text: War Crimes and Enforcement of the Law of Armed Conflict
  Self-Defense
  8-69. Self-defense generally requires the accused to demonstrate an apprehension, on reasonable grounds,
  that death or bodily harm was about to be wrongfully inflicted and that the force used by the accused was
  necessary for protection against such death or bodily harm (RCM 916(e)). The plea of self-defense has been
  recognized in war crimes trials under much the same circumstances as in trials held under ordinary criminal
  law (see, for example, MMC pt. II, Rule 916(e)).
  Accident
  8-70. Death, injury, or damage that occurs as the unintentional and unexpected result of doing a lawful act
  in a lawful manner (for example, conduct of military operations in accordance with LOAC) is an accident
  and is excusable. The defense is not available when the act that caused the death, injury, or damage was a
  negligent act (RCM 916(f); MMC pt. II, Rule 916(f)).
  Ignorance or Mistake of Fact
  8-71. It is generally a defense to an offense that the accused held, as a result of ignorance or mistake, an
  incorrect belief of the true circumstances such that, if the circumstances were as the accused believed them,
  the accused would not be guilty of the offense (RCM 916(j); MMC pt. II, Rule 916(j)).
  LOAC-Specific Discussion of Defenses
  8-72. There may be specific LOAC issues with respect to arguments that military necessity, lawful reprisals,
  superior orders, government officials, or ignorance or mistake of law constitute a valid defense.
  Military Necessity is not a Defense to Justify LOAC Violations
  8-73. Following World War II, war crimes tribunals specifically rejected defense arguments that military
  necessity (Kriegsraison) could be used to justify LOAC violations (see DOD Law of War Manual, 2.2.2.1,
  citing the Krupp case and others). One may not justify LOAC violations by invoking the need to win the war.
  Lawful Reprisals
  8-74. Reprisals are acts taken against a party that are otherwise unlawful under LOAC in order to persuade
  that party to cease violating the law. A reprisal is considered lawful, provided that the stringent conditions
  for lawful reprisal have been met, including complying with any applicable prohibitions against reprisal. The
  fact that the conduct was part of a lawful reprisal action thus means that would not need to part of a valid
  defense (see paras. 8-80 to 8-86 for additional information).
  Superior Orders
  8-75. The fact that a person acted pursuant to orders of his or her Government or of a superior does not
  relieve that person from responsibility under international law, provided it was possible in fact for that person
  to make a moral choice (see DOD Law of War Manual, 18.22.4). Under the RCM and MMC, it is a defense
  to any offense that the accused was acting pursuant to orders unless the accused knew the orders to be
  unlawful or a person of ordinary sense and understanding would have known the orders to be unlawful (RCM
  916(d); MMC pt. II, Rule 916(d)). An order requiring the performance of a military duty or act may be
  inferred to be lawful, and it is disobeyed at the peril of the subordinate. This inference does not apply to a
  patently illegal order, such as one that directs the commission of a crime (for example, an order directing the
  murder of a civilian, a noncombatant, or a combatant who is hors de combat, or the abuse or torture of a
  prisoner) (see, for example, MCM pt. IV, para. 14c(2)(a)(i)). The fact that an offense was committed pursuant
  to superior orders may also be considered as mitigation to reduce the level of punishment (see, for example,
  United States v. Sawada, V U.N. Law Reports 7-8, 13-22; ICTY art. 7(4)).
  Government Officials
  8-76. The fact that a person who committed an act that constitutes a crime under international law acted as
  Head of State or responsible Government official does not relieve him or her of responsibility under