text: Army Strategic Contexts and Intelligence
  4-32. Although an opponent has not yet used lethal force as its primary means of achieving objectives, crisis
  can escalate to armed conflict. Combat power derived from the intelligence warfighting function, in
  conjunction with the other warfighting functions, is critical in providing credible lethal capabilities to assist
  in deterring further provocation and compelling an adversary to cease aggressive action.
  4-33. Some peer threats view conflict as a continuous condition in which sharpened or reduced periods of
  violence occur and recur. Additionally, adversaries may perceive themselves in a different context or state of
  conflict than U.S., allied, and partnered forces—what is viewed by one side as crisis might be perceived by
  the other side as armed conflict or competition.
  4-34. Changing the intensity of its actions, even when that intensity reduces tension, does not end an
  adversary’s campaign to oppose U.S. interests. Intelligence professionals must continuously assess the OE
  and demonstrate flexibility in determining adversary actions, the changes they cause, and how information
  and intelligence can be used to de-escalate the situation or further prepare U.S. and allied partners for armed
  conflict. Regardless of the capabilities employed, there are generally two broad outcomes from a crisis:
  ⚫ Deterrence is maintained and de-escalation occurs.
  ⚫ Armed conflict begins.
  CONSOLIDATING GAINS
  4-35. During and after a crisis response, Army forces consolidate gains to deny adversary forces the means
  to extend the crisis or create a similar crisis in the future. This often entails maintaining an enhanced force
  posture in a joint operations area for a time to demonstrate U.S. willingness to defend allies and partners.
  Continuous intelligence operations to support U.S. forces, allies, and partners are essential during any crisis.
  Commanders must emphasize information collection before and during the transition from competition to
  crisis to maintain a detailed understanding of the threat and continuously assess the situation, positioning
  their forces to retain the initiative.
  4-36. During these transitions, threat forces attempt to exploit perceived vulnerabilities by conducting lethal
  and nonlethal activities against U.S. forces, allies, and partners. The threat’s use of disinformation and
  misinformation can be used to shape threat narratives to justify ongoing or pending actions, including the use
  of force. Commanders and staffs should focus on potential threat and friendly strengths, vulnerabilities, and
  advantages across the domains and dimensions. Continuous information collection and intelligence analysis
  are critical in ensuring flexible deterrent and/or flexible response options.
  FIGHTING FOR INTELLIGENCE
  4-37. Operations during crisis place increasing demands on the intelligence warfighting function. The
  intelligence staff increases its knowledge of the threat and the specific OE, focuses the commander and staff
  with relevant information and intelligence, and expands various intelligence capabilities as part of the
  intelligence architecture. With the shift from competition to crisis, the theater army shifts to refining
  contingency plans and preparing estimates for the phased increase of ground forces and capabilities. During
  crisis, intelligence operations focus on the following:
  ⚫ Support theater openings in terms of finding and exploiting advantages.
  ⚫ Gain and maintain situational understanding of threat intent and COAs, activities, and the nature
  of those activities and effects across the theater.
  ⚫ Provide support to noncombatant evacuation operations, when needed.
  ⚫ Provide support to targeting and prepare for targeting during armed conflict.
  ⚫ Provide support to force projection and prepare for the possibility of a contested deployment.
  ⚫ Provide support to information advantage activities, as appropriate.
  ⚫ Provide support to protection activities.
  ⚫ Provide focused analysis of the domains and human, information, and physical dimensions, then
  properly focus that into analysis of the operational variables.
  ⚫ Provide support to identify and implement flexible deterrent and response options and follow-on
  activities and operations.