Controlling Delegations in Liquid Democracy
<|reference_start|>Controlling Delegations in Liquid Democracy: In liquid democracy, agents can either vote directly or delegate their vote to a different agent of their choice. This results in a power structure in which certain agents possess more voting weight than others. As a result, it opens up certain possibilities of vote manipulation, including control and bribery, that do not exist in standard voting scenarios of direct democracy. Here we formalize a certain kind of election control -- in which an external agent may change certain delegation arcs -- and study the computational complexity of the corresponding combinatorial problem.<|reference_end|>
@article{alouf-heffetz2024controlling,
    title={Controlling Delegations in Liquid Democracy},
    author={Shiri Alouf-Heffetz, Tanmay Inamdar, Pallavi Jain, Yash More, Nimrod
  Talmon},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.07558},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2403.07558},
    primaryClass={cs.GT cs.DS}
}