text: Appendix C
  in sufficient combat power to encircle the friendly force in strength, and weak points probably exist in the
  enemy force’s perimeter.
  C-49. Early in an encirclement, there are gaps between or weaknesses in the enemy’s encircling forces. The
  friendly unit uses available reconnaissance and surveillance assets, including available joint systems, to
  provide information that increases the accuracy of the unit’s situational understanding and determines enemy
  weak points. The unit’s plans for the breakout attack capitalize on those identified weak points. Although the
  resulting attack may be along a less direct route or over less favorable terrain, it is the best COA because it
  avoids enemy strength and increases the chance for surprise.
  C-50. An encircled force may be operating under adverse conditions and may not have its normal information
  collection capabilities. This forces the encircled unit to conduct aggressive reconnaissance to collect
  information on enemy forces. The encircled unit also obtains information from joint assets, stay-behind units,
  and special operations forces in the area. If the enemy force is in close contact, the encircled unit may need
  to conduct a reconnaissance in force to ascertain enemy strengths. In any case, the unit quickly selects a COA
  and develops a plan accordingly.
  C-51. A supporting effort, such as a deception, assists a breakout by diverting enemy attention and resources
  away from the rupture effort. The force conducting a supporting effort may be located either inside or outside
  the encirclement area. The enemy force must regard the efforts of this force as credible and a threat to the
  continuity of the enemy force’s maneuver plan. The encircled commander directs the friendly force’s
  deception efforts to a point where the enemy force might expect a breakout or relief effort. The deception
  force is as mobile as available vehicles, fuel stocks, and trafficability allow, so it can reposition to take part
  in the breakout or maneuver elsewhere to support the breakout. Mobile, self-propelled weapons systems suit
  the needs of forces conducting supporting efforts. Additionally, the probability of a successful breakout
  increases measurably if another friendly force attacks toward the encircled force as it attempts to breakout.
  C-52. The encircled unit conducts tactical deception along with cyberspace electromagnetic activities tasks
  to assist the breakout attempt. Cyberspace electromagnetic activities is the process of planning, integrating,
  and synchronizing cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare operations in support of unified land
  operations (ADP 3-0). Tactical deception operations mislead enemy forces about the intentions of the
  encircled force, especially the location of the breakout attempt. For example, unmanned aircraft can
  concentrate their activities in an area away from where the rupture effort occurs to deceive enemy forces as
  to the exact location of the rupture. If it is not possible to breakout immediately, the encircled unit attempts
  to deceive enemy forces regarding the time and place of the breakout by concealing friendly breakout
  preparations and changing positions. The encircled unit can also make it appear that the encircled force will
  make a resolute stand and await relief.
  C-53. Units can use dummy radio traffic for the enemy to monitor or landlines that the enemy might be able
  tap to convey false information. The breakout should not be along the obvious route toward friendly lines,
  unless there is no other alternative. In this respect, breakout preparations mirror the preparations for any other
  offensive operation. As in other offensive actions, secrecy, tactical deception, and surprise allow for success.
  The other planning considerations for the breakout are the same as for any other attack.
  EXECUTING A BREAKOUT
  C-54. The unit exploits darkness and limited visibility during a breakout if friendly encircled forces have
  superior night vision capabilities. Concealment provided by darkness, fog, smoke, or severe weather
  conditions favor breakout by mitigating the effectiveness of the encircling enemy weapon systems or night
  vision devices/optics. The enemy has difficulty following the movements of the breakout force during
  conditions of limited visibility. However, if the encircled force waits for darkness or limited visibility, the
  encircling enemy may have time to consolidate containment positions. If friendly forces have air superiority,
  they may initiate a daylight breakout attack to exploit close air support capabilities.
  C-55. The encircled force takes all possible precautions to deceive the enemy force about the location of the
  main effort. The rupture force minimizes occupation of attack positions before starting the breakout. An
  encircled unit may require one or more supporting effort to assist the rupture force in penetrating enemy
  positions and expanding the shoulders of the rupture. The encircled unit may use feints and demonstrations