difficult to am.end. De Klerk seems to have believed that, with the re-
sources of the state behind him, he and his colleagues would be able to in-
clude enough of those obstacles in the constitution to preserve substantial
power in white hands.J?
They were greatly mistaken. The ANC, confident that it would win most
of the seats in the new parliament, was adamant that the new constitution
should create a unitary state with minimal checks on the power of the
majority, to impose its will. Moreover, Mandela was psychologically and
intellectually stronger than de Klerk, and in the committees where the
day-to-day work of CODESA was done, Cyril Ramaphosa, the chief ANC
negotiator and former trade union bargainer, was more effectivethan Ter-
tius Delport, his government counterpart. Mandela's determination that
the Whites should not be able to prevent the ANC from dominating the new
South Africa was bolstered by his knowledge that if he yielded too much
he would play into the hands of his ANC critics. But, as he had shown in the
memorandum he sent to President Botha from jail, he was also realistic in
his awareness that the ANC would have to placate the Whites, who domi-
nated the economy and controlled the police, the army, and the bureau-