text: Chapter 2
  Intelligence (Multidomain and Multidimension)
  All Army operations are multidomain operations. Similarly, Army intelligence activities, at and
  across echelons, consider the domains and dimensions:
  • The information collection effort, including collection by the intelligence disciplines and
  complementary capabilities.
  • Intelligence PED, analysis, and production in developing threat objectives and intent,
  characteristics, capabilities, targets, and COAs, as well as in analyzing civil considerations
  and other significant aspects of the OE.
  • All intelligence analysis tasks, such as pre-mission analysis of the OE, IPOE, situation
  development, and intelligence support to targeting, as well as collection management and
  intelligence architecture tasks.
  Readers should not misinterpret any isolated portions of FM 2-0 and assume the intelligence
  activity or task does not account for all domains and the human, information, and physical
  dimensions.
  SECTION II – STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS
  2-2. The Army intelligence warfighting function is designed to provide effective and flexible intelligence
  support to all Army forces. However, providing this intelligence support is challenging; the corresponding
  Army strategic context, relevant factors of the OE, echelon, unit type, and specific mission all significantly
  affect intelligence support. Therefore, there are several aspects to consider when providing effective and
  flexible intelligence support; while not all encompassing, three important general aspects are—
  ⚫ Employing and adapting all available intelligence capabilities in the context of the current
  situation and a unit’s mission/operation.
  ⚫ Knowing and adapting intelligence and operational fundamentals (largely captured in Army
  doctrine) in the context of the current situation and a unit’s mission/operation.
  ⚫ Building and maintaining tactically and technically proficient intelligence professionals who are
  effective in both the profession of arms and the intelligence profession.
  ARMY STRATEGIC CHALLENGES
  2-3. The joint force deters most adversaries from achieving strategic objectives through direct military
  confrontation with the United States. Therefore, adversaries pursue their objectives indirectly through malign
  activities and armed conflict, targeting others in ways calculated to avoid war with the United States. These
  activities include subversive political and legal strategies, establishing physical presence on the ground to
  buttress resource claims, coercive economic practices, supporting proxy forces, and spreading
  disinformation. However, several adversaries have both the ability and the will to conduct armed conflict
  with the United States under certain conditions. This requires Army forces to be prepared for limited
  contingencies and large-scale combat operations.
  2-4. Global and regional adversaries apply all instruments of national power to challenge U.S. interests and
  the joint force. Militarily, they have extended the battlefield by employing network-enabled sensors and long-
  range fires to deny access during conflict and challenge friendly forces’ freedom of action during
  competition. These standoff approaches seek to—
  ⚫ Counter U.S. space, air, and naval advantages to make the introduction of land forces difficult
  and exploit the overall joint force’s mutual dependencies.
  ⚫ Increase the cost to the joint force and its partners in the event of armed conflict.
  ⚫ Hold the joint force at risk both in the United States and at its overseas bases and contest Army
  forces’ deployment from home station to forward tactical assembly areas overseas.
  Note. Instruments of national power are all of the means available to the government in its pursuit
  of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational, and military
  (JP 1, Volume 1).