re after years can we say that christian morality is reply to frank d s uucp frank o dwyer the problem for the objectivist is to determine the status of moral truths and the method by which they can be established if we accept that such judgements are not reports of what is but only relate to what ought to be see naturalistic fallacy then they cannot be proved by any facts about the nature of the world this can be avoided in at least two ways by leaving the good undefined since anyone who claims that they do not know what it is is either lying or so out of touch with humanity as to be undeserving of a reply if the good is undefined undefinable but you require of everyone that they know innately what is right you are back to subjectivism by defining the good solely in terms of evaluative terms ditto here an evaluative statement implies a value judgement on the part of the person making it at this point the objectivist may talk of self evident truths pretty perceptive that prof flew but can he deny the subjectivist s claim that self evidence is in the mind of the beholder of course by denying that subject object is true dichotomy please explain how this helps i don t see your argument if not what is left of the claim that some moral judgements are true if nothing then no moral judgements are true this is a thing that is commonly referred to as nihilism it entails that science is of no value irrepective of the fact that some people find it useful how anyone arrives at relativism subjectivism from this argument beats me this makes no sense either flew is arguing that this is where the objectivist winds up not the subjectivist furthermore the nihilists believed in nothing except science materialism revolution and the people the subjectivist may well feel that all that remains is that there are some moral judgements with which he would wish to associate himself to hold a moral opinion is he suggests not to know something to be true but to have preferences regarding human activity and if those preferences should include terrorism that moral opinion is not true likewise if the preferences should include noterrorism that moral opinion is not true why should one choose a set of preferences which include terrorisim over one which includes noterrorism oh no reason this is patently absurd and also not the position of the subjectivist as has been pointed out to you already by others ditch the strawman already and see my reply to mike cobb s root message in the thread societal basis for morality david nye nyeda cnsvax uwec edu midelfort clinic eau claire wi this is patently absurd but whoever wishes to become a philosopher must learn not to be frightened by absurdities bertrand russell
