text: Integration through the Operations Process
  Army networks by the enemy can undermine the element of surprise and result in loss of initiative. Enemy or
  adversary forces may conduct cyberspace and EMS attacks to exposed friendly networks and capabilities,
  compromising future cyberspace attacks and cyberspace exploitation missions.
  4-91. Friendly forces conducting cyberspace operations and EW encounter many operational risks.
  Commander and staff consider cascading effects because of employing cyberspace attacks and EA. The CEMA
  section ensures that the commander and staff understand the characteristics of the various cyberspace and EW
  capabilities and their associated effects. The CEMA section informs the commander and staff of the
  reversibility of effects resulting from cyberspace attacks and EA to understand that some effects are irreversible
  at the operator level. Attaining an understanding of the characteristics, cascading effects, and reversibility
  effects provide a commander with situational awareness and in determining the acceptable risks when
  conducting cyberspace operations and EW.
  4-92. It is essential to consider risk management when conducting OCO and EA that could reveal friendly
  locations and intentions to an adversary prematurely. Some OCO or EA effects have a one-time use and once
  utilized cannot be effectively used again. OCO and EA may also create cascading effects that could hinder
  other operations.
  4-93. Personal electronic device(s) such as smartwatches, smartphones, tablets, laptops, and gaming systems
  can be a significant OPSEC vulnerability to friendly cyberspace and EW capabilities. The CEWO gathers
  understanding surrounding risks associated with PEDs from the G2 or S2 and OPSEC and makes
  recommendations to the commander regarding their usage in the organization.
  Technical Risks
  4-94. Technical risks exist when there are exploitable vulnerabilities in systems on the DODIN-A, and there
  are threats that can exploit those vulnerabilities. Nearly every technical system within the Army is networked,
  resulting in a vulnerability in one system compromising other connected systems, creating a shared
  vulnerability. These potentially vulnerable networked systems and components directly impact the Army’s
  ability to conduct operations. DCO mitigates risks by defending against specified cyberspace attacks, thereby
  denying the enemy’s ability to take advantage of technical vulnerabilities that could disrupt operations.
  4-95. Robust information systems engineering disciplines result in chain risk management, security,
  counterintelligence, intelligence, and hardware and software assurance that assist the leaders with managing
  technical risk. Friendly forces examine the technical risks when conducting cyberspace attacks to avoid making
  friendly networks vulnerable to enemy cyberspace counterattacks. The Army uses a layering approach, using
  these elements—
  * Antivirus and anti-malware programs.
  * Employing firewalls.
  * Updating firmware and patches.
  * Employing network intrusion detection and monitoring sensors.
  * Implementing both cybersecurity and physical security measures to mitigate technical risks.
  4-96. The elements listed in paragraph 4-95 are essential defensive enablers when implemented effectively
  and updated regularly.
  Policy Risks
  4-97. Policy risk pertains to authorities, legal guidance, and international law. Policies address cyberspace
  boundaries, authorities, and responsibilities. Commanders and decision makers must perform risk assessments
  and consider known probable cascading and collateral effects due to overlapping interests between military,
  civil, government, private, and corporate activities on shared networks in cyberspace. Policies, the United States
  Code (USC), the Uniform Code of Military Justice, regulations, publications, operation orders, and standard
  operating procedures all constitute a body of governance for making decisions about activities in cyberspace.
  4-98. Policy risk includes considering international norms and practices, the effect of deviating from those
  norms, and potential shifts in international reputation because of the effects resulting from a cyberspace
  operation. Cyberspace attacks can be delivered through networks owned, operated, and geographically located
  within the sovereignty of multiple governments. EA can also deliver effects that impact frequencies in the