text: Defensive Considerations in Counterinsurgency
  In 1965, the Marine Corps created the Marine Combined Action Program (CAP) in Vietnam. The plan
  was to incorporate a Marine Squad with a Vietnamese Popular Defense Force platoon on the Fort Page
  firebase.
  On June 10, 1965, 12 Marines from C Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines were placed with a
  Vietnamese Popular Defense Force platoon of about 30 men in a village. Binh Nghia had long been a
  "hotbed" of Viet Cong activity. Aggressive patrols and intelligence gained by the Popular Defense Force
  soldiers immediately disrupted Viet Cong Operations, and the sector grew quiet. The Viet Cong
  requested support from the 409 North Vietnamese Army Battalion. They planned to attack Fort Page and
  destroy the CAP. This would free the Viet Cong to resume regular operations.
  On September 14, 1965, the CAP was conducting normal night patrols, leaving Fort Page with only 6
  Marines and 12 Vietnamese soldiers. Forgetting that the CAP's presence was responsible for the lull in
  Viet Cong activity, the squad leader lowered American security from 2 Marines to 1 Marine per guard
  shift. This left Vietnamese Soldiers almost completely in charge of Fort Page security. Viet Cong Sappers
  infiltrated that night and killed 6 Vietnamese Soldiers and 5 Marines. A reserve squad from a nearby
  Marine company firebase arrived on scene after the NVA battalion withdrew. The Viet Cong thought they
  had won.
  The next morning, the Marine Division Commander asked remaining Marines if they wanted to stay. To a
  soldier, they did. At night, the Marines and Vietnamese soldiers doubled their security, and Viet Cong
  operations came to a complete stop.
  In March 1967, the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army planned another attack on Fort Page. The
  CAP had reliable intelligence about the attack, and sent out two patrols to provide early warning. Fearing
  a repeat of the 1965 attack, Marine commanders ordered the CAP to retire under threat of court martial.
  The Marine squad leader asked his squad what they thought.
  One said, “They’re not getting this fort. They’re not getting this ville. I’m not leaving here, no matter what.”
  The Marines stayed. When one of the CAP patrols killed the NVA battalion scout, the rest of the battalion
  withdrew.
  Fort Page was never again threatened. By the time the Marines withdrew from Binh Nghia, the
  Vietnamese soldiers were patrolling in buddy teams on their own.
  COUNTER AMBUSH
  6-61. Ambushes are a basic tactic commonly used by guerrilla forces. As such, counterinsurgent forces
  must continually operate under the understanding that they will encounter an ambush. Counterinsurgent
  forces must therefore develop specific local procedures to both react to and to counter ambushes. Typical
  complex insurgent ambushes involve IEDs, small arms fire, mortars, and sniper fire.
  CONSIDERATIONS DURING COUNTERINSURGENCIES
  6-62. The goal for tactical units is to identify and attack or disrupt the ambush force before it can initiate
  the ambush. Additionally, if the insurgents’ kill zone can be identified before the insurgents are in position,
  then the ambushers can be attacked as they move into position. Any counterinsurgency unit that
  is ambushed must immediately return fire and assault the ambushers. Specific considerations include—
  • Avoid massing personnel or vehicles.
  • Prepare a reaction plan that includes assaulting the ambushers.
  • Ensure only part of the element is in a kill zone at the same time (usually means dispersion).
  • Maintain control of your immediate tactical space (within 100 meters).
  • Where insurgents are likely to establish ambushes, establish counter ambushes.
  • Emplace sniper teams or other forces to overwatch likely insurgent routes to ambush sites.