text: Contested Deployments
  degree than military operations conducted abroad, and units should become familiar with requisite
  authorities.
  C-43. Homeland defense and DSCA operations may also be conducted in a wide range of circumstances not
  tied to the preparation or execution of force projection to another operational theater. This can include
  responses to both external and internal threats, natural or manmade disasters, support to law enforcement,
  and other activities. (See DODD 3025.18, JP 3-27, JP 3-28, and ADP 3-28 for more information on DSCA
  and homeland defense.)
  TRAINING AND PREPARATION CONSIDERATIONS
  C-44. Training and preparation to conduct deployment operations contested by threat forces will stress joint
  and unified action partner interoperability and coordination. The Army and other unified action partners
  conduct joint deployment exercises whenever possible, develop information and intelligence sharing
  architectures, and collaborate during other preparation activities. Preparing for a contested deployment,
  defending the homeland, and executing DSCA operations are not primary considerations for most Army
  units. However, when preparing for large-scale combat operations, units should augment their training plans
  to help prepare for deployments contested by threat forces and related activities. Examples include—
  (cid:122) Conduct deployment readiness exercises that include port authority, law enforcement, and other
  stakeholder participation from municipal, state, federal, and commercial organizations.
  (cid:122) Conduct a road march to a training center rotation from an Army installation to simulate extended
  convoy operations and test maintenance capability of Army equipment and personnel.
  (cid:122) Conduct tabletop exercises with members of the installation threat working group to discover gaps
  in planning and build a cohesive team.
  (cid:122) Conduct training with local communities to test the ability of the installation and local law
  enforcement to handle demonstrations that may occur due to misinformation.
  (cid:122) Conduct training to improve Soldier and family member awareness of likely threat information
  warfare actions and potential response strategies.
  (cid:122) Coordinate to ensure installation and unit threat working groups, emergency response centers, and
  cyber security measures are expanded to account for critical civilian dependencies, including
  reliance on civilian infrastructure.
  (cid:122) Establish and test a primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (known as PACE)
  communication plan among key Army units, installations, armories, and unified action partners
  that facilitate deployment operations.
  (cid:122) Identify requisite command and logistics nodes along primary and alternate routes to ports of
  embarkation, across multiple modes of transportation if appropriate.
  (cid:122) Prepare numerous road march plans to compensate for degraded or disrupted lines of
  communications.
  (cid:122) Maintain port overview packages for likely ports of embarkation.
  (cid:122) Build and implement an installation strategic communication plan that informs the public while
  maintaining operations security.
  (cid:122) Prepare Soldiers and family members for extended periods of no direct connectivity during initial
  stages of crisis or armed conflict to maintain operations security.
  (cid:122) Create plans for direct communication between Army installations and family members during
  the initial stages of a crisis or armed conflict to help mitigate the effects of threat disinformation
  and answer family questions.
  (cid:122) Ensure ready access to relief funds and supplies for dependents in case of threat attacks against
  financial institutions.
  (cid:122) Work with local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies to build relationships and understand
  requirements if later tasked to conduct homeland defense or DSCA.