text: Chapter 3
  Security Cooperation in the Competition Continuum
  This chapter describes SC in the competition continuum. First, it provides an overview
  of the competition continuum and SC in competition below armed conflict. Next, it
  discusses preparing FSF for combat across the range of military operations and SC’s
  role in setting the theater for multidomain and multinational operations in competition.
  Then it discusses the transition to crisis or armed conflict, provides an overview of SC
  in crisis and the activities at echelon during crisis. After that, the chapter discusses the
  transition to competition or armed conflict, an overview of SC in armed conflict, and
  the transition back to competition and post-conflict stabilization. Finally, the chapter
  concludes with a discussion on SC support to post-conflict stabilization.
  THE COMPETITION CONTINUUM
  3-1. SC occurs throughout the competition continuum but with different areas of emphasis, depending upon
  the level of cooperation and competition between the United States and other global powers; the unique
  position, geopolitical status, and military capabilities of a particular ally or partner; and the nature of that
  relationship with the United States. SC contributes to the ability of allies and partners to perform roles in
  support of U.S. campaign and contingency plans. SC activities and programs aim to ensure allies and partners
  can contribute to collective or common security effects (JP 3-20). The three security cooperation activities
  of SFA, SA, and military engagement must be fully integrated and synchronized to achieve optimal
  synergistic effects across the competition continuum. Effectively synchronizing the different programs is one
  of the critical tasks all SC practitioners must accomplish to achieve desired end states.
  3-2. The strategies used in competition below the level of armed conflict will vary depending on the
  circumstances, but successful action should have distinct traits. First and foremost, the Army should have a
  thorough understanding of how relevant actors will view or respond to the action. Second, the Army and
  partner FSF should carry out a wide range of tasks, such as establishing access to critical areas, forward
  positioning of forces, establishing appropriate and timely presence, organizing exercises, sharing intelligence
  (in accordance with foreign disclosure policies and procedures), continuous OPE, and conducting
  information operations to counter and undermine the adversarial narrative. Third, the Army and the partner
  FSF should ensure that these tasks can be carried out in a creative and flexible manner and are adaptable to
  changes in the strategic environment. Finally, the Army should conduct continuous reassessment and
  reevaluation of adversarial capabilities and intent.
  3-3. Strategic guidance calls for a renewal and strengthening of partner relationships to ensure national and
  global security. SC activities provide the “ways” to accomplish this end state by nurturing current alliances
  and building new partnerships designed to increase partner capability and capacity, and enable
  interoperability in joint, multidomain, and multinational operations. SC activities enable the Army to engage
  in strategic competition to protect and advance U.S. national interests, deter hostile aggression, counter
  adversarial competitive strategies, and set the conditions for engaging in armed conflict from a position of
  advantage if deterrence fails.
  3-4. SC plays a critical role in current doctrine across all aspects of the competition continuum. During
  competition, SC shapes an OE by deterring adversaries and setting conditions for the joint force to maneuver
  from a position of advantage if required. During crisis, SC enables the joint force commander to deter
  adversaries by quickly building credible combat power with a small, rapidly deployable U.S. SFA element
  that can embed and provide support to foreign security forces. This provides immediate capabilities on the
  ground by enabling foreign security forces already in theater to rapidly integrate with U.S.-provided joint