text: Chapter 3
  * Separation of signal sites from the supported command post (remoting) to reduce command post
  vulnerabilities.
  * Available signal capabilities—type, size, and numbers:
   Strategic.
   Host-nation.
   Multinational partners.
  * PACE plan.
  * Capability gaps by requirement and system.
  * Size and location of command and control nodes, including the number of network users at each
  node.
  * Other key headquarters requiring communications support—size and locations.
  * Data threads—understanding what systems or command posts must communicate where.
  * Satellite, electromagnetic spectrum, and communications capacity and availability to support the
  operation, including single-channel availability.
  * Services required—data, voice, and video, by location.
  * Quality of service—prioritization of key leaders, command posts, and types of data on the
  network.
  * Protection of critical nodes—the communications capabilities most critical to the success of the
  joint force and the Army component, and plans to protect those capabilities and nodes.
  * DODIN operations—define responsibilities for managing and controlling portions of the network
  and determine availability of DODIN operations tools.
  * Cybersecurity—the theater cybersecurity program and management plan.
  * Coordination for defensive and offensive cyberspace operations support—
   Organization, planning, and execution.
   Support requirements.
  * Transition plan to shift from tactical signal to fixed infrastructure, including resources available
  or needed.
  * Capabilities available for the commander at key locations and times throughout the operation.
  * Authorizing official who approves devices and software on the network.
  * Mission command information systems—
   Locations.
   Paths to servers.
   Software versions.
   Configurations.
   Effects of network latency.
  * Maintenance management and tracking.
  * Key battle rhythm events—
   Systems used.
   Times.
   Locations.
   Requirements.
  * COMSEC requirements—plan for distribution, accounting, and security of cryptographic keying
  material.
  NETWORK AND DATA PROTECTION WHILE THE FORCE IS IN TRANSIT
  3-50. As the Army force is in transit, the risk to operations increases. Units operate with limited
  communications capabilities and redundancy, and have minimal defensive capabilities while en route to an
  operational area. The peer threat will use this to their advantage. Threat actors may conduct cyberspace or
  electronic attacks to disrupt the flow of information in an attempt to impede or prevent unit deployments.