text: FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
  5-25. To accomplish these EW goals and objectives, the OPFOR employs both
  lethal and nonlethal measures. Lethal EW activities include the physical de-
  struction of high-priority targets supporting the enemy’s decision-making
  processsuch as reconnaissance sensors, command posts, and communica-
  tions systems. They also include activities such as lethal air defense suppres-
  sion measures. If available, precision munitions can degrade or eliminate
  high-technology C2 assets and associated links. Nonlethal means range from
  signals reconnaissance and electronic jamming to the deployment of corner
  reflectors, protective countermeasures, and deception jammers. Sophisticated
  camouflage, deception, decoy, or mockup systems can degrade the effects of
  enemy reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition
  (RISTA) systems. Also, the OPFOR can employ low-cost GPS jammers to
  disrupt enemy precision munitions targeting, sensor-to-shooter links, and
  navigation.
  5-26. EW activities especially focus on the enemy’s advanced C2 systems de-
  veloped to provide real-time force synchronization and shared situational
  awareness. The enemy relies on the availability of friendly and enemy force
  composition and locations, digital mapping displays, and automated targeting
  data. By targeting vulnerable communications links, the OPFOR can disrupt
  the enemy’s ability to digitally transfer and share such information. The
  OPFOR enhances its own survivability through disrupting the enemy’s abil-
  ity to mass fires with dispersed forces, while increasing enemy crew and staff
  workloads and disrupting his fratricide-prevention measures.
  5-27. EW is a perfect example of the integrated nature of OPFOR IW
  elements. It overlaps significantly with protection and security measures,
  deception, and physical destruction. Reconnaissance, aviation, air defense,
  artillery, and engineer support may all contribute to successful EW for IW
  purposes.
  COMPUTER WARFARE
  5-28. Computer warfare consists of attacks that focus specifically on the
  computer systems, networks, and/or nodes. This includes a wide variety of ac-
  tivities, ranging from unauthorized access (hacking) of information systems
  for intelligence-collection purposes, to the insertion of malicious software (vi-
  ruses, worms, logic bombs, or Trojan horses) and deceptive information entry
  into enemy computer systems. Such attacks concentrate on the denial, dis-
  ruption, or manipulation of the infrastructure’s integrity. The OPFOR may
  attempt to accomplish these activities through the use of agents or third-
  party individuals with direct access to enemy information systems. It can also
  continually access and attack systems at great distances via communications
  links such as the Internet.
  5-29. OPFOR computer warfare activities may be conducted prior to or
  during a military action. For example, by accessing databases related to an
  enemy’s projected force deployments and troop movements, the OPFOR can
  effectively disrupt planning and misdirect movement, producing substantial
  confusion and delays. As modern armies increasingly rely on “just-in-time”
  logistics support, targeting logistics-related computers and databases can
  produce delays in the arrival of critical materiel such as ammunition, fuel,
  and spare parts during critical phases of a conflict.