Last Iterate Convergence in Monotone Mean Field Games
<|reference_start|>Last Iterate Convergence in Monotone Mean Field Games: Mean Field Game (MFG) is a framework utilized to model and approximate the behavior of a large number of agents, and the computation of equilibria in MFG has been a subject of interest. Despite the proposal of methods to approximate the equilibria, algorithms where the sequence of updated policy converges to equilibrium, specifically those exhibiting last-iterate convergence, have been limited. We propose the use of a simple, proximal-point-type algorithm to compute equilibria for MFGs. Subsequently, we provide the first last-iterate convergence guarantee under the Lasry--Lions-type monotonicity condition. We further employ the Mirror Descent algorithm for the regularized MFG to efficiently approximate the update rules of the proximal point method for MFGs. We demonstrate that the algorithm can approximate with an accuracy of $\varepsilon$ after $\mathcal{O}({\log(1/\varepsilon)})$ iterations. This research offers a tractable approach for large-scale and large-population games.<|reference_end|>
@article{isobe2024last,
    title={Last Iterate Convergence in Monotone Mean Field Games},
    author={Noboru Isobe, Kenshi Abe, Kaito Ariu},
    journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.05127},
    year={2024},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    eprint={2410.05127},
    primaryClass={cs.GT cs.AI}
}