Multi-Agent Contract Design beyond Binary Actions
<|reference_start|>Multi-Agent Contract Design beyond Binary Actions: We study hidden-action principal-agent problems with multiple agents. Unlike previous work, we consider a general setting in which each agent has an arbitrary number of actions, and the joint action induces outcomes according to an arbitrary distribution. We study two classes of mechanisms: a class of deterministic mechanisms that is the natural extension of single-agent contracts, in which the agents play a Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the contract, and a class of randomized mechanisms that is inspired by single-agent randomized contracts and correlated equilibria.<|reference_end|>
@article{cacciamani2024multi-agent,
    title={Multi-Agent Contract Design beyond Binary Actions},
    author={Federico Cacciamani, Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Nicola
  Gatti},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.13824},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2402.13824},
    primaryClass={cs.GT}
}