text: Base Camp and Base Cluster Security and Defense
  E-47. The two principal types of attacks that a base camp commander and their staff focus on are categorized
  as penetrating attacks or standoff attacks. Infiltrated attacks from inside the base camp are likely to occur as
  well. Screening and vetting local workers are paramount to disrupting the threat’s potential to gain access as
  a base camp worker or visitor. Hybrid threats will use the difficulties of positive identification of threat actors
  as threat actors to their advantage, and often these actors will provide signatures similar to friendly or neutral
  actors, gaining them access to the base camps.
  PENETRATING ATTACKS
  E-48. Defending against penetrating attacks relies on a strong perimeter defense that incorporates obstacles
  and integrated fires from well-protected firing positions. When applying defensive elements to a base camp
  perimeter, the type and extent of barrier and fires integration may be restricted based on mission and
  operational variables. Base camps within complex terrain, especially in support of stability tasks, will likely
  be restricted in the amount and types of obstacles and corresponding fires allowed in the outer security area;
  this is especially true for indirect fires.
  E-49. Security forces must be capable of disrupting and delaying the penetration of the base camp perimeter
  until reinforced by a response force or TCF. Base camp defenders should have tactical mobility with as much
  personal protection as possible. Security forces must be equipped with reliable and multiple means of
  communication. They should also have the necessary sensors and devices to execute reconnaissance and
  surveillance to the limits of the security area. This helps provide adequate detection and early warnings during
  periods of limited visibility.
  E-50. Joint fires may be employed to augment the organic direct- and indirect-fire capabilities of the base
  camp or base cluster. Security force personnel (augmentation and selectively armed personnel) may be
  directed to secure key facilities within the base camp, such as command posts, ammunition storage areas,
  and aircraft revetments. They may also support finding, fixing, containing, and defeating any attacks that
  may penetrate the perimeter. Adequate fire-control measures must be employed to prevent fratricide.
  STANDOFF ATTACKS
  E-51. Standoff attackers are typically elusive targets. Level I and Level II threats may rely on blending in
  with the legitimate populace, only revealing themselves as combatants when they engage in a hostile act.
  Standoff attacks are mitigated by conducting area security tasks within and beyond the base camp AO to—
  * Deny hiding places to the enemy.
  * Disrupt enemy planning, reconnaissance, and organization.
  * Detect the enemy as it moves into position and posture forces to quickly neutralize detected forces.
  * Deny enemy anonymity through identity activities.
  E-52. These preemptive actions rely on timely, accurate, relevant, and predictable intelligence, including
  human intelligence, within the base camp outer security area and beyond. For imminent threats that originate
  outside the base AO for which the AO commander is unable to assist, the base camp commander must use
  organic base camp combat power to counter the threat or, with the permission of the support area commander,
  assume the risk of enemy standoff attacks.