text: Stability
  SUSTAINING ACTIVITIES
  8-240. Sustaining SFA activities consists of two major components: the ability of the United States and
  other partners to sustain the SFA activities successfully and the ability of host-nation security forces to sustain
  their capabilities independently over the long term. The first component may be predicated on the host-nation
  maintaining legitimacy while the second component should be considered holistically when working with
  the host nation to build their security forces. It is important to consider the sociocultural factors,
  infrastructure, and education levels of prospective FSF when fielding weapons systems and maintaining
  organizations. Though this is not the BCT, or division commander’s decision, a strong recommendation
  through the SFA chain should be made in regard to this consideration.
  INTELLIGENCE
  8-241. Intelligence provides an assessment of host nation and potential adversaries’ capabilities, capacities,
  and shortfalls. It involves understanding sociocultural factors, information and intelligence sharing, and
  intelligence training. Information-sharing between the BCT and FSF must be an early consideration for
  planners. A continuous intelligence effort will gauge the reaction of the local populace and determine the
  effects on the infrastructure of SFA efforts as well as evaluate strengths, weaknesses, and disposition of
  opposition groups in the area. Ultimately, intelligence supports the SFA and FSF leaders’ decision-making
  processes, and supports the protection of friendly forces and assets.
  Note. Train personnel two deep in every staff section or advisory subunit on foreign disclosure
  and derivative classification procedures before deployment. Interaction with host nation and FSF,
  even North Atlantic Treaty Organization or other coalition allies requires foreign disclosure officer
  approval.Authorized release or disclosure of classified information will require personnel trained
  in derivative classification and foreign disclosure. This will become a huge bottleneck if not
  trained for and decentralized.
  PROTECTION
  8-242. Protection is incumbent upon the commander to fully understand the threat environment within the
  BCT’s area of operations. By having access to fused intelligence from local, regional and national resources,
  the commander can accurately assess threats and employ measures to safeguardSFA personnel and facilities.
  Protection planning considerations should address additional support requirements for the response force,
  emergency procedures, personnel recovery, or the requirement to integrate SFA personnel into the
  host-nation protectionplan.
  8-243. Nontraditional threats, such as the insider threat, can undermine SFA activities as well as the
  cohesion of U.S. forces and FSF. Tactically, the breakdown of trust, communication, and cooperation
  between host nation and U.S. forces can affect military capability. Adversaries may view attacks against U.S.
  forces as a particularly effective tactic, especially when using co-opted host-nation forces to conduct these
  attacks. While these types of insider or “green on blue” attacks have been context-specific to a particular
  theater, the commander should ensure that protection plans consider the potential for these types of attacks
  and plan appropriate countermeasures.
  Note.More stringent protection controls and measures that are overtly heavy handed must be well
  balanced yet culturally sensitive enough to not send the wrong message to the very people and
  organizations the United Statesis trying to assist.
  LOGISTICS
  8-244. Logistics planners at the BCT level must understand the division’s concept of support and
  sustainment estimates that outline the responsibilities and requirements for maintaining logistics support for
  deployed forces within the division’s area of operations. Logistics support might include support of SFA
  augmentees and FSF within the BCT’s area of operations to conduct operational missions (supporting