text: Chapter 3
  3-4. Potential adversaries are investing in anti-access strategies and area-denial capabilities to counter the
  U.S. ability to project military force into an operational area with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish
  assigned missions. The concept of anti-access/area denial is to control the access into and movement within
  a region. Preclusion, the combination of anti-access and area denial methods, seeks to influence the ability
  of an enemy, outside the region, to introduce forces into the theater and sustain combat power. Many
  countries are pursuing weapon systems, such as ballistic or cruise missiles, which enable anti-access/area
  denial. To deter current and potential adversaries from achieving these objectives, the United States must
  maintain its ability to project power in areas where access and freedom to operate are challenged.
  3-5. From a pure ADA perspective, operational environment considerations are focused on the air domain,
  while maintaining an awareness and understanding of the potential impacts of actions within the other
  domains on AMD operations. The air domain challenges to Army operations include:
  * Increased threats from traditional ballistic missile capabilities. The ballistic missile threat has
  increased both quantitatively and qualitatively, and is likely to continue to do so over the
  foreseeable future. Our known and potential adversaries will continue to challenge both the
  proficiency and sufficiency of U.S. ballistic missile defenses due to the resulting improvement in
  ballistic missile technical sophistication, increase in inventories, advancement of
  countermeasures, and growing proliferation.
  * Expanding spectrum of air and missile threats. Within the last decade, the air and missile arsenal
  of today’s adversaries has become more robust, diverse, and complex. Not only do our adversaries
  have access to the increasingly sophisticated ballistic missiles, but they also have a growing array
  of cruise missiles, UASs, and easily attainable and lethal RAM. All of these air and missile threats
  must be addressed by Army and joint AMD forces within the context of anti-access/area denial
  operations and of defeating increasingly sophisticated countermeasures, electronic attack, and
  cyber efforts.
  THREAT TACTICS AND OBJECTIVES
  3-6. The threat will attempt to develop an overmatch in an area to mitigate the capabilities of the U.S. force.
  Traditional tactics of massing fires to overwhelm a defense and surveilling or attacking from any direction
  and altitude will continue to be employed. In massing fires, for instance, the threat will launch more missiles
  against a defense than the defending Army or joint AMD force can engage. Cruise missiles, UASs, and fixed-
  and rotary-wing aircraft have freedom of maneuver through 360 degrees in support of both attack and
  intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance operations. Threats will prioritize AMD forces and control
  elements as high priority targets.
  3-7. Advanced electronic attack, in which a threat system jams or spoofs across the electromagnetic
  spectrum in an attempt to hamper an ADA system’s ability to detect or engage a threat system or missile,
  will also be employed. And, as the ADA force becomes more network centric, a sophisticated cyber-attack
  could potentially hamper the AMD network’s ability to support the detection, identification, or engagement
  of a target.
  3-8. The threat will continue to exploit the use of countermeasures tailored to the attacking platform and
  the AMD capabilities being countered. Ballistic missiles may employ decoys, in-atmosphere maneuver
  (which may also aid accuracy of delivery), and electronic jamming pods. Air threats may employ electronic
  jamming and spoofing, flares, chaff, and other penetration aids. Penetration aids are devices carried on air
  and missile objects and/or tactics used to counter AMDs. ADA forces must be knowledgeable of the various
  types of countermeasures that could be employed and prepared to defeat them.
  3-9. An emerging tactic is a complex integrated attack which is designed to overwhelm defense of a site by
  the employment of different capabilities. Simple attacks that send one threat type at a time against a defense
  are more easily defeated in detail, as a defense can concentrate its capabilities against the specific operational
  characteristics of that type of threat. For example, when ballistic threats attack within a sector of the defense’s
  coverage, the defense is able to concentrate surveillance and firepower into that sector. However, when out-
  of-sector cruise missiles are integrated with ballistic missile attacks, the defense must counter the combined
  effects of the total attacking force. A complex integrated attack is a synchronized attack of a friendly asset
  by a mix of air and missile threats arriving near-simultaneously from different directions, altitudes, and