text: _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
  1-30. Strategic operations occur continuously, from prior to the outbreak of
  war to the post-war period. They can precede war, with the aim of deterring
  other regional actors from actions counter to the State’s interests or compel-
  ling such actors to yield to the State’s will. Before undertaking regional op-
  erations, the State lays plans to prevent outside intervention in the region.
  During the course of regional operations, the State uses strategic operations
  primarily in defensive ways, in order to prevent other parties from becoming
  involved in what it regards as purely regional affairs. At this point, the State
  relies primarily on diplomatic-political, informational, and economic means in
  a peacetime mode in relation to parties with whom it is not at war.
  1-31. If preclusion of outside intervention is not possible, the State continues
  to employ strategic operations while conducting transition and adaptive op-
  erations. With the beginning of transition operations, the military aspects of
  strategic operations become more aggressive, while the State continues to
  apply other instruments of power to the full extent possible. The aim becomes
  getting the extraregional force to leave or stop deploying additional forces
  into the region. Successful strategic operations can bring the war to an end.
  1-32. Once war begins, strategic operations become an important, powerful
  component of the State’s strategy for total war using “all means necessary.”
  What the various instruments of power do and which ones dominate in stra-
  tegic operations at a given time depends on the same circumstances that dic-
  tate shifts from regional through transition to adaptive operations. In most
  cases, the diplomatic-political, informational, and economic means tend to
  dominate. During strategic operations, military means are most often used to
  complement those other instruments of national power. For example, the
  military means are likely to be used against key political or economic centers
  or tangible targets whose destruction affects intangible centers of gravity,
  rather than against military targets for purely military objectives.
  1-33. Even within the military instrument of power, actions considered part
  of strategic operations require a conscious, calculated decision and direction
  or authorization by the NCA. It may not be readily apparent to outside par-
  ties whether specific military actions are part of strategic operations or an-
  other strategic course of action occurring simultaneously. In fact, one action
  could conceivably fulfill both purposes. For example, a demoralizing military
  defeat that could affect the enemy’s strategic centers of gravity could also be
  a defeat from an operational or tactical viewpoint. In other cases, a particular
  action on the battlefield might not make sense from a tactical or operational
  viewpoint, but could achieve a strategic purpose. Its purpose may be to inflict
  mass casualties or destroy high-visibility enemy systems in order to weaken
  the enemy’s national will to continue the intervention.
  REGIONAL OPERATIONS
  1-34. The State possesses an overmatch in most, and sometimes all, elements
  of power against regional opponents. It is able to employ that power in a con-
  ventional operational design focused on offensive action. A weaker regional
  neighbor may not actually represent a threat to the State, but rather an op-
  portunity that the State can exploit.