text: Working With Host-Nation Forces
  additions and subtractions based on their expert opinion. They will then identify relevant objective and
  subjective metrics that accurately measure the capability and capacity of the security force based on its
  doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, policies, and operations.
  11-8. U.S. or multinational forces working to develop the capability and capacity of host-nation security
  forces during the course of counterinsurgency operations must understand the difference between the
  assessment of host-nation security forces and the fulfillment of higher headquarters’ reporting
  requirements. Assessment requires a steady, persistent cycle of observation. Those observations help
  inform plans for subsequent security cooperation activities. They are also generally included in reports that
  help higher echelons make assessments of the overall effort. However, the data required for a report may
  not be enough to assess a host-nation security force. Historical examples of these kinds of reports include
  the operational readiness assessment submitted by advisor teams during operation Iraqi Freedom, and the
  commander’s unit assessment tool prepared by advisors or partner units during operation Enduring
  Freedom in Afghanistan. Higher headquarters reports rarely constitute a complete assessment of the
  host-nation security force at the tactical level.
  11-9. Learning from how a host nation fights could benefit U.S. and multinational efforts in countering an
  insurgency. When the U.S. decides to become involved in an insurgency, U.S. forces need to learn how the
  host nation fights. If possible, the U.S. should send officers and noncommissioned officers to the host
  nation’s professional military schools. If the host nation does not have a developed institutional military,
  the U.S needs to find ways for leaders to observe how the host nation operates. To the extent possible,
  host-nation forces are built following host-nation doctrine or otherwise following the host nation’s
  traditional organization and approach.
  11-10. Security cooperation is a multi-echelon endeavor that builds the capability and capacity of a
  host-nation security force at the executive direction, generating force, and operating force functions. During
  counterinsurgency operations, U.S. or multinational forces may take a bottom-up approach to building a
  host nation’s capacity to defeat the insurgency and defend its sovereignty by first developing host-nation
  security forces at the small-unit level. This approach buys time and space for a host nation to develop
  capacity at higher echelons. In time, a host-nation security force establishes the capacity to generate its own
  forces through recruiting, vetting, and induction of enlistees as well as officer candidates; initial entry
  training for all personnel, to include basic warrior or police skills and advanced technical, tactical, and
  leadership training; and processes for promotion, noncommissioned officer training, and senior leader
  training. A host-nation security force must also develop processes for acquisition and life-cycle
  management of major end items, as well as processes for procurement of all classes of supply, and
  contracting of other services or capabilities. At the executive direction levels, a host-nation security force
  must establish policies and a system of orders and directives that supports that host nation’s statutory
  framework and drives standardization of policies and procedures through a top-down flow of information
  and a robust command inspection program. U.S. or multinational personnel charged with conducting
  security cooperation activities in a counterinsurgency environment must look beyond the immediate tactical
  conditions on the ground and collaborate with multiple agencies to develop the supporting infrastructure
  required for a host-nation security force to sustain and regenerate itself over the long term.
  11-11. A bottom up approach does not negate the importance of strategic and operational planning in
  security cooperation. In fact, decisions made at the strategic level may have strategic value and yet make
  little tactical or operational sense to local commanders and staffs. The is especially true with foreign
  military sales. For example, the U.S. may sell a major weapon system to a host nation that has inadequate
  means to maintain and support that weapon system. However, the sale may accomplish an essential
  political goal, or it may ensure a continued relationship between the host nation and the U.S. If a host
  nation is dependent on the U.S. for maintaining a major weapon system, this gives the U.S. influence over
  that host nation’s decisionmaking process. Tactical leaders must understand how their actions fit into the
  overall operational approach.
  11-12. Counterinsurgency usually requires an adaptable campaign plan that includes specific objectives
  for all lines of effort, to include host-nation security force development. Comprehensive assessments of
  host-nation security force units conducted at regular intervals (possibly aligned with reporting
  requirements) provide critical information that can shape and inform U.S. or multinational units’ goals and
  objectives for host-nation security force development. One proven technique for creating an adaptable