The Oxford elements of logic, in four books, for the purpose of self-instruction.
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'V V FAV .«* * A ° 4 V ^ ° V£liE?‘ *■'*. ”lliS'\* ^°-o. r % / v*V "v^V f*°- *v »*VL% Vs Kt#** *cx *0* »»'* . ^ ** *Wa*. ^ A* *' «, tV** 0^77^*^* c ^ -.S^W^ri* ,VA A A V oVM\^ 4 • v ^ « >^.V rU '*r**gi91P * - A* ^ '•••* A° „ V '•“’ A* ■■.r **mk\ %, <.c • ‘-^trv ° ^ *‘-^ * - o V ‘ 4 O^ . * X° ^ V -s^-...’ ,. °<* *•”* • f° .... «i.N *•■■’ . s* V f f # °+ c\ A*' _ _ _ ^>. .« ,'jftV/k' ^ & s^Ksr. ^ • ^ v >.0 V f * • aV-V • * VV' ° ^b. *'Tr»* a <v o#* a o » • ^ *^0 A^ . *• ' * ♦ ^ .0^ 6 . :£*&;* ++o* ' °^ rs ^ ^ >* ^ * 0 °0 * - « , 1 • ’ aO %> ** * *0° ^ * • ' 1 #1 f0 t * o .o^ ,»•*/•. A f,*°* c\ aOv -* VA Q xf ❖ * A> "b • • ♦ &P • 4 ^ ^ "*4, v*^r^ - - A^V . V » * ^ ^ ^0^ o 0 " * * ^O ^ *l % ^ J >T C ° vi V ■X vV << ' ^ V •fkmviQfi* ^ 0 # 4 0 5 <0 % kV* * * o_ * ♦ ^ O • ' ^ o /v THE OXFORD ELEMENTS OF LOGIC , Sin dfour JSooftg, FOR THE PURPOSE OF SELF-INSTRUCTION. BEING A TRANSLATION, WITH A running illustrative commentary OF THE ELEMENTA LOGICAL Uonifon : Printed by TV* Green , 4, Grange-Court, Carey Street, FORTFIE PROPRIETORS, MILITARY CHRONICLE AND M ILITARY CLASSICS* OFFICE, 14, CIIARLOTTE-STREET, BLOOMSBURY, AND TO BE HAD OF ALL THE BOOKS ELLERS,-—! 81(5. * t 4 ADVERTISEMENT The following system of Logic is upon the plan recommended by Mr. Locke, that of retaining so much of the forms and defi¬ nitions of Aristotle as is useful for a close and methodical rea? soning, and rejecting so much as is merely formal; and thereby at once keeping pace with the progress of the age, and still re¬ taining somewhat of the exactness, the precision, and the pro¬ fundity of the philosopher who first analysed and distributed the faculties of the Understanding. In executing this purpose of adapting the Oxford Elements to Self-Instbuction, the editor has found it necessary not to con¬ fine himself to a mere litteral translation of that work. No book extant, perhaps, exhibits so full, and yet so compressed a view of the system of Aristotle as these Oxford Elements; but as they presume the presence of a professor or tutor, they would not be always so immediately intelligible by the Self-Instructor. To obviate this difficulty, the editor has had recourse to two modes; the first, that of a free, and sometimes paraphrastic translation of the close language of the Oxford Elements, and secondly, to a kind of running Commentary, or Illustrative Explanation, of the whole. He has not separated the illustration from the text, because it would have impaired the uniformity, and therein perhaps much of the utility of the work. The authors employed in this illustration are the other logical writers. Watts, Duncan, Wallis, £cc. ; and as it is no part of the design of the editor to lay claim to any merit of his own, he has employed them as fully and as often as the purpose of illustra¬ tion required. The work of Watts is good as far as the author intended it ; its main defect is in the nearly total omission of the system, the terms, and the definitions of Aristotle; arid in the want of that precision, condensation, and closeness, of which Aristotle is the master to all who have read him. Duncan’s is a loose, general, and unmethodical treatise. Wallis exceeds them all, but is in Latin, and requires much illustration. The Oxford Elements have superseded the use of Wallis. In the translation of these elements, which is now submitted to the reader, the editor has endeavoured to unite the distinctive excellence of all; the exactness, the method, and the science of the schools, with the more full and general system required for life and daily business. I * THE ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. BOOK L OF PERCEPTION OR SIMPLE APPREHENSION. Definitions. LOGIC is the art of using our reason in the discovery and communication of Truth. The end of Logic is the discovery of Truth. The object of Logic is the Human Understanding. The subject of Logic is all that we see, hear, perceive, or understand. The operations of the mind are three, — Perception , Judgment , and Reasoning. Perception , otherwise called Simple Apprehension, is that act or faculty of the mind, by which it sees, perceives, or contemplates, whatever is offered to it. The form, image, or picture, which is jthus impressed upon the mind of the thing perceived, is called an Idee k Thus if I see a horse, a man, or a tree, the form of the horse, man, or tree, which thence enters into my mind, is called the idea of the horse. In the same manner, if I meditate upon life, death, grammar, logic, &c., the form of them, as they exist in my mind, are ideas of them. Perception, therefore, is to the mind what vision is to the eye; and the mind may be further regarded as the Retina, upon which the images of things paint themselves like objects upon the eye. Judgment is that aet or faculty of the mind, by which it com¬ pares two ideas together, and thus perceiving their agreement or disagreement, affirms or denies the one of the other. Thus if I 6 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. book rf compare my idea of a tree, and my idea of height, I perceive that they agree, and thence affirm that the tree is high. Reasoning is that actor faculty of the mind, by which we compare two or more judgments (propositions) and thence infer a third. As an idea is the picture of a thing perceived, so a Word, or term, is thp sign, index, or expression of an i,dea ; and as our ideas can only be known by words, so the subject matter of Logic com¬ prehends as well words as ideas. The result of the mind, acting in its first operation, Perception, is a simple idea. The expression of this idea, in one or more words, is called a term; or in the technical Latin used by Logi¬ cians, and which it is necessary to remember, because frequent use has almost adopted itinto our own language. Vox Simplex. The result of the mind, acting in its second operation, judg¬ ment, is the perceiving the agreement of two ideas. The ex¬ pression of this agreement, in words, is a sentence, which is called logically a proposition, or in the technical Latin, a Vox Complexa. The result and process of the mind, acting in its third operation, reasoning, is the seeking and perceiving the agreement or con¬ trary of two ideas, by a comparison of each with a third. This result and process, as expressed in words, consists of three propositions, which taken together, are called a Syllogism, Argu¬ ment, or sometimes technically, a Vox Decpmplexa. According to these three operations of the mind, Logic is divided into three parts. The first treats of Perception or Simple apprehension, that is of ideas and the words by which they are expressed. The second of Judgment and Propositions. The third of Reasoning and Syllogisms. To which is usually added, by modern Logicians, a fourth part or book, upon method, or the disposition cf arguments and discourse. CHAPTER I. Of the nature of Ideas, PERCEPTION, as above defined it, is that act or faculty of the understanding, by which it perceives external objects, or its ©\yn internal acts. The image, or notionary form, which the &o6k i. ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 1 mind receives from 9uch perception, is an idea. Thus ifl see a horse, a tree, ora man, if I meditate upon life, death, and immor¬ tality, the notion or forms of such hor9e, tree, man, life, &c , which thence enter my mind, are my ideas of them. In the same manner, the notions of hunger, cold, wish, fear, &c. are my ideas t)f hunger, cold, &c. And as such horse, man, and tree, are the outward objects of my perception, and therein the outward archetypes or patterns of my ideas of them, 90 my own sensations of hunger, cold, &c are also the inward archetypes or patterns of my ideas concerning them. Among ail these ideas, such as represent bodies are generally called images, and especially if the idea of form be included. Oil the other hand, our inward ideas, such as our notions of thought, love, hatred, spirit, &c. belong more especially to the mind, and Carry nothing of shape or sense in them. CHAPTER II. OF THE OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION* SECTION I. Of Being in general , and the five Classes or Predicables , in one or uihef of which all our Ideas , with respect to Being or Essence , must fall. Essence or Being, is the nature of any thing, whether ac¬ tually, or only possibly existing. A being therefore is considered as possible, or as actual. If considered as possible, it is said to have an essence, or nature. If considered as actual, it is said to have existence also* If we compare two or more things, which appear to agree gene¬ rally, but to differ in particulars* we shall see that they agree either according to their whole essence, or according to a part of their essence ; or according to some neeessary or contingent conjunct of their essence. If they agree according to their whole essence, and differ only in severalty or individually (that is to say, in being different individuals) they are said to be of the same species . If they agree according to a part only of their essence, and differ in severalty and in species, they are said to be of the same genus. That part of the essence in which they differ, and which consti¬ tutes each to be of the species which it is, is what is logically termed, their difference . If they agree according to a necessary 8 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. BOOK I. conjunct of their essence, they are said to agree in property . If they agree only in a contingent or incidental, they are said to agree in accident Species, therefore, is a word or term for a number of individuals, agreeingin the whole of their common nature, and differing only in severalty (in numbers), i. e. in being different as individuals- Thus man is the species of Plato, Socrates, &c. who agree in the common nature of humanity, but are several as individuals. Genus is a word or term for a number of species, agreeing together in a part of their nature, but differing in that remainder which constitutes them several species. Thus animal is the ge¬ nus of men, beasts, &c. who agree in the common nature of ani¬ mality, but who differ as to that rationality, irrationality, &c. which constitutes the one species men, and the other beasts. Difference is a word or term for that part of the essence, which, in the distribution of a genus into its species, constitutes each species what it is. Thus if we distribute the genus animal into man, beast, &c.— rationality is that which constitutes man, ir¬ rationality that which constitutes beasts. Rationality, therefore, is what is logically termed the Difference,— or more frequently, the Specific Difference. A Property is a word or term for some attribute or quality of a thing, which though not regarded primarily as a part of its es¬ sence, necessarily flows or follows from such essence. Thus feeling is a property of life; and laughing, or the faculty of laugh¬ ing, the property of humanity. An Accident is a word or term for such an attribute or quality, as is not necessary to the being of a thing, and makes no part of its essence, but is merely incidental, and as such may be present or absent without affecting the being of that thing. Thus the whiteness, blackness, roughness, smoothness, &c.of a man or beast. The above five terms, Genus, Species, Difference, Property, and Accident, are what are termed by Aristotle the five Predi¬ cables, that is to say, the five classes, to one or the other of w,hich all our ideas, respecting the essence of things, must belong. And as they are frequently referred to by our philosophical writers under this common name, it is necessary to remember them, and their respective definitions. As the term animal isa genus, if considered with respectto man, beasts, birds, fishes, &c., but will become itself a species, if it be considered with respect to a higher genus, as created matter; so it is manifest that some general terms may become, in different uses, both a genus and a species. Such Genera are called BOOL T. ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 9 Subaltern . But the highest genus, i. e. that beyond which there is nothing more general, and which never becomes a species* is called, the Summum Genus. And there is the same distinction with respect to Species; some being Subaltern, and others a Species infim a* SECTION II. Of Substance audits nine Modes , making together the ten Predicaments or Categories of Aristotle , — i. e , those ten Classes , to one or other of which all our ideas , respecting any substance and its qualities , must belong. EVERY being must be considered either as subsisting in and by itself, and is then called a substance, oras it subsists in and by another, and is then called a Mode or manner of being. A Substance is a being which subsists by itself, without de¬ pendence upon any other created being. The notion of subsisting by itself gives occasion to Logicians to call it a substance. So a horse, a house, stone, water, a spirit, a body, an angel, are called substances, because they depend upon nothing but God for their existence. A Mode is that which cannot subsist by itself, but must sub¬ sist in and by another. Now as all the possible modes, or manners of any substances being, are comprehended according to Aristotle in nine classes, and as substance itself must be the ground, or subject matter of all our ideas, so he terms the ten together, (i. e, Substance and its nine Modes,) the Ten Predicaments or Categories ; that is to say, the ten classes, to one or other of which all our ideas must belong. The first Predicament is therefore Substance , which s defined to be that which subsists by itself, and as the base, ground, or subject, of all its fmodesand properties. The second Predicament (and first of the modes) is Quantity , which is an accident, according to which a thing is said to be so many, or so much, in quantity, or number, as, — hree feet, an ounce, &c. * Where I retain these Latin terms, it is because frequent use have rendered them a part of our own language, and because it is necessary to familiarize the reader to words which are of such frequent occurrence in the writings of our di¬ vines, philosophers, and even parliamentary speakers. No. I. B 10 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. BOOK 1 i The third Predicament is Quality , an accident, according to which a thing is said to be such as it is in quality ; as learned* ingenious, white, &c. The fourth Predicament is Relation , which is the respect or regard that one thing bears to another, as father and son, &c. The fifth is Action , and the sixth Passion , the one of which is doing, and the other suffering ; as to strike, — to be stricken. The seventh Predicament is Place , — the eighth Time , the ninth Position, and the tenth, the quality of Hating external in¬ vestments, such as clothes, ornaments, riches, &c. The above ten classes, i. e. Substance, and its nine Modes, (Quantity, Quality, Relation, Action, Passion, Time, Place, Position, and Having) make up those ten Predicaments, which were formerly so celebrated in the schools, and upon each of which so many volumes have been written. It is necessary to know and even to remember their names, because they are frequently referred to by our elder writers, and because the incomparable ' subtility of their inventor deserves at least that the names of his distinctions should not be forgotten. SECTION III. Of the Modern Doctrine and Distribution of Modes. THE distribution of Aristotle, as above explained, has been supplanted by a doctrine at once more simple, equally suf¬ ficient, and having a better foundation in useful and intelligible distinctions. According to this doctrine, which is the System of Logic in present use, Being is first divided as by Aristotle into Substance and Modes; and his definition of Substance and Mode is like¬ wise retained. A mode therefore is that which cannot subsist in and of itself, but is always esteemed as belonging to, and subsist ing by the help of some substance, which, for that reason, is called its subject. A mode must depend on that substance for its very existenceand being; and that not as a being depends on its cause (for so sub¬ stances themselves depend on God their creator), but the very being of a mode depends on some substance for its subject, in which it is, or to which it belongs; so motion, shape, quantity, weight, are modes of the body; knowledge, wit, folly, love, doubting, judging, are modes of the mind; for the one cannot KOOK 1. ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 11 Subsist without body, and the other cannot subsist without mind, Modes have their several divisions, as well as substances. I. Modes are either essential or accidental. An essential mode or attribute is that which belongs to the very nature or essence of the subject wherein it is ; and the subject can never have the same nature without it. Such is roundness in a bowl, hardness in a stone, softness in water, vital motion in an animal, solidity in matter, thinking in a spirit: for though that piece of wood which is now a bowl may be made square, yet if roundness be taken away it is no longer a bowl ; so that very flesh and bones, which is now an animal, may be without life or inward motion, but if all motion be entirely gone, it is no longer an animal, but a carcase ; so if a body or matter be divested of so¬ lidity, it is a mere void space or nothing; and if spirit be en¬ tirely without thinking, I have no idea of any thing that is left in it; therefore, so far as 1 am able to judge, consciousness must be its essential attribute; thus all the perfections of God arje called his attributes, for he cannot be without them. An essential mode is either primary or secondary. A primary essential mode is the first or chief thing that con? Stitutes any being in its particular essence or nature, and makes it to be that which it is, and distinguishes it from all other beings : this is called the difference in the definition of things, of which hereafter: so roundness is the primary essential mode, or differ¬ ence of a bowl : the meeting of two lines is the primary essential mode or the difference of an angle: the perpendicularity of these, lines to each other is the difference of a right angle : solid extention is the attribute or difference of matter : consciousness, or at least a power of thinking, is the difference or primary attribute of a spirit: and to fear and love God is the primary attribute of a pious man. A secondary essential mode is any other attribute of a thing, which is not of a primary consideration ; this is called a property. Sometimes indeed it goes towards making up the essence, espe¬ cially of a complex being, so far as we are acquainted with it: sometimes it depends upon, and follows from the essence of it: so volubility, or aptness to roll, is the property of a bowl, and is derived from its roundness. Mobility and figure, or shape, are properties of matter; and it is the property of a pious man to love his neighbour. An accidental mode, or an accident, is such a mode as is not necessary to the being of a thing : for the subject may be without 12 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. BOOK I, it, and yet remain of the same nature that it was before; or it is that mode which may be separated or abolished from its subject; so smoothness or roughnees, blackness or whiteness, motion or rest, are the accidents of a bowl ; for these may be all changed, and yet the body remain a bowl still. Learning, justice, folly, sickness, health, are the accidents of a man ; motion, squareness, or any particular shape or size, are the accidents of a body; yet shape and size in general are essential modes of it; for a body must have some size and shape, nor can it be without them; so hope, fear, wishing, assenting, and doubting, are accidents of the fnind, though thinking in general seems to be essential to it. Here it should be noted also, that though the word property be limited sometimes in logical treatises to the secondary essential mode, yet it is used in common language to signify these four sorts of modes, of which some are essential, and some accidental, (1.) Such as belong to every subject of that kind, but not only to those subjects. So yellow colour and ductility are properties of gold; they belong to all gold; but not only to gold, for saffron is also yellow, and lead is ductile, (2.) Such as belong only to one kind of subject, but not to every subject of that kind. So learning, reading, and writing, are pro¬ perties of human nature ; they belong only to man, but not to all men. (3.) Such as belong to every subject of one kind, and only to them, but not always. So speech or language is a property of man, for it belongs to all men, and to men only : but men are not always speaking. (4.) Such as belong to every subject of one kind, and to them only and always. So shape and divisibility are properties of body ; so omniscience and omnipotence are properties of the divine na¬ ture; for in this sense properties and attributes are the same; and except in logical treatises, there is scarce any distinction made between them. These are called propria quarto modq in the schools, or properties of the fourth sort. II. The second division of modes is into absolute and relative. An absolute mode is that which belongs to its subject, without respect to any other beings whatsoever: but a relative mode is derived from the regard that one being has to others. So round¬ ness and smoothness are the absolute modes of a bowl; for if there was nothing else existing in the whole creation, a bowl might be round and smooth ; but greatness and smallness are re¬ lative modes; for the very ideas of them arc derived merely from BOOK I. ELEMENTS OF LOGIC: 13 the comparison of one being with others. A bowl of four inches diameter is very great compared with one of an inch and a half; but it is very small in comparisons another bowl, whosediameter is eighteen or twenty inches. Motion is the absolute mode of a body, but swiftness or slowness are relative ideas ; for the motion of a bowl on a bowling-green is swift, when compared with a snail ; and is slow when compared with a cannon bullet. These relative modes are largely treated of by some meta¬ physical writers, under the name of relation; and these relations themselves are farther subdivided into such as arise from the na¬ ture of things, and such as arise merely from the operation of our mind. One sort are called real relations, the other mental ; so the likeness of one egg to another is a real relation, because it arises from the real nature of things; for whether there was any manor mind to conceive it or no, one egg would be like another; but when we consider an egg as a noun substantive in grammar, or as signified by the letters e, g, g, these are mental relations, and de¬ rive their very nature from the mind of man. These sort of rela¬ tions are called by the schools entia rationis, or second notions, which have no real being but by the operations of the mind. III. The third division of mode shews us they are either in- trinsical or extrinsical. Intrinsical modes are conceived to be in the subject or substance, as when we say a globe is round, or swift, rolling, or at rest; or when we say a man is tall or learned, these are intrinsic modes; but extrinsic modes are such as arise from something that is not in the substance or subject itself; but it is a manner of being which some substances attain, by reason of something that is external or foreign to the subject; as, this globe lies within two yards of the wall ; or, this man is beloved, or hated. Such sort of modes as this last example are called ex¬ ternal denominations. IV. There is a fourth division, whereby modes are said to be inherent or adherent; that is, proper or improper. Adherent or improper modesarising from the joining of some accidental sub¬ stance to the chief subject, which yet may be separated from it; so when a bowl is wet, or a boy is cloathed, these are adherent modes; for the water and the cloaths are distinct substances, which adhere to the bowl or to the boy; but when we say the bowl is swift or round, when we say the boy is strong or witty, these are proper or inherent modes, for they have a sort of in-being in the substance itself, and do notarise from the addition of any other substance to it. 14 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. BOOK f. V. Action and passion are modes or manners which belong to, substances, and should not entirely be omitted here. When a, smith with a hammer strikes a piece of iron, the hammer and the smith are both agents or subjects of action ; the one is the prime or supreme, the other the subordinate ; the iron is the patient, or the subject of passion, in a philosophical sense, because it receives the operation of the agent; though this sense of the words passion and patient differs much from the vulgar meaning of them. VI. The sixth division of inodes is into physical, that is, na¬ tural, civil, moral, and supernatural. So when we consider the apostle Paul, who was a little man, a Roman by the privilege of his birth, a man of virtue or honesty, and an inspired apostle ; his low stature is a physical mode, his being a Roman is a civil pri¬ vilege, his honesty is a moral consideration, and his being inspired is supernatural. VII. Modes belong either to body or to spirit, or to both. Modes of body belong only to matter or to corporeal beings; and these are shape, size, situation, or place, &c. Modes of spirit be¬ long tomind ; such are knowledge, assent, dissent, doubting, reason¬ ing, See, Modes which belong to both have been sometimes called mixed modes, or human modes; for these are only found inhuman nature, which is compounded both of body and spirit; such are sensation, imagination, passion, See. in ail which there is aconcur- rence of the operations both of mind and body, that is, of animal and intellectual nature. VIII. I might add, in the last place, that as modes belong to sub¬ stances, so there are some also that are hut modes of other modes ; for though they subsist in and by the substance, as the original subject of them, yet they are properly and directly attributed to some mode of that substance. Motion is the mode of a body; but the'swiftness or slowness of it, or its direction to the north or south, are but modes of motion. Walking is the mode or manner of man, or of a beast; but walking gracefully implies a manner of mode superadded to that action. All comparative and superlative degrees of any quality, are the modes of a mode, as swifter implies a greater measure of swiftness. It would he too tedious here to run through all the modes, ac¬ cidents, and relations at large that belong to various beings, and are copiously treated of in general in the science called metaphy¬ sics, or more properly ontology ; they are also treated of in parti¬ cular in those sciences which have assumed them severally as their proper subjects. BOOK I. ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. H6 SECTION IV. Of Not Being. As being is divided into substance and mode, so we may con¬ sider not-being with regard to both these. I. Not-being is considered as excluding all substance, and then all modes are also necessarily excluded, and this we call pure nullity, or mere nothing. This nothing is taken either in a vulgar or a philosophical sense; so we say there is nothing in the cup, in the vulgar sense, when we mean there is no liquor in it; but we cannot say there is no¬ thing in the cup, in a strict philosophical sense, while there is air in it, and perhaps a million of rays of light are there* II. Not-being, as it has relation to modes or manners of being, may be considered either as a mere negation, or as a privation. A negation is the absence of that which does not naturally be¬ long to the thing we are speaking of, or which has no right, obli¬ gation, or necessity to be present with it : as when we say a stone is inanimate, or blind, or deaf, that is, it has no life, nor sight, nor hearing; }(or when we say a carpenter ora fisherman is unlearn¬ ed, these are mere negations. But a privation is the absence of what does naturally belong to the thing we are speaking of, or which ought to be present with i t, as w hen a man ora horse is deaf, or blind , or dead, or if a phy¬ sician or a divine be unlearned, these are called privations ; so the sinfulness of any human action is said to be a privation ; for sin is that want of conformity to the law of God, which ought to be found in every action of man. CHAPTER III. Of the several sorts of Perceptions or Ideas. IDEAS are divided with regard to their original, their nature, and their objects. Ideas with respect to their original, are sensible, intellectual, or abstracted. Sensible, or corporeal ideas, are those which are derived origi¬ nally from our own senses; such are the notions we frame of all colours, sounds, tastes, figures, and motions. All the ideas which we have of body, and the sensible modes and properties that be¬ long to it, are derived from this source, sensation. 1 6 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. BOOK 1. Intellectual ideas are those which we gain by reflecting on the nature and actions of our own mind. Such are our ideas of thought, assent, dissent, reason, knowledge, love, fear, hope, &c. By sensation, the mind contemplates, as it were, things out of itself, and gains corporeal representations or sensible ideas ; by reflection, the mind contemplates itself, and things within itself, and by these means obtains its intellectual notions. Abstracted ideas are so called, because, though the original ground or occasion of them may be sensation or reflection, yet these ideas are more immediately framed by that act of the mind which we term abstraction. This is the act or faculty of with¬ drawing some parts of an idea from other parts, and confining the attention of the mind to such parts by themselves. And such ab¬ stractions are chiefly of two kinds; namely absolute abstractions, which are our general and universal conceptions of things consi¬ dered only in themselves; (such as entity, essence, existence, act, power, substance, &c.) and relative abstractions, such as causeand effect, likeness and unlikeness, subject, object, order, &c. in which we confine our attention to the relations, and entirely pass over the subjects in which they are as it were incorporated. Ideas, considered in their nature, are either simple or complex. A simple idea is one which does not admit of any division, or which cannot be separated by the mind into two or more ideas. Such are the ideas of sweet, bitter, cold, heat, white, red, hard, soft motion, rest, thought, will, wish, & c. A complex idea is one which is composed of two or more simple ideas together, such as a square, a triangle, a table, reading, writing, body, a man, &c. There are two other terms which fall under this head, of the nature of ideas; i. e. a collective and a compound idea. A collective idea is one which is composed of many ideas of the same kind joined together, — such as an army, a parliaments flock, a grove, a forest. A compound idea is one which is composed of things of a dif¬ ferent kind, such as harmony, — -virtue, &c. Ideas, according to their objects, are particular or universal. A particular idea is that of which the object is one thing only, or an individual. If this object or individual be general and indeterminate, such as when we say a man, or a horse, it is termed an Individuum Vagum. If the individual be ascertained, as when we say Bucephalus, Cicero, John, &c. orthe man and the horse, the particular idea is termed a singular idea. BOOK 1. ELEMENTS OF LOGIC, 17 A Universal idea is that of which the object is a rank of beings, or a common nature agreeing to several things — So a horse, a man, or a book, are called universal ideas, because they agree to all horses, all men, or all books. A Universal idea is either general or special. General idea is that of which the object is a genus. A Special idea is that of which the object is a species, CHAPTER IV. Of Words and their Divisions , WORDS are the signs or indices, by which we express orcon- vey our ideas to each other. But words, whether spoken or written, have no natural con¬ nexion either with the ideas they are employed to signify, nor with the things which are the objects of those ideas. Thus there is no manner of relation between the sounds white, black, &c. and the colours which we intend to convey by those names. Words therefore, are mere arbitrary names, invented by men to com¬ municate their thoughts to each other. One or more words, employed to express an idea or simple perception, is called a term. Terms are either positive or negative. Positive terms are those which imply the presence of any being or substance, — such as life, knowledge, &c. Negative terms are those, which imply the absence of any being, or mode of being, such as blindness, darkness, madness, death, &c. Terms are likewise divided into simple and complex. A simple term is one word. A complex term is when more words are used to signify one thing or idea. Some terms are complex in words, but not in sense; such as the second emperor of Rome, for it excites in our mind only the idea of one man, Augustus. Some terms are complex in sense, but not in words, as an army, a forest, &c. Again some terms are complex both in words and sense, as a tierce dog, &c. Words or names are likewise common or proper. Common names are those, of which the subject is a universal idea, or a rank of beings, whether general or special. These are called appellatives, thus fish, bird, man, city, trout, eel, &c. No. l. p BOOK I, IS ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. Proper names are those, of which the subject is a single being ; such as Cicero, Virgil, &c. Words or terms are likewise abstract or concrete. Abstract terms are those, which signify the mode or quality of a being, without any regard to the subject in which it exists; as whiteness, roundness, length, breadth, &c. Concrete terms are those which both express the quality and the subject to which it belongs, as white, round, long, broad, &c. Words are moreover univocal or equivocal. Univocal words are those which only signify one thing or idea, and are never applied to any other, as the words, book, bible, fish house, &C. Equivocal words are those, which are applied to signify two or more different kind of things or ideas, so as to cause an am¬ biguity which is intended. Thus the word head is an equivocal word, as signifying the head of a nail or of an animal, and post, which is a piece of timber, or a swift messenger. In the same manner all kind of puns, and all figurative and tropical terms. CHAPTER V. Of Definition and Division. AS words are signs of things or ideas, and as we see they may |be univocal or equivocal, it becomes necessary to explain the sense in which we use them ; that is to say, to define them, when they are obscure, or distribute them into their several significations where ambiguous. Definition of a word or name is the declaration in what sense the word is used, or what idea or object we intend by it. It is made either by a more known word, or by the etymology. A synonymous word, a mere negation of the contrary, a translation of the word into another language, or a grammatical explication of it, are indifferently used for such definition. As if any one should require what I mean by a sphere, I might reply a globe; dark, that which is not light • oval, what has the shape of an egg, &c. Definition of a thing is the declaration of its nature. It is made by its genus, by its difference, by its properties, and occasionally by the enumeration of its accidents. Three acts of the mind are employed in forming a definition* tSOOK I. Elements of logic, 19 First, we compare the thing to be defined with other things that are most like to itself, and see wherein its essence or nature agrees with them ; and this is called the general nature or genus in a definition : so if you would define what wine is, first compare it with other things like itself, as cyder, perry, &c. and you will find it agrees essentially with them in this, that it is a sort of juice. Secondly, we consider the most remarkable and primary attri¬ bute, property, or idea wherein this thing differs from those other things that are most like it; and that is its essential or specific difference: so wine dilfers from cyder and perry, and all other juices, in that it is pressed from a grape. This may be called its special nature, which distinguishes it from other juices. Thirdly, we join the general and special nature together, (or which is all one), the genus and the difference, and these make up a definition. So the juice of a grape, or juice pressedjrom grapes, is the definition of wine. So if I would define what winter is, I consider first wherein it agrees with other things which are most like it, (viz.) summer, spring, autumn, and I find they are all seasons of the year ; there¬ fore a season of the year is the genus. Then I observe wherein it differs from these, and that is in the shortness of tike days; for it is this which does primarily distinguish it from other seasons ; therefore this may be called its special nature of its difference. Then by joining these together I make a definition; Winter is that season of the year wherein the days are shortest* I confess, indeed, this is but a rude definition of it; for to define it, as an accurate astronomer, I must limit the days, hours, and minutes. 