re bit keyseach machine in article bb c mizzou missouri edu c mizzou missouri edu john kelsey writes in article apr lokkur dexter mi us scs lokkur dexter mi us steve simmons writes normally i d be the last to argue with steve but shouldn t that read years for all solutions i mean if we can imagine the machine that does trial nanosecond we can imagine the storage medium that could index and archive it hmmmm i think with really large keyspaces like this you need to alter the strategy discussed for des attempt decryption of several blocks and check the disctribution of the contents i don t think it s at all feasible to keep encryptions of a known plaintext block on any amount of tape or cd rom and certainly not such encrypted blocks anyone know a cheap way of converting every atom in the solar system into a one bit storage device i don t claim to be a crypto analyist there isn t a whole lot of good literature on the subject and the best people don t seem to publish their work but i rather doubt the approach such folks use is brute force sorry to have implied that in my previous post the history of these things is folks find clever ways of limiting the search and bang from there i guess my real problem with skipjack is i can not believe nsa would make publicly available a system they couldn t break if they wanted it just isn t in their charter remember des came from ibm not nsa and when first published was given a useful life of years i think we are well past that point now remember based on the size of the nsa budget they spend a lot more on the technology of decryption than most computer companies spend on r d i have to imagine their stuff is real interesting a friend who once worked for them he is dead now said he always enjoyed monitoring sac s strategic air command crypto traffic and i rather suspect that stuff is a bit more complex than skipjack or was it the military got the stuff from the nsa just like we get skipjack from them btw folks nsa wasn t being given the keys and the walker spy case shows for some of the systems the kgb didn t need them either information farming at for addr phone finger a a the ohio state university jebright magnus acs ohio state edu jim ebright e mail jre osu edu support privacy support encryption
