text: Chapter 5
  the AAMDC commander’s recommended AMD force allocation to the JFC, JFACC/AADC, and JFLCC.
  The AAMDC also recommends the allocation of elements to strengthen/establish passive defenses for assets,
  facilitating the economy of ADA forces.
  5-18. The AAMDC supports the development of the critical and defended asset lists. The AAMDC staff
  works with the JFACC/AADC and JFLCC staffs in developing and managing the critical asset list and
  defended asset list within a joint operations area. The AAMDC staff receives the nominated critical assets
  from subordinate Army, joint, and multinational elements, consolidates them into a list, and contributes to
  the prioritization of this critical asset list. The joint and AAMDC staffs then identify the most critical assets
  that must be defended, given the amount and availability of AMD forces. Defended assets change throughout
  an operation, as METT-TC changes. This ongoing integrated process – nomination and prioritization of
  critical assets, AMD force resourcing, and identification of defended assets – facilitates the efficient
  allocation or reallocation of AMD forces to provide the degree of protection desired or risk accepted by the
  JFC for the most critical assets in theater.
  5-19. The AAMDC performs airspace control measure planning and coordination. Airspace control spans
  joint and multinational activities and can include intergovernmental aspects as well. The AAMDC identifies
  the most suitable airspace control measures for AMD ground forces and advises the AADC of these. AAMDC
  personnel then coordinate the measures with the AADC staff, or the joint force maritime component
  commander’s staff as appropriate, to ensure the most effective measures are in place in the area of operations.
  Coordination is continuous as the requirements for and use of various control measures may change
  throughout an operation depending on METT-TC.
  5-20. The AAMDC performs an AMD IPB. The AMD IPB is an analysis process to continuously assess air
  and missile threats to the area of operations. AAMDC intelligence personnel and other staff members
  systematically evaluate the effects of significant characteristics of the operational environment and the
  anticipated threat characteristics and project the quantities and capabilities of the air and missile forces that
  may be used against friendly assets. These projections allow the AAMDC commander and staff to identify
  the degree of protection for designated critical assets and to allocate AMD elements accordingly, facilitating
  designs of the most capable defenses for the assets. AAMDC intelligence personnel also provide or assist
  their joint or Army force counterparts in the development of theater-specific threat information. This
  information assists ADA officers and staff planners, in supported corps or division headquarters, in the
  development of AMD plans and orders. For additional information on the AMD IPB, see ATP 3-01.16.
  5-21. The AAMDC performs AMD reporting. The reporting requirements begin as soon as deployment alerts
  are received. The reports comprise all aspects of force operations, to include preparation, readiness,
  certifications, personnel, training, deployments, planning, headquarters and unit locations, communications,
  weapons statuses, and future planning. Some reporting is formal, and some is more coordination oriented to
  assure synchronization with supported forces. Some reports are AMD specific and reflect the posture of ADA
  forces and their capability to defend designated assets in the joint operations area.
  5-22. The AAMDC coordinates force protection requirements for ADA forces. ADA forces are not
  sufficiently manned to provide 24-hour protection from air and missile threats and concurrently force
  protection against ground threats. The AAMDC coordinates with the JFLCC or other commanders, as
  appropriate, for forces to provide protection against the ground threat.
  5-23. The AAMDC disseminates early warning. The AAMDC, as well as other members of the joint force,
  develop early warning architectures to detect air and missile threats and warn supported Army, joint, and
  multinational units, and, when requested, civilian authorities in the operations area. The AAMDC plans,
  coordinates, and integrates AMD and other external sensor capabilities to maintain situational awareness of
  the airspace. It generates and disseminates timely early warning and alert of impending attacks for units or
  areas at risk.
  5-24. The AAMDC attack operations section supports the JFLCC and JFACC in the development of targets
  specifically against the air and missile threat. The section integrates with JFLCC and JFACC targeting teams
  to address AMD objectives in the JFC targeting strategy, and coordinates through JFLCC or JFACC targeting
  personnel to implement a coherent joint theater AMD attack plan. The section enables the deputy AADC to
  support the JFACC by helping to synchronize the targeting efforts against the air and missile threat, and
  providing AMD focus to Army deep operations and within the JFLCC’s operating environment.