text: Security Operations
  INITIAL SCREEN
  5-40. The BCT establishes the general location of the initial screen. To prevent fratricide, the squadron or
  screening unit adjusts closer to the protected force only with coordination. The initial screen often represents
  the FLOT. The initial screen is a restrictive control measure requiring coordination when units move beyond
  it to conduct aerial surveillance or ground reconnaissance. If operations forward of the screen are required,
  the commander establishes a PL to designate the security unit LOA. Key considerations include determining
  fields of fire and observation, requirements to observe specific NAIs or TAIs, and the range of supporting
  indirect fire assets.
  5-41. With permission from the BCT, the squadron or screening unit can adjust the initial screen to meet
  these considerations. Time available and the threat situation determine the method of occupying the screen.
  AREAS OF OPERATION FOR SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS
  5-42. The squadron or screening unit commander designates areas of operations for subordinate elements to
  include responsibility for NAIs and TAIs. The commander positions attack and reconnaissance aviation, UAS
  or ground-based sensors, and SIGINT systems to provide additional depth. Reduced depth is the trade-off
  when screening extended frontages. The commander may assign specific terrain to attack and reconnaissance
  aviation units and UASs, which should not be along critical high-speed avenues of approach. The
  commander’s plans include reconnaissance management (cueing, mixing, and redundancy) to maximize
  coverage and effectiveness. Commanders specify how to adjust ground observation posts or positions to
  compensate for the absence of visual observation with aerial assets, such as in adverse weather.
  5-43. Attack and reconnaissance aviation and UASs, or attached, manned aviation assets may conduct
  reconnaissance forward, to the rear, or on the flanks of ground elements to add depth and extend the
  capabilities of the ground screen. Aerial assets patrol along exposed flanks or in gaps between ground
  observation posts, augment the surveillance of NAIs, and add redundancy and depth within the sector. Aerial
  reconnaissance units extend a ground screen or provide an independent screen to protect ground forces.
  Aviation assets provide continuous observation of threat elements allowing ground forces to displace to
  subsequent positions.
  5-44. Using its own or the BCT’s organic surveillance and acquisition assets, such as UASs and ground
  sensors, the screening unit develops a plan to provide early warning on the probable avenues of approach.
  Nonorganic, higher assets, such as Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar Systems, provide earlier
  acquisition information to cue unit assets.
  Note. Most probable avenues of approach are not necessarily the high-speed avenues of approach.
  The factors of METT-TC (I) influence the most probable avenues of approach.
  5-45. BCT assets aid the squadron or screening unit when it is collapsing the screen and is most vulnerable,
  and they assist with regaining contact with the threat when contact is lost. If the squadron screens extended
  frontages, these assets can operate in an economy of force role by conducting periodic surveillance on less
  probable areas the threat may use and by maximizing ground combat power along probable avenues of approach.
  5-46. Fires planning include the integration of direct and indirect fires, attack aviation, and close air support.
  The commander’s intent drives the screen’s purpose, which is to report, disrupt, delay, or destroy specific
  elements of the threat’s formations. The staff plans targets at chokepoints along probable avenues of approach
  in areas where the threat movement may be restricted or severely restricted, such as those areas with natural
  or manufactured obstacles. Commanders designate engagement areas to focus fires along likely threat
  avenues of approach where the fires have the greatest likelihood of achieving the desired effects. The higher
  headquarters must clearly identify the command and support relationship of supporting artillery available to
  the screening force. Annex D of the OPORD articulates the fire support tasks and communication means
  (including voice and digital), additional fire support coordination measures, and planned position areas for artillery.
  5-47. Engineers provide mobility, countermobility, and survivability capabilities for specific tasks, such as
  improvement of roads and trails for mobility, emplacement of obstacles, and observation post survivability.
  Reserve obstacles are planned and prepared but are not executed until time or event criteria are met.