text: Intelligence Staff Support
  ⚫ Supporting security programs, to include the following:
  ▪ Supervise command and personnel security programs.
  ▪ Evaluate physical security vulnerabilities to support staff sections, particularly the
  operations and signal staffs.
  ▪ Perform staff planning and supervise the special security office, when applicable.
  The G-2/S-2
  The G-2/S-2 leads the intelligence staff and has responsibility for what the intelligence staff
  does and does not accomplish. The G-2/S-2 is the primary advisor to the commander and
  staff on the intelligence warfighting function. Additionally, the G-2/S-2 has staff responsibility
  for the USAF SWO.
  Successful intelligence support is based on the successful execution of the intelligence process,
  which the G-2/S-2 enables through intelligence synchronization. However, the G-2/S-2, as one
  person, must depend on its staff to provide effective intelligence support to the unit and facilitate
  situational understanding and effective targeting.
  The G-2/S-2 is not responsible for the conduct of intelligence operations by the MI unit beyond
  conducting collection management. (See ATP 2-01.) The MI unit commander is responsible
  for the conduct of intelligence operations by the MI unit. Chapter 3 discusses the roles of the
  G-3/S-3, G-2/S-2, collection manager/collection management team, and MI unit
  commander/MI unit related to intelligence operations.
  Notes. Due to the nature and fluidity of large-scale combat operations, commanders will have to
  make decisions with imperfect intelligence. Intelligence that is too late for commanders to make
  timely decisions results in a loss of the initiative and lost battles and engagements.
  As much as possible, the intelligence staff depends on thorough and disciplined all-source
  analysis. All-source analysis reduces the possibility of error, bias, deception, disinformation, and
  misinformation by considering multiple sources of information and intelligence. However, when
  necessary, the commander and staff may have to depend on either single-source intelligence or
  combat information without all-source intelligence analysis or verification.
  The cyberspace domain and the information dimension require specialized expertise from outside
  the traditional military staff, such as industry and academia. Intelligence support to the cyberspace
  domain and the information dimension often requires specific authorities, moves at a high tempo,
  and requires close coordination with higher-level friendly military cyberspace activities and
  sometimes with nonmilitary cyberspace activities.
  SECTION III – KEY INTELLIGENCE WARFIGHTING FUNCTION TASKS
  5-10. Chapter 1 describes how the intelligence warfighting function supports operations through a broad
  range of doctrinal tasks referred to as IWFTs. The intelligence staff is responsible for some of those tasks,
  MI units are responsible for other tasks, and both the intelligence staff and MI unit have shared responsibility
  for some tasks. Figure 5-2 on page 5-6 illustrates key IWFTs from an understanding the OE perspective; this
  section discusses the most important IWFTs from the intelligence staff’s perspective. Appendix B provides
  a detailed discussion of the IWFTs.