Daniel Lederman|Norman Loayza|Rodrigo R. Soares
ACCOUNTABILITY AND CORRUPTION: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS MATTER
World Bank|World Bank
economics politicsvolume 17 issue 1 p 135 accountability corruption political institutions matter daniel lederman daniel lederman world bank washington dcsearch papers authornorman v loayza norman v loayza world bank washington dcsearch papers authorrodrigo r soares rodrigo r soares university maryland catholic university rio de janeirosearch papers author daniel lederman daniel lederman world bank washington dcsearch papers authornorman v loayza norman v loayza world bank washington dcsearch papers authorrodrigo r soares rodrigo r soares university maryland catholic university rio de janeirosearch papers author first published 16 february 2005 httpsdoiorg101111j14680343200500145xcitations 295 contact address rodrigo r soares department economics university maryland 3105 tydings hall college park md 20742 usa aboutpdf toolsrequest permissionexport citationadd favoritestrack citation shareshare give accessshare full text accessshare fulltext accessplease review terms conditions use check box share fulltext version articlei read accept wiley online library terms conditions useshareable linkuse link share fulltext version article friends colleagues learn morecopy url share linkshare onfacebooktwitterlinkedinredditwechat abstract study uses crosscountry panel examine determinants corruption paying particular attention political institutions increase accountability even though theoretical literature stressed importance political institutions determining corruption empirical literature relatively scarce results confirm role political institutions determining prevalence corruption democracies parliamentary systems political stability freedom press associated lower corruption additionally common results previous empirical literature related openness legal tradition hold political variables taken account citing literature volume17 issue1march 2005pages 135 relatedinformation