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Tag Archives: Vatersay
Island Tides – Paul Glazier
July 7, 2020 by Sophie
Today Paul Glazier launches a kickstarter to support his new book "Island Tides"
Published with Bluecoat Press the book documents life on Vatersay in the Outer Hebrides over the 35 year period Paul visited the island.
Beyond Barra Head © Paul Glazier 2013 all rights reserved
"When I first went to the island of Vatersay in 1978 I was only twelve, but immediately I could feel that the landscape and people resonated with some inner reality of my own.
This is why I felt a sense of homecoming and why I've been returning to the island ever since.
Vatersay is the southernmost inhabited island of the Outer Hebrides, and the rugged landscape is the backdrop against which everything happens, from the smallest occurrences to the most momentous, lending a perspective that gives significance whilst at the same time making you aware of the ephemeral nature of the world and our place in it.
The remoteness and the scale of the island nurtures a sense of community, continuity and connection with the past, and I hope that through this book I can contribute to that narrative."
Hector © Paul Glazier 1985 all rights reserved
We featured Paul's project as a portfolio a wee while ago on the Document Scotland site and are delighted to see it's now going to be a book. Paul kindly spoke to us and answered a few questions the day before the launch of his kickstarter launched…
DS: Why did you first start the project?
PG: It evolved very slowly into a project, growing out of my love of the island. As a young artist it was natural for me to turn to something close to my heart for inspiration.
DS: How easy was it to establish the trust and collaboration of the islanders?
PG: That simply grew out of my ongoing relationship with the people there. There are always people who are more comfortable in front of a lens and some less so. The fact that they know me makes a huge difference and most are now used to my photographic habits and are fairly relaxed about me taking photos, though I try to make it as little intrusive as possible.
Jennifer © Paul Glazier 1985 all rights reserved
DS: How often are you there?
PG: In my teenage years and into my twenties I was there once or twice a year in the holidays. When I moved to Amsterdam in 1994 this became less frequent but since 2010 I've been trying to get back every year, though I have missed a couple.
DS: What has been the most rewarding aspect of undertaking the project and spending time there?
PG: Spending time there has always been very rewarding in itself and I always feel recharged after my stay. As for the project itself, it has been great to see and hear how much the islanders themselves value the work. Many of them have my photos hanging in their houses and that is a huge affirmation for me that my work has worth.
DS: What made you decide to publish it as a book?
PG: As a project it could of course go on indefinitely and I'm certainly intending to continue visiting the island and taking photographs. But it just feels like the right time to give it a more public form, both as exhibition and as a book.
DS: How did you do the process of editing 30-years of work into one book?
PG: Yes, that was tricky! I had a couple of exhibitions last year so that really helped in finding a core to the book. But it was really just a question of going through all the material and finding the strongest images that said something about the island.I could have made various versions of the book but I wanted to focus on the islanders and their environment, to make a kind of portrait. However, it is in no way an academic documentation. It is more a personal reflection on the people and place.
The people in the images seem to love the photos and I have shown many of them a digital version of the book. In fact, I recorded their comments and some of these appear in the book as captions.
DS: Did you work with an editor?
PG: No, but for the shows last year there was a bit of discussion with Elliott Halls Gallery in Amsterdam and Malcolm Dickson at Street Level Photoworks, but our choices were fairly much in line.
DS: Were there design considerations to be made about the book, and how you wanted it to look? What influenced those decisions?
PG: Of course the design is very important. I wanted there to be a certain informal flow and rhythm and avoid a too academic approach. At the same time I wanted to allow each image to breath, and that has been the crux of the process, to get the right balance between these two qualities. I've had some great feedback on that through the photo-book club and some friends here in Amsterdam.
DS: Are there further plans for the project and work?
PG: A couple of exhibitions are planned for next spring. One in a new art's centre in Oban as the opening show, and one in Amsterdam at the Elliott Halls Glallery.
If you'd like to learn more and support this project, do check out Paul's kickstarter here…
Vatersay Village © Paul Glazier 2017 all rights reserved
Walking towards Sandray © Paul Glazier 2016 all rights reserved
To learn more about Island Tides and support the project please visit https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/islandtides/island-tides
Best of luck with the kickstarter Paul, we're sure it'll be a huge success!
| black and white, Bluecoat Press, Book, fund raise, Hebrides, Island Tides, Islands, Kickstarter, Outer Hebrides, Paul Glazier, photography, Vatersay | 0


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You are here: Home / ARTICLES FROM 2018
INDIA-ASEAN MARITIME COOPERATION PROSPECTS
www.maritimeindia.org Published in Diplomacy & beyond Plus Magazine: Special Report on ASEAN-India: 25 years of Dialogue Partnership, January 2018 at www.diplomacybeyond.com As India looks towards…
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NEWS STRAIT TIMES
25 YEARS OF INDIA - ASEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION
In 2017, ASEAN and India celebrated their silver jubilee. ASEAN and India have evolved enormously since early 1992 when India joined the regional organization and launched its "Look East Policy". The policy was later named as "Act East…
https://maritimeindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/rsz_aseanhq-1410_nstfield_image_socialmediavar_1571122874.jpg 550 900 admin https://maritimeindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/sm-logo.png admin2018-03-06 19:38:472021-01-19 16:08:1125 YEARS OF INDIA - ASEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION
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INDIA AND MYANMAR: PROSPECTS OF MARITIME RECIPROCITY
www.maritimeindia.org Myanmar occupies a critical position as far as India's…
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"COMFORT" WOMEN AND "UNCOMFORTABLE" EAST ASIAN GEOPOLITICS
South Korean President Moon Jae-in, publicly criticized the 2015 Comfort Women Agreement reached between South Korea and Japan, and appointed a task force to review the Agreement— which in turn concluded that the Agreement was flawed.[1]This…
https://maritimeindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/rsz_12buruma-superjumbo.jpg 550 900 admin https://maritimeindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/sm-logo.png admin2018-02-06 16:00:292021-01-18 14:29:44"COMFORT" WOMEN AND "UNCOMFORTABLE" EAST ASIAN GEOPOLITICS
copy rights: Times now
CHINA'S GROWING INFLUENCE IN AFRICA: LESSONS FOR INDIA
On December 04, 2015, while delivering a speech at the opening ceremony of the Johannesburg Summit of the Sixth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the Chinese President Xi Jinping asserted, "In conducting China's relations with…
https://maritimeindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/rsz_indiachinaflags-ians_1.jpg 550 900 admin https://maritimeindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/sm-logo.png admin2018-02-02 16:36:202021-01-18 14:14:51CHINA'S GROWING INFLUENCE IN AFRICA: LESSONS FOR INDIA
INDIA AND INDONESIA: CONVERGING MARITIME INTERESTS IN THE CONFLUENCE OF THE OCEANS
As the 'rise' of Asia gathers momentum, the geopolitical interplay amongst the regional powers is likely to become more vigorous. India and Indonesia are amongst these powers whose interface is likely to be guided by strong convergent interests…
https://maritimeindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Picture1.png 583 852 admin https://maritimeindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/sm-logo.png admin2018-01-14 13:58:522021-01-18 14:21:47INDIA AND INDONESIA: CONVERGING MARITIME INTERESTS IN THE CONFLUENCE OF THE OCEANS
• Holistic Maritime Security-Thematic
• Holistic Maritime Security-Maritime Geostrategies
• Marine, Maritime & Naval Technology
• Blue Economy & Climate Change (BECC)
• Oceanic Resources
• Public International Maritime Law (PIML)
• Environment & Ecological Issues
• Maritime Trade & Connectivity
• Maritime Facets of Energy
• Maritime History, Heritage and Culture
• Maritime Safety
Credits: Associated Press- Photo/Built MarquezCHINA'S MANTRA FOR GREAT MARITIME POWERHOOD: PRESIDENT XI'S SPEECH AT 20TH NPC SETS THE AGENDA20 January 2023 - 4:54 pm
INDIA'S MARITIME IDENTITY18 January 2023 - 4:50 pm
CANADA'S INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY: CROSSING THE NORTH PACIFIC17 January 2023 - 3:25 pm
UKRAINE CRISIS: IMPLICATIONS FOR ASEAN'S MARITIME SECURITY7 January 2023 - 1:36 pm
MAINSTREAMING MARINE SPATIAL PLANNING IN INDIA'S APPROACH TO OCEAN GOVERNANCE6 January 2023 - 4:53 pm

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Q: How retrieve ticks with same format like DateTime.Ticks in C++ ATL/MFC Is It possible get ticks number with same format like DateTime.Ticks .NET object, that is in 100ns units, in C++ ATL or MFC?

A: DateTime.Ticks does not have any implications on timer resolution, so you are not promised that timer is 100ns accurate. In C++ you have a similar value using:
ULONGLONG nTicks = GetTickCount() * 10000i64;

If you need a more accurate timer, look for QueryPerformanceCounter based implementation. See:

*

*How to use QueryPerformanceCounter?

*Fastest timing resolution system

*Can someone decipher whether timeGetTime() or QueryPerformanceCounter/QueryPerformanceFrequency has lower overhead or/and accuracy?
UPD. As for alignment to that from .NET Ticks property, see comment from Hans above - value casted/calculated from result of GetFileTime API is also in the same 100 ns units and is set off Ticks property by a fixed constant.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


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A Discussion of Congressional Legal Issues
Can Schock Turn the Tables (and Mirrors, Chandeliers, etc.) on the Government?
So last night I am at Costco and I get a tweet from @danielschuman directing my attention to two new filings by the legal team for former Congressman Aaron Schock, who is facing federal charges arising from, among other things, the allegedly improper use of his Members Representational Allowance to decorate his congressional office in a lavish "Downton Abbey" style. Schock's attorneys maintain that the government's allegations are built on a "house of cards" (heh) and are demanding discovery regarding certain aspects of the prosecution case, including whether prosecutors gave erroneous legal instructions to the grand jury about the House Ethics Manual and other House guidelines for official conduct by members of Congress.
The real blockbuster in the Schock motions, though, was the revelation that the FBI had recruited a congressional staffer in Schock's district office to act as a confidential informant and, get this, wear a wire while having conversations with Schock and other members of his staff. The CI also allegedly seized or attempted to seize various documents from Schock's office for the government's benefit.
Schock's team is livid, and I can't say that I blame them. Bear in mind that the House Counsel has long taken the position that the FBI should go through its office to request or schedule interviews with members, officers or employees of the House related to official conduct. (The FBI supposedly agreed to this in the early 1990s, but, if so, this agreement has often been honored in the breach). The purpose of this procedure is to ensure that interviewees have the opportunity to be represented by counsel and that they understand the rights and obligations arising from their congressional service. For the FBI to not merely conduct an ex parte interview (which it has done before), but to turn a congressional staffer into an informant who secretly records conversations with his boss and colleagues, seems like a flagrant violation of the norms of conduct that have guided executive-legislative branch relations in the post-Watergate era. It is different, for example, than Abscam (controversial itself at the time), which involved third parties who were not subject to congressional rules and who did not enjoy a legislative relationship of trust and confidence with their targets.
A more difficult question is whether this breach of norms amounts to a legal violation that can be enforced in Schock's criminal case. Schock's lawyers argue that the government's actions may constitute "violations of separation of powers principles, including those embodied in Speech or Debate jurisprudence" and assert that "the CI presented a direct threat to Mr. Schock's Speech or Debate privilege." They also contend, somewhat more directly, that by "us[ing] the CI to intrude upon Mr. Schock's Office, to listen to and record conversations with Mr. Schock and his staffers, and to seize documents from with Mr. Schock's Congressional Office," the government "violated the Constitutional privilege against executive interference granted to all Members of Congress by the Speech or Debate Clause."
The government's alleged actions (and I should note my comments are based solely on what Schock's lawyers have represented) certainly implicate fundamental concerns of the Speech or Debate Clause, but for reasons I have discussed before (see here for example), I am not sure they constituted violations of the Clause itself, at least as it has been interpreted by the courts. A Speech or Debate analysis would ask whether the government was prohibited from capturing, whether through the testimony of the CI, the secret recordings or pilfered documents, discussions of a legislative nature. But I don't think that is the primary issue here. The bigger issue is the government's improper use of a legislator's "alter ego" (as legislative aides are called in the Speech or Debate jurisprudence) to act as a tool of the prosecution (i.e., the executive branch) without any contemplation of how this conflicted with his duties to the congressman and the House (i.e., the legislative branch).
The irony is that Schock's prosecution rests in part on House rules, guidelines and norms of conduct (many of which his lawyers claim are not so clear). I am not aware of any specific House rule or guideline that prohibits a staffer from secretly recording his boss or stealing office documents to hand over to the government, but I think there is a decent chance the Ethics Committee would find this to be conduct not reflecting creditably on the House. Maybe the prosecutors should have sought an advisory opinion before they started down this path.
I may have further comments on this as things progress, but these are my initial reactions.
The President and the Purposes of the Foreign Emoluments Clause (Part III): Presents and Emoluments
We may now turn to the question of whether the Framers might have had reason to exclude the president from the Foreign Emoluments Clause's presumptive ban on accepting any "present" or "emolument" from a foreign power. Here we should start with an important distinction. I am not claiming that the exclusion of the president from the FEC would be an absurd result in the sense that it would justify departing from the plain meaning of the Constitution. Compare United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 487 (1868) (classic example of the absurd results doctrine is the law "'that whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity' did not extend to the surgeon who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street in a fit"). If the plain meaning of the FEC excludes the president, I am satisfied that Professor Grewal's explanation (discussed in my original post on this topic) would be sufficient to forestall operation of the absurd results doctrine.
If, however, the question is whether the meaning of the FEC is plain or, if plain, what that meaning is, then I think Professor Grewal falls short of offering a persuasive reason why the Framers might have decided not to restrict the president's acceptance of foreign presents or emoluments. Grewal suggests first that the Framers' concerns about foreign gifts and payments may have centered on appointed officers because only officers "like ambassadors . . . would make the type of extended visits abroad that could subject them to improper foreign influence." Andy S. Grewal, The Foreign Emoluments Clause and the Chief Executive, 102 Minn. L. Rev. __, *7 (forthcoming 2017).
At the outset, there is something less than a tight fit between this hypothesis and the language used in the FEC. After all, the Clause applies to all persons who hold any office of profit or trust under the United States. This language is not limited to officials likely to make extended trips abroad, but includes many officers with a largely or exclusively domestic focus (such as the Secretary of the Treasury and subordinate officials responsible for the public fisc, the Chief Coiner and other officers of the Mint, the Attorney General and district attorneys, postmasters and other officials involved in the postal system, and the entire federal judiciary, among others). If the Framers had wanted to limit the FEC to diplomatic officials likely to spend significant time abroad, they could have employed the language used elsewhere in the Constitution ("ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls") to refer to such officials.
Common sense also suggests that foreign powers would have ample opportunity, and even greater motive, to offer the president gifts and payments (both of the somewhat above-board ceremonial kind or of the less savory surreptitious kind). For example, the president is charged by Article II with receiving ambassadors and other pubic ministers from foreign nations. See U.S. const., art. II, § 2. As the official ultimately responsible for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, the president would certainly be expected to meet and correspond directly with foreign dignitaries, including heads of state, on a regular basis. Thus, the Framers would hardly have been surprised that U.S. presidents, beginning with George Washington, have been offered or received gifts from foreign governments or dignitaries. See, e.g., Seth Barrett Tillman, The Original Public Meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause, 107 Nw. L. Rev. 180, 188-90 (2013) (citing examples).
It is true that U.S. ambassadors and other diplomatic officials were a particular concern of the FEC, due in large part to the European custom of giving gifts, sometimes of significant value, to visiting foreign diplomats. Because it was often diplomatically awkward to refuse such gifts, this is also likely why it was thought impractical to have an absolute ban on accepting them. See Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of "Emoluments" in the Constitution *40 (Feb. 5, 2017).
I am aware, however, of no evidence to suggest that the Framers were concerned exclusively with potential foreign corruption of diplomats or other officials who would be abroad for long periods. To the contrary, there is a great deal of evidence (some of which was discussed in my last post) that the Framers were equally if not more concerned about foreign corruption of the president.
For example, during the Philadelphia Convention's consideration of whether the president should be impeachable, James Madison thought it "indispensable that some provision should be made for defending the Community agst the incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the chief Magistrate." II Farrand's Documentary History of the Constitution 65. Madison warned specifically that the president "might betray his trust to foreign powers." Id. at 66.
Gouverneur Morris, who had initially leaned against the president's impeachability, pronounced himself persuaded by the debate to change his mind. He explained:
Our Executive was not like a Magistrate having a life interest, much less like one having an hereditary interest in his office. He may be bribed by a greater interest to betray his trust; and no one would say that we ought to expose ourselves to the danger of seeing the first Magistrate in foreign pay without being able to guard agst. it by displacing him. One would think the King of England well secured agst bribery. He has as it were a fee simple in the whole Kingdom. Yet Charles II was bribed by Louis XIV.
Id. at 68-69 (emphasis added). Morris's point seems to be that there is a greater chance that the president would choose his private interest over that of the country than would the King of England, who basically owns his country as private property, yet even the latter could be successfully bribed by a foreign power. Be that as it may, these remarks confirm that the Framers were attuned to the danger of a president coming to be "in foreign pay." It would therefore be highly surprising had the Framers decided the president, of all executive branch officials, should not be subject to the FEC. See Saikrishna Banglore Prakash, Why the Incompatibility Clause Applies to the Office of the President, 4 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol'y Sidebar 35, 41-42 (2009) (particularly in light of Framers' knowledge of incidents such as payments from Louis XIV of France to Charles II of England, reading FEC "as if it permitted the President to receive foreign bribes, without any congressional oversight or check, makes little sense").
It may be recalled from my last post that the anti-Federalists were dissatisfied with the Constitution's protections in two respects relevant to our discussion. The first is that the FEC is not an absolute prohibition on foreign titles and payments, but allows for their acceptance with congressional consent. The second is that the president is simply too tempting a target for foreign influence and corruption because of the powers the Constitution concentrates in his hands. George Mason reflected both of these concerns in the Virginia ratifying convention when he pointed out that the president "may, by consent of Congress, receive a stated pension from European potentates."
Responding to Mason's argument, Edmund Randolph (who, like Mason, had been a delegate to the Philadelphia Convention) contended:
There is another provision against the danger, mentioned by the honorable member, of the President receiving emoluments from foreign powers. If discovered, he may be impeached. If he not be impeached, he may be displaced at the end of four years. By the 9th section of the 1st article, "no person, holding an office of profit or trust, shall accept of any present or emolument whatever, from any foreign power, without the consent of the representatives of the people;" and by the 1st section of the 2d article, his compensation is neither to be increased nor diminished during the time for which he shall have been elected; and he shall not, during that period, receive any emolument from the United States or any of them. I consider, therefore, that he is restrained from receiving any present or emolument whatever. It is impossible to guard better against corruption.
3 Elliot's Debates 486.
This colloquy shows that Mason and Randolph, though disagreeing on the adequacy of the FEC and other constitutional provisions for this purpose, agree on two key points: (1) the president receiving emoluments or presents from foreign powers is a danger against which safeguards are needed; and (2) the FEC's strictures do apply to the president.
Randolph's remarks also suggest that the FEC and the Presidential Compensation Clause (art. II, § 1, cl. 7) are complementary restrictions that limit the president to a fixed salary and ensure that he does not receive any other emoluments from the United States, any state or any foreign power. One might quibble with Randolph on the grounds that the FEC is not an absolute prohibition, thus theoretically permitting the president to receive foreign emoluments or presents with congressional permission. In general, however, his remarks confirm, pace Professor Grewal, that the Framers did not see the presidency for some reason as raising concerns only as to domestic emoluments. Indeed, it is not obvious to me why anyone, with or without insight into the Framers' deliberations, would think that the president would be singled out for restriction on domestic emoluments, while simultaneously excluded from a general prohibition on foreign emoluments.
Finally, we may address Grewal's suggestion that the Framers might have been particularly concerned about potential foreign corruption of officers who, unlike the president, did not receive a fixed salary and were dependent on transaction-based payments for their livelihood. Andy S. Grewal, The Foreign Emoluments Clause and the Chief Executive, 102 Minn. L. Rev. __, *9 (forthcoming 2017). This idea strikes me as getting things a little backwards. The president's compensation, unlike that of any other executive branch official, is constitutionally fixed because of the singular importance of his office and the need to ensure that Congress cannot financially reward or punish him during his term of office. Likewise, he is prohibited from receiving any other emoluments from the United States or any state to prevent any financial dependence or partiality on his part. It would be utterly implausible to think that the Framers would be less concerned about the need to insulate the president from foreign financial influence, or that they would have been more worried about foreign corruption of customs collectors or immigration officials.
Federal judges also have constitutional protection for their salaries, which cannot be diminished during their time in office. In comparison to the president, there is little reason to think that they would either be in regular contact with foreign powers, or that foreign powers would have reason to influence them. Yet federal judges are not exempted from the prohibitions of the FEC. It is hard to see how it would make sense to exempt the president.
A more plausible explanation for excluding the president would relate to the requirement in the FEC to obtain congressional consent. It is at least possible to imagine that some could think it improper to require the president, as the head of a separate branch of government, to seek such consent whenever a foreign government offered him something "on the order of a snuffbox, a portrait, or a gold chain," as Professor Currie puts it. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period 1789-1801 281 (1997). Rather than requiring the president to seek congressional permission, it would be left to his judgment whether to accept a foreign gift or an emolument personally or on behalf of the United States. If he should accept a bribe or an improper gift or payment that Congress considered to amount to a high crime or misdemeanor, he would be subject to impeachment.
Tillman suggests something along these lines in his comments to my blog post of 3-13-17. While stating "I frankly admit that I do not know" why the Framers might have exempted "federal elected officials" (including the president) from the FEC, Tillman proposes that the Framers might have "relied on elected officials to act like fiduciaries" and/or been concerned about giving another body the power to make judgments concerning "those at the apex of authority." In the context of the president and the FEC, this would mean that the Framers may have preferred to rely on the president's judgment regarding the acceptance of foreign presents and emoluments, instead of requiring him to submit to Congress's judgment on such matters.
There is some surface plausibility to the "no congressional permission slip" explanation, but it is wrong for at least three reasons. First, as Professor Grewal noted regarding his own explanation, "no contemporaneous materials advance this understanding." In other words, it's a nice theory, but it is made up out of whole cloth. (I can say this since I made it up, and I think Tillman would agree as well). There is no evidence that any Framers (or anyone else) actually subscribed to it.
Second, this explanation overlooks an important aspect of the congressional consent requirement. This requirement doesn't just restrict the foreign presents and emoluments that can be accepted; it also ensures that offers of such presents and emoluments are disclosed. If the recipient of a foreign gift or payment discloses it publicly, this is in itself some assurance that it is not improper and will not influence the recipient. If the gift or payment is kept secret, on the other hand, its discovery will excite suspicion even if it was not actually a bribe.
Had the Framers intended to permit the president to be the judge of his own emoluments, they would have provided for a mechanism for disclosure of his decisions. For example, they could have required that he inform Congress, rather than seek its permission. Simply omitting the president from the FEC would be a recipe for misunderstanding and suspicion, which would likely have led to wholly unnecessary and predictable charges of corruption.
Finally, and most importantly, while it is possible that some people might have subscribed to my theory, it is inconceivable that everyone would have done so. As we have seen, any suggestion of a loophole in the FEC that would have allowed the president to receive presents or emoluments (much less titles of nobility) from foreign powers without congressional permission or oversight would have excited tremendous opposition. The fact that there was no controversy on this point can only be explained in two ways: (1) the existence of a presidential loophole in the FEC was publicly known or discussed, and yet no one objected; or (2) everyone understood or assumed, and no one (at least publicly) disputed, that the president was in fact covered by the FEC. The overwhelming evidence is in favor of the latter over the former.
The President and the Purposes of the Foreign Emoluments Clause (Part II): Titles of Nobility
There has been much debate about Professor Zephyr Teachout's claim that the Foreign Emoluments Clause and other constitutional provisions show that the Framers were "obsessed" with corruption. Compare Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 341, 405 (2009) with Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of "Emoluments" in the Constitution 59-60 (Feb. 5, 2017) (arguing that the Framers balanced their concerns with potential corruption against other competing values) and Seth Barrett Tillman, Citizens United and the Scope of Professor Teachout's Anti-Corruption Principle, 107 Nw. L. Rev. 399, 404-10 (2012) (arguing that Teachout has overstated her claim about the Framers' "obsession" with corruption). Whatever the right word for the Framers' concerns about corruption, a stronger one is probably needed to describe their hostility (and that of the founding generation) toward titles of nobility. This is particularly true in comparison with modern sensibilities, which regard financial corruption and conflicts of interest with at least as much dismay as did the Framers, but are more likely to view titles of nobility as an amusing irrelevance.
Some flavor of the republican opposition to titles of nobility can be found in the Georgia Constitution of 1777, Article XI of which provided:
No person shall be entitled to more than one vote, which shall be given in the county where such person resides, except as before excepted; nor shall any person who holds any title of nobility lie entitled to a vote, or be capable of serving as a representative, or hold any post of honor, profit, or trust in this State, whilst such person claims his title of nobility; but if the person shall give up such distinction, in the manner as may be directed by any future legislation, then, and in such case, he shall be entitled to a vote, and represent, as before directed, and enjoy all the other benefits of a free citizen.
(emphasis added). Here the holder of a title of nobility was not only disqualified from serving in the legislature and holding a "post of honor, profit, or trust," but even from exercising his right to vote.
As discussed in my last post, the Articles of Confederation did not go quite that far, but it barred both the national and state governments from issuing titles of nobility and prohibited any person holding an "office of profit or trust" under the United States or any state from accepting titles of nobility (as well as presents, emoluments or offices) from a foreign power. The Constitution largely copied these prohibitions, but, as we saw, permitted acceptance with congressional consent and did not apply to state officeholders.
The Federalists pointed to the Constitution's provisions on titles of nobility as an essential protection of republican government. Madison remarked in Federalist No. 39: "Could any further proof be required of the republican complexion of this system, the decisive one might be found in its absolute prohibition of titles of nobility, both under the federal and the state governments, and in its express guarantee of the republican form to each of the latter." (It should be noted that the Constitution's guarantee of a republican form of government to the states, which did not appear in the Articles, may in part explain why it was not considered necessary to cover state officeholders in the Foreign Emoluments Clause).
Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist No. 85, likewise listed the "absolute and universal exclusion of titles of nobility" as one of "securities to republican government" provided by the Constitution and explained in Federalist No. 84:
Nothing need be said to illustrate the importance of the prohibition of titles of nobility. This may truly be denominated the corner stone of republican government for so long as they are excluded, there can never be serious danger that the government will be any other than that of the people.
The assurance of an "absolute and universal exclusion," however, was not quite accurate. With respect to foreign titles of nobility, the Constitution's restrictions applied only to holders of offices of profit or trust under the United States. Moreover, unlike the Articles, the Constitution allowed acceptance of such titles of nobility (as well as presents, emoluments and offices from foreign powers) with congressional consent.
This latter change did not go unnoticed in the state ratifying conventions. John Hancock submitted a resolution to the Massachusetts convention asking that the words "without the Consent of Congress" be struck from the Foreign Emoluments Clause so that "there would be an absolute prohibition on federal officeholders' accepting any emolument, office, or title from a foreign country or King." Pauline Maier, Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution 1787-1788 197 (2010). The Massachusetts, New York and Rhode Island ratifying conventions all asked for amendments making this change. The Virginia and North Carolina conventions chimed in for a general amendment banning exclusive or hereditary emoluments, privileges or offices of any kind, which presumably would have banned all foreign titles among other things. See Jol A. Silversmith, The "Missing Thirteenth Amendment": Constitutional Nonsense and Titles of Nobility, 8 Southern Cal. Interdisciplinary L. J. 577, 578 & nn. 11, 13 (1999). Finally, the New Hampshire ratifying convention asked for an amendment that "Congress shall at no Time consent that any Person holding an Office of Trust or profit under the United States shall accept any Title of Nobility or any other Title or Office from any King, Prince, or Foreign State."
Clearly titles of nobility were a major concern of both Federalists and anti-Federalists, and there was considerable scrutiny during ratification of whether the FEC was sufficiently strict in this regard. It seems inconceivable that these concerns would not have extended to a presidential exemption from the FEC, if anyone thought that such an exemption might exist. To the contrary, the presidency would seem to present the most compelling example of the potential corruption of titles of nobility in general and foreign titles in particular. (It should be noted again that Professor Grewal's explanation of why the Framers might have chosen to exempt the president from the FEC does not address titles of nobility).
Unquestionably the Framers were worried about potential foreign influence over the presidency, and it was to prevent such influence that they required the president to be a natural born citizen. See U.S. const., art. II, § 1, cl. 5. This requirement is inextricably tied to fears about presidential monarchism. As St. George Tucker explained:
That provision in the constitution which requires that the president shall be a native-born citizen (unless he were a citizen of the United States when the constitution was adopted,) is a happy means of security against foreign influence, which, where-ever it is capable of being exerted, is to be dreaded more than the plague. The admission of foreigners into our councils, consequently, cannot be too much guarded against; their total exclusion from a station to which foreign nations have been accustomed to, attach ideas of sovereign power, sacredness of character, and hereditary right, is a measure of the most consummate policy and wisdom. It was by means of foreign connections that the stadtholder of Holland, whose powers at first were probably not equal to those of a president of the United States, became a sovereign hereditary prince before the late revolution in that country. Nor is it with levity that I remark, that the very title of our first magistrate, in some measure exempts us from the danger of those calamities by which European nations are almost perpetually visited. The title of king, prince, emperor, or czar, without the smallest addition to his powers, would have rendered him a member of the fraternity of crowned heads: their common cause has more than once threatened the desolation of Europe. To have added a member to this sacred family in America, would have invited and perpetuated among us all the evils of Pandora's Box.
St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries, Vol. 1, Note D, Part 7 (1803)(emphasis added). See also Akhil Reed Amar, Natural Born Killjoy (2004) (natural born citizen requirement was designed to "ease anxieties about foreign nobility," to "reject all vestiges of monarchy," and to prevent a scenario where "a foreign earl or duke would cross the Atlantic with immense wealth and a vast retinue and use his European riches to buy friends and power on a scale that no American could match."); cf. Keith E. Whittington, Originalism, Constitutional Construction, and the Problem of Faithless Electors *17 (Mar. 4, 2017), Arizona L. Rev. forthcoming ("But the founders were familiar enough with the intrigues of the feudal courts of Europe to anticipate the possibility of foreign powers or domestic cabals attempting to influence the national legislature to install some willing princeling as president").
The anti-Federalists, however, were not persuaded that the Constitution contained enough safeguards against presidential monarchism and foreign influence. At the Virginia ratifying convention, for example, William Grayson warned that '[t]he president had too much power, which would make it worth the while of foreign countries to interfere in his election—as they had done when Poland chose a new king in the early 1760s." Maier, supra, at 286. Patrick Henry likewise warned that the president "could easily become a king." Id. at 266. But no one claimed that the FEC exempted the president from the restrictions on receiving titles of nobility or other benefits from foreign powers.
Most telling in this regard were the remarks of George Mason, who like Grayson cited the Polish example as evidence of likely foreign tampering with the presidency:
Will not the great powers of Europe, as France and Great Britain, be interested in having a friend in the President of the United States? And will they not be more interested in his election than in that of the king of Poland? The people of Poland have a right to displace their King. But do they ever do it. No. Prussia and Russia, and other European powers, would not suffer it. This clause will open a door to the dangers and misfortunes which the people of Poland undergo. The powers of Europe will interpose, and we shall have a civil war in the bowels of our country, and be subject to all the horrors and calamities of an elective monarchy. This very executive officer may, by consent of Congress, receive a stated pension from European potentates.
3 Elliott's Debates 484 (emphasis added). Here Mason clearly implies that the president is subject to the FEC and therefore requires consent of Congress to receive a "stated pension from European potentates." See Natelson, supra, *12 n. 25 (noting that Mason in this speech "apparently assumes that the Foreign Emoluments Clause applies to the president"). Mason's remarks are particularly significant because (1) he was a Framer and (2) as an anti-Federalist, he had every incentive to identify any possible risks in the Constitution. (I mean, he even suggests the Russians might interfere in a presidential election!) The fact that he assumes that the FEC applies to the president suggests an interpretation to the contrary did not even cross his mind.
Indeed, nowhere in the ratification debates or the writings of the anti-Federalists does it appear that anyone suggested that the president might be exempt from the FEC. Given that many thought the FEC was already too lenient in allowing the acceptance of titles of nobility and other benefits with congressional consent, it is simply incredible that the opponents of the Constitution would not have objected to the president being exempted, which they certainly would have portrayed as a virtual invitation to foreign interference and bribery. The near universal revulsion with which titles of nobility were regarded would have made the idea that the president was free to accept foreign titles a particularly strong anti-Federalist talking point. Continue reading "The President and the Purposes of the Foreign Emoluments Clause (Part II): Titles of Nobility"
The President and the Purposes of the Foreign Emoluments Clause (Part I)
I promised to return to the subject of the Foreign Emoluments Clause and so today I will start a series of posts on the purposes of that Clause and whether it makes sense for the president to be excluded from its terms. This first post will set the stage with a little background.
To be clear, the question here is not merely whether the ostensible purposes of the FEC would be better served by including the president. Rather it is whether the exclusion of the president would be so discordant with those purposes that (1) the educated reader of the Constitution in 1787-89 would have assumed the Clause encompassed the president and/or (2) any suggestion of the president's exclusion could have been expected to provoke controversy and opposition. If either or both of these is true, then silence regarding the president's alleged exclusion should be taken as evidence that (1) such exclusion was either (a) not intended by the Framers or (b) not communicated by the Framers to anyone else; and (2) such exclusion was not widely understood by the ratifiers or the general public.
And silence there was. To my knowledge, prior to Professor Tillman's raising the issue in 2009 or so, no one had ever expressly claimed or directly implied the president was excluded by the FEC. No president, no member of Congress, no executive branch lawyer, no constitutional scholar. No one. By contrast, there had been a number of statements expressly affirming or clearly assuming the president's inclusion, including by Framers/ratifiers (Edmund Randolph and George Mason), by executive branch lawyers at the Office of Legal Counsel, by statute (the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act) and by occasional comment of constitutional writers and scholars. Perhaps this is a relative paucity of affirmations over a period of two centuries, but on the other hand there was little reason for anyone to expressly consider and affirm what no one had disputed or denied.
Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that no one had offered an explanation as to why the Framers might have excluded the president from the FEC's provisions. Indeed, Tillman himself, although he has intimated reasons why the president might have been excluded from other constitutional provisions, such as the Disqualification Clause (see here at page 92 n.83), has not explained to my recollection why the Framers would have wanted the president to be exempt from the FEC's presumptive ban against accepting "any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State." And there is no obvious reason (at least obvious to me) why the president would be exempted from a provision founded, in Justice Story's words, "in a just jealousy of foreign influence of every sort." 3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1346.
Fortunately, Professor Grewal has attempted to fill this void. In a recent article focused primarily on other aspects of the FEC, he notes:
Scholarly debates show that whether the Foreign Emoluments Clause treats the President as a U.S. Officer remains an open question. At first glance, it may seem implausible that the Constitution would exempt any member of the government from a provision designed to prevent corruption. Yet the Domestic Emoluments Clause, which also guards against corruption, applies only to the President and not generally to U.S. Officers, or even to the Vice President. This suggests that the Framers may have drafted each emoluments clause to address their principal concerns, without attempting to guard against corruption of every type imaginable.
Regarding their principal concerns, the Framers may very well have believed that only appointed officers, like ambassadors, would make the type of extended visits abroad that could subject them to improper foreign influences. The President, they may have thought, would remain stateside to tend to the needs of the nation, and his potential corruption would be best addressed through the Domestic Emoluments Clause. Under this view, the exclusion of the President from the Foreign Emoluments Clause would be entirely consistent with the Framers' design.
Andy S. Grewal, The Foreign Emoluments Clause and the Chief Executive, 102 Minn. L. Rev. __, **7-9 (forthcoming 2017).
Grewal also notes that the Framers might have been more concerned about the potential for corruption among those officers of the United States who did not receive fixed compensation, but were dependent on "potentially uncertain streams of income" such as charging transaction-based user fees for services like processing of immigration papers. Id. at *9. Because the Constitution guarantees the president a fixed salary, Grewal suggest that the Framers may have been less concerned about the possibility the president would be susceptible to foreign corruption. He acknowledges, however, that "no contemporaneous materials advance this understanding." Id.
With this potential explanation in mind, let's take a closer look at what the FEC proscribes. We begin with the text:
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.
U.S. const., art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
One thing to note from this language is that the U.S. officeholder is not only restricted from receiving any present or emolument, but two items not discussed by Professor Grewal. One is any title, including if not necessarily limited to any title of nobility, which appears to be a central focus of the Clause. (More on this later.)
The other is any "office." Presumably an office conferred by a foreign government could impose duties to be performed on behalf of that government. Acceptance of such an office would seem to be manifestly improper for any federal officeholder, much less the president of the United States. For present purposes, however, I will assume that the FEC primarily contemplates ceremonial offices, which would simply be another way of conferring an emolument or title. Therefore, I will not give separate consideration to this restriction.
The language of the FEC must be understood in light of Article VI of the Articles of Confederation, which contained a closely related provision from which the FEC is derived:
No State, without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, shall send any embassy to, or receive any embassy from, or enter into any conference, agreement, alliance or treaty with any King, Prince or State; nor shall any person holding any office of profit or trust under the United States, or any of them, accept any present, emolument, office or title of any kind whatever from any King, Prince or foreign state; nor shall the United States in Congress assembled, or any of them, grant any title of nobility.
This provision of the Articles combines two different concepts. The first sentence limits the ability of states to conduct their own foreign relations. The last sentence prohibits the United States or any state from issuing titles of nobility. The middle sentence links these seemingly unrelated subjects by prohibiting any person holding "any office of profit or trust" under the United States or any state from accepting a title of nobility or other benefit from a foreign power.
The drafters of the Constitution broke this provision into two components. The FEC addresses prohibitions on the United States, forbidding the issuance of titles of nobility at the federal level and federal officeholders from accepting, without congressional consent, titles of nobility or other benefits from foreign powers. A separate provision, which immediately follows the FEC, contains a series of prohibitions on the states, including forbidding them from entering into any treaty, alliance or confederation and from issuing any title of nobility. See U.S. const., art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
There are two observations of interest here. The first is that the FEC uses the same term, "office of profit or trust" under the United States, as was used in the Articles. Since there was no president under the Articles, there may have not been a pre-existing understanding as to whether the term embraced the office of president.
Second, unlike the Articles, the Constitution does not forbid state officeholders from accepting titles of nobility, emoluments, etc. from foreign powers. The reason for the change is unclear. One possibility is that the Framers decided to permit such acceptance with the consent of Congress, but thought it improper or impractical to require state officeholders to seek such permission (imagine Congress being inundated with requests from state officials, who at that time would have been much more numerous than federal officers). Alternatively or in addition, they may have thought it inappropriate or unnecessary for the federal constitution to regulate the conduct of state officeholders.
It is also possible that the prohibition with respect to state officeholders in the Articles was considered necessary because of the particular structure of that system. The primary national institution under the Articles was the Confederation Congress, and delegates to that Congress, who were "annually appointed in such manner as the legislatures of each State shall direct," arguably functioned more like state delegates or commissioners to an interstate convention than like ordinary legislators. This is speculation, but the drafters of the Articles may have thought that covering "offices of profit or trust" under any state was necessary in order to ensure that delegates to the Confederation Congress were subject to the prohibition.
With this background, in my next post I will turn to the purposes of the prohibition on titles of nobility.
Would Speech or Debate Protect Attorney General Sessions from Prosecution?
It is being alleged that Attorney General Sessions gave untruthful testimony in his confirmation hearing. Specifically, in response to a question from Senator Franken about communications between Trump surrogates and representatives of the Russian government in the course of the 2016 presidential campaign, Sessions responded: "Senator Franken, I'm not aware of any of those activities. I have been called a surrogate at a time or two in that campaign and I did not have communications with the Russians, and I'm unable to comment on it." In fact, Sessions apparently did have two discussions with the Russian ambassador during 2016, although it is unclear whether they discussed anything regarding the election.
For present purposes, we will skip the (serious) issue of whether there is a plausible basis for viewing this testimony as perjury or a material false statement that could be the basis of a criminal prosecution. Assuming that such a basis exists, there is an interesting legal question that arises. Would Sessions be immune from prosecution under the Speech or Debate Clause? For the reasons set forth below, the answer is probably no.
Continue reading "Would Speech or Debate Protect Attorney General Sessions from Prosecution?"
Access to Grand Jury Information
Appointments and Removal
Arrest Clause
Article V convention
Attorney Client
Congressional Accountability Act
Congressional Clerkship
Congressional Constitutional Interpretation
Congressional healthcare
Congressional Investigations
Congressional Lawyers
Congressional Privileges
Congressional Standing
Congressional Subpoenas
Contempt of Congress
Decorum and Debate
Deliberative Process
Duty to Defend
Enjoining third parties from complying
Entrenchment
Executive Reports to Congress
Extraterritorial Investigation
False Statements and Perjury Before Congress
Foreign Emoluments Clause
Foreign Parliamentary Procedure
House and Senate Legal Counsel
Immunity Grants
Incompatible Offices
Intelligence Oversight
Justice Department Investigations
Lobbying Ethics
Office and Officer
Officer of Congress
Origination Clause
Oversight of and Relations With
Oversight of the Executive
Oversight of the Judiciary
Parliamentary Procedure (general)
Presidential Records
Press Galleries
Privilege Assertions Before Congress
Recess Appointments
Records of Congress
Resolution of Inquiry
Rulemaking Power
Speech or Debate
State Legislative Proceedings
Tax Return Information
Testimonial Immunity


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