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Faya v. Almaraz
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167 Citing Cases
Full title:SONJA FAYA v. BETTY ALMARAZ, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF…
Court:Court of Appeals of Maryland
329 Md. 435 (Md. 1993)
620 A.2d 327
Court of Appeals of Maryland
holding that patients stated a proper cause of action sounding in negligence when they alleged that the physician breached a duty to obtain their informed consent by failing to inform them that he was infected with the AIDS virus before operating, without alleging that physician breached the standard of care in performing the procedure
Summary of this case from McQuitty v. Spangler
See 25 Summaries
Nos. 143, 144, September Term, 1991.
March 9, 1993.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Joseph H.H. Kaplan, J.
Harry B. Siegel (Joel Marc Abramson, Law Offices of Joel Marc Abramson, all on brief), Columbia, for appellant.
Deborah Byrnes (William B. Whiteford, Whiteford, Taylor, Preston, all on brief), Towson, Paul F. Strain (Jana Howard Carey, David J. Heubeck, Mitchell Y. Mirviss, Venable, Baetjer Howard, all on brief), Baltimore, for appellees.
Jonathan Schochor (Philip C. Federico, Kerry D. Staton, Schochor, Federico and Staton, PA, all on brief), Baltimore, for appellant in No. 144.
Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, CHASANOW, KARWACKI and ROBERT M. BELL, JJ.
MURPHY, Chief Judge.
These companion cases present the important question whether a surgeon infected with the AIDS virus has a legal duty to inform patients of that condition before operating upon them and, failing that, whether a patient's fear of having contracted the AIDS virus from the infected surgeon constitutes a legally compensable injury where the patient has not shown HIV-positive status.
Central to an understanding of these cases are the nature of the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) and its relationship to the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV or "the AIDS virus"). First isolated and identified by scientists in 1983, HIV is a retrovirus that attacks the human immune system. The virus invades host cells, notably certain lymphocytes, replicates itself, weakens the immune system, and ultimately destroys the body's capacity to ward off disease.
HIV's presence is detected by a laboratory blood test for antibodies to the virus. The virus may reside latently in the body for periods as long as ten years or more, during which time the infected person will manifest no symptoms of illness and function normally. HIV typically spreads via genital fluids or blood transmitted from one person to another through sexual contact, the sharing of needles in intravenous drug use, blood transfusions, infiltration into wounds, or from mother to child during pregnancy or birth. See Jonathan N. Weber Robin A. Weiss, HIV Infection: The Cellular Picture, Scientific American, October 1988, at 100-109; William A. Haseltine Flossie Wong-Staal, The Molecular Biology of the AIDS Virus, Scientific American, October 1988, at 52-62; Jay A. Levy, Human Immunodeficiency Viruses and the Pathogenesis of AIDS, 261 J.Am. Med.Ass'n 2997, 2998-3001 (1989); Thomas R. O'Brien et al., Testing for Antibodies to Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 2 in the United States, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, July 17, 1992, Vol. 41, No. RR-12; Donald Hermann William Schurgin et al., Legal Aspects of AIDS §§ 1:05-1:07, 1:24-1:34 (1991).
AIDS, in turn, is the condition that eventually results from an immune system gravely impaired by HIV. Medical studies have indicated that most people who carry the virus will progress to AIDS. AIDS patients by definition are profoundly immunocompromised; that is, they are prone to any number of diseases and opportunistic infections that a person with a healthy immune system might otherwise resist. AIDS is thus the acute clinical phase of immune dysfunction. Among the prevalent "AIDS-defining" diagnoses are Kaposi's sarcoma, a rare cancer; pneumocystis carinii pneumonia; cytomegalovirus infections of the eye and gastrointestinal tract; mycobacterium avium-intracellulare, a rare type of tuberculosis; and severe, prolonged yeast infections or herpes. See Institute of Medicine/National Academy of Science, Confronting AIDS: Directions for Public Health, Health Care and Research (1986) and Confronting AIDS: Update 1988 (1988); Robert R. Redfield Donald S. Burke, HIV Infection: The Clinical Picture, Scientific American, October 1988, at 90-98; Donald Hermann William Schurgin et al., Legal Aspects of AIDS §§ 1:10-1:23 (1991). AIDS is invariably fatal.
Dr. Rudolf Almaraz, an oncological surgeon specializing in breast cancer with operative privileges at the Johns Hopkins Hospital (Hopkins) in Baltimore, knew himself to be HIV-positive, i.e. a carrier of the HIV virus, since 1986. On October 7, 1988, Almaraz performed a partial mastectomy and axillary dissection on Sonja Faya at Hopkins. He removed an axillary hematoma from Faya the following March. On November 14, 1989, again at Hopkins, Almaraz surgically excised a benign lump from the breast of Perry Mahoney Rossi. The therapeutic outcome of these operations is not in dispute.
On October 27, 1989, Almaraz was first diagnosed as suffering from cytomegalovirus retinitis, the eye infection signaling full-blown AIDS. That diagnosis was confirmed by a second ophthalmologist on November 17, 1989. Thus, as well as knowing his HIV-positive status throughout the period in question, Almaraz knew that he had AIDS prior to the Rossi operation.
Almaraz gave up his practice of medicine on March 1, 1990. He terminated his association with Hopkins in June of that year. He died of AIDS on November 16, 1990. Faya and Rossi learned of their physician's illness for the first time from a local newspaper on or about December 6, 1990, well over a year after Rossi's operation and twenty months after Faya's last contact with Almaraz. Both Faya and Rossi immediately underwent blood tests for the AIDS virus, which came back negative for both. Nevertheless, by December 11 Sonja Faya, Perry Mahoney Rossi, and her husband, Dennis T. Rossi (appellants), filed suit against Almaraz's estate, his Maryland professional association business entity, and Hopkins (appellees) for compensatory and punitive damages.
In their separate actions filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, the appellants, in a multiplicity of counts, alleged various wrongful acts by Dr. Almaraz and Hopkins. Common to both complaints were counts alleging negligence, negligent failure to obtain the patients' informed consent, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. To these Faya added counts for negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract. The Rossi complaint, as amended, contained further counts alleging loss of consortium, breach of fiduciary duty, and battery.
Faya and Rossi filed parallel complaints with the Health Claims Arbitration Office of Maryland. Both parties, however, subsequently elected to waive arbitration pursuant to Maryland Code (1989 Repl. Vol.) § 3-2A-06 of the Courts Judicial Proceedings Article.
The gist of the complaints was that Almaraz acted wrongfully in operating on the two women without first telling them that he was HIV-positive (and, later, ill from AIDS proper), and that Hopkins was culpable for permitting him to do so. More specifically, appellants alleged that at the time of the consultations and surgeries, Almaraz, knowing of his illness, failed to inform them of any risk of contracting HIV that might result from his performance of the surgical procedures. They alluded to the possibility of a puncture or laceration through the protective garments worn by the surgeon and a consequent commingling of his blood with their blood. They claimed that by undergoing their operations in ignorance of Almaraz's illness, they were exposed to a hazard they would otherwise have avoided by withholding their consent, namely, a risk of AIDS attendant upon invasive surgery.
Both Faya and Rossi alleged that the hospital failed independently to take steps, such as the suspension of Dr. Almaraz's surgical privileges, to prevent him from operating on unsuspecting patients, or to adequately obtain informed consent from such patients. They further imputed to Hopkins vicarious liability for Almaraz's conduct, alleging that the physician acted as the hospital's agent or employee.
Appellants averred in their complaints that as a proximate result of the operations and their subsequent discovery of the alleged wrongdoing by Almaraz and Hopkins, they incurred injuries in the form of exposure to HIV and risk of AIDS, physical injury and financial cost resulting from surveillance blood testing for HIV antibodies, pain, fear, anxiety, grief, nervous shock, severe emotional distress, headache and sleeplessness.
Appellees filed motions to dismiss the complaints pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-322 on the ground that appellants had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The representatives of Dr. Almaraz asserted that the physician owed no duty to disclose his ailment as part of the doctor-patient exchange leading to informed consent. Hopkins contended, in the main, that it had no duty to investigate and ascertain Almaraz's HIV status; the hospital added that the obligations imposed by the informed consent doctrine did not extend to it in any case. The appellees further averred that the complaints were legally deficient in that appellants failed to allege that the AIDS virus entered their bodies as a result of surgery, and that the claimed injuries were not legally compensable because they rested on fear of a risk that never materialized.
The court (Kaplan, J.) dismissed both complaints in their entirety. In so doing, it concluded that Faya and the Rossis had failed to allege a legally compensable injury, and that their counts must therefore fail as a matter of law. The court first held that appellants had failed to plead sufficient allegations of exposure to the AIDS virus. Judge Kaplan reasoned:
"Because there are no reported cases of transmission of AIDS from a surgeon to a patient, such transmission is only a theoretical possibility when proper barrier techniques are employed. . . .
Plaintiff[s] [have] not alleged that Dr. Almaraz failed to use proper barrier techniques. Furthermore, Plaintiff[s] [have] not alleged that any incident or accident occurred during surgery that would have caused Dr. Almaraz's blood to enter [their bodies]."
The trial court next observed that Ms. Faya and Mrs. Rossi had tested HIV-negative, that is, free of the AIDS virus, in early December 1990. Judge Kaplan thus concluded that even if the appellants had been potentially exposed to the virus, their HIV-negative status more than six months after surgery made it extremely unlikely that they will develop AIDS. Accordingly, the court deemed the injury claimed by appellants to be "the fear that something that did not happen could have happened," holding that such a fear did not represent an actionable injury for which damages might be recovered. Faya and the Rossis appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. We issued a writ of certiorari prior to intermediate appellate review to address the important and timely issues raised in these cases.
IV A
In determining whether the trial court erred in granting the motions to dismiss, we must accept as true all well-pleaded facts and allegations in the complaints, together with reasonable inferences properly drawn therefrom. Dismissal is proper only if the facts and allegations, so viewed, would nevertheless fail to afford plaintiff relief if proven. Berman v. Karvounis, 308 Md. 259, 264-65, 518 A.2d 726 (1987); Sharrow v. State Farm Mutual, 306 Md. 754, 768, 511 A.2d 492 (1986); Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 116, 135-36, 492 A.2d 618 (1985); Ungar v. State, 63 Md. App. 472, 479, 492 A.2d 1336 (1985).
We said in Figueiredo-Torres v. Nickel, 321 Md. 642, 647, 584 A.2d 69 (1991), that "`any ambiguity or uncertainty in the allegations bearing on whether the complaint states a cause of action must be construed against the pleader,'" quoting Sharrow, supra, 306 Md. at 768, 511 A.2d 492. See also Berman, supra, 308 Md. at 265, 518 A.2d 726 ("[W]hat we consider are allegations of fact and inferences deducible therefrom, not merely conclusory charges.")
Moreover, in order to place a complaint in context, we may take judicial notice of additional facts that are either matters of common knowledge or capable of certain verification. McCormick, Evidence, §§ 329-330 (4th ed. 1992); Murphy, Maryland Evidence Handbook, § 1000(A)(1-2) (1989). Included in the latter category are facts "capable of immediate and certain verification by resort to sources whose accuracy is beyond dispute." Murphy, supra, § 1000(A)(2); see also McLain, Maryland Evidence, § 201.4 (1987); Fed.R.Evid. 201(b)(2). In the medical context we have relied, for example, on basic information about sexually transmitted diseases as found in medical journals and reports of the Centers for Disease Control. See B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 139-40, 538 A.2d 1175 (1988) (genital herpes is a contagious, painful, and incurable disease, spread by sexual contact, that endangers public health). The Maryland Court of Special Appeals has relied on similar sources to assess the need for precautions against AIDS transmission. See Wiggins v. State, 76 Md. App. 188, 198, 544 A.2d 8 (1988) (wearing of gloves by courtroom security personnel during trial of defendant possibly suffering from AIDS is wholly inconsistent with current theories concerning AIDS transmission), rev'd on other grounds, 315 Md. 232, 554 A.2d 356 (1989).
Before examining the legal sufficiency of the appellants' complaints, therefore, we focus on several well-established and scientifically understood facts about AIDS and its transmission. As we have already noted, AIDS is the disease that results when opportunistic infection preys on a bodily immune system that has been weakened by HIV. HIV is a necessary prerequisite to developing AIDS. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Surgeon General's Report on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 10 (1987); Hermann Schurgin, supra, §§ 1:05-1:06. HIV is a fragile virus that can survive only in the habitat of bodily fluids. While others can carry HIV, the only fluids that can transmit the virus are blood, semen, vaginal fluids and breast milk. For the virus to pass from one person to another, at least one such fluid of the carrier must enter the body of the other. Surgeon General's Report, at 16. Hermann Schurgin, supra, § 1:07. HIV is primarily transmitted through unprotected sexual intercourse, the sharing of contaminated syringes among intravenous drug users, the blood transfusions, although transmission by the latter route has greatly decreased since the Red Cross began testing the blood supply in 1985. Surgeon General's Report, at 17-20; Hermann Schurgin, supra, §§ 1:24-1:27.
The trial court took notice of most of these facts, an action which we affirm. See Smith v. Hearst Corp., 48 Md. App. 135, 141, 426 A.2d 1, 4 (1981), cert. denied, 290 Md. 721 (1981).
The virus is only transmitted if it reaches the bloodstream of the transmittee. That is, the fluid of the carrier must pass through some channel to the transferee's blood system. Hence unprotected sex, needle-sharing, pregnancy and nursing are relatively efficient modes of transfer, while others are not; for HIV to pass in non-sexual, non-needle-sharing contexts, blood must pass both through a wound in the carrier and into a wound in the transferee. In short, the two parties' blood must commingle. Thus there have been no reports of HIV transmission through casual contact. Surgeon General's Report, at 21; Hermann Schurgin, supra, § 1:24.
We note that four separate studies conducted between 1985 and 1989, which examined a total of 4,703 patients who had been operated on by surgeons with AIDS, found no documented cases of HIV transfer from surgeon to patient. See Jeffrey J. Sacks, AIDS in a Surgeon, 313 New England Journal of Medicine 1017-1018 (1985) (study of 400 patients of Florida surgeon with AIDS); LTC Frances P. Armstrong et al., Investigation of a Health Care Worker with Symptomatic Immunodeficiency Virus Infection: An Epidemiologic Approach, 152 Military Medicine 414-418 (1987) (study of 1804 patients of military surgeon with AIDS); John D. Porter et al., Management of Patients Treated by Surgeon with HIV Infection, The Lancet, January 13, 1990, at 113-14 (study of 339 patients of British surgeon with AIDS); Ban Mishu et al., A Surgeon With AIDS: Lack of Evidence of Transmission to Patients, 264 J.Am.Med.Ass'n 467-70 (1990) (study of 2160 patients of Nashville surgeon with AIDS). Another study found the risk of HIV transfer from infected patients to health care workers, even when the latter were percutaneously exposed to the blood of the former, to be a mere 0.3% per exposure. David K. Henderson et al., Risk for Occupational Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 (HIV-1) Associated with Clinical Exposures, 113 Annals of Internal Medicine 740, 743-44 (1990).
We take notice of one other fact regarding HIV. While there is often a long latency period between infection with HIV and the onset of AIDS, at least 95% of HIV carriers will test positive for the virus (though not manifest AIDS) within six months of acquiring it. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, July 21, 1989, Vol. 38, No. S-7. See also C. Robert Horsburgh et al., Duration of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection before Detection of Antibody, The Lancet, September 16, 1989, at 637-40.
There has been some concern about the accuracy of the blood tests. However, when the separate ELISA (Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay) and Western Blot tests are used in conjunction, they are more than 99.9% accurate. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Voluntary HIV Counseling and Testing: Facts, Issues, and Answers, 1991. See also Kozup v. Georgetown University, 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1052-53 (D.D.C. 1987).
These characteristics of HIV and AIDS, which the lower court also recognized, are proper objects of judicial notice. We, therefore, reject the appellants' threshold contention that the court below, in dismissing their complaints, erroneously adopted statistics and medical information that were properly the subject of expert testimony, open to challenge at trial. See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288, 107 S.Ct. 1123, 1131, 94 L.Ed.2d 307 (1987) ("[C]ourts normally should defer to the reasonable medical judgments of public health officials."); Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 381 (D.N.J. 1990) ("This court must take medical science as it finds it; its decision may not be based on speculation of what the state of medical science may be in the future."). These facts derive from reputable scientific journals and institutions and are well-accepted within the medical community.
Other courts have taken judicial notice of these facts. See Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 381 (D.N.J. 1990) (observing that AIDS cannot be spread through casual contact, rejecting defendants' proffer of one article theorizing to the contrary in light of the uncertain state of medical knowledge about AIDS); Burk v. Sage Products, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285, 288 (E.D.Pa. 1990) ("It is a medically accepted fact . . . that a person who has been infected will still test positive for the HIV antibody during th[e] latency period when no symptoms [of AIDS] are evident, assuming the accuracy of the HIV test. It is extremely unlikely that a patient who tests HIV-negative more than six months after a potential exposure will contract the disease as a result of that exposure."); Kozup v. Georgetown University, 663 F. Supp. 1048 (D.D.C. 1987) (observing the history of the medical understanding of AIDS and the combined 100% effectiveness of the two HIV antibody tests); Chalk v. U.S. Dist. Court Cent. Dist. of California, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988) (observing Surgeon General's report that HIV cannot be spread through casual contact).
While the appellants allege many counts of misconduct by the appellees, the core of their complaints is that Dr. Almaraz was negligent in failing to disclose his HIV-positive status before operating on Faya and Rossi. Appellants assert that a physician's duty of care must encompass disclosure that an operating surgeon's HIV-positive status poses the risk, however minimal, of transmission of the AIDS virus during surgery. Appellants maintain that, having properly pleaded this issue, the trial court erred in not allowing a jury to evaluate Almaraz's conduct and its consequences. We agree.
To state a cause of action in negligence, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant had a duty of care which he breached, and that the breach proximately caused legally cognizable injury. Pennwalt Corp. v. Nasios, 314 Md. 433, 453, 550 A.2d 1155 (1988); Jacques v. First National Bank of Maryland, 307 Md. 527, 531, 515 A.2d 756 (1986); Cramer v. Housing Opportunities Comm'n, 304 Md. 705, 501 A.2d 35 (1985).
The concept of legal duty, we observed years ago, emanates from "the responsibility each of us bears to exercise due care to avoid unreasonable risks of harm to others." Moran v. Faberge, 273 Md. 538, 543, 332 A.2d 11 (1975). We have explored the question of duty in the very context of infectious disease which the instant case represents. In B.N. v. K.K., supra, a nurse alleged that a doctor with whom she had been intimate was negligent in failing to inform her of his genital herpes. We began with the premise that "an important factor used to determine the existence of a duty is foreseeability." 312 Md. at 141, 538 A.2d 1175. We then observed that "one who knows he or she has a highly infectious disease can readily foresee the danger that the disease may be communicated to others with whom the infected person comes into contact." Id. at 142, 538 A.2d 1175. Because of this foreseeability of transmission, we held that the doctor had a legal duty either to refrain from sexual contact with others or to inform his sexual partners of his disease. Id. at 143, 538 A.2d 1175.
The same principle applies in the instant case. Under the allegations of the appellants' complaints, taken as true, it was foreseeable that Dr. Almaraz might transmit the AIDS virus to his patients during invasive surgery. Thus, we are unable to say, as a matter of law, that Dr. Almaraz owed no duty to the appellants, either to refrain from performing the surgery or to warn them of his condition. This is so even though the medical literature indicates that, with proper barrier techniques, the risk of HIV transmission during surgery is extremely low, for legal scholars have long agreed that the seriousness of potential harm, as well as its probability, contributes to a duty to prevent it. Restatement, Second, Torts, § 293(c), comment c; Prosser and Keeton, Torts, § 31 (5th ed. 1984); Moran, supra, 273 Md. at 543, 332 A.2d 11 ("Whether unreasonable risk exists in a given situation depends on balancing the probability and seriousness of harm, if care is not exercised, against the costs of taking appropriate cautions."). While it may be unlikely that an infected doctor will transmit the AIDS virus to a patient during surgery, the patient will almost surely die if the virus is transmitted.
The House of Delegates of the American Medical Association (AMA) has adopted the following policy statement on HIV-infected physicians:
"It should be noted that transmission of HIV from an infected physician to a patient has not yet been reported, but it is a theoretical possibility during invasive procedures. It is longstanding AMA policy that when the scientific basis for patient protection policy decisions are unclear, the physician must err on the side of protecting patients.
"That being the case, the following recommendations should be followed in the management of an HIV-infected health care worker:
"HIV-infected physicians should disclose their HIV seropositivity to a public health officer or a local review committee, and should refrain from doing procedures that pose a significant risk of HIV transmission or perform these procedures only with the consent of the patient and the permission of a local review committee. This committee will determine the activities the physician can continue to perform."
AMA "Digest of HIV/AIDS Policy," September 14, 1992. Similarly, the AMA's Code of Medical Ethics provides:
"A physician who knows that he or she has an infectious disease, which if contracted by the patient would pose a significant risk to the patient, should not engage in any activity that creates a risk of transmission of that disease to the patient. The precautions taken to prevent the transmission of a contagious disease to a patient should be appropriate to the seriousness of the disease and must be particularly stringent in the case of a disease that is potentially fatal.
"A physician who knows that he or she is [HIV] seropositive should not engage in any activity that creates a risk of transmission of the disease to others. A physician who has HIV disease or who is seropositive should consult colleagues as to which activities the physician can pursue without creating a risk to patients."
AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, "Current Opinions, Code of Medical Ethics," 1992.
Thus, in evaluating the well-pleaded allegations of the complaints with respect to the duty component of the tort of negligence, we cannot conclude that they are legally insufficient to survive the appellees' motions to dismiss; in other words, we cannot say as a matter of law that no duty was imposed upon Dr. Almaraz to warn the appellants of his infected condition or refrain from operating upon them.
We noted in Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977), that a surgeon has a legal duty, except in emergency circumstances, to obtain the "informed consent" of the patient before undertaking the surgical procedure. We said that the surgeon's duty is "to explain the procedure to the patient and to warn him of any material risks or dangers inherent in or collateral to the therapy, so as to enable the patient to make an intelligent and informed choice about whether or not to undergo such treatment." Id. at 439, 379 A.2d 1014. We further said that the proper test for measuring a physician's duty to disclose risk information is whether such data would be material to the patient's decision. Id. at 443, 379 A.2d 1014. In this regard, we explained that "[a] material risk is one which a physician knows or ought to know would be significant to a reasonable person in the patient's position in deciding whether or not to submit to a particular medical treatment or procedure." Id. at 444, 379 A.2d 1014.
The cause of action for lack of informed consent is one in tort for negligence, as opposed to battery or assault. Id. at 440 n. 4, 379 A.2d 1014.
The appellants pleaded that as a result of Dr. Almaraz's breach of duty, they were put in fear of having contracted HIV and thereby suffered the derivative consequences of that fear, which were manifested by emotional and mental distress, headaches, sleeplessness, and, in addition, the pain and expense associated with repeated blood tests. We turn now to the question of whether these are legally compensable injuries where the appellants have not alleged in their complaints an actual transmission of the HIV virus into their bodies during the surgical procedures. Instead, appellants allege only that because of Dr. Almaraz's HIV positive status, he exposed them to the virus during the surgery. In this regard, the complaints do not allege that subsequent blood tests have revealed that the appellants have, in fact, shown HIV positive status.
Courts have differed on the question of recovery of damages for the fear of AIDS and attendant physical consequences absent an HIV-positive test. In Burk v. Sage Products, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D.Pa. 1990), the court rejected a paramedic's claim based on fear of contracting AIDS after he suffered a needle-stick from a discarded syringe. The paramedic could not demonstrate that the needle had been used on an AIDS patient, and he himself had tested HIV-negative no fewer than five times during the thirteen months after the incident. Id. at 286-287. The court held first that, in the absence of any allegation that the syringe harbored HIV, the plaintiff had failed to establish an exposure to the AIDS virus sufficient to support a cause of action. Id. at 287. Moreover, the court found no compensable injury: "Plaintiff here has alleged no injury which arises out of his exposure to the AIDS virus. Rather, plaintiff's only injuries stem from his fear that he has been exposed to the disease." Id. at 288. The court deemed such fear to be unfounded, observing that the five negative tests indicated to a high degree of medical certainty that the paramedic would not develop AIDS from his needle-stick. Id.
Most cases addressing the viability of claims alleging fear of contracting disease concern exposure to asbestos, toxic chemicals, pesticides, and drug products. These cases often rely on the first holding in Burk: in the absence of facts demonstrating legitimate exposure to the disease-causing agent, there can be no recovery. See, e.g., Harper v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 808 F.2d 1139, 1140 (5th Cir. 1987) (absent competent evidence of exposure to potentially harmful chemicals, plaintiffs cannot recover for mental anguish arising from fear of future health complications); Maddy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 737 F. Supp. 1528, 1533 (D. Kansas 1990) (in cases claiming personal injury from toxic substances, it is essential that plaintiff demonstrate exposure to harmful levels of such substances); Anderson v. W.R. Grace Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1226 (D.Mass. 1986) (fear of contracting cancer after drinking contaminated water held compensable injury).
Other courts have concurred with Burk in denying recovery where the plaintiff can demonstrate neither a channel of exposure to the AIDS virus nor demonstrate injury in the form of an HIV-positive test. See Funeral Services by Gregory, Inc., v. Bluefield Community Hospital, 186 W. Va. 424, 413 S.E.2d 79 (1991) (no recovery for a mortician who had embalmed an AIDS-infected corpse, where he had worn proper protective gear and had not alleged any avenue of exposure); Hare v. State, 173 A.D.2d 523, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125 (2 Dept. 1991) (recovery denied for hospital employee bitten by unrestrained inmate, where employee failed to prove that inmate was infected and where plaintiff had tested HIV-negative); Doe v. Doe, 136 Misc.2d 1015, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. 1987) (recovery denied for "AIDS-phobia" based on husband's alleged homosexual affair, wife having failed to allege that husband was infected with the disease and having failed to allege that she had contracted HIV).
Still other jurisdictions require proof of actual injury, i.e. an HIV-positive test, even where the plaintiff has clearly shown exposure to the AIDS virus. See Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Doe, 111 Ariz. App. 51, 840 P.2d 288 (1992) (no recovery under an insurance policy covering "bodily injury" for plaintiffs who had been clearly exposed to HIV but could show no competent evidence of any physical injury resulting from that exposure); Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 698 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D.Ill. 1988) (wife of allegedly negligently infected plaintiff denied recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress where she, though clearly exposed to HIV, had failed to allege any physical injury or illness.)
For cases outside the AIDS context, see e.g. Bubash v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 717 F. Supp. 297, 300 (M.D.Pa. 1989) (mere exposure to radiation not the equivalent of physical injury); In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563, 1569-70 (D.Ha. 1990) (generalized fear of cancer, absent knowledge of functional impairment, insufficient to constitute a compensable harm underlying emotional distress); De Stories v. City of Phoenix, 154 Ariz. 604, 744 P.2d 705, 709-10 (App. 1987) (no recovery for "cancer-phobia" following asbestos exposure absent physical injury, unless physical harm developed as a result of emotional distress).
On the other hand, some courts have reasoned differently. In Johnson v. W. Va. University Hospitals, 186 W. Va. 648, 413 S.E.2d 889 (1991), the court affirmed a judgment for a police officer attacked in a hospital by an AIDS-infected patient who had first bitten himself on the arm, thereby drawing his own infected blood into his mouth, and then bitten the officer. There, the officer sued the hospital, claiming that it negligently failed to advise him that the patient had AIDS, and that as a result of his exposure to AIDS, the officer had suffered from emotional distress. Although regularly tested for the HIV virus after having been bitten by the patient, the tests were negative for the disease. The officer's treating psychologist testified that the officer suffered from post traumatic stress disorder and was unable to sleep. The court noted that, absent physical injury, there would be no recovery for emotional distress. It held, however, that there was evidence of physical injury because of the officer's having been bitten and that his physical injury included sleeplessness, loss of appetite, and other physical manifestations accompanying the emotional distress. The officer's physical injury, the court said, was a factor going to the reasonableness of the officer's fear of contracting AIDS for which he could recover damages for emotional distress, even though he tested HIV-negative. The court emphasized that its decision did not permit recovery of emotional distress damages by anyone who merely comes into contact with an AIDS-infected individual; rather, it said that "recovery of such damages is limited to the situation where the plaintiff is actually exposed to the AIDS virus as a result of a physical injury, and emotional distress, along with physical manifestations of such distress, result therefrom." Id., 413 S.E.2d at 894.
In Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Services, Inc., 1992 WL 276717 (Tenn. App. 1992), certiorari petition filed December 11, 1992, the plaintiff had been pricked by a needle while visiting her sister in the hospital. Even though the plaintiff was unable to show actual exposure to the HIV virus, or that she tested HIV-positive, she sued the hospital for damages which she alleged resulted from fear that she had contracted the disease. In reversing a summary judgment against the plaintiff, the court relied upon Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982), in which the Tennessee Supreme Court allowed plaintiffs to recover for fear of harm against an exterminating company which had leaked dangerous chemicals into their drinking supply, even though plaintiffs showed no physical symptoms of illness. Laxton specified, however, that "The period of mental anguish . . . would be confined to the time between discovery of the ingestion and the negative medical diagnosis or other information that puts to rest the fear of injury." 639 S.W.2d at 434.
Explicitly rejecting "the strict rules of actual exposure" required by Burk and its progeny, the Carroll court read Laxton to allow recovery for fear of AIDS even though the plaintiff could show neither actual HIV exposure nor an HIV-positive test. It said:
"We construe Laxton to set a standard of `reasonableness' of the fear. . . . The gravamen of the action in Laxton was the effect of defendant's negligence on the plaintiffs' state of mind and the Court found under the peculiar facts of that case that they could reasonably have the fear of acquiring serious medical maladies. The court was quite clear, however, that the period of time considered reasonable for the mental anguish would cease upon information that `puts to rest the fear of injury.'"
Carroll.
See also Castro v. New York Life Insurance Co., 153 Misc.2d 1, 588 N.Y.S.2d 695, 697 (Sup. 1991) (custodian may recover where stuck by a hypodermic needle discarded in the trash of an insurance company office, insofar as she had "a claim . . . tied to a distinct event which would cause a reasonable person to develop a fear of contracting a disease like AIDS").
In the instant case, we cannot say that appellants' alleged fear of acquiring AIDS was initially unreasonable as a matter of law, even though the averments of the complaints did not identify any actual channel of transmission of the AIDS virus. But Burk's requirement that plaintiffs must allege actual transmission would unfairly punish them for lacking the requisite information to do so.
Appellants' continued fear of contracting AIDS may, however, be unreasonable after they tested HIV-negative upon learning of Dr. Almaraz's illness, which was well over a year after their last contacts with the physician. As we noted above, there is current credible evidence of a 95% certainty that one will test positive for the AIDS virus, if at all, within six months after exposure to it. Once appellants learned of their HIV-negative status more than a year after their respective surgeries, the possibility of their contracting AIDS from Dr. Almaraz became extremely unlikely and thus, as a matter of law, might be deemed unreasonable. Therefore, appellants may only recover for their fear and its physical manifestations which may have resulted from Almaraz's alleged negligence for the period constituting their reasonable window of anxiety — the period between which they learned of Almaraz's illness and received their HIV-negative results.
This figure may well be conservative. According to the Centers for Disease Control, "[a]lmost all people develop HIV antibodies within two to twelve weeks, but it can take up to six months after infection. . . . To be sure [that one does not have the virus, one must be tested] at least 6 months after . . . last engag[ing] in behavior that can transmit HIV." U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Voluntary HIV Counseling and Testing: Facts, Issues, and Answers, 1991 (emphasis added).
We note that the window of anxiety closes once satisfactory information becomes available that puts to rest the fear of injury. Hence, even had the appellants not undergone immediate blood testing, their recovery span would be limited to the same duration, for the fear-relieving information, if known to them, would have been available for their retrieval.
In this regard, we note that it was formerly the rule that there could be no recovery of tort damages for mere fright or mental suffering caused by negligence unconnected with physical impact or injury. P., B. W.R. Co. v. Mitchell, 107 Md. 600, 607, 69 A. 422 (1908). Our subsequent cases have departed from this rigid rule. In Green v. Shoemaker, 111 Md. 69, 77, 73 A. 688 (1909), we first acknowledged the rule that mere fright, without any physical injury resulting therefrom, cannot form the basis of a cause of action because "mere fright is easily simulated, and because there is no practical standard for measuring the suffering occasioned thereby, or of testing the truth of the claims of the person as to the results of the fright." Id. Nevertheless, we held in Shoemaker that when it is shown "that a material physical injury has resulted from fright caused by a wrongful act," there is no sound reason for denying a right of action "for such physical injury." Id. at 77, 73 A. 688. We recognized that nervous disturbances may constitute suffering of the body or of the mind since nerves and nerve centers of the body are part of the physical system which may be weakened from causes acting upon the mind. Id. at 78-79, 73 A. 688. This, we said, could be a physical injury. In so holding, we quoted with approval from Sloane v. Southern Cal. R.R., 111 Cal. 668, 44 P. 320 (1896), another tort case in which there was no physical impact, that if the plaintiff's
"`nerves, or the entire nervous system are thus affected, there is a physical injury thereby produced; and if the primal cause of this injury is tortious, it is immaterial whether it is direct, as by a blow, or indirect, through some action upon the mind.'"
111 Md. at 79, 73 A. 688. We then said that
"where the wrongful act complained of is the proximate cause of the injury . . . and where the injury ought, in the light of all the circumstances, to have been contemplated as a natural and probable consequence thereof, the case . . . should be left to the jury."
Id. at 81, 73 A. 688.
We next referred in Shoemaker to Denver R.G.R. Co. v. Roller, 100 F. 738 (9th Cir. 1900), in which the jury was instructed as follows:
"`If great fright was a reasonable and natural consequence of the circumstances in which the collision aforesaid, with the ensuing wreckage, explosion and conflagration, placed the plaintiff, and if she was actually put in fright by those circumstances, and injury to her health was a reasonable and natural consequence of such fright, and was actually and proximately occasioned thereby, then said injury is one for which damages are reasonable.'"
Id. [111 Md.] at 82, 73 A. 688. We declared in Shoemaker that "[t]he reasoning upon which that conclusion was reached is, in our opinion, sound." Id.
Our later cases, expanding upon Shoemaker, have held that there can be compensable injuries from fright or shock without physical impact. See, e.g., Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933); Tea Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 A. 22 (1931); Balt. Ohio R.R. Co. v. Harris, 121 Md. 254, 88 A. 282 (1913).
In Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490, 408 A.2d 728 (1979), we held that damages could be recovered for emotional distress resulting from a tortious act; that a "physical injury" could be proved by evidence indicative of a mental state; and that the term "physical" in this context is not to be afforded its usual dictionary meaning, but rather as an injury "capable of objective determination." Id. at 500, 408 A.2d 728. The injuries alleged in Vance were mental distress, nervousness, sleeplessness, spontaneous crying, and depression; there was no medical diagnosis of any physical ailments. In finding Mrs. Vance's injuries to be legally cognizable, we said that the requirement of "physical injury" for recovery in negligence meant only that the alleged injuries must be objectively measurable.
The evidence in Vance showed that Muriel and Arnold Vance were married in a religious ceremony, lived together for 18 years, and had two children. Then Arnold left Muriel for another woman. She sought a decree awarding her alimony and child support. Arnold opposed the action on the ground that at the time of his marriage to Muriel he had not been divorced from his first wife and, therefore, his marriage to Muriel was void. It appeared that Arnold originally believed that his decree of absolute divorce from his first wife was final, and had told Muriel that he was free to marry her. About one month after their marriage, Arnold discovered that his divorce decree had not become final until after his marriage to Muriel. Arnold never told Muriel that their marriage was a nullity. She did not discover it until Arnold sought to annul the marriage 20 years later.
The evidence at trial was that the disclosure that Muriel's twenty-year marriage was void had a devastating effect on her.
"She went into a state of shock, engaged in spontaneous crying and for a period seemed detached and unaware of her own presence. She was unable to function normally, unable to sleep and too embarrassed to socialize. In addition to experiencing symptoms of an ulcer, Muriel suffered an emotional collapse and depression which manifested itself in her external condition, i.e., her significantly deteriorated physical appearance — unkempt hair, sunken cheeks and dark eyes."
Id. at 501, 408 A.2d 728. We held that this evidence was legally sufficient to establish symptoms of a mental state evidencing a "physical injury." Id.
"The evidence showed that Muriel suffered an objectively manifested, definite nervous disorder of a magnitude similar to the mental distress established in Green, Bowman, and Roch. . . . [T]he evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding that Muriel was physically injured as a foreseeable result of [Arnold's] negligent misrepresentation concerning his marital status."
Id. (footnote omitted).
In the instant case, appellants allege that their fear and mental and emotional distress are accompanied by headache, sleeplessness, and the physical and financial sting of blood tests for the AIDS virus. Vance and its precursors dictate that appellants may recover for these injuries, to the extent that they can objectively demonstrate their existence. Again, however, such damages must be confined to injuries suffered during the appellants' legitimate window of mental anxiety; after this point, for the reasons discussed above, any lingering injuries, as a matter of law, are no longer related to fear that is reasonable.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred in dismissing appellants' negligence complaints against Dr. Almaraz, which were based on his asserted failure to disclose his infected condition. Appellants have alleged facts which, if proven, indicate that Dr. Almaraz may have breached a legal duty, thereby causing them to suffer legally compensable injuries. As we said in Curley v. General Valet Service, 270 Md. 248, 264, 311 A.2d 231 (1973), negligence is a relative term, to be decided upon the facts of each particular case, and, consequently, it is ordinarily a question of fact to be determined by the fact-finder. Where, as here, we must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaints, as well as all favorable factual inferences deducible therefrom, we cannot declare as a matter of law that Dr. Almaraz was not guilty of negligence due to his claimed failure to communicate that he was HIV-positive. We, therefore, must find, as to these negligence counts, that appellants alleged sufficient facts in their complaints to survive the appellees' motions to dismiss.
We next consider whether the appellants have stated a cause of action in negligence against appellee Hopkins Hospital. Like any other employer, a hospital is responsible under agency principles for the negligence of its servants or employees; this vicarious liability extends to any apparent agents whom a hospital represents as its employees. Mehlman v. Powell, 281 Md. 269, 378 A.2d 1121 (1977); Franklin v. Gupta, 81 Md. App. 345, 567 A.2d 524 (1990). The existence of an agency relationship is a question of fact which must be submitted to the factfinder if any legally sufficient evidence tending to prove the agency is offered. P. Flanigan Sons, Inc. v. Childs, 251 Md. 646, 652, 248 A.2d 473 (1968); Hamilton v. Caplan, 69 Md. App. 566, 575, 518 A.2d 1087 (1987).
Appellants here alleged that Hopkins represented that Dr. Almaraz was its agent; that they believed that he was its agent; and that they relied on this representation and Hopkins' excellent medical reputation in selecting Almaraz as their surgeon. Because it is undisputed that Almaraz enjoyed "operative privileges" at Hopkins, we cannot say as a matter of law that the facts alleged in the appellants' complaints are legally insufficient on their face to aver an agency relationship. Thus, the trial court erred in dismissing appellants' basic negligence complaints against Hopkins.
In view of our disposition of the basic negligence counts grounded on Dr. Almaraz's asserted failure to warn the appellants of his infected condition, and because the damages claimed on all counts are essentially the same, the trial judge erred in dismissing the other counts as well. As we see it, after viewing the allegations of the complaints in support of these counts, dismissal was not appropriate in the circumstances.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY DISMISSING THE COMPLAINTS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE APPELLEES.
determining that fear of contracting HIV was objectively reasonable only within a certain window of time based on "current credible evidenceof a 95% certainty that one will test positive for the AIDS virus, if at all, within six months after exposure to it"
Summary of this case from Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Albright
determining that fear of contracting HIV was objectively reasonable only within a certain window of time based on "current credible evidence of a 95% certainty that one will test positive for the AIDS virus, if at all, within six months after exposure to it"
adopting reasonableness standard that did not require any level of knowledge in determining whether plaintiff was reasonable in experiencing emotional distress over the fear of contracting AIDS
Summary of this case from Williamson v. Waldman
reversing dismissal when HIV-positive surgeon operated on the appellants without their knowledge of his disease
Summary of this case from Nash v. Montgomery Cnty.
Summary of this case from Danso v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC
Summary of this case from Parker v. Ciena Corp.
Summary of this case from Taylor v. Anne Arundel Cnty.
Summary of this case from Haines v. Vogel
Summary of this case from Chelle v. Ghazzaoui
Summary of this case from Lasater v. Guttmann
In Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435, 620 A.2d 327 (1993), the Court of Appeals of Maryland, finding that a surgeon who had AIDS owed a duty to his patients to warn them of his condition, took judicial notice of several facts about HIV and AIDS.
Summary of this case from Doe v. Pharmacia Upjohn
In Faya, the Court of Appeals held the hospital liable for a surgeon's failure to disclose his HIV-positive status prior to operating.
Summary of this case from Robertson v. Iuliano
allowing recovery for reasonable fear of contracting AIDS after learning plaintiffs had been operated on by a surgeon with AIDS
Summary of this case from Antonio v. Sec. Serv. of America, LLC
applying Maryland law
Summary of this case from Lefande v. YUM! Brands, Inc.
relying on presence of physical manifestations such as headaches and sleeplessness
Summary of this case from Marriott v. Sedco Forex Intern. Resources
opining that a surgeon may need to disclose his HIV-status as part of an informed consent discussion, because, inter alia, it was foreseeable that the physician might transmit the HIV virus to the patient during surgery
Summary of this case from Shannon v. Fusco
noting that "nervous disturbances may constitute suffering of the body or of the mind"
relying on medical journals and reports to give context to what was known at the time about AIDS and HIV
Summary of this case from Reid v. State
In Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. at 435, 620 A.2d at 327, moreover, we elucidated that information provided to (or withheld from) a patient is the crux of an informed consent action and that the action is to be analyzed using the negligence rubric.
In Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435, 620 A.2d 327 (1993), we recognized that a physician could be required to disclose that he is HIV-positive, if he were.
Summary of this case from Goldberg v. Boone
allowing plaintiff to recover for emotional distress during "window of anxiety" period defined as the period between the time a plaintiff learns of possible exposure to HIV and the receipt of HIV negative results without a showing of actual exposure
Summary of this case from South Central Regional Medical v. Pickering
In Faya, the plaintiffs were fearful of acquiring the AIDS virus from a surgeon who had operated on them without disclosing that he was HIV-positive. The plaintiffs "allege[d] that their fear and mental and emotional distress are accompanied by headache, sleeplessness, and the physical and financial sting of blood tests for the AIDS virus."
Summary of this case from Beynon v. Montgomery Cablevision
In Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435, 620 A.2d 327 (1993), an HIV-positive oncological surgeon was sued by two former patients.
Summary of this case from Hartwig v. Oregon Trail Eye Clinic
In Faya, this Court held that a physician who knew he had AIDS had a duty to warn his patients of his condition before engaging in the kind of contact (in that unique case, surgery) in which AIDS might be transmitted; similarly, in B.N., this Court held that a man who knew he had incurable genital herpes had a duty to warn his partner before engaging in sexual relations. From these two cases, petitioner draws the strange conclusion that Kowalski had a duty to warn the victims or their mother of his pedophilia.
Summary of this case from Pettit v. Erie


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Library Home / About Us / 2010 / February / 22 / Cycling Metro Vancouver Route Planner nabs UBC Library award
Cycling Metro Vancouver Route Planner nabs UBC Library award
By Glenn Drexhage on February 22, 2010
Michael Brauer, a UBC Professor from the School of Environmental Health, has won UBC Library's inaugural Innovative Dissemination of Research Award for the Cycling Metro Vancouver Route Planner.
The Innovative Dissemination of Research Award, which includes a certificate and $2,000, honours UBC faculty, staff and students who expand the boundaries of research with the creative use of new tools and technologies.
Brauer led a team that developed an interactive cycling route planner (www.cyclevancouver.ubc.ca), which integrates research from various sources and disseminates it via a user-friendly Google Maps interface. This planner is part of the Cycling in Cities program, based at UBC's School of Population & Public Health and the School of Environmental Health.
The tool allows cyclists to find routes that fit personal preferences, such as distance, elevation gain, air quality and vegetation. The underlying code for the route planner can also be easily adapted to other municipalities wishing to embark on similar projects.
The Cycling Route Planner was recognized at the 2010 Celebrate Research Week Gala by Ingrid Parent, University Librarian. "The Library initiated the Innovative Dissemination of Research award to honour those who expand the boundaries of research by creatively using new tools and technologies to enhance understanding and uptake of research findings," said Parent.
"We celebrate these pioneers in hopes of promoting the development of a critical mass of people who will continue to evolve dissemination in new and unexpected ways – and become role models for others to emulate," she added.
The project from Brauer and his colleagues was one of 37 submissions from faculty, students and staff. The selection committee, made up of UBC faculty, publishers and librarians, was impressed by the array of approaches.
Highlighting the importance of UBC Library in the research process is one of the award's key objectives. "Integrating the Library as an active participant in knowledge creation and dissemination on campus is one of the primary ways we aspire to increase the impact of UBC's research," said Parent.
"The Library will showcase Dr. Brauer's work – and that of all the award applicants who have given their consent – on our Scholarly Communications website, and also in cIRcle, our digital repository for research and teaching materials created by the UBC community and its partners."
On behalf of UBC Library, congratulations to Michael and his team!
Posted in General | Tagged with awards, Innovative Dissemination of Research Award

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


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5/12/2013 - Happy Mother's Day!


text:
Synopsis (1)
After a space merchant vessel perceives an unknown transmission as a distress call, its landing on the source moon finds one of the crew attacked by a mysterious lifeform, and they soon realize that its life cycle has merely begun.
—dimakorou
In the distant future, the crew of the commercial spaceship Nostromo are on their way home when they pick up a distress call from a distant moon. The crew are under obligation to investigate and the spaceship descends on the moon afterwards. After a rough landing, three crew members leave the spaceship to explore the area on the moon. At the same time as they discover a hive colony of some unknown creature, the ship's computer deciphers the message to be a warning, not a distress call. When one of the eggs is disturbed, the crew realizes that they are not alone on the spaceship and they must deal with the consequences.
—blazesnakes9
In the far reaches of space, a crew on-board the ship Nostromo are returning to Earth until they receive a distress call, an alien one. Unknown to them, they will soon take back with them the most terrifying creature in the universe: The Xenomorph, a killing machine that bleeds corrosive acid whenever anyone tries to hurt it. All alone in space, no one can hear them scream: trying to warn the rest of the galaxy of the terror that is the Xenomorph.
In the distant future, during her return to Earth, the commercial spaceship Nostromo intercepts a distress call from a distant moon. The seven-member crew are awakened from hypersleep and the spaceship subsequently descends on the moon. While exploring the moon, a three-member team of the crew discover a derelict spaceship and a huge chamber inside her containing thousands of eggs. When a curious team member goes near the egg, the parasite inside the egg attacks him, rendering him unconscious. He is brought back aboard and the spaceship takes off. After a little while, the parasite dies and his host wakes up seemingly unruffled. Everything soon returns to normal, but not for long.
—Soumitra
The synopsis below may give away important plot points.
The opening credits appear in front of a large planet with rings. Cut to the far reaches of deep space: the Nostromo, a commercial towing space vehicle, carrying a refinery with twenty million tons of mineral ore, is en route to Earth with a crew of seven. Inside, the ship appears eerily quiet, but suddenly, the on-board computer is activated. Lights inside the ship are activated, and a room with seven biobeds is illuminated. The canopies open to awaken the crew. Executive Officer Kane (John Hurt) is the first to awaken from hypersleep. They congregate in the mess hall, where they cheerfully enjoy a meal. Chief Engineer Parker (Yaphet Kotto) and Engineering Technician Brett (Harry Dean Stanton) take the opportunity to discuss the bonus system, which they find unfair, as they get paid less than the officers. Captain Dallas (Tom Skerritt) is called away by MOTHER, the ship's computer, before they can have a meaningful conversation. Dallas enters the MOTHER console room, and tries to assess the situation, as the rest of the crew gets in the cockpit of the ship to determine their location. They quickly deduce that they are nowhere near home yet. Navigator Lambert (Veronica Cartwright) finds out that they are at Zeta II Reticuli, an outlying system. When Parker and Brett return from their round of the lower deck, complaining about their colleagues' attitude and the bonus system, Dallas briefs the crew: the ship is not even halfway home, and has altered its course because it has picked up an unknown signal, which repeats every 12 seconds. The crew has been awoken from hypersleep to investigate. Parker protests, arguing that they're not a rescue team and that they should be compensated for the extra work, but Science Officer Ash (Ian Holm) stipulates that per Company contract, the crew is obliged to investigate every signal from an intelligent source; non-compliance will result in loss of pay, which quickly puts Parker in a more cooperative mood.
The crew assembles in the cockpit to listen to the signal. It sounds very strange and unearthly, perhaps like a voice. Lambert homes in on it and finds that it comes from a planetoid, 1200 km in diameter, with a two-hour rotation and some gravity.
The Nostromo approaches the planet, which is close to one enormous ringed planet and two smaller ones. The ship separates from the refinery, and sets course to the planet's surface. It descends toward the planet, but the landing is rough, causing damage that will take some time for Parker and Brett to repair (although they allot themselves several more hours than their own estimate). The planet is windy, and visibility is low. As the source of the signal is 2000 meters away and the sun is coming up, Dallas and Kane decide to investigate on foot. A reluctant Lambert is ordered to join. Ash takes place behind an outer window with a communication console, as the team puts on the space suits and leaves the ship to investigate the signal on the planet's windy surface. In the meanwhile, Warrant Officer Ripley (Sigourney Weaver) has gone to the lower deck to inspect the repairs. Parker and Brett ask if there will be a bonus for any discovery which is made on the surface; Ripley assures them that the law guarantees them a share, before returning upstairs, as they keep teasing her. Outside, the team walks between the rocks, through the planetoid's inhabitable atmosphere. Inside the ship, Ash tells Ripley that MOTHER has not yet deciphered the signal; she volunteers to give it a try. Ripley accesses a console and starts working on the strange signal.
Outside, the sun is up and the wind has died down. The team clears the rock formation, and makes a fascinating discovery. Near the horizon, they see a derelict spacecraft of unknown origin. It is lying against the rocks, vaguely shaped like a horseshoe. Despite Lambert's hesitation, they approach it, losing contact with the Nostromo upon entering the massive ship through an opening at the side. Inside, they find hallways with walls textured like bones. At the end is an elevated platform. It carries the remains of an enormous alien creature in a large chair, now fossilized. Upon initial examination, there is evidence of some unknown trauma to its chest: its ribs are bent outward, as if it exploded from the inside. Lambert wants to leave. Kane then draws the others' attention to a large hole in the floor. Meanwhile, analysis of the unidentified transmission suggests that it is not an SOS, but a warning. Ripley wants to go after the search party, but Ash talks her out of it, reasoning that by the time she gets there, the search team will probably know what the signal means.
Kane is lowered into the hole by means of a winch. He finds an enormous tube-like hallway down below, divided into sections and basins. He nears one basin, discovering thousands of leathery objects that resemble large eggs. He also discovers a strange light and mist covering the eggs that reacts when broken. He trips and falls into the pit, but is okay and moves in to investigate further. Kane touches one of the eggs, which seems to give a shriek. He illuminates the egg from behind with a flashlight and discovers movement inside. He grabs a pistol: a strange, spider-like organism is the resident. The egg has flaps on top, which open, revealing its insides. As Kane moves into for a better look, the strange lifeform inside suddenly leaps out, attaching itself to Kane's helmet.
Ash is looking towards the planet's surface, when he sees Dallas and Lambert carrying the unconscious Kane back to the Nostromo. They enter the airlock and ask Ripley to let them in, while Ash waits at the inner airlock door to open it. They inform Ripley that an organism has attached itself to Kane's face. Ripley hesitates, citing quarantine protocol: for the safety of the crew, Kane should first be decontaminated for 24 hours before being brought on board. Dallas fears for Kane's life and orders her to open the door, but she refuses, despite Dallas trying to pull rank. However, Ash disregards Ripley's decision and lets them in.
In the infirmary, Dallas and Ash cut Kane's helmet open: they find that a spider-like creature has attached itself to Kane's face, with eight fingers, and a long tail tightly wrapped around his neck. Despite his mouth being blocked, Kane is breathing normally. Parker, Brett and Lambert observe through a window. Ripley joins them, and is angrily slapped by Lambert, furious for not allowing them to re-enter the ship; the men break the women apart. Dallas berates Ripley for disobeying a direct order, but Ripley furiously replies that she was just following the rules of quarantine protocol. Ash attempts to remove the creature from Kane's face with a pair of forceps, but it merely tightens its grip, and is holding on so tight that it will tear Kane's skin off with it. Kane is examined with a sophisticated medical scanner, which shows that the creature has inserted a tube into Kane's throat and is feeding him oxygen. Ash deduces that since Kane is comatose and the parasite is feeding him oxygen, removing the creature may kill Kane, however Dallas is willing to take the risk.
Ash tries to cut off one of its legs with a scalpel, but a yellowish fluid pours out of the wound and begins to eat through the floor. Out of concern that the acidic fluid will breach the hull, the crew runs several floors downstairs, and find that the stuff's corrosive effect is neutralized after burning through several decks. Dallas says the substance resembles molecular acid, and Brett comments the creature must be using it for blood. "Wonderful defense mechanism - you don't dare kill it", growls Parker. Dallas orders everyone back to their posts, as Kane is left in his coma to be tended by Ash.
Parker and Brett resume their repairs, commenting that they should never have landed on the planet. As Kane's situation remains unchanged, Ash is collecting data on the creature. He is startled by the sudden presence of Ripley in the infirmary. She wants to know what he has found out yet. Ash can only confirm that the creature's skin is made up of polysaccharides, which it is slowly replacing with silicon to toughen its hide against the new environment it finds itself within. Ripley then confronts him with his decision to let it aboard, ignoring the quarantine law; Ash defends himself by stating that he did it out of concern for Kane's life, and that he temporarily forgot the fact that Ripley is the officer in charge when Dallas and Kane are away. Ripley replies that by allowing this breech of protocol, he has put all of their lives at risk, which is not appropriate behavior for a science officer. Ash coldly lets her know that he is perfectly capable to make that decision, and she should stick to her own job. Ripley leaves.
Dallas is sitting in the Nostromo's escape shuttle, the Narcissus, listening to music, when he is called to the infirmary by Ash, because something has happened to Kane. The creature has detached from Kane's face on its own, and has disappeared. Dallas, Ripley and Ash search the infirmary, and find it when it suddenly drops from an overhead compartment on Ripley, unsuspecting; it appears to be dead, only showing basic reflexes. They take a closer look at it, and confirm it is dead. Ripley wants to get rid of it, fearing that it may become even more harmful when dead; Ash strongly disagrees, given the uniqueness of the specimen. He wants to take it back to Earth for more tests, as it is harmless now. Dallas shares Ripley's sentiment, but leaves the decision to Ash, to Ripley's amazement.
Ripley tries to talk some sense into Dallas, who is unwilling to listen to her arguments, replying that he only runs the ship, and Ash has the final word on all things concerning the Company's science division. Ripley asks if Dallas has ever worked with Ash before. Dallas mentions that he did five tours with the same science officer, but this person was suddenly replaced two days before the Nostromo left Thedus dock. Ripley admits she doesn't trust Ash, but Dallas responds that he doesn't trust anybody. He asks about the status of repairs, which are still underway, but appear completed enough to leave the planetoid. Even though Ripley does not recommend it, Dallas prefers to leave as soon as possible. After a successful take-off and despite some minor technical errors, the ship docks with the refinery and cargo in orbit. The Nostromo then resumes its course for Earth.
The crew is back in the mess hall, bickering again about what to do with Kane. Dallas decides they will all get back into hypersleep. Lambert has calculated that it will take another 10 months to get back to Earth, which spoils their moods even further. Ash suddenly calls Dallas to the infirmary. Kane has awoken, still groggy but seemingly unharmed. He remembers very little of the event, apart from a nightmare about smothering, but is starved and wants to eat. The crew decides to have one last meal before they re-enter hypersleep. During the meal, the crew is finally having a good time again, joking and enjoying the food. Kane is eating like he has not had food in ages, sharply observed by Ash. Suddenly, Kane begins to choke. After initially thinking he has swallowed something bad, the mood suddenly changes when Kane starts to groan and convulse violently. While he lies writhing and screaming on the table, the crew tries to help and stabilize him, but his chest suddenly bursts, and a small snake-like alien creature erupts through his rib cage. It silently observes its surroundings. Parker moves in to kill it with a knife, but he is stopped by Ash. The creature screeches, then scurries away quickly, leaving the crew stunned and horrified.
A quick search through the deck yields no results whatsoever. After a short funeral for Kane, where his body is jettisoned into space, the crew members separate into two teams to capture the small creature. Brett assembles a weapon similar to a cattle prod, while Ash rigs together a tracking device. Parker, Brett and Ripley investigate one of the lower decks, finding that the power has been disrupted despite repairs having been finished. Picking up a signal, they think they have the creature cornered in a cabinet. They prepare to catch it in a net, only to be startled by the discovery that it is the crew's cat, Jones, who had found a quiet place inside the cupboard, and runs away. Realizing they might pick up the cat on the tracker again later, Parker sends Brett off to catch Jones. As Brett is searching for Jones, he finds a mysterious object resembling a shed snake skin on the floor. He continues on to a hold housing one of the ship's landing struts, eventually catching up with Jones. A strange creature is hanging in the chains above him, seemingly observing him. As Brett tries to coax Jones out, the cat hisses when a huge shape drops down behind him. It is the creature, however now with four limbs, an elongated head, fully grown and towering over Brett. Brett turns around, and is mesmerized while looking at the creature opening its mouth, revealing a second set of teeth which quickly extends from the mouth, biting Brett in the head, and dragging him, bloodied and screaming, above into an airshaft. Ripley and Parker hear him and arrive just in time to catch a glimpse of the monster as Brett disappears and blood drips down.
Parker and Ripley can only confirm the creature is big and escaped through the air ducts. Brett is assumed dead. The crew debates their next move. They all agree that the alien is using the air shafts to move around, so if they could drive it from the ducts into an airlock, they might be able to blow it out into space. Ripley asks Ash if he can offer some helpful information as a scientist; Ash suggests the alien may be afraid of fire, as most animals are. Fortunately, there are several flamethrowers on board. Ripley volunteers to enter the air shafts, but Dallas overrules her by volunteering himself. Dallas enters the MOTHER console once more. He tries to get the MOTHER computer to evaluate their procedure to get rid of the alien, but MOTHER simply cannot provide an answer, due to lack of input. He tries to get MOTHER to offer suggestions, but again, the computer cannot compute, due to lack of available data. Finally, Dallas types "What are my chances?" The computer replies that it cannot compute.
The main airlock is prepared by Ripley and Ash for the decompression procedure, while Parker and Lambert position themselves where they can measure movement inside the ducts. The main duct is opened and Dallas enters the network of air shafts with a flamethrower, allowing the crew to remote-close valves behind him as he proceeds. Lambert uses a motion tracker to get his location, when she suddenly catches another signal going towards him. Assuming it is the alien, Dallas uses the flamethrower to make sure that one of the ducts leading down is safe. He ascends a ladder to the lower duct, but the alien's signal is lost in the meanwhile. He finds a puddle of slime on the floor. Lambert assures him that the alien cannot be far, so he uses the flame thrower around him to scare it out of hiding; nothing is there. Dallas is disoriented in the cramped space and starts to panic, when the other signal starts moving again, at higher speed to his location. Lambert desperately urges him to move away. He descends another ladder, turning around, his light illuminating the shrieking creature stretching its arms towards him. Static and feedback interrupt the line, and then there is only silence.
Parker puts Dallas' flamethrower on the table, saying it was just laying in the duct: no blood, no Dallas. Lambert looks as if she is near a nervous breakdown, while Ripley is desperately trying to hide her apprehension. She suggests that in absence of a better idea, they should continue with Dallas' plan. Lambert says it is madness, and suggests abandoning the ship with the shuttle; however, the shuttle cannot sustain four people. Parker also opposes the idea, and wants to kill the creature; even if this means entering the entire duct system again, and blowing the alien out of the airlock. He leaves to refill the flamethrower. Ripley once again tries to get helpful information from Ash, but he says he is still analyzing. She scoffs at him for being so little help, and decides to go and try MOTHER for answers, since she now has access in light of Dallas' absence.
Ripley accesses the MOTHER console, and queries MOTHER for answers as to why they are unable to neutralize the alien. MOTHER responds that she cannot clarify. Ripley asks MOTHER to explain why not. MOTHER replies that she cannot, referring to Special Order 937, which is only meant to be read by the science officer. Ripley uses a command override to force MOTHER to explain what Special Order 937 entails. MOTHER displays the following shocking text: "Nostromo rerouted to new coordinates. Investigate lifeform. Gather specimen. Priority one: insure return of organism for analysis. All other considerations secondary. Crew expendable." As she contemplates the cold, hard words, she suddenly finds Ash sitting next to her, saying there is an explanation for this. Furiously, she grabs and shouts at him, sobbing uncontrollably. She leaves the console, trying to contact Parker and Lambert, but she finds that Ash is closing all doors leaving the mess hall, preventing her from leaving. She demands that he open the doors, but Ash simply stares at her. She notices a drop of white liquid running down his face, and he starts to have facial twitches. Unnerved, she tries to run away, but he suddenly grabs her hair; Ripley breaks free, pulling out a lock of hair, and tries to run. Ash quickly catches up and throws her against a few walls. While she is barely conscious, Ash uses a rolled-up magazine in order to suffocate her. She starts to struggle fiercely as Ash starts to twitch and make incoherent noises. Suddenly, Parker and Lambert arrive, both trying to drag Ash away from Ripley. Parker howls in pain as Ash grabs a piece of skin on his chest, forcing him to let go. Parker quickly grabs a fire extinguisher and hits Ash with it in the back. Ash starts to convulse and shriek violently, making very inhuman sounds while spitting out white liquid. Parker gives him another blow with the extinguisher, dislodging Ash's head, revealing Ash is an android. He keeps pounding Ash until he is on the floor, white liquid gushing from its insides. Ash's movements start to decrease and Parker settles down, but suddenly, the decapitated body grabs him and forces him onto a table; Lambert finally grabs the electric prod and screams as she stabs Ash in the back with it, finally rendering the android lifeless.
With Ash disabled, Ripley theorizes that the Company sent him along to bring an alien back for their weapons division, as Ash was always very protective of the creature. They reconnect his disembodied head to see if he can give them any advice on how to deal with the creature. Ash confirms that his order was to bring back the lifeform, even if it meant sacrificing the crew. Ripley asks how they can kill the creature. He tells them they have no chance against it, as it is "the perfect organism". He has a silent admiration for it, "a survivor, unclouded by conscience, remorse and delusions of morality". When he mocks their chances of survival, Ripley disconnects him again. The three survivors decide to follow Lambert's earlier suggestion; set the Nostromo to self-destruct and escape in the shuttle, leaving the Alien to die on the main ship. As they leave the room, Parker turns the flamethrower on Ash's corpse, incinerating his remains. Ripley will prepare the shuttle for launch, while Parker and Lambert go to gather coolant for the shuttle's life-support system.
While prepping the shuttle, Ripley hears Jones meowing on the ship's open intercom system, and realizes the cat is still left behind. Lambert and Parker are in the hold gathering equipment. They proceed to a small room where the coolant is stored. Ripley ventures out alone, into the hallways of the Nostromo to find Jones the cat. Expecting the alien at every turn, Ripley finally locates the cat in the cockpit, where he startles her as he suddenly jumps into view. She puts him into his traveling container. In the meanwhile, Parker and Lambert are working so feverishly on the supplies, that neither of them pays attention to a large shadow that has appeared inside the room. It is the alien, and it closes in on Lambert. Ripley can hear Parker over the open intercom, shouting to Lambert to get out of the way, but the alien has cornered her against the wall. Parker is unable to get a clear shot at it with the flamethrower without risking harm to Lambert, as it is hulking over her. Finally, he charges at the creature, but it rapidly spins, whipping the flamethrower out of his hands with its long tail, and grabbing him with its large claws. Despite his struggle, the creature holds a tight grip, opens its mouth, and its bizarre inner jaws pierce Parker's head, instantly killing him. As Ripley rushes towards their position, she is powerless to prevent the creature from turning back to Lambert. It curls its tail around her, and the final thing that Ripley can hear from the intercom are the sounds of Lambert, crying, sobbing, gagging and screaming. Ripley finds their bloodied and lifeless bodies in the storage room, with no sign of the alien.
In terrible shock, Ripley dashes towards the emergency room without stopping. Between the sobs, she locates the ship's self-destruct mechanism and quickly completes the entire procedure to activate it. The voice of MOTHER now announces that the self-destruct mechanism has been activated, and the ship will detonate in 10 minutes; however, the self-destruct can still be canceled during the first five minutes. Ripley takes a ladder to the lower deck, where she hears a soft groan. She inspects the hold, and finds a strange organic structure adhering to the walls and machinery. Shocked, she finds Dallas stuck within the adhesive, barely alive. On the opposite wall, she notices a shape which vaguely resembles Brett; he seems to be dissolving, transforming into an object like the eggs seen in the derelict ship. Dallas very weakly begs Ripley to kill him. After some hesitation, she grants his dying request: she burns them both with the flamethrower and rushes out of the chamber.
Ripley crawls up a ladder, and runs towards the shuttle with Jones in the container. She briefly rests against a wall, when she suddenly hears the alien stirring around the corner. Terrified, she drops the cat container and carefully retraces her steps along the wall, as the alien slowly comes into view around the corner. It shows interest in Jones. The alien slams the container against a wall. Ripley races back to the self-destruct mechanism and tries to override the procedure; however, she is too late, as the mechanism is already starting to activate. She restarts the cooling unit, but MOTHER announces that it is too late to stop the countdown, and the Nostromo will explode in five minutes, much to Ripley's frustrated anger. With sirens blaring and steam releasing from the vents, Ripley runs back to the shuttle loading area, ready to make her best attempt to fight off the alien and get into the lifeboat. However, the alien is nowhere to be seen, only the cat container lying on its side. As fires start to erupt, she picks up Jones and boards the shuttle with only one minute to abandon ship. She quickly runs through the launch sequence, and the shuttle lowers to launch position as MOTHER starts counting down the last 30 seconds of the Nostromo's life. The shuttle's engines ignite and the shuttle races away, leaving the Nostromo in the distance. A series of mighty explosions follow as the Nostromo vanishes in fire, destroying the refinery and ore it had been carrying. Ripley is relieved it destroyed the alien along with it.
Ripley gives Jones a hug and prepares one of the biobeds for hypersleep, putting Jones in it. As she makes final preparations for the shuttle, a hand suddenly reaches out to her from a wall; she shrieks, and in horror, she sees the alien lying in an alcove. In fact, it had stowed away aboard the shuttle, its external physicality making it blend in with the ship's machinery. She flees into a locker with space suits inside, and notices the alien is not following her; it remains lying in the alcove, seemingly unable to do something. Ripley gets an idea, and dons one of the space suits. She arms herself with a harpoon gun, then straps herself into a chair while singing "You Are My Lucky Star" to calm her nerves. Opening a series of air vents above the alien's head, Ripley tests them one at a time, and then finds one that directly blasts high-pressure steam onto the alien, driving it shrieking from its hiding spot. As she is activating several buttons, she does not notice the monster creeping up to her from the side, until it is standing next to her to its full, menacing two-meter height, ready to attack with its inner jaw. Screaming, she opens the shuttle's airlock door. Everything not secured, including the alien, blasts towards the door. However, the alien grabs the edges of the doorway to prevent itself from being sucked outside. Ripley quickly fires her harpoon before the creature is able to haul itself in; it pierces the screaming alien, which lets go of the doorway and blasts outside, the wire connecting the gun to the harpoon pulling the gun out of Ripley's hands. However, the door slams shut, jamming the wire under it. Still tethered to the door by the wire, the alien undauntedly attempts to re-enter the shuttle by climbing inside one of the heat thrusters. However, Ripley sees the opportunity and fires the engines, incinerating the alien, and sending it drifting into space.
Before she and Jones enter hypersleep for the journey home, Ripley records a final log entry, stating that Kane, Lambert, Parker, Brett, Ash and Captain Dallas are dead. Cargo and ship are destroyed. She expects to reach the frontier in six weeks, and to be picked up by the network. She signs off as Ripley, last survivor of the Nostromo, and gets into hypersleep.
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Software provides ERP and business process management.
Exact Software North America Apr 05, 2005
Exact Macola v340 and e-Synergy v340 provide tightly coupled solution for compliance management, warehouse management, and business analysis. With Exact Macola, users can track and report internal processes required as part of FDA Part 11, ISO or Sarbanes-Oxley compliance filings. Exact e-Synergy v340 enables users to manage document versions, fill vacant positions, define cost center groups, access information, and analyze financial reports.
Exact Software's Version 340 Offers Upgraded ERP and Business Process Capabilities
Exact Macola and e-Synergy customers can access tightly coupled solution for compliance management, warehouse management and business analysis
ANDOVER, Mass. - January 10, 2005 - Exact Software(TM), a leading provider of solutions that connect the people, processes and knowledge essential to an organization, today announced the availability of new upgrades for Exact Macola, the company's mid-market ERP solution, and e-Synergy, its business process solution.
Version 340 adds new features and enhancements based on input from customers and partners, allowing them to extend the value they can leverage from Exact's core product offerings. The products are tightly coupled, offering a number of new capabilities including support for compliance management and integration with Exact's warehouse management and business analytics offerings.
"In today's competitive business environment, organizations need robust solutions that can help them manage information, improve business processes and focus their energies directly on serving their customers," said Christopher Lenzo, director of Macola products and operations at Exact. "Working closely with our own customers and partners, we incorporated the capabilities they were looking for to deliver the highest value possible to the end user."
Organizations looking to address newly tightened compliance requirements can leverage the Version 340 upgrades to Exact Macola to track and report internal processes required as part of FDA Part 11, ISO or Sarbanes-Oxley compliance filings. Utilizing the benefits provided by Version 340, Exact Macola customers can now tie-in the functionality of the Exact Warehouse Management System, a full-featured WMS offering RF data collection, picking, label printing, packing and pallet management; and Exact Business Analytics, a set of pre-built business intelligence tools that unlock value from internal information storehouses.
Other upgrades include:
o Exact WebShop, a collaborative product catalogue and storefront for Macola users
o A credit card processing module with support for Go Software PC Charge Payment Server
o A new set of inquiry tools called PowerViews to speed access to information
o A fast, efficient way to manage purchasing activities
o Improved cash-flow management features and a new opening balances feature to aid i faster startups of new installations
Exact e-Synergy is a proven business process solution, offering customers the ability to facilitate real-time collaboration between departments, offices, countries and outside partners. Version 340 enables e-Synergy customers to leverage additional functionality managing document versions, filling vacant positions, defining cost center groups, accessing information and analyzing financial reports.
"With these Version 340 upgrades to our Macola and e-Synergy solutions, we have reinforced our commitment to provide powerful, easy-to-use business software," Lenzo said. "By adding these new advanced feature sets, our customers can take their organizations to a whole new level of efficiency."
About Exact Software(TM)
At Exact Software, we believe in Business Unified(TM) - being a leading provider of solutions that connect the people, processes and knowledge essential to an efficient, competitive business. Exact's integrated solutions encompass executive control, accounting, manufacturing, distribution, online commerce, CRM, HRM, document management, Web portals, workflow and more, empowering collaboration among employees, suppliers, and customers with real-time access to central Web-based corporate information and exchange. Exact Software's solutions provide greater visibility across the organization, maximizing control, productivity and efficiency for the entire value chain.
Exact Software is a division of Exact Holding N.V. (Amsterdam: EXAH.AS), located in Delft, the Netherlands, and has its North American headquarters in Andover, MA. For more information, please visit: exactamerica.com.
Exact Software, Business Unified, e-Synergy; and Macola are trademarks or registered trademarks of Exact Holding N.V. and/or its subsidiaries in the U.S. and/or other countries.


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RA.ONE - a new benchmark in Hindi sci-fi action flicks
Ladai goliyon se nahin, dil se jeeti jati hain.
Hindi cinema has never had a strong tack record in the sci-fi and fantasy genres. Its product has tended to focus on the musical rom-com, melodrama and tragedy - sometimes all bound up in the same film. There have been successful gangster, cop and thriller movies, and a consistently rich seam of independent cinema. But with a few recent exceptions - KRRISH, perhaps - Hindi cinema hasn't really ventured into the lucrative arenas (in the West, at least) of children's animation, fantasy, horror, and sci-fi. Perhaps this reflects the fact that all these genres need state of the art technical expertise of the kind that up until recently wasn't available in Mumbai - surprisingly so, when you consider India's considerable edge in IT. But IT in the creative industries - that's something quite different. Moreover, these films need considerable and expensive post-production work - again not the kind of facilities easily accessible in Bollywood.
All this pre-amble gives you some idea as to how revolutionary RA.ONE is. Because this isn't so much a new film, to be reviewed as other films are reviewed, but a statement of faith in the future of Hindi cinema on the part of its star, legendary Hindi actor Shah Rukh Khan, and his wife and now producer, Gauri Khan. RA.ONE represents a massive gamble, and indeed investment, on their part - in creating production facilities in Mumbai - in using the best post facilities in London for effects and retrospective 3D. They have shown the world that Hindi cinema can now produce movies of technical skill to match anything Hollywood has to offer, and the box office receipts show that Indian audiences are quite willing to embrace the relatively new genre of sci-fi action thriller. To that end, RA.ONE must be seen as a technical and commercial success - a seminal film - regardless of the quality of the actual work.
The movie itself is far more conservative than the radical technical achievement. The story is a strange and not entirely felicitous mash-up of elements from TERMINATOR, THE MATRIX, and TRON, shoe-horned into a typical Hindi family comedy.
Shah Rukh Khan plays a nerdy video game designer called Shekhar, married to his loving wife Sonia (Kareena Kapoor). In order to impress his alarmingly feminine-looking son, Prateek (Armaan Verma), Shekhar invents a game in which the bad guy always wins. Problem is, the bad guy avatar, Ra.One (a play on the Hindi name of an evil demon, Raavan) breaks free of the computer game and enters the real world, desperate to kill his gaming foe Lucifer, the avatar of Prateek. Only the good guy avatar, G.One (a play on the Hindi word for "life", Jeevan), modelled on Shekhar, can save the day.
The scenes of family life, with Shekhar and then G.One playing husband and father, are classic Hindi schmaltz. It's a culture in which the family unit is idealised - where father is always right, mother is entirely dependent on father (despite a brief reference to feminist research), and the little kid is a spoilt brat who comes to realise that, well, father was right all along. There are schmaltzy scenes of bonding, and Shah Rukh Khan's brand of typically broad, crude comedy. He does things here that are so simplistic - donning a stupid perm wig to simulate being a geeky southern Indian - that no other actor would get away with. But accusations that Shah Rukh Khan is a hammy actor are beside the point. His fans want to see through the thinly veiled disguise of costume and antics to the superstar beneath. He is his own brand - losing himself in characterisation would be alienating to his admirers.
The handling of the sci-fi material is also pretty cursory. This isn't THE MATRIX - posing deep questions about the nature of reality and perception. The explanation of how Ra.One and G.One can escape the video game is all a bit Basil Exposition. No-one here is really interested in the philosophy. But I have to say that I did appreciate the almost self-effacing way in which the screenwriters (David Benullo, Kanika Dhillon, Niranjan Iyengar, Mushtaq Sheikh, director Anubhav Sinha and Shah Rukh Khan) acknowledge this fact. Shortly after the interval they insert a scene where Sonia, Prateek and G.One meet Rajnikanth in the role of Chitti - the robot come to life that he played in the recent Hindi film ENDHIRAN - a much more subtle and intelligent investigation of the nature of virtual reality. Sonia explicitly pays homage to the superior creation.
Where the film scores big is in the use of CGI and the staging of the action scenes, that surpass anything in recent Hindi cinema, and even surpass second-tier Hollywood action flicks like THE GREEN LANTERN and THE GREEN HORNET. The imaginary worlds look amazing, Shah Rukh Khan looks superb in his blue-lit suit, and the set-pieces are just stunning - particularly a train chase sequence that culminates in the (subversive political?!) destruction of Mumbai's colonial Victoria Terminus railway station. I also liked the in-jokes - the inclusion of Desi girl jokes at Priyanka Chopra's expense, for instance. And, of course, completing the cross-cultural switch, we have the American rapper Akon singing the two key songs that frame the big musical item numbers. These scenes work really well, and it's actually pretty surprising to see how convincing Akon is singing Hindi lyrics, although this is undercut by the absurdity of Khan lip-synching to them. Ra.One is also one of the more successful retrospective 3D movies of recent times.
Overall, it's easy to knock RA.ONE - the plot is shaky, the sci-fi exposition cursory - and it's basically just another vehicle for Shah Rukh Khan's brand of cheeky family comedy, newly supplemented by his buff physique. The movie was never trying to be a subtle sci-fi thriller. What is was trying to do was lay down a new benchmark for CGI-packed action films. And in that respect, it's an unqualified success.
RA.ONE went on global release on October 26th.
Labels: 3D, action, amitabh bachchan, anubhav sinha, arjun rampal, armaan verma, India, kareena kapoor, priyanka chopra, rajnikanth, sanjay datt, sci-fi, shah rukh khan, v manikanandan, vishal shekhar
You don't like Ra.One. Big deal. I love it. It is one of the few movies including Darr, Baazigar, Don, MNIK, Asoka where you will see an amalgamation of two cultures of film making -the east and the west. If Spy kids and Tron are ignored, Virtuosity is the only movie which has a virtual character played by Russell Crowe. And since the characters in the game in Ra.One were self-aware and adaptive owing to the artificial intelligence, the robot plus humanoid acting was to the point. Thesis on cuss words which are actually based on women and their body parts is actually progressive. The sense of humour like crotch jokes is similar to Deadpool. Also a video game character being a superhero is an original origin story which none of DC and Marvel has. The fight scenes are also quite original, and uses mutliple bullet time shots as in Matrix which is justified here and also the end with ten RaOne's is a nod to the mythology where the demon Raavan had 10 heads. The technology is actually possible because of research in Internet of things, Artificial Intelligence and Virtual and Augmented Reality concepts. For example Google VR and Pokémon Go respectively. Also it has original special effects of cube formation and blasts which are different from IronMan but closer to Dragon Ball. Infact similar special effects are used in The Amazing Spiderman 2 where the character Electro is nothing like in the comics. Adam Sandler's Pixels basically ripped off the concept of Ra.One although it may have been an idea formed out of Wreck it Ralph. The message is quite wonderful because considering the attraction and indifference of kids towards violence in games, movies, tv shows and badass characters is alarming. Cheers!
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Argyroeides auranticincta is a moth of the subfamily Arctiinae. It was described by Edward A. Klages in 1906. It is found in Venezuela.

References

Moths described in 1906
Argyroeides
Moths of South America

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia