text: Chapter 3
  ATTACKS AGAINST ENEMY FORCES OUT OF FRIENDLY
  CONTACT
  3-24. Army Aviation attack and reconnaissance units, maneuvering independently against an enemy force
  not in close contact with friendly ground maneuver forces, conducts hasty or deliberate attacks to divert,
  disrupt, delay, or destroy enemy capabilities before they can be brought to bear on friendly forces. The
  Army Aviation air mission commander controls the maneuver and fires of Army Aviation within an AO
  assigned by a higher headquarters, but the attack is still synchronized and/or integrated with the overall
  higher ground scheme of maneuver. The higher headquarters assigning the attack mission coordinates the
  required airspace with the appropriate airspace element.
  3-25. These attacks are conducted at such a distance from friendly ground forces that detailed integration
  with them during actions on the objective is typically not required. Based on the nature of the target and
  complexity of the OE, Army Aviation attacks out of contact may be conducted as hasty attacks, but they
  are most often deliberate attacks. Deliberate attacks against enemy forces out of friendly contact require
  detailed planning and the simultaneous or sequential employment of many enabling assets to mass effects
  and achieve the commander’s intent.
  3-26. Based on mission and operational variables, attacks against enemy forces out of friendly contact
  range from relatively low risk to extremely high-risk operations. They may be conducted by attack or
  reconnaissance elements ranging in size from a single armed UAS up to one or more AB or ACS.
  Increasing the distance from friendly forces increases the threat to the attack or reconnaissance unit.
  Likewise, low target fidelity or increased mission complexity also increases mission risk, and more detailed
  planning and integration is required by the assigning headquarters. Higher mission risk requires the
  supported higher headquarters to prioritize required enabling capabilities to provide continuous
  reconnaissance, continuous target development, and in depth integration of joint fires with detailed
  rehearsals and conditions checks prior to execution. Consideration must also be given to how long attack
  assets are committed to higher-risk attacks and weighed against the totality of the operational risk to other
  ongoing or pending operations. The decision to execute attacks against enemy forces out of friendly contact
  must be based on the overall operational risk versus the reward of successful execution within the higher
  headquarters scheme of maneuver.
  3-27. These attacks are typically deliberate attacks, but they may be executed as hasty attacks against
  emerging enemy targets of opportunity based on mission variables. If the enemy target is high payoff and
  outweighs the risk of friendly losses or if the enemy threat to aviation is known to be acceptable for hasty
  operations, hasty attacks against enemy forces out of contact can be effective in seizing emerging
  opportunities to prevent the enemy from gaining a position of relative advantage.
  3-28. Army Aviation units conduct attacks against enemy forces out of friendly contact throughout the
  depth and breadth of an AO. They may be conducted beyond the forward line of own troops (FLOT) in
  linear, contiguous AOs; in deep areas between non-linear and non-contiguous AOs; in close or rear areas
  inside large non-linear and contiguous AOs where ground forces are not present or not in contact with the
  targeted enemy force; or in joint or special operations AOs where friendly ground or surface forces are not
  present or not in contact with the targeted enemy force.
  3-29. Hasty and deliberate attacks against enemy forces out of friendly contact are executed in support of
  higher headquarters that can develop target fidelity, provide enablers to support the attack, and assign a
  subordinate AO to the attack or reconnaissance unit. This is usually no smaller than a ground maneuver
  battalion and is more typically a BCT, division, corps, or joint task force headquarters. Examples of hasty
  and deliberate attacks against enemy forces out of friendly contact, from generally the lowest risk with the
  least required planning and synchronization efforts, to very high risk operations requiring detailed planning
  and the full range of joint fires and intelligence capabilities include, but are not limited to, the following:
  * An AWT using MUM-T conducts a hasty attack to destroy a dismounted enemy team located by
  UAS while emplacing mines along a high speed avenue of approach in a deep area between non-
  contiguous AOs. With the threat assessment estimated as low, the higher headquarters assigns an
  AO for the AWT to conduct the attack and establishes ACMs. The air mission commander
  maneuvers the AWT to the AO and determines the fire control and method of attack for the