Continuous-Time Best-Response and Related Dynamics in Tullock Contests with Convex Costs
<|reference_start|>Continuous-Time Best-Response and Related Dynamics in Tullock Contests with Convex Costs: Tullock contests model real-life scenarios that range from competition among proof-of-work blockchain miners to rent-seeking and lobbying activities. We show that continuous-time best-response dynamics in Tullock contests with convex costs converges to the unique equilibrium using Lyapunov-style arguments. We then use this result to provide an algorithm for computing an approximate equilibrium. We also establish convergence of related discrete-time dynamics, e.g., when the agents best-respond to the empirical average action of other agents. These results indicate that the equilibrium is a reliable predictor of the agents' behavior in these games.<|reference_end|>
@article{elkind2024continuous-time,
    title={Continuous-Time Best-Response and Related Dynamics in Tullock Contests
  with Convex Costs},
    author={Edith Elkind, Abheek Ghosh, Paul W. Goldberg},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.08541},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2402.08541},
    primaryClass={cs.GT econ.TH}
}