text: ______________________________________________________________________________Introduction
  Broadened Context
  At the strategic level, the State’s ability to challenge U.S. interests includes not
  only the military and paramilitary forces of the State, but also the State’s dip-
  lomatic-political, informational, and economic instruments of power. Rarely
  would any country engage the United States or a U.S.-led coalition with purely
  military means. It is also possible that the State could be part of an alliance or
  coalition, in which case the OPFOR could include allied forces. These nation-
  state forces may also operate in conjunction with non-state actors such as insur-
  gents, terrorists, and drug or criminal organizations.
  The FM 7-100 series, as a whole, covers not only the military and paramilitary forces
  of the State, but also other, non-state paramilitary and nonmilitary organizations
  present in the State’s region of the world. An extraregional power becoming involved
  in that region may have to deal with any or all of these types of military, paramilitary,
  and nonmilitary elements. It might encounter these elements individually or, more
  likely, in combination with other such elements. Whether these elements operate in
  concert or independently, they are an important part of the COE.
  Trainers need to consider the total OE and all instruments of power at the
  disposal of the State and the OPFORnot just the military element, but also
  diplomatic-political, informational, and economic means. For a nation-state,
  these are instruments of national power. For non-state actors whose forces are
  paramilitary in nature, the other three instruments of power are generally
  present to one degree or another. Together, these instruments represent the
  power that actors can bring to bear against the United States.
  Terminology
  Since OPFOR baseline doctrine is a composite of how various forces worldwide
  might operate, it uses some terminology that is in common with that of other
  countries, including the United States. Whenever possible, OPFOR doctrine uses
  established U.S. military termswith the same meaning as defined in FM 1-02
  (formerly FM 101-5-1) and/or JP 1-02. However, the FM 7-100 series also in-
  cludes some concepts for things the OPFOR does differently from how the U.S.
  military does them. Even if various real-world foreign countries might use the
  same concept, or something very close to it, different countries might give it dif-
  ferent names. In those cases, the OPFOR manuals either use a term commonly
  accepted by one or more other countries or create a new, “composite” term that
  makes sense and is clearly understandable. In any case where an operational or
  tactical term is not further specifically defined in the FM 7-100 series, it is used
  in the same sense as in the U.S. definition.
  FLEXIBILITY
  As a training tool, the OPFOR must be a challenging, uncooperative sparring
  partner, capable of stressing any or all battlefield operating systems of the U.S.
  force. However, it also must be tailored to meet training requirements.
  In the OPFOR baseline presented in this manual, the FM authors often say that
  the State or the OPFOR “may” be able to do something or “might” or “could” do
  something. They often use the progressive forms of verbs to say that the State has a
  “growing” economy or “is developing” a capability or “is continually modernizing.”