text: Chapter 2
  2-104. Guerrilla operations are generally offensive, not defensive, and are often harassing in nature.
  Guerrillas seldom attempt to seize and defend physical objectives and, in general, avoid decisive
  engagement. Their overall aim is often to cause confusion, to destroy infrastructure or security forces,
  and to lower public morale. Guerrilla harassment attempts to keep government forces on the defensive
  and weaken the Host Nation, which can include destroying resources and disrupting lines
  of communication. One advantage of harassment is that it may create the perception that the guerrilla can
  strike anywhere and that the Host Nation cannot prevent it. Because of this, counterinsurgents the must not
  only win small battles, but also win the battle of public perception. In rural areas, guerrillas may seize a
  remote area or conduct raids and small-scale attacks on remote targets and lines of communications.
  Numerical Superiority
  2-105. While government forces outnumber the guerrilla, the guerrilla seeks to attain local numerical
  superiority. If guerrillas can successfully concentrate against counterinsurgents, they can attain victory over
  small elements of government forces. Guerrillas often use simple techniques of speed, surprise, maneuver,
  and especially infiltration. Near the target area, small guerrilla elements will often mass in order to conduct
  a specific, larger-scale operation. The baited ambush is a favorite guerrilla technique. Guerrillas often
  create incidents, such as arsons, bombings, and hoaxes, as the bait. These baited ambushes can attempt
  to lure small government forces of all types into a mechanical or manned ambush.
  CONVENTIONAL TACTICS
  2-106. Conventional operations are not always necessary for success; however, guerrillas may engage
  in conventional operations after an insurgency develops extensive popular and logistical support. When
  they feel the conditions are set, insurgents may generate a conventional military force that can directly
  confront HN security forces. These conventional operations may vary from a small regional operation
  to general conventional warfare. Large conventional operations are usually an attempt to obtain the
  strategic or operational objectives.
  CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
  2-107. Sustainment requirements, especially funding, often bring insurgents into relationships with
  organized crime or insurgents may turn to criminal activity themselves. Reaping windfall profits
  and avoiding the costs and difficulties involved in securing external support makes illegal activity
  attractive to insurgents. Taxing a mass base usually yields low returns and alienates the population,
  especially in cases where the insurgency provides essential services to the population. In contrast,
  kidnapping or hostage taking, extortion, armed robbery, and trafficking (drug, human, black market goods,
  and so on)—four possible insurgent criminal activities—are very lucrative, although they also alienate the
  population. The activities of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) are a perfect
  example. The FARC often receives millions of US dollars from a single high-profile kidnapping. Similarly,
  failed and failing states with rich natural resources like oil or poppies are particularly lucrative areas
  for criminal activity.
  2-108. Devoting exceptional amounts of time and effort to fund-raising requires insurgents
  to shortchange ideological or armed action. Indeed, the method of raising funds is often at the heart
  of internal debates within the insurgency. For example, the FARCs involvement in the drug trade has made
  it the richest self-sustaining insurgent group in history; yet it continues to claim to pursue “Bolivarian”
  and “socialist” or “Marxist-Leninist” ends. FARC activities have increasingly been labeled
  “narco-terrorist” or, simply "criminal," by a variety of critics.
  2-109. Many insurgencies have degenerated into criminality. This occurred as the primary movements
  disintegrated and the remaining elements were cast adrift. Such disintegration is desirable for the
  counterinsurgent. It replaces a dangerous, ideologically inspired body of disaffiliated individuals with a
  less dangerous but more diverse body. This transition would mean the counterinsurgency would also
  transition to more of a law-and-order approach. Successful counterinsurgents must recognize that the ideal
  approach eliminates both the insurgency and any criminal threats.