text: Chapter 7
  that are redeploying. ADA units also promote stability within a country or region by protecting civilians and
  geopolitical assets from state and non-state actors who may seek to exploit periods of transition.
  7-5. ADA task force capabilities can be tailored to counter diverse or specific air and missile threats based
  on JFC requirements and METT-TC. The nominal task force is generally deployed to counter both air threats
  and lower tier missile threats.
  SUPPORT TO JOINT AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE
  7-6. An ADA task force provides defense of designated joint force command assets at the strategic and
  operational levels. These include senior CPs, logistic facilities, operating bases, aerial and sea ports of
  debarkation, and geopolitical assets. The maneuver commander’s key assets are also addressed during the
  planning process. These assets are recommended by the commander’s organic AMD section or ADAM cells
  for inclusion in the critical asset listing from which defended assets are derived.
  7-7. The task force’s persistent presence facilitates long-term protection of assets against all-altitude air and
  missile threats. Augmentation with C-RAM sensors and shooters is required for the task force to defend
  against RAM threats.
  7-8. The task force also contributes to aerial surveillance and situational awareness. Its nominal
  configuration includes sensors capable of detecting low-flying air threats to ballistic missile threats, and
  publishing track data across Army and joint links to alert the force to impending attacks. Augmented with C-
  RAM sensors, the task force can also provide detection, alerting, and focused warning of RAM threats.
  SUPPORT TO UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS
  7-9. The ADA task force counters a wide variety of potential air and missile threats that target assets
  identified by the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) and selected for the JFC’s defended asset
  list. The main threats that the ADA task force must be prepared to counter are:
  * Ballistic missiles.
  * Cruise missiles and anti-radiation missiles.
  * UASs, both attack and surveillance.
  * Hypersonic weapons.
  * Fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, jammers and aerial surveillance platforms that penetrate defensive
  counterair into the task force’s defended area (commonly called leakers).
  7-10. The ADA task force’s support of ground-based elements varies in accordance with the type of
  operation, projected threats, amount of deployed maneuver and ADA forces, and other METT-TC
  considerations. Most ADA task forces are deployed to defend strategic and operational high value assets.
  ADA task forces may be assigned general support missions or, in rare occasions, placed in direct support of
  maneuver elements. In a direct support role, the task force commander coordinates with the supported unit
  commander and the ADAM cell to select the asset(s) to be defended. Direct support assignments are more
  typically made at the ADA battery or platoon echelons than at ADA task force levels.
  7-11. The ADA task force in a general support role within a corps or, more likely, a division is assigned to
  defend such key Army assets as corps or division headquarters, fuel and ammunition points, counterfire
  radars, and forward arming and refueling points. The points to be defended are designated by the supported
  commander. Offensive tasks and defensive tasks requiring rapid mobility are supported by bounding
  overwatch, as ADA elements, other than Avenger, lack shoot-on-the-move capability. Bounding overwatch
  to support offensive tasks places ADA elements behind the maneuver force, as the terrain must be secured
  prior to its occupation by ADA elements. In retrogrades, ADA elements precede the withdrawal of maneuver
  units to vacate terrain being surrendered by the retrograde.
  7-12. An ADA task force provides warning of impending air and missile attacks. Detections by Patriot and
  Sentinel radars or other sensors are broadcast to affected units or installations. UAS detections, particularly
  of low, slow, and small variants, can trigger self-defense actions taken by non-ADA units.