text: Chapter 1
  1-64. The strategic and operational levels of warfare provide the context for tactical operations. Without this
  context, tactical operations devolve into a series of disconnected and unfocused actions. Likewise, tactical
  operations inform strategic and operational objectives, ensuring that those objectives remain tethered to
  reality and adjust, when necessary, according to the situation. Strategic and operational success is a measure
  of how the achievement of objectives in one or more battles contributes to winning a major operation or
  campaign. (See ADP 3-90 for more information on tactics.)
  ARMY STRATEGIC CONTEXTS
  1-65. Joint doctrine describes the strategic environment in terms of a competition continuum. Rather than a
  world either at peace or at war, the competition continuum describes three broad categories of strategic
  relationships—cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. Each relationship is
  defined as between the United States and another strategic actor relative to a specific set of policy aims.
  Cooperation, competition, and even armed conflict commonly go on simultaneously in different parts of the
  world. Because of this, the needs of CCDRs and Army component commanders in one area are affected by
  the strategic needs of others. (See JP 3-0 for more information about the joint competition continuum.)
  Note. This manual uses “competition” to mean “competition below armed conflict.”
  1-66. Although combatant commands and theater armies campaign across the competition continuum, Army
  tactical formations typically conduct operations within a context dominated by one strategic relationship at a
  time. Therefore, Army doctrine describes the strategic situation through three contexts in which Army forces
  conduct operations:
  (cid:122) Competition below armed conflict.
  (cid:122) Crisis.
  (cid:122) Armed conflict.
  1-67. The Army strategic contexts generally correspond to the joint competition continuum and the
  requirements of joint campaigns. Because cooperation is generally conducted with an ally or partner to
  counter an adversary or enemy, Army doctrine considers it part of competition. Army doctrine adds crisis to
  account for the unique challenges facing ground forces that often characterize transition between competition
  and armed conflict. (See figure 1-3 for an illustration of Army strategic contexts.)
  Figure 1-3. Army strategic contexts and operational categories
  Competition Below Armed Conflict
  1-68. Competition below armed conflict exists when two or more state or non-state adversaries have
  incompatible interests, but neither seeks armed conflict. Nation-states compete with each other using all
  instruments of national power to gain and maintain advantages that help them achieve their goals. Low levels