text: Chapter 3
  Pacific Pathways: PACOM in Competition
  In Autumn 2023, less than a week after being confirmed as the new Army Chief of
  Staff, General Randy George attended the 13th Indo-Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference
  in New Delhi, the largest conference for land forces in the Indo-Pacific Theater. “This
  region is a priority, and the Army is all over the world but exercises more in the Indo-
  Pacific because it is a priority” stated General George.
  This prioritization of the Indo-Pacific Theater is a consequence of a strategic shift or
  ‘pivot’ that occurred in 2014 which placed the (then) Pacific Command (PACOM) as
  the strategic priority for the U.S. Army. In support of this shift, in 2014, General Vincent
  Brooks, commander of U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) created the Pacific Pathways
  program. Historically, there had been a long tradition of support to various exercises
  throughout PACOM. What was lacking was a coordinated, wholistic, plan for the
  deployment and sustainment to U.S. forces throughout the whole region, in support of
  all the exercises and any emergent humanitarian crisis (for example, a standing
  program to increase the power projection of the U.S. Army throughout PACOM). Pacific
  Pathways would fill that void.
  In June 2014, the first Pathway departed from Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM) with
  elements of the 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division. It sailed to
  Indonesia and Malaysia for multilateral exercises and then went to Japan to participate
  in exercises with the Japan Self-Defense Force. In November, after sailing for a five-
  month, 17,000-mile Pacific journey, they returned to JBLM. The initial 2014 Pathway
  was a proof-of-concept exercise in the effort to operationalize the program. In 2015,
  three Pacific Pathways, each with elements of a brigade combat team from the 25th
  Infantry Division, deployed and participated in multinational exercises in Thailand,
  South Korea, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, and Japan. In successive
  years, the three-deployment model became standard for units deployed.
  Pacific Pathways’ deployments became a forcing function for the sustainment
  enterprise to confront and work through a myriad of issues associated with the
  increased complexities of the program’s objectives. Individual exercises did not
  challenge or engage the entire sustainment structure of the Pacific Theater. With each
  deployment, the entire sustainment enterprise (specifically USAMC, Defense Logistics
  Agency, Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, 8th TSC, 593rd ESC, 402nd
  and 404th Army Field Support Brigades) had to find ways to operate together to
  strategically move a brigade combat team (minus) by sea and air, perform multiple
  RSOIs, and provide continuous sustainment for three 90-day periods. One of the
  biggest problems to overcome was simply the ‘tyranny of distance’; the distance to
  travel to conduct supply operations across the Pacific. In addition to this, issues with
  different host-nation customs rules and procedures, movement of Class IX,
  dependability and capability of OCS, and suitability and availability of fuel (especially
  aviation) were among the challenges faced in the initial deployments.
  Since these initial deployments, Pacific Pathways (subsequently named Operation
  Pathways) became a staple of power projection for USARPAC. The deployments have
  evolved, the time in country has increased to build further partnerships, and the Army
  prepositioned stocks system has become more engaged in the program. According to
  Major General Jered Helwig, commander 8th TSC, Operation Pathways “set conditions
  for the joint interior lines and to build out the architecture, because we know if we don’t
  rehearse it in competition, it will be very difficult to execute in crisis and conflict”.