text: Appendix C
  designated as priorities for a period of time. Early, frequent, and detailed coordination with port authorities
  helps mitigate potential disruptions to deployment operations. Installations and units incorporate port
  officials into deployment readiness exercises and other training events to improve mutual understanding and
  effectiveness.
  C-24. Adversary actions may directly or indirectly cause port officials to close their port or reduce operations.
  If this occurs, and if authority is granted to use another port, commanders consider the impacts to both their
  unit and the broader military effort, and to civilian requirements, before recommending or deciding to move
  assets to another port of embarkation. Port operations conducted by other government agencies or civilian
  officials may take priority over those that Army forces need to conduct based on current local, state, or
  national requirements. Additionally, other ports may become congested or disrupted by the time Army forces
  arrive. Adhering to the original plan while adapting to challenges at the port is generally less disruptive to
  the overall deployment effort than moving to another port.
  C-25. Depending on the level of conflict and assessed threat to their interests, peer enemies may attempt to
  disrupt or destroy unit equipment while in transit. If all of a unit’s equipment is placed on one transport this
  could lead to the catastrophic loss of land component capability for the JFC. Spreading unit equipment across
  multiple transport ships increases the likelihood that some will arrive and be available for employment. While
  this is not the most efficient or expeditious method to transport Army equipment, it helps ensure that the JFC
  receives some employable level of Army tactical and operational capability.
  C-26. During armed conflict, Army forces conduct additional protection activities based on enemy
  capabilities. Effective targeting by enemy lethal and nonlethal effects will drive protection and mitigation
  actions for unit personnel and equipment. Army forces maybe called on to provide additional protection
  capabilities to support port authorities. Unit commanders and staffs should balance protection requirements,
  both at the port and in-transit, against requirements to get as many critical capabilities to the required
  operational theater as quickly as possible and requirements to have combat-ready units arrive at ports of
  debarkation for employment by JFCs.
  C-27. Whether conducting operations at a port during competition, crisis, or armed conflict, Army forces
  coordinate with the relevant authorities to mitigate potential complications at the port. This includes—
  (cid:122) Coordinating for products that provide a general layout of the port and flow of port operations.
  (cid:122) Obtaining an understanding of transport ship loading.
  (cid:122) Understanding port authority structure and decision making.
  (cid:122) Understanding reliance of the port on local infrastructure to conduct operations and identifying
  potential redundancies (for example, if power is lost can port gantry cranes load containers).
  (cid:122) Planning to train Soldiers on port equipment, such as material handling equipment.
  C-28. Additional considerations for port-to-port transport are the use of unit personnel to improve, monitor,
  and maintain equipment readiness while in transit. Units should anticipate execution of vehicle maintenance
  at the port, and leaders may place a limited number of unit personnel on a transport vessel to ensure enabling
  and combat arms equipment is ready for immediate employment upon arrival in theater.
  RSOI DURING CONTESTED DEPLOYMENTS
  C-29. Historically, even during armed conflict, Army forces enjoyed high degrees of sanctuary in rear areas
  to receive and organize forces before moving them forward. However, the long-range strike capabilities of
  peer adversaries mean that sanctuary to conduct unimpeded RSOI operations in rear areas can no longer be
  assumed. It is likely that strikes by peer threats will degrade or destroy port and other transportation
  infrastructure vital to U.S force projection. This could cause Army forces to arrive in a disaggregated manner
  and disrupt RSOI operations. While integrating U.S. forces in theater could be challenging, Army planners
  must also consider host-nation requirements for logistics infrastructure. The host nation’s response to an
  attack on its infrastructure, including its military mobilization, can affect freedom of movement for U.S.
  forces. All of these challenges may require JFCs to alter their operational plans or stay in a defensive posture
  for an extended period until sufficient combat power is built to enable offensive operations.
  C-30. The theater army has primary responsibility for conducting RSOI for the entire joint land force. Army
  equipment may arrive in a piecemeal fashion across numerous ports. Commanders must establish secure