text: Appendix A
  the intelligence enterprise to determine the enemy deception plan. Using the deception planning methodology
  of see-think-do, the working group might use an abbreviated war-gaming process to construct enemy
  deception goals and objectives, targets, desired perceptions and deception story narrative, probable events
  and means, conduits, and anticipated MOEs. Deception planners then use outputs of this technique to focus
  friendly intelligence collection assets that confirm or deny the existence and scope of an actual enemy
  deception plan and related executions.
  COUNTERING OR EXPLOITING ENEMY DECEPTION
  A-5. After confirming an enemy’s deception operation, the working group has two primary functions. It
  first examines past information collection, intelligence production, and intelligence analysis to determine the
  impact the deception may have had on friendly planning, decision making, or current operational activities.
  The outputs of the working group inform future COAs or counterdeception planning. Second, the working
  group develops and presents proposed counterdeception COAs to the commander. Each COA involves a
  different level of risk or opportunity that must be weighed in the overall context of the operation and
  commander’s desired end state. Based on risks, commanders can ignore, expose, exploit, or defeat enemy
  deception efforts.
  A-6. Commanders ignore the deception if acknowledging the deception compromises friendly deception
  identification capabilities. Such a compromise of friendly capabilities might lead to future improvements in
  enemy deception capabilities. This scenario requires a working group to continue to identify deceptive
  indicators and base the friendly force operational decision making and subsequent activity on actual enemy
  capability, activity, or intent.
  A-7. Commanders might choose to publicly expose the deception to embarrass the enemy or increase risk
  within an enemy’s operational cost and benefit analysis. Through exposure, the enemy might be persuaded
  that its deception operations are futile, too costly, or too risky to continue. Exposure of a deception prior to
  combat operations might also serve to weaken the enemy’s political or military position with allies or
  domestic audiences.
  A-8. An exploitation of enemy deception focuses on forcing an enemy to expend resources and continue
  deception operations by reinforcing the perception that friendly forces are unaware of the deception. In this
  scenario, friendly forces provide positive MOEs that the deception is having the desired effect until the
  culminating point of the enemy’s deception (their desired “do or not do” for one friendly operational
  capability) and then reacting in an unexpected manner that turns the enemy’s anticipated advantage against
  itself.
  A-9. Defeating the enemy deception effort could involve destroying or degrading the enemy’s deception
  capabilities and resources so it cannot sustain its portrayal of the deception story. Like the other potential
  COAs, this outcome ideally includes a war-gaming step to identify possible second- and third-order effects
  and associated risk.