text: Chapter 2
  2-50. Space operations may contribute solutions to counter theater A2 and AD threats to allow freedom of
  maneuver through enemy defenses to gain, maintain, and dominate control across all domains. Examples of
  how space operations help counter A2 and AD strategies include:
  * Space-based assets usually provide initial notification of short range ballistic and cruise missiles
  fired from distant naval and air platforms which give Soldiers sufficient time to don protective
  gear and take cover.
  * Space-based assets help identify long-range enemy air defenses used to challenge airspace for
  both tactical operations and strategic airlift, thereby contesting air superiority.
  2-51. The Army has taken an increased role in suppressing enemy air defenses as it becomes increasingly
  tougher for air operations to gain air superiority against peer competitors when trying to gain entry to a hostile
  environment. Army space operations are a piece of the multifunction approach to countering A2 and AD.
  The U.S. military dominance in all domains will be contested by peer and regional powers and the Army may
  not enjoy the permissive advantages of forward basing it enjoyed in the past.
  2-52. A2 is the effects of systems employed by a threat actor which challenge the employment of joint
  forces during expeditionary and sustained operations to gain access close to enemy terrain. The adversaries
  intent is to make liberation of these areas too costly in terms of military and political resources, and erode
  influence, regional and global will, and influence public opinion. AD describes a threat actor’s strategy to
  deny friendly forces superiority in one or more domain, which is essential to effectively conducting rapid
  and decisive tactical maneuver on land.
  2-53. An A2 and AD strategy implemented in one domain or location may have little or no effect on other
  domains or other locations. Threat efforts may cause one component to operate in a hostile environment,
  while another component is able to operate in a permissive environment. Conversely, an A2 and AD strategy
  implemented in one domain may have detrimental effect on operations across all domains and in other
  locations. Commanders should be aware of hostile EME actions which may only have limited effects.
  2-54. The Army will face opponents who have developed strategies by learning from past conflicts. The
  most prominent anticipated strategy expected from an enemy is A2 and AD. These strategies focus on
  denying unified action partners the use of traditional staging and force development models by restricting
  access to key geographical areas and force-generating assets. In many instances, the use of ballistic missiles,
  cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial systems are a key component of an enemies’ strategy.
  2-55. Contested access to and use of the global commons—those portions of the Earth outside national
  jurisdiction all state actors have rightful access to—will significantly complicate military plans and
  operations. A threat actor may employ conventional or hybrid capabilities as part of an AD strategy, including
  the use of conventional integrated air-defense systems, long range rockets, and cruise missiles.
  2-56. Adversaries may attempt to create one or multiple effects against joint and unified action partners.
  Army forces must be prepared to conduct operations against A2 and AD actions. D3SOE is the result of a
  threat actor implementing A2 and AD strategies against U.S. and unified action partners and it is the most
  recognizable impact to space operations from threat actors.
  DENIED, DEGRADED, AND DISRUPTED SPACE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
  2-57. Army and joint operations use space-based capabilities delivered to all domains via the EMS. The
  threat to Army and joint operations from a contested EME may create vulnerabilities which makes contesting
  space capabilities attractive to threat actors. Army space operations must remain responsive and flexible to
  commanders’ needs and stay agile in response to the efforts of threat actors to place joint forces in a D3SOE.
  2-58. D3SOE is the Army space operations portion of the larger contested EME. A D3SOE may affect
  operations in any one or more domains, and may impact active and passive measures. Mission critical systems
  operate in the radio, microwave, infrared, ultraviolet, and x-ray portions of the spectrum, all of which are
  subject to interferrence.
  2-59. Army forces must be prepared to conduct operations in and through a D3SOE. Denied, degraded,
  and disrupted are used in a different context than they are for OSC, but the definitions are consistent with the
  usage in JP 3-14 and described below.