text: _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9
  PASSIVE MEASURES
  9-187. Since the mission the UAV is executing may not be apparent, actions
  should be taken to counter all possibilities. The integrated use of the passive
  air defense measures described earlier in this chapter can reduce the ef-
  fectiveness of UAVs. The use of a variety of decoys provides a false picture of
  the mission area to the enemy and, to a large extent, can deny information or
  distort the information collected by the UAV.
  STRATEGIC CONTEXT
  9-188. The OPFOR accepts that, while it has a full range of capabilities to
  deal with its neighbors, air defense against a technologically superior force is
  problematic. It believes that comprehensive planning and the creative use of
  all capabilities, including some normally not associated with air defense, can
  serve to mitigate many disadvantages.
  REGIONAL OPERATIONS
  9-189. Within the context of regional operations, the OPFOR views its air de-
  fense system as fully capable of protecting ground forces and infrastructure
  from air attack by any of its neighbors. To accomplish this, it believes that its
  aircraft will be capable of conducting successful counterair operations, thus
  denying any major encroachment into its territory or significant attacks by
  fixed-wing aircraft against its military forces operating in enemy territory.
  The ability to use ground-based systems to defeat any “leakers” and rotary-
  wing attacks serves to reinforce this belief. This confidence does not preclude
  the OPFOR from using a wide variety of other options, to include TBMs or SPF.
  9-190. While desiring to attack its regional opponent with overwhelming
  force, the OPFOR plans for the possibility of extraregional intervention. In
  doing so, it may choose to husband certain assets that may not be essential to
  accomplishing its air defense objectives against its neighbor.
  TRANSITION OPERATIONS
  9-191. The first OPFOR combat actions against extraregional forces may be
  against the enemy air threat. Past operations have shown that one of a major
  power’s first steps in support of intervention is the deployment of aircraft to
  third countries within range of the battlespace. Deployment could also in-
  clude movement of aircraft to the territory of the regional neighbor with
  which the State is already at war. Attacking sites within these countries, espe-
  cially third countries or the extraregional enemy’s homeland, is a decision made
  at the highest political levels. Once the State leadership has assessed this as a
  viable option, however, the OPFOR will use every means available to preclude
  deployment or, more realistically, limit access and delay deployment timelines.
  9-192. Taking early action against the air threat is essential to forces
  transitioning to adaptive operations. It provides time for ground forces to
  reposition. It also allows the use of OPFOR fixed-wing aircraft against
  targets they can range. Waiting too long to employ fixed-wing aircraft could
  result in an effective loss of the capability.