text: Chapter 2
  Command and Control
  This chapter examines the OPFOR system and process of command and
  control (C2). It explains how the OPFOR expects to direct the forces and ac-
  tions described in other chapters of this manual. It provides insights into the
  OPFOR theory and practice of controlling combined arms, joint, interagency,
  and multinational forces in war. Most important, it shows how OPFOR com-
  manders and staffs think and work.
  In modern war, victory is likely to go to the side that acts most quickly.
  The overriding need for speedy decisions to seize fleeting opportunities
  drastically reduces the time available for decision making and for issuing
  and implementing orders. The need to seize opportunities on the battle-
  field, coupled with dispersion to avoid the threat of precision weapons,
  dictates the replacement of concentration in terms of space by concentra-
  tion in terms of time and effects. Moreover, the operational and tactical
  situation is subject to sudden and radical changes, and the results of
  combat are more likely to be decisive than in the past. OPFOR C2 par-
  ticipants, processes, and systems are designed to operate effectively
  and efficiently in this new environment. The successful execution of an
  information warfare (IW) plan is critical to victory.
  Although dealing briefly with strategic control of forces, this chapter fo-
  cuses on operational command and control. All OPFOR levels of command
  share a common decision-making and planning process. They also share a
  parallel staff organization and command post (CP) structure, tailored to
  match the differences in scope and span of control.
  CONCEPT
  2-1. The OPFOR’s C2 concept is grounded in the essential principles of the
  States’ process for exercising command and control. At the core of the State’s
  C2 concept is the assumption that modern communications are susceptible to
  attack and/or monitoring. Accordingly, the State operates from the view that
  centralized planning defines the means for assuring both command (estab-
  lishing the aim) and control (sustaining the aim). It leads to strategic and op-
  erational directions. Necessarily, then, the State relies on the loyalty of its
  forces and accords far-ranging authority to act within the aim while foregoing
  rigorous control as both unproductive and unlikely in the modern environment.
  2-2. For the OPFOR, this concept translates into centralized planning and
  decentralized execution, requiring a high degree of initiative at low opera-
  tional and tactical levels. The OPFOR not only accepts this condition as neces-
  sary, but also considers decentralized execution the essence of its operational