text: Chapter 8
  Long
  8-29. The HN unit can conduct training, planning, sustainment, and operations with little guidance
  and the advisor provides oversight and mentorship. An example of advisor unit long-range goal would be
  to ensure that the HN intelligence officer gathers, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence and is fully
  integrated into the planning process. An example of a partner long-range goal would be to migrate
  to providing only the additional forces and quick-reaction force (QRF) capabilities to the Host Nation
  security force unit.
  Assessing Methods and Proficiency
  8-30. The training, leadership, equipment, logistics and operations of Host Nation security forces must
  be assessed. If US advisors are not on the objective with the Host Nation forces, US forces may not know
  their capabilities. Assessment of HN security forces may include their ability to—
  • Plan and brief an operation.
  • Perform correct actions on contact.
  • Properly clear and mark rooms, halls, and stairwells.
  • Perform other small unit tasks appropriate to the HN OE.
  • Use NCOs.
  • Employ fire control measures and maintain fire control.
  • Call for air reserves or quick reaction force.
  • Sustain themselves with Class I, III, and V supplies and provide medical support.
  • Maintain vehicles and equipment.
  • Maintain professionalism.
  ORGANIZE
  8-31. Organizing HN forces depends on the Host Nation’s social and economic conditions, cultural
  and historical factors, and security threat. The development program’s aim is to create an efficient
  organization with a command, intelligence, logistic, and operations structure that makes sense for the Host
  Nation. Conventional forces with limited special-purpose teams, such as explosive ordnance disposal
  and special weapons and tactics (SWAT), are preferred. Elite units tend to divert a large share of the best
  leadership and remove critical talent from the regular forces. Doctrine should be standard across the force,
  as should unit structures. The organization must facilitate the collection, processing, and dissemination
  of intelligence across and throughout all security forces.
  8-32. In many situations, simple personnel accountability is one of the greatest impediments to effective
  organizations. The advisor team should mentor and advise the Host Nation security forces on keeping
  better accountability. Formations, timelines, and uniform standards can be slow to be accepted, which can
  stem from lack of supplies. Also, it is important that the unit can manage its leave and pass system. Once
  achieved, this will further the capabilities of the Host Nation unit and allow them to focus on operations
  and training, not troops to task.
  Organizational Structure
  8-33. As much as possible, the Host Nation should determine the security force organization’s structure.
  The Host Nation may be open to proposals from US forces, but should approve all organizational designs.
  As the HN government strengthens, US leaders and trainers should expect increasingly independent
  organizational decisions. These may include changing the numbers of forces, types of units, and internal
  organizational designs. Culture and conditions might result in security forces being given what may be
  considered nontraditional roles and missions. HN police may be more paramilitary than their US
  counterparts, and the military may have a role in internal security. Eventually, police and military roles
  should clearly differ. Police should counter crime, while the military should address external threats.
  However, the exact nature of these missions depends on the HN situation. In any event, police and military
  roles should be clearly delineated.