text: Chapter 1
  * Counterattacking enemy infantry attacks.
  * Administering the decisive blow through isolation and pursuit.
  1-4. For example, the operations of the newly organized Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac during
  the Gettysburg campaign were an essential factor in the Union’s success in that pivotal battle. At Gettysburg,
  the Union Army employed an effective Cavalry force that worked directly for the commanding General of
  the Army. Below is information that highlights an example of a historical role that Cavalry units have played
  on the battlefield.
  Shaping the Battlefield with Cavalry: Gettysburg, the First Day
  In June 1863, as General Robert E. Lee led his Army of Northern Virginia through the
  Shenandoah Valley into Maryland and Pennsylvania, almost one half of the confederate
  cavalry forces under Major General J.E.B. Stuart were conducting independent
  operations. The absence of Stuart and his reconnaissance and security force would
  disadvantage Lee as he concentrated his forces in south central Pennsylvania near the
  town of Gettysburg.
  The Union Army of the Potomac moved north in several columns, screened by its cavalry.
  The westernmost column benefited from the protection of Brigadier General John Buford’s
  Cavalry division, a combined arms force. On 29 June, this formation moved to a nexus of
  roads near Gettysburg, leaving one of its brigades to cover the Catoctin Mountain passes
  to protect the army’s flank. After a brief encounter with Confederate forces, Buford led his
  remaining two brigades and one battery of artillery into Gettysburg the following day. He
  bypassed initial contact to focus on his reconnaissance objective—the location and actions
  of Lee’s army.
  Aware of a Confederate concentration of forces to his west but lacking detailed
  information, Buford dispatched scouts to conduct area reconnaissance west and north of
  Gettysburg. They reported completely and accurately the locations and lines of march for
  all three corps of Lee’s army. Buford immediately transmitted the collected information to
  General Meade and made recommendations to the Union Army commander. Buford’s
  reports allowed Meade to understand and visualize the terrain surrounding Gettysburg
  before occupation. Based on his scouts’ reports, Buford deployed his division to cover the
  primary approaches to the town from the north and west. He also ensured local security
  by implementing martial law, the arrest of a suspected spy, and the prohibition of alcohol
  sales to his soldiers. Buford understood his mission to delay the Confederates and deny
  them access to the heights overlooking the town so the Army of the Potomac could occupy
  that position.
  Having pinpointed and identified their lines of march and probable objective (Gettysburg),
  Buford undertook preparations to delay the Confederate forces (after identifying their
  advance) as long as possible. He prepared his two brigades to cover a seven-mile arc
  outside the town stretching from the west to the northeast. His main effort focused on the
  Chambersburg Pike that reached Gettysburg from the west where the closest Confederate
  forces were encamped. A series of ridgelines crossed the road, and Buford used these to
  add depth to his position. His main position lay upon McPherson Ridge, where he deployed
  much of one brigade, which he supported with his artillery battery. A series of picket lines
  and small four- to five-man patrols occupied the ridgelines forward of this position to a
  depth of nearly two miles. At their most advanced point along Whistler’s Ridge, Buford’s
  pickets laid only a half mile from their Confederate counterparts. In Gettysburg’s
  Lutheran Seminary, Buford established his signals officer in the high cupola, which
  permitted observation of the town and its surroundings.
  Buford’s operations lay in complete contrast to those undertaken by the Confederates.
  When a North Carolina brigade approached Gettysburg and discovered the Union
  Cavalry in the town, its commander withdrew and reported the contact to his division and
  corps commanders. Neither officer considered the enemy’s presence in Gettysburg to be