text: Chapter 3
  Offensive Operations
  The OPFOR sees the offensive as the decisive form of operations and the
  ultimate means of imposing its will on the enemy. While conditions at a
  particular time or place may require the OPFOR to defend, defeating an
  enemy force ultimately requires shifting to offensive operations. Even
  within the context of defense, victory normally requires some sort of of-
  fensive action. Therefore, OPFOR commanders at all levels seek to create
  and exploit opportunities to take offensive action, whenever possible.
  In the context of the theater strategic or operational level of war, offensive
  operations are often “conventional” in nature. Conventional operations
  are not, however, the only form of offensive operations. Accordingly, this
  chapter includes discussions of operational-level offensive actions that
  do not rely only on large formations of mechanized or motorized units.
  Offensive operations may include operations done by paramilitary or
  irregular forces. The OPFOR recognizes the traditional forms of ma-
  neuver: envelopment, turning movement, infiltration, penetration, and
  frontal attack.
  STRATEGIC CONTEXT
  3-1. Offensive operations are an important component of all OPFOR strate-
  gic campaigns. However, the scale and purpose of offensive actions may differ
  during the various types of strategic-level actions.
  REGIONAL OPERATIONS
  3-2. Offensive operations during regional operations attempt to achieve stra-
  tegic political or military decision by destroying the enemy’s will and capabil-
  ity to fight. This is brought about by destroying components of the enemy’s
  combat system. This may include discrete attacks on any of the four compo-
  nents of an enemy’s combat system: combat forces, combat support forces, lo-
  gistics forces, and command and control (C2) and reconnaissance, intelli-
  gence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA). It may also include an
  attempt to destroy one or more of the enemy’s systems simultaneously.
  3-3. Due to its military superiority over a regional adversary in regional op-
  erations, the State is able to pursue primarily offensive military courses of
  action. It is also prepared to use offensive means against internal and possi-
  ble extraregional threats.
  3-4. The State’s military forces are sufficient to overmatch any single re-
  gional neighbor, but may not be a match for the forces an extraregional
  power can bring to bear. Thus, the State seeks to exploit its numerical and