text: Chapter 8
  rondas were possible only because the insurgents’ treatment of villagers in its areas
  of operation had become so harsh that the locals were finally pushed to stand up for
  themselves. Improved intelligence and an end to internal divisions within the military
  allowed effective engagement of insurgent forces and effective (and rapid) support to
  threatened rondas. For the first time in the conflict, the government, police, and
  military made effective use of what would now be called strategic communication,
  with a greater emphasis on government credibility, consistency between actions and
  messages, and significant efforts to woo the population in the highlands away from
  the insurgents (efforts of which the rondas were an integral part).
  In 1992 good intelligence led to Abimael Guzmán’s (the leader of Sendro
  Luminoso) capture. The capture of Guzman changed the ongoing insurgency and
  significantly undermined insurgent efforts. At the time of his capture, the police seized
  Guzmán's computer, in which they found a very detailed roster of his armed forces
  and the weapons each formation had in each region of the country. His authoritarian
  management of Sendero Luminoso had proven very effective when he was at large,
  but when he was captured, it provided a wealth of information. This information was
  used for further operations.
  INTELLIGENCE FUNDAMENTALS
  8-2. Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis,
  and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces
  or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations (JP 2-0). Intelligence can be broken down into seven
  disciplines, and it is an enabler of any counterinsurgency effort. Each discipline provides a means for the
  counterinsurgent to gain a higher level of situational understanding. These disciplines include
  counterintelligence, human intelligence, geospatial intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence,
  open-source intelligence, signals intelligence, and technical intelligence. The intelligence disciplines are
  integrated to ensure a multi-disciplined approach to intelligence analysis. Ultimately all-source intelligence
  facilitates situational understanding and supports decisionmaking. All intelligence disciplines are important
  in counterinsurgency. However, this chapter will focus on elements of intelligence that have unique
  considerations in counterinsurgency. (See ADRP 2-0 for more information on intelligence.)
  8-3. An essential part of understanding the operational environment is the process of intelligence
  preparation of the battlefield/battlespace. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace is a
  systematic process of analyzing and visualizing the portions of the mission variables of threat/adversary,
  terrain, weather, and civil considerations in a specific area of interest and for a specific mission. By
  applying intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace, commanders gain the information necessary
  to selectively apply and maximize operational effectiveness at critical points in time and space
  (FM 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A). (See FM 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A for more information on intelligence preparation
  of the battlefield/battlespace.) In a counterinsurgency environment, intelligence preparation of the
  battlefield/battlespace must take into account operational environment considerations. (See chapter 2 for
  considerations about the operational environment and chapter 4 for considerations on analyzing an
  insurgency.)
  8-4. Culture is an element of the operational environment and, like the physical terrain, creates both
  opportunities and challenges for Soldiers and Marines. A nation’s culture is a set of complex,
  ever-changing, and interconnected social, historical, political, and environmental factors that shape the
  perceptions, motives, and behaviors of its population. Cultural intelligence is the analysis and
  understanding of groups of people and the reasons they do certain things. Cultural intelligence includes
  gaining an understanding of the mindset of a local population to support the commander’s decisionmaking
  and help drive operations. (See chapter 3 for more information on culture.)
  8-5. The counterinsurgency force must understand the cultural foundations of the operational
  environment in order to transform seemingly random and irrational activity into describable and
  semipredictable acts. Commanders and staffs must devote as much effort to understand the local population
  being supported as they do to understand the insurgents. Cultural intelligence requires historical perspective
  as well as collection and analysis of current information, because cultures and cultural factors are