text: Armies, Corps, and Divisions
  to other legitimate authorities (ADP 3-0). Army forces conduct a combination of offensive, defensive, and
  stability operations to successfully consolidate gains. Consolidation of gains is an integral and continuous
  part of armed conflict, and it is necessary for achieving success across the range of military operations. Army
  forces deliberately plan to consolidate gains during all phases of an operation, and they consolidate gains
  with unified action partners. While Army forces consolidate gains throughout an operation, consolidating
  gains becomes the primary focus of Army forces after large-scale combat operations have concluded. Armies,
  corps, and divisions are integral to these operations.
  1-27. The four strategic roles are not tasks assigned to Army units or phases of an operation. While they
  provide the larger purpose behind operations, they are not the operations themselves. Army forces execute
  various operations as part of a joint force in support of these strategic roles. The Army strategic roles provide
  a way for commanders to visualize and execute their operations in a larger strategic framework. Those
  operations occur across the range of military operations in a variety of operational environments. They may
  be of a short duration or extend for a significant period. They also vary in their intensity. Armies, corps, and
  divisions are integral to this effort.
  1-28. Generally, Army forces perform operations to fulfill the Army’s strategic roles during periods of
  competition, crisis, or conflict.
  COMPETITION CONTINUUM
  1-29. The competition continuum frames the application of landpower and the Army’s strategic roles. It
  describes the environment from an Army perspective in which landpower is applied to achieve objectives.
  For strategic and operational commanders, it provides a common way to understand, visualize, and describe
  the complexity of strategic relationships and how they correlate with general levels of violence. For tactical
  commanders, overlaying the range of military operations on the competition continuum provides a common
  way of focusing units on a particular mission theme. This visualization serves as a starting point for
  commanders to describe their operations to subordinates by using a framed explanation of the complex and
  dangerous environment they will face.
  1-30. The competition continuum describes an environment of enduring competition characterized by a
  mixture of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. The competition continuum
  creates a distinction between war and other forms of armed conflict because of the scope and scale of land
  forces involved. While the U.S. Army has not been in an officially declared war since World War II, Army
  forces fought in several conflicts that rose to the level of war because of the resources involved. In that same
  period, Army forces also fought in several armed conflicts below the threshold of war.
  1-31. The competition continuum descriptors can be used in two ways: to refer to the relationship between
  the United States and another strategic actor, or to refer to U.S. interactions with multiple actors in a specific
  theater. When considering a strategic actor that has the capability to act globally, these descriptors refer to
  the relationship between the U.S. and another strategic actor in relation to a set of specific objectives allowing
  for simultaneous interactions with the same actor at different points along the continuum. When considering
  operations inside of an AOR or theater, U.S. interactions with multiple state and non-state actors will vary
  along the continuum.
  1-32. The competition continuum also places the potential for violence and its corresponding intensity on an
  ascending scale. On the far left of the competition continuum is cooperation, where the likelihood of violence
  is low. While violence occurs during cooperation, it is limited in scope and duration. War is characterized by
  intense violence. In practice, competition does not proceed smoothly along this continuum and back again.
  The level of violence may jump from one point to another. For example, competition may erupt in general
  war without a gradual escalation, or a general war may end in cooperation over the long term. Armed conflicts
  often spark additional violence in a region, creating broad areas of instability that threaten U.S. interests. (See
  figure 1-2 on page 1-8.)