text: ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11
  interfering with friendly maneuver, OPFOR commanders must coordinate the
  planned location and duration of smokescreens with the scheme of maneuver.
  DEFENSIVE SMOKE EMPLOYMENT
  11-89. In the defense, the OPFOR may use smokescreens for—
  • Camouflaging or covering the maneuver of friendly units.
  • Concealing engineer activities from enemy observation.
  • Screening replacements of units under conditions of good visibility.
  • Camouflaging the approach of friendly units for a counterattack.
  • Providing flank and maneuver security.
  • Misleading the enemy on the disposition of reserves and planned
  counterattack axes.
  11-90. Because a completely obscured environment tends to aid the attacker
  more than the defender, an OPFOR defense uses smoke to minimize the
  enemy’s vision while allowing the defenders a fairly clear view of the enemy’s
  location. Smoke from artillery and mortar shells is the most effective means
  of blinding an advancing enemy while keeping friendly forces out of the
  obscured area.
  SIGNALING SMOKE
  11-91. Aside from smokescreens, the OPFOR also uses colored smoke for
  signal purposes. Smoke can mark enemy positions or, occasionally, friendly
  positions or movement routes for the information of supporting aircraft or
  artillery. By prearrangement, colored smoke may—
  • Identify friendly units.
  • Identify targets.
  • Control the commencing and lifting of fire.
  • Coordinate fire and maneuver of combat units.
  STRATEGIC CONTEXT
  11-92. During all strategic-level courses of action, the OPFOR will ensure
  that the employment of NBC weapons is coordinated with perception man-
  agement efforts. The purpose of this coordinated effort is to convey a message
  of political and military dominance to the regional civilian populace as well
  as to convey an adverse view of an intervening extraregional opponent.
  11-93. The OPFOR may use the threat of employing NBC weapons as an in-
  timidating factor. Any regional opponent with an NBC capability of its own
  knows that the OPFOR is prepared to retaliate in kind. The fact that NBC
  weapons may also place noncombatants at risk is a further intimidating
  factora positive factor from the State’s perspective. Thus, it may use or
  threaten to use NBC weapons as a way of applying political, economic, or
  psychological pressure by allowing the enemy no sanctuary. This applies to
  both regional and extraregional foes.
  11-94. The OPFOR realizes that an extraregional force will possess a techno-
  logical edge in the ability of its RISTA means to target OPFOR fire support