Over the air membership inference attacks as privacy threats for deep learning based wireless signal classifiers
This paper presents how to leak private information from a wireless signal classifier by launching an over the air membership inference attack (MIA) As machine learning (ML) algorithms are used to process wireless signals to make decisions such as PHY layer authentication, the training data characteristics (e.g. device level information) and the environment conditions (e.g. channel information) under which the data is collected may leak to the ML model. As a privacy threat, the adversary can use this leaked information to exploit vulnerabilities of the ML model following an adversarial ML approach. In this paper, the MIA is launched against a deep learning based classifier that uses waveform, device, and channel characteristics (power and phase shifts) in the received signals for RF fingerprinting. By observing the spectrum, the adversary builds first a surrogate classifier and then an inference model to determine whether a signal of interest has been used in the training data of the receiver (e.g. a service provider) The signal of interest can then be associated with particular device and channel characteristics to launch subsequent attacks. The probability of attack success is high (more than 88% depending on waveform and channel conditions) in identifying signals of interest (and potentially the device and channel information) used to build a target classifier. These results show that wireless signal classifiers are vulnerable to privacy threats due to the over the air information leakage of their ML models.
WiseML@WiSec