that have sapped your energy.
Rule 1. Pure air. You can begin with something as simple as spending time outdoors. Move fresh air in and out of your lungs. Move your attention from a TV or computer screen to a bird, a cloud, or falling rain. For some that will be a huge beginning. Others may be able to walk or swim, do stretches, and simple resistance exercises. The important thing is to get outside every day, rain or shine, for fresh air. Learn to breathe deeply to take oxygen way into your body. Incorporate this step into your daily life: walk instead of driving to the store or go for a walk with a friend instead of meeting for coffee. Keep your bedroom window open. You will learn to listen to your own body. Experiment. See what feels good to you. Move out some preconceived ideas you have about your self and your body.
Rule 2. Sunlight. Exposing your face to sunlight for just 15 minutes will give you more than your daily requirement of 400 units of Vitamin D. Vitamin D ensures straight and strong bones with the proper proportions of calcium and phosphorus. It also wards against depression.
Rule 3. Temperance. Don't indulge in any one thing. Temperance, or balance, is a main theme of simplicity: Eat in moderation, exercise in moderation, and rest in moderation. Remember the rule: moderation in what is good for you and abstinence from the things that are not good (you can't be healthy if you keep walking through the mine fields).
Rule 4. Rest. Get plenty of rest each night and take at least one day a week to devote to communing with and worship of your Creator. This is a great day for families to spend time together. Everybody needs a break from all kinds of work, paid and unpaid. Your body and mind need rest and fortification in order to be healthy.
Your digestive system also needs to rest periodically. Your system needs about five hours to digest food completely. Some health enthusiasts do not advocate eating between meals because the digestive system never has a chance to rest. The theory is that all systems and organs, whether you see them or not, need rest. So, after healing the intestines on the SCDiet, periodically, eat a healthy meal and wait five hours before eating again. In between, you can drink all the water and fresh brewed mint tea (from the leaves – no additives) you want. After five hours, eat a full-sized meal and fill yourself with hearty, natural food. Chew well and enjoy your food.
You want to rest not only your internal organs, but your whole body as well. You need at least seven hours of sleep. When you get up, eat a big breakfast, don't eat again for at least five hours, eat a big lunch, then have a light snack in the evening . . . all SCD legal, of course! Strive to make breakfast your heaviest meal, your midday meal the second heaviest, and supper the lightest.
Even little everyday lifestyle activities can provide health benefits similar to a traditional gym-based workout. So, get moving by parking in the furthest space, climbing the stairs instead of taking the elevator or walking or stretching while you're on the phone. Balance on one foot while brushing your teeth. Balance on the other foot while combing your hair. Take your dog for a walk every day . . . or borrow your neighbor's dog . . . or just walk your "inner dog." Brisk walking 30 minutes a day 3 days a week is recommended as the minimal exercise for a healthy heart. The ULTIMATE health standard for exercise is 1 hour per day. Even walking 30 minutes 3 times a week will keep weight down, lower cholesterol, strengthen the heart, and work off stress. Even 10 minutes of cardiovascular activity 3 times a day has been found to be very beneficial.
Experts say a great goal to help achieve good health is to accumulate 10,000 steps a day. To help keep track, some people use an electronic pedometer, a palm size gadget that clips to your waistband and measures the number of steps you take. MAKE MOVEMENT A WAY OF LIFE!
Rule 6. Water. Water is free or inexpensive, so use it liberally. Drink at least 8 to 10 glasses of good filtered water during the day to hydrate and purge your system. Drink the water 30 minutes to 1 hour before or 1 hour after meals to prevent dilution of stomach acids, which help proper digestion.
Use water not only to keep your body clean, but as a tonic as well. Do this by taking a regular, warm shower and then, at the end, turning up the cold water. This wakes up your cells and keeps them functioning.
Water is also a perfect, natural cure-all for many ailments. When used by a doctor, it is called hydrotherapy. Here is an example of hydrotherapy in action. The next time you have a headache, keep the lid on your aspirin bottle. Headaches are caused by blood vessels swelling in your head. The pressure is what causes the pain. Put your feet in a bucket of the hottest water you can tolerate; this will cause a reflex reaction that causes the blood vessels in the head to narrow. Add a cold compress to the head to aid the blood to flow to the extremities and away from the head. The hot foot bath compresses the vessels and the cold pack on the head sends the blood away. Hot draws the blood to the area, and cold sends blood away - a reflexive relationship.
Rule 7. Nutrition. We are only as healthy as what we put into our bodies. According to current medical information, most of the degenerative diseases that plague modern America - heart problems, high blood pressure, certain cancers, diabetes and stroke - are primarily the result of improper diet. All cells and tissues in our bodies are formed by the foods we eat . . . and our ability to digest those foods.
The best way to take care of our bodies is also the simplest and, in the long run, most inexpensive (since you will save on medical bills): Eat food the way it comes out of the ground, with nothing added and nothing removed. In other words, eat no processed foods.
The whole foods are: Fruits, seeds, legumes, nuts, and vegetables, vegetables, vegetables. Eat a variety of these food groups every week. Eat two servings of raw vegetable salad and two more servings of raw or cooked green or yellow vegetables daily. Eat cooked beans or peas three times a week, squash twice weekly, and a member of the cabbage family (broccoli, Brussels sprouts, cauliflower, kale) three times a week.
Research the cholesterol and low-fat myths and realize that fat is not the enemy it's made out to be. Eat no processed foods including anything packaged with hydrogenated or partially hydrogenated oils or fats and sugars. Almost all packaged/processed foods contain hydrogenated oils or fats because it gives the food a longer shelf life. They are the real enemies! Read KNOW YOUR FATS, EVERYTHING YOU'VE EVER WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT FATS by Mary Enig to learn the real scoop.
Eat more good quality free-range chicken, turkey and wild game (these are lower in cholesterol and free of antibiotics); but limited amounts of fish (even those from deep sea waters are lightly contaminated now) and beef and pork.
Add foods high in Omega-3 Fatty Acids - farm eggs; nuts; salmon, mackerel, oysters, anchovies, herring, or shrimp (from deep sea waters only); lamb and beef organ parts from pastured animals. Most health enthusiasts recommend adding an Omega-3 supplement that is free of PCBs, mercury and lead. Dr. Mercola is a good source of Krill Oil . . . a safe and healthy source of Omega-3.
Get your daily "dose" of homemade SCD lactose-free yogurt daily. One cup is sufficient but can have as much as three cups.
Rule 8. Conversation. Give your time to visit friends and family members and engage in meaningful conversation often. Get to know them and let them really know you. Offer to give a helping hand with a project that's important to them. Help a friend in need. Life is only meaningful when we give of ourselves.
Rule 9. Faith. Have faith in your Maker and take time to commune with Him daily and follow His commands for living a rich life. After all, He manufactured you and wrote the OWNER'S MANUAL for your life!
Rule 5. Exercise. Exercising in fresh air takes poisons and wastes out of the body. Fresh air from exercising fills cells with oxygen. Stretch outside every morning and find an enjoyable form of exercise that fits naturally into your day, such as bicycling or walking to work, meeting a friend for a regular walk or run, and so on. Just 15 minutes, twice a day, will make a tremendous difference!
Jethro Kloss, the author of the age-old bible on natural living titled "Back to Eden", faithfully went outside every morning, summer and winter (weather permitting) to do a certain number of jumping jacks. Afterward he would go into the kitchen for a glass of fresh orange or grapefruit juice. (The whole fruit is even better than the juice because it contains all the fiber you need to keep the digestive system working properly and doesn't give the sugar surge and the insulin high that juice does.) He began every day with fresh air, brisk exercise, and a nutritious drink.


text:
Q: JWT Token could not be verifed before I am currently using JWT since the past month and I had no issues. But since yesterday, I am experiencing this error as per below
com.auth0.jwt.exceptions.InvalidClaimException: The Token can't be used before...
I understand there is a timestamp when generating the token and the token cannot
 be verified before that. The token is being verified on another server. But all this time, it was fine. Can someone advise?
Thanks,

A: If you are using auth0-spring-security-api then you can customize leeway as follow:
@Configuration
@EnableWebSecurity
public class SecurityConfig extends WebSecurityConfigurerAdapter {

@Value(value = "${auth0.audience}")
private String apiAudience;

@Value(value = "${auth0.issuer}")
private String issuer;

@Override
protected void configure(HttpSecurity http) throws Exception {
    final JwkProvider jwkProvider = new JwkProviderBuilder(issuer).build();
    JwtAuthenticationProvider jwtAuthenticationProvider = new JwtAuthenticationProvider(jwkProvider, issuer,
            apiAudience);
    jwtAuthenticationProvider.withJwtVerifierLeeway(3);

    JwtWebSecurityConfigurer.forRS256(apiAudience, issuer, jwtAuthenticationProvider).configure(http)
            .authorizeRequests().antMatchers("/**").authenticated();
}

A: Perhaps try viewing your JWT token using https://jwt.io/ - can you ascertain whether it has expired? Take the exp value (likely epoch) and convert - https://www.epochconverter.com/
You have added very little info in the question to offer any further details. You could try (re-) authenticating with the IDP that issued you the JWT token last time, and check whether that resolves your issue too.
Based on your last comment, do the servers have any clock skew?

A: First of all have a look at your AUTH provider tenant settings. If the Login Session Management -> Inactivity timeout is set to too low, try increasing it and see if the error is happening.
OR
try: https://auth0.com/docs/libraries/auth0js/v8

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


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text:
Play park fences to be kept only where there is no risk to the health and well-being of children say Mid Devon District Council
Councillors welcome move to protect youngsters in playgrounds where there may be dangers
Lewis Clarke
The park on Millennium Way in Cullompton has been criticised for its steep bank
Fences will be kept at play parks across Mid Devon where there is no risk associated to that to their safety.
At a Community Policy Development Group (PDG) meeting held by Mid Devon District Council on Tuesday, August 1, Director of Operations, Andrew Pritchard said that the health and well being was "the paramount importance when designing our outside areas."
The discussion was part of a wider conversation regarding the ten-year plan for the district's parks and recreational areas and follows on from an Environment PDG meeting held on July 11 where residents claimed that the removal of fences in play areas would encourage paedophiles and that youngsters could wander off to nearby roads or hazards.
A report issued to councillors at the Environment Policy Development Group on Tuesday, July 11 suggested removal of walls and fences that are becoming dilapidated and that by removing them the Council can reduce future liabilities.
Mr Pritchard said: "As part of that work in terms of the physical infrastructure and open spacing, there are elements of parks and open spaces - being park benches, paths and play areas - where we'll have to take a decision what we do when it comes to the end of its natural, useful life.
"There has been an element of discussion, and a number of notes have been written and sent to parish and town councils, and I know members will have received letters and emails from interested members of the public specifically relating to children's play areas. I think that's where we're quite conscious as the community PDG will have a view on the health and well being, of children active in the open spaces of Mid Devon.
"Through Environment PDG and other discussions I can assure members that in terms of the health and well-being of children, that it is the paramount importance when we're designing our outside areas. Where to protect the health and well-being of children is wholly appropriate to have a fence in a play area, then clearly the play area will have a fence. That is the common sense approach to making sure that our children are safe when they use the facilities in Mid Devon."
Summer holidays site safety warning to youngsters in Cullompton
Councillors welcomed the proposal to keep fencing in certain parks.
Councillor Ron Dolley said: "We've got an assurance now that the play areas will be fenced. We've got documentation from people very worried about young children wandering out, being attracted out of play areas, so this is absolutely going to be fact. All play areas to be fenced."
However, Mr Pritchard pointed out that: "Where it is appropriate for the safety of the children to have a fence, there will be a fence. That isn't to be read as all play areas will be fenced because for some play areas it won't be appropriate, in the same way, that at the moment not all play areas are fenced.
"We have a number of open spaces which are open to little ones and toddlers which don't have a fence at the moment, but there is no risk associated to that to their safety."
Councillor Rosemary Berry welcomed the debate: "I understand that we want children to have freedom to roam and express their creativity but I would suggest for very small children they can do that far better if they don't have mum plugging around because they might run under a car of fall down a bank and if it's a safe environment they can be left to express themselves. I am glad for little people parks will have fences."
Cllr Berry also asked whether removal of fences was done for cost or whether they needed replacing.
"In my book, if they needed replacing, the wise course of action to avoid the problem we have had is to get the replacement lined up so that it happens seamlessly. I would say that in future, when a fence is removed, it's very important to look at what you're leaving behind. In a park that's causing problems in Cullompton, there were very deep post holes left and that was very dangerous for children.
"We're very lucky that a small child didn't break their leg."
Trip to Tiverton adds two years to the lives of Belarus youngsters thanks to Chernobyl Children's Lifeline
Councillor Bainbridge used the discussion to bring up fears regarding Linear Park on Millennium Way in Cullompton.
She said: "It's appalling. You have an extremely dangerous situation there because it goes straight in through an under croft and to your right is a great slope, unfenced, going straight down to a busy road.
"I don't know what people are thinking of. I don't know how many years that has gone on, but that should now be a priority to get fencing along the top. A ball can very easily run down it, chased by a child.
"I agree you don't want to cut off this piece of land, but you could have a fence at the bottom and if you don't want to put up gates you could have barriers.
Operations Manager Joe Scully replied saying: "I am familiar with the park and one of the steps that we did make which again is slightly controversial. One of the measures we did put in place to try and measure that slope was to create in an environmental area so it would move ball activity away from the bank and closer to the properties, but then there's the conflict with the residents as well.
"I agree that the layout of the park isn't ideal but the introduction of a fence wouldn't be the only solution there."
Nine Devon houses on the market for £150,000 or less and perfect for first time buyers
Discussions also took place regarding the importance of consultation before work is undertaken, the use of wild flowers and indigenous trees, the replacement of trees which are removed and headstone runners in cemeteries which would prevent health and safety issues.
It was resolved that play areas must be fenced when necessary for health and safety reasons, as the health, safety and, of children was of paramount importance. Play England criteria be used; when work was undertaken to remove fences or other items such as benches and the work must be undertaken safely and no hazards left. Councillors added that communication and clear consultation must take place with all parties.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


In Clojure, metadata is used to annotate the data in a collection or for the data stored in a symbol. This is normally used to annotate data about types to the underlying compiler, but can also be used for developers. Metadata is not considered as part of the value of the object. At the same time, metadata is immutable.
The following operations are possible in Clojure with regards to metadata.
This function is used to define a metadata map for any object.
This function is used to see if any metadata is associated with an object.
Returns an object of the same type and value as the original object, but with a combined metadata.


text:
package it.geosolutions.jaiext.jiffle.parser;

import org.antlr.v4.runtime.tree.ParseTree;

import java.util.HashSet;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Set;

import it.geosolutions.jaiext.jiffle.parser.node.GetSourceValue;
import it.geosolutions.jaiext.jiffle.parser.node.ImagePos;
import it.geosolutions.jaiext.jiffle.parser.node.Node;

/**
 * Support class helping to list all the unique positions read in the various sources
 */
public class SourcePositionsWorker extends AbstractModelWorker {

    private final SymbolScope scope;
    private final Set<String> names;
    private final Set<GetSourceValue> positions = new HashSet<>();

    public SourcePositionsWorker(ParseTree tree, List<String> sourceImageNames) {
        super(tree);
        this.names = new HashSet<String>(sourceImageNames);
        this.scope = new SymbolScope("fake", null) {
            @Override
            public Symbol get(String name) {
                if (names.contains(name)) {
                    return new Symbol(name, Symbol.Type.SOURCE_IMAGE);
                } else {
                    // fake a scalar variable
                    return new Symbol(name, Symbol.Type.SCALAR);
                }
            }
        };
        sourceImageNames
                .stream()
                .map(name -> new Symbol(name, Symbol.Type.SOURCE_IMAGE))
                .forEach(symbol -> scope.add(symbol));

        walkTree();
    }

    @Override
    public void exitVarID(JiffleParser.VarIDContext ctx) {
        super.exitVarID(ctx);
        Node node = get(ctx);
        if (node instanceof GetSourceValue) {
            this.positions.add((GetSourceValue) node);
        }
    }

    @Override
    public void exitImageCall(JiffleParser.ImageCallContext ctx) {
        super.exitImageCall(ctx);
        Node node = get(ctx);
        if (node instanceof GetSourceValue) {
            this.positions.add((GetSourceValue) node);
        }
    }

    @Override
    protected SymbolScope getScope(ParseTree ctx) {
        return scope;
    }

    /**
     * Returns all the unique read calls found in the source
     * @return
     */
    public Set<GetSourceValue> getPositions() {
        return positions;
    }
}

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaGithub


Absolutely delighted to have MLWP Couple Louise & Phil's fantastic Wedding Day featured in the current issue of Wedding Ideas Magazine!! The lovely couple got married last year at St James Clerkenwell, then everyone hopped on a red London Bus to Temple Pier where they boarded the Golden Jubilee for the drinks reception and sunset cruise on the Thames before arriving for dinner and dancing at Trinity Buoy Wharf. It was such a wonderful day full of lots of very happy memories and London fun and many congrats again to Louise & Phil and sending very best wishes!
Full article is in the November 2016 issue of Wedding Ideas – out now!


I need to give a little love to this excellent game. The first Noitu Love game, try reading that backwards, was doing indie gaming all the way back in 2006 before "indie gaming" even became a thing. It beat Braid, Castle Crashers, and that whole first blockbuster wave out the door by two years! Released in 2006 as a genuine free-to-play title, it was on the scene with the likes of Cave Story before people realized that you could make a pretty penny from your personal creations.
Two years later in 2008, developer Joakim Sandberg got around to making a much-improved sequel titled Noitu Love 2: Devolution and was able to finally make a bit of money from his excellent creation, and it finally hit the big leagues on Steam in 2012.
Now, thanks to MP2 Games a full eight years later, the colorful action-packed sequel will be released for the Nintendo 3DS and Wii U in 2016. The mouse functions look to be perfectly replicated with the touchscreens, and it has been re-titled Noitu Love: Devolution to avoid confusion about the series' timeline. If you love old-school action games, this is definitely one to check out.
If you want a preview, you can also buy the Steam version on sale for mere pennies. Definitely one of the best deals you can find in the holiday sale.


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Normative Ethics > Moral Psychology > Moral States and Processes > Trust
Edited by Edward Hinchman (Florida State University)
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Elections, Civic Trust, and Digital Literacy: The Promise of Blockchain as a Basis for Common Knowledge.Mark Alfano - manuscriptdetails
Few recent developments in information technology have been as hyped as blockchain, the first implementation of which was the cryptocurrency Bitcoin. Such hype furnishes ample reason to be skeptical about the promise of blockchain implementations, but I contend that there's something to the hype. In particular, I think that certain blockchain implementations, in the right material, social, and political conditions, constitute excellent bases for common knowledge. As a case study, I focus on trust in election outcomes, where the ledger records (...) not financial transactions but vote tallies. I argue that blockchain implementations could foster warranted trust in vote tallies and thereby trust in the democratic process. Finally, I argue that if the promise of blockchain implementations as democratic infrastructure is to be realized, then democracies first need to ensure that these material, social, and political conditions obtain. (shrink)
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Why Think for Yourself?Jonathan Matheson - manuscriptdetails
Life is a group project. It takes a village. The same is true of our intellectual lives. Since we are finite cognitive creatures with limited time and resources, any healthy intellectual life requires that we rely quite heavily on others. For nearly any question you want to investigate, there is someone who is in a better epistemic position than you are to determine the answer. For most people, their expertise does not extend far beyond their own personal lives, and even (...) here we can sometimes find others who are more reliable. Without relying on them we would know very little about the world. Since others are typically better positioned to determine the answers to the questions we have, it should make us wonder why we should bother to try and figure out much of anything at all for ourselves. After all, when trying to find an answer to a question, we should take the best route to the answer, and the most reliable route to the answer to most questions is to rely on the minds of others. At the same time, there is something defective about an intellectual life that outsources nearly all of its intellectual projects. That is, it seems that individuals ought to think for themselves, at least about some issues and at least some of the time. The puzzle is in determining why it is epistemically valuable to think for yourself, since doing so will almost always not be the best available route to the answer of your question. In this paper, I will first clarify our central question and sharpen this puzzle regarding epistemic autonomy. Having done so, I will argue that autonomous deliberation can be epistemically valuable to inquirers both when it is successful, as well as when it is unsuccessful. I conclude by gesturing at how these considerations point us toward an account of epistemic autonomy as an intellectual virtue. (shrink)
Trusting the Scientific Community: The Development and Validation of an Instrument to Measure Trust in Science.Matthew Slater - details
Trust in the scientific enterprise — in science as an institution — is arguably important to individuals' and societies' well-being. Although some measures of public trust in science exist, the recipients of that trust are often ambiguous between trusting individual scientists and the scientific community at large. We argue that more precision would be beneficial — specifically, targeting public trust of the scientific community at large — and describe the development and validation of such an instrument: the Scientific Community Trust (...) Index (SCTI). We show the results of initial field testing to establish instrument reliability and validity. We then demonstrate certain advantages of the SCTI against other measures of trust and deference, and present correlations between the SCTI and participant scores in two trust-in-science scenarios. Our results suggest that the SCTI is a useful and compact tool for measuring public trust in the scientific community. (shrink)
Psychological Mechanism of Corruption: A Comprehensive Review. [REVIEW]Juneman Abraham, Julia Suleeman & Bagus Takwin - forthcoming - Asian Journal of Scientific Research.details
Corruption prevention can be more effective if it does not rely merely on legal enforcement. This theoretical review aimed to propose a hypothetical psychological model capable of explaining the behavior of corruption. Moral disengagement is a variable that is considered ontologically closest in "distance" to the variable of corruption behavior. Counterfeit self, implicit self-theory, ethical mindset and moral emotion are taken into account as the pivotal factors of the corruption behavior and its mechanism of moral disengagement. Counterfeit self along with (...) some moderating variables are regarded to "set" one's future corrupt behavior based on his/her past/prior ethical or unethical behavior and moral emotions. This review discovered a conjectural-theoretical model of the corruption psychology. It can be used to design a social intervention and training for individuals to manage the mindset and emotion that can buffer counterfeit self effect. In addition, the users of these research findings are recommended to be aware of the surroundings that consist of groups of people with particular ethical mindset, moral emotion proneness and self-theory. (shrink)
Trust and Distrust in Institutions and Governance.Mark Alfano & Nicole Huijts - forthcoming - In Judith Simon (ed.), Handbook of Trust and Philosophy. Routledge.details
First, we explain the conception of trustworthiness that we employ. We model trustworthiness as a relation among a trustor, a trustee, and a field of trust defined and delimited by its scope. In addition, both potential trustors and potential trustees are modeled as being more or less reliable in signaling either their willingness to trust or their willingness to prove trustworthy in various fields in relation to various other agents. Second, following Alfano (forthcoming) we argue that the social scale of (...) a potential trust relationship partly determines both explanatory and normative aspects of the relation. Most of the philosophical literature focuses on dyadic trust between a pair of agents (Baier 1986, Jones 1996, Jones 2012, McGeer 2008, Pettit 1995), but there are also small communities of trust (Alfano forthcoming) and trust in large institutions (Potter 2002, Govier 1997, Townley & Garfield 2013, Hardin 2002). The mechanisms that induce people to extend their trust vary depending on the size of the community in question, and the ways in which trustworthiness can be established and trusting warranted vary with these mechanisms. Mechanisms that work in dyads and small communities are often unavailable in the context of trusting an institution or branch of government. Establishing trust on this larger social scale therefore requires new or modified mechanisms. In the third section of the paper, we recommend three policies that – we argue – tend to make institutions more trustworthy and to reliably signal that trustworthiness to the public. First, they should ensure that their decision-making processes are as open and transparent as possible. Second, they should make efforts to engage stakeholders in dialogue with decision-makers such as managers, members of the C-Suite, and highly-placed policy-makers. Third, they should foster diversity – gender, ethnicity, age, socioeconomic background, disability, etc. – in their workforce at all levels, but especially in management and positions of power. We conclude by discussing the warrant for distrust in institutions that do not adopt these policies, which we contend is especially pertinent for people who belong to groups that have historically faced (and in many cases still do face) oppression. (shrink)
Humility in Networks.Mark Alfano & Emily Sullivan - forthcoming - In Alessandra Tanesini, Michael Lynch & Mark Alfano (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Humility. Routledge.details
What do humility, intellectual humility, and open-mindedness mean in the context of inter-group conflict? We spend most of our time with ingroup members, such as family, friends, and colleagues. Yet our biggest disagreements —— about practical, moral, and epistemic matters —— are likely to be with those who do not belong to our ingroup. An attitude of humility towards the former might be difficult to integrate with a corresponding attitude of humility towards the latter, leading to smug tribalism that masquerades (...) as genuine virtue. These potentially conflicting priorities have recently come to the fore because "tribal epistemology" has so thoroughly infected political and social discourse. Most research on these dispositions focuses on individual traits and dyadic peer-disagreement, with little attention to group membership or inter-group conflict. In this chapter, we dilate the social scale to address this pressing philosophical and social problem. (shrink)
Experts, Public Policy and the Question of Trust.Maria Baghramian & Michel Croce - forthcoming - In Michael Hannon & Jeroen De Ridder (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. London, UK: Routledge.details
This chapter discusses the topics of trust and expertise from the perspective of political epistemology. In particular, it addresses four main questions: (§1) How should we characterise experts and their expertise? (§2) How can non-experts recognize a reliable expert? (§3) What does it take for non-experts to trust experts? (§4) What problems impede trust in experts?
Public Trust in Science: Exploring the Idiosyncrasy-Free Ideal.Marion Boulicault & S. Andrew Schroeder - forthcoming - In Social Trust.details
What makes science trustworthy to the public? This chapter examines one proposed answer: the trustworthiness of science is based at least in part on its independence from the idiosyncratic values, interests, and ideas of individual scientists. That is, science is trustworthy to the extent that following the scientific process would result in the same conclusions, regardless of the particular scientists involved. We analyze this "idiosyncrasy-free ideal" for science by looking at philosophical debates about inductive risk, focusing on two recent proposals (...) which offer different methods of avoiding idiosyncrasy: the high epistemic standards proposal and the democratic values proposal. (shrink)
Śāntideva and the Moral Psychology of Fear.Bronwyn Finnigan - forthcoming - In Douglas Duckworth & Jonathan Gold (eds.), Readings of the Introduction to Bodhisattva Practice. Columbia University Press.details
Buddhists consider fear to be a root of suffering. In Chapters 2 and 7 of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, Śāntideva provides a series of provocative verses aimed at inciting fear to motivate taking refuge in the Bodhisattvas and thereby achieve fearlessness. This article aims to analyze the moral psychology involved in this transition. It will structurally analyze fear in terms that are grounded in, and expand upon, an Abhidharma Buddhist analysis of mind. It will then contend that fear, taking refuge, and fearlessness (...) are complex intentional attitudes and will argue that the transition between them turns on relevant changes in their intentional objects. This will involve analyzing the object of fear into four aspects and 'taking refuge' as a mode of trust that ameliorates these four aspects. This analysis will also distinguish two modes of taking refuge and show the progressive role each might play in the transition from fear to fearlessness. (shrink)
Climate Change and Cultural Cognition.Daniel Greco - forthcoming - In Philosophy and Climate Change.details
Experts: What Are They and How Can Laypeople Identify Them?Thomas Grundmann - forthcoming - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
In this chapter, I survey and assess various answers to two basic questions concerning experts: (1) What is an expert?; (2) How can laypeople identify the relevant experts? These questions are not mutually independent, since the epistemology and the metaphysics of experts should go hand in hand. On the basis of our platitudes about experts, I will argue that the prevailing accounts of experts such as truth-linked, knowledge-linked, understanding-linked or service-oriented accounts are inadequate. In contrast, I will defend an evidence-linked (...) account of expertise. In the second part of the chapter, I address the question of how laypeople can identify experts in this sense. Here, I will argue that agreement among experts plays a major role. I will outline how laypeople can follow this criterion without running into circularity. (shrink)
The Fellowship of the Ninth Hour: Christian Reflections on the Nature and Value of Faith.Daniel Howard-Snyder & Daniel J. McKaughan - forthcoming - In James Arcadi & James T. Turner Jr (eds.), The T&T Clark Companion to Analytic Theology. New York, NY, USA: T&T Clark/Bloomsbury. pp. 69-82.details
It is common for young Christians to go off to college assured in their beliefs but, in the course of their first year or two, they meet what appears to them to be powerful defenses of scientific naturalism and crushing critiques of the basic Christian story (BCS), and many are thrown into doubt. They think to themselves something like this: "To be honest, I am troubled about the BCS. While the problem of evil, the apparent cultural basis for the diversity (...) of religions, the explanatory breadth of contemporary science, naturalistic explanations of religious experience and miracle reports, and textual and historical criticism of the Bible, among other things, don't make me believe the BCS is false , I am in serious doubt about it, so much so that I lack belief of it. In that case, how can I have Christian faith? And if I don't have faith, how can I keep on praying, attending church, affirming the creed, confessing my sins, taking the sacraments, singing the hymns and songs, and so on? I can't, unless I'm a hypocrite. So integrity requires me to drop the whole thing and get out." Of course, our student is not alone. Many Christians find themselves for some portion of their lives somewhere on the trajectory from doubt to getting out. Indeed, Christians in the West struggle with intellectual doubt more than they used to, especially university-educated Christians. What should we say to them? Some will say "Get out!," welcoming the development as a path to liberation. We explore a different response in this essay. (shrink)
Well-Ordered Science and Public Trust in Science.Gürol Irzik & Faik Kurtulmus - forthcoming - Synthese.details
Building, restoring and maintaining well-placed trust between scientists and the public is a difficult yet crucial social task requiring the successful cooperation of various social actors and institutions. Philip Kitcher's takes up this challenge in the context of liberal democratic societies by extending his ideal model of "well-ordered science" that he had originally formulated in his. However, Kitcher nowhere offers an explicit account of what it means for the public to invest epistemic trust in science. Yet in order to understand (...) how his extended model and its implementation in the actual world address the problem of trust as well as to evaluate it critically, an explicit account of epistemic public trust in science needs to be given first. In this article we first present such an account and then scrutinize his project of building public trust in science in light of it. We argue that even though Kitcher's ideal model and his proposals for its implementation in the real world face a number of problems, they can be addressed with the resources of our account. (shrink)
Werte, Wahrheit, Wissenschaft.Nicola Mößner - forthcoming - In R. Rothenbusch & Oliver Wiertz (eds.), Umstrittene Wahrheit. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit in Philosophie und Religionen. Munich, Germany:details
Trust as an Unquestioning Attitude.C. Thi Nguyen - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.details
Most theories of trust presume that trust is a conscious attitude that can be directed only at other agents. I sketch a different form of trust: the unquestioning attitude. What it is to trust, in this sense, is not simply to rely on something, but to rely on it unquestioningly. It is to rely on a resource while suspending deliberation over its reliability. To trust, then, is to set up open pipelines between yourself and parts of the external world — (...) to permit external resources to have a similar relationship to one as one's internal cognitive faculties. This creates efficiency, but at the price of exquisite vulnerability. We must trust in this way because we are cognitively limited beings in a cognitively overwhelming world. Crucially, we can hold the unquestioning attitude towards objects. When I trust my climbing rope, I climb while putting questions of its reliability out of mind. Many people now trust, in this sense, complex technologies such as search algorithms and online calendars. But, one might worry, how could one ever hold such a normatively loaded attitude as trust towards mere objects? How could it ever make sense to feel betrayed by an object? Such betrayal is grounded, not in considerations of inter-agential cooperation, but in considerations of functional integration. Trust is our engine for expanding and outsourcing our agency — for binding external processes into our practical selves. Thus, we can be betrayed by our smartphones in the same way that we can be betrayed by our memory. When we trust, we try to make something a part of our agency, and we are betrayed when our part lets us down. This suggests a new form of gullibility: agential gullibility, which occurs when agents too hastily and carelessly integrate external resources into their own agency. (shrink)
Trust and Sincerity in Art.C. Thi Nguyen - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.details
Our life with art is suffused with trust. We don't just trust one another's aesthetic testimony; we trust one another's aesthetic actions. Audiences trust artists to have made it worth their while; artists trust audiences to put in the effort. Without trust, audiences would have little reason to put in the effort to understand difficult and unfamiliar art. I offer a theory of aesthetic trust, which highlights the importance of trust in aesthetic sincerity. We trust in another's aesthetic sincerity when (...) we rely on them to fulfill their commitments to act for aesthetic reasons — rather than for, say, financial, social, or political reasons. We feel most thoroughly betrayed by an artist, not when they make bad art, but when they sell out. This teaches us something about the nature of trust in general. According to many standard theories, trust involves thinking the trusted to be cooperative or good-natured. But trust in aesthetic sincerity is different. We trust artists to be true to their own aesthetic sensibility, which might involve selfishly ignoring their audience's needs. Why do we care so much about an artist's sincerity, rather than merely trusting them to make good art? We emphasize sincerity when wish to encourage originality, rather than to demand success along predictable lines. And we ask for sincerity when our goal is to discover a shared sensibility. In moral life, we often try to force convergence through coordinated effort. But in aesthetic life, we often hope for the lovely discovery that our sensibilities were similar all along. And for that we need to ask for sincerity, rather than overt coordination. (shrink)
Testimonial Worth.Andrew Peet - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.details
This paper introduces and argues for the hypothesis that judgments of testimonial worth (that is, judgments of the quality of character an agent displays when testifying)are central to our practice of normatively appraising speech. It is argued that judgments of testimonial worth are central both to the judgement that an agent has lied, and to the acceptance of testimony. The hypothesis that, in lying, an agent necessarily displays poor testimonial worth, is shown to resolve a new puzzle about lying, and (...) the recalcitrant problem raised by the existence of bald faced lies, and selfless assertions (which seem to place conflicting pressures on a theory of lying). It is then shown that the notion of testimonial worth allows us to capture the distinction between taking a speaker at their word, and treating them as a mere indicator of the truth in a way other theories (such as those which emphasize interpersonal reasons of trust) fail to do. (shrink)
Conspiracy Theories and the Conventional Wisdom Revisited.Charles Pigden - forthcoming - In Olli Loukola (ed.), Secrets and Conspiracies. Rodopi.details
Conspiracy theories should be neither believed nor investigated - that is the conventional wisdom. I argue that it is sometimes permissible both to investigate and to believe. Hence this is a dispute in the ethics of belief. I defend epistemic 'oughts' that apply in the first instance to belief-forming strategies that are partly under our control. I argue that the policy of systematically doubting or disbelieving conspiracy theories would be both a political disaster and the epistemic equivalent of self-mutilation, since (...) it leads to the conclusion that history is bunk and the nightly news unbelievable. In fact (of course) the policy is not employed systematically but is only wheeled on to do down theories that the speaker happens to dislike. I develop a deductive argument from hard-to-deny premises that if you are not a 'conspiracy theorist' in my anodyne sense of the word then you are an 'idiot' in the Greek sense of the word, that is, someone so politically purblind as to have no opinions about either history or public affairs. The conventional wisdom can only be saved (if at all) if 'conspiracy theory' is given a slanted definition. I discuss some slanted definitions apparently presupposed by proponents of the conventional wisdom (including, amongst others, Tony Blair) and conclude that even with these definitions the conventional wisdom comes out as deeply unwise. I finish up with a little harmless fun at the expense of David Aaronvitch whose abilities as a rhetorician and a popular historian are not perhaps matched by a corresponding capacity for logical thought. (shrink)
The Humility Heuristic Or: People Worth Trusting Admit to What They Don'T Know.Mattias Skipper - forthcoming - Social Epistemology:1-14.details
People don't always speak the truth. When they don't, we do better not to trust them. Unfortunately, that's often easier said than done. People don't usually wear a 'Not to be trusted!' badge on their sleeves, which lights up every time they depart from the truth. Given this, what can we do to figure out whom to trust, and whom not? My aim in this paper is to offer a partial answer to this question. I propose a heuristic—the "Humility Heuristic"—which (...) is meant to help guide our search for trustworthy advisors. In slogan form, the heuristic says: people worth trusting admit to what they don't know. I give this heuristic a precise probabilistic interpretation, offer a simple argument for it, defend it against some potential worries, and demonstrate its practical worth by showing how it can help address some difficult challenges in the relationship between experts and laypeople. (shrink)
The Ethics and Epistemology of Trust.J. Adam Carter & Mona Simion - 2020 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
Trust is a topic of longstanding philosophical interest. It is indispensable to every kind of coordinated human activity, from sport to scientific research. Even more, trust is necessary for the successful dissemination of knowledge, and by extension, for nearly any form of practical deliberation and planning. Without trust, we could achieve few of our goals and would know very little. Despite trust's fundamental importance in human life, there is substantial philosophical disagreement about what trust is, and further, how trusting is (...) normatively constrained and best theorized about in relation to other things we value. This entry is divided into three sections, which explore key (and sometimes interconnected) ethical and epistemological themes in the philosophy of trust: (1) The Nature of Trust; (2) The Normativity of Trust, and (3) The Value of Trust. (shrink)
Believing to Belong: Addressing the Novice-Expert Problem in Polarized Scientific Communication.Helen De Cruz - 2020 - Social Epistemology 34 (5):440-452.details
There is a large gap between the specialized knowledge of scientists and laypeople's understanding of the sciences. The novice-expert problem arises when non-experts are confronted with (real or apparent) scientific disagreement, and when they don't know whom to trust. Because they are not able to gauge the content of expert testimony, they rely on imperfect heuristics to evaluate the trustworthiness of scientists. This paper investigates why some bodies of scientific knowledge become polarized along political fault lines. Laypeople navigate conflicting epistemic (...) and social demands in their acceptance of scientific testimony; this might explain their deference to scientific fringe theories, which often goes together with denying established scientific theories. I evaluate three approaches to mitigate denialism: improving the message, improving the messenger, and improving the environment in which the message is conveyed. (shrink)
Exploitative Epistemic Trust.Katherine Dormandy - 2020 - In Trust in Epistemology. New York City, New York, Vereinigte Staaten: pp. 241-264.details
Where there is trust, there is also vulnerability, and vulnerability can be exploited. Epistemic trust is no exception. This chapter maps the phenomenon of the exploitation of epistemic trust. I start with a discussion of how trust in general can be exploited; a key observation is that trust incurs vulnerabilities not just for the party doing the trusting, but also for the trustee (after all, trust can be burdensome), so either party can exploit the other. I apply these considerations to (...) epistemic trust, specifically in testimonial relationships. There, we standardly think of a hearer trusting a speaker. But we miss an important aspect of this relationship unless we consider too that the speaker standardly trusts the hearer. Given this mutual trust, and given that both trustees and trusters can exploit each other, we have four possibilities for exploitation in epistemic-trust relationships: a speaker exploiting a hearer (a) by accepting his trust or (b) by imposing her trust on him, and a hearer exploiting a speaker (c) by accepting her trust or (d) by imposing his trust on her. One result is that you do not need to betray someone to exploit him – you can exploit him just as easily by doing what he trusts you for. (shrink)
Introduction: An Overview of Trust and Some Key Epistemological Applications.Katherine Dormandy - 2020 - In Trust in Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 1-40.details
I give an overview of the trust literature and then of six central issues concerning epistemic trust. The survey of trust zeroes in on the kinds of expectations that trust involves, trust's characteristic psychology, and what makes trust rational. The discussion of epistemic trust focuses on its role in testimony, the epistemic goods that we trust for, the significance of epistemic trust in contrast to reliance, what makes epistemic trust rational, and epistemic self-trust.
Matters of Trust as Matters of Attachment Security.Andrew Kirton - 2020 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 28 (5):583-602.details
I argue for an account of the vulnerability of trust, as a product of our need for secure social attachments to individuals and to a group. This account seeks to explain why it is true that, when we trust or distrust someone, we are susceptible to being betrayed by them, rather than merely disappointed or frustrated in our goals. What we are concerned about in matters of trust is, at the basic level, whether we matter, in a non-instrumental way, to (...) that individual, or to the group of which they are a member. We have this concern as a result of a drive to form secure social attachments. This makes us vulnerable in the characteristic way of being susceptible to betrayal, because how the other acts in such matters can demonstrate our lack of worth to them, or to the group, thereby threatening the security of our attachment, and eliciting the reactive attitudes characteristic of betrayal. (shrink)
Trust and Distributed Epistemic Labor.Boaz Miller & Ori Freiman - 2020 - In Judith Simon (ed.), The Routledge Handbook on Trust and Philosophy. New York: Routledge. pp. 341-353.details
This chapter explores properties that bind individuals, knowledge, and communities, together. Section 1 introduces Hardwig's argument from trust in others' testimonies as entailing that trust is the glue that binds individuals into communities. Section 2 asks "what grounds trust?" by exploring assessment of collaborators' explanatory responsiveness, formal indicators such as affiliation and credibility, appreciation of peers' tacit knowledge, game-theoretical considerations, and the role moral character of peers, social biases, and social values play in grounding trust. Section 3 deals with establishing (...) reliability standards for formation and breaching of trust. Different epistemic considerations and their underpinning of inductive risks are examined through various communication routes within a discipline, between disciplines, and to the public. Section 4 examines whether a collective entity can be trusted over and above trust that is given to its individual members. Section 5 deals with the roles technological artifacts play in distributed research and collective knowledge. It presents the common view in which genuine trust cannot, in principle, be accorded to artifacts, so as an opposite view. We show that what counts as a genuine object of trust is relevant to debates about the boundaries of collective agency and as a criterion for extended cognitive systems.. (shrink)
Cognitive Islands and Runaway Echo Chambers: Problems for Epistemic Dependence on Experts.C. Thi Nguyen - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):2803-2821.details
I propose to study one problem for epistemic dependence on experts: how to locate experts on what I will call cognitive islands. Cognitive islands are those domains for knowledge in which expertise is required to evaluate other experts. They exist under two conditions: first, that there is no test for expertise available to the inexpert; and second, that the domain is not linked to another domain with such a test. Cognitive islands are the places where we have the fewest resources (...) for evaluating experts, which makes our expert dependences particularly risky. -/- Some have argued that cognitive islands lead to the complete unusability of expert testimony: that anybody who needs expert advice on a cognitive island will be entirely unable to find it. I argue against this radical form of pessimism, but propose a more moderate alternative. I demonstrate that we have some resources for finding experts on cognitive islands, but that cognitive islands leave us vulnerable to an epistemic trap which I will call runaway echo chambers. In a runaway echo chamber, our inexpertise may lead us to pick out bad experts, which will simply reinforce our mistaken beliefs and sensibilities. (shrink)
Echo Chambers and Epistemic Bubbles.C. Thi Nguyen - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):141-161.details
Recent conversation has blurred two very different social epistemic phenomena: echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Members of epistemic bubbles merely lack exposure to relevant information and arguments. Members of echo chambers, on the other hand, have been brought to systematically distrust all outside sources. In epistemic bubbles, other voices are not heard; in echo chambers, other voices are actively undermined. It is crucial to keep these phenomena distinct. First, echo chambers can explain the post-truth phenomena in a way that epistemic (...) bubbles cannot. Second, each type of structure requires a distinct intervention. Mere exposure to evidence can shatter an epistemic bubble, but may actually reinforce an echo chamber. Finally, echo chambers are much harder to escape. Once in their grip, an agent may act with epistemic virtue, but social context will pervert those actions. Escape from an echo chamber may require a radical rebooting of one's belief system. (shrink)
Trust in Medicine.Philip J. Nickel & Lily Frank - 2020 - In Judith Simon (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and Philosophy.details
In this chapter, we consider ethical and philosophical aspects of trust in the practice of medicine. We focus on trust within the patient-physician relationship, trust and professionalism, and trust in Western (allopathic) institutions of medicine and medical research. Philosophical approaches to trust contain important insights into medicine as an ethical and social practice. In what follows we explain several philosophical approaches and discuss their strengths and weaknesses in this context. We also highlight some relevant empirical work in the section on (...) trust in the institutions of medicine. It is hoped that the approaches discussed here can be extended to nursing and other topics in the philosophy of medicine. (shrink)
Vulnerability in Social Epistemic Networks.Emily Sullivan, Max Sondag, Ignaz Rutter, Wouter Meulemans, Scott Cunningham, Bettina Speckmann & Mark Alfano - 2020 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 28 (5):1-23.details
Social epistemologists should be well-equipped to explain and evaluate the growing vulnerabilities associated with filter bubbles, echo chambers, and group polarization in social media. However, almost all social epistemology has been built for social contexts that involve merely a speaker-hearer dyad. Filter bubbles, echo chambers, and group polarization all presuppose much larger and more complex network structures. In this paper, we lay the groundwork for a properly social epistemology that gives the role and structure of networks their due. In particular, (...) we formally define epistemic constructs that quantify the structural epistemic position of each node within an interconnected network. We argue for the epistemic value of a structure that we call the (m,k)-observer. We then present empirical evidence that (m,k)-observers are rare in social media discussions of controversial topics, which suggests that people suffer from serious problems of epistemic vulnerability. We conclude by arguing that social epistemologists and computer scientists should work together to develop minimal interventions that improve the structure of epistemic networks. (shrink)
Trust, Testimony, and Reasons for Belief.Rebecca Wallbank & Andrew Reisner - 2020 - In Kevin McCain & Scott Stapleford (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. London: Routledge.details
This chapter explores two kinds of testimonial trust, what we call 'evidential trust' and 'non-evidential trust' with the aim of asking how testimonial trust could provide epistemic reasons for belief. We argue that neither evidential nor non-evidential trust can play a distinctive role in providing evidential reasons for belief, but we tentatively propose that non-evidential trust can in some circumstances provide a novel kind of epistemic reason for belief, a reason of epistemic facilitation. The chapter begins with an extensive discussion (...) of standard accounts of both kinds of trust and criticises especially the standard accounts of non-evidential trust. A new account of non-evidential trust is offered that avoids a number of difficulties that plague the standard accounts by rejecting what we call 'attitude-liability assumptions'. (shrink)
Trust in a Social and Digital World.Mark Alfano & Colin Klein - 2019 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 1 (8):1-8.details
Negative Epistemic Exemplars.Mark Alfano & Emily Sullivan - 2019 - In Benjamin Sherman & Stacey Goguen (eds.), Overcoming Epistemic Injustice: Social and Psychological Perspectives. Rowman & Littlefield.details
In this chapter, we address the roles that exemplars might play in a comprehensive response to epistemic injustice. Fricker defines epistemic injustices as harms people suffer specifically in their capacity as (potential) knowers. We focus on testimonial epistemic injustice, which occurs when someone's assertoric speech acts are systematically met with either too little or too much credence by a biased audience. Fricker recommends a virtuetheoretic response: people who do not suffer from biases should try to maintain their disposition towards naive (...) testimonial justice, and those who find themselves already biased should cultivate corrective testimonial justice by systematically adjusting their credence in testimony up or down depending on whether they are hearing from someone whom they may be biased against or in favor of. We doubt that the prominent admirationemulation model of exemplarism will be much use in this connection, so we propose two ways of learning from negative exemplars to better conduct one's epistemic affairs. In the admirationemulation model, both the identification of what a virtue is and the cultivation of virtues identified thusly proceed through the admiration of virtuous exemplars. We show that this model has serious flaws and argue for two alternatives: the envyagonism model and the ambivalenceavoidance model. (shrink)
On Behalf of a Bi-Level Account of Trust.J. Adam Carter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies:1-24.details
A bi-level account of trust is developed and defended, one with relevance in ethics as well as epistemology. The proposed account of trust—on which trusting is modelled within a virtue-theoretic framework as a performance-type with an aim—distinguishes between two distinct levels of trust, apt and convictive, that take us beyond previous assessments of its nature, value, and relationship to risk assessment. While Ernest Sosa (2009; 2015; 2017), in particular, has shown how a performance normativity model may be fruitfully applied to (...) belief, my objective is to apply this kind of model in a novel and principled way to trust. I conclude by outlining some of the key advantages of the performance-theoretic bi-level account of trust defended over more traditional univocal proposals. (shrink)
Objective Expertise and Functionalist Constraints.Michel Croce - 2019 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8 (5):25-35.details
Christian Quast has recently embarked on the project of systematizing the debate about the notion of expertise, an extremely fascinating and important issue addressed by scholars of many disciplines yet still in need of an interdisciplinary take. He sheds light on a number of relevant features of this notion and defends what he calls a "balanced" account of expertise, namely one that defines this concept in light of an expert's dispositions, manifestations of their dispositions, and social role or function. In (...) this critical reply, I offer some considerations that put pressure on Quast's balanced account and hopefully help anyone interested in this debate take a step forward toward explaining what it takes for one to be an expert. The reply is structured as follows. First, I argue that his allegedly balanced view is liable to a potentially compromising tension between its function component and the ingredients of objective expertise (§1). Then, I show that Quast's threefold characterization of an objective expert is too strong, as it imposes conditions that several individuals whom we would consider experts are unable to fulfill (§2). Finally, I provide reasons in favor of endorsing an objective account of expertise in light of some specific features of our society and show how this account can take into due consideration the different services experts ordinarily perform (§3). (shrink)
On What It Takes to Be an Expert.Michel Croce - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):1-21.details
This paper tackles the problem of defining what a cognitive expert is. Starting from a shared intuition that the definition of an expert depends upon the conceptual function of expertise, I shed light on two main approaches to the notion of an expert: according to novice-oriented accounts of expertise, experts need to provide laypeople with information they lack in some domain; whereas, according to research-oriented accounts, experts need to contribute to the epistemic progress of their discipline. In this paper, I (...) defend the thesis that cognitive experts should be identified by their ability to perform the latter function rather than the former, as novice-oriented accounts, unlike research-oriented ones, fail to comply with the rules of a functionalist approach to expertise. (shrink)
A Metacognitive Approach to Trust and a Case Study: Artificial Agency.Ioan Muntean - 2019 - Computer Ethics - Philosophical Enquiry (CEPE) Proceedings.details
Trust is defined as a belief of a human H ('the trustor') about the ability of an agent A (the 'trustee') to perform future action(s). We adopt here dispositionalism and internalism about trust: H trusts A iff A has some internal dispositions as competences. The dispositional competences of A are high-level metacognitive requirements, in the line of a naturalized virtue epistemology. (Sosa, Carter) We advance a Bayesian model of two (i) confidence in the decision and (ii) model uncertainty. To trust (...) A, H demands A to be self-assertive about confidence and able to self-correct its own models. In the Bayesian approach trust can be applied not only to humans, but to artificial agents (e.g. Machine Learning algorithms). We explain the advantage the metacognitive trust when compared to mainstream approaches and how it relates to virtue epistemology. The metacognitive ethics of trust is swiftly discussed. (shrink)
Staying True with the Help of Others: Doxastic Self-Control Through Interpersonal Commitment.Leo Charles Townsend - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (3):243-258.details
I explore the possibility and rationality of interpersonal mechanisms of doxastic self-control, that is, ways in which individuals can make use of other people in order to get themselves to stick to their beliefs. I look, in particular, at two ways in which people can make interpersonal epistemic commitments, and thereby willingly undertake accountability to others, in order to get themselves to maintain their beliefs in the face of anticipated "epistemic temptations". The first way is through the avowal of belief, (...) and the second is through the establishment of collective belief. I argue that both of these forms of interpersonal epistemic commitment can function as effective tools for doxastic self-control, and, moreover, that the control they facilitate should not be dismissed as irrational from an epistemic perspective. (shrink)
The Obligation to Diversify One's Sources: Against Epistemic Partisanship in the Consumption of News Media.Alex Worsnip - 2019 - In Carl Fox & Joe Saunders (eds.), Media Ethics: Free Speech and the Requirements of Democracy. London: Routledge. pp. 240-264.details
In this paper, I defend the view that it is wrong for us to consume only, or overwhelmingly, media that broadly aligns with our own political viewpoints: that is, it is wrong to be politically "partisan" in our decisions about what media to consume. We are obligated to consume media that aligns with political viewpoints other than our own – to "diversify our sources". This is so even if our own views are, as a matter of fact, substantively correct.
The Seduction of Winston Smith.Mark Alfano - 2018 - In Ezio Di Nucci & Stefan Storrie (eds.), 1984 and philosophy, is resistance futile? Open Court.details
On the first page of 1984, Winston Smith is confronted with several posters featuring the face of Big Brother and the famous sentence, "BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU." This may not seem like a promising way to seduce someone, but the seduction of Winston Smith by Big Brother in 1984 is a most unusual love story. I call it a seduction because Winston's mind and heart are slowly won over in the aptly-named Ministry of Love. Moreover, in the final scene (...) of the novel, Winston gazes, with tears in his eyes, up at Big Brother on the telescreen. The last sentence of the book states, simply, "He loved Big Brother." How does Big Brother seduce Winston Smith? He certainly does not employ stereotypical methods. Big Brother is not particularly sexy, and his incessant angry shouting does not seem calculated to foster adoration. On top of that, Winston never meets Big Brother in person. His only access is through media: posters, stories, and the telescreen. We all know that it's hard to maintain a long-distance relationship. Long-distance seduction is even more challenging. So how does Big Brother manage it? To answer this question, I use the theory of seduction first articulated by the philosopher John Forrester (1990, p. 42), who argues that "the first step in a seductive maneuver could be summed up as, 'I know what you're thinking.'". (shrink)
Technological Seduction and Self-Radicalization.Mark Alfano, Joseph Adam Carter & Marc Cheong - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association (3):298-322.details
Many scholars agree that the Internet plays a pivotal role in self-radicalization, which can lead to behaviours ranging from lone-wolf terrorism to participation in white nationalist rallies to mundane bigotry and voting for extremist candidates. However, the mechanisms by which the Internet facilitates self-radicalization are disputed; some fault the individuals who end up self-radicalized, while others lay the blame on the technology itself. In this paper, we explore the role played by technological design decisions in online self-radicalization in its myriad (...) guises, encompassing extreme as well as more mundane forms. We begin by characterizing the phenomenon of technological seduction. Next, we distinguish between top-down seduction and bottom-up seduction. We then situate both forms of technological seduction within the theoretical model of dynamical systems theory. We conclude by articulating strategies for combatting online self-radicalization. (shrink)
Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice.Simon Barker, Charlie Crerar & Trystan S. Goetze - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:1-21.details
This volume has its roots in two recent developments within mainstream analytic epistemology: a growing recognition over the past two or three decades of the active and social nature of our epistemic lives; and, more recently still, the increasing appreciation of the various ways in which the epistemic practices of individuals and societies can, and often do, go wrong. The theoretical analysis of these breakdowns in epistemic practice, along with the various harms and wrongs that follow as a consequence, constitutes (...) an approach to epistemology that we refer to as non-ideal epistemology. In this introductory chapter we introduce and contextualise the ten essays that comprise this volume, situating them within four broad sub-fields: vice epistemology, epistemic injustice, inter-personal epistemic practices, and applied epistemology. We also provide a brief overview of several other important growth areas in non-ideal epistemology. (shrink)
When Expert Disagreement Supports the Consensus.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):142-156.details
It is often suggested that disagreement among scientific experts is a reason not to trust those experts, even about matters on which they are in agreement. In direct opposition to this view, I argue here that the very fact that there is disagreement among experts on a given issue provides a positive reason for non-experts to trust that the experts really are justified in their attitudes towards consensus theories. I show how this line of thought can be spelled out in (...) three distinct frameworks for non-deductive reasoning: namely, Bayesian Confirmation Theory, Inference to the Best Explanation, and Inferential Robustness Analysis. (shrink)
The Problem of Conspiracism.Matthew R. X. Dentith - 2018 - Argumenta 3 (2):327-343.details
Belief in conspiracy theories is typically considered irrational, and as a consequence of this, conspiracy theorists––those who dare believe some conspiracy theory––have been charged with a variety of epistemic or psychological failings. Yet recent philosophical work has challenged the view that belief in conspiracy theories should be considered as typically irrational. By performing an intra-group analysis of those people we call "conspiracy theorists", we find that the problematic traits commonly ascribed to the general group of conspiracy theorists turn out to (...) be merely a set of stereotypical behaviours and thought patterns associated with a purported subset of that group. If we understand that the supposed prob- lem of belief in conspiracy theories is centred on the beliefs of this purported sub- set––the conspiracists––then we can reconcile the recent philosophical contribu- tions to the wider academic debate on the rationality of belief in conspiracy theories. (shrink)
Litotes, Irony and Other Innocent Lies.Ignace Haaz - 2018 - Globethics Global Series No. 16.details
In the following text we would like to present the philosophical discussion on untrusting lies, which introduces a space for innocent lie understood as figurative manipulation of the speech: a poetic trope that we would argue could not only be generously used to help us tolerating our sometime deceiving human condition—which is global and universally ours, that of the finitude of human capacity of knowledge and ethical action—but also to maximise our capacity for knowledge formation and adaptation to values. Concepts (...) formation and communication relates to a collective interplay of different interiorized images, before it comes to the exterior in some well-chosen expressions, in self-mastered way; their origin remain in a mentally latent process of selection of content and ideas, as possible solutions of in a games of compatible propositions. These unconscious materials of our life relies on our capacity to identify and quickly switch between different spans, that enable us to focus on complex sets data, all depending very much on figurative manipulations, that should not be confounded with blameworthy and misleading representations. (shrink)
Matters of Interpersonal Trust.Andrew Kirton - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Manchesterdetails
This thesis defends an account of what it is to trust other people, and what gives matters of trust (i.e. situations where we trust/distrust others) a characteristic interpersonal, normative, or moral/ethical importance to us. In other words, it answers what the nature of betrayal (and being susceptible to betrayal) is. -/- Along the way I put forward/defend accounts of the following: the relationship between trust and reliance (chapter 4); an account of reliance itself (chapter 5); trust and distrust as one/two/three-place (...) attitudes (chapter 7); and the ethical/normative significance of trust and betrayal as a matter of attachment security (chapters 6 and 8). -/- In addition to these accounts, the thesis also gives (in chapter 2) a conceptual/historical overview of the dominant paradigm in philosophical understanding of trust: as a form of reliance 'plus' betrayal conditions (a la Baier 1986; Holton 1994; Hawley 2014, among others). It also offers a rebuttal of that dominant paradigm in chapter 3 and 4. Furthermore, it offers an overview of how trust is understood more generally across philosophical and some social scientific/psychological literature (chapter 1). It also offers a rebuttal of the rational choice/game-theoretic understanding of trust and economic rationality a la so-called 'trust games' (chapter 1). This carries the consequence that analysis of trust in these traditions is not really based on anything resembling interpersonal trust, as we would intuitively recognise it. (shrink)
Conscientiousness and Other Problems: A Reply to Zagzebski.Jonathan Matheson, Jensen Alex, Valerie Joly Chock & Kyle Mallard - 2018 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7 (1):10-13.details
Arguments From Expert Opinion and Persistent Bias.Moti Mizrahi - 2018 - Argumentation 32 (2):175-195.details
Accounts of arguments from expert opinion take it for granted that expert judgments count as (defeasible) evidence for propositions, and so an argument that proceeds from premises about what an expert judges to a conclusion that the expert is probably right is a strong argument. In Mizrahi (2013), I consider a potential justification for this assumption, namely, that expert judgments are significantly more likely to be true than novice judgments, and find it wanting because of empirical evidence suggesting that expert (...) judgments under uncertainty are not significantly more likely to be true than novice judgments or even chance. In this paper, I consider another potential justification for this assumption, namely, that expert judgments are not influenced by the cognitive biases novice judgments are influenced by, and find it wanting, too, because of empirical evidence suggesting that experts are vulnerable to pretty much the same cognitive biases that novices are vulnerable to. If this is correct, then the basic assumption at the core of accounts of arguments from expert opinion, namely, that expert judgments count as (defeasible) evidence for propositions, remains unjustified. (shrink)
Trusting the Media? TV News as a Source of Knowledge.Nicola Mößner - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (2):205-220.details
Why do we trust TV news? What reasons might support a recipient's assessment of the trustworthiness of this kind of information? This paper presents a veritistic analysis of the epistemic practice of news production and communication. The topic is approached by discussing a detailed case study, namely the characteristics of the most popular German news programme, called the 'Tagesschau'. It will be shown that a veritistic analysis can indeed provide a recipient with relevant reasons to consider when pondering on the (...) trustworthiness of sources of information. Moreover, it will turn out that these reasons are part of what recipients might gather from media literacy. (shrink)
Original Sin, the Fall, and Epistemic Self-Trust.Jonathan C. Rutledge - 2018 - TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 2 (1):84-94.details
In this paper, I argue that no strong doctrine of the Fall can undermine the propriety of epistemic self-trust. My argument proceeds by introducing a common type of philosophical methodology, known as reflective equilibrium. After a brief exposition of the method, I introduce a puzzle for someone engaged in the project of self-reflection after gaining a reason to distrust their epistemic selves on the basis of a construal of a doctrine of the Fall. I close by introducing the worry as (...) a formal argument and demonstrate the self-undermining nature of such an argument. (shrink)
Democratic Values: A Better Foundation for Public Trust in Science.S. Andrew Schroeder - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axz023.details
There is a growing consensus among philosophers of science that core parts of the scientific process involve non-epistemic values. This undermines the traditional foundation for public trust in science. In this article I consider two proposals for justifying public trust in value-laden science. According to the first, scientists can promote trust by being transparent about their value choices. On the second, trust requires that the values of a scientist align with the values of an individual member of the public. I (...) argue that neither of these proposals work and suggest an alternative that does better. When scientists must appeal to values in the course of their research, they should appeal to democratic values: the values of the public or its representatives. (shrink)


text:
Colleen Cathryn Hansen
July 6, 1933 - December 22, 2021
Order Flowers now for guaranteed delivery before Colleen's visitation.
age 88, went to meet her Savior peacefully on Wednesday, December 22 at the Laurels of Carson City. She was born July 6, 1933, in South Dakota on the same family farm that her father had been born on. She was the first of four children born to Dorothy Mae (Harvey) and Richard Henry Clough. Her family came to South Haven, Mi from South Dakota in 1945. They came further north in Michigan to Cedar Lake in 1947. This last move was so their children could attend the Seventh Day Adventist School, Cedar Lake Academy in May of 1951 and was Victorian of her class. In June of 1951, she married her life partner Martin Hansen and spent 59 years together greeting life as it came to them until he passed away ion 2010. They were proud parents of eight children spread out over 20 years. These children and later grandchildren were the center of their lives. Her days were consumed with the care of her family, and she had some special homemaking skills she shared with them. Quilt making had been passed down to her from female heredity. She made quilts for her home and later denim quilts for most of her grandchildren. These weighted quilts were 30 plus years ahead of their time. Many years were spent at her old sewing machine making these quilts, dolly clothes, potholders, dresses, and other items. She learned to embroider from her grandmother Clough. All her children, many of the grandchildren and great grandchildren have pillowcases that she embroidered with many of her delicate stitches. She installed a love of books and reading in all of her children and others. Several of her children has thrived despite learning disabilities because of her reading so much to them. Many a Sabbath afternoon were spent with her reading for hours, sometimes even complete books. Of course, there were the times she read herself to sleep, or she would stop reading to silently read ahead the story plot as silent reading is so much faster than reading aloud. From the Kitchen came a family famous strawberry shortcake, cinnamon sticky rolls and ice cream custard that came from an old Adventist cookbook. The shortcake recipe has been handed down through the generations as it is superior to all others. When their farm had dairy cows, she made the best custard using the thickest cream from the very top. This custard was turned into ice cream by the men and children by turning the crank on the ice maker machine. Her cinnamon rolls with a top layer of caramelized brown sugar were enjoyed by family and others. Several times large pans of her rolls went on campouts with Pathfinders. Recently a grandson posted his version of her rolls on facebook with many responding as they recognized the cinnamon rolls, they loved so much.
She never worked outside the home until after the youngest had graduated from the now Great Lake Adventist Academy in 1992. She then worked 15 plus years in the Foster Grandparent Program. First at Web Elementary then Blanchard Elementary and finally at Sunflower Elementary in KS.
Along with going to work, she also went back to school at Montcalm Community College in the fall of 1994. She completed her evening classes in May 1998 with an associate degree in Arts and Science.
Besides living in the Edmore/Cedar Lake area, she spent several years in Florida, during which her family survived hurricane Donna at Ft. Myers in 1960. Most recently she has lived with her children in Kansas and Texas.
She spent her whole life as a Seventh Day Adventist beginning with her baptism at age eight at the Mitchell SDA Church in SD. Here in Michigan, she attended the Edmore SDA Church for many many years. She also attended SDA churches in KS and TX, mostly recently Belgreen SDA Church in Greenville.
She is preceded in death by her parents, husband, brother Wayne Clough and a granddaughter, Wilhelmina Jorgensen.
She will be greatly missed by her children; Karen (Harold) Jorgensen of Greenville, Marco (Annette) Hansen of Bowling Green, KY, Clare Hansen and Marie Hall of Stanton, Jerry (Brenda) Hansen of Andover, KS, Garth Hansen of Greenville, Kristian (Teresa) Hansen of Edmore and Robin (Terence) Jimerson of Jefferson, TX, two daughters-in-law Barb Hansen of Harrison, Jody Collins of Edmore and 19 grandchildren plus 3 step great grandchildren, 25 great-grandchildren, plus 4 step great great grandchildren and a few months short of greeting her first great great grandchild.
She will also be missed by her beloved sisters, Marilyn Porter and Geneva Parks-Nedry of Edmore and a sister-in-law, Elizabeth Culver of TN. There are many nieces and nephews who will miss this special Aunt. May her foster grandchildren spare a moment for their memories of this special Grandma.
Burial has taken place at the Cedar Lake Cemetery. A family memorial is being planned around her birthday this summer.
To plant memorial trees or send flowers to the family in memory of Colleen Hansen, please visit our flower store.
I have fond memories of Colleen as one of our foster grandparents at Webb Elementary and was a fortunate recipient of her beautiful pillow cases! She touched the lives and made a difference for many children! She will be missed. My sincerest condolences to Geneva and to Colleen's family.
Deborah Snyder Dec 30 2021 9:50 PM
No service information has been added.


Curcumin prevents dopaminergic neuronal death through inhibition of the c-Jun N-terminal kinase pathway.
Key Laboratory of Cell Biology of Ministry of Public Health of China, Laboratory of Cell Engineering and Therapy of Institute of Tissue Engineering, China Medical University, Shenyang, PR China.
Recent studies have shown that the c-Jun N-terminal kinase (JNK) signaling pathway is involved in dopaminergic neuronal degeneration, and direct blockade of JNK by specific inhibitors may prevent or effectively slow the progression of Parkinson disease (PD). Previous studies have revealed that the natural phenolic compound curcumin can reduce inflammation and oxidation, which makes it a potential therapeutic agent for neurodegenerative diseases. In this study, we investigated whether curcumin protects against 1-methyl-4-phenyl-1,2,3,6-tetrahydropyridine- (MPTP) or 1-methyl-4-phenylpyridnium ion- (MPP(+)) induced dopaminergic neurotoxicity in C57BL/6N mice or SH-SY5Y cells by inhibiting JNK pathways both in vivo and in vitro. Curcumin treatment significantly improved behavioral deficits, and enhanced the survival of tyrosine hydroxylase-positive neurons in the substantia nigra (SN) in the MPTP-induced PD model mice. Most importantly, curcumin treatment significantly inhibited MPTP/MPP(+)-induced phosphorylation of JNK1/2 and c-Jun, and cleaved caspase-3. Our study suggests that the neuroprotective effect of curcumin is not related simply to its antiinflammatory and antioxidant properties, but involves other mechanisms, particularly by targeting the JNK pathways.


>>there are f/m sleeper holds?
Thanks! What was that sleeper fetish site?
>>>does anyone here know of any films or tv shows where >>>there are f/m sleeper holds? >>> >>>The Contract (1998) has a good one! johanna black >>>sleepers a guy then breaks his neck >> >> >>Here is a link to the scene in "the contract" where >>the sleeper is applied. >>Although not as good as one applied on a sleeper >>fetish site, it is one of the better ones I have seen >>from a movie... >> >>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PmKOXI0_p28&search=kill >% >>20intruder > >Thanks! What was that sleeper fetish site?


text:
package com.malaska.spark.training.timeseries

import org.apache.log4j.{Level, Logger}
import org.apache.spark.sql.SparkSession

object LeadLagExample {
  Logger.getLogger("org").setLevel(Level.OFF)
  Logger.getLogger("akka").setLevel(Level.OFF)

  def main(args:Array[String]): Unit = {
    val leadLagJson = args(0)

    val isLocal = true

    val sparkSession = if (isLocal) {
      SparkSession.builder
        .master("local")
        .appName("my-spark-app")
        .config("spark.some.config.option", "config-value")
        .config("spark.driver.host", "127.0.0.1")
        .config("spark.sql.parquet.compression.codec", "gzip")
        .enableHiveSupport()
        .getOrCreate()
    } else {
      SparkSession.builder
        .appName("my-spark-app")
        .config("spark.some.config.option", "config-value")
        .enableHiveSupport()
        .getOrCreate()
    }
    println("---")

    import sparkSession.implicits._

    val leadLag = sparkSession.read.json(leadLagJson).as[JsonLeadLag]

    leadLag.createOrReplaceTempView("leadlag")

    sparkSession.sql("select * from leadlag").collect().foreach(println)

    val leadLagDf = sparkSession.sql("SELECT " +
      "group, ts, " +
      "value as v_now, " +
      "LEAD(value) OVER (PARTITION BY group ORDER BY ts) as v_after, " +
      "LAG(value)  OVER (PARTITION BY group ORDER BY ts) as v_before " +
      "FROM leadlag")

    leadLagDf.collect().foreach(println)

    leadLagDf.createOrReplaceTempView("leadlag_stage2")

    leadLagDf.printSchema()

    sparkSession.sql("select " +
      "group, ts, v_now, v_after, v_before, " +
      "case " +
      " when v_now < v_after and v_now < v_before then 'valley'" +
      " when v_now > v_after and v_now > v_before then 'peak'" +
      " else 'n/a' " +
      "end " +
      "from leadlag_stage2").collect().foreach(println)
  }
}

case class JsonLeadLag(group:String, ts:Long, value:Long)


Handwriting Tumblers – Anomaly Creations & Designs, Inc.
Handwriting Tumbler - Customize this with REAL handwriting or drawings! It can be personalized the way you want it to be. Personalize for a friend, family or co-worker...or keep it for yourself! The options are endless- engrave a special note, perhaps from a loved one, a child's drawing, or signature. The beauty is that you design this.


Last week, a Reddit thread appeared revealing that Netflix would be purging more than 90 titles from their library at the start of 2014.
This particular list contained some excellent films and some that were less than stellar. Those titles will be vanishing from the service tonight at midnight.
Now, that same thread has a new post explaining that the company will be adding 26 new flicks to its streaming archive. While this may be a tiny figure compared to the options they're eradicating from the service, some awesome movies are finally returning.
Most of the selection is comprised of cult favorites like "American Psycho." Also, every kid who grew up in the nineties will be overjoyed to see "Good Burger" and "Spaceballs" return to Netflix. The rest of the movies are below.


text:
Paris Resource Guide
Secrets of Paris Newsletter
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Home » Paris Sightseeing » Neighborhoods » Paris Neighborhoods III: Butte aux Cailles
Paris Neighborhoods III: Butte aux Cailles
Heather Stimmler
The Low-down The Butte-aux-Cailles doesn't make it into too many mainstream guidebooks. Even Parisians, who may be able to point out its location on a map, rarely make the trek up to the small hill.
After all, there are no museums, no clubs, no trendy clothing shops or cinemas with enormous screens (like at Italie 2, down the road). At an altitude of just under 65 meters, there's hardly a view to speak of, unless you find the modern tower blocks at the neighboring Tolbiac interesting in a post-modern kind of way. So why is it that each time you meet someone from the Butte, they gush on endlessly about the "charm" and "authenticity" of the neighborhood? Namely, because it is charming, in an authentic kind of way, of course. Named after the family Cailles that once farmed on the hillside, the Butte-aux-Cailles was covered in windmills up until the late 19th century, and was one of the last corners of the city connected to the EDF's grid. It has been forgotten as the place where Pilâtre du Rozier landed the first manned hot-air balloon in 1783.
It's usually remembered as one of the strongholds of the Paris Commune of 1871, where the communards resisted the Versaillais troops until the bitter end (memorialized only by the Place de la Commune de Paris at the centre of the Butte). Afterwards, the neighbourhood remained a working-class village. It wasn't until the 1970s that the Butte was surrounded by the ugly residential towers that plague most of the 13th (fortunately, the centuries of tunnelling into the hillside to excavate stone left the Butte-aux-Cailles too fragile for anything more than a few stories tall). Rising prices elsewhere in Paris made the Butte popular with artists, intellectuals, and eventually bourgeois executives looking for a "loft".
The Butte-aux-Cailles today remains "populaire" in the French sense, with co-op owned restaurants and a Socialist mayor, but there are also trendy bars (one with free WIFI access) attracting the type of people who wear sunglasses at night. The local business owners are quite happy about this, although some of the residents are getting a bit cranky about the noisy sidewalk cafés that stay open well past midnight. As this goes to press, people on the Butte are taking sides on the issue…still a feisty neighborhood, indeed!
Visiting the Butte-aux-Cailles Get off at Metro Corvisart and head up the Rue des Cinq-Diamants to the intersection at Rue de la Butte aux Cailles. This is pretty much the centre of the action after dark. During the day things are a bit quieter, and it's a good time to explore the little streets and their hidden gardens. Turn right at the Place de la Commune de Paris and head down to the Rue Daviel, with its Alsace-styled public housing from the early 1900s, and the adorable houses with mini gardens on the Villa Daviel. Just around the corner to the left, at 31 rue Vergniaud, is a newly-opened Antiquités flea market (Tues-Sat 11am-7pm). Anyone with a sweet tooth should stop into Les Abeilles (21 rue de la Butte aux Cailles) for locally-made honies and honey-based products, or L'Osive Thé (5 rue de la Butte aux Cailles; also a tearoom by the same name across the street) for teas and dainty home decorations. On the other side of the Butte, the art-deco style Piscine de la Butte aux Cailles (5 place Paul Verlaine; don't forget your Speedos, boys) is one of the nicest public pools in Paris, supplied by a natural hot spring that keeps the waters a constant 28°C. Fans of French theatre can find the program of the Théâtre des Cinq Diamants at http://www.theatreonline.com. This fall they have a bit of vaudeville and Jean Racine (not together, of course).
Eating and Drinking You're spoilt for choice when it comes to eating and drinking on the Butte-aux-Cailles, from real Breton crepes at the Des Crêpes & Des Cailles (13 rue de la Butte aux Cailles) to authentic boudin à la Normande at the budget-priced co-op restaurant Les Temps des Cerises (18-20, rue de la Butte aux Cailles, closed weekends). Gourmet foodies can try the Italian trattoria Les Cailloux (58, rue des Cinq Diamants) and L'Avant Goût (26, rue Bobillot), both packed full for lunch and dinner. Happy Hour starts at many of the neighbourhood's bars at 6pm, including the tropical Papagallo (25 rue des Cinq Diamants) and the internet bar Sputnik (14-16, rue de la Butte aux Cailles). Le Ménestrel (10, rue de l'Espérance) specialises in feu de bois pizzas, and has Brazilian soirées every Sunday night, and the Folie en Tête (33, rue de la Butte aux Cailles), with African percussion instruments decorating the bar, is known for its friendly reggae and jazz atmosphere, from 5pm until 2am.
This article is one of the 78 original "Secrets of Paris" articles published between September 1999 and July 2004. After disappearing into the internet graveyard for almost 15 years, I've republished them in autumn 2019 to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Secrets of Paris: "1999-2019: Twenty Years of the Secrets of Paris" Broken and dead links have been updated or deactivated, but otherwise the article remains unchanged.
Share This Secret:
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