On the Outcome Equivalence of Extensive-Form and Behavioral Correlated Equilibria
<|reference_start|>On the Outcome Equivalence of Extensive-Form and Behavioral Correlated Equilibria: We investigate two notions of correlated equilibrium for extensive-form games: extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) and behavioral correlated equilibrium (BCE). We show that the two are outcome-equivalent, in the sense that every outcome distribution achievable under one notion is achievable under the other. Our result implies, to our knowledge, the first polynomial-time algorithm for computing a BCE.<|reference_end|>
@article{zhang2024on,
    title={On the Outcome Equivalence of Extensive-Form and Behavioral Correlated
  Equilibria},
    author={Brian Hu Zhang, Tuomas Sandholm},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.05245},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2402.05245},
    primaryClass={cs.GT}
}