what are best practices in hospitals and at home in maintaining quarantine?

Ethics and public health emergencies: restrictions on liberty.

Responses to public health emergencies can entail difficult decisions about restricting individual liberties to prevent the spread of disease. The quintessential example is quarantine. While isolating sick patients tends not to provoke much concern, quarantine of healthy people who only might be infected often is controversial. In fact, as the experience with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) shows, the vast majority of those placed under quarantine typically don't become ill. Efforts to enforce involuntary quarantine through military or police powers also can backfire, stoking both panic and disease spread. Yet quarantine is part of a limited arsenal of options when effective treatment or prophylaxis is not available, and some evidence suggests it can be effective, especially when it is voluntary, home-based and accompanied by extensive outreach, communication and education efforts. Even assuming that quarantine is medically effective, however, it still must be ethically justified because it creates harms for many of those affected. Moreover, ethical principles of reciprocity, transparency, non-discrimination and accountability should guide any implementation of quarantine.

Infection Prevention and Control in Pediatric Ambulatory Settings.

Since the American Academy of Pediatrics published its statement titled "Infection Prevention and Control in Pediatric Ambulatory Settings" in 2007, there have been significant changes that prompted this updated statement. Infection prevention and control is an integral part of pediatric practice in ambulatory medical settings as well as in hospitals. Infection prevention and control practices should begin at the time the ambulatory visit is scheduled. All health care personnel should be educated regarding the routes of transmission and techniques used to prevent the transmission of infectious agents. Policies for infection prevention and control should be written, readily available, updated every 2 years, and enforced. Many of the recommendations for infection control and prevention from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for hospitalized patients are also applicable in the ambulatory setting. These recommendations include requirements for pediatricians to take precautions to identify and protect employees likely to be exposed to blood or other potentially infectious materials while on the job. In addition to emphasizing the key principles of infection prevention and control in this policy, we update those that are relevant to the ambulatory care patient. These guidelines emphasize the role of hand hygiene and the implementation of diagnosis- and syndrome-specific isolation precautions, with the exemption of the use of gloves for routine diaper changes and wiping a well child's nose or tears for most patient encounters. Additional topics include respiratory hygiene and cough etiquette strategies for patients with a respiratory tract infection, including those relevant for special populations like patients with cystic fibrosis or those in short-term residential facilities; separation of infected, contagious children from uninfected children when feasible; safe handling and disposal of needles and other sharp medical devices; appropriate use of personal protective equipment, such as gloves, gowns, masks, and eye protection; and appropriate use of sterilization, disinfection, and antisepsis. Lastly, in this policy, we emphasize the importance of public health interventions, including vaccination for patients and health care personnel, and outline the responsibilities of the health care provider related to prompt public health notification for specific reportable diseases and communication with colleagues who may be providing subsequent care of an infected patient to optimize the use of isolation precautions and limit the spread of contagions.

Quarantine Stressing Voluntary Compliance

A 1-day table-top exercise in San Diego, California, in December 2004 emphasized voluntary compliance with home quarantine to control an emerging infectious disease outbreak. The exercise heightened local civilian-military collaboration in public health emergency management. Addressing concerns about lost income by residents in quarantine was particularly challenging.

Factors influencing compliance with quarantine in Toronto during the 2003 SARS outbreak.

The purpose of this study was to cull lessons from Toronto's experiences with large-scale quarantine during the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in early 2003. We focused on issues that affected the population's willingness to comply with quarantine. Information was acquired from interviews, telephone polling, and focus groups. Issues of quarantine legitimacy, criteria for quarantine, and the need to allow some quarantined healthcare workers to leave their homes to go to work were identified. Also important was the need to answer questions from people entering quarantine about the continuation of their wages, salaries, and other forms of income while they were not working, and about the means by which they would be supplied with groceries and other services necessary for daily living. The threat of enforcement had less effect on compliance than did the credibility of compliance-monitoring. Fighting boredom and other psychological stresses of quarantine, muting the forces of stigma against those in quarantine, and crafting and delivering effective and believable communications to a population of mixed cultures and languages also were critical. The need for officials to develop consistent quarantine policies, procedures, and public messages across jurisdictional boundaries was paramount.

Reverse quality management: developing evidence-based best practices in health emergency management.

The British Columbia Ministry of Health's Framework for Core Functions in Public Health was the catalyst that inspired this review of best practices in health emergency management. The fieldwork was conducted in the fall of 2005 between hurricane Katrina and the South Asia earthquake. These tragedies, shown on 24/7 television news channels, provided an eyewitness account of disaster management, or lack of it, in our global village world. It is not enough to just have best practices in place. There has to be a governance structure that can be held accountable. This review of best practices lists actions in support of an emergency preparedness culture at the management, executive, and corporate/governance levels of the organization. The methodology adopted a future quality management approach of the emergency management process to identify the corresponding performance indictors that correlated with practices or sets of practices. Identifying best practice performance indictors needed to conduct a future quality management audit is described as reverse quality management. Best practices cannot be assessed as stand-alone criteria; they are influenced by organizational culture. The defining of best practices was influenced by doubt about defining a practice it is hoped will never be performed, medical staff involvement, leadership, and an appreciation of the resources required and how they need to be managed. Best practice benchmarks are seen as being related more to "measures" of performance defined locally and agreed on by 2 or more parties rather than to achieving industrial standards. Relating practices to performance indicators and then to benchmarks resulted in the development of a Health Emergency Management Best Practices Matrix that lists specific practice in the different phases of emergency management.

Addressing the Gaps in Preparation for Quarantine

INTRODUCTION: In the event of an outbreak of a communicable respiratory illness, quarantine may become necessary. The New York Institute for All Hazard Preparedness (NYIAHP) of the State University of New York (SUNY) Downstate Medical Center, in cooperation with the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene's Healthcare Emergency Preparedness Program, (NYC DOHMH-HEPP) quarantine working group, has developed a series of clinical protocols to help health care facilities respond to such an event. PROBLEM: Two full-scale exercises (FSEs) were designed and conducted a year apart in the quarantine unit at Kings County Hospital Center (KCHC) to test the efficacy and feasibility of these quarantine protocols. The goal of these exercises was to identify the gaps in preparedness for quarantine and increase hospital readiness for such an event. METHODS: Evaluators monitored for efficient management of critical physical plants, personnel and material resources. Players were expected to integrate and practice emergency response plans and protocols specific to quarantine. In developing the exercise objectives, five activities were selected for evaluation: Activation of the Unit, Staffing, Charting/Admission, Symptom Monitoring and Infection Control, and Client Management. RESULTS: The results of the initial FSE found that there were incomplete critical tasks within all five protocols: These deficiencies were detailed in an After Action Report and an Improvement Plan was presented to the KCHC Disaster Preparedness Committee a month after the initial FSE. In the second FSE a year later, all critical tasks for Activation of the unit, Staffing and Charting/Admission were achieved. Completion of critical tasks related to Symptom Monitoring and Infection Control and Client Management was improved in the second FSE, but some tasks were still not performed appropriately. CONCLUSION: In short, these exercises identified critical needs in disaster preparedness of the KCHC Quarantine Unit. The lessons learned from this logistical exercise enabled the planning group to have a better understanding of leadership needs, communication capabilities, and infection control procedures. Kings County Hospital Center performed well during these exercises. It was clear that performance in the second exercise was improved, and many problems noted in the first exercise were corrected. Staff also felt better prepared the second time. This supports the idea that frequent exercises are vital to maintain disaster readiness. R Nathawad, PM Roblin, D Pruitt, B Arquilla. Addressing the gaps in preparation for quarantine. Prehosp Disaster Med. 2013;28(2):1-7 23158909.

[The Key Role of Taiwanese Nurses in Combating COVID-19 Pandemic]

As the COVID-19 pandemic continues to rage worldwide, Taiwan has achieved outstanding performance in controlling the spread of the outbreak domestically, earning global appreciation. Nurses on the frontlines deserve much of the credit for the ongoing success in fighting against this outbreak in Taiwan. Taiwan's success to date is grounded in proactive preparedness and deployment by the government and effective teamwork among government agencies, medical institutions, enterprises, and the public. Comprehensive containment strategies and preparedness have allowed nurses to effectively perform their duties and combat the pandemic. Nurses safeguard the public's health a myriad of ways, including implementing quarantine measures at air and seaports, conducting fever screenings, delivering inpatient isolation treatments, performing case contact tracing, providing community care services, and operating special chartered-flight services. The Taiwan Nurses Association (TWNA) provides vital lead in this pandemic response, advocating for the safety, health and wellbeing of nurses; highlighting the contributions and value of nurses; and enhancing the professional image and status of nurses. Furthermore, through its global platform, TWNA shares with peer organizations worldwide the content and efficacy of actions taken by the national government, the contributions of healthcare workers, and the support and encouragement received from the public in COVID-19 containment to demonstrate values of Taiwan and nursing.

[The Key Role of Taiwanese Nurses in Combating COVID-19 Pandemic].

2018 AAHA Infection Control, Prevention, and Biosecurity Guidelines.

A veterinary team's best work can be undone by a breach in infection control, prevention, and biosecurity (ICPB). Such a breach, in the practice or home-care setting, can lead to medical, social, and financial impacts on patients, clients, and staff, as well as damage the reputation of the hospital. To mitigate these negative outcomes, the AAHA ICPB Guidelines Task Force believes that hospital teams should improve upon their current efforts by limiting pathogen exposure from entering or being transmitted throughout the hospital population and using surveillance methods to detect any new entry of a pathogen into the practice. To support these recommendations, these practice-oriented guidelines include step-by-step instructions to upgrade ICPB efforts in any hospital, including recommendations on the following: establishing an infection control practitioner to coordinate and implement the ICPB program; developing evidence-based standard operating procedures related to tasks performed frequently by the veterinary team (hand hygiene, cleaning and disinfection, phone triage, etc.); assessing the facility's ICPB strengths and areas of improvement; creating a staff education and training plan; cataloging client education material specific for use in the practice; implementing a surveillance program; and maintaining a compliance evaluation program. Practices with few or no ICPB protocols should be encouraged to take small steps. Creating visible evidence that these protocols are consistently implemented within the hospital will invariably strengthen the loyalties of clients to the hospital as well as deepen the pride the staff have in their roles, both of which are the basis of successful veterinary practice.

War on SARS: a Singapore experience.

On Mar. 12, 2003, the World Health Organization issued a global alert regarding cases of a severe atypical pneumonia termed "severe acute respiratory syndrome" (or SARS). In Singapore alone, there have been 238 SARS cases and 33 deaths, including 5 health care workers. With modern global inter-connectivity, SARS rapidly spread to become a worldwide phenomenon. This article describes the Singapore "war on SARS" from an emergency physician's perspective, focusing on the "prevent, detect and isolate" strategy. Notable innovations include the use of home quarantine orders, mass temperature screening using thermal imaging, modular systems of hospital staffing, "virtual" hospital visits, and innovations in emergency department design. Most emergency departments, hospitals and health care systems appear to be psychologically and logistically unprepared for a massive infectious disease outbreak. In light of recent natural and terrorism-related threats, emergency care providers around the world must adopt a new paradigm. The current SARS outbreak may be merely a taste of things to come.

Infection control and pandemic influenza.

If an influenza pandemic occurs, the spread of the virus should be reduced for as long as possible while an effective vaccine is produced. Influenza spreads mainly by large respiratory droplets (> 5 microm) depositing onto the mucosal surfaces of the eye, mouth or respiratory tract. Hands are another major means for spread, and are frequently contaminated by droplets. The most effective way to reduce the spread of the virus is with good infection control practices and social distancing. Infection control practices include the use of personal protective equipment (PPE), hand hygiene, and respiratory hygiene and cough etiquette. Infected people should be isolated and spatial separation observed in common areas where infected people may be present. Any practices that create aerosols (eg, nebulisation) should be avoided, unless performed with appropriate precautions, especially with all people in the room wearing appropriate PPE. Now is the time to re-examine all our current practices so that we are better prepared, well practised and have good infection control practices in place for all transmissible respiratory infections.

Community Calls: Lessons and Insights Gained from a Medical-Religious Community Engagement During the COVID-19 Pandemic

During the pandemic caused by the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2, public health instructions were issued with the hope of curbing the virus' spread. In an effort to assure accordance with these instructions, equitable strategies for at-risk and vulnerable populations and communities are warranted. One such strategy was our community conference calls, implemented to disseminate information on the pandemic and allow community leaders to discuss struggles and successes. Over the first 6 weeks, we held 12 calls, averaging 125 (standard deviation 41) participants. Participants were primarily from congregations and faith-based organizations that had an established relationship with the hospital, but also included school leaders, elected officials, and representatives of housing associations. Issues discussed included reasons for quarantining, mental health, social isolation, health disparities, and ethical concerns regarding hospital resources. Concerns identified by the community leaders as barriers to effective quarantining and adherence to precautions included food access, housing density, and access to screening and testing. Through the calls, ways to solve such challenges were addressed, with novel strategies and resources reaching the community. This medical-religious resource has proven feasible and valuable during the pandemic and warrants discussions on reproducing it for other communities during this and future infectious disease outbreaks.

Is There a Case for Quarantine? Perspectives from SARS to Ebola.

Quarantine has been used for centuries in an effort to prevent the introduction, transmission, and spread of communicable diseases. While backed by legal authority, the public and even the health care worker community's understanding of the term is murky at best and scientific evidence to support the use of quarantine is frequently lacking. The multiple interpretations and references to quarantine, the inconsistent application of public health quarantine laws across jurisdictional boundaries, and reports of ineffectiveness are further complicated by associated infringement of civil liberties and human rights abuses. Given the need to balance public safety with human rights, we must be more precise about the meaning of quarantine and consider the efficacy and negative secondary effects resulting from its implementation. This article explains quarantine terminology and then uses a case study from Taiwan during the 2002-2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak to illustrate the key principles associated with quarantine measures taken during the 2014 Ebola outbreak and the potential hazards that can arise from quarantines. Finally, we provide a quarantine and isolation decision tree to assist policy makers and public health officials in applying medically defensible, outcomes-based data and legal authorities to optimize management of emerging infectious diseases.

Raising the Yellow Flag: State Variation in Quarantine Laws.

Quarantine is an important but often misused tool of public health. An effective quarantine requires a process that inspires trust in government, only punishes noncompliance, and promotes a culture of social responsibility. Accomplishing successful quarantine requires incentives and enabling factors, payments, job security, and a tiered enforcement plan. In this article, we examine the variation in state-level quarantine laws and assess the effectiveness of these laws and regulations. We find that most states allow for an individual to have a hearing (63%) and to have a voice in burial and cremation procedures (71%), yet are weak on all other individual rights measures. Only 20% of states have provisions to protect employment when an individual is under quarantine, and less than half have plans for safe and humane quarantines. Decision makers at the state and local levels must make a concerted effort to revise and update quarantine laws and regulations. Ideally, these laws and regulations should be harmonized so as to avoid confusion and disruption between states, and public health officials should work with populations to identify and address the factors that will support successful quarantines if they are ever required.

Lessons learned from the anti-SARS quarantine experience in a hospital-based fever screening station in Taiwan

BACKGROUND: Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was the first major novel infectious disease to hit the international community in the 21st century. While SARS was sweeping over almost 30 countries, most hospitals in Taiwan instituted mandatory quarantine measures, one of the most effective public health strategies for preventing disease transmission. We explored the anti-SARS quarantine experience of patients in a hospital-based fever screening station. METHODS: We conducted a phenomenologic, qualitative study using semistructured telephone interviews during the SARS outbreak in Taiwan. Seventeen patients with fever who were quarantined in the fever screening station of a hospital emergency department for at least 2 hours were recruited into this study. RESULTS: Data analysis using Collaizi's 9 steps revealed 2 categories—external burden and internal struggle—and 6 themes regarding patients' quarantine experience. External burden included 3 themes: (1) bearing the uncomfortable surroundings, (2) facing discrimination, and (3) lacking in-person family support. Internal struggle consisted of 3 themes: (1) struggle with being quarantined, (2) struggle with emotional turmoil, and (3) struggle with possible SARS diagnosis. CONCLUSION: These results will contribute to sensitizing health care professionals to empathize with quarantined persons while providing quality quarantine care and other infection control measures.

ASID (HICSIG) position statement: infection control guidelines for patients with influenza-like illnesses, including pandemic (H1N1) influenza 2009, in Australian health care facilities.

Standard and Droplet Precautions are considered adequate to control the transmission of influenza in most health care situations. Vaccination of health care staff, carers and vulnerable patients against seasonal and, eventually, pandemic influenza strains is an essential protective strategy. Management principles include: performance of hand hygiene before and after every patient contact or contact with the patient environment, in accord with the national 5 Moments for Hand Hygiene Standard; disinfection of the patient environment; early identification and isolation of patients with suspected or proven influenza; adoption of a greater minimum distance of patient separation (2 metres) than previously recommended; use of a surgical mask and eye protection for personal protection on entry to infectious areas or within 2 metres of an infectious patient; contact tracing for patient and health care staff and restriction of prophylactic antivirals mainly to those at high risk of severe disease; in high aerosol-risk settings, use of particulate mask, eye protection, impervious long-sleeved gown, and gloves donned in that sequence and removed in reverse sequence, avoiding self-contamination; exclusion of symptomatic staff from the workplace until criteria for non-infectious status are met; reserving negative-pressure ventilation rooms (if available) for intensive care patients, especially those receiving non-invasive ventilation; ensuring that infectious postpartum women wear surgical masks when caring for their newborn infants and practise strict hand hygiene; and implementation of special arrangements for potentially infected newborns who require nursery or intensive care.

Nonpharmaceutical Interventions for Pandemic Influenza, National and Community Measures

The World Health Organization's recommended pandemic influenza interventions, based on limited data, vary by transmission pattern, pandemic phase, and illness severity and extent. In the pandemic alert period, recommendations include isolation of patients and quarantine of contacts, accompanied by antiviral therapy. During the pandemic period, the focus shifts to delaying spread and reducing effects through population-based measures. Ill persons should remain home when they first become symptomatic, but forced isolation and quarantine are ineffective and impractical. If the pandemic is severe, social distancing measures such as school closures should be considered. Nonessential domestic travel to affected areas should be deferred. Hand and respiratory hygiene should be routine; mask use should be based on setting and risk, and contaminated household surfaces should be disinfected. Additional research and field assessments during pandemics are essential to update recommendations. Legal authority and procedures for implementing interventions should be understood in advance and should respect cultural differences and human rights.

Quarantine and the Federal Role in Epidemics.

Every recent presidential administration has faced an infectious disease threat, and this trend is certain to continue. The states have primary responsibility for protecting the public's health under their police powers, but modern travel makes diseases almost impossible to contain intrastate. How should the federal government respond in the future? The Ebola scare in the U.S. repeated a typical response--demands for quarantine. In January 2017, the Department of Health and Human Services and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention issued final regulations on its authority to issue Federal Quarantine Orders. These regulations rely heavily on confining persons who may or may not be ill, raising serious questions about federal commitment to due process protections as well as the scope of statutory authority to impose quarantine. As the Supreme Court has stated in United States v. Salerno, "liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception." Unconstrained use of quarantines undermines both the rule of law and public confidence in government decisions in times of crisis. This article analyzes the regulations and argues for a rights-based approach to infectious disease control that also protects public health. By respecting constitutional rights, the federal government can encourage public trust and cooperation and minimize harm, both essential requirements for controlling an epidemic.

Current Practices for Infection Prevention in the Hospital Settings

The principles and practices aimed at prevention and control of hospital-acquired infections are directed at various links in the chain of transmission. They include the following: (1) to contain or eliminate the reservoirs of agents and/or to curtail the persistence of agents in a specific setting, (2) to protect the host against disease caused by microorganisms, and (3) to interrupt the transmission of infection. Interventions to modify environmental reservoirs are aimed at interrupting the transmission for these inanimate environmental sources. The barriers, e.g., masks, were used to keep the smells and “contagion” away even before the germ theory of disease was conceived. The appropriate barriers now include gloves, gowns, and eye protection for blood/body fluid–borne infections and high-filtration masks for infections transmitted by droplet nuclei. The most important and effective nosocomial infection control intervention remains the routine washing of hands before, between, and after patient contact in healthcare settings. This chapter focuses on the interruption of transmission of infectious agents in the hospital setting by Standard Precautions recommended for all patients and “isolation” of patients using precautions based on known methods of transmission.

Healthcare personnel and nosocomial transmission of pandemic 2009 influenza.

Knowledge regarding the modes of transmission of pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza continues to develop, as do recommendations for the prevention of spread within healthcare facilities. The adoption of the most prudent, multifaceted approaches is recommended until there is significant evidence to reduce protective measures. The greatest threat to healthcare personnel and patients appears to be exposure to patients, healthcare personnel, or visitors who have not been recognized as contagious. The processes used within healthcare facilities must hold this concept central to any infection control plan and act in a preventive manner. This article focuses on the development of an algorithm for intensive care unit intake precautions, based on the early identification of potential source patients, as well as appropriate selection and adequate use of personal protective equipment. Visitor management, hand and respiratory hygiene, and cough etiquette have been used as measures to decrease the spread of infection. Vaccination of healthcare personnel, combined with work furlough for ill workers, is also explored. Recommendations include the elimination of potential exposures, engineering and administrative controls, and utilization of personal protective equipment.

Blue Ribbon Abstract Award: Assessment of Education and Communication Resources for Public Health Emergencies in U.S. Hospitals

Abstract BACKGROUND: Established systems for education and rapid dissemination of information are essential to a healthcare facility's ability to respond to emerging public health threats. We assessed the education activities and communication resources available for this purpose in a representative sample of U.S. hospitals. METHODS: We selected a 20% (n=1236) random sample of hospitals from the 2000 American Hospital Association database, stratified by bed size, service, metropolitan statistical sampling area (MSSA), and region to ensure representativeness. Infection control professionals (ICPs) at the hospitals were asked to complete a Web-based questionnaire during October 21–December 22, 2003. RESULTS: ICPs at 556 (45%) hospitals completed the survey, including 518 (93%) general medical-surgical, 20 (4%) other specialty (including oncology), and 18 (3%) children's hospitals; 352 (63%) were in urban (<100,000 population) areas and 224 (40%) had <100 beds. Most hospitals had provided educational programs about infection control issues related to smallpox (87%), smallpox vaccine-related adverse events (76%), severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) (75%); and anthrax (73%). Fewer offered programs on monkeypox (27%). Hospitals reported that the best ways to disseminate information to them were via e-mail (97%), Web sites or group e-mail lists (72%), videoconference (40%), or teleconference (35%). Urban hospitals were more likely than rural to identify Web sites (p=0.001) and videoconference (p=0.03) as the best ways to receive information. Hospitals used e-mail (94%), teleconferencing (72%), Web-based training (61%), computer-based tools (50%), and videoconferencing (46%) to reach hospital-based clinical personnel. Urban hospitals were more likely than rural to use e-mail (p=0.01) to reach personnel. Hospitals identified model preparedness plans (61%), educational materials for personnel (54%) or patients/public (40%), and tabletop exercises/drills (46%) as being most helpful to preparedness efforts. CONCLUSIONS: Hospitals may differ substantially in preparedness and response readiness. These findings will assist in determining the best strategies for communicating with hospitals and providing information to assist them in preparedness efforts.

Safe Hospital Preparedness in the Era of COVID-19: The Swiss Cheese Model

Since the first emergence in December 2019, COVID-19 rapidly spread out worldwide. During the pandemic of an emerging infectious disease, it is very important to prevent nosocomial outbreak and operate hospitals safely to maintain their functions. In this article, we presented the strategies for safe hospital operation based on the experiences of the Republic of Korea during early COVID-19 pandemic. Each hospital should keep multiple layered defenses to prevent even small cracks in the hospital's quarantine system.

Environmental and decontamination issues for human coronaviruses and their potential surrogates

Pandemic coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) gives ample reason to generally review coronavirus (CoV) containment. For establishing some preliminary views on decontamination and disinfection, surrogate CoVs have commonly been assessed. This review serves to examine the existing science in regard to CoV containment generically and then to translate these findings into timely applications for COVID-19. There is widespread dissemination of CoVs in the immediate patient environment, and CoVs can potentially be spread via respiratory secretions, urine, and stool. Interpretations of the spread however must consider whether studies examine for viral RNA, virus viability by culture, or both. Presymptomatic, asymptomatic, and post-14 day virus excretion from patients may complicate the epidemiology. Whereas droplet spread is accepted, there continues to be controversy over the extent of possible airborne spread and especially now for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). CoVs are stable in body secretions and sewage at reduced temperatures. In addition to temperature, dryness or relative humidity, initial viral burden, concomitant presence of bioburden, and the type of surface can all affect stability. Generalizing, CoVs can be susceptible to radiation, temperature extremes, pH extremes, peroxides, halogens, aldehydes, many solvents, and several alcohols. Whereas detergent surfactants can have some direct activity, these agents are better used as complements to a complex disinfectant solution. Disinfectants with multiple agents and adverse pH are more likely to be best active at higher water temperatures. Real-life assessments should be encouraged with working dilutions. The use of decontamination and disinfection should be balanced with considerations of patient and caregiver safety. Processes should also be balanced with considerations for other potential pathogens that must be targeted. Given some CoV differences and given that surrogate testing provides experimental correlates at best, direct assessments with SARS-CoV, Middle East respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus (MERS-CoV), and SARS-CoV-2 are required.

Infection control practices among hospital health and support workers in Hong Kong

Summary A report by the Hong Kong government noted that hospital infection control standards were inadequate, requiring audit, development and implementation. In addition, hospital staff needed training in infection control measures. We investigated infection control practices among 162 hospital health workers (109 nurses, 45 doctors and 8 therapists) and 44 support workers in one acute hospital and two rehabilitation hospitals using a non-blinded, observational design. We examined compliance with isolation precautions and infection control guidelines, including proper wearing of a mask, goggles/face shield, or gown; handling patient care equipment, linen, and laundry; routine and terminal cleaning; and terminal cleaning of an isolation room. One major breakdown in compliance was use of sleeveless disposable plastic aprons instead of long-sleeved gowns during procedures likely to generate splashes or sprays of blood and body fluids. In more than half of the observed episodes, participants failed to disinfect medical devices, such as stethoscopes, before re-use. Thorough cleansing of commodes between patients was also lacking. Overall compliance with local and international infection control guidelines was satisfactory, but several aspects required improvement.

How to Safely Reopen Colleges and Universities During COVID-19: Experiences From Taiwan

Reopening colleges and universities during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic poses a special challenge worldwide. Taiwan is one of the few countries where schools are functioning normally. To secure the safety of students and staff, the Ministry of Education in Taiwan established general guidelines for college campuses. The guidelines delineated creation of a task force at each university; school-based risk screening based on travel history, occupation, contacts, and clusters; measures on self-management of health and quarantine; general hygiene measures (including wearing masks indoors); principles on ventilation and sanitization; regulations on school assemblies; a process for reporting suspected cases; and policies on school closing and make-up classes. It also announced that a class should be suspended if 1 student or staff member in it tested positive and that a school should be closed for 14 days if it had 2 or more confirmed cases. As of 18 June 2020, there have been 7 confirmed cases in 6 Taiwanese universities since the start of the pandemic. One university was temporarily closed, adopted virtual classes, and quickly reopened after 14 days of contact tracing and quarantine of possible contacts. Taiwan's experience suggests that, under certain circumstances, safely reopening colleges and universities this fall may be feasible with a combination of strategies that include containment (access control with contact tracing and quarantine) and mitigation (hygiene, sanitation, ventilation, and social distancing) practices.

SARS in Singapore--key lessons from an epidemic.

The rapid containment of the Singapore severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003 involved the introduction of several stringent control measures. These measures had a profound impact on the healthcare system and community, and were associated with significant disruptions to normal life, business and social intercourse. An assessment of the relative effectiveness of the various control measures is critical in preparing for future outbreaks of a similar nature. The very "wide-net" surveillance, isolation and quarantine policy adopted was effective in ensuring progressively earlier isolation of probable SARS cases. However, it resulted in nearly 8000 contacts being put on home quarantine and 4300 on telephone surveillance, with 58 individuals eventually being diagnosed with probable SARS. A key challenge is to develop very rapid and highly sensitive tests for SARS infection, which would substantially reduce the numbers of individuals that need to be quarantined without decreasing the effectiveness of the measure. Daily temperature monitoring of all healthcare workers (HCWs) in hospitals was useful for early identification of HCWs with SARS. However, daily temperature screening of children in schools failed to pick up any SARS cases. Similarly, temperature screening at the airport and other points of entry did not yield any SARS cases. Nevertheless, the latter 2 measures probably helped to reassure the public that schools and the community were safe during the SARS outbreak. Strong political leadership and effective command, control and coordination of responses were critical factors for the containment of the outbreak.

When Second Best Might be the Best: Using Hospitalization Data to Monitor the Novel Coronavirus Pandemic

The novel coronavirus' high rate of asymptomatic transmission combined with a lack of testing kits call for a different approach to monitor its spread and severity. We proposed the use of hospitalizations and hospital utilization data to monitor the spread and severity. A proposed threshold of a declining 7-day moving average over a 14-day period, "7&14" was set to communicate when a wave of the novel coronavirus may have passed. The state of Ohio was chosen to illustrate this threshold. While not the ideal solution for monitoring the spread of the epidemic, the proposed approach is an easy to implement framework accounting for limitations of the data inherent in the current epidemic. Hospital administrators and policy makers may benefit from incorporating this approach into their decision making.

Time, distance, shielding and ALARA; drawing similarities between measures for radiation protection and Coronavirus disease pandemic response

The practice of radiation oncology requires stringent adherence to specific steps and principles designed to minimize exposure of an individual to unnecessary doses of radiation. The basic principles of such measures to reduce the risk of exposure and limit the doses of irradiation follow the "as low as reasonably achievable " or ALARA principle by using the concepts of time, distance and shielding. Potential exposures in radiation oncology are controlled through combination of optimal design and installation of radiation delivery equipment with well-defined standard operating procedures (SOPs). In the modern era of viral pandemics, similar principles can also be applied toward prevention of viral transmission and protection of populations at risk. In the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the probability of an individual getting infected is dependent on the viral load that an individual is exposed to in public spaces over a period of time. All prevention and control measures are based on preventing any such exposure to the virus, that can be achieved through limiting space for movement of the virus, using barriers and increasing distance to vulnerable surfaces, and limiting the duration of exposure. Apart from adhering to the laid-down provisions of a lock-down, preventive measures recommended for the general public include maintaining hand-hygiene, social distancing, and using facemasks to break the chain of transmission. Appropriate triage and customization of treatment protocols can help curtail hospital visits and time-spent by cancer patients during pandemic times, thereby reducing their risk of exposure as well as allowing efficient utilization of resources. The outbreak of the contagious COVID-19 pandemic threatens to disrupt healthcare systems globally with its unprecedented challenges. However, despite all the difficulties and hardships, it has also enabled new ways of learning and communication, which are likely to persist even in the post-COVID world.

Guidelines for prevention of hospital acquired infections

These guidelines, written for clinicians, contains evidence-based recommendations for the prevention of hospital acquired infections Hospital acquired infections are a major cause of mortality and morbidity and provide challenge to clinicians. Measures of infection control include identifying patients at risk of nosocomial infections, observing hand hygiene, following standard precautions to reduce transmission and strategies to reduce VAP, CR-BSI, CAUTI. Environmental factors and architectural lay out also need to be emphasized upon. Infection prevention in special subsets of patients - burns patients, include identifying sources of organism, identification of organisms, isolation if required, antibiotic prophylaxis to be used selectively, early removal of necrotic tissue, prevention of tetanus, early nutrition and surveillance. Immunodeficient and Transplant recipients are at a higher risk of opportunistic infections. The post tranplant timetable is divided into three time periods for determining risk of infections. Room ventilation, cleaning and decontamination, protective clothing with care regarding food requires special consideration. Monitoring and Surveillance are prioritized depending upon the needs. Designated infection control teams should supervise the process and help in collection and compilation of data. Antibiotic Stewardship Recommendations include constituting a team, close coordination between teams, audit, formulary restriction, de-escalation, optimizing dosing, active use of information technology among other measure. The recommendations in these guidelines are intended to support, and not replace, good clinical judgment. The recommendations are rated by a letter that indicates the strength of the recommendation and a Roman numeral that indicates the quality of evidence supporting the recommendation, so that readers can ascertain how best to apply the recommendations in their practice environments.

The experience of quarantine for individuals affected by SARS in Toronto.

OBJECTIVE The purpose of this study was to explore the experience of home quarantine during the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in Toronto in 2003. DESIGN Qualitative descriptive design. SAMPLE Stratified random sampling techniques were used to generate a list of potential participants, who varied in terms of gender and closeness of exposure to someone with suspected SARS (contact level). Twenty-one individuals participated in the study. MEASUREMENTS All interviews were audiotaped and followed a semistructured interview guide. Participants were invited to describe their experience of quarantine in detail including their advice for Public Health. RESULTS The experience followed a trajectory of stages beginning before quarantine and ending after quarantine. Despite individual differences, common themes of uncertainty, isolation, and coping intersected the data. CONCLUSIONS Public Health has a dual role of monitoring compliance and providing support to people in quarantine. This study has implications for public health policy and practice in planning for future public health emergencies in terms of the information and the resources required to mount an effective response.

Redesigning Primary Care to Address the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Midst of the Pandemic.

During a pandemic, primary care is the first line of defense. It is able to reinforce public health messages, help patients manage at home, and identify those in need of hospital care. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, primary care scrambled to rapidly transform itself and protect clinicians, staff, and patients while remaining connected to patients. Using the established public health framework for addressing a pandemic, we describe the actions primary care needs to take in a pandemic. Recommended actions are based on observed experiences of the authors' primary care practices and networks. Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, tasks focused on promoting physical distancing and encouraging patients with suspected illness or exposure to self-quarantine. Testing was not available and contract tracing was not possible. As the pandemic spread, in-person care was converted to virtual care using telehealth. Practices remained connected to patients using registries to reach out to those at risk for infection, with uncontrolled chronic conditions, or were socially vulnerable. Practices managed most patients with suspected COVID-19 at home. As the pandemic decelerates, practices are now preparing to address the direct and indirect consequences-complications from COVID-19 infections, missed treatment for acute problems, inadequate prevention, uncontrolled chronic disease, mental illness, and greater social needs. Throughout, practices bore tremendous financial burden, laying off staff or even closing at a time when most needed. Primary care must learn from this experience and be ready for the next pandemic. Policymakers and payers cannot fail primary care during their next time of need.

Efficiency of quarantine during an epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome--Beijing, China, 2003.

During March--July 2003, an epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Beijing, China, accounted for 2,521 probable cases (attack rate: 19 per 100,000 population). To control the epidemic, public health officials initiated enhanced surveillance, isolation of SARS patients, use of personal protective equipment (PPE) by health-care workers, and quarantine of contacts of known SARS patients. Approximately 30,000 Beijing residents were quarantined in their homes or quarantine sites. To guide future quarantine policy, the Chinese Field Epidemiology Training Program (China FETP) of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC) conducted a survey to estimate the risk for acquiring SARS among quarantined residents of Haidian District (2001 population: 2.24 million), Beijing, in May 2003, 1 month after the epidemic peaked. This report summarizes the results of that survey, which indicate that, as a component of a comprehensive SARS-control program, quarantine should be limited to persons who have contact with an actively ill SARS patient in the home or hospital, allowing for better focus of resources in future outbreaks.

Community Calls: Lessons and Insights Gained from a Medical–Religious Community Engagement During the COVID-19 Pandemic

During the pandemic caused by the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2, public health instructions were issued with the hope of curbing the virus’ spread. In an effort to assure accordance with these instructions, equitable strategies for at-risk and vulnerable populations and communities are warranted. One such strategy was our community conference calls, implemented to disseminate information on the pandemic and allow community leaders to discuss struggles and successes. Over the first 6 weeks, we held 12 calls, averaging 125 (standard deviation 41) participants. Participants were primarily from congregations and faith-based organizations that had an established relationship with the hospital, but also included school leaders, elected officials, and representatives of housing associations. Issues discussed included reasons for quarantining, mental health, social isolation, health disparities, and ethical concerns regarding hospital resources. Concerns identified by the community leaders as barriers to effective quarantining and adherence to precautions included food access, housing density, and access to screening and testing. Through the calls, ways to solve such challenges were addressed, with novel strategies and resources reaching the community. This medical–religious resource has proven feasible and valuable during the pandemic and warrants discussions on reproducing it for other communities during this and future infectious disease outbreaks.

How to improve adherence with quarantine: Rapid review of the evidence

Objectives: The January 2020 outbreak of coronavirus has once again thrown the vexed issue of quarantine into the spotlight, with many countries asking their citizens to self-isolate if they have potentially come into contact with the infection. However, adhering to quarantine is difficult. Decisions on how to apply quarantine should be based on the best available evidence to increase the likelihood of people adhering to protocols. We conducted a rapid review to identify factors associated with adherence to quarantine during infectious disease outbreaks. Study design: Rapid evidence review. Methods: We searched Medline, PsycINFO and Web of Science for published literature on the reasons for and factors associated with adherence to quarantine during an infectious disease outbreak. Results: We found 3163 papers and included 14 in the review. Adherence to quarantine ranged from as little as 0 up to 92.8%. The main factors which influenced or were associated with adherence decisions were the knowledge people had about the disease and quarantine procedure, social norms, perceived benefits of quarantine and perceived risk of the disease, as well as practical issues such as running out of supplies or the financial consequences of being out of work. Conclusions: People vary in their adherence to quarantine during infectious disease outbreaks. To improve this, public health officials should provide a timely, clear rationale for quarantine and information about protocols; emphasise social norms to encourage this altruistic behaviour; increase the perceived benefit that engaging in quarantine will have on public health; and ensure that sufficient supplies of food, medication and other essentials are provided.

If you ask them, will they come? Predictors of quarantine compliance during a hypothetical avian influenza pandemic: results from a statewide survey.

BACKGROUND An influenza pandemic, such as that of the H1N1 virus, raises questions about how to respond effectively to a lethal outbreak. Most plans have focused on minimizing impact by containing the virus through quarantine, but quarantine has not been used widely in the United States and little is known about what would be the public's response. The purpose of this study was to investigate factors that influence an individual's decision to comply with a hypothetical avian influenza quarantine order. METHODS A total of 1204 adult Pennsylvania residents participated in a random digit dial telephone sample. The residents were interviewed regarding their attitudes about and knowledge of avian influenza and about compliance with quarantine orders, including staying at home or traveling to a government-designated facility. RESULTS Analysis of variance showed differences among demographic groups in willingness to comply with quarantine orders, with women and individuals not presently employed more willing to stay at home or to travel to a government-designated facility if ordered. Those who did not regularly attend religious services were significantly less willing than those who did attend regularly to comply with any type of quarantine order. Regression analysis indicated that demographic variables, overall knowledge of avian influenza, attitudes about its severity, and the belief that the respondent and/or his or her significant other(s) may contract it were predictive. CONCLUSIONS The results of this study can provide health planners and policy makers with information for improving their efforts to conduct a quarantine successfully, including crafting messages and targeting information to certain groups of people to communicate risk about the epidemic.

Lessons from the History of Quarantine, from Plague to Influenza A

In the new millennium, the centuries-old strategy of quarantine is becoming a powerful component of the public health response to emerging and reemerging infectious diseases. During the 2003 pandemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome, the use of quarantine, border controls, contact tracing, and surveillance proved effective in containing the global threat in just over 3 months. For centuries, these practices have been the cornerstone of organized responses to infectious disease outbreaks. However, the use of quarantine and other measures for controlling epidemic diseases has always been controversial because such strategies raise political, ethical, and socioeconomic issues and require a careful balance between public interest and individual rights. In a globalized world that is becoming ever more vulnerable to communicable diseases, a historical perspective can help clarify the use and implications of a still-valid public health strategy.

Art of prevention: Life in the time of coronavirus

How to improve adherence with quarantine: rapid review of the evidence

OBJECTIVES: The December 2019 outbreak of coronavirus has once again thrown the vexed issue of quarantine into the spotlight, with many countries asking their citizens to 'self-isolate' if they have potentially come into contact with the infection. However, adhering to quarantine is difficult. Decisions on how to apply quarantine should be based on the best available evidence to increase the likelihood of people adhering to protocols. We conducted a rapid review to identify factors associated with adherence to quarantine during infectious disease outbreaks. STUDY DESIGN: The study design is a rapid evidence review. METHODS: We searched Medline, PsycINFO and Web of Science for published literature on the reasons for and factors associated with adherence to quarantine during an infectious disease outbreak. RESULTS: We found 3163 articles and included 14 in the review. Adherence to quarantine ranged from as little as 0 up to 92.8%. The main factors which influenced or were associated with adherence decisions were the knowledge people had about the disease and quarantine procedure, social norms, perceived benefits of quarantine and perceived risk of the disease, as well as practical issues such as running out of supplies or the financial consequences of being out of work. CONCLUSIONS: People vary in their adherence to quarantine during infectious disease outbreaks. To improve this, public health officials should provide a timely, clear rationale for quarantine and information about protocols; emphasise social norms to encourage this altruistic behaviour; increase the perceived benefit that engaging in quarantine will have on public health; and ensure that sufficient supplies of food, medication and other essentials are provided.

Reflection on SARS precautions in a severe intellectual disabilities hospital in Hong Kong

Background Hong Kong went through a battle with a new respiratory disease, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), from March to June 2003. All clinical settings, including rehabilitative and infirmary setting, have actively involved in fighting against the infection. The intent of this paper was to reflect on the SARS precautionary measures that had been taken in a severe intellectual disabilities hospital in Hong Kong. Methods A review on six SARS precautionary measures were conducted. They were assessment of risk, formulation of operational guidelines, implementation of infection control measures, education and training of staff, conducting audits and carrying out environmental improvement work. Results Patients were at risk of getting infected from carers, visitors, volunteers, and staff and patients of general hospitals. A SARS Quarantine Unit, isolation ward, was opened to isolate patients who might have had close contact with SARS patients during a stay in a general hospital or when they returned from home leave. Undoubtedly, both staff and relatives participated in preventing the patients from being infected. No day leave and home leave was reported and the number of hospitalization in general hospital was decreased during the critical period. Three infection control audits were conducted and improvement work was carried out subsequently. Conclusion The practice of grouping within a standard isolation room is recommended to continue in the future. Moreover, intensive infection control training for all staff is of highest importance to safeguard the health of both staff and patient.

Infection control measures of a Taiwanese hospital to confront the COVID-19 pandemic

The World Health Organization announced the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak a pandemic on 12 March 2020. Although being in proximity to China, the original epicenter of the COVID-19 outbreak, Taiwan has maintained a low number of COVID-19 cases despite its close social ties and heavy traffic between Taiwan and China. Containment strategies executed by the Taiwanese government have attracted global attention. Similarly, in-hospital settings, high alertness and swift responses to the changing outbreak situation are necessary to ensure hospital staff members' safety so they can continue to save patients' lives. Herein, we present infection control measures that can be adopted in hospital settings that were executed in a Taiwanese hospital to confront the COVID-19 pandemic, including emergency preparedness and responses from the hospital administration, education, surveillance, patient flow arrangement, the partition of hospital zones, and the prevention of a systemic shutdown by using the "divided cabin, divided flow" strategy. The measures implemented by a Taiwan hospital during the COVID-19 pandemic may not be universally applicable in every hospital. Nonetheless, the presented infection control methods have been practically executed and can be referenced or modified to fit each hospital's unique condition.

Abstract Objectives The January 2020 outbreak of coronavirus has once again thrown the vexed issue of quarantine into the spotlight, with many countries asking their citizens to ‘self-isolate’ if they have potentially come into contact with the infection. However, adhering to quarantine is difficult. Decisions on how to apply quarantine should be based on the best available evidence to increase the likelihood of people adhering to protocols. We conducted a rapid review to identify factors associated with adherence to quarantine during infectious disease outbreaks. Study design Rapid evidence review. Methods We searched Medline, PsycINFO and Web of Science for published literature on the reasons for and factors associated with adherence to quarantine during an infectious disease outbreak. Results We found 3163 papers and included 14 in the review. Adherence to quarantine ranged from as little as 0 up to 92.8%. The main factors which influenced or were associated with adherence decisions were the knowledge people had about the disease and quarantine procedure, social norms, perceived benefits of quarantine and perceived risk of the disease, as well as practical issues such as running out of supplies or the financial consequences of being out of work. Conclusions People vary in their adherence to quarantine during infectious disease outbreaks. To improve this, public health officials should provide a timely, clear rationale for quarantine and information about protocols; emphasise social norms to encourage this altruistic behaviour; increase the perceived benefit that engaging in quarantine will have on public health; and ensure that sufficient supplies of food, medication and other essentials are provided.

Time, distance, shielding and ALARA; drawing similarities between measures for radiation protection and Coronavirus disease pandemic response.

Singapore's experience of SARS.

The coronavirus that causes severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is transmitted mainly via respiratory droplets. Typical presenting symptoms are akin to those of ordinary pneumonia. Young patients start with fever, chills, malaise, headache, or myalgia; cough and dyspnoea follow. Older persons and those taking corticosteroids may have neither fever nor respiratory symptoms. Exceptional suspicion is needed to identify SARS early in the illness. During an outbreak, even patients with low suspicion of SARS should be promptly isolated, and all contacts quarantined. Health workers need training in the use of appropriate barriers against droplets and other body fluids. Any fever cluster in patients or carers requires immediate action: discharges, visits, and transfers between wards and hospitals should be stopped. Halting hospital admissions and ten-day quarantine of suspected cases create wide buffer zones. To counter a possible resurgence of SARS, a system of prepared isolation and quarantine facilities is important.

Are Quaternary Ammonium Compounds, the Workhorse Disinfectants, Effective against Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome-Coronavirus-2?

A novel virus named Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome-Coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) emerged from Wuhan, China in late 2019. Since then, the virus has quickly spread worldwide, leading the World Health Organization to declare it as a pandemic; by the end of April 2020, the number of cases exceeded 3 million. Due to the high infectivity rate, SARS-CoV-2 is difficult to contain, making disinfectant protocols vital, especially for essential, highly trafficked areas such as hospitals, grocery stores, and delivery centers. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, best practices to slow the spread rely on good hand hygiene, including proper handwashing practices as well as the use of alcohol-based hand sanitizers. However, they provide warning against sanitizing products containing benzalkonium chloride (BAC), which has sparked concern in both the scientific community as well as the general public as BAC, a common quaternary ammonium compound (QAC), is ubiquitous in soaps and cleaning wipes as well as hospital sanitation kits. This viewpoint aims to highlight the outdated and incongruous data in the evaluation of BAC against the family of known coronaviruses and points to the need for further evaluation of the efficacy of QACs against coronaviruses.

An acute febrile outbreak in a refugee community of an Italian asylum seeker center: lessons learned

Abstract Objectives The management of infectious outbreaks in closed settings represents an important public health issue. An outbreak of acute febrile syndrome affecting 22 refugees resident at the Asylum Seekers Centre of Castelnuovo di Porto in Rome has been reported, and the preventive and control measures adopted have been described as an example of public health safety. Methods Pharyngeal swab and whole-blood samples were collected from 22 cases observed and analyzed for standard bacterial cultures and respiratory and herpesviruses by qualitative CLART PneumoVir2 and Entherpex microarray. Results A possible respiratory-transmitted etiology and a concomitant reactivation of multiple herpesviruses have been evidenced. The epidemiological investigation showed that the spread of the epidemic was promoted because patients were hosted in neighboring rooms or in the same room, facilitating the rapid spread of infectious disease. Conclusions The potential way of transmission was supposed, and preventive measures for infection control were adopted. The measures adopted are an example of best practice for outbreak management, and the microbiological surveillance is recommended for public health improvement.

Chapter 26 Quarantine facilities and operations

Publisher Summary This chapter focuses on quarantine requirements at animal facilities. The well-established quarantine measures for nonhuman primates and those that have re-emerged for rodents are very important. The increased use and exchange of genetically engineered mutant mice especially demands rodent quarantine capabilities for the majority of research institutions. Apart from species-specific housing requirements, it is important to consider pathogens to be contained in terms of the route of transmission, and degree of hazard to human and animal health. Animals obtained from commercial vendors, as opposed to other research institutions, may be less likely to harbor undesirable microorganisms, often allowing them to be exempt from a quarantine program. The ideal quarantine facility should be flexible enough to allow the use of multiple species, and take into account the number and frequency of shipments expected. The more shipments and different species involved, the more subdivided the facility should be, through the use of multiple rooms, cubicles, isolators, etc. At a minimum, ABSL2 design criteria should be used to enable the containment of pathogens at the room or cage level, while also preventing agent transmission via contaminated animal waste, fomites, and personnel.

You Need a Plan: A Stepwise Protocol for Operating Room Preparedness During an Infectious Pandemic.

Background The worldwide spread of SARS-CoV-2, the coronavirus that causes the syndrome designated COVID-19, presents a challenge for emergency operative management. The transmission and virulence of this new pathogen has raised concern for how best to protect operating room staff while effectively providing care to the infected patient requiring urgent or emergent surgery. Observations Establishment of a clear protocol that adheres to rigorous infection control measures while providing a safe system for interfacility transport and operative care is vital to a successful surgical pandemic response. While emergency protocols must be rapidly developed, they should be collaboratively improved and incorporate new knowledge as and when it becomes available. These measures combined with practice drills to keep operating room personnel ready and able should help construct processes that are useful, easy to follow, and tailored to the unique local environment of each health care setting. Conclusions After the initial apprehensions and struggles during our confrontation with the COVID-19 crisis, it is our hope that the experience we share will be helpful to surgical staff at other institutions grappling with the challenges of operative care in the pandemic environment. While this protocol focuses on the current COVID-19 pandemic, these recommendations serve as a template for surgical preparedness that can be readily adapted to infectious disease crisis that unfortunately might emerge in the future.

Preparing for a COVID-19 pandemic: a review of operating room outbreak response measures in a large tertiary hospital in Singapore

The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak has been designated a public health emergency of international concern. To prepare for a pandemic, hospitals need a strategy to manage their space, staff, and supplies so that optimum care is provided to patients. In addition, infection prevention measures need to be implemented to reduce in-hospital transmission. In the operating room, these preparations involve multiple stakeholders and can present a significant challenge. Here, we describe the outbreak response measures of the anesthetic department staffing the largest (1,700-bed) academic tertiary level acute care hospital in Singapore (Singapore General Hospital) and a smaller regional hospital (Sengkang General Hospital). These include engineering controls such as identification and preparation of an isolation operating room, administrative measures such as modification of workflow and processes, introduction of personal protective equipment for staff, and formulation of clinical guidelines for anesthetic management. Simulation was valuable in evaluating the feasibility of new operating room set-ups or workflow. We also discuss how the hierarchy of controls can be used as a framework to plan the necessary measures during each phase of a pandemic, and review the evidence for the measures taken. These containment measures are necessary to optimize the quality of care provided to COVID-19 patients and to reduce the risk of viral transmission to other patients or healthcare workers.

Se préparer pour la pandémie de COVID-19: revue des moyens déployés dans un bloc opératoire d'un grand hôpital tertiaire au Singapour./ Preparing for a COVID-19 pandemic: a review of operating room outbreak response measures in a large tertiary hospital in Singapore

Wearing masks in a pediatric hospital: developing practical guidelines.

During the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in the spring of 2003, strict infection control measures were implemented in Toronto and surrounding hospitals. These measures included extreme restrictions on those who would normally accompany patients to the hospital, screening for SARS, and protective attire for hospital staff, including masks, face shields, goggles, gloves and gowns. At Toronto's Hospital for Sick Children (HSC), patients could only be accompanied or visited by one person, often only in patients' rooms. For the first four weeks, patients and their designated parent had to wear masks in almost all areas of the hospital. Staff wore masks (and other appropriate protective clothing) whenever in contact with patients and in many patient care areas. Although these barriers were an important part of containing SARS, their use created significant challenges for patients and staff. This article focusses on the use of infection control masks in routine pediatric healthcare and the tools developed by HSC staff to reduce the negative psychosocial impact on children and families.

Safe Hospital Preparedness in the Era of COVID-19: The Swiss Cheese Model

Abstract Since the first emergence in December 2019, COVID-19 rapidly spread out worldwide. During the pandemic of an emerging infectious disease, it is very important to prevent nosocomial outbreak and operate hospitals safely to maintain their functions. In this article, we presented the strategies for safe hospital operation based on the experiences of the Republic of Korea during early COVID-19 pandemic. Each hospital should keep multiple layered defenses to prevent even small cracks in the hospital’s quarantine system.

Impact of intervention methods on COVID-19 transmission in Shenzhen

By March 31, 2020, COVID-19 had spread to more than 200 countries. Over 750,000 confirmed cases were reported, leading to more than 36,000 deaths. In this study, we analysed the efficiency of various intervention strategies to prevent infection by the virus, SARS-CoV-2, using an agent-based SEIIR model, in the fully urbanised city of Shenzhen, Guangdong Province, China. Shortening the duration from symptom onset to hospital admission, quarantining recent arrivals from Hubei Province, and letting symptomatic individuals stay at home were found to be the three most important interventions to reduce the risk of infection in Shenzhen. The ideal time window for a mandatory quarantine of arrivals from Hubei Province was between 10 January and January 17, 2020, while the ideal time window for local intervention strategies was between 15 and 22 January. The risk of infection could have been reduced by 50% if all symptomatic individuals had immediately gone to hospital for isolation, and by 35% if a 14-day quarantine for arrivals from Hubei Province had been introduced one week earlier. Intervention strategies implemented in Shenzhen were effective, and the spread of infection would be controlled even if the initial basic reproduction number had doubled. Our results may be useful for other cities when choosing their intervention strategies to prevent outbreaks of COVID-19.

Transport and Management of Patients With Confirmed or Suspected Ebola Virus Disease

The foundation of safe care for patients with confirmed or suspected Ebola virus disease is effective infection control practice, which requires implementation of appropriate administrative policies, work practices, and environmental controls, accompanied by focused education, training, and supervision. In 2002, Emory University partnered with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to develop a capability for the evaluation and management of individuals with serious communicable disease. In 2005, the University of Nebraska developed a similar isolation capability. In each case, the hospitals partnered with emergency medical services (EMS) professionals to ensure safe out-of-hospital transport and management of their patients. The objectives of these hospital and out-of-hospital collaborations were to close education, training, and practice gaps to best facilitate the care for patients with serious communicable disease while ensuring the safety of the medics and the general public through meticulous implementation of infection control practices as recommended by Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The description of practices implemented by EMS teams in these communities for the transport of patients with confirmed Ebola virus disease is shared so that others might more readily implement these practices, policies, and procedures as applicable to their mission requirements and system design. Transport of patients with relevant travel history and development of illness (persons under investigation) is also included.

A joint action in times of pandemic: the German BioImaging recommendations for operating imaging core facilities during the SARS-Cov-2 emergency

Operating shared resource laboratories (SRL) in times of pandemic is a challenge for research institutions. In a multi-user, high-turnover working space, the transmission of infectious agents is difficult to control. To address this challenge, imaging core facility managers being members of German BioImaging discussed how shared microscopes could be operated with minimal risk of spreading SARS-CoV-2 between users and staff. Here, we describe the resulting guidelines and explain their rationale, with a focus on separating users in space and time, protective face masks, and keeping surfaces virus-free. These recommendations may prove useful for other types of SRLs.

Certainties and Uncertainties Facing Emerging Respiratory Infectious Diseases: Lessons from SARS

Every emerging infectious disease is a challenge to the whole of mankind. There are uncertainties regarding whether there will be a pandemic, if it will be caused by the highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza virus, when or where it will occur, how imminent or how severe it will be. No one can accurately predict if and when a given virus will become a pandemic virus. Pandemic prevention strategies must be based on preparing for the unexpected and being capable of reacting accordingly. There is growing evidence that infection control measures were helpful in containment of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) as well as avian influenza. Compliance of standard infection control measures, intensive promotion of hand and respiratory hygiene, vigilance and triage of patients with febrile illness, and specific infection control measures are key components to contain a highly contagious disease in hospital and to protect healthcare workers, patients and visitors. The importance of standard precautions for any patient and cleaning and disinfection for the healthcare environment cannot be overemphasized. SARS illustrated dramatically the potential of air travel and globalization for the dissemination of an emerging infectious disease. To prevent the potential serious consequences of pandemic influenza, timely implementation of pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical interventions locally within the outbreak area is the key to minimizing global spread. Herein, we relate our perspective on useful lessons derived from a review of the SARS epidemic that may be useful to physicians, especially when looking ahead to the next epidemic.

Essential Role of Patient Blood Management in a Pandemic: A Call for Action

The World Health Organization (WHO) has declared coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), the disease caused by the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), a pandemic. Global health care now faces unprecedented challenges with widespread and rapid human-to-human transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and high morbidity and mortality with COVID-19 worldwide. Across the world, medical care is hampered by a critical shortage of not only hand sanitizers, personal protective equipment, ventilators, and hospital beds, but also impediments to the blood supply. Blood donation centers in many areas around the globe have mostly closed. Donors, practicing social distancing, some either with illness or undergoing self-quarantine, are quickly diminishing. Drastic public health initiatives have focused on containment and "flattening the curve" while invaluable resources are being depleted. In some countries, the point has been reached at which the demand for such resources, including donor blood, outstrips the supply. Questions as to the safety of blood persist. Although it does not appear very likely that the virus can be transmitted through allogeneic blood transfusion, this still remains to be fully determined. As options dwindle, we must enact regional and national shortage plans worldwide and more vitally disseminate the knowledge of and immediately implement patient blood management (PBM). PBM is an evidence-based bundle of care to optimize medical and surgical patient outcomes by clinically managing and preserving a patient's own blood. This multinational and diverse group of authors issue this "Call to Action" underscoring "The Essential Role of Patient Blood Management in the Management of Pandemics" and urging all stakeholders and providers to implement the practical and commonsense principles of PBM and its multiprofessional and multimodality approaches.

Optimizing severe acute respiratory syndrome response strategies: lessons learned from quarantine.

Taiwan used quarantine as 1 of numerous interventions implemented to control the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome in 2003. From March 18 to July 31, 2003, 147,526 persons were placed under quarantine. Quarantining only persons with known exposure to people infected with severe acute respiratory syndrome could have reduced the number of persons quarantined by approximately 64%. Focusing quarantine efforts on persons with known or suspected exposure can greatly decrease the number of persons placed under quarantine, without substantially compromising its yield and effectiveness.

The psychological impact of quarantine and how to reduce it: rapid review of the evidence

The December, 2019 coronavirus disease outbreak has seen many countries ask people who have potentially come into contact with the infection to isolate themselves at home or in a dedicated quarantine facility. Decisions on how to apply quarantine should be based on the best available evidence. We did a Review of the psychological impact of quarantine using three electronic databases. Of 3166 papers found, 24 are included in this Review. Most reviewed studies reported negative psychological effects including post-traumatic stress symptoms, confusion, and anger. Stressors included longer quarantine duration, infection fears, frustration, boredom, inadequate supplies, inadequate information, financial loss, and stigma. Some researchers have suggested long-lasting effects. In situations where quarantine is deemed necessary, officials should quarantine individuals for no longer than required, provide clear rationale for quarantine and information about protocols, and ensure sufficient supplies are provided. Appeals to altruism by reminding the public about the benefits of quarantine to wider society can be favourable.

Art of prevention: Life in the time of coronavirus

Abstract The novel coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has continued to progress since its discovery in December 2019. A cluster of patients with atypical pneumonia identified in Wuhan, China, served as the epicenter of this recent epidemic. This family of viruses is responsible for the common cold along with the infamous severe acute respiratory syndrome epidemic in 2002 and Middle East respiratory syndrome in 2012. The Southern China Wholesale Market reportedly has connections to the original 27 cases in Wuhan, China. The worldwide confirmed case total has eclipsed 1,450,000, with more than 83,000 deaths. Patient presentation ranges from mild respiratory illness to acute respiratory distress syndrome and subsequent death. Early epidemiologic studies of viral spread support the hypothesis that COVID-19 can remain latent with an extended and infectious incubation period. The U.S. government has issued level 3 precautions for most international travel, along with prohibiting entry to foreign nationals traveling from China, Iran, the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, and the European Schengen area (e.g., France, Italy, Germany). Prevention remains the mainstay in treating and defeating the COVID-19 epidemic. Anyone infected or suspected of being infected should self-quarantine at home or admit themselves to a specified hospital with infrastructure to handle the situation. The combination of prevention and containment provides the best opportunity to stall the spread of COVID-19.

Curtailing transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome within a community and its hospital.

Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) has been transmitted extensively within hospitals, and healthcare workers (HCWs) have comprised a large proportion of SARS cases worldwide. We present a stochastic model of a SARS outbreak in a community and its hospital. For a range of basic reproductive numbers (R(0)) corresponding to conditions in different cities (but with emphasis on R(0) approximately 3 as reported for Hong Kong and Singapore), we evaluate contact precautions and case management (quarantine and isolation) as containment measures. Hospital-based contact precautions emerge as the most potent measures, with hospital-wide measures being particularly important if screening of HCWs is inadequate. For R(0) = 3, case isolation alone can control a SARS outbreak only if isolation reduces transmission by at least a factor of four and the mean symptom-onset-to-isolation time is less than 3 days. Delays of a few days in contact tracing and case identification severely degrade the utility of quarantine and isolation, particularly in high-transmission settings. Still more detrimental are delays between the onset of an outbreak and the implementation of control measures; for given control scenarios, our model identifies windows of opportunity beyond which the efficacy of containment efforts is reduced greatly. By considering pathways of transmission in our system, we show that if hospital-based transmission is not halted, measures that reduce community-HCW contact are vital to preventing a widespread epidemic. The implications of our results for future emerging pathogens are discussed.

Nurses and the control of infectious disease. Understanding epidemiology and disease transmission is vital to nursing care.

Epidemiology examines the distribution and source of a disease in a population. Understanding epidemiology and disease transmission is vital to nursing care. Infectious disease transmission requires three components: an agent (virus, bacterium, parasite or other microbe), a vulnerable host and a conducive environment. Disease spread can occur through direct contact or via indirect methods (airborne droplets, vectors, fomites, water or food). Intervention can occur by attacking the agent (e.g., using microbicides), changing the environment (e.g., providing negative pressure rooms) or strengthening the host (e.g., vaccination). Three epidemiologically relevant microbes are the SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome)-associated coronavirus, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and Clostridium difficile (C. difficile). The first is an emerging pathogen, and the latter two are existing agents that have mutated such that they are resistant to their standard treatments. For SARS, control measures include screening for possible cases and appropriate triage, respiratory and barrier precautions within the healthcare facility, and voluntary isolation in the community for contacts or healthcare workers who exhibit symptoms. Control measures for MRSA include the screening of patient lesions, isolating or cohorting patients who are already infected, covering wounds with impermeable dressings, treating staff and patient carriers with antibiotics, and improved hygiene. Control measures for C. difficile Control measures include paying close attention to the hygiene of the clinical setting, disinfecting using bleach and the isolation of infected patients.

Efficacy of Mass Quarantine as Leverage of Health System Governance During COVID-19 Outbreak: A Mini Policy Review.

On January 23, 2020, the Chinese government announced the city lockdown of Wuhan. Since then, there have been controversial debates among experts about the efficacy of mass quarantine, the oldest and probably one of the most effective methods for controlling infectious disease outbreaks. The impact of health policymaking section of health system governance becomes visible to all stakeholders and the public in such emergency contexts. The success and failure of such policies should be evaluated in order to find the proper course of action for the local and international communities. In this review, we aim to investigate the efficacy of mass quarantine in China during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. We found good quality evidence for the effectiveness of mass quarantine during the current stage of COVID-19 pandemic, and these strategies seem to have been highly effective in controlling the spread of the disease.

You Need a Plan: A Stepwise Protocol for Operating Room Preparedness During an Infectious Pandemic

Background: The worldwide spread of SARS-CoV-2, the coronavirus that causes the syndrome designated COVID-19, presents a challenge for emergency operative management The transmission and virulence of this new pathogen has raised concern for how best to protect operating room staff while effectively providing care to the infected patient requiring urgent or emergent surgery Observations: Establishment of a clear protocol that adheres to rigorous infection control measures while providing a safe system for interfacility transport and operative care is vital to a successful surgical pandemic response While emergency protocols must be rapidly developed, they should be collaboratively improved and incorporate new knowledge as and when it becomes available These measures combined with practice drills to keep operating room personnel ready and able should help construct processes that are useful, easy to follow, and tailored to the unique local environment of each health care setting Conclusions: After the initial apprehensions and struggles during our confrontation with the COVID-19 crisis, it is our hope that the experience we share will be helpful to surgical staff at other institutions grappling with the challenges of operative care in the pandemic environment While this protocol focuses on the current COVID-19 pandemic, these recommendations serve as a template for surgical preparedness that can be readily adapted to infectious disease crisis that unfortunately might emerge in the future

Responsible Return to Essential and Non-Essential Surgery During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Non-essential surgery had largely been suspended during the COVID-19 Pandemic. Enormous amounts of resources were utilized to shift surgical practices to a "disaster footing" with most elective surgeons assuming new roles to offset the anticipated burden from surgical and medical personnel delivering acute care. As the number of COVID-19-infected patients began to plateau in the state of Ohio, a four-phase "Responsible Return to Surgery" approach was adopted in concert with the Ohio Department of Health and the Ohio Hospital Association. This approach was adopted understanding that a simple return to the status quo prior to the COVID-19 pandemic might be harmful to patients, providers, and staff. The discrete phases undertaken at our quaternary care institution for a responsible return to non-essential surgery are outlined with the goal of ensuring timely care, minimizing community transmission, and preserving personal protective equipment. Operationalizing these phases relied upon the widespread use of telehealth, systematic COVID-19 testing, and real-time monitoring of hospital and personal protective equipment resources.

Foundations of the severe acute respiratory syndrome preparedness and response plan for healthcare facilities.

OBJECTIVE To help facilities prepare for potential future cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). DESIGN AND PARTICIPANTS The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), assisted by members of professional societies representing public health, healthcare workers, and healthcare administrators, developed guidance to help facilities both prepare for and respond to cases of SARS. INTERVENTIONS The recommendations in the CDC document were based on some of the important lessons learned in healthcare settings around the world during the SARS outbreak of 2003, including that (1) a SARS outbreak requires a coordinated and dynamic response by multiple groups; (2) unrecognized cases of SARS-associated coronavirus are a significant source of transmission; (3) restricting access to the healthcare facility can minimize transmission; (4) airborne infection isolation is recommended, but facilities and equipment may not be available; and (5) staffing needs and support will pose a significant challenge. CONCLUSIONS Healthcare facilities were at the center of the SARS outbreak of 2003 and played a key role in controlling the epidemic. Recommendations in the CDC's SARS preparedness and response guidance for healthcare facilities will help facilities prepare for possible future outbreaks of SARS.

Cuidados enfermeros orientados a mitigar la transmisión del coronavirus en caso de positivos: una revisión narrativa./ [Nursing care for controlling coronavirus infections in positive cases: a narrative review.]

OBJECTIVE: This review aims to map scientific evidence in nursing care aimed at controlling coronavirus infections. METHODS: A bibliographic search was conducted in the Medline, CINAHL, Scopus and WOS main databases, with no date limit and using the keywords "transmission", "infection", "contagious", "spreads", "coronavirinae", "coronavirus", "COVID 19", "sars cov 2", "nurses" and "nursing". Initially, 154 studies were identified and, after selecting them according to eligibility criteria, 16 were included. RESULTS: Among the main recommendations according to the available evidence are air exchange in rooms as a measure to reduce the risk of infection among patients; reinforcement of measures in intensive care units; follow-up of positive case contacts; and adequate training of professionals. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS: The studies included in the review addressed infection prevention and control practices by analyzing risks associated with exposure and listing actions to avoid complications in critically ill patients. Patterns of case transmission, contacts and associated factors were identified. Professional knowledge and attitudes were also studied, showing the importance of good infection control training, and of sufficient equipment and adequate infrastructure.Nurses are important vectors of spread. Although there is little evidence available on the effectiveness of care to prevent the spread of SARS-CoV-2, published studies on the prevention and control of previous outbreaks of coronavirus are of considerable value.

Using the Pillars of Infection Prevention to Build an Effective Program for Reducing the Transmission of Emerging and Reemerging Infections

Preventing transmission of emerging infectious diseases remains a challenge for infection prevention and occupational safety programs. The recent Ebola and measles outbreaks highlight the need for pre-epidemic planning, early identification, and appropriate isolation of infected individuals and health care personnel protection. To optimally allocate limited infection control resources, careful consideration of major modes of transmission, the relative infectiousness of the agent, and severity of the pathogen-specific disease are considered. A framework to strategically approach pathogens proposed for health care settings includes generic principles (1) elimination of potential exposure, (2) implementation of administrative controls, (3) facilitation of engineering and environmental controls, and (4) protection of the health care worker and patient using hand hygiene and personal protective equipment. Additional considerations are pre-epidemic vaccination and incremental costs and benefits of infection prevention interventions. Here, major strategies for preventing health-care-associated transmissions are reviewed, including reducing exposure; vaccination; administrative, engineering, and environmental controls; and personal protective equipment. Examples from recent outbreaks are used to highlight key infection prevention aspects and controversies.

Promoting best practices for control of respiratory infections: collaboration between primary care and public health services.

OBJECTIVE To determine the effectiveness of a short-term intervention to promote best practices for control of respiratory infections in primary care physicians' offices. DESIGN Before-after observational study. SETTING Family physicians' offices in Ottawa, Ont. PARTICIPANTS General practitioners and office staff. INTERVENTIONS Four infection-control practices (use of masks, alcohol-based hand gel, and signs, and asking patients to sit at least 1 m apart in the waiting room) were observed, and 2 reported infection-control practices (disinfecting surfaces and use of hand-gel dispensers in examining rooms) were audited before the intervention and 6 weeks after the intervention. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES Percentage of patients asked to use masks and alcohol-based hand gel, number of relevant signs, and percentage of patients asked to sit at least 1 m away from other patients. Percentage of surfaces disinfected and percentage of physicians using hand-gel dispensers in examining rooms. RESULTS Of 242 practices invited, 53 agreed to participate (22% response rate), and within those practices, 143/151 (95%) physicians participated. Signs regarding respiratory infection control measures increased from 15.4% to 81.1% following the intervention (P < .001). At least 1 patient with cough and fever was given a mask in 17% of practices before the intervention; during the observation period after the intervention, at least 1 patient was given a mask in 66.7% of practices (P < .001). Patients were instructed to use alcohol-based hand gel in 24.5% of practices before the intervention and in 79.2% of practices after it (P < .001). Instruction to sit at least 1 m from others in the waiting area was given in 39.6% of practices before the intervention and in 52.8% of practices following the intervention (P < .001). Before the intervention, the percentage of practices using all 4 audited primary prevention measures was 3.8%; after the intervention, 52.8% of practices were using them (P < .001), demonstrating a 49% increase in adoption of best practices. CONCLUSION A multifaceted intervention by public health nurses successfully promoted best practices for control of respiratory infections in primary care offices. Collaboration between public health services and primary care can promote best practices and warrants further study and development in areas of common interest.

Maximizing the Calm before the Storm: Tiered Surgical Response Plan for Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19)

The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) was first diagnosed in Wuhan, China in December 2019 and has now spread throughout the world, being verified by the World Health Organization as a pandemic on March 11. This had led to the calling of a national emergency on March 13 in the US. Many hospitals, healthcare networks, and specifically, departments of surgery, are asking the same questions about how to cope and plan for surge capacity, personnel attrition, novel infrastructure utilization, and resource exhaustion. Herein, we present a tiered plan for surgical department planning based on incident command levels. This includes acute care surgeon deployment (given their critical care training and vertically integrated position in the hospital), recommended infrastructure and transfer utilization, triage principles, and faculty, resident, and advanced care practitioner deployment.

Environmental and Decontamination Issues for Human Coronaviruses and Their Potential Surrogates

Pandemic COVID-19 gives ample reason to generally review coronavirus (CoV) containment. For establishing some preliminary views on decontamination and disinfection, surrogate CoVs have commonly been assessed. This review serves to examine the existing science in regards to CoV containment generically and then to translate these findings into timely applications for COVID-19. There is widespread dissemination of CoVs in the immediate patient environment, and CoVs can potentially be spread via respiratory secretions, urine, and stool. Interpretations of the spread however must consider whether studies examine for viral RNA, virus viability by culture, or both. Pre-symptomatic, asymptomatic, and post-fourteen day virus excretion from patients may complicate the epidemiology. Whereas droplet spread is accepted, there continues to be controversy over the extent of possible airborne spread and especially now for SARS-CoV-2. CoVs are stable in body secretions and sewage at reduced temperatures. In addition to temperature, dryness or relative humidity, initial viral burden, concomitant presence of bioburden, and the type of surface can all affect stability. Generalizing, CoVs can be susceptible to radiation, temperature extremes, pH extremes, peroxides, halogens, aldehydes, many solvents, and several alcohols. Whereas detergent surfactants can have some direct activity, these agents are better used as complements to a complex disinfectant solution. Disinfectants with multiple agents and adverse pH are more likely to be best active at higher water temperatures. Real-life assessments should be encouraged with working dilutions. The use of decontamination and disinfection should be balanced with considerations of patient and caregiver safety. Processes should also be balanced with considerations for other potential pathogens that must be targeted. Given some CoV differences and given that surrogate testing provides experimental correlates at best, direct assessments with SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, and SARS-CoV-2 are required. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

Estimating the Efficacy of Traffic Blockage and Quarantine for the Epidemic Caused by 2019-nCoV (COVID-19)

Background: Since the 2019-nCoV (COVID-19) outbreaks in Wuhan, China, the cumulative number of confirmed cases is increasing every day, and a large number of populations all over the world are at risk. The quarantine and traffic blockage can alleviate the risk of the epidemic and the infections, henceforth evaluating the efficacy of such actions is essential to inform policy makers and raise the public awareness of the importance of self-isolation and quarantine. Method: We collected confirmed case data and the migration data, and introduced the quarantine factor and traffic blockage factor to the Flow-SEIR model. By varying the quarantine factor and traffic blockage factor, we simulated the change of the peak number and arrival time of infections, then the efficacy of these two intervation measures can be analyzed in our simulation. In our study, the self-protection at home is also included in quarantine. Results: In the simulated results, the quarantine and traffic blockage are effective for epidemic control. For Hubei province, the current quarantine factor is estimaed to be 0.405, which means around 40.5% of suceptibles who are close contacting with are in quarantine, and the current traffic blockage factor is estimaed to be 0.66, which indicates around 34% of suceptibles who had flowed out from Hubei. For the other provinces outside Hubei, the current quarantine factor is estimated to be 0.285, and the current traffic blockage factor is estimated to be 0.26. With the quarantine and traffic blockage factor increasing, the number of infections decrease dramatically. We also simulated the start dates of quarantine and traffic blockage at four time points, the simulated results show that the early of warning is also effective for epidemic containing. However, provincial level traffic blockage can only alleviate 21.06% - 22.38% of the peak number of infections. In general, the quarantine is much more effective than the traffic blockage control. Conclusion: Both of quarantine and traffic blockage are effective ways to control the spread of COVID-19. However, the eff icacy of quarantine is found to be much stronger than that of traffic blockage. Considering traffic blockage may also cause huge losses of economy, we propose to gradually deregulate the traffic blockage, and improve quarantine instead. Also, there might be a large number of asymptomatic carriers of COVID-19, the quarantine should be continued for a long time until the epidemic is totally under control.

Prevention and control strategies of general surgeons under COVID-19 pandemic

Abstract The novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 and the disease caused by it, COVID-19, have spread to virtually all countries worldwide within just a few months. The economic and sanitary impact has been enormous. In March 2020, the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic. How to effectively prevent and control SARS-CoV-2 transmission while providing care to surgical patients during the pandemic is a crucial topic. In order to minimize the risk of cross-infection between patients and physicians, many hospitals have taken measures to limit outpatient services, elective hospitalizations, and the number of operations. Based on the prevention and control measures stipulated by major medical institutions in China, this overview provides recommendations for surgeons from three aspects: outpatient treatment, ward management and perioperative protection. Telemedicine should be encouraged as a means of social distancing. Outpatient examination should be selected. Reasonable spatial arrangement and effective environmental disinfection are important for ward management. Patient selection for surgery and timing of operations should be carefully discussed within multi-disciplinary teams. Appropriate personal protective equipment should be worn adapted to the situational risk. On December 31, 2019, China reported to the WHO Country Office a pneumonia of unknown cause detected in Wuhan [2,4]. Subsequently, the disease later named COVID-19 affected a substantial proportion of the population in Wuhan and spread to other areas of China. Relying on a nationwide shutdown and mandatory quarantine, China has effectively curtailed the domestic outbreak. However, due to the high transmissibility of SARS-Cov-2 and the mobility of people, COVID-19 spread to the rest of the world. Many hospitals worldwide were faced with confirmed and suspected SARS-Cov-2 infections, putting a huge strain on the safety of patients and employees. Consequently, surgical patients who seek medical care during the COVID-19 pandemic present significant challenges. This paper summarizes medical care and infection prevention and control in general surgery patients during the COVID-19, pandemic in the light of the current situation in China. It provides reference for surgeons and decision makers in health care in other countries suffering from the COVID-19 pandemic.

epic2: National Evidence-Based Guidelines for Preventing Healthcare-Associated Infections in NHS Hospitals in England

Executive Summary National evidence-based guidelines for preventing healthcare-associated infections (HCAI) in National Health Service (NHS) hospitals in England were commissioned by the Department of Health (DH) and developed during 1998-2000 by a nurse-led multi-professional team of researchers and specialist clinicians. Following extensive consultation, they were published in January 2001.1 These guidelines describe the precautions healthcare workers should take in three areas: standard principles for preventing HCAI, which include hospital environmental hygiene, hand hygiene, the use of personal protective equipment, and the safe use and disposal of sharps; preventing infections associated with the use of short-term indwelling urethral catheters; and preventing infections associated with central venous catheters. The evidence for these guidelines was identified by multiple systematic reviews of experimental and non-experimental research and expert opinion as reflected in systematically identified professional, national and international guidelines, which were formally assessed by a validated appraisal process. In 2003, we developed complementary national guidelines for preventing HCAI in primary and community care on behalf of the National Collaborating Centre for Nursing and Supportive Care (National Institute for Healthand Clinical Excellence).2 A cardinal feature of evidence-based guidelines is that they are subject to timely review in order that new research evidence and technological advances can be identified, appraised and, if shown to be effective in preventing HCAI, incorporated into amended guidelines. Periodically updating the evidence base and guideline recommendations is essential in order to maintain their validity and authority. Consequently, the DH commissioned a review of new evidence published following the last systematic reviews. We have now updated the evidence base for making infection prevention and control recommendations. A critical assessment of the updated evidence indicated that the original epic guidelines published in 2001 remain robust, relevant and appropriate but that adjustments need to be made to some guideline recommendations following a synopsis of the evidence underpinning the guidelines. These updated national guidelines (epic2) provide comprehensive recommendations for preventing HCAI in hospitals and other acute care settings based on the best currently available evidence. Because this is not always the best possible evidence, we have included a suggested agenda for further research in each section of the guidelines. National evidence-based guidelines are broad principles of best practice which need to be integrated into local practice guidelines. To monitor implementation, we have suggested key audit criteria for each section of recommendations. Clinically effective infection prevention and control practice is an essential feature of protecting patients. By incorporating these guidelines into routine daily clinical practice, patient safety can be enhanced and the risk of patients acquiring an infection during episodes of healthcare in NHS hospitals in England can be minimised.

Challenges in Preparing and Managing the Critical Care Services for a Large Urban Area During COVID-19 Outbreak: Perspective From Delhi

The coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has put healthcare services all over the world into a challenging situation. The contagious nature of the disease and the respiratory failure necessitating ventilatory care of these patients have put extra burden on intensive care unit (ICU) services. India has been no exception; by March 2020, the number of COVID-19 patients started increasing in India. This article describes the measures taken and challenges faced in creating ample ICU bed capacity to cater to the anticipated load of patients in the state of Delhi, India, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. The main challenges faced, among others, were estimating the number of ICU beds to be created; deciding on dedicated hospitals to treat COVID-19 patients; procuring ventilators, personal protective equipment, and other related material; mobilizing human resources and providing their training; and providing isolated in-house accommodations to the staff on duty. The authors acknowledge and agree that the methodology proposed in this article is but one way of approaching this difficult scenario and that there could be other, perhaps better, methods of dealing with such a problem.

The otolaryngologist's and anesthesiologist's collaborative role in a pandemic: A large quaternary pediatric center's experience with COVID-19 preparation and simulation

There has been a rapid global spread of a novel coronavirus, the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), which originated in Wuhan China in late 2019. A serious threat of nosocomial spread exists and as such, there is a critical necessity for well-planned and rehearsed processes during the care of the COVID-19 positive and suspected patient to minimize transmission and risk to healthcare providers and other patients. Because of the aerosolization inherent in airway management, the pediatric otolaryngologist and anesthesiologist should be intimately familiar with strategies to mitigate the high-risk periods of viral contamination that are posed to the environment and healthcare personnel during tracheal intubation and extubation procedures. Since both the pediatric otolaryngologist and anesthesiologist are directly involved in emergency airway interventions, both specialties impact the safety of caring for COVID-19 patients and are a part of overall hospital pandemic preparedness. We describe our institutional approach to COVID-19 perioperative pandemic planning at a large quaternary pediatric hospital including operating room management and remote airway management. We outline our processes for the safe and effective care of these patients with emphasis on simulation and pathways necessary to protect healthcare workers and other personnel from exposure while still providing safe, effective, and rapid care.

ACR Statement on Safe Resumption of Routine Radiology Care During the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic

The ACR recognizes that radiology practices are grappling with when and how to safely resume routine radiology care during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Although it is unclear how long the pandemic will last, it may persist for many months. Throughout this time, it will be important to perform safe, comprehensive, and effective care for patients with and patients without COVID-19, recognizing that asymptomatic transmission is common with this disease. Local idiosyncrasies prevent a single prescriptive strategy. However, general considerations can be applied to most practice environments. A comprehensive strategy will include consideration of local COVID-19 statistics; availability of personal protective equipment; local, state, and federal government mandates; institutional regulatory guidance; local safety measures; health care worker availability; patient and health care worker risk factors; factors specific to the indication(s) for radiology care; and examination or procedure acuity. An accurate risk-benefit analysis of postponing versus performing a given routine radiology examination or procedure often is not possible because of many unknown and complex factors. However, this is the overriding principle: If the risk of illness or death to a health care worker or patient from health care-acquired COVID-19 is greater than the risk of illness or death from delaying radiology care, the care should be delayed; however, if the opposite is true, the radiology care should proceed in a timely fashion.

Data quarantine in the time of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Our healthcare information is trapped. It is trapped in the proprietary data models of the electronic medical record and in our healthcare systems' data warehouses. This reality has become strikingly clear as the COVID-19 pandemic has swept across the globe, killing more than 20,000 people in the United States alone. We need answers but struggle to address even the simplest questions. How many individuals are infected? Who is at highest risk for developing severe infection? What therapies are being used to treat hospitalized patients? This crisis is testing the limits of our public health and healthcare systems in many ways, including a "quarantined" health information system. This perspective reviews several deficiencies in healthcare information technology that currently limit our ability to deal with the pandemic and suggests current solutions moving forward.

Efficacy of Mass Quarantine as Leverage of Health System Governance During COVID-19 Outbreak: A Mini Policy Review

Work Better From Home During the Coronavirus Quarantine

Managing Bioterrorism Mass Casualties in an Emergency Department: Lessons Learned From a Rural Community Hospital Disaster Drill

Bioterrorism represents a threat for which most emergency departments (EDs) are ill prepared. In order to develop an evidence-based plan for ED and hospital management of contaminated patients, a review was conducted of the most effective strategies developed during the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic, as well as Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and military guidelines on biowarfare. Six basic steps were identified: 1) lock down the hospital and control access to the ED; 2) protect emergency care personnel with appropriate personal protective equipment; 3) decontaminate and triage patients; 4) isolate patients; 5) treat patients with appropriate medications or measures, including decontamination of wounds; and 6) use restrictive admission and transfer guidelines. By emphasizing these six basic concepts, a rural ED passed an annual state-run bioterrorism mass-casualty drill. The drill provided health care personnel with the knowledge and skills necessary to prepare for future bioterrorism casualties. These same concepts could also be used to manage highly virulent viral or bacterial outbreaks.

Our Next Pandemic Ethics Challenge? Allocating "Normal" Health Care Services.

The pandemic creates unprecedented challenges to society and to health care systems around the world. Like all crises, these provide a unique opportunity to rethink the fundamental limiting assumptions and institutional inertia of our established systems. These inertial assumptions have obscured deeply rooted problems in health care and deflected attempts to address them. As hospitals begin to welcome all patients back, they should resist the temptation to go back to business as usual. Instead, they should retain the more deliberative, explicit, and transparent ways of thinking that have informed the development of crisis standards of care. The key lesson to be learned from those exercises in rational deliberation is that justice must be the ethical foundation of all standards of care. Justice demands that hospitals take a safety-net approach to providing services that prioritizes the most vulnerable segments of society, continue to expand telemedicine in ways that improve access without exacerbating disparities, invest in community-based care, and fully staff hospitals and clinics on nights and weekends.

Use of quarantine in the control of SARS in Singapore

BACKGROUND: A total of 238 cases of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) occurred in Singapore between February 25 and May 11, 2003. Control relied on empirical methods to detect early and isolate all cases and quarantine those who were exposed to prevent spread in the community. METHODS: On April 28, 2003, the Infectious Diseases Act was amended in Parliament to strengthen the legal provisions for serving the Home Quarantine Order (HQO). In mounting large-scale quarantine operations, a framework for contact tracing, serving quarantine orders, surveillance, enforcement, health education, transport, and financial support was developed and urgently put in place. RESULTS: A total of 7863 contacts of SARS cases were served with an HQO, giving a ratio of 38 contacts per case. Most of those served complied well with quarantine; 26 (0.03%) who broke quarantine were penalized. CONCLUSION: Singapore's experience underscored the importance of being prepared to respond to challenges with extraordinary measures. With emerging diseases, health authorities need to rethink the value of quarantine to reduce opportunities for spread from potential reservoirs of infection.

Barrier precautions, isolation protocols, and personal hygiene in veterinary hospitals

Because nosocomial and zoonotic diseases are inherent and ever-present risks in veterinary hospitals, proactive policies should be in place to reduce the risk of sporadic cases and outbreaks. Policies should ideally be put in place before disease issues arise, and policies should be effectively conveyed to all relevant personnel. Written policies are required for practical and liability reasons and should be reviewed regularly. Although no infection control program can eliminate disease concerns, proper implementation of barrier precautions and isolation can reduce the exposure of hospitalized animals and hospital personnel to infectious agents. Appropriate personal hygiene, particularly hand hygiene, can assist in the prevention of disease transmission when pathogens bypass barriers and are able to contact personnel. Veterinary hospitals have moral, professional, and legal requirements to provide a safe workplace and to reduce the risks to hospitalized patients. Based on experience in the human medical field and on the continual emergence of new infectious diseases, infection control challenges can only be expected to increase in the future. Regular reassessment of protocols based on ongoing research and clinical experiences is required.

Strategic measures for the control of surging antimicrobial resistance in Hong Kong and mainland of China

Antimicrobial-resistant bacteria are either highly prevalent or increasing rapidly in Hong Kong and China. Treatment options for these bacteria are generally limited, less effective and more expensive. The emergence and dynamics of antimicrobial resistance genes in bacteria circulating between animals, the environment and humans are not entirely known. Nonetheless, selective pressure by antibiotics on the microbiomes of animal and human, and their associated environments (especially farms and healthcare institutions), sewage systems and soil are likely to confer survival advantages upon bacteria with antimicrobial-resistance genes, which may be further disseminated through plasmids or transposons with integrons. Therefore, antibiotic use must be tightly regulated to eliminate such selective pressure, including the illegalization of antibiotics as growth promoters in animal feed and regulation of antibiotic use in veterinary practice and human medicine. Heightened awareness of infection control measures to reduce the risk of acquiring resistant bacteria is essential, especially during antimicrobial use or institutionalization in healthcare facilities. The transmission cycle must be interrupted by proper hand hygiene, environmental cleaning, avoidance of undercooked or raw food and compliance with infection control measures by healthcare workers, visitors and patients, especially during treatment with antibiotics. In addition to these routine measures, proactive microbiological screening of hospitalized patients with risk factors for carrying resistant bacteria, including history of travel to endemic countries, transfer from other hospitals, and prolonged hospitalization; directly observed hand hygiene before oral intake of drugs, food and drinks; and targeted disinfection of high-touch or mutual-touch items, such as bed rails and bed curtains, are important. Transparency of surveillance data from each institute for public scrutiny provides an incentive for controlling antimicrobial resistance in healthcare settings at an administrative level.

Using the hierarchy of control technologies to improve healthcare facility infection control: lessons from severe acute respiratory syndrome.

Health care facilities need to review their infection control plans to prepare for the possible resurgence of severe acute respiratory syndrome, other emerging pathogens, familiar infectious agents such as tuberculosis and influenza, and bioterrorist threats. This article describes the classic "hierarchy of control technologies" that was successfully used by occupational and environmental medicine professionals to protect workers from illness and death during the resurgence of tuberculosis in the 1990s. Also discussed are related guidelines from building and equipment professional organizations and novel infection control techniques used successfully by various hospitals in Asia, Canada, and the United States during the 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome epidemic. Taken together, they suggest a framework upon which a comprehensive infection control plan can be crafted to prevent the spread of deadly infectious agents to health care workers (clinicians and paraprofessionals), uninfected patients and visitors.

How can airborne transmission of COVID-19 indoors be minimised?

During the rapid rise in COVID-19 illnesses and deaths globally, and notwithstanding recommended precautions, questions are voiced about routes of transmission for this pandemic disease. Inhaling small airborne droplets is probable as a third route of infection, in addition to more widely recognized transmission via larger respiratory droplets and direct contact with infected people or contaminated surfaces. While uncertainties remain regarding the relative contributions of the different transmission pathways, we argue that existing evidence is sufficiently strong to warrant engineering controls targeting airborne transmission as part of an overall strategy to limit infection risk indoors. Appropriate building engineering controls include sufficient and effective ventilation, possibly enhanced by particle filtration and air disinfection, avoiding air recirculation and avoiding overcrowding. Often, such measures can be easily implemented and without much cost, but if only they are recognised as significant in contributing to infection control goals. We believe that the use of engineering controls in public buildings, including hospitals, shops, offices, schools, kindergartens, libraries, restaurants, cruise ships, elevators, conference rooms or public transport, in parallel with effective application of other controls (including isolation and quarantine, social distancing and hand hygiene), would be an additional important measure globally to reduce the likelihood of transmission and thereby protect healthcare workers, patients and the general public.

[The War Against the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-2019): Keys to Successfully Defending Taiwan].

The outbreak of COVID-19 triggered the largest human-virus war in this century. Current evidence indicates that the SARS-CoV-2 strain of coronavirus is mainly transmitted by droplets either by direct or indirect contact. The duration of infectiousness of COVID-19 ranges from 1-2 days before and 7-10 days after the onset of symptoms. It is often difficult to detect the signs and symptoms of infection and to implement timely intervention during the very early stage of infection. Thus, finding and isolating symptomatic patients may not be sufficient to contain this epidemic. Therefore, it is very important to wear masks, take personal precautions, and practice recommended social distancing to achieve source control and stop transmission. Taiwan has learned from its previous experience with the SARS epidemic and prepared for the potential of new disease outbreaks for at least 17 years. This helped the government to implement a multifaceted strategy in the early stages of the COVID-19 outbreak. Taiwan's effective response has made the country a model for pandemic response policy that has been appreciated internationally. This paper examines COVID-19 epidemic prevention from the perspective of infection control strategies. In Taiwan, hospital infection control, which is practiced nationwide, emphasizes the importance to epidemic prevention of collecting and tracking travel history, occupation, contact history, cluster (TOCC) information; practicing hand hygiene; promoting the correct use of personal protective equipment; and maintaining safe distances from others. Personal control measures are recognized as critical to providing a safe environment for patients and staff.

Addressing hospital nurses' fear of abandonment in a bioterrorism emergency.

Most hospitals' disaster plans are extensive and effective at establishing an incident command center, directing material and personnel resources, and triaging patients. However, few organizations have assessed caregivers' needs and fears related to disaster response. When nurses have been interviewed on this topic, findings indicated complex concerns involving fear of loss (e.g., loss of order in their work environment, loss of safe work conditions, loss of freedom to come and go at will, and loss of trust in their hospital's commitment to their best interest). The sobering result of anticipating these losses is fear of abandonment. The purpose of this article is to address factors identified by hospital-based nurses that contribute to their fears of abandonment in a bioterrorism emergency. Hospitals that choose to respond to these concerns will exemplify best practice toward care of the community and care of their own nurses.

Best Practices for Healthcare Facility and Regional Stockpile Maintenance and Sustainment: A Literature Review.

Preparing for mass casualty incidents is essential to maximizing community resilience. Many US-based organizations and regions have developed stockpiles of medications, supplies, and equipment for mass casualty incident preparedness. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) assess and manage federally stockpiled materials, but hospitals, healthcare systems, and regional organizations are responsible for maintaining locally owned caches. The CDC has protocols for assessing and managing the Strategic National Stockpile, but no such guidance exists for local or geographical/regional stockpiles. This article outlines best practices and recommendations identified in the literature related to maintaining and sustaining a local or regional stockpile. Recommendations are provided on the timing and procedures for assessing, inventorying, storing, managing, tracking, and deploying materials stockpiled on site, in a trailer, or in a warehouse. In addition, alternative approaches for maintaining a local or regional cache, such as vendor- or user-managed inventory methods, are addressed. Management of local or regional caches requires an investment in infrastructure and training but is necessary to ensure the integrity of stockpiled medication and supplies and to enable rapid and appropriate activation during a mass casualty incident. Hospitals, healthcare systems, businesses, academic institutions, public health agencies, organizations, and regions can use the recommendations here to develop protocols or policies to properly manage their existing stockpiles, which should minimize costs related to damaged supplies.

Infection control measures of a Taiwanese hospital to confront the COVID‐19 pandemic

The World Health Organization announced the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) outbreak a pandemic on 12 March 2020. Although being in proximity to China, the original epicenter of the COVID‐19 outbreak, Taiwan has maintained a low number of COVID‐19 cases despite its close social ties and heavy traffic between Taiwan and China. Containment strategies executed by the Taiwanese government have attracted global attention. Similarly, in‐hospital settings, high alertness and swift responses to the changing outbreak situation are necessary to ensure hospital staff members' safety so they can continue to save patients' lives. Herein, we present infection control measures that can be adopted in hospital settings that were executed in a Taiwanese hospital to confront the COVID‐19 pandemic, including emergency preparedness and responses from the hospital administration, education, surveillance, patient flow arrangement, the partition of hospital zones, and the prevention of a systemic shutdown by using the “divided cabin, divided flow” strategy. The measures implemented by a Taiwan hospital during the COVID‐19 pandemic may not be universally applicable in every hospital. Nonetheless, the presented infection control methods have been practically executed and can be referenced or modified to fit each hospital's unique condition.

Respiratory protection policies and practices among the health care workforce exposed to influenza in New York State: Evaluating emergency preparedness for the next pandemic

BACKGROUND: New York State hospitals are required to implement a respiratory protection program (RPP) consistent with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration respirator standard. Guidance provided during the 2009 novel H1N1 pandemic expanded on earlier recommendations, emphasizing the need to keep staff in all health care settings healthy to maintain services. METHODS: New York State hospitals with emergency departments having more than 1,000 visits annually were invited to participate; 23 hospitals participated. Health care workers, unit managers, and hospital managers were interviewed regarding knowledge, beliefs, and practices of respiratory protection. Interviewees were observed donning and doffing an N-95 respirator as they normally would during patient care. Written RPPs for each hospital were evaluated. RESULTS: The majority of the hospitals surveyed had implemented an RPP, although unawareness of the policies and practices, as well as inadequacies in education and training exist among health care workers. CONCLUSION: Health care workers and other hospital employees may be unnecessarily exposed to airborne infectious diseases. Having an RPP ensures safe and effective use of N-95 respirators and will help prevent avoidable exposure to disease during a pandemic, protecting the health care workforce and patients alike.

How to reduce the impact of "low-risk patients" following a bioterrorist incident: lessons from SARS, anthrax, and pneumonic plague.

A bioterrorist attack may result in a large number of people who have not been exposed coming to medical facilities in search of treatment or reassurance. In this article, we review evidence from 3 previous biological incidents that are analogous to a bioterrorist attack in order to gauge the likely incidence of such "low-risk patients" and to identify possible strategies for coping with this phenomenon. Evidence from the anthrax attacks in the United States suggested that a surge of low-risk patients is by no means inevitable. Data from the SARS outbreak illustrated that if hospitals are seen as sources of contagion, many patients with non-bioterrorism-related healthcare needs may delay seeking help. Finally, the events surrounding the pneumonic plague outbreak of 1994 in Surat, India, highlighted the need for the public to be kept adequately informed about an incident. Although it is impossible to say what the likely incidence of low-risk patients will be during a future bioterrorist incident, several strategies may help to reduce it and to safeguard the well-being of the low-risk patients themselves. These strategies include providing clear information about who should and should not attend hospital; using telephone services to provide more detailed information and initial screening; employing rapid triage at hospital entrances, based, where possible, on exposure history and objective signs of illness; and following up by telephone those judged to be at low risk.

[The War Against the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-2019): Keys to Successfully Defending Taiwan]

Inpatient Care of Patients with COVID-19: A Guide for Hospitalists

Since its emergence in December 2019, the virus known as severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 has quickly caused a pandemic. This virus causes a disease now known as coronavirus disease 2019, or COVID-19. As an increasing proportion of the at-risk population becomes infected, and patients with severe illness are hospitalized, it is essential for hospitalists to remain current on how to best care for people with suspected or confirmed disease. Establishing a system for logistical planning, and accurate information sharing is strongly recommended. Infection control remains the ultimate goal. As such, health care workers should be educated on universal and isolation precautions, and the appropriate use of personal protective equipment. Social distancing should be encouraged to prevent the spread of infection, and creative and innovative ways to reduce contact may need to be considered. Moreover, it is imperative to prepare for contingencies as medical staff will inevitably get sick or become unavailable. Hospitalists have the difficult task of caring for patients while also adapting to the many logistical and social elements of a pandemic.

A primer for pediatric radiologists on infection control in an era of COVID-19

Pediatric radiology departments across the globe face unique challenges in the midst of the current COVID-19 pandemic that have not been addressed in professional guidelines. Providing a safe environment for personnel while continuing to deliver optimal care to patients is feasible when abiding by fundamental recommendations. In this article, we review current infection control practices across the multiple pediatric institutions represented on the Society for Pediatric Radiology (SPR) Quality and Safety committee. We discuss the routes of infectious transmission and appropriate transmission-based precautions, in addition to exploring strategies to optimize personal protective equipment (PPE) supplies. This work serves as a summary of current evidence-based recommendations for infection control, and current best practices specific to pediatric radiologists. ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL: The online version of this article (10.1007/s00247-020-04713-1) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Appraisal of recommended respiratory infection control practices in primary care and emergency department settings

BACKGROUND: The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic and concern about pandemic influenza prompted the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to develop guidelines to prevent the transmission of all respiratory infections in health care settings during first contact with a potentially infected person. The extent to which health care workers and institutions use these CDC recommended practices is uncertain. METHODS: The study examined health care worker adherence to CDC recommended respiratory infection control practices in primary care clinics and emergency departments of 5 medical centers in King County, Washington, using a self-administered questionnaire. All clinical, allied, and administrative health care workers in study settings were invited to participate: 653 (53%) responded, and 630 were included. RESULTS: The survey revealed important shortcomings in overall personal and institutional use of CDC recommended practices, including deficiencies in posted alerts, patient masking and separation, hand hygiene, personal protective equipment, staff training, and written procedures. Use of recommended measures was generally higher among nursing staff than medical practitioners. CONCLUSION: This study found significant gaps in adherence to CDC recommendations for the control of respiratory infections in ambulatory care clinical settings. Practical strategies are needed to identify and reduce barriers to implementation of recommended practices for control of respiratory infections.

Airborne route and bad use of ventilation systems as non-negligible factors in SARS-CoV-2 transmission

The world is facing a pandemic of unseen proportions caused by a corona virus named SARS-CoV-2 with unprecedent worldwide measures being taken to tackle its contagion. Person-to-person transmission is accepted but WHO only considers aerosol transmission when procedures or support treatments that produce aerosol are performed. Transmission mechanisms are not fully understood and there is evidence for an airborne route to be considered, as the virus remains viable in aerosols for at least 3 h and that mask usage was the best intervention to prevent infection. Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning Systems (HVAC) are used as a primary infection disease control measure. However, if not correctly used, they may contribute to the transmission/spreading of airborne diseases as proposed in the past for SARS. The authors believe that airborne transmission is possible and that HVAC systems when not adequately used may contribute to the transmission of the virus, as suggested by descriptions from Japan, Germany, and the Diamond Princess Cruise Ship. Previous SARS outbreaks reported at Amoy Gardens, Emergency Rooms and Hotels, also suggested an airborne transmission. Further studies are warranted to confirm our hypotheses but the assumption of such way of transmission would cause a major shift in measures recommended to prevent infection such as the disseminated use of masks and structural changes to hospital and other facilities with HVAC systems.

Prevention of infectious diseases in cat shelters: ABCD guidelines.

OVERVIEW Recommendations are given in relation to infectious diseases in rescue shelters. The ABCD recognises that there is a wide variation in the design and management of shelters, and that these largely reflect local pressures. These guidelines are written with this diverse audience in mind; they point to the ideal, and also provide for some level of compromise where this ideal cannot immediately be attained. In addition consideration should be given to general requirements in order to optimise overall health and wellbeing of cats within the shelter. HOUSING: Compartmentalisation of the shelter into at least three individual sections (quarantine area for incoming cats, isolation facilities for sick or potentially infectious cats, and accommodation for clinically healthy, retrovirus-negative cats) can facilitate containment of a disease outbreak, should it occur. STANDARD OF CARE: Incoming cats should receive a full health check by a veterinary surgeon, should be dewormed and tested for retrovirus infections (feline leukaemia virus [FeLV] and/or feline immunodeficiency virus [FIV]) in regions with high prevalence and in shelters that allow contact between cats. Cats which are not rehomed should receive a regular veterinary check-up at intervals recommended by their veterinarian. VACCINATION Each cat should be vaccinated as soon as possible against feline panleukopenia virus (FPV), feline herpesvirus (FHV-1) and feline calicivirus (FCV) infections. HYGIENE: Adequate hygiene conditions should ensure that contact between shedders of infectious agents and susceptible animals is reduced as efficiently as possible by movement control, hygiene procedures of care workers, barrier nursing, cleaning and disinfection. STRESS REDUCTION: Stress reduction is important for overall health and for minimising the risk of recrudescence and exacerbation of infectious diseases. In general, a special effort should be made to rehome cats as soon as possible.

Lessons learned from Asian H5N1 outbreak control.

Numerous lessons have been learned so far in controlling H5N1 avian influenza in Asia. Early detection of incursions of virus prevented establishment of the disease in several countries, notably Japan, South Korea, and Malaysia. In countries where detection of early cases was delayed, infection is endemic and has been for three or more years. Control measures implemented in these countries need to reflect this finding. Vaccination will continue to be one of the key measures used in these endemically infected countries. Used alone, vaccination will not result in elimination of H5N1 viruses from a country, but, if used correctly, it will markedly reduce the prevalence of and susceptibility to infection. Vaccination has already played a valuable role in reducing the adverse effects of H5N1 viruses. Mass culling also reduces the level of infection in infected areas. However, the long-term benefits are limited in endemically infected countries owing to the high probability of reinfection on restocking unless other measures are used in parallel. Full epidemiological studies have not been conducted in many infected countries. Nevertheless, it is recognized that the number of clinical cases does not truly reflect the levels of infection. Domestic ducks and large live poultry markets have played a key role in the persistence of infection, because they can be infected silently. In tackling this disease, countries should adopt integrated control programs using the combination of measures best suited to the local environment. All surveillance data should be shared, both positive and negative, and should include information on cases of infection and disease. Socioeconomic and ecological implications of all control measures should be assessed before implementation, especially the impact on the rural poor.

How Much Support Is There for the Recommendations Made to the General Population during Confinement? A Study during the First Three Days of the COVID–19 Quarantine in Spain

Background: Recommendations on lifestyles during quarantine have been proposed by researchers and institutions since the COVID–19 crisis emerged. However, most of these have never been tested under real quarantine situations or derive from older investigations conducted mostly in China and Canada in the face of infections other than COVID–19. The present study aimed at exploring the relationship between a comprehensive set of recommended lifestyles, socio–demographic, and personality variables and mood during the first stages of quarantine. Methods: A virtual snow–ball recollection technique was used to disseminate the survey across the general population in Spain starting the first day of mandatory quarantine (15 March 2020) until three days later (17 March). In total, 2683 Spanish adults (mean age = 34.86 years, SD = 13.74 years; 77.7% women) from the general population completed measures on socio–demographic, COVID–related, behavioral, personality/cognitive, and mood characteristics. Results: In the present study, depression and anger were higher than levels reported in a previous investigation before the COVID–19 crisis, while vigor, friendliness, and fatigue were lower. Anxiety levels were comparable. The expected direction of associations was confirmed for the majority of predictors. However, effect sizes were generally small and only a subset of them correlated to most outcomes. Intolerance of unpleasant emotions, neuroticism, and, to a lesser extent, agreeableness, sleep quality, young age, and time spent Internet surfing were the most robust and strongest correlates of mood states. Conclusions: Some recommended lifestyles (i.e., maintaining good quality of sleep and reducing Internet surfing) might be more important than others during the first days of quarantine. Promoting tolerance to unpleasant emotions (e.g., through online, self–managed programs) might also be of upmost importance. So far, recommendations have been made in general, but certain subgroups (e.g., certain personality profiles and young adults) might be especially vulnerable and should receive more attention.