text: Chapter 8
  Fighting for Intelligence During Large-Scale Combat
  Operations
  SECTION I – OVERVIEW
  8-1. Fighting for intelligence during large-scale combat operations (armed conflict) is very different than
  fighting for intelligence during competition and crisis. Before large-scale combat operations and deployment,
  friendly forces have been under continuous enemy observation and influence. Enemy influence has occurred
  through the information dimension (including through social media, telecommunications, human interaction,
  and other forms of communications and contact) with the intent to shape the perceptions, behaviors, and
  decision making of the United States and allied and partner nations. However, with the onset of large-scale
  combat operations and deployment, the amount, intensity, and lethality of enemy actions increase drastically.
  8-2. During large-scale combat operations, operational success requires a successful intelligence effort.
  Intelligence success during large-scale combat operations requires aggressive preparations during
  competition and crisis. Intelligence architecture planning and revising, joint TSA, regional expertise,
  intelligence databases, threat signatures, threat characteristics and models, and intelligence and language
  training must all be developed or conducted before large-scale combat operations; the intelligence
  warfighting must not begin a large-scale combat operation as a cold start.
  8-3. Building on chapters 1 through 7, this chapter focuses on the tactical aspects of large-scale combat
  operations. All echelons are important to operations; theater army and corps echelons, as joint land
  component commands, play pivotal roles in successful large-scale combat operations. However, this chapter
  discusses corps (not as a joint land component command), division, and BCT echelons.
  SECTION II – CHALLENGES
  8-4. There are many challenges to effective intelligence support during large-scale combat operations. Staff
  integration, operational planning, and information collection plans are not foolproof and can become ineffective.
  Army forces compete with a determined and adaptive enemy; therefore, perfect planning and information
  collection seldom occur. Intelligence is not perfect, information collection is not easy, and a single collection
  capability (or even all collection at a single echelon) is not persistent and accurate enough to provide all the answers.
  Conducting information collection requires focused intelligence requirements, thorough and creative planning,
  aggressive execution, and adjustments based on the operational situation to inform the commander’s situational
  understanding and support decision making and targeting.
  8-5. The commander and staff must understand the doctrinal fundamentals of fighting for intelligence and
  maintain proficiency in integrating the intelligence warfighting function into operations. Conducting realistic
  staff and intelligence training and building effective relationships are vital to successful intelligence support during
  the rigors and stresses of combat operations. This section discusses some of the many challenges of a contested
  deployment and the conduct of operations and intelligence support after RSOI.