text: Operations During Crisis
  forces are committed to address a specific crisis. An example of an effective response operation occurred in
  Korea in 1976.
  Effective Response: OPERATION PAUL BUNYAN
  On 18 August 1976, a North Korean platoon-sized force attacked a small element of
  U.S. and South Korean Army forces conducting a routine tree trimming detail in the
  Joint Security Area, a location set aside for military talks and jointly secured by forces
  from both the U.S.-led United Nations Command and North Korea. The North Koreans
  murdered two U.S. officers and wounded five South Korean soldiers, escalating the
  already tense security arrangement.
  Leaders assessed that the act was an attempt to dissuade American support for the
  U.S. military presence in South Korea. U.S. leaders considered multiple response
  options. Although some advocated for a swift and lethal response, the U.S.-led alliance
  implemented a course of action designed to avoid escalation but demonstrate allied
  cohesion and resolve.
  Three days after the attack, dozens of U.S. and South Korean forces reoccupied the
  same site where the unprovoked attack occurred and cut down the tree. As a show of
  force and coalition readiness, hundreds of U.S. and South Korean soldiers provided
  overwatch for the work detail. Army forces also deployed attack helicopters and
  prepared artillery for use if necessary. This show of force was part of a larger joint
  response option. President Ford ordered U.S. forces to Defense Condition Three,
  deployed strategic bombers, and deployed a U.S. aircraft carrier.
  The operation de-escalated the situation while bringing attention to North Korea’s
  malign activity, further isolating North Korea from the international community. The
  operation compelled the North Koreans to admit they regretted the incident, and they
  agreed to separate forces in the joint security area. The response resolved the incident
  with stronger international support for the United Nations’ mission and a stronger bond
  between U.S. and South Korean forces.
  FORCE PROJECTION
  5-20. The demonstrated ability to project Army forces into an operational area is an essential element of
  conventional deterrence. Army forces depend almost entirely upon joint lift capabilities for deployment.
  Force projection is the ability to project the military instrument of national power from the United States, or
  another theater in response to requirements for military operations (JP 3-0).
  5-21. During a crisis, ground forces provide a JFC with more enduring options than forces primarily
  concentrated in or transiting other domains. Army forces are capable of occupying ground indefinitely. They
  must be sustained just like other Services, but the Army’s ability to maintain persistent presence is far greater
  because of the nature of operations on land. The potentially close physical proximity of ground forces to
  adversary forces provides the JFC with greater understanding and can help the JFC dictate the tempo of
  operations.
  5-22. Army forces achieve persistent presence by deploying forces into a theater to support forward-stationed
  U.S. forces, or those of allies or partners. These forces are likely already executing operations directed in
  response to provocations, indications, or warnings that hostile activities may commence. At the direction of
  the JFC, Army forces execute tasks, activities, and operations designed to deter further malign activity and
  set conditions for success should deterrence fail. The forward presence or projection of Army formations into
  a theater provides capabilities that create tactical and operational dilemmas for threat forces, enabling the
  JFC to seize and retain the initiative. Prompt deployment of land forces in the initial phase of a crisis can