text: Chapter 8
  TRANSITIONS
  8-134. If a defense is successful, units anticipate and transition to either offensive operations or stability
  operations. If an area or a mobile defense is unsuccessful, forces transition into a retrograde. Transition from
  one type of operation to another requires accurate situational assessment capabilities as well as mental and
  physical agility of all those involved.
  8-135. Units deliberately plan for branch or sequel operations, which assist the transition process and allow
  them to create conditions necessary for a successful transition. Such planning addresses the need to control
  the tempo of operations, maintain contact with both enemy and friendly forces, and keep the enemy force off
  balance. Transition planning establishes the procedures and priorities by which a unit prepares for the next
  mission. Based on the mission variables, it establishes the required organization of forces and control
  measures necessary for success. Probable transitions should be identified by units with a staff and reflect on
  the commanders’ decision support products.
  8-136. Prior contingency planning decreases the time needed to adjust the tempo of combat operations when
  a unit transitions from a focus on the defense to other operations. It does this by allowing subordinate units
  to simultaneously plan and prepare for subsequent operations. Preparations typically include resupplying unit
  basic loads and repositioning or reallocating supporting systems.
  8-137. A unit’s contingency planning also reduces the amount of time and confusion when it is unsuccessful
  in its defensive efforts and must transition to retrograde operations. Units designate subordinate units to
  conduct delaying operations and to evacuate casualties and inoperative equipment. They use retrograde
  operations to preserve the force as a combat-capable formation until they can establish those conditions
  necessary for a successful defense.
  TRANSITION TO OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
  8-138. A defending unit transitions to the offense by anticipating when and where an enemy force will reach
  its culminating point or require an operational pause before it can continue. At those moments, the defending
  force has odds that are more favorable. Combat power ratios favor a defending force. The enemy force will
  do everything it can to keep friendly forces from knowing it is approaching that culmination point and thus
  is overextended. Indicators that the enemy force is becoming overextended include when—
  * Enemy forces begin to transition to the defense; this defense may be by forces in or out of contact
  with friendly forces.
  * Enemy forces suffer heavy losses.
  * Enemy forces start to deploy before encountering friendly forces.
  * Enemy forces are defeated in most engagements.
  * Enemy forces are committed piecemeal in continued enemy attacks.
  * Enemy reserves are identified among the attacking forces.
  * Examination of captured or killed enemy soldiers and captured or destroyed enemy equipment and
  supplies shows that the enemy force is unable to sustain itself.
  * Enemy operations show a noticeable reduction in tempo.
  * Local counterattacks meet with unexpected success.
  8-139. In a mobile defense, transitioning to the offense generally follows the striking force’s counterattack.
  In an area defense, units designate a portion of their force to conduct the attack. This force usually includes
  the echelon’s available reserves.
  8-140. As units transition their forces from the defense to the offense, they—
  * Establish a LD. This may require the conduct of local, small-scale attacks to seize terrain necessary
  for the conduct of offensive operations or to destroy enemy forces that could threaten the larger
  offensive action.
  * Maintain contact with enemy forces, using combinations of available information collection assets
  to develop the information required to plan future operations and avoid falling for enemy military
  deception operations.