text: Chapter 4
  * Establish a permissive battlefield design, to include airspace.
  * Establish permissive FSCMs.
  * Rehearsals, especially FA technical rehearsals.
  * Time on target.
  * Continually training observers in all aspects of FS.
  * Limiting radio transmissions on fire nets to time-sensitive, mission-essential traffic only.
  4-72. The effectiveness of fires on a target will depend, in part, on the method of fire and type of ammunition
  selected to attack the target. The desired effects are created through proper weaponeering, accurate initial
  fires, and massed fires. Weaponeering is the process of determining the specific means required to create a
  desired effect on a given target (JP 3-60).
  4-73. The FA has the ability to deliver effects on a target from multiple formations to engage a target
  simultaneously. An essential capability to disrupting the enemy's A2/AD systems is our ability to mass fires.
  MASSED FIRES
  4-74. Massed fire is fire from a number of weapons directed at a single point or small area (JP 3-02). The
  FSCOORD needs to maximize the number of units massing across the fires formation to create the required
  effect in the specified EFAT. For more information on EFATs see appendix A. Massing fires within a firing
  unit distributes ammunition consumption and lessens the sustainment problem for the FA unit. Further,
  synchronized mass fires increase the lethality of the delivered munition by preventing the adversaries' ability
  to react to multiple volleys.
  4-75. Massed fires maximize effectiveness of the initial volley on the intended target. Massing all available
  fires enables the supported commander to maximize the effect of fires on a target or targets. Fires can also
  be massed in time (striking multiple targets at the same time) to overwhelm the enemy's ability to react. The
  desired effect is created through fires delivered in an instant; since these fires limit the enemy's time to react
  and seek protection. Massed fires ensure maximum effect in attacking targets that can easily change their
  posture.
  Operation Desert Storm.
  In a 15 May 1991 letter to the Commandant of the FA School, Major General Raphael
  J. Hallada (1987–1991), about the US VII Corps’ 24 February 1991 breaching
  operation, the Commanding General of the 1st Infantry Division, Major General
  Thomas G. Rhame, related: The performance of the FA in combat has caused all of
  us to remember what we had perhaps forgotten, namely its incredible destructive
  power and shock effect. The preparation fires I witnessed prior to our assault on the
  breachline were the most incredible sight I have seen in 27 years of service. On 24
  February 1991 Commander of the US VII Corps Artillery, Brigadier General Creighton
  Abrams Jr., and the Commander of the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery,
  Colonel Michael L. Dodson assembled the FA force. In support of the US VII Corps
  assault, General Abrams allocated the 42d, 75th, and 142d FA Brigades, two division
  artilleries, and 10 Multiple Launch Rocket System batteries to create a Soviet-style
  attack at the breach area. General Abrams positioned approximately 22 artillery pieces
  for each kilometer of the attack zone. More than 350 FA pieces fired 11,000 rounds
  while M270 Multiple-Launch Rocket Launchers shot 414 rockets in a FA preparation
  of 30 minutes. Besides crushing Iraqi morale, this massed fires destroyed 50 tanks,
  139 armored personnel carriers, and 152 FA pieces.
  SECTION VI – FIRE DIRECTION
  4-76. Fire direction is the tactical employment of firepower exercising the tactical command of one or more
  units in the selection of targets, the concentration and distribution of fire, and the allocation of ammunition