text: Sustainment Operations During Crisis
  strategies/alternatives developed as part of the sustainment plan. The following is a list of risk considerations
  (not all inclusive) during crisis operations:
  • Will the sustainment activities place the tactical plan at risk (for example, provide the enemy with
  sufficient information to know the plan)?
  • Have risk reduction measures been implemented and operational security measures been established
  to mitigate risks to operations? Are there sufficient forces to support combat operations if crisis
  operations are not successful?
  • Will sustainment activities precipitate transition to armed conflict?
  • Are sustainment systems hardened against cyber-attack? How do you validate requirements
  received through electronic systems? Does the threat have the capability to change information
  verses directed denial of service attacks?
  • Is coordination with host nations sufficient to ensure smooth flow into and out of APODs and
  SPODs? Have limits of host-nation ports been considered (for example, net explosive weight
  limitations and hazmat requirements) and planned to be accommodated?
  • Are security measures in place to protect critical resources such as commercial line haul, storage
  sites, stocks, caches, and critical infrastructure?
  TAILOR ARMY FORCES
  4-40. Force tailoring combines two complementary requirements-selecting the right forces and deploying the
  forces in the optimal sequence. Much of the effort for selection and deployment order occurs prior to
  deploying forces to a theater.
  4-41. Throughout the process, sustainment commands work with the theater Army sustainment staff to track
  force composition and order of deployment to ensure support is available to sustain the force package. The
  right types and number of sustainment units should be integrated early into the force flow.
  4-42. Selecting the right force involves identifying, selecting, and sourcing required Army capabilities and
  establishing their initial task organization to accomplish the mission. The result is an Army force package
  matched to the needs of the CCDR. The theater Army works with force providers (for example, FORSCOM
  and USAMC) to match the composition of the force with the forces identified in theater security cooperation
  plans or contingency plans. In the deliberate sustainment planning process, it is critical the Center for Army
  Analysis analyzes contingency plans and provides battle damage attrition estimates to the theater Army,
  TSCs, and USAMC LCMCs to ensure that adequate depot maintenance, calibration, and repair forward
  activities support is identified and integrated into the force flow for planning purposes.
  4-43. Force tailoring establishes the order of deployment for the force package, given the available lift and
  the CCDR's priorities. The organization established in force tailoring is not necessarily the same as the task
  organization for combat. It is a macro-level organization established to control the forces through deployment
  and RSOI.
  4-44. The Army National Guard and the Army Reserve makeup the Army Reserve Components. The Army
  National Guard represents Component 2, and the Army Reserve represents Component 3. Together, these
  two make up over half of the Army's total force.
  4-45. The Army Reserve Components are largely composed of sustainment and maneuver support forces.
  Almost 84 percent of the Army's sustainment force structure is in the Army Reserve Components. Army
  Reserve sustainment capabilities are essential for the operating force and provide the preponderance of
  sustainment, civil affairs, and psychological operations capabilities.
  4-46. The Army Reserve Components were not expected to deploy early into an operation. However, as the
  OE has changed and the balance of sustainment forces shifted from the Regular Army to the Army Reserves,
  Army Reserve Forces maintain higher levels of expeditionary readiness.
  RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION RESPONSIBILITIES
  4-47. A critical portion of the deployment process often associated with crisis operations is RSOI. It is this
  process that delivers combat power to the JFC in an AOR. RSOI is also a process the Army has not been
  challenged with to the extent required for large-scale combat operations in recent history. The increased
  challenge will stem from the initial deployment of large forces and will continue with a heavy flow of