text: Mission Command and Command and Control
  understanding of the population and understanding of the counterinsurgency. Understanding the problem
  and having key leaders engage the population may be more important than having a large number of troops.
  6-10. Headquarters elements may be essential in coordination with the host nation, other government
  agencies, or other unified action partners. Counterinsurgents tailor headquarters units to the requirements to
  coordinate and enable subordinate units to be effective. A larger number of headquarters or a more robust
  headquarters may provide a further ability to work with interagency and host-nation organizations.
  Interagency organizations can integrate their capabilities more effectively if there is a robust headquarters
  element to work with. The analysis and intelligence capabilities of a division or corps headquarters may be
  essential in integrating interagency organizations’ capabilities. These division and corps capabilities
  provide brigades the needed span of control to operate and integrate interagency organizations and their
  capabilities. Using multiple headquarters provides a robust capability for working with host-nation
  organizations, both military and civilian. Many programs meant to build capacity within a host nation are
  national level programs. A robust headquarters element will help to ensure that these programs are
  integrated and resourced to maximize the benefit to the counterinsurgency effort. This is needed to ensure
  that these programs are effective at the local level.
  6-11. A headquarters can also serve as a coordination center. A coordination center can provide a means to
  unify multiple governmental, military, police, and civilian partners to gather and share information, provide
  support to priority projects, conduct meetings with local leaders, promote a whole of government and
  unified effort approach, and lend added credibility to the government. Coordination centers provide needed
  flexibility to control and coordinate host nation and multinational actions. Coordination centers can also act
  as joint tactical command posts and integrate various joint capabilities, such as air support.
  6-12. An operational environment does not normally dramatically change at a unit boundary. It is essential
  in a counterinsurgency to understand the actual economic, political, and social boundaries of an operational
  environment and not use unit boundaries as the only planning consideration for operations. The
  relationships between units that are adjacent is essential. While the conditions in their operational
  environment may be different, commanders should understand their adjacent unit’s problem frame and
  operational approach. They should also understand how their actions may affect the operational
  environment of other units. This is of particular importance when integrating information-related
  capabilities. Commanders at every echelon ensure adjacent units have relationships that allow for the
  completion of the overall mission.
  6-13. The same is true of forces operating in another unit’s area of operations, such as special operations
  forces (SOF). While missions to capture an insurgent leader may be essential to the overall mission,
  commanders must coordinate with other commanders and units to mitigate negative consequences of these
  types of actions with effective information operations. Commanders and staffs at all levels must ensure that
  the units under their command have productive relationships with other units. Establishing command and
  support relationships helps create channels that streamline information dissemination by ensuring the right
  information passes promptly to the right people. The three common channels for information dissemination
  are known as command, staff, and technical channels. (See ADRP 6-0 for more information on command
  channels.)
  6-14. The effective link between planning and assessing the effects of operations in a counterinsurgency is
  the foundation for establishing effective mission command. Success in a counterinsurgency is largely
  dependent on making lasting changes to an operational environment. This requires that commanders and
  staff continue to evolve in their situational understanding. A continuous assessment process is essential for
  planning in counterinsurgency operations. (See chapter 12 for more information on assessments.)
  CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
  SYNCHRONIZATION
  6-15. Counterinsurgency requires the integration of all capabilities of the U.S. and often requires this
  integration for long periods of time. However, the integration of SOF capabilities into the effort to counter
  an insurgency is of particular importance to both Army and Marine commanders. FM 6-05/MCWP 3-36.1
  provides a doctrinal foundation for conventional force and special operating force integration. Also,