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The Politics of Solitude: Oldboy and Korean Noir
This is my second entry for the Korean Blogathon. Enjoy!
When I asked a friend why he thought Southern Korean cinema seems to offer so many films based upon the theme of revenge, I got a much different answer than the one I was expecting. Most people I know simply chalked it up to the North/South Korea thing, which was fine. I get that. No big deal. Really, as one of my girlfriends stated, you'd want revenge too "when half of your extended family probably died of starvation or were put in a work camp making asbestos-covered paper flowers for French weddings." But I was personally of the opinion that the revenge thing couldn't entirely come from the schism. There had to be more. And, as it turned out, I wasn't altogether wrong.
While I did think that the Northern/Southern Korean explanation was too much of an easy way out of explaining the severe proliferation of violent and vengeful films, I was unprepared for my friend's other answer. It seems that Southern Korean filmmakers use revenge as a trope in a way that is similar to how US filmmakers have done in the past. He noted that the contemporary South Korean attitude is one of complete and total self-reliance due to massive distrust of authority figures. In essence, if something needs to get taken care of, the individual takes care of it themselves, as almost every professional agency is seen to be corrupt in some regard. Director Bong Joon-Ho corroborated my friend's statement when interviewed about his film The Host. Bong states, "It would seem that only the little guy and his family have the best interests of Seoul at heart — the government could care less." (1)
What struck me most about this was that, beyond these directors' desire to align their main characters with a kind of "everyman/little guy" mentality, their primary focus still remains in underscoring the fact that Joe Everyman is a very lonely place to be, existing more readily in a location of solitude and self-sufficiency than any kind of communal wealth. In doing so, they inadvertently have made it so that nearly every single one of their Revenge Films feature what is, essentially, the perfect noir protagonist (2). Like the noir guys of yesteryear, the male heroes of Korean cinema tend towards a violent methodology and don't listen to anyone but their own inner voice. Of course, this may also have a lot to do with the fact that the outside world has seriously messed with their existence and thus their entirety is now dedicated to getting back at those that ruined their lives, but who knows?
Like Glenn Ford in The Big Heat (Fritz Lang, 1953) or Cliff Robertson in Underworld U.S.A (Sam Fuller, 1961), South Korean cinema is populated with characters whose main goal in life is to even the score with the figures who caused them the greatest pain without any help from a higher authority source. In the American and Korean films, the heroes chose to take matters into their own hands…with markedly different results. But they are also markedly different countries. That said, what should be noted is that both of these groups of films (American noir and what we will now call Korean noir) indicate a severe distrust of authority/authority figures. While films like Heat and Underworld were directly correlated to American political contingencies, revenge films within South Korea are a very specified and specialized kind of noir that is reflective of South Korean political culture and climate. In order to clearly see how South Korea looks at its own people and develops its own noir, looking at one film in particular may give us a more conclusive feel.
OLDBOY: Laugh and the world laughs with you. Weep and you weep alone
Noir extends beyond a mood and beyond a time. It is not a genre and it is as complicated as a chess board made from a silken spider's web…and just as sticky. Park Chan-wook's film, Oldboy, was released in 2003 as part of his "Vengeance Trilogy." I would argue that this film fits the category of Korean noir perfectly and that the political discourse being laid out could be seen as somewhat revolutionary and yet not extraordinarily unusual in that respect for the highly volatile country of South Korea. While Oldboy's sibling films also work for a discussion of Korean Noir, I feel that the overt visuals and meticulous aural planning make this the primary film of importance within the threesome.
In one of my favorite essays about the environment of film noir,"No Way Out: Existential Motifs in the Film Noir," the author describes the protagonist as never actually being able to fit the word "hero" due to the shape of his surroundings. He says that "his world is devoid of the moral framework necessary to produce the traditional hero." (3) If that description doesn't fit Oh Dae-Su's world to a T, I don't know what does. As the film begins, the poor guy is just drunk and in the police station, having been done for being drunk in public. His pal comes to get him, they make a tragic last phone call to Dae-Su's family, and…the alcohol takes over, leading Dae-Su to take off from the phone booth. The next thing he knows? He is trapped in a hotel room for the next 15 years, and he has no idea who put him there or why.
While the meat of the film may take place outside of the hotel room, post Dae-Su's "escape," that 15 year period is not to be ignored. Within his room/cell, he is allowed a very essential piece of information: a television. This media object serves as his sole escort- historically, sexually, and socially. We watch as he communes with soccer games, dance shows, and intensely important world events. Time passes and we are privy to his attempts at escape, all the while the screen is split, and we get to see the political changes taking place or the death of Princess Diana on the right while Dae-Su is trying to dig his way out on the left.
As Henry Sheehan so deftly notes,
Dae-su's imprisonment begins in 1988, the last year of the rule of Chun Doo-hwan, a brutal and murderous military dictator who ruled South Korea with the help of a secret police force, intimidation, indoctrination, and all the tools of a modern authoritarian state. Dae-su has a television set in his cell, so he is able to watch political developments more or less as they occur. But they come at him in the weird, leveling flood typical of TV images. The return of political dissident (and future president) Kim Dae-jung, for example, is given no more (and no less) emphasis than the wedding and subsequence death of Princess Diana. Dae-su's greatest television fixation is reserved for a young singer he seems to regard as his lover, but most of the time he flicks from channel to channel. Politics and sex, both a factor of imprisonment, get all mixed up in the gently pulsating beam. (4)
While we recognize what is going on in these initial diegetic circumstances , it is also integral to recognize where Oldboy itself comes from. Not unlike The Postman Always Rings Twice, The Maltese Falcon, or other famous films noirs, Oldboy had literary beginnings. Oldboy was borne out of a comic book written by Nobuaki Minegishi and Garon Tsuchiya. If those names don't sound Korean, it's because they're not. They're Japanese. Started in 1997, this 8-volume manga was bought in 2005 by Dark Horse to translate and then distribute in English due to the immense popularity of Park Chan-wook's film. Although widely considered to be a comic with a noir-like storyline, the Japanese version of Oldboy differs from the Korean film greatly. While one might say that this is due to simple translative book-to-film issues, I would argue that with this property, it goes deeper.
Historically, Korea became annexed by Japan in 1910, making it part of the Japanese Empire. It remained so until the end of World War II in 1945, when Korea became what it is today, divided into North and South. Those kinds of scars don't easily heal. One possibility with Oldboy is that Park Chan-wook saw the manga, saw the capacity it had for expansion, and simply lifted it, just wishing to use the narrative elements in an artistic manner. However, there is far too much political content within his film to argue such a thing. While these political elements are indeed gracefully hidden, they are most certainly there, making them seem just as much part of the storyline as anything else. Park Chan-wook's ability to mask politics with characterization, music, and plot is nothing if not masterful.
When asked about the politics in Oldboy, the director's response was coy. He said simply, "That is not what I intended. I can understand why people think that, and I have no intention of blocking that line of thinking!"(5) While this response may seem like a denial of having placed political messages within his work, Park Chan-wook's relaxed attitude towards other's people's interpretations and his unwillingness to "get in the way" may tell another story. The heart of Oldboy does lay in a noir-like narrative, but the politics set the stage.
As Dae-Su's story continues out of his forced isolation, he meets Mi-do, a woman who accompanies him on his journey to try to find the individual(s) who robbed him of his life. His involvement with Mi-do only leads him to more complications, and in the final face-off with the villain he discovers more about things in his past and Mi-do's past than he ever wanted to know. Dae-Su sacrifices a great deal in order to make sure that Mi-do's past never has to effect her in the way that his has caught up with him.
In this final scene, we witness Dae-Su, the man who has massacred people wildly and exacted the most horrific torture and revenge, is shown to be down on his knees in front of Lee Woo-Jin, the man who had imprisoned him for 15 years. Is he begging for his life? Not even a little. Dae-Su has shown that he cares nothing for his own existence. His body has pumped almost nothing but pure revenge since being released from that tower. No. Dae-Su is begging for the existence of Mi-do. Within this exchange, Lee Woo-Jin has said the most essential thing of all. Aside from threatening, Mi-do's life, he said, flat out, "You're notorious for not protecting your women."
When Japan conscripted over 5 million Korean men beginning in 1939 for labor and a couple hundred thousand for the war effort, they also decided that they needed some ladies for "comfort." They established brothels for their military men, and 51.8% of these "comfort women," as they were known, were Korean. Due to the fact that Korea was under Japanese control, there was nothing that the men could do to stop this from happening. Thus, this became part and parcel of Korean history.
Dae-Su's relationship with Mi-do is problematic, to say the least. She wants to make him happy, no matter what the cost to her is, even if it is physical pain during sexual intercourse. However, he knows that the emotional pain is on an entirely different registry. He will prevent this at all costs. It is almost as though through by using a Japanese text, Park Chan-wook is attempting to reinscript a new history for Korean women, one without the Japanese annexation and sexual slavery. Within this Oldboy, a film that is rewriting the comic through filmic means, the story is still relentless and painful, but Mi-do maintains dignity even if Dae-Su does not. In his final interaction with the heavy, he plays it so that she will never know her past. She will only know a future. To an extent, this is also a rewriting of Korea, over what Japan had attempted to do.
Dae-su's final showdown with the man who organized his capture is of great import. It deals with a multiplicity of issues, but more than anything, it deals with matters in and around speech, image and control. The history of Korea isn't far off from that storyline. While the details aren't quite the same, both Dae-Su and Korea spent a decent amount of time being locked away, under someone else's control. Then, upon release, they had to readjust, which still didn't guarantee a happy life! In fact, in both storylines, there was a reasonable amount of violence, paranoia, and isolation. And at the end of the day, both Dae-su and Korea end up having to be split up into separate entities, with an indeterminate ending; hoping for a good conclusion, but based upon the previous visuals…it's not lookin' so hot for anybody at the moment.
While politics provide a solid foundation for Park Chan-wook's Oldboy, it is film noir that adds the ambiance and gives it the flavor. Park Chan-wook is a very meticulous filmmaker, from his casting right down to his costuming. The mood that was set for this film and the darkness of the piece, was not entirely due to the fact that much of it took place in what were supposed to be hidden or underground locations. To begin with, the entirety of the soundtrack was designed to play as much of a character in the film as each actor. Almost every track was named after a film noir. Whether it was In a Lonely Place, Out of the Past, Kiss Me Deadly or The Big Sleep, each track played a role in rooting the film in a kind of historical background where the protagonist of the film exists in a universe of alienation, solitude and nihilism. Additionally, many (if not all) of these tracks also had a literary background, similar to Oldboy itself. The soundtrack presents Oldboy as a fully formed and musically textured piece that asks you to look beneath the surface.
Dae-Su, upon waking up in his confinement, begins to narrate the film via voiceover narrative. Now, if one were to take a survey of all the films noir that have voiceover narration…well, let's just say it would take a long time to name them all. A voiceover is a very tricky thing. As an audience, you become automatically aligned with whomever is speaking to you and telling you the story. It is a fabulous way to curry favor for your main character, and especially if your main character is not so ethically or morally…favorable?
Oldboy does not begin with a voiceover, nor does it maintain as much of a strong presence throughout the film as it does in the beginning. As the film starts, we are simply watching Oh Dae-Su. But he is quite sympathetic. He's just a drunk family man. Then we are drawn even closer to him through Park Chan-wook's use of the voiceover after he has been captured and incarcerated. Indeed, it is at this point that some of the most basic notions of film noir become verbally expressed by Oh Dae-su as he experiences 15 years of pure, unadulterated isolation.
Karen Hollinger notes that unlike other 1940's genres, where the voice-over narrative is used primarily to "increase audience identification with the main character," the narrative that is used in film noir is much less heroic. While there is certainly identification going on, the noir voice-over will "most often contain weak powerless narrators who tell a story of their past failures or of their inability to shape the events of their lives to their own design." (6) While Dae-Su is able to express himself physically and seek out those who caused him harm, the continual voiceover seems to express how powerless he still seems to feel over the 15 years he lost (amidst other plot points). In truth, by the end of the film, the revenge that he has worked so hard to get falls more than a little flat.
Of the concept of revenge, Park Chan-wook said this:
The act of vengeance is a meaningless one. Killing the villain does not bring back the dead. Even the stupidest person knows that. But despite that, people are still captivated by a desire to avenge. And it's not easy to walk away when the means are provided to "pay back." [But on top of that,] vengeance requires a tremendous passion and energy. People have to abandon their other everyday activities in order to cling to that purpose only. Why do people want to devote their whole life to this meaningless, fruitless thing? Is this incomprehensible, dark passion the human characteristic, distinguishing us from other animals? (7)
Oldboy, like many films noir, is investigating what it is to be human while living within some kind of existential panic. Oh Dae-su's solipsistic identity, caused primarily by the machinations of Woo-jin, the evil "puppetmaster," created a humanity that was so far collapsed that it could only seek the kind of vengeance that Park Chan-wook is talking about. In the end, he truly does attempt to follow the film noir path. As Robert Porfirio writes, "set down in a violent and incoherent world, the film noir hero tries to deal with it in the best way he can, attempting to make some order out of chaos, to make some sense of the world." (8)
(1) Interview w/Bong Joon-Ho, Rue Morgue Magazine #64, Jan./Feb. 2007.
(2) Noir scholars might insist that I refer to this as neo-noir based upon Oldboy's 2003 release date and noir's temporal restrictions, but due to the fact that I see this film as referring to noir in its originating capacity and also due to the fact that it is existing within the confines of another culture and country entirely, I will continue to refer to it as "noir."
(3) Porfirio, Robert G. "No Way Out: Existential Motifs in the Film Noir." Film Noir Reader. Vol. 1. Edited by Alain Silver & James Ursini. Limelight Editions, 1998. 77-93.
(4) Sheehan, Henry. "Oldboy." Film Criticism & Commentary. Accessed 3/9/11. http://henrysheehan.com/reviews/mno/oldboy.html
(5) Interview w/Park Chan-Wook by Neil Young for Neil Young's Film Lounge-Park Life. Conducted during the Edinburgh Film Festival, 8/22/2004. Accessed 3/10/2011. http://www.jigsawlounge.co.uk/film/reviews/neil-youngs-film-lounge-park-life/
(6) Hollinger, Karen. "Film Noir, Voice Over, and the Female Narrative." Film Noir Reader. Ed. Alain Silver and James Ursini. New York: Limelight, 1998.
(7) Interview w/Park Chan-wook by Carl Davis. "Oldboy Director Disses Vengeance, Looks Toward Upcoming Cyborg-Teen Comedy." 8/22/2005. Accessed 3/11/2011. http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1508066/oldboy-director-finds-revenge-meaningless-looks-toward-teen-comedy.jhtml
(8) Porfirio, ibid.
transcscript of an interview with Park Chan-Wook, writer-director of
conducted at the Sheraton Grand Hotel, Lothian Rd, Edinburgh
during the Edinburgh International Film Festival
on Sunday, the 22nd of August, 2004
between 10.00-10.30am
by Neil Young
March 10, 2011 sinaphile	Bong Joon-ho, Choi Min-sik, Film Noir, korean cinema, oldboy, Park Chan-wook, revenge films, south korea, the host, Vengeance Trilogy
2 thoughts on "The Politics of Solitude: Oldboy and Korean Noir"
Pierce Conran says:
Great essay sinaphile! Oldboy is a complicated film indeed and I agree with what you're saying. While Korean films became very popular in the west over the past decade, I feel that they are appreciated as aesthetic genre films or original revenge dramas. This is a shame as nearly every Korean film that has had an impact in the west has been a socially and historically articulate film, with far more to offer than a few thrills. The best example of this for me is Memories of Murder, a furiously complicated work that deftly weaves through Korean history and its psychologically damaged citizens within the guise of the search for a serial killer in rural Korea and which I've written about on my blog.
Thanks again for a great piece!
sinaphile says:
Thanks so very much! Your observations are quite true, and I couldn't agree with them more! Memories of Murder is one of my favorite films, actually, and I was considering writing about it for tomorrow's entry, but have chosen a different film instead. That said, I am very much looking forward to finding your piece and reading it, as I simply adore that film!


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Microsoft is closing all of its retail stores for good
Brian Heater	@bheater / 7 months
As other retailers begin the slow, cautious move to reopen, Microsoft has announced that it will be permanently shutting down the vast majority of its retail stores. There are some exceptions, including flagships in urban hubs including London, New York City, Sydney and its own campus in Redmond, Washington, but the remainder of the locations are going away.
Microsoft has since written to clarify that those handful of locations that will remain will be turned into "Microsoft Experience Centers," rather than the standard stores — basically a place to interact with products and take courses, without the actual purchasing aspect.
In a post optimistically titled, "Microsoft Store announces new approach to retail," the company spells out what amounts to a profound shift in an approach to retail that had previously found the company looking to compete with Apple at its own brick and mortar game.
It notes the planned temporary shutdown of locations due to COVID-19, but while the pandemic no doubt had an impact on that sector, this was likely a long time coming. In June of last year, it closed its smaller Specialty Stores and kiosks in the U.S.
"Our sales have grown online as our product portfolio has evolved to largely digital offerings, and our talented team has proven success serving customers beyond any physical location," Corporate VP David Porter says in the post.
Some goodish news in all of this. Microsoft has committed to transitioning retail employees to new sales and other roles, as the company shifts resources back into online commerce.
"The company's retail team members will continue to serve customers from Microsoft corporate facilities and remotely providing sales, training, and support," it writes. "Microsoft will continue to invest in its digital storefronts on Microsoft.com, and stores in Xbox and Windows, reaching more than 1.2 billion people every month in 190 markets."

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


On June 24, Turkey went through historic snap elections for both the presidency and parliament. The twin elections were the first of their kind, following the constitutional amendments of April 2017 that transformed Turkey's more than 90-year-old political system. At first glance, Turkey's controversial president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) appear to have won, although in a process that was arguably neither fair nor free. Erdogan won 52.59 percent of the presidential votes. The AKP and its coalition partner, the ultranationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP), won 53.7 percent of the votes and 344 seats in parliament (295 for the AKP, 49 for the MHP) out of 600. On the ground, not much has changed: After sixteen years and counting, Erdogan is still in power and is still winning.
However, the real winner, and the biggest surprise, of the June elections was the MHP's leader Devlet Bahceli, who made the call for snap elections in the first place. The common assumption among Turkey watchers was that the MHP could not get more than 7 percent of the votes, as opposed to 11.9 percent from last elections in 2015. They thought this for the simple reason that a new party splintered from the MHP — the Good Party (IYI), led by Meral Aksener — and that defection looked like it would severely diminish the MHP's base.
The election results proved all Turkey commentators, including yours truly, wrong. The MHP stabilized its votes at 11.7 percent, despite the fact that the IYI won 10 percent, 7 percent of whom were previously MHP voters. The MHP appears to have made up the difference by drawing in some voters who formerly supported its coalition partner, the AKP. The MHP was able to accomplish this in elections that are considered neither free nor fair: Erdogan's control of state institutions and media heavily tilted the election results toward the AKP. It is true that the MHP, as an AKP coalition partner, was not subject to the same sort of repression and delegitimization often experienced by the other parties, but it is just as important to note that the MHP also did not hold a single rally, and Bahceli received minimal air time in the media. Regardless, Bahceli outperformed all expectations.
More strikingly, both the MHP and the IYI performed well: as a start-up, the IYI received 10 percent of the votes and 43 parliamentary seats. The IYI accomplished this despite the fact that the AKP denied the new party any real media presence and even went to lengths to portray it as a "FETO project," referring to the movement led by Fethullah Gulen, public enemy number one in Turkey. Overall, the elections literally doubled the political might of the broader ultranationalist movement. Bahceli emerged as a kingmaker. Without him, Erdogan would likely have not emerged triumphant in the first round of the presidential race (if he had not won a majority in the first round, there would have been a second).
This year has been the best the ultranationalist movement has seen in decades. What are we to make of this? And what are the implications of this surprise for Turkish politics?
Three interrelated factors can explain the MHP's success. The first is a deep undercurrent in Turkish politics: A new brand of ultranationalism has been on the rise for a long time, and it has begun to have tangible impacts on the ballot box. Second, by turning to ultranationalist discourses — which he had slammed in the past — for short-term benefits in 2015, Erdogan brought this on himself. Ultranationalism proved to be a tiger he cannot control all by himself, partially because Bahceli has the tiger's ear.
The third dynamic can be referred to as the "Bahceli factor." Bahceli has long been ignored and even ridiculed by the opposition after his decision to first support and then join Erdogan from 2015 onward. He has usually been portrayed as an irrelevant and impotent "stepne" (spare tire) who allied with the president just to secure his leadership of the MHP. The recent elections suggest an alternative interpretation. Perhaps Bahceli is far from irrelevant, and has secured what he might have long envisioned: a Turkey where ultranationalist vision dominates politics, even if his own party may not be governing it.
The origins of Turkish nationalism as a modern phenomenon can be traced to the late-19th century. By the second half that century, the Ottoman Empire was facing many of crises and challenges emanating from both military defeats at the hands of more "modern" foreign competitors and ethnic nationalism rising throughout the empire, especially in the Balkans. Ottoman sultans, most notably, Sultan Abdulhamit II (reigning between 1876 and 1909), responded to these challenges in two ways: by creating a "Westernized" cadre of military officers and bureaucrats to match the Ottomans' foreign rivals, and by trying to empower a transnational ideology of "Ottomanism" that could undercut ethnic nationalism.
Ottomanism was still-born and failed to galvanize mass support behind the empire. The efforts to Westernize the military and bureaucracy led to unintended consequences. A new generation of officers and bureaucrats, some of whom trained in the Europe, ended up being inspired and enamored not only by the "modern" West, but also by the idea and power of [ethnic] nationalism, which they found lacking in the Ottoman Empire. The so-called "Young Turks" eventually grew into prominence in the state, eventually deposing Abdulhamit in 1909. Ironically, Abdulhamit became a victim of a dynamic he helped empower in the first place.
Modern Turkey's founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, a former military officer, was a product of the same Westernization efforts. Ataturk envisioned a secular and ethnic, as opposed to civic "Turkish" national identity for the new state, but faced challenges on both accounts. While secularism was a potent force among bureaucrats and some urbanites, the overwhelming majority of the population remained conservative Muslims. Furthermore, the kind of ethnic nationalism he sought to inspire in the country did not instantly "connect" with the masses, for two reasons. First, while ethnic Turks constituted the majority, there were also substantial numbers of other ethnic groups, including not only the Kurds, but also the Albanians, Laz, Circassians, Tatars, and Boshnaks among many others. The second challenge involved ethnic Turks themselves: the Ottoman sultans had refrained from invoking "Turkish [ethnic] nationalism," so even ethnic Turks did not instantly champion Turkishness over alternative (local or religious) identities.
Beyond more direct measures including massive population exchanges with Greece, Ataturk responded to these challenges by secularizing as well as "nationalizing" state institutions and society through methods such as changing the alphabet (from Arabic alphabet to a uniquely Turkish interpretation of the Latin one) and ridding the Turkish language from "foreign" (mostly Arabic and Persian) words. In tandem with reforms in the education system, the Turkish state invested in creating a historical narrative for the nation's origins. Most notably, building on existing mythologies, the "Turks" were projected as a unique, martial, and powerful race that originally hailed from Central Asia. In this telling, their glorious journey eventually brought them to Asia Minor by the turn of the 11th century, where they made their new home. Turks' conversion to Islam was also re-imagined: Since pre-Islam shamanistic Turks were worshipping Tengri, the God of Sky, a deity who shared many similarities with Allah, conversion was rather natural.
Such Central Asia-centric narratives followed from both expediency and an intention to undermine the Ottoman legacy. Ataturk needed a unique and glorious "history" comparable to similar European nationalistic narratives of the age. The Ottomans' glories, usually defined in terms of early military conquests, were gladly acknowledged, but the empire's final centuries were either brushed off, or portrayed as an age of decay, prompted by the weakness of the sultans and an inability to adopt Western ways, if just for the sake of defending Turkey against the West.
Until Erdogan's meteoric rise from 2002 onward, Turkish had nationalism evolved into different, if not necessarily incompatible, groups. A majority of the seculars, the CHP base in the present-day Turkish context, stuck to Ataturk's original interpretation with one qualification: They underplayed, if not totally dismissed, the Central Asian segments of the narrative. A near-obsessive adulation of Ataturk and his ideas was the engine behind this brand of nationalism, accompanied with a sense of deep suspicion of Western countries' intentions over Turkey.
Ultranationalists, who called themselves ulkucu ("idealists"), simply took the Central Asian narrative to its logical conclusion. In their view, the Turks were glorious in the distant past, and the only path to national salvation and regeneration was fully embracing Turkishness and the primacy of the Turkish state. The Central Asian myths were deeply emphasized, and the symbol of the movement was designated as the "Gray Wolf." In the ultranationalist mythology, the Turks of the distant past were emancipated from self-induced imprisonment with the help of a female gray wolf, Asena, who guided the Turks to salvation and glory. The modern Gray Wolves, in this narrative, aimed to guide the Turkish nation back to the path of emancipation and glory.
In this context, ultranationalists praised Ataturk as a "basbug" (chief of the Turks) who saved the Turkish nation from disarray and colonization in the aftermath of the First World War. Paradoxically, ultranationalists also did not find it difficult to incorporate Islam and Ottoman heritage into their ideology. Islam was not a big challenge, since the MHP was a right-wing party and hosted many conservatives. Ottoman heritage, in turn, was also easily integrated, with an emphasis on the Turkishness of the Ottoman sultans and the military as well as the martial origins of the Empire.
The main challenge for the early ultranationalists was the question of ethnic minorities. While some ultranationalist groups revelled in barely-hidden racism, the MHP's leaders tried to address this challenge by channeling their discourse to age old devletin bekasi (well-being of the Turkish state). In this interpretation, a Turkish citizen can hail from non-Turkic ethnic origins, but as long as s/he acts in ways that serve the well-being of the state, s/he is welcome to the fold. Conversely, anyone who acts in ways that may harm the Turkish state, regardless of ethnic origins, is a traitor.
Over the last couple of decades, the MHP's electoral performance has varied greatly. Under Devlet Bahceli (who assumed leadership in 1997), the MHP received 18 percent of the votes in 1999, establishing itself as a member of the governing coalition. However, in the snap elections in 2002, MHP was down to roughly 8 percent and, failing to clear the 10 percent barrier (a requirement for a party to be represented in the parliament), was left with no MPs. Ironically, it was Bahceli who made the call for snap elections. The elections allowed the AKP to control two-thirds of the parliament with only one-third of the votes, and near-ended Bahceli's political career.
The rise of Erdogan changed the political discourse over nationalism. It is now commonly accepted that Erdogan's AKP was rooting for a pan-Ottoman ideal, usually referred to as neo-Ottomanism. Most analyses on the concept have focused on the implications of neo-Ottomanism for Turkish foreign policy. However, Erdogan's neo-Ottomanism also came with a domestic component. For Erdogan, the secularizing/nationalizing regime was bankrupt, and, as an AKP member of parliament highlighted, a "90 years long time-out" from the Ottoman greatness. Following the Ottoman footsteps, which were built on undermining ethnic nationalism and organizing the society in terms of religious principles, Erdogan directly attacked the original interpretation of Turkish nationalism, even using the term "nationalist" as a barely-hidden insult.
Such departure from past interpretations of nationalism also allowed Erdogan to push forward the so-called "solution process" in 2013, which entailed the policy of simultaneously negotiating with the PKK through the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) and granting unprecedented, if still limited, cultural rights to Kurdish citizens of Turkey. Such departure from the original interpretation of Turkish nationalism prompted many CHP supporters to accuse Erdogan of betraying the nation. The harshest criticism came from Bahceli, who went as far as to declare that Erdogan posed a threat to the Turkish nation as much as the PKK did.
With hindsight, we can conclude that a deep under-current was sweeping through Turkish political discourse, culminating in Erdogan's decision to negotiate with the PKK: Ultranationalism was gaining ground as a cultural movement, especially among the youth. These new ultranationalists, to a large extent, are very similar to the old ones: they share an incorruptible adulation for Ataturk, are more amenable to Islam than the traditional CHP base, and consider threats to "national security" their biggest political motivator. What separates the new ultranationalism from the old is that it is not seen, especially by the youth, as a marginal, inflexible, and archaic doctrine. Especially the rise of IYI Party, whose leader Meral Aksener is sometimes portrayed as a modern day Asena, speak to this trend.
In the past, the ultranationalists could be caricatured as a group of unidimensional "tough guys," relics of the distant past and distinguished by their ulkucu mustaches. Present-day ultranationalists cannot be confined to these caricatures, but hail from all walks of life, including conservatives and ultra-secular urbanites.
Ultranationalism is becoming the new cool. More importantly, the rise of the IYI Party, with its more modern image, extends the reach of ultranationalism: If you prefer "old school," you can vote for the old guard epitomized by Bahceli, and if you prefer a more up-to-date interpretation, you can vote for the modern-day Asena, Aksener. While they may not see eye-to-eye on individual issues, both Bahceli and Aksener hail from — and speak to — a similar ideological current.
Of course, some might argue that IYI is best defined as a center-right party, not ultranationalist. Two facts remain. First, being a center-right party — in the Turkish context where left-right spectrum does not follow the Western interpretation — is perfectly compatible with ultranationalism. Second, Aksener's choice for IYI, which means "good," as a name for her party has an ulterior reason: "IYI" is a specific reference to Turks' Central Asian origins. IYI is in fact a non-alphabetical symbol for the Kayi tribe of the Oghuz Turks (from where the Ottomans originated), standing not for letters I-Y-I, but a bow between two arrows. Put differently, the name of the party itself reads like a secret handshake among ultranationalists.
So, how can we explain this new under-current? There are at least three explanations. First, especially for the youth, neither the CHP nor the AKP can still easily offer an identity that they can associate with. The increasing popularity of the MHP and HDP among the youth, not to mention the IYI Party's electoral performance, speak to this trend. As Soner Cagaptay highlights, Turkey's growing young population, who grew up under the AKP without knowing any other alternative, are bound to begin exploring alternative sources of identity.
The second factor that contributed to the rise of ultranationalism follows from the changing trends in internal and external security environment. Internally, Turkey has witnessed numerous terrorist attacks from the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIL). The failed coup attempt of July 2016 contributed to this sense of threat at the national scale. The influx of 3.5 million Syrian refugees to Turkey, in turn, has also been gradually frustrating many Turks, who may turn to more nationalist visions as a reaction.
Furthermore, the Erdogan-propelled "solution process" between 2013 and 2015, and its collapse contributed to the sense of threat, in different ways. How the collapse of the process affected ultranationalism is straightforward: The fighting between Turkish security forces and the PKK flared up, even spreading to urban areas for the first time since the conflict began during early 1980s. In a state of war, it is not surprising for many voters to turn to nationalistic discourses. What is less discussed are the ways in which the solution process itself also enraged the ultranationalists, and might have even made "ultras" out of middle-of-the-way nationalists.
The results of June and November elections in 2015 speak to this trend. In June 2015, while the solution process was still on the table, the AKP suffered a major setback, drifting to forty percent from its fifty percent in the 2011 elections. The AKP's setback is usually attributed to the HDP's success. While the HDP's success can explain the AKP losing its majority in parliament, it does not solely explain how the AKP ended up losing ten percent of its vote share. A complementary explanation is that ultranationalist voters were punishing the AKP for the solution process. Both the AKP's and the MHP's electoral performances in the 2015 elections provide partial support for this claim. In June 2015, MHP's increased its representation from 13 percent in 2011 to 16 percent, and most of the 3-percent increase likely came from the AKP. After June 2015 elections, the AKP adopted a no-holds-barred ultranationalist turn with an anti-PKK emphasis and rose back to roughly 50 percent in November.
All by itself, the AKP's 10 percent rollback reveals little about the role of ultranationalist votes. However, in the same elections, the MHP fell from 16 percent to 11 percent: it is likely that the AKP attracted a substantial proportion of the 5 percent that the MHP lost, from those who voted in favor of Erdogan's newfound ultranationalism. Perhaps, the writing was on the wall as early as November 2015: Ultranationalism had become a force to be reckoned with in the ballot box. If so, as Turkey watchers, we were staring at the wrong walls.
The third factor that eventually catalyzed the rise of ultranationalism as a game-changer in Turkish politics was Erdogan, who empowered ultranationalism with the full control of state institutions and media from 2015 onward. Erdogan's ultranationalist turn during the summer of 2015 was initially interpreted as one of his most Machiavellian achievements. However, as highlighted above, Erdogan built his combative discourse in domestic politics on anti-nationalism between 2002 and 2015. Recall that ultranationalism is not an ideological current intrinsically compatible with Erdogan's neo-Ottomanism-inspired Islamism. Faced with an electoral defeat in June 2015, and a threat emanating from the meteoric rise of PKK's sibling YPG in Syria, Erdogan's ultranationalism is best seen as a choice of necessity, or even desperation.
It is too early to conclude that the ideational tiger – ultranationalism – he empowered will eventually devour Erdogan's in the long run, as was the case for one of his personal heroes, Sultan Abdulhamit. However, the results of the June 2018 elections suggest that, just like his icon Abdulhamit, Erdogan might have set in motion a series of events that are contributing to the rise of an ideological under-current which he cannot control all by himself.
The June 2015 elections were a massive blow to Erdogan. At the same time, he had to address a burning problem in Syria: The PKK's sibling organization in northern Syria, backed by the United States in the fight against ISIL, was increasing its regional influence and territorial control. Erdogan responded by a radical turn to ultranationalism, a move accompanied with a ruthless military campaign against the PKK. Erdogan's version of ultranationalism, to be precise, is not identical to the traditional or the "new" ultranationalisms. It can be best described as "religious [ultra]nationalism," where Islamist motives and references are prioritized, with a clear adulation of the Ottoman past. The religious component of Erdogan's ultranationalism peaked in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt in July 2016, where nationalist narratives were heavily channeled through Islamic references.
The differences between Erdogan's version of ultranationalism and that of the MHP/IYI can be illustrated by examining Turkey's wildly popular TV drama industry. Erdogan's ultranationalism, for example, is clearly visible in two popular TV series, both of which hail from state channel TRT. Dirilis (Resurrection) is about the founding days of the Ottoman Empire, and focuses on Ertugrul Ghazi — the father of Osman Ghazi, after whom the empire was named — as the key protagonist. Turkic mythology and Central Asian references are heavily invoked, but through the prism of Islamic rhetoric. A second popular show is Payitaht (The Crown), a historical re-imagining of Erdogan's hero, Sultan Abdulhamit. In the series, the Ottoman strongman (who came to power in 1876 with the promise of a parliament, which he suspended two years later) outsmarts his foreign and domestic opponents by drawing on his incorruptible faith, title as the Caliph, and uncanny mastery of power politics.
MHP/IYI ultranationalism, in turn, can be observed through the lenses of two "martial" TV shows, the production of which would have been impossible before Erdogan made his ultranationalist turn (Erdogan would likely have slammed them as "racist," say, in 2013 or before). "Savasci" ("Warrior") tells the story of a special operations team in the Turkish military. There are mild references to religion, and the emphasis is on Central Asian origins, Turcomans in Syria, Iraq and beyond, and most notably, Ataturk. Almost all the names of the characters are direct references to Central Asian Turkic mythology. At the edge of the spectrum, there is "Boru" ("The Wolf"), a show about police special operations forces which, like "Savasci," fight the PKK and ISIL. Boru jettisons religious references all together, and is tongue-in-cheek about symbolic references: the main female character is named Asena, and another character, during a torture-induced interrogation scene that would give the American TV show "24's" Jack Bauer a run for his money, goes to lengths to explain that his name, Kemal, comes from Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.
At first glance, Erdogan's vision may be seen as a rival to that of the MHP/IYI. In the ever-fungible discursive world of ultranationalism, however, such visions are not necessarily rivals, and may in fact be "additive": While an Islamicized interpretation of Ottoman origins or the re-imagining of Abdulhamit as an enlightened "world leader" may offend the CHP base's sensitivities, the same is not necessarily true for traditional and new ultranationalists: Their version was never incompatible with Islam and, more importantly, now Erdogan is making their propaganda for them, or — at the very least — enabling it.
Add to the mix the recent successes of the Turkish military against the YPG and ISIL in Syria, and the PKK in Turkey as well as Iraq. The relevant policies are further militarizing the society, with constant references to victories, martyrs, selfless heroism for the sake of the nation, and threats to national security, which are the bread and butter of ultranationalists. Erdogan is a newcomer to this new discursive arena, which, for decades, was dominated by none other than Devlet Bahceli.
Bahceli has never been a popular figure in the eyes of Turkey watchers, attracting little analytical attention. After siding with Erdogan in 2015, he became even less popular, and an object of disdain as well as ridicule. His success in the recent June elections left Turkey watchers scratching their heads, while at the same time motivating some in Turkey to consider a "theory," which was likely intended to be satire, long in circulation in Turkish social media: Perhaps Devlet Bahceli was a Machiavellian wolf in an incompetent wolf's skin (or, "Bahchiavelli," as some in social media refer to him) and has been following a grand strategy that will eventually bring Erdogan down, and ultranationalists to power.
Little is known about Bahceli, including his private life (or, whether he has ever had one). From what we know, he has a peculiar first name (which literally means "The State") and was a professor of economics before switching to politics. Therefore, any strong claim about his strategic acumen is bound to be speculative. However, past evidence suggests that Bahceli is no master strategist. Recall that Bahceli's abrupt decision to call for snap elections in 2002 marginalized the MHP and nearly ended his political career, paving the way for the rise of the AKP who initially upheld positions antithetical to what Bahceli stood for. However, with hindsight, it is safe to say that Bahceli's decision to ally with Erdogan in 2015 was strategic. Bahceli likely calculated that siding with Erdogan would eventually allow the MHP to speak closer to the ears of conservative ultranationalists within the AKP and beyond. Furthermore, Bahceli might have considered that the MHP-AKP coalition would alienate some Kurdish voters from the AKP.
In all likelihood, Bahceli came on top in June elections, which he calls a "historic victory." To be precise, the AKP needs only six MPs from other parties to secure its majority in parliament, which would not be a difficult feat. However, the real leverage Bahceli has over Erdogan cannot be reduced to the number of parliamentary seats that AKP needs for a majority. Bahceli's electoral success showed Erdogan two things. First, siding with ultranationalists pays off well in the short term. Second, paradoxically, as the June elections established, Erdogan's political prospects increasingly depend on ultranationalist voters, a dynamic that renders him hostage to the ultranationalist under-current where Bahceli excels.
Note that Bahceli's main concern is not necessarily democracy, or "balancing" what can be called Erdoganocracy. His priority is dictated by his ultranationalist ideology: the well-being of the Turkish state, as he interprets it. Arguably, Bahceli would prefer an Erdogan who keeps up with the ultranationalist agenda with respect to the Kurdish Question over a coalition government that would include, or be backed by, the HDP. If Erdogan deviates from the agenda, Bahceli, as he made very clear in a statement right before the elections, will turn against Erdogan, with a vengeance.
In such a scenario, Bahceli hit where he can do the most damage, painting Erdogan as a hypocritical traitor to the nation in the eyes of the president's own base, who are being served the ultranationalistic Kool-Aid for the past three years. Erdogan can still make a radical turn, say, by initiating a second peace process with the PKK. However, he now knows, more than ever, such a turn may come at a cost, with his own base flocking to the ultranationalist camp in large numbers.
The rise of ultranationalism in Turkey will have three consequences in the long term. First, Turkey will likely continue its anti-PKK/YPG campaign in the region. As highlighted above, Erdogan may be tempted to outmaneuver Bahceli by coming to terms with HDP to negotiate a second solution process. However, his reliance on, and vulnerability to, the ultranationalist under-current will limit his course of action for a simple reason: Bahceli will be on the lookout, waiting to exploit any significant deviation from the existing hawkish anti-PKK posture. Erdogan has mastered not democracy as some claim, but the dog-eat-dog Realpolitik that drives Turkish politics. But this time, he will have to play on a field where he is a late-comer, and he might have already gone too deep with his ultranationalistic discourses to make yet another radical turn.
Second, the rise of ultranationalism does not necessarily mean that Turkey's relationship with the West will deteriorate. Instead, relations with the West (especially the United States) will be increasingly "conditional" on how the United States and European countries approach the Turkey-YPG conflict among other issues. It is true that Bahceli's foreign policy posture entails a heavy suspicion of Western powers, and that he openly declared that Turkey could leave NATO. However, such a posture is not specific to Bahceli: From leftists to ultranationalists, moderate secularists to Islamists, almost all political factions share the same understanding about "foreign powers," which reveals itself best in the half a century old anti-Americanism as well as anti-NATO sentiment embedded in all walks of life in Turkish society.
Bahceli's foreign policy posture is also far more pragmatic and less adventurous than that of Erdogan. For example, there is no evidence that Bahceli harbors "Pan-Turkic" illusions, if not sympathies, beyond Turkish borders comparable to the neo-Ottomanist dreams that drove AKP's foreign policy for a long time. Bahceli's priority is what he would consider the primary national security interests of the Turkish Republic, which for him are under serious threat from within (Bahceli staunchly opposes any federal arrangement) and from outside (especially Syria) in the form of the Kurdish question. With this background, it is difficult to define Bahceli as pro- or anti-American, or pro- or anti-Russian. It is more fitting to see him as pro-unitary-Turkey, and against anyone whom he believes could threaten that ideal. In this context, Bahceli's unrelenting position will limit the "bargaining space" between Ankara and the Washington over the YPG and PKK: Bahceli will not budge, and will strike at Erdogan the moment the Turkish president budges.
The third long-term consequence of rising ultranationalism in Turkey is that it will shape Turkish political discourse in the foreseeable future, and as the June elections clearly displayed, sometimes in ways that would difficult to predict. As Turkey watchers, we have failed to engage what the phenomenon was, and how it might affect Turkish politics. It is high time we take ultranationalism seriously and move beyond simplistic interpretations that portray ultranationalists as unidimensional caricatures or throwbacks. Ultranationalists themselves have most certainly moved well beyond such interpretations. The rest of us just need to catch up.


John has a longstanding interest in the production and development of weapons for trench warfare during World War I. The Devil's Chariots, his acclaimed history of the tank's tortuous evolution, followed five years of research largely from original unpublished documents. He also writes on general military and social history subjects including Bravest of the Brave, the Story of the Victoria Cross' The late military historian Professor Richard Holmes rated it the best single book on the VC. John organised international trade fairs before joining Earls Court & Olympia as Halls Director. Served on government organising teams for London's 50th VE and VJ commemorations, the Hong Kong handover, and London's Queen's Golden Jubilee celebrations. He is an honourable member of the Royal Signals Association and a past member of the Royal Tournament organising Committee. John is married and lives in Guildford.


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text:
Creatures of Barsaive is a supplement published by FASA in 1994 for the fantasy role-playing game Earthdawn.

Contents
Creatures of Barsaive, by Fraser Cain, is a bestiary describing fifty more creatures found in Barsaive. The information is provided by the great dragon Vasdenjas, who is dictating his reminiscences to a dwarven scribe.

Some of the creatures are original creations, some are more traditional creatures that are given a background suited to the Earthdawn setting.

Reception
In the July 1995 edition of Dragon (Issue #219), Allen Varney noted that like other Earthdawn supplements, this book "takes a creative approach to its well-worn subject." Varney thought using a dragon's point-of-view "reveals much about draconic psychology, and his dialogues with the scribe make the text a delight to read."

Reviews
Rollespilsmagasinet Fønix (Danish) (Issue 8 - May/June 1995)

References

Earthdawn supplements
Role-playing game supplements introduced in 1994

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


text:
Archive for category: ACNS
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Anglican bishops from around the world gather for the 15th Lambeth Conference
Anglican Communion News Service
From across the 165 countries of the Anglican Communion, bishops are gathering in Canterbury today to pray, study scripture, discuss global challenges and seek God's direction for the decade ahead.
The Lambeth Conference 2022, which runs until August 7, is only the 15th such global gathering of Anglican bishops in 155 years.
The event was postponed from 2020 because of the Covid 19 pandemic and takes place against a backdrop of global uncertainty – including the climate emergency, war and poverty.
Taking as their theme "God's Church for God's World", the bishops will spend time praying and studying the Bible together (focussing on the book of 1 Peter) as well as discussing major challenges faced by their global communities – ranging from climate change and scientific progress to Christian Unity and inter-faith relations.
Posted: July 27, 2022 • Permanent link: ecumenism.net/?p=12337
Categories: ACNS • In this article: Anglican Communion, Lambeth Conference Transmis : 27 juil. 2022 • Lien permanente : ecumenism.net/?p=12337
Catégorie : ACNS • Dans cet article : Anglican Communion, Lambeth Conference
Former child refugee named as next Secretary General of the Anglican Communion
A South Sudanese bishop who was forced with his family into exile before he was one year old, the Right Revd Anthony Poggo, has been named as the next Secretary General of the Anglican Communion. Bishop Anthony Poggo, the former Bishop of Kajo-Keji in the Episcopal Church of South Sudan, is currently the Archbishop of Canterbury's Adviser on Anglican Communion Affairs.
Bishop Anthony was selected for his new role by a sub-committee of the Anglican Communion's Standing Committee following a competitive recruitment process led by external consultants.
He will take up his new role in September, succeeding the Most Revd Dr Josiah Idowu-Fearon, who steps down after next month's Lambeth Conference of Anglican bishops, which is being held in Canterbury, Kent, from 26 July to 8 August.
The Anglican Communion is the world's third largest Christian denomination. It comprises 42 independent-yet-interdependent autonomous regional, national and pan-national Churches (provinces), active in more than 165 countries.
Posted: June 14, 2022 • Permanent link: ecumenism.net/?p=11747
Categories: ACNS • In this article: Anglican Communion Transmis : 14 juin 2022 • Lien permanente : ecumenism.net/?p=11747
Catégorie : ACNS • Dans cet article : Anglican Communion
Anglican Church in Wales urges WCC to distance itself from Russian Orthodox Church over Ukraine
The [Anglican] Church in Wales has called on the World Council of Churches (WCC) to distance itself from any members which have shown support for Russia's "unprovoked war of aggression" in Ukraine, namely the Russian Orthodox Church.
An emergency motion passed unanimously last month at the Church in Wales' Governing Body in Newport last week urged the WCC to stand with the oppressed and work for peace, and to take "clear and appropriate action" against any member which supported the war.
Posted: May 23, 2022 • Permanent link: ecumenism.net/?p=12732
Categories: ACNS • In this article: Russian Orthodox, Ukraine, WCC Transmis : 23 mai 2022 • Lien permanente : ecumenism.net/?p=12732
Catégorie : ACNS • Dans cet article : Russian Orthodox, Ukraine, WCC
Scientists and theologians join forces for new Anglican Communion Science Commission
ACSC will "resource the whole Anglican Communion for courageous and confident spiritual leadership in issues involving science." A new Anglican Communion Science Commission (ACSC) is being formed to "resource the whole Anglican Communion for courageous and confident spiritual leadership in issues involving science." The ACSC will be co-chaired by the Archbishop of Cape Town, Thabo Makgoba; and the Bishop of Oxford, Stephen Croft. The ACSC will formally launch at the Lambeth Conference in Canterbury, England, in July and August next year; and will hold its first conference shortly afterwards.
Scientists, theologians, and bishops from around the globe are being invited by the Anglican Communion's Secretary General, Dr Josiah Idowu-Fearon, to serve as Commissioners. The Archbishop of Canterbury, Justin Welby, has asked Anglican Communion Primates to nominate a Bishop from their Church to serve as provincial representatives at conferences of the Commission. Science will be a significant feature at the 2022 Lambeth Conference. Today, organisers have posted a series of videos, exploring the relationship between science and faith, on the Lambeth Conference website.
Categories: ACNS • In this article: Anglican Communion, Lambeth Conference, science Transmis : 21 mai 2021 • Lien permanente : ecumenism.net/?p=10870
Catégorie : ACNS • Dans cet article : Anglican Communion, Lambeth Conference, science
Unity, Faith and Order
The Department for Unity, Faith and Order in the Anglican Communion has at its core the search for deeper unity between Christians, be that within and between the churches of the Anglican Communion or between the Anglican Communion and other Christian churches and bodies.
Much of the work of Unity, Faith and Order (which goes by the extra-terrestrial acronym UFO) is taken up with encouraging Christians to talk together. Over the course of the last century much work has been done to break down mutual suspicion and division between churches by patient dialogue and the building up of relationships. This happens at the local level, where Christians find that when they come together to pray or get involved with mission and ministry that they have more in common than they first thought. It also happens at national and international level, when theologians from different churches and traditions talk together to come to agreement on issues that have previously divided them.
Posted: Feb. 7, 2020 • Permanent link: ecumenism.net/?p=10720
Categories: ACNS • In this article: Anglican Communion, Christian unity, ecumenism Transmis : 7 févr. 2020 • Lien permanente : ecumenism.net/?p=10720
Catégorie : ACNS • Dans cet article : Anglican Communion, Christian unity, ecumenism
Anglican Communion called to repent as primates affirm commitment to walk together
The work of the Task Group which was established by the Archbishop of Canterbury after the January 2016 Primates' Meeting has been commended by the Primates. The Task Group has called for a Season of Repentance, focused around the fifth Sunday in Lent this year (29 March), and has prepared a common Anglican Communion eucharistic liturgy and papers on Anglican identity.
In their communiqué, released at the end of last week's Primates' Meeting, the Primates explained that the Task Group was established "to look at how we might walk together despite the complexities we face."
They added: "at this meeting we affirmed our continued commitment to walk together; we received the work of the Task Group and commended it to the other Instruments of Communion – the Lambeth Conference and the Anglican Consultative Council."
They also recommended that a new group be established "to continue the work of the Task Group to explore how we live and work together in the light of the Lambeth Conference.
Categories: ACNS • In this article: Anglican Communion, Primates Meeting Transmis : 20 janv. 2020 • Lien permanente : ecumenism.net/?p=10722
Catégorie : ACNS • Dans cet article : Anglican Communion, Primates Meeting
A Joint Christmas 2019 Message from Archbishops Richard Clarke and Eamon Martin
Together we wish you God's richest blessings this Christmas and through the year ahead.
These few days at the turn of the year offer an opportunity for people who are normally very busy to give worthwhile time to family and friends. It can also be a stressful and difficult time for people who feel estranged from friends and loved ones to whom they were once close, and for those who feel they have no–one they can truly call a friend.
Over Christmas and New Year many people are able to rekindle relationships that have somehow gone sour. We are all capable of bringing light and love into another person's life – perhaps someone for whom hope itself is fading, someone who desperately needs the rekindling of trust that only care and friendship can bring. Jesus Christ came into the world to bring us not only the light of his love but also the warmth of his friendship. Indeed, he assured his disciples that they were more than just "followers"; they were his "friends" (John 15.15).
Posted: Dec. 19, 2019 • Permanent link: ecumenism.net/?p=10726
Categories: ACNS Transmis : 19 déc. 2019 • Lien permanente : ecumenism.net/?p=10726
Catégorie : ACNS
Papal embrace for new director of the Anglican Centre in Rome during Mauritius visit
The visit of Pope Francis to Mauritius on Monday brought fresh energy and confidence to Christians in the country, according to the Bishop of Mauritius, Ian Earnest, who leaves this month to take up his new role as Director of the Anglican Centre in Rome.
Former Primate of the Anglican Church of the Indian Ocean, Archbishop Ian Ernest, attended the mass at the Mary Queen of Peace Monument at which the Pope presided during his day-long visit to the Island. The Archbishop said the timing of the Pope's visit, just weeks before he begins his new role in Rome, made him think about how God works. "It was a great opportunity to meet with him, to be part of this eucharistic celebration at which he presided in front of 100,000 people with the authorities of the country."
The eucharist was attended by people from all areas of Mauritius and of many different religious persuasions. Archbishop Ian said: "As Anglicans we were praying the Pope's visit would create an impact on our people so that they can see and discover the values of the kingdom of God. We had been preparing for that and we have not been disappointed."
Posted: Sept. 13, 2019 • Permanent link: ecumenism.net/?p=10741
Categories: ACNS • In this article: Anglican Centre in Rome, Ian Ernest, Pope Francis Transmis : 13 sept. 2019 • Lien permanente : ecumenism.net/?p=10741
Catégorie : ACNS • Dans cet article : Anglican Centre in Rome, Ian Ernest, Pope Francis
New Director of Unity, Faith and Order appointed for the Anglican Communion
The Ecumenical Adviser to the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr William Adam, is to be the new Director of Unity, Faith and Order for the Anglican Communion. His new role, which he takes on with immediate effect, will be held alongside his role at Lambeth Palace, which he has held since 2017. He succeeds the Revd Canon Dr John Gibaut, who was appointed to the post in 2014 and held it until earlier this year, when he became President, Provost and Vice-Chancellor of Canada's Thorneloe University.
Will Adam was ordained in the Church of England in 1994 and held parish appointments until taking up his post advising the Archbishop of Canterbury. From 2017 until now he has also served as Ecumenical Officer in the Church of England's Council for Christian Unity. He has experience of ecumenical dialogue at national and international level.
Posted: Sept. 3, 2019 • Permanent link: ecumenism.net/?p=10683
Categories: ACNS • In this article: Anglican Communion Transmis : 3 sept. 2019 • Lien permanente : ecumenism.net/?p=10683
Watershed vote as Anglican Church of Canada supports an indigenous church
The General Synod of the Anglican Church of Canada has voted overwhelmingly to approve steps to enable a self-determining indigenous church within the Church. Following the approval of changes in canon law, the National Indigenous Anglican Bishop, Mark MacDonald, was given the title and status of Archbishop. He will always be an invited guest at Sacred Circle — the national gatherings of indigenous Anglicans for prayer, worship, discernment, and decision-making — with a voice but no vote.
The resolution will allow the National Indigenous Ministry to make various changes on the composition of the Anglican Council of Indigenous Peoples (ACIP) and Sacred Circle without needing the approval of General Synod.
Archbishop Mark said: "people often misinterpret what we're doing as an attempt at independence, away from the church. We really wish to become an indigenous expression of the church, and we are only asking for the freedom and dignity that other Anglicans already enjoy."
Categories: ACNS • In this article: Anglican Church of Canada, bishops, Indigenous peoples, Mark Macdonald Transmis : 19 juil. 2019 • Lien permanente : ecumenism.net/?p=10586
Catégorie : ACNS • Dans cet article : Anglican Church of Canada, bishops, Indigenous peoples, Mark Macdonald
Anglican Church of Canada elects its first female primate – Bishop Linda Nicholls
The Anglican Church of Canada (ACoC) has elected Linda Nicholls, the Bishop of the Diocese of Huron, as its next primate. She will become the first woman to hold this position in the ACoC and only the second female primate in the Anglican Communion.
The election, held during the Church's General Synod at Christ Church Cathedral in Vancouver on 13 July, began with five nominees. Bishop Linda was elected on the fourth ballot, with 64 per cent of lay votes and 71 per cent of votes among the clergy.
Speaking shortly after the election, Bishop Linda said: "you have bestowed on me an honour that I can hardly imagine, and it is terrifying. But it is also a gift, to be able to walk with the whole of the Anglican Church of Canada from coast to coast to coast."
Categories: ACNS • In this article: Anglican Church of Canada, bishops, Linda Nicholls Transmis : 15 juil. 2019 • Lien permanente : ecumenism.net/?p=10584
Catégorie : ACNS • Dans cet article : Anglican Church of Canada, bishops, Linda Nicholls
Covenant for "historical cousins" – the Methodist Church and the Church of England – moves forward
Despite an amendment to slow down the process, the Church of England's General Synod has agreed a series of motions to take forward its Covenant with the Methodist Church in Britain to allow interchangeability of ministries and intercommunion between the two Churches.
The Archbishop of Canterbury, Justin Welby, told the General Synod: "I for one am profoundly committed to moving forward in this matter, for the sake of the Gospel, for the sake of the Church and for the sake of the world we are sent to serve."
Categories: ACNS • In this article: Church of England, covenant, Methodist Transmis : 12 juil. 2019 • Lien permanente : ecumenism.net/?p=10579
Catégorie : ACNS • Dans cet article : Church of England, covenant, Methodist
World's oldest ecumenical agency celebrates its 175th anniversary
The Archbishop of York, Dr John Sentamu, joined in the celebrations with one of the oldest ecumenical global movements as it marks its 175th anniversary this year. The worldwide YMCA youth movement, which began as an evangelical young men's Christian service organisation, celebrated its start this month with a thanksgiving service at St Martin-in-the-Fields in London.
The Archbishop, who is the President of the YMCA, said: "It has been a great pleasure to join in the celebrations of 175 years of the YMCA. The work they have done and continue to do today to help and support young people is truly fantastic! My prayer is that the work continues for the next century!"
Denise Hatton, the Chief Executive of YMCA England & Wales, said: "what started with a concern for the welfare of his fellow workers and the formation of a prayer and Bible study group, grew into the YMCA which now reaches 60 million people worldwide."
Categories: ACNS • In this article: ecumenism, YMCA Transmis : 14 juin 2019 • Lien permanente : ecumenism.net/?p=10588
Catégorie : ACNS • Dans cet article : ecumenism, YMCA
Senior ecumenical panel to discuss Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification
The five Christian denominations closely associated with the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification (JDDJ) are taking part in a private consultation and public events this week to discuss how to take the document further. The JDDJ was originally agreed by the Roman Catholic Church and the Lutheran World Federation in 1999. The significant ecumenical text has been described as resolving the doctrinal dispute at the heart of the Reformation; and has since been adopted or affirmed by the World Communion of Reformed Churches, the World Methodist Council and the Anglican Consultative Council.
Posted: Mar. 27, 2019 • Permanent link: ecumenism.net/?p=10421
Categories: ACNS • In this article: Anglican Communion, Dicastery for Promoting Christian Unity, JDDJ, justification by faith, Lutheran World Federation, World Communion of Reformed Churches, World Methodist Council Transmis : 27 mars 2019 • Lien permanente : ecumenism.net/?p=10421
Catégorie : ACNS • Dans cet article : Anglican Communion, Dicastery for Promoting Christian Unity, JDDJ, justification by faith, Lutheran World Federation, World Communion of Reformed Churches, World Methodist Council
Pope Francis: walking together is "an act of obedience to the Lord and love for our world"
Pope Francis has given a strong message about the ecumenical journey during a visit to the World Council of Churches' headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. In a homily during a prayer service in the Ecumenical Centre, Pope Francis spoke about the journey towards Christian unity and the pitfalls on the way. "For us as Christians, walking together is not a ploy to strengthen our own positions, but an act of obedience to the Lord and love for our world," he said. "Let us ask the Father to help us walk together all the more resolutely in the ways of the Spirit.
"I wanted to take part personally in the celebrations marking this anniversary of the World Council, not least to reaffirm the commitment of the Catholic Church to the cause of ecumenism and to encourage cooperation with the member churches and with our ecumenical partners.
Categories: ACNS • In this article: Pope Francis, WCC Transmis : 21 juin 2018 • Lien permanente : ecumenism.net/?p=10316
Catégorie : ACNS • Dans cet article : Pope Francis, WCC
Informal group of Anglican–Roman Catholic theologians discusses "new layers of unity"
An informal but officially-sanctioned ecumenical dialogue between Anglican and Roman Catholic theologians has met to consider "the difficult question of Anglican Orders." The Malines Conversation Group was originally established in the early 1920s by Cardinal Désiré-Joseph Mercier, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Malines-Brussels; some 24 years after Pope Leo XIII declared that Anglican Orders were "absolutely null and utterly void". The 1920s Malines Conversations Group envisioned the restoration of communion between Anglicans and Roman Catholics in the phrase l'Église Anglicane unie non absorbée – united, but not absorbed.
Since then, a number of formal dialogues and relational groups between the two churches have been established, including the Anglican Roman Catholic International Commission (ARCIC), which undertakes theological dialogue; and the International Anglican-Roman Catholic Commission for Unity and Mission (IARCCUM), an episcopal commission which seeks ways to put joint agreements into practice.
Posted: May 1, 2018 • Permanent link: ecumenism.net/?p=10247
Categories: ACNS • In this article: Anglican, Catholic, dialogue, Malines Transmis : 1 mai 2018 • Lien permanente : ecumenism.net/?p=10247
Catégorie : ACNS • Dans cet article : Anglican, Catholic, dialogue, Malines
Anglican and Roman Catholic leaders in Ireland herald 20th anniversary of Belfast Agreement
The leaders of the Roman Catholic and Anglican Churches in Ireland have issued a joint statement celebrating "all that has been achieved in building peace" since the historic Belfast Agreement was signed 20 years ago. In a joint statement on eve of the 20th anniversary of the agreement, which is also known as the Good Friday Agreement, as it was agreed by political parties on 10 April 1998 – Good Friday – Archbishops Richard Clarke and Eamon Martin, say that the agreement "has continuing potential to transform society and life for all of us. Nothing remotely its equal has been outlined then or since."
Archbishop Richard is the Anglican Archbishop of Armagh and Primates of the Church of Ireland; Archbishop Martin is the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Armagh and leader of the Catholic Church in the country. They say that the Good Friday Agreement "sought to address contentious political problems in the context of decades of violence, divided communities and immense suffering and death on our streets. As such it was a complex and, in places, controversial document.
Posted: Apr. 9, 2018 • Permanent link: ecumenism.net/?p=10353
Categories: ACNS • In this article: Anglican, bishops, Catholic, Ireland, peace Transmis : 9 avril 2018 • Lien permanente : ecumenism.net/?p=10353
Catégorie : ACNS • Dans cet article : Anglican, bishops, Catholic, Ireland, peace
Anglicans and Roman Catholics agree statement on ecclesiology
Anglicans and Roman Catholics should see in each other "a community in which the Holy Spirit is alive and active," the latest communiqué from the official ecumenical dialogue between the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church says.
Members of the third-phase of the Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission (ARCIC) met in the central German city of Erfurt early this month for their seventh meeting. They chose to meet in the city to mark the 500th anniversary of the Reformation – it is here that Martin Luther was ordained and lived as a monk.
During their meeting, the members of ARCIC agreed the text of a new statement looking at Anglican and Roman Catholic ecclesiology. Walking Together on the Way: Learning to be Church – Local, Regional, Universal, to be known as The Erfurt Document, will be published next year.
Categories: ACNS, Communiqué • In this article: Anglican, ARCIC, Catholic, ecclesiology Transmis : 30 mai 2017 • Lien permanente : ecumenism.net/?p=9695
Catégorie : ACNS, Communiqué • Dans cet article : Anglican, ARCIC, Catholic, ecclesiology
Archbishop of Canterbury calls on Christians to join global wave of prayer
The Archbishop of Canterbury is encouraging Christians of all denominations to join in with a ten day global prayer initiative "Thy Kingdom Come" from Ascension Day to Pentecost. What began last year as an invitation from the Archbishops of Canterbury and York to the Church of England has grown into an international and ecumenical call to prayer. Last year more than 100,000 people joined in and in 2017 it's expected to be on a bigger scale. Launching the initiative, which runs from 25 May to 4 June, Archbishop Justin said: "When the wind of the spirit is blowing, hoist the sails and go with the wind. It's not a Church of England thing, it's not an Anglican thing, it's a Christian thing."
Categories: ACNS • In this article: Justin Welby, prayer, spiritual ecumenism Transmis : 9 févr. 2017 • Lien permanente : ecumenism.net/?p=10397
Catégorie : ACNS • Dans cet article : Justin Welby, prayer, spiritual ecumenism
The sweet song of Christian unity
Our Lord and his apostles used many figures of speech to describe the Church. From our beloved St. Paul: "We are God's fellow labourers; you are God's field, God's building" (1 Cor. 3:9). "You are the body of Christ and individually members of it" (1 Cor. 12:27). Or Jesus' words: "Fear not, little flock" (Luke 12:32a). "I am the vine; you are the branches" (John 15:5a).
Many of us have admired a well-ordered cathedral, such as St. Paul's, London, or All Saints, Nairobi. We recognise — almost unconsciously — the beauty of the human person, of a pastoral scene or vineyard. No wonder they make fitting images for the Church, the heavenly Jerusalem, a city "at unity with itself" (Ps. 122:3).
Our experience of the Church's unity tends to fall short of these glorious figures. We see "hatred, discord, jealousy, fits of rage, selfish ambition, dissensions, factions" (see Gal. 5:19-21).
In recognition of this, Anglicans have turned to other images over the past 14 years: among them, "walking together in synodality," "walking apart," or even "walking at a distance." This language proves useful, vividly illustrating different degrees or intensities of communion: some choose to be close; some go their own way; some wander onto the wrong path.
Through such images, we see how harmony, order, and unity are gifts received, but also unwrapped and used. A field must be cultivated, a building maintained, a vine pruned.
Categories: ACNS, Opinion • In this article: Anglican, WPCU Transmis : 18 janv. 2017 • Lien permanente : ecumenism.net/?p=9621
Catégorie : ACNS, Opinion • Dans cet article : Anglican, WPCU
URL: http://ecumenism.net/category/news/acns


text:
Q: How to convert filtered data into array format in swift3? I tried to converting filtered data into array format, it showing array of one row in swift3. check my below code.
func serviceTest(){
let stringurl = "http://beta.json-generator.com/api/json/get/4JjQJ50O7"
        let url = URL(string: stringurl)!
        URLSession.shared.dataTask(with: url, completionHandler: {(data,response, error) in
            guard data != nil else { return }
            do{
                var filterData:[String:Any] = [:]
                var clusterData:[[String:Any]] = [[:]]

                let json:[[String:Any]] = try JSONSerialization.jsonObject(with: data!, options: .mutableContainers) as! [[String : Any]]
                clusterData =  json
                var keyValue = ""
                for cluster in clusterData
                {
                    keyValue = cluster["Tag"] as! String
                    self.arr.append(keyValue)
                    var myArr = cluster["Feature"] as? AnyObject
                    var myA = [Any]()
                    myA = [myArr!]
                    var strArr = ""
                    for var i in 0...(myArr?.count)!-1 {
                        let m = myArr?[i] as AnyObject
                        let n = m["Name"] as AnyObject
                        let o = m["Tags"] as AnyObject
                        var oS = String(describing: o)
                        let nS = String(describing: n)
                        strArr = (nS as! String)+","+strArr
                        self.subArr = [strArr]
                    }
                    print("\(keyValue):\(self.subArr)")
                     print("---------------------")
                    self.sArr.append(self.subArr)
                }
                print("*********************************")
                print("\(self.sArr)")
                print("*********************************")
                print("tcount:\(self.sArr.count)")
                print(self.arr)
                print("count:",self.arr.count)
                DispatchQueue.main.async {
                self.tableView.reloadData()
                }
            }catch {
            }
        }).resume()
}

Required output:
Hybrid:["Moto",Lenovo","Infocus"]
---------------------
FingerPrint:["Kult","Redmi","Lenovo"]
---------------------
Security:["Nokia","Microsoft","Moto"]
---------------------
Cloud:["Microsoft","Samsung"]
---------------------
Analytics:["Lenovo"]
---------------------

my output:
Hybrid:["Moto,Lenovo,Infocus,"]
---------------------
FingerPrint:["Kult,Redmi,Lenovo,"]
---------------------
Security:["Nokia,Microsoft,Moto,"]
---------------------
Cloud:["Microsoft,Samsung,"]
---------------------
Analytics:["Lenovo,"]
---------------------

A: @Dávid Pásztor already gave the answer.
But I tried in the code:
var strArr = ""
for var i in 0...(myArr?.count)!-1 {
    let m = myArr?[i] as AnyObject
    let n = m["Name"] as AnyObject
    let o = m["Tags"] as AnyObject
    var oS = String(describing: o)
    let nS = String(describing: n)
    strArr = strArr != "" ? (nS as! String)+","+strArr : (nS as! String)
}
self.subArr = strArr.components(separatedBy: ",")

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


text:
Pope's resignation brings variety of emotion
Joshua Boley, Executive Editor
Last Tuesday, Feb. 11, Pope Benedict XVI announced that he will resign from the papacy. Benedict's announcement has drawn mixed emotions ranging from compassion for the leaving pope and excitement over the election of a new pope.
Maryann Mitts, women's head basketball coach, is the faculty representative for Catholics on Campus.
"I think anytime that something like this happens there is a shock effect for people outside of the Catholic faith more so than people within the Catholic faith," Mitts said.
Mitts said she felt that watching Pope John Paul II endure the slow progression of Parkinson's disease was more shocking to the Catholic faithful than Pope Benedict's resignation.
"I think that this decision is more universal, how most people would retire or resign from a position is what you are now seeing in this occasion in the Catholic Church," Mitts said.
Mitts said she was in Rome over Christmas, where she attended a service that Pope Benedict XVI participated in. She said he seemed feeble and did not look well. Mitts added she thought it was courageous for the Catholic Church to opt out of the normal parameters to do what is best for the church.
"Obviously my compassion for the pope and my compassion and honor for who he is in our church, my heart feels a connection to this," Mitts said.
While deeply moved, Mitts noted that Benedict's resignation would have little effect on her daily life.
Rev. J. Friedel, campus minister for Catholics on Campus and pastor of St. Peter the Apostle Catholic Church, echoed Mitt's sentiment.
"I wouldn't say it's going to have any effect on our day to day lives. Whether the seat is vacant or someone is the chair, our lives are still going to go on."
Friedel mentioned that Catholics will likely notice more of a change after the election of the next pope.
"I think that with the way the Catholic Church works, a pope can with his own desire to see certain things happen set an agenda or direction," Friedel said. "Then the whole worldwide church starts to look at it a bit more of an energized way."
Friedel said one of the Catholic students on campus told him how excited he was at the possibility having a new pope full of vitality and energy.
"I just think for college students, especially traditional age college students, I think there is a lot of excitement over the possibility of a younger pope and one that has a little more vitality," Friedel said.
Pope Benedict XVI will continue his post till the end of the month.
Friedel said that the church will not have to wait the standard nine day mourning period since it is aware of the vacancy ahead of time.
According to Friedel, once the seat is vacant, a conclave of 120 cardinals will come together to elect a new pope.
"At 52, I am excited because I'm like, let's see what this guy can bring to this role," Friedel said.
Southern students interested in more information about Catholics on Campus can contact MaryAnn Mitts via email at [email protected]
catholics on campus
maryanne mitts


text:
Updated AAP school reopening guidance calls for layers of protection, flexibility :
COVID-19 Infectious Diseases School Health
Editor's note: Updated guidance was released on Jan. 5, 2021. Please see https://www.aappublications.org/news/2021/01/05/covid-school-safety-010521. AAP interim guidance is based on current evidence and best data at the time of publication. Updates are provided to reflect changes in knowledge about the impact of the disease on children and adolescents. For the latest news on COVID-19, visithttps://www.aappublications.org/news/2020/01/28/coronavirus.
Schools that conduct classes in-person should have multiple layers of protection in place for students and staff and be ready to adapt based on local SARS-CoV-2 rates, according to updated interim AAP guidance.
While the AAP continues to advocate for in-person education, it acknowledges many schools where the virus is widespread will need to adopt virtual lessons and is calling for more federal funding to support both models.
"This is on us – the adults – to be doing all the things public health experts are recommending to reduce the spread of the virus," said AAP President Sara "Sally" H. Goza, M.D., FAAP. "If we can reduce the amount of COVID-19 in more communities, it will be possible for more schools to open, and this will be best for all of our children."
"COVID-19 Planning Considerations: Guidance for School Re-entry," has been updated based on the latest evidence including that children under 10 years may be less likely to become infected and spread infection, while those 10 years and older may spread it as efficiently as adults.
Educators will have to consider the degree to which SARS-CoV-2 is circulating in their community, as well as guidance from local public health officials. The benefits of in-person education for fostering instruction and social and emotional skills, and providing safety, healthy meals and support services also must be considered.
To mitigate the risks, the AAP recommends children over age 2 years and adult staff wear cloth face coverings. Other recommended layers of protection include keeping desks at least 3 feet apart, and ideally 6 feet apart, cohorting students, using outdoor spaces when possible, promoting hand and cough hygiene and increasing cleaning and disinfection of facilities.
The guidance notes the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) does not recommend universal testing, which is not feasible in many areas and only shows whether someone has the virus at that moment. The AAP said temperature checks at school may not be practical and suggested parents perform symptom and temperature checks at home. Students and staff should stay home if they are ill.
The updated guidance places additional emphasis on the need to address racial and social inequities in education. Schools holding classes virtually should ensure all children continue to have access to nutritious meals and the technology they need to participate in lessons.
"The persistent racial and social inequities in our educational system, including disparities in funding, quality of school buildings, and resources for curriculum and teachers have only been exacerbated by the pandemic," Dr. Goza said. "Without more resources, these disparities will worsen. Whatever school looks like this fall, we must be innovative and promote the well-being of all children, particularly children living in marginalized communities."
Information for parents from HealthyChildren.org on returning to school


The Women's March was a worldwide protest against the inauguration of Donald Trump. This was on January 21st, 2017, and on this past weekend it was the one year anniversary of the day he got into office and people gathered together again. Besides a protest on the new president, the Women's March also believe that women's rights are human rights, and that we should be advocating for reproductive rights, LGBTQ rights, workers' rights, civil rights, immigrant rights and environmental justice. They also believe in ending violence against people who apart of these groups and believe in these causes. Two girls from David Anderson High School, Reagan Emmerling and Lindsi Welsh, went to a rally in Pittsburgh, PA. They traveled with Reagan's mom, aunt, sister, and grandma to participate in the march.
The reason that they went was because they are feminists and they believe that participating in things like this raise awareness and make a difference. Many people there, including them, were wearing shirts and signs with feminist and anti-Trump slogans. They were also wearing pink hats with cat ears. They explained that these hats were to mock a rather crude statement that President Trump made about women before he was elected. The signs that they carried said things like "History has its eyes on you", "The Future is female". "I'm with her", "Not my Cheeto", "When they go low, we go high", and "A women's place is in the revolution." They marched and waved their signs as they chanted "This is what democracy looks like." While they were walking down the streets they felt empowered and strong. Even some of the representatives from PA were there among the crowd. They really do believe that they are making a change by being a part of this.