text: Insurgency Prerequisites and Fundamentals
  INSURGENCY PREREQUISITES
  4-10. The three prerequisites of an insurgency, opportunity, motive, and means, provide a framework for
  both planners and executers to plan for and prevent an insurgency. Planners and executers use the
  prerequisites for planning and execution of operations in environments where insurgencies are likely, such
  as a post-conflict environment. (See JP 3-24 for a further discussion of insurgency prerequisites.)
  OPPORTUNITY
  4-11. Opportunity refers to the emergence of significant gaps in the ability of the state or its local allies to
  control its territory and population. States must have the capacity to detect the early stages of insurgent
  organization and mobilization. This requires the cooperation of a significant portion of the population or
  the establishment of an extensive program of domestic surveillance and intelligence activities. The state
  must also be capable of suppressing the insurgency in a way that deters other potential rebels while
  avoiding contributing to the insurgent narrative and provoking wider resistance.
  4-12. For a land force, opportunity provides a means to evaluate the likelihood of an insurgency. For
  example, after a victory during a major combat operation, if the former government prevented insurgencies
  by an intelligence program, the commander and staff need to consider how likely and for how long an
  occupying force can prevent an insurgency without gaining the active support of the population or
  reestablishing intelligence programs. Understanding the opportunities for an insurgency in an area is
  essential for land forces.
  4-13. At the tactical and operational level, understanding opportunities for an insurgency provides a means
  for commanders and staffs to analyze the local conditions and the likelihood of a successful insurgency
  developing. Commanders and staffs actively make assessments on both the support of the population and
  the intelligence capability and capacity of the local area. If the population is not supportive of the host
  nation and the host nation has no means to prevent an insurgency in a hostile population, there is an
  opportunity for an insurgency in that area. (For a further discussion on why a gap in state control might
  happen, see JP 3-24.)
  MOTIVE
  4-14. A population that has grievances does not necessarily cause an insurgency. Grievances are necessary,
  but not sufficient, conditions for an insurgency. Poverty, unemployment, economic inequality, inadequate
  essential services, political marginalization, and repression are commonplace. These conditions exist in
  many places where an insurgency does not. It takes established or emerging leaders to build a compelling
  narrative that links grievances to a political agenda and mobilizes the population to support a violent social
  movement. The narrative explains who is to blame for grievances, how grievances will be addressed, and
  how the population and insurgency should work together to accomplish the goal. Ideology often provides a
  coherent set of ideas that provide a compelling framework for a narrative. Where opportunity and motive
  (grievances) intersect, individuals emerge to attempt to mobilize the population. When grievances mobilize
  a population, they are a root cause of an insurgency. (See JP 3-24 for a further discussion on motive.)
  4-15. The root causes of an insurgency are real or perceived grievances that insurgents use to mobilize a
  population in support of an insurgency. Insurgents use these grievances to fuel an insurgency. Root causes
  are not static and can change over the course of an insurgency. As conditions change, insurgent leaders
  create different narratives to mobilize a population. The root causes that led to the insurgency in the first
  place may not be the same ones that are sustaining an ongoing insurgency. Commanders and staffs perform
  continued assessments and reassessments to determine what an insurgency is using as a root cause.
  4-16. A root cause can be summarized as a broad perception of injustice linked to the government that
  insurgents use to mobilize a population. If counterinsurgents take actions such as building schools and
  roads, or creating jobs, but these actions do not address the perception of injustice, then they will not reduce
  support for insurgency. Phrased differently, deprivation that is not considered unjust is much less
  destabilizing than relative prosperity which is considered unjust. It is not the thought "I'm poor" that leads
  someone to attempt to overthrow or force a change in the government; it is "I'm poor, this is not fair, and