Testing the simplicity of strategy-proof mechanisms
<|reference_start|>Testing the simplicity of strategy-proof mechanisms: This paper experimentally evaluates four mechanisms intended to achieve the Uniform outcome in rationing problems (Sprumont, 1991). Our benchmark is the dominant-strategy, direct-revelation mechanism of the Uniform rule. A strategically equivalent mechanism that provides non-binding feedback during the reporting period greatly improves performance. A sequential revelation mechanism produces modest improvements despite not possessing dominant strategies. A novel, obviously strategy-proof mechanism, devised by Arribillaga et al. (2023), does not improve performance. We characterize each alternative to the direct mechanism, finding general lessons about the advantages of real-time feedback and sequentiality of play as well as the potential shortcomings of an obviously strategy-proof mechanism.<|reference_end|>
@article{brown2024testing,
    title={Testing the simplicity of strategy-proof mechanisms},
    author={Alexander L. Brown and Daniel G. Stephenson and Rodrigo A. Velez},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2404.11883},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2404.11883},
    primaryClass={econ.TH cs.GT}
}