Attacking the Diebold Signature Variant -- RSA Signatures with Unverified High-order Padding
<|reference_start|>Attacking the Diebold Signature Variant -- RSA Signatures with Unverified High-order Padding: We examine a natural but improper implementation of RSA signature verification deployed on the widely used Diebold Touch Screen and Optical Scan voting machines. In the implemented scheme, the verifier fails to examine a large number of the high-order bits of signature padding and the public exponent is three. We present an very mathematically simple attack that enables an adversary to forge signatures on arbitrary messages in a negligible amount of time.<|reference_end|>
@article{gardner2024attacking,
    title={Attacking the Diebold Signature Variant -- RSA Signatures with
  Unverified High-order Padding},
    author={Ryan W. Gardner, Tadayoshi Kohno, and Alec Yasinsac},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.01048},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2403.01048},
    primaryClass={cs.CR}
}