text: Chapter 10
  10-36. Counterinsurgents ensure efforts strive to physically isolate the insurgency in all domains (air,
  land, maritime, and cyberspace) from other nodes of the insurgent network. Ultimately this means
  controlling the physical and cognitive domains. However, completely controlling the domains at all times is
  not realistic.
  10-37. Patrolling and cordon and search operations can physically isolate insurgents through capture or
  deterrence. Following these operations, counterinsurgents’ treatment of captured insurgents has immense
  potential impact on insurgent morale, retention, and recruitment. Humane and just treatment may afford
  counterinsurgents many short-term opportunities as well as potentially damaging insurgent recruitment.
  Abuse may foster resentment and hatred, offering the enemy an opportunity for propaganda and assist
  potential insurgent recruitment and support. It is important that unless they are entitled to another standard
  based on status, all detainees or other persons captured in any conflict, regardless of how it is characterized,
  shall be treated, at a minimum, in accordance with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
  10-38. Isolation must include operations to counter the insurgency lines of communication to recruit,
  obtain funding, weapons, equipment, direct operations, or gain intelligence. Operations such as information
  operations, electronic warfare, and cyberspace operations are examples of efforts designed to detect and
  respond to enemy insurgent networks. These operations are vital as force multipliers to identify insurgent
  activities and create conditions to deny or defeat their operations.
  10-39. In addition to physical and psychological isolation, efforts to isolate the insurgency economically
  are necessary, but must be narrowly focused on the activities of insurgents. These efforts seek to isolate the
  insurgency as much as possible, as complete isolation of the insurgency is not realistic. If implemented too
  broadly, efforts to isolate may have a negative effect on the population and strengthen the insurgency. (For
  example, eradicating the poppy harvest in Afghanistan may have cut funding to the Taliban, but it also
  alienated the farmers who subsisted on the illicit crop.) Economic efforts to isolate an insurgent require
  both physical and informational interruption of financial, business, and criminal enterprises. Attempts to
  isolate insurgents from the population economically must be narrowly focused on the insurgents and
  minimize the effect on the population by offering viable replacement sources of employment and revenue.
  A primary means of the financial isolation is through counter threat finance operations.
  10-40. The lines of operations that support the isolation process include—
  * Border operations and port of entry operations.
  * Strikes, raids, and interdiction operations.
  * Counter threat finance.
  * Military deception and military information support operations.
  * Cyber electromagnetic activities.
  * Electronic warfare.
  * Intelligence operations.
  * Information collection.
  INFLUENCE
  10-41. The intent to influence the insurgent network is for the population to abandon support to the
  insurgency’s efforts. Planned influence operations should convey selected information and indicators to
  insurgent networks to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of
  insurgent network itself. While it is unlikely counterinsurgents will change insurgents’ beliefs, it is possible
  to change their behavior. The counterinsurgency lines of effort (shown in figure 7-2 on page 7-9) support
  this behavior modification, but to further mitigate the insurgent threat to the host nation, additional
  programs should be offered as enticement solutions. In other words, counterinsurgents must leave a way
  out for insurgents who have lost the desire to continue the struggle.
  10-42. Effective amnesty and reintegration programs provide insurgents this avenue; amnesty provides
  the means to quit the insurgency and reintegration allows former insurgents to become part of greater
  society. Rifts between insurgent leaders, if identified, can be exploited in this fashion. Offering amnesty or
  a seemingly generous compromise can also cause divisions within an insurgency and present opportunities
  to split or weaken it. Counterinsurgents can also act to magnify existing rifts. If insurgent forces are