text: Planning
  * Removal of unit identifications from uniforms.
  * The use of signal deceptive measures.
  * The use of MISO messages and actions for psychological effects.
  LEGAL SUPPORT TO MILITARY DECEPTION
  2-96. MDOs include legal support personnel in coordination efforts to ensure compliance with applicable
  U.S. and international laws, treaties, and agreements to which the United States is a party; Presidential and
  DOD policy and regulations; rules of engagement; and applicable component policy. Legal personnel assist
  in planning the operation to achieve the objective while complying with legal requirements. They also
  provide training to MDOs on law and policy applicable to deception operations.
  OPERATIONS SECURITY AND DECEPTION
  2-97. OPSEC is the process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions
  attendant to military operations and other activities to—
  * Identify those actions that can be observed by enemy intelligence systems.
  * Determine indicators that enemy intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or
  pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to enemies.
  * Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of
  friendly actions to enemy exploitation.
  2-98. The purpose of OPSEC is to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. and multinational forces from successful
  enemy exploitation of critical information. Deception is typically active, while OPSEC is more passive in
  nature. OPSEC is a concealment aspect for all deceptions, affecting both the plan and its execution. (See
  JP 3-13.3 for a detailed discussion of OPSEC.)
  2-99. Deception and OPSEC are mutually supporting activities and complementary IRCs. Planners fully
  integrate them at all levels to maximize effective support to operations. They contribute to the elements of
  surprise, security, and freedom of maneuver. Deception and OPSEC planners cooperate to manage visible
  indicators to influence how the enemy perceives friendly capabilities, actions, or intent, so to affect enemy
  subsequent action or inaction in a manner conducive to the operation.
  2-100. OPSEC incorporates countermeasures to reduce the risk of an enemy exploiting vulnerabilities.
  OPSEC is not an administrative security program but an activity to conceal and protect the operationally
  significant information from the enemy’s collection assets. Limiting the number of personnel who know the
  actual operation is often key to maintaining OPSEC.
  2-101. Deception plans can benefit from normally occurring activity provided the normal activity fits the
  deception story. Conversely, actual operations have the potential to create OPSEC indicators that pose a
  threat to the effectiveness of deception plans. These real indicators may conflict with the deception story.
  Deception and OPSEC planners have to coordinate with organizations that create these indicators to limit
  potential adverse effects or to maximize their deception potential. Critical information is the specific facts
  about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities needed by enemies to plan and act effectively against
  friendly mission accomplishment. Operations security vulnerability is a condition in which friendly actions
  provide operations security indicators that may be obtained and accurately evaluated by an adversary in time
  to provide a basis for effective adversary decision making (JP 3-13.3).
  2-102. In addition to the primary planning goal of unifying what is visible to the enemy military decision
  makers into a holistic and managed denial and deception effort, deception and OPSEC planning intersect at
  multiple points in the planning process. In execution, deception activities themselves frequently require
  OPSEC measures and countermeasures to protect sensitive means and resources, and ultimately enhance their
  believability to the enemy.
  2-103. As trained OPSEC practitioners analyze friendly information and planned activities, they understand
  what information or observable activity rises to the level of critical information and indicators. If the enemies
  can collect that critical information or those indicators, they can potentially derive an accurate operational