The Random Oracle Methodology, Revisited
<|reference_start|>The Random Oracle Methodology, Revisited: We take a critical look at the relationship between the security of cryptographic schemes in the Random Oracle Model, and the security of the schemes that result from implementing the random oracle by so called "cryptographic hash functions". The main result of this paper is a negative one: There exist signature and encryption schemes that are secure in the Random Oracle Model, but for which any implementation of the random oracle results in insecure schemes.   In the process of devising the above schemes, we consider possible definitions for the notion of a "good implementation" of a random oracle, pointing out limitations and challenges.<|reference_end|>
@article{canetti2000the,
    title={The Random Oracle Methodology, Revisited},
    author={Ran Canetti, Oded Goldreich and Shai Halevi},
    journal={In Proceedings of 30th Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of
  Computing, pages 209-218, May 1998, ACM},
    year={2000},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={cs/0010019},
    primaryClass={cs.CR}
}