text: Chapter 8
  international law (see DOD Law of War Manual, 18.22.3). Most war crimes tribunals have held that the fact
  a person acted as a Head of State or as a government official is not a defense to prosecution and punishment
  for war crimes, nor has acting as such been considered as a factor in mitigating punishment (see, for example,
  Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 7). Although status as a government official is not a
  substantive defense to liability under international law, government officials may receive immunities or other
  procedural protections from a foreign State’s exercise of jurisdiction. For example, a Status of Forces
  Agreement could provide that it is for the sending State to exercise jurisdiction, rather than the host State, in
  respect of allegations that the sending State’s forces had committed war crimes.
  Ignorance or Mistake of the Law
  8-77. Ignorance or mistake of law ordinarily is not a defense (RCM 916(l)(1); MMC pt. II, Rule 916(l)(1)).
  Individuals are expected to ascertain and conduct themselves within applicable law (see, for example, United
  States v. Flick (The Flick Case), VI Trials of War Criminals 1208). Ignorance or mistake of law may be a
  defense in certain circumstances, such as when the mistake relates to a separate non-penal law or potentially
  when the mistake results from reliance on the decision or pronouncement of an authorized public official or
  agency (RCM 916(l)(1) Discussion). For example, ignorance of international law may serve as a defense
  when the accused acts pursuant to superior orders and cannot, under the conditions of military discipline and
  operations, be expected to weigh scrupulously the legal merits of the order received (Trial of Karl Buck and
  Ten Others, V U.N. Law Reports, 39, 44). Ignorance of international law may also be a mitigating factor in
  considering punishment (see, for example, United States v. Sawada, V U.N. Law Reports 7-8).
  REMEDIES FOR VIOLATION OF LOAC
  8-78. In the event of a LOAC violation, it may be possible for an injured State to seek to resort to one or
  more of the following remedies:
  * A formal or informal complaint to the offending belligerent through the protecting power or
  neutral States;
  * Publication of the facts, with a view to shaping public opinion against the offending belligerent;
  * A formal inquiry among the parties into alleged violations (see paragraph 8-79);
  * A UN Security Council resolution to take appropriate action under the UN Charter (UN Charter
  art. 34);
  * Complaints to the offending belligerent, including protest and demand for compensation or
  punishment of individuals responsible for the violation (Hague IV art. 3; consider AP I art. 91);
  * Solicitation of the good offices (that is, the diplomatic assistance), mediation, or intervention of
  neutral States for purposes of making the offending belligerent observe its obligations under
  LOAC;
  * Punishment of captured individual offenders as war criminals, either by tribunals of the aggrieved
  belligerent or its co-belligerents, or by international tribunals, if such tribunals have jurisdiction;
  or
  * Reprisals against the offending belligerent in order to pressure it to desist from violations of LOAC
  (see paragraphs 8-80 to 8-86).
  INQUIRIES UNDER THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
  8-79. The 1949 Geneva Conventions provide that, at the request of a party to the conflict, an inquiry shall
  be instituted, in a manner to be decided between the interested Parties, concerning any alleged violation of
  the 1949 Geneva Convention (DOD Law of War Manual, 18.14.1). If agreement has not been reached
  concerning the procedure for the inquiry, the Parties should agree on the choice of an “umpire” who will
  decide upon the procedure to be followed. The Conventions further provide that if the inquiry establishes that
  a violation has occurred, the parties to the conflict are to put an end to the violation and to repress the violation
  with the least possible delay (GWS art. 52; GWS Sea art. 53; GPW art. 132; GC art. 149). Article 90 of AP
  I establishes an International Fact-Finding Commission, which operates on the basis of mutual consent (see
  DOD Law of War Manual, 18.14.1.1). Although many nations have accepted this provision, the commission