text: Integration with Unified Action Partners
  INSTALLATION CONSIDERATIONS
  C-14. Cyberspace operations and EW systems are complex and continually evolving. Warfighter readiness
  and the ability to fight upon arrival are crucial for a fully capable, ready force. Executing cyberspace
  operations and EW in a garrison environment presents unique challenges for several reasons. Leaders not
  physically co-located require the use telephonic or virtual collaboration and coordination. In addition,
  constraints due to laws, policies, and regulations may limit the use of cyberspace operations and EW on an
  installation. Specific mission sets for different installations (testing, training, and maintenance) may have
  special requirements. Additionally, establishing working relationships with garrison organizations such as
  the Network Enterprise Center is essential. The CEWO works with the installation and host nation agencies
  to incorporate cyberspace operations and EW training into their organization’s exercises.
  PRIVATE INDUSTRY CONSIDERATIONS
  C-15. Private industry plays a significant role in cyberspace and the EMS. The Army relies on its connectivity
  with its defense industrial base partners and the private sector for many of its non-warfighting day-to-day
  functions for support and sustainment. Examples include electronic databases and interfaces for medical
  services, accounting and finance services, personnel records, equipment maintenance, and logistics functions.
  Global transport and logistics require data exchange between military and private networks. The Army relies
  on shipping companies, transportation grid providers, and suppliers as a part of the global transportation
  system.
  C-16. The security and reliability of private industry networks directly affect Department of Defense (DOD)
  operations. DOD personnel does not administer these networks; however, they are still essential to effective
  Army operations. Responsibility for these networks falls on the network owners.
  C-17. Private industry has proven to be the primary catalyst for advancements in information technology
  resulting in the DOD becoming increasingly reliant on commercial off-the-shelf technology. Many of these
  products are developed by, manufactured by, or have components produced by foreign countries. These
  manufacturers, vendors, service providers, and developers can be influenced by adversaries or unwittingly
  used by them to provide counterfeit products or products that have built-in vulnerabilities. The DD Form
  1494 (Application for Equipment Frequency Allocation) process determines the compatibility and
  interoperability of commercial off-the-shelf systems that use the EMS to support national needs. The DOD
  follows risk assessments and procedures to ensure proper supply chain management and that the acquisition
  of software and hardware does not adversely affect the security of the Department of Defense information
  network (DODIN).
  C-18. The DODIN resides on commercial networks as undersea cables, fiber optic networks,
  telecommunication services, satellite and microwave antennas from local telephone companies, and leased
  channels from satellites. Many of these commercial networks are under foreign ownership, control, and
  influence. Reliance on commercial systems makes conducting cyberspace operations and EW vulnerable to
  access denial, service interruption, communications interception and monitoring, infiltration, and data
  compromise. Army commanders pursue risk mitigation through adherence to operational security,
  cyberspace security policies, inspections of vendor-supplied equipment, encryption, and enforcing
  cybersecurity training requirements.