text: Army Aviation Operations
  and non-contiguous AOs; or in the echelon support area to defeat enemy threats that were either bypassed
  during offensive operations or that have infiltrated or penetrated the main battle area or security area during
  the conduct of defensive or stability operations. Air assaults into the close fight are generally in extremis
  but may be used to exploit success by reinforcing friendly ground maneuver forces on an objective or to
  prevent friendly forces from being overrun. Based on mission and operational variables, Army Aviation
  executes air assaults with elements as small as a team of assault and a team of attack helicopters up to the
  aviation brigade level, either as a subordinate member of the combined arms team or as the AATF
  headquarters when task-organized with ground maneuver forces.
  3-123. The amount of time required to plan and prepare an air assault is largely driven by the complexity
  of the operation, the proficiency level of the ground and aviation forces forming the AATF, and the degree
  to which habitual relationships allow the use of standardized procedures to reduce planning and preparation
  times. Planning times can range from as short as 30 minutes for habitual quick reaction force missions up to
  96 hours for larger company, battalion or brigade air assaults in high threat areas. Ultimately, however, air
  assault planning should be as detailed as time permits and should include the production of written orders.
  3-124. Examples of the continuum of air assault. operations, from generally the smallest force with the
  least required planning and synchronization efforts, to very large, high risk air assault operations that
  require detailed planning and rehearsals include, but are not limited to—
  * A platoon (minus) air assaults to seize a small objective without a superior enemy security or
  reaction force in close proximity and low air defense threats (figure 3-20).
  Figure 3–20. Platoon (minus) air assault to seize a small objective
  * An infantry company air assaults to seize a lightly defended bridge within a linear deep area just
  beyond the FLOT to enable a BCT to maintain the offensive tempo without executing a
  deliberate wet gap crossing operation during the attack (figure 3-21, page 3-32).