text: Army Sustainment Operations
  arrival of throughput enablers. In addition, planners should consider maintaining unit integrity and delivering
  capabilities rather than entire formations and incorporating force tracking capabilities. Additional fort-to-port
  planning considerations include the following:
  • Coordinate with local, state, and federal authorities to mitigate deployment disruptions.
  • Ensure that units can provide combat-configured forces for worldwide deployment with limited
  notice within required times.
  • Ensure that unit deployment plans and procedures adequately support limited no-notice deployment.
  • Ensure that installation plans and procedures adequately support limited no-notice deployments.
  • Ensure unit readiness and establishment of pre-positioned stocks.
  • Identify and secure primary and alternate movement nodes to reach ports of embarkation.
  • Plan to use alternate and multiple LOCs.
  • Incorporate command and control and in-transit visibility capabilities.
  • Establish specific cyber defenses for systems and associated data used to support movement.
  • Conduct threat planning and mitigation.
  • Maximize liaisons.
  1-43. Port-to-Port: Port-to-port operations are likely targets of kinetic and non-kinetic attacks to reduce
  capabilities or capacity as U.S. forces deploy to the theater. Enemy forces may target ports or vessels while
  in-transit with long-range fires, special operations forces, cyberspace attacks, space capability degradation or
  denial, and other capabilities. Whether conducting operations at a port during competition, crisis, or armed
  conflict, Army forces coordinate with the relevant authorities to mitigate potential complications at or enroute
  to the port. This includes—
  • Coordinating with host-nation and local authorities to mitigate deployment disruptions at the port
  of debarkation/embarkation.
  • Establishing OCS and security cooperation for port operations.
  • Assembling and organizing personnel into units and force packages to build combat power in
  anticipation of a contested environment.
  • Understanding port authority structure and capabilities.
  • Anticipating problems with frustrated cargo, efficient cargo handling, vessel turnaround, and
  reasonable utilization of port facilities.
  • Conducting threat planning and mitigation.
  • Identifying potential redundancies (for example, if power is lost, can port gantry cranes load
  containers).
  • Anticipating performing logistics over-the-shore in austere environments or degraded ports.
  • Incorporating command and control and in-transit visibility capabilities.
  • Planning RSOI.
  1-44. RSOI: The theater Army has primary responsibility for conducting RSOI for all joint land forces.
  Setting the theater for RSOI operations should not rely solely on organic capabilities, but also consider HNS,
  contractor support, and after initial entry, the Component 2 and 3 forces. This is meant to fill required gaps
  in mobility, both sequentially and simultaneously. Once hostilities begin, the risk posed to strategic lift by a
  peer adversary may degrade the ability of vessels to deliver equipment and forces very far into theater. This
  may result in the transition from intertheater to intratheater lift being farther away from the fight and
  necessitate reception and staging to take place outside the theater. This will cause onward movement to occur
  over extended, contested LOCs of operational and strategic distances. Further complicating the challenge
  could be operations that must occur in a largely maritime environment.
  1-45. The need for dispersion and disaggregation of forces will cause Army equipment to arrive in numerous
  smaller ports. Because 80 percent of sustainment capabilities are in the Component 2 and 3 organizations, it
  is important for planners to understand the mobilization and time-phased force and deployment data
  (TPFDD) requirements to synchronize force flow into the theater. Additional acquisition and cross-servicing
  agreements (ACSAs) enable rapid deployment of combat forces to help bridge gaps of capabilities currently
  not in theater. As designated by the CCDR, the TSC transfers tactical control (TACON) of units to the gaining
  joint force commander (JFC) in preparation for onward movement. Additional planning considerations
  during RSOI include, but are not limited to—
  • Planning for risks against velocity.