A New Secure Memory System for Efficient Data Protection and Access Pattern Obfuscation
<|reference_start|>A New Secure Memory System for Efficient Data Protection and Access Pattern Obfuscation: As the reliance on secure memory environments permeates across applications, memory encryption is used to ensure memory security. However, most effective encryption schemes, such as the widely used AES-CTR, inherently introduce extra overheads, including those associated with counter storage and version number integrity checks. Moreover, encryption only protects data content, and it does not fully address the memory access pattern leakage. While Oblivious RAM (ORAM) aims to obscure these patterns, its high performance costs hinder practical applications. We introduce Secure Scattered Memory (SSM), an efficient scheme provides a comprehensive security solution that preserves the confidentiality of data content without traditional encryption, protects access patterns, and enables efficient integrity verification. Moving away from traditional encryption-centric methods, SSM offers a fresh approach to protecting data content while eliminating counter-induced overheads. Moreover, SSM is designed to inherently obscure memory access patterns, thereby significantly enhancing the confidentiality of memory data. In addition, SSM incorporates lightweight, thus integrated mechanisms for integrity assurance, protecting against data tampering. We also introduce SSM+, an extension that adapts Path ORAM to offer even greater security guarantees for both data content and memory access patterns, demonstrating its flexibility and efficiency. Experimental results show that SSM incurs only a 10% performance overhead compared to non-protected memory and offers a 15% improvement over AES-CTR mode memory protection. Notably, SSM+ provides an 20% improvement against Path ORAM integrated with Intel SGX under the highest security guarantees.<|reference_end|>
@article{geng2024a,
    title={A New Secure Memory System for Efficient Data Protection and Access
  Pattern Obfuscation},
    author={Haoran Geng, Yuezhi Che, Aaron Dingler, Michael Niemier, Xiaobo Sharon
  Hu},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.15824},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2402.15824},
    primaryClass={cs.CR cs.AR}
}