text: Chapter 1
  1-60. Similar to the analysis of the operational environment using the operational variables, commanders at
  the tactical level use the mission variables to seek shared common understanding. Additionally, commanders
  use these variables to assist in hazard identification during deliberate planning and real-time application. The
  identified hazards are then mitigated. (See ATP 5-19.) The support area commander is expected to exercise
  prudence and ensure that residual risk is accepted at the appropriate level. The following are examples for
  each mission variable:
  * Mission. The support area commander analyzes the mission in terms of specified tasks, implied
  tasks, and the commander’s intent (two echelons up) to determine the essential tasks. Early
  identification of the essential tasks for support area operations enables the commander to ensure
  that they have the required capabilities for mission success (or, in selected cases, to designate other
  assets to perform those roles) early in the planning process.
  * Enemy. The support area commander’s view of the enemy concentrates on enemy tactics,
  equipment, and capabilities that could threaten friendly operations in the support area and along
  the ground line of communications (LOC). This may include an analysis of other factors within
  the AO or the area of interest that could have an impact on mission success.
  * Terrain and weather. The support area commander and staff analyze terrain (man-made and
  natural) to determine the effects on friendly and enemy operations. The staff uses the five military
  aspects of terrain (observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and
  cover and concealment). The support area commander and staff also use geospatial products to
  help determine how certain aspects of the terrain aids the enemy, promotes crime and criminality,
  and impacts traffic and dislocated civilians on main supply routes (MSRs) or alternate supply
  routes (ASRs).
  * Troops and support available. The support area commander considers the number, type, and
  capabilities required (joint, multinational, and interagency forces) for mission success. The
  number and type of organizations placed in the support area depend on the mission, threat, and
  number and type of units to conduct support area operations.
  * Time available. The support area commander must understand the time needed for planning
  support area operations and the importance of collaborative and parallel planning. The commander
  must also realize the time needed for positioning critical assets and the time associated with setting
  conditions for performing support area tasks or projects.
  * Civil considerations. Civil considerations are the influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian
  institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations
  within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations (ADP 6-0). Civil considerations
  comprise six characteristics, expressed in the memory aid ASCOPE—areas, structures,
  capabilities, organizations, people, and events.
  THREAT
  1-61. The term threat includes any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and
  intent to harm U.S. forces, U.S. national interests, or the homeland. Threats include nation-states,
  organizations, people, groups, or conditions that can damage or destroy life, vital resources, or institutions.
  The various actors in an AO can qualify as a threat, an enemy, an adversary, or a neutral or friendly. A peer
  threat is an adversary or enemy with the capabilities and capacity to oppose U.S. forces across multiple
  domains worldwide or in a specific region where it enjoys a position of relative advantage. Peer threats
  possess roughly equal combat power to U.S. forces in geographical proximity to a conflict area. Enemy and
  friendly unexploded ordnance pose a significant threat during large-scale combat operations. See FM
  3-0 for additional information on peer threats.
  1-62. A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or
  criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects (TC 7-100). Hybrid threats combine
  traditional forces governed by law, military tradition, and custom with unregulated forces that act without
  constraints on the use of violence. These may involve nation-states using proxy forces or nonstate actors,
  such as criminal and terrorist organizations, that employ sophisticated capabilities traditionally associated
  with states. Hybrid threats are most effective when they exploit friendly constraints, capability gaps, and a
  lack of situational awareness (see ADP 3-0). Land operations often prove complex because actors intermix,