Enabling Rack scale Confidential Computing using Heterogeneous Trusted Execution Environment
With its huge real world demands, large scale confidential computing still cannot be supported by today's Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) due to the lack of scalable and effective protection of high throughput accelerators like GPUs, FPGAs, and TPUs etc. Although attempts have been made recently to extend the CPU like enclave to GPUs, these solutions require change to the CPU or GPU chips, may introduce new security risks due to the side channel leaks in CPU GPU communication and are still under the resource constraint of today's CPU TEE.To address these problems, we present the first Heterogeneous TEE design that can truly support large scale compute or data intensive (CDI) computing, without any chip level change. Our approach, called HETEE, is a device for centralized management of all computing units (e.g. GPUs and other accelerators) of a server rack. It is uniquely designed to work with today's data centres and clouds, leveraging modern resource pooling technologies to dynamically compartmentalize computing tasks, and enforce strong isolation and reduce TCB through hardware support. More specifically, HETEE utilizes the PCIe ExpressFabric to allocate its accelerators to the server node on the same rack for a non sensitive CDI task, and move them back into a secure enclave in response to the demand for confidential computing. Our design runs a thin TCB stack for security management on a security controller (SC) while leaving a large set of software (e.g. AI runtime, GPU driver, etc. to the integrated microservers that operate enclaves. An enclaves is physically isolated from others through hardware and verified by the SC at its inception. Its microserver and computing units are restored to a secure state upon termination.We implemented HETEE on a real hardware system, and evaluated it with popular neural network inference and training tasks. Our evaluations show that HETEE can easily support the CDI tasks on the real world scale and incurred a maximal throughput overhead of 2.17% for inference and 0.95% for training on ResNet152.
2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)