text: FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
  international sources (overt and covert) and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
  products to satisfy its civilian and military requirements.
  5-16. The OPFOR focuses its investment strategy on the following areas:
  • Computers (including increasingly complex distributed information
  systems).
  • Telecommunications (traditional and wireless communications).
  • Electronics (to included microelectronics).
  • Computer integrated manufacturing.
  • Nanotechnology.
  • Robotics.
  • Biotechnology.
  • Space-based communications.
  • Sophisticated sensing capabilities.
  VULNERABILITY OF TECHNOLOGY
  5-17. The OPFOR can manipulate an enemy’s unresolved problems of inter-
  operability and dependence on COTS systems to its advantage. COTS mate-
  rials are usually not hardened against electronic spikes, remote collection ca-
  pabilities, or extreme weather conditions. The OPFOR understands that se-
  curity cannot be constructed or guaranteed when depending on COTS. For
  example, if hackers (working independently or for a government or criminal
  organization) disrupted Internet communications or links while a military
  operation was in progress, information exchange between combat units could
  be severely disrupted.
  NEUTRALIZING TECHNOLOGICAL AND INFORMATION SUPERIORITY
  5-18. The OPFOR recognizes the increasing dependence of modern extrare-
  gional forces on information systems and their desire to obtain information
  superiority. However, the OPFOR also understands that information superi-
  ority does not equate to perfect information, nor does it eliminate the “fog of
  war.” Information systems, processors, and links add their own source of fric-
  tion and vulnerability to the operational environment. Systems and sensors
  can be tricked, destroyed, or overwhelmed with data, thus causing an enemy
  to question the value and validity of his gathered intelligence. The OPFOR
  seeks to exploit this uncertainty and friction at all times.
  5-19. The OPFOR recognizes that it cannot stand toe-to-toe with most ex-
  traregional enemies in a conventional war, and therefore seeks to target en-
  emy weaknesses. IW will be the tool of choice to counter a technologically su-
  perior opponent and to challenge his relative information dominance. In addi-
  tion, IW actions designed to break the will of a conventionally more powerful
  adversary will be common.
  NEW TARGETS
  5-20. Societies rely increasingly on a high-performance, networked informa-
  tion infrastructure for everything from air travel to electric-power generation
  and telecommunications to financial transactions. This means that a new set