text: Intelligence Staff Support
  LEVERAGE DATA, INFORMATION, AND INTELLIGENCE
  5-34. Several areas in this publication mention leveraging and collaborating across the intelligence enterprise
  and intelligence architecture but in different contexts. This task is an inherent part of intelligence support and
  pertains to every other task in this chapter. An echelon does not collect all the information it needs, and an
  intelligence staff does not conduct all the intelligence analysis and production it needs to support the
  commander and staff. Every echelon uses data, information, and intelligence from higher, lower, and adjacent
  intelligence staffs and elements.
  5-35. Information outside of military sources can be valuable, especially for the operational variables
  (PMESII-PT) and civil considerations. Academia, industry, and non-DOD information can be especially
  valuable, as well as PAI, in providing critical insight and awareness across all domains and dimensions,
  especially the human and information dimensions. Allies and other multinational partners have unique
  collection capabilities and valuable intelligence, including insight into specific regions and ongoing tensions.
  The joint force and other Services have unique and specialized data, information, and intelligence on many
  areas, especially within the maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains (including ES data and
  information). Generally, higher-level Army echelons have more time, resources, and a broader context to
  produce intelligence; lower-level echelons may often have a more detailed and timelier picture of the enemy
  they face in the close area. Optimizing the task of leveraging data, information, and intelligence and
  effectively collaborating across echelons are both an art and the application of science.
  CONDUCT PRE-MISSION ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATIONAL
  ENVIRONMENT
  5-36. To perform IPOE and the other important intelligence tasks that support operations, the intelligence staff
  must conduct a significant amount of analysis before receipt of mission. The intelligence staff cannot wait until
  receipt of mission to start intelligence analysis. As discussed in chapter 2, there are several tools and processes,
  some led by the G-2/S-2 and intelligence staff, that assist the commander and staff in understanding the OE.
  Intelligence analysis plays an important role in facilitating this understanding; therefore, the analytical effort
  must start as early as possible. As operational planning occurs in terms of theater campaign plans, contingency
  plans, and other planning (such as the ADM), the intelligence staff provides intelligence support, which is
  connected to facilitating an understanding of the OE through sequential analysis and developing various
  intelligence products. The result is an ever-increasing level of operational focus:
  ⚫ Analysis and products that account for the different aspects of the domains and dimensions,
  including their interrelationships. Note. While considering the domains and dimensions, these
  intelligence products may not be structured based on the domains and dimensions.
  ⚫ Analysis and products that account for the operational variables and how they interrelate.
  ⚫ Analysis and products that specifically address a threat; localized terrain; weather and weather
  effects; civil considerations, including cultural aspects of the OE; and other significant aspects of
  that area to prepare the staff for the MDMP, including IPOE.
  DOMAINS AND DIMENSIONS (GENERAL INTELLIGENCE)
  5-37. During competition, for those units and organizations without much operational or geographic focus,
  the intelligence staff must first understand a threat and the regional civilian population and other significant
  factors (for example, destabilizing natural disasters across a region). Using the domains and dimensions as a
  framework provides a helpful context and checklist to ensure the intelligence staff’s holdings are as complete
  as possible and to build a comprehensive understanding of the OE. Information and intelligence usually flow
  first from the U.S. IC, academia, DIA, the theater army G-2 and military intelligence brigades-theater
  (MIB-Ts), and other higher-echelon intelligence units and organizations (such as MDTFs [see paragraph 2-
  82]) in various forms. Some of this information and intelligence is or can be databased and some cannot. As
  this occurs, it is useful for intelligence staffs to practice their intelligence skills and compile or create
  intelligence products to further build their knowledge and proficiency as analysts. Analyzing and describing
  threat force capabilities, and even the whole of a threat government, are especially valuable in preparing for
  potential future operations. Producing these products should also assist intelligence staffs in finding
  information and intelligence gaps.