The Secretary Problem with Predicted Additive Gap
<|reference_start|>The Secretary Problem with Predicted Additive Gap: The secretary problem is one of the fundamental problems in online decision making; a tight competitive ratio for this problem of $1/\mathrm{e} \approx 0.368$ has been known since the 1960s. Much more recently, the study of algorithms with predictions was introduced: The algorithm is equipped with a (possibly erroneous) additional piece of information upfront which can be used to improve the algorithm's performance. Complementing previous work on secretary problems with prior knowledge, we tackle the following question:   What is the weakest piece of information that allows us to break the $1/\mathrm{e}$ barrier?   To this end, we introduce the secretary problem with predicted additive gap. As in the classical problem, weights are fixed by an adversary and elements appear in random order. In contrast to previous variants of predictions, our algorithm only has access to a much weaker piece of information: an \emph{additive gap} $c$. This gap is the difference between the highest and $k$-th highest weight in the sequence. Unlike previous pieces of advice, knowing an exact additive gap does not make the problem trivial. Our contribution is twofold. First, we show that for any index $k$ and any gap $c$, we can obtain a competitive ratio of $0.4$ when knowing the exact gap (even if we do not know $k$), hence beating the prevalent bound for the classical problem by a constant. Second, a slightly modified version of our algorithm allows to prove standard robustness-consistency properties as well as improved guarantees when knowing a range for the error of the prediction.<|reference_end|>
@article{braun2024the,
    title={The Secretary Problem with Predicted Additive Gap},
    author={Alexander Braun and Sherry Sarkar},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2409.20460},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2409.20460},
    primaryClass={cs.DS cs.GT}
}