text: Chapter 5
  5-37. Opportunists can be malign by design or by circumstance. Malign by design refers to the
  opportunists whose purpose by character is criminal and counterproductive to effective government and a
  population’s well-being. Malign by circumstance refers to opportunists whose purpose is not criminal by
  design but which shifts to wholly or partial illicit activities to further their interests based on obstacles to
  their original path. Groups like corporations, nongovernmental organizations, or security contractors may
  be advocates for a functioning government, but due to conditions which present opportunities for them,
  these groups or individuals may act counterproductively to counterinsurgent efforts. These opportunists are
  very difficult to identify due to their favorable position and the potentially clandestine activities employed
  to sustain their position.
  5-38. In the planning process, counterinsurgents analyze the activities of opportunists, even though their
  presence may not be apparent. The same conditions that may allow an insurgency to form and enjoy
  freedom of movement also allow opportunists to act. Opportunists will probably take advantage of the
  vulnerability of the population and exploit the lack of governmental control in pursuit of their goals.
  5-39. The presence, actions, and impact of opportunists can affect the success of the mission to defeat the
  insurgency and address the root causes of the conflict. This is especially true as opportunists may rely on
  the presence of the insurgency and unstable conditions to achieve their ends. Commanders and staffs need
  to include opportunists and their activities in understanding an area of operations and address them during
  mission planning and in attack the network operations. In the intelligence preparation of the
  battlefield/battlespace process, commanders and staffs may address opportunists within civil
  considerations, or within the threat, depending on where they are appropriate. The mission analysis must
  address identifying opportunists, understanding their impacts, and addressing or mitigating their impacts.
  5-40. The commander’s intent may need to include dealing with opportunists, depending on the level of
  interference or political nature of opportunists. Opportunists can impact the mission or force protection
  operations. This is especially true if the opportunists are from a state sponsor or a border region where an
  internal conflict can spread to another country. Overall, counterinsurgents need to understand how
  opportunists can aid an insurgency, either directly or indirectly, and how they can undermine the efforts of
  a host-nation government or a multinational effort to address the causes of instability.
  5-41. Commanders and staffs need to analyze how their units’ actions can provide opportunities for
  opportunists. Decisions concerning contracting, for example, can have various effects on giving
  opportunities to opportunists. Commanders and staffs must analyze their units’ effects on the battlefield.
  Some decisions that might seem to only effect a unit internally may also effect opportunists. Commanders
  and staffs must think holistically about how their units interact with the environment in order to minimize
  the effects of opportunist.
  CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS
  5-42. Insurgents commonly use criminal organizations to accomplish objectives. Common activities
  designed to gain revenue or materials include theft, drug or human trafficking, smuggling of illicit
  materials, prostitution, extortion, kidnapping, blackmail, counterfeiting, taxing of civilians, bank robbery,
  and bribery. Criminal organizations can appear as street gangs, mafias, or cartels. Criminal organizations
  may also assist insurgent groups in achieving objectives other than accumulating resources. Other
  objectives may include intimidating government employees or candidates, conducting assassinations,
  kidnapping key personnel, initiating sectarian violence, strikes, demonstrations, riots, and smuggling
  high-value leaders, advisors, or weapons. Criminal organizations may also conduct operations deemed
  unpopular with a civilian population at a distance from an insurgent movement to create deniability.
  5-43. Many insurgencies degenerate into criminality. This occurs as the primary movements disintegrate
  and the remaining elements become isolated, or the root cause is addressed. Insurgent disintegration is
  desirable; it replaces a dangerous, often ideologically inspired body of disaffiliated individuals with a less
  dangerous but more diverse body, normally of uneven character. The first is a security threat; the second is
  a law-and-order concern. This should not be interpreted as denigrating the armed capacity of a
  law-and-order threat. Successful counterinsurgents are prepared to address this disintegration. They
  recognize that the ideal approach eliminates both the insurgency and any criminal threats the insurgency’s
  elimination produces.