text: Chapter 1
  should take is to use forces to gain that understanding while not creating unintended and lasting harm to the
  mission. (See chapter 11 for more information on intelligence.)
  1-81. Because of the dispersed nature of counterinsurgency operations, the actions of counterinsurgency
  forces are key generators of intelligence. In counterinsurgency operations, a cycle often develops where
  intelligence drives operations, which produces additional intelligence that facilitates subsequent operations.
  Reporting by tactical units and civilian agencies is often of greater importance than reporting by specialized
  national intelligence assets. These factors, along with the need to generate a favorable tempo (rate of
  military operations) drive the requirement to produce and disseminate intelligence at the lowest practical
  level. Commanders are responsible for driving the intelligence process.
  1-82. Understanding the operational environment extends beyond insurgent combatants and insurgent
  leaders. To truly counter an insurgency, counterinsurgents must gather, analyze, and disseminate civil
  information pertaining to the population. If legitimacy is the primary principle of counterinsurgency
  operations, then identifying what is preventing legitimacy is as important, if not more so, than intelligence
  pertaining to enemy actions. Since Army and Marine Corps forces conduct counterinsurgency with unified
  action partners, it is vital to separate intelligence and civil information. Some partners, particularly NGOs,
  may not exchange information with Army and Marine Corps forces if that information is overtly tied to
  intelligence collection. Achieving a common situational understanding with unified action partners will
  require exchanging information outside of the intelligence realm.
  SECURITY UNDER THE RULE OF LAW IS ESSENTIAL
  1-83. Whenever possible, security forces should be provided by the host nation. To establish legitimacy,
  the affected government must strive to transition security activities from military authorities to host-nation
  law enforcement authorities as quickly as feasible. When insurgents are seen as criminals, they lose public
  support. Prior to any transition to full host-nation responsibility, however, the violence level must be
  reduced enough for the host-nation counterinsurgency forces to maintain order; otherwise, the host-nation
  counterinsurgency forces will be unable to secure the population and the host nation may lose the
  legitimacy gained by the transition. U.S. counterinsurgent forces must also understand how the military and
  police are viewed by the population and not assume they are always seen as protectors. The goal of a
  change to a host-nation security force is an accountable, self-sustaining, capable, and credible force able to
  meet the security challenges faced by the host nation and seen as legitimate by the population.
  1-84. Security forces use a legal system that conforms to local culture and practices to deal with insurgents
  and criminals and that enhances the affected government’s legitimacy. To succeed in countering an
  insurgency, the host-nation government must develop its legal and conflict resolution systems, including
  police forces, judicial systems, and penal facilities. The legal use of population control measures, including
  curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and biometric census may assist in
  identifying the insurgents and protecting the population.
  COUNTERINSURGENT FORCES SHOULD PREPARE FOR A LONG-TERM COMMITMENT
  1-85. Counterinsurgency operations can be protracted. Though most insurgencies are quickly defeated by
  the host nation and its military forces, U.S. involvement normally comes in insurgencies that are not
  quickly defeated. Insurgents can become extremely difficult to identify, track, and interdict if they are
  effective in acting clandestinely. Insurgencies may persist for many years after the main threat has been
  broken. Thus, counterinsurgency operations may demand considerable expenditures of time and resources.
  The population must have confidence in the staying power of both the affected government and any
  counterinsurgency forces supporting it. The population may prefer the affected government to the
  insurgents; however, people do not actively support a government unless they are convinced that the
  government has the means, ability, stamina, and will to win. Stabilizing the security situation and
  transforming a failed, failing, or ineffectual government into a functional one is an extremely difficult task
  that may take an extended period to complete. (See paragraphs 4-70 through 4-75 for information on the
  seventh dynamic, phasing and timing.)