text: Cyberspace Considerations During Multinational Operations
  12-28. Combatant commanders direct joint cyberspace operations within their respective areas of
  responsibility with support from USCYBERCOM and assigned cyberspace forces. USCYBERCOM assigns
  operational cyberspace forces to the joint operations commander based on the needs of the operational
  environment and availability.
  12-29. The joint cyberspace center and theater network operations control center collaborate with
  USCYBERCOM cyberspace support element, the Defense Information Systems Agency (known as DISA)
  enterprise operations center, and Service component Department of Defense information network (known as
  DODIN) operations centers to ensure effective operation and defense of the theater network.
  CENTRALIZED VERSUS DECENTRALIZED OPERATIONS
  12-30. Clearly established command relationships, unity of command, and unity of effort ensure timely and
  effective employment of cyberspace capabilities. However, the complex nature of cyberspace operations—
  where cyberspace forces can simultaneously operate at the global, theater, or joint operations area, and
  tactical levels—requires adaptations to traditional C2 structures. Multinational forces generally employ
  centralized planning and decentralized execution of operations. Due to their ability to create effects far
  outside the AO, cyberspace operations require constant and detailed coordination at the theater and global
  levels to deconflict with other operations in theater.
  12-31. Certain cyberspace operations functions, including cyberspace defense and pursuit of global
  cyberspace threats, lend themselves to centralized planning and execution to meet multiple, near-real time
  requirements for response. Multinational force commanders should integrate and synchronize centrally
  controlled cyberspace operations with regional or local cyberspace operations conducted by forces in the AO.
  For these reasons, there may be times when commanders exercise C2 of forces executing simultaneous global
  cyberspace operations and theater cyberspace operations using supported and supporting command
  relationships under separate, but synchronized, chains of command. The supported commander integrates
  and synchronizes cyberspace operations into the concept of operations and detailed plans and orders.
  DECONFLICTION WITH NATIONAL-LEVEL CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS
  12-32. In partnership with USCYBERCOM, the combatant command in the geographic location coordinates
  regionally with interorganizational and multinational partners to deconflict combatant commander-directed
  cyberspace operations with DOD or other U.S. Government cyberspace activities within the area of
  responsibility. As early as possible in the planning process, combatant commands gather cyberspace
  requirements from U.S. forces and UAPs in theater. The combatant command uses that information to
  provide USCYBERCOM with enough details about combatant commander-planned cyberspace operations
  to deconflict them with other U.S. Government cyberspace activities.
  12-33. Each combatant command with a geographic mission has a theater-aligned combat mission team to
  provide cyberspace operations expertise and enable the combatant command staff to integrate operational-
  and tactical-level cyberspace activities into operation plans. Joint force headquarters-cyberspace exercises
  operational control of combat mission teams and aligns teams to specific target sets within the area of
  responsibility. The combatant command staff and joint force headquarters-cyberspace establish unity of
  command and unity of effort for the combatant commander’s (or combined joint force commander’s)
  cyberspace operations through direction of the combat mission teams.
  SYNCHRONIZATION WITH OTHER OPERATIONS
  12-34. Cyberspace operations may create effects in the land, maritime, air, and space domains. Commanders
  can use cyberspace operations to affect threat capabilities. Commanders use their resources and knowledge
  of systemic operational behaviors to identify and mitigate unintended consequences. These unintended
  consequences can affect the following:
  • Cyberspace security governance addressing—
  ▪ Policy and doctrine.
  ▪ Key risk indicator identification.
  ▪ Third-party cyberspace risk assessment.