text: Chapter 3
  TRANSITION BACK TO COMPETITION AND POST-CONFLICT
  STABILIZATION
  3-84. Multinational forces continuously consolidate gains across the competition continuum. Consolidating
  gains during the transition back to competition is particularly important. Multinational formations
  continuously consolidate gains to maintain tempo and enable the transition from armed conflict to resuming
  competition. SC activities to consolidate gains eliminate the enemy’s capability and will to resist and are
  essential to exploiting tactical success and maintaining the initiative.
  3-85. Like shaping actions, consolidation of gains is a continuous activity with varying levels of intensity
  and a variety of tasks including stability, security, and offensive operations against bypassed enemy
  formations. If required, a multinational force can be trained to improve the way it conducts consolidation of
  gains to reset the conditions for long-term deterrence and as the prelude to creating a new and improved
  security environment. From the outset of a campaign, the multinational force plans, sets, and continually
  adjusts the conditions for a more favorable return to competition and a new normal.
  3-86. During the transition back to competition, FSF can leverage SC efforts to the extent they can be made
  available, and return to shaping the environment and defeating adversary aggression below armed conflict
  by—
  * Conducting continuous multidomain OPE.
  * Countering destabilizing information warfare campaigns.
  * Deterring escalation through deployment and training as part of multinational force.
  * Setting the conditions for rapid transition to armed conflict should deterrence fail.
  SECURITY COOPERATION SUPPORT TO POST-CONFLICT
  STABILIZATION
  3-87. A stability operation is an operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other
  instruments of national power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential
  governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (ADP 3-0). These
  operations support governance by a host nation, an interim government, or a military government. Stability
  involves coercive and constructive action (See ADP 3-07 for more information on stability operations).
  3-88. Following LSCO, it is likely that there will be widespread destruction of host-nation infrastructure.
  FSF may also be depleted or destroyed to include law enforcement elements. Depending on the nature of the
  campaign, it is possible that coalition forces may find themselves occupying adversary terrain. These areas
  are also likely to have experienced widespread destruction of infrastructure and security forces. Both
  situations create an immediate need for SC to rebuild security forces to enable stability.
  3-89. Depending on the length of the conflict, it is likely that SC forces supporting LSCO may be depleted
  to the point that that are not fully mission capable. It is critical that security cooperation planners anticipate
  this requirement and plan for additional stabilization resources prior to the commencement of conflict.
  3-90. The multinational force conducts limited stability tasks during armed conflict in accordance with the
  laws of land warfare. Stability tasks become more prevalent in consolidation areas and during consolidation
  of gains after bypassed enemy forces are defeated. Multinational operations including stability operations
  present many opportunities for SC. Having multinational forces as part of an operation provides international
  legitimacy that helps isolate adversary or enemy forces. They may provide cultural awareness, foreign
  language skills, and affinities with populations that help with understanding the environment, conducting
  stability tasks, and transitioning to legitimate authorities. Allies and partners often operate with different
  authorities to employ key capabilities in space, cyberspace, and the information dimension of an OE. Lastly,
  multinational allies and partners bring additional forces to an operation, and they often possess capabilities
  U.S. Army forces may lack (FM 3-0). Meanwhile, adversaries attempt to isolate the United States from allies
  and partners by fostering instability in critical areas and among relevant actors to increase U.S. operational
  requirements.