text: Chapter 3
  as the basis for continuous adaptation, the commander and staff must consider their own forces within the
  realm of emerging threats as well as the mission,terrain,friendly forces,and civilian populations.
  3-4. The BCT engages in close combat while operating in complex terrain in close proximity to civilian
  populations. Current and future battlefields require the BCT to fight and win in mountainous,urban,jungle,
  cold weather,and desert environments and subsurface areas. The physical challenges presented by complex
  terrain,and the continuous interactions of numerous actors,each with their own agendas,objectives,interests,
  and allegiances,influence the operational environment and mission accomplishment.
  3-5. Theimpact of operational and mission variables on the operational environment produces additional
  layers of complexity to BCT operations. As a result, the BCT commander and staff must understand the
  complicated relationships and the complex interactions between the various actors that produce tactical
  challenges and opportunities. In the context of close combat, the BCT focuses on the assigned area of
  operations and use the mission variables to conduct analyses in order to gain the required understanding.
  Understanding is critical to seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative over enemies and adversaries.
  Understanding is equally critical to the consolidation of tactical gains to achieve sustainable political
  outcomes consistent with the mission.
  STATE AND NONSTATE ACTORS
  3-6. The BCT must be prepare to defeat determined state and nonstate actors that combine conventional
  and unconventional tactics to avoid our strengths (such as mobility, long-range surveillance, and precision
  fires capabilities) while attacking our perceived vulnerabilities (such as our difficulty identifying the enemy
  among civilian populations). Current and future threats use a variety of means, including conventional
  combined arms operations,terrorism,insurgency,political subversion,and information operations to evade
  our forces and disrupt tactical and combined arms capabilities. (See FM 3-24.2.) Enemies and adversaries
  will attempt to seize the initiative and dictate the terms and tempo of operations in their favor while relying
  on their established sources of strength. These sources of strength include networks that facilitate the
  undetected movement of logistics,finances,people,and weapons areas within complex terrain to exploit U.S.
  and unified action partner military,political,social,economic,and information vulnerabilities.
  3-7. The enemy employs tactical countermeasures to limit the BCT’s ability to develop the situation, to
  avoid decisive engagements,and to initiate contact under advantageous conditions. The enemy also employs
  technological countermeasures to reduce their signature on the battlefield and degrade our force’s ability to
  detect, engage, and destroy them. Many hostile nation states continue to procure conventional capabilities
  such as tanks, antitank guided missiles (ATGM), manned aircraft, and air defense systems. These
  conventional weapons systems are increasingly available to nonstate enemy organizations. Enemy forces also
  integrate emerging technology such as robotics, unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), cyber, and
  nanotechnologies. Enemies and adversaries combine conventional and unconventional tactics to counter,
  evade,or disrupt the BCT’s efforts across the range of military operations.
  3-8. Weapons of mass destructionare chemical,biological,radiological,or nuclear weapons capable of a
  high order of destruction or causing mass casualties, excluding the means of transporting or propelling the
  weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part from the weapon (JP 3-40). The use of WMDin
  future conflict is inevitable. Many threat organizations already possess WMDand their delivery systems (for
  example,rockets and artillery). Enemies employ these WMDto obtain a relative advantage over U.S. forces
  to achieve their objectives. Threat organizations that do not currently possess WMD consistently seek
  opportunities to acquire them. The potential catastrophic effects associated with the threat or use of WMD
  adds greater uncertainty to an already complex environment. The BCT commander must anticipate and plan
  for the conduct of counteringWMD (see paragraphs 60-80and8-92).
  3-9. In current and future conflicts, the BCT commander and staff must rapidly develop a detailed and
  adaptable understanding of the threat,as it exists within the context of local conditions. Such a contextualized
  understanding allows the commander and staff to determine the nature of the conflict and to gain visibility
  of the enemy’s structure and methods of operation. This determination allows commanders to identify
  emerging opportunities to seize, retain and exploit the initiative, exert influence over local actors, and
  consolidate tactical gains into operational and strategic successes. By understanding the internal workings of