text: Chapter 1
  population or groups in a population are willing to fight to change the conditions to their favor, using both
  violent and nonviolent means to affect a change in the prevailing authority, they often initiate an
  insurgency. An insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge
  political control of a region. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself (JP 3-24). Counterinsurgency is
  comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and
  address its root causes (JP 3-24). Warfare remains a clash of interests and will between organized groups
  characterized by the use of force. In conventional warfare, there are clear determinants of victory.
  However, achieving victory for an insurgent may depend less on defeating an armed opponent and more on
  a group’s ability to garner support for its political interests (often ideologically based) and to generate
  enough violence to achieve political consequences.
  1-4. Counterinsurgency is not a substitute for strategy. When counterinsurgents attempt to defeat an
  insurgency, they perform a range of diverse methods intended to counter an insurgency. Commanders must
  effectively arrange these diverse methods in time and space to accomplish strategic objectives. The U.S.
  can use a range of methods to aid a host nation or group in defeating an insurgency. The various
  combinations of these methods with different levels of resourcing provide the U.S. with a wide range of
  strategic options to defeat an insurgency. The strategy to counter an insurgency is determined by the ends
  the U.S. wishes to achieve, the ways it wishes to achieve those ends, and the resources or means it uses to
  enable those ways. (See paragraphs 1-10 through 1-13 for more information on strategy.)
  1-5. There is a spectrum of involvement in countering an insurgency. The U.S. could enable a host nation
  by not providing forces that are directly involved in securing the population or attacking the insurgents. For
  example, the U.S. could provide training or intelligence support to a host nation. Moreover, even if the U.S.
  is directly involved in defeating the insurgency, its primary role can be only to enable a host nation. A host
  nation may be capable of providing civil control and security. The U.S. commander can integrate a force
  into the host-nation’s efforts that provides a force to perform direct action or fires provided by airpower or
  field artillery. U.S. involvement can range from a modest and supporting commitment to a major ground
  force commitment that may, for a time, take the role of primary counterinsurgent force while host-nation
  forces become better able to take on that role themselves.
  1-6. Ideally, the host nation is the primary actor in defeating an insurgency. Even in an insurgency that
  occurs in a country with a nonfunctioning central government or after a major conflict, the host nation must
  eventually provide a solution that is culturally acceptable to its society and meets U.S. policy goals. The
  conclusion of any counterinsurgency effort is primarily dependent on the host nation and the people who
  reside in that nation. Ultimately, every society has to provide solutions to its own problems. As such, one of
  the Army and Marine Corps’ primary roles in counterinsurgency is to enable the host nation.
  1-7. A counterinsurgency can occur as part of a major combat operation, but it often occurs without a
  major conflict. For example, an external threat may sponsor an insurgency, and this could be part of an
  effort to attain other strategic objectives. As such, the objectives of a counterinsurgency must be contextual
  to that insurgency. Creating objectives that are relevant to a particular insurgency is essential to defeating
  that insurgency. Effective counterinsurgency requires clearly defined and obtainable objectives that result
  in an end state acceptable to the host-nation government, the populace, and the governments providing
  forces. When the U.S. directly involves itself in a counterinsurgency, stability may be essential. Although
  all tasks executed to establish the conditions to reach a desired end state are significant, stability operations
  may be critical in a counterinsurgency. (The Army understands all operations are made up of offensive,
  defensive, and stability tasks. See ADRP 3-07 and FM 3-07 for more information on operations focused on
  stability.)
  1-8. The military role should be coordinated with the other instruments of national power that include
  diplomatic, informational, and economic parts. The Army and Marine Corps are only part of the
  instruments of national power that the U.S. can use to counter an insurgency. At times, they may be used in
  a supporting role. For example, Soldiers and Marines may be withdrawn from active counterinsurgency
  efforts while the U.S. uses other instruments of national power as the primary enablers of a host nation. In
  such cases, the Army and Marine Corps may play a supporting role by performing security cooperation
  tasks.
  1-9. The Laos insurgency highlights the unique nature of an insurgency. This insurgency took place in the
  context of Vietnam. Here, internal groups with various interests and outside groups from North Vietnam