text: Chapter 5
  PHYSICAL ADVANTAGES DURING CRISIS
  5-11. Achieving physical advantage during crisis consists of working with host-nation forces to form a
  credible defense and ensuring the survivability of allied forces in theater. If there is key or decisive terrain,
  Army forces and host-nation partners may seek to deter adversaries by setting a defense of that ground early
  in a crisis. Army forces in theater assume conflict is imminent and take all available measures to protect
  against attack in every domain where an attack could occur.
  5-12. During crisis, Army combat power will likely be limited initially to a small number of forward-
  stationed forces, those forces that can draw Army pre-positioned stocks (APS) rapidly, and forces used to
  threaten adversary forces with forcible entry into their area of operations (AO). This combat power will most
  likely be used in a defensive posture until the JFC receives enough land forces to make offensive operations
  feasible. The intent should be to increase the combat power of Army forces to a point where they can credibly
  threaten adversary forces with offensive operations. Ideally, this will deter further enemy action. If, however,
  deterrence fails, this force facilitates armed conflict that will terminate on terms favorable to U.S. interests.
  In well-developed theaters, Army combat power will likely be forward stationed and integrated with partner
  forces as a key part of their defensive plans. This credible land force, capable of disrupting or significantly
  degrading an adversary’s initial attack, maximizes the deterrent potential of Army forces.
  INFORMATION ADVANTAGES DURING CRISIS
  5-13. Two key information activities are protecting friendly information and degrading the threat’s ability to
  communicate, sense, make effective decisions, and maintain influence with relevant actors and populations.
  An example is the use of strategic messaging to undermine the credibility of an adversary by exposing
  violations of international law and showing that adversary narratives are false. Achieving information
  advantages is a commander-driven, combined arms activity that employs capabilities from every warfighting
  function. During crisis, commanders lead their staffs to refine information activities based upon plans and
  processes developed during competition. Examples include commanders and staffs focusing on the
  challenges and tasks of establishing a mission-partner environment, building or modifying an intelligence
  architecture, and creating or refining common operating procedures with allies and other partners.
  HUMAN ADVANTAGES DURING CRISIS
  5-14. While enduring relationships with alliance and coalition partners may be in place at the theater strategic
  level as a crisis develops, at the operational and tactical levels it is likely that units have less experience
  operating with one another. Forces deploying into a theater may have experience working with the security
  forces of partner nations if they were regionally aligned or worked together in a professional military
  education or training setting, but most will not have such experience. This requires leaders who have worked
  with joint and multinational partners to focus their staffs on the most critical interoperability tasks necessary
  for effective coalition operations. It also requires awareness of the difficulty in fully understanding situations
  when dealing with other cultures. Employing the liaison networks built by the theater army during
  competition will enable simultaneous in-theater training exercises with the deployment of Army forces. This
  facilitates early shared understanding, helping leaders and subordinate units integrate with allied and partner
  forces in the most expeditious and efficient manner possible while also signaling determination to
  adversaries. Demonstrated readiness for combat operations and interoperability among U.S., allied, and
  partner forces helps to upset adversary risk calculations and deter further aggression.
  ARMY SUPPORT TO THE JOINT FORCE DURING CRISIS
  5-15. The military supports unified action partners during crisis by providing flexible deterrent and response
  options. A flexible deterrent option (FDO) is a planning construct intended to facilitate early decision making
  by developing a wide range of interrelated responses that begin with deterrent-oriented actions carefully
  tailored to create a desired effect. A flexible response option (FRO) is a military capability specifically task-
  organized for effective reaction to an enemy threat or attack and adaptable to the existing circumstances of a
  crisis. FDOs and FROs occur across the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (known as DIME)
  instruments of national power, and they are not just confined to the military. They are most effective when
  integrated and implemented in a nearly simultaneous manner. Examples of simultaneous FDO and FRO