The right way to do the second game is the following: Agree to split the votes 1,1,2,2,5. Then if everything goes well, the person with the 5 wins the largest possible amount and if anyone deviates from the strategy, they will not win the money themselves.,(reply>), The incentive to not do that is that it happens out in the open. It's an entirely different thing if nobody actually cares what the other people think.<br><br>I'm just saying that as long as someone actually cooperates and wins on five they are going to get the maximum value regardless.<br><br>What you said certainly works in cases where someone actually decides to screw them over.<br><br>But if you actually propose your idea to a group it reflects your own lack of trust. Which actually increases the odds that every starts suspecting you as well.<br><br>So the logical solution can cause a psychological backfire in that way. And since the result was still optimal second guessing is something of a moot point.,(reply>), @Nicol Bolas It ended up not being any different but if someone chose lower than 4 they would have won (slightly less) so they were still running that risk. This way there is no incentive to deviate because there would always be someone with lower.,(reply>), @Nicol Bolas No it's not: if the agreement is all 4 and one 5, then if someone picks 3 their share goes from 1 to 3. But with kettwiesel25's solution, the only way to deviate from the plan is for someone to pick 3 or 4, but in that case the person that kept their word and picked 1 gets the money, so the cheater gets 0.,(reply>), Functionally not different from the all 4 and one 5 strategy they did use. I don't see what point you're trying to make.