Dozens of states have long been capable of acquiring nuclear
weapons, yet only a few have actually done so. Jacques E.C.
Hymans finds that the key to this surprising historical pattern
lies not in externally imposed constraints, but rather in state
leaders' conceptions of the national identity. Synthesizing a
wide range of scholarship from the humanities and social
sciences to experimental psychology and neuroscience, Hymans
builds a rigorous model of decisionmaking that links identity to
emotions and ultimately to nuclear policy choices. Exhaustively
researched case studies of France, India, Argentina, and
Australia—two that got the bomb and two that
abstained—demonstrate the value of this model while debunking
common myths. This book will be invaluable to policymakers and
concerned citizens who are frustrated with the frequent
misjudgments of states' nuclear ambitions, and to scholars who
seek a better understanding of how leaders make big foreign
policy decisions.