text: Appendix C
  German forces occupied various fortified French ports after Allied armies liberated the rest of France in 1944.
  Each encircled German division took approximately one Allied division to maintain its isolation. Conversely,
  an enemy force isolated without adequate supplies either surrenders or faces containment by considerably
  smaller forces. This situation occurred in Egypt during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War when an Israeli division
  isolated the Egyptian 3rd Army.
  EXECUTING AN ENCIRCLEMENT
  C-14. When feasible, encircling forces advance parallel to the enemy’s direction of movement. They attempt
  to reach key passes, bridges, and other critical points before the main enemy force reaches them. When the
  encircling force cannot outdistance the enemy force, it engages the enemy force’s flanks to force the enemy
  to fight under the most unfavorable conditions possible, ultimately in two or more directions simultaneously.
  Engineer units rapidly breach obstacles in the path of the encircling force. Friendly forces emplace obstacle
  complexes, supported by fires, to block probable avenues of escape, as they counter attempted enemy
  breakouts from encirclement. Units may use air assault and airborne forces to seize key passes or other critical
  terrain objectives to cut enemy LOCs. The encircling force completes the encirclement when it cuts all enemy
  ground LOCs. This generally occurs when the two arms of a double envelopment complete their linkup.
  C-15. Intervals in an attacking force can also occur during combat operations as the result of different rates
  of advance by movement formations that face different levels of enemy resistance and different terrain. An
  encircled enemy force attempts to discover intervals and take advantage of them as it tries to escape or
  breakout of the encirclement. Once the enveloping force completes the linkup that creates the encirclement,
  it must close these intervals as quickly as possible to prevent enemy forces from exploiting them.
  C-16. An enemy force may attempt to cut off an encircling force and extend its flank beyond the area of the
  friendly attack. If the enveloping unit attempts to outflank such a hostile extension, it may lead to the
  overextension of the enveloping force or to a dangerous separation of the enveloping force from support. It
  is usually better to take advantage of the enemy force’s extension and subsequent weakness by penetrating
  the thinly held front of an enemy force rather than risk the overextension of the enveloping force in an effort
  to outflank the enemy force’s positions completely. Alternatively, in response to the unfolding encirclement
  an enemy force may attempt a frontal, spoiling attack. In this case, the friendly force in contact defends itself
  or engages in a delaying operation, while the enveloping force continues the envelopment or moves directly
  toward the enemy force in a counterattack.
  C-17. Commanders of highly mobile forces forming the inner encircling arm may choose not to establish a
  continuous series of positions around an encircled enemy force. They may order subordinate forces to occupy
  only key terrain from which they can strike at encircled enemy forces to prevent them from concentrating
  forces and to isolate them further. Units who adopt this technique need to be able to detect enemy attempts
  to breakout and concentrate sufficient combat power against these attempts to thwart their efforts to isolate
  encircled enemy forces. Units of the outer encircling arms prevent additional enemy forces from reinforcing
  the isolated enemy force or interfering with the activities of the inner encircling arm.
  C-18. Once units decide to destroy encircled enemy forces, they reduce those enemy forces as rapidly as
  possible to free resources for use elsewhere. The reduction of an encircled enemy force continues without
  interruption, using the maximum concentration of forces and fires, until the encircled enemy force’s complete
  destruction or surrender. Units may destroy encircled enemy forces by fires or by maneuver.
  Reduction by Fires
  C-19. Reducing an encircled enemy force by fires alone is the least preferred method to destroy an enemy
  force. This method implies that the encircling friendly forces commander will use fire support as the primary
  or sole means of reducing the encircled enemy force. It includes the use of artillery, mortars, direct fires,
  fixed- and rotary-wing aviation (including armed UAS), and cyber and electromagnetic warfare capabilities.
  C-20. This method has advantages and disadvantages. An advantage is that it generally reduces the number
  of casualties suffered by the encircling force. Disadvantages of this method include an extensive amount of
  attack/delivery systems, ammunition, and time to reduce the encircled force. Additionally, fires alone might
  not be sufficient to force the surrender of the encircled enemy force. In most cases, reducing an encircled
  enemy force requires using fires and movement.