text: Chapter 5
  MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER
  5-16. Units seek to surprise enemy forces through movement and maneuver by choosing an unexpected
  direction, time, type, or strength for the attack. Surprise delays enemy reactions, overloads and confuses
  enemy command and control systems, induces psychological shock in enemy forces, and reduces the
  coherence of the enemy defense. Units can achieve tactical surprise by attacking in bad weather and over
  seemingly impassible terrain, conducting feints and demonstrations, and maintaining a high tempo, thereby
  destroying enemy forces. All of which is enhanced by the effective employment of OPSEC. For example, a
  unit in extremely hilly or mountainous terrain may consider transporting dismounted infantry forces to the
  heights and have them maneuver down the terrain. Units may plan different attack times for their main and
  supporting efforts to mislead enemy forces and allow the shifting of supporting fires to successive attacking
  echelons. However, simultaneous attacks provide a means to maximize the effects of mass in the initial
  assault. Simultaneous attacks also prevent enemy forces from concentrating defensive fires against
  successive attacks.
  5-17. Commanders and their subordinate leaders focus on the routes and formations their units use to traverse
  the terrain from the LD or PD to the objective during the planning process. Some locations may require
  attacking units to change formation, direction of movement, or movement technique when they reach those
  locations. Units designate contact points at critical locations to ensure coordination between adjacent units.
  5-18. Units attack targets throughout the depth of the enemy’s defense to keep the enemy force off balance
  and limit enemy freedom of action. However, for the main effort, units concentrate the effects of
  overwhelming combat power to shatter the cohesion of the enemy force’s defense. Units accomplish this by
  applying combat power against enemy forces at a level of violence and in a manner that enemy forces cannot
  match. For example, a battalion commander can mass an Army combined arms battalion’s firepower and
  rapid advancement against an enemy rifle company’s hastily prepared defensive position.
  INTELLIGENCE
  5-19. Commanders require information on an enemy force’s organization, equipment, and tactics to
  determine the appropriate employment of unit and system capabilities and tactics. They need to understand
  an enemy force’s strengths and weaknesses. Units develop threat courses of action and enemy situational
  templates based on analysis of all available combat information and intelligence. These products address both
  conventional and unconventional threats and are useful in determining the feasibility of available COAs.
  Ideally, this knowledge is available early in the planning phase.
  5-20. Units conduct information collection activities before they attack. Information requirements can
  include—
  * The location and depth of enemy reserves.
  * The location and extent of obstacles, potential breach sites, enemy engagement areas, and
  contaminated areas.
  * The location of areas where attacking units can become disoriented, such as rough or restrictive
  terrain.
  * The most favorable routes of approach to the attack objective.
  * Areas that attack forces can use for flanking fire and maneuver, such as support by fire and attack
  by fire positions.
  * Suitability of planned friendly assault, artillery, and sustainment positions.
  * Enemy deception operations.
  * Current and future weather impacts to operations.
  * Anything that requires a commander’s decision.
  Commanders and leaders at all echelons personally participate in this process.
  5-21. Units take every opportunity to gain and refine combat information regarding enemy forces. They
  employ information collection assets to gather combat information and process it into intelligence.
  Information gathered during the planning phase is especially useful in determining the viability of each COA
  developed. Generally, units cannot conduct deliberate attacks if they do not know the location of most of the