text: ADA Battalion
  7-33. The ADA task force commander must translate a defense plan into a defense design. The plan provides
  information on the mission, critical assets to be defended and their priority, resources allocated to the ADA
  task force, and other critical METT-TC considerations. Defense design begins by determining optimal sensor
  positions. Locations for the most capable sensors are selected first; less capable sensors are then positioned
  to complement the coverage of the more capable sensors. In most ADA task forces, Patriot radars are the
  most capable sensors and the only sensors currently able to provide fire control quality data against ballistic
  missile threats (assuming no AN/TPY-2). Fire control quality data is usable guidance updates to a weapon
  in flight that allows a seeker to acquire the target. Patriot radars available to the ADA task force are
  allocated to provide for ballistic missile defense as the first priority in accordance with mission orders and
  the presence of a creditable ballistic missile threat. Secondarily, Patriot radars are sited to provide as much
  low-altitude coverage as is feasible within the limitations of achieving necessary ballistic missile defense
  coverage. Once the Patriot radars are sited and their coverage determined, Sentinel radars are positioned to
  complement Patriot coverage, with a concentration primarily on low-altitude avenues of ingress and,
  secondarily, on weighted coverage or early engagement.
  7-34. Patriot is most effective when it fights as an ADA task force, but it deploys by batteries because of
  strong system site configuration requirements. The battery fire control section, consisting of the battery
  engagement control station, battery command post, radar set, electric power plant, and antenna mast group,
  are physically cabled together and require approximately 500 square meters of moderately level ground. All
  equipment, other than the antenna mast group, can be emplaced on up to a 10-percent slope. The antenna
  mast group cannot be emplaced on greater than a 0.5-degree slope. Patriot launchers have limitations on
  where they can be placed with respect to the radar in order to be available for the air battle. Launchers can
  be dispersed within these limitations to best provide for effective fires over the defended assets. Patriot
  missiles must be captured by a Patriot radar. Missile capture is highly dependent upon physical separation
  distance between the capturing radar and the launcher. The launcher must be in the capturing radar’s field of
  view, and that field of view varies between a “local” capture (separation distance less than one kilometer)
  and remote launch phases 1 and 3.
  7-35. Avenger typically fights as a platoon within an ADA task force. The Sentinel radar is positioned to
  best complement Patriot radars in the task force, as discussed above, while also providing track data to
  support Avenger fires. Avenger platforms can deploy independently, with no site configuration requirements.
  The primary factor impacting Avenger platform dispersal is communications connectivity to the controlling
  FAAD C2 node. An Avenger platform is capable of completing an engagement using visual detection and
  identification, but is more effective and efficient when alerting data and higher echelon identification data
  are fed to it through its controlling FAAD C2 node.
  7-36. C-RAM typically fights as a platoon within an ADA task force. C-RAM requires extensive site
  preparation for deployment of its guns. Its effectiveness is optimal when pairs of guns have mutual support
  and each pair of guns have overlapping fires with an adjacent pair. As a minimum, overlapping fires between
  guns must be achieved. Site surveys are normally done to optimize C-RAM fires against RAM well in
  advance of actual deployment. The C-RAM system includes two LCMRs per platoon. These sensors provide
  C-RAM with detection and alerting of RAM threats. They are positioned to best achieve the C-RAM mission,
  irrespective of where other sensors in the ADA task force are positioned.
  7-37. When an ADA task force includes a THAAD battery, the THAAD radar forms the base piece for sensor
  emplacement planning, followed by Patriot radars and then Sentinel radars. The THAAD radar provides
  extended range surveillance and tracking of ballistic missiles. Patriot may have to augment THAAD assets
  to provide sufficient firepower to counter ballistic missile threats as well as sufficient protection against
  threats not in THAAD’s capabilities set. This is a consideration in selecting locations and primary target lines
  for Patriot radars when THAAD coverage is available to support the task force.
  7-38. During the planning of the radar locations and primary target lines, planners must take into account
  threat air avenues of approach and named areas of interest (formerly called, in AMD applications, ballistic
  missile operating areas). Many technical aspects are involved with the positioning of the Patriot radar and
  launchers to ensure the radar can control missiles in flight. The sensor’s primary target lines are determined
  based on mission requirements, number of defended assets, and the Patriot unit’s location in relation to the
  assets. Because Patriot is a sectored system, radar orientation is critical. Sentinel radars rotate to provide 360-