text: Stability
  Assessments to Support Protection Prioritization
  8-180. Initial protection planning by the BCT commander and staff requires various assessments to
  establish protection priorities. Assessments include threats, hazards, vulnerability, and criticality. These
  assessments are used to determine which assets can be protected given no constraints and which assets can
  be protected with available resources. There are seldom sufficient resources to simultaneously provide all
  assets the same level of protection. For this reason, the commander makes decisions on acceptable risks and
  provides guidance to the staff so that they can employ protection capabilities based on protection priorities.
  8-181. Protection planning is a continuous process that includes an understanding of the threats and hazards
  that may impact operations throughout the BCT’s area of operations. Protection capabilities are aligned to
  protect critical assets and mitigate effects from threats and hazards. The protection cell prioritizes the
  protection of critical assets that best supports the commander’s end state. Protection prioritization lists are
  organized through the proper alignment of critical assets. The commander’s priorities and intent and the
  impacts on mission planning determine critical assets. Critical assets can be people, property, equipment,
  activities, operations, information, facilities, or materials. For example, important communications facilities
  and utilities, analyzed through criticality assessments, provide information to prioritize resources while
  reducing the potential application of resources on lower-priority assets. Stationary weapons systems might
  be identified as critical to the execution of BCT operations and, therefore, receive additional protection. The
  lack of a replacement may cause a critical asset to become a top priority for protection.
  Protection Template
  8-182. The protection template lists and integrates all protection tasks in an appropriate way for use by
  subordinate units, and any base and base cluster operations envisioned to be established during the BCT’s or
  subordinate battalion or squadron’s area security operation. The protection cell when established within the
  BCT operations staff officer (S-3) section augments the staff with a small protection planning cell that
  maintains and publishes the template in coordination with the division protection cell. The template is used
  as a reference before or during employment. Battalion/squadron and base/base cluster situational
  modifications to this template, and their regular rehearsal of all parts of protection plans are inspected
  periodically by the BCT protection working group. During inspections, the protection working group
  identifies weak areas in subordinate protection plans, ensures that area of operations protection best practices
  are incorporated into the plans of the BCT, and provides protection-related observations, insights, and lessons
  learned to subordinate units, and any unit relieving the BCT or subordinate unit within its area of operations.
  Note. When a protection cell officer or noncommissioned officer is not designated within or
  attached to a battalion/squadron, protection cell functions and tasks are the responsibility of the
  battalion/squadron operations officer or noncommissioned officer. Key protection tasks conducted
  within the BCT’s area security operation include area security, chemical, biological, radiological,
  and nuclear (CBRN) operations, coordinating air and missile defense, personnel recovery,
  explosive ordnance disposal, and detainee operations. (See ATP 3-91 for additional information
  on integrating and synchronizing protection tasks.)
  Protective Services
  8-183. The commander may determine that it is necessary (or be required) to provide protective services
  from within the BCT to protect high-value host nation civil and military authorities or other selected
  individual(s). This requirement usually occurs when host-nation security forces have been so extensively
  penetrated by hostile elements that they cannot be trusted to provide protective services or when host-nation
  security forces lack the technical skills and capabilities to provide the desired degree of protection. The
  element(s) tasked to perform protective services for designated personnel receives as much training and
  specialized equipment as is possible before the mission. (See ATP 3-39.35 for additional information.)