text: Preparation and Execution
  Sustain Intelligence Collection during Deception Execution
  3-13. Working with the G-2 collection manager enables internal synchronization of the deception plan. This
  helps ensure information collection assets are in position to collect MOPs and monitor MOEs and indicators
  as outlined in the plan. This synchronization also informs the commander on its status, current levels of
  success, and revised risk. During combat operations in particular, the MDO actively monitors intelligence
  collection.
  Monitor and Assess for Compromise and Counterdeception
  3-14. Using the target feedback provided by MOEs collection, in conjunction with the assessment process,
  the MDO determines the current progression and success of the deception plan. Specially trained intelligence
  analysts, supported by MDOs, remain alert for indicators of compromised components of a deception story.
  Compromise includes the identification of any possible enemy counterdeception efforts. Deception
  compromise, when detected, may lead to one or more termination or exploitation scenarios.
  Keep the Commander Informed
  3-15. The status of the deception operation is part of the commander’s routine battlefield update and
  assessment processes. As the principal authority for the execution of the plan, the commander has
  responsibility for any decision to alter, terminate, or change the deception or primary COA to exploit
  changing conditions. Deception also factors largely in the overall computation of operational risk. Increased
  risk might generate a requirement for adjustment to the plan in other areas.
  Maintain Strict Security and Access Controls Throughout
  3-16. Effective forces practice tight security throughout execution to protect the deception plan and its
  execution. While commanders make many decisions in the planning process on a need to know basis,
  situations can arise that require external expertise or input, such as legal and policy interpretations. The
  commander decides who has a need to know and applies appropriate controls to limit the compromise of any
  deception. To decide, the commander, informed by the MDO, balances mission against prudent risk to
  determine security limits and parameters. In the intense and fluid activity of managing complex military
  operations, it becomes even more critical for all involved personnel to apply appropriate classification,
  handling, and access controls on a daily basis. Staffs should immediately report any OPSEC or other security
  violations of the deception plan at any level (strategic, operational, or tactical) to the MDO and OPSEC
  planner. They will evaluate the violation for potential impact.
  MANAGING THE EXECUTION OF THE DECEPTION PLAN
  3-17. Once the commander orders the execution of the deception, staffs begin implementing the plan in a
  dynamic environment. The implementing order can require immediate execution, or it may provide an
  effective start date in coordination with other operations or events.
  3-18. The MDO is the controlling planner for its execution. Continuity of key personnel as the deception
  moves from a plan to an actual operation ensures that the people executing the deception understand all its
  conceptual nuances, the inherent risks, and the underlying intentions and techniques behind each planned
  deception event. The controlling planner oversees the implementation of the specific deception events in
  accordance with the deception event schedule and continuously monitors the deception operation as part of
  the developing situation, evaluating the deception at each stage. The planner responds to developments with
  recommendations as to how the operation should proceed. As a result of the recommendations on the actual
  situation, the commander can add, delete, or modify scheduled deception events.
  3-19. Because of the extreme sensitivity of deception plans, if the plan requires more than minor adjustments,
  the original approving authority must approve the revised plan before execution begins. Changes that impact
  the deception goal, the deception objective, or the commander’s guidance should not be considered as minor.
  Before initiating the plan, planners refer any requirements for plan changes that affect earlier assessments of
  the probability of deception success or alter the degree of risk initially associated with the operation to the
  commander. However, planners can consider minor changes that involve the timing or sequence of individual