text: Appendix C
  C-7. Commanders attempt to understand less restrictive authorities and policies that interagency and
  intergovernmental partners follow. Some of their authorities and policies may consist of applications that
  may achieve the desired effect more economically, proficiently, or with fewer risks of causing cascading
  effects. Commanders should be open to using these partner authorities when practical.
  MULTINATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
  C-8. Army units executing cyberspace operations and EW within multinational operations require a robust
  liaison effort. Effective liaison mitigates complications caused by differences in policy and facilitates system
  integration and information sharing.
  C-9. Differences in national standards and laws on sovereignty in cyberspace and the EMS may affect the
  willingness or the legality of a country’s participation in cyberspace operations and EW. Some partners may
  refuse to participate, while others will enable or undertake their operations separate from the Army
  commander’s mission.
  C-10. Connectivity is essential when multi-national forces function in mutual support during combat
  operations. Interoperability issues may compound connectivity issues. Hardware and software
  incompatibilities and disparities in standards, information security, and cyberspace security policy may cause
  gaps in protection or capability that require additional effort to fix. Such issues will likely slow down the
  collection, dissemination, and sharing of information among partners. Commanders and staffs should
  anticipate connectivity incompatibilities and disparities before entering a multinational operation.
  C-11. Intelligence and information sharing with allies and multinational partners are vital during
  multinational operations. Special attention and awareness are essential when sharing information due to
  specific and varying classification sharing policies. When synchronizing cyberspace operations and EW with
  multinational partners, Army units must ensure adherence to foreign disclosure and cyberspace security
  procedures. Security restrictions may prevent full disclosure of some cyberspace and EW capabilities or
  planning, limiting synchronization efforts. Effective synchronization requires access to systems and
  information at the lowest appropriate security classification level. Commanders are responsible for
  establishing procedures for foreign disclosure of intelligence information. For more information regarding
  foreign disclosure, refer to AR 380-10.
  NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS CONSIDERATIONS
  C-12. Commanders ensure adherence to cyberspace security procedures when conducting cyberspace
  operations with nongovernmental organizations. Planning with nongovernmental organizations may be
  necessary for foreign humanitarian assistance, peace operations, and civil-military operations. Incorporating
  these organizations into an operation requires the commander to balance the need of the nongovernmental
  organization for information with operation security. Many nongovernmental organizations may be hesitant
  to become associated with the military to prevent compromising their status as independent entities. Many
  seek to maintain this status to avoid losing their freedom of movement or members being at risk in hostile
  environments. Strategic level planning for the inclusion of nongovernmental organizations into civil affairs
  operations will likely coordinate cyberspace operations.
  HOST-NATION CONSIDERATIONS
  C-13. Each nation has sovereignty over its EMS and cyberspace components within its geographic area. The
  use of a nation’s cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) require coordination and negotiation
  through formal approvals and certifications. Host nation coordination concerning the use of the EMS is a
  function of spectrum management operations. Coordinating spectrum use is based mainly on the potential
  for electromagnetic interference (EMI) with local receivers. This coordination ensures initial spectrum
  availability and supportability for operations and establishes cyberspace availability, such as bandwidth
  allocation. The purpose of coordination is to develop an interoperable cyberspace defense capability.
  Consideration of countries adjacent to a host nation is essential, especially if forces stage, train, or operate
  within these countries. Likewise, compatibility of protective measures, such as countermeasures systems, is
  critical to avoid system fratricide.