text: FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
  The State participates in the global market, which can allow it to acquire things
  it cannot produce domestically. Such descriptions give scenario writers consider-
  able flexibility in determining what the State or the OPFOR actually has at a
  given point in time or a given place on the battlefieldin a particular scenario.
  The composite example of this baseline may meet the OPFOR requirements for
  many U.S. Army training environments. For cases that require an OPFOR based
  on a type of nation-state with characteristics different from those of the State de-
  scribed in this manual, this baseline provides a framework from which trainers
  can develop an OPFOR appropriate for their particular training requirements.
  The OPFOR must be flexible enough to fit various training requirements. It must
  be scalable and tunable. Depending on the training requirement, the OPFOR
  may be a large, medium, or small force. Its technology may be state-of-the-art,
  relatively modern, obsolescent, obsolete, or an uneven combination of those cate-
  gories. Its ability to sustain operations may be limited or robust.
  THINKING
  This manual describes how the OPFOR thinks, especially how it thinks about
  fighting its regional neighbors and/or the United States. This thinking deter-
  mines basic OPFOR operationsas well as strategy and tactics, which are the
  subjects of other manuals in this series. It drives OPFOR organizational
  structures and equipment acquisition or adaptation. It also determines how
  the nation-state OPFOR that represents the armed forces of the State would
  interact with other, non-state actors that may be present in the COE.
  Just because the U.S. force knows something about how the OPFOR has fought
  in the past does not mean that the OPFOR will always continue to fight that
  way. A thinking OPFOR will learn from its own successes and failures, as well as
  those of its potential enemies. It will adapt its thinking, its makeup, and its way
  of fighting to accommodate these lessons learned. It will continuously look for
  innovative ways to deal with the United States and its armed forces.
  ADAPTABILITY
  Like all military forces, the OPFOR has a basic, conventional design for dealing
  with forces with capabilities equal to or inferior to its own. Prior to a U.S. force
  becoming involved, therefore, the OPFOR can use the application or threat of ap-
  plication of that conventional design to dominate or influence its regional neighbors.
  The OPFOR plans these operations well in advance and tries to execute them as
  rapidly as possible, in order to preclude regional alliances or outside intervention.
  The OPFOR has developed its doctrine, force structure, and capabilities with an
  eye toward employing them against both regional and extraregional opponents, if
  necessary. It has thought about and trained for how to adapt once an extraregional
  force becomes engaged. It has included this adaptability in its doctrine in the
  form of general principles, based on its perceptions of the United States and
  other threats to its goals and aspirations. It will seek to avoid types of operations
  and environments for which U.S. forces are optimized. During the course of con-
  flict, it will make further adaptations, based on experience and opportunity.