text: Working With Host-Nation Forces
  Figure 11-4. Phases of building a host-nation security force
  11-35. The third phase of building a host-nation security force is the employment of a host-nation security
  force to protect the population and defeat the insurgents. During this phase, the primary focus shifts from
  organizing, training, equipping, and rebuilding host-nation security forces to employing host-nation
  security forces to perform the security tasks for which they were designed. As one host-nation security
  force unit enters the employment phase, other units may have just begun the force generation process.
  Meanwhile, there may be more seasoned host-nation security force units that are ready to transition to the
  lead for security operations in their assigned area of operations. Additionally, it may be possible to generate
  host-nation police forces more quickly than army units, since they can be employed individually or in small
  station-level units, they do not need to conduct large-scale collective training exercises, and they typically
  have fewer materiel requirements. However, it may take considerably longer for police forces to show their
  effectiveness during the employment phase due to the length of time it takes for police forces to gain the
  trust of the local population and build productive, enduring relationships with local or tribal leaders.
  11-36. The fourth phase of building a host-nation security force in a counterinsurgency is the transition of
  responsibility for security operations from the U.S. or multinational forces to a host-nation security force.
  In some instances, such as in Colombia or the Philippines, a host-nation security force may already be
  mature and highly capable in most or all operational realms (land, air, and maritime). Security force
  assistance activities and the resulting transition to a host-nation security force lead may refer only to
  specific functions such as intelligence or an even more discreet set of tactical tasks, such as employment of
  remote sensors, that supports the host nation’s strategic or operational counterinsurgency goals. In these
  instances, the U.S. may provide operational capabilities to meet the immediate threat, while conducting
  security force assistance in the form of equipment or training to close the capabilities gap. Once the
  capability gap is filled, a host nation’s security force assumes responsibility for that function, and U.S.
  forces redeploy, with the country team providing the host nation access to long-term security assistance
  programs as appropriate.
  11-37. The defense attaché office and foreign area officers play an important role in long-term security
  assistance programs. In other cases such as Iraq, U.S. or multinational forces may initially have to assume
  responsibility for all security tasks in all operational realms, and across all security force functions (land
  forces, police, and border security). In the latter case, transition is a lengthy process with no clearly defined
  beginning or end date.
  11-38. Transition will likely be conducted in steps or subphases, and the steps or subphases may be
  geographic, functional, or a combination of both. For example, the transition to host-nation security force
  lead for land force security operations may transpire one province at a time until the entire country has
  transitioned. A second example might be for transition to occur for land forces across the entire country by