text: Chapter 2
  2-76. Through the warfighting functions, well sustained units can move and maneuver to bring combat power
  to bear against the enemy. Joint and Army indirect fires complement and reinforce organic firepower in
  maneuver units. Survivability is a function of protection tasks, the protection inherent to Army platforms,
  and schemes of maneuver that focus friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses. Intelligence determines
  how and where to best apply combat power against enemy weaknesses. C2 enables leadership, the most
  important qualitative aspect of combat power.
  2-77. Intelligence professionals must understand the value of their role within the combined arms approach
  to generating combat power through the dynamics of leadership, firepower, information, mobility, and
  survivability. The combined arms approach creates complementary and reinforcing effects by employing
  the warfighting functions, which are primarily synchronized by the C2 warfighting function. In this manner,
  the intelligence warfighting function plays a key role in combined arms. To a large extent, understanding
  the OE, planning operations, controlling ongoing operations, and conducting operational assessments begin
  with intelligence. Effective intelligence staff activities and intelligence operations result from intelligence
  synchronization, careful planning, and tailoring the use of intelligence capabilities and the intelligence
  architecture specifically for that unit’s operation.
  MULTIDOMAIN OPERATIONS: THE ARMY’S OPERATIONAL
  CONCEPT
  2-78. The Army’s operational concept is multidomain operations. Multidomain operations are how Army
  forces contribute to and operate as part of the joint force. Army forces, enabled by joint capabilities, provide
  the lethal and resilient landpower necessary to defeat threat standoff approaches and achieve joint force
  objectives.
  2-79. The employment of joint and Army capabilities, integrated across echelons and synchronized in a
  combined arms approach, is essential to defeating threats able to contest the joint force in all domains. Army
  forces integrate land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace capabilities that facilitate maneuver to create
  human, information, and physical advantages that JFCs exploit across the competition continuum.
  Commanders and staffs require the knowledge, skills, attributes, and intelligence to integrate capabilities
  rapidly and at the necessary scale appropriate to each echelon.
  2-80. During competition, theater armies strengthen landpower networks, set the theater, and demonstrate
  readiness for armed conflict through the C2 of Army forces supporting the command campaign plan. During
  crisis, theater armies provide options to combatant commanders (CCDRs) as they facilitate the flow and
  organization of land forces moving into theater. During armed conflict, theater armies enable and support the
  joint force land component commander’s (JFLCC’s) employment of land forces. The JFLCC provides C2 of
  land forces and allocates joint capabilities to its corps and other subordinate tactical formations.
  2-81. Corps integrate joint and Army capabilities at the right tactical echelons and employ divisions to
  achieve JFLCC objectives. Divisions, enabled and supported by corps, defeat enemy forces, control land
  areas, and consolidate gains for the joint force. Defeating or destroying enemy capabilities that facilitate the
  enemy’s preferred layered standoff approaches is central to success. For example, ground-force commanders
  may be required to conduct tactical activities, such as a deliberate attack, to shape the environment to gain a
  position of relative advantage for activities, such as joint fires, within the other domains. Ultimately,
  operations by Army forces both enable and are enabled by the joint force.
  2-82. Because uncertainty, degraded communications, and fleeting windows of opportunity characterize OEs
  during combat, multidomain operations require a disciplined initiative cultivated through a mission command
  culture. Leaders must have a bias for action and accept that some level of uncertainty is always present.
  Commanders who empower leaders to make rapid decisions and accept risk within the commander’s intent
  enable formations at echelon to adapt rapidly while maintaining unity of effort. (See ADP 6-0 for doctrine
  on the mission command approach.)