text: Chapter 8
  Organizational Structures
  8-12. Perhaps the biggest hurdle for US forces is accepting that the Host Nation can ensure security
  using organizational and operational structures that differ from US practices. The goal is not to make the HN
  unit a US unit, nor even to make it operate like a US unit. HN security force commanders must be given leeway
  in resolving their own security problems. Mirror imaging HN security force structure is often impractical
  and does not approach the problem from the perspective root causes that lead to the insurgency. The
  population, and subsequently their military, will have cultural aspects that will differ with US norms.
  8-13. Commanders must recognize that the “American way is best” bias is counterproductive with
  respect to most Host Nation security forces. While relationships among US police, customs, and military
  organizations and individual unit structure work for the United States, those relationships may not exist in other
  nations that have developed differently. Units and advisors should develop innovative ways to maximize the
  effectiveness of the Host Nation’s organization, units, and bureaucracy.
  GOALS
  8-14. Training HN security forces is a slow and painstaking process. It does not lend itself to a “quick
  fix.” To ensure long-term success, commanders clarify their desired end state for training programs early. These
  goals consist of a set of military characteristics common to all militaries. Those characteristics have nuances
  in different countries. Figure 8-3 shows how well-trained HN security forces should be characterized.
  Section II—THE FRAMEWORK
  Developing HN security forces is a complex and challenging mission. The United States and multinational
  partners can only succeed if they approach the mission with the same deliberate planning and preparation,
  energetic execution, and appropriate resourcing as the combat aspects of the COIN operation. Accordingly,
  COIN force commanders and staffs need to consider the task of developing HN security forces during their
  initial mission analysis. They must make that task an integral part of all assessments, planning, coordination,
  and preparation. This section discusses developing a plan and developing Host Nation security forces.
  DEVELOPING A PLAN
  8-15. To defeat the insurgency and be able to sustain success, the Host Nation should develop a plan,
  with US assistance when necessary, to improve the unit’s organization, training, material, leadership, personnel,
  and facilities. However, these elements are tightly linked, simultaneously pursued, and difficult to prioritize.
  Commanders monitor progress in all domains. The HN security force plan must be appropriate to HN
  capabilities and requirements. At the tactical level, the US advisors or partner units will outline goals, allocate
  resources, and schedule events as part of the plan under the COIN line of effort—support Host Nation security
  forces.
  CONSIDERATIONS
  8-16. Competently trained and led Host Nation security forces are vital to winning a counterinsurgency
  and to sustaining a stable, secure, and just state. If local communities do not perceive US and HN forces
  as legitimate, or that they cannot provide for security, then the population will not risk providing the timely
  intelligence necessary to defeat the insurgency. In addition, if the populace does not see at least a gradual
  transition to Host Nation responsibility, they may begin to view the HN security forces as an instrument
  or puppet of US forces. Finally, these failures will result in HN security forces that are ill equipped to persevere
  in a protracted struggle after US/coalition forces withdraw.