text: Sustainment Operations During Armed Conflict
  enemy deep fires. See FM 3-0 for additional information on being under constant observation and all forms
  of enemy contact.
  RECONSTITUTION OPERATIONS
  5-34. The scale, complexity, and increased destructive power of large-scale combat operations results in
  greater loss of personnel, weapon platforms, supplies, and equipment than other types of operations. The
  objective of reconstitution operations is to restore combat power and build and maintain unit strength within
  a limited window of time. Under exceptional conditions, with severely degraded units, constrained time, and
  limited or no personnel replacements, commanders may make the decision to execute reconstitution.
  Reconstitution operations are extraordinary actions that commanders take to restore degraded units to an
  acceptable level of combat effectiveness as determined by the commander, commensurate with mission
  requirements, available time, and resources. Reconstitution must be planned and resourced during
  competition. Commanders directing reconstitution missions use assets under their control, along with those
  provided by higher echelons. For additional information, see ATP 3-94.4.
  SUSTAINMENT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
  5-35. Commanders and staffs should be very deliberate in planning sustainment support and only plan for
  support that is absolutely essential to mission accomplishment. Planning considerations include a known or
  anticipated support requirement, a known or anticipated problem, a readiness issue, a capability shortfall,
  enemy threat, or an aspect of operational or mission variables that influence sustainment support. If identified
  and used properly, planning considerations assist planners in identifying specific support or operational
  requirements based upon available information. Sustainment planners must also plan for execution of all
  sustainment functions (logistics, financial management, personnel services, and HSS) and their associated
  sub-functions at all echelons. This includes personnel replacement, casualty reporting, medical treatment,
  medical evacuation, and medical logistics/supply.
  5-36. Planners must consider the scope of support provided by the DSBs. All units attached to the division
  are supported by the DSB and its organic DSSB. This includes the attached maneuver brigades as well as
  other organizations supporting the division's operation. Units such as engineer, military police, CBRN, and
  air defense may operate in the division's rear and support areas. If the scope of support requirements exceeds
  the capacity of the organic DSSB, additional modular logistics companies or an additional CSSB may be
  required. The division G-4 and the DSB commander must continually assess the situation and make
  organizational changes as necessary. Division units that have small or inadequate logistics planning and
  execution capabilities, such as the division artillery, should share information with the division G-4 and
  coordinate with the DSB for logistics planning and execution.
  5-37. Planning for non-essential support puts unnecessary demands on already limited distribution and
  transportation assets and puts capability at needless risk. This may also deprive units of support for which
  they have a legitimate requirement. As an example, if heavy equipment transporter system support is needed
  for a mission with no additional transportation requirements, commanders should request a heavy equipment
  transporter system company, not a composite truck company (heavy). The composite truck company comes
  with additional, unneeded types of trucks that will only burden the mission and waste a critical asset that can
  be legitimately used elsewhere. Another example is the use of laundry and shower units. These may be
  desirable but unnecessary for mission accomplishment.
  5-38. The tempo and lethality of large-scale combat operations may overwhelm maintenance, medical,
  personnel replacement, and mortuary affairs capabilities. Additionally, the strain of support to other Services
  and multinational partners will exact a heavy toll on already constrained sustainment resources. For example,
  the quantity of air and ground distribution assets required to fulfill the Army's role as lead service for bulk
  petroleum (when designated) will place significant demands on the Army in support of large-scale combat
  operations. As another example, the Army provides the single integrated medical logistics management and
  serves as theater lead agent for medical materiel for United States Central Command, United States European
  Command, United States Africa Command, and United States Forces Korea. Managing theater CL VIII
  supply support for the joint force will add complexity, especially given the variation in medical materiel used
  by each of the Services. Because of these factors, sustainment planning should include coordination,
  integration, and synchronization at all levels for reinforcing sustainment support to the joint force and
  multinational partners.