text: Defensive Considerations in Counterinsurgency
  Figure 6-14. Types of snipers.
  CONSIDERATIONS DURING COUNTERINSURGENCIES
  6-92. Sniper operations have the same effect in insurgencies as they do in conventional warfare, but the
  purpose is different. For example, in conventional warfare, a sniper targets leaders in order to cause
  confusion on the battlefield and disrupt operations. In an insurgency, a sniper will still target leaders, but
  more for use in propaganda that can be used after a successful attack. Additionally, he can create the
  attitude that the area of his operations is not secure and the Host Nation government is powerless to stop
  him. Since the sniper has the initiative, leaders must enforce compliance with the countermeasures.
  Implementing countermeasures halfheartedly invites casualties from snipers who can wait hours for the
  moment when a unit’s guard is down. US forces have two categories of sniper countermeasures: active
  countermeasures and passive countermeasures. Each has its place, depending on the METT-TC mission
  variables.
  Active Countermeasures
  6-93. Active countermeasures seek to detect and destroy the sniper before he can fire, or engage
  and neutralize him after he fires.
  Observation Posts and Observers
  6-94. Observation posts should have access to powerful spotting telescopes, medium power binoculars,
  night observation devices (thermal, if possible), and remote control closed circuit cameras. Additionally,
  laser countermeasure should be employed, such as laser protective glasses, binoculars with laser filters,
  and indirect-view optics to protect observers. Additionally, many electronic detection devices are available
  to aid in the detection of snipers such as acoustic devices. Once detected, snipers can then be neutralized
  or forced to withdraw. Observers can maintain a constant surveillance over potential sniper positions
  and detect snipers as they attempt to move into position for a shot. Constantly scanning an area for the
  minute movements made by a well-trained sniper is exhausting. Therefore, personnel on static OP duty
  should rotate frequently. Unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and rotary wing aircraft should be integrated
  into an OP plan to give it depth.
  Patrols
  6-95. Constant reconnaissance and security patrols around a unit’s position hinder a sniper from getting
  into a firing position undetected. Small patrols are usually more effective than large ones. A moving sniper
  who has been discovered by a patrol is at a great disadvantage since he lacks the firepower to fight a long
  engagement. Small night reconnaissance patrols using night vision devices can be very effective
  in disrupting and interdicting a sniper. Reconnaissance patrols should move by covered and concealed
  routes to good observation points; should stop and observe; and then should move to another position. The
  patrol routes and times must vary, and a reaction force or supporting weapons must be ready if the patrol
  makes contact. A variation of the ambush patrol is the stay-behind ambush. A small ambush element
  moves as part of a larger patrol and occupies its position without being observed. It then observes its kill
  zone, which may be very large if the element has a sniper team with it, and engages enemy snipers as they
  attempt to move into position. Currently, SKTs, SCTs, or small observation teams (SOTs) conduct
  ambushes of likely sniper positions.