Efficient and Universal Merkle Tree Inclusion Proofs via OR Aggregation
<|reference_start|>Efficient and Universal Merkle Tree Inclusion Proofs via OR Aggregation: Zero-knowledge proofs have emerged as a powerful tool for enhancing privacy and security in blockchain applications. However, the efficiency and scalability of proof systems remain a significant challenge, particularly in the context of Merkle tree inclusion proofs. Traditional proof aggregation techniques based on AND logic suffer from high verification complexity and data communication overhead, limiting their practicality for large-scale applications. In this paper, we propose a novel proof aggregation approach based on OR logic, which enables the generation of compact and universally verifiable proofs for Merkle tree inclusion. By aggregating proofs using OR logic, we achieve a proof size that is independent of the number of leaves in the tree, and verification can be performed using any single valid leaf hash. This represents a significant improvement over AND aggregation, which requires the verifier to process all leaf hashes. We formally define the OR aggregation logic, describe the process of generating universal proofs, and provide a comparative analysis demonstrating the advantages of our approach in terms of proof size, verification data, and universality. Furthermore, we discuss the potential of combining OR and AND aggregation logics to create complex acceptance functions, enabling the development of expressive and efficient proof systems for various blockchain applications. The proposed techniques have the potential to significantly enhance the scalability, efficiency, and flexibility of zero-knowledge proof systems, paving the way for more practical and adaptive solutions in the blockchain ecosystem.<|reference_end|>
@article{kuznetsov2024efficient,
    title={Efficient and Universal Merkle Tree Inclusion Proofs via OR Aggregation},
    author={Oleksandr Kuznetsov, Alex Rusnak, Anton Yezhov, Dzianis Kanonik,
  Kateryna Kuznetsova, Oleksandr Domin},
    journal={Cryptography 2024, 8, 28},
    year={2024},
    doi={10.3390/cryptography8030028},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2405.07941},
    primaryClass={cs.CR}
}