text: FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
  ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS
  1-47. Generally, the State conducts adaptive operations as a consequence of
  intervention from outside the region. Once an extraregional force intervenes
  with sufficient power to overmatch the State, the full conventional design
  used in regionally-focused operations is no longer sufficient to deal with this
  threat. The State has developed its doctrine, organization, capabilities, and
  strategy with an eye toward dealing with both regional and extraregional op-
  ponents. It has already planned how it will adapt to this new and changing
  threat and has included this adaptability in its doctrine.
  1-48. The State’s immediate goal is survivalas a regime and as a nation.
  However, its long-term goal is still the expansion of influence within its re-
  gion. In the State’s view, this goal is only temporarily thwarted by the ex-
  traregional intervention. Accordingly, planning for adaptive operations fo-
  cuses on effects over time. The State believes that patience is its ally and an
  enemy of the extraregional force and its intervention in regional affairs.
  1-49. The State believes that adaptive operations can lead to several possible
  outcomes. If the results do not completely resolve the conflict in the State’s
  favor, they may at least allow the State to return to regional operations. Even
  a stalemate may be a victory for the State, as long as it preserves enough of
  its instruments of power to preserve the regime and lives to fight another day.
  1-50. When an extraregional power intervenes with sufficient force to over-
  match the State’s, the OPFOR has to adapt its patterns of operation. It still
  has the same forces and technology that were available to it for regional op-
  erations, but must use them in creative and adaptive ways. It has already
  thought through how it will adapt to this new or changing threat in general
  terms. (See Principles of Operation Versus an Extraregional Power below.) It has
  already developed appropriate branches and sequels to its basic SCP and does
  not have to rely on improvisation. During the course of combat, it will make fur-
  ther adaptations, based on experience and opportunity.
  1-51. Even with the intervention of an advanced extraregional power, the State
  will not cede the initiative. It will employ military means so long as this does not
  either place the regime at risk or risk depriving it of sufficient force to remain a
  regional power after the extraregional intervention is over. The primary objec-
  tives are to preserve combat power, to degrade the enemy’s will and capability to
  fight, and to gain time for aggressive strategic operations to succeed.
  1-52. The OPFOR will seek to conduct adaptive operations in circumstances,
  opportunities, and terrain that optimize its own capabilities and degrade
  those of the enemy. It will employ a force that is optimized for the terrain or
  for a specific mission. For example, it will use its antitank capability, tied to ob-
  stacles and complex terrain, inside a defensive structure designed to absorb the
  enemy’s momentum and fracture his organizational framework.
  1-53. The types of adaptive actions that characterize “adaptive operations” at
  the strategic level can also serve the OPFOR well in regional or transition
  operationsat least at the tactical and operational levels. However, once an
  extraregional force becomes fully involved in the conflict, the OPFOR will
  conduct adaptive actions more frequently and on a larger scale.