Do Sell Side Analysts Provide More Information Following Debt Covenant Violations?
This study examines whether financial analysts produce larger amounts of research output and whether their research is more valuable for investors following a debt covenant violation (DCV, hereafter) After a DCV, investor uncertainty about firm value and information asymmetry among stakeholders likely increases. It is therefore difficult for investors to assess firm prospects, resulting in increased demand for firm specific information. Sell side analysts, as sophisticated information intermediaries, are skilled at gathering and processing information; thus they are well suited to provide more research output in response to increased investor demand. I predict and find that equity analysts provide a larger amount of research, proxied by recommendation revisions and earnings forecast revisions, after a DCV. I also document an incremental association between a DCV and analyst research production for firms with less financial flexibility, firms with low institutional ownership, and firms covered by more experienced analysts. In addition, I find evidence that analyst research becomes more valuable and that uncertainty adjusted analyst forecast errors decrease following a DCV. These results suggest that a change in a firm's information environment associated with a DCV has significant influence on investors and equity analysts besides the economic consequences documented in prior literature.