text: Appendix A
  A-7. Electronic protection techniques can also help mask the electromagnetic signature of command posts
  and communications sites. The cyber electronic warfare officer assists the G-6 (S-6) in planning electronic
  protection measures to reduce the command post signature.
  Terrain Masking
  A-8. Terrain masking can effectively block radio signals from reaching enemy direction finding capabilities.
  Positioning communications systems with large terrain features or manmade structures between the
  communications system and the forward line of own troops effectively blocks an enemy from detecting the
  signal.
  Camouflage Net Masking
  A-9. Radar reflective camouflage netting is an effective means of blocking unintended electromagnetic
  radiation from the rear and sides of directional antennas. Camouflage netting to the sides and back of a line
  of sight or satellite communications antenna ensures only the main beam of the antenna radiates. This main
  beam is highly directional; it is much harder to detect since the enemy would need to be directly in the
  transmission path.
  Line of Sight
  A-10. High-throughput line of sight radios can carry high bandwidth data over distances up to 25 miles, but
  the links need to be engineered to minimize the chance of detection, targeting, and jamming. If the line of
  sight path is parallel to the forward line of troops, an enemy is less likely to detect the signal, and enemy
  jammers will be unable to reach the antenna with a signal strong enough to jam the radio.
  REMOTE ANTENNAS
  A-11. Large command posts and their high-throughput communications systems emit a significant amount
  of electromagnetic energy. While planners and operators can mask some of this energy with careful siting,
  terrain masking, and directional antennas, some electromagnetic energy remains. Because peer threats target
  friendly command and control capabilities, anything near the communications system is at risk of destruction
  from lethal fires.
  A-12. Commanders and signal planners should consider locating major communications assemblages as far
  from the supported command post as practical. Placing terrain features, man-made structures, or distance
  between communications systems and command posts provides the command post protection from lethal
  fires. Commanders and planners must consider the additional physical security and site defense requirements
  for a remote site during planning.
  FREQUENT COMMAND POST DISLOCATION
  A-13. Despite all efforts to reduce and mask the electromagnetic signature of a command post, a peer threat
  is likely to locate it eventually. Moving a command post frequently reduces the chances of destruction.
  Frequent moves are especially important when operating within the range of enemy artillery.
  A-14. Maintaining continuity during displacement of a command post or catastrophic loss requires
  designating alternate command posts and passing control between command posts (FM 3-0). During training
  exercises, units must practice frequent command post dislocation and handoff between the main and tactical
  command posts.
  INTEGRATION WITH OTHER STAFF ELEMENTS
  A-15. The G-6 (S-6) cannot plan signal support alone. Other staff sections’ functions and capabilities help
  inform sound, survivable signal support plans. Staff sections activities during the military decision-making
  process reinforce each other’s planning efforts.
  A-16. The cyber electronic warfare officer, signal planners, spectrum managers, and the G-2 (S-2) assess
  threats to friendly communications during the military decision-making process. Integrated planning counters