title: An essay on human consciousness;
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COCK AND CO. DEAN STREET, SOHO; AND PUBLISHED BY MESSRS. LONGMAN, HURST, REES, ORME, AND BROWN, PATERNOSTER ROW. 1811. I *>«>• i » I EPISTLE TO THE READER Pe r ii a p s I may find it very difficult to offer a satisfactory apo¬ logy, for presuming to amuse myself with matters concerning which an ordinary person can have no better than a very illusive apprehen¬ sion ; especially, as in venturing my ideas there will be incurred the penalty of writing in violation of rules. I shall not, however, to de¬ precate vengeance, obtrude an enumeration of the accumulated disadvantages under which this view of the subject is produced; because those who are good, will not inflict vengeance on those who intend good. If the leading Hypothesis upon which I rest shall be found sup¬ ported by facts, it will support the many deformities of my workman¬ ship. And, if the Hypothesis itself is unfounded, all the ornaments of language, and aids of erudition, though I should have been happy to have used them, could not have much enriched a baseless struc¬ ture. Such aids would have tended not at all to the end which I here aim at, that of establishing a foundation for useful inquiry. It is well known that from the earliest point of recorded time, down to the present hour, Man has existed in a state of ignorance, and 11 EPISTLE TO THE READER. anxiety, concerning the nature of that internal principle which moves him ; the collective and successive labours of philosophers having deplorably failed to procure him any satisfactory knowledge on the subject. Throughout the dark region to be explored, one only tangible point presents itself, like the pinnacle of a rock topping the surface of a fathomless deep. The extreme narrowness of this ground has re¬ duced men, of every period, to some agreement at the outset; and beyond this, when genius, and science, have attempted to advance, they have fallen into devious paths; and have been equally, and utterly, ingulphed. This center of an agreement that extends but to so small a dis¬ tance, arises from the fact, that Mind and Body re-act upon each other, the effects of which go to satisfy us as to some few questions relative to the Mind’s existence. Many have conceived it to be some¬ thing distinct from the Body ; and, for its substance, try to imagine some sublime Reality, which they hope is superior to the mutations of matter; and which, at any rate, they believe to be the sole thipg that feels, whatever is inflicted. Perhaps none deny that it is the Principle which immediately moves the Body in all voluntary motions; and beyond this, all seems either delusion, or darkness. Cheerless as this prospect must be confessed, yet the luminous reasonings of our own times have informed us that, in truth, we are in a state of ignorance much more deplorable than was, perhaps, imagined by the earliest inquirers. And if man be given to vanity, he has a mortifying lesson in finding, at this day, that it was neces¬ sary he should make considerable progress in such knowledge as is EIMSTLE TO THE KEAJJEK. m permitted him, before he could be sufficiently enlightened to descry that dark boundary which proclahns all pursuit vain ; and decides, ' that on this important subject he not only is ignorant, but is doomed to remain so. Such a prospect may have little terror for those who have previ¬ ously grown upon the sure foundation of faith ; but, as many believe not at all, beside millions of believers who still have doubts ; and as those, even who are fixed, must surely be glad to reconcile what they believe, to what they experience ; all men are deeply concerned in an inquiry concerning the Mind. Now, I know it to be a home truth , that when an ill-fated ship falls into unknown regions, and eminent peril; and, when the skil¬ ful but distracted pilot proclaims his ignorance, and despair, the whole crew will act under the impulse of one common danger. Respect for persons will pardonably vanish; the meanest zvill ad¬ vance an opinion, if he has one; and, the conscious jeopardy of the whole will secure to such opinion, at least a momentary attention. In a case, therefore, so confessedly hopeless as the present, if I happen to be struck with a view of the subject which has until now escaped observation, I cannot but think it a duty to suggest it. I shall, therefore, submit to whatever sacrifice may be necessary te> advance it for the consideration of men of different opinions: in doing which, a certain extent of publicity becomes unavoidable, and I must abide the result. I do not overlook the peril of stepping upon that hallowed ground appropriated, exclusive^', to the use of learned men; nor the oppo¬ sition which existing opinions, and interests, will doubtless present IV EPISTLE TO THE READER. to such an enterprize. Even if I should have fallen upon a truth, in any part of my search, it must be expected that some one may chuse to “ heat the furnace one seven-times more,” to agonise every vulnerable point; and, in such case, not to fear would be as sense¬ less ; as to shrink would be unworthy. I risk the chance, resting upon the motive; and, not presuming upon any higher claim, 1 hope no one will have either power, or inclination, to deprive me of this support. In all other respects I entreat the clemency of the reader. London , December 18 th, 1810. Vll OBJECT AND DESIGN. The grand object of inquiry, in the present day, I take to be, not whether Mind be Matter, or of some other Substance but, whether Mind inheres any substance whatever. Proper Materialism seems to rest on the Hypothesis that Brain' gives Consciousness, merely in virtue of its organisation; and includes, that a change of medullary substance effects no change of subject. This supposition is opposed by Immaterialists, on very rational grounds ; but at the same time, they suffer their Hypothesis to labour under the insuperable difficulty of mental Noti-extension. In this state of the question whoever shall show that Mind ope¬ rates by Extension, distinct from Brain ; and, on the other hand, that Brain cannot be the Agent of thought, should, I imagine, give a new turn to the inquiry ; and afford an interest to the scheme of Inuna- terialism which otherwise it cannot so extensively possess. Some years ago, being then in a very remote Country, I was struck by the persuasion, that all objects of Consciousness are governed in the Mind by a Law of our nature, the regular operation of which has never claimed attention.. Contemplating this, I was led to an Hypothesis, OBJECT AND DESIGN. viil round which, I think, all known conscious facts rally, operating strickly under the Law, which in these papers I have attempted to illustrate. In prosecuting this intention, it will appear that I might, to the requisite matter here contained, have added of speculation, compari¬ son of opinions, and anecdote, a considerable mass, without any real utility. Contrary to this, I have purposely contracted every branch of the subject, and have rejected every thing that did not appear abso¬ lutely necessary to afford a tolerably clear view of it. My aim herein being, if possible, the concentration of strength, to afford others, conviction of that, which has afforded conviction to myself. I am in the full assurance that I shall not avoid error, nor, per¬ haps, escape gross inconsistency. The subject, at best, has ever been a mere game of Blind-man-Buff; and though there be many to cry out, there are none , with respect be it s^id, who have not stumbled when¬ ever it has been their turn to grope. My mind is, therefore, made up to suffer all the correction that I may be justly found to deserve, and, if at any time, I appear to express myself with confidence, I beg it may be considered as only marking the emphasis of my own argument, but always with deference to those who arc competent to point out wherein I am wrong. IX GENERAL CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. Introductory Speculation . ’••••••.. Page 3 CHAPTER II. Of the Dependence of the Mind upon the Body. 12 CHAPTER III. Of Consciousness, and of the Distinct Existence, and most General Operations, of the Human Mind . 16 CHAPTER IV. Of the Susceptibility of the Mind. 33 CHAPTER V. Of the Motivity of the Mind. 4 7 CHAPTER VI. Of the Co-operation of Mind and Body. 57 CHAPTER VII. Of the Capacity of the Mind for Synchronous Perceptions . 74 CHAPTER VIII. Of the Physical Structure of the Mind... 82 CHAPTER IX. Of the general Nature of the Flexure, and Repulsion of the Mind ... • • *. 9 2 b X GENERAL CONTENTS. CHAPTER X. Page Of the Constitution of Mind different from Matter .. • • • 97 CHAPTER XI. Of the conscious division of Affections into Pleasant and Painful.• * • •. 101 CHAPTER XII. Of the Nature, and Physical Operation of sensible Pleasure and Pain. 109 CHAPTER XIII. Of the Nature of Will, and its Species... 128 CHAPTER XIV. Of Hope and Fear, and of the Nature and Operation of Intellectual Pleasure and Pain. 129 CHAPTER XV. Of Extraordinary, and Ordinary, cases explained on the Hypothesis «f a Spherule Mind .... 128 CHAPTER XVI. Retrospect of the subject advanced... 146 CHAPTER XVII. Of the External Senses in general... 148 CHAPTER XVIII. Of the relative Vividness, Precision, and Durability of Ideas. jgO CHAPTER XIX. Of Touch, Taste, and Smell.-. 174 CHAPTER XX. Of the Hear . 176 CHAPTER XXI. Of Sight.... .... 183 GENERAL CONTENTS. XL CHAPTER XXII. Page A second Retrospect of the subject advanced. 198 CHAPTER XXIII. Of Memory .... 200 CHAPTER XXIV. Of the Incapability of the Brain to perform Mental Functions.21S CHAPTER XXV. Of the radical Opposition of the Spherule, and Vibratory Hypotheses . 23 6 CHAPTER XXVI. Of the Instrumentality of the Brain... 240 CHAPTER XXVII. On Dream and Reverie... 251 CHAPTER XXVIII. The Conclusion • ... 26‘2. 4 i. ■ PL H .. • 7 ■ , o*c .. < . •. > .1 > : > :■ Xlll PARTICULAR CONTENTS CHAPTER I. Page Introductory Speculation 3 CHAPTER II. Of the Dependence of the Mind upon the Body ------ 12 CHAPTER III. Sect. 1 . Consciousness - - - 16 2. Existence of Mind - - 18 3. General Operations - - 19 4 . Will, and its Office - - ib. 5. All Knowledge is Feeling - 21 6 . Imagination is Feeling. - - 23 7 . Thought exists with Motion - 27 8 . All Feelings co-incident on Mind ib. CHAPTER IV. Sect. 1. Thought exists with Motion - 33 2.  45 CHAPTER V. SECT. 1. Motives to Action - - - 47 2. Actual Power of Mind - - 50 3. Voluntary, and Incontinent Acts 52 4. Reason and Instinct one - 54 CHAPTER VI. SECT. 1. Affections - - - * 57 2. Flexibility of Mind - - 59 3. Partition of Affections - - 6 l 4. Play of Affections - - - 62 5. Law of Interest in Affections - 63 6 . Nature ©f Interest - - - 65 7. Weak Interests - - - 66 8 . Power «f Interest ... ib. Page Sect. 9. Accidental and legal Cases - 67 10 . Gradual process of the Law - 69 11 . Extraordinary Interests - - 72 CHAPTER VII. Sect. 1 . An Idea is a Groupe of Ideas - 74 2 . Proof of Synchronous Vision - 76 3. Synchronous Ideas often nume¬ rous - - - - 78 CHAPTER  4. The Hypothesis - - - 89 5. Lesser Suppositions - - ib. 6. Capacity, and Region, of Percep¬ tion - - - - 90 CHAPTER IX. Sect. 1. Physical Deformity of the Mind 92 2. Physical Tension of Mind - 93 3. Speculation - - - - 94 CHAPTER X. Of the Constitution of Mind different from Matter - - 97 CHAPTER XI. Sect. 1 . Interests continually vary - 101 2 . Intelligence and Interest distinct conscious Facts - - - 104 3. Motions change Interests, and ex¬ ist with Tension and Flexure 105 4. Peculiar capability of a Spherule 107 CHAPTER XII. Sect. 1 . Sensible Pleasure - - - 109 2 . Physical postures of Mind - 111 3. Physical process of Pleasure - 112 4. Pleasure succeeds Pain. - - 117 5. Uneasiness the ordinary State - 120 XIV PARTICULAR CONTENTS. Sect. 6. Pleasure changed to Pain Page - 122 7. Pain changed to Pleasure - 123 8. Nature of Pain - 126 0 f the CHAPTER XIII. Nature of Will, and its Species - 128 Sect. CHAPTER XIV. 1. Hope .... - 129 2. Despair and Hope - 130 3. Fear .... * 132 4.  Occupancy - 138 2. Physical Inferences - 141 3. Various Cases of Occupancy - ib. CHAPTER XVI. Retrospect of the subject advanced - 146 Sect. CHAPTER XVII. 1. Miscellaneous - 148 2. Order of the Senses - 149 3. Hypothesis of Undulation, and Succession - - - 153 4. Physical Analogy of Undulation 156' 5. How the Senses differ in Feelings 158 CHAPTER XVIII. Sect. 1 . Interest gives vivid Ideas - 160 2. Interest gives Retention - 165 3. Visual Ideas not correct - 171 Page Sect. 4. Physical process of Sight - 187 5. Evidence of Visual Undulations 190 6. Sight and Touch from one Im¬ pulse - 191 7* Sight may play on Touch - 193 8. Interest of Succession in Sight - 194 9 . Reflection on the Sense of Sight 195 CHAPTER XXII.  of Memory - 200 2. Interest gives Memory - - 202 3. Memory is passive, and exists with Motion - 203 4. Memory is revived Feeling - 207 5. Retention not from Vibration - 20 9 6. Association not from Vibration - 212 7. Memory is G ratuitous - - 215 8. Successive Memory - - ib. 9. Reflection on Memory - - 216 CHAPTER XXIV. Sect. 1. Two Schemes opposed - - 21S 2. Doctrine of Vibrations indicates Materialism - 220 3. Sensations by the Brain physi¬ cally inconceivable - - 222 4. Brain not employed in complex Sensations or Ideas - - 225 5. The Nerves form synchronous distinct Impulses » 226 6. Association is by Interest, not by Vibration - 229 7. Brain cannot operate as Mind - 232 8. Nerves support the Spherule Hypothesis - 233 9 . Doctrine of Vibrations annihilates Mind .... 234 CHAPTER XXV. . 1. Vibrations in a Substance, form Undulations on its Surface - 236 2. Mind reciprocates by Undula¬ tions of its Surface - - 237 3. Contrast of Hypotheses - - 238 CHAPTER XIX. Sect. 1. Touch - - - . - 174 2. Taste and Smell - - 175 CHAPTER XX. Sect. 1. Province of Hear - - - 176 2. Capacity of Hear - - - 177 3 . Interest of Succession in Hear - 178 CHAPTER XXI Sect. 1. Province of Sight - - - 183 2. Capacity of Sight - - - 184 3 . Physical Analogy of Sight - 185 Sect PARTICULAR CONTENTS XV CHAPTER XXVI. Page Sect. 1 . Pressure on Brain does not give, but destroys Consciousness - 240 2. The Nerves unite at a central Ca¬ vity in the Brain ... 242 3. Disposition of the Nerves favour the Hypothesis - 243 4. Seat of Intellect is where the Nerves unite ... 245 5. Hypothesis of an Elementary Body .... ib. 6. An Elementary Body why requi¬ site .247 7. The Pineal Gland ... 249 CHAPTER XXVII. Page Sect. 1 . Absence of Sensation makes Ideas vivid - . - - 251 2. Loss of Memory occasions Incon¬ sistency in Dreams - - 254 3. Dreams rise from nervous Im¬ pulses * 258 CHAPTER XXVII. The Conclusion ..... 262 142 - - . - . i ■;.x: - ► .. •• <• • • * 1 -v» : r l </. >' '•!«., . li ; - 1 in i i M •' ■ j ■■•7 I JUo'.’i • .8 ™ '  Science , who is already fixed in his speculative opinions concerning the present occult subject, is not expected to endure what he may deem objectionable in the introductory and early parts. He may, therefore, be better pleased to enter at once upon the Sixth , Se¬ venth , and Eighth Chapters ; and, after having lent his attention, far¬ ther on, to those practical statements on the Senses of Hear and Vi¬ sion, which I hope he may find not wholly unjust; he will, perhaps, with less disgust revert to what is speculative. When the account of Sensation has been viewed, I would particularly solicit attention to the Eight Conclusions in Chapter XXV. In taking up the subject, I certainly had no wish to affect no¬ velty of opinion ; but it is, however, humbly conceived, that the view herein taken, is almost wholly original. The order of the developement of our Feelings ; the extent of Syn¬ chronous Affections ; the processes of Pleasure and Pain ; the order of our external Senses ; the relative vividness and durability of Ideas; the Hypothesis of mental Undulations , containing the interest of suc¬ cession ; and several other points are, I imagine, altogether different from any former view of the subject. But beyond these, and by far the most prominent novel consi¬ deration, is the Law of Interest ; and the Hypothesis of the physical Structure of the Mind , founded upon this Law. Concerning these, I have only to say, that one appears to be as certainly a Law , as the other is only an Hypothesis : and, that the account of conscious operations, throughout, is totally a distinct consideration from the Hypothesis ; so that each should be judged by its separate claims, or demerits. ' ■ *. • • ESSAY ON HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS. CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY SPECULATION. It is the opprobrium of the science of Mind, that no radical disco¬ veries are made therein, and one reason that has operated to prevent progress appears so evident, that whilst it is permitted to exist it may be no less than impossible to make so much as an attempt to penetrate our ignorance. J ustly has it has been observed, that in the Theories of Perception now extant, men have laboured under a grand error, in that while they have entertained a deep rooted belief of the immateriality of the Soul, they have, at the same time, been “ influenced by some general maxims of philosophising, borrowed from Physics,” which error, I 4 ESSAY ON ciiap. i. imagine, arises from this, that the conviction of the immateriality of the soul, includes, also, the supposition of its Non-ex tension. That inconsistency appears in every attempt to describe the ope¬ rations of a Non-extended Substance, (if any such there be,) as bearing any conceivable similitude to those of an extended one is, perhaps, certain ; but, while this is too striking to have escaped the remark of those who have given into it, a question arises, whether the most im¬ portant error does not lie in adopting a supposed mental property, which they were not under necessity to adopt; which is physically inconceivable; and, which proves an insuperable obstacle to dis¬ covery. I mean the supposed mental property of Non-extension. It must ever be vain to attempt reasoning beyond the range of conception. We are convinced, and constrained to believe, that the Human Mind, if it be any substance, and not a mere mode, is conti¬ nually operating upon, and suffering the operation of, the Body. But, we can have no conception of Action, without Motion of Sub¬ stance ; therefore, we are under necessity to infer, that Body and Mind reciprocate in some way, like two physical bodies. In reasoning thus (whether we conjecture right, or the contrary,) we are, at least, consistent with possibility in conception: and if we outstep this boundary, all is darkness. Supposing the Mind a substantial thing, existing distinct from the Body, if it be Non-extended it is beyond dispute we do not knozv, and perhaps cannot know , it to be so. The assumption, then, of this pro¬ perty is mere Hypothesis, which forbids inquiry; but, if the Mind has Extension, though we do not know it, yet, we may come to know it; and, the present supposition of it is, at least, as good as a suppo- CHAP. I. HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS. 5 sition of the contrary, with this grand advantage, that we may spe¬ culate upon the one, whilst utter silence is imposed by the other Hypothesis. It is agreed that all we know of the Substance of either Matter or Mind is merely relative. The one has apparent properties which our physical experience demands us to believe is incompatible with some apparent properties displayed by the other. We therefore ra¬ tionally conclude, that Substance of Matter is different from the Substance of Mind; without being able to afford ourselves even a guess as to what is the Substance of either. But our physical experience (just now appealed to) demands, that to enable two Substances to re-act upon each other, both must have the common property of Extension; and the authority for mental Immaterialism , and for mental Extension is thus one and the same , whereby these two properties are equally upheld, and joined; and this junction I am led to adopt; because the pretensions of these supposed properties are perfectly equal. Both of the highest autho¬ rity; and, what is more, they do not, upon examination , appear inconsistent. In this case I derive encouragement by considering that a proper Extension has been assigned to the Mind by men of approved erudi¬ tion; who, nevertheless, contended for its immateriality. The names of Dr. Clarke, and Dr. Price, are alone sufficient to claim a fair hearing to any positive argument that may be advanced on this Hypothesis; though no names can be expected to uphold it, if after proper investigation it shall be found unsupported. Here I will risk a conjecture, by the way, that though these re- 6 ESSAY ON CHAP. I. spectable men assigned Extension to the Soul, I doubt not, they would have started at the proposition of a definitive shape , as much as will any man of the present da} r . And if I am right in this it shows, that men are afraid to look their own conceptions in the face, because finite extension must have figure. And thus are men kept from search after an Extended Mind, even though they must now begin to suspect that Matter is as attenuate as Mind can be. After all that has been advanced to the World upon this hitherto unprofitable subject, I take the abstract of the case to be, that Con¬ sciousness, Motivity, and permanent identity, (which last is neces¬ sary to enjoy the rewards of a future state.) All these, on various grounds, forbid us to admit that our Minds are made of the same sort of Substance with our Bodies ; which last are composed of par¬ ticles insensible, and, in themselves , inert; also which are continually going from us, and are replaced by foreign parts ; insomuch, that the Body I wore at twenty years of age, may actually form parts of many different human Bodies by the time I shall be sixty; and I may then die possessed of a Body (including Brain) that some years back made parts of the Bodies and Brains of other men. That matter is generally esteemed insensible, it is unnecessary to insist. But insensible, or sensible, would make nothing toward se¬ curing our identity, seeing that even the Brain must be continually liable to change. In proof of the last mentioned consideration, I shall just notice an extensive fact, which has impressed me the more, because I have been many years an eye witness of it. The great river Ganges, including its innumerable and far spread¬ ing branches, has, during some thousand years, been the common CHAP. I. HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS. 7 grave of the many millions of Hindoos who have successively swarmed on its banks; and their Bodies have thus furnished a conti¬ nual and luxuriant supply of food to the myriads of fish that are daily taken, in their turn, for the sustenance of the inhabitants. If a man has partaken of these fish during seventy years, I imagine it will be allowed, that if he then dies, his Body and Brain must consist of some parts that made parts of other human Bodies. The confusion of personal identity that must, physically, be infer¬ red from such facts, has not escaped the remark of Doctor Priestley, who found himself thereby driven to the supposition that the Brain of a man does not change its particles; upon which it is enough to say that he appears to have felt it so weak an Hypothesis that he, at length, preferably adopted the dismal supposition that Mind is but a mode; or that Consciousness is th z mere result of organisation; and does not inhere any Substance. Contrary to this, I not only suppose the Mind to inhere a Sub¬ stance , but, looking toward eternal justice, and concluding that Matter cannot preserve the requisite identity, I should on this ground, if there were no other, suppose that the Substance of Mind is not convertible into that of the Body. But, being in all cases limited by my conception, I know not by what reasonable autho¬ rity I am called upon to believe that concerning which I can have no thought whatever; that is, a Substance non-extended moving, and being moved by, a Substance that moves only by reason that it is extended. All that I can possibly mean, or perhaps wish by an immaterial Substance, is an immutable one; which shall unchangeably remain, in 8 ESSAY ON CHAP. I. the Body, and elsewhere, safe from confusion of identity. I am not speculating in the vain view to throw any light upon the Sub¬ stance of the Mind; but only am led, along with the results of prac¬ tical observations, to state, briefly, the speculative probability of its Extension , and distinct existence. Here the force of prejudice needs no comment; and, if we have grown in the opinion of a non-extended Mind there is no proposition that will give rise to more disgust than that of an extended one. Even were it proved as grossly figured as a wheelbarrow we should receive the conviction with conscious reluctance; it therefore requires all the forbearance becoming an advocate of Non-extension, to grant his attention to the facts I shall advance, before he finally decides upon mere speculative opinions. With the Materialist, whose Hypothethis I more radically oppose, I shall at least have no such chimera to combat as that of Non-exten¬ sion. We shall encounter on fair physical ground, the only substantial ground that human nature can touch upon, and I ought to affect him if I can disprove a cerebral Mind. Without practical support, I should think any speculation how a distinct extended Mind may exist in the Brain of a man, to be the merest impertinence. But, if speculative and practical reasoning shall be found to lend light and strength to each other, I hope the very little that is here advanced may be permitted as introducing the subject. Concerning Mind, in the present state of knowledge, I suppose we are to try to conceive a Substance, not a mode or property. Farther, it must not be liable to ordinary mutations with Matter, which would endanger its identity. It must have an energy which Matter never CHAP. I. HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS. 9 displays to us, yet it must be extended , because, otherwise it could not reciprocate with the Body. Now all this seems to be con¬ ceivable. I can, without any violence, conceive in a man’s Brain a portion of space filled with mental Power, not convertible with matter, and there fixed during his life. 1 say, I have only to conceive it an extended Power, fixed there; and then I know as much of it as a Substance, as I do of the Substance of Matter. And if there be such a thing as one extended Substance, though I know not what; I do not see why there may not be another extended Substance, though I know not what. I therefore think there may be two extended Substances in existence, or else none at all. And, as to which of these should be conceived grosser , modern Science seems to have rendered the question rather a vulgar dispute. It appears neither necessary, nor perhaps possible, that the Sub¬ stance of Mind should be more attenuate than the Substance of Mat¬ ter. It seems necessary only that the size of an individual Mind, and some unknown other inherent properties should prevent a proper incorporation with Matter, thus preserving it impenetrable, or natu¬ rally unchangeable: and not to be destroyed unless by particular decree. Matter appears to exist in separate parts which are never known to be in actual contact. That thing then, which divides these parts cannot be Matter , yet it is extended , and keeps asunder while it holds together, the particles of Matter; and if it is not extended, then one of the grand maxims of philosophy is exploded. Thus though we should agree to deprive the human Mind of extension c 10 ESSAY ON CIIAP. I. we cannot deny the Extension of an existing Agent which is not material or solid. And, as this Agent can always be appealed to, I cannot see why we should deny our Minds a similar property when, by admitting it, we admit no new abstract belief as to a Power with immaterial Extension, but only remove a hitherto insuperable obstacle to inquiry. The persuasion of an extended Mind has been held by many Im- materialists who were also men of Science ; their only doubt being as to the manner of its Extension. Several respectable writers suppose the Soul to carry off with it some fine vehicle. Now if the Soul moves about, it has locality, which savours very strongly of Extension however minute. But if this be doubted, then I ask what is it that can carry off the fine extended vehicle? If it be a thing non-extended, then is it surely as much a Nonentity as those imaginary points of Matter which Dr. Priestley has been so pressed to maintain. Mind has power of resistance , as well as Matter has power of resistance ; and if it must be something that resists in the one case, I think it must also be something that resists in the other. Dr. Price’s question concerning Matter, “ What is it that attracts and repels?” is unanswerably forcible. But I feel it equally forcible to ask what is it that moves, and is moved ? And I find it as impossible to conceive it without Extension in the one case as in the other. To those on the other hand, who incline to make Mind a mere mode, having only Consciousness for its essence, I have but to say, that, though I am unable to conceive how Consciousness can be conscious; or a property can be an Agent; or how it can be either CHAP. I. HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS. ii the object , or subject , of reward and punishment, I wave all specula¬ tive contention, as beyond my province, and unprofitable ; and request their attention to facts which will be offered. If it should come to appear probable that the Mind operates ex¬ tensively and strictly like a physical organ, of an assignable figure, and, that its requisite figure, and operation, prove it to be not the Brain , I think it will open the way to possible discovery that the Mind inheres an extended Substance, whether that Substance differs much or little, from that of the Body. Doctor Priestley has asserted that the only consistent scheme of Immaterialism is that which denies the Mind all relation to space; whereby I fear he has helped to confirm many of his learned opponents in the prejudice which so extremely ridicules the supposi¬ tion that Ideas can have length and breadth. But it is a remark as true as it is vulgar, that facts are stubborn things ; and if Mind shall be found to be, what other learned Immaterialists have thought, that is extended, then Ideas also, it is probable, must exist with Extension. 12 ESSAY ON CHAP. II CHAPTER II. OF THE DEPENDANCE OF THE MIND UPON THE BODY. Though I have placed the Speculation contained in the present Chapter here, as being most in order, it may be proper to remark, that the Hypotheses of the following enquiry are not at all affected by it: and the same practical reasonings hold good whatever opi¬ nion we may incline to in regard of the dependance in question. It is generally agreed that the Mind is indebted to the physical organs which belong to it for all the knowledge it possesses ; and, though the sentient Faculty may have existed from earliest Creation, we have no ground to suppose that it ever moved consciously , until the Body moved it. If the Mind does, originally , require a condition to enable it to operate, we may suppose that its action depends upon the existence of the condition annexed ; and, that whenever the condition fails, the action of the mind must be included. We know, that after the physical condition has been annexed, and the Mind has operated consequent thereunto, there happens a regular, and irregular, succession of failures of the operation of this condition; and every impartial investigation must assure us that during sound Sleep the Mind is wholly ignorant, and at rest. CHAP. II. HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS. 13 I am obliged to confess this reduces the sublime Spirit of Man to a thing nearly answering Mr. Locke's definition of a watch : being, “ An organisation” (though perhaps not of parts) “ to a certain end, which, when a sufficient force is added to it, it is capable to attain : and this force, coming sensibly from without, is often away when the organ is in order, and well fitted to receive it.” Such a definition applied to the Human Mind may appear very degrading; but, if facts support it, we must yield conviction ; and, truly, we know not whether it degrades us at all. With proper deference to the judgment of some who contend that the Mind is always active, I must suppose them liable to a bias in the wish that it did evince this sort of independence, but appear¬ ances, I fear, leave little room for doubt. I shall not, here, introduce any of the usual arguments on the subject, except to ask what sort of operation can be supposed to go on in the Mind of a Man who has lain under water until the vital appearances have some time ceased ? and, who is yet a much longer time before he affords the least sign of returned Consciousness ? and, if the Man ceases to think but for one minute, during this lapse, where is the odds, though he ceases to think every time he sleeps, lacking the “ sufficient force ?” Not only is Sensation requisite to set the Mind first in Motion ; but it takes years of existence, before Sensation becomes that “ suf¬ ficient force,” that enables the Mind to perform its functions tolerably. Now, I imagine, no one who admits Mind to be a distinct Sub¬ stance, will suppose that it grows with the Body. They must, of 14 ESSAY ON CHAP. II. course, admit, that however originally perfect, it nevertheless de¬ pends, for its due action, upon the growth of the Body; and must wait its time, which is a dependance of the very same nature, only less in degree, than that in question. Whatever is the essence of the Mind its coalition with the Body is sufficiently humiliating; but I do not conceive it any more so that the latter should be constructed so as to produce , as well as to suspend , the action of the former; which last it certainly appears to do every night we sleep; and, at any rate, in some cases of insensibility. In both these cases the Mind is only shewn to be inferior to the great Power which made it; and, instead of being discouraged by the limitation of a condition, I confess myself, in this view of the thing, stimulated to adore the mercy of the Creator, for having (as I believe) made sensitive beings capable of rest, which I am led to hope he has made naturally incapable of solution. Mind being supposed a Reality, distinct from Body, however de¬ pendant thereon, we may conceive Bodies to vary, without limit, in other states ; but from the tendency of the present enquiry, as well as from other evidences, it will appear, we have no ground to think that Mind can either act or feel in any state without the condition of some adapted organised Body. This, if it should be found just, is a welcome view of the subject, in as much as it bears testimony to what we have been divinely taught in that faith which upholds the best hopes of Man ; and, upon reflection, I receive the inference with the more decided interest, be¬ cause it has arisen, solely, from the investigation, without my having had any previous view to such consequence. CHAP. II. HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS. 15 We unquestionably are satisfied that our earliest intelligences are those which, by experience we know, come from without. Sensa¬ tion, then, begins where Body ends and Mind commences; and the region of Perception (if it come to appear there is such a region) is the exterior of the Mind, which must be in contact with Nervous influence. 16 ESSAY ON CHAP. III. CHAPTER III. OF CONSCIOUSNESS, AND OF THE DISTINCT EXISTANCE, AND MOST GENERAL OPERATIONS OF THE HUMAN MIND. SECTION I. CONSCIOUSNESS. From the beginning of Human life, to the end, all our knowledge is received by Consciousness, which is absolute Feeling of Affections present in the Mind, including revived Feeling of those Affections which have formerly been present in it. Consciousness is that Feeling which gives conviction of any Affec¬ tion being present in the Mind, whether it be intelligence from Sense, a remembrance of any intelligence, or a Feeling of any mere intellec¬ tual operation. I am conscious of the visible Sensation , which, from experience, I refer to the pen in my hand. I am conscious of the remembrance of having seen pens of other materials. I am conscious of the judg¬ ment, or opinion, that Man is most distinguished above inferior ani¬ mals, by capacity for Thought, and capability of acting to commu¬ nicate his thoughts to other individuals ofj his species, through any distance of time, and place, by means of visible signs. CHAP. III. HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS. 17 If my foot touched the ground at this moment, I should not be conscious of the ground at iny foot; but, I should be conscious of a Sensation , which experience has taught me to refer to the ground : and this complex process, becoming instantaneous from habit, is that which we call Perception of external Things. Things present to my Nerves may stimulate, and yet, owing to some stronger present Affection, I may have no Feeling , no Percep¬ tion , of them. If so I am not conscious of their presence, which otherwise I should be. It follows, that Consciousness includes Perception of Sensations, and Ideas ; and, that it is the sole universal Sense. In other w r ords, all Feelings are co-incident in the Mind, or radically intellectual , though those which arise internally may be distinguished as merely 'ntellectual. If I perceive a Sensation, or Idea, I am conscious I perceive it; and, if I am conscious of any mere intellectual process, I perceive I am so conscious. The unity of Mind, or Intellect, dictates this language; for surely we cannot set up two intelligent Faculties, however we may vary the functions of the one; and, though a Sensation is applied exter¬ nally, it cannot he felt except internally, where intellectual Thoughts dwell. This is emphatically supported by Mr. Locke, who says, “ It being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving that he does perceive.” Consciousness is no more of the past, than of the future. We are conscious only of the Memory of past things, never of past things 18 ESSAY ON chap. nr. themselves; and this Consciousness is not a reflex act of the Mind, because we immediately suffer all Consciousness; but to reflect on that suffering is quite another operation, being a mere volition to at¬ tend to mental processes. Having thus endeavoured to express the import and extent of the term, as I intend to use it , I must observe that it seems impractica¬ ble'to treat fully concerning any of the several divisions of Con¬ sciousness, at any one view, without touching upon what belongs to some others, for which allowance is here claimed. SECTION II. EXISTANCE OF MIND. Under correction of Consciousness I here assume, that the human Mind, during vigilance, is continually agitated by Affections, great numbers of which, we are taught to believe, come from an assem¬ blage of extremely <mall particles, which cannot operate any way except by means of Extension. Also, that the Mind, under the action of these extended particles, does continually operate physically , that is, by Motions, in a similar way that a large tangible Body , of an assignable figure and texture, operates under various pressures of many surrounding small particles. This remains to be proved; but, mean time, I beg to specify under such assumptions, that the gross mode of co-operation of Body and Mind is as follows : The Nerves, respectively, convey their impulses to, and deposit them upon, the points of the Mind where Sensation is effected, which points, I shall call the region of Perception. CHAP. III. HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS. 19 Again, the Mind impressed by the minute particles contained in the nervous Vehicle, feels or is conscious ; in consequence of which it takes new Affections, and then frequently re-acts upon the ner¬ vous Vehicle, as occasion demands; either by a voluntary exertion of a peculiar qualified Motivity , or by an incontinent exertion of the same Motivity. This introduces the mere supposition of the Mind’s Reality, distinct existence, and relative situation, and leads me to offer a view of its most general modes of operation. SECTION III. GENERAL OPERATIONS. The Mind, considered as a Reality, is admirably simple; and operates in no more than two different general modes. These are Feeling , and Action. SECTION IV. WILL, AND ITS OFFICE. Feeling and Action are divided, or articulated, by a sort of men¬ tal disjunctive conjunction , called Will; being a hinge upon which Feelings turn to Action: and, concerning Will, I must here offer a few words, previously to entering upon the two grand modes which it articulates. When any Feeling produces a complete Volition, we Act ; but if Action be withheld, by either intellectual or physical force, the Will then exists in an imperfect state, called Wish 01 Desire , which last has 20 ESSAY ON CIIAP. III. been held to be a Passion, though unjustly so, as will appear from different views in this inquiry. Here I shall only observe, that Desire is as distinct f rom the Uneasiness that precedes it, as AY ill is distinct from the Motive that precedes it. In other words, Motives move Will, and Uneasiness moves Desire; but in Mankind Motives are Uneasinesses, therefore Will and Desire are moved by the same sort of impulse. 