Ownership and Trade from Evolutionary Games
<|reference_start|>Ownership and Trade from Evolutionary Games: Ownership and trade emerge from anarchy as evolutionary stable strategies. In these evolutionary game models, ownership status provides an endogenous asymmetrizing criterion enabling cheaper resolution of property conflicts.<|reference_end|>
@article{yee2002ownership,
    title={Ownership and Trade from Evolutionary Games},
    author={Kenton K. Yee},
    journal={International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp.
  183-197, 2003},
    year={2002},
    number={http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=319102},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={physics/0210125},
    primaryClass={physics.bio-ph cs.GT nlin.AO nlin.CG physics.soc-ph q-bio.PE}
}