text: Combined Arms for Air Defense
  PLANNING AND EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
  11-9. ADAM cell personnel develop the AMD appendix for the BCT. The appendix addresses the organic
  capabilities of the BCT, for both active and passive defense, and capabilities of an ADA unit placed in support
  of the BCT or of ADA units operating in its vicinity. It identifies AMD missions for the BCT’s organic and
  supporting units. Intelligence units, for instance, may assist in identifying the air threat to be countered and
  analyze potential enemy courses of action.
  11-10. The brigade commander establishes the priority of assets to be defended and influences the
  positioning of any supporting ADA unit. The ADAM cell facilitates the commander’s understanding of the
  airspace and the capabilities, locations, and missions of ADA units in or near the BCT area.
  11-11. The BCT’s battalion-size elements can get assistance from the ADAM cell or supporting ADA unit,
  if one is assigned, in incorporating AMD into their plans. The ADAM cell or ADA unit can provide the
  current data on projected air threats, special guidance on ROE, UAS and aviation locations and transit routes
  through the brigade’s area, and any engagement directives from the designated engagement authority. This
  enables aerial situational understanding for BCT units and mitigates fratricide.
  11-12. Defenses for virtually all Army elements are focused on the potential or projected ground threat.
  Units and their weapons are positioned to deny or mitigate this threat. However, with the increasing
  proliferation of UASs and potential for complex integrated attacks of any friendly concentration of forces,
  commanders must be cognizant of, plan, and allocate resources to defend against air threats. Thus, defenses
  of installations, such as operating bases, or areas where brigade elements may concentrate should consider
  the most likely air ingress routes, surveillance orbits, and suspected areas from which UASs and rotary- and
  fixed-wing aircraft can be launched.
  11-13. BCT units must incorporate passive defense measures into their AMD planning. In addition to
  camouflage and movement control, units can plan for and institute electromagnetic hardening, electronic
  masking, and emission control by such measures as shielding sensitive equipment components, controlling
  signatures to protect against threat signal intelligence operations, and selecting and controlling the use of
  sensors and C2 emitters, respectively (FM 3-12). Units on installations should continually harden their
  locations and incorporate all means to lessen the potential for threat observation and mitigate the effects of
  air attacks. For more information on passive AMD measures, see ATP 3-01.8.
  11-14. ADAM cells are cognizant of friendly UAS launch times and projected operating areas. ADAM
  Soldiers, in coordination with brigade S-3 and the maneuver force UAS units, may establish restricted
  operations zones that encompass UAS operating areas and affect the AMD actions initiated by maneuver
  force Soldiers.
  ENGAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
  11-15. Engagements can be lethal or non-lethal, and they can be executed against air and missile threats on
  the ground or those that are airborne. Engagements are conducted by the best available system or systems
  positioned and capable of negating an enemy’s capabilities. All of the maneuver forces’ organic weapons can
  be used in self-defense. Key to the engagements is the detection of the threat in sufficient time and with
  sufficient accuracy to allow friendly forces to execute necessary responses. For more information on active
  AMD measures, see ATP 3-01.8.
  11-16. The best defense against air and missile threats is to destroy them on the ground before launch or
  disrupt/destroy their control stations. Intelligence analysis and collection efforts are continuous and support
  preplanned and dynamic targeting. Using potential launch site and C2 location information identified by
  intelligence elements, field artillery, aviation, and special operating forces employ lethal means to target
  these threat assets at extended ranges. Electromagnetic jamming directed against a UAS control station can
  disrupt its electronic signals, thus reducing the controlled UAS’s ability to surveil the right area and transmit
  targeting data.
  11-17. Once the threat is airborne and enters the brigade’s defended areas, brigade units use all means to
  destroy these threats. Engagements are procedurally controlled. A different weapons control status (weapons
  hold, weapons tight, and weapons free) may be applied simultaneously to different weapon systems, different