text:
Philosophy of Pseudoscience: reconsidering the demarcation problem
by Massimo Pigliucci and Maarten Boudry
[My colleague Maarten Boudry and I have recently published a collection of essays by a number of philosophers, sociologists, historians of science and skeptics about the so-called "demarcation problem," the attempt to make sense of the complex landscape represented by science, pseudoscience, quasi-science, bad science and non-science. It was a fun project, and you can check the full results here. Below, just to wet your appetite a bit, I reprint the Introduction to the volume. Enjoy!]
Ever since Socrates, philosophers have been in the business of asking questions of the type "What is X?" The point has not always been to actually find out what X is, but rather to explore how we think about X, to bring up to the surface wrong ways of thinking about it, and hopefully in the process to achieve an increasingly better understanding of the matter at hand. In the early part of the twentieth century one of the most ambitious philosophers of science, Karl Popper, asked that very question in the specific case in which X = science. Popper termed this the "demarcation problem," the quest for what distinguishes science from nonscience and pseudoscience (and, presumably, also the latter two from each other).
As the first chapters in this collection explain, Popper thought he had solved the demarcation problem by way of his criterion of falsifiability, a solution that seemed very convincing when he compared the eminently falsifiable theory of general relativity with the equally unfalsifiable theory of psycho- analysis (Freudian or otherwise). Modern philosophers—made more wary by widespread appreciation of the issues raised in this context by the works of Pierre Duhem and W. V. O. Quine—have come to the conclusion that Popper was a bit too quick in declaring victory. They recognize that science is not a unified type of activity and that an ever-changing continuous landscape may connect it with nonscientific endeavors.
Nonetheless, the contributors to this volume also think that Larry Laudan's famous dismissal of the demarcation problem—almost three decades ago now—as an ill-conceived and even pernicious pseudoproblem, and of terms like "pseudoscience" as pieces of hollow rhetoric, was just as premature and misguided. Laudan may have forgotten Socrates' lesson: even if we do not arrive at a neat and exceptionless formal definition of some X, based on a small set of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, we may still come to learn a lot in the process. If we raise the bar for the demarcation project too high, settling for nothing less than a timeless and essential definition, a death pronouncement such as Laudan's is all too easy to make. As Daniel Dennett put it in Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life (1995), "nothing complicated enough to be really interesting could have an essence."
Philosophers and scientists readily recognize a pseudoscience when they see one. Of course, certain interesting borderline cases are hotly disputed among scientists and philosophers, but even Popper's notorious critic Thomas Kuhn acknowledged that, despite their philosophical differences about demarcation, both of them were in remarkable agreement about paradigmatic cases, as were most of their colleagues. To argue that philosophers can neither spell out which criteria we implicitly rely on to tell science from pseudoscience, nor are able to evaluate and further refine those criteria, would be to relinquish one of the most foundational tasks of philosophy (what is knowledge? how do we attain it?). For too long, philosophers have been dwelling over technical problems and exceptions to formal demarcation criteria, only to rashly conclude that the demarcation problem is dead and that there is no such thing as "pseudoscience." We think this is mistaken.
This volume testifies to a lively and constructive discussion about demarcationism among philosophers, sociologists, historians, and professional skeptics. By proposing something of a new philosophical subdiscipline, the Philosophy of Pseudoscience, we hope to convince those who have followed in Laudan's footsteps that the term "pseudoscience" does single out something real that merits our attention. A ballpark demarcation of pseudoscience—with a lot of blanks to be filled in—is not difficult to come up with: if a theory strays from the epistemic desiderata of science by a sufficiently wide margin while being touted as scientific by its advocates, it is justifiably branded as pseudoscience.
The nature of science and the difference between science and pseudo- science are crucial topics for philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science for two fundamental reasons. First, science is having an ever-increasing impact in modern society. Science commands much public attention and prestige; it is funded at very high levels by governments and the private sector; its departments take more and more space and resources on university campuses; and its products may be beneficial to human welfare or bring about great destruction on a scale never before imaginable. It is therefore of compel- ling interest to all of us to understand the nature of science, its epistemic foundations, its limits, and even its power structure—which, of course, is precisely what philosophy, history, and sociology of science are set up to do.
Second, and in a complementary way, we also need a philosophical (and historical and sociological) understanding of the phenomenon of pseudoscience. The lack of interest for pseudoscience in some philosophical quarters derives from the tacit assumption that some ideas and theories are so obviously wrong that they are not even worth arguing about. Pseudoscience is still too often considered a harmless pastime indulged in by a relatively small number of people with an unusual penchant for mystery worship. This is far from the truth. In the form of creationism and its challenges to the study of evolution, pseudoscience has done great damage to public education in the United States and elsewhere; it has swindled people of billions of dollars in the form of "alternative" medicine like homeopathy; it has caused a lot of emotional distress, for example, to people who are told by mystics and assorted charlatans that they can talk with their dead loved ones. Conspiracy theories about AIDS, which are widespread in many African countries and even in the United States, have literally killed countless human beings throughout the world. Denialism about climate change, which seems to be ineradicable in conservative political circles, may even help to bring about a worldwide catastrophe. Dangerous cults and sects such as Scientology, which are based on pseudoscientific belief systems, continue to attract followers and wreak havoc in people's lives. Even apart from the very real consequences of pseudoscience, we should pause to consider the huge amount of intellectual resources that are wasted in shoring up discredited theories like creationism, homeopathy, and psychoanalysis, not to mention the never-ending quest for evidence of the paranormal and the indefatigable activism of conspiracy theorists.
Pseudoscience can cause so much trouble in part because the public does not appreciate the difference between real science and something that masquerades as science. Pseudoscientists seem to win converts because of a combination of science parroting and of distrust of academic authorities, both of which appear to be particularly palatable to so many people. In addition, pseudoscience thrives because we have not fully come to grips yet with the cognitive, sociological, and epistemological roots of this phenomenon. This is why the demarcation problem is not only an exciting intellectual puzzle for philosophers and other scholars, but is one of the things that makes philosophy actually relevant to society. Philosophers, accordingly, do not just have a scholarly duty in this area, but ethical and social ones as well. For all these reasons, we asked some of the most prominent and original thinkers on science and pseudoscience to contribute to this edited volume. The result is a collection of twenty-four essays, grouped under six thematic sections, to help bring some order to a large, complex, and inherently interdisciplinary field.
In the first part on "the problem with the demarcation problem," Massimo Pigliucci assesses in some detail Laudan's objections to the research program and goes on to propose an approach based on a quantifiable ver- sion of Wittgensteinian family resemblance. In a similar vein, Martin Mahner suggests a cluster approach to demarcationism, drawing inspiration from the taxonomy of biological species, which does not yield to essentialist definitions either. James Ladyman deploys Harry Frankfurt's famous analysis of "bullshit" to highlight the difference between pseudoscience and straightforward scientific fraud. Sven Hansson recasts the demarcation problem in terms of epistemic warrant and proposes an approach that views science as unified on an epistemological level, while still accounting for diversity in its methods. Maarten Boudry tries to clear up some confusion between what he calls genuine demarcation (the science/pseudoscience boundaries) and the "territorial" demarcation between science and other epistemic fields (philosophy, mathematics).
The second part deals with the history and sociology of pseudoscience. Thomas Nickles gets things started with a brief but comprehensive his- tory of the demarcation problem, which leads into Daniel Thurs and Ronald Numbers's historical analysis of pseudoscience, which tracks down the coinage and currency of the term and explains its shifting meaning in tandem with the emerging historical identity of science. While we purposefully steered clear from the kind of sociology inspired by social constructivism and postmodernism—which we regard as a type of pseudodiscipline in its own right—sociologist Erich Goode provides an analysis of paranormalism as a "deviant discipline" violating the consensus of established science, while Noretta Koertge draws our attention to the characteristic social organization of pseudosciences as a means of highlighting the sociological dimension of the scientific endeavor.
The third part explores the territory marking the "borderlands" between science and pseudoscience. Carol Cleland and Sheralee Brindell deploy the idea of causal asymmetries in evidential reasoning to differentiate between what are sometime referred to as "hard" and "soft" sciences, and argue that misconceptions about this difference explain the higher incidence of pseudo- science and antiscience in the nonexperimental sciences. Professional skeptic of pseudoscience Michael Shermer looks at the demographics of pseudo- scientific belief and examines how the demarcation problem is treated in legal cases. In a surprising twist, Michael Ruse tells us of a time when the concept of evolution was in fact treated as pseudoscience and then popular science, before blossoming into a professional science, thus challenging a conception of demarcation in terms of timeless and purely formal principles.
Part 4, on science and the supernatural, begins with Evan Fales arguing that, contrary to recent philosophical arguments, the appeal to the supernatural should not be ruled out as science for methodological reasons, but rather because the notion of supernatural intervention probably suffers from fatal flaws. Meanwhile, Barbara Forrest enlists David Hume to help navigating the treacherous territory between science and religious pseudoscience and to assess the epistemic credentials of supernaturalism.
The fifth part of the volume focuses on the tactics deployed by "true believers" in pseudoscience, beginning with Jean Paul Van Bendegem's discussion of the ethics of argumentation about pseudoscience, followed by Jesper Jerkert's contention that alternative medicine can be evaluated scientifically— contra the immunizing strategies deployed by some of its most vocal supporters. Frank Cioffi, whose 2012 passing we mourn, summarizes his misgivings about Freudian psychoanalysis and argues that we should move beyond assessments of the testability and other logical properties of a theory, focusing instead on spurious claims of validation and other recurrent misdemeanors on the part of pseudoscientists. Donald Prothero describes the different strategies used by climate change "skeptics" and other denialists, outlining the links between new and "traditional" pseudosciences.
Finally, we close with a section examining the complex cognitive roots of pseudoscience. Stefaan Blancke and Johan De Smedt ask whether we actually evolved to be irrational, describing a number of evolved heuristics that are rational in ecologically relevant domains, but lead us astray in other contexts. Konrad Talmont-Kaminski explores the noncognitive functions of super- empirical beliefs and analyzes the different attitudes of science and pseudo- science toward intuitive beliefs. John Wilkins distinguishes between two mindsets about science and explores the cognitive styles relating to authority and tradition in both science and pseudoscience. Nicholas Shackel proposes that belief in pseudoscience may be partly explained in terms of idiosyncratic theories about the ethics of belief, and Filip Buekens ends the volume with a chapter on pseudohermeneutics and the illusion of understanding, drawing inspiration from the cognitive psychology and philosophy of intentional thinking.
This collection will certainly not represent the final word on the issue of demarcation. On the contrary, it is meant to renew and stimulate discussion in an area of philosophy of science that is both intrinsically interesting from an intellectual point of view and that, for once, can actually make philosophy directly relevant to people's lives.
Labels: demarcation projects, Massimo Pigliucci, pseudoscience
Thomas Jones August 29, 2013 9:09 AM
Thank you, Massimo. Glad to see it is available for both Kindle and Nook.
= MJA August 29, 2013 11:36 AM
Science is a dice game of uncertainty or probability and Nature is absolute. One day soon the grey area of demarcation dividing them will be vanished by light and mankind will unite with Nature via a single simple truth. Equal is the Way!
Randall August 29, 2013 1:54 PM
In my methods course, I spend a good deal of time covering the demarcation problem, what constitutes a paradigm and how they emerge, and the conduct of inquiry more generally. I'm excited to see this collection of essays come out. I've always wanted to offer a course on pseudoscience and the paranormal...just need to come up with a catchy course title like: "Ghosts, Goblins and Things that go Bump in the Night."
S Johnson August 29, 2013 6:42 PM
It is disappointing that the most relevant historical issue, scientific racism, doesn't seem to be addressed. Yes, the issue of genetic determinism also brings evolutionary psychology up as an issue for demarcation. It seems to me there are far too many pop science atrocities to ignore. Looking in another direction, is a study of demarcation issues that tackles psychoanalysis when religion-based therapies like Christian counseling, twelve-step programs, Focus on the Family, et al. are so vibrant, maybe even prevalent really delving into the relevant issues?
Unknown August 29, 2013 11:24 PM
Johnson,
I hear you, but this isn't an encyclopedia of pseudoscience. We left individual authors - wh have been thinking about demarcation for a while - pretty much complete freedom to pick whatever topic they wanted to write about.
Unknown August 30, 2013 1:51 AM
The difference between science and pseudoscience is apparently quite gray. Because if it were black and white, then there would be no "demarcation problem."
Do you think the so-called "professional skeptics" have a full appreciation for the demarcation problem?
Angela Kennedy August 30, 2013 1:59 PM
My answer would be 'no'.
Philip Thrift August 30, 2013 6:41 AM
At some approximation, there's a I know it when I see it aspect to what is pseudoscience. Intelligent Design comes to mind.
I agree with Paul Krugman that "Austrian School" economics is pseudoscience. He convinces me, anyway.
Isn't evolution theory a creation theory of intelligent design? =
Some argue that - perhaps more so in regard to evolutionary psychology - the 'just so story'?
Cian Eamon Marley August 30, 2013 5:31 PM
Angela Kennedy August 30, 2013 11:28 AM
Surely the 'I know it when I see it' approach to what is 'pseudoscience' is a fundamental problem! It gives rise to subjective beliefs that are socially constructed (yes I said that!) and partial knowledge at best.
My own field is in highlighting the unsoundness of psychogenic explanations for physical illnesses: the logical fallacies in reasoning, the errors in scientific method, the uncritical, unreflective turn to ideology that give rise to these diagnoses. Mine comes from a feminist, sociological perspective. One of the strengths of this perspective is the understanding of partial, situated knowledge and the ontological problem of claims to objectivity.
The notion that 'I know it when I see it' as 'good enough' to define pseudoscience immediately raises the questions: WHO has the 'authority' to 'know it when they see it'? We then find ourselves dealing with claims to authority - always a quagmire of potential irrationality, especially when subjective insider/outsider demarcations are drawn in order to do so.
Does the book address these problems?
@ Angela Kennedy
> The notion that 'I know it when I see it' as 'good enough' to define pseudoscience immediately raises the questions: WHO has the 'authority' to 'know it when they see it'? <
It would appear that professional skeptics (like Massimo Pugliucci) have been granted this authority by the AAAS (American Association for the Advancement of Science).
Ok - that someone should be 'granted authority' to do such a thing should set off alarm bells for the rational 'skeptic'...
Unknown August 30, 2013 3:27 PM
> Ok - that someone should be 'granted authority' to do such a thing should set off alarm bells for the rational 'skeptic'... <
That last comment was meant to be a little sarcastic. The point is that the demarcation between science and pseudoscience is not a black and white issue (even though Massimo, at times, makes dogmatic statements on what is and what is not science).
Ok - I wondered but I wasn't sure about you being sarcastic. You'd be surprised perhaps about what IS taken as 'authoritative' on faith in scientific insider circles (Yes I use the term 'insider').
Personally I have big problems with the term 'pseudoscience'. It's an unstable term often used as an ad hominem (a bit like 'quack'), more than any useful definition of any discipline.
Science' is also a human endeavour - so subject to various difficulties and instabilities in how it is carried out. It might be easier to establish 'facts' in some disciplines than others - but that doesn't mean scientific methods (of both induction and deduction, conjecture and refutation) are precluded in disciplines where ascertaining such facts, or indeed evidence, is difficult.
The soft sciences (psychology, sociology) are not real sciences, only the hard sciences (physics, chemistry) are. (The academy does classify biology as a hard science. So, I guess we would have to consider it a borderline field.)
So medicine, especially psychiatry, is therefore not a 'real' science?
This is obviously a problem of demarcation due to subjective beliefs about 'hard' and 'real' (linguistic constructions) and even what 'science' is, let alone 'scientific method' etc.
I'm not discussing these to be provocative: we have some real issues here which are rarely considered, unfortunately, especially by those claiming 'insider' authority as 'scientists'.
I made a typo in my previous post. I meant to say that "the academy does NOT classify biology as a hard science.)" (I'm sorry for any confusion this may have caused.)
> So medicine, especially psychiatry, is therefore not a 'real' science? <
I would argue that there is a spectrum.
physics <=> chemistry <=> biology <=> psychology <=> sociology
Medicine is obviously not an "exact" science, especially psychiatry. (I have more concerns with the practice of psychiatry than with the practice of psychotherapy. Apparently, Massimo does not.)
There are problems with your subjective 'spectrum' here. What are your criteria for defining something as a 'real' science, or 'more real' than another? Are you using 'exact' as a criteria? Are you privileging some disciplines of enquiry over another on this list (for example, why do you think psychology somehow is more 'real' a 'science' than sociology?)
And what is a 'hard' science? Who decides, and how? What does 'hard' even mean?
What is an 'exact' science?
Alastair,
Re: 'The soft sciences (psychology, sociology) are not real sciences, only the hard sciences (physics, chemistry) are.'
Why do you think this?
Unknown September 02, 2013 2:46 PM
@ Cian Eamon Marley
> What is an 'exact' science? <
The hard sciences (physics, chemistry) are considered to be exact sciences.
> Why do you think this? <
I don't really think this, but others do. (My comment was meant to be somewhat facetious.)
> There are problems with your subjective 'spectrum' here. What are your criteria for defining something as a 'real' science, or 'more real' than another? Are you using 'exact' as a criteria? Are you privileging some disciplines of enquiry over another on this list (for example, why do you think psychology somehow is more 'real' a 'science' than sociology?) <
The physical sciences (e.g. physics and chemistry) are considered to be the hard sciences; the social sciences (e.g. psychology and sociology) are considered to be the soft sciences; the life sciences (e.g. biology) falls somewhere in between the hard and soft sciences.
The hard sciences are considered to be exact sciences because they basically employ mathematical models that enable for more accurate predictions.
The 'harder' the science the more objective it is...the more likely it will lead to a consensus.
The 'softer' the science is the more subjective it is...the less likely it will lead to a consensus.
Agreed, but we are not talking about authority as in legal means. We are simply talking about people who spend time studying these things (philosophers, scientists) rendering their professional opinion. There is hardly anything to object to that, no?
It's complicated. Medicine is actually a field in between a full fledged science and a practice. Just look at recent papers showing that a large number of medical research is hard to replicate satisfactorily. But I certainly wouldn't call it pseudoscience.
> especially by those claiming 'insider' authority as 'scientists'. <
Not sure who you are referring to, but why are you putting "scientists" in scare quotes?
> Do you think the so-called "professional skeptics" have a full appreciation for the demarcation problem? <
First off, there are very few professional skeptics. But no, I don't think they do. That's part of the reason Maarten and I put together this collection.
> It would appear that professional skeptics (like Massimo Pugliucci) have been granted this authority by the AAAS (American Association for the Advancement of Science) <
It would appear that your sarcasm is misplaced. I'm not a professional skeptic, I'm a philosopher and scientist. And nobody has granted me any authority. But do I have the right to voice my opinion in matters about which I put a lot of thought?
> The soft sciences (psychology, sociology) are not real sciences, only the hard sciences (physics, chemistry) are. <
Says who? Not in my book.
> I meant to say that "the academy does NOT classify biology as a hard science.)" <
You made a mistake, not a typo. "The academy" doesn't exist as a body that makes that sort of decisions.
> I have more concerns with the practice of psychiatry than with the practice of psychotherapy. Apparently, Massimo does not. <
I think most types of psychotherapy are simply ineffective (there's data on that). Psychiatry works, but there is the problem of Big Pharma, overmedication, etc.
> even though Massimo, at times, makes dogmatic statements on what is and what is not science <
Could you provide me with an example of a "dogmatic" statement, as opposed to a statement resulting from consideration of the evidence? Thanks.
>but we are not talking about authority as in legal means. We are simply talking about people who spend time studying these things (philosophers, scientists) rendering their professional opinion. There is hardly anything to object to that, no?
Actually, yes there is. Claims to authority and insider status are always problematic. The issue should be whether the notion that there is such a thing as pseudoscience is safe by established logic, not who has the right to (subjectively) call something pseudoscience because they did a degree or two. I'm a sociologist, and yes, I too have spent time studying these things. I'm rendering my professional opinion. But it doesn't mean I'm right, any more than you are, by my sheer authority. In the final analysis, it is whether my argument is plausible, or not, that is the issue (as it is with us all here, surely?)
>It's complicated. Medicine is actually a field in between a full fledged science and a practice. Just look at recent papers showing that a large number of medical research is hard to replicate satisfactorily. But I certainly wouldn't call it pseudoscience.
I should point out immediately that I'm actually perfectly aware how complicated the issue is. I used questions only as a way to facilitate others to think in a questioning way about these issues. I'm interested that you would not call medical research pseudoscience if it can't be replicated properly: so the question is, what do you think is 'pseudoscience'. What's the purpose of such a term (if not to discredit/trivialise)?
>Not sure who you are referring to, but why are you putting "scientists" in scare quotes?
I'm putting 'scientists' in scare quotes because it's often a contested term. Some people claim to be 'scientists' but others contest that. The fact that there is a term 'pseudoscience' demonstrates this problem.
>I think most types of psychotherapy are simply ineffective (there's data on that). Psychiatry works, but there is the problem of Big Pharma, overmedication, etc.
I know you're answering Alastair - but I think it needs to be said that it can easily be argued that often psychiatry does NOT work, at least not to any scientific standard. The (valid) objections to DSM 5 is a case in point: historical incidences of psychiatry (lobotomies, psychopathologising hmosexuality in the DSM as just two examples) which show it is often wrong, and does not 'work' (if we are talking about patient safety) are others.
> so the question is, what do you think is 'pseudoscience'. What's the purpose of such a term (if not to discredit/trivialise)? <
The term "pseudoscience" is a pejorative and (as you have pointed out) it is employed by skeptics to discredit an individual's work or a field.
Thomas Jones August 30, 2013 9:51 PM
Hard science, soft science. Science, Psuedoscience. Science, scientism. I don't think Philip really meant what he said to be taken simplistically. I think he meant as science goes forward and dialogues proceed, we can better sort the wheat from the chaff. A better discussion may focus on what we can expect when pursuing certain methodologies and their inherent weaknesses and strengths as applied to a particular discipline. One senses sometimes that there seems a claim to being involved in the "purer" science. Well, I think we are long past the point where claims of expertise and authority can be made across disciplines. If there is a demarcation, then it would at times seem nothing more than which approach is "fitter." To me, this may only lead to certain biases in where study should be focused and not focused instead of how the study was conducted and whether it has merit in and of itself. Rather dangerous. Especially if it leads us into self-proclaimed esoteric pursuits that only a privileged few can engage in.
Angela Kennedy August 31, 2013 3:25 AM
I agree entirely - nevertheless, these things need teasing out, because often these problems ARE taken simplistically.
@ Massimo
> First off, there are very few professional skeptics. But no, I don't think they do. That's part of the reason Maarten and I put together this collection. <
Please define a 'professional skeptic.'
> It would appear that your sarcasm is misplaced. I'm not a professional skeptic, I'm a philosopher and scientist. <
Is it not true that you sit on the advisory board to the NYC Skeptics?
Does Richard Dawkins qualify as a 'professional skeptic?' (Dawkins held the chair as Oxford's Professor for the Public Understanding of Science). What about Daniel Dennett? Sam Harris? Susan Blackmore?
> And nobody has granted me any authority. But do I have the right to voice my opinion in matters about which I put a lot of thought? <
I never argued that you didn't have the right to voice your opinion. But you are using you position and stature in the academic and scientific community to promote a naturalistic worldview.
> Says who? Not in my book. <
Just for the sake of clarity. What is your stance on psychology? Is it a science?
> You made a mistake, not a typo. "The academy" doesn't exist as a body that makes that sort of decisions. <
Academia (Latin for "academy") classifies biology as part of the life sciences, not the physical sciences (physics and chemistry).
> I think most types of psychotherapy are simply ineffective (there's data on that). Psychiatry works, but there is the problem of Big Pharma, overmedication, etc. <
It would appear that psychiatry doesn't work much better than psychotherapy. (And the point I am making should be rather obvious - "drug therapy" is potentially more problematic than "talk therapy.")
"In 1998, a meta-analysis of published antidepressant trials found that 75% of the effectiveness of anti-depressant medication is due to the placebo effect and other non-specific effects, rather than the treatment itself.[142]"
(source: Wikipedia: Placebo)
> Could you provide me with an example of a "dogmatic" statement, as opposed to a statement resulting from consideration of the evidence? Thanks. <
Did you not state in the past that parapsychology is a pseudoscience (even though it is considered a science by the AAAS (American Association for the Advancement of Science))? (As I recall, you informed me that you were a member of the AAAS and would work to change parapsychology's status with that organization).
The term "pseudotheory" seems useful*. Empirical science relates theories to observations (data). Some theories might be called "hard" when they make relatively precise predictions (like the Standard Model as it relates to data collected at the LHC), and others "soft" (like a theory in economics as it relates to economic statistics). ID seems like more of an anti-theory than a theory: It effectively says no theory exists. ESP is a discarded theory (no evidence of brain-to-brain signals has ever been found).
* e.g. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/24/opinion/welcome-end-of-a-pseudotheory.html
Tom D. August 31, 2013 1:19 PM
>Conspiracy theories about AIDS, which are widespread in many African countries and even in the United States, have literally killed countless human beings throughout the world.<
Yes, but it would be good to keep in mind that conspiracy theories would not be so believable (in the 3rd world in particular) were it not for the fact that governments and corporations do in fact engage in unethical and unlawful behavior.
The U.S. recently ran a fake inoculation program in Pakistan in order to get DNA samples from people in the hopes of tracking bin Laden. The program left people, including children, with the false idea that they had been safeguarded against disease, when in fact they had not. The people who participated in the program were lied to and used.
Also, corporations have used 3rd world people as uninformed guinea pigs for testing drugs.
In short, not all the blame can be laid at the door of irrational thinking about drugs/inoculations. Third World people have good reason to be suspicious.
> Claims to authority and insider status are always problematic <
I disagree. I know that's a common feminist approach, but I think it goes too far. Yes, sometimes claims of authority are problematic and should be scrutinized or rejected. But surely that's not always the case. I assume that if you suffer from toothache you go to a dentist. Why? Presumably because he has "authority": he is a (hopefully competent) license practitioner of a specialized craft. Why would that be a problem?
> But it doesn't mean I'm right, any more than you are, by my sheer authority <
But I never made that claim, so I'm not sure what you are objecting to. Whenever I criticize what I think is a pseudoscientific notion I do it on the basis of evidence and argument, not authority. That said, I'm not ashamed to point out that I have expertise about this sort of things, which is readily demonstrated by my long history of publication in the field.
> I'm interested that you would not call medical research pseudoscience if it can't be replicated properly: so the question is, what do you think is 'pseudoscience' <
First of all, quite a number of medical findings can and have been replicated. Second, pseudoscience typically refers to an activity that pretends to be scientific but whose theoretical and/or empirical findings are actually null. Homeopathy being the perfect example.
> I'm putting 'scientists' in scare quotes because it's often a contested term. Some people claim to be 'scientists' but others contest that. <
I'm having a problem seeing this. A scientist is someone with an advanced degree in science (typically) who does specialized research in an academic or private setting. That doesn't mean s/he is right on whatever she says, but the word seems to me to have pretty clear meaning. Could you provide me with examples of the contested attributions you are thinking of?
> I think it needs to be said that it can easily be argued that often psychiatry does NOT work, at least not to any scientific standard <
Yes, but there also are a number of instances in which it does work, especially when it comes to a number of neurological conditions that can be treated with drugs. That's what makes it a borderline / interesting field, rather than straight science (say, like physics) or pseudoscience (say, like astrology).
> Please define a 'professional skeptic.' <
Like in any profession: someone who does it full time and for a pay. Michael Shermer is an example, or Ken Frazier, the editor of Skeptical Inquirer.
> Is it not true that you sit on the advisory board to the NYC Skeptics? <
So? I'm neither paid for it, nor is it a full time position. Besides, NYCS is a volunteer organization.
> Does Richard Dawkins qualify as a 'professional skeptic?' (Dawkins held the chair as Oxford's Professor for the Public Understanding of Science). What about Daniel Dennett? Sam Harris? Susan Blackmore <
Are we going to go one person at a time? What's your point? At any rate: Dawkins, not really, he is a full time science writer who engages in skepticism part time (his academic position was, as you point out, in science education, not skepticism); Dennett: no, he is philosopher (yes, he does write part time about skepticism, as do I); Harris: yes, that's pretty much his chosen career. Blackmore: yes, at the least since she has left academia to become an independent scholar who focuses on pseudoscience.
> But you are using you position and stature in the academic and scientific community to promote a naturalistic worldview. <
And, precisely, what is objectionable in that?
> Academia (Latin for "academy") classifies biology as part of the life sciences, not the physical sciences (physics and chemistry) <
Thanks for the (superfluous, condescending) Latin lesson. So what? You are stating the obvious.
> It would appear that psychiatry doesn't work much better than psychotherapy <
> Did you not state in the past that parapsychology is a pseudoscience (even though it is considered a science by the AAAS (American Association for the Advancement of Science))? (As I recall, you informed me that you were a member of the AAAS and would work to change parapsychology's status with that organization). <
You recall incorrectly. I am a Fellow of the AAAS, but I never made any statement about changing their position on parapsychology. Could you provide me with a link to where they say that parapsychology is a science? I find that surprising.
> In short, not all the blame can be laid at the door of irrational thinking about drugs/inoculations. Third World people have good reason to be suspicious. <
You are right. But even the kind of example you cite doesn't justify the criminal behavior of, for instance, the South African government (until recently) toward its own citizens.
> I'm neither paid for it, nor is it a full time position. <
But surely you are being compensated for your publication[s] on "pseudoscience." This would qualify you as a professional skeptic.
Merriam-Webster defines "professional" as "participating for gain or livelihood in an activity or field of endeavor often engaged in by amateurs."
> What's your point? <
My point is that prominent "professional" skeptics (Dawkins, Blackmore, Dennett, Harris, Shermer) are guilty of engaging in pseudoscience (at least, according to your expert opinion on the subject matter). I find that somewhat ironic...laughable actually. (Dawkins, Blackmore and Dennett are proponents of "memetics"; Harris and Shermer are proponents of a "science of morality." And we both know that you have deemed these fields to be pseudoscience. Isn't that right?)
> And, precisely, what is objectionable in that? <
What I object to is that you seem to equate your promotion of naturalism and pseudoskeptism with educating the public on science. Naturalism and pseudoskepticism are not really part of science.
> Thanks for the (superfluous, condescending) Latin lesson. So what? You are stating the obvious. <
If I am stating the obvious, then why the hell are you objecting to the obvious?
Previously you made the condescending objection (and I quote) "You made a mistake, not a typo. "The academy" doesn't exist as a body that makes that sort of decisions."
I didn't make a mistake. The academy (or the academic community, or academia) classifies biology as part of the life sciences, not the physical sciences (physics and chemistry).
> I beg to differ. <
I just provided you with evidence that antidepressants are not anymore effective than placebos. (It would appear that you are quite dismissal of evidence that does accord with your viewpoint.)
> You recall incorrectly. I am a Fellow of the AAAS, but I never made any statement about changing their position on parapsychology. Could you provide me with a link to where they say that parapsychology is a science? I find that surprising. <
"In 1969, under the direction of anthropologist Margaret Mead, the Parapsychological Association became affiliated with the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), the largest general scientific society in the world.[25]"
(source: Wikipedia: Parapsychology)
It will be interesting to read a number of viewpoints as they weigh into the subject of demarcation. My particular concern is with the proclivity to carve out territory, what is valid and what is foolish in terms of inquiry, and what approach or discipline is worthwhile pursuing, so that the pursuit of knowledge does not become self-limiting for fear of being ostracized by the scientific community.
Much of what we now call psuedo is only discovered in hindsight. At some point, there is general agreement that a particular line of inquiry was not worth pursuing, in hindsight not worth pursuing. But it is also clear that many lines of inquiry (like vaccination) were deemed worthless or fanciful when first proposed.
The so-called sciences (and everyone nowadays seems to want to hang that shingle on the wall)are rightly hesitant to exert and resort to authoritarian viewpoints lest they wear the costume of modern day high priests. One demarcation is between theoretical and applied, and the reasonable expectation that applied will yield predictable results. When some physicists will pronounce that the Standard Model explains, what, 90% or so of how things work, one is sometimes overcome with IMAO, until the next discovery. Well, there is no accounting for the wrong explanation with the right outcome, is there?
So it all becomes an interesting balancing act. It is an interesting debate, and one in which some already seem to have chosen a side.
Maarten Boudry September 01, 2013 7:37 AM
- @ Philip, Angela & Alastair. The "I know it when I see it" approach. That is indeed a fairly accurate description of how most scientists tell the difference between science & pseudoscience, but it does not mean that their say-so is a matter of subjective whim. Many scientists agree on the particulars: they sort the same doctrines in the same piles. The problem is that their judgement is largely intuitive and inchoate: they seem to be using similar criteria (hence their agreement on the particulars), but they find it hard to explicate them. That's exactly what you need philosophers for: analyzing the commonalities between different sciences and pseudosciences, abstracting away from the particulars and trying to come up with more or less general criteria. Some chess master also "see" an imminent checkmate. Surely that does not mean that they make stuff up, or that we are guilty of an "argument from authority" if we put trust in their judgement.
- It goes without saying that medicine and psychology are sciences! Maybe the surest sign of their maturity is that they have their own respective pseudo-sciences, theories and practices that try to emulate their epistemic standing but completely fail to do so. Think about homeopathy, Freudian psychoanalysis, Scientology, reincarnation therapy. Methodological differences with the 'hard sciences', important though they may be, are inconsequential when compared to the huge difference in epistemic credentials between, say, penicillin and oscillococcinum (homeopathic).
- @ Thomas Jones, you are right that we often realize only with hindsight which avenues of research were worth pursuing. In fact, it is reckless to discredit any truly novel idea as "pseudoscience", especially when its proponents are not even claiming that is is anything more than an exciting hypothesis or speculation. In common usage, the term "pseudoscience" refers to doctrines that are maintained in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. In the early days, phrenology or parapsychology were fairly respectable theories, until they collapsed under the weight of anomalies. People who are still on the wild goose chase for 'psi' forces, or who even claim that the evidence for 'psi' is already there but is being suppressed by a global conspiracy of orthodox science, deserve the label 'pseudoscience'. Not the early pioneers.
Thomas Jones September 02, 2013 10:54 AM
Perhaps, we appear to working at cross-purposes, but that is not my intent. In fact, I think you your characterization of "pseudoscience" is one that most here agree with.
But your statement "People who are still on the *wild goose chase* [emphasis added] for 'psi' forces, or who *even claim* [emphasis added] that the evidence for 'psi' is already there but is being suppressed by a global conspiracy of *orthodox* [again] science, *deserve* [again] the label pseudoscience," is rather over the top, don't you think? And would it not seem that such rhetoric unwittingly plays to the position you wish to discredit? This is neither delineation nor demarcation. It is just posturing and begging the question.
Maarten Boudry September 02, 2013 5:29 PM
Well, of course those are rethorical terms, but my side-note on parapsychology was meant as an illustration, not as an attempt to convince you of its epistemic bankruptcy. I hope you don't need to be convinced of that.
Thomas Jones September 03, 2013 3:15 PM
Yes, but this was your choice of rhetoric and is prehaps suggestive of an attitude that is embedded in the demarcation discussion. I find it encouraging that there is diversity in the authors in yours and Massimo's book. I would perhaps have wanted to see a bit more from those in the humanities since I don't see this discourse as confined to to epistemelogical concerns, but you can't be expected to twist arms for contributions.
My thoughts on parapsychological subjects is that I don't think about them much, at least not in a way that one could describe as thinking. But that is not to say that I would necessarily prejudge every inquiry that gives off the odor of psi and brand it as psuedo. For example, take the issue of the polygraph. The U.S. National Academy of Sciences has gone on record as finding them unreliable. Should scientists continue to pursue this matter? My answer would be "no," but it would not be framed in terms of the science/psuedo-science discourse. Rather, I have moral, political, and legalistic reasons for objecting to the use of such a device, regardless of whether science could ultimately invent a reliable "lie detector." And this ties into parts (2) and (3) of Massimo's comment to my comment regarding the proclivity to carve out territory. It is questionable whether scientists "as scientists" should weigh in on every subject except as humans entitled to make a pro or con argument. Unfortunately, many of them do not vehemently protest the promulgation of their viewpoints as scientific or as "scientists" when in fact had they adopted an anonymous identity their opinions wouldn't have garnered much more attention than my butcher. The upshot is that everyone can play that game so creationists, for example, trot out their patina of science.
This approach, I'm sure you agree, does not get us anywhere. And it is also true why the transition from "supposed" to "is" often doesn't get settled in a lifetime. So your book performs a valuable service, not only for the scientific communities, though, but for the general populace. Your rhetoric, however, does not. And it is probably why no one has addressed in my opinion the most cogent questions raised on this post, those from kate webbink: (1) "If part of distinguishing science/pseudoscience/non-science involves asking "what is non-science," aren't you asking questions about art/culture/society/politics--which bring up personal rights & ethics, too?" and (2) " I'm wondering if you necessarily meant to suggest the only valid/professional opinions on "pseudoscience" should be those of "[presumably non-postmodernist] philosophers, scientists.""? Judging from Massimo's descriptions of the sections of the book, I'm guessing that you do address these questions, not simply deciding whether things like "phrenology," a theory that was in vogue for maybe 30 years, was worth pursuing or whether the general poulation should be protected from dentists who are paid to endorse a product.
Thomas,
- My somewhat heavy-handed rhetoric seems to have detracted from the main point. "Wild goose change" means that the search for psi forces is most probably futile, because all previous attempts to find them have failed. It does not mean that we prejudge all psi research. In principle, science remains open to the possibility.
- The polygraph is different because, for one thing, it would not upturn our current understanding of physics the way that psi forces would. So the prior probabilities are different. If you have moral objections against polygraphs, apart from the issue of their reliability, indeed you should not phrase them in terms of science/pseudoscience. The demarcation project, as you correctly point out, is primarily epistemological. You can have moral objections against nuclear power, but nuclear physics is most decidedly not pseudoscience. Indeed, your moral objections would be moot if it were.
Maarten, I don't dispute that there would be differences between, let's say, a precognition detector and a lie detector. My point had to do with the rationale for saying one is science and one pseudoscience and, in the absence, as Massimo says, of some future discovery or evidence. At present, the scientific community, as represented by our National Academy of Sciences, says lie detectors are unreliable. So we will call one unreliable science for now and the other reliable pseudoscience for now. We could call both pseudoscience for now. What prevents this, your distinction that one would upturn our current understanding of physics? Well, has this ever happened before? If so, that is not a criterion that will hold up, though it may put us in the general vicinity. It's important to me that you understand I'm not attacking your point of view on psi. It's reasonable. If you did a survey of scientists, hard/soft, whatever, there would likely be significant agreement on what they presently consider science and pseudoscience. (Well, maybe not.) Still, if the purpose might be to provide some guidelines that might benefit the non-scientist as well, your work would be cut out for you. You might find yourself entangled in questions about human nature along with Kant's, What may I hope?
One final clarification regarding lie detectors, I would have moral objections, not apart, but regardless of their reliability.
> My particular concern is with the proclivity to carve out territory, what is valid and what is foolish in terms of inquiry <
Yes, that is a concern. But there are three points to demarcation projects: 1) the intellectual curiosity of what, epistemically, makes something a science, a pseudoscience, or something else; 2) the practical concern that we have limited resources (time, money), and we should be making prescriptive judgments (to the best of our knowledge) about what to pursue; and 3) the fact that some pseudoscientific practices actually hurt people (vaccine and HIV denialism, for instance) and therefore ought (morally) to be confronted.
> But surely you are being compensated for your publication[s] on "pseudoscience." This would qualify you as a professional skeptic. <
At best a part time consultant. Regardless, what exactly hinges on this particular debate?
> My point is that prominent "professional" skeptics (Dawkins, Blackmore, Dennett, Harris, Shermer) are guilty of engaging in pseudoscience <
I don't see irony there, just disagreement. And one of my major points is that there is no sharp distinction between science and pseudoscience, but rather a lot of stuff in between. Not at all coincidentally, the areas you mention all fall in that grey territory, in my opinion.
> What I object to is that you seem to equate your promotion of naturalism and pseudoskeptism with educating the public on science. Naturalism and pseudoskepticism are not really part of science <
You seem to be confused. It is science that is part of naturalism, not the other way. And I honestly don't think that what I'm promoting is "pseudo" skepticism. But I suppose a proponent of Intelligent Design or UFOs would in fact characterize it that way.
> I didn't make a mistake. The academy (or the academic community, or academia) classifies biology as part of the life sciences, not the physical sciences (physics and chemistry). <
Yes you did. The "academy" is a loose term referring to all academic disciplines, not just sciences. There is no Central Committee sitting in judgment of what qualifies as hard or soft.
> I just provided you with evidence that antidepressants are not anymore effective than placebos. <
First of all, you copied a Wikipedia text, hardly "evidence." Second, you didn't read even that correctly. It is well known that the effects of antidepressants do include a substantial placebo effect, but not all of their effects are accounted by placebo, and of course that percentage varies with different medications.
> In 1969, under the direction of anthropologist Margaret Mead, the Parapsychological Association became affiliated with the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), the largest general scientific society in the world <
Yeah, you are unfortunately right, let's count that as another black mark against Margaret Meade. Still, I never made any declaration to the effect that I would try to get AAAS to drop the PA. As you might be aware, these affiliations really count for close to nothing anyway.
> And one of my major points is that there is no sharp distinction between science and pseudoscience, but rather a lot of stuff in between. Not at all coincidentally, the areas you mention all fall in that grey territory, in my opinion. <
Just for the sake of clarity. Are you now saying the scientific status of "memetics" and the "science of morality" is gray (even if you personally believe these fields fall on the pseudo side of the spectrum)?
> You seem to be confused. It is science that is part of naturalism, not the other way. <
I'm not confused. You're conflating "methodological naturalism" with "metaphysical naturalism." (Science employs methodological naturalism. And, even this is debatable according to Popper because the difference between the natural and the supernatural, between the physical and the metaphysical is ambiguous...hence the "demarcation problem.")
> And I honestly don't think that what I'm promoting is "pseudo" skepticism. <
You hold a position as a Fellow of the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry (CSI, formerly known as the CSICOP). That organization has been accused by one of its co-founders as engaging in pseudoskepticism.
> Yes you did. The "academy" is a loose term referring to all academic disciplines, not just sciences. There is no Central Committee sitting in judgment of what qualifies as hard or soft. <
I employed the term "the academy" to refer to the academic community or academia as whole, not as some "Central Committee." That being said, it is indisputable that biology is classified as part of the life sciences, not the physical sciences.
> First of all, you copied a Wikipedia text, hardly "evidence." <
That text was footnoted by a superscript (just in case you didn't notice). So, I'm afraid your attempt to discredit Wikipedia here (a clear case of your pseudoskepticism rearing its ugly face) is not going to fly. Here's the direct source...
"Listening to Prozac but hearing placebo: A meta-analysis of antidepressant medication."
> Second, you didn't read even that correctly. It is well known that the effects of antidepressants do include a substantial placebo effect, but not all of their effects are accounted by placebo, and of course that percentage varies with different medications. <
Perhaps I should refresh your memory. I made the argument that "psychiarty doesn't appear to work much better than psychotherapy." If "75% of the effectiveness of anti-depressant medication is due to the placebo effect," then it doesn't appear that psychiarty works much better psychotherapy.
> Still, I never made any declaration to the effect that I would try to get AAAS to drop the PA. As you might be aware, these affiliations really count for close to nothing anyway. <
It didn't appear to me that you were ashamed of letting me know that you were a FELLOW (not a member) of the AAAS.
kate webbink September 01, 2013 11:59 AM
Thanks, Massimo--I work in science outreach media where it's sometimes easy to breeze past philosophical/historical/sociological questions in order to more rapidly (if not always accurately) produce characterizations of science & scientists for the public--all in the name of raising viewership, for shame... So it's exciting and inspiring to see fresh thoughts on the demarcation problem! (maybe I need to get out more?)
A question/comment: If part of distinguishing science/pseudoscience/non-science involves asking "what is non-science," aren't you asking questions about art/culture/society/politics--which bring up personal rights & ethics, too? It's complicated as you and others have said, so I understand narrowing the scope of the topic to fit coherently into a book. (And considering that demarcation debates historically focused on the "science/pseudoscience" side, it's understandable for a current debate to remain focused there--but should it?) If all of that social/political complexity and context does indeed pertain to "philosophy of pseudoscience," then concerns (like Angela K's regarding "authority on defining the topic") don't seem to go too far at all...In which case, I'm wondering if you necessarily meant to suggest the only valid/professional opinions on "pseudoscience" should be those of "[presumably non-postmodernist] philosophers, scientists." Lakatos (philosopher-scientist) & Feyerabend (philosopher-artist? dare I ask what you call him?) had such a vivid dialog on the topic, so a naive/just-for-kicks question: if you had the chance, would you have wanted papers from both of them here? (Or would you say they're in the book in spirit/ghost/goblin? Metaphorically speaking, of course...)
> if you had the chance, would you have wanted papers from both of them here? <
Yes, bot Feyerabend and Lakatos would definitely have been welcome, though I would have had my own sharp disagreements with the former! Indeed, even postmodernism (in moderation) is welcome to this debate, and once again, let me stress that I don't think that this is a debate to be reserved to academics. That said, Maarten and I did invite a couple of mo radically dissenting voices, but a few chapters didn't pass peer review.
> Are you now saying the scientific status of "memetics" and the "science of morality" is gray (even if you personally believe these fields fall on the pseudo side of the spectrum)? <
I think I have been clear already, but he we go again: I think memetics is a sterile effort based on a superficial analogy. But it's not pseudoscience in the sense of, say, astrology. As for science and morality, please check what I've written several times about it on this blog: it clearly doesn't fit a science / pseudoscience divide, because it is about a different demarcation, the difference between science and philosophy.
> You're conflating "methodological naturalism" with "metaphysical naturalism. <
I'm doing no such thing at all. I'm perfectly aware of the distinction.
> You hold a position as a Fellow of the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry (CSI, formerly known as the CSICOP). That organization has been accused by one of its co-founders as engaging in pseudoskepticism. <
That's Truzzi's opinion. Clearly, I don't share it.
> it is indisputable that biology is classified as part of the life sciences, not the physical sciences<
And who the hell dispute that??
> If "75% of the effectiveness of anti-depressant medication is due to the placebo effect," then it doesn't appear that psychiarty works much better psychotherapy. <
It still does, considering that much psychotherapy (with the exception of behavioral therapy) doesn't seem to work at all.
> It didn't appear to me that you were ashamed of letting me know that you were a FELLOW (not a member) of the AAAS <
Why should I be ashamed of it? And what the hell does that have to do with anything?
Dr. C September 01, 2013 10:45 PM
$31 for the paperback and $17 for the kindle?! Yikes. I'm probably picking it up anyway, but yikes.
Unknown September 01, 2013 11:56 PM
> But it's not pseudoscience in the sense of, say, astrology. <
But the bottom line is that you regard memetics as a pseudoscience. Therefore, logical consistency forces you to acknowledge that Dawkins, Dennett, and Blackmore are promoting some form of pseudoscience.
> I'm doing no such thing at all. I'm perfectly aware of the distinction. <
You only pay lip service to the distinction.
> That's Truzzi's opinion. Clearly, I don't share it. <
I'm more inclined to share Truzzi's opinion...
"Marcello Truzzi, one of CSICOP's co-founders, left the organization after only a short time, arguing that many of those involved "tend to block honest inquiry, in my opinion. Most of them are not agnostic toward claims of the paranormal; they are out to knock them. [...] When an experiment of the paranormal meets their requirements, then they move the goal posts."[24] Truzzi coined the term pseudoskeptic to describe critics in whom he detected such an attitude.[25]" (source: Wikipedia: Committe for Skeptical Inquiry)
> And who the hell dispute that?? <
I'm glad that's settled. So, we now agree that the academy classifies biology as a life science, not a physical science.
> It still does, considering that much psychotherapy (with the exception of behavioral therapy) doesn't seem to work at all. <
The bottom line is that psychotherapy only has to work as well as a placebo in order to work as well as antidepressants. And when you factor into equation that psychotherapy doesn't have any side effects and addiction problems, it works better.
"A new analysis has found that in the majority of trials conducted by drug companies in recent decades, sugar pills have done as WELL as -- or BETTER than -- antidepressants.." (source: "Against Depression, a Sugar Pill Is Hard to Beat" by Shankar Vedantam, Washington Post, Tuesday, May 7, 2002, Page A01)
> Why should I be ashamed of it? And what the hell does that have to do with anything? <
Well, if "these affiliations (with the AAAS) really count for close to nothing anyway," then it doesn't appear that your affiliation (your fellowship) with the AAAS is something to brag about.
> Personally I have big problems with the term 'pseudoscience'. It's an unstable term often used as an ad hominem (a bit like 'quack'), more than any useful definition of any discipline. <
Not sure what you mean by "unstable." Yes, as Maarten pointed out, something can begin as a worthwhile hypothesis to explore, then become pseudoscience if it is found to be groundless and yet some people insist in proposing it as viable. But that sort of "instability" should be welcome.
And yes, the term is definitely pejorative, because philosophy of science is a prescriptive, not descriptive, discipline. But that's no different from labeling bad reasoning as "fallacious," which philosophers do all the time, with good reason.
> what is a 'hard' science? Who decides, and how? What does 'hard' even mean? <
Usually the term refers to mature sciences that are based on sophisticated theory (often couched in mathematical terms) and backed up by plenty of empirical evidence. Physics and chemistry, in that sense, are hard sciences. The social sciences tend to be considered "soft," though that's not necessarily a pejorative; it just indicates that the structure of their theoretical-empirical bases is not like that of physics or chemistry. Biology is typically thought to be somewhere in the middle.
As for who makes these pronouncements, typically it is scientists and philosophers of science, that is, respectively, practitioners of those disciplines and people who study their epistemic structure.
Dr. C,
> $31 for the paperback and $17 for the kindle?! Yikes. I'm probably picking it up anyway, but yikes. <
I hear you. We didn't set the price, and the volume is published by an academic press, not a commercial publisher with more financial means at its disposal. Besides, it's a big book...
> the bottom line is that you regard memetics as a pseudoscience. <
No, I don't. I regard it as an uninformative metaphor.
> You only pay lip service to the distinction. <
Says who? You? It is a desperate rhetorical move to impugn one's motivations.
> I'm more inclined to share Truzzi's opinion... <
Suit yourself.
> we now agree that the academy classifies biology as a life science, not a physical science <
That phrase makes no sense. First, because "the academy" isn't a coherent body in the business of classifying things. Second, because biology is a life science by definition (as it ought to be clear from its Greek root: bio).
> The bottom line is that psychotherapy only has to work as well as a placebo in order to work as well as antidepressants <
No, that's not the bottom line, the statement is empirically incorrect.
> if "these affiliations (with the AAAS) really count for close to nothing anyway," then it doesn't appear that your affiliation (your fellowship) with the AAAS is something to brag about <
You have no idea of what you are talking about.
> No, I don't. I regard it as an uninformative metaphor. <
Blackmore presented memetics as a science in her book "The Meme Machine." And since an "uninformative metaphor" doesn't qualify as science, then logically consistency forces you to characterize memetics as a pseudoscience. Unfortunately, it doesn't appear that you are particularly concern with logical consistency - at least, not in this context. And we both know why: it would be too embarrassing for you to acknowledge that prominent professional skeptics and professors charged with the authority of educating the public on science are themselves engaging in pseudoscience.
Merriam-Webster defines "pseudoscience" as "a system of theories, assumptions, and methods erroneously regarded as scientific."
So Massimo is indulging in logical inconsistencies out of sheer desperation to save the face of Richard Dawkins? You have to savour the irony!
= MJA September 03, 2013 11:57 AM
The line between what is and what is not disappears when One removes any uncertainty or doubt. The process is called enlightenment, and Once removed, light or truth or is is all that remains. Descartes had a good method for thIS! =
> This is neither delineation nor demarcation. It is just posturing and begging the question. <
Well, Maarten's phrasing may have been over the top, but in terms of substance I think he's right. More than a century of research on parapsychology has turned up close to nothing. Time to definitely consign the enterprise to pseudoscience?
> since an "uninformative metaphor" doesn't qualify as science, then logically consistency forces you to characterize memetics as a pseudoscience <
Only if you subscribe to a contrived dualism about science and pseudoscience, which should be abundantly clear that I don't. Then again, you don't seem to bother actually reading what I write, only scanning to uncover material for rhetorical usage.
> Merriam-Webster defines "pseudoscience" as "a system of theories, assumptions, and methods erroneously regarded as scientific." <
That definition is far too broad and vague. Read the book, it will do you good.
"Time to consign the enterprise [of psi inquiries] to pseudoscience?" Is this not already the case?
Massimo, as you know, there is the question whether the whole area of concern is not simply one of engaging in foolishness. Certainly, its pretense of proceeding according to the methods of scientific inquiry have not won a place in the scientific community at large. And so, if you were to draw a line in the sand, separating the domain of science and non-science, I don't think we really have to worry much as to where psi as a whole falls.
Embedded deeply in such discussions, though, is something that falls outside the distinction being made and that is: what subject matter is worthwhile pursuing and what approach to a subject matter is or is not off limits. This is the area that concerns me most, so I tread lightly. And yes there are abuses and hucksterism, but it isn't the distinction between science and psuedoscience that guides me or many others in terms of authority or privilege in these matters.
I don't see any great difference on the subject between you and me or me and Maarten. I'm looking forward to reading the book.
> Only if you subscribe to a contrived dualism about science and pseudoscience, which should be abundantly clear that I don't. Then again, you don't seem to bother actually reading what I write, only scanning to uncover material for rhetorical usage. <
It seems to me that you see the demarcation between science and pseudoscience in binary terms when it comes to parapsychology.
> It seems to me that you see the demarcation between science and pseudoscience in binary terms when it comes to parapsychology. <
It seems to me that you are committing a category mistake here. The demarcation between science and pseudoscience is one issue, the specific question of whether parapsychology is best considered a pseudoscience is another. My answer to the first one: it's a complicated landscapes, with a few clear cases and a number of borderline ones. My answer to the second one: parapsychology has steadily moved from borderline to downright pseudoscience during the past century. Of course, this judgment can always be revised, if the evidence warrants it. But I seriously doubt it will.
> Embedded deeply in such discussions, though, is something that falls outside the distinction being made and that is: what subject matter is worthwhile pursuing and what approach to a subject matter is or is not off limits. <
Well, that is a very good question, but frankly I don't think of it as embedded into the demarcation problem, as much as orthogonal to it. That question arises, of course, even within well established science. Is it worth spending millions to fund research on string theory, given how little it has yielded in terms of empirical results (zero)? What about funding grants to study the sexual habits of yet another tropical species of moth? And so on.
Thomas Jones September 04, 2013 9:44 AM
Agreed. That is why I said "is something that falls *outside* the distinction [demarcation] being made." That such discussions should and do occur within well-established science goes without saying, but not only within. And it is in this broader context of human endeavor per se that such discussions become more problematic, but more meaningful.
> It seems to me that you are committing a category mistake here. The demarcation between science and pseudoscience is one issue, the specific question of whether parapsychology is best considered a pseudoscience is another. My answer to the first one: it's a complicated landscapes, with a few clear cases and a number of borderline ones. My answer to the second one: parapsychology has steadily moved from borderline to downright pseudoscience during the past century. Of course, this judgment can always be revised, if the evidence warrants it. But I seriously doubt it will. <
Well again, we have in the case of parapsychology (as in the case of memetics and the science of morality) several prominent skeptics (e.g Sam Harris and the late Carl Sagan (who coined the expression "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence") and several prominent scientists (e.g. physicists Brian Josephson (Nobel laureate) and the late David Bohm) who have expressed public support for parapsychology.
> we have in the case of parapsychology (as in the case of memetics and the science of morality) several prominent skeptics (e.g Sam Harris and the late Carl Sagan (who coined the expression "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence") and several prominent scientists (e.g. physicists Brian Josephson (Nobel laureate) and the late David Bohm) who have expressed public support for parapsychology. <
And, again, I don't see what your point is. (I won't quibble here on your list and what exactly those people said, it's really irrelevant.) If your point is that some scientists and/or skeptics sometimes endorse questionable, and even downright false notions, welcome to the club, nobody disagrees with that. If your point is that I don't dare criticize those people when they do, then you have simply not paid attention to what I actually write.
> If your point is that some scientists and/or skeptics sometimes endorse questionable, and even downright false notions, welcome to the club, nobody disagrees with that. <
My point is that prominent (not just "some") skeptics and scientists have endorsed what you consider to be clearly a pseudoscience - namely, parapsychology.
> If your point is that I don't dare criticize those people when they do, then you have simply not paid attention to what I actually write. <
Have you criticized Sam Harris, Carl Sagan, Brian Josephson, and David Bohm for endorsing what you consider to be pseudoscience? You tell me.
William J. Kelleher, Ph.D. September 08, 2013 4:31 PM
Interesting review of a lot of different perspectives. Look forward to reading the book!
BTW one Ph.D. from UT? Why no reference to RS Hartman's The Structure of Value? He taught phil of sci at UT Knoxville – died around 1972. He says what makes a natural science is its connection to math, and proposes a science of values which would be connected to his Formal Axiology, a math-like 'calculus.' Ever hear of him?
William J. Kelleher, Ph.D.
wjkellpro@aol.com
Waldemar M. Reis September 09, 2013 6:13 PM
Sad, Massimo. It sounds corporatist or worse (it remembers me, within due proportions, the Galileo process and the 'demarcations' some well known governments still do). The mention of budget among the reasons to hunt the witches was simply nefarious, showing very well why current main stream science is this mess: investments.
I'd think otherwise the role of true science: yes, for sure it must doubt, but rather its experiments and until they fit into its expectations of likeness, of consistency, not other attempts of knowledge and, if so, if necessary, not in this way. Science should be studying, for instance, why sometimes (I would say - so many times), those 'spurious' forms of science (I'd prefer knowledge, putting everything in a single bag) work. In the case of homeopathy, for instance, (I'm a witness of its capabilities) you'd say 'just placebo, if that much' and I'd think to myself 'why not a placebo medicine? why not study that?'.
I doubt that public knowledge of official science is obliterated any way by 'pseudo' science: if people choose this last one, it could be based on cultural reasons or still on witnessing bad official science practice (that indeed exists and, yes, must be prevented).
Finally, the text shows a sad subservience of philosophy towards not really science, but rich governments and overall investors.


text:
Tag: alternative economies
Beyond capitalism and socialism: could a new economic approach save the planet? | Guardian Sustainable Business | The Guardian
A holistic approach to the economy is necessary to avoid social, environmental and economic collapse, according to a new report by the Capital Institute Dead fish clog the Rodrigo de Freitas lake in Rio de Janiero, Brazil. Scientists claim that the fish were starved of oxygen because of pollution. A holistic approach would look closely at the environmental impacts – such as a fish die-off – of economic activities.
To avoid social, environmental and economic collapse, the world needs to move beyond the standard choices of capitalism or socialism. That's the conclusion of a new report released Wednesday by US think tank Capital Institute.
The non-partisan think tank argues that both systems are unsustainable, even if flawlessly executed, and that economists need to look to the "hard science of holism" to debunk outdated views held by both the left and the right.
Jan Smuts, who coined the term "holism" in his 1926 book, Holism and Evolution, defined it as the "tendency in nature to form wholes that are greater than the sum of the parts". For example, in the case of a plant, the whole organism is more than a collection of leaves, stems and roots. Focusing too closely on each of these parts, the theory argues, could get in the way of understanding the organism as a whole. Viewed through this perspective, the capitalist tendency to isolate an economic process from its antecedents and effects is fundamentally flawed.
The Capital Institute, created by former JP Morgan managing director John Fullerton, says that society's economic worldview has relied on breaking complex systems down into simpler parts in order to understand and manage them. For example, this traditional economic view might view automobile manufacturing separately from the mineral mining, petroleum production and workers on which it relies. Moreover, this view might also not acknowledge the impact that automobile manufacturing has on the environment, politics and economics of an area. Holism, on the other hand, would view the entire chain of cause and effect that leads to – and away from – automobile manufacturing.
The Capital Institute report, titled Regenerative Capitalism, emphasizes that the world economic system is closely related to, and dependent upon, the environment. "The failure of modern economic theory to acknowledge this reality has had profound consequences, not the least of which is global climate change," it says.
A long chain of cause and effects
According to the Capital Institute, the consequences of this economic worldview are vast and far reaching, encompassing a host of challenges that range from climate change to political instability.
For example, the current capitalist system has created extreme levels of inequality, the report says. This, in turn, has led to a host of ills, including worker abuse, sexism, economic stagnation and more. It could even be considered partly responsible for the rise of terrorism around the world, the report claims. In other words, this inequality has become a threat to the very system that is creating it. Without radical change, the report warns, "the current mainstream capitalist system is under existential threat".
What is needed now, the Capital Institute argues, is a new systems-based mindset built around the idea of a regenerative economy, "which recognizes that the proper functioning of complex wholes, like an economy, cannot be understood without the ongoing, dynamic relationships among parts that give rise to greater wholes".
Source: Beyond capitalism and socialism: could a new economic approach save the planet? | Guardian Sustainable Business | The Guardian
Author MakerePosted on May 27, 2016 Categories Economy, Sustainability, TransformationTags alternative economies, Capital Institute, Regenerative Capitalism, systems-based, wholistic
Mainstreaming new economic models – sign up for our New York event | Guardian Sustainable Business | The Guardian
Mainstreaming new economic models – sign up for our New York eventJoin us on Thursday 12 November 2015 to explore the successes and failures of neoliberal capitalism, the emergence of alternative economic models and the potential for grassroots activity to create meaningful change Demonstrators protest in Frankfurt, Germany against government austerity and capitalism earlier this year. Photograph: Michael Probst/APWednesday 7 October 2015 12.08 BST Last modified on Wednesday 7 October 2015 12.42 BSTShare on Pinterest Share on LinkedIn Share on Google+Shares100 Save for laterA growing number of individuals and organisations are questioning an economy based on limitless growth. There are two broad reasons, they argue, why such an economy is doomed to fail: firstly it exploits the people and depletes the resources it relies on to survive; secondly it is accompanied by unacceptable – even unworkable – levels of inequality, financial instability and social unrest.
Source: Mainstreaming new economic models – sign up for our New York event | Guardian Sustainable Business | The Guardian
Author MakerePosted on October 10, 2015 Categories EconomyTags alternative economies, Capitalism, global change, transition
William Connolly. If everyone lived in an 'ecovillage', the Earth would still be in trouble
Difficult – and important – reading.
"But personal action is not enough. We must restructure our societies to support and promote these "simpler" ways of living. Appropriate technology must also assist us on the transition to one planet living. Some argue that technology will allow us to continue living in the same way while also greatly reducing our footprint.
However, the extent of "dematerialisation" required to make our ways of living sustainable is simply too great. As well as improving efficiency, we also need to live more simply in a material sense, and re-imagine the good life beyond consumer culture.
First and foremost, what is needed for one planet living is for the richest nations, including Australia, to initiate a "degrowth" process of planned economic contraction.
I do not claim that this is likely or that I have a detailed blueprint for how it should transpire. I only claim that, based on the ecological footprint analysis, degrowth is the most logical framework for understanding the radical implications of sustainability."
via If everyone lived in an 'ecovillage', the Earth would still be in trouble.
Author MakerePosted on June 27, 2015 Categories Global CrisisTags alternative economies, degrowth, economic contraction, one planet living

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


HENDERSON, Ky. - There's Fall Break fun to be had in this area. Check our list of things to do.
HENDERSON, Ky, - Fall Break is about to start, but don't worry if you don't have reservations somewhere. There's fun to be had at home, too.
One of the biggest fall festivals each year in Western Kentucky is almost here. The Henderson Lions Arts and Crafts festival at Audubon State Park will be held Saturday, Oct. 6 and Sunday, Oct. 7 at Audubon State Park. Hours will be from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. each day. The only thing you have to pay to get in is a $5 parking fee, and about 100 to 150 extra parking spaces will be available this year inside the park.
Nearly 100 vendors are expected this year, selling only hand-made items. You'll find a wide variety of hand-made items this year, including seasonal florals, tobacco stick-art, hand-carved wooden toys, iron work, bracelets and rings, dolls, quilts, oil paintings, stained glass mosaics, and, of course, plenty of fall, Halloween and Christmas decorations. If you're hungry, vendors will be selling items like tenderloins, burgers, pork chops, barbecue, kettle corn, cinnamon rolls and apple dumplings.
Once again, there will be a Kid's Zone, featuring face-painting and pumpkin decorating. Shuttles, including vans, will be available to carry visitors around the park, letting riders on and off at a number of locations in the park. Each visitor will also receive a brochure that lists the locations off all vendors in the park, to help you more quickly find the items you are looking for.
About 7,000 people visited Audubon Stater Park last year for the Arts and Crafts Festival, and the Lions made about $17,000 dollars. That money stays in the community to fund eye screenings for local school children, eye surgeries and donations to a number of local non-profit organizations.
The Depot Community Room will be offering one of their regular history walks on Saturday, Oct. 6.
It stars at 10 a.m. at the The Depot, 101 North Water St. But it's recommended that you get there a few minutes early.
This weekend's talk is called "Young Hendersonians," and it focuses on those who started out here or were raised here and went on to do notable or historic things.
OK, so this is a cheat -- because it's not a Henderson event. But it's a huge festival right across the river and there's tons of food, rides, music and more to enjoy there.
According to the event website, "Every October the West Side Nut Club organizes and sponsors a mammoth Fall Festival. This is a week-long gala on the west side along Franklin Street with free entertainment, carnival attractions, over 136 food booths, amateur talent competitions and on the last day, a huge parade. This event attracts over 200,000 people to the West Side & is considered to be one of the largest street festivals in the United States."
The Annual Highway 60 Yard Sale is set for Thursday through Sunday, October 4-7.
The Highway 60 Yard Sale offers 200 miles of bargains through eight Kentucky Counties: Meade, Breckinridge, Hancock, Daviess, Henderson, Union, Crittenden and Livingston.
The Sale is along U.S. Highway 60, except for a few miles in Owensboro when it follows Kentucky 144 and then back to U.S. 60. Shoppers are asked to be cautious and observe all traffic laws.
Several of the vendors will set up indoors. Most are open dawn to dusk.
More information and updates are available on the the event's Facebook page. Search for Highway 60 Yard Sale.
Cates Farm is open for the fall corn maze and pumpkin patch Fridays 4-9 p.m.; Saturdays 10 a.m.-9 p.m.; Sundays 1-7 p.m.
General admission is $7 for children 3-11 and $9 for age 12-adult with toddlers (2 and under) free with paying adult. This includes the corn maze, pumpkin patch with one pumpkin per paying person, hayride, and all of the activity areas.
The general admission price includes a hayride, corn maze, one pumpkin from the patch, and all of the activity areas. If groups of 15 or more book at least a week in advance, the group rate is a dollar off per person for general admission. Please call 270-823-6150 for more questions.


We've discussed knowing what it is you truly need in your career, working with recruiters, and understanding cost centers vs profit centers. This brings us to what I see as1 the final "first step" any developer should take in looking for a new job: overcoming imposter syndrome.
Find the Source The first step in getting a grasp on this issue is to identify the source of it. In my experience the feeling that you don't know what you're doing comes from two places: you see someone do something, and you can't figure out how they did it, or you set an expectation for yourself and fail to meet it. Once you've established the source of your imposter syndrome, the second step is to set up a plan for overcoming the feeling.
In my experience, most of my anxiety from this form is due to assumptions I made about what the expectations were, and those assumptions turned out to be false. Either my assumptions about the order to build things in was rubber ducky debugging wrong or my guess as to what issues would come up when changing a system were wrong. Sometimes it's that I simply can't debug a problem because my expectation about the output is wrong, and I can't figure out why.


This article has focused on desktop versions of the AMD Sempron. However, it's worth noting that the Mobile AMD Sempron, which is based on the Athlon 64, offers support for AMD's Enhanced Virus Protection (enabled by Windows XP Service Pack 2), which protects user-selected applications and files from memory buffer-overrun attacks. Thin and Light Mobile AMD Semprons run at 1.6GHz, drawing 25 watts, while Mobile AMD Semprons for full-size mobile PCs (desktop replacements) run at 1.6 to 1.8GHz, drawing 62 watts. See http://www.amd.com/us-en/Processors/ProductInformation/0,,30_118_11600_11613,00.html for more information about AMD Mobile Sempron processors.


The sleeve for tablets/hybrids from Goodis has a simple design that is ideal for your daily life.
The sleeve for tablets/hybrids from Goodis has a simple design that is ideal for your daily life. Its neoprene exterior combined with a soft coating inside and a reinforced corner protection guarantee your tablet's/hybrid's safety when you transport it. Compatible with 10-12 inch tablets/hybrids, this sleeve is useful to be used alone or to be kept in your bag or backpack.
Tablet 10.1", Tablet 10.5", Tablet 12"


Ours is a country of many problems and a powerful youth. BloodConnect is a classic example of how a group of motivated young students can tackle any problem. Being a youth run NGO, BloodConnect provides innumerable opportunities to its members enabling them to discover their potential and hone their skills.
In due course of being a part of BloodConnect, the members grow into the kind of individuals they once only looked up to.
Talking to families of patients, arranging donors, organizing camps, pitching to people, encouraging them to donate, all these bring us out of our comfort zone and redefine our understanding of the world around us. Members holding the positions of Vice President, Managers or Executives of any departments get lucky chances to make contacts, develop corporate relations, brainstorm over ideas that help the cause, activate their leadership quality and in due course, develop their personality.
BloodConnect develops its members into people that have a can-do attitude and are willing to challenge themselves to grow. For certain, BloodConnect is not the sole reason for the success of its members but it surely has helped them achieve greater heights. Our member, Shivani Garg, who was the Vice President of the Camps department, got through Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad. For Shivani her work in BloodConnect helped her ace her interview. Another one of our members, Navdha Khera, made it through Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore. Like these, many of our members are placed in some big corporate firms like Bain & Company, Facebook, Ola, CarDekho.com, Opera Solutions, etc.
Over the past 6 years we've had honest, diligent and passionate people working as members of BloodConnect and they are the ones to be accredited for the success of BloodConnect as an organisation. In return BloodConnect has proved for them to be a stepping stone to success.
BloodConnect prepares its members better for the future and helps them understand the role they play in making the world a better place, thereby motivating them on the social as well as the emotional front.
BloodConnect has helped us find the best in ourselves , a fact that all our members can attest to.
The experiences we have had, the friends and memories we make in BloodConnect, are going to stay with us for life. It is definitely not cakewalk, but then facing and conquering the challenges are what keep us motivated and strong.
Orlando: Where did we go wrong?
I every tine spent my half an hour to read this weblog's articles daily along with a cup of coffee.
6 lakh litres of blood thrown away over 5 years! Wait, WHAT?
bloodconnect on What have we become?
ukphonesignal.wordpr… on What have we become?
Gurunath Odugoudar on What have we become?


text:
FLAME TREE PRESS | March Releases | Michael R Johnston Q&A
Continuing our blogs looking at the authors behind our March releases, we turn to Michael R Johnston and The widening Gyre. He talked to us about being a teacher, the hardship of creating characters and the importance of representation in his novels.
What is The Widening Gyre about?
Please allow me to be a fru-fru literature teacher for a moment: It's about self-creation, and re-creation. It's about building a family to replace the one you lost and reclaiming yourself from bitterness. It's about climbing out of the hole you've dug yourself into. It's about healing, both yourself and your people.
Is there any advice you can give someone starting to write?
Find a group of people, both writers and non-writers, who will give you honest, kind, no-BS feedback. You want people who won't be rude, but will tell you, openly, where you're not succeeding as a writer, as well as where you're knocking it out of the park. The best part of Viable Paradise, the writing workshop I attended, was that I met a group of writers who've stayed in touch. Many of us talk every day, both about writing and our lives in general. We discuss story elements, critique each other's work, and help each other become better writers.
Did you write the book in silence, or do you prefer to write to any particular music?
It really depends on my mood and where I'm writing. If I'm writing in public I tend to write in silence. If I'm at home at my desk, I'll play various "mood" playlists I've created. I have one for space battles, another for "sneaky" suspense, and another that's just good instrumental pieces, most of them from TV or movie soundtracks. I generally can't write to music with lyrics; the words get in the way and the next thing you know I'm typing the song.
How does your job as a high school teacher interact with your writing?
Teaching uses a lot of the same creative energy as writing, so after a day at school, I'm often not really enthusiastic about sitting down to write. But if I give myself a little bit of time to unwind first, I can often get some words down. I get far more writing done during school holidays, but I'm working on ways to change that.
I also find inspiration in the classroom. I haven't lifted any particular student from real life, but I've "borrowed" aspects of their personalities to inspire more verisimilitude in my characters.
What do you find is the hardest part of creating characters?
For me, the hardest thing is making sure that everything I know about them in my head is actually on the page. For The Widening Gyre, I had a character who in my head was rich with meaning, but one of my beta readers pointed out that, on the page, he was flat and lifeless. So, I had to rewrite some of the scenes with him to get some of that inner knowledge onto the page. I didn't put it all in, though--there's a couple of secrets in there that will never actually be said "on camera." It's a lesson I learned at VP--that sometimes, knowing something that you don't put into the story's narrative makes it feel more realistic, because real life is like that—we don't always know everything that is going on around us, but that information still informs how the world interacts with us. In the novel, there's one character who has a secret, and it directly informs how he interacts with everyone else, but nobody will ever know what it is.
What was your favorite scene to write?
Any scene with Tajen and Liam was fun, but my favorite was the heist in the middle of the book. That chapter just came rolling out, and it's the one most of the beta readers had no changes to suggest.
Who are your favorite authors?
I have a lot of favorites. John Scalzi, Melanie Rawn, Melinda Snodgrass, Tanya Huff, Elizabeth Bear, and Brent Weeks are all writing things I love these days. I also love the Native American writer Leslie Marmon Silko, especially her book Ceremony, which should be required reading in American Literature classes.
When did you begin writing?
I first started writing in the tenth grade. I'd just moved to Sacramento, California, which was about six times bigger than my hometown, Napa, at that time. I didn't know anybody other than my aunt and uncle, so to amuse myself I started writing stories. I never stopped, though I did sort of back away from it for a number of years, where I was just fiddling around with it and not pursuing it seriously.
Was it important to you to write a gay protagonist? Did you ever consider changing him?
I'll do this one in reverse: I never considered changing that for a moment. Growing up bisexual was hard in the eighties; there weren't a lot of positive portrayals of LGBT characters in the media I read and watched. When there were LGBT characters, they were often either villains or comedic relief characters. And in the real world, LGBT people were being demonized on multiple sides.
When I found Mercedes Lackey's Books of the Last Herald-Mage, they were eye-openers. I still reread those books every couple of years; that's how much they've meant to me. Even though it's easier now for LGBT youth, at least in terms of positive portrayals of LGBT characters, I feel there needs to be more. And there need to be books where a character simply is what he is, and feels no need to worry about who he's attracted to. I decided early on that I was going to make that happen, at least in my own books. It's very clear early on that Tajen is gay, but he never wastes a moment agonizing about it. He just is, and nobody around him cares much. If I'm being honest, there's a little bit of writing the way I wish the world really was.
What are you writing now?
I have a couple of projects in the works; one is the next volume of The Remembrance War, titled The Blood-dimmed Tide, and I've also got an epic fantasy series, a stand-alone fantasy novel, and another, separate space-opera series in various states of planning. And at some point, I'll need to start outlining Remembrance War 3, currently titled What Rough Beast.
The Widening Gyre is available from our website!
Born in the San Francisco Bay Area and raised in Napa, California, Michael R. Johnston grew up steeped in everything Science Fiction and Fantasy.
In the early 90s, he took a break from college that went from being one semester to ten years. In that time, he had several jobs, from serving subpoenas to making sandwiches, before he became the Data Processing Manager of a small research company.
Eventually he decided he'd had enough of the corporate world and returned to college, graduating with honors from California State University, Sacramento. In fall 2006, he became a high school English teacher, a job he likens to herding a swarm of angry bees. It's the best job he's ever had.
Michael currently lives in Sacramento, California, with his wife and daughter. When he's not writing or teaching, he spends time with his family, plays video games and tabletop RPGs, and reads. He blogs at MJohnstonBooks.com, and can be found on Twitter as @MREJohnston.
Check out all of the March Release blog posts!
FLAME TREE PRESS | February Releases | 1 | Jonathan Janz Q&A
FLAME TREE PRESS | February Releases | 2 | Michael R Johnston Q&A
FLAME TREE PRESS | February Releases | 3 | Brian Kirk Q&A
FLAME TREE PRESS | February Releases | 4 | Upcoming Titles
Topics: Flame Tree Press, Q&A, Flame Tree Press Authors


text:
<?php

class Klevu_Search_Model_System_Config_Source_Triggeroptions
{

    const YES    = 1;
    const NO     = 0;

    public function toOptionArray()
    {
        $helper = Mage::helper("klevu_search");

        return array(
            array('value' => static::YES, 'label' => $helper->__("Yes")),
            array('value' => static::NO, 'label' => $helper->__("No"))
        );
    }
}

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaGithub