text: Foundations of Insurgency
  COMPOSITE AND COALITION STRATEGY
  2-93. The composite and coalition strategy applies when different insurgent groups using different
  strategies combine to form loose coalitions that serve the purposes of the different groups. However, the
  composite and coalition strategy is usually united in opposition to something, for example an occupier or
  specific grievance, rather than for a positive objective. Within a single AO, there may be multiple
  competing entities, each seeking to maximize its survivability and influence. Recently, Al—Qaeda in Iraq
  provides the best example of a composite and coalition strategy; they founded the Islamic State of Iraq
  and became an umbrella group for many other established insurgent groups. Contemporary actions of the
  composite and coalition strategy include—
  • Unclear or vague objective.
  • Multiple or disjointed strategies within a single area of operations.
  • More likely to ally with criminal actors.
  • Attacks on other members of the coalition.
  SHIFTS BETWEEN STRATEGIES AND PHASES
  2-94. Insurgencies often operate using different strategies, in different phases, in different geographical
  areas. These decisions are based on the operational environment and insurgent objectives. Most
  insurgencies eventually move to the protracted popular war or subversive strategy after another strategy
  proves unsuccessful.
  2-95. Insurgencies can also shift both phases and strategy. Pressure from the counterinsurgent can force
  an insurgent to move laterally to a new strategy or return to an earlier phase (Figure 2-6). For example, an
  insurgency in Phase I, Latent and Incipient, using an urban strategy, builds sufficient strength to progress
  to Phase II, Guerrilla Warfare. Once in Phase II, the insurgents may believe they are strong enough
  to initiate a series of attacks. Then, if counterinsurgents successfully drive out the insurgents, the insurgents
  will normally consolidate and reorganize elsewhere. However, this failure may force the insurgency back
  to Phase I in that area. Additionally, the insurgent leadership may transition from the urban strategy to a
  protracted popular war strategy. When the insurgent leaders believe they are ready, the insurgency will
  return to Phase II, Guerrilla Warfare.
  2-96. Insurgencies are often vulnerable when they shift between strategy or phases. These shifts may be
  due to fractures within the insurgent leadership or setbacks. Shifts may also occur due to time, changes
  in external support, changes in leadership, or counterinsurgent action. These shifts are often rapid so
  counterinsurgents must be able to recognize and exploit them. Indicators of a shift in strategies may be:
  • Changes in propaganda message content
  • Uncharacteristic increase in communications
  • Unexplained pauses or sudden increases in guerrilla attacks
  • Shift of effort between urban and rural efforts
  • Displacement of insurgents from one location to another
  • Unanticipated statements of support from external actors for an insurgency
  • Increased organization, indoctrination, and secure means of communications
  • Increased efforts to infiltrate legitimate organizations such as trade unions, professional
  or business organizations, universities, and so on.
  • New advocacy for rights of peasants, farmers, or other groups
  • Change of in focus of attacks, such as the targeting of a specific sector