text: Understanding an Operational Environment
  lifeline to infiltrate Baghdad with foreign fighters, money, and other resources that
  fueled the insurgency. With the loss of Fallujah, al Qaim became al Qaeda in Iraq’s
  newfound sanctuary.
  Al Qaeda in Iraq arrived with offers of partnering with al Qaim’s tribes to
  defeat and expel the Americans. They promised the indigenous population money
  and other resources for their support. As Muslims and Arabs, al Qaeda in Iraq
  members exhorted that it was their obligation, their Jihad, to fight the crusaders. After
  all, the Americans, supposedly ignorant of tribal customs, religion, and traditions,
  allegedly had disrespected and dishonored the people of al Qaim and a patriotic
  resistance had already formed in the district. The tribes of al Qaim saw the al Qaeda
  movement as the answer to their problem with the Americans. The tribes, together
  with al Qaeda in Iraq, felt that the time was ripe to rid the area of the infidel occupiers.
  Al Qaim tribes varied in available resources and were incapable of defeating
  the American occupiers on their own. For example, the Albu-Mahal tribe, the
  strongest tribe in the area, organized and resourced the Hamza Battalion specifically
  to fight the Americans. However, it, along with the other tribal militias, lacked the
  weaponry, ammunition, and other equipment to win such a fight on their own. Al
  Qaeda in Iraq’s offer was tempting and most of the tribes accepted.
  As time went on it became apparent that al Qaeda in Iraq’s offer was
  deceptive; this partnership was not what it seemed. Al Qaeda in Iraq provided
  weaponry and funding, but in return they demanded to lead the Jihad with the intent
  of first destroying and then transforming the social fabric of the tribes and al Qaim. Al
  Qaeda in Iraq started by taking over the smuggling routes, skimming large profits and
  killing those that resisted. They then imposed a radical form of Sharia on the
  community with fanatical punishments for transgressors. Religion was used to justify
  al Qaeda in Iraq’s actions, which included marriages to the local women, not allowing
  cigarettes, the ban of music and films, and the common intimidation tactic of
  beheading those that resisted.
  3rd Battalion 6th Marines (3/6) executed Operation IRON FIST the first
  week of October, attacking from east to west through the town of Sadah and eastern
  Karabila, ultimately stopping at the Emerald Wadi in the center of the al Qaim region.
  They built four combat outposts, Chosin, Iwo Jima, Belleau Wood, and Khe Sahn,
  and left Marines and Iraqis in place, providing a combined, permanent, persistent,
  presence.
  The next clearing operation was conducted the first week in November by
  3/6 and 2/1 commanded by Regimental Combat Team 2. This operation cleared the
  Husaybah, Karabilah, Sadah and Ubaydi areas of all insurgents. Immediately upon
  clearing the areas, 3/6 began constructing combat outposts in all of the cities.
  By late November 3/6 had constructed 14 combat outposts in the areas
  from Husaybah to Ubaydi. Each combat outpost consisted of a U. S. Marine platoon
  and an Iraqi Army platoon or company. Those positions completed and reflected
  combined, permanent, persistent presence, where the Marines and Iraqi Army lived
  together and among the people.
  The next step was to engage the people. Mission analysis led to assigning
  company areas based on the tribal distribution. The idea was to link a company with
  a tribe. This was not an exact science because the tribes were intermingled, but they
  did locate companies in areas where a majority of a tribe resided. The next step was
  a concerted drive to recruit tribesmen into the police force. The Marines solicited help
  from the Sheikhs to nominate men from their tribes, and started developing police
  stations near the combat outposts. This would allow the Marines and Iraqi Army
  forces to partner with the local police forces in those areas and further engender trust
  and confidence from the local people.
  Moving goods across the Iraqi and Syrian border was closely connected to
  the local economy. Undermining this trade would jeopardize a fragile relationship that
  U.S. forces worked hard to develop. In fact, U.S. forces had learned from the sheikhs