Stop Stealing My Data: Sanitizing Stego Channels in 3D Printing Design Files
<|reference_start|>Stop Stealing My Data: Sanitizing Stego Channels in 3D Printing Design Files: The increased adoption of additive manufacturing (AM) and the acceptance of AM outsourcing created an ecosystem in which the sending and receiving of digital designs by different actors became normal. It has recently been shown that the STL design files -- most commonly used in AM -- contain steganographic channels. Such channels can allow additional data to be embedded within the STL files without changing the printed model. These factors create a threat of misusing the design files as a covert communication channel to either exfiltrate stolen sensitive digital data from organizations or infiltrate malicious software into a secure environment. This paper addresses this security threat by designing and evaluating a \emph{sanitizer} that erases hidden content where steganographic channels might exist. The proposed sanitizer takes into account a set of specific constraints imposed by the application domain, such as not affecting the ability to manufacture part of the required quality using the sanitized design.<|reference_end|>
@article{dolgavin2024stop,
    title={Stop Stealing My Data: Sanitizing Stego Channels in 3D Printing Design
  Files},
    author={Aleksandr Dolgavin, Mark Yampolskiy, Moti Yung},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2404.05106},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2404.05106},
    primaryClass={cs.CR}
}