text: Planning
  * Deception will enhance OPSEC.
  * Deception will enhance the effectiveness and likelihood of success of a conventional plan.
  Time
  2-13. MDOs consider time available. Time is a key element to consider when developing the deception story.
  MDOs determine how much time they have to present the deception story and to estimate how much time
  the deception target will use make a decision and direct the desired action. The available time may determine
  the scope and depth of the story. MDOs carefully time deception events to synchronize them with the
  approved plan.
  Risk
  2-14. An important planning consideration is the mitigation of identified risk. Risk is a key factor that must
  be reexamined during all phases of deception planning and execution (see paragraph 2-126). The MDO must
  evaluate any substantial risk which may include—
  * Risk of deception failure.
  * Risk of compromise.
  * Risks associated with a successful deception.
  * Exposure of means or feedback channels.
  Information Environment Analysis
  2-15. An information environment analysis is an extension of mission analysis. The information environment
  is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on
  information (JP 3-13). The information environment is a subset of an operational environment. The MDO,
  working with IO planners, must identify the key aspects of the information environment relevant to the
  deception target and decision making. To influence the behavior of the deception target, the planner must
  understand how the target views the environment, processes information, and makes decisions. This
  understanding includes an analysis of the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure
  variables of the target’s environment.
  Deception Running Estimate
  2-16. Once created, a mission analysis provides information that helps produce a deception running estimate.
  The deception running estimate is a specialized product derived from the intelligence preparation of the
  battlefield and from responses to situation-specific RFIs submitted by MDOs. Most information in the
  estimate originates from mission analysis, but much of the detail required is unique to deception. MDOs
  collaborate with intelligence analysts to build the running estimate. MDOs work with the G-2 to obtain
  information critical to effective deception planning. This information forms the basis of the deception running
  estimate that feeds the development of a viable deception concept.
  2-17. The deception running estimate identifies deception opportunities, detects information and capability
  requirements, and recommends a feasible deception goal and its objectives. The MDO presents this estimate
  during the mission analysis briefing. The estimate considers current capabilities based on enemy
  susceptibilities, preconceptions, and biases; available time; and available deception means. A key outcome
  of the running estimate is the determination of whether or not there is a viable deception opportunity.
  2-18. Preparing the deception estimate involves developing alternative approaches to reaching the deception
  goal. It first determines the objective of the deception and then the desired perceptions that likely lead to that
  objective. Developing the estimate is a critical process to prepare for a deception operation. Depending on
  the nature of the commander’s guidance, the deception estimate may be integrated in the operation’s running
  estimate, may stand alone, or may not be appropriate at that time. In the latter case, the role of deception is
  limited to OPSEC activities or simply to supporting one or another component of the operation.
  2-19. The deception running estimate is a living product. Planners refine it as additional information and
  intelligence become available, or as conditions evolve and change within an operational environment and
  information environment. During the initial planning, MDOs and intelligence analysts often make