On benefits of cooperation under strategic power
<|reference_start|>On benefits of cooperation under strategic power: We introduce a new model involving TU-games and exogenous structures. Specifically, we consider that each player in a population can choose an element in a strategy set and that, for every possible strategy profile, a TU-game is associated with the population. This is what we call a TU-game with strategies. We propose and characterize the maxmin procedure to map every game with strategies to a TU-game. We also study whether or not the relevant properties of TU-games are transmitted by applying the maxmin procedure. Finally, we examine two relevant classes of TU-games with strategies: airport and simple games with strategies.<|reference_end|>
@article{fiestras-janeiro2024on,
    title={On benefits of cooperation under strategic power},
    author={M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro, Ignacio Garc'ia-Jurado, Ana Meca, Manuel
  A. Mosquera},
    journal={Annals of Operations Research 288 (2019) 285-306},
    year={2024},
    doi={10.1007/s10479-019-03495-6},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2402.05891},
    primaryClass={cs.GT math.OC}
}