On sybil-proof mechanisms
<|reference_start|>On sybil-proof mechanisms: We show that in the single-parameter mechanism design environment, the only non-wasteful, symmetric, incentive compatible and sybil-proof mechanism is a second price auction with symmetric tie-breaking. Thus, if there is private information, lotteries or other mechanisms that do not always allocate to a highest-value bidder are not sybil-proof or not incentive compatible.<|reference_end|>
@article{pan2024on,
    title={On sybil-proof mechanisms},
    author={Minghao Pan, Akaki Mamageishvili, Christoph Schlegel},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.14485},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2407.14485},
    primaryClass={cs.GT}
}