text: Appendix C
  Civil Affairs in Special Operations
  This appendix describes the contribution of CA forces to special operations. CA forces
  can support all special operations, such as UW, direct action, special reconnaissance,
  counterterrorism, and countering weapons of mass destruction. This appendix also
  describes the USSOCOM CME program.
  OVERVIEW
  C-1. CAO are conducted within conventional and special operations missions. The difference between the two
  is that CA special operations are generally conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments
  utilizing specialized tactics, techniques, and procedures. CA special operations are conducted alongside other
  SOF from across the DOD, and in support of DOS priorities in embassies around the world.
  C-2. Given the environments in which special operations are conducted, CA forces conducting those
  missions are at a greater risk for isolation than conventional forces. This greater risk necessitates extended
  training on small unit tactics, tactical movement, survival, evasion, resistance, escape, and other techniques
  that are unique to special operations.
  UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
  C-3. The DOD defines unconventional warfare as activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or
  insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with
  an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area (JP 3-05). UW is a core activity of ARSOF,
  and has strategic utility to alter the balance of power between sovereign states.
  C-4. CA forces support UW through the execution of CAO, which is critical to the planning and execution
  of UW campaigns. When integrated throughout all phases of UW planning and execution, CA forces provide
  the capability to analyze the strengths, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of the civil component, as applicable,
  to both the existing regime and the resistance movement. CAO also provide a comprehensive approach
  toward assisting the resistance in legitimacy and TG, from the initial resistance movement, through transition,
  to an emergent stable government. CA forces also are able to assist in developing broader governance efforts
  in support of the resistance.
  C-5. CA forces are typically sought for their unique capabilities with regards to identifying and mitigating
  the underlying causes of instability in order to create a stable environment. This same analysis, however, can
  be utilized by the resistance to identify and degrade those identified strengths and bonds of the existing regime
  into vulnerabilities, resulting in its continued delegitimization. This creates legitimacy opportunities for the
  movement.
  C-6. Separately, within their sphere of control and influence, the resistance can consolidate gains in public
  support and initial governance capacity by utilizing CA assessments, strengthening civil vulnerabilities, and
  cementing a bond with the greater population. Methods to realign the legitimacy of power should consider
  the timeliness required to restore essential services and strengthen the bonds between the population and the
  resistance movement (or new government) upon the collapse of the old regime.
  C-7. Through CNDE and SCA, CA forces can support an underground, auxiliary, or government-in-exile
  to plan for and administer civil government in the areas of rule of law, economic stability, infrastructure,
  governance, public health and welfare, and public education and information. SCA is the systematic
  application of specialized skills for assessing and advising on the development of stability and governance.
  When conducting CR and CE to develop civil consideration data, ARSOF CA forces collaborate with CA