text: Insurgency Threat Characteristics
  capabilities. When the host nation has an advantage in capability, insurgents will probably use small-unit
  tactics in order to not become decisively engaged.
  5-15. Insurgents may use a wide range of conventional tactics. Insurgents often employ ambushes for
  harassment and disruption. Snipers or sharpshooters may be an effective means of engaging government
  forces without becoming decisively engaged. Insurgents may use indirect fire, such as mortar and rocket
  attacks, to harass counterinsurgents or cause them to commit forces that can then be attacked by other
  means. Weapons and munitions are frequently modified to best suit insurgent needs for a specific target or
  mission. For example, insurgents may use direct fire rockets or missiles in an indirect manner to avoid
  detection. Moreover, insurgents may have to improvise because they lack weapons.
  5-16. Improvised explosive devices are effective tools that can be integrated into many different types of
  attacks. Improvised explosive devices can be inexpensive to produce and, because of the various detonation
  techniques available, may avoid risks to the perpetrator. Also, insurgents may use suicide bombing as an
  employment method, and it can be very effective.
  5-17. Insurgents may use cyber electromagnetic attacks. Cyber electromagnetic capabilities can give an
  insurgency the ability to affect systems both within and outside the host nation. For example, a cyber
  electromagnetic attack could undermine the financial system within a state. This may be an effective way to
  undermine the legitimacy of a host nation. However, a cyber electromagnetic attack could also affect any
  state or region. For example, cyber electromagnetic capabilities provide an insurgent the ability to attack a
  country that supports the host nation. If an insurgency attains cyber electromagnetic capabilities, the nature
  of the conflict changes.
  SUPPORT ACTIVITIES
  5-18. Although noticeable, violence may be only a small part of overall insurgent activity. Insurgent
  support activities include training, logistics, and communications. These support activities sustain
  insurgencies and allow for both military and political actions. They are enabled by an insurgency’s ability
  to generate popular support. Insurgent support networks may be large, even when violence levels are low.
  These networks can include support from other nations or from population groups outside the country. The
  effectiveness of insurgent operations depends heavily on logistics.
  5-19. In some parts of the world, a lack of access to weapons may forestall insurgencies. However, there is
  widespread availability of weapons in many areas, with especially large surpluses in the most violent
  regions of the world. Explosive hazards, such as mines and improvised explosive devices, are likely to be
  common weapons in insurgencies. Insurgents can obtain weapons through legal or illegal purchases or from
  foreign sources. A common tactic is to capture them from government forces. Counterinsurgency forces
  should seek to cut off the flow of arms into an area of operations and eliminate their sources.
  5-20. Income is essential, not only for insurgents to purchase weapons, but to pay recruits and bribe
  officials. Money and supplies can be obtained through many sources. Foreign support is one possible
  source of income. Local supporters or international front organizations may provide financial support.
  Sometimes legitimate businesses are established to furnish funding. In areas controlled by insurgents,
  confiscation or taxation may be used. Another common source of funding is criminal activity.
  5-21. Funding greatly influences an insurgency’s character and vulnerabilities. The insurgents’ approach
  determines the movement’s requirements. Protracted popular war strategies that emphasize mobilization of
  the masses require considerable resources to build and maintain a counter state. In comparison, the
  military-focused approach—which emphasizes armed action—needs only the resources to sustain a
  military campaign. Counter threat finance is an important means to interdict an insurgency’s funding. (See
  ATP 3-07.20/MCRP 3-33 for more information.)
  TRAINING AND INDOCTRINATION
  5-22. The quality and quantity of training depends on how advanced the insurgency is and what its specific
  strategy is. Indoctrination is a part of training which seeks to maintain allegiance and to focus cells to
  conduct continuous operations without frequent communications and direction from insurgent leadership.
  The level of indoctrination can help analysts identify the strategy and sophistication of the insurgency and