text: Leadership During Operations
  8-10. Commanders convey importance and focus the efforts of the command by how they communicate,
  regardless of where they are physically located. A calm and authoritative tone of voice generates a sense of
  presence, as does a crisp and efficient manner of providing guidance; both require practice to master. No
  matter their location, effective commanders encourage their troops, sense their morale, and inspire through
  personal example. Commanders balance the risk of commanding forward with necessity to build trust by
  depending upon subordinates to accurately report and demonstrate initiative in their portion of an area of
  operations (AO). Lieutenant General Eichelberger’s actions to identify and address problems faced by the
  32d Infantry Division in Buna in 1942 provide an effective example of commanding forward.
  Commanding Forward—LTG Eichelberger at Buna
  In autumn 1942, U.S. forces were attempting to establish positions from which to drive
  the Japanese from New Guinea and the adjacent islands. The 32d Infantry Division
  was to eliminate Japanese positions near the village of Buna. By the end of November,
  however, the division had made little progress, and General Douglas MacArthur sent
  Lieutenant General Robert Eichelberger, I Corps commander, there to correct the
  situation. Eichelberger’s instructions were to “remove all officers who won’t fight [and]...
  if necessary, put sergeants in charge of battalions and corporals in charge of
  companies.”
  Eichelberger and his staff arrived on 2 December and were disturbed by what they
  observed: Soldiers were suffering from a number of tropical diseases. Rations were
  scant. There was little discipline or military courtesy. Morale was low. Organization was
  very poor. Only a few Soldiers were at the front line; many were in the rear areas, sent
  there initially to recover from illness or injury, but now under no one’s effective control.
  Fearing the jungle, Soldiers were afraid to patrol and, consequently, did not know the
  location of Japanese positions. Leadership at all levels was ineffective.
  Eichelberger moved quickly to address these problems. He had supplies flown in and
  distributed so that Soldiers became better fed, clothed, and medically treated. He
  stopped offensive operations for two days to reestablish effective C2. Patrols were sent
  out nightly, and Japanese positions identified. Several commanders, including the
  division commander, were replaced with officers who could instill a more disciplined
  and aggressive attitude. Eichelberger was frequently near the front, wearing his rank
  openly to show his Soldiers their commander was present. In addition to demonstrating
  to his men that he was willing to share the same risks, Eichelberger was able to
  observe battlefield conditions personally, leading to better commander’s visualization.
  By 3 January 1943, after a series of resolute—albeit costly—attacks, the 32d Infantry
  Division had overcome organized resistance at Buna. Eichelberger’s actions reversed
  the tide of battle in the theater. From a collection of demoralized units, he created a
  fighting force that stopped the Japanese advance.
  8-11. Physical presence allows commanders to gain firsthand appreciation for the situation that they can
  rarely gain any other way. Face-to-face discussions in their own or subordinate command posts and forward
  presence allow commanders to see things that may not be conveyed by C2 systems. Forward presence
  demonstrates a willingness to share danger and hardship, and it provides an opportunity to motivate
  subordinates. Commanders should avoid putting their subordinates at additional risk when they are forward,
  however, since the enemy is likely to quickly target senior commanders when their location becomes obvious.
  The same consideration applies to their own command posts, which should disperse their footprint and
  reposition often enough to complicate enemy targeting. The following factors, common to all levels of
  command, may influence where commanders position themselves:
  (cid:122) The need to understand the situation.
  (cid:122) The need to make decisions.