Expose blames London Fire Brigade for a series of blunders in response to the Grenfell Tower fire
The fire brigade response to the Grenfell inferno was riddled with blunders, a damning expose claimed on Wednesday.
The biggest error was the failure of fire chiefs to order a full evacuation of the building for almost two hours after the start of the blaze, according to the report.
It found the main control room in Wimbledon, South-West London, was undergoing maintenance, therefore some of the 800 emergency calls received were diverted to Stratford in the east of the city or as far away as Kent and Newcastle when lines were busy.
Staff initially believed the fire had been put out and were confused when they received 999 calls from residents who said it had spread.
As they could not see the West London tower, they had to rely on social media images to comprehend the scale, it was claimed.
The response by the fire brigade to the Grenfell Tower inferno was riddled with blunders, a damning expose claimed on Wednesday
The excoriating report by Andrew O’Hagan, which was published in the London Review of Books, blamed Labour and Tory governments for failing to tackle regulations surrounding social housing
The excoriating report by Andrew O'Hagan, published in the London Review of Books, blamed Labour and Tory governments for failing to tackle regulations surrounding social housing.
However, it appeared to exonerate Tory councillors at Kensington and Chelsea council of serious blame.
In particular, Mr O'Hagan suggests Nicholas Paget-Brown, the council leader who stepped down two weeks after the fire, was hung out to dry and could not be held responsible for the decision to use flammable cladding in the refurbishment of the building.
Less well known than the widely reported presence of combustible materials on Grenfell's outside walls are the string of alleged failures by the London Fire Brigade.
The biggest error was the failure of fire chiefs to order a full evacuation of the building for almost two hours after the start of the blaze, according to the report
Staff initially believed that the fire had been put out and were confused when they received 999 calls from residents who said it had spread
Mr O'Hagan, editor at large of the LRB, wrote: 'We don't like to say these things, but events on June 14 show that, regardless of our affection for them, the professional fire services' response to the fire at Grenfell Tower was anything but strong.
'The biggest weakness, all my sources agreed, was the slowness in telling residents to evacuate. Quite simply it caused nearly all of the 72 deaths.
'It had been obvious from very early on, even to spectators on the ground, that the fire at Grenfell Tower was not going to be put out, that it was jumping from floor to floor via the cladding, and that anybody staying in the building was in grave danger.'
Pictured: Theresa May speaks to Dany Cotton, Commissioner of the London Fire Brigade as she visits Grenfell Tower, on June 15, 2017
It found that the main control room in Wimbledon, south London, was undergoing maintenance and emergency calls were diverted to Stratford in east London
The report also claims that tall ladders did not arrive until more than half an hour after the first phone call to emergency services.
Very few of the 200 firefighters at the tower made it past the 20th floor because they had been issued with oxygen packs of standard duration, rather than the extended packs required when rescue operations are likely to take longer than 30 minutes.
The London Fire Brigade said it could not comment on the specific allegations because of the ongoing police investigation and public inquiry, which a spokesman said it was 'focused on supporting'.