text: Army Operations in Maritime Environments
  Deep Operations in Maritime Environments
  7-31. Deep operations in a maritime environment may focus on defeating enemy antiaccess (A2) and AD
  capabilities to set conditions for joint offensive operations using information collection, special operations
  forces, and fires. They may also focus on reconnaissance and security activities in support of joint defensive
  operations using the same capabilities. In either situation, Army intelligence capabilities support operations
  in the extended deep area, enabling the JFC to understand and visualize the operational environment before
  shaping with fires or maneuver forces in subsequent operations. Army fires assets may also be designated in
  a support role to other component commands, providing suppression of enemy air defense for aerial attack
  of island-based enemy forces or surface fires to defeat enemy naval forces. Joint forcible entry operations, to
  include the amphibious landing of Army forces, may seize key terrain to begin or exploit the disintegration
  of an enemy A2 or AD approach in a specific joint operations area (JOA).
  Close Operations in Maritime Environments
  7-32. Close operations in a maritime environment may
  Seizure or defense of key terrain may be
  appear much the same as a traditional land-based
  necessary for placement of surface-to-
  approach discussed in Chapter 6. Seizing key terrain surface or surface-to air-fires capabilities to
  requires Army forces to conduct offensive operations, enable other component commands.
  which can include airborne, air assault, and amphibious
  assaults. Close operations also include defense of islands and island-based nodes that facilitate joint
  operations, such as airfields and ports. Given the isolated nature of some forward-deployed Army forces
  critical to the success of joint operations, those forces may be required to conduct defensive operations for
  extended periods until additional forces arrive. Sustainment planning should assume isolation for periods of
  several weeks or more.
  Rear Operations in Maritime Environments
  7-33. Rear operations in a maritime environment include those necessary to set and sustain the theater and
  facilitate combat operations for the joint force. These operations include conducting protected reception,
  staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) and conducting theater sustainment. RSOI could occur
  thousands of miles away from where a unit would be employed in combat. These operations require increased
  joint integration during the planning process to ensure prioritization of critical joint resources and to mitigate
  risk to vulnerable and extended air and sea lines of communications.
  7-34. Sustainment and protection operations are associated with support areas, enabling the building and
  preservation of combat power. While forces positioned on land masses have their own support areas, large
  expanses of water may require waterborne or airborne transportation for the staging and movement of
  personnel and equipment between various echeloned support areas. Support areas may be sea based or land
  based on islands, connected by sea or air lines of communications. These strategic and tactical support areas
  are critical assets that can be vulnerable to enemy attack, and they typically require increased security
  considerations, such as anti-submarine and theater AMD.
  SECTION III – OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR A MARITIME
  ENVIRONMENT
  A landing on a foreign coast in the face of hostile troops has always been one of the most
  difficult operations of war.
  Captain Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart
  7-35. In a predominantly maritime JOA, naval and air components are typically the key components of the
  JFC’s operational approach. Army forces develop a nested operational approach that reflects and supports
  the JFC plan. This section details what Army forces consider to successfully nest their operational approach
  with the joint force. (See ATP 5-0.1 for a more detailed discussion on the Army’s recommendations for
  developing operational approaches. See JP 5-0 for a more detailed discussion of the joint operations planning
  processes.)