text: Chapter 6
  Note. A rally point and an ORP differ from an assault position,in that,an assault point is a position
  short of an objective from which final preparations are made beforethe immediate assault of an
  objection. A rally pointis an easily identifiable point on the ground at which units can reassemble
  and reorganize if they become dispersed (ATP3-21.20). Forces conducting a patrol, or an
  infiltration commonly use this control measure. The objective rally pointis an easily identifiable
  point where all elements of the infiltrating unit assemble and prepare to attack the objective
  (ADP3-90). An ORP is typically near the infiltrating unit’s objective; however, there is no
  standard distance from the objective to the ORP. It should be far enough away from the objective
  so that the enemy will not detect the infiltrating unit’s attack preparations. An assault position,
  when designated, is generally positioned in the last covered and concealed position prior to the
  objective and after leaving the ORP,when an ORP is used. Infiltrating units move to an ORPto
  consolidate their combat power,refine the plan,and conduct any last-minute coordination before
  to continuing the mission. The unit then conducts those tasks needed to accomplish its mission,
  which could be an attack, raid, ambush, seizing key terrain, capturing prisoners, or collecting
  specific combatinformation.
  NO-FIREAREA,FREE-FIREAREA,ANDRESTRICTIVE FIRELINE
  6-124. Ano-fire areais an area designated by the appropriate commander into which fires or their effects
  are prohibited (JP 3-09.3). Its purpose is to identify locations and facilities required for consolidation of gains.
  Afree-fire areais a specific region into which any weapon system may fire without additional coordination
  with the establishing headquarters (JP 3-09). Its purpose is to enclose a bypassed or encircled enemy. A
  restrictive fire line is a specific boundary established between converging, friendly surface forces that
  prohibits fires or their effects from crossing (JP 3-09). Its purpose is to prevent interference between
  converging friendly forces,such as what occurs during a linkup operation.
  LINE OF CONTACT AND LINE OF DEPARTURE
  6-125. Theline of contactis a general trace delineating the location where friendly and enemy forces are
  engaged (ADP 3-90). In the offense,aPLas a line of contact is often combined with the line of departure. In
  the defense,a line of contact is often synonymous with the forward line of troops. A line of departureis in
  land warfare, a line designated to coordinate the departure of attack elements (JP 3-31). Its purpose is to
  coordinate the advance of the attacking force, so its elements strike the enemy in the order and at the time
  desired.
  PROBABLE LINE OF DEPLOYMENT AND LIMIT OF ADVANCE
  6-126. A probable line of deployment is a phase line that designates the location where the commander
  intends to deploy the unit into assault formation before beginning the assault (ADP 3-90). Usually a linear
  terrain featuresperpendicular to the direction of attack,it is used primarily at the battalion level and below
  when the unit does not cross the line of departure in its assault formation. A limit of advanceis a phase line
  used to control forward progress of the attack (ADP 3-90). The attacking unit does not advance any of its
  elements or assets beyond the limit of advance,but the attacking unit can maneuver its security forces to that
  limit. Commanders use a limit of advance to prevent overextending the attacking force and reduce the
  possibility of fratricide and friendly fire incidents by fires supporting the attack.
  SECTION V – OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
  6-127. The BCT conducts offensive operationsto defeat ordestroy enemy forces and gain control ofterrain,
  resources, and population centers (ADP 3-0). Offensive operations are movement to contact, attack,
  exploitation,and pursuit. BCTs conduct operations according to the capabilities and limitations inherent in
  their organizational structure and the knowledge of the situation (enemy) or the advantage relationship to
  enemy (see figure 6-12).