text: Appendix A
  A-24. DOD has created several decision support tools to perform criticality assessments in support of the
  vulnerability assessment process, including mission, symbolism, history, accessibility, recognizability,
  population, and proximity (MSHARPP) and criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and
  recognizability (CARVER) (see ATP 3-37.2 for more information on MSHARPP and CARVER)—
  * MSHARPP. The purpose of the MSHARPP tool is to analyze likely terrorist targets and assess
  their vulnerabilities from the inside out, with focus on the U.S. military mission. Consideration is
  given to local threats, the probable means of attacks, and variables that affect dispositions of
  potential targets. After developing a list of potential targets, MSHARPP selection factors are used
  to assist in further refining the assessment by associating a weapon or tactic with a potential target
  to determine the efficiency, effectiveness, and plausibility of the attack method and to identify
  vulnerabilities related to the target. When the MSHARPP values for each target or component are
  assigned, the sum of the values indicates the highest-value target (for a particular mode of attack)
  within the limits of enemy known capabilities. See ATP 3-37.2 for additional information on the
  MSHARPP tool.
  * CARVER. The CARVER matrix is a valuable tool in determining criticality and vulnerability.
  For criticality purposes, CARVER helps assessment teams and commanders (and the assets that
  they are responsible for) determine assets that are more critical to the success of the mission. This
  also helps determine which resources should be allocated to protect critical assets (personnel,
  infrastructure, and information). The CARVER matrix assesses a potential target from a terrorist
  perspective to identify what the enemy might perceive as a good (soft or valuable) target.
  ESTABLISH PROTECTION PRIORITIES
  A-25. Criticality, vulnerability, and recoverability are some of the most significant considerations in
  determining protection priorities that become the subject of support area commanders’ guidance and the focus
  of area security operations. The scheme of protection is based on the mission variables and should include
  protection priorities by area, unit, activity, or resource.
  A-26. Although all military assets are important and all resources have value, the capabilities they represent
  are not equal in their contribution to decisive operations or overall mission accomplishment. Determining
  and directing protection priorities may involve the most important decisions that commanders make and their
  staffs support. There are seldom sufficient resources to simultaneously provide the same level of protection
  to all assets.
  A-27. Most prioritization methodologies assist in differentiating what is important from what is urgent. In
  protection planning, the challenge is to differentiate between critical assets and important assets and to further
  determine what protection is possible with available protection capabilities. Event-driven operations may be
  short in duration, enabling a formidable protection posture for a short time; condition-driven operations may
  be open-ended and long-term, requiring an enduring and sustainable scheme of protection. In either situation,
  the support area commander provides guidance on prioritizing protection capabilities and categorizing
  important assets.
  PROTECTION PRIORITIZATION LIST
  A-28. Protection prioritization lists are organized through the proper alignment of critical assets. The
  commander’s priorities and intent and the impacts on mission planning determine critical assets. A critical
  asset is a specific entity that is of such extraordinary importance that its incapacitation or destruction would
  have a very serious, debilitating effect on the ability of a nation to continue to function effectively
  (JP 3-26). Critical assets can be people, property, equipment, activities, operations, information, facilities, or
  materials. For example, important communications facilities and utilities, analyzed through criticality
  assessments, provide information to prioritize resources while reducing the potential application of resources
  on lower-priority assets. Stationary weapons systems might be identified as critical to the execution of
  military operations and, therefore, receive additional protection. The lack of a replacement may cause a
  critical asset to become a top priority for protection.
  A-29. The protection cell and working group use information derived from the support area commander’s
  guidance, the IPB, targeting, risk management, warning orders, the critical asset list and defended asset list,