text: Fire Support and the Operations Process
  * Develop a sustainment and protection plan for all TA and attack/delivery capabilities. The
  execution of sustainment operations across all class of supply are critical to counterfire operations.
  CL V sustainment, haul capability, triggers, required supply rate and CSR are crucial to the
  counterfire fight. Radar sections do not have the capability to provide force protection for
  themselves and firing units often need protection augmentation. A protection plan must be
  developed during MDMP to include engineer support, local force protection to secure movement
  along main supply and alternate supply routes, short-range air defense, cueing schedules,
  frequency management, and deception.
  * Communicate at distance using PACE plans, digital architecture, AFATDS database management,
  and liaison officers. When conducting counterfire in large-scale combat operations be prepared to
  operate in a degraded environment. Establish a PACE plan for the analog and digital architectures
  from sensor to shooter. AFATDS database must be verified and continuously updated to include
  FSCMs, firing unit data, sensor data, targeting data, and communications architecture. Establish
  liaison officers at echelon and in adjacent units for cross boundary fires.
  * Conduct tactical fire direction: Tactical fire direction and firing unit management is key to
  ensuring responsive fires. During MDMP and the targeting process develop target selection
  standards and attack guidance that enables rapid decision making and responsive fires. Plan for a
  dedicated all weather counterfire shooter using hot and cold status.
  * Maximize radar foundational training strategy. Develop and rehearse the counterfire fight drill
  from sensor to shooter covering all elements of the PACE plan and all TA resources possible.
  Develop a weekly digital sustainment program that is focused, and event driven at all echelons.
  DANGER CLOSE
  3-29. Danger close for air-to-surface and surface-to-surface missions is a mandatory call alerting of an
  elevated risk to the closest friendly troops from the intended point of a weapon’s impact requiring
  specific procedures for risk mitigation. This is included with the method of engagement when the predicted
  impact of around or shell is within 600 meters (m) of friendly troops for mortars or artillery and 750 m for
  naval surface fires. The creeping fire method of adjustment (no adjustment greater than 100 m for
  mortars/artillery or 200 m for NSFS) will be used exclusively during danger close missions. Do not confuse
  the creeping fire method with risk-estimate distances or minimum safe distances. See JP 3-09.3 for
  procedures on air-to-surface danger close engagement.
  THE TARGETING PROCESS
  3-30. The supported commander's FS requirements are continually identified, planned, and executed as part
  of the targeting process. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the
  appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). Targeting helps
  integrate and synchronize FS with other Army and joint functions (C2, intelligence, movement and maneuver,
  protection, sustainment, and information). The Army targeting process and the joint targeting cycle
  coordinates and synchronizes fire support to shape enemy forces in the deep area to set conditions for
  subordinate units. Units use the Army targeting process for their organic systems and the joint targeting cycle
  for joint systems as appropriate according to organizational echelon.
  3-31. The Army targeting process is integrated with the operations process, joint targeting cycle, and the
  MDMP (see figure 3-1 on page 3-10, and table 3-1 on page 3-13). Targeting occurs continuously throughout
  an operation. decide, detect, deliver, and assess functions nest with the operations process: planning,
  preparing, executing, and assessing. Furthermore, Army units that require joint capabilities to conduct
  shaping operations employ and interface with joint planning and processes, for example, the joint targeting
  cycle. Therefore, echelons above brigade Army commanders and staffs must understand and interface with
  both the Army’s decide, detect, deliver, and assess targeting processes, and those processes used within the
  joint targeting cycle.