text: Chapter 7
  and when it might be counterproductive. This judgment involves constant assessment of the security
  situation and a sense of timing regarding insurgents’ actions.
  The More Successful the Counterinsurgency is, the Less Force Can Be Used and the More Risk
  Must Be Accepted
  7-6. This paradox is really a corollary to the paradox described in paragraph 7-5. As the level of insurgent
  violence drops, expectations of the population may lead to a reduction in direct military actions by
  counterinsurgents. More reliance is placed on police work, rules of engagement may be tightened, and
  troops may have to exercise increased restraint. Soldiers and Marines may also have to accept more risk to
  maintain involvement with the people.
  Doing Nothing is Sometimes the Best Action
  7-7. Often insurgents carry out a terrorist act or guerrilla raid with the primary purpose of enticing
  counterinsurgents to overreact, or at least to react in a way that insurgents can exploit. For example,
  counterinsurgents opening fire on a crowd or executing a clearing operation may create more enemies than
  it removes from the streets. If an assessment of the effects of a course of action determines that more
  negative than positive effects may result, an alternative should be considered, potentially including not
  acting.
  Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot
  7-8. Counterinsurgents often achieve the most meaningful success in garnering public support and
  legitimacy for the host-nation government with activities that do not involve killing insurgents (although
  killing clearly will often be necessary). Arguably, the decisive effort is to isolate the insurgents by denying
  the local population as a base of support. This establishes the need for synchronizing information
  operations across the various lines of effort in order to generate operational advantages for the commander
  conducting counterinsurgency operations. Every action, including the use of force, must be supported by
  adequate information. While security is essential to setting the stage for overall progress, lasting victory
  may come from a vibrant economy and political participation that restore hope. Particularly after security
  has been achieved, dollars and ballots may have more important effects than bombs and bullets. This is
  dependent on the context of a particular insurgency and the strategy to counter that insurgency. As with the
  other paradoxes, counterinsurgents cannot treat this as a uniform rule. However, a thriving economy may
  be more important than ammunition. Depending on the state of the insurgency, therefore, Soldiers and
  Marines should prepare to accomplish many nonmilitary missions to support counterinsurgency efforts. All
  unified action partners have a role in supporting efforts to enable governance to counter an insurgency, not
  just Department of State and civil affairs personnel.
  The Host Nation Doing Something Tolerably is Normally Better Than Us Doing it Well
  7-9. It is just as important for counterinsurgents to consider who performs an operation as to assess how
  well it is done. Where the U.S. is supporting a host nation, long-term success requires supporting viable
  host-nation leaders and institutions that are legitimate and capable. The longer that process takes, the more
  U.S. public support will wane and the more the local population will question the legitimacy of their own
  forces and government. However, if the host nation cannot perform tolerably, the counterinsurgents
  supporting it may have to act. Experience, knowledge of the area of operations, and cultural sensitivity are
  essential in deciding when such action is necessary.
  If a Tactic Works This Week, It Might Not Work Next Week; If It Works In This Province, It
  Might Not Work In The Next
  7-10. Competent insurgents are adaptive. They are often part of a widespread network that communicates
  constantly and instantly. Insurgents quickly adjust to successful counterinsurgency practices and rapidly
  disseminate information throughout an insurgency. Indeed, the more effective a counterinsurgency tactic is,
  the faster it may become out of date because insurgents have a greater need to counter it. Effective leaders