text: Chapter 12
  ASSESSMENT METHODS
  12-6. Selecting the appropriate approach to assessment is the commander’s most important assessment
  decision. Assessment methodologies may be centralized, decentralized, or both. A centralized methodology
  requires units to collect and report information requirements to their higher headquarters for analysis and
  situational understanding. This is a common methodology and is often described as pattern and trend
  analysis. Pattern and trend analysis uses centralized quantitative analysis to produce a snapshot of the
  operation’s momentum over time. Pattern and trend analysts tend to accept that counterinsurgency data will
  be inaccurate and incomplete, but when viewed in aggregate this data will be sufficient to produce relevant,
  centralized, and quantifiable analysis. Pattern and trend analysis measures progress, but it is not truly an
  assessment. The problem with the centralized approach to assessment is that the decentralized nature of
  counterinsurgency prevents the development of any centralized model to understand the important nuances
  of local context. Decentralized assessments enable subordinate units to develop and measure progress
  locally. The interaction between levels of command is critical to informing the higher commander.
  Although decentralized assessments are preferred by the lower tactical levels, actual measurement of
  progress is limited by the lack of a common starting point. This often gives the best picture of a local
  situation, but it lacks the context of how it compares to other locations. Senior commanders must weigh the
  results by comparing assessments with dissimilar measurements. This makes the development of an
  aggregate analysis very difficult.
  12-7. Military forces in counterinsurgencies usually use a combination of these two assessment methods,
  choosing common reporting requirements for all subordinates but also requiring a subjective analysis from
  each of the subordinate commanders to aid in informing the senior commanders’ situational understanding.
  Units report qualitative statistics to enable pattern analysis, and commanders provide quantitative analysis
  to fully depict what the statistics mean at the local level. The combined assessment involves a top down
  planning, bottom-up refinement approach in which analysis is conducted at the level the data is collected
  and reports to higher headquarters include narratives from local commanders. This type of assessment
  eschews the establishment of core level metrics at the highest levels and allows commanders to establish
  additional metrics in accordance with their situation and their resources. Combined assessment generally
  results in more accurate reporting and efficient use of collection and analysis resources.
  12-8. In geographically distributed, decentralized counterinsurgency campaigns, only a few activities
  produce similar outcomes or are consistently implemented across the theater of operations. What is
  important in one area may not be important in another. Similarly, what works in one area may not work in
  another area.
  ASSESSMENT CONSIDERATIONS
  12-9. Assessment begins as soon as a military force receives an alert or warning and does not end until
  after that force has ceased operations and left the area of operations. Assessment begins with an initial
  assessment that serves as the basis for planning. Planning develops this into an operational assessment that
  evaluates plan effectiveness and focus. The assessment is continually reassessed. Often plans are updated
  because of the reassessment process.
  12-10. The assessment should reflect the achievements of collaborating partners. Military forces cannot
  defeat an insurgency alone. Assessors must realize that information about the underlying root causes for
  social, cultural, political, and economic turbulence will probably be incomplete. Obtaining reliable
  information can be costly and time-consuming. Assessors should be extremely wary of methods that claim
  to provide this information quickly. An assessment based on faulty information can result in military force
  actions that are counterproductive. It is better for assessors to monitor the situation, track what every
  organization is doing, and be clear about what they do not know. The next step is to postulate, hypothesize,
  and clearly state what assumptions the evaluation process is making. Assessors seek information to test
  assumptions and revise estimates as operations continue.
  12-11. At its core, a counterinsurgency environment is a political problem. Understanding and solving the
  political problem is the essence of counterinsurgency operations. A counterinsurgency environment is
  complex, with many lines of effort covering a variety of political, military, economic, social,
  infrastructural, and informational activities. As such, developing a comprehensive assessment is a