https://cyber.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/2016/11/cible_lite_2016-63.pdf
ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 Security Target Lite
Keywords Common Criteria, ASE, Security Target Lite, Lynx CNS, SSCD
NXP Semiconductors ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 20164. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 2 of 58
1.0 20160428 Release, redacted version of Security Target
STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 3 of 58
ST Title NXP ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84 in SSCD Configuration
ST Reference STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01
Version Rev. 1.0
Date 28th April 2016
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 4 of 58
Title NXP ASEPCOS-CNS v1.84 in SSCD Configuration on NXP
TOE Reference IC Platform
ID NXP P60D080PVG
Rev G
Certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0837-V2-2014 (October 24 2014)
BSI-DSZ-CC-0837-V2-2014-MA-01 (June 15 2015)
Assurance EAL 6+
Firmware - Crypto Library
ID Crypto Library V1.0 on P60x080/052/040PVC(Y/Z/A)/PVG
Certificate NSCIB-CC-12-36243-CR2
ID ASEPCOS-CNS
ROM Mask ASEPCOS-CNS_V1.84_b001
In this Security Target, the name of the composite TOE developer will be referenced as
ASEPCOS-CNS native platform is embedded on NXP P60D080PVG Integrated Circuit.
designate the NXP P60D080PVG IC [8] & [9], Application to designate the ASEPCOS-
CNS software, and Composite Product to designate the TOE.
According to the Composite product documentation [7], the different roles considered in
the composition activities are associated as follows:
Table 3. Composition Role Allocation
Role Identity
Platform Evaluator TUV-IT
Platform Certification Body BSI
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 5 of 58
Composite Product Evaluator Thales
Composite Product Certification Body ANSSI
The platform IC was evaluated to CC EAL 6+ according to BSI-PP-0035-2007 [6] (see
Security Target [11], the IC certification report [10-1] and its maintenance report [10-2]).
ASEPCOS is a multi-application ISO-7816 compatible smartcard product, which supports
RSA cryptography up to 2048 bits.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 6 of 58
import respectively is a combination of hardware and software configured to securely
If so configured an SSCD may provide management functions for key generation or
import initiated by the user as specified in 2.1.1.2.
An SSCD may provide functions to enable the user to
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 7 of 58
An SSCD may provide functions to establish a trusted, cryptographically protected
The supported function may include functions for management of the cryptographic keys,
The life cycle of a generic SSCD product is given here, in Fig 1, to introduce the role of
the SSCD Provisioning service. The SSCD Life-cycle distinguishes stages for
development, production, preparation and operational use. Development and production
of the SSCD together constitute the development phase of the TOE. The development
development phase ends with the delivery of the TOE to an SSCD-provisioning service
provider. The functional integrity of the TOE shall be protected in delivering it to an
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 8 of 58
Fig 1. SSCD Product Life-Cycle
2.2.1 SSCD Preparation Stage
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 9 of 58
2.2.2 SSCD Operational Use Phase
(6.2.2.3(2)). For an
additional key the signatory may be allowed to choose the kind of certificate (qualified, or
not) to obtain for the SVD of the new key. The signatory may also be allowed to choose
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 10 of 58
some of the data to be incorporated in the certificate, for instance to use a pseudonym
instead of the legal name4. If the conditions to obtain a qualified certificate are met the
new key can also be used to create advanced electronic signatures. The optional TOE
functions for additional key generation and certification may require additional security
functions in the TOE and an interaction with the SSCD-Provisioning service provider in
an environment that is secure or using trusted communication.
2.3 TOE Scope
December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures [12]. The
destruction of the SCD is mandatory before the TOE generates a new pair SCD/SVD or
The TOE provides a Human Interface (HI) for user authentication:
(ii) by a trusted human interface device connected via a trusted channel with the
The human interface device is used for the input of VAD for authentication by knowledge.
The TOE holds RAD to check the provided VAD. The human interface implies
appropriate hardware. The second approach allows to reduce the TOE hardware to a
minimum e. g. a smart card.
The TOE facilitates the ability to interface with a Human Interface (HI) for user
The TOE holds RAD to check the provided VAD. The human interface requires
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 11 of 58
Fig 2. SSCD Scope, Structural View
Fig 2 shows the PP scope from the structural perspective. The SSCD, i.e. the TOE,
card IC which is certified CC EAL 6+. The TOE includes embeddable software in the
EEPROM. Parts of the operating systems may be stored in EEPROM. NVM (Non Volatile
Memory) corresponds to ROM memory for the NXP P60D080PVG IC [8] & [9].
and manage signature-creation data (SCD). The SSCD protects the SCD during its
whole life cycle as to be used in a signature-creation process solely by its signatory.
— to generate signature-creation data (SCD) and the correspondent signature-
— to export the SVD for certification,
— to, optionally, receive and store certificate info,
— to switch the TOE from a non-operational state to an operational state, and
— if in an operational state, to create digital signatures for data with the following
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 12 of 58
(b) receive data to be signed or a unique representation thereof (DTBS/R)
(d) apply an appropriate cryptographic signature-creation function using the
selected SCD to the DTBS/R.
The TOE may implement its function for digital signature creation to also conform to the
specifications in ETSI TS 101 733 (CAdES)[22], ETSI TS 101 903 (XAdES)[23] and ETSI
TS 102 778 (PAdES) [24]. In this case the TOE may provide additional supporting
functions, e.g. to support receiving and/or validating a time stamp.
- generating at least one SCD/SVD pair, and
- personalizing for the signatory by storing in the TOE:
After preparation the SCD shall be in a non-operational state. Upon receiving a TOE the
signatory shall verify its non-operational state and change the SCD state to operational.
is a password or PIN, providing this information shall protect the confidentiality of the
If continued use of an SCD is no longer required the TOE will disable an SCD it holds,
e.g. by erasing it from memory.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 13 of 58
2.3.2 TOE Logical Boundaries
The TOE boundaries are illustra
ted in Fig 3.
Fig 3. TOE Boundaries
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 14 of 58
2.3.3 TOE Form Factor & Physical Interfaces
Typically the TOE is provided as an ISO-7816 module or card, which could be dual-
interface, contact only or contactless only, with the antenna required for contactless
operation embedded within the card.
 The Engineering packages may be combined with NXP carrier boards to provide
ISO-7816 compliant interface.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 15 of 58
Table 4. TOE Guidance
Title Date Version
NXP_ASEPCOS_CNS - ADM generic.doc Consult certification
report for applicable
dates and versions
NXP_ASEPCOS_CNS - ADM dedicated.doc
NXP_ASEPCOS_CNS - USR.doc
2.5 TOE Life-cycle
The TOE lifecycle is shown in Fig 4.
CNS SW Implementation
HW Design CNS Design
Fig 4. TOE Life-Cycle
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 16 of 58
2.5.1 Design
HW Design – NXP
CNS Design – NXP Development departments – Livingston, Scotland
2.5.2 Fabrication
HW Fabrication – NXP
CNS SW implementation – NXP Development departments – Livingston, Scotland
The CNS Software parts of the TOE which are developed by NXP are transferred in a
secure way for masking in ROM. In addition to the TOE, the mask contains confidential
data, knowledge of which is required in order to initialize and personalize the chip.
2.5.3 Integration
2.5.4 Initialisation
Initialization – NXP Initialization facility
Common Criteria certified ICs (here the P60D080) production, under the governance of
The initialization phase consists in the CNS application configuration and could include
and the General Application Data are loaded (EEPROM).
The product becomes operational and is delivered after this initialization phase.
2.5.5 Personalisation
Personalization – NXP or 3rd Party Personalization facility
This phase includes the loading of Personal Application Data and optional generation of
the SCD/SVD pair if loading does not include importing an SCD/SVD pair.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 17 of 58
2.5.6 Operational
2.5.7 Application Note: Scope of SSCD PP application
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 18 of 58
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 19 of 58
Table 5. Users & Subjects
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 20 of 58
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 21 of 58
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 22 of 58
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 23 of 58
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 24 of 58
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 25 of 58
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 26 of 58
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 27 of 58
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 28 of 58
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 29 of 58
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 30 of 58
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 31 of 58
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 32 of 58
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 33 of 58
that meet the following: Algorithms and parameters for
algorithms [13].
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in case of re-
importation and regeneration of a new SCD in accordance with
a specified cryptographic key destruction method overwriting old
The destruction of the SCD is mandatory before the SCD/SVD pair is re-generated by
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 34 of 58
Table 7. Security Attributes for Access control
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 35 of 58
to objects based on the following: S.User is associated
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 36 of 58
The user with the security attribute “role” set to “Administrator”
or to “Signatory” is allowed to export SVD.
based on the rule: none.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 37 of 58
The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing SCD
by an authorised SSCD of Type 1.
An SSCD of Type 1 is authorised to send SCD to an SSCD of Type 2, if it is
designated to generate the SCD for this SSCD of Type 2 and to export the SCD for
import into this SSCD of Type 2. Authorised SSCD of Type 1 is able to establish a
trusted channel to the SSCD of Type 2 for SCD.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 38 of 58
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when 10 consecutive unsuccessful
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 39 of 58
SCD/SVD management to Administrator.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 40 of 58
Signatory. In case of a PIN. In case of a DES Key, the RAD cannot be unlocked.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 41 of 58
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 42 of 58
ii. SCD Import,
iii. transfer of SVD,
The mentioned remote trusted IT products are: an SSCD type 1 for SCD import, the
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 43 of 58
Table 8. Assurance Requirements: EAL4 augmented
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 44 of 58
FDP_ACC.1/ SCD/SVD_Generation_SFP x x
FDP_ACC.1/ SVD_Transfer_SFP x
FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import x X
FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation_SFP x x
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 45 of 58
FDP_ACF.1/ SCD/SVD_Generation_SFP x x
FDP_ACF.1/ SVD_Transfer_SFP x
generation is controlled by TSF according to FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation_SFP
and FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation_SFP. The SVD transfer for certificate generation
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 46 of 58
is controlled by TSF according to FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer_SFP and
the lifecycle. The SFR FCS_CKM.4 ensures a secure SCD destruction.
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen (SCD/SVD generation) addresses that generation of a
SCD/SVD pair requires proper user authentication. The TSF specified by FIA_UID.1 and
FIA_UAU.1 provide user identification and user authentication prior to enabling access to
authorised functions. The SFRFDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation_SFP and
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation_SFP provide access control for the SCD/SVD
generation. The security attributes of the authenticated user are provided by
FMT_MSA.1/Admin, FMT_MSA.2, and FMT_MSA.3 for static attribute initialisation. The
SFR FMT_MSA.4 defines rules for inheritance of the security attribute “SCD operational”
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 47 of 58
The security functions specified by FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation_SFP and
FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation_SFP provide access control based on the security
attributes managed according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/Signatory,
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory, FMT_MSA.2, FMT_MSA.3 and FMT_MSA.4. FMT_MOF.1
ensures that only the signatory can enable/disable the signature creation function. The
SFR FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 list these management functions and the roles.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 48 of 58
8.2 SF.Signatory Authentication
8.3 SF.Signature Creation
8.4 SF.Secure Messaging
use 3DES operations. Data authentication and integrity is achieved by calculating of a
8.5 SF.Crypto
8.6 SF.Protection
functionality. The SF. Protection function is composed of software implementations of test
and security functions including self-tests, secure deallocation, card content loading and
installation and patching services.
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 49 of 58
Table 9. Symbols & Abbreviations
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 50 of 58
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 51 of 58
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 52 of 58
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation -
CCMB-2012-09-001 - Part 1: Introduction and general model, Version
3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation -
CCMB-2012-09-002 -Part 2: Security functional requirements, Version
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation -
CCMB-2012-09-003 -Part 3: Security assurance requirements, Version
[8] Product Data Sheet SmartMX2 family P60x040/052/080 VC/VG, Secure
high-performance smart card controller; Version 5.2; 27 June 2014
[9] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60x040/052/080VC Guidance
and Operation Manual; Version 1.1; 26 June 2014
[10-1] Certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0837-V2-2014 – for NXP Secure Smart
Card Controller P60D080/052/040PVG–including IC dedicated software
[10-2] Assurance continuity maintenance report BSI-DSZ-CC-0837-V2-2014-
MA-01 – for NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040PVG–
including IC dedicated software
[11] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60x080/052/040PVC(Y/Z/A)/PVG
Security Target Lite Rev. 2.1 — 19 August 2014;
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 53 of 58
[26] Crypto Library V1.0 on P60x080/052/040PVC(Y/Z/A)/PVG
Security Target Lite; Rev. 2.1 — 19 August 2014
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 54 of 58
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 55 of 58
Fig 1. SSCD Product Life-Cycle..................................8
Fig 2. SSCD Scope, Structural View.........................11
Fig 3. TOE Boundaries .............................................13
Fig 4. TOE Life-Cycle................................................15
Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0 — 28th April 2016 56 of 58
Table 3. Composition Role Allocation .............................4
Table 4. TOE Guidance ................................................15
Table 5. Users & Subjects ............................................19
Mapping ..........................................................27
Table 7. Security Attributes for Access control .............34
Table 8. Assurance Requirements: EAL4 augmented ..43
Table 9. Symbols & Abbreviations ................................49
© NXP Semiconductors N.V. 2016. All rights reserved.
Date of release: 28th April 2016
Document identifier: STLITE-ASEPCOS-CNS-v1.84-01
1.4 TOE Overview....................................................5
2. Target of Evaluation............................................6
2.1 Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD)........6
2.1.1 Additional Functions...........................................6
2.1.1.1 User Authentication............................................6
2.1.1.2 User Management of Signing Key......................7
2.1.1.3 Secure Communication......................................7
2.2 SSCD Product Lifecycle.....................................7
2.2.1 SSCD Preparation Stage ...................................8
2.2.2 SSCD Operational Use Phase ...........................9
2.3 TOE Scope.......................................................10
2.3.1 TOE Security Functionality...............................11
2.3.2 TOE Logical Boundaries ..................................13
2.3.3 TOE Form Factor & Physical Interfaces...........14
2.4 TOE Guidance .................................................15
2.5 TOE Life-cycle..................................................15
2.5.1 Design..............................................................16
2.5.2 Fabrication .......................................................16
2.5.3 Integration ........................................................16
2.5.4 Initialisation ......................................................16
2.5.5 Personalisation.................................................16
2.5.6 Operational.......................................................17
3. Conformance Claims ........................................18
3.1 CC Conformance claims ..................................18
3.2 PP Claim ..........................................................18
4. Security Problem Definition .............................19
4.1 Assets ..............................................................19
4.2 Subjects ...........................................................19
4.3 Assumptions.....................................................19
4.4 Threats.............................................................20
4.4.1 Threat Agents...................................................20
4.4.2 Threats to Security ...........................................20
4.5 Organizational Security Policy..........................22
5. Security Objectives ...........................................22
5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE .......................22
5.3 Security Objectives Rationale...........................26
5.3.1 Security Objectives Coverage ..........................27
5.3.2 Security Objectives Sufficiency ........................27
5.3.2.1 Policies and Security Objective Sufficiency......27
5.3.2.2 Threats and Security Objective Sufficiency ......29
6. Extended Components Definition ....................31
6.1 TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS.1) .........................31
7. Security Requirements......................................32
7.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements ...........33
7.1.1 Cryptographic support (FCS)............................33
7.1.1.1 Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1) ...33
7.1.1.2 Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)...33
7.1.1.3 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)............33
7.1.2 User Data Protection (FDP)..............................33
7.1.2.1 Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1) ...............34
(FDP_UCT.1) ...................................................37
7.1.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)..............38
7.1.3.1 Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1).....38
7.1.3.2 Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)..............38
7.1.3.3 Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1) .................38
7.1.4 Security Management ......................................39
(FMT_MOF.1) ..................................................39
7.1.4.3 Secure security attributes (FMT_MSA.2) .........39
7.1.4.4 Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) .......39
7.1.4.6 Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1) .........39
7.1.4.7 Security Management (FMT_SMF.1) ...............40
7.1.4.8 Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)............................40
7.1.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT) .............................40
7.1.5.1 TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS.1).........................40
(FPT_FLS.1) ....................................................41
7.1.5.4 Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3).....41
7.1.5.5 TSF testing (FPT_TST.1).................................41
7.1.6 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP) ..........................42
7.1.6.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1)............42
7.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements...........42
7.2.1 SARs Measures ...............................................43
7.2.2 SARs Rationale................................................43
7.3 Security Requirements Rationale.....................44
7.3.1 Security Requirement Coverage ......................44
7.3.2 Security Requirements Sufficiency...................45
8. TOE Summary Specification.............................48
8.1 SF.Access Control............................................48
8.2 SF.Signatory Authentication.............................48
8.3 SF.Signature Creation......................................48
8.4 SF.Secure Messaging ......................................48
8.5 SF.Crypto .........................................................48
8.6 SF.Protection....................................................48
9. Conventions & Terminology.............................49
9.1 Legislative References .....................................49
9.1.1 The Directive ....................................................49
9.1.2 Annex ...............................................................49
9.2 Symbols & Abbreviated Terms.........................49
11.4 Patents .............................................................54
11.5 Trademarks ......................................................54