Notes to Skepticism 1. For an interesting discussion of
rejecting or neutralizing the skeptic's objections, see Lehrer
2000, 131–136. 2. Wittgenstein 1969. In paragraph 519, he
writes: Doubt itself rests only on what is beyond doubt… But
since a language-game is something that consists in the
recurrent procedures of the game in time, it seems impossible to
say in any individual case that such-and-such must be beyond
doubt if there is to be a language-game—though it is right
enough to say that as a rule some empirical judgment or other
must be beyond doubt. 3. Peter Unger's view is an exception. He
directs the attack on the psychological condition which he takes
to be required for knowledge, namely certainty. He thinks very
little, if anything, is such that we are certain of it since
“certainty” is an absolute term. Further, he claims that since
“certainty” is an absolute term, if we are more (nearly) certain
of x than we are of y, y cannot be something about which we are
certain. And virtually everything is s