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Boarding Schools for Boys in Florida -- Safe Harbor is a lower cost alternative to therapeutic boarding schools in Fort Lauderdale, FL. – boarding schools for teens and teen boarding schools.
Boarding Schools for Boys in Fort Lauderdale, Florida
They May Not Accept Boys Who are Struggling with Disrespect, Peer Pressure, Minor Trouble with the Law, or Failing Grades. But Safe Harbor Does, and Molds them into Calm, Confident, Respectful, Disciplined and Knowledgeable Young Men.
As you look for boarding schools in Fort Lauderdale, Florida that will help your boy who is struggling, will you take a minute to look at Safe Harbor? Safe Harbor is a more affordable alternative to therapeutic boarding schools in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, with similar success and outcomes.
Safe Harbor is designed to teach troubled boys essential life skills and to build character.
The Safe Harbor boarding school story is portrayed in the 2009 movie "Safe Harbor" on the Hallmark Channel, which still airs periodically today. Safe Harbor has been featured nationally in People Magazine, and on CBS This Morning, NBC News Today, CNN, and CBN.
Safe Harbor transforms wayward teenage boys into mature and capable young men. Boys who are trained at Safe Harbor may be struggling from depression, anger, behavioral and school issues, minor drug use or trouble with the law, or the upheaval of a loss in their life. Often, boys who are struggling need help gaining a broader view of the world, one not so focused on themselves or keeping up with their peers.
Though you may be searching for a boarding school in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, please consider that the Safe Harbor waterfront experience blended with the personal attention, counsel and training make an unparalleled setting for growth and change in behavior.
For at-risk boys, Safe Harbor boarding school teaches boating and maritime skills, offers practical life training, and builds character in the context of vocational education, all while boys pursue their high school diplomas. The boys (many have come from Fort Lauderdale, Florida) live on board vessels at this waterfront boarding school. They gain knowledge of boating on the ocean and rivers while building respect for self and others, self-reliance, perseverance, and much more. Each teen who graduates from Safe Harbor learns to captain his own vessel, both literally and figuratively.
Enrolling Boys from Fort Lauderdale, Florida, Safe Harbor is Boarding School in Florida with Year-Round Education
At Safe Harbor, practical knowledge means as much as academic knowledge. Besides all aspects of boating and seamanship, we offer vocational training in several topics, like woodworking, boat refurbishing, navigation, log keeping and map reading, welding, engine repair, and basic electrical concepts.
Normal high school is in session year-round and can be accelerated, giving students a chance to catch up wherever they may have fallen behind academically. Boys who complete the Safe Harbor program earn a Florida high school diploma, and most continue their education at colleges of their choice.
We also know boys should be able to handle basic life skills. Graduates of Safe Harbor are taught to balance a checkbook and handle personal finances responsibly, apply for employment using appropriate resume and interview skills, understand basic nutrition, and handle laundry and housekeeping tasks, to name just a few of the topics we cover. Our goal is to make your boy respectful, self-reliant, confident, and competent.
Safe Harbor is a Boarding School that Helps Boys from Fort Lauderdale, Florida Make a Change of Heart and Attitude
Concerning counseling, our program incorporates group and one-on-one counseling, both from a mental health professional and from a pastoral counselor. The small size of our program gives an abundance of interaction time for boys from Fort Lauderdale, Florida with professional staff and mentors.
As you carry on your search in Fort Lauderdale, Florida and elsewhere, thank you for looking at Safe Harbor Maritime Academy situated on the East Coast in Jacksonville, Florida.
Boarding Schools for troubled boys from Fort Lauderdale, Florida
More about Christian boarding schools in Fort Lauderdale, Florida:
Fort Lauderdale IPAc-en is a city in the U.S. state of Florida, on the Atlantic coast. It is the county seat of Broward County. As of the 2010 census, the city had a population of 165,521. It is a principal city of the South Florida metropolitan area, which was home to 5,564,635 people at the 2010 census.
The city is a popular tourist destination, with 10.35 million visitors in 2006.Cite press release] Fort Lauderdale is sometimes known as the "Venice of America" because of its expansive and intricate canal system. The city is a major yachting center, with 42,000 resident yachts and 100 marinas and boatyards in 2006. The city sits Convert north of Miami. Fort Lauderdale and the surrounding area hosted over 4,000 restaurants and 120 nightclubs in 2006.
Fort Lauderdale is named after a series of forts built by the United States during the Second Seminole War. The forts took their name from Major William Lauderdale, who was the commander of the detachment of soldiers who built the first fort. However, development of the city did not begin until 50 years after the forts were abandoned at the end of the conflict. Three forts named "Fort Lauderdale" were constructed; the first was at the fork of the New River, the second at Tarpon Bend on the new River between the Colee Hammock and Rio Vista neighborhoods, and the third near the site of the Bahia Mar Marina.
Excerpt about Christian boarding schools in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, used with permission from Wikipedia.
Should you need help finding military schools for girls, therapeutic boarding schools for boys, therapeutic homes, girls military school, please let us know. Safe Harbor is among the top therapeutic schools, our therapeutic boarding schools for boys; one of few residential treatment centers and residential schools for teens that is affordable. As a home for troubled boys it serves at-risk boys, we help boys in Florida, Georgia, in Kentucky, in Tennessee, in Missouri, in Louisiana, in Arkansas, and in Texas. Plus, in the Midwest in Michigan, in Ohio, in Indiana and in Illinois. Mostly, troubled teens from homes along the east coast including in Virginia, in North Carolina, in South Carolina, in Pennsylvania, in New Jersey, in Massachusetts and in New York are provided counseling and therapy.
Boarding Schools for Boys in Florida -- Safe Harbor is a lower cost alternative to therapeutic boarding schools in Fort Lauderdale, FL.


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Sarkozy announces justice reform
Sarkozy greeted Rachida Dati back to work outside the court
President Nicolas Sarkozy has announced major changes to the French judiciary, bringing it closer to the system used in the English-speaking world.
President Sarkozy said he wanted to abolish investigating magistrates, who currently act as independent judges - a system brought in by Napoleon.
The changes would allow state prosecutors and the police to take the lead in investigations instead.
Critics say the move would leave the system open to political interference.
At present the investigating magistrate plays a powerful and independent role in certain cases, overseeing investigations by police and prosecutors, examining the evidence, and deciding if a case should go to trial.
State prosecutors, who answer to the justice minister, are now expected to take over criminal cases.
Such a change would be in line with recommendations made after a high-profile paedophilia case eight years ago - the Outreau scandal - in which more than a dozen people were wrongfully jailed following a flawed investigation by a young magistrate.
It would bring the French justice system closer to those used in much of the English-speaking world.
The government says it will speed up legal processes.
Around 100 lawyers and magistrates demonstrated on the steps of the Appeal Court, where Mr Sarkozy made his speech.
Unions representing magistrates warn the changes would compromise the independence of the French system.
Some have suggested that Mr Sarkozy is taking revenge against the independent judges who have led several far-reaching corruption probes into the affairs of leading politicians and businessmen.
Listening to the speech was the controversial Justice Minister, Rachida Dati, back at work just five days after giving birth to a daughter.
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17 Places That Prove Climate Change Is Real
Shoshi Parks | January 14, 2020
PHOTO: Anne Belden/iStock Editorial
Whether you choose to believe it or not, the planet is in a climate crisis.
With a U.S. president who denies the existence of climate change and the ongoing failure of leaders around the world to come up with a plan for a crisis that is already impacting the globe, it's no surprise that there are still people out there who refuse to accept that climate change is real. If you live in an echo chamber that calls man-made climate impacts "fake news," it's pretty easy to ignore the problem—especially if you're lucky enough to live in a part of the world that isn't yet feeling much impact from the coming crisis.
But the truth—the real truth, the one proven over and over again by climate scientists, marine biologists, and glaciologists using actual scientific data and evidence—is that climate change is here. And it's just getting worse. In just the last year, reports from all over the world confirm what experts have been trying to communicate for years: The atmosphere is heating up due to the massive levels of greenhouse gasses created by human activities over the last 150 years.
As carbon dioxide builds in the atmosphere, the whole world warms, melting the ice sheets and glaciers in places like Greenland and Alaska. Freed from the ice, the water is causing sea levels to rise from Venice, Italy, to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Increased temperatures and shifts in long-stable seasonal rainfall are causing extreme droughts in California, Australia, and elsewhere, triggering massive fires. In Chennai, India, there was so little water this summer that the municipal taps were shut down for 7 million people. In southern Bolivia, a lake twice the size of Los Angeles just dried up. Heat captured by the water is killing coral on the Great Barrier Reef, the South Pacific, and the Caribbean and causing hurricanes and cyclones to grow larger, stick around longer, and leave more destruction in their wake.
All of these disasters occurring simultaneously around the world are hard to ignore; the fact that they are, in most cases, unprecedented in size and level of devastation, makes it even harder. Yet, while most nations agree that there is a human-induced problem (with the exception of a few key players like the U.S. and Australia), none of them can agree on how to approach it. Last month's global climate conference, COP25, was declared an utter failure in determining how to move toward goals that will keep the entire world safe.
Whether you choose to believe the facts or not, the climate crisis is already making the world a more inhospitable place and not one of us is safe from its impacts. Here are 17 places around the globe whose struggle against rising seas and flooding, droughts and wildfires, coral bleaching and glacial melting, prove that climate change is very real.
PHOTO: Tim Brown/iStock Editorial
Chesapeake Bay and Tangier Island
WHERE: Virginia
Beginning around 250 years ago, small communities planted roots on low, marshy islands in Virginia's Chesapeake Bay. Today, only two remain. The rest have been consumed by the waves and water which are rising here faster than almost anywhere in the world. The Chesapeake has its sights set next on Tangier. Its small group of islands has already lost over two-thirds of its land mass since 1850 and without major intervention, divine or otherwise, the island will be completely underwater by 2063. Despite already facing challenges that include erosion and flooding, the people of Tangier don't seem to actually believe in climate change. Nearly every one of the town's less than 500 residents voted for climate-denier-in-chief Donald Trump in the 2016 election. The rising sea, though, doesn't care much about politics. Even if the world drastically cuts emissions tomorrow, the Chesapeake would still be coming for Tangier. The question isn't if, it's when.
Fact: Tangier Island was home to the British Fort Albion in the Revolutionary War. The remains of the fort were drowned by the sea decades ago.
PHOTO: Evan Hallein/Shutterstock
WHERE: South Africa
Since the dawn of municipal water systems, those of us lucky enough to live in most neighborhoods in major cities just expect that, when you turn on the tap, water will flow. But last year in Cape Town, South Africa the taps almost ran dry and all because the rain the city has depended on for decades just stopped falling—a pattern that's repeating itself all over the globe as temperatures heat up and the moisture in the atmosphere adjusts accordingly. When severe drought hit in 2015 and dragged on for the next three years, Cape Town's rain-dependent reservoirs virtually dried up. By February 2018, residents were restricted to using only 50 liters of water a day (about 13 gallons). The city had less than three months before Day Zero when the water was turned off. In the end, the climate threw an epic Hail Mary. The rains returned and the worst drought since 1933 was averted, but probably not for long. As the climate continues to warm, Day Zero continues to lurk just down the road.
PHOTO: RWBrooks/Shutterstock
Rising seas aren't just coming for small island towns, they're reshaping the entire geopolitical system as we know it. The small island nation of Kiribati will be the first casualty. The ocean has already inundated some low-lying villages and is rapidly seeping into freshwater ponds that communities need to survive. Without that freshwater, nothing will grow, the island will become unlivable, and it will all happen before the end of the century. Combine that with a mass die-off among coral due to the rising temperature of ocean waters and you've got a recipe for disaster that's already half-baked. Ironically, Kiribati's current president doesn't believe the crisis is man-made—he's busily funding programs to build luxury resorts and draw more tourists to its beaches. Ultimately, what the country's political administration does or doesn't do is of no consequence. Kiribati will be the first independent nation to fall, and the world will never be the same.
PHOTO: Melissa Kopka/iStockphoto
WHERE: USA
Wildfires are not new to Northern California. In the long, hot, dry months of September and October, they've always pretty much been a given. But over the last five decades, wildfire season has transformed from an occasional rural danger into an almost year-round scourge feeding off water-starved forests and blown by hot, dry winds. Nine of the most destructive fires in California history have occurred since 2015. Things have gotten so bad that the state's electric company has implemented rolling blackouts in hot, windy conditions, cutting electricity to as many as 2 million people to prevent poorly-maintained equipment from igniting dry vegetation. It used to be Northern California's relatively cool weather and predictable rainy season provided some protection against the kind of fires burning in hotter, drier conditions in Southern California. But, guess what climate change is doing? Shifting Northern California's climate patterns to more closely resemble those of the south. As increased heat sucks the moisture out of the air and causes mountain snow to melt earlier, epic droughts like the one California experienced between 2014 and 2017 will keep things crispy and flammable for years to come.
Fact: The most destructive fire in California history took place in November 2018 in northern Butte County. Over 50,000 people were evacuated, nearly 19,000 buildings destroyed, and 85 lives lost. The total bill for the 17-day blaze was $16.5 billion.
PHOTO: Ihor Serdyukov/Shutterstock
WHERE: Italy
In 2018, when five-foot high tides and heavy rains flooded the streets of Venice, the world was alarmed. Then, just two months ago, the whole thing happened again. Only it was worse this time, with flood waters peaking at six feet above sea level (the second-worst flood event in the last hundred years). Venice's founders knew the canal-striped city built on marshy islands in 421 A.D. would be vulnerable to the sea but they could never have predicted that the ocean would rise, on average, 0.05-0.07 inches per year between 1900-2000. Or that, by 2016, that rate would more than double to rise 0.13 inches per year. It doesn't sound like much but those fractions of inches add up, making (once rare) five- to six-foot floods a regular occurrence. Despite mountains of evidence, the Venetian government isn't helping. Just minutes before water began pouring into their chambers in November, Venice's town council voted against a measure to fight climate change.
Fact: At the same time Venice is battling rising seas, scientists discovered in the 2000s that it's also sinking into them due to a combination of plate tectonics and sediment compacting beneath the city—a problem they thought had stopped when the city stopped pumping groundwater from beneath its foundation. Additionally, Venice is also tilting to the east, little by little.
PHOTO: FocalPlane Photography/Shutterstock
WHERE: India
When the water goes, an entire city shuts down. That's what happened in Chennai, India's sixth largest city, this summer when its reservoirs started to run dry. For weeks, 7 million people, seven million!—or at least all those but the wealthy—had to stand in line to get water from government tanks. Restaurants and hotels closed and, despite a weeks-long heat-wave that reached 123 degrees and killed 36 people, air-conditioning all over the city was shut down because there was no additional water to run the units. It doesn't take a genius to recognize these two issues are connected. Heat waves are increasing, not just in intensity but in length. And what doesn't it do when it's literally hot enough to fry an egg on the sidewalk? Rain. When there's no rain, reservoirs don't fill. And, with no water in the reservoirs—well, you get the picture. The scariest part of it all is that summer of 2019 is just a sample of what's to come in Chennai. If the current trend of heat and drought continues, by the end of the century human beings will not be able to survive outdoors in the city for more than six hours at a time.
Fact: Chennai's coastal waters in the Bay of Bengal are just as endangered as the water in its reservoirs. Warming seas and pollution are responsible for the growth of bioluminescent algae blooms that are wreaking havoc on the marine ecosystem and the city's fishing industry.
PHOTO: Anya Douglas/Shutterstock
Hurricanes are a fact of life in the Caribbean but over the last 40 years, something has changed. It's not that there are more hurricanes, it's that those that develop are 45-87 percent more likely to be major Category 4 or 5 storms. The rise of more destructive storms like 2019's Hurricane Dorian, the most intense storm to hit the Bahamas in recorded history, has everything to do with climate change, according to scientists. Hurricanes feed off heat and, these days, the Caribbean has a lot of it. Not only have water temperatures in the Caribbean Sea been high enough to kill huge portions of its coral reefs, but air temperatures are increasing, too. Combined, hurricanes build faster, drop more water, and blow more intensely; wind gusts from 2019's Hurricane Dorian were measured at 220 mph. Dorian, alone, can't prove that climate change is real, it's true. But it doesn't have to. Since 2007, the Bahamas has been hit by four of the 12 strongest storms ever recorded in its history.
PHOTO: Danita Delmont/Shutterstock
For more than 30,000 years, humans have lived on the low-lying atolls of the South Pacific's Solomon Islands. Storms were common but predictable and life was, relatively speaking, harmonious. Then came the 20th century and along with it, tides high enough to submerge whole islands and cyclones with no respect for whether "cyclone season" was over or not. The situation has become untenable for many communities across the country and people displaced from the islands' most endangered areas are already being resettled on higher ground. Within just the next 30 years, thousands more will follow as the nation's islands are claimed by the Pacific.
Fact: Several other South Pacific nations are in the same sinking boat as the Solomon Islands. By mid-century, large portions of the Marshall Islands, Vanuatu, and Kiribati will be inundated by the rising sea.
PHOTO: aquapix/Shutterstock
WHERE: Australia
Coral reefs are like the forests of the ocean. They provide shelter for a wide variety of species, produce nitrogen and other nutrients that keep the sea healthy, and fix carbon. They even protect habitats on land by mitigating the impacts of powerful waves and tropical storms. And just like widespread forest destruction spells doom for the Earth, the widespread destruction of coral reefs spells doom for the oceans. So, the fact that the Great Barrier Reef, the largest coral reef in the world, is in crisis kind of presents a problem. The organisms are sensitive enough that all it takes is an increase in temperature of just one degree Celsius to result in catastrophic bleaching events that kill it. The two worst episodes marine biologists have ever seen took place on the Great Barrier Reef in 2016 and 2017. With temperatures rising 40% faster than scientists were predicting back in the '90s, though, these back-to-back bleaching disasters won't be the last.
PHOTO: Maridav/Shutterstock
WHERE: Alaska
When Joseph Whidbey first visited Alaska's Glacier Bay in the late 19th century, he found it strangled by tidewater glaciers. By the 1990s, they had receded more than 60 miles. Some had lost so much ice that they could no longer even be called glaciers. What's going on at Glacier Bay is going on in frozen regions all over the world. In Alaska, alone, 95% of the state's approximately 100,000 glaciers are in the process of thinning, stagnating, or retreating because air and water temperatures there are increasing at more than twice the rate as the rest of the United States. On average, the ice is receding up to 60 feet per year. It's not just a problem for the ice, Glacier Bay's whole ecosystem is under threat as changes in temperature cause spring to creep forward, throwing off the fragile balance between plants and hibernating animals.
Fact: While the vast majority of Glacier Bay's ice is retreating, the national park is one of the few places in the world where healthy glaciers still exist. At least one of them, the mile-wide, 250-foot high Johns Hopkins Glacier, is actually slowly advancing.
PHOTO: Coco Robicheaux / Alamy Stock Photo
Isle de Jean Charles
WHERE: Louisiana
A Native American community in Louisiana will be the first of the climate refugees in the U.S. It won't happen at the end of the century or even 50 years from now. It's already begun: in 2016, the entire community of Isle de Jean Charles, the home of the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw Indians, began a process of resettlement to higher ground. Back in the 1830s, when the tribe settled on Jean Charles to escape the Trail of Tears, the island was a robust five miles wide and 11 miles long. Now, a combination of rising seas, erosion of land due to storms like Hurricane Katrina, and canal dredging by oil and shipping companies have left Jean Charles just a quarter mile wide and two miles long. That it is an Indigenous community that is the first to be resettled due to climate change is no accident. From Alaska to Louisiana, Indigenous peoples are on the front lines of the crisis.
PHOTO: Cortyn/Shutterstock
The Nile gave birth to the ancient Egyptian civilization and since then the river's blue waters and regular floods have sustained millions in Egypt for thousands of years. In the 21st century, that's all starting to change. With extreme heat and drought ravaging the country, the Nile is drying up and as it recedes, salt water from rising seas is taking its place. Since most of the country's agriculture depends on the Nile and crops can't grow with an excess of salt, food shortages will be impossible to avoid. Meanwhile, the ancient port city of Alexandria is suffering the effects of rising seas like never before. The city and rest of the Nile Delta could be inundated by the end of the century, impacting 5.7 million people. Oh, and let's not forget that temperatures are skyrocketing in Egypt, causing punishing heat waves that are literally killing people. The past three years in the country have been the hottest on record. By mid-century, policy experts believe that countries in throughout the Middle East and parts of North Africa will regularly experience temperatures between 140-160 degrees. The climate crisis is already well on its way to transforming a land once celebrated for its ecological bounty into one of the most inhospitable places on Earth.
PHOTO: Oleksandr Umanskyi/iStockphoto
Many climate scientists consider Greenland "ground zero" for the crisis. The massive island is virtually covered in ice, 656,000 square miles of it to be exact. But because the heat waves plaguing the world over the last several years are more intense near the poles, Greenland's ice is melting faster than anyone could have predicted; in just a single 24-hour period in August, 11 billion tons were lost. All over the island, ice is thinning so much that traditional activities that have sustained Greenland's Inuit community for centuries like ice-fishing and dog-sledding are becoming not just dangerous but deadly. Greenland's melting ice sheets are a problem for the entire world. If they disappear, the sea will rise more than 20 feet, spelling the end for major coastal cities like New York and Shanghai.
Fact: Historically, sled dogs have played an important role in Greenland's culture but as the snow and ice become less predictable, people are abandoning the practice in larger and larger numbers. Between 1998 and 2016, the number of sled dogs in the country dropped by more than half, from over 36,000 to just around 14,000.
PHOTO: dpa picture alliance / Alamy Stock Photo
Lake Poopó
WHERE: Bolivia
In 2015, Bolivia's Lake Poopó, a body of water twice the size of Los Angeles, virtually disappeared and every single one of the factors leading to the lake's demise was caused by human hands. Rising temperatures in the region, which have increased by one degree Celsius in the last hundred years due to human-produced greenhouse gasses, have caused the shallow Poopó to evaporate more quickly than ever before. Extended drought in the region has prevented rainfall from replenishing the lake, leaving the Poopó to rely on water from the Desaguadero River. If man-made climate changes were the only stress facing the Poopó, it might have survived. But as the changing climate works to suck the lake dry, so are water managers, who have been using the river as a piggy bank for local mining and agricultural operations. By the time the Desaguadero reaches the Poopó it's little more than a trickle. Four years later, the lake still hasn't recovered and there isn't much hope that it ever will. That's been a disaster for local Indigenous communities who were dependent on the Poopó for centuries. Only about 800 Urus-Muratos people are now left on the lake's shores. The rest have become Bolivia's first climate refugees.
Fact: Half a world away in Central Asia, the Aral Sea, the fourth largest sea in the world, began to disappear in 2000. By 2014, it was almost completely gone, taking local economies down with it.
PHOTO: Jim West / Alamy Stock Photo
WHERE: USA and Canada
Like monsters from the deep, toxic algal blooms are making themselves right at home in Lake Erie, the smallest of North America's Great Lakes. The blue-green organisms which cause liver damage, numbness, dizziness, and vomiting have been appearing in larger and larger numbers since 2010 but last August's bloom was the worst so far, a 700 square mile patch of toxic goo. Algal blooms are directly linked to the chemicals and fertilizers agricultural operations are washing into Lake Erie. The more runoff, the larger the bloom and the more rain there is to move agricultural chemicals into waterways, the more runoff there is. With temperatures on the rise in the northern Midwest, more rain will fall. Climate change may not be the source of algal blooms but without it, the runoffs causing them would be easier to contain. Instead, the toxic free-for-all is just beginning to pick up speed.
Fact: Warming temperatures and agricultural chemical run-offs are also causing country-sized algal blooms in the Gulf of Mexico and China's Yellow Sea.
PHOTO: Daniel Taylor Producer/Shutterstock
New South Wales and Queensland
Australia is on fire and the blazes are larger and hotter than the country has ever seen before. The hotter and drier conditions become, the more likely fires are to ignite. And ignite they have, blanketing Sydney in toxic smoke that, in some places measured 11 times the level of "hazardous." Wild koalas, the cuddliest of Australia's bush animals aren't yet extinct, but with as many as 25,000 killed in blazes over the last two months, their future is now uncertain, too. It's estimated that as many as one billion animals have perished in the fires, in what's being called an "animal apocalypse." Australia's Prime Minister Scott Morrison is refusing to acknowledge the connection between the bushfires and the climate crisis—he says Australia's always had fires. But even Morrison can admit that 2019 was hot, hotter even than 2013, when temperatures smashed all previous records.
Fact: Drought is the new normal in Australia. Since 2003, only four years—2013 to 2016—have been drought-free. The current drought in Queensland and New South Wales has been ongoing since 2017.
PHOTO: Donatas Dabravolskas/Shutterstock
WHERE: Brazil
In South America, the dubious prize for which city will be most affected by climate change goes to Rio de Janeiro where average temperatures have risen one degree Celsius in the last five years. Sea levels are rising, too, even faster than they are in other seaside cities like Buenos Aires and Lima. In just five years, the water level has gone up 5.5 inches. Over the next 60 years, that could increase by almost six times, triggering catastrophic flooding in low-lying areas of the city. Meanwhile, Rio will heat up like nobody's business and rainfall will be cut in half. Compounding the problem is an unprecedented level of destruction in Brazil's Amazon Rainforest, which President Jair Bolsonaro wholeheartedly supports. Called the "lungs of the planet," the Amazon absorbs around two billion tons of the world's carbon annually. As it is burned for new agricultural and industrial projects (which, by the way, is currently releasing millions of tons of carbon into the atmosphere daily) the carbon dioxide will stick around in the atmosphere, magnifying all of the effects of climate change in Rio and around the world.
Climate Change,Global Warming,Science


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Festival of Religions to be held in Sofia on September 28
Written by The Sofia Globe staff on September 23, 2014 in Bulgaria - Comments Off on Festival of Religions to be held in Sofia on September 28
Representatives of various religious faiths – Jewish, Christian and Muslim – are to take part in a Festival of Religions in Bulgaria's capital city Sofia on September 28 2014.
The festival is being organised by the National Council of Religious Communities in Bulgaria and Sofia Municipality.
Proceedings start at 1pm and from 2pm outside the Old Baths in central Sofia, six faith groups will have stalls where visitors can learn more about the religious groups' beliefs and practices.
Those to be represented are the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, the Muslim religion, the religious community of Jews in Bulgaria, the Armenian Apostolic Church, the Roman Catholic exarchate and the Evangelical Alliance Bulgaria.
At 4pm, there will be a concert with participants including the Yoan Kukuzel Choir – founded in 1967 to perform traditional Orthodox Christian vocal music – the Dulce Canto, the gospel choir of the Evangelical Alliance, and representatives of the Armenian, Muslim and Roman Catholic communities.
From 6pm, the houses of worship of the faiths taking part in the festival will be holding "open house".
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September 23, 2014, by The Sofia Globe staff


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Dear all stakeholders,
2021 has been another challenging year due to the effect of Coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) on the global economy. The pandemic in Thailand intensified and widely impacted the economy during the third quarter, before softening down in the beginning of September.
During mid-July to August, the Center of COVID-19 Situation Administration (CCSA) announced curfew as a measure against the pandemic and later elevated the intensity to a lockdown. The measures were eased down in the beginning of November. Such measures caused a reduction in the spending rate of consumers as well as reduction in employment rate, which are the main factors that shrank the domestic purchasing power.
However, the government has launched various stimulus measures to boost consumer spending and relieve the impact on the economy such as Co-Pay program, 'Let's Travel Together' program, 'Section 33 We Love Each Other' program, 'We Win' program, and 'The more you spend, the more you get' . In addition, the significant increase of vaccination rate has also supported the situation in Thailand in 2021, since the government has expedited the vaccination to reduce the spread of COVID-19 and prepared for economic activities to resume.
The company has observed clear changes in consumer behaviors in two aspects; consumers buy products through online channel more, and consumers spend more time at home. The company saw the opportunity to elevate the service through Omni Channel and the development of products and services to support the changing demand of consumers, allowing the company to adapt to the changing behaviors of consumers within a timely manner.
On the aspect of online commerce, the company has developed the online channel to be more effective and convenient, both on its website and mobile applications (HomePro Application, Home Service Application and HomeCard Application). The Company has also developed SHOP4YOU, a shopping assistant service, as well as Same Day Delivery and Click & Collect for customers to make online purchase and pick up the products by themselves at stores. In addition, the company has continuously introduced various promotions to help boost consumer spending through social media and the company's applications during the pandemic to serve the demand while there are still concerns about the spread of COVID-19.
On the aspect of New Normal, the company set a goal to incorporate its products and services into consumers' daily lives at home by increasing the variety of sanitary and sterilizing products, Work From Home related products and Cooking At Home related products, with the emphasis on quality. The company is ready to provide services to customers promptly in case of an emergency such as power outage, broken air conditioner and broken plumbing through Home Service Application, or through Call Center. All channels are convenient and available throughout 24 hours for customers. 100% of technician teams receive ATK testing every week before providing service to ensure the safety of customers.
On the aspect of health and safety of customers, employees and other stakeholders who have been diagnosed with COVID-19, the company has built a field hospital in the area of Wangnoi Distribution Center to provide treatment. The field hospital is managed in collaboration with Rajthanee hospital along with managing Distribution Center under Bubble and Seal format that allows the Distribution Center to continue its operation according to Distribution Center's Business Continuity Plan, which takes care of the employees' health and safety during the pandemic while offering help to patients within surrounding communities.
In addition, the company adjusted the working method to favor Work From Home more to reduce the risk of COVID-19 infection in the office, as well as promoting for employees to receive vaccination. The company created an internal communication system called HR Clinic to provide support to employees who have been diagnosed with COVID-19, enabling them to receive treatment promptly. Care boxes containing medical equipment and medicines are sent to employees who have been mildly infected (green level) to treat themselves at home. These methods allow the workflow of the company to continue normally. The company has driven for employees to receive vaccination as completely and promptly as possible. By the end of 2021, 92% of employees have been vaccinated. Customers, therefore, can be confident to visit and shop at every HomePro store nationwide.
For store expansion in 2021, the company was still careful with its expansion due to the slow recovery of the economy. A new store was opened in Bangna Km.1 and another new store was opened in Mutiara Damansara, Malaysia. By the end of 2021, there are 87 HomePro stores, 6 HomePro S stores, 14 MegaHome stores and 7 HomePro Malaysia stores.
The company strives to make a better living for the society and community through its products and services under every aspect of sustainable development including Environment, Social and Governance: ESG.
The company promotes sustainable consumption through the selection of Eco Products, and elevates Eco Product groups to ECO CHOICE level, which are specially sortedto be options for customers. The company also promotes responsible use of plastic.
For promotion of economic growth, the company promotes the Young Entrepreneur program by developing the skills of technicians up to standard and increasing the number of technicians through local employment to align with store expansion. The result is to deliver excellent service for customers, together with stable income for technicians who participate in the program.
Furthermore, the company focuses on reducing impact to the environment by increasing the ratio of solar energy usage as Renewable Energy and managing garbage to achieve Zero Waste. The company also emphasizes on good corporate governance and fair treatment of all stakeholders, as well as prioritizing employee care with respect to Human Right, equality, and diversity, while promoting health and safety in the workplace.
Business operation in alignment with sustainability resulted in the company being rewarded multiple prizes locally and internationally. The rewards include being selected as a member of the Dow Jones Sustainability Indices (DJSI) in Emerging Markets for the fifth consecutive year, MSCI Global Sustainability Index, FTSE4Good Emerging Index, Bloomberg Gender-Equality Index (GEI) and ESG100 index. The rating result of the Company's Corporate Governance Report is excellent. The Company's stock is also listed for Thailand Sustainability Investment (THSI) along with receiving a highly commended in Sustainability Awards from the Stock Exchange of Thailand. The company received Thailand's Top Corporate Brands 2021 award from the Faculty of Commerce and Accountancy, Chulalongkorn University for the first time. The Company also received extension on CAC Certification by Thai Private Sector Collective Action Against Corruption.
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Supervenience and Mind
This article is an informal introduction to the concept of supervenience and the role it plays in the philosophy of mind. It surveys some of the many ways the concept has been used to reveal the manner and degree to which mental phenomena depend on facts about our bodies and their physical features. Philosophers usually construe the supervenience relation as a relation between classes of properties, where a class of properties, F, supervenes on a class of properties, G, just in case there is no difference in F-properties without some difference in G-properties. As David Lewis puts it, "no difference of one sort without differences of another sort" (1986, p. 14). It is in the philosophy of mind that we find the term's most frequent contemporary occurrence.
The goal of asking whether one set of properties supervenes on another is to better understand the ontological relation between the two sets — especially, whether the one set of properties depends entirely on the other. Suppose, for example, that two individuals can have different moral properties while being exactly alike in terms of their actual and potential behavior; that is, suppose that one's moral features do not supervene on one's behavioral features. Then we can conclude that the former depend on something more than the latter. And if we accept this conclusion, we are then led to search for a set of properties on which our moral features do supervene, a set of properties in terms of which any two individuals must differ with any moral difference. The goal is to isolate just that set of features on which our moral properties do wholly rely.
Suppose we succeed in identifying a set of features on which F-properties supervene (where F-properties might be moral, mental, aesthetic, economic, or any other higher-level properties). Then we can try to discover the nature of the dependence of F-properties on the underlying G-properties (for example, behavioral, physical, neurological, or intrinsic) by asking about the manner in which the former supervene on the latter. Is it a logical truth that a difference in F-properties requires a difference in G-properties? Is this covariance due to the causal laws that actually obtain? Is it a matter of metaphysical necessity? Asking these questions about the way in which F-properties supervene may help us decide whether the dependence is, for example, a wholly analytic affair, a type of causal dependence, a matter of constitution, or a matter of genuine identity.
Supervenience: The Basic Idea
Supervenience and Non-Reductive Physicalism
Varieties of Supervenience
Global and Local Versions
Varieties of Necessitation
Two Common Complaints with Supervenience Theses
Explanatory Failure
Ontological Failure
References and Further Readings
1. Supervenience: The Basic Idea
Nora's latest sculpture has many intrinsic features, including its shape, density, texture, and constituent matter. It also has various aesthetic properties — beauty, grace, elegance, and expressive power. No doubt, the aesthetic properties of the sculpture are in some way and to some degree a result of its intrinsic features. But in what way exactly, and to what degree? Thinking in terms of supervenience is a good start to finding the answer. Imagine an artwork, x*, that is intrinsically indistinguishable from Nora's sculpture, x — a perfect duplicate of x. Is it possible that despite the indiscernability, x* might differ aesthetically from x? If it is not possible for x and the intrinsically indiscernable x* to differ aesthetically, then we say that the object's aesthetic features supervene on its intrinsic features, where a class of properties, F, supervenes on a class of properties, G, just in case a difference in F-properties requires a difference in G-properties; in other words, all the same G-properties guarantee all the same F-properties.
If we decide that the object's aesthetic properties do supervene on its intrinsic features, then we are led to inquire whether the former are identical with the latter or whether the dependence relation is of some weaker sort — for example, causal dependence or constitution. On the other hand, if we conclude that the object's aesthetic properties do not supervene on its intrinsic features, that is, if x* might differ aesthetically from x despite their intrinsic similarity, then we can conclude that those aesthetic properties are at least partly a function of certain relations the object bears to external items. We are then led to ask what the relevant external relations are. We think in terms of supervenience again, imagining various changes in x's environment (different origins, differences in historical context, different standards of the qualified judges, differences in popular opinion), and for each of those changes we decide whether x's aesthetic features might also differ, until we isolate just those features of the environment on which the aesthetic properties do rely. The conclusion would then be that the object's aesthetic features supervene on its intrinsic properties together with those external features.
As this line of inquiry shows, the concept of supervenience is an invaluable tool for deciding whether and how one set of properties depends on another. An analogous line of inquiry is found in discussions of mental content. The content of one's mental states depends largely on what the individual is like internally — on the state of the brain and the brain's causal relations to other parts of the body, including sense organs and limbs. But does the content of one's mental states depend entirely on these intrinsic features? To decide this issue, we consider whether it is possible for an indistinguishable individual, a molecule-for-molecule duplicate, to differ in terms of the content of her mental states. And thanks to the thought experiments of Hilary Putnam (1973, 1975) and Tyler Burge (1979), it is widely thought that intrinsic duplicates can indeed differ in the content of their mental states. Putnam has us imagine a twin-earth that is exactly like earth except that what they call "water" on twin-earth is comprised of something other than H2O molecules. The content of your water-thoughts, it seems, differs from the content of your doppelganger's "water"-thoughts on twin-earth — simply because of the difference in the liquid toward which those thoughts are directed. (But note that Putnam's example is actually designed to show a difference in linguistic content, meaning, which does not in itself entail a difference in mental content.) Likewise, Burge shows that given suitable differences in surrounding linguistic practice, the thoughts one expresses with the word 'arthritis' might differ in content from those that one's doppelganger expresses. For example, if your duplicate inhabits a possible world in which 'arthritis' is regularly used to describe various conditions in addition to inflammation of the joints, then it seems that the content of the duplicate's 'arthritis' thoughts will differ from yours. Examples such as these seem to show that the content of one's mental states does not supervene on one's intrinsic features alone, but only on a set of features that includes features of one's environment.
While Putnam and Burge do not use the term 'supervenience' in the essays mentioned above (though Burge does use it in his 1986 discussion of externalism), it is clear that the concept of "no difference of one sort without differences of another sort" is being utilized. It was Davidson's use of 'supervenience' in "Mental Events" (1970) that made the term popular in the philosophy of mind.
2. Supervenience and Non-Reductive Physicalism
While Davidson denies that there are psychophysical laws, he acknowledges (in a widely cited passage) that
mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or supervenient, on physical characteristics. Such supervenience might be taken to mean that there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental respect, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respect without altering in some physical respect" (1970, p. 88).
Not long after the appearance of Davidson's essay, discussions of Non-Reductive Physicalism became the major locus of supervenience-talk in the philosophy of mind and the philosophical literature in general. Due to the popularity of functionalist accounts of mentality and the wide degree of multiple realizability they entail (that is, that the same mental property can be realized by events of different physical, chemical, and neural types), a dominant view in the philosophy of mind for the past few decades is the belief that mental properties are not identical with neural properties or any other properties of the natural sciences. Yet, many of those who reject psychophysical property-identities also claim to support Physicalism regarding mentality, the view that all mental phenomena obtain solely by virtue of physical phenomena. One wonders: how can mentality obtain solely by virtue of physical phenomena, as Physicalism maintains, if mental properties are not physical? The most popular answer is that while mental properties are not identical with physical properties, they nonetheless depend on nothing other than physical properties — that is, they supervene on physical properties.
Whether a mental-physical supervenience thesis captures the content of Physicalism regarding mentality depends on how exactly the supervenience relation is to be understood. To say that there is no mental difference without some physical difference leaves the matter rather unclear. Much of the literature on supervenience in the philosophy of mind is devoted to adding the needed precision. Let us consider some of the many issues that arise.
3. Varieties of Supervenience
The philosophical literature is replete with all manner of ways to describe the supervenience relation — "an unlovely proliferation," as Lewis puts it (1986, p. 14). Here are some of the most popular brands.
a. Global and Local Versions
John Haugeland expresses the idea that all properties supervene on physical properties as follows: "[t]he world could not have been different in any respect, without having been different in some strictly physical respect" (1984, p. 1). This is a global supervenience thesis, claiming that nonphysical difference entails physical difference at the level of possible worlds as a whole (where a possible world is a way the world could have been, which includes the actual world, the way the world actually is). Applied to mental and physical properties, Haugeland's global supervenience claim is that the total state of any possible world could not have been any different mentally without differing physically. That is,
(GS) for any possible worlds, w1 and w2, if w1 and w2 differ mentally, then w1 and w2 differ physically.
Equivalently, if w1 and w2 are exactly the same physically, then they are exactly the same mentally.
While GS goes a long way toward capturing the physicalist belief that the mental depends entirely on the physical, it is arguable that it does not go far enough. Kim (1987, p. 321) has us imagine that some possible world b differs physically from the actual world in only the following respect: in b one of Saturn's rings contains an additional ammonia molecule. GS requires mental similarity only between worlds that are physically indistinguishable as a whole. So despite the slight and innocuous physical difference between b and the actual world, GS allows that b mentally differs from the actual world as greatly as you please, perhaps being completely devoid of mentality. This result clearly goes against the physicalist intuition that mental phenomena obtain solely by virtue of physical phenomena. For in the case Kim describes, all of the physical features that are relevant to mentality remain constant. So it seems that if b differs mentally from the actual world, as GS allows, then whatever mental differences there are would have to be due to something other than physical differences. (Note that several authors identify and formulate different types of global supervenience; for a thorough description of varieties of global supervenience, see McLaughlin and Bennett, 2006. These complexities are ignored in this introductory survey; here the concern is with global supervenience in general.)
To come closer to capturing the content of Physicalism regarding the mind, a supervenience thesis needs to require not only that worlds differing mentally differ physically, but also that individual objects and events cannot differ mentally without differing physically. Consider, then, the following local supervenience thesis:
(LS) for any worlds, w1 and w2, and any individuals, x in w1 and y in w2, if x in w1 differs mentally from y in w2, then x in w1 differs physically from y in w2.
Or one might choose what Kim (1984) calls "strong" supervenience. To say that mental properties strongly supervene on physical properties is to say that
(SS) necessarily, for any mental property M, and any individual x that has M, there is a physical property (or set of physical properties) P, such that x has P, and necessarily, for any individual y, if y has P, then y has M.
The difference between LS and SS is that LS allows the possibility that some entities have mental properties without having any physical properties. (Yet, SS and LS are equivalent when the base set of physical properties is closed under negation, that is, when for every physical property P in the base set, its negation, ~P, is also included.)
Now suppose that Carla and Marla inhabit worlds that are physically indistinguishable in every respect except for the extra ammonia molecule in a ring of Saturn. While the worlds themselves differ physically, Carla and Marla do not. So unlike GS, LS and SS entail that Carla and Marla are mentally indistinguishable. So it seems that LS and SS better capture the physicalist intuition that mental facts obtain solely in virtue of physical facts. (However, there is some debate over whether the global thesis might actually be equivalent to SS given the right closure principles. See, for example, Petrie, 1987, Kim, 1987, Paull & Sider, 1992, and Stalnaker, 1996.)
Note that SS differs from Kim's formulation of what he calls "weak" supervenience (WS), which lacks the second occurrence of the word 'necessarily.'
(WS) necessarily, for any mental property M, and any individual x that has M, there is a physical property (or set of physical properties) P, such that x has P, and for any individual y, if y has P, then y has M.
Unlike SS and LS, WS requires only that physical duplicates are mental duplicates within possible worlds, thereby allowing that physical duplicates differ mentally across possible worlds. So unlike SS and LS, WS allows that you could have had different mental properties from those you actually have without differing in any physical way. But if you could have had different mental properties without differing physically in any way, then the mental facts about you do not depend solely on the way you are physically, which seems to be contrary to Physicalism. Thus, SS and LS are preferable to WS.
As indicated above, by not allowing that Carla and Marla differ mentally, LS and SS might seem preferable to GS. However, one might think that given externalist intuitions, GS is more desirable. If externalism regarding mental content is correct, then individuals that are the same in terms of their intrinsic physical properties are not guaranteed to be mentally the same. GS honors externalist intuitions by requiring sameness only at the level of whole worlds, thereby allowing individuals with all the same intrinsic physical properties to differ mentally. However, Kim (1987, pp. 322-4) points out that the strong supervenience thesis, SS, can also allow the truth of externalism simply by including extrinsic properties of individuals in the supervenience base, properties such as being causally related to stuff comprised of H2O. If the underlying physical properties, the subvening properties, include relations to external items, then LS can also accommodate externalist intuitions. (Although, we cannot let just any extrinsic property into the supervenience base. If we allow the extrinsic feature of occupying a world with such-and-such complete physical profile, then the strong and local supervenience theses automatically collapse into the global version. For in that case, having all the same mental properties is not required unless the individuals occupy worlds that are physically indistinguishable in every respect. Vera Hoffmann and Albert Newen, 2007, develop the idea of property-dependent supervenience as a way to include only those extrinsic properties that are relevant to the instantiation of a higher-level property.)
We saw that one worry about GS is that it allows great mental differences to be accompanied by what seem to be wholly irrelevant physical differences — allowing, for example, that Carla and Marla differ mentally despite their physical similarity, simply because in Marla's world there is one more ammonia molecule in one of the rings of Saturn. LS and SS prevent this possibility but they still fall short of fully capturing physicalist intuitions since differences irrelevant to one's mentality are to be found not only in distant regions of space. Suppose that Carla and Marla live in physically indistinguishable environments and their bodies are physically indistinguishable in all but the following respect: Marla has an additional electron in one of her toenails. Since this cuticle difference seems to be completely irrelevant to mentality, we would expect that Carla and Marla are mentally indistinguishable. However, since they are not physically indistinguishable, LS and SS allow vast mental differences between the two. This result seems contrary to the spirit of Physicalism since Carla and Marla are physically indistinguishable in all the ways that are relevant to mentality.
The move from GS to LS and SS is an attempt to isolate those physical properties that are relevant to the exemplification of a mental property. For a more successful attempt, one might appeal to Terence Horgan's regional supervenience thesis. With his notion of a P-region, a spatio-temporal region of a physically possible world, Horgan expresses his regional supervenience thesis as: "There are no two P-regions that are exactly alike in all qualitative intrinsic physical features but different in some other qualitative intrinsic feature" (1993a, p. 571). (Also see Horgan 1982, p. 37). Consider the region of space occupied by Marla's whole body minus the toenail with the extra electron and the region of space occupied by the corresponding part of Carla's body. Since these two regions are physically indistinguishable, the regional supervenience thesis yields the correct result that Carla-minus (Carla minus the toenail) does not differ mentally from Marla-minus. This result together with the fact that there is no mentality supervening on the physical features of the toenail itself yields that further desired conclusion that Marla as a whole is mentally the same as Carla as a whole. (By the way, those mental and other higher-order states that require an externalist individuation will supervene on the intrinsic features of an expanded region of space, which Horgan points out, is "a region large enough to encompass, as intrinsic features, all the contextually relevant facts": 1982, p. 39.)
Another way to isolate just those physical features that are relevant to mentality is to utilize Kim's notion of a B-minimal property. A property is B-minimal when "any property weaker than it is not a supervenience base" (1984, p. 165). If a physical property, P, is B-minimal with respect to mental property M, then P is a least sufficient condition for M — that is, P's instantiation guarantees M's instantiation, and there is no proper constituent of P an instance of which guarantees an instance of M. The properties that are B-minimal with respect to M do not include the number of electrons in one's toenails. Thus, with only B-minimal properties in the supervenience base, Carla and Marla have all the same subvening properties despite their cuticle difference, which guarantees that they have all the same mental properties. Suppose, then, that we strengthen LS and SS to read:
(LS*) for any mental property M, there is a physical property P that is B-minimal with respect to M, such that for any possible worlds, w1 and w2, and any individuals x in w1 and y in w2, if x in w1 differs from y in w2 in terms of M, then x in w1 differs from y in w2 in terms of P
(SS*) necessarily, for any mental property M, and any individual x that has M, there is a physical property (or set of physical properties) P, such that (i) x has P, (ii) P is B-minimal with respect to M, and (ii) necessarily, for any individual y, if y has P, then y has M,
respectively. Since no physical property that is B-minimal property with respect to M includes having an extra electron in a toenail, neither LS* nor SS* allows that Carla and Marla differ mentally, which is just as Physicalism seems to require given that they are physically indistinguishable in all respects relevant to mentality.
Jeffrey Poland's (1994) formulation of Physicalism further narrows the class of relevant base properties by adding the notion of a B-minimal property to a regional supervenience thesis. Poland worries that a physical property might qualify as a B-minimal supervenience base with respect to some higher-level (for example, mental) property without being the property by virtue of which the higher-level property is instantiated. To remedy this defect Poland proposes that "[f]or each non-physical attribute, N, and for each region of space-time, R, if N is actually (or possibly) instantiated in R, then there exists a minimal class of physically-based attributes, P, such that the instantiation of the members of P does (or would) provide a realization of N on that occasion" (p. 191).
Apart from deciding which of these supervenience theses to endorse, there is another issue that needs to be addressed. In formulating a supervenience thesis adequate for understanding the ontological relation between two sets of properties, we need to decide which brand of modality is to figure in our formulation? How should the necessity operators in WS, SS, and SS* be interpreted, and what is the range of the possible worlds mentioned in GS, LS, and LS*?
b. Varieties of Necessitation
Suppose it is true that whenever there is a mental difference there is a physical difference. It would seem that this is not merely an accidental fact, not merely a matter of the way things happen to be. Rather it seems that the physical facts that obtain in some way necessitate the mental facts that obtain:
(N) facts about the distribution of physical properties necessitate all the facts about the distribution of mental properties.
But what brand of necessity is at issue here? Answering this modal question is essential to understanding how the mental depends on the physical. The answer is also crucial to deciding whether a supervenience thesis can adequately capture all that Physicalism regarding mentality entails.
The physical facts clearly do not logically necessitate the mental facts. The laws of logic alone do not allow us to derive the latter from the former. However, one might wonder whether the laws of logic together with the meanings of physical and mental terms allow us to derive all true mentalistic sentences from sentences expressed in physical vocabulary. That is, one might wonder whether
(NL-C) facts about the distribution of physical properties logically/conceptually necessitate all the facts about the distribution of mental properties.
Yet, NL-C seems implausible on any reasonable interpretation of 'physical.' If we restrict the term 'physical' to properties described by the science of physics itself, then the obvious difference in meaning between mental vocabulary and the vocabulary of physics seems to show that NL-C is false. Even if the word 'physical' were used loosely enough to include brain properties, and even if mental properties were identical with brain properties, NL-C would still be highly dubious. Since mental talk is not synonymous with neural talk, mind-brain identity theorists rightly held their view, not as an analytic truth, but as a significant empirical hypothesis. (See, for example, J.J.C. Smart, 1959 and U.T. Place, 1956.) Suppose 'physical' is used liberally enough to include overt behavioral responses to environmental input — for example, bringing an umbrella when confronted with rain, grimacing and groaning as the punching continues, and responding appropriately in French to questions posed in French. With this liberal use of 'physical' NL-C would be accepted by logical behaviorists. Of course, this is no credit to NL-C given the well-known problems with logical behaviorism. Although, one might think that with such a generous use of 'physical,' analytic functionalism (which is not as implausible as logical behaviorism) is committed to NL-C as well. But that is not so. Functionalists characterize mental properties in terms of their relations to environmental input, behavioral output, and other mental properties. For instance, the belief that it is raining will be characterized in terms of an inclination to bring an umbrella if one wishes to keep dry. Given that mental predicates are to be interdefined, even with a liberal definition of 'physical' the analytic functionalist would seem compelled to deny that a purely physical description logically/conceptually guarantees the truth of any mental description.
Not only does NL-C seem to be false, it also appears to be much more than what Physicalism requires. It might be that mental phenomena depend entirely on physical phenomena (as physicalists regarding mentality contend) without there being a logical or conceptual tie between the two. Since predicates that differ in meaning might denote the very same property, it seems that even if mental properties were identical with physical properties, it would not follow that facts about the latter logically or conceptually guarantee facts about the former. (However, Robert Kirk claims otherwise. Imagine the complete set, P, of facts about the world expressed in the vocabulary of an ideal physics, and suppose that this set includes all of the physical laws that obtain. According to Kirk, Physicalism requires that the relation between P and the set of mental facts is one of strict implication, where "statement A strictly implies a statement B just in case 'A and not-B' involves inconsistency of a broadly logical or conceptual kind," 2006, p. 525. There are also the arguments of Jackson (1994 & 1998) and Chalmers' (1996) to consider, arguments purporting to show that much more follows a priori from the physical facts than what we might be inclined to think. Although, for Chalmers and Jackson, these do not include facts about the qualitative character of conscious experience.)
The fact that mental differences require physical differences would seem to have something, perhaps everything, to do with the laws of nature that actually obtain. It is arguable that the laws of nature that actually obtain are what make it the case that mental sameness guarantees physical sameness. Consider, then, the proposal that:
(NN) facts about the distribution of physical properties nomologically necessitate all the facts about the distribution of mental properties.
However, while it is reasonable to think that the supervenience of the mental on the physical is a matter of the laws of nature that actually obtain, NN is too weak to do the work a physicalist would want a supervenience thesis to do. The physicalist who appeals to supervenience is trying to honor the fact that the mental depends entirely on the physical without being committed to the view that mental properties are identical with physical properties. Suppose, as is widely believed, that mental properties are not identical with physical properties. Then the psychophysical laws by virtue of which the physical facts fix the mental facts are not purely physical laws. In that case, NN allows that there is a possible world that is physically indistinguishable from the actual world, including all the same purely physical laws, but with a very different distribution of mental properties. As Crane puts it, "if fixing the mental facts requires psychophysical laws, then fixing the physical facts alone is not sufficient to fix the mental facts" (1991, pp. 237-8).
To support our physicalist intuitions, it seems that we need a supervenience relation that is committed to the following necessitation claim:
(NP) facts about the distribution of physical properties physically necessitate all the facts about the distribution of mental properties,
where p physically necessitates q just in case 'p and not q' is not true in any possible world with all the same physical laws as those that actually obtain. If the physical laws did allow worlds with the same distribution of physical properties but a different distribution of mental properties, then there would be a clear sense in which the mental facts are at least partly due to something other than physical facts. So it is arguable that our physicalist intuitions do entail just what NP states. Indeed, Np does capture a popular way that the necessity involved in supervenience theses applied to mentality are in fact understood. (See, for example, Papineau's formulation of Physicalism: 1993, p. 21.)
Yet, there are some worries about NP. Lewis, Horgan, and Jackson address what is called the Problem of Extras. Lewis claims that "Materialism is meant to be a contingent thesis, a merit of our world that not all other worlds share" (1983, p. 362). Even if all concrete phenomena obtain solely by virtue of physical phenomena, as Physicalism maintains, it seems that things did not have to be that way. The world could have been such that angels, ghosts, or other immaterial beings reside alongside the physical items that actually exist. It is also arguable that Physicalism allows non-actual possible worlds where all the actual physical laws obtain but with immaterial extras — provided that these extras do not causally interfere with the physical world. Horgan imagines that "[i]n such worlds the spirits would not interfere with the ordinary operations of physical laws upon physical substances; they would simply co-exist with the physical" (1982, p. 35). The concern, then, is that a possible world with the same distribution of physical properties that actually obtains and all the same physical laws might nonetheless differ from the actual world by having immaterial mental extras. If such a possible world is consistent with the truth of Physicalism, as Lewis and Horgan think, then the truth of Physicalism does not require that physical sameness (including physical laws) guarantees mental sameness. And if so, then NP is not necessary for the truth of Physicalism.
One way to solve the Problem of Extras is to identify some restricted class of physically possible worlds and then characterize Physicalism as the view that physical sameness entails mental (and other higher-order) sameness in that restricted class of worlds. For example, Frank Jackson (1998) appeals to the notion of a minimal physical duplicate, where "a minimal physical duplicate of our world is a world that (a) is exactly like our world in every physical respect (instantiated property for instantiated property, law for law, relation for relation), and (b) contains nothing else in the sense of nothing more by way of kinds or particulars than it must to satisfy (a)" (p. 13). With this notion of a minimal physical duplicate, Jackson proposes that we characterize Physicalism in general as the view that "[a]ny world which is a minimal physical duplicate of our world is a duplicate simpliciter of our world" (p. 12). That is, if you physically duplicate the actual world and stop right there, then what results does not differ mentally or in any other way from the actual world. To restrict the class of physically possible worlds where physical sameness entails mental sameness, Lewis (1983) relies on the notion of a property's being "alien" to a world, where "a property is alien to a world iff (1) it is not instantiated by any inhabitant of that world, and (2) it is not analysable as a conjunction of, or as a structural property constructed out of, natural properties all of which are instantiated by inhabitants of that world" (p. 364). With the notion of an alien property, Lewis offers the following supervenience claim: "[a]mong worlds where no natural properties alien to our world are instantiated, no two differ without differing physically; any two such worlds that are exactly alike physically are duplicates" (p. 364). If we think that a physically possible world with the distribution of physical properties that actually obtains might nonetheless contain immaterial mental extras, then we might restrict NP with the help of either Lewis' proposal or Jackson's (or Horgan's proposal, which appeals to the notion of a physically accessible world, a P-world, 1982, p. 36-7).
Another potential concern about NP is expressed by Francescotti (2000, 1998). Suppose, as many believe, that mental properties are not identical with physical properties. Then the purely physical laws do not range over mental properties. In that case, Francescotti argues, the physical properties instantiated would determine which mental properties are instantiated only given the truth of irreducibly psychophysical laws. But if so, it is arguable that the truth of Np requires that mental properties are identical with physical properties (which seems to be a threat to Non-Reductive Physicalism assuming that Physicalism requires the physical necessitation of mental facts).
The search for the exact way in which the physical facts necessitate the mental facts continues. There are also the remaining issues described in section 3-a — whether to prefer local to global supervenience, and whether and how to make the thesis super-local to capture only those physical properties that are relevant to mentality. There is also the issue of whether the supervenience base should be restricted to qualitative properties or whether non-qualitative, impure properties should also be included — properties such as containing a neural event that is numerically identical with neural event x. (Recall that Horgan's regional supervenience thesis is restricted to qualitative properties.) There is also the question of whether it is acceptable for a supervenience thesis to be restricted to same-subject necessitation, where the base properties are restricted to properties of the very same object that bears the supervening properties. Should we prefer multiple-domain supervenience (where the supervening properties are exemplified by a domain of items that differs from the domain of the subvening properties) — allowing, for example, that the base properties are properties of constituents of the individuals with the supervening properties? While supervenience theorists have been dealing for years with these technical matters and many others regarding the details of the supervenience relation, some general objections have been raised to the whole project of trying to describe the dependence of the mental on the physical in terms of supervenience. Let's consider two common complaints.
4. Two Common Complaints with Supervenience Theses
Kim (1993) tells us that a supervenience thesis "itself says nothing about the nature of the dependence involved; it tells us neither what kind of dependency it is, nor how the dependency grounds or explains the property covariation" (pp. 165-6). So a supervenience thesis leaves us wondering:
Is it a matter of causal dependence? Is it in some way analogous to mereological supervenience? Is it after all a matter of meaning dependence, as logical behaviorists and some functionalists claim? Perhaps, a matter of divine intervention or plan as Malebranche and Leibniz thought? Or a brute and in principle unexplainable relationship which we must accept "with natural piety," as some emergentists used to insist? (p. 167)
There are two distinct worries expressed here — the failure of a supervenience thesis to explain mental phenomena and its failure to ontologically ground mental phenomena.
a. Explanatory Failure
If the mental supervenes on the physical as a matter of logical-conceptual necessity, then there would be an easy explanation (in terms of the laws of logic and meanings of our mental and physical terms) for why physical sameness guarantees mental sameness. Yet, if NL-C is to be rejected, as it seems it should, then the worry is that the dependence of the mental on the physical is left unexplained. One might appeal to psychophysical laws as the explanation — P guarantees M because it is a law that P → N. But this does not explain why the psychophysical law P → N obtains. The complaint that an account expressed solely in terms of supervenience commits us to unexplained psychophysical laws has been raised by many. See, for example, Gardner (2005, p. 201-2), Kim (1989, sec. IV, 1993, pp. 165-9), Heil, (1998), Horgan (1993a, sec. 8, 1993b, sec. 5), and Moreland (1998, pp. 50-1). A physicalist might allow that there are brute laws, provided that these are purely physical. But if a law is not purely physical, if it is irreducibly psychophysical, then as a physicalist one would expect an explanation in terms of purely physical laws of why that psychophysical law obtains, and this explanation is what a mere supervenience claim does not provide. As a result, a physicalist might be compelled to find some suitable brand of what Horgan calls "superdupervenience" — "ontological supervenience that is robustly explainable in a materialistically acceptable way" (1993, p. 577).
Regarding the explanatory concern, two points are worth mentioning. First, if we are offering an ontological account of mentality, then it is not clear that a "materialistically acceptable" explanation is required. According to Physicalism as an ontological doctrine, mental (and other higher-level) phenomena obtain solely by virtue of physical phenomena. However, it might be that mental phenomena are entirely due to physical phenomena in a way that is inexplicable to us. So if our concern is with the ontological status of mentality, then it is arguably not a fault of a supervenience-based account that it falls short of superdupervenience. Secondly, it seems that a supervenience thesis by itself can take us some way, perhaps a long way, toward understanding the nature of the psychophysical dependence. Recall that an adequate formulation of a supervenience thesis will need to make clear what brand of necessity is involved. Suppose that mental properties supervene on physical properties with physical necessity. Then the purely physical laws that actually obtain provide the explanation of why changes in mental properties require changes in physical properties. Suppose that mental properties supervene on physical properties with nomological necessity only. Then the explanation of why the mental supervenes on the physical would appeal to irreducibly psychophysical laws. This explanation might not (and should not) satisfy a physicalist, but it is an explanation nonetheless, and perhaps even the correct explanation. Or maybe the physical facts fix the mental facts with a type of necessity that lies between the logical/conceptual variety and the physical brand — with the metaphysical necessity that some philosophers discuss. Then we might decide that the mental supervenes on the physical, not because of the physical laws that actually obtain, but due to some other type of relation, perhaps identity or maybe some mereological (part-whole) relation. It seems, then, that thinking about the modality involved in a supervenience thesis can profitably guide our thoughts about why mental properties covary with physical properties in the way that they do.
There is another reason, and perhaps a better reason than explanatory failure, to be dissatisfied with a mere supervenience thesis.
b. Ontological Failure
Since a mental-physical supervenience thesis tells us only how mental properties covary with physical properties, it is compatible not only with property dualism (as the non-reductive physicalist would hope) but also with substance dualism. Even if substance dualism were true, it might be that immaterial minds are causally connected or otherwise related to physical bodies in such a way that any variation in the properties of these immaterial minds occurs only with a variation in physical properties of the body. Physicalism certainly does not allow that substance dualism is true. So, since a supervenience thesis is compatible with substance dualism, it does not fully capture our physicalist intuitions.
However, there is still hope for an adequate formulation of Physicalism regarding mentality that is largely supervenience-based. To avoid substance dualism, we simply need to conjoin a supervenience thesis with some constraint on the composition of mental items. For example, as Geoffrey Hellman and Frank Thompson (1975) state with their Principle of Physical Exhaustion, "everything concrete is exhausted by basic physical objects" (p. 555). Likewise, Phillip Pettit (1993) insists that "[e]verything in the empirical world is composed in some way — composed without remainder — out of (subatomic) entities of the kind that microphysics posits, or it is itself uncomposed and microphysical" (p. 215). Applied to mentality, the claim is: all mental particulars (all instances and bearers of mental properties) are ultimately comprised entirely of physical particulars.
Or we might wish to combine a supervenience thesis with a realization claim. The claim that mental properties are realized physically is popular among those who support Physicalism while denying psychophysical identities. The notion of physical realization adds to the Principle of Physical Exhaustion the idea that mental properties are functional properties that are exemplified by virtue of instances of physical properties playing the definitive functional roles. So the idea that mental properties are realized physically would also seem to rule out immaterial mental items. (Indeed, Andrew Melynk, for example, 1996, 2003, and 2006, argues that a realization thesis itself, suitably refined, is enough to capture the content of Physicalism even without an independent supervenience claim.)
5. Concluding Remarks
It is widely agreed that the notion of supervenience cannot by itself fully explain the dependence of the mental on the physical. Yet, we must not underestimate the value of the concept to understanding how mental properties relate to the physical properties on which they depend. Whether or not we actually use the term 'supervenience,' our first step in deciding whether F-properties depend solely on G-properties is to decide whether a difference in the former requires a difference in the latter. On the basis of various thought-experiments, we might conclude that (i) F-properties do not supervene on G-properties, that is, that the former are not entirely a function of the latter (as many conclude regarding the relation between mental content and intrinsic bodily features). While (i) is a negative result, it is quite useful insofar as it directs our attention to features, perhaps previously overlooked, on which F-properties do depend (for example, surrounding linguistic practice or the internal structure of the external objects of our thought). Suppose, on the other hand, we conclude that F-properties do supervene on G-properties. Establishing this conclusion is an essential step to concluding further that (ii) F-properties are identical with G-properties (since any set of properties trivially supervenes on itself). Or instead of (ii), we might conclude that (iii) F-properties depend entirely on but are not identical with G-properties. Whichever of (i)-(iii) we choose, that choice inevitably involves deciding whether supervenience obtains.
Regarding the mental and the physical, we might decide either that (ii*) mental properties are physical properties or that (iii*) while non-physical, mental properties nonetheless depend entirely on physical properties. Being a physicalist regarding mentality seems to require accepting at least (iii*). And since both (ii*) and (iii*) entail that the mental supervenes on the physical, it seems Kim is right to note that "mind-body supervenience represents the minimal physicalist commitment" (1993, p. 168). A supervenience thesis, however, is not merely a minimal physicalist commitment, for it need not leave the mental-physical covariance wholly unexplained. Suppose we accept (ii*). Then we have a simple explanation of the covariance: changes in the mental require changes in the physical simply because the mental is the physical. On the other hand, if we accept (iii*), then as noted in section 3-a, thinking about the brand of necessity involved in our supervenience thesis (conceptual, metaphysical, physical, or nomological) can take us some way, perhaps a long way, toward figuring out what type of dependence obtains. And since even making a decision regarding (i)-(iii), or (ii*)-(iii*), requires engaging in thoughts about supervenience, the concept is not only helpful, but indispensible to understanding the relation between the two sets of properties. So whether or not the term 'supervenience' remains in vogue, the very notion will remain a crucial and potentially highly useful part of our inquiry into the relation between the mental and the physical. As Dean Rickles, another writer for this encyclopedia puts it, "supervenience deserves the central place that is has found in the philosophers' toolbox" (2006).
6. References and Further Readings
Beckermann, A., H. Flohr, and J. Kim (1992). Emergence or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter).
Bennett, K. (2004). "Global Supervenience and Dependence," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68: 510-529.
Burge, T. (1979). "Individualism and the Mental," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: 73-121.
Burge, T. (1986). "Individualism and Psychology," The Philosophical Review 95: 3-45.
Chalmers, D. (1996). The Conscious Mind (New York: Oxford University Press).
Chalmers, D. and F. Jackson (2001). "Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation," Philosophical Review 110: 15-60.
Crane, T. (1991). "All God Has To Do," Analysis 51: 235-244.
Davidson, D. (1970). "Mental Events," in L. Foster and J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press): 79-101.
Francescotti, R. (2000). "Ontological Physicalism and Property Pluralism: Why They are Incompatible," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81: 349-362.
Francescotti (1998). "The Non-Reductionist's Troubles with Supervenience," Philosophical Studies 89: 105-124.
Gardner, T. (2005). "Supervenience Physicalism: Meeting the Demands of Determination and Explanation," Philosophical Papers 34: 189-208.
Hare, R.M. (1952). The Language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Haugeland, J. (1984). "Ontological Supervenience," The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Supplement 22: 1-12.
Heil, J. (1998). "Supervenience Deconstructed," European Journal of Philosophy 6: 146-155.
Hellman, G. and F. W. Thompson, (1975). "Physicalism: Ontology, Determination, and Reduction," The Journal of Philosophy 72: 551-564.
Hoffmann-Kolss, V. (2010). The Metaphysics of Extrinsic Properties (Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag).
Hoffmann, V. and A. Newen (2007). "Supervenience of Extrinsic Properties," Erkenntnis 67: 305-319.
Hofweber, T. (2005). "Supervenience and Object-Dependent Properties," The Journal of Philosophy 102: 5-32.
Horgan, T. (1993a). "From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World," Mind 102: 555-586.
Horgan, T. (1993b). "Nonreductive Materialism and the Explanatory Autonomy of Psychology," in S. J. Wagner and R. Warner (eds.), Naturalism (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press): 295-320.
Horgan, T. (ed.) (1984). Southern Journal of Philosophy 22: The Spindel Conference 1983 Supplement, Supervenience.
Horgan, T. (1982). "Supervenience and Microphysics," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63: 29-43.
Howell, R. J. (2009). "Emergentism and Supervenience Physicalism," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87: 83-98.
Jackson, F. (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
Jackson, F. (1994). "Armchair Metaphysics," in M. Michael and J. O'Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), Philosophy in Mind, (Dordrecht: Kluwer): 23-42.
Kim, J. (1993). Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Kim, J. (1990). "Supervenience as a Philosophical Concept," Metaphilosophy 21: 1-27.
Kim, J. (1989). "The Myth of Nonreductive Physicalism," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 63: 31-47.
Kim, J. (1987). "'Strong' and 'Global' Supervenience Revisited," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48: 315-326.
Kim, J. (1984). "Concepts of Supervenience," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45: 153-176.
Kirk, R. (2006). "Physicalism and Strict Implication," Synthese 151: 523-536.
Kirk, R. (1996). "Strict Implication, Supervenience, and Physicalism," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74: 244-256.
Lewis, D. (1986). The Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell).
Lewis, D. (1983). "New Work for a Theory of Universals," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61: 343-377.
McLaughlin, B. and K. Bennett (2005). "Supervenience," in E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
McLaughlin, B. (1995). "Varieties of Supervenience," in E. Savellos and U. D. Yakrin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 16-59.
McLaughlin, B. (1992). "The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism," in A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, and J. Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism (Berlin: De Gruyter): 49-93.
Melnyk, A. (2006). "Realization and the Formulation of Physicalism," Philosophical Studies 131: 127-155.
Melnyk, A. (2003). A Physicalist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Melnyk, A. (1996). "Formulating Physicalism: Two Suggestions," Synthese 105: 381-407.
Moore, G. E. (1922). Philosophical Studies (London: Routledge).
Moreland, J. P. (1998). "Should a Naturalist be a Supervenient Physicalist?," Metaphilosophy 29: 35-57.
Moser, P. (1992). "Physicalism and Global Supervenience," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 30: 71-82.
Papineau, D. (1993). Philosophical Naturalism (Oxford: Blackwell).
Paull, C. and T. Sider (1992). "In Defense of Global Supervenience," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 32: 830-45.
Petrie, B. (1987). "Global Supervenience and Reduction," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48:119-30.
Pettit, P. (1993). "A Definition of Physicalism," Analysis 53: 213-223.
Place, U. T. (1956). "Is Consciousness a Brain Process?," The British Journal of Psychology 47: 44-50.
Poland, J. (1994). Physicalism: The Philosophical Foundations (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Putnam, H. (1975). "The Meaning of Meaning,' in K. Gunderson (ed.), Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
Putnam, H. (1973). "Meaning and Reference," The Journal of Philosophy 70: 699-711.
Rickles, D. (2006). "Supervenience and Determination," in J. Fieser and B. Dowden (eds.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Shoemaker, S. (1998). "Causal and Metaphysical Necessity," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79: 59-77.
Shoemaker, S. (1980). "Causality and Properties," in P. van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause (Dordrecht: D. Reidel): 109-135.
Shrader, W. (2008). "On the Relevance of Supervenience Theses to Physicalism," Acta Analytica 23: 257-271.
Smart, J. J. C. (1959). "Sensation and Brain Processes," The Philosophical Review 68: 141-156.
Stalnaker, R. (1996). "Varieties of Supervenience," Philosophical Perspectives 10: 221-41.
Steward, H. (1996). "Papineau's Physicalism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56: 667-672.
Van Cleve, J. (1990). "Mind-Dust or Magic?: Panpsychism versus Emergence," Philosophical Perspectives 4: 215-226.
Witmer, D. G. (1999). "Supervenience Physicalism and the Problem of Extras," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 37: 315-331.
Wilson, J. (2005). "Supervenience-based Formulations of Physicalism," Nous 39: 426-459.
Yoshimi, J. (2007). "Supervenience, Determination, and Dependence," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88: 114-133.
Robert Francescotti
Email: rfrances@mail.sdsu.edu


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