text: Chapter 3
  The Military Advisor Group Concept
  In July of 1949, one year prior to the start of the Korean War, the Army initiated an SFA
  program by establishing the Korean Military Advisory Group. This effort provided
  accurate assessments of both the gaps in the South Korean military capabilities and
  the likelihood of a North Korea attack. Unfortunately, these assessments were not
  effectively used, and the U.S. Army was caught by surprise when the Korean War
  started, resulting in the Task Force Smith debacle. This is a good example of
  establishing a persistent advisory presence in an area of anticipated crisis; however, it
  also displays the problems that can occur when SFA assessments are not effectively
  used. Once the Korean War started, the Korean Military Advisor Group had marked
  success in building the Army of the Republic of Korea into a security establishment
  capable of enforcing the government’s control of its territory and population, while also
  deterring external threats.
  Enabling Partner FSF Resiliency Inside Adversarial A2/AD Networks
  3-53. SC can enable the resiliency of the partner FSF to persist inside adversary A2/AD networks during
  crisis. A2/AD is a tactic intended to prevent the United States from deploying its forces into a theater of
  operations from the onset. This tactic fails to deliver when the partner nation’s force is already operating
  inside the A2/AD area and has developed localized tactics that use dispersion to evade enemy attacks, deceive
  the enemy, and achieve surprise. SC can support the resiliency of a partner FSF in crisis by developing or
  enhancing their mobility, cover, concealment, and deception capability and capacity.
  3-54. For mobility, partner land forces should be light and agile enough to quickly conduct operations, then
  rapidly reposition along the established nodes of the landpower network within the adversary’s A2/AD zone.
  Cover capacity should include site hardening against adversary attack and be augmented with the ability of
  the unit to conceal itself from detection through physical, electronic, and cyber means. Deception capacity
  should focus on the ability of the partner FSF to present false targets to the adversary through a combination
  of electronic spoofing and physical decoys.
  3-55. SC can build partner force capacity that is highly mobile, with alternate and supplemental positions to
  ensure survivability and unpredictability. SC can enable and support FSF formations to integrate CBRN-
  defense planning considerations across all warfighting functions. SC used to increase partner FSF readiness
  against current and emerging CBRN threats and hazards, enables FSF tactical and operational formations to
  fight, survive, and win in future combat operations.
  SUPPORT TO FORCE PROJECTION
  3-56. Force projection is particularly important during crisis, as Army forces have an unknown amount of
  time to shape a developing situation. Forces projected forward during competition to conduct exercises,
  bolster allies and partners, and conduct other activities are under constant observation. Adversaries assess the
  speed and efficiency of these routine deployments, which can have a deterrent effect. Given the fluid nature
  of a crisis, force projection may continue well after a crisis has transitioned to armed conflict.
  3-57. SC activities to enable force projection may involve developing partner FSF capability and capacity to
  support, augment, resource, and protect the force as it arrives in theater. SC forces work with their
  counterparts in host-nation defense ministries and the FSF to support and augment the theater commander
  and JFC’s force projection activities by, with, and through—
  * Opening the theater.
  * Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI).
  * Initial employment of forces.
  * Sustainment.
  * Redeployment.