text: Assessment
  4-12. MOE development and collection for deception focuses on the current cognitive state of the deception
  target. The enemy’s cognitive state can be measured in one of two ways. First, it uses the evaluation of known
  comments or public statements by the decision maker. Second, it identifies and monitors the flow of enemy
  (particularly the target’s) activity to determine patterns of behavior that indicate the deception target’s
  susceptibility to being moved toward the desired perception and subsequent action or inaction. The baseline
  provides the first indication that friendly forces can affect the target in the manner that meets the desired
  effect. However, the knowledge of this activity occurring or not occurring may not be easily available or
  discernible. Sometimes, it will manifest itself at the very moment a particular effect in the deception plan is
  required; thus, the controlling planner remains vigilant to indicators that suggest the current cognitive state
  of the target has in some manner changed.
  4-13. MOP collection for deception involves two conceptual steps:
  * Determining that the tasked friendly unit or capability employed the desired means to create an
  indicator at the appropriate time and location.
  * Verifying that the intended enemy conduits cued on the friendly signature, transmitted the
  collected data, and delivered the information to the deception target in a discernable context.
  These two steps define the difference between a deception MOP and a traditional MOP (one that asks if
  friendly forces performed the directed action). Part of every successful deception execution involves action
  by the enemy. The conduit that the deception seeks to exploit must function.
  4-14. MDOs determine a deception event schedule from reporting channels. The MDO coordinates this
  reporting with the element controlling a particular execution as a part of finalizing the plan for appropriate
  access and security controls. Verifying that the enemy conduit functioned as planned and that the desired
  information reached the deception target requires focused and coordinated intelligence, surveillance, and
  reconnaissance support. Using their previous conduit analysis work, MDOs, supporting intelligence analysts,
  and the intelligence collection manager collaborate. They identify points at which the information
  transmission might fall susceptible to enemy monitoring and analysis. The presence of filters in the conduit
  pathway makes this verification process difficult because predicting the level of data aggregation or synthesis
  with other friendly observables is subjective at best. In some cases, the appearance of an anticipated MOE
  might be the only validation that a persuasive observable was accurately received and perceived.
  4-15. To provide the commander with the information to adjust plans as needed based on timely MOEs, the
  G-2 and MDO coordinate. For example, if one deception objective is for the enemy to hold the armored
  reserve away from the decisive point of ground action, then MDOs develop MOEs related to achieving that
  objective. MOE examples related to the action or inaction of the reserve might include such things as—
  * An increase or decrease in preparation of defensive positions (implying a period of static activity).
  * An increase or decrease in enemy intelligence collection in the vicinity of a friendly main axis of
  advance at the expense of other sectors (is the enemy “telegraphing” an interest?).
  * An increase or decrease in route reconnaissance toward the friendly sector by armored reserve
  units or leadership (is this pending or an active branch plan?).
  * An increase or decrease in battle drill or movement rehearsal by the enemy reserve.
  4-16. Without the close support of the G-2 and a deliberate focus on the development of viable MOEs and
  MOPs as part of the deception plan, the success or failure of the deception might not be known until the
  moment that a planned enemy action or inaction is turned against friendly forces. This could result in a loss
  of initiative or increased friendly loss of life.