text: Appendix C
  FORT TO PORT
  C-13. As part of the strategic support area, home station installations, Reserve Centers, National Guard
  Armories, and other designated points of origin are where force projection begins. They present targets that
  enemy forces may attack to delay, disrupt, and degrade force flow into theater. Additional vulnerabilities are
  present along all routes of movement, and at all potential sea and aerial ports of embarkation. Army forces
  at all echelons must comprehensively assess emerging threat capabilities that will impede deployment in a
  contested environment. To the greatest extent possible, formations should account for being under constant
  observation through strict operations security, including the safeguarding of information on specific
  deployment timelines and locations and maintaining dispersion of critical assets. The effects of attacks on
  critical military, national, or private infrastructure could halt or delay unit deployment operations before units
  have departed the United States.
  C-14. Contested deployments are a national issue, and they require coordination with a large number of
  civilian unified action partners to overcome the challenges peer threats can create. However, moving Army
  forces from military installations to ports of embarkation is also a local and regional challenge. When routine
  deployment is not possible, installations and units should have a plan to mitigate deployment disruptions.
  C-15. Deployment disruption mitigation planning requires collaboration between the deploying unit, the
  installation, appropriate federal, state, and local agencies (both government and law enforcement), and U.S.
  Army Reserve and National Guard elements. Installations are responsible for building these relationships and
  understanding how threats will likely affect their local areas. Installations do this by modifying their threat
  working groups to incorporate relevant military, government, and other local and regional stakeholders. The
  working group shares information about threats that promote civil unrest, cyber threats that impact critical
  transportation infrastructure, and other threat activities that impact deployment operations. Key planning and
  training considerations are—
  (cid:122) The local, state, and federal authorities able to mitigate deployment disruptions.
  (cid:122) Coordination and relationship building with local, state, and federal civilian law enforcement
  agencies to ensure effective movement control from fort to port.
  (cid:122) Understanding about critical infrastructure vulnerable to sabotage and unsuited for the movement
  of heavy equipment along surface lines of communication, both road and rail.
  (cid:122) Planning to use alternate railheads and marshalling yards and multiple lines of communication to
  reach ports of embarkation.
  (cid:122) Developing alternate surface transportation options to deliver unit equipment to a sea port of
  embarkation when rail service is degraded or disrupted.
  (cid:122) Establishment of fuel, maintenance, and rest locations along lines of communications.
  (cid:122) Implementation of a communication plan that informs the public while maintaining operations
  security.
  (cid:122) Establishing specific cyber defenses for systems and associated data used to support movement.
  C-16. Having an understanding of the requirements and developing mitigation plans to move from the
  installation to the assigned port of embarkation can help overcome threat activities that could stop or hinder
  deployments. An example of this is using Army heavy equipment transportation systems (known as HETS)
  to move tanks, using contract carriers to move other tracked vehicles, and convoying wheeled vehicles to a
  seaport of embarkation if rail transportation from the installation is degraded or disrupted.
  C-17. To effectively implement a mitigation plan, deploying units and the installation must have an
  understanding of the capabilities of civilian infrastructure (such as weight limitations on routes from the
  installation to the port). This includes using data from, and potentially requires coordination with, the Military
  Surface Deployment and Distribution Command about rail lines and roads designated as part of the strategic
  rail and highway corridor networks. Planners must consider the security of critical nodes and terrain along
  projected routes and conduct prior coordination with local and state authorities for security. Existing
  adversary capabilities that could be used to target civilian infrastructure were exercised during EXERCISE
  JACK VOLTAIC 3.0, conducted in 2020.