text: Understanding the Strategic Context
  and the U.S. created a unique context for the Laos insurgency. Moreover, the corrupt and ineffective host
  government was not able to wage its own counterinsurgency campaign effectively. To effectively counter
  the insurgency in Laos, the U.S. needed an operational approach that would work in that environment, if a
  successful operational approach were possible. Unfortunately, U.S. forces failed to create an effective
  strategy to counter the insurgency in Laos. Thus, the U.S. government failed to find the needed ways and
  means to meet the policy goal.
  The Laos Insurgency
  Lamented as “the forgotten war,” the insurgency in Laos was heavily
  influenced (and often overshadowed) by the conflict in neighboring Vietnam. A victim
  of geography, half-hearted fighting between the different factions in Laos may well
  have worked itself out in a lasting compromise if not for pressure from North
  Vietnamese communists to control areas of Laos for the infiltration of men and
  materiel into South Vietnam (along the Ho Chi Min trail) and U.S. efforts to oppose
  communist presence and influence.
  Beginning in earnest in 1959, fighting pitted variously rightist Royal Lao
  forces supported by Hmong guerillas against the leftist Pathet Lao (indigenous
  communists) and their North Vietnamese supporters. These participants were at
  times joined by other players, including U.S. advisors, Filipino troops, U.S. air power,
  Thai commandos and artillery formations, as well as “neutralist” Lao forces. During
  the period of conflict, Laos was underdeveloped in every way, including its
  government, its economy, and its military. The government and military were corrupt
  and ineffective and the economy was wholly dependent on outside support.
  As the United States became more invested in Vietnam, it also increased
  support to Laos; by the end of 1955, the U.S. provided 100% of the Lao military
  budget. North Vietnamese backers of the Pathet Lao sought to grow that force,
  supporting a significant recruiting campaign and sending many of the recruits to
  North Vietnam for schooling and training. This led to greater investment by the U.S.
  in materiel and training for government forces, and included, beginning in 1957,
  efforts to arm Hmong guerillas, who would play an important role later in the conflict.
  Vietnamese interest in Laos was primarily in securing the so called
  “panhandle” region, through which the Ho Chi Min trail allowed the North Vietnamese
  to infiltrate men and materiel into South Vietnam. A secondary consideration was the
  support of a fellow communist movement (the Pathet Lao). Once fighting began in
  1959, the Vietnamese used government chaos to their benefit, increasing attacks on
  government forces and expanding the territory under their influence or control. During
  this period, many attacks took the form of North Vietnamese Army regulars attacking
  and overwhelming a position, and then letting their Pathet Lao allies occupy the area
  and claim the victory, thus at least paying lip service to maintaining the neutralization
  of Laos.
  These North Vietnamese Army-led attacks and several attempted
  counterattacks by Royal Laotian Forces against Pathet Lao positions revealed the
  gross incompetence of the government’s regular forces. This lack of capability
  stemmed from several sources, including a half-hearted martial tradition in general, a
  preoccupation with profiteering and political games by the senior leadership, lack of
  efforts by the French who were responsible for their training until late 1958, and a
  fundamental lack of motivation. Despite the vigorous efforts of U.S. trainers and
  millions of dollars in materiel throughout the course of the conflict, Royal Lao Forces
  would never become a consequential fighting force. In this phase, the only effective
  forces on the government side were the Hmong tribesmen, trained and provisioned
  by the Central Intelligence Agency and fighting as guerillas.
  International pressure (from the United States as well as from China and
  Russia preferring to avoid unnecessarily provoking the United States) and support
  (from the United States and other allies) prevented the complete collapse of the
  government of Laos in 1962 and pushed for neutralization through a coalition