The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling released a final report on 5 January 2011.[315][316] The panel found that BP, Halliburton, and Transocean had attempted to work more cheaply and thus helped to trigger the explosion and ensuing leakage.[317] The report stated that "whether purposeful or not, many of the decisions that BP, Halliburton, and Transocean made that increased the risk of the Macondo blowout clearly saved those companies significant time (and money)."[317] BP released a statement in response to this, saying, that "even prior to the conclusion of the commission's investigation, BP instituted significant changes designed to further strengthen safety and risk management."[318] Transocean, however, blamed BP for making the decisions before the actual explosion occurred and government officials for permitting those decisions.[319] Halliburton stated that it was acting only upon the orders of BP when it injected the cement into the wall of the well.[318][320] It criticized BP for its failure to run a cement bond log test.[319] In the report, BP was accused of nine faults.[318][320] One was that it had not used a diagnostic tool to test the strength of the cement.[317] Another was ignoring a pressure test that had failed.[318] Still another was for not plugging the pipe with cement.[317] The study did not, however, place the blame on any one of these events. Rather, it concluded that "notwithstanding these inherent risks, the accident of April 20 was avoidable" and that "it resulted from clear mistakes made in the first instance by BP, Halliburton and Transocean, and by government officials who, relying too much on industry's assertions of the safety of their operations, failed to create and apply a program of regulatory oversight that would have properly minimized the risk of deepwater drilling."[318][320] The panel also noted that the government regulators did not have sufficient knowledge or authority to notice these cost-cutting decisions.[317]