Security analysis of the Australian Capital Territory's eVACS 2020/2024 paperless direct recording electronic voting system
<|reference_start|>Security analysis of the Australian Capital Territory's eVACS 2020/2024 paperless direct recording electronic voting system: This report describes the implications for eVACS of two cryptographic errors in the Ada Web Services Library that it depends on. We identified these errors in the course of examining and testing the 2024 eVACS code, which was made publicly available in March 2024. We disclosed the problems to AdaCore, and explained the implications at the time to the relevant electoral authorities.<|reference_end|>
@article{culnane2024security,
    title={Security analysis of the Australian Capital Territory's eVACS 2020/2024
  paperless direct recording electronic voting system},
    author={Chris Culnane and Andrew Conway and Vanessa Teague and Ty Wilson-Brown},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2409.13570},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2409.13570},
    primaryClass={cs.CR}
}