text: Appendix C
  Contested Deployments
  The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and trained, the whole object of
  his sleeping, eating, drinking, and marching is simply that he should fight at the right place
  and the right time.
  Carl von Clausewitz
  This appendix discusses unit considerations for conducting deployment operations
  contested by a peer threat. It begins with an overview and a discussion of threat
  capabilities that can affect force projection. It then covers considerations when moving
  from home station to port of embarkation, when in transit from port of embarkation to
  port of debarkation, and when conducting reception, staging, onward movement, and
  integration (RSOI) in a theater of operations. The appendix further expands upon the
  homeland as a specific operational area where homeland defense and defense support
  of civil authorities (DSCA) missions will likely be conducted as other units deploy. It
  concludes with considerations for training and preparation that Army leaders can
  incorporate into preexisting exercises or conduct as separate events.
  FORCE PROJECTION AND THREAT CAPABILITIES
  C-1. Army forces cannot expect to deploy without being challenged by the threat. For decades, U.S. military
  forces conducted uncontested and generally predictable deployments from home stations to operational
  theaters because threat actors lacked the capability to significantly affect deploying units at home station or
  while in transit to a theater of operations. This is no longer the case. Peer threats possess the capability and
  capacity to observe, disrupt, delay, and attack U.S. forces at any stage of force projection, including while
  still positioned at home stations in the United States and overseas. Commanders and staffs must therefore
  plan and execute deployments with the assumption that friendly forces are always under observation and in
  contact.
  C-2. A peer threat’s ability to impact U.S. military operations prior to arrival in an operational area extends
  beyond directly targeting unit personnel and equipment. The Army relies on various interdependent
  infrastructures, the majority of which it does not own or operate, making its domestic operations heavily
  reliant on external resources. This includes the use of civilian transportation infrastructure to move from
  installations to ports of embarkation, and it also includes home station military dependencies on civilian
  infrastructure for power, communications, fuel, water, and other life support.
  C-3. During armed conflict, Army forces should expect deployments to be contested by enemy actions in
  all domains. Army forces will require greater emphasis on protection functions to conserve combat power
  and should expect to provide forces to support homeland defense and DSCA operations. Defending U.S.
  territory against attacks by state and non-state actors through an active, layered defense while simultaneously
  seeking to project forces in a conflict with a peer enemy requires coordination across organizations, agencies,
  and jurisdictions at the local, state, and federal levels.
  C-4. Threat actions to contest a deployment are most visible during crisis and armed conflict, but they can
  also occur during competition. Army forces deploy globally as part of operations during competition to meet
  national objectives, assure allies and partners, and deter adversary malign actions. Adversary abilities to
  disrupt these deployments create risks that leaders must assess and mitigate during movement planning and
  execution. While a conventional attack on U.S. forces conducting operations during competition is unlikely,
  the greater the perceived danger to their vital national interests, the greater the chance a peer threat will
  contest U.S. military force projection. Leaders account for this intensified risk during planning and conduct