text: Chapter 2
  2-57. Leaders must understand the interdependencies between their own assigned forces and the forces or
  capabilities provided by others to generate the complementary and reinforcing effects of combined arms
  approaches. Army forces employ joint and other unified action partner capabilities to the extent they are
  available. However, because peer threats can contest the force in all domains, Army forces must be prepared
  to conduct operations when some or all joint capabilities are unavailable to support mission accomplishment.
  2-58. Army forces employ organic capabilities in multiple domains, and they continuously benefit from air
  and maritime strategic transportation and space and cyberspace capabilities that they do not control, including
  global positioning, satellite communications, and joint ISR. Lower echelons may not always notice the
  opportunities created by higher echelons or other forces that operate primarily in other domains; however,
  leaders must understand how the absence of those opportunities affects their concepts of operations, decision
  making, and risk assessment. Like all operations, Army intelligence is and has been inherently multidomain
  in terms of the intelligence process.
  RELATIVE ADVANTAGE
  2-59. During operations, small advantages can have significant impacts on the outcome of a mission,
  particularly when they accrue over time. Therefore, creating and exploiting relative advantages are necessary
  for all operations, and they become even more critical when opposing sides are evenly matched. A relative
  advantage is a location or condition, in any domain, relative to an adversary or enemy that provides an
  opportunity to progress towards or achieve an objective (FM 3-0). Commanders seek and create relative
  advantages to exploit through action, and they continually assess the situation to identify ways to expand
  opportunities. Army forces must accurately see themselves, see the enemy or adversary, and understand their
  OE before they can identify and exploit windows of opportunity to reach a relative advantage; this is one
  way that intelligence is critical to operations.
  2-60. Army leaders are accustomed to creating and exploiting relative advantages through the combined-
  arms approach that traditionally focuses on capabilities from the land, maritime, and air domains. The
  proliferation of space and cyberspace capabilities further requires leaders who understand the advantages
  those capabilities create in their OE. The ability to integrate space, counterspace, and cyberspace capabilities
  (which can vary by echelon) expands options for creating advantages to exploit. Multidomain operations
  fracture the coherence of threat operational approaches by destroying, dislocating, isolating, and
  disintegrating their interdependent systems and formations, and by exploiting the opportunities these
  disruptions provide to defeat enemy forces in detail.
  2-61. Army forces combine maneuver and targeting methods to defeat enemy formations and systems. Army
  forces employ maneuver to close with and destroy enemy formations in close operations. Targeting priorities
  support fires and other key capabilities to disintegrate enemy networks and systems. The commander and
  staff must consider the various situational understanding-related requirements and targeting-related
  intelligence requirements and prioritize them accordingly.
  Note. Generally, a thorough situational understanding is necessary to conduct effective targeting.
  Leaders execute the targeting process to create advantages that enable freedom of maneuver and
  exploit the positional advantages created by maneuver. Targeting is a key means for leaders to
  integrate the joint capabilities required to create depth in the OE and protect friendly formations.
  WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY, RELATIVE ADVANTAGES, AND INTELLIGENCE
  2-62. Reaching a position of relative advantage across multiple domains does not just happen. Friendly forces
  must find and exploit a window of opportunity to reach a relative advantage. This effort is closely related to
  planning and creating desired effects (through lethal and nonlethal means) during operations. These windows
  of opportunity could be considered subtasks of or a main task to reaching a position of relative advantage. Both
  a position of relative advantage and a window of opportunity are doctrinal concepts and not concrete graphic
  planning measures such as named areas of interest (NAIs) or decision points. However, a creative staff should
  be able to graphically portray a window of opportunity through a series of related existing graphic planning
  measures like NAIs, decision points, target areas of interest (TAIs), and engagement areas.