The Civil War in America
Shotwell, Walter Gaston, 1856-1938
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THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA BY WALTER GASTON SHOTWELL AUTHOR OF ‘ THE LIFE OF CHARLES SUMNER ’ VOLUME II LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO. 39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON, E.C. 4 NEW YORK, TORONTO • BOMBAY, CALCUTTA AND MADRAS 1923 Made in Great Britain Cl CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME PAGE CHAPTER XXXII Rosecrans manceuvres Bragg back — Crosses the Tennessee — Bragg abandons Chattanooga ...... i CHAPTER XXXIII Battle of Chickamauga — Rosecrans makes a Break — Longstreet rushes in — Rosecrans abandons the Field — Thomas stays and saves the Army 8 CHAPTER XXXIV Grant sent to Chattanooga — Opens Line of Supply — Sherman attacks Missionary Ridge . . • • • • .22 CHAPTER XXXV Lookout Mountain — ‘ Battle above the  Ridge — Bragg retreats — Pursuif:— Cleburne defends the Pass. 39 CHAPTER XXXVII Financing the War— Chase’s Career— Customs— Internal Revenue- Greenbacks — National Bank ...... 49 CHAPTER XXXVIII The War on the Ocean — Fight between the Monitor and Merrimac _ Norfolk re-captured — Coast of North Carolina taken . . 64 CHAPTER XXXIX ' ‘ ^ McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign — New Bridge, Hanover, G.H., Fair Oaks, Seven Pines, Seven Days’ Battle— Retreat ... 80 V vi CONTENTS CHAPTER XL Pope and the Army of Virginia — His Unfortunate Address — Stone¬ wall Jackson appears — Cedar Mountain — Manassas — Chantilly — Fitz John Porter ........ ' CHAPTER XLI Lee invades Maryland — Jackson captures Harper’s Ferry — South Mountain — Antietam — Lee retreats to Virginia CHAPTER XLII Proclamation of Emancipation— Compensated Emancipation de¬ clined by Border States — But they save Congress to Lincoln. CHAPTER XLIII McClellan’s want of Harmony — Ordered to move — Succeeded by Burnside — Battle of Fredericksburg — Hooker succeeds Burnside CHAPTER XLIV Battle of Chancellorsville — Hooker defeated- — Death of Jackson — Sedgwick unites with Hooker ...... CHAPTER XLV Meade succeeds Hooker — Gettysburg — Lee defeated — Retreats — Meade follows cautiously ....... CHAPTER XLVI Watchful waiting — Attempts to relieve Union Prisoners — Enlist¬ ment of Coloured Troops — Border States return to Union CHAPTER XLVII Grant made Lt. -General — Assumes Command of Eastern Army _ Sheridan to command Cavalry — Grant crosses the Rapidan. CHAPTER XLVIII Battle of the Wilderness— Spottsylvania— The North Anna— Cold Harbor — Crossing the James ...... CHAPTER XLIX Early invades Maryland— Threatens Washington— Bums Chambers- burg — Sheridan sent to the Valley— Opequon — Fisher’s Hill _ Cedar Creek and ' Sheridan’s Ride ’..... CHAPTER L Shernaan advances from Chattanooga to Atlanta— General Polk killed — Kenesaw Mountain— Atlanta — Gen. McPherson killed — Hood goes Northward ....... CHAPTER LI Farragut enters Mobile Bay — Lincoln re-elected — Amendment abolishing Slavery submitted ...... PAGE 107 126 138 145 159 173 202 213 221 260 280 295 CONTENTS CHAPTER LII Hood strikes Sherman’s Line — Allatoona — Thomas sent to Nash¬ ville— Sherman turns Southward—' March to the Sea Captures Savannah ..... CHAPTER LIII Hood advances on Nashville — Schofield evades him at Spring Hill Battle of Franklin — Nashville — Hood defeated — Retreats. CHAPTER LIV War on the Ocean — Career of th.e Alabama — Sunk by the Kearsarge The Florida sunk — The Shenandoah surrendered. CHAPTER LV Grant assails Petersburg — Reaches out for the Railroads — The Winter Quarters — Sherman’s March through the Carolinas — The Campaign of 1865 — Death of A. P. Hill — Lee attempts to escape — Surrenders at Appomattox — Johnston surrenders to Sherman — End of the War .... vii PAGE 301 315 329 339 Index • 375 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA CHAPTER XXXII Rosecrans manoeuvres Bragg back to Chattanooga — The Union Army crosses the Tennessee River at Bridgeport— Enters the Valley of Lookout Creek — Bragg leaves Chattanooga. Bragg was right when, in consenting to Morgan’s raid, he urged his prompt return, and further ordered that, in case a movement of Rosecra.ns’ army was discovered, he should at once turn back and fall upon his rear. He only acted upon the reasonable probabilities of Rosecrans’ conduct when he consented that Morgan might go. To understand these assertions it is necessary to go back a little in the narrative. Ever since the battle of Stone River, it will be remembered, Rosecrans had lain idle upon the field. The most he could show for these months was a line of entrenchments thrown up, some drilling of his troops and a few raiding expeditions that brought nearly no desirable results. At first Rosecrans could offer as his excuse for this idleness the condition of his army, the winter weather and the badness of the roads. But fine weather comes early in that latitude, and before the month of June he was compelled to admit that he had no excuse and that his army was prepared to move. During this time Bragg lay thirty miles to the south, his infantry occupj^g a line of camps from Shelbyville to Wartrace, ten miles, with his cavalry extending out thirty miles to McMinnville on the east and an equal distance to Columbia on the west. The time had been industriously employed by him in throwing up a formidable line of breastworks. Immediately behind him was Duck River; beyond which he could quickly retreat and be secure, as he thought, protected by its rocky and precipitous sides. And still behind this lay the high plateau between Duck and Elk Rivers, known as the ‘Barrens,’ a rolling tract of poor land which baked dry in summer and burned up its sparse vegetation, and became a shrinking quicksand in winter, into which the wheels of loaded wagons sank to the hubs. On this ridge, and about midway between the two rivers, lay the straggling village of TuUahoma, which had also been fortified as Bragg’s main depot. Here entrenchments had also been thrown up, to which a retreat cordd be made, if for any reason the Shelbyville line was aban¬ doned. His main base of supply was Chattanooga. And it was this mountain fastness, the gateway to East Tennessee, that his lines were primarily intended to protect. It was East Tennessee that was in dispute and for which the contesting armies were to struggle. VOL. II. I B 2 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA Rosecrans’ inactivity was not according to the will of his superiors, Lincoln and Halleck, as we have already seen. But Rosecrans had developed a controversial spirit, and each request for a forward movement had been met by an argument against it. Apparently afraid to risk the laurels he had already won in an attempt to win new ones, he did nothing. And he was not the only one of this kind. There were other generals who were afflicted in the same way. Accidental success had made them popular favourites and placed them in high commands. But once there, they seemed overwhelmed with the responsibility that was thrust upon them and could only reluctantly be persuaded to move in any direction. Their time w^ sprat in drills and in the cautious choice of positions and on fortifications. They wrote long communications to the authorities at Washington, making innumerable requests for supplies, and almost interminable arguments against movements that were desired. This conduct occasioned many of the trials of the President and his general-in-chief as well as of his secretaries, Stanton and Chase, who had to provide the means to support idle armies and bear the criticism of a dissatisfied public. Hence as spring advanced the Washington authorities became more importunate. And finally, when Grant crossed the Mississippi and started on his campaign to the rear of Vicksburg, he asked that Rosecrans be ordered to make a move so as to prevent Bragg from sending troops to Johnston for the relief of Pemberton. The order was made. But Rosecrans did not budge. He afterwards explained that this was ‘ to secure General Grant, in his operations before Vicksburg, from the consequences of compelling Bragg to retire, when it would not be possible for us to so pursue as to prevent him from reinforcing Johnston.’ But he did not secure Grant against Bragg’s troops, for some of them were sent to Johnston. And when they were gone, Washington renewed its orders to Rosecrans to move against Bragg, thus weakened. But Rosecrans now called a council of war and obtained from seventeen of his generals an opinion against such a move. Only Garfield, his chief-of-staff, dissented, and he did so in a carefully pre¬ pared opinion, showing that Rosecrans could put 65,000 troops in the movement as against Bragg’s 41,000. Rosecrans reported the opinion of his generals to Halleck, with his usual argument against every movement that was ordered. And Halleck replied suggesting that councils of war never fight. But nevertheless, and notwithstanding the opinions of his generals, Rosecrans did, within two weeks from the date of his own letter, order an advance. His movement commenced on June 24. The position of Bragg’s infantry was covered by a range of high, rocky hUls in his front. The Manchester pike leading southward from Murfreesboro towards TuUahoma and also towards Bragg’s line of communication passed these hflls through Hoover’s Gap. It was here a narrow road and ascended the hills through a long, difficult canyon called Matt’s Hollow. There was another road to Wartrace which passed the hills at Liberty Gap and ran thence along the railroad by BeUbuckle Gap. The Shelb3rville pike ran through Guy’s Gap. Bragg held all these passes. Polk’s corps was at Shelbyville and Hardee’s at Wartrace. Polk’s ROSECRANS MANCEUVRES BRAGG TO CHATTANOOGA 3 corps was estimated at 18,000 and Hardee’s at 12,000, and in addition to these there were about 8,000 cavalry, giving Bragg altogether an army of 38,000. He expected to fight Rosecrans, in case he advanced, at Shelb5rville and, if beaten there, to retreat to the Barrens beyond Duck River and take advantage of the narrow, winding roads, scarcely wide enough anywhere for wagons to pass, leading up to the Barrens, to inflict severe loss upon his pursuers without danger of loss to himself. Rose¬ crans’ plan, on the other hand, was to render useless Bragg’s entrench¬ ments and, if possible, secure his line of retreat by turning his right and moving towards the railroad bridge over Elk River. This, he thought, would compel Bragg to come out of his entrenchments and submit to a battle, on ground of Rosecrans’ choice, or drive him to a disadvan¬ tageous line of retreat. To accomplish this it would be necessary to make Bmgg believe that Rosecrans would advance against him at Shelbyville, thus keeping his army there until Rosecrans’ had reached Manchester to his right, where he could cross Duck River. This point Rosecrans would have to reach by a single passable road, the Manchester pike, passing through Hoover’s Gap, a narrow way three miles in length, between high hills, and then through Matt’s HoUow, a gorge two miles long. These passes were occupied by Bragg’s troops and were only eight miles from Hardee’s headquarters at Wartrace and not more than sixteen from Polk’s at Shelb5rville. Since the battle of Stone River, Rosecrans’ army had been re¬ inforced by the Army of Kentucky, under Major-General Gordon Granger, composed of three brigades that had lately been strengthened by two regiments of infantry and four of cavalry. This added 14,000 troops to Rosecrans’ army. Granger became one of his ablest sub¬ ordinates, and he had under him Brigadier-General George Crooke, another ofi&cer of the regular army and a graduate of West Point. The plan was to move this command to Triune and create the impression of Rosecrans’ intention to advance by the Triune and Shelbyville pike, while a cavalry movement and infantry advance, in an opposite direction, from Murfreesboro towards Woodbury, would seem to be a feint designed by Rosecrans to deceive Bragg. Accordingly General Granger sent General Mitchell on June 23 with his cavalry division, on the Shelbyville pike, to make a furious attack on Bragg’s cavalry and to drive in his infantry guards on their main line. Granger himself followed with his own corps and a division of General Thomas. It wfil be noticed that these troops advanced to the south-west. On the same day another division, with a brigade of cavalry, was sent to the south-east, to Brad5rvitle, to seize an obscure pass through the hiUs, leading by Lumley’s Stand. All these troops were provided with rations for ten or twelve days. And the same rations were ordered issued to the rest of the army. General MitcheU proceeded without interruption to Eagle viUe. Here he struck the outposts of Bragg’s army. Advancing steadily, he drove them back upon their reserves. The advance continued till the Confederate encampment at Rover was reached. Here they made a stand, but were soon driven back to UnionviUe, upon the main force, where each side used artillery and both sustained some loss. Night 4 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA coming on, Mitchell withdrew his force to a point about a mile north of Rover, where he bivouacked for the night. The next morning he was ordered by Granger to Middleton, four miles to the east, where he again engaged Bragg’s outposts. The next day he was moved to Fosterville, still farther to the east, and then to Guy’s Gap. Upon reaching the approach to the Gap on the morning of June 27, and finding it occupied by Confederates, he charged furiously upon them and drove them up and through the gorge. The Confederates now retiring on their entrenchments, Mitchell soon found himself in front of Shelbyville, followed closely by General Granger with his entire corps. These movements had the desired effect ; for Bragg, supposing he was to be attacked at Shelbyville, called into that place Buckner’s command and the troops from along the line of railroad and the spare troops at his command in East Tennessee. The last of these troops arrived at Shelbyville the very evening he commenced his retreat. While these things were transpiring in front of Shelbyville the rest of Rosecrans’ army was not idle. On the evening of the 23rd the corps commanders met at his headquarters, where the plan of the move¬ ment was explained to them and each was given his written orders. McCook was to advance on the Shelbyville road and then, turning to the left by MiUersburg and advancing on the Wartrace road, seize and hold Liberty Gap. Thomas was to advance on the Manchester pike and seize and hold Hoover’s Gap. Crittenden was to leave one division at Murfreesboro and concentrate at BradyviUe with the other two. The purpose of all these movements was to carry the entire army, with the exception of Granger’s command, to the east of Wartrace and so around the right of Bragg’s army. The movements were aU executed promptly and successfully. Liberty and Hoover’s Gaps were both taken. McCook advanced on the Wartrace road, Crittenden to Lumley’s Stand, and Thomas drove the Confederate outposts towards Wartrace. As the movements of Bragg could not be foreseen, the orders to these corps commanders had to be issued each day so as to keep their troops within supporting distance of each other. It was one of the curious incidents of the campaign that, while Rosecrans had been complaining that he could not move till the weather and the roads became settled, the very day he commenced his advance it began to rain, and during every day but one that he was engaged in the campaign it poured down incessantly, as it only could rain, as one of his generals expressed it, when the Army of the Cumber¬ land attempted to move. The streams were swollen and in many places had to be bridged, and the roads resembled rivers of mud. Into them his trains sank to the hub. They were so bad that it required four days of incalculable labour for one corps to move twenty-one miles. Yet the movement was successfully made. And this completely refuted Rosecrans’ stock argument, that a movement was impossible on account of the weather and the roads. Bragg, seeing Rosecrans on June 26 pass his right after skirmish¬ ing sharply along his whole front for two days, on the 27th abandoned his line in front of Duck River, extending from Shelbyville to Wartrace, and fell back to his entrenchments at Tullahoma. The retreat was hastily made. In abandoning Shelbyville before the advance of ROSECRANS MANCEUVRES BRAGG TO CHATTANOOGA 5 Granger’s troops, one of Bragg’s guns was hurried as far as the bridge over Duck River. Here its wheels broke through the bridge and it had to be abandoned. This served to partially blockade the bridge, thereby preventing the rapid retreat of a large body of his cavalry which was yet on the north side of the river and was closely pursued. The retreat became a panic. Those who could not cross the bridge endeavoured to swim the river, which was now very much swollen by the recent rains. While some crossed in safety, others were drowned. In the midst of this confusion, the cavalry general, Joe Wheeler, called for troops to form and stop Granger’s advance. A regiment volunteered to do this service. Thus aided. General Wheeler himself and some others escaped by swimming. But this whole regiment, except those who were killed, was captured by Granger, including the colonel and aU the line officers present. At TuUahoma, Bragg paused to await the development of Rose- crans’ plan. But he had not long to wait, for on that same day, the 27th, Rosecrans established his headquarters at Manchester and closed up his column ready for battle, thinking Bragg might fight him there. While this was being done, he determined if possible to destroy the railroad in Bragg’s rear, so as to cut off his line of retreat. He sent Wilder’s brigade to bum the bridge over Elk River and to tear up the track between Decherd and Cowan. But Wilder found the bridge defended by an infantry brigade and a battery. He was obliged to abandon that project, and only succeeded in doing some slight damage to the road. But Bragg now saw that his line was seriously threatened and, deeming himself fortunate that he had so far been able to save it, he abandoned Tullahoma, his second fortified position, and feU back again on the 29th, this time crossing the Tennessee River at Bridge¬ port and retiring to his base at Chattanooga. Here he proceeded to fortify himself. It had taken just nine days to manoeuvre Bragg out of Central Tennessee and it had cost only 560 men. While Rosecrans had cap¬ tured 1,500 prisoners and some artillery and supplies, besides inflicting an equal loss in killed and wounded. But now, having scored this brflliant success and established himself so easily in Bragg’s entrench¬ ments at TuUahoma, Rosecrans’ old disposition to idleness again overcame him. Here he remained six weeks. Lincoln and Halleck again urged him to move. And again he resorted to the same old excuses — ^want of troops, insufficient communications, bad weather, bad roads. In fact it was his same old fear to tmst himself and his abUity to score new successes, to justify the Government in continuing its confidence in him. Lincoln answered him kindly, that he felt anxious for the occupa¬ tion of East Tennessee, caUing his attention to the fact that he must consume supplies as fast as they could be got forward, and suggesting that he had no more horses now than he had at the battle of Stone River and yet more had been furnished in the meantime than his entire present stock. In answer to his statement that he was im¬ pressed, through HaUeck, that the Administration was dissatisfied with him, the President wrote : ‘ I repeat that my appreciation of you has not abated. I can never forget, whilst I remember anything, that 6 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA about the end of last year and the beginning of this, you gave us a hard-earned victory (Stone River) which, had there been a defeat instead, the nation could hardly have lived over.’ But orders more pressing were given him to move. The people of East Tennessee had been tyrannised over, and patriotic citizens had been abused, their substance consumed and their homes laid waste. The faU elections were approaching and the Democrats had gone to the country on the issue that the war was a failure. This issue must be met by success in the field. Rosecrans answered in his usual querulous tone, asking if the order to move was intended to take away his discretion, and the President answered, ‘ The orders for the advance of your army, emd that its movements be reported daily, are peremptory.’ Then Rosecrans, after waiting ten days longer, again started. Burnside, who had been urged at the same time to move upon Knox- vUle, so as to make a diversion in Rosecrans’ favour, showed some of the same inertia, but his advance entered Knoxville from Cincinnati on September i. Rosecrans had a more difficult proposition before him. Bragg lay ensconced in his rocky fastness, protected by a broad, deep river in front and by inaccessible moimtains in the rear and on either side. If Rosecrans approached it from the north, he must first cross the Cumberland Mountains, then the Sequatchie River, and then the difficult mountain barrier of Walden’s Ridge, which butted on the river with a rugged waU of rock at the bend below the city. If he approached by the south, he must first reach the river, which was easy enough, as he controlled the railroad, and then, once across the river, he must pass Raccoon Mountain and the stUl more difficult Lookout Range, and then fight his way into a fortified city. But of these two routes Rosecrans wisely chose the latter. Nevertheless it was one of the most difficult problems of his life. To create the impression on Bragg that he had chosen the other route, he sent two divisions of Crittenden’s corps by parallel roads over the Cumberland Mountains into the Sequatchie valley. Every pass into that valley was pervaded by this swarm of his soldiers. They were as far to the north-east as Sparta and scattered along the river front from Kelley’s Ferry to Kingston, two- thirds of the way to Knox¬ ville. But they massed heavily opposite the city and near the mouth of Chickamauga Creek. This powerful feint again deceived Bragg. He saw no sign of activity elsewhere, and indeed thought it not worth while to look for any. He no longer doubted that Rosecrans would cross the river from the north. But he did doubt whether Chattanooga or Knoxville, where Buckner was in command, was to be the object of attack. While Bragg was busy watching the movement in the north, Rosecrans quietly moved the main body of his army over the Cumber¬ land Mountains, and on August 29 commenced crossing his troops over the Tennessee River at Shellmound, Bridgeport, Caperton’s Ferry and at the mouth of Battle Creek, mostly by improvised rafts and bridges. By September 4 they were all over and quicldy climbed the sides of the first range of mountains and descended into the valley of Lookout Creek. This valley issues into the Tennessee River near Chattanooga. Rosecrans had, therefore, now a choice of two movements, either BRAGG LEAVES CHATTANOOGA 7 down Lookout Creek to Chattanooga or across the range of Lookout Mountains so as to operate again upon Bragg’s line of supply. He chose the latter. And again he chose wisely. His army was now occupying the v^ey of Lookout Creek from the Tennessee River to Valley Head, a distance of thirty miles or more. It began the passage of Lookout Mountains by the various passes, and his troops were soon in the wide and comparatively level stretch of ground between Missionary Ridge and Pigeon Moimtain known as McLemore’s Cove, destined to be the scene of one of the most bloody battles of modem warfare. Down it coursed the little stream known as Chickamauga Creek, which gave its name to the battle. On September g mmours kept coming in that Bragg’s army was again in retreat, and a regiment of mounted infantry was sent to make a reconnaissance from the top of Lookout Mountain, where it overlooked the^ city, to determine the truth of these mmours. At ii a.m. this regiment entered Chattanooga from the west, as the rear of Bragg’s army left from the south. And thus was accomplished the movement of Bragg’s army from a third fortified position without a battle. The goal had been reached. The long-sought mountain fastness of East Tennessee was in the hands of the Union army. And the successful accomplishment of these movements has stamped Rosecrans as one of the ablest strategists of the war. The whole movement from Murfreesboro to Chattanooga was accomplished in eighty days, with the loss of less than 1,000 men in killed, wounded and missing. Great battles with the loss of many thousands often accomplished less fhan this comparatively bloodless victory. CHAPTER XXXIII The Battle of Chickamaup — The Field — First Day’s Fight — Second Day, Break in Union Line, Longstreet rushes in, Rosecrans abandons Field — Thomas remains and saves the Army. The Union army was now in possession of the key to East Tennessee and its extensive coalfields, so much needed to supply the South. But the question still remained whether Rosecrans could maintain his hold on this prize. Bragg had left Chattanooga, but not with the intention of finally abandoning it. He had the recent example of Vicksburg before him. He would save Chattanooga from the horrors of a siege and he would save his army. And he would also preserve his line of communication. Atlanta was now his base. And Bragg’s purpose was to try out the issue of battle on a more favourable field. If he could succeed there, he knew that Chattanooga would come back to him. By the last of August it had become known that Rosecrans had crossed the Tennessee River, and that by a direct route from Bridgeport, where the crossing was effected, he was as near Atlanta as the Confederate army. His movements were now closely watched by Bragg’s cavalry. It was ascertained that his general movement was towards Dalton and Rome. This would throw the Union army between Bragg and Atlanta. The main body of Bragg’s army was between Lee and Gordon’s MiU and La Fayette, on the direct road from Chattanooga to the south. This brought his army between that of Rosecrans and the railroad to Atlanta, Bragg’s line of communication, which he was determined to guard. So that Bragg stfil had the advantage of position. To understand fully the situation, it is necessary to keep in mind the topography of the country. The principal mountain range south of the Tennessee River is Lookout Mountain, which rises 2,400 feet above the surrounding valleys. Its general direction is north and south. A spur of this range. Missionary Ridge, leaves Lookout Moun¬ tain twenty miles south of Chattanooga, and runs a little more to the east. A second spur. Pigeon Mountain, leaves Lookout five miles farther south than Missionary Ridge, and runs still more to the east. All three of these ranges lay between the two armies as Rosecrans’ troops filed up Will’s Valley, on the west of Lookout Mountain. Between the moxmtain ranges were quiet valleys, divided into fertile farms, which were tilled by residents of the neighbourhood. It was in one of these valleys that Bragg was quietly ensconced, hidden from the view of his enemy by the towering mountains with their timbered sides. From September 7 to 11 Rosecrans did not know where Bragg was. During the afternoon of the loth it was learned that he had 8 THE FIELD OF CHICKAMAUGA g retired by the La Fayette road ; but it was uncertain how far he had gone. General Crittenden was ordered at one o’clock on the morning of the nth to proceed along that road, directing his command to advance as far as Ringgold by one branch, and to continue a recon¬ naissance on the other towards La Fayette, as far as Lee and Gordon’s Mill. Crittenden that day moved as directed, and the result of the reconnaissance was to convince Rosecrans that Bragg’s main body was in the neighbourhood of La Fayette. Crittenden was therefore ordered to move his whole command, with all possible dispatch, from Ringgold to Lee and Gordon’s Mill, and to communicate from there with General Thomas, who had been ordered to take his corps up Will’s Valley and cross Lookout Mountain by Cooper’s and Steven’s Gaps. McCook’s corps had been ordered to move farther up Will’s Valley to the neighbourhood of Alpine and Summerville. Thomas, following his instructions, had already reached the eastern foot of Lookout Mountain. Crittenden’s order would bring him and Thomas together at the head of what was known as McLemore’s Cove. This was the quiet vale enclosed between Missionary Ridge and Pigeon Mountain, within which the Chickamauga found its source, and down which it noiselessly stole its way. It was framed around by lofty mountains, with their sides covered by trees, still in full leaf and with their ever-var5dng shades of green, piled b.-'nk upon bank, making a setting of surpassing beauty. Within, the stubbles of wheat and oats were yet golden. And the rows of ripening corn were rustling in the fields. The vale was dotted with quiet pastures and stately groves, where lazy cattle browsed and roamed. The surface was broken only by gentle swells and rolls, and lined with the winding pathways of the brooks. There was no sign of human life save in the simple cottages of the tillers of the soil and the musical whir of the mill, grinding by its quiet stream. No more peaceful scene of quiet home life could have been found, and none could have seemed fimther removed from the tread of advancing armies, than this retired nook, nowhere more than four miles wide, and three times as many long, hidden away among the mountains of Northern Georgia. Yet it was here that two-thirds of the Union army were directed to unite. And just beyond, behind Pigeon Mountain, the Confederate army lay, ready to sweep down and commence the fray. Rosecrans had made a serious mistake when he ordered the separa¬ tion of his three corps. This he was now beginning to realise. As we shall see, it might have cost him the loss of his army. He supposed that Bragg was running away. And acting upon this supposition, he had hurried to make pursi it. One corps, McCook’s, was now near Alpine, forty miles south 3f Chattanooga, by a direct line, and fifty-seven by the route he had traversed. Another, Thomas’, was half that distance away. While the third, Crittenden’s, was being hurried from Chattanooga to join Thomas. Rosecrans had just dis¬ covered that Bragg was not running away, but was skilfully hiding where he could protect his own line of commurdcation, and at the same time be ready to throw his whole force upon either of the detached corps of the Union army, and crush it before it could be supported by one of the others. With this knowledge brought home to him, VOL. II. c 10 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA Rosecrans now realised his mistake. There were other facts, not known to him, which, if known, would have caused him still greater anxiety. Bragg was being reinforced by Buckner with 5,000 infantry and artillery from Knoxville, and by five brigades, under the skilful leadership of Longstreet, from Lee’s army in Virginia. He did know that the main body of Johnston’s army from Mississippi had joined Bragg. ‘ It was, therefore, a matter of life and death,’ as Rosecrans afterwards wrote, ‘ to effect the concentration of the army.’ McCook was ordered to join Thomas ‘ with the utmost celerity,' and Crittenden was withdrawn, as we have seen, from Lee and Gordon’s Mill, to take post on the southern spur of Missionary Ridge, his right communicating with Thomas. Thomas was to remain where he was till McCook’s corps joined him. McCook did not reach Thomas tiU September 17, and then both were moved down the Cove, towards Lee and Gordon’s Mill. Thus on the evening of the 17th the three corps were at last within supporting distance, and Rosecrans could give a sigh of relief from the nervous strain of the last week. As it was apparent that Bragg was only threatening at Lee and Gordon’s Mill, while he was massing heavily at Reed’s and Alexander’s bridges, three or four miles farther down the Chickamauga, towards Chatta¬ nooga, Thomas was ordered to move down so as to intervene between these crossings and Rossville. He was to cover the roads from La Fayette and Ringgold to Chattanooga near Kelly’s house, where they united. This was four miles from Rossville. RossviHe was a small village at a gap in Missionary Ridge, through which the roads, here united, passed to Chattanooga. Missionary Ridge towered 1,000 feet on either side of this gap and thus made an approach to Chattanooga, by any other route, almost impracticable for one army in the presence of the other. It was, therefore, a position of great importance if Chattanooga, a mile away, was to be held. It was Thomas who was assigned to cover Rossville, the position of most importance, and likewise the one upon which the Confederates were concentrating. Crittenden was stationed on his right, farther up the Cove, and McCook still above him. It seems strange that Rosecrans should have been allowed to gather his three corps from the awkward positions in which he had placed them and draw them up thus in a compact line of battle. But the explanation is simple. Bragg had not been able to carry out his own plans. During September 9 he had learned that Thomas’ column had crossed Lookout Mountain into the Cove by way of Steven’s and Cooper’s Gaps. Bragg was an able general, perhaps, taken for all in all, the ablest the Confederate army in the West ever had, except Joe Johnston. He certainly accomplished more for his cause than any other. He realised that Rosecrans, thrown off his guard by the rapid movement of the Confederate army to the south, had construed it as a retreat and, pressing on to intercept it, had thus exposed himself in detail. He therefore ordered General Hindman, on September 9, to move with his division to Davis’ Cross Roads* on the road from La Fayette to Steven’s Gap, and there unite with Cleburne’s division of Hill’s corps, and move upon Thomas. Hill was ordered to have Cleburne meet him there. It was Bragg’s DISPOSITION OF TROOPS ii intention to strike Rosecrans’ isolated corps in succession and crush them. Polk was ordered forward with another division to cover Hindman’s rear. And Walker’s reserve corps was ordered to join Cleburne s division and unite in the attack. But Hill complained of the condition of the roads and did not get Cleburne up ; and Hindman delayed the attack till the middle of the afternoon. And then it was discovered that Thomas had withdrawn to the mountain passes to join McCook. And so it was too late. Bragg’s purpose was defeated. This movement having failed, Bragg then determined to turn upon Crittenden’s corps at Ringgold. Polk’s and Walker’s corps were immediately moved in that direction. And Polk was directed to attack Crittenden at dawn of September 13. But Polk answered late in the night of the 12th that he had taken a strong position for defence and asked to be ‘ heavily reinforced.’ He was told in reply that his force was already superior to Crittenden’s, but that he would be supported by Buckner, and was again directed to make the attack promptly as ordered. But no attack was made, and Crittenden withdrew, as we have seen, to the west side of the Chickamauga, and formed a junction with Thomas. So that both of Bragg’s plans for crushing Rosecrans’ separated corps failed for want of prompt obedience to his orders. And thus Rosecrans escaped the penalties of his imprudence. Thoroughly disappointed, Bragg removed his trains and supplies to safe positions beyond Taylor’s Ridge, a mountain range at his rear, and concentrated all his forces along the Chickamauga to face Rosecrans’ united army. On the night of the 17th orders were issued for an advance the next day. B. R. Johnson’s column was to cross at Reed’s Bridge, and Walker’s at Alexander’s, and Buckner’s at Thedford’s ford ; and aU were to unite in a movement pushing Thomas, flank and rear, vigorously up the Chickamauga, while Polk crossed at Lee and Gordon’s Mill, or the fords immediately below, and fell upon Crittenden. HiU and Wheeler’s cavalry were to cover them from an advance of McCook from above. This plan, if successful, would give Bragg the control of Rossville Gap and Chattanooga. But here again intervened the same old delays. Johnson did not get across the Chickamauga till late in the afternoon. By that time Hood, of Longstreet’s corps, had arrived from Virginia and taken Johnson’s place at the head of the corps ; while a division of three brigades was improvised for Johnson. Walker was also delayed. His crossing at Alexander’s Bridge was resisted. And he was obliged to move down stream and cross at Byram’s Ford, two miles below. He did not join Hood till after nightfall. Polk and Hill were also obliged to abandon their efforts to cross at Lee and Gordon’s Mill, and seek fords lower down. So that, while Bragg’s troops had been skirmishing all day with Rosecrans’, no organised assault was made as ordered. But Bragg’s troops now occupied the west side pf the stream, and were ready to open the battle. The Union army was in a position facing the stream from opposite the Kelly house, near Reed’s Bridge, to Crawfish Spring, two miles above Lee and Gordon’s Mill. This made a line about six miles long. The Confederate line faced it. 12 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA but was not so compact at the southern end. At last the battle was accidentally opened by Colonel McCook of the 52nd Ohio. With a brigade of General Gordon Granger’s reserve co^s, he was sent on the i8th, from Rossville, to destroy Reed’s Bridge. As he ap¬ proached the bridge, just at dark, the head of his column ran into a Confederate brigade and captured come twenty prisoners. McCook took position, allowing no fires to be built, and waited for daylight. During the night he reported to General Thomas that an isolated brigade was on the west side of the Chickamauga, and suggested that a rapid movement might result in the capture of the whole force. So during the night McCook was reinforced by two of Thomas’ brigades and the bridge was burned. Then an attack was ordered. It was vigorously made, and before it the Confederates fell back half a mile. This vigorous movement disconcerted the plan of the Confederates and opened the battle. This was on Saturday, September ig, 1863. The leading brigades became engaged on the end of the line nearest Rossville. Here the Confederates combined to move in heavy masses. Apprehending this movement, Rosecrans ordered Johnson’s .division from General McCook’s corps to be sent to Thomas’ assistance. It arrived opportunely. General Crittenden had already dispatched Palmer’s division and reported the fact to Rosecrans. The Con¬ federates, having returned Colonel McCook’s attack, were driving him back when Johnson opportunely arrived and struck their flank and drove them back, tiU. Johnson was overlapped and in imminent danger of being turned. Then Palmer coming, threw his division against the exposed line of Johnson and again drove back the advancing line of the Confederates. Another division came to Palmer’s support, but it was beaten back, when a fourth came up and was in turn over¬ powered by the now encouraged Confederates. But a fifth division was thrown in, and it at last turned the tide of battle here the other way. The assault had been made on the north end of the line and had been taken up in succession to the south. Sheridan and Davis were sent from McCook’s corps to the support of Crittenden’s, when he seemed in danger from Hood. But that line was hard pressed, and orders were sent to McCook to move his last division there. And he went with it. McCook arrived at 4.30 p.m. and fell in behind Crittenden’s line. Wilder’s mounted infantry had been fighting the Confederate reserve near Alexander’s Bridge, but had been driven back, contest¬ ing the ground step by step, and had been placed behind this line. 