Objection 1. It would seem that God cannot move the matter
immediately to receive the form. For as the Philosopher proves
(Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8), nothing can bring a form into any
particular matter, except that form which is in matter; because,
like begets like. But God is not a form in matter. Therefore He
cannot cause a form in matter. Objection 2. Further, any agent
inclined to several effects will produce none of them, unless it
is determined to a particular one by some other cause; for, as
the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), a general assertion
does not move the mind, except by means of some particular
apprehension. But the Divine power is the universal cause of all
things. Therefore it cannot produce any particular form, except
by means of a particular agent. Objection 3. As universal being
depends on the first universal cause, so determinate being
depends on determinate particular causes; as we have seen above
(Question 104, Article 2). But the determinate being of a
particular thing is from it