text: Operating in a Contested Environment
  * Continuing to operate. Enemy jamming usually involves a period of jamming followed by a brief
  listening period. Operator activity during this short period indicates to enemies whether their
  jamming efforts were successful. Continuing to operate normally gives the enemy no indication
  of success for failure. If the enemy hears discussion of the problem on the air, or radio operation
  terminates, the enemy may assume their jamming is effective. Operators should never terminate
  operation of a radio network unless they are ordered to do so. Operators should be careful not to
  disclose to the enemy that the radio has been adversely affected. This means normal operations
  should continue even when degraded by jamming.
  * Increasing transmitter power output. Low power is used for normal operations to minimize
  detection. Once the enemy begins jamming the radios, the risk of detection becomes secondary to
  the radio delivering required communications. Higher radio power may overcome the enemy’s
  jamming signal, but increases the risk of detection by enemy direction finding capabilities.
  * Improving the Signal-to-Jamming Ratio. The signal-to-jamming ratio is the relative strength of
  the desired signal to the jamming signal at the receiver. If the desired signal is much stronger than
  the jamming signal, the jamming does not significantly degrade communications. To improve the
  signal-to-jamming ratio operators and signal leaders can consider the following—
   Adjusting or changing the antenna. When jamming occurs, the radio operator should adjust
  the antenna to receive the maximum incoming signal strength. Depending on the antenna,
  some methods include reorienting the antenna, changing antenna polarization at all stations,
  or installing an antenna with a greater range.
   Establishing a retransmission site. A retransmission site can increase the effective range
  and power of a signal between radio stations without increasing transmit power.
   Relocating the antenna. Operators may use terrain masking to block the incoming jamming
  signal. This may require moving the antenna and associated radio set anywhere from a few
  meters to several hundred meters.
  * Changing frequencies. If a communications network cannot overcome enemy jamming, the
  commander may direct using an alternate or spare frequency. Preplanned and well-coordinated
  actions are required in order for practical dummy stations to continue to operate on the jammed
  frequency, to mask the change to an alternate frequency. During a jamming incident, it may be
  difficult to coordinate a frequency change. All radio operators require knowledge of when, and
  under what circumstances, they should switch to a backup frequency. If the frequency change is
  not smooth, the enemy may discover what is happening, and try to degrade communications on
  the new frequency.
  * Executing the PACE plan. Quickly changing to the alternate or contingency means of
  communications reduces communications disruption.
  * Using signals intelligence or EW capabilities to locate the jamming signal. Leveraging signals
  intelligence or EW capabilities requires coordination and collaboration with the G-2 (S-2) or the
  cyber electronic warfare officer.
  A-32. If any of the corrective actions taken mitigate the enemy jamming, operators should continue operation
  of the network and submit a joint spectrum interference resolution report to higher headquarters. Joint
  spectrum interference reports document a history of problems and help identify possible causes for
  subsequent interference. Maintaining a historical record of interference helps develop countermeasures to
  future jamming incidents. Refer to ATP 6-02.70 for more information about joint spectrum interference
  resolution reporting.
  Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Jamming
  A-33. Peer threats have capabilities to contest the space domain and attack the on-orbit, link, and terrestrial
  segments of U.S. positioning, navigation, and timing satellites. These attacks may have significant impacts
  across all warfighting functions and many weapon platforms.
  A-34. Electromagnetic jamming of positioning, navigation, and timing satellite capabilities affects not only
  communications, but also many other capabilities in tactical formations. Systems affected include—