Committee Monotonic Proportional Representation: A New Voting Rule and Impossibility Results
<|reference_start|>Committee Monotonic Proportional Representation: A New Voting Rule and Impossibility Results: We study committee voting rules under ranked preferences, which map the voters' preference relations to a subset of the alternatives of predefined size. In this setting, the compatibility between proportional representation and committee monotonicity is a fundamental open problem that has been mentioned in several works. We design a new multi-winner voting rule called the Solid Coalition Refinement (SCR) Rule that simultaneously satisfies committee monotonicity and Dummett's PSC as well as one of its variants called inclusion PSC. This is the first rule known to satisfy both of these properties. Moreover, we show that this is effectively the best that we can hope for as other fairness notions adapted from approval voting such as Rank-JR and Rank-PJR+ are incompatible with committee monotonicity.<|reference_end|>
@article{aziz2024committee,
    title={Committee Monotonic Proportional Representation: A New Voting Rule and
  Impossibility Results},
    author={Haris Aziz, Patrick Lederer, Angus Ritossa},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.19689},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2406.19689},
    primaryClass={cs.GT}
}