text: Twenty-Eight Articles:
  Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency
  al-Hassani tribes and Shi’a communities. But that work was not wasted. In mastering your first
  area, you learned techniques you can apply: how to “case” an operational area and how
  to decide what matters in the local societal structure. Do the same again, and this time the
  process is easier and faster, since you have an existing mental structure and can focus on what
  is different. The same applies if you get moved frequently within a battalion or brigade area.
  • What if higher headquarters doesn’t “get” counterinsurgency? Higher headquarters is telling
  you the mission is to “kill terrorists,” or pushing for high-speed armored patrols and a
  base-camp mentality. They just don’t seem to understand counterinsurgency. This is not
  uncommon, since company-grade officers today often have more combat experience than
  senior officers. In this case, just do what you can. Try not to create expectations that higher
  headquarters will not let you meet. Apply the adage “first do no harm.” Over time, you will
  find ways to do what you have to do. But never lie to higher headquarters about your locations
  or activities—they own the indirect fires.
  • What if you have no resources? You have no linguists, the aid agencies have no money
  for projects in your area, and you have a low priority for civil affairs. You can still get things
  done, but you need to focus on self-reliance: Keep things small and sustainable and ruthlessly
  prioritize effort. The local population are your allies in this: They know what matters to them
  more than you do. Be honest with them; discuss possible projects and options with community
  leaders; get them to choose what their priorities are. Often they will find the translators,
  building supplies, or expertise that you need, and will only expect your support and protection
  in making their projects work. And the process of negotiation and consultation will help
  mobilize their support and strengthen their social cohesion. If you set your sights on what
  is achievable, the situation can still work.
  • What if the theater situation shifts under your feet? It is your worst nightmare—Everything has
  gone well in your sector, but the whole theater situation has changed and invalidates your
  efforts. Think of the first battle of Fallujah, the Askariya shrine bombing, or the Sadr uprising.
  What do you do? Here is where having a flexible, adaptive game plan comes in. Just as the
  insurgents drop down to a lower posture when things go wrong, now is the time for you to drop
  back a stage, consolidate, regain your balance, and prepare to expand again when the situation
  allows. But see article 28: If you cede the initiative, you must regain it as soon as the situation
  allows, or you will eventually lose.
  C-11. This, then, is the tribal wisdom, the folklore that those who went before you have learned. Like
  any folklore it needs interpretation and contains seemingly contradictory advice. Over time, as you apply
  unremitting intellectual effort to study your sector, you will learn to apply these ideas in your own way
  and will add to this store of wisdom from your own observations and experience. So only one article
  remains, and if you remember nothing else, remember this:
  28. Whatever else you do, keep the initiative. In counterinsurgency, the initiative is everything.
  If the enemy is reacting to you, you control the environment. Provided you mobilize the
  population, you will win. If you are reacting to the enemy, even if you are killing or capturing
  him in large numbers, then he is controlling the environment and you will eventually lose.
  In counterinsurgency, the enemy initiates most attacks, targets you unexpectedly,
  and withdraws too fast for you to react. Do not be drawn into purely reactive operations:
  Focus on the population, build your own solution, further your game plan, and fight the
  enemy only when he gets in the way. This gains and keeps the initiative.