text: Overview
  1-85. Entry forces require seamless intelligence and operations integration from the small unit up through
  national-level decision makers, enabling leaders at all levels to access relevant information at the proper
  time and place. The JIOC ensures the intelligence staffs of subordinate component commands have
  appropriate reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence products prepared for each domain in which
  entryforcesoperate.
  1-86. As part of achieving decisive advantages early, joint force operations may be directed immediately
  against the enemy’s center of gravity using conventional and special operations forces and capabilities.
  Attacks may be decisive or may begin offensive operations throughout the enemy’s depth that can create
  dilemmascausingparalysisanddestroyingcohesion.
  1-87. When airborne, air assault, and amphibious operations are combined, unity of command is vital.
  Rehearsals are a critical part of preparation for forcible entry. Participating forces need to be prepared to
  fight immediately upon arrival and require robust communications and intelligence capabilities to move
  with forward elements. The forcible entry force must be prepared to immediately transition to follow-on
  operations,andshouldplanaccordingly.
  1-88. Forceentryactionsoccurinbothsingular andmultipleoperations.Theseactionsincludeestablishing
  forward presence, preparing the operational area, opening entrypoints, establishing and sustaining access,
  receiving follow-on forces, conducting follow-on operations, sustaining the operations, and conducting
  decisiveoperations.Additionalactivitiestoconsiderinclude—
  (cid:122) Informationoperations.Thefullimpactofinformationoperationonfriendly,neutral,andhostile
  forces should be considered with the key goal of information operations achieving and
  maintaininginformationsuperiorityfor the U.S.anditsallies;andexploitingenemyinformation
  vulnerabilities. Information operations are the integrated employment, during military
  operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to
  influence, disrupt, corrupt, orusurpthedecision makingofadversariesand potentialadversaries
  whileprotectingtheentryforce.(RefertoJP3-13.)
  (cid:122) Operationssecurity and militarydeception. Use to confuse the enemyand ease access. Actions,
  themes,and messages portrayed byall friendlyforcesmustbeconsistentif militarydeceptionis
  to be believable. Operations security helps foster a credible military deception. (Refer to
  JP3-13.3andJP3-13.4.)
  (cid:122) Specialoperationsforces.Mayprecedeforcibleentryforcestoincludethefollowing:
  Identify,clarify,andmodifyconditionsinthelodgment.
  (cid:132)
  Conducttheassaultstoseizesmall,initiallodgmentssuchasairfieldsorseaports.
  (cid:132)
  Provideorassistinemployingfiresupport.
  (cid:132)
  Conductotheroperations:seizureairfields,reconnaissanceoflandingzonesoramphibious
  (cid:132)
  landingsites.
  Conduct special reconnaissance and direct action well beyond the lodgment to identify,
  (cid:132)
  interdict,anddestroyforcesthatthreatentheconventionalentryforce (SeeJP3-05).
  1-89. Entryforces must collect, process, and disseminate relevant information in near real time to support
  fire and movement, and maintain the abilityto deliver and control joint firesthroughout the assault. Given
  the distances from which entry forces are deployed and employed, ground forces require access to and
  direction of joint fires during the assault, stabilization of the lodgment, and introduction of follow-on
  forces.
  1-90. Targeting intelligence supports forcible entry operations in verifying existing information and
  making recommendations on targeting and collateral damage estimate with respect to intelligence
  preparation of the operational environment, service capabilities, and rules of engagement. Targeting
  intelligence analysis encompasses many processes, all linked and logically guided by the joint targeting
  cycle, that continuously seek to analyze, identify, develop, validate, assess, and prioritize targets for
  engagement in order to achieve the commander’s objectives and end state. (Refer to JP 3-60 and ATP 3-
  60.1formoreinformation.)
  1-91. Thethreata tactical missionmayposetothe civilian populacerequiresbalancedlethalandnonlethal
  actionsduringforcibleentryoperations.Overcautiouspreventionactivitiesorprocedureslimitthe freedom