South Africa Leader Who Gave Up Nukes Says North Korea Is a Different Story | Voice of America - English
VOA's Korean Service reporter Kim Young-nam spoke to former South African President F.W. de Klerk on Friday about the denuclearization process for North Korea and how it might compare to that of South Africa. As president of South Africa, de Klerk ordered the end of the country's nuclear weapons program and oversaw its nuclear disarmament process.Q: Under your presidency (1989-94), South Africa was able to successfully denuclearize.
The circumstances in South Africa in 1989 and in North Korea now are entirely different. The threat to South Africa that had led us to develop nuclear weapons had disappeared as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, the successful independence process in Namibia, and our own initiatives to resolve our problems through democratic negotiations. Also, the South African government, which then represented the minority communities, was a functioning democracy with regular elections, an effective parliament and independent courts. Our main challenge at that time was to extend non-racial democracy to all our people. We had a clear interest in dismantling our nuclear capability because of its expense and because we wished to rejoin the international community as quickly as possible. I do not think that the situation in North Korea is at all the same. Kim Jong Un is a totalitarian dictator. His primary interest is in ensuring the continuation of his dynastic rule — and he views his nuclear weapons as a major bargaining chip in this process. He also wants to end the sanctions that are crippling the North Korean economy. Accordingly, I think it is unlikely that he will dispense with his nuclear weapons unless he is absolutely sure that there will be no threat to his regime — but he will continue to negotiate with a view to the removal of all, or some, of the sanctions. It will be essential to involve the IAEA in any dismantling process — as South Africa did — to ensure that the destruction of all nuclear weapons and fissionable material is meticulously monitored and controlled. The test of North Korea's sincerity in dismantling its nuclear capability will depend on its willingness to submit to international controls. I do not think it will do so until it is completely certain that its long-term security and the interests of the dynasty have been secured. As pointed out above, we decided to dismantle our nuclear weapons because the threats that had led us to develop them had by 1989 disappeared. A major factor was the collapse of the Soviet Union — and our tripartite agreement with Angola and Cuba in 1988 on the withdrawal of 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola. One must remember that as late as October 1987, our armed forces had been in direct conflict with Cuban and Soviet-led Angolan forces at the Battle of the Lomba River. The battle was probably the largest set-piece battle in Africa since World War II and resulted in the destruction of 93 Soviet-built tanks. The tripartite agreement opened the way to the implementation of the U.N. independence plan for Namibia in 1989 — and the resolution of another long-standing dispute between South Africa and the international community. I also believed that the constitutional negotiations that I planned to launch early in 1990 would resolve all of the tensions between South Africa and our neighboring states in southern Africa. Dispensing with nuclear weapons also helped to speed up our reintegration with the international community — and saved us the considerable expense involved in developing and maintaining nuclear weapons. I would advise those involved to give North Korea the security assurances that it requires and to spell out the enormous advantages of ending sanctions and reintegrating into the international economic community — in other words — following the same road that China and Vietnam took in recent decades to their enormous advantage. The danger of nuclear proliferation in Asia will increase to the degree that the countries involved feel threatened by existing nuclear states and to the degree that they perceive that they might in future no longer enjoy the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The immediate goal of the international community should be to ensure the elimination of the North Korean nuclear threat. It would be naive to imagine that North Korea will suddenly respect the full spectrum of human rights and freedoms. However, if it can be persuaded to follow the path of China and Vietnam there would be enormous improvements in the day-to-day lives of the North Korean people. Unfortunately, I have very little information regarding North Korea's relations with African countries and am, therefore, not really in a position to reply to your question.