text: ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11
  NUCLEAR WARFARE
  11-29. The OPFOR believes a war is most likely to begin with a phase of non-
  nuclear combat that may include the use of chemical weapons. The OPFOR
  emphasizes the destruction of as much as possible of enemy nuclear
  capability during this nonnuclear phase. To do so, it would use air and missile
  attacks; airborne, heliborne, and special-purpose forces; and rapid, deep
  penetrations by ground forces. The OPFOR hopes these attacks can deny the
  enemy a credible nuclear option.
  DELIVERY MEANS
  11-30. Nuclear delivery systems may include aircraft from both national- and
  theater-level aviation, and SSMs. Most artillery 152-mm or larger is capable
  of firing nuclear rounds, if such rounds are available. Other possible delivery
  means could include SPF. The OPFOR is unlikely to use affiliated forces for
  nuclear delivery.
  TRANSITION TO NUCLEAR
  11-31. Even when nuclear weapons are not used at the outset of a conflict,
  OPFOR commanders deploy troops based on the assumption that a nuclear-
  capable enemy might attack with nuclear weapons at any moment. The OPFOR
  continuously updates its own plans for nuclear employment, although it pre-
  fers to avoid nuclear warfare. As long as it achieves its objectives, and there
  are no indications that the enemy is going to use nuclear weapons, the
  OPFOR would likely not use them either. However, it could attempt to pre-
  empt enemy nuclear use by conducting an initial nuclear attack. Otherwise,
  any OPFOR decision to go nuclear would have to be made early in the con-
  flict, so that sufficient nonnuclear power would remain to follow up and to
  exploit the gains of nuclear employment.
  11-32. If any opponent were to use nuclear weapons against the State, the
  State would respond in kind, as long as it is still capable. The same would
  be true of any nuclear-capable opponent, if the State were the first to use
  nuclear means. While the State recognizes the advantage of its own first use,
  it may risk first use only when the payoff appears to outweigh the potential
  costs. Therefore, it would probably avoid the use of nuclear weapons against
  an extraregional power unless survival of the regime or the nation is at
  stake.
  11-33. The OPFOR is probably more likely to use its nuclear capability
  against a regional opponent. The likelihood increases if that opponent uses or
  threatens to use its own nuclear weapons against the State or does not have
  the means to retaliate in kind. This could account for a nuclear or nuclear-
  threatened environment existing at the time an outside force might choose to
  intervene in the region.