Information Density Bounds for Privacy
<|reference_start|>Information Density Bounds for Privacy: This paper explores the implications of guaranteeing privacy by imposing a lower bound on the information density between the private and the public data. We introduce an operationally meaningful privacy measure called pointwise maximal cost (PMC) and demonstrate that imposing an upper bound on PMC is equivalent to enforcing a lower bound on the information density. PMC quantifies the information leakage about a secret to adversaries who aim to minimize non-negative cost functions after observing the outcome of a privacy mechanism. When restricted to finite alphabets, PMC can equivalently be defined as the information leakage to adversaries aiming to minimize the probability of incorrectly guessing randomized functions of the secret. We study the properties of PMC and apply it to standard privacy mechanisms to demonstrate its practical relevance. Through a detailed examination, we connect PMC with other privacy measures that impose upper or lower bounds on the information density. Our results highlight that lower bounding the information density is a more stringent requirement than upper bounding it. Overall, our work significantly bridges the gaps in understanding the relationships between various privacy frameworks and provides insights for selecting a suitable framework for a given application.<|reference_end|>
@article{saeidian2024information,
    title={Information Density Bounds for Privacy},
    author={Sara Saeidian (1), Leonhard Grosse (1), Parastoo Sadeghi (2), Mikael
  Skoglund (1), Tobias J. Oechtering (1) ((1) KTH Royal Institute of
  Technology, (2) University of New South Wales)},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.01167},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2407.01167},
    primaryClass={cs.IT cs.CR math.IT}
}