text: Chapter 5
  depending on command and control relationships, with deep operations to degrade the enemy’s will to fight,
  destroy high-payoff targets, and disrupt enemy defensive infrastructure and sustainment.
  5-334. Sustainment capability is organic to Army organizations that execute long-range fires, rocket artillery,
  rotary wing aviation, and cyberspace, space, multidomain effects, and special operations units that support
  attacking targets in the deep areas. Specific organizations include the ARSOF GSB, multi-domain task force
  BSB, CAB ASB, fires brigade BSB, and FSCs supporting the long-range fires, rocket artillery, rotary-wing
  aviation, and special forces battalions.
  CLOSE OPERATIONS
  5-335. Close operations occur where forces at divisions and lower echelons maneuver, and where forces at
  the maneuver brigade and lower echelons conduct most direct fire engagements. Maneuver brigades and
  lower echelon formations destroy or render enemy forces combat ineffective through movement and fires
  during close operations.
  5-336. Close operations require graphic control measures to synchronize the application of combat power, to
  ensure integration of subordinate units, to maintain maximum pressure on the enemy, and to mitigate the risk
  of fratricide within the friendly force. Maneuver brigades have limited ability to control long LOCs, and their
  tempo and endurance is affected by time and distance of resupply, casualty evacuation, and other sustainment
  considerations.
  5-337. Sustainment capability is organic to Army organizations that execute close operations to destroy or
  render enemy forces combat ineffective. Specific organizations include the maneuver brigade BSBs and
  FSCs supporting combined arms battalions, infantry battalions, and cavalry squadrons.
  TRANSITION TO DEFENSE AND STABILITY
  5-338. When offensive operations culminate before enemy forces are defeated, friendly forces rapidly
  transition to the defense. Commanders may deliberately transition to the defense when enemy forces are
  incapable of fully exploiting an opportunity, or when they believe they can build combat power to resume
  the offense before enemy forces can react effectively. Depending on where culmination occurs, friendly
  forces may have to reposition forces on defensible terrain and develop a form of defense and scheme of
  maneuver based on an assessment of the mission variables.
  5-339. Successful offensive operations end because Army forces have achieved their assigned objectives. A
  successful offense can also require a transition to a defensive posture dominated by stability operations and
  a strategic environment moving toward post-conflict political goals. As a transition to stability operations
  occurs, leaders focus on stability tasks and information activities to inform and influence populations and
  conduct security force assistance. Effective collaboration with diplomatic and humanitarian organizations
  enhances the ability to achieve stability mechanisms.
  TRANSITION TO POST-CONFLICT COMPETITION
  5-340. Army forces conclude armed conflict by establishing conditions that are favorable to the United States
  on the ground. Army forces support these conditions throughout armed conflict by consolidating gains and
  prosecuting operations with the desired end state in mind. As hostilities end, stability tasks dominate
  operations with the purpose of transitioning responsibilities to legitimate authorities in a secure environment.
  Army forces provide the joint force with the option of establishing a military transitional government before
  transitioning full governing responsibility to host nation or other provisional governments.
  5-341. To achieve unity of effort, sustainment commanders synchronize efforts with U.S. and foreign
  government agencies, international agencies, nongovernmental organizations, other unified action partners,
  and contractors. As the security situation improves, Army forces may transfer responsibility for minimum-
  essential stability operations to other forces or appropriate civilian organizations while transitioning to the
  performance of primary stability tasks. Sustainment forces should anticipate this transition to avoid mission
  failure. Sustainment forces must be prepared to support the Department of State as the lead agency in
  stabilization activities transition to post-conflict competition. For additional information on stability
  operations and interorganizational coordination, see JP 3-07, JP 3-08, and ADP 3-0.