text: Chapter 4
  Operations During Competition Below Armed Conflict
  In all history, this is the first time that an allied headquarters has been set up in peace to
  preserve the peace and not to wage war.
  General Dwight D. Eisenhower on the formation of theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization
  (NATO)
  This chapter begins with an overview of how the Army contributes to competition
  below the threshold of armed conflict as part of the joint force. It describes methods
  employed by adversaries and how Army forces contest adversary activities by
  supporting combatant command campaign plans and preparing for large-scale combat
  operations with unified action partners. The chapter concludes by discussing how
  Army forces consolidate gains and transition to crisis or armedconflict as branches to
  joint campaigns.
  OVERVIEW OF OPERATIONS DURING COMPETITION
  4-1. Competition below armed conflict occurswhen anadversary’s national interests are incompatible with
  U.S. interests, and that adversary is willing to actively pursue them short of open armed conflict. While
  neither side desires, at least initially, to use military force as the primary method to achieve its goal, the
  adversary is willing to employ national instruments of power, including military force, below the threshold
  of actual armed conflict to achieve its aims. The resulting tension between the two sides creates potential for
  violent escalation when one side challenges the status quo.
  4-2. Operations during competition are intended to deter malign
  Army forces are successful during
  adversary action, set conditions for armed conflict on favorable
  competition when they deter
  terms when deterrence fails, and shape an operational environment
  adversary malign action, enable the
  with allies and partners in ways that support U.S.strategic interests
  attainment of other national
  and policy aims. Theater armies support combatant commanders objectives, and maintain the ability
  (CCDRs) as they conduct operations to deter adversaries and to swiftly and effectively transition
  achieve national objectives. Their operations, conducted as part of to armed conflict when deterrence
  a combatant command campaign plan, are conducted over time fails.
  and across broad areas without armed conflict. This may include
  cooperative training, support to local institutions, construction projects, and a range of other activities. In
  many cases, enduring engagement is necessary, especially given the tendency of adversaries to pursue
  strategic objectives over long periods of time that do not comport with the shorter political-strategic cycles
  found in the U.S. or among many of its allies and partners.
  4-3. Army forces contribute to conventional deterrence during competition by preparing for armed conflict,
  including large-scale combat operations. This includes assisting allies and partners to improve their military
  capabilities and capacity. Preparation for combat operations and demonstrating the interoperability of the
  U.S.joint force with allies and partners presents the strongest deterrence to adversaries. Deliberate messaging
  that communicates the will and capability to conduct combat operations can amplify the deterrent effect of
  physical actions onthe ground. Interoperability, coupled with the demonstrated capabilities and capacity of
  Army forces, reinforces a unified approach to defending mutual interests. Even a small contingent of
  forward-stationed U.S.Army forces are a challenge to defeat whenoperating with allies and partners. A force
  ready for large-scale combat operations contributes to the potency and integration of the other instruments of
  national power, provides CCDRscapabilities for graduated responses, and enables the Army to help the joint
  force achieve national strategic objectives through competition rather than armed conflict.