text: Chapter 11
  tactical problem, develop possible courses of action, and evaluate and select the best course of action to
  most effectively address the tactical problem. Commanders and staffs first properly frame the problem.
  When given a set of inputs, such as an order from higher headquarters or some other initiating directive,
  certain intelligence products, and an initial commander’s visualization, commanders and staffs complete
  the steps to work toward a specified output, such as a finished operation order. In cases where host-nation
  security force leaders have been directly involved in combat operations over many years, those leaders who
  survive often owe their lives to their own ability to improvise. As a result, many host-nation security force
  leaders apply an intuitive, instead of a process-oriented, method of making decisions. They can
  immediately size up a tactical situation, almost instantaneously recognize dangers and opportunities, and
  decide upon a course of action. While this capability can serve in critical situations, it cannot be taught to
  others, and it is of no use in situations unrelated to the leader’s own experiential learning. Therefore, U.S.
  or multinational advisors may have to work patiently with their host-nation security force counterparts for
  them to develop a planning and decision support process instead of allowing them to rely solely on the
  intuitive approach.
  11-45. U.S. and multinational planners ensure that they have conducted basic mission analysis prior to
  parallel planning with host-nation partners. This allows advisors to develop and assess assumptions,
  identify implied and specified tasks, determine what assets and capabilities are available, and formulate a
  tentative timeline to coordinate advisory efforts throughout the planning process.