The Impact of Run-Time Variability on Side-Channel Attacks Targeting FPGAs
<|reference_start|>The Impact of Run-Time Variability on Side-Channel Attacks Targeting FPGAs: To defeat side-channel attacks, many recent countermeasures work by enforcing random run-time variability to the target computing platform in terms of clock jitters, frequency and voltage scaling, and phase shift, also combining the contributions from different actuators to maximize the side-channel resistance of the target. However, the robustness of such solutions seems strongly influenced by several hyper-parameters for which an in-depth analysis is still missing. This work proposes a fine-grained dynamic voltage and frequency scaling actuator to investigate the effectiveness of recent desynchronization countermeasures with the goal of highlighting the link between the enforced run-time variability and the vulnerability to side-channel attacks of cryptographic implementations targeting FPGAs. The analysis of the results collected from real hardware allowed for a comprehensive understanding of the protection offered by run-time variability countermeasures against side-channel attacks.<|reference_end|>
@article{galli2024the,
    title={The Impact of Run-Time Variability on Side-Channel Attacks Targeting
  FPGAs},
    author={Davide Galli, Adriano Guarisco, William Fornaciari, Matteo Matteucci,
  Davide Zoni},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2409.01881},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2409.01881},
    primaryClass={cs.CR cs.AR}
}