text: _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
  1-9. The national security strategy is designed to achieve one or more specific
  strategic goals within the State’s region. Therefore, it typically starts with
  actions directed at an opponent within the regionan opponent that the
  State overmatches in conventional military power, as well as other instru-
  ments of power.
  1-10. The State will attempt to achieve its ends without resorting to armed
  conflict. Accordingly strategic operations are not limited to military means
  and usually do not begin with armed conflict. The State may be able to achieve
  the desired goal through pressure applied by other-than-military instruments of
  power, perhaps with the mere threat of using its superior military power against
  the regional opponent. These actions would fall under the general framework of
  “strategic operations.”
  1-11. When nonmilitary means are not sufficient or expedient, the State may
  resort to armed conflict as a means of creating conditions that lead to the de-
  sired end state. However, strategic operations continue even if a particular re-
  gional threat or opportunity causes the State to undertake “regional operations”
  that include military means.
  1-12. Prior to initiating armed conflict and throughout the course of armed
  conflict with its regional opponent, the State continues to conduct strategic
  operations to preclude intervention by outside playersby other regional
  neighbors or by an extraregional power that could overmatch the State’s
  forces. However, those operations always include branches and sequels for
  dealing with the possibility of intervention by an extraregional power.
  1-13. When unable to limit the conflict to regional operations, the State is
  prepared to engage extraregional forces through “transition and adaptive
  operations.” Usually, the State does not shift directly from regional to adap-
  tive operations. The transition is incremental and does not occur at a single,
  easily identifiable point. If the State perceives intervention is likely, transi-
  tion operations may begin simultaneously with regional and strategic opera-
  tions. Transition operations overlap both regional and adaptive operations.
  Transition operations allow the State to shift to adaptive operations or back to
  regional operations. At some point, the State either seizes an opportunity to
  return to regional operations, or it reaches a point where it must complete
  the shift to adaptive operations. Even after shifting to adaptive operations,
  the State tries to set conditions for transitioning back to regional operations.
  1-14. If an extraregional power were to have significant forces already de-
  ployed in the region prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the State would not
  be able to conduct regional operations using its normal, conventional design
  without first eliminating those forces. In this case, the State would first use
  strategic operationswith all means availableto put pressure on the al-
  ready present extraregional force to withdraw from the region or at least re-
  main neutral in the regional conflict. Barring that, strategic operations could
  still aim at keeping the extraregional power from committing additional
  forces to the region and preventing his forces already there from being able to
  fully exercise their capabilities. If the extraregional force is still able to intervene,
  the rest of the State’s strategic campaign would have to start with adaptive op-
  erations. Eventually, the State would hope to move into transition operations. If