text: Chapter 2
  * Whether the individual has formally ceased to be a member of the group such as by filing relevant
  paperwork or by otherwise formally renouncing any allegiance to the group;
  * Whether concrete and verifiable facts or persuasive indicia demonstrate that the individual has
  affirmatively returned to peaceful pursuits, such as by participating in a reconciliation program or
  swearing an oath of loyalty to the government; and
  * The amount of time that has passed since the person participated in the activities of the group in
  question, if coupled with other indicia of dissociation or renunciation.
  LEADERS
  Military leaders may be subject to attack on the same basis as members of the armed forces. Leaders
  of non-State armed groups are subject to attack on the same basis as members of the group. Enemy leaders
  who are not members of an armed force or armed group (including Heads of State, civilian officials, and
  political leaders) may be made the object of attack if their responsibilities include the operational command
  or control of the armed forces or the armed group. For example, as the commander-in-chief of the U.S. armed
  forces, the President would be a legitimate target in wartime, as is, for example, the prime minister of a
  constitutional monarchy. Attacks against them would not constitute assassination. In contrast, the reigning
  monarch of a constitutional monarchy with an essentially ceremonial role in State affairs may not be made
  the object of attack.
  In addition to leaders who have a role in the operational chain of command, leaders taking a direct part
  in hostilities also may be made the object of attack. Planning or authorizing a combat operation is an example
  of taking a direct part in hostilities. As a matter of practice, attacks on the national leadership of an enemy
  State have often been avoided on the basis of comity and to help ensure that authorities exist with whom
  peace agreements may be concluded.
  PROPORTIONALITY IN CONDUCTING ATTACKS – EXCESSIVE
  INCIDENTAL HARM AND FEASIBLE PRECAUTIONS
  In accordance with the principle of proportionality, combatants must not exercise the right to engage
  in attacks against military objectives in an unreasonable or excessive way. Therefore, when conducting an
  attack, combatants must exercise due regard to reduce the risk of incidental harm to the civilian population
  and other persons and objects that may not be made the object of attack. In particular, the following rules
  apply: (1) combatants must refrain from attacks in which the expected loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
  and damage to civilian objects incidental to the attack would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
  direct military advantage anticipated to be gained (DOD Law of War Manual, 5.12; consider AP I, art,
  51(5)(b)); and (2) combatants must take feasible precautions in planning and conducting attacks to reduce
  the risk of harm to civilians and other persons and objects protected from being made the object of attack
  (DOD Law of War Manual, 5.11; consider AP I, art. 57).
  GENERAL NOTES ON APPLYING PROPORTIONALITY IN CONDUCTING ATTACKS
  In conducting attacks, the principle of proportionality imposes duties that apply when civilians or
  civilian objects are expected to be harmed from attacks on military objectives. It would not impose
  obligations intended to reduce the risk of harm to military objectives when civilians or civilian objects are
  not expected to be harmed.
  LOSS OF LIFE, INJURY, AND DAMAGE TO PROPERTY
  In conducting attacks on military objectives, the prohibition on attacks expected to cause excessive
  incidental harm addresses the expected incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to
  civilian property. The expected loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects is
  generally understood to mean such immediate or direct harms foreseeably resulting from the attack. Lesser
  forms of harm, such as mere inconveniences or temporary disruptions to civilian life need not be considered
  in applying the proportionality rule. Similarly, remote harms that could result from the attack do not need to
  be considered in a proportionality analysis. For example, the death of enemy combatants may cause economic