text: Overview of Signal Support
  users must continuously manage risk and secure their portions of the DODIN-A. Signal planners and DODIN
  operations personnel assess security risk during network design, mitigate risk in software employment, and
  continuously monitor for signs of malicious activity within the network. Individual users must maintain
  cybersecurity awareness and learn to identify signs of malicious activity. While cybersecurity efforts cannot
  prevent every intrusion, commanders and their staffs must take steps to identify, prioritize, and secure their
  most important networks and data.
  1-14. Unlike the air, land, maritime, and space domains, cyberspace has no range constraints. A threat actor
  can disrupt, destroy, or intercept the flow of information while operating from the other side of the world.
  For example, in 2014, North Korea allegedly conducted cyberspace attacks against the California
  headquarters of Sony Pictures in retaliation for releasing a movie that insulted North Korean leaders. A peer
  threat or other adversary could recruit hackers around the world to attack Army capabilities within an area of
  operations, or all the way back to the strategic support area in the United States.
  TRENDS
  1-15. Proliferating technologies will continue to present challenges for the joint force. The widespread
  availability of inexpensive communications devices allows threat actors to greatly increase their command
  and control capabilities. Adversaries take advantage of the low entry cost to achieve offensive cyberspace
  capabilities. Cyberspace attacks are a low-cost means for state and non-state threat actors to attack civilian,
  military, and governmental targets. Cyberspace attacks can extend an enemy’s reach. Enemies will use
  cyberspace attacks to counter the Army’s dominance on the battlefield. Enemy forces no longer need to
  develop costly aircraft, naval, or missile systems to cause significant damage to infrastructure, command and
  control nodes, or logistic capabilities.
  1-16. As technology continues to advance, so does the Army’s reliance on the DODIN-A. Every aspect of
  Army operations relies on networked communications, from individual Soldiers, to logistics, precision fires,
  and command and control. In 2002, maneuver units’ manning and equipment authorizations provided
  networked communications capabilities to echelons brigade and above, with limited satellite communications
  assets pooled at the division and corps. A typical 20–30 vehicle convoy included only three or four single-
  channel radios.
  1-17. By 2005, satellite-based networked communications became available as low as battalion level. Nearly
  every vehicle now has a radio and some form of networked friendly force tracking capability. The increase
  in communications capabilities enables greater dispersion of forces and allows smaller forces to operate
  across a larger battlespace. The increased capabilities enable faster flow of information between commands,
  better flow of intelligence, just in time logistics, and enhanced situational understanding.
  1-18. Over-reliance on technology creates significant vulnerabilities. Command and control nodes have
  always been key targets for enemy attack. An enemy can attack command and control nodes with lethal fires,
  cyberspace attack, or electronic attack. Army units have come to rely on uninterrupted, high-speed digital
  communications and satellite positioning, navigation, and timing. Units must be able to operate without these
  capabilities.
  1-19. Soldiers need the skills to navigate with a map and compass to operate when capabilities are degraded
  or denied. Staffs need to maintain paper maps and overlays in command posts to maintain situational
  awareness of their area of operations if mission command information systems become disrupted or
  unavailable. A primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) communications plan provides
  redundant communications means if the primary capability is unavailable. Disciplined initiative according to
  the commander’s intent allows units to continue operations in the absence of reliable communications.
  1-20. Peer threats have advanced capabilities to locate the electronic signature of communications systems.
  The cyber electronic warfare officer can help formulate communications and electronic protection plans to
  minimize the electronic signature of command posts and signal sites. Commanders should consider locating
  communications transmitters and antennas remotely from major command posts to protect the headquarters
  in case an enemy targets communications systems with lethal fires. Command posts and communications
  systems must frequently displace during large-scale combat operations against a peer threat.