text: Chapter 4
  Defensive Operations
  While the OPFOR sees the offense as the decisive form of military action,
  it recognizes defense as the stronger form of military action, particularly
  when faced with a superior, extraregional foe. Defensive operations can
  lead to strategic victory if the extraregional enemy abandons his mission.
  It may be sufficient for the OPFOR simply not to lose. Even when an
  operational-level commandsuch as a field group (FG) or operational-
  strategic command (OSC)as a whole is conducting an offensive operation,
  it is likely that one or more subordinate units may be executing defensive
  missions to preserve offensive combat power in other areas, to protect an
  important formation or resource, or to deny access to key facilities or geo-
  graphic areas.
  OPFOR defenses can be characterized as a “shield of blows.” Each force
  and zone of the defense plays an important role in the attack of the en-
  emy’s combat system. An operational-level defense is structured around
  the concept that destroying the synergy of the enemy’s combat system will
  make enemy forces vulnerable to attack and destruction.
  Commanders and staffs do not approach the defense with preconceived
  templates. The operational situation may cause the commander to vary
  his defensive methods and techniques. Nevertheless, there are basic
  characteristics of defensive operations (purposes and types of action) that
  have applications in all situations.
  STRATEGIC CONTEXT
  4-1. Defensive operations are an important component of all OPFOR stra-
  tegic campaigns. However, the scale and purpose of defensive actions may
  differ during the various types of strategic-level actions.
  REGIONAL OPERATIONS
  4-2. The State possesses an overmatch in all elements of power against
  internal and regional opponents. It is able to employ that power in regional
  operations in a conventional operational design. This overmatch does not
  imply, however, that regional operations are entirely offensive. Consolidation
  of gains, security actions, and economy-of-force measures can all produce de-
  fensive courses of action inside a larger offensive design.
  4-3. The State’s military forces are sufficient to overmatch any single re-
  gional neighbor, but not necessarily an alliance or coalition of neighboring
  countries. They may not be a match for the forces an extraregional power
  can bring to bear. Thus, the OPFOR seeks to exploit its numerical and