text: Chapter 4
  might be collected. Orienting on the reconnaissance objective helps Cavalry formations understand when and
  if it should adjust information collection of an NAI.
  4-6. Report all required information rapidly and accurately. Commanders develop plans and make decisions
  based upon the analysis of information subordinate units collect. Commanders require quick and accurate
  reports to make informed decisions on the proper application of forces. Rapid reporting allows staffs
  maximum time to analyze information and make timely recommendations to the commander. Information
  requirements tied to decision points with an LTIOV date-time group provide focus for units collecting
  information and ensure units report information to facilitate timely decisions.
  4-7. Retain freedom of maneuver. Tactical mobility and maneuver drive the success of reconnaissance
  operations. Commanders and staffs consider task organization, movement techniques, and scheme of
  maneuver to retain the unit’s ability to maneuver. Reconnaissance operations confirm or deny assumptions
  about terrain and enemy made during mission analysis and IPB to identify opportunities and maintain
  freedom of maneuver for the BCT. Counterreconnaissance operations retain freedom of maneuver by denying
  enemy collection efforts and identifying opportunities for the command to seize, retain, and exploit initiative.
  Commanders change movement techniques and employ multiple assets to make contact with the smallest
  possible element and to avoid becoming decisively engaged. Commanders retain freedom of maneuver by
  avoiding decisive engagement with a superior force and develop the situation further. Commanders
  consistently balance the requirement to maintain contact with retaining freedom of maneuver.
  4-8. Gain and maintain enemy contact. Cavalry forces find and sustain contact with the enemy on terms
  and conditions of their choosing. Using at least one of the nine forms of contact (visual, direct, indirect,
  nonhostile, obstacles, aircraft, CBRN, influence, and electromagnetic warfare), commanders and staffs plan
  for and integrate aerial and ground sensors, manned platforms and unmanned systems, dismounted
  operations, SIGINT, geospatial intelligence, HUMINT, and visual observation to gain contact with the enemy
  using the smallest element possible. Intelligence units can provide a wide array of support to assist Cavalry
  forces in detecting and tracking the enemy, such as UAS imagery and full motion video or geo-location
  provided by SIGINT collectors. Once units make contact, Cavalry forces maintain contact, until specific
  orders are given, a change of mission occurs when directed by a higher headquarters, or the unit conducts a
  reconnaissance handover with another unit. Maintaining contact with the enemy provides real-time
  information of the enemy’s composition, disposition, strength, and actions that allow staffs to analyze and make
  recommendations to the commander.
  4-9. Develop the situation rapidly. Cavalry forces act instinctively and urgently to increase the
  commander’s situational understanding of the terrain, enemy, and civilian population. Effective Cavalry
  forces understand how time impacts movement (both friendly and enemy) and how timely collection of
  information requirements supports the commander’s decision-making. The reconnaissance scheme of
  maneuver and tempo matches the requisite urgency to answer the necessary information requirements.
  Cavalry forces collect on directed reconnaissance objectives in close contact with civilian populations while
  selectively choosing to fight enemy forces to determine intent, disposition, composition, and strength.
  4-10. The following vignette highlights a Cavalry organization’s use of reconnaissance fundamentals to
  locate an opposing force during the Civil War.
  Reed’s Bridge
  In the days preceding the battle of Chickamauga, the roads in northwest Georgia were filled
  with columns of marching and countermarching soldiers as the Union Army of the
  Cumberland and the Confederate Army of Tennessee maneuvered in preparation for battle.
  By mid-September, General Rosecrans had begun to concentrate Union forces, but the action
  took time. Most of his army remained south of Chattanooga, while smaller forces garrisoned
  the town and occupied key locations nearby.
  General Bragg’s Army of Tennessee sought to engage and destroy a portion of Rosecrans’s
  army before it could be reinforced. Alternatively, he sought to interpose his Confederate
  Army between Rosecrans and the main Union supply depot at Chattanooga, forcing an
  engagement. Critical to Union planning lay the determination of Bragg’s location and intent.
  Therefore, mounted forces, including Colonel H. G. Minty’s Cavalry brigade were