text: Chapter 7
  along the line.” Simultaneously, engineer assets needed for improving of defensive
  positions were instead constructing a cavernous bunker for the corps command post.
  Lack of cooperation with allied forces and inadequate reconnaissance and security
  operations allowed German and Italian elements of Armeegruppe Afrika to achieve tactical
  surprise at the onset and throughout the battle. During the following weeks, French and
  American units routinely found themselves surprised by enemy contact,fighting from non-
  mutuallysupporting positions,and unable to mass direct and indirect fires. German and
  Italian forces, enjoying local air superiority as allowed by weather, rarely experienced
  disruption at the hands of isolated and easily bypassed defensive positions. Retrograde
  operations frequently degenerated into routes with significant losses of manpower and
  equipment. Allied attempts to maneuver against Axis forces were poorly coordinated due
  to failures to incorporate flexibility into the array of forces as well as command failures at
  multiple echelons. Brigadier General Paul R. Robinette,commander of Combat Command
  Aof the 1stArmored Division,would later record the Soldiers’observation that during this
  battle “never were so few commanded by so many from so far away.”
  The poor performance of the American Army left a bitter legacy for the American Soldier
  that would haunt Anglo American relations in the theater. At the human level, II Corps
  sustained approximately six thousand casualties during the February 1943 engagements
  as well as the loss of 183 tanks,104half-tracks,208 artillery pieces,500 other vehicles,
  and vast amounts of supplies. Conversely,Rommel’s forces sustained approximately 1000
  casualties and a tenth of thematerial losses. (See figure 7-1.)
  Various