text: _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
  PRINCIPLES OF OPERATION VERSUS AN EXTRAREGIONAL POWER
  1-54. The State assumes the distinct possibility of intervention by a major
  extraregional power in any regional conflict. Consequently, it has devised the
  following principles for applying its various instruments of diplomatic-
  political, informational, economic, and military power against this type of threat.
  CONTROL ACCESS INTO REGION
  1-55. Extraregional enemies capable of achieving overmatch against the
  State must first enter the region using power-projection capabilities. There-
  fore, the State’s force design and investment strategy is focused on access
  controlto selectively deny, delay, and disrupt entry of extraregional forces
  into the region and to force them to keep their operating bases beyond con-
  tinuous operational reach. This is the easiest manner of preventing the ac-
  cumulation of enemy combat power in the region and thus defeating a techno-
  logically superior enemy.
  1-56. Access-control operations are continuous throughout a strategic cam-
  paign and can reach beyond the theater as defined by the State’s NCA. They
  begin even before the extraregional power declares its intent to come into the re-
  gion, and continue regardless of whether the State is conducting regional, transi-
  tion, or adaptive operations. Access-control operations come in three basic forms:
  strategic preclusion, operational exclusion, and access limitation.
  Strategic Preclusion
  1-57. Strategic preclusion seeks to completely deter extraregional involve-
  ment or severely limit its scope and intensity. The State would attempt to
  achieve strategic preclusion in order to reduce the influence of the extrare-
  gional power or to improve its own regional or international standing. It
  would employ all its instruments of power to preclude direct involvement by
  the extraregional power. Actions can take many forms and often contain sev-
  eral lines of operation working simultaneously.
  1-58. The primary target of strategic preclusion is the extraregional power’s
  national will. First, the State would conduct diplomatic and perception man-
  agement activities aimed at influencing regional, transnational, and world
  opinion. This could either break apart ad hoc coalitions or allow the State to
  establish a coalition of its own or at least gain sympathy. For example, the
  State might use a disinformation campaign to discredit the legitimacy of dip-
  lomatic and economic sanctions imposed upon it. The extraregional power’s
  economy and military would be secondary targets, with both practical and
  symbolic goals. This might include using global markets and international fi-
  nancial systems to disrupt the economy of the extraregional power, or con-
  ducting physical and information attacks against critical economic centers.
  Similarly, the military could be attacked indirectly by disrupting its power
  projection, mobilization, and training capacity. Preclusive actions are likely
  to increase in intensity and scope as the extraregional power moves closer to
  military action. If strategic preclusion fails, the State will turn to operational
  methods that attempt to limit the scope of extraregional involvement or cause
  it to terminate quickly.