A brokerage account on which the client makes few or no transactions for a lengthy period of time. As brokers make their profits from fees on transactions, some brokerages levy a special fee on inactive accounts to encourage trading.
A brokerage account in which few transactions take place. Some brokerage firms levy a fee on accounts in which securities are deposited but no activity occurs during a specified time.
Google, for example, has an Inactive Account Manager enabling users to decide either that all their data should be deleted after a certain period of inactivity, or that notification of inactivity should be given to a nominated person who will be able to download all authorised data.
refund to the respective accounts on the next working day, except an amount of Rs260 million which could not be duly credited for various reasons such as closure of account, inactive account, incorrect account number provided by the claimant etc.
Google offers an Inactive Account Manager that allows a user to make a few choices about what happens to his or her account if it's been inactive for some user-set length of time.
In 2016, LPL said it planned to end its mutual-fund direct business, which lets its advisors hold brokerage mutual fund investments directly with sponsors, on April 10, 2017; it also explained that its new fund-only accounts will not entail IRA custodial fees, trading (or ticket) charges, inactive account or confirm fees, and fees for "systematics.
After getting the insurance data, they offered bonus or attractive deals to inactive account.
On Facebook, unlike an inactive account, a memorial brings in people, traffic that can then be monetised with advertising.
Google + Authorized person Silent No can deactivate/ delete or inactive account manager Twitter Authorized person Silent No can deactivate/ delete or inactive account policy (six months) Linkedin Verification of No No death form-- close account and remove profile.
Earlier this year it launched Inactive Account Manager (IAM), which allows aii (Hint holders to instruct Google what they want (lone with their Google accounts.
Google's Inactive Account Manager allows the client to name an heir of sorts who can gain access to the client's online data once his or her accounts have been inactive for a certain period of time.
The Inactive Account Manager provides a way for users to share parts of their account data or notify someone if they've been inactive for a certain period of time.
Google's been thinking this problem through and invented a new feature on all Google Accounts called Inactive Account Manager.


cPanel is the industry standard in web hosting management software. When it comes to graphic interface, it's number one on most people's list. Around 90% of web hosting firms use cPanel for their business.
It's an extremely easy to use web-based control panel for your web hosting account that gives you, as a user, all the necessary tools you need to easily and successfully manage and administer your own website in any browser.
cPanel is the number one way for hosting a WordPress website. With our one-click installers we make it simple for the Average Joe to easily deploy a WordPress website and start building.
Looking to move your website to GoHosting? We offer a fully managed service to migrate your website, domain and email for as little as $89 per website!
Let GoHosting handle the technicalities and contact us now for a personalized migration plan. We'll make sure that there is little to no down time when moving a website and that no data is lost in the process.
When you're looking for the right business web hosting plan you want power, flexibility and maximum security and a high level of support. GoHosting offers 3 separate web hosting plans that are sure to meet your needs. We'll help you choose the plan that is the most flexible for you, one which allows for adaptability and growth in your activities.
Looking for asp.net, tomcat or ColdFusion? Click here!


Shairoz joined NHS Berkshire West CCG's predecessor organisation, NHS Newbury and District CCG in November 2014.
She has over 20 years healthcare experience working as a pharmacist and commissioning and redesigning health services.
She has extensive experience of service redesign of planned care services and medicines optimisation within the NHS.
Shairoz has previously worked with Central Southern Commissioning Support Unit in the Planning and Transformation Team as a Senior Principal Consultant working with CCGs in the Thames Valley to enable commissioners to plan healthcare services for their populations, to produce local strategic plans, to identify QIPP initiatives, and to deliver service redesign priorities.
Shairoz has a BSc Hons in Pharmacy, a clinical diploma in Clinical Pharmacy and is qualified as an Independent Prescriber.


One of the hallmarks of complete physique development is having six pack abs. You can pound away at the weights but if you have weak ab development or a coating of fat around it , you won't be winning a bodybuilding contest anytime soon.
The ability to get "ripped" is mostly a function of diet, with some aerobic training usually thrown in but that is not the focus of this article. We are going to concentrate on what it takes to build the muscle necessary to display great ab development.
If you think back to gym class in grade school or high school, you may remember doing dozens of situps in an effort to "burn off fat" and strengthen the stomach muscles. Unfortunately, these old school methods are wrong on many counts.
First of all, since the ab region is comprised of one of the smaller muscle groups in the body, doing endless sets and reps of situps and crunches will burn an insufficient amount of calories to lean you out. You are far better off using a routine consisting of compound exercises, especially ones where the legs are the main muscle being used. The reason for this is the legs require far more energy during training because they are the body's largest muscle. Thus, they burn more fat.
The more muscle you carry on your body, the less fat you tend to have. Muscle burns a lot of calories both when its working and when at rest. Even while relaxing muscle burns many times more calories than other tissue. So a sound strategy is to build as much muscle as possible when you are younger and preserve as much as possible as you age. If you begin bodybuilding when you are older it is still possible to add a good amount of muscle to your frame, so don't feel you are late to the game. Train hard and get plenty of rest and good nutrition and you will succeed.
A common misconception regarding abs is they are endurance muscles, and as such, must be trained using high sets and reps in order to grow larger and stronger. This is not correct, in fact, they need to be trained in much the same way as other muscles. All muscles grow as a result of the correct amount of stress, or stimulus, put on them during a training session and respond during periods of rest. This necessitates the use of moderate weights and reps. A good rep range to use is 12-20. Vary the reps with different exercises as each rep count affects the abs in a different way.
Keep in mind that you don't want to add too much mass to the abs because that will give you a thicker waist appearance, something you want to avoid if you desire the much-sought after v-taper. Train the entire abdominal area including the upper and lower abs, serratus and obliques so you end up with complete development.
End all sets 1-2 reps before muscular failure. Rest one minute between sets.
End all sets 1 rep before muscular failure. Take a 20-30 second rest between sets depending on conditioning.
Lie flat on your back on the floor with your legs straight in front of you. Place your hands at your sides by the floor for support. Slowly bend your legs at the knees bringing them towards your chest. Once the knees are by your chest, raise your shoulders and torso as far as possible from the ground in a curling movement without raising your back from the floor. Return your legs to the starting position and bring your torso back to the floor.
Do these while hanging from a chin-up bar, preferably using ab straps for support.
Hold a dumbbell in each hand at your side. Lean as far as you can to your left side. Reverse direction and lean as far right as you can. Repeat until unable to complete another rep.
All sets are to be taken to total muscular failure; that is until no more reps can be completed. Do these exercises as a giant set- as soon as you complete one exercise go to the next one without any rest. Since you are at an advanced level of High Intensity Training, one set of each exercise carried to muscular exhaustion is all you will need to build and strengthen all musculature in this region.
As you can see there is a natural progression from beginner to advanced. The beginner ends sets 1-2 reps before failure because the main focus is on learning proper exercise form. The intermediate bodybuilder finishes his/her sets just shy of failure, continuing to emphasize proper form and adding additional resistance to the exercises to facilitate gains in strength and development.
The advanced trainee is ready to safely push himself/herself to the limit and has gained the ability to focus the resistance on the muscle. Because of a heightened level of strength and ability to apply greater intensity to the abs, three sets is all that is needed.
The usual time-frame from beginner to advanced bodybuilder is: beginner progression to intermediate three months of training, intermediate to advanced an additional 3-6 months of training.
Keep in mind there are other great exercises to train this area, I have outlined a few of the most common to get you started.
5 Ways to Build Confidence Fast!


text:
U.S. Air Force Announces selection of GPS III follow-on contract
Press Release From: Department of Defense
The U.S. Air Force announced selection of Lockheed Martin for a fixed-price-type production contract for 22 GPS III Follow-On satellites with a total estimated contract value up to $7.2 billion.
"The world is dependent on GPS, from getting directions to getting cash from an ATM or trading on the stock exchange," said Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson. "These satellites will provide greater accuracy, and improved anti-jamming capabilities, making them more resilient."
Today, the Air Force operates a total of 77 satellites vital to national security that provide communications, command and control, missile warning, nuclear detonation detection, weather and GPS for the world.
"Since Desert Storm, our joint and allied war fighting team have relied on uninterrupted position, navigation and timing signals to employ precision on and over the battlefield," said Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen. David L. Goldfein. "This investment in GPS III continues to advance our capabilities into the future."
The Air Force's acquisition strategy for this solicitation achieved a balance between mission success, meeting operational needs, opportunities for technology insertion, lowering costs and introducing competition for National Security Space missions.
"America's Air Force is being fielded faster and smarter," said Wilson.
Since the Department of Defense delegated decision authorities on this program to the Air Force, the service saved five months by eliminating an additional layer of reviews and speeding up the source selection process. Additionally, by using a fixed-price contract, the contractor, not the taxpayer, would be responsible for any cost overruns.
"Having decision authority in the Air Force is critical for speed and accountability," said Dr. Will Roper, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. "Our acquisition and contracting strategies are sound; waiting to award only takes time away from the warfighter."
The first GPS IIIF satellite is expected to be available for launch in 2026. The Air Force is the lead agency for procuring these satellites.
"Through this acquisition, we are demonstrating many of the principles of our SMC transformation," said Lt. Gen. John F. Thompson, Space and Missile Systems Center commander and Air Force program executive officer for space. "Getting to a manufacturing steady state in a fixed-price environment will allow us the opportunity to realize substantial cost savings, deliver on a planned schedule, and provide avenues for needed warfighter capability upgrades in the future."
The Air Force Space Command's Space and Missile Systems Center, located at Los Angeles Air Force Base, California, is the U.S. Air Force's center of excellence for acquiring and developing military space systems. Its portfolio includes the Global Positioning System, military satellite communications, defense meteorological satellites, space launch, range systems, satellite control networks, space-based infrared systems, and space situational awareness capabilities.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


Thanks for the info. This is very bad news for me. When I decided to buy this car, carplay was a main cause.
I downloaded the software update, it also works from the citroen website, but currently not installed.
Is there any new feature on this version?
AdrianC - do you have the Touch with the NAVI system or just the Touch with the Radio?
I have the Flair model, pretty much everything on it except the traction knobby thing so I have navigation and upgraded stereo HiFi system too.
It'd be nice to have a true reflection of the android phone screen - not an app mirror - however I am quite happy with the way I have it working now just connecting via bluetooth. I spend most of my time listening to Audible stories.
I do not have the Navigation option, and I have a 7 "Touchscreen, and I also can not turn on AndroidAuto.
I can not even connect to MyCitroen APP.
The connection is made by a hardware component that is not present in your vehicle and by a software component.
That's why, whatever the software update, you will not be able to benefit from this feature.
I'm afraid that if they told that way, unfortunately there is no hope for us. How frustrating and ultra-stupid things is this????
I mean - the "hardware component" cannot costs hundreds of euros..... but it would make many benefits for users.... very stupid politics.... other companies simple added this earlier to cars - they cannot.


text:
Home China Insights The Magnanimous Emperor Taizong
China Insights
The Magnanimous Emperor Taizong
By Leo Timm
Emperor Taizong of the Tang, personal name Li Shimin.(Image: Wang Shuangkuan / The Epoch Times)
In the 7th century A.D., China's Sui Dynasty collapsed. Wasteful policies and civil war devastated the country and its people.
Moving out from their northern stronghold of Taiyuan, aristocrat Li Yuan and his sons raised an army and defeated the warlords vying for control of the broken empire, bringing order to China under the Tang Dynasty (618-907).
On the battlefield, Li Yuan's second son, Li Shimin, demonstrated both tactical excellence and strategic vision. When the war was won, Li Yuan, now emperor, wanted to forgo the tradition of naming his firstborn son crown prince, and give the throne to Li Shimin instead.
A righteous coup
But it had been mere decades since Yang Jian, the emperor of the Sui Dynasty, had turned the throne over to his treacherous and arrogant son Yang Guang, who, like Li Shimin, was also a second-born. Yang Guang's mad desire for luxury and extravagance doomed the Sui to a mere 40 years of existence.
Even Li Shimin himself disapproved of his father's idea.
But it turned out that history does not always repeat itself. Immediately following the victory of the Tang, Li Shimin's older and younger brothers began plotting to usurp their father. With the power to command their own private armies, they began affairs with Li Yuan's imperial consorts and hunted commoners for sport.
Only Li Shimin remained loyal, staying away from politics and only mobilizing his forces when the Tang came under attack by the Turkic tribes of the north.
His brothers knew that that the one force stopping them from overthrowing Li Yuan and dividing China between themselves was Li Shimin.
Hearing of his brothers' conspiracy to assassinate him and seize power, Li Shimin considered letting himself be killed to ensure a smooth imperial succession. At this juncture, one of his subordinates protested vehemently: The other princes were debauched scoundrels certain to destroy the Tang if allowed to prevail in their designs. For the sake of their father's legacy, Li Shimin could not afford to die.
Before the impending coup, Li Shimin and his supporters planned their own moves. Leading elite troops to the Tang capital of Chang'an, Li ambushed and slew his wicked brothers outside the northern gate of the imperial palace. Sixty days later, Li Yuan abdicated, and Li Shimin became Emperor Taizong.
Ruling with magnanimity
Emperor Taizong was perhaps the greatest of all rulers in Chinese history. His 23 years of enlightened rule, the Reign of Zhenguan (貞觀之治), saw the rise of a prosperous and cosmopolitan empire that received emissaries and scholars from dozens of kingdoms throughout Asia.
Emperor Taizong was perhaps the greatest of all rulers in Chinese history. (Image: Public Domain)
Taizong never forgot the bloodshed that brought him to power. He made sure to respect the opinions of his ministers, and even encouraged them to raise objections to him while holding court.
In the early Tang Dynasty, the population was starving and there was much rebuilding that needed to be done. The weak rule of Li Yuan and the corruption of Taizong's late brothers had not helped to improve the state of the empire, and Turks continued to threaten its northern frontier.
Instead of piling taxes on the people, Emperor Taizong dropped fees and ran government on a smaller budget. He did everything to prioritize industriousness among the Tang subjects. The legal code was simplified for commoners, but officials were held to high standards of conduct.
Once, when Emperor Taizong was holding a discussion with his ministers, one official recommended using stronger laws to deter thieves.
Taizong said: "People steal because the government taxes them heavily and they have to do a lot of work for the government… If the people live in poverty, they will steal shamelessly. We should stop unnecessary spending, save costs and reduce expenses, and promote honest officials. That way, people will have enough food and clothing, and they will not need to steal. What need do we have for harsh laws?"
Like all successful Chinese rulers, Emperor Taizong placed great emphasis on moral teachings. He made efforts to ensure that China's native religion, Taoism, could coexist in peace with Buddhism, which was introduced from India and was becoming increasingly important in Chinese spiritual life. At the same time, his rule embodied China's secular Confucian morality.
The Tang Dynasty was one of the peaks of Chinese civilization. ((Image: Public Domain)
Order through virtue
Despite the hard times, society was in good order, as people learned to improve their personal conduct and behave as proper subjects. It was said that even as wealth increased, people would leave their doors unlocked at night and did not hesitate to offer food to travellers.
Even criminals seemed to be reformed by Taizong's reign. A famous story tells of how one year, 70 death-row convicts were to be executed for serious offenses. But Taizong ordered that the criminals be given one year of freedom so that they could return home to spend the New Year with their families.
Amazingly, when the one year was over, every one of the convicts reported to the authorities to receive their punishment. Seeing the trust that his people had in him, Taizong gave them a collective pardon.
One reason why Taizong was remembered as such a great emperor was because of the trust he had cultivated in his subjects.
On one occasion, Taizong was discussing the characteristics of good government with two of his ministers. "How do I compare with Emperor Wen of the Sui Dynasty?" He was referring to Yang Jian, who was a shrewd and extremely hardworking emperor.
They said: "Although he did not have compassion, he was a diligent emperor."
Emperor Taizong replied: "You see only one aspect of the situation. Emperor Wen of the Sui Dynasty made decisions on everything personally instead of relying on his officials.
"The world is so big and there are so many things to deal with. A person could work himself to death, but still not deal with everything well by himself! His officials knew how he ruled his empire, and they all waited for his decision. They kept their own thoughts to themselves and did not dare to speak up. That was why the Sui Dynasty only lasted for two generations.
Follow us on Twitter or subscribe to our weekly email
Leo Timm
Leo Timm is a writer and translator focusing on China's traditional culture, international relations, and its national polity. Follow him on Twitter at @soil_and_grain.
Emperor Taizong
zhenguan
Previous articleBeijing Relaxed Controls on Pollution That Kills 1.1 Million Annually
Next articleChinese Idiom: Thinking of Plums to Quench Thirst
Skirt Power: A Story of Yi Women
Reading this story will offer you a better understanding of women of the Yi nationality and how they prevent fighting between tribes in their...
Former Governor Christopher Patten Foresaw the Fall of Hong Kong
According to Apple Daily, it was 24 years ago that Governor Christopher Patten outlined 16 indicators, in his final administrative report, that would herald...
Chinese Entrepreneur Sun Dawu Predicted His Fate at the Party's Hands
In 1985, Sun Dawu, who has become a Chinese entrepreneur, and his wife started their business with a thousand chickens and 50 pigs. Ten...


The BeatMaster Mobile Sound System is like no other.?The BeatMaster Mobile is an experienced partner in corporate large events and in small or simple parties. We can accommodate any type of event with our consistent high quality service..
The BeatMaster Mobile Sound System is like no other.?The BeatMaster Mobile is an experienced partner in corporate large events and in small or simple parties. We can accommodate any type of event with our consistent high quality service.
Professional Sound and DJ System.?We ensure perfect audio all throughout the event! We believe special events only happen once, so we use our high-quality PA Sound Systems, Remix Stations, and our other professional audio equipment just for you!


Hanging Christmas Decoration Awesome Awesome Easy Christmas Decorations – Fitspired is just one of the many collections of best interior design ideas Reference that we have on this website. We have a lot of best interior design ideas or wall decorating and any other things concerning in this website. We're not just providing info about , but , you can get a lot more reference to create your dream home as well. So , don't forget to keep visiting eldiariodelanovia.com to get the latest update about best interior design ideas , wall decorating ideas , Sample home design and more.
Hanging Christmas Decoration Awesome Awesome Easy Christmas Decorations – Fitspired was posted in February 26, 2017 at 1:55 am. Hanging Christmas Decoration Awesome Awesome Easy Christmas Decorations – Fitspired has viewed by 49 users. Click it and download the Hanging Christmas Decoration Awesome Awesome Easy Christmas Decorations – Fitspired.
Christmas, Extra Large Christmas Balls was posted March 10, 2017 at 10:06 pm by eldiariodelanovia.com . More over Extra Large Christmas Balls has viewed by 4643 visitor.
Christmas, Santa Christmas Ornament was posted April 18, 2017 at 11:02 am by eldiariodelanovia.com . More over Santa Christmas Ornament has viewed by 1720 visitor.
Christmas, Buy Christmas Baubles Online was posted May 2, 2017 at 6:18 pm by eldiariodelanovia.com . More over Buy Christmas Baubles Online has viewed by 6890 visitor.


text:
Seeing Through the Museum
Roger White
The book sometimes resembles a competent white noise machine.
Why Withdraw?
Francisco Unger
How to Not Sell Out
Anonymous, Nell Zink
The Everything Snore
Lisa Borst
The Syria Catastrophe
Again and again, countries across and outside the Middle East have decided that escalating the war by military means is justified by whatever little sliver of national interest they feel is at stake. The US, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, China, France, and Britain have all pumped military resources into the conflict, increasing not only the war's capacity for destructive violence but also its duration.
The response required at this late, desperate stage is neither anti-Assad nor anti-ISIS nor even anti-imperialist — it is antiwar.
Ali Kaaf, Ras Ras.
Get n+1 in your inbox.
Author's Note: I wrote and edited this consideration of the Syrian war between December 2016 and March 2017. The issue in which it appears was sent to the printer on March 27, before the chemical attack in Khan Sheikhoun, which the US government has attributed to Syrian government forces, and before the US government launched 59 Tomahawk missiles at Bashar al-Assad's Al Shayrat airfield. —R.B.
This essay appears in Issue 28 of n+1, out later this month. Subscribe here to read the entire issue as soon as it appears online. —The Editors
The Syrian war is at once incomprehensibly byzantine and very simple. It is complex in the number of countries involved, in the shifting and fragile internal alliances and resentments of the groups constituting the rebellion, in the threads of national interest that circle back and consume themselves like a snake eating its own tail. To take just one example: after a decade of friendly relations with Syria, Turkey turned on Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and decided to work toward his downfall, and Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan vowed that his country would "support the Syrian people in every way until they get rid of the bloody dictator and his gang." Since then, Turkey has served as a staging ground for the rebel Free Syrian Army (FSA), but it has also been repeatedly accused of funneling funds and arms to ISIS, which regularly attacks FSA bases and beheads the soldiers it captures. Turkey has provided military aid to the effort to combat ISIS, but it also devotes energy and resources to fighting Kurdish nationalists, who have been more effective in fighting ISIS than any other group to date. In November 2016, Erdoğan reiterated his determination to unseat Assad, saying Turkish forces had entered Syria in August 2016 for no other reason than to remove Assad from power. One day later, he retracted his statement and claimed Turkey's military campaign in Syria had been designed solely to defeat ISIS, the terrorist group whose operations Turkey had at least tacitly and perhaps actively supported. Turkey is now working closely with Russia, which has done more than any other country to prevent Erdoğan from realizing his goal of bringing down Assad. Turkey is just one of at least nine countries involved in the conflict.
The simple part of the war is that it is a human, social, and environmental disaster that equals some of the 20th century's worst conflicts. Around half a million have died, with another two million wounded, in a country whose prewar population amounted to just more than twenty million. Since the conflict's beginning, in 2011, Syrian life expectancy has dropped by more than twenty years, from roughly 79 to 56. More than half of the country's population has been forced to leave their homes, including some six million internally displaced and nearly five million refugees. Their movements have in turn contributed to political upheaval across Europe and North America, with right-wing nationalists campaigning against the supposedly dangerous influx of refugees. The use of torture against political enemies and captured soldiers has been widespread, especially on the part of the Assad regime. Many refugees cite their female family members' dramatically increased risk of being raped as a major reason for leaving. In addition, a country with a strong national identity and a tradition of religious tolerance — including for a dozen Christian denominations and esoteric sects like the Druze — has been transformed into a place of bitter sectarian violence. Much of Aleppo, one of the oldest continuously inhabited cities on Earth and one of the region's architectural and cultural jewels, has been reduced to rubble. As regime forces, backed by Russian air strikes and Iranian ground troops, made their final, decisive assault on the rebellion's dwindling territory there in December 2016, many residents found themselves trapped and began to tweet out their good-byes. In one such video, an old man rocked back and forth in the middle of a bombed-out street, pushing his hands away from his face as he called out, "We are starving. There is nothing."
The war's complexity makes it difficult to see a viable path forward, but there is a sense in which it would be foolish to think of the conflict as one big Rubik's cube in need of solving, because the complexity itself is part of the problem — the best thing to do with the Rubik's cube would be to throw it against a wall. Again and again, countries across and outside the Middle East have decided that escalating the war by military means is justified by whatever little sliver of national interest they feel is at stake. The US, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, China, France, and Britain have all pumped military resources into the conflict, increasing not only the war's capacity for destructive violence but also its duration. To the extent that it needed to take place at all, it should have been a civil war fought by two sides with limited military resources. Instead, it has turned into a series of extravagantly funded proxy wars across two or three separate axes, none of which has any organic connection to the questions of regime tolerance for political assembly and speech that prompted the conflict in the first place. While it would not be useful to ask nations to stop pursuing their national interests, the ease with which these countries have turned to military means in the pursuit of those interests is shameful. The response required at this late, desperate stage is neither anti-Assad nor anti-ISIS nor even anti-imperialist — it is antiwar.
The first person to make the mistake of military escalation was Bashar al-Assad himself. In his book Syria Burning (2016), the journalist Charles Glass recounts an old joke:
A dog in Lebanon . . . was so hungry, mangy and tired of civil war that he escaped to Syria. To the surprise of the other dogs, he returned a few months later. Seeing him better groomed and fatter than before, they asked whether the Syrians had been good to him. "Very good." "Did they feed and wash you?" "Yes." "Then why did you come back?" "I want to bark."
The protests that sparked the conflict in 2011 were not originally calls for Assad's fall. They were instead demonstrations demanding reforms: the end of emergency law (justified by a permanent "state of war" with Israel), the release of political prisoners, the removal of a regional governor who allegedly allowed the torture of teenagers by police, an end to the bribes and harassment and other daily humiliations of life under authoritarian rule.
Syria initially seemed to have avoided the wave of Arab Spring unrest that swept across much of the Middle East beginning in late 2010, but beneath its surface stability and continuity lay several of the same factors that destabilized Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, and other countries. Political power was concentrated among a tiny elite of technocrats and Assad flunkies. The Mukhabarat, a set of brutal intelligence agencies originally trained by the Stasi, snuffed out the faintest flicker of opposition. The introduction of neoliberal economic policies also unsettled Syrian society — Assad had attempted a halfhearted marketization of the economy that produced the worst of both worlds, destroying the country's economic safety net without actually producing more jobs. Farmers who had relied on now-diminished government fuel subsidies could no longer afford to keep their machines running. In the cities, millions of educated young people found there was nothing for them to do with their educations.
The protests that made the world aware of these grievances were expressions of a desire to bark, and they were carried out peacefully. Assad's security forces responded with beatings, water cannons, and live ammunition, killing protesters and then killing mourners at those protesters' funerals. By the time Assad released the teenagers and removed the regional governor (his cousin Faisal Kalthum), it was too late, and the protesters' demands had changed. Assad's now very likely victory in the war should not obscure the fact that his 2011 response to the protests was a disaster — six years later, he remains the leader of what is no longer a functioning state.
The opposition's decision to militarize was a mistake, too, although it's true that Assad's crackdown left few other options. Even after Assad's security forces had made a habit of shooting up funerals, the pro-democracy protesters of 2011 did not reach for their rifles en masse. Instead, they were gradually overtaken and displaced by more than three thousand militias, defectors from the military who established the Free Syrian Army, and the al-Nusra Front, an al Qaeda–affiliated group of Sunni fundamentalists that saw in the escalating chaos an opportunity to topple Assad's Alawite regime (al-Nusra changed its name to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham before joining up with other rebel groups to form Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or the Liberation of the Levant Committee, in January). The shift from peaceful protest to military engagement turned a reformist project into a revolutionary one. Yet the revolutionaries had no single vision for what a post-Assad Syria would be. Rather, they had competing visions that were inherently incompatible with one another, ranging from secular democracy to an authoritarian theocratic state under Sunni rule. The revolution as a whole lacked a constructive political project, and so it was doomed from the beginning. One Syrian journalist reporting on the Battle of Aleppo said there was a moment in 2012 during which the FSA, had it been able to muster a unified force of a few hundred, could have seized city hall and "proclaimed Aleppo a liberated city." It didn't.
These fissures in the Syrian rebellion were apparent from an early stage, and external countries should have seen them as a reason to stay away and allow the conflict to exhaust itself. Instead, they saw the rebellion's weaknesses as an opportunity to use it for their own various ends. Within the Middle East, Syria became a flash point in the regional conflicts that had been escalating since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Saudi Arabia, the world's only remaining theocracy ruled by an absolute monarch, had been alarmed by the Arab Spring protests in Egypt and Tunisia. It saw in the Syrian conflict an opportunity to spark a counterrevolution, as well as a chance to weaken Iran, its primary opponent and Assad's most important supporter in the Middle East. For its part, Iran saw Syria as a key arm of its regional influence, which has increased enormously ever since the US deposed its primary regional rival, Iraq. When US officials began to criticize Assad's brutal tactics in 2011, supporting his regime also became a useful way for Iran to resist the Middle East's great Western antagonist. Meanwhile, the diplomatically insignificant but very wealthy country of Qatar bet on the rebels in hopes of winning increased regional influence after Assad's fall, a tactic it had previously pursued by supporting opposition forces, particularly Islamists, in other Arab Spring uprisings. The country pumped nearly $3 billion into the rebellion during the first two years of the conflict.
Other countries in that area of the world have used the war to deepen their involvement in the Middle East. Following its unenthusiastic and unsuccessful pursuit of EU membership, Turkey decided to direct its geopolitical muscle to the east instead, and the Syrian rebellion provided what looked like an ideal opportunity to flex. The country hosted Syrian army defectors who eventually formed the core of the FSA; helped to organize Group of Friends of the Syrian People, an international coalition modeled on the coalition that brought about Gaddafi's fall in Libya; and served as by far the most important point of entry for arms and other supplies used by the rebellion.
Then, most famously, there is Russia, without which Assad may well have fallen. In addition to vetoing UN Security Council resolutions calling for Assad's resignation, Russia has lavished the Assad regime with military and economic aid. Russian air strikes have turned the military tide against the rebels in recent months, and in an earlier stage of the war, when Syria's economy was on the brink of collapse, Moscow delivered some thirty tons of new banknotes to Damascus, ensuring that the government could continue to function.
Farther afield, Britain and France decided that toppling Assad would help to stymie Iran. Still pumped from its Libyan escapade in 2011, France demanded Assad's departure and has since provided rebels with arms and communications equipment, as well as conducted a few air strikes of its own. And while the UK's parliament initially decided against overt military involvement in the country, the successes of ISIS and the al-Nusra Front changed its mind. The Royal Air Force carried out air strikes in Syria in 2015, and British Special Forces were operating within Syria by summer 2016.
For the US, the Syrian war has been a long and painful lesson on the consequences of squandering one's status as world hegemon on military adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan. When protests first broke out, the US was slow and reluctant to respond for two main reasons. The first is that, after its experience in Libya, in which toppling the dictator had not produced a flourishing of peace and representative democracy, the Obama Administration was reluctant to involve the US too deeply in another regional conflagration. The second is that the US had not been particularly focused on Syria, and the State Department's resources were already stretched to the limit by everything else happening in the Middle East, a phenomenon referred to by diplomats as the "bandwidth" problem. There are only so many crises any government, even the US, can address at once. Even as Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton began to speak out against Assad's crackdowns, the tone was very much wait-and-see, condemning the violence while also making it clear that Assad would be welcome to remain in power should he implement reforms.
In 2012, as the conflict was maturing into a full-fledged civil war, Obama told the White House press corps that any use of chemical or biological weapons by Assad would be a "red line for us," the implication being that direct military intervention would follow. He used the "red line" phrase twice, saying, "That would change my calculus. That would change my equation." But one year later, when chemical weapons were launched at rebel-held positions in Ghouta, it turned out that Obama's calculus would stay the same, and the expected air strikes never came. While this may have been a wise decision on its own, it could not compensate for the recklessness of having made the "red line" remarks in the first place. Opposition forces had spent a year digging in and escalating the military conflict in the expectation that the American cavalry would soon arrive, and its failure to do so left the FSA in the lurch. ISIS soon seized the initiative that the FSA could no longer hold. Three years later, American diplomacy finds itself marginalized. When Russia, Iran, and Turkey organized a December meeting in Moscow to pursue a political solution to the conflict, the US was not invited.
None of which is to say that America hasn't been involved. Over the past fifteen years, debates over Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya have steadily moved the discursive goalposts, such that "non-interventionist" now means "anything short of a full-scale occupation." That's the only sense in which one can say the US hasn't carried out military intervention in the Syrian war. In 2011, Hillary Clinton objected to and undermined peace talks that didn't include Assad's removal as a condition. The CIA has assisted rebels with training, arms, ammunition, and supply routes along the Turkish border. The US has also helped train the much-praised "moderate rebels" in Jordan and in 2014 provided anti-tank weapons to the Supreme Military Council, which includes members of the most prominent rebel groups. Kurds were resupplied in 2015, and when it became clear that the $500 million rebel-training program had failed, that money was used to buy arms, which were then sent to the rebel groups already on the ground, trained or otherwise. Special operations forces have also carried out missions in Syria.
Surprisingly, the US has managed to ratchet up its involvement in the Syrian war without concurrently ratcheting up its anti-regime rhetoric. Assad has not been made into a villain on anything like the Saddam Hussein model. The reason has been the rise of the Islamic State — variously referred to as IS, ISIL, or ISIS. This group is a direct consequence of the Iraq war. It emerged out of the post-Saddam chaos in 2006, just barely survived the US "surge" in 2007, and returned to the scene in 2010. With its kidnappings, videos of hostage beheadings, destruction of ancient temples and other archaeological treasures, and eventual capture of the Iraqi city of Mosul in 2014, ISIS has assumed al Qaeda's former place as America's preeminent terrorist bogeyman, all without ever carrying out a major terrorist attack in the United States itself. It was probably the beheading videos, with their combination of medieval violence and PR savvy, that clinched it. But it could also have been the group's habit of claiming credit for terrorist attacks in Paris, Brussels, San Bernardino, and Orlando, whether it played an actual role in organizing those attacks or not. The group's brutality and destructiveness are by no means unprecedented among either extremist groups or some of the region's authoritarian regimes, but its eagerness and ability to portray itself as brutal and destructive probably are. Assad may have torture chambers of his own, and other groups may carry out massacres, too, but only ISIS is widely thought of as a "death cult," something outside the realm of rational human calculation. ISIS's successes have provided the US with a progressively freer military hand in the Middle East over the past two years, perhaps a freer hand than it has had at any point since the golden days of bin Laden and al Qaeda. In Syria, the group captured the city of Raqqa in 2013 and has subsequently battled the Kurds for control of the country's northeastern region, which shares borders with Turkey and Iraq and holds valuable oil fields. As long as ISIS remains a force in Syria, there is little reason to expect much domestic opposition to America's involvement there.
What benefits have accrued to the states that have invested so heavily in the war? According to Christopher Phillips, author of The Battle for Syria (2016), none at all. Assad's likely survival means that Turkey's ambitions of regional leadership are done, at least for the moment. Turkey also faces an increase in domestic terrorism committed by Islamists operating in Syria who have decided to cross back over the border. Qatar's international reputation has been damaged by its alleged connections to al Qaeda. Saudi Arabia is stuck spending huge sums on military operations around the region during a time when oil prices are low, portending an ominous future for the kingdom's economy. Iran protected its ally, but at the cost of its influence everywhere in the Middle East aside from Shia-dominated states. Even Russia shouldn't get too excited. The country dramatically increased its geopolitical prominence at relatively low cost, but it now finds itself responsible for a failed state with no functioning economy and a government regarded by its own citizens and much of the world as illegitimate. Putin's position today may turn out to be similar to that of George W. Bush in May 2003, when he stood on the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln in a flight suit and announced that "major combat operations in Iraq have ended."
The Syrian conflict is what military scholars call a total war, one in which the lines between combatants and civilians blur, societies devote all their resources to the war effort, and tactics gain acceptance regardless of their brutality. Total war manifests in many ways, from the aerial bombardment of city centers all the way down to what happens between a couple of guards and a prisoner in a locked cell. On the latter end of that spectrum, torture stands out as a favored retaliatory technique on both sides and a central component of Assad's plans for keeping power (as opposed to an ugly by-product of those plans). Summary arrests have regularly occurred since protests broke out in 2011, and except in cases where those detained are prominent figures or members of important families, it is safe to assume that arrests are followed by torture. The war reporter Janine di Giovanni, in her book The Morning They Came for Us (2016), interviewed a man called Hussein, a 24-year-old student of human rights law who helped organize protests in the prewar days. Hussein was captured in Homs and then taken to a hospital the government used as a prison for dissidents. There, he was beaten with sticks, electrocuted, burned, and cut. He suffered a collapsed lung, and at night, unable to walk, he was kept in a room with corpses piled on the floor. One night, his captors laid Hussein on top of a body that turned out to be that of his brother. He only escaped, he says, because a doctor assigned to monitor the torture sessions eventually decided he could not bear to watch anymore. He declared Hussein dead and had him smuggled out of the hospital. This story is representative. In the New Yorker, Ben Taub has reported on torture conducted at a military hospital located near the presidential palace in Damascus. One detainee, having already been tortured for nearly a year, was taken to this hospital when he began to urinate blood. When he arrived, according to Taub, "a nurse asked him about his symptoms, then beat him with a stick."
Torture is not an inevitable element of war. Its use was not universal in ancient societies, and it was banned in nearly all of Western Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries. These bans did not function perfectly, any more than universal bans on murder function perfectly today, but they constituted a stable and functioning societal taboo. This taboo broke down over the course of the 20th century. By the mid-1980s, nearly three decades after the United Nations' adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the regular use of torture was documented in one-third of UN member states. In the past five years, Amnesty International has documented torture in 141 countries, or three-quarters of the world. Torture is accepted by the Syrian regime because it is currently accepted by most regimes, usually in practice and sometimes in theory, too. The Republican Party in the United States is currently one of those regimes.
When one person brings up some wrong committed by a non-US country, and then a second person responds by pointing out that the US has committed the same wrong, the second person is sometimes accused of "whataboutism," a rhetorical technique that seeks to blunt criticism by painting it as hypocritical. There are instances in which whataboutism does serve this propaganda function, but the debate on torture is not one of them, because a taboo is like herd immunity: it only works if almost everyone is immune. Despite its recent difficulties as world hegemon, the United States remains more powerful and influential than any other single country, and there can be no hope for preventing horrors like those committed by Assad's security forces, or for punishing those responsible for them, so long as the US accepts torture.
The death penalty is not the central problem of America's incarceration complex, and neither is torture the central problem of modern militarism. But as the death penalty stands as a metonym for the prison system's general willingness to effectively, if not literally, end the life of someone who commits even a minor crime, so does torture stand as an emblem of the modern world's acceptance of total war. A world that accepts and practices torture, that is willing to inflict unlimited suffering on a person in order to obtain a confession, is a world that also accepts the destruction of entire states and societies in the pursuit of military victory. During the past fifteen years, the war on terror and the many other civil wars and extremist rebellions that have emerged in its wake have seen the mainstreaming of torture and total war alike. The same editorial pages that lay out a ticking-time-bomb scenario as a justification for waterboarding will also publish pieces arguing that civilian casualties are "inevitable" (meaning "acceptable") when extremist groups so cleverly blend in among the civilian inhabitants of densely populated urban areas. It will be hard, not to say hypocritical, for the United States to call for Assad's arrest and prosecution when the CIA has rendered terrorism suspects to Syria specifically so they could be tortured there. Rebuilding the international community's taboo on torture would require at the very least that the US close Guantánamo, that it pay reparations to those who have been held there, and that it agree to be subject to the decisions of the International Criminal Court, even if that court were to decide to prosecute George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, or another architect of the country's rendition and torture programs. For now, Bush Jr. remains a welcome guest at presidential inaugurations and a celebrated early-career painter.
If none of this seems likely to occur in the coming years, that may have to do with how little American debate on the conflict has considered the Syrian war as a moral issue. While the occasional harrowing photograph or chilling testimonial has provoked bouts of public outrage, that outrage has somehow not been channeled back into evaluations of America's extensive involvement in the war. Even absent a full-scale invasion, the extent to which the US and other countries have fueled the bloodshed with arms and other equipment should be a scandal. The arms transfers have increased each side's capacity to kill and wound its enemies, and discouraged the pursuit of diplomatic solutions to the catastrophe. But instead of a clear reckoning with what this has meant for the people of Syria, there is only talk of various US interests: the state of its credibility in the eyes of the world, the terrorist threats allegedly posed by desperate refugees, the exact circumference of America's sphere of influence. It is politically unsophisticated to say so, but none of this matters to a noncombatant resident of Aleppo.
The suppression of war's morality in American public discourse has not only occurred with respect to Syria — it is a general characteristic of foreign-policy discussion. The reason why is pretty simple: America is now involved in so many wars in so many different places, and there exists such an overwhelming bipartisan consensus that involvement in these wars is necessary and to the US advantage, that to confront the morality of our militarism honestly would require an almost total overhaul of America's role in the world. In the years following the revelations of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, the same dynamic could be found in arguments over torture. Instead of recognizing that torture is always wrong, every time, no matter the severity of the threat it is used to address, Democrats and Republicans argued over whether torture produced accurate intelligence, a debate of purely academic interest that should have had no place in the political sphere. Thirteen years after Abu Ghraib, the results of that debate are obvious. "Don't tell me it doesn't work," Donald Trump said at a campaign event in February 2016. "Torture works." He promised to bring back waterboarding and "a hell of a lot worse." Trump very slightly moderated his position after General James Mattis, whose nickname is Mad Dog, told him he'd "never found [torture] to be useful," but there's no reason to think that moderation will outlive Mattis's tenure as a Trump adviser.
Even Barack Obama's guiding principles for weighing the wisdom of military action, so cautious in comparison with those of his neoconservative predecessors, betrayed an eagerness to look away from what war does to those caught in its path. "I don't oppose all wars," he said in a 2002 speech. "What I am opposed to is a dumb war. What I am opposed to is a rash war." He lived up to this self-description, with a few exceptions, during his eight years as President. Except for his "red line" comments, his decisions regarding Syria were thoughtful and deliberate, and none of them have permanently damaged America's international standing. But opposing dumb wars isn't enough. Smart wars should be opposed and avoided too, until the last moment and at all possible costs, because they are wars. All military conflict rips apart the social fabric in irreparable ways, and all the US and Russia have done with their careful, self-interested maneuverings is intensify and accelerate the process by which a dictator has reduced his unfree but still stable society to rubble.
How will America's involvement with Syria change now that Trump has assumed office? It is clear that the new President is a racist provocateur who sees Muslims as America's primary antagonists throughout the world. But it remains unclear what kind of foreign policy these racist views will produce, because Trump does not appear to hold foreign-policy views at all (except insofar as foreign countries "steal" American jobs). Though much of the recklessness of his travel ban derives from the way it escalated tensions between the US and countries across the Middle East, the executive order was primarily an act of domestic politics meant to shore up and energize his nativist base. He believes terrorism is bad and that the US should be "strong," but he has never indicated how that might translate into a style of diplomacy or a military strategy. Among the many mistakes liberal journalists made during the presidential campaign was their effort to paint Trump as a committed supporter of the Iraq war. This claim was based on a Howard Stern interview in which Trump responded to the question "Are you for invading Iraq?" by saying, "Yeah, I guessss . . . sooo." The obvious conclusion to draw from the hesitant tone of Trump's answer is that he hadn't thought about it all that much and wasn't particularly invested in the outcome, and during the campaign, Trump only brought up Iraq when it could be used as a cudgel to beat Hillary Clinton or some primary opponent. Is Trump an interventionist or an anti-interventionist? The evidence suggests that he doesn't really give a shit.
That's not meant to be reassuring. The importance of presidential diplomacy to America's international relationships makes Trump's erratic personality frightening. In addition, our unprincipled new President is advised by a cabinet and a party stuffed with foreign-policy hawks. Defense Secretary Mattis has refused to rule out the deployment of conventional American ground forces to combat ISIS in Syria, and he has also been careful to not close the door on possible cooperation with the Russian military, which would, by extension, entail cooperation with Assad. On the other hand, ramping up tensions with Assad could go a long way toward antagonizing Iran, a cherished Republican goal. (The party's 2016 platform specified that Republicans "consider the Administration's deal with Iran, to lift international sanctions and make hundreds of billions of dollars available to the Mullahs, a personal agreement between [Obama] and his negotiating partners and non-binding on the next president.") While the specific targets of the Republican Party's foreign-policy aggression under Trump remain to be seen, it is probably safe to assume that American aggression will increase over the next four years, an increase enabled in part by the totally unnecessary $54 billion military-budget increase Trump proposed in February.
Opposing this kind of pervasive, amoral militarism in the US cannot just be a matter of demonizing the executive, however, no matter how repulsive this particular executive may be. American militarism was thriving well before Trump hatched his campaign plans, and will outlast his sad and flailing administration. Even if Trump were to adopt a stance of rigid isolationism, forgoing all direct American military involvement in the conflicts and wars of foreign nations, America would still be one of the single biggest engines of militarism by virtue of its arms trade. US weapons companies were involved in more than half of the world's arms deals in 2015, deals which netted them some $40 billion (France finished in second place with $15 billion). In December 2016 alone, the State Department approved the following sales: a $115 million "Electronic Warfare Range System" to Australia, fighter-jet upgrades to Finland, nearly $700 million worth of infantry carrier vehicles to Peru, $3.5 billion in Chinook helicopters to Saudi Arabia, missiles for Morocco, Apache helicopters for the United Arab Emirates, logistical support services and equipment in Qatar (plus engines and equipment for C-17 Globemaster planes), nearly $2 billion in equipment and support for Kuwait, some planes for Norway, and something called "Sea Giraffe 3D Air Search Radars" for the Philippines. In 2015, the CEO of Lockheed Martin told reporters that she looked at the Middle East and Asia as "growth areas" because of their instability. By approving the sale of arms in such massive quantities, the State Department is helping to ensure Lockheed's profits for years to come.
Drastically reducing the country's arms exports would probably not be in the best interest of the American economy. Weapons manufacturers are conscientious about operating plants within the US, including in politically crucial states like Michigan and Ohio, thus cultivating a broad base of support for arms exports in Congress. Nevertheless, the American arms industry should be an appealing target for protest and antiwar political mobilization. The duration and the brutality of the Syrian war are largely due to nearly a dozen countries deciding again and again that a militarized approach to the conflict was more in keeping with their respective national interests than diplomacy. The political reasons behind those decisions have been as varied as the countries making them, but the availability of every imaginable weapon on the international arms market has been a constant, and no country does as much to maintain that availability as the United States. American activists may not be able to influence Erdoğan's views on the pros and cons of Assad's continued rule, but they could theoretically influence how many missiles and aircraft the US would be willing to send him.
The anti-imperialist analysis of global conflict, in which America is almost always seen as the primary bad actor, is useful and productive, but the Syrian war has exposed its limits. The political interests involved in the war are so complicated and numerous that even if the US government were persuaded to abandon the pursuit of any of its ambitions in the Middle East, the war would likely continue unabated. Only an international effort to set aside those interests, to remoralize the discussion around war and acknowledge that wars are atrocities by definition, will produce a solution. What's needed is not an anti-imperialist analysis but an antimilitarist one. Fortunately, antimilitarism is an authentically internationalist stance, for the simple reason that war is equally bad for everyone on the receiving end of it.
If you like this article, please subscribe or leave a tax-deductible tip below to support n+1.
My 19th Century
Under Color of Statute
Maggie Gram
Issue 23 As If
Aren't we all somewhere on the sapphic continuum?
Magic Dirt Nation
Samantha Schuyler
Belarus Dispatch
Michael Wasiura
In the last decade, no organ of music criticism has wielded as much influence as Pitchfork
Gun Violence and the War on Terror
The Responsibility Isn't Theirs Alone
Lobby Day in Albany
Richard Beck, Kelley Deane McKinney, Rachel Riederer


text:
Man injures 5 TSA agents while rushing through security at Phoenix airport, authorities say
Posted: Jun 21, 2019 1:35 PM CST
Security footage shows a man trying to rush through a security checkpoint at the Phoenix airport. By Chris Boyette and Jay Croft, CNN
(CNN) -- A man tried to rush through a security checkpoint at the Phoenix airport, attacking security officers and injuring five TSA agents, authorities say.
One transportation security officer was taken to a hospital and four to urgent care clinics, said Lorie Dankers, a spokeswoman for the Transportation Security Administration. All were treated and released.
The incident occurred around 9:45 a.m. Tuesday at a security checkpoint in Terminal 4 of Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport, Dankers said.
Other transportation security officers and members of the Phoenix Police Department subdued the man, she said.
The suspect, identified as Tyrese Garner, was arrested and charged with criminal trespassing and resisting arrest, which are felonies, as well as five counts of misdemeanor assault, Phoenix Police Det. Luis A. Samudio said.
The suspect is due in court Tuesday. He is being held in the Maricopa County Jail on $1,500 bond. He has not yet been assigned an attorney, according to court documents.
"This unprovoked and brazen physical attack against our employees is unacceptable," Dankers said. "We are grateful for our committed workforce and for the role they play in protecting the traveling public every day. We continue to monitor the safety and health of the TSOs involved in this incident and will cooperate fully with the ongoing investigation."
The-CNN-Wire™ & © 2018 Cable News Network, Inc., a Time Warner Company. All rights reserved.


Ahead of Sunday's game between the Detroit Lions and Tampa Bay Buccaneers, Free Press sports writer Dave Birkett looks at the biggest factor for each team to win, and highlights the game's key matchup.
The Lions will win if … Marvin Jones scores a touchdown. Jones has emerged as one of the best deep-threat receivers in the NFL this year. He has eight touchdowns and 11 catches of 25-plus yards, both tied for fourth in the NFL. The Lions' success hasn't quite been tied to Jones' production this year, but they are 4-2 in games when he gets in the end zone. Given the status of Matthew Stafford's hand — he'll play, but he's not 100% — a big day for Jones likely means a big day for Stafford as well. The Bucs have the NFL's 31st-ranked pass defense, so both are certainly possible.
►Mailbag: Should Lions tank? Who was Golden Tate's verbal shot at?
►If Stafford struggles, should Lions insert Jake Rudock?
The Bucs will win if … they force two or more turnovers. As bad as Tampa has been this year, the Bucs are one of the best in the NFL at taking the football away. They're tied for the league lead with 11 fumble recoveries, and they happen to be playing a quarterback with a bum hand who's tied for the league lead in lost fumbles. Two weeks ago, the Bucs forced five turnovers in a win over the Miami Dolphins. And earlier this year, they had four takeaways in a win over the Chicago Bears. If Stafford isn't better about protecting the ball, the Lions are headed for a long day.
Lang has missed time this season because of a back injury and concussion, and he suffered a foot injury against the Ravens that caused him to miss two days of practice this week. Lang is officially questionable to play Sunday, but assuming he's on the field, he'll face one of the better defensive tackles in the NFL. McCoy, 29, isn't the same dominant force he was, but he's still a very good player, and he's key to igniting a Bucs pass rush that's one of the worst in the NFL. If Lang can keep McCoy at bay, that should allow Stafford and his injured enough time to take shots downfield.


TIM REYNOLDS | 9/6/2016, 12:29 p.m.
RIO DE JANEIRO (AP) – The U.S. Olympic Team made itself right at home in Rio.
The British, they had a games to savor as well. The host Brazilians got soccer gold that they craved, the Russians struggled on the heels of the exposure of a state-sponsored doping program, and the Chinese finished well below expectations.
So went the medal race at the Rio de Janeiro Olympics, where the Americans – with women leading the way – dominated both the gold and overall totals. The U.S. will finish with 46 gold medals after the men's basketball team earned a gold – 121 medals overall, its 51-total-medal margin over second-place China the largest in a non-boycotted Olympics in nearly a century.
"This experience has been the dream of a lifetime for me," said U.S. gymnast and closing ceremony flagbearer Simone Biles, who won five medals, four of them gold, in her first Olympics.
Gymnasts Gabrielle Douglas, Lauren Hernandez, Madison Kocian and Aly Raisman, also representing the U.S. took home a gold each, 13 medals in all for the team.
For the fourth consecutive games, U.S. swimmer Michael Phelps left with more medals than anyone else. He won six in Rio, while Biles and U.S. swimmer Katie Ledecky each won five to lead to lead a big haul from American women.
U.S. women left Rio with 27 golds – by far the most among any team of female Olympians at these games – and 61 medals total. U.S. track star Allyson Felix, now a six-time gold medalist and a winner of nine medals in all, was particularly delighted to learn that women are bringing more medals home to American than the men.
"Got 'em," Felix said, smiling.
United States' Claressa Maria Shields won a gold medal for the women's middleweight 75-kg boxing. Natasha Hastings, Phyllis Francis, Allyson Felix and Courtney Okolo, representing the U.S. during the women's 4x400-meter relay final, also earned a gold medal.
The previous record for U.S. medals at a fully attended Olympics was 110, set at Beijing eight years ago. And the margin between first and second in the overall medals race this year tops all others (the boycotted games of 1980 and 1984 excluded) since the Americans won 67 more medals than Italy did at the 1932 Los Angeles Games.
"We weren't sure we were going to have that kind of success coming in," said USOC CEO Scott Blackmun, noting the track and swimming teams had plenty of first-time Olympians.


text:
561.865.6238 Request Franchise Information
What is Salt Therapy?
Why The Salt Suite?
TSS Available Territories
Kaleigh Marschall
Ever since I was a little girl, I've had the most sensitive skin, especially on my face. I've gone through at least ten different dermatologists throughout the years, trying to treat something no one could diagnose. I've tried everything on the market. Being a 19 year old girl with red, itchy, bumpy skin ruined my self-confidence. I finally with diagnosed with chronic rosacea and my grandma gifted me five sessions at The Salt Suite for Christmas. Within two sessions, the rashes on my legs and my back and chest were completely gone and my face already started to subside. I became a member the next week and started using many products The Salt Suite offered. Six months later and my skin is completely clear and I feel better than ever. The Salt Sure gave me back the confidence I lost so long ago. This place has changed my life and I will be a member for a very long time.
Share on facebook (opens in a new window)Share on Twitter (opens in a new window)Share on Linkedin (opens in a new window)
Become a Franchise Owner Today!
Connect with The Salt Suite®
We're here to answer your questions, discuss yourexperience, and help you determine if owning The Salt Suite® franchise is right for you.
561.865.6238 GET STARTED
franchising@thesaltsuite.com
This franchising information is not intended as an offer to sell a franchise or the solicitation of an offer to buy a franchise. The following states regulate the offer and sale of franchises: California, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. Certain other states- Connecticut, Kentucky, Michigan, Nebraska, Texas, and Utah- have franchise filing requirements. If you are a resident of one of these states we will not offer or sell you a franchise unless and until we have complied with the applicable presale filing, registration, and disclosure requirements in your state. By providing information, you give us permission to call, text, and email you about this franchise opportunity.
© Copyright 2023 Salt Suite Franchise. All rights reserved. | Privacy Policy (Opens in a New Window) | Powered by ClickTecs (Opens in New Window)


Route 208-15 departs from exit 126 off I-95, leaving the Route 208 Commuter Lot on Courthouse Road/Houser Drive in Fredericksburg, VA at 4:30AM.
The members of this van travel to the North Side of Telegraph Road at Fort Belvoir and operate on a 6:00AM-2:30PM Monday-Friday work schedule.
The van arrives back to the Route 208 Commuter Lot at 3:45PM.


Four stage intelligent chargers with 12 Volt, 24 Volt, or 48 Volt inputs, to charge 6 Volt, 12 Volt and 24 Volt lead acid batteries, (flooded, VRLA, Gel, or AGM.) Charge a wheel chair, bicycle or scooter in your car or van.
You don't always have AC power to charge batteries with. Here are some battery chargers that use DC input power.
PST-DCCP Up to 36V <1V to 32V, as long as the maximum charge voltage is at least 1V lower than the source voltage. Can taper charge a lead acid or lithium ion pack at up to 5 Amps constant current.
12 Volts (10-15VDC) 12 Volt sealed lead acid batteries These 4 stage chargers can be used to charge 12 volt batteries from larger 12 volt batteries, or automobile power points (cigarette lighter sockets). Great for emergencies, camping, boating, e-bikes, etc.
12 Volts (10-15VDC) 24 Volt sealed lead acid batteries. High power 4-stage intelligent chargers for charging wheelchairs and scooters in your van or car.
These microprocessor controlled board charge a 12 volt lead acid battery from a low voltage DC input that can range from 18 to 28 volts. This lets the charger be positioned at a remote battery while being powered with low voltage DC up to 1000 feet away.
This rapid battery charger charges 2 or 4 AA and AAA Ni-Mh/Ni-Cd rechargeable batteries quickly and conveniently from home or car.
Two current settings for different battery capacity. Select "low" if the battery is less than 7 AH in capacity.
Note: For the higher current models the input current is too high for a cigarette lighter socket to handle. This charger must be wired into the battery-alternator circuit of your car or van.
Wheelchair chargers, electric bike chargers, and scooter chargers for charging a 24 volt battery from a 12 volt source such as a car, van, or boat.


text:
\section{Introduction}
For $i=1,2$, let $X_{i}$ be a noncompact hyperbolic Riemann orbisurface of finite volume $\vx(X_{i})$
with genus $g_{i}\geq 1$, and can be realized as the quotient space $\Gamma_{i}\backslash\mathbb{H}$,
where $\Gamma_{i}\subset \mathrm{PSL}_{2}(\mathbb{R})$ is a Fuchsian subgroup of the first kind acting
on the hyperbolic upper half-plane $\mathbb{H}$, via fractional linear transformations. Let $\mathcal{
E}_{i}$ and $\mathcal{P}_{i}$ denote the finite sets of elliptic fixed points and cusps of $\Gamma_{i}$,
respectively. Put $\overline{X}_{i}=X_{i}\cup \mathcal{P}_{i}$. Then, $\overline{X}_{i}$ admits the structure of
a Riemann surface. Now consider the complex surface $X=X_{1}\times X_{2}$, which admits the structure of a
noncompact K\"ahler-orbifold of dimension two. Put $\overline{X}=\overline{X}_{1}\times \overline{X}_{2}$.

\vspace{0.2cm}
For $i=1,2$, let $\hypi$ denote the (1,1)-form associated to hyperbolic metric, which is
the natural metric on $X_{i}$, and of constant negative curvature minus one. Now $\hypone +\hyptwo$
is the natural metric on $X$, and let $\hypvol$ denote the volume form associated to
$\hypone +\hyptwo$.

\vspace{0.2cm}
For $i=1,2$, the Riemann surface $\overline{X}_{i}$ is embedded in its Jacobian variety $\mathrm{Jac}(
\overline{X}_{i})$ via the Abel-Jacobi map. Then, the pull back of the flat Euclidean metric by the Abel-Jacobi map is called the
canonical metric, and the (1,1)-form associated to it is denoted by $\hatcani$. We denote its restriction
to $X_{i}$ by $\cani$. Now, $\canone+\cantwo$ defines a metric on $X$, which corresponds to the flat
Euclidean metric, and let $\canvol$ denote the volume form associated to $\canone+\cantwo$.

\vspace{0.2cm}
For $i=1,2$, let $\deli$ denote the hyperbolic Laplacian acting on smooth functions on $X_{i}$. The
hyperbolic heat kernel $\khypi(t;z_{i},w_{i})$ on $\mathbb{R}_{>0}\times X_{i}\times X_{i}$ is the unique
solution of the heat equation
\begin{align*}
\bigg(\deli + \frac{\partial}{\partial t}\bigg)\khypi(t;z_{i},w_{i}) =0,
\end{align*}
with the normalization condition
\begin{align*}
\lim_{t\rightarrow 0}\int_{X_{i}}\khypi(t;z_{i},w_{i})f(z_{i})\hypi(z_{i}) = f(w_{i}),
\end{align*}
for any fixed $w\in X_{i}$ and any smooth function $f$ on $X_{i}$. When $z_{i}=w_{i}$, for brevity of
notation, we denote the hyperbolic heat kernel by $\khypi(t;z_{i})$.

\vspace{0.3cm}\textbf{Main result}
With notation as above, for $z=(z_{1},z_{2})\in (X_{1}\backslash \mathcal{E}_{1})\times
(X_{2}\backslash \mathcal{E}_{2})$, we have the relation of differential forms
\begin{align*}
&g_{1}g_{2}\canvol(z)=\bigg(\frac{1}{4\pi}+ \frac{1}{\vx(X_{1})}\bigg)\cdot \bigg(\frac{1}{4\pi}+
\frac{1}{\vx(X_{2})}\bigg)\hypvol(z)+\frac{1}{2}\bigg(\frac{1}{4\pi}+ \frac{1}{\vx(X_{1})}\bigg)\times
\\&\bigg(\int_{0}^{\infty}\deltwo \khyptwo(t;z_{2}) dt\bigg)\hypvol(z)+
\frac{1}{2}\bigg(\frac{1}{4\pi}+ \frac{1}{\vx(X_{2})}\bigg)\cdot\bigg(\int_{0}^{\infty}\delone \khypone(t;z_{1}) dt\bigg)\hypvol(z)+\notag\\&
\frac{1}{4}\bigg(\int_{0}^{\infty}\delone \khypone(t;z_{1}) dt\bigg)\cdot\bigg(\int_{0}^{\infty}\deltwo \khyptwo(t;z_{2}) dt\bigg)\hypvol(z).
\end{align*}
The above relation, which we call the key-identity, relates the two natural metrics defined on a
K\"ahler-orbifold of dimension two. The key-identity is proved for compact hyperbolic Riemann surfaces,
by J.~Jorgenson and J.~Kramer in \cite{jk}. The same authors extended the key-identity to noncompact
hyperbolic Riemann surfaces of finite volume in \cite{bonn}. Following diferent methods, the
key-identity is extended to noncompact hyperbolic Riemann orbisurfaces in \cite{anilpaper}.
\paragraph{Arithmetic significance}
The key-identity is the most significant technical result of \cite{jk}, which transforms a
problem in Arakelov theory into that of hyperbolic geometry. The key-identity has enabled
J.~Jorgenson and J.~Kramer to derive optimal bounds for the canonical Green's function defined on a compact hyperbolic Riemann
surface $X$ in terms of invariants coming from the hyperbolic geometry of $X$.

\vspace{0.2cm}\noindent
Using the key-identity one can relate the holomorphic world of cusp forms with the $C^{\infty}$
world of M\"ass forms, via the spectral expansion of the hyperbolic heat kernel in terms
of M\"ass forms. In fact, J.~Jorgenson and J.~Kramer have derived a Rankin-Selberg $L$-function
relation relating the Fourier coefficients of cusp forms with those of M\"ass forms in \cite{bonn}.

\vspace{0.2cm}\noindent
Our main result is the first instance of an extension of the key-identity to higher dimensions,
relating the cusp forms of the group $\Gamma_{1}\times\Gamma_{2}$ with the M\"ass forms defined on
$X_{1}$ and $X_{2}$ via the spectral expansions of the hyperbolic heat kernels $\khypone(t;z_{1})$ and
$\khyptwo(t;z_{2})$, respectively.
{\small{\paragraph{Acknowledgements}
This article was realized during the author's graduate studies, which was completed under the
supervision of  J.~Kramer at Humboldt Universit\"at zu Berlin. The author would like to express his
gratitude to J.~Jorgenson and J.~Kramer for introducing him to the exciting area of heat kernels and
automorphic forms, and for generously discussing many new scientific ideas, which resulted in the
completion of this project.

The author would also like to extend his gratitude to N.~Walji, who through many interesting scientific
discussions has conveyed the importance of the key-identity. }}
\section{Background material}\label{section1}
For $i=1, 2$, let $\Gamma_{i} \subset \mathrm{PSL}_{2}(\mathbb{R})$ be a Fuchsian subgroup of the first kind acting by
fractional linear transformations on the upper half-plane $\mathbb{H}$. Let $X_{i}$ be the quotient space $\Gamma_{i}\backslash \mathbb{H}$, and let $g_{i}$
denote the genus of $X_{i}$. The quotient space $X_{i}$ admits the structure of a Riemann orbisurface.

\vspace{0.2cm}
Let $\mathcal{E}_{i}$ and $\mathcal{P}_{i}$ be the finite sets of elliptic fixed points and cusps of
$X_{i}$, respectively; put $\mathcal{S}_{i} = \mathcal{E}_{i}\cup\mathcal{P}_{i}$. For
$\mathfrak{e}_{i}\in \mathcal{E}_{i}$, let $m_{\mathfrak{e}_{i}}$ denote the order of $\mathfrak{e}_{i}$; for
$p_{i}\in \mathcal{P}_{i}$, put $m_{p_{i}}=\infty$; for $z_{i}\in X_{i}\backslash \mathcal{E}_{i}$, put $m_{z_{i}}=1.$ Let $\overline{X}_{i}$
denote $\overline{X}_{i}=X_{i}\cup\mathcal{P}_{i}.$

\vspace{0.2cm}
Locally, away from the elliptic fixed points and the cusps, we identify $\overline{X}_{i}$ with its
universal cover $\mathbb{H}$, and hence, denote the points on $\overline{X}_{i}\backslash
\mathcal{S}_{i}$ by the same letter as the points on $\mathbb{H}$.

\vspace{0.2cm}
The quotient space $\overline{X}_{i}$ admits the structure of a compact Riemann surface. We refer the
reader to Section 1.8 in $\cite{miyake}$, for the details regarding the structure of $\overline{X}_{i}$ as a compact Riemann surface.

\vspace{0.2cm}
Let $X$ denote the product of the Riemann orbisurfaces $X_{1}\times X_{2}$. Then, $X$ admits the
structure of a complex K\"ahler-orbifold of dimension two. The boundary of $X$ is given by
$\partial X=\big(X_{1}\times\mathcal{P}_{2}\big)\cup\big(X_{2}\times\mathcal{P}_{1}
\big)$, and the compactification of $X$ is given by $\overline{X}=\overline{X}_{1}\times\overline{X}_{2}$.

\paragraph{Hyperbolic metric}
For $i=1,2$, we denote the (1,1)-form corresponding to the hyperbolic metric of $X_{i}$, which is compatible with the complex structure on $X_{i}$
and has constant negative curvature equal to minus one, by $\hypi(z_{i})$. Locally, for
$z_{i}\in X_{i}\backslash \mathcal{E}_{i}$, it is given by
\begin{equation*}
 \hypi(z_{i})= \frac{i}{2}\cdot\frac{dz_{i}\wedge d\overline{z}_{i}}{{\Im(z_{i})}^{2}}.
\end{equation*}
From the above formula, it follows that the hyperbolic metric $\hypi(z_{i})$ is singular at the elliptic fixed points and at the cusps.

\vspace{0.2cm}
Let $\vx(X_{i})$ be the volume of $X_{i}$ with respect to the hyperbolic metric $\hypi(z_{i})$. It is given by the formula
\begin{equation*}
\vx(X_{i}) = 2\pi\bigg(2g_{i} -2 + |\mathcal{P}_{i}|+\sum_{\mathfrak{e}_{i} \in \mathcal{E}_{i}}\bigg(1-
\frac{1}{m_{\mathfrak{e}_{i}}}\bigg)\bigg).
\end{equation*}
We denote the (1,1)-form corresponding to the hyperbolic metric of $X$, which is compatible with the complex structure on $X$, by $\hyp(z)$
and the corresponding volume form by $\hypvol(z)$. Locally, for
$z=(z_{1},z_{2})\in (X_{1}\backslash \mathcal{E}_{1})\times(X_{2}\backslash \mathcal{E}_{2})$, it is given by
\begin{align*}
\hyp(z)= \hypone(z_{1})+\hyptwo(z_{2})=\frac{i}{2}\cdot\frac{dz_{1}\wedge d\overline{z}_{1}}{{\Im(z_{1})}^{2}}+\frac{i}{2}\cdot\frac{dz_{2}\wedge
d\overline{z}_{2}}{{\Im(z_{2})}^{2}},
\end{align*}
and the corresponding volume form is given by
\begin{align*}
\hypvol(z)=\hypone(z_{i})\wedge\hyptwo(z_{2})=-\frac{dz_{1}\wedge d\overline{z}_{1}\wedge dz_{2}\wedge d\overline{z}_{2}}{2\Im(z_{1})^{2}\Im(z_{2})^{2}}.
\end{align*}
\paragraph{Canonical metric}
For $i=1,2$, let $S_{2}(\Gamma_{i})$ denote the $\mathbb{C}$-vector space of cusp forms of
weight 2 with respect to $\Gamma_{i}$ equipped with the Petersson inner-product. Let
$\lbrace f_{1}^{i},\ldots,f_{g_{i}}^{i}\rbrace $ denote an orthonormal basis of $S_{2}(\Gamma_{i})$
with respect to the Petersson inner-product. Then, the (1,1)-form $\cani(z_{i})$ corresponding to the
canonical metric of $X_{i}$ is given by
\begin{equation*}
\cani(z_{i})=\frac{i}{2g_{i}} \sum_{j=1}^{g_{i}}\left|f_{j}^{i}(z_{i})\right|^{2}dz_{i}\wedge d\overline{z}_{i}.
\end{equation*}
The canonical metric $\cani(z)$ remains smooth at the elliptic fixed points and at the cusps, and measures
the volume of $X$ to be one.

\vspace{0.2cm}
Let $\Omega_{\overline{X}_{i}}^{1}$ denote the cotangent bundle of holomorphic differential forms of degree
one on $\overline{X}_{i}$. Recall that for each $f^{i}\in S_{2}(\Gamma_{i})$, $f^{i}(z_{i})dz_{i}$
defines a holomorphic differential form of degree one on $\overline{X}_{i}$, and every holomorphic
differential form of degree one on $\overline{X}_{i}$ comes from a weight 2 cusp form. So
$\lbrace f_{1}^{i},\ldots,f_{g_{i}}^{i}\rbrace $ the orthonormal basis of $S_{2}(\Gamma_{i})$ with
respect to the Petersson inner-product gives us an orthonormal basis $\lbrace f_{1}^{i}dz_{i},\ldots,f_{g_{i}}^{i}dz_{i}\rbrace $ of $H^{0}(\overline{X}_{i},\Omega_{\overline{X}_{i}}^{1})$
endowed with the $L^{2}$-inner product given by
\begin{align*}
\langle\alpha^{i},\beta^{i} \rangle=\frac{i}{2}\int_{\overline{X}}\alpha^{i}(z_{i})\overline{\beta^{i}(z_{i})},
\end{align*}
where $\alpha^{i},\beta^{i}\in\Omega_{\overline{X}_{i}}^{1}$.

\vspace{0.2cm}
Let $\Omega_{\overline{X}}^{2}$ denote the space of holomorphic differential forms of degree 2, and let $\lbrace \omega_{1}, \ldots, \omega_{n}
\rbrace $ denote an orthonormal basis of $H^{0}(\overline{X},\Omega_{\overline{X}}^{2})$ endowed with the $L^{2}$-inner product given by
\begin{align*}
\langle\alpha,\beta \rangle=-\frac{1}{4}\int_{\overline{X}}\alpha(z)\overline{\beta(z)},
\end{align*}
where $n$ denotes the dimension of $H^{0}(\overline{X},\Omega_{\overline{X}}^{2})$ as a vector space over $\mathbb{C}$, and
$\alpha,\beta\in\Omega_{\overline{X}}^{2}$. Then, the canonical volume form on $X$ is defined as
\begin{align*}
\canvol(z)=-\frac{1}{4n}\sum_{j=1}^{n}\omega_{j}(z)\wedge\overline{\omega_{j}(z)}.
\end{align*}
The canonical volume form $\canvol(z)$ measures the volume of $X$ to be one.
\paragraph{Hyperbolic Laplacian}
For $i=1,2$, the hyperbolic Laplacian acting on smooth functions defined on $X_{i}$ is given by
\begin{align*}
\deli =-y_{i}^{2}\bigg(\frac{\partial^{2}}{\partial x_{i}^{2}}+\frac{\partial^{2}}{\partial y_{i}^{2}}\bigg),
\end{align*}
and the hyperbolic Laplacian acting on smooth functions defined on $X$ is given by
\begin{align*}
\del=\delone+\deltwo= -y_{1}^{2}\bigg(\frac{\partial^{2}}{\partial x_{1}^{2}}+\frac{\partial^{2}}{\partial y_{1}^{2}}\bigg)-
y_{2}^{2}\bigg(\frac{\partial^{2}}{\partial x_{2}^{2}}+\frac{\partial^{2}}{\partial y_{2}^{2}}\bigg).
\end{align*}
\paragraph{Hyperbolic heat kernels}
For $t \in \mathbb{R}_{> 0}$  and $z, w \in \mathbb{H}$, let $K_{\mathbb{H}}(t;z,w)$ denote the hyperbolic heat kernel on $\mathbb{R}_{> 0}
\times\mathbb{H}\times\mathbb{H}$.

\vspace{0.2cm}
For $i=1,2$, $t \in  \mathbb{R}_{> 0}$ and $z_{i}, w_{i} \in X_{i}$, the hyperbolic heat kernel $\khypi(t;z_{i},w_{i})$ on
$\mathbb{R}_{> 0}\times X_{i}\times X_{i}$ is defined as
\begin{equation}\label{defnkhyp}
\khypi(t;z_{i},w_{i})=\sum_{\gamma_{i}\in\Gamma_{i}}K_{\mathbb{H}}(t;z_{i},\gamma_{i} w_{i}).
\end{equation}
For $z_{i},w_{i}\in X_{i}$, the hyperbolic heat kernel $\khypi(t;z_{i},w_{i})$ satisfies the differential equation
\begin{align}\label{diffeqnkhyp}
\bigg(\Delta_{\text{hyp},z}^{i} + \frac{\partial}{\partial t}\bigg)\khypi(t;z,w) &=0,
\end{align}
Furthermore, for a fixed $w_{i}\in X_{i}$, and any smooth function $f^{i}$ on $X_{i}$, the hyperbolic heat kernel $\khypi(t;z_{i},w_{i})$
satisfies the equation
\begin{align}\label{normcondkhyp}
\lim_{t\rightarrow 0}\int_{X_{i}}\khypi(t;z_{i},w_{i})f^{i}(z)\hypi(z_{i}) &= f^{i}(w_{i}).
\end{align}
To simplify notation, we write $\khypi(t;z_{i})$ instead of $\khypi(t;z_{i},z_{i})$, when $z_{i}=w_{i}$.
\paragraph{Key-identity on $X_{i}$}
For $i=1,2$, $z_{i}\in X_{i} \backslash \mathcal{E}_{i}$, we have the relation of differential forms
\begin{align}\label{keyidentityrs}
&g_{i}\cani(z_{i}) =\bigg(\frac{1}{4\pi}+ \frac{1}{\vx(X_{i})}\bigg)\hypi(z_{i})+ \frac{1}{2}\bigg(\int_{0}^{\infty}\deli \khypi(t;z_{i}) dt\bigg)
\hypi(z_{i}).
\end{align}
This relation has been established as Theorem 3.4 in \cite{jk}, when $X_{i}$ is
compact. The proof given in \cite{jk} applies to our case where $X$ does admit elliptic fixed points and
cusps, as long as $z_{i}\in X_{i}\backslash \mathcal{E}_{i}$.

\vspace{0.2cm}
In \cite{anilpaper}, the above identity is extended to elliptic fixed points and cusps at the level of
currents.
\section{Key-identity on $X$}\label{section2}
\begin{lem}\label{lem1}
The dimension of $H^{0}(\overline{X},\Omega_{\overline{X}}^{2})$ as a vector space over $\mathbb{C}$ is $g_{1}g_{2}$, and
for $z=(z_{1},z_{2})\in X$, the canonical volume form is given by
\begin{align}\label{lem1eqn}
\canvol(z)=\canone(z_{1})\wedge\cantwo(z_{2})=-\frac{1}{4g_{1}g_{2}}\sum_{j=1}^{g_{1}}\sum_{k=1}^{g_{2}}|f^{1}_{j}(z_{1})|^{2}\cdot|f^{2}_{k}(z_{2})|^{2}
dz_{1}\wedge d\overline{z}_{1}\wedge dz_{2}\wedge d\overline{z}_{2}.
\end{align}
\begin{proof}
From K\"unneth theorem of algebraic geometry, we have
\begin{align*}
H^{0}\big(\overline{X},\Omega_{\overline{X}}^{2}\big)=H^{0}\big(\overline{X}_{1},\Omega_{\overline{X}_{1}}^{1}\big)\otimes H^{0}\big(\overline{X}_{2},
\Omega_{\overline{X}_{2}}^{1}\big).
\end{align*}
So from the isomorphism $S_{2}(\Gamma_{i})\cong H^{0}(\overline{X}_{i},\Omega_{\overline{X}_{i}}^{1})$, it follows that the
set
\begin{align*}
\big\lbrace f^{1}_{j}f^{2}_{k} \big\rbrace_{\substack{1\leq j\leq g_{1}\\1\leq k\leq g_{2}}}
\end{align*}
forms an orthonormal basis of $H^{0}(\overline{X},\Omega_{\overline{X}}^{2})$, which implies that
\begin{align*}
\canvol(z)=-\frac{1}{4g_{1}g_{2}}\sum_{j=1}^{g_{1}}\sum_{k=1}^{g_{2}}|f^{1}_{j}(z_{1})|^{2}\cdot |f^{2}_{k}(z_{2})|^{2}
dz_{1}\wedge d\overline{z}_{1}\wedge dz_{2}\wedge d\overline{z}_{2}.
\end{align*}
Furthermore, a direct calculation, shows that $\canone(z_{1})\wedge\cantwo (z_{2})=\canvol(z)$, which completes the proof of the lemma.
\end{proof}
\end{lem}
\begin{thm}\label{thm2}
For $z=(z_{1},z_{2})\in (X_{1}\backslash \mathcal{E}_{1})\times (X_{2}\backslash \mathcal{E}_{2})$, we have the relation of differential forms
\begin{align*}
&g_{1}g_{2}\canvol(z)=\bigg(\frac{1}{4\pi}+ \frac{1}{\vx(X_{1})}\bigg)\cdot \bigg(\frac{1}{4\pi}+
\frac{1}{\vx(X_{2})}\bigg)\hypvol(z)+\frac{1}{2}\bigg(\frac{1}{4\pi}+ \frac{1}{\vx(X_{1})}\bigg)\times
\\&\bigg(\int_{0}^{\infty}\deltwo \khyptwo(t;z_{2}) dt\bigg)\hypvol(z)+
\frac{1}{2}\bigg(\frac{1}{4\pi}+ \frac{1}{\vx(X_{2})}\bigg)\cdot\bigg(\int_{0}^{\infty}\delone \khypone(t;z_{1}) dt\bigg)\hypvol(z)+\notag\\&
\frac{1}{4}\bigg(\int_{0}^{\infty}\delone \khypone(t;z_{1}) dt\bigg)\cdot\bigg(\int_{0}^{\infty}\deltwo \khyptwo(t;z_{2}) dt\bigg)\hypvol(z).
\end{align*}
\begin{proof}
The proof of the theorem follows from combining equations \eqref{keyidentityrs} and \eqref{lem1eqn}.
\end{proof}
\end{thm}

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaArXiv


text:
Latina/o Religion, Culture, and Society Unit
This Unit examines, through systematic study and reflection, the social locations, religious beliefs, and practices of the rich and diverse multicultural backgrounds of Latinas/os in the United States. The Unit recognizes that this is an interdisciplinary enterprise in view of the cultural and religious roots and sources of Latinos/as, including heritages from Europe, indigenous nations of the Americas, Africa, and Asia. The traditions emerging out of the mixture of these cultures throughout the Americas continue to undergo further development and innovation in the North American context, producing the distinct phenomena of Latino/a theologies and religions. It is this rich and deep religious/theological-cultural-social-political complex that is the focus of this Unit.
We solicit papers in the following 6 areas of study. Anyone who wishes to organize a panel on a subject not listed below may also contact one or both of the Unit's co-chairs to propose the panel.
● Building on the AAR's theme focused on "creating, redefining, and expanding spheres of public discourse," we invite papers on San Diego's Chicano Park and its mural paintings. This multi-unit co-sponsored session will likely be supplemented by a separate tour to the site. In 1970 Chicano Park emerged through the efforts of community activists responding to the fracture and displacement of Chicanx communities caused by the construction of the Interstate 5 freeway in the barrio of Logan Heights. On this freeway's pillars, Chicano Park displays one of the largest assemblages of public murals in North America, inspired by Chicanx history. In 2018, the San Diego Tribune described the space as a "battleground" for cultural identity between right wing groups waving American flags and Chicanx groups waving flags of Aztlan. We welcome papers from multiple disciplinary vantage points. We are particularly interested in proposals that take an ecological approach by engaging both the manner in which the contested space informs religious/spiritual identities and practices and the manner in which Chicanx spiritualities have influenced this built environment. Likely co-sponsors include the following Units: Religion and Cities; Religions in the Latin Americas; Native Traditions in the Americas; Latina/o Religion, Culture and Society; Anthropology of Religion; Religion, Memory, History; Ecclesial Practices; and Latina/o and Latin American Biblical Interpretation (SBL).
● We invite papers for a co-sponsored session that engage and analyze the work of the recently departed scholar Luis León, for a commemorative co-sponsored panel. Likely co-sponsors include the following Units: North American Religions; and Religions in the Latin Americas.
● We invite papers for a tri-sponsored session that analyze religion, social class, and the 'food chain.' This may include food-chain labor; food ecologies; theological meanings of food labor; food injustice; Latinx food culture/religiosity; ghettoization, ethnicization, and/or gendering of food labor spaces; and other relevant topics. Likely co-sponsors include the following Units: Religion and Food; and Class, Religion, and Theology.
● We invite papers for a co-sponsored session on Ancestry and Death/Los Muertos in indigenous religious traditions. We are particularly interested in scholarship on indigenous and Latinx celebrations of Día de Muertos. Likely co-sponsors include the following Units: Indigenous Religious Traditions.
● We invite invite papers for a tri-sponsored session that explores the themes of religious contact, crossings, and contestation, and especially encourage historical perspectives on militarized border encounters (broadly construed). The quincentennial of the Hernán Cortez's arrival in Mexico occasions us to consider contact cultures in the history of Christianity in the Americas and the longer legacy of incommensurate religious, cultural, political, and social encounters. The location of the AAR's 2019 meeting in San Diego further invites interrogations of borders as sites and metaphors of contact as well as of containment. 250 years after Cortez's landfall, Fr. Junipero Serra, also under the auspices of the Spanish Crown, undertook the establishment of missions throughout California. The first of these, San Diego de Alcalá, founded 250 years ago (1769), symbolizes the expansion and contested legacy of the Spanish borderlands. San Diego itself epitomizes the gateway of contact and encounters. Theorizing from her twentieth century context, critic Gloria Anzaldúa argued, "The U.S.-Mexican border es una herida abierta (is an open wound) where the third world grates against the first and bleeds." In recent weeks, confrontations between the "caravan" of Hondurans and armed agents of the United States' heavily-militarized border at the gates of the San Diego-Tijuana crossing, serve as a sobering reminders of Anzaldúa's description, while complicating the longer legacy of borders in the Americas. Likely co-sponsors include the following Units: History of Christianity; and Religion, Memory, and History.
● We invite papers for a session on climate change, displacement, and legal violence. Papers should address topics related to climate-related violence and Latinx communities in the U.S.A. and beyond. Topics of interest include ecological racism, loss of land and economic upheaval, gentrification, or other more hidden forms of climate-related violence against peoples. Recent reports from the United Nations, climate and social scientists, and social movements have demonstrated for a wider audience that climate change is not merely a theoretical hypothesis for the future, but an all too present reality. Moreover, sociologist Tracy Skillington (in "Climate Justice without Freedom," 2015) studied the consequences of climate change for persons displaced by climate change, and referred to the legislative opposition to refugees by industrialized countries as "legal violence." Theology and ethics have rich traditions of speaking to issues related to creation care and the consequences arising when we neglect this calling: from the Jewish notion of tikun olam, theologies arising from Native American and other indigenous spiritualities, to more recent contributions of ecofeminists and other scholar-practitioners. Situating our conversation at the intersections of religious/philosophical, environmental, and social scientific thought, we invite papers that address climate-related violence, Latinx communities, religion, and social justice. Likely co-sponsors include the following Units: La Comunidad of Hispanic Scholars of Religion.
Jeremy V. Cruz, cruzj@stjohns.edu
Lauren Frances Guerra, laurenguerra18@gmail.com
Grace Vargas, gracev@smu.edu
Jacqueline Hidalgo, jh3@williams.edu
Jennifer Owens-Jofré, jowens-jofre@austinseminary.edu
Lloyd Barba, lbarba@amherst.edu
Matilde Moros, mmoros@vcu.edu
Wendy Arce, wendy.arce@gmail.com


text:
Chuck Gallery > Home > Press Release > Manchester Art Scene Enriched with New African Gallery
Manchester Art Scene Enriched with New African Gallery
Famed for its eclectic art scene, Manchester adds the vibrancy of contemporary West African art to its cultural offering with the opening of Chuck Gallery – the city's only Art Gallery dedicated to the promotion of modern African art and the only gallery of its kind outside of London.
MANCHESTER, MAN – Manchester is regarded as the 'Creative Capital of the North', having developed a reputation for itself as an exciting city to experience art based on its rich cultural diversity. From historic collections at the Manchester Art Gallery, to contemporary Chinese exhibitions at the Centre for Chinese Contemporary Art, and progressive installations at the Artzu Gallery the city has a lot to offer to the art enthusiast, plus much more besides. Art from cultures around the world have found permanent residency in Manchester's many galleries over the years yet African Art has remained a temporary visitor with only one-off exhibitions from time to time, that is until now and the opening of Chuck Gallery.
Chuck Gallery is a privately opened art space based at 166 Plymouth Grove in Longsight. The gallery first opened its doors to the public in January 2016 with a solo exhibition called 'Exuberance, Forms and the Notion of Self' featuring famous Nigerian contemporary artist, Fidel Oyiogu. Not content with only introducing established artists to the Manchester community, Chuck Gallery is also committed to discovering emerging talent and providing a platform for unknown artists to connect with the wider public. As was the case in the galleries most recent exhibition, 'Intransigence', which featured the paintings sculptors of two upcoming Nigerian artists Okey Ibeabuchi and Joel Utuedor.
The gallery's founder, Chukwudi Onwudiwe, is a well-known art dealer in Lagos, Nigeria with a wealth of experience trading art in the African market. When asked why he decided to establish a gallery of this kind in Manchester, a far cry from Lagos, he said:
"Manchester has its own, unique, edgy features. It is an alternative capital (to London) with its own culture and history. There's an interesting African demographic in Manchester that appreciates art but the city is also interested in many cultures. This gallery presents another angle to that interest."
"Our Gallery is not just a space to display nice art but is a venue that allows artists to feature a body of work and show their stylistic progress over time. Additionally, the gallery creates access to people who are interested in art and open to creativity of any kind."
Vinejuice – http://www.vinejuice.co.uk/manchester-art-scene-enriched-with-new-african-gallery/
Arts and Review
Gina Henrie says
I've been looking into getting into visiting art galleries with my husband but not sure how to go about it. I like what you said about how you said that Manchester is regarded as the Creative Capital of the North, this is good to know thanks for sharing!
The Guardian Art News
Smashed cars and Chinese chewing: the five masterpieces of video art January 19, 2020
Minha casa é sua casa: The family who turned their Lisbon home into a hotel January 19, 2020
An Experience So Marvellous
Artist Makes Big Impression During Women's History Month
Bracing for the MARVEL Moment
Chukwudi Onwudiwe | the man behind the gallery
Exuberance, Forms and the Notion of Self
Future Talent inspired by Gallery Visit
Intransigence
Manchester's Great and Emerging Self-portraitures; LS Lowry and Jessica Omitola
Spillage Exhibition Meet the Artist Event
The Experience of a Chuck Gallery First-Time Art Buyer
Unmasking celebrates International Women's Day
Welcoming Bolaji Ogunwo to the Gallery
Your ticket for the: Manchester Art Scene Enriched with New African Gallery