Mergeable weighted majority games and characterizations of some power indices
<|reference_start|>Mergeable weighted majority games and characterizations of some power indices: In this paper, we introduce a notion of mergeable weighted majority games with the aim of providing the first characterization of the Colomer-Mart\'inez power index (Colomer and Mart\'inez in J Theor Polit 7(1):41-63, 1995). Furthermore, we define and characterize a new power index for the family of weighted majority games that combines ideas of the Public Good (Holler in Polit Stud 30(2):262-271, 1982) and Colomer-Mart\'inez power indices. Finally, we analyze the National Assembly of Ecuador using these and some other well-known power indices.<|reference_end|>
@article{armijos-toro2024mergeable,
    title={Mergeable weighted majority games and characterizations of some power
  indices},
    author={Livino M. Armijos-Toro, Jos'e M. Alonso-Meijide, Manuel A. Mosquera},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.06298},
    year={2024},
    doi={10.1007/s10479-023-05340-3},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2402.06298},
    primaryClass={cs.GT math.OC}
}