text: Working With Host-Nation Forces
  PARALLEL
  11-22. A parallel command is when U.S. or multinational forces maintain their own command structure
  with no integration or partnership with a host nation. Under a parallel command structure, no single force
  commander is designated. This arrangement is suitable when a host-nation security force has well
  established, mature operational and institutional capabilities, and U.S. or multinational forces deploy to
  provide additional capabilities. The relationship may be based on U.S. forces being given a specific task.
  For example, U.S. forces may only conduct raids or only gather intelligence for the national command
  authority. It can also be based on the U.S. forces being given their own area of operations within a host
  nation. This can be done for various reasons, including that the area is sensitive to host-nation forces and an
  external counterinsurgent may provide a temporary stabilization of the area. This arrangement supports unit
  cohesion, and it also supports unity of command.
  LEAD NATION
  11-23. A lead nation structure exists when all member nations place their forces under the control of one
  nation. This relationship works with one nation’s forces in the lead, and the supporting nation provides a
  unit or units that are attached to and under operational or tactical control of the lead nation. This
  arrangement provides flexibility in that the U.S. or multinational force may initially serve as the lead
  nation, and as the operational capacity of the host-nation security force grows, the host nation can
  eventually assume the role of lead nation. In also provides a possible means for the U.S. to aid a host nation
  in an ongoing insurgency. For example, the U.S. could provide a brigade to a host nation in an ongoing
  insurgency. Like parallel command, this arrangement supports unit cohesion, and it also supports unity of
  command.
  PARTNERED
  11-24. This arrangement differs from parallel command in that U.S. or multinational forces and
  host-nation security forces are paired down to the small-unit level. Commanders and staffs must consider
  how to manage unity of command, logistics challenges, and language and cultural barriers. Partnering has
  the advantage of maintaining a degree of unit cohesion (individual units are still homogenous), and the
  specific capabilities of each nation’s force can be leveraged down to the small-unit levels.
  INTEGRATED
  11-25. Integrate means to assemble forces from both the U.S. or multinational and a host-nation security
  force, and meld them into a single, inseparable unit. Integration, also referred to as augmenting, poses many
  challenges, but it has been used successfully in the past. For example, the Korean augmentation to the U.S.
  Army was a very successful program that integrated individual South Korean soldiers into Army units. This
  yielded units with enhanced manpower, and cultural and linguistic fluency, down to the squad level. The
  drawback is that integration requires significant time to institutionalize and does little to enable a
  host-nation security force as a whole to assume lead responsibility for operations. Integration requires a
  single shared language for all personnel, so either the U.S. or multinational forces will have to learn the
  host nation’s language or host-nation security force personnel will have to learn English. Furthermore,
  integration of U.S. and host-nation security forces into a single coherent force requires significant
  combined training in individual and collective tasks, which will result in a period at the beginning of the
  deployment when the integrated force is not fully combat capable. This could result in extended
  deployment periods to compensate for this operational integration and training period. Finally, integration
  does little to build the capability and capacity of the host nation’s ministerial-level leadership or the
  security forces’ supporting institutions.
  ADVISING
  11-26. When host-nation security force units achieve a certain degree of organizational maturity at a
  specific echelon, U.S. or multinational forces may assign individuals or teams of advisors to perform any
  number of advisory tasks. One advantage of this approach is that is imposes the smallest possible U.S. or
  multinational force requirement. It also puts the host-nation security force in the most visible role of