A proposal for founding mistrustful quantum cryptography on coin tossing
<|reference_start|>A proposal for founding mistrustful quantum cryptography on coin tossing: A significant branch of classical cryptography deals with the problems which arise when mistrustful parties need to generate, process or exchange information. As Kilian showed a while ago, mistrustful classical cryptography can be founded on a single protocol, oblivious transfer, from which general secure multi-party computations can be built.   The scope of mistrustful quantum cryptography is limited by no-go theorems, which rule out, inter alia, unconditionally secure quantum protocols for oblivious transfer or general secure two-party computations. These theorems apply even to protocols which take relativistic signalling constraints into account. The best that can be hoped for, in general, are quantum protocols computationally secure against quantum attack. I describe here a method for building a classically certified bit commitment, and hence every other mistrustful cryptographic task, from a secure coin tossing protocol. No security proof is attempted, but I sketch reasons why these protocols might resist quantum computational attack.<|reference_end|>
@article{kent2001a,
    title={A proposal for founding mistrustful quantum cryptography on coin tossing},
    author={Adrian Kent},
    journal={Phys. Rev. A 68, 012312 (2003).},
    year={2001},
    doi={10.1103/PhysRevA.68.012312},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={quant-ph/0111097},
    primaryClass={quant-ph cs.CR}
}