Amy is older than you. And most meteorites. A different form of
pluralism about conceptual structure doesn’t employ atomic cores
but simply says that the prototype, theory, etc. are all
themselves concepts (Weiskopf 2009). Rather than holding that a
single concept (e.g., the concept CAT) has multiple types of
structure as components, as in the first form of pluralism, this
form takes each type of structure to be a concept on its own,
resulting in a plurality of concepts (CAT1, CAT2, CAT3, etc). On
this view, it is wrong to suppose that there is such a thing as
the concept CAT. Instead, there are many cat-concepts, each with
a different type of structure, where each is involved in just a
subset of the high-level psychological processes associated with
cats. CAT1, for example, might explain some instances of
categorization and some inferences, while CAT2, CAT3, etc.
explain others. What’s more, on this form of pluralism, people
might also differ with respect to which kinds of cat-concepts
they possess. And even