text: Chapter 7
  the population and insurgents occurs, it will reveal the validity of planning assumptions, test the strengths
  and weaknesses of designs, inform the operational approach, and provide guidance to further planning and
  engagement. Other considerations include:
  * Systems thinking.
  * Continuous assessment.
  * Structured learning.
  7-17. Systems thinking involves understanding a problem in terms of systems and how they relate to, and
  influence, each other. For counterinsurgents this includes not only how the various systems in an
  insurgency interact, but how they interact and affect the various systems in the operational environment.
  Additionally, systems thinking should drive commanders and staffs to develop an understanding of how
  their lines of operations and lines of effort relate and influence each other. (See paragraphs 4-88 through
  4-103 for more information on networked insurgencies.)
  7-18. Continuous assessment is essential to learning and adapting within the inherent complexity of
  counterinsurgency operations. No design or model completely matches reality, and reasonable and feasible
  solutions at one moment can become ineffective at the next moment due to changes in the situation. The
  object of continuous assessment is to identify where and how the actions and activities of the
  counterinsurgent are working or failing and to consider adjustments to design and the operational approach.
  (See chapter 12 for more information on assessments.)
  7-19. The objective of structured learning is to develop a reasonable initial design and then learn, adapt,
  and iteratively and continuously improve the initial plan as more about the dynamics of the
  counterinsurgency problem become evident. The operational approach and framing of the problem can be
  thought of as models. In counterinsurgency, these models must always be tested to determine how well
  they match reality. In other words, counterinsurgents may believe they have an understanding and general
  idea of how to solve a problem, but they review that belief to ensure it is still valid at any given time.
  Counterinsurgents must understand the actual problem to ensure that tactical actions have an effect on the
  environment.
  CENTER OF GRAVITY
  7-20. An important element of conceptual planning is center of gravity analysis. The center of gravity is
  important in understanding both the environment and the enemy. A center of gravity is the source of power
  that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act (JP 5-0). A center of gravity
  construct is useful as an analytical tool to help counterinsurgency forces analyze the insurgency’s sources
  of strength as well as its weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Centers of gravity may change over time, they
  may be different at the operational and strategic level, and they could be different from location to location.
  (See JP 2-01.3 for more information on centers of gravity.)
  7-21. In an insurgency, the population is not necessarily the center of gravity for an insurgent. A center of
  gravity could be external support from another country, it could be a group of core leadership or believers,
  or it could be a host of other factors or vital functions. Center of gravity analysis begins with the
  understanding that every environment is unique, and a center of gravity analysis must not begin with a
  preconceived center of gravity.
  7-22. Counterinsurgents must understand their own center of gravity and that of the host nation. In many
  cases, political support is the strategic center of gravity for the U.S. Some tactical actions, such as war
  crimes, can undermine political support for the counterinsurgency. Host nations may also have a wide
  range of centers of gravity. Operational and tactical leaders must plan and execute operations that do not
  undermine the host nation’s center of gravity.
  LINES OF OPERATION AND EFFORT
  7-23. Lines of operation and effort are important planning tools to move conceptual planning into detailed
  planning. These planning tools help describe how a military force will turn a commander’s understanding
  of the current situation into a desired end state. An end state is the set of required conditions that defines
  achievement of the commander’s objectives (JP 3-0). The primary source for any commander’s end state is