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Реформа энергетического комплекса на Украинеenglish
THE REFORM OF UKRAINE'S ENERGY COMPLEX
AS A PRECONDITION OF ELIMINATING
UKRAINE'S ENERGY DEPENDENCE
Only 16 per cent of Ukraine's gas and 13 per cent of its oil is produced domestically and more than half of Ukraine's imports consist of energy.[i] Most of energy imports originate in Russia. This energy dependence upon Russia and problems to pay for energy deliveries is perceived as a big threat to Ukraine's sovereignty. Unauthorised siphoning of gas destined for Western Europe urged Russian Gazprom to start negotiations about a gas pipeline bypassing Ukraine. This would bereave Ukraine of a major source of income, i.e. between one quarter and one third of its domestic gas consumption.
Ukraine's energy dependence upon Russia and security threats involved are investigated in this contribution.
It is argued that with a reform of the energy economy, energy dependence would be very limited. The level of energy dependence is, among others, dependent upon the levels of domestic energy consumption and production. Energy consumption is very high due to lack of incentives to economize on energy consumption. Domestic energy production could be more efficient and much more cheaper if proper incentives would be in place. The payments crisis and the parasitic role of energy traders constitute the root of the current energy crisis. The obstacles that prevent a reform of the energy economy are the same that prevent Ukraine reducing its energy dependence.
First problems of energy consumption, trade in energy and the energy payments crisis are analysed. Subsequently domestic energy production is looked at. Then the results of the reform of the energy sector of the Yushchenko government are dealt with. Finally, energy imports and energy dependence upon Russia are analysed.
1. Wastage of energy
In Soviet times, enterprises and households did not have any incentive to economise on energy consumption. All houses had central heating and costs of heating were included in the very low fixed rent. Enterprises consumed huge amounts of energy that was delivered for a very low price because the Soviet Union had enormous amounts of energy reserves. Moreover, all enterprises were faced with soft budget constraints: the state would automatically cover losses. It made the Soviet Union one of the most energy intensive economies in the world.
After the independence of Ukraine the situation changed. Ukraine imported more than half of the energy it consumed and soon Ukraine had to pay the world market price for the oil and gas that was mainly delivered by Russia. In three years time the price went up from approximately 15 per cent of the world market price to the world market level. Although not all delivered energy was paid for (Russia continued to subsidise Ukraine although regularly cutting of supplies) and Ukraine started to indebt itself, the change-over had an enormous impact upon the economic situation in Ukraine. It contributed to the economic collapse (a 65 per cent production decline from 1991-1996) and partly explains why Ukraine was performing so much worse compared to Russia.
Although Ukraine had to pay much more for the energy it consumed, the wasteful attitude of households and enterprises towards energy use hardly changed. Households still generally do not have thermo-regulators and do not have individual gas meters.
Although households had to pay more for the energy they consumed they were not given the means to diminish energy consumption.[ii] The local energy providers reacted upon lack of energy resources by switching on the heating later in winter and switch it off earlier in springtime. As far as cut-offs occurred, they were usually arbitrary and often not directly related to non-payment.
Enterprises had to pay more for energy but the budget constraints of big state owned enterprises and many privatised enterprises remained rather soft and non-payment of the energy bill often did not result in cutting off of energy. In 2000, 13 000 debtor companies continued to receive energy. On the other hand, new private enterprises had incentives to take energy saving measures.
The industrial structure of Ukraine changed. The share of energy intensive industries like heavy metallurgy and chemical industry increased. Heavy metallurgy as a share of total industrial production increased from 14.4 per cent in 1990 to 26 per cent in 1999, mainly as a result of increased exports. Thirteen per cent of total gas consumption is by heavy metallurgy and 11.3 per cent by chemical industry.[iii] The energy intensity of heavy metallurgy is such that if costs of energy would be reflected in the export product, it would not be competitive. Most steel enterprises produce steel in open-hearth furnaces (Martin ovens) that are already several decades ago abandoned in the Western world. Therefore Ukrainian steel enterprises use up to 60 per cent more energy as their foreign competitors. However, steel enterprises do not pay for all the energy they use. This is the reason that Ukrainian steel exported abroad is often faced with anti-dumping procedures.
Although Ukrainian steel enterprises often managed to make some profit, revenues are hardly used for new investments, among others in energy saving measures.
During the 1990s Ukraine became the most energy inefficient country in the world.[iv] International comparison of GNP per kg oil equivalent (US dollars) shows that Ukraine produced in 1996 only 0.5 dollars per kg/oil equivalent, while it was 3.0 dollars for South Korea, 5.4 for the Netherlands and 7.0 for Germany.[v]
Little has been done hitherto to reduce the energy intensity of production. President Kuchma complained that there is no governmental activity in the sphere of energy conservation.[vi] With a more efficient use of electricity, 20-25 per cent could be saved on the electricity bill, according to the Energy Center of the European Union, 40 per cent according to the Energy Research Institute of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.[vii] Yet, energy intensity of industrial production has increased during the 1990s, because generally, decline of power consumption has been less than the general decline of industrial production. In 1994, electric power use per unit GDP was 4-4.5 times higher in Ukraine than in Western Europe. This ratio was 2.5-3 times in the 1980s.
Nowadays, Ukraine surpasses virtually all Western European countries in per capita electric power consumption.[viii] Ukraine, with 49 million inhabitants, burns the same amount of gas as affluent Germany with 80 million inhabitants.
According to O. Khraban, of the Danish energy-technology firm Danfoss, 'the potential market for energy saving technology is huge, but the real market is much smaller, mostly because there is little awareness of the problem.'[ix] There is also the misconception that energy saving technology is expensive.
Some energy conservation projects clearly show the problem. With the help of a USA agency a school in Lviv insulated windows and accomplished herewith 43 per cent energy savings. Also a new heating control system was installed. Before the upgrade has been made, the school paid 900 000 hryvnas monthly for energy, while two years after the work has been completed the school pays 544 000 hryvnas monthly. The costs of the works were 29 000 dollars. Two years after completion Lviv got 10 000 dollars back and is saving 5000 dollars a year.[x]
Unfortunately, very few institutions followed this example. For example, hospitals still spend on average 20 to 30 per cent of their budget for heating, while economizing on energy could free money for salaries and equipment.[xi]
2. Energy payments crisis
Energy trade is one of the most profitable business in Ukraine, despite the fact that there is a payments crisis in the energy sector. Official statistics about the financial situation in the energy sector are not reliable because most actors involved are opposed to transparency. In many ways tax-authorities are cheated. The fact that large part of energy is traded in barter deals makes energy trade very opaque. Barter gives ample opportunities to siphon of profits and hide revenues for tax authorities. This situation is further complicated by the fact that energy traders often get the exclusive right to provide energy to designated enterprises. This gives them the opportunity to squeeze these enterprises, usually with the collaboration of these manufacturing enterprises.
For example, a steel enterprise buys gas from a trader that is imposed upon the enterprise by political authorities. The trader delivers the gas for a high price and receives in exchange, apart from a small amount of cash, the larger part in the form of undervalued steel. On paper, the steel enterprise pays only for part of the delivered energy. The energy trader sells the undervalued steel for a low price to an off shore steel trader, owned by the energy trader. Subsequently the offshore company makes big profits selling the undervalued steel for the world market price abroad.
On paper, both the steel enterprise and the energy trader are making losses with this deal. On paper, the energy trader receives only payments for part of the delivered gas. The steel enterprise becomes indebted with the energy trader.
In many cases, steel enterprises are loss making (on paper) and receive direct or indirect subsidies from the state. Energy traders are often on paper also loss making and do not pay for all energy delivered by energy producers. Often, the state jumps in and subsidises the energy traders and energy producers. Energy traders often bought from energy producers energy on loans, guaranteed by the state. When the energy trader failed to pay, the state paid back the loan.
Independent energy traders can buy cheap gas, for example by paying immediately in cash and bypassing Gazprom. According to Yulia Timoshenko, in such a case gas could be bought for 25-30 dollars per 1000 m3, while Ukraine buys gas from Gazprom for 80 dollars in barter deals. Itera, the Russian/Ukrainian joint venture can, according to her, sell gas at 60 dollars per 1000 m3. The advantage of paying by cash gives the small private traders enormous profits. [xii]
The whole set up favours the energy traders, not the energy producers. As President Kuchma said in early 2000: 'By getting hold of and monopolising the (energy) market, countless intermediaries are making super-profits, looting energy facilities and enterprises.'[xiii] Unfortunately, the president himself helped to create such a situation.[xiv] The energy producers are all state owned, therefore the state pays here the bill. Despite the fact that energy traders are the winners in the equation, they do not invest in the energy transportation infrastructure, because non-reported profits are channelled abroad. The deteriorating state of the electricity grid generates each year more power outages. Gas leakage increases each year due to bad maintenance of the pipeline system.
Government placed a lot of enterprises and institutions on a list of entities that can not be disconnected from the energy grid under any circumstances. Among these are the most chronic non-payers of energy. This further aggravates the payments crisis.
3. Energy production
Almost half of the energy Ukraine consumes is produced domestically. Almost all consumed coal is produced in Ukraine. An important asset is the nuclear power stations that produce almost half of the electricity consumed in Ukraine.
Of all Ukrainian energy needs, 26 per cent are accounted for by oil, 35 per cent by gas, 34 per cent by coal and 4 per cent by nuclear power and hydroelectric power. [xv]
The output of coal, the major part mined in South-Eastern Ukraine, declined from 216 million tons in 1975, to 189 million tons in 1985, 165 million tons in 1990, 84 million tons in 1995 and 81 million tons in 1999. Since the independence of Ukraine, 1991, coal production declined by more than half while employment dropped by more than one third. While the coal industry employed 650 000 employees in 1995, the beginning of restructuring, it counted 410 200 employees in January 2000.[xvi]
Table 1 Energy production in Ukraine
coal (million tons) 165 83.8 81.7
electric energy (kWh) 298 194 172
gas (m3) 28.1 18.2 18.1
oil (million tonnes) 5.3 4.1 3.8
Source: Ukraine v Tsifrax 1999, p. 65
The loss making coal mining sector is still for the larger part not privatized and receives large direct and indirect subsidies.[xvii] Coal mines are being kept afloat that produce coal twice the world market price while conditions for coal mining are deteriorating, given the prospect of even more expensive coal in the future.
The easily available coal had been extracted so that what remained lay in thin and sloping seems, often more than 1200 meters deep with each passing year average depth of the coal faces increased by 10-15 meters. Quality of coal was declining. Mining technology is very primitive: 75 per cent of all jobs in the mines are done manually (from the mid-seventies onwards investments in coal mining were channeled to other regions than South Eastern Ukraine). One third of the mines is more than 50 years old, and some date of the 19th century. Many key pieces of equipment, including one third of the ropes hauling the mine elevators, are well beyond their service time.[xviii]
Miners found themselves in a downward spiral of declining rates of productivity and investment leading to the increasing hazards of their work. In 1998 every thousand tons of coal cost the lives of four miners.[xix]
The United Kingdom produces with only 3.8 per cent of miners 57.9 per cent of coal produced in Ukraine. Labor productivity of American miners is 58.7 times as high as that of Ukrainian miners. Here we do not take into account the fact that on average, Ukrainian coal contains 4000-5000 kcal/kg, while internationally, 7000 kcal/kg is usual.[xx]
On average, in Ukraine production costs of coal are 40 dollars per ton compared with a world price of 35 dollars a ton, requiring huge government subsidies. According to the former minister of coal industry, Mr Tulub, coal enterprises owed late 1998 8.5 billion hryvnas to creditors and 63 per cent of mines were operating at extreme losses.[xxi]
Support by the state is provided to cover 'accounting losses' which equals to 'profit on paper', reduced by the sum of operational losses. 'Profit on paper' is calculated by multiplying listed prices by the sales amount, provided by financial estimation. In fact, the real price of coal sold by the mines is much less than the listed price. That is why the mines which fulfil their production plan can not cover the operation costs, even when subsidized by the state.
Well functioning mines are punished by siphoning off profits while badly performing mines are rewarded with subsidies. In Donetsk, fifty per cent of mines, all loss making, produce only 15 per cent of coal output. These mines take, however, two thirds of all subsidies to the coal mining sector.[xxii]
A lot of (expensive) coal is consumed by electricity power stations. There the economic situation is disastrous as many clients, including industrial clients, do not pay, or have big payment arrears. In Ukraine as a whole, only 7 per cent of delivered electricity is paid in cash, half is paid in barter, and the rest is not paid for at all (1999).[xxiii] Electricity tariffs are still below cost price. On top of that, government has denominated 645000 energy consumers as privileged energy payers. The government does not compensate the energy enterprises for these discounts.[xxiv] As a result, electricity power stations do not pay for a large part of coal supplies.
Also, big state enterprises, like cokes and steel enterprises, consume a lot of coal that is only partially paid.
End 1998, 60 per cent of paid coals was paid in barter, down from 77.5 per cent in early 1997.[xxv] In January/February 1999, just 20 per cent of coal sold to consumers was paid for using cash. This contributed to wage arrears.
Private middlemen selling coal, keep one third of the proceeds from coal sales, according to federal tax police.[xxvi]
In 1998 a middleman sold 6.3 million m3 gas to Krasnodonugol, a local mining company at a price of 88.7 dollars per 1000 m3. However, other suppliers sold for 66 dollars. Gas sold at auctions sold even lower. However, in 1998 Krasnodonugol shipped 33, 457 tons of coal to the middleman for a total amount of 564 722 dollars.[xxvii]
Another example: a fiscal report of government dated 1998, showed the case of a middleman who sold a piece of machinery to a mine six times the market price.[xxviii]
It means that the performance of coal mines is on paper worse than it would be in a situation of open competition. Of course, other factors are involved, such as hidden and open state subsidies, that makes an assessment of the performance of coal mines even more complicated. However, is it safe to say that with the elimination of corruption in the coal sector, many more coal mines would be profitable and less state subsidies would be needed.
An important mineral resource is the methane accumulated near coal seams. Estimates of reserves vary from 1 to 20 trillion cubic metres (depending on the depth of occurrence). The problem is that big investments are needed to extract methane. Foreign investors could do the job but are not interested due to bad investment climate in Ukraine.[xxix]
Ukrainian gas consumption was 90 billion m3 in 1999. 18 billion m3 was domestically produced. Within Ukraine the state owned company Naftogaz, founded in 1998 to unite all state oil and gas enterprises, is responsible for all gas and oil extraction. (5-96).
Early 1998, the gas price was 83 dollars for industrial consumers and 66 dollars for budgetary organizations and households. Von Hirschhausen calculated that under competitive conditions the price could be 40 per cent lower. One cost factor is the salaries of workers in the Ukrainian gas sector where employment is 20 to 30 times higher than in comparable market economies.[xxx] By mid 2000, the gas market was divided among Naftogaz and 10 private firms who accounted for 80 per cent of gas turnover. All private firms depended heavily on government protection.[xxxi]Naftogaz supplies a large part of gas consumed in Ukraine. However, only 34 per cent of gas is paid, 11 per cent is paid in cash.[xxxii] As a result, Naftogaz accumulated huge debts with the government.
Ukraine has six oil refineries, four of which have halted production, due to insufficient supplies of oil. Only half of the rude oil is refined into benzene, diesel and other clean fuels while half of it is forwarded to thermal power stations for fuel. With modern refining methods 80 to 90 per cent of crude oil could be transformed into high quality fuels.[xxxiii]
About half of Ukraine's electricity is provided by nuclear power stations. As all power stations, they are faced with non-payment of the energy bills. This resulted, among others, in non-payment of wages, lack of investment funds, lack of funds for maintenance and even non-payment of supplied fuels from Russia. The Ukrainian government sought to remedy the situation by designating the most liquid industrial enterprises as privileged customers of Enerhoatom, that is the umbrella organisation for all nuclear power stations in Ukraine. It was argued that in such a way, Enerhoatom could get cash payments for delivered energy and so generate the cash needed to buy fuel supplies in Russia.[xxxiv] This drained liquid consumers from the thermal power stations.
However, Enerhoatom is still in big financial problems. This is partly related to corruption in Enerhoatom. Vice premier Timoshenko accused Enerhoatom of embezzlement.[xxxv] A ministry's report calculated that 40 per cent of Enerhoatom's costs had nothing to do with the actual production of energy.[xxxvi] Intermediary companies supplying nuclear fuel charge 30 per cent commission. Also, 23 per cent commission is charged for sending spent fuel to Russia. Also, Enerhoatom supplied electricity for 20 per cent of the market price.[xxxvii] According to president Kuchma, Enerhoatom provided in 1999 intermediaries worth 1.5 billion hryvnas (approximately 300 million dollars) worth of electricity at a one third discount.[xxxviii] Timoshenko accused Ukrainian Credit bank of squeezing Enerhoatom by levying an interest rate of 1 per cent a day for loans provided to Enerhoatom.[xxxix] In 1999, Enerhoatom recorded a 1.4 billion hryvnas loss that was covered by the state.
The situation in thermal power stations is even worse. They are mostly built in the 1950s and 1960s and already passed their anticipated service life. Operating expenses are very high.[xl] Increasingly the electricity power stations are overloaded with the result that nuclear power stations are automatically switched off due to too low frequency in the electricity grid, As a result thermal power stations are even more overloaded and forced to cut off energy supplies to part of customers, especially in the countryside. In Kharkiv, the second town of Ukraine, electricity is cut off twice or three times a day.[xli]
A general problem with energy producers is that Ukraine depends on former Soviet republics, primarily Russia, for a range of electricity transforming and transmission equipment, units of refinery equipment, pumping stations and parts of nuclear reactors. The disruption of the Soviet division of labour affected the Ukrainian energy complex very much. For example, uranium is extracted in Ukraine, it is processed into fuel for nuclear power stations in Russia, then sent to Ukraine. Subsequently, the used fuel is again sent to Russia for processing.
The conclusion is that energy producers are squeezed by intermediaries and do not get incentives to invest. A reformed energy sector and better investment climate could lead to less subsidies and turning loss making energy companies into profitable ones. In some areas, like methane and nuclear power, production could be enhanced. To replace the nuclear power station Chernobyl, two new nuclear power stations will be finished, in Rivne and Khmelnytsky, with Western help.
4. Reform of the energy sector
It was mainly under the pressure of IMF, World Bank and other international financial donors, that the government under Prime Minister Victor Yushchenko embarked upon a reform of the energy sector in early 2000. Surprisingly, it was Yulia Timoshenko, head of United Energy Systems of Ukraine during 1995-1997, who became the vice prime minister responsible for energy. While being Prime Minister, Pavel Lazarenko gave United Energy Systems in 1996 monopoly rights and a tax break for five years. This gave the company and Lazarenko, who is now prosecuted in the United States for money laundering, hundreds of millions of dollars profit.
The energy sector reform was aimed at boosting cash receipts for the energy producers and distributors by forbidding barter trade and forcing the settlement of energy deals through special, government controlled accounts in the Oshchad bank. All consumers must deposit electricity payments into special accounts at Oshchad bank. Subsequently the cash is distributed among oblenergos and energy generators.[xlii]
The impact of these reforms is difficult to assess given contradictory information from government sources. When Timoshenko presented before parliament figures about payments in the energy sector, in October 2000, she told parliament that cash payments of energy consumers increased considerably since the onset of reforms. She claimed that tax authorities received much more in 2000 compared to 1999. However, these claims were denied by the tax authorities and a commission investigating these conflicting claims came to the conclusion that Timoshenko misinformed parliament. It was stated that payments to the budget from the side of actors in the energy consumers did not increase in 2000. Debt for electricity deliveries rose in 2000, according to tax authorities. [xliii] The consumer debt to Naftogaz was up from 2.6 to 4.4 billion hryvnas in the first 9 months of 2000.[xliv] Electricity supplied by state owned generators was only half paid in cash
Conflicting figures were, among others, based on the fact that Timoshenko allowed oblenergos to offset debts owed to energy providers with tax debts of these energy providers. The Cabinet of Ministers permits mutual settlements of government financed entities' energy debts.[xlv] Also, government ordered Oshchad bank to provide government backed loans to oblenergos to allow them to pay for energy supplies. In this way, the payments record of oblenergos was artificially boosted. The World Bank expressed concern about this.[xlvi]
Moreover, Yevhen Marchuk, the director of the national security service, accused Yulya Timoshenko that she used credits of Oshchad bank to purchase expensive energy from offshore companies.[xlvii]
Oblenergos started to pay more to electricity providers, but do not collect any more from their customers.[xlviii] With Lvivoblenergo. the collection rate increased from 60 to 70 per cent from 1999 to 2000. However, there are cash flow problems because of increased payments to the energy providers. Therefore, there is less money for salaries and basic supplies. Formerly, energy providers were paid with goods and promisory notes.
The energy producers profited from the energy reforms and received initially more cash that was used to pay wage arrears. The financial situation of coal mines improved. Cash payments for electricity supplied by state generators was 50 per cent paid for in cash during the first nine months of 2000, while it was only 19 per cent during the same period in 1999.[xlix] Government figures show that, on paper at least, losses of coal mines gradually diminished over the first 10 months of 2000 and turned into profits in July and August. During the first three months approximately half of all payments was in cash, but this ratio declined subsequently to approximately 8 per cent in October 2000. The share of mutual settlement rose to 10-20 per cent during July-October 2000. The share of barter rose from approximately 50 per cent of all payments during the first three months of 2000 till approximately three quarters during August-October 2000.[l]
Also, it seems that households are paying more, The population paid 75 per cent of housing services in Jan-Sept 2000, while it was 48 per cent for the same period in 1999. However, in some oblasts, like Kharkiv, the collection rate went down.[li]
One part of the reform of the energy sector is the privatisation of oblenergos. Early 2000 six oblenergos have been privatised. However, the effect was that privatised oblenergos paid only 7 per cent of delivered electricity while state owned oblenergos paid 60 to 98 per cent (also with help of the government- see above).
Energorynok, that got the role of state owned electricity wholesaler and overseeer of the electricity market, profited from the new arrangement.
The ban on barter hit the energy traders who based their shadowy profitable deals on barter trade. Many members of parliament derived profits from energy trade and energy traders financed the re-election of president Leonid Kuchma. Therefore the energy reforms were under continuous attack and reform efforts were undermined by the state bureaucracy and parliament. Moreover, the judiciary failed to tackle corruption in the energy sector. Yulia Timoshenko complained that the general prosecutor failed to instigate criminal proceedings against embezzlement in the energy sector.[lii]
Generally, the situation in the energy sector continued to deteriorate, owing to insufficient liquidity and political disagreement. In autumn 2000, Ukrainian government had to resort to external borrowing to secure energy supplies. 100 million dollars was provided by the EBRD for the purchase of fossil fuels, while 300 million dollars was provided by the bank Credit Suisse First Boston. [liii] Total debts of the fuel and energy sector increased during the first 9 months of 2000 by 1.1 billion hryvnas and totalled 13.6 billion hryvnas in October 2000. [liv]
Power outages are occurring more frequently, often blamed on bad weather. Large part of customers in Ukraine is regularly disconnected from the energy supply.
Although Timoshenko urges for enhancement of payment discipline, she said that she would not allow electricity cut offs to the population.[lv] This may be related to the fact that households are not the worst offenders with respect to non-payments of energy. Nevertheless electricity cut offs occurred, for example in Kharkiv.
Also, 42 per cent of energy indebted enterprises continued to function.[lvi]
The position of the thermal power stations worsened as they were forced to pay more for coal deliveries. As a result, their payments for gas deliveries worsened. In September, Itera told that thermal power stations paid for only 27.4 per cent of the gas supplied.[lvii]
Nevertheless, Timoshenko claims that, due to more cash payments. 178 million dollars has been paid for fresh fuel for nuclear power stations, and half of the gas debt for Turkmenistan has been paid while the debt to Itera has been slashed by more than 40 per cent.[lviii]
Although the energy reform was half hearted and obstructed by many in the energy sector, oligarchs who made their fortunes with energy trade felt threatened and tried to undermine the position of the Yushchenko government and more in particular Yulia Timoshenko. Her husband has been arrested, being accused of embezzlement. Also, the Russian prosecutor opened a case against her involving bribes in dealing with Russian officials. This is noticeable as it happens so many years after the assumed bribing took place (1996). Some argue that Russia is not interested in energy reforms and market oriented reforms in Ukraine as this may allow Ukraine to turn to the West. The argument is that Russia can better deal with a non-reformed Ukraine.
The attempts to reform the energy sector show how deeply rooted vested interests are that profited from the non-reformed energy sector, based on barter trade.
5. Energy imports
During the 1990s, on average half of domestically consumed energy was imported and between 35 and 50 per cent of imports consisted of energy, mainly delivered by Russia.
During 1991-1994, Ukraine had great difficulties in paying for delivered oil and gas and Ukraine accumulated debts with Russia despite the fact that Russia continued to deliver gas and oil below world market prices and on favourable conditions. Nevertheless, Russia tried to use its leverage and linked energy deliveries to political demands, especially during 1993-1994 when interruptions of energy deliveries led to closures of enterprises and schools. October 1993, the energy crisis had forced the closure of half of Kyiv's industrial enterprises. Through the winter of 1993-4, most public buildings were not heated, most streetlights were turned out and Ukrainian television began operating on a reduced schedule in order to conserve energy. [lix]
In the early 1990s, Ukrainian government put priority in developing coal mining and nuclear power in order to diminish energy dependence.
Ukrainians decided not to give in to Russia's demands and refused, among others, the hand over of a majority stake in the transit gas pipeline. From mid 1994 the situation began to stabilise and Western lending to Ukraine helped Ukraine in paying its energy bill. Especially the USA realised that Ukrainian independence was at stake. In the meantime, Russia enhanced further the price of delivered gas. The average price of Russian gas increased from 45.2 dollars per 1000 cubic metres in 1993 to 80 dollars per 1000 cubic metres in 1996.
Ukraine did not react by reforming the energy sector and despite Western assistance, difficulties arose around securing energy supplies from Russia, although Russia was pressed by the West to be lenient towards Ukraine. Russia accepted barter arrangements that were not always favourable for Russia.
Gazprom accepted in 1994 and 1995 settlement of gas debts worth 1.4 million dollars with the delivery of paper.[lx] Later, gas was delivered in exchange for eleven strategic bombers and food. Payment arrears were accepted.
The fee Russia paid for the transit of Russian gas had declined since 1996 to offset a drop in gas import prices.[lxi] Ukrainian service surplus in 1999 had fallen by more than 50 per cent since 1996.
Since the advent of president Vladimir Putin, in December 1999, Russia became less lenient towards Ukraine and demanded higher prices for delivered gas. Prompt cash payment was expected. Also, a value added tax was levied on the export of oil and gas (a 30 per cent excise duty on gas, per 1 June 2000). Russia protested against the unauthorised siphoning of gas. Russian vice prime minister Viktor Khryshenko complained about the fact that 'Russia practically subsidises Ukrainian industry'.[lxii]
According to media reports in March 2000, Russia proposed in the negotiations about settling the outstanding gas debts, to offset debts with stakes in strategic Ukrainian enterprises. According to the Eastern Economist, Russian vice prime minister Kasyanov handed over a list with Ukrainian enterprises.[lxiii] In December 2000, this issue surfaced again.
It became more difficult to negotiate a settlement about gas deliveries with Russia. The main negotiator in 2000 was Yulia Timoshenko. United Energy Systems, that she headed in 1995-97, had an outstanding debt with Gazprom worth 334 million dollars. As a minister, Timoshenko tried to settle this debt.
From 1999 onwards, Ukraine siphoned of large quantities of gas destined for Central, Western Europe and Turkey. According to President Kuchma, during the first nine months of 2000, 700 million m3 have been stolen [lxiv] It caused great problems. Altogether, for 1.4 billion dollars worth of gas was siphoned of in 1999.
For example, in 1999, Turkey got 40 per cent less gas from Russia than foreseen. Three big power stations had to stop working and big industrial enterprises had to interrupt production. Turkey protested with the Ukrainian government.[lxv]
At the same time, Ukraine continued to re-export gas. In 1999, 8.5 of Ukraine's exports consisted of fuels. Ukraine Russia protested against this re-export (17 November 2000).
Ukrainian government was unable to prevent the unauthorised siphoning of gas by Naftogaz, despite the fact that Itera, an Ukrainian-Russian joint venture, got the exclusive right to buy gas from Gazprom. Ukraine reached an agreement with Russia that siphoned of gas would automatically be added to the state debt of Ukraine.[lxvi]
Ukraine responded to Russia's demands by trying to diversify gas and oil deliveries. This was difficult because earlier Ukraine failed to pay for gas from Turkmenistan. May 1999 Turkmenistan halted gas deliveries to Ukraine due to non-payment of gas worth 315 million dollars. Mid 2000, President Kuchma secured a gas deal with Turkmenistan, to be delivered through a gas pipeline passing Russia. Under this deal, former gas debts were settled and new gas would be delivered by immediate payment in cash, goods and investment projects, through Naftogaz. (40 per cent in cash, 60 per cent in goods and investments).[lxvii]
In December 2000 it has been agreed in Minsk that in 2001 30 billion cubic metres of gas will be provided by Russia (including gas delivered as transit fee) and another 30 billion cubic metres by Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan is interested in joining the GUUAM group, consisting of a group of CIS states that want to distance from Russia (Georgia, Azerbaizjan, Moldova, Ukraine, Turkmenistan). On the other hand, Russia founded recently the Eurasian Economic Community, consisting of Russia, Belarus, Kazachstan, Kyrgysistan and Tajikistan.
Russia responded to the continuing stealing of gas by Ukraine by proposing a gas pipeline through Belarus, bypassing Ukraine. Re-routing gas supplies to Western Europe through Belarus would deprive Ukraine of transit fees, worth one third of the natural gas consumed by Ukraine. It would it also make easier to cut gas supplies to Ukraine all together. Nowadays this is very difficult given the fact that gas destined for customers in Western Europe has to go through Ukrainian pipelines.
Ukraine reckons with the co-operation of Poland that is interested in diminished Russian influence in Central Europe. However, also Poland suffered from the stealing of gas by Ukraine, destined for Poland. The European Union expects a doubling of gas imports from Russia and EU firms are involved in plans for a new pipeline through Belarus. The pipeline could be laid within two years. It means that within two years Ukraine could be faced with a loss of transit fee worth 18 billion cu m3 annually.
Hitherto, it seems that Russia has not been able to use its leverage with respect to energy dependence of Ukraine adequately. Ukraine did not concede to Russia's demands with respect to handing over shares in the transit pipeline, improved payments discipline and the Russian wish to acquire major stakes in strategic Ukrainian enterprises. However, it seems that with the new gas pipeline bypassing Ukraine, the Russian leverage may increase significantly.
Ukraine pretends to be at the crossroads of Europe. However, increasingly transporters try to avoid Ukraine. The Odessa-Brody oil pipeline that would connect the Black Sea with Poland was for 85 per cent ready in 1996 but was never finished due to lack of funds. This is another missed opportunity. There appears to be no interest from the side of foreign investors. This makes it more difficult to diversify oil supplies. In 1999, almost all oil imports originated in Russia (8.5 million tonnes) and Kazachstan (1.37 million tonnes). [lxviii]
End 2000, energy reforms are obstructed by the presidential administration, state bureaucracy and major players in the energy market and, moreover, undermined by inconsistent government policies.
During ten years of regular reductions of energy supplies from Russia and continuous shortfalls of energy supplies, especially during winter time, Ukraine has done very little to promote energy conversation measures that could diminish energy dependence significantly and has done very little to reform the energy sector, that could free billions of hryvnas yearly.
The energy reform, embarked upon early 2000, was half hearted and failed to raise significantly collection rates of energy payments. It highlighted bottlenecks in the energy sector and deeply rooted vested interests that block energy reform.
Under President Putin, Russian attitude towards accumulating energy debts of Ukraine and non-authorised siphoning of gas by Ukraine became tougher. Diversification of energy supplies is rendered difficult by the bad payments record of Ukraine. This is making import prices of gas higher. Lack of reform in the energy sector will further undermine Ukrainian sovereignty while giving Russia more economic leverage.
Bojcun, M. (1999) The Ukrainian economy since independence.
Clover, C. (2000), 'Le Donbass: une йconomie de prйdation', Le courrier des pays de l'Est. Nr 1002, February.
Cornelius,P.K.,Lenain,P. (Eds) (1997) Ukraine: Accelerating the Transition to Market. Washington: IMF.
D'Anieri, P.J. (1999) Economic Interdependence in Ukrainian-Russian Relations. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Hirschhausen, C. von, Lunina, I., Vachnenko, T. (1997) 'Die Energiewirtschaft der Ukraine - Bestandsaufnahme und Reformbedarf zur Unternehmisierung', in Hoffman, L. and Siedenberg, A., pp. 144-62.
Hirschhausen, C. von, (1999) 'Gas Sector Restructuring in Ukraine: Analysis of Import Dependence, Price Formation and Socio-Economic Effects' in Hoffmann, L. and Siedenberg, A., pp. 391-408.
Hoffman, L. and Siedenberg, A., (1999) Ukraine at the Crossroads. (Berlin: Physica Verlag.
International Monetary Fund (1997), Ukraine - Recent Economic Developments. Staff Country Report, no 97/109.October.
Ukraine u tsifrax u 1999 rotsi. (2000) Kyiv.
Zon, Hans van (2000) 'The political economy of independent Ukraine' MacMillan, UK.
Zon, Hans van; Batako, Andre; Kreslavska, Anna (1998), 'Social and Economic Change in Eastern Ukraine - the example of Zaporizhzhya', Ashgate. UK.
[i] During the first half of 2000, 50.2 of Ukraine imports consisted of fuels.
[ii] Households pay a fixed amount for housing services related to the number of persons living in the house and the useful living space. For example, a household, with one adult and one pensioner, that owns a house that formerly belonged to Zaporozhstal in Zaporizhzhya and still profits from its housing services regime, with discount, with 31 square meters useful living space, pays for housing services (tax, electricity, gas, warm water and central heating) 37 hryvnas (approximately 7 dollars) per month. A household with two children, one adult and on top one pensioner with discount, with 66.4 square meters living space, pays 26.5 hryvnas a month for hot water and 38.5 hryvnas for central heating. On top of that 24 hryvnas is paid if 200 kWh electricity is consumer (payments for electricity varies between 24 and 48 hryvnas a month. (December 2000). It means that this family pays for energy between 89 and 113 hryvnas (between 17.8 and 20.5 dollars). It is obvious that in the first case mentioned amount, if paid, can not cover real costs of energy consumption. Still many houses fall under special housing services regimes. In the second case, when energy costs are based on commercial calculations, in most cases families can not pay the full bill.
An average household in the UK consumes 250 cub. m of gas a month, and pays for it 40 pounds, i.e. 58 dollars. Assuming the average consumption per household in Ukraine is also 250 m3, charging 80 dollars per 1000 cubic metres, means 20 dollars per month, i.e. 110 hryvnas.
[iii] Energobiznes, Nr 34-35, 5 September 2000.
[iv] EIU, Ukraine Country Report, October 2000, p. 29
[v] World Development Report 1999/2000, p. 249.
[vi] The Day, 13 June 2000.
[vii] Hirschhausen, C. von, et al, 1997, p. 159. According to the World Bank, the energy intensity of production in Ukraine was in 1995 even 0.2 dollar per kg oil equivalent.
[viii] IMF, 1997, p.11.
[ix] Kyiv Post, 28 March 1999.
[x] Kyiv Post, 18 May 2000.
[xi] IMF, April 1999, p. 19.
[xii] Eastern Economist, 22 May 2000.
[xiii] The Day, 22 February 2000.
[xiv] The system of regionally based gas monopoly rights that Prime Minister Lazarenko created is still in place and protected by President Kuchma. Kuchma vetoed a law that would give rights to the accounting chamber to inspect budget revenues, so protecting the gas traders who suck the Ukrainian economy, giving nothing in return but allowing these traders to transfer huge sums on foreign bank accounts.(Financial Times, 27 October 2000)
[xv] d'Anieri, 1999, p. 73.
[xvi] Eastern Economist, 24 February 2000.
[xvii] Subsidies to coal mining amounted in 1992 to 2.29 per cent of GDP, in 1993 3.36 per cent of GDP, in 1994 3.02 per cent, in 1995 0.66 per cent, in 1996 1.55 per cent, in 1997 2.01 per cent (Zerkalo Nedeli, 6 February 1999).
[xviii] Kyiv Post, 28 March 1999.
[xix] BBC/SWB, 5 January 1999.
[xx] Hirschhausen, C. von, et al, 1997, p. 155.
[xxi] Kyiv Post, 30 December 1998.
[xxii] According to P. McInally, coal mining engineer working as consultant for TACIS in Donetsk. 30 January 1999.
[xxiii] According to a report of the European Investment Bank, The Guardian, 17 February 1999. According to Kyiv Post 6 April 1999, 18 per cent of industrial enterprises pay their energy bill in cash. Only half of the delivered energy remained unpaid. According to BBC/SWB, FSU, 26 March 1999, during January-February 1999 power stations paid only 1.6 per cent of the value of coal consumed.
[xxiv] In 1996, residential natural gas prices were at 77 per cent of international prices, residential coal prices at 85 per cent and industrial coal prices at 93 per cent (World Bank, 1996, Ukraine - The Real Economy and its Sectors; Kyiv).
[xxv] BBC/SWB, FSU, 12 March 1999.
[xxvi] Radio Free Europe, 3 June 1998.
[xxvii] Golos Ukrainy, 11 February 2000
[xxviii] Clover, C.,2000, p. 29.
[xxix] Zerkalo Nedeli, 12 June 2000.
[xxx] Hirschhausen, C. von, 1999, p. 404.
[xxxi] Zerkalo Nedeli, 8 May 1999.
[xxxii] EIU, Ukraine country report 1999, 4th quarter.
[xxxiii] Bojcun, M. 1999.
[xxxiv] The Day, 13 June 2000.
[xxxv] Eastern Economist, 12 June 2000.
[xxxvi] Kyiv Post, 17 February 2000.
[xxxvii] Zerkalo Nedeli, 4 November 2000.
[xxxviii] The Day, 22 February 2000.
[xxxix] Kyiv Post, 22 June 2000.
[xl] Radio Free Europe, 29 April 1998.
[xli] Zerkalo Nedeli, 4 Augustus 2000.
[xlii] Kyiv Post, 1 November 2000.
[xliii] The Day, 17 October 2000.
[xliv] Zerkalo Nedeli, 14 October 2000.
[xlv] Kyiv Post, 22 November 2000.
[xlvi] BBC, 3 November 2000.
[xlvii] Kyiv Post, 6 November 2000.
[xlviii] Kyiv Post, November 2000.
[xlix] Kyiv Post, 16 October 2000.
[l] Zerkalo Nedeli, 9 December 2000.
[li] Zerkalo Nedeli, 20 May 2000.
[lii] Radio Free Europe, 11 October 2000.
[liii] EIU, Country Report Ukraine, October 2000, p. 26.
[liv] The Day, 17 October 2000.
[lv] Kyiv Post, 11 September 2000.
[lvi] Zerkalo Nedeli, 10 June 2000.
[lvii] Kyiv Post, 2 October 2000.
[lviii] Kyiv Post, 16 October 2000.
[lix] D'Anieri, 1999, p. 80.
[lx] Kyiv Post, 17 November 2000.
[lxi] EIU, Country Report Ukraine, October 2000, p. 31.
[lxii] Eastern Economist, 6 June 2000.
[lxiii] Eastern Economist, 24 February 2000.
[lxiv] Radio Free Europe, 12 October 2000.
[lxv] Zerkalo Nedeli, 14 October 2000.
[lxvi] The Day, 21 November 2000.
[lxvii] Kyiv Post, 4 October 2000.
[lxviii] Zerkalo Nedeli, 14 October 2000.
Hans van Zon
University of Sunderland, UK
Contribution to the conference
'Geopolitical and Geoeconomical problems
of Russian-Ukrainian relations',
St Petersburg, 22-24 January 2001
Draft, 8 December 2000
Not for quotation


text:
Alicarnasso () era una città-stato greca situata nel territorio in cui oggi sorge il distretto di Bodrum (Turchia); su una collina al suo interno si trovava il mausoleo di Alicarnasso, considerato una delle sette meraviglie del mondo.

Alicarnasso era situata sulla costa sud-occidentale della Caria, in Asia Minore, in un luogo pittoresco e strategico del golfo di Coo; originariamente occupava solo la piccola isola di Zefiria vicina alla spiaggia, ora dominata dal grande castello di San Pietro, ma successivamente si estese fino ad incorporare Salmace.

Patria del filosofo Dionigi e dello storico Erodoto, Alicarnasso fu una colonia della città di Trezene e nel VI secolo a.C. fece parte dell'esapoli dorica, da cui venne espulsa quando un suo cittadino, Agasicle, portò via un tripode raffigurante Apollo Tropio; dopo essere stata saccheggiata da Alessandro Magno restò sotto l'orbita tolemaica, ma in seguito alla pace di Apamea divenne una città-stato libera da ogni egemonia straniera.

Tra i pochi monumenti recuperati dagli archeologi moderni spicca la porta di Myndos, mentre non sono stati ancora localizzati i templi dedicati ad Ares e Afrodite.

Etimologia
Il suffisso -ᾱσσός (-assos) del greco Ἁλικαρνᾱσσός è indicativo di un toponimo di substrato, il che significa che un nome originale non greco ha influenzato o stabilito il nome del luogo. È stato recentemente proposto che l'elemento -καρνᾱσσός sia affine al luvio (CASTRUM)ha+ra/i-na-sà / (CASTRUM)ha+ra/i-ni-sà 'fortezza'. In tal caso, il toponimo è probabilmente preso in prestito dal cario, una lingua luvica parlata insieme al greco ad Alicarnasso. Il nome cario di Alicarnasso è stato provvisoriamente identificato con 𐊠𐊣𐊫𐊰 𐊴𐊠𐊥𐊵𐊫𐊰 ( alos k̂arnos) nelle iscrizioni.

Storia

Presenza micenea nell'area
Alcune grandi tombe micenee sono state trovate a Musgebi (o Muskebi, l'attuale Ortakent), non lontano da Alicarnasso. Secondo l'archeologo turco Yusuf Boysal, il materiale di Muskebi, datato dalla fine del XV secolo a.C al ca. 1200 a.C., testimonia la presenza, in questa regione, di un insediamento miceneo.

Sono stati scoperti più di quaranta luoghi di sepoltura risalenti a quell'epoca. Una ricca collezione di reperti rinvenuti in queste tombe è ora ospitata nel castello di Bodrum.

Questi reperti gettano luce sul problema della determinazione dei territori dell'antica Arzawa e Ahhiyawa.

Origine
La fondazione di Alicarnasso è dibattuta tra varie tradizioni, ma gli studiosi sono d'accordo sul fatto che sia una colonia dorica, e le figure sulle sue monete, come la testa di Medusa, Atena o Poseidone, o il tridente, supportano l'affermazione che le città madri fossero Trezene e Argo. Gli abitanti sembrano aver accettato Anthes, figlio di Poseidone, come loro leggendario fondatore, come menzionato da Strabone, ed erano orgogliosi del titolo di Antheadae.

In un primo periodo Alicarnasso era un membro dell'esapoli dorica, che comprendeva Cos, Cnido, Lindo, Camiro e Ialiso; fu espulsa dalla lega quando uno dei suoi cittadini, Agasicle, portò a casa il tripode premio che aveva vinto nei giochi del Trio, invece di dedicarlo secondo l'uso all'Apollo Tropio. All'inizio del V secolo a.C. Alicarnasso era sotto il dominio di Artemisia I di Caria (conosciuta anche come Artemesia di Alicarnasso), che si rese famosa come comandante navale nella battaglia di Salamina. Di Pisindeli, suo figlio e successore, si sa poco. Il nipote di Artemisia, Ligdami II di Alicarnasso, è noto per aver messo a morte il poeta Paniassi e per aver causato Erodoto, forse il più noto nativo di Alicarnasso, a lasciare la sua città natale (457 a.C circa).

Dinastia degli Ecatomnidi
Ecatomno divenne re di Caria, a quel tempo parte dell'impero persiano, governando dal 404 a.C. al 358 a.C. e stabilendo la dinastia degli Ecatomnidi. Lasciò tre figli, Mausolo, Idrieo e Pissodaro, i quali a loro volta gli succedettero nella sovranità; e due figlie, Artemisia e Ada, che erano sposate con i loro fratelli Mausolo e Idrieo.

Mausolo trasferì la sua capitale da Mylasa ad Alicarnasso. I suoi operai hanno approfondito il porto della città e hanno utilizzato la sabbia trascinata per realizzare frangiflutti di protezione davanti al canale. Sulla terra pavimentarono strade e piazze e costruirono case per semplici cittadini. Su un lato del porto costruirono un imponente palazzo fortificato per Mausolo, posizionato per avere una visuale chiara sul mare e nell'entroterra fino alle colline, luoghi da cui i nemici potevano attaccare. Sulla terra gli operai costruirono anche mura e torri di avvistamento, un teatro in stile greco e un tempio ad Ares, il dio greco della guerra.

Artemisia e Mausolo hanno speso ingenti somme di denaro delle tasse per abbellire la città. Mausolo e Artemisia governarono Alicarnasso e la regione circostante per 24 anni. Commissionarono statue, templi ed edifici di marmo lucente. Alla sua morte nel 353 a.C, sua moglie, sorella e successore, Artemisia II di Caria, iniziò la costruzione di una magnifica tomba per sé e per suo marito su una collina che domina la città. Morì nel 351 a.C. (di dolore, secondo Cicerone, Tusculanae Disputationes 3.31). Secondo Plinio il Vecchio gli artigiani continuarono a lavorare alla tomba dopo la morte del loro patrono, "considerando che era insieme memoriale della propria fama e dell'arte dello scultore", terminandola nel 350 a.C. Questa tomba di Mausolo divenne nota come il Mausoleo, una delle sette meraviglie del mondo antico.

Ad Artemisia successe suo fratello Idrieo, al quale, a sua volta, successe la moglie e la sorella Ada quando morì nel 344 a.C. Tuttavia, Ada fu usurpata da suo fratello Pissodaro nel 340 a.C. Alla morte di Pissodaro nel 335 a.C. suo genero, un persiano di nome Orontobate, ricevette la satrapia di Caria da Dario III di Persia.

Alessandro Magno e Ada di Caria

Quando Alessandro Magno entrò in Caria nel 334 a.C., Ada, che era in possesso della fortezza di Alinda, gli cedette la fortezza. Dopo aver preso Alicarnasso Alessandro le restituì il governo della Caria; lei, a sua volta, adottò formalmente Alessandro come suo figlio, assicurandosi che il governo di Caria gli passasse incondizionatamente alla sua eventuale morte. Durante l'assedio di Alicarnasso la città fu incendiata dai persiani in ritirata. Non potendo ridurre la cittadella, Alessandro fu costretto a lasciarla bloccata. Le rovine di questa cittadella e fossato sono ora un'attrazione turistica a Bodrum.

Storia successiva
Non molto tempo dopo i cittadini ricevettero in dono da Tolomeo un ginnasio e costruirono in suo onore una stoà o portico. Sotto l'egemonia egizia, intorno al 268 a.C., un cittadino di nome Ermia divenne Nesiarca della Lega Nesiotica nelle Cicladi.

Alicarnasso non si riprese mai del tutto dai disastri dell'assedio e Cicerone la descrive come quasi deserta.

Archeologia

Il sito è attualmente occupato in parte dalla città di Bodrum, ma si possono ancora tracciare le antiche mura intorno a quasi tutto il loro circuito, e la posizione di molti dei templi, del Teatro di Alicarnasso, e di altri edifici pubblici può essere fissata con certezza.

Le rovine del mausoleo furono recuperate a sufficienza dagli scavi del 1857 di Charles Newton per consentire un restauro abbastanza completo del suo progetto. L'edificio era costituito da cinque parti: un basamento o podio, uno pteron o recinto di colonne, una piramide, un piedistallo e un gruppo di carri. Il seminterrato è stato costruito con blocchi di pietra verde, rivestiti di marmo e ricoperti da intagli di mucche. Intorno alla sua base erano probabilmente disposti gruppi statuari. Lo pteron era costituito (secondo Plinio) da trentasei colonne dell'ordine ionico, che racchiude una cella quadrata. Tra le colonne probabilmente sorgevano singole statue. Dalle porzioni recuperate risulta che il fregio principale dello pteron rappresentasse combattimenti di Greci e Amazzoni. Inoltre sono presenti molti frammenti a grandezza naturale di animali, cavalieri, ecc., appartenenti probabilmente a sculture frontonali, ma in precedenza ritenuti parti di fregi minori. Sopra lo pteron si ergeva la piramide, composta da 24 gradini fino a un apice o piedistallo.

Su questo vertice stava il carro con la figura dello stesso Mausolo e un attendente. Nella statua i capelli cadono dalla fronte in grosse onde su ciascun lato del viso e scendono quasi fino alla spalla; la barba è corta e stretta, la faccia squadrata e massiccia, gli occhi infossati sotto le sopracciglia sporgenti. Sono stati proposti ogni sorta di restauri di questo famoso monumento. Quello originale, realizzato da Newton e Pullan, è errato sotto molti aspetti; e anche quello di Oldfield, sebbene sia preferito per la sua leggerezza (si diceva anticamente il mausoleo fosse "sospeso a mezz'aria"). Un altro, quello del veterano architetto tedesco F. Adler, fu pubblicato nel 1900, ma da allora sono stati fatti degli studi.

Note

Bibliografia
 Cook, BF, Bernard Ashmole e Donald Emrys Strong. 2005. Scultura in rilievo del Mausoleo di Alicarnasso . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 Jeppeson, Kristian. 2002. Il Maussolleion ad Halikarnassos: Rapporti della spedizione archeologica danese a Bodrum: la sovrastruttura, un'analisi comparativa delle prove architettoniche, scultoree e letterarie . vol. 5. Aarhus, Danimarca: Aarhus Univ. Premere.
 Rodríguez Moya, Inmaculada e Víctor Minguez. 2017. Le sette antiche meraviglie del primo mondo moderno . New York: Routledge.
 Steele, James e Ersin Alok. 1992. Architettura ellenistica in Asia Minore . Londra: edizioni dell'Accademia.
 Jean-Pierre Thiollet, Bodream, H & D, 2010. ISBN 978-2-35035-279-4
 Wiater, Nicolas. 2011. L'ideologia del classicismo: lingua, storia e identità in Dionisio di Alicarnasso . New York: De Gruyter.
 Winter, Frederick E. 2006. Studi in architettura ellenistica . Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Altri progetti

Collegamenti esterni

Bodrum
Città romane in Turchia
Colonie greche della Caria
Culto di Ares
Culto di Afrodite

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


David Aitken has made the ultimate city change to Armidale . He has moved from Hong Kong, where he was working with the most advanced mobile telecommunications network in the world. We catch up with him to find out WHY ARMIDALE?
When did you first live in Armidale?
I first lived in Armidale in 1990, after moving from Narrabri to study at UNE. I had previously been at school in Sydney and was really looking forward to living full-time in the country again. I lived in St Albert's College in my first year at university, which was a great introduction to university life and also the city. In second year, I lived in town with college friends and then was lucky enough to be employed at TAS as a Duty Master. I stayed at TAS for a number of years, and then took up a position as a residential law tutor in Robb College.
What did you achieve while studying at UNE?
I received degrees in Arts and Law, which set the foundation for my working life. I've had an interesting career to date, and I owe much of this to the things that I learnt during my time at UNE. I also made some great friends here in Armidale, so it was great to come back and catch up with them again.
Why have you decided to return to Armidale?
My wife, Megan, and I were living in Hong Kong with our children, Charlie and Campbell. We had been there for six years and both had interesting careers, but we wanted the kids to be raised in Australia and have a country upbringing. I had always retained very fond memories of Armidale, and we began to discuss the possibility of moving back to this region. We found a place that we love just outside of town and moved here in December last year.
The decision to choose Armidale for us was, I guess, a very similar one that brings other people to Armidale. Education has always been important to us, and Armidale has exceptionally good schools. Beyond that, I was fortunate enough to be offered a position with Wilson & Co Lawyers, who had similar ideas to me about providing legal services to clients both locally and further afield.
Our kids were very enthusiastic about coming to Armidale. They've been riding horses since they were three years old, and the opportunity to have their own horses was too good to miss. They enjoy the open space and the outdoors, which is a big change after life in Hong Kong.
What part of law do you specialise in?
My family's background is in agriculture, and I continue to maintain an interest in that industry, raising a few cattle myself as well as the horses. I have always considered myself a 'country boy' – even when I was sitting in a high rise in the middle of the city, so now I specialise in the law as it relates to rural people and businesses. I act for landholders throughout NSW who have found themselves negotiating with coal miners and CSG companies wanting to either access or acquire their land. I also specialise in Local Government and planning law and have acted for a number of Councils in New South Wales. I also act for large agri-corporates, as well as undertaking farm succession planning work. Effectively I am a business and commercial lawyer, but I have also run many commercial litigation matters during the 15 years since I was admitted as a solicitor.
Your greatest achievements while working in Asia, Europe and North America?
While in Hong Kong, I was part of a team that designed, built and implemented what was then the most advanced mobile telecommunications network in the world. It was a complex and difficult project, but the end result was extremely satisfying. I looked after the regulatory side of the project and got to meet and deal with some very high profile representatives of the Chinese government.
I also found the time to undertake more studies and completed a Postgraduate Diploma in Corporate Governance and Directorship and a Master of Science.
I think that the greatest achievement while working overseas was not something that I achieved personally, but rather something that is inherent in almost every Australian: that is an ability to adapt, create and 'have a go', which is why Australians are highly valued employees in many countries around the world.
Would you say Armidale is suited to running big business and why?
Any business owner will tell you that their business is only as good as its people. Armidale is fortunate to have a highly competent and educated workforce (thanks in part to UNE), which means that it is a great place to build a business.
Many people relocate here but their work (or in my case – clients) are from much further afield. With technology, the tyranny of distance becomes meaningless, so that you can be based here but effectively and easily work with businesses and colleagues from around the world. Added to that the NBN, which is already a reality in New England (I have the NBN connected at my house) will further facilitate opportunities for existing Armidale businesses or new ones looking to set up shop.
What do you do in Armidale for enjoyment?
Most of my spare time is spent with our wonderful kids. We all ride horses, so that takes up most of our leisure time. Aside from that, I enjoy catching up with friends at Armidale's great restaurants, following the Rugby and reading.


Performers Sister Elizabeth Eustis, vocals ; Alverta Mills, soprano ; Richard Peterson, piano ; Ruby Mae Summers, organ ; and John Joseph, bass.
Publisher/Record Label Euphonic Sound Recording Co.
Text Contributors Hubbart, James, author.
Other Contributors Mills, Ken Grayson, sound engineer.
Note Title from container .
Program notes by James Hubbart.


APEX System & Equipment Controllers - Bruce Technologies, Inc.
Controllers The BDF System Control is a distributed control system which uses the 7355X or 7360DDC Micro-controller as a host and individual micro-controller modules for dedicated control tasks. All modules are managed by a system controller microprocessor. Most of the control electronics are housed in a self standing control cabinet located at the end of the load station or adjacent to offset shroud. Satellite modules are located elsewhere in the Furnace system.
APEX is a software application that provides a set of tools for automating wafer processing.
o 10/100 BASE-T Ethernet utilizing TCP/IP across private network.
Menu driven from operator front panel.
Communications port for upstream APEX Computer.
o Local storage/retrieval of up to three recipes while a fourth (duplicate) is operating.
Digital speed accuracy control to + 1% of set-point.
Integrated EMS push-button and movement indicating light.
On-board electronics for paddle lift and autodoor.
Interlocks with tube level alarms.
Configured for process specific application.
LEDs, the VCVD Interface IIITM takes a major leap forward in VCVD processing.
Alarm Output and LED indication if an Internal Power Supply is Out of Specification.
o "O" – RING MOUNTED INJECTOR FOR LEAK-TIGHT SEAL.


Checks all the menswear boxes. Perfect for flexing on IG.
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In today's "Why I Do UniCamp", Don "Chatty" Chatelain, a Woodsey Alumni, recounts his experiences with camp in the 1950's, and demonstrates how even decades later, UniCamp still holds a special place in our hearts.
My best personal memory is the aroma of the pine trees as UniCamp was opened for another summer during the 1950s. Irv, Charlie and Ken had to "turn on" the Camp which included our generator and volatile water system. I was in charge of administering SRBs. Luke presided as the staff and counselors prepared for the continuing rush of camper sessions throughout the summer and into the beginning of our busy fall school schedules.
Each fall we worked on camper event follow-up from the past summer and recruitment with the Los Angeles agencies to provide kids for the next summer – coupled with a successful Mardi Gras and UniCamp drive on campus, we counselors and staff were eager for each UniCamp summer of serving 1000+ deserving, low income kids, return once again.
During each session, at the counselors' campfire, after a full day of activities, once the kids were in the sack (supposedly – maybe in the Biffy), Luke would tell us that "Camp is for the Kids". Many of us who hung around the program for a long time realized that "Camp is just as much for the Counselors" (Of course Luke knew that as well and took care to form the counselor experience accordingly).
Given the dear kids that Unicamp served in the 1950s, most campers had the outdoor experience of a lifetime and we would only later realize how fulfilling facilitating those experiences was for us counselors as well. On campus, UniCamp was an intense, fun and socially-in, Woodsey (a term coined or at least given more oxygen, in the 1950s) experience, during our UCLA four years (or five or six). Much of our UniCamp student's character and soul also got worked out in intense camp bonding and involvement, certainly supporting the deserving kids, but mostly derived from the deep and long lasting relationships with other students from all walks of life involved in in the program with you – relationships lasting forever. You may lose track of each other over the years, but the bond will always be there.
I speak very personally, having served over ten years (1952-1962) as counselor, Camp Board Chairman, URC LA staff, Program Director at upper site when it opened and then URC Director at UC Riverside. One could not have a more worthwhile "Best of LA" charity to support.
Blessings on all the kids who have gone since 1935 and continue to go to UniCamp each summer. Blessings on our community supporters. And blessings on all the counselors, through the years and now, who have helped to provide positive growth opportunities for the kids, while forming and shaping their own lives as well.
Want to share your experiences with UCLA UniCamp? Did you volunteer with Chatty? Share your thoughts with us in the comments section or email Evi at clau@unicamp.org!
Did I ever volunteer with Chatty! I was a counselor at the first College Camp session from UCR in 1960, where he was PD, and our leader at the URC. The sight and smell of the sun on the pine trees brings about such memori es. Woodsey (or is it Woodsy?) counselors/maintenance men are still among my very best friends. Ten of us bought a cabin on the road to the (late) lower site, and are still together after more than 30 years.


On Thursday, three student-led groups at James Madison University held a debate to discuss a multitude of important political topics. The groups involved were the College Democrats, the College Republicans, and Madison Liberty. For the format of the event, each organization submitted two questions regarding a specific political issue that all of the groups then answered.
It was quite interesting to hear the differing positions of the students and their groups, to hear where they overlapped and where they disagreed. All three seemed to support policies that are more tolerant of drug legalization than the mainstream of either the Republican or Democratic Parties. Could this result simply stem from the college mentality of greater personal freedom? Or does this commonality represent the growing acceptance of more liberal drug laws and a future in which each state or locality can set their own policies? And when a Republican student from Washington D.C. asked if anyone thought that the American Civil War was not a "good war", it was amusing to see a fair number of hands in the audience raised in opposition.
However, what made the evening truly special, in my mind, was the fact that the three groups made a conscious effort to come together in a civil atmosphere to actually discuss political principles. Unfortunately, it seems as if the whole political sphere has become increasingly poisoned with divisive and unproductive rhetoric. The mentality of far too many individuals is, why waste your time debating issues with people of differing opinions?
The 2012 Republican nomination for President, Senate, and House of Representatives shows a similar trend among members of the party. For example, twenty-year incumbent Bob Goodlatte has so far refused to directly engage Karen Kwiatkowski, his primary opponent. He practiced a similar move in 2010 when facing challengers outside of the GOP. Although there are certainly tactical arguments to be made why he shouldn't debate, his more or less outright refusal to do so further erodes the chance for future political dialogue here in the Shenandoah Valley. Now it would be disingenuous to pretend Goodlatte is some sort of lone exception. After all, this act has been the trend of frontrunners and incumbents for many years, a tactic used to delegitimize their opposition. Nevertheless, regardless of the merits of the candidate who employs it, political debate ought to be encouraged rather than stifled.
However, I'm a bit disappointed to confess that I haven't always held such a viewpoint. As I recall, during my time with the College Republicans of William & Mary from 1998 to 2002, our group didn't make many efforts to reach across the aisle to engage the Democrats or other opposed organizations in order to openly explain the difference in our two groups so that the student body could get a better understanding of the issues that separated us. Why would we? After all, weren't they the hated enemy that we sought to defeat by any means necessary? And what about the libertarians? Those that came to our organization were typically viewed with suspicion and deemed too wacky to be taken seriously. I'm glad to see that the JMU organizations are choosing a more open-minded path.
Getting back to the present, here in the Shenandoah Valley, there are currently at least five different kinds of political groups active: Democrats, Republicans, Libertarians, Constitutionalists, and the Tea Party. Is it possible for some or all of these groups learn from the JMU students and to come together and offer the community a similar forum? Or is such an idea nothing more than an idealistic dream?
Given their efforts to improve political dialogue on Thursday, I applaud the efforts of the JMU students in Madison Liberty, the College Republicans, and the College Democrats. Although there is certainly a wide variety of political opinions, the attempt of these groups to not only reach out to the community for more recruits, but also foster a greater understanding and even tolerance for opposing viewpoints is a lesson that organizations outside the university and national political pundits would do well to learn.
For those of you who did not attend, to follow is a brief excerpt of the gathering. I hope you find it informative.
Well ladies and gentlemen, the time for the 2012 Tax Day Rally has come and gone.
On April 14th, the Shenandoah Valley Tea Party held their annual event in downtown Harrisonburg, Virginia. The event boasted an impressive list of speakers including Virginia Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli. Even if you missed the gathering, you can still either read about it on examiner.com or watch a slideshow video on youtube.
Enjoy and make certain to attend in 2013!
Guest post by Daniel Wilson.
United States gasoline prices are up over 13 percent since the start of the new year, standing at a national average of $3.92 a gallon. On a seasonal basis and in nominal terms, gas prices are the highest ever.
High and escalating gas prices have become a major political issue with numerous politicians and pundits in the media quickly coming to false conclusions on the issue.
One of the most common fallacies perpetrated by politicians on both sides of the aisle is that investors speculating in futures markets cause prices to rise and fluctuate dramatically.
Typically so, politicians have it backwards, speculators actually play a vital and important role in the economy. Speculators make markets more liquid by adding additional buyers and sellers, thus aiding transactions and improving efficiency. Also, speculators actually make markets less volatile. In order for speculators to make money they have to buy low and sell high. Buying at a low price, increases the low price, and selling at a high price, lowers the high price, causing the market price to have a lower variance in the long run.
In addition, a recent study by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas demonstrated that speculators didn't contribute to the run up in oil or gas prices over the last decade.
Another common myth about gas prices is that the big oil companies control and manipulate prices upwards in the name of greed and corporate profits. This myth runs wild within the Democratic party, many of them have recently scolded the oil companies for price-fixing gas and oil to profit at the expense of everybody else. Oil companies control gas prices like grocery stores control cereal prices. Measured by profit margins, oil companies rank 114 out of 225 different industries. Big oil companies, like Exxon Mobil only earn seven cents per gallon of gas. Compare that to the $.50 a gallon excise tax that's embedded into the price of gas that local and federal governments collect. In other words, governments are collecting seven times more in taxes than oil companies make per gallon of gas. So, the next time you fill up at a gas station, ask yourself, who's actually greedy, big oil or big government?
One of the most conspicuous causes of higher oil and gas prices, that often goes ignored, is the depreciating value of the U.S. dollar on international exchange markets. People generally accept that individual prices go up or down based on changes in supply and demand. However, they fail to understand that the value of the dollar, in which goods are priced, is also determined by supply and demand. Therefore, when the Federal Reserve system prints excessive amounts of money for misguided political and economic reasons, the supply of US dollars increases, which then reduces the value of the dollar. Over the past 10 years the US dollar has lost 35 percent of its international exchange value. This means that commodities, such as oil, that are sold in international markets denominated in dollars, have to go up in price since the value of the dollar has fallen. To sum this up, when the value of the dollar falls from an increase in its supply, everything priced in dollars becomes more expensive, it's called inflation.
Measured in Swiss francs, a strong currency, the price of oil has risen to a less extent. For example, since 2010 the price of oil has risen by 15 percent in Swiss francs, but 30 percent in US dollars. Measured in terms of gold, which has historically been used as a monetary unit, oil prices are below their 40 year average. Both of these measurements indicate that a large portion of higher gas prices are due to a falling U.S. dollar.
The Joint Economic Committee released a study showing that just a 10 to 15 percent appreciation in the dollar would lower gas prices by 43 cents.
Politicians should stop wrongfully blaming big oil companies and speculators and worry about the real problem that threatens this country's economic future and that's the declining dollar. The resurgence of a strong greenback would lower gas and oil prices more than any other political solution.
Daniel Wilson is a senior who is majoring in economics at James Madison University.
On Friday, the Republican Party of Virginia announced that four of the five candidates seeking the Republican nomination for Virginia's Senate seat had successfully submitted a sufficient number of signatures to appear on the June 12th primary ballot. These candidates are: George Allen, E.W. Jackson, Bob Marshall, and Jamie Radtke. Only David McCormick failed to submit any signatures and thus was denied a spot in this contest.
Although many voters likely welcome the opportunity to select between four candidates, this particular situation heavily favors one candidate, George Allen. Unlike the others, George Allen has held a multitude of political offices including serving as both the Governor of Virginia and a Senator from 2001-2007. Therefore, due to his decades of political experience and campaigning, he has a much higher name identification rate and a massive campaign war chest when compared to any of the other candidates.
It should be noted that some of George Allen's positions as well as his votes while serving as a senator do worry some conservative activists. Although one can find a more extensive article on this subject here, George Allen voted to raise the debt ceiling many times, he voted to strip away our civil liberties via the Patriot Act, and he supported No Child Left Behind. In addition, his refusal to take a public stance on either NDAA or SOPA may lead some people to believe that he will continue to support big government policies if he is elected senator again.
However, even though there are three alternatives to George Allen, it is highly unlikely that any of these challengers can mount a successful bit to deny the current frontrunner in this present situation. Collectively, Radtke, Marshall, and Jackson may very well end up with more votes that Mr. Allen in the primary, but as a winning candidate only needs a plurality of the votes and not a majority, it will be difficult for any of the three to do so. Jamie Radtke has a considerable following among the tea parties, Bob Marshall still has remnants of his loyal followers who nearly propelled him to victory in the 2008 Senate contest, and E.W. Jackson has done quite well among the social conservatives. Other conservatives will support George Allen due to the belief that he has the best chance of the four to win the seat. Thus, we find the conservative dilemma.
Recognizing this situation, the ideal solution would be for two of the candidates to withdraw so that voters can decide if they would prefer George Allen or someone who bills him or herself to be a more conservative alternative. However, at this point, such a move seems unlikely. Jamie Radtke has been campaigning for well over a year, likely has the best defined campaign, and has spent more time, energy, and money than either Jackson or Marshall. Jackson continues to electrify audiences with his passionate speeches as has recently expanded his campaign staff. Marshall, even though he is the newest entrant into the race, still probably commands a higher ID than either of the other two combined. Thus, believing each is the strongest candidate to face Allen, none of them will withdraw and, chances are, the anti-Allen vote will be split in such a way as to be more or less irrelevant in the June 12th contest.
Will conservatives band together, rejecting two of the others, and rally behind one of the non-Allen candidates? Conversely, do conservatives believe that George Allen shares enough of their principles to hold this office once again? And, once the primary is over, can any of the four candidates capture the hearts and minds of conservatives to cobble together a successful coalition of his or her rivals' supporters and independent voters in order to beat the Democratic nominee former Governor Tim Kaine in November? What a dilemma!