text: Preparing for Short-Range Air Defense Operations
  Ground reconnaissance is performed to select the best SHORAD positions, march routes, start points,
  release points, checkpoints, sensor positions, and communications sites. The SHORAD battery commander
  or platoon leader should coordinate with the local maneuver commander and the supported element S-3 to
  determine what areas maneuver units plan to occupy, or, when in support of a fixed asset, with the on-site
  commander and base defense operations center to identify the best locations for SHORAD weapon systems
  and sensors. Mutual agreement must be established to make the best use of the available terrain.
  The reconnaissance officer prepares for a ground reconnaissance by, at a minimum:
  * Selecting personnel and equipment to conduct the reconnaissance and assigning tasks to the
  reconnaissance party personnel. The unit SOP establishes the normal composition and
  responsibilities of the party.
  * Determining in detail the elements, positions, areas, routes, and related terrain considerations.
  * Determining the priority order of the elements to be emplaced and setting up the timeline
  accordingly.
  * Determining the products that must be developed as a result of this reconnaissance; products
  should include a list of sensor and weapon locations, sketches of these locations, sketches of the
  areas and routes, and identification of restrictive terrain locations.
  * Coordinating instructions on C2, communications, and rendezvous locations with team members
  and higher headquarters (SHORAD battalion or battery). The higher unit and/or supporting unit
  can order a backbrief on previous reconnaissance in the area.
  * Developing and issuing a reconnaissance plan/order with all of the above information.
  As soon as preparations are complete, the reconnaissance party leaves. It ensures that the selected
  primary route meets equipment requirements (height, weight, width, and slope to be traversed), is passable,
  and avoids possible ambush locations. Road guides are positioned, as required.
  As the reconnaissance party approaches the new location, the team leader must ascertain if the tentative
  map-selected locations will allow immediate occupation for accomplishment of the mission. Ground
  reconnaissance verifies whether the terrain provides good natural concealment; has access roads for primary
  and alternate routes into the position; provides good observation, fields of fire, and sectors of search; and has
  firm ground that will support the weight of the equipment.
  DEFENSE DESIGN
  Defense design for ADA is a strategy for defense based on a compiled list of tasks required to protect
  against air and missile threats in support of operations. SHORAD units are positioned to best protect the
  designated assets against the projected air threats in accordance with detailed defense designs. Sensor and
  weapon system placements are selected to maximize surveillance, tracking, and engagements. In designing
  a defense, sensors are positioned to provide surveillance and fire control tracking capability sufficient to
  protect assigned assets and prevent gaps in the coverage. Weapon systems and teams are positioned to
  optimize the defense of the defended assets, enabling lethal coverage over the assigned assets and extending
  firepower through as much of the defense coverage area as possible.
  The AMD employment tenets and the latest intelligence assessments inform the defense design.
  Considerations for the defense design should also include the quantity, capabilities, and potential locations
  of combined arms for self-defense teams. Interspersing these teams with SHORAD systems will further
  enhance defenses.
  SELECTING POSITIONS
  Site selection begins upon receipt of a movement order. Careful consideration must be given to ensure
  that the selected positions for the sensors, launchers, and C2 nodes are oriented in the direction of the
  expectant air threats, are capable of maintaining required communications with the battery and supported
  asset's C2 elements, and, above all, can collectively provide the required defense. The need for dispersion of
  equipment, camouflage throughout the site, appropriate deception measures, and operational security must
  also be addressed.