text: Working With Host-Nation Forces
  Figure 11-1. Host-nation security force meter
  11-17. Regardless of the tasks taken to develop the capabilities of a host-nation security force, a key
  interest of security cooperation in counterinsurgency is to legitimize a host-nation security force in the eyes
  of its population. This is best accomplished by setting the conditions for a host-nation security force to
  conduct security and law enforcement operations independently and professionally.
  11-18. Assisting a host-nation security force in counterinsurgency means providing or augmenting a host
  nation’s security forces with U.S. or multinational capabilities or resources that they cannot generate on
  their own. Forms of assistance may include enablers such information collection assets and capabilities in
  support of a host-nation security force’s intelligence collection efforts. U.S. or multinational forces may
  provide assistance in the form of certain battlefield effects such as close air support, electronic warfare,
  secure long-range communications, or information operations. Assistance to host-nation security forces
  often complements their nascent logistics capabilities, such as transportation or mobility, medical
  capabilities, or corrective maintenance support. Assistance may also come in the form of materiel support
  across one or more classes of supply. For example, the U.S. may provide a host nation with fuel under a
  bilateral agreement, even if that host nation could acquire its own fuel for operational efficiency.
  Historically, host-nation security force personnel have shown few reservations about asking U.S. forces for
  materiel or other forms of assistance. Before providing any of these types of assistance, U.S. forces must
  ensure legal authorities permit the assistance. When pressed for assistance of any kind, U.S. or
  multinational personnel should ask themselves three questions:
  * Do my counterparts really need this materiel or capability to accomplish their mission?
  * Is there any way host-nation security forces could procure or acquire this resource or capability
  using their own systems, processes, or methods?
  * Can host-nation security forces sustain this system or capability over the long term?
  11-19. Commanders and staffs should consider the following example. Host-nation security force
  counterparts suspect that insurgent forces have established camps on the far side of a ridgeline where they
  assemble and conduct final preparations prior to conducting attacks into major towns in the area. These
  counterparts ask if the U.S. commander can arrange for unmanned aircraft systems to maintain persistent
  surveillance over these suspected campsites to provide early warning of pending attacks. By posing the
  three fundamental questions listed in paragraph 11-18, it may be possible to determine other courses of
  action whereby a host-nation security force can produce and sustain the same effects. For example, the
  commander might offer a host-nation security force instruction on how to build an information collection
  plan and techniques for determining named areas of interest. Next, the advisors could coach their