text: Army Sustainment Operations
  activities in the United States, abroad, or in transit from one location to another (10 USC § 2926[h]). The
  following paragraphs describe considerations for conducting logistics operations when contested by a peer
  threat. It discusses an overview of peer threat capabilities that affect logistics, provides planning
  considerations for conducting operations in a contested logistics environment, and concludes with logistics
  considerations for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) in a contested logistics
  environment.
  Logistics Threats
  1-34. Sustainment commanders and staffs must therefore plan and execute logistics with the assumption that
  sustainment forces are always under observation, in contact, and contested. Sustainment forces must be
  prepared to operate in a contested logistics environment. Peer adversaries possess the capability and capacity
  to observe, disrupt, delay, and attack U.S. forces, infrastructure, and operations in all domains within the
  United States, abroad, and while in transit. Contested logistics involve planning, executing, and enabling the
  movement and support of military forces across multiple domains (air, land, sea, space, cyberspace,
  electromagnetic spectrum) in a contested environment.
  1-35. Peer adversaries possess air, space, and cyberspace capabilities, increasing the likelihood that threat
  forces can gain and maintain continuous visual and electromagnetic contact with Army forces. Sustainment
  leaders must assume they are under constant observation from one or more domains and continuously ensure
  they are not providing lucrative targets for the enemy to attack. FM 3-0 describes nine forms of contact in
  multiple domains that sustainment forces may face: direct, indirect, non-hostile, obstacle, CBRN, aerial,
  visual, electromagnetic, and influence.
  1-36. Sustainment forces must anticipate being under continuous visual, electromagnetic, and influence
  contact with adversaries during logistics operations. Peer adversaries will deploy persistent visual
  surveillance through space and other capabilities to detect and target logistics operations. Peer adversaries
  are capable of persistently probing and disrupting logistics operations through the deployment of space and
  cyberspace capabilities to maintain contact with logistics forces. Logistics operations are subject to adversary
  influence through disinformation and misinformation campaigns targeting Soldiers, their families, and their
  friends.
  1-37. Sustainment forces must understand that a peer adversary can deploy capabilities that may impact
  logistics operations during competition. A peer adversary’s capability to employ effects across multiple
  domains can disrupt critical infrastructure at home and locations abroad. This infrastructure includes civilian
  transportation infrastructure, power, communications, fuel, water, and other life support. Interdiction of these
  types of infrastructure can disrupt, delay, and potentially deny military operations.
  1-38. During crisis and armed conflict, sustainment forces should expect an enemy that contests logistics
  activities in all domains by employing means to detect and rapidly target sustainment forces and resources.
  Forces and resources that are concentrated and static are easy for enemy forces to detect and destroy.
  Dispersing these assets has multiple survivability benefits. Sustainment forces must be prepared to operate
  dispersed, quickly mass, and then rapidly disperse again to increase survivability. Constant dispersion of
  sustainment forces and resources can be used as a form of deception and help to conceal intentions and
  capabilities. Dispersion also creates targeting dilemmas for the adversary by reducing the effect enemy strikes
  can have on U.S. forces. See ATP 3-37.34 for information on survivability positions and FM 3-13.4 for more
  information on deception.
  1-39. Adversaries will employ predatory economics, economic coercion, economic warfare, misinformation,
  and other means to achieve their objectives short of conflict during competition and set conditions for their
  advantage in conflict. Although the Army does not have direct influence over this facet of competition, the
  Army and joint force are heavily reliant on contracted good and services, HNS, and access to host-nation
  infrastructure. Moreover, peer adversaries have vastly more ability in scope and scale to render contractors
  and vendors unable or unwilling to support the U.S. or deny them access to required materials.