None
Op grond van voormelde overwegingen kunnen bcide })Ovengenoemde v1agen bevestigend warden beantHoord.
Een punt van verschil tussen de ERTA casuspositie en de
onderhavige procedure is dat, in tcgenste lli ng tot de

DUTILH. VAN DER HOEVEN & SLAGER
ADVOCATEN

27.
ROTTERDAM

verordeningen 2141 en 2142/70, verordening 543/69,
Pb. 1969 L 77, blz. 49 betreffende de harmonisatie
van hepaalde voorschriften van sociale aard voor
het wegvervoer, blijkens artikel 3 uitdrukkelijk
voorzag in een externe bevoegdheid voor de Gemeenschap. Gelet op de bewoording van overweging 28
lijkt dit verschil niet van belang. Dit te meer
niet omdat de marktverordcning en de structuurverordening voor de visserijsector ecn veel verdergaande mate van marktordening voorzien dan verorde ning
no 543/69 welke slechts

harmonisatie van bcpaalde

voorschriften van socialc aard voor het wegvervoer
voorzag.
Een ander verschil tussen de ERTA casuspositie en
de onderhavige procedure is dat hier de Raad volledige vrijheid van handelen genoot en dat de lidstaten niet, zoals in het ERTP gcval, al reeds een
zekere binding ten opzichte van derde land en hadden
aangegaan.
Integendeel de voor deze materie relevante Londense
conventie van 9 maart 1964 bepaalt in artikel 10
dat de bepalingen van de conventie geen n adelige
invloed kunnen hebben op een eventuee l in te stell en
E.E.G.-visserijregiem.
De stelling dat beide bovengenoemde vragen en daarmedc
ook de tweede

prejudici~le

vraag bevestigend diencn te

worden beantwoord vindt extra steun in het advies van
het Hof uitgebracht krachtens artikel 228 lid 1, t weede
alinea E.E.G.-Verdrag Advies 1/75 Publicatieblad 19 75
C 268 blz. 18.
 Ondubbelzinnig wordt gea dviseerd dat de Gemeenschap
de uitsluitende bevoegdheid heeft deel te n emen aan
de Rcgeling inzake een norm voor de plaatselijke uitgaven. De motiver ing v an het advies is Gvenccns bij
uitstek van tocpass ing op de gemeenschappelijke marktord ening voor visserij produkten. Het onderwerp van de

DUTILH. VAN DER HOEVEN & SLAGER

28.
ROT! I" ROAM

ADVOCATDJ

quoteringsmaatregclcn en de wijze waarop een dergelijke
regeling past in de opzet van de marktordening en het
structuurbeleid wijzcn duidelijk in de richting van
een exclusieve bevoegdheid. De in het advies ond er B 2
gegeven motivering wint nog aan kracht indien zij
wordt toegepast op een terrein waar ecn gemeenschappelijke politiek reeds van kracht is. De gevaren verbonden aan het voorbehouden van nationale bevoegdh eden
terzake zijn door het Hof duidclijk aangewezen. De
onderhavigc procedure laat zien hoe jui st en gegrond
de door het Hof aangevoerde argumenten zijn. Het argument dat:
"Eenzijdig optredcn van de lidstaten zou immer s
kunnen uitlopen op ongelijkheden in de voorwaarden voor verlening van exportkr e dieten, zodat de
mededinging tussen de ondcrnemingen der verschillende lidst aten op de buitenlandse markten
kan warden verstoord. Dez e distorsi ee ffecten
kunnen slechts warden voorkomen door middel van
een rigoreuze gelijkheid in de aan de ondern emingen van de Gemeenschap, ongeacht hun nationaliteit
verleende krcdietvoorwaarden. ''
geldt zoals in het voorgaande bij herhaling is aangetoond mutatis mutandis volledig voor de exclusieve
gemeenschapsbevoegdheid in de vi sserijsector.
 Naar analogie van overwegingen van het Hof in het Galliarrest zaak 31/74 Jur. 1975 blz. 47 (o verweging 16)
kan erop warden gewezen dat de enige met het

gemee nschc~

recht verenigbare manier om op een gebied waar een
gemeenschappelijke

m~~~tordening

van kracht is te ge-

raken tot nationale maatregelen is gelcgen in het
binnen het gemeenschappelijk kader ontplooien van lnltiatieven. In casu was het dan mogelijk geweest con©unautaire quota te vragen op de Noord-·Oost Atlantische
Vjsserij Conferentie.
•
De meest

con~unautaire

gang van zaken lS die volgens

DUTILH. VAN DER HOEVEN & SLAGER

2 9.
ROlTERDAM

welke de Commissie een onderhandelingsmandaat zou
zijn gegeven en de Commissie vervolgens de resultaten van de onderhandelingen in de vorm van een
voorstel voor een verordening aan de Raad zou
hcbben voorgelegd. Dat het Commissievoorstel, vervat in het oorspronkelijke artikel 6 van de structuurverordening voor een dergelijk rnandaat geen
Raadsrneerderheid heeft kunnen verkrijge n, beinvloedt de beantwoording van de tweede prejudiciele vraag overigens in gencn dele.
Een machtiging door de Raad aan de individue le lidstaten om zelfstandig over quota te onderh and e l en
en deze to e te passen, zou moeilijk te verdedigcn
zijn. Deze l aatste mogelijkhe id ligt zelfs nu als
voorstel van de Conrnissie voor een verordening van
de Raad ter tafel. Alleen h et poneren v a n een dergelijk voorstel toont a l duidelijk hoezeer de gemeenschapsinstellinge n zich van hun falen op dit
terrein bewust zijn.
5. OPMERK INGEN BETREFFENDE DE VIERDE

PREJUDICI~LE

VRAAG.
 De vierde aan de orde geste ld e vr aag h eeft impliciet
een bevestigend antwoord gekrege n in de arresten van
het Ho£ zaak 31/74 Jur. 1975 blz. 47 en 65/75 . In
beide arresten was de prejudiciele vraag gesteld of
artikel 30 van het

E~ E .G.-V erdrag

en gelijkluidende

bepalingen uit het s ecundaire gemeenschapsrecht ,
artikel 21, lid

~

tweede str ecp v erordening no 1 20/67

artikel 3, lid 1 derde streep van

veror~ening

no

136/66 in zaak 3J/74 e n artikel 35 van V2rordening no
100 9/6 7 in zaak 65/75, fundamentele beginsclen zijn
van de gcmecnschappelijke rcchtsorde , waaruit voor de
jus titi abe l en subjectieve rechten voortvloeien die

oe

DUTILH. VAN OCR HOCVCN B. SLAGER

30.
ROTrLHDAM

ADVOCATEN

nati onale rechters dienen te handhaven. Dicta 1n b eide
arresten beantwoorden deze vragen bevestigend met
betr ekk ing tot de secunda ire gemeenschapsrechterlijke
bepalingen. Hoewel in beide dicta artikel 30 niet
wordt geno ernd , kan het geen enkele twijf cl leiden of
een ze lfde antwoord geldt oak voor dit artikel en voorts
oak voor de artikelen 31 en 34.
 Genoemde bepalingen van secundair recht zijn 1n d e desbe
treffende verord en ing en ingevoegd omdat ingevolge &rtikel 44 van het Verdrag de mogelijkheid bestond gedur e nde de overgan gs periode te derogere n van onde r meer de
bepalingen van artikel 30 e .v. v an het Verdrag . Genoemde bepalingen beog en dan oak een volledige vrijmaking van h et handels verkee r voor het verstrijken van
de overgangsp er iode. Omdat de marktordening voor de
visserijsector is ingest e ld na afloop van de overgangsperiode is hiermede tevens verkl aard waarom een dergclijke bepaling in de verordening ontbreekt. Het verbod
van maatregelen van gelijke werking als kwantitatieve
restricties voert in casu dan oak rechts treeks voort
uit artikel 30 van het Verdrag. Het is daarom dan oak
van b e lang dat deze vraag deze maa l expliciet wordt
beantwoord.
Een ontkennende beantwoording v an deze prejudiciele
vraag is temecr ondenkbaar omda t dan aan 's Hofs ui t-spraken in de arresten zaak 8/74,
zaak 15/74 Jur. 1974 bl z . 11 47 .;

Jur.1~74

z~ak

blz. 837,;

192/ 73 Jur. 1974

blz. ·731, elke grand zou komen te ontvallen.
Ec~

dcr-

gelijke beantwoording zou bovendien niet strokcn me t
de door het IIof met . b etrekk ing tot andere bepalingcn
van het Verdrag ontwikkcldc jurisprudentie.
-.-.-.-.-.. )

) ,'

PRODUCTIE No l

,,

',

( BRON : Landbouw- Economisch Instituut,~1&0 127 ,nag. 20

'

...::t:-_

-==t-=-

==r==

==F==-_t
:=:=1===- -t- -

600 1-~----------+-----

----:=1=::=

--41----t

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I

I
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\

\

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---

L&.!

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-==-----=- ~: <?

\

\

M.>OrJ·

r: [
' ,, .....
 /

,,
'

0

. L - - - - - - _ J L - - - - - - - - - 1 ,f)o
Grolt' Hevissl'r ij

[]'lll ldCln<' ~l't'Vis~crij
('W,ifj Cor na lcnvi sscrij
I nJe ling contil<'n t.\ ,1 1 pLH 1\ ><>t<l«'•' •
~0

20

1o''o . L

•

PRODUCTIE No 2
(BRON:ProductschaP voor vis en visnroductcn,
nubJicatie 276/76

1l~ENVi\'I"l' ltJG

VAN DE JQ'..J-i"VOER

VERl{O~IIT

VOOH.
MEI~SELIJKE

CO!JSU~-".;~"'IE

Ill DC .:IJ:\nJ\N 197'3, EN 19._,(.
1 9 7 4
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Hocveelheid
I

Waarde

Gem.
pr~Js

Hoeveelhcid

Waarde

Gc~.
p~lJ S

---------------~-----~-!~QQQ_~2---~-!~QQQ_2!~-- -~~~~~9--~-!~QQQ_~2---~-!~QQQ_2~~---~~£~~~.
tau.l-Generaal

284.340

451.259

159

271.9 26

417.322

15 3

e- en k\1 stvisserij
rondvis
schelvis
kabeljauw
koolvis
wijting
lP-ng
heek
poon
overige

176.201
36.940
1.903
18.5 36
4.427
9.528
98
128
900
1.420

373.660
51.939
2.416
31.326
4.206
10.1 95
132
307
801
2.55 6

212
141
127
169
95
107
135
/.40
89
180

176.531
43.091
2.546
19.3S8
8.614
10.037
115
j99
888
1. 33 7

359.296
67.073
3.660
39.384
9.2G9
11 . l 15
170
423
718
/..334

20<
15C
144
203
10 3
1 11
14 8
213
81
175

'\t Vi s

6 7 . 12 4
2 2 6 . 6 17
3 38
72 . 254
2 16 . 18 8
2 9 =I
sQhol
43.978
71.2 -14.
162
48.47/.
76.2 84
15"7
-----------------~------------------------------------------------------schar
3.500
3.115
89
3.681
3.G/.7
99
t~ng
13. 963
12 7 . 2_0] _____ 9LL-------t4..L11G
11G .0~5
822
- .tdrbot--------------3.-o-29 ______ 20.-143
665 ·
2.
 1_s~818
61_1__ _

s88 ______

grjct
overige

_____

854
1.000

3.3 82
1. 530

39 6
85

814
2.5 83

2 . 676
1 • 748

3?9
68

ingacbt..igen
verse b aring
gezouten haring
overige

60.403
25.068
33.327
2.008

86.465
27. 825
57.516
1. 124

148
111
173
56

51.122
24.218
24.948
1.9 56

68.867
20. ·192
47.516
u59

135
85
19 0

reel

11.200

7.840

70

9.220

6. 1 31

66

175

324

185

216

332

154

et

9

27

300

8

325

i

350

448

128

617

26
679

3./.96
1.163
1.000
1. 133

13.661
4.293
8.060
1.3il

415
369
806
116

2.106
205
8<13
1.058

8.351
675
6.101
1.275

397
329
75 9
121

104.843
5.800
97.607
1 . 2 36.
200

63.935
24.000
28.500
11.155
280

61
414
29
qo3

93.289
6.0 84
85.84?.
1.204
159

49.675
19. 18 7
19.979
10. 307
202

53
315
23
85G
127

-:selrneervisserij
snockbaars
aal of paling
overiqe
aal- en weckdicren
garnalcn
mosselcn ·
oesters
overige

orlopige cijfers

•

140

44

11 0

~:.
PRODUCTIE No 3
BRON : Productscha~ Vis en Visoroducten no 267/76

236/76

_..,..,_ .. ..,..,......,._...,_ ... .---·-

__,_::.......t.:
_____
gem. pri-;
s oe::.
:: •

_ _ _ _..!.1-.. _

~_0l_

JI 'l"VOER

200.218 to~1 \·oo r f. 571 miljoen
( 201.019 Lon v oor f . 558 miljoen )
X

f.
2r3~

( 2 , 78 }

1. 000,--

lcrinq, r~O.......:IJ.::::;1t.~-p~n..~-----------------_..(,_.._l!~~.___ _ _ _-x..:5G.....ill-"-'7_ __ _ _ _ ~ ,_1ti._ __

!:: ---..-..L"----"'--

-

raarvan naar

•

( 27.366 )

( 57. 227 )

( 2,09)

16 .7 25
( 16.912 )

1 ,24
( 1 , 09)

2.5 92

B. L.E .. U.
( 2 . 836 )
\'lest-Dui tsland

19.592
(1 9 . 924 )

Frankrijk

(

aarvan naar

: ti..L.J:.U.
 Wcs t=buits l a nd
Frankrijk-_

7 00
43 0)

13.520
(1 5.552 )- 2. 3o.r( 2._115 )
-11.426
- ( 10 . 55 7)

2 . 105
( 1. 653 )

~eE'vis ,

v err; en bevro!~ cn ,
~~icf filets
~-

raarvan naar

B.L.E.U.
West-Dui tsland

Frankrijk
I talic

7 0.3 7 3
(7 0.874 )

5 . 870
( 6 . 859 )
l 3 .71 6
(1 :, . 615)
19.3 11
( 2 0 .027 )

11.058
(1 0 . 303 )

. Engeland

12 .01 0
(1 2 . 694 )

Amerika

1. 603
( 2 .. 4 49 )

271. 657
( 285 . 19 9 )

PRODUCTIE No 4
r~r.
237/76

( BRON:Productschao Vis en

Visnroductcn No 267/76 )

VOt"JPl-O~JC::S CLTFE!{C) O'l?.P Dr: HNOE1l H ·i HET JJ', }\.R 1975
--·~--~

Totaal

99.113 ton voor f. 274 miljo~n
( 96 . 887 ton voor f. 254 miljocn)
~.000 k~

__ - - ,.' ; _

(11. 3-15)

lerland

25.752
( 23 .1 15)
744

flaring, vc rs en -bevroren

Wes-t.-Duitsland

aarvan uit

(

Engeland
Ierland
Noor..,.;egen

F

en bevroren

29.480
28 . 846)

1 I 14-

51.278
( 48.973)

1,72
( 1 , 8'1)

1.~--2"5)

4 7 5)

29.833
(2 6 .1 7'7)
2.395
( 3.312)
4.721

: B.L.E.U.
 - -west-Dui tsland

( 4.521)

3.132
( 5.618)
7. 821
( 2.830)
1. 505
( 1.763)
6.867
( 4 . 818 )
685
(
807)

Frankrijk
Denemarken
Noorv:egen

Engeland
~ u.:.d

0,72
( 0,76)

\.2. 770~-

'-'sief filets

1aarvan uit

(

8.050
8.660)

( 2.166)
4.223
( 3.985)
15.1 50
( 1 0. 801 )
1. 480
{ 2.205)
- - 2.G02

Denemarkcn

v~rs

f. 1.000,--

1.052

Frankri-3-k

~~is ,

2,76
( 2 , 62)

6.918
( 5.290)
4.273
( 6.032)

Engeland

uit

X

11. 225

1arino,
_., oezoutcn
aar~an

() == 1974.
·- ----------·

l-\fr ika

(

Bran Landbouw-Economisch Instituut,inl.l53(75)PRODUCTIE NoS
UIJLAGE l. H.:lming van de bedrij fsuitkomsten VC!n de Nc'-Jcrlandse 7..C c>\·-i sscr j j
(mlu. gld.)

1973

197 /~

1975

19 76 (r2minp,)

dcf.
dcf.
rannng

minder i nzet dan u] L ' 7 5
I"ot
~i.
n1 hiT

471

465

I, 13

265
2360

331
2189

108

318
2353
1 15

I 01

309
287
1802
89

BcsommiDg
Non- factorl:os ten

268
135

269
187

250
209

258
212

258
223

25 8

Nctto to cgcvocgde waarde
~,l aarvan : rente
loon / soc .lasten
ncttoresultaat

133

82
24
91
-33

41

35

2Lf
31

84

46
28
82

-73

-6/!

Klcine

zecv~sser1]

A3ntal. schep~n
Ho torvcnnor.en (I 000 pk)

Bemanning
Aanvocr ( r~!ln . kg)

~-

--

__,

._.._ - . . . ,.,_...
Grotc

_.,.,../""'.
zcevis~er1j

--.
......
~

16

- --

___.
......,._

-

-

_,....
- -

. , _ ~-

367
31 9
-2002
89

1903

89

23!~

29
81
-75

..-.-.
79

- 8G

~

...,...._

-- ....
 61

40

43

46

82
768
77

63
565
58

66

70

602
58

6Lf0

84

68
84
812
73

BcsorPminr,

96

94

98

1\on-factorkos ten

57

62

]ll

95
65

95
68

95
i' 1

Nctto toegevoegdc waard e
,,raarvan ~ ren tc

39
5
36
-2

32
7
36

24

30
7
34

27

24

7

8
31.
70

A.Jntal schcpcn
Notorvemogcn (1000 pk)
Bemanning
Aanvocr ( r.1J n . kg)

78

850

loo ~..1 /soc.la sten

nettorcsult aat
......__
..,..__.,_, ............
Garnalcnvi sseri j

~

--·

~

~

.......
~

~

....... .....................
---

-1 ]
~

8

34
-11
-14
...._ .....................
_ . .....................
35
- 19

--

58

-18
~--- -~

137
22
346

150
25

169

164

173

182

30

33

389

L,84

31
427

34
475

6

7

6

7

l3esomming

18

20

25

30

Non-factorkosten

8

I1

14

16

Netto toegevoegde waarde
Haarvan: rente
Joon / soc . lasten
Nettoresultaat

10
I

9

8
+1

9

11
2
I1

-1

-2

683

Aantal sche.pen
Motorvermogcn (1000 pk)
f

---

104
+13

30

337
303

l3emanning
Aanvoer (mln. kg)

Aan tal s ch(;. 1 •
Motorvcrmogcn (1000 pk )
Be:.manning

I

30
18

-1

2
13
-2

2
13
-3

643
443
3441
184

513
381
2794
154

553
402
2956
154

595
423
31 17

373
297

383

383

3 83
3 2 '3

Aanvoer (m1 n . l<g)

3554
195

Bcsornming

381

383

Non-factorkostcn

199

260

tocgcvocgdc wanrdc
\~0arvan : rente
loon/soc. l asten

182
22
148

I 23
32
13G

40
130

+12

-1~5

- 94

~etto

_____ _______ ---------------------..,.
Nct:torcsult~tit
,

7

30
17

672
365
3523
197

!•27

'•51
7

---------------------14
13
12
2
13

I 54

293
308
--------------75
90
76
........
 37
J 29
-76

~-

38
128

-91
_ _ _..........,.., .. ,_-.:!!

i'

;2.
IN THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

CASES NOS. 3, 4 AND 6/76

WRITTEN OBSERVATIONS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

submitted pursuant to Article 20 of the Protocol on the Statute of the
Court of Justice of the European Economic Community.
These Observations deal with the questions referred to the Court of
Justice of the European Communities for a preliminary ruling under
Article 177 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community by:

Case No. 3/76:

the Arrondissement Court of
Zwolle in .thP- Action:h t
lngescnreven m··neCreglster van e ·
Public Prosecutor Hof van Justl:;~ ocder r~r. .6JJ..tz..
Luxemburg. ··--·-··-·--V:I..: .....d ..-....}:.6..........._
Qe G: iffier.
against

tLJ.
Cornelius Kramer
Case No. 4/76:

the Arrondissement Court of Zwolle in the

;iU\_

m~Sft:Yan f:lo~Z)

Public Prosecutor
against
Hendrik van den Berg
Case No. 6/76:

the Arrondissement Court of Alkmaar in the Action:Public Prosecutor
against
Kramer en Bais
1

The United Kingdom has the honour to submit the following
observations in these Cases.
PART

I

Background
1.
The acts giving rise to the prosecutions appear from the judgments

of the referring courts to have occurred in the North Sea.
The United

Kingdom is one of those coastal States bordering the North Sea which
exercises a measure of jurisdiction over fisheries out to 12 miles from
the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured.
Other coastal

States in the North Sea exercise a measure of jurisdiction to the same or
a lesser distance.
This means that the greatest part of waters forming

the North Sea has the status of high seas.
The general rule on the

high seas remains that of the freedom of the seas, including the freedom
of fishing.
 But the fish stodksin the North Sea have been fully

exploited for some years.
The States concerned are under obligations

under international law to conserve fish stocks.
Accordingly, there

has been for some time a clear need for effective measures of conservation and, because the fish stocks are found primarily in the waters of
the high seas, these measures have had to be drawn up on an international
basis.
In particular, conservation is being ensured at the present time

by means of quota arrangements drawn up within the North East Atlantic
Fisheries Commission, a body created by the North East Atlantic Fisheries
Convention (NEAFC).
2.
Under general international law, there is now a clear, solemn duty

to conserve fish stocks.
This duty is demonstrated by the following:

2 -

The judgment of the International Court of Justice in
the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (United Kingdom v Iceland
and Federal Republic of Germany v Iceland;
1974, pages 3ff and 175ff).
ICJ Reports,

In these two cases, which

concerned fishing around Iceland, the International Court
of Justice held that Iceland, the United Kingdom and the
Federal Republic of Germany were under the "obligation to
keep under review (fish) resources and to examine together,
in the light of scientific and other available information,
such measures as may be required for the conservation •••••
of those resources" (at page 34 and page 206).
There can

be no doubt that similar obligations exist in other parts
of the world.
The Mult ilateral Convention on Fishing and Conservation of
Living Resources of the High Seas (Geneva 1958), to which the
United Kingdom and some other Member States are parties.
 This

makes clear that the right of States for their nationals to
fish the high seas is subject inter alia to the duty to adopt
measures necessary for conservation (Article 1).
This Con-

vention is regarded as being in many ways expressive of
customary law.
Regional Conventions such as NEAFC, the purpose of which is
"to ensure the conservation of fish stocks •••• of the North
East Atlantic Ocean •••• "according to its Preamble, as well
as the International Convention for the North West Atlantic
Fisheries (ICNAF).
3

The Community institutions must have regard to the obligations of the
Member States under international law to ensure the conservation of fish
stocks.
Some recognition of this duty is to be found in Regulation 2141/70

(paragraph 11 below).
Rights and obligations arising from agreements

concluded with third countries prior to the entry into force of the Treaty
for the various Member States are specifically safeguarded by Article 234
of the Treaty of Rome and Article 5 of the Act of Accession.
In the case

of the United Kingdom this applies both to ICNAF, set up in 1949, and to
NEAFC, set up in 1959.
Furthermore the Court will ensure that in the

interpretation and application of the Treaty of Rome the law is observed
(Article 164).
3.
The Netherlands legislation, which is paralelled by implementing

arrangements in other Member States including the United Kingdom, gives
effect to binding quota arrangements adopted pursuant to Articles 7 and 8
of the NEAFC of 1959.
The Convention is a treaty in force, binding the

following States:
Belgium
Denmark
France
Federal Republic of Germany
German Democratic Republic
Iceland
Irish Republic
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Soviet Union
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
No other States fish in the North East Atlantic.
 The quota arrangements

adopted by the contracting parties apply both to the waters under the
sovereignty or jurisdiction of the States concerned and to the high seas

4

beyond.
The quotas are adopted, in general, for a year at a time ,

although some schemes have been adopted for different periods.
long- term quota arrangements exist.
No

At the present time, the arrange-

ments in operation will expire at the end of 1976 except in the case of
Celtic Sea herring where expiry will be on 31 March 1977.
4.
Similar arrangements exist in the North West Atlantic pursuant to

the ICNAF of 1949.
The parties to this Convention are :
Bulgaria
Canada
Cuba
Denmark
France
Federal Republic of Germany
German Democratic Republic
Iceland
Italy
Japan
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Spain
Soviet Union
United Kingdom
United States of America

•

The arrangements apply only to waters beyond the territorial sea and
exclusive fisheries zones of the contracting parties.
5.
At the meetings of the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission

which drew up the quota arrangements for 1975 and 1976, those Member
States of the Community which are also contracting parties to the
Convention were represented by their national commissioners in accordance
with the provisions of the Convention.
Before and during the meetings,

discussions were held amongst these Member States, together with the
Commission of the European Communities , with a view to adopting a common
line.
Similar consultations were held for the 1975 ICNAF meeting.
5

6.
law,

Although certain aspects of fisheries are regulated by Community
com~on

rules have not been laid down within the Community with

regard to the conservation of fish stocks by means of quota arrangements
or by any other means.
 In particular, the Council has not adopted

measures in accordance with Article 5 of Regulation No. 2141/70 or
Article 4 of Regulation No. 101/76, nor has the Commission yet made
proposals.
P ART I I

The Questions Referred

1.
Turning now to the questions referred to the European Court by the

Arrondissement courts in identical terms in all three cases, the United
Kingdom submits that the European Cour t should be guided by the following
considerations.
Question 1

8.
Articles 38-47 of the Treaty of Rome provide for the elaboration of

a Common Agricultural Policy.
Historically this policy has in large

measure been developed on the basis of market organisation structures,
regulating individual agricultural sectors, pursuant to Article 40,
paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Treaty.
As the European Court held in Case

51/74, van der Hulst's Zonen v. Produktschap voor Siergewassen, 1975
ECR 79 (ground 25),
"Once the Community has, pursuant to Article 40 of the Treaty,
legislated for the establishment of a common market organisation of the market in a given sector, Member States are under
an obligation to refrain from taking any measures which might
undermine or create exceptions to it".
6

9.
Where, however, Community rules cover the subject matter only

partially, Member States may retain power to regulate the remaining
area to the extent necessary and insofar as such additional regulation
does not impair the existing Community rules.
This emerges clearly

from Case 190/73, Public Prosecutor v. van Haaster, 1974 ECR 1123
(grounds 13 to 17), in which the Court examined the compatibility with
Regulation 234/68 on the establishment of a common market organisation
in live trees and other plants etc of measures limiting production.
 It

found the measures in question incompatible with that Regulation not
because they were inherently incompatible with the existence of any
market organisation, but because that particular market organisation
comprehended mechanisms designed to achieve similar ends, namely
(See also Case 4/75, Rewe-Zentralfinanz

maintaining quality standards.
v. Landwirtschaftskammer, 1975 ECR 843, grounds 7 and 8, and Case 65/75,
Tasca, ground 6).
10.
Community rules have of course been laid down establishing a market

organisation for fishery products (Regulation 2142/70 at the date of
reference) but it is in the nature of these rules that they apply to the
marketing of landed fish and do not regulate fisheries as such (cf first
and second whereas).
The penultimate preambular paragraph of the Regula-

tion refers, admittedly, to the need to take account of Community interests
in conservation, but nowhere in the body of the Regulation itself is conservation let alone regulation of catch levels referred to unless by
implication as a rider to the stipulation that appropriate account is to
be taken of the objectives set out in Articles 39 and 110 of the Treaty
(Article 32 of the Regulation).
-

7

11.
Regulation 2141/70, applicable at the date of reference, refers

more specifically to conservation (fourth whereas, Article 5 and, by
implication, Article 1).
Article 5 nevertheless provides only for

safeguard action on conservation:
system of conservation.
it does not establish a concrete

Furthermore, Article

5 applies only to the

maritime waters coming under the sovereignty or within the jurisdiction
of Member States:

12.
it does not apply to the high seas beyond.
 It would appear therefore that the Community has the potential

to adopt conservation measures in the maritime waters to which the
common fisheries policy applies and to determine conditions for fishing,
but that no such measures have been adopted so far.
13.
In the submission of the United Kingdom the common Community

fisheries rules in question do not apply to conservation measures taken
in respect of the high seas beyond national fisheries zones.
And those

portions of the rules which could be of relevance have neither been applied
nor invoked in respect of the rnari tiyne waters to which the common fisheries
policy does apply and to which the NEAFC quotas equally apply.
14.
The interpretation put forward by the United Kingdom above receives

its confirmati on L~ Article 102 of the Act concerning the Conditions of
Accession and the Adjustment to the Treaties (Act of Accession).
This

provides that from 1978 at the latest ''the Council, acting on a proposal
from the Commission, shall determine conditions for fishing with a view
to ensuring protection of the fishing grounds and conservation of biological
re sources of the sea".
As already indicated, no such determination had
8

been made by the Council at the time the questions were referred to the
•

European Court.
Discussions have, however, begun within the Community

institutions on possible measures which, if adopted, may in effect
implement Article 102 by means inter alia of a Community quota system.
In the meantime Member States retain full power to take autonomous action,
as Regulation 2141 acknowledges (cf Articles 2, 3, 11 and 13 in particular).
15.
The elements of Community law referred to in question 1 of the

reference orders must be viewed as a whole.
 Until the Council determines

the conditions for fishing in accordance with Article 102 of the Act of
Accession, such conditions cannot properly be anticipated by a process of
extrapolation from the general terms of Articles 38-47 of the Treaty of
Rome and Regulations 2141/70 and 2142/70.
Moreover these provisions do

not apply ratione loci to the high seas beyond waters under the sovereignty
or jurisdiction of the Member States.
The United Kingdom therefore

submits that question 1 of the reference orders should be answered in the
affirmative.
Question 2

16.
In Case 22/70, Commission v. Council, Rec XVII 263, 1971 CMLR 335

(the AETR case) the Court held:

[15]

To determine in a particular case the Community's

authority to enter into international agreements, one must
have regard to the whole scheme of the Treaty no less than
to its specific provisions.
[16l

Such authority may arise not only from an explicit

grant by the Treaty - as is the case with Articles 113 and
114 for tariff and commercial agreements and with Article 238
for Association agreements - but may equally flow from other
provisions of the Treaty and from steps taken within the
framework of these provisions, by the Community institutions.
9

[171

In particular, each time the Community, with a view

to implementing a common policy envisaged by the Treaty, lays
down common rules, whatever form these may take, the Member
States no longer have the right, acting individually or even
collectively, to contract obligations towards non~ember States
affecting these rules.
[18]

To the extent that such common rules come into being,

the Community alone is in a position to assume and carry out
contractual obligations towards non-Member States affecting
the whole sphere of application of the Community legal system.
 [19]

One cannot, therefore, in implementing the provisions

of the Treaty, separate the category of measures internal to
the Community from that of external relations.
[20]

By the terms of Article 3(e), the adoption of a common

policy in the sphere of transport is specially mentioned among
the aims of the Community.
[21]

B.y the

terms of Article 5, the

ember-States are required

on the one hand to take all appropriate steps to ensure the
carrying out of the obligations arising out of the Treaty or
resulting from the acts of the institutions and, on the other
hand, to abstain from any steps likely to jeopardise the
attainment of the purposes of the Treaty.
[22]

If these two provisions are read in conjunction, it

follows that to the extent that Community rules are promulgated
for the attainment of the purposes of the Treaty, the MemberStates cannot, outside theframework of the Community institutions,
assume obligations likely to affect such rules or alter their
scope.
This ruling evoked considerable controversy at the time it was made.
The

decision has given rise to certain difficulties of interpretation particularly as regards the notion of "common rules", upon which turns the passage
cited above.
In the submission of the United Kingdom the proper
10

interpretation is that the doctrine applies where a body of substantive
rules covers the actual subject matter of the agreement:

thus in Case

22/70 itself the common rules in question (Regulation 543/69) governed
social conditions in road transport, while the subject matter of the
international agreement in question, the European Road Transport Agreement, was substantially identical.
17.
But in the present case there is no identity of subject matter

between such common rules as exist on fisheries and the NEAFC and ICNAF
quota rules.
The AETR doctrine cannot therefore apply.
 Further, the

doctrine to be derived from the opinion of the court in Opinion 1/75,
Re Export Credits, O.J. 1975 No. C.268/18, is of no application here, for
that doctrine turns upon the rules forming the Community common commercial
policy which of themselves confer exclusive competence on the Community
to conclude international agreements on commercial policy matters.
Insofar as the is~ue of quotas is directly in point, the common commercial
policy rules are implicity referred to in Article 17 of Regulation 2142/70
prohibiting Member States from imposing quantitative restrictions.
That

rule governs trade in products with third countries and does not touch upon
the regulation of domestic primary producers.
Similarly Articles 30, 31

and 34 of the Treaty of Rome would govern landed fish and fish products
only (see further below paragraph 19).
18.
In the submission of the United Kingdom there are no grounds for

considering that competence is passed to the Community to conclude agreements concerning conservation measures.
The second question in the

reference orders should therefore be answered in the negative.
11

Question 3
19.
It follows from the above submissions that national measures

concerning quotas in the fisheries sector are compatible with Community
law.
Articles 38-47 of the Treaty of Rome and Regulations 2141/70 and

2142/70 have to be read in the light of Article 102 of the Act of
Accession.
Articles 30, 31 and 34 of the Treaty of Rome relate to trade

in fish and fish products between Member States and cannot be interpreted
as applying to national regulation of catch levels by Community nationals.
Article 2 of Regulation 2141/70 speaks of "equal conditions of access"
and not "free access".
The obligation imposed on Member States under

international law to conserve fish stocks cannot be displaced by a claim.
 to Community competence going beyond the competence already conferred by
internal Community rules.
Insofar as such competence may be claimed

already to exist, such an assertion should not and cannot

overturn

commitments already entered into by Member States for a certain period
(Case 22/70, paragraph 86 ff).
20.
The Court has admittedly suggested in Case 190/73, Public

Prosecutor v. van Haaster (ground 18) that measures designed to limit
production could in the context of Regulation 234/68 amount to a measure
having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction for the purposes
of Article 10 of that Regulation, but that decision appears to be based
upon the incompatibility of the measure with the Regulation generally.
It contains equally cogent dicta (grounds 9-11) to the effect that
measures of equivalent effect relate to trade rather than to production.
The contrary dicta should be limited to the facts of Case 190/73, and
have no application to Articles 30, 31 and 34 of the Treaty of Rome,
relating specifically to trade between Member States, let alone to
Article 17 of Regulation 2142/70 relating to trade with third countries.
12

That provision cannot in any case be in point because the relevant third
countries were themselves committed to the NEAFC quota system.
Having

regard to the analysis of Regulations 2141/70 and 2142/70 under question 1,
it cannot be said that the auota system infringes the objects and purposes
of the Regulation.
Conservation measures cannot in any event be regarded

as measures designed to restrain production within the meaning of Case
190/73.
21.
The third question should therefore be answered in the negative.
Question 4.
22.
 The United Kingdom submits that the Articles referred to are of

no application to the regulation of catch levels, but would be of application to landed fish and fish products only.
Accordingly the United

Kingdom does not consider it necessary to express an opinion on the
substance of the question.
W. H. Godwin.
Assistant Treasury Solicitor
23rd March 1976

Submitted on behalf of the United Kingdom
by the Treasury Solicitor of Matthew Parker
Street, London, SW1H 9NN.
11 . /3

)ENRIGSMINISTERIET
for Udenrigs0konomi
lngeschreven in het rt.g. :~~.-r v~n . ~eJ.
Hof van Justrtie on ...ler l\t. (, ~: ~.f:..9
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~~;

~partementet

/lA.
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-

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'

Den 23. marts 1976.
I forbindc1se med nmodningerne om en
re1se pa grund1ag af

pr~judicie1

afg0-

- kende1se afsagt den 2L~ . december 1975 af "Arrondisse men t srec htbank", Zwo 1le 1 sagen
Officier van Justitie
mod
Corne1is Kramer
-

sag nr . J/76

- kendelse afsagt den 24 . december 1975 af "Arrondissemen tsrech tbank", Zwo11e 1 sagen
Officicr van Justitie
mod
Hendrik van den Berg
-

sag nr.
 4/76

kende1se afsagt den 2 . januar 1976 af "Arrondissementsrechtbank", A1kmaar i sagen
Officier van Justitie
mod
Firmaet Kramer og Bais, Den He1der
-

sag nr . 6/76

afgiver den danske r egering i medf0r al artike1 20 1 protoko11en vedr0rende statutten for E0F's Domsto1 f0lgende
ind1~g:

1. De i ovcnn~vnte sager imp1icerede personer er ved ho11andske domsto1e ti1ta1t lOr at have ud0vet fiskeri i strict
med forskrifter , som de ho11and ske myndigheder har udstedt
ti1 gennemf0re1se af NEAFC-vedtagelser for 1975. Som led
i bevaringsloranstaltningerne inden for denne organisation
indgar b1andt andet fasts~ttelse af totale fangstkvoter
for visse fiskearter og en forde1ing heraf pa de enkelte
lande samt fasts~tte1se af fredningsbestemme1ser. De her
omhandlede sager angar formodede overtr~delser af reg1erne
for Eiskeri af s0tunger og r0dsp~tter.
-

2 -

De hollandske dom3tole sp0rger dels om, hvorvidt kvotaordninger af denne art er i overensstemmelse med fffillesskabsretten , dels om alene Fffillesskabet har kompetence
til at indga internationale aftaler om foranstaltninger
t i l bevaring af fiskebestanden og endelig, om medlemsstaterne har bef0jelse t i l at lastsffitte kvotaordningerne.
2.a. Efter den danske regerings opfattelse b0r f0lgende syns punkter danne grundlag for besvarelsen af disse sp0rgsmal:
De i sagerne omhandlede kvotaordninger bygger pa vedtagelser i henhold til konventionen af 1959 angaende fiskeri i
det nord0stlige Atlanterhav. Formalet med konventionen er
if0lge prffiamblen at ''sikre bevarelsen af fiskebestandene
og en rationel udnyttelse af fiskeriet", og til fremme af
dette formal er der blandt andet i artikel 7 skabt hjemmel
til indf0relse af fangstkvoter og regulering af den maksimale fiskeintensitet.
 Det bemffirkes, at disse bestemmelser blev indsat i konventionen i 1971, efter at man havde konstateret utilstrffikkeligheden af de oprindeligt hjemlede foranstaltninger, som
blandt andet omfattede regler for fiskeredskaber og tilbeh0r, fredningsperioder og - omrader samt andre foranstaltninger til for0gelse og forbedring af havets rigdomskilder.
Samtlige ' inden for konventionen vedtagne bevaringsforanstaltninger baseres i henhold t i l artikel 6 pa resultatern e
af videnskabelig forskning og unders0gelse.
Den alvorlige udvikling for nords0fiskeriet kan illustreres
med f0lgende tal, der angiver de totale fangster (i 1.000
tons) af sild og tunger i Nords0en l perioden 1966-1974.
Sild

Tunger

1966

869

31

1967

696

32

1968

718

30

1969

547

27

1970

563

20

1971

520

24

1972

498

21

1973

483

19

1974

259

17

For sa vidt angar r0dspffitter viser beregningerne en stagnation al fangstmffingderne i denne periode, sk0nt fiskeriindsatsen er blevet forstffirket. Ogsa de ovenfor angivne
tal for sild og tungcr ma ses pa baggrund af en 0get fiskeriindsats, og beregninger af denne art har - sammenholdt
med et stffirkt fald i bestandene af k0nsmodne fisk - dannet
baggrund for fiskeribiologernes advarsler mod overfiskning.
-

J -

I denne forbindelse bor det understreges, at lignende vurderinger af situationen i det nordvestlige Atlanterhav har
f0rt til, at der ogsa inden for rarnmerne af ICNAF er vedtaget sadanne bevaringsforanstaltninger, herunder kvotaordninger, som derefter er blevet gennemf0rt pa nationalt
plan.
 Kvotaordningerne er et uundvrerligt element i de bestandsbevarende bestrrebelser og har samme karakter som for eksempel egentlige fredningsbestemmelser. Det vil i realiteten
kun vrere et teknisk-administrativt sp0rgsmal, om man pa
grundlag af de foretagne videnskabelige vurderinger fastsretter den forsvarlige makslmale fangstmrengde i tons, eller
om man betjener sig af fredningsperioder eller -omrader
for at tilgodese bevaringshensynet. De her omhandlede sager understreger i 0vrigt dette synspunkt, idet de tilsyneladende angar overtrredelser af savel kvotaordninger som
legentlige fredningsbestemmelser. Der er altsa tale om en
samlet bestandsbevarende indsats, som bygger pa sagkyndige
vurderinger af behovet for bevaringsforanstaltninger for
de forskellige fiskearter.
b. Fiskerisektoren adskiller sig ved de naturgivne forhold
afgorende fra den egentlige landbrugssektor. Selv om
fiskeri er omfattet af E0F-traktatens bestemmelser om
landbrug, er det derfor ikke givet, at alle de principper,
der grelder pa det egentlige landbrugsomrade, ogsa er anvendelige i fiskerisektoren.
Medens der inden for landbruget er tale om en produktion,
der principielt kan for0ges eller formindskes alt efter
markedets behov, er situationen i fiskerisektoren den, at
bestanden af fisk er naturbestemt og begrrenset. Bevaringsforanstaltninger er derfor af en helt anden betydning i
fiskerisektoren end i den egentlige landbrugssektor. Kvotaordninger, der gennemf0res i bevarings0jemed, kan saledes
heller ikke sidestilles med kvotaordninger i den egentlige
landbrugssektor . Medens sidstnrevnte - uanset deres formal kan have en produktionsbegrrensende virkning, vil kvoter i
fiskerisektoren, der er baseret pa videnskabelige resultater, og hvis formal er at bevare fiskebestanden, tvmrtimod
pa lrengere sigt sikre den st0rst mulige produktion.
 En egentlig produktionsbegr~nsning inden for fiskerisektoren er derimod omhandlet i forordning nr. 2142/70 om den
frelles markedsordning for fiskerivarer. Det hedder i prreamblen blandt andet, at det i forbindelse med bestemmelserne for markedernes funktion vil vrere rigtigt at fast srette bestemmelser, der muligg0r en tilpasning af udbuddene til markedskravene, og af forordningens art. 5 fremgar det blandt andet, at en producentorganisation skal
fremme gennemf0relsen af fiskeriplaner, og at dens medlemmer vod produktion og afsretning skal anvende de bestemmelser, som organisationen har fastsat srerligt med henblik pa
at forbedre varernes kvalitet og at tilpasse den udbudte
mrengde til markedets krav. Her er der saledes faktisk tale
om hjemmel til at regulere produktionen af fiskerivarer,
herunder til at foretage periodiske begrrensninger af fiskeriet af visse arter. Formalet hermed er at indrette produktionen efter markedet.
- 4 Denne bestemmelses formal samt dens placering i markedsordningen bidrager til at understrege, at der er en fundamental
forskel mellem pa den ene side afpasninger af varemrengden
ud fra en vurdering af ertersp0rgslen pa markedet - dette
sp0rgsmal drekkes af markedsforordningen - og pa den anden
side bevaringsforanstaltninger, der blandt andet kan have
form a1 kvotaordninger.
J.
Der er intet i markedsordningen, som hindrer, at medlemsstaterno fastsretter fangstkvoter og andre bevaringsforanstaltninger af ikke-diskriminatorisk art.
 E0FT's artikel 39 nrevner blandt de gonerelle mal for den
fffilles landbrugspolitik stabilisering af markederne og
sikring af forsyningerne. Disse mal spiller - som det fremgar af ovenstaende bomrerkninger - en belt anden rolle i
fiskerisektoren end i det egentlige landbrug, hvilket da
ogsa bar indvirket pa udformningen af markedsordningen
(nr. 2142/70). Det siges saledes i prffiamblen, at "ved anvendelsen af denne fffilles markedsordning ma det endvidere
tages i betragtning, at Fffillesskabet bar interesse i i videst muligt omfang at bevare fiskebestandene." Da markedsforordningen ikke indeholder bestemmelser om bevaringsforanstaltninger, ma mening e n hermed vrere, at markedsordningen ikke ma modvirke de i anden sammenbffing fastsatte foranstaltninger . Denne opfattelse st0ttes af, at det i den
pa samme tidspunkt gennemf0rte strukturforordning (nr.
2141/70) bade i prffiamblen og i artiklerne 2 og 5 er forudset, at der gennemf0res bevaringsforanstaltninger, nationalt eller pa frellesskabsplan.
Da der endvidere ikke i frellesskabsretten eller Domstolens
praksis er grundlag for at anse nationale reguleringer for
udelukket som 10lge af den blotte indl0relso af en frelles
markedsordning, ma det efter den danske regerings opfattels e
vrere klart, at man ikke kan anse kvotaordningerne for at
v~re i
strict med den for fiskerivarer greldende markedsordnin
Tv~rtimod ma en konkret bed0mmelse af kvotaordningerne og
deres baggrund f0re t i l at betragte dom som ikke blot forenelige med markedsordningen og dens formal samt med de 0Vrige frellesskabsregler pa omradet, men endog som en n0dvendig forudsretning for fiskeriordningernes funktion, jfr.
E0FT art . J9 og forordningerne nr. 2141/70 og 2142/70. Dette er en naturlig f0lge af deres karakter af bevaringsforanstaltninger, og denne grundlreggende kendsgerning er ligeledes a1g0rende , nar man pa foranledning af de hollandske
domstoles tredje sp0rgsmal skal bed0mme kvotaordningerne
i forhold t i l reglerne om kvantitative begrrensninger eller
foranstaltninger med tilsvarende virkning.
 4. Efter den danske regerings opfattelse ma det vrere udelukket at drage nogen parallel mellem Domstolens afg0relse
af JO . oktober 1974 i sag nr. 190/73 (Van Haaster-sagen)
og de her omhandlede kvotaordninger. Forudsretningen for
som i den pagreldende sag at opfatte kvotaordninger som
foranstaltninger med tilsvarende virkning som kvantitative restriktioner er , at der foroligger en produktionsbegrrensning , som kan medf0re begrrensninger i den frie sam-

- 5 handel . Dette er der som nffivnt ikke tale om for sa vidt
angar de i NEAFC vedtagne kvotaordninger, der - i modsffitning til de i mark edsforordningens artikel 5 hjemlede tilpasningsforanstaltninger - bar til 1orma1 at sikre den
st0rst mu1ige produktion pa 1ffingere sigt. Der er selvsagt
intet som helst ho1depunkt for at antage, at kvoterne vi11e Vffire b1evet st0rre e11er forde1ingen ander1edes, safremt
Fffi11esskabet og ikkc de enke1te med1ems1ande havde f0rt
forhand1ingerne og s1uttet afta1erne i den Nord0stat1antiske Fiskerikommission og derefter havde gennemf0rt kvotaordningerne internt i Fffi11esskabet.
I samme forbinde1se ma det nffivncs, at safremt man ansa
kvotaordningerne i fiskerisektoren for ulov1ige produktionsbegrffinsninger, matte samme synspunkt finde anvende1se
pa en 1ang r~kke andre foranstaltninger, der bygger pa bevaringshensyn . Dette gffilder for eksempe1 reg1erne om fiskeredskaber, fredningsperioder og -omrader inden for fiske~isektoren samt i 0vrigt fredningsforansta1tninger pa en
1ang rffikke andre fe1ter . Sadanne konsekvenser matte forekomme k1art uantage1ige set save1 fra med1ems1andenes som
fra Fffil1esskabets synspuruzt, og dette bidrager ti1 at und erst rege de afg0rende juridiske og praktiske 1orske11e
me11em pa den ene side kvotaordninger, som er bevarings1oransta1tninger , og pa den anden side kvotaordninger, som
i'aktisk - ud fra ikke -b evarings mffissige hensyn - begrffinser
en produktion, som e11ers vi11e Vffire mu1ig.
 5.a. Kompetence ti1 at vedtage bevaringsforansta1tninger er omhand1et i strukturforordningen og i tiltrffide1sesakten. Artike1 2 i strukturforordningen forudsffitter eksistensen af
nationa1e "ordninger for ud0ve1sen a1 fiskeriet", og af
ti1trffide1sesaktens art . 100, stk . 1, fremgar det 1ige ledes,
at der er en national kompetence med hensyn t i l bevaringsforansta1tninger, idet det her bestemmes, at medlemsstaterne i de rescrverede kystzoner ikke kan vodtage bestemmelser om vilkar for fiskeri, dcr er mindre restriktive end de
ved tiltrffidelse n gffi1dende vilkar . I strukturforordningens
art . 5 er der hjemmel t i l at vedtage fffillesskabsforanstaltninger ti1 bevarelse af fiskebestandene, men dog kun safremt en medlemsstats fiskeri medi'0rer fare for "en a1t
for intensiv udnyttelse a£' bestemte fiskebestande." Det er
altsa her forudsat , at medlemsstaterne som udgangspunkt
se1v bar kompetence t i l at hindre overfiskning.
I tiltrffidelsesaktens artike1 102 blev det dcrefter bestemt,
at senest fra det sjette ar efter tiltrffidelsen vedtages
af Ra det vilkarene for ud0v else af fiskeri med henb1ik pa
at sikre beskytte1se af fiskebankerne og bevaring af havets
biologiske ressourcer . Der er altsa her skabt hjemmel t i l
pa fffillesskabsplan at vedtage bevaringsforanstaltninger,
herunder ogsa kvotaordninger, som er begrundet i bevaringshensyn. Som det fremgar af ordlyden , indtrffider pligten hert i l imidlertid f0rst pa et se n ere tidspunkt.
 Medens markedsordningen i henho1d ti1 forordning nr. 2142/
70 principie1t omfatter a11e fangster - uanset om fangst-

- 6 pladsen ligger uden 1or eller inden for medlemslandenes
s0- eller fiskeriterritorium - 1remgar det imidlertid klart
af 1orordning nr. 2141/70 (strukturforordningen), at den
alene g~lder for de dele af havet, der henh0rer under staternes h0jhedsomrade eller jurisdiktion, hvilket i 0jeblikket vil sige et omrade pa maksimalt 12 S0mils bredde. Den
almindelige opfattelse af artikel 102 i tiltrredelsesakten
er, at dennes anvendelsesomrade ma afgrrenses pa samme made.
De kvoter, som vedtages i NEAFC, og som gennemf0res pa nationalt plan, er imidlertid ikke begrrenset t i l s0- eller
Eiskeriterritoriet. Tvrertimod angar de hovedsageligfangster
der er taget pa det abne hav. Sadanne kvoter kan ikke vedtages af Radet med hjemmel i strukturforordningen, og
altsa nreppe heller med hjemmel i tiltrredelsesaktens art.
102.
Selv om man skulle forsta artikel 102 som omfattende ogsa
1oranstaltninger (over for medlemsstaternes skibe) uden
for 12 S0mils -grrensen, ma det under alle omstrendigheder
konstateres, at der ikke er blevet fremsat noget kommissionsforslag med et sadant indhold - hvad der som nrevnt
heller ikke i henhold til tiltrredelsesaktens art. 102 har
vreret pligt til. Det har saledes i denne situation vreret
n0dvendigt for medlemslandene at gennemf0re de forn0dne
bevaringsforanstaltninger ved nationale regler.
