text: Chapter 11
  campaign plan is to prepare a draft plan prior to deployment, and then complete the plan once the initial
  assessment is complete. Following every subsequent assessment, the U.S. or multinational commander
  develops new goals and objectives based upon the developmental needs of the host-nation security force,
  and then the commander issues a fragmentary order with specific tasks for the advisor teams or partner
  units that support the new goals.
  11-13. Host-nation security force developmental goals must include harmonized coordination among the
  various branches of the host-nation security force, particularly between the land forces and the police. All
  components of a host-nation security force must understand their own constitutional mandates and
  limitations. For example, a host-nation army must know if or when it has the authority to detain individuals
  suspected of a crime. Host-nation police forces must understand and support the rule of law, and ensure that
  their actions harmonize with the nation’s criminal courts, as well as with the prison system. Finally, when
  U.S. and multinational forces advise host-nation security force personnel, they must conduct the proper
  troop-to-task analysis to ensure that land forces orient their operations according to host-nation army
  doctrine, while police forces should be employed in a way that meets the expectations of a host-nation
  government and the people they protect.
  11-14. Monitoring of host-nation security forces serves multiple functions, including intelligence and
  operations security. U.S. or multinational forces must always be aware of a host-nation security forces
  leadership’s loyalty to its host nation and be sensitive to any perceived intentions on the part of a
  host-nation security force that may run counter to legitimization of its nation’s government.
  11-15. Unified action partners advise host-nation security forces to affect changes in the way they operate.
  If host-nation security forces are efficient across all functions, no advising is necessary. However, the only
  way a host-nation security force will undergo enduring growth and improvement is if the motivation comes
  from within. Therefore, advisors must shape host-nation security force actions so that they make their own
  processes and their systems work as intended. Prior to and during deployment, advisors must apply a
  motivated approach to learning and understanding a host-nation security force’s organizational design. To
  build effective working relationships, advisors need to possess a basic understanding of the host nation’s
  culture, social mores, and taboos. Language capability (focused on rapport-building words and phrases
  instead of just operational jargon) further enhances an advisor’s credibility and status. The ability to
  negotiate and communicate diplomatically is essential for effective advising.
  11-16. Once the U.S. or multinational forces gain an understanding of their counterparts’ culture and
  organizational design and have completed an initial assessment of the host-nation security force unit’s
  capabilities and capacity, advising activities can commence. Advisors consider culture, resources available,
  and the base line assessment when choosing which advising task to employ when advising the host-nation
  security force. There are three tasks that impart knowledge to the host-nation security force: teach, coach
  and advise.
  * Teaching involves a number of activities designed to impart knowledge or skills to host-nation
  security force counterparts, but the advisor or partner unit drives the process.
  * Coaching also involves the transfer of knowledge, skills, and abilities, but host-nation security
  force units or individuals assume responsibility for applying what they have learned when
  executing counterinsurgency tasks.
  * Advising simply involves providing advice to commanders and staffs on their actions. There is
  no longer a need to actively transfer knowledge. Advising is passive and allows a host nation to
  be the primary actor.
  In many counterinsurgencies, the U.S. will only provide equipment, training, and advice. The host nation
  has a better understanding of the operational environment and is able to better maintain its legitimacy if it
  does not employ foreign forces directly. Advisors must keep in mind that they are also students and they
  probably have a great deal to learn from their host-nation counterparts. (See figure 11-1.)