This paper aims at illustrating the virtues and vices of biased
rationality. Starting with the virtues of biased rationality, we
will illustrate the idea of Homo Heuristicus along with its
fallacious dimension. We will claim that biases provide us with
premissory starting points even in absence of relevant
information to solve the problem at hand. In the second part, we
will turn to the vices of biased rationality: we will contend
that the adaptive value of fallacies are limited to those
situations in which we do not have (relevant) information,
whereas being in such a situation is not adaptive at all. We
will point out that de-bising rationality is made possible when
human learning becomes an option ecologically supported by the
accumulation of knowledge in the human cognitive niche. In order
to provide ground to this idea, we will employ the lens model
introduced by Egon Brunswik.