text: FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
  Operational Exclusion
  1-59. Operational exclusion seeks to selectively deny an extraregional force
  the use of or access to forward bases of operation within the region or even
  outside the theater defined by the NCA. For example, through diplomacy,
  economic or political connections, information campaigns, and/or hostile ac-
  tions, the State might seek to deny the enemy the use of bases in other for-
  eign nations. It might also attack population and economic centers for the in-
  timidation effect, using long-range surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs), WMD,
  or SPF.
  1-60. Forces originating in the enemy’s homeland must negotiate long and
  difficult air and surface lines of communication (LOCs) merely to reach the
  region. Therefore, the State will use any means at its disposal to also attack
  the enemy forces along routes to the region, at transfer points en route, at ae-
  rial and sea ports of embarkation (APOEs and SPOEs), and even at their
  home stations. These are fragile and convenient targets in support of transi-
  tion and adaptive operations.
  Access Limitation
  1-61. Access limitation seeks to affect an extraregional enemy’s ability to in-
  troduce forces into the theater. Access-control operations do not necessarily
  have to deny the enemy access entirely. A more realistic goal is to limit or in-
  terrupt access into the theater in such a way that the State’s forces are capa-
  ble of dealing with them. By controlling the amount of force or limiting the
  options for force introduction, the State can create conditions that place its
  conventional capabilities on a par with those of an extraregional force. Capa-
  bility is measured in terms of what the enemy can bring to bear in the thea-
  ter, rather than what the enemy possesses.
  1-62. The State’s goal is to limit the enemy’ accumulation of applicable com-
  bat power to a level and to locations that do not threaten the accomplishment
  of a strategic campaign. This may occur through many methods. For example,
  the State may be able to limit or interrupt the enemy’s deployment through
  actions against his aerial and sea ports of debarkation (APODs and SPODs)
  in the region. Hitting such targets also has political and psychological value.
  The State will try to disrupt and isolate enemy forces that are in the region or
  coming into it, so that it can destroy them piecemeal. It might exploit and
  manipulate international media to paint foreign intervention in a poor
  light, decrease international resolve, and affect the force mix and rules of
  engagement (ROE) of the deploying extraregional forces.
  EMPLOY OPERATIONAL SHIELDING
  1-63. The State will use any means necessary to protect key elements of its
  combat power from destruction by an extraregional forceparticularly by air
  and missile forces. This protection may come from use of any or all of the fol-
  lowing:
  • Complex terrain.
  • Noncombatants.
  • Risk of unacceptable collateral damage.