text: Chapter 1
  operational environment and section II for more information on understanding the actions of an
  insurgency).
  1-24. There may be multiple insurgencies in an operational environment. A networked insurgency may
  have conflicting goals within its organization and its actions are not controlled by a command structure.
  These insurgencies can have links to other insurgencies or criminal organizations. Networked insurgencies
  might divide or combine with groups. In such cases it is difficult to analyze an insurgency or insurgencies if
  they are treated as monolithic actors. Instead, counterinsurgents must understand the dynamics within the
  insurgency or multiple insurgencies. (See paragraphs 4-88 through 4-103 for more information on
  networked insurgencies.)
  1-25. Victory in a counterinsurgency may not be as clear as winning in a conventional conflict. U.S.
  national ends determine the criteria for success, regardless of how the U.S. land force is deployed to
  conduct counterinsurgency operations. As it applies to U.S. national objectives, success in an insurgency
  often depends on developing host-nation capacity to contain, reduce, and defeat the insurgency without
  requiring direct U.S. involvement. In a counterinsurgency, the host nation often determines the criteria for
  success. U.S. counterinsurgents should avoid judging host-nation criteria based on their own cultural
  expectations. Achieving success may depend less on defeating the armed element of the insurgency and
  more on the ability to legitimize host-nation institutions to the populace. Short and mid-term success in
  counterinsurgency may be developing a host-nation government that has sufficient capability to secure
  itself and address an insurgency on its own. This success allows the U.S. to continue to support the host
  nation through a long-term relationship that addresses that nation’s legitimacy. Success includes enabling
  the development of resiliency within the host-nation population and host-nation institutions to sustain the
  ability to counter the insurgency in the future and prevent the conditions in the area from allowing an
  insurgency to gain strength. Achieving the conditions for success may require a mix of application of force,
  information operations, cultural acceptance, and building capacity and competency within host-nation
  institutions. Counterinsurgents may either persuade the people to support the government or dissuade them
  from supporting the insurgents. What capabilities the U.S. uses to counter an insurgency is dependent on
  the context of that insurgency and U.S. national interests.
  1-26. U.S. forces should expect that the host-nation government will have its own interests that may not
  coincide with U.S. national interests. It may not be willing to undertake the political changes necessary to
  address the root causes of the insurgency. The commitment of U.S. forces may depend upon the degree to
  which U.S. policy makers consider the affected government to be receptive to assistance, advice, and
  reform. How Soldiers and Marines are employed will also require a clear determination by national
  decisionmakers as to what post-conflict commitments by military and civilian organizations will be
  required. Outside counterinsurgents, however, can never fully compensate for lack of will, incapacity, or
  counterproductive behavior on the part of the supported government. If a government is unambiguously
  committed to the defeat of insurgency, it is more likely to defeat it, regardless of the actions (or
  commitment level) of an outside supporter.
  LEGITIMACY AND CONTROL
  1-27. Legitimacy, the acceptance of an authority by a society, and control are the central issues in
  insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. This is true however the U.S. enables a host nation to defeat an
  insurgency. The population of a particular society determines who has legitimacy to establish the rules and
  the government for that society. A population’s values and cultural norms will determine who that society
  perceives as a legitimate authority. Both the insurgency and the host nation attempt to control the
  population by some mixture of consent and coercion. Insurgents use all available tools, including political
  (diplomatic), informational (including appeals to religious, ethnic, historical, national, class, political, tribal
  or ideological beliefs), and social, military, and economic tools to overthrow or undermine an existing
  authority. Likewise, the host nation will use all available tools to maintain acceptance of its authority. This
  authority may be an established government or an interim governing body. It may be a generally accepted
  social order. Control of a population, however, may not be the end state desired by an insurgent. A criminal
  enterprise might seek to undermine existing political power in order to enable it to continue its criminal
  activities or insurgents could seek political power in order to impose an ideological (or religious) system on
  an unwilling population. In counterinsurgencies, if the affected government wants to end the insurgency, it