text: Chapter 4
  Large-Scale Combat Operations
  This chapter discusses signal support to large-scale combat operations. The chapter is
  divided into 4 sections. Section I provides an overview of signal support to joint and
  Army large-scale combat operations. Section II discusses signal support in large-scale
  defense operations. Section III discusses signal support in large-scale offensive
  operations. Section IV discusses signal support to the consolidation of gains in large-
  scale combat operations.
  SECTION I – SIGNAL SUPPORT TO LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS
  OVERVIEW OF LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS
  4-1. The nature and scope of some missions may require joint forces to conduct large-scale combat
  operations to achieve national strategic objectives or protect national interests. Such combat typically occurs
  within the framework of a major operation or a campaign (FM 3-0). When large-scale combat operations
  commence, the joint force commander immediately exploits friendly capabilities across multiple domains
  and the information environment to gain the initiative.
  4-2. The geographic combatant commander may direct a field army, corps, or division to establish a joint
  task force. In most cases, standing up a joint task force headquarters requires augmentation. Establishment
  of a joint network operations control center supporting the joint task force requires augmentation, either from
  other Services or elements of the theater tactical signal brigade. The joint task force J-6 determines
  communications requirements for the joint task force headquarters and lower echelon units directly
  supporting the commander, joint task force. Requests for support route through the geographic combatant
  command J-3 to the Joint Staff.
  4-3. Establishing a joint task force to conduct large-scale combat operations requires speed, detailed
  planning, and coordination. The joint task force may use the facilities and assigned signal Soldiers of the
  theater or field army to support the joint task force headquarters until adequate facilities become available.
  The geographic combatant commander may attach elements of the theater tactical signal brigade to meet joint
  task force communications requirements until further augmentation or rotational units arrive.
  RISKS TO SIGNAL SUPPORT
  4-4. The enemy will seek to render U.S. combat power ineffective by systemic and continual attacks across
  multiple domains and the information environment, both before and during combat operations. These attacks
  include lethal attacks, cyberspace attacks, and electronic attacks targeting command and control nodes and
  networks. The isolation or destruction of a key command and control node offers the enemy a marked tactical
  advantage.
  4-5. Commanders should assume the enemy considers the network and the ability to communicate to be
  key targets for destruction or degradation. Disrupting a unit’s ability to communicate reduces its effectiveness
  and combat capability. The enemy can conduct electronic attacks to jam satellite positioning, navigation, and
  timing systems and degrade the effectiveness of precision munitions, sensor-to-shooter links, and navigation.
  The enemy may also use lethal fires, electronic attack, or cyberspace attack to destroy, degrade, disrupt, or
  isolate individual units and capabilities.
  4-6. Peer threats may use EW capabilities before and during large-scale combat to locate and identify
  friendly command and control and other key nodes. Spectrum managers and EW personnel develop electronic