text: FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
  strategic level, the State can use the OPFOR and its other instruments of
  power to counter or target the systems and subsystems that make up an op-
  ponent’s instruments of power. The primary purpose is to subdue, control, or
  change the opponent’s behavior.
  1-112. If an opponent’s strength lies in his military power, the State and the
  OPFOR can attack the other instruments of power as a means of disaggre-
  gating or disrupting the enemy’s system of national power. Thus, it is possi-
  ble to render the overall system ineffective without necessarily having to de-
  feat the opponent militarily.
  APPLICATION AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL
  1-113. At the operational level, the application of systems warfare pertains
  only to the use of armed forces to achieve a result. Therefore, the “system of
  systems” in question at this level is the combat system of the OPFOR and/or
  the enemy.
  Combat System
  1-114. A combat system (see Figure 1-5) is the “system of systems” that re-
  sults from the synergistic combination of four basic subsystems that are inte-
  grated to achieve a military function. The subsystems are as follows:
  • Combat forces (such as main battle tanks, IFVs and/or APCs, or infantry).
  • Combat support forces (such as artillery, SSMs, air defense, engineers,
  and direct air support).
  • Logistics forces (such as transportation, ammunition, fuel, rations, main-
  tenance, and medical).
  • C2 and RISTA (such as headquarters, signal nodes, satellite downlink
  sites, and reconnaissance sensors).
  1-115. The combat system is characterized by interaction and interdepend-
  ence among its subsystems. Therefore, the OPFOR will seek to identify key
  subsystems of an enemy combat system and target them and destroy them
  individually. Against a technologically superior extraregional force, the
  OPFOR will often use any or all subcomponents of its own combat system to
  attack the most vulnerable parts of the enemy’s combat system rather than
  the enemy’s strengths. For example, attacking the enemy’s logistics, C2, and
  RISTA can undermine the overall effectiveness of the enemy’s combat system
  without having to directly engage his superior combat and combat support
  forces. Aside from the physical effect, the removal of one or more key subsys-
  tems can have a devastating psychological effect, particularly if it occurs in a
  short span of time.