text: Chapter 8
  CONTESTED DEPLOYMENT
  8-6. Threat information warfare operations can have a global reach and hamper friendly military
  deployments. With sufficient scale or precision, they have the potential to completely halt effective unit
  deployment operations. Targeted disinformation and threats delivered via social media to the Family
  members of every Soldier in a unit can be potentially devastating without prior planning, preparation, and
  trust building.
  8-7. Commanders and their staffs must understand the potential effects of adversarial disinformation
  operations on units and leaders. Targeted adversary or enemy activities in the information dimension can
  rapidly degrade Soldiers’ performance, impacting their readiness. These activities can also degrade civilian
  performance and affect the critical infrastructure they manage. Leaders combat this through—
  ⚫ Public communications, both before and during deployment operations.
  ⚫ Coordination with relevant public affairs personnel.
  ⚫ Soldier and Family preparation, which can include incorporating response strategies for
  disinformation dissemination into exercises and other training.
  8-8. As friendly forces transition from competition and crisis to armed conflict, threat actors increase the
  intensity and lethality of their tactics. This can include infrastructure sabotage by pre-positioned agents, a
  broad scope of cyberspace or information attacks (such as targeting an oil pipeline supplying a large region
  rather than only a specific port), or long-range precision strikes using a variety of munitions. Concurrently,
  threat actors posture for, and may eventually escalate through, nonlethal and lethal actions of increasing
  intensity to improve standoff and prevent power projections from the U.S. homeland and other basing and
  staging areas. Threat actors may also strike transport vessels along sea lines of communications while these
  vessels are enroute to a seaport of debarkation.
  8-9. Peer threats may choose to support proxy forces or influence unwitting groups, including irregular forces,
  saboteurs, sympathetic civil organizations, and criminals. These groups may be used to prevent timely
  deployment operations by denying access to roads or facilities with crowds, protests, or looting. Using these
  forces may also allow for direct action against U.S. targets while masking the responsible nation or group.
  Threat actors may design these activities to affect the economy and global trade in addition to the political-
  military balance in the United States or overseas. Additionally, other state and nonstate actors may exploit the
  situation with attacks to pursue their own objectives. These attacks may be conducted within the United States
  or allied nations, in the theater where Army forces are preparing to deploy, or in other, unrelated regions.
  8-10. Leaders anticipate adversary activities in all domains while preparing for or conducting deployment
  operations. Disruptions may not be preventable. They can, however, be mitigated through intelligence
  support, training, preparation, and coordination with unified action partners. Effective mitigation in planning,
  preparation, and execution ensures the Army provides the required forces to CCDRs and other JFCs.
  8-11. FM 3-0 discusses how deployments comprise various movements and activities—fort to port, port to
  port, and RSOI—all of which involve unique intelligence considerations. (See appendix C and FM 3-0.) Most
  subsequent discussions in this chapter address actions after friendly force RSOI. Following RSOI, there may
  be challenges for the intelligence warfighting function based on the loss of or delay in receiving intelligence
  personnel or the loss, delay, or damage to intelligence systems.