text: Chapter 3
  radio frequency interference, and other naturally occurring phenomenon such as radiation and space weather.
  A robust DSC capability influences enemies’ perceptions of space capabilities and makes them less confident
  in successfully interfering with those capabilities. Friendly forces may be warned when enemy space-based
  reconnaissance and surveillance assets will be in a position to view and record activity. An example of DSC
  enabled by SSA is forces using camouflage, concealment, and deception techniques to protect themselves
  when notified of potential space-based observations.
  3-23. DSC operations protect our capabilities from deliberate interference and threat actor’ attacks. DSC
  preserves access to, and use of, space capabilities by reacting to events affecting U.S. and multinational space
  capabilities. DSC is built on the capabilities to detect and characterize interference, locate the source of
  interference, and defeat the interference, all of which support deterring deliberate interference. DSC is
  consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deters others from deliberate interference and attack,
  defends our space systems, contributes to the defense of multinational space systems, and if deterrence fails,
  supports efforts to attack them.
  3-24. DSC provides encryption and protection of vital communications and information collection links
  necessary to support the force in permissive operations and D3SOE. Protection of assets from adversarial
  exploitation ensures the commander’s ability to communicate and navigate in a D3SOE. Passive DSC
  protection measures such as encryption and electronic hardening of GPS receivers increases the likelihood
  Soldiers will receive GPS information in a D3SOE. Active DSC protection actions such as geo-locating
  jamming sources assist Soldiers to find, fix, and destroy jammers.
  OFFENSIVE SPACE CONTROL
  3-25. OSC is offensive actions taken to negate attacks against U.S. and friendly space assets. The
  importance of space capabilities in military operations makes it crucial to be capable to negate enemy efforts
  interfering with or attacking U.S. and multinational space capabilities. OSC actions employ both reversible
  and nonreversible effects. Measures include actions against ground, data link, and space segments or user to
  deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy enemy’s space systems, or to thwart hostile interference on U.S.
  and multinational space systems.
  * Deceive—measures designed to mislead an adversary by manipulation, distortion, or falsification
  of evidence or information into a system to induce the adversary to react in a manner prejudicial
  to their interests.
  * Disrupt—measures designed to temporarily impair an adversary’s use or access of a system for a
  period, usually without physical damage to the affected system.
  * Deny—measures designed to temporarily eliminate an adversary’s use, access, or operation of a
  system for a period, usually without physical damage to the affected system.
  * Degrade—measures designed to permanently impair (either partially or totally) the adversary’s
  use of a system, usually with some physical damage to the affected system.
  * Destroy—measures designed to permanently eliminate the adversary’s use of a system, usually
  with physical damage to the affected system.
  NAVIGATION WARFARE
  3-26. The intent of NAVWAR is to ensure unimpeded access to GNSS for joint forces and multinational
  partners while denying the same to the enemy. It encompasses various offensive, defensive, and support
  activities (such as surveillance, reconnaissance, and EMS management) to ensure unimpeded availability and
  integrity of PNT information. NAVWAR may be implemented in a localized area or across all domains and
  mission areas. NAVWAR should be a consideration in all joint planning efforts. As it has strategic
  implications, it is incumbent upon the Army and joint forces to minimize unintended disruption to civil PNT
  services for non-combatants outside the military area or operations.
  3-27. The effects of NAVWAR on many systems are complex and may be limited in scope to a few miles
  or cover an entire AOR. It includes varying conditions from mild degradation to total GNSS denial, and may
  include GNSS signal spoofing. The loss of GNSS signal may yield a significant decrease in the ability to
  conduct mission operations. The impact due to GNSS interference—intentional or otherwise—goes far