text: Army Strategic Contexts and Intelligence
  4-7. Intelligence support is inherently difficult and is often discussed throughout this manual as fighting for
  intelligence. Fighting for intelligence applies as much to intelligence support to Army units and organizations
  during competition (including long-term situational understanding) or crisis as it does to intelligence support
  to a division conducting offensive operations during a large-scale combat operation. Each strategic context
  discussion in this chapter concludes with a fighting for intelligence discussion. (See paragraphs 1-120 through
  1-125 for a discussion on the concept of fighting for intelligence.)
  SECTION II – COMPETITION BELOW ARMED CONFLICT
  4-8. Competition exists when two or more state or nonstate adversaries have incompatible interests but
  neither seeks armed conflict. Nation-states compete using all instruments of national power to gain and
  maintain advantages that assist them in achieving their goals. Low levels of lethal force can be part of
  competition. Adversaries often employ cyberspace capabilities and information warfare to destroy or disrupt
  infrastructure, interfere with government processes, and conduct activities in a way that does not cause the
  United States and its allies to respond with force. Competition provides military forces—
  ⚫ Time to prepare for armed conflict.
  ⚫ Opportunities to assure allies and partners of resolve and commitment.
  ⚫ Time and space to set the necessary conditions to prevent crisis or armed conflict.
  ADVERSARY METHODS
  4-9. Conducting effective operations during competition requires a broad understanding of the strategic
  security environment and common adversary methods and objectives. During competition, adversaries seek to
  further their own interests using a variety of methods to hinder the United States from achieving its objectives.
  Therefore, the intelligence staff must understand adversary methods and their associated goals and desired
  effects. This knowledge assists the intelligence warfighting function in integrating and synchronizing with the
  other warfighting functions to generate combat power and apply it against adversary actions.
  Note. Peer threats conduct activities over prolonged time windows, so peer threat objectives,
  advantages, and effects may not be recognized immediately. In some situations, these advantages
  and effects may be observed slowly over expanded timeframes and eventually lead to crisis and
  possibly armed conflict. fragment
  ADVERSARY ACTIVITIES TO ACHIEVE STRATEGIC GOALS
  4-10. By using a range of military and nonmilitary activities, peer threats use all instruments of national
  power to further their interests. The adversary’s use of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military
  activities shapes the OE to the adversary’s advantage well before armed conflict. Adversaries operate
  aggressively in the space or cyberspace domains during competition and crisis to influence the OE and deter
  or degrade friendly operations. Adversaries target foreign audiences to promote strategic messages on the
  international stage. At times, these messages are not legitimate or correct; the adversary’s intent is to get the
  messages out first, outside of the friendly forces’ ability to effectively counter these messages. Analyzing the
  possibility of threat and friendly forces leveraging a window of opportunity to gain or maintain human,
  information, and physical advantages is an important aspect of intelligence support during competition.
  ADVERSARY ACTIVITIES TO COUNTER A U.S. RESPONSE
  4-11. An adversary may attempt to prevent or constrain the United States’ ability to project forces to the
  region and limit U.S. response options by using the following methods:
  ⚫ Conduct information warfare activities to manipulate the acquisition, transmission, and
  presentation of information in a manner that legitimizes adversary actions and portrays the
  United States as the aggressor.