text: Reconnaissance and Security
  captured enemy soldiers, screening of the civilian population, and debriefing of friendly Soldiers, such as
  scouts and special operations forces.(SeeFM 2-0 for additional information.)
  Technical Channels
  5-102. Technical channels, while not a command or support relationship, often affect intelligence
  operations. For intelligence operations,technical channels are the transmission paths between paths between
  intelligence units and sections performing a technical function requiring special expertise. Technical channels
  control the performance of technical functions. They neither constitute nor bypass command authorities;
  rather,they serve as the mechanism for ensuring the execution of clearly delineated technical tasks,functions,
  and capabilities to meet the dynamic requirements of decisive actions. (See FM 2-0 for additional
  information.)
  RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY ACROSS ALL DOMAINS
  5-103. During reconnaissance and security operations, the BCT commander and staff, as well as
  subordinate commanders and staffs,consider intelligence operations to collect information across all relevant
  or necessary domains (air,land,maritime,space,and cyberspace). The BCT commander attempts to leverage
  advantages in one or multiple domains,such as seizing key terrain or denying enemy freedom of movement
  and action in the maritime and air domains, disrupting cyber access, or controlling narratives to influence
  population support. The BCT’s higher headquarters (usually division or corps) supplements the information
  collection capabilities of the military intelligence company in one or multiple domains. Even as aggressive
  air-ground reconnaissance and security operations remain the key means of information collection,
  intelligence operations in multiple domains can increase the commander’s situational understanding. The aim
  is to integrate information collection by all means (reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and
  intelligence operations) in all domains throughout the depth of the battlefield to prevent surprise,protect the
  force,and preclude enemy options.
  5-104. Within the space domain, intelligence operations capabilities can provide information collection,
  earlywarning,environmental monitoring,and satellite-basedcommunications,positioning,navigation,and
  timing. Such activities enable freedom of action for operations in all other domains,and operations in other
  domains can create effects in and through thespace domain. The BCT commander considers the use of such
  capabilities in this domain for reconnaissance and surveillance operations, but also an enemy’s use of
  capabilities. Reconnaissance and security forces must be prepared to operate in a denied, degraded, and
  disrupted operational environment. For example, in the space domain enemies will deny U.S. and partner
  space-based intelligence, reconnaissance, Global Positioning System (GPS), and secure satellite
  communications. Since space operations are inherently joint,the BCT commander and staff must not assume
  U.S. forces will have unconstrained use of space-based capabilities. (See FM 3-14 for doctrine on Army
  space operations.)
  5-105. In the cyberspace domain,capabilities yield the same advantages to friendlyforces and enemies and
  are therefore key for intelligence operations during reconnaissance and security operations. Cyberspace is
  highly vulnerable for several reasons, including ease of access, network and software complexity, lack of
  security considerations in network design and software development, and inappropriate user activity (see
  paragraph 4-329). Access to cyberspace by an individual or group with a networked device is easy,and an
  individual with a single device may be able to disable an entire network. An enemy could implant malicious
  code on the United Statesand its partners disrupting logistics,communications,reconnaissance,battlefield
  information systems,and ultimately security measures in other domains. Vulnerabilities in the systems that
  operate in cyberspace contribute to a continuous obligation to manage risk and protect portions of cyberspace.
  5-106. Within the air domain, enemy forces will employ integrated air defense capabilities, particularly
  man-portable systems that are difficult to detect,or capabilities which are resistant to electronic suppression.
  UASs, fixed and rotary wing aircraft, in addition to airborne and air assault operations all fall under this
  domain. From a security standpoint,intelligence operations must consider enemy use of each of these systems
  during planning in order to protect the force. From a surveillance, reconnaissance,and securitystandpoint,
  the BCT commander and staff consider thesame assets or capabilities within U.S. and partner forces in order
  to support intelligence operations.