text: ______________________________________________________________________________Introduction
  When a U.S. force or a U.S.-led coalition first begins to deploy into theater, the
  OPFOR will seek to disrupt the deployment and thus create opportunity. In such
  cases, the conventional design the OPFOR used in regionally-focused operations
  may still provide the framework for military operations against an advanced ex-
  traregional force. The OPFOR will not shy away from the use of military means
  against such an opponent, so long as the risk is commensurate with potential
  gains. As a U.S. or coalition force builds up power in the region, the OPFOR must
  rely on adaptive applications of its basic design in order to mitigate its disadvan-
  tages and exploit its advantages compared to this new opponent.
  In general, the contemporary OPFOR will be less predictable than OPFORs in
  the past. It will be difficult to template as it adapts and attempts to create oppor-
  tunity. Its patterns of operation will change as it achieves success or experiences
  failure. OPFOR doctrine might not change, but its way of operating will.
  INITIATIVE
  Like U.S. Army doctrine, OPFOR doctrine must allow sufficient freedom for bold,
  creative initiative in any situation. OPFOR doctrine is descriptive, but not prescrip-
  tive; authoritative, but not authoritarian; definitive, but not dogmatic. The OPFOR
  that U.S. units encounter in various training venues will not apply this doctrine
  blindly or unthinkingly, but will use its experience and assessments to interpolate
  from this baseline in light of specific situations. Thus, U.S. units can no longer say
  that the OPFOR has to do certain things and cannot do anything that is not ex-
  pressly prescribed in established OPFOR doctrine. Doctrine guides OPFOR actions
  in support of the State’s objectives; OPFOR leaders apply it with judgment and
  initiative.
  KEEPING THE COE AND THE OPFOR CONTEMPORARY
  The COE is extremely fluid, with rapidly changing regional and global relation-
  ships. New actorsboth nations and non-state actorsare constantly appearing
  and disappearing from the scene. The OPFOR operational doctrine provided in
  this manual should meet most of the U.S. Army’s training needs for the foresee-
  able future. During the period covered by the COE, almost anyone who fights the
  United States would probably have to use the same kinds of adaptive action as
  outlined in this doctrine. As the geopolitical situation, forces, or capabilities
  change over time, OPFOR doctrine and its applications will evolve along with
  them, to continue to provide the Army a “contemporary” OPFOR. Thus, the
  OPFOR will remain capable of presenting a challenge that is appropriate to meet
  evolving training requirements at any given point in time.