text: Appendix B
  B-37. These packets are developed and maintained at the Army HVT level (but referenced to the larger threat
  target system and component) and include a unique target intelligence number that is maintained throughout
  operations.
  B-38. After target intelligence packets are first developed, they are subsequently updated throughout
  operations to further detail information and intelligence over time. Initially, a target intelligence packet
  includes the same level of detail as the associated threat model, except for unit and geographic specificity.
  Over time, the target intelligence packet includes analysis and supporting intelligence and information down
  to a detailed assessment of target element vulnerabilities and a historical record of HVT collection and
  analysis.
  IDENTIFY SPECIFIC HIGH-VALUE TARGETS
  B-39. HVTs are developed during step 3 (Evaluate the threat) and initially refined during step 4 (Determine
  threat COA) of the IPB process, an integrated process of step 2 (Mission analysis) of MDMP. Outputs from
  step 3 include the threat template, HVT list, and threat capability statement. Step 4 requires an understanding
  of the threat characteristics, as well as the effects of terrain, weather, and civil considerations on operations.
  The most important element in determining threat COAs is understanding threat operational art and tactics.
  The process for determining the COAs these threat forces may employ consists of the following:
  * Identify likely objectives and the desired end state.
  * Determine threat battlefield functions.
  * Determine threat capabilities available to perform each battlefield function.
  * Identify the full set of COAs available to the threat.
  * Evaluate and prioritize each threat COA.
  * Develop each COA in the amount of detail time allows.
  * Identify HVTs for each COA.
  * Identify initial collection requirements for each COA.
  B-40. Below are several techniques used by the intelligence staff in identifying and evaluating HVTs:
  * Identify HVTs from threat models, situation templates with time phase lines, existing intelligence
  studies, database evaluations, patrol debriefs, and size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment
  (also called SALUTE) reports.
  * A review of threat tactics, techniques, and procedures.
  * Previous threat operations.
  * Understanding the threat's objective, tasks, purpose, and intent.
  * Identify assets that are key to executing the primary operation, branches, or sequels of threat
  COAs.
  * Determine how the threat might react to the loss of each identified HVT. Consider the threat's
  ability to substitute other assets and adopt branches or sequels.
  * Consider AO and area of interest effects and potentially broader effects.
  * Consider how the threat may use multiple capabilities to create the effects of one or more HVTs.
  * Consider how the threat may use assets by phases of an operation, which may lead to classifying
  certain threat assets, functions, or systems as HVTs across all domains, the information
  environment, and the electromagnetic spectrum.
  * Consider the multidomain nature of complex OEs and how threat forces may use assets to disrupt
  friendly operations at multiple echelons and locations.