text: Fighting for Intelligence During Large-Scale Combat Operations
  ⚫ Protecting the force.
  ⚫ Supporting counterreconnaissance.
  ⚫ Filling information gaps to successfully complete planning.
  ⚫ The effectiveness or ineffectiveness of ongoing joint ISR and higher-echelon information
  collection.
  ⚫ The effectiveness or ineffectiveness of ongoing (transitional) unit information collection.
  ⚫ Risks to collection assets based on threat capabilities.
  ⚫ The amount of time required to complete the MDMP.
  ⚫ The amount of time necessary for collection assets to plan and prepare for executing collection.
  ⚫ The risk of ineffectively tasking collection assets during preliminary or initial information
  collection, and then not being able to retask the assets in time to support executing operations.
  ⚫ Using a reconnaissance-push or reconnaissance-pull approach.
  Reconnaissance-Push and Reconnaissance-Pull
  Reconnaissance-push is reconnaissance that refines the common operational picture,
  enabling the commander to finalize the plan and support main and supporting efforts
  (FM 3-90). The commander and staff use reconnaissance-push when they have a relatively
  thorough understanding of the OE. In these situations, commanders push reconnaissance
  assets into specific portions of their AOs to confirm, deny, and validate planning assumptions
  affecting operations. Reconnaissance-push emphasizes detailed, well-rehearsed planning.
  Reconnaissance-pull is reconnaissance that determines which routes are suitable for
  maneuver, where the enemy is strong and weak, and where gaps exist, thus pulling the main
  body toward and along the path of least resistance (FM 3-90). Commanders use
  reconnaissance-pull when they are uncertain of enemy force compositions and dispositions
  in their AOs, information concerning terrain is vague, and time is limited. In these situations,
  reconnaissance assets initially work over broad areas to develop the enemy situation. As they
  gain an understanding of enemy vulnerabilities, these assets then pull the main body to
  positions of tactical advantage.
  Aggressive Information Collection
  8-123. Depending on the situation and threat capabilities, information collection at certain depths or against
  certain threat capabilities may not seem possible. Friendly forces may have to aggressively plan and execute
  information collection to overcome collection gaps. Overcoming these gaps is not only the collection
  manager and collection management team’s responsibility; the commander, G-2/S-2, G-3/S-3, and other key
  staff members must take ownership of information collection. Commanders and staffs can attempt several
  approaches, such as the following, to overcome collection limitations and ensure or surge information
  collection during critical phases of an operation:
  ⚫ Allocate maneuver, fires, and other capabilities to conduct combat operations to enable
  information collection. For example, the corps commander and staff can coordinate for the joint
  suppression of enemy air defenses during a critical phase of an operation to open a window of
  opportunity that allows aerial collection against the threat.
  ⚫ Embed certain longer-range information collection capabilities in cavalry units or an advanced
  force operating further across the forward edge of the battle area.
  ⚫ Employ certain special intelligence capabilities when a unit has deployed with those capabilities.
  ⚫ Coordinate for specific special operations forces information collection, when possible.
  ⚫ Leverage national technical means as a method to tip, cue, and/or validate IPOE and other
  intelligence products.
  ⚫ Prearrange for specific joint ISR support tailored to Army tactical requirements, when possible.
  ⚫ Coordinate for the use of multinational partner collection platforms in an integrated approach.
  Commanders and staffs should not overlook the valuable and sometimes unique collection
  capabilities of multinational partners.