Last-Iterate Convergence of Payoff-Based Independent Learning in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games
<|reference_start|>Last-Iterate Convergence of Payoff-Based Independent Learning in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games: In this paper, we consider two-player zero-sum matrix and stochastic games and develop learning dynamics that are payoff-based, convergent, rational, and symmetric between the two players. Specifically, the learning dynamics for matrix games are based on the smoothed best-response dynamics, while the learning dynamics for stochastic games build upon those for matrix games, with additional incorporation of the minimax value iteration. To our knowledge, our theoretical results present the first finite-sample analysis of such learning dynamics with last-iterate guarantees. In the matrix game setting, the results imply a sample complexity of $O(\epsilon^{-1})$ to find the Nash distribution and a sample complexity of $O(\epsilon^{-8})$ to find a Nash equilibrium. In the stochastic game setting, the results also imply a sample complexity of $O(\epsilon^{-8})$ to find a Nash equilibrium. To establish these results, the main challenge is to handle stochastic approximation algorithms with multiple sets of coupled and stochastic iterates that evolve on (possibly) different time scales. To overcome this challenge, we developed a coupled Lyapunov-based approach, which may be of independent interest to the broader community studying the convergence behavior of stochastic approximation algorithms.<|reference_end|>
@article{chen2024last-iterate,
    title={Last-Iterate Convergence of Payoff-Based Independent Learning in
  Zero-Sum Stochastic Games},
    author={Zaiwei Chen, Kaiqing Zhang, Eric Mazumdar, Asuman Ozdaglar, and Adam
  Wierman},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2409.01447},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2409.01447},
    primaryClass={cs.LG cs.GT}
}