text: Security Cooperation in the Competition Continuum
  crisis. Pre-positioned combat equipment to enable the rapid transition to crisis or armed conflict becomes a
  key consideration when deemed necessary.
  3-35. While transitioning to crisis or armed conflict, it is critical for SFA forces already in the crisis or
  conflict zone to understand their legal status. The decision to become a combatant is reserved for the highest
  levels of the USG therefore SFA forces must take deliberate efforts to ensure they fully understand and abide
  by their combatant status as determined by the National Command Authority. To provide options to senior
  leaders, deployed SFA forces should always be prepared to transition to a combatant status and work with
  their partner security forces. SFA forces should also be prepared to maintain a noncombatant status, which
  will likely involve withdrawing from the country during a transition to crisis or conflict. It is likely that SFA
  forces will continue to support their partner forces, but they will do so from an adjacent country. In this
  instance, SFA forces will still likely work through their partner FSF to achieve theater objectives in a
  noncombatant role.
  3-36. Current host-nation and partner FSF capability, capacity, and interoperability assessment data is an
  integral component to the planning process, especially during the rapid transition to crisis or armed conflict.
  These assessments may include quantitative and qualitative performance measures and estimates based on
  assessment, monitoring, and evaluation best practices. Key partner FSF entity variables may include the
  force’s purpose, structure, their will to fight, and strengths and weaknesses by warfighting function and
  domain. SFA forces in the contact layer are instrumental in the generation and dissemination of relevant
  partner FSF assessment data during transition not only to the theater Army and combatant command, but also
  to the blunt and surge forces that will deploy and augment the joint force in crisis.
  3-37. Transitions are inherently complex and unpredictable because operational environmental conditions
  can quickly change and alter the perception of strategic leaders who may not have all the information
  necessary for clear situational understanding. To compete effectively during the transition period, SFA forces
  adopt a long-term approach that is agile enough to react to rapid changes in the political, diplomatic, and
  strategic environment.
  SECURITY COOPERATION IN CRISIS OVERVIEW
  3-38. A crisis is an emerging incident or situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens,
  military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic,
  or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national
  and/or strategic objectives (JP 3-0). A crisis can be long in duration, but it can also reflect a near-simultaneous
  and rapid transition to armed conflict if deterrence fails.
  3-39. The collective military capability and capacity generated during competition sets the conditions and
  provides the leverage to win in crisis or resolve the situation with conditions favorable to the United States
  and its allies and partners. In crisis, SC enables the joint and multinational force to present credible and
  integrated deterrent options that demonstrate the ability to impose costs on malign action. During crisis, SC
  personnel may provide unique capabilities to advance partnerships, influence adversarial behavior, and
  support partner FSF and defense ministry crisis response operations.
  3-40. In crisis, SFA forces may also be used to extend the capabilities of the multidomain task force by using
  combinations of partner FSF-provided non-kinetic and kinetic maneuver to neutralize adversary A2/AD
  networks to enable joint freedom of action.
  3-41. SA activities in crisis seek to provide allies and partners with the relevant defense articles they require
  to conduct successful operations. Special SA authorities and programs can sometimes be used during crisis
  to enable the rapid provisioning of defense articles to allies and partners under 22 USC authority if certain
  conditions are met. These special program processes can be executed much faster than the normal FMS case
  management process used to conduct SA. For example, under the Presidential Drawdown Authority, the
  President can authorize the immediate transfer of articles and services from U.S. stocks, up to a funding cap
  established in law, in response to an “unforeseen emergency” (22 USC §2318(a)(1)). SFA forces may be
  used to provide training on this equipment under special SA authorities. Effective synchronization of these
  combined SA and SFA efforts during crisis is critical to achieving desired end states.