text: _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4
  4-10. The OPFOR can use the time it takes the extraregional force to prepare
  and deploy into the region to change the nature of the conflict into something
  for which the intervening force is unprepared. The OPFOR tries to establish
  conditions that force the new enemy to fight at less than full strength and on
  terrain for which his forces are not optimized. It seeks to take advantage of
  complex terrain whenever possible, while controlling the enemy’s access to
  such terrain. It plans operations to exploit the opportunities created by the
  presence of NGOs, PVOs, media, and other civilians on the battlefield.
  4-11. Meanwhile, transition operations permit other key forces the time,
  space, and freedom of action necessary to move into sanctuary in preparation
  for a shift to adaptive operations. These forces preserve combat power and
  prepare to defend the State homeland, if necessary. Transition operations
  usually include mobilization of reserve and militia forces to assist in defending
  the State.
  4-12. At some point, the OPFOR may conclude that it cannot deny entry or
  defeat the extraregional force by destroying his early-entry forces. The
  OPFOR then shifts its emphasis to completing the transition to adaptive
  operations as soon as possible, before the enemy can deploy overwhelming
  forces into the region.
  ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS
  4-13. From the perspective of the extraregional power, any regional crisis has
  the potential to expand into a major theater war. Therefore, it will try to
  avoid crisis expansion by early engagement and rapid response. The longer
  the State can delay effective extraregional response to the crisis in the region,
  the greater its chances for success. Failing to limit or interrupt access to the
  region, the State will attempt to degrade further enemy force projection, hold
  initial gains, and extend the conflict, while preserving its own military capa-
  bility and other instruments of national power.
  4-14. When the OPFOR shifts to adaptive operations, these are more defensive
  in nature than were regional or transition operations. When overmatched
  in conventional power, the OPFOR seeks to preserve its own power and
  apply it in adaptive ways. It expects its commanders to seize opportunity,
  tailor organizations to the mission, and make creative use of existing
  resourceseven more than they did in regional and transition operations.
  4-15. Generally, the OPFOR conducts adaptive operations during the strate-
  gic campaign as a consequence of intervention from outside the region. If it
  cannot control the extraregional enemy’s access into the region or defeat his
  forces before his combat potential in the region equals or exceeds its own, the
  OPFOR must resort to adaptive operations. The primary objectives are to
  preserve combat power, to degrade the enemy’s will and capability to fight,
  and to gain time for aggressive strategic operations to succeed.
  4-16. Adaptive operations occur as a result of an extraregional power
  intervening with sufficient forces to thwart the OPFOR’s original of-
  fensive operations in the region. The OPFOR disperses to the extent its C2
  allows and conducts decentralized operations in both offense and defense.
  The OPFOR views adaptive operations as temporary in nature, serving as a
  means for the OPFOR to return to regional operations.