text: Planning
  * Command and staff process for analyzing and determining COAs (by echelon), including—
   Required elements of information for COA analysis.
   Assessment factors and biases.
   The analytical process, to include human reasoning and automated decision aids.
  * Command and staff process for developing OPLANs and issuing orders (by echelon).
  Military Capabilities Information
  2-88. Friendly intelligence routinely collects information on the military capabilities of potential threats.
  Access to all information regarding military capabilities is crucial to effective planning and execution of
  deception. The more MDOs know about actual capabilities of the threat, the more accurately they can assess
  the ability of a designated target to achieve a specific deception objective in time for the actions (or inaction)
  of its forces to be exploited by friendly forces. Typical classes of information about threat capabilities that
  may prove useful to the MDO include—
  * Doctrinal “ways of war” data.
  * Force structure, systems, and capabilities.
  * Military mobilization systems.
  * Force training priorities and proficiencies.
  * Force mobility and maneuver capabilities.
  * Force deployments and reserves.
  * Force reconnaissance, intelligence and target acquisition systems, and capabilities.
  * Technical and operational characteristics of key weapons systems.
  * Logistic support systems, techniques, and capabilities.
  * Command and control procedures, systems, and capabilities.
  * Standard operating procedures and practices.
  * Strategic, theater, and tactical communications systems, procedures, and capabilities.
  * Information warfare and command and control warfare doctrine, systems, and capabilities.
  * Military space systems, operations, and capabilities.
  * Nuclear forces and weapons.
  LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
  2-89. A number of U.S. and international legal and policy restrictions governs the conduct of deception
  operations in wartime and contingency operations. MDOs ensure that they are knowledgeable on such matters
  and able to reliably advise the commander. This means coordinating with the higher command echelon
  deception staff element to determine applicable guidelines. MDOs also work with the command’s legal
  officer to ensure that the commander’s legal responsibilities are properly reflected in deception planning and
  execution.
  2-90. Supporting IRCs such as public affairs activities, civil affairs operations, cyberspace operations, and
  military information support operations (MISO) are controlled and regulated by their respective policies and
  practices. A compliant MDO knows these policies and practices while ensuring that no aspect of the
  deception plan or its execution conflicts with the governing policies of other agencies or activities.
  Coordination and planning ensure an adherence to all policies and their integration in a synchronous manner.
  While deception operations may leverage the resources, activities, and operations of such parallel activities
  and operations, they cannot do so in a way that violates governing policy and legal responsibilities. This is
  why sufficient training and experience are critical attributes of an MDO. MDOs must possess discreet
  capabilities in a legally sufficient manner that insulates risk to the commander.
  UNLAWFUL DECEPTIONS
  2-91. Certain deception activities or techniques are prohibited because they violate the law of war, including
  killing or wounding the enemy by resorting to perfidy. Acts of perfidy are acts that, by design, invite the