text: Space Products
  * Mountainous terrain may impede the basic line of sight between a satellite and a ground terminal
  or receiver (primarily SATCOM and GPS). Communication satellites in a geosynchronous orbit
  with high inclinations may move the satellite in and out of the line of site of a receiver due to their
  ground trace. Mountains and buildings may also affect GPS accuracy. GPS signals,
  communications, and radar from a satellite may experience multi-pathing, which occurs when the
  signal is reflected off a mountains or buildings on the way to a receiver. The timing of the GPS
  signal is impaired which affects the accuracy of the receiver. Though this should only be a minor
  problem for navigation, it has the potential for a greater impact on GPS guided munitions.
  * Information collections systems may also be impacted by terrain as off-center imagery collection
  may be blocked by mountains and tall buildings. If this happens, the satellite cannot take an image
  to complete its mission until another revisit provides a better angle.
  * Vegetation may also be a consideration when conducting the space related terrain analysis. Dense
  jungles may require a higher reliance on ultrahigh frequency communications, GPS signal
  reception may be impeded, and panchromatic imagery will only provide a black and white image
  of the top of the forests with no penetration. However, multispectral imagery may be able to detect
  changes in vegetation (destroying, modifying, and camouflage) that indicate enemy activity.
  STEP 3–EVALUATE THE THREAT
  6-16. Step 3 transitions from an orientation on the environment as a whole to a detailed focus on enemy
  capabilities. The SSE coordinates with the intelligence cell staff for this information. The desired end effect
  is knowledge of adversarial space forces, the doctrinal principles that indicate how these space forces are
  employed, recommended space high-value targets, and an initial assessment of adversarial space courses of
  action.
  6-17. In step 3 of the IPB process, the SSE will coordinate with the intelligence cell for an examination of
  key enemy space capabilities including use of civil and commercial space assets. The SSE needs to ensure
  the intelligence cell understands the resulting intelligence products are important and will provide support to
  the intelligence cell as requested. Important factors to include in step are below.
  * Assist the intelligence cell in developing information requirements for intelligence support to
  space operations.
  * A detailed review of the adversarial space threat characteristics and the potential commercial
  space threat characteristics available to support enemy operations. Knowledge of the space threat
  characteristics is the necessary first step to understanding the threat. As part of this initial analysis,
  the SSE needs to consider enemy counterspace capabilities.
  * An identification of space capabilities that will probably be employed by the enemy in the specific
  operation the SSE is analyzing. These enemy space capabilities include organic space systems,
  third-party space capabilities, enemy access to space capabilities via consortia, and direct enemy
  use of commercial space assets.
  * An analysis of the following factors, regarding enemy force enhancement operations:
  Reconnaissance and surveillance. What are the near-space and space reconnaissance and
  o
  surveillance systems (organic, commercial, third-party) available to support military
  operations? Does the enemy use space reconnaissance and surveillance for strategic or
  tactical operations? What are enemy tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and
  dissemination capabilities for space reconnaissance and surveillance? Does the enemy have
  the ability to receive and disseminate information in a timely manner to support the targeting
  process?
  Missile warning. Most potential adversaries have no space-based missile warning capability.
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  However, the SSE should consider what threat ballistic and cruise missile assets are available,
  and the capability of friendly space-based warning systems to collect and accurately identify
  potential threat missile systems. The SSE does not need to analyze threat missile targeting
  strategies (intelligence cell role) nor attempt to duplicate the air defense role in warning and
  dissemination.
  Environmental monitoring. What space weather and remote sensing assets are available to
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  support the enemy? Determine the doctrinal employment of these systems.