text: Chapter 8
  8-30. For instance, if soldiers commit massacres or atrocities against POWs or against the civilian population
  of occupied territory, the responsibility may rest not only with the actual perpetrators, but also with the
  commander if the commander’s dereliction contributed to the offense. If the commander concerned ordered
  such acts be carried out, then the commander would have direct criminal responsibility (UCMJ, Art. 77: “Any
  person punishable under this chapter who – commits an offense punishable by this chapter, or… commands…
  its commission… is a principal.”).
  8-31. Under international law, criminal responsibility may also fall on commanders or certain civilian
  superiors with similar authorities and responsibilities as military commanders if they had actual knowledge
  or constructive knowledge of their subordinates’ actions and failed to take “necessary and reasonable”
  measures to prevent or repress those violations. That is, commanders may be held responsible if they knew
  or should have known, through reports received by them or by other means, that troops or other persons
  subject to their control were about to commit or have committed a war crime and did nothing to prevent such
  crimes or punish the violators. Once established that a commander has knowledge (actual or constructive) of
  a subordinates’ actions, the commander may be liable under international law only where failure to supervise
  subordinates properly constitutes criminal negligence on the commander’s part. That is, the commander may
  be criminally liable where there is personal neglect amounting to a wanton, immoral disregard of the action
  of the commander’s subordinates that amounts to acquiescence in the crimes.
  Aiding and Abetting
  8-32. An individual who aids and abets, as well as one who counsels, commands, assists, encourages,
  advises, or instigates another to commit an offense or one who procures the commission of an offense may
  be held responsible for an offense equally as one who actually commits the offense (see UCMJ, Art. 77).
  Aiding and abetting liability for an offense can be usefully analyzed by evaluating: (1) knowledge of the
  illegal activity being aided, abetted, or counseled; (2) a desire to help the activity succeed; and (3) some act
  of helping (see DOD Law of War Manual, 18.23.4).
  Conspiracy
  8-33. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons agree to commit a criminal offense and at least one of
  the persons does something to effect the agreed-upon offense while the agreement exists. Under U.S. law,
  conspiracy can take one of two forms. First, it can be based on a completed crime, such as the murder of
  civilians. Conspiracy entails intentional participation in a common plan to complete a war crime. The
  individual need not engage in the physical act of the war crime. He or she must intentionally participate in
  the common plan, although the role can be relatively minor. To be found guilty under U.S. law, an accused
  need not have prior knowledge of a particular crime, as long as the accused intended to aid acts of similar
  character, such as the murder of civilians. Second, conspiracy can be charged as a separate, stand-alone
  offense requiring only an agreement and some overt act furthering the agreement (also known as inchoate
  conspiracy).
  8-34. The crime of conspiracy can be found in a number of statutes applicable to war crimes, including the
  War Crimes Act, other sections of Title 18 of the U.S. Code, the UCMJ, and the Military Commissions Act
  (MCA). Defendants have argued in litigation that the Constitution does not allow for the offense of
  conspiracy to be tried by military commission because it is not an offense under the international law of war.
  The Government has responded to that argument by, among other things, noting that U.S. military
  commissions tried and convicted a number of defendants on conspiracy charges during the Civil War and
  World War II. Current appellate litigation in the Military Commissions may afford U.S. practitioners with
  clarity on this issue. (Compare UCMJ art. 81, 10 U.S.C. § 881, with 10 U.S.C. § 950t (29)).
  Joint Criminal Enterprise
  8-35. Although not specifically reflected in U.S. law, international criminal tribunals in recent years have
  held individuals acting together with others pursuant to a common design, guilty of offenses committed by
  other members of the group, even though the individual did not commit the punishable offense personally;
  this form of liability is very similar to the first form of conspiracy discussed above (paragraph 8-33) (see, for
  example, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, 220 (International Criminal Tribunal for the
  former Yugoslavia [ICTY] App. Chamber, July 15, 1999)). This basis is sometimes referred to as joint