text: Appendix C
  Denied, Degraded and Disrupted Operations
  To effectively operate in denied, degraded, and disrupted environments Commanders
  must drive training conditions based on the expected conditions in the OE. This chapter
  is an example on how to plan for and train to maintain firing capabilities when all
  capabilities are not fully functional. Section I describes the types of degraded
  conditions. Section II describes the five requirements for accurate predicted fire during
  degraded, disrupted or denied operations.
  SECTION I – TYPES OF DENIED, DEGRADED, AND DISRUPTED
  CONDITIONS
  C-1. The TTP required to conduct denied, degraded, and disrupted operations are perishable skills. It is
  imperative that unit leaders institute training programs to conduct operations under all conditions in order to
  maintain proficiency and sustain the FS systems ability to continuously support operations.
  C-2. As we become more reliant on technology to perform operational tasks, we also become more
  susceptible to single points of failures within our system of systems. To counter this we must be prepared to
  fight without technology. To ensure organizations can maintain full mission capability in degraded
  operations, proper planning and rehearsals at all organizational levels are essential to ensure FS for maneuver
  forces within the OE. Denied, degraded, or disrupted space operational environment is a composite of those
  conditions and influences in which space-enabled capabilities have been impaired by hostile threats or non-
  hostile means (FM 3-14).
  THE THREAT TO COMMUNICATIONS
  C-3. Enemies and adversaries may seek to contest the use of the information environment as a means of
  denying operational access and diminishing the capability of the US and multinational forces. The ability to
  perform C2 and communicate with globally deployed forces is a key enabler for protection of US national
  interests and, as such, is also a key target for adversaries.
  C-4. Enemies and adversaries may deliberately attempt to deny friendly use of the EMS, space, cyberspace,
  and terrestrial systems. Due to our heavy joint reliance on advanced communications systems, such an attack
  may be a central element of any enemy or adversary A2 and AD strategy, requiring a higher degree of
  protection for friendly C2 systems and planning for operations in a denied or degraded environment (JP 6-
  0).
  C-5. Peer and near-peer adversaries have demonstrated hybrid threat capabilities that threaten the Army's
  dominance in cyberspace and the EMS. Communications are a key enabler; therefore, communication and
  information networks present a high-value target for enemies and adversaries. Our peer threats understand
  the extent of U.S. forces' reliance on satellite communication systems. Enemies and adversaries will contest
  the information environment to deny operational access and diminish the effectiveness of our forces.
  C-6. Space weather can adversely impact communications systems, to include satellite communications,
  GPS, missile warning, and space surveillance and reconnaissance. Knowledge of space weather effects
  enables forces to mitigate operational impacts during forecast periods of reduced communications
  availability.