text: Planning and Operational Considerations
  7-38. Transitions and assessments should be planned and executed from the beginning of any
  counterinsurgency. Commanders can build legitimacy by ensuring that the host nation takes responsibility
  for basic functions when it can. Therefore, building towards and executing that transition to the host nation
  is fundamental to the commander’s planning and operations. Transitions to other units or other agencies
  maintain a coherent and logical progression towards an ultimate transition to the host nation. The
  commander avoids allowing any U.S. element to transition with another U.S. or multinational element in a
  way that sets back the mission. This is also true for transitions between phases. A transition to another
  phase before the operational environment allows can have disastrous consequences.
  7-39. Effective counterinsurgency is about effectively linking tasks to a purpose and achieving that
  purpose. This is what makes lines of effort effective planning tools for a counterinsurgency. Whether
  commanders and staffs are using direct or indirect methods, they must link those methods to an end state.
  However, linking both assessments and transitions into each line of effort is just as essential. The end state
  of every line of effort is the creation of the conditions that satisfy the requirements of mission
  accomplishment. (See figure 7-2 on page 7-9.) In counterinsurgency, ultimate success comes when a
  society maintains its own legitimate government and defeats its insurgency using its own resources, not
  through outside enablers. Transitioning to that point requires a well planned effort that evaluates progress
  and executes all transitions in a way that does not undermine the objective of the line of effort. (See chapter
  12 for a further discussion on assessments.)
  7-40. A transition is a sequence of actions required to reorient on a changed situation, change to the next
  phase of action, or shift responsibility from one organization to another, not a specific point in time.
  Transitions require adequate time to allow for all transitional tasks to be completed. Thinking of a transition
  as a general series of actions rather than a point in time better aids commanders and staffs in recognizing
  transitions, planning for them, and executing them seamlessly.
  7-41. When transitions occur between organizations, whether between military units or from a military unit
  to a civilian agency, all involved organizations must clearly understand the tasks and responsibilities being
  transferred and the time expected for completion. Commanders and staffs enable coordination between
  units, agencies, and organizations to reduce the friction normally associated with a transition. Commanders
  identify a collaborative transition planning team early in the process.
  7-42. Commanders and staffs identify the criteria and conditions that must be met prior to executing a
  transition. For example, transitioning a strongpoint to host-nation control may require the host nation to
  allocate specialized personnel to replace the specialized personnel previously provided by other forces.
  Additionally, host-nation manning may need to be increased to offset the departure of transitioning forces.
  Commanders identify criteria for all parties involved or gaps will develop in execution. One criteria is the
  minimum sustainable effort of the host nation prior to transition. Getting the host nation’s minimum
  sustainable effort right with the proper balance for sustained effectiveness and long-term maintenance may
  reflect a less than optimal solution from the perspective of the counterinsurgent, but any higher level of
  effort by the host nation may actually jeopardize the legitimacy of the host nation in the long term by being
  too heavy-handed or too costly.
  7-43. Counterinsurgents must understand that transitions occur at varying times and locations based on the
  situation in a given area. A transition may be linear at the local level, but transitions may occur at multiple
  levels in the aggregate. For example, one battalion or brigade may have three village clusters in a build
  phase, one that has transitioned, and two that are in a clear phase without any geographic context. One
  host-nation security unit may be more advanced in training and equipping than another. As a result,
  counterinsurgent forces may have to tailor their approach on a daily basis depending on the area, village, or
  unit where they are operating. Success in counterinsurgency operations requires small-unit leaders agile
  enough to transition among many types of missions and able to adapt to change. (See chapter 9 for more
  information on the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework.)
  7-44. Maintaining unity of effort is particularly important during transitions, especially between
  organizations of different capabilities and capacities. Relationships tend to break down during transitions.
  A poorly executed transition affects the success of the mission and places the new unit at risk. Ego and
  unhealthy competition are often the greatest impediments to achieving an effective transition, and they
  increase unnecessary risks to Soldiers, Marines, and the mission. Commanders must set the tone for their
  forces to accomplish effective physical and contextual transitions.