text: Multidomain Operations and Intelligence
  EMERGING THREAT CAPABILITIES
  2-22. The intelligence enterprise is continuously conducting intelligence collection and analysis on adversary
  actions, possible intent, and capability developments. Additionally, intelligence analysts watch for trends and
  the employment of new capabilities and techniques during ongoing conflicts. While the principles and
  fundamentals of warfare remain relatively unchanged, emerging capabilities—which many of the Nation’s
  adversaries have procured or can procure—may have a disproportionate impact on future conflicts with U.S.
  and allied forces. Therefore, intelligence collection and analysis are critical in developing countermeasures
  and contingency plans. Certain Army intelligence units and organizations, primarily INSCOM, the Army
  Space and Missile Command, and the Army Futures Command, contribute to the Defense Intelligence
  Agency (DIA) and other DOD and intelligence enterprise organizations in performing these tasks.
  2-23. Current and future capability developments—in terms of artificial intelligence, hypersonic weapons,
  robotics, and fully and semiautonomous weapons system capabilities, among other developments—require
  continued intelligence collection and analysis. In recent exercises and conflicts, fully and semiautonomous
  weapons system capabilities and drone swarm technologies have been effectively employed by the Nation’s
  adversaries. The use of semiautonomous weapons systems and drone swarms have occurred during Israel
  Defense Forces versus Hamas engagements, the 2d Norgorno-Karabakh conflict (2020), the renewed Russian
  invasion of the Ukraine on 24 February 2022, and subsequent operations. This trend will most likely continue;
  therefore, the U.S. military must leverage intelligence collection and develop resources to ensure the Nation’s
  adversaries do not capture the strategic advantage.
  ARMY STRATEGIC CONTEXTS
  2-24. Joint doctrine describes the strategic environment in terms of a competition continuum. Rather than a
  world either at peace or at war, the competition continuum describes three broad categories of strategic
  relationships—cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. (See JP 3-0.) Each
  relationship is defined as between the United States and another strategic actor relative to a specific set of
  policy aims. Cooperation, competition, and even armed conflict commonly go on simultaneously in different
  parts of the world.
  2-25. Although combatant commands and theater armies campaign across the competition continuum, Army
  tactical formations typically conduct operations within a context dominated by one strategic relationship at a
  time. Therefore, Army doctrine describes the strategic situation through three contexts in which Army forces
  conduct operations: competition below armed conflict, crisis, and armed conflict. Figure 2-2 illustrates the
  Army strategic contexts and the range of military operations.
  Figure 2-2. Army strategic contexts and operational categories
  Note. This publication often uses competition to mean competition below armed conflict.