text: Fundamentals
  SEQUENCING RULE
  1-57. Planners must sequence deception activities and maintain them for as long as possible to maximize the
  deception story. OPSEC measures can help planners mask unit observables that would otherwise reveal the
  unit’s mission and intent until the last possible instant. To be effective, deception and OPSEC activities must
  be sequenced and coordinated in both time and space, and in conjunction with adjacent or pre-existing
  operations.
  IMPORTANCE OF FEEDBACK
  1-58. Planners must develop indicators that will determine the success or failure of the deception. An
  assessment plan uses measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to determine if the enemy has adopted, rejected, or
  countered the deception plan. Assessing MOEs gives the commander the necessary feedback to continue,
  adjust, or terminate a deception plan. When developing the deception plan, planners should build associated
  MOEs for key events.
  1-59. An example of the importance of feedback happened during World War II. The British developed a
  top-secret cryptographic tool called ULTRA that enabled the British to read German codes. The information
  that ULTRA provided to the Allies was a critical element to the success of the Allied invasion of Normandy.
  The Allies knew through ULTRA that the German troops remained in Norway and concluded through
  feedback that the deception was successful.
  BEWARE OF POSSIBLE UNWANTED REACTIONS
  1-60. Deceptions may produce unintended, often unwanted consequences. Believing that a threat is real, an
  enemy can act unpredictably. Proper planning and coordination and knowing the enemy can reduce the
  chance that deceptions will result in unfavorable action. Successful planners consider second- and third-order
  effects of the deception plan to mitigate unintended consequences. The risk inherent to a deception operation
  is measured by the losses that can result from its failure. The possibility of failure stems from the uncertainties
  surrounding how the target receives and interprets information intended for the target and, eventually, how
  it affects the target’s desired perceptions. If discovered, resources used for the deception may be in jeopardy.
  As with any military operation that puts forces at risk, planners decide to use deception after a deliberate
  assessment that weighs opportunity against need and cost against benefit. The deception planner must advise
  the commander of the risk, benefit, and cost of the deception operation relative to both success and failure.
  DECEPTION MEANS
  1-61. Deception means are methods, resources, and techniques that can be used to convey information to the
  deception target (JP 3-13.4). There are three basic categories of deception means: physical, technical, and
  administrative. An individual deception means may have multiple attributes that allow it to be characterized
  in more than one category. Planners normally employ deception means in complementary variety to mislead
  multiple types of enemy sensors to increase credibility and the likelihood of creating the desired perception.
  Means provide the signatures, associations, and profiles of friendly purported activities to the enemy. For
  additional deception means and the authorities to employ them, refer to CCMD instructions and request
  guidance from the CCMD.
  PHYSICAL MEANS
  1-62. Physical means are resources, methods, and techniques used to convey or deny information or
  signatures normally derivable from direct observation or active sensors by the deception target. Most physical
  means also have technical signatures visible to sensors that collect scientifically or electronically. Planners
  typically evaluate physical means using characteristics such as shape, size, function, quantity, movement
  pattern, location, activity, and association with the surroundings. Examples might include—
  * Movement of forces.
  * Exercises and training activities.
  * Decoy equipment and devices.
  * Tactical actions.