text: Army Operations in Maritime Environments
  counterair and an airspace control authority for joint airspace control. Normally, the JFC designates the air
  component commander as the area air defense commander and airspace control authority, because the three
  functions are so integral to one another. Coordination and integration with the surface combatants of the joint
  maritime component commander performing AMD roles for critical joint bases is also required. With the
  support of the component commanders, the area air defense commander develops, integrates, and distributes
  a JFC-approved joint area air defense plan. (See to FM 3-01 or ATP 3-01.15 for detailed information about
  the planning and integration of AMD.)
  7-41. Theater and tactical ADA units provide early warning by employing sensors to detect air and missile
  threats and disseminating air defense warnings to U.S. forces, allied or partnered forces, and civilian
  populations. C2 elements disseminate air defense early warnings through various communication networks
  and nodes, to include submitting an incoming threat or an all-clear message to the network. (See FM 3-01
  for more detailed information on early warning tasks associated with AMD operations.)
  7-42. Army forces in maritime environments should assume their land operations are being observed by the
  enemy and not assume that AMD protection extends to their AO, especially when separated by extended
  distances and vast bodies of water. Larger air threats entering friendly space can be detected early, and
  identified, processed, and defeated as part of the air component’s roles and responsibilities to the JFC. There
  remains a requirement to find (including detect, identify, and be prepared to defeat) UASs, which could be
  launched from naval or commercial vessels or other land masses. Sensors, which include long-range and
  short-range radars, optical devices, wireless, and audible alert systems face challenges detecting smaller
  tactical UASs at sufficient ranges to mitigate effects. (See ATP 3-01.81 for more information regarding
  counter-UAS planning and execution.)
  7-43. The JFC normally designate JSAs and designates forces to provide the security of base, base clusters,
  and lines of communications. Various types of security forces can secure the JSA and lines of
  communications, including dedicated Army forces, coalition partners, and host-nation forces. Bases and base
  clusters can be noncontiguous with each other even on relatively small islands, and they may be separated
  by extended distances and vast bodies of water.
  7-44. Army commanders can be assigned roles as an area commander, base cluster commander, or base
  commander, all of which facilitate base defense in support of land and other Service forces. Base threats may
  include special operations forces, naval gunfire, long-range surface-to-surface fires, and manned and
  unmanned aircraft. Security forces should be able to coordinate for indirect and joint fire support, have a high
  degree of tactical mobility, and a reasonable span of C2. (See JP 3-10 for more information on the joint
  requirements for base defense and securing lines of communication. See ATP 3-37.10 for more information
  on the techniques of establishing and securing bases.)
  7-45. Threat employment of CBRN weapons can deny access to key terrain containing ports, airfields, or
  staging areas for either friendly or enemy forces until decontamination is complete or until the land
  component commander assumes the risk of operating in a contaminated environment. Army forces should
  understand the threat’s intent, weapons capabilities, and weapons effects. The threat may range from artillery
  or rockets to theater ballistic missiles. Delivery tactics could include overt or covert means (for example,
  special operations forces), state-sponsored terrorism, or other asymmetric methods. Contamination
  mitigation minimizes the time required to return personnel and mission-essential equipment to a
  mission-capable state as part of an overall contamination mitigation plan for the JOA. (See ATP 3-11.32 for
  more detailed information about CBRN and contamination mitigation techniques during security operations.)
  7-46. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units detect, identify, conduct onsite evaluations, render safe, and
  conduct exploitation, disposal, or other disposition of explosive ordnance, including weapons of mass
  destruction. They advise commanders on improvised explosive devices and other explosive hazard threats,
  including the most effective way to defeat the devices. They also directly support requirements to render safe
  explosive hazards that put the use of ports, airfields, and other critical infrastructure at risk. EOD units can
  support remediation of areas that ensure access to clear aerial ports of debarkation and seaports of debarkation
  facilities and other facilities that support seaports. (See JP 3-42 for a more detailed discussion on the joint
  integration and Army roles for ordnance. See ATP 4-32 for detailed information on the techniques of EOD.)
  7-47. Islands identified as key terrain for operations typically require additional engineer support to harden
  existing key infrastructure or construct new infrastructure to meet the JFC’s requirements for airfields, ports,