text: Maneuver Enhancement Brigade
  often with no easy means to distinguish one from another. Civilians could interfere with military operations.
  Civilians are considered noncombatants or combatants under the Law of Land Warfare. Civilians are afforded
  noncombatant status unless they engage in a hostile act. They may be the most difficult to counter because
  they are not normally part of an established enemy agent network and their actions may be less predictable.
  1-63. Many urban environments include vast, densely packed areas with populations that exceed a million
  people. In urban environments, threats can be difficult to identify due to the often complex nature of the
  forces and environment. These threats may operate independently or together. Individuals may be active
  members of one or more groups. Potential urban adversaries share many characteristics. In urban terrain,
  friendly forces may encounter a variety of potential threats, such as conventional military forces, paramilitary
  forces, insurgents or guerilla forces, terrorists, criminals and organized crime, drug traffickers, warlords, or
  street gangs. Individual criminals or small gangs do not normally have the capability to adversely affect
  legitimate political, military, and judicial organizations. However, large-scale criminal organizations can
  challenge governmental authority with capabilities and characteristics similar to a paramilitary force.
  1-64. Threats in a support area are categorized by the three levels of defense required to counter them. Any
  or all threat levels may exist simultaneously in the support area. Emphasis on base defense and security
  measures may depend on the anticipated threat level. A Level I threat is a small enemy force that can be
  defeated by those units normally operating in the echelon support area. A Level I threat generally consists of
  a squad size unit or smaller groups of enemy soldiers, agents, criminals, or terrorists. Typical objectives for
  a Level I threat include supplying themselves from friendly supply stocks, disrupting friendly missions
  command nodes and logistics facilities, and interdicting friendly LOC.
  1-65. A Level II threat is an enemy force or activities beyond the defense capability of both the base camps
  and base clusters and any local reserve or response force. Level II threats consist of enemy special operations
  teams, long-range reconnaissance, mounted or dismounted combat reconnaissance teams, and attrited small
  combat units. Typical objectives for Level II threats include the interdiction of friendly LOC, as well as the
  disruption or destruction of friendly command and control nodes and logistics and commercial facilities, the
  collection of information on friendly forces, and the interdiction of friendly LOC. Typically, MEB military
  police assets can neutralize Level II threats.
  1-66. A Level III threat is an enemy force or activities beyond the defense capability of both the base camps
  and base clusters and any local reserve or response force. It consists of mobile enemy combat forces. Possible
  objectives for a Level III threat include seizing key terrain, interfering with the movement and commitment
  of reserves and artillery, and destroying friendly combat forces. Its objectives could also include destroying
  friendly sustainment facilities, supply points, command post facilities, airfields, aviation AAs, and arming
  and refueling points; gathering information on friendly forces; and interdicting LOC and major supply routes.
  The most appropriate response to a Level III threat in the support area is a TCF.
  1-67. The nexus between criminal and irregular threats has grown closer and stronger. Most criminal
  activities in the operational environment occur in densely populated urban areas where disorder, crime, and
  the fear of crime harm civilian populations, weaken developing security forces, destabilize governments, and
  threaten military operations. Irregular and criminal threats continue to attack, manipulate, exploit, and
  intimidate vulnerable and frustrated populations as ways to discredit governments, gain power and influence,
  drive disorder and instability, and generate illicit profits. Crime, disorder, and the fear of crime continue to
  be persistent, debilitating factors that contribute to instability across the operational environment, especially
  in densely populated urban areas and in weak, failing, and failed states. Despite the potential threat, the
  support area will likely include urban areas, and MEBs will often establish base camps or base clusters in
  them to take advantage of existing facilities (airports, warehouses, ports).
  SUPPORT TO ARMY OPERATIONS
  1-68. The Army defeats enemies by using a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations and
  supports civil authorities through DSCA. The effort accorded to each task is proportional to the mission and
  varies with the situation. The MEB supports Army operations through the integration of MEB capabilities to
  synchronize, integrate, and organize all organic and task-organized capabilities and resources throughout
  operations to shape the operational environment, prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale combat, and
  consolidate gains. The MEB primary task of support area operations in support of operations enables the