text: Chapter 4
  4-6. Some individuals may actually choose isolation. For example, Captain (Chaplain) Emil J. Kapaun
  made such a decision in November 1950. At the start of the Korean War in June 1950, he deployed to
  Korea as the chaplain of the 3rd Battalion of the 8th Cavalry Regiment. During fierce combat with Chinese
  forces in North Korea, his unit was under heavy pressure and preparing to withdraw toward friendly lines
  when he was told that wounded 3rd Battalion Soldiers were surrounded and could not withdraw.
  Accompanied by Captain (Doctor) Clarence L. Anderson, Father Kapaun left the secure perimeter and
  found the men. He ministered to the Soldiers until captured by the enemy. He was the only member of the
  group not wounded. He elected to remain with the Soldiers—to isolate himself—rather than evade and
  return to friendly lines. Father Kapaun died in captivity.
  4-7. The mission is always paramount. The Soldier’s Creed and the Warrior Ethos (see ADP 1 and
  TC 3-21.75) make it clear that the Army values its members, but the mission is foremost. At the tactical
  level, this often creates tension between accomplishing the mission and protecting those endangering their
  lives for the mission. Major combat increases this tension for leaders and Soldiers because of an increased
  tempo. Whereas stability or DSCA missions include episodes of high tempo, major combat operations
  maintain a high tempo as the norm. The need to create and maintain combat power when and where it is
  needed contrast with the requirement to preserve life. Expectations of life-saving personnel recovery
  operations prove challenging to meet in the conditions of major combat.
  THE UNCERTAINTY OF PERSONNEL RECOVERY IN MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS
  4-8. Civilians within an operational area increase the uncertainty of personnel recovery activities,
  particularly in densely populated areas. Complex or unfamiliar cultural factors make it difficult to predict
  civilian behavior for or against isolated Soldiers. A local population or group opposed to friendly
  operations make personnel recovery operations more challenging. Groups or individuals supportive of
  enemy forces enhance the intelligence gathering capabilities of the enemy and increase the threat to isolated
  persons. Conversely, friendly populations are a boon to allied intelligence and support networks. However,
  modern communications enable anyone to secretly report the sighting of U.S. forces to their enemies.
  4-9. Army commanders at every level are committed to the safety and security of their organizations.
  They emphasize personnel recovery to prevent Army forces from becoming isolated, missing, or captured
  and lessen the tactical, operational, and strategic impact of isolation incidents. Commanders and staffs at all
  echelons must guard against treating personnel recovery as episodic. They must anticipate requirements.
  Commanders who adequately resource personnel recovery elements with a full-time staff minimize the
  adverse impact of personnel recovery operations on mission accomplishment. This is especially important
  in major combat operations, where a robust recovery capability raises troop morale. This is because
  Soldiers can execute their missions in extremely hazardous conditions with the confidence that they can
  successfully avoid or contend with isolation incidents.
  CAUSES OF ISOLATION INCIDENTS
  4-10. Individuals or groups become isolated for various reasons, including their own behavior, enemy
  actions, and interaction with the physical environment. Personnel recovery efforts must be effective
  regardless of the reason or reasons for an isolation incident. Paragraphs 4-11 through 4-16 discuss common
  causes of isolation incidents. This discussion applies mainly to major combat (offensive and defensive)
  operations, but also to stability and DSCA operations. The categories are flexible and do not exclude other
  possible causes.
  ISOLATION BY FRIENDLY BEHAVIOR
  4-11. The most frequent cause of isolation incidents is friendly force behavior, regardless of the situation.
  The actions prescribed by warning orders, OPORDs, or FRAGORDs occasionally expose the force or
  individuals to unknown, underestimated, or even unacceptable risk of isolation. The information available
  for supporting situational awareness and decisionmaking may be incomplete or flawed. A leader exercising
  individual initiative sometimes directs a COA that leads to isolation, such as deviating from a planned route
  to take advantage of a just-discovered shortcut. An on-the-spot decision based on available information
  seems appropriate for an urgent situation, such as autorotating a helicopter with an engine failure.