text: Chapter 6
  Offense
  The brigade combat team (BCT) conducts offensive operations to defeat and destroy
  enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. Offensive actions
  impose the BCT commander’s will on the enemy. Offensive actions capitalize on
  accurate and timely intelligence and other relevant information regarding enemy
  forces, weather and terrain, and civil considerations. Protection tasks, such as security
  operations, operations security, and information protection prevent or inhibit the enemy
  from acquiring accurate information about friendly forces. As the commander
  maneuvers forces to advantageous positions before contact, contact with enemy forces
  before the decisive operation is deliberate and designed to shape the optimum situation
  for the decisive operation. When committed, the decisive operation is a sudden,
  shattering action that capitalizes on subordinate initiative and a common operational
  picture (COP). This chapter addresses the characteristics of the offense, common
  offensive planning considerations, forms of maneuver, offensive operations, and
  planning considerations when transitioning to other tactical operations.
  SECTION I – CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFENSE
  6-1. Successful offenses share the following characteristics: surprise,concentration,tempo,and audacity.
  Offensive characteristics, used in concert, create the foundation for an effective offense in any operational
  environment. The tactical vignette below is an example of this foundation and illustrates why U.S. forces
  must be able to transition from one type of military action (counterinsurgency) to another (close combat)
  seamlessly and rapidly.
  6-2. Close combat,as experienced by Russian forces in Grozny and U.S. forces in Fallujah illustrate two
  approaches for conducting the offense in urban terrain. In each case,noncombatants were told to evacuate in
  advance of the attack,and anyone left was a de facto enemy fighter. These geographically remote cities were,
  in effect, besieged and then stormed, with attacks supported by massive firepower. The result was high
  casualties on both sides and rubbled cities. The 2008 battle for Sadr City offers a different approach. The
  challenges during the battle for Sadr City were in some cases even more formidable than the challenges posed
  by Grozny and Fallujah.
  The Battle for Sadr City
  Sadr City is part of Baghdad and has an estimated population of 2.4 million. Forcing
  noncombatants to evacuate was not an option,there was nowhere for them to go. However,
  the approach to ridding Sadr City of Jaish al-Mahdi fighters’was quite different from that
  used in Grozny or Fallujah. The operation in Sadr City focused on enemy fighters and their
  capabilities,rather than seizingand clearing the city.
  The trigger for the battle was Jaish al-Mahdi fighter’s response to the Iraqi government’s
  offensive against insurgents in Basra. Jaish al-Mahdi fighters launched their own
  offensive, overrunning Iraqi government security forces and firing rockets and mortars
  into the International Zone, also known as the Green Zone. In response, a U.S. Army
  brigade and Iraqi security forces (army and police), featuring Abrams tanks, Bradley
  fighting vehicles, and Strykers, along with engineers, civil affairs, and psychological
  operations personnel and other support troops, attacked Jaish al-Mahdi fighters. The
  command and control arrangements gave the brigade commander direct access to crucial