text: Chapter 11
  threat types, and in different airspace areas (JP 3-01). The more restrictive status (weapons hold) is generally
  in effect in low threat environments or when there are numerous friendly aircraft operating in the brigade
  airspace. A more liberal status (weapons tight or free) may potentially be declared in a high threat
  environment or when there is certainty that no friendly or neutral air platforms are in the area. The right of
  and rules for self-defense are also established; the right of self-defense is never denied.
  11-18. Engagement authority for most air threats in the brigade area flying below the coordinating altitude
  is likely vested with the BCT commander. The sole exception may be fixed-wing aircraft; the AADC or his
  designated representative (for example, the RADC) may retain engagement authority for these threats,
  irrespective of whether they are flying above or below the coordinating altitude.
  11-19. Maneuver forces on the tactical edge of the battlefield use their organic weapons to engage
  surveilling or attacking rotary- or fixed-wing aircraft and UASs. All such efforts are considered self-defense
  actions. Crew-served weapons are more capable against fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, while small arms
  are generally better against the group 1 UASs. Threat systems that transit a unit’s location, but are not
  attacking that unit, may also be engaged; however, they are more likely allowed to continue transiting given
  the relative short ranges and limited AMD effectiveness of maneuver force weapons.
  11-20. The reintroduction of Stinger to the maneuver force provides an additional capability for the defense
  of critical assets in BCTs and their subordinate units. Brigade or battalion commanders may task organize
  Stinger teams at their respective locations for protection of CPs or logistical elements, or each team may
  remain with its parent company (one Stinger team is currently projected per maneuver company). Regardless
  of organization, a team is generally positioned in proximity to the defended asset. The team weights its
  coverage to the most likely air avenue of approach. The team receives positional information of friendly,
  hostile, or neutral air activity in its vicinity from the ADAM cell, or a supporting ADA unit, through its unit’s
  communications nets. Early warning cues the Stinger Soldier as to where to look for the aerial object. Once
  the object has been detected, the team uses the ROE, weapons control status, and identification criteria to
  determine whether to engage or not. Primary targets are rotary-wing aircraft and UASs, especially the low,
  slow, and small ones. As noted previously, different weapon control statuses may be in effect for different
  air types. It is likely that weapons tight may be directed for rotary-wing aircraft and weapons free for the low,
  slow, and small UASs. See ATP 3-01.18 for additional discussion of Stinger team techniques.
  11-21. Army forces can use electronic attack measures against airborne UASs to disrupt signals.
  Electromagnetic deception and intrusion devices and activities are designed to mislead or deceive the threat
  (FM 3-12). These devices can deny, defeat, or exploit the link between the UAS and its ground control station.
  Deny activities are executed through jamming with little to no operator interaction; defeat is the deliberate
  measure to render the link ineffective and requires man-in-the-loop interaction; and exploit is the deliberate
  effort to employ deception measures and is exercised by an operator. See FM 3-12 for additional discussion
  of cyberspace capabilities.
  11-22. Aviation forces do not have a dedicated air-to-air weapon system. Army helicopters and UASs may
  engage enemy air threats as targets of opportunity or in self-defense. Air crews must give careful
  consideration to collateral damage. No current aviation weapon system has a self-destruct capability, and
  firing air-to-ground systems at enemy aircraft creates a significant collateral damage hazard in the sector of
  fire.
  11-23. Offensive actions by the aviation, field artillery, and special operating forces continue during the air
  battles and after the threat platforms have exited the brigade area. Combined fires continue to target enemy
  air capabilities − platforms on the ground and control stations – to reduce further air activities.
  11-24. A summary of the actions which the different forces, cited in paragraph 11-4 on page 11-2, can take
  against air threats is presented in table 11-1. Engagement actions are typically conducted in self-defense. For
  more information, see ATP 3-01.8.