text: Chapter 6
  combat power. At brigade echelons and below, units close with and destroy weapon systems, combat
  platforms, and personnel to render enemy forces incapable of resistance.
  DISLOCATE
  6-112. Dislocate as a defeat mechanism renders an enemy’s position ineffective and, ideally, irrelevant.
  Dislocation can enable surprise. It forces enemy forces to react to the unexpected, and it imposes new
  dilemmas on enemy decision makers. If the dislocation that occurs is great enough, enemy forces may
  reconsider their risk assessment and conclude that they must surrender or reposition because their position
  no longer offers a reasonable expectation of success. More commonly, dislocation will force an enemy to
  make major changes to its dispositions and give up considerable ground.
  6-113. The challenge of dislocation is that enemy leaders likely understand the value of the position desired
  by the friendly force, and they have made efforts to protect it. Therefore, to maneuver forces into positions
  that are so advantageous they render the enemy dispositions ineffective, commanders must often make use
  of deception and assume considerable risk.
  6-114. Dislocation extends into the human and information dimensions. Combinations of physical
  maneuver and information activities can undermine the confidence of decision makers and their forces.
  Deception operations that enable surprise can present enemy forces with dilemmas they did not expect, and
  they may incite them to question other assumptions they made about friendly courses of action. For example,
  an enemy force preparing a defense that believes terrain and weather will protect its flank is surprised when
  friendly forces maneuver there during an attack. Not only is the geographic position and orientation of the
  enemy defense rendered ineffective, but so too is the confidence of the force. The force may begin to question
  its leadership while it adjusts its dispositions under the pressures of time and friendly contact.
  6-115. At the operational level, commanders dislocate the enemy by posturing friendly forces in multiple
  assembly areas that do not make any single course of action obvious, and then they threaten maneuver along
  multiple axes of advance that exceed the enemy force’s ability to mass effects. While dislocation alone is
  unlikely to cause enemy forces to lose the will to fight, it creates favorable conditions for the combination of
  other defeat mechanisms. It can overwhelm enemy networked air defense and integrated fires systems, and
  it can enable a tempo of offensive operations from which enemy defenses cannot recover.
  6-116. At the tactical level, vertical and horizontal envelopments and turning movements are common
  forms of maneuver that can precipitate dislocation. While these tactics can create rapid success, they may
  come with significant risk to rear areas and flanks, operational reach, and maintaining the momentum
  required to achieve objectives in accordance with a specific timeline. These tactics are most often successful
  against enemy units operating at or beyond the limit of their supporting capabilities, adjacent units, or
  reserves. Essentially, the friendly force assesses that it can achieve an advantageous position and exploit it
  faster than supporting enemy forces can react. The defeat of North Korean forces in 1950 illustrates the
  relationship between the defeat mechanisms of destroy and dislocate.