text: Appendix A
  Operating in a Contested Environment
  This appendix addresses the means to recognize and overcome threat activities
  affecting signal support in a contested environment. It includes an overview of peer
  threat tactics, techniques, and procedures and methods to counter threat EW and
  cyberspace attacks.
  THREAT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES
  A-1. Information and its management, dissemination, and control have always been critical to the successful
  conduct of tactical missions. Given today’s advancements in information and information systems
  technology, this importance is growing in scope, impact, and sophistication. The opposing force recognizes
  the unique opportunities that information warfare gives tactical commanders, and it continuously strives to
  incorporate information warfare activities in all tactical missions and battles (TC 7-100.2).
  A-2. A peer threat’s information warfare activities will integrate electronic attack, military deception, lethal
  fires, perception management, information attack, and computer warfare to deny U.S. and allied forces access
  to the electromagnetic spectrum in a contested environment.
  A-3. Understanding threat capabilities in the electromagnetic spectrum is key to sound signal support plans.
  Enemy attacks on friendly command nodes may combine electronic attacks, other information warfare
  effects, and lethal fires to deny friendly forces the use of spectrum-dependent systems. To accomplish this
  goal, threat forces gather technical and combat information about their enemies. As enemy forces locate and
  identify friendly units, enemy information warfare elements establish priorities to—
  * Jam communications assets.
  * Deceptively enter radio networks.
  * Interfere with the normal flow of U.S. and allies’ communications.
  A-4. Commanders, their staffs, and equipment operators must train to recognize and react to peer threat
  information warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures if they are to continue communicating in a contested
  environment.
  U.S. MEASURES TO PREVENT THREAT EFFECTS
  A-5. There are operational tactics, techniques, and procedures signal planners and operators can take to
  mitigate peer threat capabilities in the electromagnetic spectrum. If an enemy cannot detect friendly signals,
  they cannot geolocate or jam those signals.
  LIMITING ELECTROMAGNETIC SIGNATURE
  A-6. To protect against a peer threat’s ability to locate and target radio signals, the G-6 (S-6) must plan
  signal support in a way that limits the electromagnetic signature of the command post. Measures to reduce
  the electromagnetic signature of command posts and communications sites include—
  * Careful site selection for communications equipment.
  * Employment of directional antennas.
  * Operations using the lowest power required.
  * Limiting radio transmissions.
  * Using burst transmission to minimize transmission time.
  * Using a random battle rhythm schedule.