text: Chapter 5
  SECTION VI – SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING, THE COMMON
  INTELLIGENCE PICTURE, AND THE COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE
  5-85. As an operation progresses, the intelligence staff facilitates the commander and staff’s situational
  understanding through as timely and accurate situation development as possible. Information collection at
  and across echelons results in combat information and the dissemination of data and information to
  intelligence elements for analysis and the production of intelligence. The G-2/S-2 and intelligence staff
  perform many activities to integrate and synchronize intelligence collection, PED, and intelligence analysis
  at and across echelons, including collection management. Each echelon performs information collection and
  also collaborates across echelons to share data, information, and intelligence, which can be maintained at or
  accessed by that echelon.
  5-86. The fog and friction of operations and information collection, as well as time constraints, can
  significantly challenge the intelligence staff. As this occurs, the intelligence staff provides continuous
  intelligence products, within the capabilities of intelligence analysis systems, including the COP, to facilitate
  the commander and staff’s situational understanding. The COP is the most important operational product
  used to establish a shared understanding between echelons. The intelligence staff provides the intelligence
  portion of the COP to the rest of the staff for integration into the COP. However, the G-2/S-2 ultimately
  succeeds or fails—not by producing any particular intelligence product or CIP; the G-2/S-2 succeeds by
  providing the commander what the commander needs, with respect to accurate intelligence, when the
  commander needs it.
  5-87. Concurrent with producing intelligence, the intelligence staff collaborates across echelons to maintain
  a shared or common interpretation of threat locations, capabilities, objectives and intent, COAs, strengths,
  and vulnerabilities. While the G-2/S-2 and intelligence staff’s primary responsibility is to their commander
  and staff, they must also continually collaborate and share products, such as the CIP and intelligence portion
  of the COP across echelons. This open collaboration—usually up and down at least one echelon and with
  adjacent units—and a common intelligence interpretation result in better intelligence for each echelon’s
  commander and staff and supports a shared operational understanding between echelons. Figure 5-10 depicts
  the complex and intense effort to both support the commander and staff and collaborate across echelons with
  other intelligence staffs to support a common interpretation.
  5-88. There are several areas where friction occurs while providing the commander and staff with
  intelligence to drive decision making and targeting and have a common interpretation between echelons:
  ⚫ The commander can disagree with the analysis. After providing the commander with the logic, if
  the commander still disagrees, the G-2/S-2 and intelligence staff must adopt the commander’s
  analysis while still considering other possible threat actions to support branches and sequels.
  ⚫ The higher- or lower-level or adjacent-unit G-2/S-2 or representative can disagree with the
  intelligence interpretation of many threat aspects of the situation.
  ⚫ Commanders across echelons can have a very different understanding, including their
  interpretation of the threat situation.
  ⚫ Communications between echelons can be degraded, intermittent, and limited.
  5-89. The intelligence warfighting function works through this friction and then resets the CIP, as needed.
  Resetting a common interpretation of the situation and building a new CIP are necessary as commanders
  make decisions, operations transition, or echelons start a new MDMP and IPOE.