Russia and Democracy: The German Canker In Russia
Wesselitsky, Gabriel de, 1841-1930 | Cockayne-Cust, Henry John, 1861-1916
See Ss es ao Sa — pare = SS aeee : ; = eS Sra ~ : LSS: = ee : > —— = == % a LN ae SS = =< > é = Z SS RS epee ee = = Se = = > ——— ie =. SSE SS —— = Se ———— = SSS pI Se = SSS = = Sas SS <= 2 Se =: = = = SoS =z = = : = = = SSS = ee = Se =a = Se SS = <a — 7. SS SS SSS ees SS pa Se SSS ———— ee RUSSIA & DEMOCRACY : THE GERMAN CANKER IN RUSSIA. RUSSIA & DEMOCRACY: THE GERMAN CANKER IN RUSSIA. BY G. DE WESSELITSKY, WITH A PREFACE BY HENRY CUST. PUBLISHED FOR THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL PATRIOTIC ORGANIZATIONS, 62, CHARING CROSS, LONDON, BY DUFFIELD & COMPANY NEW YORK. 1916. Printed in Great Britain, CONTENTS. ee PAGE PREFACE Vv CHAPTER I. FROM THE FOUNDATION OF THE RUSSIAN STATE TO THE ACCESSION OF PETER THE GREAT (A.D. 862- 1682) 3 II. PETER THE GREAT (1682-1725) 7 III. From PETER THE GREAT TO CATHERINE THE GREAT (1725-1762) 10 IV. CATHERINE THE GREAT (1762-1796) 16 V. Pauw I. (1796-1801) ; ALEXANDER I. (1801-1825) 20 VI. Nicuoras I. (1825-1855) a7 VII. ALEXANDER II. (1855-1881) 37 VIII. ALEXANDER III. (1881-1894) 49 IX. THE PRESENT REIGN: PERIOD OF CONSERVATISM (1894-1905) 54 X. PERIOD OF PROGRESS (1905-1915) ... 6g XI. RECAPITULATION AND CONCLUSIONS 82 PostscriPt 87 INDEX 93 PREFACE. ——. THE enlightenment of war may be counted among the very few advantages war brings to man. War strips bare and illuminates what peace disguises and huddles away. And this is true not only of men and nations, but of attitudes of mind and trends of thought and policy, of which, after dim movings and returnings, appearances and vanishings, the long results stand suddenly apart and clear; unexpected, but, it seems, inevitable. Things: futile and fortuitous are seen as ordered processes ; and the unmeaning takes on significance. This war has already left many men and nations mother-naked, and later has exposed, for good or for bad, the very nerves of their spines and the convolutions of their brains. The world went travelling a year ago, and discovered Germany, France and England, nations hitherto unknown ; discovered them equipped with a psychology, histology, pathology, &c., undreamed-of by the newest science. But, in judging Russia, who was also girding her loins, men were the more perplexed, because their means of diagnosis, especially of political diagnosis, were scant and faulty. Here was a state of mind which seemed of sudden birth ; an impulse, a conviction, a unity, a faith; a creed, un- preached, unformulated, and yet of perfervid and overmastering vehemence.. Whence grew the flame and whither was its blasting heat directed ? We have heard much of Russia in the last thirty years, but in the mdin of modern Russia only. Of old Russia, the Russia of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, where the roots of Russia lie deep, there is little reading to-day. Alexander Gwagninus and Paulus. Oderbornius we may reasonably leave unopened. vi PREFACE, Even Samuel Purchas found in them nothing but “ huskes, shels and rumours.” But the close-packed stories of Giles Fletcher and Sir Jerome Horsey, ambassadors of Elizabeth to Ivan IV., and go-betweens in that astounding passage of love and commerce; of Richard Chanceler, shipmate and _co- adventurer of Sir Hugh Willoughby; of George Turbervile, writer of verse; of Anthony Jenkinson and of Robert Best; of the Italians, Paolo Giovio, Contarini and Barbaro; of the Germans, Sigismund von Herberstein and Olearius ; ending with the stately pages and glorious engravings of Corneille Le Brun ; all these paint us the Russian picture and the men who thought and wrought and fought within its frame, in a style of mingled breadth and detail which has lost nothing of freshness or value. Here are the blood and bones and body of the Russian stock from which derived, sequentially and logically, Orloff and Potemkin, Suvaroff and Koutousoff, Pushkin, Turgenieff, Tolstoy, and Dostoieffsky ; but with which half the famous names in later Russian history have nothing whatever to do._ And it may well be that the stress that has been lately laid on Russian phenomena, some partly alien, some wholly exotic, both in literature and art, has led to a forgetfulness of the broad human foundation of the Russian people. The mighty revolution of Peter the Great made rather for division than for union among the Russians. That swashing blow at custom and tradition was too swift to be profound or abiding, and the Master’s need for intelligent " foreigners to execute his plans sowed germs of a disease which came near to suffocate the healthy national life he thought to establish. Russia was divided and in some sense has remained divided until to-day. There has been a Russia looking out of the window and a Russia inhabiting the house, but the face has not interpreted the body. It has given a false presentment of the truth behind it, and in it alien blood has circulated. To shift the image, the PREFACE. vii stream of the people’s life has flowed on and in time brought flower and fruit to birth, a generous harvest for the world to wonder at and seek to understand. The true character of the Russians silently enlarged and fixed its type. Late learners they were, but their character was founded deep in sheer simplicity and brought simplicity’s attending dangers. For simplicity may most easily be led astray into the perverse paths of cunning and weakness, before it shall find at last its natural and inevitable heritage of sincerity and strength. Russia, half in blindness, half in compulsion, wandered under perfidious guidance from the way, and has to-day regained it. And so it is that you find the Russia of to-day as has been sketched above. For to-day Russia is getting rid of Germany. Two hundred years of tyranny, of suppression, of paralysis are being realised almost for the first time, and in that realisation are being swept away. Two long centuries of reaction, of intrigue, of exploitation, of perfidy, and of false sacrifice, are going up in gunpowder along the banks of the San. And millions of men feel a new hope in a new heart, and lift undazzled eyes to a dawn which they had grown at last to believe would never break. The mighty work of Peter is purged of the long slow poison it trailed in its traces, and Russia comes to her own at last. And how this fell, this book is written to relate. For this is not a book on Russia, It is a closely knit political study of two hundred years of Russian history, in which a great people went near to ruin and has won through to power and great- ness, and, it may be hoped, to happiness such as it has never known. And theauthor is perhaps the most competent living man to write it. Of his perfect devotion to the cause of Anglo-Russian friendship I have had the fullest means of judging for near a quarter of a century. Of his utter loyalty and integrity I have had the same experience. His personal acquaintance with Napoleon IIT. and Bismarck, to mention but two names, adds a quality of immediacy to his work. ‘‘ No man perhaps has shown viii PREFACE, me more kindness,” he wrote to me once, ‘‘ than Prince Bismarck ; though-no personal gratitude could prevail against national feeling. And his greatest act of kindness was the knowledge of the realities in politics, which I derived from discussing with him every possible eventuality. Of all my teachers I owe him most.” And he added curiously, ‘‘ My next greatest teacher was Leo XIII.” In such a school of high policy, where action alternated with state-craft, M. de Wesselitsky won his fine international position. By his steadfast loyalty to the central idea of an Anglo- French-Russian Alliance, the old: historic aim of Peter the Great, he earned and has retained the distinction of the cordial dislike and dread of Germany and Austria, in whose journals he is constantly abused. For this he has his reward to-day. As President for some fifteen years of the Foreign Press Association in London he has gathered fresh store of influence, respect and affection. England and Russia owe him much, and by this new and most original volume he adds to the debt. It is in the hope of obtaining yet larger recognition for such generous service that I have ventured at the wish of my friend to write this introduction. HENrRy Cust. RUSSIA AND DEMOCRACY: THE GERMAN CANKER IN RUSSIA. Russians who reside in England are agreeably impressed by the fact that the English political world and English Society of to-day show cordial appreciation of the actual progress of Russia and of her culture in genera]. They are, moreover, deeply touched by the warm recognition of the efforts of Russia to do her duty by her Allies in the present war. The writer hears, however, that there are earnest and sincere men in this country and in the United States who think she is still the same Russia she was at the time of the Crimean War, and who consider an alliance with her as incompatible with the struggle of Democracy against Military Despotism. We Russians can confidently leave to our English friends the task of clearing up those misunderstandings and of bringing home to the larger public an up-to-date knowledge of Russia as she really is. This is already being done very ably and consistently in articles and books on Russia, as well as in the daily communications of British correspondents in Russia. The above-mentioned objections, however, touch on a very important question on which it is well worth while to throw a clear and true light, particularly at the present moment, B Is Russia opposed to Liberty and democracy ? 2 RUSSIA AND DEMOCRACY. viz., whether there really exists an opposition between liberty and democracy on one side and Russia on the other. An adequate answer to this question cannot be found in onestage or in one feature of Russian development. It must be sought in the whole course of her history, in her fundamental institutions, in her national life and character. G. DE W. CHAPTER I. FROM THE FOUNDATION OF THE RUSSIAN STATE TO THE ACCESSION OF PETER THE GREAT (A.D. 862-1682). For many centuries preceding the foundation of the Russian State the Slavs of Russia lived in small, self-governing, mostly agricultural communities, all members of which were free and equal ; they did not owe allegiance to feudal chiefs and waged no wars of plunder or of conquest. All their local affairs were decided, in towns, by the Vetche, and in villages, by the Mir, an assembly of heads of families, Only in vital matters the decision rested with the elders of the tribe. In the vast Stilpreservea Empire of Russia of to-day the great bulk of the population is still living in villages with the same primeval Mirs. The life and character of the immense majority of the Russians can hardly be said to have essentially changed through all the evolutions of the Russian history. Left to themselves, the Russians always reverted to the same kind of existence. The necessity of defending themselves against foreign aggression alone produced various superstructures over their primitive society. The appeal made to the Varanger princes was the first step in the way of permanently securing the safety and indepen- dence of the country. The state of the Russian Slavs was not, however, substantially altered thereby. National unity came to be represented by the Grand Duke, who, in reality, Primeval demo- cratic of the Blavs of Rasaia. Still preserved a Lr peasantry of to-day, Democratic Re- ablics ander the eadership of Princes of the House of Rurik. The Mongol and abeclute power, Limitations of absolutism by the influence of aristocracy 4 RUSSIA AND DEMOCRACY. was only the first among other Princes, and these mostly were commanders of troops and chief magistrates in the local democracies. It was under the nominal rule of Princes that Novgorod and Pskov grew up as prosperous and powerful republics.* The Mongol yoke first introduced the conception, till then utterly unknown to the Russians, of an absolute power as an omnipotent, all-overwhelming force to which obedience was irresistibly due. The Grand Dukes of Moscow, as vassals and representatives of the Great Khans, claimed to exercise the fulness of the authority belonging to their suzerains. At the same time they assumed the part of intercessors for, and defenders of, the people. The marriage of the first independent Sovereign of Russia, Ivan III., with a Palaeologus, connecting the Russian monarchy with the Byzantine tradition, bestowed on it a historic legitimacy, while the sanction of the Church endowed it with a sacred character. The title of Tsar assumed by Ivan IV. gave a full expression to that evolution. For a long time, however, the autocracy of the Tsars existed in principle rather than in reality. Representatives of the people used to be called together in different principalities before the Mongol invasion; this habit was preserved and extended during the Moscow period, and the Zemsky Sabors became a national institution. They were mostly convened in great emergencies and a more direct influence was exercised by a permanent council, the Boyarskaya Douma, a stronghold * The progress of civilization brought about in large cities marked differences in fortune and position which led to the rise of ancient and wealthy families who strove for influence; yet on the whole, the political and social organization of Russia before the Moscow period remained decidedly democratic. TO ACCESSION OF PETER THE GREAT. 5 of the Muscovite aristocracy which grew up simultaneously with the growth of the monarchy.* Thus Russia, after having, in striking contrast with Western Europe, been from time immemorial a pure democracy, began in the fifteenth century to resemble in political institutions and social organizations West-European countries. But, however necessary this new régime may have been for her national development in that period, it was too uncongenial to her profoundly democratic people. Many Russians, rather than submit to it, preferred leaving the Russia of those days; and these emigrants founded, in lands inhabited by or exposed to the invasion of Tartar peoples, the military democratic republics of the Cossacks of the Dnieper, the Don, the Volga, the Yayik (Oural), and the Terek. In their struggles with the boyars the Tsars leant on the other classes, and the stronger-willed among them showed great solicitude for the welfare of the people at large. Ivan the Terrible, who was trying to crush the boyars completely, not only convened the Zemsky Sabors, but allowed elected repre- sentatives of the middle and lower classes a share in juridical functions and administrative duties. He granted also charters of self-government to many peasant communities. Notwith- standing the outbursts of his wrath directed against the boyars, * When Moscow became the centre of national life, wealthy and influential personages from all parts of Russia, accompanied by numerous followers, began to gather there, entering the service of the rulers of Moscow and actively working for the unification of Russia. The position of the boyars (lords) of Moscow was raised thereby to a high eminence, still more increased by their being also joined by princes, descendants of Rurik, who had lost their principalities and were content to become Moscow boyars, retaining only their princely title. This aristocracy differed, however, from West European in being dependent on service to the State, and not on feudal or territorial position. Dissatisfaction of the masses. Emigration and foundation of the Cossack Republics. Popular ideal of a Peopie’s Tsar. Introdaction of sertdom. War of the mazses against the upper classes under the banner of legit/mate monaroby. 6 RUSSIA AND DEMOCRACY. but reaching occasionally whole towns or provinces, he greatly contributed to the growth in the imagination of the masses of the ideal of a People’s Tsar. On the contrary, rulers weak in character or in their position invariably fell under the influence of the aristocracy. Boris Godounoff, who, owing to the circumstances of his accession, needed particularly the support of the upper classes, forbade free labourers to leave on or about St. George’s day the estates they were cultivating, as was customary in Russia, thus converting them virtually into serfs. This act, depriving the mass of the people of personal freedom which, unlike the people of Western Europe, it had always enjoyed, led naturally to a tremendous political and social upheaval; one false Dimitri after another, personifying in the eyes of the masses a legitimate as well as a popular Tsar, found strenuous partisans, particularly amongst the peasants and the Cossacks. While the boyars were intriguing for personal advantage even with foreign enemies the gentry and the upper middle class, animated with ardent patriotism, saved the independence of Russia and put an end to anarchy by electing as Tsara scion of the universally popular house of the Romanoffs. The rulers of that dynasty had decided popular sympathies and recognized the need of reforms; their intentions, however, were paralyzed by more or less disguised opposition on the part of the boyars. CHAPTER II. PETER THE GREAT (1682-1725). Peter the Great,* whose gigantic personality seems to have Peter the Great's equalled in strength and energy the whole French Convention, broke down the boyardom, utterly destroying Russian aristocracy, completely subjected the Church of Russia to the State, and, for the first time in Russia, rendered monarchy really absolute. Moreover, under the name of ‘“‘ Reform” he undertook to revolutionize the entire political and social organization -as well as the whole national] life of Russia. It appears probable, however, that he looked on absolute Atsslute power * Peter the Great was the last Russian Sovereign whose official title was “‘ Tsar of Russia.’’ At the request of the ‘‘ Governing Senate,’’ he adopted, November 2, 1721, the title of ‘“‘ Emperor of Russia’’ which has gradually, in special] clauses of international! treaties, been recognized by all Powers. In this way only can a Russian Sovereign be officially addressed. Ever since, all educated Russians have always spoken of their Sovereign, in a foreign language, as “‘ the Emperor’’ and in Russian as ‘** Gosouday Imperatoy’’ or simply ‘“‘ Gosoudar’’ (Sire). The title ‘* Tsar’? is still greatly used by the peasants, who likewise use the word oy ;Gosouday.’’ It is also often used in historical works, in oratory and in poetry. In Western Europe diplomatists, particularly those who have been in Petrograd, generally use the official appellation of ‘‘ Emperor of Russia,’ while with the public the former title, “‘the Tsar,’’ still mostly prevails, meaning exclusively “* Emperor of Russia’’ ; strictly speaking it is no longer correct, for the Bulgarian Sovereign bears the title of “Tsar of the Bulgarians.”’ Since Alexander I. all Imperial Manifestoes are issued in the name of ‘‘ Emperor of Russia, Tsar of Poland, Grand-Duke of Finland.’’ Compulso change of the forms of life, Opposition of the great jority of the population. Rift in the Russian Nation. 8 RUSSIA AND DEMOCRACY. power aS a temporary dictatorship necessary for the establishment of the new order of things, destined to assure to Russia her natural place among the Nations. He gave a strong organization and extensive rights to the Senate, which he called “governing” to emphasize its sharing with the Sovereign in the government of Russia. A law passed at the end of his reign, but never applied by his successors, provided for the election of two members for each province who were also to sit in the Senate. And he took up again Ivan IV.’s democratic reforms, giving the people a share in provincial and municipal administration. He also opened up all careers to men of all classes. A man’s advancement was in future not to depend on the mere accident of his birth, but on the value of his services to the State. This last measure certainly was in the interest of democracy, but its benefit, like that of all of Peter the Great’s measures, was vitiated by the obligation for the servants of the State to adopt West European dress and manners. As the great majority of the Russians, viz., all peasants and most towns- folk, rigidly kept to the traditional customs and national way of living, only a small, passively obedient minority, the new Noblesse, took interest in the State as its governing class; the rest of the population were mere taxpayers and subjects. Many of them, distrusting a Church in subjection to civil power, joined the Raskol (Dissent), which then became a form of the national protest against the forced introduction of foreign ways. A rift was thus created in the Russian nation which is only now being filled up. The greatest ruler of Russia remained unbeloved by his people during his life, and the utility of his “‘Reform’’ never ceased to be a matter of discussion. To its artificial character PETER THE GREAT. 9 are attributed most of the unwelcome sides of the development of Russia during the last two centuries. The worst consequence of the ‘“‘ Reform” was that fatal separation of the new bureaucratic Noblesse from the mass of the people which per- mitted the domination of the Russian State by a foreign nationality. Peter the Great’s foreign policy was, on the contrary, quite in the national interest, both in what he achieved—the opening up of a window into Europe—as well as in what he attempted, the liberation of Eastern Christians and the alliance of Russia with France and England. In 1698 he clearly saw the necessity of what has been achieved only in 1914! And he was not less wise in his policy towards Germany, that of protecting her minor States against the ambitions of Austria and of Prussia. Plan of an Angto- Franco-Ruasiao Alliance. 10 CHAPTER III. FrRoM PETER THE GREAT TO CATHERINE THE GREAT (1725-1762). Peter’s immediate successors unfortunately exaggerated the wrong sides of his home programme, and totally upset his foreign one. The direction of the whole military and administrative machine became concentrated in St. Peters- burg, the new capital situated at the extremity and almost out of the Empire—imagine the capital of Great Britain at Land’s End! testmehy eed To this place soon streamed a mass of adventurous foreigners coterie regardless of the wi ofthe wishes of who settled there as in a colony of their own, spreading a foreign atmosphere round an already almost denationalized government. So, asa natural result, the Government ruled Russia from the new capital without any consideration for the needs and wishes of the people, guided merely by the private interest of the momentary holders of power, and sometimes even by their enthusiastic devotion to the interests of a foreign country. They were enabled so to act owing to the indifference of the masses who regarded the “‘ reformed”? State as unholy, and limited their relations with it to a sullen obedience to all its commands which could not be eluded. The new Noblesse, unsupported by the people, was of necessity subservient to the Court and particularly to the dominant faction of the moment. FROM PETER THE GREAT TO CATHERINE THE GREAT. II Only in one instance did the democratic spirit of the nation show itself even in ‘‘ reformed’’ Russians. When the St. Petersburg government, in imitation of Prussia, tried to create a class of large landowners on the basis of the right. of primogeniture, and enacted a law according to which a man’s whole estate passed to his eldest son, the Russian Noblesse never applied it and persistently demanded its abolition until the government saw itself compelled to give way on that point to a feeling which was quite unanimous. The great Peter, in revolutionizing the whole structure of Russian life, needed above all clever and precise men to carry out his will unhampered by any connection with the order of things he was resolved to destroy. He found them at first chiefly in foreigners and, aftcr the conquest of Esthonia and Livonia, availed himself particularly of the services of the German barons of those provinces who were accustomed from their birth to rule over a subject race. He never meant to bestow on them any privileges over Russians, and was making hasty efforts so that Russians might acquire in great Western centres all the knowledge he wished to see applied to Russia. Nothing could have been further from Peter’s thoughts than granting to foreigners, and least of all to Germans, a predominant position in the Empire. Notwithstanding this, various factors inevitably led exactly to such a result. Intermarriages with members of German dynasties brought to St. Petersburg German princes and princesses with their suites, and gave to a great extent a German character to the Russian Court. Many of the Baltic barons settled likewise in the capital of the Empire which they considered themselves to be called upon to rule. Thither flocked from all parts of Germany men whose title to nobility was small or doubtful ; German barors of the Baltic Provinces. German princes and princesses. German immi- grants of the upper and middie class. Privileges of Germans in Rusela. I2 RUSSIA AND DEMOCRACY. many of them, even, were but simple adventurers. They were attracted by the great resources of Russia which an almost German Court held at its disposal, and they often obtained most unexpected prizes. Members of German learned and teaching professions, following in the wake of princes and nobles, came to Russia and acquired highly privileged positions. The Russian Academy of Sciences became a German institution, so much so that, up to quite lately, it published its works in German. It never concealed its hostility towards Russian scientists, and boy- cotted the most eminent among them. It refused admittance in its midst even to Mendeleyeff. When the latter came to Oxford in 1894 to receive the highest honours from the University of Oxford, he was there often referred to as a Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. On one occasion he told the writer (who accompanied him there) that, as a matter of fact, it was the only academy in Europe of which he was nota member. The favour shown to German schools in Russia, and their growing prosperity, for a long time contrasted strongly with the many restrictions placed on Russian schools, and the very scanty funds which the Russian Exchequer, up to the present reign, found possible to devote to them. It would be too long to enumerate all the privileges enjoyed by Germans in every profession and trade in Russia, many of which were still preserved till the outbreak of the present war. Some are continued even at this day. As a remarkable example of them the following may be quoted. The writer, when residing in Germany in the eighties, witnessed the universal outburst of indignation there on account of Russian Jews having petitioned the Russian Government for permission to own chemists’ stores in St. Petersburg, then an exclusive FROM PETER THE GREAT TO CATHERINE THE GREAT. 13 privilege of Germans. German writers and speakers appealed to the Jews of Germany to require from their co-religionists in Russia that they should abstain from such a “revolting ’”’ attack on the “‘ rightful’’ possessions of Germans in Russia. The influx of Germans was so great that, in consequence of intermarriages with them, a considerable part of the Russian Noblesse had German blood in their veins. And the same was the case with the Russian intelligentzia and the upper middle class in St. Petersburg. If the language of the cosmopolitan society in the new capital did not become German, it was chiefly due to the fact that the German princes and nobles of the eighteenth century spoke French among themselves. With them, however, even a foreign language served as a vehicle for national thoughts, while the adoption of it by the Russian ruling class consummated their denationalization. Acquaintance with French literature inspired, in truth, in many Russians interest in and sympathy with France, but did not exercise any influence on the policy of Russia, the Court and Government remaining more or less greatly Germanized. The use of a foreign language in society and at home by all families of distinction, or pretending to be such, had the effect of widening more than anything the gulf between the rulersand the ruled. Foreign observers, even so late as the end of the last century, noted with amazement that, in administrative departments and other public institutions, courteous attention was paid to all foreigners, as well as to Russians who spoke a foreign language, while those who spoke the language of the country were treated with contempt. While society was becoming cosmopolitan, the Court and diplomacy, the army and higher administration grew more and more to be a private domain of the Germans. They were Russia, ruled by Ge becomes 14 RUSSIA AND DEMOCRACY. filling up all the most. important and advantageous posts, and always pushed forward other Germans who received every preference over Russians.. Ruled thus by the Germans, the Russian Empire was practically a Germanic Power whose forces were principally employed to serve Germany and Germanism. And the German yoke proved to be harder and more deeply harmful than the Mongol. It reached its climax when the Empress Anna (1730-1740) entrusted with absolute power her German favourite, Biron, who introduced a régime of terror against all Russians suspected of disliking German rule. He created a special inquisition, invented tortures, and was the first to make extensive use of banishment to Siberia. It was enough to bear the reputation of being independent in character or of having national Russian feelings to ensure becoming a prey to the spies and agents of the Teuton tyrant. The meekness with which the Russians submitted to an anti- national persecution in their own country can be understood only by remembering that it was exercised chiefly on a denationalized class who had lost the confidence of the people, who did not see much difference between being oppressed by foreigners or by their own estranged countrymen. There was a kind of reaction against the exclusive domination of the Germans under the Empress Elizabeth (1741-1762),* but it was only a superficial one. The persecution of Russians as such ceased; and they were again admitted to higher posts in the administration. But no serious measures were taken to dislodge the Germans from the many privileged * Elizabeth died on December 25, 1761(0.s.),which in the 18th century corresponded to January 5, 1762 (N.S.). FROM PETER THE GREAT TO CATHERINE THE GREAT. I5 positions they had possessed themselves of, or to counter- balance their influence at Court and in the government. Russia’s foreign policy continued to be determined by one of the two rival German factions at Court, one Austrian, the other Prussian. Elizabeth favoured the former and made war on Frederick II. The St. Petersburg Germans, who already saw in that King the restorer of the ancient power of Germany, were entirely for Prussia. They were gathered round Elizabeth’s heir, the Duke of Holstein, a German in his feelings and an enthusiastic admirer of Frederick, who openly declared he valued his commission in the Prussian Army higher than the Imperial Crown of Russia. On ascending the Beundies deve throne as Peter III. (1762) he immediately gave back to ines Frederick II. East Prussia, Brandenburg and Pomerania, which had been conquered by the Russian Army, then occupying Berlin. He did not ask for any compensation or guarantee for the future, and even placed his army in Prussia under the command of Frederick. The latter recognized that he had been saved by Russia from utter destruction, but showed his gratitude in his own way. Before even the end of the Seven Years’ War he sent emissaries to instigate the Khan of the Crimea to invade Russia. Russian vational under revival Catherine Her liberal reforms. 16 CHAPTER IV. CATHERINE THE GREAT (1762-1796). Catherine II.’s reign constituted a more serious anti- German reaction. KRussia’s foreign policy became as a rule independent of the Germanic Cabinets and pursued purely Russian aims. The recovery of the shores of the Black Sea was an historical achievement as essential to the existence of the Russian Empire as was that of the shores of the Baltic. In the Army and the administration Germans were no longer favoured at the expense of Russians; the foremost generals and statesmen of Catherine bore Russian names. She won the enthusiastic loyalty of the Noblesse, which in her reign ceased to be mere bureaucracy. She extended the privileges granted by Peter III. in the Charter of the Noblesse. The nobles were given a certain share in the management of local affairs in the provinces. Provincial and district assemblies of the Noblesse were the first deliberative bodies of the reformed Russia; their presidents, the Marshals of the Noblesse, were the first elective, non-bureaucratic, high functionaries of the Empire. Catherine gave also municipal self-government to larger cities. She went even much farther. Under the name of the “‘ Commission for the framing of laws,’”’ she convened an assembly elected in the whole Empire in which all classes were represented. That assembly met in 1767, twenty-two years earlier than the French States-General convened by CATHERINE THE GREAT. 17 Louis XVI. It was not, however, given to the “‘ Commission ”’ to become a starting-point of the constitutional development of Russia. The spirit of independence evinced by its members impressed courtiers and bureaucrats as being dangerous to their privileges. Under their influence, Catherine, though she largely availed herself of the legislative work of the Com- mission, never summoned it again. Russian writers, comparing Catherine’s reign with those of her predecessors as well as of her successors, regard it as an era of national revival. This is, on the whole, true. Catherine consistently strove to feel and to act as a: Russian, though she was not altogether free from the influence of her German blood and education. In spite of her relations with French philosophers, she was, in her inner policy, mostly carrying out German ideas. Her constitution of the Noblesse as a class of privileged landowners was an imitation of the Prussian ‘‘ Adelstand’’; and the Assemblies of the Noblesse were copied from the ‘‘ Landtage.”” The organization of the trades’ corporations and of the municipal administration was also on German lines. She had a clear perception of the necessity of emancipating the serfs, yet she did not attempt to carry it through. As she owed her throne to her popularity with the Noblesse, and particularly the officers of the Guards, on whose further support she relied, Catherine could hardly undertake against the wishes of the nobles a reform so deeply affecting their interests. Not only did she not abolish serfdom, but she even extended it to parts of Russia where it was not known. The result was similar to that of the introduction of serfdom by Boris Godounoff—a terrible insurrection in which peasants and Cc Reforms uafluenced by German ideas. Catherine inaaga- rates German evlonization o: Bussia. Partition of Poland the moet fatal ecnsequence of German infiuence. Turkish ware unite the Noblecse and the people in the struggie for an ideal. 18 RUSSIA AND DEMOCRACY. Cossacks thronged to the banner of a false Peter III.,in whom they once more imagined they saw the incarnation of their old dream of a People’s Tsar. While the position of the Russian agriculturists was rendered still harder, favours were lavished on German colonists called in by Catherine to settle in Russia. Every one of them received 60 dessiatines (about 160 acres) of the best Jand, and every colony large pasture grounds and woods. They were, moreover, exempted from all taxes and duties, even from military service, and were granted complete self-government. Absolutely useless to Russia, those colonies formed advance guards of the German Drang nach Osten. The most fatal instance of the German influence on Catherine’s policy was her listening to Frederick’s proposals concerning Poland and her consenting ‘to its partition. It is true she annexed provinces originally Russian and mostly inhabited by Russians. Nevertheless, the participation of Russia in an act of unjustifiable violence against a Slavic Kingdom bound more strongly than anything the policy of Russia to that of Prussia and Austnia. Every time that Russia appeared inclined to form friendships with Western Powers, the Germanic Cabinets appealed to the solidarity among the three partitioning States. They even arrogated to themselves the right to object to any treatment of the Russian Poles which might encourage their national aspirations. No other act of the St. Petersburg government proved more helpful to Germany and more detrimental to Russia. Catherine’s wars with the Turks produced quite a different effect. They not only secured for Russia her natural frontiers in the South, but also gave her the nght to protect the Eastern Christians which equally gratified the sentiments of CATHERINE THE GREAT. IQ both the westernized Noblesse and of the masses faithful to the ancient Muscovite régime. These saw in the struggle against Infidels a defence of their own faith and a liberation of their co-religionists. These campaigns were the first action of the reformed State which the people could understand and sympathize with. They opened the series of Russian Crusades, and began to unite the severed parts of the nation in fighting for the same ideal. Catherine systematically encouraged Russian language and literature, stimulated Russian national feeling and mani- fested her pride in being a Russian Sovereign. Of all the teigns of the St. Petersburg period hers was the most liberal up to that of Alexander II. and the most national up to that of Alexander III. Above all she knew how to inspire daring enterprise, persistent efforts and boundless devotion to the throne and the country, which led to feats of heroism and self- sacrifice filling the Russians with confidence in their own Empire and nationality. Germaa domina- tion restored. Alexander L’s policy determined y his predilection for Germany and the Bovereigas of the Sovoroe: C) Prussia. CHAPTER V. Paut I. (1796-1801) ; ALEXANDER I (1801-1825). Catherine the Great seemed to have clearly traced for her successors the main lines of their right policy. The fact is the more astonishing that they adopted just the reverse. Her death was immediately followed by the restoration of the German domination over Russia, not in sooth in the crude form of Biron’s tyranny, but in a more subtle one, penetrating the Russian State deeper than ever before, and determining the whole foreign policy of Russia for ninety-five years, from the accession of Paul I. to the conclusion of the Franco- Russian Alliance by Alexander ITI. Paul I.’s reign was particularly remarkable for its tendency to reverse whatever had been done under Catherine. The hopes of Russian Liberals were set on his heir, who appeared to be destined, not only to continue Catherine’s reforms, but also to satisfy the aspirations of all lovers of progress. Cautious men even apprehended the radicalism of a revolutionary’s pupil.* In the opinion of the talented historian who threw more light than any other on Alexander I.’s personality (the Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovitch), he was a great ruler, but xoé for Russia. Most unfortunately he neither under- stood Russia, nor liked anything Russian. And he hada strong * Alexander I.’s tutor was Laharpe, who afterwards, as a Jacobin Member of the French Convention, voted for the execution of Louis XVI. PAUL I.; ALEXANDER I. 2I preference for everything German. Loving humanity above all, he saw its highest expression in Germany, by promoting whose interests he believed himself to be working for the greatest good of mankirid. He was, besides, bound by ties of intimate friendship to King Frederick William III. and Queen Louisa of Prussia, the object of the one platonic affection of his life. The vows he exchanged with them were in his eyes more binding than his duty to his own country. The consequence of that state of mind were fatal to himself as well as to Russia. Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovitch, in publishing Alexander I.’s private correspondence with his sister and _ political confidant, the Grand Duchess Catherine, showed that at Tilsit Napoleon decided to wipe Prussia out of the number of independent States and offered Russia for her frontier the line of the Vistula and that of the Danube. Alexander refused both ; the former because he wanted above all to preserve Prussia, and the latter on account of his promise to Prussia not to annex the Danubian countries. Napoleon consented, “out of regard for. the wishes of the Emperor of Russia” to preserve the existence of Prussia, but was unable to under- stand a Sovereign caring more for the interests of a foreign country than his own. He, therefore, suspected Alexander of fundamental hostility against himself, and of deep designs against the French Empire. Their friendship was thus under- mined and a conflict became inevitable. Yet while Alexander was, for the love of Prussia, staking Russia’s existence in the war with France, Frederick William, in letters full of most abject flattery and humility, was imploring Napoleon to give Prussia the Russian Baltic Provinces ! But even his friend’s shameful betrayal had no power to His eacrifice of essential intere of Ruasia in order to save Prussia. Qa Garman advice Alexander re- nounces tae idea of granting a constitation to ussla. Ts be promoted to be German the highest favour in Russia. 22 RUSSIA AND DEMOCRACY. change Alexander’s heart. After expelling the French and their German Allies from Russia, he at once undertook a war for the liberation of Germany ; and at the Vienna Congress insisted above all on the aggrandisement of Prussia. Later on, he founded the Holy Alliance, which practically amounted to Russia’s assisting Prussia and Austria in the satisfaction of their ambitions. His predilection for Germany and the Germans influenced also the whole of Alexander’s home policy. In the earliest years of his reign he was determined to grant a most liberal constitution to Russia. A Committee of young men of his age enjoying his particular confidence sat under his presidency in the Winter Palace elaborating such a Constitution. As is seen from the journals of that Committee, the Emperor’s great apprehension was the weakness of the future opposition. Early wars for the sake of his German friends, his absorbing interest in Prussia and the influence of his German advisers deterred him from giving a practical shape to the constitution. 