text: Chapter 4
  PRINCIPLES OF MISSION COMMAND
  4-2. The BCT commander focuses the order on the purpose of the operation through mission orders.
  Mission orders allowthe commander’s subordinates the greatest possible flexibility to accomplish assigned
  tasks. Mission command is enabled by the principles of—
  (cid:122) Competence.
  (cid:122) Mutual trust.
  (cid:122) Shared understanding.
  (cid:122) Commander’s intent.
  (cid:122) Mission orders.
  (cid:122) Disciplined initiative.
  (cid:122) Risk acceptance.
  Note.(See ADP 6-0 for a detailed discussion of the principles of mission command.)
  COMMAND PRESENCE
  4-3. Command presencerequires the BCT commander to lead from a position that allows timely decisions
  based on an operational environment assessment of the operational environment and application of judgment.
  The commander may find it necessary to locate forward of the main command post(CP). For example,the
  commander may position with the main effort to gain understanding,prioritize resources,influence others,
  and mitigate risk. To do this,the commander must understand how the principles of mission command guide
  and help combinethe art of command and the science of control.
  4-4. The Armored Raid on Baghdad in 2003 offers an example of how the mission command approach to
  command and control enabled 2dBrigade,3dInfantry Division(ID)(Mechanized) to seize,retain,and exploit
  the initiative in an uncertain environment. The vignette below demonstrates how the seven principles of
  mission command guided the brigadecommander during the operation. It also describes how the commander
  used the principles of mission command to combinethe art and science of command and control to understand
  situations,make decisions,direct actions,and lead forces toward mission accomplishment.
  Armored Raid on Baghdad, 5 April 2003
  On 5 April 2003, COL David Perkins’ 2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized),
  conducted a raid into western Baghdad as part of the division’s advance on Baghdad after
  a two-week march ofover 700 kilometers from Kuwait. As part of the advance,3d Infantry
  Division (Mechanized) created a partial cordon around the Iraqi capital. The raid,ordered
  by 3d Infantry Division commander MG Buford Blount and V Corps commander LTG
  William S. Wallace, was conducted as a battalion sized reconnaissance in force into
  western Baghdad to determine the composition and strength of Iraqi forces defending the
  capital.
  Staging out of Objective (OBJ) SAINTS, the column of M1A1 Abrams tanks and M2
  Bradley Fighting Vehicles from LTC Eric Schwartz’s Task Force 1stBattalion,64th Armor
  Regiment (Task Force1-64 AR),would advance north on Highway 8(the main north-south
  expressway west of the Tigris River) into western Baghdad. The column then turned west
  to link with troops at the airport. Since the enemy situation was unclear, the operation
  required initiative and flexibility from the officers,noncommissioned officers,andSoldiers
  executing the operation. Wallace judged that such a bold plan was a reasonable risk. The
  raid was the first armored foray into a major city since World War II. Perkins’concept for
  the raid,called a “Thunder Run”by the tankers,was for an advance up Highway 8 that
  “…create[d] as much confusion… inside the city [as possible].”In mitigating the inherent
  risk of the operation, the 2d Brigade commander considered “…that my Soldiers or my
  units [could] react to chaos much better than the enemy [could].” Perkins’ specific