Notes to Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism 1. This observation is
owed to Ray Monk. See Monk 1996, 200. It was brought to my
attention by Peter Simons. 2. Wittgenstein's logical atomism is
related to his logical constructivism, according to which every
proposition is the result of successive applications of one
logical operation — the so-called “N-operator” — to a base of
elementary propositions, but this topic goes beyond the scope of
the present entry. For a discussion see Geach 1981, 1982;
Fogelin 1982, 1987; Soames 1983. 3. There are difficulties in
stating the appropriate constraints on these replacements. We
cannot say that a given apparent name should be replaced by a
synonymous term for a complex since Wittgenstein denies that
sub-sentential expressions have sense (3.3). But nor would it be
correct to say that an apparent name should be replaced by a co-
referring expression, for strictly speaking, terms for complexes
do not refer. It seems we can only say that the replacing term
should have the same appa