text: Chapter 5
  includes more than just the overall objective of the insurgency. Subordinate leaders within an insurgency
  are indoctrinated because they must execute the senior leadership’s intent and vision as well as guide
  operations until redirected. With better indoctrination of intent and vision, insurgents may be more
  effective in decentralized operations and being self sufficient.
  5-23. Training also includes individual and collective training, depending on the role of the insurgent and
  the specific skills of the insurgent (such as sniper, information operations, human intelligence, raid or
  ambush, communications, logistics and caches, or bomb maker). More advanced training may include how
  insurgents conduct themselves if captured, including resistance to interrogation and operations within
  detention facilities (recruiting, clandestine communications, and maintaining control of other insurgents).
  Other states may play an essential role in training an insurgency. Training can occur at sites in the
  supporting country or covertly within the host nation. Many states maintain the ability to conduct
  unconventional warfare. (See FM 3-05 for more information on unconventional warfare.)
  COMMUNICATIONS
  5-24. Communications in an insurgency cannot depend on open and traditional means. Ensuring an
  effective network of communications is an essential support activity of an insurgency. Insurgents can
  compensate for the lack of regular and reliable communications in numerous ways, including masking their
  communications in radio, television, or Internet messages. They may also pass information in cameras,
  high frequency, short-wave, and amateur (ham radio) sets, cellular phones, the mail, computers, or memory
  storage devices transported by couriers. They may also avoid detection by use of couriers and face-to-face
  meetings.
  INSURGENT STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
  5-25. Insurgents usually have several strengths. They usually have a significant knowledge of an area of
  operations. Usually they are operating in their own country and own ethnic group, making it extremely
  difficult for friendly forces to identify insurgents in the community or to identify people connected with the
  insurgency. Insurgents have intimate knowledge of the area of operations including things like the
  characteristics of the local people and their culture, daily schedules, accents, and local slangs that enable
  them to blend in with the local population, enhancing their ability to operate with secrecy. They will
  probably wear similar clothing, have like postures, mannerisms and hand gestures, body movements,
  walking speed, greetings, body motions, and maintain eye contact (or lack of) as the population of the area
  of operations. They will also probably observe local social norms of food, drink, and sleeping schedules.
  5-26. An insurgent is not usually responsible for maintaining normal governmental obligations to the local
  population. While insurgents may conduct some governmental functions and set up a shadow government,
  an insurgency does not normally have the same expectations from the population to provide governmental
  services. This normally means that insurgencies spend few resources on governmental functions, which
  frees more resources to conduct the insurgency.
  5-27. Most insurgencies have limited personnel and resources. Long periods without resupply and loss of
  key personnel can affect an insurgency’s ability to sustain a conflict. Counterinsurgents can apply pressure
  on an insurgency by conducting raids on cell members; recovering enemy caches; interdicting supply
  routes; searching or seizing resources from cars, homes, and personnel entering the area of operations;
  isolating the insurgents from access to markets, smugglers, and black-market goods; and by conducting
  offensive operations that diminish guerrilla numbers. Insurgencies usually fail when their ability to
  replenish, either through counterinsurgent action, mismanagement on their own part, or withdrawal of the
  support of an external actor, is undermined.
  5-28. Insurgent movements are vulnerable to friendly force information operations that show their danger,
  futility, privation, and numerical inferiority compared to government forces. In some cases, the fear of
  being treated as a criminal if captured, and the fear of violence to an insurgent and the insurgent’s family,
  can cause desertions and defections. In some societies, good treatment, pardons, protection, food, shelter,
  and participation in the government may be stronger incentives than the fear of criminal punishment to
  induce desertions. Other insurgent stress factors include sustained combat and a hostile environment that
  weakens insurgent resolve.