Public Projects with Preferences and Predictions
<|reference_start|>Public Projects with Preferences and Predictions: In the public projects problem, a group of decisionmakers aggregate their preferences to choose one alternative. Recent work on public projects has proposed the Quadratic Transfers Mechanism (QTM) and shown asymptotic welfare guarantees in some cases. We begin by giving new non-asymptotic Price of Anarchy guarantees for the QTM.   We then incorporate an alternative philosophy toward group decisionmaking, aggregation of information about which is the best alternative. We propose a public projects mechanism based on the QTM that aggregates both preferences and predictions, modeled as forecasts of the projects' welfare impacts. When the predictions come from a prediction market or wagering mechanism, we show the entire mechanism is robust to manipulation and give Price of Anarchy guarantees, though under strong assumptions on the mechanism's knowledge. Our results focus primarily on the case of deciding between two alternatives, showing the Price of Anarchy tends to $1$ as natural measures of the "size" of the population grow large. In most cases, the mechanisms achieve a balanced budget as well.<|reference_end|>
@article{monroe2024public,
    title={Public Projects with Preferences and Predictions},
    author={Mary Monroe and Bo Waggoner},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.01042},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2403.01042},
    primaryClass={cs.GT}
}