Latent Adversarial Training Improves Robustness to Persistent Harmful Behaviors in LLMs
<|reference_start|>Latent Adversarial Training Improves Robustness to Persistent Harmful Behaviors in LLMs: Large language models (LLMs) can often be made to behave in undesirable ways that they are explicitly fine-tuned not to. For example, the LLM red-teaming literature has produced a wide variety of 'jailbreaking' techniques to elicit harmful text from models that were fine-tuned to be harmless. Recent work on red-teaming, model editing, and interpretability suggests that this challenge stems from how (adversarial) fine-tuning largely serves to suppress rather than remove undesirable capabilities from LLMs. Prior work has introduced latent adversarial training (LAT) as a way to improve robustness to broad classes of failures. These prior works have considered untargeted latent space attacks where the adversary perturbs latent activations to maximize loss on examples of desirable behavior. Untargeted LAT can provide a generic type of robustness but does not leverage information about specific failure modes. Here, we experiment with targeted LAT where the adversary seeks to minimize loss on a specific competing task. We find that it can augment a wide variety of state-of-the-art methods. First, we use targeted LAT to improve robustness to jailbreaks, outperforming a strong R2D2 baseline with orders of magnitude less compute. Second, we use it to more effectively remove backdoors with no knowledge of the trigger. Finally, we use it to more effectively unlearn knowledge for specific undesirable tasks in a way that is also more robust to re-learning. Overall, our results suggest that targeted LAT can be an effective tool for defending against harmful behaviors from LLMs.<|reference_end|>
@article{sheshadri2024latent,
    title={Latent Adversarial Training Improves Robustness to Persistent Harmful
  Behaviors in LLMs},
    author={Abhay Sheshadri, Aidan Ewart, Phillip Guo, Aengus Lynch, Cindy Wu,
  Vivek Hebbar, Henry Sleight, Asa Cooper Stickland, Ethan Perez, Dylan
  Hadfield-Menell, Stephen Casper},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.15549},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2407.15549},
    primaryClass={cs.LG cs.AI cs.CL}
}