text: Appendix C
  Information requests are processed and expedited to ensure required data is available as quickly and as
  complete as possible. The SHORAD battalion and the supported asset are generally the two primary sources
  of intelligence for SHORAD batteries and platoons. Other AMD units operating in the vicinity of SHORAD
  forces may provide relevant data on threat air elements and capabilities.
  ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ON OPERATION
  C-7. SHORAD leaders and staffs must conduct an in-depth analysis of the effects of terrain and weather on
  the enemy and friendly forces to project how a threat may project its air forces and how SHORAD forces
  may be positioned to defeat them. Each potential air threat must be considered with respect to the AO and
  the area of interest.
  TERRAIN ANALYSIS
  C-8. Terrain analysis in support of air defense is significantly different from terrain analysis for ground
  operations. The nature of airspace does not eliminate the need for terrain analysis because enemy air and
  friendly ADA will still attempt to use terrain to their own best advantage. IPB focuses on what impact the
  geographic factors have on the ability of threat air to approach, acquire, and engage a target, or deliver
  airborne or air assault troops.
  C-9. Analysis of the terrain for IPB follows the same principles as ground analysis and uses the military
  aspects of terrain observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, and key terrain.
  C-10. Observation and fields of fire. Observation and fields of fire relate to the influence of terrain on
  reconnaissance and target acquisition. In the IPB context, observation relates to optical and electronic line of
  sight. Many battlefield systems require line of sight to effectively operate or acquire and engage targets.
  These systems include radios, radars, jammers, direct-fire weapons, and airborne and ground sensors as well
  as SHORAD systems. Fields of fire relate to the terrain effects on weapon systems. Airspace must be
  analyzed with regard to routes which provide the best protection for air threats entering the target area and
  those which provide the best fields of fire once they reach the target area.
  C-11. Cover and concealment. Cover and concealment have slightly different applications with respect to air
  systems. The following tactics and techniques are considerations of cover and concealment.
  * Contour flying is flying a constant altitude above ground level of less than 22.8 meters (75 feet).
  This allows for maximum use of terrain masking.
  * Popup tactics are the use of a low-altitude approach to the target area. Target acquisition and
  engagement is made by popping-up in altitude at a predetermined position or time to minimize
  exposure.
  * Masking is using terrain to protect an air system from visual and electronic observation or
  detection. Electromagnetic warfare supplements natural masking.
  * Cover is using terrain to provide protection from direct-fire weapon systems.
  * Ground clutter can be characterized as a reduction of electromagnetic signal-to-noise ratio due to
  the signature of a background. It is different for each type of terrain or feature.
  C-12. Threat aircraft (especially attack helicopters), cruise missiles, and possibly even UASs will use contour
  flying, masking, and ground clutter to avoid detection and to provide cover from direct fires. Aircraft will
  also use the terrain by loitering on reverse slopes, using pop-up tactics, and by using ground clutter and
  vegetation as a backdrop to enhance concealment.
  C-13. Obstacles. There are three primary types of obstacles:
  * Those which prevent the effective employment of ADA systems.
  * Those which restrict contour flight.
  * Those which force air threats to employ a particular surveillance or attack profile or route, or to
  gain excessive altitude.
  C-14. Of particular interest are obstacles and terrain which restrict lateral movement within an avenue of
  approach. This will canalize movement or restrict evasive action. Additionally, terrain may stop the
  employment of certain air threat systems if the terrain exceeds the system's maximum operating ceiling.