text: Chapter 4
  Transfer in Afghanistan
  The fall of Kandahar and Kabul in November of 2001 marked the collapse of the
  Taliban government and disintegration of its fighting forces. While the organization of
  the Afghan Interim Authority was taking place, JSOTF-North consolidated the
  stabilization effort by assigning UW to the three 5th SFG battalion commanders.
  The Special Operations Command and Control Elements (SOCCEs) were formed to
  better control operations by various Alliance warlords and to reduce bypassed pockets
  of Taliban and al-Qaeda resistance around Tora Bora in eastern Afghanistan.
  A second Ranger parachute assault (Objective Bastogne) seized a remote airfield to
  support ARSOF attack helicopter operations. Destroying al-Qaeda leaders became a
  secondary mission for JSOTF-North under the new functional alignment directed by
  SOCCENT. That was to be the primary mission of the new JSOTF-South. The ADVON
  of that headquarters relocated to Kandahar Air Base when Marine Corps forces at
  Objective Rhino moved there. The 10th Mountain Division left K2 for Bagram Air base,
  south of Kabul. Just days after Hamid Karzai became interim prime minister, the Joint
  Civil Military Operations Task Force was established in Kabul to direct and coordinate
  civil and humanitarian affairs in rebuilding Afghanistan. In mid-January 2002, TF
  Rakkasan from the 101st Airborne Division deployed to Kandahar Airport to replace
  the Marines…
  …3rd SFG at Fort Bragg had been alerted to replace 5th SFG in the combat zone, and
  19th and 20th SFG (ARNG) battalion staffs and ODAs were arriving in theater.
  Mobilized USAR CA and PSYOP units had been “earmarked” to replace Active Army
  forces in theater…
  Weapon of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan
  CMH Pub 70-100-1
  4-135. The JFC may establish a JCMOTF to accomplish a specific contingency mission with a civil-military
  nature (such as FHA, PRC or transitional military authority) and/or to provide CMO support to U.S. or
  coalition military forces conducting military operations. Service component and other task force commanders
  are still responsible for accomplishing the CMO—that is within their ability—in their AOs. When their need
  exceeds their capability, a JCMOTF assists in meeting the shortfall. A JCMOTF can—
  * Be a stand-alone JTF or a subordinate unit in a JTF.
  * Assist JTF unit commanders when their organic ability cannot meet the CMO needs of their joint
  operations area.
  * Provide linkage between the JTF and nonmilitary agencies operating in the joint operations area
  through a CMOC.
  * Advise the JTF commander on policy; funding; multinational, foreign, or host-nation sensitivities;
  and their effect on theater strategy and/or campaign and operational missions.
  * Provide command and control or direction of military host-nation advisory, assessment, planning,
  and other assistance activities by joint U.S. forces.
  * Assist in establishing U.S. or multinational and military-to-civilian links for greater efficiency of
  cooperative assistance arrangements.
  * Perform essential coordination or liaison with host-nation agencies; country teams; United Nations
  agencies; and deployed U.S. multinational, host-nation military forces, and their supporting
  logistic organizations.
  * Assist in the planning and conduct of civil information programs to—
  Publicize positive results and objectives of military assistance projects.
  
  Build civil acceptance and support of U.S. operations.
  
  Promote local capabilities contributing to recovery and economic-social development.
  
  * Plan and conduct joint and combined CMO training exercises.
  * Advise and assist in strengthening or stabilizing civil infrastructures and services.