text: _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
  • Countermeasure systems.
  • Dispersion.
  • Fortifications.
  • IW.
  1-64. Operational shielding generally cannot protect the entire force for an
  extended time period. Rather, the State will seek to protect selected elements
  of its forces for enough time to gain the freedom of action necessary to prose-
  cute important elements of a strategic campaign.
  CONTROL TEMPO
  1-65. The OPFOR initially employs rapid tempo to conclude regional opera-
  tions before an extraregional force can be introduced. It will also use rapid
  tempo to set conditions for access-control operations before the extraregional
  force can establish a foothold in the region. Once it has done that, it needs to
  be able to control the tempoto ratchet it up or down, as is advantageous to
  its own operational or tactical plans.
  1-66. During the initial phases of an extraregional enemy’s entry into the re-
  gion, the OPFOR may employ a high operational tempo. Taking advantage of
  the weaknesses inherent in enemy power projection, it seeks to terminate the
  conflict quickly before main enemy forces can be brought to bear. If the
  OPFOR cannot end the conflict quickly, it may take steps to slow the tempo and
  prolong the conflict, taking advantage of enemy lack of commitment over time.
  CAUSE POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE CASUALTIES
  1-67. The OPFOR will try to inflict highly visible and embarrassing losses on
  enemy forces to weaken the enemy’s domestic resolve and national will to
  sustain the deployment or conflict. Modern wealthy nations have shown an
  apparent lack of commitment over time, and sensitivity to domestic and
  world opinion in relation to conflict and seemingly needless casualties.
  1-68. The OPFOR has the advantage of disproportionate interests: the ex-
  traregional power may have limited objectives and only casual interest in the
  conflict, while the State approaches it from the perspective of total war and a
  threat to its aspirations or even to its national survival. The State is willing
  to commit all means necessary, for as long as necessary, to achieve its strate-
  gic goals. Compared to the extraregional enemy, the State stands more will-
  ing to absorb higher military and civilian casualties in order to achieve vic-
  tory. It will try to influence public opinion in the enemy’s homeland to the ef-
  fect that the goal of intervention is not worth the cost.
  NEUTRALIZE TECHNOLOGICAL OVERMATCH
  1-69. Against an extraregional force, the OPFOR will forego massed forma-
  tions, patterned echelonment, and linear operations that would present easy
  targets for such an enemy. It will hide and disperse its forces in areas where
  complex terrain limits the enemy’s ability to apply his full range of techno-
  logical capabilities. However, the OPFOR can rapidly mass forces and fires
  from these dispersed locations for decisive combat at the time and place of its
  own choosing.