THEPOLITICALTRANSITION
Buthelezi and the government therefore had a common interest: both
wished to undermine the ANC. South African army and police units pro-
vided valuable assistance to the
IFP in the form of money, training,
weapons, and personnel, and collaborated
with the homeland govern-
ment in covert activities against the ANC. Supporters of the ANC replied in
kind. IFP "hit squads" and ANC "self-defense units" fought one another in
rival villages, killing men, women, and children, and burning their homes.
Although most of the victims were ANC supporters, a large minority were
IFP supporters. Mandela tried to calm the situation in KwaZulu but with-
out success, largely because local ANC warlords prevented him from deal-
ing directly with Buthelezi until it was too late to be effective.30
In 1990, political violence escalated in the Johannesburg area as well as
in KwaZulu and Natal. There were struggles between rival political fac-
tions for control of the townships. In many cases, police turned a blind eye
to IFP aggressors, or actually assisted them. Zulu male migrant workers,
housed in squalid hostels, started a series of brutal attacks on township
residents, killing many and destroying their homes. South African police