text:
Tragedy and Justice
Bernard Williams remembered
Categories: Philosophy
Topics: Books & Ideas
Bernard Williams died on June 10, 2003, at the age of 73, while on holiday with his family in Rome, after a long and often painful bout with multiple myeloma. To call him one of the few truly distinguished British philosophers of the 20th century is accurate but misleading. He was a philosopher of a unique sort, and he was never altogether at home in British philosophy, much of which he rightly considered narrow, dry, and in flight from some of the most important aspects of human existence. In a culture that valued explicitness above imaginative power, his work was suggestive and revealing rather than systematic and finished, reaching for imaginative insight rather than hobbled by conventions of analysis. Although nobody in the subject possessed the capacity for logical argument to a higher degree, and although he honored that capacity, he wanted more from writing, and his work was often more like poetry than like standard philosophical prose, illuminating by elusive compressed signs. He did not write aphoristically like the Nietzsche he so much admired, but his writing combined brilliant clarity with some of the properties of aphorism: vivid wit, terse enigmatic utterance, decoding left to the reader.
Williams made a large demand on behalf of philosophy: that it come to terms with, and contain, the difficulty and complexity of human life. He believed that much philosophy of the past had represented a flight from reality, a rationalistic defense against complexity, emotion, and tragedy. Utilitarianism and Kantianism, particularly, had simplified the moral life in ways that he found egregious, failing to understand, or even actively denying, the heterogeneity of values, the sometimes tragic collisions between one thing we care for and another. They also underestimated the importance of personal attachments and projects in the ethical life and, in a related way, neglected the valuable role emotions play in good choice. Finally, they failed to come to grips with the many ways in which sheer luck affects not only happiness but the ethical life itself, shaping our very possibilities for choice. A lover of both literature and opera, Williams asked philosophy to come up to the higher standards of human insight these other forms of expression exemplified. What was the point in it, if it didn't? Clear obtuseness does not contribute anything to human life. "Writing about moral philosophy should be a hazardous business," he wrote in the opening sentence of Morality—both because one reveals "the inadequacies of one's own perceptions" more clearly than in other parts of philosophy and because one runs the risk of "misleading people about matters of importance." But most writers on the subject avoid the second danger by "refusing to write about anything of importance." Williams never refused.
Philosophers on the Continent during Williams's lifetime had consistently addressed the deep questions that Williams found missing from the British scene; and yet Williams never made common cause with them. His intellectual precision and his keen sense of order made him unhappy with anything that seemed muddy or vague; and his liberal-democratic sympathies made him eschew obscurity, seeking a style that could be grasped by anyone who was willing to face the issues along with him. As I have already suggested, this clarity of style was compatible with considerable compression, even elusiveness, in argumentative structure. It was also compatible with a strong interest in literature and with the use of detailed, often powerful examples. Logical clarity was combined with a richer human precision, which required, in his view, at least some of the techniques of narrative. He relied on a sharp distinction between the methods and aims of science and those of ethics, which he saw as a human discipline with its own characteristic modes of inquiry, which ought to include a close attention to the complex realities of life. Thus, though something of a rebel in British academic society, he was also quintessentially British. If Nietzsche became a passion, he remained closer to Hume.
Williams grew up in Essex and received a strong classical education at the Chigwell School before entering Balliol College, Oxford. There he became a well-known prodigy, taking his degree in classics with "congratulatory honors," a rare tribute. He showed brilliance in classical scholarship, but turned to modern philosophy instead, though the love of the Greeks was a thread that would run through his whole career. After military service flying planes with the Royal Air Force he won a coveted Prize Fellowship at All Souls College, Oxford. He married Shirley Williams (now Baroness Williams of Crosby), a rising star in the Labour Party, and eventually moved to University College, London, and then to Bedford College. The marriage lasted 17 years before being dissolved in 1974; a daughter from that marriage, Becky, survives him. Williams then married Patricia Skinner, a gifted editor and a most remarkable woman, to whom he remained very happily married until his death. Two sons from that marriage also survive him.
Throughout his career Williams gave evidence of being a really serious feminist. He not only defended women's equality in politics and employment, and later their right to be free from sexual harassment in the university, but he also saw the importance of acting in ways that supported women's aspirations. During both of his marriages, for example, he provided a lot more child care than was common among men at his level of success, and he always supported the careers of his wives, both women of immense achievement. I am grateful for his advice concerning an instance of sexual harassment in my own career. His advice was both sympathetic and tough: he insisted that women should not put up with anything that compromised their dignity.
In the 1970s Williams, already famous for his dazzling lectures and interventions and for brilliant essays on morality and personal identity, began to publish the books that altered British moral philosophy: Morality in 1972, Problems of the Self in 1973, and, in the same year, his famous "A Critique of Utilitarianism" in the volume Utilitarianism: For and Against (paired with a "pro" essay by J. J. C. Smart). In these works we already see the basic outlines of the assault on both Kantianism and utilitarianism that he would develop in greater detail in his most systematic book,Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, published in 1985. (Many of his most influential contributions throughout his career were in the form of essays rather than books.)
As a group these works denounced the trivial and evasive way in which moral philosophy was then being praticed in England, under the aegis of those two dominant theories. Most work, he charged, was not only exceedingly boring but also utterly failed to confront some of the most significant ethical issues. Kantianism, as Williams understood it, was a theory that made the concept of moral obligation central while neglecting the contribution to the moral life of the emotions, personal relationships, and necessity. By making "What is my moral duty?" the salient question for ethics, he argued, Kant neglected the importance of starting from a much broader question—"How should one live?"—and attending to the variety of commitments that a full human life includes. Williams's account of Kant is in many respects narrow and unsympathetic, ignoring, for example, Kant's accounts of virtue and education; but it fairly represented a good deal of the influential Kantianism of that time.
The narrow focus of Kantian theories meant, for Williams, that even Kant's account of moral obligation was wanting. In the important essay "Ethical Consistency," in Problems of the Self, he argues that tragic dilemmas like that of Agamemnon—told by the gods that in order to save his men he must sacrifice his daughter—cannot be understood at all if we follow Kant's insistence that genuine conflicts of obligation do not exist, a key point in Kant's attempt to keep the moral domain pure from the effects of luck. Kant understood moral worth to be the sort of thing that retains its full splendor regardless of the ravages of chance, and thus he could not allow that the bad luck of being caught in a tragic dilemma could ever cause the moral agent to form morally bad intentions. But we have to acknowledge, Williams argued, that the world can sometimes force a person of good will to act in a way that is ethically heinous and violates a genuine obligation, even if one course is less reprehensible than the other alternatives that may be available. Such a tragic situation leaves behind both regret and remorse, and these emotions are appropriate even when the person could not have done anything to avoid the predicament. More generally, in "Morality and the Emotions" he assailed the silence of both major traditions on that topic, so important to the Greeks and to many other important figures in the history of moral philosophy.
Utilitarianism, with its tremendous influence on public life, came in for a variety of different criticisms at different times in Williams's career. His most influential critique concerned its impoverished notion of the person and of human agency. According to the utilitarian the right choice is the one that maximizes total or average welfare. Because of this exclusive focus on the results of our conduct, the theory forces us to consider the world from a perspective outside our own lives. We are not permitted to ascribe particular importance to a consideration simply because it plays a salient part in our own life, or to an action simply on the ground that it is we who do it. In a famous and much-debated example, Williams imagines a scientist, Jim, doing research somewhere in Latin America. Suddenly confronted by the henchmen of a brutal dictator, he is shown a group of captive rebel Indians and told that all 20 will shortly be executed—unless Jim, as an honored guest, agrees to kill one of them himself. In that case the other 19 will be let go. For utilitarianism there is no dilemma here, because the only relevant consideration is the outcome. For Jim, Williams argues, there ought to be a serious dilemma (though in the end he thought Jim should probably accept the offer), because the fact of his own agency in wrongdoing—the fact that he will kill someone, and not simply that someone will die—makes an ethically relevant difference. In general utilitarianism makes the person only an engine to produce outcomes, but this is an impoverished conception of the person and cannot suffice for a plausible theory of human conduct. Williams made it clear that his argument was intended as an objection not only to utilitarianism but to all forms of consequentialism—all views, that is, that hold that an action is right just in case it promotes the best consequences.
A later discussion coauthored with Amartya Sen, the Introduction to their edited collection Utilitarianism and Beyond, usefully dissects utilitarianism into three parts: consequentialism; sum-ranking (a theory about how different people's welfares are aggregated, namely that they are simply added together); andwelfarism (the view that the value of consequences is a function solely of human welfare). All three parts are independent, all contain serious problems, and all the troubles converge on a "narrow view of the person" as merely a container of satisfactions. No doubt because Sen did not accept Williams's critique of consequentialism (he has argued that agency and the personal point of view can be worked into a complicated account of which consequences are in fact best), Williams did not repeat his earlier arguments. Instead, the coauthored piece focuses on difficulties with sum-ranking and utilitarian accounts of welfare. Sum-ranking fails to give sufficient salience to the worth of each person: it in effect permits one person's large misery to be overbalanced by small benefits to a large number of others. If A has a miserable life full of pain and indignity, but B and C and D have extremely happy lives, then the sum of happiness may be greater than if A's life were improved at the cost of small losses to B, C, and D. But politics should not only consider the total, treating a person as nothing but a function in a larger social system; it should also consider the claim that each individual has to be treated with decency and have his or her rights respected. In making this criticism, Sen and Williams were in strong agreement with John Rawls's Kantian account of justice. These views about the importance of equal respect for persons were central to Williams's engagement with politics; he was a lifelong social democrat and egalitarian. (His article "The Idea of Equality" remains one of the most important discussions of that political value.)
Sen and Williams also criticize the major theories of welfare in utilitarian theories: pleasure and satisfaction of preferences. These accounts assume that the good is single when in fact it is heterogeneous; they rely on preferences, which are notoriously malleable, adjusting to unjust background conditions, rather than adopting some more robust account of the good.
The role of luck in the ethical life—the idea that factors outside one's control could affect the ethical value of one's life—had been on Williams's mind since his early essay on Agamemnon. In 1981 he published a collection of essays entitled Moral Luck, whose lead paper develops this theme in a controversial way. There are many ways in which luck enters the moral life. For example, the Greeks focused on the fact that certain choices of a way of life made one far more open to luck than others: to go in for politics or love is much riskier than to go in for intellectual contemplation. But Williams focused on a different and odder issue: the relationship of outcome luck to ex post facto moral assessment. Gauguin made a choice that looks morally reprehensible, abandoning his family to go off to paint in Tahiti. Williams argues that our judgment of Gauguin is appropriately dependent on matters that Gauguin could not have foreseen at the time and that were not fully under his control. If his artistic experiment had been a failure, he should have judged himself harshly; since it was a brilliant success, he may be excused. I have never been fully convinced by this example. In part, I actually prefer Gauguin's pre-Tahiti paintings to his Tahiti paintings, which seem to me exercises in the crassest sort of racial and sexual objectification. Second, even if we grant that the experiment was a success, I think we should view the case as similar to Agamemnon's: Gauguin faced a tragic dilemma, and made a choice that inflicted grievous moral wrong. He ought to feel remorse, and we ought to blame him. In any case, Williams's remarkable treatment of the case opened up a vein of ethical discussion that had not been mined since the time of the Greeks and Romans, given the subsequent dominance of providential views of the universe. In so doing, he did moral philosophy a huge service.
In 1985, Williams published Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, which had occupied him for years. In this major book Williams assails all systematic theorizing in ethics, defining an ethical theory as "a theoretical account of what ethical thought and practice are, which account either implies a general test for the correctness of basic ethical beliefs and principles or else implies that there cannot be such a test."1 Focusing on the aspirations of Kantianism and utilitarianism, he argues that the project of providing rational and systematic foundations for the ethical life is not only doomed to failure but also damaging, conducing to a narrow and simplistic understanding of the ethical life. Williams suggests that the whole enterprise of systematic theorizing in ethics is an attempt to deny the complexity of human life and the irrational aspects of human nature—including the fact that people find value, as he said in Morality, "in such things as submission, trust, uncertainty, risk, even despair and suffering." He urged philosophers to return to the Greeks' inclusive and general starting point, the question "How should one live?", which invites consideration of all the salient aspects of human life. Instead of constructing systematic moral theories, ethical philosophers should be confronting life's tough questions, presumably in a piecemeal way, with close attention to literature and to psychology. Williams believed that the central questions in ethics are practical—"What am I to do?"—not theoretical, and that success would require engagement with hard practical questions.
Some people who have attacked ethical theory have done so out of a confidence in conventional morality and people's daily intuitions, but Williams later said that he had no such confidence; he was always dismissive of what he saw as a complacent moral conventionalism. In a reply to critics of the book he speaks of the "emptiness and cruel superficiality of everyday thought" and denounces as "wonderfully perverse" a "certain vulgar Wittgensteinianism" that seeks to return us to those everyday intuitions.2 But then it remains unclear why a theory like Kant's, which seeks to remind us of what is least corrupt in our daily understandings, would be bound to be so damaging, except in the sense that Williams plainly disagrees with some specific parts of its content. Nor was it clear where Williams's critique left a theory such as Aristotle's, with whose content he could be presumed to be more in agreement.3
Another puzzling question concerns the relationship between the ethical and the political. Williams later maintained that his attack on ethical theorizing left intact the aspiration to constructpolitical theories, which might be valuable guides. But where does this leave those among the great Western political theorists such as Aristotle, Cicero, Rousseau, Kant, and John Rawls, who put a moral theory at the core of their political theories? Williams singles out Rawls as an example of the criticized class of moral theories; and yet his later statement suggests that after all he might admit the usefulness of Rawls's theory, given its political nature. In any case the source of the distinction between an acceptable aspiration to a theory of political justice and an unacceptable aspiration to a theory of individual morality is left obscure. Williams's general failure to engage systematically with Rawls's ideas about social and political justice leaves such important issues unresolved.
More generally Williams seems to alternate between an extreme contemptuousness toward most everyone—neither the theorists nor everyday intuitions offer good guidance; both are superficial and distorting—and an extreme confidence. Somehow, without theories to guide us, we will manage to confront the complexities of life. But the great theorists in ethics, Aristotle and Kant among them, typically begin from an assessment of human beings that is, I think, both more generous and more realistic. Most people have an ethical understanding that is in many respects sound, but they are also hasty, self-serving, prone to self-deceptive rationalization. An ethical theory, then, might help to fix in a clear way the best deliverances of reflective self-examination, so that in times of haste or temptation we might have a paradigm to consider, which would, if the theory was a good one, represent the best part of ourselves. Kant's idea that we must always treat humanity as an end and never as a mere means might in this way help us criticize many inclinations we have, in both personal and political life.
On this view ethical theory would not be an evasion of life—a device for "switching off the monitors to earth," as Williams once described Robert Nozick's ethical theorizing—but a considered response to its complexities and to our own weaknesses. To my mind Williams never adequately confronted this plausible account of the good in ethical theory.4 Perhaps this silence is to be explained by the very great importance he attached to each person's grappling directly with the problems of life rather than taking off-the-shelf guidance. It may be that no corporate account of our good could satisfy because only a deeply personal search could count for much. This element of Existentialism in Williams's thought explains, I believe, his equal hostility to theory and to convention. As a historian of philosophy I believe we should resist this stark contrast between the personal and the theoretical: sometimes, I believe, we get the best and most personal understanding of our lives by grappling with the great theories of the past.
Despite this major assault on Enlightenment rationalism, Williams never fully abandoned the Enlightenment. The rationalism evident in his early first-rate book on Descartes never fully left him, and it resurfaced dramatically in his last book,Truth and Truthfulness, in which he brilliantly defended the values of truth and objectivity against postmodernist and Foucauldian critique, arguing that any viable human society needs to make these notions central, to rely on them, and to honor the related virtues of accuracy and sincerity. In this book he also offers a general account of how to criticize corrupt social systems, in this way responding to some of the critics of his antitheoretical stance.
Of all of Williams's contributions, the one that has always fascinated me most is his recuperation for modern moral philosophy of the patterns of action and thought inherent in ancient Greek literature. From his early essay on "Ethical Consistency" to the engagement with Thucydides in Truth and Truthfulness, the Greek poets and historians commanded his respect; he thought, along with Nietzsche, that they were more truthful about our condition than most philosophers. In Shame and Necessity he made an admirably lucid argument against various condescending progressivist interpretations of Greek culture, putting to rest once and for all the tired allegation that the early Greeks had no concept of deliberation and choice and a primitive notion of agency. He also argued powerfully that the Greeks did not have a "shame culture" in the sense in which that term is sometimes used, to mean a culture entirely focused on external reward. Shame for the Greeks, he argues, is an ethical notion connected with inner self-evaluation. Finally, he convincingly argued that the Greek poets show us a view of the world that we would do well to ponder: a world in which the things that matter most are not under the control of reason or indeed under human control at all, and we are exposed to luck on a grand scale.
There was, however, more than this in his fascination with Greek tragedy. As time went on Williams pushed his interest in a Nietzschean anti-Enlightenment direction that I found increasingly unsettling, though whether it was a change in his view or a revelation of elements that had always been there is difficult to say. Certainly it involved a displacement, to me disturbing, of the constructive political side of his work that had been in evidence earlier. This element perhaps shows up most clearly in an essay he wrote later than Shame and Necessitycalled "The Women of Trachis: Fictions, Pessimism, Ethics."5
Williams begins by announcing that moral philosophy typically aspires to give us "good news" about our condition—whether in the form of an Hegelian narrative of progress in which reason ultimately prevails, or that of Leibnizian theodicy in which all bad things are simply necessary evils in this best of all possible worlds. Even Kant's insistence on the dignity of the good will under pressure of adverse fortune is itself a type of good news. By contrast, "stark fictions," prominently including Greek tragedies, bring us face to face with "the horrors" inherent in human existence, offering "a necessary supplement and a suitable limitation to the tireless aim of moral philosophy to make the world safe for well-disposed people." By showing us an ethically relevant space over which we lack control they ask us to cede that space to nature, fate, and the capricious gods.
Of course some tragedies do this. But I believe that Williams's story is too simple, as is his distinction between "good news" and "bad news." Consider the ending of Sophocles' Trachiniai, his case in point. Deianeira's well-intentioned plan of giving her husband Heracles a love potion has gone awry through the centaur's malice. Heracles is stricken not by love but by horrible agony. Watching him suffer, his son Hyllus asks for suggnômosunê, fellow-feeling, from the human onlookers (and the audience), contrasting this sympathy with the callousness of the gods. The famous concluding passage is cited by Williams as his epigraph:
You see the great indifference (agnômosunê) of the gods
to these things that have happened,
who begat us and are called our fathers
and look on such sufferings.
What is to come no one can see,
but what is here now is pitiable for us
and shameful for them,
but of all men hardest for him
on whom this disaster has fallen.
Maiden, do not stay in this house:
you have seen death and many agonies,
fresh and strange,
and there is nothing here that is not Zeus.
Williams sees in these lines a truthful recognition of the inevitable limitations of human projects. Hyllus recognizes and accepts that the universe is fundamentally unjust and arbitrary, and that there is nothing to be done about that. Thus the "stark fiction" confronts us squarely with "the horrors" and immunizes us against the philosophers' "good news." But there are two problems with such a reading. First, it ignores the extent to which human moral judgment is prized and asserted, even in the face of disaster: the pity and fellow-feeling of the human community have a nobility that, in Aristotle's words, "shines through" despite the horror, contrasting favorably with the indifference of the gods. That is not exactly the same as Kant's good news about the will beset by the "accidents of stepmotherly nature," but it is surely closer to Kant than Williams acknowledges.
Second, Williams's reading makes too little, I believe, of Hyllus's anger. Williams does not exactly counsel resignation, but it is hard to know what other moral attitude his perspective suggests. Resignation to tragic necessity, however, is certainly not what is conveyed by the words megalên theôn agnômosunên, "great indifferent thoughtlessness of the gods," nor yet by the characterization of the gods as parents who sat by while terrible events transpired. Obviously enough the Greek family would view as profoundly reprehensible the conduct of any father who allowed such things to happen to his children when he could have stopped it. Such conduct is indeed "shameful" and, as Williams has insisted, shame in the Greek world is compatible with moral reactions of indignation and blame. We must take very seriously the idea that the gods are anthropomorphic agents, like humans but much more powerful. For such beings to have permitted this disaster is deeply culpable, especially when they purport to be caring parents. Such a world need not have existed; they permitted it.
Think of an Indian onlooker, surveying the carnage after General Dyer's massacre of thousands of innocent civilians at Amritsar. He might well have spoken such a speech, ending it with the line, ". . . and there is nothing here that is not the Raj." In other words, how dare these powerful people come here claiming to be our superiors and parents, and then conduct themselves in this disgraceful and evil way?6 Because the Greeks saw their gods as anthropomorphic agents, and not as morally exemplary such agents either, questions about the justice of their actions were live questions and it was not inappropriate to press them—or, to the extent that some thought it was appropriate (Plato certainly did), it was regularly done anyway. (Imagine how shocking it would still be to see a play that depicted actions of Jesus as "shameful" and callously obtuse and you will see something of the difference between Greek and Christian perspectives.) The play does not say that such things must happen; far less does it say (what a Judaeo-Christian text probably would have said) that everything that has happened is just and good, although we cannot comprehend divine justice and goodness. It says the opposite, and it thereby blames the choices of the gods.
And notice what has now become of the issue of good news and bad. The news that the suffering we witness is the result of distant, unapproachable, implacable, unintelligent necessity would in a sense be bad news: for it would mean that it had to happen, and that similar things will go on happening no matter what we do. That is what Williams means by saying that such news is a corrective to overly optimistic offers of "good news." But I think that there is another sense in which that kind of news is good: it means that there is nobody to blame and nothing more to do. We can sit back and resign ourselves to the world as it is, knowing that its horrors lie outside our control.
If, however, we think that malice, ignorance, and callousness may lie behind the suffering we witness, well, that is in one sense good news: it means that there is a hope of change. But it is in another sense bad news: it means that the suffering was perhaps not necessary, and that if we had worked harder or thought better we might have prevented it. At the very least it means that we had better get ourselves together to do whatever we can to avoid such things in the future; anything less would be shameful. In the case where the disparity of power between victims and perpetrators is that between mortals and gods, it is not very clear what can be done, although withdrawal of worship is at least one thing that is regularly tried in both tragedy (the end of the Trojan Women) and comedy (The Birds); short of that, angry demands for acknowledgment and reparation must be pursued and pursued again. Even if the gods are relatively obtuse, they are not altogether deaf to human accusations. Given that their obtuseness frequently seems to arise not from profound malice but from a real lack of understanding of what mortal beings experience, making the cost of their actions clear to them is at least a hopeful stratagem.
But certainly in the case, very common in tragedy, where the perpetrators are, like General Dyer, human, the consequence of recognizing wrongdoing as the source of tragedy is clear: the witness must oppose such evil at great cost and denounce it to others. One way to do that would be to write a drama revealing the evil to the entire citizen body of a democracy. And tragic dramas frequently allude to their own capacity to recognize the suffering of outcasts, fostering a more adequate ethical vision. To take just one example, the oozing sore on Philoctetes' foot, in Sophocles' tragedy, makes him an object of avoidance to the commanders, who simply deny the suffering that their behavior perpetuates. The drama, by contrast, constantly alludes to its own determination to see his suffering and take its measure, connecting this imaginative activity to the goal of morally appropriate action. Since such actions are much more difficult than contemplating the horrors of existence, the news that evil and not necessity lies behind suffering is bad news. For Neoptolemus, the awareness that he can choose to act justly is as painful as Philoctetes' attack: he uses the same expression, papai, to signal the agony of recognized agency.
I believe that the "stark fictions" of the Greeks challenge their audience to just such difficult reflections on the causes of disaster: is the cause immutable necessity, or is it malice and folly? Where should we draw the line between the one and the other? We gain understanding from the subtle and frequently indeterminate way in which tragedies pose that question, and from the challenges they give us to confront the role of blameworthy agency even in what seems as natural as breathing. We must never forget that tragedies were vehicles of political deliberation and reflection at a sacred civic festival—in a city that held its empire as a "tyranny" and killed countless innocent people. For that audience tragedy did not bring the good news of resignation; it brought the bad news of self-examination and change. (In 415, the year that Euripides' Trojan Women was produced, the Athenians killed all the male citizens of the rebellious colony Melos and enslaved the women and children.)
In short, instead of conceding the part of ethical space within which tragic events occur to implacable necessity or fate, tragedies often challenge their audience to inhabit it actively, as a contested place of moral struggle, a place in which virtue might possibly in some cases prevail over the caprices of amoral power and in which, even if it does not prevail, it may still shine through for its own sake. In our contemporary world, in which it is a good assumption that most of the starvation and much of the other misery we witness is the result of culpable negligence by the powerful, metaphysical resignation would, again, be relatively good news for the powerful, letting them off the hook. But the truthful news of Greek tragedy, for us as for the Athenians, is far worse than that: for the bad news is that we are as culpable as Zeus in the Trachiniai and the Greek generals in The Trojan Women and Odysseus in Philoctetes and many other gods and mortals at many times and places—unless and until we throw off our laziness and selfish ambition and obtuseness and ask ourselves how the harms we witness might have been prevented. It is this injunction to a socially active compassion that Williams omits from his story of Greek tragedy. And that, for me, means that his story of the bad is just too good to be true.
Others describing Bernard Williams's life, after his death, have spoken of his dazzling quickness, of his sometimes devastating wit, and of the intuitive understanding of human issues that made him a precious friend as well as a deft subverter of philosophical obtuseness. He was such a personal presence on the philosophical scene that it seems inappropriate to separate the writings from the impression made by the man. I certainly could not do so if I tried, so I had better put my memory cards on the table so that you can ponder the complex sources of the criticisms I have just made. When I first met Bernard, in New York in the winter of 1973, he was standing in a dark hallway outside the seminar room at the City University Graduate Center where a monthly Greek philosophy discussion group was about to begin. His vivid, rapid existence eclipsed everything around him. I was not surprised to learn later that he had been a daring and successful pilot in the RAF. He had just performed a showy crash landing into our world, and the philosophical landscape would never look the same again.
It will tell you a great deal about that moment that I remember both his dark green sports jacket and precisely what I myself was wearing: a pink minidress from Bergdorf Goodman and black fishnet stockings. The feeling of being attended to by a magical force of nature was as powerful as the impression of witnessing such a force in action. Later that week, after listening to the first lectures in his visiting course on Descartes, I had an epiphany while sitting in rollers under the large bonnet hair dryer that was still my habit in those days of still-nascent feminism (I was in the '70s, but not yet of them). Reading under said dryer the correspondence of Descartes with Princess Elizabeth, I thought to myself that the most wonderful relation in the world would be that of corresponding in her way with the dazzling intellect of Bernard Williams. The subservience latent in that wish has shaped my thoughts and dealings with Bernard ever since, making our eventual friendship risky and uneven. And if I recall with pleasure some things he sometimes said about my work, I also recall, and perhaps with more verbal exactitude, the time I ran past his King's College provostial window in orange running shorts with a pink top, only to be told later that the primary qualities were acceptable, but the secondary qualities rather off. (This was the furthest he would ever go, as a man very much in love with his wife, and it was characteristic of his somewhat self-delighted style.) As Catharine MacKinnon writes: women live in objectification the way fish live in water.
For some years, albeit not right at the start, I have wanted to dislodge these feelings of passionate inferiority, to establish some basis of equality, proving that I had something that was just as good as that jet-pilot velocity. And since, as I said, he was as close to being a feminist as a powerful man of his generation could be, and since he was indeed an understanding friend, I have not even had the solace of blaming him for the subordination his presence always elicited. So: anger to which I knew I had no right, desire to destroy the power that radiated over me, guilt at being the person who harbored such anger against a friend, joy at the sight of the friend when he turned up, blocked longing for love, desire to make reparation for hostile wishes (especially when he received an honorary degree from our University)—all these feelings have been simmering in my thoughts for years, not least during his illness. Caveat lector.
Nietzsche wrote that when a philosopher harps very insistently on a theme, that shows us that there is a danger that something else is about to "play the master." Nietzsche was talking about rationalists and their desire to suppress the irrational passions that threatened to take over. But his insight may be applied elsewhere. When Bernard denigrated the aspirations of philosophical reason in human affairs and harped so insistently on the importance of irrational passion, what might have been in danger of playing the master? I believe that much of his interest in Nietzschean pessimism and irrationalism was in the service of warding off a powerful depression, even perhaps despair. Over the years I began to notice that he was never angry (whereas I am angry more or less all the time). Contempt, world-weariness, cynicism, even an irritability linked to the world-weariness, but never just anger, the sense that wrong has been done and that one had better go out and right it. I think his non-angry attitude to tragedy was of a piece with his critique of the Enlightenment: doing good for a bad world did not energize him, because his attitude to the world was at some deep level without hope. The world was a mess, and there was no saving or even improving it. It was childish, naïve, to suggest that improvement was possible. (His liberal politics were difficult to reconcile with this view, and this perhaps explains his increasing withdrawal from politics and even political thinking in later life.) Nietzsche called this attitudeamor fati and connected this embracing of necessity with a kind of cheerfulness, the cheerfulness that comes when we abandon the hope of real change. Similarly, what energized Bernard, cheered him up, was a kind of elegant assertion of the hopelessness of things against the good-newsers, a contemptuous yet brilliant scoffing. As a mutual friend once said to me, "Bernard is like the sun: a lot of light, but very little warmth." (A remark that, apart from its incompleteness about Bernard, showed that the speaker must have spent his days in England.)
Bernard's world-weary attitude made me angry, because it seemed a waste of a chance to do some good, however small, through his enormous philosophical talents. (This was an anger to which I thought I had a right, although it was always difficult to disentangle it from the other sort of anger.) My do-good engagéeattitude irritated him, as if I had become Major Barbara when I might have grown into someone interesting. (It was only when the postmodernists showed him the excesses of his own position that he brought out, against them, his old Cartesian rationalism and his always deep commitment to truth, along with an equally strong commitment to social criticism. The dialectic between his Enlightenment self and his Nietzschean self makes his last, enigmatic book especially precious to me.)
Thus a strain developed in our friendship, under pressure of my criticisms of his Nietzschean turn and his reaction to those public criticisms.
One could never get the better of Bernard in an argument. He was always several steps ahead, modifying his position to circumnavigate the objection. Even now, when he cannot respond, his capacity for response is so powerfully present that all one can do is to pose to him some questions, such as:
Isn't it perhaps all right to try to engage one's philosophical energies so as to make things a little better in the world, and can't one do so without being duped by any teleology of progress? Or: Isn't Kant's sort of "good news" worth working for, even if Hegel's sort may indeed be a delusion?
Isn't it not boring but rather exciting to see what one might do under the aegis of anger and hope? (Or: Isn't Dickens more exciting, really, than Nietzsche?)
Is despair possibly a sin, as well as a psychological problem?
It is but one mark of Williams's depth and greatness, as a philosopher and as a human being (as a philosopher who insisted on bringing his humanity into philosophy) that he understood those objections to himself, their human urgency, and theimpossibility of answering them, except by living life and thought in one's own way. As he so briefly did.
1 As I argue in the article cited below, n. 4, this definition proves too narrow to accommodate everything that Williams himself takes to be theory: he includes Rawls's theory as an example of ethical theory' and yet Rawls insists that justification in ethics is holistic and that there is no single "test" for the correctness of beliefs; rightness is seen only in the fit of particular judgments and theoretical claims in the system as a whole.
2 "Replies," in J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison, eds., World, Mind and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 218.
3 See my essay in World, Mind and Ethics and Williams's equivocal reply. Williams always disliked Aristotle, whom he found boring; nonetheless there are many points of agreement between Williams's approach to ethics and Aristotle's.
4 See my "Why Practice Needs Ethical Theory: Particularism, Principles, and Bad Behavior," in Steven J. Burton, ed., 'The Path of the Law' and Its Influence: The Legacy of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 50–86, and in Brad Hooker and Margaret Little, eds., Moral Particularism(Clarendon Press, 2000), 227–55.
5 In R. B. Louden and P. Schollmeier, eds., The Greeks and Us(University of Chicago Press, 1996), 43–53.
6 In his Autobiography Nehru describes an encounter with General Dyer on a train in 1919. Unobserved, he took the vacant upper berth of a crowded compartment and overheard the loud conversation of a group of British officers. "One of them was holding forth in an aggressive and triumphant tone and soon I discovered that he was Dyer, the hero of Jallianwala Bagh, and he was describing his Amritsar experiences. He pointed out how he had the whole town at his mercy and he had felt like reducing the rebellious city to a heap of ashes, but he took pity on it and refrained. . . . I was greatly shocked to hear his conversation and to observe his callous manner. He descended at Delhi station in pyjamas with bright pink stripes, and a dressing-gown." If the last touch belongs more to Aristophanes (Poseidon at the end of The Birds is about right), the rest is on all fours with Euripides. Indeed, Dyer's speech could have been extracted from the opening dialogue of the gods in The Trojan Women. (Once again: think of a play that put Jesus in pink striped pajamas, and you will see the large difference between Greek piety and its Christian analogue.)
Martha C. Nussbaum teaches philosophy and law at the University of Chicago. Her most recent book is Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America's Tradition of Religious Equality.
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In Search of Foucault's Last Words
Against the philosopher's dying wish, the final volume of History of Sexuality has now been published. How should we approach it, and what can it teach us about how Christianity shaped the modern self?
Mark D. Jordan
The Fight for Reparations Cannot Ignore Climate Change
Racial redress should be modeled on the global anticolonial tradition of worldbuilding.
Olúfẹ́mi O. Táíwò


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A new concept of specifically protected areas of nature is introduced into Armenia – biospheric reserve. The specifically protected areas of nature have already been selected, which shall turn into biosphere reserves on the basis of Zangezour Biospheric Complex in Syunik Region and Sevan National Park in Gegharkounik Region.
Zangezour Biospheric Complex was established in 2013 on the basis of Shikahogh" state reserve, "Pine Park" state reserve and "Khoustoup" state reserve, "Areviq" branch includes "Areviq" national park and "Boghaqar" state reserve for the purpose of reducing the costs of specifically protected areas of nature. Under the governmental resolution 1465-Ն dated on 19 December 2013, seven specifically protected areas of nature were united in one entity.
German KfW Bank promised 8.25 million Euros for the development of this area in the frames of 'Support to Preserved Areas: Armenia' project, the first tranche of which was transferred in the spring of 2017.
Project leader Heino Hertel informed EcoLur these funds will be directed to the improvement of the socio-economic state of 32 communities adjacent to Zangezour biospheric complex. There is already the project of ensuring Tsav, Shikahogh, Srashen and Nerqin Hand communities adjacent to 'Shikahogh' state reserve with wood.
'RA Nature Protection Ministry and 'ArmForest' has signed a contract on the provision of fuelwood to these villages and our project will pay for this fuelwood, which costs around 80,000 Euros. We also provide energy efficient windows, which cost 100,000 Euros. Next year we are planning to install energy-efficient stoves in the houses,' Heino Hertel said. No other practical measures are implemented in other communities.
The project on establishing biosphere reserve based on Sevan National Park still doesn't have any funding.


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Was the medieval time merry? - as suggested by Chesterton - or was it miserable as portrayed in popular culture and indeed in popular history.
I am not going to answer that question except to state that it depends on whether or not Christianity is taken into consideration and taken seriously.
Any past era was 'miserable' for most people in the sense that (compared with the past several decades) there was a lot of starvation, disease, warfare, torture, discomfort and dirt.
But in eras of great Christian devoutness - other-worldly eras - these factors carried much, much less weight than they do or would for us.
An interesting test case is Carmina Burana (songs from the Beuern, a monastery), which is a collection of essentially secular lyrics, a selection from which was set to music in a dramatized cantata by Carl Orff during the paganistic era of National Socialism - in other words a modern and non-Christian angle on medievalism.
Carmina Burana is probably my favourite piece of 20th century music, something I find almost wholly enjoyable.
To appreciate Orff's Carmina Burana, I think it needs to be seen dramatized, as in the first-rate 1975 TV version conducted by Eichhorn and currently available in segments on YouTube, e.g:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LqutsAaQQK4&NR=1
Orff's CB represents just about the 'merriest' version of the medieval era that is possible minus Christianity - and (yet) it is (taken in total) a terrifying vision of life.
(It also notable the the vulgar vigour of this 1975 dramatization - its 'lust for life', a factor which is absolutely necessary to its positive appeal - would be utterly impossible for the PC-ridden world of 2011.)
A further example of this is the (excellent) novel The Name of the Rose by Umberto Eco. All positive valences attach to modern phenomena (science, philosophy) and the religious aspects are seen as negative, obscurationist, or simply deluded, psychotic, wishful, pitiful.
My contention is that the evaluation of medieval times (or indeed any past era) is for modern people systematically and severely distorted by our habitual subtraction or trivialization of religion from the world view.
Either we miss Christianity out altogether, regard it as peripheral, or regard it purely negatively. All of these are grossly unhistorical biases.
For example, the popular Time Traveller's Guide to Medieval England by Ian Mortimer is solid, engaging and informative so far as it goes - but it contains very little about the Christian life, and completely misses its centrality to the Middle Ages; therefore, ultimately, the book ends by being a travesty of its subject, a massive misrepresentation of the experienced quality of medieval life.
The deeply-entrenched secularism of the modern age is revealed most strongly in such matters: it seems we simply cannot understand what it is to live with religion at the centre of life; or else we can only imagine this an an unmitigated horror.
The idea of a world in which sweetness, beauty and hope; craft, learning, justice and morality, were Christian phenomena - is simply unimaginable to most people, most of the time - and recent literature, art and history are not helping matters.
So if the medievals were indeed merry, as Chesterton argued, then the fact would be necessarily invisible to the modern secular mind-set.
Posted by Bruce Charlton at Monday, September 05, 2011
Thursday said...
One should remember though that the farther north one went the less Christianized the great mass of people were. Christianity was important to the Middle Ages, but it seems to have been mostly important to the more educated classes. Most of the people in Northern Europe were still essentially pagan until the Reformation.
Though more of a phenonmenon in Northern Europe, some of the same things can be said of all Europe. The villagers in Carlo Levi's memoir Christ Stopped At Eboli is a good example of this:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christ_Stopped_at_Eboli
@Thursday
I agree that medieval (Northern) Europe cannot compare with late-first millenium Byzantium, nor with early Orthodox Russia, as a through-and-through religious society.
Nonetheless, Northern Europe was at least as religious in the medieval era as it is now leftist and politically correct - both 'ideologies' led by elites, but adopted - in somewhat diluted and reluctant form, by the masses.
Northern European populations are much more coherent, placid and obedient than in the south; so the elites have more influence.
@Thursday:
That broadside is a product of early Romantics at the earliest; once one examines individual countries of northern Europe, the idea falls apart.
Ireland needs no examination. England? Try Duffy's Stripping of the Altars or histories of the conversion of Anglo-Saxon England. Germany? Any histories of the great monastic orders there. The only place where I think one might even say 'most of the people were mostly pagan' might be Norway and Sweden, which to the medieval Church was a remote territory, far beyond the organism of Roman Europe.
Of course, if one goes applying Protestant or modern understandings of religion to medieval peasant folkways, one will be confused. Most likely the majority of men in any age never have the intelligence to hold to reliable, complex, complete orthodox faith; which is probably why Christ gives so many second chances and loves the faith of little children. I think the error of many 'traditionalists' or counter-liberals still within the modern perspective is to miss this. (Charlton here has done much here illuminating that problem for me, of course).
Religious != Christian. I have no doubt that most people in Medieval society were religious, because most people in every society, except modern ones, are always religious.
The middle classes, particularly in urban centres, had been pretty thoroughly Christianized and there were other pockets of Christianization as well. How could it be otherwise? I think Duffy is way overegging the pudding: serious attempts to Christianize the peasantry only followed threats to the church from Lollardy and then later Protestantism.
Don't know much about Byzantium, but Russia doesn't seem to have been all that different from the rest of Northern Europe in having a long survival of pagan belief among the peasants.
I don't know much about it, but I have no doubt that Byzantine empire, like much of the rest of of the Mediterranean was much more thoroughly Christianized. However, even there I would guess that the situation in the countryside was often similar to that as depicted in Levi's book on Southern Italy.
I should make clear that Christianity _was_ absolutely central to the intellectual life of the Middle Ages and to suggest otherwise would be completely crazy.
Northern Europe was at least as [Christian] in the medieval era as it is now leftist and politically correct - both 'ideologies' led by elites, but adopted - in somewhat diluted and reluctant form, by the masses.
I'd generally agree with this.
I'm unsure why you rely principally on a single, 20th century, Jewish leftist snapshot to get to the idea that "most of the people...were still essentially pagan." If one can be 'essentially pagan' without pagan priests, public religion, self-identification, or collective memory (reifying various folk magics, superstitions, etc. as the long-forgotten Oden-and-Thor paganism is a stretch). The Christianity/leftism definition you accept later seems more on target, but it is definitely qualitatively different from your first statement.
Not sure what the import of all this discussion is given that peasant superstitions etc. were of almost no historical importance. Additionally I don't think these superstitions had anything to do with the very frequent heresies of medieval Europe, the Cathars most infamous among them. They are a very real problem with any rose-colored image of medieval Christendom. But the roots of those heresies seem to have been entirely inside the Christian cultural-intellectual structure.
Also, bgc, what do you mean that northern populations are more obedient than southern ones? The invention of Protestantism and Leftism, among other great rebellions, in the north point at least somewhat to the opposite conclusion. Not to say that the more reliable obedience of Mediterraneans to Rome and to established power was an unmitigated good, but it seems to speak to more innate obedience in the south.
I'm unsure why you rely principally on a single, 20th century
I haven't.
If one can be 'essentially pagan' without pagan priests, public religion, self-identification, or collective memory (reifying various folk magics, superstitions, etc. as the long-forgotten Oden-and-Thor paganism is a stretch).
None of these are necessary.
Not sure what the import of all this discussion is given that peasant superstitions etc. were of almost no historical importance.
They were of importance to the daily lives of people in the Middle Ages, which is the topic under discussion.
wrt 'paganism' - Paganism is the natural spontaneous religion - Christianity is added to paganism; so pagan elements are in themselves not evidence against Christianity - indeed I would say they are essential to Christianity so long as they are subordinated to Christianity.
So, pagan gods are found in Christianity as angels and demons, where they have a powerful influences and an important role. But they are subordinated to the triune creator God, and salvation is possible only through Christ.
The pagans gods are conceptualized as partial understandings of reality, which was later reveal more fully.
In such matters it is necessary to remember that three quarters of Christianity existed before the Reformation, and half of it before the Great Schism - the rule-of-thumb baseline of Christianity is (say) AD 400-1000, after the scriptures had been compiled and its doctrines sorted-out, but before it began to fall-apart. Developments since then have been at best double-edged - advantages in one respect being balanced by disadvantages in other respects - like scholasticism.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


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Nashville's finest Woody Pines play Clonmel date on May 17
news@tipperarystar.ie
Woody Pines play Raheen House Hotel Clonmel on Thursday 17th May 2018
Clonmel World Music is delighted to welcome a fantastic band, Woody Pines, from Nashville USA. After many successful UK and Ireland tours they are widely regarded as one of the most entertaining acts on the Americana circuit.
Along with artists like Pokey Lafarge, Woody Pines continues to forage through the secret world of old 78′s and to write new chapters in the Anthology of American Music. Integrating sounds from Leadbelly to Bob Dylan, from Woodie Guthrie to Preservation Hall, Woody Pines belts out songs of fast cars, pretty women and hard luck with a distinctive vintage twang.
The bands distinctive viper sound is brought together by Woody who plays the National Guitar, harmonica and floor tom, singing in a voice sounding uncannily like a young Willie Nelson. Joining him in the band is Skip Frontz Jr. on the upright bass, adding both foot tappin' low-end and rapid fire percussion with his sought after slap technique. Brad Tucker on the vintage electric guitar and with great vocal harmonies fills out the trio.
If you're wondering where the music of Nashville troubadour Woody Pines comes from, look to the streets. It was on the streets as a professional busker that Woody first cut his teeth, drawing liberally from the lost back alley anthems and scratchy old 78s of American roots music, whether country blues, jugband, hokum, or hillbilly.
Heavy rollicking street performances are the key to Woody's intensely catchy rhythms, jumpy lyrics, and wildly delirious sense of fun. Woody traveled all over the streets of his country, road testing his songs, drawing from the catchiest elements of the music he loved and adding in hopped-up vintage electrification to get that old country dancehall sound down right.
Its proper to call Woody Pines new songs "hillbilly boogie;" a rarely remembered genre of American music made famous by the Delmore Brothers. Hillbilly boogie sits at the exact moment when the buzzed- out, electrified hillbilly country music of Appalachia (which itself drew heavily from country blues), first hit the sawdust-floored honky-tonks of old Nashville and Memphis.
It was the moment exactly before the birth of rock 'n' roll. Woody writes with a wink to this critical time on songs like "Anything for Love" and "New Nashville Boogie," drawing in modern references at will to make his points. He also dives deep into the tradition, drawing up gems like the old gangsta- folk song "Make It to the Woods" from the Mississippi Sheiks. In Woody's music, there's never an idea that roots music should be a recreation of an older time.
Instead, he taps the vein of this music that's still beating today, finding common ground with the old hucksters and bar-hounds who created the music in the first place.
Tickets for this great gig are on sale now, and are available online on www.clonmelworldmusic.com, and in Marians Bookshop. O'Connell St. Clonmel , and South Tipperary Arts Centre, Nelson Street Clonmel,
Doors for the gig will open at 8pm. There will be no support act, and the band will start at 9pm prompt. Tickets are available now; online on www.clonmelworldmusic.com; in Marians Bookshop Clonmel; in South Tipperary Arts Centre Clonmel, or from Gerry Lawless on 086 3389619


Best Buy is celebrating the launch of Wave 6 by offering a big discount on previous LEGO Dimensions sets.
Today only (September 27th) you can save 25%-33% on select LEGO Dimension packs.
Target on the other hand is offering a week long sale on Fun Packs.
You can pick them up on sale for Buy 1 Get 1 free.
This deal will last through October 1st.
POLL: Who Do You Think Will Take Away The Awards In Tonight's 'The Game Awards'?


Are you a stuffing lover or a stuffing hater? Stuffing is probably the #1 favorite Thanksgiving side dish, but not if it's bland or mushy. A good stuffing recipe delivers a balanced combination of flavors and textures. I've been perfecting my recipe for Thanksgiving stuffing for years, and I think it's just right. This best-ever Thanksgiving stuffing recipe is a blend of savory and sweet, with just a touch of bacon, because bacon makes everything better!
Your stuffing making process will be easier if you prep all the ingredients ahead of time. Have all the ingredients and tools assembled before you start, so the recipe comes together quickly.
Dice one cup of onion and one cup of celery. Cut 1/2 pound of sliced bacon crosswise into little sticks about 1/3 inch wide.
Cook and stir the bacon in a large skillet over medium high heat until the pieces are starting to get crispy. Turn off the heat, and move the bacon to a small plate using a slotted spoon. Pour the bacon fat from the skillet into a heat-proof measuring cup.
Return four tablespoons of bacon fat to the skillet. Add the celery, onion and butter. Cook and stir over medium high heat for three minutes. Add the garlic. Cook and stir for three more minutes until the celery and onion are translucent and starting to soften. Remove from heat.
This recipe calls for a 14-ounce package of traditional or herb seasoned stuffing mix. I like Pepperidge Farm Classic Herb Seasoned stuffing mix, because it has a mix of white and wheat bread. If you have another favorite stuffing mix, use that instead.
Blend all the stuffing ingredients together in a large mixing bowl. Taste to find out if the seasonings need to be adjusted. I like a lot of black pepper in stuffing, so I might add more than the recipe calls for.
The stuffing mix is already seasoned, but I like to add a little extra seasoning, using either dried sage or poultry seasoning. My absolute favorite is Rudy's Turkey Rub, which I have shipped from Texas, but any poultry seasoning will work fine.
This stuffing is moist but not wet. If you like a wetter stuffing, add 1/2 cup to 1 cup more liquid (a mix of apple juice and broth). If you have homemade chicken or turkey broth, that is absolutely the best, but canned or reconstituted broth is also good.
When it comes to Thanksgiving stuffing, people debate about whether to cook it inside or outside the turkey. If the stuffing is cooked outside the turkey, it's technically not stuffing, it's dressing. There's no need to get hung up on terminology, though. It's going to be tasty no matter what you call it!
I cook my stuffing outside the turkey, because in my experience a stuffed turkey takes longer and is harder to cook. It's already challenging to roast a turkey and get both the light and dark meat to the right temperature. Stuffing makes it even more challenging. Our favorite way to cook a Thanksgiving turkey is using an electric turkey roaster.
To cook your Thanksgiving stuffing outside the bird, put the stuffing mixture in a medium casserole dish, preferably one that has a lid. Bake, covered, at 350 degrees for 25 minutes. Uncover and bake another 10 minutes. By this time your stuffing will be cooked through and toasty on top.
Isn't it gorgeous? This Thanksgiving stuffing is absolute perfection – savory and smoky, with a touch of sweetness.
This Thanksgiving stuffing is absolute perfection - savory and smoky, with a touch of sweetness. Elevate plain stuffing with bacon and apple for a balanced combination of flavors and textures.
Place bacon in a large, deep skillet. Cook over medium high heat about 5 minutes until crisp, stirring to prevent burning.
Remove bacon from heat. Remove bacon pieces from skillet using a slotted spoon. Set aside.
Pour the bacon fat from the skillet into a heat-proof small bowl or measuring cup. Wipe out the skillet with a paper towel.
Return 4 tablespoons bacon fat to the skillet. Add the butter, celery and onion. Cook and stir over medium high heat about 3 minutes.
Add the garlic. Cook and stir 3 more minutes, until the vegetables are translucent and beginning to soften. Remove vegetable mixture from heat.
In a large mixing bowl, combine the stuffing mix, sage or poultry seasoning, vegetable mixture, bacon pieces, apple juice, chicken broth, and black pepper.
Transfer mixture to medium buttered baking dish. Bake covered in preheated oven 25 minutes; uncover and bake an additional 10 minutes until the top is lightly browned.


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Mariem Ben Chaabane (, born July 30, 1983) was a Tunisian actress. She is especially known for her roles in the Tunisian series Casting and Machair.

Biography
Meriam Ben Chaabane was born on July 30, 1983. In 2007 she graduated from the University of Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris 3  with a bachelor's degree in performing arts theater specialty. The actress had dancing and singing Trainings as well, She has also managed  theater Workshops.

In 2010 Mariem was discovered by Tunisians audience with her role of Dorra mnawer in the Tunisian series "Casting". Yet in 2012 she made a strong comeback with her role in the series Maktoub.

She was on the cover of the Tunivisions people magazine in September 2012.

In 2016, she starred in two series which were broadcast during the month of Ramadan, Awled Moufida and Flashback, The actress also appeared in the movie Woh! by the Tunisian director Ismahane Lahmar.

In 2019 Mariem Ben Chaabane took a leading role in the Tunisian Television series Machair by the Turkish director Muhammet Gok, she starred as Meriem "A fightful women who has brain cancer and has only a few days left to live". The series made a huge success in the Maghreb area during Ramadan 2019, Her role was admired by the Tunisian and Maghreb audience.

Filmography

Film
 2014 : Face à la mer by Sabry Bouzid
 2016 : Woh ! by Ismahane Lahmar

Television
 2010 : Casting by Sami Fehri : as Dorra Mnawer
 2012 : Maktoub (3rd season) by Sami Fehri : as Chekra Ben Sallem
 2013 : Layem by Khaled Barsaoui
 2016 : Awled Moufida (saison 2) by Sami Fehri
 2016-2017 : Flashback by Mourad Ben Cheikh
 2019 : Machair () by Muhammet Gök : as Meriem : Maryem Yahiya

References

External links

1983 births
Living people
Tunisian film actresses
Tunisian television actresses

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


text:
I was born in Chicago, IL but moved to rural Aliceville, AL before fate landed me in the City of Champions. I can be heard during the midday, sometimes speaking with eloquence and professionalism. But every now and then, I have to "bring it on home," and you'd swear you were talking to a cousin or good friend. I have no problem making fun of myself, giving compliments, or saying what most people are thinking. That's just me!
Join the Tuscaloosa SCLC for Unity Day Events Now
Join us now for the Tuscaloosa Chapter of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference's Unity Day Events.
Tuscaloosa Chapter of the SCLC to Host Virtual Unity Day
Much like other events, this year's Unity Day events will look quite different as COVID precautions are observed. The breakfast and Mass Rally will be virtual.
Mayor Maddox to Present YMCA Honorees with Awards: Get Your First Look Here
Sunday, Jan 17, the Barnes YMCA begins its Youth First Campaign. Mayor Maddox will present awards to community leaders for their service to the Barnes YMCA.
Bridge Builder Foundation and Gordo Church Partner for Food Giveaway
New Home Missionary Baptist Church has partnered with the Bridge Builder Foundation to provide food boxes as part of community outreach on Saturday, Oct. 31.
Have Safe Fall Fun this Weekend with These Tuscaloosa Area Events
There are a number of events being held this weekend for children to pick up candy. food, and have good, clean fun while practicing social distancing.
Truth Initiative Awards Grant to Stillman College to Develop a Tobacco and Vape-Free Campu…
Stillman College was recently awarded a grant from Truth Initiative to adopt a 100 percent tobacco/vape-free campus policy
Is Your Family Prepared for Emergency Situations?
Just as schools and places of work have emergency safety plans, so should one's household.
Tuscaloosa SCLC to Protest the Tuscaloosa VA
Among the list of concerns is an alleged statement by one person in a leadership position, who is accused of telling people of color that they could be his slaves.
Southern Stuff: Adding E-R Doesn't Make a Word Proper
People convert words which end in "A" to end in "E-R" for no godly reason. Words that end in "E-R" are often made to end with an "A" to create an informality.
Aliceville Street to be Dedicated in Honor of Inv. Dornell Cousette
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Diego Montoya (born ) is an American visual artist and fashion designer. He works with recycled materials creating "larger-than-life," "innovative, and subversive" installations and costumes for galleries, stores, and queer performers.

Early life and education
Diego Montoya was born in Lima, Peru. His family immigrated to the Little Haiti neighborhood in Miami, Florida when he was ten, and when he was fifteen he started going to the city's drag shows.

In college, at Florida State University, he studied fashion design and fine art; he found himself sketching drag queens and club kids. He chose as his muse during this period, performance artist, and actress Amanda Lepore, "She was all over my storyboards." Montoya got experience designing for performers in school working with the college's circus, including his acrobat boyfriend, it "helped hone an aesthetic based on 'savage beauty.'" After graduating in 2004 he moved to New York City.

Career

Early career: 2004-late 2000s
Montoya notes drag as a queer art form, "In sensibility, in approach, in its imagination: This is queer art." He cites as an early inspiration the 1981 wedding dress of Princess Diana (designed by David Emanuel and Elizabeth Emanuel). "It was so obnoxious and beautiful to me." He was also inspired by the joyfulness of John Galliano, and the darkness of Alexander McQueen. Montoya found the drag scene in New York City stale in the mid 2000s, moving there in 2004, until the Brooklyn area started transforming with what he characterized as a "more deconstructed," and experimental voice. For his own outfits he wore custom onesies made of spandex "to take some pressure off myself by creating playful and maybe a little ridiculous aliases." He wore them exclusively for his first four years in the city; later on he would shoot a series, Gay Superheroes, with them as the basis. He says it was also dangerous to go out in drag as RuPaul's Drag Race, that would popularize and mainstream drag queen culture, would not start airing until 2009. Montoya though was mixing and collaborating with "amazing queer performers."

Initially when he moved to New York City, he worked in fashion for several years while freelancing in costume design. One costuming project was for Clara's Nutcracker, a re-imagined abstraction of The Nutcracker from the protagonist's perspective "at age 6, 20, 40, 80 all happening at the same time performed at this former glass factory in Queens." The piece was from two friends, writer/director Josh William Gelb, and choreographed by Katie Rose McLaughlin. He took a fluid approach with all four Claras in all white contrasted to the industrial surroundings.

Installation art: late 2000s-mid 2010s
In the late 2000s he was hired full-time designing window displays. The shift got him thinking about designing "more conceptually about spacial design and environments." He started doing nightlife event art installations which led to site-specific art installations. He works with recycled materials creating "larger-than-life," "innovative, and subversive" installations and costumes for galleries, stores and "queer performers."

He cites this period as having the most growth artistically; taking weeks to construct, they were in "massive warehouses or abandoned theaters" and were usually collaborative efforts. He was the design director for the MIXNYC Queer Experimental Film Festival from 2010–15, producing entire spaces. He first attended MIXNYC in 2006 and got more networked and involved; he designed a t-shirt for the 2008 festival, staff uniforms for 2009, and was asked to design the space starting in 2010. He either staged his installations at home, where he had a sewing station, or had a temporary space. There would be a frenzy to complete everything in place, it was open to the public for a week, then taken apart. He worked on a series in the mid-2010s, Future Rituals, merging costume design and environment art, "to make interactive vignettes." According to Carnegie Mellon University's Art School, Montoya "creates hyper visual pieces that are both opulent and bizarre exploring themes of ritual and subcultural." For several seasons Montoya had his own fashion line with pieces at the Leslie-Lohman Prince Street Project Space.

In December 2015 he presented as part of "Superfine! House of Art and Design" at Art Basel Miami with "Ascend With You," a 3,000-square-foot hanging sculpture piece. Montoya said of returning to his neighborhood, "Miami specifically is super-kitsch...It's all pastel colors and neon, and that kind of playfulness is definitely in my work." In May 2016 Montoya won Best Visual Artist at the Brooklyn Nightlife Awards. As of October 2018, Montoya has done art installations at Leslie-Lohman Museum, Abrons Arts Center, Same Art Museum, 29Rooms LA, and Art Basel Miami.

Collaboration with Sasha Velour for RuPaul's Drag Race
In late 2016, a "popular Brooklyn queen," Sasha Velour, contacted Montoya to create some couture for an unnamed purpose, which turned out to be the ninth season of RuPaul's Drag Race (RPDR), the show started airing in March 2017 with Montoya's designs as her entrance look. Velour had fallen in love with Montoya's headpieces and masks that he would post on Instagram. Montoya says, "I'm obsessed with things that are beautiful but in an aggressive way," noting many of his pieces are heavily ornamented. "It's just what I'm naturally drawn to. I identify as a queer artist, and I think a lot of that visibility is campy and has a lot of things that I love, but is also aggressive." Montoya builds on the character or persona a queen has created and designs with that in mind. Vice noted Velour as a perfect muse for Montoya as she has a reputation for more cerebral drag— "taking the history of the genre and pulling it apart to reconstruct and move it forward".

For the finale, Velour contacted Montoya again, and they collaborated to create a red carpet entrance look, as well as an outfit for the competition performance. The entrance look was a "cobalt gown with a corresponding Queen Elizabeth-esque ruff" based on Francis Ford Coppola's 1991 film Dracula's character Lucy Westerna, a vivacious beautiful young woman who falls victim to Count Dracula. They had intended for shades of regal vampire red but had to change to colors that would not blend in with the theater's background. Later Velour would have Montoya deconstruct it and rework it "for a queen on the go."

For the performance they created an "ornate and beautiful," but "kinda scary" white dress she wore for the winning performance. Her ensemble included Montoya's tearaway and pearl "felt, lace, and hand-beaded mask held together by magnets that she cracked open like an egg to reveal her face." They attempted a futuristic egg effect as Velour had been called the Fabergé egg queen, it covered her entire head. According to MTV News, Velour's "more baroque, performance art-inspired drag that had long existed off the show" was put on equal footing with more popular "campy or Insta[gram]-glamorous" drag forms. The finale set a ratings record for VH1. Out's Coco Romack stated "without a doubt, [Velour will] go down in herstory as one of the most fashion-forward competitors" the series has seen.

For Montoya, the finale outfit and performance brought in a "flood of requests" for his couture and increased his Instagram followers five-fold to over 10,000. Montoya said it led to "new opportunities and kind of changed my life," he was still working out of his room and had to throw away his bed to make room for more dresses. Within two years he was able to forego his restaurant job, and open a Bushwick, Brooklyn design studio with five employees. Velour said In June 2018 Velour crowned the tenth season winner, Aquaria, with a Montoya-designed dress that invoked an alien version of Eve from the Garden of Eden.

Further works, 2017-present
Montoya has since collaborated with more Drag Race queens including: "Ongina, Kameron Michaels, Asia O'Hara, Eureka O'Hara, Monét X Change, Pearl, Jinkx Monsoon, Blair St. Clair, Bob the Drag Queen, Kim Chi, Aja, Honey Davenport, and Soju." Montoya notes that when Drag Race started in 2009 the female illusion was more central to the queens look, passing as a woman was almost enough. As of 2019, every aspect is exaggerated, with the custom garments costing from $2,000-10,000.

In October 2017, Montoya's costumes were used for the world premiere of The Power of Emotion: The Apartment—"a trilogy of works that explores how we watch, hear, and perform emotion"—directed by Katherine Brook for the Tele-Violet company with the TAK ensemble at the Abrons Arts Center.

In October 2018 jazz singer-composer and bassist Esperanza Spalding released 12 Little Spells, her seventh studio album, a twelve-part song cycle based on parts of the human anatomy. Each song was released on its own day, with a corresponding video; later she did a series of twelve pop-up concerts across the U.S. tied to each song. She collaborated with other artists on various aspects of the video and live performances, and commissioned Montoya to do a series of dresses for the effort; the live shows were filmed for a concert release.

In late 2018 Montoya again worked with Sasha Velour for her Smoke and Mirrors tour which started in Australia and New Zealand in January, and later throughout the U.S. In it she revives a vaudeville-era conceit of something going wrong with the show, then having to go on with the show anyway—but with technology as the show is multimedia with live projection mapping. For the first act Montoya designed a couture full bodysuit in red, and covered with jewels; each number has its own costuming, half in white velvet, that layers over the bodysuit, and scenery—projected onto the velvet pieces—layered on top. In the second act, Velour's story is about her transforming and maturing, she wears another bodysuit that ultimately helps her morph into a tree from her childhood. Velour stated, "all of the beautiful fabric choices, the way things move, and the way things sparkle in the light...those are the things that Diego is really passionate about, so he was able to improve upon my ideas in incredible ways."

As a first, Montoya designed Shangela's dress for her red carpet debut at the 2019 Oscars in February. Shangela is the first drag queen to walk the Oscar's red carpet, a long tradition for film stars, in drag; she was dressed in an "icy lilac mermaid gown with draped details and asymmetrical gold beading," (seen here). Montoya had ten days to make the dress, including five days of his team hand-beading. Shangela walked the red carpet with her longtime friend, actress Jenifer Lewis, who wore a custom copper suit also produced by Montoya. Shangela was a supporting actress in Bradley Cooper's A Star Is Born (2018) alongside Willam Belli, and featured performers Cooper and Lady Gaga. In September 2018, Shangela also wore a Montoya dress, a Shakespearean-inspired "golden number, dripping in jewels," that she commissioned for the London red carpet premiere of the movie. In May 2019 Them noted his influences as "the kitsch, excess, and color of Miami, where he was raised after moving from Lima, Peru, as well as the drag queens and club kids he encountered growing up."

In September 2019, Montoya's costumes were part of the world premiere of Joseph Keckler's Let Me Die, "a genre-bending performance" opera performed as part of Opera Philadelphia's O19 festival.

For their work in the HBO series We're Here, Montoya has won a Primetime Emmy Award.

Notes

References

1980s births
Living people
American fashion designers
American LGBT artists
People from Lima
Peruvian emigrants to the United States
Queer artists
People from Miami
Florida State University alumni
21st-century LGBT people
Primetime Emmy Award winners


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Northpointe Capital LLC raised its position in Valero Energy Co. (NYSE:VLO) by 8.3% in the 1st quarter, according to the company in its most recent 13F filing with the SEC. The fund owned 55,574 shares of the oil and gas company's stock after buying an additional 4,238 shares during the period. Valero Energy accounts for 1.5% of Northpointe Capital LLC's investment portfolio, making the stock its 19th biggest holding. Northpointe Capital LLC's holdings in Valero Energy were worth $4,714,000 at the end of the most recent quarter.
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See Also: What is the Consumer Price Index (CPI)?
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