Stable matching as transportation
<|reference_start|>Stable matching as transportation: We study matching markets with aligned preferences and establish a connection between common design objectives -- stability, efficiency, and fairness -- and the theory of optimal transport. Optimal transport gives new insights into the structural properties of matchings obtained from pursuing these objectives, and into the trade-offs between different objectives. Matching markets with aligned preferences provide a tractable stylized model capturing supply-demand imbalances in a range of settings such as partnership formation, school choice, organ donor exchange, and markets with transferable utility where bargaining over transfers happens after a match is formed.<|reference_end|>
@article{echenique2024stable,
    title={Stable matching as transportation},
    author={Federico Echenique and Joseph Root and Fedor Sandomirskiy},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.13378},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2402.13378},
    primaryClass={econ.TH cs.GT}
}