text: Appendix A
  Counterdeception
  COUNTERDECEPTION PLANNING
  A-1. Enemies can use deception to mislead friendly analysts and decision makers about their activities,
  capabilities, or intent to offset a friendly superiority or gain some other operational advantage.
  Counterdeception is efforts to negate, neutralize, diminish the effects of, or gain advantage from a foreign
  deception operation (JP 3-13.4). Successful friendly decision makers know of enemy deception activities to
  formulate informed and coordinated responses and, more importantly, avoid placing friendly forces at an
  operational disadvantage. Counterdeception contributes to situational awareness by protecting friendly
  systems and decision makers from responding to deceptive manipulation or faulty analysis of an operational
  environment. Counterdeception applies across the range of military operations in which enemies might use
  deception in an attempt to alter friendly activities or even achieve operational surprise during hostilities.
  A-2. Knowledge of an enemy’s deception plan enables a commander to act appropriately against the
  deception. It provides friendly forces an opportunity to gain valuable insight into the means used to portray
  the deception. It also provides friendly forces a chance to analyze enemy deception targets and objectives as
  indicators of the broader context in which the enemy views friendly forces and operations. Counterdeception
  becomes a tool for influencing those perceptions and could subsequently be turned effectively against the
  enemy.
  DETECTING ENEMY DECEPTION
  A-3. The intelligence warfighting function plays a central role in identifying enemy deception operations.
  MDOs can assist in this effort. Trained deception personnel should be postured and have access to
  information, intelligence data, analytical support, and intelligence products during the deployment and
  execution of friendly operations. To identify enemy deception, trained deception personnel must first
  understand the enemy’s deception doctrine, techniques, capabilities, and limitations. Knowing previous
  methods the enemy has used deception is also important. The MDO collaborates with the G-2 to collect and
  provide this information as part of the deception running estimate. Understanding the enemy’s operational
  objectives; normal operational profiles; posture; tactics, techniques, and procedures; and intent are also
  crucial to identifying tactical or operational indicators of possible deception. The MDO can use the friendly
  OPSEC doctrinal construct of signature, association, profile, contrast, and exposure to assess enemy activity
  for its congruency with known patterns or expectations based on the evolving operational situation. Indicators
  of potential deception can range from a dedicated analyst’s intuitive sense that “something is amiss” to the
  outright compromise of deceptive means, methods, or activity by friendly intelligence collection assets.
  Properly balancing tactical and operational indicators with strategic assumptions is also important. Planners
  can reduce potential surprise if their estimates weigh tactical indicators more heavily than strategic
  assumptions in some phases of the operation. Dismissing tactical indicators or other minor contrasts because
  they conflict with friendly biases and preconceptions may allow a hostile deception to succeed.
  CONFIRMING ENEMY DECEPTION
  A-4. If intelligence reveals or suggests an enemy deception activity, the staff must fully analyze the situation
  and ensure that this intelligence and its potential impact on the friendly operation are presented to the
  commander. One method to analyze the situation involves forming a working group to analyze, review, and
  determine the deceptive activity. This working group could include the MDOs, G-2 analysts, red team
  members, G-3 planners, and others with knowledge of suspected enemy deception means or methods. If it
  has not already been done, the working group analyzes vulnerability to enemy deception using the physical,
  informational, and cognitive dimensions. The group then uses information and intelligence available through