The significance of German war planning is that despite having alternatives, Moltke chose to launch an offensive that he should have known could not achieve its nominal objectives.[94] Tuchman has noted that Moltke was one of the few senior military figures to consider a long war and despite the failure of the offensive, German forces did manage to occupy economically important Franco-Belgian territory.[90] Most of the deployments and operations available to him, including Aufmarsch II Ost which was of his own devising, were defensive and could decisively alter the strategic balance in German power through the destruction of Franco-Russian forces. Indeed, Moltke's alterations to the plan were significant enough to mean that historian now argue it should be more properly known as the Schlieffen-Moltke Plan.[95] Moltke's choice was particularly dangerous given that the main French deployment plan, Plan XVII, was designed to counter the Schlieffen-Moltke Plan. Plan XVII deployed the bulk of the French Army on the Franco-Belgian border, for an offensive operation through southern Belgium into Germany.