Phantom: General Trigger Attacks on Retrieval Augmented Language Generation
<|reference_start|>Phantom: General Trigger Attacks on Retrieval Augmented Language Generation: Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) expands the capabilities of modern large language models (LLMs) in chatbot applications, enabling developers to adapt and personalize the LLM output without expensive training or fine-tuning. RAG systems use an external knowledge database to retrieve the most relevant documents for a given query, providing this context to the LLM generator. While RAG achieves impressive utility in many applications, its adoption to enable personalized generative models introduces new security risks. In this work, we propose new attack surfaces for an adversary to compromise a victim's RAG system, by injecting a single malicious document in its knowledge database. We design Phantom, general two-step attack framework against RAG augmented LLMs. The first step involves crafting a poisoned document designed to be retrieved by the RAG system within the top-k results only when an adversarial trigger, a specific sequence of words acting as backdoor, is present in the victim's queries. In the second step, a specially crafted adversarial string within the poisoned document triggers various adversarial attacks in the LLM generator, including denial of service, reputation damage, privacy violations, and harmful behaviors. We demonstrate our attacks on multiple LLM architectures, including Gemma, Vicuna, and Llama.<|reference_end|>
@article{chaudhari2024phantom:,
    title={Phantom: General Trigger Attacks on Retrieval Augmented Language
  Generation},
    author={Harsh Chaudhari, Giorgio Severi, John Abascal, Matthew Jagielski,
  Christopher A. Choquette-Choo, Milad Nasr, Cristina Nita-Rotaru, Alina Oprea},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2405.20485},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2405.20485},
    primaryClass={cs.CR cs.CL cs.LG}
}