text: Understanding the Strategic Context
  operations. The United Nations, in particular, has many subordinate and affiliated agencies active
  worldwide.
  1-75. In the private sector, multinational corporations and other businesses often operate in a conflict
  environment. At a minimum, commanders should know which companies are present in their area of
  operations and where those companies are conducting business. Understanding the overall profit motivation
  of these business will help commanders understand their actions in the operational environment.
  1-76. When the U.S. government pays contractors, the principle of unity of command should apply.
  Commanders should influence contractors’ performance through U.S. government contract supervisors.
  Commanders should identify contractors operating in their area of operations and determine the nature of
  their contract, accountability mechanisms, and appropriate coordination relationships. (See FM 4-92 for
  more information on contractors.)
  STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES
  1-77. Whatever type of strategy and operational approach that a counterinsurgency takes, several strategic
  principles are normally relevant. Whether the U.S. is enabling a host nation with certain capabilities or
  directly using its land forces, the principles listed in paragraphs 1-78 through 1-92 are relevant to most
  counterinsurgency operations. However, these principles are not meant to be exclusive rules for every
  conflict. They are provided for the practitioner and planner as a foundation for how they think about
  planning and executing counterinsurgency operations.
  LEGITIMACY IS THE MAIN OBJECTIVE
  1-78. Fostering development of effective governance by a legitimate government that can provide security
  and acts in the best interests of its people may be essential to countering an insurgency. Legitimacy can be
  seen as the willing acceptance of a government by its population. Counterinsurgency forces may achieve
  this objective by the balanced application of both military and nonmilitary means. Governments rule
  through a combination of consent and coercion. Governments that are “legitimate” normally rule with the
  consent of the governed; those described as “illegitimate” tend to rely mainly or entirely on coercion.
  Citizens of the latter tend to obey the state for fear of the consequences of doing otherwise, rather than
  because they voluntarily accept its rule. Legitimacy is a perceived condition by the population that can only
  be achieved by host-nation government actions that lead to an acceptance of its primacy by the people. (See
  paragraphs 1-27 through 1-33 for more information on legitimacy and control.)
  COUNTERINSURGENT FORCES MUST UNDERSTAND THE ENVIRONMENT
  1-79. Successful conduct of counterinsurgency operations depends on thoroughly understanding the
  society and culture within which they are being conducted. In most counterinsurgency operations in which
  foreign forces participate, insurgents hold a distinct advantage in their level of local knowledge. They speak
  the language, move easily within the society, and are more likely to understand the population’s interests.
  Thus, for foreign forces participating in counterinsurgency operations, they require a greater emphasis on
  certain skills, such as language and cultural understanding. Understanding the operational environment
  allows the counterinsurgent to identify the conditions which impact the prerequisites for the insurgency and
  the root causes that are driving the population to accept the insurgency. Only through understanding the
  operational environment can the counterinsurgent plan and execute successful operations to counter the
  conditions that allow the insurgency to exist in the first place. Nevertheless, U.S. forces must never assume
  they will be welcomed by a local population. They may even be viewed as occupiers. (See chapter 2 for a
  discussion on developing an understanding of the operational environment.)
  INTELLIGENCE DRIVES OPERATIONS
  1-80. Effective counterinsurgency operations are shaped by timely, relevant, tailored, predictive, accurate,
  and reliable intelligence, gathered and analyzed at the lowest possible level and disseminated throughout
  the force. Without accurate and predictive intelligence, it is often better to not act rather than to act.
  Gaining situational understanding before action is often essential in avoiding long term damage to mission
  objectives. In environments where commanders do not have situational understanding, the first action they