text: Large-Scale Combat Operations
  OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
  On 19 March 2003, 3ID began its attack on Baghdad as the geographic combatant
  commander’s main effort of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. Because of the Army’s
  lack of multi-channel tactical satellite ground systems and the time required to establish
  terrestrial based, line of sight networks, there were only two complete 24-hour periods
  when the network was available for the command. 3ID fought most of the war with the
  division command net on single-channel satellite radios and all other command
  communications on single-channel VHF radios. The United States declared victory on
  14 April 2003 with the fall of Baghdad.
  Since the conclusion of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, the Army has transitioned its
  tactical communications capabilities to a primarily satellite-based, at-the-halt network
  with wideband line of sight radios to make the network more robust. Divisions and
  brigade combat teams have organic on-the-move network capabilities to quickly
  establish an agile network. This provides maneuver forces voice, data, and video
  capabilities on-the-move, and greater network throughput at-the-quick-halt.
  4-39. Large-scale offensive operations are inherently mobile. Maneuver elements will perform tactical
  enabling tasks away from the command posts using highly mobile means of communications. The brigade
  combat team command posts maintain upper tier tactical internet connectivity for communications to
  division, but communication with subordinate echelons relies heavily on vehicle-mounted, man-pack, and
  handheld communications devices. When satellite transport is available, on-the-move networking provides
  improved situational awareness and increases the communications capabilities available at the battalion.
  4-40. During planning and mission rehearsals, the S-6 staff must ensure the commander and staff understand
  the communications plan, specifically what communications capabilities will be available by phase of the
  operation or critical points of the battle. Command post personnel and their signal support must plan and
  rehearse rapid displacement to enhance command post survivability and support the rapid advance of
  maneuver forces.
  4-41. Single-channel radio retransmission is a critical command and control enabler. Because U.S. ground
  forces move rapidly in offensive operations and the battlefield situation is fluid, retransmission teams must
  track the progress of the maneuver operation and anticipate emerging communications requirements. This
  awareness helps them maintain fully operational networks to support the commander’s mission requirements.
  For retransmission planning considerations, see paragraph 4-15.
  4-42. Signal elements support command and control as commanders maneuver their forces to positions of
  relative advantage before contact. Redundant systems and diversity in the network architecture allow for
  communications throughout the corps and division areas of operations. Although commanders require
  communications capabilities, effective command and control does not necessarily rely on continuous access
  to the DODIN-A. The commander’s intent is the basis for all offensive operations. PACE plans, organic unit
  liaison teams, and digital liaison detachments provide commanders options to enhance coordination and
  interoperability. Units must train and rehearse to operate by redundant means and exercise disciplined
  initiative within the commander’s intent when disconnected from the network.
  SIGNAL SUPPORT TO SUSTAINMENT
  4-43. Sustainment is critical to offensive operations. Sustainment units require reliable communications to
  control their teams operating from dispersed locations. Supply points, maintenance collection points,
  ambulance exchange points, and long-haul convoys are essential to mission success and operate throughout
  the corps and division areas of operations.
  4-44. Long lines of communications may expand support area communications requirements beyond the
  organic signal capabilities of sustainment units. Dispersed sustainment nodes require expeditionary signal