NoSEBrEaK - Attacking Honeynets
<|reference_start|>NoSEBrEaK - Attacking Honeynets: It is usually assumed that Honeynets are hard to detect and that attempts to detect or disable them can be unconditionally monitored. We scrutinize this assumption and demonstrate a method how a host in a honeynet can be completely controlled by an attacker without any substantial logging taking place.<|reference_end|>
@article{dornseif2004nosebreak,
    title={NoSEBrEaK - Attacking Honeynets},
    author={Maximillian Dornseif, Thorsten Holz, Christian N. Klein},
    journal={Proceedings from the fifth IEEE Systems, Man and Cybernetics
  Information Assurance Workshop, Westpoint, 2004; Pages 123-129},
    year={2004},
    doi={10.1109/IAW.2004.1437807},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={cs/0406052},
    primaryClass={cs.CR cs.CY}
}