text: Chapter 1
  Table 1-1. Deception differences
  Deception in support of
  Military deception Tactical deception
  operations security
  Influence the action or Gain a tactical advantage Make friendly force
  Focus inaction of enemy over an enemy intentions harder to
  decision makers interpret
  Level Strategic or operational Tactical Any
  Military campaigns and Army commanders All in support of an
  Support to major operations approved operations
  security plan
  Combatant command and Joint task forces, Army All
  joint task forces Service component
  Headquarters
  command, division, and
  below
  In accordance with Two levels higher (as per Two levels higher (as per
  Approval
  CJCSI 3211.01 or combatant command combatant command
  from
  DODI 3604.01 instruction) instruction)
  Target Adversary or enemy Enemy Foreign intelligence entity
  CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
  DODI Department of Defense instruction
  MILITARY DECEPTION
  1-5. Military deception (MILDEC) is planned, trained, and conducted to support military campaigns and
  major operations. MILDEC activities are planned and executed to cause adversaries to take actions or
  inactions that are favorable to the commander’s objectives. The majority of MILDEC planned for and
  executed by the combatant command (CCMD) to create operational-level effects. MILDEC is normally
  planned before, and conducted during, combat operations. CCMD instructions add guidelines, policies, and
  processes that must be adhered to in their respective commands. MILDEC is a joint activity to which the
  Army, as the primary joint land component, contributes. Army forces do not unilaterally conduct MILDEC.
  MILDEC must adhere to the regulatory requirements found in Army policy and regulations, CJCSI 3211.01
  series, and applicable CCMD instructions.
  TACTICAL DECEPTION
  1-6. Tactical deception is an activity planned and executed by, and in support of, tactical-level
  commanders to cause enemy decision makers to take actions or inactions prejudicial to themselves and
  favorable to the achievement of tactical commanders’ objectives. Commanders conduct tactical deception
  (TAC-D) to influence military operations to gain a relative, tactical advantage over the enemy, obscure
  vulnerabilities in friendly forces, and enhance the defensive capabilities of friendly forces. In general, TAC-D
  is a related subset of deception that is not subject to the full set of MILDEC program requirements and
  authorities. In most circumstances, Army commanders can employ TAC-D unilaterally if certain criteria are
  met. In description, TAC-D differs from MILDEC in four key ways:
  * MILDEC is centrally planned and controlled through CCMD-derived authorities, but TAC-D is
  not. TAC-D can be employed unilaterally by tactical commanders with an approved plan.
  * TAC-D actions are tailored to tactical requirements of the local commander and not always linked
  or subordinate to a greater MILDEC plan.
  * The TAC-D approval process differs from the MILDEC approval process in that it is only required
  to be approved at two echelons higher, provided that it adheres to the joint policy for MILDEC
  addressed in CJCSI 3211.01. CCMD instructions add guidelines, policies, and processes that must
  be adhered to in their respective commands.
  * Planning for TAC-D is usually more abbreviated, but still focuses on influencing the action or
  inaction of enemy decision makers, to gain a tactical advantage over an enemy. TAC-D gains this
  relative advantage using deception activities that affect the enemy’s perceptions of friendly
  activities and possibly targeting lower-echelon enemy combatants to affect their operations.