A Deep-Learning Technique to Locate Cryptographic Operations in Side-Channel Traces
<|reference_start|>A Deep-Learning Technique to Locate Cryptographic Operations in Side-Channel Traces: Side-channel attacks allow extracting secret information from the execution of cryptographic primitives by correlating the partially known computed data and the measured side-channel signal. However, to set up a successful side-channel attack, the attacker has to perform i) the challenging task of locating the time instant in which the target cryptographic primitive is executed inside a side-channel trace and then ii)the time-alignment of the measured data on that time instant. This paper presents a novel deep-learning technique to locate the time instant in which the target computed cryptographic operations are executed in the side-channel trace. In contrast to state-of-the-art solutions, the proposed methodology works even in the presence of trace deformations obtained through random delay insertion techniques. We validated our proposal through a successful attack against a variety of unprotected and protected cryptographic primitives that have been executed on an FPGA-implemented system-on-chip featuring a RISC-V CPU.<|reference_end|>
@article{chiari2024a,
    title={A Deep-Learning Technique to Locate Cryptographic Operations in
  Side-Channel Traces},
    author={Giuseppe Chiari, Davide Galli, Francesco Lattari, Matteo Matteucci,
  Davide Zoni},
    journal={2024 Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition
  (DATE), Valencia, Spain, 2024, pp. 1-6.},
    year={2024},
    doi={10.23919/DATE58400.2024.10546758},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2402.19037},
    primaryClass={cs.CR cs.LG}
}