text: Chapter 1
  natural manner. The harder the target has to work to acquire it, the more likely the target will believe it as
  credible.
  1-50. Important military information that is too easy to obtain is usually suspect. Information that falls into
  the enemy’s hands must appear to be the result of legitimate collection activities. People naturally tend to
  believe information earned more than information given. An example of this technique could be feeding
  mission information to the enemy through a trusted source instead of making the information general
  knowledge.
  1-51. A common characteristic of successful deceptions is that they were designed to co-opt skepticism by
  requiring the target to participate either by physically obtaining the evidence or analytically by interpreting
  it. However, if the deception is too subtle, it risks that the target will fail to perceive the deception story at
  all.
  1-52. An example of this principle is from early in World War II, when a German aircraft heading for
  Cologne became lost and made a forced landing near Malines in Belgium. Belgian authorities soon arrested
  the three passengers, two Wehrmacht officers and a Luftwaffe major. They were taken to the police station
  and left alone briefly. They attempted to burn some documents they were carrying. They were top secret
  documents containing attack plans for Holland and Belgium. However, the documents failed to burn and fell
  into the hands of Belgian authorities. The authorities believed that the documents were a part of a deception
  plan because the Germans could not be careless enough to allow actual war plans to fall into the hands of the
  Allies. This example shows a misclassification error in which a real windfall was dismissed as false because
  it was too easy to obtain.
  LEVERAGE THE TRUTH
  1-53. In this instance, truth means reality based on facts or precedence. As a rule, the deception should not
  portray a reality that would come as a surprise to the target. A deception that conforms to proven or
  predictable patterns of behavior is more likely to succeed than a deception that violates these norms. Because
  the target has access to Army doctrine and probably understands how the Army operates (to include its core
  values), the target will see deceptions as false if they fail to align with foundational Army tenets or historical
  patterns of behavior. In this instance, the deception will fail. Planners can provide meaning to actual events,
  activities, and operations that support the deception plan.
  MINIMIZE FALSEHOOD
  1-54. The less the deception relies on false information, the greater the chance of success. Although
  deception, by its nature, implies the use of false information to shape the target’s perceptions, each portrayal
  of falsehood increases the risk of failure by increasing susceptibility to competing observables. This
  deception principle resembles the principle of economy of force—use only the amount of false information
  needed to produce the desired perceptions. Any falsehoods should be supported by elements of truth. This
  way the target discovers that, everywhere it turns, it finds verifiable information that makes any questionable
  part of the deception more believable.
  HUSBANDING OF DECEPTION ASSETS
  1-55. This maxim suggests that it may be wise to withhold the employment of deception capabilities until
  the stakes and the benefits are high. Put another way, a planner conserves deception assets and activities until
  forces can employ them to achieve the greatest impact at the most opportune time. This principle considers
  that employment of an asset will cause it to become valueless after it has been used once.
  1-56. An example of holding deception assets in reserve until the right moment involves the use of double
  agents by Britain in connection with the Normandy deception in World War II. The British had captured all
  known German agents operating in Britain and decided to use them against Germany. While Britain was
  certain that it was in control of the German’s espionage system, it waited to use the agents against Germany
  until the Normandy invasion.