text: Intelligence
  consistently shifting. Periods of warfare, instability, and natural disasters increase the rate of cultural
  change within a society.
  8-6. Also, cyberspace is an essential domain for the gathering of intelligence in a counterinsurgency.
  Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent
  network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet,
  telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers (JP 1-02). The
  commander and senior intelligence officer must be highly aware of the intelligence oversight implications
  of collecting against United States (U.S.) persons, as the distinction of citizenship is difficult to assess in
  cyberspace. The distinction is required because intelligence collection is enabled by and must comply with
  all applicable U.S. laws and policy. However, cyberspace is used by insurgents and cannot be ignored by
  counterinsurgents. Cyberspace and the technologies that enable it allow people of every nationality, race,
  faith, and point of view to communicate, cooperate, and prosper like never before. Some adversaries clearly
  understand the power of cyberspace. Terrorists employ the Internet for recruiting, training, motivating, and
  synchronizing their followers. Adversaries frequently operate in cyberspace unrestrained, and they exploit
  its potential. To be effective in defeating an insurgency, commanders and staffs must gather intelligence on
  how an insurgency is using cyberspace.
  ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE
  8-7. The Army defines all-source intelligence as the integration of intelligence and information from all
  relevant sources to analyze situations or conditions that impact operations. (See ADRP 2-0.) The joint force
  defines all-source intelligence as intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate
  all sources of information in the production of finished intelligence (JP 2-0). All-source intelligence is used
  to develop the intelligence products necessary to aid situational understanding, support the development of
  plans and orders, and answer information requirements. Although all-source intelligence normally takes
  longer to produce, it is more reliable and less susceptible to deception than single-source intelligence.
  Intelligence organizations fuse data and information into all-source intelligence products to support
  counterinsurgency operations. Analysis for counterinsurgency operations is challenging, due in part to
  the—
  * Need to understand perceptions and culture.
  * Need to track hundreds or thousands of personalities.
  * Local nature of insurgencies.
  * Tendency of insurgencies to change over relatively short periods of time.
  8-8. Commanders and staffs need data to analyze and synthesize insurgent activities and personalities.
  Intelligence staffs should create a common searchable combatant command database of insurgent actions
  and personnel, and another database(s) that provides discoverable, accessible, and retrievable data on
  insurgent actions and personnel, and provide similar access to all intelligence reporting. This data should be
  accessible by analysts both in and out of the theater as well as conventional, special operations forces, and
  multinational units.
  8-9. Because all echelons collect and use intelligence, all staffs are heavily involved in analysis. Units are
  simultaneously intelligence producers and consumers. Intelligence capabilities are normally greater at
  higher echelons of command. For example, battalion staffs have fewer personnel than brigade staffs to
  collect patrol debriefs, analyze incoming information from multiple sources, produce finished intelligence
  products, and disseminate products to appropriate consumers. In many cases, brigade intelligence sections
  may be inadequately staffed to handle the vast amounts of information necessary to conduct operations in a
  counterinsurgency environment.
  8-10. Counterinsurgency requirements may require pushing analysts to battalion and brigade staffs to give
  those echelons the required analytical support. Often analysts can be beneficial at the company level. In
  these cases, developing company intelligence support teams may be useful. Many maneuver company
  commanders organize small intelligence support teams from within their units to provide tailored
  intelligence products to the company leadership. They may receive augmentation from the brigade military
  intelligence company or other intelligence Soldiers and Marines to form the nucleus of a company
  intelligence support team. The company intelligence support team combines information gained from