text: Chapter 4
  * Providing a deputy to the area air defense commander (normally the commander of the Army air
  and missile defense command) for land-based joint theater air and missile defense operations as
  determined by the JFC. The AAMDC provides inputs to the JFC’s joint area air defense plan and
  the airspace control plan for the joint force land component command.
  * Supporting the JFC’s information operations by developing requirements that support land control
  and synchronize land force information operations assets when directed.
  * Integrating the joint and Army networks within the DOD information networks throughout the
  AO. Performing this function may require joint and Service augmentation.
  * Performing joint security functions.
  * Establishing standard operating procedures and other directives based on the JFC’s guidance.
  4-16. To facilitate joint security operations, the JFC may establish a joint security element with a designated
  joint security coordinator to coordinate operations in a JSA. If the JTF commander gives the joint force land
  component commander responsibility for a JSA, the corps commander may elect to split the corps
  headquarters functions. The deputy corps commander—with part of the corps staff, augmentation from
  theater echelon units, and an Army maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB)—receives TACON of the theater
  units in the JSA for protection and movement. The deputy corps commander becomes the joint security
  coordinator. Alternatively, the commander may designate and organize a subordinate task force to focus
  solely on operations in the JSA.
  4-17. An associated requirement of the corps headquarters controlling U.S. land forces is for the corps
  headquarters to also function as a multinational joint force land component command headquarters for
  multinational units operating in its AO. In most cases, the corps exercises TACON over multinational
  brigades and divisions. However, in this case, the corps becomes a multinational joint force land component
  command, and the corps commander becomes a multinational force LCC commander. National caveats often
  exist on the use of multinational forces. The higher grades structured into the design of the corps headquarters
  facilitate these concerns. Commanders and staff operating as a joint headquarters must be aware that
  multinational brigades normally lack the ability to communicate digitally, or if they do, their systems might
  prove incompatible. This creates an additional layer of complexity to planning and execution. The corps also
  trains in multinational exercises as part of theater engagement and security assistance managed by the theater
  army.
  LIMITATIONS
  4-18. There are some limitations and dependencies that must be considered when employing a corps in any
  of its roles. Those limitations include, but are not limited to Reserve Component mobilization and mobility
  and security.
  Reserve Component Mobilization
  4-19. The multi-component nature of the corps imposes certain limitations on the corps’ capability to
  strategically deploy and rapidly initiate large-scale combat operations. The corps has multiple Reserve
  Component organizations that require lead-time to mobilize, train, and integrate into their respective roles
  and responsibilities. The main command post operational detachment is required to man the corps command
  posts. When the corps is preparing to deploy, commanders, staffs, and planners must take care to coordinate
  for Reserve Component mobilization with enough time to assemble the formation for deployment.
  Alternatively, the corps may not have enough time and must either structure its deployment and employment
  to assemble the formation after the main deployment, secure resources and capabilities from other formations,
  or operate without the pieces of the formation. The main command post operational detachment provides
  additional depth to the corps staff for sustained operations. The MEB is an integral part of command and
  control in the corps support area. The corps is also dependent on integration with the MEB to operate the rear
  command post. If the corps does not have a MEB, then it must either assign another organization to control
  the corps support area or assume direct control. Additionally, without a MEB to integrate with the rear
  command post, the corps headquarters would have to integrate with another organization or devote additional
  staff and equipment from the main command post and tactical command post to properly staff the rear
  command post. When a second field artillery brigade is required to perform counterfire, it will often be