text: Intelligence Staff Support
  5-54. If the intelligence staff does not have the information required to form conclusions, it uses assumptions
  to fill information gaps—always careful to ensure the commander understands when assumptions are used
  in place of facts to form conclusions.
  Step 3—Evaluate the Threat
  5-55. The purpose of evaluating the threat is to understand how a threat can affect friendly operations.
  Although threat forces may conform to some of the fundamental principles of warfare that guide Army
  operations, these forces have obvious, as well as subtle, differences in how they approach situations and
  problem solving. Understanding these differences is essential to understanding how a threat force will react
  in each situation.
  5-56. Threat evaluation does not begin with IPOE. The intelligence staff conducts threat evaluations and
  creates threat models during the pre-mission analysis of the OE. Using this information, the intelligence staff
  refines threat models, as necessary, to support IPOE. When analyzing a well-known threat, the intelligence
  staff may be able to rely on previously developed threat models. When analyzing a new or lesser-known
  threat, the intelligence staff may have to evaluate the threat and develop threat models during the MDMP’s
  mission analysis step. When this occurs, the intelligence staff relies heavily on the threat evaluation
  conducted by higher headquarters and other intelligence agencies.
  5-57. In situations where the mission is not oriented on a threat force, intelligence analysis and intelligence
  products may focus on terrain, weather, and civil considerations. (An example of this type of situation is a
  natural disaster.) However, IPOE must consider potential hazards and threats, such as terrorism, to any
  operation, as well as how friendly forces are under constant observation and contact by peer threats.
  Step 4—Determine Threat Courses of Action
  5-58. During step 4, the intelligence staff identifies and develops possible threat COAs that can affect
  accomplishing the friendly mission. The staff uses the products associated with determining threat COAs to
  assist in developing and selecting friendly COAs during the COA steps of the MDMP. Identifying and
  developing valid threat COAs minimize the potential of surprise to the commander by an unanticipated threat
  action and support the development of important branches and sequels.
  5-59. Failure to fully identify and develop valid threat COAs may lead to the development of an information
  collection strategy that does not provide the information necessary to confirm what COA the threat has taken,
  potentially resulting in friendly forces being surprised and possibly defeated. When needed, the staff should
  identify all significant civil considerations (those identified as OE significant characteristics) to portray the
  interrelationship of the threat, friendly forces, and population activities.
  5-60. The staff develops threat COAs in the same manner friendly COAs are developed. ADP 5-0 provides
  a model for developing valid threat COAs that are suitable, feasible, acceptable, unique, and consistent with
  threat doctrine or patterns of operation. Although the intelligence staff has the primary responsibility for
  developing threat COAs, it needs assistance from the rest of the staff to present the most accurate and
  complete analysis to the commander.
  INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT PRODUCTS
  5-61. While there are other important IPOE process outcomes, the development of several IPOE products is
  also important. These products assist in driving subsequent steps of the MDMP, targeting, collection
  management, protection, risk management, other processes, and the conduct of IPOE at lower echelons.
  While not all inclusive, figure 5-7 on page 5-18 shows the flow of common products across IPOE’s four
  steps.