text: Considerations to Achieve Unity of Effort
  getting right to the point in discussions and taking charge of meetings or missions, often fail to facilitate
  cooperation. Moreover, Army leaders must remember that the relatively strict hierarchical structure
  common to Army operations is less common among many partner organizations and possibly unwelcome
  on interagency teams.
  Nature of Humanitarian Efforts
  3-25. Some U.S. agencies are reluctant to be seen as having direct connections to U.S. forces. Reasons may
  be philosophical as well as practical. Members of many U.S. agencies providing aid intend to serve
  altruistic humanitarian purposes. They do not wish to be regarded as serving political objectives or
  advancing U.S. influence. They prefer their identity to be as civilian as possible in stabilization efforts.
  Moreover, the host-nation populace may not welcome humanitarian aid when U.S. forces are known or
  believed to be connected to humanitarian operations. Therefore, members of civilian agencies may feel that
  increased military involvement in stability efforts impairs their mission or image and compromises
  humanitarian values. Army leaders should expect such viewpoints. They can avoid friction by
  understanding that these attitudes may reflect the situation on the ground and most likely do not indicate
  that partners are criticizing Army operations. Army leaders and partners should determine collaboratively
  the most effective way Army forces can contribute to the whole-of-government approach.
  Time Orientation
  3-26. Army leaders need to consider how the tendency of Army operations to focus on relatively short-
  term objectives affects long-term goals of partners and U.S. policy. Some partners tend to emphasize
  future, long-term goals and the actions necessary to achieve them. For example, in Afghanistan, the
  Army’s’ short-term orientation has typically led to a focus on projects that achieves quick results. Some
  partners have considered projects such as building schools or clinics without adequate infrastructure or
  resources for their sustainment detrimental to Afghanistan’s long-term development. Overall stability
  efforts must achieve a balance of short- and long-term objectives; interagency coordination that includes
  military forces can be ideal for this purpose.
  Measurement
  3-27. Military and interagency partners also differ in how they measure success and when they consider
  the work of stability complete. Due in part to the military’s orientation on relatively short times and quick
  results, the military often measures tangible items such as the number of units trained or neighborhoods
  cleared. Conversely, civilian agencies often assess more intangible goals, such as the progress toward
  reconciliation. Not only are these intangible goals harder to measure, but they also require more time.
  Friction can result when Army leaders consider their mission accomplished while civilian leaders believe
  much work remains toward long-term, intangible goals not easily quantified. Army leaders can avoid
  discord by considering Army efforts within the context of long-term U.S. goals. They can collaborate with
  interagency partners to apply measurements that show the success of the whole-of-government approach.
  Army leaders participating in interagency groups—
  * Learn about partners’ timelines and develop metrics supportive of all U.S. stability objectives.
  * Establish metrics that measure outcomes (end results), not just activities (such as dollars spent,
  number of units trained).
  * Clarify exactly how proposed actions support stability or developmental goals.
  * Place immediate needs in the context of long-term strategic goals.
  STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING COMMUNICATION
  3-28. Effective Soldiers learn how to facilitate communication and information sharing across partner
  agencies. Differences in organizational objectives and cultures present variations in informational needs,
  communication style, information-sharing processes, and priorities. Differences may include willingness or
  urgency to share information. Further, as teams are likely to be ad hoc, so are information arrangements.
  Therefore, every effort to enhance communication will support an effective whole-of-government
  approach.