text: Chapter 7
  DEVELOP SIMPLE, FLEXIBLE PLANS THROUGH MISSION ORDERS
  7-31. Effective plans and orders are simple and direct. During insurgency and counterinsurgency
  operations, not all participates will understand military language and terms. Staffs must be careful to
  prepare clear, concise orders that communicate to all organizations involved a clear understanding of the
  operation using operational terms and symbols that are understood by all or enabling understanding through
  liaisons or other coordination means.
  7-32. Flexible plans help participates adapt quickly to changing circumstances. Commanders and planners
  build opportunities for initiative into plans by anticipating events. This allows them to operate inside of the
  enemy’s decision cycle or to react promptly to deteriorating situations. Identifying decision points and
  designing branches ahead of time—combined with a clear commander’s intent—help create flexible plans.
  7-33. Commanders stress the importance of using mission orders as a way of building simple, flexible
  plans. Mission orders are directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they
  are to achieve them (ADP 6-0). Mission orders clearly convey the unit’s mission and the commander’s
  intent. Mission orders provide subordinates information on what to do and the purpose of doing it, without
  prescribing exactly how to do it.
  7-34. +Commanders must also give guidance concerning risk when they issue mission orders. It is the
  responsibility of commanders and staff to assess tactical and operational risk. Moreover, they should ensure
  their forces are using techniques that take safety into account. That said, tactical initiative that supports
  mission accomplishment should never be sacrificed because of safety. An over focus on safety undermines
  the needed aggressive behavior to attack the enemy and take the needed risk to maintain contact with the
  population. However, informing decisionmakers of hazards, recommended controls (resources), and
  residual risk allows responsible individuals to weigh benefit against risk, direct resources to best mitigate
  the risk, and employ forces in the most efficient manner. (See ATP 5-19 for details on the risk management
  process and processes for integrating the process in both deliberate planning and under real-time
  constraints.)
  TRANSITIONS
  7-35. Transitions are fundamental to the planning and execution of any line of operation or effort.
  Transitions may occur as a result of both success and failure in terms of friendly actions, host-nation
  actions, and adversary actions. There are four types of transitions in counterinsurgency operations:
  * Transitions between changes in the environment.
  * Transitions between phases.
  * Transitions between units in an area of operations.
  * Transitions of responsibilities to host nation or other agencies.
  7-36. Transitions are critical events. They are critical because they represent significant changes to the
  situation and because a failure to properly execute them can stall or even negate progress. Whatever their
  nature, transitions are milestones that require reassessment. Even if a transition is a result of success, such
  as moving forward in phases, it is a cause to assess whether the basic assumptions and plans associated
  with the next phase are still appropriate and relevant. In counterinsurgency, in addition to possible
  transitions due to enemy actions, the commander and staff base transitions on changes in the population’s
  perception of legitimacy.
  Because transitions are based on the conditions of an operational environment, they must be a part of both
  the planning process and based on assessments of an operational environment. Transitions in
  counterinsurgency are essential because they generally measure progress towards the desired end state.
  However, the commander must link transitions to an assessment process that allows that commander to
  attain situational understanding. A transition to another phase or a transition to the host nation not linked to
  the assessment process can undermine the achievement of the end state. For example, a transition to a
  host-nation agency before that host-nation agency is ready to assume responsibility may ultimately have the
  effect of undermining the legitimacy of the host nation as the host nation fails to meet the basic
  expectations of the population.