Perhaps it was foolish not to instantly realise that director Steven Spielberg and Hergé's much beloved comic book Tintin would be a natural fit for one another. The similarities between Spielberg's world-weary archaeologist Indiana Jones and Herge's intrepid young reporter are obvious – both men travel the pre-1950s globe on the hunt for mystery-shrouded historical treasures. Both characters are also courageous men of action, throwing themselves into danger, frequently getting beaten up, and resourcefully mixing brains and brawn to achieve their goals. As a result you can pretty much consider Spielberg's first CGI-animated effort, The Adventures of Tintin, to be a cinematic cousin to the Indiana Jones series – only with much more humour, zero supernatural elements, and a decidedly vanilla hero.
The Adventures of Tintin draws on plot points from three different Tintin stories, The Secret of the Unicorn, The Crab with the Golden Claws and Red Rackham's Treasure. In the film, Jamie Bell's performance-captured Tintin finds his life threatened when he buys a sought-after model ship containing a clue to a long-lost treasure. Pitted against the sinister Sakharine (Daniel Craig) in the race to solve the mystery first, Tintin at least has the aid of his loyal wire hair fox terrier Snowy, as well as blustery alcoholic Captain Haddock (Andy Serkis), whose ancestry makes him a pivotal figure in the treasure hunt. Meanwhile Scotland Yard detectives Thomson and Thompson (Simon Pegg and Nick Frost) blunder around in the background.
The Adventures of Tintin hits the ground running. Like the Indiana Jones films, Tintin is action-packed to the point of exhaustion and rarely lets up. In fact, after one particularly extended sequence that begins with a daring ocean escape and ends with an airplane crash in the Sahara, the cinema audience is likely to let out a collective sigh of relief… and satisfaction, mind you.
Your stamina for back-to-back action scenes may determine how much you enjoy The Adventures of Tintin, but there is no denying that this film – along with Rango – supports the argument that animation is currently superior to live-action cinema when it comes to creatively choreographed and highly engaging action scenes. For example, there's a 17th Century naval battle in Tintin that trumps anything in the entire Pirates of the Caribbean quadrilogy.
This said, The Adventures of Tintin isn't my favourite animated film of the year – that title belongs to the more consistently enjoyable Arthur Christmas(read the review). Tintin is, however, 2011's most technically brilliant animated film… by a mile. Although there is nothing standout about the film's 3D, Tintin is the best CGI-animated film made so far that utilises motion-captured performances of real actors. In Tintin there's no dead-eyed, disturbingly rubber characters à la The Polar Express, Beowulf and Mars Needs Moms. While it takes a scene or so to adjust to the film's character design – which unusually blends the hyper-real and Hergé's cartoonish, colourful approach – you quickly fall in step after that and accept the film's universe without question.
The technical mastery of The Adventures of Tintin elevates the film into 4-star territory, which is fortunate because it could have been a 3-starrer, given the number of gripes that can be made about other areas of the movie.
For example, the film's storyline is weak in terms of character motivations – holding a grudge over events that happened to ancestors centuries ago seems a bit farfetched. And, as with the comics, Tintin isn't the most charismatic hero. He's likeable enough – principled and motivated – but typically you feel like he's the creation of another era, and personality-wise he just can't compete with loud, over-the-top characters like Haddock. Speaking of the latter, having already impressed in 2011 as Rise of the Planet of the Apes' Caesar, Serkis (the Motion Capture King) dominates here, demonstrating great versatility as Haddock staggers for the most part between clumsy, aggressive drunkenness and remorseful, self-induced despair.
Riddled with little visual references to the Tintin comics, and Spielberg's filmography as well, The Adventures of Tintin should please fans and newcomers to the franchise alike. It's a breathless, light adventure for the whole family that refreshingly doesn't soften or dumb itself down. In short, The Adventures of Tintin is what Indiana Jones and the Kingdom of the Crystal Skull should have been. Now if only Spielberg would make an animated Indiana Jones TV series just like this.
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On this week movie great on cinema is Power Rangers and the movie Power Rangers En Entier Film get viewer most to watch this movie. Cinema like Megashare, Megashare, BoxOfficeMojo, etc have thousand visitors/2h. This movie Power Rangers great come from this channel (http://streaming.vodlockertv.com/?tt=0113820) and this great movie Power Rangers En Entier Film can download and watch for free unlimited.
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Handmade baby blankets are priceless!
This heirloom style baby blanket crochet kit uses the beautiful Honeycomb Tunisian crochet stitch to create a gorgeous baby blanket, perfect for gifting to a new mom – or crocheting for your own baby.
Instructional videos are included to teach you the Honeycomb stitch pattern, as well as adding a delicate border for a finishing touch. You get a mini Tunisian Crochet course with this pattern kit.
This kit includes Addie's Baby Blanket crochet pattern and 6 skeins of organic cotton yarn in your preferred color.
Addie's Baby Blanket crochet kit creates a beautiful Tunisian Crochet Honeycomb Stitch baby blanket perfect for crocheting a handmade baby blanket gift.
This baby blanket crochet kit includes Addie's Baby Blanket crochet pattern and 6 skeins of sport weight organic cotton. Appalachian Baby Design 100% Organic cotton yarn is created from cotton grown organically in Texas and spun by hand by two women in West Virginia. Definitely USA made and super light and soft!
Grown, spun, and dyed in the USA – Sustainable!
I designed this baby blanket as a gift for a friend's new baby, Addison. Being a Spring baby, a lightweight cotton blanket was a great option.
Instructional videos are included to teach you the Tunisian Crochet Honeycomb stitch pattern, as well as how to add a delicate Picot Stitch border for a finishing touch. A mini Tunisian Crochet course is included with this pattern.
Addie's Baby Blanket crochet pattern is part of the Blanket a Month Collection of crochet patterns.
This is a baby blanket that will be treasured for years to come!
6 skeins of Appalachian Baby Design organic cotton sport weight yarn and Addie's Baby Blanket crochet pattern. You will choose your yarn color from the photos as you order. The yarn and pattern will be sent to you. The pattern is also available for download for future reference.
Please do not copy, sell, or redistribute this pattern or photos in any way. You are welcome to sell finished items. Please provide this link to my shop when selling finished products online. Pattern by Little Monkeys Design.


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redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaGithub


text:
We Make Movies, LLC
Classic Award-Winning Documentary films
Filmmaker-run Production and Distribution since 1970
Films used by thousands of Colleges/Universities, Native Tribes, Native American Studies, Libraries,Law Schools, Social Justice, Anti- drug Programs, Government Agencies, Women's Studies, U.S. Military,, Law Enforcement, Television...
ON-SITE PUBLIC PERFORMANCE LICENSE INCLUDED!
FALL SALE! SAVE $149.00!!
ALL 3 NATIVE FILMS FOR JUST $298.00!
Our Movies
Broken Treaty at Battle Mountain
To Protect Mother Earth
Even if a Hundred Ogres
SKEZAG
Sam's War
Reviews/Awards
Land of the Brave
A MacArthur Foundation Film Selection
Narrated by Robert Redford
A Joel L. Freedman Film; 60 minutes: color
"Generates a narrative excitement that is not often found in
non-fiction films...it has much to say to anyone who is concerned with big against small, with preservation against 'progress'
and it says it well" -The New York Times
Called by the San Francisco Chronicle "A powerful documentary which is creating history", BROKEN TREATY is now a motion picture Classic—The Western Shoshone of Nevada fight to preserve 24,000 acres of their Treaty land, save their sacred trees and their traditional way of life.
Click for Awards/Reviews
List Price $149.00 SALE Price: all 3: $298.00
"The powerful sequel to the acclaimed Broken Treaty at Battle Mountain –"A gripping contemporary story of the Western Shoshone people's fight to save ancestral lands from illegal seizure and nuclear destruction." National Congress of American Indians
Hard hitting and gripping-unforgettable imagery!- The Hollywood Reporter.
Inspiring! – The Los Angeles Times
List Price: $149.00 Sale Price: All three: $298.00
Filmed at the Winter Olympics
List Price: $149.00 Sale Price All Three: $298.00
"A stunning theatrical performance by the Saami People of the Arctic dramatizing one thousand years of Indigenous history, with fantastic music, unique chanting and weird and wonderful masks. Filmed at the Olympic Games at Lillehammer! " - The Westport News
"This is an important video as it shows the history of Native People in an affirmative way, while being highly entertaining, powerful, and full of humor and insight. Highly recommended!"
E-The Environmental Magazine - Doug Moss
Even If A Hundred Ogres...
Introduced and Narrated by Joanne Woodward
A Film By Joel L. Freedman; 60 minutes: color
Selected by THE UNITED STATES LIBRARY OF CONGRESS for THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
Used by Universities, Libraries, -Anti-Drug Programs, Law Enforcement, US Military & more.
He heart of the drug culture exposed with clarity and devastation. Rough, honest, yet sensitive. Should be seen by every young person and the world!
ABC Eyewitness News
A major tool in the war against opioids. Highly recommended. - Anri Kissilenko, MD, Silverhill Hospital, CT
List Price: $149.00 SALE PRICE: $125
FIGHT THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC!
The Most Powerful anti-drug film ever made!
A film by Joel L. Freedman & Phillip F. Messina;
60 minutes, color
A GI's Journey featuring Sam Brody
A film by Joel L. Freedman
"The film is a terific testament to Sam and to all our fighting men. Well done!"
– Bruce Joel Rubin - Academy Award "GHOST"
"An amazing story of courage, sacrifice and selfless service. Sam's sincere, personal narrative provides a genuine and vivid first-hand account of the experienes faced by our "Greatest Generation" of World War II
– Commissioner Sean M. Connolly, Dept. of Veterans Affairs
A riveting personal account of a GI's death-defying experiences as an American Jew fighting against Nazi Germany." – The Stamford Advocate
As seen on CBS Nationwide,
Colleges, Libraries, Museums, Music & Art Schools
An extraordinary portrait of jazz genius and artist Jeremy Steig. Mr. Steig was a rarity --flute was his first and only instrument. An in the view of many critics and musicians, he was a master. The film a "happening", as Jeremy creates a first-time fusion between jazz and rock."
- The New York Times.
© COPYRIGHT 2018 Cinnamon Productions Inc. All Rights Rerserved

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


U.S. President Donald Trump has agreed to provide written answers to questions in a defamation lawsuit brought by a former contestant on the television show "The Apprentice," according to court papers filed on Friday.
Zervos sued Trump for defamation in 2017 after he labeled such allegations lies and retweeted a post calling her claims a hoax.
Trump and Kasowitz have been fighting the lawsuit, arguing in court filings that a sitting U.S. president is immune from being sued in a state court during his term in office.Justice Jennifer Schecter of the New York state court in Manhattan in March rejected Trump's bid to dismiss the lawsuit, saying she found "absolutely no authority" to end litigation over purely unofficial conduct because he was a sitting president.


The plugin repository has never been easy to navigate, or very visually appealing. It is a place to get into, find your plugin and get out. That may not be the case for long. A beta for a plugin repository redesign can now be viewed as of today. They have done away with sidebars and let the plugins be the star of the page.
The front page now shows the top four Featured, Popular, and Beta plugins. You can choose to see all to view the full list.
The search bar is now more prominent and takes up the entire top of the page.
The pages for plugins themselves have been cleaned up, and only show plugin information without a sidebar.
The entire thing looks more pared down and minimal. It will be exciting to see what the final design looks like.
What do you think of the new design? What would you change or add? Answer in the comments below.


Everyone's favourite former First Lady dropped some nuggets of wisdom as her Becoming tour returned to London for a sell-out event. Stylist's Meena Alexander reveals her five take-away points from the chat.
Oh Michelle – light of our lives, queen of our hearts, patron saint of toned arms – how we miss you every day.
There's no denying that Michelle Obama is one of the world's most beloved and inspirational leaders, so it's unsurprising that demand for her Becoming book tour went through the roof. But for her to sell out London's O2 Arena, drawing a 15,000-strong crowd that rose to their feet as she walked out to Beyonce's Halo (appropriate), is nothing short of incredible.
There were no laser light shows, no song and dance routines, no dramatic clouds of smoke – just Obama and The Late Show host Stephen Colbert in big comfy chairs, having a chat. And yet it was the most joyful experience I've had over the past few Brexit-tinged, Trump-enraged months.
Unlike so many people in a position of power, Obama is humble to a fault. Her achievements as a lawyer, activist and former First Lady are awe-inspiring, yet she constantly deflects praise onto others.
She credited the White House staff for helping to raise her daughters. She thanked her parents – particularly her father, who "always respected her as an equal and relevant voice in the household" – for raising her to be confident and independent.
Even the roaring crowds at the O2 Arena didn't go to her head – she simply attributed the success of her book to the unified experience of people all over the world, encouraging us to realise how much we all have in common.
"When they go low, we go high," is Obama's most famous quote, and it's one she lives by. Of course, during her talk there were plenty of references to the "current occupant of the White House", but ever the class act, Obama was never tempted to take a cheap shot.
She encouraged the audience to remain hopeful and "take a long-term view", but refused to be drawn into mud-slinging.
When asked how she felt about the dismantling of her husband's legacy, she simply said: "America is like a teenager that comes from a broken family. We're a little unsettled. Sometimes you spend the weekends with divorced dad and that feels like it's fun, but then you get sick of it.
Although Obama recognised social media as a tool that has opened up the diversity of the world to young people, she also warned against allowing it to define our views.
She encouraged the audience to be sceptical about the information we take in, measuring it against our own interactions with people rather than taking it as read.
Yeah, I was practically whooping at this point.
Phew, she is human. When asked by a fan how she dealt with the steady onslaught of bad news coming from our TVs and smartphones, Obama admitted that sometimes she has to take a break if she isn't feeling "emotionally able" to deal with it – something many of us have felt in the age of the 24-hour news cycle.
"I only let some of that stuff enter into my world when I am ready and solid – that's what I would recommend," she said.
The Obamas' message has always been one of hope, and Michelle is still very much 'on brand'.
Though she's taken harder knocks than most, enduring racist, misogynistic attacks throughout her husband's campaign, she never loses sight of what she wants: a better, fairer future for everyone. "We're experiencing bumps in the road, but change is hard, nobody said it was going to be easy," she said.
She reminded would-be activists that fighting for change wasn't about glory, but about "planting seeds you may never see the fruits of".
She left the audience on a hopeful high, reminding us that dips and backward slides were a natural part of progress. "We have an obligation not to lose faith in the possibility of being better," she said.
Her words rung in my ears as the crowds slowly trickled out.
Her over-arching message had finally hit home: if she, a black woman from humble beginnings on the South Side of Chicago, can achieve great things, then so can everybody else.
"Can I trade it in for equal pay?"


> source without having to get all of tomcat to get it?
>> log messages I guess I missed it.
>> interceptor, but is this the correct behaviour?
>> and not really emulating a real scenario.
>> can get more understanding, and help you further.
>>> the setters/getters you mention below?
>>> heartbeat is running in a separate thread for both send/receive?
>>> How to solve this, bump the heartbeat timeout?
>>>> My startup code looks like this.
>>> the port, then simply do it.
>>>> number of attempts to a maximum number before notifying?
>>>> limited docs on the apache site?
>>>> connection was 	forcibly closed by the remote host].
>>>> 	WARNING: Unable to send mcast message.
>>>> 	WARNING: Recovery thread failed to stop membership service.
>>>> 	WARNING: Recovery thread failed to start membership service.


Wo are largest manufacturers of concrete machinery in the world. We build 6 styles and sizes of concrete mixers; 3 styles of block machines, brick machines, tile molds and sewer pipe molds and automatic tile machines, fence post machines, burial vaults, tombstones and monuments. ornamental products—mixers, engines, tools, etc.
OUR 144-PAGE BOOK —over 50 illustrations —gives full working knowledge of Concrete Industry, sent for 24c stamps; money back if not satisfied. Fence Post Machine Circular Free.


When the weather gets colder, I turn to baked potatoes for comfort. It's the perfect excuse to turn on the oven and warm up the house. Besides who doesn't want a side of roasted taters for dinner?
These crispy Parmesan potato stacks are a fun twist on your standard baked potato, and they're surprisingly easy to make.
A muffin tin is definitely required equipment for this recipe. I tried baking these stacks on a baking sheet, but nearly half of the potato stacks toppled over midway through the bake. The walls of a muffin pan help keep everything in place.
Slice the potatoes as thinly as possible. A mandolin set to 1/16-inch is great for slicing uniform, thin slices, but you can use a chef's knife, too. Just try to slice as thinly as you possibly can.
If you're using a mandoline, make sure to be very careful with the blade. As an extra precaution, I always wear cut-resistant gloves when I'm operating the mandoline.
One or two stacks is usually enough for each person. If you have a big crowd coming around for dinner, feel free to double up the recipe! Just be sure to save a stack for me, okay?
I purposely use a silicone pastry brush for this recipe because I found that a standard pastry brush with bristles added too much oil.
1 Preheat oven to 375F. Set an oven rack in the center position. Coat a standard 12-cup muffin pan with cooking spray or brush on a thin layer of oil.
2 In a small bowl, mix olive oil, garlic powder and salt together. Set aside.
3 Slice the potatoes: Rinse and scrub your potatoes. Slice each potato thinly, between 1/8 and 1/16-inch thick. I use a mandoline to get 1/16-inch thick slices.
4 Assemble the potato stacks: Place 4 slices of potatoes at the bottom of each cup of the muffin tin. Using a silicone brush, lightly brush the potatoes with some of the oil mixture. Sprinkle some thyme leaves on top. Continue stacking several layers of potatoes, brushing the oil and sprinkling thyme leaves until you have stacked all the potato slices. Each muffin cup should be filled to the top with potato slices.
Sprinkle half of the Parmesan evenly over the potato stacks.
5 Bake the potato stacks: Bake the stacks for 30 minutes, then pull out the potatoes and sprinkle the remaining cheese on top. Bake another 5 to 15 minutes, depending on how brown and crispy you want them to be (35 to 45 minutes total).
6 Transfer the stacks to plates or serving dish: Use a spoon to help release the potato stacks from the muffin pan. Season potato stacks with more salt and pepper, if you like. Serve immediately while hot and crispy.
Hello! All photos and content are copyright protected. Please do not use our photos without prior written permission. If you wish to republish this recipe, please rewrite the recipe in your own unique words and link back to Crispy Parmesan Potato Stacks on Simply Recipes. Thank you!
Can you make them ahead of time?
You could probably do that, but you'd likely lose some hard-won crispiness by reheating it in the oven. Instead, I'd suggest preparing the stacks through step 4 the night before or earlier in the day, covering the pan with foil and then baking them off for dinner or whenever you need them. Thanks for your question, Peggy.
I have been making these for a quite awhile, my grandkids are always asking me to make them. They are very great to look at and are a hit with get togethers.
My husband loved these and was coming up with all the possibiltys of adding other ingredients to them. Thanks for great and fun recipe.
Great question, Nancy! From my experience, things don't crisp up as much when I use silicone muffin pans. For this recipe, I think the edges of the potato stacks won't brown as much but they should fully cook in the silicone muffin pans. Let us know how it turns out!
I made this last weekend. They were excellent. I did modify the recipe a bit. Instead of a muffin pan, I used a cookie pan. A toothpick through the stack kept them from sliding over. Just remember to remove them before serving!
Oh, great tip about using a toothpick, Michael. Thanks!
Oh yes they definitely look crispy and delicious! What a cute idea, great for parties too!
Do you think these world work as finger food for cocktail party or would forks be needed?
Hi, Patti! I think they could work as finger food, though I wouldn't layer on as many slices–probably 9 instead of 12. If you make them shorter, you'll have to either bake everything in batches or use another muffin pan. Also, the potato slices on the bottom tend to be a bit greasy because the oil drips down to the bottom of the wells as it bakes. If that's not a problem, they these could be served as finger food. Thanks for the question!
Sounds lovely and a great way to warm up my house during the fall/winter months. I've been heavily using my new spiralizer that I've completely neglected my mandolin.
Exactly how I felt! I pull out my spiralizer often when cooking, but the mandoline has been neglected in my kitchen.
Can you prepare and freeze before baking. Seems like a great recipe to prepare ahead.
Hi, Mary Ann! That's a great question! I haven't tried to freeze it ahead yet, but I don't see why it wouldn't work. You might have to bake it for a few extra minutes, but it should work fine. Let me know how it goes!
Oh my goodness. I hardly ever comment but these look like such a great alternative for all of the normal things I do with potatoes. Do you think garlic would also work here?
My slicing gloves have saved my hands…all it took was some stitches and now I am a convert!
Hi Paula, fresh garlic should work–maybe 2 or 3 cloves of garlic. I would mince the garlic pretty well so that you don't bite into huge chunks of garlic when you're eating it. Thanks for your question and let me know how they turn out!


My friend Robin is a Pampered Chef consultant and is always giving me wonderful recipes to try, so when she made us these Margaritas for one of my home shows I was very happy to find out just how simple they were to make. I adapted the recipe to make it my own but the original came from Robin. You can see her webpage here to order any of the spices I use in my recipes or even if you just want to check out the new catalog.
Mix all liquid ingredients in a pitcher and stir well.
After stirring, pour the salt onto a small plate and set aside.
Using a piece of the lime, gently squeeze it as you rub in around the whole glass. Tip the glass over and press into the salt to evenly coat the whole glass.
Fill the glass with the Margarita and bottoms up! YUM!


text:
iShares Global Utilities ETF (JXI)
Description of iShares Global Utilities ETF
iShares Global Utilities ETF
Statistics of iShares Global Utilities ETF (YTD)
The total return, or increase in value over 5 years of iShares Global Utilities ETF is 34.3%, which is lower, thus worse compared to the benchmark SPY (66.1%) in the same period.
Looking at total return, or performance in of 25.2% in the period of the last 3 years, we see it is relatively lower, thus worse in comparison to SPY (46.2%).
'The compound annual growth rate isn't a true return rate, but rather a representational figure. It is essentially a number that describes the rate at which an investment would have grown if it had grown the same rate every year and the profits were reinvested at the end of each year. In reality, this sort of performance is unlikely. However, CAGR can be used to smooth returns so that they may be more easily understood when compared to alternative investments.'
Compared with the benchmark SPY (10.7%) in the period of the last 5 years, the annual return (CAGR) of 6.1% of iShares Global Utilities ETF is lower, thus worse.
Compared with SPY (13.5%) in the period of the last 3 years, the annual performance (CAGR) of 7.8% is lower, thus worse.
The historical 30 days volatility over 5 years of iShares Global Utilities ETF is 12.4%, which is lower, thus better compared to the benchmark SPY (13.4%) in the same period.
During the last 3 years, the historical 30 days volatility is 10.9%, which is lower, thus better than the value of 12.3% from the benchmark.
Compared with the benchmark SPY (14.6%) in the period of the last 5 years, the downside volatility of 13.8% of iShares Global Utilities ETF is lower, thus better.
Looking at downside volatility in of 12.1% in the period of the last 3 years, we see it is relatively lower, thus better in comparison to SPY (13.9%).
Looking at the Sharpe Ratio of 0.29 in the last 5 years of iShares Global Utilities ETF, we see it is relatively smaller, thus worse in comparison to the benchmark SPY (0.61)
Compared with SPY (0.9) in the period of the last 3 years, the ratio of return and volatility (Sharpe) of 0.49 is smaller, thus worse.
'The Sortino ratio improves upon the Sharpe ratio by isolating downside volatility from total volatility by dividing excess return by the downside deviation. The Sortino ratio is a variation of the Sharpe ratio that differentiates harmful volatility from total overall volatility by using the asset's standard deviation of negative asset returns, called downside deviation. The Sortino ratio takes the asset's return and subtracts the risk-free rate, and then divides that amount by the asset's downside deviation. The ratio was named after Frank A. Sortino.'
The excess return divided by the downside deviation over 5 years of iShares Global Utilities ETF is 0.26, which is lower, thus worse compared to the benchmark SPY (0.56) in the same period.
During the last 3 years, the ratio of annual return and downside deviation is 0.44, which is smaller, thus worse than the value of 0.8 from the benchmark.
Compared with the benchmark SPY (3.99 ) in the period of the last 5 years, the Ulcer Ratio of 5.62 of iShares Global Utilities ETF is higher, thus worse.
Looking at Ulcer Index in of 4.76 in the period of the last 3 years, we see it is relatively higher, thus worse in comparison to SPY (4.04 ).
'Maximum drawdown measures the loss in any losing period during a fund's investment record. It is defined as the percent retrenchment from a fund's peak value to the fund's valley value. The drawdown is in effect from the time the fund's retrenchment begins until a new fund high is reached. The maximum drawdown encompasses both the period from the fund's peak to the fund's valley (length), and the time from the fund's valley to a new fund high (recovery). It measures the largest percentage drawdown that has occurred in any fund's data record.'
Looking at the maximum DrawDown of -14 days in the last 5 years of iShares Global Utilities ETF, we see it is relatively larger, thus better in comparison to the benchmark SPY (-19.3 days)
During the last 3 years, the maximum drop from peak to valley is -12.9 days, which is higher, thus better than the value of -19.3 days from the benchmark.
'The Drawdown Duration is the length of any peak to peak period, or the time between new equity highs. The Max Drawdown Duration is the worst (the maximum/longest) amount of time an investment has seen between peaks (equity highs) in days.'
The maximum time in days below previous high water mark over 5 years of iShares Global Utilities ETF is 362 days, which is larger, thus worse compared to the benchmark SPY (187 days) in the same period.
During the last 3 years, the maximum days under water is 309 days, which is greater, thus worse than the value of 139 days from the benchmark.
Compared with the benchmark SPY (41 days) in the period of the last 5 years, the average days below previous high of 115 days of iShares Global Utilities ETF is larger, thus worse.
During the last 3 years, the average days below previous high is 97 days, which is greater, thus worse than the value of 36 days from the benchmark.
Performance of iShares Global Utilities ETF (YTD)
Allocations of iShares Global Utilities ETF
Returns of iShares Global Utilities ETF (%)
Performance results of iShares Global Utilities ETF are hypothetical, do not account for slippage, fees or taxes, and are based on backtesting, which has many inherent limitations, some of which are described in our Terms of Use.


text:
Saint-Sulpice () is a station on Line 4 of the Paris Métro. It is located on the Rive Gauche, in the 6th arrondissement. In 2018, 2,350,813 travelers entered this station which places it at the 234th position of Métro stations for its traffic.

Location

The station is located under the Rue de Rennes at the intersection with the Rue du Vieux-Colombier.

History
The station was opened on 9 January 1910 as part of the connecting section of the line under the Seine between Châtelet and Raspail. It is named after the nearby Church of Saint-Sulpice, famous for its gnomon.

In the spring of 2010, the station underwent renovations as part of the Un métro + beau operation. From June to July 2019, platform doors were installed on the platforms as part of the line's ongoing full automation.

Passenger services

Access
The station has three entrances:
 Entrance 1: Rue de Rennes, Rue du Four side in front of 65 Rue de Rennes
 Entrance 2: in front of 69 Rue de Rennes
 Entrance 3: rue de Rennes, rue de Mézières (escalator)

The two entrances located on the Rue de Rennes on either side of the Rue du Vieux-Colombier are decorated with a Val d'Osne candelabra.

Station layout

Bus connections
 RATP buses 39, 63, 70, 84, 87, 95, 96
 Night buses N01, N02, N12, N13

Nearby
Also nearby are the Church of Saint-Sulpice of Paris, Luxembourg Palace, the Saint-Germain-des-Prés neighbourhood, Rue Bonaparte, Institute of Intercultural Management and Communication and the mairie of the 6th arrondissement.

Gallery

References

Roland, Gérard (2003). Stations de métro. D'Abbesses à Wagram. Éditions Bonneton.

Paris Métro stations in the 6th arrondissement of Paris
Railway stations in France opened in 1910

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


Hi, I'm Drew! I am a professional illustrator living in Toronto. My cat Ripley is here and she wants me to mention her. Yes, Ripley, I said it.
Please let go of my arm, you're hurting me.
Education: BAA Illustration Sheridan College, 2011.
Represented in publishing by P.S. Literary agency. For all inquiries about books please contact Maria Vicente.


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text:
Severn's Building is a Grade II listed building dating from the 15th century in Castle Road, Nottingham.

History

Severn's Building dates from around 1450. It was built as a Merchant's house and located on Middle Pavement. When the street was numbered, it became no. 10. From 1879 to 1885 it was the offices of Samuel Dutton Walker and John Howitt, architects.

John and James Severn operated a wine and spirit business on Middle Pavement and in 1900 they moved into this building.

After the Second World War the owners put forwards plans for alterations to it. The roof of the yard was extensively damaged in the Nottingham Blitz. It was also under threat as there were plans to widen Middle Pavement.

In 1968 it was taken down by F.W.B. Charles, and its former site on Middle Pavement became part of the Broadmarsh Centre. It was reassembled on Castle Road by 1970. From 1980, Jack Richards operated it as a Lace museum and shop of Lace. This closed in 2009. Owned by the city council, the building was put up for sale in 2012.

References

Grade II listed buildings in Nottinghamshire
Buildings and structures in Nottingham
Timber framed buildings in England
Houses completed in the 15th century


text:
Q: Controling console.log client side I'm working on a site that takes fairly long to build/deploy. I sometimes need information that is only available server-side for debugging. Using console.log is annoying since adding a console.log in the code and building takes too long.
But I also don't want the site to always log that information to the console.
My plan was to have a wrapper function for console.log, that checks if there is e.g dev_config set in localStorage.
For example to activate certain verbose levels that then show respective logs, or log only in certain sections.
Would this have a significant impact on performance of the site?
For instance something like this:
const devLog = (message) => {
  devConfig = JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem('dev_config'))

  if (devConfig != null) {
    // ...
    // other checks (set devMode to true)
    // ...

    if (devMode === true) {
      const now = new Date()
      const hours = now.getHours()
      const min = (now.getMinutes() + '').padStart(2, '0')
      const sec = (now.getSeconds() + '').padStart(2, '0')
      console.log(`[${hours}:${min}:${sec}] `, message)
    }
  }
}

PS: I am aware of the built-in browser dev tools and I am using them in most cases. But since the information in my current problem is server side, I don't think I can get with the dev tools what I need.

A: You could overwrite console.log but that could annoy you later on. I prefer to have my own logger like your devLog function. It's more explicit.
As @Barmar suggested in the comments you could instead check the localStorage on load instead of on every call. I have something similar to the below in a few projects of mine:
{
    let devConfig = JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem('dev_config'));

    devLog = (...args) => {
        if (devConfig) {
            const time = new Date().toLocaleTimeString()
            console.log(`[${time}] `, ...args)
        }
    };

    devLog.activate = () => {
        devConfig = true;
        localStorage.setItem('dev_config', true)
    }

    devLog.deactivate = () => {
        devConfig = false;
        localStorage.setItem('dev_config', false)
    }

    devLog.toggle = () => {
        if ( devConfig ) {
            devLog.deactivate()
        } else {
            devLog.activate()
        }
    }
}

Since when you're reading dev_config from the localStorage for the first time you'll get null it will start off deactivated - which seems like a good default to me.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


text:
PNB Housing Finance raises Rs 2,500 cr by issuing bonds to LIC
PTI New Delhi | Updated on November 07, 2019 Published on November 07, 2019
PNB Housing Finance on Thursday said that LIC has invested Rs 2,500 crore in the company by subscribing to its secured redeemable non-convertible debentures (NCDs).
This issuance is through private placement basis with a door-to-door tenure of 10 years, and the proceeds will be utilised by the company for its normal course of business operations, the company said.
"This is the second NCD issuance by the company for the financial year 2019-20 after the first lot of Rs 500 crore was subscribed by a foreign bank. This issuance of Rs 2,500 crore has been subscribed by Life Insurance Corporation of India," said Sanjaya Gupta, Managing Director, PNB Housing Finance.
Gupta said this facility will augment the company's liquidity position and further strengthen the asset liability management position across buckets.
PNB Housing said that during the current financial year, it has so far mobilised nearly Rs 27,000 crore through long-term sources.
This includes Rs 6,379 crore through fixed deposits, Rs 5,899 crore through securitisation (direct assignment route), Rs 3,000 crore through NCDs, Rs 1,211 crore ($ 175 million) through ECBs and balance in the form of bank facilities, the company said.
"Correspondingly, during the period, we have also significantly cut down our dependency on Commercial Paper to around 5 per cent of total resources as of current date. In addition to this company has a healthy pipeline of sanctioned lines which are under process of disbursement," it said further.
PNB Housing Finance Ltd


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text:
307 F. 2d 637 - Jenkins v. United States
307 F2d 637 Jenkins v. United States
113 U.S.App.D.C. 300
Vincent E. JENKINS, Appellant,
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
On Rehearing in Banc. Reargued Feb. 9, 1962.
Decided by Judgment Entered April 12, 1962, Opinion Rendered
Mr. Gerald Golin, Washington, D.C. (appointed by the District Court) for appellant.
Mr. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David C. Acheson, U.S. Atty., Charles T. Duncan, Principal Asst. U.S. Atty., and Harry T. Alexander, Asst. U.S. Atty., at the time the brief was filed, were on the brief, for appellee. Messrs. Nathan J. Paulson and David J. McTague, Asst. U.S. Attys., also entered appearances for appellee.
Messrs. Arthur B. Hanson, Dean Farrington Cochran and Samuel J. L'Hommedieu, Jr., Washington, D.C., filed a brief on behalf of American Psychological Association, as amicus curiae, urging reversal.
Mr. Warren E. Magee, Washington, D.C., filed a brief on behalf of American Psychiatric Association, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance.
Before WILBUR K. MILLER, Chief Judge, EDGERTON, PRETTYMAN, BAZELON, FAHY, WASHINGTON, DANAHER, BASTIAN and BURGER, Circuit Judges, sitting in banc.
BAZELON, Circuit Judge.
Appellant relied solely upon the defense of insanity in a jury trial which culminated in his conviction for housebreaking with intent to commit an assault, assault with intent to rape, and assault with a dangerous weapon. He alleges that the District Court erred in (1) determining his competency to stand trial, (2) excluding diagnostic opinions of two defense psychiatrists on the ground that their opinions were without 'proper basis,' (3) instructing the jury to disregard the testimony on three defense psychologists that appellant had a mental disease or defect on the ground that 'a psychologist is not competent to give a medical opinion as to a mental disease or defect,' and (4) depriving him of a fair trial by conducting a lengthy and disparaging examination of some expert witnesses.
I. The Facts
The record discloses the following pertinent information. After indictment, appellant was committed to the District General Hospital for a mental examination on September 4, 1959, to determine his competency to stand trial and his condition at the time of the alleged offense.1 Appellant was given a series of psychological tests on October 20 and 22, 1959, by staff psychologists under the supervision of the Chief Psychologist, Dr. Bernard I. Levy. Appellant scored 63, high moron, on the IQ. section of the tests. He was also interviewed three or four times by Dr. Richard Schaengold, Assistant Chief Psychiatrist. Appellant's test performance and his 'dullness and inability to relate correctly' led Dr. Schaengold to consider and reject the possibility of undifferentiated psychosis in favor of a diagnosis of mental defect: a basic, unchanging deficiency in brain function.2 His findings were confirmed by Dr. Mary V. McIndoo, District General's Chief Psychiatrist, on the basis of interviews on November 23, 24 and 25, and a review of appellant's history and test results. By letter of November 25, 1959, signed by Dr. Schaengold and countersigned by Dr. McIndoo, the District Court was advised that appellant was 'suffering from an organic brain defect resulting in mental deficiency and impaired judgment. He is, therefore, psychotic, incompetent, and incapable of participating in his own defense.' Appellant was adjudicated incompetent to stand trial on the basis of this report and was commited to 'Saint Elizabeths Hospital until he is mentally competent to stand trial pursuant to Title 24, Section 301, District of Columbia Code, 1951 Edition, as amended August 9, 1955.'
At St. Elizabeths, Dr. Lawrence Tirnauer, a staff psychologist, administered another battery of psychological tests on February 25 and March 2, 1960, in which appellant scored 74 on the I.Q. section. Dr. Tirnauer concluded that appellant was suffering from schizophrenia. Thereafter Dr. David J. Owens of St. Elizabeths interviewed appellant several times, 'probably (for) fifteen or twenty minutes,' and saw him at a staff conference on October 3, 1960. Dr. Owens found no evidence of mental disease or defect. He classified appellant as 'a borderline intelligence.' Dr. William G. Cushard, another psychiatrist at St. Elizabeths, who saw appellant at the staff conference, reviewed the test reports and agreed with Dr. Owens' findings. Dr. Margaret Ives, Chief Psychologist at St. Elizabeths, was also present at the staff conference. Subsequently, she reviewed Dr. Tirnauer's test results and appellant's past history and administered one part of a six-part Szondi profile test. She agreed with Dr. Tirnauer that appellant 'had a mental illness by name of schizophrenia.'
Ten days later, the Acting Superintendent of the Hospital notified the District Court that 'it has been determined that he (appellant) is, at this time, mentally competent to stand trial and to consult with counsel and assist properly in his own defense. He is not suffering from mental disease * * *. Although he is not suffering from mental deficiency, he has only borderline intelligence.' Upon appellant's objection to this report, the court conducted a hearing on November 4, 1960, wherein appellant was found competent and ordered to stand trial.
In preparation for their testimony at trial, Drs. McIndoo and Schaengold noted the later and different diagnosis and the apparent change in appellant's I.Q. reported by the St. Elizabeths psychologists. They requested Dr. Levy of their staff to re-test appellant in order to reconsider their diagnoses that he was mentally defective on June 10, 1959, the date of the alleged offenses. This time appellant scored 90 on the I.Q. test, an improvement inconsistent with mental defect. In reporting this result, Dr. Levy, who had previously been unable to make a diagnosis, concluded that upon review of all test data appellant 'ispsychotic and schizophrenic.' Considering this report in the light of the hospital record and 'reports' from St. Elizabeths, Drs. McIndoo and Schaengold revised their previous diagnoses without seeing appellant again. Dr. McIndoo concluded that appellant was schizophrenic, and Dr. Schaengold diagnosed his condition as undifferentiated psychosis.
II. Admissibility of the Psychiatrists' Opinions
The trial court, sua sponte, excluded the revised diagnoses of Drs. McIndoo and Schaengold and instructed the jury to disregard testimony of the three defense psychologists that appellant had a mental disease when he committed the crimes charged.
We discuss first the exclusion of Dr. Schengold's testimony. After questioning him at great length about the basis of his revised opinion, the court ruled: 'All I will allow is that in his opinion on June 10, 1959 (the date of the alleged offenses), the defendant was mentally defective'; it excluded Dr. Schaengold's later diagnosis of mental illness because 'there isn't any testimony here that is based on any proper evidence that he was suffering from a mental disease. I am not going to allow it on the basis of a report of a psychologist.' The court gave no further explanation.
The Government suggests that the ruling rests on the familiar principle that an expert witness' knowledge of 'basic facts' must be adequate to support his conclusion.3 It urges that the later psychological reports could not provide Dr. Schaengold with such information, 'absent a personal re-examination of appellant,' since thirteen months had elapsed between his personal examination of appellant and his revised diagnosis. The proposition seems to be that a psychiatric witness may not rely on pyschological test reports unless he has considered them in conjunction with a contemporaneous personal examination. We are aware of no authority for such a rigid and artificial stricture.4
Dr. Schaengold, whose expert qualifications were unquestioned, testified that he could arrive at a valid diagnosis on the basis of an earlier examination and later test reports. The court must be deemed to have rejected this statement. We find no basis for such action. We think it clear that Dr. Schaengold's ability to make the revised diagnosis without conducting a personal re-examination presents a question for the consideration of the jury, under appropriate instructions, in assessing the weight of his testimony and not a question for the court upon which it may rest exclusion of the diagnosis as a matter of law.
It is at least as likely, however, that the court predicated its ruling on cases which bar an expert's opinion based upon facts not in evidence unless it is derived solely from his own observations.5 But we agree with the leading commentators6 that the better reasoned authorities admit opinion testimony based, in part, upon reports of others which are not in evidence but which the expert customarily relies upon in the practice of his profession.7 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has forcefully stated the policy underlying the application of this rule to medical testimony:
'In order to say that a psysician, who has actually used the result of * * * tests in a diagnosis * * * may not testify what that diagnosis was, the court must deliberately shut its eyes to a source of information which is relied on by mankind generally in matters that involve the health and may involve the life of their families and of themselves-- a source of information that is essential that the court should possess in order that it may do justice between these parties litigant.
'This court * * * will not close the doors of the courts to the light which is given by a diagnosis which all the rest of the world accepts and acts upon, even if the diagnosis is in part based upon facts which are not established by the sworn testimony in the case to be true' (Sundquist v. Madison Ry., 197 Wis. 83, 221 N.W. 392, 393 (1928).)
The record in this case confirms the wellknown practice of psychiatrists of relying upon psychologists' reports in aid of diagnosis.8 And it shows that Dr. Schaengold's changed diagnosis did not rest solely on the later test reports which were not in evidence when he testified,9 but also upon his own earlier examination.10 This diagnosis was 'the type of clinical opinion he is accustomed to form and to rely upon in the practice of his profession. * * * Though (his) conclusions were not mathematically demonstrable certainties, neither were they mere conjectures, suspicions or hunches.' Blunt v. United States, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 266, 275, 244 F.2d 355, 364 (1957).
It follows from the foregoing that the court's sua sponte exclusion of Dr. Schaengold's testimony concerning his changed diagnosis was error.11 Since the exclusion was clearly prejudicial, the conviction must be reversed for a new trial.12
Appellant also objects to the similar exclusion of Dr. McIndoo's revised diagnosis. She testified that the later tests induced her to change her opinion. But when the court, in very extensive questioning, made clear its view barring reliance upon psychological test reports, she stated that she 'did not have a medical opinion about the new diagnosis.' At one point she said, 'I'm strictly confused now.' Later the following occurred:
THE COURT: Would you express an opinion as to a person's mental condition on the basis of a report given to you by a psychologist?
THE WITNESS: I do, Your Honor, very frequently.
THE COURT: Without even seeing the patient?
THE WITNESS: In most cases I do see the patient. This person I had seen. He was showing certain signs and symptoms. I made a wrong diagnosis. The suggested diagnosis from a psychologist explains my wrong diagnosis.
Since the new trial required by the exclusion of Dr. Schaengold's testimony will afford an opportunity for clarification of Dr. McIndoo's testimony in light of our earlier discussion, we think it unwise to engage in the speculation required to resolve the meaning of her testimony at the trial under review. Hence we refrain from deciding whether the court erred in excluding her opinion.
III. Admissibility of the Psychologists' Opinions
The next assignment of error we discuss concerns the court's instruction to the jury to disregard testimony of three defense psychologists that appellant had a mental disease when he committed the crimes charged. Although appellant failed to object to this instruction, we consider it because it presents a question which is likely to arise upon a new trial.13
The first psychologist, Dr. Tirnauer, administered a battery of tests to appellant, studied his case history, and concluded he had been suffering from schizophrenia when he committed the crimes. In his opinion, the disease and the crimes were 'related.' The second psychologist, Dr. Margaret Ives, had reviewed Dr. Tirnauer's test results, had seen appellant at a staff conference, and had administered part of a Szondi profile test. She stated that appellant was suffering from schizophrenia and that his crimes were the product of the disease. The third psychologist, Dr. Levy, interpreted test results obtained by members of the District General staff in October 1959, and administered two additional tests shortly before trial. He testified that defendant had been suffering from schizophrenia on June 10, 1959, but could give no opinion concerning the relationship between the illness and the crimes. At the conclusion of the trial the court instructed the jury:
'A psychologist is not competent to give a medical opinion as to a mental disease or defect. Therefore, you will not consider any evidence to the effect that the defendant was suffering from a mental disease or a mental defect on June 10, 1959, according to the testimony given by the psychologists.'
The trial court apparently excluded these opinions because psychologists lack medical training. We agree with the weight of authority, however, that some psychologists are qualified to render expert testimony in the field of mental disorder.14
We begin by placing this problem in the context of the considerations governing the reception of expert testimony.
'An observer is qualified to testify because he has firsthand knowledge which the jury does not have of the situation or transaction at issue. The expert has something different to contribute. This is a power to draw inferences from the facts which a jury would not be competent to draw. To warrant the use of expert testimony, then, two elements are required. First, the subject of the inference must be so distinctively related to some science, profession, business or occupation as to be beyond the ken of the average layman, and second, the witness must have such skill, knowledge or experience in that field or calling as to make it appear that his opinion or inference will probably aid the trier in his search for truth. The knowledge may in some fields be derived from reading alone, in some from practice alone, or as is more commonly the case, from both. (McCormick, Evidence 13 (1954), citing authorities.)'
The test, then, is whether the opinion offered will be likely to aid the trier in the search for truth. In light of that purpose, it is hardly surprising that courts do not exclude all but the very best kind of witness. See 2 Wigmore, Evidence 569 (3d ed. 1940). Accord: Fightmaster v. Mode, 31 Ohio App. 273, 167 N.E. 407 (1928). Thus a general practitioner may testify concerning matters within a medical specialty if his education or experience, or both, involves demonstrable knowledge of the subject. Sher v. DeHaven, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 257, 199 F.2d 777, 36 A.L.R.2d 937 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 936, 73 S.Ct. 797, 97 L.Ed. 1363 (1953); 2 Wigmore, op. cit. supra. Nor need a skilled witness on a medical subject be duly licensed to practice medicine. Ibid. The general rule is that 'anyone who is shown to have special knowledge and skill in diagnosing and treating human ailments is qualified to testify as an expert, if his learning and training show that he is qualified to give an opinion on the particular question at issue.' 'It is not essential that the witness be a medical practitioner.' 32 C.J.S. Evidence 537 (1942). Thus, non-medical witnesses who have had experience in electrical work may testify to the effects of electrical shock upon the human body. Vessels v. Kansas City Light & Power Co., 219 S.W. 80 (Mo.Sup.Ct.1920); Blakeney v. Alabama Power Co., 222 Ala. 394, 133 So. 16 (1931). Optometrists, whose training includes instruction in the symptoms of certain eye diseases, may testify to the presence of cataract discovered in the course of fitting glasses, Jackson v. Waller, 126 Conn. 294, 10 A.2d 763 (1940), and to the effect of a scar upon vision. Black Starr Coal Corp. v. Reeder, 278 Ky. 532, 128 S.W.2d 905 (1939). A toxicologist has been permitted to testify to the effect of oxalic acid, a poison, upon the human eye. Reynolds v. Davis, 55 R.I. 206, 179 A. 613 (1935). The kinds of witnesses whose opinions courts have received, even though they lacked medical training and would not be permitted by law to treat the conditions they described, are legion. The principle to be distilled from the cases is plain: if experience or training enables a proffered expert witness to form an opinion which would aid the jury, in the absence of some countervailing consideration, his testimony will be received.
Suggesting the diagnostic category into which an accused's condition fits, and relating it to his past behavior require skill far in excess of that possessed by laymen. Lest the jury be misled into relying on opinions which are not based upon relevant learning and experience, we must examine the reality behind the title 'psychologist.' Many psychologists may not qualify to testify concerning mental disease or defect. Their training and experience may not provide an adequate basis for their testimony. Some psychologists, for example, teach and engage in theoretical research in fields unrelated to the diagnosis and treatment of mental disease. Others are employed in personnel administration, still others advise industry on problems of employee morale. See Western Personnel Institute, Opportunities for Psychologists, Psychiatrists, Psychiatric Social Workers 8-10 (1958); Daniel and Louttit, Professional Problems in Psychology 250-52, 297 (1953). Such experience does not ordinarily provide the skill essential to offer expert testimony concerning mental disorders. Cf. Albee, Mental Health Manpower Trends 116 (1959). Some psychologists, moreover, have had no post-graduate instruction. Id. at 121-22.
On the other hand, the Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology involves some-- and often much-- training and experience in the diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders. Typically, candidates are trained, inter alia, in general psychology, theory of personality and psychodynamics, psychopathology, diagnostic methods, therapeutic techniques, selected aspects of physiology and anatomy, and clinical methods. A one-year internship in a mental hospital is required for this degree.15 After graduation, many clinical psychologists administer and interpret diagnostic tests which elicit the patient's intellectual level, defenses, personality structure, attitudes, feelings, thought and perceptual processes. See 1 Rapaport, Diagnostic Testing 7-9 (1945). In many institutions and clinics their reports, which regularly include opinions concerning the presence or absence of mental disease or defect,16 are important aids to psychiatrists who customarily have the final responsibility for diagnosis. Some psychologists, moreover, regularly administer psychotherapy and related non-organic therapies in the treatment of certain types of mental disorders.17
The determination of a psychologist's competence to render an expert opinion based on his findings as to the presence or absence of mental disease or defect must depend upon the nature and extent of his knowledge. It does not depend upon his claim to the title 'psychologist.' And that determination, after hearing,18 must be left in each case to the traditional discretion of the trial court subject to appellate review.19 Although there are no statutory criteria for licensing psychologists in the District of Columbia to assist trial courts,20 the American Psychological Association's list of approved graduate training programs provides some guidance. When completion of such training is followed by actual experience in the treatment and disagnosis of disease in association with psychiatrists or neurologists, the opinion of the psychologist may properly be received in evidence.
Some graduate clinical psychologists, moreover, are certified by the American Board of Examiners in Professional Psychology.21 Certification, which indicates exceptional professional competence, is awarded upon completion of written and oral examinations in, inter alia, diagnosis and treatment.22 Applicants must have four years, acceptable professional experience and must present credentials, including a sample of their work and letters of recommendation, showing sufficient professional achievement to warrant further examination.23 The purpose of Board certification is to identify and evaluate psychologists at an advanced professional level. If the postdoctoral experience required for certification has included substantial experience in a hospital or clinical setting in association with psychiatrists or neurologists, clinical psychologists who are diplomates of the American Board of Examiners in Professional Psychology should ordinarily qualify as expert witnesses.
We need not decide whether the three psychologists who testified for the defense at the trial under review were qualified to offer expert opinions since they may not be called to testify at the retrial.24 We hold only that the lack of a medical degree, and the lesser degree of responsibility for patient care which mental hospitals usually assign to psychologists, are not automatic disqualifications. Where relevant, these matters may be shown to affect the weight of their testimony, even though it be admitted in evidence. The critical factor in respect to admissibility is the actual experience of the witness and the probable probative value of his opinion. The trial judge should make a finding in respect to the individual qualifications of each challenged expert. Qualifications to express an opinion on a given topic are to be decided by the judge alone.25 The weight to be given any expert opinion admitted in evidence by the judge is exclusively for the jury.26 They should be so instructed.
IV. Competency to Stand Trial
Another ground urged for reversal is that the November 4 order adjudicating appellant competent to stand trial was not authorized by D.C.Code 24-301(b). That section provides, in substance, that when an accused person 'is restored to mental competency' and when the hospital superintendent so certifies, the court may enter an adjudication of competence 'unless the accused or the Government objects, in which event, the court, after hearing without a jury, shall make a judicial determination of the competency of the accused to stand trial.' Emphasis supplied. Here, the Superintendent did not certify that appellant's competency had been 'restored' but rather that appellant 'is, at this time, mentally competent.' Upon appellant's objection, the court conducted a hearing in which Dr. David J. Owens, a hospital psychiatrist, testified that appellant was not a mental defective, and that there was no indication of organic brain injury or mental illness. His testimony clearly implied that appellant had been competent when committed. Appellant presented no evidence, and the court adjudicated him 'mentally competent to stand trial.'
Appellant contends that the statute applies only to cases of 'restored competency' and cannot be invoked, as here, to set aside an original adjudication of incompetency. He argues that an adjudication of 'restored competency' was precluded by the evidence at the hearing which showed only that appellant's condition was unchanged.
Clearly the determination of appellant's eligibility to stand trial may be established by a finding of 'restored competency' or a finding that he never was incompetent. Assuming, arguendo, as appellant implies, that a proceeding to set aside the original adjudication of incompetency is required, we think the substance of such proceeding was provided by the hearing conducted below. Appellant does not claim that he was surprised or otherwise prejudiced by the Government's evidence that he never was incompetent.
Appellant's remaining contention concerns the conduct of the trial court in questioning certain expert witnesses. Since this issue may not arise upon the new trial, we do not consider it.
The judgment of conviction is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.27
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.28
FAHY, Circuit Judge (concurring).
Having Joined in the opinion issued October 26, 1961, reversing and remanding for a new trial, I join now in similar action taken by the court after rehearing en banc. I concur generally in the opinion, adding the qualifications to be stated.
While, strictly speaking, it is not necessary, as the present opinion states, to decide whether the three psychologists who testified for the defense at the trial were qualified to offer expert opinions, since they may not be called to testify at the retrial, it would be altogether appropriate to pass upon their qualifications on the record before us; for the record is here for our review of the rulings of the District Court in excluding their testimony. Upon the reasoning of both the original and the present opinions, considered with the facts, I would hold that these witnesses were qualified. A ruling to that effect now would be useful to the District Court.
The main feature of the present opinion, however, is its holding that psychologists may qualify as experts on the question of mental disease or defect under the standards set forth in the opinion. I am in entire agreement with this, which was the gist of the opinion of the division prior to the rehearing en banc.
I am authorized to say that Judges EDGERTON and WASHINGTON join in the views above expressed.
BURGER, Circuit Judge (concurring).
I concur in the remand because the court's basic holding that a psychologist is not barred as a matter of law from giving expert testimony about mental diseases makes it essential that we have a comprehensive record before us on the education and training of psychologists in general and clinical psychologists in particular. This is emphasized by recalling that appellant's entire case in this court, including his oran argument, was based on matter outside the record in the form of recitals of what various writers thought on the subject of whether, and to what extent, psychologists should be permitted to testify relating to mental disease. Similarly the majority opinion relies largely on 'the literature.' The literature cited and relied on by the appellant, and indeed by the majority opinion originally, was and is now a series of references selected to support one or the other point of view. They were not developed in the record by an adversary process or subjected to adversary examination. The reason we now remand is to have a record made in an orderly way and in that process authoritative texts, or parts thereof, may well be offered and received, subject, of course, to the established rules of evidence.
At the outset certain factors should be kept in mind. The issue is not now and never was whether a psychologist's testimony is admissible in litigation where 'sanity' is in issue. Such testimony has long been admissible in the form of psychological tests and the analysis and explanation of such tests by a psychologist. No one doubts that such matter is admissible. The real issue in dispute is whether the clinical psychologists in this case, by which we mean persons having degrees of Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology, and also additional training as clinical psychologists, are competent in a scientific sense and hence legally qualified
(1) to make a diagnosis of the existence and character of a mental disease, and
(2) whether there is a causal relation-ship between a disease and an unlawful act.
The issue can be stated also in terms of whether medical opinions and medical diagnoses can be made by and be the subject of expert testimony by a Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology with added clinical experience. For convenience I will hereafter refer to such a psychologist as a Clinical Psychologist.
While the issue is new to this court it is not new to medicine and psychiatry. In 1954 a Resolution was adopted by the American Medical Association, the Council of the American Psychiatric Association and the Executive Council of the American Psychoanalytical Association to the effect that psychologists and other related professional groups were autonomous and independent in matters where medical questions were not involved, but that where diagnosis and treatment of mental illness was involved the participation of psychologists 'must be co-ordinated under medical responsibility.'1 This Resolution, while not controlling on the courts is plainly entitled to great weight.
My difficulty with the opinion of the majority, as distinguished from the remand for additional evidence, is that it fails to give adequate guidance as to the scope and nature of the inquiry to be conducted by the trial judge on remand. I agree that it is entirely within the discretion of the District Court whether he should conduct the hearing out of the presence of the jury. In this particular case, since this is an exploratory process, there are probably valid practical reasons to hold the hearing out of the presence of the jury although once we resolve the basic problem, that process would not be necessary in future cases.
As I see it, the hearing to be conducted in this case will be somewhat unusual because of the nature of the question and the need for a comprehensive record of testimony. The practical reason for conducting this particular hearing out of the presence of the jury is that the hearing could well take several days. It is not a question which can be resolved simply by examination of the particular psychologists whose testimony is offered. The preliminary hearing on qualifications will be enlarged if the District Judge allows, as he might well do, participation by the several amici curiae, who are highly qualified to be of aid to the court. That would be a dubious process for every future case but entirely appropriate for this case. We have said that the conduct of the hearing lies in the sound discretion of the trial judge. But it is not enough to say that it is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and at the same time fail to reflect just what we are driving at.
We must bear in mind that there is a difference between the holdings 'that some psychologists are qualified to render expert testimony in the field of mental disorder' (see note 14 majority opinion) and the question of a psychologist's competence to make a diagnosis of mental disease. The former proposition is, as we have noted, widely accepted; the latter is not-- and it is the latter we are now exploring.
On remand I assume broad areas are to be explored and should be explored in order to give the trial judge, in the first instance, and this court if need be, an evidentiary basis and a record on which to act. As I see it, remand hearing ought to cover among other things the following:
(a) The scope, nature and extent of the education of a Ph.D. in Psychology and in Clinical Psychology, including time spent in hospitals, with patients, and under what supervision.
(1) What is the education, training and clinical experience of the proffered witness?
(2) Define for the record the term 'clinical experience.'
(b) What, in particular, is the extent and scope of this Clinical Psychologist's clinical education in physiological and medical subjects? How does it compare with that of a psychiatrist?
(c) What is the scope of the work of Clinical Psychologists at St. Elizabeths Hospital?2
(1) Do they make diagnosis of mental diseases on their own independent responsibility or only subject to the supervision of a psychiatrist? The relationship should be developed fully.
(2) What is the scope of the work and extent of clinical responsibility of the particular Clinical Psychologist with patients independent of psychiatrists? That is, what work is done fully by the Clinical Psychologist chologist alone and without regard to any supervision or overseeing by a psychiatrist?
(d) In how many specific cases has the particular Clinical Psychologist made a diagnosis of mental disease, prescribed or supervised treatment of patients without the intervention or approval of a psychiatrist?
(e) In how many cases approximately (whether at St. Elizabeths or elsewhere) has the witness made a diagnosis of the existence or nonexistence of mental disease and communicated that diagnosis directly to the patient or patient's family independent of a psychiatrist?
(f) To what extent has the witness prescribed or supervised treatment of mental patients independent of a psychiatrist?
(g) The opinions of both psychiatrists and clinical psychologists ought to be made part of the record on the following:
(1) In what kinds or categories of mental disease are the physiologican and medical factors not of any consequence?
(2) In what categories does a diagnosis of mental disease involve analysis, understanding and synthesis of physical and physiological factors as well as psychological factors?
(3) If diagnosis of mental disease always involves consideration of or evaluation of physical, biological or physiological data, how does a clinical psychologist acquire clinical experience and scientific competence to make such diagnosis?
(4) What is a differential diagnosis in the context of diagnosis of mental disease?
(5) Is the process of diagnosis of mental disease the elimination of various alternative explanations?
(6) In this process what factors must be taken into account?
(7) In the process of eliminating alternative explanations do the medical history of the patient, the physical examination and various medical tests play a part?
(8) Can any mental disease be diagnosed without taking into account pathological data? If so, what mental diseases can be diagnosed independent of and without regard to pathological data?
The cases cited by the majority concerning the optometrist, the toxicologist and other skilled specialists who are not medical doctors are not in any real sense relevant. Indeed they tend to divert us from the central issue. Of course an optometrist or the toxicologist is permitted to give some expert testimony within his competence just as a skilled shoemaker might be qualified to testify from long observation and experience as to the effect of wearing certain kinds of shoes, or a farrier to give expert testimony about the effect of certain types of shoeing on horses.
The heart of our problem is not whether a clincical psychologist is qualified to testify as an expert, for of course he is in some areas, but whether he is qualified to give expert testimony in the form of a diagnosis of a mental disease or illness, and to express an opinion on whether a stated mental disease 'caused' the patient to commit a given unlawful act or 'produced' that act. More rationally the question ought to be whether mental disease so substantially affected him that he was unable to control his conduct.
I agree with the majority that the scope of the training of the psychologist is of critical importance and that many factors other than academic degrees go to the admissibility and weight of the expert testimony. For example, if a general medical practitioner testified on the subject of mental disease, and gave a diagnosis of presence or absence of mental illness in opposition to a trained psychiarist it would obviously be proper for the trial judge to tell the jury they could take into account the differences in training and experience in weighing the testimony of the one against the other. In the same way it would be proper, if a clinical psychologist is found qualified to testify as to the presence or absence of a mental disease and does so in opposition to a psychiatrist, to tell the jury they could take into account the difference in the education, training and experience of psychologists and psychiatrists and the absence of medical training in the former.
BASTIAN, Circuit Judge, with whom WILBUR K. MILLER, Chief Judge, joins, dissenting.
In the early morning of June 10, 1959, the complaining witness was in her apartment alone, in the process of getting ready to go to work that day, when she heard a knock at her front door and, upon partially opening it, she found herself face to face with the appellant. He showed her a card, saying something about an address. Then he suddenly burst into the apartment, knocked her to the floor, stuffed a gag into her mouth, and informed her he was going to rape her. When she began to fight back at her attacker, kicking and scratching at him as best as she could, he proceeded to punch her into unconsciousness with his fists. When she regained consciousness, she found herself lying on her apartment floor, disheveled, badly beaten, and bleeding profusely. She had been stabbed with a sharp instrument, presumably a knife, a number of times, causing severe loss of blood and necessitating subsequent surgery. As a result of this ordeal she remained hospitalized for approximately six weeks. In the District Court, a jury convicted appellant of housebreaking, assault with intent to commit rape, and assault with a dangerous weapon.
In reversing this conviction, the majority of this court, without adquately discussing the real nature and present medical understanding of mental illness, hold inter alia that certain psychologists can qualify to give expert opinion concerning the existence vel non of a mental disease or defect and its connective relationship, if any, to criminal behavior. We cannot agree. In our opinion it should be an absolute condition precedent to expert testimony as to a medical diagnosis that the witness be a medical doctor.
In the first place, we think it must be concluded beyond doubt that the existence of a mental disease or defect is, first and foremost, a medical problem. The ascertainment of such a medical illness in a given individual with reference to kind, quality, degree and influence is, except in extreme cases, a highly unverifiable process, judged by any objective standard, even when undertaken by a medical doctor with years of special training in the detection of medical disturbances of the mind. Time and time again, where insanity is raised as a defense at the trial of criminal cases in this jurisdiction, sincere and experienced psychiatrists have taken the stand and voiced diametrically opposite opinions as to whether or not the defendant had a mental disease or defect at the time he committed the crime charged against him. And even when these psychiatrists are in some agreement that the defendant had a mental disease or defect at the time of the crime, they frequently differ widely concerning its symptoms, nature, intensity, and causal influence with respect to the offense committed.
Our emphasis of this situation is not to belittle the integrity of the psychia trists who testify at these trials, nor to disparage the integrity of the psychiatric profession, but merely to illustrate how nebulous and uncertain is the issue of mental illness even to those of the medical profession who are experienced and trained in its diagnosis and treatment. If the issue is so debatable among conceded professional medical experts, it is sheer folly, in our opinion, to attribute to a lay psychologist, who admittedly is not a doctor of medicine, such presumptive medical knowledge and diagnostic acuity as to entitle him to wear in a criminal courtroom the badge of an expert witness with respect to the existence of that elusive medical condition known as mental disease or defect.
By this we do not mean to suggest that a psychologist should never be called upon to testify in insanity cases. In proper circumstances, testimony concerning the results of psychological tests administered to a defendant should be admissible as a means of enlightening a jury with respect to the specific information contributed by the psychologist to the over-all mass of information ultimately utilized by the medically trained psychiatrist in arriving at an expert opinion concerning the medical diagnosis of mental disease or defect. But to say that a psychologist is qualified to give an expert opinion with reference to a medical diagnosis is, in effect, to say that a non-medical witness can render an expert answer to a medical question on the strength of information insufficient to resolve it.1 Such an opinion is a conclusion by guesswork, as far as a valid and proper medical determination is concerned.
We are not alone in our views on this precise issue. The American Psychiatric Association, an organization 'comprised of those twelve thousand qualified Doctors of Medicine who specialize and practice as psychiatrists,' in its amicus curiae brief, urges this court not to allow psychologists to qualify as experts to express opinions. We find in the brief this pertinent observation in regard to the proper medical ascertainment of mental disease or defect:
'The diagnostic synthesis of all data collected is properly carried out only by an individual Doctor of Medicine with a broad training, experience, and familiarity with all of the areas indicated, and the diagnosis must reflect a comprehensive medical judgment in which the proper weight is given to all of the data available. Further, we know of no mental illness which does not have a biological as well as a psychological component. No facet of the data can be assumed to reflect the total diagnosis until viewed in the context of the total picture. A clinical psychologist, lacking medical training and the specialization required of the qualified psychiatrist, is not qualified to make this total medical diagnosis or to testify as a medical expert thereon.'
The majority of the court ignores the above quoted wise counsel from the only undisputed experts now at work in the area of medical illness of the mind. In doing so, the court, we suggest, is bypassing all objective criteria in reaching the highly questionable and subjective conclusion that lay psychologists, whose opinions are predicated on the basis of test results, may qualify as experts on the medical question of the diagnosis of mental disease or defect, as well as experts concerning the causal relationship between a particular defendant's mental abnormality, as such may be 'diagnosed' by these psychologists, and that defendant's criminal activity. in our opinion, the holding of the majority on this issue is wholly untenable. We would affirm the judgment and sentence of the District Court.
See generally Winn v. United States, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 133, 270 F.2d 326 (1959)
Durham v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 228, 241, 214 F.2d 862, 875, 45 A.L.R.2d 1430 (1954)
Toho Bussan Kaisha, Ltd. v. American Pres. Lines, Ltd., 265 F.2d 418, 76 A.L.R.2d 1344 (2d Cir. 1959); Haug v. Grimm, 251 F.2d 523 (8th Cir. 1958). The Government cites United States v. Alker, 260 F.2d 135, 155 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 906, 79 S.Ct. 579, 3 L.Ed.2d 571 (1959), where the proposition appears as dictum
The Government's reliance upon Blunt v. United States, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 266, 275, 244 F.2d 355, 364 (1957); and Carter v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 227, 236, 252 F.2d 608, 617 (1957), is misplaced since our discussion of the absence of detailed testimony concerning the underlying basis for the psychiatrists' opinions related to the weight of the testimony and not its admissibility.
Cf. Williams v. United States, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 277, 278, 261 F.2d 743, 744 (1958), where we held that a new trial would be required if appellant could establish his allegations concerning newly discovered evidence of changed psychiatric opinion 'without additional examination of appellant.'
E.g., People v. Black, 367 Ill. 209, 10 N.E.2d 801 (1937) (alternative holding); Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Kazee, 257 Ky. 803, 79 S.W.2d 208 (1935) (dictum). See generally McCormick, Evidence 15 (1955)
McCormick, Evidence 15 (1955). See 3 Wigmore, Evidence 688 (3d ed. 1940)
Taylor v. Monongahela Ry., 155 F.Supp. 601, 604 (W.D.Pa.1957), aff'd per curiam, 256 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1958); Sundquist v. Madison Ry., 197 Wis. 83, 221 N.W. 392 (1928); Schooler v. State, 175 S.W.2d 664 (Tex.Civ.App.1943)
Hidden v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 217 F.2d 818, 821 (4th Cir. 1954); Scheflen, The Psychologist as a Witness, 32 Pa.Bar Ass'n Q. 329, 333 (1961). See McDonald, Psychiatry and the Criminal 162 (1958)
Such reliance would amount to offering an opinion of another in violation of the hearsay rule. Cf. McCormick, Evidence 15 (1955)
Dr. Schaengold testified that he considered undifferentiated psychosis a possibility when he first examined appellant. The improvement in appellant's I.Q. scores was inconsistent with mental defect, and induced Dr. Schaengold to abandon that diagnosis in favor of undifferentiated psychosis which was consistent both with his earlier clinical observations and the later test reports. An opinion so formulated is admissible. Cf. Williams v. United States, supra note 4. Any infirmity arising out of Dr. Schaengold's failure to re-examine appellant would go to the weight and not to the admissibility of his opinion. Cf. Brill v. Mushinsky, 90 U.S.App.D.C. 132, 194 F.2d 158 (1952)
See Hidden v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra note 8; Watts v. State, 223 Md. 268, 164 A.2d 334 (1960) (alternative ground)
In holding Dr. Schaengold's testimony admissible, we do not intimate approval of his failure to re-examine appellant. Compare Winn v. United States, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 133, 270 F.2d 326 (1959); Carter v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 227, 236, 252 F.2d 608, 617 (1957); Blunt v. United States, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 266, 275, 244 F.2d 355, 364 (1957)
Villaroman v. United States, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 240, 184 F.2d 261, 21 A.L.R.2d 1074 (1950)
See Hidden v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra note 8; Watson v. State, 161 Tex.Cr.R. 5, 273 S.W.2d 879 (1954), rev'd on other grounds on rehearing. People v. Hawthorne, 293 Mich. 15, 291 N.W. 205 (1940) (dictum); State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 347 P.2d 312, 78 A.L.R.2d 908, (1959) (dictum). See generally, Scheflen, supra note 8; Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World, 39 Minn.L.Rev. 235 (1955)
See Report of the Committee on Training in Clinical Psychology of the American Psychological Association, in 2 Am. Psychol. 539, 543-58 (1947). The Association certifies only those programs meeting the standards laid down in this report
Scheflen, supra note 8
See Clark, America's Psychologists 188-205 (1957). See also Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Mental Health, Action for Mental Health 244-50 (1961)
The court may conduct this hearing in the presence of the jury unless special circumstances warrant its exclusion
Cf. Pollard v. Hawfield, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 374, 170 F.2d 170 (1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 909, 69 S.Ct. 514, 93 L.Ed. 1073 (1949). Compare State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 347 P.2d 312, 78 A.L.R.2d 908 (1959). See also McDonald, supra note 8
The qualification of a particular witness to testify as an expert is largely within the domain of the trial judge. Particular inquiries which may be appropriate in some cases may be inappropriate in others. The majority of this court think the matter should be left to the sound judicial discretion of the trial judge, with no more specific guidance than is contained in this opinion.
Such statutes are in force in several states. See, e.g., Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. 20-188 to 20-191 (1930); Md.Ann.Code Art. 43 618-620, 629-636 (1957); Mich.Stat.Ann. 14.677(3)-14.677(11) (Supp.1959), Pub.Acts 1959, No. 257
Kelley, Sanford & Clark, The Meaning of the ABEPP Diploma, 16 Am.Psychol. 132-34 (1961). Prior to 1949, the Board waived the Ph.D. or examination requirements, or both, if a candidate was judged qualified on the basis of training, professional experience and his colleagues' endorsements. Id. at 132
Id. at 134, 138
Id. at 134
The trial judge might have concluded that one or more of the three defense psychologists were competent to testify as experts. All are clinical psychologists; all hold doctoral degrees from institutions approved by the American Psychological Association; all are associated with psychiatrists and neurologists in a hospital setting in the diagnosis and treatment of mental illness. Two were chief psychologists at the hospitals where they were employed, and the third had diagnosed more than a hundred patients during his three years at St. Elizabeths
Sher v. De Haven, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 257, 199 F.2d 777, 36 A.L.R.2d 937 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 936, 73 S.Ct. 797, 97 L.Ed. 1363 (1953)
O'Donnell v. Geneva Metal Wheel Co., 183 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 903, 71 S.Ct. 612, 65 L.Ed. 1342 (1951)
See note 19 supra
The retirement of Senior Circuit Judge Prettyman became effective April 16, 1962. Prior thereto he concurred in the foregoing opinion and joined in the judgment entered April 12, 1962
The Resolution in full is as follows:
'For centuries the Western world has placed on the medical profession responsibility for the diagnosis and treatment of illness. Medical practice acts have been designed to protect the public from unqualified practitioners and to define the special responsibilities assumed by those who practice the healing art, for much harm may be done by unqualified persons, however good their intentions may be. To do justice to the patient requires the capacity to make a diagnosis and to prescribe appropriate treatment. Diagnosis often requires the ability to compare and contrast various diseases and disorders that have similar symptoms but different causes. Diagnosis is a continuing process, for the character of the illness changes with its treatment or with the passage of time, and that treatment which is appropriate may change accordingly.
'Recognized medical training today involves, as a minimum, graduation from an approval medical school and internship in a hospital. Most physicians today receive additional medical training, and specialization requries still further training.
'Psychiatry is the medical specialty concerned with illness that has chiefly mental symptoms. The psychiatrist is also concerned with mental causes of physical illness, for we have come to recognize that physical symptoms may have mental causes just as mental symptoms may have physical causes. The psychiatrist, with or without consultation with other physicians, must select from the many different methods of treatment at his disposal those methods that he considers appropriate to the particular patient. His treatment may be medicinal or surgical, physical (as electroshock) or psychological. The systematic application of the methods of psychological medicine to the treatment of illness, particularly as these methods involved gaining an understanding of the emotional state of the patient and aiding him to understand himself, is called psychotherapy. This special form of medical treatment may be highly developed, but it remains simply one of the possible methods of treatment to be selected for use according to medical criteria for use when it is indicated. Psychotherapy is a form of medical treatment and does not form the basis for a separate profession.
'Other professional groups such as psychologists, teachers, ministers, lawyers, social workers, and vocational counselors, of course, use psychological understanding in carrying out their professional functions. Members of these professional groups are not thereby practicing medicine. The application of psychological methods to the treatment of illness is a medical function. Any psysician may utilize the skills of others in his professional work, but he remains responsible, legally and morally, for the diagnosis and for the treatment of his patient.
'The medical profession fully endorses the appropriate utilization of the skills of psychologists, social workers, and other professional personnel in contributing roles in settings directly supervised by physicians. It further recognizes that these professions are entirely independent and autonomous when medical questions are not involved; but when members of these professions contribute to the diagnosis and treatment of illness, their professional contributions must be co-ordinated under medical responsibility.'
In this connection an obviously well qualified expert, who might well be called as a witness by the court, if he is not called by any party, is the Superintendent of St. Elizabeths Hospital who has presided over a staff of psychiatrists and clinical psychologists dealing with precisely the issues of criminal responsibility
It is well to remember that a psychologist's opinion in this respect is grounded basically upon his interpretation of the results of certain psychological tests administered to the defendant. As an example of the instability of such test result, we mention that in the instant case the appellant was subjected to the same I.Q. test on three separate occasions, scoring, respectively, 63 (high moron), 74 (borderline defective), and 90 (average)