text: Understanding the Strategic Context
  COMPREHENSIVE EFFORT
  1-47. A comprehensive effort, at a minimum, incorporates all the capabilities of U.S and host-nation
  governments, and may include intergovernmental and regional organizations, and nongovernmental
  organizations (NGOs) to address the root causes of the insurgency, in conjunction with military operations
  aimed at the insurgents themselves. This is difficult because many organizations will be operating in the
  same area, some conducting combat operations and others using non-lethal methods such as education
  programs and humanitarian assistance. Each organization will have different perspectives or interests.
  Foreign area officers may be essential in ensuring these various organization work in a comprehensive
  effort. Some organizations that may be part of a comprehensive effort are—
  * Other governments’ agencies.
  * Multinational forces.
  * Multinational corporations and contractors.
  * Intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations.
  * NGOs.
  * Private sector corporations.
  * Other organizations that wield diplomatic, informational, and economic power.
  1-48. These various organizations may work with, in parallel to, separately from, or counter to U.S.
  government and civilian agencies supporting counterinsurgency efforts. Those organizations whose goals
  align at least partially with U.S. government goals frequently have capabilities that, if properly
  synchronized and coordinated, can be critical to achieving success in counterinsurgency operations.
  Aligning U.S. military, NGO, and intergovernmental organization capabilities requires collaboration and
  cooperation focused toward a common goal. This can be more difficult than working with other U.S.
  government agencies. Where military operations typically demand unity of command, the challenge for
  military and civilian leaders is to forge unity of effort among the diverse array of actors involved in a
  counterinsurgency. Often, the legal, cultural, and operational requirements prevent direct collaboration
  between U.S. land forces and non-U.S. civilian organizations. U.S. forces may encounter NGOs not aligned
  with any insurgent faction who are providing humanitarian assistance. These organizations can be neutral
  or hostile to U.S. policy goals. Commanders should handle such groups carefully and professionally.
  Commanders work to understand the objectives and priorities of each organization. Unity of effort between
  U.S. forces and host-nation forces is particularly critical. Understanding these organizations is essential to
  understanding the operational environment and shaping effects on organizations that are hostile or neutral
  to U.S. policy goals. (See JP 3-08 for more information on NGOs.)
  UNITY OF COMMAND AND EFFORT
  1-49. Unity of command is the operation of all forces under a single responsible commander who has the
  requisite authority to direct and employ those forces in pursuit of a common purpose (JP 3-0). Where
  possible, counterinsurgency leaders achieve unity of command by establishing and maintaining formal
  command or support relationships. While designated officers will exercise unity of command of military
  forces, such relationships will not usually include nonmilitary U.S. government organizations engaged in a
  counterinsurgency mission. (See ADRP 5-0 for more information on unity of command.)
  1-50. Unity of command of military forces is operationally desirable and important for the military to
  establish. However, unity of command is almost impossible to achieve among all of the various actors in a
  counterinsurgency. Differing political objectives, national caveats, the legal limitations on the use of force,
  and sensitivities about subordinating national forces to those of other states or intergovernmental
  organizations often preclude strong command relationships. While agreements that establish a
  multinational force provide a legal foundation for determining the scope and limitations on authorities,
  responsibilities, command, support, or other relationships, the reality might be less clear. Unity of
  command is one of the most sensitive and difficult to resolve issues in a counterinsurgency.
  1-51. When unity of command with part or all of the force, including nonmilitary elements, is not possible,
  commanders work to achieve unity of effort. Unity of effort is coordination and cooperation toward
  common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization,
  which is the product of successful unified action (JP 1). In a counterinsurgency operation, an example of