re is there any security in the clipper in article zeev apr sepia ccc amdahl com zeev ccc amdahl com ze ev wurman writes it seems to me that all discussions about clipper security are almost irrelevant if i cannot choose the key but have to use a key chosen for me by the foundry the security of the whole universe of users is as good or as bad as the security of vlsi technologies inc or their handlers it is a trivial effort to run any ciphertext agains all the keys ever manufactured after all we are talking about to million keys that will ever be manufactured the key depositories can be as secure and incorruptible as they wish to be nobody cares anyway they key depositories are irrelevant in order for the applicable law enformcement agencies to be able to know what keys to request from escrow the system will have to squawk its serial number in clear text as part of the link establishment protocol whoever owns the program that assigns keys to each serial number won t need access to the key depository in other words the fbi may need a court ordered release of escrowed keys but the nsa has the keys before the chip is ever manufactured there is no need to go through the escrow or to try all keys while relations between law enforment agencies have sometimes been strained there is also a long history of trading favors this will re establish the nsa as a very important agency for everyone to get along with because they can give you untraceable encryption leaks without court orders the more i think about this affair the fouler it smells i d rather have a des with an engineered in backdoor lars poulsen smts software engineer internet e mail lars cmc com cmc network products rockwell int l telephone santa barbara ca telefax
