Tighter Privacy Auditing of DP-SGD in the Hidden State Threat Model
<|reference_start|>Tighter Privacy Auditing of DP-SGD in the Hidden State Threat Model: Machine learning models can be trained with formal privacy guarantees via differentially private optimizers such as DP-SGD. In this work, we study such privacy guarantees when the adversary only accesses the final model, i.e., intermediate model updates are not released. In the existing literature, this hidden state threat model exhibits a significant gap between the lower bound provided by empirical privacy auditing and the theoretical upper bound provided by privacy accounting. To challenge this gap, we propose to audit this threat model with adversaries that craft a gradient sequence to maximize the privacy loss of the final model without accessing intermediate models. We demonstrate experimentally how this approach consistently outperforms prior attempts at auditing the hidden state model. When the crafted gradient is inserted at every optimization step, our results imply that releasing only the final model does not amplify privacy, providing a novel negative result. On the other hand, when the crafted gradient is not inserted at every step, we show strong evidence that a privacy amplification phenomenon emerges in the general non-convex setting (albeit weaker than in convex regimes), suggesting that existing privacy upper bounds can be improved.<|reference_end|>
@article{cebere2024tighter,
    title={Tighter Privacy Auditing of DP-SGD in the Hidden State Threat Model},
    author={Tudor Cebere, Aur'elien Bellet, Nicolas Papernot},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2405.14457},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2405.14457},
    primaryClass={cs.LG cs.CR}
}