text: FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
  1-70. Another way to operate on the margins of enemy technology is to ma-
  neuver during periods of reduced exposure. The OPFOR trains its forces to
  operate in adverse weather, limited visibility, rugged terrain, and urban envi-
  ronments that shield them from the effects of the enemy’s high-technology weap-
  ons and deny the enemy the full benefits of his advanced reconnaissance, intelli-
  gence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) systems.
  1-71. Modern militaries rely upon information and information systems to
  plan and conduct operations. For this reason, the OPFOR will conduct exten-
  sive information attacks and other offensive IW actions. It can also use the
  enemy’s robust array of RISTA systems against him. A sophisticated enemy’s
  large numbers of sensors can overwhelm subordinate units’ ability to receive,
  process, and analyze raw intelligence data and to provide timely and accurate
  intelligence analysis. The OPFOR can add to this saturation problem by us-
  ing deception to flood enemy sensors with masses of conflicting information.
  Conflicting data from different sensors at different levels (such as satellite
  imagery conflicting with data from unmanned aerial vehicles) can confuse the
  enemy and degrade his situational awareness.
  1-72. The OPFOR will concentrate its own RISTA, maneuver, and fire sup-
  port means on the destruction of high-visibility (flagship) enemy systems.
  This offers exponential value in terms of increasing the relative combat
  power of the OPFOR and also maximizes effects in the information and psy-
  chological arenas. Losses among these premier systems may not only degrade
  operational capability, but also undermine enemy morale. Thus, attacks
  against such targets are not always linked to military objectives.
  CHANGE THE NATURE OF CONFLICT
  1-73. The OPFOR will try to change the nature of conflict to exploit the dif-
  ferences between friendly and enemy capabilities. Following an initial period
  of regionally-focused conventional operations and utilizing the opportunity af-
  forded by phased enemy deployment, the OPFOR will change its operations
  to focus on preserving combat power and exploiting enemy ROE. This shift in
  the focus of operations will present the fewest targets possible to the rapidly
  growing combat power of the enemy. Also, the OPFOR or affiliated forces can
  use terror tactics against enemy civilians or soldiers not directly connected to
  the intervention as a device to change the fundamental nature of the conflict.
  1-74. Against early-entry forces, the OPFOR may still be able to use the de-
  sign it employed in previous operations against regional opponents, particu-
  larly if access-control operations have been successful. However, as the extrare-
  gional force builds up to the point where it threatens to overmatch the OPFOR,
  the OPFOR is prepared to disperse its forces and employ them in patternless op-
  erations that present a battlefield that is difficult for the enemy to analyze and
  predict.
  1-75. The OPFOR may hide and disperse its forces in areas of sanctuary. The
  sanctuary may be physical, often located in urban areas or other complex ter-
  rain that limits or degrades the capabilities of enemy systems. However, the
  OPFOR may also use moral sanctuary by placing its forces in areas shielded
  by civilians or close to sites that are culturally, politically, economically, or
  ecologically sensitive. It will defend in sanctuaries when necessary. However,