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Studium / Lehre
Siebenbürgen-Institut
Forschungsstelle Deutsche in Russland
ZEGK > Historisches Seminar, Osteuropäische Geschichte > Mitarbeiter > Prof. Dr. Heinz-Dietrich Löwe > Herunterladbare Artikel >
Pogrome in Rußland 1903-1905/6
Heinz-Dietrich Löwe
5. The Pogroms in Kishinev and Gomel': Preliminary Skirmishes of the Revolution.
"...the pogrom against the Jews came as a complete surprise to local revolutionary circles, 9/10 of which are made up of Jews. It dealt a considerable - and lasting - blow to the senseless revolutionary activities of these people"[1]. - Charnoluskii, Chief of Police, Bessarabia.
"...in order to rid the Jews of their traditional obsequiousness towards the government, history sent them a teacher in the form of Pleve"[2]. - Di Arbeitershtimme.
The most serious accusation levelled at Pleve by contemporaries and historians is that he made Jewish pogroms another weapon in the armoury of reaction, because he feared the Jewish revolutionary above all others[3]. Witte, too, blamed his ministerial colleague for the infamous and bloody pogrom in Kishinev, the capital of the Russian province of Bessarabia[4]. In order to provide the revolutionary mood with a safety-valve, he was said to have given the initial impetus to the enterprise, which others then organised. The Director of the Police Department under Pleve, Aleksei A. Lopukhin, disputed the fact that the former had organised the pogrom, it is true[5], though this should be treated with caution: had the Minister himself been involved, he would have had to take pains to ensure that his assistant - a man known to hold liberal views - knew nothing of it. Lopukhin, on the other hand, might not have wanted not incriminate his superior, because, in so doing, he would have incriminated himself, formally at least. Let us, instead, follow the line of reasoning laid down by Witte and others: is it feasible that a Minister who, after the pogrom, wished for a "small, victorious war" to help him cope with the revolutionary mood in the country[6] also conceived the idea of a short, successful pogrom as a means of suppressing the revolutionary movement? It should be remembered that Pleve's moral integrity was not held in particularly high regard even by his conservative colleagues. When the Tsar asked Pobedonostsev whom he should make Minister of the Interior, Sipyagin or Pleve, Pobedonostsev merely replied: "Pleve is a scoundrel, but Sipyagin is a fool[7]".
It is also certain that, shortly after he became Minister of the Interior, Pleve reincorporated the office responsible for the Jewish question into the Police Department. In so doing, he he attributed to the "Jewish question" an eminently political character; and as a sign of his general distrust he placed the Jews under direct police supervision[8]. Right at the beginning of his period of office, Pleve clashed with those responsible for Jewish matters, who were slightly more liberal than he was[9].
However, let us first have a look at the circumstances which surrounded the events of Kishinev before we embark on any further conjecture. The Kishinev pogrom of 6th-8th April 1903 shattered the relative peace - albeit characterised by poverty, lack of basic civil rights and oppression by the authorities - in which the Jews of Russia had lived since the mid-1880's. For three days the mob raged, while police and army stood by and watched. The Governor of the province, von Raaben, who resided in Kishinev, vanished for the duration. He was not seen in public until the third day of rioting[10]. It was not until strict orders were issued from St Petersburg that the unrest was to be put down, using firearms if necessary, that the pogrom was stopped. In the event, no shots were fired. Police and army had previously intervened only to suppress Jewish self-defence[11]. This behaviour on the part of the authorities strengthened the conviction held by the marauding masses - and later to become the common property of all pogromshchiki[12] - that the Tsar had granted them three days to beat the Jews[13].
The history of events leading up to this pogrom is instructive. Let us leave aside the question whether Kishinev was itself a good breeding-ground for the development of suppressed instincts which were misused by the protagonists for their own ends: the evidence here is contradictory[14]. Much more interesting for us are the pogromshchiki and their friends in the highest government circles. Anti-Jewish propaganda began with the raising of the spectre of a ritual murder. In Dubossary, not far from Kishinev, a young boy had been murdered by a non-Jew. The investigative authorities had established this beyond dispute[15]. Nevertheless, anti-Semitic newspapers - among them the local Bessarabets, the Znamia and Suvorin's Novoe Vremia - stuck to the ritual murder theory, and exploited this for the purpose of violently anti-semitic agitation on their pages. The Commander of the local Okhrana, Levendal', and Governor Raaben were both warned of an impending pogrom. They displayed, however, complete indifference and took no precautions against possible unrest, although the feeling was widespread among local inhabitants that Easter would not pass peacefully[16]. Pollen, Procurator of the Odessa court district left the Governor of Bessarabia in no doubt as to the undesirable influence of Bessarabets and asked him in future to suppress any further agitatory articles[17]. This was aimed at the censorship which was under the control of Vice-Governor Ustrugov, a violent anti-Semite[18]. The Minister of Justice, too, was informed[19]. Yet nothing happened. On the contrary, I. G. Shcheglovitov and A. A. Khvostov - each destined to become Minister of Justice and at the time working on the staff of the Ministry - drew the Minister's attention to the "interesting case" in Dubossary[20]. The Minister's reaction can only be partially reconstructed from the documents. What is clear, however, is that the Ministry of Justice requested the assistance of the Ministry of the Interior in making enquiries about fanatical Jewish sects apparently thought capable of committing ritual murder[21]. The same judicial officer who, not long before, had asserted that ritual murder could be ruled out, re-opened the case that had been closed earlier[22]. The Minister, Murav'ev, was kept personally informed of the progress of investigations. Certainly he had not displayed any sign of disapproving of the re-opening of proceedings. One official of the Odessa court district actually had close connections with the Bessarabets[23] and tried to get those of his colleagues who were involved in the investigations to pass interesting snippets of information to the newspaper, anonymously if need be. By "interesting" he meant of course information which would support the ritual murder theory. Anyone co-operating in this way was to receive a free subscription as a token of thanks[24].
After all this, it is not surprising that the great mass of the population had concluded that anti-Jewish excesses would be dealt with very leniently by local and central authority. After all, a newspaper like the Bessarabets was subject to censorship, and the censor was Vice-Governor Ustrugov[25]. It was widely believed in Kishinev that he was actually contributing to the paper[26]; if one is to believe this depends on whether one can trust those that maintained they knew for sure. It would, however, have been the inescapable duty of any honourable official to deny such an allegation publicly and unequivocally. Furthermore, it is certain that members of the local Legal Authorities were working for the Bessarabets[27]. The newspaper had its friends in government circles (in the central censorship office) who believed that its political line was "soundly-based" and that it was undesirable, from the government's point of view, to suspend its publication[28].
The rumour, widespread in Kishinev, that the Bessarabets was financially subsidised by the Ministry of the Interior, should not be dismissed out of hand, for it managed to secure such a subsidy after 1905. At any event, Krushevan's second newspaper received financial support from the government[29]. Thus, the prevailing impression among the population was that the government wanted a pogrom[30]. This is also apparent from testimonies, which reached Petersburg in the form of protocols forwarded to the Ministries[31]. The people could not help but see the preferential treatment accorded in Petersburg to individual pogromshchiki, for example Pronin, one of the chief instigators and protagonists in the pogrom[32]. Even after the pogrom, Pronin was able to make use of his connections with Interior Minister Pleve in order to try and apply pressure to the new Governor of Bessarabia, Prince Sergei D. Urusov[33]. Urusov summed up the consequences of this behaviour of Russian government organs as follows:
"The prevailing motive on the part of the looters was not hatred, nor was it revenge. It was simply the carrying out of actions which, for some, accorded with the government's aims and objectives, and for others were permitted and which finally, as popular wisdom had it, were really in fulfilment of an order from the Tsar.
"For this reason, I do not consider that central government can be absolved from moral responsibility for the murder and robbery in Kishinev"[34].
His words were lent weight by the fact that central government could hardly claim to have known nothing. Reports from local authorities were coming in before and after the event. In a circular to the governors of the Western Provinces, Pleve himself stated that the false rumours about "ritual murder" had played a significant part in the emergence of the "anti-Jewish disturbances"[35]. It cannot have escaped him that these rumours had been propagated by newspapers, at least one of which he was subsidising, and which he both could have suspended at the stroke of a pen. He had not hesitated to do so in the case of opposition newspapers' reports of the pogrom[36].
The behaviour of government departments - and especially that of the Ministry of the Interior - showed clearly on which side their sympathies lay. It is true that Pleve sacked the Governor of Bessarabia and later opposed his rehabilitation, but the much more actively anti-Semitic Vice-Governor Ustrugov[37], who, in his capacity as censor, left the Bessarabets alone, did not lose Pleve's confidence and went on to pursue his career[38]. Likewise, Levendal', the local Commander of the Okhrana - suspected of directly organising the pogrom and enjoying excellent connections with its principal protagonist, Pronin - was able to continue his career unhindered, despite the fact that he was unable to explain the whereabouts of a considerable amount of government money[39]. While Pleve confiscated, or prevented the publication, of opposition newspapers and periodicals planning to report the pogrom, newspapers such as Novoye Vremy, Znamia and the Bessarabets were able to carry on spreading their horror stories and could even claim that the Kishinev pogrom had really been a Jewish attack on the Christians[40]. The Vice-Governor of Bessarabia, still in office, would not allow the Jews to distribute a booklet containing speeches by dignitaries of the Russian Orthodox Church condemning the Kishinev pogrom, on the grounds that this would be a dangerous influence on the uneducated, but above all because it emphasised the fact that Jesus Christ was a Jew. However, a number of copies managed to enter circulation, and so he had printed a speech by the long-dead former Moscow patriarch Makarii, which condemned the pogroms of the 1880's. It was distributed by police and the clergy[41]. The suppression of the first publication led to proceedings in the Senate, in which the Vice-Governor was acquitted[42]. Distribution of the newspaper Novosti, which published a speech by the cleric Johann von Kronstadt - himself inclined towards anti-Semitism - attacking the Kishinev pogrom, was also prohibited. The explanation for this was, as Ustrugov cynically admitted during the above-mentioned Senate proceedings, to persuade Johann von Kronstadt to change his opinions. This was ultimately successful. The senior cleric actually apologised "to his Christian brethren in Kishinev" for having sought to apportion all the blame to them. He was now, he said, convinced that the Jews themselves were largely to blame for the catastrophe[43]. With regard to a bishop who had passed a harsh judgement on the pogromshchiki, Ustrugov voiced his fear that this could have led to a widespread belief among the people that even leading churchmen had succumbed to Jewish influence[44].
The same Ustrogov permitted a committee, set up by Pronin, to look after the families of imprisoned pogromshchiki[45]. Pleve himself was concerned about their fate and reported to the Tsar on the subject[46]. On the other hand, he declined to accede to a request by Witte that the victims of the pogrom should be helped. Witte nevertheless did take a number of steps on his own account to alleviate the effects of the pogrom[47]. Even after the excesses, Pleve continued cordial relations with Pronin, the organiser of the pogrom[48]. Evidently, Pleve wanted to make it clear, once again, where his sympathies lay: Pronin's role at Kishinev cannot have escaped him.
The Ministry of Justice, too, was quite clear on where the government sought its friends. Following an attack on the other well-known organiser of the pogrom, Krushevan, by a young Jew in revenge for Kishinev, the Ministry decided that the the trial should be held in secret. The reason, cynicly admitted, was to prevent Krushevan's role in the Kishinev pogrom from becoming public knowledge[49]. The Ministry of Justice also took steps to prevent the trial of a number of minor participants which followed the pogrom from leading to an exposition of the events that had taken place. No reference was to be made to the conduct of the authorities during the pogrom; fresh charges against persons hitherto not implicated were not admitted; the civil representatives of the victims (i.e. plaintiffs) failed to receive a number of important documents; and fresh witnesses were not allowed to stand before the court[50]. On the orders of the Ministry of the Interior, the public was to be excluded from the trial[51].
The tsarist government thus did absolutely nothing to give the public the impression that it was distancing itself from the pogrom. Indeed, it would probably be true to speak of indirect hints that the pogrom had not been entirely unwelcome-- this despite Pleve's making it clear to the Governors shortly after the unrest that he would tolerate no further disturbance[52]. The fact that the local police authorities remained quite convinced, even after the excesses of Kishinev, that Petersburg wanted pogroms, is made clear by Governor Urusov's report on the conduct of Reikhardt, the local Chief of Police, in the face of a threat of fresh unrest on the first anniversary of the Kishinev pogrom. Urusov was aware of strong reservations on the part of his subordinate when regulations and orders were being formulated with the objective of preventing a new pogrom. There was clearly a difference between the two men's conception of their duties. Reikhardt's behaviour changed only when Urusov was able to show him a telegram from Pleve which stressed in the strongest possible terms that another pogrom was to be avoided:
"I will never forget the change which ensued and which could be seen in the face, mannerisms, the entire behaviour of the Chief of Police. It was as though a mist which had been enveloping his spirit had suddenly lifted. He became animated, cheerful, confident and clear-sighted, like someone who knows, henceforward, which of two paths he is to take. He concluded his report with the words: 'Do not worry, Your Majesty, there will be no disturbances in Kishinev'"[53].
There are, however, also indications that the central authorities intervened directly. In this connection, a letter from Pleve to the Governor of Bessarabia, first published in The Times, is often quoted. This contained a veiled instruction that the Governor should tolerate a pogrom[54]. Urusov, A. A. Lopukhin (Director of the Police Department under Pleve) and Vladimir Gurko all described this letter as a forgery[55], arguing that Pleve was too clever to send such a telegram, even if he had organised the pogrom. However, it is notable that the local commanders in Kishinev behaved precisely as the contested telegram instructed[56]: firearms were not used "in order to avoid upsetting the non-revolutionary element of the population" as stressed in all the reports, both during(!) and shortly after the the pogrom[57]. This can only mean that the troops did nothing, but just stood and watched as the mob plundered and looted. Vladimir I. Gurko's description of Pleve's reaction as he read the contested letter is illuminating:
"When Pleve himself saw it in Ozvobozhdenie[58]..., he at first thought that he really had signed it. He summoned the Director of the Police Department, Lopukhin, and asked him angrily: 'How could you bring me this drivel for signature?' Only when he heard that there had been no such letter did he calm down"[59].
This, in itself, speaks volumes: Pleve himself considered it possible that such a letter could have been placed before him - and that he could have signed it. At the very least, the prevailing attitude within the Ministry of the Interior must have been such that it would not have surprised him had a letter like this originated there. The German ambassador thought, incidentally, that an order similar to that contained in the telegram printed in "The Times" had actually been issued. Pleve's assistant is said to have explained to a diplomat that it would have been unthinkable to order soldiers to fire on Christians to protect the Jews.
If one assumes that the letter was a forgery, it is nevertheless extraordinary that the Ministry of the Interior had absolutely no contact with the Governor of Bessarabia in connection with the imminent pogrom[60], despite the fact that it had been warned by the local Commander of the Okhrana that a pogrom could arise[61]. In a similar case a year later, Pleve had vigorously exhorted the new Governor of Bessarabia to maintain law and order. Whatever may be thought of the controversial letter, it seems probable that the pogrom was at least tolerated. Seen against the background of Pleve's good relations with Pronin, it has to be said that he must have regarded it as serving his political purpose. Pronin was one of the principal organisers of the pogrom: this was established by a group of jurists led by the renowned lawyer Zarudnyi. Genrich B.Sliozberg ascribed his involvement to the economic competition which, as a building contractor, he was experiencing from Jewish rivals[62]. The court proceedings which followed the pogrom established the fact that he had been writing inflammatory anti-Semitic articles in Krushevan's newspaper Znamia[63]. Furthermore, he maintained close connections with one of the bitterest anti-Semites to be found among the dignitaries of the Church, Johann von Kronstadt. Even under the new Governor, Urusov, who quickly had acquired the reputation of a "philosemite", Pronin dared to send the police anti-Semitic leaflets for distribution - needless to say that during that this time they - in contrast probably to a few months earlier - they were confiscated[64].
Also enjoying good relations with Pronin was Baron Levendal', Commander of the Kishinev Okhrana[65]. According to Sliozberg, the Commission set up under the leadership of the above-mentioned lawyer by the Biuro zashchity, the "Office for the Protection of the Jews" in St Petersburg found that Levendal' - who had been appointed Head of the Secret Service in Kishinev shortly before the riots - had been one of the chief organisers of the pogrom[66]. Of still greater significance is the fact that the court authorities discovered a man by the name of Drachinskii who claimed that Levendal' had organised the pogrom, with the help of his agents, in order to have an excuse to arrest revolutionaries and engage in house searches. It transpired that Drachinskii was a secret collaborator of Levendal' and had direct personal contact with him. This informant was prepared to repeat his claims in the presence of Levendal'. His testimony is lent further credibility by his request that it should not be made public, on the grounds that he did not want to help the Jews. The protocol of his depositions was immediately destroyed by the investigative authorities: evidently the content was regarded as explosive. The Ministry of Justice was also told of the sensational evidence given by this witness[67]. The authorities appeared in a still more unfavourable light when they expelled the lawyer Zarudnyi from Kishinev because - at least according to Sliozberg - his investigations were proving too successful[68].
Pleve himself despatched the Director of the Police Department, A. A. Lopukhin, to Kishinev to investigate the causes of the pogrom, and he subsequently published a report on the investigations which purportedly came from Lopukhin. But Lopukhin later claimed that he had not written it. The original report was, however, no longer to be found among Police Department files[69]. According to the Police Department's own count, the "Kishinev Files" comprised four volumes, the first three of which were nowhere to be found[70]. All remaining Interior Ministry files date from after the pogrom.
The prevailing mood in St Petersburg suggested that the pogrom was viewed in a positive light in the very highest circles: indeed, that it had probably been desired. The Tsar, as well as Pleve, had expressed the opinion that the Jews had needed to be taught a lesson because of their arrogance and also because they stood in the front ranks of the revolutionary movement[71]. Shortly after the pogrom, the Tsar thanked Krushevan for the work of his newspaper Bessarabets[72]. Pobedonostsev handed on to Pleve a memorandum in which the Jews were accused of everything that could conceivably be ascribed to them: dilution of the Orthodox religion and of morality, exploitation of the native population; they were, the memorandum maintained, the very vanguard of the revolution; they served as a tool of an Austro-German expansionist policy to reinforce the "Drang nach Osten" and worked to bring about the Germanisation of the entire Balkans and also of the Ottoman Empire. And all this was a conspiracy on the part of the all-powerful kahal, the secret Jewish world government[73]! However, the memorandum continued, the population of Bessarabia was now starting to defend itself against Jewish bumptiousness, of which the pogrom was a sure sign. In the end, it went on to say, a political question needed to be answered: namely, who was actually in charge, the Jews or the Russians[74]. The view - widely held in government circles - that the Jews were the most active of the revolutionaries[75], and that this explained the pogrom, was supported by a press campaign on the part of Novoe Vremia, Znamia, Bessarabets and other publications. They could, of course, be assured of approval in the highest quarters.
In the course of this campaign, Krushevan also published in Znamya, for the first time, extracts from the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, and did so at the precise time that the Gomel' pogrom took place[76]. Pleve, on the other hand - after the pogrom at Kishinev - was able to feel upheld in his patriarchalist, anti-constitutional stance: "Now, please give the rabble of Kishinev a constitution", he is alleged to have said to the publisher of the Neues Wiener Tageblatt[77]. His anti-Jewish instincts grew stronger still: "Are you ready to fight the Jews?" were the words with which he greeted the members of a new commission on the Jewish question which he had himself assembled[78]. He actually told a delegation of Jewish notables: "If Jewish youth is not kept away from revolution, I shall make life impossible for the Jews of Russia". Witte rendered Pleve's words somewhat differently: "Put a stop to revolution among your people and I will put a stop to the pogroms"[79]. At the inaugural reception of thea newly-formed commission on the Jewish question, Pleve deliberately ignored the Governor of Bessarabia, Urusov, because the latter had dared to suggest that discriminatory Jewish legislation should be scrapped. This memorandum caused a sensation in St. Petersburg: Urusov's courage was regarded with admiration. He had in any case only been invited to the commission because the Chairman had insisted that all shades of opinion should be represented[80]. There followed, in June 1903, further restrictive measures against the Jews[81].
Lcal authorities seem to have been perfectly well aware of the mood which prevailed in the highest quarters. Ozvobozhdenie reported that a Jewish delegation had held discussions with the local authorities in Kishinev. Echoing their Chief, Pleve, the authorities promised that the Jews would be safe as long as their brethren refrained from all political activities[82]. A Governor is reported as having said the same in connection with the imminent May Day demonstration of 1903[83]. However, the Vice-Governor of Bessarabia again surpassed everyone: playing on old religious prejudices, he is reported to have said, at the grave of the Jews killed in the Kishinev pogrom: "This is for your sins and for the sins of your children. This - is God's doing, God wished it thus"[84].
Taking all in all - the authenticated statements of officials and the Tsar, the conduct of the authorities and finally the close connections between pogromshchiki and government circles - it must be said that the pogrom was desired. The assertion that Pleve himself organised it cannot be proven, nor is it likely. Why should Pleve dirty his own hands when there were others who regarded his wish as their command?
Within a short time of the events at Kishinev there were fresh anti-Jewish riots. On 29th August 1903, there was a fight between Jews and peasants at the Gomel' bazaar. The cause can no longer be established. According to reports from the Jewish Bund, the feelings of the Russian population had been inflamed days before by the slogan "Don't buy anything from the Jews, there will be a pogrom"[85]. Weapons for street fighting were made available for Russian pogromshchiki at the house of a nobleman with such speed that organisation must be suspected[86]. Many Jews, too, had armed themselves. They were in no mood to allow a second Kishinev to take place. In the general melee, a Russian was killed. The police quickly succeeded in quelling the disturbance. However, after two days of unusual tension and frantic anti-Jewish agitation, a pogrom broke out at around midday on 1st September[87]. This was principally organised by the administrative head of the local railwaymen. The Gomel' Chief of Police made a genuine attempt to suppress the excesses. However, the army units which had been called in to support him disobeyed his express orders by protecting the pogromshchiki against Jewish self-defence groups. In so doing, they made the pogrom possible. It could not be stopped until the Police Chief managed to assert his authority and ordered firearms to be used. Four people were killed in the process. The Jewish self-defence groups made use of their revolvers, too, though they did not wound anyone. Both Jews and Russians were killed, while a large number of people was wounded and there was considerable damage to property[88].
Within six months, Russia experienced a second major pogrom, despite the fact that Interior Minister Pleve had issued strict instructions to Governors after the events at Kishinev that they were not to permit any anti-Jewish disturbances[89]. What had changed? Pleve's categorical order did not remain effective for long - or, maybe, it did at least not apply to obviously well regarded anti-Semitic agitation. The pogrom propaganda soon began again over wide areas of Russia. The police themselves spread rumours of possible pogroms in an attempt to intimidate would-be participants in May Day demonstrations[90]. A "Secret Monarchist Society" emerged in Pinsk proclaiming: "Brothers, workers, orthodox believers and Catholics! Christ is risen! - let us smite the Jews!"[91]. The motivating force behind this agitation was not only, it seems, anti-Jewish: it was also directed at the workers and the intelligentsia. The Bund - the Marxist Jewish Social Democratic Workers' Party - was particularly affected by the agitation. Because of the risk that a May demonstration might spark off anti-Jewish riots, the Party was obliged to call them off in a number of towns, among them Gomel'[92].
The pogrom of September 1st was, therefore, not entirely unexpected. It appears that it was welcomed by the local Okhrana[93] as a means of combating the Bund. This opinion was expressed by Klingenberg, the Governor of Mogilev, speaking to a deputation of Jews from Gomel:
"...The pogroms of the 1880's were of a quite different nature: they arose as a result of exploitation on the part of the Jews... Now, the Jews are the leaders and instigators of all anti-government movements. The whole of the Bund and all the Social Democrats - are Jews... In the grammar schools the Jews are corrupting young people; when there is a gathering at the university - it's the Jews. Speaking generally, the Jews have lost all respect for authority... You don't bring up your children as you ought, you have no influence over them. But you could at least 'expose' them by turning them in to the police. But you aren't doing so, you are covering up for them... You are disseminating disobedience among an uncivilised population, urging them to fight against the government, but the great majority of the Russians do not want this and are turning against you. And so we see the consequences... When we heard that the Jews were arming themselves and firing on the army..., then it wasn't necessary for us to protect you but rather to protect ourselves from you..."[94].
It could not be pu more bluntly that Russian officials believed - or wished others to believe - the cause of the pogrom to lie in the revolutionary activities of a part of the Jewish population. Pogroms were, as far as the Governor was concerned, obviously a sort of anti-revolutionary do-it-yourself justice, which was viewed with a certain amount of benevolence from above. In this connection, it is significant that - as the Central Committee of the Bund claimed - the pogrom took place after Social Democratic leaflets had been distributed among the peasants in surrounding villages[95]. The pogrom, therefore, might well have been designed to check the influence of revolutionaries in rural areas. In the town, the aim would have been to split the revolutionary movement, consisting of Jews organised within the Bund and of workers organised by the Russian Social Democratic Party. If this was all the result of a conscious policy, it certainly worked: The Social Democratic workers, in fact, had refused to come to the help of the Jewish population[96].
The trial that followed the pogrom was also engineered in way to stir up enmity between the Jews and the native population. A number of Jews - alongside the pogromshchiki - were arraigned for trial as representatives of Russian Jewry, on the grounds that they had organised a "Russian pogrom" in revenge for Kishinev. That some elements of the Jewish community had, on the initiative of the local Bund committee, formed a so-called self-defence organisation, gave the trial a veneer of credibility[97]. Shortly after the organisation had been set up, according to the indictment, "Jewish youth began to talk, not of self-defence but of the necessity to take revenge for Kishinev"[98]. The Jews of Gomel' were further accused of having always been hostile to the Christian population: more recently, the indictment read, they had been insulting to peasants and workers, and had not made way for officers on the pavements and had been rude to Christian shopkeepers[99]. In other places, too, the indictment lapses into a somewhat lurid and emotional style which is inappropriate in a legal document[100]. All these were not complaints which could be adjudicated in a court of law. They were probably incorporated in the indictment simply in order to raise anti-Jewish feelings on the part of the Russian population, feeding on existing prejudices and resentments. More and beyond that, these accusations deliberately - the trial was public, in contrat to the one following the Kishinev pogrom - brought up a theme always somehow connected with the "Jewish question" - that of power and domination. There seems to have been a lurking fear, shared by those at the top and those at the bottom, that Jews could become dominant, arrogate power and somehow enslave those who should as of right exercise the fullness of power. This fear was always activated when the question of equal rights seemed on the agenda. In October 1905 this image was conjured up not only once. The tone might have been set here - a common fear had been expressed publicly for the first time in a way that was intended to mobilize.
During the trial it became clear that the authorities wanted to influence proceedings. In the courtroom antechamber, a local policeman read extracts from the indictment to the police officers who would have to testify[101]. The intention is quite clear. The prosecution also brought forth witnesses who related, using almost identical words and expressions, how Jews had mercilessly beaten up Christians[102]. Other prosecution witnesses declined to answer questions from those defending the Jews (despite their obligation to do so) once they had made their statements and answered the presiding judge's questions[103]. Still others gave contradictory evidence[104]. This elicited an explanation from the "Osoboe Prisutsvie" (a special court supervisor) to the effect that the "simple peasant folk" were unable to think their answers through properly because of the "forceful and passionate tone" and "lack of calm" on the part of the Jewish defence lawyers. Besides this, the "Osoboe Prisutsvie" wanted to keep a tight grip on the range of questions deemed admissible[105]. In the light of what has been reported so far it can hardly be surprising tha repeated attempts were made during the trial to present the undesirable political activities of the Jews as the reason for the pogrom[106]. In this respect the sentencing of a number of Jews in the Gomel trial constituted a partial success. The sentences were lenient, and the court itself actually asked for mitigation, without drawing any distinction between aggressors and victims, i.e. between Jews and pogromshchiki[107].
The legal magazine Pravo commented:
"... The truth can be clearly discerned even in this verdict... If guilt for the spilling of blood and plundering can be attached in but very small measure to either Christian or Jew - and what other explanation could there be for the extreme leniency of the sentences? - then the question inevitably arises: who was really to blame for the terrible deeds that were perpetrated in Gomel'? The only possible answer is as follows: apart from the Christians and Jews, there is a third guilty party - the bureaucracy, playing a political game"[108].
The bureaucracy had certainly succeeded - if the Bund is to be believed - in goading the Russian population of Gomel into a state of extreme hostility towards the Jews[109]. As in the year before, attempts were made in 1904 to prevent May Day demonstrations[110] by means of pogrom agitation - this time with claims such as: "The Jews are providing the Japanese with financial help"[111]. In the midsummer, the incidence of minor pogroms and attacks became frequent. These were chiefly connected with mobilisation, and were possibly intended, by the officers who incited them, as a response to the Bund's increasingly powerful revolutionary propaganda among the army[112].
The Gomel' pogrom must be regarded as a turning point. The organisation of pogroms was subsequently looked upon by many administrators as an act of patriotism and as a legitimate weapon in the fight against revolution. This did not change appreciably even when Pleve was assassinated and his place taken by Svyatopolk-Mirsky. The change meant merely that the pogromshchiki could no longer count on the automatic blessing of the Interior Minister. But to keep a check on local authorities, and especially on officers, was beyond the power of the new Minister.
3. The Pogroms of October 1905: Organised or Spontaneous Counter-Revolution?
The declaration of the October manifesto was followed by a wave of anti-Jewish pogroms in Russia, and in general by demonstrations, pogroms against intelligentsia and Zemstva, looting of estates and armed clashes. A commission appointed by the Zionist relief fund in London recorded approximately 690 anti-Jewish pogroms, principally in the southern and south-western provinces (Bessarabia, Kherson, Tauria, Ekaterinoslav, Poltava, Chernigov, Kiev, Podolia)[113]. The epicentre was thus within the southern part of the Pale of Settlement, though a number of pogroms took place in other parts of the Pale of Settlement, in Poland and in the Russian heartland. The survey of 690 pogroms did not include numerous disturbances and pogroms which were not aimed chiefly at Jews. It is possible to gain only a very incomplete picture of the number of deaths and injuries and of material losses in these ant-Jewish excesses. The most important provinces registered 876 deaths and 1,770 cases of injury[114]. However, the number of people injured, in particular, must have been far higher, as the statistics only accounted for those victims who were admitted to hspital, and even then were not always complete. A figure of 7,000-8,000 is probably more realistic[115]. Material damage due to looting and arson was estimated at more than 62 million roubles[116], and in a number of cases the Jewish population of a single town suffered losses running into millions[117].
The simultaneity of the pogroms - they occurred principally between 18th and 25th October - led contemporaries to make sweeping accusations that the Russian government had organized the excesses. The Witte government was, wrote the famous Jewish historian Dubnov, going the same way as the bureaucracy under the old system, only less openly[118]. Many journalists were even harsher in their accusations:
"Governors, gradonachal'niki and Chiefs of Police organized the pogroms openly and cynically, they sent in the army to shoot the samooborona [the armed Jewish self-defence organisation] to pieces, led and directed the looters and refused to protect the victims"[119].
The problem was not that the government was powerless, but that it was more powerful than it should be[120], commented the Jewish periodical Voskhod. This view is still shared by a large number of historians today[121]. Many academics believed that a significant role in preparations for the anti-Jewish excesses was played by the "Union of the Russian People" (Soiuz Russkago Naroda - SRN). However, this grouping was founded only after the October wave of pogroms by Dr. Dubrovin, who at the time of the pogroms was still a complete unknown. The claim that the Union was founded by the government is also difficult to substantiate, although a number of influential people had certainly given thought to something of the kind[122]. In any case, the relationship between government and SRN was anything but harmonious, nor was Dubrovin the sort of man who would allow himself to be made use of by others[123]. The sensational disclosures of the industrialist F. A. L'vov in Nasha Zhizn'[124], accepted in their entirety by many well-known historians to this day, have been refuted[125]: a certain General Evgenii Bogdanovich is stated to have been the leader of a large pogrom organisation, though this man was in no way an active member of the military, and besides was already 76 years old in 1905. How inaccurate, if not downright false, L'vov's so-called disclosures were is shown by the fact that he even classed Lopukhin with the pogrom organisers, despite the fact that the latter had, as Governor espoused the liberal cause and had consequently fallen from grace. Furthermore, Lopukhin was the source of a number of reliable disclosures - and there were few of these - regarding pogrom activity on the part of central government offices.
It is virtually impossible today to determine why in each individual ces a pogrom broke out and who was the culprit either because he (or his group)instigated the excesses or because he (or the group) failed to act in repressing it. Contemporary reports contradict one another and - where not actually false - are characterized by omissions which served to confirm the opinions of the newspaper or government office concerned[126]. Nevertheless, a general discussion, supported by the description of typical individual instances, will give some idea of the nature of the wave of pogroms which took place in October 1905. Jewish pogroms had been by no means uncommon in Russia since Kishinev and Gomel'. The permanent anti-Jewish propaganda seen in newspapers such as Bessarabets, Novoe Vremia and Moskovskiia Vedomosti, occasionally in official newspapers of individual provinces[127] and in anti-Jewish leaflets had without doubt contributed to a general atmosphere that was conducive to pogroms. However, pogroms arose for the most diverse of reasons. The rapidity with which an employer in Feodosiia (Kherson) was able, early in 1905, to transform a strike - in which his Jewish workers took part - into a pogrom against the Jews indicates the presence of deep-seated anti-Jewish feelings and possibly tensions deriving from stiff competition under harsh circumstances[128]. Here, a similar situation to that in Odessa might have prevailed where the highly volatile work-force in the docks - segregated by nationality - had to compete for work each day anew under conditions of a severe economic slump[129]. In general, near-starvation and high unemployment in Russian towns must be taken into consideration: both will have contributed towards a general state of unrest[130]. That right-wing agitators could stir up groups of demonstrators to mount a pogrom against the Jews by telling them that the October manifesto had granted them equal rights[131] suggests a deep-seated antipathy which may have been connected with economic and political causes. It might mirror what we have already abserved in 1881: the fact that the discussion of equal rights for Jews could be a contributory factor to a wave of pogroms, just as in Germany the discussion of the emancipation of the Jews probably was a major factor in the Hep Hep riots of 1819[132]. It might mirror the inability on the part of a rather backward population to see the Jews in anything else but in a subordinate position. The Clerk to the 2nd Police District in Orsha, Sinitskii, one of the organizers of the pogrom played skilfully on that theme. He is reported to have addressed the pogromshchiki as follows:
"Now, the Jews and Poles are rebelling, and they want to get their hands on the whole of Russia. Now, you have to do the dirty work again, for the Jews, just as you used to in former times when you were serfs. Now, we must stand up for ourselves, otherwise we shall be in their hands(60)."
Here it is again, the question of who holds the reign of power and who is entitled to hold them. It is the theme which was present in 1881 and which had been played up again by some segments of the authority after the pogrom of Gomel' in 1903. The the argument was phrased cleverly, suggesting that a successful revolution would bring about the re-enserfment of the peasants and it gave a hint of an exchange of elites, which was entirely in accordance with - and also an expression of - the traditional thinking characteristic of old agrarian societies. The whole episode was absolutely typical of the arguments which served to stir up pogroms.
In to this rather traditional background fits well that peasants were not entirely clear about how the battle lines were drawn. In some districts, Jewish pogroms and "illuminations"[133] took place at the same time, or else rural unrest arose from Jewish pogroms[134]. In Bessarabia, for example, a minor pogrom resulting from revolutionary agitation and directed at large-scale land-owners and Jewish shopkeepers in fact first and foremost affected the pomeshchiki and then the few Jews in the village[135]. Similar cases are also reported in the enquête of the "Imperial Free Economic Society" on the agricultural unrest of 1905/6[136]. Peasants rebelled instinctively and spontaneously against the advent of modern economic forms. In their way, they were rebelling against the forces which compelled them to enter the market or endangered their economic existence because of the way the market functioned[137]. In this respect, Jews and land-owners were only the two sides of the same coin as far as the peasants were concerned. Had not their historical experience in Old Poland been that Jews were the agents of landlords? Peasants expressed an attitude like this again and again. At the same time, the pomeshchik was the decisive element in a hated system of rural self-government which kept the peasant in a state of legal inequality. Many peasants expected that the Tsar would bring about an improvement in this situation[138].
It was probably not entirely coincidental that the majority of the pogroms of October 1905 took place in the Ukraine. The Ukraine was a region of rapid economic progress. Most significantly, it was here that agriculture was at its most advanced. In the right-bank Ukraine the great majority of the estate businesses were capitalised and their production was achieved using modern agricultural methods. This process had started with the sugar-beet factories in the south west. Alongside the advanced production methods, however, primitive elements in the relationships between land-owner and peasant survived. The peasants living close to the modernised estate businesses were forced by the estate-owners to work the land of the aristocracy or of large-scale capitalist farmers in exchange for benefits such as grazing rights, wood-gathering, the renting of land and so on. This most archaic form of payment was called otrabotka (labour dues). Modern economic forms were thus juxtaposed with the old system - reminiscent of serfdom - in which the peasants were dependent upon the land-owners. The Ukraine was also the region in which the relationship between the land-owning class and the peasants came closest to the so-called "Prussian way to capitalism" - unjustly invoked, as even here the peasantry was not driven from the land. But in contrast to the rest of Russia, there was no significant decline in large-scale land-ownership and there had developed a certain degree of differentiation within the peasantry. Further, the land-owners were leasing less and less land to the peasants, which gave rise to a proletariat without land and a large migratory labour force that was needed for agricultural work on the estates[139]. As a result of this, the peasantry rebelled: against the land-owners with a strong and relatively well-organised agricultural movement but also, from primitive instinct, with pogroms directed against the Jews. Despite this, though, most of the pogroms took place in towns and townlets. The Ukraine, too, had a long tradition of anti-Jewish violence dating back to the times of the hetman Bogdan Khmel'nitskii, when Cossacks and peasants rose against their Polish oppressors.
It is certain that social tensions, old, outstanding personal "scores", feelings of resentment and prejudices - including those of a religious sort - all played a part in the pogroms. However, the dominant feeling among those concerned may have been that of fulfilling a patriotic duty: defending the Tsar against the hegemony of the aristocracy and the Jews. The muzhik, in his primitive way, imagined, too, that it was precisely these two groups who prevented the Tsar from handing over the land to the peasants. The pogroms were primarily a political phenomenon, however confused the ideas of the pogromshchiki may have been. Anti-Jewish excesses were to a considerbale degree the expression of counter-revolution, part spontaneous, part organised. It cannot be surprising that urban counter-revolutionary riots were not invariably directed against the Jews or against Jews alone. Students were invariably targets of popular wrath. Often businesses owned by Russians were looted as well as those belonging to Jews[140]. There were pogroms which had nothing to do with Jews, but were directed against Zemstvo [local government] officials and intelligentsia, as, for example, at Tver[141].
Old tensions between "town and gown" also seem to have played a frequent role in ant-Jewish pogroms[142]. A further myth concerning the wave of pogroms should be dispelled. The liberal and revolutionary press described - for the most part disparagingly - those who took part in the rioting as chernye or professional hooligans. Alternatively, using arguments of a more sociological nature, they spoke of the middle classes - shopkeepers, merchants, coachmen, concierges, etc - as the organisers[143]. Many modern historians are of the same opinion[144]. There is no doubt that these groups constituted a potential anti- revolutionary force and that they took an active part in Jewish pogroms. As already mentioned, the peasants, too, numbered among the most active pogrom participants, although pogroms largely took place in towns and townlets. Seldom spoken of, however, was the fact that workers also played a considerable role. In some places, the pogroms were entirely their responsibility[145]. If there is any reluctance to believe the descriptions given by the authorities and the Jewish press, eloquent testimony is provided by the rebuke which a workers' assembly in Elizavetgrad delivered to its misguided comrades for having taken part in the pogrom[146].
If the Zionist journal Evreiskaia Zhizn' is to be believed, the Social Democrats often reacted with indifference to a pogrom. In 1904, for example, a local SD organisation is alleged to have allowed a pogrom to take place and to have failed to react to it, remaining unmoved. This stance was condoned by a regional committee which for its part avoided any mention of the Jews in an appeal criticising the government for the pogrom[147]. According to the journal, this, too, suggested the existence of a strong undercurrent of anti-Semitism amongst the workers, which the local SD committee felt it had to take into account. However, it must also be emphasized that there were no anti-Jewish pogroms in the big industrial centres in the towns and provinces of Moscow, St. Petersburg, Vladimir and throughout Poland where there existed a long tradition of worker militancy and of revolutionary work by political parties. There, the workers actually organised themselves against anti-Jewish riots[148]. Those workers who did take part in anti-Jewish excesses probably lived in a milieu which was insufficiently urban and which displayed still a strong affinity towards a rural way of life. They can be classed together with the otkhodniki [seasonal workers migrating to the cities during the winter mainly and returning to the countryside during the summer], a Russian phenomenon typical of this period.
The fact that the pogroms of October 1905 all took place within the space of a few days was a major contributory factor towards the assumption that they had been organised on a signal from central government authorities or from the leadership of the Black Hundreds. However, the developments which led up to 17th/18th October are in themselves sufficient to explain the simultaneity of the pogroms. The October manifesto alone had had a dramatic impact on the country: it highlighted the fact that the country was engulfed in a breath-taking struggle for power between the old and the new forces; it mobilized both sides; it encouraged the revolutionary movement to make an immediate claim to the rights which it promised and to continue the struggle against the old system until the latter's complete capitulation. At the other end of the political spectrum, the manifesto brought into the open the defenders of the status quo. It also had turned many of those who sympathised with the revolution into neutrals or opponents of the revolution[149]. An observer of the events of October in Krasnoiarsk stated emphatically that this was the case, declaring that the manifesto had been responsible for the strengthening of conservative and reactionary elements. This drastic change of opinion had then, he went on to say, made the pogrom possible as well[150].
It is certain, too, that in some places a further cause of aggravation was the fact that revolutionaries - among them, obviously, many Jews - tried to force merchants and shopkeepers to shut their businesses and join in the general strike[151]. In those areas which lay within the Pale of Settlement, the means of applying this force was the "self-defence organisation" of the Bund. Despite vigorous counter-measures and counter-pressure from the police, most shopkeepers were more afraid of the Jewish revolutionaries than they were of the police, and closed their businesses, however unwillingly[152]. During 1905 the Bund once again clarified the role of the self-defence organisation. An appeal directed principally at Jewish society in America, for example, contained the following:
"We have to prepare not only for pogroms but also for the final assault on absolutism. The revolution is near. Support our struggle in the only way you can...with money for arms"[153].
The self-defence organisations - at least in so far as they were controlled by the Bund - were in reality not composed of Jewish youth "merely arming itself to defend against the attack for which the opposite side was preparing"[154]. Throughout the whole of 1905, the Bund's combat organisation expanded its activities, with the result that it was possible in some areas to establish an effective revolutionary authority opposed to or even supplanting government authorities. Bund organisations fought against the police, offered armed resistance to police and army, erected barricades on occasion. The Bund's "self-defence organisations" were used not only in defence of its own meetings but also to break up those of the Liberals[155]. In Vitebsk immediately before the October manifesto, a co-ordinating committee of the Bund and the Social Democrats issued a call for an uprising[156]. All these factors had undoubtedly exacerbated the situation to such an extent as to justify the assumption that pogroms would break out without necessarily having been organised by the authorities. In this connection, it should also be stressed that - in contrast to Harcave's description[157] - anti-revolutionary resistance for the most part did not arise only a few days after the declaration of the October manifesto or as a reaction to revolutionary and opposition demonstrations, but often emerged almost simultaneously with it, as, for instance, was the case in Odessa[158]. It was from such clashes between revolutionary rallies and patriotic counter-demonstrations - irrespective of whether or not these were putting in a late appearance on the scene - that the pogroms mostly evolved[159]. Highly critical situations also arose when revolutionaries marched towards prisons demanding the release of political prisoners. These often culminated in pogroms when the authorities refused to give way[160]. However, even when the demands of the demonstrators were met, clashes between revolutionaries and Black Hundreds erupted into pogroms[161].
In such explosive situations, the attitude of the police was, of course, of the utmost importance. They had long been accustomed to seeing the Jews as the mainstay of the revolution, and this opinion was shared by most high-ranking police officers as well as by many Governors[162]. The police were mourning heavy losses within their ranks, and it may be assumed that the Bund had played a part in incurring these following its conference resolution that the "elimination of police officers" could be beneficial in certain circumstances[163]. However this may have been, the police believed it to be the case. The Pinsk Chief of Police is said, for example, to have declared following the murder of two of his subordinates:
"Each of these officers has relatives in the countryside, and they will come and take revenge...If another policeman is murdered, I will myself stand at the head of my men, and we will shoot the Jews"[164].
Such a statement was not untypical of the mood of the police. Police officers saw the patriotic demonstrations as simply a manifestation of loyalty towards the existing system. In the event of clashes between revolutionaries and "patriots", they therefore for the most part supported the latter[165], from whom they did not have to fear murderous attack. In a great number of cases, the police either took part in the pogroms or organised them themselves[166]. Even Prime-Minister Stolypin admitted later that, under his predecessors, officers of the police and gendarmerie had supported or taken part in pogroms. In so doing, they had followed their political convictions[167]. He explained this as a consequence of the total disarray of the government apparatus. In the case of the Simferopol' pogrom, it was actually established by court proceedings that the police had organised the pogrom and had taken part in it. The Deputy Police Chief was convicted. His boss could no longer be called to account, since he had died in the meantime[168]. The pogrom at Feodosiia, too, was alleged to have been partially organised by a district Chief of Police together with several officers. However, the major organisational role was played by a number of other officials and the harbour authorities[169]. In Orsha, the moving spirit behind the pogrom was Sinitskii Clerk to the 2nd Police District there. He, too, was subsequently found guilty by the court[170].
The police of Orsha (and in particular a number of police officers) faced serious accusations in the indictment and in eye-witness accounts in court. However, what is of particular interest - and Orsha is certainly not an isolated case - is the fact that the peasants gave evidence that the volost' elders had called on them to move into the town "in order to defend the Tsar against the Jews". They had, they said, been threatened with punishment should they fail to comply[171]. This also suggests an official involvement in the pogrom, since the volost' authorities were subject to strict administrative supervision, above all by the land-captains who belonged to the land-owning class, the gentry. It is entirely typical of the forces which still persisted in Russia that these people should make use of what remained of the old, feudal, "patriarchal" system in order to mobilise a counter-revolution of sorts.
A very strange pogrom took place in Nezhin (Chernigov) in October 1905. Although this event was for from typical, some features of the October pogroms can clearly be observed in the following account - as rendered by a right wing journal. It does not matter, if the report is correct in all details. Rather, it shows what representatives of the nascent political right thought about how all this should work and how tended to look at the pogroms. The right-wing and loyal elements of this town reacted against the proclamtion of the manifesto of October 17th and the following expressions of joy and jubilant oppositionism with a solemn church service on the 20th, for which 3000 people turned up, quite a few of them peasants from the surrounding villages. Then ‑ with gonfalons and protraits of the Tsar ‑ a march set off for the local School for Languages (Philologicheskii Institut), where a revolutionary meeting had taken place on the 18th to celebrate the good tidings of the manifesto. The doors were barred ‑ students obviously were afraid of the impending outburst of patriotic wrath. By threats the marchers succeeded in having the building opened. They demanded that everybody would come out. Shouts were heard like: "Who has allowed you to create play at revolution (buntovat')?", or "how can you dare to tear up portraits of the Tsar?", and then the leitmotif of the whole action: "Ask forgivance". After that the crowd demanded from the students to bring out the institute's portrait of the Tsar ‑ although of course they themselves had carried several with them[172].
We may interrupt the narrative for an attempt at interpreatation. It had to be the portrait from the institute, one is forced to assume, because in the understanding of the patriotic marchers the ensuing procedure would otherwise not have its full weight. The protrait of the institute had to witness the following events. Only then it would be able, when brought back, to remind the students of the lesson they had been taught, of the ceremony of repentance and the oath taken to the Tsar. Somehow, in a way not really understandable to twentieth century man, this protrait, which was normally displayed in the "Philologicheskii Institut", would work upon the students to put their mind right, in the word's double meaning. There is something mystical in all that, or even fetischist, because obviously deep down in the minds of the patriots there was a believe in the powers of a portrait and the occasion, or more exactly the ritual, it had been part of.
To pick up where we left the story: Students ‑ and Jews of course, because for right wingers this was all the same anyway ‑ were now forced to carry the Tsar's portrait to the main church and to sing the national anthem on their way. The march stopped at every building, where allegedly a protrait of the Tsar had been torn up. At each such building students and Jews were forced again to intone the national anthem to atone for these acts. This certainly was a mirror of ancient purgatory or purification rituals. Then the marchers stopped at the town hall and the peasants ‑ so the report says ‑ demanded that a telegram be sent to the Tsar, asking for the closure of the "Philologicheskii Institut", because students were not learning at all, but were dabbling in revolution instead. The institute's portrait of the Tsar was then put up in the main square of the town in front of the cathedral and shouts were heard: "'Buntovshchiki'(seditionists), on your knees". Then students and Jews had to swear that they would no longer "buntovat'" (make revolution) and pay due respect to the Tsar. This was not done in a mass ceremony, but for each individual separately: Each one of the unhappy students and Jews had to step forward, kneel down before the (institute's) protrait of the Tsar, kiss it and take the oath to Nikolai. Meanwhile, when all this took place, patriotic marchers forced somebody to hand out a list of "democrats", who were rounded up by the pogromshchiki and forced to go through the same ceremony. This went on until deep into the night.
"All that happened here", a contemporary rapporteur remarked, "reminded one of mystical occurrences of earlier centuries and it was an echo of medieval clashes". But basically what the patriots wanted to do was to restore the old hallowed order through an act of atonement. Those who rose beyond their station and had displayed aspirations beyond the natural order of things had to be and had been taught a lesson.
Clergymen and church banners were also a characteristic phenomenon of such pogroms[173]. They would certainly have helped to rid those who looted and murdered of the feeling that what they were doing was wrong. It should be borne in mind that the Orthodox Church was under direct state control and that the authorities repeatedly enlisted the clergy to "reassure" and "instruct" the population. Police and military often escorted patriotic demonstrations, giving active protection against revolutionaries[174] and supporting both the looting of Jewish property and assaults on Jewish life. This frequently went so far that the police and army would actually shoot the Jewish self-defence to bits, thereby opening the way for the pogromshchiki and their work of destruction[175]. The army sometimes even used the artillery against houses from which shots had been fired at looters[176]. The City Commandant of Odessa justified this as follows:
"The principal danger in the whole affair... lay not in the pogrom, but in armed attacks... on army and police, which were aimed at bringing about a revolution"[177].
It has to be assumed that not unfrequently revolutionaries, mistaking the situation, did move against the police or the army[178]. When such events became known, the opposition press generally ascribed them to the work of agents provocateurs[179], yet it is highly improbable that police officers would have attacked - sometimes even killed - police or soldiers on a grand scale in order to unleash a pogrom. Militias, sometimes organised as an organ to uphold revolutionary order, on the whole were more likely to exacerbate the situation than to calm it[180].
When a pogrom had started, the police - if not actually actively involved - for the most part stood by and watched, or did not act until it was too late[181]. However, the suggestion that this was the result of an order from above is not supported by the fact that in many places where a pogrom took place with the connivance of officials of the local administration, some police officers did, at the same time, move against the pogromshchiki in their own districts, thereby largely preventing local outrages[182]. In a large number of cases - e.g. at Iuzovka - the police quite obviously played no part in the organisation of pogroms[183]. In others, they or the army prevented a pogrom from taking place, or at least managed to ensure that it did not assume major proportions[184]. In Gomel', police and Jewish self-defence joined forces in the search for looted goods[185]. There were also cases where the police rescued revolutionaries or Jews from the clutches of hooligan "patriots"[186].
Where the authorities wished to stop a pogrom, they often were faced with a difficult task. In Orsha, for example, Vice-Governor Ladyzhenskii attempted to halt the pogrom by calling on the massed pogromshchiki to disperse. Their response was to shout "He's been bought by the Jews!" and the rioting continued. The authorities had to turn to the chief agitator - Police Clerk Sinitskii - with the plea that he put an end to the pogrom. Although he was one of the main instigators of the pogrom he finally obliged and managed to do so[187]. When requested by a representative of the civil administration to move against the pogromshchiki, one officer explained that he feared that his soldiers would not obey such a command[188]. Lower ranks frequently disobeyed orders from their superiors to put down a pogrom[189]. Adjutant-General Dubasov explained that dissatisfaction with the Jews had become so great that it had to be given free rein[190]. It is possible that he, too, feared that police and soldiers would not have obeyed orders to move against looters.
Many Governors in South-West Russia were at least neutral towards the pogroms, if they did not actually support them. The statement by Kaul'bars, Governor-General of Odessa, that "all of us sympathise inwardly with the pogrom" is typical[191]. Some Governors even marched at the head of the patriotic demonstrations, which at the very least were always in danger of degenerating into pogroms[192]. In general, Governors gave their blessing to such patriotic demonstrations, although they must have been quite aware of the likely consequences[193]. In response to a request to put a stop to the pogrom at Nezhin[194], the Governor, A. N. Khvostov, is alleged to have said that he could not prevent demonstrations of patriotism. Army generals, too, declined to put a stop to rioting on the grounds that the crowd was acting in a spirit of patriotism[195].
As Governors and City Commandants - not entirely without justification - saw in the Jews the mainstay of the revolution, the pogroms were often by no means unwelcome to them. They considered pogroms to be the loyal population's response to revolutionary provocation, and in particular to the "particularly provocative conduct of the Jews"[196]. One Governor went so far as to emphasize the positive effects of pogroms in countering the "Jewish revolution": the latter had started to gain in strength again only after the authorities had averted the danger of further pogroms[197]. Many Governors, and their subordinates, agreed with those who instigated the pogroms - for example, the clerk Sinitskii - that they were a response to revolution, and that the Tsar and Russia had been saved by them[198]. This affinity often led to close co-operation in the provinces with the various "patriotic" and counter-revolutionary groups which had been formed during 1905, even in the absence of all-Russian umbrella organisations, which did not come into being until after the October manifesto[199]. Very often, such groups were loosely organised around a "club"[200]. People such as Krushevan, Pronin, Pikhno, Gringmut and Sharapov emerged as their literary champions, and a good many provincial newspapers had no qualms about re-printing their anti-Semitic, rabble-rousing propaganda[201].
D. F. Trepov, still Deputy Minister of the Interior in the immediate aftermath of the manifesto, considered that it was the government's duty to help these patriotic groups[202]. General Bekman endeavoured to prevail on "moderate" elements of society to "resist" the radicals, as he himself reported to the Interior Ministry[203]. However, the doings of the "patriotic" organisations during the events of October in no way constituted any sort of concerted action, regardless of their considerable activities later on. Quite simply, they lacked unity and central leadership. The extent of their involvement in events at any one location is difficult to assess, as their regional distribution cannot be established with any degree of precision and substantiated reports are lacking[204]. However, it is certainly safe to assume active participation in pogroms on their part, at least to the extent that they had been able to get organised locally.
Even before the October pogroms, the magazine Russkoe Delo - published by Sergei Sharapov in collaboration with Prince A. G. Shcherbatov - wrote of the Nizhnii Novgorod pogrom: "The patriotic, sensible folk (narodnoe) movement is growing"[205]. Subsequently, Russkoe Delo reported the October pogroms with satisfaction[206]. These groups, however, were counter-revolutionary not only because of their anti-liberal and anti-socialist stance but also because they were opposing the new form of government and its new chief. In Kishinev, for example, the pogromshchiki made a number of speeches in which Witte was reviled as a protector of the Jews who deserved the death sentence[207]. Antonii, Orthodox Bishop of Volhynia (a member of the Russian Assembly or Russkoe Sobranie) declared in a letter to Boris Nikol'skii[208] that he was convinced that the struggle against the revolution must start with Witte's execution[209]. Even after the October manifesto, the reactionary groups continued to call for a purely consultative Duma or even for a Zemskii Sobor[210], to be elected strictly according to the system of estates.
It is hard to believe that Witte's government would have collaborated with those forces which saw pogroms as the answer to the surrendering of the Tsar's prerogatives[211]. Indeed, Witte himself had pushed through this abrogation of monarchical powers and had planned the reforms promised in the manifesto as measures to help pacify the population. Pogroms could only impede the attempted overtures which Witte made to the forces of moderation shortly afterwards. For this reason, it flies in the face of the logic of events that the government should have planned the pogroms in collaboration with right-wing radical groups. It should also be noted that there is no documentary evidence whatsoever that Witte's cabinet as a whole even took a benevolent view of the pogroms. Witte's standing with the Tsar must also have grown weaker the longer it took to bring peace to the country[212]. He must have foreseen that the disturbances and pogroms which followed the declaration of the October manifesto would be used as a weapon and as additional evidence against his policies[213]. Further, when one recalls General Dubasov's report that Jewish pogroms could also develop into agrarian disturbances[214], it must be accepted that a responsible government would resist the temptation to use pogroms as a counter-revolutionary measure.
The government replied to the wave of pogroms with admonitions to the public and with the assurance that it would protect life and property irrespective of nationality. The Military Governor of Petersburg called on all citizens, including those who were "peace-loving" (i.e. loyal to the regime), not to organise demonstrations[215]. In a further communication, the government actually admitted that members of the police had taken part in the attacks, and promised that these would be punished in order to avoid similar occurrences[216]. The Cabinet instigated an investigation of a series of pogroms; among them were the Kiev and Odessa riots, and Senators Turau and Kuz'minskii were dispatched to those cities[217]. The Governor of Minsk, P. G. Kurlov[218], and the City Commandant of Odessa, Neidgardt[219], were recalled and brought to court[220]. Witte also ordered an internal analysis of the events of October which explained the particular difficulties which had arisen for the central government as a result of the wrongful behaviour on the part of local authorities and the Ministry of the Interior. This document, too, suggests quite clearly that the government did not want the pogroms and could not have done so[221].
Yet how does one have to see Nicholas II's role in the October pogroms? Is it really possible to speak of the treachery Tsar who, it was said, held out an olive-branch to the liberal public with one hand whilst stabbing it in the back with the other[222]? In a letter to his mother, the Tsar gave his interpretation of events:
"The elements of subversion raised their head in the first few days after the manifesto, but a powerful reaction quickly set in and great numbers of loyal people suddenly made their strength felt. The result was obvious, and was what one would expect in our country. The impudence of the socialists and revolutionaries had once again made the people angry; and as nine-tenths of the instigators of unrest are Jews, all this displeasure was directed against them. Hence the pogroms took place. It is really astonishing the way that they occurred simultaneously in all the towns of Russia and Siberia"[223].
Even if the Tsar clearly welcomed the pogroms as a reaction to the revolution, it is unlikely that at this stage he knew any more than this letter suggests or that he was in any way involved, even indirectly, in organising the pogroms. Neither were Nicholas II's relations with the new reactionary groups lacking in piquancy. A delegation from the "Union of the Russian People"[224] as well as a further delegation from the "Union of the Russian Folk"[225] tried to explain to the Tsar that the manifesto of 17th October did not mean any limitation of the autocracy, and they called for a Zemskii Sobor. They explained, indirectly but clearly, that the Tsar did not have the right to renounce the fullness of his autocratic powers. Spokesmen for the Union of the Russian Folk actually went so far as to threaten that the people would not tolerate any rule other than an autocratic one, and that they would react to a constitution with serious unrest. The Tsar's reply was ambiguous: he alone bore the responsibility for his rule before God. This could have been taken as a rebuke for the undiplomatic speeches of the SRN representatives, and at the same time as confirmation of their theory that autocracy was still unchanged, even after the manifesto of 17th October. The Jewish question was also touched upon by the delegation of the Union of the Russian People. A certain A. N. Baranov appealed to the Tsar not to grant equal rights to the Jews, because otherwise "they would rule over us" and because they were the main culprits of the recent disturbances. The Tsar answered: "I will think about it". The speeches of the also contained obvious attacks on Witte, though without actually mentioning him by name: he had, they said, strengthened the freemasons and was relying on inorodtsy for his support. Nicholas replied to all these speeches with a few friendly, though non-committal words of thanks[226]. His flirtation with the radical Right had evidently not yet begun properly.
The much-mentioned printing shop in the Interior Ministry's Police Department under the Officer of the Gendarmerie, Komissarov, did not - at least according to the account of A. A. Lopukhin, who had earlier directed the Department under Pleve and Mirskii[227] - commence its work until after the October 1905 wave of pogroms, either[228]. Komissarov used a secret printery in order to produce pogrom appeals which were directed against the Jews[229]. According to Witte[230] and Lopukhin, Komissarov, with the support of two assistants, worked from the time after the publication of the manifesto up to late January/early February, when Witte found out and put a stop to this activity. Distribution of the appeals was undertaken by Dubrovin and the coterie surrounding the Moskovskiia Vedomosti under Gringmut. This demonstrates that there was close co-operation between sections of the Police Department and the "Black Hundreds", though this only began on any scale after the events of October. The reports of Witte and Lopukhin agree that a further series of pogroms was only prevented by the former's vigorous intervention at the Interior Ministry and with the local authorities[231]. Under Witte's chairmanship, the Council of Ministers, too, discussed the danger of new pogroms. This was in accordance with a promise made by Witte to representatives of a number of Jewish societies. The Council of Ministers made it clear that the government could not, and would not, tolerate pogroms[232].
Much of Komissarov's work remains obscure. Above all, the identity of those who might have given him his orders cannot be established. Witte, in his memoirs, citing Lopukhin as his source, named Palace Commandant D. F. Trepov and P. I. Rachkovskii, the former chief of the Okhrana in Paris and a high official of the Department of the Police in the Ministry of Interior, and went on to say that he was convinced that Interior Minister Durnovo himself knew nothing of the whole affair[233]. On the other hand, S. P. Beletskii - subsequently Director of the Police Department and Deputy Minister of the Interior - reported the case in such a way as to encourage the suspicion that Durnovo may have played a decisive role in the affair after all. Furthermore, he claimed, Komissarov had been very closely connected with Gerasimov, Chief of the St. Petersburg Okhrana - who was responsible for a large area of the Russian empire. According to Beletskii, Witte had attempted to prove Durnovo's decisive role by means of an investigation, carried out by Vuich (Director of the Police Department), Rachkovskii and the Public Prosecutor (Procurator) Kamyshanskii. Rachkovskii, however, could not have had any interest in seeing the matter properly resolved as he had probably been involved in it himself[234]. Unfortunately, Komissarov covered up for his superiors by taking the entire responsibility on his own shoulders.
Witte had the impression that the Tsar already knew a great deal about Komissarov's activities, and so, in order to accord with Nicholas II's opinion, proposed in his report to his Imperial master that Komissarov should not be punished. The Tsar replied that he would not have done so anyway, since Komissarov had performed outstanding service in the Russo-Japanese War[235]. Witte refrained from pressing the matter, probably for the principal reason that he considered it pointless to move against his enemies Trepov or Durnovo who stood very much higher in the emperor' favour. He also declined to inform the press, something which Lopukhin held very much against him in his memoirs. It appears as though Witte had already given up by this time and had abandoned his struggle against the "dark" forces that were influencing the Tsar. That he had given himself up may even be seen in the fact that he publicly distanced himself from the policy of repression pursued by his own Minister of Interior[236]. The opinion of Witte that was current in the circles surrounding Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich is illustrated by an entry in the diary of the Prince's Adjutant, General Raukh, from mid-December 1905:
"Dubrovin claims that Witte belongs to a freemason's lodge in St. Petersburg, and that he is entirely in the hands of the Jews. He may be right"[237].
The Prime Minister was suspected of wanting to become Russia's first republican president. It was said that he had failed to take any assertive action against the revolution in the days following the declaration of the manifesto because he desired its further success. When Rachovskii explained that there were no masonic lodges in Russia and that Witte therefore belonged to nothing of the sort, Raukh was astonished[238]. Everyone was already agreed that Witte should remain in office only until the Duma was called[239]. A further sign of Witte's weakness was the occurrence of another pogrom at Gomel' in January 1906[240]. At Witte's request, Interior Minister Durnovo ordered that the pogrom be investigated by one of his officials, G. G. Savich[241]. Savich concluded that Count Podgorichani-Petrovich, Assistant to the Mogilev Chief of Gendarmerie, had taken no steps to stop the pogrom; that he maintained close relations with the "Union of Russian Patriots", which supported the pogrom; and that on top of everything else he had provoked the population with unwarranted arrests[242]. The matter was taken up by the Council of Ministers, which drew the necessary conclusions from Savich's report and, amongst other recommendations, called for the legal steps to be taken against Count Podgorichani-Petrovich. Nicholas merely wrote in the Council's journal: "What has this got to do with me?"[243]. It is possible to take this as the second of a long series of pardons for pogromshchiki. Interior Minister Durnovo had, it is true, claimed in a letter[244] to Witte that the necessary steps had been taken to expel Podgorichani from the service; but a few months later Witte learned that Podgorichani had now become Chief of Police at a town on the Black Sea[245].
The fact that the pogrom appeals were fully in accordance with the policies of individual senior Interior Ministry officials is borne out by the report of a Ministry official investigating pogrom agitation on the part of a certain Cavalry Captain, Budogovskii, in Aleksandrovsk (Ekaterinoslav Province). In this Budogovskii had been helped by anti-Jewish fly-sheets printed in the Police Department. He reported his activities quite freely, saying, amongst other things, how valuable these appeals were in the struggle against the revolutionary movement, and also claiming that they had stopped the peasants from attacking the pogromshchiki. Budogovskii received no censure from either Rachkovskii or Timofeev, his direct superiors at the Interior Ministry, both of whom knew of his activities. On the contrary, he was recommended for a reward[246], and in fact received it[247]. Witte's powerlessness (and that of the Council of Ministers) in the face of wilful encroachments of the law by local agents of the Ministry of Interior or by the military was shown up repeatedly, sometimes also in instances that had nothing to do with Jewish pogroms[248]. A. A. Lopukhin certainly came close to the truth when he wrote that the police were not in the hands of authority, but that authority was in the hands of the police[249].
[1] Dubnov, Krasnyi-Admoni(eds.): Materialy vol. I, p. 149.
[2] Quoted from Vestnik Bunda. Izdanie zagranichnago komiteta Evreiskago Rabochago Soiuza v Litve, Pol'she i Rossii, no. 1/2, 1904, p. 15.
[3] Sliozberg: Dela vol. III, p. 53f.
[4] Vitte: Vospominaniia vol. II, p. 215; Witte repeated this accusation to grand-duke Constantine, see Iz dnevnika Konstantina Romanova, in: Krasnyi Arkhiv 43, 1930, p. 102.
[5] A. A. Lopukhin: Otryvki iz vospominanii. Moscow 1923, p. 14f.
[6] Vitte: Vospominaniia vol. II, p. 291.
[7] Ibidem p. 36: "Pleve podlets, a Sipiagin durak".
[8] Aizenberg, Evreiskaia Letopis' 1, p. 41f.
[9] Ibidem p. 40.
[10] Official reports on the pogroms in Dubnov, Krasnyi-Admoni(eds.): Materialy vol. I, pp. 134ff., 140ff.; cf. Sliozberg: Dela vol. III, p. 63; L. Errera: Die russichen Juden. Leipzig 1902, p. XI.
[11] Sliozberg: Dela vol. III, p. 61.
[12] Derived from pogrom, meaning in Russian those who took part in the excesses and violence.
[13] Report by the public prosecutor to the Minister of Justice, cf. Dubnov, Krasnyi-Admoni(eds.): Materialy vol. I, p. 137.
[14] Sliozberg: Dela vol. III, p. 56f.; Urusov: Memoirs p. 142ff.
[15] Dubnov, Krasnyi-Admoni(eds.): Materialy vol. I, p. 5.
[16] Ibidem p. 7.
[17] Ibidem p. 7f.
[18] Urusov: Memoirs p. 79; Errera: Die russischen Juden p. XI.
[19] Dubnov, Krasnyi-Admoni(eds.): Materialy vol. I, p. 7f.
[21] Ibidem pp. 48ff.
[22] Ibidem pp. 42f., 45f.
[23] The Bessarabets was one of two newspapers belonging to Pavel A. Krushevan, later a founding member of the "Union of the Russian People" and a member of the II. Duma.
[24] Dubnov, Krasnyi-Admoni(eds.): Materialy vol. I, p. 44.
[25] Osvobozhdenie 22, 1903, p. 379; Errera: Die russischen Juden p. XI; Dubnov, Krasnyi-Admoni(eds.): Materialy vol. I, p. 217.
[26] Ibidem p, 217; the radical liberal opposition organ Osvobozhdenie which appeared in Stuttgart and then in Paris and which was always very well informed reported that a whole group of highly placed local officials contributed, with Ustrugov among them, see no. 22, 1903, p. 379.
[27] Dubnov, Krasnyi-Admoni(eds.): Materialy vol. I, p. 217.
[28] Urusov: Memoirs p. 79; the chief of police of the province of Bessarabia described the Bessarabets as "objective", cf. Dubnov, Krasnyi-Admoni(eds.): Materialy vol. I, p. 149.
[29] Urusov: Memoirs pp. 45ff.; Dubnov, Krasnyi-Admoni(eds.): Materialy vol. I, p. XI, 217.
[30] Errera: Die russischen Juden p. XIIf.
[31] Dubnov, Krasnyi-Admoni(eds.): Materialy vol. I, pp. 213ff.
[33] Urusov: Memoirs pp. 45ff, 80.
[34] ibidem 80f.
[36] This Pleve did to the opposition journal Pravo, cf. Frumkin(ed.): Russian Jewry p. 29f.
[37] Aizenberg: Na slovakh p. 37; Urusov: Memoirs p. 78 and passim.
[38] Aizenberg: Na slovakh p. 38.
[39] Urusov: Memoirs p. 82.
[40] Dubnov, Krasnyi-Admoni(eds.): Materialy vol. I, pp. 200ff., 328ff.
[41] Ibidem 349.
[42] Ibidem p. 347; Sudebnye otchety. Pravitel'stvuiushchii Senat, in: Pravo 1904, cl. 1218-1222.
[43] St. Petersburger Zeitung 30. 5. (12. 6.) 1903, no. 150, clip appended to PA, Rußland 73. Die Juden in Rußland, Bd. 7, A 8978, K 187828.
[44] Pravo 1904, cl. 1220.
[46] Ibidem pp. 176-178.
[47] New York Herald 1. 7. 1903, appended to PA, Rußland 73. Die Juden in Rußland, Bd. 7, A 10455, K 187884.
[48] Urusov: Memoirs pp. 45ff.
[49] Dubnov, Krasnyi-Admoni(eds.): Materialy vol. I, p. 314f.
[50] Dubnov, Krasnyi-Admoni(eds.): Materialy vol. I, pp. 195f, 317f.
[51] Urusov: Memoirs p. 74f.
[54] Text in Dobnov, Krasnyi-Admoni(eds.): Materialy vol. I, p. 220f.
[55] Urusov: Memoirs p. 78, Lopukhin: Otryvki iz vospominanii - quoted from Aizenberg: Na slovakh i na dele p. 37; Gurko: Features p. 248.
[56] This was pointed out by Sliozberg: Dela vol. III, p. 65.
[57] Dubnov, Krasnyi-Admoni(eds.): Materialy vol. I, pp. 130-132.
[58] Well informed illegal journal, connected with the oppositional radical intelligentsia and the zemstvo-movement, first published in Stuttgart and then in Paris, from where it was smuggled into Russia; edited by Petr Berngardovich Struve. Contributors were P. N. Miliukov, Sergei Bul'gakov, I. I. Petrunkevich and other well known figures of the opposition.
[59] Gurko: Features p. 248.
[60] Dubnov, Krasnyi-Admoni(eds.): Materialy vol. I, p. 223f., this is what Lopukhin wrote to Arnold White.
[62] Sliozberg: Dela vol. III, p. 60ff.; Osvobozhdenie 22, 1903, p. 380 also gives economic competition and envy as the reason why the pogrom grew even worse on the second day.
[67] Dubnov, Krasnyi-Admoni(eds.): Materialy vol. I, pp. 318f., 322.
[68] Sliozberg: Dela vol. III, p. 62f.
[69] Ibidem p. 64f.
[71] Dnevnik Kuropatkina, in: Krasnyi Arkhiv 2, 1923, p. 43.
[72] Von Alvensleben an von Bülow, 19. 6. 1903, no. 381, PA, Rußland 73. Die Juden in Rußland, Bd. 7, A 9066, K 187833.
[73] The old bogus, already erected in Jacob Brafmanns: Kniga kagala was here resurrected, see also N. Cohn: Warrant for Genocide, chpt. 2,2.
[74] Dubnov, Krasnyi-Admoni(eds.): Materialy vol. I, pp. 244ff.; the author of the memorandum remains anonymous.
[75] Heilbronner: Count Aehrenthal p. 397.
[76] Dubnov, Krasnyi-Admoni(eds.): Materialy vol. I, pp. 200ff.; Cohn: Warrant chpt. 3.
[77] E. Semenoff: The Russian Government and the Massacres. London 1907, p. 7.
[78] Urusov: Memoirs p. 172ff.
[79] First quote from Aizenberg: Na slovakh i na dele p. 29f. where he also voices his doubts on Witte's version; also Vitte: Vospominaniia vol. II, p. 215; the first and probably original report supports Aizenberg's version, see Osvobozhdenie 18. 6. 1903, p. 15.
[80] Urusov: Memoirs p. 172.
[81] Heilbronner: Count Aehrenthal p. 396; Gessen: Vremennyia pravila cl. 816.
[82] Osvobozhdenie 22, 1903, p. 380.
[83] Ibidem 24, 1903, p. 431.
[85] Pravda o Gomel'skom pogrome. London 1902, p. 2; this proclamation of the Central Committee of the "Bund" was published in 35000 copies in Yiddish, and in 10000 Russian copies.
[86] Delo o bezporiadkakh v g. Gomele, in: Pravo 1904, cl. 3116, 3397; Pravda o Gomel'skom pogrome p. 3.
[87] Pravda o Gomelskom pogrome p. 3; one agitator was areested by the police, whose chief, Raevskii, genuinely had tried to avert the pogrom, cf. Vestnik Bunda 1/2, 1904, p. 17.
[88] Reports on the pogrom in Osvobozhdenie 7(31), 1903, pp. 122-124; Vestnik Bunda 1/2, 1904, pp. 16-18 has the report of one of the commanders of a self-defence group; there was a short official communication in Pravitel'stvennyi Vestnik which was reprinted in Moskovskiia Vedomosti 5. 9. 1903, no. 244, p. 2. The number of deaths given varies between five and eight. - The testimonies in court are reported verbatim in Delo o bezporiadkakh v g. Gomele, in: Pravo 1904, cl. 3039-3057, 3116-3127, 3192-3202, 3258-3266, 3311-3318, 3395-3405, 3457-3468, 3535-3546, 3624-3637.
[90] Osvobozhdenie 24, 1903, p. 431 - one Governor said publicly: "There won't be a pogrom if the youth and the workers keep quiet".
[91] Ibidem.
[92] Vestnik Bunda 1/2, 1904, p. 16; Pravda o Gomel'skom pogrome p. 2.
[93] Sliozberg: Dela vol. III, p. 88 accused the local Okhrana of having organized the pogrom.
[94] Osvobozhdenie 7(31), 1903, p. 124; cf. Dubnow: History of the Jews vol. III, p. 89.
[95] Pravda o Gomel'skom pogrome p. 2.
[96] Osvobozhdenie 7(31), 1903, p. 123, 2nd column; Vestnik Bunda 3, 1904, p. 22.
[97] The bill of indictment was published in Pravo 1904, cl. 3041-3057; the general part also in Evreiskaia Zhizn' 1904, no. 10, pp. 227-234.
[99] Ibidem. - The Governor of Mogilev accused the Jews of similar misdemeanors: A Jew had run into his wife when riding a bicycle; a Jewish youth - cigarette in his mouth - had not made way for him - a.s.o., cf. his already quoted speech in Osvobozhdenie 7(31), 1903, p. 124. The importance of this speech was rightly emphasized in a still unpublished essay by Hans Rogger: Pogroms in Perspective, in: Klier, Lambroza(eds.): Pogroms (to appear soon with Cambridge University Press)
[100] Evreiskaia Zhizn' 1904, no. 10, p. 225.
[101] Pravo 1904, cl. 3541.
[102] Ibidem cl. 3312.
[103] Ibidem.
[105] Ibidem cl. 3463f.
[106] Ibidem cl. 3193f.; Evreiskaia Zhizn' 1904, no. 12, p. 114.
[107] Dubnow: Weltgeschichte vol. X, p. 382f.
[108] Pravo 1905, cl. 399. Unfortunately not available to me was M. N. Krol'(ed.): Gomel'skii protsess. Podrobnyi otchet. St. Petersburg 1907; a short review by Iu. Lavrinovich is found in Byloe 1907, no. 9, p. 312f.
[109] Die Tätigkeit des "Allgemeinen Jüdischen Arbeiterbundes in Litauen, Polen und Rußland" ("Bund") nach seinem 5. Parteitag. Bericht für den internationalen Sozialistischen Kongreß in Amsterdam. Genf 1904, p. 7.
[110] Ibidem p. 6f.
[111] During the Russo-Japanese this would have amounted to high treason.
[112] On the Bund's propaganda in the army ibidem p. 11f.; the Bund had distributed 4500 appeals to officers and 20000 declarations to recruits; another forms of public protest was to acompany new recruits to their barracks - for some of the smaller pogroms, see Evreiskaia Zhizn' 1904, no. 10, pp. 222-226 and no. 11, p. 140f.
[113] A. Linden(ed.): Die Judenpogrome in Rußland, hg. im Auftrag des zionistischen Hilfsfond in London von der zur Erforschung der Pogrome eingesetzten Kommission. Vol. I. Köln 1910, pp. 187-192; L. estimated that altogether 725 pogroms took place.
[114] Ibidem p. 213.
[117] For instance in the town Mariupol', cf. Pravitel'stvennyi Vestnik 1905, no. 232, p. 4.
[118] S. M. Dubnov: Uroki strashnykh dnei, in: Voskhod 1905, no. 47/48, cl. 1ff.
[119] Voskhod 1905, no. 44/45, cl. 3. A gradonachal'nik is the equivalent to a provincial Governor in a big city.
[120] Administratsiia i pogromy, ibidem no. 42/43, cl. 3ff.
[121] Cf. Kochan: Russia p. 95: "The capacity to organize these attacks over areas that were hundreds, if not thousand miles apart, with the co-ordinated action of civil and military authorities testified to the unbroken, if shaken, machinery of Tsarism".
[122] The foundation of the Union may have proceeded in close contact with the high offiicial of the Ministry of Interior, Petr I. Rachkovskii. more than ten years after the events Grand-duke Aleksei maintained in his diary that the foundation of the SRN had been sugested by. R., see Iz dnevnika A. V. Romanova za 1916-1917 gg., in: Krasnyi Arkhiv 26, 1928, p. 199.
[123] So D. C. Rawson: The Union of the Russian People 1905-1907. A Study of the Radical Right. University of Washington unpubl. PhD 1971, p. 59.
[124] Voskhod 1905, no. 47/48, cl. 43.
[125] This was tellingly done by Hans Rogger: The Jewish Policy p. 46, reprinted in idem: Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics pp. 25ff.
[126] Just one example is the report of the Newspaper Rus' which managed over several long columns not to mention the absolutely important role in the events of the armed students' militias and the Jewish samooborona, reprinted in Posle Manifesta, in: Pravo 1905, appendix to no. 48/49, cl. 136-140.
[127] Examples in Semenoff: The Russian Government p. 61f.(reprint of such an article from Pravitel'stvennyi Vestnik, the official government newspaper!); Pravo 1905, cl. 741f.; R. Vrba: Die Revolution in Rußland. Prag 1906, pp. 221 and passim has examples from the anti-Semitic paper Novoe Vremia; cf. also the articles by one of the most prominent anti-Semitic scribes of the last newspaper in M. O. Men'shikov: Pis'ma k blizhnim. St. Petersburg 1902ff.; with M. anti-Semtic diatribes became compulsive over the time.
[128] Voskhod 1905, no. 7, cl. 20-22.
[129] This is the situation described by S. Weinberg: The Pogroms and the Revolution of 1905 in Odessa, in: Russian Review 46, 1987, pp. 53-75. - A rather different picture, in which the blame is squarely laid at the civil and military adminstrations' door, is given in Odesskii pogrom i samooborana. Izdanie zapadnago Tsentral'nago Komiteta Samooborony Poale Tsion. Paris 1906; I am indebted to Harold Shukman, Oxford, for providing me with a copy of this rare edition.
[130] Cf. Gr. Portugalov: Pogromnaia tolpa, in: Evreiskaia Zhizn' 1905, no. 12, pp. 48-68; see also report on unemployment in Rech' 12. 4. 1906, no. 46, p. 1, 4.
[131] Pravitel'stvennyi Vestnik 24. 10. 1905, no. 228, p. 2.
[132] This is at least the argument of J. Katz in Zion 38, 1973, pp. 62-115 (in Hebrew). I am indebted to David Sorkin, Oxford, for relating Katz's main points to me.
[133] Ironic reference to the burning down of manors, introduced by the Cadets' agrarian expert Gertsenshtein.
[134] Voskhod 1905, no. 42/43, cl. 44 (Novozybkov); cf. reprt of the Adjutant-General Dubasov that agrarian unrest in Chernigov province had started with pogroms against the Jews, Agrarnoe dvizhenie v 1905g., in: Krasnyi Arkhiv 11/12, p. 183.
[135] Revoliutsiia 1905-1907gg. Dokumenty i materialy. Noiabr'-dekabr' 1905g. Chast' III, tom I, p. 693f.
[136] The Russian name of this learned society founded by Catherine II was Imperatorskoe Vol'noe Ekonomicheskoe Obshchestvo; cf. Agrarnoe dvizhenie v Rossii v 1905-1906gg., in: Trudy Imperatorskago Vol'nago Ekonomicheskago Obshchestvo 1908, no. 4/5, pp. 68, 113, 290, 357f.
[137] Peasants resented and often rebelled against landlord that changed payment for rent a.o. from dues in kind or in labour to money; they also rebelled against increases in the manorial economy and against sugar refineries in the countryside, cf. P. Maslov: Krest'ianskoe dvizhenie 1905-1907g., in: L. Martov a.o.(eds.): Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie. Vol. II, pt. 2. St. Petersburg 1910, p. 230, also Agrarnoe dvizhenie v 1905-1906gg. pp. 59, 146, 382.
[138] Peasant members of the Union of the Russian People (a right wing-reactionary organisation) accused the Governor of Bessarabia that as a member of the nobility he had no understandning of the needs of the peasantry and that he was a Judaeophile anyhow, cf. Kishinevskii okruzhnyi sud. Oskorblenie politseiskago chinovnika, in: Pravo 1908, no. 44, cl. 2419f.; indirect confirmation of such tendencies in this branch of the Union of the Russian People in A. Chernovskii, V. P. Viktorov(eds.): Soiuz Russkogo Naroda. Po materialam chrezvychainoi sledstvennoi komissii Vremennego Pravitel'stva 1917g. Moscow-Leningrad 1929, p. 393f. and passim for similar negative attitudes and outbursts of right wing peasants against the nobility; also I. Stoliarov: Zapiski krest'ianina; also A. Kornilov: Fakticheskie dannye o nastroenii krest'ian, in: Pravo 1905, no. 39, cl. 2689-2699. The Professor for economics at Khar'kov explained in a letter to Witte that the peasants had interpreted the October manifesto as an appeal by the Tsar to free him from the nobility, who - together with the Jews and the students - prevented him from distributing the land to the peasants, cf. Mehlinger, Thompson: Count Witte p. 187.
[139] For this see A. M. Anfimov: Zemel'naia arenda v Rossii v nachale XX veka. Moscow 1961, pp. 30f., 35, 37, 65-68; Ocherki razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva Ukrainskoi SSR. Moscow 1954, pp. 44-57. Description of the right-bank Ukraine in R. Edelman: Proletarian Peasants. The Revolution of 1905 in Russia's Southwest. Ithaca, N.Y.-London 1987, pp. 35ff.; when peasants met Jews individually in an activity they approved of or from which they might benefit, peasants could be friendly or neutral too, ibidem p. 160f.
[140] Voskhod 1905, no. 44/45, cl. 56f.
[141] Pravo, appendix to no. 48/49, cl. 176-178; a similar events took place at Berdichev, cf. Pravitel'stvennyi Vestnik 24. 10. 1905, no. 228, p. 2; at Viatka, ibidem 25. 10. 1905, no. 229, p. 4; at Balakhna, ibidem p. 5.
[142] Harcave: The Russian Revolution p. 206; Kievlianin 1905, no. 298, quoted from V. V. Shul'gin: Chto nas u nikh ne nravitsia. Paris 1929, pp. 323-326
[143] Kochan: Russia p. 90.
[144] P. Lebedev: Krasnye dni v Nizhnem-Novgorode, in: Byloe 1907, no. 5, p. 144; Novoe Vremia described the pogrom at Kerch in a similar way, cf. Voskhod 1905, no. 37, cl. 8.
[145] Reports of that are relatively frequent in the Jewish press and in government pronouncements: at Tiraspol' railroad workers killed 9 and injured 32 Jews; a particularly nasty pogrom took place in Iuzovka, cf. Voskhod 1905, no. 42/43, cl. 34; for Birzul cf. ibidem no. 444/45, cl. 67f.; also Iulii V.: Chernye ili temnye, ibidem no. 47/48, cl. 18-22; for Odessa and Saratov see Pravitel'stvennyi Vestnik 22. 10. 1905, no. 226, p. 2; for Kherson ibidem 24. 10. 1905, no. 228, p. 2, also Pravo 1905, appendix to no. 48/49, cl. 201. Portugalov: Pogromnaia tolpa pp. 48-68 maintains that politically unorganized workers played an important role, in particular rail-road workers.
[146] Voskhod 1905, no. 42/43, cl. 40f.; Pravitel'stvennyi Vestnik 24. 10. 1905, no. 228, p. 1.
[147] Portugalov: Pogromnaia tolpa p. 66; after the pogroms of October S. M. Dubnov attacked the Bolshevik newspaper Novaia Zhizn' and the Russian proletariat in general for not or only belatedly having condemned the pogroms, cf. Dubnov: Uroki strashnykh dnei cl. 1ff.
[148] L. Trotsky: 1905. Pelican Books 1973, p. 153ff.
[149] Although it is somtimes difficult to pinpoint, one should not underestimate this development, cf. Mehlinger, Thompson: Count Witte p. 54.
[150] P. K-v: Krasnoiarsk v kontse 1905 goda, in Byloe 1907, no. 6, p. 15f.
[151] E. g. Rezhitsa, cf. Voskhod 1905, no. 42/43, cl. 37.
[152] Tobias: The Jewish Bund p. 315.
[153] Ibidem p. 318; among the revolutionary Zionists the samooborona was also seen as an act of revolutionary assertion, cf. Agasfer: Evreiskii tovaricheskii soiuz, in: Evreiskaia Starina 10, 1918, p. 192f. But the Poale Tsion, for instance, insisted on the samooborona being the concern of all Jews and not only of those who were part of their own revolutionary organization (as the Bund, e.g.), see Odesskii pogrom i samooborona p. II/III.
[154] Thus Dubnow: Weltgeschichte vol. X, p. 390. However, one has to state a difference: for "bourgeois" Zionist groups organizing self-defence detachments Dubnov's dictum may be correct, not, however, for the Bund that refused to take part in such "non-political" and non-revolutionary detachments, cf. V. Sukennikov: Evreiskaia samooborona, in: Voskhod 1905, no. 42/43, cl. 55-60.
[155] Tobias: The Jewish Bund p. 301f., 307, 309, 311, 321.
[156] Kirzhnits, Rafes(eds.): 1905. Evreiskoe rabochee dvizhenie p. 202, 205.
[157] Harcave: The Russian Revolution p. 203; also Iu. Lavrinovich: Kto ustroil pogromy. Berlin n. d. [1908/9], p. 8.
[158] Mehlinger, Thompson: Count Witte pp. 60ff.; detailed study of this pogrom by Weinberg: The Pogroms pp. 53-75; as the patriotic demonstration in Odessa was armed one has to assume that it was organized. - Similar developments in Rostov, Iaroslavl', Kishinev, (all on the 18th), in Vladimir, Birzul, Viazma, Nikolaev, (all on the 19th), cf. Pravo 1905, appendix to no. 48/49, cl. 153-156, 171ff., 178f., 189f., 191, 196; Kamenets-Podol'sk (19. 10), cf. Voskhod 1905, no. 42/43, cl. 39; Pravitel'stvennyi Vestnik 23. 10. 1905, no. 227, p. 1.
[159] Similarly in Kursk, Orel, Briansk, Mogilev-Podol'sk and Riazan', Voskhod 1905, no. 42/43, cl. 44f.; Pravitel'stvennyi Vestnik 25. 10. 1905, no. 229, p. 4f. the pogrom in Iuzovka erupted when a small demonstration mainly of Jews wanted to acquaint the workers with the contents of the October manifesto, cf. Voskhod 1905, no. 47/48, cl. 18-22. The patriotic demonstrations mobilize considerable numbers, in Kaluga 8-10000 people took part, Pravo 1905, appendix to no. 48/49, cl. 174.
[160] For instance in Kishinev, Voskhod 1905, no. 44/45, cl. 71.
[161] E. g. Rostov and Viazma, Pravo 1905, appendix to no. 48/49, cl. 153f., 191.
[162] Cf. A. T. Wassiljew: Ochrana. Aus den Papieren des letzten russischen Polizeidirektors. Zürich 1930, p. 80f.; for the attitude of the provincial Governors towards the Jews V. P. Semennikov: Revoliutsiia 1905 goda i samoderzhavie. Moscow 1927, pp. 228f., 237f., 241f., 247-249, 252. The Minister of the Interior P. N. Durnovo described the SD, SR and the Jewish Bund as the main forces of the revolution. The Revolution in the western provinces, according to him, took the shape of urban unrest by the Jews and some agararian unrest. Altogether Durnovo did not emphasize the role of the Jews as strongly as the Governors did, cf. W. D. Santoni: P. N. Durnovo as Minister of Internal Affairs in the Witte Cabinet. A Study in Suppression. University of Kansas unpubl. PhD 1968, pp. 119, 136, 169.
[164] Voskhod 1905, no. 41, cl. 1-3.
[165] For instance in Orel, Voskhod 1905, no. 42/43, cl. 44; General Mezentsev said to the Governor who wanted him to put a stop to the pogrom in Kaluga: "I can't use fire-arms, the crowd is for the Tsar, it's mood is patriotic", Pravo 1905, appendix to no. 48/49, cl. 174.
[166] Cf. B. Pares: My Russian Memoirs. London 1937, p. 98 who conducted his own "private" investigation. See also the report of the French consul in Nikolaev, R. Girault: La révolution russe de 1905 d'apres quelques temoignages francaises, in: Revue Historique 230, 1963, p. 111; Linden(ed.): Die Juden pogrome in Rußland vol. II abounds with examples of connivance and active participation of the police; numerous examples also in the appendix to Pravo 1905, no. 48/49.
[167] B. Pares: Conversations with Mr. Stolypin, in: Russian Review 2, 1913, no. 2, p. 103.
[168] Delo ob oktiabr'skom pogrome v Simferopole. Sudebnyi otchet s illustr. prilozheniiami na otdel'nykh listkakh. 1907, was unfortunately not available to me, quoted from the review by Iu. Lavrinovich in: Byloe 1907, no. 9, p. 312.
[169] Kirzhnits, Rafes(eds.): 1905. Evreiskoe rabochee dvizhenie p. 214.
[170] Delo o pogrome v Orshe 21-24 oktiabria 1905 goda. Obvinitel'nyi akt i sudebnoe sledstvie. St. Petersburg 1908, pp. 4-11, 78.
[171] Ibidem p. 5, 69. The volost' is an administrative unit for the peasants.
[172] The description of the pogrom follows in the main the rendering in Sergei Sharapov's journal Russkoe Delo 5. 11. 1905, no. 40, p. 12-14; this is one of the few extensive and detailed and relatively accurate descriptions of a pogrom in an openly anti-Semitic right wing organ, it is here supplemented by Linden: Die Judenpogrome vol. 2, pp. 265ff. and Pravo 4. 12. 1905, no. 48/49, appendix p. 198.
[173] There was always a number of these willing to take part. One priest in Orsha claimed, howver, to have been forced by the police to take part, cf. Delo o pogrome v Orshe p. 58.
[174] This was sometimes even reported in Pravitel'stvennyi Vestnik, see the dition of 23. 10. 1905, no. 227, p. 1; a report, which was probably ordered by Witte himself, also stressed this fact, cf. K istorii nashei kontr-revoliutsii, in: Rech' 26. 4. 1906, no. 58, p. 2f.
[175] Ibidem. Lavrinovich: Kro ustroil pogromy pp. 45ff. has numerous examples of that. Senator Kuz'minskii reported in his official investigation of the pogrom in Odessa that the army and the police only shot at the self-defence groups, but not at the pogromshchiki, cf. Kievskii i Odesskii pogrom v razsledovaniiakh senatorov Turau i Kuz'minskago. St. Petersburg 1907, p. 220.
[176] So in Kishinev, see Pravo 1905, appendix to no. 48/49, cl. 169.
[177] Materialy k istorii russkoi kontr-revoliutsii. St. Petersburg 1908, p. 32.
[178] In Odessa this happened on a significant scale, cf. Mehlinger, Thompson: Count Witte p. 60, according to them two police-men were killed and 10 injured; also Weinberg: The pogroms.
[179] For instance in the case of such an occurrence in Kishinev, see Pravo 1905, appendix to no. 48/49, cl. 60.
[180] Delo o pogrome v Tomske. Tomsk 1909, p. 17; here the militia shot at a patriotic demonstration.
[181] This is occasionally even admitted in the official government organ, cf. Pravitel'stvennyi Vestnik 24. 10. 1905, no. 228, p. 2 (pogrom in Kherson). Of inactivity and strong reluctance to act on the part of the local Governor, Pilar, in Rostov (Don) reports P. P. Zavarzin: Zhendarmy i revoliutsionery. Vospominaniia. Paris 1930, p. 98f., 101, pilar changed a command by Z. to use arms against the hooligans. See also Linden(ed.): Die Judenpogrome in Rußland vol. II, p. 505 (Iaroslavl'), 514 (Kursk), 500f. (Briansk) and passim for many more; for Starodub, see Pravo 1905, appendix to no. 48/49, cl. 200.
[182] For instance in Rostov (Don), Linden(ed.): Die Judenpogrome in Rußland vol. II, p. 497.
[183] So a Jewish rapporteur who also stressed that the police was rather weak, cf. Iulii V.: Chernye ili temnye, in: Voskhod 1905, no. 47/48, cl. 18-22; similarly Linden(ed.): Die Judenpogrome in Rußland vol. II, p. 216.
[184] For instance in Kamenets-Podol'sk and Orel, see Linden(ed.): Die Judenpogrome in Rußland vol. II, pp. 455, 514; also Pravo 1905, appendix to no. 48/49, cl. 194.
[186] Linden(ed.): Die Judenpogrome in Rußland vol. II, p. 517.
[187] Delo o pogrome v Orshe pp. 19ff.
[188] Ibidem p. 21.
[189] Linden(ed.): Die Judenpogrome in Rußland vol. II, p. 51.
[191] This remark was preserved by the official police scribe in the official files, see Rech' 18. 3. 1906, no. 24, p. 1f.
[192] In Kursk for instance, see Pravitel'stvennyi Vestnik 23. 10. 1905, no. 227, p. 2; In Chernigov the Governor A. N. Khvostov (during the First World War Minister of the Interior) marched at the head of the demonstration which erupted into a pogrom without the police trying seriously to stop this development, see Pravo 1905, appendix to no. 48/49, cl. 201f.
[193] Governor Klingenberg (see the chapter on the pogrom in Gomel', 1903) allowed the patriotic demonstration in Orsha which developed into a pogrom, see Delo o pogrome v Orshe p. 57; city-commandant Neidgardt allowed the demonstration in Odessa which took the same course, see Rech' 18. 3. 1906, no. 24, p. 1f.
[194] Pravo 1905, appendix to no. 48/49, cl. 198.
[196] For Adjutant-General Dubasov, Governors Gerschau-Flotov (Vitebsk), Shtakelberg (Volhynia), Andreevskii (Orel), Eilev (Podolia), Levashov (Riazan'), Sukovkin (Smolensk), see Semennikov: Revoliutsiia pp. 110, 228f., 243, 247-249, 252.
[198] Delo o pogrome v Orshe p. 76; one high military there also described the pogrom as counter-revolutionary phenomenon, ibidem p. 56.
[199] In Saratov even an armed counter-revolutionary fighting group had formed, see V. Levitskii: Pravyia partii, in: Martov a.o.(eds.): Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie vol. III, p. 371; for right-wing groups before October see also Rawson: The Union of the Russian People pp. 31-46; H. Rogger: The Formation of the Russian Right, in: California Slavic Studies 3, 1964, pp. 66-94, also in his: Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics.
[200] E. g. in Tiraspol' and Kishinev, cf. Voskhod 1905, no. 46, cl. 28; cf. J. W. Bohon: Reactionary Politics in Russia: 1905-1909. University of North Carolina unpubl. PhD, Chapel Hill 1967, pp. 64-70. In preparation for the elections to the never to be Bulygin Duma such groups had laso formed, e. g. a "Russian party", group landowners and Marshalls of the Nobility in Kiev, see Voskhod 1905, no. 37, cl. 13.
[201] Even the official guberniia newspapers in Kherson and Chernigov, cf. Linden(ed.): Die Judenpogrome in Rußland vol. II, p. 105, 267.
[202] Rech' 26. 4. 1906, no. 58, p. 3; Trepov's resolution on the report of the Governor of Tula.
[204] Cf. also fn. 88; before October such groups existed a.o. in Kishinev, Odessa, Kherson, Kursk, Tver', Moscow, St. Petersburg, Saratov, Tula, Iaroslavl', Rezhitsa, Kamenskoe, Aleksandrovsk, Ekaterinodar, Zhitomir, Tsaritsyn, Tiflis, Batum, Feodosiia, Kholm (Khar'kov) and in Murom. In the Baltic provinces an organisation for the "fight with sedition" operated in the villages. In February 1905 a "Society of Nationalists in the cities of Kiev, Odessa, Kherson, Kishinev, Bender, Akkerman a.o. came up with anti-Semitic and anti-intelligentsia leaflets, cf. Levitskii: Pravyia Partii p. 372f., Rawson; The Union of the Russian People p. 44; Linden(ed.): Die Judenpogrome in Rußland vol. II, passim. The "Russkoe Sobranie" which in this context can't really be mentioned because of its "polite" character and its exclusively "noble" composition, had branches in the following places: St. Petersburg, Moscow, Khar'kov, Kiev, Warsaw, Orenburg, Kazan', Perm', Vilnius, cf. Levitskii: Pravyia partii p. 358. The pogromshchiki of the city of Iaroslavl' joined later the Union of the Russian People when it was formed, Chernovskii, Viktorov(eds.): Soiuz Russkogo Naroda p. 365.
[205] Levitskii: Pravyia partii p. 374.
[206] Russkoe Delo 29. 10. 1905, no. 38/39, and 5. 1. 1905, no. 40, pp. 12-14.
[208] Prominent member of the Union of the Russian People.
[209] Sh. Levin: Materialy dlia kharakteristiki kontr-revoliutsii 1905g. in: Byloe 21, 1923, p. 171. This letter was written on January 3rd, 1906, when Witte was still Prime-Minister and undisputedly the centre of Russian governmental activities. Later the SRN actually did try to murder Witte, cf. Chernovskii, Viktorov(eds.): Soiuz Russkogo Naroda p. 58f.
[210] Russkoe Delo 1905, no. 42/43, pp. 6f.
[211] Ibidem 29. 10. 1905, no. 38/39.
[212] This indeed happened, cf. Mehlinger, Thompson: Count Witte, p. 47f.
[213] The Governors reported again and again that the October manifesto actually served to heighten the crises in the localities, Semennikov(ed.); Revoliutsiia pp. 104, 225, 228, 241, 243, 249f., 252.
[214] Agrarnoe dvizhenie 1905 goda, in: Krasnyi Arkhiv 11/12, p. 183.
[215] Pravitel'stvennyi Vestnik 23. 10.1905, no. 227, p. 1.
[216] Ibidem 29. 10. 1905, no, 223, p. 1f.
[217] Their reports were published, cf. Kievskii i Odesskii pogrom po otchetam senatorov Turau i Kuz'minskago; also reprinted in Materialy k istorii russkoi kontr-revoliutsii.
[218] This happened on Witte's insistence, see Kurlov: Gibel' p. 56f.
[219] Voskhod 1905, no. 46, cl. 21f.
[220] However, both were acquitted by the Senate, where Minister of Interior P. N. Durnovo appeared to defend them, cf. Pravo 1906, no. 12, cl. 1156; also Neidgardt opravdan, in: Rech' 18. 3. 1906, no. 24, p. 1f.; both continued successfully with their carrers.
[221] First unofficially - but only in parts - published in Rech' 26. 4. 1906, no. 58, p. 2f.; also in Materialy dlia istorii russkoi kontr-revoliutsii, whose editors assumed that Witte wanted to use this material against his enemy General D. F. Trepov.
[222] Thus Dubnow: Weltgeschichte vol. X, p. 397.
[223] Bing(ed.): The Letters p. 190f.
[224] Pravitel'stvennyi Vestnik 2. 12. 1905, no. 260, p. 3; a delegateion of a Union of Large Landowners also complained that after the manifesto there was uncertainty as to the character of the autocracy.
[225] Rawson: The Union of the Russian People p. 105f.
[226] Vysochaishii priem deputatov "Soiuza Russkago Naroda", in: Pravo 1906, cl. 201-206.
[227] Lopukhin: Otryvki pp. 88-91; Aizenberg: Na slovakh pp. 24-43.
[228] S. D. Urusov, the former Governor of Bessarabia in Kishinev and Deputy Minister of Interior under Durnovo did not give any dates in his sensational Duma speech in which he disclosed the existence of this secret printing shop, but he seems to be talking of a time after October, similarly P. A. Stolypin in his answer to an interpellation, see Gosudarstvennaia Duma. Stenograficheskie otchety. I sozyv, 1 sessiia, 23 zasedanie, 8. 6. 1906, cl. 1126, 1129-32 (from hence GDSO I, 1, 23, 8. 6. 1906).
[229] Kommissarov denied later ever to have printed anti-Semitic leaflets, cf. Padenie Tsarskogo Rezhima. Stenograficheskie otchety doprosov i pokazanii dannykh v 1917g. v Chrezvychainoi Sledstvennoi komissii Vremennogo Pravitel'stva. Moscow 1925-1927, vol. III, pp. 158-162.
[230] Vitte: Vospominaniia vol. III, p. 86-88.
[231] Letter from A. A. Lopukhin to Stolypin, cf. Materialy k istorrii russkoi kontr-revoliutsii p. XCVIf., in December Rachkovskii - according to Lopukhin - personally handed over a parcel of leaflets to Gringmut, one of the most prominent and influential leaders of the radical right. Urusov's hints that distribution was taken over by "the most patriotic organisation" and by a non-St. Petersburg newspaper fits these disclosures, cf. GDSO I, 1, 23, 8. 6. 1906, cl. 1130.
[232] Mery priniaty, in: Rech' 28. 2. 1906, no. 6, p. 2. Minister of Interior Durnovo, however, did not see any reason for concern. In the days leading up to Easter in 1906 it was especially the local authorities that made clear that they would not tolerate any excesses in spite of the pogrom-agitation of the soiuzniki, see Nechto o pogromakh, in: Rech' 1. 4. 1906, no. 37, p. 2.
[233] Vitte: Vospominaniia vol. III, pp. 85-87; Komissarov named [A. A.?] Makarov [the subsequent Minister of Interior?] as the one who ordered the leaflets - on an attack on the army in a Baltic province, not with anti-Semitic contents, he maintained, cf. Padenie Tsarskogo Rezhima vol. III, pp. 158-162.
[234] S. P. Beletskii in Padenie Tsarskogo Rezhima vol. IV, p. 338f.; however, B. had only heard about the whole affairs, his source of information was P. N. Zuev, a long serving official of the Ministry of Interion and for a time Director of the Depatment of the Police. - komissarov does not mention Vuich as a participant in the enquiry, cf. ibidem vol. III, p. 161.
[235] Vitte: Vospominaniia vol. III, p. 87; Komissarov continued his career, became a General and during the war a high official in the Ministry of Interior.
[236] The press noted a note of resignation in Witte's behaviour, cf. Novosti i Birzhevaia Gazeta 1. 1. 1906, p. 1.
[237] Dnevnik G. O. Raukha p. 90.
[240] A report on the pogrom which saw one dead and ten seriously injured, which brought damages of several million roubles, is in Novosti i Birzhevaia Gazeta 18. 1. 1906, no. 17, p. 1, 3.
[241] Vitte: Vospominaniia vol. III, p. 87f. - Witte erroneously gave December as the time of the pogrom.
[242] Savich's report is in Materialy k istorii russkoi kontr-revoliutsii pp. 376-391.
[243] Iz zapisnoi knizhki arkhivista. Nikolai 1905g., in: Krasnyi Arkhiv 11/12, 1925, p. 439; according to Witte nikolai added in the oral exchange with his Prime-Minister that the question of any further steps in Podgorichani's case belonged to the responsibilities of the Minister of Interior, i.e. not to Witte's, cf. Vitte: Vospominaniia vol. III, p. 88.
[244] Materialy k istorii Russkoi kontr-revoliutsii p. 375f.
[245] Vitte: Vospominaniia vol. III, p. 88; Lavrinovich: Kto ustroil pogromy p. 190 reports the same.
[246] The report is printed in Materialy k istorii russkoi kontr-revoliutsii pp. LXXXVIIIff.; the press was informed about it through Lopukhin's letter, cf. Rech' 3. 5. 1906, no. 63. - Timofeev was a confidante of General Trepov and soon retunred to him by taking up a position at court. It seems that the investigation into the situation at Aleksandrovsk was begun at Witte's initiative.
[247] GDSO I, 1, 23, cl. 1126f.
[248] Mehlinger, Thompson: Count Witte pp. 165ff.
[249] Materaily k istorii russkoi kontr-revoliutsii p. XCIX.