A Treatment of EIP-1559: Enhancing Transaction Fee Mechanism through Nth-Price Auction
<|reference_start|>A Treatment of EIP-1559: Enhancing Transaction Fee Mechanism through Nth-Price Auction: With the widespread adoption of blockchain technology, the transaction fee mechanism (TFM) in blockchain systems has become a prominent research topic. An ideal TFM should satisfy user incentive compatibility (UIC), miner incentive compatibility (MIC), and miner-user side contract proofness ($c$-SCP). However, state-of-the-art works either fail to meet these three properties simultaneously or only satisfy them under certain conditions. In this paper, we propose a burning $N$-price auction TFM named BNP. This mechanism divides the transaction fee into a base fee, which is burned, and a priority fee, which is allocated to miners. Theoretical proofs and experimental analyses demonstrate that, even under conditions of significant transaction congestion, this mechanism satisfies UIC, MIC, and $c$-SCP simultaneously. Furthermore, the BNP mechanism is not constrained by the type of blockchain consensus, making it widely applicable.<|reference_end|>
@article{li2024a,
    title={A Treatment of EIP-1559: Enhancing Transaction Fee Mechanism through
  Nth-Price Auction},
    author={Kun Li, Guangpeng Qi, Guangyong Shang, Wanli Deng, Minghui Xu, Xiuzhen
  Cheng},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.18957},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2406.18957},
    primaryClass={cs.DC cs.GT}
}