text: Generating and Applying Combat Power
  Systems Warfare and Sanctuary: Eastern Ukraine, 2014
  During the Russia-Ukraine conflict, an attack on Ukrainian forces demonstrated the
  lethality of the modern battlefield and the impact created by the threat’s use of
  sanctuary and systems warfare. In July 2014, the Armed Forces of Ukraine moved
  several mechanized brigades into a position near the Russian border to prevent the
  illegal movement of military equipment across the frontier to rebels in eastern Ukraine.
  Early on the morning of 11 July, soldiers at the position noticed a drone orbiting above
  them for some time. Not long after the drone disappeared, rockets fired from 9A52-4
  Tornado multiple launch rocket systems located in Russian territory began landing on
  one of the brigades. Reporting indicated that the UAS was cued by other systems that
  located civilian cell phones in the assembly area.
  The barrage lasted four minutes. Rockets carrying a mixture of high explosive, cluster,
  and thermobaric munitions impacted the unit’s position. Cannon rounds followed the
  rockets with devastating effect. The Ukrainian units took heavy losses. One battalion
  was virtually destroyed, and others were rendered combat ineffective due to heavy
  losses in vehicles and personnel. Casualties quickly overwhelmed army and local
  medical facilities. In the days that followed, rocket and cannon strikes continued,
  disrupting the Ukrainian army’s ability to defend that region of eastern Ukraine.
  The lethality of the attacks was enabled by a sophisticated real-time targeting system
  that used inexpensive unmanned aircraft systems for ISR, target acquisition, and fire
  control. Rockets were likely fired from within a town in Russian territory, hampering
  potential Ukrainian military responses due to the sanctuary provided by both an
  international border and proximity to civilian noncombatants. Additionally, Russia
  extended its integrated air defense system, located within Russian territory, over the
  conflict zone in Ukraine. This action denied Ukraine’s ability to use its air power, which
  separated Ukraine’s air capability from its ground forces. Without air power for close
  air support and counter-UAS operations, the Ukrainian ground forces were left
  vulnerable to the sophisticated targeting systems used by Russian and pro-Russian
  forces.
  Over the following months and years, Ukraine military forces adapted. In 2022, Russia
  began an unprovoked conventional attack along multiple axes throughout Ukraine.
  Ukrainian forces responded effectively. They exercised a more disciplined and efficient
  use of the electromagnetic spectrum, complicating Russian detection efforts. Ukrainian
  forces also defended in more mobile, dispersed formations, providing fewer lucrative
  targets for Russian fires.
  Preclusion
  To preclude is to keep something from happening by taking action in advance. Peer threats use a wide
  variety of actions, activities, and capabilities to preclude a friendly force’s ability to shape an operational
  environment and mass and sustain combat power. Antiaccess (A2) and area denial (AD) are two strategic
  and operational approaches to preclusion. Antiaccessis an action, activity, or capability, usually long-range,
  designed to prevent an enemy force from entering an operational area (JP 3-0). For example, A2 activities
  prevent or deny forces the ability to project and sustain forces into a desired area. The employment of A2
  capabilities against Army forces begins in the continental United States and extends throughout the strategic
  support area into a theater. Peer threats have the means to disrupt the United States’ force projection capability
  at home station. These means include ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; and space, cyberspace, and
  information warfare capabilities.