On Descriptive Philosophy, Or Beyond the Linguistic Turn, Final
Part [This is the final section of this essay. For the earlier
two parts, please see here]. Apodicticism, descriptivism, and
deconstructionism continually attempt to outflank and outargue
each other. And when these philosophies fail to do so on the
issue of any particular question, they inevitably widen the
terrain of dispute. Recourse is often made to the various
contexts in question. We see this already in our discussion of
consistency. When we bring up the question of consistency, we
begin to invoke the question of memory, time, and history. That
is, consistency is about the relation between a given theory and
the past. Many apodictics, descriptivists, and
deconstructionists attempt to refute each other by means of
recourse to arguments which invoke time and history, and yet,
each group stakes out fundamentally different relations with the
question of time, history, memory, and the past. According to
the apodictic, we relate to the past in a m