text: Chapter 1
  organizations adhere to a single plan. Once the commander approves the deception plan, the designated
  operational element monitors the situation and its effects on the target, as well as friendly and partnered
  forces. The MDO, working with the deception working group (DWG), ensures synchronization,
  deconfliction, and OPSEC.
  SECURITY
  1-27. Successful deception requires strict security that begins before execution with measures to deny the
  enemy knowledge of the friendly force’s intent to deceive. Successful planners apply strict need to know
  criteria to each aspect of the deception plan. Maintaining the security of the deception means limiting the
  number of informed planners and participants to those needed. The MDO must develop and maintain access
  rosters and other security controls to limit exposure of operational deception activities.
  TIMING
  1-28. The most critical aspects of deception planning are beginning proper synchronization with the
  commander’s intent and maintaining synchronization during execution. Timing in deception operations is
  crucial. The challenge is to get the deception target to act in accordance with the deception objective within
  the timelines required by the friendly operation. Planners must conduct a thorough conduit analysis to
  understand the amount of time required for an observable to pass through filters and nodes before reaching
  an enemy decision maker. This means that friendly deception executions must be completed in a manner that
  accounts for the time consumed by the enemy’s intelligence collection and analysis process, the enemy’s
  decision-making process, and the enemy’s activity that is to be exploited by friendly forces. Timing must be
  synchronous among friendly deception actions taken, the assimilation and reaction processes of the enemy,
  and dependent friendly operations.
  INTEGRATION
  1-29. Deception is an integral part of an operation that planners must integrate, at all levels, throughout the
  planning process. This integration includes developing a concept for deception that supports the overall
  mission as part of COA development. Planners must also integrate deception plans with higher headquarters
  plans. Deceptions must be consistent with Army doctrinal norms. The MDO assists the staff in integrating
  the deception operation throughout all phases of the operation. This begins with planning, continues through
  execution, and concludes with the termination of the deception.
  TYPES OF MILITARY DECEPTION
  1-30. Any deception aims to either increase or decrease the level of uncertainty, or ambiguity, in the mind
  of the deception target. This ambiguity has the potential to compel the target to mistakenly perceive friendly
  motives, intentions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities thereby altering the target’s assessment. Two generally
  recognized types of MILDEC exist:
  * Ambiguity-increasing.
  * Ambiguity-decreasing.
  AMBIGUITY-INCREASING DECEPTION
  1-31. Ambiguity-increasing deception provides the enemy with multiple plausible friendly COAs.
  Ambiguity-increasing deception is designed to generate confusion and cause mental conflict in the enemy
  decision maker. Anticipated effects of ambiguity-increasing deception can include a delay to making a
  specific decision, operational paralysis, or the distribution of enemy forces to locations far away from the
  intended location of the friendly efforts. Ambiguity-increasing deception is often directed against decision
  makers known to be indecisive or risk-adverse.
  1-32. These deceptions draw attention from one set of activities to another. They can create the illusion of
  strength where weakness exists, or create the illusion of weakness where strength exists. They can also
  acclimate the enemy to particular patterns of activity that are exploitable later. For example, ambiguity-
  increasing deceptions can cause the target to delay a decision until it is too late to prevent friendly mission