A Hardware-Friendly Shuffling Countermeasure Against Side-Channel Attacks for Kyber
<|reference_start|>A Hardware-Friendly Shuffling Countermeasure Against Side-Channel Attacks for Kyber: CRYSTALS-Kyber (a.k.a. Kyber) has been drafted to be standardized as the only key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) scheme by the national institute of standards and technology (NIST) to withstand attacks by large-scale quantum computers. However, the side-channel attack (SCA) on its implementation is still needed to be well considered for the upcoming migration. In this brief, we propose a secure and efficient hardware implementation for Kyber by incorporating a novel compact shuffling architecture. First of all, we modify the Fisher-Yates shuffle to make it more hardware-friendly. We then design an optimized shuffling architecture for the well-known open-source Kyber hardware implementation to enhance the security of all the potential side-channel leakage points. Finally, we implement the modified Kyber design on FPGA and evaluate its security and performance. The security is verified by conducting the correlation power analysis (CPA) attacks on the hardware. Meanwhile, FPGA place-and-route results show that the proposed design reports only 8.7% degradation on the hardware efficiency compared with the original unprotected version, much better than existing hiding schemes.<|reference_end|>
@article{xu2024a,
    title={A Hardware-Friendly Shuffling Countermeasure Against Side-Channel
  Attacks for Kyber},
    author={Dejun Xu, Kai Wang, Jing Tian},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.02452},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2407.02452},
    primaryClass={cs.CR}
}