Halliday’s research underscores two distinct conclusions about
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679: that it was basically
unnecessary, and that, even worse, it may have been
counterproductive, opening the door for formal suspensions of
the writ by Parliament in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. At the very least, the act had the effect, in
Halliday’s words, of “cutting down the common law writ by
promoting the assumption that the writ could be effective only
when supported by statute.” Saving the latter point (that the
HCA was counterproductive) for my next post, I thought I’d try
to briefly outline in this post the key evidence supporting
Halliday’s first conclusion: that the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679
was largely unnecessary. First, Halliday’s archival research
disproves rather convincingly the long-held view that it was
difficult (if not impossible) to obtain a writ of habeas corpus
during the King’s Bench’s vacations prior to 1679. Halliday
uncovered dozens (if not hundreds) of writs issued during
vacatio