text: Chapter 3
  * Protecting DOD information.
  * Identity and access management.
  3-24. Sharing cybersecurity program information and threat warnings builds trust and confidence between
  the Army and unified action partners. Timely and deliberate information sharing maximizes the security of
  critical network infrastructure. Cybersecurity and network defense personnel must share vulnerability
  information to the maximum extent allowed by law, regulation, and government-wide policy. The geographic
  combatant command J-6 and theater army G-6 develop guidance and programs for sharing cybersecurity
  information. The theater army is the cybersecurity lead for any coalition network provided by the Army.
  SUPPORT TO DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS
  3-25. The DODIN-A faces continuous risk from threat actors. Signal planners collaborate with the CEMA
  section to help identify key terrain in cyberspace during operations to shape. The CEMA section plans for
  defensive cyberspace operations support. Cyberspace capabilities must be coordinated, built, moved, and
  provided access to various nodes across cyberspace. These systems require constant maintenance and defense
  throughout operations to shape.
  3-26. Defensive cyberspace operations require access to the theater network. DODIN operations personnel
  collaborate with defensive and offensive cyberspace operations personnel throughout the planning process,
  since their activities are interdependent.
  ADDITIONAL SHAPING ACTIVITIES
  3-27. As part of operations to shape, Army signal forces conduct numerous other activities supporting the
  geographic combatant command and theater army. These include signal support to intelligence operations,
  support to countering weapons of mass destruction, support to humanitarian efforts, and organizing and
  participating in combined training and exercises.
  SUPPORT TO INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS DURING SHAPING ACTIVITIES
  3-28. The theater military intelligence brigade-theater provides regionally-focused collection and analysis to
  support the geographic combatant commander, theater army commander, and Army forces conducting
  operations to shape. The theater military intelligence brigade has S-6 staff support and dedicated satellite
  transport systems for sensitive compartmented information networks. With transport convergence (see
  paragraph 2-267), tactical signal systems replace the dedicated intelligence transport systems for sensitive
  compartmented information networks.
  3-29. Units at home station access sensitive compartmented information networks, SIPRNET, NIPRNET,
  and coalition networks through the DODIN-A fixed infrastructure. In a deployed environment, Warfighter
  Information Network-Tactical provides satellite transport for top secret/sensitive compartmented information
  networks to the brigade level. If the military intelligence brigade identifies network requirements beyond the
  capability or capacity of organic signal assets, they request additional signal support through the theater army
  and geographic combatant command. Signal support comes from theater-available assets or elements of an
  expeditionary signal battalion. See appendix E for more information about requests for signal support.
  SUPPORT TO COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
  3-30. Shaping activities work toward strategic deterrence of weapons of mass destruction. Army forces shape
  an operational environment to dissuade or deter adversaries from developing, acquiring, proliferating, or
  using weapons of mass destruction.
  3-31. The DODIN-A fixed infrastructure supports the countering weapons of mass destruction mission.
  Units conducting countering weapons of mass destruction missions use their organic signal capabilities.
  When organic capabilities cannot meet mission requirements, these units request additional support through
  the theater army and geographic combatant command.