text: Command and Control of ADA Forces
  CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF ADA FORCES
  4-29. Control is the regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordance
  with the commander’s intent (ADP 6-0). Control extends over the entire force and is executed in the different
  domains by various authorities. In the air domain, the JFC designates the AADC to execute AMD operations
  and the airspace control authority to coordinate the use of the airspace. See paragraph 4-51 on page 4-8 for
  more information.
  4-30. Limited AMD resources, the potentially catastrophic consequences of failed engagements, and the ever
  present risk of fratricide make effective control of AMD fires a top priority of all personnel involved in
  engagement operations. The structure and degree of this control varies based upon situational factors, which
  include span of control, degree of airspace traffic density, operational context (phase of operations), and geo-
  political considerations and sensitivities.
  ELEMENTS OF CONTROL
  4-31. Commanders use control to direct and coordinate the actions of subordinate forces. However, control
  is not a one-way process – it entails the reciprocal flow of information from subordinate elements as well as
  from higher and lateral sources. There are four elements of control: direction, feedback, information, and
  communications.
  DIRECTION
  4-32. Directions are generally transmitted through plans and orders. These may contain amplifying control
  and coordination measures. AMD documents, such as the area air defense plan, airspace control plan, and
  airspace control order, may, for instance, identify air routes through the area of operations, specify who is
  delegated engagement and/or identification authority, activate/deactivate missile engagement zones, and
  establish the weapons control status.
  4-33. Automated C2 tools can enhance the ADA commander’s ability to exercise control to account for
  changing circumstances and direct adjustments within the defense design and ROE to address the new
  situation. These tools facilitate shortened response times to achieve and implement critical C2 decisions and
  directives.
  FEEDBACK
  4-34. Feedback may come from higher headquarters or adjacent, subordinate, or supporting forces, and it
  may occur before, during, or after operations. Feedback conveys concurrence/approval of existing plans or
  activities, or it may recommend/direct changes. Feedback promotes common situational understanding.
  INFORMATION
  4-35. The ability to gather and process information from multiple sources (for example, sensor data, situation
  reports, and unit movement reports) allows commanders and their staffs to see and understand the air battle.
  While this holds true for all phases of the fight, it is particularly critical as maneuver forces look to seize the
  initiative and execute decisive action against the enemy. Given the pace of these operations, this information
  must be timely and unambiguous. While this has proven to be a challenge across all domains, the ability to
  gather and process this information as it pertains to the airspace has been particularly daunting. The lack of
  a real-time air picture at BCTs and functional brigades forces these commanders to accept what amounts to
  incalculable risk when factoring in the enemy’s ability to influence (interdict, delay, or disrupt) their schemes
  of maneuver to achieve decisive action. ADAM cells must establish communications and information
  exchange procedures with ADA units and other AMD assets, within their assigned brigades’ areas of
  operations, in order to leverage the capabilities those assets provide. Even if they do not have all the assets
  to defeat the potential air threat, identifying and understanding it allows brigade commanders to assess the
  risk and implement measures to mitigate it.