text: Security Cooperation in the Competition Continuum
  3-58. During a crisis, the rapid projection of SC forces provides the JFC with more enduring options than
  forces primarily concentrated in or transiting other domains. The potentially close physical proximity of
  partner ground forces to adversary forces provides the JFC with greater understanding and a greater capacity
  to dictate the tempo of operations.
  3-59. Partner forces will likely already be executing operations directed in response to provocations,
  indications, or warnings that hostile activities may commence. At the direction of the combatant command,
  Army personnel execute SC tasks, activities, and operations with partner FSF designed to deter further malign
  activity and set conditions for success should deterrence fail. The forward presence or projection of SC teams
  in a coalition support role provides capabilities that create tactical and operational dilemmas for threat forces,
  enabling the joint force to seize and retain the initiative.
  3-60. Prompt deployment of land forces in the initial phase of a crisis can preclude the need to deploy larger
  forces later, while also providing reassurance to allies and partners. SC uses a smaller force and less resources
  to build partner FSF combat power and represents an economy of force capability from a U.S. perspective.
  This benefit accrues to the JFC in a potential LSCO theater as well as to global U.S. military considerations
  in other theaters. Based on conditions and accepted risk, the Army can lessen its force commitment in one or
  more areas by employing SC teams as the primary Army presence for the duration of the crisis. The theater
  army and joint force may consider deploying SC teams to sustain contact with key partners, demonstrate U.S.
  commitment, counter adversary machinations, and maintain access for future contingencies.
  3-61. Effective early intervention by SC forces and activities can also deny adversaries the time necessary
  for them to set conditions in their favor. Deployment alone does not guarantee success, rather it involves
  convincing adversaries that the deployed force can markedly reduce the adversary force’s chance of success
  during armed conflict. Adversaries measure the ability of Army and partner forces to conduct operations
  during armed conflict through careful observation of how well those forces prepare for and respond to a
  crisis.
  ACTIVITIES AT ECHELON DURING CRISIS
  3-62. During crisis, SFA teams embedded within the executive, generating, and operating functions of the
  host-nation defense forces may work closely to support RSOI operations for arriving forces. SFA and the
  partner may work together to support arriving forces as they complete collective training, theater orientation,
  and theater acclimation.
  3-63. SFA teams embedded with the partner FSF in a coalition support role may be useful in coordinating,
  integrating, and synchronizing AOR-tailored capability to incoming forces during crisis. The partner FSF
  can support setting the theater, enabling expeditionary maneuver, and responding immediately to regional
  emergencies all while protecting bases, key nodes, and networks.
  3-64. During crisis, the U.S. land component headquarters may deploy into an operational area as a tactical
  headquarters with subordinate divisions and brigades. Impending LSCO may require the corps headquarters
  to function under the command of a multinational force land component or become subordinate to a joint
  task force army equivalent established as part of a multinational coalition. SC liaisons, including SFA
  advisors in a coalition support role will be key to partner FSF unit emplacement under the command of U.S.
  forces. Whether the multinational force is U.S.-led or not, the deep understanding of embedded SFA teams
  in partner force defense ministries will facilitate interoperability and overall demonstration of combat power.
  3-65. During consolidation of gains, SC teams perform multiple tasks and developmental activities. SC
  teams leverage the FSF to ensure retention and safeguarding of critical capabilities it may have lost during
  events leading up to the crisis, such as computer server farms, television, and radio broadcast stations. SC
  also supports the FSF in its coordination with the joint force to safeguard key storage areas containing
  weapons, munitions, and weapons of mass destruction or its components. SFA activities can also enable and
  support the partner FSF in the rapid and comprehensive use of information to shape public opinion, discredit
  enemy narratives, and promote friendly objectives. SFA activities at this time are intended to enable and
  support the partner FSF to reinforce stability and resume full competition activities.