text: ADA Battalion
  7-45. Force protection is an important planning function for distributed elements of the ADA task force.
  Selection of sites for distributed components, such as communications relay groups and remote launch farms,
  must consider the availability of other military organizations in the vicinity of the dispersed element to
  provide force protection and site security.
  ENGAGEMENT OPERATIONS
  7-46. The ADA task force does not fight the AMD battle alone. Fires are typically controlled by joint C2
  authorities, such as the RADC or the SADC, as part of the kill chain. These commanders have a more
  complete understanding of the air domain as they execute the airspace control plan and offensive/defensive
  counterair operations on behalf of the JFACC/AADC. While the ADA task force possesses significant
  functionality to perform active and passive identification of air tracks, these capabilities often fall short of
  achieving true combat identification for the full spectrum of airspace users. Operating under the centralized
  control of the kill chain via joint tactical data links ensures that the ADA task force receives a joint air picture
  and achieves connectivity with the controlling identification authority and engagement authority. ADA task
  force engagement operations are governed by several documents specific to each theater, such as the area air
  defense plan, special instructions, and AAMDC tactical supplement.
  7-47. Identification authority and engagement authority reside with the AADC; however, these authorities
  may be delegated to the echelon level that has the greatest amount of situational understanding and the
  resources to make decisions timely enough to affect an action. For ADA task force aerial engagements, less
  ballistic missiles and RAM, this authority typically remains with the RADC or SADC. For certain types of
  threats, such as ballistic missiles and small UASs, identification authority and engagement authorization are
  commonly delegated to ADA task force level (or below). Against RAM threats, engagement authorization
  typically resides at the base defense operations center, if operating on an installation, or at firing platoon level
  if operating in off-base locations. Decentralizing identification and engagement authorization to the task force
  commander enables more responsive land-based AMD fires; it also allows for greater defense effectiveness
  as the threat volume increases. However, this decentralization may increase the risk of fratricide to friendly
  air platforms.
  7-48. ADA task force mission readiness is governed through the use of alert states. Alert states, as mentioned
  previously, prescribe the amount of resources directed to achieve battle stations (ready to fire) and specify
  manning requirements and equipment configuration. Alert states are METT-TC dependent. Alert states are
  generally promulgated by the ADAFCOs via the surface-to-air missile tactical order. Utilizing alert states
  allows for maximum flexibility to conduct training or maintenance while meeting mission requirements.
  7-49. The ADA task force fights from stationary locations; therefore, tactics are a matter of the proper
  positioning, orientation and system configuration of subordinate components with respect to the defended
  assets and threat, rather than a function of maneuver. Tactics for threat engagements will vary based on the
  specific threat platforms, such as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, or fixed-wing aircraft.
  7-50. At the ADA task force level, Patriot C2 node is capable of controlling engagements against ballistic
  missiles within the Patriot and THAAD system. Ballistic missile engagement planning and execution are
  accomplished at the battery C2 node in both Patriot and THAAD. The ADA task force C2 node performs a
  threat assessment to the defended assets which are threatened by an in-flight missile and assigns the best
  battery to conduct the engagement. The engaging battery (Patriot or THAAD) C2 nodes then determines
  when, where, and how (launcher, missile type) to execute the engagement. Missile engagements are
  conducted manually or automatically; even in the automatic mode, an operator must validate engagements
  and may prevent the engagement or, if required, destroy the missile after launch. If a designated defended
  asset is threatened and the threat is engageable, the system will initiate an engagement when in the automatic
  mode; however, an operator must initiate engagement in the manual mode.
  7-51. When a THAAD battery is attached to a non-Patriot ADA task force, the THAAD battery C2 node
  provides the capability of planning and executing engagements against ballistic missiles in its threat set.
  While operational control resides in the ADA task force C2 node, tactical control is exercised through the
  AAMDC AADFCO, as neither FAAD C2 nor C-RAM C2 has the requisite software to provide adequate fire
  control orders to THAAD. See ATP 3-01.91 for further discussions of THAAD battery operations.