text: Chapter 4
  ⚫ Conduct preclusion activities through nonlethal means to undermine relationships, raise political
  stakes, manipulate public opinion, and erode resolve to constrain or eliminate basing rights,
  overflight corridors, logistics support, and concerted allied actions.
  ⚫ Isolate the United States from allies and partners by fostering instability in critical areas and
  among relevant actors to increase U.S. operational requirements.
  ⚫ Create sanctuary from U.S. and partner forces through international law and treaty agreements,
  monitoring and attacking partner forces from across international borders and using proxy forces.
  ⚫ Conduct systems warfare by executing cyberspace attacks against critical force projection and
  sustainment infrastructure nodes to delay or disrupt the United States’ ability to deploy forces.
  Systems warfare approaches include nonattributable attacks on domestic infrastructure and the
  employment of networked military capabilities that support isolation and preclusion efforts.
  ADVERSARY ACTIVITIES TO PRECLUDE U.S. ACCESS TO A REGION
  4-12. Establishing favorable conditions by shaping an OE is critical to the United States’ success and the
  adversary’s success. Adversaries seek to establish conditions that limit or prevent U.S. access to a region,
  typically in locations close to either adversary borders or U.S. allied-partner borders. This includes but is not
  limited to—
  ⚫ Forward positioning of layered and integrated air defenses, long-range fires, and other A2
  capabilities.
  ⚫ Positioning of systems capable of delivering conventional and nuclear munitions.
  ⚫ Positioning of intermediate-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.
  ⚫ Positioning of fixed-wing aircraft.
  ⚫ Positioning of unmanned aircraft systems (UASs).
  ⚫ Positioning of naval surface and subsurface forces.
  ⚫ Early warning surveillance radars.
  ⚫ Rocket artillery.
  ⚫ Conducting offensive cyberspace activities against friendly C2, infrastructure, and sustainment
  capabilities.
  ⚫ EW capabilities.
  ⚫ Counterspace capabilities.
  4-13. Adversaries seek exploitable advantages in the OE; therefore, U.S. forces should expect that
  adversaries are observing them, including U.S. forces’ intentions and activities across all echelons within
  CONUS and outside the continental United States (OCONUS). Security activities and CI considerations for
  all echelons are important, ranging from technology protection and force modernization security to tactical
  unit deployments and exercises. Adversaries may reach and exploit advantages in terms of intelligence
  collection and then use the intelligence to cause grave harm to U.S. interests and operations.
  OPERATIONAL ASPECTS
  4-14. Operations during competition—
  ⚫ Deter malign adversary action.
  ⚫ Set conditions to support friendly operations and the effective use of various capabilities should
  deterrence fail.
  ⚫ Shape an OE with allies and partners in ways that support U.S. strategic interests and policy aims.
  4-15. Preparation for armed conflict is the primary focus of Army conventional forces during competition.
  Operations during competition focus on—
  ⚫ Setting the theater.
  ⚫ Building allied and partner capabilities and capacity.
  ⚫ Improving joint and multinational interoperability.
  ⚫ Protecting forward-stationed forces.