text: Chapter 5
  Operations During Crisis
  The 1930’s taught us a clear lesson: aggressive conduct, if allowed to go unchecked and
  unchallenged ultimately leads to war.
  President John F. Kennedy
  This chapter begins with a discussion of the broad trends that occur in the strategic
  environment and adversary actions during crisis. It discusses how Army forces provide
  options to joint force commanders (JFCs) seeking to obtain relative advantages during
  crisis, and how the Army projects forces. It then describes the roles of theater armies,
  corps, divisions, and brigades. The chapter concludes with a discussion of
  consolidating gains and transitioning back to competition or to armed conflict.
  OVERVIEW OF OPERATIONS DURING CRISIS
  5-1. A crisis is an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces,
  or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military
  importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives
  (JP 3-0). A crisis may be the result of adversary actions or indicators of imminent action, or it may be the
  result of natural or human disasters. During a crisis, opponents are not yet using lethal force as the primary
  means for achieving their objectives, but the situation potentially requires a rapid response by forces prepared
  to fight to deter further aggression. When directed, the Army provides a JFC with capabilities to help deter
  further provocation and sufficient combat power to maintain or reestablish conventional deterrence. The
  introduction of significant land forces demonstrates the will to impose costs, provides options to joint force
  and national leaders, and signals a high level of national commitment. The effects of a persistent presence on
  the ground among allied or partner forces cannot be easily replicated with air or maritime power alone.
  5-2. Crisis response operations are characterized by high
  degrees of volatility and uncertainty. A crisis may erupt with Success during a crisis is a return to a
  no warning, or it may be well anticipated. Its duration is state of competition in which the
  United States, its allies, and its
  unpredictable. Additionally, adversaries may perceive
  partners are in positions of increased
  themselves in a different context or state of conflict than U.S.,
  advantage relative to the adversary.
  allied, and partner forces. What is seen by one side as a crisis
  Should deterrence fail, Army forces
  might be perceived by the other as armed conflict or
  are better positioned to defeat enemy
  competition. Army leaders must demonstrate flexibility, forces during conflict.
  anticipate changes in an operational environment, and provide
  JFCs with credible, effective options. This requires trained
  forces agile enough to adapt quickly to new situations and commanders and staffs adept at linking tactical
  actions to attaining policy objectives.
  5-3. Regardless of the capabilities employed, there are generally two broad outcomes from a crisis. Either
  deterrence is maintained, and de-escalation occurs, or armed conflict begins. While this requires that Army
  forces be prepared for either type of transition, forces deploying during crisis always assume they are
  deploying to fight. While Army forces prepare for armed conflict, they avoid sending signals that armed
  conflict is inevitable, regardless of what the adversary does, to avoid inadvertent escalation. Generally, senior
  leaders at the corps and higher echelons influence those perceptions through public communications in
  support of the JFC and national leaders.