text: Overview of Signal Support
  1-45. Careful operational planning can minimize disrupted operations in a degraded environment. The
  commander’s priority of effort includes priorities of service. Continuity of operations plans, PACE plans,
  and disciplined initiative under the mission command approach can mitigate the effects of degraded
  communications capabilities. The information and knowledge management plans should include priorities
  for knowledge management in a degraded environment.
  Denied Environment
  1-46. Enemies and adversaries may adopt an antiaccess and area denial strategy against U.S. forces. An
  enemy or adversary with the ability to field layered and fully integrated antiaccess and area denial capabilities
  may try to deny U.S. access to an operational area altogether. Operations relying on the DODIN, and
  operations of the DODIN itself, must continue even in times of crisis. The DODIN architecture supports
  continued operations in a denied environment.
  1-47. Continuity of operations plans, disaster recovery plans, and distributed DODIN operations reduce the
  adverse effects of isolated network disruptions. Network failures should be transparent to end users.
  Continuing operations rely on systems and capabilities that automatically and immediately transfer to
  alternate means, to minimize interruptions to connectivity. Denied access in an isolated area or operational
  theater does not affect the continued overall operation of the DODIN outside the contested area. See appendix
  A for more information about operations in a contested environment.
  Continuity of Operations Planning
  1-48. Army units must develop, train, and implement techniques across all warfighting functions to ensure
  continuity of operations and enable an accurate common operational picture when communications become
  degraded. These methods include—
  * Anticipating and recognizing degraded and denied communications so operators can quickly
  employ countermeasures.
  * Adjusting the dispersion of units.
  * Graphic control measures.
  * Bandwidth management.
  * Adjusting operational tempo.
  * Centralizing or decentralizing key communications capabilities, as required.
  * Employing redundant communications, targeting, and collection assets.
  * Implementing procedures to transfer critical data and information, both manually and verbally.
  * Retaining the ability to perform critical command and control and other warfighting function tasks
  manually.
  * Establishing push, versus pull, reporting procedures in case normal reporting is hindered.
  * Planning locations and capacity for data storage.
  * Scheduling regular backups of operational data.
  * Establishing and rehearsing procedures for emergency restoration.
  1-49. U.S. forces’ increased reliance on reachback information and network capabilities creates
  vulnerabilities to attack from various sources. Employment of the mission command philosophy is essential
  to overcome the fog and friction that a decentralized, disaggregated, and degraded communications
  environment adds to the battlefield when other defensive countermeasures fail (FM 3-0). The assistant chief
  of staff, signal (G-6) or battalion or brigade signal staff officer (S-6) supports the assistant chief of staff,
  operations (G-3) and battalion or brigade operations staff officer (S-3) continuity of operations plans by
  planning a robust communications network with redundant means of transport and developing PACE plans
  during the military decision-making process.
  Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency Plan
  1-50. Commanders must be able to communicate with adjacent units, supporting joint forces, and host-nation
  and multinational forces in addition to their subordinates. Successful commanders understand that networks
  may be degraded through threat or environmental factors during operations. They develop methods and