text: Chapter 2
  Conduct Conduit Analysis of the Deception Target
  2-42. Conduit analysis is the detailed mapping of individual conduits or information pathways to the
  potential deception targets. The MDO chooses and deconflicts access to specific conduits to deliver a
  synchronized portrayal of selected information and indicators. In general terms, an individual conduit
  consists of a sensor that registers a signature, a transmission means from the sensor to an intermediate node
  or nodes that might act on the information in a variety of ways, and a delivery to the deception target.
  2-43. Conduit analysis usually depicts the conduit and the method of transmitting information between two
  nodes. Conduit analysis begins with the initiation of planning and continues to be refined through the COA
  development, COA selection, and finalization of the deception plan. MDOs normally identify potential
  conduits using one of two methods: working outward from the deception target and their inner circle of
  information sources or working inward by visualizing the presentation of a potential indicator to known
  enemy collection capabilities up through the process flow to the deception target.
  2-44. Some key terms associated with conducting conduit analysis include the following:
  * Conduit: An information or intelligence gateway to the deception target. Conduits can include a
  FIE, an intelligence collection platform, an open-source intelligence, and foreign and domestic
  news media.
  * Observable: The detectable result of the combination of an indicator within an enemy’s conduit
  intended to cause action or inaction by the deception target. Observables are events, activities, or
  elements of information that must be seen or sensed by the target to form the desired perceptions.
  * Transmission time: The average time for an observable transmission to move from sensor to
  deception target. Estimating and anticipating transmission time for conduits is critical to
  synchronizing a deception plan execution.
  2-45. Planners consider information on any risks incurred by using a conduit. Risks might include exposure
  of friendly means, forces, or sensitive capabilities. Risks can also include potential awareness by the enemy
  that a selected means might be part of a friendly deception, causing the conduit to lose credibility. The
  selection of appropriate conduits is a critical part of developing a successful plan. When selecting conduits,
  the MDO considers—
  * How the information enters the conduit.
  * The information that can be conveyed through the conduit.
  * The time the conduit is available to transmit information.
  * The amount of time the information needs to reach the target.
  * The degree of control the relevant nodes have over the conduit.
  * The credibility of the conduit to the decision maker.
  * The filters likely to affect information as it moves through the conduit.
  2-46. Whatever method (or combination of methods) the MDO uses, the more conduits that the planner and
  supporting G-2 intelligence analysts can identify and map, the greater the chance of synchronizing friendly
  deception operations to feed multiple conduits simultaneously, and the increased potential success of the
  deception. Additionally, when the MDO classifies conduits as simple or complex, then the planning team can
  share the context more effectively. A simple conduit transmits data to the intended decision maker without
  applying an intermediate filter. A complex conduit includes one or more filters that might substantially alter
  the content, add context to the observable, or alter the timeframe for delivery.
  2-47. Ideally, the MDO selects multiple conduits to deliver information to the deception target and sequences
  the delivery in a manner that builds and confirms the deception story. Such delivery can cause information
  about the same observable to be delivered at multiple differing times and from many sources. This technique
  can reinforce the desired ambiguity-increasing or ambiguity-decreasing effect. To enhance the believability
  of the deception story, the MDO works with OPSEC and other IRCs to manage competing observables (any
  indicator that might contradict the deception story) and to limit the function of conduits that might register
  and report them.
  2-48. While the initial discussion of a given conduit might address the relevant information flow in simple
  terms, planners cannot actually fully exploit that conduit until they analyze it in detail. Intelligence analysts