text: Integration through the Operations Process
  4-29. Civil considerations are applied by cross walking with the operational variables. The G-2 or S-2
  includes such civil considerations as cellular phone coverage, internet service providers, and electricity
  distribution for industrial, commercial, and residential areas.
  4-30. Threats in cyberspace and the EMS and all intelligence gathered and analyzed for environmental
  effects are incorporated into such IPB products as the threat overlays, threat description tables, terrain effects
  matrices, terrain analysis, or modified combined obstacle overlay, and assessments.
  EVALUATE THE THREAT
  4-31. In collaboration with the CEMA section, the G-2 or S-2 determines threat cyberspace and EW
  capabilities, doctrinal principles, and tactics, techniques, and procedures used by the enemy in the assigned AO.
  An enemy’s use of the cyberspace and the EMS to accomplish or support their objectives vary. Using input
  from the various intelligence disciplines, The G-2 or S-2 and CEMA section evaluate the threat, create threat
  models, develop broad threat COAs, and identify enemy high value targets (HVTs). When creating the threat
  model, the G-2 or S-2 incorporates cyberspace and EMS consideration to determine how the enemy integrates
  and uses cyberspace and EW capabilities.
  4-32. The enemy will likely have cyberspace and EW capabilities that operate across all warfighting
  functions. To increase situational awareness, the G-2 or S-2 should identify enemy cyberspace and EMS assets
  employed in support of each warfighting function. The G-2 or S-2 also evaluates neutral actors and adversaries
  conducting operations in cyberspace and the EMS throughout the AO and forwards the information to local
  and Army law enforcement or counterintelligence elements. Neutral actors and adversaries include—
  * Nation-state actors.
  * Transnational non-state actors or terrorists.
  * Criminal organizations or multinational cyber syndicate actors.
  * Individual actors, hacktivists, or small groups.
  * Insider threats.
  * Autonomous systems, software, and malicious code.
  4-33. Data gathered by evaluating the threat helps develop threat models that depict how enemy forces
  typically execute operations, including threat characteristics on how they use cyberspace and the EMS. The
  threat model also describes how enemy forces historically reacted to various types of cyberspace attacks and
  EA in similar circumstances relative to OE and overall operation.
  4-34. In addition to the threat model, the G-2 or S-2 creates threat capability statements that align with the
  threat model and include options or other supporting operations the enemy can use to affect the accomplishment
  of the friendly forces’ mission. Threat models guide the development of threat COAs.
  DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION
  4-35. The G-2 or S-2 uses data gathered through threat evaluation to identify and develop the full range of
  COAs an enemy has available. The G-2 or S-2 collaborates with the CEMA section to develop threat COAs
  regarding an enemy’s capabilities in cyberspace and the EMS. The G-2 or S-2 provides the G-3 or S-3 with
  information and intelligence necessary for developing friendly COAs to counter those available threats COAs
  and influence friendly operations. The G-2 or S-2 also collaborates with the CEMA section to develop
  countermeasures to threat COAs in cyberspace and the EMS. Each threat COA includes identified cyberspace
  attack and EA-related HVTs such as nodes, command and control centers, communications towers, satellites,
  internet service providers, fiber optic lines, and local power substations.
  4-36. When developing friendly COAs related to countering the enemy’s capabilities in cyberspace and the
  EMS, the G-2 or S-2, in collaboration with the CEMA section, incorporates such considerations as the
  adversary’s historical use of cyberspace and the EMS and the types of cyberspace and EMS-related operations
  they have conducted. The G-2 or S-2 assists the CEMA section in determining the unit’s specific cyberspace
  and EW assets that can produce desired effects when engaging HVTs.
  4-37. The G-2 or S-2 should understand that a cyberspace threat could be operating outside of the unit’s
  assigned AO. An enemy can use proxies worldwide beyond a unit’s area of interest. Development of threat