text: Planning
  and MDOs must understand and subsequently collaborate to diagram key elements and complete a worksheet
  or other planning template that corresponds to each conduit for use in future planning.
  Understand the Enemy’s Intelligence and Counterintelligence Organizations and Capabilities
  2-49. Enemy decision making stems from its intelligence and counterintelligence organizations and
  capabilities that support them (to include external intelligence sources). To manipulate or augment the
  information available to a deception target, the MDO needs detailed knowledge of the enemy’s ability to see
  and interpret all relevant friendly activities and indicators. Traditionally, the G-2 analyzes enemy intelligence
  and counterintelligence capabilities, organizations, and functions. By leveraging the full scope of resources,
  the G-2 provides the enemy’s perception of friendly goals and objectives, the enemy’s perception of friendly
  technical estimates, and the enemy’s intelligence process.
  2-50. The G-2 provides the enemy’s perceptions of friendly capabilities. This analysis includes an enemy
  perspective analysis of friendly probable goals and objectives, friendly most probable and dangerous COAs,
  a blue center of gravity analysis, and any other fundamental assumptions or perceptions the enemy has
  developed about friendly activities, capabilities, or intent.
  2-51. The G-2 provides detailed technical estimates of the enemy’s collection capabilities, intelligence
  networks, and reporting channels. Ideally, this analysis includes the capabilities of FIEs that share intelligence
  with the enemy. The G-2 can capture this information within the deception running estimate by organizing
  threat capabilities under the intelligence disciplines: geospatial intelligence, human intelligence, signals
  intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, open-source intelligence, technical intelligence, and
  counterintelligence. Deception planners need the scope of this analysis to identify a particular threat’s
  collection capabilities anywhere that they provide potential knowledge of friendly plans.
  2-52. The G-2 also provides knowledge of the enemy’s intelligence process: planning and direction,
  collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination and integration. The
  MDO needs to understand every sensor, link, node, and potential filter in the conduit through which that
  event’s execution was transmitted. This knowledge enables planners to inject deceptive information into the
  enemy’s intelligence system as a deception event, track its delivery to the decision maker, and evaluate
  whether the execution produced the desired perception or effect. Knowledge of the enemy’s intelligence
  process requires sufficient fidelity of intelligence in the deception running estimate to conduct a reasonably
  accurate enemy conduit analysis with minimal assumptions later in the planning process.
  Analyze the Enemy’s Potential Vulnerability to Deception
  2-53. To fully analyze a target for deception, planners analyze the enemy’s vulnerability to deception and
  conditions that might favor the enemy in protecting against deception. MDOs use the framework of physical,
  informational, and cognitive dimensions of the information environment. Sample vulnerabilities in the
  physical dimension include shortfalls in collecting or processing capability and vulnerabilities in force
  structure or capability. Examples of vulnerabilities in the informational dimension might include such things
  as poor information management or data processing capability and overdependence on vulnerable or non-
  redundant communications networks. Cognitive vulnerabilities to deception can include such things as
  predisposition or bias, an overly burdensome decision-process model, poor decision quality (group think,
  single point of failure, or lack of subordinate autonomy), or poor decision timeliness (a leader who cannot
  come to a decision quickly). Enemy strengths in the areas mentioned above are normally inverse statements
  to examples provided.
  Analyze Enemy Deception and Counterdeception Doctrine and Resources
  2-54. Planners fully analyze a target for deception by exploring an enemy’s deception and counterdeception
  doctrine and capability. Knowing an enemy’s deception doctrine and capability is critical to deception
  planning. It can enable analysts and MDOs to understand the emphasis the enemy places on deception and
  thus vigilance in its detection. This knowledge also provides the necessary awareness to help friendly forces
  identify when the enemy might use deception to influence friendly decision making.