text: Chapter 3
  Support to Governance
  3-118. Identify key government and local leaders that can support the re-establishment of local
  government that can administer the area. Identifying the underlying issues of the population.
  Restore Essential Services
  3-119. Identify essential services that need immediate attention.
  Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development
  3-120. Identify potential “quick win” projects to stimulate the local economy and create additional
  support for the government.
  Conduct Information Engagement
  3-121. The message to the populace focuses on gaining and maintaining their overt support for the
  counterinsurgency effort, as well as informing them that active support for the insurgency would prolong
  combat operations, creating a risk to themselves and their neighbors. The message to the insurgent force
  focuses on convincing them that they cannot win, and that the most constructive alternatives are
  to surrender or cease their activities.
  HOLD
  3-122. After clearing the area of guerrillas, the counterinsurgent force must then assign sufficient troops
  to the cleared area to prevent their return, to defeat any remnants, and to secure the population. This is the
  hold task. Ideally, Host Nation security forces execute this part of the clear-hold-build operation. Success
  or failure depends on effectively and continuously securing the populace and on reestablishing an HN local
  government. Although offensive and stability operations continue, in this phase, uses defensive operations
  to secure the population.
  BASES
  3-123. Cleared areas are best held by establishing counterinsurgent forces in bases among or adjacent to
  the area. From these bases, the counterinsurgent forces can then concentrate on two primary purposes:
  to disrupt, identify, and ultimately eliminate the insurgents, especially their leadership and infrastructure;
  and to end popular support for the insurgency and to gain popular support for the government
  3-124. Exactly where these bases are established and their actual force composition is a key
  counterinsurgent decision. The main consideration should be towards the desired effect on the population,
  especially increasing their security. If a area is supportive of the insurgency, then a base established
  in known insurgent strongholds may sever the relationships between insurgents and the populace.
  However, if the area is neutral or has pockets of support for the government, then the base should be
  established where it can best help in developing the area.
  SECURING THE POPULACE
  3-125. If adequate HN security forces are not available, units should consider hiring and training local
  paramilitary forces to secure the cleared village or neighborhood. Not only do the members of the
  paramilitary have a stake in their area’s security, they also receive a wage. Providing jobs stimulates the
  economy. Having a job improves morale and allows locals to become a potential member of the local
  governmental process.
  3-126. Contact with the population should be continuous, and both planned and unplanned. Being based
  within the population forces information engagement and provides opportunities for contact with the
  population. From the first day, Soldier’s actions in these areas, if culturally astute, can build bonds with the
  local populace and in many cases change the attitudes of the people. Ultimately, the goal of this contact