text: _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9
  9-68. After that, the Phase II mission is performed primarily by air defense
  forces at the strategic and operational levels. Interceptor aircraft and long-
  and medium-range SAMs conduct this phase of the air defense.
  9-69. When the enemy aircraft enter an OPFOR disruption zone, shorter-range
  operational- and tactical-level air defense systems can engage them. Such systems
  often conduct air defense ambushes from positions within the disruption zone.
  PHASE III
  9-70. The third phase entails the destruction of enemy aircraft that have
  penetrated into the airspace over OPFOR ground maneuver forces. Thus, the
  “target area” consists of the area where enemy aircraft have penetrated over
  the OPFOR disruption, battle, and support zones. The disruption zone is in-
  cluded here, since part of the air defense mission in it is to protect forces on
  the ground within that zone.
  9-71. In Phase III, it is not always necessary to destroy the enemy aircraft.
  After all, the objective is to deny enemy aviation the ability to interfere with
  OPFOR ground maneuver units. The OPFOR can accomplish this either by
  destroying enemy aircraft or by forcing them to expend their munitions beyond
  effective range or by diverting the aircraft before they reach their targets.
  Planning
  9-72. Planning for Phase III extends down to the tactical level. However,
  tactical efforts are typically part of a plan for integrated air defense at the
  operational and perhaps the national level.
  Participants
  9-73. In Phase III, the OPFOR may be able to employ its own tactical fighter
  aircraft, operating in the relatively safe airspace of the “target area.” These
  fighters and fighter-interceptors can engage enemy aircraft that have “leaked
  through” ground-based air defenses. However, the bulk of the air defense effort
  in Phase III falls upon short- to medium-range SAMs and antiaircraft (AA)
  guns of tactical air defense units, complemented by operational- and national-
  level air defense assets and other weapons of the ground maneuver units.
  9-74. In the “target area,” the OPFOR is particularly concerned about attack
  helicopters using standoff firing techniques. It is critical to identify likely fir-
  ing positions for these helicopters through terrain analysis. These sites will
  be located primarily in the disruption zone. The planned combined use of
  antihelicopter mines, artillery, and remote sensors by OSCs and their con-
  stituent organizations can be an effective tactic against attack helicopters.
  9-75. Once identified, potential sites for attack helicopter firing positions can
  be seeded with antihelicopter mines. These are directional fragmentation
  mines that function like a Claymore mine, but are larger. Once emplaced, the
  mines can be left unattended. Built-in sensors detect approaching helicopters
  and initiate the mine when a helicopter enters the lethal zone. Thus, the
  antihelicopter mine systems can autonomously detect and engage enemy
  helicopters. This technique can be used at some potential sites to economize
  other air defense assets for use at the most likely sites.