Juan Camilo Cárdenas|John K. Stranlund|Cleve E. Willis
Economic inequality and burden-sharing in the provision of local environmental quality
Pontificia Universidad Javeriana|University of Massachusetts Amherst|University of Massachusetts Amherst
large inconclusive literature addresses economic heterogeneity affects use local resources local environmental quality one line thought derives nash equilibrium provision public goods suggests contexts individual actions degrade local environmental quality wealthier people community tend protect environmental quality paper report experiments performed rural colombia designed explore role economic inequality plays provision local environmental quality subjects asked decide much time devote collecting firewood local forest degrades local water quality much unrelated pursuits economic heterogeneity introduced varying private returns alternative pursuits consistent nash equilibrium prediction found players valuable alternative options put less pressure local water quality however subjects less valuable alternative options showed significantly restraint relative pure nash strategies furthermore willing bear significantly greater opportunity costs move groups outcomes yielded higher average payoffs better water quality nash equilibrium outcome