text: Appendix C
  Force Projection Operations Considerations
  FORCE PROJECTION THREATS
  C-1. Force projection is the ability to project the military instrument of national power from the United
  States or another theater in response to requirements for military operations (JP 3-0). It is the military
  component of power projection and a central element of the national military strategy. Army organizations
  and installations linked with joint forces and industry form a strategic platform to maintain, project, and
  sustain Army forces wherever they deploy. Force projection operations are inherently joint and require
  situational understanding and detailed planning and synchronization.
  C-2. During force projection, peer threats can apply strategic and operational reach to contest Army
  deployments; in terms of the most dangerous COAs, they can employ devastating lethal and nonlethal
  capabilities across multiple domains. Gaining situational understanding of threat intentions and activities
  across force projection processes can present challenges for deploying units since their assigned intelligence
  collection assets are transitioning from home station to forward theaters, and intelligence analysis may be
  focused on understanding threats in the forward theater operational areas.
  C-3. Peer threats possess the capability and capacity to observe, disrupt, delay, and attack U.S. forces at any
  stage of force projection, including while still positioned at home stations in the United States and while
  overseas. (See FM 3-0.) The Army relies on various interdependent infrastructures, most of which it does not
  own or operate. This makes the Army’s domestic operations rely heavily on external resources susceptible
  to a multitude of lethal and nonlethal threat methods and capabilities leveraged across one or more domains.
  Leveraged threat methods and capabilities include but are not limited to—
  ⚫ Conducting lethal and nonlethal attacks against units posturing for deployment.
  ⚫ Conducting persistent, multidomain information collection on Army forces, training, and
  installations.
  ⚫ Conducting information warfare operations against local communities, Service members, DOD
  civilians, contractors, and Soldiers’ Family members:
  ▪ Targeted threats through social media, email, or other means designed to frighten and
  distract deploying Soldiers and their Families.
  ▪ Cyberspace attacks against Soldier and Family member bank and credit agencies, impeding
  or disrupting access to personal funds.
  ▪ Cyberspace attacks against civilian infrastructure (including transportation, supply, fuel, and
  navigation) used to support military operations.
  ▪ Targeted strikes against defense communications infrastructure to disrupt communications
  between units, installations, and other unified action partners that assist deployment.
  ⚫ Disinformation dissemination and misinformation support designed to—
  ▪ Undermine the legitimacy of or reduce support for U.S. Government action.
  ▪ Incite civil unrest in local communities and along road and rail lines of communications that
  deploying forces need or plan to use to reach ports of embarkation.
  ▪ Reduce trust in future official communications from government, law enforcement, or
  military officials by releasing disinformation that appears genuine but contains incorrect or
  confusing information.
  ⚫ Conducing infrastructure sabotage using pre-positioned agents in the U.S. homeland or theater.