text: Chapter 2
  Russia’s Application of Cyberspace Operations and Electronic
  Warfare during the Russo-Ukrainian War
  In 2013, Ukraine’s pro-Russian leadership opted for closer ties to the pro-Russian
  Eurasian Economic Union rather than sign with the European Union. In response,
  violent protests erupted throughout Ukraine. In constant competition with the United
  States and China to increase the flow of trade, Russia has always sought access in
  expanding commerce throughout the region. As Ukraine descended into chaos,
  Vladimir Putin and the Russian Federation recognized conditions were optimal for
  seizure of Ukraine’s Black Sea warm water ports in the Crimea. Seizure of these ports
  not only provided lucrative access to Mediterranean trade and commerce, but also
  challenged the United States’ military power on the Black Sea. Russian actions also
  included strategic efforts to stop NATO expansion and to reduce the buffer zone
  between the west and Russian economic expansion.
  Ukraine’s use of Russian command, control, communications, computer, surveillance,
  and reconnaissance (C4ISR) made them vulnerable to Russian exploitation and
  attacks. Formulating their campaign plans around thematic denial and deception
  operations, Russian military planners went to work on a hybrid campaign that was a
  multifaceted mix of regular and irregular actions. Russian planners identified Ukraine’s
  center of gravity as their C4ISR. Russia infiltrated Ukrainian telecommunication
  systems, while Ukrainian’s use of communication devices likely aided Russia’s
  targeting efforts. In order to inject strategic, operational, and tactical chaos within
  Ukraine’s decision-making cycle, Russia conducted targeted cyberspace operations
  and electromagnetic warfare (denial of service, manipulation of social media, etc.) on
  critical C4ISR nodes. At the tactical level, the Russian Army’s utilization of targeted
  cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare actions were lethal.
  The Ukrainian Army moved several mechanized brigades near the Russian border in
  order to interdict illegal cross border shipments of equipment heading to rebels in
  Eastern Ukraine. On the morning of 11 July 2014, Ukrainian soldiers spotted a drone
  orbiting above them. Shortly after the drone disappeared, one of the Ukrainian
  brigades was struck with a devastating barrage from a 9A52-4 Tornado multiple rocket
  system.
  Rockets containing a mixture of high explosive, cluster, and thermobaric munitions
  rained down on the unit’s positions over the course of four minutes. Following this initial
  rocket salvo, the Russians followed with high explosive artillery rounds and the
  cumulative effects were devastating. In a post mortem of the action, the Ukrainian Army
  suffered 37 killed and 100 wounded. One Ukrainian battalion was virtually destroyed,
  and others were rendered combat ineffective due to heavy losses in personnel and
  equipment. It was later assessed that the Russian Army’s ability to collect intelligence
  and geo-locate, coupled with their ability to target Ukrainian communication nodes,
  played a significant role in enabling the Russians to find, fix, and destroy an entire
  Ukrainian combat arms brigade. The Russians’ targeted application of electromagnetic
  warfare and cyber attacks created chaos within Ukraine’s civil and military leadership
  and left them confused, a second-order effect. Western leaders found themselves
  limited in their ability to respond to Russian actions in the region. Russia’s use of
  cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare capabilities to Ukraine’s command and
  control enabled them the seize Crimea and achieve their strategic goal of obtaining
  commercial and military ports on the Black Sea.