text: _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5
  TRANSITION OPERATIONS
  5-81. During transition operations, the OPFOR focuses IW activities on
  access-control operations, perception management and deception campaigns,
  and protection and security of its IW assets. Deception activities focus on
  concealing the intentions of the OPFOR as well as the likely course of the
  transitioneither into adaptive operations or back to regional operations.
  5-82. Denying an adversary information dominance is critical during transi-
  tion operations. The OPFOR attempts to take advantage of the enemy’s
  reliance on advanced C2 and RISTA technology. Such technology and related
  communications and data links are critical to the enemy’s maintaining
  enhanced situational awareness and thus become the key targets of all IW
  actions.
  5-83. The protection and security of OPFOR IW assets and related communi-
  cations is always a critical element. However, its importance increases during
  transition operations, since the OPFOR’s paramount goal is to preserve all
  instruments of power and prepare for a possible move to more adaptive
  operations.
  5-84. The State’s internal IW goal might be to convince its citizens that
  transition operations are necessary in order to exploit the many gains it has
  already made and to prevent the intervention of an extraregional force. The
  State also conducts a ubiquitous information campaign to strengthen its
  national will by portraying the State as a victim of impending antagonistic
  actions, thus rallying support for State actions.
  5-85. In perception management campaigns targeting the international
  community, the State increases its emphasis on popularizing the State
  and its actions. If it is obvious that the OPFOR will be overmatched by the
  extraregional force that is about to intervene, the State may depict the
  intervening force as an unwanted aggressor involving itself in regional af-
  fairs in order to support its own selfish interests. This may lead to intense
  international media pressure. During transition operations, the State may
  implement a cleverly developed plan to fracture alliance or coalition support
  to extraregional intervention.
  ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS
  5-86. Against extraregional threats, the OPFOR begins to use more offensive
  and adaptive forms of IW. These include not only more aggressive information
  campaigns, but also IA, EW, and increased emphasis on physical destruction. As
  extraregional forces continue to deploy into the region, the OPFOR can use IAs
  on enemy C2 systems and to strip away the enemy’s RISTA capabilities.
  5-87. The OPFOR uses perception management and other tools to attack the
  enemy’s will to fight or otherwise continue its intervention, and to manipulate
  international opinion. If it still occupies territory of a neighboring country, it also
  tries to turn the populace there against the intervening extraregional force.
  5-88. The State continues to leverage international media to influence world
  perception and public opinion within the extraregional power’s own populace.
  It also continues to censor and manipulate the media.