Bias Detection Via Signaling
<|reference_start|>Bias Detection Via Signaling: We introduce and study the problem of detecting whether an agent is updating their prior beliefs given new evidence in an optimal way that is Bayesian, or whether they are biased towards their own prior. In our model, biased agents form posterior beliefs that are a convex combination of their prior and the Bayesian posterior, where the more biased an agent is, the closer their posterior is to the prior. Since we often cannot observe the agent's beliefs directly, we take an approach inspired by information design. Specifically, we measure an agent's bias by designing a signaling scheme and observing the actions they take in response to different signals, assuming that they are maximizing their own expected utility; our goal is to detect bias with a minimum number of signals. Our main results include a characterization of scenarios where a single signal suffices and a computationally efficient algorithm to compute optimal signaling schemes.<|reference_end|>
@article{chen2024bias,
    title={Bias Detection Via Signaling},
    author={Yiling Chen, Tao Lin, Ariel D. Procaccia, Aaditya Ramdas, Itai Shapira},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2405.17694},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2405.17694},
    primaryClass={cs.GT}
}