text: Chapter 1
  TECHNIQUES
  1-40. The application of techniques varies with each operation depending on time, assets, and objectives.
  Planners assess which techniques to apply based on feasibility, availability, and effectiveness. Table 1-2
  provides sample deception techniques.
  Table 1-2. Sample deception techniques
  Technique Deception created
  Amplifying signatures To make a force appear larger and more capable or to simulate
  the deployment of critical capabilities.
  Suppressing signatures To make a force appear smaller and less capable or to conceal
  the deployment of critical capabilities.
  Overloading enemy sensors To confuse or corrupt their collection assets by providing
  multiple false indicators and displays.
  Repackaging known organizational To generate new or deceptive profiles that increase or decrease
  or capability signatures the ambiguity of friendly activity or intent.
  Conditioning the enemy To desensitize to particular patterns of friendly behavior and to
  induce enemy perceptions that are exploitable at the time of
  friendly choosing.
  Reinforcing the impression To mislead by portraying one course of action when actually
  taking a different course of action.
  Conditioning the target by To believe that an apparently standard routine will be pursued,
  repetition whilst in fact preparing a quite different course of action.
  Leading the enemy by substitution To believe that nothing has changed by covertly substituting the
  false for the real, and vice versa.
  Leading the enemy by mistake To believe that valuable information has come into their
  possession through a breach of security, negligence, or
  inefficiency.
  DECEPTION MAXIMS
  1-41. The military derives deception maxims from game theory, historical evidence, social science, and
  decision analysis theory. These maxims are offered to enhance the deception concepts provided in this
  publication. They provide additional insight that commanders and their staffs can use to develop their plans.
  Note. These deception maxims originated in Deception Maxims: Fact and Folklore. See the
  Source Notes.
  MAGRUDER’S PRINCIPLE
  1-42. Magruder’s principle states that it is generally easier to induce the deception target to maintain a pre-
  existing belief than to deceive the deception target for the purpose of changing that belief. Magruder’s
  principle exploits target biases and the human tendency to confirm exiting beliefs. Magruder’s principle
  alludes to two paths. A path of the deceiver changing the belief of a target and a path of maintaining a present
  belief. The principle then advises the better of the two paths. Magruder’s principle is named for Major
  General John Magruder. During the Civil War, he was tasked with impeding Major General George
  McClellan’s advance on Richmond with a numerically superior force. Magruder deceived McClellan by
  encouraging McClellan’s belief that he faced a larger enemy than he actually faced. In using Magruder’s
  principle, MDOs provide the targeted decision makers with information that reinforces their expectations for
  what they believe to be true. This reinforces the target’s pre-existing perceptions. Any bias is potentially
  exploitable. Most targets are unaware of how deeply their biases influence their perceptions and decisions.
  Most people resist letting go of existing opinions and tend to seek information that reinforces their own bias.