text: Chapter 11
  activities are essential throughout the phases of any operation. (See JP 5-0 for more information on the joint
  phasing model.)
  11-31. If the U.S. commits forces to a counterinsurgency conflict, it will normally deploy a joint task
  force or multinational joint task force headquarters to provide planning and command and control. The
  multinational joint task force’s desired end state is to terminate the operation plan at the conclusion of
  Phase V, stand-down or redeploy the multinational joint task force headquarters, and revert to Phase 0
  operations. The geographic combatant command and respective Service component commands, in
  coordination with the country team, resume security cooperation activities directed by the country plan.
  Counterinsurgency operations typically extend across all phases (0 through V). Therefore, U.S. or
  multinational security force assistance and foreign internal defense activities in support of the host-nation
  security force’s counterinsurgency conflict may occur under the auspices of the American ambassador to
  the host nation and the geographic combatant commander, or under the authority of the multinational joint
  task force commander.
  DEVELOPING HOST-NATION SECURITY FORCES
  11-32. Both foreign internal defense and security force assistance can be used as part of a long term plan
  to develop and deploy a host-nation force to defeat an insurgency. While the U.S. may intervene in a
  country that only needs enablers to enhance an already effective military force, a host nation may lack an
  effective military. If the host nation lacks an effective military, aid in the development of that host-nation
  military could follow five phases: planning and resourcing host-nation security force, generation of
  host-nation security force, employment of host-nation security force, transition of responsibility for security
  to host-nation security force, and sustainment of host-nation security force. These phases are distinct and
  independent of those in the joint phasing model. U.S. or multinational forces conduct parallel planning with
  their host-nation security force counterparts to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives in
  support of the overall counterinsurgency campaign, while at the same time working toward milestones that
  lead to a successful transition from U.S. or multinational lead to host-nation security force lead for security.
  11-33. Typically, the first phase of building a host-nation security force, planning and resourcing, falls to
  the responsibility of geographic combatant command-level planners in coordination with the country team.
  Coordination of legal authorities and funding for security force assistance and foreign internal defense
  activities is an interagency process because it typically involves resources provided under a number of
  different sections of the United States Code (USC). Moreover, other security cooperation programs, such as
  foreign military sales, may be essential in equipping another military to perform foreign internal defense
  operations.
  11-34. Generating the host-nation security force is the second phase in building a host-nation security
  force. If the U.S. is deploying conventional forces, this will probably be the initial phase in which
  regiments or brigade combat teams will actually have an active role. These forces can partner with
  host-nation security forces of varying developmental levels in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations.
  For example, while supporting recent counterinsurgency operations in Colombia and the Philippines,
  host-nation security force counterparts had already fielded relatively sophisticated, well-developed
  operational units supported by robust supporting institutions and well established executive-level or
  ministerial leadership. In other U.S. historical counterinsurgency operations such as Afghanistan and Iraq,
  the host-nation security force operational units, their supporting institutions, and the most senior-level
  executive leadership functions were undeveloped or completely non-existent. In situations such as these,
  U.S. and multinational forces must organize, train, and equip host-nation security force units while
  assisting in the building or rebuilding of their supporting infrastructure. The organize, train, and equip
  security force assistance tasks may be assigned to U.S. or multinational regiment- or brigade-sized units
  while they are simultaneously battling the insurgents. At the same time, unified action must be taken to
  establish a host-nation security force’s own sustainable force generation capabilities and capacity. U.S. or
  multinational personnel, working with their host-nation security force counterparts, are placed in a difficult
  predicament in that they must carefully select key host-nation security force leaders to be pulled away from
  the immediate counterinsurgency fight to assume critical command and staff positions within the
  host-nation security force’s organizations. Counterinsurgents must exercise restraint by not assigning all of
  the best host-nation security force leaders to operating force units while neglecting to invest in their own
  force generation capacity. (See figure 11-4.)