text: Chapter 2
  2-117. Electromagnetic deception is the deliberate radiation, re-radiation, alteration, suppression,
  absorption, denial, enhancement, or reflection of electromagnetic energy in a manner intended to convey
  misleading information to an enemy or to enemy electromagnetic-dependent weapons, thereby degrading or
  neutralizing the enemy’s combat capability. Using electromagnetic deception is not exclusive to deception
  but can provide potent effects for aspects of deception operations related to the electromagnetic. Among the
  types of electromagnetic deception are the following:
  * Manipulative involves actions to eliminate revealing, or convey misleading, electromagnetic
  telltale indicators that may be used by hostile forces.
  * Simulative involves actions to simulate friendly, notional, or actual capabilities to mislead hostile
  forces.
  * Imitative involves actions to imitate enemy emissions to mislead hostile forces.
  CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS
  2-118. Deception and cyberspace operations can be mutually supportive in many ways. Since an enemy can
  reside in cyberspace and leverage the same systems and processes, cyberspace operations serve as an
  effective conduit for placing or delivering deceptive material to affect enemy military decision making and
  subsequent action or inaction. MDOs can help protect friendly use of information systems by applying
  deceptive activities similar to those used in the physical dimension for maneuver forces. Such an operation
  may include constructing false servers, communications nodes, and other hardware associated with a tactical
  computer network to include the replication of traffic and false data storage.
  2-119. Enemy intelligence and targeting systems, which make a priority of attacking or subverting a
  friendly information system, can be dissuaded from doing so via a successful deception plan. MDOs can
  redirect enemy collection assets toward deceptive events (such as the presentation of a false “weakness” in
  friendly information systems) and then target those assets for destruction or exploitation by friendly forces.
  Any deception plan must consider the abilities and limitations of friendly and enemy cyberspace operations.
  Careful and detailed planning ensures deception executions using cyberspace operations assets are tracked,
  recorded, and deconflicted with other nondeceptive cyberspace operations. Planners properly classify and
  avoid exposing the deception plan to unprotected computer networks or sending it via unsecured email. Any
  exposure can lead to plan failure.
  SPACE OPERATIONS
  2-120. Space operations capabilities offer many options to influence deception activities to include satellite-
  based imagery and signals intelligence collection systems against friendly forces. These collection satellites
  generally operate in predetermined orbits, and thus the time they are in position to collect intelligence on
  friendly forces is predictable. MDOs can use this information to portray to the enemy a desired observable
  or use it to camouflage or take appropriate OPSEC measures to avoid providing indicators to enemy
  intelligence operations. Additionally, the posturing of friendly force satellites capabilities may also assist in
  deception efforts. For instance, the use of a friendly force intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, or
  the positioning of a communications satellite both illustrate methods that may help mislead the enemy
  regarding friendly force intentions.
  PUBLIC AFFAIRS
  2-121. Deception activities, including planning efforts, are prohibited from explicitly or implicitly
  targeting, misleading, or attempting to influence the U.S. Government, U.S. Congress, the U.S. public, or the
  U.S. news media. Legal staff review all deception activities to eliminate, minimize, or mitigate the possibility
  that such influence might occur. Planners coordinate deception plans that have activities potentially visible
  to the media or the public with appropriate public affairs officers to identify any potential problems.
  Coordination reduces the chance that public affairs officers inadvertently reveal information that could
  undermine an ongoing or planned deception.