text: Chapter 8
  8-141. Within the security environment, enemies, adversaries, and other organizations use propaganda and
  disinformation against the commander’s efforts to influence various civilian populations within and external
  (area of interest) to the BCT’s area of operations. The BCT’s public affairs staff officer, in coordination with
  the division public affairs officer works closely with the intelligence staff officer to be proactive, rather than
  reactive, to such attacks. A coordinated information operations plan informs and counters the effects of
  propaganda and misinformation. The plan (generally developed at BCT level in coordination with the
  division information operations officer and public affairs officer) establishes mechanisms, such as a media
  center or editorial board, to educate and inform local and international media, which in turn, informs the
  public, with accurate and timely information. Additionally, civil affairs operations and PSYOPare integrated
  into counterpropaganda efforts at the BCT level through the division, or higher headquarters’ information
  operations working group.
  8-142. When needed, the BCT chaplain can play an important role in bridging gaps with religious leaders
  that set conditions for future successful key leader engagements and civil affairs operations. During planning,
  the chaplain advises the commander concerning matters of religion, culture, and religious key leaders in the
  area of operations and area of interest. The chaplain and religious affairs noncommissioned officer provide
  important,up-to-date perspectives concerning local, provincial, and national atmospherics not often included
  or clear in other sources. Their efforts should always be coordinated with the BCT information operations
  officer and BCT information operations working group (see FM 3-13), when established.
  8-143. Without a detailed Soldier and leader engagement plan, different units and staff elements meet with
  and engage local leadership with different desired end states thereby undermining the ability of any or all
  forces to build capacity and work towards transition to host nation lead. Coordination between staff elements
  or units within the BCT, when working with the same host nation individual or office, enables unity of effort
  and the desired end state for the BCT’s area security operation. The creation of a detailed engagement plan
  includes identifying differences between provinces or localities within the province and sets out the
  objectives to reach the desired end state. Host nation leaders in a city, district or provincehave face-to-face
  meetings with these leaders to advance the creation and building of host nation capacities.
  8-144. Soldier and leader engagements have a significant impact on the human component during all
  operations that occur among the people. Human beings capture information and form perceptions based on
  inputs received through all the senses. Humans see actions and hear words. Humans compare gestures and
  expressions with the spoken word. Humans weigh the messages presented to them by the Soldiers and leaders
  of the BCT, and other sources with the conditions that surround them. When the local and national news
  media are unavailable or unreliable, people turn to alternative sources, such as the internet—where
  information flows freely at unimaginable speeds—or rumor and gossip. Perception equals truth to people
  lacking objective sources of information. Altering perceptions requires shaping information through
  engagements according to how people absorb and interpret information, molding the message for broad
  appeal and acceptance.
  8-145. Operations security is as important during the conduct of stability-focused operations as it is during
  the conduct of offensive- and defensive-focused operations. Operations security contributes to the BCT’s
  ability to achieve surprise during area security missions, thus enabling its chances for success. Within the
  BCT area of operations, human adversaries/enemies monitor the BCT’s normal activities to detect variations
  in activity patterns that forecast future operations. They monitor the conversations of Soldiers both on duty
  and off duty to gain information and intelligence. Adversaries/enemies monitor commercial internet activity
  and phone calls from BCT operational and recreation facilities. They will look at trash created by BCT
  activities. The absence of operations security about BCT activities contributes to excessive friendly casualties
  and possible mission failure in area security operations just like it does in combat operations. The BCT’s
  information superiority hinges in no small part on effective operations security; therefore, measures to protect
  essential element of friendly information (EEFI) cannot be an afterthought. (See FM 3-13 and ATP3-13.1
  for additional information.)