text: Chapter 2
  Russian’s Reconnaissance-strike Model
  During the Russo-Ukrainian War’s Donbas campaign, Russia’s use of drones, supported with
  Russian indirect fire assets, proved to be an effective method to dominate land battle and gain
  the tactical advantage against their peer threats. On July 11, 2014, Ukrainian forces began to
  uncoil from their AA and prepare for offensive operations. Russian forces used drones cued by
  electronic signature-tracking systems to identify Ukrainian force positions to target them when
  they were most vulnerable. At approximately 0400 hours, when it was still dark and Ukrainian
  forces were disorganized, Ukrainian forces heard drones overhead. Shortly after, the
  Ukrainian tactical radio network fell silent. All Ukrainian communication systems were
  simultaneously jammed followed by volleys of accurate and deadly indirect fire strikes directly
  on Ukrainian force positions. The bombardment lasted four minutes and the Russians bombed
  Ukrainian force positions with a barrage of rockets and artillery. By the end of the attack,
  Ukrainian forces suffered over 30 soldiers killed in action with several others severely wounded,
  and over 2 battalions worth of combat power destroyed and rendered combat ineffective.
  This revamped tactic is known as the Russians’ reconnaissance-strike model which is a mixture
  of drones, rockets, artillery fire, special reconnaissance, cyber capabilities, and geo-locating
  technology to find, fix, and destroy the enemy on the battlefield in near-real time. Russians
  demonstrated the effective use of this type of reconnaissance-strike model and they continually
  use this model on the battlefield today. Russians believe in an “artillery destroys, infantry
  occupies” mentality, and they could be expected to use their indirect fire systems to destroy
  their enemy at the first opportunity. The slaughter of Ukrainian forces at Zelenopilla
  demonstrated how the Russians have updated and improved their tactics using technology and
  enhanced military capabilities like accurate, long-range artillery and rockets to destroy their
  enemies without much tactical risk to themselves.
  During reconnaissance and security operations, forces must be aware of how the battlefield of
  the 21st century has changed, and how surveillance systems like drones or UAS are an effective
  tool when the system is observing for an artillery battery. Sensors are now able to scan for a
  unit’s electronic signature, which provides the enemy with accurate locations on the battlefield.
  Near peer and peer threats have developed new and emerging tactics and reconnaissance and
  security operations must develop ways to counter these enemy disruption techniques and
  tactics. Peer and near peer threats have refined their reconnaissance fire system where they
  could have reconnaissance to engagement using high-precision, long-range weapons tied to
  immediate and real-time data.
  Disruption techniques and tactics are designed to disrupt, destroy, and change the course of
  military operations against the enemy during large-scale combat operations. This vignette
  provides an example of how the enemy can rapidly gain and maintain contact through multiple
  means. Near peer and peer threats do not want to be vulnerable; therefore, they use aggressive
  counterreconnaissance methods to destroy ground reconnaissance forces early. The Ukrainian
  army was unable to defend the eastern region of Ukraine after this attack. Emerging threats
  group their intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets and their indirect fire units
  around each other, which usually provides a location for a high-payoff target, if identified.
  Enemy forces use deception, cover and concealment, and obscuration to achieve positions of relative
  advantage. They may move in different types of units, groups, or formations to avoid obvious detection and
  to concentrate against perceived weaknesses. Irregular and regular forces often conduct short engagements
  and attempt to break contact before U.S. forces can bring indirect fire or other capabilities to bear. The enemy
  employs deception measures to reduce U.S. forces’ information collection efforts. Deception measures
  include enemy formations, hardened and buried facilities, and multispectral decoys to mask the signatures of