text: Chapter 5
  Note. Army forces also respond to crises related to disaster response, humanitarian assistance, and
  defense support to civil authorities when tasked. These crisis contexts and response options are
  covered in separate doctrinal publications. See JP 3-28, JP 3-29, ADP 3-07, ADP 3-28, FM 3-07,
  and ATP 3-57.20 for more information on these types of crises and associated response options.
  ADVERSARY METHODS DURING CRISIS
  5-4. A crisis is frequently caused by an adversary acting aggressively to coerce and intimidate its opponents
  with the threat of force. Once an adversary crosses a U.S., allied, or partner crisis threshold, it attempts to
  shape and control the crisis to limit or prevent a U.S. military response. An adversary’s attempts to control
  the situation involves escalating or de-escalating its activities based on an assessment of the situation, which
  includes a calculation of risk. Adversary forces conduct a detailed analysis of their available capabilities,
  capacity, and operational reach within a theater relative to friendly forces; their overall desired end state; and
  their willingness to achieve that end state before deciding to escalate. Even after careful analysis, the way a
  situation develops can be unpredictable. Some peer adversaries view conflict as a continuous condition in
  which heightened or reduced periods of violence occur and recur. Changing the intensity of their actions,
  even when that reduces tension, does not end their campaign to oppose U.S. interests.
  ADVERSARY ACTIVITIES TO SHAPE A CRISIS
  5-5. As a crisis develops, peer adversaries will attempt to shape the situation to their benefit through
  information warfare and preclusion focused on the U.S. joint force. They may use diplomatic, economic, and
  information means to divide an opponent’s political leadership from its civilian population. They create
  separation by introducing or exacerbating distrust and division between different groups to weaken an
  opponent’s political leadership and to create dissatisfaction among an opponent’s civilian population.
  Adversaries position military forces in ways to increase uncertainty for opponents and to complicate their
  decision making. These activities create conditions for the adversary to exploit situations with minimal
  interference from the U.S., allied, or partner military forces.
  5-6. Adversaries may use proxy forces to conduct information warfare, unconventional warfare, and
  criminal activities, although the balance and utility of these forces in crisis differs from their use during
  competition. Proxy forces, whether they are a militant separatist group, private military company, or criminal
  network, bring different capabilities to a situation, and the employment of their capabilities shifts as the
  strategic context changes. For example, while criminal networks can still accomplish useful tasks in
  environments marked by increased levels of violence, they do not have the same level of utility that they did
  during competition. Similarly, separatist groups cannot typically operate without significant support from
  their sponsor’s military or security services, and that support is likely to be focused elsewhere at the beginning
  of a crisis. Despite their limitations, proxy forces provide adversaries with another tool to shape a crisis
  situation.
  ACTIVITIES TO CONTROL ESCALATION
  5-7. Peer adversaries may attempt to control the escalation of a crisis to avoid armed conflict with the
  United States by initiating actions to prevent or counter a U.S. response. These actions may focus on allies
  or partners using diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments. Adversary measures include
  setting fait accompli conditions on the ground designed to make military responses either too expensive to
  employ or too late to affect the political situation. An adversary also has other options to control escalation,
  which include accelerating its operational timelines, employing information warfare, increasing support to
  proxy forces, and increasing the number of forward deployed units in the region. Adversary forces may also
  initiate crises in other theaters to distract U.S. forces and diffuse their response in the area of greatest interest.
  In extreme cases, an adversary may conduct a limited attack in response to U.S. reactions to the activities
  that precipitated the original crisis.