text: Chapter 4
  spectrum owned and operated by commercial, government, and other neutral users. Therefore, it is vital to
  consider the legal, cultural, and political costs associated with using cyberspace and the EMS as avenues of
  approach.
  4-99. Policy risks occur where policy fails to address operational necessity. For example, a policy emplaced
  that limits cyberspace operations, which results in low levels of collateral effects, can result in a unit constrained
  to cyberspace attacks that will not result in the desired outcomes necessary for mission success. A collateral
  effects analysis to meet policy limits is distinct from the proportionality and necessity analysis required by the
  law of war. Even if a proposed cyberspace operation is permissible after a collateral effect’s analysis, the
  proposed cyberspace operation or EW mission must include a legitimate military objective that is also
  permissible under the law of war.
  4-100. Policy risk applies to risk management under civil or legal considerations. An OCO or EA mission
  may pose a risk to host nation civilians and non-combatants in an OE where a standing objective is to minimize
  collateral damage. During a mission, it may be in the Army’s best interest for host nation populations to be able
  to perform day-to-day activities. Interruptions of public networks may present hazards to the DODIN-A and
  pose dangers to Army forces because of social impacts that lead to riots, criminal activity, and the emergence
  of insurgent opportunists seeking to exploit civil unrest.
  Operations Security Risks
  4-101. Both cyberspace and the EMS provides a venue for OPSEC risks. The Army depends on cyberspace
  security programs and training to prevent or mitigate OPSEC risks. Commanders emphasize and establish
  OPSEC programs to minimize the risks. OPSEC measures include actions and information on the DODIN and
  non-DODIN information systems and networks. All personnel are responsible for protecting sensitive and
  critical information. EP denies unauthorized access to information that an enemy intercept in the EMS through
  electromagnetic security operations. For more information on OPSEC, refer to AR 530-1 and ATP 3-13.3.
  KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT
  4-102. Knowledge management is the process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding,
  learning, and decision making (ADP 6-0). The four components of knowledge management are people,
  processes, tools, and organizations. Knowledge management facilitates the transfer of knowledge among the
  commander, staff, and forces to build and maintain situational awareness and enhance organizational
  performance. Through knowledge management, information gets to the right personnel at the right time to
  facilitate decision making.
  4-103. During knowledge management, the necessary cyberspace operations and EW-related information and
  tools from higher headquarters are provided to the CEMA working group in a timely enough manner to make
  decisions during mission analysis and COA development. Through the knowledge management process,
  cyberspace operations and EW-related intelligence received through information collection and IO is
  disseminated for decision making by the CEMA working group. The knowledge management steps are—
  * Assess.
  * Design.
  * Develop.
  * Pilot.
  * Implement.
  4-104. The CEWO is responsible for establishing and overseeing the flow of all cyberspace operations and
  EW-related information throughout the headquarters staff, including higher and lower echelons. The CEWO is
  accountable for providing IRs to the G-2 or S-2 to attain essential information needed to understand cyberspace
  and the EMS within an OE. Information acquired from IRs is also crucial to the CEMA section’s ability to
  appropriately integrate and synchronize cyberspace operations and EW with the operations process.
  4-105. The CEMA section and collaborating staff provide meaning to operations by sharing both tacit and
  explicit knowledge. Tacit knowledge is what individuals know; a unique, personal store of knowledge gained
  from life experiences, training, and networks of friends, acquaintances, and professional colleagues (ATP 6-
  01.1). All members of the CEMA working group provide knowledge attained from years of operational and