text: Chapter 8
  Intelligence
  8-1. Intelligence must drive operations in a counterinsurgency. Commanders and staffs must understand
  the area of operations in a counterinsurgency. The insurgency in Peru demonstrates that intelligence
  capabilities can be integrated with information operations and integrated monetary shaping operations to
  successfully undermine an insurgency. The Peruvian government was eventually successful in using
  economic development and an information campaign to weaken the Shining Path insurgency. With the
  gradual development of an effective military, Peru was able to continue its success. Intelligence, resulting
  in the capture of the Shining Path’s leader, changed the nature of the insurgency and significantly reduced
  the threat of the Shining Path to Peru.
  Intelligence and the Shining Path
  Peru suffered an unprecedented economic downturn in the 1970s and
  1980s. The Peruvian government, though democratic, was characteristically
  ineffective and unable to stem the worsening crisis. This opened the door for an
  insurgent organization, the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), and its establishment
  of alternative governance structures in the economically devastated Peruvian
  highlands. Sendero Luminoso leaders purged local officials and established their own
  authority in the villages, beating back control efforts by the Peruvian police.
  In the first few years of the insurgency, the government did not take the
  threat seriously. Opposition to the insurgents (such as it was) was organized by local
  police, and the government made no effort to improve the desperate socioeconomic
  conditions in the highlands or to define a clear mission for regional security forces.
  With its superior organization and a lack of effective response by the government,
  Sendero Luminoso made significant progress. Its operations and propaganda were
  coordinated to create the perception that the group was a “winner” and was meeting
  its Maoist strategic goals, in sharp contrast to the largely ineffective government.
  Still plagued by a lack of internal unity both in the government and in the
  military, the state moved forward with two competing counterinsurgency strategies:
  one focused on development and the other focused on ideology and military force.
  First proposed in 1984, the developmental approach finally got its turn in 1985. The
  state recognized that the highlands were particularly hard hit by the economic crisis
  and were the heartland of the insurgency, so its goal was to increase development
  and job opportunities in these regions. Public investment in Ayacucho (a region in the
  southern highlands) quadrupled between 1985 and 1986. Unfortunately, the
  insurgents actively resisted this development, or co-opted it, forcing government
  teachers to include Sendero Luminoso materials in their curricula. The government
  did not provide the security necessary for development to have any effect.
  Subsequent to 1986, development funding fell off, and embezzlement became
  common. As a result, this initial push of development and investment fell far short of
  meeting the needs of the economically disadvantaged population in the highlands.
  The election of Alberto Fujimori in June 1990 raised new hopes of resolving
  the conflicts within the government and making greater headway against the
  insurgents. Fujimori promised a better human rights record and a new commitment to
  development. In addition to renewed government legitimacy, the Fujimori
  administration also brought two significant improvements to Peru’s approach to
  counterinsurgency: first, the use of the police and the national intelligence service to
  track the movements of Sendero Luminoso sympathizers and attempt to infiltrate the
  group and, second, the arming of rondas, peasant civil-defense militias. These