A Generalised $\lambda$-Core Concept for Normal Form Games
<|reference_start|>A Generalised $\lambda$-Core Concept for Normal Form Games: In this note we develop a generalisation of the $\lambda$-Core solution for non-cooperative games in normal form. We show that this generalised $\lambda$-Core is non-empty for the class of separable games that admit a socially optimal Nash equilibrium. Examples are provided that indicate that non-emptiness of the generalised $\lambda$-Core cannot be expected for large classes of normal form games.<|reference_end|>
@article{chakrabarti2024a,
    title={A Generalised $\lambda$-Core Concept for Normal Form Games},
    author={Subhadip Chakrabarti, Robert P Gilles and Lina Mallozzi},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.06086},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2408.06086},
    primaryClass={cs.GT econ.TH}
}