text: Integration through the Operations Process
  in the EMS beyond enemy or adversary’s spectrum-dependent devices, disrupting or denying friendly forces
  access to the EMS throughout the EMOE.
  4-81. Collateral effects, including collateral damage, are the accidental cyberspace or EW effects of military
  operations on non-combatant and civilian cyberspace or EW capabilities that were not the intended target when
  implementing fires.
  Note. Rules of Engagement or an operations order may limit cyberspace or EW operations to only
  those cyberspace or EW tasks that may result in no or minimal collateral effects. The CEMA
  spectrum manager must deconflict the joint restriction frequency list to mitigate EMI before all
  EW missions.
  REVERSIBILITY OF EFFECTS
  4-82. Targeting planners must consider the level of control that they can exercise throughout each cyberspace
  and electromagnetic attack. Categorization of reversibility of effects are—
  * Operator reversible effects. These effects can be recalled, recovered, or terminated by friendly
  forces. Operator reversible effects typically represent a lower risk of undesired consequences,
  including discovery or retaliation.
  * Non-operator reversible effects. These are effects that targeting planners cannot recall, recover,
  or terminate after execution. Non-operator reversible effects typically represent a higher risk of
  response from the threat or other undesired consequences and may require more coordination.
  Considerations When Requesting Offensive Cyberspace Operations for Targeting
  4-83. The integration of OCO into the targeting process requires both long-term preparation and real-time
  mission planning during execution activities of the operations process. Due to target development and access
  to both OCO capabilities and access to an enemy in cyberspace, it is essential to emphasize the necessity for
  long-term preparation and planning of OCO for deliberate targets and effects.
  4-84. When planning for OCO support to attack deliberate targets, the CEMA working group should consider
  the following:
  * Determine if the target is targetable using OCO. Generally, the only potential targets that receive
  effects from a cyberspace attack are actively functioning in some portion of the information
  environment (data or information generation, processing, storage, communications, and digital
  data consumption or destruction).
  * Ensure the target has not already been nominated or on an existing targeting list. If it has not
  already been nominated or placed on a current targeting list, it will require nomination for further
  target development.
  * Consolidate all answered CCIRs and IRs. CCIRs and IRs may include such threat cyberspace
  intelligence as—links or nodes; associated hardware or software; specific software versions and
  configurations, communications protocol; physical or logical dependencies; or specific identifiers
  (IP address, machine access control address, international mobile subscriber identity, or phone
  numbers).
  * Determine if intelligence attained through the IPB also includes information necessary to tailor
  targeting development on avenues to gain access to an enemy’s cyberspace capabilities.
  Approaches to attain access to an enemy’s cyberspace capabilities include—telephony, IP,
  embedded systems, and radio frequencies.
  * The CEMA section is responsible for providing regular updates on a combat mission team’s ability
  to conduct OCO as well as provide updated information on the supported operation.