text: Chapter 1
  Figure 1-9. Contiguous and noncontiguous areas of operations
  1-122. Commanders generally consider noncontiguous AOs or the combination of both contiguous and
  noncontiguous AOs based on these factors: insufficient forces to cover the entire AO, geographic isolation
  based upon terrain, or time constraints for completing the mission. The reasons for using a noncontiguous
  area vary, but they begin with geographical separation of important terrain from the remainder of the AO. A
  commander’s decision to deploy part of a force in noncontiguous AOs is derived from the commander’s
  analysis of the operational and mission variables. In particular, the commander evaluates threat forces and
  their ability to mass sufficient combat power to threaten friendly forces. Second, the commander evaluates
  the ability of threat forces to sever lines of communication between the noncontiguous AOs. Finally, the
  commander assesses the risks of having isolated forces defeated in detail against what may be gained in
  mission accomplishment.
  1-123. While a commander can always choose to use noncontiguous AOs based upon specific operational
  variables, the most obvious AOR requiring the use of noncontiguous areas of operations is the U.S.
  Indo-Pacific Command AOR. The geography and distances involved between island chains force a
  noncontiguous approach to land combat that relies heavily on joint capabilities.
  CONCLUSION
  1-124. Armies, corps, and divisions conduct operations from the range of military operations across the
  competition continuum as part of a joint and multinational force. These echelons are capable of converging
  combat power from multiple domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment to
  achieve a unified purpose.