text: Chapter 1
  capabilities, or functions in such a way that they can operate singly or in concert without adversely
  affecting individual elements.
  * Flexibility is the employment of a versatile mix of capabilities, formations, and equipment for
  conducting operations (ADP 3-0). Flexibility enables adaptive forces, facilitates collaborative
  planning and decentralized execution, and fosters individual initiative. The AMD principle of mix
  discusses the combination of ADA systems as task force tailored formations. The principle of
  flexibility is applied in AMD terms primarily by building METT-TC informed task organizations.
  * “Agility is the ability of friendly forces to react faster than the enemy” (ADP 3-90). For AMD, at
  the platoon level, it is the ability to leverage digital capabilities (e.g., air picture) to maneuver to
  defeat an air and missile threat. At the battalion level, it is the use of continuous air IPB and digital
  systems to employ forces to defeat the threat by operating inside the enemy's decision space.
  AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE EMPLOYMENT TENETS
  While commanders should always start AMD employment planning by applying the principles
  described above, they should also strive to adhere to employment tenets when planning and positioning their
  ADA resources. The tenets are desirable attributes that should be built into all plans and operations and are
  directly related to how assets should be employed. There are seven tenets (figure 1-2 on page 1-5).
  * Mutual Support. Weapons are positioned so that the fires of one weapon can engage targets within
  the dead zone of the adjacent weapon. For guns, this dead zone is usually small. For missiles, the
  dead zone may be large, and mutual support is a critical element. Mutual support can also cover
  nonoperational weapons or weapons at lower states of readiness. Mutual support, when applied to
  sensors has the same connotation; that is, sensors are deployed to cover the dead zone of adjacent
  sensors.
  * Overlapping Fires and Overlapping Coverage. Weapons are positioned so that their engagement
  envelopes overlap. Because of the many altitudes, directions, and ranges from which the enemy
  can attack or conduct surveillance operations, defense planners must apply mutual supporting and
  overlapping fires vertically and horizontally. Overlapping coverage is the positioning of sensors
  such that their coverage does not leave any seam in the defense that might be used by incoming
  threats. Overlapping fires and overlapping coverage should be planned during defense design.
  * Balanced Fires. Weapons are positioned to deliver an equal volume of fires in all directions. This
  is necessary for AMD in an area where the terrain does not canalize the threat or when the avenues
  of approach are unpredictable. Balanced fires is a desired characteristic of defense design against
  cruise missiles and other air threats.
  * Weighted Coverage. Weapons coverage is combined and concentrated toward the most likely
  threat air avenues of approach or directions of attack. Based on the tactical situation, a commander
  may risk leaving one direction of attack unprotected or lightly protected to weight coverage toward
  another direction. Weighted coverage and balanced fires are not mutually achievable, requiring
  the defense designer to give up most aspects of one to achieve the other.
  * Early Engagement. Early engagement generally requires extending the defense away from the
  defended asset. Sensors and weapons are positioned so they can engage the threat before ordnance
  release or detection of friendly forces. Early engagements enable destruction of enemy platforms
  over enemy forces and unoccupied areas, thereby reducing the possibility of friendly collateral
  damage and fratricide. As with weighted coverage, early engagement is achieved at the expense
  of balanced fires.
  * Defense in Depth. Sensors and weapons are positioned so that the threat is exposed to a
  continuously increasing volume of fire as it approaches the friendly protected asset or force.
  Defense in depth decreases the probability that attacking missiles, aircraft, or RAM will reach the
  defended asset or force.
  * Resilience. Resilience is the quality of the defense to maintain continuity of operations regardless
  of changes in or unanticipated tactics by enemy air or losses of critical air and missile defense
  components (FM 3-01). ADA planners must plan for defense design adjustment based on ADA
  system attrition. Resilience is a key determinant when considering which tenet (or tenets) to use
  in maintaining the defense.