text: Chapter 5
  during and after crisis response creates enduring change that reinforces deterrence against adversaries and
  improves relative advantages for U.S., allied, and partner forces.
  TRANSITION TO COMPETITION OR ARMED CONFLICT
  In the midst of war and crisis nothing is as clear or as certain as it appears in hindsight.
  Barbara Tuchman
  5-64. There are two outcomes of a crisis—a de-escalation to competition or an escalation to armed conflict.
  Transitions are typically points of friction. Commanders emphasize information collection prior to and during
  transitions to maintain a detailed understanding of the threat and continuously assess the situation in order to
  position their forces to retain the initiative.
  TRANSITION BACK TO COMPETITION
  5-65. During a crisis, partner nation security forces and government institutions may suffer losses that reduce
  capability and capacity due to the actions of adversary or proxy forces. Army forces may be tasked to execute
  security cooperation programs to help restore or maintain partner nation capabilities and capacity as a means
  to consolidate gains. Army forces seek to restore partner security forces and government institutions as
  quickly as possible to maintain popular support. Doing so reduces the need for large numbers of U.S. forces
  to deploy in the future or be maintained in theater to support or enable a partner nation’s security. A quick
  recovery also highlights the strength of the alliance or bilateral relationship of a partner nation with the United
  States. (See Chapter 4 for more information on partner nation capabilities and capacity.)
  5-66. Army forces use products developed from the civil preparation of the environment to help rebuild
  partner-nation security forces. Army forces work with partner nations to do this and do not act unilaterally.
  The security force assistance brigade (SFAB) and civil affairs units are the ideal core for this effort, but all
  types of Army units may contribute. When the effort is large and there is a need for additional subject matter
  expertise, or there is a need to reconstitute host-nation conventional forces, additional Army forces may be
  required. (See JP 3-20 and FM 3-57 for more details on security cooperation and civil affairs operations.)
  5-67. Army forces may help the JFC exploit favorably resolved crises to establish new patterns of behavior
  for a theater. While crises are generally uncertain and volatile, their resolution and resulting transition back
  to competition provide opportunities to capitalize on changes in an operational environment. Army forces
  support joint efforts to create and reinforce changes that benefit the United States and its allies and partners
  in competition and provide improved relative advantages that assist in deterring future adversary malign
  behavior.
  TRANSITION TO ARMED CONFLICT
  5-68. Army forces responding to a crisis are prepared for and expect to fight. This saves time during the
  transition and requires an understanding of the OPLAN or likely concept of operations as early as possible.
  Forward-positioned forces reposition into battle positions or tactical assembly areas and take all available
  measures to protect themselves from attack in every domain as they prepare for combat. When located with
  allied or partner units, Army forces synchronize their activities to ensure unity of purpose and mutual support.
  Depending upon the enemy and distance from the United States, Army forces should expect to receive little
  support in the opening stages of a conflict and plan accordingly.