Breaking a chaos-noise-based secure communication scheme
<|reference_start|>Breaking a chaos-noise-based secure communication scheme: This paper studies the security of a secure communication scheme based on two discrete-time intermittently-chaotic systems synchronized via a common random driving signal. Some security defects of the scheme are revealed: 1) the key space can be remarkably reduced; 2) the decryption is insensitive to the mismatch of the secret key; 3) the key-generation process is insecure against known/chosen-plaintext attacks. The first two defects mean that the scheme is not secure enough against brute-force attacks, and the third one means that an attacker can easily break the cryptosystem by approximately estimating the secret key once he has a chance to access a fragment of the generated keystream. Yet it remains to be clarified if intermittent chaos could be used for designing secure chaotic cryptosystems.<|reference_end|>
@article{li2004breaking,
    title={Breaking a chaos-noise-based secure communication scheme},
    author={Shujun Li, Gonzalo 'Alvarez, Guanrong Chen and Xuanqin Mou},
    journal={Chaos, vol. 15, no. 1, art. no. 013703, March 2005},
    year={2004},
    doi={10.1063/1.1856711},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={nlin/0407052},
    primaryClass={nlin.CD cs.CR}
}