text: Threat
  INDIVIDUALS
  3-17. Identifying the threat posed by states and organizations is relatively easy when compared to the
  challenge of identifying the threat posed by a single individual. Although U.S. forces have not historically
  focused on neutralizing the threat of a single person,the growing interconnectivity of states,organizations,
  and individuals increases the ability of an individual with sufficient computer technical skills to attack U.S.
  interests and forces using an army of computers. The BCT must be prepared to defend its command and
  control system against cyber-attacks,whether initiated by a state,organization,or individual. In addition to
  fighting and defeating states and organizations, the BCT commander and staff must retain the ability to
  identify, disrupt, and isolate individuals within the political, social, and tactical context of the operational
  environment.
  SECTION II – THREAT CHARACTERISTICS AND ORGANIZATION
  3-18. The BCT possesses the capability to fight and win against regular and irregular forces (may involve
  nation-states using proxy forces or nonstate actors such as criminal and terrorist organizations). The term
  hybrid threat captures the complexity of operational environments, the multiplicity of actors involved, and
  the blurring of traditionally regulated elements of conflict.
  3-19. Regular forces are part of nation states that employ military capabilities and forces in military
  competition and conflict. Normally, regular forces conduct operations to accomplish the following
  objectives, defeat an enemy’s armed forces, destroy an enemy’s war making capacity, and seize or retain
  territory.
  3-20. Regular forces often possess technologically advanced weapon systems integrated into mechanized
  and motorized combined arms formations and light Infantry forces. Military equipment that the BCT may
  encounter in combat include armored fighting vehicles, antiarmor systems, air defense systems, ballistic
  missiles, manned and unmanned aircraft, indirect-fire systems, mines, EW, and digital communications
  systems. Regular force organizations are hierarchical (companies,battalions,brigades,and so forth) with a
  centralized command and control structure. Regular forces can conduct long-term conventional and
  unconventional operations. Examples of regular forces include—
  (cid:122) Islamic Republic of Iran Army.
  (cid:122) Peoples Liberation Army of China.
  (cid:122) Russian Army.
  (cid:122) North Korean People’s Army.
  3-21. Irregular forces may be armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces,
  police, or other internal security forces. Irregular forces employ unconventional, asymmetric methods to
  counter U.S. advantages. Unconventional methods may include terrorism,insurgency,and guerrilla warfare.
  A weaker threat or enemy often uses unconventional methods to exhaust the U.S. collective will through
  protracted conflict. Economic, political, informational, and cultural initiatives usually accompany and may
  even be the chief means of an attack on U.S. influences. Irregular forces or complex threats include
  paramilitaries,terrorists,guerillas,and criminal organizations and networks.
  3-22. Irregular forces or complex threats have political, ideological, or grievance related objectives tied to
  their motivation. These grievances may be real or perceived. Identifying these insurgent objectives and
  motivations can be difficult for a number of reasons,such as(these same issues occur in other irregular threats
  such as paramilitary,guerrillas,and criminal organizations)—
  (cid:122) Multiple insurgent groups with differing goals and motivations may be present.
  (cid:122) Insurgent leaders may change,and the movement’s goals change with them.
  (cid:122) Organizations may fracture into two or more new entities with different or opposing goals.
  (cid:122) Movement leaders may have different motivations from their followers.
  (cid:122) Insurgents may hide their true motivations and make false claims.
  (cid:122) Goals of the insurgency may change due to operational environment changes.
  3-23. Irregular forces customarily operate in small, dispersed, decentralized formations or cells (team and
  squad size) within a decentralized command and control structure. Irregular forces are often highly motivated