text: PART ONE
  Strategic and Operational Context
  When the United States (U.S.) conducts or supports counterinsurgency operations, it
  does so in a unique strategic and operational environment. While this is true for all
  operations, this is of particular importance when the U.S. is countering an
  insurgency. Tactical actions often have strategic effects in a counterinsurgency. This
  makes it essential to understand both the strategic and operational context when
  countering an insurgency. In this manual, part one provides an overview for
  commanders and staff to understand the environment and context of an insurgency
  and the decision to counter that insurgency. Chapter 1 provides the strategic context
  of a counterinsurgency. When the U.S. becomes involved in a counterinsurgency,
  policy and strategic decisions affect operations. Chapter 2 provides an overview of
  an operational environment and operational variables. In a counterinsurgency, there
  are unique considerations that operators and planners consider. Of particular
  importance in a counterinsurgency is culture. Chapter 3 provides an in-depth
  overview of culture and its relationship to counterinsurgency.
  Chapter 1
  Understanding the Strategic Context
  1-1. Any decision by the President to commit United States (U.S.) forces must be understood within the
  larger sphere of U.S. policy. Soldiers and Marines must first understand the strategic context that the U.S.
  is acting in to best plan, prepare, conduct, and assess a counterinsurgency operation to protect national
  interests. Countering an insurgency should incorporate previous or continuing security cooperation efforts
  and other activities, U.S. and host-nation objectives, and U.S. and host-nation whole-of-government efforts
  to address the root causes of the conflict. (For more information on root causes, see paragraphs 4-14
  through 4-22.) Despite its irregular nature and generally less intense level of combat, counterinsurgency
  may be just as critical to U.S. vital interests as conventional warfare.
  1-2. Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence
  over the relevant population(s) (JP 1). Irregular warfare favors indirect approaches, though it may employ
  the full range of military and other capacities in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.
  Because of its irregular nature, U.S. involvement in a counterinsurgency demands a whole-of-government
  approach. Defeating an insurgency requires a blend of both civilian and military efforts that address both
  assisting the host-nation government in defeating the insurgents on the battlefield and enabling the host
  nation in addressing the root causes of the insurgency. Moreover, after large scale combat or in an
  ungoverned space, there may not be a functioning host-nation government. In those cases, U.S. forces must
  work with population groups in the area and enable them to build governmental capacity. In either case,
  U.S. civilian and military participants in counterinsurgency cannot compensate for lack of will, acceptance
  of corruption, or counterproductive behavior on the part of the supported government or the population.
  1-3. Insurgency in the most basic form is a struggle for control and influence, generally from a position of
  relative weakness, outside existing state institutions. Insurgencies can exist apart from or before, during, or
  after a conventional conflict. Elements of a population often grow dissatisfied with the status quo. When a