Concurrently Non-Malleable Zero Knowledge in the Authenticated Public-Key Model
<|reference_start|>Concurrently Non-Malleable Zero Knowledge in the Authenticated Public-Key Model: We consider a type of zero-knowledge protocols that are of interest for their practical applications within networks like the Internet: efficient zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge that remain secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks. In an effort to reduce the setup assumptions required for efficient zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge that remain secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks, we consider a model, which we call the Authenticated Public-Key (APK) model. The APK model seems to significantly reduce the setup assumptions made by the CRS model (as no trusted party or honest execution of a centralized algorithm are required), and can be seen as a slightly stronger variation of the Bare Public-Key (BPK) model from \cite{CGGM,MR}, and a weaker variation of the registered public-key model used in \cite{BCNP}. We then define and study man-in-the-middle attacks in the APK model. Our main result is a constant-round concurrent non-malleable zero-knowledge argument of knowledge for any polynomial-time relation (associated to a language in $\mathcal{NP}$), under the (minimal) assumption of the existence of a one-way function family. Furthermore,We show time-efficient instantiations of our protocol based on known number-theoretic assumptions. We also note a negative result with respect to further reducing the setup assumptions of our protocol to those in the (unauthenticated) BPK model, by showing that concurrently non-malleable zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge in the BPK model are only possible for trivial languages.<|reference_end|>
@article{deng2006concurrently,
    title={Concurrently Non-Malleable Zero Knowledge in the Authenticated
  Public-Key Model},
    author={Yi Deng, Giovanni Di Crescenzo and Dongdai Lin},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:cs/0609057},
    year={2006},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={cs/0609057},
    primaryClass={cs.CR}
}