text: Fundamentals
  1-43. An example of this principle occurred with the selection of the invasion site and its cover plan for the
  D-Day invasion of France. Using reconnaissance and communications intercepts, the Allies learned that
  Hitler and his senior military advisors believed that the most likely place for the Allied invasion would be in
  the Pas de Calais region. This was a viable plan as it provided better air cover and a shorter transit time from
  England; in fact, it was a reverse of their plan to invade England in 1940. The Allies were able to exploit and
  reinforce the enemy’s expectations to the extent that the Germans had a difficult time reacting to the actual
  landings in Normandy.
  LIMITATIONS TO HUMAN INFORMATION PROCESSING
  1-44. The human brain can only process so much information and only so fast; it is susceptible to inherent
  limitations or tricks of the mind. There are two primary exploitable limitations to human information
  processing: the law of small numbers and the susceptibility to conditioning. The law of small numbers is the
  tendency to generalize from a small sample set. Exploiting this law means that it does not necessarily take
  many observables for the target to draw a conclusion. Susceptibility to conditioning is the repeated
  presentation of stimuli to elicit a specific response from the target. In deception, it is the frequent inability of
  deception targets to detect small changes in friendly force indicators, even if the cumulative change over time
  is large.
  1-45. An example of this principle was the breakout of the German ships Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Prinz
  Eugen from Brest on February 12, 1942. The Germans facilitated the breakout by jamming British radars.
  Ordinarily this would have been a significant tip-off that something was amiss, but British radar operators
  dismissed it as being caused by atmospheric disturbance. This error was the result of a carefully orchestrated
  German ruse directed by General Wolfgang Martini, the head of the Luftwaffe Signals Service. The Germans
  jammed the British radar sites every day at the same time to build the British radar operators’ belief that the
  atmosphere was interrupting the receipt of any signals. The British became so accustomed to the so-called
  atmospheric problems that the ships were able to escape.
  MULTIPLE FORMS OF SURPRISE
  1-46. A strong correlation exists between deception and surprise. The more forms of surprise built into the
  deception plan, the more likely it will overwhelm the target. These forms of surprise include size, activity,
  location, unit, time, equipment, intent, and style. One effect of surprise is the cry-wolf syndrome in which
  repeated false alarms have the potential to desensitize an enemy. A pattern of behavior lulls an opponent into
  a sense of normal behavior to allow a friendly action to occur without an immediate counteraction.
  1-47. An example occurred when Egypt successfully deceived Israel into a false sense of security in 1973
  by mobilizing reservists twenty-three times before actually acting. Many times over one year, the same source
  provided information that the war would break out on a specific date. Each time, that day would come and
  go without an attack. This happened so often that when the source actually provided the date of the real
  attack, no one believed him.
  JONES’ DILEMMA
  1-48. This principle is named after Reginald Victor Jones, a British professor heavily involved in solving
  science and technology intelligence challenges. In this deception, the target receives information through
  multiple means and methods, from many angles, throughout an operational environment. Deception generally
  becomes more difficult as the number of conduits available to the deception target to confirm the real situation
  increases. However, the greater the number of conduits that are deceptively manipulated, the greater the
  chance the target will believe the deception. Planners must balance the need to disrupt or deny enemy
  capabilities with the need to preserve select deception conduits to the enemy decision maker.
  CARE IN THE DESIGN OF PLANNED PLACEMENT OF DECEPTIVE MATERIAL
  1-49. Windfalls (unexpected gains) of information or plans are usually second-guessed, and the target or the
  target’s intelligence assets usually doubt the authenticity of any windfall if it comes too easily. The target
  will likely view deceptive materials or information as credible if it uncovers the information in a seemingly