text: Intelligence
  1-118. The complexity of the intelligence architecture can be exemplified through a portion of the
  architecture referred to as foundation layer. The foundation layer supports all-source and single-source
  analysis and production through technical aspects such as data management, sensor processing,
  interoperability, data standards, and other advanced services. Examples of fielded and partially fielded
  systems and applications within the foundation layer include the GEOINT Workstation (also known as
  GWS), Carbon/Capability Drop 1 (also known as CD1), and Army Intelligence Data Platform/Capability
  Drop 2 (also known as AIDP/CD2).
  Note. Due to the variety of fielded and partially fielded systems and applications, this publication
  will refer to them generically as intelligence analysis systems.
  1-119. For more discussion on the intelligence architecture see chapter 5 and appendix B.
  SECTION V – FIGHTING FOR INTELLIGENCE AT AND ACROSS ECHELONS
  1-120. Providing effective and flexible intelligence support against a determined and adaptive threat—
  whether a peer threat or terrorist cell—is a significant challenge referred to as fighting for intelligence.
  Fighting for intelligence spans the Army strategic contexts; several factors create this challenge, hindering
  the provision of effective and flexible intelligence support:
  ⚫ Threat efforts to deny, minimize, or confuse friendly information collection from camouflage,
  countermeasures, and deception to lethal counterreconnaissance during armed conflict.
  ⚫ The inherent complexities of information collection. Any single collection capability is likely
  not effective enough in answering all intelligence requirements; managers should employ
  multiple capabilities to enhance collection results.
  ⚫ The complexities associated with intelligence readiness and the intelligence enterprise and
  architecture.
  ⚫ The complexities of multidomain operations and many competing demands on the intelligence
  warfighting function.
  ⚫ The difficulties inherent in understanding the domains and dimensions of the OE, especially the
  human and information dimensions where events do not occur purely based on logic, and the
  information dimension where activities are often inseparable from ground operations.
  ⚫ The fog and friction of operations; this can occur even during competition below armed conflict
  and crisis.
  ⚫ Perfect planning and intelligence production seldomly occurring. There are frequent time
  constraints and other complications in performing important staff planning and intelligence
  processes.
  1-121. The challenge to provide effective and flexible intelligence support constantly changes. Factors that
  influence this challenge include but are not limited to—
  ⚫ The threat (or threats) and how it adapts.
  ⚫ Threat countermeasures against friendly information collection.
  ⚫ The OE and conditions within a particular Army strategic context.
  ⚫ The friendly echelon and type of unit.
  ⚫ The friendly overall operation.
  ⚫ The friendly mission.
  ⚫ Intelligence authorities and architecture.
  ⚫ Intelligence requirements.