text: Chapter 7
  7-28. Commanders and staffs must consistently question and evaluate lines of effort as part of the
  operations process. As assessment indicates changes to the situation (sudden opportunities to exploit,
  failure of certain activities, new actors, and an actual change to the end state) the tasks and objectives of
  various lines of operation and effort may no longer be relevant or appropriate. Worse, they can trap the
  commander into a preconceived notion that accomplishment of various tasks will result in a successful
  completion. Lines of operation and effort are useful means to help plan activities, but they are not measures
  of mission success. All leaders must guard against the assumption that their actions are relevant because
  they support any particular line of operation or effort. The underlying assumptions behind the tasks and
  objectives of any detailed plan must be constantly questioned and evaluated. Just because counterinsurgents
  take an action, that does not make that action relevant.
  7-29. The effects of actions in one line of effort are not contained to only that line. For example, the
  commander could have a line of effort to support the rule of law and a line of effort to support economic
  development. However, a working legal system has a direct effect on the economic system. A system in
  which contract law is enforced, for example, will have a much wider range of economic activity than a
  system where contract law is not enforced. In this example, progress in the support economic development
  line of effort may be hindered by struggles within the support rule of law line of effort. The use of systems
  thinking allows commanders and staffs to use lines of operation and effort not only for planning and
  conceptualization, but also for visualization of how they relate and influence each other.
  7-30. Figure 7-2 illustrates one example of lines of effort in a counterinsurgency. However, while this is an
  example that may apply well to a counterinsurgency after large-scale combat operations, it may not apply
  well to other counterinsurgency operations. The U.S. could be providing only enablers for a
  counterinsurgency effort. For example, U.S. forces might be combining capabilities such as counter threat
  finance, signals intelligence, and a direct action force to enable the host nation by stopping the insurgency
  from attaining the means to fight, providing intelligence on an insurgency’s communications, and providing
  a means to neutralize insurgent leadership. The host nation may have the capability to handle basic
  functions such as governance. When designing lines of effort for a counterinsurgency, the context the
  counterinsurgent is operating in is not important. If commanders and staffs reduce lines of effort to some
  standard solution set, they are no longer using the tool, but they are being used by the tool. This illustrates
  that complex problems in counterinsurgency require critical thinking and defy solution by checklist and
  battle drill methodologies. When commanders and staffs use them properly, and when they are tied to
  operational and strategic purposes, lines of operation and effort are means to help commanders and staffs
  perform successful counterinsurgency operations. Figure 7-2 provides examples of possible tasks on each
  line of effort. However, commanders and staffs must remember that these are sample lines of effort and
  sample tasks on the lines of effort. Just as the individual lines of effort must meet the situation commanders
  and staffs find themselves in, tasks on a lines of effort must fit an operational environment and its desired
  end states. (See figure 7-2.)