text: Chapter 19
  friendly courses of action through evidence of intentions and capabilities that the friendly force does not
  possess. Critical to the confusion effect is that the evidence presented must be doctrinally feasible. The
  desired outcome would be action or inaction from the enemy that would lead to a tactical advantage for the
  friendly force. These actions could include a delay of a specific decision, operational paralysis, or the
  distribution of enemy forces to locations that cannot influence friendly efforts. This effect is best used when
  the deception target tends to be indecisive or risk adverse.
  AMBIGUITY-DECREASING DECEPTION (CONFIRMATION EFFECT)
  19-21. Ambiguity-decreasing deception exploits deception targets’ pre-existing beliefs by confirming their
  desired expectations. This is provided to them through conditioning and diversion of intentional observations
  that convinces the enemy to be at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and under equipped. The intent is to
  hide the real friendly intentions and current capabilities from the enemy through a vigorous defense of
  friendly force information requirements. This information, if uncovered, would be detrimental to the
  accomplishment of the mission for the friendly unit. The confirmation effect is best employed when deception
  targets tend to accept higher levels of risk with their force and are resolute in their decision making.
  19-22. Both types are applied by using the deception principles. These principles can be best employed
  when the friendly unit has a reliable understanding of the current situation because desired effects of tactical
  deception provide a foundation to build their deception plan on in the planning process.
  TACTICAL DECEPTION MEANS
  19-23. Deceptions means are applied to observables to increase the probability of being accepted by the
  deception target. Deception means are methods, resources, and techniques that can be used to convey
  information to the deception target (JP 3-13.4). There are two tactical deception means categories: physical
  and technical. Planners normally employ deception plans to supplement several means that aim to mislead
  multiple types of enemy sensors. This increases credibility and the likelihood of deceiving the deception
  target. Tactical deception means provide the signatures, associations, and profiles of friendly alleged
  activities to the enemy. Units employ as many means as possible within their capabilities to support tactical
  deception during all types of operations.
  PHYSICAL MEANS
  19-24. Physical means are resources, methods, and techniques used to convey information normally derived
  from direct observation or active sensors by the deception target. Most physical means also have technical
  signatures visible to sensors that collect scientifically or electronically. Planners typically evaluate physical
  means using characteristics such as shape, size, function, quantity, movement pattern, location, activity, and
  association with the surroundings. Examples might include—
  * Movement of forces.
  * Decoy equipment and devices.
  * Security measures, such as camouflage and concealment.
  * Tactical actions, such as feints and demonstrations.
  * Reconnaissance, security, and surveillance activities.
  Movement of Forces
  19-25. Units frequently reposition forces to increase ambiguity to ongoing or planned operations. They also
  do this to hide the main effort. This repositioning is not limited to only maneuver forces but can also apply
  to command and control nodes, fires, and sustainment assets. This frequent repositioning requires detailed
  terrain management and coordination across all echelons to prevent inadvertent concentration of forces,
  unnecessary congestion of routes, and reduce the likelihood of the repositioning creating unanticipated seams
  and gaps between units.