text: Chapter 2
  to do it—the purpose of the deception operation. Deception mission analysis begins before the Army tactical
  deception planning process and is always properly informed by current operations and planning efforts.
  2-8. The deception goal and its associated deception objectives are key outputs of deception mission
  analysis, and the foundation for subsequent deception planning. They provide the commander and MDOs
  with a solid understanding of how the deception supports the overall operation and establishes the conceptual
  framework for the deception plan. An effective deception does not have to be elaborate or complex.
  Simplicity is often preferred.
  2-9. MDOs need to participate in and have their efforts informed by conventional planning efforts.
  Conventional and deception planning horizons occur simultaneously in parallel. During mission analysis, the
  MDO begins with analyzing and assessing an operational environment and information environment.
  Deception may be a feasible option, if appropriate to the mission, and if there is a possibility of success.
  Issues that planners consider when determining if deception is a viable COA include—
  * Availability of assets.
  * Understanding any potential deception targets.
  * Suitability.
  * Time.
  * Risk.
  Availability of Assets
  2-10. MDOs consider the availability of assets to determine if sufficient assets exist to support both the
  operation and the deception. There are few assets specifically designed and designated for deception. This
  means plans may require shifting assets from supporting the operation to the deception plan. Commanders
  consider the risks to ascertain that shifting assets to support deception does not adversely affect the operation
  or prevent mission success. Resource development includes collecting potential target data sources,
  identifying potential conduit systems, and cataloging potential deception means. Resource development also
  includes the collection of essential foreign and friendly situation and background information needed to
  initially to organize operations and assess general capabilities.
  Understanding the Deception Target
  2-11. MDOs consider the potential deception target to determine if sufficient information exists on how the
  target acquires information and makes decisions, what knowledge the target has of the situation, and how the
  target views the friendly force. Planners also determine if sufficient information exists to reveal the biases,
  beliefs, and predispositions of the deception target. If necessary, the staff can make assumptions about the
  deception target, but it must avoid mirror imaging, which is the tendency to assume a person sees the world
  and makes decisions in a manner similar to oneself. It is for this reason that MDOs rely heavily on human
  factors analysis (see paragraph 2-37).
  Suitability
  2-12. MDOs consider suitability. Some missions are better suited to deception than others are. When a unit
  has the initiative and has some control over the area of operations, then deception is more suitable. In some
  situations, specific personnel or organizations are better suited to execute deception operations than others
  are. Deception planners determine if conditions are appropriate to conduct deception and make a
  recommendation to commander. The decision ultimately resides with the commander. Conditions in which
  deception are appropriate include the following:
  * The enemy has an advantage that cannot be overcome without using deception, for example,
  advantageous force strength, capability, agility, or situational awareness.
  * The enemy has known preconceptions that can be exploited.
  * The enemy has known flaws in its decision-making process.
  * The enemy is under pressure to act.
  * The enemy is susceptible to suggestion.