A game theory analysis of decentralized epidemic management with opinion dynamics
<|reference_start|>A game theory analysis of decentralized epidemic management with opinion dynamics: In this paper, we introduce a static game that allows one to numerically assess the loss of efficiency induced by decentralized control or management of a global epidemic. Each player represents a region which is assumed to choose its control to implement a tradeoff between socio-economic aspects and health aspects; the control comprises both epidemic control physical measures and influence actions on the region opinion. The Generalized Nash equilibrium $(\mathrm{GNE})$ analysis of the proposed game model is conducted. The direct analysis of this game of practical interest is non-trivial but it turns out that one can construct an auxiliary game which allows one: to prove existence and uniqueness; to compute the GNE and the optimal centralized solution (sum-cost) of the game. These results allow us to assess numerically the loss (measured in terms of Price of Anarchy ($\mathrm{PoA}$)) induced by decentralization with or without taking into account the opinion dynamics.<|reference_end|>
@article{de silva2024a,
    title={A game theory analysis of decentralized epidemic management with opinion
  dynamics},
    author={Olivier Lindamulage De Silva, Samson Lasaulce, Irinel-Constantin
  Morarescu, Vineeth S. Varma},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.05020},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2407.05020},
    primaryClass={eess.SY cs.SY}
}