text: _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5
  equipment and to blend them with the surrounding terrain. Capabilities
  available include—
  • Natural concealment.
  • Camouflage paint.
  • Artificial camouflage (nets and screens).
  • Antiradar camouflage (radar-absorbing nets and paints).
  • Decoy equipment (mockups) and deception positions.
  • Light and thermal camouflage.
  • Smoke camouflage.
  PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT
  5-44. Perception management involves measures aimed at creating a percep-
  tion of truth that furthers the OPFOR’s objectives. It integrates several
  widely differing activities that use a combination of true, false, misleading, or
  manipulated information. Enemy or foreign audiences, as well as the State’s
  own public, may be targets. Perception management can include misinforma-
  tion, media manipulation, and PSYWAR. Perception management is critically
  important to all types of OPFOR operations.
  5-45. PSYWAR is the capability and activities designed to influence selected
  friendly, neutral, and/or hostile target audiences’ attitudes and behaviors in
  support of the OPFOR. PSYWAR can target either specific decision-making
  systems or the entire information system of the target audience, while influ-
  encing key communicators and decision makers. The OPFOR attacks an en-
  emy’s perceived centers of gravity. For example, prolonging an operation and
  using all forms of media to show the devastation of conflict can sway public
  opinion against the effort.
  5-46. Statecraft (the art of conducting state affairs) and diplomacy (the art
  and practice of conducting negotiations with other states) are aspects of
  perception management conducted with foreign governments, and include
  those countries’ populations as a target. The OPFOR skillfully employs
  media and other neutral players, such as nongovernmental and private
  volunteer organizations, to influence further public and private perceptions. It
  exploits the international media’s willingness to report information without in-
  dependent and timely confirmation. Individuals such as agents of influence,
  sympathizers, and antiwar protesters are also employed advantageously by the
  State or OPFOR to influence the enemy’s media, politicians, and citizenry.
  5-47. The State’s Ministry of Public Information controls its own population’s
  access to information and perceptions of reality. Successful preparation of the
  population significantly enhances public support for the OPFOR’s military actions.
  INFORMATION ATTACK
  5-48. An information attack (sometimes called cyber attack) focuses on the in-
  tentional disruption or distortion of information in a manner that supports a
  comprehensive IW campaign. Unlike, computer warfare attacks that target the
  information systems, IAs target the information itself. Attacks on the commer-
  cial Internet by civilian hackers have demonstrated the vulnerability of cyber