text: Direct Methods for Countering Insurgencies
  As a result of Mrs. Quezon’s murder, President Quirino appointed then-Congressman
  Ramon Magsaysay as Secretary of Defense in 1950.
  After this, the Huk Rebellion became a good example of successful
  shape-clear-hold operations, with Magsaysay immediately instituting a
  shape-clear-hold approach. Shaping operations focused on efforts to win popular
  support for the counterinsurgency effort in preparation for future operations to clear
  insurgent areas. These operations included putting a stop to the abuses of civilians
  by the Constabulary and Army, firing many high-level military officers, placing the
  Constabulary under Magsaysay’s personal control, suppressing troop brutality
  towards the population, and increasing pay for enlisted troops to remove their
  incentives for looting. They also involved the establishment of a civil affairs office
  through which troops became involved in civic action projects (including digging wells
  and building bridges) and the Army’s provision of medical assistance to villagers.
  Additionally, Magsaysay pursued a population engagement strategy, even going so
  far as to set up a telegraph system that provided a direct line to the Defense Ministry
  for any villager on Luzon to use.
  9-7. The shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework describes an operational approach that moves
  through each of its phases to destroy insurgent capacity and empower host-nation capacity. The phases of
  this method are not mutually exclusive, but the phases represent a general progression of operations. The
  shape phase refers to making changes to the environment, through information operations or other methods,
  that create the conditions for success of the other phases. The population needs to understand that there will
  be an increase in security and initially local leaders should be contacted. The clear phase is an effort to
  remove the open insurgent presence in an area. The hold phase is defined by providing security for the
  population in an area so an open insurgent presence cannot return. The build phase entails efforts to
  increase security and governmental capacity so that government and local forces can control the area and
  prevent the return of insurgents. The transition phase is the transition of security to local and government
  forces.
  9-8. The commitment of resources, to include time, troops, money, development programs, and other
  enablers depends entirely on the capacity of the insurgency, the capacity of the host nation’s institutions,
  the capacity of the host nation’s security forces, and the capacity of the host nation’s population. The
  capacity requirement for the external counterinsurgent is that capacity which overcomes the capacity
  differential between the insurgents and the host nation’s systems. As the framework is predicated on the
  conditions on the ground, the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is based on understanding areas
  of operation and understanding the comprehensive threat. To transition between the clear, the hold, and the
  build, a unit must be able to measure the conditions on the ground and how those conditions are achieving
  the commander’s end state. This ties the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework to assessments.
  9-9. The shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework can be used as a method for constructing specific
  tactical operations, planning short-range operations for a specific area, or developing a mid- to long-range
  operational framework for a unit’s plan for countering an insurgency. The shape-clear-hold-build-transition
  framework can be used as a campaign framework, guiding planning from the introduction of foreign forces
  to conflict resolution. It can be used as campaign design to be executed by multiple units on a rotational
  basis. The imperatives, structure, considerations, and conditions listed here apply no matter how the
  shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is applied.
  9-10. Counterinsurgents must be aware that the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is not a phase
  by phase linear process. The phase that a unit performs is determined by the environment in an area of
  operations and each area must be assessed. Different villages, cities, or regions can be in varying degrees of
  insurgent control to host-nation control. Moreover, different areas in one city or different towns in one
  region might be along a spectrum of insurgent to host-nation control. Areas can reverse progress during a
  counterinsurgency. While the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework can be a phased operation in
  each area, the environment must dictate its progress. The counterinsurgent uses the framework as the way
  to synchronize subordinate unit actions, prioritize efforts, allocate resources, and direct specific effects to
  achieve end state criteria in an ever-changing environment. The overall objective of using the shape-clear-
  hold-build-transition framework is to transition responsibility for countering the insurgency to the host