text: Introduction
  The 2006 version of FM 3-24/ MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, filled an important doctrinal gap at a
  time when U.S. forces were engaged in counterinsurgency operations. This version of
  FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 builds on that important manual. This field manual provides doctrine that frames
  counterinsurgency within the context of the range of military operations and provides a framework for the
  different ways land forces could counter an insurgency. Understanding insurgencies and the operational
  environment in which they exist, the ways in which the U.S. will attempt to counter insurgencies, and how
  commanders synchronize their efforts to achieve end states is at the core of what this manual provides to
  both the Army and the Marine Corps.
  This version is organized differently than the 2006 version. The new title, Insurgencies and Countering
  Insurgencies, provides insight into the thinking behind the organization. Overall, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 is
  divided into three parts. Part one provides strategic and operational context, part two provides the doctrine
  for understanding insurgencies, and part three provides doctrine for defeating an insurgency. In short,
  FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 is organized to provide the context of a problem, the problem, and possible
  solutions.
  Part one, the “Strategic and Operational Context,” provides a framework for understanding the environment
  where a counterinsurgency exists. Part one consists of chapters one through three.
  Part two, “Insurgencies,” provides a doctrinal framework for understanding an insurgency. Part two
  consists of chapters four and five.
  Part three, “Counterinsurgencies,” describes how to plan and execute operations to enable a host nation to
  defeat an insurgency.
  Chapter 1, “Understanding the Strategic Context,” answers the questions of how and why U.S. forces might
  get involved in a counterinsurgency. Chapter 1 highlights that there are many different ways U.S. forces
  could counter an insurgency and that there are a range of various contexts in which an insurgency can
  occur. Commanders and staffs must understand the conditions in which an insurgency occurs and the
  overall strategy for countering that insurgency so they can effectively support it.
  Chapter 2, “Understanding an Operational Environment,” provides context for an operational environment
  where an insurgency might be occurring.
  Chapter 3, “Culture,” describes the role of culture in counterinsurgency operations. Understanding culture
  is essential in any effort to support a counterinsurgency effort. Culture is of unique importance in
  understanding an operational environment.
  Chapter 4, “Insurgency Prerequisites and Fundamentals,” provides doctrine for understanding the
  prerequisites of an insurgency and the root causes that allow an insurgency to keep and gain legitimacy. It
  than provides a framework for understanding the strategic decisions an insurgency might make and eight
  dynamics for analyzing any particular insurgency.
  Chapter 5, “Insurgency Threat Characteristics,” provides doctrine for understanding the threat
  characteristics of an insurgency.
  Chapter 6, “Command and Control and Mission Command,” provides doctrine for executing command and
  control under the philosophy of mission command. In a counterinsurgency effort, many units may perform
  many different tasks in decentralized operations. Understanding decentralized operations and ensuring
  these units are meeting the overall commander’s intent is essential for successful counterinsurgency
  operations.
  Chapter 7, “Planning and Operational Considerations,” provides guidance on how commanders and staffs
  can work from conceptual planning to detailed planning in counterinsurgency operations. It also provides