text: Chapter 7
  Army heavy equipment into theater and the pre-positioned equipment already in theater as part of their
  preclusion and isolation approaches. While Army forces can take measures to protect equipment already in
  theater, they are dependent upon the other Services for the protection of people, equipment, and supplies in
  transit.
  7-15. Threats may employ asymmetric tactics to reinforce
  their area denial (AD) approaches throughout a region, Defeating enemy forces before they
  capitalizing on the vulnerability of isolated friendly locations can generate superior combat power
  lacking adequate protection. Locations that cannot be and expand lodgments is critical.
  reinforced or supported by other elements of the joint force are
  particularly vulnerable. Attacks by enemy special operations and naval forces are difficult for Army forces
  to detect and counter without proper positioning and preparation. Anticipating possible enemy courses of
  action in one region that would support a broad theater-wide outcome should drive friendly priorities of
  planning and preparation.
  7-16. Enemy forces may use proxy forces to destabilize regional partners, further delaying Army forces from
  safely accessing basing and lines of communications. Proxy forces can facilitate enemy reconnaissance,
  surveillance, and disruption of joint operations. They can also affect access to sea-lanes and airports for
  transportation, hindering the resupply of island bases, and limiting the ability to reinforce forward-positioned
  friendly forces through attacks on bases and base clusters.
  7-17. Enemy surface-to-surface and surface-to-air fires systems are critical to the layered defense and early
  warning systems necessary to attack forward-positioned friendly forces with little warning. These systems
  simultaneously prevent reinforcement or support of those friendly forces. Enemies position robust and
  integrated air and missile defenses, early warning surveillance radars, and electronic warfare capabilities that
  range elements of the U.S. joint force put them at risk during competition, crisis, and conflict. Enemy medium
  range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles, and air and naval forces also put friendly forces at
  risk. This combination of systems warfare approaches threatens land-based forces even when they do not
  directly target them, since land-based forces require the support of air and maritime forces for sustainment,
  early warning, and protection.
  ARMY-SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS
  7-18. Commanders and staffs account for multiple considerations
  Forward-based Army forces in
  when planning and executing operations in a maritime
  range of adversary fires require
  environment. Counter-reconnaissance by Army forces on an
  significant hardening for
  island requires a 360-degree approach to avoid surprise.
  survivability against enemy ballistic
  Responding to threats requires highly mobile capabilities that missiles, aircraft, naval fires, and
  mass effects against enemy forces quickly. Although threats can cyberspace attacks. Forward-based
  approach from any direction to achieve surprise, there are Army forces can defend critical joint
  constraints in terms of where enemy forces are able to land during infrastructure when properly
  an amphibious or air assault and range constraints that might positioned and prepared.
  cause aircraft to favor certain approaches. Intelligence preparation
  of the battlefield requires an understanding of air and maritime avenues of approach and their relationship to
  a particular land mass or grouping of land masses.
  7-19. Army forces positioned at existing bases within the range of adversary long-range fires establish
  primary and alternate survivability positions for themselves while providing air and missile defense (AMD)
  and local security to airbases and ports. They may also be required to defend against amphibious assaults,
  and airborne or air assault operations by enemy forces seeking to control a particular land area or destroy
  critical infrastructure. Army forces operating on islands with austere infrastructure and resources require
  significant sustainment during prolonged operations.
  7-20. Land areas able to accommodate significant military forces in strategically or operationally important
  areas are scarce in maritime environments, and what is available is already a known point for enemy planners.
  This makes surveillance of friendly activities simpler, affecting the ability to achieve surprise or avoid being
  surprised. It also makes the process of enemy observation, information collection, and subsequent targeting