text: Chapter 2
  * Enhancement of precision fires; and
  * Reliable targeting resource for non-GPS reliant precision munitions such as inertial navigations
  systems.
  SPACE OPERATIONS PERSISTENCE ACROSS THE JOINT PHASING MODEL
  2-66. There is usually a difference between the phase the ground operations are in and the phase space
  operations are in—or any EMS-dependent elements are in—particularly when ground forces are in the
  shaping phase. For example, space operations may be in the deter, seize the initiative, or even entering the
  dominate phase of an operation while ground operations are firmly rooted in the shape phase. In EMS-
  dependent operations the threat is rarely destroyed. The threat rarely acquiesces when U.S. forces win a
  campaign and troop redeployment occurs. The threat to space operations are continuous.
  2-67. A major characterization defining space operations are persistence—persistence of threats and
  persistence of operations. For mission areas reliant on the EMS, the operations are never-ending, the
  capabilities are never cased, and space forces never stand-down in completion of their mission to redeploy
  because operations are constantly being contested.
  2-68. Persistence of threats and hazards applies to both ground-based and space-based assets. Whether in
  battle or in reset, Soldiers are always impacted by persistent counterspace threats. The space threat directly
  impacts Soldiers and may be applied against space-based assets, or against the ground assets by disrupting a
  satellite communications or navigation signal. Even during peacetime operations, a threat actor could easily
  disrupt worldwide SATCOM, PNT, missile warning, and other critical space-based capabilities which may
  have significant military, commercial, and civil impacts.
  2-69. Traditionally, Army forces conduct training in preparation for deployment, deploy forces to an area
  of responsibility, win in a complex environment, redeploy forces, and reset. Sometimes a campaign is
  complete in a few months, sometimes it requires constant rotation of forces over a decade or more, but the
  campaign ends and troops redeploy. Troops stop deploying for that campaign and the force has the
  opportunity to reset; they conduct an end-to-end review of the mission, evaluate doctrine, update tactics,
  techniques, and procedures, and conduct training for the next mission.
  2-70. EMS-dependent operations are never complete. They must constantly meet combatant commander
  needs worldwide–even when there is no campaign to fight. Persistence of space operations is akin to
  performing maintenance on a car while driving down the road—space operations are constant, and are being
  contested by threat actors every day. There is never a reset—only a persistence barrage of attack must be
  defended.
  2-71. The six activity phases—shape, deter, seize initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil
  authorities—provide a framework for understanding a joint operation. A phase is a planning and execution
  tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity (JP 5-0). Phasing helps commanders and staffs
  visualize, plan, and execute an entire operation and define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time,
  area, and purpose. Phasing helps in planning and controlling operations during execution. Within a phase, a
  large portion of the force executes similar or mutually supporting activities.
  2-72. Phases are rarely discrete. They often overlap and some phases may occur multiple times, while
  others may not occur. Commanders may compress, expand, or omit a phase entirely. Phases may or may not
  be conducted sequentially and many activities from a phase may begin in a previous phase and continue well
  into subsequent phases.
  2-73. While the phasing model is a planning and execution tool, it is important to recognize it is more
  applicable to traditional operations than it is for those areas reliant upon the EMS. There are several reasons
  for this, including: lack of definition of what electromagnetic actions constitute an act of aggression, and the
  reluctance of commanders to initiate an operation plan (OPLAN) when a threat actor only executes
  electromagnetic actions against U.S. forces. It is fairly straight forward to identify an act of aggression if a
  company of tanks start moving and firing on friendly forces. However, it is more challenging to identify
  intentional jamming of a limited frequency range of the EMS or orchestrating a distributed denial of service
  attack as an act of aggression.