text: Chapter 11
  Combined Arms for Air Defense
  This chapter addresses the contributions that Army non-AMD forces provide in the
  execution of AMD operations, commonly referred to as combined arms for air defense.
  All forces may be involved in AMD operations, either through direct engagement or
  indirect support actions. The capabilities and considerations presented throughout this
  chapter are of those non-AMD forces that complement the capabilities of dedicated
  Army, joint, and multinational AMD forces. The capabilities may include small arms,
  crew-served weapons, or missiles. In most cases, the discussion addresses situations
  where there are no ADA forces present. The focus of this chapter, unless otherwise
  indicated, is the BCT and low-flying threats.
  GENERAL
  11-1. Since the advent of air power, Army forces have been observed, challenged, threatened, and attacked
  by enemy air and have had to learn, train, and execute their missions under the premise of air attack. To help
  counter this air threat the Army developed AMD capabilities, ranging from missile defense to C-RAM
  systems. The AMD capabilities are prioritized and allocated to protect the most critical force assets
  throughout an operation. However, the amount of dedicated ADA resources available within the Army has
  always been insufficient to protect all of the force components. Therefore, non-ADA forces must contribute
  to defense against air threats, relying on their own protection capabilities to supplement any dedicated ADA
  forces allocated to them.
  11-2. The primary air threats to the maneuver force are RAM, UASs (groups 1 and 2), fixed- and rotary-
  wing aircraft, and cruise missiles. It is likely all of these threats, in various quantities and with various
  capabilities, are present in a BCT’s area of operations and can threaten the commander’s ability to maneuver
  freely and execute mission requirements. The most prevalent air threat generally varies by theater and by
  time during an operation. RAM and surveillance UASs, capable of cueing fires against friendly assets, are
  likely always present. The low, slow, and small l UASs (groups 1 and 2) are prominent threats, given their
  small size and signature and ability to report friendly force locations in near-real time. UASs may also be
  employed in coordinated groups and, in the future, swarms, further complicating engagements by friendly
  forces. And, as discussed in previous chapters, the threat has added the capability to execute complex
  integrated attacks, using a combination of different platforms with different capabilities to conduct a
  synchronized attack in near-real time.
  11-3. Actions taken by Army forces in support of AMD may be either active or passive.
  * Active measures are offensive and defensive actions taken to defeat the air threat before, during,
  and after they attack friendly assets. These actions can be taken by Army systems that have not
  been optimized or adapted with a capability against the air threats or by Army systems with
  enhanced AMD capabilities. The non-optimized systems engage an air threat, without making
  changes to the system’s primary mission, role, or capabilities. For instance, crew-served weapons
  shoot at an air target using manual super elevation and lead angle (Kentucky windage).
  Enhancements may add such capabilities as air track targeting information in C2 systems, airborne
  platform attack mode in electronic attack systems, and new software in BCT sensors to enable
  detection, tracking, and reporting of airborne platforms. Active measures may be taken against all
  air threats cited above in the air or on the ground, with the exception of RAM. Only ADA units
  and some self-protection systems have the capability to actively engage RAM threats in the air.
  * Passive measures are actions taken to reduce the enemy’s ability to detect, locate, target the force,
  and minimize the effects of the attack. Passive measures include camouflage, cover, concealment,