Stable Matching with Contingent Priorities
<|reference_start|>Stable Matching with Contingent Priorities: Using school choice as a motivating example, we introduce a stylized model of a many-to-one matching market where the clearinghouse aims to implement contingent priorities, i.e., priorities that depend on the current assignment, to prioritize students with siblings and match them together. We provide a series of guidelines and introduce two natural approaches to implement them: (i) absolute, whereby a prioritized student can displace any student without siblings assigned to the school, and (ii) partial, whereby prioritized students can only displace students that have a less favorable lottery than their priority provider. We study several properties of the corresponding mechanisms, including the existence of a stable assignment under contingent priorities, the complexity of deciding whether there exists one, and its incentive properties. Furthermore, we introduce a soft version of these priorities to guarantee existence, and we provide mathematical programming formulations to find such stable matching or certify that one does not exist. Finally, using data from the Chilean school choice system, we show that our framework can significantly increase the number of students assigned to their top preference and the number of siblings assigned together relative to current practice.<|reference_end|>
@article{rios2024stable,
    title={Stable Matching with Contingent Priorities},
    author={Ignacio Rios, Federico Bobbio, Margarida Carvalho and Alfredo Torrico},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2409.04914},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2409.04914},
    primaryClass={cs.GT math.OC}
}