text: Chapter 19
  Showing the enemy multiple observables of a particular intention is the most convincing way to sell the
  tactical deception.
  19-56. The unit’s tactical deception should be employed in an environment in which the unit has more
  options available than the enemy has combat power to cover. If the enemy can effectively defend against all
  avenues of approach, then deceiving it as to the friendly choice becomes much less significant. As influence
  over the assigned area begins to increase, the unit’s options and, therefore, its opportunity for deception begin
  to increase. As the enemy’s influence begins to diminish, its intelligence collection capability becomes more
  degraded by increasing friendly control of the assigned area. Consequently, the enemy’s ability to assess
  friendly capabilities and probable intentions shifts to an environment of relative uncertainty. The
  opportunities for deception continue to increase. The enemy is required to make more tactical decisions based
  on the remaining, often uncorroborated, intelligence.
  19-57. Deception operations induce the enemy decision maker to view the operation from multiple courses
  of action. This provides friendly commanders the ability to develop favorable and exploitable courses of
  action. Because of induced misperceptions of the battlefield, the enemy in defense is not given time to identify
  the composition, location, and time of the friendly force’s attack.
  19-58. As the enemy begins to lose its active intelligence collection capability, its ability to detect the
  friendly force’s deception becomes progressively more difficult. Established procedures and doctrine make
  friendly deception operations easier to conduct. These procedures result in distinct and recognizable offensive
  patterns. Many units have enhanced their offensive capabilities by applying deception variations.
  19-59. Increasing patrol and reconnaissance activities in areas away from the main attack may confuse the
  enemy. However, friendly activities should not vary with normal procedures to the extent that they reveal
  friendly forces who are engaged in deception. For example, a friendly commander may conduct
  reconnaissance in an area away from the main effort’s objective, potentially causing the enemy to shift focus
  away from the friendly force’s main effort.
  TACTICAL DECEPTION IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
  19-60. Due to the relatively static nature of defensive operations at the lower tactical levels, tactical
  deception takes on an increased importance. Tactical deception is used in the defense to preserve combat
  power by hiding the location of friendly forces in the main battle area, the main effort, and friendly reserves.
  By concealing friendly defensive positions, this preserves combat power and improves survivability. This
  causes the enemy to expend combat power and exhaust intelligence efforts and resources unprofitably.
  Creating false targets to cause the enemy to misuse reconnaissance efforts and firepower is a concurrent,
  coordinated activity during all phases of the defense to cause the enemy to pursue a COA favorable to friendly
  operations.
  19-61. At the point of the attack, the enemy has decided on its course of action. It is easier to convince the
  enemy to continue that course rather than alter its plans or tactics. A successful tactical deception operation
  conducted by a defender can result in the inappropriate deployment of attacking enemy forces. Maintaining
  that tactical deception can result in the continued commitment of enemy forces at a time and location least
  advantageous to the enemy.
  19-62. In the defense, operational security is an ally of tactical deception. For example, the enemy has
  decided on a course of action, it is easier to convince them to continue their course of action than alter their
  plan. A successful deception in the defense can result in the inappropriate deployment of attacking enemy
  forces. The far easier task of maintaining that deception can result in the continued commitment of enemy
  forces at a time and location least advantageous to them.
  RISK TO TACTICAL DECEPTION
  19-63. Tactical deception, by its very nature, implies taking calculated risks to gain the tactical advantage
  over the enemy. Planned deceptions allow friendly forces to sequence the presentation of the battlefield to
  the enemy in the manner in which friendly forces allows the enemy to view the battlefield.