text: Fundamentals of Operations
  capability, Army forces cue intelligence platforms from other domains to improve their understanding of
  enemy force dispositions and engage those forces on advantageous terms.
  3-77. Identifying enemy locations may not provide enough information for Army forces to discern enemy
  intentions. Commanders develop the situation through action when they deliberately place forces in contact.
  Small maneuver forces are often the most effective way to compel enemy forces to react and show their
  intentions. Leaders exercise tactical patience and set conditions for success. They synchronize maneuver with
  complementary and reinforcing capabilities through the depth of an operational environment to generate
  situational awareness and detect opportunities to exploit. By combining friendly speed with multiple
  dilemmas, it is possible to rapidly disintegrate the coherence of an enemy formation before it can effectively
  respond.
  3-78. Using capabilities from multiple domains, such as air and ground, commanders cause threat systems
  to activate or emit electromagnetic signals that reveal their capabilities and the locations of their critical
  nodes, such as sensors, shooters, and command posts. During competition, commanders and staffs use this
  information to improve understanding, update target lists, and refine plans for attacking threat vulnerabilities.
  By doing this, commanders and staffs set conditions for success during armed conflict.
  3-79. There are situations in which it is not advisable to make contact with the smallest possible element.
  When commanders are confident they have superior forces, have the element of surprise, and know the
  enemy’s disposition and course of action, they make contact with as much combat power as possible to
  maximize surprise and shock effect against enemy forces.
  IMPOSE MULTIPLE DILEMMAS ON THE ENEMY
  3-80. Imposing multiple dilemmas on enemy forces complicates their decision making and forces them to
  prioritize among competing options. It is a way of seizing the initiative and making enemy forces react to
  friendly operations. Simultaneous operations encompassing multiple domains—conducted in depth and
  supported by deception—present enemy forces with multiple dilemmas. Employing capabilities from
  multiple domains degrades enemy freedom of action, reduces enemy flexibility and endurance, and disrupts
  enemy plans and coordination. The application of capabilities in complementary and reinforcing ways creates
  more problems than an enemy commander can solve, which erodes both enemy effectiveness and the will to
  fight.
  3-81. Deception contributes to creating multiple dilemmas, achieving operational surprise, and maintaining
  the initiative. Deception efforts by tactical formations seek to delay enemy decision making until it is too late
  to matter, or to cause an enemy commander to make the wrong decision. Deception requires an understanding
  of how to surprise enemy forces; time to plan, prepare, execute, and assess a deception operation; and the
  ability to properly resource the deception effort.
  3-82. Deception inhibits effective enemy action by increasing the time, space, and resources necessary to
  understand friendly courses of action. Well-executed deception begins a cumulative effect on enemy
  decision-making cycles, and it can cause inaction, delay, misallocation of forces, and surprise as enemy forces
  react to multiple real and false dilemmas. Attempts to mislead enemy forces are fundamental to all courses
  of action development wherever possible. While commanders and staffs integrate deception as part of course
  of action development, they take operations security measures to obscure friendly intentions, make enemy
  forces account for multiple friendly courses of action for as long as possible, and ensure that enemy forces
  do not become aware of the deception effort. (See JP 3-13.4 and FM 3-13.4 for more information on military
  deception.)
  3-83. Forcible entry operations and envelopments into locations offset from how enemy defenses are
  oriented can create multiple dilemmas by dislocating enemy forces’ prepared operational approach or
  exceeding their capability to respond. The capability to project power across operational distances presents
  enemy forces with difficult decisions about how to array their forces in time and space. Rapid tactical
  maneuver to exploit a penetration or envelopment defeats enemy attempts to reposition integrated fires
  networks or integrated air defense systems, which in turn are typically less effective when moving.
  3-84. Creating multiple dilemmas requires recognizing exploitable opportunities. Understanding enemy
  dispositions, systems, and vulnerabilities, and the characteristics of the terrain and population, informs