text: Operations During Crisis
  forces. While immediate support may be limited, even limited support could prove decisive when it is obvious
  that additional capabilities are quickly moving into the theater to address initial shortfalls.
  SUSTAINMENT
  5-50. Sustainment is central to force projection, and sustainment preparation of an operational environment
  is the basis for sustainment planning. Corps, division, and brigade planners focus on identifying the resources
  available in an operational area for use by friendly forces and ensuring access to them. The theater army is a
  key partner in providing this information to deploying units. A detailed estimate of requirements allows
  planners to advise the commander of the most effective method of providing adequate and responsive
  support, while minimizing the vulnerable sustainment footprint. There is no fundamental difference in
  sustainment preparation of an operational environment during competition, crisis, or armed conflict, except
  that sustainment activities intensify as Army forces respond to crisis and prepare for armed conflict, since
  time available decreases and requirements from risks to units on the ground increase exponentially. Proper
  sustainment permits the Army to project force over time and through the necessary depth of an AO. (See
  FM 4-0 for more information on sustainment.)
  REDEPLOYMENT
  5-51. Redeployment is the transfer or rotation of forces and materiel to support another commander’s
  operational requirements, or to return personnel, equipment, and materiel to the home and/or demobilization
  stations for reintegration and/or out-processing (JP 3-35). National strategic leaders determine the appropriate
  time for the redeployment of Army forces. Usually, redeployment of Army forces does not occur until
  tensions reduce and conditions permit the transition of security and stability responsibilities to other
  legitimate authorities.
  ARMY ECHELONS DURING CRISIS
  5-52. All Army echelons have considerable responsibilities when responding to a crisis. Each conducts
  reconnaissance, liaison, and troop preparation. As units deploy, they may send leaders and staffs to other
  headquarters and to ports and airfields to refine their understanding of requirements and the situation on the
  ground. Deploying units can expect their leaders to be called to outside planning meetings early in the process
  and for special training needs to emerge even as units are busy with other preparations for movement. Units
  can expect to receive individual replacements or augmentees and a number of attachments based on task
  organization.
  THEATER ARMY ROLES DURING CRISIS
  5-53. The theater army commands all Army forces in the AOR until the CCDR attaches selected Army forces
  to a subordinate JTF. Until another organization can assume the role, the theater army initially divides its
  responsibilities between the Army component (the ARFOR) in the JOA or theater of operations and Army
  forces operating in other parts of the AOR. This may require force tailoring by the theater army to develop
  the initial request for forces, followed by additional task organization as forces arrive in the AOR. The theater
  army is able to perform as a JTF or combined forces land component command headquarters for limited
  contingency operations and during the initial period of a crisis. It requires rapid augmentation to conduct
  continuous operations in either case.
  5-54. As the Service component command, the theater army remains responsible to Headquarters,
  Department of the Army for service-specific requirements within the AOR during a crisis. This falls under
  the ADCON chain of authority. This authority establishes a hierarchy for Army support to deployed forces
  without modifying the operational chain of command that runs from the CCDR through subordinate JFCs.
  For example, theater army commanders may—
  (cid:122) Lead RSOI operations for arriving forces.
  (cid:122) Complete collective training, theater orientation, and theater acclimation.
  (cid:122) Manage force modernization of Army forces before their employment in the JOA.