APARTHEIDIN CRISIS
tions would hurt Blacks more than Whites, and that Borha's reform policy
was moving South Africa in the right direction. Supporters of sanctions
replied that segregation and apartheid had developed in a century of eco-
nomic growth, that many black South Africans supported sanctions, and
that Botha was unrelenting in his refusal to give Africans an effective say in
the political sysrem.s?
Accepting Pretoria's propaganda
at face value, President Reagan re-
mained ill-informed about the situation in South Africa and prejudiced in
favor of the white population.
South Africa, he said in 1985, has "elimi-
nated the segregation we once had in our own country."30 By September
1985, however, American public opinion was so aroused that, to preempt
more vigorous action by Congress, Reagan issued an executive order im-
posing limited sanctions against South Africa. But the momentum grew. In
October 1986, Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid
Act
over the president's veto, banning new investments and bank loans, ending
South African air links with the United States, prohibiting a range of South
African imports, and threatening to cut off military aid to allies suspected
of breaching the international
arms embargo against South Africa.