text: Chapter 11
  January 20XX, all police forces by June 20XX, and air and maritime forces by December 20XX. A
  transition to a host-nation security force lead should be conditions or assessments-based, although the U.S.
  or multinational forces may elect to use a set transition date as a forcing function to compel the host-nation
  security forces to assume greater responsibility for securing their own country and their own people.
  Transitions will rarely be simple. In cases where U.S. or multinational general-purpose brigade combat
  teams deploy for extended tours such as 12-month rotations, units may find that they are supporting the
  host-nation security force transition to lead for security when they arrive in-country and still supporting the
  same transition when they redeploy one year later.
  11-39. The fifth phase of building a host-nation security force in counterinsurgency is sustainment. In this
  context, the term sustainment does not refer exclusively to logistic sustainment or sustainment functions.
  Rather, sustainment is an ongoing set of security assistance activities (Title 22) and security cooperation
  activities (Title 10) designed to enhance the capabilities and capacity of a host nation to provide for its own
  security and to participate in regional or global multinational operations. These programs also seek to
  develop enduring relationships with key leaders within the host-nation security force and to facilitate
  peacetime or contingency access to host-nation facilities such as ports, airfields, and training venues. As the
  transition to the host-nation security force lead for security draws to a close, there may be a number of
  security force assistance tasks that require an extended period to be completed properly. Examples include
  foreign military sales of new equipment such as tanks, artillery, helicopters, or watercraft and subsequent
  deployment of mobile training teams to train the host-nation security force on the employment of these new
  weapons systems. Enduring geographic combatant command-level security cooperation activities, such as
  rotational deployment of U.S. forces to conduct combined exercises with the host-nation security force,
  sustain and extend the development of the capability and capacity of a host-nation security force to deal
  with residual insurgent threats and potential future external threats to that host nation’s sovereignty.
  11-40. In a counterinsurgency, the host-nation security force’s executive and ministerial leadership, its
  force generation capacity, and its operating forces’ capabilities must develop and mature quickly, while
  U.S. or multinational forces initially provide time in the form of security to allow this process to succeed.
  U.S. or multinational forces gradually reduce and eventually relinquish control of the counterinsurgency to
  a host-nation security force. Parallel planning with a host-nation security force provides the blueprint for
  what must occur from the U.S. or multinational side and a host-nation security force side of an operation.
  Both entities plan for transition to host-nation security force lead, but they approach the transition from
  different perspectives. Initially, teaching, coaching, and advising host-nation security forces in their
  planning efforts is part of the overall process, but it ultimately should result in a host-nation security force
  having the capability and capacity to defeat an insurgency on its own.
  PARALLEL PLANNING
  11-41. When enabling a host nation to develop a security force, parallel planning is essential. Parallel
  planning is a time-saving technique that enables leaders at all levels from fire team to division to initiate the
  operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) prior to the receipt of a complete operation order.
  Parallel planning allows units to generate tempo by conducting a multi-tiered planning process. This
  reduces haste and provides all echelons more available time to prepare for future actions. Likewise, parallel
  planning with host-nation security forces enables greater efficiency and the ability to conduct simultaneous
  actions. It also serves as an essential step in the host-nation security force transition to the lead for security
  in a counterinsurgency.
  11-42. Parallel planning with the host-nation security force assumes adequate planning capabilities on the
  part of at least some of the host-nation security force commanders and staffs. When making this
  assumption, U.S. or multinational forces assume operational risks relating to the ability of the host-nation
  security force staffs to deliver on their planning requirements. Considerations when conducting parallel
  planning with the host-nation security force commanders and staffs may include, but are not limited to,
  varying or competing agendas, lower literacy rates, access to computer technology, and use of graphics or
  visuals. U.S. commanders and staffs conducting parallel planning consider these points: