text: Chapter 13
  13-18. Properly established command and support relationships are critical to the success of the SFAB and
  its SFA mission. The SFAB’s Army Service component command headquarters consider the following SFAB
  traits prior to establishing their command relationships:
  • SFABs are optimized to operate at the advisor team level. Breaking teams apart degrades their
  ability to conduct advisor team activities.
  • SFABs can task-organize advisor teams from across a brigade against unique FSF requirements by
  location.
  • SFABs are designed to manage, coordinate, and adjust SFA tasks at the tactical and operational
  levels to support strategic goals.
  • SFABs have no capability to conduct independent combat operations against an enemy force.
  • SFABs have a very limited ability to sustain themselves.
  • SFABs expand combined combat power up to two echelons above a unit type. For instance, a
  captain-led team could integrate a battalion and a lieutenant colonel-led battalion advising team
  could integrate a division.
  • SFABs enable partner forces access to joint fires and effects.
  COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION SUPPORT
  13-19. Despite the existence of a broadly accepted regime of international agreements, adversaries continue
  to develop and field weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to gain an advantage against the United States and
  its allies. To prevent, dissuade, or deny adversaries or potential adversaries from possessing or proliferating
  WMD, U.S. forces work with UAPs to support countering WMD, prevention, protection, and response
  efforts.
  13-20. The United States, its partners, and allies face an increasing WMD threat from actors who operate
  transregionally and require U.S. forces and allies to counter with a coordinated approach. The DOD
  contributes to the U.S. Government efforts by providing joint forces to deter the use of WMD.
  13-21. Countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) operations have a greater likelihood of success if
  planned in cooperation with allies and partner nations. Countering weapons of mass destruction are efforts
  against actors of concern to curtail the conceptualization, development, possession, proliferation, use, and
  effects of weapons of mass destruction, related expertise, materials, technologies, and means of delivery
  (JP 3-40). Unity of command and unified action are essential to CWMD. CWMD shaping activities planned
  and executed in cooperation with partners can alleviate concerns regarding acquiring, developing or using
  WMD and alleviate the need for more aggressive and costly action later. (Refer to JP 3-40 for details on
  CWMD operations.)
  13-22. CWMD programs are a part of a network. When operating with a partner or host nation, it can be
  expected, and generally encouraged, for the partner or host nation to take the lead in dealing with the local
  populace. A host nation understands the adversary language and culture making the host nation better at
  communicating transportation, financing, production, and storage capabilities to other partners. An in-
  country source understands the WMD threat an adversary might use. Language similarities between partners
  or host nations and adversaries may aid in information collection.
  13-23. Multinational doctrine helps guide employing the forces of two or more nations in coordinated action.
  In some cases, multinational doctrine is required for CWMD. For example, NATO has developed doctrine
  for CBRN defense and CWMD. The increased potential of forces to encounter CBRN hazards during CWMD
  activities necessitates planning interoperability of warning and reporting systems. Standardization of reports
  among partner nations improves communication. Partners prepare standardized reports to clearly
  communicate WMD hazards to enable understanding and response. Many partner nations use NATO Allied
  Technical Publication-45 to standardize exchanging CBRN information.
  13-24. Integrated multinational sustainment may improve efficiency and effectiveness, but unique national
  equipment requirements for CBRN environments pose challenges. Operations in CBRN environments can
  increase demand on the logistics system for consumables that may be unique to each nation. For example,
  filter systems and protection equipment may not be interoperable with all nations. The United States and
  many NATO countries may follow NATO standardization recommendations and STANAGs to unify