text: Multidomain Operations and Intelligence
  2-63. Identifying a possible window of opportunity (in time, location, domains, and possibly dimensions),
  planning operations, and controlling operations to exploit the window of opportunity requires focused
  intelligence analysis. Therefore, Army forces require timely, accurate, relevant, and predictive intelligence to
  understand threat characteristics, capabilities, objectives, and COAs across domains when relevant to the
  mission. Intelligence initially drives the combinations of defeat mechanisms that commanders and staffs pursue
  as they employ friendly force capabilities, sometimes precisely in time and space, against enemy forces.
  2-64. During IPOE, each staff element provides input, ensuring a sufficiently broad view of the OE.
  Subsequently, the IPOE effort assists in identifying windows of opportunity to exploit threat vulnerabilities.
  For example, the air defense artillery staff element’s input to IPOE about enemy IADS capabilities and
  vulnerabilities may present the friendly commander with a possible window of opportunity. The gaps
  identified during initial IPOE and the requirements developed during the subsequent steps of the MDMP
  would drive information collection requirements to confirm the window of opportunity, support further
  planning, and support the exploitation of the window of opportunity. (See ATP 2-01.3 for IPOE doctrine.)
  2-65. Besides IPOE, building a relatively complete situational understanding (supported by intelligence
  situation development) across all domains and dimensions is required to see opportunities, seize the initiative,
  and exploit enemy vulnerabilities at a window of opportunity. Seeing and understanding when and how to
  isolate portions of the OE in one or more domains must be supported by the intelligence warfighting function
  across echelons and include leveraging the intelligence enterprise. (See figure 2-7.) Friendly forces may not
  be able to continually maintain an adequate level of situational understanding to exploit every window of
  opportunity. In these situations, friendly forces must either accept a greater degree of risk or wait until they
  can rebuild an adequate level of situational understanding to exploit a window of opportunity.
  Figure 2-7. Finding windows of opportunity by building situational understanding
  2-66. During large-scale combat operations against a peer threat, ground-force commanders may be required
  to conduct tactical activities, such as a deliberate attack, to open a window of opportunity for further
  exploitation by the joint force. For example, the destruction of specific enemy IADSs within a time window
  and at specific locations may allow friendly joint suppression of enemy air defense operations. This, in turn,
  may allow a deep strike that could result in the destruction of key enemy capabilities and lead to a relative