SoK: Membership Inference Attacks on LLMs are Rushing Nowhere (and How to Fix It)
<|reference_start|>SoK: Membership Inference Attacks on LLMs are Rushing Nowhere (and How to Fix It): Whether LLMs memorize their training data and what this means, from privacy leakage to detecting copyright violations -- has become a rapidly growing area of research over the last two years. In recent months, more than 10 new methods have been proposed to perform Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs) against LLMs. Contrary to traditional MIAs which rely on fixed -- but randomized -- records or models, these methods are mostly evaluated on datasets collected post-hoc. Sets of members and non-members, used to evaluate the MIA, are constructed using informed guesses after the release of a model. This lack of randomization raises concerns of a distribution shift between members and non-members. In the first part, we review the literature on MIAs against LLMs. While most work focuses on sequence-level MIAs evaluated in post-hoc setups, we show that a range of target models, motivations and units of interest have been considered in the literature. We then quantify distribution shifts present in the 6 datasets used in the literature, ranging from books to papers, using a bag of word classifier. Our analysis reveals that all of them suffer from severe distribution shifts. This challenges the validity of using such setups to measure LLM memorization and may undermine the benchmarking of recently proposed methods. Yet, all hope might not be lost. In the second part, we introduce important considerations to properly evaluate MIAs against LLMs and discuss potential ways forward: randomized test splits, injections of randomized (unique) sequences, randomized finetuning, and post-hoc control methods. While each option comes with its advantages and limitations, we believe they collectively provide solid grounds to guide the development of MIA methods and study LLM memorization. We conclude by proposing comprehensive, easy-to-use benchmarks for sequence- and document-level MIAs against LLMs.<|reference_end|>
@article{meeus2024sok:,
    title={SoK: Membership Inference Attacks on LLMs are Rushing Nowhere (and How
  to Fix It)},
    author={Matthieu Meeus, Igor Shilov, Shubham Jain, Manuel Faysse, Marek Rei,
  Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.17975},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2406.17975},
    primaryClass={cs.CL cs.CR cs.LG}
}