text: Armies
  CONTINGENCY COMMAND POST
  3-12. The contingency command post enables the theater army to provide the GCC with a small-scale crisis
  response or limited contingency command post for thirty days or less without significant augmentation. This
  includes command of up to two BCTs or their equivalent. These operations vary from humanitarian response
  through hostile action. This is most appropriate for crisis response situations such as humanitarian assistance
  or disaster relief missions. The contingency command post is deployable by intra-theater aircraft. However,
  the contingency command post should redeploy as soon as an adequate JTF headquarters is operational.
  3-13. The contingency command post is organized with a command group, and support elements from the
  headquarters and headquarters battalion, and a staff organized under functional cells for intelligence,
  movement and maneuver, fires, protection, and sustainment. Unlike the main command post, the contingency
  command post is organized with only two of the three integrating cells: a robust current operations integrating
  cell and a small future operations cell. The contingency command post depends upon the main command
  post for long-range planning and special staff functional support, if required. The contingency command post
  staff can access and employ joint capabilities (such as fires, intelligence, and signal) and coordinate additional
  required capabilities through the main command post. The contingency command post special staff normally
  includes personnel from the main command post’s knowledge management and public affairs sections.
  Sometimes the special staff may include representatives from other special staff elements. The table of
  organization and equipment (known as TO&E) for individual contingency command posts is designed to
  meet the specific requirements of each AOR. The contingency command post does not include security
  elements so the theater army must provide additional forces for this function.
  3-14. Employing the contingency command post for a mission involves a trade-off between the contingency
  command post’s immediate responsive capability and its known limitations. These limitations address the
  scope, scale, complexity, intensity, and duration of operations that it can effectively command without
  significant augmentation. (See ATP 3-93 for more information on the organization and responsibilities of a
  contingency command post.)
  THE ROLE OF THE THEATER ARMY
  3-15. The theater army is the ASCC to a geographic combatant command, and this is a role it cannot be
  divested of. As an ASCC, the theater army performs certain functions that can be found in 10 USC;
  Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5101.1; and the combatant commander’s requirements. The seven
  functions performed as the ASCC are—
  * Execute combatant commander’s daily operational requirements (see paragraph 3-17).
  * Provide ADCON of Army forces (see paragraph 3-28).
  * Set and maintain the theater (see paragraph 3-32).
  * Set and support operational areas (see paragraph 3-33).
  * Exercise command and control over Army forces in the theater (see paragraph 3-40).
  * Perform joint roles of limited scope, scale, and duration (see paragraph 3-42).
  * Plan and coordinate for the consolidation of gains in support of joint operations (See paragraph 3-
  51).
  3-16. Theater army operations during competition are critical to deterring potential adversaries and to
  securing advantages should deterrence fail. The theater army sets conditions for the joint force to conduct
  operations in both competition and conflict. Their operations to shape the environment and establish
  conditions for the employment of forces provide flexibility to strategic commanders and decision makers.
  COMBATANT COMMANDER’S DAILY OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
  3-17. The theater army is primarily responsible to the GCC for daily operational requirements in the AOR.
  It translates the GCC’s plans and requirements into concrete actions by Army forces using operational art
  and science. During competition, the theater army’s focus is on enabling the United States and its allies to
  compete effectively below the threshold of armed conflict in ways directed by the GCC. This allows strategic-
  level leaders to frustrate threats’ attempts to achieve their objectives. As part of their daily activities, theater
  armies support GCC activities that set conditions for military success in the event that threatened or actual