text:
\section{Introduction}

Historically, political decision-making has been modeled in a number
of ways.  Models that propose rational decision making on the part of
voters must account for the fact that voters frequently have
difficulty in responding to factual surveys on political issues.  One
resolution to this difficulty is to model candidate evaluation as an
online learning process, in which a tally representing candidate
affect is incremented in response to external information
\cite{Lodge1989}, after which the information itself is discarded.
However, in a number of recent studies of political decision-making,
apparently anomolous behavior has been observed on the part of voters,
in which \trm{negative} information about a candidate $k$ strengthens
(rather than weakens) a prior positive opinion held about $k$
\cite{civettini_voters_2009,redlawsk_hot_2002} .

This behavior appears to run counter to rational models of decision
making, and it is sometimes interpreted as evidence of non-rational
``motivated reasoning'' \cite{Kunda_1990}.  In motivated reasoning
models, a voter will (1) evaluate the affect of new information—i.e.,
its positive or negative emotional charge, then (2) compare this to
the affect predicted by current beliefs, and finally (3) react, where
\trm{congruent} information (i.e., information consistent with
predicted affect) is processed quickly and easily, and incongruent
information is processed by a slower "stop-and-think"
process. "Stop-and-think" processing may include steps such as
counter-arguing, discounting the validity of the information, or
bolstering existing affect by recalling previously-assimilated
information \cite{Lodge_Taber_2000,redlawsk_hot_2002}.

Some evidence for the motivated reasoning hypothesis comes from
hman-subject experiments using a \trm{dynamic process tracing
  environment} (DPTE), in which data relevant to a mock election is
presented as a dynamic stream of possibly relevant news items.  In
DPTE experiments, detailed hypotheses about political reasoning can be
tested, for instance by varying the frequency and amount of
incongruent information presented to voters in the mock election.
Experimental evidence shows, for instance, that both political
sophisticates and novices spend more time processing negative
information about a liked candidate, and novices also spend longer
processing positive information about a disliked candidate
\cite{redlawsk_hot_2002}. Most intriguingly, small to moderate amounts
of incongruent information---e.g., negative information about a liked
candidate---actually reinforce the prior positive view of the
candidate \cite{redlawsk_tipping_2010}.

This apparently anomalous effect---whereby information has the inverse
of the expected impact on a voter---appears to be inconsistent with
rational decision-making.  In this paper, we show analytically that
this ``anomalous'' effect can occur in a model of rational decision
making which includes the possibility of deceptive information.  The
model makes another interesting prediction: it justifies as
computationally effective and efficient a heuristic of pretending to
believe information from a possibly-deceptive source if that source's
political preferences are the same as the voters.

In particular, we will consider a model in which there are two classes
of voters, which we will call \trm{trusting voters} and
\trm{suspicious voters}, and two types of information sources, which
we will call \trm{unbiased sources} and \trm{biased sources}.
Information from an unbiased source is modeled simply as data $D_k$
that probabilistically inform a voter about a candidate $k$'s
positions.  \trm{Trusting voters} are voters that treat information
about a candidate as coming from an unbiased source.  We show that, in
our model, new data about a candidate can be efficiently incorporated
by a trusting voter, and anomalous updates (in which ``negative''
information increases support) are impossible.

\trm{Biased sources} are information sources $j$ who plan their
communications with a goal in mind (namely, encouraging trusting
voters to vote in a particular way).  To do this, $j$ will access some
data $C_{k}$ which is communicated to them only (not to voters
directly) and release some possibly-modified version $B_{k}$ of
$C_{k}$, concealing the original $C_{k}$.  $B_{k}$ is chosen based on
the utility to $j$ of the probable effect of $B_{k}$ on a trusting
voter $i$.

We then introduce \trm{suspicious voters}.  Unlike trusting voters,
who behave as if communications were from unbiased sources, suspicious
voters explicitly model the goal-directed behavior of biased sources.

The behavior of rational suspicious voters depends on
circumstances---depending on the assumptions made, different effects
are possible.  If the partisan goals of the biased source $j$ and a
suspicious voter $i$ are aligned, then a suspicious voter can safely
act as if the information is correct---i.e., perform the same updates
as a naive voter.  Intuitively, this is because $j$ is choosing
information $B_k$ strategically to influence a naive voter to achieve
$j$'s partisan goals, and since $i$'s goals are the same, it is
strategically useful for $i$ to ``play along'' with the deception;
this intutition can be supported rigorously in our model.  If the
partisan goals of $j$ are unknown, then a rational suspicious voter
$i$ may discount or ignore the information $B_k$; again, this
intuition can be made rigorous, if appropriate assumptions are made.
Finally, if the partisan goals of $j$ are known to be ``opposite''
those of $i$, then a rational suspicious voter may display the
``anomalous'' behavior discussed above: information $B_k$ that would
cause decreased support for a suspicious voter will cause increased
support for $i$.  Intuitively, this occurs because $i$ recognizes that
$j$ may be attempting to decrease support for candidate $k$, and since
$i$ and $j$ have ``opposite'' partisan alignments, it is rational for
$i$ to instead increase support.

In short, in this model, a negative communication about $k$ can have
the effect opposite to one's initial expectation; however, the
apparent paradox is not due to motivated reasoning, but simply to
imprecise planning on the part of $j$.  In particular, $j$'s
communication was planned by a biased source with the aim of
influencing trusting voters, while in fact, $i$ is a suspicious voter.

Below, we will first summarize related work, and then flesh out these
ideas more formally.  Our model will be based on a formalism
introduced by the artificial intelligence community called
``multi-agent influence diagrams'', which generalize Bayesian networks
to settings involving multiple agents with distinct goals.

\section{Related work} \label{sec:related}

This work is inspired for recent work on motivated reasoning and hot
cognition in political contexts (for recent overviews, see
\cite{graber_political_2005,redlawsk_feeling_2006}).  There is strong
experimental evidence that information processing of political
information involves emotion, and there recent research has sought to
either collect empirical evidence for
\cite{redlawsk_hot_2002,civettini_voters_2009}, and and build models
that explicate \cite{lodge_first_2006}, the mechanisms behind this
phenomenon.

The models of this paper are not intended to dispute role of emotion
in political decision making.  Indeed, our models reflect situations
in which one party deliberately withholds or distorts information to
manipulate a second party, and introspection clearly suggests that
such situations will typically invoke an emotional response.  However,
work in social learning (e.g., \cite{rendell_why_2010}) and
information cascades (e.g., \cite{salganik_experimental_2006}) shows
that behaviors (such as ``following the herd'') which appear to be
driven by non-rational emotions may in fact be strategies that are
lead to results that are evolutionarily desirable (if not always
``rational'' from the individual's perspective.)  Hence, the
identification of emotional aspects to decision-making does not
preclude rational-agent explanations; rather, it raises the question
of \emph{why} these mechanisms exist, what evolutionary pressures
might cause them to arise, and whether or not those pressures are
still relevant in modern settings.  This paper makes a step toward
these long-term goals by identifying cases in which behavior
explainable by motivated reasoning models is also rational, for
instance in the result of Theorem~\ref{thm:motivated}.

The explanation suggested here for anomalous, motivated-reasoning-like
updating is based on a voter recognizing that a source may be biased,
and correcting for that bias.  While this explanation of anomalous
updates is (to our knowledge) novel, it is certainly recognized that
\emph{trust} in the source of information is essential in political
persuasion, and that a voter's social connextions strongly influences
political decision-making (e.g., \cite{beck_social_2002}).  More
generally, empirical studies of persuasion substantiate a role of
confirmatory bias and prior beliefs \cite{dellavigna_persuasion_2010}, and show that in
non-political contexts (e.g., in investing), sophisticated consumers
of information adjust for credibility, while inexperienced agents
under-adjust.

The results of this paper are also related to models of media
choice---for instance, research in which the implications of a
presumed tendency of voters to seek confirmatory news is explored
mathematically
\cite{burke_introductions_2007,bernhardt_political_2008,duggan_spatial_2011,stone_ideological_2011}.
Other analyses show why preferences for unbiased news lead to economic
incentives to distort the news \cite{burke_unfairly_2007}.  This paper
does not address these issues, but does contribute by providing a
rational-agent model for why such a confirmatory bias exists: in
particular, Proposition~\ref{prop:same-alignment-utility} describes
a strategy from using information from biased information sources with
similar preferences as a voter. We notice that this strategy is both
simple and computationally inexpensive, and might be preferable on
these grounds to more complex strategies to ``de-noise'' biased
information from sources with unknown preferences.

A further connection is to formal work on ``talk games'', such as
Crawford and Sobel's model of strategic communication
\cite{crawford_strategic_1982}.  In this model, a well-informed but
possibly deceptive ``sender'' sends a message to a ``receiver'' who
(like our voter) takes an action that affects both herself and the
sender.  Variants of this model have explored cases in which
information can only be withheld or disclosed, and disclosed
information may be verified by the receiver
\cite{milgrom_relying_1986}; \iffalse cases where sender and
reciever's payoffs are aligned in some sense, e.g., where sender's
payoff is concave in receiver's level of belief
\ct{kamenica-gentzkow09}; - THESE ARE UNPUBLISHED?  cases in which
competition in information sources is present
\ct{kamenica-gentzkow11}; \fi cases where the receiver uses approximate
``coarse'' reasoning \cite{mullainathan_coarse_2008}; and cases where
there is a mixed population of strategic and naive recievers, all of
whom obtain information from senders acting strategically
\cite{ottaviani_naive_2006}.

The analysis goals in ``talk games'' is different from the goals of
this paper.  whereas we investigate whether specific counter-intuitive
observed behavior can arise in a plausible (not necessarily temporally
stable) situation, this prior work primarily nalyzes the communication
efficiency of a a system {in equilibrium}, Some of the results
obtained for talk games are reminiscent of results shown here: for
instance, Crawford and Sobel show that in equilibrium, signaling is
more informative when the sender and reciever's preferences are more
similar.  However, other results are less intuitive: for instance, in
some models there is no deception at equilibrium
\cite{ottaviani_naive_2006}.  We note that while equilibria are
convenient to analyze, there is no particular reason to believe that
natural political discourse reaches an equilibria.

Game theory has a long history in analyses of politics; in particular,
writing in 1973, Shubik discusses possible applications of game theory
to analysis of misinformation \cite{shubik_game_1973}.  The tools used
used in this paper arose from more recent work in artificial
intelligence \cite{koller_multi-agent_2003,pfeffer_networks_2008},
specifically analysis of multi-agent problem solving tasks, in which
one agent explicitly models the goals and knowledge of another in
settings involving probabilistic knowledge.  One small contribution of
this paper is introduction of a new set of mathematical techniques,
which (to our knowledge) have not been previously used for analysis of
political decision-making.  We note however that while these tools are
convenient, they are not absolutely necessary to obtain our results.

\section{Modeling trusting voters}

\subsection{A model}

\begin{table}

\yy{to check: subscripts for $C,B,R$}

\begin{tabular}{ll}
\hline
$i$		& a voter \\
$j$		& a pundit \\
$k$             & a candidate \\
$T_i,T_j$       & ``target positions'' for voter $i$ and source $j$ \\
$T_k$           & the position of a candidate $k$\\
$dom(T)$        & the set of values taken on by random variable $T$\\
$S_{ik},S_{jk}$  & similarity of a target position and a candidate \\
$D_{k}$	        & data about candidate $k$\\
$Y_{ik}$ 	& the vote of $i$ for $k$\\
$U_i$ 	        & utility function for $i$\\
\hline
$C_{jk}$	& data about $k$ that is known only to $j$\\
$B_{jk}$	& biased variant of data $C_{jk}$ about $k$ that has been modified by $j$\\
$R_{jk}$	& reputational cost to pundit $j$ of modifying $C_{jk}$ to $B_{jk}$\\
\hline
$P\tv(X|Y)$     & a conditional probability computed using the trusting voter model\\
$P\bp(X|Y)$     & a conditional probability computed using the biased pundit model\\
$P\sv(X|Y)$     & a conditional probability computed using the suspicious voter model\\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Notation used in the Paper}
\label{tab:notation}
\end{table}

\begin{figure}
\centerline{\includegraphics[width=0.7\textwidth]{./Slide1.png}}
\caption{Model of a trusting voter, in MAID and Bayes Net notation}
\label{fig:trusting-voter-model}
\end{figure}

Consider the influence diagram on the left-hand side of
Figure~\ref{fig:trusting-voter-model}.  In this model $i$ is a voter,
and $k$ is a candidate.  A voter $i$ has a preference $T_i$: for
example, $T_i$ might be a member of the set
\[ dom(T) = \{ {\rm goodLiberal}, {\rm evilLiberal}, {\rm goodConservative}, {\rm evilConservative} \}
\]
Likewise $T_k$ is candidate $k$'s actual position, which is also an
element of $dom(T)$.  $S_{ik}$ measures how similar two positions are.
$Y_{ik}$ is a measure of $i$'s support for $k$, which is chosen by
voter $i$ to maximize $i$'s utility.  The utility $U_i$ for voter $i$
is a function of how appropriate $Y_{ik}$ is given $S_{ik}$.  Finally,
$D_{k}$ is some data about $k$, generated probabilistically according
to the value of $T_k$.  As an example, this might be a statement made
by $k$.  The notation used in this diagram (and elsewhere below) is
summarized in Table~\ref{tab:notation}.

The shapes in the nodes in the diagrams indicate the type of the
variable: diamonds for utilities, circles for random variables, and
squares for \textit{decision variable}, which an agent (in this case,
voter $i$) will choose in order to maximize utility.  The dotted arrow
lines leading into a decision variable indicates information available
when the decision is made.  The arrows leading into a random variable
node indicate ``parents''---variables on which the value of the
variable is conditioned. This sort of diagram is called an influence
diagram, and the general version we will use later (in which multiple
agents may exist) is called a MAID (Multi-Agent Influence Diagram)
\cite{pfeffer_networks_2008,koller_multi-agent_2003}.

More precisely the model defines a probability distribution
generated by this process:
\begin{itemize}
\item Pick $t_i \sim P(T_i)$, where $P(T_i)$ is a prior on voter preferences.
\item Pick $t_k \sim P(T_k)$, where $P(T_k)$ is a prior on candidate positions.
\item Pick $d_k \sim P(D_k|T_k=t_k)$. Equivalently, we could let $d_k=f_D(t_k,\epsilon_D)$, where $f_D$ is a
function and $\epsilon_D$ is a random variable chosen independently of all other random variables in the model.
\item Pick $s_{ik} \sim P(S_{kij}|T_k=t_k,T_j=t_j)$. Equivalently, we could let $s_{ik}=f_S(t_i,t_k,\epsilon_S)$, where $f_S$ is a
function and $\epsilon_S$ is a random variable, again chosen independently of all other random variables in the model.
\item Allow voter $i$ to pick $y_{ik}$, based on a user-chosen probability distribution
  $P_\tau(Y_{ik}|S_{ik}=s_{ik})$, or equivalently computed using $f_Y(s_{ik},\epsilon_Y)$.
\item Pick utility $u_i$ from $P(U|y_{ik},s_{ik})$---or
  equivalently, computed as $u_i = f_U(y_{ik},s_{ik},\epsilon_U)$.
\end{itemize}
The user can choose any distribution $P_\tau(Y|S)$, but we will
henceforth assume that she will make the optimal choice---i.e., the
probability distribution $P_\tau$ will be chosen by $i$ to maximize
the expected utility $u_i$, where $u_i$ will be picked from
$P(U|y_{ik},S_{ik})Pr(S_{ik})$---or equivalently computed as
$u_i=\sum_{s'} P(S_{ik}=s') * f_U(y_{ik},s',\epsilon_U)$.  In this
specific case, the conversion is based on the observation that
\begin{equation} \label{eq:trust}
 P\tv(Y_{ik}=y|S_{ik}=s) = P\left(y={\rm argmax}_{y'} \int_{\epsilon_U} f_u(y',s,\epsilon_U) d\epsilon_U\right)
\end{equation}
and yields the Bayes network on the righthand side of
Figure~\ref{fig:trusting-voter-model}. Here $Y_{ik}$ is simply a
random variable conditioned on $S_{ik}$, where the form of the
dependency depends on Equation~\ref{eq:trust}.  Notice that the link
from $S_{ik}$ to $Y_{ik}$ is deterministic.  We call this the
\trm{trusting voter model}, since voter $i$ trusts the validity of the
information $D_k$.

MAIDs (and their single-agent variants, influence diagram networks)
have a number of advantages as a formalism.  They provide a compact
and natural computational representation for situations which are
otherwise complex to describe - in particular, situations in which
agents have limited knowledge of the game structure, or mutually
inconsistent beliefs, but act rationally in accordance with these
beliefs.  In particular, MAIDs relax the assumption usually made in
Bayesian games that players' beliefs are consistent, and supports an
explicit process in which one player can model another player's
strategy.  MAIDs also support an expressive structured representation
for a player's beliefs.  Together these features make them appropriate
for modeling ``bounded rationality'' situations of the sort we
consider here.  Further discussion of MAIDs, and their formal relation
to other formalisms for games and probability distributiobns, can be
found elsewhere \cite{koller_multi-agent_2003,pfeffer_networks_2008}.

Next, we will explore some simplifications of Eq.~\ref{eq:trust}) If
$f_u$ is deterministic, then Eq.~\ref{eq:trust} simplifies to the
following choice of $y_{ik}$ given $s_{ik}$:
\[
y_{ik} = f_y\tv(s_{ik}) = {\rm argmax}_{y'} f_u(y',s_{ik})
\]
If only a distribution $P(S_{ik}=s)$ is known, then voter $i$'s
optimal strategy is to let
\[
y_{ik} = {\rm argmax}_{y'} \sum_s f_u(y',s) P(S_{ik}=s)
\]

In any case, however, the model has similar properties: once we assume
that $i$ uses an optimal strategy, then the MAID becomes an ordinary
Bayes net, defining a joint distribution over the variables $T_i$,
$T_k$, $S_{ik}$, and $Y_{ik}$.  We will henceforth use $P\tv$ to
denote probabilities computed in this model, and reserve the
non-superscripted $P(A|B)$ and $P(A)$ for conditional (respectively
prior) probability distribution that are assumed to be available as
background information.

\begin{table}[tb]
\begin{small}
\begin{tabular}[t]{|l|r|}
\hline
$d$  & $P(T_i=d)$ \\
\hline
goodLiberal & 0.4 \\
goodConserv & 0.4 \\
evilLiberal & 0.1 \\
evilConserv & 0.1 \\
\hline
\multicolumn{2}{c}{~} \\
\hline
$d$  & $P(T_k=d)$ \\
\hline
goodLiberal & 0.29 \\
goodConserv & 0.69 \\
evilLiberal & 0.01 \\
evilConserv & 0.01 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}~\begin{tabular}[t]{|ll|r|}
\hline
$t_i$            & $t_k$       & $s_{ik}|t_i,t_k$ \\
\hline
goodLiberal      & goodLiberal &  $5 + \epsilon$ \\
goodLiberal      & goodConserv &  $1 + \epsilon$ \\
goodLiberal      & evilLiberal & $-2 + \epsilon$ \\
goodLiberal      & evilConserv & $-5 + \epsilon$ \\
goodConserv      & goodConserv &  $5 + \epsilon$ \\
goodConserv      & evilLiberal & $-5 + \epsilon$ \\
goodConserv      & evilConserv & $-2 + \epsilon$ \\
evilLiberal      & evilLiberal &  $5 + \epsilon$ \\
evilLiberal      & evilConserv & $-5 + \epsilon$ \\
evilConserv      & evilConserv &  $5 + \epsilon$ \\
\hline
\end{tabular}~~\begin{tabular}[t]{|ll|l|}
\hline
$t_k$ & $c_k$ & $P(c_k|t_k)$ \\
\hline
goodLiberal & safety-net & 0.4 \\
goodLiberal & motherhood & 0.6 \\
goodConserv & guns       & 0.3 \\
goodConserv & motherhood & 0.7 \\
evilLiberal & safety-net & 0.9 \\
evilLiberal & chthulu    & 0.1 \\
evilConserv & guns       & 0.8 \\
evilConserv & chthulu    & 0.2 \\
\hline
\multicolumn{3}{c}{ ~ } \\
\multicolumn{3}{c}{ $P(Y_i=1|S_{ik}=s)$: see Eq~\ref{eq:trust} }
\end{tabular}
\end{small}
\caption{Conditional probability tables (CPT) for a sample example of
  the trusting voter model.  In the table for $s_{ik}|t_i,t_k$,
  $\epsilon$ is drawn unformly from the set $\{-1,0,+1\}$ and for
  pairs $t_i,t_k$ not shown, $s_{ik}|t_i,t_k=s_{ik}|t_k,t_i$.}
\label{tab:cpt}
\end{table}

\begin{example}
To take a concrete example, igure~\ref{tab:cpt} shows the conditional
probability tables for a small example, where candidates and target
positions have values like \textit{evilLiberal} and
\textit{goodConserv}, and the value of a communication $C_k$ is a name
of something that a candidates might support (e.g.,\textit{motherhood}
or \textit{guns}).
\end{example}

\subsection{Implications of the model}

\subsubsection{New information about a candidate is easy to process}
\label{sec:trusting-inference}

It is obvious how to use the trusting voter model to compute $Y_{ik}$
if $T_k$ and $T_i$ are known.  However, a more reasonable situation is
that $D_k$ and $T_i$ are known to $i$, but the true position of the
candidate can only be inferred, indirectly, from $D_k$.  Fortunately,
using standard Bayes network computations, we can also easily compute
a distribution over $Y_{ik}$ given $D_k$.

First, note that we can marginalize over $T_k$ and compute
\[ P(D_k=d) = {\sum_{t'}P(D_k=d|t')P(T_k=t')}
\]
and that using Bayes' rule
\begin{eqnarray}  \label{eq:tk-from-d}
P(T_k=t|D_k=d)  =  \frac{P(D_k=d|T_k=t)P(T_k=t)}{P(D_k=d)} = \frac{P(D_k=d|T_k=t)}{P(D_k=d)} P(T_k=t)
\end{eqnarray}
This gives a simple rule for $i$ to use in choosing her vote $Y_{ik}$ given $D_k$:
\begin{eqnarray}
\lefteqn{P\tv(Y=y|T_i=t_i,D_k=d_k)} & & \label{eq:y-from-tk}\\
   & = & \sum_{s}P\tv(Y=y|S_{ik}=s)\sum_{t}P(S_{ik}=s|T_i=t_i,T_k=t)P(T_k=t|D_k=d_k) \\
   & = & P\tv(Y=y|S_{ik}) P(S_{ik}|t_i,T_k)P(T_k|d_k) \nonumber
\end{eqnarray}
The last line uses a simplified notation from the Bayes net community,
where sums used to marginalize are omitted, and the event $X=x$ is
replaced with $x$ when the variable $X$ is clear from context.

\begin{figure}
\centerline{\includegraphics[width=0.7\textwidth]{./Slide2.png}}
\caption{Model of a trusting voter with $m$ multiple independent data items about the candidate, in Bayes Net notation}
\label{fig:mds-trusting-voter-model}
\end{figure}

This procedure can be extended easily to the case of multiple
data items $D_{k,1},\ldots,D_{k,m}$ about the candidate, each
independently generated from $P(D_k|T_k)$, as shown in
Figure~\ref{fig:mds-trusting-voter-model}.  It can be shown that
\[
P(T_k=t|d_{k,1},\ldots,d_{k,m})  =
    \prod_{\ell}\frac{P(d_{k,\ell}|T_k=t)}{P(d_{k,\ell)}} P(T_k=t)
\]
Put another way, we can define $P(T_k=t|d_{k,1},\ldots,d_{k,m})$ recursively as follows:
\[
P(T_k=t|d_{k,1},\ldots,d_{k,m})  =
     \frac{P(d_{k,m}|T_k=t)}{P\tv(d_{k,m)}} \cdot P(T_k=t|d_{k,1},\ldots,d_{k,m-1})
\]
Hence, voter $i$ can quickly update beliefs about $T_k$
\textit{incrementally} with each new piece of information $d_{k,\ell}$
and then (as before) use Equation~\ref{eq:y-from-tk} to update her
vote.

This incremental update property is worth emphasizing---while it may
be complicated (if not computationally complex) to compute
$P\tv(Y|S)$, or it may be difficult for a voter to establish her
preferences $t_i$, absorbing new information in the trusting voter
model is straightforward, and consists of two ``natural'' steps:
estimating the candidate's position $T_k$ given the information
$d_{k,\ell}$; and then updating her support $y_{ik}$ for candidate $k$,
given the updated estimate of the candidate's position.

\subsubsection{Positive information increases support}

In a number of recent studies of political decision-making,
\trm{negative} information about a candidate $k$ has been observed to
strengthen (rather than weaken) a voter's support for $k$.  We will
show that under fairly reasonable assumptions this effect can {\em
  not} occur with the trusting voter model.  In particular, we will
assume that support $Y_{ik}$ increases monotonically with the
similarity $S_{ik}$ of the candidate's position $T_k$ and the voter's
preference $T_i$.

Recall that in the trusting voter model $Y_{ik}$ is a deterministic
function of $S_{ik}$, defined as
\begin{equation}
f_Y\tv(s_{ik}) = {\rm argmax}_{y'} \int_{\epsilon_U} f_u(y',s,\epsilon_U) d\epsilon_U
\end{equation}
If $f_Y\tv$ has the property that
\[ \forall s_1>s_2, f_Y\tv(s_1)\geq{}f_y\tv(s_2)
\]
then we will say that \textit{$i$'s support for $k$ increases
  monotonically with $s_{ik}$}.  This is one assumption needed for our
result.

We also need to precisely define ``negative'' information.  We say
that $d_k$ is \textit{strictly negative about $k$ to voter $i$} if
there is some partition of $dom(S_{ik})$ into triples
$(a_1,b_1,\delta_1)$, \ldots,$(a_m,b_m,\delta_m)$ so that
\begin{itemize}
\item For every triple $(a_\ell,b_\ell,\delta_\ell)$, $a_\ell<b_\ell$,
  $\delta_\ell>0$, $P(S_{ik}=a_\ell|d_k) = P(S_{ik}=a_\ell) +
  \delta_\ell$, and $P(S_{ik}=b_\ell|d_k) = P(S_{ik}=b_\ell) -
  \delta_\ell$.  In other words, learning $D_k=d_k$ shifts some
  positive probability mass $\delta_\ell$ from the larger similarity
  value $b_\ell$ to the smaller similarity value $a_\ell$.
\item For all $s\in dom(S_{ik})$ that are not in any triple,
  $P(s_{ik}=s|d_k)=P(s_{ik}=s)$.  In other words, the probability mass
  of values $s$ not in any triples is unchanged.
\end{itemize}

\begin{figure}
\centerline{\includegraphics[width=0.7\textwidth]{./Slide6.png}}
\caption{An illustration of strictly negative information for a voter $i$}
\label{fig:neg-info}
\end{figure}

To illustrate this, consider Figure~\ref{fig:neg-info}, which
illustrates a plausible example of strictly negative information.
Strictly positive information is defined analogously.

We can now state formally the claim that negative information will
reduce support.  An analogous statement holds for strictly positive
information.

\begin{theorem} \label{thm:strictly-neg}
Let $E_P[X]$ denote the expected value of $X$ in probability
distribution $P$.  In a trusted voter model $P\tv$, if voter $i$'s
support for $k$ increases monotonically with $s_{ik}$ and $d_k$ is
strictly negative about $k$ to voter $i$, then
$E_{P\tv}[Y_{ik}|D_k=d_k] < E_{P\tv}[Y_{ik}]$.
\end{theorem}

\begin{proof}
Let $S'=dom(S_{ik})-\{a_1,b_1,\ldots,a_m,b_m\}$, where the $a_\ell,b_\ell$'s are
the triples guaranteed by the strictly-negative property of $d_k$.
\begin{eqnarray*}
\lefteqn{E_{P\tv}[Y_{ik}|D_k=d_k]} && \\
   & = & \sum_y y \cdot P\tv(Y_{ik}=y|D_k=d_k) \\
   & = & \sum_s f_y\tv(s)P\tv(S_{ik}=s|D_k=d_k) \\
   & = & \sum_{s'\in{}S'} f_y\tv(s)P\tv(S_{ik}=s|d_k)
       + \sum_{\ell=1}^m f_y\tv(a_\ell)P\tv(S_{ik}=a_\ell|d_k)
       + \sum_{\ell=1}^m f_y\tv(b_\ell)P\tv(S_{ik}=b_\ell|d_k)
\end{eqnarray*}
Looking at the three terms of the final sum in turn, clearly
\[ \sum_{s'\in{}S'} f_y\tv(s)P\tv(S_{ik}=s|d_k) = \sum_{s'\in{}S'} f_y\tv(s)P\tv(S_{ik}=s)
\]
and the last two terms can be written as
\begin{eqnarray*}
 &    & \sum_{\ell=1}^m f_y\tv(a_\ell)P\tv(S_{ik}=a_\ell|d_k) + f_y\tv(b_\ell)P\tv(S_{ik}=b_\ell|d_k) \\
 &=   & \sum_{\ell=1}^m f_y\tv(a_\ell)\left(P\tv(S_{ik}=a_\ell) + \delta_\ell \right) + f_y\tv(b_\ell)\left( P\tv(S_{ik}=b_\ell) - \delta_\ell \right) \\
 &=   & \sum_{\ell=1}^m f_y\tv(a_\ell) P\tv(S_{ik}=a_\ell) + f_y\tv(b_\ell) P\tv(S_{ik}=b_\ell)
                 + \delta_\ell (  f_y\tv(a_\ell) -  f_y\tv(b_\ell) ) \\
 &\leq& \sum_{\ell=1}^m f_y\tv(a_\ell) P\tv(S_{ik}=a_\ell) + f_y\tv(b_\ell) P\tv(S_{ik}=b_\ell)
\end{eqnarray*}
with the last step holding because (a) $\delta_\ell>0$ and (b) $a_\ell<b_\ell$.  (Recall that
from the monotonicity of $f_y$, if $a_\ell<b_\ell$ then $f_y\tv(a_\ell) \leq{}  f_y\tv(b_\ell)$).
Combining these gives that
\begin{eqnarray*}
\lefteqn{E_{P\tv}[Y_{ik}|D_k=d_k]} && \\
   & = & \sum_{s'\in{}S'} f_y\tv(s)P\tv(S_{ik}=s|d_k)
       + \sum_{\ell=1}^m f_y\tv(a_\ell)P\tv(S_{ik}=a_\ell|d_k)
       + \sum_{\ell=1}^m f_y\tv(b_\ell)P\tv(S_{ik}=b_\ell|d_k)  \\
  &\leq& \sum_{s'\in{}S'} f_y\tv(s)P\tv(S_{ik}=s) + \sum_{\ell=1}^m f_y\tv(a_\ell) P\tv(S_{ik}=a_\ell) + f_y\tv(b_\ell) P\tv(S_{ik}=b_\ell) \\
  & =  & \sum_{s\in{}dom(S_{ik})} f_y\tv(s)P\tv(S_{ik}=s) = E_{P\tv}[Y_{ik}]
\end{eqnarray*}
\end{proof}

\section{Modeling biased pundits and suspicious voters}

\subsection{Biased pundits}

\begin{figure}
\centerline{\includegraphics[width=0.7\textwidth]{./Slide3.png}}
\caption{Model of a biased pundit, in MAID and Bayes net notation}
\label{fig:biased-pundit-model}
\end{figure}

We now consider a new model, as shown in
Fig~\ref{fig:biased-pundit-model}.  In this model there is a pundit
$j$, who, like a voter, has a target candidate position $T_j$.  Pundit
$j$ observes a private datapoint $C_k$ from candidate $k$---perhaps
based on a private communication or research---and then publishes a
``biased version'' $B_k$ of $C_k$.  However, $B_k$ is chosen under the
assumption that some trusting voter $i$ will react to $B_k$ {\em as if
  it were $D_k$ in the trusting voter model of
  Figure~\ref{fig:trusting-voter-model}}.  Specifically, we assume
that $B_k$ will provoke a vote $Y_{ik}$ according to the trusting
voter model.  The utility assigned by $j$ to this outcome is a
function of $i$'s vote $Y_{ik}$, the similarity of $S_{jk}$ of $T_k$
to $j$'s target $T_j$, and a ``reputational cost'' $R_{jk}$, which is
a function of $C_k$ and $B_k$. For instance, $R_{jk}$ might be zero if
$b_k=c_k$, and otherwise some measure of how embarrassing it might be
to $j$ if his deception of replacing $c_k$ with $b_k$ were
discovered.

More precisely the model defines a probability distribution
generated by this process:
\begin{itemize}
\item Pick $t_j \sim P(T_j)$, where $P(T_j)$ is a prior on pundit preferences.
\item Pick $t_k \sim P(T_k)$, where $P(T_k)$ is a prior on candidate positions.
\item Pick $c_k \sim P(D_k|T_k=t_k)$, or equivalently, $c_k=f_D(t_k,\epsilon_D)$.  (Notice that we assume
$c_k$ is chosen from the same conditional distribution $P(D_k|T_k)$ used in the trusting voter model
to chose $D_k$---we're using a different variable here to emphasize the different role it will play.)
\item Allow pundit $j$ to pick $b_{k}$, based some user-chosen distribution $P_\sigma(B_k|C_k=c_k)$.
\item Pick $r_{ik} \sim P(R_{jk}|B_k=b_k,C_k=c_k)$, or equivalently, $r_{jk}=f_R(b_k,c_k,\epsilon_R)$.
\item Show $b_k$ to a trusting voter $i$, presenting it as a sample
  from $P(D_k|T_k=t_k)$, and allow user $i$ to pick $y_i$ according to the
  trusting voter model.
\item Pick $u_{i} \sim
  P(U_{j}|R_{jk}=r_{jk},S_{jk}=s_{jk},Y_{ik}=y_{ik})$, or
  equivalently, let $u_{j}=f_U(r_{jk},s_{jk},y_{jk},\epsilon_U)$.
\end{itemize}
To distinguish the two utility functions, we will henceforth use
$f_U\tv$ for the utility function $f_U(s,y)$ used in the trusting voter model,
and use $f_U\bp$ for the utility function $f_U(r,s,y)$ defined above.
As below, we will assume pundit $j$ will pick $b_{k}$, based on available estimates of
  $S_{ij}$ and knowledge of $C_k$, to maximize the expected utility $u_j$. This can be computed as
\[ u_j = \sum_{r,s,y} P\tv(Y_{ik}=y|D_k=b_k)
      P(S_{jk}=s|D_k=c_k) P(R_{jk}=r|b_k=c_k) f_U\bp(r,s,y,\epsilon_U)
\]
where $P\tv(Y_{ik}|D_k=b_k)$ is estimated using the trusting voter
model; $P(S_{jk}|D_k=c_k)$ is computed as in
Section~\ref{sec:trusting-inference}, using $P(DC_k|T_k)$ and
$P(S_{jk}|T_j,T_k)$; and $P(R_{jk}=r|b_k,c_k)$ is computed using the
given probability function of reputational cost $r$, as a function of
the unbiased data $c_k$ and the biased version $b_k$ that is released.

Since pundit $j$ picks $B_k$ to maximize utility, then as before, we
can convert this MAID to a Bayes net.  Specifically, $B_k$ depends on
the parents $C_k$ and $S_{jk}$ as follows.
\begin{eqnarray*}
\lefteqn{P\bp(B_k=b|C_k=c,S_{jk}=s) = } & &\\
    & & P\left( b={\rm argmax}_{b'} \sum_{r,y} P\tv(Y_{ik}=y|D_k=b_k) P(R_{jk}=r|b',c_k)
	  \int_{\epsilon_U} f_U\bp(r,s,y,\epsilon_U) d\epsilon_U \right)
\end{eqnarray*}
This can be simplified, if we assume that $f_U\bp$ and $f_R$ are deterministic:
\begin{equation} \label{eq:biased-pundit-model}
P\bp(B_k=b|C_k=c,S_{jk}=s) =
    P\left( b={\rm argmax}_{b'} \sum_{y} P\tv(Y_{ik}=y|D_k=b_k) f_U\bp(f_R(b',c),s,y)\right)
\end{equation}

\subsection{Suspicious voters}

\begin{figure}
\centerline{\includegraphics[width=0.7\textwidth]{./Slide4.png}}
\caption{Model of a suspicious voter in MAID notation}
\label{fig:suspicious-voter-model-maid}

\bigskip

\centerline{\includegraphics[width=0.7\textwidth]{./Slide5.png}}
\caption{Model of a suspicious voter in Bayes net notation}
\label{fig:suspicious-voter-model-bn}
\end{figure}

Finally, we introduce a model for a ``suspicious voter''.
Intuitively, this model is simple. As before, we assume that $j$
chooses $b_k$ according to the biased pundit model of
Eq.~\ref{eq:biased-pundit-model}---i.e., that $j$ believes $i$ to be a
trusting voter.  The suspicious voter will then attempt to reason with
this correctly, and find the vote $Y_i$ maximizing $i$'s true utility,
given then information revealed by $j$'s choice of $b_k$.  The MAID
and Bayes net versions of this model are shown in
Figure~\ref{fig:suspicious-voter-model-maid} and
Figure~\ref{fig:suspicious-voter-model-bn} respectively, and
probabilities computed in this model will be writted as $P\sv$.

This suspicious voter model does not have a simple closed-form
solution for $P\sv(S)$, as in the trusting voter model.  The
generative process for the suspicious voter model is identical to the
biased pundit model, except that after $b_k$ is chosen according to
Eq.~\ref{eq:biased-pundit-model}, $i$ will pick a value of $Y_{ik}$
from a distribution $P\sv(Y_{ik}|B_k=b_k)$, which is chosen to
maximize the expected value of $u_i$.  We will define
\[
 P\sv(Y_{ik}=y|S_{ik}=s) = P\left(y={\rm argmax}_{y'} \int_{\epsilon_U} f_u(y',s,\epsilon_U) d\epsilon_U\right)
\]
or, assuming determinacy,
\[
y_{ik} = f_y\sv(s_{ik}) = {\rm argmax}_{y'} f_u(y',s_{ik})
\]
This leads to a more complex inference problem for voters.  Although
the process of computing $P(S_{ik}|T_i,T_k)$ is unchanged, relative to
the trusting voter model, a suspicious voter cannot estimate a
distribution over $T_{k}$ using $d_{k}$, as in Eq.~\ref{eq:tk-from-d},
because $d_{k}$ is not known.  Instead $i$ only has indirect evidence
about $d_k$ in the form of $b_k$.

However, voter $i$ can use this indirect evidence to compute
\begin{equation} \label{eq:tk-from-bk}
P\sv(T_k|B_k=b_k) = \sum_c P\tv(T_k|D_k=c) \cdot P\bp(B_k=b|C_k=c) \cdot P\tv(D_k=c)
\end{equation}
where $P\bp(b|c)=\sum_{t_j} P\bp(b|c,t_j)P(t_j)$ is the probability, in the
biased pundit model, of pundit $j$ publishing $B_k=b$ when $C_k=c$.  We
can now break the summation over $c$ into two cases:
\begin{eqnarray}
\lefteqn{P\sv(T_k|B_k=b_k)} & & \nonumber \\
  & = & P\tv(T_k|D_k=b) \cdot P\tv(D_k=b) \cdot P\bp(B_k=b|C_k=b) \label{eq:accurate}\\
  & + & \sum_{c\not=b} P\tv(T_k|D_k=c) \cdot P\tv(D_k=c) \cdot P\bp(B_k=b|C_k=c) \label{eq:deceptive}
\end{eqnarray}
In the term in line~\ref{eq:accurate}, $j$ is not altering the
original input $c_k$, so we say he is being \textit{accurate}.  In
line~\ref{eq:deceptive}, so we say that $j$ is being \textit{deceptive}.
In order to exploit the information in $b_k$ using Eq~
\ref{eq:accurate}-\ref{eq:deceptive} to optimize her utility, the
suspicious voter must assess the probability of deception, and adjust
inferences about candidate $k$ accordingly---a potentially difficult
inference problem.

\subsection{Implications of the suspicious voter model}

To simplify further analysis, we will make some additional
assumptions.
\begin{itemize}
\item We assume a deterministic reputational cost function $f_R$ in
  the biased pundit model.

\item We assume the reputational cost of being accurate is zero, i.e.,
that \( \forall c, f_R(c,c)=0 \), and that the reputational cost of
being deceptive is greater than zero, i.e., \( \forall b\not=c, f_R(b,c)>0 \).

\item We assume deterministic utility functions $f_U\tv$  and $f_U\bp$.

\item We assume the utility for pundits is the same
as the utility for voters, minus the reputational cost of altering $c$
to $b$---i.e., that
\[ f_U\bp(r,s,y) \equiv f_U\tv(s,y) - r
\]
\end{itemize}

Given these assumptions, some observations can now be made.

\begin{prop}
If the prior $P(T_j)$ such that $P\bp(b|c)=P\bp(b'|c')$ for all
communications $b$, $b'$, $c$ and $c'$, then for all $b_k$,
$P\sv(T_k|b_k)=P\sv(T_k)=P\tv(T_k)$.
\end{prop}

In other words, if $P\bp(b|c)$ is constant, then a biased pundit's
publications $b_k$ convey no information to $i$.  This can be seen
immediately by inspection of Eq.~\ref{eq:tk-from-bk}.  Notice that
requiring that $P\bp(b|c)$ does not imply that any individual pundits
simply publish information $b$ uniformly at random, without regard to
$c$---instead, it says that if one averages over all pundits and
considers $\sum_{t_j} P\bp(b|c,t_j)P(t_j)$, then the cumulative
probability of seeing any particular $b$ is constant, and independent
of $c$.

More generally, one can make this observation.

\begin{prop}
If the prior $P(T_j)$ such that (1) $P\bp(c|c)=\alpha$ for all $c$,
and (2) $P\bp(b|c)=P\bp(b'|c)$ for all communications $b\not=c$ and $b'\not=c'$,
then for all $b_k$,
\[ P\sv(T_k|b_k) = \alpha P\tv(T_k|b_k) + (1-\alpha) P\tv(T_k)
\]
\end{prop}

In other words, if all deceptions are equally likely, but publications
are accurate with fixed probability $\alpha$, then a suspicious
voter's update to $T_k$ is simply a mixture of her prior belief
$P\sv(T_k)=P\tv(T_k)$ and the belief a trusting voter would have,
$P\tv(T_k|b_k)$, with mixing coefficient $\alpha$.  Again, this
proposition can be be verified immediately by inspection of
lines~\ref{eq:accurate}-\ref{eq:deceptive}.

A final observation is that when a biased pundit's preference $t_j$ is
the same as a voter's preference $t_i$, and this is known to both $i$
and $j$, then even a suspicious voter will obtain high utility by
simply believing $j$'s publication $b_k$.  In particular $i$'s utility
from adopting the belief that $D=b_k$ is just as high as if $i$ had
observed $c_k$ itself.

\begin{prop} \label{prop:same-alignment-utility}
If $t_j=t_i$, and $b_k$ is a publication from $j$ under the biased
pundit model, then the expected utility to $i$ of voting according to
$P\tv(T_k|D_k=b_k)$ is at least as large as the expected utility to
$i$ of voting according to $P\tv(T_k|D_k=c_k)$.
\end{prop}

This proposition seems plausible if we recall that $b_k$ was chosen to
maximize the utility to $j$ of $i$'s belief in $b_k$ in the trusting
voter model---thus, since the utility to $i$ is the same as the
utility to $j$, it seems reasonable that adopting this belief is also
useful to $i$.  To establish it more formally, let us define
$EU_\ell(b|c,t_i)$ to be the expected utility to agent $\ell$ (either
$i$ or $j$), absent reputational costs, of having $i$ adopt the belief
in the trusting-voter model that $D_k=b$ when in fact $D_k=c$, if
$T_i=t_i$.  In other words, we define
\[ EU_\ell(b|c,t_i) \equiv \sum_{s_{\ell k},t_k,y_{ik}} P\tv(T_k=t_k|D_k=c) P(S_{\ell k}=s_{\ell k}|t_\ell,t_k) P\tv(Y_{ik}=y_{ik}|T_i=t_i,D_k=b) f\tv_u(s_{\ell k},y)
\]
Note that the weighting in the factors $P\tv(T_k=t_k|D_k=c)
P\tv(S_{\ell k}=s_{\ell k}|t_\ell,t_k)$ holds for both $i$ and $j$,
because here we care about the true distribution over $T_k$, as
deduced from $c$.  The weighting in the factor
$P\tv(Y_{ik}=y|T_i=t_i,D_k=b)$ arises because for both $i$ and $j$,
utility is based on $i$'s estimated support $y_{ik}$ for $k$ given
$i$'s known preference $t_i$.

If we assume that $t_i=t_j=t$, then this simplifies to
\[ EU_i(b|c,t_i) = EU_j(b|c,t_i) = \sum_{s,t_k,y_{ik}} P\tv(T_k=t_k|D_k=c) P\tv(S=s|t,t_k) P\tv(Y_{ik}=y_{ik}|T_i=t,D_k=b) f_u(s,y)
\]
and hence we see that in this case, the functions for $i$ and $j$ are
indeed the same.  Since $j$ has chosen $b$ to maximize
$EU_\ell(b|c)-f_R(b,c)$, and $f_R$ is never negative, clearly \(
EU_j(b|c,t_i) \geq EU_j(b|c,t_i) \), and so \( EU_i(b|c,t_i) \geq EU_i(b|c,t_i) \)
as well.

As noted in Section~\ref{sec:related}, there are a number of papers
analyzing media bias in which voters are assumed prefer ``good news''
(i.e., new biased towards their favored candidates) leading to
fragmentation and specialization as media companies differentiate by
providing news biased for their readers.  The results above suggest a
rational reason for picking a news source $j$ with the same partisan
preferences as one's self: in particular, this sort of news is
computionally easier to process. Similarly, biased sources with
unknown preferences are ``less informative'', in the sense that new
information leads to changes in support (relative to unbiased sources,
or well-aligned partisan sources).

\subsection{Suspicious voters and ``irrationality''}

Finally, we address the question of whether suspicous voters can
behave in the counter-intuitive manner discussed in the
introduction---whether information about the candidate $k$ that is
negative (as interpreted by a trusting voter) can increase support for
a suspicous voter.  We will show that this is possible.

\begin{theorem} \label{thm:motivated}
It can be the case that information $b$ will decrease $i$'s support
for $k$ in the trusted voter model, and increase $i$'s support for $k$
in the suspicous voter model: i.e., it may be that
$E_{P\tv}[Y_{ik}|D_k=b] < E_{P\tv}[Y_{ik}]$ but
$E_{P\sv}[Y_{ik}|D_k=b] > E_{P\sv}[Y_{ik}]$.
\end{theorem}

Intuitively, this happens when $i$ believes strongly that $j$ is being
deceptive, and $i$ has different candidate preferences from $j$.  The
theorem asserts the existence of such behavior, so we are at liberty
to make additional assumptions in the proof (preferably, ones that
could be imagined to hold in reality).

In the proof, we assume that $j$'s preferences $T_j$ are known to $i$.
This is plausible since context may indicate, for instance, that $j$
is a strong conservative.  This does not affect the basic model, since
we allow the case of an arbitrary prior on $T_j$.

We also assume that all information about candidates is either
strictly positive for $i$ and strictly negative for $j$, or else
strictly negative for $i$ and strictly positive for $j$.  To see how
this is possible, first imagine a hypercube-like space of candidate
positions, as in Figure~\ref{fig:neg-info}, and assume that $T_i$ and
$T_j$ are on opposite corners of the cube.  The cube might indicate,
for example, positions on the environment, abortion, and increased
military spending, with $i$ preferring the liberal position on all
three and $j$ preferring the conservative positions.  Then assume that
all information indicates the probability of the candidate's position
along these three axis; in this case the assumption is satisfied.

Given these two assumptions, the statement of the theorem holds.
First, we need a slightly stronger version of
Theorem~\ref{thm:strictly-neg}.  Informally, this states that if $i$
has partial knowledge of $b$, but does know that $b$ is strictly
negative for $i$, then $i$'s support for $k$ will be weakened.

\begin{corr} \label{thm:strictly-neg-mixtures}
Suppose $H$ is a probability distribution over items of information
$b$, and also $b$ is strictly negative for $i$ for every $b$ with
non-zero probability in $H$.  Let $P\tv(Y_{ik}|H)$ denote
\[ \sum_{b} P\tv(Y_{ik}|D_k=b)P_H(b).
\]
Then $E_{P\tv}[Y_{ik}|H] < E_{P\tv}[Y_{ik}]$.
\end{corr}

\begin{proof}
For any item $s\in dom(S_{ik})$, it is clear that
\[ P(Y|E) = \sum_{b} P(Y|b) P_H(b)
\]
and also, by marginalization over the (unrelated) variable $H$, we see
that $P(Y) = \sum_{b} P(Y) P_H(b)$.  Since for all $b$ with non-zero
probability under $H$ we have that $E[Y|b]<E[Y]$, the result holds.
\end{proof}

We can now prove Theorem~\ref{thm:motivated}.

\begin{proof}
Suppose information $b$ that is strictly negative for $i$ is observed
by $i$, and consider again the formula for $P\sv(T_k|B_k=b_k)$ given
on lines~\ref{eq:accurate} and \ref{eq:deceptive}.  This shows that
the suspicous voter will reason by cases.  In one case, $j$ is being
accurate, and the change in probability for $T_k$ is in the same
direction as in the trusted voter model, and as noted above, this will
lead to a belief update that decreases support for $k$.  However, this
change is down-weighted by the factor $P\bp(B_k=b|C_k=b) P\tv(D_k=b)$,
which can be interpreted as the probability that $b$ was really
observed times the probability that $j$ chooses to report accurately.
We will assume that $P\tv(D_k=b)$ is very small, so that
\[ P\sv(T_k|B_k=b_k) \approx \sum_{c\not=b} P\tv(T_k|D_k=c) \cdot P\tv(D_k=c) \cdot P\bp(B_k=b|C_k=c)
\]
In this case, $j$ is being deceptive.

Reasoning is this case is complicated by the fact that $i$ must
consider all inputs $c$ that could have observed, and compute the
product of $P\tv(D_k=c)$, the prior probability of $c$, and also
$P\bp(B_k=b|C_k=c)$, the probability of $b$ being reported in place of
$c$ by $j$.  However, since the preferences of $i$ and $j$ are
opposite, the latter is quite informative: in particular, since $b$
was deceptively chosen by $j$ to be negative for $i$, then $b$ must
prefer that $i$ give weaker support for $k$, implying that $c$ is
actually negative for $j$, and hence positive for $i$.  This holds for
every $c$ that could have let to the deceptive report $b$.  By
Corollary~\ref{thm:strictly-neg-mixtures}, the net change in support
for $i$ in the suspicous voter model positive.
\end{proof}

\section{Concluding Remarks}

To summarize, we propose a model in which there are two classes of
voters, \trm{trusting voters} and \trm{suspicious voters}, and two
types of information sources, \trm{unbiased sources} and \trm{biased
  sources}.  Information from an unbiased source is modeled simply as
observations $D_k$ that probabilistically inform a voter about a
candidate $k$'s positions, and \trm{trusting voters} are voters that
treat information about a candidate as coming from an unbiased source.
We show that reasoning about new information is computationally easy
for trusting voters, and that trusting voters behave intuitively: in
particular, negative information about candidate $k$ (according to a
particular definition) will decrease support for $k$, and positive
information will increase support.

\trm{Biased sources} are information sources $j$ who plan their
communications in order to encourage trusting voters to vote in a
particular way).  To do this, they report some possibly-modified
version $B_{k}$ of a private observation $C_{k}$, concealing the
original $C_{k}$.  In the model, $B_{k}$ is chosen based on the
utility to $j$ of the probable effect of $B_{j}$ on a trusting voter
$i$.

Finally, suspicious voters model the behavior of biased sources.  In
general this is complicated to do, however, some special cases lead to
simple inference algorithms.  For instance, under one set of
assumptions, all information from biased sources can be ignored.  In
another set of assumptions, a suspicious voter will make the same sort
of updates to her beliefs as a trusting voter, but simply make them
less aggressively, discounting the information by a factor related to
the probability of deception.

Another interesting tractible reasoning case for suspicious voters is
when the biased information source $j$ has the same latent candidate
preferences as the voter $i$.  In this case, suspicious voters can act
the same way a trusting voter would---even if the information acted on
is false, it is intended to achieve a result that is desirable to $i$
(as well as $j$).

These results are of some interest in light of the frequently-observed
preference for partisan voters to collect information from similarly
partisan information channels.  The results suggest a possibly
explanation for this, in terms of information content.  The optimal
way to process information from a possibly-deceptive unknown source,
or a source with a known-to-be-different partisan alignment, is to
either discount it, ignore it, or else employ complicated (and likely
computationally complex) reasoning schemes.  However, reports from
partisan source with the same preferences as a voter can be acted on
as if they were trusted---even if the reports are actually deceptive.

Finally, we show rigorously that a suspicious voter can, in some
circumstances, increase support for a candidate $k$ after receiving
negative information about $k$.  Specifically, information that would
decrease support for a trusting voter might increase support for a
suspicious voter---if she believes the source has different candidate
preferences, and if she believes the source is being deceptive.  This
behavior mimics behavior attributed elsewhere to ``motivated
reasoning'', but does not arise from ``irrationality''---instead it is
a result of the voters correct identification of, and compensation
for, an ineffective attempt at manipulation on the half the
information source.

We should note that this hypothesis does \emph{not} suggest that
emotion is not present in such situations---in fact, it seems likely
that reports viewed as deceptive would indeed provoke strong emotional
responses.  It does suggest that some of the emotion associated with
these counterintuitive updates may be associated with mechanisms that
have an evolutionary social purpose, rather than being a result of
some imperfect adaption of humans to modern life.

It seems plausible that additional effects can be predicted from the
suspicious-voter model.  For instance, although we have not made this
conjecture rigorous, if a biased source $j$ does not know $i$'s
political preferences, then deceptive messages $b$ will likely tend to
be messages that would be interpreted as negative by most voters.  For
instance, $j$ might assert that the candidate violates some cultural
norm, or holds an extremely unpopular political views. (Or , on the
other hand, assert the candidate has a property that almost all voters
agree is ``good''.  Arguably, most information from deceptive partisan
sources would be of this sort, rather than discussion of stands on
widely-disagreed-on issues (like gay marriage or abortion in the US).

As they stand, however, the results do suggest a number of specific
predictions about how information might be processed in a social
setting. First,
information provided by persons believed to have political
  alignments similar to voter $i$ will be more easily assimilated, and
  have more effect on the view of $i$, than information provided by
  persons believed to have different political alignments.
Second, information provided by persons with political alignments
  similar to voter $i$ will be more assimilated in roughly the same
  speed (and with the same impact) as information from a
  believed-to-be-neutral source.
Third, information provided by persons with political alignments
  different from voter $i$ may lead to counterintuitive updates, while
  information from similarly-aligned sources or neutral sources will
  not.
An important topic for future work would be testing these predictions, for instance using
the DPTE methodology.

\bibliographystyle{plain}

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaArXiv


text:
La onzième saison de la série télévisée américaine New York, unité spéciale, ou La Loi et l'Ordre : Crimes sexuels au Québec, (en anglais ), se déroule du 23 septembre 2009 au 19 mai 2010.

Distribution

Acteurs principaux
 Christopher Meloni ( : Jérôme Rebbot) : détective Elliot Stabler
 Mariska Hargitay ( : Dominique Dumont) : détective Olivia Benson
 Richard Belzer ( : Julien Thomast) : sergent John Munch
 Ice-T ( : Jean-Paul Pitolin) : détective Odafin Tutuola
 Stephanie March ( : ?) : substitut du procureur Alexandra Cabot (épisodes 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15 et 16)
 B. D. Wong ( : Xavier Fagnon) :  George Huang
 Tamara Tunie ( : Sylvie Jacob) :  Melinda Warner
 Dann Florek ( : Serge Feuillard) : capitaine Don Cragen

Acteurs récurrents

Membres de l'Unité Spéciale
 Amir Arison : docteur Manning (épisodes 4, 14 et 17)

Bureau des Affaires Internes
 Robert John Burke : lieutenant Ed Tucker (épisodes 9)

Procureur
 Sam Waterston : procureur Jack McCoy (épisode 21)

Substituts du procureur
 Christine Lahti : substitut du procureur Sonya Paxton (épisodes 1, 2, 3, 4 et 8)
 Gretchen Egolf : substitut du procureur Kendra Gill (épisode 19)
 Sharon Stone : substitut du procureur Jo Marlowe (épisodes 21, 22, 23 et 24)

Avocats de la défense
 J. Paul Nicholas : avocat de la défense Linden Delroy (épisodes 1 et 17)
 Robert Klein : avocat de la défense Dwight Stannich (épisode 2)
 Ned Eisenberg : avocat de la défense Roger Kressler (épisodes 4 et 16)
 Jeri Ryan : avocate de la défense Patrice LaRue (épisodes 5 et 17)
 Austin Lysy : avocat de la défense Russell Hunter (épisode 8)
 Peter Hermann : avocat de la défense Trevor Langan (épisodes 9 et 22)
 David Thornton : avocat de la défense Lionel Granger (épisode 11)
 Delaney Williams : avocat de la défense John Buchanan (épisodes 14 et 22)
 Jason Jurman : avocat de la défense Mitch Shankman (épisode 21)
 Alex Kingston : avocate de la défense Miranda Pond (épisode 23)

Juges
 Harvey Atkin : juge Alan Ridenour (épisodes 2, 9 et 23)
 Joanna Merlin : juge Lena Petrovsky (épisodes 3 et 8)
 John Cullum : juge Barry Moredock (épisode 4)
 Lindsay Crouse : juge D. Andrews (épisodes 5, 16 et 21)
 Audrie J. Neenan : juge Lois Preston (épisodes 10, 11 et 19)
 Patricia Kalember : juge Karen Taten (épisode 11)
 Tonye Patano : juge Linda Maskin (épisodes 14, 15 et 22)
 Judith Light : juge Elizabeth Donnelly (épisode 15)
 John Henry Cox : juge Gregory Trenton (épisode 17)
 Kate Nelligan : juge Sylvia Quinn (épisode 22)
 Anita Gillette : juge Sheila Tripler (épisode 23)

FBI
 Vincent Spano : agent spécial Dean Porter (épisode 6)

Hôpital
 Stephen Gregory : Dr. Kyle Beresford (épisodes 3, 13 et 22)

NYFD
 Nathaniel Albright : ambulancier Jones (épisodes 3 et 5)

NYPD

Police scientifique
 Joel de la Fuente : technicien scientifique promu lieutenant Ruben Morales (épisodes 5, 6, 7, 11, 14, 19 et 20)
 Caren Browning : capitaine C.S.U. Judith Siper (épisodes 9, 17 et 22)
 Saila Rao : technicienne T.A.R.U. Anu Nayyar (épisodes 2 et 4)

Officiers de police
 Jabari Gray : détective Keegan Timmons (épisodes 3, 6, 11, 12, 15 et 20)
 Georgia Lyman : officier Whitney Bowman (épisodes 4, 9 et 21)
 Philip Levy : officier Fineman (épisode 8)
 Jamie Lynn Concepcion : officier de police Delgado (épisode 13)
 John Schuck : chef des détectives Muldrew (épisodes 10 et 12)

Entourage de l'Unité spéciale
 Isabel Gillies : Kathy Stabler (épisode 8)
 Jeffrey Scaperrotta : Dickie Stabler (épisode 8)
 Ernest Waddell : Ken Randall, fils de Fin Tutuola (épisode 19)
Isabelle Huppert : Sophie Gérard (épisode 24)

Production
La onzième saison, comporte 24 épisodes et est diffusée du 23 septembre 2009 au 19 mai 2010 sur NBC.

En France, la série est diffusée du 13 septembre 2010 au 20 décembre 2010 sur TF1.

Elle marque le retour de Stéphanie March en tant que personnage principale, cette dernière interprète de nouveau Alexandra Cabot, la substitut du procureur. Elle quitte la série au terme du seizième épisode de la saison.

Liste des épisodes

Épisode 1 : Flic ou voyou

Épisode 2 : Un bagage de trop

Épisode 3 : Le Poids de la solitude

Épisode 4 : Meurtre en état d'ivresse

Épisode 5 : Inexcusable

Épisode 6 : À l'écoute

Épisode 7 : Thérapie par le pire

Épisode 8 : Mauvaises fréquentations

Épisode 9 : Les Mains sales

Épisode 10 : Sans attache

Épisode 11 : Rencard express

Épisode 12 : Perdre la face

Épisode 13 : La Voix des femmes

Épisode 14 : Destin brisé

Épisode 15 : Savoir... et se taire

Épisode 16 : Le Témoin clé

Épisode 17 : Sans mot pour le dire

Épisode 18 : Un tueur en sommeil

Épisode 19 : Le Mal-aimé

Épisode 20 : La Petite boucherie des horreurs

Épisode 21 : La Beauté des flammes

Épisode 22 : Carte sur table

Épisode 23 : Quand je serai grand

Épisode 24 : À la folie...

Notes et références

Saison de New York, unité spéciale

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


text:
Humanization of Pets Named One of the Greatest Investment Themes
by Jackie | Feb 19, 2017 | Industry News
MSNBC's Jim Cramer Calls This New Pet Care Investing Trend "Man's Best Friend"
The big players are finally beginning to catch on. In a recent MSNBC article by Mad Money's Jim Cramer, large-scale companies are beginning to act on the lucrative attraction to the multi-billion-dollar-a-year pet care industry. While Cramer speaks mostly to the recent acquisition of Veterinary Centers of America (VCA) by food mogul Mars—who plans to merge the VCA system with its Banfield pet hospitals to create a "dominant" companion animal health care company—other members of the pet care industry including doggie daycare franchises can feel the trickle down effect of top-level investing by the big players.
"Spending on companion animals has been growing faster than almost any other consumer outlet," says Cramer. "Pets have moved from the backyard, to the basement, and finally, to the bed," he says. "Americans spending on pets has exploded in the 21st Century, more than doubling since 2001."
This fact would help explain why doggie daycare franchises like Hounds Town USA have seen exponential growth in revenue over the past 15 years. When Hounds Town USA founded its first location in 2001, owner Michael Gould—a retired NYPD canine handler—never expected the company to grow so quickly. Due to such a high demand for its daycare, boarding, grooming, and training services, Hounds Town USA now has five locations across Long Island and counting. They have collectively hosted nearly 600,000 canine (and feline) visitors since their inception.
Cramer also names the cash nature of the pet care business as a top reason the industry is so attractive to investors outside the industry. "There aren't many large scale companies with exposure to the sector," he explains. This leaves the door wide open for doggie daycare franchises like Hounds Town USA—which is rooted in legitimate professional experience with animals—the opportunity to provide much- needed doggie daycare, boarding, grooming, training, and retail services.
While most pet owners bring their dogs to doggie daycare franchises like Hounds Town for daycare, boarding, and grooming, there is an intrinsic health and wellness added value for the pet when they use these services. Socialization and interaction in a doggie daycare environment helps with pet obesity, arthritis, and other physical ailments, not to mention the psychological benefits it provides for a dog. "I think anything that makes a company less dependent on pet food and more dependent on animal health is a positive," says Cramer. Count Hounds Town USA in.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


I had to admit, it was boring as hell, and I sort of dreaded it everyday. There were benefits of course: I could distract myself with the gym TV, I could run in comfortable temperatures no matter what it was like outside, and I could stop whenever I wanted and not be miles from home.
However, always up for a challenge, I decided to try some outdoor workouts. The track was a step up, but it was boring running in circles. The magic really happened when I first hit the local park trail.
I had hilly terrain to challenge me, I had fresh air, sunlight on my skin, and beautiful scenery to inspire me. I also loved the feeling of running from one area of the city to another and back again, it felt like a huge accomplishment.
Ready to run? Here is our ultimate beginners training plan for running a 5K.
I even developed a love for running in the rain. There is something so soothing about raindrops cooling you down as you make your way through a rain shower.
I quickly began moving all of my workouts outdoors, even strength training. I now sprint down fields and up hills, I broad jump down my block, I do burpees at the football field, I flip tires at the local high school, and I even lift weights on my back patio. It feels just like playing outdoors as a child.
My enjoyment for working out seemed to increase exponentially when I moved it outdoors. I knew it had something to do with fresh air and sunshine, but I recently discovered a body of research studying the benefits of outdoor exercise, and the benefits go far beyond fresh air.
Those who exercise outdoors may actually have a lower risk of being overweight than those who stay indoors . Studies show that children who spent time outdoors were 27-41% less likely to be overweight than children who stayed inside.
Being indoors seems to make us more lazy, with multiple seating areas and televisions and technology to distract us. Being outside inspires movement and exploration, which helps us to stay active.
A University of Glasgow study found that exercising outdoors showed a greater improvement in mental health than exercising in artificial environments . These results showed an association between regular outdoor exercise with a lower risk of poor mental health and well-being, but not for activity in other types of environment.
It also found a 50% greater positive effect on mental health than exercising indoors. In other words, if you're already struggling with depression, anxiety, tension, and stress, getting outdoors will increase your likelihood of feeling better than just exercise alone.
Are you mentally fit? Read here for help with improving your mental fitness.
A 2010 study found that exercising for just 5 minutes per day in outdoor environments improved mood and self-esteem greatly, especially if the participant was exercising near water . If you're having a rough day or feeling down, even a quick stroll outdoors can improve your outlook.
Exercising outdoors has been proven to have a direct correlation with an increase in exercise frequency  . Because of the improved mental aspects that seem to go along with outdoor activity, people who exercised outdoors had a more restorative effect, and therefore an increased desire for more frequent exercise. If you're struggling with motivation to work out, moving your workout to the great outdoors may help you want to keep at it.
Need even more motivation? This list will make you want to get in shape.
Exercising outdoors can improve your ability to focus and perform. One study found that children with ADHD (attention deficit hyperactivity disorder) who took a 20 minute walk in a park setting improved concentration levels and performance . For us, this means that taking just 20 minutes to get outdoors, especially to a green environment, can help us to perform better at work and school.
While gym memberships and down payments can be a big hit to your bank account and an excuse not to exercise, stepping outside and walking around your neighborhood or the park is absolutely free. I would even go as far as to say, with all these benefits, that it makes you richer.
Being outdoors seems to revitalize us and make us feel more alive, according to research .
"Nature is fuel for the soul…Often when we feel depleted we reach for a cup of coffee, but research suggests a better way to get energized is to connect with nature." -Richard Ryan, professor of psychology at the University of Rochester.
We get vitamin D from sunlight on our skin, and vitamin D is responsible for improved immunity, building stronger bones and muscles, reducing stress and depression, reducing blood pressure, and preventing illnesses like cancer and heart disease .
Question: Do you exercise outdoors or indoors? What do you enjoy about either?
I won't run on a treadmill! Too boring. I will run outside in any weather, and I just make sure to wear the right gear.
Great article D. And bicycling down these trails in the park with my dog was good for me too! everyday I did a little more until I reached 5 miles plus. every week I tried to set the bar higher.
It does feel really boring to me now. Once you go outside I don't see how you can go back to a treadmill, no matter how cold it is!
Have been thinking about starting to walk/run. Don't know if it is for me though. Having read this I think I should give it a go.
I take my exercise outdoors in a different way using my mini dvd player in my backyard to do my Tae Bo and other exercises in the fresh air on nice days.


I was inspired by BuffBars. BuffBars however do not include fact that player and any target can have up to 24 buffs and same amount of debuffs. I tried to modify original addon, but it wasn't the thing I was looking for, bars (even made smaller) took to much space even without adding maximal amount of bars (48).
After few hours of thinking, I realized that best place for bars would be countdown under original (de)buff icons. So I started digging in game files to find out how are they made. After few hours I had a working prototype, which I finished within next hours.
Curse has long delays when it gets to approving new packages, it is common that you see new description but there is no file yet. Please verify version that you download, if it isn't latest then you can visit Polish project page. You might also check repository if you are interested.
Before you post an error read Bug Reports.
I use my own SVN repository server. You may find current working copy here.
Thanks to xzanthar for inspiration and bars layout.
Support for player buffs only.
Status bar under player's (de)buff icon.
Copied and displayed on status bar time from original counter (bar covers it).
No bar if (de)buff is not time limited.
Please do not post comments or send messages telling that it doesn't work. If you want to complain then go get a glass of watter, but if you want to help, post a comment or send a message with as detailed description as you can. It doesn't hurt and can make work much faster. Once again I want to thank all people that were sending their feedback, suggestions and error reports.
If error is not caused by any other addon.
If you develop a patch which you want to share, you can send it to me and if I like it I will include it.
Please leave a comment on Curse or on my page with suggestions/fixes/solutions.
how do you activate them ingame?
You don't have to do anything. If you don't see bars then probably one of your addons had an error which prevented loading other addons. Please first check that.
If you don't see bars and buff icons than you probably have installed some gui modification which hide this game element. In that case there is nothing I can do about it.


text:
Elastica 'Elastica' LP
Rough Trade Records announce the reissue of Elastica's debut album 'Elastica', which came out in March 1995 and went straight to Number One.
The album will be released on CD and vinyl. The vinyl format contains a fanzine and black flexidisc featuring bonus track 'In The City'.
Justin Welch: "The band is shocked and totally overwhelmed at the outpouring of love that obviously still exists for Elastica after all these years. Unfortunately, there are no immediate plans for a reunion but we are really excited to announce that we are working with Rough Trade Records and the re release of the first album."
Catalogue number: RTRADLP914
Label: Rough Trade
Robert Forster 'The Candle and the Flame' LP
The Pale Fountains 'From Across The Kitchen Table' LP
Freddie Gibbs '$oul $old $eparately' LP
Pozi 'Smiling Pools' LP


text:
Gender and sex, what it means to modern day...
Creator: Meiyjhe June 24, 2017 6:59am
Forums Off Topic Gender and sex, what it means to modern day...
43 posts - page 3 of 5
Joxuu
<Fabulous>
Esteemed (336)
Permalink | Quote | PM | +Rep June 25, 2017 6:08pm | Report
Nighthawk wrote:
Being preached too by a bunch of cisgender people isn't exactly the best way to have a discussion.
That's not quite right. It's good to get the best out of both worlds. You get a better view on things after you listen to both parties and their arguments. Example: There's an attempt to make health care better in America atm. You get the best optimized solution by listening both sides who are against and for the update. You don't get the best overall solutions by listening only the side that agrees with you.
Debating/argumenting/discussing with all sides of the spectrum is how you get a better world view.
[quote=Joxuu][quote=Nighthawk]Being preached too by a bunch of cisgender people isn't exactly the best way to have a discussion.[/quote] That's not quite right. It's good to get the best out of both worlds. You get a better view on things after you listen to both parties and their arguments. Example: There's an attempt to make health care better in America atm. You get the best optimized solution by listening both sides who are against and for the update. You don't get the best overall solutions by listening only the side that agrees with you. Debating/argumenting/discussing with all sides of the spectrum is how you get a better world view.[/quote]
"A person giving you advice isn't perfect and has their own shortcomings but they may give you the piece that you're missing."
GrandmasterD
Call me conservative or however you want, but I simply can't see how is gender associated with what's inside one's mind/one's current mood or whatever.
How can you not understand that, and at the same time not deny the existence of transgender? Not that I am saying you should deny that, but I don't know how these two statements do not conflict with each other.
RottedApples wrote:
If you want to go around and act like a girl even though you aren't, or vice versa. go ahead. I won't stop you. But for the love of god don't get mad just because someone doesn't "refer to you with the correct gender pronoun" or some stupid **** like that. When i was younger i didn't get mad at someone on the phone for calling me a girl because my voice was higher then. (and yes that actually happened a couple times)
I think it has everything to do with understanding. If someone asks if you could not refer to them as something, then I suppose that's not entirely unreasonable. I think both sides need to be understanding in that; be calm, polite, and try to adjust; it really isn't all that hard.
I mean, if calling someone "he" as opposed to "she" makes them feel better, then what's the big deal of you know, not granting that?
No real point in having this kind of discussion here, there's other places to educate yourself if you want too and if you don't nothing I say is going to change that.
Expecting people to educate themselves is not only too easy, but also kind of lazy. If you wish people in the world to become more knowledgeable on a subject like this, then you better start teaching them. Yes, not everyone wants to learn, but you'll find that there's a lot of reasonable people out there who will be like "Oh, I never looked at it that way."
Being preached too by a bunch of cisgender people...
Let's turn this into an "us versus them" argument, that'll make things a lot easier. Also: to*.
Joxuu wrote:
I think the American healthcare comparison is about one of the worst ones to make, but that's out of the scope of this discussion :^).
While I do think this is a correct message, I do also think that it means people need to have an open mind to new ideas; there being more than two genders is a new idea to most Western Cultures, and I think meeting that with a resounding "I believe there are only two genders, and no one can convince me of the opposite being true." is dismissive and kind of contradicts your message, in my opinion.
I am mostly curious where the "I refuse to believe that more or less than two genders exist."—paraphrasing here—idea comes from; if gender is different from sex, and if gender is a social construct, then why is the very notion of exploring the option of considering that there's more than two genders considered absurd?
I am not saying that people should necessarily agree, disagree, believe, or not believe any of it, but I am just trying to comprehend this thought process, and what it's based on; because if the only reason, for dismissing the notion that more than two genders may exist, one can come up with is the fact that one cannot picture or comprehend that, then I think that one should seriously start to consider that they may be wrong on the subject.
Personally, I can say that I mostly find exploring the idea of gender as a psychological and social construct to be interesting, and it makes me wonder whether gender as a concept can actually exist in a vacuum or not.
I, too, have a hard time understanding what potential other genders are, how they are defined, and how gender itself is defined; what classifies as a gender? That being said, I personally cannot come up with a feasible argument at the moment as to why more than two genders couldn't be possible.
[quote=GrandmasterD][quote=Lady Amelyne]Call me conservative or however you want, but I simply can't see how is gender associated with what's inside one's mind/one's current mood or whatever.[/quote] How can you not understand that, and at the same time not deny the existence of transgender? Not that I am saying you should deny that, but I don't know how these two statements do not conflict with each other. [quote=RottedApples]If you want to go around and act like a girl even though you aren't, or vice versa. go ahead. I won't stop you. But for the love of god don't get mad just because someone doesn't "refer to you with the correct gender pronoun" or some stupid shit like that. When i was younger i didn't get mad at someone on the phone for calling me a girl because my voice was higher then. (and yes that actually happened a couple times)[/quote] I think it has everything to do with understanding. If someone asks if you could not refer to them as something, then I suppose that's not entirely unreasonable. I think both sides need to be understanding in that; be calm, polite, and try to adjust; it really isn't all that hard. I mean, if calling someone "he" as opposed to "she" makes them feel better, then what's the big deal of you know, not granting that? [quote=Nighthawk]No real point in having this kind of discussion here, there's other places to educate yourself if you want too and if you don't nothing I say is going to change that.[/quote] Expecting people to educate themselves is not only too easy, but also kind of lazy. If you wish people in the world to become more knowledgeable on a subject like this, then you better start teaching them. Yes, not everyone wants to learn, but you'll find that there's a lot of reasonable people out there who will be like "Oh, I never looked at it that way." Be the change you want to see in the world. [quote=Nighthawk]Being preached too by a bunch of cisgender people...[/quote] Let's turn this into an "us versus them" argument, that'll make things a lot easier. Also: to*. [quote=Joxuu][quote=Nighthawk]Being preached too by a bunch of cisgender people isn't exactly the best way to have a discussion.[/quote] That's not quite right. It's good to get the best out of both worlds. You get a better view on things after you listen to both parties and their arguments. Example: There's an attempt to make health care better in America atm. You get the best optimized solution by listening both sides who are against and for the update. You don't get the best overall solutions by listening only the side that agrees with you. Debating/argumenting/discussing with all sides of the spectrum is how you get a better world view.[/quote] I think the American healthcare comparison is about one of the worst ones to make, but that's out of the scope of this discussion :^). While I do think this is a correct message, I do also think that it means people need to have an open mind to new ideas; there being more than two genders is a new idea to most Western Cultures, and I think meeting that with a resounding "I believe there are only two genders, and no one can convince me of the opposite being true." is dismissive and kind of contradicts your message, in my opinion. [rule] I am mostly curious where the "I refuse to believe that more or less than two genders exist."—paraphrasing here—idea comes from; if gender is different from sex, and if gender is a social construct, then why is the very notion of exploring the option of considering that there's more than two genders considered absurd? I am not saying that people should necessarily agree, disagree, believe, or not believe any of it, but I am just trying to comprehend this thought process, and what it's based on; because if the only reason, for dismissing the notion that more than two genders may exist, one can come up with is the fact that one cannot picture or comprehend that, then I think that one should seriously start to consider that they may be wrong on the subject. Personally, I can say that I mostly find exploring the idea of gender as a psychological and social construct to be interesting, and it makes me wonder whether gender as a concept can actually exist in a vacuum or not. I, too, have a hard time understanding what potential other genders are, how they are defined, and how gender itself is defined; what classifies as a gender? That being said, I personally cannot come up with a feasible argument at the moment as to why more than two genders couldn't be possible.[/quote]
The issue here is that many people have actually stated they refuse to listen to anything anyone has to say that is different from their own views. It is everyone's job to listen in a debate, not just Nighthawk's and mine. It isn't even Nighthawk or me saying that we refuse to listen.
It's fair to point out that people outside the scope of understanding should take their perceptions with a grain of salt and challenge their own inherent biases. A white American stating racism doesn't exist in the US because African Americans get access to special scholarships may honestly believe that is true, but that perception doesn't make them correct.
No one has yet to even approach the simple question I asked: if you believe that gender dysphoria exists, what about people who identify as neither male nor female or somewhere in between who experience or have even been diagnosed with gender dysphoria by medical professionals? Those people exist, they are not an imaginary thing. Modern psychology (that is to say, science) doesn't agree with a binary assessment of gender. That's why professional diagnostic tools like the DSM-5 use phrases like "other genders" when referencing diagnostic criteria for gender dysphoria. The science used to actually understand how the human brain views itself disagrees with you. Lack of understanding of a concept does not render that concept nonexistent.
I do believe that naming every point on a spectrum is an arduous endeavor and that generic labels should be used in the vernacular, however. Labels like genderqueer, agender, etc can easily be explained even if they are not immediately understood.
[quote=The_Nameless_Bard]The issue here is that many people have actually stated they refuse to listen to anything anyone has to say that is different from their own views. It is [i]everyone's[/i] job to listen in a debate, not just Nighthawk's and mine. It isn't even Nighthawk or me saying that we refuse to listen. It's fair to point out that people outside the scope of understanding should take their perceptions with a grain of salt and challenge their own inherent biases. A white American stating racism doesn't exist in the US because African Americans get access to special scholarships may honestly believe that is true, but that perception doesn't make them correct. No one has yet to even approach the simple question I asked: if you believe that gender dysphoria exists, what about people who identify as neither male nor female or somewhere in between who experience or have even been diagnosed with gender dysphoria by medical professionals? Those people exist, they are not an imaginary thing. Modern psychology (that is to say, science) doesn't agree with a binary assessment of gender. That's why professional diagnostic tools like the DSM-5 use phrases like "other genders" when referencing diagnostic criteria for gender dysphoria. The science used to actually understand how the human brain views itself disagrees with you. Lack of understanding of a concept does not render that concept nonexistent. I do believe that naming every point on a spectrum is an arduous endeavor and that generic labels should be used in the vernacular, however. Labels like genderqueer, agender, etc can easily be explained even if they are not immediately understood.[/quote]
jhoijhoi
<MOBAFire Mother>
Mythical (2023)
I believe there are two sexes based on human anatomy and physical characteristics typically associated with those sexes. Eg: broad shoulders, slim hips, flat chest, hirsute = xy sex. Significantly more fatty tissue, larger hips, shorter stature = xx sex. OBVIOUSLY those physical characteristics don't ALWAYS apply to xy and xx exclusively.
I wrote a lot of stuff but deleted it, because the only thing I guess I really want to ask is:
Why does the world need genders? Why can't we go off sex?
[quote=jhoijhoi]I believe there are two sexes based on human anatomy and physical characteristics typically associated with those sexes. Eg: broad shoulders, slim hips, flat chest, hirsute = xy sex. Significantly more fatty tissue, larger hips, shorter stature = xx sex. OBVIOUSLY those physical characteristics don't ALWAYS apply to xy and xx exclusively. I wrote a lot of stuff but deleted it, because the only thing I guess I really want to ask is: Why does the world need genders? Why can't we go off sex?[/quote]
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jhoijhoi wrote:
Sex is a much broader concept with a much broader definition that does not hinge on humans specifically (See: ZW and X0). Also, next to male and female, there's also intersex.
Additionally, what you're referring to are the secondary sex characteristics, although these are not inherent to the definition of the noun sex as sexual dimorphism is not a thing in all species.
Because gender is a construct that we as a society at some point deemed necessary to exist--I cannot personally tell you if it's possible to have gender exist even if there would be no society at all--and a clear evidence of that, for example, are the gender roles; what sex someone is, is actually irrelevant.
For example, consider a person with CAIS; their sex would be male, but their appearance suggests female, and I think that treating them as male would be very confusing for almost everyone involved.
[quote=GrandmasterD][quote=jhoijhoi]I believe there are two sexes based on human anatomy and physical characteristics typically associated with those sexes. Eg: broad shoulders, slim hips, flat chest, hirsute = xy sex. Significantly more fatty tissue, larger hips, shorter stature = xx sex. OBVIOUSLY those physical characteristics don't ALWAYS apply to xy and xx exclusively.[/quote] Sex is a much broader concept with a much broader definition that does not hinge on humans specifically (See: ZW and X0). Also, next to male and female, there's also intersex. Additionally, what you're referring to are the secondary sex characteristics, although these are not inherent to the definition of the noun sex as sexual dimorphism is not a thing in all species. [quote=jhoijhoi]I wrote a lot of stuff but deleted it, because the only thing I guess I really want to ask is: Why does the world need genders? Why can't we go off sex?[/quote] Because gender is a construct that we as a society at some point deemed necessary to exist--I cannot personally tell you if it's possible to have gender exist even if there would be no society at all--and a clear evidence of that, for example, are the gender roles; what sex someone is, is actually irrelevant. For example, consider a person with CAIS; their sex would be male, but their appearance suggests female, and I think that treating them as male would be very confusing for almost everyone involved.[/quote]
RottedApples
<Inhouse Addict>
Permalink | Quote | PM | +Rep June 25, 2017 10:41pm | Report
The_Nameless_Bard wrote:
I do believe that naming every point on a spectrum is an arduous endeavor and that generic labels should be used in the vernacular, however.
This is my main problem with how some people are trying to treat and argue this. I treat that in between with a generic label. I have no problem with people who exists in between or want to exist in between but please stop making ammunition for memes. You just make yourself look stupid and it makes it harder for me to take anything seriously. Also don't get offended by memes, they are just memes. I laugh at jokes about crippling depression despite my current state mentally.
Also on a personal note I myself am a guy, I know this. This is a fact. I do sometimes wish I was a girl, I like wearing panties sometimes because it's a fetish I have and I get off on this. I also have used a ***** before and enjoyed the experience, which does partially, mostly, play into why I sometimes want to be a girl (but it's also because I want to look like a cute grill) and I'm bisexual. Yet I won't take any actions such as surgery to complete this goal and I have no problems being a guy because that's what I am and I'm fine with it. I wasn't born as a girl so trying to become one I feel would be a rough and unfulfilling experience physically, mentally, and socially. But I don't go around identifying myself as some weird thing because I want to. I just keep living my life, hanging out doing whatever having a good time. Gender is something I hardly ever worry about. And for as much as it is so important and iconic in our lives being something that affects daily routine, it hardly matters to me and I do somewhat struggle to grasp why it matters so much, to the extent that people will flip out if they are "misgendered", to other people. I feel like you have to have something wrong with you mentally to be so concerned over something that in the grand scheme of things is so minor.
[quote=RottedApples][quote=The_Nameless_Bard]I do believe that naming every point on a spectrum is an arduous endeavor and that generic labels should be used in the vernacular, however.[/quote] This is my main problem with how some people are trying to treat and argue this. I treat that in between with a generic label. I have no problem with people who exists in between or want to exist in between but please stop making ammunition for memes. You just make yourself look stupid and it makes it harder for me to take anything seriously. Also don't get offended by memes, they are just memes. I laugh at jokes about crippling depression despite my current state mentally. Also on a personal note I myself am a guy, I know this. This is a fact. I do sometimes wish I was a girl, I like wearing panties sometimes because it's a fetish I have and I get off on this. I also have used a dildo before and enjoyed the experience, which does partially, mostly, play into why I sometimes want to be a girl (but it's also because I want to look like a cute grill) and I'm bisexual. Yet I won't take any actions such as surgery to complete this goal and I have no problems being a guy because that's what I am and I'm fine with it. I wasn't born as a girl so trying to become one I feel would be a rough and unfulfilling experience physically, mentally, and socially. But I don't go around identifying myself as some weird thing because I want to. I just keep living my life, hanging out doing whatever having a good time. Gender is something I hardly ever worry about. And for as much as it is so important and iconic in our lives being something that affects daily routine, it hardly matters to me and I do somewhat struggle to grasp why it matters so much, to the extent that people will flip out if they are "misgendered", to other people. I feel like you have to have something wrong with you mentally to be so concerned over something that in the grand scheme of things is so minor.[/quote]
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GrandmasterD wrote:
Sex ... does not hinge on humans specifically ... intersex.
I was only referring to humans in this case. And by saying there are only 2 sexes for humans, I'm not saying that you can't have a combination of both (like a hermaphrodite).
secondary sex characteristics... not a thing in all species.
Again, was only referring to humans. I didn't write *****/vagina as I thought those were obvious primary characteristics.
This is my issue. Why is there a difference between treating a person as a "male" or a "female"?
[quote=jhoijhoi][quote=GrandmasterD]Sex ... does not hinge on humans specifically ... intersex.[/quote] I was only referring to humans in this case. And by saying there are only 2 sexes for humans, I'm not saying that you can't have a combination of both (like a hermaphrodite). [quote=GrandmasterD]secondary sex characteristics... not a thing in all species.[/quote] Again, was only referring to humans. I didn't write penis/vagina as I thought those were obvious primary characteristics. [quote=GrandmasterD]For example, consider a person with CAIS; their sex would be male, but their appearance suggests female, and I think that treating them as male would be very confusing for almost everyone involved.[/quote] This is my issue. [i]Why[/i] is there a difference between treating a person as a "male" or a "female"?[/quote]
<Veteran>
Permalink | Quote | PM | +Rep June 26, 2017 12:48am | Report
It's actually not mine or anyone else's job to educate you in order to have you accept my opinion. I also view it as a waste of time.
Especially when multiple have flat out stated their opinions are correct and if you think otherwise you're wrong.
It's especially hilarious when people treat this as such a minor topic. To you, yeah I'm sure it is.
To people who identify out of their social norms, to be expected to just calmly be told that they should just accept that no matter how they change their appearance, or no matter how many times they say that they aren't what they look like, or put in all of that effort in order to go about that, just to be told that they are wrong and don't know what's best for them or that if they "freak out" over being told they're lying to themselves, is ridiculous.
Society in general is ridiculous, but telling someone who's trans that their entire outlook on life is wrong and they're lying to themselves is like telling someone named Steve that their name is actually Nick and if they think otherwise they're an idiot.
Does that seem like a silly comparison? Sure! Because society doesn't place the same weight on names as we, for whatever reason, place on gender or sex. And because different people have different dislikes. There are people who really don't give a **** what you call them, and there are people who correct you every time you misspell their name. Invalidating one because of the other isn't fair to either.
I'm also quite aware that seeing both sides of the argument is a valid one and I actually appear on a podcast weekly to try and help more people debate properly and understand each side rather than slinging mud and losing focus of the issue at hand. It's a little harder to do over an internet forum, however.
And as Nameless said for a proper discussion to occur, you do have to be willing to change your opinions.
Also scientifically speaking there's more than just XX or XY "sexes". It's not black and white.
And Trans people have been shown to have physical bodies more akin to their "preferred gender" from birth.
[quote=Nighthawk]It's actually not mine or anyone else's job to educate you in order to have you accept my opinion. I also view it as a waste of time. Especially when multiple have flat out stated their opinions are correct and if you think otherwise you're wrong. It's especially hilarious when people treat this as such a minor topic. To you, yeah I'm sure it is. To people who identify out of their social norms, to be expected to just calmly be told that they should just accept that no matter how they change their appearance, or no matter how many times they say that they aren't what they look like, or put in all of that effort in order to go about that, just to be told that they are wrong and don't know what's best for them or that if they "freak out" over being told they're lying to themselves, is ridiculous. Society in general is ridiculous, but telling someone who's trans that their entire outlook on life is wrong and they're lying to themselves is like telling someone named Steve that their name is actually Nick and if they think otherwise they're an idiot. Does that seem like a silly comparison? Sure! Because society doesn't place the same weight on names as we, for whatever reason, place on gender or sex. And because different people have different dislikes. There are people who really don't give a shit what you call them, and there are people who correct you every time you misspell their name. Invalidating one because of the other isn't fair to either. I'm also quite aware that seeing both sides of the argument is a valid one and I actually appear on a podcast weekly to try and help more people debate properly and understand each side rather than slinging mud and losing focus of the issue at hand. It's a little harder to do over an internet forum, however. And as Nameless said for a proper discussion to occur, you do have to be willing to change your opinions. Also scientifically speaking there's more than just XX or XY "sexes". It's not black and white. And Trans people have been shown to have physical bodies more akin to their "preferred gender" from birth.[/quote]
Permalink | Quote | PM | +Rep June 26, 2017 2:14am | Report
For the record I understand the subject better now, and seeing how the definition of "gender" differs from "sex", I understand why some people would want to label themselves differently to just male or female (of which my definition previously was "**** or vagina", referring to sex). In their place I would find it very unnecessary, as RottedApples does, but I understand that not everyone cares about the same things, as Nighthawk said.
Gender's a made up concept anyway, no harm in making up more genders.
[quote=Vapora Dark]For the record I understand the subject better now, and seeing how the definition of [url=https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/gender]"gender"[/url] differs from "sex", I understand why some people would want to label themselves differently to just male or female (of which my definition previously was "dick or vagina", referring to sex). In their place I would find it very unnecessary, as RottedApples does, but I understand that not everyone cares about the same things, as Nighthawk said. Gender's a made up concept anyway, no harm in making up more genders.[/quote]
Latest Legend
Established (149)
I'll respond in more detail later (after I've found the time to check out the things Nameless linked), but now that the word science has come up I have a follow-up question: is gender related to sex or is it not? Because if we start talking about X and Y chromosomes we're in the sex department I suppose.
[quote=Latest Legend]I'll respond in more detail later (after I've found the time to check out the things Nameless linked), but now that the word science has come up I have a follow-up question: is gender related to sex or is it not? Because if we start talking about X and Y chromosomes we're in the sex department I suppose.[/quote]
********'s a pretty good fertilizer


Steven Malikowski will lead this workshop and use his experience with bike touring in the US, UK, and EU. People in the workshop will be invited to join weekend bike tours this summer. The workshop is offered through Minneapolis Community Education. To sign up for the class, complete the online form at https://tinyurl.com/BikeTouring519. The $25 cost should be paid to Minneapolis Community Education, which determined the cost.


text:
Novokuzněck (rusky Новокузне́цк) je město v Kemerovské oblasti na Sibiři v Rusku.

Město bylo založeno Kozáky jako strážní, předsunutá základna na řece Tom u ústí Kondomy a původně se nazývalo Kuzněck. Právě zde si v roce 1857 Dostojevskij vzal za ženu Marii Isajevu. Po Velké říjnové socialistické revoluci zde Stalin z ospalého města vybudoval jedno z nejvýznamnějších ruských těžařských měst, když zde vznikl Kuzněcký hutnický kombinát. Mezi lety 1932 a 1961 také město neslo Stalinovo jméno - Stalinsk. Dnes jsou tu letiště, divadlo, vysoké školy a muzea.

Sport
Ve městě působí hokejový klub Metallurg Novokuzněck, který hraje Kontinentální ligu ledního hokeje.

Partnerská města
  Dallas, Spojené státy americké
  Nižnij Tagil, Rusko
  Pittsburgh, Spojené státy americké
  Záporoží, Ukrajina
  Birmingham, Spojené království

Odkazy

Reference

Externí odkazy

Města v Kemerovské oblasti
Přejmenovaná sídla v Rusku