text: Appendix C
   If non-electronics deception techniques (reconnaissance, engineer activities, and so forth)
  were used, what was the desired effect of the techniques?
  * What resources (personnel, equipment, and time) were tasked to conduct operations with
  deceptive intent?
  * Were sufficient resources available?
  * What was the experience level of deception element personnel?
  * What specific deception items (dummies, decoys, and so forth) were constructed, used, and how?
  How many were used?
  * What other resources or services were required? Were they available?
  * What real missions could not be accomplished because these resources were being used for
  deception?
  * Do the benefits of deception justify any loss of operational resources?
  * Were dedicated, secured communications lines and other means of transmission of the plan
  available? Were they adequate?
  * Was sufficient time available to formulate, write, and execute the deception and OPSEC plans?
  * What were the results of deception activities?
  * Did the deception assist in the successful execution of the overall operation?
  G-2 EVALUATION CHECKLIST
  C-2. The G-2 completes an evaluation after a deception. The evaluation checklist can include the following
  questions:
  * Were deception and OPSEC annexes to the OPLAN written to support tactical operations?
  * Does intelligence have an established enemy database and an understanding of enemy doctrine?
  * Was there awareness of enemy intelligence capabilities and collection schedules?
  * What were the priority intelligence requirements and information requirements for the deception
  and OPSEC plans?
  * What intelligence activities were targeted at discovering deceptions in progress against friendly
  forces?
  * What intelligence activities were targeted to determine enemy reaction to friendly deceptions?
  * What enemy activities were identified as being deception related? Why?
  * What was the deception story?
   At what level of the enemy organization was it focused?
   Did the deception story cause the enemy decision maker to make the desired decision?
   Was the story consistent with the friendly unit’s tactical doctrine, established patterns, and
  normal operational sequences?
   Was the story consistent with the target’s perception of the friendly unit’s real capabilities?
   Did the story permit verification by various enemy collection systems?
  * What countersurveillance techniques were used to deny the enemy knowledge of true intentions
  and evaluate indicator visibility?
  * What were the essential elements of friendly information and were they integrated into the plan as
  specific, inherently low-visibility options? What options were chosen?
  * What deception steps were employed?
   If communications-electronics deception and electronic counter-countermeasures or
  command, control, and communications protection measures were planned for and used, what
  was the actual effect of these measures?
   If non-communications-electronics deception and electronic counter-countermeasures were
  planned for and used, what was the actual effect of these measures?
   If non-electronics deception techniques (reconnaissance, engineer activities, and so forth)
  were used, what was the desired effect of the techniques?