text: Chapter 8
  PRODUCING FOCUSED AND TAILORED INTELLIGENCE
  8-124. The commander drives intelligence, and the G-2/S-2 synchronizes intelligence closely through the
  transition to conducing tactical intelligence operations. This transition is complex and includes extending the
  tactical portion of the intelligence architecture, conducting thorough planning, and starting information
  collection. Consequently, the unit starts to produce focused and tailored intelligence. Depending on the tempo
  and the commander’s guidance, planning may become abbreviated, and the unit may operate on overlay
  orders with emphasis on centralized planning and decentralized execution, allowing tactical flexibility. No
  matter how the unit operates, the commander decides how the unit plans, what staff products are required,
  and when the products are needed. The G-2/S-2 and intelligence staff must focus on what the commander
  requires. This may necessitate the intelligence staff to understand how to abbreviate various intelligence tasks
  while still ensuring task results effectively support operations and targeting.
  8-125. Early during this tactical transition, units may have to depend on the theater army, joint force, and
  allied- or partner-nation forces for most of their intelligence. However, as tactical units make contact and
  start information collection, that dependence should become less significant although higher-level
  intelligence will always be important. During competition, crisis, deployment, and this early transition, allied
  and partner nations, DIA, the joint force, and regionally aligned Army forces must develop and populate an
  authoritative database of threat signatures and associated contextual information. Units establish localized
  intelligence databases following RSOI. This intelligence effort allows tactical units to access, maintain,
  populate, and continually update their databases throughout subsequent operations.
  8-126. As during competition and crisis, all-source intelligence is central to supporting operations and
  targeting during large-scale combat operations. All-source intelligence analysis and production reduces the
  possibility of error, bias, misinformation, and disinformation by considering multiple sources of information
  and intelligence. As discussed earlier, an effective IPOE sets the conditions for effective staff planning. The
  commander narrows the focus to effectively account for the mission variables and then dictates how to
  complete staff planning. For example, the staff can use abbreviated planning to develop an overlay order.
  8-127. Focused and tailored intelligence assists in providing a focused view of the OE and presents the
  commander with multiple options for employing capabilities and gaining positions of relative advantage. As
  the execution of the operation transpires, the G-2/S-2 collaborates with the commander and G-3/S-3 to
  develop and disseminate focused and tailored intelligence in the right format at the right time. However,
  intelligence must also support future operations. Intelligence products must predict future threat actions,
  capabilities, and dispositions; changes in the terrain and weather; and the ever-changing dynamics within
  civil considerations.
  Note. Narrowing the focus to the mission variables does not mean focusing only on the land
  domain and physical dimension. Aspects of the other domains and the information and human
  dimensions can be the difference between mission success and failure. Threat capabilities from
  the other domains can be more lethal than threat capabilities in the land domain. Despite the natural
  tendency to focus on the land domain during large-scale ground combat, analysts must look across
  the OE to determine how the land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains affect Army
  operations and seek possible windows of opportunity.
  PROCESSING, EXPLOITATION, AND DISSEMINATION
  8-128. Short and demanding timelines and requirements to support the commander’s decisions at echelons
  corps and below may make intelligence PED more vulnerable to enemy denial and deception activities since
  there is less time available for initial analysis during exploitation activities. Frequent CP movements and
  short halts may preclude units from performing intelligence PED with the little time available to reestablish
  connections within the intelligence architecture. Further, because Soldiers are required to perform tasks to
  take-down and reestablish CPs, their time to resume intelligence PED activities is reduced when CPs make
  frequent moves.