text: Chapter 9
  approach that is similar to the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework at the tactical level. While this
  is certainly not a uniform rule, having some framework in understanding another counterinsurgent’s actions
  provides a point of reference for understanding. Commanders and staffs must have an understanding of
  how to solve a particular problem before they advise or assist another commander solve that problem.
  Understanding the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is a fundamental framework for
  understanding what units are trying to accomplish in a counterinsurgency. This framework applies to all
  units involved in the counterinsurgency, including, for example, an infantry battalion directly performing
  actions, a member of a special forces team advising a host nation, or a member of a combatant command
  integrating and evaluating various security cooperation capabilities.
  9-6. Whether U.S. forces are executing the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework or another state
  is executing it, it can be very effective in defeating an insurgency. For example, in the Philippines, the
  government was successful in using the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework, even if it was not
  called shape-clear-hold-build-transition by the counterinsurgents at the time. Commanders and staffs must
  understand the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework to understand what a host nation is trying to
  achieve in its counterinsurgency efforts. This framework is used by U.S. and foreign forces.
  Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transition: The Huks
  The Hukbalahap, or “Huks,” were one of several guerilla organizations that
  appeared in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation of World War II. By the
  time of the country’s liberation from the Japanese occupation, the Huks were
  well-armed with weapons taken from the Japanese or shipped to them from the U.S.
  The Philippines gained independence from the U.S. on July 4, 1946, and
  held its first national election in November 1946. The Huks participated in the
  elections, and the head of the wartime Huk movement, Luis Taruc, won a seat in the
  Philippine Congress. However, the newly elected President, Manuel Roxas, refused
  to seat Mr. Taruc or his allies in Congress, leading many Filipino peasants to join the
  Huk movement.
  By late 1946, there was open fighting between the Huks and the forces of
  the newly independent Republic of the Philippines. The insurgency was motivated by
  vast economic inequality during the country’s transition to an export-led capitalist
  economy, with abject poverty affecting 90 percent of the population.
  The Huks’ primary tactics in the beginning of the conflict included bank,
  payroll office, and train robberies, as well as small hit-and-run raids and ambushes
  that allowed them to avoid contact with large government formations. During these
  first few years, the Huks numbered 5,000 active insurgents, 10,000 lightly armed
  reserves, and 35,000 other supporters. The Huks also enjoyed incredible levels of
  internal support, with an estimated 250,000 peasants actively supporting them during
  the early years of the insurgency.
  The counterinsurgency force was unable to control the insurgency in the
  early years. Shortly after the country was granted independence, the Philippine Army
  was reduced from 132,000 to 37,000 men. Approximately 24,000 of these men were
  in the Military Police Command, which was tasked with combating the insurgency.
  However, the Military Police Command was poorly led and poorly equipped, and
  pursued tactics that accomplished little beyond alienating the population between
  1946 and 1948. In 1948, President Roxas reorganized the Military Police Command
  into the Philippine Constabulary, which remained neither well-trained nor
  well-equipped. It mainly practiced encirclement and sweeps, both of which were
  easily evaded by the Huks, and systematically committed abuses against civilians:
  raiding villages, stealing possessions, and treating the population worse than the
  Huks did.
  The Huks then began making strategic and operational errors, failing to
  reach out to other disaffected groups to form a broad front, and employing many
  common criminals in their ranks, causing peasants to fear the group. Probably most
  catastrophic to the group’s public image was the assassination of Mrs. Aurora
  Quezon, the well-liked and popular wife of the late former President, Manuel Quezon.