text: Chapter 5
  and guerrillas approaching from any direction can be fired on by at least two automatic weapons.
  Disadvantages include the requirement for an ambush force of platoon size or larger to reduce the danger
  of being overrun by a large guerrilla force; one or more legs of the triangle may come under guerrilla
  enfilade fire; and lack of dispersion, particularly at the points, increases danger from guerrilla mortar fire.
  Box Formation
  5-172. The box formation is similar in purpose to the triangle ambush. The unit is deployed in four
  elements positioned so each element becomes a corner of a square or rectangle. Advantages
  and disadvantages are much the same as the triangle formation.
  VARIATIONS
  5-173. Common ambush variations during counterinsurgency operations include—
  Baited Trap
  5-174. A variation of the area ambush is the “baited trap” ambush. A central kill zone is established along
  the insurgent’s avenue of approach. Point ambushes are established along the routes over which units
  supporting or reinforcing the insurgent force will have to approach. The insurgents in the central kill zone
  serve as “bait” to lure relieving or reinforcing insurgent units into the kill zones of the outlying ambushes.
  Items such as infrastructure, sensitive equipment, caches, and security measures can be used as bait.
  Spider Hole
  5-175. This type of point ambush is designed for open areas that lack the cover and concealment
  and other features normally desirable in a good ambush site. This technique is effective in less populated
  rural areas or urban areas with subterranean. Concealed in a “spider hole," a type of covered and concealed
  foxhole, the attack element is deployed in the formation best suited to the overall situation. Soil is carefully
  removed and positions expertly camouflaged. This ambush takes advantage of the tendency of patrols
  and other units to relax in areas that do not appear to favor ambush. The chief disadvantage of this
  technique is that the ambush element’s vulnerability if compromised.
  SNIPER OPERATIONS
  5-176. Sniper operations are effective for both insurgent and counterinsurgent in the COIN environment.
  Snipers, if employed correctly, are a COIN force multiplier and provide the commander an immediate
  means to enter the insurgent decision cycle.
  5-177. Small kill teams (SKTs), small observation teams (SOTs), and small capture teams (SCTs) differ
  by task, manning, and equipment. SKT focuses on destroying of insurgent elements. SCTs focus on the
  capture of those elements. SOTs are for reconnaissance. In COIN, more may be gained by capturing than
  by killing the insurgent. However, SKTs can give commanders a deterrent to insurgent activity.
  5-178. Sniper teams sometimes as part of SKTs, SOTs, or SCTs, are employed in populated urban areas
  or large rural areas with adequate fields of fire. For mission success, all three teams employ specific point
  and area weapons systems. All three also rely on redundant communications, marking materials, detailed
  infiltration plans, exfiltration, mutual support, security, compromise contingencies, and engagement criteria
  CONSIDERATIONS
  5-179. Sniper employment in a COIN must be carefully considered. The infiltration or exfiltration
  of snipers, SKTs, and SCTs must be meticulously planned with the understanding of the habits, behaviors,
  and density of the local population. Besides the basic mission of precision fires and surgical elimination
  of individuals, they are valuable for ISR collection, route and area security augmentation, countersniper
  operations, and counter mortar or rocket operations. Compromise and contingency planning is critical
  to sniper employment. Commanders base this detailed planning on a thorough analysis of the mission
  variables with specific attention to terrain and civil considerations. Specific considerations using elements
  of the mission variables are—