The Beirut car bombing occurred "within the continuously evolving framework of an American 'preemption' counterterror program".[1] Following the 1983 United States embassy bombing and the 1984 U.S. embassy annex bombing, the U.S. military considered a range of retaliatory options, but it was unclear that these would have any deterrent value. On November 14, 1983, U.S.President Ronald Reagan authorized a retaliatory strike, but Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger did not authorize U.S. aircraft to take off for reasons that have not been disclosed.[10] CIA director William Casey, along with CIA General Counsel Stanley Sporkin, favored the use of preemptive terrorism practices in Lebanon; others, including Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John N. McMahon, did not approve of the strategy, concerned that it would violate Executive Order 12333.[7]