text:
With Minds of Children
I have often asked Christian apologists if they expect non-believers to accept their god-belief claims on their say so, as if their voice carried the cosmic authority they attribute to the god they enshrine in their imagination. I ask this question because religious believers who set out to defend their beliefs from the threat of non-belief offer precious little in clearly explaining why they believe what they claim to believe, and why others should believe what they claim. In my experience apologists typically seem to think this not a serious question, for few have offered a sincere answer. In encounters with apologists, even if their claims are given the attention they apparently think they deserve, questions about why they should be believed or why one should think they are true are either ignored or ridiculed, or effort is made to discredit the character of those who posed them in the first place. Such behavior simply indicates that those who would defend the religious view of the world have little or no confidence in any answers they might provide in response to questions posed about their beliefs and the claim that those beliefs are true.
But this no doubt does not put a stop to apologists seeking to rationalize their mystical beliefs (often by vilifying alternative positions) even while evading questions that sometimes strike at the very core of those beliefs or the motivation to carry on the pretense that they are true. And what is it that they are saying is true? Stories of magical personae and events, tales of conscious beings existing beyond our perception and beyond our ability to discover and know rationally, claims of an invisible magic being which created the universe by wishing it into existence and which "controls whatsoever comes to pass" (1), etc. All this strikes a reasonable thinker as legends and tales which are no more true than Alice in Wonderland or The Wizard of Oz.
Some apologists are quite open about the fact that it requires the mind of a child to take such stories seriously and accept them as truth. This is quite refreshing in fact, since it serves to confirm a basic point that I have observed in religious believers who on the whole otherwise seem at least somewhat intelligent. And that point is that god-belief will take its root best when the believer, like a naïve child, is philosophically defenseless against the false premises which lurk under theism's pre-packaged exterior of anecdotes, pretended authority, fake promises of vindication and the like. It is, in the case of Christianity for instance, the absurd and nonsensical which distinguish its teachings from other worldviews most dramatically, insisting that adults lower their minds to the level of a 6-year-old, prone to trusting persons in postions of authority and intellectually unable to recognize any abuse of that trust. It is the recognition of religion's predatory defrauding of the human mind and spirit that prompted Rand to point out to us that "faith in the supernatural always begins with faith in the superiority of others," that "A mystic is a man who surrendered his mind at its first encounter with the minds of others." (2)
Various passages in the bible make it clear that one must have the mind of a child rather than an adult to qualify as an approved believer. For instance, consider the following:
"Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. Whosoever therefore shall humble himself as this little child, the same is greatest in the kingdom of heaven." (Matthew 18:3-4)
"Whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child, he shall not enter therein." (Mark 10:15)
Presuppositional apologist John Frame tells us that
Scripture never rebukes childlike faith; indeed, Jesus makes such faith a model to be followed by adults (Luke 18:16). One who requires proof may be doing it out of ungodly arrogance, or he may thereby be admitting that he has not lived in a godly environment and has taken counsel from fools. God's norm for us is that we live and raise our children in such a way that proof will be unnecessary. (3)
Luke 18:16, which Frame cites above, says:
"But Jesus called them unto him, and said, Suffer little children to come unto me, and forbid them not: for of such is the kingdom of God."
Christianity needs the believer to lower his mind to the level of a child because it can only survive by exploiting his ignorance, and exploiting an individual's ignorance will be more difficult if that individual thinks as an honest adult, is intellectually informed, does not indiscriminately give his trust to just anyone or automatically presume that other minds are superior to his. Apologists recognize that the only way to goad adult thinkers into renouncing their adult minds is by coaxing them into questioning their certainty. It is for this reason that the deployment of many apologetic schemes are so unpersuasive: not only do they fail to draw on objectively verifiable facts which can be examined impartially by all viewers, they also fail to apply concepts in a self-consciously meaningful and consistent manner (which can work against a child's mind, but many adults tend to sense that their leg is being pulled).
For instance, when apologists say things like "[t]he ground of rationality must be the living and triune God" (4), it is entirely unclear what they might be trying to say since the term 'rationality' is not a Christian concept. And we know that 'rationality' is not a Christian concept because a) it is not a biblical concept, and b) the very basis of the concept of rationality, which is the primacy of existence principle, is wholly antithetical to the fundamental metaphysical orientation underpinning Christianity (which is the primacy of consciousness view of reality). Moreover, apologists tend to use such terms while ignoring the need to clarify any working definitions they may assume in the context of their claims and characterizations.
In the interest of undermining the non-believer's certainty (which is rightly perceived as an obstacle that must be removed for there to be any hope of vindicating Christianity from criticism), a favorite tactic of Christian apologists is to barrage a non-believer with numerous questions, questions which they apparently picked up in an introduction to philosophy course or from some apologetics primer. The immediate aim is to uncover some area of ignorance on the non-believer's part while the underlying strategy is to focus on any hint of ignorance on virtually any issue and exaggerate its proportions by driving a wedge of uncertainty deep into its core. This uncertainty is then used to manipulate the non-believer into doubting the efficacy of his mind and the truth of his verdicts, and Christianity - like a bully who takes pleasure in kicking a guy when he's down - waits in the wings to fill the void.
This tactic can be seen in action in these illustrative examples of questions posed by Christian apologists:
"how does the atheist account for non-material logical laws?" (5)
"Now, how does the atheistic worldview account for morality? ...how can one account
for laws of logic? How can the atheist account for any abstract, universal law?" (6)
"assuming that non-theism were true, on what basis could we assume the validity of the inductive principle (or, in simple terms, the continual uniformity of nature)?" (7)
Such questions are supposed by apologists to have no "cogent" answer on the basis of "the atheist worldview," an expression which implies a uniformity in the thinking of atheists which does not exist.
Statements from apologists repeating the affirmation that "the atheist worldview" or non-believers in general "cannot account for" some feature of cognition read like indistinct widgets rolling off an assembly line, as if those making the affirmations were as robotic as the machines manufacturing the widgets. The uniformity of mindlessly repeated utterances indicates uniform mindlessness on the part of those who make them. Some choice examples include the following:
The atheist world view is irrational and cannot consistently provide the preconditions of intelligible experience, science, logic, or morality. The atheist world view cannot allow for laws of logic, the uniformity of nature, the ability for the mind to understand the world, and moral absolutes. In that sense the atheist world view cannot account for our debate tonight. (8)
The atheistic world view is inadequate… [it] cannot adequately explain the existence of the world… is unable to provide the necessary preconditions to account for the laws of science, the universal laws of logic — and, of course, absolute moral standards… cannot account for the meaningful realities of life. (9)
The atheistic worldview is irrational and cannot provide an adequate basis for intelligible experience. An atheistic world is ultimately random, disorderly, transitory, and volatile. It is therefore incapable of providing the necessary preconditions to account for the laws of science and the universal laws of logic. In short, it cannot account for the meaningful realities people encounter in life. (10)
On an unbelieving basis, however, there is no particular reason to believe that there are laws that actually describe facts. Who is to know that reality is regular at all? If the world is ultimately the result of chance (or 'ultimate matter', which is the same thing), surely it is equally likely that the world will become random or chaotic; and if our senses and reason seem to be telling us differently, why should we believe that in a world of chaos they would be telling us the truth? And if chance is king, where do laws come from? They do not exist in the objective world, because that world is the result of chance, not the product of a designer who gives it a structure of regularity. (11)
In the atheist worldview, rationality and ethics are the anomalies that require explanation. In the Christian worldview, irrationalism and evil are the anomalies. At the very least, atheism, not Christianity, has the up-hill battle in explaining how the existence of human rationality makes sense in their worldview. But the atheist's ultimate explanation for anything can be only one thing, the irrational. Therefore, in terms of the atheist worldview there can never really be a rational explanation for anything." (12)
The anti-theist worldview can not account for the uniformity of nature on which to base the scientific process. (13)
The non-Christian's presuppositions cannot account for any area of human experience. (14)
The essence of the presuppositional strategy is to lampoon non-belief as such, typically by charging it with crippling intellectual disabilities through a variety of vilifying caricatures, presumptuous generalizations and uncharitable translations of certain positions affirmed by certain individuals, thereby making Christian god-belief somehow seem superior, more empowering, more philosophically informed. This tactic and other trademark elements of typical apologetic maneuvers suggest that apologists are really hoping that non-believers respond to their line of interrogation by throwing up their arms and saying "I donno, must be God did it!" After all, apologists give us nothing to suppose that this is not what they did themselves when it came to the task of using their minds.
In such a way, this interrogative style of apologetics is intended to get the heat off the believer and his task of providing reasons for believing what he claims while trying to undermine the non-believer's confidence in reason and his own mind (ironically characterized as a fault-ridden faculty which was allegedly created by a perfect creator). Since the apologist likely knows deep down that his god-belief claims have no rational defense, his concern is to hide them behind a blanket of challenges posed to those who have not surrendered their minds in similar fashion, not because their philosophical orientation is truly faulty, but because they are perceived to be a threat. All the while, the apologist seems completely oblivious to the need to provide a reason for believing the claims he apparently wants us to accept.
This whole approach to apologetics smacks of the behavior of an incorrigible child hoping to entrap adults in his midst whom he resents for being right. Children are not only often overly trusting, suggestible, imprudently credulous and intellectually vulnerable, they are also often prone to lacking self-restraint, social crudeness, and depth of intellect. And it is common knowledge that a child who is reluctant to grow up is sometimes given to petty nitpicking, emotional outbursts, temper tantrums. Non-believers who are willing to engage Christian apologists should not be surprised that such tendencies may show in their opponents since, as we saw above, this childishness is actually encouraged by the Christian worldview. As Van Til confessed unabashedly,
My whole point [is] that there is perfect harmony between my belief as a child and my belief as a man… My unity is that of a child who walks with its father through the woods. (15)
And of course, this is because Van Til never grew up. Which just underscores the $64,000.00 question:
Why be born again when you can just grow up?
(1) Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, p. 160.
(2) Atlas Shrugged
(3) John Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, p. 66.
(4) Douglas Wilson, Second Rebuttal to Theodore Drange
(5) Michael Butler, TAG vs. TANG
(6) Dennis Nenadov, The Existence of the Triune God
(7) Sycamore, Reply to An Atheists perspective of God
(8) Greg Bahnsen, Opening Statement
(9) Hank Hanegraaff, Is Atheism Logical?
(10) Rolaant McKenzie, Why Christianity?
(11) John Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, p. 77.
(12) Mike Warren, Christian Civilization Is the Only Civilization
(13) Justin S. Holcomb, Knowledge Falsely So-Called: The Theological Case Against Scientific Realism
(14) Harry Callahan, Opening Statement
(15) Van Til, Why I Believe in God
Bahnsen's Poof Revisited
BJ of Men of Athens recently sent the following comment in response to one of my earliest blogs, Bahnsen's Poof:
Hi, I just read your blog and I think you are misreading or not hearing the argument that Bahnsen is making...so let me help you...the thrust of the argument (TAG) says that without the truth of the christian God being presupposed nothing can be proven at all. Now how should an atheist understand this? Easy. Given the most fundamental assumptions about reality that the atheist "HAS" he now should reflect on those basic presuppositions and he will realize that given his presuppositions science, logic, and morality would be "impossible". In the correspondence that followed the debate between Stein and Bahnsen, Bahnsen again showed Stein that his atheistic worldview could not even allow him to make since out of balancing his checkbook. As in the debate Stein kept appealing to the notion that atheist do have morality, science, and logic. Bahnsen rightly would point out to Stein that he could not use such tools for human experience to be intelligible if his worldview were "true". POOF....Christianity is true because of the impossibilty of the contrary. In its technical form it is an "reductio ad absurbdum" argument. If P then Q, P therefore Q or If morality, science, and logic are the case (P) then Q (Christianity) has to be affirmed as logically necessary "because" ("because" clause is vital here)Q is the precondition of P. That is the indirect argument. Now, how is that bold assertion proved? Assume not Q (in this case non-christianity)and then look for internal contrsdictions within a particualr worldview for it to refute itself. If you do not understand Kant then the odds are you will not understand what Van Til was up to. Basically atheism can not provide the preconditions for logic, science, or morality to have any "meaning" to our human experience. [sic]
In this blog entry I will interact with BJ's statements.
BJ: "Hi, I just read your blog and I think you are misreading or not hearing the argument that Bahnsen is making...so let me help you..."
BJ apparently wants to say that the conclusion of my analysis of Bahnsen's opening statement in his debate with Stein is wrong. My conclusion was that Bahnsen failed to present an argument in his opening statement. This conclusion was established as the result of a line-by-line analysis of the last paragraphs of Bahnsen's statement, for which - as an opening statement in a debate on the existence of the Christian god - Bahnsen should have been most prepared to present. In fact, since he begins these last few paragraphs with the statement "And so I come thirdly then to the transcendental proof of God's existence," we would naturally expect Bahnsen to use this opportunity to present any argument he might have. But instead of presenting an argument for his claim that his god exists, Bahnsen launches right into accusing Stein of two fallacies, even though Stein hasn't even had a chance to speak yet! (Did Bahnsen feel a need to poison the well at this early point in the debate?) He then tells us that his god-belief "is not tested in any ordinary way like other factual claims." So there are all these reasons why we should not expect to validate Bahnsen's theistic claims in ways that other claims can be validated. And yet in spite of such limitations he still wants to say it's a fact that his god exists. Does Bahnsen explain how his theistic claims can be confirmed and verified? No, he doesn't do this - he just tells us how they can't be verified. He then tells us that "we can prove the existence of God from the impossibility of the contrary," which he nowhere establishes, and which conflicts with teachings which are explicitly laid out in the New Testament (see below). Bahnsen asserts that "without Him, it is impossible to prove anything." But upon what this statement is based is never explained. It sounds like a conclusion, but no argument is given to support it. In fact, the statement assumes that Bahnsen's god exists, which is precisely what Bahnsen is called to prove. Does he offer a proof? No, he doesn't. Rather, he goes on to charge "the atheist world-view" with all kinds of failings, as if this served as a proof of the Christian god's existence.
Given that the conclusion of my analysis is that Bahnsen did not present an actual argument for the existence of his god in his opening statement, to show that my conclusion is wrong BJ would have to identify an argument present in Bahnsen's opening statement. Does BJ do this? No, he does not. Instead of identifying any traceable argument in Bahnsen's opening statement, BJ says that he thinks I am "misreading or not hearing the argument that Bahnsen is making." (So it's my fault!) But if there's no argument presented, then obviously I cannot "misread" or "hear" something that's not there. What specifically am I "misreading or not hearing"? I reviewed Bahnsen's own comments from his opening statement - the statement for which he would have been most prepared to present. In my analysis, I showed that there is no argument since the apparent conclusion (which, in the case of an argument for the existence of a god should be something along the lines of "therefore god exists") has no inferential support to be found in Bahnsen's opening statement. Nothing in BJ's comment to me overcomes this. One cannot insert an inference into Bahnsen's statement when there's no inference there as that would simply constitute tampering with the evidence.
BJ: "the thrust of the argument (TAG) says that without the truth of the christian God being presupposed nothing can be proven at all."
That's the "thrust of the argument"? Exactly what is meant by the term "thrust" here? My concern is not to find out how Bahnsen blasted himself into orbit, but to uncover any inferential support that Bahnsen might have given for the claim that the Christian god exists in the first place. The "thrust" of his non-argument may consist of the claim that the Christian god exists. But a claim is not an argument. What I'm looking for is the argument which Bahnsen might have presented. His conclusion is clear enough, but what were his premises? For instance, what premises support the claim that "without the truth of the christian God being presupposed nothing can be proven at all"? Since this claim itself assumes what Bahnsen is called to prove, all that such claims accomplish is to multiply the apologist's burden of proof while failing to meet any burdens already sitting in his cart.
BJ: "Now how should an atheist understand this? Easy. Given the most fundamental assumptions about reality that the atheist 'HAS' he now should reflect on those basic presuppositions and he will realize that given his presuppositions science, logic, and morality would be 'impossible'."
Before addressing the points here, it should be pointed out that, had Bahnsen presented a clear argument for his god's existence, BJ's statements here would not be necessary. Also, it should be pointed out that BJ's statement here does nothing to rescue Bahnsen from the verdicts of my analysis. All that BJ succeeds in doing here is to give his own interpretation of TAG. But this does not get Bahnsen off the hook. Moreover, any problems which any particular atheist's "presuppositions" might have, whether actual or hypothetical, are irrelevant to the matter, for it does not follow from an instance of error in a non-believer's view of the world that the Christian god therefore exists. This would make said god's existence contingent on someone's intellectual error, and typically theists claim that their god's existence is absolute rather than contingent. So we have here already an instance in which the presuppositional apologetic is incompatible with the theism which it purports to defend (since presuppositionalism depends on the discovery of errors in rival worldviews). In spite of this, the typical habit of presuppositional apologists is to dwell on their resentment of what they call "the atheist world-view" rather than identify in clear terms why they believe what they claim to believe.
Turning now to BJ's own points, I offer the following points in return.
BJ seems to think that, as an atheist, I should consider my "most fundamental assumptions about reality" and subject them to scrutiny. I have no objection to this recommendation. In fact, it is a challenge which my "most fundamental assumptions about reality" are quite prepared to satisfy fully. That is because my "most fundamental assumptions about reality" are made explicit by the axioms as opposed to hiding in some dark cave of mysticism. (I respond to criticism of my worldview's axioms in my blog post Probing Mr. Manata's Poor Understanding of the Axioms.)
Specifically, my axioms are:
1) that existence exists (i.e., there is a reality),
2) that to exist is to be something (A is A, the law of identity), and
3) that consciousness is consciousness of something (the axiom of consciousness).
These axioms would have to be true even to deny them. In order to deny these axioms, there would have to be a reality which serves as a point of reference, the axioms would have to have identity (so that there is something that is being denied), and there would have to be someone who is conscious to do the denying (since denial is a conscious activity). Together these axioms imply a general, inescapable principle known as the primacy of existence - that is, that existence exists independent of consciousness, which means: the object(s) of consciousness holds metaphysical primacy over the subject of consciousness. This is the objective orientation of the subject-object relationship. The only alternative to this is the opposite view - that the subject of consciousness holds metaphysical primacy over its objects (such as when the Christian god creates the universe ex nihilo by an act of will, or causes an entity to behave in a manner that is contradictory to its nature by an act of will - cf. the doctrine of miracles).
Now, let's do as BJ recommends, namely "reflect on those basic presuppositions," and see if "given [these] presuppositions science, logic, and morality would be 'impossible'." First let's look at science. (By science I generally mean the systematic application of reason to specific areas of study based on controlled observations.) Does science presuppose that existence exists, i.e., that there is a reality? Sure it does. Without something that exists, there would be nothing for science to study. Does science presuppose that a thing has identity? Sure it does. If things existed but did not have identity, scientific study would be futile for it could yield no reliable conclusions. If the things that exist had no identity, then there would be nothing specific to observe. Does science presuppose that consciousness is consciousness of something? Sure it does. If consciousness were consciousness of nothing, then what faculty would make scientific inquiry possible? Non-consciousness? And if there were no consciousness at all, what would do the observing? Clearly scientific inquiry requires consciousness of things that exist, for science inherently involves observation of objects. So science requires the truth of the axioms.
Now let's look at logic. (By logic I generally mean a set of principles that guide the mind in forming non-contradictory identifications.) Does logic presuppose that existence exists, that there is a reality? Sure it does. If nothing exists, then logic doesn't exist, either. And if nothing existed, there'd be nothing to be logical about, and there'd be no one to think logically. So logic undeniably presupposes the first axiom. Does logic presuppose that things have identity? Sure it does. The very foundation of logic is the law of identity, that things are what they are, that to exist is to be something specific, that a thing is itself, that A is A. It is because things are what they are that the principles of logic can be applied in the first place. Does logic presuppose that consciousness is consciousness of something? Sure it does. It would be illogical to say that consciousness can be consciousness of nothing. The alternative to consciousness of something is consciousness of nothing. This would mean that there is no object to consider. But without an object to consider, what would be considered? Obviously nothing. And if nothing were considered, there would be nothing to think about logically. Thus there would be nothing to which logical principles could be applied. So like science, logic clearly requires the truth of the axioms.
Now let's look at morality. (By morality I generally mean a code of values which guides one's choices and actions.) Does morality presuppose that existence exists, that there is a reality? Sure it does. If nothing exists, then man does not exist, and consequently the fundamental alternative between life and death which he faces and which makes morality a necessity for him does not exist. This would mean that there would be no basis or need for morality. Does morality presuppose that a thing has identity? Sure it does. Specifically it presupposes that man and his environment have identity, and with this that man's identity is such that he faces a fundamental alternative, namely between life and death. If man did not face this alternative, he would not need a code of values which guides his choices and actions. Does morality presuppose consciousness? Sure it does. Since man's moral actions are chosen, he could not make choices if he did not have a conscious faculty which could identify alternatives and make selections among them in the first place. Clearly, morality presupposes the truth of the axioms.
So in the case of science, logic and morality, it should be clear: my "most fundamental assumptions about reality" would have to be true for these endeavors to be possible in the first place. By retortion (presumably a technique championed by presuppositionalists), let's deny these fundamentals and see if science, logic and morality can survive. Let's deny the first fundamental, the axiom of existence. Let's say there's no existence. Well, just by saying "there's no existence," we've already contradicted ourselves, for we would have to exist in order to say this. Since science does not stand on contradictions, this could not be true. Thus the axiom of existence would have to be true in order for science to be possible. The same outcome would be the case for logic as well: logic does not rest on self-contradiction. Nor does morality. Indeed, if existence did not exist, there would be no science, no logic and no morality. So by retortion the axiom of existence must be true for science, logic and morality to be legitimate human concerns.
Let's try denying the second fundamental, the axiom of identity. Let's say that to exist is not to be something. If this were the case, then what would do science? We could not say that man will do science, for this presupposes that man is man, that a thing that exists is something specific and has specific attributes (such as a conscious faculty). And what would be observed and studied, if to exist is not to be something? We could not say that we would observe and study things that exist, for this presupposes that things are what they are, that they have a nature. What would do any logical thinking if things that exist had no identity? We could not say that man does the logical thinking, for this assumes that man is something specific, namely an entity capable of performing logical thought. And what use would morality serve? Morality is only useful to man because of his specific nature: he faces a fundamental alternative and his life is not automatically guaranteed to him - he must act in accordance with his nature in order to live because of his nature. So by retortion the axiom of identity must be true for science, logic and morality to be legitimate human concerns.
Now let's try denying the third fundamental, the axiom of consciousness. Let's say that consciousness is consciousness of nothing. That would mean that consciousness is irrelevant. (For to say that consciousness is consciousness of nothing is to assert consciousness without a relationship to any object to perceive and/or consider.) If consciousness were irrelevant, what would do the observing and studying that science requires? Obviously nothing, for on this view consciousness has been denied. So science presupposes consciousness of objects. What about logic? Could there be any use for logic if consciousness had no objects? This would mean that there is nothing for a consciousness to be logical about. Since logic requires objects to provide content to our identifications, inferences, deductions, etc., logic presupposes consciousness of objects. What about morality? Could there be any morality if we were not conscious of objects? If it were the case that we were not conscious of objects, we would not be able to identify either values or potential threats. Thus we would not be able to identify the kinds of actions we need to take in order to obtain and protect our values and avoid destructive threats. Consequently morality, too, presupposes consciousness of objects. So by retortion the axiom of consciousness must be true for science, logic and morality to be legitimate human concerns.
So by the presuppositionalist's own standard, the argument by retortion, the axioms obtain, and their denial would constitute their very validation at the same time (which means: denial of the axioms results in absurdity). Contrary to what the presuppositionalist would like to see, "the most fundamental assumptions about reality" made by my worldview are validated by the presuppositionalist's own preferred form of testing.
BJ: "In the correspondence that followed the debate between Stein and Bahnsen, Bahnsen again showed Stein that his atheistic worldview could not even allow him to make since out of balancing his checkbook."
This point is not relevant to my post, since my post was concerned with whether or not Bahnsen presented a proof for his god's existence in his opening statement, or if he simply offered a poof - i.e., a series of assertions which are presented on the pretense that they offer an argument when in fact the speaker offers no argument whatsoever. As for the claim that "Bahnsen again showed Stein that his atheistic worldview could not even allow him to make [sense] out of balancing his checkbook," yes, Bahnsen did make claims like this throughout the debate, but simply claiming this to be the case does not constitute a demonstration of the truth of that claim, nor does it constitute a proof of the existence of Bahnsen's god. Keep in mind that Stein was not a philosopher; rather, he was an expert in the special sciences, specifically biology if I'm not mistaken. So I would not expect Stein to have been prepared to give a play-by-play analysis of how the mind works (e.g., on how concepts are formed on the basis of perception and integrated into statements of recognition, inductive generalizations, deductive conclusions, etc.) since this was not the area of his specialty. At best, all Bahnsen may have shown is that Stein specifically did not have detailed knowledge of these things. It would be embarrassingly fallacious to try to draw from Stein's ignorance the conclusion that a god must therefore exist. But this is principally what Bahnsen seemed eager to do, which is simply an admission that his god-belief ultimately stands on ignorance as such. In this way TAG is just another tired god-of-the-gaps strategy (notice I did not say 'argument' here, since Bahnsen did not present an argument). The apologist is supposed to be able to ask vague and open-ended questions like "How do you account for logic?" and the non-believer is apparently supposed to throw up his hands and say "Duh, I donno! Must be God did it!" What else does the apologist offer?
BJ: "As in the debate Stein kept appealing to the notion that atheist do have morality, science, and logic. Bahnsen rightly would point out to Stein that he could not use such tools for human experience to be intelligible if his worldview were 'true'. POOF...."
Yes, Bahnsen did claim this. But that's not the same as proving this to be the case. And we already know that he didn't offer an argument in his opening statement, the very statement which he would have been able to prepare in advance. Furthermore, I just showed how the axioms of my worldview are necessary "for human experience to be intelligible" since they identify the preconditions of experience to begin with.
BJ: "Christianity is true because of the impossibilty of the contrary." [sic]
While Bahnsen does make a similar claim in his opening statement, he nowhere substantiated it. At any rate, I answer this mindlessly repeated slogan in my blog article Is the Contrary to Christianity Truly Impossible?
In that post I show how the presuppositionalist's claim that "Christianity is true because of the [impossibility] of the contrary" violates one of presuppositionalism's own feigned standards, namely that of internal consistency. Since the bible is clear in explicitly affirming that "all things are possible" (Matt. 19:26), a defense strategy which contradicts this (by affirming that there is something that is impossible) is unfit for what it's intended to defend, namely a worldview which clearly and explicitly affirms that "all things are possible." I've yet to see a good response to my point. Additionally, my worldview is clearly contrary to what Christianity teaches, and yet it is a reality. So on this point the claim that the contrary to Christianity is impossible is clearly false.
BJ: "In its technical form it is an 'reductio ad absurbdum' argument."
To the extent that TAG is a reductio ad absurdum, it is unsuitable as a defense of Christianity, for the reason I just gave above. Moreover, since Christianity assumes the primacy of consciousness view of reality (I prove this here), the very claim that Christianity is true contradicts itself, since the concept 'truth' assumes the opposite principle, the primacy of existence.
BJ: "If P then Q, P therefore Q"
If only Bahnsen could have developed his opening statement in such a logical fashion. Then (and only then) would there be an argument to dissect in that statement. Of course, he would have to validate the inputs plugged in for the variables here, had he presented an argument in the first place. However, not only did he not present an argument, he nowhere validated the inputs he plugged into any of his assertions. Essentially, he showed up DOA - defeated on arrival. No matter what faults can be found in what Stein presented, Bahnsen failed to prove that his god exists.
BJ: "or If morality, science, and logic are the case (P) then Q (Christianity) has to be affirmed as logically necessary 'because' ('because' clause is vital here) Q is the precondition of P."
On the contrary, since Christianity assumes the primacy of consciousness view of reality, it necessarily disqualifies itself as a viable precondition for any fundamental anchoring morality, science and logic since morality, science and logic, as I showed above, require the axioms and the primacy of existence principle. In fact, my analysis of the axioms and their relationship to science, logic and morality above demonstrate an opposite conclusion, to wit: If science, logic and morality are the case (P), then O (Objectivism) has to be affirmed as logically necessary because the truth of Objectivism is the precondition to P. Christianity falls as one casualty among a whole host of mystical worldviews which stand on the primacy of consciousness view of the world, which is anathema to science, logic and morality (since the primacy of consciousness violates the axioms while science, logic and morality would not be possible without the axioms).
BJ: "That is the indirect argument."
And as such, it shows that its defenders are not very aware of the nature of the fundamentals of either science, logic or morality. These areas of concern simply offer apologists an occasion for bamboozling unprepared non-believers. What is telling is that presuppositionalism fails to make any relationship between either science, logic or morality and the teachings of Christianity clear and traceable. All in all, presuppositionalism essentially consists of nothing more than a claim to magic (which is a consequence of enshrining ignorance).
BJ: "Now, how is that bold assertion proved? Assume not Q (in this case non-christianity)and then look for internal contrsdictions within a particualr worldview for it to refute itself." [sic]
Okay, I offer my non-Christian worldview. Where are the contradictions within it? Please, show me. Don't forget that the concept 'contradiction' assumes the primacy of existence principle, for only if the objects of awareness hold metaphysical primacy over the subject of awareness would contradictions be objectionable. To say that contradictions are objectionable, then, the theist must borrow from my worldview which is the only proper philosophical custodian of the concept of objectivity.
BJ: "If you do not understand Kant then the odds are you will not understand what Van Til was up to."
Even though Van Til sought to replace Kant's categories and antimonies with Christian theism and "apparent contradictions," both thinkers erred in granting validity to the primacy of consciousness view of reality, which is self-defeating.
BJ: "Basically atheism can not provide the preconditions for logic, science, or morality to have any 'meaning' to our human experience."
It is not the task of atheism to "provide the preconditions for logic, science, or morality" any more than the task of music theory is to provide men with the aural nerves they need for listening music. If music theory could do this, Beethoven would not have died such a frustrated man. Atheism is simply the absence of god-belief. As such, it tells us only what someone does not believe, not what one does believe. Therefore it constitutes a fundamental misunderstanding to hold atheism accountable for failing to "provide the preconditions for logic, science, or morality." Besides, I do not think it is at all accurate to say that a worldview "provides" these things; these preconditions are metaphysical and exist in nature, and they are competently identified by the axioms. To say that a worldview must "provide the preconditions for logic, science, [and] morality" is incoherent; those preconditions would need to be in place for the worldview in question to be possible in the first place. What a worldview enables one to do is to identify those preconditions in explicit terms (here's where the axioms come in) and integrate them into a coherent whole in accordance with those preconditions which in turn enables him to identify the values his life requires and the actions he needs to take in order to achieve those values. Writes Ayn Rand:
The task of philosophy is to provide man with a comprehensive view of life. This view serves as a base, a frame of reference, for all his actions, mental or physical, psychological or existential. This view tells him the nature of the universe with which he has to deal (metaphysics); the means by which he is to deal with it, i.e., the means of acquiring knowledge (epistemology); the standards by which he is to choose his goals and values, in regard to his own life and character (ethics) - and in regard to society (politics); the means of concretizing this view is given to him by esthetics. ("The Chickens' Homecoming," The New Left, p. 107.)
As for bickering over how many angels can dance on the head of a pin, the theologians are free to waste their time with such arbitrary and worthless matters.
Bahnsen's Three Charges of Prejudice
On pages 135-138 of his book Always Ready (page numbers in this blog entry refer to this publication), presuppositional apologist Greg Bahnsen seeks to indoctrinate his readers with the presumption that criticism of Christianity is necessarily borne on "prejudicial conjecture," that
unbelievers, both educated and uneducated, take the offensive against Christianity before they have become familiar with what they're talking about. In the place of research and honest assessment of available evidence concerning some aspect of the Bible, many unbelievers have substituted personal conjecture about what "seems likely" to them. (p. 135)
Apparently "unbelievers" are not supposed to put much stock in what "seems likely" to them, but why they shouldn't remains unexplained. Regardless, we should not let ourselves be fooled by Bahnsen's use of "many unbelievers" as if he meant only a portion of those who do not number themselves among Christendom. It's clear from the context of his statements that he wants to give his devotees the impression that all non-believers are uninformed about the teachings of Christianity (even though a great number of non-believers in the west are themselves former Christians or have at least been widely exposed to Christian zealots), and therefore their criticism of Chistianity couldn't possibly have any bearing on the matter. For instance, on p. 137, Bahnsen writes: When we defend our Christian faith, then, we must constantly be on the lookout for the way in which the reasoing of unbelievers rests on prejudicial conjecture. When stated in this fashion, the impression is that one is supposed to that "the reasoning of unbelievers" will be the product of "prejudicial conjecture," even before this has been established. Apparently Bahnsen thinks this is responsible advice.
At any rate, Bahnsen goes on to cite three indications of prejudice which budding apologists should expect to detect in "the reasoning of unbelievers." Let's review them.
1) Prejudice vs. Impartiality: "The first [indication of] prejudice is the assumption that the Biblical text is no different from any other written document which we find in our natural experience throughout history - which of course begs the fundamental question over which the believer and unbeliever are arguing!" (p. 136)
If it is the case that "the assumption that the Biblical text is no different from any other written document...begs the fundamental question over which the believer and unbeliever are arguing," wouldn't the opposite assumption - namely the assumption that the biblical text is significantly "different from any other document which we find in our natural experience throughout history" - also "beg the fundamental question over which the believer and unbeliever are arguing"? Bahnsen's rebuttal to reasonable impartiality regarding texts presented for review to non-believers requires him to take for granted the premise that the bible is singularly different from other texts without the need to first establish this premise. In other words, he takes the bible's utter uniqueness as a self-sufficient primary which does not need to be validated. If he could validate this premise, why would he need to do this? Also, we might ask whether Bahnsen would be able to validate his god-belief if he did not take such a premise for granted. In essence, he seems eager to reserve for himself the privilege of "beg[ging] the fundamental question over which the believer and unbeliever are arguing" while simultaneously denying this privilege to non-believers. The anxious defender of a weak case would need such an advantage.
But is it really so inappropriate to view the books of the bible as "no different from any other written document"? Bahnsen gives no reason against this other than that it allegedly "begs the fundamental question over which the believer and unbeliever are arguing." The Muslim could deploy the same tactic with respect to the Koran. In actuality, there are overriding general features of the bible that it shares with all other written documents which put the bible on the same level. For example, like other written documents, the bible itself is a written document. Like other written documents, the bible consists of words written on pages which can be read by readers who can read the language in which those words are written. Also, like other written documents, the bible consists of written statements which readers can examine and relate to the broader sum of knowledge which they have acquired throughout their lives, and thus form judgments about the quality of its content, whether it is true or false, useful or useless, meaningful or meaningless, etc. This is the case with the bible just as it is with a play by Shakespeare, a poem by Pushkin, a play by Molliere, an essay by Jefferson, or a book by Greg Bahnsen. In the case of Shakespeare's play, Pushkin's poem, Molliere's play, Jefferson's essay and Bahnsen's book, each can be judged by its content. Is Bahnsen saying that we should do this in the case of every written document except the biblical text? Is Bahnsen worried about what outcome may transpire if someone does judge the bible by its content? If he were so confident that everything in the biblical text is true, would we expect him to fear the outcome of people independently judging it by its content, just as we do in the case of an essay by Russell or a newspaper article?
Bahnsen goes on to say:
If the Bible is, as it claims, the inspired word of Almighty God, then the history of its textual transmission may very well be quite different than other human documents since God would have ordained that its text be preserved with greater integrity than that of ordinary books. (p. 136)
This is a common refrain coming from apologists, but the special pleading and appeal to unseen magical forces are simply embarrassing. In actuality, with the invention of the printing press and the print technology available today, the accurate replication of texts does not present the great potential for error that dogged the copyists of past centuries. Today one can go into any bookstore and pull a Mario Puzo novel off the shelf, and the same title sitting right next to it is precisely the same, right down to a typo on page 172, since they were replicated from the same print master by the same automated technology. Modern technology has at the very least significantly reduced the enormous potential for error that plagues copying texts by hand. No doubt the bible's copyists would have been green with envy had they known about the ease with which their precious bibles could be mass produced today. So ironically, Bahnsen is correct, in a way he did not intend, when he supposes that "the history of [the bible's] textual transmission" is "different than other human documents," since there is no shortage of "other human documents" whose textual reproduction is far more faithful to their respective originals than one could ever hope for in the case of the biblical text, since the automated print technology in use today was not used in the preservation of the biblical text.
But Bahnsen seems oblivious to another point which we would be wrong to ignore when considering his statement here. And that point is the fact that, when we attempt to justify a position by asserting the existence of an invisible magic being, one can argue anything. On the premise that there's an invisible magic being that can intervene in human affairs and actualize its wishes such that reality conforms precisely to its will (cf. metaphysical subjectivism), one could even argue that there is no need for a biblical text that must be read in the first place. On such a premise, one could simply argue that "divine knowledge" was zapped into the his mind by "the hand of God," thereby implying that the biblical text is completely superfluous. After all, if there were a magic being that could do this, why wouldn't it, and why would we need to rely on our own reasoned interpretation of "the Scriptures" to come fallibly to the "knowledge of God" which Christians claim to possess? The point is that, if we make allowance for the arbitrary, the arbitrary becomes the standard and reason becomes the first casualty. And when reason has been rejected in this fashion, the human mind has no way to recover itself.
2) Prejudice vs. Consistency: "The second indication of prejudice is that the unbeliever does not offer any concrete evidence that (say) some medieval monk tampered with the text before us today." (p. 136)
While above Bahnsen was happy to proceed on the premise that "God would have ordained that [the biblical] text be preserved with greater integrity than that of ordinary books," for which he supplied no supporting evidence, he now expects "the unbeliever" to offer "concrete evidence" to substantiate what is prima facie a reasonable possibility. Does Bahnsen really expect people to believe that it is impossible that some medieval monk deliberately tampered with the text? Is he expecting us to suppose that it is impossible that some medieval monk made a mistake in copying the biblical text? Indeed, it seems that one would have to be quite conflicted psychologically to expect people to accept on the one hand the possibility that an invisible magic being works through human hosts down through the centuries to preserve a religious text which would be superfluous anyway, while on the other hand denying the possibility of deliberate mischief or human error. Perhaps this is akin to the kind of skewed thinking one author of the gospel had in mind when he had his Jesus scold the "blind guides, which strain at a gnat, and swallow a camel" (Matt. 23:24). Indeed, the biblical text itself, in Romans 3:4, tells us "let God be true, but every man a liar," which explicitly endorses the assumption that human beings are by nature deceivers. Unless Bahnsen can show that the medieval monks who were responsible for the duplication and preservation of the biblical text were something other than human beings, it seems that the biblical text itself clearly supports the presumption that those same monks were just as prone to deception and vice as everyone else is supposed to be. So on biblical assumptions, we would be wrong to suppose that the medieval monks who took on the task of copying the biblical text were above deliberate tampering with that text as they copied it. But perhaps consistency was not one of Bahnsen's stronger points.
Nevertheless, in considering Bahnsen's claim that "the unbeliever does not offer any concrete evidence that (say) some medieval monk tampered with the text," we should ask: is he expecting his readers to take this claim at face value, without any supporting argument? Does he suppose - and/or does he expect his readers to assume - that critics of the Christian worldview are completely ignorant of what it teaches, in spite of the facts that Christianity is the dominant religion in the west and that former Christians typically make the most informed critics of Christianity? Do Bahnsen's gratuitous assumptions comport with the awareness he is trying to raise against prejudice? It seems that, if Bahnsen were genuinely concerned about prejudice, he would not answer alleged prejudice with just more prejudice.
In fact, there is concrete evidence that someone tampered with the text, in some cases even before the monastic orders were instituted by the church and commissioned with copying it. For instance, the oldest known manuscripts of the gospel of Mark end at 16:8, while today's bible's have Mark end at 16:20. At some point, probably still very early, these latter 12 verses were tacked on, and I doubt a talking snake did this. The same is the case with the final chapter of the gospel of John, often referred to by scholars as the Appendix. The gospel most sensibly ends at chapter 20, but the version we find in our modern bibles includes a 21st chapter. One article on the topic describes it as follows:
The text of the Gospel of John appears to reach a conclusion at the end of chapter 20, as the text summarises the many signs that Jesus performed for his followers, not all of which could be recorded in the Gospel. John 21 begins simply with After these things... (Greek: Μετὰ ταῦτα) and nonchalently recounts another appearance of Jesus, as if the conclusion at the end of the prior chapter hadn't been there - as if the text was going "...and they all lived happily ever after. The end. Anyway, back in galilee they ...".
Who tacked on these endings on these gospels? In the case of the gospel of Mark, this is especially significant since without the added ending, Mark would end (and originally ended) without any post-resurrection sightings. And if believers insist that the last 12 verses of Mark's gospel are authentic scripture, then I have a jar of dark liquid for them to drink.
3) Prejudice vs. Informed Criticism: "The third indication of prejudice in the criticism of the unbeliever is that he or she has not taken account of the actual evidence which is publicly available regarding the text of Scripture. If the critic had taken time to look into this subject, he or she would not have offered the outlandish evaluation that the Biblical text is unreliable." (p. 136)
This is the same tired and over-used generalization that critics couldn't possibly know what they're talking about, and as such constitutes a prejudice on Bahnsen's part which he is more than happy to promulgate among his devotees. Bahnsen tries to bring his point home with the following autobiographical anecdote:
This came home to me with great force after taking an advanced course on Plato in graduate school, a course which took account of the textual criticism of the literary corpus of Plato's works. Our earliest extant manuscript of a work by Plato dates from right before 900 A.D…. and we must remember that Plato is thought to have lived roughly 350 years before Christ - thus leaving us with a gap of over twelve centuries. By contrast, the earliest fragments of the New Testament date less than fifty years after the original writing; the bulk of our most important extant manuscripts dates from 200-300 years after original composition." (pp. 136-137)
It is unclear what exactly Bahnsen thinks this contrast, which non-believers should have no problem acknowledging, is supposed to prove. Presumably Bahnsen's concern is to prove that Christianity is true, not that the earliest copies we have of the text of the New Testament are closer in time to their original writing than Plato's works. Even if we found a copy of Baum's The Wizard of Oz that was produced two weeks after he had completed it, what would this prove? Would this prove that there was actually an Emerald City populated with horses which perpetually changed colors and witches who could fly on broomsticks? Of course not. Perhaps Bahnsen is saying that, if we accept the existence of a man named Plato on the basis of his writings whose earliest manuscripts date some twelve or so centuries after the time when he is supposed to have lived, then we should accept the existence of a god-man named Jesus whose extant biographical documents date to within decades of their supposed original composition. But this is a non sequitur which relies on blurring certain key distinctions. For one thing, in the case of Plato's writings, someone had to compose them. Whether they were originally written by Plato himself, or by his pupils, is really irrelevant. The teachings in those writings are attributed to a man, and whether this man's name was Plato or something else, is not really that big a deal. Since non-believers are not people who worship a god, they aren't going to deify Plato either. If it turned out to be the case that the ideas we attribute to Plato were actually conceived and developed by a small band of Scythians, would it cause us to change our lives? Let's not forget also that none of the texts in the New Testament purport to have come from Jesus' own hand. Many of the texts are anonymous, some are clearly pseudonymous, and contrary to what Bahnsen claims, the New Testament record is far from "remarkably uniform." (p. 137; see my blog Reckless Apologetic Presumptuousness.)
But still, Bahnsen claims that there is "actual evidence which is publicly available regarding the text of Scripture." Evidence which supports specifically what? That the New Testament was written almost 2,000 years ago? Who disputes this? Is Bahnsen saying that there's "actual evidence which is publicly available" which supports the view that the events it records actually happened? In regard to "Scripture," Bahnsen says that "its truth has a public nature, open to inspection" (p. 127), but complains that teachings such as those about a "[c]onscious life following physical death, everlasting damnation, and a future resurrection are not readily accepted." (p. 126) But what evidence does Bahnsen or any other Christian apologist present to support its teachings? For instance, "the text of Scripture" claims that there is a heaven. What "publicly available" evidence can Bahnsen or other Christians supply to support this claim? Where is this heaven, and how can its existence be verified? Can such a claim be scientifically tested? If not, why not? The existence of extraterrestrial places, such as planets, moons, asteroids, comets, nebulae, galaxies, etc., can be scientifically verified, so why can't heaven? "Scripture" also claims that there is a hell, presumably a place where souls are flame-broiled without reprieve for all eternity. (I thought souls were immaterial - how is it that they can burn? If God has a soul, is it flame-retardant?) What "publicly available" evidence do Christians supply to support these claims? Do they accept them because they know of concrete evidence for their existence, but choose to keep that evidence to themselves? Or, do they accept these teachings as truth without evidence, perhaps in the fear that it might be true?
Let's consider another example. In Matthew 27:52-53, the following event is said to have occurred when Jesus died on the cross:
52 And the graves were opened; and many bodies of the saints which slept arose,
53 And came out of the graves after his resurrection, and went into the holy city, and appeared unto many.
Now, this is quite a remarkable event indeed. Either that, or it's a complete fabrication. Since Christians want to say that the entirety of the bible is wholly true, inerrant and infallible, they consequently would defend the claim that this event really happened. But what evidence do we have for this that is "publicly available"? No other New Testament document corroborates this alleged event - perhaps that's what Bahnsen meant by the "The word of the Lord is self-attestingly true and authoritative"? (p. 25) But if such an event did occur, it would be astonishing to find that no one other than the author of Matthew would have thought to make a note of it. Indeed, no extrabiblical source supports it. Imagine a crowd of reanimated corpses walking throughout a city who "appeared unto many" of its inhabitants, and yet no witness had the presence of mind to write about it! Apologists may claim that the author of Matthew was an eyewitness, but even the book of Matthew does not claim this; indeed, it records other things that its author could not have been an eyewitness (such as the virgin birth, the temptation in the wilderness, etc.). Perhaps we're supposed to believe this story on the basis of the supposed fact that the earliest manuscripts date to within 200-300 years of its original writing? I trow not.
For that matter, what "publicly available" evidence supports the claim that Jesus rose from the dead? The bible cannot serve as proof of this since it is where this claim is found in the first place. A claim does not double as its own proof. It is the claim which needs to be proven in the first place. Showing that the copies of the writings in which the claim is found date to within 200-300 years of their original composition does not prove that the claim contained in those writings is true. A proof needs support relating to the details of the claim which is being proved. (Of course, there's no way to prevent apologists from delivering a Poof!)
So it seems that Bahnsen's charge that non-believers operate on the basis of prejudice is itself an instance of the pot calling the kettle black. In fact, it's rather easy to see through. What's sad is that Bahnsen's devotees lap up his contempt for non-believers as if it were water at the height of drought season. Whatever makes them feel better, I guess.
What Happened to Paul?
Does anyone know what happened to Paul Manata? He seems to have departed the scene completely, and without even saying goodbye! There's been no activity on his blog Pressing the Antithesis since Oct. 14, and the last I saw of him in any comments section was when he tried to tackle one of my arguments in this post of Goosing the Antithesis. And while I've been described by Aaron Kinney as "a proverbial Navy SEAL in the war of ideas," Paul typically displayed a formidable tough-guy persona when interacting with non-believers. Could it be that his bad-boy image was just that, an image fabricated for purposes of intimidation? Where oh where has Paul run off to?
Will we be seeing milk cartons with Paul's picture on it with the caption "Have you seen me?" or "Missing since 10/14/05"? Perhaps it would include details that might give a clue as to how to locate him. For instance, it could say "Ht. 6'1", Wt. 190 lbs. Last seen embarrassing himself on non-Christian blogs trying to defend belief in invisible magic beings," or something along these lines.
Come to think of it, it seems that Paul's retreat is not a sole instance, for other apologists seem to have given up as well. Perhaps they all decided to take a vow of silence? Of course, that would mean that they couldn't tell us lest they break their vow silence.
Labels: Paul Manata
Tape-Loop Apologetics
If you find yourself confronted with an apologist - especially one steeped in the mystical casuistry of presuppositional apologetics - it won't be long before he brandishes one or more of his shiny terms of endearing negation before you and challenges you to "account for" some philosophical issue covered in some apologetics handbook. One such term is the word 'immaterial', an elusive notion which is integral to modern apologetic discourse, but which apologists typically do not define in positive terms. As Rand so poignantly noted, "their definitions are not acts of defining, but of wiping out." (Atlas Shrugged, p. 951) The concept 'immaterial' supposedly refers to something (which presumably exists) that is "not material." Of course, this only tells us what it is not, not what it is, so whatever it is remains unidentified. This is most ironic of course, since Christian apologists tend to make "meaning" an important element in how they characterize the antithesis between believers and non-believers, frequently intimating that "meaning" is only possible if there's a god, and yet here they are often hard-pressed to provide meaning to their key terms.
As an example of what they mean by 'immaterial', apologists often like to point to "the laws of logic," just as Greg Bahnsen did in his debate with Gordon Stein. Yes, that's right, it is strange to see people who enshrine invisible magic beings and other religious notions carry on as if they were concerned for logic. And it's not surprising that a religionist would seize on the laws of logic as an example of what they mean by "immaterial" since religionists in general typically have little or no understanding of concepts. Indeed, I've never found any book in the bible that teaches a theory of concepts. And how exactly does one prove that the laws of logic are in fact "immaterial"?
The presuppositional playbook stipulates that the apologist keep control of the conversation (which he quickly wants to characterize as a debate) by focusing the discussion on the non-believer's view of the world while the apologist hides his own faith-based worldview behind his back, keeping its nonsensical teachings conveniently out of sight. This is the real purpose behind the apologist's attempt to challenge the non-believer to "account for" some item that is usually topical to the mind and its operation, such as the assumption that nature is uniform, logical inference, scientific inquiry, moral judgment, etc., as if his religion had anything important to say on these matters whatsoever. The apologist doesn't really care about the issues that he challenges the non-believer on; if he did, he'd have already adopted an honest-to-reality philosophy. On the contrary, the apologist hopes to keep the non-believer busy explaining his own non-believing position while hoping to spring his Christian dogmas on the non-believer to "clean up" after the non-believer's worldview has been "destroyed" by the apologist's shallow grasp of philosophical matters.
Again the apologist exhibits a most pungent irony here, for in spite of all the feigned importance that the he places on being able to "account for" such things, we should not be surprised when the apologist shows himself unable to "account for" the totems of his worldview. The following brief dialogue shows how the apologist loses at his own game:
Presupposer: "How can your chance-bound, relative-only materialistic worldview account for immaterial entities?"
Non-Believer: "I'm not sure what you're asking. But please, tell me, how does your Christian worldview account for the 'immaterial'?"
Presupposer: "By the self-attesting sovereignty of the Triune God of Christian theism."
Non-Beleiver: "Is this god material or immaterial?"
Presupposer: "God is wholly immaterial."
Non-Believer: "So let me get this straight: you 'account for' that which is 'immaterial' by appealing to that which you say is 'immaterial'? How does that explain anything?"
Presupposer: [blank out]
Notice how the apologist's challenge is so easily shown to loop around and bite him in his nether regions. For if he appeals to the very thing that's being called to be explained, then he simply makes no progress in providing an explanation, for in the end he simply winds up with what he's called to explain. And indeed, if the apologist is challenged to "account for" the "immaterial," what options does he have? If he points to something material to "account for" that which he calls "immaterial," then he's basically admitting that matter is "ultimate" (a favorite presuperstitionalist term). But if he points to something allegedly "immaterial" to "account for" that which he characterizes as "immaterial," has he really explained anything?
The same kind of problem arises when apologists claim pretend that pointing to their god will somehow explain the origin of life. But their god is said to be alive already, so pointing to somethat that's alive does not help explain the origin of life. They're just pointing to what needs to be explained. In the final analysis, it is shown that the apologist is guilty of the very charge he levels against non-believers: the failure to "account for" something important in his own worldview.
Such muddlemindedness is what we can expect to find when we examine the tape-loop antics of presuppositional apologetics. Like a dog chasing its tail, presuppositionalists simply make no progress except in digging their own intellectual graves.
Probing Mr. Manata's Poor Understanding of the Axioms
In his 29 September comments to this Christian apologetics blog, amateur Christian apologist Paul Manata of Press the Antithesis has attempted to bring the Objectivist axioms into doubt with a series of questions he prepared. But curiously, even before he presented his questions, he announced his own ignorance on the matter:
First, I don't know what you mean by the axioms.
It is apparently upon this foundation of admitted ignorance that he proceeded to pontificate:
Ultimately, 'existence exists' is broken down to saying that only material particulars exist, this surely isn't a self-evident axiom. So, you can't ask if I agree with them since they are very vague and, once subjected to some kind of Wittgensteinian linguistic analysis, they are shown to not stand.
Notice the stupendous ignorance already in need of correction: a properly conceived axiom by definition does not "break down" into prior statements, for those prior statements would need a firm foundation in order be meaningful, and the axioms are the only proper foundation for meaningfulness. Since an axiom is a conceptually irreducible primary, it cannot be "broken down" into more fundamental affirmations. Additionally (and it is surprising that this would need to be pointed out), the axiom 'existence exists' and the statement "only material particulars exist" are not identical statements. To say that the axiom 'existence exists' can be "broken down to saying" something that is not identical to it, assumes that axioms are not conceptually irreducible, and if Mr. Manata is attempting to critique the Objectivist axioms, this is something that he would have to prove.
As for exclusivity, the only exclusivity of importance implied by the axiom 'existence exists' is that only existence exists. The axiom 'existence exists' does not "break down to saying that only material particulars exist," since the clause "only material particulars exist" is not conceptually irreducible, and pointing out the fact that existence exists leaves open the question of the nature of any particular existent that may be discovered. So we have not only an ill-fated attempt to interpret an axiom which in no way necessitates such interpreting (indeed, one should not interpret on the basis of self-admitted ignorance), we observe the fallacy of the stolen concept in action: Mr. Manata is asserting a multi-concept proposition, which is not conceptually irreducible, at the same level of or prior to a foundational axiom, which is conceptually irreducible. Indeed, the statement "only material particulars exist" – whether true or not – already assumes the fact that something exists (namely the particulars that are said to be exclusively material in nature as well as both the subject and object of cognition).
Also, Mr. Manata's confusion may in fact be due to an errant understanding of 'self-evident'. Many philosophers have claimed self-evidence for certain of their formulations which in fact are not at all self-evidently true (some have even suggested that invisible things are self-evident - cf. Rom. 1:20), and this trend in philosophy has unfortunately led to pervasive confusion about what it means to say that a truth is self-evident. Unfortunately, Mr. Manata appears to have fallen victim to such confusion.
Another confusion here is the tendency to mistake generality for vagueness. The two are not the same. I can say "all birds are biological organisms"; this statement is a generalization, but it is not in any way vague. The concept 'existence' is the widest of all concepts (it includes reference to anything and everything that exists, whether observed or postulated), but this does not lead to vagueness. To say that the concept 'existence' is vague suggests an inability to discriminate between the real and the unreal. If someone says that birds exist, who would find this vague? Mr. Manata and other theists insist that their god exists, and yet they do not seem to be troubled by any vagueness here. Indeed, the concept 'vague' is an abstraction which assumes the validity of a whole chain of prior concepts which ultimately stand on the truth of the axioms. So again, one must assume the truth of the axiom in order to make such statements, which again is evidence of yet another stolen concept.
Mr. Manata then suggests that axioms, when "subjected to some kind of Wittgensteinian linguistic analysis," can be "shown not to stand." Here Mr. Manata would be wise to check his premises, indeed, his own foundations. For here he is seeking to discredit a conceptually irreducible foundational statement by using a massive abstract system whose own foundations lie in the darkness of obscurity and which ultimately assume the primacy of consciousness (i.e., a view of reality that essentially denies the axioms). This tactic thus amounts to question-begging. All the while, the truth of the axiom 'existence exists' must be the case in order for Mr. Manata to utter any statements to begin with. If there were no existence, there would be no Mr. Manata and no "Wittgensteinian linguistic analysis" to deepen his confusion. But ironically, Mr. Manata's very own existence and efforts to destroy rival views merely confirm the Objectivist axioms. So again, we have a jumble of stolen concepts choking a confused mind unable to find his way among the concepts he attempts to apply but which turn out to be too big for him to handle effectively.
Then Mr. Manata stated,
Anyway, resprting to axioms is basically foundationalism.
For one who seems to think himself competent in the ways of "some sort of Wittgensteinian linguistic analysis," Mr. Manata could make a better effort to clarify what he is trying to say. The series of letters "resprting" does not show up in my dictionary. Perhaps he meant to write "resorting"? Let's add this correction and see if his statement starts to make any sense:
Anyway, resorting to axioms is basically foundationalism.
Now this is at least a little more coherent, but unfortunately not much more. Mr. Manata does not make himself clear for he does not make his position on the matter explicit, but it appears that he is attempting to use the term 'foundationalism' to connote a derogatory position. Foundationalism in philosophy has been contrasted with such notions as 'contextualism' and relativism. Perhaps there are other positions against which foundationalism is asserted. But until Mr. Manata isolates his view on this matter and explains a) how "[resorting] to axioms is basically foundationalism" and b) what in tarnation might be wrong with foundationalism as he understands it, this statement, if correctly interpreted from his sloppy writing, appears to have been written with the intention to inflame rather than inform.
Mr. Manata then proceeded to itemize his criticisms, which I will address in the order in which they were given. But before proceeding, I want to point out that, as Leonard Peikoff notes in Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand (p. 11), "no argument can coerce a person who chooses to evade" the axioms, and even if I thought this were possible, I would not seek to coerce anyone, even Mr. Manata himself. He is free to evade all he wishes. With that said, I will now go on to interact with his questions and criticisms.
i. If only beliefs that are perceptually self-evident serve as appropriate axioms, then what is the epistemic staus of this belief itself: that only beliefs which are perceptually self-evident can serve as axioms (or, basic beliefs)? Is this belief itself perceptually self-evident. No. So Burner's criteria runs afpul of its own standards. [sic]
This argument, to the extent that it can be taken as an argument, simply misconstrues the position it is attempting to critique. A worldview founded on objective axioms has no need to make the claim that all statements (even those pertaining to the nature of axioms) are axiomatic. The epistemic status of higher level statements is certainly not axiomatic (for they are not conceptually irreducible), and affirming that certain fundamental truths are axiomatic in no way commits one to the claim that higher abstractions and inferences must also be axiomatic. The essence of the issue should be quite easy to understand: we would need to have already formulated the axioms in order to discover their unique nature and understand their special relationship to the rest of one's knowledge. Statements summarizing the nature of axioms do not themselves have to be perceptually self-evident, and identifying the axioms as such in no way stipulates that statements summarizing what can be discovered about the axioms must also be perceptually self-evident. So there is no internal inconsistency here, no breach of one's own standards, just a lack of understanding on the part of the critic.
ii. The myth of the given: Sellers argues that this myth consists in thinking that perceptual states such as "this is red," and our powers of sensory discrimination in general, are pure an incorrigable, completely independant of any theoretical contribution or, background beliefs. So, perceptually self-evident claims cannot be foundational since it depends on prior assumptions for its intelligibility. Sellers writes: "For the point is specifically that observational knowledge of any particular fact, e.g., that this is green, presupposes that one knows general facts of the form X is a reliable symptom of Y. And to admit this requires an abandonment of traditional empiricist idea that observational knowledge 'stands on its own feet.'"
Again Mr. Manata's sloppiness needs to be corrected here. The name is Sellars, not "Sellers," and the ideas which Mr. Manata is repeating here belong specifically to one Wilfrid S. Sellars. There are several problems with Sellars' argument (or at least with Mr. Manata's attempt to present it – though it's not at all clear what the phrase "pure an incorrigable" [sic] is supposed to mean). But nonetheless the error here presents a good opportunity for clarifying an important point about the Objectivist axioms which is often missed by critics. Specifically, the issue here has to do with reducibility as well as the overlooked distinction between perception and conceptualization. The statement "this is red" is not a perceptual state, but a conceptualized identification based on a perceptual state. According to Objectivism, conceptualization must reduce to the perceptual level if it is to be objective and meaningful (since conceptualization is the result of abstracting ultimately from what is perceived). Also, statements like "this is red" and "that is green" are not conceptually irreducible. To be sure, the statement which Sellars proposes as a template for predication – "X is a reliable symptom of Y" – is certainly not conceptually irreducible. Such statements do stand on prior assumptions, but acknowledging this does not in any way imply that perception is not the pre-conceptual foundation to cognition. Objectivism simply makes those fundamental assumptions explicit by rightly identifying them as axiomatic truths – that is, as truths that would have to be true even for one to deny them. Now, the quote that Mr. Manata cites does not indicate what Sellars would propose in place of the "traditional empiricist idea" in question (let alone what he would propose in place of the Objectivist axioms), but this would be interesting to see. If it is thought that conceptual thought does not reduce to the perceptual level, then to what does it reduce (if to anything), and to what is that thought supposed to pertain (if not to things that we perceive)? Since Mr. Manata does not elaborate on these topics, it's hard to rule out the possibility that they matter not to him.
To be sure, before Rand, there were many misunderstandings that persisted in the realm of philosophy about the nature of perception and its role in the cognitive process. Now, however, we have sound theories of perception and concept-formation which integrate to form an objective basis for rational thought. The axioms are crucial to this objective basis, for they identify what makes it possible. Since consciousness is consciousness of something, statements are statements about something. Similarly, attribution of a property to a thing or a class of things is possible because properties are properties of things, of entities. So statements such as "this is red" and "that is green" do in fact require the axioms; if the axioms were not true, there would be nothing either green or red, and there would be no one around to call them such. To suppose that something other than perception must provide the basis of our knowledge is to say that something other than awareness is the faculty which makes knowledge possible. Thus the absurdity of those who contend against the primacy of perception in cognition is exposed.
iii. The regress is not halted: you must justifiedly believe yourself competent to judge whether a belief possesses those features which make it axiomatic. So accepting a certain claim B as basic requires that he also accept another claim K as basic: that B has whatever features needed to make it axiomatic, and not some alternative, as the proper foundation for knowledge. Thus the regress is not halted.
This statement completely misses the point. In order for a person to judge anything, whether it's his own competence or a job offer, the Objectivist axioms would have to be true: the person doing the judging would have to exist (there's one axiom), and he would have to be conscious in order to judge (there's another axiom). Furthermore, to judge anything presupposes differences which can be discriminated, and there wouldn't be any differences to discriminate if the axiom of identity were not true (so there's a third axiom). Quite simply, judging oneself competent to do anything is not a precondition for the general truths identified by the axioms: the axioms are true whether one judges himself competent or incompetent. That's because truth is objective - that is, truth is the identification of any actual state of affairs that obtains independent of our wishing, ignorance or denial.
Now we must ask: What is metaphysically more basic to any cognitive process than the subject-object relationship which makes cognition possible? A cognitive process is a process by which a conscious subject perceives, identifies and considers any object. The theist of course will want to posit that a deity is responsible for this. But is not the deity itself supposed to be conscious? Of what is it conscious? So the theist is right back to square one again, while Objectivism secures its position with an objective starting point which theism wants to second-guess as it tries to get away with denying it. What theists overlook is the fact that the Objectivist position would have to be true in order for the theist even to question or dispute that position.
iv. How do axiomatic beliefs support non-axiomatic beliefs?
It's good that Mr. Manata chooses to bring such questions to non-Christians, for his bible nowhere addresses them. So how do the axioms support non-axiomatic knowledge? The axioms provide higher knowledge with the solid conceptual basis needed for building the entire sum of one's knowledge in hierarchical structure. The axioms identify in the broadest possible terms the context which makes knowledge possible and important to human life and as such they directly identify the very preconditions of intelligibility.
The issue of the hierarchical structure of knowledge is of key importance to understanding the nature of the relationship between the axioms and the higher abstractions of a worldview. Peikoff makes the following point in this regard:
Human knowledge is not like a village of squat bungalows, with every room huddling down against the earth's surface. Rather, it is like a city of towering skyscrapers, with the uppermost story of each building resting on the lower ones, and they on still lower, until one reaches the foundation, where the builder started. The foundation supports the whole structure by virtue of being in contact with solid ground. (Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, p. 130.)
Objectivism can claim certainty for its foundations because those foundations are grounded in the invulnerability of the axioms. To deny the axioms is to deny the reality that gives authority to any truth. In this way such denial is self-refuting. Denial is an action undertaken by a consciousness, and a denial that consists essentially of saying that there is no consciousness is a denial that rules itself out. Similarly, a denial that says there is no existence is a denial that consists essentially of saying the one who's doing the denying does not exist. So denying the axioms does not get someone very far. Indeed, what is he trying to accomplish? Will his denying get him where he wants to go?
v. How does one know what he perceives is the way the world really is? Is there a difference between appearance and reality? Maybe your axioms tell us how we should think in order to be rational, but how do you know your axioms, which are based on perception, marry the world outside you? How does you escape the ego-centric predicament?
It's unclear what these questions are expected to achieve, if not simply to antagonize. Consider the first question: "How does one know what he perceives is the way the world really is?" Does Mr. Manata truly think it's possible to perceive things as they are not? Typical examples of what some might call "misperceptions" might include things like so-called 'optical illusions', such as a pencil sticking in a glass of water. "The pencil is straight, but look at it when it's dunked in the glass of water! It looks bent! See! The senses can't be accurate!" Well, how did he know that the pencil is straight in the first place? Silly religious fool! He's so quick to discount his own means of knowledge that he doesn't realize that he's discounting his own means of knowledge!
The issue here is not an error in perception. Rather, it is a misidentification of what one perceives. There's a fundamental difference here, since perception is not the same as conceptualization. Of course, we should not expect those who have no native theory of concepts to grasp such distinctions. Rather, it may be the case that such persons are grasping for anything that will open the door to doubts that feed theistic craving.
Perception is not a volitional process. We can focus our perception, and such directing is volitional, but we do not choose to perceive something in place of something that's really there. We also don't choose how our senses integrate sensory input into perceptions; this is a metaphysical feature of our nature as biological organisms. Mr. Manata seems to be concerned that the axioms might not "marry the outside world." It's not clear what this is meant to say, but apparently the concern is that the axioms have nothing to do with what they're naming. But what is driving this concern? If the axioms are formed on the basis of what we perceive, why wouldn't they have anything to do with what we perceive? Is this a genuine concern on the part of Mr. Manata, or is it just more smoke and mirrors? It's clear that he perceives Objectivism and its axioms to be a threat. And as an apologist for the religious view of the world, he should. What he misses is the fact that his faith-based worldview is no match for a worldview founded on reality and reason.
vi. People disagree about what is perceptually self-evident.
Peikoff deals with this kind of tired, go-nowhere statement very effectively in his book Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand (pp. 9-10):
"People disagree about axioms," we hear. "What is self-evident to one may not be self-evident to another. How then can a man know that his axioms are objectively true? How can he ever be sure he is right?"
This argument starts by accepting the concept of "disagreement," which it uses to challenge the objectivity of any axioms, including existence, consciousness, and identity. The following condensed dialogue suggests one strategy by which to reveal the argument's contradictions. The strategy begins with A, the defender of axioms, purporting to reject outright the concept "disagreement."
A.. "Your objection to the self-evident has no validity. There is no such thing as disagreement. People agree about everything."
B. "That's absurd. People disagree constantly, about all kinds of things."
A. "How can they? There's nothing to disagree about, no subject matter. After all, nothing exists."
B. "Nonsense. All kinds of things exist. You know that as well as I do."
A. "That's one. You must accept the existence axiom even to utter the term 'disagreement'. But, to continue, I still claim that disagreement is unreal. How can people disagree, since they are unconscious beings who are unable to hold ideas at all?"
B. "Of course people hold ideas. They are conscious beings – you know that."
A. "There's another axiom. But even so, why is disagreement about ideas a problem? Why should it suggest that one or more of the parties is mistaken? Perhaps all of the people who disagree about the very same point are equally, objectively right."
B. "That's impossible. If two ideas contradict each other, they can't both be right. Contradictions can't exist in reality. After all, things are what they are. A is A."
Existence, consciousness, identity are presupposed by every statement and by very concept, including that of "disagreement." (They are presupposed even by invalid concepts, such as "ghost" or "analytic" truth.) In the act of voicing his objection, therefore, the objector has conceded the case. In any act of challenging or denying the three axioms, a man reaffirms them, no matter what the particular content of his challenge. The axioms are invulnerable.
Mr. Manata's goal in vi. was to bring the axioms into dispute by declaring that people disagree about axioms. But, as Peikoff points out, just by acknowledging that there are people who can disagree about anything, Mr. Manata only succeeds in affirming the truth of the axioms while seeking to deny them. As Peikoff succinctly puts it, "The axioms are invulnerable."
vii. Why trust your axioms? Maybe it's just perceptually self-evident to you.
Having run out of objections which can be groomed to appear substantial, Mr. Manata is now obviously grasping for anything that can be turned into a weapon against the axioms. But as before, he seems oblivious to the fact that he must assume their truth even to dispute them. To say "maybe it's just perceptually self-evident to you" concedes the truth of the axioms: something would have to exist for the terms in such a statement to be meaningful, and someone would have to be conscious in order to utter them. Man has no choice about what is fundamentally true; this much is for certain. Wishing does not make something true (unless of course you're Geusha ;). The most fundamental choice we have is to think, or to evade thinking. If we choose to think, then we are already affirming the truth of the axioms implicitly, whether we consciously realize it or not. In order to think, we must first exist (there's the first axiom), we also must be conscious (there's the second axiom), and our consciousness must have the kind of nature that enables cognitive processing (there's the third axiom). In fact, in order for thinking even to be an option, the axioms must be true, since thinking, even as a potential, is a conscious activity. And if there were no consciousness (a supposition entailed by any rejection of the axioms), then thinking could not be considered an option (since there would be no consciousness to do the thinking and since consideration of options is a conscious activity as well).
To assert this all a matter of "trust" is to commit the fallacy of the stolen concept: these facts must be true long before we even get to the question of trusting someone or something. Since trust is a conscious activity, the axioms would have to already be true in order for us even to form the concept, let alone probe questions concerning what should or should not be trusted. In sum, the truth of the axioms does not depend on anyone's trust in them. They are true whether we trust them or not, which simply means that trust is irrelevant to their truth. They don't stop being true simply because someone chooses to distrust them.
viii. (If you says you knows that his perception is true for everone) How do you know this, then how do you know what you just said, ad infinitum. That is, how do you escape infintie regress? [sic]
Questions about truth only become an issue when considering statements about things, and even then only if we do so honestly. We do not say that a rock is either true or false, but we can say that a statement about the rock is either true or false. We can say, for instance, that the rock sitting in the garden came from a nearby construction site. This may or may not be true, and such claims are open to investigation. But the rock itself is neither true nor untrue, it simply is.
Now, the concept 'perception' refers to an autonomic physical activity of a biological organism. Perception can no more be "wrong" or "untrue" than a heartbeat or digestion. We would not say that hair growth is untrue, would we? Why then would we say that perceiving an object is untrue? Where did the critic of the primacy of perception get the concepts 'true' and 'untrue'? To what do they refer? Indeed, if one is not perceiving something, he's not conscious, for perception is the means by which biological organisms are conscious. To be conscious is to be conscious of something. If someone says that he is aware of an object but that the body's perceptual faculty is not involved in making that awareness possible, can he identify the means by which he has this awareness? Perhaps he just has "faith" – that is, he feels it in some non-sensory manner. In other words, he appeals to nonsense.
ix. Just assert me that your view is axiomatic (dogmatism).
To recognize that one's view is founded on the basis of undeniable axioms is not to declare his view in toto is summarily axiomatic. Axioms provide objective grounding to an entire conceptual hierarchy: while the total architecture of the context of knowledge is supported on the firm basis of axioms, we do not claim that all the concepts and affirmations that inform the entire structure of that hierarchy are axiomatic. Properly formed non-axiomatic abstractions are formed on the basis of the axioms, and ultimately reduce to the axioms as well. For instance, I hold to the view that man has the right to exist for his own sake, i.e., that he does not need to seek permission from anyone, either real or imagined, to live. But I do not declare this view as an axiom. Indeed, Objectivism is extremely careful about what it calls an axiom. An axiom has the following qualities:
It names a perceptually self-evident fact
Its truth not inferred from prior truths
Its truth conceptually irreducible
Its truth is implicit in all perception
Its truth is implicit in all knowledge and any statement
Its truth must be assumed even in denying it
Consider the axiom of existence: the concept 'existence' refers generally to anything and everything that exists. We know that things exist because we have awareness of them, and that awareness is possible by means of perceptual integration of sensory input. By saying 'existence exists', the Objectivist is simply affirming that there is a reality, for reality is the realm of existence. He does not infer this truth from prior truths, for there could be no truths prior to the fact that there is a reality. To what would those allegedly "prior truths" refer? To something other than reality? To non-reality? The unreal is unreal, so originating claims on the basis of something other than reality could not lead to truth. Thus beginning with non-reality (or non-existence, as religionists do) is futile. Also, the concept 'existence' is conceptually irreducible; it is not defined in terms of prior concepts (again, to what would those prior concepts refer if not to things that exist?), but is defined ostensively, that is, by pointing to reality. Moreover, the concept 'existence' is implicit in all perception, since perception is perception of something (i.e., of something that exists) by someone (i.e., by a conscious subject which also exists). Likewise, since objective knowledge is grounded ultimately on what is perceived, the concept 'existence' is implicit in any knowledge claim, any inference, any generalization, any conclusion, since knowledge is knowledge of something. And lastly, as we saw above, the truth of the existence axiom must be assumed even in an attempt to deny its truth.
x. Or, repeat what you've already said, i.e., that it's perceptually self-evident (circularism).
Repeating a truth does not make that truth "circular," if by this one means the fallacy of circular reasoning. They are true whether one repeats them or not. Furthermore, as pointed out above, the axioms are not inferred from prior truths; on the contrary, they are the truths on which all other truths stand. The axioms would have to be true for anything else to be true, since the concept 'truth' refers to statements which accurately identify some actual state of affairs. That is, statements that are true are statements that accurately identify reality (the realm of existence). So there's no instance of fallacious reasoning undergirding the axioms since they do not derive their truth from prior argument. Indeed, if the axioms were not true, there would be nothing to argue about and no one to assemble any arguments.
xi. How do we learn of these axioms?
By discovering them. As adults this requires the process of conceptual reduction, which involves systematically breaking our concepts down to their most fundamental assumptions, and checking to see if we've hit bottom, so to speak. The truth of the axioms is already implicit in our first perceptual experiences, since the axioms identify what we directly perceive. So long as we are conscious of anything, the axioms are present. In fact, the axioms are implicit in all perception, since perception is the fundamental, pre-conceptual awareness of some object by some conscious subject. Perception is perception of something, so the only validation that the axioms require is the relationship between a knowing subject and the objects it perceives.
But identifying these truths as axioms does require a hierarchy of knowledge which is consistent with those truths and which is enables a serious thinker to consider the question: What is fundamental to the knowledge I know? Unless one introspects honestly on the nature and source of his knowledge, however, it's probable that he will misconstrue the nature of his own mind as he misconstrues the nature and source of knowledge. The result of such misconstrual is religion.
To conclude, we should not miss the fact that the problem for Mr. Manata on this topic is that he does not understand how the human mind forms concepts from perceptions. And he doesn't understand this because his worldview does not explain how the mind forms concepts to begin with. Essentially, he does not understand the relationship between the conceptual and the perceptual, and how the perceptual holds epistemological primacy over the conceptual. This is going to be extremely difficult for Mr. Manata to grasp because he has chosen to commit himself to a worldview which holds that the subject of consciousness holds metaphysical primacy over its objects rather than the other way around, even though he must assume the very opposite in order to think and act. It is here where the ultimate problem lies: the willful devotion to a position which is ultimately subjective in nature – that is, a view of the world which grants metaphysical primacy to the subject of consciousness over its objects. So long as a mind remains committed to such a distorted and distorting view of the world, he will not be able to deal with these issues honestly.
Labels: Axioms, Objectivism, Paul Manata, Presuppositional Gimmickry