text: Chapter 3
  UNDERSTAND AND MANAGE THE EFFECTS OF OPERATIONS ON UNITS AND SOLDIERS
  3-96. Continuous operations rapidly degrade the performance of people and the equipment they employ,
  particularly during combat. In battle, Soldiers and units are more likely to fail catastrophically than gradually.
  Commanders and staffs must be alert to small indicators of fatigue, fear, indiscipline, and reduced morale,
  and they must take measures to deal with these before their cumulative effects drive a unit to the threshold
  of collapse. Staffs and commanders at higher echelons must take into account the impact of prolonged combat
  on subordinate units, which causes efficiency to drop, even when physical losses are not great. Leaders
  consider the isolation Soldiers experience when not being able to remain connected with family and friends
  via social media and other platforms for extended periods. Well-trained, physically fit Soldiers in cohesive
  units retain the qualities of tenacity and aggressiveness longer than those who are not.
  3-97. Although all units experience peaks and valleys in combat effectiveness, well-trained, cohesive units
  under effective leaders have increased endurance and higher effectiveness than units that lack training and
  effective leaders. Leaders develop resilient subordinates. Staffs and commanders need to take this variance
  in performance into account in their planning by matching units to missions, rotating units through difficult
  tasks to permit recuperation, and by basing their expectations of a unit’s performance on accurate awareness
  of its current capabilities. Historically, during conflicts where tactical units are in contact with enemy forces
  on a continuous basis for weeks or more at a time, commanders and staffs at echelons above brigade rotated
  subordinate units out of enemy contact to reorganize, rest, and train on a regular basis. Continuously assessing
  the combat effectiveness of subordinate formations is necessary to inform such decisions in the future.
  SECTION III – OPERATIONAL APPROACH AND OPERATIONAL
  FRAMEWORK
  3-98. The operational approach provides the logic for how tactical tasks ultimately achieve the desired end
  state. It provides a unifying purpose and focus to all operations. Sound operational approaches balance risk
  and uncertainty with friction and chance. The operational approach provides the basis for detailed planning,
  allows leaders to establish a logical operational framework, and helps produce an executable order. (See ADP
  3-0 for more information on operational art. See ADP 5-0 for more information on planning.)
  3-99. An operational framework organizes an area of geographic and operational responsibility for the
  commander and provides a way to describe the employment of forces. The framework illustrates the
  relationship between close operations, operations in depth, and other operations in time and space across
  domains. As a visualization tool, the operational framework bridges the gap between a unit’s conceptual
  understanding of the environment and its need to generate detailed orders that direct operations.
  OPERATIONAL APPROACH
  3-100. Through operational art, commanders develop their operational approach—a broad description of
  the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission (JP 5-0). An
  operational approach is the result of the commander’s visualization of what needs to be done in broad terms
  to solve identified problems. It is the main idea that informs detailed planning. When describing an
  operational approach, commanders—
  (cid:122) Consider ways to defeat enemy forces in detail and potential decisive points.
  (cid:122) Employ combinations of defeat mechanisms to isolate and defeat enemy forces, functions, and
  capabilities.
  (cid:122) Assess options for assuming risk.
  DEFEATING ENEMY FORCES IN DETAIL
  3-101. Armed conflict implies the need to defeat enemy forces. Defeat is to render a force incapable of
  achieving its objectives (ADP 3-0). When used as a task or effect in operations, defeat provides maximum
  flexibility to the commander in how to accomplish the mission. Senior leaders assign defeat as a task when
  the situation is still developing, or when the commander on the ground, by virtue of experience and proximity
  to the problem, is uniquely capable of deciding how to employ lethal force to accomplish objectives. As a
  task, defeat is appropriate for theater strategic and operational-level echelons, but it is often too vague for