text: Operational Art and Science
  Operational Reach and Basing: Sixth Army in the Philippines
  Campaign
  In the fall of 1944, the US military expanded its Pacific Campaign to recapture the
  Philippines from Japanese control. As the equivalent of a land component command,
  this required the U.S. Sixth Army to extend its reach from recently seized positions in
  New Guinea to Leyte in the Philippines for an amphibious assault against entrenched
  defenders. The offensive, which would enable control of the South Pacific, required an
  integrated joint approach with supporting naval and air commands to enable movement
  of multiple U.S. Army corps across over 2,550 kilometers (1585 miles) of
  noncontiguous maritime spaces.
  Once Allied air and naval forces had cleared the way to Leyte, the Sixth Army launched
  from New Guinea in mid-October, prepared for the impending attack during transport,
  and finally executed a coastal assault from the west on the island. With the X Corps
  and the 1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions attacking to the north and the XXIV
  Corps and the 7th and 96th Infantry Divisions attacking farther south, the invasion force
  fought through monsoon rains that limited air support. Over the next two months, the
  Allies defeated the 65,000 defenders of Japan’s 35th Army in vicious jungle combat.
  Basing on Leyte positioned the Sixth Army for its decisive operation: an attack on
  Luzon where over 275,000 Japanese troops defended the island. As the U.S. Navy
  repelled the Japanese Imperial Navy to retain maritime control, the field army
  expanded its reach with new airfields and fortified bases to facilitate the projection,
  sustainment, and support of its forces on Luzon. The final offensive to recapture the
  Philippines, two years after they were lost, featured aggressive maneuver by both
  corps with Filipino support. The 1st Cavalry Division’s final capture of Manila illustrated
  the benefits of the Sixth Army’s use of the principle of reach and the success of the
  joint campaign.
  Culmination
  2-33. The limit of a unit’s operational reach is its culminating point. The culminating point is the point at
  which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense (JP 5-0).
  Culmination represents a crucial shift in relative combat power. It is relevant to both attackers and defenders
  at each level of warfare. On the offense, the culminating point occurs when a force cannot continue an attack
  and must assume a defensive posture or execute an operational pause. While conducting defensive tasks, it
  occurs when a force can no longer defend itself and must withdraw or risk destruction. The culminating point
  is more difficult to identify when Army forces conduct stability tasks. Two conditions can result in
  culmination: units too dispersed to achieve security and units lacking required resources to achieve the end
  state.
  2-34. Commanders ensure forces and assets arrive at the right times and places to support the operation and
  that sufficient resources will be available when needed in the later phases. Integration and synchronization
  of sustainment with the concept of operations can forestall culmination and help commanders control tempo.
  At both tactical and operational levels, logistics planners forecast the expenditure of resources associated
  with conducting operations over extended distances and times. They respond by generating enough military
  resources at the right times and places to enable their commanders to achieve operational objectives before
  reaching their culminating points.
  Basing
  2-35. Basing is an indispensable part of operational art that enables lines of operations and operational reach.
  A base is a locality from which operations are projected or supported (JP 4-0). Determining the location and
  sequence of establishing bases and base camps is essential for projecting power and sustaining the force. A