text: Air and Missile Defense Operations Process
  2-4. Force operations continue, as described below, with such other tasks as designing defenses, task
  organizing a unit to meet mission requirements, initiating support relationships, moving the unit to the area
  of operations, establishing communications networks, and sustaining the unit. Each task may be executed
  before, during, or after the initiation of engagement operations.
  AMD PLANNING AND DESIGN PROCESS
  AMD Planning and Design Process
  2-5. ADA commanders and staffs develop AMD plans based on
   Military Decision Making
  the guidance of their higher headquarters and in accordance with
  Process.
  their supporting or supported relationships. The military decision
   Integrated Defense Design.
  making process integrates the activities of the commander, staff,
   Criticality, Vulnerability,
  subordinate headquarters, and unified action partners to understand
  Threat.
  the situation and mission, develop and compare courses of action,
   Troop Leading Procedures.
  decide on a course of action that best accomplishes the mission, and
  produce an operation plan or order for execution (ADP 5-0).
  2-6. Any AMD operation begins with detailed planning in collaboration with joint and multinational AMD
  partners. Coordinated planning, such as war-gaming, is conducted in anticipation of future operations to
  identify potential issues or concerns and plan the way ahead. Planning considers all AMD operational
  elements, as appropriate, across the levels of war. Planning considerations at the operational level may be
  more extensive than those at the tactical level as a primary threat could be ballistic missiles, and coordination
  and integration must be conducted with joint and multinational AMD elements. Planning at the tactical level
  is nevertheless necessary to develop defenses against those aerial platforms that may threaten tactical units.
  At the operational level, the AAMDC directs ADA planning priorities and focus. The AAMDC identifies the
  geostrategic picture and provides suitable guidance to deployed ADA forces in concert with directives from
  the area air defense commander (AADC) to enable operational and tactical level planning. The result of this
  planning process is an integrated defense design that leverages all available joint AMD capabilities to most
  effectively defeat aerial threats from ballistic missiles and high-performance aircraft down to UASs and RAM
  threats at the tactical level. At the tactical (maneuver) level, much of the planning resides with the ADAM
  cell in BCTs to enable AMD where feasible and to leverage inherent non-dedicated, active AMD capabilities
  (combined arms fires and maneuver force Stinger teams) for protection of the maneuver forces. The ADA
  personnel in ADAM cells assist the brigade commanders and their staffs in planning support by ADA forces
  or general coverage by SHORAD sensors and shooter systems, if such support is allocated.
  2-7. AMD planning involves joint, multinational, and Army units including service or functional
  component commands, AAMDCs, ADA brigades, and ADA battalions. Defense design tools are available
  in an array of planners, ranging from Command and Control Battle Management and Communications
  (C2BMC) planner at the strategic level to the air and missile defense workstation (AMDWS). The Patriot
  tactical planning workstation and THAAD portable planner at the operational and tactical levels provide
  automated means to develop effective plans and alternative plans and to respond to dynamically changing
  tactical situations. These design tools are domain specific (C2BMC in ballistic missile defense planning) or
  system specific (Patriot tactical planning workstation for Patriot AMD planning, AMDWS for general
  defense planning and specific Avenger planning, and THAAD portable planner for THAAD planning.), thus
  inducing a strong hierarchical planning structure.
  2-8. The criticality, vulnerability, and threat methodology is used to allocate ADA forces to mission
  requirements. This methodology begins with the combatant commander’s nomination of high value assets
  across all deployed forces and considers political and geographic aspects as well as military assets. These
  high value assets are incorporated into a critical asset list – a prioritized list of assets or areas, normally
  identified by phase of the operation and approved by the joint force commander, that should be defended
  against air and missile threats (JP 3-01). After receiving all nominated critical assets, the methodology
  considers and ranks the importance of these assets based upon:
  * Criticality − how critical is the asset to the JFC in the execution of the mission and plan for
  accomplishing that mission? Criticality can change over the course of a campaign. For example,
  early entry may place a higher value on a limited number of access points, but, as the theater
  matures and more access points are opened, the criticality of a particular access point may diminish
  significantly.