text: FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
  of insurgent groups they have identified as having potential usefulness in
  their strategic and operational planning. In all operations of the strategic
  campaign, insurgent forces serve as an excellent source of intelligence.
  1-103. During the conduct of regional operations, the decision to influence in-
  surgents to execute actions that support operations will depend on a number
  of factors. If the OPFOR views extraregional intervention as unlikely, it may
  choose to keep insurgent participation low. A key reason for making this de-
  cision is the potential for those forces to become an opponent once the OPFOR
  has accomplished its goals. On the other hand, the OPFOR may plan to have
  these groups take part in directly supporting its operations in anticipation of
  further support in the case of an extraregional intervention. Insurgent in-
  volvement during regional operations may be held to furthering OPFOR IW
  objectives by creating support for the State’s actions among the population,
  harassing and sniping enemy forces, conducting raids, and assassinating
  politicians who are influential opponents of the State. Insurgents can also
  serve as scouts or guides for OPFOR regular forces moving through unfamil-
  iar terrain and serve as an excellent source of political and military intelligence.
  1-104. The usefulness of insurgent forces can be considerable in the event of
  extraregional intervention and the decision to transition to adaptive opera-
  tions. During transition operations, insurgent forces can support access-
  control operations to deny enemy forces access to the region or at least delay
  their entry. Delay provides the OPFOR more time to conduct an orderly tran-
  sition and to reposition its forces for the conduct of adaptive operations. The
  principal means of support include direct action in the vicinity of APODs and
  SPODs and along LOCs in the enemy’s rear area. Dispersed armed action for
  the sole purpose of creating casualties can have a demoralizing effect and
  cause the enemy to respond, thus drawing forces from his main effort.
  OPFOR regular forces can coordinate with insurgents, supported by SPF ad-
  visors, to execute a variety of actions that support the strategic campaign or a
  particular operation plan. Insurgents can support deception by drawing at-
  tention from an action the OPFOR is trying to cover or conceal. They can de-
  lay the introduction of enemy reserves through ambush and indirect fire,
  cause the commitment of valuable force-protection assets, or deny or degrade
  the enemy’s use of rotary-wing assets through raids on forward arming and
  refueling points and maintenance facilities.
  TERRORIST AND CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS
  1-105. Through the use of intelligence professionals and covert means, the
  OPFOR maintains contact with and to varying degrees supports terrorist and
  criminal organizations. During peacetime, these organizations can be useful,
  and in time of war they can provide an added dimension to OPFOR strategy
  and operations.
  1-106. Although the OPFOR recognizes that these groups vary in reliability,
  it constantly assesses both their effectiveness and usefulness. It develops re-
  lationships with those organizations that have goals, sympathies, and inter-
  ests congruent with those of the State. In time of war, it can encourage and
  materially support criminal organizations to commit actions that contribute
  to the breakdown of civil control within a neighboring country. It can provide
  support for the distribution and sale of drugs to enemy military forces, which