Density and Affinity Dependent Social Segregation and Arbitrage Equilibrium in a Multi-class Schelling Game
<|reference_start|>Density and Affinity Dependent Social Segregation and Arbitrage Equilibrium in a Multi-class Schelling Game: Contrary to the widely believed hypothesis that larger, denser cities promote socioeconomic mixing, a recent study (Nilforoshan et al. 2023) reports the opposite behavior, i.e. more segregation. Here, we present a game-theoretic model that predicts such a density-dependent segregation outcome in both one- and two-class systems. The model provides key insights into the analytical conditions that lead to such behavior. Furthermore, the arbitrage equilibrium outcome implies the equality of effective utilities among all agents. This could be interpreted as all agents being equally "happy" in their respective environments in our ideal society. We believe that our model contributes towards a deeper mathematical understanding of social dynamics and behavior, which is important as we strive to develop more harmonious societies.<|reference_end|>
@article{venkatasubramanian2024density,
    title={Density and Affinity Dependent Social Segregation and Arbitrage
  Equilibrium in a Multi-class Schelling Game},
    author={Venkat Venkatasubramanian, Jessica Shi, Leo Goldman, Arun Sankar E.M.,
  Abhishek Sivaram},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.04084},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2403.04084},
    primaryClass={physics.soc-ph cs.MA}
}