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In recent years there have been those who assert that the philosophy
of Wittgenstein resembles Zen Buddhism and those who deny it on the
ground that any supposed resemblances are only apparent. But, so far as I
know, neither party has made any serious attempt to substantiate his
claim. Normally this is understandable because their main purposes lie
in a different directions. It is, for instance, quite common for the
latter merely to locate Wittgenstein in a different philosophical
tradition and pin a label such as Logical Positivism or Logical
Empiricism on him. I think the matter is much more complex than this or
indeed than either party seems to allow. I want to try to see to what
extent either position can be supported. Any errors and confusions of
which I am guilty may perhaps stimulate someone to give a more thorough
treatment or to attempt further clarification by way of correction. [1]
In one of his typical dissertations Wittgenstein himself pointed
out that its spirit was different from the mainstream of European and
American civilization. [2] About this K. T. Fann comments: "It is not
surprising that we should find striking resemblances between
Wittgenstein's methods and those of Zen Buddhism -- a philosophy from a
very different culture." [3] Because it is not relevant to his main
purpose Fann does not proceed to clarify or support his assertion about
these resemblances. He merely contents himself with one or two general
remarks about the well-known ability of Zen masters to show the
nonsensical character of metaphysical questions along with a remark
about a resemblance between the enlightenment attributed to the Buddha
and the state of complete clarity for which Wittgenstein was striving.
This seems as good a starting point as any other, and I will begin
negatively by challenging some of the resemblances mentioned by Fann.
At the outset one of his assertions must be rejected and another
regarded as seriously misleading. In the first place Zen is described as
"a philosophy from a very different culture." That Zen is the product
of a very different culture cannot be disputed; but that it is a
philosophy has to be denied, and Zennists have always done so. Indeed
Zen is a deliberate and clearheaded rejection of the propriety of
importing philosophizing of any kind into the types of situation where
the person is directly concerned with the attainment of the
enlightenment and liberation attributed to the Buddha. This may well
give Zen a certain philosophical interest, especially when some of the
methods used by Zen
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H. Hudson is a member of the Philosophy Department, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand.
1. Whenever I write about Buddhism I include Zen Buddhism, and
instead of "Zen Buddhism" I have used the term "Zen" for convenience.
The Wittgenstein of whom I write is the Wittgenstein of the
Philosophical Investigations and other associated works, not the earlier
Wittgenstein who wrote the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
2. Cf. Wittgenstein's Foreword to his Philosophische Bermerkugen.
3. K. T. Fann, Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), p. 110.
p. 472
masters have the purpose of helping the individual to realize the
absurdity of doing this. One may also, of course, philosophize about the
"aim" of Zen and its methods but as has often been pointed out, this is
not to practice it.
Secondly, Fann speaks of Zen masters showing the nonsensical
character of metaphysical questions. This is true, but misleading. It
might be interpreted as meaning, for example, that Zen masters hold
implicitly at least some general thesis about the nonsensicality of such
questions and assertions. But this is not so, either in Zen in
particular or in Buddhism in general. When the Buddha was asked the
famous Four Questions we are told that he refused to answer, saying that
they were profitless because they are irrelevant to the problem of
freeing us from suffering and are unanswerable or undecidable. By the
latter he has to be taken as meaning just what he says and exhorting us
to leave what is undecidable as undecidable. By abstaining from any kind
of yes or no answer he takes the Middle Way or the freedom of no
position on such matters. The questions have been said to be like asking
whether the hair of a tortoise is smooth or hard; but whatever we may
think of this analogy, the error involved seems to be that of confusing
the Transcendent with what is empirical in the ordinary sense of the
latter word. [4] Alternatively it amounts to confusing what is beyond
all conceptualization with what is conceptualized, or confusing two
different categories. Later in the Maadhyamika dialectic, there is a
systematic effort to show that if we abandon the Buddha's position on
such questions and relapse into dogmatism or giving a yes or a no
answer, the result is self-contradiction and nonsense. But the dialectic
is an attempt to demonstrate the absurdity of dogmatic attitudes to
propositions rather than the absurdity of the propositions themselves.
There is nothing wrong in conceptualization, the fault lies in us when
we confuse it with what is beyond conceptualization and take a dogmatic
attitude about the truth of the consequences of our mistake or about the
falsity of someone else's. In Zen, where the chief concern is with the
practice of meditation, a Zen master may indeed show the nonsensical
character of metaphysical questions and assertions, but when doing so he
speaks from the position of the Buddha, with such points as those
mentioned in mind, to those who are actively and directly engaged in
attaining enlightenment.
Nevertheless there is a perfectly legitimate function for
Buddhist metaphysics, although it is subject to certain provisos. It
must be constructed in such a way that it is helpful in freeing us from
attachment and, in accordance with the principles of the
nonsubstantiality of all things, their impermanence and conditionality.
In so helping us it will not and cannot describe or give us a picture of
the world as seen by a buddha, but it can point to the experience of a
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4. Cf. T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, 2d ed. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1960), pp. 44-45.
p. 473
buddha. Such schemes give us an account in terms of basic
constituents or the interrelatedness of things of such a kind that it
would be impossible or even conceptually absurd to be attached to them.
We are apt to become attached to our own pictures or constructions,
which we make from such accounts, and when this happens we are victims
of illusion. So we can say that any Buddhist metaphysic contains an
inbuilt correction against dogmatic attachment to it: like a kind of
medicine that carries with it an antidote against addiction.
From a conventional point of view such a metaphysic may be
regarded as true, and certainly every effort will be made to provide
something which can be so regarded. But this kind of truth applies only
to conceptual constructions, and its importance lies in the fact that it
enhances the scheme's utility for helping people. In short, its
function is basically therapeutic, and the motive involved is
compassion. One is not guilty of dogmatism even if one does regard such a
scheme as true, for one can see through it, so to speak -- see that it
is only a mere set of conceptual constructions and see that it points to
what is really important. It is the kind of thing to which it would be
absurd to be attached, so one is free to take it up or put it down
according to circumstances. Buddhism has often been described as
antimetaphysical, but this is a serious oversimplification. It all
depends on what we have in mind by metaphysics.
Wittgenstein was not antimetaphysical either, at least not in the
way that it has often been supposed. He has no project such as the
elimination of metaphysics nor has he any intention of reducing
metaphysical propositions to nonsense. When doing Wittgensteinian
philosophy, metaphysical assertions are at first typically puzzling.
Then we are able to see that a feature of such propositions is that they
obliterate the distinction between empirical and conceptual inquiries.
[5] They then take on the aspect of nonsense. But at a deeper level of
analysis we realize that they are illuminating because they help to give
us a clear view of the logical or philosophical grammar of important
terms in our language. It is because we lack such a view that so many of
our philosophical troubles arise. [6] The metaphysical assertions
remain quite undisturbed or unaltered for now we can see that they are
quite all right as they stand. Our angle of vision of them has changed.
This situation calls to mind a Zen master's characterization of what
happens in Zen practice. "Before you study Zen, mountains are mountains
and rivers are rivers; while you are studying it, mountains are no
longer mountains and rivers are no longer rivers; but once you have
Enlightenment, mountains are once again mountains and rivers are
rivers." [7] Despite the obvious difference between the philosophical
practice of
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5. Cf. Wittgenstein, Zettel trans. C. E. M. Anscombe, ed. C. E. M.
Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1967), para. 458.
6. Cf. Philosophical Investigations, trans. C. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), para. 122.
7. D. T. Suzuki, Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of Suzuki, ed. William Barrett (New York: Doubleday, 1956), pp. xvi-xvii.
p. 474
Wittgenstein and Zen meditation there is an intriguing parallel
between the steps taken to enlightenment or understanding in each.
When Wittgenstein speaks of bringing metaphysical terms back to
their uses in everyday language, [8] he does not do so from any spirit
of hostility to metaphysics but because he wishes to show how they
illuminate the deeper logical grammar of our language. This consists of
rules analogous to "A sphere has no length" or "A rod must have length,"
and rules of course are not descriptions. But with metaphysical
assertions we get what could be described as proposals to alter some of
the basic grammar. It is this which makes them illuminating and, even at
this deeper level of analysis, can give them a paradoxical look;
although once we can see what is going on they lose this. But as far as
this kind of view is concerned there is, to my knowledge, no parallel in
Buddhist thought.
As for the view that a feature of metaphysical propositions is
that they obliterate the distinction between conceptual and empirical
inquiries, there may appear to be some agreement but this is superficial
and masks an important difference. The word 'empirical' can be
misleading here. What Wittgenstein has in mind by an empirical inquiry
would be regarded in Buddhism as merely another conceptual type. For
Wittgenstein, for instance, natural science would certainly count as an
empirical inquiry, but not for Buddhism, because it has an elaborate
conceptual structure. Again, Zen is often said to be concerned with
direct, concrete experience. When we speak of an experience in this way,
we might think of direct perceptual experience as a typical example,
albeit this kind of experience is conceptualized; in Zen we have to
think in terms of nonconceptualized sensory experience. But this kind of
experience should not be thought of merely as nonconceptual. It is the
experience of one who is free from selfcenteredness and the attachments
that go with it. It is no use protesting that to do this is strictly
impossible. A whack with a master's stick or the first moment of pain
after burning ourselves on a hot stove will cut through our sophistries.
So the demarcation between the empirical and the conceptual is drawn
along different lines from that taken in Western philosophy.
Nor is there any analogy in Wittgenstein's work corresponding to
the mistake which the Buddhists think lies behind dogmatic metaphysics,
that is, the confusion of transcendental experience with ordinary
experience. And while metaphysics may be illuminating for each, it can
hardly be said to be illuminating in the same way. Nevertheless, despite
this difference, there is an interesting parallel in the various steps
or stages of illumination and between the flexible attitudes toward
metaphysics. I suppose that the mistake mentioned has some analogy with
the kind of mistake which Gilbert Ryle called a "category confusion" or
with what Wittgenstein would describe as a confusion of
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8. Philosophical Investigations, para 116.
p. 475
the rules of different kinds of language games. The Buddha seems to
have laid down a basic rule for the conduct of religious thinking. It is
not so much that this rule is peculiar to Buddhism but the way in which
it is applied is a crucial factor in giving Buddhism its distinctive
character.
Wittgenstein does not try to restrict us to any one view of
metaphysics. Like most other assertions, metaphysical assertions are
multifunctional. He has suggestions about another way of looking at
them. Our ordinary language "holds our minds in one position, as it
were, and in this position sometimes it feels cramped, having a desire
for other positions as well." [9] A metaphysician invents a notation
which stresses a difference more strongly, makes it more obvious than
ordinary language does. In a way he has discovered "a new way of looking
at things. As if [he] had invented a new way of painting, or again a
new metre, or a new kind of song." [10] According to this suggestion
then, metaphysics can be regarded as giving us the grammar so to speak,
of a new way of thinking which is involved in seeing the world
differently and which frees us from a kind of suffering -- from a sense
of mental or spiritual cramp or constriction. There can be, at the very
most, only a very limited analogy between the kind of suffering
Wittgenstein and the Buddhists have in mind, and the notion of word
'liberation' serves to conceal an important difference rather than to
indicate any significant similarity. For in Buddhism, liberation serves
to fit us for life in this everyday world by freeing us from its grip
not to give us a vision of a different world or even of this world seen
in terms of different categories and conceptual distinctions. Despite
his suggestion, perhaps it is significant that Wittgenstein himself in
his work concentrated on the philosophical practice of trying to free us
from deep, personal puzzles and perplexities. But whether this
indicates a deeper resemblance requires separate and subsequent
consideration.
Buddhism has been described as a set of methods and techniques
rather than as a set of doctrines, for even though it is customary to
speak of "doctrines," they are only conceptual constructions and their
test is their utility. Accordingly they are best regarded
methodologically rather than as statements of absolute and fundamental
truths. Wittgenstein too, denied that he taught any philosophical theses
or doctrines but only methods which function as kinds of therapy. For
philosophical perplexities are like different kinds of illness, and so
different methods are to be used according to the circumstances. Whether
Buddhism and Wittgenstein are or are not concerned basically with the
same thing, their attitudes toward dogmatism in philosophy are
surprisingly similar. [11]
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9. Wittgenstein, Blue and Brown Books 1st ed., ed. Rush Rhees (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), p. 59.
10. Philosophical Investigations, para. 401.
11. Cf. ibid., paras. 132 and 133.
p. 476
Because of his obvious interest in ordinary language and its
connection with our perplexities, a lot of people seem to think that
Wittgenstein was mainly concerned with a therapy of language. He is not
concerned, however, with linguistic pathology and some type of surgical
reconstruction of language, but with people -- the users of language --
and with some of the special features of the instrument they use when
they use language. These are the features which are of special interest
to philosophers, since lack of proper appreciation of them is an
important cause of our philosophical troubles. There is nothing wrong
with natural language; there is not even anything wrong with
metaphysical language; the trouble lies in us: in our lack of knowledge
and insight into what we are doing when we use language. Consequently he
says: "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of
language; it can in the end only describe it." [12] Of course he did not
mean that philosophy may not affect our own personal use of language,
for instance, by giving it greater clarity, but he did not see the task
of philosophy, as he wanted to do it, as the introduction of linguistic
reforms which substitute supposedly more precise and refined forms for
ordinary language. He wanted to help the users to reform themselves.
This, of course, is a far cry from the position of various contemporary
purveyors of formal linguistic programs and systems who are eagerly
contributing their mite to the process of fitting us for the dawning
automated and computerized society.
From a Zen point of view there is nothing wrong with the forms of
ordinary experience nor with the forms of life which make up ordinary
existence. There is not even anything wrong with conceptual thinking and
with metaphysics. The trouble lies in us. There is no program of
substituting some special supermundane experience for ordinary
experience nor some special type of holy life for ordinary everyday
life. But after the kind of insight which can occur in Zen practice,
although in a sense everything is left as it is, the person is different
because his angle of vision has changed. Ordinary experience is now the
experience of a bodhisattva and our ordinary life is the holy life.
Here again, even though one might say that Wittgenstein and the Zen
Buddhists are obviously talking about different things, there is an
interesting similarity of attitude and approach to them. In connection
with this, Wittgenstein emphasized that language was inescapably
connected with life and with experience. "... the speaking of a language
is part of an activity, or a form of life." [13] "... for is what is
linguistic not an experience?" [14]
Wittgenstein tells us that philosophical problems have depth:
that "they are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the
forms of our language
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12. Ibid., para. 124.
13. Ibid., para. 23.
14. Ibid., para. 649.
p. 477
and their significance is as great as the importance of our
language." [15] I think that Zen Buddhists would agree with the first
statement and would also agree with Wittgenstein's characterization of
philosophy as a battle against the bewitchment of the intelligence by
words, but they would not regard the second statement as adequate. We
want a heart that is not bewitched, not merely an intelligence. The
roots of our problems are certainly deep, but the depth differs from
that of our linguistic forms and is proportional to the depth of our
ego-centeredness.
Zen methods enable us to reach down or out through thought and
language, as normally used, to quite a different level or kind of
experience. Language can still be used here, of course, but not as it is
normally used in everyday life and science; for example, as any reading
of Zen literature quickly shows, and certainly not in a way appropriate
to a more linguistic type of therapy of the users of language in a
philosophical context. In order to help us reach out through thought and
language and appreciate the different type of task or problem with
which we are faced, certain more intellectual and philosophical moves
are sometimes made as preliminary steps. It is here that Fann's remark
about the well-known ability of Zen masters to show the nonsensical
character of metaphysical questions and assertions applies. The swift
ironic and sometimes humorous demolition of such questions and
assertions serves to remind us that thinking of this type is out of
place. The use of more philosophical comments as reminders calls to mind
one of Wittgenstein's characterizations of philosophy as "assembling
reminders for a certain purpose." [16] But although the general function
is the same, the more special function is different for philosophical
comments are used to remind us of different things. Wittgenstein keeps
trying to bring us back from abstractions to what is concrete and
familiar, but which we are apt to overlook when we are doing philosophy;
and he keeps reminding us of these things and of what people do and do
not merely say in familiar everyday situations. This should not be taken
to mean that he gives what is familiar and everyday a special status at
the expense of what is unusual or strange but that he uses one to
illuminate the other. Obviously this cannot be done unless one can see
what is before one's eyes or under one's nose all the time.
Since it is a severely practical form of Buddhism, Zen is par
excellence meditational Buddhism. In Rinzai Zen, as is well known,
kooans are introduced into the meditation situation. These kooans, among
other things, can be regarded as functioning as reminders or warnings
that intellectual and logical types of thinking are out of place. But
whether kooans are introduced into the meditation situation or whether
this situation is itself regarded as a kooan, the
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15. Ibid., para. 111.
16. Ibid., para. 127.
p. 478
effect at first is to generate deep puzzlement and perplexity. For
here the individual does not know his way about, and even if he is given
useful hints and admonitions he does not know how to adjust to the
situation. Nor is he told or shown, supposing that were possible: this
would defeat the entire point of the procedure. He must find his own way
himself. This makes Zen deeply personal in a very direct way.
Recognition of this adds another dimension to what we should understand
by direct concrete experience in Zen and adds another difference to what
we would understand even if we spoke of 'direct concrete personal
experience'. This with all deference to Wittgenstein who also thought
that philosophy was deeply personal and not something formal, neutral,
and detached.
Because the person does not know his way about in the kooan cum
meditation situation, the situation seems to have the typical form of
one which can be cleared up by intelligent inquiry, experimentation, and
reflection. Despite warnings and reminders he will tend to treat it as
if it were a situation of this kind and become more puzzled and
perplexed than ever. He displays a tendency to force all problem
situations into the same general mold, thus showing how his thinking is
nourished by one-sided examples, which Wittgenstein remarks is a main
cause of philosophical disease; a statement with which any Zen master
could agree. A crucial step is made when the person sees, not merely
intellectually but deeply feels, that his rigid and stereotyped approach
is not correct. It is a very intelligent kind of insight. Rather too
much by way of overcorrection of prevalent tendencies is apt to be made
of the so-called non-rationality of Zen.
The deep puzzlement and frustration generated in this situation
has an analog in Wittgenstein's procedure with his students. He did his
utmost to ensure that they were thoroughly perplexed by a philosophical
problem. They had to actually feel and live it and work their way into
and through it. A person has to feel the need of the clarification,
which a comment or observation on a philosophical problem may bring,
otherwise it is worth very little. He does not give us any so-called
answers, but only methods and suggestions to be used according to the
circumstances; nor does he explain to us how to use his methods,
although he gives us examples to illustrate their point, which we have
to see for ourselves. Again, he believed that a question is often best
disposed of by a question; to give an answer is often unfair for it is
apt to involve one-sidedness and in any case is too apt to close up
further inquiries. Sometimes he disposes of a question or a thesis by a
joke. He once even suggested that a perfectly serious philosophical work
could be written which consisted entirely of jokes or of questions. The
similarity in the type of procedure used to that used by a Zen master
is too obvious to require further comment.
Finally, Wittgenstein has no intention of trying to tie us to
philosophy. On the contrary, by freeing us from philosophical
perplexities he aims to free us
p. 479
from philosophy; for the discovery which really counts is the one
that makes one capable of not philosophizing when one wants. It is
hardly surprising that various professional philosophers should regard
such a standpoint with amused incredulity and scepticism. In Buddhism
too the aim, among other things, is to free us from the grip of
doctrines and teachings, even Buddhist ones: for these are merely like
rafts, which enable us to cross a river. When we have crossed we have no
further use for them. Here again, whatever we may say about the
similarity or lack of it between the final goal of peace and clarity for
which Wittgenstein was striving and the goal of Zen, one can hardly
deny a similarity in attitude to theses and doctrines.
Wittgenstein saw philosophical problems, not as interesting,
intellectual puzzles but as deeply personal and genuinely tormenting,
and for him the practice of philosophy was a way of life for freeing us
from them. He speaks of the peace that comes from the real philosophical
discovery, "the ... discovery which makes me capable of stopping doing
philosophy when I want to." [17] So for him, philosophy can be regarded
as a way of liberation from obsessive worries and perplexities that have
a central role in our lives and find their expression in philosophical
problems. The culminating question of whether there is any analogy
between 'the real philosophical discovery' of which he speaks and the
serenity and clarity and the ability to 'take up and put down' theses,
attitudes, and feelings as they come and go, without agitation or
disturbance, which are products of Zen meditation and training, must now
be faced.
Enough has been said, I think, to show that to maintain there is
no similarity between Zen and the philosophical practice of
Wittgenstein, is untenable. But although the similarities mentioned may
be interesting and surprising, and depending on our point of view and
approach, even important, it does not follow that they warrant any claim
of a similarity such as the one in question. Perhaps what they take to
be the absence of this similarity is what some people have in mind when
they say there is no real resemblance. I will now attempt to put forward
some considerations which support this claim.
When all is said and done Buddhist philosophy and Zen practice
are based on a faith which understandably finds no expression in
Wittgenstein's position. Naagaarjuna, for example, may indeed have been a
great critical and dialectical philosopher in his own right, but he was
a deeply religious man and his philosophy is carried out from this
position and can be properly understood only in terms of it. Again, it
is doubtful, to say the least, whether Zen has anything even approaching
the same view of the dispersal of doubt and perplexity that
Wittgenstein has. In Rinzai Zen for instance, one does not try to clear
up and resolve doubts and worries about the meaning of life, the world,
and so on, by
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17. Ibid., para. 133.
p. 480
linguistic analysis or any other kind of analysis. One simply doubts
and doubts until, as it has been said, one becomes one with the doubt.
Indeed it is doubtful whether "doubt" is even quite the right word, for
there is wonder and faith involved as well. Wittgenstein's procedure
with his students is certainly surprisingly like that of a Zen master
with his pupils. But their aim is different. The former wants to get his
students to feel the doubt for themselves as a preliminary to exploring
and probing it. The latter wants to help his pupils to dispose of
anything that will distract them from just letting their doubt alone and
becoming one with it. This, of course, applies, among other things, to
the demonstrations of the absurdity of metaphysical types of questions
and assertions. In other words he uses his supporting procedures to
discourage the very kind of activities that Wittgenstein uses his to
encourage.
It might be said that understandably there is no analog in
Wittgenstein's philosophy for meditation, which is central and crucial
in Zen and in Buddhism generally; accordingly there can be no place for
the techniques appropriate to meditation in the practice of his
philosophy. This, of course, is true but the difference goes deeper than
that. It has to do with the different diagnoses of spiritual disorder,
provided one is prepared to describe the puzzlement and perplexity with
which Wittgenstein was so afflicted. For whereas he seems to ascribe it
to our lack of a clear view of the logical grammar of our discourse and
uses the knowledge of this gained by philosophy to make the distinctions
which help to release us from our worries, in Zen we come to see how
ego-centeredness and attachment lead us to make distinctions and keep
things apart when really they are together all the time. If one says
that both agree in regarding ignorance as a crucial source of our
troubles, then it seems clear enough that each understands the term
differently. Again, Wittgenstein is much more concerned with therapy
than with the style of life which follows successful therapy. One gets
the impression that he regarded the kind of enlightenment he sought as
marking the end of crucial philosophical practice for a person, though
he may, of course deepen and extend his understanding and try to help
others by acquainting them with his skills and techniques. So far as Zen
is concerned, there is an unfortunate and rather prevalent
misconception that enlightenment or satori is the end and culmination of
Zen practice; whereas it is the beginning of it.
For both Wittgenstein and Zen, enlightenment is thought of in
terms of changing the angle of vision to what is natural or what is
given rather than of replacing them with something else or of directing
our attention elsewhere. Because the forms of nature, of life, and of
language are all right as they stand, the source of our difficulties
lies in ourselves. Wittgenstein likens philosophy to a therapy of the
users of language rather than of language itself; there are different
methods like different therapies and they should be used according to
the circumstances. He refuses to tie us down to any one method and has
no
p. 481
philosophical theses to propound. He is constantly trying to free us
from the bewitchment of words and concepts and ignorance of what we are
doing when we use language -- all of which lead to rigidity and
dogmatism and one-sided emphases and theses. This instrumental approach
and the attempt to free us from rigidity and dogmatism has obvious
resemblances to what are regarded as the results of Zen practice. The
enlightenment conferred by both Wittgensteinian and Zen practice is a
kind of emancipation or freedom. For Wittgenstein it is the kind of
emancipation which makes one capable of not philosophizing when one
wants, of taking it up or putting it down. Above all it means freedom
from the obsessive worries and perplexities which played a central role
in his life. It might be said that any resemblance between the freedom
attainable by Wittgensteinian and Zen methods can, at most, be only
partial. But I think the position is that if a person did happen to
attain Wittgensteinian freedom one could not guarantee that he would be
free from such worries as those about death, the way he is treated by
others, and the like; whereas if he genuinely attained the freedom
sought by Zen one should be able to guarantee this. In other words one
cannot assert that the Wittgensteinian would not be free from such
worries but only that one could not guarantee it. Finally regarding
procedure, there are certainly striking resemblances between
Wittgenstein's practice of "assembling reminders for a certain purpose"
and his procedure with his students, and certain aspects of Zen
practice.
To dismiss the differences and resemblances mentioned as
superficial and unimportant does not seem to me to be reasonable, but
this means that any attempt to assess the claim that Wittgenstein was
striving for the same goal as that sought by Zen is not a simple and
straightforward matter. The differences are such that they cannot be
said to be seeking the same identical goal. On the other hand, the
resemblances are good enough to make it unreasonable to assert that they
are completely different. In view of this I think we can conclude that
there is a resemblance between the goal of Wittgenstein and that of Zen,
and by saying this I mean that the resemblance is of a significant and
not merely of a superficial kind. To go further than this does not seem
possible because any argument for drawing them closer together can be
countered by good arguments for keeping them further apart and vice
versa. When it is claimed that the two goals have a likeness or
resemblance it is natural to want some more definite statement and to
ask: "How alike and how unlike are they?" But such a question gives rise
to other difficult and complex ones, which it would be out of place to
try to answer here; for example, What are the criteria to be employed in
reaching a decision and what kind of person is best qualified to act as
judge or assessor in such a matter? Indeed, has such a question any
answer at all or in what sense if any has it one?
In recent years there have been those who assert that the philosophy
of Wittgenstein resembles Zen Buddhism and those who deny it on the
ground that any supposed resemblances are only apparent. But, so far as I
know, neither party has made any serious attempt to substantiate his
claim. Normally this is understandable because their main purposes lie
in a different directions. It is, for instance, quite common for the
latter merely to locate Wittgenstein in a different philosophical
tradition and pin a label such as Logical Positivism or Logical
Empiricism on him. I think the matter is much more complex than this or
indeed than either party seems to allow. I want to try to see to what
extent either position can be supported. Any errors and confusions of
which I am guilty may perhaps stimulate someone to give a more thorough
treatment or to attempt further clarification by way of correction. [1]
In one of his typical dissertations Wittgenstein himself pointed
out that its spirit was different from the mainstream of European and
American civilization. [2] About this K. T. Fann comments: "It is not
surprising that we should find striking resemblances between
Wittgenstein's methods and those of Zen Buddhism -- a philosophy from a
very different culture." [3] Because it is not relevant to his main
purpose Fann does not proceed to clarify or support his assertion about
these resemblances. He merely contents himself with one or two general
remarks about the well-known ability of Zen masters to show the
nonsensical character of metaphysical questions along with a remark
about a resemblance between the enlightenment attributed to the Buddha
and the state of complete clarity for which Wittgenstein was striving.
This seems as good a starting point as any other, and I will begin
negatively by challenging some of the resemblances mentioned by Fann.
At the outset one of his assertions must be rejected and another
regarded as seriously misleading. In the first place Zen is described as
"a philosophy from a very different culture." That Zen is the product
of a very different culture cannot be disputed; but that it is a
philosophy has to be denied, and Zennists have always done so. Indeed
Zen is a deliberate and clearheaded rejection of the propriety of
importing philosophizing of any kind into the types of situation where
the person is directly concerned with the attainment of the
enlightenment and liberation attributed to the Buddha. This may well
give Zen a certain philosophical interest, especially when some of the
methods used by Zen
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H. Hudson is a member of the Philosophy Department, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand.
1. Whenever I write about Buddhism I include Zen Buddhism, and
instead of "Zen Buddhism" I have used the term "Zen" for convenience.
The Wittgenstein of whom I write is the Wittgenstein of the
Philosophical Investigations and other associated works, not the earlier
Wittgenstein who wrote the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
2. Cf. Wittgenstein's Foreword to his Philosophische Bermerkugen.
3. K. T. Fann, Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), p. 110.
p. 472
masters have the purpose of helping the individual to realize the
absurdity of doing this. One may also, of course, philosophize about the
"aim" of Zen and its methods but as has often been pointed out, this is
not to practice it.
Secondly, Fann speaks of Zen masters showing the nonsensical
character of metaphysical questions. This is true, but misleading. It
might be interpreted as meaning, for example, that Zen masters hold
implicitly at least some general thesis about the nonsensicality of such
questions and assertions. But this is not so, either in Zen in
particular or in Buddhism in general. When the Buddha was asked the
famous Four Questions we are told that he refused to answer, saying that
they were profitless because they are irrelevant to the problem of
freeing us from suffering and are unanswerable or undecidable. By the
latter he has to be taken as meaning just what he says and exhorting us
to leave what is undecidable as undecidable. By abstaining from any kind
of yes or no answer he takes the Middle Way or the freedom of no
position on such matters. The questions have been said to be like asking
whether the hair of a tortoise is smooth or hard; but whatever we may
think of this analogy, the error involved seems to be that of confusing
the Transcendent with what is empirical in the ordinary sense of the
latter word. [4] Alternatively it amounts to confusing what is beyond
all conceptualization with what is conceptualized, or confusing two
different categories. Later in the Maadhyamika dialectic, there is a
systematic effort to show that if we abandon the Buddha's position on
such questions and relapse into dogmatism or giving a yes or a no
answer, the result is self-contradiction and nonsense. But the dialectic
is an attempt to demonstrate the absurdity of dogmatic attitudes to
propositions rather than the absurdity of the propositions themselves.
There is nothing wrong in conceptualization, the fault lies in us when
we confuse it with what is beyond conceptualization and take a dogmatic
attitude about the truth of the consequences of our mistake or about the
falsity of someone else's. In Zen, where the chief concern is with the
practice of meditation, a Zen master may indeed show the nonsensical
character of metaphysical questions and assertions, but when doing so he
speaks from the position of the Buddha, with such points as those
mentioned in mind, to those who are actively and directly engaged in
attaining enlightenment.
Nevertheless there is a perfectly legitimate function for
Buddhist metaphysics, although it is subject to certain provisos. It
must be constructed in such a way that it is helpful in freeing us from
attachment and, in accordance with the principles of the
nonsubstantiality of all things, their impermanence and conditionality.
In so helping us it will not and cannot describe or give us a picture of
the world as seen by a buddha, but it can point to the experience of a
4. Cf. T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, 2d ed. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1960), pp. 44-45.
p. 473
buddha. Such schemes give us an account in terms of basic
constituents or the interrelatedness of things of such a kind that it
would be impossible or even conceptually absurd to be attached to them.
We are apt to become attached to our own pictures or constructions,
which we make from such accounts, and when this happens we are victims
of illusion. So we can say that any Buddhist metaphysic contains an
inbuilt correction against dogmatic attachment to it: like a kind of
medicine that carries with it an antidote against addiction.
From a conventional point of view such a metaphysic may be
regarded as true, and certainly every effort will be made to provide
something which can be so regarded. But this kind of truth applies only
to conceptual constructions, and its importance lies in the fact that it
enhances the scheme's utility for helping people. In short, its
function is basically therapeutic, and the motive involved is
compassion. One is not guilty of dogmatism even if one does regard such a
scheme as true, for one can see through it, so to speak -- see that it
is only a mere set of conceptual constructions and see that it points to
what is really important. It is the kind of thing to which it would be
absurd to be attached, so one is free to take it up or put it down
according to circumstances. Buddhism has often been described as
antimetaphysical, but this is a serious oversimplification. It all
depends on what we have in mind by metaphysics.
Wittgenstein was not antimetaphysical either, at least not in the
way that it has often been supposed. He has no project such as the
elimination of metaphysics nor has he any intention of reducing
metaphysical propositions to nonsense. When doing Wittgensteinian
philosophy, metaphysical assertions are at first typically puzzling.
Then we are able to see that a feature of such propositions is that they
obliterate the distinction between empirical and conceptual inquiries.
[5] They then take on the aspect of nonsense. But at a deeper level of
analysis we realize that they are illuminating because they help to give
us a clear view of the logical or philosophical grammar of important
terms in our language. It is because we lack such a view that so many of
our philosophical troubles arise. [6] The metaphysical assertions
remain quite undisturbed or unaltered for now we can see that they are
quite all right as they stand. Our angle of vision of them has changed.
This situation calls to mind a Zen master's characterization of what
happens in Zen practice. "Before you study Zen, mountains are mountains
and rivers are rivers; while you are studying it, mountains are no
longer mountains and rivers are no longer rivers; but once you have
Enlightenment, mountains are once again mountains and rivers are
rivers." [7] Despite the obvious difference between the philosophical
practice of
5. Cf. Wittgenstein, Zettel trans. C. E. M. Anscombe, ed. C. E. M.
Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1967), para. 458.
6. Cf. Philosophical Investigations, trans. C. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), para. 122.
7. D. T. Suzuki, Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of Suzuki, ed. William Barrett (New York: Doubleday, 1956), pp. xvi-xvii.
p. 474
Wittgenstein and Zen meditation there is an intriguing parallel
between the steps taken to enlightenment or understanding in each.
When Wittgenstein speaks of bringing metaphysical terms back to
their uses in everyday language, [8] he does not do so from any spirit
of hostility to metaphysics but because he wishes to show how they
illuminate the deeper logical grammar of our language. This consists of
rules analogous to "A sphere has no length" or "A rod must have length,"
and rules of course are not descriptions. But with metaphysical
assertions we get what could be described as proposals to alter some of
the basic grammar. It is this which makes them illuminating and, even at
this deeper level of analysis, can give them a paradoxical look;
although once we can see what is going on they lose this. But as far as
this kind of view is concerned there is, to my knowledge, no parallel in
Buddhist thought.
As for the view that a feature of metaphysical propositions is
that they obliterate the distinction between conceptual and empirical
inquiries, there may appear to be some agreement but this is superficial
and masks an important difference. The word 'empirical' can be
misleading here. What Wittgenstein has in mind by an empirical inquiry
would be regarded in Buddhism as merely another conceptual type. For
Wittgenstein, for instance, natural science would certainly count as an
empirical inquiry, but not for Buddhism, because it has an elaborate
conceptual structure. Again, Zen is often said to be concerned with
direct, concrete experience. When we speak of an experience in this way,
we might think of direct perceptual experience as a typical example,
albeit this kind of experience is conceptualized; in Zen we have to
think in terms of nonconceptualized sensory experience. But this kind of
experience should not be thought of merely as nonconceptual. It is the
experience of one who is free from selfcenteredness and the attachments
that go with it. It is no use protesting that to do this is strictly
impossible. A whack with a master's stick or the first moment of pain
after burning ourselves on a hot stove will cut through our sophistries.
So the demarcation between the empirical and the conceptual is drawn
along different lines from that taken in Western philosophy.
Nor is there any analogy in Wittgenstein's work corresponding to
the mistake which the Buddhists think lies behind dogmatic metaphysics,
that is, the confusion of transcendental experience with ordinary
experience. And while metaphysics may be illuminating for each, it can
hardly be said to be illuminating in the same way. Nevertheless, despite
this difference, there is an interesting parallel in the various steps
or stages of illumination and between the flexible attitudes toward
metaphysics. I suppose that the mistake mentioned has some analogy with
the kind of mistake which Gilbert Ryle called a "category confusion" or
with what Wittgenstein would describe as a confusion of
8. Philosophical Investigations, para 116.
p. 475
the rules of different kinds of language games. The Buddha seems to
have laid down a basic rule for the conduct of religious thinking. It is
not so much that this rule is peculiar to Buddhism but the way in which
it is applied is a crucial factor in giving Buddhism its distinctive
character.
Wittgenstein does not try to restrict us to any one view of
metaphysics. Like most other assertions, metaphysical assertions are
multifunctional. He has suggestions about another way of looking at
them. Our ordinary language "holds our minds in one position, as it
were, and in this position sometimes it feels cramped, having a desire
for other positions as well." [9] A metaphysician invents a notation
which stresses a difference more strongly, makes it more obvious than
ordinary language does. In a way he has discovered "a new way of looking
at things. As if [he] had invented a new way of painting, or again a
new metre, or a new kind of song." [10] According to this suggestion
then, metaphysics can be regarded as giving us the grammar so to speak,
of a new way of thinking which is involved in seeing the world
differently and which frees us from a kind of suffering -- from a sense
of mental or spiritual cramp or constriction. There can be, at the very
most, only a very limited analogy between the kind of suffering
Wittgenstein and the Buddhists have in mind, and the notion of word
'liberation' serves to conceal an important difference rather than to
indicate any significant similarity. For in Buddhism, liberation serves
to fit us for life in this everyday world by freeing us from its grip
not to give us a vision of a different world or even of this world seen
in terms of different categories and conceptual distinctions. Despite
his suggestion, perhaps it is significant that Wittgenstein himself in
his work concentrated on the philosophical practice of trying to free us
from deep, personal puzzles and perplexities. But whether this
indicates a deeper resemblance requires separate and subsequent
consideration.
Buddhism has been described as a set of methods and techniques
rather than as a set of doctrines, for even though it is customary to
speak of "doctrines," they are only conceptual constructions and their
test is their utility. Accordingly they are best regarded
methodologically rather than as statements of absolute and fundamental
truths. Wittgenstein too, denied that he taught any philosophical theses
or doctrines but only methods which function as kinds of therapy. For
philosophical perplexities are like different kinds of illness, and so
different methods are to be used according to the circumstances. Whether
Buddhism and Wittgenstein are or are not concerned basically with the
same thing, their attitudes toward dogmatism in philosophy are
surprisingly similar. [11]
9. Wittgenstein, Blue and Brown Books 1st ed., ed. Rush Rhees (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), p. 59.
10. Philosophical Investigations, para. 401.
11. Cf. ibid., paras. 132 and 133.
p. 476
Because of his obvious interest in ordinary language and its
connection with our perplexities, a lot of people seem to think that
Wittgenstein was mainly concerned with a therapy of language. He is not
concerned, however, with linguistic pathology and some type of surgical
reconstruction of language, but with people -- the users of language --
and with some of the special features of the instrument they use when
they use language. These are the features which are of special interest
to philosophers, since lack of proper appreciation of them is an
important cause of our philosophical troubles. There is nothing wrong
with natural language; there is not even anything wrong with
metaphysical language; the trouble lies in us: in our lack of knowledge
and insight into what we are doing when we use language. Consequently he
says: "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of
language; it can in the end only describe it." [12] Of course he did not
mean that philosophy may not affect our own personal use of language,
for instance, by giving it greater clarity, but he did not see the task
of philosophy, as he wanted to do it, as the introduction of linguistic
reforms which substitute supposedly more precise and refined forms for
ordinary language. He wanted to help the users to reform themselves.
This, of course, is a far cry from the position of various contemporary
purveyors of formal linguistic programs and systems who are eagerly
contributing their mite to the process of fitting us for the dawning
automated and computerized society.
From a Zen point of view there is nothing wrong with the forms of
ordinary experience nor with the forms of life which make up ordinary
existence. There is not even anything wrong with conceptual thinking and
with metaphysics. The trouble lies in us. There is no program of
substituting some special supermundane experience for ordinary
experience nor some special type of holy life for ordinary everyday
life. But after the kind of insight which can occur in Zen practice,
although in a sense everything is left as it is, the person is different
because his angle of vision has changed. Ordinary experience is now the
experience of a bodhisattva and our ordinary life is the holy life.
Here again, even though one might say that Wittgenstein and the Zen
Buddhists are obviously talking about different things, there is an
interesting similarity of attitude and approach to them. In connection
with this, Wittgenstein emphasized that language was inescapably
connected with life and with experience. "... the speaking of a language
is part of an activity, or a form of life." [13] "... for is what is
linguistic not an experience?" [14]
Wittgenstein tells us that philosophical problems have depth:
that "they are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the
forms of our language
12. Ibid., para. 124.
13. Ibid., para. 23.
14. Ibid., para. 649.
p. 477
and their significance is as great as the importance of our
language." [15] I think that Zen Buddhists would agree with the first
statement and would also agree with Wittgenstein's characterization of
philosophy as a battle against the bewitchment of the intelligence by
words, but they would not regard the second statement as adequate. We
want a heart that is not bewitched, not merely an intelligence. The
roots of our problems are certainly deep, but the depth differs from
that of our linguistic forms and is proportional to the depth of our
ego-centeredness.
Zen methods enable us to reach down or out through thought and
language, as normally used, to quite a different level or kind of
experience. Language can still be used here, of course, but not as it is
normally used in everyday life and science; for example, as any reading
of Zen literature quickly shows, and certainly not in a way appropriate
to a more linguistic type of therapy of the users of language in a
philosophical context. In order to help us reach out through thought and
language and appreciate the different type of task or problem with
which we are faced, certain more intellectual and philosophical moves
are sometimes made as preliminary steps. It is here that Fann's remark
about the well-known ability of Zen masters to show the nonsensical
character of metaphysical questions and assertions applies. The swift
ironic and sometimes humorous demolition of such questions and
assertions serves to remind us that thinking of this type is out of
place. The use of more philosophical comments as reminders calls to mind
one of Wittgenstein's characterizations of philosophy as "assembling
reminders for a certain purpose." [16] But although the general function
is the same, the more special function is different for philosophical
comments are used to remind us of different things. Wittgenstein keeps
trying to bring us back from abstractions to what is concrete and
familiar, but which we are apt to overlook when we are doing philosophy;
and he keeps reminding us of these things and of what people do and do
not merely say in familiar everyday situations. This should not be taken
to mean that he gives what is familiar and everyday a special status at
the expense of what is unusual or strange but that he uses one to
illuminate the other. Obviously this cannot be done unless one can see
what is before one's eyes or under one's nose all the time.
Since it is a severely practical form of Buddhism, Zen is par
excellence meditational Buddhism. In Rinzai Zen, as is well known,
kooans are introduced into the meditation situation. These kooans, among
other things, can be regarded as functioning as reminders or warnings
that intellectual and logical types of thinking are out of place. But
whether kooans are introduced into the meditation situation or whether
this situation is itself regarded as a kooan, the
15. Ibid., para. 111.
16. Ibid., para. 127.
p. 478
effect at first is to generate deep puzzlement and perplexity. For
here the individual does not know his way about, and even if he is given
useful hints and admonitions he does not know how to adjust to the
situation. Nor is he told or shown, supposing that were possible: this
would defeat the entire point of the procedure. He must find his own way
himself. This makes Zen deeply personal in a very direct way.
Recognition of this adds another dimension to what we should understand
by direct concrete experience in Zen and adds another difference to what
we would understand even if we spoke of 'direct concrete personal
experience'. This with all deference to Wittgenstein who also thought
that philosophy was deeply personal and not something formal, neutral,
and detached.
Because the person does not know his way about in the kooan cum
meditation situation, the situation seems to have the typical form of
one which can be cleared up by intelligent inquiry, experimentation, and
reflection. Despite warnings and reminders he will tend to treat it as
if it were a situation of this kind and become more puzzled and
perplexed than ever. He displays a tendency to force all problem
situations into the same general mold, thus showing how his thinking is
nourished by one-sided examples, which Wittgenstein remarks is a main
cause of philosophical disease; a statement with which any Zen master
could agree. A crucial step is made when the person sees, not merely
intellectually but deeply feels, that his rigid and stereotyped approach
is not correct. It is a very intelligent kind of insight. Rather too
much by way of overcorrection of prevalent tendencies is apt to be made
of the so-called non-rationality of Zen.
The deep puzzlement and frustration generated in this situation
has an analog in Wittgenstein's procedure with his students. He did his
utmost to ensure that they were thoroughly perplexed by a philosophical
problem. They had to actually feel and live it and work their way into
and through it. A person has to feel the need of the clarification,
which a comment or observation on a philosophical problem may bring,
otherwise it is worth very little. He does not give us any so-called
answers, but only methods and suggestions to be used according to the
circumstances; nor does he explain to us how to use his methods,
although he gives us examples to illustrate their point, which we have
to see for ourselves. Again, he believed that a question is often best
disposed of by a question; to give an answer is often unfair for it is
apt to involve one-sidedness and in any case is too apt to close up
further inquiries. Sometimes he disposes of a question or a thesis by a
joke. He once even suggested that a perfectly serious philosophical work
could be written which consisted entirely of jokes or of questions. The
similarity in the type of procedure used to that used by a Zen master
is too obvious to require further comment.
Finally, Wittgenstein has no intention of trying to tie us to
philosophy. On the contrary, by freeing us from philosophical
perplexities he aims to free us
p. 479
from philosophy; for the discovery which really counts is the one
that makes one capable of not philosophizing when one wants. It is
hardly surprising that various professional philosophers should regard
such a standpoint with amused incredulity and scepticism. In Buddhism
too the aim, among other things, is to free us from the grip of
doctrines and teachings, even Buddhist ones: for these are merely like
rafts, which enable us to cross a river. When we have crossed we have no
further use for them. Here again, whatever we may say about the
similarity or lack of it between the final goal of peace and clarity for
which Wittgenstein was striving and the goal of Zen, one can hardly
deny a similarity in attitude to theses and doctrines.
Wittgenstein saw philosophical problems, not as interesting,
intellectual puzzles but as deeply personal and genuinely tormenting,
and for him the practice of philosophy was a way of life for freeing us
from them. He speaks of the peace that comes from the real philosophical
discovery, "the ... discovery which makes me capable of stopping doing
philosophy when I want to." [17] So for him, philosophy can be regarded
as a way of liberation from obsessive worries and perplexities that have
a central role in our lives and find their expression in philosophical
problems. The culminating question of whether there is any analogy
between 'the real philosophical discovery' of which he speaks and the
serenity and clarity and the ability to 'take up and put down' theses,
attitudes, and feelings as they come and go, without agitation or
disturbance, which are products of Zen meditation and training, must now
be faced.
Enough has been said, I think, to show that to maintain there is
no similarity between Zen and the philosophical practice of
Wittgenstein, is untenable. But although the similarities mentioned may
be interesting and surprising, and depending on our point of view and
approach, even important, it does not follow that they warrant any claim
of a similarity such as the one in question. Perhaps what they take to
be the absence of this similarity is what some people have in mind when
they say there is no real resemblance. I will now attempt to put forward
some considerations which support this claim.
When all is said and done Buddhist philosophy and Zen practice
are based on a faith which understandably finds no expression in
Wittgenstein's position. Naagaarjuna, for example, may indeed have been a
great critical and dialectical philosopher in his own right, but he was
a deeply religious man and his philosophy is carried out from this
position and can be properly understood only in terms of it. Again, it
is doubtful, to say the least, whether Zen has anything even approaching
the same view of the dispersal of doubt and perplexity that
Wittgenstein has. In Rinzai Zen for instance, one does not try to clear
up and resolve doubts and worries about the meaning of life, the world,
and so on, by
17. Ibid., para. 133.
p. 480
linguistic analysis or any other kind of analysis. One simply doubts
and doubts until, as it has been said, one becomes one with the doubt.
Indeed it is doubtful whether "doubt" is even quite the right word, for
there is wonder and faith involved as well. Wittgenstein's procedure
with his students is certainly surprisingly like that of a Zen master
with his pupils. But their aim is different. The former wants to get his
students to feel the doubt for themselves as a preliminary to exploring
and probing it. The latter wants to help his pupils to dispose of
anything that will distract them from just letting their doubt alone and
becoming one with it. This, of course, applies, among other things, to
the demonstrations of the absurdity of metaphysical types of questions
and assertions. In other words he uses his supporting procedures to
discourage the very kind of activities that Wittgenstein uses his to
encourage.
It might be said that understandably there is no analog in
Wittgenstein's philosophy for meditation, which is central and crucial
in Zen and in Buddhism generally; accordingly there can be no place for
the techniques appropriate to meditation in the practice of his
philosophy. This, of course, is true but the difference goes deeper than
that. It has to do with the different diagnoses of spiritual disorder,
provided one is prepared to describe the puzzlement and perplexity with
which Wittgenstein was so afflicted. For whereas he seems to ascribe it
to our lack of a clear view of the logical grammar of our discourse and
uses the knowledge of this gained by philosophy to make the distinctions
which help to release us from our worries, in Zen we come to see how
ego-centeredness and attachment lead us to make distinctions and keep
things apart when really they are together all the time. If one says
that both agree in regarding ignorance as a crucial source of our
troubles, then it seems clear enough that each understands the term
differently. Again, Wittgenstein is much more concerned with therapy
than with the style of life which follows successful therapy. One gets
the impression that he regarded the kind of enlightenment he sought as
marking the end of crucial philosophical practice for a person, though
he may, of course deepen and extend his understanding and try to help
others by acquainting them with his skills and techniques. So far as Zen
is concerned, there is an unfortunate and rather prevalent
misconception that enlightenment or satori is the end and culmination of
Zen practice; whereas it is the beginning of it.
For both Wittgenstein and Zen, enlightenment is thought of in
terms of changing the angle of vision to what is natural or what is
given rather than of replacing them with something else or of directing
our attention elsewhere. Because the forms of nature, of life, and of
language are all right as they stand, the source of our difficulties
lies in ourselves. Wittgenstein likens philosophy to a therapy of the
users of language rather than of language itself; there are different
methods like different therapies and they should be used according to
the circumstances. He refuses to tie us down to any one method and has
no
p. 481
philosophical theses to propound. He is constantly trying to free us
from the bewitchment of words and concepts and ignorance of what we are
doing when we use language -- all of which lead to rigidity and
dogmatism and one-sided emphases and theses. This instrumental approach
and the attempt to free us from rigidity and dogmatism has obvious
resemblances to what are regarded as the results of Zen practice. The
enlightenment conferred by both Wittgensteinian and Zen practice is a
kind of emancipation or freedom. For Wittgenstein it is the kind of
emancipation which makes one capable of not philosophizing when one
wants, of taking it up or putting it down. Above all it means freedom
from the obsessive worries and perplexities which played a central role
in his life. It might be said that any resemblance between the freedom
attainable by Wittgensteinian and Zen methods can, at most, be only
partial. But I think the position is that if a person did happen to
attain Wittgensteinian freedom one could not guarantee that he would be
free from such worries as those about death, the way he is treated by
others, and the like; whereas if he genuinely attained the freedom
sought by Zen one should be able to guarantee this. In other words one
cannot assert that the Wittgensteinian would not be free from such
worries but only that one could not guarantee it. Finally regarding
procedure, there are certainly striking resemblances between
Wittgenstein's practice of "assembling reminders for a certain purpose"
and his procedure with his students, and certain aspects of Zen
practice.


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## Chữa cận thị, viễn thị, loạn thị....bằng phương pháp luyện tập tự nhiên
Kính chào các mẹ!!!
Xã hội càng văn minh càng phát sinh nhiều thứ bệnh. Một trong những căn bệnh mà những bậc làm cha mẹ như chúng ta đã vô tình làm ảnh hưởng tới thế hệ con cháu mình đó là bệnh về mắt. Gia đinh tôi cũng không phải ngoại lệ. Khi phát hiện ra cháu nheo mắt khi xem tivi mới cho đi khám. Thú thật, các cụ bảo có bệnh thì vái tứ phương, chúng tôi cho cháu đi khám ở nhiều cơ sở thì mỗi nơi phán 1 kiểu bệnh và kê ra một cách điều trị khác nhau làm cho chúng tôi rất hoang mang nhất là đôi mắt sẽ ảnh hưởng đến tương lai của các cháu sau này. Rất may mắn, chúng tôi được biết 1 địa chỉ chữa các bệnh về mắt như cận, viễn, loạn thị do một người bạn có con đã được chữa khỏi mách cho. Tuần vừa rồi, tôi đưa cháu đến khám. Hóa ra không có gì phức tạp hay nguy hiểm gì hết. Rất đông các bệnh nhân tới đây đều qua sự giới thiệu của những người đã từng có người thân được điều trị và khỏi bệnh, phần đông là những người đến từ các tỉnh rất xa như Lào Cai, Yên Bái, Tuyên Quang, Hải Phòng.... Phần lớn các cháu bị bệnh ở mắt là do học tập và sinh hoạt không đúng cách mà gây nên (không đủ ánh sáng, làm việc và học tập liên tục trong một thời gian dài, xem tivi, chơi điện tử quá nhiều vv và vv) có nhiều cháu đeo kính trên 10 đi ốp, bỏ kính ra cách 1m là không nhìn rõ mặt người. Sau khi được thăm khám xác định mức độ của bệnh, Bác sĩ cho các cháu luyện tập ngay tại chỗ khoảng từ 1 đến 2 giờ đồng hồ thị lực các cháu tăng lên rõ rệt ( không phải bấm huyệt gì cả) , có cháu đeo kính 7 -8 đi ốp sau khi luyện tập mà đọc được báo không dùng kính. Cuối buổi, mọi người tập trung lại và được nghe bác sĩ giải thích và hướng dẫn để về nhà tự luyện tập cũng như chế độ ăn uống tốt cho mắt. Với các cháu từ 6 đến 18 tuổi, nếu kiên trì luyện tập theo đúng phương pháp thì từ 4 tuần đến 8 tuần là thị lực đã khôi phục bình thường. Bác sĩ có học vị tiến sỹ với đề tài về chữa mắt, vợ bác sỹ có học vị thạc sỹ cũng về điều trị mắt. Cháu nhà tôi, sau khi được bác sĩ hướng dẫn về nhà rất chăm chỉ luyện tập, bỏ hẳn các thói quen xấu như xem tivi hay chơi game trên máy tính và thị lực đang phục hồi rất tốt.
Vì thấy đây là phương pháp chữa bệnh về mắt đơn giản và hiệu quả nên tôi muốn chia sẻ với các mẹ. Để tôn trọng bác sĩ tôi không tiện nêu tên.
Nếu ai quan tâm có thể tới địa chỉ: nhà số 27 ngõ 233 đường Xuân Thủy, Cầu Giấy, Hà Nội để tham khảo.
Bác sĩ khám tại nhà vào các ngày thứ 7 và Chủ nhật bắt đầu từ 7h00 sáng.
Vì phòng khám rất đông khách nên bác sĩ có dặn nếu ai giới thiệu thì phải gọi điện hẹn trước để tránh quá tải.
Các mẹ quan tâm có thể gọi theo các số ĐT: 0913546744, cố định: 043768.0291
Chúc các mẹ và các con có đôi mắt sáng mãi để xây dựng tổ quốc.
**Hãy bấm nút CẢM ƠN và TRẢ LỜI bài viết nhé, đây là nguồn động lực để hoalantuong04 có những bài viết bổ ích hơn ^^**
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08-02-2012 10:13 AM
[#2](http://vuontre.vn/forum/f56/chua-can-thi-vien-thi-loan-thi-bang-phuong-phap-luyen-tap-tu-nhien-8671.html#post139790)
Khi bị cận thị nên tới các phòng khám, bệnh viên
[chuyên khoa mắt](http://vuontre.vn/forum/links.php?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.chuyenkhoamat.com%2F)để điều trị, vì mắt cực kỳ quan trọng nên không thể có sai sót trong quá trình điều trị. Đặc biệt là [điều trị cận thị](http://vuontre.vn/forum/links.php?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.chuyenkhoamat.com%2Fkien-thuc%2Fchia-se-cung-ban%2Fcan-thi-va-cac-phuong-phap-dieu-tri.html), hình như mình nghe nói còn di truyền nữa. Nên [chữa cận thị](http://vuontre.vn/forum/links.php?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.chuyenkhoamat.com%2Fkien-thuc%2Fchia-se-cung-ban%2Fcan-thi-va-cac-phuong-phap-dieu-tri.html)cho mình là chữa cho con mình sau này thôi. **Hãy bấm nút CẢM ƠN và TRẢ LỜI bài viết nhé, đây là nguồn động lực để probook1859 có những bài viết bổ ích hơn ^^**
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04-11-2013 04:28 PM
[#3](http://vuontre.vn/forum/f56/chua-can-thi-vien-thi-loan-thi-bang-phuong-phap-luyen-tap-tu-nhien-8671.html#post279600)
## Re: Chữa cận thị, viễn thị, loạn thị....bằng phương pháp luyện tập tự nhiên
**Trị bệnh viễn thị bằng đông y**
Bệnh viễn thị là 2 mắt nhìn gần thì rõ mà nhìn xa như người bình thường thì không rõ vật (viễn thị bất minh); bệnh viễn thị thường gặp ở người từ tuổi 50 trở lên hoặc những người tự nhiên gầy sút nhanh...
Nguyên nhân gây bệnh viễn thị do dương khí hư, phần hỏa bị suy tổn lâu ngày không bù đắp lại được làm cho thận hỏa, tâm hỏa, can hỏa hư suy nghiêm trọng dẫn đến phần thủy và phần hỏa mất cân bằng. Do vậy việc nuôi dưỡng mục hệ không đầy đủ mà sinh bệnh.
Triệu chứng lâm sàng:
Hai mắt nhìn gần mờ dần, thị lực giảm, nhìn xa rõ hơn. Hai mắt có cảm giác khô, sâu hơn; người mệt mỏi, gầy sút, ăn uống kém, trong người bứt rứt khó chịu; mạch hư nhược.
Phương pháp điều trị bệnh viễn thị:
Tư bổ can thận, ôn trung tán hàn, minh mục.
Bài thuốc điều trị bệnh viễn thị:
“Gia giảm chú cảnh hoàn”
Chử thực tử 1 lạng, xuyên tiêu 1 lạng, câu kỷ tử 2 lạng, ngũ vị tử 2 lạng, xa tiền tử 2 lạng, thục địa hoàng 5 lạng, đương quy 5 lạng, thỏ ty tử (hạt phơi khô của cây tơ hồng) 8 lạng.
Xa tiền tử, xuyên tiêu sao, thỏ ty tử tửu tẩm. Các vị sao giòn tán mịn tinh, mật hoàn viên. Ngày uống 3 lần, mỗi lần 15g với rượu trắng hoặc với nước sôi để nguội.
Phòng bệnh viễn thị
Giữ vệ sinh cho mắt, khi đọc cần đủ ánh sáng, rửa mặt bằng nước và khăn mặt sạch. Đảm bảo chế độ ăn đủ dinh dưỡng và hợp lý, không ăn các chất cay nóng.
Xem thêm:
[viễn thị bẩm sinh](http://vuontre.vn/forum/links.php?url=http%3A%2F%2Fkenhsuckhoe.vn%2Fchuyen-de%2Fvien-thi%2F)
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04-11-2013 10:10 PM
[#4](http://vuontre.vn/forum/f56/chua-can-thi-vien-thi-loan-thi-bang-phuong-phap-luyen-tap-tu-nhien-8671.html#post279604)
## Re: Chữa cận thị, viễn thị, loạn thị....bằng phương pháp luyện tập tự nhiên
cận thị có thể chữa bằng phuong pháp tập luyện sao , hay thật
#### Các Chủ đề tương tự
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[Việt Nam làm chủ công nghệ nhiệt luyện nòng pháo](http://vuontre.vn/forum/f341/viet-nam-lam-chu-cong-nghe-nhiet-luyen-nong-phao-158478.html)Bởi habisu trong diễn đàn TIN TỨCTrả lời: 0Bài viết cuối: 11-07-2012, 04:18 AM
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[Có mẹ hay bố nào biết phí điều trị Laser u xơ Tiền luyệt tiến bao nhiêu không?](http://vuontre.vn/forum/f26/co-me-hay-bo-nao-biet-phi-dieu-tri-laser-u-xo-tien-luyet-tien-bao-nhieu-khong-148952.html)Bởi hoacomay7681 trong diễn đàn Các loại bệnh thường gặpTrả lời: 0Bài viết cuối: 10-06-2012, 04:50 PM
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[Xuất hiện nhiều trung tâm luyện thi giả tại Hà Nội](http://vuontre.vn/forum/f341/xuat-hien-nhieu-trung-tam-luyen-thi-gia-tai-ha-noi-127949.html)Bởi tinhdau trong diễn đàn TIN TỨCTrả lời: 0Bài viết cuối: 11-04-2012, 02:00 PM
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['Sẽ còn nhiều tội ác dã man như Lê Văn Luyện'](http://vuontre.vn/forum/f341/se-con-nhieu-toi-ac-da-man-nhu-le-van-luyen-89543.html)Bởi 2saigon trong diễn đàn TIN TỨCTrả lời: 0Bài viết cuối: 13-01-2012, 03:50 PM
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[Chế độ ăn uống, tập luyện cho người bị gan nhiễm mỡ, các mẹ tham khảo nhé](http://vuontre.vn/forum/f52/che-do-uong-tap-luyen-cho-nguoi-bi-gan-nhiem-mo-cac-me-tham-khao-nhe-80095.html)Bởi hongle trong diễn đàn Các loại bệnh thường gặpTrả lời: 0Bài viết cuối: 30-12-2011, 11:30 AM
#### Bài viết được tìm thấy trên google bởi từ khóa:
## chữa cận thị bằng phương pháp tự nhiên,
## cách chữa cận thị bằng phương pháp tự nhiên,
### loạn thị có chữa được không,
### chua can thi bang phuong phap tu nhien,
### cách bấm huyệt chữa cận thị,
#### chữa cận thị bằng đông y có hết không,
#### chua benh loan thi,
#### bấm huyệt chữa cận thị,
#### Chua can thi,
#### chua can thi tu nhien,
#### đông y có chữa được cận thị không,
#### các phương pháp chữa cận thị,
#### phuong phap chua can thi tu nhien,
#### dia chi chua mat can thi,
#### cận loạn thị có chữa được không,
#### chua can thi bang phuong phap bam huyet,
#### benh loan thi co chua duoc khong,
#### Bâm huyêt tri cân loan thi,
#### bam huyet chua can thi,
#### co the bam huyet de khoi can thi ko,
#### cach luyen mat de chua can thi,
#### việt mắt hà nội khám sáng chủ nhật,
#### chữa cận thị bằng bấm huyệt,
#### chữa cận thị,
#### Loan thi,
#### cach chua loan thi,
**cách chữa cận thị viễn thị loạn thị bằng phương pháp tự nhiên**, **chua can thi bang phuong phap dan gian**, **mat bi loan thi**, **bi can thi dieu tri mot cach tu nhien**, **tự chữa cận thị**, **cach dieu tri vien loan thi**, **Cach chua can thi tu nhien**, **luyện mắt chữa cận thị**, **chua mat can thi**, **loan thi o tre em**, **Thuốc chữa bệnh loạn thị ở trẻ em**, **chữa cận thị tự nhiên**, **phuong phap tap luyen chua can thi**, **luyen tap cho mat vien thi**, **tap mat can thi bang phuong phap tu nhien**, **phuong phap dieu tri loan thi bam sinh**, **can thi do 1**, **chua can thi nhanh hieu qua bang tu nhien**, **chua mat bi loan thi**, **thuoc chua can thi**, **mat can loan thi**, **dia chi chua can thi**, **chữa cận**, **luyen tap chua can thi**, **bà loan chữa cận thị**, **các bệnh về mắt cận viễn**, **nhung bien phap ren luyen mat giam bi can thi**, **nhung cach chua mat can thi bang cach tu nhien**, **cach chua can thi**, **cac bien phap chua can tu nhien**, **cach dieu tri benh loan thi**, **cách chữa cận thị cho người cận thị**, **cach tap luyen chua benh loan thi**, **dieu tri vien loan thi**, **luyen mat chua loan thi**, **điều trị cận thị**, **phuong phat chua can thi**, **phương pháp chữa cận tự nhiên**, **ca ch chua benh loan thi**, **phuong phap chua mat can loan thi**, **chũa loạn can thị**, **chua can thi o ha noi**, **cach luyen mat chua can thi**, **cách chữa loạn thị**, **cach tap luyen mat loan thi tre em**, **loan vien thi**, **điều trị mắt cận thị**, **an gi tot cho mat loan thi**, **điều trị bệnh Loạn thị bằng thức ăn dân gian**, **cách chữa cận thị bằng phương pháp đông y**, **chua can thi bang bam huyet**, **cach chua benh loan thi**, **cận thị luyện tập**, **bác sĩ chữa loạn thị**, **phuong phap lyen tap cho doi mat giam can thi**, **phuong phap chua khoi can thi bang bam huyet**, **co chua duoc loan thi hay khong**, **benh loan thi co het khong**, **cận thị**, **benh loan thi**, **het can thi tự nhiên**, **Tri cân thi băng phương phap tư nhjen**, **dieu tri can thi bang phuong phap tu nhien**, **tu chua can thi**, **kinh nghiệm chữa cận thị**, **chữa cân thị**, **dia chi kham loan thi**, **chua loan thi**, **chua can thi mat**, **chua can thi cho**, **chua can thi tien sy tien o cau giay**, **cách trị cận thị tại nhà**, **phuong phap luyen mat cho nguoi can thi**, **bấm huyệt chữa cận thị Cau giay**
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beeg nhat ban.com
- Chuyên mục dành riêng cho người đã trưởng thành.
- Chuyên muc beeg nhat ban.com được tạo ra không ngoài mục đích giải trí.

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game hon nhau tren giuong ngu
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phim bo chong va nang dau 18
- Chuyên mục dành riêng cho người đã trưởng thành.
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# Tăng mức lương tối thiểu vùng từ 1/1/2013
**Từ ngày 1/1/2013 sẽ áp dụng mức lương tối thiểu vùng từ 1.650.000 đến 2.350.000 đồng/tháng đối với người lao động làm việc ở doanh nghiệp, hợp tác xã, tổ hợp tác, trang trại, hộ gia đình, cá nhân và các cơ quan, tổ chức có thuê mướn lao động.**
Chính phủ vừa ban hành Nghị định 103/2012/NĐ-CP quy định mức lương tối thiểu vùng đối với người lao động làm việc ở doanh nghiệp, hợp tác xã, tổ hợp tác, trang trại, hộ gia đình, cá nhân và các cơ quan, tổ chức có thuê mướn lao động, thay thế Nghị định 70/2011/NĐ-CP ngày 22/8/2011.
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Đối tượng áp dụng bao gồm doanh nghiệp thành lập, tổ chức quản lý và hoạt động theo Luật Doanh nghiệp (kể cả doanh nghiệp có vốn đầu tư nước ngoài tại Việt Nam); Hợp tác xã, liên hiệp hợp tác xã, tổ hợp tác, trang trại, hộ gia đình, cá nhân và các tổ chức khác của Việt Nam có thuê mướn lao động; Cơ quan, tổ chức nước ngoài, tổ chức quốc tế và cá nhân người nước ngoài tại Việt Nam có thuê mướn lao động (trừ trường hợp điều ước quốc tế mà Cộng hòa xã hội chủ nghĩa Việt Nam là thành viên có quy định khác với quy định của Nghị định này).
Mức lương tối thiểu sẽ bắt đầu áp dụng từ ngày 1/1/2013 tới đây chia theo 4 vùng I, II, III, IV. Cụ thể như sau:
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|Vùng |
|Mức lương tối thiểu vùng áp dụng từ ngày 1/1/2013 (theo Nghị định 103/2012/NĐ-CP |
|Mức lương tối thiểu vùng áp dụng hiện nay (theo Nghị định 70/2011/NĐ-CP
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|I |2.350.000 đồng/tháng||2.000.000 đồng/tháng|
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|II |2.100.000 đồng/tháng||1.780.000 đồng/tháng|
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|III |1.800.000 đồng/tháng||1.550.000 đồng/tháng|
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|IV |1.650.000 đồng/tháng||1.400.000 đồng/tháng|
Như vậy, mức lương tối thiểu vùng mới cao hơn mức lương hiện nay khoảng từ 250.000 - 350.000 đồng/tháng.
Nghị định cũng nêu rõ, mức lương tối thiểu vùng quy định như trên cơ sở để doanh nghiệp và người lao động thỏa thuận tiền lương bảo đảm mức tiền lương tính theo tháng trả cho người lao động chưa qua đào tạo làm công việc đơn giản nhất trong điều kiện lao động bình thường, bảo đảm đủ số ngày làm việc tiêu chuẩn trong tháng và hoàn thành định mức lao động hoặc công việc đã thỏa thuận không được thấp hơn mức lương tối thiểu.
Mức tiền lương thấp nhất trả cho người lao động đã qua học nghề (kể cả lao động do doanh nghiệp tự dạy nghề) phải cao hơn ít nhất 7% so với mức lương tối thiểu vùng.
Đối với doanh nghiệp đã xây dựng và ban hành thang lương, bảng lương thì căn cứ vào mức lương tối thiểu vùng để điều chỉnh các mức lương trong thang lương, bảng lương, phụ cấp lương, các mức lương trong hợp đồng lao động cho phù hợp với các thỏa thuận và quy định của pháp luật lao động.
Đối với doanh nghiệp chưa xây dựng thang lương, bảng lương thì căn cứ vào mức lương tối thiểu vùng để tính các mức lương khi xây dựng thang lương, bảng lương, phụ cấp lương, tính các mức lương ghi trong hợp đồng lao động và thực hiện các chế độ khác theo quy định của pháp luật lao động.
Cũng theo Nghị định, khuyến khích các doanh nghiệp trả lương cho người lao động cao hơn mức lương tối thiểu vùng quy định.
Nghị định 103/2012/NĐ-CP có hiệu lực thi hành từ ngày 20/1/2013. Mức lương tối thiểu vùng quy định tại Nghị định này được áp dụng từ ngày 1/1/2013.
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KINH DOANH CHUYÊN SÂU CÁC LOẠI XE GIÁ TIỀN TRUNG BÌNH, THƯƠNG HIỆU ĐẲNG CẤP, SẢN XUẤT 2000- 2006: BMW, MERCEDES, FORD, HYUNDAI, MAZDA, ISUZU,...
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Giá tham khảo:
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Đời xe: 2009
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Giá tham khảo:
Mitsubishi Galant - 1997 2.5 màu xanh bích
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Giá tham khảo:
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Giá tham khảo:
Lacetti CDX - 2011 1.8 màu trắng
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Toyota Camry LE - 2010 2.5 màu đen
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Mini Cooper - 2004 1.6 màu đen
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Kia Soul - 2008 màu ghi vàng
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Giá tham khảo:
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Kia Morning - 2012 FO màu vàng
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Đời xe: 2009
Xuất xứ:
Giá tham khảo:
Daewoo Lacetti SE - 2009 1.6 màu đỏ
Màu sắc: Đỏ
Đời xe: 2009
Xuất xứ: Hàn quốc
Giá tham khảo:
Hyundai Santafe - 2008 màu xanh ngọc
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Màu sắc: Xanh- Đen
Đời xe: 2009
Xuất xứ: Hàn quốc
Giá tham khảo:
1
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
SP Tiêu Biểu
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Chevrolet captiva đời 2007
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## Additional Information
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hãy nêu đặc điểm về vị trí địa lý , kích thước của lãnh thổ châu á và ý nghĩa của chúng đối với khí hậu
Khoa học và Giáo dục
01/01/2011 Đăng bởi
Chưa đặt tên
Câu trả lời
1 trong số 6
Cái này lớp 8 phải không? Trả lời nè:
1. -Châu á thuộc 1 phần của lục địa á- âu , nằm hoàn toàn ở nửa cầu bắc
- Trải dài từ vùng cực bắc đến vùng xích đạo
- Giáp với 2 châu lục ( Châu phi, châu âu) 3 đại dương ( ấn độ dương, thái bình dương và bắc băng dương)
- Có diện tích lớn nhất thế giới : 41,5 tr km vuông ( kô tính phần hải đảo, nếu tính thì là 44,5 tr)
- ý nghĩa đối với KH: làm cho châu á có nhìu đới khí hậu
2. Khí hậu châu á phân bố đa dạng vì:
- Do lãnh thỗ trải rộng từ vùng cực bắc đến vùng xích đạo, địa hình phức tạp ( địa hình núi cao làm ngăn cách với biển), 3 mặt giáp với biển và đại dương. Nên dẫn đến các đới khí hậu của châu á phân bố thành nhiều kiểu khí hậu khác nhau( đa dạng)
3. Đặc điểm sông ngòi ở châu á:
Châu á là nơi có mang lưới sông ngoài khá dày đặc, có nhìu hệ thống sông lớn
- Có 3 hệ thống sông chính:
+ Bắc á : gồm sông O-Bi, O-ne-nit-xay
Đặc điểm: Sông ngoài dày đặc,sông vào mùa đông dóng băng, mà xuân có lũ zo băng tuyết tan.
+Nội địa và Tây nam á: Gồm sông: Ti-grơ và sông Ơ- Phrát
Đặc điểm: Ít sông, nguồn cung cấp nước cho sông chủ yếu là do băng tuyết tan là chính
+Đông á, Nam á, Đông nam á: Gồm sông: Lưỡng hà, hoàng hà, ấn, hằng
Đặc điểm: Mạng lưới sông ngòi khá dày đặc, nước sông lên xuống theo mùa.
3. Lịch sử phát triển của các nước châu á là ( câu này trong đề thi địa lớp 8 năm ni)
- Các nước châu á là các nước chậm phát triển do trước kia là thuộc địa của các nước đế quốc.
- Sau chiến tranh thế giới thứ 2, các nước châu á phát triển mạnh theo hướng hiện đại hóa, công nghiệp. Các nước phát triển song song và đồng đều với nhau. bên cạnh đó vẫn có các nước còn chậm pt
Cái ni tự mình viết. Mình cũng học lớp 8, có gì thì bạn pmm mình qua địa chỉ YH!: MrMoneyNgan
Thân, Thái Ngân
01/01/2011 Đăng bởi
Thái Ngân
2 trong số 6
neu tinh cac dao la 44.4 trieu km vuong
06/10/2012 Đăng bởi
Chưa đặt tên
3 trong số 6
neu tinh cac dao la 44.4 trieu km vuong
06/10/2012 Đăng bởi
Chưa đặt tên
4 trong số 6
1. -Châu á thuộc 1 phần của lục địa á- âu , nằm hoàn toàn ở nửa cầu bắc
- Trải dài từ vùng cực bắc đến vùng xích đạo
- Giáp với 2 châu lục ( Châu phi, châu âu) 3 đại dương ( ấn độ dương, thái bình dương và bắc băng dương)
- Có diện tích lớn nhất thế giới : 41,5 tr km vuông ( kô tính phần hải đảo, nếu tính thì là 44,5 tr)
- ý nghĩa đối với KH: làm cho châu á có nhìu đới khí hậu
2. Khí hậu châu á phân bố đa dạng vì:
- Do lãnh thỗ trải rộng từ vùng cực bắc đến vùng xích đạo, địa hình phức tạp ( địa hình núi cao làm ngăn cách với biển), 3 mặt giáp với biển và đại dương. Nên dẫn đến các đới khí hậu của châu á phân bố thành nhiều kiểu khí hậu khác nhau( đa dạng)
3. Đặc điểm sông ngòi ở châu á:
Châu á là nơi có mang lưới sông ngoài khá dày đặc, có nhìu hệ thống sông lớn
- Có 3 hệ thống sông chính:
+ Bắc á : gồm sông O-Bi, O-ne-nit-xay
Đặc điểm: Sông ngoài dày đặc,sông vào mùa đông dóng băng, mà xuân có lũ zo băng tuyết tan.
+Nội địa và Tây nam á: Gồm sông: Ti-grơ và sông Ơ- Phrát
Đặc điểm: Ít sông, nguồn cung cấp nước cho sông chủ yếu là do băng tuyết tan là chính
+Đông á, Nam á, Đông nam á: Gồm sông: Lưỡng hà, hoàng hà, ấn, hằng
Đặc điểm: Mạng lưới sông ngòi khá dày đặc, nước sông lên xuống theo mùa.
3. Lịch sử phát triển của các nước châu á là ( câu này trong đề thi địa lớp 8 năm ni)
- Các nước châu á là các nước chậm phát triển do trước kia là thuộc địa của các nước đế quốc.
- Sau chiến tranh thế giới thứ 2, các nước châu á phát triển mạnh theo hướng hiện đại hóa, công nghiệp. Các nước phát triển song song và đồng đều với nhau. bên cạnh đó vẫn có các nước còn chậm pt'
songthung8 tra loi
22/10/2012 Đăng bởi
Chưa đặt tên
5 trong số 6
câu này thì mk chưa học tới nên bạn thông cảm nha
25/10/2013 Đăng bởi
Chưa đặt tên
6 trong số 6
khó thế này kiểm tra chết mất
28/10/2013 Đăng bởi
Chưa đặt tên
Bạn cũng có thể quan tâm
vị trí, lãnh thổ của địa hình châu á co ảnh hưởng gì tới khí hậu châu á
Đông Nam Á có mấy quốc gia & vùng lãnh thổ ???
chứng minh nền kinh tế và lãnh thổ của các nước châu á ko đồng đều
Tại sao phần lớn lãnh thổ Hoa Kỳ có khí hậu ôn đới?
cây cầu nào nối liền hai châu lục?
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