CP-nets and Nash equilibria
<|reference_start|>CP-nets and Nash equilibria: We relate here two formalisms that are used for different purposes in reasoning about multi-agent systems. One of them are strategic games that are used to capture the idea that agents interact with each other while pursuing their own interest. The other are CP-nets that were introduced to express qualitative and conditional preferences of the users and which aim at facilitating the process of preference elicitation. To relate these two formalisms we introduce a natural, qualitative, extension of the notion of a strategic game. We show then that the optimal outcomes of a CP-net are exactly the Nash equilibria of an appropriately defined strategic game in the above sense. This allows us to use the techniques of game theory to search for optimal outcomes of CP-nets and vice-versa, to use techniques developed for CP-nets to search for Nash equilibria of the considered games.<|reference_end|>
@article{apt2005cp-nets,
    title={CP-nets and Nash equilibria},
    author={Krzysztof R. Apt, Francesca Rossi and K. Brent Venable},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:cs/0509071},
    year={2005},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={cs/0509071},
    primaryClass={cs.GT cs.AI}
}