Overlapping Coalition Formation via Probabilistic Topic Modeling
Michalis Mamakos, Georgios Chalkiadakis
Research in cooperative games often assumes that agents know the coalitional values with certainty, and that they can belong to one coalition only. By contrast, this work assumes that the value of a coalition is based on an underlying collaboration structure emerging due to existing but unknown relations among the agents; and that agents can form overlapping coalitions. Specifically, we first propose Relational Rules, a novel representation scheme for cooperative games with overlapping coalitions, which encodes the aforementioned relations, and which extends the well-known MC-nets representation to this setting. We then present a novel decision-making method for decentralized overlapping coalition formation, which exploits probabilistic topic modeling, and in particular, online Latent Dirichlet Allocation. By interpreting formed coalitions as documents, agents can effectively learn topics that correspond to profitable collaboration structures.
cs.GT