text: FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
  assets capable of delivering NBC munitions. Additionally, the OPFOR real-
  izes that its regional opponent may receive RISTA support (such as satellite
  and fixed-wing signals intelligence and imagery) from an extraregional
  power. Therefore, OPFOR fire support planners develop contingency plans to
  preserve their NBC-capable fire support assets during all strategic-level
  courses of action. Common countermeasures are to disperse fire support
  assets and to use decoys and camouflage.
  REGIONAL OPERATIONS
  11-95. During regional operations, the State may be able to employ NBC
  weapons with little fear of retaliation from its regional neighbors. Thus, it is
  possible that the OPFOR would use chemical weapons early in an operation
  or from its outset, against key targets in a neighbor’s homeland. However, it
  is aware that use of any NBC weapons could have both positive and negative
  affects on its ability to achieve its strategic goals. On the one hand, it may be
  concerned that NBC use during a strategic campaign against a regional
  neighbor might lead to the intervention of an extraregional force. On the
  other hand, the OPFOR could use NBC against a regional neighbor as a
  warning to any potential extraregional enemy that it is willing to use such
  weapons. The State would prefer not to use chemical weapons within its own
  boundaries, except perhaps in an area populated by a particularly rebellious
  dissident minority opposed to of the State government.
  TRANSITION OPERATIONS
  11-96. During transition operations, the OPFOR may use NBC weapons to
  attack unique or key targets in aerial and sea ports of debarkation in order to
  disrupt the deployment tempo of the extraregional force. These targets in-
  clude key C2 nodes, logistics operating bases, ground and airborne RISTA
  platforms, and contractors and contractor-operated facilities. The OPFOR
  will also seek to conduct these attacks in concert with the perception man-
  agement portion of the information warfare (IW) plan, in order to leverage
  the world media to report adverse perceptions of the extraregional force.
  ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS
  11-97. When the OPFOR shifts to adaptive operations, it will employ all
  means availableeven WMD against selected targetsto allow the enemy
  no sanctuary. As in regional operations, the OPFOR would prefer not to use
  even chemical weapons within the boundaries of the State. However, it would
  contaminate its own soil if necessary in order to preserve the regime or the
  State’s sovereignty.
  11-98. During adaptive operations, the OPFOR seeks to use a nontraditional
  approach to NBC warfare. This approach revolves around the creation of
  WMD-like events in concert with the perception management portion of the
  IW plan. For example, the OPFOR may seek to use the media to amplify and
  embellish the results of a fire at a facility that produces chemicals used in
  everyday households. The media campaign would seek to attribute the cause
  of the fire to enemy action and would emphasize that injuries caused to the
  civilian population are similar in nature to those caused by the release of a
  chemical munition.