text: Introduction
  important operational considerations, such as attack the network, that are essential in counterinsurgency
  operations.
  Chapter 8, “Intelligence,” provides considerations for intelligence in counterinsurgency. Because
  understanding the environment is essential in counterinsurgency, intelligence facilities successful
  operations.
  Chapter 9, “Direct Approaches to Counter an Insurgency,” provides guidance on how the Army and the
  Marine Corps directly counter an insurgency at the operational and tactical level. The operational
  philosophy behind the direct approach is shape-clear-hold-build-transition. If tactical units are directly
  interfacing with a society, they will perform shape-clear-hold-build-transition. In addition to guiding U.S.
  forces’ actions, shape-clear-hold-build-transition also provides a framework for understanding host-nation
  actions. If U.S. forces have to be the primary counterinsurgency force until the host nation can deploy its
  forces, shape-clear-hold-build-transition provides an effective operational approach.
  Chapter 10, “Indirect Methods for Countering Insurgencies,” provides a framework for working with and
  through a host nation. While the U.S. may provide the primary counterinsurgent forces, it may also work
  indirectly through the host nation. There are also important indirect enablers.
  Chapter 11, “Working with Host-Nation Forces,” provides a foundation for understanding how security
  cooperation efforts are integrated into a counterinsurgency effort. Whether U.S. forces are, for a time, the
  primary counterinsurgent forces or they are working indirectly through a host nation, enabling the host
  nation through security cooperation activities is essential.
  Chapter 12, “Assessments,” provides doctrine for understanding how a counterinsurgency environment
  changes and determining if counterinsurgent actions are having an effect on achieving the desired end state.
  Continued assessments are fundamental to understanding how an environment is evolving and reframing
  the basic problems commanders and staffs are facing.
  Chapter 13, “Legal Considerations” provides some legal considerations that are important for commanders
  and staffs to consider in all counterinsurgency operations.
  FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 provides doctrine on how to understand a counterinsurgency environment,
  determine the counterinsurgency problem, and plan and execute operations in that environment. It provides
  guidance to commanders and staffs facing the unique challenges of countering an insurgency. This field
  manual is one manual in a larger doctrinal library that commanders and staffs need to understand in order
  to be effective in countering an insurgency. Any effort to counter an insurgency must be built on broad
  professional competence.
  The Army uses the term intelligence preparation of the battlefield while the Marine Corps uses the term
  intelligence preparation of the battlespace. Both Services use the same definition for these terms. This
  manual uses the term intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace to align with
  FM 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A.