text: Operational Art and Science
  importance may cause the enemy to commit significant resources to defend it. The loss of a decisive point
  weakens a center of gravity and may expose more decisive points, eventually leading to an attack on the
  center of gravity itself.
  2-16. Generally, more decisive points exist in a given operational area than available forces and capabilities
  can attack, seize, retain, control, or protect. Accordingly, planners study and analyze decisive points and
  determine which offer the best opportunity to attack the enemy’s center of gravity, extend friendly operational
  reach, or enable the application of friendly forces and capabilities. Operational art includes selecting decisive
  points that best lead to establishing end state conditions in a sequence that most quickly and efficiently leads
  to mission success.
  Center of Gravity: Republican Guard Divisions in the
  1991 Gulf War
  The coalition campaign to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in the 1991 Gulf War
  provides an example of a military force massing combat power to destroy an enemy
  center of gravity. For the defending Iraqi Army, its Republican Guard divisions served
  as its operational-level center of gravity and mechanized core of its strategic fighting
  capacity. Coalition planners identified this factor and planned accordingly to first
  reduce the elite Republican Guard with air and ground fires and then follow with an
  envelopment from the West by the VII Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps to destroy or
  dislodge the entrenched defenders in the deserts of Southern Iraq.
  The Battle of Medina Ridge on 26 and 27 February unfolded on the VII Corp’s left flank
  as a decisive maneuver in the campaign. The massive envelopment saw the
  1st Armored Division attack through forward Iraqi defenses and then destroy a brigade
  of the Tawakalna Division, a brigade of the Adnan Infantry Division, and most
  importantly, most of the powerful Medina Division. Its 2nd Brigade alone fought the
  single largest armored engagement of the war against its counterpart in the Medina
  Division where it destroyed 61 tanks, 34 armored personnel carriers, and 5 air defense
  systems in a single hour.
  Throughout the Battle of Medina Ridge, the 1st Armored Division experienced over
  48 hours of continuous and intense combat while advancing 115 kilometers (71 miles)
  into Southern Iraq. Tactical successes like this occurred along the entire corps front
  and effectively destroyed the Republican Guard’s ability to fight, and with it, the Iraqi
  Army’s capacity and will to defend in depth. At the strategic level, the destruction of
  their operational center of gravity convinced the Iraqi national command that they could
  not win the war and resulted in a dramatic retreat and the complete liberation of Kuwait.
  2-17. Decisive points identified for action become objectives. An objective can be physical (an enemy force
  or a terrain feature) or conceptual (established rule of law). In the physical sense, an objective is a location
  on the ground used to orient operations, phase operations, facilitate changes of direction, and provide for
  unity of effort. In the conceptual sense, an objective is the clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward
  which an operation is directed (JP 5-0). Objectives provide the basis for determining tasks to subordinate
  units. The most important objective forms the basis for developing the decisive operation. Combined with
  end state conditions, objectives form the building blocks for developing lines of operations and lines of effort.