text: Fundamentals
  DECEPTION IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS SECURITY
  1-7. Deception in support of operations security (DISO) is a deception activity that conveys or denies
  selected information or signatures to a foreign intelligence entity (FIE) and limits the FIE’s overall ability to
  collect or accurately analyze critical information about friendly operations, personnel, programs, equipment,
  and other assets. The intent of DISO is to create multiple false, confusing, or misleading indicators to make
  friendly force intentions harder to interpret by FIE. DISO makes it difficult for FIEs to identify or accurately
  derive the critical information and indicators protected by OPSEC. Deception and OPSEC are mutually
  supporting activities. DISO prevents potential enemies from accurately profiling friendly activities that
  would provide an indication of a specific course of action (COA) or operational activity. DISO differs from
  joint MILDEC and TAC-D plans in that it only targets FIEs and is not focused on generating a specific enemy
  action or inaction. Because a DISO does not target a specific enemy decision maker, the DISO approval
  process differs from the MILDEC approval process. A DISO can be approved at two levels higher, provided
  that it adheres to the joint policy for MILDEC in CJCSI 3211.01 series and is developed in support of an
  approved OPSEC plan. CCMD instructions add guidelines, policies, and processes that must be adhered to
  in their respective commands.
  KEY TERMS OF MILITARY DECEPTION
  1-8. Military deception officers (MDOs) must have a comprehensive understanding of deception terms and
  definitions. Deception refers to those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion,
  or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the enemy’s interests. The
  following are terms and definitions associated with deception that deception will use throughout the planning
  process—
  * Deception goal.
  * Deception objective.
  * Deception target.
  * Desired perceptions.
  * Conduits.
  * Indicator.
  * Filter.
  * Node.
  * Link.
  * Deception event.
  * Observable.
  * Competing observable.
  * Patterns.
  * Deception story.
  1-9. The deception goal is the commander’s statement of the purpose of military deception as it contributes
  to the successful accomplishment of the assigned mission (JP 3-13.4). It is always written from the
  perspective of the friendly force commander. In initial planning guidance, a deception goal may be general
  in nature, requiring refinement during the development of the deception estimate. The deception goal is
  usually stated as a positive friendly advantage or condition such as: “Deception will create a decisive combat
  power advantage for the coalition main effort attack along AXIS MONTANA.” Like any other form of
  military operation, the measure of success for deception is its direct contribution to the accomplishment of
  the mission. Deception plans often require investments in effort and resources that would otherwise be
  applied against the enemy in a more direct fashion. Consequently, it is important for the commander to first
  envision the deception goal in terms of its specific contribution to accomplishing the designated mission.
  Some additional examples include—
  * “I want to use deception to improve the friendly force advantage.”
  * “I want to use deception to increase freedom of maneuver.”