 A number of writers argue that objects can have extrinsic final value, or that there can be a reason to value entities for their own sakes on account of their non-intrinsic features.1 Many examples have been offered of such value. Shelly Kagan suggests that a pen used by Abraham Lincoln to sign the Emancipation Proclamation might be something that “we could reasonably value for its own sake” precisely on account of the fact that it was used by Lincoln.2 Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen suggest that someone might value a dress worn by Princess Diana for its own sake “because it has belonged to Diana.”3 And Guy Fletcher defends the view that an object can have “sentimental value,” or be “valuable for its own sake in virtue of a subset of its relational properties,” such as its relation to friends or family.4