text: Chapter 5
  and civilian agencies. The appropriate staff cells and elements consider the number of suitable routes and lift
  assets available to meet the movement requirements of subordinate units. Other considerations include—
  (cid:122) Construction of routes.
  (cid:122) Road and route improvement and maintenance.
  (cid:122) Repair of bridges and culverts.
  (cid:122) Clearance of obstacles, including explosive hazards.
  (cid:122) Bridging rivers or dry gaps.
  (cid:122) Establishment of security along routes.
  (cid:122) Placement of convoy support centers.
  (cid:122) Traffic control to permit freedom of or restriction of civilian movement along routes.
  (cid:122) Communications architecture.
  (cid:122) Requirements of allies and other partners moving at the same time as U.S. forces.
  Integration of Forces
  5-45. In the context of RSOI, integration is the coordinated transfer of units into an operational commander’s
  force prior to mission execution. It can start as soon as the JFC and the new unit are aware of the mission.
  The JFC may provide initial and periodic situational updates to the inbound unit throughout the force
  projection process. The JFC may have training requirements for the deploying unit that it must accomplish
  before and upon arrival in the theater. Integration occurs across all warfighting functions. Generally, the more
  time a unit has to integrate before conducting operations, the better the unit will perform. However, the
  situation may require rapid integration. Therefore, commanders balance the risks to mission and force when
  determining the tempo of unit integration.
  5-46. When a deploying unit replaces another unit, a relief in place occurs during integration. During crisis
  integration of deploying forces will probably involve augmentation of U.S. and host-nation forces already in
  position, and not require a relief in place, although establishing liaison with units on the flanks is required.
  Regardless of the circumstance, the command of combat-ready units is transferred to the receiving
  commander during integration. Integration is complete when the CCDR, other JFC, or land component
  commander establishes positive control over arriving units. This usually occurs in forward assembly areas
  when those units are capable of performing missions.
  5-47. If the deploying division or brigade is the first U.S. force into a JOA, there may be a need to deploy an
  advance party task-organized with security, protection, logistics, and engineering support capabilities. As
  part of the unit movement preparations, the advance party is resourced from the division, brigade, attached
  assets, or it is provided by outside units. This is particularly true if the predeployment site survey determines
  that the AO does not have sufficient infrastructure to support division or brigade operations. Changes in the
  number of available forces as deployment proceeds will also increase the number of units present and change
  disposition of units and the dimensions of AOs. In circumstances demanding more experienced leadership,
  it may be necessary for the deputy commander and a select staff to lead this advance party. They set the
  groundwork for the rest of the unit by performing face-to-face coordination with local military or civilian
  leaders.
  5-48. Unit deployment operations end when all deploying elements complete their RSOI within the assigned
  JOA. The specifics of RSOI reflect the specific circumstances of the operational and mission variables
  prevailing in that JOA. (See JP 3-35 for information on joint RSOI requirements.)
  INITIAL EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES
  5-49. The initial employment of Army forces during a crisis will most likely be as part of FDOs or FROs.
  This employment may represent the opening stages of a joint operation or a show of force demonstration.
  The objective of this early employment is to deter an adversary from further aggression, expand the theater
  to receive follow-on Army and joint forces, and form a credible defense with host-nation forces to prevent
  adversary gains. Without a robust theater infrastructure, a large number of forward-stationed forces, or a
  robust APS inventory that enables rapid deployment, Army forces can only provide limited support to partner