text: Chapter 7
  Acceptability--The threat's tactical or operational advantage gained by executing the COA must
  justify the cost. The threat might undertake an unfavorable COA if he believes there are no
  other choices.
  Distinguishability--Each threat COA must differ greatly from the others.
  Completeness--The COA must show how the decisive operation accomplishes the mission, and
  how shaping and sustaining operations support the decisive operation.
  EVALUATE AND PRIORITIZE EACH COURSE OF ACTION
  7-68. The commander and staff need to develop a plan that is optimized to one of the COAs, while
  allowing for contingency options should the threat choose another COA. Therefore, the staff must evaluate
  each threat COA and prioritize it according to how likely the threat will adopt that option. Use judgment to
  rank the threat COAs in their likely order of adoption. Modify the list as needed as the current
  situation changes.
  DEVELOP COURSES OF ACTION
  7-69. Once a COA set is complete, develop each COA into as much detail as time allows. To ensure
  completeness, each COA must answer six basic questions: who, what, when, where, how and why. Each
  developed COA has three parts--
  • Situation templates.
  • Threat course of action and options.
  • High value targets.
  SITUATION TEMPLATES
  7-70. Situation templates are developed on the threat’s current situation, for example, training and
  experience levels, logistical status, losses, dispositions, the environment, threat doctrine. or patterns of
  operations. The SITEMP is a graphic that shows the expected threat dispositions should the threat adopt a
  particular COA.
  Construction
  7-71. To construct a SITEMP, start with the threat template and lay it over the MCOO. Adjust the
  disposition of the arrayed force on the threat template to account for battlefield effects such as weather and
  terrain. Try to array forces as the threat commander might. Construct the SITEMP in as much detail as
  time allows:
  • Conventional Threat--evaluate time and space factors to develop time phaselines showing
  threat movement.
  • Unconventional Threat--other tools such as pattern analysis. Pattern analysis uses multiple
  map overlays and text assessing military, terrorist, or other threat activity in an urban area.
  These events can be related by any of several factors to include location and time. These events
  can be analyzed by plotting them on maps over time, using multiple historical overlays (analog
  or digital) that can be compared to one another over time, and using a time-event wheel or other
  analysis tools (Figure 7-7).