Contest design with a finite type-space: A unifying approach
<|reference_start|>Contest design with a finite type-space: A unifying approach: We study the classical contest design problem of allocating a budget across different prizes to maximize effort in a finite type-space environment. For any contest, we characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium. In this equilibrium, different agent types mix over contiguous intervals so that more efficient agents always exert greater effort than less efficient agents. We then solve for the expected equilibrium effort, investigate the effect of increasing competition under linear costs, and identify conditions under which this effect persists under general costs. As a result, we find that the winner-takes-all contest is optimal under linear and concave costs. Lastly, we obtain an equilibrium convergence result for the continuum type-space, and since the finite type-space encompasses the complete information environment as a special case, our analysis offers a unified approach to studying contests in these classical environments.<|reference_end|>
@article{baranski2024contest,
    title={Contest design with a finite type-space: A unifying approach},
    author={Andrzej Baranski, Sumit Goel},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.04970},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2410.04970},
    primaryClass={econ.TH cs.GT}
}