text: _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
  1-87. Regional operations are largely conventional actions against a less ca-
  pable force. While dealing with such a regional opponent primarily
  through offensive means, the State employs its economic, informational,
  and diplomatic-political instruments of power in a peacetime, “defensive”
  mode against other regional and extraregional parties with whom it is not at
  war. This overall strategy constitutes a “strategic defense” that supports the
  offensive military operations being conducted in the region while seeking to
  preclude outside involvement. The practitioner of operational art must insure
  that his plan for use of forces is congruent with the aims of the SCP and vice
  versa. The soldier does not view the proper, coordinated use of these other in-
  struments of power as a hindrance. From his perspective, their use to influ-
  ence an extraregional power not to commit forces or to delay their commit-
  ment is the equivalent of having extra divisions.
  1-88. Transition and particularly adaptive operations are at the core of what
  makes OPFOR military and operational art distinctive, if not unique. The po-
  litical and military leadership recognizes that attempts to achieve national
  strategic goals through the use of force can result in a military response from
  within and outside the region. Strategic plans take this possibility into ac-
  count and, depending on the degree of risk, contingencies are planned to ac-
  count for such an eventuality.
  1-89. Applying the principles of operation versus an extraregional power,
  (discussed earlier in this chapter) and taking a “systems warfare” approach,
  the State and the OPFOR seek to develop contingency plans that transition
  to a “strategic offense” while conducting military operations that are, at least
  initially, defensive in nature. The purpose of the strategy is to disaggregate
  the enemy’s elements of power through the conduct of strategic operations,
  while seeking to disaggregate his combat systems at the operational level.
  The ultimate goal is to exhaust the enemy and destroy his will to continue
  the fight.
  1-90. In preparing contingency plans, the political and military leadership
  conducts a detailed analysis to determine major actions that might be taken
  by an intervening force to mobilize, deploy, and operate within the region.
  Using this analysis (which is continually updated) and the assessed risk, they
  further refine the plan. Actions to support the plan, prior to its execution,
  could include increasing the readiness of units, organizations, and industry
  required to support an intervention scenario. Other actions could include pre-
  positioning forces, weapons, and logistics to those areas that support the con-
  tingency plan. Plans for strategic operations in support of transition and
  adaptive operations are developed while the military operational planners
  continue to plan for the employment of tactical forces to achieve the aims set
  forth in the strategy. All of this is set against a matrix that identifies key
  events that would trigger execution of the contingency.
  1-91. Inherent in the concept of adaptive operations is the idea that the op-
  erational planner assigns missions and arrays tactical forces in such a way to
  support the operation. Although the tactical commander will understand,
  from a conceptual context, that he is involved in adaptive operations, from a
  tactical perspective that will be transparent. It is through the manner in
  which the operational commander arrays and employs his forces that adap-
  tive operations are achieved. Tactical commanders are adaptive in the sense