text: Chapter 2
  airborne force. Enemy air defense fires against resupply aircraft and long-range artillery and
  mortar fires on the drop zone can hamper the delivery, collection, or distribution of critical
  supplies.
  (cid:122) Once on the ground, the airborne force has limited tactical mobility. That mobility depends on
  the number and type ofvehiclesand helicoptersthatcan be broughtinto the objectivearea with
  thefollow-onforce.
  (cid:122) The airborne force has limited field artillery and air defense artillery support until additional
  assets can be introduced into the objective area. Additional target acquisition assets are needed
  toprovideaccurateandtimelytargetinginformation.
  (cid:122) Evacuation of casualties from the airhead is difficult. Until evacuation means are available, the
  BCT must be prepared to provide medical care through the attachment of its organic medical
  companyortheattachmentofechelonaboveBCTmedicalelements.
  VULNERABILITIES
  2-25. Airborne forcesare vulnerable to enemyattack while enroute to the drop zone. Althoughthe USAF
  can conduct limited airdrops without air superiority, large operations require neutralization or suppression
  of enemy air defenses (SEAD). This may require SEAD, radar jamming, and fighter aircraft besides
  transport and close air support sorties. Initial airborne assault elements are light and are separated from
  weapon systems, equipment, and materiel that provide protection and survivability. An ABNAF is
  particularlyvulnerabletoenemy—
  (cid:122) Attack by aircraft and air defense weapon systems during the movement and airborne assault
  phases.
  (cid:122) Attack by chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons because of limited chemical,
  biological,radiological,andnuclearprotectionanddecontaminationcapability.
  (cid:122) Attackbyground,air,orartilleryduringtheassaultandlandingphases.
  (cid:122) Airstrikesifairsuperiorityisnotgainedbeforetheairborneassault.
  (cid:122) Electronicattack,toincludejammingofcommunicationsandnavigationsystems,anddisrupting
  aircraftsurvivabilityequipment.
  (cid:122) Small-arms fire that presents a large threat to the aircraft during the air movement, airborne
  assaultandlandingphases.
  SECTION IV – AIRBORNE COMMAND AND CONTROL PLATFORMS
  2-26. Airborne operations require extensive coordination between the USAF, Army, and often, other
  services.Duringforcible entry, airbornecommandandcontrolplatformsmay be employedseparatelyor in
  combination to augment or even replace the ground-based elements when response time is critical. This
  section discusses the airborne elements of the tactical air control system, consisting of the Airborne
  Warning and Control System (AWACS), Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), and
  the Joint Airborne Communications Center/Command Post (JACC/CP) or "Jackpot" package, designed to
  fitaboard a C-130aircraft.
  AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM
  2-27. TheAWACS,designatedbytheUSAFasthe E-3 radar,is a modifiedBoeing707thathouses a radar
  subsystemand vastcommunicationsequipment. Itis under operationalcontrol ofthe tacticalairliftcontrol
  center(TACC).The AWACS radarsystemcancompensate forthe majorlimitationsofground-based radar
  systemssuchastheirinabilitytodetectlow-flyingaircraftduetoline-of-sightrestrictions.Otherlimitations
  of ground-based radar systems include their susceptibility to electronic countermeasures and their
  vulnerabilitytoattack.
  2-28. The AWACScancommunicate with a wide range of systems. It hasextensive high frequency(HF),
  very high frequency (VHF), and ultrahigh frequency (UHF) radios used to communicate with ground
  controllers, airborne forces, and ground forces. The E-3‘s radar flexibility allows it to support tactical
  missions, defensive missions, or both at the same time. The aircraft is used for weapons control or as a