text: Chapter 6
  joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, and fire support including
  attack helicopters, fighter aircraft, armed Predator unmanned aircraft systems, and
  Shadow unmanned aircraft systems. This arrangement gave the brigade commander a
  short decision response time,rapidly increasing the tempo of attacks to disrupt Jaish al-
  Mahdi operations.
  An early priority was to stop the rocket and mortar attacks on the International Zone. Jaish
  al-Mahdi fighters could launch these attacks quickly and almost at will. These attacks
  simply required pulling a vehicle into a firing position,unloading the rocket and its firing
  rail,firing off the rocket,and driving back to a hide position. U.S. forces quickly realized
  that the International Zone was at the extreme end of the 107-millimeter (mm) rocket’s
  range. Thesolution was to force Jaish al-Mahdi fighters out of their firing positions and
  back into Sadr City. This approach did not stop Jaish al-Mahdi infiltration. The brigade
  then employed an innovative but straightforward approach: It walled off two
  neighborhoods south of Sadr City,including the one containing the Jamilla market where
  Jaish al-Mahdi fighters obtained much of their resources. This inventive plan consisted of
  T-wall sections, each twelve feet tall and weighing 9000 pounds. The wall became
  impenetrable; a nearly five-kilometer long barrier that denied Jaish al-Mahdi fighters
  what had been terrain and avenues of movement crucial to its operations. The fighting was
  particularly intense and required the brigade commander to commit Abrams tanks and
  Bradley fighting vehicles to dislodge Jaish al Mahdi fighters and protect the soldiers
  building the wall. As soon as the wall started to go up, Jaish al Mahdi fighters instantly
  recognized the threat posed to their operations and launched numerous attacks to stop its
  construction. Thewall,in the words of one U.S. commander,became a terrorist magnet.
  U.S. forces fought from a position of advantage, massing the effects of combat power to
  defeat the Jaish al-Mahdi fighters’assaults. Whilethe construction of the T-wall ultimately
  squelched the rocket attacks by defeating Jaish al-Mahdi fighters, U.S. forces waged an
  intense and instructive concentration of counterfire operation.
  Key to the counterfire operation was giving the brigade commander direct access to joint
  intelligence,surveillance,and reconnaissance assets so that the commander could identify
  firing locations almost immediately without having to consult with another headquarters.
  The commander could also pass intelligence rapidly by using secure communications down
  to the company level. The commander could attack enemy firing points around the clock
  with a formidable array of assets, including Apache helicopters, air component fighter
  aircraft, and armed Predator unmanned aircraft systems. Brigade intelligence analysts
  honed their techniques over time and learned to follow Jaish al-Mahdi rocket teams to
  their source rather than attack them immediately. This tactic allowed the U.S. forces to
  strike ammo dumps and senior leaders at a time or place the enemy did not expect. This
  tactic had a profound effect,more so than if they had destroyed a vehicle and a few fighters.
  The overall results were impressive. In about two months,U.S. and Iraqi forces obliterated
  Jaish al-Mahdi fighters, killing an estimated 700, won back significant numbers of the
  population, and re-established control of what had been an insurgent stronghold. U.S.
  forces killed in action numbered fewer than ten. Furthermore,the Multi-national Division-
  Baghdad exploited the success of the combat gains in Sadr City with an intensive campaign
  of providing local security and reconstruction, all complemented by information
  operations. In addition to the key lessons highlighted above, other key lessons emerged.
  First, persistent intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, security operations, and
  responsive precision strikes were crucial to success because they were integrated at low
  levels. Second, ground maneuver forces were essential. Aggressive ground maneuver
  forced the enemy to react and enabled U.S. forces to seize control of the terrain south of
  Sadr City and to erect the barrier. Finally, capable indigenous forces were decisive in
  securing gains. Their presence signaled that Iraqis were in charge, not coalition forces
  that would leave eventually.
  Jerry Salinger