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Em à! Khi anh ngồi viết những dòng này có lẽ em đang ở Hải Phòng xa xôi. Mấy hôm nay, Hà Nội trời mưa nhiều lắm, mỗi lần trời mưa anh lại nhớ em nhiều. Càng ngày anh càng nhận ra rằng “với anh cuộc sống này sẽ chẳng còn gì ý nghĩa khi không có em”. (Nguyễn Khắc Khởi)
Sent: Saturday, June 07, 2008 1:29 PM
Subject: Gui toa soan: Anh nguyen yeu em suot cuoc doi!
Đ3T yêu dấu!
Thời gian trôi nhanh quá em nhỉ, mới đó mà đã sắp sửa tròn 6 tháng chúng mình yêu nhau rồi đó, không biết em có còn nhớ những kỷ niệm ngày đầu mình quen nhau không? Đến bây giờ nhiều lúc anh vẫn nghĩ mình đang mơ.
Em à! Khi anh ngồi viết những dòng này có lẽ em đang ở Hải Phòng xa xôi. Mấy hôm nay Hà Nội trời mưa nhiều lắm, mỗi lần trời mưa anh lại càng nhớ em nhiều hơn, những ký ức của những chiều đông mưa lại hiện về. Vẫn biết rằng em chẳng có nhiều thời gian để lên mạng đọc báo nhưng anh luôn hy vọng những dòng tâm sự này sẽ đến được với em
Đúng là cuộc sống luôn là một ẩn số, càng ngày anh càng nhận ra rằng “với anh cuộc sống này sẽ chẳng còn gì ý nghĩa khi không có em”. Còn nhớ lần đầu tiên gặp em cũng giống như bao người con gái khác, anh nghĩ rằng mình sẽ chỉ là đồng nghiệp, là bạn của nhau, ấy vậy mà chỉ sau một tháng anh đã bắt đầu cảm thấy nhớ nhung nếu mỗi ngày không được gặp em. Anh yêu em cũng bắt đầu từ đấy.
Khi ấy em hồn nhiên và rất vô tư, vô tư đến buồn cười nữa. Nhưng cái gọi là là “đồng nghiệp” ấy chẳng kéo dài được bao lâu. Ngày em nghỉ việc ở công ty anh cảm thấy buồn lắm, buồn vì anh thấy trống vắng khi không còn có người con gái nhí nhảnh ngồi bên cạnh, hằng ngày cùng đi ăn cơm, uống nước, cùng tâm sự mỗi khi rảnh rỗi. Buồn nhất là mỗi ngày đi làm sẽ không được nhìn thấy em, nhưng những điều mà anh lo lắng rồi cũng dần qua bởi dù không còn làm chung nhưng chúng mình vẫn thường xuyên được gặp nhau, hơn nữa em đã để lại cho anh sự tin tưởng và lạc quan mà trước đây anh chưa hề có.
Gần đây anh thấy em hay buồn, khác hẳn với “bé yêu” ngày trước, em có biết những lúc như thế anh lo cho em lắm không? Nhưng anh không hiểu được tại sao những lúc anh muốn quan tâm, chia sẻ, thì em lại bảo “anh sẽ không hiểu được đâu". Tại sao lại như thế? sao em không mở lòng với anh? phải chăng anh quá vô tâm? hay thực anh chưa hiểu hết về em? Chúng mình đã xác định yêu nhau, gắn bó với nhau suốt cuộc đời rồi cơ mà.
Cho dù cuộc sống có khó khăn, có thế nào đi chăng nữa anh nguyện sẽ luôn yêu em và sẽ cùng em đi hết cuộc đời giống như bài hát “Chân tình” mà mỗi lần đi hát anh thường dành tặng em! Hãy cho anh thời gian, chúng mình sẽ cùng phấn đấu em nhé. Anh tin vào lập trường của em cũng như tình yêu của chúng mình
Anh yêu em!
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Việt Báo
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TIN
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In recent years there have been those who assert that the philosophy
of Wittgenstein resembles Zen Buddhism and those who deny it on the
ground that any supposed resemblances are only apparent. But, so far as I
know, neither party has made any serious attempt to substantiate his
claim. Normally this is understandable because their main purposes lie
in a different directions. It is, for instance, quite common for the
latter merely to locate Wittgenstein in a different philosophical
tradition and pin a label such as Logical Positivism or Logical
Empiricism on him. I think the matter is much more complex than this or
indeed than either party seems to allow. I want to try to see to what
extent either position can be supported. Any errors and confusions of
which I am guilty may perhaps stimulate someone to give a more thorough
treatment or to attempt further clarification by way of correction. [1]
In one of his typical dissertations Wittgenstein himself pointed
out that its spirit was different from the mainstream of European and
American civilization. [2] About this K. T. Fann comments: "It is not
surprising that we should find striking resemblances between
Wittgenstein's methods and those of Zen Buddhism -- a philosophy from a
very different culture." [3] Because it is not relevant to his main
purpose Fann does not proceed to clarify or support his assertion about
these resemblances. He merely contents himself with one or two general
remarks about the well-known ability of Zen masters to show the
nonsensical character of metaphysical questions along with a remark
about a resemblance between the enlightenment attributed to the Buddha
and the state of complete clarity for which Wittgenstein was striving.
This seems as good a starting point as any other, and I will begin
negatively by challenging some of the resemblances mentioned by Fann.
At the outset one of his assertions must be rejected and another
regarded as seriously misleading. In the first place Zen is described as
"a philosophy from a very different culture." That Zen is the product
of a very different culture cannot be disputed; but that it is a
philosophy has to be denied, and Zennists have always done so. Indeed
Zen is a deliberate and clearheaded rejection of the propriety of
importing philosophizing of any kind into the types of situation where
the person is directly concerned with the attainment of the
enlightenment and liberation attributed to the Buddha. This may well
give Zen a certain philosophical interest, especially when some of the
methods used by Zen
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H. Hudson is a member of the Philosophy Department, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand.
1. Whenever I write about Buddhism I include Zen Buddhism, and
instead of "Zen Buddhism" I have used the term "Zen" for convenience.
The Wittgenstein of whom I write is the Wittgenstein of the
Philosophical Investigations and other associated works, not the earlier
Wittgenstein who wrote the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
2. Cf. Wittgenstein's Foreword to his Philosophische Bermerkugen.
3. K. T. Fann, Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), p. 110.
p. 472
masters have the purpose of helping the individual to realize the
absurdity of doing this. One may also, of course, philosophize about the
"aim" of Zen and its methods but as has often been pointed out, this is
not to practice it.
Secondly, Fann speaks of Zen masters showing the nonsensical
character of metaphysical questions. This is true, but misleading. It
might be interpreted as meaning, for example, that Zen masters hold
implicitly at least some general thesis about the nonsensicality of such
questions and assertions. But this is not so, either in Zen in
particular or in Buddhism in general. When the Buddha was asked the
famous Four Questions we are told that he refused to answer, saying that
they were profitless because they are irrelevant to the problem of
freeing us from suffering and are unanswerable or undecidable. By the
latter he has to be taken as meaning just what he says and exhorting us
to leave what is undecidable as undecidable. By abstaining from any kind
of yes or no answer he takes the Middle Way or the freedom of no
position on such matters. The questions have been said to be like asking
whether the hair of a tortoise is smooth or hard; but whatever we may
think of this analogy, the error involved seems to be that of confusing
the Transcendent with what is empirical in the ordinary sense of the
latter word. [4] Alternatively it amounts to confusing what is beyond
all conceptualization with what is conceptualized, or confusing two
different categories. Later in the Maadhyamika dialectic, there is a
systematic effort to show that if we abandon the Buddha's position on
such questions and relapse into dogmatism or giving a yes or a no
answer, the result is self-contradiction and nonsense. But the dialectic
is an attempt to demonstrate the absurdity of dogmatic attitudes to
propositions rather than the absurdity of the propositions themselves.
There is nothing wrong in conceptualization, the fault lies in us when
we confuse it with what is beyond conceptualization and take a dogmatic
attitude about the truth of the consequences of our mistake or about the
falsity of someone else's. In Zen, where the chief concern is with the
practice of meditation, a Zen master may indeed show the nonsensical
character of metaphysical questions and assertions, but when doing so he
speaks from the position of the Buddha, with such points as those
mentioned in mind, to those who are actively and directly engaged in
attaining enlightenment.
Nevertheless there is a perfectly legitimate function for
Buddhist metaphysics, although it is subject to certain provisos. It
must be constructed in such a way that it is helpful in freeing us from
attachment and, in accordance with the principles of the
nonsubstantiality of all things, their impermanence and conditionality.
In so helping us it will not and cannot describe or give us a picture of
the world as seen by a buddha, but it can point to the experience of a
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Cf. T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, 2d ed. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1960), pp. 44-45.
p. 473
buddha. Such schemes give us an account in terms of basic
constituents or the interrelatedness of things of such a kind that it
would be impossible or even conceptually absurd to be attached to them.
We are apt to become attached to our own pictures or constructions,
which we make from such accounts, and when this happens we are victims
of illusion. So we can say that any Buddhist metaphysic contains an
inbuilt correction against dogmatic attachment to it: like a kind of
medicine that carries with it an antidote against addiction.
From a conventional point of view such a metaphysic may be
regarded as true, and certainly every effort will be made to provide
something which can be so regarded. But this kind of truth applies only
to conceptual constructions, and its importance lies in the fact that it
enhances the scheme's utility for helping people. In short, its
function is basically therapeutic, and the motive involved is
compassion. One is not guilty of dogmatism even if one does regard such a
scheme as true, for one can see through it, so to speak -- see that it
is only a mere set of conceptual constructions and see that it points to
what is really important. It is the kind of thing to which it would be
absurd to be attached, so one is free to take it up or put it down
according to circumstances. Buddhism has often been described as
antimetaphysical, but this is a serious oversimplification. It all
depends on what we have in mind by metaphysics.
Wittgenstein was not antimetaphysical either, at least not in the
way that it has often been supposed. He has no project such as the
elimination of metaphysics nor has he any intention of reducing
metaphysical propositions to nonsense. When doing Wittgensteinian
philosophy, metaphysical assertions are at first typically puzzling.
Then we are able to see that a feature of such propositions is that they
obliterate the distinction between empirical and conceptual inquiries.
[5] They then take on the aspect of nonsense. But at a deeper level of
analysis we realize that they are illuminating because they help to give
us a clear view of the logical or philosophical grammar of important
terms in our language. It is because we lack such a view that so many of
our philosophical troubles arise. [6] The metaphysical assertions
remain quite undisturbed or unaltered for now we can see that they are
quite all right as they stand. Our angle of vision of them has changed.
This situation calls to mind a Zen master's characterization of what
happens in Zen practice. "Before you study Zen, mountains are mountains
and rivers are rivers; while you are studying it, mountains are no
longer mountains and rivers are no longer rivers; but once you have
Enlightenment, mountains are once again mountains and rivers are
rivers." [7] Despite the obvious difference between the philosophical
practice of
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Cf. Wittgenstein, Zettel trans. C. E. M. Anscombe, ed. C. E. M.
Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1967), para. 458.
6. Cf. Philosophical Investigations, trans. C. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), para. 122.
7. D. T. Suzuki, Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of Suzuki, ed. William Barrett (New York: Doubleday, 1956), pp. xvi-xvii.
p. 474
Wittgenstein and Zen meditation there is an intriguing parallel
between the steps taken to enlightenment or understanding in each.
When Wittgenstein speaks of bringing metaphysical terms back to
their uses in everyday language, [8] he does not do so from any spirit
of hostility to metaphysics but because he wishes to show how they
illuminate the deeper logical grammar of our language. This consists of
rules analogous to "A sphere has no length" or "A rod must have length,"
and rules of course are not descriptions. But with metaphysical
assertions we get what could be described as proposals to alter some of
the basic grammar. It is this which makes them illuminating and, even at
this deeper level of analysis, can give them a paradoxical look;
although once we can see what is going on they lose this. But as far as
this kind of view is concerned there is, to my knowledge, no parallel in
Buddhist thought.
As for the view that a feature of metaphysical propositions is
that they obliterate the distinction between conceptual and empirical
inquiries, there may appear to be some agreement but this is superficial
and masks an important difference. The word 'empirical' can be
misleading here. What Wittgenstein has in mind by an empirical inquiry
would be regarded in Buddhism as merely another conceptual type. For
Wittgenstein, for instance, natural science would certainly count as an
empirical inquiry, but not for Buddhism, because it has an elaborate
conceptual structure. Again, Zen is often said to be concerned with
direct, concrete experience. When we speak of an experience in this way,
we might think of direct perceptual experience as a typical example,
albeit this kind of experience is conceptualized; in Zen we have to
think in terms of nonconceptualized sensory experience. But this kind of
experience should not be thought of merely as nonconceptual. It is the
experience of one who is free from selfcenteredness and the attachments
that go with it. It is no use protesting that to do this is strictly
impossible. A whack with a master's stick or the first moment of pain
after burning ourselves on a hot stove will cut through our sophistries.
So the demarcation between the empirical and the conceptual is drawn
along different lines from that taken in Western philosophy.
Nor is there any analogy in Wittgenstein's work corresponding to
the mistake which the Buddhists think lies behind dogmatic metaphysics,
that is, the confusion of transcendental experience with ordinary
experience. And while metaphysics may be illuminating for each, it can
hardly be said to be illuminating in the same way. Nevertheless, despite
this difference, there is an interesting parallel in the various steps
or stages of illumination and between the flexible attitudes toward
metaphysics. I suppose that the mistake mentioned has some analogy with
the kind of mistake which Gilbert Ryle called a "category confusion" or
with what Wittgenstein would describe as a confusion of
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
8. Philosophical Investigations, para 116.
p. 475
the rules of different kinds of language games. The Buddha seems to
have laid down a basic rule for the conduct of religious thinking. It is
not so much that this rule is peculiar to Buddhism but the way in which
it is applied is a crucial factor in giving Buddhism its distinctive
character.
Wittgenstein does not try to restrict us to any one view of
metaphysics. Like most other assertions, metaphysical assertions are
multifunctional. He has suggestions about another way of looking at
them. Our ordinary language "holds our minds in one position, as it
were, and in this position sometimes it feels cramped, having a desire
for other positions as well." [9] A metaphysician invents a notation
which stresses a difference more strongly, makes it more obvious than
ordinary language does. In a way he has discovered "a new way of looking
at things. As if [he] had invented a new way of painting, or again a
new metre, or a new kind of song." [10] According to this suggestion
then, metaphysics can be regarded as giving us the grammar so to speak,
of a new way of thinking which is involved in seeing the world
differently and which frees us from a kind of suffering -- from a sense
of mental or spiritual cramp or constriction. There can be, at the very
most, only a very limited analogy between the kind of suffering
Wittgenstein and the Buddhists have in mind, and the notion of word
'liberation' serves to conceal an important difference rather than to
indicate any significant similarity. For in Buddhism, liberation serves
to fit us for life in this everyday world by freeing us from its grip
not to give us a vision of a different world or even of this world seen
in terms of different categories and conceptual distinctions. Despite
his suggestion, perhaps it is significant that Wittgenstein himself in
his work concentrated on the philosophical practice of trying to free us
from deep, personal puzzles and perplexities. But whether this
indicates a deeper resemblance requires separate and subsequent
consideration.
Buddhism has been described as a set of methods and techniques
rather than as a set of doctrines, for even though it is customary to
speak of "doctrines," they are only conceptual constructions and their
test is their utility. Accordingly they are best regarded
methodologically rather than as statements of absolute and fundamental
truths. Wittgenstein too, denied that he taught any philosophical theses
or doctrines but only methods which function as kinds of therapy. For
philosophical perplexities are like different kinds of illness, and so
different methods are to be used according to the circumstances. Whether
Buddhism and Wittgenstein are or are not concerned basically with the
same thing, their attitudes toward dogmatism in philosophy are
surprisingly similar. [11]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9. Wittgenstein, Blue and Brown Books 1st ed., ed. Rush Rhees (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), p. 59.
10. Philosophical Investigations, para. 401.
11. Cf. ibid., paras. 132 and 133.
p. 476
Because of his obvious interest in ordinary language and its
connection with our perplexities, a lot of people seem to think that
Wittgenstein was mainly concerned with a therapy of language. He is not
concerned, however, with linguistic pathology and some type of surgical
reconstruction of language, but with people -- the users of language --
and with some of the special features of the instrument they use when
they use language. These are the features which are of special interest
to philosophers, since lack of proper appreciation of them is an
important cause of our philosophical troubles. There is nothing wrong
with natural language; there is not even anything wrong with
metaphysical language; the trouble lies in us: in our lack of knowledge
and insight into what we are doing when we use language. Consequently he
says: "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of
language; it can in the end only describe it." [12] Of course he did not
mean that philosophy may not affect our own personal use of language,
for instance, by giving it greater clarity, but he did not see the task
of philosophy, as he wanted to do it, as the introduction of linguistic
reforms which substitute supposedly more precise and refined forms for
ordinary language. He wanted to help the users to reform themselves.
This, of course, is a far cry from the position of various contemporary
purveyors of formal linguistic programs and systems who are eagerly
contributing their mite to the process of fitting us for the dawning
automated and computerized society.
From a Zen point of view there is nothing wrong with the forms of
ordinary experience nor with the forms of life which make up ordinary
existence. There is not even anything wrong with conceptual thinking and
with metaphysics. The trouble lies in us. There is no program of
substituting some special supermundane experience for ordinary
experience nor some special type of holy life for ordinary everyday
life. But after the kind of insight which can occur in Zen practice,
although in a sense everything is left as it is, the person is different
because his angle of vision has changed. Ordinary experience is now the
experience of a bodhisattva and our ordinary life is the holy life.
Here again, even though one might say that Wittgenstein and the Zen
Buddhists are obviously talking about different things, there is an
interesting similarity of attitude and approach to them. In connection
with this, Wittgenstein emphasized that language was inescapably
connected with life and with experience. "... the speaking of a language
is part of an activity, or a form of life." [13] "... for is what is
linguistic not an experience?" [14]
Wittgenstein tells us that philosophical problems have depth:
that "they are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the
forms of our language
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. Ibid., para. 124.
13. Ibid., para. 23.
14. Ibid., para. 649.
p. 477
and their significance is as great as the importance of our
language." [15] I think that Zen Buddhists would agree with the first
statement and would also agree with Wittgenstein's characterization of
philosophy as a battle against the bewitchment of the intelligence by
words, but they would not regard the second statement as adequate. We
want a heart that is not bewitched, not merely an intelligence. The
roots of our problems are certainly deep, but the depth differs from
that of our linguistic forms and is proportional to the depth of our
ego-centeredness.
Zen methods enable us to reach down or out through thought and
language, as normally used, to quite a different level or kind of
experience. Language can still be used here, of course, but not as it is
normally used in everyday life and science; for example, as any reading
of Zen literature quickly shows, and certainly not in a way appropriate
to a more linguistic type of therapy of the users of language in a
philosophical context. In order to help us reach out through thought and
language and appreciate the different type of task or problem with
which we are faced, certain more intellectual and philosophical moves
are sometimes made as preliminary steps. It is here that Fann's remark
about the well-known ability of Zen masters to show the nonsensical
character of metaphysical questions and assertions applies. The swift
ironic and sometimes humorous demolition of such questions and
assertions serves to remind us that thinking of this type is out of
place. The use of more philosophical comments as reminders calls to mind
one of Wittgenstein's characterizations of philosophy as "assembling
reminders for a certain purpose." [16] But although the general function
is the same, the more special function is different for philosophical
comments are used to remind us of different things. Wittgenstein keeps
trying to bring us back from abstractions to what is concrete and
familiar, but which we are apt to overlook when we are doing philosophy;
and he keeps reminding us of these things and of what people do and do
not merely say in familiar everyday situations. This should not be taken
to mean that he gives what is familiar and everyday a special status at
the expense of what is unusual or strange but that he uses one to
illuminate the other. Obviously this cannot be done unless one can see
what is before one's eyes or under one's nose all the time.
Since it is a severely practical form of Buddhism, Zen is par
excellence meditational Buddhism. In Rinzai Zen, as is well known,
kooans are introduced into the meditation situation. These kooans, among
other things, can be regarded as functioning as reminders or warnings
that intellectual and logical types of thinking are out of place. But
whether kooans are introduced into the meditation situation or whether
this situation is itself regarded as a kooan, the
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. Ibid., para. 111.
16. Ibid., para. 127.
p. 478
effect at first is to generate deep puzzlement and perplexity. For
here the individual does not know his way about, and even if he is given
useful hints and admonitions he does not know how to adjust to the
situation. Nor is he told or shown, supposing that were possible: this
would defeat the entire point of the procedure. He must find his own way
himself. This makes Zen deeply personal in a very direct way.
Recognition of this adds another dimension to what we should understand
by direct concrete experience in Zen and adds another difference to what
we would understand even if we spoke of 'direct concrete personal
experience'. This with all deference to Wittgenstein who also thought
that philosophy was deeply personal and not something formal, neutral,
and detached.
Because the person does not know his way about in the kooan cum
meditation situation, the situation seems to have the typical form of
one which can be cleared up by intelligent inquiry, experimentation, and
reflection. Despite warnings and reminders he will tend to treat it as
if it were a situation of this kind and become more puzzled and
perplexed than ever. He displays a tendency to force all problem
situations into the same general mold, thus showing how his thinking is
nourished by one-sided examples, which Wittgenstein remarks is a main
cause of philosophical disease; a statement with which any Zen master
could agree. A crucial step is made when the person sees, not merely
intellectually but deeply feels, that his rigid and stereotyped approach
is not correct. It is a very intelligent kind of insight. Rather too
much by way of overcorrection of prevalent tendencies is apt to be made
of the so-called non-rationality of Zen.
The deep puzzlement and frustration generated in this situation
has an analog in Wittgenstein's procedure with his students. He did his
utmost to ensure that they were thoroughly perplexed by a philosophical
problem. They had to actually feel and live it and work their way into
and through it. A person has to feel the need of the clarification,
which a comment or observation on a philosophical problem may bring,
otherwise it is worth very little. He does not give us any so-called
answers, but only methods and suggestions to be used according to the
circumstances; nor does he explain to us how to use his methods,
although he gives us examples to illustrate their point, which we have
to see for ourselves. Again, he believed that a question is often best
disposed of by a question; to give an answer is often unfair for it is
apt to involve one-sidedness and in any case is too apt to close up
further inquiries. Sometimes he disposes of a question or a thesis by a
joke. He once even suggested that a perfectly serious philosophical work
could be written which consisted entirely of jokes or of questions. The
similarity in the type of procedure used to that used by a Zen master
is too obvious to require further comment.
Finally, Wittgenstein has no intention of trying to tie us to
philosophy. On the contrary, by freeing us from philosophical
perplexities he aims to free us
p. 479
from philosophy; for the discovery which really counts is the one
that makes one capable of not philosophizing when one wants. It is
hardly surprising that various professional philosophers should regard
such a standpoint with amused incredulity and scepticism. In Buddhism
too the aim, among other things, is to free us from the grip of
doctrines and teachings, even Buddhist ones: for these are merely like
rafts, which enable us to cross a river. When we have crossed we have no
further use for them. Here again, whatever we may say about the
similarity or lack of it between the final goal of peace and clarity for
which Wittgenstein was striving and the goal of Zen, one can hardly
deny a similarity in attitude to theses and doctrines.
Wittgenstein saw philosophical problems, not as interesting,
intellectual puzzles but as deeply personal and genuinely tormenting,
and for him the practice of philosophy was a way of life for freeing us
from them. He speaks of the peace that comes from the real philosophical
discovery, "the ... discovery which makes me capable of stopping doing
philosophy when I want to." [17] So for him, philosophy can be regarded
as a way of liberation from obsessive worries and perplexities that have
a central role in our lives and find their expression in philosophical
problems. The culminating question of whether there is any analogy
between 'the real philosophical discovery' of which he speaks and the
serenity and clarity and the ability to 'take up and put down' theses,
attitudes, and feelings as they come and go, without agitation or
disturbance, which are products of Zen meditation and training, must now
be faced.
Enough has been said, I think, to show that to maintain there is
no similarity between Zen and the philosophical practice of
Wittgenstein, is untenable. But although the similarities mentioned may
be interesting and surprising, and depending on our point of view and
approach, even important, it does not follow that they warrant any claim
of a similarity such as the one in question. Perhaps what they take to
be the absence of this similarity is what some people have in mind when
they say there is no real resemblance. I will now attempt to put forward
some considerations which support this claim.
When all is said and done Buddhist philosophy and Zen practice
are based on a faith which understandably finds no expression in
Wittgenstein's position. Naagaarjuna, for example, may indeed have been a
great critical and dialectical philosopher in his own right, but he was
a deeply religious man and his philosophy is carried out from this
position and can be properly understood only in terms of it. Again, it
is doubtful, to say the least, whether Zen has anything even approaching
the same view of the dispersal of doubt and perplexity that
Wittgenstein has. In Rinzai Zen for instance, one does not try to clear
up and resolve doubts and worries about the meaning of life, the world,
and so on, by
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. Ibid., para. 133.
p. 480
linguistic analysis or any other kind of analysis. One simply doubts
and doubts until, as it has been said, one becomes one with the doubt.
Indeed it is doubtful whether "doubt" is even quite the right word, for
there is wonder and faith involved as well. Wittgenstein's procedure
with his students is certainly surprisingly like that of a Zen master
with his pupils. But their aim is different. The former wants to get his
students to feel the doubt for themselves as a preliminary to exploring
and probing it. The latter wants to help his pupils to dispose of
anything that will distract them from just letting their doubt alone and
becoming one with it. This, of course, applies, among other things, to
the demonstrations of the absurdity of metaphysical types of questions
and assertions. In other words he uses his supporting procedures to
discourage the very kind of activities that Wittgenstein uses his to
encourage.
It might be said that understandably there is no analog in
Wittgenstein's philosophy for meditation, which is central and crucial
in Zen and in Buddhism generally; accordingly there can be no place for
the techniques appropriate to meditation in the practice of his
philosophy. This, of course, is true but the difference goes deeper than
that. It has to do with the different diagnoses of spiritual disorder,
provided one is prepared to describe the puzzlement and perplexity with
which Wittgenstein was so afflicted. For whereas he seems to ascribe it
to our lack of a clear view of the logical grammar of our discourse and
uses the knowledge of this gained by philosophy to make the distinctions
which help to release us from our worries, in Zen we come to see how
ego-centeredness and attachment lead us to make distinctions and keep
things apart when really they are together all the time. If one says
that both agree in regarding ignorance as a crucial source of our
troubles, then it seems clear enough that each understands the term
differently. Again, Wittgenstein is much more concerned with therapy
than with the style of life which follows successful therapy. One gets
the impression that he regarded the kind of enlightenment he sought as
marking the end of crucial philosophical practice for a person, though
he may, of course deepen and extend his understanding and try to help
others by acquainting them with his skills and techniques. So far as Zen
is concerned, there is an unfortunate and rather prevalent
misconception that enlightenment or satori is the end and culmination of
Zen practice; whereas it is the beginning of it.
For both Wittgenstein and Zen, enlightenment is thought of in
terms of changing the angle of vision to what is natural or what is
given rather than of replacing them with something else or of directing
our attention elsewhere. Because the forms of nature, of life, and of
language are all right as they stand, the source of our difficulties
lies in ourselves. Wittgenstein likens philosophy to a therapy of the
users of language rather than of language itself; there are different
methods like different therapies and they should be used according to
the circumstances. He refuses to tie us down to any one method and has
no
p. 481
philosophical theses to propound. He is constantly trying to free us
from the bewitchment of words and concepts and ignorance of what we are
doing when we use language -- all of which lead to rigidity and
dogmatism and one-sided emphases and theses. This instrumental approach
and the attempt to free us from rigidity and dogmatism has obvious
resemblances to what are regarded as the results of Zen practice. The
enlightenment conferred by both Wittgensteinian and Zen practice is a
kind of emancipation or freedom. For Wittgenstein it is the kind of
emancipation which makes one capable of not philosophizing when one
wants, of taking it up or putting it down. Above all it means freedom
from the obsessive worries and perplexities which played a central role
in his life. It might be said that any resemblance between the freedom
attainable by Wittgensteinian and Zen methods can, at most, be only
partial. But I think the position is that if a person did happen to
attain Wittgensteinian freedom one could not guarantee that he would be
free from such worries as those about death, the way he is treated by
others, and the like; whereas if he genuinely attained the freedom
sought by Zen one should be able to guarantee this. In other words one
cannot assert that the Wittgensteinian would not be free from such
worries but only that one could not guarantee it. Finally regarding
procedure, there are certainly striking resemblances between
Wittgenstein's practice of "assembling reminders for a certain purpose"
and his procedure with his students, and certain aspects of Zen
practice.
To dismiss the differences and resemblances mentioned as
superficial and unimportant does not seem to me to be reasonable, but
this means that any attempt to assess the claim that Wittgenstein was
striving for the same goal as that sought by Zen is not a simple and
straightforward matter. The differences are such that they cannot be
said to be seeking the same identical goal. On the other hand, the
resemblances are good enough to make it unreasonable to assert that they
are completely different. In view of this I think we can conclude that
there is a resemblance between the goal of Wittgenstein and that of Zen,
and by saying this I mean that the resemblance is of a significant and
not merely of a superficial kind. To go further than this does not seem
possible because any argument for drawing them closer together can be
countered by good arguments for keeping them further apart and vice
versa. When it is claimed that the two goals have a likeness or
resemblance it is natural to want some more definite statement and to
ask: "How alike and how unlike are they?" But such a question gives rise
to other difficult and complex ones, which it would be out of place to
try to answer here; for example, What are the criteria to be employed in
reaching a decision and what kind of person is best qualified to act as
judge or assessor in such a matter? Indeed, has such a question any
answer at all or in what sense if any has it one?
In recent years there have been those who assert that the philosophy
of Wittgenstein resembles Zen Buddhism and those who deny it on the
ground that any supposed resemblances are only apparent. But, so far as I
know, neither party has made any serious attempt to substantiate his
claim. Normally this is understandable because their main purposes lie
in a different directions. It is, for instance, quite common for the
latter merely to locate Wittgenstein in a different philosophical
tradition and pin a label such as Logical Positivism or Logical
Empiricism on him. I think the matter is much more complex than this or
indeed than either party seems to allow. I want to try to see to what
extent either position can be supported. Any errors and confusions of
which I am guilty may perhaps stimulate someone to give a more thorough
treatment or to attempt further clarification by way of correction. [1]
In one of his typical dissertations Wittgenstein himself pointed
out that its spirit was different from the mainstream of European and
American civilization. [2] About this K. T. Fann comments: "It is not
surprising that we should find striking resemblances between
Wittgenstein's methods and those of Zen Buddhism -- a philosophy from a
very different culture." [3] Because it is not relevant to his main
purpose Fann does not proceed to clarify or support his assertion about
these resemblances. He merely contents himself with one or two general
remarks about the well-known ability of Zen masters to show the
nonsensical character of metaphysical questions along with a remark
about a resemblance between the enlightenment attributed to the Buddha
and the state of complete clarity for which Wittgenstein was striving.
This seems as good a starting point as any other, and I will begin
negatively by challenging some of the resemblances mentioned by Fann.
At the outset one of his assertions must be rejected and another
regarded as seriously misleading. In the first place Zen is described as
"a philosophy from a very different culture." That Zen is the product
of a very different culture cannot be disputed; but that it is a
philosophy has to be denied, and Zennists have always done so. Indeed
Zen is a deliberate and clearheaded rejection of the propriety of
importing philosophizing of any kind into the types of situation where
the person is directly concerned with the attainment of the
enlightenment and liberation attributed to the Buddha. This may well
give Zen a certain philosophical interest, especially when some of the
methods used by Zen
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H. Hudson is a member of the Philosophy Department, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand.
1. Whenever I write about Buddhism I include Zen Buddhism, and
instead of "Zen Buddhism" I have used the term "Zen" for convenience.
The Wittgenstein of whom I write is the Wittgenstein of the
Philosophical Investigations and other associated works, not the earlier
Wittgenstein who wrote the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
2. Cf. Wittgenstein's Foreword to his Philosophische Bermerkugen.
3. K. T. Fann, Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), p. 110.
p. 472
masters have the purpose of helping the individual to realize the
absurdity of doing this. One may also, of course, philosophize about the
"aim" of Zen and its methods but as has often been pointed out, this is
not to practice it.
Secondly, Fann speaks of Zen masters showing the nonsensical
character of metaphysical questions. This is true, but misleading. It
might be interpreted as meaning, for example, that Zen masters hold
implicitly at least some general thesis about the nonsensicality of such
questions and assertions. But this is not so, either in Zen in
particular or in Buddhism in general. When the Buddha was asked the
famous Four Questions we are told that he refused to answer, saying that
they were profitless because they are irrelevant to the problem of
freeing us from suffering and are unanswerable or undecidable. By the
latter he has to be taken as meaning just what he says and exhorting us
to leave what is undecidable as undecidable. By abstaining from any kind
of yes or no answer he takes the Middle Way or the freedom of no
position on such matters. The questions have been said to be like asking
whether the hair of a tortoise is smooth or hard; but whatever we may
think of this analogy, the error involved seems to be that of confusing
the Transcendent with what is empirical in the ordinary sense of the
latter word. [4] Alternatively it amounts to confusing what is beyond
all conceptualization with what is conceptualized, or confusing two
different categories. Later in the Maadhyamika dialectic, there is a
systematic effort to show that if we abandon the Buddha's position on
such questions and relapse into dogmatism or giving a yes or a no
answer, the result is self-contradiction and nonsense. But the dialectic
is an attempt to demonstrate the absurdity of dogmatic attitudes to
propositions rather than the absurdity of the propositions themselves.
There is nothing wrong in conceptualization, the fault lies in us when
we confuse it with what is beyond conceptualization and take a dogmatic
attitude about the truth of the consequences of our mistake or about the
falsity of someone else's. In Zen, where the chief concern is with the
practice of meditation, a Zen master may indeed show the nonsensical
character of metaphysical questions and assertions, but when doing so he
speaks from the position of the Buddha, with such points as those
mentioned in mind, to those who are actively and directly engaged in
attaining enlightenment.
Nevertheless there is a perfectly legitimate function for
Buddhist metaphysics, although it is subject to certain provisos. It
must be constructed in such a way that it is helpful in freeing us from
attachment and, in accordance with the principles of the
nonsubstantiality of all things, their impermanence and conditionality.
In so helping us it will not and cannot describe or give us a picture of
the world as seen by a buddha, but it can point to the experience of a
4. Cf. T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, 2d ed. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1960), pp. 44-45.
p. 473
buddha. Such schemes give us an account in terms of basic
constituents or the interrelatedness of things of such a kind that it
would be impossible or even conceptually absurd to be attached to them.
We are apt to become attached to our own pictures or constructions,
which we make from such accounts, and when this happens we are victims
of illusion. So we can say that any Buddhist metaphysic contains an
inbuilt correction against dogmatic attachment to it: like a kind of
medicine that carries with it an antidote against addiction.
From a conventional point of view such a metaphysic may be
regarded as true, and certainly every effort will be made to provide
something which can be so regarded. But this kind of truth applies only
to conceptual constructions, and its importance lies in the fact that it
enhances the scheme's utility for helping people. In short, its
function is basically therapeutic, and the motive involved is
compassion. One is not guilty of dogmatism even if one does regard such a
scheme as true, for one can see through it, so to speak -- see that it
is only a mere set of conceptual constructions and see that it points to
what is really important. It is the kind of thing to which it would be
absurd to be attached, so one is free to take it up or put it down
according to circumstances. Buddhism has often been described as
antimetaphysical, but this is a serious oversimplification. It all
depends on what we have in mind by metaphysics.
Wittgenstein was not antimetaphysical either, at least not in the
way that it has often been supposed. He has no project such as the
elimination of metaphysics nor has he any intention of reducing
metaphysical propositions to nonsense. When doing Wittgensteinian
philosophy, metaphysical assertions are at first typically puzzling.
Then we are able to see that a feature of such propositions is that they
obliterate the distinction between empirical and conceptual inquiries.
[5] They then take on the aspect of nonsense. But at a deeper level of
analysis we realize that they are illuminating because they help to give
us a clear view of the logical or philosophical grammar of important
terms in our language. It is because we lack such a view that so many of
our philosophical troubles arise. [6] The metaphysical assertions
remain quite undisturbed or unaltered for now we can see that they are
quite all right as they stand. Our angle of vision of them has changed.
This situation calls to mind a Zen master's characterization of what
happens in Zen practice. "Before you study Zen, mountains are mountains
and rivers are rivers; while you are studying it, mountains are no
longer mountains and rivers are no longer rivers; but once you have
Enlightenment, mountains are once again mountains and rivers are
rivers." [7] Despite the obvious difference between the philosophical
practice of
5. Cf. Wittgenstein, Zettel trans. C. E. M. Anscombe, ed. C. E. M.
Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1967), para. 458.
6. Cf. Philosophical Investigations, trans. C. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), para. 122.
7. D. T. Suzuki, Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of Suzuki, ed. William Barrett (New York: Doubleday, 1956), pp. xvi-xvii.
p. 474
Wittgenstein and Zen meditation there is an intriguing parallel
between the steps taken to enlightenment or understanding in each.
When Wittgenstein speaks of bringing metaphysical terms back to
their uses in everyday language, [8] he does not do so from any spirit
of hostility to metaphysics but because he wishes to show how they
illuminate the deeper logical grammar of our language. This consists of
rules analogous to "A sphere has no length" or "A rod must have length,"
and rules of course are not descriptions. But with metaphysical
assertions we get what could be described as proposals to alter some of
the basic grammar. It is this which makes them illuminating and, even at
this deeper level of analysis, can give them a paradoxical look;
although once we can see what is going on they lose this. But as far as
this kind of view is concerned there is, to my knowledge, no parallel in
Buddhist thought.
As for the view that a feature of metaphysical propositions is
that they obliterate the distinction between conceptual and empirical
inquiries, there may appear to be some agreement but this is superficial
and masks an important difference. The word 'empirical' can be
misleading here. What Wittgenstein has in mind by an empirical inquiry
would be regarded in Buddhism as merely another conceptual type. For
Wittgenstein, for instance, natural science would certainly count as an
empirical inquiry, but not for Buddhism, because it has an elaborate
conceptual structure. Again, Zen is often said to be concerned with
direct, concrete experience. When we speak of an experience in this way,
we might think of direct perceptual experience as a typical example,
albeit this kind of experience is conceptualized; in Zen we have to
think in terms of nonconceptualized sensory experience. But this kind of
experience should not be thought of merely as nonconceptual. It is the
experience of one who is free from selfcenteredness and the attachments
that go with it. It is no use protesting that to do this is strictly
impossible. A whack with a master's stick or the first moment of pain
after burning ourselves on a hot stove will cut through our sophistries.
So the demarcation between the empirical and the conceptual is drawn
along different lines from that taken in Western philosophy.
Nor is there any analogy in Wittgenstein's work corresponding to
the mistake which the Buddhists think lies behind dogmatic metaphysics,
that is, the confusion of transcendental experience with ordinary
experience. And while metaphysics may be illuminating for each, it can
hardly be said to be illuminating in the same way. Nevertheless, despite
this difference, there is an interesting parallel in the various steps
or stages of illumination and between the flexible attitudes toward
metaphysics. I suppose that the mistake mentioned has some analogy with
the kind of mistake which Gilbert Ryle called a "category confusion" or
with what Wittgenstein would describe as a confusion of
8. Philosophical Investigations, para 116.
p. 475
the rules of different kinds of language games. The Buddha seems to
have laid down a basic rule for the conduct of religious thinking. It is
not so much that this rule is peculiar to Buddhism but the way in which
it is applied is a crucial factor in giving Buddhism its distinctive
character.
Wittgenstein does not try to restrict us to any one view of
metaphysics. Like most other assertions, metaphysical assertions are
multifunctional. He has suggestions about another way of looking at
them. Our ordinary language "holds our minds in one position, as it
were, and in this position sometimes it feels cramped, having a desire
for other positions as well." [9] A metaphysician invents a notation
which stresses a difference more strongly, makes it more obvious than
ordinary language does. In a way he has discovered "a new way of looking
at things. As if [he] had invented a new way of painting, or again a
new metre, or a new kind of song." [10] According to this suggestion
then, metaphysics can be regarded as giving us the grammar so to speak,
of a new way of thinking which is involved in seeing the world
differently and which frees us from a kind of suffering -- from a sense
of mental or spiritual cramp or constriction. There can be, at the very
most, only a very limited analogy between the kind of suffering
Wittgenstein and the Buddhists have in mind, and the notion of word
'liberation' serves to conceal an important difference rather than to
indicate any significant similarity. For in Buddhism, liberation serves
to fit us for life in this everyday world by freeing us from its grip
not to give us a vision of a different world or even of this world seen
in terms of different categories and conceptual distinctions. Despite
his suggestion, perhaps it is significant that Wittgenstein himself in
his work concentrated on the philosophical practice of trying to free us
from deep, personal puzzles and perplexities. But whether this
indicates a deeper resemblance requires separate and subsequent
consideration.
Buddhism has been described as a set of methods and techniques
rather than as a set of doctrines, for even though it is customary to
speak of "doctrines," they are only conceptual constructions and their
test is their utility. Accordingly they are best regarded
methodologically rather than as statements of absolute and fundamental
truths. Wittgenstein too, denied that he taught any philosophical theses
or doctrines but only methods which function as kinds of therapy. For
philosophical perplexities are like different kinds of illness, and so
different methods are to be used according to the circumstances. Whether
Buddhism and Wittgenstein are or are not concerned basically with the
same thing, their attitudes toward dogmatism in philosophy are
surprisingly similar. [11]
9. Wittgenstein, Blue and Brown Books 1st ed., ed. Rush Rhees (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), p. 59.
10. Philosophical Investigations, para. 401.
11. Cf. ibid., paras. 132 and 133.
p. 476
Because of his obvious interest in ordinary language and its
connection with our perplexities, a lot of people seem to think that
Wittgenstein was mainly concerned with a therapy of language. He is not
concerned, however, with linguistic pathology and some type of surgical
reconstruction of language, but with people -- the users of language --
and with some of the special features of the instrument they use when
they use language. These are the features which are of special interest
to philosophers, since lack of proper appreciation of them is an
important cause of our philosophical troubles. There is nothing wrong
with natural language; there is not even anything wrong with
metaphysical language; the trouble lies in us: in our lack of knowledge
and insight into what we are doing when we use language. Consequently he
says: "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of
language; it can in the end only describe it." [12] Of course he did not
mean that philosophy may not affect our own personal use of language,
for instance, by giving it greater clarity, but he did not see the task
of philosophy, as he wanted to do it, as the introduction of linguistic
reforms which substitute supposedly more precise and refined forms for
ordinary language. He wanted to help the users to reform themselves.
This, of course, is a far cry from the position of various contemporary
purveyors of formal linguistic programs and systems who are eagerly
contributing their mite to the process of fitting us for the dawning
automated and computerized society.
From a Zen point of view there is nothing wrong with the forms of
ordinary experience nor with the forms of life which make up ordinary
existence. There is not even anything wrong with conceptual thinking and
with metaphysics. The trouble lies in us. There is no program of
substituting some special supermundane experience for ordinary
experience nor some special type of holy life for ordinary everyday
life. But after the kind of insight which can occur in Zen practice,
although in a sense everything is left as it is, the person is different
because his angle of vision has changed. Ordinary experience is now the
experience of a bodhisattva and our ordinary life is the holy life.
Here again, even though one might say that Wittgenstein and the Zen
Buddhists are obviously talking about different things, there is an
interesting similarity of attitude and approach to them. In connection
with this, Wittgenstein emphasized that language was inescapably
connected with life and with experience. "... the speaking of a language
is part of an activity, or a form of life." [13] "... for is what is
linguistic not an experience?" [14]
Wittgenstein tells us that philosophical problems have depth:
that "they are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the
forms of our language
12. Ibid., para. 124.
13. Ibid., para. 23.
14. Ibid., para. 649.
p. 477
and their significance is as great as the importance of our
language." [15] I think that Zen Buddhists would agree with the first
statement and would also agree with Wittgenstein's characterization of
philosophy as a battle against the bewitchment of the intelligence by
words, but they would not regard the second statement as adequate. We
want a heart that is not bewitched, not merely an intelligence. The
roots of our problems are certainly deep, but the depth differs from
that of our linguistic forms and is proportional to the depth of our
ego-centeredness.
Zen methods enable us to reach down or out through thought and
language, as normally used, to quite a different level or kind of
experience. Language can still be used here, of course, but not as it is
normally used in everyday life and science; for example, as any reading
of Zen literature quickly shows, and certainly not in a way appropriate
to a more linguistic type of therapy of the users of language in a
philosophical context. In order to help us reach out through thought and
language and appreciate the different type of task or problem with
which we are faced, certain more intellectual and philosophical moves
are sometimes made as preliminary steps. It is here that Fann's remark
about the well-known ability of Zen masters to show the nonsensical
character of metaphysical questions and assertions applies. The swift
ironic and sometimes humorous demolition of such questions and
assertions serves to remind us that thinking of this type is out of
place. The use of more philosophical comments as reminders calls to mind
one of Wittgenstein's characterizations of philosophy as "assembling
reminders for a certain purpose." [16] But although the general function
is the same, the more special function is different for philosophical
comments are used to remind us of different things. Wittgenstein keeps
trying to bring us back from abstractions to what is concrete and
familiar, but which we are apt to overlook when we are doing philosophy;
and he keeps reminding us of these things and of what people do and do
not merely say in familiar everyday situations. This should not be taken
to mean that he gives what is familiar and everyday a special status at
the expense of what is unusual or strange but that he uses one to
illuminate the other. Obviously this cannot be done unless one can see
what is before one's eyes or under one's nose all the time.
Since it is a severely practical form of Buddhism, Zen is par
excellence meditational Buddhism. In Rinzai Zen, as is well known,
kooans are introduced into the meditation situation. These kooans, among
other things, can be regarded as functioning as reminders or warnings
that intellectual and logical types of thinking are out of place. But
whether kooans are introduced into the meditation situation or whether
this situation is itself regarded as a kooan, the
15. Ibid., para. 111.
16. Ibid., para. 127.
p. 478
effect at first is to generate deep puzzlement and perplexity. For
here the individual does not know his way about, and even if he is given
useful hints and admonitions he does not know how to adjust to the
situation. Nor is he told or shown, supposing that were possible: this
would defeat the entire point of the procedure. He must find his own way
himself. This makes Zen deeply personal in a very direct way.
Recognition of this adds another dimension to what we should understand
by direct concrete experience in Zen and adds another difference to what
we would understand even if we spoke of 'direct concrete personal
experience'. This with all deference to Wittgenstein who also thought
that philosophy was deeply personal and not something formal, neutral,
and detached.
Because the person does not know his way about in the kooan cum
meditation situation, the situation seems to have the typical form of
one which can be cleared up by intelligent inquiry, experimentation, and
reflection. Despite warnings and reminders he will tend to treat it as
if it were a situation of this kind and become more puzzled and
perplexed than ever. He displays a tendency to force all problem
situations into the same general mold, thus showing how his thinking is
nourished by one-sided examples, which Wittgenstein remarks is a main
cause of philosophical disease; a statement with which any Zen master
could agree. A crucial step is made when the person sees, not merely
intellectually but deeply feels, that his rigid and stereotyped approach
is not correct. It is a very intelligent kind of insight. Rather too
much by way of overcorrection of prevalent tendencies is apt to be made
of the so-called non-rationality of Zen.
The deep puzzlement and frustration generated in this situation
has an analog in Wittgenstein's procedure with his students. He did his
utmost to ensure that they were thoroughly perplexed by a philosophical
problem. They had to actually feel and live it and work their way into
and through it. A person has to feel the need of the clarification,
which a comment or observation on a philosophical problem may bring,
otherwise it is worth very little. He does not give us any so-called
answers, but only methods and suggestions to be used according to the
circumstances; nor does he explain to us how to use his methods,
although he gives us examples to illustrate their point, which we have
to see for ourselves. Again, he believed that a question is often best
disposed of by a question; to give an answer is often unfair for it is
apt to involve one-sidedness and in any case is too apt to close up
further inquiries. Sometimes he disposes of a question or a thesis by a
joke. He once even suggested that a perfectly serious philosophical work
could be written which consisted entirely of jokes or of questions. The
similarity in the type of procedure used to that used by a Zen master
is too obvious to require further comment.
Finally, Wittgenstein has no intention of trying to tie us to
philosophy. On the contrary, by freeing us from philosophical
perplexities he aims to free us
p. 479
from philosophy; for the discovery which really counts is the one
that makes one capable of not philosophizing when one wants. It is
hardly surprising that various professional philosophers should regard
such a standpoint with amused incredulity and scepticism. In Buddhism
too the aim, among other things, is to free us from the grip of
doctrines and teachings, even Buddhist ones: for these are merely like
rafts, which enable us to cross a river. When we have crossed we have no
further use for them. Here again, whatever we may say about the
similarity or lack of it between the final goal of peace and clarity for
which Wittgenstein was striving and the goal of Zen, one can hardly
deny a similarity in attitude to theses and doctrines.
Wittgenstein saw philosophical problems, not as interesting,
intellectual puzzles but as deeply personal and genuinely tormenting,
and for him the practice of philosophy was a way of life for freeing us
from them. He speaks of the peace that comes from the real philosophical
discovery, "the ... discovery which makes me capable of stopping doing
philosophy when I want to." [17] So for him, philosophy can be regarded
as a way of liberation from obsessive worries and perplexities that have
a central role in our lives and find their expression in philosophical
problems. The culminating question of whether there is any analogy
between 'the real philosophical discovery' of which he speaks and the
serenity and clarity and the ability to 'take up and put down' theses,
attitudes, and feelings as they come and go, without agitation or
disturbance, which are products of Zen meditation and training, must now
be faced.
Enough has been said, I think, to show that to maintain there is
no similarity between Zen and the philosophical practice of
Wittgenstein, is untenable. But although the similarities mentioned may
be interesting and surprising, and depending on our point of view and
approach, even important, it does not follow that they warrant any claim
of a similarity such as the one in question. Perhaps what they take to
be the absence of this similarity is what some people have in mind when
they say there is no real resemblance. I will now attempt to put forward
some considerations which support this claim.
When all is said and done Buddhist philosophy and Zen practice
are based on a faith which understandably finds no expression in
Wittgenstein's position. Naagaarjuna, for example, may indeed have been a
great critical and dialectical philosopher in his own right, but he was
a deeply religious man and his philosophy is carried out from this
position and can be properly understood only in terms of it. Again, it
is doubtful, to say the least, whether Zen has anything even approaching
the same view of the dispersal of doubt and perplexity that
Wittgenstein has. In Rinzai Zen for instance, one does not try to clear
up and resolve doubts and worries about the meaning of life, the world,
and so on, by
17. Ibid., para. 133.
p. 480
linguistic analysis or any other kind of analysis. One simply doubts
and doubts until, as it has been said, one becomes one with the doubt.
Indeed it is doubtful whether "doubt" is even quite the right word, for
there is wonder and faith involved as well. Wittgenstein's procedure
with his students is certainly surprisingly like that of a Zen master
with his pupils. But their aim is different. The former wants to get his
students to feel the doubt for themselves as a preliminary to exploring
and probing it. The latter wants to help his pupils to dispose of
anything that will distract them from just letting their doubt alone and
becoming one with it. This, of course, applies, among other things, to
the demonstrations of the absurdity of metaphysical types of questions
and assertions. In other words he uses his supporting procedures to
discourage the very kind of activities that Wittgenstein uses his to
encourage.
It might be said that understandably there is no analog in
Wittgenstein's philosophy for meditation, which is central and crucial
in Zen and in Buddhism generally; accordingly there can be no place for
the techniques appropriate to meditation in the practice of his
philosophy. This, of course, is true but the difference goes deeper than
that. It has to do with the different diagnoses of spiritual disorder,
provided one is prepared to describe the puzzlement and perplexity with
which Wittgenstein was so afflicted. For whereas he seems to ascribe it
to our lack of a clear view of the logical grammar of our discourse and
uses the knowledge of this gained by philosophy to make the distinctions
which help to release us from our worries, in Zen we come to see how
ego-centeredness and attachment lead us to make distinctions and keep
things apart when really they are together all the time. If one says
that both agree in regarding ignorance as a crucial source of our
troubles, then it seems clear enough that each understands the term
differently. Again, Wittgenstein is much more concerned with therapy
than with the style of life which follows successful therapy. One gets
the impression that he regarded the kind of enlightenment he sought as
marking the end of crucial philosophical practice for a person, though
he may, of course deepen and extend his understanding and try to help
others by acquainting them with his skills and techniques. So far as Zen
is concerned, there is an unfortunate and rather prevalent
misconception that enlightenment or satori is the end and culmination of
Zen practice; whereas it is the beginning of it.
For both Wittgenstein and Zen, enlightenment is thought of in
terms of changing the angle of vision to what is natural or what is
given rather than of replacing them with something else or of directing
our attention elsewhere. Because the forms of nature, of life, and of
language are all right as they stand, the source of our difficulties
lies in ourselves. Wittgenstein likens philosophy to a therapy of the
users of language rather than of language itself; there are different
methods like different therapies and they should be used according to
the circumstances. He refuses to tie us down to any one method and has
no
p. 481
philosophical theses to propound. He is constantly trying to free us
from the bewitchment of words and concepts and ignorance of what we are
doing when we use language -- all of which lead to rigidity and
dogmatism and one-sided emphases and theses. This instrumental approach
and the attempt to free us from rigidity and dogmatism has obvious
resemblances to what are regarded as the results of Zen practice. The
enlightenment conferred by both Wittgensteinian and Zen practice is a
kind of emancipation or freedom. For Wittgenstein it is the kind of
emancipation which makes one capable of not philosophizing when one
wants, of taking it up or putting it down. Above all it means freedom
from the obsessive worries and perplexities which played a central role
in his life. It might be said that any resemblance between the freedom
attainable by Wittgensteinian and Zen methods can, at most, be only
partial. But I think the position is that if a person did happen to
attain Wittgensteinian freedom one could not guarantee that he would be
free from such worries as those about death, the way he is treated by
others, and the like; whereas if he genuinely attained the freedom
sought by Zen one should be able to guarantee this. In other words one
cannot assert that the Wittgensteinian would not be free from such
worries but only that one could not guarantee it. Finally regarding
procedure, there are certainly striking resemblances between
Wittgenstein's practice of "assembling reminders for a certain purpose"
and his procedure with his students, and certain aspects of Zen
practice.

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com.autotrader.enterprise.common.net.RequestParameterFilter.doFilter(RequestParameterFilter.java:62) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:274) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:242) at com.autotrader.enterprise.common.context.CodeTrackingFilter.doFilter(CodeTrackingFilter.java:89) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:274) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:242) at com.autotrader.enterprise.common.context.CodeTrackingFilter.doFilter(CodeTrackingFilter.java:89) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:274) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:242) at com.autotrader.enterprise.common.net.UrlResponseFilter.doFilter(UrlResponseFilter.java:23) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:274) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:242) at com.autotrader.util.LegacyRequestFilter.doFilter(LegacyRequestFilter.java:45) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:274) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:242) at org.tuckey.web.filters.urlrewrite.RuleChain.handleRewrite(RuleChain.java:176) at org.tuckey.web.filters.urlrewrite.RuleChain.doRules(RuleChain.java:145) at org.tuckey.web.filters.urlrewrite.UrlRewriter.processRequest(UrlRewriter.java:92) at org.tuckey.web.filters.urlrewrite.UrlRewriteFilter.doFilter(UrlRewriteFilter.java:381) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:274) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:242) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardWrapperValve.invoke(StandardWrapperValve.java:275) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardContextValve.invoke(StandardContextValve.java:161) at org.jboss.web.tomcat.security.SecurityAssociationValve.invoke(SecurityAssociationValve.java:181) at org.jboss.web.tomcat.security.JaccContextValve.invoke(JaccContextValve.java:88) at org.jboss.web.tomcat.security.SecurityContextEstablishmentValve.invoke(SecurityContextEstablishmentValve.java:100) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardHostValve.invoke(StandardHostValve.java:159) at org.apache.catalina.valves.ErrorReportValve.invoke(ErrorReportValve.java:102) at org.jboss.web.tomcat.service.jca.CachedConnectionValve.invoke(CachedConnectionValve.java:158) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardEngineValve.invoke(StandardEngineValve.java:109) at org.jboss.web.tomcat.service.request.ActiveRequestResponseCacheValve.invoke(ActiveRequestResponseCacheValve.java:53) at org.apache.catalina.connector.CoyoteAdapter.service(CoyoteAdapter.java:362) at org.apache.coyote.http11.Http11Processor.process(Http11Processor.java:877) at org.apache.coyote.http11.Http11Protocol$Http11ConnectionHandler.process(Http11Protocol.java:654) at org.apache.tomcat.util.net.JIoEndpoint$Worker.run(JIoEndpoint.java:951) at java.lang.Thread.run(Thread.java:744)
- <AjaxViewRoot id="_viewRoot" immediate="false" locale="en" renderKitId="HTML_BASIC" renderRegionOnly="false" rendered="true" selfRendered="false" submitted="false" transient="false" viewId="/research/modelinfo/overview.xhtml">
- <!DOCTYPE html >
-
-  <meta http-equiv="X-UA-Compatible" content="IE=10"/> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8"/>
- <meta name="description" content="Learn about the #{year} #{make} #{model} #{body} at AutoTrader.com. See car photos, auto videos, car safety information, new car prices, special offers, reviews, and more."/> <meta name="keywords" content="New cars, new car shopping, new car models, #{make} #{model} #{body}, #{year} #{model}, #{make}, #{make} information, #{make} for sale, buy #{make} #{model}."/>
- <meta name="p:domain_verify" content="315d28475397cff9ca9875c3d437ee5b"/>
- <ComponentRef id="j_id5" rendered="true" transient="false">
- <meta name="apple-itunes-app" content="app-id=700740807"/>
- </ComponentRef>
- <title>
- <HtmlOutputText escape="true" id="j_id8" rendered="true" transient="false" value="2004 Mercedes-Benz E320 Sedan - Prices & Reviews"/>
- </title>
- <link href="//fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Roboto:400,300" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"/>
- <ComponentRef id="j_id11" rendered="false" transient="false">
- <HtmlOutputText escape="false" id="j_id12" rendered="true" transient="false"/>
- <HtmlOutputText escape="false" id="j_id13" rendered="true" transient="false"/>
- </ComponentRef>
- <ComponentRef id="j_id14" rendered="true" transient="false">
- <link rel="stylesheet" href="/#{headerAction.jawrBuildReleaseDirectory}/bundles/base.css" type="text/css"/>
- <HtmlOutputText escape="false" id="j_id16" rendered="true" transient="false" value=""/>
- </ComponentRef>
- <HtmlOutputText escape="false" id="j_id19" rendered="false" transient="false" value=" "/>
- <HtmlOutputText escape="false" id="j_id20" rendered="false" transient="false" value="

P3P: CP="NOI DSP COR DEVa TAIa OUR BUS UNI"


markdown:
java.lang.NullPointerException at com.autotrader.components.ad.AdLegacy.writeTarget(AdLegacy.java:138) at com.autotrader.components.ad.AdLegacy.encodeBegin(AdLegacy.java:99) at javax.faces.component.UIComponent.encodeAll(UIComponent.java:928) at javax.faces.component.UIComponent.encodeAll(UIComponent.java:933) at javax.faces.component.UIComponent.encodeAll(UIComponent.java:933) at com.sun.facelets.FaceletViewHandler.renderView(FaceletViewHandler.java:592) at org.ajax4jsf.application.ViewHandlerWrapper.renderView(ViewHandlerWrapper.java:100) at org.ajax4jsf.application.AjaxViewHandler.renderView(AjaxViewHandler.java:176) at com.sun.faces.lifecycle.RenderResponsePhase.execute(RenderResponsePhase.java:110) at com.sun.faces.lifecycle.Phase.doPhase(Phase.java:100) at com.sun.faces.lifecycle.LifecycleImpl.render(LifecycleImpl.java:139) at javax.faces.webapp.FacesServlet.service(FacesServlet.java:266) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:324) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:242) at org.jboss.seam.servlet.SeamFilter$FilterChainImpl.doFilter(SeamFilter.java:83) at org.jboss.seam.web.IdentityFilter.doFilter(IdentityFilter.java:40) at org.jboss.seam.servlet.SeamFilter$FilterChainImpl.doFilter(SeamFilter.java:69) at org.jboss.seam.web.MultipartFilter.doFilter(MultipartFilter.java:90) at org.jboss.seam.servlet.SeamFilter$FilterChainImpl.doFilter(SeamFilter.java:69) at org.jboss.seam.web.ExceptionFilter.doFilter(ExceptionFilter.java:64) at org.jboss.seam.servlet.SeamFilter$FilterChainImpl.doFilter(SeamFilter.java:69) at org.jboss.seam.web.RedirectFilter.doFilter(RedirectFilter.java:45) at org.jboss.seam.servlet.SeamFilter$FilterChainImpl.doFilter(SeamFilter.java:69) at org.ajax4jsf.webapp.BaseXMLFilter.doXmlFilter(BaseXMLFilter.java:206) at org.ajax4jsf.webapp.BaseFilter.handleRequest(BaseFilter.java:290) at org.ajax4jsf.webapp.BaseFilter.processUploadsAndHandleRequest(BaseFilter.java:388) at org.ajax4jsf.webapp.BaseFilter.doFilter(BaseFilter.java:515) at org.jboss.seam.web.Ajax4jsfFilter.doFilter(Ajax4jsfFilter.java:56) at org.jboss.seam.servlet.SeamFilter$FilterChainImpl.doFilter(SeamFilter.java:69) at org.jboss.seam.web.LoggingFilter.doFilter(LoggingFilter.java:60) at org.jboss.seam.servlet.SeamFilter$FilterChainImpl.doFilter(SeamFilter.java:69) at org.jboss.seam.servlet.SeamFilter.doFilter(SeamFilter.java:158) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:274) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:242) at com.autotrader.enterprise.common.context.AtcOverrideServletRequestFilter.doFilter(AtcOverrideServletRequestFilter.java:70) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:274) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:242) at com.autotrader.consumer.web.util.ZipCodeFilter.doFilter(ZipCodeFilter.java:49) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:274) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:242) at com.autotrader.consumer.web.util.AtcVersioningFilter.doFilter(AtcVersioningFilter.java:129) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:274) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:242) at com.autotrader.consumer.web.util.AtcVersioningFilter.doFilter(AtcVersioningFilter.java:129) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:274) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:242) at com.autotrader.consumer.web.util.AtcVersioningFilter.doFilter(AtcVersioningFilter.java:129) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:274) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:242) at com.autotrader.commons.webfilter.RequestContextHolderFilter.doFilter(RequestContextHolderFilter.java:51) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:274) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:242) at com.autotrader.util.bi.BIRFPageInstanceFilter.doFilter(BIRFPageInstanceFilter.java:204) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:274) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:242) at com.autotrader.enterprise.common.net.RequestParameterFilter.doFilter(RequestParameterFilter.java:62) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:274) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:242) at com.autotrader.enterprise.common.context.CodeTrackingFilter.doFilter(CodeTrackingFilter.java:89) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:274) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:242) at com.autotrader.enterprise.common.context.CodeTrackingFilter.doFilter(CodeTrackingFilter.java:89) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:274) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:242) at com.autotrader.enterprise.common.net.UrlResponseFilter.doFilter(UrlResponseFilter.java:23) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:274) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:242) at com.autotrader.util.LegacyRequestFilter.doFilter(LegacyRequestFilter.java:45) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:274) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:242) at org.tuckey.web.filters.urlrewrite.RuleChain.handleRewrite(RuleChain.java:176) at org.tuckey.web.filters.urlrewrite.RuleChain.doRules(RuleChain.java:145) at org.tuckey.web.filters.urlrewrite.UrlRewriter.processRequest(UrlRewriter.java:92) at org.tuckey.web.filters.urlrewrite.UrlRewriteFilter.doFilter(UrlRewriteFilter.java:381) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:274) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:242) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardWrapperValve.invoke(StandardWrapperValve.java:275) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardContextValve.invoke(StandardContextValve.java:161) at org.jboss.web.tomcat.security.SecurityAssociationValve.invoke(SecurityAssociationValve.java:181) at org.jboss.web.tomcat.security.JaccContextValve.invoke(JaccContextValve.java:88) at org.jboss.web.tomcat.security.SecurityContextEstablishmentValve.invoke(SecurityContextEstablishmentValve.java:100) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardHostValve.invoke(StandardHostValve.java:159) at org.apache.catalina.valves.ErrorReportValve.invoke(ErrorReportValve.java:102) at org.jboss.web.tomcat.service.jca.CachedConnectionValve.invoke(CachedConnectionValve.java:158) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardEngineValve.invoke(StandardEngineValve.java:109) at org.jboss.web.tomcat.service.request.ActiveRequestResponseCacheValve.invoke(ActiveRequestResponseCacheValve.java:53) at org.apache.catalina.connector.CoyoteAdapter.service(CoyoteAdapter.java:362) at org.apache.coyote.http11.Http11Processor.process(Http11Processor.java:877) at org.apache.coyote.http11.Http11Protocol$Http11ConnectionHandler.process(Http11Protocol.java:654) at org.apache.tomcat.util.net.JIoEndpoint$Worker.run(JIoEndpoint.java:951) at java.lang.Thread.run(Thread.java:744)
- <AjaxViewRoot id="_viewRoot" immediate="false" locale="en" renderKitId="HTML_BASIC" renderRegionOnly="false" rendered="true" selfRendered="false" submitted="false" transient="false" viewId="/research/modelinfo/overview.xhtml">
- <!DOCTYPE html >
-
-  <meta http-equiv="X-UA-Compatible" content="IE=10"/> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8"/>
- <meta name="description" content="Learn about the #{year} #{make} #{model} #{body} at AutoTrader.com. See car photos, auto videos, car safety information, new car prices, special offers, reviews, and more."/> <meta name="keywords" content="New cars, new car shopping, new car models, #{make} #{model} #{body}, #{year} #{model}, #{make}, #{make} information, #{make} for sale, buy #{make} #{model}."/>
- <meta name="p:domain_verify" content="315d28475397cff9ca9875c3d437ee5b"/>
- <ComponentRef id="j_id5" rendered="true" transient="false">
- <meta name="apple-itunes-app" content="app-id=700740807"/>
- </ComponentRef>
- <title>
- <HtmlOutputText escape="true" id="j_id8" rendered="true" transient="false" value="2008 Audi R8 Coupe - Prices & Reviews"/>
- </title>
- <link href="//fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Roboto:400,300" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"/>
- <ComponentRef id="j_id11" rendered="false" transient="false">
- <HtmlOutputText escape="false" id="j_id12" rendered="true" transient="false"/>
- <HtmlOutputText escape="false" id="j_id13" rendered="true" transient="false"/>
- </ComponentRef>
- <ComponentRef id="j_id14" rendered="true" transient="false">
- <link rel="stylesheet" href="/#{headerAction.jawrBuildReleaseDirectory}/bundles/base.css" type="text/css"/>
- <HtmlOutputText escape="false" id="j_id16" rendered="true" transient="false" value=""/>
- </ComponentRef>
- <HtmlOutputText escape="false" id="j_id19" rendered="false" transient="false" value=" "/>
- <HtmlOutputText escape="false" id="j_id20" rendered="false" transient="false" value="