text: Chapter 11
  provided the government of El Salvador with security assistance. By following an effective strategy that
  linked this aid to governmental and military reform, the U.S. was able to shape the ongoing
  counterinsurgency and aid the government of El Salvador in defeating its insurgency.
  Security Cooperation in El Salvador
  In 1979, a group of disparate insurgent groups formed a coalition that would
  become a significant threat to the Salvadoran government. They were opposed by
  the Salvadoran armed forces, at that time a barracks-bound, defensively minded
  organization with severe deficiencies in command and control, tactical intelligence,
  tactical mobility, and logistics. The Salvadoran army did poorly in combat, and its only
  significant successes early in the conflict were in intimidating and massacring the
  civilian population.
  The mid-1980s saw a massive U.S. aid effort, and considerable civilian and
  military reform. Congressionally constrained to an initial limit of no more than 55
  military advisors and no combat troops, U.S. aid consisted of arms, military trainers,
  and reform and civic action programs. Several of these programs made slow
  progress because many in the Salvadoran military resented their imposition by an
  outside power.
  Though resentful of the imposition, many in the Salvadoran military
  recognized the incentive structure, where much U.S. aid was contingent on improving
  El Salvador’s human rights record. Salvadoran Defense Minister Vides Casanova
  said, “We know that improving our image is worth millions of dollars of aid for the
  country.” Even if many Salvadoran counterinsurgents were principally motivated by
  the flow of foreign aid, they did learn, they did increase their competence, and they
  did improve their human rights behavior. The idea of focusing on all aspects of the
  struggle, political, social, economic, as well as military, had taken root and continued
  to the end of the war.
  11-4. One issue with developing security forces in counterinsurgency is the issue of the quality versus the
  quantity of host-nation counterinsurgency forces. In the case of counterinsurgency, quality tends to be more
  important than quantity. While quantity and quality must be balanced to some degree and “quantity has a
  quality all its own” to the extent that too small a force will not be able to accomplish its mission, quantity is
  not a substitute for quality.
  11-5. U.S. or multinational efforts to develop the capability and capacity of a host-nation security force
  must focus on operational and developmental needs of host-nation counterparts. Developing a sound plan
  to develop a host nation’s capability to address the root causes of the insurgency requires a deliberate,
  comprehensive assessment of that host nation’s security force. The set of metrics that the U.S. or
  multinational forces selects to assess a host-nation security force must be appropriate for the type of
  security force being assessed. For example, assessment of a host-nation army may require a completely
  different set of criteria from those used to assess a host-nation police force. Likewise, a host nation’s border
  or customs police, local (city or county) police, and provincial, state, or national police must all be assessed
  according to their specific mission requirements, while taking into consideration that host nation’s federal
  or local laws, political considerations, culture, and tribal affiliations.
  ASSESSING AND DEVELOPING A HOST-NATION FORCE
  11-6. Assessment of host-nation army or land forces typically comes more naturally to U.S. or
  multinational forces than assessing host-nation police forces. It is easier for a Soldier or Marine to assess
  another Army or Marine Corps unit than it is for a Soldier or Marine to accurately assess a police precinct,
  fire department, or sanitation department. Developing measures of performance and measures of
  effectiveness based on their standards and how effective those standards are is important. (See chapter 12
  for more information on assessments.)
  11-7. One method to create an assessment framework is to form a working group of subject matter experts.
  This working group will review any lines of effort and tasks identified by the host nation and recommend