text: Chapter 12
  progress. However, the complex nature of counterinsurgency operations makes progress difficult to
  measure. Subjective assessment at all levels is essential to understand the diverse and complex nature of
  counterinsurgency problems. It is also needed to measure local success or failure against the overall
  operation’s end state. Additionally, commanders need to know how actions along different lines of effort
  complement each other; therefore, planners evaluate not only progress along each line of effort but also
  interactions among lines of efforts.
  12-20. The most common types of assessment measures are measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and
  measures of performance (MOPs). A measure of effectiveness is a criterion used to assess changes in
  system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end
  state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect (JP 3-0). MOEs focus on the results or
  consequences of actions. MOEs answer the question, “Are we achieving results that move
  counterinsurgents towards the desired end state, or are additional or alternative actions required?” A
  measure of performance is a criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task
  accomplishment (JP 3-0). MOPs answer the question, “Was the task or action performed as the commander
  intended?”
  12-21. MOEs and MOPs for assessing counterinsurgency operations are designed with the same
  characteristics. MOEs and MOPs are measurable, observable, distinctive, relevant, and responsive:
  * MOEs and MOPs have quantitative or qualitative standards against which they can be measured.
  The most effective measurement is a combination of quantitative and qualitative measures to
  guard against an inaccurate view of results.
  * Each MOE and MOP measures a separate, distinct aspect of the task, purpose, or condition.
  * MOEs and MOPs are relevant to the measured task, outcome, and condition. Host-nation local,
  regional, and national leaders, and NGO personnel, may provide practical ideas, professional
  ideas, and feedback to craft relevant MOPs and MOEs.
  * Assessment tools detect environmental and situational changes.
  DESIGNING MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND PERFORMANCE
  12-22. An MOE provides some information about how an operational environment is changing. An MOE
  of a number of attacks on counterinsurgents can indicate a successful counterinsurgency, or it can indicate
  insurgent control of an area and an unwillingness of counterinsurgents to contest that control. In this
  example, commanders and staffs need to understand why the number of attacks are down. What is essential
  to any MOE is the development of an effective measure that tells the commander critical information about
  how an operational environment is changing.
  12-23. Moreover, in developing MOPs, commanders and staffs measure a unit’s performance based on
  the conditions of its area of operations. In other words, MOPs should be developed as a means to measure
  if a unit is effectively doing the things that the commander and staff view as essential to defeating an
  insurgency. MOPs are developed based on a counterinsurgency mission and an area of operations.
  12-24. When designing MOEs and MOPs, commanders and staffs consider several points:
  * Raw counts of something is usually not as important as how many out of a possible total and
  how important each one is.
  * Knowledge of the state of insurgent training may provide information about the overall
  capability of the insurgency. If an insurgency can produce trained units, it may have a higher
  military and sustainment capacity.
  * Training in other states could indicate support from another state.
  * A high number of un-coerced informant reports could be an important indicator of a breakdown
  in insurgent security. Also, the position of the informer in the society might be an important
  indicator.
  * The number of insurgent attacks is not always as important as the scale of an insurgent attack.
  Large-scale attacks require a level of operational sophistication that may imply an increased
  insurgent capability.