Belief Revision and Rational Inference
<|reference_start|>Belief Revision and Rational Inference: The (extended) AGM postulates for belief revision seem to deal with the revision of a given theory K by an arbitrary formula, but not to constrain the revisions of two different theories by the same formula. A new postulate is proposed and compared with other similar postulates that have been proposed in the literature. The AGM revisions that satisfy this new postulate stand in one-to-one correspondence with the rational, consistency-preserving relations. This correspondence is described explicitly. Two viewpoints on iterative revisions are distinguished and discussed.<|reference_end|>
@article{freund2002belief,
    title={Belief Revision and Rational Inference},
    author={Michael Freund and Daniel Lehmann},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:cs/0204032},
    year={2002},
    number={Leibniz Center for Research in Computer Science, Hebrew University:
  TR-94-16, July 1994},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={cs/0204032},
    primaryClass={cs.AI}
}