text: Chapter 8
  defense. These planning tools are system specific, so the battery commander must coordinate with dissimilar
  system platoon leaders and exercise manual integration of options to develop a desired defense design. Patriot
  and THAAD planning tools provide automated capabilities for determining the “best” defense design, and
  information can be directly linked into the initiation of these systems. AMDWS provides for the transfer of
  planning factors and acceptance or rejection of higher echelon mission orders, but requires a manual
  determination of “better” defense design options. The commander synchronizes the detailed positioning plans
  with the overall defense design being developed by the parent battalion and supported force’s air defense
  element/ADAM cell, if assigned a direct or other support mission to a maneuver element.
  8-20. Once the initial emplacement is completed for ADA task-organized batteries, adjustments to the
  defense can be executed by moving individual pieces of equipment. Patriot and THAAD C2 tools provide
  automated assistance in the adjustment of defense designs and can adjust parameters of the design that do
  not require physical relocation of equipment, with only minor disruptions in combat operations. This includes
  adjustment of primary target lines, rotation to secondary target lines (for Patriot), and a change in radar search
  parameters. Patriot, THAAD, and FAAD/C-RAM C2 require manual processes to adjust the defense as
  components depart and enter the network. Task-organized Patriot and THAAD batteries, with Patriot or
  THAAD unique C2 equipment, must deploy and redeploy as a battery, with the exception that individual
  launchers can be redeployed within the defense. Complementary Avenger or C-RAM platoons, forming a
  part of a task-organized Patriot or THAAD battery, can deploy and redeploy independently of the base battery
  by individual element.
  8-21. ADA task-organized batteries are high value assets with limited organic security capabilities. When
  the mission permits, they are emplaced on large operating bases, similar to ADA task forces. When a mission
  requires that they deploy outside of these installations, additional force protection assets may be required to
  prepare and secure the new sites. IPB and analysis of METT-TC factors determine the force protection
  requirements. However, batteries must be prepared to implement their own site defenses regardless of other
  force protection assets.
  8-22. The ADA task-organized battery’s deployment of its sensors and weapons varies based on the threat
  and the defended asset. When integrated with its parent battalion, sensor and weapon positioning are
  determined as a part of the integrated ADA task force defense design. When deployed independent of its
  parent battalion, a greater responsibility rests upon the battery commander to select the positions. Sensor
  positioning is generally the first consideration in establishing a defense. The most capable sensor (for
  example, THAAD or Patriot) is deployed first. Other sensors are then deployed to complement the coverage
  of the base sensor. Sensors are distributed in the ADA task-organized battery’s area of operations to best take
  advantage of their sensing function. Patriot and THAAD radars are site-configured such that the radar has
  direct linkage to its controlling C2 node. Sentinel radars have a sensor C2 node that links them into the FAAD
  C2 data network, allowing greater freedom in their deployment. Identification metrics are supplied by AMD
  sensors and can be supplemented by data from networked sensors accessed via the battery C2 node. The node
  correlates track data from multiple air defense sensors into a composite air picture. Sensor data is reported
  via the standard joint reporting responsibility schema on link 16 to form a common air picture.
  8-23. The battery commander uses the ADA employment tenets to position launchers in accordance with
  METT-TC. THAAD and Patriot launchers are weighted towards ballistic missile defense. A secondary
  consideration for Patriot launchers is early coverage along potential cruise missile avenues of ingress within
  the Patriot radar’s sectored coverage. Avenger and C-RAM weapons are positioned to achieve mutual support
  and/or overlapping fires (see paragraph 9-34 on page 9-5).
  8-24. Sensors and launchers are assigned primary and secondary target lines. When integrated into an ADA
  task force defense, these lines are established as a part of the task force defense design. When operating
  independently, the battery commander selects them based on mission requirements and defended assets.
  Patriot should have secondary target lines to enable rapid reaction to attacks from other than the primary
  sector. Secondary target lines require careful planning. They must be sufficiently broad to cover all likely
  avenues of attack. However, launchers must be positioned to support them. Launchers positioned to protect
  in secondary sectors may not be available to support the primary sector, depending upon system limitations
  on missile capture by the guiding radar after launch. Avenger and Sentinel use primary and secondary target
  lines as a means of prioritizing operations in mass attack scenarios.