text: Chapter 5
  what operations were executed correctly and what could have been done better. This information must be
  passed on so that others can learn from the operation. Finally, unit members must account for and clean
  their equipment in order to be ready for the next operation. The debrief, at a minimum, should include—
  • Specifics on the five W’s (who, what, when, where, why) and how.
  • Photos or sketches.
  • Answers to priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and other information requirements.
  • Actionable intelligence.
  • Recap of route.
  • Reports of enemy contact.
  • Engagements conducted:
  (cid:131) Who engaged the guerrilla force?
  (cid:131) What concerns have the HN population brought to the patrols attention?
  (cid:131) What promises did the US make as a result of these concerns?
  • Tips or actionable information for intelligence.
  • Noteworthy observations (propaganda, graffiti, and so on).
  • Changes in the HN population, which leaders can use to improve understanding of community
  dynamics. These changes may be detected in—
  (cid:131) People’s attitudes toward coalition forces.
  (cid:131) Local infrastructure.
  (cid:131) Civil leadership.
  (cid:131) Local organization.
  (cid:131) Civil institutions.
  Section III—OTHER LINES OF EFFORT
  Offensive operations enable and complement the other lines of effort—support HN security forces, restore
  essential services, provide support to economic and infrastructure development, provide support to governance,
  and conduct information tasks. Without the increased security resulting from offensive operations, units may
  not be able to accomplish any significant tasks in the other LOE.
  SUPPORT HOST NATION SECURITY FORCES
  5-220. The preferred method is to conduct all offensive operations combined with HN security forces
  to improve their tactical and technical competence and develop their professionalism. This technique also
  takes advantage of both forces’ strengths and capabilities, especially the HN security forces’ language
  skills and cultural knowledge. An example of this is a combined cordon and search of a suspected
  insurgent village where US forces establish the outer cordon and the HN security forces conduct the actual
  search of the village.
  SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE
  5-221. In COIN, tactical units must consider how offensive operations can be used to assist their efforts
  to strengthen the local government. For instance, a unit might conduct a combined cordon and search based
  on a tip provided by the local mayor, assist in securing polling sites during local or national elections,
  or set the conditions for completion of a government project. Units must remember that all offensive
  operations support one or another group’s political agenda. Eliminating one insurgent group may lead
  to another group filling the power vacuum.
  RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES
  5-222. Tactical units must consider how to incorporate essential service projects as a complementary
  portion of their offensive operations. For instance, delivering water to a neighborhood without clean
  drinking water can be useful in several ways. For example, it may afford the opportunity to gather
  intelligence for an upcoming raid, reconnoiter for a cordon and search, serve as a deception for the