text: Sustainment Operations in a Maritime Environment
  Fires Planning Considerations
  6-23. Some planning considerations for fires are listed below:
  • Anticipate supporting the required relocation of fires units between land masses to support
  operational requirements.
  • Ensure that watercraft transporting ammunition are properly positioned to support fires operations.
  • Anticipate increased requirements to move munitions for maneuver units.
  • Ensure that watercraft transporting ammunition have the correct documentation and approval for
  partner-nation port entry.
  Protection Planning Considerations
  6-24. Some planning considerations for protection are listed below:
  • Expect attack using artillery, aircraft, mines, and ground forces. Commanders must ensure defense
  forces are adequate to survive effects.
  • Plan for convoy security along the sea LOCs. This must include attacks from the air as well as the
  water.
  • Plan for dispersion as much as possible to accommodate operations.
  • Maximize the use of available space on Army watercraft for detainee movement.
  • United States Army EOD is not trained or equipped for explosive ordnance in maritime or littoral
  environments. Plan for render safe capability, such as U.S Navy EOD, to be low density and in high
  demand.
  SUSTAINMENT ACTIONS TO COUNTER ENEMY THREATS
  6-25. Leaders must understand enemy courses of action and how they can be used to disrupt sustainment in
  a maritime environment. Potential employment of capabilities across all domains will challenge sustainment
  forces from home station to forward locations. Enemy forces may use submarine or mine warfare to interdict
  or disrupt watercraft operations. Leaders must be prepared to coordinate with joint, allied, and multinational
  partners for assistance with securing sea LOCs. Types of capabilities that joint, allied, and multinational
  partners can provide include mine sweeping, sensor technology, and aerial reconnaissance.
  6-26. Leaders must understand that gains in the development of precision sustainment and predictive logistics
  technologies can increase decision dominance and responses to potential enemy threats. The ability to deploy
  autonomous watercraft for resupply can impose dilemmas on enemy targeting and cause diversions from
  intended actions. Predictive logistics will also drive development of advanced power solutions that enable
  employment of autonomous vehicles in support of maritime operations.
  6-27. Leaders must also understand the use of antiaccess and area denial techniques in the maritime
  environment to disrupt sustainment operations. These techniques can range from use of missile defense and
  artillery systems to deny access to key terrain or waterways to using enemy special operations and naval
  forces. Use of SOF to destabilize or disenfranchise regional partners can impact employment of Army
  watercraft and sustainment forces in a maritime environment. Additional details for enemy antiaccess and
  area denial techniques can be found in FM 3-0.
  6-28. Leaders must consider deception as a way to impose multiple dilemmas on the enemy. Deception
  contributes to creating multiple dilemmas, achieving operational surprise, and maintaining the initiative.
  Deception efforts by tactical formations seek to delay enemy decision making until it is too late to matter, or
  to cause an enemy commander to make the wrong decision. Deception requires an understanding of how to
  surprise enemy forces; time to plan, prepare, execute, and assess a deception operation; and the ability to
  properly resource the deception effort. The use of autonomous aerial delivery systems and future
  development of autonomous watercraft can be used as part of deception in the maritime environment. Leaders
  can employ autonomous vehicles in locations other than where operations are intended to cause the enemy
  to react in an unplanned manner. See JP 3-13.4 and FM 3-13.4 for information on deception. See FM 3-0 for
  more information on imposing dilemmas.