text: Chapter 2
  STANDOFF WEAPONS
  2-97. A standoff weapon is a medium-range, precision-guided, air to-surface glide weapon employing a
  variety of munitions that can be employed against land and sea targets. It is a launch-and-leave weapon that
  employs a GPS-aided INS and is capable of day, night, and adverse weather operations. Standoff weapons
  provide an ability to engage targets at extended ranges while minimizing the risk to friendly forces. Some
  examples of air-to-surface standoff capabilities include:
  * The Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (referred to as JASSM) and its extended-range variant,
  which are air-launched, low-observable, subsonic cruise missiles specifically designed to
  penetrate air defense systems. The missiles incorporate GPS-aided INS guidance with an infrared
  seeker in the terminal phase of flight. Optimizing JASSM's full-precision and low-observable
  capabilities requires prior coordination with both strike units and target intelligence agencies.
  * The small diameter bomb (referred to as SDB), which is an air-launched, precision guided, glide
  weapon. It provides strike aircraft with high-loadout, all-weather, autonomous, standoff-attack
  capability outside of point defenses. SDB increment I provides precision capability through a
  GPS-aided INS against fixed targets, while SDB increment II incorporates a GPS-aided INS and
  additional tri-mode seeker, optimized for engaging fixed, relocatable, moving targets, at any time
  of day and in adverse weather conditions.
  CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS
  2-98. Cyberspace operations are the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to
  achieve objectives in or through cyberspace (JP 3-0). Both the offensive cyberspace operations and defensive
  cyberspace operations-response action missions may rise to the level of use of force, where physical damage
  or destruction of enemy systems require use of fires in cyberspace. offensive cyberspace operations are
  intended to project power by the application of force in and through cyberspace and defensive cyberspace
  operations-response action uses defensive measures, including fires, outside the defended network to protect
  it.
  2-99. Cyberspace attack are actions taken in and through cyberspace that create denial (i.e., degradation,
  disruption, or destruction) or manipulation effects in cyberspace and are considered a form of fires (JP 3-12).
  2-100. Cyberspace attack actions are a form of fires, are taken as part of an offensive cyberspace operations
  or defensive cyberspace operations-response action mission, are coordinated with other USG departments
  and agencies, and are carefully synchronized with planned fires in the physical domains. For more
  information on CEMA see FM 3-12.
  SPACE OPERATIONS
  2-101. Many lethal and nonlethal fires capabilities depend on space capabilities to support, integrate, and
  deliver fires. Army space capabilities are integrated throughout the fires warfighting function, providing
  robust and reliable planning, contributing to target development, and providing positioning, navigation, and
  timing, satellite communications, imagery, geolocation, weather, and terrain capabilities.
  2-102. As a FS attack/delivery capability, space control operations that create a desired effect on enemy
  space systems across all domains by employing a variety of measures to assure the use of space and attribute
  enemy attacks. These include terrestrial fires to defend space operations and assets. A capability for, or
  employment of, fires may deter threats and/or contain and de-escalate a crisis.
  2-103. When deliberate, nonlethal FS attack/delivery capabilities are directed into the space domain, they
  must be coordinated between the affected combatant commands if time permits. By honoring the boundaries
  of the space domain, CCDRs help preserve space situational awareness, spacecraft life span, and space
  system performance. For more information on space operations see JP 3-14. Space domain is the area above
  the altitude where atmospheric effects on airborne objects become negligible (JP 3-14).