text: Chapter 6
  * Availability of surface-to-surface FS assets may be initially limited. Initial dependency on CAS,
  rotary wing aviation, and naval gunfire until artillery and mortars are available. Ensure proper
  ALO, JTAC, and air-naval ground liaison company representation in the assault force.
  * Ensure adequate FA systems are introduced early in the airborne operation and following air land
  operations to create flexibility by reducing the dependency on CAS, attack aviation, and naval
  gunfire.
  * SEAD to support transport aircraft (to include enemy ADA as well as enemy aircraft bases and
  enemy helicopter army and refueling points).
  * Pre-assault fires of the airhead and other critical targets including interdiction fires.
  * Deception fires at false landing zones.
  * CEMA to disrupt forces in vicinity of the airhead.
  * Inclusion of long-range precision fires.
  * Establish liaison with all joint and unified action partners supporting the operation.
  * Common understanding and visualization of all SOF and unified action partners already operating
  in the area.
  6-18. Air assault forcible entry FS consideration include:
  * Deception. False preparations can be fired into areas other than the objective or landing zone area
  to deceive enemy forces.
  * Duration of preparation fires. A preparation of long duration may reduce the possibility of surprise.
  The preparation fires should begin as the first aircraft of the first lift crosses the release point and
  end just before the first aircraft lands.
  * Availability of FS assets. When an air assault is executed across extended distances, preparation
  fires by CAS or attack helicopters may be the only viable alternative to organic FA.
  6-19. Special operations FS considerations include:
  * Allocating priorities for CAS.
  * Allocating LRPF capabilities as soon as possible; establishing a DS support relationship between
  HIMARS or MLRS to SOF forces as appropriate.
  * Ensure SOF positions as well as the multinational unified action partners they are supporting are
  known and tracked throughout the operation, especially during any pre-assault fires.
  * Define and expedite clearance of fires responsibilities between SOF and conventional forces by
  establishing a ground force commander and redundant communications.
  FORCIBLE ENTRY PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
  6-20. Forcible entry operations are conducted in five phases. The five phases of forcible entry are preparation
  and deployment, assault, stabilization of the lodgment, introduction of follow-on forces, and termination or
  transition of operations. Each phase with FS considerations is discussed below.
  6-21. Preparation and deployment, FS considerations include:
  * Establishing a PACE plan for enroute communications.
  * The availability of joint TA and joint FS attack/delivery platforms including the integration with
  SOF forces already in the vicinity of the lodgment.
  * Input to the joint integrated prioritized target list and ATO.
  * Targeting the enemy's A2/AD capabilities utilizing AI to engage targets in the vicinity of the
  lodgment area.
  * Integrate CEMA and other information-related capabilities into the operation early as authorities
  for use require longer timelines.
  * Recommend FS considerations into the GO-NO GO criteria for the operation. Consider ISR
  allocation for BDA for answering these criteria.