text: FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
  STRATEGIC CONTEXT
  7-71. During all strategic-level courses of action, the OPFOR may use various
  fire support assets to attack the most vulnerable parts of the enemy’s combat
  system. These attacks are coordinated with perception management efforts to
  convey a message of political and military dominance to the regional civilian
  populace as well as to convey an adverse view of an intervening extraregional
  opponent.
  7-72. The OPFOR is able to employ all of its methods of fire in regional and
  transition operations. However, it is unable or finds it difficult to employ the
  counterbattery method of fire during adaptive operations due to an extrare-
  gional force’s technological advantage in ability to target OPFOR fire support
  assets.
  REGIONAL OPERATIONS
  7-73. During regional operations, the OPFOR can use fire support means
  (primarily aviation, SSMs, and long-range rockets) to attack targets in the
  homeland of a regional opponent. The OPFOR generally possesses an
  overmatch in military capability against its regional neighbor and is able
  to control the airspace, thus allowing it freedom of maneuver. However, the
  OPFOR is concerned about the intervention of an extraregional force during a
  strategic campaign against a regional neighbor.
  7-74. The OPFOR realizes that its regional opponent may receive RISTA
  support (such as satellite and fixed-wing signals intelligence and imagery)
  from an extraregional power. OPFOR fire support planners also develop con-
  tingency plans to preserve their fire support assets during transition and
  adaptive operations, if necessary. Common countermeasures are to disperse
  fire support assets and to use decoys and camouflage.
  TRANSITION OPERATIONS
  7-75. During transition operations, the OPFOR is concerned about the
  extraregional force’s military capabilities arriving or being established be-
  fore the OPFOR can completely achieve its strategic objectives. Therefore, the
  overall focus is on the disaggregation of the enemy’s combat system (see
  Systems Warfare earlier in this chapter and in Chapter 1).
  7-76. Starting with transition operations, the OPFOR may use various fire
  support assets in access-control operations and attack of the enemy’s LOCs
  and rear. It attacks the most vulnerable parts of the enemy’s combat system.
  This may include attacks on the infrastructure or even civilian targets. The
  OPFOR coordinates such attacks with perception management efforts to
  convey the view that these terror tactics are no worse than enemy bombing
  campaigns.
  7-77. The goal of the OPFOR is to disrupt the deployment tempo of the ex-
  traregional force by attacking unique or key targets in aerial and sea ports of
  debarkation. These targets include key C2 nodes, contractors and contractor-
  operated facilities, logistics operating bases, and ground and airborne RISTA
  platforms. For example, the OPFOR can greatly reduce an extraregional
  force’s combat power by attacking a logistics system that depends on “just-in-
  time” or “reach-back” delivery. The OPFOR would also seek to conduct these