text: Appendix C
  C-4. Peer threat objectives and advantages may not be immediately recognized since the effects of peer
  threat activities may appear over prolonged time windows. By using a range of military and nonmilitary
  activities, a peer threat can use various instruments of national power to further its interests and contest Army
  force projection processes. The adversary’s use of diplomatic, information, economic, and military activities
  shape the OE well before armed conflict by gaining situational awareness of, detecting, and even deterring
  Army force projection processes. In crisis, peer threats may seek to delay or disrupt friendly forces moving
  from the U.S. homeland to overseas theaters long enough to achieve their goals in forward theaters. During
  armed conflict, peer threats may seek to inflict significant damage to or deny or defeat Army forces in the
  deployment phase or at home station before Army forces reach their assigned operational area or debarkation
  location. Army forces must evaluate the peer threat’s ability to contest U.S. force deployment and home
  station activities in all domains and across the Army strategic contexts.
  C-5. Nonpeer or opportunistic threats may attempt to detect, deter, delay, or defeat Army forces conducting
  CONUS and OCONUS force projection processes. These threats may be inspired or influenced by peer
  threats and attempt to take advantage of peer threat associated contested deployment activities to advance
  their own goals. Peer threat, nonpeer threat, or other opportunistic threat actions may use the same methods,
  making attribution difficult.
  C-6. Because threat forces may attempt to disrupt one or more force projection processes, G-2/S-2s must
  continuously leverage the intelligence enterprise to maintain visibility of potential threats to force projection
  processes in CONUS and OCONUS territories. Close collaboration between the deploying unit; the
  installation; appropriate federal, state, and local agencies (both government and law enforcement); and USAR
  and ARNG elements is critical in mitigating threat activities leveraged to disrupt force projection. G-2/S-2s
  and other staff members must consider incorporating strategies into planning and training to mitigate the
  potential for threat activities during force projection. Key planning and training considerations include but
  are not limited to—
  ⚫ Local, state, and federal authorities able to mitigate deployment disruptions.
  ⚫ Coordination and relationship building with local, state, and federal civilian law enforcement
  agencies to ensure effective movement control from fort to port.
  ⚫ Understanding about critical infrastructure vulnerable to sabotage and unsuited for the
  movement of heavy equipment along surface (road and rail) lines of communications.
  ⚫ Using alternate railheads and marshalling yards as well as multiple lines of communication to
  reach ports of embarkation.
  ⚫ Developing alternate surface transportation options to deliver unit equipment to a seaport of
  embarkation when rail service is degraded or disrupted.
  ⚫ Establishing fuel, maintenance, and rest locations along lines of communications.
  ⚫ Implementing a communications plan that informs the public while maintaining OPSEC.
  ⚫ Establishing specific cyberspace defenses for systems and associated data used to support
  movement.
  C-7. G-2/S-2s, in conjunction with the intelligence enterprise, perform IPOE for threat activities associated
  with force projection processes. Additionally, G-2/S-2s conduct intelligence reach to AISE and theater
  intelligence units and organizations to inform deployment-related IPOE and address information gaps
  concerning threats to movement into a specific theater. Conversely, AISE and theater intelligence units and
  organizations conduct activities to support their intelligence operations, analysis, activities, and anticipated
  intelligence requirements for Army forces conducting force projection processes. AISE and theater
  intelligence units and organizations can support force projection processes by—
  ⚫ Providing situational understanding of the threat’s attempt to gain and/or maintain positions of
  relative advantage associated with force projection activities.
  ⚫ Detecting indicators of imminent threat activities.
  ⚫ Providing an understanding of enemy intentions.
  ⚫ Tracking enemy activities and capabilities across domains and dimensions.