text: Chapter 5
  Deployment Friction: Task Force Ironhorse in OPERATION IRAQI
  FREEDOM
  In 2003, Task Force Ironhorse initially shipped its unit equipment sets to Turkey as
  called for in the initial invasion operations order. However, the equipment sets had to
  be rerouted through the Suez Canal and Kuwait after Turkey did not allow the use of
  its territory for the invasion of Iraq. The task force concept of operations called for
  tailored force packages that would allow rapid employment upon arrival in Turkey.
  However, tailoring the force packages precluded the ability of U.S. Transportation
  Command to maximize the available square footage of strategic sealift ships. This
  degraded the ability of the JFC to receive additional assets. Additionally, the refusal of
  Turkey forced the task force commander, Major General Odierno, to rapidly develop
  new courses of action for forces tailored for an operation that was no longer feasible.
  Though friction occurred due to the extreme change in conditions, the unit adapted. It
  did this while constantly interfacing with organizations at the strategic and theater
  strategic levels. Major General Odierno also ensured that all leaders of his task force
  were integrated into the plan as it changed. As a result of these efforts, Task Force
  Ironhorse had personnel staged in Kuwait, prepared for the new conditions facing them
  when their equipment finally arrived in Kuwait.
  PROTECTION DURING TRANSIT
  5-33. The U.S. Army Installation Management Command is a critical protection enabler during unit
  predeployment activities through the fort-to-port movement of Army forces. This command manages most
  Army installations, and garrison commanders ensure the protection of forces as they deploy. Installation
  provost marshals protect deploying unit assets as they prepare to deploy with police and security guards. In
  addition, installation safety, medical, and information management personnel protect the force during
  deployment preparation and execution. Corps and division staffs coordinate closely with installation staffs to
  identify information and assets that need protection, and they apply appropriate protection and security
  measures consistent with their collective threat analysis.
  5-34. Threats may attempt to impede or prevent unit deployments. This creates a requirement for
  coordination of the physical security of deploying unit personnel and equipment as they move to ports of
  embarkation. Physical security is required for personnel and equipment while awaiting transport at ports of
  embarkation, during movement, and after arrival at ports of debarkation. Planning for physical security
  remains a focus in unit staging areas, along routes upon which units and supplies move, and for tactical
  assembly areas prior to onward movement into AOs.
  5-35. U.S. Transportation Command and the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
  administer a defense transportation security program to provide standardized transportation security
  measures and procedures, constant oversight, and central direction in coordination with other Department of
  Defense (DOD) activities and port authorities. Commanders plan for protection measures for their units and
  equipment from home station to the port of embarkation, while Military Surface Deployment and Distribution
  Command coordinates for security within the port.
  5-36. Corps and division staffs ensure that all contract processes for transportation movements meet DOD
  security requirements. They coordinate with the installation transportation officer in the continental United
  States at home station or the movement control team outside the continental United States and authorized
  railroad or commercial truck carriers on guard and escort matters. Some government and commercial carriers
  provide limited security measures to protect in-transit equipment and supplies. These measures include the
  use of contract security personnel and secure transfer facilities to safeguard unit assets.
  5-37. If the corps or division staff determines that carrier security measures are insufficient given the threat,
  corps and division headquarters have a number of options for increasing the protection and security of
  deploying units and their associated equipment and supplies. These options include directing subordinate