text: Chapter 1
  counterinsurgent force. Successful counterinsurgents must therefore not only prevent insurgents from
  obtaining this goal, but also actively work to influence public opinion for the COIN mission.
  1-18. Commanders must be prepared to operate within a broad range of political structures. The Host
  Nation’s form of government may range from a despotic dictatorship to a struggling democracy.
  Commanders at all levels, including platoon leaders and company commanders, need to recognize the
  importance of establishing and reinforcing the HN as the lead authority for all operations. This reinforces
  the legitimacy of the HN government.
  MILITARY
  1-19. This variable includes the military capabilities of all armed forces. Most COIN units will need
  to analyze the insurgency’s military forces (guerrillas), local militias, and the Host Nation security forces.
  Commanders should consider qualitative aspects, such as conscription or recruitment systems, economic
  basis (to include appropriations system), and position of forces in national and local government structure.
  Additional qualitative considerations are general organization, training and doctrine, efficiency, rapport
  with population, and the police role in the nation’s internal security. For example, a typical US brigade
  in Iraq might have to analyze a Sunni guerrilla force, a Shia guerrilla force, an Iraqi National Police
  brigade, an Iraqi Army brigade, the Iraqi local police, and a Sons of Iraq militia unit.
  ECONOMIC
  1-20. The economic variable consists of the general economic categories of an Area of Operations
  (AO), such as energy; raw materials; government development policy; distribution of labor and labor
  policies; income distribution; national food distribution; free market or socialist interface and functions;
  consumption patterns; external investment, taxation policy; port authorities; movement of goods; consumer
  issues; border controls; foreign trade; tariffs; and graft or corruption.
  1-21. A low standard of living and a desire for economic reform may be a cause of resentment toward
  the government. Generally, the counterinsurgents plan their operations to minimize damage to the
  economic structure of an area to avoid causing adverse psychological and economic impacts and to support
  economic development.
  SOCIAL
  1-22. The social variable describes societies within an operational environment. A society is a
  population whose members are subject to the same political authority, occupy a common territory, have a
  common culture, and share a sense of identity. Both insurgents and counterinsurgents need the support
  of the population to be successful. Most insurgencies attempt to increase friction between different groups
  in a society and to gain or increase support from any group that shares common elements with the
  insurgency. These groups may be aligned along racial, ethnic, religious, or social lines. Language
  similarities or tradition can also be a reason for alignment. Religious influences often play a major role in
  the sociological factors that affect the insurgent.
  1-23. To be successful against insurgents in a particular area and to avoid alienating the populace,
  counterinsurgents must understand the local environment. This includes local social issues and national
  issues that effect the local environment. For instance, Afghanistan units may interact with groups
  of Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Nuristani across their AO.
  INFORMATION
  1-24. The information variable involves the collection, access, use, manipulation, rapid distribution,
  and reliance on data, media, and knowledge systems—both civilian and military—by the global and local
  communities. Insurgents seek to control and manipulate how the local, regional, national, and international