text: Chapter 8
  operations inside their assigned areas. Intelligence support to deep, close, and rear operations involves close
  coordination with the operations staff to determine how the intelligence warfighting function can best support
  operations at any given time. Although deep, close, and rear operations are distinctly different, aspects of
  each may overlap; likewise, at times intelligence operations in each may comprise similar activities.
  8-33. Typically, corps and divisions assign CPs to enable control of deep, close, and rear areas. At echelons
  brigade and below, differentiating between deep, close, and rear areas may have less utility during large-scale
  combat operations because of the high tempo, narrow focus, and short planning horizons. However, at every
  echelon, commanders must understand the relationship among these operations and their combined impact on
  mission accomplishment. (See FM 3-0 and FM 3-94 for doctrine on deep, close, and rear operations.)
  8-34. Intelligence synchronization across deep, close, and rear operations is required to ensure the unity of
  support and unity of effort. This mitigates the dynamic nature of the OE. Operations in each area will cause
  effects, impacting threat, neutral and friendly forces. These impacts must be continuously monitored to ensure
  commanders and staffs have the most updated and accurate assessments from which to make decisions. For
  example, information regarding bypassed enemy forces in the close area must be received by units in the rear
  and deep areas to assist in deep and rear area assessments.
  8-35. Commanders, G-2/S-2s, and the staff must ensure analytical sections in deep, close, and rear areas are
  manned, able to assess threat activities in each area, and have access to an architecture to share information
  across these areas. During large-scale combat operations, analytical elements in the three areas must
  collaborate to ensure threat monitoring is maintained as the unit maneuvers through their AORs and
  communicate that information to subordinate elements.
  8-36. The fusion of information and intelligence from the deep, close, and rear areas provides commanders
  and staffs with a holistic picture, from which to build assessments of current operations and subsequently
  provide the relevant information to determine future operations. G-2/S-2s must maintain communications
  with higher, subordinate, and adjacent echelons to ensure all relevant information regarding the OE is
  assessed, considered, and incorporated into operations. Figure 8-2 illustrates the variety of activities across
  the operational framework and how they interrelate.
  Figure 8-2. Notional operational framework during offensive operations