The great Pacific war; a history of the American-Japanese campaign of 1931-33
Bywater, Hector C. (Hector Charles), 1884-1940
es : > ad . 7 ae emer mie Pret OES ae aml taal Ts aad See eset ek ieee ae “ SS ea pa It iad F aed OIL zor a ene cg eet <a ange ere ae en UNIVERSITY OF \LLINO! S LIBRARY. Ag) URBANA:CHAMF IGN STACKS « NOTICE: Return or renew all Library Materials! The Minimum Fee for each Lost Book is $50.00. The person charging this material is responsible for its return to the library from which it was withdrawn on or before the Latest Date stamped below. Theft, mutilation, and underlining of books are reasons for discipli- nary action and may result in dismissal from the University. To renew call Telephone Center, 333-8400 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN L161—O-1096 Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2022 with funding from University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign Alternates httos://archive.org/details/greatpacificwarhOObywa_0O THE GREAT “PACIFIC -WAR BY THE SAME AUTHOR SEA POWER IN THE PACIFIC The Morning Post.—‘‘ All thinking men and women would do well to read Mr. Bywater’s book, in which he dis- cusses with admirable frankness and great lucidity the naval problems of that ocean. . .. A standark work of reference.... A book of absorbing interest.” The Naval and Military Record.—‘ A profound study of the strategic problems of the future, sagaciously perceived and admirably reasoned.” The Daily Telegraph—‘' The author reveals himself as well qualified to act as guide on matters about which most people are singularly ill-informed . . . it is of an exhaustive character, free from national bias. . . . Aseries of chapters which will be read with appreciation by those who have not followed closely the development of the fleets of the United States and Japan.’ Truth.— A very able disquisition upon the approaching struggle, and especially upon the nature of the weapons being got ready by the combatants. ... Mr. Bywater’s book represents much thought- ful and conscientious research work.” THE GREAT PACIFIC WAR A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN- FAPANESE CAMPAIGN OF 1931-33 BY HE@TQORwGy BYWATER: ASSOCIATE OF INST. NAY. ARCH., ASSOCIATE MEMBER OF U.S. NAV. INST. AUTHOR OF ‘“*SEA POWER IN THE PACIFIC” BOSTON - AND - NEW YORK HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 1925 PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY RICHARD CLay & Sons, LIMITED, BUNGAY, SUFFOLK. J Tr 2° 17em PREFACE A.THouGH this book portrays the course of an imaginary war between the United States and Japan, it has not been written to support the view that such a conflict is either close at hand or inevitable. No doubt there are elements of danger in the immigration controversy, while further causes of friction may attend the growth of American commercial enterprise in the Far East. For the moment, however, the Pacific horizon is fairly free from clouds. But if war between the two nations is happily improbable, it remains a contingency that eannot be dismissed as wholly impossible. In a previous volume, ‘‘ Sea Power in the Pacific,” I discussed at some length the formidable problems of strategy that would confront the United States in the event of hostilities with Japan. To naval officers the peculiar character of those problems had, of course, long been evident, but their recital appears to have aroused considerable interest among the public at large. To develop the theme further it was necessary to have recourse to the medium of fiction. In the present book I have sought to demonstrate that, notwithstanding the handicaps of distance and, on America’s side, the want of naval stations in the western area of the Pacific, means might still be found of estab- lishing contact between the main belligerent forces and thus forcing matters to a decisive issue. It is often averred that war between the United States and Japan is out of the question, if only because their respective fleets, divided as they are by thousands of miles of ocean and with no intermediate bases of supply, could never get sufficiently close to engage. This, however, is probably a delusion, as I have endeavoured to show. Vv 616076 vi PREFACE In foreshadowing the strategic moves and counter- moves of the supposititious campaign, it has been my aim to keep well within the bounds of reasonable possi- bility, and not to sacrifice reality for the sake of dramatic effect. It would have been easy, for example, to bring the Japanese battle fleet to Hawaii, or even to the American seaboard. I might even have conveyed whole Japanese army corps to San Francisco and allowed them to overrun the Pacific Slope. But to do so would have been to expose the narrative to the well-merited ridicule of informed critics. Service readers may take exception to the account of the Bonins expedition, on the ground that so foolhardy an undertaking would never for a moment commend itself to the merest tyro in naval strategy. I submit, however, that the enterprise in question would be no more hazardous and unsound than certain operations which were seriously advocated by professional strategists during the world war of 1914-18. Moreover, at a time of national crisis any scheme which promises to achieve major results at small cost must inevitably make a strong appeal to political leaders, who have not infre- quently been known to sanction military operations in the teeth of the best professional advice. Particulars of the American and Japanese combatant forces are based upon the latest and most reliable infor- mation from both countries. Japanese submarines are designated in accordance with the new system promul- gated by the Imperial Navy Department in November, 1924. The descriptions of islands, harbours, and channels, in common with all other topographical details, have been carefully checked, nor has the influence of weather conditions in certain regions of the Pacific escaped attention. Most names of merchant ships appearing in the text are actually borne by vessels now afloat. The account of cruiser and submarine raids on commerce has been compiled with due regard to existing trade routes and sea traffic. In fine, no effort has been spared to ensure technical accuracy throughout the narrative. PREFACE vii All persons named in the book, whether American or Japanese, are fictitious, no attempt having been made to draw individuals ‘“ from the life.” I am indebted to Mr. Francis EK. MecMurtrie, a co- editor of ‘“‘ Fighting Ships,” the well-known naval annual, for valuable aid in the preparation of this story. His wide knowledge of maritime affairs was placed un- reservedly at my disposal, and it is due to his practical interest that the original plan of the book was extended to include chapters descriptive of the trade war and other subsidiary but instructive operations beyond the principal zone of hostilities. I have only to add that, to the best of my knowledge, this book constitutes the first attempt that has been made to forecast the progress of a future naval war in the Pacific from the Western point of view, though at least two Japanese works on the same subject have appeared within recent years. Hecror C. BYwaTErR. April, 1925. 4 aheed Bia by Se ah oe ae Sih ‘ 10 R ap es ? et wb! net d ry. eben ye ate, Th eer ian Tit ht eee: Sohal ayer t (Gelert ARBOR, D Baudet ae toy yl: Ke Busby 1 ey le betes . bavi at gee an XXI. CONTENTS INTRODUCTORY . . F : ; JANUARY-MARCH, 19381 P MARCH, 1981 : ‘ ‘ : MARCH-APRIL, 1931 ; ; : ; ; APRIL, 1931 ; é , APRIL-MAY, 1931 , ; JUNE-JULY, 1931 E , ‘ AUGUST-SEPTEMBER, 1931 . , : OCTOBER-—DECEMBER, 1931 . : ‘ : DECEMBER, 1931-JANUARY, 1982 . 5 d % 99 ¥ fe ok . ; FEBRUARY—MARCH, 1932 ; ; ; ; MARCH-APRIL, 1932 . : : APRIL-JUNE, 1982 : , ‘ : JUNE-AUGUST, 1932 AUGUST-—OCTOBER, 1932 OCTOBER-NOVEMBER, 1932 . 7 j : NOVEMBER, 19382 . ; ‘ , ; ; NOVEMBER, 1932-MARCH, 19338 : : p APPENDIX I.—THE UNITED STATES NAVY APPENDIX II.—THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY INDEX OF PERSONAL NAMES. INDEX OF SHIP NAMES : 1x a yi oy ii ny fiioy Jf ¥ THE GREAT PACIFIC WAR CHAPTER I Causes that led to the War—Japan’s endeavours to control China— China takes a step towards unification—Friction over an American concession—Situation complicated by a Communist agitation in Japan—Japanese Government decides on war with the United States as a solution for domestic difficulties A pistTou shot fired at Sarajevo in June, 1914, touched off the European powder magazine, causing an explosion that convulsed the earth. It might be said with equal truth that a bomb bursting in Tokyo on January 5, 1931, gave the signal for the recent tremendous conflict between the United States and Japan, the echoes of which have scarcely died away. Thanks to the documen- tary evidence now available, it is possible to trace, link by link, the connection between this attempt on the life of Prince Kawamura, the Japanese Prime Minister, and the subsequent events which culminated in the Pacific War; but to do so we must first briefly review what had been happening in Japan and elsewhere in the Far East during the preceding ten years. While to most of the nations embroiled therein the World War of 1914-18 had proved an unmitigated curse, to one at least it had brought wealth, prosperity, and increased political influence. Alone among all the belligerents, Japan emerged from the struggle with a substantial balance on the credit side. In the space of four years her industrial system developed beyond all expectations, her foreign trade increased fourfold, and her gold reserve tenfold. Since she had taken only a nominal share in the actual fighting, her losses had been trivial, yet they were richly B 2 THE GREAT PACIFIC WAR compensated by the possession of all the former German Pacific islands north of the Equator. Moreover, she had made the most of her opportunities in China while the rest of the world was preoccupied with war. Over some of the richest provinces of that ancient Empire she ruled with all the authority of a proprietor. China itself, disunited, racked, and plundered by selfish factions, with a puppet central government and a horde of venal politicians who kept the treasury in a chronic state of emptiness, was in no condition to resist the encroach- ment of her virile neighbour. The ‘21 Demands” which Japan put forward in 1915 showed how far she was prepared to go in her resolve to make the best part of Chinese territory an appanage of Nippon. Nor did Japanese imperialism encounter any serious check till 1921. In that year the Washington Conference met, and the attitude of the Western Powers, though not unfriendly, was such as to convince the statesmen of Tokyo that some modification of their policy towards China was advisable in the interest of Japan herself. Certain covenants were therefore negotiated, aiming at the maintenance of the “ open door,” and the granting of equal opportunities to all who wished to trade with China or assist in developing her economic resources. But it soon became evident that Japan had no intention of allowing others to share the privileges she claimed on the Asiatic mainland. The process of “ freezing out ”’ foreign interests in those parts of China under her domina- tion went on as before, though by methods less overt and brusque than had hitherto been practised. Period- ical outbreaks of civil warfare gave her a pretext for keeping troops at strategic points in Chinese territory. Her capitalists and merchants enjoyed a virtual monopoly in Southern Manchuria, besides holding a controlling interest in the mines, railways and industries of Eastern Inner Mongolia. The province of Fukien had been brought within the ever-widening sphere of Japanese influence, and even the coal and iron mines of the Yangtse Valley were exploited to a large extent by Japanese nationals. To a casual observer, therefore, it seemed as THE GREAT PACIFIC WAR 3 though nothing could prevent Japan from becoming, by the process of transition from “‘ peaceful penetration ” to permanent occupation, the supreme arbiter of China’s destiny, political as well as economic. But for the attainment of this object it was essential that China should remain disunited and impotent. National unifica- tion, the setting up of a strong central government which could speak and act for China as an entity, and, if need be, mobilise all the national resources in defence of national interests—such a development would mean the end of foreign ascendancy. Japan, knowing this well, had shown herself unsympathetic towards every move- ment in the direction of coalition. It was to her interest that the policy of divide et tmpera should be pursued by fomenting internal discord. She was credited with -having secretly supported with arms and money the various T'w’chuns, or local war lords, whose private feuds kept the country in a perennial ferment and effectually hindered the establishment of national unity. So dissension and disorder held sway till 1929, with the state of China going from bad to worse; but in that year arose the star of General Wang Tsu, scholar, soldier, and patriot, whose name bids fair to go down to posterity as the regenerator of his country. As a youth Wang Tsu had graduated at an American University, where his intellectual gifts had earned him something of a reputa- tion. Returning to China, he took up the practice of law at Hankow, and was engaged in that peaceful pursuit when civil war broke out early in 1929, following the attempt of Tu-Shih-kuan, a military adventurer from Shansi, to march on Peking and proclaim himself dictator. Wang Tsu, who had joined the Northern Army in March as a volunteer, soon revealed himself as a military genius with a talent for leadership. Rising by sheer force of personality to commanding rank, he was found a few months later leading the right wing of General Min’s army, which inflicted a smashing defeat on Tu Shih- kuan at Ho-kian. Shortly after this battle General Min was disabled by sickness, whereupon the government at Peking, yielding to the wish of the army, appointed 4, THE GREAT PACIFIC WAR Wang Tsu as his successor. The new commander-in- chief lost no time in showing his mettle. Following up the discomfited Tu Shih-kuan, he fell upon that luck- less adventurer and scattered his army to the winds, Tu himself being killed. Then, turning in his tracks with a speed seldom paralleled in Oriental warfare, Wang marched his troops 200 miles in twelve days and attacked Li Ping-hui, the Manchurian ruler who had supported Tu, routing him with heavy loss. It is interest- ing to note that even at this early date Wang had struck a blow at Japanese interests, to which Li Ping-hui was known to be attached. Flushed with success, the victorious general returned to Peking and placed himself at the disposal of the Govern- ment, at the same time requesting that he be given a free hand to deal with any other satrap who chose to defy the central authority. President Huang Sen, a well-meaning statesman who now saw his long-cherished dream of unity within reach, sent out invitations to the military governors of each province to assemble at Peking for the purpose of discussing a new scheme of federation, hinting that failure to comply would be followed by a visit from the redoubtable Wang Tsu and his ever-victorious army. The hint was not lost. By 1930 all the provincial governors had repaired to the capital, and it was evident that agreement would be reached on the vital point of unification. Even the sluggish patriotism of the provincial governors was stirred by the prospect of putting an end to that foreign dicta- tion which they had endured for so long; and for the first time since the revolution, all parties in China found themselves working amicably together with one common object—in this case the eradication of Japanese influence from every part of the Chinese dominions. Such, then, was the position at the dawn of 1930. Japan looked on with growing concern, as well she might, having by this time convinced herself, rightly or wrongly, that her whole future—nay, her very existence, was bound up with the exploitation of China. She had come to regard the resources of that country as her own by divine right. THE GREAT PACIFIC WAR 5 Without Chinese minerals her industrial machine could not be kept going; it required to be fed with a constant supply of the coal, iron, copper and tin from the mines of Shansi, Shantung and Manchuria. With- out Chinese foodstuffs her people would go hungry, for the domestic supply had long since ceased to cover the needs of an ever-growing population. The proportion of imported food had now increased to more than one- third, of which the greater part came from China. Since the discovery of rich oil-fields in Shansi province in 1926, and her acquisition of prior rights over the same, Japan had largely reorganised her industries and communica- tions on an oil-fuel basis, and any stoppage or inter- ference with this supply would be disastrous. For these reasons it was necessary at all costs to maintain her grip on China, and no one familiar with the cireum- stances ever doubted that she would take drastic measures rather than relax it. But she had another and even more imperative motive for holding her own in China. In the event of war with a Great Power she could not carry on for a month without Chinese supplies, and since China—smarting under the memory of years of tyranny—would be at best a malevolent neutral in such a war, nothing was more certain than that the stream of foodstuffs and raw materials from the mainland would be cut off unless Japan were in control of the source. Japanese strategists therefore had reason on their side when they endeavoured by every means to strengthen their grasp on the most productive provinces of the neighbouring country, for if these were lost Japan would be at the mercy of any foe who was powerful at sea. But in thus pursuing a policy which aimed at the virtual enslavement of China, she had inevitably drawn upon herself the hostility of other Powers. Japan, in fact, had been looked at askance for some years past as a nation whose avowed militaristic tendencies were a danger to world peace. Her intolerant attitude towards other foreign interests in East Asia had repeatedly evoked protests from the Western Governments, though by this time it was clear to everyone that nothing short of 6 THE GREAT PACIFIC WAR military action would avail to turn her from her purpose. And she was much too formidable to be challenged with impunity. In the opinion of the best judges, her strategic position made her almost impregnable to attack, for her fleet held absolute command of the Western Pacific, and the lack of bases in that area seemingly rendered it impossible for any hostile fleet to menace her shores. Moreover, with an active army of 250,000 men, and a trained reserve of two millions, she was strong enough to hold her own against any force that could be brought against her from the neighbouring Continent. And so it happened that up to the period at which our narrative begins Japan’s ascendency on the Asiatic Continent, antagonistic though it was to all other interests in that region, had not been seriously contested. In the autumn of 1930 an incident had occurred which seemed not unlikely to bring matters to a head. In October the Peking Government granted to an American syndicate, headed by Mr. Waldo Sayers, the well-known New York financier, a concession to work the Green Mountain iron and coal fields of Kiangsi, an upper province of the Yangtsze Valley, where excep- tionally rich deposits had been located by American prospectors. Japan forthwith addressed a protest to Peking, pointing out that since the district referred to was one in which Japanese interests had hitherto been recognised as paramount, the validity of this concession to the nationals of another Power could not be admitted by her. The Chinese Government, in reply, pointed out that Kiangsi province was not mentioned as a Japanese enclave in any existing convention or treaty between the two countries, so that the Government was fully justified in granting such a concession to the American syndicate. The Japanese rejoinder to this note was brusque, and even threatening, but Peking stood firm. There the matter rested for the moment while Mr. Sayers continued his preparations for developing the concession, though the Japanese Press boasted in violent language that neither he nor any other foreigner would be permitted to raise a ton of coal or iron from the Kiangsi mines. THE GREAT PACIFIC WAR 7 Concurrent events in Japan itself had already begun to turn the thoughts of her rulers into dangerous channels. A succession of harsh laws had utterly failed to check the spread of radical doctrines which had taken root among the masses some twenty years beforehand. Large sections of the people were imbued with Com- munistic ideas, and organised labour was loudly demand- ing a voice in the conduct of national affairs. It was clear that the old order was changing, but the repre- sentatives of that order were in no mood to accept the inevitable. Honestly believing as they did that the advent of democratic government would herald the ruin of their country, they were prepared to go to any lengths rather than submit to such an innovation. It is true that manhood suffrage had been conceded in 1925 after years of fruitless agitation by the Liberal parties, but this, as everyone had foreseen, made little difference to the system of government, which remained in essence just as much an autocracy as before. The Japanese Parliament, having no real executive power, was little more than a debating club. The group of Elder States- men whose labours had raised Japan to the rank of a Great Power, had passed away, but in their stead the military chiefs still reigned supreme. It was not to be expected that they would stand idle while the shadow of revolution darkened the land and threatened the eclipse of everything they and their caste stood for. Many years before, a writer on Asiatic affairs had pre- dicted what their decision would be in such an event. “It is a cardinal principle of the ruling element in Japan,” he observed, “‘ that a people which is kept preoccupied with trouble abroad will have neither the time nor the inclination to brood over its domestic grievances. That these men, in whom the feudal spirit still burns fiercely beneath a veneer of Western civilisa- tion, will remain passive in face of this growing menace to their power and their most sacred traditions, is not to be believed. On the contrary, it is virtually certain that they will shrink from no course of action which is calculated to stem the rising tide of rebellion and anarchy. 8 THE GREAT PACIFIC WAR On an earlier occasion, when the domestic situation was far less grave, they did not scruple to plunge the country into war with China. What more likely than that the same expedient will be adopted in the present emer- gency? Patriotism is still a virtue in Japan, and there is little doubt but that all the best elements in the nation would support a policy of war if they believed the alternative to be social chaos.’’ At the period we are now dealing with the social situation in Japan was far more acute than it had been when the above forecast was penned. Communist agitators were hard at work in all the great industrial centres; mass meetings at which sedition was preached were held without any attempt at concealment, and the police were openly defied. In November, 1930, an attempt to arrest two prominent Communists, Watanabe and Onzu, who were addressing a Labour Convention at Osaka, provoked a riot, in which several police officials and more than a score of civilians were killed. So threatening was the temper of the crowd on this occasion that troops were called out. In the following month Watanabe was arrested at Tokyo, and the authorities announced that he would be severely dealt with. Organised labour at once took up the challenge; indignation meetings were held in all parts of the country, and resolutions passed demanding the immediate release of the prisoner and the dismissal of the Minister for Home Affairs, Mr. Sasaki, who had ordered the arrest to be made. Failing com- pliance with these demands, the Labour spokesmen threatened a general strike. There were those in the Cabinet who urged upon the Premier, Prince Kawamura, the wisdom of setting Watanabe at liberty in view of the ugly temper of the populace. But the Prince refused to listen to such advice. He would countenance no parleying with the mob, he said. It was the duty of the Government to maintain law and order, and they were determined to take all necessary measures to that end. When the Premier’s answer became known there was a violent outburst of fury among the workers. A general strike was declared on January 2, 1931, and THE GREAT PACIFIC WAR 9 so swift was the response that in less than twenty-four hours the industrial system of the country was all but paralysed. Riots broke out simultaneously at so many points in Tokyo and the provinees that the police were powerless to cope with them. Strong detachments of military were hurried to the chief cities, with instruc- tions to suppress all disturbance with an iron hand. On the night of January 4 the residences of the Premier and Home Minister were attacked by a huge crowd, which broke through the cordon of troops and did a great deal of damage before it was dispersed by rifle fire. The bodies of those killed by the fusillade were then carried through the streets on litters, to the mourn- ful strains of the ‘“ Hymn of Revolution.” Parliament was to meet next morning, and at an early hour a throng numbering at least one hundred thousand persons gathered in the neighbourhood of the Diet buildings. Ministers and Deputies, under a strong escort of police and troops, reached their places in safety, but the noise of the vast multitude outside made it difficult to proceed with the business of the day. Replying to interpella- tions in both Chambers, the Government announced that the situation was well in hand, and that should the strike continue troops would be drafted to carry on essential public services; furthermore, that force would be employed without stint against those evil-minded persons who were seeking to overthrow the Constitution. As the Premier was passing out through the lobby of the Upper Chamber a man in the uniform of an usher hurled a bomb. Although the explosion was violent Prince Kawamura escaped serious injury, but two Deputies with him were killed outright, and there were numerous casualties among bystanders in the lobby. The assassin, on being apprehended, was found to be a young student who had gained admission to the building by donning the uniform of an usher from one of the Ministries. That same evening a conference took place at Prince Kawamura’s villa, at which, in addition to the senior members of the Cabinet, General Oka, chief of the General Staff, was present. Contradictory versions of 10 THE GREAT PACIFIC WAR what transpired at this momentous gathering have been circulated, but in view of subsequent events it appears certain that the Premier laid bare his drastic plan for ‘* bringing the people to their senses,” as he termed it, and there and then secured the consent of his colleagues to its immediate application. So much, indeed, is admitted by the Japanese historian, Dr. Ikeda, whose recent volume, “‘ Political Antecedents of the American War,” contains what purports to be an accurate summary of the proceedings at this emergency meet- ing of the Cabinet. The following extracts from this work, which was published at Tokyo in 1934, are illuminating : ‘** Prince Kawamura, having received his visitors, announced that they would await the arrival of the chief of the General Staff before opening the dis- cussion, as military questions of the highest import- ance were involved. ‘The Foreign Minister, Baron Fukuhara; the Naval Minister, Admiral Oshima; the War Minister, General Ofuji, and other members of the Cabinet were already present. When General Oka arrived the Premier at once declared the meet- ing in session and began an address. ‘ The country stands in imminent danger,’ he said. ‘As you are aware, the revolt is spreading more rapidly than we can cope with it, and the ringleaders, conscious of their strength, are daily becoming more defiant. I have been advised from certain quarters to parley with them, but that to my mind would be a fatal course, for it would lead them to think that their tactics of intimidation had succeeded and they would be encouraged to raise all manner of impossible demands. On the other hand, to stamp out this menace we should need to employ the most ruthless measures; blood would flow in streams; and when all was over the populace, cowed though they might be for the time being, would be more than ever inclined to lend an ear to seditious teaching. Nor is that all. Before deciding to make unrestricted use THE GREAT PACIFIC WAR 11 of troops to crush this revolt we must be sure that the spirit of the army is proof against the insidious propaganda of the revolutionaries, and I fear that we have no such assurance. The War Minister informs me that two battalions of the 85th infantry regiment at Nagoya refused to entrain for Tokyo, declaring that they would not fire on their own people, and although the mutineers have been severely dealt with the divisional commander reports that acts of disobedience have occurred in other regiments. Only this evening a despatch has been received from Kanazawa, reporting a mutinous outbreak among the troops of that division. We shall therefore do well not to place too great a strain on the loyalty of the army. Now, gentlemen, it seems to me that the only alternative to civil war is a diversion abroad, which would inflame the declining patriotism of the people and provide them with something to think about in place of their imaginary grievances. There can be no doubt that at the first threat of foreign aggression all sections of the community would forget their differences and rally to the sup- port of the Government. It has always happened before; it will surely happen again. And, as a matter of fact, such a threat already exists. The recent epidemic of militarism in China has not subsided; on the contrary it is increasing, and at any moment we may be forced to defend our vital interests in that country at the point of the sword. We have positive evidence that American money, arms, and equipment are pouring into China for the purpose of enabling her to attack us, and now comes this affair of the Sayers concession to prove, if proof were needed, that America is stealthily manoeuvring ~ to destroy our privileged position in those lands which we have brought under our economic sway by the labour and sacrifice of years. If we elect to wait until America and her Chinese confederates are ready to strike, we may find ourselves driven out of the Continent, including Korea; and that, 12 THE GREAT PACIFIC WAR of course, would mean the end of Japan as a Power that counts in world affairs. I therefore propose that we make clear without delay our firm resolve to tolerate no foreign interference with our rights. This will not necessarily mean war, but if war should result I think we could face it calmly. The staffs of the army and navy are in complete agreement on that point. The military position vis-d-vis China is favourable at the moment, but it will, of course, turn more and more against us as the reorganisa- tion of the Chinese army progresses. The naval position, I am assured, is such that a conflict with America could be entered into with every prospect of a happy issue. For the rest, we have a gold reserve that experts declare to be adequate for the contingency in view; provided our communica- tions with the Continent are kept open there will be no shortage of essential supplies, and our industry is now sufficiently organised and developed to produce all the material necessary for a campaign of some duration. Finally there is no reason to suppose that we should have to deal with any enemies other than China and America. Our — relations with other Powers are on a footing that rules out the possibility of their taking up arms against us unless their interests were directly molested, which we should be particularly careful to avoid. And now let us consider the advantages we should derive from a favourable issue of this struggle in defence of our national existence. In the first place it would scotch, if not completely kill, the demon of anarchy who has been rearing his head in our country of late. Chastened in the hard school of war, our people would turn aside from the baneful doctrines which foreign agitators have been pro- pagating, and revert to their former allegiance. For a generation at least the country would be purged of the revolutionary poison which has invaded its system. Secondly, our position in China would become impregnable, and we could henceforth THE GREAT PACIFIC WAR 13 continue the development of its resources without fear of interruption. Thirdly, we could set up impassable barriers against the extension of those Western influences, moral as well as material, which have wrought so much harm in the past to the peoples of Asia, and which, if allowed to spread, will end by bringing the whole Continent under the domination of the white race. Fourthly, we should obtain new territories in the Pacific which, by reason of their admirable climate, fertility, and rich resources, would offer the best possible field for settlement by our surplus population. I have now placed before you quite frankly the problem with which we are confronted, and would ask you to judge which of the two alternatives it is our duty to adopt; but before coming to a decision it would be advisable to hear the reports of the Ministers of Army and Navy.’ ~ “ Admiral Oshima, General Ofuji, and General Oka were then successively called upon to express their views, which generally confirmed the favourable account which the Premier had given of the outlook from the naval and military points of view. After a discussion lasting several hours all the Ministers, excepting only Mr. Sasaki (Home Affairs), agreed that a strong foreign policy offered the best means of uniting the nation and putting an end to the grave domestic troubles then in progress. Mr. Sasaki dissented, but expressed his readiness to resign if his views did not harmonise with those of the rest of the Cabinet. At this the meeting broke up, Prince Kawamura bidding his colleagues farewell with the significant words: ‘ Gentlemen, the neces- sary steps will be taken to give effect to our common decision.’ At 6 p.m. secret orders were issued to put in force Sections 1, 2 and 44 of the War Emergency Plan.” It should be noted in connection with the foregoing that, while Dr. CHAPTER II JANUARY-MARCH, 1931 Diplomatic correspondence preceding hostilities—Radio and cable communications interrupted—Dangerous weakness of U.S. Asiatic Squadron—Captain Appleton, Assistant Chief of Naval Opera- tions Bureau, resigns as a protest—Japanese steamer blows up in Panama Canal, suspending communication between Atlantic and Pacific—Question of employing submarines against merchant vessels raised—Bad news of the Asiatic Squadron EVENTS now marched swiftly to their appointed end. Rioting continued in the capital and elsewhere during the 6th and 7th, and as the troops were repeatedly com- pelled to use their weapons, the tale of casualties mounted steadily. With Japan, as it seemed, on the verge of revolution, her friends and enemies alike waited breath- lessly for the dénowement. But suddenly the whole complexion of affairs underwent a marked change. Speaking in the Diet on January 10, the Foreign Minister announced in solemn tones that a critical situation had arisen in China, the gravity of which was enhanced by the unlooked-for intervention of a third Power. Baron Fukuhara then reviewed the negotiations which had taken place with regard to the Sayers concession, reminded his hearers that the Chinese Government had lately adopted a tone which was difficult to reconcile with peaceful intentions and added: ‘“‘ In order to make our position quite clear we have informed the United States Government that, since the question at issue concerns only ourselves and China we do not propose to make the Sayers concession a subject of diplomatic negotiation with any other Power.’’ Appreciating to the full the significance of these words, the deputies gave way to patriotic fervour, their cheers quite drowning for the 15 16 THE GREAT PACIFIC WAR moment the tumult of the crowd which still surged about the precincts of the Diet. An hour or so later, when the evening papers appeared with a report of the Foreign Minister’s speech under flaring headlines, and the people read that little Japan had figuratively snapped its fingers under the nose of the American Colossus, they speedily verified the Premier’s prediction by forgetting all about those grievances which they had come out to ventilate. Serried masses of workmen still paraded the streets, but in place of the ‘“‘ Hymn of Revolution ”’ many of them were now chanting the martial songs which their fathers had sung on the eve of battle, and the air was full of “* Banzais.’”’ That night the labour chiefs held an emergency meeting, at which they decided to annul the general strike and suspend their campaign against the Government until the foreign crisis was at an end. A few of the leaders were against this course, arguing that the crisis had been deliberately manu- factured to turn the thoughts of the people away from their wrongs, and that action by the workers was more necessary than ever now that the imperialists were seek- ing to plunge the country into war. These counsels, however, were not listened to. Not only was the strike declared at an end, but the meeting passed resolutions pledging the trade unions to support the Government in any reasonable measures it might take to safeguard the country against foreign aggression. Revolution had been averted for the moment, but unless the fires of patriotism were kept burning a reaction might set in and the forces of disorder again become supreme. The Press was therefore encouraged to inflame racial passion by recalling the American attitude on Japanese immigration. In a few days a violent anti-American campaign was in full blast. Fuel was added to the blaze by the receipt of a strong note from Washington, which not only upheld the validity of the Sayers concession, but declined to recognise Japan’s claims to favoured treatment in the district concerned, and expressed ‘“‘ profound surprise’? at the tone of the Foreign THE GREAT PACIFIC WAR 17 Minister’s speech in the Diet. Contrary to all diplomatic precedent, the Japanese Government at once com- municated the contents of this note to the Press, which naturally hailed it as further evidence of America’s aggressive intentions. In a further note, dated Feb- ruary 4, the United States proposed that the dispute over the Sayers concession be submitted to arbitration, as provided for in the Nine-Power Treaty negotiated at Washington in February, 1922. Japan, however, declined the proposal on the ground that the question at issue concerned her sovereign rights, and was therefore not a fit subject for submission to an international tribunal. Undeterred by this rebuff, the United States Government was continuing its efforts to promote an amicable solution when an incident occurred which gave a fresh impetus to the war fever in Japan. On Feb- ruary 15 a New York paper stated, with an air of authority, that all American warships in the Atlantic had received urgent orders to pass through the Panama Canal and join up with the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii, from whence the combined force would make a cruise to the Philippines. This report was instantly contra- dicted by the Navy Department in an official com- muniqué. A few ships, it was stated, had certainly been ordered to the Pacific, but only in line with ordinary routine, and the report of a naval cruise to the Philip- pines was absolutely unfounded. But the mischief was done. The original message had been flashed to Japan, where it caused the wildest excitement; while for some reason, never satisfactorily explained, the Navy Department’s denial was held up for several days. Before it reached Tokyo—or at any rate before its receipt was Officially admitted there—the Government addressed a sharp Note to Washington, protesting against naval movements “‘ which could only be interpreted as a menace to Japan.” The Note went on to declare that American transports were known to be under orders to proceed to the Philippines with cargoes of guns and naval mines, and added that unless these ships were immediately recalled “‘ the Imperial Government will be C 18 THE GREAT PACIFIC WAR forced to conclude that the intentions of the United States Government are not of a friendly character.” It was now clear to all that Japan was bent, if not on provoking war, at least on subjecting the United States to a diplomatic humiliation that would not only reduce American prestige in the Far East to zero, but at the same time force that country to acknowledge, in so many words, Japan’s complete ascendency in China and her monopoly of Chinese resources. The gravity of the issue was fully appreciated at Washington, but the authorities were determined to prevent the catastrophe of war if this were possible without the sacrifice of national honour. In a long and courteously-worded Note the Japanese Government was urged to reconsider the arbi- tration proposal, and assured that the United States would scrupulously refrain from taking any action, military or otherwise, that could in any way be con- strued as prejudicial to Japanese interests. The Sayers concession, as well as all other American undertakings in the disputed Chinese territory, would be regarded as in abeyance pending the decision of the arbitration court. ‘The Note concluded by recalling the traditional friendship between the two nations, ‘* which the United States Government most earnestly desires shall continue unimpaired, and which it will do its utmost to preserve.” But forces were already at work against which all the arts of diplomacy were powerless. Japan, having definitely resolved to unsheath the sword, was in no mood to draw back at the eleventh hour. Her reply to the last American Note was curt, and while professing peaceful sentiments, reiterated the demand that no reinforcements of any kind whether of ships, troops, or material, should be dispatched to the American stations west of Hawaii. 