text: Chapter 4
  FORCE PROJECTION
  4-7. The demonstrated ability to project Army forces into an operational area is an essential element of
  conventional deterrence. Army forces depend upon joint lift capabilities for deployment. Force projection is
  the ability to project the military instrument of national power from the United States or another theater in
  response to requirements for military operations (JP 3-0).
  4-8. Force projection is particularly important during crisis, as Army forces have an unknown amount of time
  to shape a developing situation. It can occur, however, in any context. Forces projected forward during
  competition to conduct exercises, bolster allies and partners, and conduct other activities are under
  observation. Adversaries assess the speed and efficiency of these routine deployments, which can have a
  deterrent effect. Given the fluid nature of a crisis, force projection may continue well after a crisis has
  transitioned to armed conflict. Force projection includes—
  • Opening the theater.
  • Mobilization
  • Deployment.
  • Initial employment of forces.
  • Sustainment.
  • Redeployment.
  OPENING THE THEATER
  4-9. During the transition to crisis or armed conflict, Army forces open the theater to receive deploying
  forces. Army forces execute existing plans to establish and open air, sea, and rail terminals. Distribution
  systems and ISBs may be established where required. Higher echelon (including theater, corps, and division
  enablers) and rapidly deployable command and control elements begin to integrate with host-nation forces
  as quickly as possible to set the conditions for RSOI of follow-on tactical forces. This includes coordination
  with the forces of other supporting nations to assure effective distribution of services, facilities, and supplies
  to all deploying units across the alliance or coalition. During theater opening, designated arriving forces draw
  available APS. This provides the JFC with increased capacity and capability during the initial stages of a
  crisis or armed conflict. Army forces must be prepared for combat while conducting theater opening
  operations. The first deploying units require the capability to defend themselves while they provide reaction
  time and maneuver space for follow-on forces.
  MOBILIZATION
  4-10. Mobilization is the process by which the Armed Forces of the United States, or part of them, are brought
  to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency (JP 4-05). This includes activating all or part of
  the Reserve Components, as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and equipment. See JP
  4-0 for additional information on mobilization.
  DEPLOYMENT
  4-11. Deployment is the movement of forces into and out of an operational area (JP 3-35). How the JFC
  intends to employ forces is the foundation of the deployment structure and timing. For example, a JFC may
  deploy a combat-ready maneuver brigade or division early in a crisis to stabilize a situation or secure ports
  for follow-on forces, accepting risks to the movement efficiency of follow-on forces. Corps and division
  staffs examine all deployment possibilities and conduct parallel planning.
  INITIAL EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES
  4-12. The initial employment of Army forces during a crisis will most likely be as part of FDOs or FROs.
  This employment may represent the opening stages of a joint operation or a show of force demonstration.
  The objective of this early employment is to deter an adversary from further aggression, expand the theater
  to receive follow-on Army and joint forces, and form a credible defense with host-nation forces to prevent
  adversary gains.