text: Planning
  commander. It can directly influence, corrupt, disrupt, and usurp the enemy’s decision-making process and
  the subsequent direction of its forces.
  INTEGRATION WITH OTHER INFORMATION-RELATED
  CAPABILITIES
  2-111. IRCs play a coordinated and interrelated role in the overall deception effort. In many cases, IRCs
  provide the sole means for accomplishing a deception task. Just as MDOs integrate deception with the overall
  plan, they also coordinate and deconflict it with IRC plans to eliminate potentially counterproductive
  activities. This is normally accomplished through the integrating and synchronizing function of IO. Not all
  planners know the existence or extent of deception activity since access to the plan remains strictly on a need
  to know basis.
  MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS
  2-112. Military information support operations are planned operations to convey selected information and
  indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the
  behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the
  originator’s objectives (JP 3-13.2). Deception targets differ from MISO target audiences; however, a
  deception target might also be included as part of a broader MISO target audience. MDOs deconflict
  deception observables used to deceive deception targets with MISO themes and messages to maintain
  believability and credibility.
  2-113. MISO actions and messages are generally truth based. This practice is not based upon legal or policy
  restrictions but a requirement to maintain credibility with target audiences in order to execute future MISO.
  Informed MDOs know the MISO themes and messages that the intended deception target may receive. MISO
  actions and messages contain both objective and subjective truth, and must be generally “verifiable” by the
  target audience. Deception events and deceptive information inserted into enemy conduits may contain
  falsehoods and need only be believable to the target. The two can be mutually beneficial, but they may also
  run counter to each other; therefore, planners carefully coordinate MISO and deception.
  2-114. Commanders can use MISO actions and messages directed at specific enemy target audiences with
  deception techniques such as feints, demonstrations, ruses, and displays to add credibility to the deception
  story or event. MISO messages warning of impending multinational force arrival, providing surrender
  instructions, or attacking the morale of enemy military or paramilitary forces are examples of this type of
  cooperation. However, because of the requirement for MISO to retain credibility with its broader target
  audiences, MDOs carefully evaluate any use of MISO in this manner (and proposed themes) for potential
  costs, benefits, and second- and third-order effects of its use.
  ELECTRONIC WARFARE
  2-115. Electronic warfare is essential for protecting friendly operations and denying enemy operations
  within the electromagnetic spectrum throughout an operational environment. The term electronic warfare
  refers to military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the
  electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy (JP 3-13.1). Deception, in conjunction with OPSEC,
  supports electronic warfare operations by protecting the development, acquisition, and deployment of
  sensitive electronic warfare capabilities.
  2-116. Electronic warfare can support feints, ruses, demonstrations, and displays. Positioning electronic
  warfare systems in a particular location, and the electromagnetic signatures the systems present, can create
  an indicator of the command’s intended main effort. By disrupting enemy communications, and other enemy
  systems using the electromagnetic spectrum, electronic warfare can introduce or increase ambiguity, confuse
  enemy operations, or affect the enemy’s ability to obtain and pass information about certain activities. Close
  coordination is required between friendly electronic warfare, deception, communications, cyberspace and
  space support elements, frequency management, and intelligence planners to ensure electronic warfare does
  not disrupt enemy communications systems that are used as deception conduits or that are providing
  intelligence feedback.