A Quantum of QUIC: Dissecting Cryptography with Post-Quantum Insights
<|reference_start|>A Quantum of QUIC: Dissecting Cryptography with Post-Quantum Insights: QUIC is a new network protocol standardized in 2021. It was designed to replace the TCP/TLS stack and is based on UDP. The most current web standard HTTP/3 is specifically designed to use QUIC as transport protocol. QUIC claims to provide secure and fast transport with low-latency connection establishment, flow and congestion control, reliable delivery, and stream multiplexing. To achieve the security goals, QUIC enforces the usage of TLS 1.3. It uses authenticated encryption with additional data (AEAD) algorithms to not only protect the payload but also parts of the header. The handshake relies on asymmetric cryptography, which will be broken with the introduction of powerful quantum computers, making the use of post-quantum cryptography inevitable. This paper presents a detailed evaluation of the impact of cryptography on QUIC performance. The high-performance QUIC implementations LSQUIC, quiche, and MsQuic are evaluated under different aspects. We break symmetric cryptography down to the different security features. To be able to isolate the impact of cryptography, we implemented a NOOP AEAD algorithm which leaves plaintext unaltered. We show that QUIC performance increases by 10 to 20% when removing packet protection. The header protection has negligible impact on performance, especially for AES ciphers. We integrate post-quantum cryptographic algorithms into QUIC, demonstrating its feasibility without major changes to the QUIC libraries by using a TLS library that implements post-quantum algorithms. Kyber, Dilithium, and FALCON are promising candidates for post-quantum secure QUIC, as they have a low impact on the handshake duration. Algorithms like SPHINCS+ with larger key sizes or more complex calculations significantly impact the handshake duration and cause additional issues in our measurements.<|reference_end|>
@article{kempf2024a,
    title={A Quantum of QUIC: Dissecting Cryptography with Post-Quantum Insights},
    author={Marcel Kempf and Nikolas Gauder and Benedikt Jaeger and Johannes
  Zirngibl and Georg Carle},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2405.09264},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2405.09264},
    primaryClass={cs.NI cs.CR}
}