text: Chapter 7
  Planning and Operational Considerations
  7-1. Planning is important for gaining understanding. Military planning processes provide a way to
  understand an operational environment and understand the commanders’ intent within that operational
  environment. Planning is often conducted simultaneously with other activities, such as execution and
  assessment, and both informs, and is informed by, those activities. Planning as understanding, continually
  refined and questioned through assessments, helps commanders maintain situational understanding in the
  ever changing environment of counterinsurgency. This continued conceptualization of the operational
  environment and problem is essential for the use of mission command. However, before commanders and
  staffs can conceptualize the problem, they need to understand certain paradoxes of counterinsurgency.
  COUNTERINSURGENCY PARADOXES
  7-2. A commander planning a counterinsurgency requires a specific mindset before that commander can
  plan or execute operations, and that mindset is the foundation for understanding how to counter an
  insurgency. When the United States (U.S.) acts, even temporarily, as the primary counterinsurgent,
  commanders operate carefully between fighting for a population and being seen as fighting against a
  population. When acting indirectly to enable a host nation, these paradoxes provide a framework for
  understanding and enabling the host nation. Throughout conceptual and detailed planning, the
  counterinsurgency paradoxes described in paragraphs 7-4 through 7-12 provide a set of apparent
  contradictions that aid commanders and staffs in developing a counterinsurgency mindset that helps
  commanders and staffs operate effectively. These paradoxes are offered to stimulate thinking, not to limit
  it. The applicability of the these paradoxes depends on the local situation and, in particular, the state of the
  insurgency. For example, the statement that “sometimes, the more force used, the less effective it is”, does
  not apply when the enemy is breaching the perimeter; however, that thought is applicable when effective
  security has already been achieved in an area. In short, commanders and staffs should not reduce these
  paradoxes to a checklist; they should be used with considerable thought.
  7-3. The commander must be conscious of the problem of the observer effect, where the act of engaging
  the population, itself, makes changes in the operational environment. Any action on the environment
  generates a reaction, thereby altering the environment. This means the environment changes with every
  interaction with a society. In other words, the very act of interactions with a society changes the operational
  environment. Commanders must understand this reality and constantly consider its effects on their
  assessment and planning processes. Moreover, this fact is at the heart of many of the paradoxes that follow.
  Sometimes, the More You Protect Your Force, the Less Secure You May Be
  7-4. Ultimate success in counterinsurgency operations is normally gained by protecting the population,
  not the counterinsurgency force. If military forces remain in their compounds, they lose touch with the
  people, appear to be running scared, and give the initiative to the insurgents. A possible path to success
  could include an increase in outreach programs that focus on protecting the population. Commanders weigh
  the effectiveness of establishing patrol bases and operational support bases against the security of using
  larger unit bases. Establishing patrol bases ensures access to the intelligence needed to facilitate operations.
  Sharing risks with the population reinforces the connections with them that help establish legitimacy.
  Sometimes, the More Force is Used, the Less Effective It Is
  7-5. Any use of force produces many effects, not all of which can be foreseen. Using substantial force
  also increases the opportunity for insurgent propaganda to portray lethal military activities as brutal. In
  contrast, using force precisely and discriminately could strengthen the rule of law that needs to be
  established. The key to successful counterinsurgency operations is knowing when more force is needed,