text: Using the Operational Framework
  DEPTHS
  C-41. The depths of the division and corps close and deep areas are defined in kilometers beyond the forward
  line of troops. Using the information in paragraph C-55, depths can be derived for the division, corps, and
  field army:
  * The division close area extends out to 15 kilometers (9 miles).
  * The division deep area extends from 15 to 24 kilometers (9 to 15 miles).
  * The corps close area extends out to 24 kilometers (15 miles).
  * The corps deep area extends from 24 to 45 kilometers (15 to 28 miles).
  * The field army close area extends out to 45 kilometers (28 miles).
  * The field army deep area extends from 45 to 300 kilometers (28 to 186 miles).
  C-42. The placement of support areas is influenced by enemy artillery and rocket ranges. Support areas are
  generally placed out of range of the majority of the enemy’s indirect fire systems to increase their
  survivability. These general considerations results in the minimum distances behind the forward line of
  troops:
  * The division support area extends from 29 to 36 kilometers (18 to 22 miles) behind the forward
  line of troops.
  * The corps support area extends from 70 to 90 kilometers (44 to 56 miles) behind the forward line
  of troops or 40 to 60 kilometers (25 to 37 miles) behind the division’s support areas.
  * The field army support area extends from 300 to 500 kilometers (186 to 311 miles) behind the
  forward line of troops depending on where the enemy is able to position its long-range munitions.
  C-43. These distances are generic, and they do not account for specific mission variables such as the terrain,
  availability for friendly mobility assets, types of formations, and specific missions.
  C-44. Consolidation areas are areas designated by the commander to facilitate the security and stability tasks
  necessary for freedom of action in the close and deep areas. As such, their placement will generally be behind
  the rear boundary of each echelon's subordinate units. Although this may not be true in all instances, in
  large-scale combat operations they most probably will because of the inherent fluidity, lethality, and tempo
  of close operations.
  C-45. This construct is generic and not tied to specific terrain. In a scenario like that on the Korean peninsula
  the frontages could be much narrower based upon the terrain and the enemy with less available depth to
  protect critical support assets. In a European scenario, these frontages could be much wider.
  CONTIGUOUS AND NONCONTIGUOUS AREAS OF OPERATIONS
  C-46. The previous construct portrayed a linear construct for operations using only one formation for each
  echelon. It also did not display areas of influence and areas of interest. AOs can also be organized
  contiguously or noncontiguously depending upon the situation.
  C-47. An area of influence is a geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing
  operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander’s command or control
  (JP 3-0). This area is bounded by the ranges of the commander’s assigned maneuver and fire support units.
  It is not dependent upon those capabilities that can be requested from higher echelons but are not assigned to
  the formation. A commander’s area of influence is normally larger than that commander’s assigned AO, but
  it is smaller than their area of interest.
  C-48. An area of interest is that area of concern, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and
  extending into enemy territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize
  the accomplishment of the mission (JP 3-0). An area of interest will vary in size and shape from operation to
  operation. It should include all enemy activities that might affect a friendly force throughout the duration of
  an operation. An area of interest will usually surround an AO, extending forward and to the flanks of the AO.
  Depending upon the operation, it may also extend rearwards. During offensive operations, portions of the
  area of interest may become part of an AO as friendly forces advance.