text: Chapter 5
  Table 5-1. Potential Army contributions to joint flexible deterrent and response options
  Army contribution examples to joint flexible deterrent options
  Command and control headquarters—establishment of a field army or deployment of a corps or division.
  Air defense to protect key infrastructure and population centers from theater ballistic missiles.
  Additional personnel to expand the capability of theater-assigned headquarters.
  Intelligence assets to support situational understanding, targeting, and information activities.
  Deploying a security force assistance brigade to establish liaison capability or conduct security force
  assistance.
  Building or expanding infrastructure and increasing sustainment capacity to facilitate reception, staging,
  onward movement, and integration.
  Army contribution examples to joint flexible response options
  Airborne or air assault units positioned to conduct joint forcible entry.
  A brigade combat team drawing Army pre-positioned stocks.
  Port opening to receive the joint force.
  Multi-domain task force to respond to adversary antiaccess and area denial activities.
  Special operations forces to conduct foreign internal defense, direct action, or special reconnaissance.
  Civil affairs to enable civil-military operations and interorganizational cooperation.
  Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear units for response to weapons of mass destruction
  employment.
  5-17. While FDOs are primarily intended to prevent a crisis from developing or worsening, FROs are
  designed to preempt or respond to attacks against U.S. interests. FDOs are preplanned, deterrence-oriented
  actions carefully tailored to bring an issue to early resolution without armed conflict, and they can be initiated
  before or after unambiguous warning of threat action. In comparison, FROs can be employed in response to
  aggression by adversaries, and they are intended to facilitate early decision making by developing a wide
  range of actions carefully tailored to produce desired effects. FDOs and FROs must be deliberately tailored
  in terms of timing, efficiency, and effectiveness to avoid undesired effects, such as eliciting an armed
  response should adversary leaders perceive that friendly FDOs or FROs are being used as preparation for a
  preemptive attack.
  5-18. FDOs and FROs serve three basic purposes. First, they provide a visible and credible message to
  adversaries about U.S. will and capability to resist aggression. Second, they position U.S. forces in a manner
  that facilitates implementation of the operations or contingency plan should armed conflict occur. Third, they
  provide options for joint and national senior leaders. They allow for measured increases in pressure to avoid
  unintentionally provoking combat operations, and they enable decision makers to develop the situation to
  gain a better understanding of adversary capabilities and intentions. FDOs and FROs are elements of
  contingency plans executed to increase deterrence in addition to, but outside the scope of, the ongoing joint
  operations. The key goals of FDOs and FROs are—
  (cid:122) Communicate the strength of U.S. commitment to treaty obligations and regional peace and
  stability.
  (cid:122) Confront adversaries with unacceptable costs for their possible aggression.
  (cid:122) Isolate adversaries from regional neighbors and attempt to split adversary coalitions.
  (cid:122) Rapidly improve the military balance of power in the theater of operations without precipitating
  an armed response from adversaries.
  (cid:122) Develop the situation and better understand adversary capabilities and intentions.
  5-19. Leaders exercise restraint and carefully calculate risk before recommending an increase in Army forces
  to address a crisis. Peer adversaries have global capabilities, and they can create multiple dilemmas for U.S.
  forces by escalating a crisis horizontally in a different theater. Surging forces in one region may address a
  crisis, but it potentially creates opportunities for adversaries or enemies in another region. Leaders must
  anticipate second- and third-order effects on other combatant commands and the risk to the homeland when