text: Fundamentals of Operations
  (cid:122) Non-hostile: neutral interactions that may degrade or compromise military operations (including
  civilians on the battlefield).
  (cid:122) Obstacle: interactions from friendly, enemy, and natural obstacles (including minefields and
  rivers).
  (cid:122) CBRN: interactions from friendly, enemy, and civilian CBRN effects (including chemical attacks,
  nuclear attacks, industrial accidents, and toxic or hazardous industrial materials).
  (cid:122) Aerial: interactions from air-based combat platforms (including attack helicopters, armed
  unmanned aircraft systems [UASs], air interdiction, and close air support).
  (cid:122) Visual: interactions from acquisition via the human eye, optical, or electro-optical systems
  (including ground reconnaissance, telescopic, thermal, and infrared sights on weapons and sensor
  platforms such as unmanned aircraft systems and satellites).
  (cid:122) Electromagnetic: interactions via systems used to acquire, degrade, or destroy using select portions
  of the electromagnetic spectrum (including radar, jamming, cyberspace, space, and
  electromagnetic systems).
  (cid:122) Influence: interactions through the information dimension intended to shape the perceptions,
  behaviors, and decision making of people relative to a policy or military objective (including
  through social media, telecommunications, human interaction, and other forms of
  communication).
  3-58. In all contexts, direct, indirect, non-hostile, CBRN, and aerial contacts are sporadic. However, Army
  forces are typically in continuous visual, electromagnetic, and influence contact with adversaries. Army
  forces are under persistent visual surveillance by space and other capabilities. Army forces and individuals
  are in constant electromagnetic contact with adversaries who persistently probe and disrupt individual, group,
  and Army capabilities dependent on space and cyberspace. Army forces are subject to adversary influence
  through disinformation campaigns targeting Soldiers and their family and friends through social media and
  other platforms.
  3-59. During competition, adversary forces employ multiple methods of collecting on friendly forces to
  develop an understanding of U.S. capabilities, readiness status, and intentions. They do this in and outside
  the continental United States. They co-opt civilians and employ space-based surveillance platforms to
  observe unit training and deployment activities. They also penetrate networks and gain access to individual
  and group cyberspace personas to create options for future intimidation, coercion, and attack. Soldiers and
  their families should use telecommunications, the internet, and social media in ways that do not make them
  or their units vulnerable to adversary surveillance.
  3-60. During armed conflict, enemy networked land-, maritime-, air-, and space-based capabilities enable
  threats to detect and rapidly target friendly forces with fires. Forces that are concentrated and static are easy
  for enemy forces to detect and destroy. Dispersing forces has multiple survivability benefits. It increases
  opportunities to use cover and concealment to reduce probability of detection. In the event the enemy detects
  elements of the friendly force, dispersion acts as a form of deception, helping to conceal the intentions of the
  friendly force. Leaders only concentrate forces when necessary and balance the survivability benefits of
  dispersion with the negative impacts dispersion has on mission effectiveness. In addition to dispersion,
  leaders integrate and synchronize deception, operations security, and other actions to thwart enemy detection
  efforts. (See JP 3-13.3 and ATP 3-13.3 for detailed information on operations security. See FM 3-13.4 for
  more information on deception.)
  3-61. Command posts are extremely vulnerable to detection from air and space, as well as in the
  electromagnetic spectrum. Army forces must ensure their command posts are difficult to detect, dispersed to
  prevent a single strike from destroying more than one node, and rapidly displaceable. Once a command post
  is detected it has only a few minutes to displace far enough to avoid enemy indirect fire effects. Leaders
  should focus command posts on the minimum functions necessary to retain their mobility and do everything
  possible to avoid detection. When the risk of enemy fires is high, commanders consider making their
  operations more decentralized, dispersing command post nodes into smaller component nodes, and greater
  dispersion of electromagnetic signatures. Use of existing hardened structures and restrictive terrain to conceal
  headquarters equipment and vehicles, instead of tents organized in standard configurations, are options
  commanders have to improve command post survivability.