text: Chapter 8
  Support to Host Nation Security Forces
  “Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably
  than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it
  for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical
  work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.”
  T.E. Lawrence, 27 Articles
  This chapter addresses the working relationship between US forces and Host Nation
  security forces. It begins with a discussion of the benefits and challenges involved
  and resources required. It provides a framework for successful US and Host Nation
  operations that accomplish both HN and US objectives.
  Section I—BENEFITS, CHALLENGES, AND GOALS
  Success in counterinsurgency operations requires establishing a legitimate government, supported by the
  people, and able to address the root causes that insurgents use to gain support. Achieving these goals requires
  the Host Nation to secure the populace, defeat the insurgents, uphold the rule of law, and provide a basic level
  of essential services and security for the populace. Key to all these tasks is developing an effective Host Nation
  security force. A goal in any counterinsurgency operation is the eventual transition of the responsibility
  for security to the Host Nation security forces. Many factors influence the amount and type of assistance
  required in developing Host Nation security forces. These factors include—
  • Existing HN security force capabilities.
  • Character of the insurgency.
  • Population and culture.
  • Level of commitment and sovereignty of the Host Nation.
  • Level of commitment from the United States and other nations.
  • Impact of US forces on the local infrastructure and HN legitimacy.
  BENEFITS
  8-1. A Host Nation is a nation which permits, either by written agreement or official invitation,
  government representatives, agencies, forces or supplies of another nation to operate in or to transit
  through its territory under specified conditions (JP 1-02). A Host Nation naturally needs security forces.
  Therefore, a primary goal of partnering is to get the best that both sides have to offer. Figure 8-1 shows a
  typical flow of these benefits.
  US ARMY ASSETS
  8-2. These bring numerous assets to the counterinsurgency fight. They bring a professional military
  with its training, leadership, targeting, technology, assets, resources, and expertise.
  HN ASSETS
  8-3. These also bring many assets to the fight. If properly measured, organized, rebuilt, trained,
  equipped, advised, and mentored, an HN security force unit is uniquely able to protect the HN population,
  because they understand the operational environment far better than US Forces. Their cultural
  and situational awareness is a significant force multiplier during any counterinsurgency operation,
  especially in HUMINT, information engagement, negotiations, and targeting. In terms of specific COIN
  operations, HN security forces can aid or even take the lead on clear-hold-build operations. They should be