title: The Semi-Random Satisfaction of Voting Axioms
abstract: We initiate the work towards a comprehensive picture of the worst average-case satisfaction of  voting axioms in semi-random models, to provide a finer and more realistic foundation for comparing voting rules. We adopt the semi-random model and formulation in [Xia 2020],  where an adversary chooses arbitrarily correlated ``ground truth'' preferences for the agents, on top of which random noises are added. We  focus on characterizing the semi-random satisfaction of two well-studied voting axioms:  Condorcet criterion and participation. We prove that  for any fixed number of alternatives, when the number of voters $n$ is sufficiently large, the semi-random satisfaction of the Condorcet criterion under a wide range of voting rules is $1$, $1-\exp(-\Theta(n))$, $\Theta(n^{-0.5})$, $ \exp(-\Theta(n))$, or being $\Theta(1)$ and $1-\Theta(1)$ at the same time; and the semi-random satisfaction of participation is  $1-\Theta(n^{-0.5})$.   Our results  address  open questions by Berg and Lepelley in 1994, and also  confirm the following high-level message: the Condorcet criterion is a bigger concern than participation under realistic models. 
authors: Lirong Xia
hIndex: Lirong Xia 34