Competitive Equilibrium in Microgrids With Dynamic Loads
<|reference_start|>Competitive Equilibrium in Microgrids With Dynamic Loads: In this paper, we consider microgrids that interconnect prosumers with distributed energy resources and dynamic loads. Prosumers are connected through the microgrid to trade energy and gain profit while respecting the network constraints. We establish a local energy market by defining a competitive equilibrium which balances energy and satisfies voltage constraints within the microgrid for all time. Using duality theory, we prove that under some convexity assumptions, a competitive equilibrium is equivalent to a social welfare maximization solution. Additionally, we show that a competitive equilibrium is equivalent to a Nash equilibrium of a standard game. In general, the energy price for each prosumer is different, leading to the concept of locational prices. We investigate a case under which all prosumers have the same locational prices. Additionally, we show that under some assumptions on the resource supply and network topology, locational prices decay to zero after a period of time, implying the available supply will be more than the demand required to stabilize the system. Finally, two numerical examples are provided to validate the results, one of which is a direct application of our results on electric vehicle charging control.<|reference_end|>
@article{salehi2024competitive,
    title={Competitive Equilibrium in Microgrids With Dynamic Loads},
    author={Zeinab Salehi, Yijun Chen, Ian R. Petersen, Elizabeth L. Ratnam, and
  Guodong Shi},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.02690},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2402.02690},
    primaryClass={eess.SY cs.GT cs.SY}
}