text: FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
  technological overmatch against one regional opponent rapidly, before other
  regional neighbors or an extraregional power can enter the fight. In some
  cases, this may require defensive operations against one or more regional
  neighbors who are not the main target of the strategic campaign, to mitigate
  their ability to disrupt an OPFOR offensive against the one that is.
  4-4. Regional operations include essentially defensive security actions to
  maintain internal stability. In addition, the Internal Security Forces help
  control the population in territory the OPFOR seizes or engage enemy forces
  that invade State territory.
  4-5. The State’s military goal during regional operations is to destroy its re-
  gional opponents’ military power in order to achieve specific ends. The State
  plans regional operations well in advance and executes them as rapidly as is
  feasible in order to preclude intervention by outside forces. Still, at the very
  outset of these operations, it lays plans and positions forces to conduct access-
  control operations in the event of outside intervention. Extraregional
  forces may also be vulnerable to conventional operations during the time
  they require to build combat power and create support at home for their
  intervention.
  TRANSITION OPERATIONS
  4-6. If an extraregional force starts to deploy into the region, the balance of
  power begins to shift away from the State. Although the OPFOR may not yet
  be totally overmatched by the enemy force, it faces a threat it cannot handle
  with normal, “conventional” patterns of operation designed for regional
  conflict. Therefore, the OPFOR must begin to adapt its operations to the
  changing threat.
  4-7. As the State begins transition operations, its immediate goal is preser-
  vation of its instruments of power while seeking transition back to regional
  operations. Transition operations therefore feature a mixture of offensive and
  defensive actions.
  4-8. This combination of offensive and defensive actions can allow the State
  to control the strategic tempo while changing the nature of conflict to
  something for which the intervening force is unprepared. If these actions are
  successful and the extraregional force is no longer a factor, the OPFOR may
  be able to transition back to regional operations without having to complete
  the shift to adaptive operations.
  4-9. During transition operations, the State must decide whether to keep
  its forces in any territory it has occupied in a neighboring country or to
  withdraw them back to its home territory. The decision to stay or withdraw
  at this point may be based on the presence or absence of complex terrain
  suitable for defensive operations in the occupied territory against an
  extraregional power with overmatch in technology and conventional forces.
  The OPFOR is more likely to remain in the occupied territory if it has already
  achieved its strategic goal in regional operations or at least achieved major
  intermediate objectives leading toward that goal and can structure an
  effective defense in that territory. Military forces in the immediate vicinity
  of the point of intervention move into defensive positions as opportunity
  allows, making use of existing command and control (C2) and logistics.