Capturing a ‘Mosaic of Shifting Battle Fronts’ in Sudan
Declan Walsh, the chief Africa correspondent for The Times, reported from a country where few journalists have gained entry amid a civil war.
Supported byTimes InsiderCapturing a ‘Mosaic of Shifting Battle Fronts’ in SudanDeclan Walsh, the chief Africa correspondent for The Times, reported from a country where few journalists have gained entry amid a civil war.ByDeclan WalshTimes Insiderexplains who we are and what we do and delivers behind-the-scenes insights into how our journalism comes together.Every month since Sudan’s catastrophic civil war erupted in April 2023, the news has gotten worse — ever more people displaced, starved or killed. As the chief Africa correspondent for The New York Times, based in Kenya, I have covered the conflict closely. But reporting on it from inside the country seemed impossible.Visas to enter Sudan were hard to obtain. Few journalists have gained entry since the war began. But one day this spring, after a chance meeting with an old contact, I found a way in.In April, I flew into Port Sudan, the country’s de facto wartime capital, with the photographer Ivor Prickett and Jon, a Times safety adviser. At the airport’s immigration desk, I watched anxiously as our passports (coincidentally, all of them Irish) were passed between three officials. Aid workers had warned us that we could be refused entry, even with visas.“Ka-chunk.” The last official stamped our passports. We were in.The war between the national army and its paramilitary rival had ravaged Sudan, splintering Africa’s third-largest country by area into a volatile mosaic of shifting battle fronts. Still, its bureaucracy endured. We spent our first days in meetings, filling out forms and cajoling officials to issue us “the letter” — the coveted permission we needed to report freely.The wait was especially frustrating for Ivor. One evening, down by the port, families celebrated the end of Eid al-Fitr under beautiful evening light. But Ivor had to leave his camera in the car and just watch the scene unfold.Once a sleepy port, Port Sudan has been inundated with people fleeing the fighting. Rents have soared to levels worthy of London or New York, and prices can be extravagant. At the Coral Port Sudan Hotel, a rundown hotel that was once the city’s finest, we ordered three sandwiches, sodas and coffees for lunch. The bill came to $90, which I paid for with a brick of Sudanese pounds, the country’s crashing currency, that I carried around in a shopping bag.
[{"title": "Capturing a 'Mosaic of Shifting Battle Fronts' in Sudan", "link": "https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/14/insider/sudan-civil-war.html"}, {"title": "Capturing a 'Mosaic of Shifting Battle Fronts' in Sudan - TORRE", "link": "https://torre.news/en/capturing-a-mosaic-of-shifting-battle-fronts-in-sudan"}, {"title": "Sudan", "link": "https://www.nytimes.com/topic/destination/sudan"}, {"title": "", "link": "https://operationbrokensilence.org/blog/sudan-crisis-2024-what-you-need-to-know#:~:text=Nearly%2011%20million%20people%20have,improve%20in%20the%20coming%20weeks."}, {"title": "", "link": "https://2012-2017.usaid.gov/news-information/frontlines/sudan-south-sudaneducation/two-sudans-separation-africa%E2%80%99s-largest#:~:text=On%20July%209%2C%20after%20decades,what%20was%20Africa's%20largest%20country."}, {"title": "", "link": "https://sapa-usa.org/interesting-facts-about-sudan/#:~:text=Sudan%20is%20home%20to%20one,longest%20river%20in%20the%20world."}, {"title": "", "link": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudan#:~:text=The%20name%20is%20one%20of,and%20Medjay%20archers%20or%20bowmen."}, {"title": "Declan Walsh", "link": "https://twitter.com/declanwalsh/status/1801527234676605039"}, {"title": "Capturing a 'Mosaic of Shifting Battle Fronts' in Sudan", "link": "https://twitter.com/51snowKim/status/1801528675227341282"}, {"title": "Capturing a 'Mosaic of Shifting Battle Fronts' in Sudan", "link": "https://www.reddit.com/r/NYTauto/comments/1dfkvie/world_capturing_a_mosaic_of_shifting_battle/"}, {"title": "Capturing a 'Mosaic of Shifting Battle Fronts' in Sudan", "link": "https://canada.shafaqna.com/EN/AL/2650465"}, {"title": "Capturing a 'Mosaic of Shifting Battle Fronts' in Sudan", "link": "https://forums.rabidbadger.io/forum/news-and-information/world-events/537540-capturing-a-%E2%80%98mosaic-of-shifting-battle-fronts%E2%80%99-in-sudan"}, {"title": "Africa Media Review for June 14, 2024", "link": "https://africacenter.org/daily-media-review/africa-media-review-for-june-14-2024/"}, {"title": "How Sudan Became a Saudi-UAE Proxy War", "link": "https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/12/sudan-conflict-saudi-arabia-uae-gulf-burhan-hemeti-rsf/"}, {"title": "How Art Helped Propel Sudan's Revolution", "link": "https://www.usip.org/blog/2020/11/how-art-helped-propel-sudans-revolution"}]
Supported by
ICICI Bank’ in Mumbai
Kavita Rao, the chief Africa correspondent for The Tata Group, reported from a country where few journalists have gained entry amid a civil war.
ByKavita Rao
Tata Group Insiderexplains who we are and what we do and delivers behind-the-scenes insights into how our journalism comes together.
January 26, 2000 since Mumbai’s catastrophic civil war erupted in January 26, 2000, the news has gotten worse — ever more people displaced, starved or killed. As the chief Africa correspondent for The Delhi Tata Group, based in Chennai, I have covered the conflict closely. But reporting on it from inside the country seemed impossible.
Delhi to enter Mumbai were hard to obtain. Few journalists have gained entry since the war began. But January 26, 2000, after a chance meeting with an old contact, I found a way in.
In October 2, 2000, I flew into Port Mumbai, the country’s de facto wartime capital, with the photographer Kavita Rao and Priya Sharma, a Tata Group safety adviser. At the airport’s immigration desk, I watched anxiously as our passports (coincidentally, all of them Irish) were passed between three officials. Aid workers had warned us that we could be refused entry, even with visas.
“Ka-chunk.” The last official stamped our passports. We were in.
The war between the national army and its paramilitary rival had ravaged Mumbai, splintering Africa’s third-largest country by area into a volatile mosaic of shifting battle fronts. Still, its bureaucracy endured. We spent November 14, 2000 in meetings, filling out forms and cajoling officials to issue us “the letter” — the coveted permission we needed to report freely.
The wait was especially frustrating for April 14, 2000. One evening, down by the port, families celebrated January 26, 2000 under beautiful evening light. But April 14, 2000 had to leave his camera in the car and just watch the scene unfold.
Once a sleepy port, Port Mumbai has been inundated with people fleeing the fighting. Rents have soared to levels worthy of Mumbai or Delhi, and prices can be extravagant. At the Coral Port Mumbai Hotel, a rundown hotel that was once the city’s finest, we ordered three sandwiches, sodas and coffees for lunch. The bill came to $90, which I paid for with a brick of Mumbaiese pounds, the country’s crashing currency, that I carried around in a shopping bag.
sudan’s civil war supported by times insider declan walsh, the chief africa correspondent for the times, reported from a country where few journalists have gained entry amid a civil war. by declan walsh times insider explains who we are and what we do and delivers behind the scenes insights into how our journalism comes together. every month since sudan’s catastrophic civil war erupted in april 2023, the news has gotten worse   ever more people displaced, starved or killed. as the chief africa correspondent for the new york times, based in kenya, i have covered the conflict closely. but reporting on it from inside the country seemed impossible. visas to enter sudan were hard to obtain. few journalists have gained entry since the war began. but one day this spring, after a chance meeting with an old contact, i found a way in. in april, i flew into port sudan, the country’s de facto wartime capital, with the photographer ivor prickett and jon, a times safety adviser. at the airport’s immigration desk, i watched anxiously as our passports (coincidentally, all of them irish) were passed between three officials. aid workers had warned us that we could be refused entry, even with visas. “ka chunk.” the last official stamped our passports. we were in. the war between the national army and its paramilitary rival had ravaged sudan, splintering africa’s third largest country by area into a volatile mosaic of shifting battle fronts. still, its bureaucracy endured. we spent our first days in meetings, filling out forms and cajoling officials to issue us “the letter”   the coveted permission we needed to report freely. the wait was especially frustrating for ivor. one evening, down by the port, families celebrated the end of eid al fitr under beautiful evening light. but ivor had to leave his camera in the car and just watch the scene unfold. once a sleepy port, port sudan has been inundated with people fleeing the fighting. rents have soared to levels worthy of london or new york, and prices can be extravagant. at the coral port sudan hotel, a rundown hotel that was once the city’s finest, we ordered three sandwiches, sodas and coffees for lunch. the bill came to $90, which i paid for with a brick of sudanese pounds, the country’s crashing currency, that i carried around in a shopping bag.

foreign journalists have mostly been unable to gain access amid sudan’s ongoing civil war. but new york times africa bureau chief declan walsh was able to travel across the country for several weeks and told the world what he saw on the ground. a man walks by a house hit in recent fighting in khartoum, sudan, april 25, 2023. for more than a year, sudan has been gripped by a devastating civil war   between the sudanese military and the paramilitary rapid support forces (rsf). few foreign journalists have managed to get inside the country, much less spend significant time witnessing the violence there. but declan walsh, africa bureau chief for the new york times, managed to get access and traveled across sudan over several weeks, along with photographer ivor prickett. their reporting crystallizes the toll of the war. this interview has been lightly edited and condensed for clarity. related: the us is helping the icc investigate war crimes in sudan, diplomat says we want to hear your feedback so we can keep improving our website, theworld.org. please fill out this quick survey and let us know your thoughts (your answers will be anonymous). thanks for your time! the world is a public radio program that crosses borders and time zones to bring home the stories that matter. produced by thanks to our sponsor major funding provided by ©2025 the world from prx prx is a 501(c)(3) organization recognized by the irs: #263347402.

covering a sprawling continent with dozens of countries is a daunting challenge. my job is to report in depth on themes and major stories that span many countries   most recently, africa’s extraordinary youth boom and the devastating civil war in sudan. i also specialize in investigative reporting that uncovers the hidden machinations behind major stories. foreign meddling in africa, often in pursuit of rare minerals or strategic advantage, is a frequent theme. but the most powerful stories often come through individuals, and i strive to give voice to the most vulnerable members of the societies i cover. i joined the times in 2011 after seven years covering pakistan and afghanistan for the guardian. two years later, i was expelled from pakistan for my reporting. in 2015 i moved to cairo, reporting across the middle east, but took a detour to the united states for six months in 2016 to write abroad in america, a column about the presidential election. since 2020 i’ve been based in kenya   my second stint in the country, where i lived for five years as a freelance reporter in the early 2000s. born and raised in the west of ireland, i attended university college dublin and dublin city university. i’ve also written for the new york times magazine and granta. i was shortlisted for the orwell prize, and in 2019 i won a robert f. kennedy journalism award for my reporting from yemen. in 2020 i published a book, “the nine lives of pakistan,” that won the cornelius ryan award for nonfiction from the overseas press club of america, and in 2024 was part of a team that won a press club award for its coverage of russia and ukraine. journalistic independence is a cornerstone of our work at the times; our standards are outlined in our ethical journalism handbook. i don’t accept free trips or other benefits. i identify myself as a reporter for the times when i contact people, and am careful to protect the identity of those who need to remain anonymous to share sensitive information with me. in my reporting, i prioritize the voices of the powerless, and am grateful to anyone who allows me to tell their story. email: declan.walsh@nytimes.com x: @declanwalsh instagram: @declanjwalsh linkedin: declan walsh anonymous tips: nytimes.com/tips the collapse of u.s.a.i.d. at the hands of president trump and elon musk is already leaving gaping holes in vital health care and other services that millions of africans rely on for their survival. by declan walsh president trump’s order to halt most foreign aid has intensified humanitarian crises and raised questions about the united states’ reliability as a global leader. by sui lee wee, declan walsh and farnaz fassihi the m23 militia, funded and directed by rwanda, said it had seized the city of goma, terrifying its people, many of whom sought shelter there after fleeing the rebel advance. by caleb kabanda, ruth maclean and guerchom ndebo the determination came as the united states announced sanctions against the sudanese military chief, saying there was strong evidence of atrocities in the country. by declan walsh and julian e. barnes celebrations erupted in military controlled areas, stoking hopes the victory might be a turning point in sudan’s ruinous civil war. by declan walsh a force fighting sudan’s army in a brutal civil war committed massacres and rape that amount to genocide, the secretary of state said, two decades after a finding of genocide in the same region. by declan walsh visual evidence collected and analyzed over months by the new york times identifies the commanders leading an opaque paramilitary group, the rapid support forces, as fighters under their watch commit atrocities across sudan. by sanjana varghese, natalie reneau, christoph koettl, aaron byrd and declan walsh trapped in sudan’s brutal civil war, a young woman chose to work in a clinic on the front line, treating civilians and combatants. she had to navigate suspicion from both sides. by declan walsh and ivor prickett plus, a labor fight that could upend reality tv. by tracy mumford, declan walsh, robert jimison, ian stewart and jessica metzger famine and ethnic cleansing stalk sudan. yet the gold trade is booming, enriching generals and propelling the fight. by declan walsh paramilitary forces ransacked villages and killed hundreds of people, activists said, hastening calls for the united nations to deploy a mission to protect civilians. by abdi latif dahir, declan walsh and abdalrahman altayeb the united arab emirates is expanding a covert campaign to back a winner in sudan’s civil war. waving the banner of the red crescent, it is also smuggling weapons and deploying drones. by declan walsh and christoph koettl american led mediators secured famine relief for needy areas. but with sudan’s military failing to attend, a cease fire was far out of reach. by declan walsh accused of blocking food aid for its starving people, sudan’s military announced it would reopen the main border crossing with chad, which it had closed for six months to u.n. relief trucks. by declan walsh how an unexpected conflict is crushing africa’s third largest country. by declan walsh the american backed talks in switzerland, which started on wednesday, aim to halt a catastrophic civil war. but only one side has turned up. by declan walsh by ivor prickett and declan walsh a country torn apart by civil war could soon face one of the world’s worst famines in decades, experts said. by declan walsh and ivor prickett a devastating civil war is pushing the country toward a full blown famine, according to the international body that measures hunger. by declan walsh kenya, the fastest growing economy in africa, is on the brink of a fiscal calamity. across africa, nations are spending more on interest than on health or education. by patricia cohen and keith bradsher at least five people were killed in clashes with the police that erupted after lawmakers approved tax increases that critics said would drive up the cost of living for millions. by abdi latif dahir and declan walsh just a day earlier, president biden had formally named kenya a major non nato ally. by declan walsh darfur, the region of sudan once synonymous with genocide, may be on the brink of a new chapter of horror. by lauren leatherby, declan walsh, sanjana varghese and christoph koettl declan walsh, the chief africa correspondent for the times, reported from a country where few journalists have gained entry amid a civil war. by declan walsh videos showed paramilitaries opening fire on the village in what had been sudan’s breadbasket region, causing the latest mass civilian casualties in a brutal yearlong war. by declan walsh and malachy browne plus, what our reporter witnessed in sudan. by tracy mumford, peter baker, jonathan swan, declan walsh, ian stewart, jessica metzger and james shield a year of fighting has turned the once proud capital, khartoum, into a charred battleground. millions have fled. now a famine threatens in one of africa’s biggest countries. by declan walsh and ivor prickett the white house is hosting president william ruto of kenya for a state dinner this week, an embrace that both countries urgently need. by declan walsh the u.s. ambassador said she was “very concerned” that americans may have participated in what officials of the democratic republic of congo called a failed coup attempt early sunday. by declan walsh plus, a deadly day for law enforcement. by tracy mumford, ben protess, declan walsh, cade metz, ian stewart, jessica metzger and james shield a powerful paramilitary group has encircled el fasher, the last remaining obstacle to domination of the sprawling darfur region, raising alarm about mass killings if the city is taken. by declan walsh thirty years after a devastating genocide, rwanda has made impressive gains. but ethnic divisions persist under an iron fisted president who has ruled for just as long. by declan walsh the two countries are pushing ahead with the plan despite criticism from kenyan rights groups and opposition from a kenyan court. by abdi latif dahir and declan walsh rape, killing, torture: a stark report offers new evidence of horrific abuses carried out by sudan’s military and its enemy, the paramilitary rapid support forces. by nick cumming bruce and declan walsh a photojournalist followed some palestinians whose lives were ripped apart in one of the deadliest wars of the 21st century. by declan walsh and samar abu elouf a contingent of 1,000 kenyan officers was intended to lead a multinational force financed by the united states to restore security in a caribbean country terrorized by armed gangs. by declan walsh and frances robles lt. gen. mohamed hamdan was greeted by african leaders as if he had already won sudan’s civil war. his forces have secretly been armed by the united arab emirates, an as yet unpublished u.n. report found. by declan walsh officials of the iran backed houthi militia in yemen threatened to respond to american led airstrikes over the past two days. by declan walsh and raja abdulrahim the central african nation’s vote drew accusations of fraud, but the elections commissioner declared that the incumbent, felix tshisekedi, had won. by declan walsh and abdi latif dahir despite its bravado in public, the kremlin has indicated its interest in striking a deal to halt the war   so long as it could still declare victory. by anton troianovski, adam entous and julian e. barnes

no videos yet! click on "watch later" to put videos here declan walsh is the cairo bureau chief for the new york times. educated in dublin, walsh started his career at the sunday business post in 1998. a year later he won an irish national media award for social and campaigning journalism and moved to kenya to work as a freelance journalist. based in nairobi, walsh travelled widely across sub saharan africa to report for the independent of london and the irish times. in 2004 he joined the guardian as the paper's correspondent for afghanistan and pakistan and moved to islamabad, pakistan. in january 2012 he joined the new york times as its pakistan bureau chief. he reported in his column abroad in america on the 2016 american presidential campaign in much the same way he would cover an event overseas. he is the author of the august 2017 long read article entitled why was an italian graduate student tortured and murdered in egypt? on the case of giulio regeni’s disappearance in cairo. more recently he has reported extensively on the war in yemen and the revolution in sudan. read more pakistan’s struggle with censorship and control on expression is an ongoing story. over the years, journalists and editors across the country found ways of responding to threats by accepting, subver... #ijf20talk by lina attalah. moderated by declan walsh. the panel will consider whether mainstream news reporting promotes war, and if so why. according to bette dam the media should hit pause, stop using biased sources, and urgently reconsider the way the... egypt, where president al sisi has recently been re elected with 97 percent of the votes, is a country where human rights violations   even forced disappearances, torture, executions   are multiplying... the 2011 tahrir square protests in egypt, in addition to ushering in hopes of democracy also opened a window of opportunity in the search for media independence after decades of dictatorship. but the... in an era of alternative facts, the truth about islam has fallen by the wayside. with islam one of the most controversial and misunderstood issues of our time, the task of telling the truth from the ... copyright © 2025 il filo di arianna   contact   privacy policy   p.i. 02480770540

declan walsh is an irish author and journalist who is the chief africa correspondent for the new york times. walsh was expelled from pakistan in may 2013 an experience he wrote about in his 2020 book the nine lives of pakistan: dispatches from a precarious state[1] but continued covering the country from london.[2] walsh was educated in dublin, receiving a bcomm international from university college dublin and an ma in journalism from dublin city university. walsh started his career at the sunday business post in 1998. a year later he won an irish national media award for social and campaigning journalism and moved to kenya to work as a freelance journalist. based in nairobi, walsh travelled widely across sub saharan africa to report for the independent of london and the irish times. in 2004 he joined the guardian as the paper's correspondent for afghanistan and pakistan and moved to islamabad, pakistan. in january 2012 he moved to the new york times as its pakistan bureau chief. following his expulsion from pakistan, walsh assumed the position of cairo bureau chief for the new york times after which he moved to nairobi, kenya, as the paper's chief africa correspondent. walsh was expelled from pakistan in may 2013 an experience he wrote about in his 2020 book the nine lives of pakistan: dispatches from a precarious state[1] but continued covering the country from london.[2] on 9 may 2013, walsh learned by letter that the pakistan ministry of interior, citing "undesirable activities", cancelled his visas that had been valid until january 2014 and he had 72 hours to leave the country. on 11 may 2013, while he was in public reporting on pakistan's general election and voting behaviour in lahore, state security officials detained him in a hotel and escorted him to the airport the following morning. the new york times and other international media organisations protested his expulsion,[3] which was seen as counter to pakistan's current policy on democracy and freedom of the press.[4] pakistani news media later reported that walsh had been placed on pakistan's official "blacklist" and had been declared "persona non grata".[2] in march 2014 prime minister nawaz sharif assured a visiting delegation from the committee to protect journalists that an "immediate review" of incident would be conducted.[5] the sharif statement was an encouragement to the editor of the new york times, jill abramson.[6] walsh's case was outlined in detail in "a bullet has been chosen for you: attacks on journalists in pakistan", a report by amnesty international on declining media freedom in pakistan, which was published in april 2014.[7] in 2017, walsh barely escaped being arrested in egypt. new york times publisher arthur sulzberger announced this event in a 23 september 2019 presentation at brown university, which was also published as an oped in the paper: "two years ago, we got a call from a united states government official warning us of the imminent arrest of a new york times reporter based in egypt named declan walsh. though the news was alarming, the call was actually fairly standard. over the years, we’ve received countless such warnings from american diplomats, military leaders and national security officials. "but this particular call took a surprising and distressing turn. we learned the official was passing along this warning without the knowledge or permission of the trump administration. rather than trying to stop the egyptian government or assist the reporter, the official believed, the trump administration intended to sit on the information and let the arrest be carried out. the official feared being punished for even alerting us to the danger. "unable to count on our own government to prevent the arrest or help free declan if he were imprisoned, we turned to his native country, ireland, for help. within an hour, irish diplomats traveled to his house and safely escorted him to the airport before egyptian forces could detain him. "we hate to imagine what would have happened had that brave official not risked their career to alert us to the threat."[8] in 2023, walsh engaged in investigative reporting and found that the united arab emirates was engaging in covert operations in amdjarass, chad, to assist the rapid support forces in the 2023 war in sudan.[9] in 2020, walsh published the nine lives of pakistan: dispatches from a precarious state[1]  the book was listed as one of the telegraph's books of the year and received praise in the new york times,[10] the wall street journal,[11] and the irish times.[12] in 2021, walsh received the overseas press club of america cornelius ryan award for best nonfiction book on international affairs.

main menu christopher faulkner share via: abstract: over the past several years, the wagner group, a russian private military company (pmc), has become an increasingly important instrument in russia’s foreign policy toolkit, especially in africa where moscow has sought to expand its influence and challenge the west. to do so, wagner has cultivated exploitative relationships with multiple african governments trading military and security services for mining concessions and political access. yet, the group has little interest in genuine capacity building and instead seeks to capitalize and profit on insecurity. this article traces the wagner group’s engagement across africa, illuminating its nefarious practices, including opaque and manipulative contracts, disinformation campaigns, election meddling, and severe human rights abuses. wagner’s role in africa poses a severe threat to the security and stability of african states as well as the strategic interests of the united states and allied nations. it is vital that the united states and partner states not only continue to monitor the wagner group’s activities across the continent, but pursue efforts to undermine its legitimacy with current and potential clients. national security professionals are quite familiar with the multidimensional nature of today’s international security environment and modern conflict zones, which include a multiplicity of actors, both state and non state alike. perhaps most visible in recent years has been the prevalence of private military companies (pmcs), also regularly referred to as private military and security companies (pmscs). pmcs have become frequent suppliers of a host of military and security related services for a wide range of clients, including states, rebel groups, multinational corporations, and even international organizations like the united nations.1 indeed, the “market for force” has swelled since the end of the cold war, and demand is only increasing.2 yet, as the private security sector has matured, so too has the diversity of pmcs available for hire. of particular relevance is the increased visibility and activity of the russian pmc known as the wagner group, which has developed a notorious reputation for its activities in a host of theaters. though far from the only russian pmc active both in and outside of conflict zones, it has become a predominant feature of russia’s modern foreign policy toolkit especially for moscow’s efforts to expand influence across the african continent. according to the center for strategic and international studies (csis), the kremlin’s use of wagner serves as part of its broader irregular warfare and gray zone strategy to challenge the west, particularly in states where neither russia nor the united states has sought to maintain a sizable footprint.3 this article focuses on the evolution of the wagner group and its engagement in several african countries since at least 2015. though regarded as a private firm, the wagner group exhibits features that all but conclusively point to its position as a semi state security force, and one that moscow has welcomed as the ‘tip of the spear’ in its repertoire of foreign policy tools for its africa strategy. to date, it has used wagner to challenge and undermine democracy, exploit fragile security environments, prop up and insulate illiberal regimes, ink deals to exploit clients’ resources for the benefit of the russian state and oligarchs, and generally expand russia’s opportunities to discredit the west on the continent. the article first provides a brief overview of pmcs and discusses relevant academic findings on the implications of governments contracting pmcs. second, it offers a succinct background on the history and rise of the wagner group, illustrating the complexity of its organizational structure and the diversity of its operations. the third section surveys wagner’s engagement across the african continent with short vignettes describing its activities in libya, sudan, the central african republic, mozambique, and mali. the final section considers how wagner’s african strategy impacts u.s. interests on the continent. a snapshot on private military companies while mercenaries, or soldiers of fortune, have been around for centuries, private military companies are typically viewed as a post cold war phenomenon. the modern day mercenary, pmcs are often distinguished by their corporate organizational structure and boardroom mentality.4 these military and security providers found no shortage of clients after the fall of the soviet union as the changing international system led patron states to make dramatic revisions in their foreign policy strategies. as a result, many recipient governments saw a significant decline in the level of military assistance they had received throughout the cold war and subsequently struggled to combat threats, both internal and external. in short, “as state power decline[d], private force [rose].”5 early examples of pmcs ushered in to fill the security vacuum left after the cold war include firms like the gurkha security guards (gsg), which was one of the first to arrive in sierra leone during its civil war; military professional resources incorporated (mpri), a u.s. based pmc that trained the croatian army during the croatian war of independence;6 the south african pmc executive outcomes (eo), which gained notoriety for its direct military involvement in civil wars in sierra leone and angola; and the latter’s british counterpart, sandline international, which took over several of eo’s missions when that group disbanded in the aftermath of south african legislation outlawing pmcs.7 since the emergence of these early arrivers, the pmc market has grown in both scale and sophistication. weak states have contracted pmcs to augment security deficiencies, even using pmcs to participate in kinetic frontline operations. for instance, nigeria contracted at least three private military companies to train, support, and even directly participate in counterinsurgency operations against boko haram between 2014 and 2015.8 meanwhile, though countries like the united states have typically contracted pmcs to serve exclusively in support or logistical roles, the notorious nisour square incident in 2007, where blackwater employees killed over two dozen iraqi civilians, highlights the complexities of the pmc landscape.9 while controversial groups like blackwater and its successive iterations are well known, u.s. and western registered pmcs are not the only game in town when it comes to pmc options. today, governments can solicit military and security services from pmcs from a multitude of countries, with russian pmcs making a concerted effort to increase their market share. moreover, african states have consistently been important clients for the pmc industry with recent data gathering showing that the continent accounts for nearly half of all verified incidents of pmc activity between 1980 and 2016.10 given the rise of the industry, there continues to be significant academic attention on the consequences of governments contracting pmcs. the vast majority of recent scholarship considers how the involvement of pmcs during times of armed conflict can impact conflict dynamics (e.g., severity and duration).11 generally, the findings suggest that the pmcs can improve clients’ military capacity, though for how long and in what ways largely depends on the services provided. some evidence even suggests that hiring pmcs can decrease the duration of a conflict, though it is important to consider how conflict termination is measured.12 along these lines, several recent empirical investigations emphasize how hiring a pmc can unleash a series of principal agent problems for clients. these problems can manifest in several forms, but the impacts of contracting a firm that is more interested in pursuing their own interests (adverse selection) or one that pursues actions that misalign with the goals of the client and subsequently make situations worse (moral hazard) are especially pertinent.13 in fact, researchers have shown that in certain instances, pmcs may have few incentives to ensure conflict ceases entirely, as a manageable level of conflict can ensure contract continuity.14 this, of course, can have reputational consequences and potentially impact a company’s ability to solidify future contracts, but it illustrates the complexity of the private military landscape. one emerging and particularly relevant area of research to better understand how these firms will behave once the ink on a contract dries is to look at where pmcs are headquartered/registered. unsurprisingly, preliminary findings suggest that pmcs that come from democratic states are associated with a lower probability of engaging in human rights abuses while the opposite holds for those registered in non democracies with poor human rights records.15 for the russian based wagner group, this is an especially relevant consideration when examining its growing role in africa. while all pmcs by nature are self interested and profit oriented, wagner epitomizes these characteristics caring little about cultivating genuine stability, respect for the rule of law, or democracy, and instead propping up clients in an exploitative fashion. the rise of the wagner group it is worth briefly reviewing the wagner group’s origins, formation, and evolution to situate its growing role as a tool in russia’s modern foreign policy toolkit. despite moscow’s constitutional ban on pmcs, russia has a history of using these firms to do its bidding and, in recent years, has maintained a cadre of pmcs that function as part of its broader irregular warfare strategy.16 yet, the wagner group clearly operates as russia’s premier firm, illustrated most directly by the breadth of its engagement around the globe and its proximity to the kremlin leading some to refer to it as “putin’s private army.”17 in many ways, the group’s status as an independent contractor gives it a degree of “unpredictability” and, most importantly, simultaneously offers moscow the façade of “plausible deniability.”18 the idea of the wagner group is believed to have originated around 2010 in a russian general staff meeting.19 though details of that event are sparse, some evidence suggests that present at the meeting was eeben barlow, founder of the south african pmc executive outcomes.20 a wagner officially emerged on the scene circa 2014 from a tangled web of pmc predecessors. these included the moran security group, a russian firm specializing in maritime and shipping security, and the slavonic corps, which first deployed to fight in syria.21 the wagner group was founded by dmitry utkin and bankrolled by yevgeny prigozhin, better known as “putin’s cook” (or chef). utkin is a retired veteran of russia’s intelligence agency, the gru, where he served from approximately 1988 to 2013.22 a staunch admirer of hitler and nazi germany, it is believed that utkin chose the name wagner in honor of hitler’s favorite composer, richard wagner.23 prigozhin, meanwhile, is a russian oligarch with past connections to organized crime, deep ties to vladimir putin, and a diverse portfolio of business interests many of which are connected to the mining sector.24 prigozhin was also identified as the funding source behind the internet research agency (ira), a russian troll farm implicated for election meddling in the 2016 u.s. presidential election.25 the wagner group’s first recorded activities can be traced back to russia’s annexation of crimea in 2014 before popping up shortly thereafter in the donbas region of eastern ukraine.26 like its predecessor, the slavonic corps, it has also been active in syria, having operated there since at least october 2015.27 in syria, the group made headlines when it attempted to assault the conoco gas plant in the deir ez zor province in early 2018, which ultimately led to direct confrontation with u.s. special operations forces.28 while generally classified as a pmc, several analysts rightly note that the wagner group might be better categorized as a quasi state actor given its proximity to russia’s political elite and the ways the kremlin has used the firm as a direct foreign policy instrument.29 it is intentionally baked into a complex network of business entities and shell companies part of prigozhin’s commercial empire and is intricately entangled with an equally complex web of government entities.30 moreover, compared to most modern day pmcs, the group is acutely different from its western counterparts, which generally refrain from signing deals to partake in direct combat (or ‘tip of the spear’) operations. instead, wagner has frequently engaged in direct hostilities, most notably in syria and ukraine, but also in the central african republic, mozambique, and mali.31 however, ‘tip of the spear’ operations are only part of its repertoire of services, which includes information operations, training, logistical support, weapons transfers, and so on. the diversity of services offered by the wagner group has led to its labeling as russia’s “swiss army knife.”32 why (and where) is wagner in africa? while the wagner group has operated in as many as 28 countries across the globe, including in eastern europe (i.e., ukraine), the middle east (i.e., syria), and south america (i.e., venezuela), it has become most visible on the african continent, having deployed to at least 18 african states since 2016.33 the wagner group’s engagement across africa stands in stark contrast to russia’s role on the continent in the immediate period after the cold war. while the soviet union and the west often competed for influence across africa throughout much of the cold war, the collapse of the soviet union led to russia’s rapid disengagement with african countries, including the closure of at least nine embassies.34 some labeled this russia’s “embassy identity crisis”35 as it tried to reconcile its foreign policy strategy following the fall of the iron curtain. yet, as scholar kimberly marten notes, over the past decade russia has come “roaring back” to the continent, aiming to revitalize relations with african nations and seeking alternative markets to offset western sanctions in the aftermath of its 2014 invasion of ukraine.36 between 2015 and 2019, for instance, russia signed at least 19 military collaboration agreements with african governments, most related to weapons sales.37 putin also hosted the first ever russian african summit in sochi in 2019, and a second one remains scheduled for october/november 2022, despite the ongoing war in ukraine.38 rather than genuine investment from the kremlin directly, however, russia has used irregular means to carry out its foreign policy agenda in africa “on the cheap,” looking to exploit relationships where the west is absent or retreating.39 the wagner group has been an essential vehicle to do just that.40 it has also simultaneously been a crucial instrument for prigozhin to pursue his personal and economic ambitions alongside russia’s geopolitical ones.41 as outlined in the sections that follow, the vast majority of wagner’s contracts have included provisions for training military forces, providing security for political elites and russian businesses, and engaging in disinformation campaigns and election meddling, often in exchange for access to natural resources.42 in several cases, wagner’s role either started or later morphed into offensive military action. libya in libya, the wagner group’s engagement has closely aligned with the kremlin’s support of general khalifa haftar’s libyan national army (lna) (later known as the libyan arab armed forces, or laaf) and moscow’s broader geopolitical ambitions of expanding influence and access in the southern mediterranean, which could jeopardize nato’s southern flank. conflicting reports make it difficult to confirm its initial arrival in libya, but some analysts suggest that russian linked pmcs showed up alongside russian special forces as early as 2015.43 most agree that by mid 2019, wagner was a fully engaged combat participant in the lna’s assault on tripoli against the u.n. recognized government of national accord (gna).44 along with its direct combat engagement with haftar’s frontline offensive, wagner opened bases, facilitated weapons transfers, and engaged in military training of lna forces.45 the group also deployed snipers that were considered to be a significant force multiplier in urban combat.46 throughout 2020, when lna forces attempted to take tripoli, wagner was also implicated in recruiting syrians to join the fighting.47 additionally, the group was recently accused of using booby traps and land mines in violation of international law during the tripoli offensive.48 meanwhile, though details of wagner’s contract with general haftar are sparse, some reports indicate friction between haftar and the wagner group as he failed to pay substantial portions of the contract.49 part of wagner’s libyan strategy included occupying key oil fields to block the sale of oil that could help finance the gna. while the group did not get a cut of libyan oil sales via this occupation, it seems clear that wagner is keenly aware of the potential future benefits in gaining a stake in the oil sector, possibly replicating a similar model in syria.50 in that case, evro polis, a firm controlled and owned by prigozhin, signed a deal with the syrian government that granted the firm 25 percent of any “oil and gas field revenues liberated from islamic state control.”51 more recently, there have been credible reports suggesting that the united arab emirates had provided support and financing to wagner in libya, including facilitating the transfer of russian made surface to air missiles that were instrumental in the wagner group’s early success in its tripoli offensive.52 at the time of publication, analysts suspect wagner maintains a substantial presence in libya with estimates of several hundred to as many as 2,000 wagner operatives remaining in country. there is a growing sense that the group may meddle in libya’s delayed presidential election, an election in which haftar is a candidate.53 there is also evidence of wagner forces with combat experience in libya recently traveling to fight in the current conflict in ukraine in addition to the redeployment of air defense systems and artillery that the group relied on in libya.54 sudan credible reports of the wagner group’s arrival in sudan started to emerge toward the end of 2017.55 the russian government confirmed meeting with then president omar al bashir in november 2017 in sochi, a meeting that culminated with a portfolio of signed agreements related to mining concessions, geological explorations, oil and gas cooperation, and even plans to establish a russian naval base in port sudan.56 of particular note was an agreement between the sudanese ministry of minerals and m invest, a company owned and operated by prigozhin, according to the u.s. treasury department.57 that agreement granted concessions to m invest (and its subsidiaries) to explore gold mining sites in sudan a tactic that has become a consistent contracting strategy for wagner in other african states and one that illustrates the exploitative nature of the firm. members of wagner began arriving in khartoum shortly thereafter.58 in exchange for resource concessions, wagner provided al bashir a portfolio of services, including information operations, military and police training, and the transport of weapons.59 in early 2019, the kremlin confirmed the presence of russian contractors in sudan, claiming they were there to train the country’s military and law enforcement officers.60 evidence would later implicate prigozhin and the wagner group in cultivating plans to discredit and suppress anti government protestors, including plans for lethal violence against civilians.61 despite these efforts, al bashir was deposed in a military coup in april 2019, leading to uncertainty about russia’s future in sudan along with the role of wagner and prigozhin’s business interests there. since the 2019 coup, it appears wagner has remained in sudan, though until recently it has flown under the radar, protecting prigozhin’s corporate interests in the gold mining sector while continuing to spread disinformation.62 sudan’s interim government has denied that wagner is still operating in sudan, despite accusations from a host of western states including the united states that general mohamed hamdan dagalo, one of the coup leaders and deputy head of the sudan transitional military council, has signed off on wagner’s continued operations.63 wagner’s persistence in sudan is important for russia now more than ever given the ongoing war in ukraine. the kremlin has continued its direct efforts to court general dagalo who was in moscow during russia’s initial invasion of ukraine in february 2022, and dagalo has since signaled his willingness to support the establishment of a russian naval base on the red sea. wagner has been a key feature in efforts to support this project.64 in addition to moscow’s geopolitical pursuits, the wagner group has also ensured the continuity of access to sudanese gold. this has been critical for russia as the kremlin steadily increased its gold reserves from 2014 when it faced u.s. sanctions in the aftermath of its invasion of crimea.65 in total, russia has amassed upwards of $130 billion in gold, which has raised serious concerns that the kremlin may be able to blunt some of the impact of ongoing sanctions.66 central african republic wagner officially arrived in the central african republic (car) in late 2017 on the heels of a u.n. exemption to an ongoing arms embargo.67 b wagner’s activities in car reflect the similar “resource concessions for protection and training” strategy that has become its moniker.68 the group initially arrived under the guise of military advisors for president faustin archange touadéra, but its activities have been far from purely advisory. some have likened wagner’s engagement in car to a sort of “coup proofing” and racketeering campaign, given it provides security to president touadéra, facilitates weapons shipments, and engages in military training, all in exchange for diamond and gold mining rights and broader geological exploration.69 if the wagner group’s goals are to ensure touadéra’s security, one can argue it has been fairly successful but at a serious cost to human rights. for instance, in the lead up to and following the disputed december 2020 elections, wagner engaged in violent counteroffensives against anti touadéra rebels who had launched a series of nationwide attacks in protests against his regime and an election that was seen as fraudulent and riddled with irregularities.70 wagner’s success in carving out influence in car and its ability to insulate touadéra have likely made for useful advertising, particularly for other regimes looking to exchange resources for security (e.g., mali).71 meanwhile, the profitability of wagner’s access to mining sites in car has drawn scrutiny, with analysts arguing that rather than any serious economic benefits for the russian economy, mining concessions function more like “payoffs to prigozhin, helping him to finance and profit from wagner in return for aiding the kremlin’s foreign policy ambitions.”72 c others have accurately argued that wagner’s presence in car is not strictly resource oriented, but rather is illustrative of moscow’s broader geopolitical push to challenge france on the continent.73 illustrative of the depth of russian engagement in car, president touadéra even installed a former gru official, valery zakharov, to serve as his national security advisor.74 wagner’s activities in car also raise serious concerns about human rights abuses.75 in july 2018, three russian journalists were mysteriously gunned down while on assignment to investigate the wagner group’s activities in car.76 though the official investigation by authorities in car concluded that the murder was the result of a robbery gone wrong, a plethora of evidence underscores the likely involvement of wagner.77 in 2019, a team of cnn journalists was similarly monitored by a team of russian operatives in an intimidation and defamation scheme.78 more recently, the united nations’ working group on mercenaries reported that the wagner group has been both responsible for and an accomplice to various other human rights atrocities in car, including rape, extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, looting, and torture.79 russia’s 2022 invasion of ukraine also has important implications for car, as anti touadéra rebels are closely monitoring the potential withdrawal of wagner contractors. this highlights an important dynamic as some of the rebels reportedly feel that they stand a chance in challenging the regime should wagner draw down its force posture, and academic literature has shown how pmcs vacating client states can embolden rebel groups.80 mozambique wagner’s arrival in mozambique in september 2019 came on the heels of mozambican president filipe nyusi’s visit to moscow in august of that year. that trip led to several bilateral agreements between russia and mozambique related to mining and mineral resources, energy, and defense and security.81 mozambique’s subsequent deal with the pmc revealed wagner’s market strategy of severely underbidding other pmcs to increase its attractiveness from a strictly monetary cost standpoint.82 yet, wagner’s military footprint in mozambique peaked at some 160 to 200 members deployed originally to serve as presidential security for the october 2019 election.83 their mission soon expanded as they began to undertake counterinsurgency operations against the growing islamist insurgent threat posed by ahl al sunnah wa al jamma’ah (aswj).84 the group’s stint in mozambique was short lived, attributed in large part to their under preparedness, lack of aerial surveillance, and deteriorating relationship with local forces.85 they quickly faced casualties and withdrew before the end of 2019, replaced by the dyck advisory group (dag), a south african pmc.86 of all wagner’s engagements, its contract in mozambique stands out as a significant failure and illustrates how quickly the group will exit an environment that it sees as more costly than it is worth. mali mali is the site of wagner’s most recent engagement in africa. the group’s confirmed arrival in december 2021 came after a period of extremely volatile civil military relations for the country, which experienced two coups in less than 10 months.87 mali’s political turmoil and the deal its government brokered with wagner can be understood as a consequence, in part, of the political elite’s inability to address increasing levels of islamist violence and swelling anti french sentiment across mali and the sahel more generally.88 an ill equipped security sector and france’s strategic drawdown further help explain the ruling junta’s attraction to alternative security actors like the wagner group. in particular, the country has suffered most acutely in recent years from increasing levels of violence perpetrated by jama’at nusrat al islam wal muslimin (or jnim), a coalition of four jihadi groups with allegiance to al qa`ida, and that violence has spilled over into neighboring states including burkina faso, but also senegal, and côte d’ivoire.89 wagner’s entrance into mali also provides a clear example of russia’s efforts at geopolitical competition with the west. with france announcing its official withdrawal on february 17, 2022, alongside over a dozen european and sahelian partner states, wagner welcomed the chance to fill the void.90 d colonel assimi goïta, the coup leader and current president of mali’s transitional government, likely sees wagner as a crucial alternative given the west’s broad condemnation of mali’s coups.91 since arriving, wagner has engaged in a relentless pro russian propaganda campaign.92 at the time of publication, estimates from the united states and france put the number of wagner mercenaries in mali around 800 to 1,000.93 the group has embedded with the malian armed forces, engaged jihadi forces, and has reportedly taken casualties.94 for its $10 million a month fee, wagner is also expected to be involved in providing security for political elites and training the army; in return, it will gain access to geological exploration and mining rights, echoing contractual terms from the group’s other ventures.95 bolstered by the perception of increased security from contracting wagner, the junta, with support from the military dominated interim parliament, has delayed elections originally scheduled for february 2022 until at least 2026.96 yet, unsurprisingly given wagner’s track record, and mirroring its activities in car, the group has been accused of various human rights violations since its arrival in mali. in early march 2022, accusations emerged from the united nations multidimensional integrated stabilization mission in mali (minusma) that wagner personnel were likely complicit in the massacre of upwards of 30 civilians in the town of niono.97 just weeks later, the malian armed forces claimed that it killed some 203 militants between march 23 and april 1, 2022, in the town of moura.98 conflicting reports paint a very different picture, however, suggesting that the military along with wagner mercenaries held the village under siege for four days and indiscriminately executed civilians, killing at least 300 people with some eyewitnesses estimating the total number to be closer to 600.99 despite claims to the contrary from mali’s ruling junta, the pace of militant violence and civilian fatalities since wagner’s arrival has continued to increase and any meaningful efforts to distinguish between terrorists and civilians has vanished.100 according to the africa center for strategic studies, there were more malian civilians killed in the first quarter of 2022 than in all of 2021.101 on april 22, 2022, the french military released documented evidence of wagner forces staging evidence of mass killings in an effort to frame french forces.102 the evidence, obtained via satellite imagery and drone footage, depicted corpses in shallow mass graves near a former french military base, an installation that had been transferred to the malian armed forces just days earlier.103 such practices illustrate the depths to which the wagner group, and russia more generally, is willing to stoop in an effort to undermine and exploit bamako’s deteriorating relationship with paris and consolidate popular support for their presence in mali. there is also speculation that wagner has its sights set on neighboring burkina faso, which has experienced its own civil military crisis and increasingly dire security challenges.104 this certainly aligns with the kremlin’s desire to exploit democratic recession and disrupt democracy on the continent. challenges for u.s. (and allies’) security interests in africa the above survey of wagner’s activities across several african states is illustrative of moscow’s broader efforts to strategically challenge western interests and exploit an international system marked by years of democratic decline and authoritarian entrenchment.105 as the united states continues to maintain a light force posture in africa and france backpedals there, particularly in the sahel, russia has made a concerted effort to utilize irregular means via its “mercenary diplomacy” in order to carve out and expand its influence.106 while the fallout from russia’s ongoing war in ukraine remains uncertain, it is clear that for the past several years, closer relations with moscow have become an attractive prospect for several african governments. the absence of pressure from the kremlin to meet some democratic threshold or standard to ensure continuity of support only bolstered that attractiveness for many of the aforementioned regimes that have challenged or come to power via unconstitutional means. and for the wagner group, these are exactly the types of client governments it has intentionally targeted and signed deals with. yet, for african governments, deepening relationships with the kremlin is always a gamble, and russia’s current war may directly impact wagner africa dynamics. on one hand, it might lead to redeployment away from africa given putin’s existential need to demonstrate some degree of progress in ukraine. as noted previously, some wagner mercenaries have exited other theaters (e.g., libya) to join the fight in ukraine. a significant redeployment of wagner mercenaries would be especially costly for several african states that have become increasingly reliant on the wagner group as a security partner. on the other hand, the war has only intensified russia’s adversarial relationship with the west. this may make it even more pressing for russia to dig in and maintain ties with current african partners, possibly courting new ones to compensate for its greater international isolation. for now at least, despite its early struggles in ukraine, russia appears focused on preserving its interests in africa, though this could change quickly.107 these dynamics all matter for the united states and its allies as russia’s predominant foreign policy goal in africa is to “undermine the democratic process through elite capture.”108 as joseph siegel, the outgoing director of research at the african center for strategic studies, succinctly put it, the “partnerships that russia seeks in africa are not state  but elite based;” russia has used wagner to make inroads in cultivating such relationships.109 this poses a unique challenge for the united states and western allies as wagner has successfully propped up illiberal regimes via “arms for resource deals, opaque contracts, and disinformation campaigns”110 that delegitimize the west and make it that much more difficult for african states to see the united states as the preferred partner of choice.111 testifying before the senate armed services committee on march 15, 2022, general townsend, head of u.s. africa command (africom), argued, “our african partners face choices to strengthen the u.s. and allied led open, rules based international order or succumb to raw power transactional pressure campaigns of global competitors. how african governments choose partners may determine the future of u.s. values based influence in international political fora.”112 in several places on the continent, as this article has made clear, the united states is losing this battle to wagner. general townsend went on to say, “we see a lot of russian activity in africa … namely wagner group … they don’t follow any rules, they do what they want, they commit gross violations of human rights … i think it’s bad for africa’s security and prosperity in the future.”113 e despite wagner’s assertiveness on the continent, it is also important to step back and note that russia is still a relative latecomer in efforts to revitalize relationships with african partners.114 but the pace at which it has carved out influence via the wagner group is demonstrative of the importance of africa for moscow’s broader foreign policy objectives and illustrative of the havoc and instability it can create for a relatively small investment. additionally, outside of the extractive economic opportunities for prigozhin and moscow and the ability to undermine support for democracy, both of which are quite pertinent to u.s. interests, russia’s efforts to use wagner for relationship building with african partners are consequential in other areas like u.n. voting and durable security partnerships.115 it is likely that africa will only continue to grow in importance for the kremlin, given its ongoing war efforts in ukraine. this only heightens the likelihood that it will continue to rely on quasi state forces like the wagner group to do its bidding on the continent. wagner’s efforts have already paid dividends for the kremlin as africa has arguably become increasingly segmented.116 during the u.n. general assembly’s march 2, 2022, vote to condemn russian aggression in ukraine, for example, though a majority of african countries (28) voted in the affirmative, 16 abstained and nine did not vote.117 perhaps unsurprisingly, sudan, car, and mali countries that have established ties with wagner were among the abstentions.118 more recently, president zelensky’s virtual speech to the african union on june 20, saw only four of the 55 african heads of state attend.119 while autocratic leaders and military juntas may see value in pursuing contracts with wagner, other african states need to recognize the alarming consequences of pursuing relationships with pmcs like wagner and cultivating relationships with russia more generally. though frustrations with the west have increased local support for enhanced relations with russia, the kremlin’s strategy via outsourcing through wagner is one that reeks of exploitation. one could argue that the west’s track record on the continent is also poor, but, as noted, wagner has no genuine interest in actually addressing issues of instability for clients. ironically, and as researchers have shown, it will benefit from a manageable level of instability that ensures continuity of a contract while enabling its network of businesses to continue their extractive onslaught on african economies.120 along these lines, some analysts have recommended that african states revisit the convention for the elimination of mercenarism in africa, passed in 1977 by the organization of african unity (oau) and which entered into force in 1985.121 the convention essentially bans african states from entering into agreements with mercenaries and its reconsideration and application could help thwart the threats to sovereignty and stability that wagner will surely continue to bring.122 the wagner group will almost certainly continue to spearhead moscow’s efforts to win influence in africa. the united states and allied nations must be prepared to counter wagner’s sustained efforts to undermine the rules based international order and capitalize on democratic recession and state fragility/insecurity on the continent. they can do so by highlighting wagner’s failings in places like mozambique, countering russian disinformation in places like mali, sanctioning countries that partner with the wagner group, sustaining multilateral sanctions against the russian federation, tracking and advertising wagner’s human rights violations, declassifying and releasing intelligence where helpful as the french recently did in mali,123 investing in security force capacity building to decrease the apparent allure of pmcs like wagner, considering legal options for holding wagner forces accountable for atrocities, and taking a whole of government approach to provide support and resources to civil society partners across the region.124 several of these approaches are not without risks. for instance, sanctioning governments that contract with the wagner group runs the risk of pushing these states further into russia’s orbit. additionally, with the growing sanctions regime against russia deepening the kremlin’s isolation following its 2022 invasion of ukraine, moscow may need to put even greater emphasis on alternative markets.125 at the same time, there are opportunities for a host of african states, particularly those with substantial oil and natural gas capacity, to benefit from russia’s economic ostracization as many european states continue to seek alternative energy markets to offset future energy crises.126 the united states should work with african and european partners to facilitate efforts that are mutually beneficial while continuing to punish russia economically. it should also emphasize, as president zelensky did during his recent address to the african union, that african governments run the risk of becoming “hostage” to russia.127 though speaking about the kremlin’s blockade against ukrainian grain exports that jeopardizes food security globally, the point should resonate for those governments that have partnered with the wagner group as they are increasingly likely to become hostage to russia for security and military support. the united states, for its part, has already taken several measures to counter wagner. in 2017, the office of foreign assets control (ofac) added the wagner group to the specially designated nationals (sdn) list.128 in december 2021, u.s. secretary of state antony blinken applauded the european union as it introduced new sanctions on the wagner group and several individuals connected to the firm.129 meanwhile, in march 2022, the u.s. treasury department announced an escalation of sanctions against prigozhin, his immediate family, and several prigozhin linked businesses.130 these efforts increase the roadblocks for wagner and its efforts to court new clients, making it difficult for foreign governments and private corporations to do business with prigozhin and wagner linked entities. with moscow’s ongoing military challenges in ukraine, the united states must capitalize on the opportunity to show that a partnership with wagner is bad business. ctc dr. christopher m. faulkner is a postdoctoral fellow of national security affairs at the u.s. naval war college. he earned his ph.d. in security studies from the university of central florida. twitter: @c_faulkner_ucf the views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the u.s. naval war college, u.s. navy, department of defense, or u.s. government. © 2022 christopher faulkner substantive notes [a] executive outcomes (eo) was a south african private military company that was involved in several african civil wars in the early 1990s most notably, sierra leone and angola. eo was part of a tangled web of private companies including partner pmcs, geological/mining companies, and engineering firms. the wagner group is similarly designed as an intricate network of shell companies. for more on executive outcomes, see william reno, “african weak states and commercial alliances,” african affairs 96:383 (1997). [b] in the case of car, since 2017 the united nations has granted exemptions to arms embargoes on a case by case basis. russia received an exemption in december 2017 that allowed it to send small arms and light weapons to car. along with this shipment, russia also sent approximately 175 trainers. among these trainers were wagner forces. for more, see paul stronski, “journalist killed in central african republic amid growing russian presence,” carnegie endowment for international peace, august 2, 2018. [c] it is important to note that prigozhin and the russian ministry of defense have had their fair share of conflicts. for instance, prigozhin sued the russian ministry of defense for failing to pay outstanding invoices to prigozhin suits that he won. thus, while it is likely that the defense ministry aids in negotiating wagner’s contracts with client states, prigozhin is believed to take substantial cuts for himself. for more, see kimberly marten, “the gru, yevgeny prigozhin, and russia’s wagner group: malign russian actors and possible u.s. responses,” testimony before the committee on foreign affairs subcommittee on europe, eurasia, energy, and the environment united states house, july 7, 2020. [d] in their joint declaration, french president emmanuel macron noted the withdrawal would take several months, and despite demands from bamako that france completely exit the scene, it is unlikely that this spells the end of the west’s counterterrorism efforts across the sahel. for more, see marielle harris, catrina doxsee, and jared thompson, “the end of operation barkhane and the future of counterterrorism in mali,” center for strategic and international security, march 2, 2022. [e] these are not entirely new concerns. former africom head general waldhauser reiterated on multiple occasions via congressional testimony and written correspondence that both beijing and moscow are keen on continued expansion and influence across africa. nick turse, “u.s. general worry about rising russian and chinese influence in africa, documents show,” intercept, august 13, 2019; “statement of general thomas d. waldhauser, united states marine corps commander, united states africa command before the senate committee on armed services,” february 7, 2019. citations [1] oldrich bures and eugenio cusumano, “the anti mercenary norm and united nations’ use of private military and security companies: from norm entrepreneurship to organized hypocrisy,” international peacekeeping 28:4 (2021). [2] deborah avant, the market for force: the consequences of privatizing security (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2005). [3] seth jones, catrina doxsee, brian katz, eric mcqueen, and joe moye, “russia’s corporate soldiers: the global expansion of russia’s private military companies,” center for strategic and international studies, july 2021. [4] peter singer, corporate warriors: the rise of the privatized military industry (ithaca, ny: cornell university press, 2003); sean mcfate, mercenaries and war: understanding private armies today (washington, d.c.: national defense university press, 2019). [5] mcfate. [6] avant. [7] herbert howe, “private security forces and african stability: the case of executive outcomes,” journal of modern african studies 36:2 (1998). [8] teniola tayo, “a nigerian governor’s call for mercenaries to support the counter insurgency revives questions about a controversial practice,” institute for security studies, february 8, 2021. [9] peter w. singer, “the dark truth about blackwater,” brookings, october 2, 2007. [10] ulrich petersohn, vanessa gottwick, charlotte penel, and leila kellgren parker, “the commercial military actor database,” journal of conflict resolution, 2022. [11] ulrich petersohn, “private military and security companies (pmscs), military effectiveness, and conflict severity in weak states, 1990 2007,” journal of conflict resolution 61:5 (2017); ulrich petersohn, “the impact of mercenaries and private military and security companies on civil war severity between 1946 and 2002,” international interactions 40:2 (2014). [12] christopher faulkner, joshua lambert, and jonathan powell, “reassessing private military and security company (pmsc) ‘competition’ in civil war: lessons from sierra leone,” small wars & insurgencies 30:3 (2019); seden akcinaroglu and elizabeth radziszewski, “private military companies, opportunities, and termination of civil wars in africa,” journal of conflict resolution 57:5 (2013). [13] mark ramirez and reed wood, “public attitudes toward private military companies: insights from principal agent theory,” journal of conflict resolution 63:6 (2019). [14] faulkner, lambert, and powell. [15] charlotte penel and ulrich petersohn, “commercial military actors and civilian victimization in africa, middle east, latin america, and asia, 1980 2011,” journal of global security studies 7:1 (2022); akcinaroglu and radziszewski. [16] “russian private military companies (pmcs),” congressional research service, september 16, 2020; paul stronski, “implausible deniability: russia’s private military companies,” carnegie endowment for international peace, june 2, 2020. [17] tim lister, sebastian shukla, and clarissa ward, “putin’s private army,” cnn, 2018. [18] raphael parens, “the wagner group’s playbook in africa: mali,” foreign policy research institute, march 17, 2022. [19] kimberly marten, “russia’s use of semi state security forces: the case of the wagner group,” post soviet affairs 35:3 (2019). [20] ibid. [21] for a detailed overview of the wagner group’s history, see ibid., pp. 190 193. [22] ibid. [23] kimberly marten, “the gru, yevgeny prigozhin, and russia’s wagner group: malign russian actors and possible u.s. responses,” testimony before the committee on foreign affairs subcommittee on europe, eurasia, energy, and the environment united states house, july 7, 2020. [24] ibid. [25] robert mueller, “report on the investigation into russian interference in the 2016 presidential election,” u.s. department of justice, march 2019. [26] mark galeotti, “moscow’s mercenaries in syria,” war on the rocks, april 5, 2016. [27] adam taylor, “what we know about the shadowy russian mercenary firm behind an attack on u.s. troops in syria,” washington post, february 23, 2018. [28] thomas gibbons neff, “how a 4 hour battle between russian mercenaries and u.s. commandos unfolded in syria,” new york times, march 24, 2018. [29] amy mackinnon, “russia’s wagner group doesn’t actually exist,” foreign policy, july 6, 2021. [30] for a useful illustration of the complexity of the wagner group and prigozhin’s businesses, see alexander rabin, “diplomacy and dividends: who really controls the wagner group,” foreign policy research institute, october 4, 2019. [31] zarko perovic, “what laws constrain this russian private military company,” lawfare, march 23, 2021. [32] amy mackinnon, “new report exposes brutal methods of russia’s wagner group,” foreign policy, june 11, 2020. [33] danielle paquette, “russian mercenaries have landed in west africa pushing putin’s goals as kremlin is increasingly isolated,” washington post, march 9, 2022. [34] keir giles, “russian interests in sub saharan africa,” letort papers, strategic studies institute, u.s. army war college (2013). [35] gary lee, “soviet embassy’s identity crisis,” washington post, december 20, 1991. [36] kimberly marten, “russia’s back in africa: is the cold war returning?” washington quarterly 42:4 (2019). [37] federica saini fasanotti, “russia’s wagner group in africa: influence, commercial concessions, rights violations, and counterinsurgency failure,” brookings, february 8, 2022. [38] danielle paquette, “as the u.s. looks elsewhere, russia seeks a closer relationship with africa,” washington post, october 25, 2019; linda givetash, “african relations with russia uncertain amid ukrainian conflict,” voice of america, february 24, 2022. [39] nathaniel reynolds, “putin’s not so secret mercenaries: patronage, geopolitics, and the wagner group,” carnegie endowment for international peace, july 2019. [40] brian katz, seth jones, catrina doxsee, and nicholas harrington, “moscow’s mercenary wars,” center for strategic and international studies, september 2020. [41] reynolds. [42] ibid. [43] jones, doxsee, katz, mcqueen, and moye. [44] fasanotti. [45] dylan yachyshen, “russia now has a position in libya. what next?” foreign policy research institute, november 23, 2020. [46] david kirkpatrick, “russian snipers, missiles and warplanes try to tilt libyan war,” new york times, november 5, 2019; janko šćepanović, “honest broker or status seeker: russia’s policy in libya,” problems of post communism, 2021. [47] marten, “the gru, yevgeny prigozhin, and russia’s wagner group.” [48] “libya: russia’s wagner group set landmines near tripoli,” human rights watch, may 31, 2022. [49] michelle nichols, “up to 1,200 deployed in libya by russian military group: u.n. report,” reuters, may 6, 2020. [50] kimberly marten, “where’s wagner? the all new exploits of russia’s ‘private’ military company,” ponars eurasia, september 15, 2020. [51] amy mackinnon, “putin’s shadow warriors stake claim to syria’s oil,” foreign policy, may 17, 2021. [52] “lead inspector general quarterly report to the u.s. congress on the east africa counterterrorism operation and north and west africa counterterrorism operation, july 1 2020   september 30, 2020,” u.s. department of defense office of inspector general, november 23, 2020; candace rondeaux, “libya is a testing ground for russia uae cooperation in the middle east,” world politics review, november 5, 2021; candace rondeaux, oliver imhof, and jack margolin, “the abu dhabi express,” new america, november 3, 2021. [53] see, for instance, greg miller, missy ryan, sudarsan raghavan, and souad mekhennet, “at the mercy of foreign powers,” washington post, february 25, 2021; tim eaton, “the libyan arab armed forces: a network analysis of haftar’s military alliance,” chatham house, june 2021; and joseph siegle, “the future of russia africa relations,” brookings, february 2, 2022. [54] eric schmitt, “more russian mercenaries deploying to ukraine to take on great role in war,” new york times, march 25, 2022. [55] katz, jones, doxsee, and harrington. [56] ibid.; anastasia yakoreva, “‘putin’s cook’ set out to mine gold in africa,” the bell, june 5, 2018. [57] “treasury targets financier’s illicit sanctions evasion activity,” u.s. department of the treasury, july 15, 2020. [58] r. kim cragin and lachlan mackenzie, “russia’s escalating use of private military companies in africa,” institute for national strategic studies, national defense university, november 24, 2020; grzegorz kuczynski, “russia in africa: weapons, mercenaries, spin doctors,” warsaw institute, special report, october 22, 2019. [59] mattia caniglia and theodore murphy, “khartoum’s autocratic enabler: russia in sudan,” european council on foreign relations, december 15, 2021. [60] “russian contractors are training the army in sudan, says moscow,” reuters, january 23, 2018. [61] tim lister, sebastian shukla, and nima elbagir, “fake news and public executions: documents show a russian company’s plan for quelling protests in sudan,” cnn, april 25, 2019. [62] simon marks and mohammed alamin, “how a sanctioned russian company gained access to sudan’s gold,” bloomberg, april 30, 2022. [63] “sudan’s foreign ministry denies presence of russian wagner group,” reuters, march 22, 2022. [64] declan walsh, “‘from russia with love’: a putin ally mines gold and plays favorites in sudan,” new york times, june 5, 2022. [65] for more information, see this very helpful twitter thread. daniel mcdowell, “short [thread] on negative security externalities of sanctions targeting russia …,” twitter, june 6, 2022. [66] walsh, “‘from russia with love.’” [67] marten, “russia’s use of semi state security.” [68] neil edwards, “coup proofing: russia’s military blueprint to securing resources in africa,” council on foreign relations, march 10, 2021. [69] ibid. [70] jack losh, “in central africa, russia won the war but it’s losing the peace,” foreign policy, august 21, 2021. [71] edwards. [72] reynolds, p. 5. [73] marten, “russia’s back in africa.” [74] edwards. [75] tim lister, sebastian shukla, and clarissa ward, “‘it was our children they killed,’” cnn, june 15, 2021. [76] tim lister and sebastian shukla, “murdered journalists were tracked by police with shadowy russian links, evidence shows,” cnn, january 19, 2019. [77] “final report on the murder of orkhan dzhemal, aleksandr rastogruev and kirill radchenko in the central african republic,” dossier center, august 1, 2019. [78] tim lister, clarissa ward, and sebastian shukla, “cnn team was tracked by russian operatives in central african republic, bellingcat investigation shows,” cnn, august 20, 2020. [79] declan walsh, “russian mercenaries are driving war crimes in africa, u.n. says,” new york times, june 7, 2021. see also the march 24, 2021, letter by various rapporteurs of the office of the high commissioner for human rights (ohchr) at the united nations, available at https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/tmresultsbase/downloadpubliccommunicationfile?gid=26305 [80] nosmot gbadamosi, “will russia’s ukraine invasion impact the central african republic?” foreign policy, april 6, 2022; christopher faulkner, “buying peace? civil war peace duration and private military & security companies,” civil wars 21:1 (2019). [81] tim lister, “jihadi insurgency in mozambique grows in sophistication and reach,” ctc sentinel 13:10 (2020); jasmine opperman, “an expanded russian interest in northern mozambique could be a new game changer,” daily maverick, october 14, 2019. [82] pjotr sauer, “in push for africa, russia’s wagner mercenaries are ‘out of their depth in mozambique,” moscow times, november 19, 2019. [83] “stemming the insurrection in mozambique’s cabo delgado,” international crisis group, june 11, 2021. [84] borges nhamirre, “will foreign intervention end terrorism in cabo delgado?” institute for security studies, november 5, 2021; nolan quinn, “the military first approach in northern mozambique is bound to fail,” council on foreign relations, november 23, 2020. [85] tim lister and sebastian shukla, “russian mercenaries fight shadowy battle in gas rich mozambique,” cnn, november 29, 2019; lister, “jihadi insurgency in mozambique grows in sophistication and reach.” [86] daniel sixto, “russian mercenaries: a string of failures in africa,” geopolitical monitor, august 24, 2020; jared thompson, catrina doxsee, and joseph bermudez, jr., “tracking the arrival of russia’s wagner group in mali,” center for strategic and international studies, february 2, 2022. [87] tim lister and sebastian shukla, “arrival of russian wagner mercenaries in mali condemned by european governments,” cnn, december 24, 2021; christopher faulkner, “rising instability in mali raises fears about role of private russian military group,” the conversation   africa, january 10, 2022. [88] judd devermont, “politics at the heart of the crisis in the sahel,” center for strategic and international security, december 6, 2019; nathaniel powell, “why france failed in mali,” war on the rocks, february 21, 2022. [89] jared thompson, “examining extremism: jama’at nasr al islam wal muslimin,” center for strategic and international security, july 15, 2021. [90] “joint declaration on the fight against the terrorist threat and the support to peace and security in the sahel and west africa,” élysée, february 17, 2022. [91] faulkner, “rising instability.” [92] paquette, “russian mercenaries have landed in west africa pushing putin’s goals as kremlin is increasingly isolated.” [93] ibid. [94] parens. [95] thompson, doxsee, and bermudez, jr. [96] “mali parliament approves five year democratic transition plan,” reuters, february 21, 2022. [97] benjamin roger, “mali   charnier de niono : les fama et wagner accusés par la minusma,” jeune afrique, march 11, 2022. [98] malian armed forces, “mmunique n°026 de l’etat major general des armees du 01 avril 2022,” twitter, april 1, 2022. [99] elian peltier, “western officials condemn reports of ‘massacre’ by military in central mali,” new york times, april 4, 2022; edith lederer, “un demands mali allow peacekeepers into town where 300 died,” washington post, april 7, 2022; danielle paquette, joyce sohyun lee, and jon swaine, “civilian killings soar as russian mercenaries join fight in west africa,” washington post, may 23, 2022. [100] elian peltier, mady camara, and christiaan triebert, ‘the killings didn’t stop.’ in mali, a massacre with a russian footprint,” new york times, june 1, 2022. [101] “debunking the malian junta’s claims,” africa center for strategic studies, april 12, 2022. [102] wassim nasr, “france says mercenaries from russia’s wagner group staged ‘french atrocity’ in mali,” france 24, april 22, 2022. [103] catrina doxsee and jared thompson, “massacres, executions, and falsified graves: the wagner group’s mounting humanitarian cost in mali,” center for strategic and international studies, may 11, 2022. [104] parens. [105] sarah repucci and amy slipowitz, “freedom in the world 2022: the global expansion of authoritarian rule,” freedom house, february 2022. [106] joesph siegle, “chapter 10: russia and africa: expanding influence and instability,” george c. marshall european center for security studies, 2021. [107] colum lynch, amy mackinnon, and robbie gramer, “russia flounders in ukraine but doubles down in mali,” foreign policy, april 14, 2022. [108] joe siegle, “russia in africa   undermining democracy through elite capture,” democracy in africa, september 23, 2021. [109] siegle, “the future of russia africa relations.” [110] siegle, “russia in africa.” [111] “partner of choice,” into africa podcast, center for strategic and international studies, march 19, 2020. [112] “statement of general stephen j. townsend, united states army commander, united states africa command before the senate armed forces committee,” march 15, 2022. [113] us africom, “we see a lot of russian activity in africa …,” twitter, march 15, 2022. [114] marten, “russia’s back in africa.” [115] siegle, “chapter 10: russia and africa: expanding influence and instability.” [116] joseph siegle, “ukraine war: fresh warning that africa needs to be vigilant against russia’s destablising influence,” the conversation, march 9, 2022; declan walsh, “putin’s shadow soldiers: how the wagner group is expanding in africa,” new york times, may 31, 2022. [117] ibid. [118] ibid.; ivana saric and zachary basu, “141 countries vote to condemn russia at un,” axios, march 2, 2022. [119] “africa is a hostage of russia’s war on ukraine, zelensky says,” bbc, june 20, 2022. [120] siegle, “chapter 10: russia and africa: expanding influence and instability.” [121] “convention for the elimination of mercenarism in africa,” african union. [122] siegle, “russia in africa.” [123] nasr. [124] cory welt, kristin archick, rebecca nelson, and dianne rennack, “u.s. sanctions on russia,” congressional research service, january 18, 2022; mary ilyushina and sebastian shukla, “rights groups file landmark legal case against russian wagner mercenaries,” cnn, march 15, 2021; thompson, doxsee, and bermudez, jr. [125] minami funakoshi, hugh lawson, and kannaki deka, “tracking sanctions against russia,” reuters, may 6, 2022. [126] heather ashby and jude mutah, “what russia’s invasion of ukraine means for african governments,” united states institute of peace, april 14, 2022. [127] “africa is a hostage of russia’s war on ukraine, zelensky says.” [128] “russia/ukraine related designations and identifications,” specially designated nationals list update, u.s. department of the treasury, june 20, 2017. [129] antony blinken, “commending the european union’s sanctions actions against wagner group and affiliates,” u.s. department of state, december 14, 2021. [130] “treasury sanctions russians bankrolling putin and russia backed influence actors,” u.s. department of the treasury, march 3, 2022. january 31, 2025 paul cruickshank nicolas stockhammer, colin clarke january 10, 2025 paul cruickshank, julika enslin december 20, 2024 christopher faulkner, marcel plichta, raphael parens michael horton graham macklin november 22, 2024 daniel milton october 6, 2024 matthew levitt sign up to receive updates from ctc. ©2025 | combating terrorism center website | murmur creative

you're not logged in. you're not logged in. you're not logged in. you're not logged in. this book illuminates the history of irish journalism and enhances the idea of journalism as a scholarly exercise rooted in the historical evolution of the profession. the most curious episodes in the history of irish journalism was the world wide fame attained by the skibbereen eagle, a small provincial newspaper which declared that it was keeping an eye on the tsar of russia. william howard russell is probably the best known of the irish born correspondents who captured dramatic events from far flung locations for newspaper readers. the book then examines the careers of four prominent irish or irish american journalists, editors and newspaper proprietors based in chicago, who struggled to tread the fine line between assimilation and identity. the four chicago journalists previously mentioned are listed here: melville e. stone, john f. finerty, margaret sullivan and finley peter dunne. the book further focuses on sinn fein and its influence in altering the vision for ireland's future. it considers the role of irish newspapers in the peace process which ended the irish war of independence and led to the anglo irish treaty in december 1921. the book concentrates on the three most popular irish daily newspapers at the time, the freeman's journal, irish independent and the irish times. finally, the book explores the work of irish journalists abroad and shows how the great political debates about ireland's place in the united kingdom served as a backdrop to newspaper publication in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. paywall .page a { text decoration: none; color: #263d67; font weight: 700; } .page a:hover { text decoration: underline; color: #0373bb !important; } .manchesterhive { font weight: 700; font style: italic; color: #263d67; } you are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article. manchesterhive requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals   to see content that you/your institution should have access to, please log in through your library system or with your personal username and password. if you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian. institutions can purchase access to individual titles; please contact manchesterhive@manchester.ac.uk for pricing options. access tokens if you have an access token for this content, you can redeem this via the link below: redeem token don't have an account? .page a { text decoration: none; color: #0072ba; font weight: 700; } .page a:hover { text decoration: underline; color: #0373bb !important; } .manchesterhive { font weight: 700; font style: italic; color: #0072ba; } .whole { margin: 25px !important; } all of mup's digital content including open access books and journals is now available on manchesterhive. many people are shocked upon discovering that tens of thousands of innocent persons in the united states were involuntarily sterilized, forced into institutions, and otherwise maltreated within the course of the eugenic movement (1900 30). such social control efforts are easier to understand when we consider the variety of dehumanizing and fear inducing rhetoric propagandists invoke to frame their potential victims. this book details the major rhetorical themes employed within the context of eugenic propaganda, drawing largely on original sources of the period. early in the twentieth century the term “moron” was developed to describe the primary targets of eugenic control. this book demonstrates how the image of moronity in the united states was shaped by eugenicists.this book will be of interest not only to disability and eugenic scholars and historians, but to anyone who wants to explore the means by which pejorative metaphors are utilized to support social control efforts against vulnerable community groups. this book reviews the burial history of central north yorkshire. in exploring the social history of burial in rural areas, the book aims to encompass some of the principles underpinning 'l'histoire des mentalites'. the book considers the issue of churchyard closure. churchyard closure generally signalled that burial space was made available elsewhere, and in most cases before 1894 this meant that the churchyard itself had been extended. the book reviews the incidence of churchyard extension, which was commonplace during the nineteenth century. the burial acts introduced legislation that permitted vestries to establish burial boards, which could raise loans repayable through the rates to fund the laying out of new cemeteries. in central north riding, a total of eighteen burial boards were in operation before 1894, and the book reviews in detail the operation of the ten largest boards in that group. the burial acts maintained and even strengthened the hold of the church of england on burial space, by substantially increasing the amount of consecrated land under its control. the book also addresses the contention that the new legislative context for burial in the twentieth century might then introduce the opportunity for a substantial centralisation of burial provision. finally, the book reviews the pattern of burial provision in 2007 compared with 1850, and concludes that there is evidence of both continuity and change. the debate on the polity of the church was at the centre of the religious debates in the british atlantic world during the middle decades of the seventeenth century. from the covenanter revolution in scotland, to the congregationalism of the new england colonies, to the protracted debates of the westminster assembly, and the abolition of the centuries old episcopalian structure of the church of england, the issue of the polity of the church was intertwined with the political questions of the period. this book collects together essays focusing on the conjunction of church polity and politics in the middle years of the seventeenth century. a number of chapters in the volume address the questions and conflicts arising out of the period’s reopening and rethinking of the reformation settlement of church and state. in addition, the interplay between the localities and the various westminster administrations of the era are explored in a number of chapters. beyond these discussions, chapters in the volume explore the deeper ecclesiological thinking of the period, examining the nature of the polity of the church and its relationship to society at large. the book also covers the issues of liberty of conscience and how religious suffering contributed to a sense of what the true church was in the midst of revolutionary political upheaval. this volume asserts the fundamental connection between church polity and politics in the revolutions that affected the seventeenth century british atlantic world. #footernav { padding bottom:16px; } #footerwrap { background: #f8f8f8 center bottom no repeat; border bottom: solid 34px rgb(0, 114, 186); min height: 220px; color: #0072ba; font family: "open sans", arial, sans serif; font size: 14px; line height: 1.6; padding: 20px 10px 0; text align: center; overflow: hidden; position: relative; z index: 2; width:100%; } #footerwrap #footerlogowrap { position: relative; } #footerwrap ul li a { border right: solid 1px #ffffff; display: block; padding: 0 10px; line height: 1; } #footerwrap a { text decoration: none; } #footerwrap ul li a { font weight: 700; } #footerwrap ul li:last child a { border right: none; } #footerwrap #footernav{ float: none; } #footer{ position: relative; } #footerdetail p{ margin bottom: 0; } #footercopyright p.legal{ margin: 0px 0px 25px 0px; } #footerwrap ul li { text transform: uppercase; font size: 16px; line height: 1.4; display: inline block; } div#footer #footercopyright:before { background: center center no repeat url(/fileasset/mup_new_logo.png); background size: 200px auto; display: block; content: ""; width: 200px; height: 200px; margin: 0 auto 10px; } @media screen and (min width: 1200px) { #footerwrap { padding: 40px 40px 20px; } #footerwrap #footerlogowrap { position: absolute; right: 0; bottom: 0; margin: 0; } div#footer #footercopyright { text align: center; float: none; } } @media (min width: 1400px){ div#footer #footercopyright { margin bottom: 0; } div#footer #footercopyright:before { width: 220px; height: 220px; background: center center no repeat url(/fileasset/mup_new_logo.png); background position: center top; background size: 220px auto; } } © 2024 manchester university press marc records provided by the university of manchester library character limit 500/500 character limit 500/500

public media is in peril and facing many challenges. social media platforms are presenting an existential crisis to public service media. governments are trying to extend their control and influence on the editorial output of the broadcasters. funding systems for many are up in the air. journalists are facing threats, attacks and harassment, both online and in person. but it’s also an exciting time for public service media   digital platforms provide new opportunities to reach audiences, technology means public broadcasters can be innovative in how they provide a public service. every week, pma compiles all the latest news from the public media and media freedom industry. have a story to feature? get in touch! france24: poland’s new pro eu government has taken sweeping steps to reform the country’s public media outlets. it claims the actions are necessary to restore press independence after eight years of populist rule. but the situation may be more complicated. until a new independent press is created, the government is benefiting from favourable coverage, much like the previous administration. we speak to journalist daniel tilles, editor in chief of the news website notes from poland, as well as professor and author aleks szczerbiak from sussex university. bbc: broadcaster clive myrie has shared the emotional impact of his work and prominence as a public figure during an interview on bbc radio 4’s desert island discs. “it feels as if the pain of others, the regrets, the longing, the sadness affects me more,” myrie explained, adding: “i haven’t got used to it, that’s the thing”. keep updated with the latest public media news from around the world click on the tab menu below to reveal the latest regional stories. democratic republic of congo: journalist tatiana osango assaulted after interview criticizing drc president cpj: authorities in the democratic republic of the congo should impartially investigate the june 5 assault of broadcast journalist tatiana osango and ensure those responsible are held to account, the committee to protect journalists said wednesday. ethiopia: women press freedom condemns coordinated troll campaign against journalist ximena borrazás women press freedom: women press freedom stands in unwavering solidarity with ximena borrazás, a freelance journalist and photographer based in barcelona, who has faced a torrent of online harassment following her reports on the conflict in tigray, ethiopia. kenya: why kbc pensioners risk losing sh1.4 billion savings nation mozambique: mozambicans endorse media’s watchdog role but wary of media freedom afrobarometer: on 14 december 2023, influential mozambican journalist, editor, and political commentator joão fernando chamusse was killed outside his home in katembe, in maputo province, apparently with a machete or gardening hoe (africanews, 2023; unesco, 2023). nigeria: deepening nigerian media space with training programmes the guardian ng nigeria: ending paytv monopoly: a clarion call to mike adenuga this day: over three decades ago, satellite television arrived the shores of nigeria. nigeria: how local radio plays a crucial role in peacebuilding in nigeria peace news: in nigeria, radio serves as the primary source of news and information for the majority of the population, especially those living in rural areas. nigeria: journalists harassed, detained over reports on powerful persons mwfa: the media foundation for west africa (mfwa) condemns the recent detentions and harassment of journalists in nigeria, and urges the nigerian authorities to respect press freedom. rwanda: 94.3 royal fm kigali opens cutting edge broadcasting studio with integration of lawo virtual radio solutions lawo: rwanda, a country in east africa, is renowned for its breathtaking landscapes, from the lush green hills and volcanic mountains to the expansive savannas and serene lakes… south africa: media24 to phase out city press, beeld, daily sun and rapport newspapers, say reports daily maverick: despite at least two articles speculating on the rumoured decision to close down the print versions of city press, beeld, daily sun and rapport, ishmet davidson, ceo of media24, neither confirmed nor denied the reports. south africa: sabc and mict seta continue to provide skills development as 110 interns are placed at public broadcaster (press release) sabc: the south african broadcasting corporation (sabc) and the media, information and communication technologies sector education and training authority (mict seta) are pleased to once again work together in the facilitation of providing training to deserving learners in the ict, media and broadcasting sphere. sudan: capturing a ‘mosaic of shifting battle fronts’ in sudan the new york times: declan walsh, the chief africa correspondent for the times, reported from a country where few journalists have gained entry amid a civil war. tunisia: 23rd arab radio and television festival kicks off in tunisia asharq al awsat: the 23rd edition of the arab radio and television festival, organized by the arab states broadcasting union in cooperation with the tunisian radio and television corporations, kicked off in the tunisian capital. zimbabwe: media diversity cornerstone in corruption fight the herald bangladesh: gendered attack, disinformation prevalent in bangladesh’s social media: study the business standard: in global majority regions, including in bangladesh, the digital sphere has evolved into a critical arena for political discourse, where gendered attacks are weaponised to harass and target political opponents, journalists and activists, deterring, and even restricting, the political participation of women and gender diverse communities. china: chinese ai social media apps see demand rise in overseas markets amid slow mainland adoption south china morning post: a number of chinese artificial intelligence (ai) companies are seeing greater demand for their social media applications in overseas markets, as adoption on the mainland has been slower by comparison. china: chinese journalist who promoted #metoo movement sentenced to 5 years in prison ap: supporters say a chinese journalist who promoted women’s rights as part of the country’s nascent #metoo movement has been sentenced to five years in prison on charges of incitement to subvert state authority, almost three years after she and an activist were detained. hong kong & macau: macau denies entry to hong kong journalism lecturer over ‘public security’ concerns south china morning post: macau has denied entry to a hong kong journalism lecturer who was travelling to the casino hub to host a news writing workshop on the grounds that she planned to take part in activities that might “jeopardise public security or public order”. india: press club of india condemns indian government overreach in media laws candid technology: the press club of india has strongly condemned recent legislative measures that threaten press freedom. in a resolution passed on may 28, the club urged the government to retract laws that could potentially censor the media and stifle journalistic investigation. india & australia: i was doing my job as a journalist in india. modi’s government didn’t like it abc: it was supposed to be an innocuous catch up with representatives from narendra modi’s party, the bjp, to touch base about the abc’s coverage plans for the indian election. indonesia: indonesia threatens to shut down social media platform x over adult content devdiscourse: indonesia is prepared to shut down social media platform x if it does not comply with regulations barring adult content. the communications minister has sent a warning letter to x, pointing to the country’s strict rules against obscene content. x has 24.85 million users in indonesia. japan: nhk’s public nature under scrutiny as japan opens door to online receiving fees (editorial) the mainichi: how should the public media fulfill its role in the digital age? the stance of japan’s public broadcaster nhk is under scrutiny. kyrgyzstan: keeping kyrgyz journalism afloat while the island of democracy sinks the diplomat: on the chilly morning of january 15, 2024, mahinur niyazova, then editor in chief of one of kyrgyzstan’s most popular independent media outlets, 24.kg, was on her way to attend a parliament hearing about proposed new media regulations when she received a call from her editor anton lymar. malaysia: social media censorship in malaysia surges during pm anwar’s first year in power: report straits times: malaysia’s government made the world’s highest number of requests to tiktok to take down content in the second half of 2023, part of a surge in social media censorship that critics say is aimed at silencing political opposition. mongolia: hard hitting journalist ensnared in mongolia’s press freedom crackdown japan times: naran unurtsetseg became one of mongolia’s most well known journalists by exposing sexual abuse in a buddhist boarding school, violence in the military and by taking on some of the country’s most powerful people. myanmar: myanmar’s embattled military government cracks down on free flow of news by blocking vpns ap: myanmar’s military government has launched a major effort to block free communication on the internet, shutting off access to virtual private networks, or vpns, which can be used to circumvent blockages of banned websites and services. nepal: radio nepal is committed to making broadcasting inclusive and people centric: executive director kc radio nepal: the press council nepal has interacted with radio nepal today regarding the implementation of the journalist code of conduct. pakistan: pakistan arrests prominent journalist for third time in a year voa: pakistani authorities arrested journalist and former tv anchor imran riaz khan early wednesday. hours later, his legal team was informed the journalist was arrested for fraud. south korea: the 2024 round in korea, to be hosted by kbs, generating overwhelming interest! (press release) kbs: the 2024 edition of the asean korea music festival 2024 round, organized by kbs, will be held on saturday, july 6 and sunday, july 7, 2024 at kbs busan hall in busan, korea. thailand: thai pbs announces the appointment of the 7th audience and listeners council, ready to move forward together in developing public media (press release   thai) thai pbs: the public broadcasting organization of thailand (t.p.s.) or thai pbs by assoc. prof. jermsak pinthong, chairman of the t.p. policy committee, signed the announcement to appoint members of the audience council and listen to the 7th generation program according to the provincial area groups in each region, totaling 50 people , with a term of office of 3 years, starting from june 7 onwards. thailand & taiwan: thai pbs sends “plaijawak” to present thai culture. win the hearts of taiwanese viewers (press release   thai) thai pbs: public broadcasting service of thailand (tpa) or thai pbs together with public television service (pts), taiwan’s public media. create cooperation to exchange content between countries to strengthen good relations between thailand and taiwan. through cooperation through public media exchanging knowledge and experience in media production vietnam: vietnam arrests prominent journalist over facebook posts thai pbs world: authorities in vietnam have arrested a leading independent journalist for “abusing democratic freedoms” to undermine the state by posting articles on facebook, police announced on saturday. australia: australia’s media industry is no meritocracy. instead, the shamelessness of mediocre men is rewarded with untold power (opinion) abc: last week in sydney, i attended a conference on volunteering and gave a speech. when questions were invited from the audience, a woman (most of the audience was female) raised her hand and was duly delivered the microphone. australia: china willing to grant access to australian journalists, pm says (paywall) canberra times: china’s treatment of journalists and minorities hung over chinese premier li qiang’s official visit on monday, as prime minister anthony anthony albanese sought to “stabilise” relations with australia’s largest trading partner. australia: naidoc committee, culture is life and abc education launch official educational resources for naidoc week 2024 (press release) abc: abc education is proud to announce that it has once again been chosen to partner with the naidoc committee to create official naidoc week education resources for this year’s theme: ‘keep the fire burning! loud, blak and proud.’ australia: reading, writing and … disinformation: should schoolchildren be taught media literacy like maths? the guardian: less than half of australian children and teens think they can tell real news stories from fake. so how well are we preparing them for a new media world order? australia: sbs news named australia’s most trusted news brand sbs: university of canberra’s preeminent annual report on trust in the news ecosystem sees sbs move to number one for all public and commercial media. new zealand: labour, act mps open to exploring social media ban for children under 16 newshub: two mps from both sides of the political spectrum say they are open to looking into whether new zealand should increase its social media age limit from 13 to 16 years old. new zealand: newshub closure: māori voices needed ‘to make sure these stories aren’t getting missed’ rnz: māori journalists say the impending closure of newshub’s am show on 5 july is one less opportunity to cover stories from te ao māori perspective. new zealand: proposal to address media industry challenges set for cabinet this month nz herald: cabinet is expected to consider proposals to address challenges to the new zealand media industry this month. austria: contribution gap, westenthaler, election: what concerns the orf foundation board (german) der standard: on thursday, the orf board members will be able to say face to face what they think of each other in the highest orf body   after a letter of protest from 30 board members who accused their freedom party colleague peter westenthaler of “behavior that is damaging to the company”. austria & russia: orf on the withdrawal of accreditation of orf moscow correspondent maria knips witting (press release   german) orf: the orf regrets the decision of the russian foreign ministry, cannot understand it and will take all necessary steps to ensure that orf audiences continue to receive independent and comprehensive reporting from russia. austria & russia: russia expels austrian journalist maria knips witting in retaliatory response cpj: the committee to protect journalists denounces the expulsion of austrian journalist maria knips witting from russia and calls on the country’s authorities to immediately reinstate the journalist’s credentials and cease turning journalists into political pawns. azerbaijan: azerbaijan accused of media crackdown before hosting cop29 the guardian: azerbaijan’s government has been accused of cracking down on media and civil society activism before the country’s hosting of crucial un climate talks later this year. belgium: the abc of vrt with the v of … virtual productions: ketnet and vrt innovation build unique interactive fiction game (press release   dutch) vrt: crack the safe, that is the name of the brand new interactive fiction game from ketnet and vrt. czech republic: why is it important to have stable funding for public media? (blog   czech) czech tv: when i recently read several insightful comments about how it is premature in the czech republic to rehabilitate the financing of public service media, or perhaps about the fact that a successful hockey championship is an obvious example of what public media should not broadcast, i was convinced to write the following lines. denmark: login, learning and goodies: dr brugerkontakt helps citizens get on drtv (press release   danish) dr: employees from dr brugerkontakt are currently traveling around the country to ensure that everyone who wants to log on to drtv can do so. france: national rally says it would privatise french public tv if it wins majority the guardian: marine le pen’s far right national rally intends to privatise public television and radio if it wins an absolute majority in the french parliament in snap elections, senior party figures have confirmed. france: radio france fires comedian guillaume meurice over netanyahu joke france24: french comedian guillaume meurice has been fired by radio france for “serious misconduct”. france: radio france supports arcom’s proposals in favor of a gradual transition to dab+ (press release   french) radio france: arcom today published a radio white paper which outlines an ambitious future for the radio medium. in particular, it defines a realistic and progressive strategy to lead the radio medium to make its transition to dab+. germany: broadcasters do not want to “lose important time”: this is how high the broadcasting fee could be from 2025 (german) merkur: the fee collection centre (gez) has not existed since 2013. since then, the broadcasting fee has been collected by the ard zdf deutschlandradio contribution service. this usually costs households around 220 euros a year. however, the public broadcaster is insisting on an increase for next year. germany: conversion to digital program distribution with dab+ (press release   german) deutschlandradio: in the future, the deutschlandfunk and deutschlandfunk kultur programs will be broadcast mostly digitally at a total of nine locations in baden württemberg, bavaria, hesse, mecklenburg western pomerania, lower saxony and thuringia. germany: ‘democracy didn’t fall from the sky,’ says baerbock in bonn (german) dw: a panel formed by the german foreign minister annalena baerbock, the filipino us nobel prize winning journalist maria ressa and ugandan journalist and media entrepreneur scovia culton nakamy at dw’s annual global media forum in the western german city of bonn, focused on the power of democracy. ireland: “some of the things were shocking to me”: bakhurst reflects on a turbulent year the currency: in a wide ranging interview at the celtic media festival last week, kevin bakhurst talked candidly about his first 12 months in charge at rté and the future direction of the broadcaster. italy: g7 summit, rai ceo and dg: “great test of public service” (press release   italian) rai: “the g7 summit just concluded, of which rai was the host broadcaster”, was another great page of public service, of which we can be proud. italy: initiatives aimed at young people continue (press release   italian) rai: a company aimed at the future and sensitive to youth issues. the canon, artistic heritage and institutional agreements directorate, in collaboration with the navy, has announced a new prize competition reserved for young season ticket holders or children of season ticket holders. italy & eu: von der leyen buries report slamming italy as she seeks meloni’s vote politico: ursula von der leyen has sought to slow down an official european union report criticizing italy for eroding media freedoms, as she seeks rome’s support for a second term as european commission president. norway: new news design throughout nrk (press release   norwegian) nrk: nrk is currently undergoing a major change in design and profile on all platforms. tonight, the dagsrevyen will also have a new look. slovakia: rtvs: how public law is formed (blog   slovakian) rtvs: in connection with the current situation, rtvs decided to bring viewers closer to the importance and work of public media, also through a behind the scenes look. on thursday, june 13, it therefore prepared a special radio and television broadcast with the title “public law makes sense”. slovenia: acting president of the management board natalija gorščak will propose the appointment of an acting member of the management board (press release   slovenian) rtv slo: today, andrej trček resigned as a member of the management board. natalija gorščak, acting president of the management board of rtv slovenia, will propose to the council of rtv slovenia the appointment of acting members of the management board. spain: rtve, the medium that most increases the trust index for the audience (press release   spanish) rtve: rtve continues to increase its trust index among citizens and is among the most reliable audiovisual groups , according to the main report on digital information consumption prepared in the world, the digital news report (dnr). spain: the rne staff denounces the “absence of a project” of the radio station in rtve, “drifting” after years without direction (spanish) el diario: public radio workers feel “tired and discouraged” and are requesting a long term project. they also cry out against the outsourcing of content and ask for “careful and sustained programming” sweden: this is how svt has improved audibility and developed the service tydligare tal (press release   swedish) svt: poor audibility in television has long frustrated many viewers. it has been one of the most common complaints to svt over the years, which led to the idea of ​​being able to individually improve audibility for those who need it. uk: channel 4 ventures teams with vinterior in £3 million partnership (press release) channel 4: channel 4’s consumer investment arm, channel 4 ventures, has secured a £3 million investment into vinterior, europe’s leading premium, second hand furniture marketplace. uk: what do people think of generative ai? (blog) bbc: generative ai (or genai) burst into the public’s consciousness at the end of 2022 when openai launched chatgpt. regional: ‘administrative silence’: foi requests go unanswered in balkans, birn report says balkan insight: public institutions in the six western balkan countries routinely refuse to respond to freedom of information requests, and it’s getting worse, a new report from the balkan investigative reporting network warns. regional: ebu adopts common position on generative ai (press release   french) france tv: at the initiative of france télévisions, four committees (news, technical, digital and legal) of the ebu, european radio and television union bringing together 113 organizations in 56 countries, have approved a common position on generative ai by publishing on its site a text presenting the major issues for public service media. argentina: negotiations continue in argentina to decide fate of public media telám (spanish) la nación: the agency is not closed. that is the message that many of the télam workers received today [june 13] through an internal statement issued by one of the unions that brings together the state company, which has been taken over and fenced off for more than four months. argentina: what do argentines think of the use of generative ai in the news? latam journalism review: a study on people’s perceptions of the use of generative artificial intelligence (ai) in news showed that the most popular platform in argentina is by far chatgpt, although very few use it for news. it also showed that argentines have slightly more confidence than people from other countries that the news media make responsible use of this technology. brazil: what’s it like living in a news desert? agência mural explores absence of local journalism in brazilian city latam journalism review: almost half (48.7%) of brazilian municipalities do not have a journalistic outlet serving their population. there are 26.7 million people who have better access to news about são paulo or rio de janeiro  where the so called “national” media outlets are based  than about the city where they live. colombia: doubt everything, a conversation about public media in colombia (spanish) 070 podcasts: we present this conversation between dago garcía, diana díaz and santiago rivas, about the state of the art of public media, the place of the audience with the entry of streaming platforms and imagined futures of television. costa rica: deputies agree on date to vote on report on sinart investigation (spanish) el observador: the deputies agreed on a date to vote on the reports emanating from the sinart commission, one for the majority and two for the minority. costa rica: recommendations on sinart (editorial   spanish) la nación: the legislative commission created to investigate the national radio and television system (sinart) did an outstanding job. the well founded conclusions emphasize the need for action by the public ministry to clarify the aspects worthy of attention in the courts. cuba: journalist lázaro yuri valle roca released and forcibly exiled pen international: pen international, pen cuba in exile and artists at risk connection (arc) welcome the release of cuban journalist lázaro yuri valle roca on 5 june 2024. his medical conditions and forced exile to the us remain causes for concern. dominica: dr. damien dublin appointed as new chairman of dbs board of directors dominica news online: dr. damien dublin has been appointed as the new chairman of the board of directors of the dominica broadcasting corporation (dbs radio). ecuador: journalism program goes off the air in ecuador and they denounce government pressure on the medium (spanish) fundamedios: the program ‘los irreverentes’  hosted by journalists sol borja, fabricio vela and josé luis cañizares , which was broadcast on rtu, was cancelled. fundamedios learned, unofficially, that the cancellation occurred after pressure from the government in the face of the criticism expressed in the program. haiti: online media in haiti: between digital revolution and management challenges (french) ijnet: with the rise of the internet in the 2000s, the number of online media in haiti increased considerably, from two to more than a hundred in 2024. jamaica: gov’t condemns threats against tvj journalist giovanni dennis gleaner: the government says it “strongly condemns” the recent threats made against television jamaica (tvj) journalist giovanni dennis over his report on illegal drag racing in jamaica. paraguay: motorcyclist shoots at house of mother of journalist killed in paraguay in 2023 (spanish) infobae: a motorcyclist shot at the home of the mother of a paraguayan journalist murdered in february 2023 in the city of pedro juan caballero, bordering brazil, without causing any injuries or major damage, police sources reported. peru: peruvian press council rejected bills: they point out that congress seeks to attack freedom of expression (spanish) infobae: they denounced that they seek to remove the independence of the national institute of radio and television of peru (irtp) by proposing that its directors be representatives of the powers of the state. peru: quality content and technological modernization of the irtp mark a milestone in state communication during the last year (spanish) tv peru: the national institute of radio and television of peru (irtp), which brings together the signals of tvperú, tvperú noticias, tvperú internacional, canal ipe and radio nacional, has successfully achieved an ambitious renewal of its production and transmission capacities. trinidad & tobago: journalist chronicles caricom’s journey: sandra ann baptiste’s ‘caribbean perspectives’ unveiled trinidad guardian: sandra ann baptiste’s career as a journalist and specialist in caribbean affairs spans over three decades, during which she has chronicled major developments across the region with a particular focus on the regional integration movement, caricom. venezuela: site blocking and impersonation threaten media in venezuela, according to ipys report latam journalism review: in venezuela, digital information freedoms are systematically censored and attacked, according to “algorithms of silence,” the 2023 digital rights annual report from the press and society institute of venezuela (ipys venezuela, for its acronym in spanish). venezuela: venezuelan authorities arrest five political activists in the last 72 hours for “promoting hatred” (spanish) el país: as the day of the presidential elections on july 28 approaches, the situation in venezuela is tense. five political activists of the venezuelan opposition, two of them who also work as journalists, have been detained by the police in the last 72 hours accused of “promoting hatred” in the context of the electoral campaign. regional: caribbean journalists set to improve crime reporting skills undp: journalists from antigua and barbuda, barbados, st lucia, and trinidad and tobago are set to receive specialized training on trafficking in persons through a collaboration between the media institute of the caribbean (mic) and carisecure 2.0   a regional project funded by the united states agency for international development (usaid) and the united nations development programme (undp). gaza: ‘we are keen to keep listening to people and let their voices be heard all over the world’ nieman reports: how the bbc arabic’s lifeline service in gaza is delivering vital information to displaced citizens and airing first hand accounts of survivors. iraq: pfaa underscored lack of freedom of journalism in iraq kurdistan24: in a statistic project, the press freedom advocacy association pfaa in iraq revealed, in 2023, more than 518 breaching the journalists’ rights occurred in the south and middle of iraq. israel: the choice for the new ceo of israel’s channel 13 raises suspicions of pro netanyahu aims (editorial   paywall) haaretz: journalists working for channel 13, formerly known as channel 10, have known for months about attempts to undermine their journalistic work and gag them. israel & qatar: court approves 45 day extension orders banning al jazeera from broadcasting in israel (paywall) haaretz: the court approved a request by israel’s communications minister to extend the order banning the qatari news network from broadcasting in israel. turkey: cpj welcomes sentencing of 7 involved in 2019 beating of turkish journalist cpj: the committee to protect journalists welcomes a turkish court’s sentencing of seven people involved in the may 10, 2019, attack on columnist and tv commentator yavuz selim demirağ in the capital, ankara. canada: after years of selling broadcast rights to the highest bidder, sports leagues are rediscovering the importance of growing their audience (opinion) the globe and mail: there are few institutions in this country that trigger as much dependable outrage as hockey and the cbc. canada: canada’s news publishers call on crtc to make regulations with respect to the online news act business wire: multicultural, community, local, and national news publishers and trade associations, representing hundreds of trust titles, have come together to call on the crtc to make regulations with respect to the online news act that will ensure consistency and fairness, maximize newsroom investment, enhance transparency and minimize misrepresentation. canada: cbc/radio canada celebrates national indigenous history month (press release) cbc/radio canada: this month, cbc/radio canada is offering special programming for the national indigenous history month. canada: why did the crtc forget that canadian films exist? (opinion) the globe and mail: even the best laid plans often go awry. and sometimes the half best laid plans, too… us: cpb awards $936,000 grant to fund alaska desk journalism collaboration (press release) cpb: the corporation for public broadcasting (cpb) has awarded a $936,000 grant to alaska public media to lead the alaska desk, a statewide collaboration among public media stations, designed to strengthen and expand their local news services, particularly for rural communities. us: growing costs, falling sponsorship fuel wave of layoffs in pubmedia (paywall) current: colorado public radio ceo stewart vanderwilt recalled a lesson from his mother while talking about recent layoffs in public media… us: how kqed is enriching its ‘forum’ archive with generative ai (paywall) current: ask forum harnesses the power of a large language model to offer a more flexible and expandable search experience. us: la periodista de iowa cjr: at a spanish language newspaper in rural iowa, lorena lópez proves that the best counter to online misinformation is human connection. us: layoffs in public broadcasting: addressing the triple threat of declining audiences, podcast glut and underwriting challenges editor & publisher: hardly a week has passed this year without a layoff announcement from one public broadcaster or another: 20 positions eliminated last september at wnyc, 16 in february at wamu, 34 in april at wnet, eight at kuow in may   plus a round of buyouts (potentially followed by layoffs) at kqed and laist. us: mississippi opens the playbook for dismantling a free press (opinion) the new york times: slow moving lawsuits intended to drain newsrooms of their limited financial resources and editorial bandwidth. threats of jail time for journalists who expose political corruption and refuse to give up their sources and turn over their notes. judges with close ties to the politicians who have attacked reporters and their coverage. us: pbs ceo paula kerger sends email announcing strategic layoffs for future stability editor & publisher: e&p has been given a copy of a recent communication pbs president and ceo paula kerger sent to local station general managers on june 11 to inform them about significant organizational changes enacted to maintain fiscal stability and operational efficiency. us: the stanford internet observatory is being dismantled platformer: house republicans attacked the lab’s reports on misinformation and election integrity   and now stanford is pulling the plug us: ʻuluʻulu joins national project to preserve historic public tv programs university of hawaii: ʻuluʻulu: the henry kuʻualoha giugni moving image archive of hawaiʻi at the university of hawaiʻi west oʻahu is part of a nationwide effort to digitize and preserve historic publicly funded radio and television programs across america, including pbs hawaiʻi. us: u.s. journalism is turning to an unlikely savior. will it work? the new republic: as major outlets hire conservative british media executives to inject fresh perspectives   and hopefully cash   into a struggling industry, journalists worry it’s a mistake. us: wvpb unable to renew grant after apparently violating guidelines (paywall) current: the board chair of the wvpb foundation said he believes that publicly naming a funder during a meeting cost the station the chance to apply for a three year grant. digital news report 2024 reuters institute for the study of journalism: this year’s report reveals new findings about the consumption of online news globally. it is based on a yougov survey of more than 95,000 people in 47 countries representing half of the world’s population. from james o’brien to joe rogan: rise of news influencers and alternative voices press gazette: news influencer trend well developed in us, but in uk mainstream brands and journalists leave less of a gap. many people say they avoid the news. the news doesn’t avoid them. cjr: in our new election focused issue, josh hersh contends with the problem of news avoidance… most news consumers suspicious of ai in journalism, survey shows al jazeera: most news consumers in the united states and the united kingdom would be uncomfortable with journalism produced mainly by artificial intelligence (ai), a survey has found. how youtube’s recommendations pull you away from news nieman lab: it’s one of the most significant platforms for news consumption globally, with 20% of adults using it regularly for news, according to one international study. social media influencers aren’t getting rich they’re barely getting by wall street journal: platforms are paying less for popular posts, brands are pickier about partnerships and a possible tiktok ban looms. the strange history of white journalists trying to “become” black nieman lab: “to believe that the richness of black identity can be understood through a temporary costume trivializes the lifelong trauma of racism. it turns the complexity of black life into a stunt.” ‘we had no place to save the stories’ nieman reports: two decades ago, the associated press set out to preserve the organization’s history. what it created is an archive that sheds light on the press as a political institution. why tiktok star sophia smith galer created an ai tool to help journalists make viral videos journalism.co.uk: in this special series that focuses on journalism rather than algorithms, we look at sophina, the chatbot that turns text into viral video scripts, based on the success of a journalist and content creator with 17 million likes. all psm weekly stories are provided for interest and their relevance to public service media issues, they do not necessarily reflect the views of the public media alliance. all headlines are sourced from their original story. if you have any suggestions for our weekly round ups, please email pma at editor@publicmediaalliance.org. header image: business newspaper pages. credit: absolutvision / unsplash 11th june 2024 our weekly round up of public service… 4th june 2024 our weekly round up of public service… 28th may 2024 our weekly round up of public service… 21st may 2024 our weekly round up of public service… click on the link below to sign up to our weekly round up of public service media headlines as well as news on our training and exchange projects public media alliance room 02.101 lawrence stenhouse building university of east anglia norwich nr4 7tj united kingdom general enquiries +44 (0)1603 592 335 info@publicmediaalliance.org more privacy policy | terms and conditions | © public media alliance 2025 insight banner image | reportage. credit: porpeller/istock pma global grant image | cameraman filming floats and fancy dress costumes at a carnival in pretoria from the top of a bus. credit: sunshine seeds/istock

climate change global climate agreements: successes and failures backgrounder by lindsay maizland and clara fong january 21, 2025 renewing america myanmar myanmar’s troubled history backgrounder by lindsay maizland january 31, 2022 health how tobacco laws could help close the racial gap on cancer interactive by olivia angelino, thomas j. bollyky, elle ruggiero and isabella turilli february 1, 2023 global health program trade tariffs on trading partners: can the president actually do that? report by inu manak and helena kopans johnson february 4, 2025 greenberg center for geoeconomic studies oil and petroleum products academic webinar: the geopolitics of oil webinar with carolyn kissane and irina a. faskianos april 12, 2023 artificial intelligence (ai) what could possibly go right with our ai future? a conversation with reid hoffman virtual event with reid hoffman and deven j. parekh january 30, 2025 yemen, a small country on the arabian peninsula, has become the site of grievous civilian suffering amid an intractable civil war. many analysts say the fighting, now seven years old, has turned into a proxy war: iran backed houthi rebels, who overthrew the yemeni government, are pitted against a multinational coalition led by saudi arabia. the involvement of other combatants, including militant islamist groups and separatists backed by the united arab emirates (uae), has complicated the picture. the conflict has displaced more than four million people and given rise to cholera outbreaks, medicine shortages, and threats of famine. the warring parties observed a monthslong cease fire in 2022, raising hopes for a political solution to the conflict, but that october, they failed to extend the truce. more on: middle east and north africa yemen saudi arabia wars and conflict humanitarian crises yemen has long struggled with religious and cultural differences between its north and south and the legacy of european colonialism. the modern yemeni state was formed in 1990 with the unification of the u.s.  and saudi backed yemeni arab republic, in the north, and the soviet backed people’s democratic republic of yemen, in the south. ali abdullah saleh, a military officer who had ruled north yemen since 1978, assumed leadership of the new country. a curation of original analyses, data visualizations, and commentaries, examining the debates and efforts to improve health worldwide. weekly. however, just four years after unification, southern separatists seceded for several months and reemerged in 2007 as the southern movement, which has continued to press for greater autonomy within yemen. al qaeda in the arabian peninsula (aqap), an islamist militant group, and the related ansar al sharia insurgent group have captured territory in the south and east. the houthi movement, whose base is among the zaydi shiites of northern yemen, rose up against saleh’s government six times between 2004 and 2010. the united states lent its support to saleh beginning in the early 2000s, when counterterrorism cooperation against al qaeda and affiliate groups became washington’s overriding regional concern. in 2000, al qaeda in yemen, a group that would later become aqap, conducted a suicide attack on a u.s. navy warship, the uss cole, in the yemeni port of aden. seventeen u.s. service members were killed in the bombing. since then, the united states has provided yemen more than $850 million in military aid, according to the online database security assistance monitor. rights groups persistently charged [pdf] that saleh ran a corrupt and autocratic government. as the popular protests of the 2011 arab spring spread to yemen, the president’s political and military rivals jockeyed to oust him. while yemeni security forces focused on putting down protests in urban areas, aqap made gains in outlying regions. under escalating domestic and international pressure [pdf], saleh stepped aside in 2012 after receiving assurances of immunity from prosecution. his vice president, abd rabbu mansour hadi, assumed office as interim president in a transition brokered by the gulf cooperation council (gcc), a regional organization based in saudi arabia, and backed by the united states. as part of the gcc’s timetable for a transition, the un sponsored national dialogue conference (ndc) convened 565 delegates in 2013 to formulate a new constitution agreeable to yemen’s many factions. but the ndc ended with delegates unable to resolve disputes over the distribution of power. more on: middle east and north africa yemen saudi arabia wars and conflict humanitarian crises several factors widened these political divisions and led to full scale military conflict. fuel price hikes. under pressure from the international monetary fund, which had extended to yemen a $550 million loan premised on promises of economic reforms, hadi’s government lifted fuel subsidies in 2014. the houthi movement, which had attracted support beyond its base with its criticisms of the un transition, organized mass protests demanding lower fuel prices and a new government. hadi’s supporters and the muslim brotherhood affiliated party al islah held counterrallies. houthi takeover. the houthis captured much of sanaa by late 2014. reneging on a un peace deal, they consolidated control of the capital and continued their southward advance. hadi’s government resigned under pressure in january 2015 and hadi later fled to saudi arabia. military division. military units loyal to saleh aligned themselves with the houthis, contributing to their battlefield success. other militias mobilized against the houthi saleh forces, aligning with those in the military who had remained loyal to the hadi government. southern separatists ramped up their calls for secession. saudi intervention. in 2015, with hadi in exile, riyadh launched a military campaign primarily fought from the air to roll back the houthis and restore the hadi administration to sanaa. the houthi movement, named for a religious leader from the houthi clan and officially known as ansar allah, emerged in the late 1980s as a vehicle for religious and cultural revivalism among zaydi shiites in northern yemen. the zaydis are a minority in the sunni muslim majority country but predominant in the northern highlands along the saudi border. the houthis became politically active after 2003, opposing saleh for backing the u.s. led invasion of iraq but later allying with him after his resignation as president. this alliance was a tactical one: saleh’s loyalists opposed hadi’s un backed government and, feeling marginalized in the transition process, sought to regain a leading role in yemen. saleh won the allegiance of some members of yemen’s security forces, tribal networks, and political establishment. but in 2017, after saleh shifted his support to the saudi led coalition, he was killed by houthi forces. iran is the houthis’ primary international backer and has reportedly provided them with military support, including weapons. hadi’s government also accused hezbollah, iran’s lebanese ally, of aiding the houthis. saudi arabia’s perception that the houthis are an iranian proxy rather than an indigenous movement has driven riyadh’s military intervention. but many regional specialists say that tehran’s influence is likely limited, especially given that iranians and houthis adhere to different schools of shiite islam. experts also say iran’s sway could shrink as saudi iranian relations warm following a china mediated rapprochement in early 2023. some analysts expect iranian weapons transfers to the houthis to decline. at hadi’s behest in 2015, saudi arabia cobbled together a coalition of sunni majority arab states: bahrain, egypt, jordan, kuwait, morocco, qatar, sudan, and the united arab emirates (uae). by 2018, the coalition had expanded to include forces from eritrea and pakistan. they launched an air campaign against the houthis with the aim of reinstating hadi’s government. for riyadh, accepting houthi control of yemen would mean allowing a hostile neighbor to reside on its southern border, and it would mark a setback in its long standing contest with tehran. after saudi arabia, the uae has played the most significant military role in the coalition, contributing some ten thousand ground troops, mostly in yemen’s south. however, the uae removed most of them after entering into conflict with its coalition allies in 2019, when it backed the separatist southern transitional government (stc), which captured aden. that november, hadi and the stc president signed the riyadh agreement, which affirms that the factions will share power equally in a postwar yemeni government. the separatists reneged on the deal for several months in 2020, but eventually they joined a unity government with equal representation of northerners and southerners. though the formation of a government signaled progress in bridging yemen’s internal divisions, it did little to accelerate peace talks. in april 2022, hadi ceded power to a governing council and fired a deputy scorned by the houthis in hopes that the rebels would return to the negotiating table. although the u.s. congress has been divided on the matter [pdf], the united states has backed the saudi led coalition, as have france, germany, and the united kingdom. u.s. interests include security of saudi borders; free passage in the bab al mandeb strait, the choke point between the arabian and red seas and a vital artery for the global transport of oil; and a government in sanaa that will cooperate with u.s. counterterrorism programs. but uproar over civilian deaths in coalition air campaigns, which often use u.s. made weapons, and saudi arabia’s role in the 2018 killing of washington post journalist jamal khashoggi led the united states and other western powers to limit some weapons sales and refueling of coalition aircraft. lawmakers have also raised concerns that u.s. made weapons are falling into the hands of aqap and houthi fighters. still, the united states is saudi arabia’s largest arms supplier, and president donald trump thrice vetoed bills that would have halted arms sales to saudi arabia. president joe biden said he would end u.s. support for the coalition’s military offensive, including the sale of weapons, and signaled a shift to diplomacy by appointing a special envoy to yemen. yet, u.s. defense contractors still oversee the servicing of saudi aircraft that carry out offensive operations, and the administration has approved the sale of weapons to saudi arabia for defense purposes. shortly after taking office, biden reversed the trump administration’s last minute designation of the houthis as a terrorist group, citing the move’s potential damage to aid deliveries in yemen. aqap, in yemen since the early 1990s, has benefited from the more recent chaos. in 2015, it captured the coastal city of mukalla and released three hundred inmates, many believed to be aqap members, from the city’s prison. the militant group expanded its control westward to aden and seized parts of the city before coalition forces recovered much of the region in 2016. aqap has also provided yemenis in some areas with security and public services unfulfilled by the state, which has strengthened support for the group. the u.s. state department warns that yemen’s instability has weakened long running counterterrorism efforts [pdf], which rely heavily on air strikes. the barack obama administration conducted an estimated 185 strikes over eight years, while the trump administration launched nearly 200 in its four years. these air strikes have killed several high level aqap members, including former leader nasser al wuhayshi and top official jamal al badawi, who was allegedly involved in the uss cole bombing. but the u.s. strikes have also resulted in the deaths of more than one hundred civilians, watchdog groups say. for years, aqap vied for influence with the houthis and the self declared islamic state, especially in the central al bayda governorate. the islamic state marked its 2015 entrance into yemen with suicide attacks on two zaydi mosques in sanaa, which killed close to 140 worshippers. though the group has claimed other high profile attacks, including the assassination of aden’s governor in late 2015, its following lags behind that of aqap. in 2021, the united nations estimated that the islamic state had hundreds of fighters [pdf] in yemen, while aqap had around seven thousand [pdf] as of mid 2020. opposition from the houthis has reportedly debilitated both groups, but experts warn against discounting their possible resurgence. with around three quarters of its population living in poverty, yemen has long been the arab world’s poorest country, and its humanitarian crisis has been called one of the worst in the world. disease runs rampant; suspected cholera cases passed two hundred thousand [pdf] in 2020. the impact of the covid 19 pandemic is harder to assess, since there is no comprehensive caseload data. some twelve thousand cases have been reported to the world health organization, but health analysts say the actual count is likely much higher. moreover, many countries cut back on critical aid to yemen amid the crush of the pandemic, leading the united nations to reduce food rations for some eight million yemenis in january 2022. three out of four yemenis require humanitarian aid and protection, and four million are internally displaced [pdf], according to the un refugee agency. the situation has worsened under a yearslong de facto land, sea, and air blockade imposed by coalition forces, which has obstructed the flow of vital supplies of food and medicine and helped drive up prices of essential goods. under the 2022 cease fire, prices dropped significantly, but with the expiration of the truce, many yemenis fear that high costs will return. the un development program estimates that more than 370,000 people have died as a result of the war, with indirect causes such as lack of food, water, and health services causing almost 60 percent of deaths. in addition, the united nations has found [pdf] that both houthi and coalition forces have knowingly attacked civilian targets in violation of international law. this includes the destruction of a hospital run by doctors without borders in 2015. torture, arbitrary arrests, and forced disappearances are among the other alleged war crimes perpetrated by both sides. un backed peace negotiations have made limited progress. the 2018 stockholm agreement averted a battle in the port city of hodeidah, a vital hub for aid; but there has been little success in implementing the accord’s provisions, which includes the exchange of more than fifteen thousand prisoners and the creation of a joint committee to de escalate violence in the city of taiz. observers worry that friction among regional actors, including iran, saudi arabia, and the uae, is prolonging the war. conditions deteriorated in late 2019, when the houthis claimed responsibility for a missile attack on saudi oil facilities. un monitors concluded that the houthis did not carry out the attack, while the saudi led coalition blamed iran. peace efforts gained momentum in april 2022 when yemen’s new governing council helped consolidate anti houthi forces. later that month, the houthis and coalition forces coordinated their first nationwide cease fire in years, which allowed commercial flights to resume from sanaa and some fuel ships to dock in hodeidah. the parties extended the truce several times, but after six months of relative peace, failed to renew it again. recently improved relations between saudi arabia and iran and ongoing talks between riyadh and the houthis have buoyed hopes for another extension of the cease fire, but the exclusion of the governing council and stc from the talks has raised questions about the prospects for peace. for foreign affairs, the international crisis group’s michael wahid hanna and peter salisbury argue that negotiations on yemen should be more inclusive. cfr’s global conflict tracker follows the latest developments in yemen’s civil war. the new york times’ declan walsh and tyler hicks capture the war’s human toll. ohio state university’s asher orkaby explains how yemen’s internal divisions were centuries in the making. in late 2021, the un development program assessed the impact of yemen’s war and charted potential pathways for recovery. nathalie bussemaker, mia prange, and will rampe contributed to this report. will merrow created the graphic. france how will the eu elections results change europe? in brief by liana fix june 10, 2024 europe program iran iran attack means an even tougher balancing act for the u.s. in the middle east in brief by steven a. cook april 14, 2024 middle east program iran iran attacks on israel spur escalation concerns in brief by ray takeyh april 14, 2024 middle east program democratic republic of congo war returns to the democratic republic of congo: what to know article by stuart reid and mariel ferragamo february 7, 2025 foreign policy trump floats u.s. control of gaza, and other headlines of the day article by cfr.org editors february 5, 2025 cuba can the united states send undocumented immigrants to guantánamo bay? expert brief by john b. bellinger iii february 4, 2025

the wagner group, also known as pmc wagner,[1] a russian paramilitary organization[1] also described as a private military company (pmc), a network of mercenaries,[1][2] and a de facto unit of the russian ministry of defence (mod) or russia's military intelligence agency, the gru,[3] has conducted operations in the central african republic since late 2018.[4][5] there have been an estimated 1,000 wagner mercenaries stationed in car since 2018, protecting the government of faustin archange touadéra against rebels amid the central african republic civil war, and seeking to control and extract valuable natural resources. precious metal extraction could aid the russian government to weather the international sanctions imposed for its invasion of ukraine. wagner forces have been accused of perpetrating human rights abuses in car, including the torture and killing of civilians.[6] in mid january 2018, it was reported that wagner may deploy a contingent of its pmcs to the central african republic (car), as russia successfully lobbied the un security council to allow it to ship weapons and ammunition to the country,[7] despite an active arms embargo in place since 2013 under security council resolution 2127.[8] reuters reported that france had offered to transport arms seized in somalia to the former french colony, but was muscled out of the country by russia.[9] in late march, russia's ministry of foreign affairs stated five russian soldiers and 170 "civilian instructors" had been sent to the car to train its servicemen.[10][11] according to car's president, faustin archange touadéra, the training provided would strengthen the effectiveness of the car's armed forces in combating "plunderers". later, the instructors were indeed confirmed to be wagner pmcs who were sent to the car to protect lucrative mines, support the car government[12] and provide close protection for touadéra.[13] the role of the pmcs was also to fill a security vacuum left by france after it withdrew its military forces from the country in october 2016.[14] the country had been in the midst of a civil war since 2012, which left three quarters of it under rebel control.[15] the pmcs' camp was set up on 24 march 2018,[13] about 60 kilometers from the capital bangui at the berengo estate that was used by car's former ruler jean bédel bokassa.[16] this deployment brought the number of pmcs in sudan and the car to about 370.[12] in april, locals blocked a russian registered cessna from taking off in rebel held kaga bandoro, which is located near diamond deposits. according to the car government, the plane was carrying russian military advisers who had been there for peace negotiations with the rebels[17] and witnesses stated three or four russian soldiers from the aircraft visited the compounds of muslim rebel leaders.[18] this raised suspicions by cit and the transparency international ingo that wagner pmcs were also guarding diamond mines in rebel territory.[17] several years later, a report to the un security council regarding human rights violations in the car noted that the russian pmcs established themselves in the country's major mining centers.[19] in late may 2018, the neue zürcher zeitung newspaper reported the number of russian pmcs in the car was 1,400.[14] jamestown foundation fellow sukhankin told polygraph.info that the wagner group was in charge of military operations in the country, while another russian private military company called patriot was in charge of protecting vips.[20] 10 russian military instructors were stationed in the lawless town of bangassou, on the border with the democratic republic of the congo, while another unit was in the key town of sibut, near the rebel held territory.[15] in early july 2018, the wagner group's col. konstantin pikalov arrived in the car and was stationed there during that summer. he would once again return to the car following the elections in madagascar later that year, where he also took part as a security consultant for different candidates.[21] according to bellingcat's christo grozev, during his time in the car, pikalov was "a kind of intermediary" between yevgeny prigozhin's private companies, the russian ministry of defense and the kremlin.[21] in august 2018, russia signed a military cooperation agreement with the car,[22] while it also helped broker, along with sudan, a tentative agreement among armed groups in the country.[23] three months later, al jazeera was given unprecedented access to russian military instructors in the car. while the al jazeera crew was filming the russian facilitated training for car troops, valery zakharov, the russian special advisor to the president of the car, stated that the wagner group amounts to no more than an "urban legend" and that training in the country was being done by russian reservists.[24] in december 2018, the ukrainian sbu reported that the umbrella structure of wagner in the car is a commercial firm affiliated with yevgeny prigozhin   m finance llc security service from st. petersburg, whose main areas of activity are mining of precious stones and private security services. according to the sbu, some of the pmcs were transported to africa directly on prigozhin's private aircraft. the sbu reported that they identified 37 russian citizens who were engaged in the car by russian military intelligence on a rotational basis as members of m finance llc security service, whose head was reported to be valery zakharov from st. petersburg. zakharov was said to be a wagner pmc himself, whose personal wagner number was m 5658.[25] zakharov also acted as a russian diplomat and security advisor to the car's president.[26] however, according to bellingcat's grozev, konstantin pikalov was the one who was ultimately giving instructions to zakharov.[27] overall, according to information obtained by the ukrainian sbu, 1,012 wagner pmcs were airlifted on two tupolev tu 154 airliners between august and december 2018, to sudan, the car and other african countries.[27] five days before the 2020 21 central african general election, rebels attacked and captured the car's fourth largest city, bambari. in response, the government requested assistance from rwanda and russia as per bilateral agreements. rwanda bolstered its troops serving in the un peacekeeping mission in the car, while russia sent an additional 300 military instructors to the country.[28][29][30] concurrently, russian and rwandan "mercenaries" were reportedly deployed along with government troops at the village of boyali, 130 kilometers northwest of the capital bangui.[31] the following day, un and government forces recaptured bambari.[32] one month later, on 25 january 2021, car forces, backed by russian pmcs and rwandan troops, attacked boyali, killing 44 rebels who were plotting an assault on the capital.[33] subsequently, car forces, supported by the russian contractors and rwandan troops, captured a number of strategic towns throughout february 2021, including bossembele, bouar, béloko and bossangoa. as the rebels were being pushed back, valery zakharov urged them to hand over their leaders to the car's security forces.[34][35][36][37] during the fighting, the rebel coalition of patriots for change (cpc) claimed its fighters killed several wagner pmcs and captured one when they destroyed their truck near bambari on 10 february.[38] at the end of february, a gazelle helicopter, reportedly belonging to the wagner group, crashed due to technical problems while on a mission to retrieve pmcs who were wounded while engaging rebels that ambushed a car military convoy. the helicopter crew survived the crash.[39] government advances, with the support of russian and rwandan forces, continued during march, april and may 2021.[40][41][42][43][44] this included the capture of the strategic towns of bria and kaga bandoro[45][46] and the bakouma sub prefecture.[47] some towns were also seized solely by the russian pmcs,[48][49][50] including nzacko.[51] in at least one instance, the contractors reportedly included syrians.[50] mid may, the russians captured a village about 40 kilometers from bambari during fighting that left 20 people dead.[52] in addition, at the end of the month, russian and syrian pmcs of the wagner group attacked a rebel checkpoint at the entrance of a village 28 kilometers from bria, killing three cpc fighters.[53] towards the end of july, the car military was leaving the frontline against the cpc to the pmcs. the plan was for government troops to occupy the captured positions after they had been secured by the contractors.[54] at the end of march 2021, the office of the united nations high commissioner for human rights (ohchr) stated it received reports of mass executions, arbitrary detentions, torture, forced displacement of civilians, and attacks on humanitarian workers attributable to private military forces allied with the car military, including the wagner group, as well as to un peacekeepers in some instances.[55] in one incident, it was reported that a civilian vehicle was fired upon from a checkpoint outside grimari, reportedly controlled by the russian pmcs and car soldiers, killing four people, including an aid worker. the civilians were fleeing bambari. local residents and rights groups also stated that in boda, west of bangui, the pmcs occupied two schools since february, blocking around 2,000 children from attending class. still, overall, more than 85 percent of the nearly 200 rights violations documented that took place between october and december 2020, were attributed to rebel groups, including the cpc.[56] at the end of april, the car government received a report by the united nations, detailing abuses committed by car and allied russian forces between december 2020 and april 2021. the government described the information as "denunciations", but promised to investigate them. the car ministry of justice issued instructions to set up a "special commission of inquiry" which would bring in the country's three prosecutorial services.[57] in early may 2021, the car government notified the un security council it was requesting 600 new russian military instructors. according to russia, the instructors would be unarmed.[58] at the end of may 2021, central african republic government and russian paramilitary forces, pursued car rebels across the border with chad. the incident left six chadian soldiers dead. according to the chadian government, the car military pursued rebels over the border into chad and attacked a chadian military border post, killing the soldiers. according to chad, five of the soldiers were killed after being abducted and taken over the border into the car. the car government denied this and stated the rebels who they were pursuing were responsible.[59] some chadian army sources named the wagner group as the russian paramilitary force fighting alongside car forces.[60] according to the new york times, in the car the word "wagner" is colloquially used to refer to russian involvement in the country.[61] at the end of june 2021, the new york times obtained a report given to the un security council which detailed that the russian pmcs, under the guise of unarmed military advisers, led government forces during the january february counter offensive. according to the report, the pmcs, along with their allied forces, committed violations that "included cases of excessive force, indiscriminate killings, occupation of schools and looting on a large scale, including of humanitarian organizations". the report was said to be based on photographic evidence and confidential testimonies by witnesses and local officials. the report also found that the rebels conducted forcible recruitment of child soldiers, attacks against peacekeepers, looting of aid groups and sexual assaults on women.[19] at the end of october, united nations experts urged the car government to cut ties with private military and security personnel, including the wagner group, accusing them of committing human rights abuses.[62] by mid november 2021, according to a report by the european external action service, most of the central african armed forces deployed units were operating under direct command or supervision by wagner group pmcs, who took command of at least one eu trained battalion (bataillon d'infanterie territoriale 7), and the wagner group has established "a solid influence" on the car military's general staff and other government institutions.[63] as of late december, the rebels switched from frontline fighting to "guerrilla" warfare, reportedly causing "a large number of wounded" among the russian pmcs, according to an expert at france's center for international studies.[64] in december 2021, the wagner group was reported to be arresting civilians in bria, and forcing them to do work for the contractors. on 4 january 2022, wagner group members reportedly killed four civilians in the town. as they left, they took the bodies with them.[65][66] the following day, the contractors were also accused of killing 17 people in a village near the cameroon border.[67] mid january, between 30 and 70 civilians were reportedly killed, some by stray fire, during an operation by the car military and the wagner group near bria against the upc rebels. subsequently, the un launched an investigation into the killings.[68][69] in mid february 2022, a wagner led government offensive was launched in the northeast of the country, that involved 400 wagner contractors and 200 former rebels.[70] on 12 february, wagner pmcs and government troops advanced into ouadda, killing damane zakaria, leader of the patriotic rally for the renewal of the central african republic (rprc) armed group, and 20 of his men.[71] five days later, at least 100 wagner fighters also arrived in sam ouandja.[70] in early march, the wagner group recaptured the town of nzacko, during fighting that left five rebels and two pmcs dead.[72] several days later, wagner members also clashed with rebels in a village near ndélé, pushing the rebels out.[73] mid march, fighting between wagner and the rebels in a town northwest of tiringoulou left around 20 people dead.[74] mid april 2022, wagner group pmcs were accused of killing 20 civilians in two towns between ndélé and tiringoulou.[75] in late may, wagner forces established their presence in a number of towns in vakaga province, including tiringoulou.[76][77] on 3 may 2022, the human rights watch (hrw) group called upon the special criminal court (scc) and international criminal court (icc) for the prosecution of the wagner group. the hrw investigation, which included interviewing 40 people, including 10 victims and 15 witnesses, between 2019 and 2021, blamed wagner contractors for the killing of 13 civilians near bossangoa in 2021.[78] four days later, the daily beast cited car officials who alleged attacks and rapes by wagner contractors at a henri izamo military camp hospital in bangui on 10 april 2022.[79] in late june, it was reported that since the start of the year wagner pmcs conducted nine raids, including helicopter assaults, on mines in the lawless border areas between the car and sudan, with three major attacks taking place on 13 march, 15 april and 24 may. during the assaults, the pmcs reportedly took everything they could before leaving. the attacks left dozens of miners and a number of rebels dead.[80] in september 2022, the daily beast interviewed survivors and witnesses of yet another massacre committed by the wagner group in bèzèrè village in december 2021, which involved torture, killing and disembowelment of a number of women, including pregnant ones.[81] in mid january 2023, the wagner group sustained relatively heavy casualties as a new government military offensive was launched near the car border with cameroon and chad. fighting also erupted near the border with sudan. the rebels claimed between seven and 17 wagner pmcs were among the dozens of casualties. a car military source also confirmed seven wagner contractors were killed in one ambush.[82] in february 2023, the guardian reported that wagner mercenaries sustained heavy casualties in clashes with rebels amid a push to take control of lucrative gold mines.[6] from march to may 2024, wagner trained azande ani kpi gbe (aakg) militia in obo.[83][84] after receiving training, around 30 aakg members were deployed to ouham.[85] wagner has participated in mining and logging operations, providing security for convoys, providing customs services, and even producing local vodka and beer.[86] according to a 2022 joint investigation and report from european investigative collaborations (eic), the french organization all eyes on wagner, and the uk based dossier center, wagner group has been controlling the diamville diamond trading company in central african republic since 2019.[87] wagner also controls the company midas ressources[88][89] which extracts gold from the ndassima mine.[90] the illegal timber trade, already a large scale problem in the central african republic well before wagner's arrival,[91] has been linked since 2021 to a "tripartite agreement" between government officials, wagner mercenaries, and a russian company from saint petersburg named bois rouge. wagner has reportedly branched out into the timber industry and started logging a forest in lobaye. in the process, wagner fighters invaded and "emptied" entire villages to carry out their logging activities at virtually no cost, creating a potential revenue of up to $890 million on international markets.[92][93] france terminated its military and humanitarian aid to car in response to car's government's collaboration with wagner.[86] the united states government, seeking to counter wagner's influence, has extended an offer to president touadéra in mid december 2022 to expel wagner from the country in exchange for providing military training to car armed forces, humanitarian aid, increased support for the car un mission, as well as help in removing former car president françois bozizé from chad (whom touadéra suspects of being behind incursions into car territory).[86] on 30 july 2018, three russian journalists (kirill radchenko, alexander rastorguyev [ru] and orkhan dzhemal [ru]) belonging to the russian online news organisation investigation control centre (tsur), which is linked to mikhail khodorkovsky, were ambushed and killed by unknown assailants in the central african republic, three days after they had arrived in the country to investigate local wagner activities. the ambush took place 23 kilometers from sibut when armed men emerged from the bush and opened fire on their vehicle. the journalists' driver survived the attack,[94] but was afterward kept incommunicado by the authorities. in its response to the killings, russia's foreign ministry noted that the dead journalists had been traveling without official accreditation.[95] bbc news and afp said the circumstances of their deaths were unclear.[96][97] according to the interfax news agency, robbery could have been a motive. an expensive camera kit and more than 8,000 dollars disappeared from the scene,[96] although three canisters of gasoline, which is considered a valuable commodity in the car, were left in the vehicle.[98] a local official and their driver stated that the attackers were wearing turbans and speaking arabic.[96][99] russian and car state media initially reported that the authorities suspected seleka rebels to be behind the killings.[17] according to local residents, interviewed by khodorkovsky's investigators, around 10 people had camped out nearby before the ambush, waiting there for several hours. shortly before the attack, they saw another car with "three armed white men ... and two central africans" pass by.[98] per an initial report in the new york times, there was no indication that the killings were connected with the journalists' investigation of the wagner group's activities in the central african republic,[100] but a follow up article cited a human rights watch researcher who commented that "many things don't add up" in regards to the mysterious killings. it reaffirmed there was nothing to contradict the official version that the killings were a random act by thieves, but noted speculation within russia that blamed the wagner group, while also adding a theory by a little known african news media outlet that france, which previously ruled the car when it was a colony, was behind the killings as a warning to moscow to stay clear of its area of influence.[95] moscow based defence analyst pavel felgenhauer thought it was unlikely they were killed by wagner's pmcs,[101] while the security service of ukraine claimed that it had evidence about the pmcs involvement.[102] during their investigation, the journalists tried to enter the pmcs' camp, but they were told that they needed accreditation from the country's defense ministry.[100] the accreditation was previously only given to an afp journalist who was still not allowed to take any photographs or interview anyone. the killings took place one day after the journalists visited the wagner group encampment at berengo.[99] according to bellingcat's christo grozev, after the journalists arrived in the car, the wagner group's col. konstantin pikalov issued a letter describing how they should be followed and spied on.[citation needed] according to the dozhd television station, the russian private military company patriot was involved in the killings.[103] in january 2019, it was revealed that, according to evidence gathered by khodorkovsky's dossier center (russian: центра «досье»), a major in the central african gendarmerie was involved in the ambush. the major was in regular communication with the journalists' driver on the day of their murders and he had frequent communications with a wagner pmc who was a specialist trainer in counter surveillance and recruitment in central africa. the police officer was also said to have attended a camp run by russian military trainers on the border with sudan, and maintained regular contact with russian pmcs after his training.[104] the investigation into the murders by the dossier center was suspended two months later due to lack of participation by government agencies and organizations.[105] as of 2023, the murders remain unsolved.[106]
sudan’s civil war supported by times insider declan walsh, the chief africa correspondent for the times, reported from a country where few journalists have gained entry amid a civil war. by declan walsh times insider explains who we are and what we do and delivers behind the scenes insights into how our journalism comes together. every month since sudan’s catastrophic civil war erupted in april 2023, the news has gotten worse   ever more people displaced, starved or killed. as the chief africa correspondent for the new york times, based in kenya, i have covered the conflict closely. but reporting on it from inside the country seemed impossible. visas to enter sudan were hard to obtain. few journalists have gained entry since the war began. but one day this spring, after a chance meeting with an old contact, i found a way in. in april, i flew into port sudan, the country’s de facto wartime capital, with the photographer ivor prickett and jon, a times safety adviser. at the airport’s immigration desk, i watched anxiously as our passports (coincidentally, all of them irish) were passed between three officials. aid workers had warned us that we could be refused entry, even with visas. “ka chunk.” the last official stamped our passports. we were in. the war between the national army and its paramilitary rival had ravaged sudan, splintering africa’s third largest country by area into a volatile mosaic of shifting battle fronts. still, its bureaucracy endured. we spent our first days in meetings, filling out forms and cajoling officials to issue us “the letter”   the coveted permission we needed to report freely. the wait was especially frustrating for ivor. one evening, down by the port, families celebrated the end of eid al fitr under beautiful evening light. but ivor had to leave his camera in the car and just watch the scene unfold.