text: Chapter 7
  degree surveillance and track-while-scan capabilities; they may be stopped to stare at fixed sectors. THAAD
  also provides sectored radar coverage against ballistic threats.
  7-39. Patriot radars may be assigned secondary target lines to counter alternate air avenues of approach or
  to provide mutual support/overlapping coverage for an adjacent radar. Secondary target lines must be planned
  in advance to allow the proper siting of launchers to accommodate both primary and secondary target line
  requirements.
  7-40. Patriot launchers can be rotated in azimuth via tabular inputs from the engagement control station, but
  such rotation is done prior to the conduct of an engagement. During the engagement process, Patriot launchers
  fire at a fixed elevation and azimuth. Patriot missiles must be acquired by a Patriot radar so that in-flight
  updates can be provided to enable target intercept. Thus, launcher locations must be carefully selected to
  meet technical requirements and to ensure proper lethality at intercept. Patriot launchers are emplaced within
  the Patriot radar coverage, or, if secondary target lines are assigned, in such a position as to support fires in
  this secondary sector. Launchers emplaced to support secondary sectors may not be available in the primary
  sector, and launchers available in the primary sector may not be available to support secondary sectors.
  Algorithms in the engagement control station automatically calculate which launchers can support a sector
  and command appropriate slew actions to enable that support. The first principle in emplacing launchers is
  that of mass to ensure proper lethality against the anticipated attacks on defended assets. Patriot launchers
  are emplaced, dependent upon missile load, with sufficient mass to defeat the anticipated ballistic missile
  threat and support wider area cruise missile defense. Missile load-out is task force tailorable as is the
  composition of the task force itself. In consideration of defeating the ballistic missile threat, preference is
  given at emplacement to launchers carrying missile segment enhancement missiles first and then to PAC-3
  missiles second, as the hit-to-kill characteristics of these missiles provides greater lethality against ballistic
  threats. Launchers carrying guidance enhanced missiles should be placed in positions primarily to optimize
  cruise missile defense and secondarily to support the ballistic missile fight. While other factors are considered
  in the engagement, decision, and assignment process, missile selection is critical.
  7-41. Patriot launchers can be distributed across the area of operations, subject to constraints on the technical
  requirements of missile capture and uplinks and the need to achieve sufficient mass. Patriot launchers are
  connected to the network via data link terminals, which are embedded in engagement control stations and
  communication relay groups. Launchers are directly connected to their controlling engagement control
  station by data link terminals (local and phase 1 remote) or by launcher data link terminal to a data link
  terminal in a communications relay group (phase 3 remote), which then connects the launcher to its
  controlling engagement control station. (When providing control of remote launchers, a communications
  group is also called a launcher control station.) Fiber optic cable connections can replace the data link terminal
  connections when time permits site improvements. Since only four communication relay groups are available
  in a nominal task force, launchers should be grouped either locally with the radar or in distributed remote
  launch farms such that the demand for relay terminals to place launchers on the net is minimized consistent
  with achieving desired lethality to protect assets. Patriot launchers located in the vicinity of a defended asset
  provide for better lethality and shorter time of flight. However, sustainment and security of remote launch
  farms must be considered when selecting locations for the deployment of launchers.
  7-42. Avengers, with a nominal load of eight Stinger missiles, are emplaced to support engagements of the
  anticipated cruise missile threat through 360 degrees, though Stinger’s operational range is limited. Avengers
  rotate in azimuth to point Stinger missiles in the optimal direction. Since Patriot radars, and thus Patriot
  engagements, are sectored, the emplacement of Avenger considers the out-of-sector attack potential of air
  threats in a complex integrated attack scenario; Avengers are positioned to deny any ingress routes not
  already covered by Patriot. Once these routes are defended, any additional Avengers can be positioned to
  thicken the defense and provide for earlier engagement of very low altitude threats.
  7-43. C-RAM deploys and fights as a platoon. When C-RAM is attached to an ADA task force, C-RAM
  deployment and employment continues to be in accordance with C-RAM doctrine.
  7-44. ADA units are high value assets with limited organic security capabilities. ADA task force equipment
  is vulnerable to both direct and indirect fire and enemy special operations forces. When the mission permits,
  ADA forces are typically emplaced as part of larger operations bases; however, when a mission requires that
  ADA components deploy outside of these installations, additional force protection assets, such as engineers
  and infantry, are required to prepare and secure the new site.