text: FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
  1-35. To seize territory or otherwise expand its influence in the region, the
  State must destroy a regional enemy’s will and capability to continue the
  fight. It will attempt to achieve strategic political or military decision or
  achieve specific regional goals as rapidly as possible, in order to preclude re-
  gional alliances or outside intervention.
  1-36. During regional operations, the State relies on its continuing strategic
  operations to preclude or control outside intervention. It tries to keep foreign
  perceptions of its actions during a regional conflict below the threshold that
  will invite in extraregional forces. The State wants to win the regional con-
  flict, but has to be careful how it does so. It works to prevent development of
  international consensus for intervention and to create doubt among possible
  participants. Still, at the very outset of regional operations, it lays plans and
  positions forces to conduct access-control operations in the event of outside
  intervention.
  1-37. At the military level, regional operations are combined arms, joint, in-
  teragency, and/or multinational operations. They are conducted in the State’s
  region and, at least at the outset, against a weaker regional opponent. The
  State’s doctrine, organization, capabilities, and national security strategy al-
  low the OPFOR to deal with regional threats and opportunities primarily
  through offensive action.
  1-38. The State designs its military forces and employs an investment
  strategy that ensures superiority in conventional military power over any
  of its regional neighbors. Regionally-focused operations typically involve
  “conventional” patterns of operation. However, the term conventional does
  not mean that the OPFOR will use only conventional forces and conventional
  weapons in such a conflict, nor does it mean that the OPFOR will not use
  some adaptive approaches.
  TRANSITION OPERATIONS
  1-39. Transition operations serve as a pivotal point between regional and
  adaptive operations. The transition may go in either direction. The fact that
  the State begins transition operations does not necessarily mean that it
  must complete the transition from regional to adaptive operations (or vice versa).
  As conditions allow or dictate, the “transition” could end with the State conduct-
  ing the same type of operations as before the shift to transition operations.
  1-40. The State conducts transition operations when other regional and/or
  extraregional forces threaten the State’s ability to continue regional opera-
  tions in a conventional design against the original regional enemy. At the
  point of shifting to transition operations, the State still has the ability to ex-
  ert all instruments of national power against an overmatched regional en-
  emy. Indeed, it may have already defeated its original adversary. However,
  its successful actions in regional operations have prompted either other re-
  gional actors or an extraregional actor to contemplate intervention. The State
  will use all means necessary to preclude or defeat intervention.
  1-41. Although the State would prefer to achieve its strategic goals through
  regional operations, an SCP has the flexibility to change and adapt if re-
  quired. Since the State assumes the possibility of extraregional intervention,