Some remarks regarding the regularity model of cause in Hume and Kant
At first, I intend to discuss summarily the role of propensities of human nature in Hume's theory of causality. I ascribe to Hume a regularity model of cause according to which the meaning itself of the word "cause" does not depend on natural propensities. But then I suggest that, because Hume's regularity model is also nomicist (necessitarian) belief in the reality of such an idea of "cause" does depend on those propensities, since that idea does not have an objective reference in the sense of a corresponding impression in the objects. After making these points, I intend to show that an a priori concept of "cause" is able to support such a regularity model of cause better than a naturalist theory, because an a priori concept of "cause" could ascribe an objective reference to the regularity model of cause given merely empirical regularities between events. To sum up, I suggest that both Hume and Kant share the same regularity model of cause, but only Kant has the means to justify regularist nomicist causal claims while Hume can only account for our taking a subjective reference (an internal impression) for an objective one.