VCAT: Vulnerability-aware and Curiosity-driven Adversarial Training for Enhancing Autonomous Vehicle Robustness
<|reference_start|>VCAT: Vulnerability-aware and Curiosity-driven Adversarial Training for Enhancing Autonomous Vehicle Robustness: Autonomous vehicles (AVs) face significant threats to their safe operation in complex traffic environments. Adversarial training has emerged as an effective method of enabling AVs to preemptively fortify their robustness against malicious attacks. Train an attacker using an adversarial policy, allowing the AV to learn robust driving through interaction with this attacker. However, adversarial policies in existing methodologies often get stuck in a loop of overexploiting established vulnerabilities, resulting in poor improvement for AVs. To overcome the limitations, we introduce a pioneering framework termed Vulnerability-aware and Curiosity-driven Adversarial Training (VCAT). Specifically, during the traffic vehicle attacker training phase, a surrogate network is employed to fit the value function of the AV victim, providing dense information about the victim's inherent vulnerabilities. Subsequently, random network distillation is used to characterize the novelty of the environment, constructing an intrinsic reward to guide the attacker in exploring unexplored territories. In the victim defense training phase, the AV is trained in critical scenarios in which the pretrained attacker is positioned around the victim to generate attack behaviors. Experimental results revealed that the training methodology provided by VCAT significantly improved the robust control capabilities of learning-based AVs, outperforming both conventional training modalities and alternative reinforcement learning counterparts, with a marked reduction in crash rates. The code is available at https://github.com/caixxuan/VCAT.<|reference_end|>
@article{cai2024vcat:,
    title={VCAT: Vulnerability-aware and Curiosity-driven Adversarial Training for
  Enhancing Autonomous Vehicle Robustness},
    author={Xuan Cai, Zhiyong Cui, Xuesong Bai, Ruimin Ke, Zhenshu Ma, Haiyang Yu
  and Yilong Ren},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2409.12997},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2409.12997},
    primaryClass={cs.LG cs.AI}
}