text: Twenty-Eight Articles:
  Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency
  Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts. Over time, if you successfully build
  networks of trust, these will grow like roots into the population, displacing the enemy’s
  networks, bringing him out into the open to fight you, and letting you seize the initiative.
  These networks include local allies, community leaders, local security forces,
  nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other friendly or neutral nonstate actors in your
  area, and the media. Conduct village and neighborhood surveys to identify needs in the
  community, and then follow through to meet them. Build common interests and mobilize
  popular support. This is your true main effort; everything else is secondary. Actions that help
  build trusted networks serve your cause. Actions—even killing high-profile targets that
  undermine trust or disrupt your networks—help the enemy.
  14. Start easy. If you were trained in maneuver warfare you know about surfaces and gaps. This
  applies to counterinsurgency as much as any other form of maneuver. Don’t try to crack the
  hardest nut first—don’t go straight for the main insurgent stronghold, try to provoke a
  decisive showdown, or focus efforts on villages that support the insurgents. Instead, start
  from secure areas and work gradually outwards. Do this by extending your influence through
  the locals’ own networks. Go with, not against, the grain of local society. First win the
  confidence of a few villages and see who they trade, intermarry, or do business with. Now
  win these people over. Soon enough the showdown with the insurgents will come. But now
  you have local allies, a mobilized population, and a trusted network at your back. Do it the
  other way around and no one will mourn your failure.
  15. Seek early victories. In this early phase, your aim is to stamp your dominance in your sector.
  Do this by seeking an early victory. This will probably not translate into a combat victory
  over the enemy. Looking for such a victory can be overly aggressive and create collateral
  damage—especially since you really do not yet understand your sector. Also, such a combat
  victory depends on the enemy being stupid enough to present you with a clear-cut target,
  which is a rare windfall in counterinsurgency. Instead, you may achieve a victory by
  resolving long-standing issues your predecessors have failed to address, or by co-opting a key
  local leader who has resisted cooperation with our forces. Like any other form of armed
  propaganda, achieving even a small victory early in the tour sets the tone for what comes later
  and helps seize the initiative, which you have probably lost due to the inevitable hiatus
  entailed by the handover-takeover with your predecessor.
  16. Practice deterrent patrolling. Establish patrolling methods that deter the enemy from
  attacking you. Often our patrolling approach seems designed to provoke, then defeat, enemy
  attacks. This is counterproductive; it leads to a raiding, day-tripping mindset or, worse, a
  bunker mentality. Instead, practice deterrent patrolling. There are many methods for this,
  including multiple patrolling in which you flood an area with numerous small patrols working
  together. Each is too small to be a worthwhile target, and the insurgents never know where all
  the patrols are—making an attack on any one patrol extremely risky. Other methods include
  so-called blue-green patrolling, where you mount daylight, overt humanitarian patrols, which
  go covert at night and hunt specific targets. Again, the aim is to keep the enemy off balance,
  and the population reassured through constant and unpredictable activity, which, over time,
  deters attacks and creates a more permissive environment. A reasonable rule of thumb is that
  one—to two-thirds of your force should be on patrol at any time, day or night.
  17. Be prepared for setbacks. Setbacks are normal in counterinsurgency, as in every other form
  of war. You will make mistakes, lose people, or occasionally kill or detain the wrong person.
  You may fail in building or expanding networks. If this happens, don’t lose heart, simply
  drop back to the previous phase of your game plan and recover your balance. It is normal
  in company counterinsurgency operations for some platoons to be doing well while others do
  badly. This is not necessarily evidence of failure. Give local commanders the freedom
  to adjust their posture to local conditions. This creates elasticity that helps you survive
  setbacks.