text: Chapter 1
  clearly linked, since they often involve support from diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts by
  non-military forces. (See chapter 9 for more information on direct methods and chapter 10 for more
  information on indirect methods. See JP 5-0 for more information on direct and indirect approaches.)
  LAND FORCES AND THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
  1-14. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps can prevent or defeat an insurgency across the range of military
  operations. This is true if an insurgency starts in the context of a major combat operation or if it starts
  during peace. Across the range of military operations and in accordance with U.S. strategy, U.S. land forces
  take actions and set priorities to shape an environment to reduce the possibility of insurgencies. In some
  instances an operational environment and its related variables are unstable or fragile and hostile actions
  against a host-nation government begin. In this environment, the U.S. may make a decision to use some
  type of military capability. Commanders must understand the effects that the actions and priorities of the
  U.S. force have on an operational environment. When acting in this environment, commanders must have
  situational understanding of the environment and the effects of U.S. actions in that environment. This
  influences how the commander attempts to shape the environment. An insurgency can also occur in the
  context of another conflict. For example, during major combat operations, land forces must take actions to
  prevent insurgencies from occurring during operations and once the opposing conventional force is
  defeated. While an insurgency is only a possibility in a major combat operation, it could occur during major
  operations or afterwards. Commanders and staffs must assess the possibility of an insurgency in any
  operational environment and take actions to prevent one from occurring. These actions can include a range
  of stability operations and security cooperation activities. (See ADRP 3-07 for more information on
  stability operations and FM 3-22 for more information on security cooperation.)
  1-15. The circumstances of U.S. involvement in a counterinsurgency are important in understanding the
  operational and tactical actions of U.S. forces. The type and scale of involvement, whether the Army and
  Marine Corps are involved temporarily as the primary counterinsurgent forces or are providing modest
  indirect and direct support to a counterinsurgency effort, will be determined by the circumstances of U.S.
  involvement. U.S. forces participate at the direction of the President, based on national security interests.
  One example circumstance is the collapse of a fragile state in a geographically strategic area. Even if U.S.
  land forces are not in place when the government collapses, the President may deploy land forces to
  counter an insurgency and restore stability. The use of indirect capabilities in a failed state is complex
  because the commander often has to work with groups outside of the legitimately constituted government.
  Building capacity and enabling existing capabilities is difficult when a state lacks functional institutions.
  Because these areas lack state institutions to provide various governmental functions to include security
  forces, large scale direct involvement is often resource intensive. The U.S. can use smaller direct
  capabilities to support groups outside the legitimately constituted government, but this also adds to
  uncertainty and strategic risk.
  1-16. U.S. forces can participate at the request of a government that seeks to counter an insurgency in its
  country with assistance from the U.S. When a requesting government is capable and functioning, the U.S.
  can offer a wide range of capabilities. Having a capable government changes the relationship between ends,
  ways, and means. A capable government could require fewer resources to intervene, or it could only require
  indirect and direct enablers in order to be successful. However, as with any involvement to counter an
  insurgency, often unforeseen risks could lead to greater U.S. involvement.
  1-17. U.S. involvement can also occur in a country where there are ongoing security cooperation activities.
  If the U.S. is performing security cooperation activities in a country and an insurgency develops, continued
  security cooperation efforts could result in U.S. involvement in a host nation’s counterinsurgency efforts.
  Efforts to train and equip host-nation forces will likely be seen as U.S. involvement by both the insurgents
  and the international community. Moreover, U.S. forces could also transition to direct involvement in an
  insurgency. Whatever the degree of involvement, a clear policy decision should be made to include the
  development of a national strategy.
  1-18. Insurgencies could also be part of large scale combat or fueled by a regional or global adversary. In a
  protracted large scale operation, an insurgency often develops in controlled areas with populations
  sympathetic to the enemy. As such, planning for prevention of an insurgency and integrating stability
  operations into a prolonged operation is essential. If an insurgency develops, it will require resources to