text: Sustainment Operations During Armed Conflict
  Tactical Mobility
  5-72. Tactical mobility is the ability of friendly forces to move and maneuver freely on the battlefield relative
  to the enemy (ADP 3-90). By design, tactical units are generally more mobile and therefore require fewer
  external transportation assets to relocate. However, corps and division enablers have limited organic
  transportation assets and require significant assistance to move rapidly over long distances. Achieving tactical
  mobility varies based upon unit composition and operational requirements. Sustainment units generally
  require external support from transportation enablers. It is difficult, but not impossible, for the DSB to
  conduct sustainment operations while displacing. The DSB requires augmentation from a corps sustainment
  brigade and prioritization of effort. Augmentation extends the division's tactical reach by enabling the DSB
  to push supplies to the BSB and the BSB to subsequently push supplies to supported units. Additional
  information on the mobility ratings and requirements for specific units can be found in the Section 1 narrative
  of the Table of Organization and Equipment.
  Sustainment Mobility
  5-73. Sustainment mobility is the ability to support logistics, financial management, personnel services, and
  HSS operations. Motor transport operations provide essential distribution and lift capabilities for supporting
  sustainment mobility. The DSB's composite truck company requires augmentation to support sustainment
  mobility. Without augmentation, the composite truck company's capacity is consumed with supporting
  tactical mobility. The lack of augmentation requires BSBs to pull supplies from the division support area
  instead of receiving supplies from the DSB. The FSCs in turn must then pull supplies from the BSA and push
  supplies to the forward line of own troops multiple times a day. By design, maneuver brigades have two
  mobile days of supplies with one day of supplies located at the FSC and one day of supplies located at the
  BSB. The third day of supplies is not mobile and is stored at the BSA.
  MISSION ANALYSIS: REQUIREMENTS, CAPABILITIES, AND
  SHORTFALLS
  5-74. For sustainment planning, the most important factors are requirements, capabilities, and shortfalls. For
  example, insufficient transportation assets impact the ability of sustainment units to rapidly disperse or
  displace. Extended supply lines present significant challenges to bulk petroleum distribution. Peer threats
  impact the Army’s ability to outsource fuel distribution, forcing sustainment commands to use military assets
  over extended supply lines. The inability to leverage OCS or host-nation assets may result in operational
  pause or culmination before reaching an objective. Commanders and staffs at all echelons assess what is
  needed to support the force, what is on hand, and how to mitigate any shortfalls in space and time. The results
  developed by applying command and control systems and analytics in support of large-scale combat
  operations differ from those during prevent operations in scope and composition, but the analytical process
  is the same. The same is true of capability assessment.
  5-75. Protection planning is a continuous process that must include a thorough understanding of the OE.
  Sustainment planners must also consider requesting additional security and control measures (military police
  escort, route clearance, checkpoints, traffic control posts) to protect movements or alleviate traffic concerns
  along an area of a specific route. Sustainment planners must be active participants in the protection working
  group to articulate, organize, and synchronize needed security resources and activities. Additional security
  and control measures may be established to facilitate the movement of a single element, or they may be
  established for a longer period of time to facilitate the movement of a number of elements along a given
  route. The owner of an AO should apply protection measures within the AO along an established main supply
  route or a route designated for unit movement when there is an increased enemy threat. See ADP 3-37 for
  additional information on protection.
  5-76. Maneuver brigades with organic BSBs and FSCs have relatively robust logistics capability to fulfill
  maintenance requirements in most cases. However, a shortfall exists in armored and Stryker brigades because
  these lack track and specialized armor maintenance capabilities beyond the FSC. Commanders in the two-
  level maintenance system have multiple options available for maximizing maintenance capabilities. They
  may choose to utilize maintenance surge teams in armored and Stryker brigades to address the shortfall in
  maintenance capabilities. Commanders may want to consider echeloning maintenance and recovery assets to
  maintain responsive support to sustain momentum and preserve combat power. Commanders may choose to