text: FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
  the AORs of one or more operational-level commands and could cover air-
  space not included in any of those AORs. It is possible that the OPFOR could
  divide a large geographic area into air defense sectors even when it does not
  establish multiple theater headquarters within that area.
  9-30. Sector air defense can reduce the physical and electronic signature of
  defensive systems. To the extent possible, the OPFOR disperses high-value
  assets. Still, air defense assets may be close enough together to be hard-
  wired. Sector IADS enables the OPFOR to mass the effects of air defense assets
  from dispersed sites to protect the most critical targets. It also facilitates the use
  of passive air defense techniques including dispersal, deception, and camouflage.
  9-31. In choosing to fight within sectors, the OPFOR accepts risk, in that air
  defense sectors present seams in the defenses and may be unable to provide
  mutual support. Within sectors, the OPFOR develops air defense ambushes
  along the most likely air avenues of approach.
  Operational and Tactical Level
  9-32. In most situations, an operational-strategic command (OSC) directs the
  employment of the air defense assets of at least its immediate tactical-level
  subordinatesdivisions and division tactical groups (DTGs) or separate bri-
  gades or brigade tactical groups (BTGs). Brigades and BTGs that are part of
  a division or DTG provide coverage for their own units and vertically inte-
  grate with division or DTG coverage. When not part of a division or DTG,
  they vertically integrate with OSC-level coverage, which would be their next-
  higher level of command. There may be skip-echelon situations when the
  OSC will specify how divisional maneuver brigades employ their air defense
  batteries. Normally, however, the division or DTG will dictate that.
  9-33. At the tactical level, the commander normally strives to achieve
  horizontal integration. His ability to integrate or be integrated vertically will
  depend on the air defense course of action taken at the next-higher level.
  CENTRALIZATION VERSUS DECENTRALIZATION
  9-34. Air defense control relationships are subject to conflicting pressures for
  centralization and decentralization. Factors favoring centralized control
  include the greater efficiency and effectiveness of centralized target detection
  systems and the increased ranges of modern surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).
  Centralized control is necessary, especially during defensive operations, to
  ensure that the coverage of air defense units is mutually supporting and
  comprehensive. Centralization of control gives the OPFOR flexibility in the
  employment of air defense resources to meet the overall goal of an operation. In most
  situations, therefore, an operational-level command directs the employment of
  the air defense assets of at least its immediate tactical-level subordinates.
  9-35. Nevertheless, the complexity and fluidity of the modern battlefield
  require the possibility of some decentralization. Decentralized control provides
  flexibility and shorter response times for supporting fast-paced operations by
  ground maneuver units and the many contingencies that can arise in local
  situations. The OPFOR expects its air defense commanders, like their
  maneuver counterparts, to demonstrate aggressive action and originality,
  responding to changes in the tactical situation and operating effectively when