text: Tactical Deception
  approval authority for a brigade commander requesting to execute a feint or demonstration as part of their
  plan,
  19-36. Units have two options to disseminate the tactical deception plan to their subordinates. It is
  imperative that the unit maintains operational security for the success of the operation. The first option is for
  the unit’s leaders to know the true task and purpose of the organization, subordinates may receive a different
  task and purpose in order to maintain operational security. The second option is for the unit to provide
  complete briefings to their subordinates. In both options, caution must be exercised to ensure that deception
  details are not mentioned in their operation orders. OPSEC must be recognized as a vital element of the
  variation of the tactical deception.
  FEINT
  19-37. A feint is a variation of tactical deception that makes contact solely to deceive the adversary as
  to the location, time of attack, or both. The feint leads the enemy into erroneous conclusions about friendly
  dispositions. Feints are usually offensive in nature and closely resemble an attack; however, they can be
  executed during other operations. A feint requires engagement with the enemy to give the appearance of the
  main attack. See table 19-2 on page 19-9 for the tactical planning symbol.
  19-38. The principal difference between a feint and an attack is that friendly forces assign their troops an
  objective limited in size, scope, or some other measure. It should contribute to the overall accomplishment
  of the mission and deceive the enemy. Forces conducting feints make direct fire contact with enemy forces
  and potentially decisively engage to draw resources from the enemy to enable the success of the friendly
  force’s main effort. Several purposes for feints include causing the deception target to—
  * Employ their second-echelon forces other than intended.
  * Move away from the main attack toward the feint or to hold the enemy’s second echelon force in
  its current location.
  * Shift its supporting fires from the friendly main attack to the feint.
  * Reveal enemy defensive fires and capabilities.
  19-39. A single event feint might not always deliver the desired effect. Instead, a series of recurring feints
  might be necessary to deceive the enemy decision maker. For example, repeated raids may condition the
  enemy to confirm the commander’s perception that the friendly commander lacks the combat power to
  conduct a main attack. The enemy may become so accustomed to the pattern of raids that it takes little or no
  action when the friendly main attack actually occurs. The enemy will consider it as another raid.
  19-40. Another important consideration for the execution of a feint is the location. Observing the terrain
  and enemy disposition, the commander or staff considers—
  * The enemy’s area of interest. The deception target may not react as desired to the presented threat
  because it is of little value to the enemy.
  * Whether or not the enemy may displace its force if the feint is deployed beyond the range of its
  direct and indirect fires, based on its current positions.
  * An assigned area that is sufficient for the successful execution of the feint without interfering with
  the main attack.
  19-41. Units conduct feints before or during the main attack. Therefore, planners consider the timing of the
  main attack in determining the time for the feint. The estimated time necessary for the enemy to react in the
  desired manner also influences the timing of the tactical deception. A feint before a main attack usually
  requires carefully determined lead time.
  19-42. The precise time a feint occurs will vary depending on the commander’s intent. Moving additional
  forces will require more time than shifting fires. For example, if the intent is to move the second echelon
  forces, the feint has to be initiated well ahead of the main effort.
  19-43. A feint conducted simultaneously with the main attack may cause the enemy to divert its attention
  and possibly a portion of its forces and supporting fires. A feint conducted after the main attack is launched
  can hold the enemy’s uncommitted forces in its present location. Faced with a new threat, the enemy becomes
  uncertain about the location of the main effort.