text: Fire Support and the Operations Process
  and decoys). SEAD assets may be scarce and categorized as high demand/low-density assets. Thus, during
  large-scale combat operations, they usually will not be tasked for missions without a SEAD requirement.
  Other fighter-attack and multi-role fighter crews normally are trained to support the SEAD mission,
  especially against the enemy air defense infrastructure.
  SURFACE COMPONENT CAPABILITIES
  3-18. Based on the JFC guidance, the land and maritime surface components' fires cells and FSEs will
  determine the weapon systems available to conduct SEAD. Examples of these capabilities include FA,
  mortars, naval surface fire, attack helicopters, EW, and surface-to-surface missiles (referred to as SSMs). To
  ensure unity of effort and conservation of force, components need to coordinate SEAD activities within their
  AO with the JFACC to ensure they meet mission requirements and do not interfere with other planned
  operations. The BCD can assist localized suppression operations by coordinating the means to request surface
  FS. A rapid and free exchange of SEAD target information between the JFACC and Army commanders is
  required for effective surface suppression.
  THREAT
  3-19. Air defense threats can encompass many national or multinational systems normally integrated into an
  IADS. Adversaries' IADS have become increasingly complex and can differ widely from country to country
  in terms of organization, sophistication, and operational procedures. An adversary's IADS needs to be
  analyzed in-depth for strengths and weaknesses, especially seams in coverage. The goal is to identify target
  critical capabilities and vulnerabilities, C2 reliability/redundancy, and defensive weapons systems. SEAD
  operations target the HPTs of an IADS:
  * C2 nodes/centers.
  * Surface-to-air missile sites.
  * Surface-to-air missile carriers and storage bunkers.
  * Antiaircraft artillery.
  * Early warning and fire control radars and ground control intercept sites.
  * Air defense operations and maintenance personnel.
  * Naval air defense assets.
  * Directed energy weapons.
  * EW systems.
  3-20. SEAD operations are accomplished through denial, degradation, destruction, and disruption.
  * Denial eliminates the utility of an enemy's targeted system, usually without physical damage.
  Denial prevents an enemy from acquiring accurate information about friendly forces.
  * Degradation permanently impairs (partially or totally) the enemy's targeted systems, usually with
  physical damage. Degradation may confuse or delay the actions of an enemy.
  * Destruction seeks the destruction of the target system or operating personnel.
  * Disruption temporarily denies, degrades, delays, or neutralizes enemy surface air defense systems.
   Means include offensive cyberspace operations, EA, and tactics such as avoidance or evasive
  flight profiles.
   UA can be used to actively employ disruptive means.
  COUNTERFIRE
  3-21. Like friendly FS systems, threat FS systems can inflict serious damage on friendly maneuver forces,
  FS systems, and supporting infrastructure; therefore, the enemy's FS system must be acquired and eliminated.
  Counterfire contributes to the combined arms fight by providing fires against the enemy integrated fires
  complex; it protects friendly forces, combat functions, and facilities from enemy indirect fires by neutralizing,
  or destroying enemy weapons, TA assets, observers (to include special purpose forces), C2 facilities, and
  communications and logistics sites. Counterfire gains freedom of maneuver for all friendly forces.