text: Understanding the Strategic Context
  1-11. Effective counterinsurgency operations require an understanding of the military profession. The tasks
  counterinsurgents perform in countering an insurgency are not unique. It is the organization of these tasks
  in time and space that is unique. For example, geographic combatant commanders employ theater strategy
  to align and shape efforts, resources, and tasks to support strategic goals and prepare for conflict and
  contingencies in their region. In support of this goal, theater strategies normally emphasize security
  cooperation activities, building partner capacity and force posture, and preparing for contingencies and
  other tasks those are not unique to counterinsurgency operations. For example, a unit can perform security
  cooperation tasks in support or not in support of countering an insurgency. (See FM 3-22 for more
  information on security cooperation tasks.) Those units that carry out security cooperation tasks to support
  a counterinsurgency should understand security cooperation and the tasks they are performing and
  teaching. Moreover, they should understand how these tasks are used in defeating an insurgency. Soldiers
  and Marines must start from a foundation of professional knowledge and competence to have a framework
  for understanding and aiding a host nation in defeating an insurgency. Whether a unit is directly performing
  the tasks to defeat an insurgency or indirectly supporting a host nation, this manual provides a doctrinal
  framework for counterinsurgency operations. However, to be effective, Soldiers and Marines must be
  professionally competent. This is the foundation in understanding another nation’s or group’s actions to
  defeat an insurgency and in providing aid to that nation or group. (See ADRP 1 for more information on
  professional competence.)
  1-12. Political leaders and commanders must have a dialogue to decide the optimal strategy to meet the
  security needs of the U.S and states or groups the U.S. supports. Different capabilities provide different
  choices that offer different costs and risks. U.S. strategy is defined by how it combines these capabilities
  (the ways), resources them (the means), and its willingness to accept risk in attaining its policy goals.
  Commanders inform political leaders about the prospects for victory and the different costs and risks of
  various options, and political leaders weigh these costs and risks against their importance to U.S. national
  interests. Once U.S. policymakers have determined the goals (the ends) of the U.S., the military evaluates
  operational approaches to conduct counterinsurgency efforts depending on the ends, ways, means, and
  acceptable risk. The joint force provides a range of capabilities that it integrates into the overall strategy.
  For example, in a functioning state that is facing an insurgency, the joint force may employ a range of
  security cooperation tools. Moreover, other tools fall outside of security cooperation, such as direct action
  and counter threat financing, that the U.S. can integrate into the mix of ways that it will use to defeat or
  contain an insurgency. The U.S. government integrates the various instruments of national power to create
  a range of strategic options, of which military involvement is only one part. (For a further discussion on
  strategy, see MCDP 1-1.) (See table 1-1.)
  Table 1-1. Ends, ways, means, and risk in countering an insurgency
  Ends Ways Means Risk
  Defeat or contain an Direct methods Unified action Determined by a
  insurgency. (See chapter 9.) • Military force. mismatch in the
  • Other ends, ways, and
  Support strategic goals Indirect methods governmental means.
  capabilities
  and end state defined by
  (See chapter 10.)
  policy makers.
  1-13. An operational approach is a description of the broad actions the force must take to transform
  current conditions into those desired at end state (JP 3-0). The commander may use direct or indirect
  approaches to counter threats. Commanders may find their operational approach is mainly direct, indirect,
  or a mixture of both. The approach is the manner in which a commander contends with a center of gravity.
  A direct approach attacks the enemy’s center of gravity or principal strength by applying combat power
  directly against it. An indirect approach attacks the enemy’s center of gravity by applying combat power
  against a series of decisive points that lead to the defeat of the center of gravity while avoiding the enemy
  strength. Commanders may use a single direct or indirect approach or, more likely, may employ a
  combination of approaches to counter an insurgency and its influence. Additionally, the emphasis on or
  combination of approaches may have to evolve as the security situation and insurgent networks evolve. The
  commander’s intent and the approach(es) the commander selects will drive the methods used by
  counterinsurgents. These methods may be direct or indirect. Approaches and methods must be nested and