text: Understanding the Strategic Context
  defeat the insurgents. This will reduce the resources available to defeat the enemy in large-scale combat. In
  addition, an adversary can fuel an insurgency in a host nation to undermine U.S. interests. In this case, the
  insurgency is part of an adversary’s overall strategy and policy. (See FM 3-05, chapter 2, for more
  information on unconventional warfare. It provides a U.S. perspective on enabling an insurgency.)
  1-19. An insurgency can also occur at the conclusion of a large scale combat operation when an organized
  movement seeks to challenge the authority of the U.S. and its partners. The organized movement may be
  remnants of the defeated force or an opportunistic movement that seeks to obtain power using a
  political-military challenge to the existing authority. In either case, U.S. land forces, along with other
  unified action partners, must be prepared at all stages of conventional warfare to assess the capability of an
  insurgency occurring either during the conflict or after hostilities cease. Soldiers and Marines must also
  recognize that the presence of U.S. forces in the region can lead to the conditions for an insurgency. U.S.
  land forces can help to prevent an insurgency from occurring in the manner in which they conduct
  conventional warfare and in the conduct of post-conflict operations. Should prevention fail, U.S. forces will
  be exponentially more successful in countering an insurgency if they shape the environment during and
  immediately following conventional warfare for an effective transition to counterinsurgency.
  1-20. In the military operations, U.S. forces can prevent an insurgency from occurring in large scale
  combat operations by integrating stability operations. If an insurgency does begin, U.S. forces can shape its
  formation and make it easier to defeat. U.S. land forces can also prevent an insurgency from occurring in
  peacetime through security cooperation activities and other capabilities that support the host nation or other
  groups. If there is an insurgency, the U.S. can integrate a number of capabilities into an overall operational
  approach to defeat that insurgency.
  1-21. From the U.S. land forces’ perspective, insurgencies range along a spectrum depending on the scale
  of effort and resources the Army and Marine Corps must take to counter them. In a worst-case scenario, an
  extremely capable insurgency that has a significant impact on the population exists in a failed state region
  in which there is little or no host-nation government capability. The U.S. may have to commit significant
  combat power to offset the momentum of the insurgency. While the U.S. can avoid using land forces in
  direct combat, the use of other capabilities will often support groups that are not the recognized
  government. In such cases, the U.S. would be enabling one group to gain control over the state. For
  example, the U.S. could equip groups within a state and empower them to take control over an area. While
  the initial cost may be lower, this course of action is fraught with possible unintended consequences. The
  group that counterinsurgents enable, which is essentially another insurgency, may act in ways that are
  counter to U.S. interests once it gains control of the area. On the other hand, direct involvement could be
  extremely costly and provoke a wider conflict. If the U.S. operates in a failed state to defeat an insurgency,
  it must create a policy and strategy that matches its goals and the resources that it is willing to spend.
  Moreover, it must be willing to accept a large degree of uncertainty and strategic risk.
  1-22. The best-case scenario is when the host nation has the capability to defeat an insurgency and the U.S.
  plays only a supporting role in enabling the insurgencies’ defeat with equipment, training, or intelligence.
  A middle case occurs when a functional state has an insurgency in a remote area where the host-nation
  government cannot exert complete control. The existing insurgency is not a challenge to the continued
  authority of the host-nation government, but it may seek to gain control of a specific region or area. This
  type of scenario can require much fewer resources for U.S. land forces to counter the insurgency than the
  worst-case scenario. Since the capacity of the host-nation security forces exists to contain the insurgency to
  a specific region or area, the U.S. can integrate a number of capabilities into the host government’s efforts
  to increase the effectiveness and capabilities of the host nation. While every insurgency is unique, this basic
  framework offers the U.S. the opportunity to achieve policy goals while spending fewer resources and
  offering less uncertainty and risk. However, as with any conflict, unintended consequences can change the
  insurgency and increase the cost and uncertainty of U.S. involvement.
  1-23. In all cases, specific national policies govern U.S. land forces’ actions to counter an insurgency. An
  insurgency’s goals and actions are influenced by the conditions the insurgency develops in. An
  insurgency’s objectives are not exclusive to the condition of the state, but each can occur anywhere along
  the range of state conditions. However, the operational environment an insurgency develops in will affect
  how it understands its goals and will affect its actions (See chapter 2 for more information on an