text: Chapter 6
  Disintegration of Egyptian Defense: 1973 Arab-Israeli War
  After the destruction of its air force and defeat of its ground forces by Israel in the 1967
  Six Day War, Egypt reorganized its armed forces in preparation for what it saw as the
  inevitable next conflict. With help from the Soviet Union, it acquired a modern
  integrated air defense system and anti-tank guided missile systems to counter the
  Israeli air and armor forces that had been a large factor in its defeats in three previous
  wars. These new capabilities gave the Egyptian army the opportunity to surprise the
  potent Israeli Defense Forces air-ground team, which it exploited in 1973.
  In a well-planned and rehearsed operation, Egyptian forces rapidly assaulted across
  the Suez Canal, penetrated Israeli Defense Force defensive positions, and established
  a deliberate defense after a short advance. The Israeli counterattack with aircraft and
  an armored brigade was defeated with heavy losses from surface-to-air missiles and
  anti-tank guided missile systems, respectively. The losses were a shock to the
  previously undefeated Israeli air and armor forces, which needed to quickly
  reconstitute and adapt to a very different operational environment than 1967. The
  Israeli Army recognized that a mounted, tank-only approach was not going to defeat
  well-trained infantry with modern long-range anti-tank missiles. Only a combined arms
  approach to close combat would be effective, so it quickly task-organized infantry units
  into the armored brigades.
  Once the task-organized brigades penetrated Egyptian first echelon defenses and
  cleared key objectives, the Israeli Army was able to disrupt and ultimately defeat the
  integrated air defense system by destroying vulnerable launchers and radars with
  direct fire. The Israeli action forced the remaining integrated air defense systems to
  displace further into Egypt. With the integrated air defense system effectively defeated,
  the Israeli air force maneuvered unimpeded in support of its ground forces and
  contributed to the complete tactical defeat of the Egyptian army.
  The success of the Israeli Defense Force combined approach to operations later in the
  war sharply contrasts with the failure of its hasty and unbalanced initial counterattack.
  The Israeli Defense Force’s success is also an example of how ground forces enabled
  operations in the air domain, which in turn were able to enable the ground forces.
  Lastly, the Israeli Defense Force operational approach took advantage of the
  integrated air defense system’s critical vulnerabilities, which included dependence
  upon relatively fixed positions. Disintegration of the integrated air defense system did
  not occur until the Israeli Defense Force was able to create and then exploit
  opportunities on the ground through hard fought close combat.
  ENABLING OPERATIONS
  6-133. Enabling operations set friendly conditions required for most operations. Commanders direct
  enabling operations to support the conduct of offensive, defensive, and stability operations and defense
  support to civil authorities tasks. The execution of enabling operations alone does not directly accomplish
  the commander’s end state, but enabling operations must occur to complete the mission. Examples of
  enabling operations are—
  (cid:122) Reconnaissance.
  (cid:122) Security.
  (cid:122) Troop movement.
  (cid:122) Relief in place.
  (cid:122) Passage of lines.