text: Understanding the Strategic Context
  MANAGE INFORMATION AND EXPECTATIONS
  1-86. Information and expectations are related; skillful counterinsurgency forces manage both. To limit
  discontent and build support, the affected government and any counterinsurgency forces assisting it create
  and maintain a realistic set of expectations among the population, friendly military forces, and the
  international community. The key tools to accomplish this are information operations through the effective
  coordination and synchronization of information related capabilities. Effective counterinsurgency
  commanders tell the truth; they refuse to give projections; and they do not promise more than can be
  provided. Achieving steady progress toward a set of reasonable expectations can increase the population’s
  tolerance for the inevitable inconveniences of ongoing counterinsurgency operations. Where a large foreign
  force is present to help establish a regime, this progress can extend the period until foreign forces are
  perceived by the population as an army of occupation.
  1-87. Effective counterinsurgency forces must ensure that their deeds match their words and both are
  consistent with the broader narrative. They should also understand that any action has an information
  reaction. Counterinsurgency forces should carefully consider that information reaction’s impact on the
  many audiences involved in the conflict and on the sidelines. They should work actively to shape responses
  that further their ends. In particular, messages to different audiences must be consistent. In the global
  information environment, people in the area of operations can access the internet and satellite television to
  determine the messages counterinsurgency forces are sending to the international community. Any
  perceived inconsistency reduces credibility and undermines counterinsurgency efforts.
  USE THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF FORCE
  1-88. Any use of force generates a series of reactions. There will be times when an overwhelming effort is
  necessary to destroy or intimidate an opponent and reassure the population. However, counterinsurgency
  forces, whether they are land, maritime, or air, calculate carefully the type and amount of force to be
  applied and who wields it for any operation. Normally, counterinsurgency forces can use escalation of force
  procedures to minimize unnecessary loss of life or suffering. These procedures are especially appropriate
  during any operation in which the counterinsurgent security force interacts with the local population.
  1-89. All interactions between security forces and the population directly impact legitimacy, and if the
  counterinsurgent security forces show restraint in the eyes of the population, the entire counterinsurgency
  effort is further legitimized. The general rule for the use of force for the counterinsurgents is “do not create
  more enemies than you eliminate with your action.” Escalation of force does not limit the right of
  self-defense, including the use of deadly force when such force is necessary to defend against a hostile act
  or demonstrated hostile intent. However, counterinsurgency forces must be properly trained in such
  procedures and, more importantly, in methods of shaping situations so that tactical leaders have to make
  fewer split-second, life-or-death decisions.
  LEARN AND ADAPT
  1-90. An effective counterinsurgency force is a learning organization. Insurgents connected with other
  organizations constantly exchange information about their enemy’s vulnerabilities—even with insurgents
  in distant theaters. However, skillful counterinsurgency forces can adapt at least as fast as insurgents. Every
  unit needs to be able to make observations, draw and apply lessons, and assess results. Commanders must
  develop an effective system to circulate best practices throughout their command. Commanders might also
  need to seek new policies that authorize or resource necessary changes. Insurgents shift their locations
  looking for weak links, so widespread competence is required throughout the counterinsurgency force.
  EMPOWER THE LOWEST LEVELS
  1-91. Local commanders have the best grasp of their situations, but they require access to or control of the
  resources needed to produce timely intelligence, conduct effective tactical operations, and manage
  intelligence and civil-military operations. Leaders encourage individual initiatives and facilitate the
  learning that must occur at every level. Effective counterinsurgency operations are decentralized, and
  higher commanders owe it to their subordinates to push as many capabilities as possible down to their
  levels. However, this must be balanced with ensuring that tactical leaders have the situational