A Game Theoretic Framework for Incentives in P2P Systems
<|reference_start|>A Game Theoretic Framework for Incentives in P2P Systems: Peer-To-Peer (P2P) networks are self-organizing, distributed systems, with no centralized authority or infrastructure. Because of the voluntary participation, the availability of resources in a P2P system can be highly variable and unpredictable. In this paper, we use ideas from Game Theory to study the interaction of strategic and rational peers, and propose a differential service-based incentive scheme to improve the system's performance.<|reference_end|>
@article{buragohain2003a,
    title={A Game Theoretic Framework for Incentives in P2P Systems},
    author={Chiranjeeb Buragohain, Divyakant Agrawal, Subhash Suri},
    journal={Proc. of the Third International Conference on P2P Computing
  (P2P2003), Linkoping Sweden, 2003},
    year={2003},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={cs/0310039},
    primaryClass={cs.GT}
}