Data Sharing for Mean Estimation Among Heterogeneous Strategic Agents
<|reference_start|>Data Sharing for Mean Estimation Among Heterogeneous Strategic Agents: We study a collaborative learning problem where $m$ agents estimate a vector $\mu\in\mathbb{R}^d$ by collecting samples from normal distributions, with each agent $i$ incurring a cost $c_{i,k} \in (0, \infty]$ to sample from the $k^{\text{th}}$ distribution $\mathcal{N}(\mu_k, \sigma^2)$. Instead of working on their own, agents can collect data that is cheap to them, and share it with others in exchange for data that is expensive or even inaccessible to them, thereby simultaneously reducing data collection costs and estimation error. However, when agents have different collection costs, we need to first decide how to fairly divide the work of data collection so as to benefit all agents. Moreover, in naive sharing protocols, strategic agents may under-collect and/or fabricate data, leading to socially undesirable outcomes. Our mechanism addresses these challenges by combining ideas from cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. We use ideas from axiomatic bargaining to divide the cost of data collection. Given such a solution, we develop a Nash incentive-compatible (NIC) mechanism to enforce truthful reporting. We achieve a $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{m})$ approximation to the minimum social penalty (sum of agent estimation errors and data collection costs) in the worst case, and a $\mathcal{O}(1)$ approximation under favorable conditions. We complement this with a hardness result, showing that $\Omega(\sqrt{m})$ is unavoidable in any NIC mechanism.<|reference_end|>
@article{clinton2024data,
    title={Data Sharing for Mean Estimation Among Heterogeneous Strategic Agents},
    author={Alex Clinton, Yiding Chen, Xiaojin Zhu, Kirthevasan Kandasamy},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.15881},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2407.15881},
    primaryClass={cs.GT cs.LG}
}