text: _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
  the commander’s imagination. While performing these functions, the Inter-
  nal Security Forces may be operating within their own hierarchy of com-
  mand, or they may be assigned a dedicated command relationship within an
  OSC or one of its tactical subordinates.
  1-98. During regional operations, the Internal Security Forces may serve to
  control the population situated in newly seized territory. They are an excel-
  lent source of human intelligence and can provide security for key sites lo-
  cated in the support zones. The Internal Security Forces can either augment
  or replace regular military organizations in all aspects of prisoner-of-war
  processing and control. While continuing their normal tasks in the homeland,
  they can assist regular military organizations in the areas of traffic control
  and regulation.
  1-99. During transition operations, the Internal Security Forces evacuate im-
  portant political and military prisoners to safe areas where they can continue
  to serve as important sources of information or means of negotiation. Traffic
  control and the security of key bridges and infrastructure take on a higher
  level of importance as the OPFOR repositions and moves forces transitioning
  to adaptive operations. The Internal Security Forces can continue to gather
  intelligence from the local population and assist in mobilizing civilians in oc-
  cupied territory for the purpose of augmenting OPFOR engineer labor re-
  quirements. Finally, the use of qualified personnel to stay behind as intelli-
  gence gatherers and liaison with insurgent, terrorist, and criminal organiza-
  tions can provide the OPFOR an increased capability during the adaptive op-
  erations that follow.
  1-100. Especially important in the conduct of adaptive operations is the abil-
  ity of the Internal Security Forces to free up regular military organizations
  that can contribute directly to the fight. The security of support zones within
  an OSC area of responsibility is just one example of this concept. Where nec-
  essary, some units can augment the defense or defend less critical areas, thus
  freeing up regular military forces for higher-priority tasks. Stay-behind
  agents working with insurgent, terrorist, and criminal organizations can
  contribute by directing preplanned actions that effectively add depth to the
  battlefield. Their actions can cause material damage to key logistics and
  command and control (C2) assets, inflict random but demoralizing casualties,
  and effectively draw enemy forces away from the main fight in response to
  increased force-protection requirements.
  INSURGENT FORCES
  1-101. The OPFOR ensures that the exploitation and use of insurgent forces
  operating against and within neighboring countries is an integral part of its
  strategic and operational planning. Insurgent forces, properly leveraged, can
  provide an added dimension to the OPFOR’s capabilities and provide options
  not otherwise available. During peacetime, a careful balance is kept between
  covert support for insurgent groups that may prove useful later and overt re-
  lations with the government against which the insurgents are operating.
  1-102. During peacetime, support to insurgents can consist of weapons, stag-
  ing and sanctuary areas within the State, and training by OPFOR SPF. It is
  during this time that the OPFOR attempts to cultivate the loyalty and trust