text: FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
  of the sensor package on board. Once the mission in the target area is com-
  plete, the UAV climbs to higher altitude and departs the mission area.
  TARGETED SUBSYSTEMS
  9-181. Countering UAVs should not be viewed as just a defense against the aerial
  vehicle, although that is important. Most UAV systems consist of three basic
  subsystems: the air vehicle, the ground station, and the launcher. (In some
  cases, the latter two may be one vehicle.) There are also a variety of communica-
  tion data links between the ground station and the air vehicle. Some systems
  also include satellite links. The air defense commander must coordinate with
  other arms to ensure that UAVs are being attacked not just in the air, but that
  their related subsystems are also addressed. The successful destruction of a UAV
  ground station has a far greater impact than the destruction of a single air vehicle.
  9-182. Thus, air defense against UAVs requires not only an IADS but also an
  integrated all-arms approach. Air defense commanders and planners should
  view the three UAV subsystems as three separate targets that can be coun-
  tered through a variety of means. These means are both active and passive.
  ACTIVE MEASURES
  9-183. A wide variety and large number of active measures are available to
  the OPFOR to counter UAVs. The effectiveness of air defense radars can vary
  dependent on the radar cross section (RCS) and altitude of the vehicle. Of
  course, this does not preclude the use of radar, since these factors are consid-
  erations in detecting any aircraft. The relatively small size of many UAVs
  obviously reduces their RCS.
  9-184. A variety of sound-ranging systems are available that can provide
  early warning and azimuth of an approaching UAV. This in turn provides air
  defense weapons and maneuver unit weapons an opportunity to prepare for the
  vehicle’s approach and to put up a large volume of fire, provided the UAV can
  subsequently be visually detected. The early warning provided by sound ranging
  increases the probability that visual observers will be able to spot the vehicle.
  9-185. The location of UAV ground stations and launchers is typically a high
  priority for reconnaissance. The OPFOR will use all available means (from
  the civilian population to commercially available satellite imagery) to locate
  these key targets. Reconnaissance assets for locating these targets can be
  tied to artillery, MRLs, or aircraft that can quickly engage the targets once
  the information is received. SPF operating in the enemy rear can also be a
  valuable asset in locating launchers and ground stations. They can either
  take direct action to destroy the targets or relay location information to allow
  the OPFOR to employ other means against them.
  9-186. The OPFOR can also use jamming techniques to counter UAV system
  data links. In some cases, data links cannot be jammed but they can be
  monitored. The effectiveness of these procedures varies according to the UAV
  system being attacked. High-power spot or barrage noise jammers can be
  effectively used to mask ground targets from side-looking airborne radars.
  Many satellite up- and downlinks employed are through the use of the
  commercial telecommunication infrastructure. This infrastructure and
  supporting satellites can be jammed or monitored to some degree.