text: Operations During Crisis
  remove some or all mobilization limitations, enhancing the Army’s ability to respond to an aggressive act by
  an enemy with the necessary capabilities. An example of a limitation that is lifted for armed conflict would
  be ordering a full mobilization of the Army National Guard or Army Reserve in lieu of a selected reserve
  call up or partial mobilization.
  5-28. Despite the rapid response and expeditionary capabilities of the joint force, no amount of expeditionary
  capability can overcome the challenges posed by physical distance. Most Army forces tasked to respond to
  a crisis have a delay between notification and the time they assemble at the location from which to deploy.
  For active-duty formations this time period is generally days or weeks, and for Army National Guard or
  Army Reserve forces this time period is generally weeks to months. The mobilization process takes longer
  for units with large amounts of equipment and personnel.
  5-29. Some units are directed to maintain higher levels of readiness or maintain a prepared-to-deploy status.
  This higher state of readiness primarily includes units in the immediate response force. The immediate
  response force provides the Army with the ability to provide combatant commanders (CCDRs) with land
  capabilities of limited capacity to rapidly respond to a crisis.
  5-30. For most Army forces, mobilization operations begin at home station. As a general rule, once
  mobilized, it takes at least 30 to 45 days for most Army forces stationed within the United States to deploy
  to a theater when their equipment is shipped via strategic sealift. This planning timeline is the same whether
  the United States is involved in a crisis or armed conflict due to the fixed speed of moving Army equipment
  over civilian transportation infrastructure. However, if a threat force inflicts significant damage across the
  strategic support area during armed conflict, these timelines may be further extended. This timeframe does
  not include RSOI upon arrival overseas. Additional time may also be required if the joint force is not able to
  provide sufficient capacity to protect land, sea, and air lines of communications or sufficient sea and airlift is
  not available for simultaneous movement of multiple large units. (See Appendix C for more information on
  deployments contested by threat forces.)
  DEPLOYMENT
  5-31. Deployment is the movement of forces into and out of an operational area (JP 3-35). Proper planning
  establishes what, where, and when forces are needed to achieve objectives. How the JFC intends to employ
  forces is the foundation of the deployment structure and timing. For example, a JFC may deploy a combat-
  ready brigade combat team (BCT) or division early in a crisis to stabilize a situation or secure ports for
  follow-on forces, accepting risks to the movement efficiency of follow-on forces. Corps and division staffs
  examine all deployment possibilities and conduct parallel planning.
  5-32. Most Army equipment travels via strategic sealift. It will take weeks or months for the equipment to
  arrive in theater. Commanders and planners must not underestimate the joint deployment challenges of
  operating against peer adversary forces with robust air, maritime, space, and cyberspace capabilities.
  Commanders and planners must envision what they want the force to look like upon arrival in theater and
  then backwards plan with the assumption that some of it may not arrive as planned or even at all. The
  objective of deployment planning is to synchronize deployment activities to facilitate effective execution of
  operations in an operational area. Successful deployment planning requires knowledge of a unit’s deployment
  responsibilities, an understanding of deployment, and an appreciation of the link between deployment and
  employment. (See ATP 3-35 for a discussion of these deployment phases and planning in detail.) The steps
  used in deployment planning are—
  (cid:122) Analyze the mission.
  (cid:122) Structure forces.
  (cid:122) Refine deployment data.
  (cid:122) Prepare the force.
  (cid:122) Schedule movement.
  An example of deployment friction and unit actions to overcome it occurred in 2003.