Persuading while Learning
<|reference_start|>Persuading while Learning: We propose a dynamic product adoption persuasion model involving an impatient partially informed sender who gradually learns the state. In this model, the sender gathers information over time, and hence her posteriors' sequence forms a discrete-time martingale. The sender commits to a dynamic revelation policy to persuade the agent to adopt a product. We demonstrate that under the assumption that the sender's martingale possesses Blackwell-preserving kernels, the family of optimal strategies for the sender takes an interval form; namely, in every period the set of martingale realizations in which adoption occurs is an interval. Utilizing this, we prove that if the sender is sufficiently impatient, then under a random walk martingale, the optimal policy is fully transparent up to the moment of adoption; namely, the sender reveals the entire information she privately holds in every period.<|reference_end|>
@article{arieli2024persuading,
    title={Persuading while Learning},
    author={Itai Arieli and Yakov Babichenko and Dimitry Shaiderman and Xianwen
  Shi},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.13964},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2407.13964},
    primaryClass={cs.GT}
}