text: Chapter 2
  Over the last several years, the U.S. Army has rapidly shifted the focus of its doctrine,
  training, education, and leader development to increase readiness and capabilities to
  prevail in large-scale ground combat operations against peer and near-peer threats.Our
  new doctrine dictates that the Army provide the joint force four unique strategic roles:
  shaping the security environment, preventing conflict, prevailing in large-scale combat
  operations, and consolidating gains to make temporary success permanent. To enable this
  shift of focus, the Army is now attempting to change its culture shaped by over 15 years of
  persistent limited-contingency operations. Leaders must recognize that the hard-won
  wisdom of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars is important to retain but does not fully square
  with the exponential lethality, hyperactive chaos, and accelerated tempo of operations
  across multiple domains when facing a peer or near-peer adversary.
  U.S. Army LTG(retired) Michael D. Lundy
  ARMY FORCES IN LARGE-SCALE GROUND COMBAT
  OPERATIONS
  2-61. Large-scale ground combat operationsare sustained combat operations involving multiple corps and
  divisions (ADP 3-0). Army forces constitute the preponderance of land combat forces,organized into corps
  and divisions, during large-scale combat operations. Army forces seize the initiative, gain and exploit
  positions of relative advantage in multiple domains to dominate an enemy force,and consolidate gains. Corps
  and divisions execute decisive action (offense, defense, and stability), where offensive and defensive
  operations make up the preponderance of activities conducted during combat operations. Corps and division
  commanders must explicitly understand the lethality of large-scale combat operations to preserve combat
  power and manage risk. Commanders use ground maneuver and other land-based capabilities to enable
  maneuver in the air, land, cyberspace, and maritime domains. Commanders leverage operations in the
  cyberspace and space domains,and the informationenvironmentto support ground maneuver.
  2-62. Corps and division commanders use fires to create effects in support of Army and joint operations.
  Cross-domain fires—fires executed in one domain to create effects in a different domain (ADP 3-19)—
  provide commanders with the flexibility to find the best system to create the required effect and to build
  redundancy into their plan. Cross-domain fires also present a more complex problem to the adversary or
  enemy than fires within a single domain. Multi-domain fires—fires that converge effects from two or more
  domains against a target (ADP 3-19)—converge surface-based fires with other effects across domains to
  create multiple dilemmas, taxing the enemy’s ability to effectively respond. A commander may employ
  offensive cyberspace operations to attack an enemy air defense network while surface-to-surface fires destroy
  enemy air defense radars and air-to-surface fires destroy the air defense command and control nodes.
  2-63. During large-scale combat operations, the performance of offensive operations is traditionally
  associated with a favorable combat-power ratio. Combat multipliers often provide positions of relative
  advantage,even when Army forces are outnumbered. A numerically superiorforce is not a precondition for
  performing offensive operations. Rather, a commander must continuously seek every opportunity to seize
  the initiative through offensive operations,evenwhen the force as a whole is on the defense. This requires
  the commander to perform economy of force measures to adequately resource the force’s main effort. The
  offensive plan allows the corps or division to shift and synchronize combat power where necessary to
  reinforce the main effort. Mobility, surprise, and aggressive execution are the most effective means for
  achieving tactical success when performing both offensive and defensive operations. Bold,aggressive tactics
  may involve significant risk; however, greater gains normally require greater risks. A numerically inferior
  force capable of bold and aggressive action can create opportunities to seize and exploit the initiative. (See
  chapter 6 for additional information on the offense.)
  2-64. Defending corps and division commanders seek to push the enemy off-balance in multiple domains
  and the information environment when that enemy initially has the initiative. The key to a successful corps
  or division defense is the orchestration and synchronization of combat power across all available domains
  and the information environment to converge effects. Commanders decide where to concentrate combat
  power and where to accept risk as they establish engagement areas (EAs). Corps and division defensive
  planning normally calls for the decisive operation to culminate in the main battle area (MBA) with the