text: Introduction
  This manual gives the US Army a common language, concept, and purpose to fight and achieve success in a
  counterinsurgency. COIN is a complex subset of warfare that encompasses all military, paramilitary, political,
  economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency at the company, battalion,
  and brigade levels. To do this, the manual merges traditional approaches to COIN with the realities of the current
  operational environment.
  The US Army thinking and doctrine on COIN tactics since the end of World War II have focused on the conduct
  of counterguerrilla operations in the later stages of insurgency. The Army has seen itself as defeating guerrilla
  forces—usually communist forces—rather than defeating an entire insurgency. It saw success as something it could
  achieve by using the force of arms directly against guerrilla forces. This doctrine of COIN began to take shape shortly
  after World War II in manuals such as FM 31-20, Operations against Guerrilla Forces (1951) and later in FM 31-15,
  Operations against Irregular Forces (1961). The Army refined its counterinsurgency doctrine during Vietnam
  in FM 31-22, US Counterinsurgency Force, FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations (both published in 1963)
  and in FM 31-23, Stability and Support Operations (1972). After Vietnam, the Army split COIN doctrine off from
  conventional “high intensity” operations in FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (1990) in which
  the “light” forces owned counterinsurgency, and FM 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations (1986), where the focus
  remained on defeating the guerrilla force. This manual is the historical successor to FM 90-8. In addition, parts of FM
  100-20 have been integrated into this FM, as have the Army’s concept of full-spectrum operations and all elements
  of COIN operations.
  At its heart, a counterinsurgency is an armed struggle for the support of the population. This support can be achieved
  or lost through information engagement, strong representative government, access to goods and services, fear,
  or violence. This armed struggle also involves eliminating insurgents who threaten the safety and security of the
  population. However, military units alone cannot defeat an insurgency. Most of the work involves discovering
  and solving the population’s underlying issues, that is, the root causes of their dissatisfaction with the current
  arrangement of political power. Dealing with diverse issues such as land reform, unemployment, oppressive
  leadership, or ethical tensions places a premium on tactical leaders who can not only close with the enemy, but also
  negotiate agreements, operate with nonmilitary agencies and other nations, restore basic services, speak the native (a
  foreign) language, orchestrate political deals, and get "the word" on the street.
  Today’s counterinsurgent battlefield is increasingly cluttered with US, Host Nation, and other coalition forces, each
  with its own strengths and limitations. In addition, multiple insurgent groups, nongovernmental organizations, armed
  contractors, and a local population divided into several ethnic groups add to this clutter. A counterinsurgency
  long-range plan for a tactical unit combines offensive, defensive and stability operations. To achieve the appropriate
  ratio between these and accomplish unity of effort among diverse units and actors, units must build long-term plans
  around the seven counterinsurgency lines of effort: establish civil security, establish civil control, support Host Nation
  forces, support to governance, restore essential services, support economic and infrastructure development,
  and conduct information engagement.
  All seven lines of effort are critical to establishing unity of effort for actions conducted by US units, Host Nation
  security forces, and the Host Nation government. These actions can range from killing or capturing an insurgent cell
  known to emplace IEDs, to solving unemployment in an area, to publicizing the opening of a water treatment facility.
  Without unity of effort over time, the tactical unit’s long-range plan will face challenges in securing the population,
  gathering the population’s support, and defeating the insurgency.
  Counterinsurgency is an iterative process. Tactical units can conduct a wide variety of operations. These can include
  anything from a combined cordon and search operation with Host Nation security forces, to a medical operation
  to inoculate a hamlet’s children against disease, to a road project to connect a village to the highway, to a loudspeaker
  broadcast to inform a village about a recent council meeting. Regardless of the mission, successful tactical units learn
  and adapt as they discover more about their own strengths and limitations—and the strengths and limitations of the
  Host Nation government, the populace, and the insurgents. This manual furthers FM 3-24’s theory that “in COIN, the
  side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly—the better learning organization—usually wins.”
  Each counterinsurgency is unique. Leaders must always execute good judgment, tactical patience, and innovation
  to defeat an insurgency. As the US Army continues its lengthy battles against insurgency around the world, tactical
  units must continue to focus on securing the support of the population, achieving unity of effort, and learning
  and adapting faster than the insurgents do.