text: Insurgency Prerequisites and Fundamentals
  Sense of Time
  4-35. An insurgents’ sense of time will also affect their actions. If insurgents feel time is on their side, they
  are more likely to adopt a lower risk approach and avoid becoming decisively engaged. If they perceive
  time as being against them, that will push them towards higher risk activities. Commanders and staffs must
  determine an insurgency’s perception of time to determine its behavior. (See paragraphs 2-43 through 2-44
  for more information on the time variable.)
  Adaptability
  4-36. Adaptability is also an essential element to understanding an insurgency’s strategic behavior.
  Adaptability determines how well, how often, and how the insurgency adapts tactically, operationally, and
  strategically. This can be directly linked to the organization of an insurgency. A networked insurgency may
  be highly adaptable at the operational and tactical level, but not at the strategic level. On the other hand, the
  reverse may be true for a hierarchal insurgency.
  4-37. An insurgency's strategy is not static, and it can shift. Counterinsurgents must recognize and respond
  to shifts in strategy. As the operational environment changes, it can affect an insurgency’s resourcing, the
  ways an insurgency attempts to achieve its ends, and its calculation of what its ends should be. In a
  networked insurgency, different elements of the insurgency may evolve differently than other elements of
  the insurgency. An insurgency is not static, and it continues to evolve as conditions evolve.
  Insurgent Approaches
  4-38. An insurgency might take several approaches to achieve its objectives. In many insurgencies,
  different elements of the same insurgency or related insurgencies will have different strategic calculations.
  Commanders and staffs must understand an insurgency’s approach to develop effective programs that
  attack the root causes of that insurgency. Commanders and staffs combine their understanding of the
  insurgent’s ways to accomplish its ends, with the insurgent’s means to pursue those ends, to provide the
  most probable and dangerous course of action for all insurgencies operating in an area of operation. This
  provides an understanding of the insurgency’s approach.
  4-39. Commanders and staffs must understand the insurgent’s ends to understand the insurgent’s
  decisionmaking process, capabilities, future actions, current tactics, method of command and control,
  recruiting, propaganda, and use of the local population. Examining the ends of an insurgency and the
  insurgents’ attempts to achieve those ends through various ways, including combat actions, propaganda,
  and subversion, enable counterinsurgents to undermine the enemy’s decisionmaking process. The
  insurgents’ strategic ends may be overt and publicly championed or covert. Insurgent operations may have
  immediate consequences or delayed effects aligned with long-term objectives. For example, car bombings
  among a local population may seem counterproductive because they incite immediate anger against the
  bombings and their perpetrators. However, a sustained campaign of massive violence can have two
  long-term results, it can—
  * Weaken popular support for the government, which has failed to protect the people.
  * Make the population susceptible to insurgent intimidation.
  Whatever the insurgent’s ends, approaching the problem from the perspectives of the insurgent and the
  population can provide counterinsurgents the means to interdict the threat on a number of levels.
  4-40. Counterinsurgents are likely to face insurgents who use several different approaches to achieve their
  ends. Some common approaches at the tactical level and operational level are the urban (terrorist), military
  focused, protracted, and subversive approaches. The urban (terrorist) and military focused are considered
  basic approaches and the protracted and subversive are considered advanced approaches. Basic approaches
  refer to the insurgent capabilities needed to achieve long-term strategic objectives. Basic approaches do not
  mean insurgents are not efficient in tactics or other skills, but overall they lack the means to pursue a more
  advanced approach towards achieving their goals. In contrast, advanced approaches probably have political
  wings that govern the militant side of the movement and are focused on longer-term political goals.
  4-41. Insurgents may use different approaches at different times, applying tactics that take advantage of
  circumstances. Insurgents may also combine a number of methods that include tactics drawn from any or