text: Chapter 8
  8-101. Developing detailed and effective threat characteristics, threat models, and joint TSA and other
  target development products during competition and crisis allows tactical units to quickly start effective IPOE
  as early as RSOI. Early IPOE is crucial because the commander and staff must quickly gain a significant
  amount of knowledge focused to the mission variables (which account for all domains and dimensions). At
  this stage in operations, IPOE assists the commander and staff in identifying significant aspects of the OE
  within the AO and AOI and in developing indicators of threat activities, intentions, and objectives. The need
  to continuously update key intelligence products cannot be overstated through the analytical continuum of
  pre-mission analysis of the OE, IPOE, and situation development. While IPOE is critical, it may be necessary
  to conduct an abbreviated IPOE, still accounting for all four steps, through cross-staff collaboration, which
  is critical to operations. The situational understanding provided by accurate and timely IPOE products permits
  commanders and units to maintain a high tempo and execute the RDSP, when necessary, to achieve freedom
  of action and identify and exploit relative advantages across one or more domains and dimensions. (See
  ATP 2-01.3 for IPOE doctrine.)
  8-102. The entire staff considers gaps in intelligence during the MDMP to develop often detailed
  information requirements, which in turn can go forward as potential intelligence requirements. However,
  these generic requirements lack the specifics of a particular tactical situation. Full consideration of every
  aspect of a tactical situation is necessary to develop information and intelligence requirements during
  operations. Intelligence and information collection are driven by the commander’s intelligence requirements.
  The intelligence warfighting function must be very focused on intelligence requirements during large-scale
  combat operations. Together, IPOE and intelligence requirements drive information collection, subsequent
  intelligence analysis, and targeting.
  TARGET DEVELOPMENT
  8-103. Target development in a tactical situation requires continuous collaboration between all staff
  sections, but, at a minimum, it must include the targeting team, operations staff, CEMA cell, and the
  intelligence staff. Effective targeting is supported by accurate situational understanding. Without accurate
  situational understanding and detailed IPOE, effective targeting is unlikely.
  8-104. The analysis associated with target development includes analyzing threat systems, unless this
  analysis already exists. Additionally, target development also includes deconfliction, aim point
  recommendations, target materials production, and collateral damage estimation. Target development
  generally results in products such as target intelligence folders, information collection requirements, and
  target briefs. Detailed analysis should characterize the function, criticality, and vulnerabilities of each target,
  linking them back to targeting objectives and measures of effectiveness. Target development includes target
  vetting and target validation. (See FM 3-60.)
  8-105. The intelligence section must account for adequately supporting targeting, to include BDAs across
  multiple CPs. Accomplishing this at a high tempo against a peer threat is difficult. The D3A targeting
  methodology must consider—
  ⚫ Threat deception, camouflage, cover, and dispersion.
  ⚫ Threat counterreconnaissance and EW capabilities.
  ⚫ Threat counterfire capabilities.
  ⚫ Any issues, damages, destruction, or delays based on the deployment of fire support capabilities.
  ⚫ Friendly fire support planning, including logistics; movement following RSOI; and displace and
  emplace requirements following fire missions.