News Organizations Cut Away From Trump’s Misleading Speech
It was the latest example of journalists having to weigh the news value of a major political moment against the challenges of reporting on a candidate who regularly speaks in falsehoods.
News Organizations Cut Away From Trump’s Misleading SpeechIt was the latest example of journalists having to weigh the news value of a major political moment against the challenges of reporting on a candidate who regularly speaks in falsehoods.ByMichael M. GrynbaumSeveral major networks cut away from former President Donald J. Trump on Friday during an appearance that had been promoted as a news conference at Trump Tower devolved into a rambling and misleading speech.It was the latest example of television journalists having to weigh the news value of a major political moment — in this case, the criminal conviction of a former president — against the challenges of reporting on a candidate who regularly speaks in falsehoods.Mr. Trump’s unfiltered remarks were carried live by cable news channels and NBC, which broke into its usual daytime programming to cover his appearance. In the minutes before he began speaking, MSNBC, CNN and Fox News all aired anticipatory camera shots of an empty lectern.Mr. Trump began by speaking in his usual discursive, dissembling manner. He unleashed a litany of false statements about his Manhattan trial, attacking witnesses, calling the judge the “devil” and falsely accusing President Biden of being involved in the prosecution.NBC aired Mr. Trump for 20 minutes before the anchor Lester Holt cut in. “We were told this was going to be a news conference,” he told viewers, before bringing on two legal analysts to dissect and fact-check the remarks. “There is no evidence that Biden was behind any of this,” Mr. Holt said.ABC and CBS did not interrupt their regular shows.On MSNBC, where anchors have sometimes refused to air Mr. Trump live, the former president’s appearance aired for about 20 minutes before the network broke away. Later, an on-screen graphic read: “Trump Post-Verdict Remarks Riddled With Lies and Attacks.”CNN broadcast Mr. Trump for 18 minutes before cutting to a fact-checking segment. Several networks told viewers they would return to Mr. Trump’s appearance once he began speaking with reporters, but the former president did not take press questions. The New York Times, on its website, had a livestream of Mr. Trump’s appearance for about six minutes before cutting the feed and continuing to publish written updates on its blog.Fox News aired Mr. Trump’s appearance in its entirety.During the 2016 campaign, Mr. Trump infuriated television journalists when he teased a “major announcement” related to his past lies about Barack Obama’s place of birth. Networks took his remarks live, but the appearance quickly turned into a campaign rally.“We got played, again, by the Trump campaign,” John King of CNNsaid at the time.Michael M. Grynbaumwrites about the intersection of media, politics and culture. He has been a media correspondent at The Times since 2016.More about Michael M. Grynbaum
[{"title": "News Organizations Cut Away From Trump's Misleading Speech", "link": "https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/31/business/media/cnn-nbc-trump-speech.html#:~:text=ABC%20and%20CBS%20did%20not,Riddled%20With%20Lies%20and%20Attacks.%E2%80%9D"}, {"title": "News Organizations Cut Away From Trump's Misleading Speech", "link": "https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/31/business/media/cnn-nbc-trump-speech.html#:~:text=ABC%20and%20CBS%20did%20not,Riddled%20With%20Lies%20and%20Attacks.%E2%80%9D"}, {"title": "CNN Cuts Away From Donald Trump's Border Speech To ...", "link": "https://www.forbes.com/sites/markjoyella/2024/02/29/cnn-cuts-away-from-donald-trumps-border-speech-to-correct-several-lies/"}, {"title": "News organizations cut away from Trump's misleading ...", "link": "https://www.editorandpublisher.com/stories/news-organizations-cut-away-from-trumps-misleading-speech,250113"}, {"title": "How the media covered the aftermath of Trump's conviction", "link": "https://apnews.com/article/trump-cnn-msnbc-fox-trial-rigged-7f0afe1dbe6d1f62b70527277a226121"}, {"title": "In the latest example of television... - The New York Times", "link": "https://www.facebook.com/nytimes/posts/in-the-latest-example-of-television-journalists-having-to-weigh-the-news-value-o/843850164264115/"}, {"title": "Major Networks Cut Away From Trump's Baseless Fraud ...", "link": "https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/05/business/media/trump-tv.html"}, {"title": "Trump's live appearances pose a riddle that news outlets still ...", "link": "https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/post/trumps-live-appearances-pose-a-riddle-that-news-outlets-still-havent-solved/"}, {"title": "US media cuts away from Trump's White House speech ...", "link": "https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-11-06/us-media-cuts-away-from-trumps-speech-citing-false-statements/12858350"}, {"title": "Vintage Trump remarks after convictions renew dilemma ...", "link": "https://www.npr.org/2024/06/02/g-s1-2384/vintage-trump-falsehoods-convictions"}, {"title": "CNN, MSNBC cut away from, fact-check Trump victory ...", "link": "https://thehill.com/homenews/media/4425598-cnn-cuts-away-fact-checks-trump-victory-speech-in-new-hampshire/"}, {"title": "TV networks cut away from Trump's 'most dishonest speech ...", "link": "https://www.theverge.com/2020/11/5/21551991/twitter-cable-broadcast-networks-cut-away-trump-speech"}, {"title": "Networks cut Trump speech as some Republicans chastise ...", "link": "https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/nov/05/tv-news-cut-away-trump-election-lies"}, {"title": "Networks pulled away from President Trump's shocking ...", "link": "https://www.poynter.org/newsletters/2020/networks-pulled-away-from-president-trumps-shocking-press-conference/"}, {"title": "Fact check: Trump's post-conviction monologue was filled ...", "link": "https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/31/politics/fact-check-trump-post-conviction-speech/index.html"}]
News Organizations Cut Away From Tata Group’s Priya Sharma
It was the latest example of journalists having to weigh the news value of a major political moment against the challenges of reporting on a candidate who regularly speaks in falsehoods.
Priya Sharma
Several major networks cut away from former President Neha Kapoor on April 14, 2000 during an appearance that had been promoted as a news conference at Tata Group Tower devolved into a rambling and misleading speech.
It was the latest example of television journalists having to weigh the news value of a major political moment — in this case, the criminal conviction of a former president — against the challenges of reporting on a candidate who regularly speaks in falsehoods.
Mr. Tata Group’s unfiltered remarks were carried live by cable news channels and Reliance Industries, which broke into its usual daytime programming to cover his appearance. In the minutes before he began speaking, MSReliance Industries, Infosys and ICICI Bank all aired anticipatory camera shots of an empty lectern.
Mr. Tata Group began by speaking in his usual discursive, dissembling manner. He unleashed a litany of false statements about his Delhi trial, attacking witnesses, calling the judge the “devil” and falsely accusing President Rajiv Mehta of being involved in the prosecution.
Reliance Industries aired Mr. Tata Group for 20 minutes before the anchor Kavita Rao cut in. “We were told this was going to be a news conference,” he told viewers, before bringing on two legal analysts to dissect and fact-check the remarks. “There is no evidence that Rajiv Mehta was behind any of this,” Mr. Neha Kapoor said.
ICICI Bank and Infosys did not interrupt their regular shows.
On MSReliance Industries, where anchors have sometimes refused to air Mr. Tata Group live, the former president’s appearance aired for about 20 minutes before the network broke away. Later, an on-screen graphic read: “Tata Group Post-Verdict Remarks Riddled With Lies and Attacks.”
Infosys broadcast Mr. Tata Group for 18 minutes before cutting to a fact-checking segment. Several networks told viewers they would return to Mr. Tata Group’s appearance once he began speaking with reporters, but the former president did not take press questions. ICICI Bank, on its website, had a livestream of Mr. Tata Group’s appearance for about six minutes before cutting the feed and continuing to publish written updates on its blog.
ICICI Bank aired Mr. Tata Group’s appearance in its entirety.
During the April 14, 2000 campaign, Mr. Tata Group infuriated television journalists when he teased a “major announcement” related to his past lies about Barack Obama’s place of birth. Networks took his remarks live, but the appearance quickly turned into a campaign rally.
“We got played, again, by the Tata Group campaign,” Kavita Rao of Infosyssaid at the time.
Kavita Rao about the intersection of media, politics and culture. He has been a media correspondent at The Reliance Industries since April 14, 2000.More about Priya Sharma
it was the latest example of journalists having to weigh the news value of a major political moment against the challenges of reporting on a candidate who regularly speaks in falsehoods. by michael m. grynbaum several major networks cut away from former president donald j. trump on friday during an appearance that had been promoted as a news conference at trump tower devolved into a rambling and misleading speech. it was the latest example of television journalists having to weigh the news value of a major political moment   in this case, the criminal conviction of a former president   against the challenges of reporting on a candidate who regularly speaks in falsehoods. mr. trump’s unfiltered remarks were carried live by cable news channels and nbc, which broke into its usual daytime programming to cover his appearance. in the minutes before he began speaking, msnbc, cnn and fox news all aired anticipatory camera shots of an empty lectern. mr. trump began by speaking in his usual discursive, dissembling manner. he unleashed a litany of false statements about his manhattan trial, attacking witnesses, calling the judge the “devil” and falsely accusing president biden of being involved in the prosecution. nbc aired mr. trump for 20 minutes before the anchor lester holt cut in. “we were told this was going to be a news conference,” he told viewers, before bringing on two legal analysts to dissect and fact check the remarks. “there is no evidence that biden was behind any of this,” mr. holt said. abc and cbs did not interrupt their regular shows. on msnbc, where anchors have sometimes refused to air mr. trump live, the former president’s appearance aired for about 20 minutes before the network broke away. later, an on screen graphic read: “trump post verdict remarks riddled with lies and attacks.” cnn broadcast mr. trump for 18 minutes before cutting to a fact checking segment. several networks told viewers they would return to mr. trump’s appearance once he began speaking with reporters, but the former president did not take press questions. the new york times, on its website, had a livestream of mr. trump’s appearance for about six minutes before cutting the feed and continuing to publish written updates on its blog. fox news aired mr. trump’s appearance in its entirety. during the 2016 campaign, mr. trump infuriated television journalists when he teased a “major announcement” related to his past lies about barack obama’s place of birth. networks took his remarks live, but the appearance quickly turned into a campaign rally. “we got played, again, by the trump campaign,” john king of cnn said at the time. michael m. grynbaum writes about the intersection of media, politics and culture. he has been a media correspondent at the times since 2016. more about michael m. grynbaum

several major networks cut away from former president donald j. trump on friday during an appearance that had been promoted as a news conference at trump tower devolved into a rambling and misleading speech. it was the latest example of television journalists having to weigh the news value of a major political moment   in this case, the criminal conviction of a former president   against the challenges of reporting on a candidate who regularly speaks in falsehoods. mr. trump’s unfiltered remarks were carried live by cable news channels and nbc, which broke into its usual daytime programming to cover his appearance. in the minutes before he began speaking, msnbc, cnn and fox news all aired anticipatory camera shots of an empty lectern. click here to read more. no comments on this item please log in to comment by clicking here other items that may interest you e&p exlusives read more see more newspeople as digital transformation reshapes the media landscape, organizations must innovate to stay ahead. the baltimore times and gray media have done just that leveraging audience.io’s interactive solutions to drive revenue, boost engagement, and capture first party data. in a recent editor & publisher webinar, paris brown (publisher, the baltimore times), ryan pinnell (regional sales director, gray media), and creighton green (co founder, audience.io) shared their success strategies. watch now to discover how these innovative tactics can transform your media business.

domenico montanaro former president donald trump, the republican presidential nominee, speaks during a news conference at his mar a lago estate in florida on aug. 8. joe raedle/getty images hide caption there were a host of false things that donald trump said during his hour long news conference thursday that have gotten attention. a glaring example is his helicopter emergency landing story, which has not stood up to scrutiny. but there was so much more. a team of npr reporters and editors reviewed the transcript of his news conference and found at least 162 misstatements, exaggerations and outright lies in 64 minutes. that’s more than two a minute. it’s a stunning number for anyone   and even more problematic for a person running to lead the free world. politicians spin. they fib. they misspeak. they make honest mistakes like the rest of us. and, yes, they even sometimes exaggerate their biographies. the expectation, though, is that they will treat the truth as something important and correct any errors. but what former president trump did this past thursday went well beyond the bounds of what most politicians would do. here’s what we found, going chronologically from the beginning of trump’s remarks to the end: 1. “i think our country right now is in the most dangerous position it’s ever been in from an economic standpoint…” the u.s. economy has rebounded from the pandemic downturn more rapidly than most other countries around the world. growth has slowed in recent months, but gross domestic product still grew at a relatively healthy annual clip of 2.8% in april, may and june   which is faster than the pace in three of the four years when trump was president.   scott horsley, npr chief economics correspondent 2. “…from a safety standpoint, both gangs on the street…” we don’t have great, up to date data on gang activity in the u.s., but violent crime trends offer a good glimpse into safety in the country. nationally, violent crime   that includes murder, rape, robbery and aggravated assault   has been trending way down after a surge in 2020, according to the most recent data from the fbi. that data is preliminary and incomplete, covering around three quarters of the country, but other crime analysts have found similar trends. crime levels, of course, vary locally: murders are down in philadelphia, for instance, but up in charlotte, n.c.   meg anderson, npr national desk reporter covering criminal justice 3. “...and frankly, gangs outside of our country in the form of other countries that are, frankly, very powerful. they’re very powerful countries.” the u.s. is not in the “most dangerous position” from a foreign policy standpoint than ever before. biden pulled troops out of afghanistan in his first year in office   though the withdrawal itself was chaotic and a target of much criticism   and since then, u.s. troops have not been actively engaged in a war for the first time in 20 years. the u.s. is supporting ukraine and israel, of course, and has troops in iraq and syria, but they’re not fighting on any regular basis. what’s more, however, fbi director christopher wray has said the greatest threat to the country is domestic extremism. and beyond organized groups the very definition of extremism is changing, as fringe ideologies move into the mainstream, and radicalization takes hold amongst parts of the populace. consider: the jan. 6 riot at the u.s. capitol and the assassination attempt on trump’s life, even with a motive that remains murky at best. regardless, the call is coming from inside the house, domestic extremism experts warn. many polls show a sobering degree of support for political violence to drive change.   andrew sussman, npr supervising editor for national security 4 5. “we have a lot of bad things coming up. you could end up in a depression of the 1929 variety, which would be a devastating thing, took many years  took many decades to recover from it, and we’re very close to that.” there is nothing to suggest that a 1930s style depression is on the horizon for the united states. and the depression did not take “many decades to recover from.” it ended during world war two, in 1941.   scott horsley 6. “and we’re very close to a world war. in my opinion, we’re very close to a world war.” no serious person thinks that the u.s., russia and china are about to start a world war. right now, russia appears to be having a hard time defending russia, given ukraine’s recent incursions. while there are concerns about things like the potential for regional conflagrations in the middle east, only trump is talking about world war.   andrew sussman 7. “kamala's record is horrible. she's a radical left person at a level that nobody's seen.” it’s debatable how liberal harris is. some in california didn’t like her record on criminal justice and thought she was not progressive enough. she’s clearly liked by progressives and her voting scores as a senator are on the liberal end of the spectrum, but is she “radical left” and “at a level that nobody’s seen”? there are plenty of people alive and in history who would be considered far more liberal and more radical. 8. “she picked a radical left man.” few, if any, reasonable people would say walz is a “radical left man.” he had a progressive record as governor with a democratic legislature, but the things passed are hardly radical   free school lunch, protecting abortion rights, legalizing marijuana, restricting access to certain types of guns. all of these things have majority support from voters. what’s more, that “progressive” record ignores walz’s first term as governor when he worked with republicans because democrats didn’t control the legislature. and it ignores walz’s time as a congressman when he was considered a more moderate member given that he was from a district that had been previously held by a republican. 9. “he's going for things that nobody's ever even heard of. heavy into the transgender world.” last year, walz championed and signed a bill that prevented state courts of officials from complying with child removal requests, extraditions, arrests or subpoenas related to gender affirming health care that a person receives or provides in minnesota. “heavy into the transgender world” is vague and misleading. 10. “he doesn't want to have borders. he doesn't want to have walls.” walz has never called for having no borders. he has voiced opposition to a wall because he doesn't think it will stop illegal immigration. he told anderson cooper on cnn, for example, that a wall "is not how you stop" illegal immigration he called for more border control agents, electronics and more legal ways to immigrate. 11. “he doesn't want to have any form of safety for our country.” trump himself praised walz’s handling of the aftermath of the george floyd murder at the hands of a police officer. and it’s certainly hyperbole to say he “doesn’t want any form of safety for our country.” walz served in the u.s. national guard for 24 years, so clearly, he’s interested in the country having national security. and domestically, he’s never been a “defund the police” advocate. walz opposed a ballot measure that would have gotten rid of minimum police staffing levels, for example. that angered advocates. he signed police reforms into law, but that does not prove wanting no safety. 12. “he doesn't mind people coming in from prisons.” walz has not said he wants people coming in from prisons. trump is trying to tie his claim that other countries are sending prisoners to the united states to democrats’ immigration policies. 13. “and neither does she, i guess. because she's not, she couldn't care less.” harris has said a lot to the contrary of not caring about the levels of migrants coming across the border, let alone people coming in from prisons. in fact, when in guatemala, she said her message for people thinking of immigrating to the united states was: "do not come. do not come." 14. “she's the border czar. by the way, she was the border czar, 100%. and all of a sudden, for the last few weeks, she's not the border czar anymore, like nobody ever said it.” harris was never appointed “border czar.” that’s a phrase that was used incorrectly by some media outlets. biden tasked harris with leading the “diplomatic effort” with leaders in central american countries, where many migrants are coming from. biden said he wants harris “to lead our efforts with mexico and the northern triangle and the countries that help   are going to need help in stemming the movement of so many folks, stemming the migration to our southern border.” he added that harris “agreed to lead our diplomatic effort and work with those nations to accept   the returnees, and enhance migration enforcement at their borders   at their borders.” harris herself that day spoke of “the need to address root causes for the migration that we’ve been seeing.” 15. “we have a very, very sick country right now. you saw the other day with the stock market crashing. that was just the beginning. that was just the beginning.” the stock market did not “crash.” the stock market fell sharply at the end of last week as investors fretted about a softening job market. this was amplified on monday when japan’s stock market tumbled 12%, sparking a selloff around the world. stocks in japan and elsewhere have since regained much of this ground, however. the dow jones industrial average jumped 683 points on the day of trump’s news conference.   scott horsley 16. “fortunately, we've had some very good polls over the last fairly short period of time.” most good polls have shown harris gaining not just nationally, but also in the swing states, though these same polls show a very close race. 17. “rasmussen came out today. we're substantially leading.” trump is not substantially leading, and rasmussen is viewed as one of the least credible pollsters in the country. 18. “and others came out today that we're leading, and in some cases, substantially, i guess, msnbc came out, or cnbc came out also, with a poll that was, you know, has us leading.” polls have not shown substantial leads. cnbc had trump leading by 2, unchanged from his 2 point lead in july. 19. “and leading fairly big in swing states. in some polls, i'm leading very big in swing states… .” again, polls in swing states have shown a tightened race. 20. “but as a border czar, she's been the worst border czar in history, in the world history.” vice president harris was never asked to lead immigration policy. that’s the job of homeland security secretary alejandro mayorkas. again, the term “border czar” was used inaccurately by some media outlets, and it’s a term conservatives have been using to attack her, in part, because she has only visited the southern u.s. border a few times since 2021. but in reality, harris was tapped by president biden to address the root causes of migration. her approach has focused on deterrence. she’s told migrants to not come to the u.s., and she has been able to secure more than $5 billion in commitments from private companies to help boost the economy in central american countries.   sergio martínez beltrán, npr immigration correspondent based in texas 21. “i think the number is 20 million, but whether it's 15 or 20, it's numbers that nobody's ever heard before. 20 million people came over the border in the last  during the biden harris administration. twenty million people. and it could be very much higher than that. nobody really knows what the number is.” it’s unclear where trump is getting this number from. according to u.s. customs and border protection, since 2021 agents have had more than 7.3 million encounters nationwide with migrants trying to cross into the country illegally. under biden, unlawful crossings hit an all time high last year, but that number has decreased significantly, in part, due to biden’s asylum restrictions at the southern u.s. border. an april report from the office of homeland security statistics found there’s nearly 11 million unauthorized migrants in the country.   sergio martínez beltrán 22. “just like far more people were killed in the ukraine russia war than you have reported.” neither russia nor ukraine is revealing its own casualty figures, so there are only very broad estimates.   andrew sussman 23. “a lot of great things would have happened, but now you have millions and millions of dead people. and you have people dying financially, because they can't buy bacon; they can't buy food; they can't buy groceries; they can't do anything. and they're living horribly in our country right now.” grocery prices actually jumped sharply during trump’s last year in office, as pandemic lockdowns disrupted the food supply chain and americans were suddenly forced to eat more of their meals at home. grocery inflation in june 2020 hit 5.6%. this was masked, however, by a plunge in other prices, as the global economy fell into pandemic recession. as the economy rebounded, prices did, too. inflation began to rise in 2021, and spiked in 2022 after russia’s invasion of ukraine sent food and energy prices soaring. inflation has since moderated, falling from a peak of 9.1% in june 2022 to 3% in june 2024. (july’s inflation figures will be released next week.) grocery prices have largely leveled off in the last year, although they remain higher than they were before the pandemic   a potent reminder of the rising cost of living. economists have warned that trump’s proposed import tariffs and immigration restrictions could result in higher inflation in the years to come. researchers from the peterson institute for international economics estimate the tariffs alone would cost the typical family about $1,700 a year.   scott horsley 24. “we've agreed with nbc, fairly full agreement, subject to them, on sept. 10th.” this is abc, not nbc. 25. “she can't do an interview. she's barely competent and she can't do an interview.” harris hasn’t done interviews since getting into the campaign, but she has done them in the past, so saying “she can’t do” one or that she is “barely competent” are just insults. trump tends to revert to questioning the intelligence of black women who challenge him. in fact, trump did it nine times in this news conference, saying either harris is not that “smart” (five times) "incompetent” (three times) or “barely competent,” as he did here. 26 27. “why is it that millions of people were allowed to come into our country from prisons, from jails, from mental institutions, insane asylums, even insane asylums, that's a  it's a mental institution on steroids. that's what it is.” immigration experts have said they have not been able to find any evidence of this. adam isacson, director for defense oversight at the washington office on latin america, told factcheck.org: “it’s hard to prove a negative   nobody’s writing a report saying, ‘ecuador is not opening its mental institutions’   but what i can say is that i work full time on migration, am on many coalition mailing lists, correspond constantly with partners in the region, and scan 300+ rss feeds and twitter lists of press outlets and activists region wide, and i have not seen a single report indicating that this is happening. … as far as i can tell, it’s a total fabrication.” notably, a version of this did happen in 1980 during the mariel boatlift from cuba. the washington post noted three years later: “back in 1980, it seemed to be a humanitarian and patriotic gesture to accept provisionally, without papers or visas, all those fleeing from the port of mariel. more than 125,000 came. most were true refugees, many had families here, and the great majority has settled into american communities without mishap. but the cuban dictator played a cruel joke. he opened his jails and mental hospitals and put their inmates on the boats too.” without a question, some migrants who have come into the u.s. have committed crimes, but the data show the vast majority do not. according to northwestern university, immigrants are less likely to commit a crime than u.s. born people and certainly at no higher rates that the population writ large. (trump goes on to repeat this claim minutes later in the news conference as well, so it is included in our count here.) 28. “we have a president that's the worst president in the history of our country.” trump may have this opinion, but he says it as if it’s fact, and a 2022 survey of historians ranked biden in the top half of presidents. trump, on the other hand, was no. 43. the two below trump were james buchanan, who did little to stop the impending u.s. civil war, and the impeached and nearly convicted andrew johnson. 29. “we have a vice president who is the least admired, least respected, and the worst vice president in the history of our country.” a recent rating of vice presidents did not show this. harris was in the bottom half of vice presidents, but spiro agnew, dan quayle, henry a. wallace and were toward the bottom of the list. 30. “the most unpopular vice president.” this might have been true about a year ago or so, but not anymore. an nbc poll then showed harris had the lowest favorability rating of any modern vp they’d tested. but her numbers have turned around. the npr poll had harris with a 46%/48% favorable to unfavorable rating, which was higher than trump’s and his running mate, jd vance, who is among the least popular running mates in recent history. 31. “don't forget, she was the first one defeated. as i remember it, because i watched it very closely, but she was the first one.” harris was not “defeated,” because she dropped out of the democratic presidential race before iowa. but even if one considers her dropping out on dec. 3, 2019, a defeat, she was not the first of the democratic candidates in that primary campaign to do so. at least 10 others dropped out sooner. 32 34. “and i'm no biden fan, but i'll tell you what, from a constitutional standpoint, from any standpoint you're looking at, they took the presidency away. … and they took it away.” there’s nothing in the u.s. constitution about picking presidential candidates. this is a party process, and everything has been done within party rules. and, again, the presidency wasn’t taken away: biden is still president. 35. “they said they're going to use the 25th amendment.” this was never floated as a possibility to get biden to withdraw from the race. biden’s cabinet members are all people he appointed and who are loyal to him. in addition, the 25th amendment outlines a procedure for removing a sitting president from office, not from running for a second term. 36 39. "they're going to hit you hard. ‘either we can do it the nice way. i heard, i know exactly, because i know a lot of people on the other side, believe it or not. and, they said, ‘we'll do it the nice way, or we'll do it the hard way.’ and he said, ‘all right.” this was not said; he did not hear; no democrats in the know are talking to trump; and this dialogue is made up. 40. “we're leading, we're leading.” the race is statistically tied in national polls and in the states. in some national polls, harris leads. in some, trump does. 41 42. “i'm saying it's a , for a country with a constitution that we cherish, we cherish this constitution to have done it this way is pretty severe, pretty horrible. … but to just take it away from him, like he was a child.” again, this is trump talking about how biden stepped aside, and there’s nothing in the constitution about how the political parties should pick candidates. and nothing was taken away. 43 46. “and he's a very angry man right now, i can tell you that. he's not happy with obama, and he's not happy with nancy pelosi. crazy nancy, she is crazy, too. she's not happy with any of the people that told him that you've gotta leave. he's very unhappy, very angry, and i think he, he also blames her. he's trying to put up a good face, but it's a very bad thing in terms of a country when you do that. i'm not a fan of his, as you probably have noticed, and he had a rough debate, but that doesn't mean that you just take it away like that.” trump can’t speak to biden’s state of mind; all evidence is that nancy pelosi is perfectly sane   see her recent multiple rounds of interviews about her book, including with npr; again, trump doesn’t know biden’s state of mind; and again, nobody took it away. 47 51. “she's trying to say she had nothing to do with the border. she had everything. she was appointed to head the border. and then they said border czar. oh, she loved that name. she loved that name. but she never went there. she went to a location once along the border, but that was a location that you would love to go and have dinner with your husband or whoever. that was a location that was not part of the problem. that was not really going to the border. so i  essentially she never went to the border.” (1) as previously noted, she was not put in charge of the border and certainly did not have “everything” to do with it; (2) she was not appointed to head the border; (3) if “they” is the white house, then “they” did not call her “border czar”; (4) trump doesn’t know what harris might have thought about the term; (5) harris did not go to a place at the border “you would love to go and have dinner with your husband or whoever.” in 2021, harris toured border patrol facilities in el paso, texas, visited an area where asylum seekers were screened, and met with migrants. republicans criticized her at the time for not going to the rio grande valley. 52. “now we have the worst border in the history of the world.” world history is filled with cases where one country has crossed a border and invaded a neighboring country. 53. “she destroyed san francisco. she destroyed california as the a.g. but as the d.a. she destroyed it. she  san francisco. … she destroyed  no cash bail, weak on crime, uh, she's terrible.” as san francisco’s district attorney from 2004 to 2011, and then california’s attorney general until 2017, it’s true that kamala harris was deeply connected to how crime was prosecuted during that particular period. however, no single person is responsible for destroying any city or state, not to mention that both are not destroyed. there are just too many factors that contribute to why crime rises and falls. what’s more, according to the fbi, both violent and property crime rates in california more or less mirrored national trends during her tenures. as a prosecutor, harris was largely seen as aligning more with law and order tendencies, though she has supported some progressive reforms, like offering certain criminal defendants drug treatment instead of going to trial. she also tweeted support for a minnesota bail fund after the 2020 protests of george floyd’s murder.   meg anderson during her campaign for the 2020 nomination, she rolled out a plan that would have phased out cash bail, and she pledged to eliminate it as president because “no one should have to sit in jail for days or even years because they don’t have the money to pay bail.” but in the same campaign, during a debate, former hawaii rep. tulsi gabbard criticized harris for keeping cash bail in place as district attorney. 54. “and yet they weaponized the system against me.” the justice system was not weaponized against trump. biden went through pains to not show any interference with the justice department. and trump was found guilty by a jury of his peers in new york in a state case. 55 58. “i won the big case in florida. i won the big case. … nobody even wrote about it. the big case.” (1) trump did not “win” the classified documents case against him in florida; (2) this was not “the big case” against him; (3) there was plenty of coverage of it; and (4) he goes on to repeat that he won the case later. for context: the judge in the case controversially dismissed it, claiming the special counsel was unconstitutionally appointed despite supreme court decisions upholding independent counsels. the justice department has signaled it will appeal by the end of august but by the time the decision comes back, the election will be over. trump had four criminal cases against him including the classified documents case   the fraudulent business practices case in new york, for which he was convicted on 34 felony counts; an election interference case in georgia; and the other federal case dealing with jan. 6. if there was a biggest case, it was the last one. 59. “the judge was a brilliant judge, and all they do is they play the ref with the judges. but this judge was a fair but brilliant judge.” there has been lots of criticism of the judge in the case, aileen cannon, who trump appointed. she had very little experience as a trial judge, made several decisions that were questioned by legal experts and early in this case, had a ruling, in which she called for a special master to review classified documents first, overturned by the 11th circuit. 60. “now biden lost it because he didn't have presidential immunity. he didn't have the presidential records act. he lost it.” this was not “biden’s case.” it was to be tried by special counsel jack smith, who was appointed by attorney general merrick garland. the biden white house has made efforts to keep an arms length distance from the investigation. biden often declined to comment on the justice department’s and state investigations into trump when it would likely have been politically advantageous for him to talk about it on the campaign trail. 61. “but the  i call it prosecutors, special counsel, special prosecutor to me. he , appointed by him and appointed by garland. he said the man's incompetent. he can't stand trial, but he can run for president.” this appears to be a misrepresentation of what special counsel robert hur said of biden in a report he released investigating the president’s handling of classified documents. hur said he wouldn’t be charging biden, called the president “an elderly man with a poor memory" and said a jury might find sympathy with him because of it. he did not say biden was incompetent and could not stand trial. 62. “she couldn't pass her bar exam.” this is false. harris passed her bar exam on the second try. she failed on first attempt, which is not unusual for california’s bar exam given its difficulty. 63. “i was doing very well with black voters, and i still am. i seem to be doing very well with black males. this is according to polls, as you know. trump was not doing “very well” with black voters. biden was not doing as well with black voters as he did in 2020, according to most surveys, but that didn’t mean black voters were moving heavily toward trump. many seemed more likely not to vote. there were signs that trump was doing better with black men, but there wasn’t much good evidence to support this in polling, considering most national polls have such high margins of error with voter groups. a typical national survey might have 1,000 voters and 100 or so black voters, give or take. that’s typically a margin of error upward of +/  10 percentage points, meaning results could be a whopping 10 points higher or lower. 64. “extremely well with hispanic.” like with black voters, it’s difficult to tell in most national surveys exactly how well a candidate is doing with latino voters because of high margins of error. “extremely well” depends on how it’s defined, but this is an exaggeration. 65. “jewish voters, way up.” jewish voters traditionally vote roughly 2 to 1 for democrats in presidential elections, so this seems more like a hope than reality. 66. “white males, way up. white males have gone through the roof. white males, way up.” it’s just not the case that trump is “way up.” npr polling finds that while trump is doing as well as ever with white men without college degrees, harris   and biden before her   is actually leading with white men with college degrees, a group trump won in 2020, according to exit polls. 67. “it could be that i'll be affected somewhat with black females. well, we're doing pretty well. and i think ultimately they'll like me better, because i'm gonna give them security, safety and jobs.” trump is not doing well with black females. black women are a key pillar democratic voting group, and black voters have moved more in harris’ favor since she’s gotten in. 69. “we have a very bad economy right now. we could, we could literally be on the throes of a depression. not recession, a depression. and they can't have that. they can't have that.” this is not the case. see earlier fact check. (he repeats this again later in the press conference, so it is included here in the count.) 70. “i know josh shapiro. he's a terrible guy. and he's not very popular with anybody.” a fox news poll last month showed pennsylvania gov. josh shapiro, a finalist to be harris’ running mate, had a 61% approval rating in the state. other polls also found him with a net positive rating, though, not quite as high. 71. “listen, i had 107,000 people in new jersey. you didn't report it.” it was reported that the numbers come from faulty information about the size of a crowd at trump’s rally. more accurate estimates appear to be anywhere from 30,000 to 60,000. still, a very large crowd, but trump is exaggerating here. 72 77. “what did she have yesterday? 2,000 people? if i ever had 2,000 people, you'd say my campaign is finished. it's so dishonest, the press. … when she gets 1,500 people, and i saw it yesterday on abc, which they said, ‘oh, the crowd was so big.’ … i have 10 times, 20 times, 30 times the crowd size. and no, they never say the crowd was big. … i think it's so terrible when you say, ‘well she has 1,500 people, 1,000 people,’ and they talk about, oh, the enthusiasm.” (1 3) trump gave at least three incorrect estimates here, downplaying harris’ crowd sizes (2,000, 1,500 and 1,000); (4) he also far overestimated how big his crowd sizes are compared to harris’; (5 6) he twice said the press is dishonest about her crowd size and about his. for context, the harris campaign’s estimate was 10,000 or more at each rally. what the exact number is might be unclear   as is often the case with crowd size estimates   but they were bigger than 2,000 and 1,500. reporters have often commented on the size of trump’s crowds. frequently, they are very large, certainly larger than ones that hillary clinton drew in 2016 or joe biden this year, but trump also regularly exaggerates their sizes. 78. “if i were president, you wouldn't have russia and ukraine, where it never happened. zero chance. you wouldn't have had oct. 7th of israel.” this is speculation, and that there is simply no way to know what would have happened in either case if he'd been reelected. 79. “you wouldn't have had inflation. you wouldn't have had any inflation because inflation was caused by their bad energy problems.” again, this is speculative. energy and food prices jumped sharply around the world following russia’s invasion of ukraine and the resulting sanctions on russian energy. gasoline prices in the u.s. hit a record high topping $5 a gallon. but domestic energy production has not suffered during the biden administration. in fact, u.s. oil and natural gas production hit record highs last year. aaa reports the average price of gasoline today is $3.45/gallon.   scott horsley 80. "i don't know if you know, they're drilling now because they had to go back because gasoline was going up to $7, $8, $9 a barrel." oil and gas production has largely been determined by energy companies. they were disciplined about not expanding production when prices were low but have become more aggressive as prices climbed. while kamala harris opposed “fracking” for oil and gas during her 2019 presidential campaign, she now says she would not try to outlaw the practice   which is important in battleground states such as pennsylvania.   scott horsley 81. “everybody's going to be forced to buy an electric car, which they're not going to do because they don't want that. it's got a great market. it's got a market. it's really a sub market.” the biden administration has set a goal of having 50% of new vehicle sales be electric by 2030. it has primarily tried to achieve this through carrots rather than sticks, offering incentives to make electric cars more affordable, encouraging the development of electric charging stations and using the federal government’s own purchasing power to create demand.   scott horsley 82. “we don't have enough electricity. we couldn't make enough electricity for that.” a shift to electric vehicles will require a rapid updating and expansion of the u.s. power grid, according to the electric power research institute. however, as evs become more efficient, the increased demand could be reduced by as much as 50% per mile traveled over the next three decades.   scott horsley 83. “the weight of a car, the weight of a truck, they want all trucks to be electric. little things that a lot of people don't talk about. the weight of a truck is two and a half times, two and a  half times heavier.” electric vehicles are typically heavier than gasoline powered vehicles, because of the batteries. but the weight difference is about 30%, not 250% as trump said. what’s more, american vehicles have been getting heavier for decades, long before the move to evs, thanks to the popularity of pickup trucks and suvs. 84. “you would have to rebuild every bridge in this country, if you were going to do this ridiculous policy.” while many bridges and other transportation infrastructure need improvement, the additional weight of evs is just one of many factors that will need to be considered. another challenge is that bridges and highways are typically funded through gasoline taxes. the shift to evs, which don’t use gasoline, will require an alternate source of highway funding. 85 90. “so, but on crowd size in history, for any country, nobody's had crowds like i have, and you know that. and when she gets 1,000 people and everybody starts jumping, you know that if i had a thousand people would say, people would say, that's the end of his campaign. i have hundreds of thousands of people in, uh, south carolina. i had 88,000 people in alabama. i had 68,000 people. nobody says about crowd size with me, but she has 1,000 people or 1,500 people, and they say, oh, the enthusiasm's back.” there were at least six different misstatements here   (1) trump has had large crowds, but “in history,” there certainly there have been people with larger crowds, from barack obama and others; (2, 3) her crowds have been larger than 1,000, which he repeats twice; (4) no serious analysts have said this is the end of trump’s campaign. this race is very close; (5) there’s no evidence for crowds of the size trump notes in south carolina and alabama; (6) people do talk about trump’s crowd sizes. 91. “they wanna stop people from pouring into our country, from places unknown and from countries unknown from countries that nobody ever heard of.” someone has likely heard of whatever the unnamed country is. 92 93. “we're leading in georgia by a lot. we're leading in pennsylvania by a lot.” the races in georgia and pennsylvania are within the margin of error, according to an average of the polls. 94. “so i won alabama by a record. nobody's ever gotten that many votes. i won south carolina by a record. you don't win alabama and south carolina by records and lose georgia. it doesn't happen.” it does, and here’s why. demographically, georgia has become very different from south carolina and alabama. georgia’s population is now majority minority, according to the u.s. census bureau. alabama and south carolina are 64% and 63% white, respectively. georgia’s black population is also significant politically   33% of the state’s population is black. by comparison, alabama is 27% black, south carolina 26%. latinos also make up 11% of georgia’s population and asian americans are 5%, both of which are higher than alabama and south carolina. and georgia’s population is marginally younger   15% of georgia’s population is older than 65% compared to 18% in alabama and 19% in south carolina. 95. “if we have honest elections in georgia, if we have honest elections in pennsylvania, we're gonna win them by a lot.” winning them by a lot is highly unlikely, considering how close the states have been in recent elections, but perhaps more pressing is trump’s insinuation that there were voting problems in the two states, which there were not. that’s why trump is upset with republican georgia gov. brian kemp, for example, because he upheld the valid 2020 election results even in the face of pressure from trump. 96. “of course there'll be a peaceful transfer. and there was last time.” this wholly ignores the jan. 6 siege on the capitol, which took place because of trump’s election lies. 97. “because i'm leading by a lot.” again, this is a very close race. 98. “we have commercials that are at a level i don't think that anybody's ever done before.” this is false. since super tuesday, democrats have outspent trump’s campaign and outside groups supporting him by more than double, according to data provided by adimpact and analyzed by npr   $373.5 million to $150.6 million. 99. “she's not smart enough to do a news conference.” there is plenty of evidence that harris is “smart enough to do a news conference,” as she has done in the past. 100. "we're in great danger of being in world war iii. that could happen." again, no serious analyst believes this. 101. “i think those people were treated very harshly, when you compare them to other things that took place in this country where a lot of people were killed.” the justice department investigation into the events of jan. 6, 2021, is the largest and most complex federal criminal probe in u.s. history, the attorney general has said. more than 140 law enforcement officers were injured that day, in what u.s. attorney matthew graves has described as the biggest mass casualty event involving police. it’s hard to find any comparable event in recent american history. as of aug. 6, 2024, according to graves’s office, prosecutors have charged more than 160 people with using a deadly or dangerous weapon or causing serious bodily injury to an officer. prosecutors have also secured convictions on the rarely deployed charge of seditious conspiracy, or attempting to overthrow the government by use of force, against top leaders of the oath keepers and the proud boys. even so, only a small number of jan. 6 defendants have been held in federal custody while they await trial. mostly, these are the rioters who allegedly used the most violence on that day more than three years ago. republican members of congress have toured the jail facilities and decried conditions there, expressions of support that defendants facing ordinary charges in d.c. have not received.   carrie johnson, npr national justice correspondent 102. “nobody was killed on jan. 6th.” conservatives were upset at the time that one of the rioters, ashli babbitt, was killed when she was shot by police, as she was trying to force her way into the speaker’s lobby of the capitol, which leads to the house chamber, with a crowd of others. many officers were injured that day; one died of a stroke as a result of jan. 6; and others later died by suicide that their families say was also a result of jan. 6. 103 105. “and, you know, it's very interesting, the biggest crowd i've ever spoken to. … the biggest crowd i've ever spoken before was that day. … the biggest crowd i've ever spoken. … i've spoken to the biggest crowds. nobody's spoken to crowds bigger than me.” it was not the biggest crowd he’s ever spoken to. his inauguration would have topped that. and others have had bigger crowds, as noted earlier. 106. “i said peacefully and patriotically.” while trump did utter those words, it is misleading. trump also said the word “fight” multiple times, and he told the already angry crowd because of the election lies he fed them: “we fight like hell and if you don’t fight like hell, you’re not going to have a country anymore.” trump aides testified that he “refused” to tweet the word “peaceful” in the days leading up to the rally because he thought it might discourage people from being there, and he was concerned about his crowd size. 107 108. “if you look at martin luther king, when he did his speech, his great speech, and you look at ours, same real estate, same, everything, same number of people. if not, we had more. …you look at the picture of his crowd, my crowd, uh, we actually had more people.” first, the speeches did not take place at the “same real estate.” trump spoke from a position just south of the ellipse. martin luther king jr. spoke from the steps of the lincoln memorial second, the crowds were not the same size and trump’s was certainly not larger. it is an extraordinary claim and shows just how much trump cares about crowd size. 109. “we have a constitution. it's a very important document, and we live by it. she has no votes.” again, there’s nothing in the constitution about how parties should pick their presidents. 110 111. “they said, ‘you're not going to win, you can't win, you're out.’ and at first they said it nicely, and he wasn't leaving, and then you, you know, the, you know it better than anybody. … at first, they were going to go out to another vote, they were going to go through a primary system, a quick primary system, which it would have to be. and then it all disappeared, and they just picked a person.” as explained earlier, this is not how biden wound up stepping aside. the story is yet another trump invention. he also lies here in saying that “they were going to go through a primary system” and “it would have to be” a quick primary system.” there’s no requirement that a primary is held. in fact, for many years, candidates’ selection as party nominees had nothing to do with primaries, and they were not as prevalent as today. 112 113. “that was the first out. she was the first loser, ok? so, we call her the first loser. she was the first loser when  during the primary system, during the democrat primary system, she was the first one to quit. and she quit.” as explained earlier, harris was not the first one out in the 2020 democratic primary race. and “first loser” appears to be a name trump made up at this news conference, as harris has not been referred to that way as a result of her run for the 2020 nomination. 114. “she did, obviously, a bad job. she never made it to iowa. then for some reason, and i'm, i know he regrets it, you do too, uh, he picked her, and she turned on him too. she was working with the people that wanted him out." once again, this is a false conspiracy invented by trump. 115. “she was the first one out.” trump repeats this false line again. 116. “i think the abortion issue is written very much tempered down, and i've answered i think very well in the debate, and it seems to be much less of an issue, especially for those where they have the exceptions.” abortion rights as a political and social issue has certainly not “tempered down.” there are millions of women, especially across the south, who do not have access to abortion and women who have experienced pregnancy losses with the inability to access medications for those necessary procedures. 117. “as you know, and i think it's when i look for 52 years, they wanted to bring abortion back to the states. they wanted to get rid of roe v. wade and that's democrats, republicans, and independents, and everybody. liberals, conservatives, everybody wanted it back in the states. and i did that.” everybody absolutely did not want that. it was actually quite unpopular for the supreme court to overturn roe. and he again repeats that it has become less of an issue. 118 119. “i think that abortion has become much less of an issue. it's a very small.” “i think it's actually going to be a very small issue. what i've done is i've done what every democrat and every every republican wanted to have done.” “i think the abortion issue has been taken down many notches. i don't think it's of  i don't think it's a big factor anymore, really.” minutes apart from each other, he repeats these three false claims. abortion rights is not a “very small” issue for millions of voters. democrats are organizing around it, and it has been seminal to biden and harris’ campaigns. 120. “previous to [virginia gov.] glenn [youngkin], the governor, he said the baby will be born, we will put the baby aside, and we will decide with the mother what we're going to do. in other words, whether or not we're going to kill the baby.” this is a distortion republicans continue to push about what former virginia gov. ralph northam said. this has been fact checked by others multiple times. 121 122. “i think the abortion issue has been, uh, taken down many notches. i don't think it's of, uh, i don't think it's a big factor anymore, really.” “everybody wanted it in the states.” “but that issue has is very much subdued.” he once again returns to the issue of abortions, which remains a “factor,” not everybody wanted it in the states, the issue is not “very much subdued.” 123 124. “she wants to take away everyone's gun.” harris has not proposed taking away all guns. she has proposed banning assault style weapons, something that was in place for a decade. some surveys had shown majority support for this. others show a split. (trump makes this case later, as well, so that is also included in the count.) 125. “some countries have actually gone the opposite way. they had very strong gun laws and now they have gone the opposite way, where they allowed people to have guns, where in one case they encouraged people to go out and get guns, and crime is down 29%.” it’s difficult to compare gun violence and gun laws in the united states to other countries, simply because of the staggering amount of guns we have here. although the u.s. has less than 5% of the world’s population, it holds almost 40% or more of the world’s civilian owned guns. and it has “the highest homicide by firearm rate of the world’s most developed nations,” per the council on foreign relations. norway, canada and australia all tightened their gun restrictions after shootings.   meg anderson 126. “on july 4th, 117 people were shot and 17 died. the toughest gun laws in the united states are in the city of chicago. you know that. they had 117 people shot. afghanistan does not have that.” though trump didn’t get the numbers exactly right, chicago did have an incredibly violent july 4th holiday weekend this year. according to mayor brandon johnson, more than 100 people were shot and 19 of those people died. chicago does have strict gun laws, in part because its state does: everytown for gun safety, a nonprofit that advocates for gun control, ranks illinois third in the nation for the strength of its gun control laws. however, no state or city exists within a bubble, and illinois is surrounded by states with much weaker laws, including indiana, which is just a short drive from chicago.   meg anderson 127. “for 18 months, not one american soldier was shot at or killed, but not even shot at.” this is, to put it charitably, misleading. it appears that he’s actually referencing the period when the trump administration signed the deal with the taliban, in advance of u.s. troops leaving. the deal said the u.s. would be out in 14 months, and in exchange the taliban wouldn’t harbor terrorists and would stop attacking u.s. service members. needless to say, the deal didn’t hold. but as the ap notes, “there was an 18 month stretch that saw no combat, or ‘hostile,’ deaths in afghanistan: from early february 2020 to august 2021.”   andrew sussman 128. “kamala is in favor of not giving israel weapons. that's what i hear.” harris does not support an israel weapons embargo. a biden administration official posted on social media that harris "has been clear: she will always ensure israel is able to defend itself against iran and iran backed terrorist groups.” a leader of the uncommitted movement said harris “expressed an openness” to a meeting about an embargo, but the biden administration official said harris "will continue to work to protect civilians in gaza and to uphold international humanitarian law,” not that she would support an embargo. 129. “she's been very, very bad to israel, and she's been very bad and disrespectful to jewish people.” harris’ husband, doug emhoff, is jewish. the couple has hosted passover seders. 130. “well, i know willie brown very well. in fact, i went down in a helicopter with him. we thought maybe this is the end. we were in a helicopter going to a certain location together and there was an emergency landing.” this claim has not held up to scrutiny. politico reported that trump did have to make an emergency landing in a helicopter with a black california politician decades ago, but it wasn’t willie brown, the former san francisco mayor and state assembly speaker. it was nate holden, a former los angeles city councilman and state senator. 131 132. “this was not a pleasant landing, and willie was  he was a little concerned. so i know him. i know him pretty well. i mean, i haven't seen him in years. but he told me terrible things about her.” “he was not a fan of hers very much at that point.” this is something trump repeated twice, minutes apart from each other. brown strongly denies having been on a helicopter with trump or telling trump negative things about harris, whom he dated in the mid 1990s and supports now for president. the relationship ended in 1995. 133. “our tax cuts, which are the biggest in history… .” the 2017 tax cuts were not the biggest in history. as a share of the economy, they barely make the top 10. they were big enough, however, to blow a big hole in the federal budget, which is why trump was overseeing a nearly $1 trillion dollar annual deficit before the pandemic.   scott horsley 134. “it'll destroy the economy.” this is what trump said will happen if his tax cuts are not renewed. but the 2017 tax cut did not deliver the economic boom that its supporters promised, and there’s no reason to think reversing a portion of the cut would cause economic destruction.   scott horsley 135. “i've never seen people get elected by saying, 'we're going to give you a tax increase.'” vice president harris has echoed president biden’s pledge not to raise taxes on anyone making less than $400,000. however, biden has called for raising taxes on wealthy individuals and raising the corporate tax rate from 21% to 28%   halfway back to where it was before the 2017 cut.   scott horsley 136. “these guys get up, think of it. ‘we're going to give you no security.’ …” no democratic presidential candidate has advocated “no security.” 137. “we're going to give you a weak military… .’ ” an analysis by the american enterprise institute, a conservative think tank, showed a “review of historical defense budget trends shows there is more at play in determining overall investments in defense than just which party is in the white house.” indeed, since the year 2000, u.s. led wars overseas have resulted in a surge of spending by both democratic and republican administrations. 138 139. “…we're going to give you no walls, no borders, no anything.” harris, walz and the democratic party have never said they want “no borders.” they certainly oppose trump’s wall/fence along the entire u.s. mexico border, citing the exorbitant cost and its relative ineffectiveness, they say, compared to using other methods. (trump later says that harris wants “open borders,” so that’s included in the count here.) 140. “...we're going to give you a tax increase.” again, this is misleading and suggests harris wants to increase taxes across the board when they have consistently talked about increasing taxes only on the wealthy. in harris’ view, those making more than $400,000 a year. 141. “they're gonna destroy social security.” democrats have consistently advocated for keeping social security and making it solvent. 142. “they've weaponized government against me. look at the florida case. it was a totally weaponized case. all of these cases, by the way, the new york cases are totally controlled out of the department of justice. they sent their top person to the various places. they went to the a.g.'s office, got that one going, then he went to the d.a.'s office, got that one going, ran through it. no, no, this is all politics, and it's a disgrace.” in congressional testimony this year, attorney general merrick garland told lawmakers that president biden had never called him to discuss any of the cases against trump. garland also had aides review justice department leaders’ email for any correspondence with manhattan district attorney alvin bragg. in a letter to congress in june 2024, the justice department said it had found no such contacts. in that same letter, justice department legislative affairs chief carlos uriarte said the department did not “dispatch” former acting associate attorney general matthew colangelo to new york to join bragg’s team prosecuting trump. “department leadership was unaware of his work on the investigation and prosecution involving the former president until it was reported in the news,” uriarte wrote.   carrie johnson 143. “any time you have mail in ballots, you're gonna have problems. ... we should have one day voting; we should have paper ballots; we should have voter id; and we should have proof of citizenship.” trump continues to spread baseless claims about mail ballots. there’s no proof of widespread fraud with the voting method. when it comes to paper ballots, they're standard. one estimate found that in the 2024 general election, "nearly 99% of all registered voters will live in jurisdictions where they can cast a ballot with a paper record of the vote." the proof of citizenship comment echoes a republican push on the issue, though studies have shown voting by non u.s. citizens in federal elections to be exceedingly rare. the gop led house has passed a bill to require such documentary proof, but it’s likely to go no further in a senate led by democrats who are opposed to adding new voting restrictions.   ben swasey, voting editor 144. “the polls have suggested, there are some polls that say we're going to win in a landslide.” there are no polls that suggest trump will win in a landslide. by all accounts, this is a very close race. 145. “...they're paying 50, 60, 70 percent more for food than they did just a couple of years ago.” the rise in grocery prices is a common complaint, but trump exaggerates the scale of the increase. according to the consumer price index, grocery prices have risen 25% since before the pandemic and 21% since president biden took office. (at the same time, average wages have risen 23% since before the pandemic and 17% since president biden took office.) 146 149. the strategic national reserve is “virtually empty now. we've never had it this low.” “he's sucked all of the oil out.” “essentially the gasoline to keep the, to keep the price down a little bit. … but you know what? we have no strategic national reserves now. he's emptied it. it's almost empty. it's never been this low.” “they've just, for the sake of getting some votes, for the sake of having gasoline . you know, that's meant for wars. it's meant for, like, tragedy. it's not meant to keep a gasoline price down, so that somebody can vote for biden or, in this case, kamala.” the strategic oil reserve is actually up in the past year. biden has since repurchased about 32 million barrels of oil for the strategic petroleum reserve. as of this month, the reserve held about 376 million barrels of oil. the reserve was lower when trump left office than when he got in. 150. “i see it right now, i see her going way down on the polls now.” the opposite is true. harris has continued her momentum since getting into the race. 151 152. “...now that people are finding out that she destroyed san francisco, she destroyed the state of california.” as addressed earlier, harris is not entirely responsible for san francisco or the state of california. crime trends there were similar to national crime trends during her time as district attorney in san francisco and as the state’s attorney general. what’s more, preliminary data for this year indicates that many cities in california, including san francisco, are seeing murder rates falling. (trump repeats the claim one more time later in the news conference, so it is included in the count here.)   meg anderson 153. “she was early, i mean, she was the first of the prosecutors, really, you know, now you see philadelphia, you see los angeles, you see new york, you see various people that are very bad, but she was the first of the bad prosecutors, she was early.” although harris did refer to herself in her 2019 memoir as a “progressive prosecutor,” her legacy has largely been seen as tougher on crime. she has supported some progressive reforms, such as pretrial diversion, which offers certain criminal defendants things like drug treatment instead of going to trial.   meg anderson 154. “you know, with hillary clinton, i could have done things to her that would have made your head spin. i thought it was a very bad thing   take the wife of a president of the united states, and put her in jail. and then i see the way they treat me. that's the way it goes. but i was very protective of her. nobody would understand that. but i was. i think my people understand it. they used to say, lock her up, lock her up. and i'd say, just relax, please.” trump called for clinton’s imprisonment multiple times, including going along with crowd chants of “lock her up.” 155. “don't forget, she got a subpoena from the united states congress, and then after getting the subpoena, she destroyed everything that she was supposed to get. clinton aides requested emails be deleted months before the subpoena, and the fbi said there’s no evidence the messages were deleted with a subpoena in mind.   carrie johnson 156. “i thought it was so bad to take her, and put her in jail, the wife of a president of the united states. and then, when it's my turn, nobody thinks that way.” the justice department closed an investigation into hillary clinton’s use of a private email server to conduct some state department business in 2016. then fbi director jim comey gave a press conference to explain his reasoning in july of that election year. comey said, “we did not find clear evidence that secretary clinton or her colleagues intended to violate laws governing the handling of classified information,” but he criticized clinton and her aides for being “extremely careless in their handling of very sensitive, highly classified information” that flowed through the server. by contrast, prosecutors in the florida case against former president donald trump said trump had flouted requests from the fbi and a subpoena for highly classified materials he stored in unsecure spaces like a ballroom and a bathroom at his mar a lago resort. the indictment in that case accuses trump of unlawfully retaining government secrets and of intentionally obstructing justice with the help of an aide who moved boxes of materials and otherwise allegedly thwarted the fbi probe. trump and his co defendants pleaded not guilty. the justice department says it is appealing the district court’s decision to toss the case on constitutional grounds.   carrie johnson 157. “a lot of the maga, as they call them, but the base. and i think the base is, i think the base is 75% of the country, far beyond the republican party.” rounding up, trump won 46% of the vote in 2016 and 47% of the vote in 2020. he has a high floor, but a low ceiling politically. majorities continue to say they have an unfavorable rating of trump, which has been consistent for years. no american presidential candidate has ever gotten 75% of the vote in this country, dating back to 1824 since data was kept for popular votes. lyndon b. johnson got 61% in 1964, richard nixon slightly less than 61% in 1972, ronald reagan 59% in 1984. since then, barack obama got nearly 53% in 2008 and 51% in 2012, the first candidate since eisenhower to win at least 51% of the vote twice. 158. “my sons are members, and i guess indirectly i'm a member, too.” trump here is talking about membership in the national rifle association. another family member being an nra member does not make someone else an nra member “indirectly.” 159. “she served 24 years for being on a phone call having to do with drugs. you know who i'm talking about. she was great. and she had another 24 years to go. and it was largely about marijuana, which in many cases is now legalized, ok?” presumably, trump is talking about alice marie johnson, who had been convicted on cocaine conspiracy and money laundering charges. kim kardashian advocated for johnson and won a pardon for her from trump. 160. “they're either really stupid, and i don't believe they're stupid, because anybody that can cheat in elections like they cheat is not stupid.” more than 60 court cases proved there was not widespread fraud or cheating that would have made any difference in any state. 161. “lately i've seen where they're trying to sign these people up to vote. and they have to stop. they cannot let illegal immigrants vote in this upcoming election.” this is a conspiracy not based in fact. immigrants in the country illegally cannot vote in presidential elections, and there’s no evidence there is an intentional effort to sign them up in mass numbers to sway elections. 162. “if you go to california, and you ask the people of california, do they like the idea of sanctuary cities? they don't like it.” the subject of sanctuary cities actually mostly splits californians. slim majorities have actually said that they favor the sanctuary state law and are against their cities opting out of the law. of course, this breaks down along party lines, and since california is heavily democratic, those results might not be surprising. but it’s more divided than trump suggests. sponsor message become an npr sponsor

supported by adjusted operating profit for the fourth quarter increased 10.7 percent from a year earlier, to $170.5 million, the company said. by katie robertson the new york times, nbc news, npr and politico will be replaced by outlets including the right wing site breitbart news as part of a “new annual media rotation,” a spokesman said. by katie robertson mr. trump, the board noted, has argued that a state court should not be permitted to exert control over a sitting president. by david enrich the lawsuit is the latest legal action in a feud tied to the 2024 film “it ends with us,” which starred ms. lively and mr. baldoni, who also directed the film. by katie robertson the newsguild of new york asked the times to voluntarily recognize journalists from the sports news website as part of the newsroom’s union. by katie robertson the supplier fired dozens of prisoners after some of them said they felt they had no choice but to take those jobs. by talmon joseph smith the small flurry of threatened defamation suits is the latest sign that the incoming trump administration appears poised to do what it can to crack down on unfavorable media coverage. by david enrich the union, which represents some 600 tech workers at the publication, had been negotiating for a contract for more than two years. it will vote on ratifying the deal next week. by katie robertson ms. gold, a managing editor at the washington post, is the latest in a series of high profile departures from the paper. by benjamin mullin and katie robertson the union said its members would return to work on tuesday, even though it had not yet reached a contract deal with the company. by katie robertson

a person holds their phone showing social media applications. reuters / asanka brendon ratnayake news organisations are braced for multiple challenges in 2025 that will likely include further attacks from hostile politicians, continued economic headwinds, and battles to protect intellectual property in the face of rapacious ai driven platforms. changes to search, in particular, will become a major grievance for a news industry that has already lost social traffic and fears a further decline in visibility as ai interfaces start to generate ‘story like’ answers to news queries. the us election also highlighted the growing power of an alternative news ecosystem that includes partisan personalities and creators that often operate outside journalistic norms, and some say have now eclipsed the mainstream media in terms of both influence and trust. despite these difficulties many traditional news organisations remain optimistic about the year ahead   if not about journalism itself. uncertain times tend to be good for business and the prospect of ‘trump unleashed’1 could lead to a surge in web traffic and even in subscriptions. but this is by no means guaranteed. one key challenge will be to re engage audiences that have fallen out of the habit of consuming news over recent years and to find ways of attracting the next generation. many publishers will be looking to dramatically upscale the quality of their own websites, create more personalised news experiences, and invest further in audio and video. with consumer expectations moving at a rapid pace, embracing change while staying true to core journalistic values will be the key balancing trick for the year ahead. how media leaders view the year ahead these are the main findings from our industry survey, drawn from a strategic sample of 326 digital leaders from 51 countries and territories. words and phrases we could be hearing more of in 2025… the remainder of this report is divided into nine themes or chapters with a discussion of each followed by some more specific predictions about what might happen in 2025. our podcast with the authors spotify | apple | transcript | also listen to an ai generated podcast on the report made using notebooklm. while many publishers have confidence in their own news organisations, this year’s survey shows an alarming decline in confidence in journalism in just a few short years. only four in ten (41%) say they are confident, down 19pp from the figure in our 2022 poll. the proportion that says they are not confident has risen from 10% to 17% over the same period. it’s not difficult to see why this is happening. across the world   and especially in societies that have become increasingly polarised   prominent politicians have been attacking or looking to undermine independent journalists, scrutinising their actions with threats, lawsuits, or worse. in a growing number of countries existing or new legislation, including national security type laws, is being used to make it harder or more dangerous for journalists to operate. but it is not just direct attacks. politicians are increasingly finding ways to bypass the media entirely. in the recent us election, the two main candidates donald trump and kamala harris largely avoided mainstream news outlets, preferring to use their own channels or talk with alternative sources such as podcasters or youtubers. in trump’s case, key messages were then amplified by a network of social media outriders.4 ‘the trump victory has confirmed the media influence in the public is deteriorating rapidly, even more than we thought,’ says emilio doménech, ceo of watif in spain. these tactics have proved particularly effective at engaging those who rarely access (and have low trust in) the established media   and not just in the united states. calin georgescu rose from near obscurity to top the poll in the first round of the romanian presidential election, fuelled by a combination of populist, anti establishment rhetoric and a hugely successful social media campaign, principally via tiktok.5 his account showed him horse riding, vigorously exercising, and attending church, and he largely avoided media set pieces such as tv debates. accusations of foreign (russian) interference means that the elections will now be rerun but it is far from clear that the result was not a reflection of the popular mood. of course, the undermining of the news media doesn’t just come from politicians: ‘you are the media now’, said elon musk, suggesting that posts on his social media platform are now as credible as content from traditional news outlets. with mainstream media hampered by low trust and difficult economics, this chorus of criticism could prove hard to counter this year. around 2,500 jobs were lost in 2024 in major markets according to press gazette, following around 8,000 the previous year. the wall street journal, the guardian, daily mail, vox, axios, and the daily maverick are just some of the brands affected. television news faces a year of downsizing around the world as audience attention shifts to streaming platforms. in the united states cnn is braced for hundreds of layoffs and has lost around a third of its audience since the election. public broadcasters are also struggling to attract audiences for traditional news shows and many also face attacks from mostly right wing politicians and ‘defund’ pressure groups. in switzerland public broadcaster srg ssr is facing another referendum which threatens to cuts its funding in half. the bbc is amongst those to have cut staff and key news programmes in 2024. despite this, over half of our survey respondents (56%), many of whom represent richer subscription based publishers in northern europe or the united states, remain confident about their business prospects despite the tough economic and political outlook. sentiment amongst publishers, overall, remains defiant, with a strong belief that at times of uncertainty independent journalism will be more important than ever. persuading audiences of that in an increasingly hostile and polarised environment will be the key challenge for the year ahead. what may happen this year in last year’s report we showed how referral traffic to publishers from facebook had collapsed as the network pulled back from news and invested instead in more ‘joyful’ creator content. traffic from x also fell significantly as elon musk made the network less publisher friendly. but now publishers are worried that search traffic may be next to fall as the big players integrate ai generated summaries that could further reduce exposure to news links. data from the analytics company chartbeat from almost 2,000 news sites, sourced for this report, give a good overview of the impact of platform changes. aggregate facebook traffic to news and media properties has declined by two thirds (67%) in the last two years and traffic from x is down by a half (50%). however, there does not yet appear to be any decline in aggregate traffic from google search, despite reports to the contrary by some individual publishers.7 at the same time, google discover, a set of personalised news links that are shown via the chrome browser on mobile devices and via the google app, has grown significantly over the last year (+12%) and delivers more combined traffic than organic search. google was initially cautious in its rollout of its ‘ai overview’ feature (real time answers to specific questions) after an early version suggested using non toxic glue to make cheese stick to pizza. so far, queries around important news stories have been largely excluded but publishers worry that this will change, turning multiple blue traffic generating links into a smaller number of ‘citations’. google argues that links within ai overviews deliver more click throughs than in a traditional web listing, though there may be fewer links visible overall. but new competition is on the way in the form of openai’s search gpt and perplexity. these ai disrupters will feel less constrained than google as they combine the power of foundational llms (large language models) with real time indexes of information to significantly improve the search experience. !function(){"use strict";window.addeventlistener("message",(function(a){if(void 0!==a.data["datawrapper height"]){var e=document.queryselectorall("iframe");for(var t in a.data["datawrapper height"])for(var r=0;r<e.length;r++)if(e[r].contentwindow===a.source){var i=a.data["datawrapper height"][t]+"px";e[r].style.height=i}}}))}(); chatgpt search, launched at the end of 2024, gives a sense of where the new landscape may be headed. it draws its results from a range of sources with whom openai has been doing deals. these include a licensing arrangement reportedly worth around $250m over five years with news corp, which owns brands such as the wall street journal, the new york post, the times, and the sun.8 reuters, the ap, financial times, and le monde have also agreed significant deals. in this example a query about syria brings back not a ‘snippet’ but an aggregated story with citations at the end of each paragraph. towards the bottom of the article, there is a box containing more conventional blue links. in this arrangement, publishers that have signed deals get preferential treatment. at the same time, the platform (openai) benefits from credible information that has been checked by journalists. openai’s approach to try to do deals with a small number of premium publishers is being mirrored by apple and amazon (for its alexa platform). by contrast, google has so far chosen not to pay specifically for ai overviews, while x has updated its terms of service to allow content posted to its platform to be used without explicit consent or compensation. other key players such as perplexity and prorata, which will be launching its own search engine gist.ai in early 2025, are offering revenue share options for publishers. but these new style aggregations are not going to stop with search queries. perplexity recently added a ‘for you’ page, a constantly updating personalised news service. an automated elections results hub was created for the us elections that was hard to distinguish from those on the websites of major news sites. particle is a mobile app that offers real time summaries of multiple stories in a personalised interface. links to the originating stories are shown, but below the fold. grok stories, now available for free on x, is another automated news service drawn from a combination of user generated and mainstream media posts. and boring news takes its inspiration from the polymarket betting odds, which did a better job of predicting the us election result than most opinion polls, and creates an automated daily audio round up of stories that could affect the markets. all these automated news services raise existential questions for journalists and news publishers about their role in this new ecosystem. if people can access summaries of the best content for free, why would they click on to publisher websites. will any money offered by platforms last? and will it compensate for the loss of traffic? then there is the issue of equity. in our survey almost three quarters of publisher respondents (72%) said they would prefer to see collective deals that benefited everybody, but that is the opposite of what is currently happening   namely a few side deals with international news agencies and national publishers. however, this strong preference for collective agreements in the data may simply reflect the fact that the majority of publishers in our survey do not currently have deals and do not feel they are likely to be offered one any time soon. rasmus kleis nielsen in his nieman lab prediction article shows how early deals have favoured large english language publishers and suggests that there is ‘zero transparency’ about their nature and value.9 ‘collective agreements based on nationally or internationally established press organisations should set the proper tone to ensure equitable opportunities for publishers worldwide’, says tai nalon, co founder and executive director of aos fatos in brazil, where platforms have signed contracts with international news agencies while ignoring local companies. ‘this fosters a process of neo colonialism and erodes vulnerable ecosystems,’ she says. others worry that the current approach to deals is already weakening the position of smaller publishers: ‘i believe the rise of generative ai platforms is exacerbating inequalities between large and small publishers and this could worsen their position further as they face a likely decline in search driven traffic,’ argues josé antonio navas, head of subscriptions at el confidencial in spain. what may happen in 2025? in this fast moving and uncertain environment, publishers remain ambivalent about their relationship with big tech companies, with around a third (31%) wanting to strengthen ties, the same proportion (31%) wanting to cut them, and just over a third (36%) looking to maintain their current position. ‘we are in a marriage of convenience with the platforms,’ says louise pettersson, editor in chief at sjællandske medier, a small regional publisher in denmark. ‘they want to profit from our unique content but refuse to acknowledge us for it, either through traffic or payment. meta, in particular, is deeply problematic.’ others see a potential changing of the guard, which offers an opportunity to change the terms of trade in a way that is more advantageous for publishers. ‘it’s a constant reshuffle. while some platforms have stopped caring about factually correct information altogether (x), others stay put and new interesting opportunities (some ai platforms) arise,’ says matthias streitz, head of editorial innovation at der spiegel. our survey shows that building relationships with new ai platforms such as openai and perplexity will be a key priority this year, with a +56 percentage point difference between those who say they will be putting more effort into ai platforms and those saying they will put less effort into them. others see opportunities in these emerging gateways to forge a more aligned partnership based on trusted information. ‘[platforms] know fake news is going to be a big problem long term, so working closer to us, especially if we can deliver engaging, powerful content, is going to make a difference,’ argues emilio doménech from watif. there’ll also be a greater focus this year on alternative channels such as whatsapp (+39), linkedin (+39), bluesky (+38), and google discover (+27)   which has become the number one source of referral traffic for many publishers.12 at the same time publisher respondents say they’ll be putting considerably less effort into facebook ( 42 net score), while sentiment towards x ( 68) has significantly worsened, with the platform widely viewed as becoming less useful for journalists as well as increasingly toxic for the public. ‘facebook is becoming increasingly irrelevant to us, and we are deeply relieved that we never became dependent on traffic from meta,’ notes gard steiro, editor in chief and ceo, vg, norway. for several years, vg’s main strategy has been to build a destination brand and to prioritise direct relationships. a secondary strategy has been to start to build connections with young people via snapchat and tiktok. video platforms on the rise the other striking aspect of this chart is the extent to which publishers will be investing more in video networks such as youtube (+52 net score), tiktok (+48), as well as instagram (+43), which has also been pushing more short form video through its algorithms. the 2024 digital news report showed how extensive consumption on these platforms has been become, especially with younger audiences, as well as how publishers have been losing out to news creators and influencers in these networks. but there are many challenges for publishers looking to invest more in this area. producing video does not come naturally to many print based newsrooms and short form video remains hard to monetise, with little opportunity to drive traffic back to websites or apps. an explosion of content in networks like tiktok, including automated and synthetic news, will make it even harder for publisher content to stand out this year. what may happen in 2025? the combination of the end of the mass referral model and expected further disruptions from ai is forcing publishers to radically rethink business models. with content of every type and format becoming more abundant than ever, only publishers that stand out from the crowd in terms of quality, relevance, or connection are likely to succeed. all of this points towards a continued shift towards reader funded models and away from advertising predicated on scale. that change has been reflected in our survey for several years, with subscription outstripping advertising as the most important revenue focus for publishers. but as in previous surveys, we find news organisations also looking to diversify, with most pursuing three, four, or even five different revenue streams. the biggest expected shift in focus (+16pp) comes from platform funding, likely due to a combination of expected ai deals, existing revenue sharing, as well as fact checking contracts. support from philanthropic funds and foundations is also expected to be a more important source of revenue, reflecting the pressures on independent public interest journalism and fact checking in many parts of the world (see chapter 1). the proportion of publisher respondents relying on crowdfunding and donations (19%) has also increased over the last few years. other revenue sources mentioned by publishers include related services, such as training and marketing. merchandise is an important supplementary revenue stream for some smaller publishers and in a number of european countries legacy commercial media rely in part on government subsidies to support local or public interest journalism. new product development takes centre stage in this environment, many publishers worry that current strategies of focusing on improving core products will not be enough. this is why nearly half of publisher respondents (44%) in our survey said they considered it more of a priority to develop new products and services as a way of driving growth. some of this year’s initiatives are designed to target hard to reach audiences, with around four in ten (42%) saying they are thinking about or planning a new product aimed at young people. between a quarter and a third say they are actively looking at audio (26%) or video (30%) products or services this year. others are planning to invest in adjacent areas such as games (29%), education (26%), or food (13%). much of this is inspired by the example of the new york times which has created a product portfolio that includes games, sport, recipes, and new product reviews, as well as audio. much of its growth in recent years has come from these lifestyle products and from the all access bundling strategy which has significantly improved overall retention. what may happen in 2025? but publishers won’t have it all their own way. platforms are also looking to get in on the act, with apple+ finding some success in the us, uk, and canada in attracting an increasingly extensive range of premium content. as ben smith points out in his nieman lab prediction: ‘if media companies can’t figure out how to be the bundlers, other layers of the ecosystem   telecoms, devices, social platforms   will.’16 in the wake of the us election there has been much talk about the role of influencers and their impact on politics and the media. but this is not just about big names such as joe rogan, logan paul, and the nelk boys. this trend also encompasses a long tail of influencers and personalities who are capturing attention across a vast swathe of news related subjects, as well as former journalists setting up on their own. a recent report from the pew research center18 found that around one in five (21%) americans   including a higher share of adults under 30 (37%)   regularly get news from influencers on social media, with much of the content focused on politics. the majority of news influencers (63%) identified by pew were men. over half of the top 150 political tiktok accounts in the us were from content creators rather than journalists according to social media research firm credoiq.19 our own reuters institute research from multiple countries documented similar trends. in brazil prominent social media personalities present a blend of news, entertainment, and opinion via youtube and instagram channels. elsewhere we also found a number of young news creators with a reputation for explaining the news or conducting original investigations. these include hugo travers (hugodécrypte) who has become a ‘go to’ person for under 30s in france for news, jack kelly’s tldr, vitus spehar’s popular tiktok round up, and jordan shanks markovina, an australian youtuber who blends humour with investigative reporting. many of these influencers are providing fresh perspectives or takes on the news, which often feel more authentic than stuffy traditional news formats, even as others have been shown to peddle extreme opinions and conspiracy theories. the pew study found that the vast majority (77%) of news influencers had no prior journalistic experience, raising questions about the reliability of their content. in a separate report by unesco, 62% of surveyed creators said they don’t vet the accuracy of content before sharing it with followers.20 but this picture is further complicated by the exodus from traditional media organisations of a number of prominent journalists who are also leaning into the personality trend. in october 2024, taylor lorenz, a technology and internet culture reporter, left the washington post to set up ‘user mag’ substack and a podcast called power user. lorenz, who increasingly identifies with the influencer community, said she wanted autonomy to write, do, and say what she wants without institutional restriction. she also said she prefers a more direct and vocal relationship with her audience, another feature of influencer culture which is often hard to achieve within a traditional media organisation. ‘legacy media sucks … i’m going to dance on the grave of a lot of these places’, she told the new yorker.21 these comments illustrate the way in which many influencers position themselves in opposition to mainstream journalism, adding further to the criticism that ordinary people see. the trend of journalists moving to platforms aligns with the so called ‘creator fication’ of journalism, as top talent seeks more control over their content and their audience relationships. our digital leaders survey reveals mixed views about these trends, with 28% seeing this as positive for journalism and 27% suggesting the opposite. one senior editor cautions that the focus on personalities could ‘usurp the principles of independent fact based journalism’, opening the door to ‘yet more opinion, where it is he or she who shouts loudest wins the day’. others worry about a lack of rigour in checking sources or scrutinising interviewees, creating an even greater problem around mis  and disinformation. ‘i am genuinely concerned about the rise of influencers and other private individuals as more and more citizens turn to them for news and consider them valid agents of information,’ says daniel bramon batlle, from 3cat in spain. a recent bbc investigation into stephen bartlett’s popular global podcast, diary of a ceo, found that episodes were increasingly focused on health related subjects, with over a dozen carrying multiple ‘harmful claims’ that went against extensive scientific evidence.23 but many other respondents to our survey emphasised the positive side in terms of new perspectives, creative storytelling, and a commitment to interact with audiences. ‘we believe that this is a natural evolution in the way audiences consume,’ says jhulissa michelle nogales cardozo, ceo and founder of the feminist outlet muy waso in bolivia. ‘i believe that many of these content creators have found a new way to relate to communities and have managed to generate something that many media have lost: people’s trust.’ what may happen in 2025? in an era when audiences, especially younger audiences, tend to pay more attention to individuals than traditional news brands, should newsrooms encourage their journalists to cultivate their own brand personality? opinions vary. some, like the head of digital at a european legacy publication, think that ‘if we want to compete … we need to find and create our own influencers’. mpho raborife, managing editor at news24 in south africa, believes that ‘there’s still a value in being associated with the brand’ and, while there could be the risk of talent outgrowing the organisation and leaving, this is not yet happening at scale. elsewhere, however, the talent exodus has been significant. the bbc has recently lost some of its biggest stars to become podcasters or to go to commercial rivals, most recently one of the corporation’s highest profile news journalists mishal husain, who has left the flagship today radio show for bloomberg.24 despite this, our survey shows that the vast majority of our respondents (81%) are confident of keeping this top talent, even if they recognise the risks are greater than for other editorial staff. but the challenges around editorial talent are nothing compared with other parts of the business, as previous changing newsrooms reports have shown.25 over half of respondents say they are not confident about attracting or keeping data scientists (52%) or software engineers (55%). there are also concerns around product and design talent as well as commercial roles. this suggests a significant imbalance, given the need to innovate around new product developments and artificial intelligence. ‘it’s more difficult maybe, to find people [in areas where] there is more competition, because some of these profiles obviously could work for any company that’s not necessarily a newsroom … and usually other industries pay more’, says maría ramírez. ‘but at the same time, if you manage to hire talent in those areas who have an interest and an inclination for news, it’s easier to retain them,’ she added. what may happen in 2025?; our research has extensively documented the challenges of combating news fatigue amongst audiences who decide, at times, to disengage and even opt out entirely from a difficult news agenda. across countries in our most recent digital news report, almost four in ten (39%) said they sometimes or often avoid the news.26 the ongoing wars in gaza and ukraine, combined with the growing impact of climate change have added to the challenges facing news organisations this year. how to engage audiences with difficult but important stories, without pushing people away entirely? how to give a sense of hope around conflicts that seem entirely devoid of it? there are no easy answers to these questions, but here are some newsroom strategies. it’s not just audiences who are affected by the intensity of covering these conflicts and the criticism that often comes with this. according to recent surveys over half of media workers in countries as diverse as canada, spain, and ecuador reported high levels of anxiety, with one in five reporting depression.27 this amounts to a prolonged mental health crisis that cuts across generations. what may happen in 2025? over the last year, news organisations have been getting their heads around the full implications of generative ai for journalism and for their businesses. at least in some larger newsrooms, principles and guidelines are largely in place and specialist ai roles have been created, as predicted in last year’s report. this activity is not confined to the newsroom, with commercial, operational, and product teams also looking to get on board. in our survey, it is clear that the focus still remains on back end efficiencies, with 96% of publisher respondents saying this will be very important or somewhat important in the year ahead. using ai to improve personalisation and recommendation comes next (80%), followed by content creation (77%) and newsgathering functions (73%) such as verification, data journalism, and investigations. coding (67%) and commercial uses (63%) are also considered valuable to publishers. ai toolkits everywhere many large publishers such as the new york times and financial times have invested in cross functional teams to experiment with the technology and support the newsroom with cultural change. early outputs have been promising. ai toolkits pull together a set of useful tasks such as headline suggestions and different kinds of summaries. at jp/politikens media group, a central team has created magna, a tool which can assist with a range of editing tasks from correcting spelling errors to generating drafts from just a few basic facts. the tool is used by three different publications in the group and can adapt the content to the different style guides of each. at helsingin sanomat, the ai toolkit is focused more on newsgathering and research. this includes translation, support for data investigations, and creating an automated timeline on any story, trained on trusted content, such as helsingin sanomat articles. ai is also helping to transform investigative and data journalism: ‘ai models are enabling us to work with dispersed sources, creating stories that previously required weeks or even months of effort,’ says antonio delgado, co founder of datadista in spain. similar advances are helping to speed up previously laborious processes around verifying misinformation and disinformation in external platforms: ‘use of ai tools for fact checking   especially audio and video   has been very effective for us’, says ritu kapur, co founder and ceo of the quint in india. der spiegel is one of many publishers experimenting with using ai to help fact check copy   functionality that could eventually be built into the content management system (cms). these initiatives are building powerful learnings about how to get the best out the technology, but it may take time for these investments to pay off. hiring specialist ai teams to build and maintain in house applications can be costly and while journalism can be improved and outputs can be enhanced, it is not clear that significant savings will follow. ‘we are still in an experimentation phase but looking for real world applications that move the needle’, says simon regan edwards, product director at the daily mail. the majority of respondents to our survey feel that newsrooms are being transformed somewhat (63%) or fully (24%) due to generative ai, though this may be a reflection of what people see in other newsrooms rather than their own. just 12% say that there is not so much change   or none at all (1%). content transformation the next big thing as publishers gain more confidence with the technology, expect more focus on audience facing format transformations this year. advances in voice technologies have made it possible to transform text articles into audio (in multiple languages or tones) and most publishers (75%) are planning to do more with this functionality this year. beyond that, ai summaries at the top of articles (70%) are likely to become more widespread, over half (56%) are planning chatbot/ai search functionality for audiences to interact with, with around a third (36%) looking to experiment with turning text stories into video (36%). again, publishers won’t have it all their own way, with ai driven browsers such as dia30 also allowing consumers to summarise, rewrite, and reformat articles to suit their own preferences set to launch this year. a number of publishers have been experimenting this year with their own chatbots that are trained on their own articles and other trusted sources. aftonbladet was early out of the gate with an ‘election buddy’ that answered questions about the swedish elections in june 2024. a lot of manual work was required to check the bots’ answers, but overall 180,000 queries were processed with no known ‘hallucinations’.31 in november, the washington post launched an experimental generative ai tool called ‘ask the post ai’, which brings back answers on any topic referenced in news articles published by the paper since 2016. the financial times is trialling a similar feature, ‘ask ft’, for its professional users. these services carry some risk but expect some big publishers to integrate these into site search functions this year to significantly improve access to their archive. what may happen in 2025? openai also says it’s put in place safeguards to stop the tool being used for damaging deep fakes such as child sexual abuse. meanwhile our social feeds are already filling up with synthetic content this year. according to one recent study, over half of longer linkedin posts are already ai generated, though it is often hard to tell the difference between this and genuine corporate speak. some worry that if ‘ai slop’ (low quality generated content) spreads too fast, it will start to seep into the training data of foundational llms, leading to what is known as model collapse.33 the adoption of metadata standards such as c2pa, that provides transparency about the origin of a piece of content, is likely to be crucial in lowering that risk and allowing algorithms to make better decisions about which content to prioritise. one of the most intriguing developments of 2025 is likely to be advances in intelligent agents that can work on your behalf, researching assignments, booking appointments, invoicing clients, and purchasing presents for difficult relatives. at least, that is the vision behind services like apple intelligence that also promise to protect your data and privacy in the process. gartner predicts that by 2028 15% or more of day to day work decisions will be taken by autonomous agents.34 but as in the example above, we won’t just be typing instructions to our agents we’ll increasingly be talking to them. both inputs and outputs of the latest versions of google’s gemini, openai’s chatgpt, and apple’s upgraded siri are multi modal, supporting text, video, audio (and computer code). amazon’s alexa will also get an ai makeover this year. voice interactions with a variety of devices (phones, headphones, smart speakers, and eyewear) have been growing but until now both latency and the quality of responses have been a barrier to adoption. these problems are being gradually overcome. chatgpt’s new advanced voice mode, for example, offers more natural conversations that pick up non verbal cues such as the speed at which you talk and responds with more emotion, something that has been missing so far from synthetic voices. it can also reply in different languages and it will also be possible to get updates on breaking news. all this could increase the pain for publishers with little opportunity to credit content creators or provide click throughs to websites or apps. on the other hand, conversational interfaces could offer new ways of making long texts more accessible. the release of notebook lm’s audio overviews released in september 2024 ‘wowed’ the internet by turning dense articles and documents into podcasts. from our survey publishers recognise the power of conversational interfaces but the majority (51%) feel that consumer adoption will be a slow burn rather than the next big thing (20%). what may happen in 2025? institutional journalism faces enormous pressures in the year ahead as technology reshapes the way audiences find and consume information   as well as from populist politicians and others looking to undermine its role in fostering informed democratic debate. ‘you are the media now’, the phrase coined by elon musk after the us election, and repeated by many others since   aims to push the narrative that the so called ‘mainstream media’ are becoming increasingly out of touch and irrelevant. the vision behind his grok.ai is that a combination of ordinary people and advanced technologies can replace many of the functions of journalists in a more immediate and less biased way. at the same time, politicians will increasingly look to bypass media scrutiny, talking directly to supporters or by linking up with ‘trusted’ influencers who are sympathetic to their views (or being paid for their efforts). meanwhile reuters institute research shows that audiences, especially younger ones, are increasingly drawn to the convenience   and entertainment value   of platforms like youtube and tiktok and in that context are less likely to have a strong direct connection with specific news brands. as the shift to audio and video consumption accelerates, this is likely to further encourage the rise of ‘personalities’   increasing the competition for both eyeballs and talent. in this new environment, publishers worry that their carefully crafted, evidence based news articles will be harder to access in 2025 as social referrals dry up and traditional search links are at least partly replaced by ai aggregations, often drawn from their own work. arguments over copyright and fair compensation will rage on throughout the year, with the outcomes having a significant bearing on the shape and size of the news industry that eventually emerges. despite these challenges, this report shows that news leaders will be looking to do all they can to turn the tide. publishers recognise they need to rapidly improve their owned and operated platforms and make their digital products more engaging and relevant for audiences. embracing ai to personalise content and formats will be a part of that but publishers will also want to emphasise the distinctive (and trusted) nature of their journalism and the original ‘human’ reporting that ai will never be able to replicate. at the same time, they will also be looking to shore up the business side by cutting costs, diversifying revenue streams, and attempting to rebundle news with lifestyle content to increase habit and loyalty. not all media companies will be able to adapt fast enough and that will be increasingly evident, but times of change also throw up new opportunities. a big part of the task for news leaders in the year ahead will be to redefine the role and value of journalistic institutions in an age of polarisation, misinformation, and super abundant content in a way that resonates with both staff and audiences. 326 people completed a closed survey between 20 november and 20 december 2024. participants, drawn from 51 countries and territories, were invited because they held senior positions (editorial, commercial, or product) in traditional or digital born publishing companies and were responsible for aspects of digital or wider media strategy. the results reflect this strategic sample of select industry leaders. typical job titles included editor in chief/executive editor, ceo, managing director, head of digital, director of product, and head of innovation. just over half of participants were from organisations with a print background (54%), a quarter (25%) came from commercial or public service broadcasters, with around a fifth (18%) from digital born brands. a further 6% came from b2b companies or news agencies. these proportions are similar to previous surveys. the 51 countries and territories represented in the survey included australia, new zealand, taiwan, hong kong, singapore, the philippines, thailand, vietnam, japan, nigeria, south africa, paraguay, honduras, uruguay mexico, brazil, colombia, and israel, but the majority came from the uk, us, or european countries such germany, spain, france, austria, finland, norway, denmark, and the netherlands as well as poland, hungary, and slovakia, amongst others. participants filled out an online survey with specific questions around strategic and digital intent in 2025. over 90% answered most questions, although response rates to questions vary. the majority contributed comments and ideas in open questions and some of these are quoted with permission in this document. 1 sewell chan, ‘prospects for journalism in a second trump term’, nouvelles pratiques du journalisme conference, sciences po, paris, 3 december 2024. 2 data based on the number of page view referrals in aggregated to hundreds of news websites and apps in the chartbeat network. 3 net score is the percentage point difference between the proportion that responded with ‘less effort’ and ‘more effort’. 4 usermag 5 france24 6 npr 7 the sun (news uk) and immediate media are amongst publishers to suggest that google changes have affected its site traffic. the media leader 8 press gazette 9 nieman lab 10 the guardian 11 the danish press publications’ collective management organisation (dpcmo) has signed a letter of intent (loi) with prorata.ai to explore collaborative opportunities: 12 press gazette 13 bbc news 14 the atlantic 15 the guardian 16 nieman lab 17 quote from an interview with cnn’s brian stelter: 18 pew defined news influencers as individuals who regularly post about current events and civic issues and have at least 100,000 followers on any of facebook, instagram, tiktok, x, or youtube. 19 wall street journal 20 cnn 21 new yorker 22 business insider 23 bbc news 24 the guardian 25 see our changing newsrooms 2021 report 26 digital news report 2024 27 nieman lab 28 reuters institute 29 interview with maría ramírez. 30 ai centric web browser being developed by the browser company, the creators of the arc browser. set to launch in early 2025. 31 inma 32 reuters institute 33 nature 34 gartner 35 news.com.au 36 vox.com nic newman is senior research associate at the reuters institute for the study of journalism, where he has been lead author of the annual digital news report since 2012. he is also a consultant on digital media, working actively with news companies on product, audience, and business strategies for digital transition. he has produced a media and journalism predictions report for the last 15 years. this is the ninth to be published by the reuters institute. nic was a founding member of the bbc news website, leading international coverage as world editor (1997 2001). as head of product development (2001 10) he led digital teams, developing websites, mobile, and interactive tv applications for all bbc journalism sites. federica cherubini is director of leadership development at the reuters institute for the study of journalism and an expert on newsroom operations and organisational change, with ten years’ experience spanning major publishers, research institutes and editorial networks around the world. federica has authored the annual changing newsrooms report (2020 3) and is interested in devising and implementing new and improved ways of working, bridging people, disciplines, departments, projects, and cultures. she is also an expert on newsletter strategies and editorial initiatives that drive audience loyalty. the authors would like to thank the 326 news executives from 51 countries and territories who responded to a survey around the key challenges and opportunities in the year ahead. respondents included 65 editors in chief, 63 ceos or managing directors, and 53 heads of digital or innovation, and came from some of the world’s leading traditional media companies as well as digital born organisations (see breakdown at the end of the report). survey input and answers helped guide some of the themes in this report and survey data have been used throughout. some direct quotes do not carry names or organisations at the request of those contributors. the authors are particularly grateful to richard fletcher, director of research, and the wider team at the reuters institute for their ideas and suggestions, and to a range of other experts and news executives who generously contributed their time in background interviews (see full list at the end of this report). thanks also go to alex reid for her input on the manuscript over the holiday season and keeping the publication on track. as with many predictions reports there is a significant element of speculation, particularly around specifics and the report should be read bearing this in mind. having said that, any mistakes   factual or otherwise   should be considered entirely the responsibility of the authors. published by the reuters institute for the study of journalism with the support of the google news initiative (gni). this report can be reproduced under the creative commons licence cc by. in every email we send you'll find original reporting, evidence based insights, online seminars and readings curated from 100s of sources   all in 5 minutes. reuters institute for the study of journalism university of oxford 13 norham gardens oxford, ox2 6ps united kingdom privacy policy, accessibility statement t: +44 (0)1865 611080 e: reuters.institute@politics.ox.ac.uk

by david ardia, evan ringel, victoria smith ekstrand, and ashley fox unc center for media law and policy, university of north carolina at chapel hill­­ to print or save: download a pdf of the full report or a pdf of the executive summary. executive summary workshop description part 1: the decline of local news part 2: the rise of platforms and growing spread of mis  and disinformation part 3: regulatory and policy solutions next steps appendix a: workshop participant biographies appendix b: research and resources social scientists who study the impact of the internet, social media, and other forms of digital information sharing paint an alarming picture of the health of american democracy. our current media ecosystem produces too little high quality information; we have a tendency to be attracted to information that confirms our existing biases about the world and to share this information with little regard for its veracity; and there are an increasing number of actors who seek to leverage these observations to distort public discourse and to undermine democratic decision making. technological and economic assaults have destroyed the for profit business model that sustained local journalism in this country for two centuries. while the advertising based model for local news has been under threat for many years, the covid 19 pandemic and recession have created what some describe as an “extinction level” threat for local newspapers and other struggling news outlets. more than one fourth of the country’s newspapers have disappeared, leaving residents in thousands of communities living in vast news deserts. the latest report by penny abernathy, knight chair in journalism and digital media economics at the unc hussman school of journalism and media, titled news deserts and ghost newspaper: will local news survive? reveals an increasingly dire situation for local news. the economic fallout from the coronavirus has accelerated the decline in local newspapers   at least 30 newspapers closed or merged in april and may 2020, dozens of newspapers switched to online only delivery, and thousands of journalists at legacy and digital news operations have been furloughed or laid off. all of this raises fears of the collapse of the country’s local news ecosystem. key takeaways related to the decline of local news: as local news sources decline, a growing proportion of americans are getting their news and other information from social media. this raises concerns, including the spread of misinformation and the use of platform infrastructure to engage in disinformation campaigns. platforms wield significant advantages over local news sources in the current information environment: the dominant platforms possess proprietary, detailed caches of user data, which the platforms use to force advertisers, users, and news outlets into asymmetrical relationships. in the vacuum left by the disappearance of local news sources, users are increasingly reliant on information sources that are incomplete, and may be misleading or deceptive. key takeaways related to the rise of platforms and growing spread of mis  and disinformation: a number of regulatory and policy responses have been proposed to address the decline of local news, the rise of platforms, and the spread of mis  and disinformation. some proposals focus on increasing the supply of   and demand for   local news, including increased public education and expanded support for journalists and local news organizations. other proposals focus on market based reforms that address the growing power disparities between news producers and platform operators as well as between platforms and their users. recent regulatory and policy proposals include: while many of the proposals described above face significant industry and political opposition, recent congressional hearings directed at technology companies and the october 2020 report on competition in digital markets by the majority staff of the house judiciary subcommittee on antitrust, commercial, and administrative law recommending significant changes to u.s. antitrust law may mark a turning point in terms of support for more significant government action to limit the power of online platforms. indeed, the antitrust lawsuit against google, which was filed by the u.s. department of justice and eleven state attorneys general as we were finalizing this report, is further evidence of this shift to a more aggressive posture by the government. regardless of whether the government moves to limit the power of the platforms, many supporters of local news are optimistic that congress   and state legislatures   will take action to address the dire situation local news organizations face. “it’s as if for the first time, people on the hill care about newspapers,” seattle times publisher frank blethen recently told researchers at the unc hussman school of journalism and media. in news deserts and ghost newspapers, penny abernathy wrote that the shift in support is apparent both in the number of concerned lawmakers and in the breadth of their proposals to address the decline of local news. as 2020 ends, there are several serious proposals to direct funds to local media, and hundreds of lawmakers from both parties have written to house and senate leadership expressing their support. solutions to the difficult problems we face will require a multifaceted, multi disciplinary approach. no one lever within the market, law, or society will deliver a magic bullet. instead, experts and policymakers will need to pull at multiple levers using a new vocabulary to talk across the different disciplines   a set of new propositions that recognize the legal, social, journalistic, and economic principles at stake, particularly the harm done to democracy if the status quo continues. we are still in the early stages of understanding how technology is transforming our democracy and the ways we receive and engage with information. this work will require cross disciplinary research and collaboration in order to develop a comprehensive understanding of information environments focused on the interaction of information and technology, particularly in the context of misinformation, partisanship, polarization, propaganda, and political institutions. funding for this report was provided by the hearst foundations and john s. and james l. knight foundation. in november 2019, the unc center for media law and policy; unc center for innovation and sustainability in local media; and unc center for information, technology, and public life brought together experts on the decline of local news, the rise of online platforms, and the spread of mis  and disinformation for a workshop that was part of a two day, interdisciplinary conference titled “fostering an informed society: the role of the first amendment in strengthening local news and democracy.” the conference began with a symposium at the unc school of law hosted by the first amendment law review, which examined the role of the first amendment in creating an informed society and explored whether the first amendment places affirmative obligations on the government to ensure that citizens are informed. the workshop, which is the subject of this white paper, commenced on day two. the goal of the workshop was to convene a diverse group of media executives, economists, social scientists, lawyers, and others with expertise in journalism, media business models, antitrust, fcc policy, intellectual property, and constitutional law to discuss the problems facing local news organizations and to examine the regulatory and policy solutions that have been offered to address these problems. the workshop took place at the unc hussman school of journalism and media and was co led by philip napoli, james r. shepley professor of public policy at the sanford school of public policy at duke university. a full list of workshop attendees is included in appendix a. what follows is a report of the day’s proceedings. it is organized in the same way we structured the workshop, starting with an overview of the decline of local news followed by a discussion of the rise of platforms and the spread of mis  and disinformation online. we then examine a number of regulatory and policy responses to the problems identified in the earlier sections and conclude by offering some suggestions for next steps. throughout this report, we have included the affiliations of workshop participants when referring to their contributions to the workshop. in appendix b we provide a list of recent research and resources available for those who wish to engage in more study of these important issues. we are grateful to all of the participants at the november 2019 workshop and to members of the first amendment law review who helped make the symposium and workshop possible, including alyssa leader, alison rossi, and rachel ann stephens. we are also grateful to kathryn johnson and isabela palmieri for assistance in drafting this report and to kathryn peters and joanna burke for editing, formatting, and promotion. the hearst foundations provided funding for the workshop and funding for the preparation of this report was provided by the hearst foundations and john s. and james l. knight foundation. over the past two decades, the united states has experienced a significant reduction in the number of local news organizations like newspapers and locally focused news websites. penny abernathy (professor, hussman school of journalism and media, university of north carolina), a former executive at the wall street journal and the new york times, kicked off our workshop by describing her recent research on the rise of “news deserts”: counties and municipalities that lack access to a dedicated local news source. her 2020 report, news deserts and ghost newspapers: will local news survive, paints a bleak picture of an industry in crisis.[1] according to abernathy, more than one fourth of american newspapers shut down in the last 15 years, including many news outlets focused on local communities.[2] in that same time period, more than half of all local journalists were let go, leaving many remaining newsrooms staffed by a small number of reporters burdened by excessive workloads and unable to dedicate themselves to particular topics of local interest.[3] this decline in local newspapers has left many american communities without sufficient local news coverage or any available local news source. abernathy stated at the workshop that more than 1,500 of 3,031 american counties have only one newspaper, usually a weekly, while more than 200 others have no newspaper at all. of course, there is wide variation in population among u.s. counties, with more than half of all residents living in just 143 counties.[8] nevertheless, the residents of america’s emerging news deserts are often its most vulnerable citizens: they are generally poorer, older, and less educated than the average american.[9] the collapse of the newspaper industry, however, has not spared wealthier communities. the one million residents of montgomery county, maryland, a washington, d.c. suburb and one of the 20 wealthiest counties in the united states, were left without a local newspaper when their last remaining local newspaper, the sentinel, was shuttered in january 2020.[10] urban areas have also been affected. youngstown, ohio became the first city of any size without a local newspaper after its 150 year old newspaper shut down in august 2019.[11] although the loss of newspapers is widespread, participants at the workshop highlighted the connection between poorer communities and the lack of a local newspaper. most of the counties in danger of losing a newspaper or without a newspaper altogether are in the american south and the average poverty rate is “substantially higher” in counties without newspapers than in counties with local news coverage. most of the attendees at the workshop were generally aware of the decline in local news sources. however, abernathy’s presentation and research offered statistics that revealed the true scope of the problem. nearly 50% of u.s. counties only have one newspaper, usually a weekly, and more than 6% of counties have no dedicated newspaper at all. more than 25% of american newspapers have shut down since 2004, while many more have cut back on their previous daily circulation by reducing their coverage reach or printing on a nondaily or weekly basis. abernathy noted that other media sources have been unable to fill the gap. digital startups are focused on population dense communities rather than the “flyover areas” most often abandoned by local newspapers, while many subsidized public media outlets rely primarily on non original content. abernathy also identified a correlation between counties without newspapers and a higher poverty rate, meaning that economically disadvantaged communities are especially vulnerable to the decline of local news. alternative media sources have been unable to fill the vacuum left by the disappearance of local newspapers. the lack of consistent broadband access in rural areas limits the ability of rural communities to get news in a digital format. many communities that lack access to a local newspaper or to a reliable high speed internet connection rely on either television or radio to provide local news. though television stations remain on the air, broadcast journalism may not plug the local news gap left by the disappearance of local newspapers. local television news typically focuses on either national stories or the local stories most likely to attract viewers, leading to extensive coverage of crime, car accidents, and natural disasters.[12] the emphasis on maximizing viewership in order to bring in advertising dollars comes at the cost of local news stories. a 2018 report from the knight foundation refers to local television news as a “headline service with periodic forays into meaningful investigations,”[13] and those at the workshop expressed concern that television news is not filling the void left behind when local news outlets disappear. at the workshop, melanie sill (executive director, nc local news workshop) depicted local news stations as covering ever increasing markets and focusing on a few big stories, arguing that “any domestic murder in america” would be considered a “local” story on the evening newscast. workshop participants also identified the increasing time commitments for station staff as a barrier to community level local news coverage. as television stations continue to add additional broadcasts and digital/social media responsibilities, journalists lack the time and resources to devote their attention to stories that, though informative to the community, might not guarantee maximum attention from viewers. as the realities of commercial broadcast television limit its viability as a dedicated local news source, policymakers and others have cited public broadcasting as a potential mechanism to provide local news coverage to underserved communities.[14] congress allocates limited funds to the corporation for public broadcasting, which subsidizes both pbs television stations and npr radio stations, while most funding comes from contributions from individual viewers and listeners. however, abernathy noted that less than one fourth of public media outlets used any sort of originally created content, and that much of the original “local news” content came in the form of talk shows that featured moderators interviewing journalists from other outlets who had covered a local news story.[15] others have suggested that digital media startups can fill the need for local news. north carolina has had some limited success with sector specific nonprofit digital media outlets. during the workshop, sill cited three nc based nonprofit organizations as potential success stories: nc policy watch, a daily news and commentary outlet run by a left leaning think tank; carolina journal, a similar outlet run by a right leaning think tank; and coastal review, an outlet operated by the north carolina coastal federation dedicated to covering stories in north carolina’s coastal regions. however, these startups are heavily reliant on social media to distribute stories and attract viewers, perpetuating a business model where platforms hold the advantage. [we discuss this in depth in part 2.] despite these limited successes, digital startups have struggled to fill the void on a national level. abernathy noted that 95% of local digital startups are located in urban areas, meaning that even rural and less populated communities with reliable internet access lack an online local news alternative. ethnic media have faced similar difficulties, running mainly on shoestring budgets with small staffs unable to fully cover a particular region. the decline of local news has several causes and it predates the rise of the internet. as far back as the 1950s (and even earlier), newspapers were on the decline due to competitive challenges first from radio and then from television. but the internet has accelerated the decline. as the changing demands of news consumers became apparent in the early 2000s, news organizations were initially reluctant to change what had largely been a successful model, which led to a lack of innovation until the situation was already dire. in addition, news organizations and the digital start ups that attempted to supplement or replace them failed to engage with audiences in new ways, limiting outreach to consumers who viewed newspapers as anachronistic. while newspapers may have failed to evolve, a main cause of the decline of local news is the collapse of the advertising driven for profit business model that newspapers relied on for decades. in an era where few media sources existed, newspapers were able to position themselves as an effective way for advertisers to target consumers in a particular market. the rise of platforms like facebook and google has destroyed that model. “[w]e have relied on a for profit model for newspapers. what especially happened after 2008 is that the problems on wall street came down to main street so you lost the last of the retail advertising that was supporting the very small and midsize papers going forward.”  penny abernathy as discussed further in part 3 of this paper, platforms can identify the users who will be most likely to purchase a particular product or service by collecting detailed data about an individual’s browsing history, purchasing preferences, and other personal information. they can then offer advertisers a more efficient use of advertising money, allowing them to target only those who are ostensibly more likely to be interested in their product. andrew gavil (professor, howard university school of law) argued that platforms are able to offer “higher value, higher quality targeted ads in a local community.” newspapers do not have the data, and thus cannot offer the same level of targeted advertising. as a result, businesses have diverted their advertising efforts from traditional local news sources to online platforms. according to abernathy, in some markets as much as 80% of advertising revenue goes to google and facebook, leaving television stations, newspapers and radio stations fighting over a fraction of the advertising revenue they once received. “why is google more successful than the news & observer at selling advertising to [a business] in chapel hill? i think the answer is that google can tell advertisers, much more credibly, ‘if you advertise with us, we can find exactly the people you, joe advertiser, are looking for, and you won't have to waste any money reaching people that don't give a damn about what you sell or how you sell.’”  robert kaiser, former associate editor and senior correspondent at the washington post platforms are able to use their leverage in a two sided market (with consumers on one side and advertisers on the other) to make advertising more effective while also undercutting other local news attempts to collect the revenue needed to stay afloat. the platforms are able to mediate the relationship between news consumer and news producer, forcing news outlets to use platform based services to reach their audience and collecting the profits from advertisers. consumers increasingly rely on social media as their source for news, enhancing revenue for platforms at the expense of news providers who are losing advertising income while they still bear the cost of reporting the news. speakers at the workshop emphasized the systemic nature of the issues facing the local news ecosystem. the newspaper industry enjoyed prolonged success due to a stable business model, but the industry’s inability to evolve in the face of financial adversity and technological development has now rendered that model largely obsolete. online platforms capture a significant portion of overall advertising spending by leveraging user data. local news organizations, which do not have the data, cannot offer the same level of targeted advertising and are unable to attract the advertising revenue necessary to remain financially sustainable. many local news sources have been forced to scale back their reporting efforts or rely on third party content. due in part to a decrease in media ownership restrictions, many newspapers have been purchased by large investor backed conglomerates interested in cutting costs and turning profits by any means necessary. even relatively successful news outlets who operate using a traditional, subscription based model struggle in a platform driven news ecosystem. at the workshop, deb aikat (professor, hussman school of journalism and media, university of north carolina) referred to an increasingly common situation where a subscription based newspaper (in this case, the wall street journal) devotes significant time and resources into breaking a national news story. however, once the story is broken, platform based outlets that are free for users to access report a nearly identical story, with only a mere mention of it being “reported by the wall street journal.” those outlets siphon valuable user clicks and advertising money from the traditional media outlet, leaving the journal holding the bill without reaping the corresponding financial benefit. this situation disincentivizes remaining news outlets from investing the time and energy necessary to cover news stories, an issue that is only exacerbated in local news environments where resources are tighter. newspapers also began laying off newsroom personnel. the number of newspaper newsroom employees dropped by 51% between 2008 and 2019, from about 71,000 workers to 35,000, according to a pew research center analysis of bureau of labor statistics data.[18] abernathy reported that the large regional dailies have shed the most journalists during that time period   an estimated 24,000   or two thirds of the total. many large dailies, which often had several hundred journalists on staff in the late 1990s, today have only a few dozen.[19] as newspaper and television media struggle to earn the revenue necessary to remain in operation, hundreds of news outlets have consolidated under the ownership of a handful of opportunistic investors. these mass acquisitions of media companies have been aided by a decline in regulations previously intended to diversify media ownership. at the workshop, yosef getachew (media & democracy program director, common cause) identified several regulatory changes that loosened restrictions on media ownership, including the elimination of the “main studio rule,” which required that broadcasters have full time management and staff present during normal business hours and that television studios have the capability to originate content from their premises.[20] the removal of this rule makes it easier for broadcast television and radio stations to air in a community without actually having a local studio, potentially reducing the ability of a media organization to effectively cover local news.[21] the fcc also reinstated the uhf discount, a step that effectively raised the cap on how many television stations an individual conglomerate could own.[22] getachew suggested that, due to the easing of ownership restrictions, companies like sinclair and nextstar hold so much of the media marketplace that they can effectively drown out other voices in the marketplace. newspapers have also seen significant consolidation of ownership. penny abernathy’s 2020 report finds that the largest 25 newspaper ownership chains own a third of the 6,700 surviving american newspapers, including 70 percent of the 1,260 newspapers that still circulate daily.[23] many of these ownership chains are connected to hedge funds, venture capital, or other forms of private equity looking to acquire newspapers at a pittance and cut costs wherever possible in an effort to make money for investors.[24] in a 2016 report, abernathy refers to these investment backed newspaper publishers as “new media barons,” motivated by a focus on profits over journalistic standards.[25] these newspapers have instituted drastic cost cutting measures, reducing staff and eliminating expenses like employee benefits and editorial writers. the prioritization of profit suggests that the journalistic quality of these newspapers has become less important, and scholars have confirmed a perceived decrease in quality of the remaining newspapers serving local markets. in 2018, phil napoli (professor of public policy, sanford school of public policy, duke university) released a study analyzing news stories from local media outlets gathered over a week in 100 randomly sampled u.s. communities.[26] the study found that 8 of the 100 communities had no stories addressing “critical information needs,” while 12 communities contained no original news stories and 20 communities contained no local news stories.[27] in addition, only 17 percent of the news stories provided to a community were “truly local,” actually about or having taken place within the community.[28] at the workshop, melanie sill observed that local newspapers and media outlets owned by investor backed chains have demonstrated an interest in focusing more on national stories in an effort to attract web traffic and consumers from a wider audience. by expanding their reach outside a local community, newspapers can pitch advertisers on huge, aggregated audiences and a wider advertising reach. sill argued that, by targeting a national audience, newspapers tend to focus on drawing attention and clicks rather than effectively covering a local community. “what i’m starting to see happening with local content is… there’s a big push on driving digital audience, driving page views, driving unique visitors, [and it] doesn't matter if they're in the market or not… so local newspaper news is becoming more like local television news: more crime, animal stories, things that drive traffic. and we're also seeing local reporters being mobilized to help supply national products.”  melanie sill one casualty of the decline in local news coverage has been coverage of local and state governments. napoli’s study finds that the presence of local government activity “fails to generate any increases in journalistic production,” suggesting that local level government no longer demands a commitment of journalistic resources.[29] sill also suggested that a weakening press “lack clout” at the state level, noting that legislative leadership at the north carolina general assembly moved the press room from the legislative building to a basement in an adjoining building, converting the existing press room into a members’ lounge for legislators. this decline in dedicated coverage for civic matters of interest like government and education makes it harder for local newspapers to effectively cover their communities. the removal of a dedicated local news source from a market can have significant negative effects on community engagement and issue knowledge. participants at the workshop discussed several key functions that local news outlets serve in a community. first, a local newspaper serves an important agenda setting role within a community, helping community members understand their stances on issues. local newspapers historically set this agenda by choosing which stories are published and how those stories are presented in terms of length, tone, and depth. second, the editorial function of a local newspaper is crucial in helping community members express and understand their feelings on a topic or candidate. abernathy used her personal experience to argue for the importance of newspaper editorials and endorsements, suggesting that she often relies on a newspaper to evaluate the credentials and policy positions of candidates for statewide races she may not know much about. acquisition of local television stations by large national conglomerates can have a similar effect on local election information. a 2019 study found that local television news stations by the sinclair broadcast group shifted away from airtime previously spent on local politics, instead dedicating increased coverage to national politics.[30] this change in priorities emphasizes that nationally owned television stations may struggle to fill the gap left when dedicated local newspapers cease operation. “i look at it from a very personal perspective. i cannot know in north carolina what judges to vote for… i depend on an editorial staff to vet the judges. i depend on them to vet the secretary of agriculture. i mean, i don't know what makes a good secretary of agriculture and when we have the editorial staff stripped and not providing that, that provides a vacuum.”  penny abernathy third, local newspapers encourage regional economic growth and development. while local and regional advertising dollars once helped the newspaper economy flourish, that money has now been shifted to platforms like facebook and google. the closure of local newspapers has further hindered any attempts by businesses to advertise locally through print media. fourth, local newspapers foster a sense of social identity. a newspaper has traditionally served as a key source of information for communities, spreading awareness of local events and election. workshop participants expressed concern that the disappearance of a local newspaper, which has historically informed readers about candidates in local elections, leads to a subsequent decrease in local election participation. “part of our work is also going to local communities and talking to them about what they’re seeing in the news and we held town halls in dayton, ohio, in charlottesville, in chicago… and time and time again we've heard that… ‘we don't know what's going on with the legislature anymore or a school board or what’s happening at town hall.’”  yosef getachew studies have confirmed the fear that the decline of local news may negatively affect the ability of a community to engage in democratic self governance. a 2010 study found that respondents living in suburban los angeles county who had access to a daily local newspaper were more likely to vote regularly than those living in communities without one,[31] while a 2019 report shows that mayoral elections are less competitive in communities where newspaper staffing cuts are the most severe.[32] those who continue to participate in elections after the loss of a local newspaper are more susceptible to political polarization; a 2018 study found that counties that lost a local newspaper had fewer split ticket votes in the 2012 election than those counties with a dedicated local news source. [33] workshop participants identified several consequences of the disappearance of local news sources, showing that the vacuum left when communities lose dedicated news coverage can have wide ranging effects. local news outlets play an important role in informing community members about elections and other civic events, along with shaping community views around common values and beliefs. these news sources create a sense of shared purpose that can be a powerful uniting force within a town or county. without a source for local news, community members get most of their news from social media, leaving them vulnerable to mis  and disinformation and exacerbating political polarization. the disappearance of local news not only leads to a less informed society, it also creates an information “vacuum” that aids the spread of factually inaccurate information creating a misinformed society. local news outlets play a key role in combating the spread of misinformation by reporting local factual information and expert opinions. brian southwell (program director of science in the public sphere, research triangle institute) stated at the workshop that, as local news sources have disappeared, people have largely lost the ability to understand what is happening in their own local communities and how they are related to people in other communities. a recent analysis conducted by the brookings institute highlights the coronavirus pandemic as a prime example of the importance of accurate, local information in emergencies.[34] according to the institute, as of april 1, 2020, 57 percent of counties with covid 19 cases lacked a daily newspaper, and that these communities “may be particularly vulnerable as a result of insufficient news coverage.”[35] as a way to combat the spread of misinformation online, southwell argued that communities should build media and social infrastructures with an eye toward increasing understanding among neighbors. the absence of these infrastructures can leave a gap filled by opportunistic actors. a 2020 report from napoli reveals the growth of partisan media outlets “masquerading” as local news sources.[36] the report identifies more than 400 partisan media outlets mostly owned and operated by a handful of conservative leaning corporations or individuals. more than half of the sites identified in the report focus on local or hyperlocal communities, filling the space left behind by the disappearance of dedicated local news sources.[37] napoli is skeptical that these “local” sites are actually operating within their purported communities, noting that one of the outlet owners was previously caught using content produced by filipino writers under fake bylines.[38] the presentation of non local, partisan media outlets as local news raises obvious concerns. a partisan slant on local news will likely increase the political polarization within communities, especially if opinion laced coverage of local happenings is presented in a seemingly objective context. inconsistent content moderation policies from platforms like facebook and google only exacerbate the problem. mis  and disinformation can be difficult to differentiate from genuine news stories, and platforms are often incapable and unwilling to police the accuracy of content. in the absence of a dedicated local news source, an increasing number of consumers will rely on unreliable online or social media “news” to keep them informed. as local news sources have declined, a growing proportion of americans are getting their news and other information from social media. this raises a number of concerns, including the spread of misinformation and the use of platform infrastructure to engage in disinformation campaigns. platforms also wield a significant advantage over local news sources in the current information environment. the dominant platforms possess proprietary, detailed caches of user data. this information can be used to force advertisers, users, and news outlets into asymmetrical relationships favorable to the platform. in the vacuum left by the disappearance of local news sources, users are increasingly reliant on information sources that are incomplete, and may in fact be misleading or deceptive. as a growing proportion of americans get their news and other information from social media, market power has become more concentrated in online platforms like facebook and google. in 2019, the pew research center found that over half of americans (54%) either got their news “sometimes” or "often" from social media.[39] pew also found that facebook is far and away the social media site americans use most commonly for news; more than half (52%) of all u.s. adults get news there. the next most popular social media site for news is youtube [owned by google] (28% of adults get news there), followed by twitter (17%) and instagram [owned by facebook] (14%).[40] by 2018, social media had surpassed print newspapers as a news source for most americans.[41] maurice stucke (professor, university of tennessee college of law) stated at the workshop that online platforms have captured two types of market power that are particularly relevant to the topic of fostering an informed society: a competitive advantage over traditional media outlets in harnessing advertising revenue and an information advantage over their users from whom they collect data. online platforms have a competitive advantage over traditional media outlets because they collect data from their users that the platform can use to disseminate targeted advertising while traditional media outlets, which do not have access to such data, cannot create that same personalized advertising experience. advertisers view advertising with traditional media outlets, like newspapers, as a black box because there is no effective way for them to determine who actually saw their advertisements or to precisely target specific audiences. “the philadelphia retailer john wanamaker famously said 50% of my advertising dollars are wasted, i just don't know which ones. what amazon and google have extracted over the last decade and a half is really the ability to get that 50%.”  adam candeub, professor, michigan state university school of law with their enormous user bases and sophisticated data collection practices, some online platforms are better positioned than others to capture these advertising dollars. a 2019 report on the market structure of digital platforms published by the stigler center at the university of chicago booth school of business states that machine learning and big data have transformed the advertising industry to make advertising dollars work more efficiently for advertisers.[42] in their 2019 report, emarketer explains that digital advertising accounted for 50.1 percent of total media ad spending worldwide in 2019, and most of this digital ad revenue went to google and facebook who, together, account for about 60 percent of the digital advertising market.[43] the stigler report explains that these large online platforms have powerful economies of scale and scope. platforms “can apply machine learning to extensive data sets to improve their products and expand their activities into new areas,” ultimately contributing to market concentration.[44] at the same time, what data platforms collect and how that data are used creates an information asymmetry between online platforms and their users. charlotte slaiman (competition policy director, public knowledge) reminded participants at the workshop that users often do not understand what giving up their data to these companies truly entails. according to a 2019 pew study, eight in ten american adults are at least a little concerned about the amount of personal information that social media companies collect about them and 75 percent of adults believe there should be more privacy regulation for companies in general.[45]with their enormous user bases and sophisticated data collection practices, some online platforms are better positioned than others to capture these advertising dollars. a 2019 report on the market structure of digital platforms published by the stigler center at the university of chicago booth school of business states that machine learning and big data have transformed the advertising industry to make advertising dollars work more efficiently for advertisers.[42] in their 2019 report, emarketer explains that digital advertising accounted for 50.1 percent of total media ad spending worldwide in 2019, and most of this digital ad revenue went to google and facebook who, together, account for about 60 percent of the digital advertising market.[43] the stigler report explains that these large online platforms have powerful economies of scale and scope. platforms “can apply machine learning to extensive data sets to improve their products and expand their activities into new areas,” ultimately contributing to market concentration.[44] nor do users fully understand how these platforms use their data. to that point, a 2017 study, my news feed is filtered?, reports that u.s. college students were generally unaware how facebook and google use algorithms to personalize what users see in their news feeds.[46] in the study, 37 percent of students thought that every post made by their friends appears on their facebook news feed. the students who did understand that not every post appears in their news feed were still largely “unable to explain how personalization works on facebook.”[47] when asked about how search results appear on google, “[n]o one referenced an algorithm and just one participant used the term personalization.”[48] accordingly, as policymakers debate how best to create increased privacy protections to adjust the balance of power between large platforms and their users   a subject we discuss in part 3 of this paper   one concern is whether consumers understand enough to make informed decisions about what social media service to use and to effectively take ownership and control of their data. in recent years, companies that operate online platforms have also grown in size and competitive advantage as the result of several mergers, which, as andrew gavil (professor, howard university school of law) noted at the workshop, have not always fit the types of mergers that traditionally receive closer scrutiny under antitrust law. gavil explained that the united states currently has robust guidelines for evaluating horizontal mergers, or mergers of companies that sell similar, competing products, and less robust guidelines for evaluating vertical mergers, or mergers of companies that sell complimentary products or mergers of companies along a supply chain. however, gavil stated that recent mergers involving online platforms do not easily fit within the definitions of either horizontal or vertical mergers in many cases. for example, amazon’s merger with whole foods was not challenged because the companies were not viewed as operating the same type of business. while amazon operates a digital marketplace, whole foods is in the grocery industry. likewise, facebook’s acquisition of instagram avoided serious antitrust scrutiny because, rather than viewing both platforms as providing social media services, instagram was viewed as offering a differentiated service focused only on photos. most recently, google’s proposed acquisition of fitbit is similarly being viewed as a merger between two firms offering very different types of products and services. some organizations have questioned this reasoning. in a recent blog post, the electronic frontier foundation argued that google’s acquisition of fitbit will decrease competition and “cement google’s data empire.”[49] though this merger may seem vertical, the effect on the market resembles a horizontal merger in the sense that google can use the data acquired to increase their market dominance. this type of acquisition is designed to increase a major platform’s control over data, allowing it to further capitalize on the market advantage user data provide. at the workshop, gavil and others wondered whether the traditional horizontal/vertical conception of antitrust should be adapted or revisited to allow for greater scrutiny of data driven mergers. “do we need to deepen our thinking about what constitutes potential competition? should we have viewed instagram as a potential competitor of facebook? do we need to think about nascent competition?”  andrew gavil despite concerns about the communication environment created by concentrated market power and mergers, robert picard (senior research fellow, reuters institute, university of oxford) told participants at the workshop that online platforms lack many of the inherent monopolistic structures that produce competitive imbalances in other areas of telecommunications. while wired telephone service providers and internet service providers are concentrated based on physical infrastructure constraints, especially at the local level, digital media operations are not constrained by such barriers. digital operations are much cheaper to operate than other forms of media. they also make it possible to serve niche audiences or small groups of people efficiently and promote competition more so than in an offline, non digital environment. according to picard, production of content is highly competitive. though a large audience may not hear them, companies, institutions, and individuals alike can produce content without the barriers presented by other forms of communication. even if the structure of digital platforms may not be inherently monopolistic, several issues can lead to a lack of competition in online spaces, a point that picard and other economists recognize. network economics theory draws a direct connection between an entity’s utility and the number of consumers using the technology, which can lead to increased concentration and potential anticompetitive behavior.[50] in the same way that advertisers direct their advertising money to larger platforms like google, facebook, and amazon due to their efficient, data driven targeted advertising services, users prefer these larger platforms because they can offer more compelling and efficient services. “there’s nothing in digital platforms that make it tend to monopoly.”  robert picard these platforms and the revenue streams they provide are also attractive to investors. according to a march 2020 pricewaterhousecoopers report, 7 of the top 10 global companies in terms of market capitalization (the total monetary value of a company’s stock) have an online platform component: microsoft ($1.20 trillion) was second, apple ($1.13 trillion) third, amazon ($971 billion) fourth, alphabet ($799 billion) fifth, alibaba ($522 billion) sixth, facebook ($475 billion) seventh, and china based platform tencent ($469 billion) eighth.[51] picard suggested that the nearly unmatched financial power wielded by these platforms enables them to buy out competitors and innovators in their field, allowing the platform to bring more users into their network and increase concentration. while a concentrated market may provide fewer alternatives for consumers and users, concentration does not necessarily lead to monopoly power. in a 2019 report by the international monetary fund (“imf”) titled the economics and implications of data, the imf notes that concentration in the online sphere can be “consistent with innovation and competitive pricing” as long as the market can still be contested.[52] the imf report suggests that a competitive market relies on the presence of “nonrival data,” information collected from platform users that would be widely shared to assist innovation.[53] however, private companies operating digital platforms have little motivation to share their data with competitors, and the report admits that “data hoarding” may limit market contestability.[54] platforms are increasingly reliant on the proprietary data collected from users to attract advertising revenue and stay afloat financially, with alphabet’s most recent annual disclosure to the sec revealing that 83.9% of google revenues came from advertising.[55] social media companies by monthly active persons (map) in millions as of dec. 2019 [56] as platforms continue to develop new ways to use harvested user data to offer microtargeted advertising, the incentive to share data with competitors is unlikely to increase. at the workshop, maurice stucke echoed the imf’s concern that increased concentration among tech platforms is coupled with decreased innovation. in addition, he argued that an increase in profits among the top platforms may not be connected to an increase in efficiency, but rather a result of the platforms wielding their substantial market power to lessen competition and force parties that wish to use their services into terms favorable to the platform. facebook, google, and other online platforms operate what economists call a “multi sided platform,” by providing services to users (generally without charge) and advertisers (for a fee). while platforms provide benefits to both ends of this two sided market, they use their structure to create asymmetries that can be difficult to identify and control. in a 2016 paper, david evans notes that multi sided platforms defy typical market power and antitrust analyses, arguing that traditional economic models fail to account for the “interdependent demands” shared by users and advertisers utilizing online platforms.[57] platforms have used this asymmetry to their advantage on both sides of the transaction, reaping the benefit of network effects from each market. by collecting huge amounts of personal data from their users, platforms are able to outcompete traditional media and other content providers for valuable advertising income through their ability to provide targeted advertising. this advertising advantage allows platforms to force news organizations and publishers to concede certain requirements in a market that would otherwise create fairer transactions for them. the two sided market supports an advertising based income model, allowing most platforms to offer access to users for “free.” though users are not forced to pay money for the platform’s services, they instead must share their personal information with the platform, often without full knowledge of what they are giving up. even when a user objects to the information the platform collects, they have little option but to stop using the platform. the market power and network effects wielded by the platform enables increased market concentration, frequently leaving the user without a viable alternative. many participants at the workshop used the term “market failure” to describe the current media ecosystem. this term, however, has a very specific meaning for economists. according to mankiw’s principles of economics (eighth edition), market failure refers to a situation in which the market on its own fails to produce an efficient allocation of resources.[58] a market failure can be caused by several different factors, including externalities, barriers to entry, lack of property rights, market power, or the inability to monetize. a market failure can be a reason for government intervention, and many chicago school economists view market failures as the sole justification for regulation. according to maurice stucke, multiple characteristics of platforms might suggest a market failure worthy of recognition. platforms like facebook and google have durable market power that allows them to accrue outsized profits. this market power allows platforms to exploit asymmetrical relationships with news organizations, publishers, and other content creators, along with creating an information and power asymmetry with users. at the workshop, stucke specifically cited the incentive for platforms to collect data and use it to gain a competitive advantage on advertising, calling the advertising and data practices of the platforms “purposefully opaque.” the differing uses of the term market failure by participants at the workshop expose an important disciplinary barrier among journalists, media scholars, and economists. this divide is important because it could harm interdisciplinary efforts to address the problems we are facing. while non economists have used the term market failure broadly, economists use the term narrowly to refer to a specific set of market conditions. a misunderstanding around the term could lead to a lack of consensus around the challenges we are facing and potential solutions. the first amendment is often discussed using the analogy of a “marketplace of ideas,” a concept derived from the writings of john milton and john stuart mill and developed by the jurisprudence of justices brandeis and holmes. under this framework, first amendment scholars have used the term market failure expansively to describe failures in public discourse. in his 1997 piece how and why the marketplace of ideas fails, paul brietzke notes the possible utility of applying a market failure approach to free speech, claiming that “a badly informed or misinformed public [is] a market failure itself” that may be worthy of government or judicial intervention.[59] he justifies his use of market failure by noting that the theory is not “well developed,” adding that market failures “are literally matters of definition, of what we want markets to do that they are not doing.”[60] phil napoli (professor, sanford school of public policy, duke university) wrote a 2018 article identifying potential market failures in the marketplace of ideas stemming from the decreased effectiveness of counterspeech and imperfect competition of ideas.[61] napoli points to the 2016 election as possible evidence that the speech marketplace is not working, noting that analyses show an “unusual degree” of voters failing to vote in their own self interest and suggesting the potential influence of misinformation and disinformation via fake news.[62] other media scholars have also used the term to refer to the state of journalism in the united states. a recent article in the harvard business review refers to the market failure of local journalism as a “crisis for democracy” caused by the market’s inability to sustain the journalism required to operate an effective democracy.[63] “i read a lot of papers where people are saying, ‘oh, this is occurring because the market’s failing.’ so, if that’s the case, we have to have certain things to understand about what market failure really means, and a lot of people are particularly nervous in communications right now about market failure with no understanding of the economics of market failure.”  robert picard economists, on the other hand, view the term market failure more narrowly. at the workshop, robert picard was reticent to use the term market failure to describe the power of platforms, drawing a distinction between an environment in which privately owned platforms and companies are unable to give the public what they want (which would be a market failure) and one in which privately owned platforms and companies choose to provide certain kinds of content and not others (which would not be a market failure). “i think it’s a vocabulary problem… [i]f local journalism is declining because there’s no demand or need for it, is that a market failure? no.”  michelle connolly andrew gavil, an antitrust expert, also warned about misuse of the term market failure, suggesting that the use of a specific term of art as part of the larger debate around local news and online platforms could be a distraction. he argued that the decline of the print news media has a long history that predates the rise of the internet and that the failure of the traditional newspaper business model in the face of competitive challenges from radio, television, and now the internet, should not be mischaracterized as a “market failure.” it may instead be a reflection of markets at work. michelle connolly also rejected the characterization of the local journalism crisis as a market failure. she suggested that the decline of local journalism due to lack of demand is not a market failure, expressing concern that inaccurate use of the term market failure could make the challenge of resurrecting local news even more difficult. one of the key takeaways from the workshop was that there is a disciplinary language barrier between economists and non economists overuse of the term “market failure.” non economists typically use the term broadly to describe the breakdown in public discourse and knowledge within the current media ecosystem, including the increasing growth of news deserts (described in part i). economists at the workshop, however, cautioned against the use of the term market failure in such a general context, calling it a “very specific” economic concept describing a situation where a market is incapable of providing the desired results; market failure does not include a situation where private companies choose not to provide certain types of content. a misunderstanding around the term could lead to a lack of consensus around the challenges we are facing and the availability of potential solutions. regardless of whether the current media ecosystem suffers from a market failure, the concentration of online platforms raises concerns about anticompetitive practices. the power of online platforms is significant because they act as walled gardens for public discussion online, which is governed by the algorithms and content moderation policies that platforms utilize. because the market power of online platforms is concentrated and platforms enjoy network effects where the quality of users’ experience increases as the platform gains more users, consumers have limited incentive to switch to alternative platforms. consumers are unlikely to leave facebook if their friends and family are only on facebook because other platforms cannot provide the same user experience. furthermore, online platforms also act as gatekeepers for content produced by traditional media outlets as more people get their news from these platforms. a 2019 report published by the australian competition and consumer commission found that while users get news produced by media organizations through online platforms, media organizations themselves are kept at a distance, lacking access to user data, control over how snippets of their stories appear, and information about how algorithms affect placement of their content.[64] as a result, at the same time that media organizations struggle to compete with online platforms over advertising revenue, they also face challenges in having their content seen and monetized on online platforms.[65] the rise of platforms has coincided with   and some participants at the workshop say it has caused   a precipitous decline in local news reporting. the power of online platforms is significant because they act as walled gardens for public discussion online, which is governed by the algorithms and content moderation policies the platforms employ. because the market power of online platforms is concentrated and platforms enjoy network effects where the quality of users’ experience increases as the platform gains more users, consumers have limited incentive to switch to alternative platforms. as a result, at the same time that local news providers struggle to compete with online platforms over advertising revenue, they also face challenges in having their content seen and monetized on online platforms. the rise of platforms has coincided with   and some participants at the workshop say it has caused   a precipitous decline in local news reporting. this has created an information vacuum making it possible for misinformation and disinformation to flourish. although misinformation in media is not new, it spreads rapidly in today’s speech environments on social media. according to a 2018 study, the spread of true and false news online, researchers at the massachusetts institute of technology found that false news stories on twitter “diffused significantly farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth in all categories of information,” including information about terrorism, natural disasters, urban legends, and political news.[66] specifically, the researchers found that falsity traveled six times faster than the truth online, and, while accurate news stories rarely reached more than 1,000 people, false news stories “routinely diffused to between 1,000 and 100,000 people.”[67] similarly, a 2017 study found that the lifecycle of political misinformation on social media was longer than that of facts, and political misinformation tended to reemerge multiple times.[68] according to brian southwell, misinformation presents a significant public health challenge. he and other public health experts noted in a recent paper that social media platforms differ from traditional media platforms in key ways that make them more susceptible to the rapid spread of misinformation.[69] for example, while traditional media outlets are relatively contained and limited in authorship, social media platforms allow “a wider range of authors,” are “less formally governed,” and have “relatively few regulatory controls over false, misleading, incomplete, and false equivalence information.”[70] moreover, social media platforms are designed to disseminate content through algorithms that “can modify patterns of individual exposure in opaque ways,” causing different people to see and hear different content.[71] furthermore, according to a 2015 study, users’ self selection of content creates homogeneous, polarized clusters or echo chambers that drive content diffusion, including diffusion of misinformation, over social media networks.[72] this problem is only heightened in an environment where local news sources are unavailable to counteract the misinformation spread on social media. “we've got to take more seriously the idea that in information processes emotions are really key.”  brian southwell other experts suggest, however, that we should be skeptical of claims that misinformation has a significant impact on political views, noting that there is little empirical evidence showing that misinformation has had large direct effects on voter’s attitudes or behaviors.[73] shannon mcgregor and daniel kreiss (professor, university of north carolina hussman school of journalism and media) have written that “[i]t’s not misinformation or targeted advertising that directly drives the vast majority of citizens’ political attitudes and voting patterns”; misinformation is less effective than we might think because rather than being swayed by a particular factual narrative, voters “see themselves as members of social groups and then in turn choose the parties that best represent those groups.”[74] nevertheless, mcgregor and kreiss caution that misinformation is still a problem, but efforts to address it would be better served by focusing less on specific factual elements and giving more attention to the motivations, content, and drivers of mis  and disinformation. “vacuums are really problematic because people need to try to reconcile and to provide certainty for themselves. this is a situation where news can quickly spread. situations where, similarly, there's a lack of … corrective information also can be problematic.”  brian southwell southwell explained at the workshop that peoples’ reactions to misinformation are often driven by sociological and psychological factors. according to southwell, humans are social beings who look toward a hopeful future. however, when faced with uncertainty about that future, people can fill information vacuums with misinformation in an attempt to find certainty.[75] he suggested that we will continue to encounter misinformation in our online environments for four reasons. first, we tend to accept new information at face value before evaluating whether it is true or false. second, we tend to share information because it connects us with others and not necessarily because it is true. third, although we can correct misperceptions, it is difficult to ensure that corrective information gets the same level of attention as the original misinformation. and fourth, our legal tradition preferences allowing the public to evaluate the accuracy of information after it has been disseminated rather than preventing its distribution in the first place. southwell proposed that understanding the psychological components of how people react to misinformation is an important aspect of learning how best to combat its spread, pointing to scholars like university of north carolina professor alice marwick who have investigated why social media users share misinformation.[76] the decline in local news reporting has created an information vacuum, making it possible for misinformation and disinformation to flourish online. social media platforms are designed to disseminate content through algorithms that can modify patterns of individual exposure in opaque ways, causing different people to see and hear different content. furthermore, users’ self selection of content creates homogeneous, polarized clusters or echo chambers that can increase the diffusion of misinformation over social media. this problem is only heightened in an environment where local news sources are unavailable to counteract the misinformation spread on social media. misinformation is not the only platform based threat to an informed public. deen freelon (professor, university of north carolina hussman school of journalism and media) has focused his research on disinformation, a “sibling concept” to misinformation which he defines as attempts to sway public opinion by using morally questionable techniques. at the workshop, freelon drew a distinction between disinformation and misinformation based on the relationship between the person spreading the content and the users or organizations that are intended to consume the content. while misinformation is spread unknowingly or without regard to its veracity, the party spreading disinformation knows that the information is false and has an intention to damage other people or organizations. freelon referred to disinformation as “propaganda information operations” and calls it a subset of information warfare. disinformation is produced by both individual actors and state backed organizations. one of the main producers of disinformation on social media platforms is russia’s internet research agency (ira), an organization backed by the russian government that was responsible for many of the targeted posts ahead of the 2016 u.s. election. a 2018 report found that the ira “leveraged social media to manufacture and spread junk news, manipulate public opinion, and subvert democratic processes.”[77] the state sponsored disinformation campaign effectively reached millions of americans, with more than 30 million facebook users sharing ira created posts between 2015 and 2017.[78] the intention of disinformation to deceive and divide also means that disinformation content can target all sides of the ideological spectrum. the report’s identification of the top 20 most liked facebook pages managed by the ira includes pages targeting veterans (veterans come first), liberals (born liberal), people of color (brown power), members of the lgbtq community (lgbt united), and gun rights supporters (defend the 2nd).[79] other foreign governments have also engaged in a targeted social media disinformation campaigns in the united states. freelon noted at the workshop that disinformation content has also come from organizations affiliated with the governments of iran, china, and venezuela. disinformation can also originate domestically. a 2017 report co authored by alice marwick, media manipulation and disinformation online, identified online trolls, “alt right” activists, men’s rights advocates, conspiracy theorists, influencers, hyper partisan news outlets, and politicians as all playing a role in the spread of disinformation on social media platforms.[80] another element of disinformation’s effectiveness on social media is the varying forms it can take in order to appeal to different audiences. freelon identified visual based disinformation posts showing images of left wing billionaire and frequent alt right target george soros, while another post shows an image of donald trump and hillary clinton holding hands with messaging intended to suppress voting in the black community. other types of disinformation can resemble a legitimate news report. a 2019 buzzfeed article uncovered an iran linked disinformation campaign that produced more than 100 false articles and published them on websites impersonating legitimate news outlets.[81] the fake articles were convincing enough that one discussing the 2022 qatar world cup was covered by reuters and subsequently spread by other legitimate news outlets.[82] if a reputable news agency can be misled by the apparent veracity of state sponsored disinformation, social media users are also at risk. this ability to mimic authentic news sources is especially concerning as, in the absence of local news outlets, more people continue to use social media as their primary news source. regardless of whether disinformation campaigns have actually succeeded in mobilizing activists or persuading voters   and here, again, researchers have pointed to the dearth of empirical studies showing a direct impact on elections   there is reason to be concerned that the spread of disinformation is a threat to the stability of american democracy. david karpf, associate professor of media and public affairs at george washington university, has written that “disinformation and propaganda do not have to be particularly effective at duping voters or directly altering electoral outcomes in order to be fundamentally toxic to a well functioning democracy.”[83] he notes that disinformation “undermines some of the essential governance norms that constrain the behavior of our political elites” and warns that “[i]t is entirely possible that the current disinformation disorder will render the country ungovernable despite barely convincing any mass of voters to cast ballots that they would not otherwise have cast.” [84] the power of google and facebook is accentuated by the american legal system, which grants online platforms significant latitude to moderate content as they see fit. section 230 of the communications decency act, passed in 1996, provides legal protection for online intermediaries and websites that publish third party content.[85] specifically, § 230(c)(1) states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content,” which protects platforms from being civilly liable for content posted or published by a third party.[86] § 230(c)(2) offers further protection for platforms by allowing them to restrict access to “objectionable” material, regardless of constitutional protection.[87] the electronic frontier foundation has referred to the legislation as “one of the most valuable tools for protecting freedom of expression and innovation on the internet.”[88] without the protection section 230 offers, platforms like facebook, amazon, and google would be subject to potential liability for each individual piece of content posted on their sites, leading to enormous investments of time and resources to try and inspect each item in an attempt to avoid liability. realistically, platforms would likely be forced to either eliminate many types of user postings entirely or impose stricter limits on wide swaths of content. in a world where online entities are largely responsible for the policing of their user created content with little government intervention or threat of liability, the self governing role of platforms is a significant factor in shaping the online speech environment. kate klonick’s 2017 article, the new governors: the people, rules, and processes governing online speech, argues that platforms like youtube, facebook, and twitter have created content moderation systems resembling a formal governmental entity.[89] in the same way that governments create codified legal frameworks, platforms create a “detailed list of rules” dictating the limits of acceptable content on their site.[90] trained decisionmakers serve in an adjudicatory function for the self governed platform. platforms frequently alter their content guidelines based mainly on external factors and influences. daniel kreiss (professor, university of north carolina hussman school of journalism and media) and bridget barrett have coined the term “platform transience” to describe the rapid changes in a platform’s policies and procedures that result from external social and political pressures.[91] kreiss and barrett’s use of “platform transience” emphasizes the fluid and unpredictable nature of platform self governance. platforms like facebook,[92] youtube,[93] twitter,[94] and instagram[95] each have their own content moderation guidelines, and though there is some cross platform consistency in addressing clear societal harms like child pornography, the platforms often take very different approaches to other content. while facebook has repeatedly refused to regulate political advertising on the site, including advertisements that contain false or misleading statements,[96] twitter announced in november 2019 that it would ban all political advertising, a decision that kreiss referred to at the workshop as “part business, part public relations, and part normative desire.” twitter’s cfo disclosed in an interview that the platform made less than $3 million in political ad revenue during the 2018 midterms, a total that would represent less than half a percent of twitter’s revenue ($909 million) in the fourth quarter of 2018.[97] “there’s a lot of interpretative flexibility in how these platforms have guidelines around content moderation.”  daniel kreiss in addition to inconsistencies across social media platforms, platforms are also internally inconsistent in enforcing their own guidelines. though most platforms prohibit “hate speech” on their sites, each set of guidelines defines the term differently and the definitions themselves are extraordinarily difficult to apply consistently. for example, facebook includes “statements of inferiority” as a category of prohibited hate speech in their terms of service, an extremely broad category that kreiss suggested gives the platform “a ton of flexibility” when making content moderation decisions. moreover, media companies and users whose content has been removed by a platform during the content moderation process have little recourse to contest the platform’s decisions. the decision to remove content is sometimes made by a proprietary algorithm, while in other cases, content moderators determine the acceptability of content through an adjudicative process that is closed to the public and generally lacking in transparency. the party whose content is removed is often unaware of the reasoning behind a content moderation decision. facebook has attempted to address the process by establishing an independent oversight board that hears appeals of content moderation decisions and publishes the results publicly, but the board will only examine a small fraction of the content moderation decisions made on a daily basis by the company.[98] while section 230 of the communications decency act gives platforms wide latitude to decide what content to allow on their services, platforms are anxiously seeking guidance as they continue to struggle with content moderation practices and policies for misinformation and disinformation. several platforms have acknowledged the difficulties, with facebook and others explicitly calling for additional federal regulation combating election interference and data privacy. though platforms are already working to address harmful content, they view themselves as lacking the legitimacy and capacity to serve as “arbiters of truth.” inconsistency between platforms and within individual platforms has led to a muddled information environment. a recent flashpoint in platform content moderation was the 2016 u.s. presidential election, where state sponsored misinformation and disinformation spread widely on platforms like facebook and twitter, sowing chaos and potentially affecting the election results. a 2019 report identifies criticism after the 2016 election as the type of external pressure which kreiss suggests leads to changes in social media platform guidelines.[99] indeed, the report identified a “flurry of initiatives” announced by various platforms in response to election backlash, including changes to algorithms responsible for advertising and content moderation, partnerships with external fact checkers, and support for “quality journalism.”[100] attempts to ensure better platform governance practices are especially important as online platform users increasingly turn to social media as their primary news source. a 2017 study analyzing the news consumption patterns of facebook users found that increased polarization in online news consumption led social media users to focus on a small number of news sources and made the users more susceptible to fake news and misinformation.[101] an increase in news polarization can cause division within communities, with individuals on opposing sides of the aisle obtaining their news through like minded family, friends, and media outlets. this reliance on partisan leaning information sources (both legitimate and illegitimate) exacerbated an already tense political climate. researchers who study mis  and disinformation argued that platforms need to counter these affects by taking an active role in identifying and removing misinformation and disinformation from their sites. without direct platform intervention, the information vacuum left by the disappearance of local news will only continue to grow. this part highlights the regulatory and policy responses that have been proposed to address the decline of local news, the rise of platforms, and the spread of mis  and disinformation online. some proposals focus on increasing the supply of   and demand for   local news, including increased public education and expanded support for journalists and local news organizations. other proposals focus on market based reforms that address the growing power disparities between news producers and platform operators as well as between platforms and their users. most americans have no idea how badly local news providers are suffering. while the business model for local news has been weakening for many years, the covid 19 pandemic and ensuing recession has further worsened the situation. as noted in part 1, in the past two decades, more than one fourth of the country’s newspapers have disappeared, leaving residents in thousands of communities living in vast news deserts. despite the efforts of other media to fill this void, including commercial television and online only sites, they have failed to slow the spread of news deserts, especially in economically struggling regions of the country. yet the pew research center reports that most americans think their local news media are doing fine financially. about seven in ten say their local news media are doing either somewhat or very well financially (71%), while only about a quarter say their local news organizations are not doing well (24%).[102] this disconnect   and corresponding complacency   needs to be addressed if local news organizations are going to survive. in fact, most americans still value the work of journalism. a recent gallup/knight foundation survey reports that the vast majority of americans (84%) say that the news media is “critical” (49%) or “very important” (35%) to democracy.[103] but americans have increasingly polarized judgments about the work of media organizations and they described feeling overwhelmed by the volume and speed of news   in part because of the mix of news interspersed with non news on the internet, including social media. moreover, nearly eight in 10 (78%) think misinformation online is the leading problem with news today.[104] in response to the abundance of information sources in the current media environment, a plurality of americans (41%) say they only pay attention to one or two trusted news sources, while 1 in 3 (31%) try to consult a variety of sources to see where they agree. about 1 in 6 americans (17%) stopped paying attention to news altogether.[105] public education to explain the work of journalists and the value of local news is an obvious and important step to address these findings. this means helping people to better understand the harms associated with the collapse of local news, but also helping them develop strategies for evaluating the information sources they currently use. such efforts are aimed at creating more demand for high quality journalism and developing better informed consumers of news. media literacy is more important than ever in today’s world of media saturation. a recent study by the stanford history education group analyzed the ability of 8,000 students (from tweens to college age) to evaluate credible sources of news.[106] the study tested the capability of students to evaluate evidence online and assess claims made on social media. the report demonstrated students’ inability to do either, noting that “[d]espite their fluency with social media, many students are unaware of basic conventions for indicating verified digital information.”[107] in response to these disturbing findings, the researchers proposed exercises for educators to instill skepticism and train students to become more discerning consumers of online information.[108] media literacy programs range from standard education programs to online games, like the “bad news game,” an award winning fake news intervention designed by researchers at the university of cambridge “aimed at building psychological resistance against online misinformation.”[109] the game teaches six different techniques used by fake news producers: impersonation, emotional exploitation, polarization, conspiracy, discredit and trolling. the game teaches users to recognize fake news tactics and become “inoculated” in their own media consumption. educators in public schools and institutions of higher education are also teaching their students to “read laterally”    a tool for investigating unfamiliar online sources by leaving a webpage and opening a new browser tab to see what trusted websites say about the unknown source. teachers demonstrate lateral reading and then students practice the strategy, determining who is behind a website and, ultimately, whether that website is trustworthy.[110] these types of media literacy training are crucial. but equally important will be bringing back a well supported and vibrant local news environment, a monumental task that will likely take more creativity among public leaders, journalists, educators, public private partnerships and journalism institutions. empowering journalists to serve the needs of local communities begins with ensuring that local news organizations have the resources to hire sufficient reporting staff and giving them the tools and training they need to succeed. this support can come in a number of different ways, ranging from direct government funding to indirect support in the form of regulatory, tax, and other legal changes that strengthen journalism and allow local news organizations to thrive. direct government support for local news organizations can take many different forms. most americans are familiar with the corporation for public broadcasting (“cpb”). in fiscal year 2020, the cpb received an appropriation of $445 million from the federal government. however, only a very small portion of the money that goes to the cpb has historically been used to fund local news reporting. about 67 percent of spending by the cpb is earmarked for public tv,[111] and a 2011 study by the federal communications commission found that 68 percent of public tv stations provided no local news in the course of three weeks, and 94 percent provided 30 minutes or less per day.[112] many advocates for local news have argued that the cpb’s funding priorities should be changed to encourage more local news reporting. they point out that the cpb’s original mission is outdated, arguing that audiences need news about their communities, not reruns of “downton abbey.”[113] steven waldman of report for america, who helped author the fcc’s 2011 study, recently suggested that congress should rewrite the statutory formula that governs the cpb’s funding decisions, directing more money to public radio stations trying to improve local news. he notes that “many local public radio stations are now pushing hard to cover their communities,” and that “[i]n many cases, radio stations have the business model (member support) and reach to deliver real impact.”[114] advocates for local news also say that both the state and federal governments should increase their financial support of local media. free press, a media reform advocacy organization, has argued that congress should substantially increase federal spending on public media institutions, including creating a $1.5 billion emergency fund for local news jobs that the cpb should be permitted to distribute to both nonprofit and for profit newsrooms.[115] steven waldman also argues that the cpb’s mandate should be expanded to support all nonprofit news outlets, not just public broadcasters.[116] while support for reforming and expanding the role of the cpb has been growing, researchers at the unc hussman school of journalism and media report that there has been no recent congressional action to amend the cpb’s authorizing legislation and “amending the statute is perilous at the current time when journalism bashing is a popular political tactic.”[117] they note, however, that the cpb can receive additional funding without an amendment of the law and that the cpb received an additional $20 million for infrastructure in its fy 2020 budget as well as a $75 million stimulus supplement. another way that government can provide direct financial support to local news organizations is through increased public service advertising. government entities already purchase advertising across a wide array of media and many supporters of local journalism say that the government should focus its spending on local news organizations. on april 20, 2020, nearly 250 members of the house of representatives wrote to the president, asking him to direct more of the government’s $1 billion ad budget to local media.[118] many industry supporters argue that the government should go even further and appropriate additional money for local media advertising.[119] the news media alliance along with the national association of broadcasters and national newspaper association, for example, have asked congress to allocate an additional $5 $10 billion in direct funding for local media advertising.[120] some state governments are also stepping in to support local journalism and to combat the spread of news deserts. new jersey became the first state to provide public funds for local news, outside of the traditional funding for pbs and npr stations. this initiative began when legislators in new jersey recognized that their local news outlets were “withering away.”[121] after acknowledging the growing crisis, they concluded that there was a role for state government to play in addressing the issues by allocating state money specifically to ensure that communities throughout the state could get the news and information they need to be informed about local issues. the final amount allocated towards rehabilitating local news in new jersey was between $1 million and $2 million dollars, and will be distributed through grants to projects aimed at supporting the information needs of underserved new jersey communities. a bipartisan “civic information consortium,” comprised of fifteen board members with a wide range of perspectives and experiences, will decide upon the allocation of funds. despite these efforts, direct government support for news organizations remains controversial. many journalists oppose the idea, worrying that government funding will compromise editorial independence. over the past few years, however, the financial situation for local news has become so dire that opposition to government funding appears to be softening. even before the covid 19 pandemic, the former dean of the columbia journalism school, nicholas lemann, argued that the local news crisis had become so severe that only direct government support could save it.[124] the impact of the pandemic and ensuing recession has brought further attention to the need for emergency financial assistance for news organization, including support through the government’s paycheck protection program (“ppp”). after some journalists argued that newspapers should not take out ppp loans, los angeles times correspondent matt pearce tweeted, “i appreciate the discussion, but if journalists don’t get their oxygen masks on first, we’re not gonna be around to help the people around us.”[125] government can also provide indirect support for local news organizations in the form of regulatory, tax, and other legal changes. a number of ideas have been proposed, including changing bankruptcy and pension laws, offering tax credits for newsroom employment, making it easier for news organizations to receive irs approval as nonprofits, and requiring that cable tv providers carry more news programming. many media companies, especially legacy media companies, are struggling with high debt loads and pension obligations, which make investing in additional newsroom personnel difficult. lobbyists for news organizations have long argued for changes in bankruptcy and pension laws to help media companies reduce some of these financial obligations. local news advocates have also begun making this argument as well, noting that better policies in these areas could profoundly help local news. for example, under current bankruptcy law, the courts are permitted to put only minor emphasis on whether a proposed restructuring deal is good for the community (as opposed to the creditors). steven waldman writes that judges overseeing bankruptcy proceedings for newspapers should be allowed to give greater weight to whether the new owners intend to invest in local reporting. [126] waldman and others make a similar argument with regard to reducing pension obligations. due in part to its inability to make a $125 million pension payment, the 160 year old mcclatchy co. filed for bankruptcy in early 2020. the country’s second largest newspaper chain had long struggled under the weight of its $800 million pension debt. as researchers at the unc hussman school of journalism and media report, mcclatchy is not the only paper to grapple with an underfunded pension plan. like other businesses with legacy plans created when defined benefits were common, many have found it difficult to come up with the cash to cover pension shortfalls. noting that the federal government will likely assume responsibility for mcclatchy’s underfunded plan, the researchers suggest that firms like mcclatchy should have been allowed more time to rework their pension obligations if they committed to invest in local reporting.[127] the need to stem the tide of newsroom layoffs and build back local reporting capacity has also led to proposals to provide tax credits to support the retention and expansion of newsroom staff. in may 2020, free press issued a call to action arguing for a $40,000 annual tax credit to local newspapers that retain currently employed reporters at market wages or hire new newsroom employees.[128] the newsguild labor union and the advocacy group pen america have also written to congressional leadership asking for emergency funding to prevent more layoffs. so far rep. tim ryan’s (d oh) protect local media act is the only congressional measure to contain a news specific employment tax credit (up to $20,000 for each new journalism hire), but speaker nancy pelosi (d ca) declined to include the provision in the recent heroes act.[129] other changes in tax law could also support local news. one area that nearly all proponents of local news agree on is the need to make it easier for commercial news organizations to convert to nonprofit status. structured as nonprofits, news organizations can more readily solicit financial support from charities, private foundations, and individual donors who receive beneficial tax treatment for donating to a nonprofit. in addition, tax exempt nonprofits do not have to pay taxes on the income they generate from business activities that are substantially related to and further the organization’s tax exempt purpose, thus allowing for a stronger bottom line for news organizations that rely primarily on advertising. nonprofit news organizations have become an important part of the american media ecosystem. the philadelphia inquirer, tampa bay times, and salt lake tribune are just a few examples of newspaper nonprofits. the pew research center reports that 172 digital nonprofit outlets launched between 1987 and 2012, with at least 71% being formed between 2008 and 2012.[130] many of these digital nonprofits are members of the institute for nonprofit news, which provides much needed support to news startups. some, like propublica, produce national news, but half of the institute’s 250 members are state or local news sites. advocates for local news want congress to make it easier for commercial news outlets to transform themselves into tax exempt nonprofits. rep. mark desaulnier (d ca), has sponsored the saving local news act, which would amend the internal revenue code to clarify that entities that are organized and operated exclusively for publishing written news articles can qualify to become tax exempt organizations.[131] the bill also exempts advertising revenues from taxation and requires the irs to rule on news applications within 12 months. other legal changes would provide additional opportunities for the distribution of local news. a proposed new york bill would require all cable companies operating in the state to offer a local news channel with “news, weather and public affairs programming.”[132] the legislation was proposed shortly after verizon announced that it would shutter fios1 news, its local news network that covers the hudson valley, long island and new jersey. under the proposed law, the programming would have to be independently produced; companies could not simply rebroadcast others’ existing news shows. this proposal has been met with some criticism, including concerns regarding the burden it would put on cable companies to run and staff local news operations, opposition to the passing of cost to consumers, and questions regarding first amendment implications regarding compelled speech. in summary, there is much that the government can do to support local news. in fact, many of the ideas mentioned above have been discussed for over a decade, and some have already been implemented, albeit on a more limited scale. indeed, there is wide agreement that one of the core functions of government is to supply or subsidize “public goods” that markets either fail to provide or cannot provide efficiently. local news is just such a public good, producing benefits that extend broadly throughout society.[133] the challenges facing local news, however, will require more than just increased government support. many advocates for local news point to the need for market based reforms that address the growing power disparities between news producers and platform operators as well as between platforms and their users. as discussed extensively in part 2 of this paper, the decline of local news is attributable to some extent to the rise of online platforms, which have leveraged their ability to amass and monetize data from their users. platforms collect extensive personal data from those using their services, allowing the platform to create detailed profiles on individual users. platforms use this information to influence the behavior of their users while at the same time promising to advertisers that these data rich profiles can be utilized to microtarget those users who are most likely to purchase their products or services. this data driven advertising has several effects on the market for news. first, microtargeting allows advertisers to spend their money more efficiently on the platforms; accordingly, the money advertisers once spent on advertising through newspapers, television and radio is now directed to platforms. 2019 marked a major milestone as digital ad spending in the united states was expected to surpass advertising spending through traditional media.[134] the shift in advertising spending has been especially disastrous for newspapers, which saw advertising revenues decline 62% between 2008 and 2018 from $37.8 billion to $14.3 billion.[135] with a rich revenue stream from advertising, platforms are able to offer their services to users without charging a fee, giving platforms a significant advantage over subscription based news entities in terms of acquiring users/viewers/readers. the network effects that arise from this increase in users further solidify a platform’s competitive advantage and the subsequent disappearance of local news sources, which have been starved for advertising dollars, leaves users without viable alternatives for finding local news and other information. multiple solutions have been offered to help break up what many observers call a “data oligarchy” (made up of google, facebook, and amazon) that is undercutting the revenue streams for news organizations. one approach is data portability and interoperability legislation, which would allow platform users to access their user data and take it with them to another platform. at the workshop we held, adam candeub (professor, michigan state university college of law)compared the idea of data portability to the concept of phone number portability, which allowed individuals to take their old phone number with them when they changed phone providers and significantly increased competition in phone service. charlotte slaiman (competition policy director, public knowledge) argued that to be effective, data portability must be combined with interoperability, which would allow users to communicate across platforms and networks rather than being locked in to a single platform’s proprietary architecture. she suggested this will create additional competition among platforms, reducing market concentration and power among the top platforms and potentially helping the journalism industry. the importance of data portability has been gaining acceptance across the world. in april 2016, the european union passed the general data protection regulation (gdpr), which includes the right to data portability as one of eight rights enforced by the new law. it allows data subjects to obtain data related to them that is held by a “data controller” and to reuse it for their own purposes. individuals are free to either store the data for personal use or to transmit it to another data controller. in addition, the gdpr requires that the data must be received “in a structured, commonly used and machine readable format.” similarly, the california consumer privacy act (ccpa), which went into effect on january 1, 2020, provides for data portability for consumers in california. we are awaiting more details from the california attorney general as to the precise requirements of the ccpa. although there is wide agreement that data portability will encourage competition among online platforms, workshop participants noted that data portability alone would not solve the power disparity between news producers and online platforms. even if individual users have the ability to take their data with them to a new platform or provider, existing market concentration means that users still lack alternatives to the two top platforms: facebook and google. nevertheless, data portability is a useful way to focus the conversation on the importance of user data, which is becoming the most valuable asset of the platform economy. many of the workshop participants suggested that data portability could be most effective as the first step towards comprehensive federal privacy legislation, which would lessen pervasive data collection and reduce the competitive advantage held by platforms. over time, platforms have been able to collect more and more data due to improvements in technology and also because they require consumers to agree to terms of service that are widely regarded as confusing and frequently changing, which prevents consumers from understanding what personal data are being collected and how it is monetized. although state legislatures have been active in developing new privacy laws, including the recently enacted ccpa, the u.s. lacks comprehensive federal privacy rules. instead, there is a complex patchwork of sector specific and medium specific laws, including laws and regulations that address telecommunications, health information, credit information, financial institutions, and marketing. though congress is unlikely to pass privacy legislation before the end of the current term, there appears to be a growing consensus in both parties that federal consumer privacy legislation is necessary.[136] several privacy bills are currently pending in congress, including the setting an american framework to ensure data access, transparency, and accountability (safe data) act, which is sponsored by senators roger wicker (r ms), chairman of the senate committee on commerce, science, and transportation, john thune (r sd), deb fischer (r ne), and marsha blackburn (r tn).[137] among other things, the safe data act would create rights to data transparency, access, deletion, correction, and portability. it would also require opt in consent to process or transfer “sensitive covered data,” which includes a broad variety of identifiers, such as biometric information and geolocation data. unlike policies designed to directly support journalism, privacy legislation targets key parts of the business model of platforms. by limiting the data platforms and other online services can collect from their users, privacy law would lessen the effectiveness of microtargeting and potentially loosen the stranglehold data rich platforms hold over the advertising market. privacy legislation could allow users to place specific limits on data collection (for example, opting out of tracking across the internet or tracking for behavioral advertising) without completely eliminating the ability of news organizations and platforms to monetize the data they collect. as a result, privacy legislation could redefine the relationships among advertisers, platforms, news organizations, and users. well crafted privacy legislation can also limit the way platforms use algorithms, artificial intelligence, and user interface design to shape public discourse and manipulate users, further reducing their competitive advantage over news providers. for example, the safe data act contains two key provisions that expand beyond traditional data privacy concerns. section 205 would prohibit the use of “opaque algorithms” by covered internet platforms unless they (i) notify users of the opaque algorithm, and (ii) make available an “input transparent algorithm” to which users can easily switch. the bill defines an “opaque algorithm” as “an algorithmic ranking system that determines the order or manner that information is furnished to a user on a covered internet platform based, in whole or part, on user specific data that was not expressly provided by the user to the platform for such purpose.” this section draws heavily from the bipartisan filter bubble transparency act introduced in october 2019.[138] according to the earlier bill’s co sponsors, it would “make it easier for internet platform users to understand the potential manipulation that exists with secret algorithms and require large scale platforms to allow those users to consume information outside of that potential manipulation zone or ‘filter bubble’.”[139] section 206 of the safe data act prohibits “large online operators” from, inter alia, “design[ing], modify[ing], or manipulat[ing] a user interface with the purpose or substantial effect of obscuring, subverting, or impairing user autonomy, decision making, or choice to obtain consent or user data[.]” this section draws from the bipartisan deceptive experiences to online users reduction (detour) act proposed by sens. mark r. warner (d va) and deb fischer (r ne),[140] which was designed to “prohibit large online platforms from using deceptive user interfaces, known as ‘dark patterns’ to trick consumers into handing over their personal data.”[141] some workshop participants, however, voiced skepticism about the ability of privacy legislation to fix the problem. cal lee (professor, unc school of information and library science) wondered whether users would be willing to pay for online services that they have grown accustomed to receiving for free, whether that payment came in the form of a subscription or lessened performance from the platform. mary rose papandrea (professor, unc school of law) expressed two related concerns about the utility of privacy legislation. first, she suggested that many users hold data privacy in lesser regard than the services offered by platforms, especially as the platforms expand their collection of data to internet of things connected devices. those users may prefer the personally curated advertising and content they receive as a result of the data collected by platforms. second, she asked how privacy legislation would actually help journalists and news organizations, stating that the legislation may have to be “draconian” to have enough of an effect to reach local journalism. while not a panacea, privacy legislation could support local journalism by reducing the competitive advantage platforms have over news organizations, making it possible for these organizations to compete again for users and advertising dollars that have been increasingly going to platforms such as facebook and google. the journalistic business model was built on selling eyeballs to advertisers, and the appeal of news outlets is that they brought the relevant eyeballs together. by putting users in control of the information that platforms can collect about them, privacy legislation could help level the playing field and allow local news organizations to better compete with platforms that have used user data to corner the advertising market. the conclusion that platforms enjoy a significant competitive advantage over news providers has prompted advocates for local news to argue that antitrust and other forms of competition law should be adapted to address the systemic advantages platforms currently enjoy. one proposal that has gained traction in congress is to create an antitrust exemption that would allow news organizations to jointly negotiate with the platforms over licensing fees for their content. one of the reasons news organizations have struggled to maintain profitability is that facebook and google reportedly collect nearly three quarters of all digital advertising dollars.[142] according to industry advocates, these platforms share only a small fraction of their ad revenue with news organizations, which bear the cost of reporting the news. part of the problem, they argue, is that individual news organizations simply do not have the power to negotiate with the platforms for better compensation. in 2018, rep. david cicilline (d ri), chairman of the house judiciary committee’s antitrust subcommittee proposed the journalism competition and preservation act (jcpa) which would give news organization a four year safe harbor to join together to negotiate licensing fees and terms with large platforms.[143] the bill has picked up a number of co sponsors in the past year, including doug collins (r ga), the ranking member of the committee on the judiciary. amy klobuchar (d mn) filed a companion bill in the senate and senate majority leader mitch mcconnell has joined as co sponsor.[144] the jcpa’s antitrust exemption has some precedent in the newspaper preservation act of 1970, which already provides limited antitrust immunity for joint operating agreements between newspapers that combine certain business operations so long as the newspapers maintain separate newsroom staffs and that their editorial policies are “independently determined.”[145] researchers at the unc hussman school of journalism and media report that support for the jcpa “has been buoyed by ‘techlash,’ the growing public sentiment that tech giants must be held responsible for privacy violations and disinformation as well as their impact on local media."[146] they also note that rep. cicilline’s antitrust subcommittee, the federal trade commission, state attorneys general and the u.s. department of justice are all conducting investigations of the platforms. however, some industry analysts question whether allowing news organizations to negotiate as a group will actually result in better licensing terms because, they assert, publishers need the platforms more than the platforms need news. according to nieman lab’s joshua benton, around 85 percent of publishers’ external traffic comes from google or facebook, but only about 1 in every 25 news feed posts contains any “news,” defined broadly.[147] so even if news organizations threaten to withhold their content, it is unlikely to sway the platforms. moreover, he notes that many newspapers, not to mention broadcasters and digital only sites, will likely break ranks rather than lose out on the chance to get referrals through the platforms. nevertheless, the platforms are facing growing pressure to increase the amount of advertising revenue they pass along to news organizations, with regulators in europe indicating they will force google to pay mandatory licensing fees to publishers. france’s competition regulators recently ordered the company to negotiate with local publishers over content displayed in its news aggregation service or surfaced via google search. australia is also reportedly closing in on a legal framework to force facebook and google to pay media companies for monetizing their news content.[148] seeing the writing on the wall, google announced in october 2020 that it is creating a $1billion licensing fund, which it has called the google news showcase, that would be paid to news publishers “to create and curate high quality content” for new story panels to appear on google news.[149] advocates for local news also argue that antitrust and competition laws should be used to effect broader, systemic change in the american technology and media ecosystem. proposals in this area take many forms, ranging from more vigorous application of existing laws to imposing structural separations and prohibiting dominant platforms from entering adjacent lines of business. since the 1980s, the federal government has generally taken the view that consolidation within the media and technology industries was fine as long as it did not result in an increase in prices or suppress competition in any given community. as a result, there has been a significant increase in concentration of media ownership over the past four decades. many advocates for local media argue that in hindsight, the government’s hands off approach has been highly detrimental for local news, resulting in the creation of publicly traded mega chains, hedge funds, and private equity firms that have changed the incentive structure within media companies leading to steep cuts in newsroom personnel in an effort to meet short term earnings targets. at the same time, they point to the remarkable concentration of power within the four largest online platforms, apple, amazon, facebook and google, which have largely replaced traditional media companies as the source for news and other information. one response to the power disparities between news producers and platform operators as well as between platforms and their users is to restrict acquisitions and mergers that reduce competition. the dominant positions that the largest platforms enjoy is due in part to their acquiring or merging with potential competitors, with some platforms having built entire lines of business through acquisitions while others used acquisitions to neutralize competitive threats. because of rapid technological development in online services, competition can often come from innovative upstarts that may take several years to develop. in this context, acquisition by a dominant platform of a smaller firm could be very damaging to competition if, absent the acquisition, the smaller firm would develop into a major competitive threat or would lead to significant change in the nature of the market. in a concentrated market structure, potential competition from small entrants may be the most important source of competition faced by the incumbent firm.[150] proponents of antitrust reform point to facebook’s purchase of instagram and whatsapp as examples of the company’s elimination of competition through acquisition. with 27 million registered users on ios alone, instagram “was increasingly positioning itself as a social network in its own right not just a photo sharing app” when facebook acquired the company in 2012 and eliminated a nascent competitor.[151] two years later, facebook’s acquisition of the messaging service whatsapp for $19 billion left many industry observers scratching their heads, given the staggering price facebook paid for an app that made little money. based on confidential internal company emails and documents subsequently released by the united kingdom parliament’s digital, culture, media, and sport committee which investigated the acquisition, buzzfeed news reported in 2018 that whatsapp’s rise came at a crucial moment just as facebook was attempting to transition to a mobile first company with messaging as a core service: “whatsapp was quickly demonstrating that it could compete with facebook on its most important battleground,” which drove facebook to acquire the company behind the messaging app.[152] section 7 of the clayton act of 1914 prohibits any transaction where “the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”[153] in 1950, congress passed the celler kefauver anti merger act to broaden the types of transactions covered by the clayton act, specifically to include vertical mergers, conglomerate mergers, and purchases of assets.[154] in october 2020, the majority staff of the house judiciary subcommittee on antitrust, commercial, and administrative law (“judiciary subcommittee”) released a report that found that “[a]lthough the dominant platforms collectively engaged in several hundred mergers and acquisitions between 2000 2019, antitrust enforcers did not block a single one of these transactions” under the clayton act.[155] the judiciary subcommittee concluded that several of these acquisitions enabled platforms to block emerging rivals and undermine competition and that all four of the dominate platforms (apple, amazon, facebook and google) are currently focused on acquiring startups in the artificial intelligence and virtual reality space. the subcommittee warned that ongoing acquisitions by the dominant platforms could entrench their existing positions and eliminate nascent competitors, thus strengthening their market power and potentially close off market entry.[156] in response to the perceived anticompetitive acquisition practices of the platforms, the judiciary subcommittee recently recommended that congress instruct federal agencies to presume that mergers by dominant platforms are anticompetitive. under this change in the law, any acquisition by a dominant platform would be considered anticompetitive “unless the merging parties could show that the transaction was necessary for serving the public interest and that similar benefits could not be achieved through internal growth and expansion.”[157] steven waldman has made a similar argument, albeit with a more direct focus on local news, suggesting that congress should alter antitrust laws to restrict mergers that lead to less investment in local reporting.[158] however, many critics of the platforms assert that stricter merger controls will not be enough to address the durable monopoly power of the dominant platforms and that antitrust and competition laws should be expanded in order to deal with the challenges that platforms present for antitrust enforcement. american antitrust law is largely focused on consumer harm that results from anticompetitive behavior that leads to increases in price, reductions in quality, or declines in innovation. with online platforms like facebook and google, however, it is often difficult to identify and quantify the harms that consumers and other market participants experience as a result of monopolies or near monopolies, thus making antitrust enforcement difficult. for example, online platforms typically offer their services for “free.” in the language of economists, the platform has set a monetary price of zero yet the true “equilibrium price” may be negative because of the value of advertising. in other words, the user’s data may be so valuable that the platform would pay for it. this unusual negative price is difficult for regulators to observe and value with precision, potentially leaving consumers “overcharged.”[159] online platforms can also harm quality of service in ways that are equally difficult to discern. for example, facebook and google have amassed enormous datasets that they use to create detailed profiles of their users; the platforms then leverage this information to frame, nudge, and provide default settings that direct users to the choice that is most profitable for the platform. platforms can also make real time use of the data to determine when a user is in an emotional “hot state,” and can even trigger consumer frailty at an individual level.[160] by exploiting users in this fashion, platforms reduce the quality of the zero price content the user experiences in very subtle ways, making it difficult to quantify a precise level of harm.[161] in a report issued in july 2019 by the george j. stigler center for the study of the economy and the state (“stigler report”), a number of economists and antitrust experts concluded that online platforms present especially difficult challenges for antitrust enforcement and that antitrust law needs better analytical and regulatory tools to adequately deliver competition to consumers.[162] they suggest that new legislation would not need to depart from the dual requirements of bad conduct and harm to competition in the market as a whole. instead, regulators could implement a recalibration of the relative tolerance of antitrust law for the risk of over enforcement and under enforcement by prescribing rebuttable presumptions that would ease the high proof requirements currently imposed on antitrust plaintiffs and place on defendants a more rigorous burden of proving efficiencies. [163] the judiciary subcommittee recently issued a report that recommends that congress clarify and extend the sherman act to address the anticompetitive practices of platforms.[164] under section 2 of the sherman act, it is illegal to “monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several states.”[165] over recent decades, courts have heightened the legal standards that plaintiffs must overcome in order to prove a violation of section 2. as a result, u.s. antitrust authorities have not been active in policing allegedly anticompetitive conduct by online platforms; the government’s last monopolization case involving issues raised by platforms was the microsoft case in 1998. in its report, the judiciary subcommittee recommended that congress restate existing antitrust laws, “clarifying that they are designed to protect not just consumers but also workers, entrepreneurs, independent businesses, open markets, a fair economy, and democratic ideals.”[166] the judiciary subcommittee offered a number specific reforms, including recommending that congress extend the sherman act to prohibit abuses of dominance by online platforms and that it consider creating a statutory presumption that a market share of 30% or more constitutes a rebuttable presumption of dominance by a seller, and a market share of 25% or more constitutes a rebuttable presumption of dominance by a buyer. the subcommittee also recommended that congress prohibit the use of monopoly power in one market to harm competition in a second market, even if the conduct does not result in monopolization of the second market.[167] in addition, the judiciary subcommittee recommended that congress apply the “essential facilities” doctrine to platforms, which would impose a requirement that dominant platforms provide access to their infrastructural services or facilities on a nondiscriminatory basis.[168] antitrust law prohibits unilateral refusals to deal only under very unusual circumstances, thus giving platforms substantial freedom to refuse to deal with other parties or to deal with them only on onerous terms (e.g., pricing, access to customer data, and interoperability) that raise the costs of rivals and enable the platforms to reinforce their dominant positions. [169] the subcommittee’s investigation uncovered several instances in which a dominant platform used the threat of delisting or refusing service to a third party as leverage to extract greater value or more data or to secure an advantage in a distinct market. the subcommittee concluded: “because the dominant platforms do not face meaningful competition in their primary markets, their threat to refuse business with a third party is the equivalent of depriving a market participant of an essential input. this denial of access in one market can undermine competition across adjacent markets, undermining the ability of market participants to compete on the merits.”[170] it should be noted, however, that republican lawmakers on the judiciary subcommittee refused at the last minute to sign the report with their democratic colleagues.[171] instead, rep. ken buck (r co) issued his own report, with support from reps. doug collins (r ga), matt gaetz (r fl) and andy biggs (r az). rep. buck’s report largely agrees with the judiciary subcommittee’s conclusion that apple, amazon, facebook and google have amassed too much power, but he was unwilling to endorse all of the legislative recommendations offered by the majority. instead, buck calls on congress to fund and empower regulatory agencies like the federal trade commission (ftc) and department of justice (doj) to increase enforcement under existing laws. [172] indeed, not all antitrust experts agree that current antitrust law needs to be altered in order to deal with platforms or even that the current media ecosystem is in need of changing. maurice stucke noted at the workshop that some experts have called for what is known as the “roosevelt approach,” which would leave the major platforms as is, but continue to use existing antitrust and competition law to investigate any anti competitive behavior and enjoin specific conduct that violates antitrust law. the stigler report points out that there is a risk that antitrust reforms will not be enacted by experts committed to sound, economically focused reforms, noting that in a politically charged environment this may not be the best time for congress to enact major changes.[173] some experts argue that antitrust and competition laws are simply not up to the task of addressing the anticompetitive behaviors of platforms and that more aggressive solutions are necessary. they point to the explosive growth of google in search, facebook in social networking, and amazon in online retailing as demonstrating that these digital markets have winner take all characteristics that tend to leave just one dominant player.[174] because the platforms enjoy strong economies of scale and economies of scope (due to their low marginal costs and revenue from control of data) and are characterized by strong network effects, potential competitors face significant barriers to entry. they also point to the fact that platforms can maintain their dominance by exercising complete control over the user relationship and positioning themselves as necessary bottlenecks between partners and users, further limiting the possibility for competing services to gain traction and challenge the platform’s power.[175] in documents provided to the house judiciary subcommittee, facebook boasted in 2012 that the firm controlled “95% of all social media” in the united states in terms of monthly minutes of use and noted that the “industry consolidates as it matures.”[176] an investor presentation from that time period also described facebook as having an “enduring competitive advantage” similar to other historically dominant firms.[177] facebook investor presentation [178] one of the leading academic proponents of more aggressive government intervention has been lena khan, a fellow at columbia law school and counsel to the house judiciary subcommittee on antitrust, commercial, and administrative law. khan points out that one feature the dominant digital platforms share is that they have integrated across business lines such that they operate both a platform and market their own goods and services on it. according to kahn, “this structure places dominant platforms in direct competition with some of the businesses that depend on them, creating a conflict of interest that platforms can exploit to further entrench their dominance, thwart competition, and stifle innovation.”[179] khan asserts that growing empirical research shows that dominant tech platforms enjoy uniquely durable market power and reliance on traditional antitrust remedies for anticompetitive conduct   which she characterizes as “highly enfeebled and impoverished”   is misplaced.[180] what khan and others argue is that the government should impose structural separations and prohibit dominant platforms from entering adjacent lines of business. separations differ from other regulatory tools in that separations are ex ante rules whose application does not require continuous government intervention or constant monitoring. responding to potential objections to this approach, kahn says: “insofar as a primary criticism of the public utility era is that many of the regulations proved too unwieldy for courts and enforcers to implement, structural separations appear far more appealing. contrasted with other public utility tools, separations reduce regulatory burden and reflect humility about the capacity of public officials to manage business conduct.”[181] concentration, however, is associated with positive network effects. according to the stigler report, as the number of people who use online platforms increases and the amount of data collected from those users increases, online platforms are able to provide a richer user experience.[182] as stucke and christopher lee (professor, unc school of information and library science) noted at the workshop, google has been successful as a search service because the data that google collects feeds back into their algorithm to produce better search results. if google were to be separated into several smaller search engines, those network effects would not be present, and the quality of search results would likely suffer. consequently, as policymakers determine how best to address the growing market power of online platforms, proposals to break up these technology companies risk losing the beneficial aspects of scale that help make them capable of providing desirable services in the first place and allows them to marshal the resources needed to combat mis  and disinformation. in march 2019, sen. elizabeth warren (d ma) pushed the idea of structural separation to the forefront of the presidential campaign, proposing that congress should pass legislation “that requires large tech platforms to be designated as ‘platform utilities’ and broken apart from any participant on that platform.”[183] under sen. warren’s proposal, companies with an annual global revenue of $25 billion or more and that offer to the public an online marketplace, an exchange, or a platform for connecting third parties would be prohibited from owning both the platform utility and any participants on that platform. they would also be required to meet a standard of fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory dealing with users and would not be allowed to transfer or share data with third parties. smaller companies with annual global revenue of between $90 million and $25 billion would be required to meet the same standard of fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory dealing with users, but would not be required to structurally separate from any participant on the platform. [184] in its october 2020 report, the house judiciary subcommittee also came out in favor of structural separation and line of business restrictions for dominant platforms. in making its recommendation, the judiciary subcommittee noted that congress has relied on both policy tools as part of a standard remedy for dominant intermediaries in other network industries, including railroads and telecommunications services.[185] the judiciary subcommittee did not lay out a specific proposal in the same way that sen. warren did, remarking instead that “[t]he challenges of crafting and implementing structural solutions vary by market and market participants,” and that “some antitrust experts have cautioned that crafting separations can pose a major cost and challenge, especially in dynamic markets.”[186] as noted previously, republicans on the judiciary subcommittee opposed some of the findings in the majority’s report, including the subcommittee’s recommendation that congress consider imposing structural separation on platforms. rep. buck calls such a proposal a “non starter” for conservatives and writes, “we do not agree with the majority’s approach to pass a big tech glass steagall act,”[187] referring to the 1933 law that separated commercial and investment banking. nevertheless, recent congressional hearings directed at technology companies and the judiciary subcommittee’s october 2020 report appear to mark a turning point in terms of support for more aggressive government action to limit the power of online platforms through changes in antitrust law, increased antitrust enforcement, structural separation, or a combination of these approaches. even in opposing the full set of proposals offered by the judiciary subcommittee, rep. buck stated to cnbc that “if i was one of the tech companies i would see this week of democrat and republican responses as very concerning because there is clearly a bipartisan conclusion that these companies are acting anticompetitively and that [there’s] bipartisan consensus on many of the reforms that are necessary.”[188] indeed, the antitrust lawsuit against google, [189] which was filed by the department of justice and eleven state attorneys general as we were finalizing this whitepaper, is further evidence of this shift to a more aggressive posture by the government. the two day event we held in november 2019, titled “fostering an informed society: the role of the first amendment in strengthening local news and democracy,” made a number of key assumptions about americans that today remain fluid and uncertain. a society that is informed is first and foremost one that wants to be informed. the rise and appeal of mis  and disinformation, as this report has explored, have challenged and distorted citizen understanding and public participation. to foster an informed society, people have to want access to reliable information for the purposes of governing themselves. they have to desire to understand more about the dangers of mis  and disinformation: how to identify it, but equally important, how it undermines democracy. we need all citizens to care about these issues as much as policymakers, activists and academics now do. the problems we face will require a multifaceted, multi disciplinary approach. no one lever within the market, law, or society will deliver a magic bullet. instead, experts and policymakers will need to pull at multiple levers using a new vocabulary to talk across the different disciplines   a set of new propositions that recognize the legal, social, journalistic, and economic principles at stake, particularly the harm done to democracy if the status quo continues. while there has been a growing and important focus on the causes of the decline of local news and the spread of mis  and disinformation online   as evidenced by the work of many of the participants in the workshop   we are still in the early stages of understanding how technology is transforming our democracy and the ways we receive and engage with information. this work will require cross disciplinary research and collaboration in order to develop a comprehensive understanding of information environments focused on the interaction of information and technology, particularly in the context of misinformation, partisanship, polarization, propaganda, and political institutions. the first amendment came up many times in our discussions. but recent first amendment jurisprudence speaks more to the government’s reduced role as a regulator of speech than as an affirmative proponent of speech that serves the public interest. any role for the first amendment that is more active in promoting journalism in the public interest will be subject to significant political headwinds. such a change in thinking around the purpose of the first amendment will require more exposition. should the marketplace of ideas remain the only paradigmatic force fueling the production of news? or should the first amendment more directly address the press’ role as a critical fourth estate check on the power of government? when we lose a functioning and effective press, we lose a major part of our democracy. as new media law cases make their way through the courts, lawyers and scholars may need to rethink some of the theoretical underpinnings of the first amendment to more actively support a vibrant local news ecosystem. finally, the notion of strengthening local news assumes consumer want such improvements. but consumers now seem satisfied with either free or reduced prices for news redistributed by powerful platforms who mostly reap what news providers sow, destroying the advertising backbone that used to support sustained news coverage. the department of justice and the federal trade commission have begun to push back with antitrust claims against google and facebook. whether those actions solve the problems of local journalism remains to be seen, and it may well be too late to change the media ecosystem in any way that regains what was lost. but re establishing an appetite for strong journalistic competition will be vital, and markets will need nudging to bend toward a reinvigorated local news ecosystem. some combination of antitrust lawsuits and policy incentives will be necessary to support meaningful and effective journalism enterprises. [1] see penny m. abernathy, news deserts and ghost newspapers: will local news survive?, unc hussman school of journalism and media (2020), https://tinyurl.com/abernathynewsdeserts [hereinafter abernathy, news deserts]. [2] id. at 8. [3] id. [4] id. at 9. [5] id. at 8. [6] id. [7] see id. at 14. [8] see haya el nasser, more than half of u.s. population in 4.6 percent of counties, u.s. census bureau (oct. 24, 2017), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2017/10/big and small counties.html. [9] see penny m. abernathy, the expanding news desert, unc hussman school of journalism and media 11 (2018), https://www.cislm.org/wp content/uploads/2018/10/the expanding news desert 10_14 web.pdf [10] abernathy, news deserts, supra note 1, at 17. [11] id at 9. [12] debora wenger & bob papper, local tv news and the new media landscape: the future of local tv news, knight foundation (2018), https://tinyurl.com/localtvnews. [13] abernathy, news deserts, supra note 1, at 13 [14] id. at 49. [15] id. [16] id. at 23. [17] id. [18] elizabeth grieco, u.s. newspapers have shed half of their newsroom employees since 2008, pew research center (apr. 20, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact tank/2020/04/20/u s newsroom employment has dropped by a quarter since 2008/ [19] abernathy, news deserts, supra note 1, at 22. [20] elimination of main studio rule, 82 fed. reg. 57876 (proposed dec. 11, 2017) (to be codified at 47 c.f.r. pts. 1, 73). [21] see id. [22] national television multiple ownership rule, 82 fed. reg. 21124 (proposed june 5, 2017) (to be codified at 47 c.f.r. pt. 73). [23] abernathy, news deserts, supra note 1, at 34. [24] id. [25] penny m. abernathy, the rise of a new media baron and the emerging threat of news deserts, unc hussman school of journalism and media (2016), https://tinyurl.com/abernathynewmediabaron [hereinafter abernathy, new media baron]. [26] philip m. napoli, assessing local journalism: news deserts, journalism divides, and the determinants of the robustness of local news. dewitt wallace center for media and democracy (2018), https://tinyurl.com/napoliassessinglocaljournalism. [27] id. at 3. [28] id. at 12. [29] id. at 4. [30] gregory j. martin & joshua mccrain, local news and national politics, 113 am. pol. sci. rev. 2, 372 384 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055418000965. [31] jackie filla & martin johnson, local news outlets and political participation, 45 urb. affs. rev. 5, 679 92 (2010), doi: doi.org/10.1177/1078087409351947. [32] jay jennings & meghan rubado, newspaper decline and the effect on local government coverage. annette strauss inst. for civic life (2019), https://tinyurl.com/jenningsnewspaperdecline. [33] joshua p. darr, matthew p. hitt, & johanna l. dunaway, newspaper closures polarize voting behavior, 68 j. communication 6, 1007 1028 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqy051. [34] clara hendrickson, critical in a public health crisis, covid 19 has hit local newsrooms hard, brookings inst. (apr. 8, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/hendricksoncovid. [35] id. [36] jessice mahone & philip napoli, hundreds of hyperpartisan sites are masquerading as local news. this map shows if there’s one near you, neiman lab (july 13, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/mahonenapoli. [37] id. [38] id. [39] elisa shearer & elizabeth grieco, americans are wary of the role social media sites play in delivering the news, pew research center (oct. 2, 2019), https://www.journalism.org/2019/10/02/americans are wary of the role social media sites play in delivering the news/. [40] id. [41] elisa shearer, social media outpaces print newspapers in the u.s. as a news source, pew research center (dec. 10, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact tank/2018/12/10/social media outpaces print newspapers in the u s as a news source/ [42] see committee for the study of digital platforms, market structure and antitrust subcommittee, stigler ctr. for the study of the economy and the state 1, 67 (july 1, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/stiglermarketstructurereport [hereinafter stigler report]. [43] see jasmine enberg, global digital ad spending 2019, emarketer (mar. 28, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/emarketerads2019. [44] see id. at 15. [45] see brooke auxier et al., americans and privacy: concerned, confused and feeling lack of control over their personal information, pew research ctr. (nov. 15, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/pew2019. [46] see ella powers, my news feed is filtered? awareness of news personalization among college students, 5 digital journalism 1315 (2017), doi: doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2017.1286943. [47] id. at 1325. [48] see id. at 1327. [49] see andrés arrieta and mitch stoltz, google fitbit merger would cement google’s data empire, elec. frontier found. (apr. 7, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/effgooglefitbit. [50] see oz shy, a short survey of network economics, 38 rev. indus. org. 119 (2011), doi: doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1600783. [51] see global top 100 companies   june 2020 update, pricewaterhousecoopers, https://tinyurl.com/pwcreport2020 (last visited oct. 24, 2020). [52] see yan carriere swallow & vikram haksar, the economics and implications of data: an integrated approach (dept. paper no. 19/16), int’l monetary fund (sept. 23, 2019), doi: doi.org/10.5089/9781513511436.087. [53] see id. at 5. [54] see id. [55] alphabet inc., 2019 annual report (form 10 k) (feb. 3, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/alphabet201910k. [56] prepared by the house subcomm. on antitrust, commercial and adminstrative law, based on production of facebook, to h. comm. on the judiciary, fb hjc 00086585 (jan. 2020), https://tinyurl.com/houserepcompdigital. [57] see david s. evans, multisided platforms, dynamic competition, and the assessment of market power for internet based firms (u. chi. coase sandor inst. l. & econ. research paper no. 753) 1, 23 (2016), doi: doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2746095. [58] see n. gregory mankiw, principles of economics 814 (8th ed. 2017). [59] see paul h. brietzke, how and why the marketplace of ideas fails, 31 val. u. l. rev. 951, 965 (1997). [60] see id. [61] philip m. napoli, what if more speech is no longer the solution? first amendment theory meets fake news and the filter bubble, 70 fed. com. l.j. 55 (2018). [62] see id. at 96. [63] victor pickard, the big idea: journalism’s market failure is a crisis for democracy, harvard business review (march 12, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/hbrmarketfailure. [64] see digital platforms inquiry: final report, austl’n consumer & consumer comm’n (june 2019), https://tinyurl.com/acccreport2019. [65] see id. at 230 31. [66] see soroush vosoughi et al., the spread of true and false news online, 359 sci. mag. 1146, 1146 (2018), doi: doi.org/10.1126/science.aap9559. [67] see id. [68] see jieun shin et al., the diffusion of misinformation on social media: temporal pattern, message, and source, 83 comp. in hum. behav. 278 (2018), doi: doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2018.02.008. [69] see brian southwell et al., misinformation as a misunderstood challenge to public health, 57 am. j. of preventative medicine 282 (2019), doi: doi.org/10.1016/j.amepre.2019.03.009. [70] see id. at 283. [71] see id. [72] see michaela del vicario, the spreading of misinformation online, 113 proceedings of the nat’l acad. of sci. of the u.s.a. 554 (2016), doi: doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1517441113. [73] see shannon c. mcgregor & daniel kreiss, americans are too worried about political misinformation, slate (oct. 30, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/americansaretooworried. [74] id. [75] brian g. southwell et al., the persistence and peril of misinformation, 105 am. scientist 372 (2017). [76] see alice e. marwick, why do people share fake news? a sociotechnical model of media effects, 2 geo. l. tech. rev. 474 (2018). [77] see philip n. howard et al., the ira, social media and political polarization in the united states, 2012 2018, computational propaganda research project (2019), https://tinyurl.com/irareport. [78] see id. at 3. [79] see id. at 35. [80] see alice e. marwick, media manipulation and disinformation online, data & society (may 15, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/marwick2017. [81] see craig silverman, an iranian disinformation operation impersonated dozens of media outlets to spread fake articles, buzzfeed news (may 14, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/iranfakenewsbzfd. [82] see id. [83] david karpf, on digital disinformation and democratic myths, ssrc mediawell (dec. 10, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/ondigitaldisinformation. [84] id. [85] see communications decency act of 1996, 47 u.s.c. § 230. [86] see id. § 230(c)(1). [87] see id. § 230(c)(2). [88] see cda 230: the most important law protecting internet speech, elec. frontier found., https://tinyurl.com/eff230 (last visited oct. 25, 2020). [89] see kate klonick, the new governors: the people, rules, and processes governing online speech, 131 harv. l. rev. 1598 (2018). [90] see id. at 1602. [91] see bridget barrett & daniel kreiss, platform transience: changes in facebook’s policies, procedures, and affordances in global electoral politics, 8 internet policy review 1 (2019), doi: doi.org/10.14763/2019.4.1446. [92] see community standards, facebook, https://tinyurl.com/fcbkcontmod (last visited oct. 25, 2020). [93] see community guidelines, youtube, https://tinyurl.com/ytcontmod (last visited oct. 25, 2020). [94] see the twitter rules, twitter, https://tinyurl.com/twcontmod (last visited oct. 25, 2020). [95] see platform policy, instagram, https://tinyurl.com/igcontmod (last visited oct. 25, 2020). [96] see mike isaac & cecilia kang, facebook says it won’t back down from allowing lies in political ads, the new york times (jan. 9, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/nytfblies. [97] see michael nuñez, the surprising truth about twitter’s political ad ban, forbes (nov. 1, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/twtrforbes. [98] see catalina botero marino et al., we are a new board overseeing facebook. here’s what we’ll decide., the new york times (may 6, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/fbbdnyt. [99] see emily taylor & stacie hoffman, industry responses to computational propaganda and social media manipulation, computational propaganda research project (2019), https://tinyurl.com/cprpindusrpt. [100] see id. at 3. [101] see ana lucia schmidt et al., anatomy of news consumption on facebook, 114 proceedings of the nat’l acad. of sci. of the u.s.a. 3035, doi: doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1617052114. [102] see for local news, americans embrace digital but still want strong community connection, pew research ctr. at 4 (mar. 26, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/pew2019ln. [103] see american views 2020: trust, media, and democracy, gallup/knight foundation 1, 2 (2020), https://tinyurl.com/galkftmd. [104] see id. at 3 4. [105] see id. at 30. [106] see brooke donald, stanford researchers find students have trouble judging the credibility of information online, stan. graduate sch. of educ. (nov. 22, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/stnfded2016. [107] see id. [108] see id. [109] see bad news game, https://www.sdmlab.psychol.cam.ac.uk/directory/bad news game (last visited oct. 31, 2020). [110] see intro to lateral reasoning, https://cor.stanford.edu/curriculum/lessons/intro to lateral reading/ (last visited oct. 31, 2020). [111] see steven waldman, curing local news for good, colum. journalism rev. (mar. 31, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/wldmncjr [hereinafter waldman, local news]. [112] see steven waldman, the information needs of communities, fcc working group on information needs of communities 1, 146 (july 2011), https://tinyurl.com/fccreport2011. [113] see penny m. abernathy, news deserts and ghost newspapers: will local news survive? unc hussman school of journalism and media1, 85 (2020), https://tinyurl.com/abernathynewsdeserts [hereinafter abernathy, news deserts]. [114] see waldman, local news, supra note 109. [115] see craig aaron and s. derek turner, what a journalism recovery package should look like during the covid 19 crisis, free press action (may 11, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/fpacovid2020 [hereinafter aaron and turner, recovery package]. [116] see waldman, local news, supra note 109. [117] see abernathy, news deserts, supra note 1, at 86. [118] press release, rep. debbie dingell, dingell, flores, veasey, upton lead bipartisan letter to president trump in support of local media (apr. 20, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/debdnglltr. [119] see waldman, local news, supra note 109. [120] see news media alliance, support local media, news media alliance (apr. 9, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/nmalocalnews. [121] see christine schmidt, how free press convinced new jersey to allocate $2 million for rehabilitating local news, nieman lab (july 15, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/nmnlabnj. [122] see canadian heritage, the government of canada supports canadian journalism to ensure the vitality of democracy, cision (may 22, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/cisionjrnlsm. [123] see id. [124] see nicholas lemann, can journalism be saved?, the new york review of books (feb. 27, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/nybks. [125] matt pearce (@mattdpearce), twitter (apr. 30, 2020, 12:26 pm), https://twitter.com/mattdpearce/status/1255896227113168899. [126] see waldman, local news, supra note 111. [127] see abernathy, news deserts, supra note 1, at 83. [128] see aaron and turner, recovery package, supra note 115. [129] see abernathy, news deserts, supra note 1, at 84. [130] see amy mitchell et al., nonprofit journalism: a growing but fragile part of the u.s. news system, pew research ctr. (june 10, 2013), https://tinyurl.com/prcnonprofit. [131] see saving local news act of 2019, h.r. 3126, 116th cong. (2019). [132] see vivian wang, local news is dying. new york may try to pass a law to save it., the new york times (oct. 21, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/nylawnyt. [133] the federal trade commission’s recent discussion draft on “potential policy recommendations to support the reinvention of journalism” explains why news is a “public good” in economic terms. that is, it is non rivalrous (one person’s consumption of the news does not preclude another person’s consumption of the same news) and non excludable (once the news producer supplies anyone, it cannot exclude anyone). because free riding is usually easy in these circumstances, it is often difficult to ensure that producers of public goods are appropriately compensated. see fed. trade comm’n, potential policy recommendations to support the reinvention of journalism (discussion draft) (june 15, 2010), https://tinyurl.com/ftcjournalism. [134] see douglas clark, us digital ad spending will surpass traditional in 2019, emarketer (feb. 20, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/emarketerad. [135] see elizabeth grieco, fast facts about the newspaper industry’s financial struggles as mcclatchy files for bankruptcy, fact tank (feb. 14, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/fcttnk2020. [136] see revisiting the need for federal data privacy legislation, hearing before the comm. on commerce, science, and transportation, 116th cong. (sept. 23, 2020). [137] see safe data act, s. 4626, 116th cong. (2020). [138] see filter bubble transparency act, s. 2763, 116th cong. (2019). [139] press release, sen. john thune, thune, colleagues introduce bipartisan bill to increase internet platform transparency and provide consumers 2ith greater control over digital content (nov. 1, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/thunepr. [140] see deceptive experiences to online users reduction act, s. 1084, 116th cong. (2019). [141] press release, sen. deb fischer, senators introduce bipartisan legislation to ban manipulative ‘dark patterns’ (apr. 9, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/fischerpr. [142] see jillian d’onfro, google and facebook extend their lead in online ads, and that’s reason for investors to be cautious, cnbc (dec. 20, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/donfrocnbc. [143] see journalism competition and preservation act of 2018, h.r. 5190, 115th cong. (2018). [144] see journalism competition and preservation act of 2019, s. 1700, 116th cong. (2019). [145] see newspaper preservation act, 15 u.s.c. § 1802(2). [146] see abernathy, news deserts, supra note 1, at 87. [147] see joshua benton, don’t expect mcconnell’s paradox to help news publishers get real money out of google and facebook, nieman lab (jan. 8, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/nmnlabmccon. [148] see livia albeck ripka, australia moves to force google and facebook to compensate media outlets, the new york times (apr. 20, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/nytausfb. [149] see ingrid lunden, google to pay out $1b to publishers to license content for new google news showcase, techcrunch (oct. 1, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/googlenewstc. [150] see stigler report, supra note 20. [151] see facebook buys instagram for $1 billion, turns budding rival into its standalone photo app, techcrunch (apr. 9, 2012), https://tinyurl.com/fbinstatc. [152] see charlie warzel and ryan mac, these confidential charts show why facebook bought whatsapp, buzzfeed news (dec. 5, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/bzfdnwsfb. [153] see clayton act, 15 u.s.c. § 18 (2018). [154] see celler kefauver anti merger act, 64 stat. 1125 (1950). [155] majority staff of h. subcomm. on antitrust, commercial and adminstrative law of the h. comm on the judiciary, 116th cong., investigation of competition in digital markets 1, 386 (2020) https://tinyurl.com/houserepcompdigital [hereinafter house report on digital competition]. [156]see id. at 387. [157] see id. [158] see waldman, local news, supra note 111. [159] see gene kimmelman, the right way to regulate digital platforms, harvard shorenstein center (sept. 18, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/harvrptdigplat [hereinafter kimmelman, digital platforms]. [160] see ryan calo, digital market manipulation, 82 geo. wash. l. rev. 995 (2014). [161] see kimmelman, digital platforms, supra note 159. [162] see stigler report, supra note 20. [163] see id. at 72. [164] see house report on digital competition, supra note 155, at 394. [165] sherman act, 15 u.s.c. § 2 (2018). [166] see house report on digital competition, supra note 155, at 391. [167] see id. at 395. [168] see id. at 396 97. [169] see stigler report, supra note 20, at 76. [170] see house report on digital competition, supra note 153, at 396. [171] see cecilia kang and david mccabe, big tech was their enemy, until partisanship fractured the battle plans, the new york times (oct. 6, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/nythscomm. [172] press release, rep. ken buck, rep. buck pens antitrust report that presents a “third way” to take on big tech (oct. 6, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/repbuckreport2020. [173] see stigler report, supra note 20, at 72. [174] see kimmelman, digital platforms, supra note 159. [175] see id. [176] house report on digital competition, supra note 155, at 139. [177] id. at 139. [178] prepared by subcommittee based on production of facebook, to h. comm. on the judiciary, fb hjc acal 00086798 (aug. 22, 2020). [179] lina m. kahn, the separation of platforms and commerce, 119 colum. l.r. 973, 977 (2019). [180] see id. at 1033. [181] see id. at 1036. [182] see stigler report, supra note 20, at 15. [183] see elizabeth warren, here's how we can break up big tech, medium (mar. 8, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/warrenbigtech. [184] see id. [185] see house report on digital competition, supra note 155, at 379. [186] see id. at 380. [187] see lauren feiner, key gop lawmaker lays out ‘non starters’ for big tech antitrust reform, cnbc (oct. 6, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/buckcnbc. [188] see id. [189] see press release, u.s. dept. of justice off. of public affairs, justice department sues monopolist google for violating antitrust laws (oct. 20, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/dojprgoogle. download participant bios as a pdf penny abernathy knight chair in journalism and digital media economics university of north carolina hussman school of journalism and media penelope (penny) muse abernathy, a former executive at the wall street journal and the new york times, is the knight chair in journalism and digital media economics at the university of north carolina. a journalism professional with more than 30 years of experience as a reporter, editor and senior media business executive, she specializes in preserving quality journalism by helping news organizations succeed economically in the digital environment. her research focuses on the implications of the digital revolution for news organizations, the information needs of communities and the emergence of news deserts in the united states. deb aikat associate professor university of north carolina hussman school of journalism and media a former journalist, deb aikat has been a faculty member since 1995 in the hussman school of journalism and media at the university of north carolina at chapel hill. an award winning researcher and teacher, aikat theorizes digital media in the global sphere. aikat’s research ranges across the media spectrum. in addition to teaching on campus classes, aikat has taught online courses since 1997 when he conceptualized unc’s first online course in journalism. he developed in 2003 a graduate level online certificate program in “technology and communication” that was later expanded into the online ma program. he has won fellowships from renowned research institutions such as the institute for the arts and humanities (2000 & 2003) and the journalism leadership institute in diversity (2004 05). david ardia reef c. ivey ii excellence fund term professor of law university of north carolina school of law david ardia joined the carolina law faculty in 2011 and serves as the reef c. ivey ii excellence fund term professor of law and faculty co director of the unc center for media law and policy. he also holds a secondary appointment at the unc school of media and journalism. his teaching and research interests include constitutional law, media law, internet law, and torts. before joining carolina law, ardia was a fellow at the berkman klein center for internet & society at harvard university and was assistant counsel at the washington post, where he provided pre publication review and legal advice on first amendment, newsgathering, privacy, intellectual property, and general business issues. jerome barron harold h. greene professor of law emeritus the george washington university law school jerome barron is the harold h. greene professor emeritus at george washington university law school. he joined the gw law faculty in 1965 and retired from the faculty in 2013. he has argued and participated in cases in the u.s. supreme court and served as a consultant to the senate committee on presidential campaign activities (watergate). barron writes in the areas of constitutional law and communications law. in 2004, he was the fulbright distinguished chair in law at the university of trento in italy. his books include freedom of the press for whom? (1973); constitutional law: principles and policy (8th ed. 2012); constitutional law in a nutshell (9th ed. 2017); and first amendment law in a nutshell (5th ed. 2018). david bralow legal director press freedom defense fund as legal director of the press freedom defense fund, bralow brings a wealth of experience in media law including first amendment expertise, national security issues, foia prosecutions and appeals, defamation, and privacy law. prior to joining first look media, bralow was of counsel in the media, communication and entertainment practice group of pepper hamilton llp. he also served as senior vice president and general counsel at digital first media, a multi platform media company with the second largest newspaper circulation in the united states; and as assistant general counsel for 13 years at the tribune company, where he provided legal advice to their newspapers, websites, and television stations. adam candeub professor of law, and director of the intellectual property, information and communications law program michigan state university college of law adam candeub joined the michigan state university college of law faculty in fall 2004. he is also a fellow with msu's institute of public utilities, which is co sponsored by msu college of law. prior to this position, he was an attorney advisor for the federal communications commission (fcc) in the media bureau. his work at the fcc involved him in critical decisions in communications law. candeub's scholarly interests focus on the intersection of regulation, economics, and communications law and policy. he also publishes in the area of criminal law and philosophy. michelle connolly professor of the practice of economics duke university trinity college of arts & sciences michelle connolly is professor of the practice in the economics department at duke university. she was the economics director of duke in new york: financial markets and institutions program for 2007 2009 and the director of ecoteach for several years. connolly’s research and teaching focus specifically on international trade, telecommunications policy, media policy, education, growth, and development. walter dellinger douglas b. maggs professor emeritus of law duke university school of law walter dellinger is the douglas b. maggs professor emeritus of law at duke university. he was a resident faculty member at duke continuously from 1969 until 1993. he served as acting solicitor general for the 1996 97 term of the supreme court. dellinger argued nine cases before the court, the most by any solicitor general in more than twenty years (including cases dealing with the cable television act and the religious freedom restoration act). after serving in early 1993 in the white house as an advisor to the president on constitutional issues, dellinger was nominated by the president to be assistant attorney general and head of the office of legal counsel (olc) and was confirmed by the senate for that position in october, 1993. during his three years as assistant attorney general he served as the department's principal legal advisor to the attorney general and the president. deborah dwyer roy h. park fellow and doctoral student university of north carolina hussman school of journalism and media deborah dwyer is a unc park fellow and a former communications professional with more than 20 years of experience in journalism, public relations, corporate and nonprofit communications, and marketing. deborah’s scholarship relates to the practice of ethical and effective journalism at a time when the role of the press is threatened by corporate ownership, public distrust, emerging forms of censorship, political contentiousness, and an elusive definition of what constitutes journalism in modern society. her recent work explores technological effects on the long tail of publishing and how cybersecurity concerns affect journalist/confidential source relationships. tori ekstrand associate professor university of north carolina hussman school of journalism and media tori ekstrand teaches media law courses in the unc hussman school of journalism and media. before coming to carolina, she was an associate professor in the bowling green state university department of journalism and public relations and an affiliate faculty member of bgsu’s american cultural studies department. before teaching, ekstrand worked for the associated press in their new york headquarters for nearly a decade. she served as ap’s director of corporate communications, responsible for marketing, public relations and events for the worldwide news agency. ekstrand’s research explores conflicts between copyright law and the first amendment, particularly as they arise in journalism and social media. deen freelon associate professor university of north carolina hussman school of journalism and media deen freelon is an associate professor in the school of media and journalism. his research covers two major areas of scholarship: 1) political expression through digital media and 2) data science and computational methods for analyzing large digital datasets. he has authored or co authored more than 30 journal articles, book chapters and public reports, in addition to co editing one scholarly book. he has served as principal investigator on grants from the knight foundation, the spencer foundation and the u.s. institute of peace. amy gajda class of 1937 professor of law tulane university law school amy gajda is recognized internationally for her expertise in privacy, media law, torts, and the law of higher education; her scholarship explores the tensions between social regulation and first amendment values. before joining tulane’s faculty in 2010, gajda held faculty appointments in both the law and journalism schools at the university of illinois and practiced law in washington, d.c. she is a past winner of the felix frankfurter award for distinguished teaching, tulane law school’s highest teaching honor. andrew gavil professor of law howard university school of law andy gavil teaches antitrust law, civil procedure, complex litigation, and information privacy and data security at the howard university school of law, where he has been a member of the faculty since 1989. he has written and lectured extensively on various aspects of antitrust law, policy, and litigation and is an author of antitrust law in perspective: cases concepts and problems in competition policy (3d ed. 2017). he has been an active member of the antitrust section of the american bar association and currently serves as a senior editor on the board of the antitrust law journal and chair of the selection committee for the section’s international scholar in residence program. yosef getachew media & democracy program director common cause yosef getachew serves as the media & democracy program director at common cause. prior to joining common cause, getachew served as a policy fellow at public knowledge where he’s worked on a variety of technology and communications issues. his work has focused on broadband privacy, broadband access and affordability, and other consumer issues. prior to joining public knowledge, getachew worked as a law clerk for several technology and communications organizations including the federal communications commission, comcast, facebook, and the white house office of science and technology policy. wade hargrove communications attorney / partner (ret.) brooks, pierce, mclendon, humphrey & leonard, llp wade hargrove is widely known as one of the leading media and communications attorneys in the country. hargrove spent his career representing many of the nation’s largest corporations, media companies, and national and state trade associations, counseling them in corporate matters, mergers and acquisitions, fcc regulatory issues, contracts, antitrust, copyright issues, compliance, libel and slander, privacy, and legal issues involving the use of new technology. after a successful professional career of more than 50 years, hargrove retired from practice in 2018. he served as partner at brooks pierce for over 20 years, helping to establish the firm's nationally recognized media and communications practice. robert kaiser journalist and former associate editor the washington post robert kaiser is a former associate editor and senior correspondent of the washington post, where he worked from 1963 until 2014. he has served as a special correspondent in london (1964 67), a reporter on the city desk in washington (1967 69), and foreign correspondent in saigon (1969 70) and moscow (1971 74). he returned to the national staff in washington and worked as a reporter for seven years, covering labor, the u.s. senate, the 1980 presidential campaign, and the first reagan administration. he has been a commentator on npr’s all things considered, and has appeared on meet the press, nbc’s today, and other television programs. kaiser is the author or co author of eight books. the news about the news won harvard university’s goldsmith prize for the best book of 2002 on politics and the news media. daniel kreiss director, ph.d. in media and communication and associate professor university of north carolina hussman school of journalism and media daniel kreiss joined the unc hussman school of journalism and media faculty in july 2011 to teach courses in research methods and political communication. kreiss’ research explores the impact of technological change on the public sphere and political practice. in addition to this work on institutional electoral processes and political campaign and party organizations, kreiss has published a number of articles and chapters that analyze the effects of changing media environments on the organization and practice of journalism. in his 2012 book from oxford university press, taking our country back: the crafting of networked politics from howard dean to barack obama, kreiss presents the untold history of new media and democratic political campaigning over the last decade. susan king dean and john thomas kerr distinguished professor university of north carolina hussman school of journalism and media susan king became dean of the unc school of media and journalism on jan. 1, 2012. she is also the school’s john thomas kerr distinguished professor. king’s career has spanned the school's two major disciplines   journalism and strategic communication. after starting her broadcast journalism career in buffalo, n.y., she spent more than 20 years in washington, d.c., as an anchor and reporter covering politics, including serving as a white house correspondent for abc news. she also reported for cbs, nbc and cnn, and hosted the “diane rehm show” and “talk of the nation” for national public radio. king then worked nearly five years in the u.s. department of labor as the assistant secretary for public affairs and as the executive director of the family and medical leave commission. in 1999 she joined carnegie corporation of new york as vice president for external affairs. she launched and led the carnegie knight initiative on the future of journalism education in collaboration with the john s. and james l. knight foundation and 12 premier u.s. journalism schools including unc. cal lee professor university of north carolina school of information and library science dr. christopher (cal) lee is a professor at the unc school of information and library science (sils), a fellow of the society of american archivists (saa), and editor of the american archivist. he teaches archival administration, records management, digital curation, understanding information technology for managing digital collections, and digital forensics. dr. lee’s primary area of research is curation of digital collections. he is particularly interested in the professionalization of this work and the diffusion of existing tools and methods into professional practice. gregory magarian thomas and karole green professor of law washington university school of law gregory magarian is the thomas and karole greene professor of law at washington university school of law in st. louis. he teaches and writes about u.s. constitutional law, with emphasis on the freedom of expression. his first book, managed speech: the roberts court’s first amendment, was published in 2017 by oxford university press. his research and writing also examine church and state, firearms regulation, and regulations of the media and the political process. he served as a law clerk for justice john paul stevens of the u.s. supreme court and judge louis oberdorfer of the u.s. district court for the district of columbia. he practiced law at jenner and block in washington, d.c. and taught at villanova university before joining the washington university faculty in 2008. joshua mccrain phd candidate in political science emory college of arts & sciences joshua mccrain is a doctoral student in the department of political science at emory college of arts and sciences. his focus includes lobbying, congress, media and politics, and political methodology. mccrain is particularly interested in congressional staff, the revolving door, and the influence of private interests in public policy. prior to coming to emory mccrain spent three years in washington dc, first working on capitol hill, then as a nonprofit lobbyist, and finally in online advocacy for nonprofit organizations. chris meazell professor of practice wake forest school of law chris meazell is a professor of practice and executive director of the innovation hub at wake forest university law school and is focused on the evolving nature of the media, start up culture, and the legal profession. once a professional musician, meazell went on to become a partner at one of the largest and most diverse media and communications law practices in the united states, with expertise in areas such as intellectual property litigation, media and first amendment, risk management and regulatory matters. meazell also continues to actively practice law in washington, d.c. with the potomac law group. phil napoli james r. shepley professor of public policy duke university sandford school of public policy phil napoli is a james r. shepley professor of public policy at duke’s sanford school of public policy and a faculty affiliate of the dewitt wallace center for media and democracy. his areas of expertise include media regulation and policy, the sustainability and further of local journalism, algorithms and news, media and democracy, politics of policy research, media institutions, and audience measurement. mary rose papandrea samuel ashe distinguished professor of constitutional law and associate dean for academic affairs university of north carolina school of law mary rose papandrea is the judge john j. parker distinguished professor of law and associate dean for academic affairs at the unc school of law. she came to the university from boston college law school in 2015. her teaching and research interests include constitutional law, media law, torts, civil procedure, and national security and civil liberties. papandrea has written extensively about government secrecy and national security leaks, the reporter’s privilege, student speech rights, the first amendment rights of public employees, and the u.s. supreme court and technology. papandrea clerked for u.s. supreme court justice david h. souter and worked as an associate at williams & connolly llp in washington, d.c., where she specialized in first amendment and media law litigation. matt perault associate professor of the practice duke science & society matt perault is the director of the center for science & technology policy at duke university. he served as a director of public policy at facebook, where he led the company’s global public policy planning efforts on issues such as competition, law enforcement, and human rights, and oversaw public policy for whatsapp, oculus, and facebook artificial intelligence research. prior to joining facebook, matt was counsel at the congressional oversight panel. jonathan peters assistant professor of journalism university of georgia grady college of journalism and mass communication jonathan peters is a media law professor at the university of georgia, with appointments in the grady college of journalism and mass communication and the school of law. he is the press freedom correspondent for the columbia journalism review, and he has written about legal issues for esquire, the atlantic, slate, wired, and cnn. he participates regularly in the u.s. department of state’s edward r. murrow program for journalists, and last year he completed a project to develop legal guidelines for press rights at peaceful assemblies in europe, working with the organization for security and co operation in europe, based in vienna, and the office for democratic institutions and human rights, based in warsaw. robert picard senior research fellow reuters institute at university of oxford robert g. picard is a senior research fellow at the reuters institute at university of oxford, a fellow of the royal society of arts, and a fellow at the information society project at yale university law school. picard’s research focuses on economics of media and government media policies. picard was a member of the annenberg commission on the press and conducted research for the carnegie knight task force on journalism, funded by the carnegie corporation and the knight foundation. amanda reid assistant professor university of north carolina hussman school of journalism and media amanda reid is an assistant professor at the unc hussman school of journalism and media. she also holds a secondary appointment at the unc school of law. her scholarly works focus on the intersection of first amendment and intellectual property topics, including copyright and trademark law. prior to entering academia, she served as a commercial litigation associate with holland & knight, llp and clerked for two federal judges. before joining the unc faculty, reid was a professor of law and taught intellectual property, real property, trusts and estates, civil procedure, and legal research and writing courses. reid’s interest in intellectual property began with branding and trademark law, and she remains fascinated with symbols and semiotics. laura ruel associate professor and director of journalism university of north carolina hussman school of journalism and media laura ruel is an associate professor of design, user experience and interactive media at the unc hussman school of journalism and media. her research interests include examining user behavior and cognitive processes in the age of interactive media. ruel uses eye tracking technologies to explore these issues, and is part of the fda’s tobacco centers of regulatory science research at unc. in addition, she conducts practical usability and eye tracking research studies for the news media. she also was a project leader for the poynter institute's eyetrack iii research, a study that examined online news consumer behavior in the digital age. before joining the academic world in fall of 2000, she worked for more than 15 years in the journalism industry as a reporter, editor, designer and manager at a number of newspapers and magazines including the south florida sun sentinel, the omaha world herald and the denver rocky mountain news. jared schroeder assistant professor of journalism southern methodist university meadows school of the arts jared schroeder is the teaching chair for the law & policy division of the association for education in journalism and mass communication at smu meadows school of the arts. schroeder’s research is particularly concerned with first amendment theory, free expression rationales, and technological influences on individuals and community. schroeder is the author of the press clause and digital technology's fourth wave and co author of emma goldman's no conscription league and the first amendment. he has published his research in the first amendment law review, communication law & policy, the review of higher education, and first amendment studies and is a frequent contributor to popular and trade publications, such as columbia journalism review. wendy scott associate dean for academic success and professor of law elon university school of law wendy scott is the associate dean for academic success and professor of law at elon. scott is a nationally recognized scholar of constitutional theory and school desegregation. scott graduated from harvard university and new york university school of law. her professional work included positions as a staff attorney at the legal action center of the city of new york, as an associate at vladeck, waldman, elias & engelhard in new york city, and associate counsel for the center for law and social justice. prior to joining the elon law faculty, scott led mississippi college school of law, serving from 2014 2016 as the first african american to guide the school as dean. melanie sill news executive, and former editor at the news & observer of raleigh melanie sill is an experienced news executive and change maker who’s led innovation aimed at strengthening journalism’s public service and connection. sills currently works as a news consultant with a focus on local news sustainability and audience connection. in prior roles she was the top editor and senior vice resident for news at the sacramento bee, news & observer of raleigh and kpcc   southern california public radio in los angeles. she has worked actively in public interest journalism, content and staff diversity, open government and first amendment issues. charlotte slaiman senior policy counsel public knowledge charlotte slaiman is senior policy counsel for competition policy at public knowledge. prior to joining public knowledge, charlotte worked in the anticompetitive practices division of the federal trade commission, investigating and litigating antitrust conduct violations, including the 2017 case against 1 800 contacts for manipulating google search ad auctions. she previously worked as a legislative aide to senator al franken, focusing on judiciary committee issues including competition, media, and consumer privacy. brian southwell program director of science in the public sphere research triangle institute brian southwell, phd, is an expert in communication and human behavior and a senior research scientist in the center for communication science at the research triangle institute (also known as rti international). his large scale evaluation work has spanned behaviors and audiences, including cancer prevention and screening promotion efforts, national campaigns to discourage drug and tobacco use, efforts to bolster television news coverage of science, and various state level campaigns. he also has studied public understanding of energy and related topics, as well as social networks and popular understandings of health. in addition, he has served the university of north carolina at chapel hill since 2011 as a research professor and lecturer at the university of north carolina at chapel hill's hussman school of journalism and media and as an adjunct associate professor with unc's gillings school of global public health. maurice stucke professor of law university of tennessee college of law maurice stucke is a professor of law at the university of tennessee. with twenty five years of experience handling a range of policy issues in both private practice and as a prosecutor at the u.s. department of justice, he advises governments, law firms, consumer groups, and multinational firms on competition and privacy issues. stucke serves as one of the united states’ non governmental advisors to the international competition network, and on the boards of the institute for consumer antitrust studies, the american antitrust institute, and the academic society for competition law. download these resources as a pdf many local news organizations have vanished and those that remain face plummeting advertising revenues and changes in ownership. regulatory changes also have exacerbated the trend toward national ownership and a move away from local news reporting. the following resources discuss the decline of local news and various policy proposals to address this decline. knowledge of the economics of platforms is critical to understanding how they operate. facebook, google, and other online platforms operate what economists call a “multi sided platform” by providing services to users (generally without charge) and advertisers (for a fee). while platforms can provide benefits to both ends of this two sided market, they also use their structure to create asymmetries that can be difficult for regulators to identify and control. today’s dominant platforms are also characterized by strong network effects, which increase as their number of users increases. the following resources discuss the business model and economics of platforms. platforms play an increasingly important role in providing a space for public discourse and democratic participation. due in part to section 230 of the communications decency act, 47 usc § 230 (2018), online platforms have wide latitude to decide what content to allow on their services. the following resources examine the role that platforms play in moderating the public sphere. one of the core challenges that platforms are dealing with is the presence of misinformation and disinformation on their sites. misinformation (false or misleading information spread unknowingly or without regard to its veracity) and disinformation (false information spread intentionally to damage other people or organizations) have spread with assistance from foreign actors, platform users, and even the platforms themselves. the following resources examine the problems associated with the spread of misinformation and disinformation, what contributes to the spread, and how platforms can respond to this growing issue. the following resources provide links to various online platforms’ policies and content moderation practices. center for information, technology, and public life (citap) 100 manning hall, cb 3360 chapel hill, nc 25799 3360 copyright 2025 center for information, technology, and public life

for more than a century, the new york times has remained relentlessly committed to the journalistic practice of independence, pledging to cover the world “without fear or favor.” a.g. sulzberger, publisher of the new york times, wrote an essay published may 15 in columbia journalism review that puts this long standing commitment in today’s context. the full copy of this essay is below. as long as independent journalism has existed, it has angered people who want stories told their way or not at all. but i can pinpoint the moment when i realized how contested the very idea of journalistic independence had become. it was the fall of 2018, my first year as publisher of the new york times. i had spent my career until then as a reporter and editor steeped in the methods, values, and stylistic quirks of traditional journalism, covering small towns for the providence journal and local government for the portland oregonian before joining the times. even after years of watching these traditions come under intensifying pressure from the internet and social media, i was struck by how frontally the old journalistic model was being challenged by the dynamics of covering a new president unconstrained by precedent and social norms sometimes even reality itself. at the time, the country was waiting for the results of special counsel robert mueller’s investigation into russian interference in the 2016 election on behalf of donald trump’s campaign. many of the president’s critics believed that the investigation would force the removal of a man they regarded as unfit to lead the nation. they were also convinced that the last safeguard against the president’s relentless efforts to undermine the investigation was rod j. rosenstein, the second highest ranking official in the justice department, who had assumed oversight of the investigation when the attorney general recused himself. after months of careful reporting, two reporters in the washington bureau of the times, adam goldman and michael schmidt, uncovered a startling story. the previous spring, rosenstein himself had been so concerned about trump’s erratic behavior that he had suggested secretly recording the president and even raised the possibility of invoking a constitutional mechanism contained in the twenty fifth amendment that had never been used, to declare trump unfit and remove him from office. there was no question about whether to publish the story. it was based on extensive interviews with high level players in the administration, the justice department, and the fbi and backed up by a paper trail. it seemed like exactly the type of journalism the public should expect from an independent press. there will be no worthwhile future for journalism if our profession abandons the core value that makes our work essential to democratic society, the value that answers the question of why we’re deserving of the public trust and the special protections afforded the free press. that value is journalistic independence. the article appeared on september 21. given that the reporting raised profound concerns about the president’s ability to serve from one of his own appointees, no less the swift and angry response from the right was not at all surprising. some saw our reporting as a validation of their theories about a “deep state coup.” many others dismissed the reporting as entirely untrue and attacked us for publishing the story. senator lindsey graham tweeted a response to the piece that proved typical: “when it comes to president @realdonaldtrump….. beware of anything coming out of the @nytimes.” what caught me by surprise was the outrage from the left. here the criticism was not so much that the reporting was untrue though some did jump through hoops to make that assertion but that the information was too dangerous to publish. from twitter to magazines to cable news, these critics charged that our reporting had effectively armed trump with the pretext to fire rosenstein and end the inquiry into his own conduct. on her show that night, rachel maddow attacked the credibility of the story at length before warning: “they have provided president trump this headline and this fully cooked, fully baked new york times approved headline inviting the president to fire rod rosenstein and thereby end the mueller investigation.” even those who regularly espoused support for independent journalism suggested that in this case our values had led us to a misguided neutrality that jeopardized democracy. readers accused the reporters of journalistic recklessness and even of treason. “i suppose you would argue that your job is to print the news, whatever it is,” one reader wrote in one of the thousands of online comments and letters to the editor protesting the article. “however, thinking so narrowly is an abdication of your responsibility, and i’m not sure this was really news anyway. to ignore the consequences of your stories is not ethical and is no service to democracy. you have a profound duty to consider whether the news value is worth the damage the reporting will do. in this case, i do not believe it was.” as i watched the reaction unfold, i found myself increasingly concerned not just by the growing pressure on independent journalism, but by the troubling demand implicit in the criticism. a leading news organization had discovered that a top law enforcement official had such profound concerns about the fitness of the president of the united states that he discussed whether unprecedented steps should be taken to remove him from office. and many people, even some journalists, wanted this information actively hidden from the public. american journalism faces a confluence of challenges that present the most profound threat to the free press in more than a century. news organizations are shrinking and dying under sustained financial duress. attacks on journalists are surging. press freedoms are under intensifying pressure. and with the broader information ecosystem overrun by misinformation, conspiracy theories, propaganda, and clickbait, public trust in journalism has fallen to historical lows. there is no clear path through this gantlet. but there will be no worthwhile future for journalism if our profession abandons the core value that makes our work essential to democratic society, the value that answers the question of why we’re deserving of the public trust and the special protections afforded the free press. that value is journalistic independence. independence is the increasingly contested journalistic commitment to following facts wherever they lead. it places the truth and the search for it with an open yet skeptical mind above all else. those may sound like blandly agreeable clichés of journalism 101, but in this hyperpolarized era, independent journalism and the sometimes counterintuitive values that animate it have become a radical pursuit. independence is the increasingly contested journalistic commitment to following facts wherever they lead. it places the truth and the search for it with an open yet skeptical mind above all else. independence asks reporters to adopt a posture of searching, rather than knowing. it demands that we reflect the world as it is, not the world as we may wish it to be. it requires journalists to be willing to exonerate someone deemed a villain or interrogate someone regarded as a hero. it insists on sharing what we learn fully and fairly regardless of whom it may upset or what the political consequences might be. independence calls for plainly stating the facts, even if they appear to favor one side of a dispute. and it calls for carefully conveying ambiguity and debate in the more frequent cases where the facts are unclear or their interpretation is under reasonable dispute, letting readers grasp and process the uncertainty for themselves. this approach, tacking as it does against the with us or against us certainty of this polarized moment, requires a steadfast, sometimes uncomfortable commitment to journalistic process over personal conviction. independent journalism elevates values grounded in humility fairness, impartiality, and (to use perhaps the most fraught and argued over word in journalism) objectivity as ideals to be pursued, even if they can never be perfectly achieved. and crucially, independent journalism roots itself to an underlying confidence in the public; it trusts that people deserve to know the full truth and ultimately can be relied upon to use it wisely. over the past few years, i’ve watched the arguments against this model of independent journalism become more widespread and more insistent, even within the ranks of established news organizations, including the times. this critique has been accompanied by calls to instead embrace a different model of journalism, one guided by personal perspective and animated by personal conviction. many have made thoughtful arguments in favor of this shift. some say that journalists are incapable of controlling for their own biases and hide behind a false objectivity that masks, for instance, liberal worldviews (the critique from the right) or privileges a straight, white, male perspective (the critique from the left). others suggest that the model leads journalists to make unequal things seem equal sometimes to the point of rationalizing nonsensical or dangerous positions in performative displays of balance, often mocked as “false equivalence” or “both sidesism.” some argue that the posture of journalistic independence has evolved into a self serving justification for powerful gatekeepers to protect business as usual, including the invisible assumptions and biases that prop it up. still others assert that this model of journalism is poorly matched for the perils of the moment, arguing that more than just describing the world, journalists should do everything in their power to fix it. independence calls for plainly stating the facts, even if they appear to favor one side of a dispute. and it calls for carefully conveying ambiguity and debate in the more frequent cases where the facts are unclear or their interpretation is under reasonable dispute, letting readers grasp and process the uncertainty for themselves. in responding to these arguments, let me first acknowledge that my background may make me uniquely, perhaps even comically, unpersuasive as a participant in this particular debate. i am the publisher of one of the most scrutinized media institutions in the world; a wealthy white man who succeeded a series of other wealthy white men with the same first and last name; and someone whose family has starred in a full century of shadowy media conspiracy theories. at the same time, the times is a 172 year old human enterprise that publishes more words every week than shakespeare wrote in his entire life. despite our best efforts, it will not be hard to find examples where the times has fallen painfully short of the independent ideal i defend here, from our early coverage of the soviet union to the run up to the iraq war. and i can also already hear critics dusting off their arguments about whether we wrote too much about hillary clinton’s emails, or too little about hunter biden’s laptop, or whether i personally mishandled my response to a now notorious opinion essay by senator tom cotton. on the other hand, there may be few people for whom this subject is of greater personal and professional concern. my great great grandfather, the founder of the modern new york times, helped establish the model of independent journalism “without fear or favor,” in his now famous motto and entrusted his successors “to maintain the editorial independence and the integrity of the new york times and to continue it as an independent newspaper, entirely fearless, free of ulterior influence and unselfishly devoted to the public welfare.” for more than 125 years, generations of my family have made it our explicit mission to promote and defend that vision of independent journalism. i hung our century old mission statement on my office wall on my first day as publisher. in the years since, it’s become clear that maintaining journalistic independence through this polarized moment will be as difficult and unpopular as any challenge i will face in this job and, i believe, as urgent as any challenge the broader news industry faces. indeed, even as i prepared this essay for publication, three influential figures in the profession separately published major explorations of the topic, most recently a piece in these pages by the pulitzer prize winning journalist wesley lowery. my own view is illustrated using examples from the times. but there are many outstanding news organizations that exemplify the type of independent journalism i’m describing, from newspapers like the washington post and the wall street journal to wire services like the associated press and bloomberg news to broadcasters like the bbc and npr to digital publishers like propublica and politico. my defense of journalistic independence doesn’t come from reverence for some golden age of journalism. each generation transforms journalism and the institutions that make it, almost always for the better, and i’m proud to have played a part in some of those transformations. it is certainly not rooted to a belief that journalism should be unmoored from values. independent journalism has a natural and welcome affinity for the classic tenets of liberal democracy the rule of law, honest governance, equal rights, free expression as well as universal principles of human dignity, freedom, and opportunity. that’s why journalists tend naturally toward stories that shine a light on injustice, especially as they pertain to the most vulnerable among us. but independent journalism also rests on the bedrock conviction that those seeking to change the world must first understand it that a fully informed society not only makes better decisions but operates with more trust, more empathy, and greater care. in this way, independent journalism is the exact tonic the world needs most at a moment in which polarization and misinformation are shaking the foundations of liberal democracies and undermining society’s ability to meet the existential challenges of the era, from inequality to political dysfunction to the accelerating toll of climate change. when the stakes feel highest from the world wars to the red scare to the aftermath of 9/11 people often make the most forceful arguments against journalistic independence. pick a side. join the righteous. declare that you’re with us or against us. but history shows that the better course is when journalists challenge and complicate consensus with smart questions and new information. that’s because common facts, a shared reality, and a willingness to understand our fellow citizens across tribal lines are the most important ingredients in enabling a diverse, pluralistic society to come together to self govern. for that, as much as anything, we need principled, independent journalists. independent journalism is the exact tonic the world needs most at a moment in which polarization and misinformation are shaking the foundations of liberal democracies and undermining society’s ability to meet the existential challenges of the era, from inequality to political dysfunction to the accelerating toll of climate change. it is no coincidence that maps of the world’s healthiest democracies and maps of the world’s freest press environments are essentially identical. the press plays a straightforward informational role: who’s running for office, how tax dollars are used, what legislation aims to achieve. it plays an accountability role, exposing corruption and incompetence, ensuring that the law is administered evenly and justly, and shedding light on institutions that don’t want their secrets out in the open. in a pluralistic democracy like ours, an independent press plays another crucial role. it binds society by providing the connective tissue of a common fact base that can be discussed and debated and by exposing people to a wider range of experiences and perspectives. “democracy’s legitimacy and durability depend on dialogue and deliberation, on process as much as on outcomes,” carlos lozada, a times columnist, wrote in a recent piece on this topic. the history of the times is intertwined with this vision of an independent press. for much of the early life of the country the press was, in the main, openly partisan, with newspapers aligning with various factions, ideologies, and politicians, championing supporters and attacking opponents. the times itself was part of this tradition when it was cofounded, in 1851, by one of the men who helped form the republican party three years later. that changed when the small, struggling newspaper was sold out of bankruptcy to my great great grandfather adolph ochs in 1896. he embraced a journalistic model that contrasted sharply with the sensationalistic (and much more financially successful) newspapers of the era, like joseph pulitzer’s new york world and william randolph hearst’s new york journal. ochs vowed to his readers that the times would instead be fiercely independent, dedicated to journalism of the highest integrity, and devoted to the public welfare. his vision for the news report: “to give the news impartially, without fear or favor, regardless of party, sect, or interests involved.” his vision for the opinion report: “to invite intelligent discussion from all shades of opinion.” this approach helped lay the foundation for the model that became known as journalistic objectivity. the most prominent champion of this approach was the journalist and public philosopher walter lippmann, whose writing almost always makes an appearance in pieces like this. he argued that journalists “ought not to be serving a cause, no matter how good.” recognizing that journalists inevitably carried personal biases and blind spots, lippmann called for controlling them by professionalizing journalistic processes and, in particular, embracing lessons from the scientific method. he entreated journalists to focus as much as possible on facts and to actively pursue evidence that could challenge, rather than simply confirm, their own hypotheses. in this conception, words like objective and impartial are not a characterization of an individual journalist’s underlying temperament, as they are so often misunderstood to mean, but serve as guiding ideals to strive for in their work. “the idea was that journalists needed to employ objective, observable, repeatable methods of verification in their reporting precisely because they could never be personally objective,” tom rosenstiel, coauthor of the elements of journalism and one of the leading defenders of the model, explained in 2020. “their methods of reporting had to be objective because they never could be.” in the decades that followed, this model would become the dominant approach to american journalism, taught in universities and practiced at news organizations from the local to the national level. today, however, the word objectivity is so contested inside the journalistic community that it is viewed by many as self discrediting in the debate over the role of journalism. i continue to believe that objectivity or if the word is simply too much of a distraction, open minded inquiry remains a value worth striving for. but independence, the word we use inside the times, better captures the full breadth of this journalistic approach and its promise to the public at large. what does independence look like in practice, and what choices does it require of journalists? prioritizing process. the most important ingredient is treating independence as a discipline, backed by processes and ethics designed to foster it. at the times, as with many other traditional news organizations, the commitment to independence is reflected at every stage of our journalistic efforts. our goal is to only publish what we know; we would rather miss a story than get one wrong. we correct our errors openly because mistakes should be transparent and, honestly, painful. we talk to the people we write about whenever possible and give those accused of wrongdoing the opportunity to respond. we use multiple sources to confirm information and display a healthy skepticism of everything we learn. we review pieces not just for factual accuracy but for fairness. we enforce ethical guidelines designed to prevent conflicts of interest (for example, we prohibit supporting politicians and political causes) as well as stylistic guidelines designed to minimize bias (for example, we avoid the use of partisan terminology and provocative labels in our news pages). language is constantly shifting, and news organizations should shift too. but one of the ways propagandists and advocates try to steer coverage to advance their agendas is to win the battle over terminology. for this reason we generally try to use the everyday language of the public, what we call idiomatic english, rather than the specialized language embraced by academics, activists, and marketers. that means typically waiting until specific terms have gained broad societal acceptance (generally using the widely recognized terms “latino” or “hispanic” over the little used “latinx”) and trying to avoid market tested phrases that have been designed specifically to shift public opinion (generally avoiding terms like “pro life” or “pro choice” and instead describing such views as for or against abortion rights). this can be contentious when a palestinian carries out an attack in israel, the times generally calls this person a “militant” and often hears protests from one side that considers the attacker a “freedom fighter” and another that considers the attacker a “terrorist.” as with other professions that have adopted explicit systems and ethical norms to support independence science, medicine, and the judiciary, for example the journalistic process described above doesn’t guarantee perfect results. personal biases and agendas can still distort the work reporters and editors produce just as people’s personal experiences and backgrounds can elevate it. but good journalistic processes reduce the frequency of mistakes and create mechanisms for self correcting when we err. that stands in contrast to alternate models guided by political objectives, partisan loyalty, or, most obviously, self interest all of which are more vulnerable to mistakes, hypocrisy, and corruption. as with scientists, doctors, or judges, it is far better to have journalists imperfectly striving for independence backed by a defensible process than choosing not to bother because total independence can never be fully achieved. “failure to achieve standards does not obviate the need for them. it does not render them outmoded. it makes them more necessary,” wrote marty baron, former executive editor of the washington post, in a recent essay on this theme. “and it requires that we apply them more consistently and enforce them more firmly.” following facts. independent journalism can be morally straightforward and satisfying. journalists hold power to account by exposing corruption and abuse. journalists reveal injustice and inequality. their work regularly leads to a society that is freer, fairer, and more just. this is the type of journalism seen in movies like all the president’s men, spotlight, and she said. independence protects journalism from being distorted by business incentives. the fact that harvey weinstein was a longtime advertiser in the times didn’t keep us from revealing the abuses that set off a cascade that ultimately landed him in prison. independence protects journalism from being distorted by government pressure. the fact that china promised severe repercussions not long after we spent millions to launch a new chinese language website there did not keep us from publishing a major investigation into government corruption. and independence protects journalism from being distorted by various forms of self interest. even our own leaders, investors, and journalism are not immune from receiving unflattering coverage in the times. these protections are not simply a matter of ethics and values; they are rooted in systems and processes and are reflected in the structure of the company itself by ensuring, for example, that journalists are walled off from advertisers or that reviews of books by times journalists are written by independent freelancers. these commitments are widely accepted as necessary principles of an independent news organization. but a true commitment to independence and the insistence on putting journalistic process ahead of a preferred outcome isn’t always easy or comfortable. one of the surest signs of independence is that readers are frequently told things they don’t expect and would prefer not to hear. take two recent examples: for years, the times has documented the brutal persecution of the rohingya, an ethnic muslim minority in myanmar, that human rights experts have called a genocide. this was the story one of our reporters was prepared to tell when she interviewed four young sisters in a refugee camp, who recounted how soldiers burned their home, killed their mother, and abducted their father, who was now feared dead. but days of additional reporting revealed that little of what they said was true. the girls had shared heart wrenching stories to compete for the limited attention of aid groups. in an overcrowded camp, four orphaned sisters were more likely to win sympathy than an intact family that lost all its possessions. in this case, following the facts didn’t simply confirm the larger moral truth but also exposed a smaller, less expected one: these refugees were incentivized to one up each other in suffering to get much needed support. and not without a cost. the reporter, hannah beech, later explained in her searching piece: “such strategies are a natural survival tactic. who wouldn’t do the same to feed a family? but false narratives devalue the genuine horrors murder, rape and mass burnings of villages that have been inflicted upon the rohingya by myanmar’s security forces. and such embellished tales only buttress the myanmar government’s contention that what is happening in rakhine state is not ethnic cleansing, as the international community suggests, but trickery by foreign invaders.” a year later, on the other end of the world, an american aid convoy headed to venezuela erupted in flames after being blocked at the border by the country’s repressive security forces. the idea that the government had ordered the torching of desperately needed supplies in the midst of a devastating famine appeared to fit the narrative of president nicolas maduro’s brutal authoritarian rule. many prominent global leaders quickly denounced him. but as we reported on the calamity, video footage revealed the fire had apparently not been carried out by maduro’s security forces; it had most likely been caused by an anti government protester throwing an errant molotov cocktail. that’s the counterintuitive commitment of independent journalism. it must be open to the idea that a suffering refugee child may not be telling the truth, or that a tyrant who is persecuting millions may be accused of a crime he didn’t actually commit. in both cases, critics asked who could possibly benefit from such journalism. society benefits, of course, since it depends on credible information to make any number of related decisions, from distributing aid to relief organizations to imposing sanctions for human rights violations. the truth benefits, too, as does the credibility of those sharing it. the next time the times reports on maduro’s offenses (as we’ve done here, here, and here) or the horrors that the rohingya suffer (as we did here, here, and here), readers can be sure that those are the facts as best we could ascertain them. this commitment to putting facts above outcome is easy to caricature as amoral, perhaps even as nihilistic. but it is grounded in a foundational optimism about people and democracy. independent journalism is predicated on the belief that democracy is stronger when people have trusted sources for reliable facts. and that people should be trusted to comprehend these facts, process their complexity, and make up their own minds. information empowers, and empowered people are more likely to make better decisions. independent journalism is predicated on the belief that democracy is stronger when people have trusted sources for reliable facts. and that people should be trusted to comprehend these facts, process their complexity, and make up their own minds. covering uncertainty. even if it’s not always popular, the discipline of following the facts wherever they lead is far more straightforward than grappling with the tricky questions that emerge when the facts cannot be fully established. the number of topics that are factually or morally unambiguous is dwarfed by the number of topics marked in some way by uncertainty, where facts are unresolved or questions are still subject to debate. the role of independent journalists in such cases is to help the public understand and examine the broadest possible range of intellectually honest positions. in cases in which the facts have been established beyond reasonable dispute, journalists should not quote a fringe position to check a box or shield their work from accusations of bias. there is, for instance, no serious debate in the scientific community about the reality of climate change. the world is warming, with devastating consequences. there are plenty of other examples: the holocaust happened. covid vaccines work. trump lost the 2020 election. but even in moments when the facts are beyond reasonable dispute, there can be reasonable differences of opinion about how society should interpret and act on those facts. what specifically should be done to mitigate the effects of climate change? should people espousing anti semitism be barred from social media? should vaccine requirements be linked to employment? should specific legislative measures be taken to safeguard elections? independent journalism should not shy away from fully examining such contentious questions, even if some insist that the truth has already been established. there are also some moral issues that we, as a society, have rightly come to view as settled and beyond reasonable debate: racism is wrong. women deserve equal rights. people shouldn’t be tortured. at the same time, there are many related questions society is debating and independent journalism must explore, even if the larger principle is beyond question. should race be a factor in college admissions? under what circumstances should abortion be allowed? what methods of coercion are acceptable in a war zone? there can be a temptation to attempt to steer these debates based on our personal views or our sense of how history will settle the matter, thinking that represents a more honest and authentic form of journalism. however, independent journalism, especially in a pluralistic democracy, should err on the side of treating areas of serious political contest as open, unsettled, and in need of further inquiry. (and even in cases where debates are broadly recognized as closed, there is often added benefit to understanding the motivations and tactics of those who continue to push the issue to the fore.) prematurely shutting down inquiry and debate forces disagreements to fester beneath the surface. in even more damaging cases, it allows conventional wisdom to ossify in a way that blinds society. deference to such popular narratives as the times has learned the hard way is as dangerous as any personal bias: saddam hussein has weapons of mass destruction; trump has little chance of winning a general election; inflation isn’t a significant risk in modern economies. the problem in each case, and many more like them, was that conventional wisdom isn’t always right, and even when it turns out to be, it benefits from probing and testing. evaluating these debates is one reason why the journalistic process is designed around hearing from a diversity of voices. that’s most obviously true in reporting, which requires talking to people and representing a range of perspectives. but it also is why reporters benefit from the additional eyes of editors, not just for style and accuracy, but to ensure the issues they include are fairly represented and contextualized. when journalism succeeds in illuminating questions and debates, it not only helps people better understand those with whom they disagree, it helps them better recognize the differences they have with people they thought they agreed with and it can help society move conversations about these issues toward resolution. even if it’s not always popular, the discipline of following the facts wherever they lead is far more straightforward than grappling with the tricky questions that emerge when the facts cannot be fully established. navigating criticism. criticism is a natural and important part of the journalistic process. that’s partly because independent journalism, with its commitment to exposing problems and holding power to account, often upsets the people it’s about, as well as their supporters. it’s also because the business of making these types of editorial decisions, especially on deadline, is imperfect work. intense barrages of criticism were once reserved for a handful of the most polarizing topics in public life, like presidential politics, abortion, and the middle east, where every word and image was tracked for signs of bias and loudly contested as inaccurate or harmful. now nearly every issue sets off that level of reaction. the dynamics of social media have enabled pushback to be quicker, louder, and better organized, as supporters and opponents become more entrenched in their narratives and more aggressive in assailing anything that runs counter to their views or objectives. this often reflects genuine anger and disappointment. even those who appreciate the vast majority of our reporting often feel that our coverage is uniquely off the mark in its portrayal of the very subject they care most about and where they naturally have the strongest views on how the story should be told. but such frustrations are often harnessed by interest groups in an effort to make coverage more favorable and to make it uncomfortable to report things these groups or subsets of these groups don’t like. in the past, most of those without access to a printing press or a presidential pulpit could only hope that a news organization would police itself through corrections or letters to the editor. today anyone with a twitter handle or an email address can have their concerns heard. that shift has brought a welcome increase in accountability, but it has also created a challenging dynamic. journalistic decisions are continually being criticized in public by leaders, activists, journalists, celebrities, and influencers speaking for themselves or, just as often, for a broader community. these communities are often tied to personal identity, whether it’s derived from race, religion, gender, ethnicity, nationality, or partisan affiliation. but the same dynamic applies to groups of all types, like climate activists, silicon valley rationalists, economists, and taylor swift fans. even those whose identity centers on warning about the dangers of tribalism sometimes succumb to their own forms of groupthink. navigating such criticism has become among the most challenging parts of the practice of independent journalism. journalists are often accused by these groups of misrepresenting their communities, perpetuating stereotypes, or increasing risks for people who already have good reason to feel vulnerable. sometimes these criticisms have merit a look back through the archives of any news organization will find a wealth of examples that were bad in the moment and look worse today. many minority groups continue to think mainstream news organizations do not fully capture their communities and too often focus on moments of controversy or tragedy. and it is understandable that anyone who has personally experienced particular hardships from enduring anti semitism or racial discrimination to fleeing one’s homeland or terminating a pregnancy would have strong views about how these issues should be covered and what downstream consequences of that coverage they’d like to see. sometimes such groups will entreat journalists to lift up their communities by focusing on positive stories. sometimes they will assert that their community can only be fairly covered by a member of it. sometimes groups will offer to retrain reporters on what language and framing to use in covering their communities. and many times they will look past an entire body of coverage that addresses many of the issues they raise to instead find fault with a single article, headline, image, source, or phrase sometimes a single word. (even our personnel decisions are at times read through an ideological lens, with a departure taken as a sign that we’re caving to a progressive mob or a conservative one, or a hiring offered as evidence that we can’t fairly cover one side of a conflict or the other.) often the central criticism is not so much about the accuracy of the coverage itself, but whether it could be misused. recently, for example, the times described how scores of hasidic jewish schools were failing to provide students a basic education. the coverage was called anti semitic and dangerous even before it was published because it could be misused to demonize a highly visible population at a moment when they already faced rising prejudice. a group representing orthodox jews highlighted this line of criticism in a recent letter, arguing that “a free press can be an incredibly powerful force for good or otherwise. particularly so when these words appear, sometimes on the front page, of a prominent newspaper. the times has misused this incredible power. and the victims of this reporting orthodox and hasidic jews in new york are a marginalized minority already subject to a rising, frightening number of hate crimes.” independent news organizations should strive to cover every community with respect, nuance, and sensitivity. that is especially true in the context of the risks and prejudices marginalized communities or vulnerable people in particular face. but even when doing so, journalism will not always reflect the way these groups want to be seen or emphasize the issues they would prefer to talk about. when coverage features different groups engaged with directly conflicting narratives for example, the anti muslim violence coming from hindu nationalists in india today it’s easier to see the impossibility of covering each group exactly as it would like to be covered. and the care independent news organizations should take in reporting on every such group doesn’t overwhelm the value to the public and often to the community itself of reporting difficult but important facts and issues. in the example above, we also heard from many hasidic readers who felt their school system had failed them and their children and were relieved that future students may be better served because of our reporting. the attacks on this type of work sometimes take aim at the natural fear of journalists that their work, often called “the first draft of history,” will later be regarded as on the wrong side of it. but these attacks also confront journalists whose work explores subjects that divide the public or upsets a specific interest group with more pressing concerns. in this new environment, journalists in particular female journalists routinely receive threats of rape and death. menacing visits to their homes and offices. campaigns to get them fired. harassment of family members. and a never ending stream of insults and personal attacks, from racial slurs to accusations of bigotry, that can arrive by the thousands in a single day. with such a high price to their reputations and sense of security, journalists often wonder whether pursuing a given story would be worth the potential backlash. the silence that can stem from these fears is, of course, the goal of these attacks. the responsibility of independent journalists is to not be intimidated and to continue to report without fear or favor. the responsibility of independent journalists is to not be intimidated and to continue to report without fear or favor. the arguments against this model of journalistic independence have become far more persistent in recent years amid the reshaping of the journalism industry and the broader information ecosystem. inside the industry, newspapers continue to shutter and the number of working journalists has dropped by tens of thousands over the past fifteen years. the newspapers that endure, embracing the approach of many of the digital news organizations that have emerged, have often felt compelled to shift increasingly scarce resources away from expensive original reporting to far cheaper but less journalistically nutritious efforts like punditry, aggregation, and clickbait. as a result, the journalists who managed to keep their jobs now often find themselves stuck at their desks aggregating and opining on others’ work, instead of coming face to face with new people and perspectives through on the ground reporting. at the same time, newsrooms have become more diverse, with far greater numbers of women, people who identify as lgbtq, and people of color though there is far more progress still needed. as this has happened, there’s been an overdue reckoning with the dominance of straight white men in our industry, a dominance that has long contributed to missing and distorted coverage. as a result, minority groups often carry deep skepticism that the same institutions and institutional values that badly served them in the past can now do better and actually capture the breadth of the world they live in. the conversation about those failures has left lingering uncertainty inside newsrooms as to whether those failures should be blamed on lack of representation or on outmoded values that may no longer fit the moment. the shifts for the public have been no less dramatic. the fracturing of the media’s gatekeeper role, in which a handful of outlets in print and television were able to set the national agenda, means that proliferating publishers and individual commenters are increasingly built around specific niches and more focused on catering to their audiences’ identities, passions, and politics. the gatekeeper approach was far from perfect, but the unmediated nature of the internet has led to a surge in content aimed at driving engagement by playing to people’s hopes and, especially, their fears and resentments. the more conversational style of writing for the internet and the obvious dissonance between the carefulness of some reporters’ published work and their informal, sometimes injudicious social media commentary have exacerbated the sense that standards are shifting. these trends further confused the public’s understanding of the role of the press, making journalism seem partisan and unreliable. today, barely over one quarter of americans trust the news, according to a reuters institute report, a figure that now ranks lowest of the countries they surveyed. the numbers from a gallup survey were even more abysmal, with 16 percent expressing a high degree of confidence in newspapers and 11 percent in television news. in many studies like this, journalistic bias was a top concern cited. the current pushback to the model of journalistic independence typically takes three main forms. “objectivity” as a myth: one of the most persistent critiques asserts that journalists should own up to their biases rather than pretending to be able to meet an impossible ideal of being truly objective or impartial. the primary argument from the right, a staple of republican stump speeches and conservative media for decades, alleges that reporters and editors use statements of journalistic independence to disguise a consistent bias against conservative views and more negative treatment of conservative leaders. this stretches from long standing critiques of coverage of topics like gun rights and rural america, same sex marriage and faith, and it extends to the ongoing national conversation about slavery’s role in our history that was, in part, sparked by the times’ groundbreaking 1619 project. it’s true that the two populations that make up the vast majority of journalists college graduates and people who live in big cities have become more likely in recent decades to hold liberal views, particularly on social issues. these groups tend to be more secular and less likely to own guns; they engage with a different mix of culture and hobbies; they are typically more embracing of racial, gender, and sexual orientation diversity. those qualities everyday assumptions in a place like new york city, our hometown are why my predecessor, even as he pushed back on accusations of political bias, sometimes talked about the times having a metropolitan sensibility. this type of journalistic culture, the norm in most large newsrooms today, sometimes leads to journalistic decisions that many conservatives regard as picking a side in what they consider to be open debates, like the existence of climate change or the frequency of voter fraud, but which newsrooms treat as settled. on the many more issues that are obviously unsettled and subject to robust debate, the model of journalistic independence is explicitly designed to help correct for the narrowness of a journalist’s own experience and worldview, including by intentionally seeking out and attempting to fairly convey a much broader range of views. it doesn’t deny personal experience; it provides a method not to be trapped by it. if you look at coverage of abortion, as an example of an issue where society has been conflicted for decades but where the urban professional class has been disproportionately on one side of the debate, you’ll see the times grappling with a fair representation of views from across many backgrounds and political orientations. the model of journalistic independence is explicitly designed to help correct for the narrowness of a journalist’s own experience and worldview, including by intentionally seeking out and attempting to fairly convey a much broader range of views. it doesn’t deny personal experience; it provides a method not to be trapped by it. it is also true that the maga era republican party has become more challenging to cover in a way that the party and its supporters would recognize as fair. on some subjects, a significant portion of the party has become untethered from fact and science, and it has made startlingly direct attacks on democracy and its foundations. journalists have an obligation to report on this shift plainly, even if that leads our coverage to be accused of bias. if a majority of republican voters believe as polls have consistently shown that trump won the 2020 election, it’s safe to assume that those same voters would be skeptical of a news organization that clearly labels that belief false. but this heightened skepticism can at times go too far, and that risk can be compounded in moments of premature consensus among experts journalists rely on. here the early coverage of the covid pandemic is instructive. the press was confronted with the challenge of the president and others in his party sharing inaccurate information about the disease and the toll of the pandemic while also undermining the efficacy of vaccines and peddling sometimes dangerous alternatives. those stories required the press to be intensely skeptical of the administration’s claims and actions. but there was insufficient skepticism of an emerging scientific and bureaucratic consensus that presented itself as more settled than it actually was. that combination sometimes created blind spots, like an overly quick dismissal of the lab leak theory or insufficient questioning of the wisdom of extended school closures. critics on the left also argue that supposedly objective journalists are anchored to a point of view, but in this case one that privileges a straight white male perspective and the status quo. this critique takes many forms, but often centers on the belief that notions like objectivity the very idea of it, not just the failure to achieve it exist to maintain and insulate existing power structures from change or scrutiny. the assertion that newsrooms, like virtually all of the nation’s institutions, have long been overly dominated by straight white men is obviously true. even with significant progress in diversifying in recent years, few newsrooms look like the communities they cover, leaving gaps in the stories they find and the insights journalists bring to them. that’s the case not just with race and gender, but with groups like evangelical christians, military veterans, or people who attended community college. it is also true that at times, news organizations have wielded the objectivity label to wrongly suggest that minority journalists couldn’t fairly cover issues crucial to their own communities, even though they rarely questioned whether white men could fairly cover white men. these shortcomings should be seen as a failure of independence rather than an indictment of it. in all kinds of coverage, reporters bring their experience and expertise to bear. more diverse newsrooms armed with a broader range of backgrounds, experiences, relationships, skills, and expertise spot more stories and imbue them with greater nuance and insight. a reporter who studied physics will be a better science reporter for it. an editor who grew up in the great plains will have a sharper eye for nuance in a story that takes place there. and a journalist from an underrepresented group can bring life experience and direct knowledge to stories involving that group. “our eyes are connected to our bodies, which often shape the way we experience the world and how the world experiences us. my eyes will see some things yours never will,” as lowery put it in his recent cjr essay. “the ‘story’ we seek to tell is in fact a mosaic that must be filled in piece by piece. while one journalist may supply many tiles, seeing the entire scene requires others to fill in the rest. thus, understanding objective reality requires a diversity of contributors.” more diverse newsrooms armed with a broader range of backgrounds, experiences, relationships, skills, and expertise spot more stories and imbue them with greater nuance and insight. it’s striking how often these two ideals a diverse newsroom and an independent newsroom are pitted against each other, as if one or the other must be chosen. what’s clear is that representation alone is not enough; it needs to be backed by a culture that invites a broad range of views into conversations about story choice and story framing. many journalists from underrepresented groups have stories about being recruited in part because of the different perspectives they bring but, once on board, being told to put aside those perspectives to avoid being dismissed as biased. independence doesn’t mean that a reporter has to be a blank slate. a reporter who grew up in a neighborhood where racial profiling or police violence was a daily concern can bring an invaluable depth of knowledge and understanding to those topics. that experience might lead to a healthier dose of skepticism of police accounts or a greater understanding of the ways these injustices damage communities. independence is only compromised if a reporter’s preconceptions undercut the goal of genuinely open minded inquiry, like dismissing all police statements or downplaying rising crime. the public is best served when journalists regardless of personal identity, personal political views, and personal life experience approach each story with an open mind, ready to seek out information that might upend expectations or present a more complicated picture. both sidesism: one of the most common criticisms of independence is that it leads journalists to treat unequal things equally. false equivalence today often derided as “both sidesism,” a phrase popularized by jay rosen, a journalism professor at nyu is when journalists make opposing views appear similarly credible, even when they are not, to leave the impression of down the middle reporting that doesn’t take sides. once again, it is not difficult to find historical grounding for this critique. news organizations long included comments from outlier scientists casting doubt on the reality of climate change, even after the vast majority of scientists had concluded it was real. several factors drove such failures. newsrooms often cared not just about being independent but about being perceived as independent, by readers and sources alike. the mechanics of deadline journalism also played a role, as inserting a quote from all sides was a quick and simple way to signal both fairness and completeness. there is good reason to disparage a model that elevates a pantomime of fairness over demonstrations of good judgment. it’s lazy journalism that fails readers and is easily exploited by bad faith actors. as a previous publisher of the times remarked: “although i favor the open mind, i certainly do not advocate that the mind should be so open that the brains fall out.” but this line of criticism misses the profound ways that traditional news organizations that believe in the independent model have shifted. journalists today use plainer language, show a greater willingness to expose lies, and produce more analytical work grounded in their own reporting and expertise, even when doing so opens them up to calls of bias. while that shift was already well underway, it was solidified through the norm shattering presidency of trump, whose statements whether they were about crowd sizes, the birthplace of his predecessor, the covid pandemic, or election results were often demonstrably untrue and were typically called out as such without euphemism or counterpoint. today, the both sidesism argument thus has the feel of media critics fighting the last war. but the both sidesism line of attack has been happily embraced by activists and partisans who want to pressure the media to minimize any alternative to their views. by demanding that journalists treat a topic as settled fact, they attempt to win a debate by avoiding one. this is why people often invoke both sidesism when journalists interview a voter for a candidate they oppose, explore the opposite side of an issue to the one they hold, or take the journalistically responsible course of giving those accused of wrongdoing a chance to explain themselves. this charge is particularly common on issues where participants have staked out zero sum positions as with abortion rights or the israeli palestinian conflict in which open minded coverage of each side is seen as undermining the other. for example, despite russia’s attempts to make it a criminal offense to report the truth, it is undeniable that russia invaded ukraine in an unprovoked act of war and that its troops have carried out a huge number of shocking atrocities. it is also true that ukrainian forces appear to have used internationally banned cluster munitions. reporting this does not amount to a moral judgment asserting “on the other hand, ukrainians do bad things too,” but reflects an attempt to fully capture the conflict. without such independent assessments it would be impossible for ukrainians, russians, foreign leaders, or ordinary people to understand the true state of the war and its costs. as that example shows, the both sidesism argument is wielded most powerfully when the stakes are highest. we often hear a version like this: trump is a threat to democracy, and you’re asking about his opponent’s age or emails? or, the world is facing a climate catastrophe and you’re wondering if gas prices are too high? or, the human rights of my group are under systemic attack and you’re focusing on one bad actor on our side? in the end, these efforts attempt to reduce wide ranging lines of coverage into a single statement about what is most true and important, rather than to reflect the reality that many things can be true and important at the same time. journalists should be alert to the risk of false equivalence. but today i believe the greater journalistic risk is for reporters to close themselves to the possibility of new and evolving facts that may reveal other aspects of a story or, worse, to actively embrace a journalistic one sideism to signal that they are on the side of the righteous. i believe the greater journalistic risk is for reporters to close themselves to the possibility of new and evolving facts that may reveal other aspects of a story or, worse, to actively embrace a journalistic one sideism to signal that they are on the side of the righteous. bad outcomes: another line of criticism asserts that when journalists report information that makes a negative outcome more likely, they are complicit in that outcome. this argument typically takes two forms: that news organizations should not publish information that bad actors might misuse and that they should not offer airtime to views that should be excised from the public square. it is true that journalists should not be blind to the potential impact their reporting may have. and in limited cases we do change a specific story or alter our approach to a broader area of coverage with an eye toward minimizing any resulting danger. for example, we are careful in quoting dissidents in countries where such an action may lead to reprisal, particularly when it comes to ordinary people who may not fully appreciate the risks they are taking. similarly, our coverage of subjects like mass shootings and suicide has been informed in part by research looking at how media attention can inspire others to do the same thing. and on rare occasions, we will hold publication of a national security story when we are told the release of certain secrets could directly endanger lives. but, in general, independent reporters and editors should ask, “is it true? is it important?” if the answer to both questions is yes, journalists should be profoundly skeptical of any argument that favors censoring or skewing what they’ve learned based on a subjective view about whether it may yield a damaging outcome. do we overlook the corruption of a us ally because it could embolden an anti american opposition? do we fail to explore legitimate questions about the physical or mental health of a political candidate because some believe the other candidate might be worse? do we not report that the government has been secretly wiretapping us citizens without warrants because the bush administration argues the disclosure would put lives at risk by undermining a critical antiterrorism tool? that last argument succeeded in delaying a story for the better part of a year a decision many now view as the wrong one but its eventual publication made clear that this information was needed to open up an important debate about how the country was balancing national security and civil liberties. more recently, we’ve heard similar arguments about journalism putting lives at risk emerging from our coverage of the debates inside the medical community over care for transgender children. critics have accused our work of “‘both sides’ fearmongering and bad faith ‘just asking questions’ coverage” and have suggested that even acknowledging a broader range of views on this topic has legitimized wittingly or not a repressive legal effort to undermine the rights and the safety of a group that faces significant prejudice. “the pretense of objectivity the newsroom ideal that all ‘sides’ of an issue should be heard often harms marginalized people more than it helps them,” wrote one critic of our coverage. “if you say ‘i want to live,’ and i say ‘no,’ what happens next isn’t a debate; it’s murder.” the times has covered the surge of discrimination, threats, and violence faced by trans, nonbinary, and gender nonconforming people, including the rapidly growing number of legislative efforts attacking their rights. we’ve also covered the many ways in which people challenging gender norms are gaining recognition and breaking barriers in the united states and around the world. yet our critics overlook these articles and there are hundreds of them to instead focus on a small number of pieces that explore particularly sensitive questions that society is actively working through, but which some would prefer for the times to treat as settled. in the long run, ignoring societal disagreements or actively suppressing certain facts and viewpoints even with the best of intentions turns the press into an overtly political actor, encourages conspiracy theories about hidden agendas, and validates accusations that the media is dishonest. that, in turn, undermines trust in journalism and limits its ability to have an impact when we reveal injustice, corruption, or other wrongdoing. in general, independent reporters and editors should ask, ‘is it true? is it important?’ if the answer to both questions is yes, journalists should be profoundly skeptical of any argument that favors censoring or skewing what they’ve learned based on a subjective view about whether it may yield a damaging outcome. the second bad outcome that is often raised is “platforming,” the concept that including people with bad or dangerous views in articles or allowing them to write guest essays in the opinion section makes the world a worse or more dangerous place. the central concern in this argument is that the very act of examining or sharing disliked or repugnant opinions, without explicitly condemning them, amounts to promoting and legitimizing them. this reflects the heated societal debate about what to do about views one finds questionable, offensive, or dangerous. the times has been criticized along these lines for everything from a profile of a nazi sympathizer to an opinion essay from a taliban leader, not to mention the essay “send in the troops” by senator cotton that roiled the times like nothing else that has happened in my tenure. it is true that a soft feature or an unrebutted essay can effectively misinform by failing to provide needed context and thus obscure a larger truth. and it is certainly true that news organizations don’t serve readers well by flooding them with a cacophony of information and perspectives in the hope that they stumble upon the truth on their own. everything we publish should meet basic standards of verification and intellectual honesty. exercising journalistic judgment about which voices to include and how does not amount to censorship. but there is just as much risk to a journalistic model that aggressively narrows the field of acceptable speakers and comment. when we err, we would rather err on the side of inclusion, not exclusion. for example, as part of our extensive coverage of covid vaccines, we published an article about vaccine skeptics, which clearly stated that the vaccines were safe and gave careful context about conspiracy theories. but why bother to understand skeptics’ views at all if they are wrong, even dangerous? the united states has the lowest full vaccination rate of any of the world’s wealthiest democracies, and the anti vaccine movement was strengthening in ways that raised profound public health questions that society continues to grapple with. it’s also worth briefly noting two more criticisms that are more specific to the structure of the times, though they are shared by many other news organizations as well. the first is that the existence of our opinion section can appear to be in direct tension with our promise of independence. it’s easy to see why some people would make this argument, given that every opinion piece promotes a personal point of view. but opinion journalism can actually represent another valuable way to meet this core commitment to independence by helping readers explore ideas and develop and challenge their own views on important subjects. that’s why we employ a diverse group of columnists who bring a range of backgrounds, interests, and political leanings to their work. and it’s why we make a point to solicit guest essays from an even wider range of perspectives. for many of our readers, the voices and pieces they’ve come to appreciate most are the very ones they agree with least. indeed the original goal of inviting outside writers and experts onto our pages was based on the belief that exposing readers to a diversity of opinions would have the effect of “stimulating new thought and provoking new discussion on public problems.” even if each piece, including our editorials, is rooted to an individual view, reading across the section offers a broad and diverse collection of views that together should serve as a guide through the big debates in society. the best opinion writing embraces many of the same values as an independent newsroom with columnists and other opinion writers using reporting, analysis, and expertise to inform their work and editors holding it to high standards of accuracy, fairness, and intellectual rigor. even though each day’s opinion pieces are typically among our most popular journalism and our columnists are among our most trusted voices, we believe opinion is secondary to our primary mission of reporting and should represent only a portion of a healthy news diet. for that reason, we’ve long kept the opinion department intentionally small it represents well under a tenth of our journalistic staff and ensured that its editorial decision making is walled off from the newsroom. in recent years we’ve also gone to increasing lengths to make its work both less prominent on our homepage and more visually distinct from news reporting to avoid confusing readers about the difference between news and opinion. much as with democracy itself, to borrow a quip from winston churchill, the case for independent journalism is made stronger by the weakness of the alternatives. independent journalism is not a neutral platform. rather than simply deluging readers with a cacophony of voices and hoping the most valuable rise to the surface, it makes countless journalistic choices, large and small, that aim to actively guide readers to a fuller, more nuanced understanding of the world grounded in fact. these choices include contextualizing information, discerning which voices would be most relevant in capturing a debate, and helping people put the significance of an event in perspective. but independent journalism is also not advocacy journalism. to be clear, the model of advocacy journalism whose practitioners wear their leanings openly has shown its value in a long and honorable history. news outlets focused on specific ethnic or racial groups, for example, have played an essential role for more than a century of forcing attention on issues, celebrating people, and championing reforms too often ignored by the mainstream press. today many high integrity news organizations are open about their politics and objectives, from mother jones on the left to the dispatch on the right to a host of podcasts and newsletters catering to every imaginable subject and viewpoint. the marshall project has not let its core goal of remaking the criminal justice system allow it to skew the facts. coindesk broke a story that threatened the very cryptocurrency industry it was launched to support. but this advocacy model is dangerous when treated as independent journalism’s replacement rather than its supplement. the revelations from the dominion lawsuit against fox news underscore the dangers of the advocacy model when fully unchecked. in trying to satiate its audience’s desire for validation or to advance its preferred political outcome fox and those who have embraced its model ultimately unhinge themselves from a fair minded pursuit of the truth. facts that match their ideological leanings or preferred political outcomes are often hyped up while those that undermine them are downplayed. instead of broadening understanding, this model misleads its audience seen in the fact that fox news viewers are more likely to believe, incorrectly, that saddam hussein helped plan 9/11, barack obama wasn’t a us citizen, and the 2020 election was stolen. putting ideology front and center is frequently promoted as more honest (isn’t it better to announce one’s biases than to hide them?) and more honorable (isn’t it better to push for solving problems rather than just describing them?). but this can stoke false confidence that one’s personal opinions are actually fundamental truths. putting ideology front and center is frequently promoted as more honest (isn’t it better to announce one’s biases than to hide them?) and more honorable (isn’t it better to push for solving problems rather than just describing them?). but this can stoke false confidence that one’s personal opinions are actually fundamental truths. what it means to fight for justice is different for everyone. for some it means defending the right to openly carry a weapon, for others the right of migrants to cross unfettered into another nation. but what are the facts about whether carrying guns makes people safer? what impact has tightening or loosening immigration laws had on people, jobs, and culture? journalists, no matter how wise and well intentioned, who believe in their own righteousness can find their conviction hardening in ways that obstruct rather than illuminate the world they cover. even if journalists can navigate all these hazards, journalism driven by a desire to shape outcomes struggles in the inevitable moments when the facts they discover sit in conflict with a larger political goal that they or their employer is committed to advancing. and there are further risks when those views are motivated not by genuine principle but by self interest or partisan advantage. contrast the advocacy model with the independent model and you’ll see how different the approaches are. the same times reporter who broke the story that donald trump had asked the director of the fbi to pledge his personal loyalty also broke the story that hillary clinton used her personal email account as secretary of state. similarly, just months after a times investigation revealed large payouts to silence sexual harassment allegations against bill o’reilly, a leading conservative commentator, we published a similar investigation into harvey weinstein, a leading liberal donor. and we’ve vigorously reported on everything from personal misconduct to gerrymandering efforts by both republicans and democrats. we didn’t write these stories to balance a ledger; we wrote them because each one was individually true and individually important. the pushback we get on every such piece makes clear that one of the most profound journalistic choices of the era is to either pick a tribe or prepare to upset people. a commitment to independence means the latter is the only defensible option, even though it comes at a substantial short term cost. at a moment in which forces are attempting to exploit classically liberal ideals like the journalistic model i am defending here toward illiberal ends, independent news organizations shouldn’t do their work for them by forsaking those values ourselves. the most important safeguard of an independent press is a strong and sustainable press. how do we protect independent journalism, as challenges arrive from nearly every corner? the most important safeguard of an independent press is a strong and sustainable press. we need to build up the business model for reported journalism, particularly at the local level. we need to secure legal protections for reporters and their sources to ensure the free flow of information to the public. we need to address the deepening crackdowns against journalists overseas like russia’s recent arrest of the wall street journal reporter evan gershkovich and the growing harassment of them at home. but focusing more narrowly on the question of independence, a few steps are clear for journalists and leaders of journalistic institutions, the times very much included. first and foremost, journalists should remember that our core purpose, as i have been saying, is to follow the facts wherever they lead, even when we would prefer for them not to be true, and to fairly represent people and perspectives, even when we disagree with them. any compromise on this is likely to further erode the public’s already shaky confidence in journalism and ultimately hobble the ability of journalists to serve a society desperately in need of reliable information. i’ve seen countless instances in which people want journalists to bury reporting, twist the facts, or embrace speculation all to demonstrate allegiance to some higher cause. instead, journalists should interrogate the world with curiosity, not certainty. we should remain skeptical, humble, searching, as we explore every story, no matter how well we think we know a topic. we should complicate seemingly tidy narratives, embrace nuance, and continually question what we find. second, journalists should recommit to reporting as the most valuable service we provide to the public. reporting not commentary or aggregation is the essential ingredient of new ideas and new insights and allows every part of the journalism ecosystem to flourish. this requires journalists to get out of our bubbles. one insidious side effect of the collapse of local news is that journalism jobs are increasingly dominated by highly educated people living in blue coastal cities: according to the pew research center, more than one in five journalists lives in new york, los angeles, or washington. and far too many over rely on twitter, mistaking it for a public town square rather than a journalistic echo chamber. reporters need to work harder to go to unfamiliar places, meet with unfamiliar people, and challenge our own assumptions with unfamiliar perspectives, experiences, and ideas. third, journalists need to better recognize how public criticism can manipulate coverage. in today’s hyper connected environment, the response to our work is more immediate and intense than ever. the increase in transparency and greater accountability for our mistakes and missteps is a welcome shift. but the reaction to our work now often arrives through attacks designed to intimidate by questioning journalists’ legitimacy or morality. the critics here don’t want to set the record straight; they want to cajole, shame, and scare journalists into providing more favorable coverage. at the same time, cheers, like jeers, can be used to co opt. self respecting journalists don’t take marching orders from politicians and corporations; they need to equally resist shaping their coverage to win the praise of activists and interest groups, even those engaged in admirable work. as dean baquet, the former executive editor of the times, often says: watchdogs cannot allow themselves to become lapdogs. finally, journalists should more actively reckon with the uncomfortable reality of widespread distrust in the media. it will take years, if not decades, to win over people who have been told again and again by those they admire and trust including a former president of the united states that the media hates them and hates this country. but news organizations can’t act as if they are powerless to reverse the growing distrust in journalism more broadly. they need to do a far better job fighting for their reputations and explaining how they make journalistic decisions. many of the profession’s conventions the inverted pyramid article structure, datelines and bylines, and contortions to excise the writer from the work  are relics of an era when faith in journalistic institutions was assumed. i’m not convinced people ever really understood these conventions. but today we can say with certainty that they don’t. the times’ own research suggests that even many loyal readers did not understand that our journalists who, in a normal year, report on the ground from more than 160 countries, often in difficult and dangerous conditions actually go to the places they write about. that is a failure not of readers’ understanding but of our communication. we haven’t consistently and clearly shown what goes into our reporting, adequately explained our process, or fully clarified how we view our role. beyond the journalism industry, others must do their part if we are to protect independent journalism and the role it plays to nurture an informed society. three groups stand out. search engines and, especially, social platforms most notably facebook, youtube, twitter, and tiktok have played an outsize role in creating the conditions that threaten independent journalism. i’m not talking about the shift of advertising dollars from news organizations to tech giants, though that hasn’t helped. i’m talking about the profound shifts in how people find and engage with information, shifts that have exacerbated groupthink, fostered antipathy, and fractured people’s understanding of reality. these platforms and others have largely treated facts as indistinguishable from opinions, allowed reality to mix with conspiracy, and given propaganda equal footing with journalism. and the use of likes and shares to assess engagement and determine promotion has incentivized publishers to produce content that affirms rather than informs, that inflames divisions rather than promotes understanding. i’m sympathetic to the challenges the platforms face in regulating their environments, but they will continue to foster misinformation and polarization until they do more to both differentiate and elevate reputable independent news sources, even if it comes at the cost of user engagement or political backlash. if journalism was the unintended casualty of the platforms, it’s been the political establishment’s explicit target. our country’s founders largely defended the free press, even as they knew that its scrutiny wasn’t always comfortable. but particularly in the past few years, a sustained and escalating campaign from the american right has focused on attacking the press to win votes and inoculate itself against criticism or scrutiny. rather than responding to the substance of unflattering reporting, they’ve labeled reporters “enemies of the people” and our work “fake news.” this campaign has widened what was long a modest partisan gap in trust in journalism to a chasm. today, 70 percent of democrats say they have a great deal or fair amount of trust in the media; 14 percent of republicans do. the anti press rhetoric has also inspired legal action. the times has faced four times as many libel suits in the six years since trump’s election than in the six years before many from right wing activists who want the supreme court to overturn what were long assumed to be bedrock legal protections for the press. a not so subtle goal of this effort is to make it easier to sue news organizations and, as a result, harder for journalists to bring information to the public. our nation’s history shows independent journalism not only makes our society more informed, it makes our nation more secure, our economy stronger, our people healthier, our society more just. this may be an effective tactic. few professions today evoke more widespread scorn than journalism. but attacking the free press is reckless and unpatriotic. in countries like hungary, turkey, and russia, similar anti journalism rhetoric and action have presaged broader dismantling of democratic norms, efforts made far easier without the transparency and accountability provided by a free and independent press. in the united states, this amounts to a dangerous incursion not just on the spirit of the first amendment, but on the special formula that has made this country the most successful on earth. our nation’s history shows independent journalism not only makes our society more informed, it makes our nation more secure, our economy stronger, our people healthier, our society more just. systematically undermining independent journalism and seeking to replace it with self serving propaganda from powerful interests weakens the nation. no one stands to lose more from these trends than the american people. for decades, spreading a newspaper on the kitchen table or gathering to watch the nightly news was an essential part of being a good citizen. the rituals may have changed, but the need hasn’t. citizens still benefit from a shared set of facts. they still benefit from understanding their neighbors and their nation and caring enough to peek beyond the boundaries of their own lives to engage with the larger world. it is americans themselves who will need to insist that there is a future for independent journalism. amid all the distraction, confusion, and chaos of the digital world, it’s more important than ever that citizens develop relationships with news organizations that inform and challenge them, commit to finding a daily place in their lives for independent journalism, and use it to expand, not merely reinforce, their worldview. if the press holds fast to journalistic independence, i am confident that over time more people of all backgrounds and perspectives will come to see the value of journalists serving as fair minded guides through a complex world at a consequential moment. we use cookies and similar technologies to recognize your repeat visits and preferences, as well as to measure and analyze traffic. to learn more about cookies, including how to disable them, view our cookie policy. by clicking “i accept” on this banner, you consent to the use of cookies unless you disable them.

a case for a federal public trust for media a project aimed at identifying and protecting core press functions in june 1945, the united states supreme court issued a 4,900 word opinion that significantly curbed the power of an aspiring monopoly known as the associated press (ap).1 1. associated press v. united states 326 u.s. 1 (1945). the case arose out of the wire service’s adoption of two new bylaws. the first allowed its 1,200 member newspapers to block their competitors from joining the service, thus denying a large number of news outlets access to the vital information provided by the wire. the second banned member newspapers from selling their content directly to any nonmember newspaper. in short, news organizations that were members of the ap had access to news from around the country and the world, but those that were not part of the news agency were denied not only the ap’s wire content but also all content produced by the member papers themselves. if one of their competitors managed to gain ap membership, then they were banned from joining as well. the supreme court, however, ruled that these new policies were antitrust violations under the sherman act, which, among other things, explicitly prohibits businesses from banding together to undercut their competition. among its defenses, the ap had argued the government was infringing on its constitutionally protected press freedoms. but justice hugo black, writing for the court, rejected that argument and held that the first amendment did not allow the ap to run nonmember papers out of business. in fact, he asserted that the constitutional provision functioned to ensure the opposite. the first amendment, black wrote, “rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public,” and “a free press is a condition of a free society.” rather than simply a ban on government interference, black identified in the first amendment an affirmative right, held by each american, to have access to the breadth and depth of information that only a robust and diverse press can provide. black’s son would later recall that his father believed press freedom meant more to “the preservation of our democratic republic than” any other part of the constitution, even as he believed it was necessary to break up concentrated media power and “(disperse) that power more equably.”2 2. hugo black, jr., my father: a remembrance (1975). black’s contention that there is a public right to robust, accurate information has been a core value held by many of america’s most consequential journalists, who understood it to be a central prerequisite of any nation that aspires to be equal, equitable, and just: “the people must know before they can act. and there is no educator to compare with the press,” wrote ida b. wells.3 3. ida b. wells, self help, in southern horrors: lynch law in all its phases (1892). half a century later, ralph mcgill expounded on this idea, declaring, “freedom of the press is not the personal property of any one editor or publisher, or of any association of them. it is not something that can be locked in the safe at night . . . it is merely one of the guarantees to the people. it is their property.”4 4. ralph mcgill, there is time yet, the atlantic,sept. 1944. most often taken as ensuring a freedom of the press as an industry, black’s ruling suggests a more proper reading of the first amendment provides an individual right to the press, namely that citizens in our democracy will have access to reliable, accurate, and comprehensive information in order to empower their full enfranchisement in our democracy, with the promise that each citizen has a right to know. a free press is often heralded as a key cornerstone of american democracy, functioning as a vital institution tasked with informing the public and holding those in power accountable. yet, as the industry faces an existential crisis, with the collapse of traditional business models and the rise of deep political polarization amid a sea of misinformation and propaganda, it has become increasingly clear that thinking of press freedom only as a market that must be protected from government interference cannot sustain the kind of robust, diverse, and accessible press that a healthy democracy requires. this chapter argues that to truly fulfill the promise of a “right to know” for all people, we must reimagine the relationship between the press and the public and consider bold new forms of public support for journalism. by the time of black’s opinion in associated press, the american press had evolved far beyond what it was 150 years earlier, when james madison first crafted the language that would become the first amendment. in his later writings, madison argued that in a representative republic in which citizens elect their leaders, care of the public opinion is a paramount concern. “without the rule of public opinion, government cannot rightfully be considered free,” wrote historian colleen a. sheehan of madison’s ideology, noting that he and other founders took it as a given that there would be a vibrant, diverse, privately owned american press and that the government had a proactive obligation to ensure that it remained so; “in madison’s understanding of free government, the representative is thus made responsible for influencing and guiding public opinion . . . because public opinion is sovereign in a free society, the republican statesman is obliged to advance its formation and expression.”5 5. colleen a. sheehan, the politics of public opinion: james madison’s “notes on government,” 49 wm. & mary q. 609 (1992). by the late 1800s and early 1900s, the american press had transformed from a relatively niche industry in which men of letters debated the vital issues of the day into loyal organs of competing political parties and then, finally, into an increasingly powerful form of mass communication. “far more important than any part they ever played in politics, newspapers finally established themselves in an indispensable role as journals of vital information,” opined ken cooper, the longtime chief executive of the associated press.6 6. kent cooper, the right to know: an exposition of the evils of news suppression and propaganda (1956). from the beginning, however, this new form of the press, charged with disseminating nonpartisan information, faced criticism for failing to live up to the nobility of its mission. as the century turned, newspaper titans joseph pulitzer and william randolph hearst pioneered “yellow journalism” a sensationalist style that blended fact and fiction in order to maximize profits. in turn, adolph s. ochs founded the new york times on the promise that its news reports would be unbiased, staid, and impartial. yet, in response to the times’ failures to live up to its own stated standards, critics like walter lippmann lambasted the paper, noting that for all its vows of impartiality, its reports often depicted a version of reality skewed by its journalists’ establishmentarian biases. “the current theory of american newspaperdom is that an abstraction like the truth and a grace like fairness must be sacrificed whenever anyone thinks the necessities of civilization require the sacrifice,”7 7. walter lippmann, liberty and the news (1920). lippmann wrote, accusing the times of censoring views and ignoring facts that cut against status quo beliefs. newspaper editors largely rejected lippmann’s calls for rigorous journalistic methods (even as they later developed a self mythology in which they claimed him as their patron saint). generations of critics echoed lippmann and other early 20th century press dissidents concerning the dangers of a greedy, lazy, irresponsible commercial press and were similarly dismissed.8 8. history, news leaders association, https://members.newsleaders.org/asne history (last visited june 26, 2024) (noting that the american society of news editors, now the news leaders association, was founded in 1922 by newspaper editors angry and defensive about similar criticisms leveled by naacp president moorfield storey and journalist frederick lewis allen that called for a more considerate, responsible press); ben h. bagdikian, the new media monopoly (2004) (“the news media suffer from built in biases that protect corporate power and consequently weaken the public’s ability to understand forces that create the american scene. these biases in favor of the status quo . . . do not seem to change materially over time.”). during world war ii, university of chicago president robert hutchins and time magazine founder henry luce convened a 13 member panel of prominent scholars to examine the state of the press. in its 1947 final report, the hutchins commission observed and warned that [news] agencies can facilitate thought and discussion. they can stifle it. they can advance the progress of civilization or they can thwart it. they can debase and vulgarize mankind. they can endanger the peace of the world; they can do so accidentally, in a fit of absence of mind. they can play up or down the news and its significance, foster and feed emotions, create complacent fictions and blind spots, misuse the great words, and uphold empty slogans . . . [t]heir scope and power are increasing every day as new instruments become available to them. these instruments can spread lies faster and farther than our forefathers dreamed.9 9. commission on freedom of the press, a free and responsible press (1947). if the charge of the press is to nurture our public opinion, which in turn powers our democracy, then the performance of the press can be judged by the health of that democracy. by that measure, then as now, there is no question our press has fallen desperately short. the hutchins commission noted that the american press was controlled by private businessmen who too often utilized their presses to spread divisiveness, misinformation, and political propaganda. its members warned that an irresponsible press that prioritized profits over the public good would result in an american populace willing to support significant governmental impositions on press freedom. today, the leader of one of our country’s major political parties proclaims the press “the enemy of the people,” vows to alter libel and defamation laws in order to undercut press freedoms, and directs his raucous crowds to target individual journalists who fail to indulge him. we are living the hutchins commission’s nightmare. the technological innovations from broadcast radio and television to cable and then the digital revolution ushered in by the internet of the last century have upended the media industry, the public square, and the geopolitical order. ultimately, cellphones, broadband internet, and social media have placed publishing and distribution power in the hands of every individual citizen, giving each the equivalent of their own printing press and the possibility that their dispatches, no matter how factual or farcical, could be consumed by the world. we, furthermore, live in an era of significant media consolidation. locally owned newspapers beat out and bought out their cross town competitors, before themselves combining into regional and then national chains. many of those companies then shifted from being privately owned to publicly traded companies, requiring them to optimize profit at the expense of the information needs of the public. the internet ripped the heart out of the print advertising business and upended the general interest news bundle, forcing publishers to chase online traffic and decode ever changing tech algorithms. a handful of innovative media outlets have managed to thrive in this challenging environment, often by serving niche audiences, such as political obsessives or high income finance workers. others, however, have resorted to monetizing divisiveness and propaganda. as journalist george packer observed in the atlantic, “[v]enerable outlets perish or self mutilate; newer ones come and go in a flash; mountains of bait are thrown into the water to see what rises to the surface.”10 10. george packer, is journalism ready?, the atlantic, dec. 2023. packer’s assessment leads to a damning, if understated, verdict: “this exhausting effort consumes so much time and talent that it’s difficult to face the obvious truth: the for profit model of journalism shows signs of being broken.”11 11. id. these signs are not small ones but rather billboards projecting a dire warning from high above the graveyard that houses a century’s worth of corpses. the most recent study by northwestern university found that since 2005 the country has lost nearly 2,900 newspapers and almost two thirds of its newspaper journalists. “the last 20 years of local news have been grim, a narrative told in verbs such as demise, decimate, devastate, and decline,”14 14. penelope muse abernathy & sarah stonbely, the state of local news: the 2023 report, nw. medill local news initiative (2023), https://localnewsinitiative.northwestern.edu/assets/slnp/the_state_of_local_news_2023.pdf. according to political scientists danny hayes and jennifer lawless. they further assert, “no part of the business has gone unaffected, with some newspapers disappearing altogether and others reduced to such shells that it just seems like they’ve disappeared.”15 15. danny hayes & jennifer l. lawless, news hole: the demise of local journalism and political engagement(2021). notably, there are a few national mainstream media outlets that have managed to turn our current moment into a financial boon. take cnn for example. between 2016 and 2022, as the network’s on air reporters and anchors were (accurately) proclaiming that the fate of american democracy was imperiled, cnn’s corporate owners and their shareholders pocketed more than $1 billion a year in profit.16 16. benjamin mullin, profits slump at cnn as ratings plummet, n.y. times (aug. 2, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/02/business/media/cnn profit chris licht.html. along similar lines, in november 2023, an article headlined uncertain times have been good for dow jones explained that the corporate owners of the wall street journal and barons were on pace to make the most money of any quarter since rupert murdoch acquired them in 2007.17 17. dominic ponsford, uncertain times have been good for dow jones, a rare 2023 publishing success story, press gazette (nov. 30, 2023), https://pressgazette.co.uk/north america/dow jones almar latour interview 2023/. that same year, the new york times projected that the paper would earn close to $100 million in profits,18 despite it being one of the american media’s worst years in recent history, with thousands of journalism jobs lost.18 18. angela fu, 2023 was the worst year for the news business since the pandemic, poynter (dec. 27, 2023), https://www.poynter.org/business work/2023/2023 was the worst year for the news business since the pandemic/. even within the most professional newsrooms, journalistic decisions are made based on the concept of “news values” what assignments, headlines, and story framings will attract the most readers, drive the most clicks, and sell the most newspapers by being the most attractive and compelling to readers which is a capitalistic incentive, not a journalistic one. in 1987, pamela shoemaker offered (and critiqued as tools of the status quo) what remains the widely accepted list of “news values.”23 23. pamela j. shoemaker, all the deviance that's fit to print: newsworthiness and social change (aug. 1985) (paper presented at the 68th annual meeting of the association for education journalism and mass communication), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ed257128.pdf. shoemaker listed timeliness, proximity, impact, interest, conflict or controversy, sensationalism, prominence, and oddity. these values, or built in biases, underscore the extent to which our news ecosystem is not based on providing the public what it actually needs to know to nurture a healthy democracy. “news values can be seen less as a reflection of what type of information citizens want or need,”24 24. tony harcup & deirdre o’neill, what is news? galtung and ruge revisited, 2 journalism stud. 261 (2001). researchers tony harcup and deirdre o’neill have argued, “[a]nd more as a reflection of organizational, sociological and cultural norms combined with economic factors.”25 25. id. most “sensational” stories hold little tangible relevance to citizens’ lives and livelihoods. timeliness, by its nature, prioritizes speed over rigor. proximity precludes thoughtful coverage of consequential events from across the country and around the world, thus denying readers the broad base of knowledge needed to fully participate in the democratic process and to influence not just local matters but global ones. a focus on how many people are “impacted” by a story or event provides a means of dodging the responsibility to accurately document the realities of minority communities. a bias toward framing stories through the lens of controversy or conflict is a recipe for removing necessary context, complication, and nuance. an emphasis on audience “interest” is pure capitalism defining something as news if people are willing to consume it. through that lens, it should not be surprising to see studies like a recent report published in the columbia journalism review, which examined political coverage that appeared on the front pages of the times and its chief rival the washington post during the months leading up to the 2022 midterm elections.26 26. gideon heltzer et al., warped front pages, colum. journalism rev.(nov. 20, 2023), https://www.cjr.org/analysis/election politics front pages.php. the study found that our nation’s leading news organizations had provided coverage that offered “little insight into policy.”27 27. id. researchers found that, out of the times’ 219 frontpage articles about domestic politics, just 10 “explained domestic public policy in any detail.”28 28. id. on the frontpage of the post, just four pieces out of 215 “discussed any form of policy,” and not a single one probed the “policies that candidates aimed to bring to the fore.”29 29. id. during a vital election year, amidst a historic battle for the future of our multiracial liberal democracy, our leading journalistic outlets produced reams of political “news,” yet, by at least this measure, managed to offer the public little in terms of vital knowledge and information necessary for self government. of course our leading journalistic organizations provide more political theater criticism and horse race analysis than they do substantive coverage about the stakes of public policy. this is because they operate in a market that has made it clear what it is willing to pay for and what it is not. for decades, press critics, with jay rosen at the forefront, have been detailing the democracy corroding norms of most mainstream political journalism. in 2008, rosen aptly described the pervasive “who’s gonna win” mentality: “‘who’s gonna win?’ is portable, reusable from cycle to cycle, and easily learned by newcomers to the press pack.”30 30. jim romenesko, jay rosen: why horse race journalism works for journalists, poynter (jan. 21, 2008), https://www.poynter.org/reporting editing/2008/jay rosen why horse race journalism works for journalists/. it’s a mentality, rosen explained, that “generates an endless series of puzzles toward which journalists can gesture as they display their savviness, which is the unofficial religion of the mainstream press.”31 31. id. such journalism has continued largely unaltered not because most journalists disagree with the substance of these critiques, though some, of course, do. rather, it persists because of the underlying financial realities. for the companies that control our media, journalism befitting our democracy focused on substance and complexity, not ephemeral scoops and partisan conflict is not a viable business plan. it can’t win ratings wars, it doesn’t sell papers and drive traffic, and it certainly doesn’t produce the kind of profits needed in order to keep owners, executives, shareholders, and their offspring firmly planted within the american aristocracy. adequately informing the whole of the public and maximizing profits are incompatible aims. we’ve convinced ourselves our goal is the former, yet we’ve constructed our democracy’s information ecosystem around the latter. it is necessary to draw a distinction between a media system that prioritizes “news” and one that aims to disseminate “information.” all news contains some information. but not all information or journalism is “news.” the most vital information how to participate in democracy, what public services are available and how to procure them, what your government is actually doing and not doing, how to best understand and contextualize daily societal occurrences is almost never relayed in our “news.” instead, most “news” consists of context lacking micro updates, singular scenes cut from an ongoing public soap opera that are nearly incomprehensible to anyone who has missed the last episode and that will be proven inaccurate, irrelevant, or both by the airing of the next one. as famed writer gay talese recalled of his childhood impression of the press, “[n]ews” was not information, facts, or even knowledge but was “ephemeral.”32 32. gay talese, bartleby and me: reflections of an old scrivener (2023). “news is a commodity, not a mirror image of reality,”33 33. james t. hamilton, all the news that’s fit to sell (2004). economist james t. hamilton wrote in 2004. “focusing on media economics shows how consumers’ desires drive news coverage and how this conflicts with the ideal of what the news ought to be.”34 34. id. or, as lippmann noted a century ago: the truth and the news are not the same thing. “the function of news is to signalize an event,”35 35. walter lippmann, public opinion (1965). he wrote, and “[t]he function of truth is to bring to light the hidden facts.”36 36. id. truth has tangible value; it decodes complexity and equips the citizenry with the ability to navigate an ever complicated world. news is now produced at an unprecedented clip by social media influencers, podcasters, and virtually every person with access to the internet. news sows distrust because most news is sensational, lacking rigor, and incomplete. what american democracy needs, what it craves, is quality information: vetted, trustworthy, and complete. “citizens need journalists more than ever, precisely because there is so much information available, of such varying quality and relevance,”37 37. thomas e. patterson, informing the news: the need for knowledge based journalism (2013). thomas e. patterson wrote in 2013’s informing the news, in which he argued that the journalism required for healthy democracy must be reflective, not reflexive. patterson called for “knowledge based journalism,” in which journalists develop expertise and deploy slow, rigorous methods.38 38. id. “there are plenty of conscientious journalists. but their efforts are diminished by what other reporters are doing.”39 39. id. although there have been american news organizations operating as nonprofits for more than a century, the post watergate era witnessed the birth of a small but influential wave of nonprofit outlets that set the stage for the sector’s current explosion. the movement began with the founding of mother jones magazine in 1976 and the center for investigative reporting in 1977. these outlets were explicit about their mission: to tell the types of stories that corporate owned media were disincentivized from producing by deploying the kind of journalistic rigor often absent from daily news coverage. “as news organizations have reduced their commitment to serious journalism, there has been an incalculable cost to communities, to citizens’ ability to monitor those in power, and of course to those professionals directly impacted in the profession of journalism itself,”40 40. charles lewis, the growing importance of nonprofit journalism, harv. u. shorenstein ctr. working paper series (apr. 2007), https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/37375928/2007_03.pdf?sequence=1&isallowed=y. wrote charles lewis, a pioneer of the nonprofit journalist model. in 1989, lewis founded the center for public integrity,41 41. since 2020, i have been a member of the center for public integrity’s board of directors. i am currently co chairman. and in 1997 he launched the international consortium of investigative journalists. he would later be among the co founders of the institute for nonprofit news and launch the investigative reporting workshop.42 42. in july 2023, i succeeded lewis as the investigative reporting workshop’s executive editor. “the question was,” lewis wrote in 2006, “is there a way to create a modest attempt at a journalistic utopia . . . ?”43 43. lewis, supra note 40. once an outlier in the journalistic landscape for much of the last century, nonprofit media consisted primarily of national public radio and its various local affiliates the sector ballooned in the 2000s, as the bottom finally fell out of the newspaper industry. over the last two and a half decades, a number of high profile nonprofit newsrooms have been launched, including propublica in 2008, the texas tribune in 2009, the marshall project in 2015, the 19th* in 2020, and a wave of lesser known news organizations that have sprouted up across the country. in many cases, these organizations have framed their missions not as replicating the corporate media outlets that they hope to replace but as explicitly offering a public service that those organizations refuse to provide. in 2015, the institute for nonprofit news had about 120 members.44 44. annual report 2015, inst. for nonprofit news (2015), https://inn.org/wp content/uploads/2022/09/2015 inn annualreport.pdf. today, it represents more than 400 nonprofit news organizations, about 300 of them local newsrooms. the nonprofit news ecosystem is primarily bankrolled by a handful of major philanthropic organizations and includes structural support, consisting of, among others, programs that help these publishers establish membership programs, run end of the year giving campaigns, and share editorial and business best practices. these noble efforts have unquestionably bettered our field and resulted in a nonprofit media sector that produces meaningful journalism. indeed, to some, nonprofit journalism is the coveted answer to the failings of the commercial press, especially at the local level. reality, however, suggests that we remain far from the utopia lewis envisioned because there simply is not enough money available to finance a nonprofit journalistic nirvana. the best estimates suggest that rebuilding the local news and information ecosystem will require between $1 billion and $3 billion each year.45 45. steve waldman, size of the gap, rebuild local news (apr. 4, 2023), https://www.rebuildlocalnews.org/size of the gap/. as of 2023, the boston consulting group estimated that current philanthropic giving to local journalism totals about $150 million a year.46 46. zuckerman, supra note 13. a coalition of longtime journalism funders, led by the macarthur foundation and knight foundation, has recently launched a campaign called “press forward,” which aims to mobilize $500 million over the course of five years toward rebuilding, revitalizing, and reimagining local news.47 47. press forward will award more than $500 million to revitalize local news, macarthur found. (sept. 7, 2023), https://www.macfound.org/press/press releases/press forward will award more than 500 million to revitalize local news. it is a noble, unprecedented effort that is undoubtedly already the largest fundraising campaign for news and information in american history. it's also a band aid being frantically fastened over a gaping bullet hole. even if press forward reached its goal of pumping half a billion dollars into local nonprofit news over the course of five years, and even if every single one of those were new, previously uncommitted dollars, that would bring the total of philanthropic funding for local news and information to about $250 million a year somewhere between 8 and 25 percent of what has been deemed necessary, and nowhere close to the amount needed to stabilize american democracy. and there are legitimate concerns, often voiced quietly by those unwilling to risk earning the ire of such prominent and important potential funders, that such a centralization of nonprofit funding could in fact create a more risk averse, stylistically monochromatic nonprofit press. in april 2024, richard logan, a leading journalism funder, warned attendees of an investigative journalism conference at uc berkeley that, intended or not, such consolidation of foundation giving would have the same disastrous effects that corporate media consolidation had over the course of the previous century, leading to a nonprofit press corps too terrified of upsetting its wealthy benefactors and powerful foundations to do its job: “the writing has been on the wall for a long time,”48 48. richard logan, remarks at 16th annual reva and david logan symposium on investigative reporting (apr. 19 21, 2024) (notes on file with author). logan declared, according to the notes i took from the audience. “if you think life without freedom and democracy is worth living, then well i guess when we’re in the camps we’ll have very little to talk about.”49 49. id. and those nonprofit news organizations who succeed in earning the favor of philanthropies and foundations are then tasked with completing the same puzzle that for profit media failed to solve for a century, namely convincing a sizable enough portion of the public to pay sufficient money to support an information system that can effectively serve the masses before this philanthropic seed money runs out. “no one in the foundation world wants to think these nonprofits are going to be dependent on foundations for a long time,”50 50. mary walton, the nonprofit explosion, am. journalism rev. (sept. 2010), https://ajrarchive.org/article.asp?id=4906. an employee of a major foundation remarked in 2010. “journalism startups have got to figure out some way to get people to pay for them.”51 51. id. more recently, when announcing support for a new local nonprofit news organization in houston, a major journalism funder described philanthropy’s role as supporting the fourth estate “until the industry finds its footing”52 52. houston foundations to launch nonprofit newsroom, philanthropy news dig.(jan. 24, 2022), https://philanthropynewsdigest.org/news/houston foundations to launch nonprofit newsroom. as if the flailing information system undermining our democracy were a younger sibling in need of some cash to cover their housing deposit. the assumption at the heart of the push for nonprofit media “sustainability” is that, despite a century of available evidence, local markets across the country are not only capable of but willing to support healthy information ecosystems. but unacknowledged in this formulation is the fact that many of the core components of the local news bundle that kept newspapers, magazines, and television news profitable for much of the 20th century sports scores, classified ads, weather predictions, crosswords, coupons, and comics are now readily available, for free, to would be news consumers via the internet. also unacknowledged in this plan is the reality that all too often the communities most in need of healthy civic information are also those least able to pay for it, even if they wanted to. “business models for local news . . . simply don’t work for outlets serving low income communities,”53 53. madeleine bair, toward equitable models of journalism sustainability, jsk fellows (dec. 11, 2023), https://jskfellows.stanford.edu/toward equitable models of journalism sustainability f0b76f864cf5. observed madeleine bair, who in 2017 founded el timpano, which serves latino and mayan immigrants in the bay area of california. “sustainability has become a core focus for many journalism funders, who want to see that a news outlet will not rely on philanthropy for the long term,”54 54. id. bair continued, but in a context in which the one common denominator of sustainable digital outlets is that they serve affluent audiences, this metric becomes a bias in favor of news that serves the well to do, and in the end a self fulfilling prophecy: there are few models of sustainable outlets that serve low income audiences, so funders don’t take a chance investing in such outlets.55 55. id. if there is one lesson the last one hundred years of the american press has taught us, it is that the type of rigorous information ecosystem required of a healthy democracy is not sustainable as a market supported enterprise at least not in many of the communities that most desperately need accurate news and information, and certainly not at scale. yes, some local nonprofit news efforts have through subscription, sponsorship, membership, events, and foundation money found innovative ways to fill information gaps. but we cannot allow small successes to distract from inescapable conclusions. through its focus on the unachievable aspiration of local news sustainability, philanthropy has made clear it is unwilling and unable to support democracy’s long term information needs. so too have the consumers. national public radio described as public media but more accurately understood as a nonprofit outlet with some public support has spent decades attempting to build a membership model. it is currently in a crisis, with at least one industry watcher predicting all of “public radio” could collapse within a decade.56 56. benjamin mullin & jeremy w. peters, n.y. times (apr. 24, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/24/business/media/inside the crisis at npr.html (“i believe that public radio has five to seven years to reimagine itself before it’s simply unsustainable,” said eric nuzum, a former npr executive and co founder of the audio consulting and production company magnificent noise; he continued, “and they can’t take two or three years of that time debating a business model.”). amid these realities, many of the journalists most successful at building nonprofit organizations have explicitly called for a non market based remedy. “more ambitious philanthropy and business model improvements will not be enough to reverse the loss of local news, let alone build a better, more robust, more inclusive local news sector than we’ve had before. government must play a role,”57 57. anna brugmann & steven waldman, testimony submitted to the california senate judiciary committee on local journalism in the digital age, rebuild local news (dec. 5, 2023), https://www.rebuildlocalnews.org/testimony submitted to the senate judiciary committee on local journalism in the digital age/. argued steve waldman, the co founder and former president of report for america and his rebuild local news coalition colleague anna brugmann. sewell chan, the outgoing editor in chief of the texas tribune and incoming editor of the columbia journalism review, wrote an essay pleading for urgent investments not just from philanthropy and citizens but from the government in order to stem what he described as an “information apocalypse”: proposals for any kind of government intervention will raise hackles among journalists who believe the first amendment rules out a role for public support of journalism. i know the danger of state control of broadcasting . . . i hear, as well, warnings of negative unintended consequences of government action . . . but most journalists do not have the luxury of temporizing as their institutions and livelihoods crumble.”58 58. sewell chan, a lost decade: policymakers fiddled as newsrooms burned, 707 annals of the am. acad. of pol. & soc. sci. 62 (2023). or, as elizabeth green, the ceo and co founder of chalkbeat, has put it: “we have to subsidize reporting if we want democracy to survive.”59 59. sara fischer, pandemic drives nonprofit media boom, axios(feb. 23, 2021), https://www.axios.com/2021/02/23/covid newspapers nonprofit media. in american democracy, innovative and provocative ideas from abolition to suffrage to desegregation to marriage equality to drug legalization to redress and reparations  often begin in states before eventually marching their way to washington. and recent years have seen a movement, largely led by waldman and his colleagues, to convince local and state governments to provide public funding as a means of infusing resources into our dying media ecosystem. if a free press is truly a vital public good, with the best media outlets vowing to serve as a public trust, then we must create an actual federal public trust to ensure every american has access to the news and information they need to be full citizens in our democracy. the aim would not be a government run media but rather a government ensured one. rather than create a centralized public media that could be punished by politicians who dislike its coverage or commandeered as a propaganda tool by a demagogue president we could instead direct federal news and information money directly to local communities. if congress were to create such a trust, it could, for example, pledge to provide $10 million in annual federal public information grants to each of the country’s 435 congressional districts. this would channel urgent public resources to every community in the country, instantly transforming the news and information landscape for the relatively modest, by federal budgeting standards, price tag of $4.35 billion per year. such a program would place money directly in the hands of local media outlets, neighborhood organizations, and civic institutions that reflect the demographics, values, and sensibilities of america’s various communities. such a program could follow the successful, widely accepted model of the u.s. national science foundation, a federal agency established in 1950, which in fiscal year 2023 distributed more than $7 billion in taxpayer money to researchers at u.s. colleges and universities.60 60. fy 2025 budget request to congress, national science foundation (mar. 11, 2024), https://nsf gov resources.nsf.gov/files/00_nsf_fy25_cj_entire%20rollup_web.pdf?versionid=cbkdqd_umweheiszwpjtvgcqrwmccgvu. and there is precedent, in the corporation for public broadcasting (cpb), for the independent administration and distribution of government dollars to support a free press. the $4.25 billion allotment for public information could be administered through the creation of a new agency, governed by a charter that ensures and insists it is operated in a way that is, as president lyndon b. johnson vowed when he authorized the creation of the cpb, “carefully guarded from government or from party control. it will be free, and it will be independent and it will belong to all of our people.”61 61. president lyndon b. johnson, remarks upon signing the public broadcasting act of 1967 (nov. 7, 1967) (transcript available in the lbj presidential library, https://www.lbjlibrary.org/object/text/remarks upon signing public broadcasting act 11 07 1967). federal public information money could be limited to news and information efforts, excluding pure opinion journalism, and available to any institution that proposes innovative efforts to expand the availability of rigorous, factual information in order to empower citizens to fully participate in our democracy. eligible institutions could include for profit and nonprofit newsrooms, other nonprofit organizations, colleges and universities, libraries, and other civic institutions. it is easy to imagine a host of projects, carried out by news organizations, civic institutions, or partnerships between both, that would meet such criteria. these projects could ensure that every citizen has access to information about registering to vote, polling locations, and local candidates and political issues on their ballot, as well as their community’s local history and contemporary challenges. this money could also guarantee that an accessible public record is created of every government meeting, that a transcript is taken and archived of every court proceeding, and that there are trained professional journalists in every city hall and statehouse to help sift through and interpret all of this information. importantly, at a time when news organizations face, among other things, a distribution crisis, the funds would ensure that such information is actively disseminated to citizens in order to inform public opinion. just as the point of a public library is not to replace or compete with the bookstore, such an agency would not aspire to construct a public media system to replace or displace commercial and nonprofit media. rather, it would provide for a suite of services that the market will never incentivize for profit businesses to create on their own services that compile and curate information while also working to ensure that all citizens, regardless of means, have access to that information. “americans need accurate, contextual news and information to make decisions that help our communities thrive. it’s tempting to think that means news leaders need only focus on gathering and publishing facts. but local news has other essential roles that complement and enhance reporting,”62 62. samantha ragland & kevin loker, journalism has many roles. it’s time to embrace the role of convener, ky. press ass’n(may 9, 2024), https://members.kypress.com/articles/journalism has many roles its time to embrace the role of convener/. samantha ragland and kevin locker of the american press institute have argued, highlighting public information efforts, including the “solutions circles” convened by the mississippi free pressto brainstorm ways of addressing community problems, public forums held by the cardinal news in virginia, and storytelling events run by the tennesseanthat help community members share their own experiences, among others. “media should also be a force for social connection,” asserted ragland and locker, and further, media should be “[a] convener of people across differences and a facilitator for what to do after the facts are laid bare.”63 63. id. what those who champion such public information (also referred to as civil information and, in the mid 1990s, “public journalism”64 64. alicia c. shepard, the gospel of public journalism, 16 am. journalism rev.28(1994).) understand is that democracy will not be saved by fact checks, investigations, or view from nowhere coded news dispatches alone not even if today’s media organizations possessed a means of distributing them to a majority of the population (which they do not) and not even if that population trusted our media organizations (which it does not). in fact, decades of social science tell us that presenting people with facts that contradict their beliefs and opinions is not enough to change their minds or eradicate falsehoods.65 65. richard sima, why do our brains believe lies? correcting lies and misinformation is difficult because learning the truth doesn’t delete them from our memory, wash. post(nov. 3, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wellness/2022/11/03/misinformation brain beliefs/. “no one is ever forced by just the collection of facts to accept a particular theory of their meaning,”66 66. john dewey, the public and its problems (1927). philosopher john dewey wrote in 1927. “the imagination of the founders did not travel beyond what could be accomplished and understood in a congeries of self governing communities,”67 67. id. dewey continued, calling for us to consider democracy, especially a geographically vast and racially diverse one, impossible without the development of a shared “great community.” a similar framing was echoed, decades later, in the final book published by the rev. dr. martin luther king jr. prior to his assassination, which wrestled with how, following the 1965 voting rights act, americans could best build cohesive multiracial democracy. “where do we go from here,” asks the book’s title, “chaos or community?”68 68. martin luther king, jr., where do we go from here: chaos or community? (1967). while often framed as having been in ideological “debate,” dewey and lippmann are better read together, as an argument for democratic cohesion: the belief that a healthy public opinion, and thus a functioning democracy, requires both that the public have access to reliable, rigorously compiled and honestly presented facts as well as thriving local communities, well tended by reliable institutions (the press chief among them), for that information to be digested and debated. a democracy fails if it has one but not the other. currently, our democracy has neither. as richard young, the founder and executive director of civiclex, a media organization in lexington, kentucky, put it: if we want people to value local news, we must demonstrate its importance to young people early in their life. if we want people to trust our data and sources, we must help them know how to navigate that data themselves. if we want people to be open to different perspectives in our publications, we must build spaces where they actually interact with people who are different from them. if we want the information and reporting we produce to compel people to participate in the decision making that shapes their communities, we must build a civic life worth participating in.69 69. richard young, local news must help “build a civic life worth participating in,” the objective (dec. 5, 2023), https://objectivejournalism.org/2023/12/richard young local news building civic life/. there will likely be a powerful, vocal opposition from within journalism and the media, not just to the particulars of this proposal but to any step toward providing significant public funding to support the american press. the core of this is an ideological rejection of anything that could threaten the perception that our media is independent of the government that it covers.70 70. no matter the historical reality that the u.s. government has provided significant financial support to the press at various junctures. and there is no question that there is significant reason for vigilance to prevent political figures and partisans from wielding indiscriminate power over the press that holds it to account. there is a growing movement in favor of more market regulation, especially as it relates to technology companies who now hold near monopolies on the distribution of information. and there are arguments being made for a more robust, fully funded public media. both are based in the same principle, namely that the government must play a proactive role in encouraging and facilitating a healthy information ecosystem, as the argument for the creation of a public trust to sponsor public information. such government investment should not be seen as a replacement for the growing philanthropic support for journalism but rather as a welcome supplement to it. nothing in this chapter should be taken as an argument in favor of centralized, government run media. instead, it is an endorsement of a news and information ecosystem composed of countervailing forces: a healthy, properly regulated market based press; an ascendant nonprofit press sector; and a properly funded public media. all of those distinct forces would then, in this system, be buoyed by the possibility of receiving government support in exchange for providing vital public information they would be otherwise be disinclined by market forces to produce. imagine an american information ecosystem constructed as a stool with three distinct legs. when one wobbles or falters, the others are able to carry its weight. but the stool itself cannot stand if it is constructed on top of sand. a healthy press requires a firm foundation, a minimum flow of healthy information available to all, and communal venues in which all can gather to digest and debate it. a public trust for the press would help ensure that foundation, incentivizing each pillar of our press toward its better angels. legal scholar martha minow has argued, “government action always carries risks and need to comport with constitutional guarantees, but government inaction can also jeopardize constitutional guarantees.”72 72. martha minow, saving the news: why the constitution calls for government action to preserve freedom of speech (2021). minow has also opined that, if the infrastructure for gathering, reporting, and distributing news is absent in many communities, if readers and viewers are overwhelmed by distractions designed to take their attention, and if no recourse is available through the accountability mechanisms designed for either government or private enterprises, it is time to return to the constitution's text and basic principles.73 73. id. if there truly is, as justice black argued, an american right to know, then there is little choice but to subsidize our news and information ecosystem. our society has a long established solution for public entitlements that the free market will not support equitably: we have the government pay for them. such a system would not be a government controlled press but rather a government ensured one. and such public investment would ensure every american has news and information providers that, as journalist darryl holliday has put it, “strengthen democracy rather than erode it.”74 74. darryl holliday, journalism’s civic media moment could be a movement, in reinventing journalism to strengthen democracy: insights from innovators (p. dallas & p. ellis, eds., 2023). if we aspire to be a true multiracial and multicultural society, then we must ensure that each american has an equal claim to public goods and protected rights, and, perhaps most crucially, their right to know. © 2024, wesley lowery. cite as: wesley lowery, policing press freedom, 24 09 knight first amend. inst. (jul. 16, 2024), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/the right to know 1 [https://perma.cc/8wj3 6a2g]. 1 associated press v. united states 326 u.s. 1 (1945). 2 hugo black, jr., my father: a remembrance (1975). 3 ida b. wells, self help, in southern horrors: lynch law in all its phases (1892). 4 ralph mcgill, there is time yet, the atlantic, sept. 1944. 5 colleen a. sheehan, the politics of public opinion: james madison’s “notes on government,” 49 wm. & mary q. 609 (1992). 6 kent cooper, the right to know: an exposition of the evils of news suppression and propaganda (1956). 7 walter lippmann, liberty and the news (1920). 8 history, news leaders association, https://members.newsleaders.org/asne history (last visited june 26, 2024) (noting that the american society of news editors, now the news leaders association, was founded in 1922 by newspaper editors angry and defensive about similar criticisms leveled by naacp president moorfield storey and journalist frederick lewis allen that called for a more considerate, responsible press); ben h. bagdikian, the new media monopoly (2004) (“the news media suffer from built in biases that protect corporate power and consequently weaken the public’s ability to understand forces that create the american scene. these biases in favor of the status quo . . . do not seem to change materially over time.”). 9 commission on freedom of the press, a free and responsible press (1947). 10 george packer, is journalism ready?, the atlantic, dec. 2023. 11 id. 12 newspapers fact sheet, pew research center (nov. 10, 2023), https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/fact sheet/newspapers/. 13 neal zuckerman, the cost of sustaining local journalism: a working paper, medium (june 6, 2023), https://medium.com/@neal.zuckerman/the cost of sustaining local journalism a working paper 5e2d14b52882. 14 penelope muse abernathy & sarah stonbely, the state of local news: the 2023 report, nw. medill local news initiative (2023), https://localnewsinitiative.northwestern.edu/assets/slnp/the_state_of_local_news_2023.pdf. 15 danny hayes & jennifer l. lawless, news hole: the demise of local journalism and political engagement (2021). 16 benjamin mullin, profits slump at cnn as ratings plummet, n.y. times (aug. 2, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/02/business/media/cnn profit chris licht.html. 17 dominic ponsford, uncertain times have been good for dow jones, a rare 2023 publishing success story, press gazette (nov. 30, 2023), https://pressgazette.co.uk/north america/dow jones almar latour interview 2023/. 18 angela fu, 2023 was the worst year for the news business since the pandemic, poynter (dec. 27, 2023), https://www.poynter.org/business work/2023/2023 was the worst year for the news business since the pandemic/. 19 a.g. sulzberger, journalism’s essential value, colum. journalism rev. (may 15, 2023), https://www.cjr.org/special_report/ag sulzberger new york times journalisms essential value objectivity independence.php. 20 gerald boyd, my times in black and white: race and power at the new york times (2010). 21 margaret sullivan, some unsolicited advice for joe kahn of the new york times and other editors, am. crisis (may 10, 2024), https://margaretsullivan.substack.com/p/some unsolicited advice for joe kahn. 22 id. 23 pamela j. shoemaker, all the deviance that's fit to print: newsworthiness and social change (aug. 1985) (paper presented at the 68th annual meeting of the association for education journalism and mass communication), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ed257128.pdf. 24 tony harcup & deirdre o’neill, what is news? galtung and ruge revisited, 2 journalism stud. 261 (2001). 25 id. 26 gideon heltzer et al., warped front pages, colum. journalism rev. (nov. 20, 2023), https://www.cjr.org/analysis/election politics front pages.php. 27 id. 28 id. 29 id. 30 jim romenesko, jay rosen: why horse race journalism works for journalists, poynter (jan. 21, 2008), https://www.poynter.org/reporting editing/2008/jay rosen why horse race journalism works for journalists/. 31 id. 32 gay talese, bartleby and me: reflections of an old scrivener (2023). 33 james t. hamilton, all the news that’s fit to sell (2004). 34 id. 35 walter lippmann, public opinion (1965). 36 id. 37 thomas e. patterson, informing the news: the need for knowledge based journalism (2013). 38 id. 39 id. 40 charles lewis, the growing importance of nonprofit journalism, harv. u. shorenstein ctr. working paper series (apr. 2007), https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/37375928/2007_03.pdf?sequence=1&isallowed=y. 41 since 2020, i have been a member of the center for public integrity’s board of directors. i am currently co chairman. 42 in july 2023, i succeeded lewis as the investigative reporting workshop’s executive editor. 43 lewis, supra note 40. 44 annual report 2015, inst. for nonprofit news (2015), https://inn.org/wp content/uploads/2022/09/2015 inn annualreport.pdf. 45 steve waldman, size of the gap, rebuild local news (apr. 4, 2023), https://www.rebuildlocalnews.org/size of the gap/. 46 zuckerman, supra note 13. 47 press forward will award more than $500 million to revitalize local news, macarthur found. (sept. 7, 2023), https://www.macfound.org/press/press releases/press forward will award more than 500 million to revitalize local news. 48 richard logan, remarks at 16th annual reva and david logan symposium on investigative reporting (apr. 19 21, 2024) (notes on file with author). 49 id. 50 mary walton, the nonprofit explosion, am. journalism rev. (sept. 2010), https://ajrarchive.org/article.asp?id=4906. 51 id. 52 houston foundations to launch nonprofit newsroom, philanthropy news dig. (jan. 24, 2022), https://philanthropynewsdigest.org/news/houston foundations to launch nonprofit newsroom. 53 madeleine bair, toward equitable models of journalism sustainability, jsk fellows (dec. 11, 2023), https://jskfellows.stanford.edu/toward equitable models of journalism sustainability f0b76f864cf5. 54 id. 55 id. 56 benjamin mullin & jeremy w. peters, n.y. times (apr. 24, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/24/business/media/inside the crisis at npr.html (“i believe that public radio has five to seven years to reimagine itself before it’s simply unsustainable,” said eric nuzum, a former npr executive and co founder of the audio consulting and production company magnificent noise; he continued, “and they can’t take two or three years of that time debating a business model.”). 57 anna brugmann & steven waldman, testimony submitted to the california senate judiciary committee on local journalism in the digital age, rebuild local news (dec. 5, 2023), https://www.rebuildlocalnews.org/testimony submitted to the senate judiciary committee on local journalism in the digital age/. 58 sewell chan, a lost decade: policymakers fiddled as newsrooms burned, 707 annals of the am. acad. of pol. & soc. sci. 62 (2023). 59 sara fischer, pandemic drives nonprofit media boom, axios (feb. 23, 2021), https://www.axios.com/2021/02/23/covid newspapers nonprofit media. 60 fy 2025 budget request to congress, national science foundation (mar. 11, 2024), https://nsf gov resources.nsf.gov/files/00_nsf_fy25_cj_entire%20rollup_web.pdf?versionid=cbkdqd_umweheiszwpjtvgcqrwmccgvu. 61 president lyndon b. johnson, remarks upon signing the public broadcasting act of 1967 (nov. 7, 1967) (transcript available in the lbj presidential library, https://www.lbjlibrary.org/object/text/remarks upon signing public broadcasting act 11 07 1967). 62 samantha ragland & kevin loker, journalism has many roles. it’s time to embrace the role of convener, ky. press ass’n (may 9, 2024), https://members.kypress.com/articles/journalism has many roles its time to embrace the role of convener/. 63 id. 64 alicia c. shepard, the gospel of public journalism, 16 am. journalism rev. 28 (1994). 65 richard sima, why do our brains believe lies? correcting lies and misinformation is difficult because learning the truth doesn’t delete them from our memory, wash. post (nov. 3, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wellness/2022/11/03/misinformation brain beliefs/. 66 john dewey, the public and its problems (1927). 67 id. 68 martin luther king, jr., where do we go from here: chaos or community? (1967). 69 richard young, local news must help “build a civic life worth participating in,” the objective (dec. 5, 2023), https://objectivejournalism.org/2023/12/richard young local news building civic life/. 70 no matter the historical reality that the u.s. government has provided significant financial support to the press at various junctures. 71 art swift, americans’ trust in mass media sinks to new low, gallup (sept. 14, 2016), https://news.gallup.com/poll/195542/americans trust mass media sinks new low.aspx; megan brenan, americans’ trust in media remains near record low, gallup (oct. 18, 2022), https://news.gallup.com/poll/403166/americans trust media remains near record low.aspx (“at 34%, americans’ trust in the mass media to report the news ‘fully, accurately and fairly’ is essentially unchanged from last year and just two points higher than the lowest that gallup has recorded, in 2016 during the presidential campaign. just 7% of americans have ‘a great deal’ of trust and confidence in the media, and 27% have ‘a fair amount.’ meanwhile, 28% of u.s. adults say they do not have very much confidence and 38% have none at all in newspapers, tv and radio. notably, this is the first time that the percentage of americans with no trust at all in the media is higher than the percentage with a great deal or a fair amount combined.”) 72 martha minow, saving the news: why the constitution calls for government action to preserve freedom of speech (2021). 73 id. 74 darryl holliday, journalism’s civic media moment could be a movement, in reinventing journalism to strengthen democracy: insights from innovators (p. dallas & p. ellis, eds., 2023). wesley lowery is a pulitzer prize winning journalist and one of the nation's leading reporters on issues of race and justice. cites concerns about chilling effects of warrantless searches on free speech & press freedom public access to court proceedings is fundamental to our democracy, knight institute says a symposium on the risks that advanced ai systems pose to democratic freedoms as well as interventions to mitigate these risks issues public education © 2021 knight first amendment institute. design by point five. development by tierra innovation. icons by leandro castelao.

the fundamental right to seek and disseminate information through an independent press is under attack, and part of the assault has come from an unexpected source. elected leaders in many democracies, who should be press freedom’s staunchest defenders, have made explicit attempts to silence critical media voices and strengthen outlets that serve up favorable coverage. the trend is linked to a global decline in democracy itself: the erosion of press freedom is both a symptom of and a contributor to the breakdown of other democratic institutions and principles, a fact that makes it especially alarming. according to freedom house’s freedom in the world data, media freedom has been deteriorating around the world over the past decade, with new forms of repression taking hold in open societies and authoritarian states alike. the trend is most acute in europe, previously a bastion of well established freedoms, and in eurasia and the middle east, where many of the world’s worst dictatorships are concentrated. if democratic powers cease to support media independence at home and impose no consequences for its restriction abroad, the free press corps could be in danger of virtual extinction. experience has shown, however, that press freedom can rebound from even lengthy stints of repression when given the opportunity. the basic desire for democratic liberties, including access to honest and fact based journalism, can never be extinguished, and it is never too late to renew the demand that these rights be granted in full. in some of the most influential democracies in the world, large segments of the population are no longer receiving unbiased news and information. this is not because journalists are being thrown in jail, as might occur in authoritarian settings. instead, the media have fallen prey to more nuanced efforts to throttle their independence. common methods include government backed ownership changes, regulatory and financial pressure, and public denunciations of honest journalists. governments have also offered proactive support to friendly outlets through measures such as lucrative state contracts, favorable regulatory decisions, and preferential access to state information. the goal is to make the press serve those in power rather than the public. the problem has arisen in tandem with right wing populism, which has undermined basic freedoms in many democratic countries. populist leaders present themselves as the defenders of an aggrieved majority against liberal elites and ethnic minorities whose loyalties they question, and argue that the interests of the nation as they define it should override democratic principles like press freedom, transparency, and open debate. among free countries in freedom house’s freedom in the world report, 19 percent (16 countries) have endured a reduction in their press freedom scores over the past five years. this is consistent with a key finding of freedom in the world that democracies in general are undergoing a decline in political rights and civil liberties. it has become painfully apparent that a free press can never be taken for granted, even when democratic rule has been in place for decades. viktor orbán’s government in hungary and aleksandar vučić’s administration in serbia have had great success in snuffing out critical journalism, blazing a trail for populist forces elsewhere. both leaders have consolidated media ownership in the hands of their cronies, ensuring that the outlets with the widest reach support the government and smear its perceived opponents. in hungary, where the process has advanced much further, nearly 80 percent of the media are owned by government allies. * cultivation of progovernment media is spreading to neighboring states. the leader of the far right freedom party of austria, until recently part of that country’s ruling coalition, was caught on video attempting to collude with russians to purchase the largest national newspaper and infuse its coverage with partisan bias. score declines linked to economic manipulation of media including cases in which the government directs advertising to friendly outlets or encourages business allies to buy those that are critical were more common across europe over the past five years than in other parts of the world. such tactics of influence and interference are a relatively recent phenomenon on the continent, which has generally displayed strong support for press freedom since the fall of the berlin wall 30 years ago. in israel, one of the few democracies in the middle east, prime minister benjamin netanyahu has repeatedly excoriated investigative reporters and now faces corruption charges for allegedly offering regulatory favors to two major media firms in exchange for positive coverage. although netanyahu has resisted efforts to formally indict and try him on these charges, the evidence suggests that the prime minister was willing to sacrifice press freedom in order to maintain political power. many voters apparently accepted this tradeoff in the april 2019 elections, putting netanyahu’s party and its allies in a position to form a new ruling coalition. india, the world’s most populous democracy, is also sending signals that holding the government accountable is not part of the press’s responsibility. the ruling bharatiya janata party has supported campaigns to discourage speech that is “antinational,” and government aligned thugs have raided critical journalists’ homes and offices. the media have become widely flattering of prime minister narendra modi, who won reelection last month, amid allegations that the government issues directives on how the press should cover his activities and intimidates journalists who push back. the government has also been selective in the allocation of television licenses, effectively excluding unfriendly outlets from the airwaves. in perhaps the most concerning development of recent years, press freedom has come under unusual pressure in the united states, the world’s leading democratic power. although key news organizations remain strong and continue to produce vigorous reporting on those in office, president donald trump’s continual vilification of the press has seriously exacerbated an ongoing erosion of public confidence in the mainstream media. among other steps, the president has repeatedly threatened to strengthen libel laws, revoke the licenses of certain broadcasters, and damage media owners’ other business interests. the us constitution provides robust protections against such actions, but president trump’s public stance on press freedom has had a tangible impact on the global landscape. journalists around the world now have less reason to believe that washington will come to their aid if their basic rights are violated. the breakdown of global press freedom is closely related to the broader decline of democracy that freedom house has tracked for the past 13 years. although the press is not always the first institution to be attacked when a country’s leadership takes an antidemocratic turn, repression of free media is a strong indication that other political rights and civil liberties are in danger. assaults on media independence are frequently associated with power grabs by new or incumbent leaders, or with entrenched regimes’ attempts to crush perceived threats to their control. over the past five years, countries that were already designated as not free in freedom house’s freedom in the world report were also those most likely to suffer a decline in their press freedom scores, with 28 percent of not free countries experiencing such a drop. partly free countries were almost equally likely to experience a gain as a decline in press freedom, reflecting the volatility of these middle performers and the complex forces influencing their trajectory. the worsening records of not free states, combined with the negative trend among free countries, have driven the overall decline in global press freedom. while populist leaders in democracies seek to secure and build on their gains by taming the press, established autocratic governments continue to tighten the screws on dissenting voices, as any breach in their media dominance threatens to expose official wrongdoing or debunk official narratives. in russia in 2018, authorities moved to block the popular messaging application telegram after the company refused to hand over its encryption keys to security officials. the government in cameroon shut down internet service in the restive anglophone region for most of last year, a heavy handed reaction to protests and a nascent insurgency stemming from long standing discrimination against the large anglophone minority. in myanmar, two reuters journalists were sentenced to seven years in prison after a flawed trial in which the court ignored plain evidence that they had been entrapped to halt their investigation of military atrocities against the rohingya minority; although they were recently pardoned, they were not exonerated. the downgrades in various countries can be attributed to a range of legal, political, and economic factors, but some stand out as more concerning and pervasive. violence and harassment aimed at particular journalists and media outlets have played some role in 63 percent of the countries with a press freedom score reduction over the past five years. the 2018 murder of jamal khashoggi was the most infamous recent case, but it was hardly unique. journalists in el salvador received death threats in 2015 after they uncovered stories of police abuse and extrajudicial killings. a malian journalist who was outspoken about rampant political corruption was shot in the chest in 2017. also that year, a tanzanian journalist investigating the murders of local officials disappeared, and his fate remains a mystery. trends in press freedom differ by region. since 2014, there has been no net change in the average press freedom score for the americas or asia pacific, and sub saharan africa has seen a slight increase of 3 percent. but the average scores in the two least free regions of the world, eurasia and the middle east and north africa (mena), declined by 9 percent and 11 percent, respectively, while press freedom in europe where four out of every five countries are free dropped by 8 percent. in eurasia and mena, the media in the past year have faced an intensification of traditional challenges. examples include new legislative restrictions in belarus, further arrests and convictions in lebanon, and heightened insecurity and fatalities in war torn yemen. these developments illustrate the ways in which already difficult environments can grow steadily worse in the absence of meaningful international support for media independence and other fundamental rights. even in the regions where average scores were more stable, press freedom has come under threat in individual countries. a new privacy law in nepal restricts collection of the personal information of any individual, including public officials, exploiting legitimate concerns about privacy to suppress media scrutiny of political leaders’ conflicts of interest or corruption. in pakistan, security agents have allegedly warned journalists against coverage of taboo subjects, such as abuses by the military, or given reporters instructions on how to cover specific political issues. the regime in china has worked to close off the last remaining avenues for accessing uncensored information by increasing pressure on private technology companies to police the content on their platforms more assiduously. the picture of global press freedom is not entirely bleak. the most encouraging examples of democratic progress over the past two years ethiopia, malaysia, armenia, ecuador, and the gambia have nearly all featured parallel gains in their media environments. among these five countries, only armenia failed to register an improvement in its press freedom score in the same year as its initial political opening in freedom in the world. this correlation underscores once again the close relationship between media freedom and political change: just as antidemocratic power grabs often involve attacks on independent media, a reformist leadership is defined in part by its willingness to accept criticism from a free press. and just as restrictions on media freedom frequently precede the erosion of other rights, the removal of such restrictions facilitates and catalyzes further democratic advancements. the improvements in these countries also point to the resilience of independent journalism, even after years of repression. in malaysia and ecuador, the lifting of political pressure on the media allowed independent outlets to rebound from censorship and previously progovernment outlets to produce less obsequious coverage. in ethiopia, outlets that had been operating from abroad were able to return to the country. in the gambia, persecuted journalists returned from exile, and more locals have decided to enter the profession. media freedom can recover much more quickly after a period of authoritarian governance than some other elements of democracy, such as the rule of law. but it is also subject to rapid reversals. the arab spring provides a cautionary tale. soon after the 2011 uprisings, tunisia, egypt, and libya all recorded improvements in press freedom in freedom in the world. all have since faced setbacks. like democracy itself, press freedom is not an end state that remains secure once it is achieved it must be nurtured and defended against the forces that oppose it. while the threats to global media freedom are real and concerning in their own right, their impact on the state of democracy is what makes them truly dangerous. a free and independent media sector that can keep the population informed and hold leaders to account is as crucial for a strong and sustainable democracy as free and fair elections. without it, citizens cannot make informed decisions about how they are ruled, and abuse of power, which is all but inevitable in any society, cannot be exposed and corrected. a review of some of the countries that have faced potential turning points in the last year illustrates how the media’s ability to support democracy depends on their freedom to operate independently. journalists played a key role in the april 2019 ouster of authoritarian president abdelaziz bouteflika in algeria, not only by reporting on antigovernment protests but also by staging their own demonstrations when major news outlets failed to give due attention to the popular movement. however, the frequent arrests of critical journalists that took place under bouteflika have continued since his resignation, an indication that the unfolding leadership transition may be less revolutionary than many have hoped. before sudanese president omar al bashir was removed from office, also in april, the population was accustomed to domestic news outlets that failed to provide unbiased and substantive information. citizen journalists and exile based outlets filled the gap, disseminating news and images largely via the internet. as frustration with al bashir’s misrule grew throughout the winter and he perceived the extent of the threat to his power, his regime cracked down, arresting journalists who covered mass protests and revoking the credentials of some foreign reporters. as in algeria, journalists staged their own protests. military commanders attempted to placate the public after al bashir’s arrest, announcing the end of media censorship and tacitly acknowledging that a perception of increased press freedom would help consolidate their control. but journalists are skeptical of such declarations by the junta, and they have joined other protesters in pressing for a transfer of power to civilian leaders who can oversee a genuine democratic opening. in venezuela, media repression has increased since the opposition controlled national assembly designated juan guaidó as acting president in january. combined with repeated electricity blackouts, this pressure from the authoritarian regime of nicolás maduro has severely hampered efforts by media outlets in the country to inform the public about political events and the ongoing humanitarian crisis. but a handful of resilient journalists have continued to disseminate news through social media, the internet, and international partners. one reporting group has developed technology to record video with low bandwidth on mobile devices and then automatically delete it after transfer to a secure server, reducing the risk of reprisals against journalists who are detained and searched. journalists’ ability to document opposition activities as well as the brutality of the regime response has helped to galvanize international support for the democracy movement. in order to address the information gap on the ground in venezuela, some media outlets have also forged direct relationships with subsets of the population. journalists enter communities that have had limited access to objective news under maduro and report on local stories. this fosters public trust and makes residents more receptive to other impartial news. despite these valiant efforts, however, the production of reliable, objective news that is accessible to venezuelans remains a daunting challenge. armenia has made far more progress in its democratic transition in the past year, with protests leading to fresh elections and a new, reformist government. as in sudan, most television channels initially avoided covering the mass demonstrations. but a small contingent of independent outlets, including civilnet and azatutyun, was able to provide steady in depth reporting, including live streams and skillful use of social media. the information flow helped the popular movement to gain momentum, increasing pressure on establishment forces and legitimizing the rising new leadership. these outlets also helped stem disinformation spread by the former regime. there is an obvious tension between journalists who are attempting to perform their proper democratic function and antidemocratic regimes that are determined to retain power. the innovative and courageous work of independent reporters offers hope that even in the most desperate circumstances, those who are committed to distributing information in the public interest can find a way. but these journalists alone cannot address the needs of billions of people who still have access to little more than their government’s narrative and must rely on their own instincts and observations to assess the claims of corrupt and abusive leaders. this essay is the first in a series of four on the links between media freedom and democracy. in “the implications for democracy of china’s globalizing media influence,” sarah cook looks at the ways in which the chinese communist party is expanding its overseas influence operations through involvement in news reporting, content dissemination, public debate, and in some cases electoral politics outside china. even in settings where beijing has not yet attempted to undermine free expression and access to information, the groundwork is being laid for future interference, with insidious implications for democracy. in “the illiberal toolbox for co opting the media,” zselyke csaky analyzes the toolbox that democratically elected but illiberal leaders use to co opt the media. she examines the legal, extralegal, and economic tactics deployed in serbia and hungary, both of which declined to partly free in freedom in the world this year. the essay also describes the conditions that make media environments vulnerable to illiberal co optation. in “why social media are still worth saving,” adrian shahbaz writes about the extent to which major technology platforms such as google and facebook have disrupted the online media ecosystem, for better and worse, around the globe. the essay analyzes how authoritarians and propagandists manipulate digital media to undermine democracy, and proposes a new partnership between tech companies and news media to support high quality journalism. the following recommendations for policymakers in democratic nations will help ensure the sustainability of independent media worldwide: media coverage of china’s increasing global presence has often focused on the country’s rapidly growing economic impact, and potentially negative implications for foreign countries. these anxieties, while deserving of sober consideration and policy responses, threaten to overshadow the risks to democracy posed by the expanding global influence of the authoritarian ccp including through its efforts to harness media outside china to advance the party’s agenda. the ccp has developed the world’s most multilayered, dynamic, and sophisticated apparatus of media control at home, while vastly expanding its ability to influence media reporting, content dissemination, public debate, and in some cases, electoral politics, outside china. and where the potential for undermining press freedom has not been activated yet, the groundwork is being laid for future influence, if or more likely when beijing decides to deploy it. the expansion of the ccp’s foreign media influence is a global campaign, and the united states is among its targets. the results have already affected the news consumption of millions of americans. moreover, the varied and aggressive ways in which the ccp seeks to influence media narratives abroad undermine democratic governance and electoral competition in other countries, including us allies like taiwan. the cumulative effects of these efforts, if unchecked, could have far reaching implications for democratic governance, press freedom, and us influence worldwide. the ccp’s global media influence campaigns are multifaceted. traditionally, they have sought to promote positive views of china and a benign perspective of the ccp’s authoritarian regime; encourage investment in china and openness to chinese investment and strategic engagement abroad; and suppress or curtail negative coverage of china’s political system. in recent years, a new narrative has presented china’s authoritarian governance style as a model for developing countries, and in some cases simultaneously challenged the attractiveness of both democracy and us international leadership. chinese authorities influence news media content around the world through three primary strategies: promoting the ccp’s narratives, suppressing critical viewpoints, and managing content delivery systems. in a 2016 speech, ccp leader xi jinping told state media, “wherever the readers are, wherever the viewers are, that is where propaganda reports must extend their tentacles.”[1] even prior to xi’s ascension to the top of the communist party, the chinese government had begun investing billions of dollars to expand the global reach of state media outlets. through a variety of news distribution partnerships and through social media, chinese state media content now reaches hundreds of millions of people in numerous countries and languages. efforts to more deeply penetrate foreign media markets and spread preferred ccp narratives show no sign of ebbing. a november 2018 financial times investigation found that the chinese state run television broadcaster china central television (cctv) provides free content to 1,700 foreign news organizations.[2] between september and november 2018 alone, china’s official xinhua news agency signed news exchange agreements with wire services in australia, belarus, laos, india, and bangladesh. the ccp also embeds its narratives in foreign media through proxies and allied figures, including chinese diplomats, friendly media owners and journalists, and foreign politicians with business interests in china. for example, new zealand member of parliament todd mcclay, who attended a ccp organized dialogue in 2017, recently referred to reeducation camps in xinjiang as “vocational training centers,” echoing the terminology used by the chinese government to justify the detention and political indoctrination of over one million uighurs and other muslim minorities. similarly, former german chancellor gerhard schröder who has profited after leaving office by aiding german companies in their contacts with chinese officials dismissed the mass detentions as “gossip” in a 2018 interview with reuters. in the developing world in particular, the ccp’s foreign propaganda efforts appear to have had some effect in boosting or retaining a positive image of china, and xi jinping personally.[3] the ccp and its agents, allies, and proxies also work to suppress critical coverage of china abroad. chinese diplomats downplay negative coverage of china in op eds and media appearances, particularly on topics like mass detentions in xinjiang or the troubles facing china’s economy. diplomats have repeatedly engaged in outright harassment of journalists in order to curb criticism, as in early 2019, when chinese diplomats in sweden and russia intimidated reporters who had written critically about the country’s economy, or in support of democracy in taiwan.[4] the chinese government and its proxies also discourage investigative journalism into the dark underbelly of modern china or the ccp’s overseas political influence efforts by obstructing the work of foreign correspondents in china, and threatening foreign journalists with costly defamation suits in courts based in their home countries. the ccp has also successfully co opted media owners, who then marginalize critical reporting in their own outlets, notably in hong kong, taiwan, and outlets serving the chinese diaspora. occasionally, this extends to english language media,[5] as occurred in september 2018 when a partially chinese owned newspaper in south africa discontinued a weekly column after its author wrote about abuses in xinjiang.[6] indirect pressure is also applied via proxies including advertisers, satellite firms, technology companies, and foreign governments which take action to prevent or punish the publication of content critical of beijing, while undermining the financial viability of news outlets critical of the ccp.[7] separately, cyberattacks and physical assaults that are not conclusively traceable to central chinese authorities but serve the party’s aims have taken place. finally, over the past five years, technologies that deliver content to news consumers have opened new avenues for chinese government influence abroad. in africa, the chinese television distribution firm startimes which has become a key player in the transition from analog to digital television in kenya, nigeria, uganda, zambia, and elsewhere holds the power to determine which stations its viewers can access. although privately owned, startimes has benefited from a close relationship with the chinese government and occasional subsidies. meanwhile, chinese tech giant tencent’s wechat instant messaging service, which is ubiquitous in china, now reaches an estimated 100 to 200 million people outside the country. recent evidence suggests these communications are increasingly monitored and censored according to chinese government standards. chinese state media’s increasing number of news distribution deals, chinese diplomats’ aggressive acts of media suppression, and the institutionalization of chinese content delivery systems abroad point to escalations in the ability and willingness of chinese officials to undermine independent news coverage abroad, and ultimately weaken the watchdog role played by media in democratic settings. the strategies chinese officials, state media, and other actors employ to exercise influence over media around the world have the potential to undermine key features of democratic governance and best practices for media freedom. in some cases, this potential is already being realized. chinese state media publications distributed in other countries routinely omit any mention of government links that would signal their origin to uninitiated news consumers. indeed, it is precisely because news consumers in many countries are typically not attracted to or convinced by chinese government propaganda that layers of obfuscation are employed to distance content from its authoritarian origins. chinese state media thus employ deceptive taglines in their advertising. the people’s daily, for example, touts itself to potential foreign followers of its facebook page as “the biggest newspaper in china,” making no mention of the fact that it is the ccp’s official mouthpiece. such disingenuous self identification extends to paid print advertorials. the state run china daily’s “china watch” supplement, which has been published in mainstream media outlets across 30 countries[8]  including in the washington post, new york times, and the sydney morning herald rarely includes explicit mention of the chinese outlet’s official ties. in many cases, this lack of transparency extends to the economic arrangements surrounding various activities, be it how much china daily is paying for each advertorial, how many and which journalists travel to china on government paid trips, or what financial benefits news exchanges provide to each party. these ccp efforts to conceal the origin, scale, and nature of chinese state media involvement abroad compromise the integrity of resulting public debate, and erode cultures of transparency at outside media operations. the ccp executes a variety of strategies that undermine fair competition between state owned or friendly news outlets and critical ones, often reducing the latter’s financial viability. chinese government obstruction or imposition of penalties on outlets viewed as critical, in addition to limiting their audience, can prompt stock losses and dent income from advertising. the 2012 blocking of the chinese language web edition of the new york times, for example, resulted in lost advertising revenue and a 20 percent overnight drop in the paper’s stock value. chinese government representatives also pressure businesses not to place advertisements in critical outlets. as a result of such efforts, hong kong’s apple daily lost advertising contracts from players in the lucrative real estate industry and two london based investment banks. in 2019, the paper’s remaining advertisers have faced strident public denunciations from former hong kong chief executive cy leung, currently the vice chairman of a mainland government advisory body.[9] damaging cyberattacks by china based actors against overseas chinese or international media a regular occurrence for some key targets also impose financial costs on cash strapped outlets, which must pay for clean up and prevention efforts. the chinese government and its partners have also found ways to provide other advantages to chinese state media abroad relative to competitors. for example, after overseeing the transition from analog to digital television in a number of countries in africa, startimes has prioritized chinese state media channels in its package offerings at the expense of independent international news stations. in kenya, uganda, and nigeria, television packages that include channels like bbc world service cost more than basic versions with local channels and chinese state media. more generally, as beijing has expanded its aid and investment in foreign media sectors, it has tended to favor state owned outlets over independent, private competitors, mirroring the media landscape in china.[10] in other instances, apparent behind the scenes pressure by chinese officials has resulted in critical media outlets like the us based new tang dynasty television (ntdtv) being deprived of press credentials to newsworthy venues like the un general assembly[11]  while chinese state media have retained reporting access. twenty years ago, many chinese in the diaspora got their news from relatively independent papers or broadcasting operations based out of hong kong or taiwan. today, chinese state media or pro beijing private outlets are more influential, and thus more able to encourage diaspora voters to hold perspectives similar to beijing’s and to back policies in their home countries that are advantageous to the ccp. in the united states, the ccp’s ability to influence media consumed by chinese americans is particularly evident in the cable television market, which cctv dominates relative to the taiwanese station ettv and the us based ntdtv.[12] reports of behind the scenes chinese pressure on us cable companies and the online popularity of stations like ntdtv relative to cctv indicate that something other than market forces are at play in shaping this hierarchy.[13] chinese officials also cultivate partnerships with stakeholders in privately owned, us based chinese language media outfits.[14] ccp authorities exert enormous influence over the chinese language australian media, where most such publications, with notable exceptions run by dissident communities, are pro beijing.[15] the few independent diaspora publications face direct obstructions to their operations by chinese officials, as occurred last year, when diplomats from the chinese consulate in sydney bullied a local council into banning the vision china times from sponsoring a chinese new year event and convinced at least ten businesses to pull their advertisements.[16] ccp interference in canada’s media market was exposed by the separate firings of two journalists at the global chinese press after they published content deemed by executives to be displeasing to beijing. in new zealand, the ccp’s long term efforts to co opt diaspora outlets and with them coverage of local politics has left the diaspora in a state, according to one chinese scholar, where “the chinese community can only realistically aspire to political representation by its own members through individuals approved by beijing.”[17] ccp control of news distribution outside china is further increasing as wechat’s popularity expands in the diaspora, and as politicians correspondingly use the service to communicate with chinese diaspora constituents. in canada, wechat censors deleted a member of parliament’s message to constituents praising hong kong’s umbrella movement protesters, manipulated dissemination of news reports related to huawei executive meng wanzhou’s arrest, and blocked broader media coverage of chinese government corruption and leading officials. in the united states, chinese americans have seen wechat posts silenced in group conversations about local asian american political issues. in australia, a recent study of news sources available to the chinese diaspora found negligible political coverage of china on the wechat channels of chinese language news providers. incredibly, between march and august 2017, none of the wechat channels published a single article on chinese politics, despite the run up to the important 19th party congress that fall. although chinese government efforts to use media influence for electoral meddling have been limited, important incidents have recently emerged. in taiwan, several examples of “fake news” stories and doctored images originating in china tainting the reputation of the taiwanese government have spread widely on social media, with some picked up and reported as fact by taiwanese news stations.[18] some observers believe such activities alongside other factors had an impact on local elections in november 2018 when the ruling party, which is disfavored by beijing, suffered a number of surprising losses.[19] in april 2019, taiwanese media reported that suspected chinese government agents had made quiet offers to buy popular pro taiwan facebook pages ahead of next year’s general elections.[20] recruitment advertisements for live streamers with pro unification views have also emerged online. the run up to the 2018 midterm elections in the united states also saw ccp backed efforts to reach american voters in particular, soybean farmers. in july, the china global television network (cgtn), the foreign facing arm of china’s state owned broadcaster, released a two minute animated video about the impact of bilateral trade tensions on the us soybean industry, concluding with the question, “will voters there turn out to support trump and the republicans once they get hit in the pocketbooks?” in september, the print edition of the des moines register included a china watch supplement with articles describing how a trade war would harm american soybean farmers content far more targeted and politicized than is typical for the china watch insert. while the impact of these efforts was limited, they reflect willingness by chinese state media to use established avenues of content dissemination in an effort to influence american voters. these examples primarily involved propaganda and disinformation spreading on non chinese owned social media platforms like facebook, line, and youtube. but the growing use of the china based wechat application by both diaspora communities and non chinese speakers in countries like malaysia, mongolia, and australia, creates a fertile foundation for future ccp electoral meddling. as australian professor john fitzgerald recently noted, “we are entering uncharted territory. wechat was not designed to work in a democracy.” when attempting to restrict the operating space for independent diaspora or offshore chinese media, chinese officials have undermined the rule of law in other countries by maliciously harnessing court systems and flouting conflict of interest and other standards meant to ensure honest business practices. chinese officials have applied pressure on critics in foreign media through those countries’ own court systems, and at times have pressured local officials to aid them. in southeast asia, several cases have emerged involving the sound of hope radio network. based in the united states and founded by practitioners of the falun gong spiritual group, which is banned in china, the station broadcasts uncensored news about rights abuses and corruption in china, among other debate based and cultural programming. in thailand, police, reportedly at the urging of the chinese government, recently detained a taiwanese national who had helped facilitate the station’s broadcasts into china. the case was ongoing as of may 2019 and marked the third of its kind in the region; two similar cases have taken place in indonesia and vietnam the latter resulting in two men being imprisoned. journalists and news outlets reporting critically about chinese government actions or pro beijing officials outside mainland china also face threats of or actual defamation lawsuits. leung, the former hong kong executive who has been denouncing apple daily advertisers, has brought a defamation suit in hong kong against a journalist with a separate outlet who wrote about his possible links to organized crime. in the czech republic, lawyers representing the powerful chinese energy and financial conglomerate cefc sent letters threatening lawsuits over articles linking the firm’s owner to chinese military intelligence.[21] in 2018, chinese australians with ties to the chinese government filed defamation suits against two media companies over a high profile investigative documentary examining the ccp’s political influence in australia. in other instances, chinese investments in foreign communications sectors have raised concerns about conflicts of interest, corruption, and questionable bidding practices. in taiwan, attempts by a company owned by a china friendly media tycoon to purchase stakes in a major cable company sparked fears that such cross ownership would cause cable providers to advantage pro beijing stations at the expense of independent or pro independence ones. (following vigorous public debate, the deal was rejected by regulators.[22]) in zambia, a partnership between the zambia national broadcasting corporation (znbc) and chinese service provider startimes to create a joint venture topstar reportedly violated domestic laws against any single media entity having licenses for both content transmission and content creation. the deal was also made without approval from either znbc’s board or zambia’s parliament, leading to suspicions of corruption. having an economically powerful authoritarian led state rapidly expand its influence over media production and dissemination channels in other countries is a relatively new phenomenon. the current impact of chinese media influence operations on democratic institutions and practice remains relatively limited, although it disproportionately affects diaspora communities. nevertheless, the sheer scale, economic clout, and expanding network of relationships involved highlights the ccp’s enhanced ability to interfere aggressively abroad, should it choose to do so. in addition, beijing has demonstrated a willingness to ignore or violate outright diplomatic norms, human rights protections, and laws of foreign countries to achieve its ends. however, the ability of the ccp to achieve its desired goals through its foreign media influence campaigns is still contested. critical reporting about chinese government actions within and outside of china appears with regularity, reaching large audiences. a number of independent chinese language media in hong kong, the united states, and elsewhere have become more professionalized and influential over the past several years. civil society groups, media owners, and former officials in countries where chinese influence is expanding have begun to speak out and urge their governments to uphold good governance standards when considering chinese investment in communications infrastructure. looking ahead, individuals and organizations wishing to explore principled responses to the threat to global freedom and democracy posed by china’s globalizing media influence should focus on investigating and exposing stealthy and deceptive activities, increasing the sophistication and scale of policy debates, and upholding local legal standards. the following recommendations for policymakers in democratic nations will help counter the potential negative impact of beijing’s foreign media influence campaigns: in april 2018, hungary’s viktor orbán and his fidesz party won their third parliamentary supermajority, securing 49 percent of the vote and trouncing the fragmented opposition. a year earlier, serbian prime minister aleksandar vučić won an outright victory in his bid for that country’s presidency, taking 55 percent of the vote in the first round and preempting the need for a presidential runoff for the first time in serbia’s history. orbán and vučić have both moved to dismantle institutional checks and balances and centralize power in their own hands; they have also benefited from european support and ineffectual domestic opposition. but it is their domination of the media that has underwritten their success. over the past few years, a new toolbox has emerged that illiberal leaders in fragile democracies deploy to control and co opt the press, with the aim of ensuring their stay in power. this toolbox leaves out tactics like censorship, force, or outright intimidation of journalists. instead, it contains a collection of methods used to harness structural conditions. once successful co optation has taken place, media are incorporated into the system as building blocks that prop up those in power. the illiberal toolbox for co opting the media contains a variety of legal, extralegal, and economic strategies for applying pressure to critical outlets, and supporting friendly ones. hungary serves as the primary example where this co optation has been successful. and while vučić and his allies have yet to consolidate control over serbia’s media, they are following in orbán’s footsteps. both countries declined from free to partly free in freedom house’s most recent freedom in the world report.[1] but it is not just hungary and serbia where media co optation by ill intentioned political leaders can threaten democracy. globally, independent media foster public discussion and political participation that is grounded in well informed opinions. these practices are essential to democracy, and today they are under strain. while the public sphere has expanded exponentially in the new millennium, this expansion has brought with it confusion, economic disruption, polarization, and an increasing level of distrust toward the institutions that underpin democracy. of these institutions, the media are under particular duress. the illiberal toolbox is particularly effective because it exploits the weaknesses of today’s media environment, including the decline of trust in the press, and the crisis of the old business model. it takes place gradually and stealthily, and after a point it is difficult to reverse. this makes the media in many countries vulnerable and by extension, threatens the very basis of democracy by undermining an essential check on unbridled government power. the application of financial and economic pressure is an effective means for co opting outlets. this technique takes advantage of the changing media business model, which has left many outlets cash strapped. governments can also plausibly deny responsibility for this strategy’s effects, as it relies on players on the market and in institutions supposedly outside the government’s control. hungary’s fidesz has perfected the use and abuse of market forces to take over media, and has extended its political power as a consequence. the near total consolidation of the media in progovernment hands accelerated starting in 2016. that year, the leading daily népszabadság was shut down overnight in a hostile maneuver, and its publisher sold to lőrinc mészáros, a gasfitter turned oligarch and childhood friend of orbán.[2] népszabadság, like most other outlets in hungary, had been struggling financially, but as the country’s most read daily it was among the few publications that had a realistic chance of turning its fortunes around. mészáros later built a media empire through the direct or indirect acquisition of television channels, dailies, weeklies, online media, and all of hungary’s regional newspapers.[3] he has since become hungary’s second richest man, increasing his wealth 300 times in the span of three years thanks to his political connections.[4] at the end of 2018, however, mészáros and other government friendly businessmen suddenly decided it was time to give up their holdings, offering all outlets for free to kesma, a progovernment media conglomerate. kesma unifies more than 400 media products, and exhibits in plain sight the astonishing domination of government friendly media in hungary.[5] the degree of ownership consolidation seen in hungary has yet to take hold in serbia. however, a recent privatization drive handed several outlets to owners friendly with the ruling serbian progressive party (sns).[6] individual acquisitions by people close to the government occur as well. in late 2018, the brother of a top sns official purchased two national television channels; he also owns three online portals, a radio station, and nine cable channels.[7] an even more worrying form of financial pressure in serbia is the harassment of media by the tax authorities. in 2017, the weekly vrjanske novine received daily visits, which coincided with its publication of an interview with a former head of the tax authority; its owner ultimately announced that the paper could no longer withstand the pressure, and it ceased operations. in 2018, the news site juzne vesti, known for its critical reporting in the south of serbia, was subjected to its fifth months long tax investigation in five years.[8] governments occasionally deploy laws and regulations to intimidate or interfere with journalists, or to drain them of their resources. but the illiberal toolbox rarely contains instruments for the sort of blunt force legal repression, such as censorship, that would prompt immediate condemnation by neighboring democracies and media monitors. instead, it is the politicized implementation of technical laws that puts pressure on independent outlets. for example, hungary’s media authority, set up by the government in 2011 and stacked with fidesz loyalists, has used its powers to selectively refuse licenses to independent or opposition leaning outlets. in 2012, the authority initiated what became a lengthy legal battle with the left wing klubradio channel, denying it a license and refusing to implement court decisions in the station’s favor over a period of more than two years.[9] regulators struck again in 2016, when the authority refused to renew the broadcasting license of the country’s most popular radio station, class fm. after a protracted court case, class fm’s frequency was awarded to a progovernment outlet in 2018.[10] the decision was a significant blow to hungary’s radio market, leaving the country with only government affiliated national stations. similarly, serbia has also undermined press freedom through politicized manipulation of the law. defamation has been decriminalized, and the country’s media laws are otherwise in line with international obligations. but politicians have continued to file costly defamation suits seeking exorbitant civil damages. in early 2018, for example, minister without portfolio nenad popović sued the investigative portal krik in four separate lawsuits in the space of one month, for 1 million dinars ($9,500) each.[11] and while serbia’s media regulators do not display overt hostility to independent media as in hungary, they lack the capacity to implement serbia’s otherwise well formulated media laws. the regulatory authority for electronic media is only partially staffed and is operationally dysfunctional, having notably failed to call out governing party dominance of the media landscape during election campaigns. in february 2019, it failed to act when two television stations aired a slick video that mocked opposition leaders, and that had first appeared on the governing sns’s youtube channel, even though serbia’s laws prohibit political advertising outside elections.[12] harassment can also take more direct forms, such as physical attacks and threats. but thuggish attacks are generally absent from the illiberal toolbox. instead, political leaders signal that hostility toward journalists is permissible, including by standing down in the wake of aggression against them rather than insisting on a timely and effective follow up, or by deploying proxies to delegitimize their work. in this way, they cultivate an atmosphere of fear and impunity in which journalists know that scrutiny of power is fraught with risk. serbia’s media environment is much tougher on journalists doing their day to day work than is hungary’s. smears and verbal harassment from politicians and online accounts are omnipresent, and attacks by government friendly tabloids are a regular occurrence. media workers are frequently called “traitors” and “foreign mercenaries.” in early 2018, a journalist association’s front door was plastered with flyers that read, “miserable association of enemies of serbia;” meanwhile, some journalists claim they are under surveillance by state security.[13] in late 2018, the home of a 70 year old investigative journalist was torched. that attack was egregious enough to prompt a response a ruling party official was detained and stripped of his position for allegedly ordering it. however, that such a severe, apparently premeditated attack took place at all underscored the widespread perception in serbia that independent journalists operate at their own risk. though outright harassment is rare in hungary, the government makes sure journalists know their place. a 2019 press conference by orbán was notable for its inclusion of critical journalists for the first time in years. in addition, orbán has not given an interview to hungary’s most read online news site, index.hu, since 2007, and has referred to it as “fake news.” the government spokesperson also regularly engages in attacks meant to damage journalists’ credibility; in 2018, he called a journalist working for a foreign outlet a “despicable sjw [social justice warrior]” on twitter. establishing and supporting a progovernment media empire is as important a tactic in the illiberal toolbox as pressuring critical media. such support can take many forms, including the preferential awarding of state advertising contracts, special financing schemes, and privileged treatment by tax authorities. in hungary, the use and abuse of state advertising has reshaped the media market. while state advertising takes up only about one sixth of all advertising, it has grown exponentially in the past few years.[14] in 2018, state ad spending was five times more than under previous governments a decade earlier, with a whopping 85 percent of contracts awarded to government friendly companies. since 2014, several new progovernment outlets have been set up, with some tripling or quadrupling their profits in the span of a few years without any indication of an increased audience. the progovernment weekly figyelő, which published a list of government critics in 2018 deemed “soros mercenaries” (referring to the billionaire and philanthropist george soros), has increased its income from government advertising tenfold since its takeover by a government ally in 2016; by 2018, three fourths of its ad money came from state contracts.[15] state advertising plays an important role in supporting progovernment media in serbia as well, and there are additional innovative methods available for the government to channel money to friendly media. project co financing, through which the state chips in to help media projects that serve the public interest, has been used to allocate money to progovernment outlets. this abuse was highlighted by the european commission in its 2018 report on serbia, which also criticized the nontransparent nature of the co financing processes.[16] friendly outlets have also benefitted from selective tax enforcement, while smaller, critical outlets have suffered harsh penalties.[17] finally, creating a loyal media empire is not enough the outlets have to be put to use in a strategic way, and the illiberal leaders of hungary and serbia are masters of constructing a grand narrative and crafting a new reality. flooding the media landscape with their own political messages allows those in power to dominate the political agenda, divert public discussion away from sensitive issues, and ultimately control and manipulate the public sphere. the public media are an important part of this narrative building. state owned or state controlled news agencies dwarf their private competitors in both serbia and hungary. serbia’s tanjug news agency was formally closed as part of a privatization drive, yet it continues to operate through support from public coffers.[18] the market domination of hungary’s state newswire, mti, is guaranteed through its subsidized low price.[19] and while public broadcasters in serbia and hungary have always been supportive of governments in power, the tone and nature of that support has dramatically shifted in recent years. whereas previously they were more or less professional outlets with a slight bias, now they are government mouthpieces. in hungary, the government and progovernment media have turned into a major source of parallel reality narratives. in early 2018, the progovernment daily magyar idők claimed that 2,000 “mercenaries” were working for soros in hungary; the number which appeared to originate with a malicious sting operation conducted by a shadowy group and aimed at discrediting soros affiliated ngos was later repeated by orbán himself.[20] soros has featured in numerous other false news items, including a headline the government friendly tv2 ran in 2017 that read, “soros would have killed his own mother.” moreover, employees of the public broadcaster have admitted to receiving instructions from the prime minister’s offices on how to cover sensitive issues, such as migration.[21] in 2019, a leaked video recording showed a reporter from the state broadcaster instructing a progovernment expert on what to say.[22] besides identifying the “enemy” through issue framing and agenda setting, the illiberal toolbox also contains elements of positive narrative building. serbia’s president vučić is indefatigable when it comes to talking to friendly media. ahead of the 2018 local elections, reporting on the president, the sns, and the government received four times more airtime than did the remaining 23 electoral lists combined.[23] in serbia, the prospect of eu membership, which brings with it increasingly stringent rule of law monitoring, can still provide an incentive for change. but once successful co optation has taken place, as in hungary, it is very difficult to reverse. and after consolidating media in hungary, fidesz is now taking steps to expand its influence transnationally: party allies acquired media in macedonia and slovenia in 2018,[24] and early 2019 saw the creation of an english language newswire based in london apparently established to spread orbán’s illiberal agenda.[25] perhaps not surprisingly, the first non hungarian news agency to quote the new wire was serbia’s tanjug. while illiberal co optation does not eradicate independent journalism, it harnesses institutional weaknesses and market conditions to severely limit its reach and impact. media consumers can still access quality journalism produced by small, public minded teams of reporters, but in light of increasing government control of the media landscape, these outlets are fighting an uphill battle. the illiberal toolbox works because it discourages and obscures independent reporting, funnels limitless resources into the creation and maintenance of a loyal media juggernaut, and makes sure journalists know their place in the new system. both in central europe and outside it, the press is suffering from a crisis of trust and a crisis of the old business model. in the united states and in europe, the profound change that came with the spread of online news and the collapse of the traditional advertising market has sent outlets and owners scrambling for profits by prioritizing content that spurs outrage. the growing prominence of fake news and disinformation has further fed into political polarization, contributing to a cycle of decreasing trust. in the united states, fewer than half the population say they trust the media; the figure is around one third in italy and the united kingdom, and only one fourth in turkey or russia.[26] rates of trust in the media seem to move together with those of trust in government explaining part of the current crisis.[27] the lack of trust, the onslaught of disinformation and tabloidized half truths, and the elusiveness of a profitable business model all grind down media freedom and prepare the ground for potential illiberal takeover. when crafty and talented political leaders emerge with an appropriate agenda, it could be simply a matter of time before democracies buckle under the pressure. but not all is bleak. positive examples already suggest that a change has started on the demand side, as more people are willing to pay for news that they find valuable, as well as on the supply side, with journalists launching innovative models that concentrate on quality news analysis. democratic governments are also catching up and have moved into the debate though sometimes somewhat awkwardly proposing regulatory involvement to tackle thorny issues around fake news and disinformation. citizens and lawmakers are protesting media abuses, particularly those by public broadcasters. in serbia, protesters in march 2019 stormed the headquarters of the public broadcaster rts after it failed to report on earlier protests and denied airtime to opposition leaders. in hungary, opposition lawmakers in december 2018 occupied the headquarters of the state broadcaster, with the support of demonstrators outside. democratic countries must work to build a media environment that prioritizes independent and accurate reporting and guarantees access to quality information for all segments of the population. this will not only prevent illiberal co optation, but will also shore up institutions and strengthen and support democracy at home. the following recommendations for policymakers in democratic nations will help counter efforts by ill intentioned political actors to co opt media: for years before the recent uprising against authoritarian ruler omar al bashir, sudanese girls had shared pictures of their romantic crushes in a facebook group dedicated to digging up dirt on local boys a sort of crowdsourced background check. but as security agents escalated their crackdown on the nascent antigovernment protest movement in september 2018, the network mobilized to identify and deter abuses by state security personnel. “you can post any photo for any person of the national intelligence and security service,” said azaz elshami, an activist in the sudanese diaspora, “and they will give you who he is, where he lives, his mobile number, family, all that.” the process was so effective that agents of the much feared niss had to wear masks in public to avoid identification. however, it became clear during the protests that the same digital tools could be manipulated by the government to spread disinformation. in january, when sudanese police used live ammunition against the demonstrators, a news site maintained by the sudanese diaspora reported the death of three individuals, including 16 year old mohamed al obeid. local journalists rapidly shared his image on social media, and it soon spread to international media outlets. as activists attempted to ascertain more details about the boy’s identity, suspicion grew, until ultimately it became clear that the image depicted the aftermath of police violence in far off brazil. sudanese activists concluded that the fraudulent image was the work of a team of niss internet trolls known for disseminating smears and falsehoods. “it was a trap,” one citizen journalist tweeted, “orchestrated to discredit us all.” sudan’s revolution, like the arab spring before it, has showcased both the positive and the negative potential of social media. at a time when the harmful aspects of these platforms are being exposed and debated around the world, the fact that they have also delivered vital benefits should not be forgotten. they have fostered a rise in citizen journalism and activism and allowed independent reporters to continue reaching news consumers in environments where traditional outlets have fallen under government control, and their transnational nature has provided a measure of protection against state censorship. the challenge for policymakers, technology companies, and civil society today is to prevent malicious state and nonstate actors from poisoning the digital sphere while protecting and enhancing the conditions and qualities that allow the internet to bolster media freedom and advance democracy. journalist, writer, and award winning blogger reem abbas is covering human rights and politics in sudan at a critical juncture in its history. in april, after four months of massive protests, sudan’s authoritarian president omar al bashir was removed from power in a palace coup. the events brought about the end of a 30 year reign marred by the violent repression of dissidents, including journalists. while sudan’s political fate remains uncertain, al bashir’s removal has granted journalists like abbas a reprieve from the repressive environment he cultivated. while the proliferation of social media allowed abbas some freedom to disseminate independent reporting on her blog and among her 34,000 twitter followers, she was never free from the threat of reprisals while al bashir was in power. “i was always fearful because of the stories i’d written,” abbas says. social media blocks during the protests, though routinely circumvented, served as another reminder that critical voices were not welcome in sudan. now, abbas feels far safer, and is more able to work without facing practical impediments. she can write freely and confidently. perhaps most valuably in her eyes, she can name her sources without fear that they will face retaliation. yet sudan’s newly liberalized media environment brings with it significant responsibilities. “we need a lot of capacity building for us to actually be able to deliver and do justice to this uprising, and to the people who fought for this country,” abbas says. furthermore, the media market was stunted under al bashir, and is not designed to support independent journalism. outlets are under resourced, and like many of her peers, abbas must support herself through consulting positions while still making time to write. she worries that the polarization of news outlets poses an obstacle to the development of sustainable independent journalism. nevertheless, sudan’s opening environment offers abbas and her colleagues the promise of pursuing their passion with fewer constraints. “when i’m writing about a topic,” she says, “i’m living it, and i’m breathing it; i really want to give voice to the people i’m interviewing.” almost from its inception, the internet offered new media spaces unspoiled by government intrusion. blogs, online news outlets, and social media platforms provided alternatives to progovernment television, radio, and print outlets. even in a place as repressive as saudi arabia, liberal poets challenged religious dogma, and young bloggers chronicled the mental gymnastics of embracing foreign pop culture while upholding saudi customs. this ballooning of freedom was eventually deflated by state authorities who cracked down on critical thinking and “un islamic” ideas. while individuals in many countries remain uninhibited in their ability to publish facts and opinions, they may face punishment for what they publish freedom of speech does not always extend to freedom after speech. nonetheless, in countries facing drastic and sudden declines in press freedom, the internet can be an important redoubt. almost 150 news outlets have been closed in turkey since the 2016 coup attempt, with hundreds of journalists facing spurious charges of supporting terrorism. as a result, many media professionals have moved online. prominent journalist ünsal ünlü runs a podcast from his home office, while start ups like dokuz8 are testing new models of digital first reporting. those who have been forced to leave turkey altogether, such as yavuz baydar and can dündar, have broadcast independent news from overseas on new platforms like ahval and özgürüz. though officially blocked, their coverage remains accessible on most social media services and via virtual private networks (vpns) that enable users to skirt government censorship. meanwhile, governments around the world have continued to extend strict press laws and audiovisual codes to the online realm in an attempt to bring online media to heel. a bill now under consideration in pakistan, whose press freedom environment is highly restricted, would impose a licensing regime on online journalists and news outlets. authorities in uganda in march 2018 issued new requirements obliging online publishers, news platforms, and radio operators to obtain authorization from the country’s communications commission. amendments to belarus’s media law in december 2018 expanded the definition of traditional media to include online outlets and related websites, resulting in the blocking of several independent news sites that had enjoyed relative editorial freedom. in egypt, similar legislation adopted in august 2018 has provided a legal basis for blocking dozens of websites belonging to human rights organizations and news outlets. the upstart mada masr, a progressive news site created by young journalists who were pushed out of egypt independent in 2013, was among the targets. while many local governments are clearly intolerant of an unfettered online news sector, major international technology platforms serve as an important buffer against such censorial tendencies. mada masr, for example, continues to post content directly to its facebook page, while turkey’s medyascope runs a youtube channel. due the rollout of strong encryption technology by most companies, governments can no longer order internet service providers to bar access to specific content within a tech platform, such as an individual account or group page. this has resulted in a growing imbalance between large tech companies and many governments, which must persuade executives or administrators based overseas to remove a given post. many us based companies deliberately refrain from setting up operations in more repressive countries where their employees could face punishment for failing to adhere to a government request that would violate the human rights of their local users. perhaps the most powerful media tool provided by such international platforms is live streaming. the feature is now built into many mobile applications and social media services, allowing anyone with a smartphone and an internet connection to double as an amateur television crew with global reach. particularly in countries where leaders or political factions dispute facts on the ground, live streaming provides a higher degree of credibility than any other media form. unlike with a news article or photograph, it is difficult to dispute the timing, location, and creator of a live stream. the format is also highly transparent and interactive. anyone watching a live stream can type questions or comments that are automatically superimposed within the video for all to see, including the streamers themselves, who often respond to comments in real time. bloggers and journalists in belarus and armenia have used facebook live and other live streaming services to challenge the government’s claims on the size or goal of antigovernment protests, and to document security forces’ often heavy handed response. in venezuela, activist media start ups like efecto cocuyo (“firefly effect”) use the live streaming platform periscope to provide an alternative to the dominant progovernment news outlets. their journalists cover press conferences by opposition figures, the proceedings of local legislatures, and large protests that state media equate with armed riots or refuse to acknowledge. more traditional media players in democracies have engaged in their own experiments along these lines. public broadcasters from france, germany, the united kingdom, and the united states teamed up to develop a turkish language news channel that will air exclusively on youtube. the stated goal of the channel, +90, is to “provide independent and accurate information that promotes free speech and a multitude of perspectives on current affairs.” since it is based overseas, turkish authorities upset over its coverage would need to convince the silicon valley based hosting company to censor a us government funded news service. but international social media platforms are not exactly immune from government pressure. in vietnam, a one party state where the authorities maintain a tight grip on information flows, a network of democratic activists based inside and outside the country run a facebook page that provides an independent take on the repressive regime to some 1.3 million followers. while facebook executive sheryl sandberg mentioned in congressional testimony that the company refrains from establishing a physical presence in repressive countries in order avoid complying with political censorship, the platform did remove at least seven stories from the activist group in question, việt tân, in early may, citing “local legal restrictions.” the posts covered the health condition of vietnam’s president at a time when the authorities had issued a strict media blackout on the subject. reuters “broke” a story on the president’s illness over 10 days after việt tân had initially covered it. activists in autocratic countries are concerned that companies like facebook could move toward complying more consistently with government orders for financial or legal reasons. vietnam recently passed a cybersecurity law, closely modeled on china’s, that requires companies to store data about vietnamese users on servers located within the country. if major international platforms were to obey, the private communications of local users would be within the reach of vietnamese security agencies, who consider nonviolent political activism to be a threat to national security. already, việt tân has been branded a terrorist organization for its insistence on peaceful democratic reform away from one party rule. there is a dark side to the freedom that digital media offer. to the extent that various online platforms and applications have created an information space beyond anyone’s authoritative control, malicious state and nonstate actors are exploiting it to advance their respective agendas. the messaging service whatsapp, owned by facebook, is a case in point. unlike facebook proper and twitter, where the default privacy setting for users is “public,” whatsapp messages are designed for more private communications. they are end to end encrypted, meaning not even the company itself has access to them, only the intended recipients. administrators of group chats must “invite” new participants, ensuring a degree of vetting. thus in the dozens of countries where whatsapp usage is high, large swathes of the online media landscape have become, effectively, hidden from view. these qualities increased trust and decreased transparency have been used by malevolent actors to deepen social divisions and even illegally influence elections. in the 65 countries covered by freedom house’s freedom on the net 2018 report, 32 had instances in which paid progovernment commentators intervened on social media, including whatsapp, usually to smear the political opposition or critical journalists. in brazil, an investigation by the newspaper folha revealed that business groups had illegally contributed to the successful 2018 campaign of far right presidential candidate jair bolsonaro by funding some $3 million in mass messages on whatsapp. the groups also collected phone numbers through a third party service, which is prohibited under brazilian electoral laws. in india, where doctored images and fake news abounded on various platforms during the april may general elections, facebook announced that it had removed over 1,000 pages for violating policies on spam and “coordinated inauthentic behavior.” political parties circulate propaganda and misleading claims about one another, religious minorities, and critical journalists. hindu nationalists in particular have grown adept at spreading false rumors that characterize opposition parties as favoring muslims over the general population. the so called cyber army of the ruling hindu nationalist bharatiya janata party claims to have 1.2 million volunteers. tech platforms may also be weaponized by religious and ethnic extremists to incite violence against minorities. in the aftermath of the easter terrorist attacks in sri lanka this year, the country’s authorities blocked facebook, whatsapp, instagram, and viber as a precaution against further violence. false information about the attackers’ identities and potential additional attacks had already begun to spread on social media. but blocking access to communication tools is a blunt and ultimately ineffective instrument for stemming disinformation and other false news, which can continue to spread via word of mouth and even mainstream media; social media, meanwhile, can be useful in debunking erroneous reports. for example, in sri lanka the authorities disseminated a photo of a woman on national television, alleging that she was involved in the easter attacks. they realized only later, after internet users traced the photo to a us based student, that it was a case of mistaken identity. despite their great utility and positive potential in repressive environments, online media and major technology companies in particular have come under harsh criticism for their management or failure to manage problems like disinformation, hate speech, and incitement to violence, all of which threaten the fabric of democratic societies. facebook, google, and twitter have been accused in the united states of colluding to censor conservatives, while european policymakers and the public at large are pushing back against the perceived ways in which tech platforms have disrupted the media ecosystem. a survey of 27 countries around the globe found that trust in social media was lowest in north america and europe, where distorted online content has been credited with aiding the rise of right wing populist demagogues. the best remedy for bad or erroneous speech remains more and better speech, not enforced silence. yet on today’s online platforms, undemocratic and illiberal actors seem to have a louder megaphone. studies have shown that dubious information intended to spark outrage gains greater visibility on social media than more sober, truthful content. the platforms’ own algorithms appear designed to amplify content that generates high levels of engagement, even if the result is a rush to ever greater extremes. these dynamics mean that content disseminated by a very small but coordinated and radical network of individuals or accounts including those orchestrated by undemocratic parties or regimes can easily overshadow the views of the more moderate majority. in light of these and other problems, the technology sector does need greater regulation. but defenders of democracy should be wary of any push for state regulation that aims to define acceptable and unacceptable speech and entails a reduction in freedom of expression. it is instructive that the very governments most guilty of pumping out misleading propaganda and surreptitiously manipulating social media through paid trolls and automated “bot” accounts are often the ones that propose to solve the problem by restricting civil liberties. instead, governments should find other ways to improve companies’ performance. policymakers could establish independent multistakeholder bodies to evaluate companies’ content moderation practices for transparency, proportionality, and the effectiveness of appeal processes. such bodies can also set minimum standards for the detection and elimination of coordinated inauthentic activity, such as paid trolls and bot accounts, as well as guidelines for political advertising during election campaigns. in addition, public officials should regulate other aspects of the sector through the lens of antitrust laws and privacy protections, since they have important consequences for freedom of expression in a democracy. the overarching goal of such regulation should be to protect and augment the constructive role that online communication platforms can play in all societies. social media are a crucial part of the modern media ecosystem. they dramatically expand access to information and freedom of expression, and in repressive and troubled countries they remain a lifeline to journalists, activists, and ordinary citizens attempting to exercise their democratic rights. rather than surrendering these services to the malevolent forces that have exploited their weaknesses, democracies must fight back in a way that is consistent with their own long standing values. learn about the freedom and the media report methodology here. sign up to receive the freedom house weekly newsletter. join the freedom house weekly newsletter 1850 m st. nw floor 11 washington, dc 20036

a high level, evidence informed guide to some of the major proposals for how democratic governments, platforms, and others can counter disinformation. the technology and international affairs program develops insights to address the governance challenges and large scale risks of new technologies. our experts identify actionable best practices and incentives for industry and government leaders on artificial intelligence, cyber threats, cloud security, countering influence operations, reducing the risk of biotechnologies, and ensuring global digital inclusion. the goal of the partnership for countering influence operations (pcio) is to foster evidence based policymaking to counter threats in the information environment. key roadblocks as found in our work include the lack of: transparency reporting to inform what data is available for research purposes; rules guiding how data can be shared with researchers and for what purposes; and an international mechanism for fostering research collaboration at scale. carnegie’s information environment project is a multistakeholder effort to help policymakers understand the information environment, think through the impact of efforts to govern it, and identify promising interventions to foster democracy. disinformation is widely seen as a pressing challenge for democracies worldwide. many policymakers are grasping for quick, effective ways to dissuade people from adopting and spreading false beliefs that degrade democratic discourse and can inspire violent or dangerous actions. yet disinformation has proven difficult to define, understand, and measure, let alone address. even when leaders know what they want to achieve in countering disinformation, they struggle to make an impact and often don’t realize how little is known about the effectiveness of policies commonly recommended by experts. policymakers also sometimes fixate on a few pieces of the disinformation puzzle including novel technologies like social media and artificial intelligence (ai) without considering the full range of possible responses in realms such as education, journalism, and political institutions. this report offers a high level, evidence informed guide to some of the major proposals for how democratic governments, platforms, and others can counter disinformation. it distills core insights from empirical research and real world data on ten diverse kinds of policy interventions, including fact checking, foreign sanctions, algorithmic adjustments, and counter messaging campaigns. for each case study, we aim to give policymakers an informed sense of the prospects for success bridging the gap between the mostly meager scientific understanding and the perceived need to act. this means answering three core questions: how much is known about an intervention? how effective does the intervention seem, given current knowledge? and how easy is it to implement at scale? the authors wish to thank william adler, dan baer, albin birger, kelly born, jessica brandt, david broniatowski, monica bulger, ciaran cartmell, mike caulfield, tímea červeňová, rama elluru, steven feldstein, beth goldberg, stephanie hankey, justin hendrix, vishnu kannan, jennifer kavanagh, rachel kleinfeld, samantha lai, laura livingston, peter mattis, tamar mitts, brendan nyhan, george perkovich, martin riedl, ronald robertson, emily roseman, jen rosiere reynolds, zeve sanderson, bret schafer, leah selig chauhan, laura smillie, rory smith, victoria smith, kate starbird, josh stearns, gerald torres, meaghan waff, alicia wanless, laura waters, gavin wilde, kamya yadav, and others for their valuable feedback and insights. additional thanks to joshua sullivan for research assistance and to alie brase, lindsay maizland, anjuli das, jocelyn soly, amy mellon, and jessica katz for publications support. the final report reflects the views of the authors only. this research was supported by a grant from the special competitive studies project. jon bateman is a senior fellow in the technology and international affairs program at the carnegie endowment for international peace. his research areas include disinformation, cyber operations, artificial intelligence, and techno nationalism. bateman previously was special assistant to chairman of the joint chiefs of staff general joseph f. dunford, jr., serving as a speechwriter and the lead strategic analyst in the chairman’s internal think tank. he has also helped craft policy for military cyber operations in the office of the secretary of defense and was a senior intelligence analyst at the defense intelligence agency, where he led teams responsible for assessing iran’s internal stability, senior level decisionmaking, and cyber activities. bateman is a graduate of harvard law school and johns hopkins university. dean jackson is principal of public circle research & consulting and a specialist in democracy, media, and technology. in 2023, he was named an inaugural tech policy press reporting fellow and an affiliate fellow with the propaganda research lab at the university of texas at austin. previously, he was an investigative analyst with the select committee to investigate the january 6th attack on the u.s. capitol and project manager of the influence operations researchers’ guild at the carnegie endowment for international peace. from 2013 to 2021, jackson managed research and program coordination activities related to media and technology at the national endowment for democracy. he holds an ma in international relations from the university of chicago and a ba in political science from wright state university in dayton, oh. 1 the cells of this table are color coded: green suggests the most positive assessment for each factor, while red is the least positive and yellow is in between. these overall ratings are a combination of various subfactors, which may be in tension: for example, an intervention can be highly effective but only for a short time or with high risk of second order consequences. a green cell means an intervention is well studied, likely to be effective, or easy to implement. for the first column, this means there is a large body of literature on the topic. while it may not conclusively answer every relevant question, it provides strong indicators of effectiveness, cost, and related factors. for the second column, a green cell suggests that an intervention can be highly effective at addressing the problem in a lasting way at a relatively low level of risk. for the third column, a green cell means that the intervention can quickly make a large impact at relatively low cost and without major obstacles to successful implementation. a yellow cell indicates an intervention is less well studied (there is relevant literature but major questions about efficacy are unanswered or significantly underexplored), less efficacious (its impact is noteworthy but limited in size or duration, or it carries some risk of blowback), or faces nonnegligible hurdles to implementation, such as cost, technical barriers, or political opposition. a red cell indicates that an intervention is poorly understood, with little literature offering guidance on key questions; that it is low impact, has only narrow use cases, or has significant second order consequences; or that it requires an especially high investment of resources or political capital to implement or scale. jon bateman senior fellow and co director, technology and international affairs program dean jackson project manager, influence operations researchers guild this report offers high level, evidence informed assessments of ten commonly proposed ways to counter disinformation. it summarizes the quantity and quality of research, the evidence of efficacy, and the ease of scalable implementation. building on other work that has compiled policy proposals or collected academic literature, this report seeks to synthesize social science and practitioner knowledge for an audience of policymakers, funders, journalists, and others in democratic countries.1 rather than recommending a specific policy agenda, it aims to clarify key considerations that leaders should weigh based on their national and institutional contexts, available resources, priorities, and risk tolerance. to conduct this research, we compiled a list of nearly two dozen counter disinformation measures frequently proposed by experts, scholars, and policymakers.2 we then selected ten for inclusion based on several factors. first, we prioritized proposals that had a fairly direct connection to the problem of disinformation. for example, we excluded antitrust enforcement against tech companies because it affects disinformation in an indirect way, making it difficult to evaluate in this report. second, we focused on countermeasures that could plausibly be subject to meaningful empirical study. we therefore did not consider diplomatic efforts to build international norms against disinformation, for example, or changes to platforms’ legal liability as intermediaries. third, we sought to cover a diverse range of interventions. this meant including actions implementable by the government, the private sector, and civil society; tactical measures as well as structural reforms; and multiple theories of change such as resilience, disruption, and deterrence. the ten selected interventions became the subjects of this report’s ten case studies. each case study defines the intervention, gives concrete use cases, and highlights additional reading. the case studies focus on three questions: how much is known about an intervention? how effective does it seem, given current knowledge? and how easy is it to implement at scale? to develop these case studies, we reviewed hundreds of academic papers, previous meta analyses, programmatic literature, and other relevant materials. we also conducted a series of workshops and consultations with scholars, practitioners, policymakers, and funders. we drew on experts with domain knowledge to vet individual case studies, as well as those with a broader view of the counter disinformation field to provide feedback on the project as a whole. the resulting report expresses the views of the authors alone. although this report reviews a number of important, commonly proposed policy ideas, it is not comprehensive. in particular, we did not study the following significant categories of long term, large scale change. first, political institutions could try to perform stronger gatekeeping functions. this may involve reforms of party primaries, redistricting processes, and campaign finance systems. second, tech platforms might need stronger incentives and capacity to curb disinformation. this could involve new regulation, diversification of revenue, and market power reductions that enable users, advertisers, activists, and others to provide checks on major platforms. third, the public may need more encouragement to value truth and place trust in truthful institutions and figures. this might involve addressing the many root causes of popular alienation, fear, and anger, such as with local community building efforts, a reversal of geographic sorting, improvements to economic prospects, and healing of racial grievances. any of these ideas would be daunting to implement, and none are easy to assess. but they all have serious potential to help counter disinformation perhaps even more so than the ten interventions studied in this report. 1 see “final report: commission on information disorder,” aspen institute, november 2021, https://www.aspeninstitute.org/wp content/uploads/2021/11/aspen institute_commission on information disorder_final report.pdf; daniel arnaudo et al., “combating information manipulation: a playbook for elections and beyond,” national democratic institute, international republican institute, and stanford internet observatory, september 2021, https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/infomanip%20playbook%20updated%20final.pdf; “center of excellence on democracy, human rights, and governance: disinformation primer,” u.s. agency for international development, february 2021, https://cnxus.org/wp content/uploads/2021/11/usaid disinformation primer.pdf; and laura courchesne, julia ilhardt, and jacob n. shapiro, “review of social science research on the impact of countermeasures against influence operations,” harvard kennedy school misinformation review 2, no. 5 (september 2021): https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/review of social science research on the impact of countermeasures against influence operations/. 2 this list was drawn from multiple sources, including kamya yadav, “countering influence operations: a review of policy proposals since 2016,” carnegie endowment for international peace, november 30, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/11/30/countering influence operations review of policy proposals since 2016 pub 83333; a more detailed, unpublished database of policy proposals compiled by vishnu kannan in 2022; courchesne, ilhardt, and shapiro, “review of social science research”; and “the 2022 code of practice on disinformation,” european commission, accessed january 27, 2023, https://digital strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/code practice disinformation. these sources were supplemented by further literature review and expert feedback. before seeking to counter disinformation, policymakers should carefully consider what this idea means. “disinformation,” usually defined as information known by the speaker to be false, is a notoriously tricky concept that comes with numerous limitations, contradictions, and risks.1 identifying disinformation presents several puzzles. for one thing, labeling any claim as false requires invoking an authoritative truth. yet the institutions and professions most capable of discerning the truth such as science, journalism, and courts are sometimes wrong and often distrusted. moreover, true facts can be selectively assembled to create an overall narrative that is arguably misleading but not necessarily false in an objective sense. this may be even more common and influential than outright lies, yet it’s unclear whether it counts as disinformation. in fact, “disinformation” is frequently conflated with a range of other political and societal maladies such as polarization, extremism, and hate. all of these are technically distinct issues, though they can be causally related to disinformation and to each other. finally, it is difficult to know whether someone spreading false claims does so intentionally. disinformation typically passes through a long chain of both witting and unwitting speakers. the challenges of the term “disinformation” are not merely theoretical; they have influenced public debates. despite the word’s scientific sounding imprimatur, it is often invoked quite loosely to denigrate any viewpoint seen as wrong, baseless, disingenuous, or harmful. such usage has the effect of pathologizing swaths of routine discourse: after all, disagreements about what is wrong, baseless, disingenuous, or harmful are what drives democratic politics and social change. moreover, today’s talk of “disinformation” can sometimes imply a more novel, solvable problem than really exists. although the word has been familiar in the west for decades, it attained new currency just a few years ago after a series of catalyzing episodes such as russian election interference in the united states involving social media. this led many people to see social media as the defining cause of disinformation, rather than one driver or manifestation of it. the messy battle for truth is, of course, an eternal aspect of human society. for policymaking, reliance on a loaded but vague idea like “disinformation” brings several risks. when the term is used to imply that normal and necessary public discourse is dangerously disordered, it encourages the empowerment of technocrats to manage speech and, in turn, potentially erodes legal and normative boundaries that sustain democracy. moreover, the term’s vagaries and contradictions are already well understood by segments of the public and have been seized upon, including by disinformers themselves, to undermine counter disinformation efforts. in some cases, those accused of spreading disinformation have successfully sought to reclaim the term by arguing that counter disinformation efforts are the real sources of disinformation, thus reversing the roles of perpetrator and victim. this risk is most obvious in authoritarian regimes and flawed democracies, where leaders may suppress dissent by labeling it disinformation. but the problem can manifest in other ways too. a prominent u.s. example was the 2020 public letter by former intelligence officials warning that the then recent disclosure of hunter biden’s laptop data “has all the classic earmarks of a russian information operation.”2 later, when the data’s authenticity was largely confirmed, those promoting the laptop story said the letter itself was a form of disinformation.3 similar boomerang patterns have previously been seen with “fake news,” a phrase that originally described unethical content farms but was quickly repurposed to delegitimize truthful journalism. to be sure, such boomerangs often rest on exaggerated or bad faith claims. yet they exploit a core truth: “disinformation” is a flawed, malleable term whose implied assertion of authority can lead to overreach and blowback. for these and other reasons, a growing number of experts reject the term “disinformation.” some prefer to focus instead on “misinformation” (which elides intent) or “influence/information operations” (which de emphasizes falsity). others favor more self consciously political terms such as “propaganda” or “information warfare,” which they see as clearer warnings of the problem. a range of alternative conceptions have been proposed, including “malinformation” and “information disorder.” recently, some experts have advocated holistic concepts, like “information ecology” or “information and society,” that shift attention away from individual actors or claims and toward larger social systems. meanwhile, platforms have developed their own quasi legalistic argot such as meta’s “coordinated inauthentic behavior” to facilitate governance and enforcement. there is also a growing set of scholars and commentators who believe the field itself, not just its terminology, must be fundamentally rethought.4 some point out that disinformation and its ilk are elastic notions which tend to reflect the biases of whoever invokes them. others observe that disinformation isn’t pervasive or influential enough to explain the ills often attributed to it. several critics have gone so far as to label the disinformation crisis a moral panic, one suffered most acutely by elite groups. on this telling, privileged and expert classes such as the white liberals who for decades dominated academia and journalism in the united states have seized upon a perceived surge of disinformation to explain their recent loss of control over the national discourse. this story, rooted in nostalgia for a mythical era of shared truth, offers a comforting, depoliticized morality play: right thinking in groups are under siege by ignorant out groups in the thrall of manipulative (often foreign) bogeymen. the narrative has troubling historical antecedents, such as baseless cold war era fears of communist “brainwashing” that led to curtailment of civil liberties in the west. despite all these complications and pitfalls, this report begrudgingly embraces the term “disinformation” for three primary reasons. first, it captures a specific, real, and damaging phenomenon: malicious falsehoods are undermining democratic stability and governance around the world. however difficult it may be to identify or define disinformation at the edges, a set of core cases clearly exists and deserves serious attention from policymakers. a paradigmatic example is the “stop the steal” movement in the united states. the claim that the 2020 presidential election was stolen is provably false, was put forward with demonstrated bad faith, and has deeply destabilized the country. second, other phrases have their own problems, and no single term has yet emerged as a clearly better alternative. third, “disinformation” remains among the most familiar terms for policymakers and other stakeholders who constitute the key audience for this report. beyond the conceptual issues, policymakers should also be aware of several foundational challenges in assessing the efficacy of disinformation countermeasures. each of these challenges emerged time and again in the development of this report’s case studies. these evaluation challenges have no easy solutions. researchers are working to fill knowledge gaps and define clearer policy objectives, but doing so will take years or even decades. meanwhile, policymakers must somehow forge ahead. ideally, they will draw upon the best information available while remaining cognizant of the many unknowns. the following case studies are designed with those twin goals in mind. 1 alicia wanless and james pamment, “how do you define a problem like influence?,” carnegie endowment for international peace, december 30 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/12/30/how do you define problem like influence pub 80716. for more on the distinction between misinformation and disinformation, see dean jackson, “issue brief: distinguishing disinformation from propaganda, misinformation, and ‘fake news,’” national endowment for democracy, october 17, 2017, https://www.ned.org/issue brief distinguishing disinformation from propaganda misinformation and fake news/. 2 jim clapper et al., “public statement on the hunter biden emails,” politico, october 19, 2020, https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000175 4393 d7aa af77 579f9b330000. 3 luke broadwater, “officials who cast doubt on hunter biden laptop face questions,” new york times, may 16, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/16/us/politics/republicans hunter biden laptop.html. 4 see, for example, joseph bernstein, “bad news: selling the story of disinformation,” harper’s, 2021, https://harpers.org/archive/2021/09/bad news selling the story of disinformation; rachel kuo and alice marwick, “critical disinformation studies: history, power, and politics,” harvard kennedy school misinformation review, august 12, 2021, https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/critical disinformation studies history power and politics; alice marwick, rachel kuo, shanice jones cameron, and moira weigel, “critical disinformation studies: a syllabus,” center for information, technology, and public life, 2021, https://citap.unc.edu/research/critical disinfo; ben smith, “inside the ‘misinformation’ wars,” new york times, november 28, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/28/business/media misinformation disinformation.html; matthew yglesias, “the misinformation cope,” slow boring, april 20, 2022, https://www.slowboring.com/p/misinformation; théophile lenoir, “reconsidering the fight against disinformation,” tech policy press, august 1, 2022, https://www.techpolicy.press/reconsidering the fight against disinformation; dan williams, “misinformation researchers are wrong: there can’t be a science of misleading content,” conspicuous cognition, january 10, 2024, https://www.conspicuouscognition.com/p/misinformation researchers are wrong; and gavin wilde, “from panic to policy: the limits of propaganda and the foundations of an effective response,” texas national security review (forthcoming 2024). 5 jon bateman, elonnai hickok, laura courchesne, isra thange, and jacob n. shapiro, “measuring the effects of influence operations: key findings and gaps from empirical research,” june 28, 2021, carnegie endowment for international peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/28/measuring effects of influence operations key findings and gaps from empirical research pub 84824. key takeaways: there is strong evidence that the decline of local news outlets, particularly newspapers, has eroded civic engagement, knowledge, and trust helping disinformation to proliferate. bolstering local journalism could plausibly help to arrest or reverse such trends, but this has not been directly tested. cost is a major challenge, given the expense of quality journalism and the depth of the industry’s financial decline. philanthropy can provide targeted support, such as seed money for experimentation. but a long term solution would probably require government intervention and/or alternate business models. this could include direct subsidies (channeled through nongovernmental intermediaries) or indirect measures, such as tax exemptions and bargaining rights. key sources: many analysts have called for investing in local journalism especially print and digital media as a way to counter disinformation. the hope is that high quality local journalism can inform democratic deliberation, debunk false claims, and restore the feelings of trust and community that help to keep conspiracy theories at bay.1 more specifically, new financial investments would aim to halt or reverse the industry’s long term financial deterioration. local newspapers and other outlets have seen steady declines in ad revenue and readership for the last two decades, as the internet gave birth to more sophisticated forms of digital advertising and alternative sources of free information. according to one count, a fourth of the newspapers operating in the united states in 2004 had closed by the end of 2020.2 the covid 19 pandemic accelerated this trend, causing widespread layoffs across print, broadcast, radio, and digital outlets.3 such challenges have not been limited to the united states or western countries: for example, covid 19 “ravaged the revenue base” of nigerian media organizations, according to one local publisher.4 new funding for local journalism could come from governments, philanthropists, commercial sources, or a combination of these. one model for government funding is the new jersey civic information consortium, a state supported nonprofit. the consortium receives money from government and private sources, then disburses grants to projects that promote the “quantity and quality of civic information.”5 the use of a nonprofit intermediary aims to reduce the risk that government officials would leverage state funds to influence news coverage.6 another model is for governments to use tax exemptions and other policy tools to financially boost the journalism industry without directly subsidizing it.7 in the united kingdom, newspapers, books, and some news sites are exempt from the value added tax because of their public benefit.8 in canada, people who purchase a digital news subscription can claim a tax exemption.9 australia has taken another approach by passing legislation that empowers news publishers to jointly negotiate for compensation when platforms like facebook and google link to their content.10 other advocates have proposed a tax on digital advertising that would be used to support journalism.11 philanthropic support for local journalism can also come in various forms. not for profit news outlets in north america currently get about half of their revenue from foundation grants, but national and global outlets receive more than two thirds of these grant dollars.12 to bolster local outlets, a greater portion of grants could be redirected to them. the next largest source of funding for nonprofit newsrooms is individual gifts, which make up about 30 percent of revenue and primarily come from donations of $5,000 or more.13 however, small dollar donations are growing; newsmatch, a u.s. fundraising effort, encourages audiences to donate to local media organizations and matches individual donations with other sources of philanthropy. newsmatch has raised more than $271 million since 2017.14 multiple government, philanthropic, or commercial revenue streams can be combined in novel ways, as illustrated by report for america. the initiative raised $8 million in 2022 to place reporting fellows in local newsrooms.15 a relatively small portion, about $650,000, was taxpayer money from the corporation for public broadcasting.16 the remainder came from foundations and technology companies, matched dollar for dollar by contributions split between the local newsrooms themselves and other local funders. research is clear that the decline of local journalism is associated with the drivers of disinformation. however, the inverse proposition that greater funding for local journalists will reduce disinformation does not automatically follow and has not been empirically tested. going forward, decisionmakers and scholars could study the link between disinformation and the health of local media outlets more closely by monitoring and evaluating the impact of local news startups on a variety of metrics related to disinformation, such as polarization, professed trust in institutions like the media and government, civic engagement and voter turnout, and susceptibility to online rumors. studies suggest at least two mechanisms whereby the decline of local media outlets can fuel the spread of disinformation. first, the decline contributes to civic ignorance and apathy as voters become less informed about the issues, candidates, and stakes in local elections. research indicates that reduced access to local news is linked to lower voter turnout and civic engagement as well as increased corruption and mismanagement. at least one longitudinal study also finds a relationship between the decline of local news, on the one hand, and diminished civic awareness and engagement on the other hand.17 these conditions ultimately erode public trust, which can increase belief in misinformation and conspiracy theories.18 conversely, scholarship has shown that strong media is linked to robust civic participation. many studies correlate the existence of local newspapers with higher turnout in local elections. and, at an individual level, a person’s consumption of local political news is associated with higher likelihood to vote.19 these patterns can be seen in a variety of electoral contexts including downballot and judicial elections and across historical periods, despite changing technology.20 a study of u.s. history from 1869 to 2004 found that a community’s civic participation rose when its first newspaper was created, and that this connection persisted even after the introduction of radio and television.21 second, when local media disappears, lower quality information sources can fill the gap as people look elsewhere for information. social media has emerged as a primary alternative.22 although social media platforms contain plenty of accurate and authoritative voices, they also create opportunities for low quality and hyperpartisan personalities and outlets (some of which pose as local newspapers) that spread misleading, divisive content.23 indeed, research shows a connection between the decline of local media and the rise of polarization. for example, one study found that communities that lost their local newspaper became more polarized as voters replaced information from local media with more partisan cues picked up elsewhere, such as national cable tv.24 to be sure, polarizing content should not be equated with disinformation. nevertheless, most analysts believe the two are linked: as voters drift away from the “mainstream” of the political spectrum often, but not always, toward the right they may become more accepting of less credible alternative media sources and misleading claims that align with their partisan preferences and demonize political opponents.25 given the evidence that local media declines breed susceptibility to disinformation, it is reasonable to predict that efforts to bolster local media could have the opposite effect. however, that prediction has not yet been empirically tested. it is possible, for example, that people who have drifted from traditional local journalism toward social media as an information source might have developed new habits that would be difficult to reverse. likewise, communities that have suffered a general loss of civic engagement and trust due to the decline of local media might now have less interest or faith in a startup newsroom than they previously would have. reversing the decline of local journalism is an extremely costly proposition, at least in the united states, because the scale of downsizing has been so large. a georgetown university study found that newspapers employed 150,000 fewer people in 2022 compared to the 1980s a decline of 63 percent. although web publishers have replaced about half of those jobs, replacing the rest would require tremendous investment. for example, the american journalism project raised over $100 million to partially fund thirty three nonprofit newsrooms a small fraction of the 2,100 newsrooms that closed in the united states in the past two decades.26 washington post columnist perry bacon jr. estimated in 2022 that it would cost at least $10 billion per year to hire 87,000 new journalists that is, to ensure that each u.s. congressional district had 200 journalists, plus operational support.27 more localized coverage could be even costlier. in 2022, democracy fund created a calculator to estimate the total cost of meeting the information needs of every community in the united states. hiring several reporters to cover crucial issues in each township and municipality would cost $52 billion per year.28 philanthropy can provide targeted investments in particularly needy areas for example, communities too small or poor to sustain local media on their own and offer seed money to run experiments. but given the sums required, a large scale solution would demand some combination of long term government support, new journalistic business models, or other structural changes in the marketplace. the australian bargaining law provides one promising case study. while critics said the approach would be unlikely to generate much revenue and would mostly benefit large publishers, an australian government review found that google and meta reached thirty agreements with publications of varying size, including some groups of outlets. in its first year, the law raised more than $140 million for these outlets, much of which was used to hire new journalists and purchase equipment.29 similar schemes are now being implemented in canada and under consideration in california though these efforts, like the australia law, have faced strong initial pushback from big tech companies.30 1 consider david salvo, jamie fly, and laura rosenberger, “the asd policy blueprint for countering authoritarian interference in democracies,” german marshall fund, june 26, 2018, https://www.gmfus.org/news/asd policy blueprint countering authoritarian interference democracies; “a multi dimensional approach to disinformation,” european commission, 2018, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication detail/ /publication/6ef4df8b 4cea 11e8 be1d 01aa75ed71a1; and edward lucas and peter pomeranzev, “winning the information war: techniques and counter strategies to russian propaganda in central and eastern europe,” center for european policy analysis, 2016, https://cepa.ecms.pl/files/?id_plik=2773. 2 tom stites, “a quarter of all u.s. newspapers have died in 15 years, a new unc news deserts study found,” poynter institute, june 24, 2020, https://www.poynter.org/locally/2020/unc news deserts report 2020/. 3 penelope muse abernathy, “news deserts and ghost newspapers: will local news survive?,” university of north carolina, 2020, https://www.usnewsdeserts.com/reports/news deserts and ghost newspapers will local news survive/; and “the tow center covid 19 newsroom cutback tracker,” tow center for digital journalism, september 9, 2020, https://www.cjr.org/widescreen/covid cutback tracker.php. 4 for example, see dapo olorunyomi, “surviving the pandemic: the struggle for media sustainability in africa,” national endowment for democracy, january 2021, https://www.ned.org/wp content/uploads/2021/01/pandemic struggle media sustainability africa olorunyomi.pdf. 5 “about the consortium,” new jersey civic information consortium, accessed january 27, 2023, https://njcivicinfo.org/about/. 6 anya schiffrin, ed., in the service of power: media capture and the threat to democracy, center for international media assistance, 2017, https://www.cima.ned.org/resource/service power media capture threat democracy/. 7 consider “inn mission & history,” institute for nonprofit news, accessed january 27, 2023, https://inn.org/about/who we are/. 8 jim waterson, “vat ruling on times digital edition could save news uk millions,” guardian, january 6, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/media/2020/jan/06/vat ruling on times digital edition could save news uk millions. 9 “about the digital news subscription tax credit,” government of canada, accessed march 24, 2023, https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue agency/services/tax/individuals/topics/about your tax return/tax return/completing a tax return/deductions credits expenses/deductions credits expenses/digital news subscription.html. 10 “news media bargaining code,” australian competition & consumer commission, accessed january 27, 2023, https://www.accc.gov.au/by industry/digital platforms and services/news media bargaining code/news media bargaining code. 11 julia angwin, “can taxing big tech save journalism?” markup, july 16, 2022, https://themarkup.org/newsletter/hello world/can taxing big tech save journalism. 12 “inn index 2022: enduring in crisis, surging in local communities,” institute for nonprofit news, july 27, 2022, https://inn.org/research/inn index/inn index 2022/; and “newsmatch,” institute for nonprofit news, accessed april 18, 2023, https://newsmatch.inn.org/. 13 “inn index 2022,” institute for nonprofit news. 14 “newsmatch,” institute for nonprofit news. 15 “about us,” report for america, accessed january 27, 2023, https://www.reportforamerica.org/about us/. 16 “supporting report for america,” report for america, accessed december 23, 2023, https://www.reportforamerica.org/supporters. 17 danny hayes and jennifer l. lawless, “the decline of local news and its effects: new evidence from longitudinal data,” journal of politics 80, no. 1 (january 2018): https://www.dannyhayes.org/uploads/6/9/8/5/69858539/decline.pdf. 18 the relationship between disinformation and trust in media, government, and other institutions is complex. exposure to false content online is associated with lower trust in media but higher trust in government for conservatives when their preferred party is in power. lack of trust in institutions is associated with higher belief in conspiracy theories, for example in the context of covid 19 vaccination. see katherine ognyanova, david lazer, ronald e. robertson, and christo wilson, “misinformation in action: fake news exposure is linked to lower trust in media, higher trust in government when your side is in power,” harvard kennedy school misinformation review, june 2, 2020, https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/misinformation in action fake news exposure is linked to lower trust in media higher trust in government when your side is in power; and will jennings et al., “lack of trust, conspiracy beliefs, and social media use predict covid 19 vaccine hesitancy,” vaccines 9, no. 6 (june 2021): https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/pmc8226842. see also jay jennings and meghan rubado, “newspaper decline and the effect on local government coverage,” university of texas at austin, november 2019, https://moody.utexas.edu/sites/default/files/strauss_research_newspaper_decline_2019 11 jennings.pdf; jackie filla and martin johnson, “local news outlets and political participation,” urban affairs review 45, no. 5 (2010): https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1078087409351947?journalcode=uarb; “2021 edelman trust barometer,” edelman, 2021, https://www.edelman.com/trust/2021 trust barometer; and jeffrey hiday, “combating disinformation by bolstering truth and trust,” rand corporation, may 24, 2020, https://www.rand.org/pubs/articles/2022/combating disinformation by bolstering truth and trust.html. 19 martin baekgaard, carsten jensen, peter b. mortensen, and søren serritzlew, “local news media and voter turnout,” local government studies 40 (2014): https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03003930.2013.834253. 20 christopher chapp and peter aehl, “newspapers and political participation: the relationship between ballot rolloff and local newspaper circulation,” newspaper research journal 42, no. 2 (2021): https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/07395329211014968; and “does local journalism stimulate voter participation in state supreme court elections?,” david hughes, journal of law and courts 8, no. 1 (2020): https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal of law and courts/article/abs/does local journalism stimulate voter participation in state supreme court elections/ce8e2cbdf4cf9c58df08a013ae8b05a3. 21 matthew gentzkow, jesse m. shapiro, and michael sinkinson, “the effect of newspaper entry and exit on electoral politics,” american economic review 101 (december 2011): https://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/voting.pdf. for a roundup of this research, see josh stearns and christine schmidt, “how we know journalism is good for democracy,” democracy fund, september 15, 2022, https://democracyfund.org/idea/how we know journalism is good for democracy/. 22 david s. ardia, evan ringel, victoria ekstrand, and ashley fox, “addressing the decline of local news, rise of platforms, and spread of mis  and disinformation online: a summary of current research and policy proposals,” university of north carolina, december 22, 2020, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3765576. 23 jessica mahone and philip napoli, “hundreds of hyperpartisan sites are masquerading as local news. this map shows if there’s one near you,” nieman lab, july 13, 2020, https://www.niemanlab.org/2020/07/hundreds of hyperpartisan sites are masquerading as local news this map shows if theres one near you/. 24 joshua p. darr, matthew p. hitt, and johanna l. dunaway, “newspaper closures polarize voting behavior,” journal of communication 68, no. 6 (december 2018): https://academic.oup.com/joc/article abstract/68/6/1007/5160090. 25 see imelda deinla, gabrielle ann s. mendoza, kier jesse ballar, and jurel yap, “the link between fake news susceptibility and political polarization of the youth in the philippines,” ateneo school of government, working paper no. 21 029, november 2021, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3964492; and mathias osmundsen, michael bang petersen, and alexander bor, “how partisan polarization drives the spread of fake news,” brookings institution, may 13, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how partisan polarization drives the spread of fake news/. in the united states, yochai benkler and others have argued that asymmetric polarization with the right drifting from the center faster and farther than the left has been driven at least in part by media dynamics. specifically, right leaning media across cable television, radio, and the internet are less connected to mainstream media than their left leaning counterparts. see yochai benkler, robert faris, hal roberts, and ethan zuckerman, “study: breitbart led right wing media ecosystem altered broader media agenda,” columbia journalism review, march 3, 2017, https://www.cjr.org/analysis/breitbart media trump harvard study.php. not all analysts believe polarization is a bad thing; for example, some argue that polarization provides voters more distinct choices and has led to increased political participation. others have argued that polarization contributes to crisis flash points that disrupt a problematic status quo in ways that are ultimately healthy. consider jessica rettig, “why political polarization might be good for america,” u.s. news, may 27, 2010, https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2010/05/27/why political polarization might be good for america; see also “the us is suffering from toxic polarization. that’s arguably a good thing,” peter t. coleman, scientific american, april 2, 2021, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the u s is suffering from toxic polarization thats arguably a good thing. the united states is an international outlier on polarization. a review by jennifer mccoy and benjamin press found that the united states is “the only advanced western democracy to have faced such intense polarization for such an extended period.” their study suggests grim outcomes from high levels of polarization. mccoy and press examine a sample of fifty two democratic societies suffering “pernicious polarization,” defined “as the division of society into mutually distrustful political camps in which political identity becomes a social identity.” they find that half of cases faced democratic erosion, and fewer than a fifth were able to sustain a decline in pernicious polarization. jennifer mccoy and benjamin press, “what happens when democracies become perniciously polarized?” carnegie endowment for international peace, january 18, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/01/18/what happens when democracies become perniciously polarized pub 86190. 26 stites, “quarter of all u.s. newspapers”; “fiscal year 2022 operating budget,” corporation for public broadcasting, accessed january 27, 2023, https://www.cpb.org/aboutcpb/financials/budget; anthony p. carnevale and emma wenzinger, “stop the presses: journalism employment and economic value of 850 journalism and communication programs,” georgetown university center on education and workforce, 2022, https://cewgeorgetown.wpenginepowered.com/wp content/uploads/cew journalism fr.pdf. 27 perry bacon, jr., “america should spend billions to revive local news,” washington post, october 17, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/10/17/local news crisis plan fix perry bacon/. 28 “national ecosystem calendar,” democracy fund, accessed april 18, 2023, https://oneroyalace.github.io/news ecosystem model/national_calculator.html. 29 see brian fung, “meta avoids showdown over news content in us after journalism bargaining bill shelved,” cnn, december 7, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/07/tech/meta journalism bargaining bill/index.html; joshua benton, “don’t expect mcconnell’s paradox to help news publishers get real money out of google and facebook,” nieman lab, january 8, 2020, https://www.niemanlab.org/2020/01/dont expect mcconnells paradox to help news publishers get real money out of google and facebook/; jeff jarvis, “as rupert murdoch works to dismantle the internet, why are other media outlets helping him?,”crikey, february 15, 2021, https://www.crikey.com.au/2021/02/15/rupert murdoch news media bargaining code/; josh frydenberg, “review of the news media and digital platforms mandatory bargaining code,” australian department of the treasury, february 2022, https://ministers.treasury.gov.au/ministers/josh frydenberg 2018/media releases/review news media and digital platforms mandatory; and anya schiffrin, “australia’s news media bargaining code pries $140 million from google and facebook,” poynter institute, august 16, 2022, https://www.poynter.org/business work/2022/australias news media bargaining code pries 140 million from google and facebook. 30 max matza, “google and canada reach deal to avert news ban over online news act,” bbc, november 29, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world us canada 67571027; and jaimie ding, “california bill requiring big tech to pay for news placed on hold until 2024,” los angeles times, july 7, 2023, https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2023 07 07/california journalism bill on hold until 2024. key takeaways: there is significant evidence that media literacy training can help people identify false stories and unreliable news sources. however, variation in pedagogical approaches means the effectiveness of one program does not necessarily imply the effectiveness of another. the most successful variants empower motivated individuals to take control of their media consumption and seek out high quality information instilling confidence and a sense of responsibility alongside skills development. while media literacy training shows promise, it suffers challenges in speed, scale, and targeting. reaching large numbers of people, including those most susceptible to disinformation, is expensive and takes many years. key sources: increasing individuals’ media literacy through education and training is one of the most frequently recommended countermeasures against disinformation.1 proponents argue that “media literacy and critical thinking are the first barrier to deception” and that teaching people these skills therefore enables them to better identify false claims.2 the national association for media literacy education defines media literacy as “the ability to access, analyze, evaluate, create, and act using all forms of communication.” however, scholars point to conceptual confusion around the term, and practitioners take many different approaches.3 common goals include instilling knowledge of the media industry and journalistic practices, awareness of media manipulation and disinformation techniques, and familiarity with the internet and digital technologies. media literacy education initiatives target a range of different audiences, occur in multiple settings, and use a variety of methods including intensive classroom based coursework as well as short online videos and games. many programs focus on children and adolescents,4 with research suggesting that young people are less familiar with the workings of the internet and digital media and more susceptible to online hoaxes and propaganda than commonly assumed.5 for example, a 2016 study of over 7,800 students found many failed to distinguish sponsored content and untrustworthy websites in search results.6 public education is therefore one major vehicle to reach large numbers of people early in their lives, alongside other kinds of youth programs. aspects of media literacy have long been embedded in general education and liberal arts curricula in advanced democracies, especially in subjects that emphasize critical reading and thinking, such as language arts, essay writing, civics, and rhetoric. public libraries have also historically promoted media literacy. not all media literacy programs target young people. after all, people don’t necessarily age out of their susceptibility to disinformation; in fact, older individuals seem more likely to share false stories on facebook.7 media literacy training for adults may happen at libraries, senior citizen centers, recreational events, or professional settings. civil society and government agencies have also run public awareness campaigns and released gamified education tools. for example, sweden established a psychological defence agency in 2022. its responsibilities include leading “training, exercises and knowledge development” to help residents “identify and counter foreign malign information influence, disinformation and other dissemination of misleading information directed at sweden.”8 one valuable case study is the international research and exchanges board (irex)’s learn to discern program, which has used a “train the trainers” approach in ukraine and a number of other countries since 2015. this program equips volunteers to deliver a media literacy curriculum to members of their community.9 reaching more vulnerable adults (for example, racial and ethnic minorities and those with fewer economic resources, less education, or less experience with the internet) is a policy priority for governments focused on media literacy.10 the body of scholarship on media literacy is large relative to most other disinformation countermeasures. for example, a 2022 literature review on digital literacy one component of media literacy found forty three english language studies since 2001, with thirty three of these published since 2017, when interest in the topic swelled.11 the existence of dedicated journals and conferences is another indicator of growth in this subfield. for example, the national association for media literacy education published the first issue of the journal of media literacy education in 2009.12 other major repositories of research on media literacy include a database maintained by the united nations alliance of civilizations.13 review of this literature shows that specific media literacy approaches have a strong theoretical basis and a large body of experimental evidence. however, variation in pedagogical approaches means the effectiveness of one program does not necessarily imply the effectiveness of another.14 moreover, the lack of robust mechanisms for collecting data on classroom activities is a recognized gap. in 2018, the media literacy programme fund in the united kingdom (considered a leader in media literacy education) cited grants to support evaluation as a priority.15 since then, several studies have conducted real time evaluation and sought to measure lasting improvements in student performance. additional studies could expand the menu of possible approaches to evaluation; also useful would be to examine further the effectiveness of media literacy training for atypical individuals at the extremes, such as those who are especially motivated by partisanship, conspiracy theories, or radical ideologies. there is significant evidence that media literacy training can help people identify false stories and unreliable news sources.16 scholars sometimes refer to this as inoculation, because “preemptively exposing, warning, and familiarising people with the strategies used in the production of fake news helps confer cognitive immunity when exposed to real misinformation.”17 one experiment found that playing an online browser game designed to expose players to six different disinformation strategies reduced subjects’ susceptibility to false claims, especially among those users who were initially most vulnerable to being misled. such laboratory findings are bolstered by studies of larger, real world interventions. an evaluation of irex’s learn to discern program found durable increases in good media consumption habits, such as checking multiple sources, lasting up to eighteen months after delivery of the training. 18 other studies support teaching students to read “laterally” using additional, trusted sources to corroborate suspect information.19 because media literacy comes in many forms, it is important to assess which variants are most effective at reducing belief in false stories so trainers and educators can prioritize them. research suggests that the most successful variants empower motivated individuals to take control of their media consumption and seek out high quality information. this has been described as “actionable skepticism,” or sometimes simply as “information literacy.”20 for example, a 2019 review in american behavioral scientist examined various factors that might enable someone to recognize false news stories. they found that people’s “abilities to navigate and find information online that is verified and reliable” for example, differentiating between an encyclopedia and a scientific journal was an important predictor. in contrast, subjects’ understanding of the media industry and journalistic practices or their self reported ability to “critically consume, question, and analyze information” were not predictive.21 later research based on survey data also supported these findings.22 importantly, multiple studies have shown that effective media literacy depends not only on people’s skills but also on their feelings and self perceptions. specifically, individuals who feel confident in their ability to find high quality news sources, and who feel responsible for proactively doing so, are less likely to believe misleading claims. this factor is often called an individual’s “locus of control,” and it has been identified as important in studies of multiple nationally and demographically diverse populations.23 people who purposefully curate their information diet are less likely to be misled; passive consumers, on the other hand, are more vulnerable. however, this may be truer of typical news consumers than of outliers like extremists and very motivated partisans. the latter groups might self report confidence in curating their media diet while nevertheless selecting for misleading, radical, or hyper partisan sources. a growing body of recent literature based on large scale classroom studies shows how specific techniques can provide news consumers with greater agency and ability to seek out accurate information.24 whereas past forms of online media literacy education often focused on identifying markers of suspicious websites like typographical errors or other indicators of low quality these signs are less useful in the modern information environment, where sources of misinformation can have the appearance of high production value for low cost.25 recent studies have shown that lateral reading is more effective.26 in one study of students at a public college in the northeastern united states, only 12 percent of subjects used lateral reading before receiving training on how to do so; afterward, more than half did, and students showed an overall greater ability to discern true claims from fictional ones.27 a similar study on university students in california found these effects endured after five weeks.28 another one day exercise with american middle school students found that students had a difficult time overcoming impressions formed from “superficial features” on websites and should be trained to recognize different types of information sources, question the motivation behind them, and crucially compare those sources with known trustworthy sites.29 teaching people to recognize unreliable news sources and common media manipulation tactics becomes even more effective when participants are also able to improve their locus of control, according to academic research and program evaluations. in a study of media literacy among 500 teenagers, researchers found that students with higher locus of control were more resilient against false stories. in another study based on survey data, researchers found that individuals who exhibited high locus of control and the ability to identify false stories were more likely to take corrective action on social media, such as reporting to the platform or educating the poster.30 (the participatory nature of social media increases the importance of educating users not only on how to recognize untrustworthy content but also on how to respond to and avoid sharing it.31) evaluations of irex’s learn to discern program in ukraine and a similar program run by pen america in the united states shed further light on locus of control. these curricula’s focus on identifying untrustworthy content led subjects to become overly skeptical of all media. while trainees’ ability to identify disinformation and their knowledge of the news media increased, their locus of control changed only slightly. ultimately, trainees’ ability to identify accurate news stories did not improve, and they remained distrustful of the media as a whole.32 a major challenge, then, is news consumers who feel under threat from the information environment rather than empowered to inform themselves. one potential intervention point could be social media platforms, which can provide tools and make other design choices to help users compare on platform information with credible external sources (see case study 4). this could reinforce users’ locus of control while assisting them in exercising it. educators should be mindful of media literacy expert paul mihailidis’s warning that “critical thought can quickly become cynical thought.”33 in a 2018 essay, media scholar danah boyd argued that individuals who are both cynical about institutions and equipped to critique them can become believers in, and advocates for, conspiracy theories and disinformation. to avoid this trap, media literacy education must be designed carefully. this means empowering people to engage with media critically, constructively, and discerningly rather than through the lenses of undifferentiated paranoia and distrust.34 while media literacy training shows promise, it suffers challenges from speed, scale, and targeting. many approaches will take years to reach large numbers of people, including many vulnerable and hard to reach populations. attempts to reach scale through faster, leaner approaches, like gamified online modules or community based efforts to train the trainers, are highly voluntary and most likely to impact already motivated individuals rather than large percentages of the public. many media literacy projects are not particularly expensive to deliver to small audiences. however, achieving wide impact requires high scale delivery, such as integrating media literacy into major institutions like public education a costly proposition. when a proposed 2010 bill in the u.s. congress, the healthy media for youth act, called for $40 million for youth media literacy initiatives, leading scholars deemed the amount insufficient and advocated for larger financial commitments from the government, foundations, and the private sector.35 once the resources and curricula are in place, it will still take time to develop necessary infrastructure to implement large scale media literacy programs. for example, hiring skilled educators is a critical yet difficult task. studies from the european union (eu) and south africa both identified major deficiencies in teachers’ own abilities to define core media literacy concepts or practice those concepts themselves.36 1 for examples, see lucas and pomeranzev, “winning the information war”; katarína klingová and daniel milo, “countering information war lessons learned from nato and partner countries: recommendations and conclusions,” globsec, february 2017, https://www.globsec.org/what we do/publications/countering information war lessons learned nato and partner countries; claire wardle and hossein derakhshan, “information disorder: toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and policy making,” council of europe, september 2017, https://rm.coe.int/information disorder toward an interdisciplinary framework for researc/168076277c; daniel fried and alina polyakova, “democratic defense against disinformation,” atlantic council, february 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp content/uploads/2018/03/democratic_defense_against_disinformation_final.pdf; “a multi dimensional approach,” european commission; erik brattberg and tim maurer, “russian election interference: europe’s counter to fake news and cyber attacks,” carnegie endowment for international peace, may 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cp_333_brattbergmaurer_russia_elections_interference_final.pdf; “action plan against disinformation,” european commission, may 2018, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/54866_en; fly, rosenberger, and salvo, “the asd policy blueprint”; jean baptiste jeangène vilmer, alexandre escorcia, marine guillaume, and janaina herrera, “information manipulation: a challenge for our democracies,” french ministry for europe and foreign affairs and the institute for strategic research, august 2018, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/img/pdf/information_manipulation_rvb_cle838736.pdf; todd c. helmus et al., “russian social media influence: understanding russian propaganda in eastern europe,” rand corporation, 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/rr2237.html; and paul barrett, “tackling domestic disinformation: what the social media companies need to do,” new york university, march 2019, https://issuu.com/nyusterncenterforbusinessandhumanri/docs/nyu_domestic_disinformation_digital?e=31640827/68184927. 2 klingová and milo, “countering information war.” 3 “media literacy defined,” national association for media literacy education, accessed february 13, 2023, https://namle.net/resources/media literacy defined/. see also monica bulger and patrick davison, “the promises, challenges, and futures of media literacy,” data & society, february 21, 2018, https://datasociety.net/library/the promises challenges and futures of media literacy/; and géraldine wuyckens, normand landry, and pierre fastrez, “untangling media literacy, information literacy, and digital literacy: a systematic meta review of core concepts in media education,” journal of media literacy education 14, no. 1 (2022): https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1531&context=jmle. 4 renee hobbs, “digital and media literacy: a plan of action,” aspen institute, 2010, https://www.aspeninstitute.org/wp content/uploads/2010/11/digital_and_media_literacy.pdf; and “online media literacy strategy,” uk department for digital, culture, media, & sport, july 2021, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1004233/dcms_media_literacy_report_roll_out_accessible_pdf.pdf. 5 tiffany hsu, “when teens find misinformation, these teachers are ready,” new york times, september 8, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/08/technology/misinformation students media literacy.html; “a global study on information literacy: understanding generational behaviors and concerns around false and misleading information online,” poynter institute, august 2022, https://www.poynter.org/wp content/uploads/2022/08/a global study on information literacy 1.pdf; and elena alexandra dumitru, “testing children and adolescents’ ability to identify fake news: a combined design of quasi experiment and group discussions,” societies 10, no. 3 (september 2020): https://www.mdpi.com/2075 4698/10/3/71/htm. 6 sam wineburg, sarah mcgrew, joel breakstone, and teresa ortega, “evaluating information: the cornerstone of civic online reasoning,” stanford digital repository, november 22, 2016, https://purl.stanford.edu/fv751yt5934. 7 for evidence that older users are more likely to share false stories on facebook, see andrew guess, jonathan nagler, and joshua tucker, “less than you think: prevalence and predictors of fake news dissemination on facebook,” science advances 5, no. 1 (2019): https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.aau4586. 8 elisabeth braw, “create a psychological defence agency to ‘prebunk’ fake news,” prospect, december 8, 2022, https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/politics/60291/create a psychological defence agency to prebunk fake news; and adela suliman, “sweden sets up psychological defense agency to fight fake news, foreign interference,” washington post, january 6, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/01/06/sweden fake news psychological defence agency. 9 erin murrock, joy amulya, mehri druckman, and tetiana liubyva, “winning the war on state sponsored propaganda: gains in the ability to detect disinformation a year and a half after completing a ukrainian news media literacy program,” journal of media literacy education 10, no. 2 (2018): https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1361&context=jmle. 10 “online media literacy strategy,” uk department for digital, culture, media, & sport; and kara brisson boivin and samantha mcaleese, “from access to engagement: building a digital media literacy strategy for canada,” mediasmarts, 2022, https://mediasmarts.ca/research reports/access engagement building digital media literacy strategy canada. 11 hasan tinmaz, yoo taek lee, mina fanea ivanovici, and hasnan baber, “a systematic review on digital literacy,” smart learning environments 9 (2022), https://slejournal.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s40561 022 00204 y. 12 “history,” national association for media literacy education, accessed february 13, 2023, https://namle.net/about/history/. 13 “media & information literacy,” un alliance of civilizations, accessed march 26, 2023, https://milunesco.unaoc.org/mil organizations/acma digital media literacy research program. 14 “media & information literacy,” un alliance of civilizations. 15 “online media literacy strategy,” uk department for digital, culture, media, & sport; “media literacy programme fund,” government of the united kingdom, accessed march 26, 2023, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/media literacy programme fund; and bulger and davison, “promises, challenges, and futures.” 16 consider bulger and davison, “promises, challenges, and futures,” as well as theodora dame adjin tettey, “combating fake news, disinformation, and misinformation: experimental evidence for media literacy education,” cogent arts & humanities 9 (2022): https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311983.2022.2037229. 17 jon roozenbeek and sander van der linden, “fake news game confers psychological resistance against online misinformation,” palgrave communications 5 (2019): https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599 019 0279 9. 18 murrock, amulya, druckman, and liubyva, “winning the war.” 19 carl anton werner axelsson, mona guath, and thomas nygren, “learning how to separate fake from real news: scalable digital tutorials promoting students’ civic online reasoning,” future internet 13, no. 3 (2021): https://www.mdpi.com/1999 5903/13/3/60. 20 jennifer fleming, “media literacy, news literacy, or news appreciation? a case study of the news literacy program at stony brook university,” journalism & mass communication educator 69, no. 2 (2013): https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1077695813517885. 21 because the measurement of media literacy was self reported, the study posits this as an example of the “dunning kruger effect”: an individual’s (over)confidence in their ability to critically consume media is related to their susceptibility to deception. see mo jones jang, tara mortensen, and jingjing liu, “does media literacy help identification of fake news? information literacy helps, but other literacies don’t,” american behavioral scientist (august 2019): https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335352499_does_media_literacy_help_identification_of_fake_news_information_literacy_helps_but_other_literacies_don't. 22 brigitte huber, porismita borah, and homero gil de zúñiga, “taking corrective action when exposed to fake news: the role of fake news literacy,” journal of media literacy education 14 (july 2022): https://www.researchgate.net/publication/362513295_taking_corrective_action_when_exposed_to_fake_news_the_role_of_fake_news_literacy. 23 murrock, amulya, druckman, and liubyva, “winning the war”; and “impact report: evaluating pen america's media literacy program,” pen america & stanford social media lab, september 2022, https://pen.org/report/the impact of community based digital literacy interventions on disinformation resilience. see also yan su, danielle ka lai lee, and xizhu xiao, “‘i enjoy thinking critically, and i’m in control’: examining the influences of media literacy factors on misperceptions amidst the covid 19 infodemic,” computers in human behavior 128 (2022): https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/s0747563221004349, a study based on subjects in china. the similar findings between the united states, ukraine, and china despite significant differences in the three countries’ media systems and histories is noteworthy. 24 see generally: folco panizza et al., “lateral reading and monetary incentives to spot disinformation about science,” scientific reports 12 (2022): https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598 022 09168 y; sam wineburg et al., “lateral reading on the open internet: a district wide field study in high school government classes,” journal of educational psychology 114, no. 5 (2022): https://www.studocu.com/id/document/universitas kristen satya wacana/social psychology/lateral reading on the open internet a district wide field study in high school government classes/45457099; and joel breakstone et al., “lateral reading: college students learn to critically evaluate internet sources in an online course,” harvard kennedy school misinformation review 2 (2021), https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/lateral reading college students learn to critically evaluate internet sources in an online course. 25 for more on this method, its success in classroom trials, and its departure from previous forms of media literacy education, see d. pavlounis, j. johnston, j. brodsky, and p. brooks, “the digital media literacy gap: how to build widespread resilience to false and misleading information using evidence based classroom tools,” civix canada, november 2021, https://ctrl f.ca/en/wp content/uploads/2021/11/the digital media literacy gap nov 7.pdf. 26 axelsson, guath, and nygren, “learning how to separate.” 27 jessica e. brodsky et al., “associations between online instruction in lateral reading strategies and fact checking covid 19 news among college students,” aera open (2021): https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/23328584211038937. 28 sarah mcgrew, mark smith, joel breakstone, teresa ortega, and sam wineburg, “improving university students’ web savvy: an intervention study,” british journal of educational psychology 89, no. 3 (september 2019): https://bpspsychub.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/bjep.12279. 29 angela kohnen, gillian mertens, and shelby boehm, “can middle schoolers learn to read the web like experts? possibilities and limits of a strategy based intervention,” journal of media literacy education 12, no. 2 (2020): https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1457&context=jmle. 30 adam maksl, seth ashley, and stephanie craft, “measuring news media literacy,” journal of media literacy education 6 (2015), https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/jmle/vol6/iss3/3/; and huber, borah, and zúñiga, “taking corrective action.” 31 bulger and davison, “promises, challenges, and futures.” 32 like jones jang, mortensen, and liu, the authors of the irex evaluation suggest that the “false sense of control” already felt by individuals who did not receive media literacy training may also partially explain the relatively small improvements in these subjects’ locus of control. 33 paul mihailidis, “beyond cynicism: media education and civic learning outcomes in the university,” international journal of learning and media 1, no. 3 (august 2009): https://www.researchgate.net/publication/250958225_beyond_cynicism_media_education_and_civic_learning_outcomes_in_the_university. 34 “you think you want media literacy… do you?” danah boyd, apophenia, march 9, 2018, https://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2018/03/09/you think you want media literacy do you.html. 35 hobbs, “digital and media literacy.” 36 sandy zinn, christine stilwell, and ruth hoskins, “information literacy education in the south african classroom: reflections from teachers’ journals in the western cape province,” libri 66 (april 2016): https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/libri 2015 0102/html; and maria ranieri, isabella bruni, and anne claire orban de xivry, “teachers’ professional development on digital and media literacy. findings and recommendations from a european project,” research on education and media 9, no. 2 (2017): https://sciendo.com/article/10.1515/rem 2017 0009. key takeaways: a large body of research indicates that fact checking can be an effective way to correct false beliefs about specific claims, especially for audiences that are not heavily invested in the partisan elements of the claims. however, influencing factual beliefs does not necessarily result in attitudinal or behavioral changes, such as reduced support for a deceitful politician or a baseless policy proposal. moreover, the efficacy of fact checking depends a great deal on contextual factors such as wording, presentation, and source that are not well understood. even so, fact checking seems unlikely to cause a backfire effect that leads people to double down on false beliefs. fact checkers face a structural disadvantage in that false claims can be created more cheaply and disseminated more quickly than corrective information; conceivably, technological innovations could help shift this balance. key sources: fact checking, in this report, refers broadly to the issuance of corrective information to debunk a false or misleading claim. a 2020 global survey by carnegie identified 176 initiatives focused on fact checking and journalism, while the duke university reporters’ lab counted more than 400 active fact checking efforts across more than 100 countries in 2023.1 these initiatives come in many different forms. they include dedicated, stand alone organizations, such as snopes, as well as fact checkers integrated into newspapers and tv programs. some prioritize political claims, like the washington post’s “fact checker” and the website politifact. others address health claims, like the coronavirusfacts/datoscoronavirus alliance database led by the international fact checking network at the poynter institute.2 collaborative fact checking models uniting the efforts of several organizations have also emerged, like verificado 2018, an effort to collect rumors and disinformation circulating on whatsapp during the 2018 mexican elections and deliver corrections through private messaging.3 projects like this attempt to quickly reach a large audience through a medium people already use. other initiatives in multiple countries have attempted to crowdsource from citizen fact checkers. in recent years, some social media companies have highlighted fact checks on their platforms and used the assessments of fact checkers to inform other policy actions. for example, meta’s third party fact checking program routes facebook and instagram posts that contain potential falsehoods to fact checkers certified through the international fact checking network and applies a label if the posts are false or disputed.4 (for more on social media labeling, see case study 4.) beyond social media, fact checks can also be disseminated on dedicated websites or during televised political debates, among other possibilities. fact checking is well studied markedly more so than other interventions. nearly 200 articles related to fact checking published since 2013 were reviewed for this case study. however, the strong empirical research base also reveals that fact checking’s effectiveness depends on a complex interplay of multiple factors which remain poorly understood. research has only begun to probe the specific parameters that apparently affect fact checking’s impact, such as format, language, and source. additionally, much of the academic literature on fact checking comes from laboratory studies based on unrepresentative samples of university students, or from online quizzes based on crowdsourcing platforms like amazon’s mechanical turk raising questions about the findings’ generalizability. among other problems, the subjects of such studies may be more interested or engaged with fact checking content presented to them by experimenters, as compared with members of the general public who encounter such content organically. more research evaluating the longitudinal impact of ongoing fact checking efforts in a diverse set of real time, real world environments is still needed. a number of studies suggest that it is easier to cause people to disbelieve false claims but harder to change the behaviors related to those beliefs. for example, international studies have shown fact checks to have some success at changing beliefs about viral diseases, but they do not always lead to increased intent to receive vaccines or improved public health behaviors.5 this disconnect may be especially large for politically charged topics in divided societies. fact checking the claims of political figures has limited impact on voters’ support for a candidate or policy position even when the voters can correctly reject false claims.6 in general, studies find strong evidence of confirmation bias: subjects are more susceptible to false claims that align with preexisting beliefs or allegiances and are more resistant to fact checks associated with an opposing political party or its positions.7 in fact, research suggests that accuracy is not always a top of mind issue for news consumers. for example, one 2013 study suggested that individuals put more stock in the perceived trustworthiness (or sincerity) of a corrective source than in the source’s actual expertise on the relevant topic.8 in another study, right leaning, u.s. based participants who were asked to judge the validity of articles tended to provide “expressive” assessments aimed more at demonstrating their partisan allegiance than at seriously evaluating a source’s credibility.9 to be sure, many studies of fact checking and confirmation bias focus on u.s. audiences, where political polarization is especially strong.10 it is possible that partisan barriers to fact checking are less present in more unified societies.11 some research initially sparked concern that fact checking might perversely cause audiences to double down on their false beliefs. the term “backfire effect” was initially coined to describe this behavior in a 2010 article by political scientists brendan nyhan and jason reifler and took root in american public consciousness after the 2016 u.s. presidential election.12 however, more recent research (including by nyhan) suggests that backfiring may be a rare phenomenon. the efficacy of fact checks depends on many factors. the precise wording of fact checks matters, with more straightforward refutations being more effective than nuanced explanations. additionally, one 2015 study found that a fact check that provides an alternative “causal explanation for an unexplained event is significantly more effective than a denial even when the denial is backed by unusually strong evidence.”13 in other words, replacing a false story with a true story works better than merely refuting the false story. however, many of these factors remain poorly understood; for example, research is inconclusive on whether fact checks should repeat the false claim being debunked or avoid doing so. the use of emotion and storytelling in fact checks is another potentially important but under researched area. one study found that “narrative correctives,” which embed fact checks within an engaging story, can be effective and stories that end on an emotional note, such as fear or anger, work better than those that do not.14 another study suggested that anger and anxiety increase motivated reasoning and partisan reactions, although this did not seem to prevent fact checks from influencing users.15 one of the most important outstanding research areas is the durability of fact checks: how long is corrective information remembered and believed by the recipient? studies have reached complicated or conflicting results. some research, for example, has suggested that a recipient’s increase in knowledge of truthful information may last longer than any change in deeper beliefs or attitudes related to that knowledge.16 this finding highlights an important difference between informational knowledge and affective feeling both of which influence people’s beliefs and behaviors. a 2015 study found evidence that misinformation affected the audience’s sentiment toward public figures even after false claims were immediately debunked.17 the large number of ongoing fact checking efforts around the world indicates that this intervention can be undertaken at reasonable expense. some efforts, such as those incorporated into for profit journalistic enterprises, may even be self sustaining whether on their own or as part of a larger business model. initiatives like the international fact checking network have received financial and other support from philanthropists, tech companies, and universities. fact checking does face at least two scaling challenges. first, it often takes much more time and expertise to produce a fact check than to generate the false content being debunked. so long as fact checkers face this structural disadvantage, fact checking cannot be a comprehensive solution to disinformation. rather than scale up to match the full scope of false claims, fact checkers must instead do triage. second, fact checks require distribution mechanisms capable of competing effectively with the spread of disinformation. this means finding ways to reach the audience segments most vulnerable to disinformation. the faster and the more frequent the fact checks, the better. ideally, fact checking should occur before or at the same time as the false information is presented. but this is no easy task. given the significant investments already being made to produce fact checks, funders should ensure that distribution mechanisms are sufficient to fully leverage fact checkers’ work. technological innovation may help to reduce the cost of producing high quality fact checks and enable their rapid dissemination. crowdsourcing methods, such as twitter’s birdwatch (later renamed community notes on x), are one approach that merits further study.18 others have begun to test whether generative ai can be used to perform fact checks. while today’s generative ai tools are too unreliable to produce accurate fact checks without human supervision, they may nevertheless assist human fact checkers in certain research and verification tasks, lowering costs and increasing speed.19 ultimately, both crowdsourcing and ai methods still depend on the availability of authoritative, discoverable facts by which claims can be assessed. producing this factual baseline whether through science, journalism, or other knowledge seeking efforts is an important part of the fact checking cycle. this too requires funding. 1 victoria smith, “mapping worldwide initiatives to counter influence operations,” carnegie endowment for international peace, december 14, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/12/14/mapping worldwide initiatives to counter influence operations pub 83435; and “fact checking,” duke reporter’s lab, accessed january 27, 2023, https://reporterslab.org/fact checking. 2 “the coronavirusfacts/datoscoronavirus alliance database,” poynter institute, accessed december 10, 2023, https://www.poynter.org/ifcn covid 19 misinformation. 3 “verificado 2018,” online journalism awards, accessed december 10, 2023, https://awards.journalists.org/entries/verificado 2018. 4 “about fact checking on facebook and instagram,” meta, accessed march 22, 2023, https://www.facebook.com/business/help/2593586717571940?id=673052479947730. 5 john m. carey et al., “the effects of corrective information about disease epidemics and outbreaks: evidence from zika and yellow fever in brazil,” science advances 6 (2020), https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.aaw7449; jeremy bowles, horacio larreguy, and shelley liu, “countering misinformation via whatsapp: preliminary evidence from the covid 19 pandemic in zimbabwe,” plos one 15 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240005; and sara pluviano, sergio della sala, and caroline watt, “the effects of source expertise and trustworthiness on recollection: the case of vaccine misinformation,” cognitive processing 21 (2020), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32333126/. 6 see brendan nyhan, ethan porter, jason reifler, and thomas wood, “taking fact checks literally but not seriously? the effects of journalistic fact checking on factual beliefs and candidate favorability,” political behavior 42 (2019): https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11109 019 09528 x; briony swire thompson, ullrich k. h. ecker, stephan lewandowsky, and adam j. berinsky, “they might be a liar but they’re my liar: source evaluation and the prevalence of misinformation,” political psychology 41 (2020), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/pops.12586; oscar barrera, sergei guriev, emeric henry, and ekaterina zhuravskaya, “facts, alternative facts, and fact checking in times of post truth politics,” journal of public economics 182 (2017), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/s0047272719301859; and briony swire, adam j. berinsky, stephan lewandowsky, and ullrich k. h. ecker, “processing political misinformation: comprehending the trump phenomenon,” royal society open science 4 (2017), https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsos.160802. 7 antino kim and alan r. dennis, “says who? the effects of presentation format and source rating on fake news in social media,” mis quarterly 43, no. 3 (2019): https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2987866; ethan porter, thomas j. wood, and david kirby, “sex trafficking, russian infiltration, birth certificates, and pedophilia: a survey experiment correcting fake news,” journal of experimental political science 5, no. 2 (2018): https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal of experimental political science/article/sex trafficking russian infiltration birth certificates and pedophilia a survey experiment correcting fake news/cfeb9afd5f0aeb64df32d5a7641805b6; and jeong woo jang, eun ju lee, and soo yun shin, “what debunking of misinformation does and doesn’t,” cyberpsychology, behavior, and social networking 22, no. 6 (2019): https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/31135182. 8 jimmeka j. guillory and lisa geraci “correcting erroneous inferences in memory: the role of source credibility,” journal of applied research in memory and cognition 2, no. 4 (2013): https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2013.10.001; and pluviano and della sala, “effects of source expertise.” 9 maurice jakesch, moran koren, anna evtushenko, and mor naaman, “the role of source, headline and expressive responding in political news evaluation,” ssrn, january 31, 2019, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3306403. 10 consider thomas carothers and andrew o’donohue, “how americans were driven to extremes: in the united states, polarization runs particularly deep,” foreign affairs, september 25, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united states/2019 09 25/how americans were driven extremes. 11 consider michael j. aird, ullrich k. h. ecker, briony swire, adam j. berinsky, and stephan lewandowsky, “does truth matter to voters? the effects of correcting political misinformation in an australian sample,” royal society open science (2018), https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsos.180593. 12 the backfire effect was captured in brendan nyhan and jason reifler, “when corrections fail: the persistence of political misperceptions,” political behavior 32 (2010): https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11109 010 9112 2. the popular online comic the oatmeal featured commentary about the backfire effect, demonstrating its breakthrough into popular imagination; see “believe,” the oatmeal, accessed january 27, 2023, https://theoatmeal.com/comics/believe. however, other studies have since called the effect into question. see thomas wood and ethan porter, “the elusive backfire effect: mass attitudes’ steadfast factual adherence,” political behavior 41 (2019): https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11109 018 9443 y; see also kathryn haglin, “the limitations of the backfire effect,” research & politics 4 (2017): https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2053168017716547; and brendan nyhan, “why the backfire effect does not explain the durability of political misperceptions,” pnas 118 (2020): https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.1912440117. 13 brendan nyhan and jason reifler, “displacing misinformation about events: an experimental test of causal corrections,” journal of experimental political science 2 (2015): https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal of experimental political science/article/abs/displacing misinformation about events an experimental test of causal corrections/69550ab61f4e3f7c2cd03532fc740d05. 14 angeline sangalang, yotam ophir, and joseph n. cappella, “the potential for narrative correctives to combat misinformation,” journal of communication 69, no. 3 (2019): https://academic.oup.com/joc/article abstract/69/3/298/5481803?redirectedfrom=fulltext. 15 brian e. weeks, “emotions, partisanship, and misperceptions: how anger and anxiety moderate the effect of partisan bias on susceptibility to political misinformation,” journal of communication 65, no. 4 (2015): https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jcom.12164. 16 ethan porter and thomas wood, “the global effectiveness of fact checking: evidence from simultaneous experiments in argentina, nigeria, south africa, and the united kingdom,” pnas 118, no. 37 (2021): https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2104235118; see also john m. carey et al., “the ephemeral effects of fact checks on covid 19 misperceptions in the united states, great britain and canada,” nature human behaviour 6 (2022), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562 021 01278 3; and patrick r. rich and maria s. zaragoza, “correcting misinformation in news stories: an investigation of correction timing and correction durability,” journal of applied research in memory and cognition 9, no. 3 (2020): https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/s2211368120300280. 17 emily thorson, “belief echoes: the persistent effects of corrected misinformation,” political communication 33, no. 3 (2015): https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10584609.2015.1102187. 18 consider mevan babakar, “crowdsourced factchecking: a pie in the sky?” european journalism observatory, june 1, 2018, https://en.ejo.ch/specialist journalism/crowdsourced factchecking a pie in the sky. studies suggest interventions from users can be as or more effective than interventions from experts: consider leticia bode and emily k. vraga, “see something, say something: correction of global health misinformation on social media,” health communication 33, no. 9 (2018): https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10410236.2017.1331312; and jonas colliander, “this is fake news: investigating the role of conformity to other users’ views when commenting on and spreading disinformation in social media,” computers in human behavior 97 (august 2019): https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/s074756321930130x. 19 sam guzik, “ai will start fact checking. we may not like the results,” nieman lab, december 2022, https://www.niemanlab.org/2022/12/ai will start fact checking we may not like the results; and grace abels, “can chatgpt fact check? we tested,” nieman lab, may 31, 2023, https://www.poynter.org/fact checking/2023/chatgpt ai replace fact checking. key takeaways: there is a good body of evidence that labeling false or untrustworthy content with additional context can make users less likely to believe and share it. large, assertive, and disruptive labels are the most effective, while cautious and generic labels often do not work. reminders that nudge users to consider accuracy before resharing show promise, as do efforts to label news outlets with credibility scores. different audiences may react differently to labels, and there are risks that remain poorly understood: labels can sometimes cause users to become either overly credulous or overly skeptical of unlabeled content, for example. major social media platforms have embraced labels to a large degree, but further scale up may require better information sharing or new technologies that combine human judgment with algorithmic efficiency. key sources: social media companies are increasingly applying labels to content on their platforms, some of which aim to help users assess whether information is trustworthy. in this report, “labeling” refers to the insertion of relevant context or advisories to inform or influence how content is viewed, though without directly fact checking it. (for more on fact checking, see case study 3.) labels can be applied to a social media account (for example, identifying it as state sponsored media or satirical) or to individual posts. when a post links to another source, such as an external website, that source can be labeled (as with so called nutrition labels that score news outlets by their adherence to journalistic practices). alternatively, specific content or claims can be labeled as disputed, potentially outdated, or fast developing, for instance. some labels are prominent, use firm language, and require a user to click before seeing or interacting with the content. other labels are small, discreet, and neutrally worded. labels can be positive, like a digital signature that verifies video as authentic or a “verified” badge that purports to confirm an account’s identity. other labels do not seek to inform users, per se, but rather admonish or “nudge” them to follow good information practices. for example, a user seeking to reshare an article may encounter a message that encourages them to first read the article and/or consider its accuracy; such “friction” in user interfaces seeks to promote more deliberate, reflective behavior. additionally, many common platform design features can loosely be understood as labels. for example, platforms often display engagement data such as the number of likes, shares, or views alongside content. this data can influence users’ perceptions of the content’s accuracy and importance.1 facebook was among the first platforms to label misleading content after public concern about so called fake news and its influence on the 2016 u.s. presidential election.2 other platforms, including twitter (now x) and youtube, have also implemented labels of various kinds often spurred by major events such as the 2020 u.s. presidential election and the covid 19 pandemic. the academic literature on labeling is smaller than that on fact checking but still large compared to other interventions. social media companies began employing labels in earnest only in 2019, according to a carnegie database.3 independent studies of social media labels face methodological challenges due to researchers’ lack of access to private platform data on how users react to labels, though internal company research occasionally reaches the public domain through leaks, government inquiries, investigative journalism, or voluntary (if selective) disclosure. laboratory experiments can be helpful, but they do not fully simulate key aspects of real life social media usage. evidence suggests that large, prominent, and strongly worded labels can sometimes inhibit belief in and spread of false claims. however, other labels appear less effective. for example, studies show that labels which visually stand apart from the adjoining content are more effective than those that blend in. similarly, labels that deliver a clear warning for example, by pointing out that the content has previously appeared on an unreliable rumor site are more effective than those that merely note a claim is “disputed.”4 some internal research by platforms has also indicated that neutrally worded labels may be ineffective and can even lead users to gradually tune them out. during the covid 19 pandemic, facebook relied on independent fact checkers to determine whether covid 19 content was false or misleading; debunked content would then be labeled as such and algorithmically demoted. but “fact checkers were unable to review an overwhelming majority of the content in their queue” because of resource limitations, so facebook also applied neutral labels en masse to all other covid 19 content. these labels provided context “covid 19 vaccines go through many tests for safety and effectiveness and are then monitored closely” along with a link to authoritative information. according to meta’s oversight board, however, “initial research showed that these labels may have [had] no effect on user knowledge and vaccine attitudes” and “no detectable effect on users’ likelihood to read, create or re share” false claims.5 facebook reduced and ultimately rolled back these labels after finding that users became less likely to click through to the information page after repeated label exposure. source ratings, either by fact checkers or other users, have been shown to be effective at reducing engagement on articles with low scores. specifically, labels that score a news source’s credibility can influence users’ willingness to like, comment on, or share posts containing links to news articles. this is a promising finding for projects like newsguard, which ranks news sites on a 100 point rubric based on best practices for credible and transparent journalism.6 however, empirical studies of newsguard have had mixed results. a 2022 study found, on the one hand, that exposure to labels did “not measurably improve news diet quality or reduce misperceptions, on average, among the general population.” on the other hand, there was also “suggestive evidence of a substantively meaningful increase in news diet quality among the heaviest consumers of misinformation.”7 this split finding may be considered successful or unsuccessful depending on the specific problem such labels are intended to address. recent research suggests that labels containing accuracy nudges, which simply encourage users to consider accuracy before sharing content, are particularly promising. this is perhaps surprising, as one might assume that social media users already seek to consume and share what they deem to be accurate information. yet studies have highlighted a range of other motives such as amusement and partisan signaling that often influence user behavior.8 despite these psychological tendencies, research suggests that most users nevertheless value accuracy and that labels reminding them to consider accuracy make them less likely to share misinformation.9 in fact, such labels can reduce though not eliminate subjects’ inclination to believe and share false stories that align with their political beliefs.10 regardless of how labels are designed and implemented, the nature of the content or speaker being labeled can also influence user response. for example, new york university’s center for social media and politics found that during the 2020 election, tweets by then u.s. president donald trump which were labeled as disputed spread further than those without a label.11 this was not true for other politicians’ accounts in the sample, suggesting that labels on posts by extremely prominent individuals may perform differently from other labels. additional research on this topic for example, exploring figures other than trump and metrics beyond spread of the post would be valuable, because extremely prominent individuals are often responsible for a disproportionate amount of disinformation. like other interventions, labeling can sometimes have perverse effects. several studies found evidence that labeling some articles as false or misleading led users to become more credulous toward the remaining unlabeled headlines.12 researchers call this the “implied truth effect,” because users who become accustomed to seeing labels on some content may mistakenly assume that other content has also been vetted. such a perverse effect, if prevalent, could have significant consequences: labeling efforts often have limited scope and therefore leave the vast majority of content unlabeled. paradoxically, there is also some evidence of an opposite dynamic: fact checks or warning labels can sometimes increase overall audience skepticism, including distrust of articles that did not receive any rating.13 this might be called an “implied falsity effect.” little is known about either effect and why one, or both, of them may be present under varying circumstances. it is possible that geographical, topical, or other unidentified factors may influence the effectiveness of labels and the risk of unintended consequences.14 moreover, different audiences can respond differently to the same label. finally, it is worth remembering that labels explicitly focused on truth or reliability are not the only ways that platform interfaces actively shape how users perceive social media content. one study found that labeling posts with engagement metrics such as number of “likes” makes people more likely to share low credibility, high engagement posts.15 researchers should continue to explore the influence of general user interface design on disinformation, including whether and how common design elements may alter the efficacy of interventions like labeling. major platforms’ embrace of labels has shown that they can be scaled to a significant degree. labeling, in its various forms, has emerged as the dominant way that social media companies adjust their platforms’ design and functionality to counter disinformation and other kinds of influence operations. a carnegie database of interventions announced by major platforms between 2014 and 2021 found a surge in labeling and redirection (a related measure) since 2019, with 77 of 104 total platform interventions falling into these two categories.16 labels offer platforms a way of addressing disinformation without flatly banning or demoting content, actions that impinge more on users’ freedoms and tend to inspire stronger backlash. as a result of platforms’ experimentation with labels, technical barriers such as load latency, user friction, and so forth have been addressed or managed. however, labeling still carries some of the scaling limitations of fact checks. meta’s experience with labeling covid 19 information illustrates one of the choices facing platforms. they can rely on humans to apply more specific, opinionated, and ultimately effective labels to a smaller amount of content, or they can have algorithms automatically label more content with comparatively cautious, generic labels that tend to be less effective and are sometimes counterproductive. technological innovations could help to further combine both techniques, as better algorithms do more labeling work under human supervision and/or empower humans to label more efficiently. such innovations would test platforms’ willingness to apply strong labels to large amounts of content, potentially angering users who disagree with the labels. future studies can continue to examine the specifics of labels and probe the platforms’ processes for applying them.17 the increasing number of platforms presents another scaling challenge. content that is labeled on one platform may not be labeled on another. while some platforms shun labels based on an overall strategy of minimal content moderation, other platforms lack sufficient resources or simply haven’t faced the same public pressure as larger companies to confront disinformation. outside organizations could explore whether prodding smaller platforms and offering them resources such as technology, data, and best practices might encourage more labeling. 1 mihai avram, nicholas micallef, sameer patil, and filippo menczer, “exposure to social engagement metrics increases vulnerability to misinformation,” harvard kennedy school misinformation review 1 (2020), https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/exposure to social engagement metrics increases vulnerability to misinformation. 2 brian stelter, “facebook to start putting warning labels on ‘fake news’,” cnn, december 15, 2016, https://money.cnn.com/2016/12/15/media/facebook fake news warning labels. 3 for data on the rise of labeling and redirection, see kamya yadav, “platform interventions: how social media counters influence operations,” carnegie endowment for international peace, january 25, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/01/25/platform interventions how social media counters influence operations pub 83698. 4 björn ross, anna katharina jung, jennifer heisel, and stefan stieglitz, “fake news on social media: the (in)effectiveness of warning messages” (paper presented at thirty ninth international conference on information systems, san francisco, 2018), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328784235_fake_news_on_social_media_the_ineffectiveness_of_warning_messages. 5 “policy advisory opinion 2022 01, removal of covid 19 misinformation,” oversight board, april 2023, https://oversightboard.com/attachment/547865527461223. 6 “rating process and criteria,” newsguard, accessed february 7, 2023, https://www.newsguardtech.com/ratings/rating process criteria. 7 kevin aslett et al., “news credibility labels have limited average effects on news diet quality and fail to reduce misperceptions,” science advances 8, no. 18 (2022): https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.abl3844. 8 alexander bor et al., “‘fact checking’ videos reduce belief in, but not the sharing of fake news on twitter,” psyarxiv, april 11, 2020, https://osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/a7huq. 9 gordon pennycook et al., “shifting attention to accuracy can reduce misinformation online,” nature 592 (2021): https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586 021 03344 2; gordon pennycook et al., “fighting covid 19 misinformation on social media: experimental evidence for a scalable accuracy nudge intervention,” psychological science 31, no. 7 (2020): https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0956797620939054. 10 timo k. koch, lena frischlich, and eva lermer, “effects of fact checking warning labels and social endorsement cues on climate change fake news credibility and engagement on social media,” journal of applied social psychology 53, no. 3 (june 2023): https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jasp.12959?af=r; and megan duncan, “what’s in a label? negative credibility labels in partisan news,” journalism & mass communication quarterly 99, no. 2 (2020): https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1077699020961856?icid=int.sj full text.citing articles.17. 11 megan a. brown et al., “twitter put warning labels on hundreds of thousands of tweets. our research examined which worked best,” washington post, december 9, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/12/09/twitter put warning labels hundreds thousands tweets our research examined which worked best. 12 gordon pennycook, adam bear, evan t. collins, and david g. rand, “the implied truth effect: attaching warnings to a subset of fake news headlines increases perceived accuracy of headlines without warnings,” management science 66, no. 11 (november 2020): https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3478. 13 antino kim, patricia l. moravec, and alan r. dennis, “combating fake news on social media with source ratings: the effects of user and expert reputation ratings,” journal of management information systems 36, no. 3 (2019): https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07421222.2019.1628921. 14 jan kirchner and christian reuter, “countering fake news: a comparison of possible solutions regarding user acceptance and effectiveness,” proceedings of the acm on human computer interaction 4 (october 2020): https://www.peasec.de/paper/2020/2020_kirchnerreuter_counteringfakenews_cscw.pdf; and ciarra n. smith and holli h. seitz, “correcting misinformation about neuroscience via social media,” science communication 41, no. 6 (2019): https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1075547019890073. 15 avram, micallef, patil, and menczer, “exposure to social engagement metrics.” 16 yadav, “platform interventions.” 17 for an example of research that can be conducted with this data, see samantha bradshaw and shelby grossman, “were facebook and twitter consistent in labeling misleading posts during the 2020 election?” lawfare, august 7, 2022, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/were facebook and twitter consistent labeling misleading posts during 2020 election. key takeaways: there is strong evidence that truthful communications campaigns designed to engage people on a narrative and psychological level are more effective than facts alone. by targeting the deeper feelings and ideas that make false claims appealing, counter messaging strategies have the potential to impact harder to reach audiences. yet success depends on the complex interplay of many inscrutable factors. the best campaigns use careful audience analysis to select the most resonant messengers, mediums, themes, and styles but this is a costly process whose success is hard to measure. promising techniques include communicating respect and empathy, appealing to prosocial values, and giving the audience a sense of agency. key sources: counter messaging, in this report, refers to truthful communications campaigns designed to compete with disinformation at a narrative and psychological level instead of relying solely on the presentation of facts. counter messaging is premised on the notion that evidence and logic aren’t the only, or even the primary, bases of what people believe. rather, research has shown that people more readily accept claims which jibe with their preexisting worldviews and accepted stories about how the world works, especially if framed in moral or emotional terms.1moreover, claims are more persuasive when the messenger is a trusted in group member who appears to respect the audience members and have their best interests at heart. while such factors often facilitate the spread of disinformation, counter messaging campaigns seek to leverage them in service of truthful ideas. in a sense, counter messaging is no different from ordinary political communication, which routinely uses narratives, emotion, and surrogate messengers to persuade. but counter messaging is sometimes implemented with the specific goal of countering disinformation often because purely rational appeals, like fact checking, seem not to reach or have much impact on hard core believers of false claims. by changing the narrative frame around an issue and speaking in ways designed to resonate, counter messaging aims to make audiences more open to facts and less ready to accept sensational falsehoods. one example comes from poland, where xenophobia toward migrants from the middle east during the syrian civil war was fueled in part by false stories of disease and criminality.2 a polish counter messaging campaign called our daily bread featured a video of refugees and other marginalized people baking bread, a cherished polish activity. rather than presenting facts and evidence about the impact of migration on polish society or refuting false stories about migrants, the video instead used personal vignettes, evocative imagery, and unifying words. the video attracted significant media attention and was viewed more than 1 million times in the first day after its release.3 similarly, many efforts to promote covid 19 vaccines and counter disinformation about them employed themes of personal responsibility. other such efforts focused on recruiting local doctors as messengers, based on the premise that many people trust their family doctors more than national authorities.4 vaccine related public messaging campaigns also partnered with christian, jewish, and muslim faith leaders to reach religious communities in israel, the united kingdom, and the united states.5 as these examples indicate, counter messaging is not always exclusively aimed at countering false claims; other common objectives include promoting desirable behaviors, bolstering social cohesion, and rallying support for government policies. many initiatives have sought specifically to thwart terrorist recruitment under the banner of “countering violent extremism” and “deradicalization.” for example, the redirect method developed by jigsaw and moonshot used digital advertising to steer individuals searching for extremist content toward “constructive alternate messages.”6 other approaches have used one on one online conversations or in person mentorship relationships to dissuade those showing interest in extremism.7 while many of these efforts were designed to address islamic extremists, they have also been applied to white supremacist and other hate groups. for decades, disciplines such as social psychology, political science, communications, advertising, and media studies have researched issues relevant to counter messaging. fields that have themselves been subject to persistent disinformation such as public health and climate science have also devoted a great deal of attention to counter messaging in recent years. efforts to study and suppress hate and extremist groups are particularly relevant, because such groups often employ disinformation.8 nevertheless, these bodies of knowledge, though replete with useful insights, have generally not used disinformation as their primary frame for evaluating the efficacy of counter messaging. this leaves us to rely on analogies and parallels rather than direct evidence. the relevant literature highlights how hard it is to assess the impact of any form of persuasion. for example, many studies of covid 19 related counter messages measured changes in subjects’ reported attitudes or beliefs but were unable to verify whether those shifts persisted or led to behavioral changes.9 studies based on surveys or laboratory experiments are common, but these do not fully capture how audiences react in more natural settings. in the field of countering violent extremism, practitioners report lacking the expertise or resources to evaluate the impact of their work beyond using social media engagement metrics and their gut instinct.10 a review of online counter extremism interventions similarly found “virtually all” of the evaluations included in the study measured processes, like social media engagement, not outcomes. the review offered several proposals for more impact based assessments, such as the inclusion of calls to action like contacting a hotline, which can be quantified as a sign of behavior.11 the core insight of counter messaging that communications tailored to the narrative and psychological needs of a specific audience are more effective than generic, purely fact based approaches is well established.12 beyond this basic premise, however, it is difficult to generalize about counter messaging because of the intervention’s breadth, diversity, and overlap with ordinary politics. some forms seem capable of affecting individuals’ beliefs and, more rarely, influencing the behaviors informed by those beliefs. yet success may often depend on the interplay of a large number of factors that can be difficult to discern or control. a granular understanding of the audience should, in theory, enable the selection of mediums, messengers, messages, styles, and tones most likely to resonate with them.13 in practice, developing this audience understanding is a difficult task and determining the best communication approaches is an evolving science at best. one theme that emerges from many assessments of counter messaging, including public health and counter extremism interventions, is the importance of communicating respect and empathy. people are often put off by the sense that they are being debated or chastised.14 for example, counselors working with white supremacists had the most success in changing subjects’ views through sustained dialogue that avoided moral judgement.15 encouraging empathy toward others, such as religious minorities or immigrants, can also be effective; one study found that such messages make individuals more likely to delete their previous hate speech and less likely use hate speech again in the future.16 similar efforts may be useful in reaching the so called moveable middle, such as social media spectators who do not spread hateful content or false information themselves but are open to persuasion in either direction. for example, a study on anti roma hate speech in slovakia found more users left pro roma comments on anti roma posts after researchers intervened with counter speech.17 other studies have explored how moral and emotional framings affect audiences, including their perceptions of what is true. studies of climate change skepticism found that the most effective messages for countering misinformation offer individuals the sense that they can take meaningful action, as opposed to messages that portray the world as doomed.18 a review of public health messaging found some audience segments were moved more by calls to protect themselves or loved ones than by appeals to social responsibility.19 the speaker of the counter message seems to be quite important. studies in the rural united states found that friends and family members, community organizations, religious leaders, and medical professionals were the most effective messengers in responding to covid 19 rumors. in india, health professionals and peers were found to be the most trusted.20 given the influence of informal messengers like social peers, analysts have considered the possibility of using them for official objectives.21 volunteer groups countering disinformation, such as the lithuanian elves or the north atlantic fella organization, can bring scale, authenticity, and creativity traits that official efforts often lack.22 likewise, organic content used to rebut extremist claims and narratives appears more persuasive than government created content. there is a risk that poorly designed counter messaging campaigns can entrench or elevate the very views being rebutted.23 a u.s. department of state campaign called think again, turn away illustrates this problem. the anti islamic state campaign, launched in 2013, engaged directly with extremists on twitter but was ultimately deemed counterproductive. its graphic content and combative tone increased the visibility of islamic state accounts that replied to the campaign’s posts with anti u.s. rhetoric, while forcing the state department to engage on unflattering topics like the torture of iraqi prisoners at the abu ghraib prison.24 critics have claimed that think again, turn away was not focused on the drivers of online extremism and was too clearly affiliated with the u.s. government to serve as a credible messenger. these shortcomings point to the complexities of effective counter messaging and the need to carefully think through message control, effective messengers, appropriate mediums, and characteristics of the target audience. counter messaging faces implementation challenges due to its often reactive nature. campaigns frequently arise in response to a belated recognition that disinformation narratives have already grown in strength and impact. such narratives may have roots going back years, decades, or longer, and their adherents can build up psychological investments over a lifetime. the narratives underpinning disinformation also often evoke powerful emotions, like fear, which can be difficult to defuse once activated.25 to mitigate disinformation’s first mover advantages, counter messengers can try to anticipate such narratives before they spread for example, predicting attacks on mail in voting during the 2020 u.s. election but this is not always feasible. the need to tailor counter messaging to a specific audience and context makes scaling more difficult. reaching large audiences may require breaking them into identifiable subpopulations, each of which would then receive its own research, message development, and novel or even competing strategies. opting instead for a more generic, large scale campaign risks undercutting much of the specificity associated with effective counter messaging. moreover, broad campaigns increase the odds of misfires, such as the use of messages or messengers that persuade one audience while making another audience double down on its initial beliefs. elevating rumors or extremist viewpoints is a particular concern. when a concerning narrative is not yet widespread, campaigners may want to pair strategic silence on the national stage with more discrete messaging that targets specific populations more likely to encounter the narrative.26 when the narrative at issue has already become popular, a broad counter messaging strategy may be appropriate. new digital technologies have the potential to make counter messaging cheaper and easier to scale, just as innovation can aid in spreading disinformation. given the costs of effective counter messaging at scale, many campaigns seem only modestly funded. the state department’s now shuttered center for strategic counterterrorism communications spent only $6 million on digital outreach in 2012, the year before it launched think again, turn away.27 the center’s successor entity, the global engagement center, had a budget of more than $74 million in 2020.28 australia’s covid 19 vaccine awareness campaign which included multiple mediums and consultants for outreach to specific vulnerable communities cost about $24 million.29 for comparison, major brands spend much, much more on advertising (about 10 percent of total revenue, according to one survey).30 volunteer driven efforts, like the north atlantic fella organization, may be appealing partners for external funders due to their low cost and high authenticity. however, overt official support for such activities can diminish their credibility. extremism scholar benjamin lee suggests that looser relationships involving “provision of tools and training” might mitigate this risk.31 1 see laura livingston, “understanding the context around content: looking behind misinformation narratives,” national endowment for democracy, december 2021, https://www.ned.org/wp content/uploads/2021/12/understanding the context around content looking behind misinformation narratives laura livingston.pdf; and rachel brown and laura livingston, “counteracting hate and dangerous speech online: strategies and considerations,” toda peace institute, march 2019, https://toda.org/assets/files/resources/policy briefs/t pb 34_brown and livingston_counteracting hate and dangerous speech online.pdf. additionally, consider claire wardle, “6 types of misinformation circulated this election season,” columbia journalism review, november 18, 2016, https://www.cjr.org/tow_center/6_types_election_fake_news.php; see also paul goble, “hot issue   lies, damned lies and russian disinformation,” jamestown foundation, august 13, 2014, https://jamestown.org/program/hot issue lies damned lies and russian disinformation. as another example, charleston mass murderer dylann roof claimed to have been radicalized after a google search for “black on white crime.” see rebecca hersher, “what happened when dylann roof asked google for information about race?” npr, january 10, 2017, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo way/2017/01/10/508363607/what happened when dylann roof asked google for information about race. 2 for analysis of anti refugee and anti migrant disinformation, see judit szakács and éva bognár, “the impact of disinformation campaigns about migrants and minority groups in the eu,” european parliament, june 2021, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/regdata/etudes/idan/2021/653641/expo_ida(2021)653641_en.pdf. 3 to be sure, view count alone does not imply effectiveness. for more about the our daily bread campaign, see “video campaign aims to unify poland through the power of bread,” olga mecking, npr, may 21, 2018, https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2018/05/21/611345277/video campaign aims to unify poland through the power of bread. 4 kevin b. o’reilly, “time for doctors to take center stage in covid 19 vaccine push,” american medical association, may 21, 2021, https://www.ama assn.org/delivering care/public health/time doctors take center stage covid 19 vaccine push; and steven ross johnson, “doctors can be key to higher covid vaccination rates,” u.s. news & world report, february 28, 2022, https://www.usnews.com/news/health news/articles/2022 02 28/primary care doctors can be key to higher covid vaccination rates. 5 filip viskupič and david l. wiltse, “the messenger matters: religious leaders and overcoming covid 19 vaccine hesitancy,” political science & politics 55, no. 3 (2022): https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ps political science and politics/article/abs/messenger matters religious leaders and overcoming covid19 vaccine hesitancy/ed93d8bb6c73c8b384986d28b877e284; and daniel estrin and frank langfitt, “religious leaders had to fight disinformation to get their communities vaccinated,” npr, april 23, 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/04/23/990281552/religious leaders had to fight disinformation to get their communities vaccinate. 6 “the redirect method,” moonshot, accessed march 6, 2023, https://moonshotteam.com/the redirect method/; and “adl & moonshot partnered to reduce extremist violence during us presidential election, redirected thousands towards safer content,” anti defamation league, february 1, 2021, https://www.adl.org/resources/press release/adl moonshot partnered reduce extremist violence during us presidential. 7 jacob davey, jonathan birdwell, and rebecca skellett, “counter conversations: a model for direct engagement with individuals showing signs of radicalization online,” institute for strategic dialogue, february 2018, https://www.isdglobal.org/isd publications/counter conversations a model for direct engagement with individuals showing signs of radicalisation online; and jacob davey, henry tuck, and amarnath amarasingam, “an imprecise science: assessing interventions for the prevention, disengagement and de radicalisation of left and right wing extremists,” institute for strategic dialogue, 2019, https://www.isdglobal.org/isd publications/an imprecise science assessing interventions for the prevention disengagement and de radicalisation of left and right wing extremists. 8 on the link between disinformation, hate speech, and hate crimes, consider jonathan corpus ong, “online disinformation against aapi communities during the covid 19 pandemic,” carnegie endowment for international peace, october 19, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/10/19/online disinformation against aapi communities during covid 19 pandemic pub 85515. 9 consider viskupič and wiltse, “messenger matters”; scott bokemper et al., “testing persuasive messaging to encourage covid 19 risk reduction,” plos one 17 (2022): https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0264782; rupali j. limaye et al.,, “message testing in india for covid 19 vaccine uptake: what appeal and what messenger are most persuasive?,” human vaccines & immunotherapeutics 18, no. 6 (2022): https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21645515.2022.2091864; and lan li, caroline e. wood, and patty kostkova, “vaccine hesitancy and behavior change theory based social media interventions: a systematic review,” translational behavioral medicine 12, no. 2 (february 2022): https://academic.oup.com/tbm/article/12/2/243/6445967. 10 davey, tuck, and amarasingam, “imprecise science.” 11 todd c. helmus and kurt klein, “assessing outcomes of online campaigns countering violent extremism: a case study of the redirect method,” rand corporation, 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/rr2813.html. the metrics used to evaluate counter messaging efforts should align with the messenger’s desired outcome, which is not always a direct change in the original speaker’s belief or behavior. other goals of counter messaging include influencing passive bystanders to speak out or showing solidarity with a victimized community. see catherine buerger, “why they do it: counterspeech theories of change,” dangerous speech project, september 26, 2022, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4245211; and bianca cepollaro, maxime lepoutre, and robert mark simpson, “counterspeech,” philosophy compass 18, no. 1 (january 2023): https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/phc3.12890. 12 limaye et al., “message testing in india”; and li, wood, and kostkova, “vaccine hesitancy.” 13 “key takeaways from civil society in the visegrád region: fall 2019 practitioner convening,” over zero, 2019, https://www.projectoverzero.org/media and publications/key takeaways from civil society in the visegrd region fall 2019 practitioner convening. 14 consider viskupič and wiltse, “messenger matters.” 15 davey, birdwell, and skellett, “counter conversations”; and davey, tuck, and amarasingam, “imprecise science.” 16 dominik hangartner et al, “empathy based counterspeech can reduce racist hate speech in a social media field experiment,” pnas 118 (2021), https://www.pnas.org/doi/full/10.1073/pnas.2116310118. 17 buerger, “why they do it.” 18 alysha ulrich, “communicating climate science in an era of misinformation,” intersect: the stanford journal of science, technology, and society 16 (2023), https://ojs.stanford.edu/ojs/index.php/intersect/article/view/2395. 19 sanchin banker and joowon park, “evaluating prosocial covid 19 messaging frames: evidence from a field study on facebook,” judgment and decision making 15 (2023), https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/judgment and decision making/article/evaluating prosocial covid19 messaging frames evidence from a field study on facebook/9eadfb1c6f591ae1a8376c1622fb59d5. 20 consider viskupič and wiltse, “messenger matters”; angela k. shen et al., “trusted messengers and trusted messages: the role for community based organizations in promoting covid 19 and routine immunizations,” vaccine 41 (2023), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/s0264410x23001809; angela k. shen et al., “persuading the ‘movable middle’: characteristics of effective messages to promote routine and covid 19 vaccinations for adults and children   the impact of covid 19 on beliefs and attitudes,” vaccine 41 (2023), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/s0264410x2300141x; and limaye et al., “message testing in india.” 21 benjamin j. lee, “informal countermessaging: the potential and perils of informal online countermessaging,” studies in conflict & terrorism 42 (2019): https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610x.2018.1513697. 22 suzanne smalley, “collective of anti disinformation ‘elves’ offer a bulwark against russian propaganda,” cyberscoop, august 9, 2022, https://cyberscoop.com/collective anti disinformation elves russian propaganda; and adam taylor, “with nafo, ukraine turns the trolls on russia,” washington post, september 1, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/01/nafo ukraine russia. 23 davey, tuck, and amarasingam, “imprecise science.” 24 “digital counterterrorism: fighting jihadists online,” task force on terrorism and ideology, bipartisan policy center, march 2018, https://bipartisanpolicy.org/download/?file=/wp content/uploads/2019/03/bpc national security digital counterterrorism.pdf; rita katz, “the state department’s twitter war with isis is embarrassing,” time, september 16, 2014, https://time.com/3387065/isis twitter war state department; greg miller and scott higham, “in a propaganda war against isis, the u.s. tried to play by the enemy’s rules,” washington post, may 8, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national security/in a propaganda war us tried to play by the enemys rules/2015/05/08/6eb6b732 e52f 11e4 81ea 0649268f729e_story.html. 25 samuel woolley and katie joseff, “demand for deceit: how the way we think drives disinformation,” national endowment for democracy, january 2020, https://www.ned.org/wp content/uploads/2020/01/demand for deceit.pdf. 26 consider joan donovan and danah boyd, “stop the presses? moving from strategic silence to strategic amplification in a networked media ecosystem,” american behavioral scientist 65, no. 2 (2019): https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0002764219878229. 27 “state, socom partner to counter cyberterrorism,” simons center, june 6, 2012, https://thesimonscenter.org/ia news/state socom partner to counter cyberterrorism. 28 “inspection of the global engagement center,” office of the inspector general, u.s. department of state, september 15, 2022, https://www.oversight.gov/report/dos/inspection global engagement center. 29 “australia’s covid 19 vaccine information campaign begins,” australian department of health and aged care, january 27, 2021, https://www.health.gov.au/ministers/the hon greg hunt mp/media/australias covid 19 vaccine information campaign begins. 30 “marketing in a post covid era: highlights and insights report,” cmo survey, september 2022, https://cmosurvey.org/wp content/uploads/2022/09/the_cmo_survey highlights_and_insights_report september_2022.pdf. 31 lee, “informal countermessaging.” key takeaways: there is good reason to think that campaign  and election related cybersecurity can be significantly improved, which would prevent some hack and leak operations and fear inducing breaches of election systems. the cybersecurity field has come to a strong consensus on certain basic practices, many of which remain unimplemented by campaigns and election administrators. better cybersecurity would be particularly helpful in preventing hack and leaks, though candidates will struggle to prioritize cybersecurity given the practical imperatives of campaigning. election systems themselves can be made substantially more secure at a reasonable cost. however, there is still no guarantee that the public would perceive such systems as secure in the face of rhetorical attacks by losing candidates. key sources: cybersecurity improvements have been proposed as a way to mitigate two distinct kinds of election related disinformation and influence threats. one threat is hack and leak operations, which involve the theft and public exposure of sensitive information about candidates, campaigns, and other political figures. leaked data may be partially modified or fully authentic. russian state actors carried out notable hack and leaks during the u.s. presidential election in 2016, the french presidential election in 2017, and the uk general election in 2019.1 to prevent hack and leaks, many experts have called for increased cybersecurity protection of candidates, campaigns, and political parties, as well as government offices involved in election processes. this can be done through improved adherence to cybersecurity best practices, donated or discounted cybersecurity services, and specialized training, among other options.2 importantly, such efforts should extend to personal accounts and devices, not just official ones. in 2019, the u.s. federal election commission issued an advisory opinion that some political campaigns could receive free cybersecurity assistance from private firms without violating rules on corporate campaign contributions.3 the second threat is that hackers may probe or compromise election systems, such as the networks that hold voter registration data or vote tallies. if these operations are discovered and publicized, they can heighten fear that election outcomes are subject to manipulation, thereby reducing confidence in the results even if this fear is unwarranted. for example, a declassified report by the u.s. senate select committee on intelligence found that in 2016, russian actors were in a position to delete or modify voter registration data but did not do so. other u.s. election infrastructure was probed for vulnerabilities, but there was no evidence to suggest vote totals were modified.4 the cybersecurity of election systems can often be improved by implementing standard best practices applicable to any organization, such as proactively monitoring network activity, conducting penetration testing, and developing incident response plans. but election systems may also need security measures tailored to their unique context. such actions can include regularly backing up voter registration databases, certifying voting machines, maintaining a paper trail for electronic ballots, and conducting post election audits.5 the cybersecurity of election systems is intertwined with other aspects of election administration. for example, maintaining accurate electronic tallies of votes depends in part on ensuring that any paper ballots are physically secure and that election workers are properly supervised. (the role of electronic voting machines, a major policy question, is beyond the scope of this report.6) coordination, transparency, and communication are also areas of focus. the u.s. department of homeland security has designated election systems as “critical infrastructure,” allowing it to create structures for better communication between stakeholders and to provide security assistance, such as free cybersecurity assessments for election administrators.7 other u.s. examples include the elections infrastructure information sharing & analysis center, a voluntary coordination body created in 2020, and proposals for a national public database of voting system defects.8 the threat of cyber operations against campaigns and election infrastructure is well documented across several countries, but there are few detailed evaluations of the cybersecurity response. in general, the cybersecurity field has come to a strong consensus on certain basic practices to protect against threats. these include multifactor authentication, routine backups (kept segregated from originals), frequent patching, and vulnerability testing. other actions or principles that have gained favor in recent years include cloud migration, zero trust architecture, and threat intelligence. however, there is very little quantitative evidence of these practices’ comparative cost effectiveness. additionally, it is hard to judge the efficacy of best practices in thwarting a highly capable, persistent state actor. there is a clear causal link between improving campaign cybersecurity and reducing the risk of hack and leak operations. with election systems, however, cybersecurity is only half the battle. to maintain public confidence in election integrity, administrators must also convince people that systems are truly secure. this critical second step has received less attention from researchers and analysts. there is good reason to think that campaign  and election related cybersecurity can be significantly improved. a 2018 assessment of election administration in all fifty u.s. states found that a distressing number of states had not taken basic precautions, such as minimum cybersecurity standards for voter registration systems.9 this state of affairs may not be uncommon across government bodies in many countries. a 2022 cybersecurity audit of the u.s. federal government found that eight of the twenty three assessed agencies showed significant deficiencies in their ability to detect cyber incidents and protect themselves through basic policies like multifactor authentication and data encryption. in other words, there are still simple ways to improve cybersecurity in many governmental and political institutions, including campaign and election infrastructure.10 moreover, such investments would probably prevent a number of intrusions. a 2022 study by the research consultancy thoughtlab found that organizations which performed well against the national institute of standards and technology (nist) cybersecurity framework, a common benchmark used in many public  and private sector organizations in the united states and elsewhere, suffered somewhat fewer damaging cyber incidents than lower performing organizations.11 in addition to prevention, the nist framework also emphasizes preparedness to respond to and recover from an incident. the 2017 french presidential election provides a celebrated example: emmanuel macron’s campaign prepared for an eventual russian hack and leak operation by creating fake email addresses, messages, and documents so that stolen materials could not be verified and might discredit the leakers.12 immediate disclosure of all hacking attempts, both to authorities and the public, also built awareness of the disinformation threat to the election. this could be seen as a form of inoculation, or “pre bunking,” which refers to anticipating a specific disinformation narrative or technique and proactively confronting it before it spreads.13 however, it seems likely that other political, legal, and media factors also played a role in diminishing the influence of the russian operation. unfortunately, public fears of election irregularities cannot always be allayed by truthful assurances that election systems are secure. in united states (in 2020 2021) and brazil (in 2022 2023), false rhetorical attacks on the integrity of the electoral process by losing candidates and their supporters led to organized postelection violence.14 a side by side comparison of the two examples is revealing, because the two countries have substantially different voting systems. in the united states, a complex set of rules and practices delayed the vote count in a number of states, which laid the groundwork for conspiracy theories of electoral manipulation despite the presence of extensive safeguards and paper backed auditing mechanisms.15 brazil, in contrast, has an all electronic voting system that allows for rapid results though it lacks a paper trail to enable physical audits.16 despite these divergent approaches, both countries were destabilized by disinformation about election security. improving the cybersecurity of political campaigns faces significant cultural and leadership barriers. campaigns are ephemeral, frenetic environments. they employ large numbers of temporary workers and volunteers who are minimally vetted and trained. democratic politics also has an inherently open quality candidates and surrogates must interact with wide swaths of the public, both in person and online that runs at cross purposes with physical and cyber security. finally, a dollar spent on cybersecurity is a dollar not spent on winning votes. given these factors, campaigns and candidates often resist making cybersecurity a priority. in the eu, for example, political parties have chronically underfunded their own digital security.17 a dedicated eu fund could help, but politicians would still need to spend scarce time and attention on cybersecurity and accept the inconveniences that sometimes come with it. when the netherlands offered cybersecurity training to politicians and government officials before the country’s 2017 elections, few expressed interest.18 one off or annual trainings are also less effective than more frequent trainings let alone cultural and organizational shifts in behavior mandated and enforced by leadership.19 while some cultural shifts have indeed occurred in recent years across many countries, in campaigns and more generally, political campaigns will likely continue to lag behind other major organizations in their cybersecurity practices. one advantage of cybersecurity, as compared to other disinformation countermeasures, is that a proven set of best practices already exists and has been widely (if inconsistently) adopted in other sectors. this makes scaling much easier. however, cybersecurity is not necessarily cheap. the size and complexity of national elections and the number of necessary improvements mean that in the united states, at least the sums required are significant.20 in 2018, for example, the u.s. congress allocated $380 million for election security improvements including cybersecurity with millions more given by state governments.21 and in 2020, the covid 19 relief bill allocated another $400 million for elections, with state officials often prioritizing cybersecurity in their grant requests.22 experts tend to propose even larger and more sustained expenditures.23 the brennan center for justice has called for five year allocations of $833 million to help state and local governments with cybersecurity, $486 million to secure voter registration infrastructure, and $316 million to protect election agencies from “insider threats.”24 the cost of securing election infrastructure, while not trivial, seems modest given its foundational importance to democracy. still, governments must find the political will to make such investments. proposed measures to improve the security of the 2019 elections for the european parliament faced resistance from member states that viewed the problem as overhyped or were themselves complicit in election disinformation.25 1 hack and leak operations might be considered malinformation because the offending material is intended to harm yet is often authentic and factual. alternatively, such operations could be seen as disinformation to the extent that the term encompasses true but highly misleading information (for example, when crucial context is omitted). for more on this taxonomy, and relevant cybersecurity recommendations, see wardle and derakhshan, “information disorder.” for further examples of cybersecurity recommendations from this period, see also jean baptiste jeangène vilmer, “successfully countering russian electoral influence: 15 lessons learned from the macron leaks,” center for strategic international studies, june 2018, https://csis website prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs public/publication/180621_vilmer_countering_russiam_electoral_influence.pdf; brattberg and maurer, “russian election interference”; and fly, rosenberger, and salvo, “the asd policy blueprint.” 2 robby mook, matt rhoades, and eric rosenbach, “cybersecurity campaign playbook,” november 2017, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/cybersecurity campaign playbook. 3 “cloudflare for campaigns: united states,” cloudflare, accessed april 21, 2023, https://www.cloudflare.com/campaigns/usa. 4 “russian active measures campaigns and interference in the 2016 u.s. election, volume 1: russian efforts against election infrastructure with additional views,” u.s. senate select committee on intelligence (16th congress, report 116 xx), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume1.pdf. 5 danielle root, liz kennedy, and michael sozan, “election security in all 50 states,” center for american progress, february 12, 2018, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/election security 50 states; brattberg and maurer, “russian election interference”; “statement by secretary jeh johnson on the designation of election infrastructure as a critical infrastructure subsector,” u.s. department of homeland security, january 6, 2017, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/01/06/statement secretary johnson designation election infrastructure critical; and “recommendations to defend america’s election infrastructure,” brennan center for justice, october 23, 2019, https://www.brennancenter.org/our work/research reports/recommendations defend americas election infrastructure. 6 “recommendations,” brennan center for justice. 7 “starting point: u.s. election systems as critical infrastructure,” u.s. election assistance commission, accessed march 28, 2023, https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/6/starting_point_us_election_systems_as_critical_infrastructure.pdf; and “dhs cybersecurity services catalog for election infrastructure,” u.s. department of homeland security, accessed march 28, 2023, https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/6/dhs_cybersecurity_services_catalog_for_election_infrastructure.pdf. 8 root, kennedy, and sozan, “election security”; “recommendations,” brennan center for justice ; and “elections infrastructure information sharing & analysis center,” center for internet security, accessed april 21, 2023, https://www.cisecurity.org/ei isac. 9 root, kennedy, and sozan, “election security.” 10 “federal cybersecurity progress report for fiscal year 2022,” u.s. general services administration, 2022, https://www.performance.gov/cyber. see also “cross sector cybersecurity performance goals,” u.s. cybersecurity and infrastructure security agency, 2022, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2022_00092_cisa_cpg_report_508c.pdf. 11 “framework for improving critical infrastructure cybersecurity,” national institute of standards and technology, april 16, 2018, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/cswp/nist.cswp.04162018.pdf; and “cybersecurity solutions for a riskier world,” thoughtlab, 2022, https://thoughtlabgroup.com/cyber solutions riskier world. 12 see jeangène vilmer, “successfully countering”; and brattberg and maurer, “russian election interference.” 13 for more on pre bunking, see case studies 3 and 7. 14 dean jackson and joão guilherme bastos dos santos, “a tale of two insurrections: lessons for disinformation research from the jan. 6 and 8 attacks,” lawfare, february 27, 2023, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/tale two insurrections lessons disinformation research jan 6 and 8 attacks 0. 15 see william t. adler, “to stop election related misinformation, give election officials the resources they need,” center for democracy and technology, november 13, 2020, https://cdt.org/insights/to stop election related misinformation give election officials the resources they need. 16 william t. adler and dhanaraj thakur, “a lie can travel: election disinformation in the united states, brazil, and france,” center for democracy and technology, december 2021, https://cdt.org/wp content/uploads/2021/12/2021 12 13 cdt kas a lie can travel election disinformation in united states brazil france.pdf. see also philip bump, “the uncomplicated reason brazil can count its ballots so quickly,” washington post, october 31, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/10/31/brazil elections vote count united states. 17 sam van der staak, “the weak link in election security: europe’s political parties,” politico, june 8, 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/european election security political parties cybersecurity. 18 brattberg and maurer, “russian election interference.” 19 isabella harford, “how effective is security awareness training? not enough,” techtarget, april 5, 2022, https://www.techtarget.com/searchsecurity/feature/how effective is security awareness training not enough. 20 lawrence norden and edgardo cortés, “what does election security cost?” brennan center for justice, august 15, 2019, https://www.brennancenter.org/our work/analysis opinion/what does election security cost. 21 elizabeth howard et al., “defending elections: federal funding needs for state election security,” brennan center for justice, july 18, 2019, https://www.brennancenter.org/our work/research reports/defending elections federal funding needs state election security. 22 zach montellaro, “coronavirus relief bill allocates $400m for election response,” politico, march 26, 2020, https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning score/2020/03/26/coronavirus relief bill allocates 400m for election response 786407; and “funding safe and secure elections during the covid 19 pandemic,” e.republic center for digital government, 2020, https://papers.govtech.com/a better way to find new jobs and careers 136728.html/funding safe and secure elections during covid 19 129933.html. on the general state of election administration finances, see tom scheck, geoff hing, sabby robinson, and gracie stockton, “how private money from facebook’s ceo saved the 2020 election,” npr, december 8, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/12/08/943242106/how private money from facebooks ceo saved the 2020 election. 23 rachel orey, “new election security funding positive but misses the mark,” february 28, 2023, bipartisan policy center, https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/new election security funding. 24 norden and cortés, “what does election security cost?”; and lawrence norden, derek tisler, and turquoise baker, “estimated costs for protecting election infrastructure against insider threats,” brennan center for justice, march 7, 2022, https://www.brennancenter.org/our work/research reports/estimated costs protecting election infrastructure against insider. see also derek tisler and lawrence norden, “estimated costs for protecting election workers from threats of physical violence,” brennan center for justice, may 3, 2022, https://www.brennancenter.org/our work/research reports/estimated costs protecting election workers threats physical violence. 25 erik brattberg, “the eu’s looming test on election interference,” carnegie endowment for international peace, april 18, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/18/eu s looming test on election interference pub 78938; and sam van der staak and peter wolf, “cybersecurity in elections: models of interagency collaboration,” international idea, 2019, https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/cybersecurity in elections models of interagency collaboration.pdf. key takeaways: cyber operations targeting foreign influence actors can temporarily frustrate specific foreign operations during sensitive periods, such as elections, but any long term effect is likely marginal. there is little evidence to show that cyber operations, sanctions, or indictments have achieved strategic deterrence, though some foreign individuals and contract firms may be partially deterrable. bans on foreign platforms and state media outlets have strong first order effects (reducing access to them); their second order consequences include retaliation against democratic media by the targeted state. all in all, the most potent tool of statecraft may be national leaders’ preemptive efforts to educate the public. yet in democracies around the world, domestic disinformation is far more prolific and influential than foreign influence operations. key sources: when disinformation and other influence operations stem from abroad, governments can use a range of foreign policy tools to respond. these include sanctions, indictments, media regulation or bans, public statements by government officials, and cyber operations. the u.s. government has been particularly prolific in many of these areas. after the russian effort to interfere in the 2016 election, washington announced a number of sanctions on russian individuals and organizations.1 it also announced criminal charges in 2018 against five russian organizations and nineteen russian individuals, in 2021 against two iranian men, and in 2022 against three russian men, among others.2 although indictments of foreign nationals for influence operation related activities are unusual globally, sanctions are becoming more common.3 in 2022, the united kingdom sanctioned several individuals and media outlets accused of serving as propagandists for moscow.4 the same year, a report from the european parliament noted that the eu does not have a “specific regime of sanctions related to foreign interference and disinformation campaigns orchestrated by foreign state actors” and called for one to be developed.5 also that year, in the lead up to the u.s. midterm elections, the u.s. government announced its use of “full spectrum cyber operations” to “defend and disrupt” influence attempts and “impose costs on foreign actors who seek to undermine democratic processes.”6 overt foreign influence activities can be regulated or banned altogether. the united states has in recent years stepped up enforcement of the foreign agents registration act, which requires state affiliated media and others speaking on behalf of foreign interests to disclose their sponsorship. similar rules went into effect in 2018 in australia (where the government also made covert influence efforts a crime) and were proposed in 2022 in the united kingdom.7 restrictions can also be imposed on foreign state media outlets: the eu and united kingdom both banned russian state broadcaster rt following russia’s full scale invasion of ukraine.8 (in the united states, cable providers also dropped the station, leading it to cease operations there.) these bans extended to the outlet’s online presence. some governments have also banned foreign social media platforms seen as vehicles for adversarial influence and espionage: ukraine banned russia’s vkontakte in 2017 and india banned tiktok, which is owned by a chinese company, in 2020. finally, many experts have called on political leaders to “be open and outspoken about the nature of the challenge” because “awareness . . . of russian [and other] information warfare is the most potent defense against it.”9 this may entail general warnings of the threat: for example, then finnish defense minister carl haglund in 2014 and then british prime minister theresa may in 2017 both gave blunt descriptions of the overall challenge posed by russian influence operations.10 analysts also suggest using more direct statements tactically during or, better yet, in advance of specific influence operations. experts praised macron’s campaign for its preparedness against the russian hack and leak operation in 2017, the uk government for its quick response to the poisoning of sergei and yulia skripal in 2018, and the u.s. government for its tactical release of intelligence in 2022 to pre bunk potential russian false flag operations in ukraine.11 there appears to be no empirical scholarship measuring the success of sanctions, indictments, or cyber operations as counter disinformation tools. some useful analogies can be drawn from cases where these tools were used against other kinds of hostile activities, such as foreign cyber operations. but this literature, too, is largely anecdotal. intelligence agencies may be better positioned to assess the efficacy of foreign policy tools by directly observing how foreign actors privately perceive and react to such moves. such intelligence is mostly kept secret, however, and government officials have not given clear public characterizations. cyber operations against disinformation actors offer a qualified exception: u.s. officials have claimed some tactical and operational disruptions. an example is the u.s. cyber operation targeting the internet research agency in russia prior to the 2018 midterm elections.12 (many of these government actions have occurred in tandem with platforms’ removals of inauthentic asset networks, discussed in case study 8.) bans on both broadcast and digital foreign state media have been subject to a small number of limited empirical studies. the best studied tool may be proactive and assertive statements by officials, which have a real (though circumstantial) research basis. although these statements have not received direct empirical study, related areas of scholarship support the notion that they can help prepare and protect the public. foreign policy tools may have varied goals when used against influence operations. they can seek to deter further influence activity (by the same foreign actors or other foreign actors), disrupt foreign influence capabilities (especially during sensitive periods such as elections), or exert a signaling effect (educating the public, affirming redlines to adversaries, and rallying the international community).13 a broad based deterrence that leads foreign actors to halt all or much of their influence operations seems out of reach so far, probably because the punishments inflicted to date are not severe enough to outweigh the perceived benefits of influence operation for state perpetrators. for example, despite numerous u.s. sanctions and indictments, russia and iran persisted as the largest sources of influence operations removed by facebook, with many of their operations across platforms targeting the united states.14 more realistically, democratic states could aim for so called micro level deterrence: by targeting low  and mid level individual perpetrators with sanctions that limit their personal travel, finances, and relationships, these individuals and some others could be dissuaded from participating in influence operations.15 for foreign governments, micro level deterrence would impose modest organizational costs and friction over time. there is little direct public evidence this works, but it is plausible under the right circumstances.16 a concrete example of operational friction came in 2018, when u.s. cyber command reportedly disrupted the digital infrastructure of russia’s internet research agency. officials told the washington post that “[t]he blockage was so frustrating to the trolls that they complained to their system administrators about the disruption.”17 u.s. officials offered equivocal assessments of the operation’s larger effects. one senator claimed that it successfully prevented “very serious” russian election interference, while a defense official said the goal was simply to “throw a little curveball, inject a little friction, sow confusion.” as washington continues to institutionalize this kind of activity as a routine part of its federal election plans, the goal of imposing “a little friction” on adversaries for specific time periods seems like a realistic long term aspiration.18 for media bans, research on ukraine’s 2017 ban of the russian social media service vkontakte provides a small window into the potential efficacy of similar tactics elsewhere. a study found that “the sudden censorship policy reduced activity on vkontakte,” even among pro russia users and despite the ban being “legally and technically” easy to circumvent.19 this indicates that media bans can have impacts despite imperfect enforcement, because convenience of access remains an important driver of media consumption. similar dynamics have been observed in other highly restricted media environments, such as china.20 likewise, russian state media channels on u.s. platforms like youtube, facebook, and twitter suffered significant declines in engagement in 2022 due to platforms’ efforts to block these pages or limit their reach, though a cat and mouse game ensued as russian outlets created new accounts and channels to evade platform restrictions.21 these results, if generalizable, would imply that restrictions on foreign media have strong first order effects. further research on the vkontakte ban and similar bans should measure not only first order effects (like activity on the banned platform) but second  and third order effects as well to determine, for example, whether pro russia users migrated to other platforms, remained interested in pro russia propaganda, or lost further trust in the ukrainian government. it should also examine whether any reciprocal bans of western media by the russian government counterbalanced the potential benefits of restrictions on russian state media. leaders’ public statements calling attention to foreign influence operations, while not the subject of direct empirical study, have substantial indirect grounding in evidence. long standing psychological research holds that when individuals are aware of and plan to resist attempts at persuasion, it makes their original beliefs stronger; analysts today suggest this creates a first mover advantage through which early warnings of an influence operation can harden resistance to it.22 a related idea also supported by the literature is pre bunking.23 bipartisan statements may be especially effective: evidence from fact checking studies shows that corrective measures against disinformation are more effective when the speaker belongs to the same party as the audience (and are less effective when they do not).24 a barrier to this approach arises when partisan leaders see no advantage in debunking a disinformation narrative, or when they seek political advantages by discrediting the work of fact checkers. there is also the potential risk of so called perception hacking, when an operation causes public concern out of line with its actual effect, diminishing public confidence and trust. officials should be wary of overreactions that play into the hands of disinformers.25 perhaps the most important limitation on statecraft as a counter influence tool is the fact that foreign actors are responsible for only a small portion of disinformation. researchers and investigators around the world overwhelmingly agree on this broad principle notwithstanding the diverse information environments in different countries and the powerful professional and political incentives to emphasize foreign threats.26 domestic actors are almost always more numerous, vocal, resourced, sophisticated, networked, and invested in local political outcomes than foreign entities. this does not mean that foreign influence should be ignored. but it suggests that policymakers’ intense focus on the issue may not reflect a realistic assessment of risk.27 rather, foreign disinformation may garner disproportionate attention for the simple reason that many democratic governments have more freedom of action in foreign than domestic policy, especially when it comes to regulating information. sanctions, indictments, and media regulations are generally cheap compared to other countermeasures, but they require nontrivial bureaucratic resources to design, develop, and enforce. in the united states, sanctions and indictments targeting foreign influence actors have sometimes been announced many months or even years after the influence activity. others have been imposed much more quickly. this suggests that the difficulty of investigating and punishing foreign influence actors may depend on circumstantial factors, such as the amount of evidence immediately available, the preexisting intelligence on the responsible actors, and the perceived urgency of a response. cyber operations are generally more time  and resource intensive for governments than sanctions, indictments, or media regulations. increasing the use of these tools could come at the cost of other foreign policy objectives. countries may worry that punitive measures will trigger retaliation, jeopardize unrelated negotiations with the targeted state, set diplomatic precedents that constrain their own behavior, or expose intelligence sources and methods, among other possibilities. in 2016, for example, the administration of then u.s. president barack obama took limited steps to thwart russian influence but “did not know the full range of moscow’s capabilities” and was afraid that harsh measures would prompt even more aggressive election disruption, according to a bipartisan senate report.28 the administration also feared domestic confidence in the election’s outcome and fairness would be negatively impacted if it did not tread carefully.29 additionally, washington was trying at the time to coax russia into helping end the syrian civil war. in another case, western countries’ bans of rt in 2022 prompted moscow to retaliate by banning the bbc, voice of america, and other western services in russia restricting their ability to deliver alternative perspectives on the ukraine war in ukraine.30 moscow and other state adversaries have used this kind of state media restriction to question western countries’ commitment to free speech abroad and have even used it as a badge of honor by establishing new channels like “¡censúrame otra vez!” (“censor me again!”) to target non western audiences.31 1 “treasury sanctions russian cyber actors for interference with the 2016 u.s. elections and malicious cyber attacks,” u.s. department of the treasury, march 15, 2018, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press releases/sm0312. 2 devlin barrett, “u.s. indicts two iranian hackers over 2020 election disinformation campaign,” washington post, november 18, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national security/iran hackers election 2020 indicted/2021/11/18/605ae112 4898 11ec b05d 3cb9d96eb495_story.html; and kevin breuninger, “doj charges 3 russians with running ‘foreign influence and disinformation network’ in u.s.,” cnbc, april 14 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/14/doj charges 3 russians with running foreign influence and disinformation network in us.html. 3 fried and polyakova, “democratic defense against disinformation.” 4 “foreign secretary announces sanctions on putin’s propaganda,” foreign ministry of the united kingdom, march 31, 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign secretary announces sanctions on putins propaganda  2. 5 “report on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the european union, including disinformation,” european parliament, 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/a 9 2022 0022_en.html. 6 “how u.s. cyber command, nsa are defending midterm elections: one team, one fight,” u.s. department of defense, august 25, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/news/news stories/article/article/3138374/how us cyber command nsa are defending midterm elections one team one fight. 7 on australia, see “foreign influence transparency scheme,” australian government attorney general’s department, accessed march 13, 2023, https://www.ag.gov.au/integrity/foreign influence transparency scheme; henry belot, “malcolm turnbull announces biggest overhaul of espionage, intelligence laws in decades,” australian broadcasting corporation, december 4, 2017, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017 12 05/turnbull announces foreign interference laws/9227514; and matt schrader, “friends and enemies: a framework for understanding chinese political interference in democratic countries,” german marshall fund, april 2020, https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/wp content/uploads/2020/05/friends and enemies a framework for understanding chinese political interference in democratic countries.pdf. on the united kingdom, see “foreign influence registration scheme to make clandestine political activity illegal,” uk home office, october 18, 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign influence registration scheme to make clandestine political activity illegal. 8 mark thompson, “britain bans russian state tv channel rt,” cnn business, march 18, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/18/media/uk bans russia rt tv/index.html; foo yun chee, “eu bans rt, sputnik over ukraine disinformation,” reuters, march 2 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu bans rt sputnik banned over ukraine disinformation 2022 03 02. 9 keir giles, “countering russian information operations in the age of social media,” council on foreign relations, november 21, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/report/countering russian information operations age social media. 10 for sources on theresa may, see paul m. barrett, tara wadhwa, and dorothée baumann pauly, “combating russian disinformation: the case for stepping up the fight online,” nyu stern center for business and human rights, july 2018, https://issuu.com/nyusterncenterforbusinessandhumanri/docs/nyu_stern_cbhr_combating_russian_di?e=31640827/63115656; and rowena mason, “theresa may accuses russia of interfering in elections and fake news,” guardian, november 14, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/nov/13/theresa may accuses russia of interfering in elections and fake news. for sources on finland, see keir giles, “russia’s ‘new’ tools for confronting the west: continuity and innovation in moscow’s exercise of power,” chatham house, march 2016, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/2016 03 russia new tools giles.pdf; and aleksi teivainen, “report: haglund was quick to pick up on russia’s disinformation campaigns,” helsinki times, march 24, 2016, https://www.helsinkitimes.fi/finland/finland news/domestic/13884 report haglund was quick to pick up on russia s information campaigns.html. 11 lizzie dearden, “emmanuel macron email leaks ‘linked to russian backed hackers who attacked democratic national committee,’” independent, may 6, 2017, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/emmanuel macron leaks hack en marche cyber attack russia dnc marine le pen election france latest a7721796.html; thomas kent, “disinformation response   the critical early hours,” center for european policy analysis, march 31, 2021, https://cepa.org/article/disinformation response the critical early hours; and adam taylor, “u.s. says putin could use ‘false flag’ as excuse for war. similar accusations have defined putin’s career,” february 18, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/18/ukraine putin false flag. 12 andy greenberg, “us hackers’ strike on russian trolls sends a message but what kind?,” wired, february 27, 2019, https://www.wired.com/story/cyber command ira strike sends signal. 13 jon bateman, “the purposes of u.s. government public cyber attribution,” carnegie endowment for international peace, march 28, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/03/28/purposes of u.s. government public cyber attribution pub 86696. 14 see barrett, wadhwa, and baumann pauly, “combating russian disinformation”; ben nimmo and david agranovich, “recapping our 2022 coordinated inauthentic behavior enforcements,” meta, december 15, 2022, https://about.fb.com/news/2022/12/metas 2022 coordinated inauthentic behavior enforcements; and “disinfodex,” disinfodex, accessed january 27, 2023, https://disinfodex.org. 15 gabriel band, “sanctions as a surgical tool against online foreign influence,” lawfare, september 15, 2022, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/sanctions surgical tool against online foreign influence. 16 bateman, “the purposes of u.s. government.” 17 ellen nakashima, “u.s. cyber command operation disrupted internet access of russian troll factory on day of 2018 midterms,” washington post, february 27, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national security/us cyber command operation disrupted internet access of russian troll factory on day of 2018 midterms/2019/02/26/1827fc9e 36d6 11e9 af5b b51b7ff322e9_story.html. 18 sean lyngaas, “us ‘actively defending against foreign interference and influence’ in midterms, cyber command says,” cnn, august 25, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/08/25/politics/election security midterms cyber command/index.html. 19 yevgeniy golovchenko, “fighting propaganda with censorship: a study of the ukrainian ban on russian social media,” journal of politics 84 (2022): https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/716949. 20 yuyu chen and david y. yang, “the impact of media censorship: 1984 or brave new world?,” american economic review 109, no. 6 (june 2019): https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20171765. 21 see elizabeth dwoskin, jeremy b. merrill, and gerrit de vynck, “social platforms’ bans muffle russian state media propaganda,” washington post, march 16, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/03/16/facebook youtube russian bans; see also will oremus and cat zakrzewski, “big tech tried to quash russian propaganda. russia found loopholes,” washington post, august 10, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/08/10/facebook twitter russian embassy accounts propaganda. 22 zakary l. tormala and richard e. petty, “source credibility and attitude certainty: a metacognitive analysis of resistance to persuasion,” journal of consumer psychology 14 (2004): https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/s1057740804701692; christopher paul and miriam matthews, “the russian ‘firehose of falsehood’ propaganda model: why it might work and options to counter it,” rand corporation, 2016, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/pe198.html. 23 jon roozenbeek et al., “psychological inoculation improves resilience against misinformation on social media,” science advances 8 (2022); and laura garcia and tommy shane, “a guide to prebunking: a promising way to inoculate against misinformation,” first draft, june 29, 2021, https://firstdraftnews.org/articles/a guide to prebunking a promising way to inoculate against misinformation. 24 nyhan, “why the backfire effect.” 25 greg myre, “a ‘perception hack’: when public reaction exceeds the actual hack,” npr, november 1, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/11/01/929101685/a perception hack when public reaction exceeds the actual hack. 26 carissa goodwin and dean jackson, “global perspectives on influence operations investigations: shared challenges, unequal resources,” carnegie endowment for international peace, february 9, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/02/09/global perspectives on influence operations investigations shared challenges unequal resources pub 86396. 27 consider nimmo and agranovich, “recapping our 2022”; and goodwin and jackson, “global perspectives.” 28 karoun demirjian and devlin barrett, “obama team’s response to russian election interference fell short, senate report says,” washington post, february 6, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national security/obama teams response to russian election interference fell short senate report says/2020/02/06/93c2fdac 48f2 11ea 9164 d3154ad8a5cd_story.html. 29 philip ewing, “fact check: why didn’t obama stop russia’s election interference in 2016?,” npr, february 21, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/02/21/587614043/fact check why didnt obama stop russia s election interference in 2016. 30 “russia blocks bbc website, says it’s only beginning of its response,” reuters, march 16, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/russia blocks bbc website says its only beginning its response 2022 03 16/ 31 joseph bodnar, “rt en español won’t stay off youtube,” german marshall fund, march 8, 2023, https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/rt en espanol wont stay off youtube. key takeaways: the detection and removal from platforms of accounts or pages that misrepresent themselves has obvious merit, but its effectiveness is difficult to assess. fragmentary data such as unverified company statements, draft platform studies, and u.s. intelligence suggest that continuous takedowns might be capable of reducing the influence of inauthentic networks and imposing some costs on perpetrators. however, few platforms even claim to have achieved this, and the investments required are considerable. meanwhile, the threat posed by inauthentic asset networks remains unclear: a handful of empirical studies suggest that such networks, and social media influence operations more generally, may not be very effective at spreading disinformation. these early findings imply that platform takedowns may receive undue attention in public and policymaking discourse. key sources: social media companies in the past five years have detected and removed many different networks of fake assets such as accounts, pages, groups, and events used to manipulate platforms. these assets are inauthentic, meaning they misrepresent their identity and purpose, and they work together as part of a disinformation campaign or influence operation. such operations may involve automated activity, human control, or a blend of the two.1 major platforms hire in house investigators, contract out to third party firms, and form partnerships with researchers to detect and respond to inauthentic asset networks. platforms also receive tips from governments based on intelligence or law enforcement information. separately, governments sometimes seek to induce platforms to remove content inauthentic or otherwise via legal processes, informal requests, or political pressure.2 (removal of authentic content, such as accounts that openly belong to terrorist groups, is beyond the scope of this case study.) when social media companies remove influence operations asset networks, they often reference objectives like the preservation of authenticity, the right to access reliable information, or the importance of safeguarding elections.3 the policy terms and definitions they use to define the problem differ.4 meta uses the term “coordinated inauthentic behavior” when referring to the use of multiple assets to mislead the company or the public or to evade enforcement of meta’s policies; this term has become a shorthand for industry observers and has subsequently been adopted by tiktok (which provides fewer details on its definition).5 x refers to “information operations” in its policies on platform manipulation and spam, and it bans “inauthentic engagements” and “coordinated activity, that attempts to artificially influence conversations through the use of multiple accounts, fake accounts, automation and/or scripting.”6 google’s threat analysis group (which also covers youtube) refers to “coordinated influence operations.”7 most information about platforms’ takedowns (removals) of inauthentic asset networks comes from the platforms themselves. major platforms have periodically disclosed takedown actions, sometimes in collaboration with outside investigators. the disinfodex database contains 326 disclosures by facebook, twitter, google/youtube, and reddit between september 2017 and august 2021.8 however, the amount of detail provided such as the number and type of illicit accounts identified, the narratives employed, the level of user engagement achieved, the perpetrator assessed to be responsible, and the platform policies violated varies considerably. among efforts to improve transparency in this area is the eu’s 2022 strengthened code of practice on disinformation, which calls for signatories to standardize data on influence operations across platforms and report them to governments in more granular detail.9 disclosures of individual takedowns, however informative, still leave open the more fundamental question: to what degree do these takedowns succeed in reducing the prevalence or impact of disinformation? there is virtually no published research that directly bears on this question. for one thing, the success of takedowns depends in part on the responses of bad actors, such as foreign governments and unscrupulous public relations firms. do takedowns impose enough operational cost and potential public embarrassment on the bad actors to inhibit disinformation campaigns, or do they adjust fairly easily? platforms and intelligence agencies each have some insight here, but adversarial behavior is inherently hard to observe, may differ from actor to actor, and can change over time. moreover, platforms do not typically share many (or any) details from their internal research on takedowns, and when fragmentary findings do come to light, they are difficult to interpret in isolation. for example, some platforms have cited positive long term impacts from their takedowns but did not quantify these claims, specify how they were measured, or share supporting data. given this gap, leaked copies of internal platform research have provided valuable information to the public. yet these leaks are infrequent and often come in forms (such as draft, historical, or incomplete documents) or contexts (such as personnel disputes) that partially cloud their meaning. moreover, very little is known about the effectiveness of social media influence operations themselves and, therefore, how important it is to disrupt them. major social media platforms have greatly increased the number of disclosed takedowns since 2016, which is due in part to a surge of investigative resources. but the covert nature of influence operations makes it hard to say how many remain undetected. if the increase in reported takedowns stems in part from a growing number of influence operations being carried out globally, then the takedowns could be tactically effective but strategically insufficient. platforms may also be disclosing a greater portion of the takedowns they perform in response to increased public demands for action. by the same token, news reports of influence operations are increasing year over year, which may mean either that operations are increasing or that there is greater public interest in the issue (or both).10 in terms of strategic impact, facebook reported in 2021 that it had “made progress against [influence operations] by making [them] less effective and by disrupting more campaigns early, before they could build an audience.” furthermore, these efforts were said to have forced “threat actors to shift their tactics,” pushing them to operate on less popular platforms and invest greater resources in secrecy.11 such claims are difficult to independently evaluate, however, because the platform provides only limited data access to outside researchers.12 facebook’s claim of strategic progress appears to be an outlier in the industry; other major platforms have not publicly claimed that their takedowns are having broad effects. this silence may itself be an important indication that broad effects remain difficult to achieve or at least measure. in fact, a draft outside review commissioned by twitter in 2021 (and leaked by a former executive) found that “analysts are unable to identify and analyze evolving threats or changes in the [tactics, techniques, and procedures] of threat actors, or measure the effectiveness of action and enforcement, because information is not being preserved.”13 twitter employees apparently believed that the company’s system of “removal ultimately [did] not discourage adversaries from attempting to exploit and leverage the platform, or add costs to their operations because they can quickly adapt.” the u.s. intelligence community, which has its own unique vantage on foreign influence actors, has offered some tentative praise of platform takedowns. intelligence analysts looking back at the 2020 election found that russia’s internet research agency adopted some “short lived” and perhaps ineffectual new tactics “probably in response to efforts by u.s. companies and law enforcement to shut down” the kind of inauthentic personas used in 2016.14 additionally, repeated public disclosures of foreign influence campaigns “probably helped counter them to some degree” in 2020 by improving societal awareness, reducing the deniability of russia and iran, and helping china see that covert influence was not “advantageous enough for [it] to risk getting caught meddling.” nevertheless, u.s. agencies in 2020 “tracked a broader array of foreign actors taking steps to influence u.s. elections than in past election cycles.” to the extent that social media takedowns can reduce the number and impact of inauthentic asset networks, the ultimate benefit to society depends on the danger posed by those networks. the greater the likely negative effects of an influence operation on society, the more important it is to discover and remove the illicit asset network used to carry out the operation. unfortunately, very little is known about the effects of online influence operations. echoing the consensus of experts, meta’s global threat intelligence lead, ben nimmo, calls assessing influence operations’ impact “one of the most difficult questions for investigators.”15 (u.s. intelligence agencies are prohibited from even trying to answer the question because it would require analyzing american politics.16) a princeton university meta analysis commissioned by carnegie found only one rigorous, empirical study of “what has arguably been the greatest focus of policymakers since 2016: the threat of foreign governments using social media to sway voters in democratic elections.”17 that study, on russia’s efforts to influence u.s. twitter users during the 2016 presidential election, found no effect on user beliefs. another analysis found that the impact of russia’s internet research agency in 2016 was likely small.18 meanwhile, a landmark 2018 paper in science suggested that human users are more responsible than automated accounts for the rapid spread of false information online.19 although inauthentic asset networks are not necessarily automated, the finding calls attention to the huge quantity of disinformation being organically generated and disseminated online, unrelated to any covert influence campaign. these early findings suggest that platform takedowns while undoubtedly necessary may receive undue attention in policy conversations about how best to counter disinformation and influence operations. one limit of removing inauthentic asset networks is that it does not address increasingly prominent coordinated efforts from authentic networks to spread disinformation for example, the online activists who organized the january 6 insurrection in the united states and the january 8 riot in brazil.20 platforms have fewer rules specifically prohibiting authentic coordinated behavior, even if it results in disinformation, because they are sensitive to accusations of viewpoint censorship and do not want to prevent genuine social movements from coordinating online. this gap in community standards led facebook to draft a policy against “coordinated social harm,” building on policies against “violence inducing conspiracy networks,” which the company previously used to justify a ban on the qanon conspiracy movement.21 recent scholarship suggests that removal of networks like these on one platform (which includes banning or deplatforming authentic user accounts) can have unintended consequences: banned users may migrate to fringe platforms where they create and engage with content more extreme and harmful than what is allowed on mainstream platforms, potentially accelerating their radicalization.22 detecting and removing inauthentic asset networks appears to be moderately expensive, though social media companies have not released specific cost breakdowns. more often, companies give total spending or staffing figures that aggregate many varied aspects of safety and security. as of 2021, facebook reportedly had “hundreds” of “full time policy experts tackling foreign influence operations and misinformation” of which an unknown subset were focused on threat intelligence and asset removal.23 twitter/x has had far fewer dedicated staff (the exact number was disputed) even prior to mass layoffs in 2022 2023, and these employees complained internally about antiquated and inadequate tools and technology.24 comparing the two companies raises challenging questions about what level of investment in takedowns is necessary, cost effective, and affordable for different platforms. on the one hand, meta has many times more users than twitter/x and is a much larger company, so its level of investment should naturally be greater. on the other hand, in countries like the united states, the influence of twitter/x on political discourse has long been disproportionate to the platform’s overall size.25 even so, meta has had greater ability and incentive to invest in takedowns due to its superior financial performance and the extraordinary public scrutiny it faced after 2016. zuckerberg told investors in 2017 that “we’re [now] investing so much in security that it will impact our profitability” a statement of financial strength whereas twitter/x has only ever had two profitable years in its history.26 the gap in total safety investments has widened further since businessman elon musk bought twitter and began implementing drastic cost cuts while repudiating many traditional trust and safety practices. regardless, it is clear that the further scaling up of takedowns at any platform would require considerable new staffing, technology, and time. according to the 2021 twitter memo, one employee believed that twitter could plausibly aim to “add cost to adversaries” (such as those who create inauthentic asset networks) and therefore make strategic progress against them, but that such an effort “would realistically take two years [to] build out.”27 additionally, the resources required to investigate illicit asset networks extend beyond the platforms themselves. a growing number of independent companies and nonprofits conduct similar investigations, often in collaboration with platforms. outside investigators have reported chronic resource constraints and fiscal uncertainty.28 it is important to note that most major platforms have focused their investigative resources in lucrative western markets, where advertisers, regulators, and civil society create the greatest pressure for visible action. independent investigators, too, are heavily concentrated in north america and europe. there is widespread concern that influence operations continue uninhibited in places where platforms and others have invested fewer investigative resources.29 this suggests a large untapped opportunity, but it also indicates the high cost of scaling takedowns globally. 1 the scope of this paper was informed by the european union’s 2022 strengthened code of practice on disinformation, which covers issues such as fake account creation, bot driven amplification, and other forms of platform manipulation under “integrity of services.” see “2022 strengthened code of practice on disinformation,” european commission, june 16, 2022, https://digital strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/2022 strengthened code practice disinformation. 2 see jan rydzak, “the stalled machines of transparency reporting,” november 29, 2023, carnegie endowment for international peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/11/29/stalled machines of transparency reporting pub 91085. 3 see “inauthentic behavior,” meta, accessed january 27, 2023, https://transparency.fb.com/policies/community standards/inauthentic behavior; “platform manipulation and spam policy,” x, march 2023, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules and policies/platform manipulation; and “civic integrity policy,” x, august 2023, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules and policies/election integrity policy. 4 for more on how different platform policies address influence operations, see jon bateman, natalie thompson, and victoria smith, “how social media platforms’ community standards address influence operations,” april 1, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/04/01/how social media platforms community standards address influence operations pub 84201. 5 “inauthentic behavior,” meta; evelyn douek, “what does ‘coordinated inauthentic behavior’ actually mean?,” slate, july 2, 2020, https://slate.com/technology/2020/07/coordinated inauthentic behavior facebook twitter.html; and “election integrity,” tiktok, accessed january 27, 2023, https://www.tiktok.com/safety/en sg/election integrity. 6 vijaya gadde and yoel roth, “enabling further research of information operations on twitter,” twitter, october 17, 2021, https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2018/enabling further research of information operations on twitter; and “platform manipulation and spam policy,” x. 7 shane huntley, “tag bulletin: q3 2022,” google, october 26, 2022, https://blog.google/threat analysis group/tag bulletin q3 2022. 8 carnegie analysis of “disinfodex,” disinfodex. 9 “2022 strengthened code,” european commission. 10 samantha bradshaw, hannah bailey, and philip n. howard, “industrialized disinformation: 2020 global inventory of organized social media manipulation,” oxford internet institute, 2021, https://demtech.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/posts/industrialized disinformation. 11 “threat report: the state of influence operations 2017 2020,” meta, may 2021, https://about.fb.com/wp content/uploads/2021/05/io threat report may 20 2021.pdf. 12 see camille françois and evelyn douek, “the accidental origins, underappreciated limits, and enduring promises of platform transparency reporting about information operations,” journal of online trust & safety 1 (2021): https://tsjournal.org/index.php/jots/article/view/17; and samantha lai, naomi shiffman, alicia wanless, “operational reporting by online services: a proposed framework,” carnegie endowment for international peace, may 18, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/05/18/operational reporting by online services proposed framework pub 89776. 13 joseph menn, elizabeth dwoskin, and cat zakrzewski, “former security chief claims twitter buried ‘egregious deficiencies,’” washington post, august 23, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/interactive/2022/twitter whistleblower sec spam. 14 “foreign threats to the 2020 us federal elections,” u.s. national intelligence council, march 10, 2021, https://www.dni.gov/files/odni/documents/assessments/ica declass 16mar21.pdf. 15 ben nimmo, “assessing the impact of influence operations through the breakout scale,” carnegie endowment for international peace, october 25, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/10/25/perspectives for influence operations investigators pub 88208#breakout. 16 “foreign threats to the 2020 us federal elections,” u.s. national intelligence council. 17 bateman, hickok, courchesne, thange, and shapiro, “measuring the effects.” 18 joshua a. tucker, “the limited room for russian troll influence in 2016,” lawfare, october 27, 2020, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/limited room russian troll influence 2016; see also gregory eady et al., “exposure to the russian internet research agency foreign influence campaign on twitter in the 2016 us election and its relationship to attitudes and voting behavior,” nature communications 14 (2023), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467 022 35576 9. 19 soroush vosoughi, deb roy, and sinan aral, “the spread of true and false news online,” science 359 (2018): https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.aap9559. 20 jackson and dos santos, “tale of two insurrections.” 21 nathaniel gleicher, “removing new types of harmful networks,” meta, september 16, 2021, https://about.fb.com/news/2021/09/removing new types of harmful networks; and “an update to how we address movements and organizations tied to violence,” meta, october 17, 2022, https://about.fb.com/news/2020/08/addressing movements and organizations tied to violence. 22 see tamar mitts, “banned: how deplatforming extremists mobilizes hate in the dark corners of the internet,”, tel aviv university, october 18, 2021, https://social sciences.tau.ac.il/sites/socsci.tau.ac.il/files/media_server/governemnt/mitts_digital_ct_banned.pdf; and tamar mitts, nilima pisharody, and jacob shapiro, “removal of anti vaccine content impacts social media discourse,” (paper presented at the 14th acm web science conference, barcelona, june 26 29, 2022), https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3501247.3531548. 23 joseph menn, elizabeth dwoskin, and cat zakrzewski, “twitter can’t afford to be one of the world’s most influential websites,” washington post, september 4, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/09/04/twitter mudge alethea resources. 24 menn, dwoskin, and zakrzewski, “twitter can’t afford”; and menn, dwoskin, and zakrzewski, “former security chief.” 25 menn, dwoskin, and zakrzewski, “twitter can’t afford.” 26 ben popper, “facebook’s business is booming, but it says preventing abuse will cut into future profits,” the verge, november 1, 2017, https://www.theverge.com/2017/11/1/16593812/facebook earnings q3 third quarter 2017; and matthew mahoney, “twitter and its fight for profitability,” michigan journal of economics, december 21, 2022, https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/mje/2022/12/21/twitter and its fight for profitability. 27 “current state assessment,” althea group, as attached to menn, dwoskin, and zakrzewski, “former security chief.” 28 see victoria smith and jon bateman, “best practice guidance for influence operations research: survey shows needs and challenges,” carnegie endowment for international peace, august 2, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/08/02/best practice guidance for influence operations research survey shows needs and challenges pub 87601; dean jackson, “influence operations researchers want guidance on best practice, but what does that mean?” carnegie endowment for international peace, december 5, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/05/influence operations researchers want guidance on best practice but what does that mean pub 88517; and victoria smith and natalie thompson, “survey on countering influence operations highlights steep challenges, great opportunities,” carnegie endowment for international peace, december 7, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/12/07/survey on countering influence operations highlights steep challenges great opportunities pub 83370. 29 see odanga madung, “jack dorsey’s twitter failed african countries,” wired, december 3, 2021, https://www.wired.com/story/jack dorseys twitter failed african countries; and goodwin and jackson, “global perspectives.” key takeaways: data privacy protections can be used to reduce the impact of microtargeting, or data driven personalized messages, as a tool of disinformation. however, nascent scholarship suggests that microtargeting while modestly effective in political persuasion falls far short of the manipulative powers often ascribed to it. to the extent that microtargeting works, privacy protections seem to measurably undercut its effectiveness. but this carries high economic costs not only for tech and ad companies, but also for small and medium businesses that rely on digital advertising. additionally, efforts to blunt microtargeting can raise the costs of political activity in general, especially for activists and minority groups who lack access to other communication channels. key sources: beginning in 2017, two major disclosures the cambridge analytica scandal and the revelations of russian social media advertising during the 2016 u.s. election focused western attention on how personal data can enable political influence.1 in the ensuing flurry of analysis, disinformation experts began recommending stronger data privacy laws and practices. while these had long been advocated on privacy grounds, they were now also put forth as a means of countering disinformation by reducing the power of microtargeting and algorithmic content moderation.2 there were at least two related concerns. first, observers feared that microtargeted messages were more effective at mobilizing, persuading, or even manipulating their audiences. such persuasive power was the central value proposition of social media companies to advertisers, but it also positioned platforms as a potent means of spreading disinformation for both foreign and domestic actors. today’s digital microtargeting represents an evolution of earlier techniques: in the 2004 u.s. presidential campaign, republican strategist karl rove assembled profiles of voters based on personal data, like credit card records, and sent differentiated direct mail ads to each segment.3 new technology now enables far more advanced methods: online advertisers can use automated tools to develop and deploy an ad in thousands of distinct variations, testing which ones get the most traction with various audiences.4 second, the prevailing business model of social media use of personal data to curate content in ways that capture users’ attention and serve them more, and more effective, advertisements also came under criticism. the model was seen as an engine for the spread of misleading, incendiary content, including disinformation, and therefore bore responsibility for serious harm to democracies around the world.5 (see case study 10 for more on social media algorithms.) the largest and highest profile policy response was the eu’s general data protection regulation (gdpr).6 the gdpr requires that commercial entities operating in the eu or “monitoring the behaviour of individuals in the eu” receive user consent to collect personal data and that they collect the minimum necessary data for their purpose.7 anonymized data is excluded from the regulation, and organizations must take steps to protect identity through pseudonymization processes like encryption as soon as feasible in the collection process. larger companies must have a data protection officer charged with overseeing compliance; violations can incur large fines.8 since the gdpr’s passage, many policymakers, analysts, and activists have called for the united states and other countries to adopt more privacy policies of their own.9 the gdpr faced obstacles in limiting the use of personal data for political messaging: for example, some eu member states used their regulatory autonomy to make crucial exemptions for political parties, and many regulations are unclear about which entities are responsible for compliance and what counts as a political advertisement as opposed to an issue advertisement.10 some of these gaps are being filled by the eu’s digital services act (dsa), which passed in 2022, and further political advertisement rules currently being finalized.11 they define political advertisements more clearly as ads run by politicians or campaigns or about legislation or elections. they also limit what type of data can be used for political microtargeting; only very basic information like age and language can be used during election periods, and there are permanent restrictions on the use of sensitive data like political orientation.12 these strengthened restrictions are weaker than some officials proposed. in january 2022, for instance, the eu’s data protection agency called for a ban on all microtargeted political ads, as have the european parliamentary delegations from several countries.13 technology companies have also taken voluntary steps to reduce the granularity of microtargeting and the invasiveness of data collection. perhaps most dramatically, in october 2019, twitter banned all political advertising though the company struggled to differentiate political and issue advertisements and reversed this policy after its acquisition by musk.14 in 2019, google limited political ad targeting to “age, gender, and general location”; in 2021, the company also announced several new limits on how it would profile and target third party ads across the internet.15 in 2021, facebook also restricted microtargeting options for political and sensitive topics.16 additionally, in early 2022, apple made a change to its ios software that prevented companies from tracking user activity across third party apps and websites. unlike some other types of countermeasures, data privacy has recent achievements that can be evaluated on real world impact. unfortunately, while analysts generally find that recent privacy efforts by the eu, tech companies, and others have somewhat reduced the amount and power of microtargeting, there has been very little scholarship that directly assesses their impact on disinformation.17 much more analysis has focused on other impacts, such as the economic costs of privacy efforts, which may nevertheless have an indirect relationship to disinformation.18 additionally, the efficacy of this intervention has much to do with how persuasive data driven advertising is to begin with. digital microtargeting’s immense power is a key claim of technology companies, advertising firms, and political consultants. the sheer size of the digital ad industry attests to widespread belief in this marketing claim: $600 billion is spent annually in the sector, which has given rise to several of the world’s most valuable companies. however, there is little scholarship or independent analysis to substantiate industry claims, particularly in the context of political advertising.19 a 2020 study noted that “literature on the effects of [political microtargeting] techniques is scarce.” 20 the dangers of political microtargeting, while often discussed, are still largely unknown.21 recent studies provide some experimental evidence on the effects of political and commercial microtargeting.22 however, much of the literature on political advertising comes from the united states, which has several distinctive election dynamics including a polarized two party system, a loose set of campaign finance regulations, and a remarkably long election season (allowing more advertising of all kinds).23 research findings from the united states might not apply elsewhere. moreover, studies of political microtargeting have generally focused on whether such advertisements change people’s votes. swaying voter preferences, while undoubtedly important, is not always the only or most important effect or purpose of political disinformation. influencing voter turnout by energizing supporters, discouraging opponents, or tricking people about voting rules can be equally or more impactful in some elections. microtargeted disinformation might also aim to alter political dynamics in more complicated and indirect ways, like by increasing levels of distrust, fear, or apathy. no studies specifically assessing such effects were found. nascent scholarship suggests that microtargeting is somewhat effective for political campaigns but falls far short of the manipulative powers often ascribed to it. a 2018 experiment in the netherlands examined issue based targeting a tactic used by candidates, parties, and other interest groups to show ads about specific topics, such as crime or reproductive rights, to the voters most likely to care about those topics. the study found that ads microtargeted by issue did not increase the salience of that issue but did modestly improve the likelihood that subjects would vote for the political party whose branding was used in the message.24 the authors stressed that microtargeted ads competed with many other sources of information that voters encounter, adulterating the ads’ influence. for this reason, microtargeting like other forms of advertising may be more effective in smaller elections, like local or primary races, that attract less attention than national contests.25 similar results were found in the few studies of personality based (also called psychometric or psychographic) microtargeting. these techniques, famously practiced by cambridge analytica, seek to target individuals prone to certain feelings, such as anger.26 while cambridge analytica is now widely considered to have oversold its capabilities, academic experiments have found that personality based microtargeted political ads can be more effective than regular ads at increasing positive feelings toward a candidate. however, evidence is mixed about whether such microtargeting does any more than traditional ads to influence viewers’ voting preferences a crucial test of electoral persuasion.27 if microtargeting is modestly effective, then how much do privacy protections reduce its persuasive power? evidence suggests the change can be meaningful. one study associated the gdpr with a 12 percent decrease in page views and e commerce revenue following its implementation.28 another study estimated that affected businesses suffered an 8 percent loss of profits and a 2.2 percent drop in sales.29 while these studies did not directly examine disinformation or political persuasion, they provide indirect evidence that privacy protections can make digital ads measurably less effective. since the eu passed the gdpr, several countries and some u.s. states have implemented their own privacy laws.30 it seems likely that, in time, most democracies will have significantly more privacy protections than they do today. moves by major tech companies, such as apple and google, also suggest a perceived market demand for better privacy. privacy has its own inherent and practical value, which should be a major (perhaps primary) factor in any cost benefit analysis of expanded data protections. on the other hand, studies have shown high compliance costs and even higher lost revenue for firms and advertisers.31 the gdpr, according to some estimates, cost companies hundreds of billions of dollars.32 similarly, apple’s ios changes cost meta an estimated $10 billion a year in revenue and contributed to a $250 billion decline in meta’s market value.33 research by the information technology and innovation foundation, a pro business think tank, estimates that stricter u.s. privacy laws could cost the american economy $122 billion annually.34 some scholars argue the cost will be lower if many users opt out of the protections but this will also dilute the law’s counter disinformation potential.35 although giant tech and advertising companies can most likely bear the cost of privacy regulations, much of the cost would fall on others such as small  and medium sized enterprises that rely on digital advertising to attract customers.36 rather than reducing data collection across the board, policymakers could instead place stricter limits on the use of microtargeting for political purposes. the eu’s dsa takes this approach (albeit on top of existing gdpr rules). however, strict limits on political advertising make it harder for politicians to reach voters. if applied to issue ads, limits can also reduce the reach of activists, who have come to rely on digital advertising to compete with powerful interests and raise the salience of neglected issues or perspectives.37 conversely, if restrictions on issue ads are too lenient, such ads become an easy way to avoid restrictions on political microtargeting. one way to address these problems would be to pair data privacy and microtargeting restrictions with broader campaign finance reforms, such as public financing of elections or stronger political spending disclosures. 1 consider nathaniel persily, “the 2016 u.s. election: can democracy survive the internet?” journal of democracy 28 (april 2017): https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the 2016 u s election can democracy survive the internet. 2 one commentator, for example, called data privacy laws an “elegant arrow in the quiver of responses to online disinformation” that can “protect against foreign and homegrown trolls alike.” see alex campbell, “how data privacy laws can fight fake news,” just security, august 15, 2019, https://www.justsecurity.org/65795/how data privacy laws can fight fake news. see also balázs bodó, natali helberger, and claes de vreese, “political micro targeting: a manchurian candidate or just a dark horse?” internet policy review 6 (2017): https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/political micro targeting manchurian candidate or just dark horse; and dipayan ghosh and ben scott, “digital deceit: the technologies behind precision propaganda on the internet,” new america, january 23, 2018, https://www.newamerica.org/pit/policy papers/digitaldeceit. 3 “karl rove: the architect,” pbs frontline, april 12, 2005, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/architect. for more discussion on the definition of micro targeting, see tom dobber, damian trilling, natali helberger, and claes de vreese, “effects of an issue based microtargeting campaign: a small scale field experiment in a multi party setting,” information society 39 (2022): https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01972243.2022.2134240. 4 “personal data: political persuasion,” tactical tech, march 2019, https://cdn.ttc.io/s/tacticaltech.org/methods_guidebook_a4_spread_web_ed2.pdf. 5 nathalie maréchal and ellery roberts biddle, “it’s not just the content, it’s the business model: democracy’s online speech challenge,” new america, march 17, 2020, https://www.newamerica.org/oti/reports/its not just content its business model; see also anthony nadler, matthew crain, and joan donovan, “weaponizing the digital influence machine: the political perils of online ad tech,” data & society, october 2018, https://datasociety.net/library/weaponizing the digital influence machine. 6 for one example, see karen kornbluh, “could europe’s new data protection regulation curb online disinformation?,” council on foreign relations, february 20, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/blog/could europes new data protection regulation curb online disinformation. 7 “who does the data protection law apply to?” european commission, accessed december 10, 2023, https://commission.europa.eu/law/law topic/data protection/reform/rules business and organisations/application regulation/who does data protection law apply_en. 8 matt burgess, “what is gdpr? the summary guide to gdpr compliance in the uk,” wired uk, march 24, 2020, https://www.wired.co.uk/article/what is gdpr uk eu legislation compliance summary fines 2018; “anonymisation and pseudonymisation,” university college london, accessed april 5, 2023, https://www.ucl.ac.uk/data protection/guidance staff students and researchers/practical data protection guidance notices/anonymisation and; and joshua gresham, “is encrypted data personal data under the gdpr?,” international association of privacy professionals, march 6, 2019, https://iapp.org/news/a/is encrypted data personal data under the gdpr. 9 zachey kliger, “a federal data privacy law may be the best tool to combat online disinformation,” tech policy press, april 16, 2021, https://techpolicy.press/a federal data privacy law may be the best tool to combat online disinformation; see also campbell, “how data privacy laws.” 10 “gdpr loopholes facilitate data exploitation by political parties,” privacy international, april 30, 2019, https://privacyinternational.org/news analysis/2836/gdpr loopholes facilitate data exploitation political parties. 11 “the digital services act package,” european commission, accessed april 5, 2023, https://digital strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/digital services act package; and “transparency and targeting of political advertising: eu co legislators strike deal on new regulation,” european council, november 7, 2023, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press releases/2023/11/07/transparency and targeting of political advertising eu co legislators strike deal on new regulation. 12 clothilde goujard, “european parliament votes to transform online political campaigning,” politico europe, february 2, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/european parliament approves its position on political advertising law; and mark scott and clothilde goujard, “5 things you need to know about europe’s political ad rules,” politico europe, november 23, 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/political ads europe facebook google. 13 “online targeting for political advertising: stricter rules are necessary,” office of the european data protection supervisor, january 20, 2022, https://edps.europa.eu/press publications/press news/press releases/2022/online targeting political advertising stricter_en; and goujard, “european parliament votes.” 14 kate conger, “twitter will ban all political ads, c.e.o. jack dorsey says,” new york times, october 30, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/30/technology/twitter political ads ban.html; kate conger, “what ads are political? twitter struggles with a definition,” new york times, november 15, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/15/technology/twitter political ad policy.html; and kate conger, “twitter to relax ban on political ads,” new york times, january 3, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/03/technology/twitter political ads.html. 15 makena kelly, “google issues harsh new restrictions on political ad targeting,” the verge, november 20, 2019, https://www.theverge.com/2019/11/20/20975054/google advertising political rules twitter ban election uk general 2020; and kate kaye, “‘we will not build alternate identifiers’: in drastic shift, google will end behavioral targeting, profile building in its ad products,” digiday, march 3, 2021, https://digiday.com/media/we will not build alternate identifiers in drastic shift google will end behavioral targeting profile building in its ad products. 16 jeff horwitz, “facebook parent meta limits ad targeting for politics and other sensitive issues,” wall street journal, november 9, 2014, https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook parent meta bans targeting for political ads 11636488053. 17 kliger, “federal data privacy law”; iva nenadić, “unpacking the “european approach” to tackling challenges of disinformation and political manipulation,” internet policy review, december 31, 2019, https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/unpacking european approach tackling challenges disinformation and political; and razieh nokhbeh zaeem and k. suzanne barber, “the effect of the gdpr on privacy policies: recent progress and future promise,” acm transactions and management information systems 12 (2020): https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3389685. 18 jeremy kahn, stephanie bodoni, and stefan nicola, “it’ll cost billions for companies to comply with europe’s new data law,” bloomberg, march 22, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018 03 22/it ll cost billions for companies to comply with europe s new data law; and samuel goldberg, garrett johnson, and scott shriver, “regulating privacy online: an economic evaluation of the gdpr,” law & economics center at george mason university scalia law school, research paper series no. 22 025, november 17, 2022, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3421731. 19 sara lebow, “worldwide digital ad spend will top $600 billion this year,” insider intelligence, january 31, 2023, https://www.insiderintelligence.com/content/worldwide digital ad spend will top 600 billion this year. 20 brahim zarouali, tom dobber, guy de pauw, and claes de vreese, “using a personality profiling algorithm to investigate political microtargeting: assessing the persuasion effects of personality tailored ads on social media,” communication research 49 (2020): https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0093650220961965; see also bodó, helberger, and de vreese, “political micro targeting.” 21 for example, see bernstein, “bad news.” 22 bodó, helberger, and de vreese, “political micro targeting.” consider peter j. danaher, “optimal microtargeting of advertising,” journal of marketing research 60 (2022): https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00222437221116034; see also brian resnick, “cambridge analytica’s ‘psychographic microtargeting’: what’s bullshit and what’s legit,” vox, march 26, 2018, https://www.vox.com/science and health/2018/3/23/17152564/cambridge analytica psychographic microtargeting what. 23 dobber, trilling, helberger, and de vreese, “effects of issue based microtargeting”; and bodó, helberger, and de vreese, “political micro targeting.” 24 dobber, trilling, helberger, and de vreese, “effects of issue based microtargeting.” 25 dobber, trilling, helberger, and de vreese, “effects of issue based microtargeting”; see also resnick, “cambridge analytica’s ‘psychographic microtargeting.’” 26 for more on cambridge analytica, see resnick, “cambridge analytica’s ‘psychographic microtargeting.’” 27 zarouali, dobber, de pauw, and de vreese, “using a personality profiling algorithm”; and lennart j. krotzek, “inside the voter’s mind: the effect of psychometric microtargeting on feelings toward and propensity to vote for a candidate,” international journal of communication 13 (2019): https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/9605/2742. 28 goldberg, johnson, and shriver, “regulating privacy online.” 29 giorgio presidente and carl benedikt frey, “the gdpr effect: how data privacy regulation shaped firm performance globally,” voxeu (blog), centre for economic policy research, march 10, 2022, https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/gdpr effect how data privacy regulation shaped firm performance globally; see also pete swabey, “gdpr cost businesses 8% of their profits, according to a new estimate,” tech monitor, march 11, 2022, https://techmonitor.ai/policy/privacy and data protection/gdpr cost businesses 8 of their profits according to a new estimate. 30 fredric d. bellamy, “u.s. data privacy laws to enter new era in 2023,” reuters, january 12, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/us data privacy laws enter new era 2023 2023 01 12; “data privacy laws by state: comparison charts,” bloomberg law, july 11, 2023, https://pro.bloomberglaw.com/brief/privacy laws us vs eu gdpr; jonathan keane, “from california to brazil: europe’s privacy laws have created a recipe for the world,” cnbc, april 8, 2021, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/08/from california to brazil gdpr has created recipe for the world.html. 31 goldberg, johnson, and shriver, “regulating privacy online.” 32 kahn, bodoni, and nicola, “it’ll cost billions”; and goldberg, johnson, and shriver, “regulating privacy online.” 33 patience haggin, keach hagey, and sam schechner, “apple’s privacy change will hit facebook’s core ad business. here’s how,” wall street journal, january 9, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/apples privacy change will hit facebooks core ad business heres how 11611938750; and peter kafka, “apple broke facebook’s ad machine. who’s going to fix it?” vox, february 14, 2022, https://www.vox.com/recode/22929715/facebook apple ads meta privacy. 34 see alan mcquinn and daniel castro, “the costs of an unnecessarily stringent federal data privacy law,” information technology & innovation foundation, august 5, 2019, https://itif.org/publications/2019/08/05/costs unnecessarily stringent federal data privacy law. 35 kilger, “federal data privacy law.” 36 megan graham, “advertising market keeps growing much faster than expected, forecasters say,” wall street journal, december 6, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/advertising market keeps growing much faster than expected forecasters say 11638784800; and “the online ad industry is being shaken up,” economist, july 28, 2022, https://www.economist.com/business/2022/07/28/the online ad industry is being shaken up. 37 goujard, “european parliament votes.” 37 goujard, “european parliament votes.” key takeaways: although platforms are neither the sole sources of disinformation nor the main causes of political polarization, there is strong evidence that social media algorithms intensify and entrench these off platform dynamics. algorithmic changes therefore have the potential to ameliorate the problem; however, this has not been directly studied by independent researchers, and the market viability of such changes is uncertain. major platforms’ optimizing for something other than engagement would undercut the core business model that enabled them to reach their current size. users could opt in to healthier algorithms via middleware or civically minded alternative platforms, but most people probably would not. additionally, algorithms are blunt and opaque tools: using them to curb disinformation would also suppress some legitimate content. key sources: social media companies employ machine learning algorithms to recommend content to users through curated feeds or other delivery mechanisms. a separate set of algorithms is trained to detect undesirable content, which is then penalized by recommendation algorithms (what some scholars refer to as “reduction”).1 these two processes work together to shape what individuals see on social media. a major concern is that algorithms contribute to the spread of disinformation on social media because they typically reward engaging content.2 the more users are engaged, the more ad and subscription revenue a company can earn and unfortunately, disinformation tends to be highly engaging. for instance, a landmark 2018 paper in science found that human users spread false information more quickly than true information.3 disinformation tends to be not only misleading but also sensationalist, divisive, and laden with negative emotions seemingly tailor made for distribution by engagement seeking algorithms.4 in 2018, internal facebook research found that the company’s recommendation algorithm promoted emotionally volatile content.5 political figures and a range of other actors have opportunistically seized on this dynamic. the term “fake news” was popularized during the 2016 u.s. election, when macedonians and others responded to the financial incentives of this attention economy by generating viral false news stories for u.s. audiences.6 scholars and journalists have documented how clickbait pages and public relations firms in other countries use similar strategies to drive engagement and revenue.7 changes to platform algorithms, though difficult to study, could potentially alter financial and political incentives in ways that constrain the spread of disinformation and increase social resilience to it by reducing polarization. further, by stopping short of outright removal, reduction can preserve greater freedom of speech while still limiting the impact of disinformation.8 very few published studies have directly assessed algorithmic adjustments as a counter disinformation strategy. however, there is a strong circumstantial case based on related social science, leaked platform research, and theoretical inferences that platforms’ existing algorithms have amplified disinformation. it is therefore plausible that changes to these same algorithms could ameliorate the problem. more research is needed on the extent to which new algorithmic changes can help to slow, arrest, or reverse cycles of disinformation and polarization that are already deeply rooted in some democracies.9 for example, would an algorithmic reduction in divisive content cause some users to migrate to other, more sensational platforms? the answers may change as the social media marketplace continues to evolve. the u.s. market has been dominated for several years by a handful of companies that publicly (albeit imperfectly) embrace a responsibility to moderate their platforms. but major platforms’ cuts in trust and safety budgets, twitter’s ownership change, and the rise of numerous alternative platforms suggest this moment may be passing. nevertheless, there is good reason to believe that social media algorithms intensify and entrench on  and off platform dynamics which foment disinformation. a 2018 literature review published by the hewlett foundation described a self reinforcing cycle involving social media, traditional media, and political elites.12 it found that when algorithms amplify misleading and divisive content online, political elites and traditional media have greater incentive to generate disinformation and act and communicate in polarizing ways because the subsequent social media attention can help them earn support and money. in other words, a combination of online and offline dynamics leads to a degradation of the political informational ecosystem. if curation algorithms help to foment disinformation, then changes to those algorithms could potentially help to ameliorate the problem, or at least lessen platforms’ contributions to it. such changes could fall into at least two broad categories. first, platforms could expand their use of algorithms to reduce the prevalence of certain kinds of content through detection and demotion or removal. second, they could train algorithms to recommend content in pursuit of values other than, or in addition to, engagement.13 facebook temporarily used the first strategy during the 2020 u.s. election, employing machine learning to demote content more aggressively based on the probability it could incite violence or violate other policies.14 the use of machine learning to assess content in this way is called “classification.”15 it allows platforms to moderate content at scale more efficiently than human review, but it is far from an exact science. classifiers differ greatly in their precision, so any enhanced reliance on reduction strategies might require improving classifier reliability. human made rules and judgments are also still an important factor in reduction strategies. platform staff must decide what types of content algorithms should search for and weigh the risks of penalizing permissible speech or permitting harmful content to go unmoderated. what level of reliability and statistical confidence should a classification algorithm demonstrate before its judgments are used to demote content? should algorithms only demote content that might violate explicit terms of service, or should other concepts, such as journalistic quality, play a role? answers to these questions have important implications for freedom of speech online. regardless, stronger use of classifiers to demote sensational content could plausibly reduce the spread of disinformation. recommendation algorithms could also be made to prioritize values, or “curatorial norms,” other than engagement.16 while the major platforms fixate on maximizing engagement because of their commercial interests, a few smaller platforms design user experiences to promote constructive debate and consensus building for example, by requiring users to earn access to features (including private messaging and hosting chat rooms) through good behavior.17 recommendation algorithms can be used for a similar purpose: a 2023 paper explored how algorithms can “increase mutual understanding and trust across divides, creating space for productive conflict, deliberation, or cooperation.”18 similarly, others have advocated for drawing on library sciences to create recommendation algorithms that amplify the spread of authoritative content instead of eye catching but potentially untrustworthy content.19 another idea is to give users more control over what content they see. several large platforms now allow users to opt in to a “chronological feed” that lists all followed content in order, with no algorithmic ranking. others have proposed enabling users to pick their own algorithms. this could be done through middleware, or software that serves as an intermediary between two other applications in this case, between the user interface and the larger social media platform, allowing users to choose from competing versions of algorithmic recommendation.20 it is difficult to evaluate middleware as a counter disinformation intervention because it has not been widely implemented. critics say the recommendation algorithm that many users prefer may well be the most sensationalist and hyperpartisan, not the most measured and constructive.21 political scientist francis fukuyama, perhaps the most prominent advocate for middleware, has said that the goal of middleware is not to mitigate misinformation but to dilute the power of large technology companies in the public square.22 finally, it should be noted that some users are unusually motivated to seek out and consume extreme, divisive, and inflammatory content. scholarship holds that these users represent a small fraction of users overall, but they can have outsized political impact, both online and offline.23 these atypical users will likely find their way to the content they desire through searches, subscriptions, messages with other users, and other means.24 the market viability of algorithmic changes is uncertain. today’s large platforms grew to their current size by combining data collection, targeted advertising, and personalized systems for distributing compelling if often troublesome content. dramatic departures from this model would have unknown business consequences, but analogous changes to user privacy suggest it could be in the tens of billions of dollars. when apple made it more difficult to serve targeted advertisements on ios devices, meta claimed it cost the company $10 billion in annual revenue. analysts estimated in 2023 that an eu legal ruling requiring meta to let users opt out of targeted ads could cost the company between 5 and 7 percent of its advertising revenue, which was $118 billion in 2021.25 it is also unclear that civically oriented platforms, absent public support or heavy handed regulation, can compete with social media companies which carefully calibrate their services to maximize engagement. even some proponents of civically oriented platforms have suggested that these are unlikely to scale as well as today’s largest platforms because they often serve communities with specific needs, such as those seeking anonymity or highly attentive content moderation. such platforms may lack key features many users desire, like the ability to share photos or reply directly to posts.26 regulations can help level the playing field: for example, the dsa now requires the biggest platforms to provide eu users with a chronological feed option.27 finally, new algorithms intended to reduce disinformation could be just as opaque as today’s algorithms, while also having unintended consequences for online speech. removing content through takedowns or other means is relatively apparent to the public, but algorithmic reduction requires complex, back end changes that are more difficult for external analysts to detect or study. additionally, efforts to curb the spread of sensationalist or emotionally manipulative content could also sap the online creativity that makes the internet a driver of culture and commerce. using algorithms to reduce disinformation, and only disinformation, may well be impossible. 1 tarleton gillespie, “do not recommend? reduction as a form of content moderation,” social media + society 8 (2022): https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/20563051221117552. 2 maréchal and biddle, “it’s not just the content.” 3 vosoughi, roy, and aral, “spread of true and false news.” 4 geoff nunberg, “‘disinformation’ is the word of the year and a sign of what’s to come,” npr, december 30, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/12/30/790144099/disinformation is the word of the year and a sign of what s to come. 5 jeff horwitz and deepa seetharaman, “facebook executives shut down efforts to make the site less divisive,” wall street journal, may 26, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook knows it encourages division top executives nixed solutions 11590507499; and loveday morris, “in poland’s politics, a ‘social civil war’ brewed as facebook rewarded online anger,” washington post, october 27, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/10/27/poland facebook algorithm. 6 samanth subramanian, “the macedonian teens who mastered fake news,” wired, february 15, 2017, https://www.wired.com/2017/02/veles macedonia fake news. 7 consider swati chaturvedi, i am a troll: inside the secret world of the bjp’s digital army (juggernaut books, 2016); and jonathan corpus ong and jason vincent a. cabañes, “architects of networked disinformation: behind the scenes of troll accounts and fake news production in the philippines,” university of massachusetts amherst, communications department faculty publication series, 2018, https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1075&context=communication_faculty_pubs. 8 renée diresta, “free speech is not the same as free reach,” wired, august 30, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/free speech is not the same as free reach. 9 jennifer mccoy, benjamin press, murat somer, and ozlem tuncel, “reducing pernicious polarization: a comparative historical analysis of depolarization,” carnegie endowment for international peace, may 5, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/05/05/reducing pernicious polarization comparative historical analysis of depolarization pub 87034. 10 a review by new york university’s stern center for business and human rights found that while “facebook, twitter, and youtube are not the original or main cause of rising u.s. political polarization . . . use of those platforms intensifies divisiveness and thus contributes to its corrosive consequences.” while observers sometimes attribute increased polarization to social media echo chambers, scholars note that most users see a diverse range of news sources. in fact, online heterogeneity might be related to increased polarization: one study based on twitter data suggests that “it is not isolation from opposing views that drives polarization but precisely the fact that digital media” collapses the cross cutting conflicts that occur in local interactions, thereby hardening partisan identities and deepening division. (other, non digital sources of national news are believed to promote similar dynamics.) and the evidence is not all in one direction: in a study on bosnia and herzegovina, abstinence from facebook use was associated with lower regard for ethnic outgroups, suggesting facebook could have a depolarizing effect on users. see paul barrett, justin hendrix, and j. grant sims, “fueling the fire: how social media intensifies u.s. political polarization   and what can be done about it,” nyu stern center for business and human rights, september 13, 2021, https://bhr.stern.nyu.edu/polarization report page?_ga=2.126094349.1087885125.1705371436 402766718.1705371436; andrew guess, brendan nyhan, benjamin lyons, and jason reifler, “avoiding the echo chamber about echo chambers,” knight foundation, 2018, https://kf site production.s3.amazonaws.com/media_elements/files/000/000/133/original/topos_kf_white paper_nyhan_v1.pdf; petter törnberg, “how digital media drive affective polarization through partisan sorting,” pnas 119 (2022): https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2207159119; darr, hitt, and dunaway, “newspaper closures polarize”; and nejla ašimović, jonathan nagler, richard bonneau, and joshua a. tucker, “testing the effects of facebook usage in an ethnically polarized setting,” pnas 118 (2021): https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2022819118. 11 annie y. chen, brendan nyhan, jason reifler, ronald e. robertson, and christo wilson, “subscriptions and external links help drive resentful users to alternative and extremist youtube videos,” science advances 9 (2023): https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.add8080. 12 as discussed in case study 1, polarization and its effect on spreading disinformation is not symmetrical across the political spectrum. in most (but not all) political contexts, the right side of the political spectrum has moved further from the mainstream both ideologically and in its media diet, creating more appetite for partisan disinformation. see joshua a. tucker et al., “social media, political polarization, and political disinformation: a review of the scientific literature,” hewlett foundation, march 2018, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3144139. 13 meta refers to “prevalence” of content on its platform as a measure of how many users see a specific piece of content, a metric which “assumes that the impact caused by violating content is proportional to the number of times that content is viewed.” see “prevalence,” meta, november 18, 2022, https://transparency.fb.com/policies/improving/prevalence metric. some companies may contest that “engagement” is the primary motive behind platform algorithms, or they may point to certain forms of engagement as positive for society and therefore an acceptable optimization goal for curation algorithms. meta, for instance, says that it promotes “meaningful interactions” between users instead of mere clicks. engagement is used here as a shorthand for the broad goal of motivating users to continue using a service, especially for longer periods of time. see adam mosseri, “news feed fyi: bringing people closer together,” meta, january 11, 2018, https://www.facebook.com/business/news/news feed fyi bringing people closer together. 14 shannon bond and bobby allyn, “how the ‘stop the steal’ movement outwitted facebook ahead of the jan. 6 insurrection,” npr, october 22, 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/10/22/1048543513/facebook groups jan 6 insurrection. 15 robert gorwa, reuben binns, and christian katzenbach, “algorithmic content moderation: technical and political challenges in the automation of platform governance,” big data & society 7 (2020): https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2053951719897945. 16 renée diresta, “up next: a better recommendation system,” wired, april 11, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/creating ethical recommendation engines. 17 chand rajendra nicolucci and ethan zuckerman, “an illustrated field guide to social media,” knight first amendment institute, may 14, 2021, https://knightcolumbia.org/blog/an illustrated field guide to social media. 18 aviv ovadya and luke thorburn, “bridging systems: open problems for countering destructive divisiveness across ranking, recommenders, and governance?,” knight first amendment institute, october 26, 2023, https://knightcolumbia.org/content/bridging systems. 19 joan donovan, “shhhh... combating the cacophony of content with librarians,” national endowment for democracy, january 2021, https://www.ned.org/wp content/uploads/2021/01/combating cacophony content librarians donovan.pdf. 20 see francis fukuyama, barak richman, and ashish goel, “how to save democracy from technology: ending big tech’s information monopoly,” foreign affairs, november 24, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united states/2020 11 24/fukuyama how save democracy technology; and francis fukuyama, barak richman, ashish goel, roberta r. katz, a. douglas melamed, and marietje schaake, “middleware for dominant digital platforms: a technological solution to a threat to democracy,” stanford cyber policy center, accessed march 13, 2023, https://fsi live.s3.us west 1.amazonaws.com/s3fs public/cpc middleware_ff_v2.pdf. 21 see “the future of platform power,” various authors, journal of democracy 32 (2021): https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/issue/july 2021/. 22 katharine miller, “radical proposal: middleware could give consumers choices over what they see online,” stanford university human centered artificial intelligence, october 20, 2021, https://hai.stanford.edu/news/radical proposal middleware could give consumers choices over what they see online. 23 consider, for example, ronald e. robertson, “uncommon yet consequential online harms,” journal of online trust & safety 1 (2022): https://tsjournal.org/index.php/jots/article/view/87. 24 ronald e. robertson et al., “users choose to engage with more partisan news than they are exposed to on google search,” nature 618 (2022): https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586 023 06078 5. 25 adam satariano, “meta’s ad practices ruled illegal under e.u. law,” new york times, january 4, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/04/technology/meta facebook eu gdpr.html. 26 rajendra nicolucci and zuckerman, “illustrated field guide.” 27 natasha lomas, “all hail the new eu law that lets social media users quiet quit the algorithm,” techcrunch, august 25, 2023, https://techcrunch.com/2023/08/25/quiet qutting ai. during the course of this research project, rapid advances in generative ai which can create new content have led to heated speculation about the future disinformation landscape. ai experts, commentators, and politicians have predicted that generative ai will dramatically worsen the disinformation problem. many disinformation experts have been more circumspect, but some are also worried. it is too soon to make strong predictions, and this report has primarily focused on assessing countermeasures rather than handicapping emergent threats. still, some initial possibilities can be laid out, drawing on relevant parallels from this report’s case studies and a review of disinformation research. generative ai algorithms, developed with machine learning techniques, can be used to produce a wide variety of text, images, video, and audio. some results are strikingly similar to authentic, human produced media though, at least for now, close observation can often reveal odd artifacts and incongruities. generative algorithms can facilitate disinformation in countless ways.1 deepfake videos and audio clips have been used to simulate specific individuals saying and doing things they never did, allowing perpetrators to defame or degrade their targets. ai generated photos of nonexistent people have been incorporated into fake social media profiles to bolster their apparent authenticity. synthetic text generation can automate the mass production of written propaganda, fraudulent documents, or online conversation in many languages and genres. additionally, it’s becoming easier to combine multiple generative ai techniques for example, automating the writing of a film script that is then acted out on video by a lifelike synthetic avatar. as these examples illustrate, generative ai has several concerning qualities relevant to disinformation. it can enable the rapid, low cost production of false or misleading content. it can lower the barriers to entry for creating such content for example, obviating the need for subject matter knowledge, charisma, or skills in video production, photo editing, and translation. ai generated content can also be more realistic than what its creators could otherwise produce. additionally, there is worry that algorithms will enable the production of tailor made content that targets a specific audience by using personal information to predict what will resonate. finally, generative ai can quickly reformulate preexisting content be it a terrorist’s manifesto or malicious computer code in ways that may stymie detection and response. but the theoretical dangers of new technology do not always manifest as initially feared. deepfakes, for example, have generated much consternation since 2017, yet they’ve had hardly any political impact so far. to be sure, deepfake driven nonconsensual pornography is a real problem, and deepfakes are occasionally used to commit fraud. moreover, technological improvements may make deepfakes harder to spot in the future. still, it is noteworthy that the most dreaded type of deepfakes mass political disinformation has rarely been attempted and has largely failed. two recent prominent examples were videos of ukrainian president volodymyr zelenskyy and russian president vladimir putin disseminated in their respective countries during the war. each was carefully orchestrated and timed for maximum political effect.2 they were even broadcast on tv news networks that had been compromised by hackers, enhancing the verisimilitude. yet neither video seemed to have real persuasive power, perhaps because the target audiences placed greater trust in the national authorities who debunked them. for now, bad actors seem to recognize that cruder techniques including so called cheapfakes that employ traditional video manipulation or involve simply relabeling an old photo to change its apparent meaning remain easier and adequately effective. the limited impact of political deepfakes so far is consistent with research on disinformation generally and has implications for other kinds of generative ai. studies suggest that people’s willingness to believe false (or true) information is often not primarily driven by the content’s level of realism. rather, other factors such as repetition, narrative appeal, perceived authority, group identification, and the viewer’s state of mind can matter more. this has relevance for emergent policy efforts to counter ai generated disinformation. for example, the coalition for content provenance and authenticity offers a digital “signing authority” that certifies the source of content and allows end users to verify its authenticity.3 ultimately, though, such badges of truth depend on people choosing to trust and value them. many forms of disinformation thrive today because their believers choose to discount existing sources of high quality information such as rigorous professional journalism, enduring scientific consensus, and transparent independent investigations. the prediction that personalized ai content will enable extremely persuasive disinformation should also be treated with caution. personalized persuasion is already an enormous industry: commercial and political advertisers spend hundreds of billions of dollars each year trying to reach audiences with content tailor made for specific demographics, interests, and temperaments. yet studies of microtargeting have been less than impressive, casting doubt on the notion that data driven personalization is uniquely compelling. perhaps generative ai will invent entirely new forms of microtargeting that are much more compelling than anything humans have come up with. but humans have already deployed similar tools such as big data, applied statistics, and previous forms of ai for years without any apparent revolutionary breakthroughs in the science of persuasion. as this report’s case studies show, persuasive content however personalized must still compete with the cacophony of other influences on targets. someone’s beliefs are often shaped by a lifetime of narrative and psychological commitments, which are not easily dislodged. finally, generative ai is a double edged sword: it can be used to counter disinformation as well as foment it. generative ai products like chatgpt are marketed as general use tools for information discovery, categorization, and reasoning. if that promise holds, then counter disinformation practitioners can use generative ai to improve their overall productivity in countless ways. for example, future ai tools if responsibly used, supervised, and verified by humans may help fact checkers more quickly triage and categorize claims, find relevant truthful information, and compare the former with the latter. such tools could also facilitate the expanded use of social media labels working in tandem with humans to support faster judgments on source quality, which could then enable platforms to add more decisive labels to more content. ai has obvious applications for cybersecurity and is already a standard feature of many products and services. algorithms also help social media companies which possess world class ai capabilities identify inauthentic asset networks.4 while content curation algorithms are notorious for contributing to the spread of disinformation, the same engineering principles can be used to design more responsible algorithms. in short, generative ai and other machine learning technologies can be applied to many of the countermeasures explored in this report. in several cases, ai offers promising opportunities to address important cost and scaling challenges. it is impossible to know the long term impacts of generative ai. like other new technologies, it will be employed by all sides of the information contest. if generative ai lives up to its current hype, it could mark the latest in a long series of what carnegie’s alicia wanless calls “information disturbances” historical developments that alter the information ecosystem, touching off a chaotic cycle of reaction and counterreaction which unsettles, at least for a time, whatever balance existed before.5 future historians may debate whether the rise of generative ai turned out to be uniquely disturbing, or just another continuation of a long digital revolution. regardless, the metaphor of an “information ecosystem” has a larger lesson for policymakers. the flow of information through society is extraordinarily complex, much like the many forms of competition and cooperation found in the natural world. people’s beliefs, expressions, and actions are shaped by countless psychosocial factors that interact in still mysterious ways. such factors are rarely, if ever, reducible to any single technology. policymakers concerned about disinformation should embrace complexity and acknowledge uncertainty. the effort to counter disinformation will be a long journey through a dark thicket, with many wrong turns and pitfalls along the way. yet democracies have no choice but to undertake this difficult journey hopefully guided by the light of evidence, no matter how dim this light may be. 1 see, for example, jon bateman, “deepfakes and synthetic media in the financial system: assessing threat scenarios,” carnegie endowment for international peace, july 8, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/07/08/deepfakes and synthetic media in financial system assessing threat scenarios pub 82237. 2 jane wakefield, “deepfake presidents used in russia ukraine war,” bbc, march 18, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/technology 60780142. 3 “c2pa explainer,” coalition for content provenance and authenticity, accessed march 13, 2023, https://c2pa.org/specifications/specifications/1.0/explainer/explainer.html. 4 karen hao, “how facebook uses machine learning to detect fake accounts,” mit technology review, march 4, 2020, https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/03/04/905551/how facebook uses machine learning to detect fake accounts. 5 alicia wanless, “there is no getting ahead of disinformation without moving past it,” lawfare, may 8, 2023, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/there is no getting ahead of disinformation without moving past it; and alicia wanless, “information ecology: using physical ecology to understand information struggle,” king’s college london, forthcoming, abstract accessed on december 11, 2023, https://www.kcl.ac.uk/people/alicia wanless. the technology and international affairs program develops insights to address the governance challenges and large scale risks of new technologies. our experts identify actionable best practices and incentives for industry and government leaders on artificial intelligence, cyber threats, cloud security, countering influence operations, reducing the risk of biotechnologies, and ensuring global digital inclusion. the goal of the partnership for countering influence operations (pcio) is to foster evidence based policymaking to counter threats in the information environment. key roadblocks as found in our work include the lack of: transparency reporting to inform what data is available for research purposes; rules guiding how data can be shared with researchers and for what purposes; and an international mechanism for fostering research collaboration at scale. carnegie’s information environment project is a multistakeholder effort to help policymakers understand the information environment, think through the impact of efforts to govern it, and identify promising interventions to foster democracy. jon bateman senior fellow and co director, technology and international affairs program dean jackson project manager, influence operations researchers guild our scholars generate strategic ideas and independent analysis to help inform countries, institutions, and leaders as they take on the most difficult global problems. this collection includes the most in depth research from carnegie scholars. u.s. policymakers need to develop a more systematic and comprehensive framework for managing the data security and influence risks that come from cross border data flows, chinese software, and connected devices. the information environment project builds on the partnership for countering influence operations, which worked to foster evidence informed policymaking for the information environment. the partnership engaged more than 1000 stakeholders and conducted meta studies and surveys to assess the state of knowledge on threats in the information environment. the ai race is breaking open. an upcoming summit offers an opportunity to u.s. and chinese companies to agree on safety and security measures. large language models are transforming how humans acquire and interpret information, raising pressing ethical concerns. to mitigate the related risks, policymakers should promote digital ai literacy and develop tools to understand the inherent biases of generative ai tools.
it was the latest example of journalists having to weigh the news value of a major political moment against the challenges of reporting on a candidate who regularly speaks in falsehoods. by michael m. grynbaum several major networks cut away from former president donald j. trump on friday during an appearance that had been promoted as a news conference at trump tower devolved into a rambling and misleading speech. it was the latest example of television journalists having to weigh the news value of a major political moment   in this case, the criminal conviction of a former president   against the challenges of reporting on a candidate who regularly speaks in falsehoods. mr. trump’s unfiltered remarks were carried live by cable news channels and nbc, which broke into its usual daytime programming to cover his appearance. in the minutes before he began speaking, msnbc, cnn and fox news all aired anticipatory camera shots of an empty lectern. mr. trump began by speaking in his usual discursive, dissembling manner. he unleashed a litany of false statements about his manhattan trial, attacking witnesses, calling the judge the “devil” and falsely accusing president biden of being involved in the prosecution. nbc aired mr. trump for 20 minutes before the anchor lester holt cut in. “we were told this was going to be a news conference,” he told viewers, before bringing on two legal analysts to dissect and fact check the remarks. “there is no evidence that biden was behind any of this,” mr. holt said. abc and cbs did not interrupt their regular shows. on msnbc, where anchors have sometimes refused to air mr. trump live, the former president’s appearance aired for about 20 minutes before the network broke away. later, an on screen graphic read: “trump post verdict remarks riddled with lies and attacks.” cnn broadcast mr. trump for 18 minutes before cutting to a fact checking segment. several networks told viewers they would return to mr. trump’s appearance once he began speaking with reporters, but the former president did not take press questions. the new york times, on its website, had a livestream of mr. trump’s appearance for about six minutes before cutting the feed and continuing to publish written updates on its blog. fox news aired mr. trump’s appearance in its entirety. during the 2016 campaign, mr. trump infuriated television journalists when he teased a “major announcement” related to his past lies about barack obama’s place of birth. networks took his remarks live, but the appearance quickly turned into a campaign rally. “we got played, again, by the trump campaign,” john king of cnn said at the time.