In John Doris (ed.), Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford
University Press (2010) |Abstract||In this chapter, we begin
with a discussion of motivation itself, and use that discussion
to sketch four possible theories of distinctively moral
motivation: caricature versions of familiar instrumentalist,
cognitivist, sentimentalist, and personalist theories about
morally worthy motivation. To test these theories, we turn to a
wealth of scientific, particularly neuroscientific, evidence.
Our conclusions are that (1) although the scientific evidence
does not at present mandate a unique philosophical conclusion,
it does present formidable obstacles to a number of popular
philosophical approaches, and (2) theories of morally worthy
motivation that best fit the current scientific picture are ones
that owe much more to Hume or Aristotle than to Kant.| |Through
your library||Configure| Similar books and articles C. Daniel
Batson (2011). What’s Wrong with Morality? Emotion Review 3
(3):230-236. Donald C. Hubin (1999). What's