Meta-mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions over Social Networks
<|reference_start|>Meta-mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions over Social Networks: Recently there has been a large amount of research designing mechanisms for auction scenarios where the bidders are connected in a social network. Different from the existing studies in this field that focus on specific auction scenarios e.g. single-unit auction and multi-unit auction, this paper considers the following question: is it possible to design a scheme that, given a classical auction scenario and a mechanism $\tilde{\mathcal{M}}$ suited for it, produces a mechanism in the network setting that preserves the key properties of $\tilde{\mathcal{M}}$? To answer this question, we design meta-mechanisms that provide a uniform way of transforming mechanisms from classical models to mechanisms over networks and prove that the desirable properties are preserved by our meta-mechanisms. Our meta-mechanisms provide solutions to combinatorial auction scenarios in the network setting: (1) combinatorial auction with single-minded buyers and (2) combinatorial auction with general monotone valuation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that designs combinatorial auctions over a social network.<|reference_end|>
@article{fang2024meta-mechanisms,
    title={Meta-mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions over Social Networks},
    author={Yuan Fang, Mengxiao Zhang, Jiamou Liu, Bakh Khoussainov},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.04555},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2408.04555},
    primaryClass={cs.GT}
}