text: Chapter 9
  Direct Methods for Countering Insurgencies
  9-1. The direct method of using United States (U.S.) land, maritime, and air forces in a decisive action
  role is resource intensive when done on a large scale, but it is often necessary to fully support a
  counterinsurgency effort. A direct method may be used, for example, when the success of a host nation’s
  counterinsurgency efforts is critical to U.S. interests. The U.S. can use a direct method after or during a
  major conflict or when U.S. interests necessitate stability in a failed or failing state. Leaders can also
  integrate land forces into a host nation’s ongoing effort. Unfortunately, unintended consequences, such as
  increased tensions among segments of society or resistance to U.S. involvement, often accompany a direct
  approach. Leaders must carefully plan and execute operations before and during a direct response to avoid
  negative consequences. However, using direct capabilities remains a valid option and an important
  capability that the Army and Marine Corps provide the joint force.
  9-2. The level of direct U.S. involvement can vary. In many cases, a host nation will be fully capable of
  providing security for its population. However, integration of fires or a direct action force could enable a
  host nation’s counterinsurgency efforts. The Army and Marine Corps bring many capabilities that can be
  integrated into a counterinsurgency effort. When counterinsurgents consider direct involvement, they
  should consider a wide spectrum of activities that range from a modest force conducting limited missions to
  a large force that could be, at least for a time, the primary counterinsurgency force.
  9-3. The U.S. has a wide range of capabilities that it can use to create many different operational
  approaches to counter an insurgency. Direct involvement by U.S. forces can take place along a spectrum,
  from little direct U.S. involvement to U.S. forces acting as the primary counterinsurgents. If U.S. forces are
  acting temporarily as the primary counterinsurgents, the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework forms
  a tactical and operational background for battalion and brigade operations. While the shape-clear-hold-
  build-transition framework must be enabled with other capabilities, such as security force assistance, the
  shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework provides a framework for how Army and Marine forces will
  defeat an insurgency at the tactical level. Moreover, this tactical background also creates a frame of
  reference for understanding actions by the host nation to defeat an insurgency. This understanding is
  essential in integrating U.S. capabilities into a host-nation effort.
  9-4. Counterinsurgents should not think that all counterinsurgencies end the same way. The shape-clear-
  hold-build-transition framework provides a good framework for a protracted struggle. Counterinsurgencies
  are conducted using a wide range of different approaches. For example, the insurgency in Sri Lanka was
  fought using conventional tactics and ended in a traditional offensive operation. It ended in something that
  looked much more like a conventional offensive operation then an application of the shape-clear-hold-
  build-transition framework. In some cases, the government or insurgents can impose their impose their will
  and control the population. While counterinsurgents should remember that specific insurgencies are unique,
  for many insurgencies, the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is a starting point for understanding
  host-nation actions and then enabling those actions.
  SHAPE-CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD-TRANSITION FRAMEWORK
  9-5. For a tactical and operational ground commander acting as the primary counterinsurgent commander,
  the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework provides a foundation for detailed planning. Moreover, the
  shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is well-suited to those commanders and staffs engaged in
  training, advising, or integrating capabilities into a host-nation effort. If a host nation is performing
  operations, whatever the U.S. role in the counterinsurgency, Soldiers and Marines must have a framework
  for understanding that host nation’s actions. Commanders and staffs cannot evaluate, advise, or train
  another force unless they have a base of knowledge on the operations being conducted. In many
  counterinsurgency efforts, a state will try to defeat insurgencies by performing a general operational