text: Chapter 2
  that disruption of trade was one of the major grievances the locals had against al
  Qaeda in Iraq. Local tribes agreed to allow U.S. forces to stop and inspect all
  vehicles coming into the country to ensure no foreign fighters, money, or weapons
  were entering Iraq. The tribes also agreed to help with the inspection. New local
  police largely conducted these inspections with the Iraqi Army (with Marines in
  overwatch.) The tribes had picked the Iraqi government’s side in the struggle against
  al Qaeda in Iraq and wanted to stop foreign fighters, money, and weapons from
  entering Iraq as much as the U.S. forces did.
  2-11. Understanding is necessary to begin planning the initial development of measures of effectiveness
  and performance. The commander must understand what has happened in an operational environment and
  determine the nature, scope, and severity of its problems. A situation is usually more complicated than it
  seems when the military force first becomes involved. Understanding an operational environment is a
  collaborative effort of the unified action partners. These partners may include U.S. government military and
  civilian personnel, international civilian and military personnel, and host-nation civilian and military
  personnel. To the maximum extent possible, the military force and unified action partners strive to have a
  common situational understanding from the beginning of an operation. If the partnering agencies do not
  have the same situational understanding, they can quickly find themselves working at odds with each other.
  Commanders will rarely have enough time to fully understand an operational environment. Understanding
  an operational environment is a continued and iterative process that will continue throughout an operation.
  2-12. An area of operations is an operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and
  maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces (JP 3-0).
  For land operations, an area of operations includes subordinate areas of operations as well.
  2-13. A commander’s area of operations may be relatively static, but people, weapons, commodities, and
  information continuously flow through an area of operations. An area of operations can cross physical
  structures, such as roads and rivers, and span diverse population groups. Fabricated borders that divide
  natural groupings can create problems in understanding an area of operations. For example, cross-border
  ties allow insurgents safe havens outside of a tactical unit’s area of operations. Moreover, international
  boundaries often divide population groups. The span of an insurgency may be far larger than the defined
  area of operations and areas outside the area of operations may be relevant to a commander. For example,
  areas outside a commander’s area of operations may provide a safe haven for an insurgency, or an adjacent
  state may support an insurgency. In an insurgency, an area of interest may be large.
  2-14. The area of interest is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas
  adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy
  forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission (JP 3-0). It is the area in which events
  could have significant impact on areas of operations. An area of interest can be large relative to the area of
  operations. When defining an area of interest, commanders should consider the operational variables. (See
  JP 3-0 for more information on an area of influence.)
  2-15. Commanders analyze operational variables to understand the operational environment in which they
  are conducting operations. An operational environment is not static; it continues to evolve. Introducing
  units into an operational environment causes shifts and changes. As a result, commanders, their respective
  staffs, and all Soldiers and Marines must continuously reassess an operational environment for changing
  conditions. Moreover, in addition to understanding U.S. interests and desired end states in an environment,
  a commander must understand the environment from three additional perspectives: those of the host nation,
  the enemy, and the population.
  POLITICAL
  2-16. The political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of
  governance—formally constituted authorities, as well as informal or covert political powers. The
  counterinsurgent seeks to understand not just the formal political system, such as political parties and
  elected officials, but also the informal systems of political influence, such as ethnic groups and other
  centers of power. There is a connection between the political variable and the social variable. For example,