text: Chapter 1
  1-10. The deception objective is the desired result of a deception operation expressed in terms of what the
  adversary is to do or not to do at the critical time and/or location (JP 3-13.4). It is the action or inaction that
  directly leads to the advantage or condition stated in the deception goal. For example, “Cause the enemy to
  hold its armored reserve in a position or status unable to impact friendly forces along AXIS MONTANA
  through H+36 hours.”
  1-11. The deception target is the adversary decision maker with the authority to make the decision that will
  achieve the deception objective (JP 3-13.4). The target thus directs the action or inaction of the military
  capability described in the deception objective. The deception target or target set is key individuals on whom
  planners focus the deception plan. Understanding the target’s process for receiving and processing
  information, assessing a situation, and deciding a COA is critical to a successful deception plan. For more
  information on deception targets, see chapter 2.
  1-12. In military deception, desired perception is what the deception target must believe for it to make the
  decision that will achieve the deception objective (JP 3-13.4). They are personal conclusions, official
  estimates, and assumptions that the deception target must believe in order to make the decision that will
  achieve the deception objective. These enemy perceptions will form from both objective (observation and
  analysis) and subjective (intuition and experience) analysis. They are also heavily impacted by biases,
  preconceptions, predispositions, and filters applied in the collection, analysis, delivery, and reception of
  information.
  1-13. Within military deception, conduits are information or intelligence gateways to the deception target,
  such as foreign intelligence entities, intelligence collection platforms, open-source intelligence, and foreign
  and domestic news media (JP 3-13.4). They are the pathways to the deception target. Collectively, they define
  how the enemy will observe activity in the information environment and how those observations are
  transmitted, processed, and ultimately delivered to the decision maker. For more discussion on conduits and
  conduit analysis, see discussion beginning in paragraph 2-33.
  1-14. In operations security usage, an indicator is data derived from friendly detectable actions and open-
  source information that an adversary can interpret and piece together to reach conclusions or estimates of
  friendly intentions, capabilities, or activities (JP 3-13.3).
  1-15. A filter is any node within a conduit that aggregates, synthesizes, or applies bias information on its
  path to the deception target. A node is an element of a system that represents a person, place, or physical
  thing (JP 3-0). Planners understand that filters make every conduit unique, affecting the way information is
  transmitted through them. To create the most effective portrayal of the deception story, planners assess each
  conduit and the filters involved, ensure redundancy with other conduits, and appreciate the relative value of
  each conduit as perceived by the target.
  1-16. A link is a behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes (JP 3-0). The key link
  between selected indicators and the deception story is the tentative identification of one or more enemy
  conduits to which the plan exposes the indicator. Observable activities and the threat conduits combine to
  produce indicators that can be seen or perceived to aid in collection and decision-making processes. Unless
  exposed to one or more active conduits, an indicator is ineffective in conveying the observable or indicator:
  the enemy cannot register or respond to what it cannot see. Executions are the tasks or activities that the
  friendly unit conducts to put an observable into action.
  1-17. A deception event is a deception means executed at a specific time and location in support of a
  deception operation (JP 3-13.4). A deception event aims to portray an observable that contributes to desired
  perceptions in the deception target.
  1-18. In military deception, an observable is the detectable result of the combination of an indicator within
  an adversary’s conduit intended to cause action or inaction by the deception target (JP 3-13.4). Observables
  are often made up of executions, which can include events, activities, or elements of information that must
  be seen or sensed by the target to form the desired perceptions. Observables may gain credibility through the
  use of supporting observables. To enhance the probability that the target will receive or accept one or more
  of the required observables.
  1-19. MDOs may need to develop supporting observables. Supporting observables enhance the deception
  story and help create a believable context for the required observables. Planners identify all the activities