text: Chapter 1
  government. The North Vietnamese were content to allow negotiations to take place,
  as they had succeeded in securing what they needed: the Ho Chi Min trail. After
  months of wrangling, 1962 finally saw another Geneva agreement, this time for a
  neutralized Laos with a coalition government representing the three major factions:
  the rightists, the leftists, and the neutralists. Part of the neutralization agreement
  included the removal of foreign forces from Laos. While U.S. and allied personnel
  who had been fighting on the side of the Royal Lao Government were withdrawn from
  the country, very few of the substantial number of North Vietnamese Army forces
  withdrew. Nor did the Central Intelligence Agency cease its work with the Hmong.
  The new coalition government proved shaky. Turmoil again rocked the Lao
  government with continued political maneuvering by greedy generals and a string of
  coups. Military region commanders ran their zones like private fiefdoms, rarely
  dispatching their troops outside the Mekong River valley. A series of spectacular
  failures by the Royal Lao forces all but ensured those forces would never seek to
  take the initiative and act in other than a strictly defensive capacity again. Between
  1964 and 1968, the conflict was primarily between the U.S.-supported paramilitaries
  (backed by U.S. airpower), and the Pathet Lao. The cycle of dry season and wet
  season, each favoring one side or the other, saw very modest back and forth
  movement between the two primarily irregular forces, with little change from year to
  year. That all changed in 1969. The communist dry season offensive of 1968 did not
  end with the onset of the rainy season, and gains were substantial. In early 1970, the
  communists seized a provincial capital for the first time, and later that year they
  seized another.
  In the now traditional way, Hmong guerillas counterattacked. However, after
  nearly a decade of war, the Central Intelligence Agency’s secret army was nearly
  fought out. Fighting against superior numbers of regular troops, the Hmong became
  more and more reliant on U.S. airpower and on support from Thai artillery. Bombing
  in southern Laos expanded such that by 1971, it was more extensive than bombing
  in South Vietnam and Cambodia combined.
  The communist dry season offensive that started in December of 1971
  brought extraordinary pressure on the government. For the first time, North
  Vietnamese Army forces used significant armor, as well as large tube artillery. The
  Hmong were battered and quickly thrown back. After another year of significant
  communist gains, the Lao government and its international supporters once again
  sought a ceasefire.
  By the time of the 1973 ceasefire and neutralization, the government of
  Laos controlled little more than the capital and the Mekong river valley, and that only
  by virtue of the Hmong and U.S. airpower. With the withdrawal of U.S. support (both
  airpower and funding) in 1973, the Hmong were demobilized and the Lao
  government was left to its fate, which was to fall relatively quickly to the communists.
  UNITED STATES’ STRATEGY AND POLICY TO COUNTER AN
  INSURGENCY
  1-10. When and how the U.S. government provides assistance to other states to counter an insurgency is a
  question of policy and strategy. Commanders and staffs should understand that the U.S. can respond with a
  range of measures, many of which do not directly involve U.S. forces securing the population or
  performing offensive operations, in a counterinsurgency. This manual provides the reader with information
  on how counterinsurgents may organize tactical tasks in time and space to reach an end state. It cannot and
  should not be the only reference to conduct counterinsurgency operations for someone who wishes to fully
  understand the policy tools available to the U.S. to aid a host nation in fighting a counterinsurgency. (See
  JP 3-24, Allied Joint Publication 3.4.4, and the U.S. Government Guide to Counterinsurgency for more
  information on counterinsurgency policy tools.)