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M. David Stone Doxie The Apparent Doxie lacks application software, but it focuses on ease of use and can optionally send scans directly to cloud applications.
Doxie
By M. David Stone
August 26, 2010 11:37AM EST
Reasonably portable. Easy to use. Scans directly to cloud storage. Gets power over USB connection.
No application software.
The Apparent Doxie lacks application software, but it focuses on ease of use and can optionally send scans directly to cloud applications.
If I had to pick one word to describe the Doxie scanner ($129 direct) from Apparent Corporation, I'd go with easy. It's easy to set up, easy to use, and (with one exception I'll get to later) easy to learn how to use. That's the good news. The potentially bad news is that the reason there's hardly anything to learn is that it doesn't come with any application software. If you already have all the programs you need, however, or just want some way to turn loose pages and photos into digital format, it may be precisely the right choice.
IRIScan anywhere 2
Canon imageFormula P-150 Scan-tini
The Doxie is the latest example of a small but growing group of minimalist portable scanners, including the IRIScan anywhere 2 ($199 direct, ) and Pandigital Personal Photo Scanner/Converter PanScn06, both of which I've reviewed recently. All three fall into the same broad portable sheetfed scanner category as the Editors' Choice Canon imageFormula P-150 Scan-tini ($295 direct, ), but they differ from traditional scanners in important ways.
In the case of the Doxie, the lack of bundled programs is one of the key differences. A second one is that it lets you save your scans directly to cloud applications, starting with Apparent's own free Doxie Cloud storage. (Doxie Cloud doesn't impose any limits on storage use, but you have to give each file an expiration date, with a default of two weeks and a maximum life of 6 months.)
One interesting twist is that the ability to send scans to cloud apps makes the lack of application programs less of an issue. Doxie's scan utility and the Doxie Web site even make a point of suggesting other cloud apps to use, including, for example, Google Docs. They also suggest application programs, like Google's Picassa photo editor, that you can download for free.
Apparent doesn't limit its download suggestions to other people's programs. Instead of shipping a disc with the scanner, it includes instructions for downloading the utility from the Web. The idea is to ensure that you have the most recent version of the program. And because the software consists primarily of the scan utility itself, the download doesn't take very long. (The download also includes Twain and WIA drivers, which let you scan directly from most Windows programs with a scan command. However, the Doxie representative I spoke with was surprised to hear that. According to Doxie, the scanner doesn't officially support either driver, and both may disappear in the next upgrade.)
I installed the Doxie on a Windows Vista system. According to Apparent, the Windows software will also work with 64-bit Vista as well as both 32- and 64-bit versions of Windows 7 and XP. You can also download a Mac version for OS X 10.5 and above.
Installation consists of downloading the software, running the setup program, and then using the supplied USB cable to plug in the scanner. The Doxie scanner is typical for a portable manual sheetfed scanner, at 1.6 by 11.5 by 2.0 inches (HWD) and 0.7 pounds. Because it gets power over the USB cable, there's no power cord to plug in. It comes with a leatherette soft carrying case to make it easy to carry it along with a laptop.
The Doxie scan utility is deceptively simple. The main screen features a cartoon version of the scanner, with a text balloon that says, "Hi, I'm Doxie! Put in a [photo or page] and press my heart button to start." The "heart button" refers to the shape of the pink scan button on the scanner itself, and also the icon on the scan button in the window.
The utility lets you make only two settings choices, with drop down lists for resolution, at 75 to 600 pixels per inch (ppi), and color mode, with choices for color, grayscale, and black and white. To scan, you optionally change the settings, follow the instructions to insert a photo or document in the scanner, and then either press the button on the scanner or click on the button in the window.
You can also change both resolution and color mode settings at once by choosing Scan Photos or Scan Documents. Each choice will restore the last resolution and mode setting you used for that type of scan. Also worth mention is that if you don't want to risk damaging originals by sending them through a sheet feeder, you can protect them by inserting them in the plastic sleeve that comes with the scanner. The sleeve is large enough for originals as large as 4- by 6-inches.
Saving to the Cloud and Elsewhere
After scanning, the software opens a new window with a preview of the scan, which you can then either save as a JPG, PNG, BMP, or PDF file on your hard disk; send to a program like Photoshop that the software found on your disk during installation (or you added later); send to an iPhone or iPad via iTunes; or send directly to Doxie Cloud or another cloud app that you've given the program your account information for.
I found setting up to save to both Doxie Cloud and Google Docs accounts was simple and straightforward. When you save to the Doxie cloud, the server asks for an expiration date, and it generates a separate URL for each file, which you can give to others so they can see the scans. You can also see the list of all your files, as well as delete files, though the Doxie utility.
Fixing Your Scan
The scan utility is extraordinarily easy to learn, with one important exception. I would never have seen one feature if I hadn't been told about it by an Apparent representative.
It turns out that after you scan, but before you save the file, you can edit the image to improve the quality. To see the editing commands, however, you have to click on a small button that's easy to overlook, has no text attached, is marked with an obscure icon, and whose existence isn't even hinted at in the getting started manual.
If you click on the button, however, you get the option to adjust contrast, brightness, saturation, rotation, and the way the image is cropped. I didn't see any need to improve on the software's auto rotation in my tests. However, the auto cropping benefitted from manual adjustment in several cases, and being able to adjust contrast, brightness, and saturation improved most of the photo scans substantially.
Scan Speed and Quality
Timing tests for manual-feed scanners are somewhat misleading, because they don't include the time it takes to manually feed the scanner. That said, I timed the Doxie for 4-by-6 photos from the moment I pressed the scan button to the moment the image showed on screen. At 300 ppi, the times ranged from 16 seconds in landscape mode to 23 seconds in portrait mode. At 600 ppi, the time for portrait mode jumped to 42 seconds.
As a point of comparison, the range for the Pandigital PanScn06 for the same set of scans was 7.2 to 34 seconds. All told, I'd rate the Doxie's speed as tolerable, but a little sluggish.
The Doxie's image quality, on the other hand, is a strong point. Even without manually tweaking contrast, brightness, and saturation, the scan quality was easily good enough for scanning and reprinting copies of photos for friends and relatives. I saw substantial darkening in most photos, with loss of detail in dark areas, but I could also recover most of that detail with quick and easy manual adjustments. Serious photographers with a trained eye will still notice some loss of quality, but most people should find the results more than acceptable.
Unfortunately, the lack of software made it pointless to test scanning for anything besides photos. You can, for example, use the scanner with an optical character recognition (OCR) program. But because the results will vary depending on the program, whatever results I might get in testing wouldn't be relevant if you use another program.
Some people will no doubt find the pink heart shaped button and cartoon theme in the software appealing. But if your first reaction is that it's a little too cute for your tastes, you might want to try to look past them.
The Doxie is a surprisingly talented scanner for the price. Its easy-to-use persona hides a wealth of sophisticated features, from easily saving files to the cloud to the inadvertently hidden image adjustment features for improving scan quality. If you need a small scanner for individual photos or for scanning a page or two at a time, and particularly if you already have all the software you need, the Doxie is a more than reasonable choice, whether you're brand new to scanning or an old hand.
More Scanner Reviews:
• IRIScan Executive 4
• Fujitsu ScanSnap iX100 (2019)
• Epson DS-870
• Plustek ePhoto Z300
• Epson WorkForce ES-50 Portable Document Scanner
Bottom Line: The Apparent Doxie lacks application software, but it focuses on ease of use and can optionally send scans directly to cloud applications.
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M. David Stone Lead Analyst Printers, Scanners & Projectors
M. David Stone is an award-winning freelance writer and computer industry consultant. Although a confirmed generalist, with writing credits on subjects as varied as ape language experiments, politics, quantum physics, and an overview of a top company in the gaming industry. David is also an expert in imaging technologies (including printers, moni... See Full Bio
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This is the last in a three-part "end of term" series of blog posts on "Doing Better by Gen Y." In the first post, one of my students spoke about the paucity of opportunities to actually think critically about the role of digital media in society, in learning, in global relations, in local and global inequalities, and in the workplace. In the second post, "What Are Digital Literacies: Let's Ask the Students," both of my classes, "This Is Your Brain on the Internet" and "Twenty-First Century Literacies," helped us understand what about my peer-led, peer-assessed, peer-designed multimedia classes was different and new and useful to their lives. They had never been asked that question before, it turned out. They all noted that they use Instructional Technology (IT) in lots of their classes. Since a number of my students are engineers or computer scientists, they often make technology—doing everything from programming (almost all have some programming background) to creating AI robots. But even the next-generation technology makers aren't thinking about what they are doing in a critical way.
I've been blogging all semester about my two small (< 20 students) seminars. In the last post, many people began contributing ideas about projects for learning, both in and outside the classroom, that brilliantly combine making-doing-critical thinking-creativity. In this post, it would be great to start another "forum": how can we transform the large lecture class into an interactive space for making-doing-critical thinking-creativity?
Since embracing student-created, peer-driven methodology, I've not taught a large lecture class. At this moment, Duke has wanted to be an explorer, pushing the boundaries of teaching, and I've concentrated on the small class experience to prototype some methods. But I'm looking ahead to the large lecture class, one of my favorite forms of teaching and one that, at many universities, isn't a choice but a necessity.
That's the question: "What Can We Do to Transform the Large Lecture into an Interactive Experience?" I've said before that if we can be replaced by a computer screen, we should be! So what can we do to make the experience of a lecture not simply like participating in an online course but one that takes advantage of the singular experience of group learning?
We go to movies rather than only watch DVD's alone; we go to sports events rather than just watch them on tv; we hear live music and go to plays together–and we attend great lectures (such as the TED talks) because there is something humanly compelling about sitting among strangers and collectively enjoying and responding to (or not) the same stimuli. It teaches us something profound about the human community to be in a shared group experience. I don't doubt the power of such live performances and gatherings. But, as educators, what can we do to enhance the interactive doing-as-making, thinking-as-creating capacities of our students in the large lecture? That's the challenge.
A few colleagues are already innovating along these lines. I've heard second-hand about someone who now takes his two-lectures-per-week class at a state university, (involving over 300 students) and lectures only once a week and, on the second day, divides the class into teams, each with a team-leader that changes each week. Each team has one class during the term where they develop a point from the lecture, create some kind of online challenge for their classmates, and then use that challenge interactively in the classroom during their assigned day. This experimental student-run day takes up some challenge, issue, question, or problem posed from the lecture itself and there's always some interactive online component. Unfortunately, because this was related second-hand, I don't know any more about the grading, the forms of interactivity, or even the actual subject of the course but perhaps other DML Central readers out there will fill in details and ideas.
From Michael Wesch (the master!) at Kansas State University: he turns very large lecture classes into production companies, focusing on the digital literacies of our era. His "A Vision of Students Today" video, created with his students in a very large lecture class has been seen by more than 4 million viewers on YouTube. In making this video, his students did the research, learned about presentation and pacing, learned about IP, and so forth.


Meghan King Edmonds Announces The Names Of Her Newborn Twins!
The Real Housewives of Orange County former star shared with her many followers the monikers of her new twin baby boys! Three days after giving birth to the bundles of joy, Meghan King Edmonds took to her blog to announce that she and her hubby decided to name them Hayes and Hart!
In addition to the name reveal, the reality TV star also went into detail about their birth story.
'Three days later after much thinking, we name Baby A Hayes and Baby B Hart,' Meghan wrote.
As fans know already, the happy mother of three posted a first pic of the twins on Wednesday when she confirmed they were born.
She now posted another one that featured her and hubby Jim Edmonds holding the twins.
'Thank you for all your amazing well wishes and kind messages,' she wrote in the caption.
The happy parents shared the news that they were expecting again back in December.
A couple of months later, Meghan decided to recreate the epic Beyonce twin pregnancy pics.
'Honestly, I thought it was brilliantly extra when she did it, and then when I got pregnant with twins, I was like, 'OMG. This is perfect. I have to recreate this. I cannot decide if it is so Versace, if it is '90s glam, or if it is the latest and greatest artist,' the mother of three told ET at the time.
Meghan and Jim are also the parents of a one-year-old daughter named Aspen.
'Counting On' Star Josiah Duggar And Lauren Swanson's Top Secret Wedding Date Revealed!


The Arc Baton Rouge serves people of all ages throughout south Louisiana with intellectual and developmental disabilities. Years ago we had a handful of people with disabilities that wanted to play basketball. Since that gathering of athletes, we've expanded our Inclusive Recreation program to incorporate all abilities to play with us.
Our organization is committed to inclusion by creating programs for all people with and without disabilities in our community.


Legendary Rover Team from Rzeszów University of Technology for the second time won the prestigious race Mars rovers competition - University Rover Challenge, which ended in the US. Third place went to the team Continuum from the University of Wroclaw.
Gdańsk University of Technology students have built their own Mars rover. "Lem" - named in honour of the famous science fiction writer - will start in the American competition University Rover Challenge 2016, and later serve as an educational platform for students of robotics.
Political parties and international organisations, diplomacy, medical and smart tourism, economics and accounting, globalization, information technology, philology and many more– between 23.03-27.03, students will be able to take part in a series of lectures given by foreign lecturers. Limited number of places. Registration until March 18.
The European Higher Education Fair India took place in the cities of Delhi, Bangalore and Kolkata from 30 November 2014 to 5 December 2014. Showcasing nearly 90 globally renowned higher education institutions, including some of the world's top-ranked universities, from across 23 member nations of the European Union, the Fair was an unqualified success with over 6,500 unique visitors.


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Three United youngsters that can shine in Northampton League Cup tie
Posted September 19, 2016 10:45 by
Paul Rowles
Follow @@RowlesPaul
The League Cup has historically been viewed in a rather unflattering light for many United fans. A 'Mickey Mouse' tournament would be a frequent Mancunian jibe, with many a red of the opinion that the club would, and should, have bigger fish to fry.
By Paul Rowles
Follow Paul on Twitter
Whether through the lottery of the tournament or lack of prioritisation, United last lifted League Cup silverware in 2010, defeating Aston Villa through goals from Michael Owen and Wayne Rooney. The League Cup is often portrayed as a hindrance rather than an opportunity for success. A positive take on the competition is the opportunity it affords managers of top clubs to blood aspiring first-teamers eager to impress.
The midweek tie against League 1 Northampton Town is such an opportunity for some of the club's youth prospects to showcase their talents to Jose Mourinho. Second stringers have moved on from last season- the likes of Will Keane, Joe Rothwell and James Weir have moved to pastures new, whereas the Pereira duo, James Wilson and Cameron Borthwick-Jackson have sought regular first-team football elsewhere temporarily.
That leaves a core of youngsters chomping at the bit to get an opportunity against Northampton, we run the rule over three of the most likely candidates who could shine:
Axel Tuanzebe
The Congolese born defender has been fast-tracked to the cusp of the first-team and is highly thought of by Mourinho. Tuanzebe has shown leadership qualities by captaining the Under-18 side as soon as eligible and has now taken the second team armband from the departed Weir. The centre-back stands at six foot tall whose strength lies in his aerial ability despite a slender figure.
He can boast a composure on the ball to go with that aerial prowess. Tuanzebe is not afraid to bring the ball out of the back and break into midfield. His game also involves high pressing onto opposition attackers meaning his side can gain yardage up the field. Tuanzebe isn't short of a yard of pace too, judging when to press can have its risks, Tuanzebe's pace means he can often recover defensively and his reading of the game is as reliable as they come at youth team level.
Tuanzebe's physicality and ability at just 18-years of age has left many followers of United's youth team incredibly excited by what he can offer. He is very much in the mould of Eric Bailly and will surely get a chance sooner rather than later, having traveled with the squad to Feyenoord in midweek.
The young Dutchman turned many a head last season with stunning displays against Watford on his full Premier League debut and West Ham in the FA Cup quarter-final replay. He excelled in those matches at centre-back and left-back respectively, showing off his versatility.
Before the start of the season, many observers were hellbent on Fosu-Mensah starting the season as United's first choice right-back before Valencia found some form… of sorts. His physicality, power and ability to take to first-team life like a duck to water were large factors in that viewpoint.
The Dutchman looked like a seasoned veteran last season, even if he had the blemish of giving away a penalty in an FA Cup semi-final against his name. Personally, I believe this lad is going to be a big name at United for years to come. There is an argument that TFM could thrive in United's midfield, and he will need to find a niche position to avoid becoming a victim of his own adaptability. Centre-back or centre-mid will be his permanent calling, in my eyes.
Fosu-Mensah has all the attributes of a Mourinho player. The world will be his oyster and it will not be long before we see him on a more regular basis.
Sean Goss
To be likened to Michael Carrick in terms of your ability and style at such a young age is high praise indeed. If it wasn't for a niggling back injury last campaign, Sean Goss would be further along in his development than having to establish himself in the second team once again.
What stands out about Goss' style is his neat and tidy play in possession, often being tasked with the playmaker's role he rarely wastes a pass in the engine room. Goss was making real headway in his progression before only being restricted to a mere six appearance for the Under-21s last term.
With a few question marks over some of United's senior central midfielders of late, Goss will be eager to make the trip to Northampton and take his chance.
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redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


The African regional human rights system: In need of reform?
Of course, legal mechanisms for the protection of human rights in Africa operate in the context of the practices and attitudes of those in Africa who deal with human rights issues on a daily basis: government officials, lawyers, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), academics and civil society. The legal and extra-legal aspects of human rights protection in Africa form part of the same organic whole, and as such they are interdependent. The ultimate test for any legal system that purports to deal with human rights is the difference it makes to the lives of people.
This contribution focuses primarily on the legal mechanisms for the regional protection of human rights created by the OAU, and in particular on the African Charter system. Some comments will also be made on aspects of human rights that are outside the legal domain, but which are nevertheless important if the Charter system is going to have an influence in changing reality. The underlying question is whether there is a need to change the legal basis of the Charter system in order to enhance its impact.
The African Charter, soon to be supplemented by the African Human Rights Court Protocol, lies at the heart of the African human rights system. Africa has often been criticised on account of its human rights record, and the African Charter system in particular has been subjected to stringent criticism due to its apparent inability to improve the situation. Many are also sceptical about the potential of the Court to improve the situation. It is in this context that this paper asks the question whether the African Charter system is in need of reform.
'Reform' of the Charter system could take place in a number of ways. It could, for example, involve amendment of the Charter itself,  of the African Human Rights Court Protocol,  or of the Rules of Procedure.  On a more informal level it could involve changes in the practices of the Commission. It might also manifest itself in the form of new approaches being followed by those who are actually or potentially engaged in the practical implementation of the system.
If one proceeds from the premise that the level of human rights violations in Africa constitutes a problem of immense magnitude, and that the African Charter system has to date made a far from satisfactory impact in redressing the situation, one may follow one of two very different approaches in respect of the question whether the reform of the Charter system is called for.
The first approach would be to emphasise the value of stability and advocate for minimal reform. According to this line of thinking, the Charter system is not perfect, but at least it is a reality; it is in place. The Commission is just finding its way, and in fact has largely reinvented the Charter to bring the system in line with international jurisprudence. For example, the so-called 'claw-back' clauses, which have been the subject of much criticism, have effectively been neutralised through their interpretation by the Commission. Articles 60 and 61 of the Charter, in terms of which the Commission is required to interpret Charter provisions in line with international precedents, provide ample opportunity for the flaws of the Charter system to be corrected by the Commission. In other words, the system as it stands makes sufficient provision for its own adjustment, if necessary. The African Charter is a flexible instrument and does not need amendment. The Court is still in the process of being established, and should first be given an opportunity to make its contribution before the system is modified.
Moreover, in its present form the Charter enjoys overwhelming support, even if largely on a symbolic level, having been ratified by every member state of the OAU. To now tamper with the system may create confusion, and provide an opportunity for some of the 'fish' that have already been caught to escape. The momentum gained over many years might be lost.
Proceeding from the same premise outlined above, a second approach might emphasise the need for more extensive reform to improve the effectiveness and impact of the system. The Charter was drafted in a world that no longer exists. In the early 1980s Africa was emerging from colonialism, apartheid was alive and well, the Cold War was raging, and the idea of human rights had gained only tentative acceptance. The Charter could consequently not be framed to protect human rights to the same extent as is presently possible.
From this point of view it could be argued that while it is true that the Commission has in substantial respects reinvented the Charter and compensated for its flaws, this is not a healthy development in the long run if these new interpretations are not followed up by the reform of the Charter itself. The rule of law demands that law is predictable, and as a result words used in legal texts should be given their ordinary meaning as far as is possible. To retain its integrity, the Charter should in this sense be understood to say what it means, and to mean what it says. Where there are deviations, these need to be rectified, even if that means that the Charter has to be amended.
The Commission's practice during the last few years of interpreting the Charter in line with international precedents, though brave, does not solve the problems in the long run. The Charter itself is not well known in Africa, and the decisions of the Commission are even less known. Someone who wants to hold a state party to observe the norms of the Charter has a much smaller chance of achieving this if that person first has to cite Commission (or Court) decisions to support a specific interpretation of the Charter that is not obvious from its wording. Decisions of the Commission also do not have the same binding force as, for example, the Charter itself. Moreover, some of the problems inherent in the African Charter, as well as the African Human Rights Court Protocol, are beyond the powers of the Commission and the Court to rectify, even through creative interpretation.
A perhaps small but telling example of the kind of problems the present wording of the Charter causes is that it is hardly worth the effort to go on a massive campaign to popularise the Charter across Africa and to make it available in easily accessible format, in all the languages of the continent, if the Charter does not say what it means.
Because the entire OAU is being restructured, and is being placed on a much firmer human rights foundation, the time is ripe to consider amendments to the Charter as well. Steps are in any event underway to amend the Charter to remedy the way in which women's rights are treated. The other defects might just as well also be remedied in the same process.
To assess the relative merits of the two different approaches outlined above, we would need to take a closer look at the areas where the Charter system is in need of reform, treating each case on its own merits. Only after the full magnitude of potential problem areas has been established in a 'no punches pulled' fashion, could an appropriate response be devised. After such an investigation one might well conclude that it is not a question of total reform or of no reform at all, but rather that some reforms are necessary and others are desirable, and that different strategies should be followed in respect of the various areas where change is needed. This could for example lead to the AU appointing a team tasked with formulating proposals on the reform of the Charter system. What follows is a discussion of a number of areas of possible reform, which in my view deserve serious attention.
In respect of the substantive human rights provisions of the Charter, the following are among the issues that should be considered: According to article 1 of the Charter, '[t]he member states of the Organisation of African Unity parties to the present Charter shall recognise the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in the Charter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them'. This seems to be a very weak way of formulating the obligations of state parties. Words such as 'state parties undertake to respect, protect, promote and fulfil . . .' or 'undertake to secure . . .' would set out the obligations of the state parties in a stronger and more meaningful way.
The way in which the Charter deals with the limitation and derogation of rights is particularly problematic. This is important because rights will be, and under some circumstances should be, limited in any society that is not to become ungovernable. However, this is a process that must be carefully managed, in order to ensure that such limitations are done in an acceptable way. Carefully constructed limitation and derogation clauses serve the dual function of allowing infringements of rights and at the same time defining standards that must be met by such infringements. In other words, such clauses limit rights, but they also limit limitations.
The Commission should thus reverse its interpretation of the Charter on this point, and recognise the right of states to derogate certain Charter rights under closely defined circumstances. Since the Charter is silent on the issue of derogation, international norms in this regard should prevail. A less ideal alternative for the Commission (or the Court) would be to hold that at least those rights containing claw-back clauses may be derogated from in times of real emergency, to the extent that this is allowed under international law. This option would obviously only be available as long as the claw-back clauses are still part of the Charter. If, however, the Charter is going to be amended, it will be advisable to make explicit provision for derogation in the Charter, in addition to the scrapping of the claw-back clauses. Until such time, a ruling from the Commission (or in future the Court) setting out the conditions for legitimate derogation, is called for.
The Commission is the sole supervisory body for the African Charter at the moment, but the Court will come into existence as soon as the African Human Rights Court Protocol has entered into force.  Possible ways of strengthening both institutions will now be considered.
Important aspects of the Commission's mandate to monitor compliance with the Charter norms are not provided for, or are not clearly provided for, in the Charter. This in fact applies in respect of the two most important monitoring mechanisms used by the Commission, namely the individual complaints system and the state reporting procedure.
The Charter contains elaborate and explicit provisions for inter-state complaints, which have hardly played a role in practice.  However, for a long time there was uncertainty as to whether the Commission had the authority to consider ordinary individual complaints, and as a result also uncertainty about the exact mandate of the Commission when considering such complaints. Under the heading 'Other communications', article 58 does provide for a special procedure to be followed where it appears to the Commission that there has been 'a series of serious or massive' human rights violations, but it was not entirely clear from the text whether individual communications could be considered by the Commission if these communications did not reveal such 'serious or massive violations'. Nor was it clear whether the 'serious or massive violations' procedure should necessarily have been the result of an individual communication.
Article 59(1) provides that '[a]ll measures taken within the provisions of the present Charter shall remain confidential until such a time as the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments shall otherwise decide'. This is an obvious and long-standing source of concern in human rights circles. Although it may now for all practical purposes be a routine matter for the Commission's reports to be approved by the Assembly,  the Assembly can still block publication if it wishes to do so. In this way, the independence of the Commission could be inhibited. The most powerful tool at the disposal of international monitoring bodies is publicity, and this provision leaves the question whether there will be such publicity in the hands of the likely perpetrators. The entire article should not survive scrutiny of the Charter.
It is not clear from the Charter what kind of findings the Commission is able to make after the consideration of individual communications, or indeed whether it can make a finding at all, and what the possible remedies are. The Commission has developed a practice of its own in this regard, but this needs to be clarified in the Charter.
The mandate of the Commission to consider the reports that are submitted by states on a bi-annual basis is not at all provided for in the Charter. Article 62 provides that state parties should submit such reports, but does not stipulate to whom they should be submitted, and it does not determine who should consider those reports. The Assembly has agreed to a request by the Commission that the Commission considers the reports,  but this kind of arrangement should be formalised in the Charter itself.
The Commission has started using the potentially powerful mechanism of appointing special rapporteurs, so far with mixed results. Part of the problem is that the legal basis for appointing such rapporteurs is rather tenuous.  Specific provisions for the appointment of special rapporteurs need to be included in the Charter.
Other aspects of the Commission's functioning also deserve attention. The composition of the Commission has been controversial for many years. The main problems have been members' lack of independence from governments, the fact that the various regions of Africa have not been properly represented, and that almost no women served on the Commission. The situation has improved in some respects in recent years, but appropriate provisions in the Charter determining the profile of those who are appointed to serve on the Commission would help to increase and consolidate those gains.
The Commission has a daunting task, if one considers the sheer number of countries in Africa, the prevalence of human rights violations on the continent, and the diversity of African cultural, religious and legal traditions. As is evident from the experience in the Americas, regional human rights commissions are powerful tools in such situations, in some respects even more so than courts.  However, the question needs to be asked whether the African Commission could not be better structured to meet this challenge.
It is almost inconceivable to think that a commission of eleven people, meeting twice a year for a few days, during which time they have a huge workload to attend to, can have a significant impact in such a situation. I have argued elsewhere that it is perhaps necessary to think about a stronger sub-regional division of responsibilities within the Commission.  For example, commissioners living within a certain area (for example East or West Africa) may be given a collective role in terms of attempts at reconciliation and fact-finding within that sub-region. Whether a change in the Charter would be required to achieve this would depend on the nature of the specific proposal. Much can be done in this regard without such an amendment, simply by changing the practice of the Commission or the Rules of Procedure.
Given the fact that the African Human Rights Court Protocol was adopted only recently, and that the Court has not yet been established, the question could be asked whether it is appropriate to talk about reforming the Court system. It is submitted that the strengths and weaknesses of the Court should indeed be analysed continuously, right from the start, in order to emphasise the strengths and to downplay, if not eliminate, possible weaknesses in a pro-active manner.  The Commission had a very slow start; the same should not be allowed to happen in respect of the Court.
The creation of the Court could serve to strengthen the African regional system. Without courts, the European and Inter-American systems would have had little chance to effect their societies in the way that they have. At the same time, care should be taken to ensure that the African Human Rights Court does not undermine the African Commission, either by weakening its budget or by making the Commission irrelevant. Africa needs a fully functioning Commission as well as a Human Rights Court.
In spite of the general advance which the Protocol on the Court represents, I find some aspects of the Protocol troubling. Again, a creative court could through progressive interpretation alleviate some problems. However, to have to depend on the possible goodwill of individual judges to do this undermines the rule of law, diminishes the credibility of the system and provides justifications for states not to ratify the Protocol. The wider the discretion granted to judges, the more unpredictable the system becomes, and the less likely states are to submit themselves to the system, and to remain committed to its success. It should be remembered that the entire system is based on consent, not only in terms of the willingness of states to become state parties, but also in terms of the budget allocated and in practical terms also the deference shown to the Court.
would appear to extend the jurisdiction of the Court over any treaty which impinged on human rights in Africa, eg, the OAU Convention on Refugees, and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, but also UN instruments such as the International Covenants on Human Rights . . .
They suggest that even (sub-) regional instruments, such as the ECOWAS treaty, could become justiciable. According to Udombana, an aggrieved person who is not adequately covered by the African Charter may bring a case in terms of the Protocol under 'any other international treaty' that provides a higher level of protection.  Mutua makes essentially the same point.  Presumably even environmental treaties and those related to mercenaries etc would become justiciable, in so far as they have human rights implications.
If this interpretation is correct, and followed by the Court, it will cause jurisprudential chaos. It will mean that all human rights treaties ratified by a state party to the Protocol in the past will become justiciable, and future ratification of treaties will have the same consequence. States might be deterred not only from ratification of the Protocol, but from ratification of any human rights treaty.
Following this approach would also mean the end of even the pretence that there is something unique about human rights in Africa, a point that has been argued so passionately over the years.  This would amount to unconditional surrender to globalisation and uni-versalism in its most pervasive form. While other regions continue to enforce human rights as they themselves understand the concept, Africa — where so much is made of the unique features of the African Charter — will be the only region in the world that enforces the wider body of international human rights treaty law, with the African Charter being just one treaty among many.
The present situation nevertheless has the potential to create confusion. The possibility that article 3(1) could be interpreted to grant the Court such a wide jurisdiction could deter states from ratifying the Protocol. It is also possible that the Court could follow the interpretation of article 3(1) advanced by the authors. Article 3(1) should consequently be amended to provide that the Court exercises jurisdiction over 'the African Charter and all Protocols to the Charter'. The African Human Rights Court should in any event make it clear at the first opportunity that it does not exercise jurisdiction over the entire corpus of human rights treaties ratified by African states.
The above is symptomatic of a deeper problem. Because of the defects in the Charter, the rhetoric about a unique conception of human rights in Africa is often abandoned around the first corner. International norms are embraced with open arms in an uncritical fashion. Africa is rendered defenceless against the cold winds of globalisation. There is, however, an alternative. The Charter should be modernised to ensure that it meets the needs of contemporary African society.
There are also, in the second place, problems in respect of the interpretation provisions of the African Human Rights Court Protocol. It is assumed that article 7 of the Protocol, under the heading 'Sources of law' (cited above), deals with interpretation and not with jurisdiction, which is covered in article 3. While article 3(1) creates the impression that it grants the Court a jurisdiction that has an excessively wide scope, article 7 seems to dramatically and unnecessarily limit the sources of law that are to be used by the Court as points of reference when engaging in interpretation, by recognising only the provisions of the Charter 'and other relevant human rights instruments ratified by the state concerned' as legitimate sources of the law. Earlier reference was made in this contribution to the fact that articles 60 and 61 of the Charter allow the Commission to draw very widely on international jurisprudence in interpreting the Charter, and the fact that the Commission has by and large done this to good effect. However, articles 60 and 61 grant this power only to the Commission. Article 7 of the Protocol grants the Court much less latitude in respect of the Charter. This is bound to lead to a difference in the way the rights in the Charter are interpreted by the Commission and the Court, and in general to impoverish the jurisprudence of the Court.
Moreover, the Court seems to be expected in terms of article 7 of the Protocol to interpret the rights in the Charter differently in respect of the various state parties, depending on the treaties that each one has ratified at the time of the alleged violation. An article on interpretation requiring the Court to take cognisance of the entire body of international human rights law (without being bound by it) would bring the Protocol in conformity with the Charter, and resolve the issues raised above.
Access to the Court by individuals is another problematic issue. The Protocol grants the Commission (and state actors) access to the Court, presumably after the Commission has heard the case in question.  This is an automatic consequence of the ratification of the Protocol. Access by individuals to the Court is provided for in article 5(3) in the following terms: 'The Court may entitle relevant Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) with observer status before the Commission, and individuals to institute cases directly before it, in accordance with Article 34(6) of this Protocol.' According to article 34(6) states may make a declaration accepting the competence of the Court to receive such cases.
In terms of these provisions, individuals and NGOs do not have standing to seize the Court in respect of states that have ratified the Protocol, unless such a state has made the article 34(6) declaration. Unless such a declaration has been made, individuals and NGOs will remain unable to proceed on their own volition past the Commission level and to take the initiative to secure binding decisions in their favour. They are in effect left to the mercy of the Commission to take their cases further. Where individuals are placed in this position — and it will be submitted that it is likely to be the case in respect of most states for a long time — the Protocol could provide a very low level of protection for the individual, except if the Commission follows an activist approach, which cannot be guaranteed.
In respect of states that have made the additional declaration in terms of article 34(6), individuals and certain NGOs  will have 'direct' access to the Court. 'Direct' in this context presumably means that they will be allowed to bypass the Commission. Granting direct access to individuals to the Court provides a high — and many will say too high — level of protection to the individual, which could be seen as threatening to state sovereignty, and result in states not making the additional declaration.
Given the sensitivities about international adjudication expressed by the states involved in the drafting and adoption process of the African Charter as well as the Protocol, granting individuals direct access to an untested and untried court that takes binding decisions is not likely to be a popular option.  Requiring individuals first to present their case to the Commission before approaching the Court cushions the blow and has a higher chance of being accepted by states. In fact, granting states a choice between accepting the limited level of protection to human rights offered by the mere ratification of the Protocol, and accepting what many states are certain to consider the excessive level of protection that comes into play when the declaration is made, could well be seen by cynics as a move to ensure a choice in favour of the first option and to render the individual powerless.
Given the likely reluctance of states to make the additional declaration, most people in Africa are bound to live under dispensations where they do not have the right of access to the Court, even after the African Human Rights Court Protocol has entered into force.
The ideal option would be for the Protocol, as an automatic consequence of the ratification of the Protocol, to include the right of individuals and NGOs to have access to the Court after they have gone through the Commission procedure, and after they have met the initial admissibility criteria, including the exhaustion of domestic remedies. If the idea that individuals may proceed on their own initiative from the Commission to the Court is politically unacceptable — and it was indeed a heavily opposed position during the drafting of the Protocol — the second best option would be to provide for such access, but to include a provision entitling states to make a declaration indicating that they do not wish to subject themselves to this procedure. In other words, this will allow them to 'opt out' as an exception to the rule.
At the outset of this article the broader social context within which the Charter system operates was emphasised. In order to make the system the dynamic institution that it should be, there are many possible changes that could supplement the more technical, legal amendments suggested above and enhance the impact of the system as a whole. A small and to some extent random selection from the list of the changes that those of us who on a daily basis engage in human rights issues in Africa can bring about, will now be mentioned.
The first point relates to attitude. An uncritical attitude to the Charter system, in terms of which it is seen as above improvement, is as damaging as the cynical approach that one sometimes encounter, according to which nothing good can be expected from either the Commission or the Court. What we need is loyal or engaged criticism. We have the duty to respect, protect, promote — and criticise — the Charter.
On a more practical level, the Charter system needs to be made part of the curriculum of the different universities in Africa, with a view to educating lawyers who can make it accessible to their clients and for judges to cite Charter jurisprudence in their decisions. There is a great need for a textbook with instruments, cases and materials — a 'human rights reader' — that caters specifically for African law faculties and covers the Charter system in particular. A website needs to be developed on which progressive developments in respect of human rights law may be posted. The Charter needs to be internalised into the legal culture of Africa.
There are a small number of African journals that deal with human rights law. More of these are needed to develop the intellectual climate in which the system can flourish. In general, the conditions for the emergence of an indigenous African human rights jurisprudence need to be improved. African courts should be placed in a position to refer to one another in their judgments, as opposed to having continuously to cite non-African cases and precedents.
Well-edited and readily available publications containing the decisions of the Commission and the Court need to be developed, as well as a digest to make access easier. The compilations of decisions of the Commission that are in existence are very useful, but they lack proper referencing tools, are full of mistakes and are not readily available.
The question of the location of the Court is an important one, and does not receive enough attention. The experience with the Commission being based in a place as difficult to access as The Gambia has shown that the Court will have to be based elsewhere. In order to provide the intellectual setting in which the Court can flourish and have a wider impact in Africa, and given that all judges except the president will work part-time, it should not only be on one of the main air routes, but should also be close to libraries and universities that focus on human rights law in Africa. It will be ideal if the Commission follows the Court to such a setting.
Some of the reforms that have been proposed in respect of the UN human rights treaties may be equally applicable to the OAU system.  I would for example argue that in each country, an inter-departmental body responsible for reporting and dealing with communications under all human rights treaties be formed. These bodies should have access to a database with the information necessary to deal with reports under all treaties. State efforts aimed at meeting treaty obligations such as reporting, and dealing with follow-up, should be part of an ongoing process. A treaty support unit should be formed in Africa, to assist governments with setting up such structures, and to train those who will staff it.
In addition, national human rights institutions should become involved in follow-up, both in respect of individual communications and reports. The national annual reports of these institutions should comment on compliance with directives from OAU and UN human rights bodies, and the decisions of the African Human Rights Court.
I have discussed some of the most obvious flaws of the African Charter system. The ideal option for the future would indeed be the reform of the system by means of a protocol, designed to rectify these and other possible defects in a systematic and comprehensive manner. States who take the system seriously and who want it to be effective should be willing to participate in such a process. It is also clear that, if the system is at some point going to be amended, it should be done before the Court comes into existence. The African Human Rights Court, in contrast with the experience with the European Court of Human Rights, is certain to start dealing with substantive issues soon after it comes into being. It would be wasteful if the Court started developing a certain jurisprudence, only to find that substantial portions of it have become obsolete within a few years when the basic rules are changed.
The debate on the possible reform of the system in itself is already an important contribution towards the improvement of the system, since it is likely to make the system more responsive to the needs of the continent. Engaging in this debate is to exercise a form of ownership, and to say that since the Charter belongs to all of us, it is up to us to continuously ensure its improvement. Ideas are developed, consequences are thought through, and new initiatives are born in the course of such discourses. Such a debate is already a first step towards a more efficient and stronger regional human rights system in Africa.
 The first and most elaborate set of guidelines was adopted by the Commission in 1988. AFR/COM/HPR.5(IV). A second and apparently additional set of guidelines, which is much more concise, was adopted by the Commission in 1998. OAU Doc/05/27 (XXIII).
 47 UNTS 39 (1963) International Legal Materials, 766, reprinted in C Heyns Human rights law in Africa 1998 (2001) 117.
 Constitutive Act of the African Union CAB/LEG/23.15, entered into force 26 May 01.
 Art 68 of the Charter provides that amendments to the Charter need to be approved by a majority of state parties.
 Art 35 of the Protocol provides that the Assembly has to approve amendments to the Protocol by a simple majority.
 Rules 121 & 122 provide that the Commission can change its own rules.
 Eg 11 protocols have been adopted in the European system since 1950 and the 12th protocol has been opened for ratification.
 It should also be pointed out that the call in the Preamble of the Charter to eliminate Zionism, together with other evil systems such as apartheid, has been considered to be problematic by some states. For example, South Africa has entered a note verbale when it ratified the Charter, objecting to the characterisation of Zionism in the Charter. Reprinted in C Heyns Human rights law in Africa 1997 (1999) 10.
 Arts 6 & 7. For a discussion, see C Heyns 'Civil and political rights in the African Charter' in R Murray & M Evans (eds) The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: The system in practice (forthcoming, Cambridge University Press).
 Although art 10, dealing with the right to free association, could be understood to incorporate this right.
 The right to vote in genuine periodic elections, based on universal franchise, as recognised in art 25(b) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is not recognised in the Charter.
 Women's rights are grouped with children's rights in art 18(3), suggesting that the role of women is confined to that context. For a discussion, see MS Nsibirwa 'A brief analysis of the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women' (2001) 1 African Human Rights Law Journal 40. The language of the Charter is also strongly male oriented. Only the masculine form is used throughout. Art 42 provides for the election of a 'Chairman' and a 'Vice-Chairman'.
 It is also not entirely clear whether art 15 recognises the right of the unemployed to be employed, or the right of the employed to be treated fairly in the course of their employment.
 For example, it is not clear exactly how the duty to 'preserve the harmonious development of the family' in art 29(1) should be interpreted and given practical application by a court of law.
 See R Higgins 'Derogation under human rights treaties' (1976-77) 48 The British Yearbook of International Law 281.
 See for example EA Ankumah The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (1996) 176.
 Communication 101/93, Civil Liberties Organisation in respect of the Nigerian Bar Association v Nigeria, Eight Annual Activity Report para 16.
 It should at the same time be noted that the small number of socio-economic rights contained in the Charter do not contain the standard and in my view necessary internal modifiers. For example, art 16 provides as follows: '1. Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health. 2. States parties to the present Charter shall take the necessary measures to protect the health of their people and to ensure they receive medical attention when they are sick.' The unconditional way in which the right is stated - it is not made subject to progressive implementation, the availability of resources, etc - could easily create unrealistic expectations, and as such could undermine the legitimacy of the Charter.
 Eg Communications 105/93, 128/94, 130/94 & 152/96, Media Rights Agenda, Constitutional Rights Project, Media Rights Agenda and Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria, Twelfth Annual Activity Report para 68.
 n 25 above, para 69.
 In this context the recognition of duties in the African Charter system could play a unique role. It is instructive to note that art 27 appears under the heading 'Duties'. Duties can in effect be seen as limitations on rights. A general limitation clause could for example state that all the rights in the Charter may be limited by laws of general application in accordance with those duties that are reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society, in respect of the rights of others, collective security, etc.
 Communication 70/92, Commission Nationale des Droits de l'Homme et des Libertés v Chad, Ninth Annual Activity Report para 21.
 See J Oraá Human rights in states of emergency in international law (1992) 210.
 Fifteen ratifications are required in terms of art 34(3) for the Protocol to enter into force. So far, ratifications by the following states have been received: Burkina Faso, Mali, Senegal, The Gambia and Uganda.
 This was confirmed in Communications 147/95, 149/96, Sir Dawda K Jawara v The Gambia, Thirteenth Annual Activity Report para 42.
 See R Murray The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and international law (2000).
 R Murray 'Serious or massive violations under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A comparison with the Inter-American and European mechanisms' (1999) 17 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 109.
 That is, the involvement of the Assembly should be terminated. The concept that the Commission may make special findings in cases of exceptional gravity does not present a problem.
 See F Viljoen 'Overview of the African regional human rights system' in Heyns (n 7 above) 128.
 Viljoen (n 36 above) 154.
 This is in fact provided for in rules 85(3) & 86(1) of the Rules of Procedure.
 See F Viljoen 'State reporting under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A boost from the South' (2000) 44 Journal of African Law 110. The observation by M Mutua 'The African Human Rights Court: A two-legged stool?' (1991) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 350 that the Commission communicates its comments and general observations to the state in question after consideration of its report, is not borne out by Commission practice.
 F Viljoen 'The relevance of the Inter-American human rights system for Africa' (1999) 11 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 659.
 C Heyns 'The regional and subregional protection of human rights in Africa: In search of a realistic dream' African Society of International and Comparative Law Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Conference Cairo (1996) 170.
 For commentary on the creation of the Court, see GJ Naldi & K Magliveras 'Reinforcing the African system of human rights: The Protocol on the Establishment of a Regional Court of Human and Peoples' Rights' (1998) 16 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 431; A Stemmet 'A future African Court for [sic] Human and Peoples' Rights and domestic human rights norms' (1998) 23 South African Yearbook of International Law 233; J Mubangizi & A O'Shea 'An African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights' (1999) 24 South African Yearbook of International Law 256; NJ Udombana 'Toward the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights: Better late than never' (2000) 3 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 45 and Mutua (n 39 above). See also Murray (n 33 above) 27.
 Naldi & Magliveras (n 43 above) 435.
 Udombana (n 43 above) 90.
 Mutua (n 39 above) 354.
 It is already controversial in many jurisdictions to make socio-economic rights justiciable by the domestic courts. The Protocol, in making the socio-economic rights in the African Charter justiciable by a regional court, breaks new ground. It is unprecedented to give power over the national budget to an international tribunal and it remains to be seen to what extent this could work. To make the entire Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in its present form justiciable by an international court is unheard of at this stage, while state sovereignty is still such a powerful notion.
 See M Mutua 'The Banjul Charter and the African cultural fingerprint: An evaluation of the language of duties' (1995) 35 Virginia Journal of International Law 339; UO Umozurike The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1997) 87. See also C Heyns 'Where is the voice of Africa in our Constitution?' Occasional Paper 8, Centre for Human Rights (1996).
 Eg art 23 Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women.
 Udombana (n 43 above) 99 observes that the requirement that only NGOs with observer status before the Commission may approach the Court is unduly restrictive.
 In the case of Europe, for example, a system of direct access to the single court was introduced decades after the Court was founded and had established the foundations of its jurisprudence.
 The Commission has stated that the local remedies must be 'available, effective and sufficient'. Communications 147/95, 149/96, Sir Dawda K Jawara v The Gambia, Thirteenth Annual Activity Report para 31.
 There may be a partial way out of the problem caused by the fact that the admissibility criteria are not obligatory, short of the amendment of the Protocol. States that make the declaration could enter a reservation specifying that they do not agree to the jurisdiction of the Court unless the admissibility criteria (or at least the important ones, such as the exhaustion of domestic remedies) in the Charter have been met. However, this would require a relatively high level of goodwill on the part of states, and many states might opt simply not to make the declaration at all.
 It should be noted that the Court has the power under art 6(3) to refer such cases to the Commission, but it is not compelled to do so.
 See C Heyns & F Viljoen The United Nations human rights treaties at the national level (forthcoming, Kluwer Law International).
 One way of avoiding a situation where a substantial number of states defect from the system would have been to make membership of the new African Union dependent upon acceptance of whatever reforms in respect of the African Charter system might be agreed upon. For all practical purposes that opportunity has already been missed, but there might be others that could be used with similar effect.


text:
Q: apache mod_rewrite I want mod_rewrite to do this:

*

*http://server/*  -> redirect to http://server/app/*

*http://server/app/* should not be redirected.

*http://server.domain/* -> redirect to http://server/app/*

*http://server.domain/app*  -> redirect to http://server/app/*
It has to work with mod_jk!
Edit: this is the final solution
# force use of host 'server'
RewriteCond %{HTTP_HOST} !^server$
RewriteRule ^(.*)$ server$1 [R,NE,L]

# prepend /app to URL if missing
RewriteCond %{request_uri} !^/app.*?
RewriteRule ^(.+?)$ app/$1 [R,NE,L]

Thanks to you, fahadsadah and Insanity5902!
I'm hesitant to flag either one of you as 'correct', as both have provided valuable input that made up the final solution.

A: Use the following config directives (you probably want to add them to your .htaccess file):
RewriteEngine on
RewriteCond %{request_uri} !^/prepended
RewriteRule ^(.+?)$ prepended/$1

A: This should work better
RewriteEngine On
RewriteCond %{HTTP_HOST} !^server$ [NC]
RewriteRule ^(.*)$ http://server/$1

RewriteRule ^$ /app

This is off the top of my head, but what should be happening. Request comes in, if it isn't using server for the host name, then it will redirect to http://server keeping the rest of the URI field intact. Then it will reprocess the rules again, skip the first one (since RewriteCond is false) and then process the RewriteRule. Which is saying, if the URI is empty send it to /app. If the URI is anything other then empty, it will use what is already there.
So on top of what you already have, it should also work as
http://server/foo -> http://server/foo
http://server.domain/foo -> http://server/foo

Let me know how that works, In my head it seems to work fine :)

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


Before you start, plan: think about what you hope to gain from the placement. Even if you're not planning a career in psychiatry, your placement can teach you transferable skills, help you gain experience and fulfil curriculum requirements.
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Talk to your colleagues – specialty trainees can tell you their experiences and may help you identify opportunities or give you a different perspective.
Read our guide to good practice in psychiatry in the Foundation programme.


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The Xbox One guide said HDDs purchased from iFixit are not formatted and do not contain the necessary Xbox applications. Mine was formatted and had the necessary Xbox applications. Not sure if I got lucky or the guide needs to be updated.
It went awesome. The 1 TB replacement HDD I purchased from iFixit was formatted and had all the necessary Xbox sof . . .


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Q: NightwatchJS > Storing response from "elements" command and performing further actions I have a button with the same class name that appears on the page in a few instances. How do I store the response from elements(i.e Web Element JSON Objects) in array to perform further actions on them as clicking and asserting? I've been trying to do the following but it did not work:
 browser.elements('css selector', 'elem', function(res) {
        arr = res.value;
        console.log(arr);
        a = arr[1].ELEMENT;
        console.log(a);
        browser.elementIdClick(a);

It prints the index of the ELEMENT, but the elementIdClick command does not perform any actions nor throws any errors in response. Please help

A: It should work:
 this.elementIdClick(a) or this.api.elementIdClick(a)
if not could you print console.log(browser) and console.log(this)
It might be helpful.


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Search results for "2019-04"
Updates: 1 - 25 of 195 (page 1 of 8)
2019-04 Cumulative Update for Windows Server 2019 for x64-based Systems (KB4495667) Windows Server 2019 Updates 5/3/2019 n/a 222.0 MB 232744708
2019-04 Cumulative Update for Windows 10 Version 1809 for x86-based Systems (KB4495667) Windows 10 Updates 5/3/2019 n/a 109.6 MB 114893491
2019-04 Cumulative Update for Windows 10 Version 1809 for ARM64-based Systems (KB4495667) Windows 10 Updates 5/3/2019 n/a 251.6 MB 263780963
2019-04 Servicing Stack Update for Windows 10 Version 1903 for ARM64-based Systems (KB4498524) Windows 10, version 1903 and later Security Updates 4/29/2019 n/a 17.7 MB 18573233
2019-04 Servicing Stack Update for Windows Server, version 1903 for x64-based Systems (KB4498524) Windows Server, version 1903 and later Security Updates 4/29/2019 n/a 14.5 MB 15213715
2019-04 Servicing Stack Update for Windows 10 Version 1903 for x86-based Systems (KB4498524) Windows 10, version 1903 and later Security Updates 4/29/2019 n/a 6.5 MB 6842509
2019-04 Servicing Stack Update for Windows 10 Version 1903 for x64-based Systems (KB4498524) Windows 10, version 1903 and later Security Updates 4/29/2019 n/a 14.5 MB 15213715
2019-04 Cumulative Update for Windows 10 Version 1903 for ARM64-based Systems (KB4497093) Windows 10, version 1903 and later Updates 4/29/2019 n/a 129.5 MB 135757939
2019-04 Cumulative Update for Windows 10 Version 1903 for x86-based Systems (KB4497093) Windows 10, version 1903 and later Updates 4/29/2019 n/a 74.1 MB 77659336
2019-04 Cumulative Update for Windows Server, version 1903 for x64-based Systems (KB4497093) Windows Server, version 1903 and later Updates 4/29/2019 n/a 162.8 MB 170677131
2019-04 Cumulative Update for Windows 10 Version 1903 for x64-based Systems (KB4497093) Windows 10, version 1903 and later Updates 4/29/2019 n/a 162.8 MB 170677131
2019-04 Cumulative Update for Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems (KB4493473) Windows 10,Windows 10 LTSB Updates 4/24/2019 n/a 1408.3 MB 1476665763
2019-04 Cumulative Update for Windows Server 2016 for x64-based Systems (KB4493473) Windows Server 2016 Updates 4/24/2019 n/a 1408.3 MB 1476665763
2019-04 Cumulative Update for Windows 10 Version 1607 for x86-based Systems (KB4493473) Windows 10,Windows 10 LTSB Updates 4/24/2019 n/a 786.8 MB 825054501
2019-04 Update for Windows Server 2012 R2 for x64-based Systems (KB4496878) Windows Server 2012 R2 Updates 4/24/2019 n/a 128.2 MB 134458306
2019-04 Update for Windows 8.1 for x86-based Systems (KB4496878) Windows 8.1 Updates 4/24/2019 n/a 111.3 MB 116660307
2019-04 Update for Windows Embedded 8 Standard for x64-based Systems (KB4496877) Windows 8 Embedded Updates 4/24/2019 n/a 97.5 MB 102215636
2019-04 Update for Windows Server 2012 for x64-based Systems (KB4496877) Windows Server 2012 Updates 4/24/2019 n/a 97.5 MB 102215636
2019-04 Update for Windows Embedded 8 Standard for x86-based Systems (KB4496877) Windows 8 Embedded Updates 4/24/2019 n/a 78.7 MB 82570816
2019-04 Cumulative Update for Windows Server 2016 (1709) for x64-based Systems (KB4493440) Windows Server 2016 Updates 4/24/2019 n/a 1053.3 MB 1104452914
2019-04 Cumulative Update for Windows 10 Version 1709 for ARM64-based Systems (KB4493440) Windows 10 Updates 4/24/2019 n/a 1037.2 MB 1087578941


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Posted on February 14, 2011 January 12, 2022 by Peace
After almost thirty years President Hosni Mubarak is gone. For the people of Egypt and especially those with the courage to have taken to the streets it is no doubt a day that is impossible to put into words. For the rest of us, a day of awe, celebration and inspiration.
Some however have probably not summoned up too broad a smile today — the other non-democratic regimes of the Middle East for instance. Interestingly, Israel too belongs on that list of the "not-exactly-thrilled".
Israel has long made much of its claim to being the only democracy in the Middle East, it now seems that the claim was more an aspiration rather than a lamentation. Israel has been clinging dearly to the Mubarak regime, and encouraging others (notably the U.S.) to do likewise.
Despite claims to the contrary, Mubarak's Egypt was far from being a regional linchpin for security and stability, for moderate governance, or even for economic success. The country's harsh security regime produced terrorists and a rallying cry for extremists. Its authoritarianism made a mockery of the tag "moderate," and its economy is today a quarter the size of Turkey's (though both countries have populations of similar size). In fact America's previous role as a guarantor of the Mubarak regime should be considered counterproductive to American interests, certainly once the Cold War was over.
But Mubarak's Egypt was a linchpin for something else — namely Israel's ability to pursue a hard-line regional policy with near impunity. When Benjamin Netanyahu (or his predecessors) needed to revive his 'man of peace' credentials he could always pop over to Sharm el-Sheikh for a hug-in with his friend Hosni, and when Israel needed the Arab world to turn a blind eye to entrenched occupation and settlements or harsh military adventurism then it would be Hosni running cover and diluting any Arab response. For years that strategy paid off for the now-deposed Egyptian leader — it made Mubarak relevant, even indispensable for successive U.S. governments desperately trying to balance their indulgence for outlandish Israeli behavior with a desire to retain some semblance of credibility in the Arab world. The latter of course never happened, but the America was too busy listening to the unelected leaders rather than to their publics.
Trying to keep this equation in play is what brings many Israeli officials (and others in the region, the U.S. and beyond) to now push for continued military, as opposed to civilian control.
As of today, the new equation is simple and it is this — those governing Egypt will henceforth have to be more responsive to the public will.
Some have suggested that Israeli concern is focused on avoiding a revocation of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. It is not. Insisting on Egyptian adherence to the peace treaty with Israel is a legitimate position, has international support, and also accords with both Israeli and Egyptian interests. The treaty has saved lives on both sides, neither of which relishes the prospect of renewed military conflagration. The treaty can be sustained.
Israel's real concerns lie elsewhere.
There were a set of regional policies pursued by the Mubarak regime which lacked popular legitimacy. These included the closure imposed on Gaza, support for the Iraq war and for heightened bellicosity toward Iran, and playing ceremonial chaperone to an Israeli-Palestinian peace process that became farcical and discredited. Arguably these policies were also misguided for Israel. For an Egypt reflecting the popular will they make absolutely no sense and are therefore likely to be discontinued.
Yes, the January 25 democracy protests were about economic conditions, domestic governance issues and freedom, but a part of the democracy deficit in Egypt was also a dignity deficit, and these Israeli designed policies for the region appeared undignified and anti-Arab to the Egyptian public.
When Egypt first made peace with Israel it was criticized at home and in the region for going it alone, for abandoning the Palestinian and broader Arab cause. Had the Israeli-Egyptian peace been followed by a regional peace then this narrative would likely have disappeared, but in the absence of comprehensive peace it was a critique that seemed to be vindicated.
To the 1978 Camp David Accords was attached an annex entitled "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East," which included a commitment to Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian territories and to negotiating final status within five years. That of course never happened. What did happen is that the 10,000 Israeli settlers living in the West Bank when that accord was signed have become over 300,000 today.
Indeed, whether by design or not, the peace treaty with Egypt ushered in the era of the Israeli "free hand" in the region. Even though it has not delivered real security for Israel and has encouraged an Israeli hubris that can be both dangerous and self-destructive, that era of hegemony is something that Israelis are instinctively uncomfortable about losing.
A popular Israeli refrain is that the peace with Egypt has neutralized any serious Arab military option vis-a-vis Israel. That the same cannot be said in reverse understandably irks the Arab street. Since signing the accord with Egypt, Israel has conducted several large-scale military campaigns against Lebanon and against the Palestinians, launched bombing raids against Syria and Iraq, and conducted high-profile assassinations in Jordan and the UAE — and that is only a partial list.
This deep regional disequilibrium, one that became more rooted under Mubarak's Egypt, is, understandably, both unpopular and unacceptable to a majority of Arab public opinion.
Maintaining the peace treaty with Egypt has morphed over time and under Mubarak into maintaining a peace process that has ultimately entrenched occupation and settlements and made a mockery of its Arab participants. Post-transition Egypt is unlikely to continue playing this game. And without Mubarak's enthusiastic endorsement, the process itself is likely to further unravel. It is hard to imagine other Arab states leaping into this breach, or the Palestinians accepting 20 more years of peace-process humiliation, or indeed Syria adopting the Egyptian model and signing a stand-alone peace agreement with Israel. Israel's strategic environment is about to change.
Israel's options would appear to be narrowing. Thus far Israeli establishment voices have discussed two options. One has been to dig in, to fear-monger, to convince the West that Israel is its outpost of stability in a sea of hostility, and to hope the military stays in power and democracy is tamed. In the words of Prime Minister Netanyahu, "might" is the answer. The second approach advocates an urgent return to the peace process. Neither will work. The first will exacerbate Israel's predicament, and the second is too little too late.
Israel has a third option, albeit one that is dramatic and out of synch with today's zeitgeist. It would be perhaps Israel's best and last chance for a two-state solution. While it would involve cutting Israel's losses, it would also have the potential of unleashing huge benefits — economic, security and more, for an Israel accepted as part of the tapestry of a democratic Middle East.
Broadly speaking, this option has three components. First, an Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 armistice lines almost without preconditions or exceptions (minor, equitable and agreed-upon land swaps and international security guarantees could fall into the latter category ). Second, Israel should undertake an act of genuine acknowledgment of the dispossession and displacement visited on the Palestinian people, including compensating refugees where appropriate, and thus set in motion the possibility of reconciliation. Third, there needs to be a clear Israeli commitment to full equality for all of its citizens, notably including removal of the structural barriers to full civil rights for the Palestinian Arab minority.
Admittedly, this is a path less traveled and one likely to remain so, and while the alternatives to this path may well include democracy in the region, they could preclude a future for the State of Israel.
While Israeli-Egyptian peace has often been described as a cold peace, it could perhaps be more accurately framed as a pyramid peace — in which only the very tips of the respective societies met and forged narrow common interests. It is high time to reverse that equation and build a democratic peace between the bases of those pyramids. In truth, the onus is on Israel to make this happen, and one key will be to take a more honest and dignified approach to Israel's Palestinian neighbors and co-citizens and to belatedly implement that regional peace annex from Camp David.
Posted on February 1, 2011 January 12, 2022 by Peace
This piece was originally published at the Middle East Channel
Beyond the immediate dilemmas – how and how hard to push Mubarak to stand down, what to say in public versus in private, and how best to pressure the US-backed Egyptian security forces – the transition period that lies ahead for Egypt will hold its own complicating factors for Washington policymakers.
First, it needs to be remembered that this is not primarily about the US (nor should it be), this is about Egyptians empowering themselves. Nevertheless, the US and other international actors will have a role to play and will have to chart a new policy course for relations with Egypt, and this will in no small measure set a trend for the region as a whole.
One minor luxury that the administration should have is that there are not significant or obviously apparent domestic political pressures being brought to bear on this issue. Both parties, Democrat and Republican, have made nice with dictators in the Arab world while paying limited lip service to democracy. There is no victory lap, freedom coupon to clip as was the case in the former Soviet bloc, there is no Arab democracy political lobby, even if the Arab American community will be largely thrilled by what is happening in the region. The one exception to this is the role that some traditional pro-Israel groups may play in urging a go-slow conservatism to a US embrace of change in the Middle East.
The lack of enthusiasm on the part of some of the pro-Israel community is an understandable if regrettable phenomenon. Israel is a strong status quo power in the region and Israel's establishment considers the rule of Western-oriented dictators (especially those with strong ties to U.S. aid and the U.S. military) to have served Israel's interests. President Mubarak has been a key facilitator of Israel's agenda in the region – partly due to his support for the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty but primarily centered around his maintenance of a "go-nowhere" peace process which helps shield Israel from international criticism while giving Egypt the appearance of being a useful ally to the U.S..
In recent years, this alliance has extended beyond preventing pressure on Israel and grown to include support for Israel's closure of Gaza (Egypt followed suit on its own border with Gaza), helping besiege Hamas, and playing host to the occasional peace gala in order to maintain the fiction that all of this "peace processing" might lead somewhere.


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"Pride is overwhelming emotion" as Blue & Gold record impressive win at Leeds Rhinos ahead of Superleague homecoming
Team Bath Netball will go into their first home Vitality Superleague match for two years this week off the back of a fantastic victory at Leeds Rhinos that proud coach Anna Stembridge says epitomises the club's culture and ethos.
The Haines Watts-sponsored Blue & Gold travelled to Yorkshire on Monday without their regular coaching team due to Covid and missing several experienced players through injury and illness.
The squad stepped up to the plate, though, to produce a brilliant performance and record an impressive 67-47 victory over last season's fellow semi-finalists – the perfect response to a challenging week and a great springboard for Friday's eagerly-anticipated homecoming against Surrey Storm at the Team Bath Arena (7.30pm centre-pass, click here to buy tickets).
Kim Borger and Sophie Drakeford-Lewis were in fine form in attack. PICTURE: Ben Lumley
Team Bath Netball Superleague Head Coach Stembridge said: "Pride is definitely the overwhelming emotion after that performance. The work and effort that went into the match and the whole week building up to it was incredible and it shows the culture we have within the group.
"We are always striving to have a leaderful group of players and that really came to the fore as they not only delivered their own performances but they got the best out of each other. That was the case in training too, with us coaches planning the sessions and the players running them. Everyone was adaptable and agile in dealing with the situation and there was so much to be proud of."
Jo Vann stepped in as coach
Stembridge was also keen to thank Jo Vann, who returned to the Army full-time after last season but stepped back into her coaching role for Monday's match and travelled to Sheffield with the team.
"We are incredibly lucky to have people like Jo as part of our Team Bath family," said Stembridge. "She is a true Team Bath legend and I couldn't have asked for anyone better to take on that role this week."
Leeds Rhinos had gone into their first-ever home match at EiS Sheffield off the back of Friday's win at Strathclyde Sirens but it was Team Bath who quickly told hold of the proceedings.
Layla Guscoth soars to block a shot. PICTURE: Stephen Gaunt of Touchlinepics.com
Player of the match Imogen Allison and fellow defenders Layla Guscoth and Tash Pavelin were in dominant form from the off, winning plenty of ball that Jess Shaw and Kirsty Harris – playing her first full Superleague match – used brilliantly to provide a constant supply to Kim Borger and Sophie Drakeford-Lewis.
The home defence struggled to get to grips with the attacking duo's clever movement throughout and their clinical finishing saw Team Bath race into an 12-4 lead midway through the first quarter which was stretched to 34-22 at half-time.
Lily-May Catling came on for her Team Bath Superleague debut and helped the Blue & Gold continue to pull away, with the gap increasing to 49-35 at the end of the third quarter before they wrapped up an impressive 20-goal success.
Player of the match Imogen Allison and debutant Lily-May Catling close down a Rhinos attack. PICTURE: Stephen Gaunt of Touchlinepics.com
Molly Hole also gained more court time, while fellow teenager Lily Jones was on the bench alongside her U21 coach and training associate Anya Le Monnier who stepped up to the Superleague squad for the first time.
Attention is now turning to Friday's match against Surrey Storm, the first chance for Team Bath – who are also backed by Rengen – to run out in front of their home fans since March 2020.
"We are all so excited at the thought of finally playing a home match again," said Stembridge. "We are so lucky to have had fans travelling to cheer us on at the Copper Box Arena in the back end of last season and then Birmingham for this year's Season Opener but nothing beats playing in front of your home crowd. It's going to be a great night, we can't wait!"
Tickets for Friday's match and the seven other home fixtures at the Team Bath Arena during the 2022 season are on sale now. Click here for more information.


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Microsoft will host Intel's Spectre and Meltdown patches on its own site
Microsoft already will optionally patch your PC's hardware, so helping out with Spectre and Meltdown is a natural extension.
on 02 March, 2018 10:22
Credit: Google/Natascha Eibl
If you've been worried about receiving Spectre and Meltdown BIOS patches for the PC you built yourself, there may be a solution: Microsoft has begun supplying them itself via an archive on its site.
Typically, patching Spectre and Meltdown mitigations have followed a traditional pattern: Microsoft patches Windows via Windows Update, antivirus companies like AVG have patched their antivirus software, and so on. Intel, too, authors patches, as it recently did for Haswell and Broadwell CPUs. But unlike Microsoft, Intel doesn't directly ship those patches to end users—it uses its network of PC makers and motherboard vendors to distribute them, after the appropriate testing by each vendor.
Microsoft falls into an area somewhere between the two. It has been responsible for patching Windows for Meltdown and Spectre, and it distributes Intel-authored patches to its various Surface products. Now Microsoft will archive both its own patches, and Intel's, too.
Currently, the microcode being archived is just a fraction of Intel's available patches (which so far cover the Skylake H-, S-, U-, and Y-series microprocessors). The microcode is available as part of a patch for Windows 10 version 1709 (the Fall Creators Update): KB4090007, which will be stored as part of Microsoft's Update Catalog. It's a standalone update, meaning it won't be part of a subsequent "rollup" update.
What isn't clear is whether Microsoft will also push out Intel's microcode via Windows Update, its usual distribution mechanism for supplying patches. Historically, Windows Update has offered a checkbox to allow users to receive patches for other hardware inside or connected to their PC, and not just Windows. It seems that Intel is piggybacking on Microsoft's distribution network to push Spectre patches where they need to be, and fast.
Though neither Microsoft nor Intel clarified exactly why Microsoft is providing Intel's microcode, the likely reason is to support smaller PC makers, and especially motherboard makers, who either lack the distribution network or the incentive to distribute patches as quickly as Intel and Microsoft would like. Microsoft is also using KB4090007 as a sort of catchall: For now, Microsoft is only saying that "some" Skylake devices will be supported by the patch, and more will be added as Microsoft works with Intel, chipset, and device makers to supply more mitigations.
What this means to you: If you've built a PC using parts from a smaller vendor, patches and other firmware updates might be slow to arrive. Normally, this might be an acceptable risk. Intel rightly feels that it has an obligation to push those Spectre patches out as quickly as possible.
Tags Microsoftintel