text: Chapter 10
  of the national population. The demobilization of insurgents enables the eventual development of value
  systems, attitudes, and social practices that help them reintegrate into civil society.
  10-49. Reintegration is the process through which former combatants, belligerents, and displaced civilians
  receive amnesty, reenter civil society, gain sustainable employment, and become contributing members of
  the local population. It encompasses the reinsertion of individual former insurgents into host-nation
  communities, villages, and social groups. Reintegration is a social and economic recovery process focused
  on the local community. It complements other community-based programs that spur economic recovery,
  training, and employment services. It includes programs to support resettlement in civilian communities,
  basic and vocational education, and assistance in finding employment in local economies. It accounts for
  the specific needs of women and children associated with insurgent and other armed groups.
  10-50. Insurgents, when properly protected, reintegrated, and well treated, can become positive members
  of their community. Conversely, unprotected, poorly prepared, or poorly treated former insurgents will
  become powerful propaganda opportunities for the insurgents. Reintegration processes and programs, such
  as host nation-led moderate ideological or religious education and job training, should be started early in
  the reintegration process.
  10-51. Counterinsurgency operations ultimately support reintegration through the integration of the
  stability functions in planning and execution. The stability functions are security, governance and
  participation, humanitarian assistance, rule of law, and economic stabilization and infrastructure. Specific
  consideration within stability operations to support the reintegration process include—
  * Civil-military operations and commander’s emergency response program funds for special
  projects.
  * Support to civic education projects.
  * Support to employment programs.
  * Support to relocation to prevent reprisals.
  * Support to integration into the political process.
  * Support to transitional justice.
  10-52. The importance of influencing members of an insurgency to surrender cannot be overstated. The
  importance of how a former insurgent is reintegrated into a peaceful society is also critical because the way
  a war is won will decide how long the peace will last.
  10-53. Counterinsurgents should offer surrendered insurgents generous terms, and counterinsurgents
  should follow those terms. By separating an insurgent from the population, commanders and staffs make
  that insurgent feel vulnerable and also take from the insurgency a means for recruitment and logistic
  support. Planners and commanders should work toward creating liberal and generous surrender terms.
  Counterinsurgents must protect surrendered insurgents from reprisals from their former insurgent
  colleagues.
  OTHER INDIRECT ENABLERS
  10-54. The U.S. can integrate enablers into a host nation’s counterinsurgency efforts. These enablers can
  provide intelligence or prevent the flow of resources to a counterinsurgency. Various intelligence
  capabilities, such as signals intelligence, human intelligence, and geospatial intelligence, may be essential
  to a host nation’s counterinsurgency. Sharing of information from these sources may enable a host nation to
  defeat an insurgency. Also, other enablers, such as airlift capabilities, might be important for
  counterinsurgency. Another capability that can be integrated into a counterinsurgency effort is counter
  threat finance. Counter threat finance works to detect, counter, contain, disrupt, deter, or dismantle the
  transitional financing of state and non-state enemies threatening the U.S. Counter threat finance can deny
  an insurgent access to vital funding streams by identifying the sources and conduits of funding. In
  counterinsurgency, this can play an important role because of the connection between insurgencies and
  black markets. It provides one means to prevent an insurgency from obtaining resources. (For more
  information on counter threat finance, see ATTP 3-07.20/MCRP 3-33 and DODD 5205.14.)