text: Contested Deployments
  Department of Defense (DOD) Civilians, contractors, and Soldiers’ family members. This includes, but is
  not limited to—
  (cid:122) Targeted threats through social media, email, or other means designed to frighten and distract
  deploying Soldiers and their families.
  (cid:122) Cyberspace attacks against Soldier and family member banks and credit agencies, cutting off or
  disrupting access to personal funds.
  (cid:122) Cyberspace attacks against civilian infrastructure (including transportation, supply, fuel, and
  navigation) used to support military operations.
  (cid:122) Targeted strikes against defense communications infrastructure to disrupt communications
  between units, installations, and other unified action partners that assist in deployment.
  (cid:122) Disinformation dissemination and misinformation support designed to—
  (cid:131) Undermine the legitimacy of, or otherwise reduce support for, U.S. Government action.
  (cid:131) Incite civil unrest in local communities and along rail and road lines of communications that
  deploying forces need or plan to use to reach ports of embarkation.
  (cid:131) Reduce trust in future official communications, from government, law enforcement, or
  military officials, by releasing disinformation that appears genuine but contains incorrect or
  confusing information.
  C-8. Threat information warfare operations can be conducted at a very low cost compared to conventional
  warfare methods, and they have global reach. At low levels, they can be used to hamper military deployments.
  With sufficient scale or precision, they have the potential to completely halt effective unit deployment
  operations. Targeted disinformation and threats delivered via social media to the family members of every
  Soldier in a unit could potentially be devastating without prior planning, preparation, and trust building.
  C-9. Commanders and their staffs must understand the potential effects of adversarial disinformation
  operations on units and leaders. Targeted adversary or enemy activities in the information dimension could
  rapidly degrade the performance of Soldiers, impacting their readiness. It could also degrade civilian
  performance and affect the critical infrastructure they manage. Leaders combat this through public
  communications both prior to and during deployment operations, coordination with relevant public affairs
  personnel, and Service member and family preparation. This preparation can include incorporating response
  strategies for disinformation dissemination into exercises and other training.
  C-10. As U.S. forces transition from competition to crisis or armed conflict, threat actors will increase the
  intensity and lethality of their tactics. This could include infrastructure sabotage by pre-positioned agents,
  cyber or information attacks broader in scope (such as targeting an oil pipeline supplying a large region rather
  than only a specific port), or long-range precision strikes using a variety of munitions. Concurrently, they
  posture for, and may eventually escalate through, nonlethal and lethal actions of increasing intensity to
  improve stand-off and prevent power projection from the U.S. homeland and other basing and staging areas.
  Threat actors may also strike transport vessels along sea lines of communication while these vessels are en
  route to a seaport of debarkation.
  C-11. Peer threats may choose to support proxy forces or influence unwitting groups, including irregular
  forces, saboteurs, sympathetic civil organizations, and criminals. These groups may be used to prevent timely
  deployment operations by denying access to roads or facilities with crowds, protests, or looting. Use of these
  forces may also allow for direct action against U.S. targets while masking culpability. Threat actors may
  design these activities to affect the economy and global trade in addition to the political-military balance in
  the United States or overseas. Additionally, other state and non-state actors may exploit the situation with
  attacks in pursuit of their own objectives. These attacks may be conducted within the United States or allied
  nations, in the theater into which Army forces are preparing to deploy, or in other, unrelated regions.
  C-12. Leaders anticipate adversary activities in all domains while preparing for or conducting deployment
  operations. Disruptions may not be preventable. They can, however, be mitigated through training,
  preparation, and coordination with unified action partners. Effective mitigation in planning, preparation, and
  execution ensures the Army provides the required forces to combatant commanders (CCDRs) and other joint
  force commanders (JFCs). (See AR 525-93 for Army deployment policies and responsibilities.)