Imperceptible Rhythm Backdoor Attacks: Exploring Rhythm Transformation for Embedding Undetectable Vulnerabilities on Speech Recognition
<|reference_start|>Imperceptible Rhythm Backdoor Attacks: Exploring Rhythm Transformation for Embedding Undetectable Vulnerabilities on Speech Recognition: Speech recognition is an essential start ring of human-computer interaction, and recently, deep learning models have achieved excellent success in this task. However, when the model training and private data provider are always separated, some security threats that make deep neural networks (DNNs) abnormal deserve to be researched. In recent years, the typical backdoor attacks have been researched in speech recognition systems. The existing backdoor methods are based on data poisoning. The attacker adds some incorporated changes to benign speech spectrograms or changes the speech components, such as pitch and timbre. As a result, the poisoned data can be detected by human hearing or automatic deep algorithms. To improve the stealthiness of data poisoning, we propose a non-neural and fast algorithm called Random Spectrogram Rhythm Transformation (RSRT) in this paper. The algorithm combines four steps to generate stealthy poisoned utterances. From the perspective of rhythm component transformation, our proposed trigger stretches or squeezes the mel spectrograms and recovers them back to signals. The operation keeps timbre and content unchanged for good stealthiness. Our experiments are conducted on two kinds of speech recognition tasks, including testing the stealthiness of poisoned samples by speaker verification and automatic speech recognition. The results show that our method has excellent effectiveness and stealthiness. The rhythm trigger needs a low poisoning rate and gets a very high attack success rate.<|reference_end|>
@article{yao2024imperceptible,
    title={Imperceptible Rhythm Backdoor Attacks: Exploring Rhythm Transformation
  for Embedding Undetectable Vulnerabilities on Speech Recognition},
    author={Wenhan Yao, Jiangkun Yang, Yongqiang He, Jia Liu, Weiping Wen},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.10932},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2406.10932},
    primaryClass={cs.SD cs.AI eess.AS}
}