text: Chapter 12
  12-20. The defense of cyberspace assets supports mission assurance. Mission assurance is a process to
  protect or ensure the continued function and resilience of capabilities and assets, including personnel,
  equipment, facilities, networks, information and information systems, infrastructure, and supply chains,
  critical to the execution of Department of Defense mission-essential functions (JP 3-26). Units protect
  friendly cyberspace to enable the conduct of their missions and provide indirect support to other operations.
  Cybersecurity
  12-21. Cybersecurity establishes baseline network protection, network monitoring and threat detection,
  incident analysis and response, and cyber incident mitigation and remediation. Cybersecurity personnel apply
  measures to secure the network against all known vulnerabilities and exploits. A network attack identified
  during network monitoring and threat detection will trigger cyberspace defense actions.
  Cyberspace Defense
  12-22. Cyberspace defense preserves the ability to use friendly cyberspace capabilities and protect data,
  networks, cyberspace, enabled devices, and other designated systems by defeating on-going or imminent
  malicious cyberspace activities. Intelligence estimates inform cyberspace defense efforts to recommend
  defensive measures to deny threat actors the ability to access and affect friendly networks. Cyberspace
  defense forces integrate and synchronize their activities at all echelons to share network situational
  awareness, assess network security, maintain readiness, and recommend changes to the network
  cybersecurity baseline.
  Cyberspace Offense
  12-23. Offensive cyberspace capabilities provide commanders a way to deny, degrade, disrupt, destroy, and
  manipulate an enemy’s ability to maneuver in cyberspace. Preserving friendly freedom of action in
  cyberspace while denying the same to the enemy allows commanders to achieve an information advantage.
  12-24. Commanders understand that cyberspace effects can support maneuver efforts all the way from the
  strategic level (influence and deterrence) to the tactical level (disruption or destruction of threat capability)
  to destroy or otherwise limit an enemy’s ability to tactically maneuver. Targeting for cyberspace follows the
  existing targeting process. However, due to the restrictive authorities for cyberspace offense, commanders
  and staffs identify potential targets early through the joint targeting process and add them to the geographic
  combatant commander’s target list with sufficient time for approval before the effects are needed. (Refer to
  FM 3-12 for more information about requests for cyberspace effects.)
  CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS STAFF
  12-25. Multinational forces coordinate for information sharing. When attached to a multinational force
  headquarters, dedicated cyberspace personnel understand the available range of cyberspace capabilities and
  provide input during mission analysis, planning, and targeting. Cyberspace operations staffs understand the
  commander’s intent, mission, and schemes of fire and maneuver to integrate cyberspace capabilities and
  effects thoroughly into planning.
  12-26. The cyberspace operations staff informs commanders of available cyberspace assets and recommends
  how to best use cyberspace capabilities in all phases of an operation to support the overall scheme of
  maneuver. Commanders and staffs must understand that effects in the land, maritime, air, and space domains
  can also create effects in cyberspace. The cyberspace operations staff can identify and nominate cyberspace
  targets for lethal and nonlethal targeting. Once a commander approves a COA, the staff synchronizes desired
  cyberspace effects through the targeting process to deconflict with lethal and other nonlethal fires capabilities
  and to prioritize the use of resources.
  CYBER SUPPORT TO THE MULTINATIONAL TASK FORCE
  12-27. Currently, no cyberspace multinational operations doctrine exists. Each alliance or coalition develops
  its own protocols and plans. U.S. planning for joint operations accommodates and complements such
  protocols and plans for the potential use of U.S. cyberspace forces to protect multinational force networks.
  (Refer to JP 3-12 for more information on cyber support.)