text: Chapter 1
  Current Lethality Challenges:
  Russian Integrated Defense in Depth
  Since Operation Barbarossa in 1941, Soviet and Russian military thinkers have
  prized area denial tactics. Emerging from World War II, Soviet Deep Battle doctrine
  required synchronization of precise ground and air fires with maneuver in order to
  mass on critical targets at a decisive moment. Deep Battle endured throughout the
  Cold War and continues to influence current Russian doctrine. Russia’s current
  concept applies Deep Battle in a defensive nature to protect a critical asset in three
  dimensions.
  In practice, however, Russia’s current approach employs not a single protective
  layer, but multiple mutually-supporting capabilities which include man-portable-,
  short-, medium-, and long-range air defense systems; manned and unmanned
  aircraft; tube and rocket artillery; ballistic and cruise missiles; direct fire systems; and
  information warfare capabilities. The sum of these systems is an integrated network
  of combined arms capabilities designed to deter enemy attack or inhibit freedom of
  action from the tactical to the strategic levels.
  At the tactical level, integrated air defenses attempt to deter or defeat low altitude
  rotary wing (RW) and unmanned systems operations. An integrated fires complex
  employs artillery systems for counter-fire and fire support, and electronic warfare
  (EW) assets seek to disrupt enemy communications and operations.
  At the operational level, air defense systems employ a blend of short- and medium-
  range missiles alongside long-range precision fires. Attacks target deep critical
  assets such as aviation headquarters, tactical assembly areas, and sustainment
  sites. Russia’s intent at the operational level is to prevent brigade-sized elements
  from effectively concentrating combat power, resupplying, or reorganizing.
  At the strategic level, the Russian integrated defense in depth combines lethal and
  non-lethal capabilities to target major air and seaports, assembly areas, high-level
  headquarters, regional networks and communications, high-performance aircraft, and
  surface ships. Cyber and other information warfare elements attempt to disrupt
  operations or deny access to information anywhere in the theater through targeted or
  mass attacks. This multi-layered network seeks to deter enemy attack by presenting
  a prohibitively costly theater of operations; if deterrence fails, it seeks to impede an
  enemy force from ever organizing to challenge Russian actions.
  SECTION III – CORE COMPETENCIES OF ARMY AVIATION
  1-5. As a fully-integrated component of the combined arms team, Army Aviation forces are organized,
  trained, and equipped to defeat a full range of threats. Army Aviation forces provide an asymmetric
  maneuver advantage through amplified reach, protection, lethality, and situational understanding. Army
  Aviation’s inherent mobility, speed, range, flexibility, lethality, precision, and persistent reconnaissance
  capabilities provide the combined arms team with multiple options to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative
  to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage through the following competencies executed
  individually, simultaneously, or sequentially across multiple domains. Army Aviation is unique in that, in
  addition to its ability to maneuver in the third dimension, it is able to operate in all six warfighting
  functions in support of commanders’ missions and objectives.