text: Chapter 5
  preclude the need to deploy larger forces later, and it assures allies and other partners. Effective early
  intervention can also deny adversaries the time necessary for them to set conditions in their favor.
  5-23. Deployment alone does not guarantee success. Achieving successful deterrence involves convincing
  adversaries that the deployed force is able to markedly reduce the adversary force’s chance of success during
  armed conflict. Adversaries measure the ability of Army forces to conduct operations during armed conflict
  through careful observation of how well those forces are prepared to conduct large-scale combat operations
  and the capabilities those forces introduce into a specific context as part of the overall joint response.
  5-24. As Army forces prepare to respond to a crisis, the JFC conducts a final review of deploying forces,
  ensuring they are deployed in the proper sequence and are able to be task-organized effectively for the
  anticipated mission. Threat forces are likely to detect force projection activities using space and cyberspace
  capabilities, human intelligence, and open-source collection efforts. Planners should anticipate adversary
  forces using all available means to contest the deployment of forces, beginning from home station, during
  transit, and upon arrival in theater. Therefore, operations security, dispersion of forces, deception operations,
  and physical security are critical planning considerations. Senior commanders and planners must understand
  the risks and shape deployments to satisfy both speed and operational readiness. (See Chapter 3 for more
  information on force tailoring and Appendix C for further discussion on contested deployments.)
  5-25. Force projection is particularly important during crisis, as Army forces have an unknown amount of
  time to shape a developing situation. It can occur, however, in any context. Forces projected forward during
  competition to conduct exercises, bolster allies and partners, and conduct other activities are under
  observation. Adversaries assess the speed and efficiency of these routine deployments, which can have a
  deterrent effect. Given the fluid nature of a crisis, force projection may continue well after a crisis has
  transitioned to armed conflict. Sound force projection planning encompasses—
  (cid:122) Opening the theater.
  (cid:122) Mobilization.
  (cid:122) Deployment.
  (cid:122) Protection during transit.
  (cid:122) Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI).
  (cid:122) Initial employment of forces.
  (cid:122) Sustainment.
  (cid:122) Redeployment.
  OPENING THE THEATER
  5-26. During the transition to crisis or armed conflict, Army forces open the theater to receive deploying
  forces. Army forces execute existing plans to establish and open air, sea, and rail terminals. Distribution
  systems and intermediate staging bases may be established where required. Higher echelon (including
  theater, corps, and division enablers) and rapidly deployable C2 elements begin to integrate with host-nation
  forces as quickly as possible to set the conditions for RSOI of follow-on tactical forces. This includes
  coordination with the forces of other supporting nations to assure effective distribution of services, facilities,
  and supplies to all deploying units across the alliance or coalition. During theater opening, designated arriving
  forces draw available APS. This provides the JFC with increased capacity and capability during the initial
  stages of a crisis or armed conflict. Army forces must be prepared for combat while conducting theater
  opening operations. The first deploying units require the capability to defend themselves while they provide
  reaction time and maneuver space for follow-on forces.
  MOBILIZATION
  5-27. Mobilization is the process by which the Armed Forces of the United States, or part of them, are
  brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency (JP 4-05). During mobilization, the Army
  focuses its efforts on filling joint manning documents to augment combined and joint task force (JTF)
  headquarters, land component headquarters, and Army units designated for deployment. During crisis,
  strategic leaders may decide to mobilize select portions of the U.S. Army National Guard and U.S. Army
  Reserve to provide key capabilities to JFCs. During armed conflict, it is likely that strategic leaders will