Agent-Constrained Truthful Facility Location Games
<|reference_start|>Agent-Constrained Truthful Facility Location Games: We consider a truthful facility location problem in which there is a set of agents with private locations on the line of real numbers, and the goal is to place a number of facilities at different locations chosen from the set of those reported by the agents. Given a feasible solution, each agent suffers an individual cost that is either its total distance to all facilities (sum-variant) or its distance to the farthest facility (max-variant). For both variants, we show tight bounds on the approximation ratio of strategyproof mechanisms in terms of the social cost, the total individual cost of the agents.<|reference_end|>
@article{deligkas2024agent-constrained,
    title={Agent-Constrained Truthful Facility Location Games},
    author={Argyrios Deligkas, Mohammad Lotfi, Alexandros A. Voudouris},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2405.05197},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2405.05197},
    primaryClass={cs.GT}
}