text: Leadership During Operations
  Initiative in the Absence of Orders – Naval Bombers at Midway
  On 4 June 1942, American naval aviators, acting on initiative and without
  communications from higher echelon headquarters, struck a major blow in the Pacific
  War at the Battle of Midway. The Japanese First Air Fleet, known as Kido Butai,
  launched a massive raid against Midway Island, causing significant damage. The
  American carriers Hornet, Enterprise, and Yorktown launched unsynchronized strikes
  against Kido Butai by several different air groups. Once aloft these carrier groups were
  soon beyond radio range of their ships and had to rely on prior intelligence, intuition,
  and luck to find the enemy.
  Lieutenant Commander John Waldron, commander of Torpedo 8 (Hornet), believed
  his air group commander was leading the group on an incorrect heading. He broke
  formation and led his squadron on another course. They found Kido Butai and
  attacked, but the entire squadron was shot down because it had no fighter cover. The
  torpedo bombers of Torpedo 6 (Enterprise) followed Waldron’s squadron and also
  suffered heavy losses without scoring a hit. The dive bombers of Bombing 6
  (Enterprise) and Scouting 6 (Enterprise) had launched earlier in the day and arrived at
  their designated coordinates without finding the enemy. Lieutenant Commander
  Clarence McClusky, commander of Bombing 6, could not radio back to the Enterprise
  for further orders. Exercising disciplined initiative, he began to search the area despite
  running low on fuel and found a Japanese destroyer, which he followed to Kido Butai
  just as Japanese fighters completed the destruction of Torpedo 8 and Torpedo 6. The
  Japanese fighters and anti-aircraft guns were entirely focused on the low altitude
  attacks from the torpedo bombers, leaving them vulnerable to a high-altitude dive-
  bombing run. McClusky ordered an attack by Bombing 6 which, by chance, occurred
  at the same time as Bombing 3 (Yorktown) arrived on the scene. The resulting action
  by two squadrons acting on their own initiative to carry out the mission fatally damaged
  three Japanese carriers, the Kaga, Akagi, and Soryu, which sank later in the day,
  putting the formerly outnumbered Americans at a 3:1 advantage in aircraft carriers.
  The performance of commanders like Waldron and McClusky, out of contact with
  higher commands and acting on their own initiative, led to victory at Midway.
  DRIVING THE OPERATIONS PROCESS
  8-27. Commanders employ the operations process to incorporate coalition and joint partners, empower
  subordinate initiative, and to ensure authorities and risk acceptance are delegated to the appropriate echelon
  required for the situation. Staffs and subordinate headquarters earn the commander’s trust by providing
  relevant information, anticipating needs, and directing supporting actions. (See ADP 5-0 for more
  information on the operations process and FM 6-0 for more on the role of commanders in operations.)
  8-28. The major components of the operations process are planning, preparing, executing, and continuously
  assessing the operation. Planning normally begins upon receipt of orders from a higher echelon headquarters
  and continues through the execution of the operation. The commander and staff continually assess operations
  and revise the plan through fragmentary orders. Commanders, assisted by their chiefs of staff or executive
  officers, drive the preparation for an operation by allocating time, prioritizing resources, and supervising
  preparation activities such as rehearsals to ensure their forces are ready to execute operations. During
  execution, commanders and staffs focus their efforts on translating plans into direct action to achieve
  objectives in accordance with higher commander’s intent. (See figure 8-1 on page 8-8 for a graphic depiction
  of the operations process.)