text: Appendix C
  C-49. Commanders generally consider noncontiguous or the combination of both contiguous and
  noncontiguous AOs based upon these factors: insufficient forces to cover the entire AO, geographic isolation
  based upon terrain, or time constraints for completing the mission. The reasons for using a noncontiguous
  area vary, but they begin with geographic separation of important terrain from the remainder of the AO. A
  commander’s decision to deploy part of a force in noncontiguous AOs is derived from the commander’s
  analysis of the operational and mission variables. In particular, the commander evaluates threat forces and
  their ability to mass sufficient combat power to threaten friendly forces. Second, the commander evaluates
  the ability of threat forces to sever lines of communication between the noncontiguous AOs. Finally, the
  commander assesses the risks of having isolated forces defeated in detail against what may be gained in
  mission accomplishment.
  C-50. While a commander can always chose to use noncontiguous AOs based upon specific operational
  variables, the most obvious AOR requiring the use of noncontiguous areas of operations is the U.S. Indo-
  Pacific Command AOR. The geography and distances involved between island chains force a noncontiguous
  approach to land combat that relies heavily on joint capabilities.
  C-51. Contiguous AOs ensure that subordinates are in mutually supporting range of each other while
  avoiding gaps and seams in responsibility. Contiguous AOs may also provide additional security for
  maneuver units and headquarters and support units.
  C-52. In noncontiguous AOs, subordinate units are not mutually supporting to each other and there are gaps
  between their boundaries. These gaps remain the responsibility of the higher echelon headquarters, and they
  can present added risks to an operation.