text: Chapter 1
  Enemies and adversaries are likely to contest the information environment across the conflict continuum to
  deny operational access and diminish the effectiveness of U.S. and allied forces.
  1-37. An enemy can use radio frequency direction finding equipment to locate any radio frequency emitter,
  such as a radio, satellite communications terminal, counter-improvised explosive device system, radar, or
  cell phone. Once they determine an accurate location, enemy forces can direct lethal or non-lethal fires to
  destroy, degrade, or compromise the capability.
  1-38. Combining signal and electronic protection techniques with current intelligence estimates may mitigate
  an enemy’s ability to find and attack key communications nodes or command posts. The assistant chief of
  staff, intelligence (G-2) or battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer (S-2) section can better define an
  enemy’s electronic technical data. The cyber electronic warfare officer’s knowledge of threat EW capabilities
  and techniques helps inform a communications plan to limit the enemy’s effectiveness. Units can camouflage
  their operational use of the spectrum within the spectral noise of an urban area or mask communications
  transmissions using terrain or antenna placement. Refer to Army doctrine for EW and ATP 6-02.53 for more
  information about communications masking and antenna placement.
  1-39. Synchronizing signal support with cyberspace, EW, intelligence, space, and other information-related
  capabilities is key to achieving and maintaining freedom of action in contested cyberspace and the
  electromagnetic spectrum while denying the same to adversaries. Synchronization is the arrangement of
  military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place
  and time (JP 2-0). Synchronization provides the ability to execute multiple related and mutually supporting
  tasks in different locations at the same time, producing greater effects than executing each in isolation.
  Synchronization of capabilities across multiple domains and warfighting functions maximizes their
  complementary effects in and through cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum.
  1-40. Changes in the operational variables (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure,
  physical environment, and time) or mission variables (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and
  support available, time available, and civil considerations) could change communications requirements
  beyond the capabilities of assigned and attached signal elements. Because DODIN operations authorities
  align to the operational chain of command, commanders can allocate the available communications and
  network support to their highest mission priorities until additional capabilities are available. Refer to FM
  6-0 for a complete discussion of the operational and mission variables.
  Degraded Environment
  1-41. The cyberspace and space domains grow in importance as global competitors, regional competitors,
  and non-state actors invest in capabilities to protect their access and disrupt or deny access to others. Although
  Army forces have grown accustomed to communicating freely without fear of jamming or interception, U.S.
  enemies and adversaries are likely to use technological advances in cyberspace and vulnerabilities in the
  electromagnetic spectrum to conduct cyberspace or electromagnetic spectrum attacks (FM 3-0).
  1-42. A broad array of threat actors will challenge the joint force’s freedom of action in space, cyberspace,
  and the electromagnetic spectrum. For example, an enemy that jams positioning, navigation, and timing
  satellites may render precision fires inaccurate. Army commanders must protect their own systems and
  disrupt the enemy’s ability to operate while being prepared to operate with degraded communications and
  reduced access to cyberspace and space capabilities.
  1-43. While enemy action might cause a degraded environment, degraded capabilities may also occur
  because of insufficient resources to support all communications requirements. For example, inadequate
  communications satellite capacity in an operational area cause congestion and network latency. Jamming or
  unintentional electromagnetic interference may also cause degradation. The architecture of the tactical
  network implements redundant communications means to improve reliability in a degraded environment.
  1-44. In a hostile EW environment where satellite links are denied or degraded, Army forces at echelons
  corps through brigade retain the ability to communicate through protected satellite communications. Units at
  echelons battalion and below rely on line of sight communications and other terrestrial means to overcome
  satellite denial or degradation. Ground and aerial retransmission links can extend the communications range,
  but are still vulnerable to direction finding and jamming. Refer to ATP 6-02.54 for more information about
  protected satellite communications.