text: Chapter 2
  commander must understand competing interests within the operational and information environment to
  determine what is of value to competitive parties (to include identified adversaries or enemies) and entities
  within the BCT’s area of operations. Understanding competing interests helps the commander develop
  ethical,effective,and efficient COAsthat influence the populace and political structure,enhance the security
  situation,and lead to mission success. Additionally,the commander anticipates ethical risks associated with
  the BCT’s operational environment and understands how adherence to the Army Ethic provides moral basis
  for decisive action and how it becomes a force multiplierin all operations (see ADP 1).
  It Is All About the Information
  1 In both Joint and Army doctrine, information operations is defined as “the integrated
  employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with
  other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of
  adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.”2In more general terms,
  information operations support the commander’s ability to achieve a position of relative
  advantage through activities in the information environment (the physical, informational,
  and cognitive dimensions) to influence the adversary’s will to fight; disrupt, corrupt, or
  usurp its capabilities to collect, process, and disseminate information; and ultimately
  manipulate (deceive) or disrupt an adversary decision-maker’s understanding of the
  operational environment.
  Commanders visualize and understand the operational environment through information.
  As an element of combat power, information enables decision-making, and its transmission
  aids decisive operations. Today, modern technology has significantly increased the speed,
  volume, and access to information. Concurrently, technology has enabled significant
  means to disrupt, manipulate,distort, and deny information—technology that adversaries
  have already demonstrated a willingness to use with great effect.
  “It is all about the information;” that whoever controlled the information could dominate
  competition and conflict.3In large-scale combat operations, this remains as true as ever.
  Commanders direct resources toward intelligence collection in order to develop the
  situation and gain the sufficient information required to make a timely and informed
  decision. Just as importantly, measures must be put into place to protect friendly
  information while simultaneously developing and executing means in all domains to attack
  the adversary’s ability to access, process and disseminate information. In this way
  information operations enable an accurate understanding of the operational environment
  while disrupting or manipulating that of the adversary. Through information operations,
  the adversary/enemy decision-maker’s reality should be that which best supports achieving
  a position of relative advantage. That said, more needs to be done to fully garner the true
  potential of information as an element of combat power in a large-scale combat operations
  context. Common sense dictates that information absent accompanying action does not
  resonate cognitively in the same way when both are present and complementary. The
  duality of the relationship between action and information must become a constant theme
  of operations in the Information Age” of the 21st Century.
  In Iraq and Afghanistan, the Taliban and al Qaeda staged countless engagements against
  United States and its partners, less for the physical effects in the immediate operational
  environment, but rather to gain an informational advantage around the world. Videotaped
  improvised explosive device attacks, while devastating, worked well to promote an image
  of organizational credibility, bolster adherents’ will to fight, radicalize vulnerable
  populations, and increase financial support. More importantly with respect to large-scale
  combat operations, Russian information confrontation activity preceding, during, and
  following its illegal annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine demonstrates
  the power of integrated operations in the information environment, in this case more
  appropriately termed information warfare. Russia successfully sowed disinformation
  causing the international community to distrust the information it was receiving while also
  crippling the Ukrainian response through cyberspace operations, electronic warfare, and
  psychological operations. The confusion and misdirection caused by Russian information