text: Operations During Crisis
  brigades to disperse elements into company-sized tactical formations while they are performing maintenance
  checks, loading munitions, ensuring crew readiness, and preparing to move to forward positions. These plans
  may change frequently as new forces arrive, and they will need to be modified for every stage of deployment.
  (See ATP 3-92 for additional details on corps operations.)
  DIVISION
  5-61. The division headquarters performs many of the same activities as the corps headquarters. The division
  headquarters fulfills its primary role as a tactical headquarters staffed, trained, and equipped to command two
  to five BCTs and other subordinate brigades and battalions. One or more of these brigades may be allied
  formations. Upon deployment into a theater, a division may undergo significant task organization in
  preparation for its assigned roles during operations. Initially, during crisis, a division conducts defensive,
  security, and stability tasks in support of joint operations. The primary role of a division during crisis is to
  demonstrate credible coercive force as a combined arms formation. Divisions should expect to conduct short
  notice training exercises with multinational partners and perform other activities that demonstrate capabilities
  as part of crisis response. In an immature theater, a division headquarters should be prepared to accommodate
  the command structure of the next higher echelon until that echelon’s systems are in place. (See ATP 3-91
  for additional details on division operations.)
  BRIGADES
  5-62. During crisis, brigades provide strategic leaders and JFCs with an alternative to deploying a corps or
  division. If strategic leaders or the joint force require a credible and rapidly deployable deterrent during an
  escalating crisis, they may decide to deploy a BCT, functional brigade, multifunctional brigade, or a
  combination thereof as part of a FDO or FRO. To conduct an effective FDO or FRO a brigade could be given
  prepare-to-deploy orders or conduct emergency deployment readiness exercises. Other options include
  moving brigades operating in a theater to dispersed locations with improved survivability that are
  advantageous for defense or integrating these forces into the area or mobile defensive plans of partner nations.
  If there is no corps or division present in the theater, the theater army provides C2 of the brigade. An example
  of a BCT rapidly deployed as an FRO occurred in 2019 in Iraq.
  Crisis Response: Baghdad Embassy Attack
  On 31 December 2019, during a time of heightened tensions with Iran, an initial wave
  of 750 paratroopers from the 82d Airborne division assigned to the immediate response
  force deployed to Baghdad to provide additional security. This deployment was in
  response to an attack that occurred on the U.S. embassy 18 hours earlier. The
  remainder of the Soldiers in the brigade deployed within days. In total, 3,000 Soldiers
  provided additional security at the embassy for almost two months. While forward
  deployed, the Soldiers continued training to demonstrate readiness, and they were
  postured to rapidly respond at the CCDR’s direction.
  CONSOLIDATING GAINS
  5-63. During and after crisis response, Army forces consolidate gains to deny adversary forces the means to
  extend the crisis or create a similar crisis in the future. This will often entail maintaining an enhanced force
  posture in a JOA for a period of time to demonstrate U.S. willingness to defend allies and partners. Army
  forces continue to support improvements to host-nation capabilities through a security cooperation plan
  designed to make them less vulnerable to future crisis. If an adversary directly targets partner forces, or acts
  through a proxy, the United States must be prepared to reconstitute the partner’s forces as quickly as possible.
  The ability of Army forces to reconstitute partner nation forces is especially important to JFCs since, in many
  areas, only the Army has the capacity to conduct a comprehensive security cooperation program. Many allies
  and partners rely primarily on their armies and do not have robust navies or air forces. Consolidating gains