text: Chapter 1
  additional details. Mitigation of some of the capacity shortfalls can be achieved through contributions by the
  other services’ AMD components. In addition, the Army is standing-up additional ADA SHORAD forces
  and reintroducing them into maneuver formations. Short-range air defense are capabilities that provide
  air defense against low-altitude air threats. The ADA force is also introducing the Integrated Air and
  Missile Defense Battle Command (IBCS) system in the near term. IBCS provides a common C2 capability
  across all ADA echelons. It will allow for efficient task force tailoring of system components, vice complete
  systems, and the defense of more assets by the same number of ADA units.
  AMD FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES AND TENETS
  1-17. Fundamental to the planning and employment of ADA forces and the execution of the tasks cited above
  for joint and unified land operations are the AMD principles and employment tenets. ADA commanders use
  these to design AMD defenses. When applying the principles and tenets, planners must consider the tactical
  and technical capabilities of each weapon and sensor system and the relevant factors of mission, enemy,
  terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC),
  intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), and AMD priorities.
  1-18. The principles provide an underlying rule set. The tenets identify criteria for the positioning of ADA
  systems.
  AMD PRINCIPLES
  1-19. Armed with a thorough understanding of the operational environment that is further focused through
  the lens of current METT-TC conditions, commanders apply AMD principles when planning active AMD
  operations. A principle is a comprehensive and fundamental rule or an assumption of central importance that
  guides how an organization or function approaches and thinks about the conduct of operations (ADP 1-01).
  1-20. The AMD principles are mass, mix, mobility, integration, flexibility, and agility. Mass, mix, mobility,
  and integration are traditional principles that have stood the test of time. The new principles, flexibility and
  agility, are inherent considerations for how ADA forces organize and operate on future battlefields.
  MASS
  1-21. Mass is the concentration of combat power sufficient to achieve the commander’s intent. Mass, when
  applied to AMD, is achieved by assigning enough AMD firepower to successfully defend the force or the
  asset against aerial attack or surveillance. To mass AMD combat power in one area, commanders may have
  to accept risks in other areas of the battlefield.
  1-22. AMD mass may also be achieved by the launching of more than one missile against a target. In today’s
  system-centric architectures, missile-on-target mass is achieved by assigning the target to an engaging fire
  unit and that fire unit selecting a method of fire, such as ripple or salvo fire, for assigned launchers to achieve
  the desired mass. See paragraph 2-32 on page 2-9 for additional discussion of methods of fire.
  Note. A fire unit is the smallest group of personnel and equipment capable of conducting a
  complete engagement, from detection to destruction. In Patriot and THAAD, a firing battery is a
  fire unit. In Avenger, an Avenger platform constitutes a fire unit.
  MIX
  1-23. Mix is the employment of a combination of weapons and sensors to protect the force and assets from
  the threat. Mix offsets the limitations of one system with the capabilities of another and complicates the
  situation for the attacker. Joint, interorganizational and multinational AMD capabilities are considered when
  applying this principle. Proper mix causes the enemy to adjust tactics. Enemy tactics designed to defeat one
  system may make the enemy vulnerable to another system. Mix is achieved by assigning multiple system-
  centric architectures within a defense design, with each system controlled by its C2 architecture, and
  coordinating with other systems in the defense. The principle of mix addresses both threat susceptibilities
  and vulnerabilities and ADA system limitations. For example, complex integrated attacks by enemy forces