text: Chapter 4
  demonstrate credible coercive force as a combined arms formation. Divisions should expect to conduct short-
  notice training exercises with multinational partners and perform other activities that demonstrate capabilities
  as part of crisis response. In an immature theater, a division headquarters should be prepared to accommodate
  the command structure of the next higher echelon until that echelon’s systems are in place.
  4-71. Some adversaries possess significant capability to employ antiaccess and area denial strategies across
  all domains. Countering those strategies is the responsibility of the JFC. The land component commander's
  challenge is conducting forcible entry operations and deploying significant combat power in an environment
  where the enemy has an initial advantage.
  4-72. Forcible entry is the seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition or
  forcing access into a denied area to allow movement and maneuver to accomplish the mission. (JP 3-18)
  These operations are complicated and always joint. In the case of a no-notice and/or crisis response mission,
  only hours separate the alert from the deployment.
  4-73. The phases of a forcible entry operation are (1) preparation and deployment, (2) assault, (3) stabilization
  of the lodgment, (4) introduction of follow-on forces, and (5) termination or transition operations. Once an
  assault force seizes a lodgment, it normally defends to retain it while the JFC rapidly deploys additional
  combat power by air and sea.
  4-74. Sustainment of these operations is normally divided into three echelons during deployment: assault,
  follow-on, and rear echelons. Sustainment of forces during early entry operations focuses on supply and
  distribution. This is accomplished by leveraging resupply by air including planned resupply, immediate
  airdrop resupply, and emergency airdrop resupply requests. The assault force is supported by both organic
  and external elements organized to distribute supplies, materiel, fuel, and ammunition forward by air or water
  LOCs. The exact organization and disposition of the assault and follow-on sustainment elements is a function
  of the assault force’s mission and anticipated follow-on operations.
  4-75. The DSB provides the foundational capabilities for enabling forcible entry. DSBs may perform
  specialized roles in rapid deployment operations from home station in support of forcible entry. Once
  deployed, the DSB and its task-organized subordinate units focus on sustaining both the assault and
  introduction of follow-on forces.
  4-76. As sustainers plan for support of the force entering the theater, they also consider requirements during
  crisis operations that may differ in scale, scope, or type from those associated with other operations. Planners
  identify and account for unique requirements such as—
  • Establishing civil security and control.
  • Supporting essential services requirements.
  • Integrating non-organic sustainment capability.
  • Providing support to infrastructure development, such as general engineering support.
  • Providing direct or indirect support to unified action partners.
  • Building POL stockage objectives and intertheater and intratheater days of supply.
  CONSOLIDATION OF GAINS DURING CRISIS
  4-77. During and after crisis response, Army forces consolidate gains to deny adversary forces the means to
  extend the crisis or create a similar crisis in the future. This will often entail maintaining an enhanced force
  posture in a JOA for a period of time to demonstrate U.S. willingness to defend allies and partners. Army
  forces continue to support improvements to host-nation capabilities through a security cooperation plan
  designed to make them less vulnerable to future crisis. If an adversary directly targets partner forces, or acts
  through a proxy, the United States must be prepared to reconstitute the partner’s forces as quickly as possible.
  The ability of Army forces to reconstitute partner nation forces is especially important to JFCs since, in many
  areas, only the Army has the capacity to conduct a comprehensive security cooperation program. Many allies
  and partners rely primarily on their armies and do not have robust navies or air forces. Consolidating gains
  during and after crisis response creates enduring change that reinforces deterrence against adversaries and
  improves relative advantages for U.S., allied, and partner forces.