Defaults: a double-edged sword in governing common resources
<|reference_start|>Defaults: a double-edged sword in governing common resources: Extracting from shared resources requires making choices to balance personal profit and sustainability. We present the results of a behavioural experiment wherein we manipulate the default extraction from a finite resource. Participants were exposed to two treatments -- pro-social or self-serving extraction defaults -- and a control without defaults. We examined the persistence of these nudges by removing the default after five rounds. Results reveal that a self-serving default increased the average extraction while present, whereas a pro-social default only decreased extraction for the first two rounds. Notably, the influence of defaults depended on individual inclinations, with cooperative individuals extracting more under a self-serving default, and selfish individuals less under a pro-social default. After the removal of the default, we observed no significant differences with the control treatment. Our research highlights the potential of defaults as cost-effective tools for promoting sustainability, while also advocating for a careful use to avoid adverse effects.<|reference_end|>
@article{montero-porras2024defaults:,
    title={Defaults: a double-edged sword in governing common resources},
    author={Eladio Montero-Porras, R'emi Suchon, Tom Lenaerts and Elias
  Fern'andez Domingos},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.06796},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2403.06796},
    primaryClass={cs.GT cs.CY}
}