text: Support to Host Nation Security Forces
  Host Nation AAR
  8-108. First, an advisor should never take credit for an idea; instead, they should empower their
  counterpart. Discuss the issue and come up with the solution together, even if he has the answer. The point
  is that advisors are mentoring them to come up with solutions of their own in the future. Second, by giving
  them the credit and making them look good the leader will more readily come to the advisors for advice
  and take advice more readily in the future.
  8-109. Advisors should cover all activities and salient points (sustainment and improvement) for each
  phase of the operation, including information engagements. The AAR should conclude with a plan
  to follow-up and make improvements as necessary. Just as with US forces, an AAR with the HN security
  forces is not only potentially of great value but it is also potentially full of pitfalls. To evaluate the HN
  security forces, the advisors should assess at a minimum—
  • Leadership
  • Level of training demonstrated on operations
  • Use and effectiveness of administrative/logistics (as applicable).
  • Professionalism to include human rights and dealing with civilians.
  8-110. Advisors need to bring up general positive points with the groups, but they should refrain from
  singling out a leader, staff, soldier, or unit to provide criticism in front of others. The US military culture
  of group AARs to discuss all mistakes is a technique we find valuable because our culture accepts it
  as important for improvement. Most other cultures do not accept pointing out criticisms of one person
  or group to another. The advisor should take that member or unit aside and discuss the issue. Let them talk
  about how to improve this point in a productive way. Figure 8-10 shows an example AAR for a Host
  Nation security force after and operation.
  Commander's One-on-One
  8-111. Remember some AAR points are best kept between the advisor and the Host Nation commander.
  Internal Advisor AAR
  8-112. In order to effectively advise HN security forces, the US Advisor Team should also conduct an
  internal AAR, focusing on what the Team must sustain and improve. An internal AAR is for the advisors
  only and should cover three primary topics:
  • Conduct of advisors and US partner
  • Conduct of the HN security force
  • Review ROE/EOF for effectiveness and compliance/training level
  EMPLOYMENT OF NEWLY TRAINED FORCES IN COIN
  8-113. Building the morale and confidence of HN security forces should be a long term objective.
  Committing poorly trained and badly led forces results in high casualties and invites tactical defeats. While
  defeat in a small operation may have little effect on the outcome of a conventional war, even a small
  tactical defeat of HN security forces can have serious strategic consequences, since COIN is largely about
  perceptions. Effective insurgent leaders can quickly turn minor wins into major propaganda victories.
  In short, the HN security forces must be prepared for operations so that they have every possible
  advantage. The decision to commit units to their first actions and their employment method requires careful
  consideration. As much as possible, HN security forces should begin with simpler missions. As their
  confidence and competence grows, these forces can assume more complex assignments.