title: D3C: Reducing the Price of Anarchy in Multi-Agent Learning
abstract: Even in simple multi-agent systems, fixed incentives can lead to outcomes that are poor for the group and each individual agent. We propose a method, D3C, for online adjustment of agent incentives that reduces the loss incurred at a Nash equilibrium. Agents adjust their incentives by learning to mix their incentive with that of other agents, until a compromise is reached in a distributed fashion. We show that D3C improves outcomes for each agent and the group as a whole in several social dilemmas including a traffic network with Braess’s paradox, a prisoner’s dilemma, and several reinforcement learning domains.
authors: Ian Gemp Kevin McKee Richard Everett Edgar Alfredo Duenez-Guzman Yoram Bachrach David Balduzzi Andrea Tacchetti
hIndex: Yoram Bachrach 35