text: Support to Host Nation Security Forces
  The situations in Iraq and Afghanistan are not the first time US forces have
  created Host Nation security forces from scratch and allowed them to win
  in a counterinsurgency. The Philippine-American War began in 1898
  and ended officially in 1902, but hostilities remained until 1913. The war was
  not a popular one in the United States, but resulted in a stable and free
  Philippine Republic.
  The Philippine Constabulary (PC) was established on August 8, 1901,
  to assist the United States military in combating the remaining Filipino
  revolutionaries. The PC was entrusted into the hands of Captain Henry T.
  Allen, named as the chief of the force and later dubbed as "the Father of the
  Philippine Constabulary." With the help of four other army officers, Captain
  Allen organized the force, trained, equipped, and armed the men as best
  as could be done under difficult conditions.
  General Henry Adler said it best when he said, “For some time to come, the
  number of troops to be kept here should be a direct function of the number
  of guns put into the hands of the natives…It is unwise to ignore the great
  moral effect of a strong armed force above suspicion.”
  The Constabulary was instrumental in defeating the insurgency. Originally
  officered by Americans, the Filipinos slowly over took all operations of the
  unit. At a tactical level, they were initially used to augment US forces
  and moved into having their own area of operations. In July of 1901, the US
  Army garrisoned 491 positions and by December it only garrisoned 372
  positions. Although poorly armed with shotguns and revolvers, the
  constabulary soon maintained ownership of entire provinces.
  REBUILD OR BUILD FACILITIES
  8-49. HN security forces need infrastructure support. Soldiers and police need buildings for storage,
  training, and shelter. Often, requirements include barracks, ranges, motor pools, and other military
  facilities. Construction takes time; the Host Nation needs to invest early in such facilities if they are to be
  available when needed. Protection must be considered in any infrastructure design, including headquarters
  facilities, since infrastructure is an attractive target for insurgents. (See FM 5-104 for information on
  hardening measures to increase infrastructure survivability and improve protection.)
  8-50. During an insurgency, HN military and police forces often operate from local bases. Building
  training centers and unit garrisons requires a long-term force-basing plan. If possible, garrisons should
  include housing for the commissioned officers, NCOs, and families; government-provided medical care for
  the families; and other benefits that make national service attractive.
  8-51. The easiest way for a partner unit to do this is to build a combined facility to house both itself
  and the HN unit. As the situation improves, the Host Nation security forces can occupy the entire
  compound once the partner unit leaves.
  8-52. Advisor units can use funding that they have to build showers, tents, toilets, dining facility
  equipment, barriers and minor building renovations. Improving the military facilities can result in an
  increase in the morale and performance of the HN unit.
  TRAIN
  8-53. US and multinational training assistance should address shortfalls at every level with the purpose
  of establishing self-sustaining training systems.
  US Trainers
  8-54. Soldiers assigned to training missions should receive training on the specific requirements
  of developing HN forces. The course should emphasize the Host Nation’s cultural background, introduce