text: Fundamentals
  with other deception activities to mislead enemy intelligence collection and direct the enemy’s attention away
  from actual forces. Decoys must appear realistic to the enemy sensors to be effective. See ATP 3-37.34 for
  additional information on camouflage, concealment, and decoys.
  INFORMATION QUALITY
  1-69. Information quality refers to the accuracy, completeness, relevance, and believability of information
  available for decision making. Deception should affect the quality of information available for enemy
  decisions in the following ways:
  * Portray to the enemy true information that supports the deception story.
  * Deliberately present misleading information and indicators to enemies to degrade the accuracy of
  enemy information.
  * Give enemy decision makers a false sense of completeness of their understanding about friendly
  forces or intentions.
  * Cause enemy forces to misjudge the relevance of available information and misallocate
  operational or intelligence resources.
  * Cause enemies to doubt the veracity of their own intelligence assessments.
  1-70. MDOs protect the quality of information available for friendly decisions and public dissemination by
  instituting internal processes to identify and isolate information generated as a by-product of any deception
  activity. This protection helps prevent the commander from reaching erroneous conclusions because the staff
  unknowingly integrated the content or output of the deception efforts as accurate information. This also
  ensures the information made public is not part of any deception plan that would result in a loss of public
  trust.
  ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
  1-71. Army commanders and their staffs have distinct and coordinating roles and responsibilities in
  deception. All planners must understand the roles and responsibilities of everyone involved with deception
  planning and execution and then tailor each planning team accordingly.
  COMMANDERS
  1-72. The commander’s role is critical in planning deception. The commander determines the utility of
  deception’s contribution to achieving objectives. Commanders decide to develop a deception plan after
  evaluating the analysis and recommendations from the MDO. Commanders should guide applicable
  deception executions while understanding their potential importance during planning and execution. The
  commander has explicit and inherent responsibilities for the deception effort. The commander—
  * Assesses higher headquarters’ plans and orders for stated and implied deception tasks.
  * Considers the ways deception can support every operation, mindful of deception maxims to gain
  maximum impact.
  * States the tentative deception objective in the initial planning guidance.
  * Approves the deception objective.
  * Allocates necessary resources.
  * When required, seeks appropriate approval to employ certain deception means.
  * Determines when to exploit deception or counterdeception.
  G-2
  1-73. The G-2 assists the commander by identifying deception objectives to complement operational
  objectives. With the commander leading the efforts, the G-2 identifies deception objectives that apply to
  operations, intelligence, and counterintelligence resources. The G-2—