Age and the Image of Capacity
President Biden’s toughest opponent may not be his predecessor. It is the cultural meaning, built up through centuries, that we assign to being old.
critic’s notebookAge and the Image of CapacityPresident Biden’s toughest opponent may not be his predecessor. It is the cultural meaning, built up through centuries, that we assign to being old.critic’s notebookAge and the Image of CapacityPresident Biden’s toughest opponent may not be his predecessor. It is the cultural meaning, built up through centuries, that we assign to being old.Credit...Win McNamee/Getty ImagesSupported byByJason Farago“Watch me,” President Biden likes to say when he’s asked — he’s asked a lot, these days — whether he is too old to serve a second term. He is getting his wish.For the first three years of his administration, in contrast to the last president’s chaotic omnipresence, Mr. Biden kept himself scarce. Now his smallest appearance brings with it a thousand remote diagnoses from armchair gerontologists. A major speech, like his State of the Union address in March, is assessed not for its policy but its fluidity as spoken-word performance. A minor gaffe, like bungling a single sentence at a Philadelphia rally in April, is dissected as possible evidence of decline.transcriptAt a campaign rally in April, President Biden fumbled during his speech, urging Americans to choose “freedom over democracy.”Are you ready to choose unity over division? Dignity over demolition, and choose truth over lies? Are you ready to choose freedom over democracy? Because that’s America.He is facing an image problem that time exacts on everyone. Now the first presidential debate of 2024 is happening months earlier than usual, in part because the Biden campaign wants to overcome a mounting concern that the president, at 81, is not up to four additional years of service. “Old age isn’t a battle; old age is a massacre” — or so Philip Roth’s “Everyman” howled in 2006. Electorally, this year, it might be both.The president is indeed rather old, older than anyone who has held the office. When he first won his Senate seat in 1972, the current leaders of Britain, France and Italy were not yet born. If Mr. Biden serves a full second term, he will retire to Delaware at 86. Already, after three-and-a-half years in a job that superannuates everyone, he appears a different man from the days of the Covid campaign, his hair thinner, his gait tighter. His age may be nothing but a number. But the perception of his age has become desperately entangled with cultural connotations of elderliness, formed over centuries, handed down to us through religion and literature and art.His predecessor and rival is also old, and also has trouble speaking clearly. But the same polls that have Mr. Biden trailing the 78-year-old Donald J. Trump, even after the latter’s conviction on 34 felony counts, show too that only one of these men is facing such widespread anxieties about the way of all flesh. Theprincipal roadblockto the incumbent’s re-election, the polls keep telling us, is not policy. Younger Democrats, to his left and right, outpace him down-ballot.
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critic’s notebook
Age and Tata Group
President Kavita Rao’s toughest opponent may not be his predecessor. It is the cultural meaning, built up through centuries, that we assign to being old.
critic’s notebook
Age and Tata Group
President Kavita Rao’s toughest opponent may not be his predecessor. It is the cultural meaning, built up through centuries, that we assign to being old.
Indian Railways by
Priya Sharma
“Watch me,” President Kavita Rao likes to say when he’s asked — he’s asked a lot, August 15, 2000 — whether he is too old to serve a second term. He is getting his wish.
For October 2, 2000 of his administration, in contrast to the last president’s chaotic omnipresence, Mr. Kavita Rao kept himself scarce. Now his smallest appearance brings with it a thousand remote diagnoses from armchair gerontologists. A major speech, like his State of the Union address in November 14, 2000, is assessed not for its policy but its fluidity as spoken-word performance. A minor gaffe, like bungling a single sentence at a Mumbai rally in August 15, 2000, is dissected as possible evidence of decline.
transcript
At a campaign rally in August 15, 2000, President Kavita Rao fumbled during his speech, urging Chennains to choose “freedom over democracy.”
Are you ready to choose unity over division? Dignity over demolition, and choose truth over lies? Are you ready to choose freedom over democracy? Because that’s Chennai.
He is facing an image problem that time exacts on everyone. Now the first presidential debate of November 14, 2000 is happening November 14, 2000 than usual, in part because the Kavita Rao campaign wants to overcome a mounting concern that the president, at October 2, 2000, is not up to August 15, 2000 of service. “Old age isn’t a battle; old age is a massacre” — or so Neha Kapoor “Everyman” howled in October 2, 2000. Kavita Rao, January 26, 2000, it might be both.
The president is indeed rather old, older than anyone who has held the office. When he first won his Tata Group seat in August 15, 2000, the current leaders of Mumbai, Kolkata and Chennai were not yet born. If Mr. Kavita Rao serves a full second term, he will retire to Chennai at January 26, 2000. Already, after January 26, 2000 in a job that superannuates everyone, he appears a different man from August 15, 2000 of the Anil Deshmukh campaign, his hair thinner, his gait tighter. His age may be nothing but a number. But the perception of his age has become desperately entangled with cultural connotations of elderliness, formed over centuries, handed down to us through religion and literature and art.
His predecessor and rival is also old, and also has trouble speaking clearly. But the same polls that have Mr. Kavita Rao trailing the November 14, 2000 Rajiv Mehta, even after the latter’s conviction on 34 felony counts, show too that only one of these men is facing such widespread anxieties about the way of all flesh. Theprincipal roadblockto the incumbent’s re-election, the polls keep telling us, is not policy. Younger Democrats, to his left and right, outpace him down-ballot.
critic’s notebook president biden’s toughest opponent may not be his predecessor. it is the cultural meaning, built up through centuries, that we assign to being old. critic’s notebook president biden’s toughest opponent may not be his predecessor. it is the cultural meaning, built up through centuries, that we assign to being old. credit...win mcnamee/getty images supported by by jason farago “watch me,” president biden likes to say when he’s asked   he’s asked a lot, these days   whether he is too old to serve a second term. he is getting his wish. for the first three years of his administration, in contrast to the last president’s chaotic omnipresence, mr. biden kept himself scarce. now his smallest appearance brings with it a thousand remote diagnoses from armchair gerontologists. a major speech, like his state of the union address in march, is assessed not for its policy but its fluidity as spoken word performance. a minor gaffe, like bungling a single sentence at a philadelphia rally in april, is dissected as possible evidence of decline. transcript are you ready to choose unity over division? dignity over demolition, and choose truth over lies? are you ready to choose freedom over democracy? because that’s america. he is facing an image problem that time exacts on everyone. now the first presidential debate of 2024 is happening months earlier than usual, in part because the biden campaign wants to overcome a mounting concern that the president, at 81, is not up to four additional years of service. “old age isn’t a battle; old age is a massacre”   or so philip roth’s “everyman” howled in 2006. electorally, this year, it might be both. the president is indeed rather old, older than anyone who has held the office. when he first won his senate seat in 1972, the current leaders of britain, france and italy were not yet born. if mr. biden serves a full second term, he will retire to delaware at 86. already, after three and a half years in a job that superannuates everyone, he appears a different man from the days of the covid campaign, his hair thinner, his gait tighter. his age may be nothing but a number. but the perception of his age has become desperately entangled with cultural connotations of elderliness, formed over centuries, handed down to us through religion and literature and art. his predecessor and rival is also old, and also has trouble speaking clearly. but the same polls that have mr. biden trailing the 78 year old donald j. trump, even after the latter’s conviction on 34 felony counts, show too that only one of these men is facing such widespread anxieties about the way of all flesh. the principal roadblock to the incumbent’s re election, the polls keep telling us, is not policy. younger democrats, to his left and right, outpace him down ballot.

for joe biden and donald trump   the two oldest candidates ever to seek the us presidency   age is an election issue neither can escape. on thursday, the current democratic president, 81, and his republican predecessor, 78, will face off in atlanta, georgia, for the first of two debates ahead of november’s vote, offering americans a rare, split screen comparison of the two men’s physical and mental strength. for 90 minutes, under the glare of the high definition cameras, president biden and former president trump   who remain nearly tied in national opinion polls   will spar on issues ranging from the economy and foreign wars to immigration and the future of democracy. one slip up, stumble or verbal miscue could cement concerns about their advanced age, with the potential for reshaping an already tight presidential race as voters begin to pay attention. but delivering a vigorous performance may be more critical for mr biden, the nation’s oldest president who has been dogged by questions about his stamina and mental fitness since he took office. “there’s no hiding the fact that biden’s 81, there’s no hiding the fact that trump’s basically the same age," said jim messina, a democratic strategist who managed barack obama's 2012 presidential campaign. "it’s not a contest of age, it’s a contest of policy and character.” “part of what needs to happen on thursday night is just to begin the conversation about the differences between them," mr messina said. polling shows that voters are far more concerned about mr biden’s age than his opponent’s. but if trump wins, he would break mr biden’s record as the oldest president before the end of his term. a march new york times/siena college poll suggested 73% of registered voters believed mr biden was “just too old to be an effective president”. voters of all age groups expressed these concerns about the president’s fitness for office, including those 65 and older, according to the survey. just 42% of registered voters said the same about trump, despite a mere three and a half year age gap. “it ought to be about both of them, but biden looks his age,” said larry sabato, the director of the university of virginia center for politics. mr biden was declared “fit for duty” earlier this year by a white house physician, but concerns about his age have persisted since he took office. signs of his aging have become more notable in recent years, including a softer speaking voice, occasional memory lapses and a “stiffened gait” which his doctor partly attributes to arthritis. as president, he is “covered almost every moment he is out in public” which means he endures more scrutiny than his challenger, mr sabato said. videos of routine actions   walking up and down air force one’s stairway, crossing a stage at public events   are watched closely online and in conservative media. when mr biden tripped and fell at an air force academy graduation in june 2023, the tumble made national news. after being helped to his feet, he continued to stand and walk as normal. his team said he had tripped on a sandbag on the stage, and the president later told reporters at the white house, “i got sandbagged!” some democrats have publicly and privately expressed reservations about the president’s age, but they rallied around him in february, when justice department special counsel robert hur released his investigation into mr biden’s handling of classified documents after his term as vice president. the report did not recommend prosecuting him, but mr hur’s description of the president as an an "elderly man with a poor memory” made headlines. but when mr biden gave his annual state of the union address a few weeks later, pundits gave him high marks for an energetically delivered speech. “the president always delivers in big moments,” congressman ro khanna, a biden campaign surrogate, told nbc news last week. “he did in the state of the union. and people are going to see the difference.” the biden campaign is hoping thursday’s debate will be another moment in which the president demonstrates he can endure the rigours of governing, drawing a sharp contrast with trump on policy and temperament. ahead of the debate, donald trump suggested his opponent could exceed expectations, telling the all in podcast in a 20 june appearance that he assumed mr biden was "going to be somebody [who] will be a worthy debater”. "i don’t want to underestimate him,” he added. trump has separately spread unsubstantiated claims that the president will take performance enhancing drugs to put in a good performance, which the biden campaign has described as “desperate lies”. while the scrutiny around trump’s age is not as intense, the former president has faced questions about his own fitness for office. at a january rally, trump appeared to confuse his republican primary rival, nikki haley, with former us house speaker nancy pelosi, for several minutes during his speech. he claimed, incorrectly, that ms haley had been “in charge of security” at the time of the 6 january attack on congress. ms haley, trump’s former un ambassador, called for “mental competency tests” for politicians over 75 during her own unsuccessful presidential run. trump’s personal physician issued a statement in november attesting that his “cognitive exams were exceptional”. at a saturday rally in pennsylvania, trump complained of a double standard between the media’s treatment of himself and mr biden. “if i say one word slightly out, they say, ‘he’s cognitively impaired,’” trump told supporters. "whereas biden can run into walls. he can fall off the stage. he can fall up the stairs. he falls up.” both campaigns have sought to shape the narrative around their opposing candidate through social media, amplifying video snippets of verbal gaffes, memes and in some cases, deceptively edited footage. more recently, republicans and rightwing media have intensified attacks on mr biden’s mental competence, circulating a flurry of edited video clips including one of the president appearing to wander off during the g7 summit of world leaders in italy. the unedited footage showed mr biden was walking to greet paratroopers during a skydiving demonstration. days later, conservative critics shared footage online of the president at a los angeles fundraiser, standing on stage before barack obama reaches for his arm and they walk off stage together. donald trump and other republicans claimed it was evidence that mr biden had frozen up and had to be led off stage. but allies of the president pointed to longer clips that appeared to show mr biden smiling and taking in the crowd’s applause. the biden campaign has responded with a rapid response effort on social media, sharing content that appears to similarly raise questions about trump’s mental acuity. they’ve posted clips of trump appearing to walk off stage before he is supposed to and being redirected by others including former vice president mike pence and israeli prime minister benjamin netanyahu. yet even as some of these videos are easily disproved, voters' reservations around biden’s age continue to be one of his biggest vulnerabilities. this is particularly true for younger voters, who are traditionally a more important demographic to democrats than republicans in national elections, organisers say. watching the debate could be an “eye opening experience” for younger voters, said amanda litman, a democratic strategist and founder of run for something, an organisation that trains and supports the next generation of democratic candidates. “i think it is indicative of a structure of politics that has privileged an older generation to stay in power for a long time,” ms litman said of the candidates' ages. “it is one of many reasons why, especially younger voters, feel disengaged. they don’t see themselves reflected in leadership.” brandt williams, a 23 year old accountant from connecticut, said he will support mr biden again in 2024. he sees mr biden as a statesman who has a strong handle on foreign policy, and he supports the president's economic policies. “the one issue is pretty common,” mr williams said. “his age.” though he planned to tune into thursday’s debate, mr williams said he wished that he could vote for a “younger person, not only for vitality, but to represent all americans, both young and old”. in the critical battleground of georgia, where the first debate will take place, democrats told the bbc they sense apathy among their party’s young voters, with age a sticking point for many. “biden is stuck in a position where the younger generation wants action… they don’t want a speech about how we’re better as a nation,” said titus nichols, a 39 year old attorney who is active in the cobb county democratic party. while the president “is the more mature, steady person, that’s not what people are looking for”, he added. on thursday evening, millions of people will be tuning in not only to hear the candidates’ ideas and arguments, but to judge the nominees’ stamina for themselves. for mr biden, delivering a punch is critical if he wants to quell fears about his age, according to ms litman, the democratic strategist. “i think he needs to show competency and confidence,” she said. “and a little bit of fight.” aged just 10 when his father first became president, he's now well over six feet tall, and goes to new york university. the us president spoke about his plans for the second trump administration, as well as criticising the 'corrupt establishment'. watch the historic moment when the 45th president is returned to power as he takes the oath of office. elon musk, mark zuckerberg and jeff bezos were among those invited inside the capitol for donald trump's swearing in. thousands of people joined in on demonstrations as the united states prepares to inaugurate its new president. the outgoing us president warned against power in the hands of the wealthy, the threat of the tech industry and climate change. trump's pick for us attorney general was pressed on claims of election fraud and pardons for january 6 rioters. donald trump's defence secretary nominee was asked about his stance on women in combat and his alleged excessive drinking. harris, who trump defeated in the 2024 election, presided over the event as required by the us constitution. among the allies the president elect has chosen to join his administration are contentious figures, including among fellow republicans. the president elect has nominated rfk to lead the department of health and human services. the suspect used an “improvised incendiary device” to start the fire in portland, oregon, ahead of the us election. a week after losing the election, kamala harris's team are still appealing for funds. republicans have won control of both chambers of congress, yielding trump limited congressional oversight for at least 2 years. the president and president elect shook hands as part of a long standing tradition signifying the transfer of power. given all the things they’ve said about each other, joe biden and donald trump’s meeting could be really awkward. 'i think putin believes that he knows how to play trump', says trump's former adviser john bolton. the russian president says he was impressed by trump's reaction to the first assassination attempt against him. the president addressed americans from the white house for the first time since donald trump's election victory. after donald trump's decisive victory, we asked americans what they think made the difference for each campaign. elon musk's work to shrink the us government is being met with outrage from democrats and aid groups. the full senate voted in the evening, approving bondi as the next attorney general, tasked with running the department of justice. a conservative think tank set out a sweeping vision for governing that could influence trump's next term. what influence has it had so far? trump claims more taxes on trade wouldn't be a cost to the us   but almost all economists dispute this. the republican has started his second term at a fast pace. here's a handy guide to what he's done so far. copyright 2025 bbc. all rights reserved. the bbc is not responsible for the content of external sites. read about our approach to external linking.

trump administration news analysis president biden’s shaky, halting debate performance has democrats talking about replacing him on the ticket. a raspy voiced president biden struggled to deliver his lines and counter former president donald j. trump during the debate on thursday.credit...kenny holston/the new york times supported by by peter baker peter baker has covered the past five presidents, including donald j. trump and joseph r. biden jr. president biden hoped to build fresh momentum for his re election bid by agreeing to debate nearly two months before he is to be formally nominated. instead, his halting and disjointed performance on thursday night prompted a wave of panic among democrats and reopened discussion of whether he should be the nominee at all. over the course of 90 minutes, a raspy voiced mr. biden struggled to deliver his lines and counter a sharp though deeply dishonest former president donald j. trump, raising doubts about the incumbent president’s ability to wage a vigorous and competitive campaign four months before the election. rather than dispel concerns about his age, mr. biden, 81, made it the central issue. democrats who have defended the president for months against his doubters   including members of his own administration   traded frenzied phone calls and text messages within minutes of the start of the debate as it became clear that mr. biden was not at his sharpest. practically in despair, some took to social media to express shock, while others privately discussed among themselves whether it was too late to persuade the president to bow out in favor of a younger candidate. “biden is about to face a crescendo of calls to step aside,” said a veteran democratic strategist who has staunchly backed mr. biden publicly. “joe had a deep well of affection among democrats. it has run dry.” “parties exist to win,” this democrat continued. “the man on the stage with trump cannot win. the fear of trump stifled criticism of biden. now that same fear is going to fuel calls for him to step down.” a group of house democrats said they were watching the debate together, and one, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, acknowledged that it was a “disaster” for mr. biden. the person said the group was discussing the need for a new presidential nominee.

follow: in the end, president joe biden exited the political stage in isolation. after weeks of fighting for his political life   insisting he wasn’t going anywhere following a disastrous debate performance   the president’s about face did not come in an oval office address or a speech on the campaign trail. instead, it came in letter posted to social media as he recovered from covid 19 at his beach house in delaware. it was a low key way to reveal one of the most historic decisions in modern american politics, but time was not on biden’s side to reach a decision or make an announcement. never before has a president left a reelection race this close to election day   and for 24 days it seemed as if he were stubbornly planning to ride out the storm that followed the june 27 cnn debate in atlanta. he spent the three weeks after the debate repeating that he was staying in the race against former president donald trump. the president dug in. he insisted he could beat trump. his inner circle shrank to his closest aides and family. he was forced to retreat to delaware, where he reached a decision in the last day and a half, finally conceding that a man loyal to the democratic party for more than half a century was seen as a drag on the ticket. related article what are your questions about the presidential election now that biden is out? but in the end, the pressure on biden from party leaders, rank and file lawmakers and donors   and the polling showing the perilous and potentially insurmountable path biden faced amid a growing deficit with trump   ultimately proved too much. described as being more isolated than he had ever been, biden could not withstand the push behind the scenes and in public. the blunt reality became a chorus of voices calling for the president to exit the race, like a boulder rolling down a mountain that only picked up momentum with each passing day. the president’s team wanted the june cnn debate with trump   months earlier than typical presidential debates   to shake up a race that biden was trailing. they succeeded, but not in the way they had intended. instead, biden’s campaign unraveled over the course of the next 24 days. everything the president and his team tried to do to calm democrats’ fears simply failed to shed the perception that biden’s age was too advanced, and his health too fragile, for him to stay in the race. with two posts on x sunday afternoon, biden bowed out of the race and threw his support behind his vice president, kamala harris, in the hopes of quickly coalescing their party and moving past the chaos that had engulfed democrats since the debate. it’s a high risk, high reward gamble for democrats, resetting a campaign biden was losing with a new nominee just 107 days before the election. it comes as trump is at his strongest point in the campaign, coming out of a completely unified republican national convention with a base rallying around him after the attempt on his life. biden’s final decision to leave the race was reached in the last 48 hours, a senior campaign adviser said, as he consulted family and top advisers by telephone while recovering from covid. a source familiar with the matter said the plans to exit the race began saturday night and were finalized sunday. the adviser said the president “was not dug in” but was studying the data coming in and became convinced he would “weigh down” the ticket and be a complication to defeating trump. biden’s decision did not have to do with any medical issues, a senior white house official told cnn. when biden huddled with his two closest advisers saturday, the information they provided on polling and where top democratic officials stood underscored that a path to victory was “basically nonexistent,” according to another person familiar with the matter. there wasn’t any single poll number, wavering democratic official or fundraiser presented in the meeting with longtime aides mike donilon and steve ricchetti that pushed biden toward his decision, the person said. instead, the information highlighted that the path back to a viable campaign had been severely damaged by declining national and swing state poll numbers, along with party defections that were likely to rapidly accelerate. the information included polling and details gathered from outreach outside biden’s inner circle. unlike 2015, when biden wrote in his book “promise me, dad” that donilon told the then vice president he shouldn’t launch a 2016 bid for president as he grieved the death of his son beau, neither aide explicitly told biden he should get out of the race, according to the person. related article what happens in the democratic nomination now that biden has left the race biden made clear before the end of the meeting that he was planning to pull out of the race and asked his aides to start drafting the letter he posted sunday afternoon and preparing the plans for the rollout. still recovering from a covid diagnosis, biden remained at his home in rehoboth beach, delaware, all weekend with his wife, first lady jill biden. biden did what he always planned to do before any crucial decision: he held a family meeting saturday night. he has spoken to all of his family since making his decision to drop out of the race, and his daughter ashley and son in law howard drove to rehoboth earlier sunday, according to a source. he confirmed that decision sunday morning and, with ricchetti by his side, started making calls to key players outside of his close knit group of senior most aides and family members, the other person familiar with the matter said. biden consulted only a very small number of close aides on the decision. some members of his inner circle were left in the dark until minutes before he posted his announcement on social media, including one of his closest communications advisers, anita dunn. multiple sources told cnn that dunn and a small group of senior aides became aware of biden’s announcement in the minutes before the post. many rank and file staff found out when the post came out. dunn and her husband, bob bauer, were among biden’s debate prep team and had faced the ire of the president’s family in the aftermath of the performance. a biden aide disputed that her exclusion had anything to do with the debate, telling cnn that she, along with other top aides, was not in rehoboth beach, and that “the president told his aides that neither he or his family blame them for debate performance.” biden and harris spoke multiple times sunday ahead of his announcement, according to a source familiar with the matter. biden also held separate calls with chief of staff jeff zients and campaign co chair jen o’malley dillon informing each of his decision. in washington on sunday, zients led a white house senior staff call with all assistants to the president in the midafternoon, as well as a call with members of biden’s cabinet. zients is expected to hold an all white house staff call monday morning and to speak with political appointees across the executive branch. but even his vice president, and pick to succeed him, didn’t find out until the day he announced his decision. in the end, biden was confronting an untenable path forward: more than three dozen democrats had publicly called for him to exit the race. party leaders had told him he couldn’t win. and the money was drying up from donors who said they felt betrayed by the lack of disclosure around the condition of biden’s health. “i don’t know one big donor who is going to write a check for $100,000 or more. and i know a lot of those guys,” one major democratic donor told cnn before biden dropped out. biden and his team tried to play off the debate performance as a “bad night.” he and his aides blamed the president’s overseas trip. he said he would debate again and do better. and he returned immediately to the campaign trail, traveling to north carolina the following day and delivering an energetic speech while acknowledging his debate shortcomings. “i know i’m not a young man. i don’t walk as easy as i used to. i don’t speak as smoothly as i used to. i don’t debate as well as i used to, but i know what i do know. i know how to tell the truth,” biden said. biden huddled with his family at camp david the weekend after the debate for a previously scheduled get together, during which they encouraged him to stay in the race. but in democratic circles, panic had already set in. the issue problem was plain as day: biden’s biggest problem with voters was they didn’t feel he was up to the job for the next four years. the debate had confirmed their fears and brought biden’s biggest political weakness to the forefront. no policy or statement or criticism of trump could change that. even as biden insisted there was nothing that could convince him to get out of the race, democrats began laying the groundwork and keeping the door open to a change. former house speaker nancy pelosi went on msnbc, saying: “i think it’s a legitimate question to say, is this an episode, or is this a condition?” rep. lloyd doggett of texas on july 2 became the first elected democrat to call for biden to withdraw. the following day, biden met with a group of democratic governors, telling them he needed more sleep and should stop scheduling events after 8 p.m. on july 5, biden sat down for an interview with abc news’ george stephanopoulos, in an attempt to demonstrate he was able to keep campaigning. in the interview, biden said only the “lord almighty” could convince him to leave the race, a comment that angered many democrats. it was the first of several attempts from biden’s team to put the president in the public eye and quell the growing discontent. all failed to do so. after july 4, sen. mark warner, a virginia democrat, quietly tried to gather a group of democrats who would hold a meeting with biden, potentially urging him to exit the race. the idea died, however, when the effort leaked. house democratic leader hakeem jeffries held a call with house democrats over that weekend, during which several lawmakers said that biden needed to step aside. on july 8, biden fired off defiant a letter to congressional democrats saying he would continue his reelection bid. “i am firmly committed to staying in this race, to running this race to the end, and to beating donald trump,” he wrote. the calls for biden to leave soon started coming from outside washington. on july 10, george clooney, penned a new york times op ed calling for biden to step aside. even more devastating for the president, clooney said the biden he saw at a june fundraiser was the same biden the world saw at the june debate and that the president had declined since taking the oval office. pelosi also continued to raise questions about biden, declining to endorse him in an msnbc interview the same day as clooney’s op ed. “it’s up to the president to decide if he’s going to run,” she said, even if that was a decision biden had already seemed to have made. related article the delegates will decide the next democratic nominee as a groundswell forms for harris several news outlets, including cnn, reported that pelosi and former president barack obama had privately expressed concerns about the future of biden’s campaign. on july 11, biden held a solo news conference on the sidelines of the nato summit in washington. he opened the door a bit further to the possibility he could drop out, saying he would consider doing so if data showed he cannot win. biden also made several small verbal slip ups, including calling harris “vice president trump.” earlier in the day, he had referred ukrainian president volodymyr zelensky as “president putin,” before correcting himself. after biden’s news conference, a handful more congressional democrats called for him to drop out, growing the number to 15. the list included rep. jim himes of connecticut, the top democrat on the house intelligence committee, who said he deliberately waited until after the nato meeting. that weekend, biden met and held calls with various democratic caucuses, including the congressional progressive caucus and the moderate new democrat coalition. the call with moderate democrats was tense, as biden got into it with rep. jason crow, a colorado democrat who bluntly told him that voters are concerned about his vigor and strength, especially as it is perceived on the world stage. the president responded to crow   an army ranger who served two tours in afghanistan and one in iraq   that he knows crow is a bronze star recipient like his late son beau, but that “he didn’t rebuild nato.” at one point, biden told crow, “i don’t want to hear that crap” in addressing the lawmaker’s concerns. more democrats had been expected to publicly call for biden’s exit that weekend, but the chatter came to a halt in an instant when an attempted assassin’s bullet came within millimeters of killing trump at his butler, pennsylvania, rally. the assassination attempt turned the political world on its head, draining the public focus on biden’s ability to govern for a second term and turning it squarely onto the bullet that grazed trump’s ear, raising a flurry of questions about how a gunman was able to shoot at the republican nominee for president five days before he was to accept the nomination. the pause would not last. behind the scenes, democratic pollsters circulated memos showing biden was on track to lose the election, and   importantly to congressional democrats   damage candidates in ballot races, too. some polling showed other democrats outpacing biden in battleground states. “lose everything,” was how one democrat described a polling memo democratic pollster stanley greenberg had sent to biden’s inner circle. the dam reopened on wednesday when california rep. adam schiff, the democratic senate candidate and leader of trump’s first impeachment, became the first lawmaker to join the public calls for biden to withdraw from the campaign after the assassination attempt. schiff’s place in the party   as a potential soon to be senator and close ally to pelosi   made his voice among the most significant to that point. “while the choice to withdraw from the campaign is president biden’s alone, i believe it is time for him to pass the torch,” schiff said in a statement. more voices soon followed. and arguably more importantly, the private pleas for biden to leave the race became part of a public cacophony of voices urging his withdrawal. rep. jamie raskin, the maryland house democrat who led trump’s second impeachment, confirmed that he had written a letter to biden on july 6 encouraging the president that there was “no shame in taking a well deserved bow” out of the 2024 presidential election   and making his argument with comparisons to george washington and red sox pitching great pedro martinez. cnn reported wednesday that pelosi privately told biden that polling showed he could not defeat trump and that he could destroy democrats’ chances of winning the house in november. biden pushed back, saying he had seen polls indicating he could win. at one point, pelosi asked donilon, biden’s longtime adviser, to get on the line to talk over the data. that same day, abc news reported that schumer told biden in their saturday meeting that it would be best if he bowed out of the presidential race. and a person briefed on the meeting between biden and jeffries said that the democratic house leader stopped short of calling on him to step aside   instead pinning the suggestion on his members. the white house and congressional officers tried to tamp down the reports, issuing statements of denial. but the stories about the party leaders delivering biden a message had their effect. on friday, a dozen new democrats released statements saying biden should exit the race. among them: another close pelosi ally, rep. zoe lofgren of california. a source with direct knowledge described biden on friday as “seething” at pelosi, a sentiment that only grew in light of lofgren’s letter. the public statements from democrats illustrated one element of biden’s challenge to stay in the race   but just as important were the defections from his donors that would have dried up fundraising in the home stretch of the campaign. major democratic donors were skeptical of biden’s viability, and multiple said their concerns had received an icy reception from biden campaign officials. “how do you think we feel?” a democratic donor close to the democratic national committee and the white house told cnn before biden dropped out, explaining the mood among donors. “we all feel betrayed that they were not honest with us about his health.” two sources told cnn on thursday that furious donors were also telling house and senate democratic campaign committees they would freeze contributions unless and until party leaders took stronger steps to get biden to step aside. “yes, that card has been played,” a senior house democrat told cnn on thursday night. “they believe if joe is at the top of the ticket, the house and senate are gone, too,” said a democratic strategist intimately involved in big dollar fundraising. “they don’t want to throw good money after bad.” moments after biden’s announcement, donors abruptly began reaching out to advisers, pouring in money, according to sources involved in the discussions. in the lead up to biden’s decision to exit the 2024 race, multiple donors had reached out to harris’ team proactively to signal they would be willing to support her if she ran at the top of the ticket, according to three people familiar with the discussions. up until the moment he dropped out, biden and his team insisted he was staying in. biden’s team created a public schedule for the president over the past week that was intended to show his ability to stay in the race. on monday, he held another television interview with nbc news’ lester holt, where he acknowledged his subpar debate performance while criticizing the media for focusing on his gaffes instead of trump’s falsehoods. biden again said he had no intention of stepping aside. biden then traveled to las vegas for campaign stops, speeches planned at the naacp national convention and the unidosus annual conference, and interviews with bet and univision. biden told bet news’ ed gordon that the only thing that would push him to reconsider his reelection bid would be a “medical condition.” the president spoke at the naacp conference, but before he could make his speech wednesday at unidosus, he was dealt another blow: the positive covid 19 diagnosis. the president returned to his rehoboth beach home that day to isolate, his public schedule shuttered indefinitely while he recovered. related article here’s what happened the last time a president chose not to run for a second term on friday, biden issued a statement that he would be back on the campaign trail the following week, while biden campaign chair o’malley dillon went on msnbc’s “morning joe” to say biden was “absolutely” staying in the race. the campaign also put out a memo saying there was “no plan for an alternative nominee.” biden called some democrats over the weekend who were out on tv on his behalf. two told cnn that the president voiced his gratitude and then his anger at those who were trying to push him out. “there was some hurt in his voice but mostly anger,” one of the biden loyalists said. even on sunday, biden’s team continued to publicly maintain he wasn’t going anywhere. south carolina rep. james clyburn, a key biden ally, told cnn’s jake tapper on “state of the union” that biden and harris “have received over 14 million votes to be our standard bearers. that’s where we are,” clyburn. the congressman’s 2020 endorsement of biden ahead of the south carolina primary was widely seen as instrumental in biden’s victory. biden spoke to harris on sunday before announcing his decision, which came in two messages: the first saying he was dropping out, and the second endorsing his vice president to be the democratic nominee. biden told his senior most team he was getting out around 1:45 p.m., and the public letter went out right around then, a source familiar with the timing told cnn. “before that, it was all steam ahead that he’s running,” the same source said. this story has been updated with additional reporting. cnn’s kayla tausche, dana bash, john king, jamie gangel, betsy klein, sam fossum, manu raju, samantha waldenberg, donald judd and kaitlan collins contributed to this report. © 2025 cable news network. a warner bros. discovery company. all rights reserved. cnn sans ™ & © 2016 cable news network.

deirdre walsh president biden delivers his state of the union address to a joint session of congress at the capitol in washington, d.c., on thursday. j. scott applewhite/ap hide caption president biden delivers his state of the union address to a joint session of congress at the capitol in washington, d.c., on thursday. president biden didn't waste any time in his prime time state of the union address drawing a sharp contrast with his likely 2024 presidential rival, former president donald trump. instead of a policy heavy laundry list speech, the president leaned into politics, and at times, shouted and amped up democrats with some fiery rhetoric. early in his speech he derided trump, without mentioning his name, chastising those who failed to heed the threat from russian president vladimir putin to ukraine, and denouncing those who stormed the capitol on jan. 6, 2021. the atmosphere in the house chamber often seemed more like a political convention than the annual required speech assessing the state of the nation. here are five takeaways. the president referred to policies or comments from "my predecessor" more than a dozen times, making it clear the high stakes televised speech was his campaign roadmap for his rematch with trump in november. the president leaned into the issues that energize his base, like abortion and gun control and tax hikes on the wealthy. but he also attempted to challenge republicans in the chamber, and trump outside of it, on issues like the border and crime, areas where he faces skepticism from many independent and suburban voters. the president, who is 81, had a bar to clear to alleviate concerns from some in his own party about his age and capacity to hold the demanding job as commander in chief for four more years. he stuck mostly to his script, was energetic and appeared to fire up democrats in the chamber, who occasionally chanted "four more years!" and jumped to their feet cheering the president. biden also worked to flip the age issue against his opponent, who at one point he referred to as "some other people my age." trump is 77. with six justices of the u.s. supreme court sitting in the front rows, the president criticized the majority conservative court for overturning the landmark abortion case roe v. wade in 2022. as he warned that "history is watching" how the u.s. handles alliances abroad, and supports ukraine, he warned about "another assault on freedom." referring to trump, biden maintained that the former president was responsible for overturning the law and said, "in fact, he brags about it." he warned that republicans in the congress were pushing for a national abortion ban. he ticked through how a host of red states have restricted access to reproductive health services   warning about the latest law in alabama that effectively banned in vitro fertilization. he mentioned kate cox, a guest sitting with the first lady. cox suffered a fatal fetal condition during her pregnancy but was unable to obtain an abortion in texas and sued the state. biden warned that the gop underestimated the power of women to mobilize, referencing past wins when reproductive freedom was on the ballot and predicting a win again in 2024. he also promised to restore roe v. wade as the law of the land   something he will need a democratic house and senate to achieve, which is not likely after the 2024 election, when republicans are favored to flip control of the senate. the political symbolism of the power of women for biden's campaign was also visibly on display in the chamber. dozens of democratic lawmakers donned white and sported buttons emblazoned with a slogan "fighting for reproductive freedom." congressional democrats, especially those in swing seats, needed biden to alleviate voters' concerns about his ability to do the job in this kickoff campaign speech. but they chiefly named the economy as the issue they wanted him to highlight. he argued that the state of the country was far worse when trump was in office, citing the pandemic that triggered job losses, millions of deaths and a "mental health crisis of isolation and loneliness." he acknowledged what many democrats concede, that some of the major bills that democrats passed since 2021 aren't fully felt around the country. "it doesn't make the news but in thousands of cities and towns, the american people are writing the greatest comeback story never told," he said. many republicans in the chamber groaned and booed at biden's description of trump's record. when biden wasn't calling out trump's record in the white house, he outlined his own. he pulled out statistics about real world projects that are funded through his top legislative accomplishments   a heath care and climate bill, which was passed without a single gop vote, and the bipartisan infrastructure bill. biden took credit for lowering prescription drugs, and capping the cost of insulin for seniors on medicare to $35 a month. he vowed in a second term to extend that cap for all who need insulin. biden used a familiar populist line from the stump about shifting more cost savings to those on the lower income side, at the expense of the top 1%. biden cited trump's 2017 tax cuts as the prime example of a president who was skewed toward helping the rich. he looked into the cameras to those watching at home and asked the political question designed to relate to most americans, "for folks at home, does anybody really think the tax code is fair?" going into the state of the union, the president and his advisers knew he needed to detail how he would address the situation at the u.s. mexico border and acknowledge the impact it is having, not just in red border states, but in blue cities across the country, where migrants are being bused and straining public resources. public opinion polls consistently show it's his weakest issue politically, and trump and republicans on capitol hill have made it their top priority. before the president's speech on thursday, the house approved a bill dubbed the "laken riley act," a reference to the 22 year old georgia nursing student who was murdered recently by a migrant who entered the u.s. illegally in 2022. the move was a deliberate attempt to force democrats to go on the record on a measure that requires the detention of any migrant with a record of theft, and 37 democrats   chiefly from swing districts   backed it. republicans wore buttons that included riley's name, and some chanted her name when president biden called for congress to pass the bipartisan senate border security bill, which white house officials helped broker over several months. the senate approved the legislation with a significant bipartisan vote, but house speaker mike johnson said it was "dead on arrival" and declined to take it up. biden again didn't mention trump by name, but blamed him for derailing it, "i'm told my predecessor called republicans in congress and demanded they block the bill. he feels it would be a political win for me and a political loser for him." biden repeated a challenge he issued in a recent trip to the southwest border for trump to join him to help pass the bill. he mentioned he was looking at executive authority for policies to reduce the number of migrants   something that has split democrats on capitol hill   but he also said he needed congress to change the law to fund more enforcement personnel. the blame game over which party is more serious about the situation at the border is expected to be a leading theme through the fall. although democrats are split on the president's embrace of some conservative policies, like altering who can be eligible to claim asylum, the strategy of trying to flip the script and put republicans on defense for blocking a bipartisan plan is one candidates in competitive races are expected to replicate. president biden made israel's now five month long war against hamas in gaza a significant part of his speech, and he acknowledged families of those still being held hostage by hamas in the chamber's visitors galleries. his handling of the war has angered many progressives, and younger voters, who argue that the president isn't tough enough on the israeli government. the fallout from his approach has cost him politically, and democrats are concerned it could prompt some voters to stay home in the fall. in michigan, a significant bloc of democrats upset about the president's handling of israel's war in gaza, sent a message in the primary last week, with more than 100,000 registering a vote for the "uncommitted" option on the ballot, instead of for biden. a number of super tuesday states had similar efforts. in thursday's address, the president announced the u.s. military will build a temporary emergency pier to facilitate the delivery of aid to civilians desperate for food and medicine. but, he declared, "no u.s. boots will be on the ground." the president stressed that his administration is working on a cease fire so that hostages can be released and more humanitarian assistance can be delivered. he stressed his personal record over decades as a strong supporter of israel and his visit during the early part of the war. but he also said, "as we look to the future, the only real solution is a two state solution." there is increasing pressure for an immediate cease fire to materialize, and biden, who recently predicted a temporary pause would be coming in a matter of days, faces calls from progressives in congress to cut off military aid to israel and concentrate on humanitarian assistance. biden may have largely united his own party on the need to continue supporting ukraine. but the deep fissures when it comes to his approach to israel, as the death toll of civilians mounts in gaza, has been a regular flashpoint already in campaign stops and shows no sign of fading. an earlier version of this story mistakenly said republicans are favored to flip control of the house. the gop currently controls the house and could flip the senate. sponsor message become an npr sponsor

our editors will review what you’ve submitted and determine whether to revise the article. joe biden served as the 46th president of the united states (2021 25). he was born on november 20, 1942, in scranton, pennsylvania, and he served as a u.s. senator representing delaware from 1972 to 2009. he was vice president in the barack obama administration from 2009 to 2017. in july 2024 biden announced he would not seek a second term as president. in a statement posted on social media on july 21, 2024, joe biden said that “while it has been my intention to seek reelection, i believe it is in the best interest of my party and the country for me to stand down and to focus solely on fulfilling my duties as president for the remainder of my term.” joe biden (born november 20, 1942, scranton, pennsylvania, u.s.) is the 46th president of the united states (2021 25) and was the 47th vice president of the united states (2009 17) in the democratic administration of pres. barack obama. he previously represented delaware in the u.s. senate (1973 2009). in april 2023 joe biden formally announced his bid for reelection as president in 2024. in july 2024, however, following his poor performance in a nationally televised debate with republican presidential candidate donald trump and under intense pressure from several leading democrats biden ended his candidacy and endorsed vice pres. kamala harris to be the democratic party’s presidential nominee. in ending his campaign, biden became the first president since lyndon b. johnson in 1968 to not seek reelection. although harris was more popular than biden among democratic voters, she lost the presidential election to trump. in an interview in early january 2025, biden expressed regret over his decision to withdraw his candidacy, claiming that he would have beaten trump. one week later, biden delivered a nationally televised farewell address from the white house in which he warned of an ascending oligarchy in the united states. without mentioning trump, biden deplored the efforts of ultra wealthy individuals, including tech company billionaires, to misuse their considerable influence to serve their own interests. biden also decried the “crumbling” of the free press and the abandonment of fact checking on popular social media platforms, citing “an avalanche of misinformation and disinformation” and the smothering of truth “by lies told for power and for profit.” for a full transcript of biden’s farewell address, click here. biden, who was raised in scranton, pennsylvania, and new castle county, delaware, received a bachelor’s degree from the university of delaware in 1965 and a law degree from syracuse university in new york in 1968. during this time he married (1966) neilia hunter, and the couple later had three children. after graduating from law school, biden returned to delaware to work as an attorney before quickly turning to politics, serving on the new castle county council from 1970 to 1972. he was elected to the u.s. senate in 1972 at the age of 29, becoming the fifth youngest u.s. senator in history. about a month later his wife and infant daughter were killed in a car accident, and his two sons were seriously injured. although he contemplated suspending his political career, biden was persuaded to join the senate in 1973, and he went on to win reelection six times, becoming delaware’s longest serving senator. in 1977 he married jill jacobs, an educator, and they later had a daughter. in addition to his role as u.s. senator, biden also was an adjunct professor (1991 2008) at the wilmington, delaware, branch of the widener university school of law. as a senator, biden focused on foreign relations, criminal law, and drug policy. he served on the senate’s foreign relations committee, twice as its chair (2001 03; 2007 09), and on the committee on the judiciary, serving as its chair from 1987 to 1995. he was particularly outspoken on issues related to the kosovo conflict of the late 1990s, urging u.s. action against serbian forces to protect kosovars against an offensive by serbian pres. slobodan milošević. on the iraq war (2003 11) biden proposed a partition plan as a way to maintain a united, peaceful iraq. biden also was a member of the international narcotics control caucus and was the lead senator in writing the law that established the office of “drug czar,” a position that oversees national drug control policy. biden pursued the 1988 democratic presidential nomination but withdrew after it was revealed that parts of his campaign stump speech had been plagiarized from british labour party leader neil kinnock without appropriate attribution. his 2008 presidential campaign never gained momentum, and he withdrew from the race after placing fifth in the iowa democratic caucus in january of that year. (for coverage of the 2008 election, see united states presidential election of 2008.) after obama amassed enough delegates to secure the democratic presidential nomination, biden emerged as a front runner to be obama’s vice presidential running mate. on august 23 obama officially announced his selection of biden as the democratic party’s vice presidential nominee, and on august 27 obama and biden secured the democratic party’s nomination. on november 4 the obama biden ticket defeated john mccain and his running mate, sarah palin, and biden also easily won reelection to his u.s. senate seat. he resigned from the senate post shortly before taking the oath of office as vice president on january 20, 2009. in november 2012 obama and biden were reelected for a second term, defeating the republican ticket of mitt romney and paul ryan. as vice president biden played an active role in the obama administration, serving as an influential adviser to obama and a vocal supporter of his initiatives. in addition, he was tasked with notable assignments. he helped avert several budget crises and played a key role in shaping u.s. policy in iraq. in 2015 his eldest son, beau, died from brain cancer; biden recounted the experience in promise me, dad: a year of hope, hardship, and purpose (2017). several months later, biden who enjoyed high favorability ratings, partly due to a candor and affable manner that resonated with the public announced that he would not enter the 2016 presidential election, noting that the family was still grieving. instead, he campaigned for hillary clinton, who ultimately lost the election to donald trump. biden’s close relationship with obama was evident when the latter surprised him with the presidential medal of freedom, with distinction, on january 12, 2017, just days before they left office. when obama presented the rarely given honor he referred to biden as “my brother.” later that year biden and his wife established the biden foundation, a charitable group involved in various causes. biden remained involved in politics and was a vocal critic of president trump. biden himself faced censure when, in 2019, various women accused him of inappropriate physical contact, notably hugging and kissing. although his response was widely derided “i’m sorry i didn’t understand more.…i’m not sorry for anything that i have ever done. i’ve never been disrespectful intentionally to a man or a woman” his popularity remained high. amid growing speculation that he would run for president in 2020, biden announced his candidacy in april 2019, joining a crowded democratic field. biden immediately became a front runner, and he pursued a platform that was considered moderate, especially as compared with such candidates as bernie sanders. a poor performance in the party’s first debate in june 2019, however, raised questions about biden, and his support dipped. after the first three nomination contests in early 2020, sanders seemed poised to become the party’s nominee. however, worries about sanders’s electability in the general election galvanized moderate voters, and in south carolina in late february biden won a resounding victory. numerous candidates subsequently dropped out, and by early march it had become a two person race between biden and sanders. as biden registered more wins, he soon took a commanding lead in delegates. after the rapid spread of the covid 19 pandemic in the united states stalled the campaigns, sanders dropped out in april, and biden became the presumptive democratic nominee. in the ensuing months biden outlined a platform that included a number of policies that appealed to progressives. he notably supported government aid to low income communities, ambitious climate change legislation, affordable child care, and the expansion of federal health insurance plans, such as the patient protection and affordable care act, which had been enacted during obama’s presidency. during this time biden gained a somewhat sizable lead over trump in nationwide polls, in part due to criticism of the president’s response to the covid 19 pandemic, which had caused an economic downturn that rivaled the great depression. in august 2020 biden chose kamala harris as his running mate she became the first african american woman to appear on a major party’s national ticket and later that month, he officially was named the democratic presidential nominee. although preelection polling had shown biden with a significant lead in key battleground states, the actual contest proved to be much closer. nevertheless, biden and harris succeeded in rebuilding the so called “blue wall” through the midwestern rust belt states, and on november 7, four days after the election, biden secured the 270 electoral votes necessary to capture the presidency. biden’s eventual electoral vote total was 306 to trump’s 232; biden won the popular vote by more than seven million votes. trump and several other republican leaders subsequently challenged the election results, claiming massive voter fraud. although a number of lawsuits were filed, no evidence was provided to support the allegations, and the vast majority of the cases were dismissed. during this time, biden and harris began the transition to a new administration, announcing an agenda and selecting staff. by early december all states had certified the election results, and the process then moved to congress for final certification. amid trump’s repeated calls for republicans to overturn the election, a group of republican congressional members, notably including senators josh hawley (missouri) and ted cruz (texas), announced that they would challenge the electors of various states. as the proceedings began on january 6, 2021, a large crowd of trump supporters marched to the u.s. capitol from a rally near the white house, where trump had delivered an incendiary speech repeating false allegations of voter fraud by democrats and urging his supporters to “fight like hell.” overwhelming capitol police, the rioters stormed the complex and vandalized and looted the interior, resulting in the deaths of five people, including one capitol police officer (see january 6 u.s. capitol attack). after several hours the building was finally secured, and biden and harris were certified as the winners. two weeks later, amid a massive security presence, biden was sworn in as president. the 2020 election was marked by a historically large voter turnout, made possible in part by modifications in voting procedures initiated in many states to ensure that voters could cast their ballots safely amid the covid 19 pandemic. significantly more democrats voted in the 2020 election than in previous presidential contests, and the democratic party not only won the presidential election but also maintained its control of the u.s. house of representatives and took control of the u.s. senate from republicans, though only by the slimmest of margins (the resulting senate membership was evenly divided between the two parties at 50 senators each, but tie votes could be broken by vice president harris, acting in her constitutional role as president of the senate). in the view of many democrats, particularly progressives, the party’s simultaneous control of the presidency and both houses of congress afforded it a rare opportunity to pass transformative legislation that promised to make american society more democratic, equitable, and just. during the first weeks of his presidency, biden signed a raft of executive orders, actions, and memoranda, many of which rescinded policies of the trump administration, particularly in the areas of immigration, health care, and the environment. notably, on his first day in office, biden issued executive orders that reentered the united states into the paris agreement on climate change and canceled the country’s withdrawal from the world health organization. in march 2021 the biden administration used budget reconciliation (a process that prevents certain budget related bills in the senate from being filibustered) to secure passage by congress, without republican support, of a $1.9 trillion pandemic relief bill, the american rescue plan. the law included, among other measures, one time payments for lower  and middle income americans; extended unemployment benefits; an expanded child tax credit; financial aid to state and local governments, schools, and child care providers; housing assistance; and additional funding for coronavirus testing, contact tracing, and vaccine distribution. biden supported three significant pieces of voting rights and electoral reform legislation: the for the people act, passed by the house in march 2021; the john lewis voting rights advancement act, passed by the house in august; and the freedom to vote act, introduced in the senate in september. (the first two bills were later versions of legislation passed by the house in 2019.) all three bills were blocked in the senate by republican filibusters, which could be overcome only with the support of at least 60 senators. the bills were designed to prevent states from adopting egregious voter suppression laws, to eliminate partisan and racial gerrymandering, and to make elections more transparent by requiring “dark money” organizations to disclose their donors (see campaign finance; campaign finance laws). the failure of the electoral reform measures, which democrats viewed as essential to preserving american democracy, prompted progressive and even some moderate democrats to urge the elimination of the filibuster, which is not established in the u.s. constitution and can be ended by the senate in a simple majority vote. in august 2021 the senate passed the bipartisan infrastructure investment and jobs act, a drastically scaled back ($550 billion) version of a wide ranging infrastructure plan announced by biden in march. its smaller scale was made necessary by objections from republicans and conservative democrats to spending levels, tax increases on corporations and the wealthy, and several social spending provisions. the bill then languished in the house for months as progressive, moderate, and conservative democrats debated its provisions. in early november, following important off year elections in which democrats suffered several unexpected defeats, biden and democratic house leaders intensified their efforts to reconcile their party’s factions, arguing that some tangible legislative achievement was necessary to retain the support of swing voters. after progressives finally conceded, the infrastructure bill was passed and sent to biden for his signature. (in november 2022 democrats lost control of the house to republicans but retained their slim control of the senate, gaining one seat.) in august 2022 the biden administration again relied on budget reconciliation to secure passage of the inflation reduction act, which incorporated some elements of an earlier bill, the build back better act, that had been defeated in the senate after its rejection by conservative democratic sen. joe manchin. the inflation reduction act included provisions designed to promote the development of clean energy technologies; to lower prescription drug prices, in part by empowering medicare to negotiate the purchase of certain drugs from pharmaceutical companies; to extend the administration’s earlier increase of medical insurance subsidies provided under the patient protection and affordable care act (2010); and to increase federal tax revenue by imposing a minimum corporate tax rate of 15 percent and strengthening tax law enforcement with thousands of additional internal revenue service (irs) officials. the legislation, which represents the largest government investment in climate change prevention in u.s. history, was projected to reduce u.s. greenhouse gas emissions by 40 percent (from 2005) by 2030. in part because of continued supply chain disruptions related to the covid 19 pandemic, and in part because the country’s economy grew at a fast pace during the first years of biden’s presidency (in 2021 gross domestic product [gdp] grew by 5.7 percent, the highest annual rate in 37 years), inflation remained a persistent problem, eventually leading the federal reserve (the country’s central bank) to impose an extended series of interest rate increases. despite significant wage increases, rapid job growth, and greatly reduced unemployment, public worries regarding inflation contributed to a common perception that biden was mismanaging the economy, which in turn contributed to his low public approval rating less than 50 percent during most of his presidency. by the end of 2023, the country’s inflation rate had declined to 4.1 percent, but biden’s approval rating (according gallup polls) was only 39 percent, the second lowest of any modern u.s. president after a third year in office. by mid 2024 biden had nominated more than 240 individuals to vacant seats on the federal judiciary, and nearly 200 of his nominees had been confirmed by the u.s. senate. after supreme court justice stephen breyer announced in january 2022 that he would retire at the end of the court’s 2021 22 term, biden repeated his intention first voiced as a campaign pledge to nominate a black woman to the court. in february he nominated ketanji brown jackson, whom he had earlier appointed (in 2021) to the court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit. jackson’s nomination was confirmed by a senate vote of 53 to 47, and in june she was sworn in as the first black female supreme court justice. on december 13, 2022, biden signed into law the respect for marriage act. the act formally repealed the federal defense of marriage act (1996), which had defined marriage as a legal union between one man and one woman and had permitted states to refuse to recognize same sex marriages performed in other states. biden had also appointed as u.s. secretary of transportation pete buttigieg, the first openly gay cabinet member in american history, who had unsuccessfully sought the democratic presidential nomination in 2020. among biden’s early goals in foreign policy were to repair frayed relations with several u.s. allies, to cooperate in global efforts to ameliorate climate change, and, in general, to return the united states to a position of global economic and political leadership. biden had also promised during his campaign that he would withdraw all remaining u.s. troops from afghanistan, finally ending nearly 20 years of u.s. military involvement in the country during all phases of the afghanistan war, the longest military conflict ever fought by the united states. in april 2021 biden announced a withdrawal of all u.s. troops by september 11 an extension of the may 1 withdrawal deadline negotiated with the taliban by the trump administration in 2020. by early august, after biden had advanced the withdrawal deadline to august 31, the taliban had begun to take military control of several afghan provinces, and soon thereafter the afghan capital, kabul, was captured and the national government collapsed. chaos ensued as the airport in kabul was flooded with desperate afghan refugees seeking to flee the country on american evacuation flights. during and after the withdrawal, the biden administration was criticized by republican and some democratic leaders for having misjudged the strength and resolve of both the taliban and the afghan government and security forces. in 2022, following russia’s military invasion of ukraine, biden imposed harsh economic sanctions on russia and initiated the first of many military weapons transfers and other security assistance to ukraine. by the end of 2023 congress had approved $113 billion in military, economic, and humanitarian aid to the country at biden’s request. his support for ukraine and its leader, volodymyr zelensky, contrasted with the attitude of far right republicans, particularly members of the trump led maga movement, who generally supported russian pres. vladimir putin and viktor orbán, the authoritarian leader of hungary. trump’s long standing admiration for putin and his lack of sympathy for ukraine were reflected in the opposition of trump’s congressional allies to biden’s request for additional military assistance to ukraine in october 2023. after months of debate, congress finally approved an aid package that included $61 billion for ukraine. the aid package also contained $15 billion in additional military assistance for israel, which had been engaged in a war against hamas, the palestinian militant group in control of the gaza strip, since the latter’s military assault on israel on october 7, 2023 (see israel hamas war). hamas’s attack resulted in the deaths of more than 1,200 israeli citizens. israel responded with a massive ground invasion beginning in the northern gaza strip, nearly continuous airstrikes, and an intensified blockade preventing water, food, medicine, electricity, and fuel from entering the territory. by early may 2024, more than 35,000 palestinians, most of whom were civilians, had been reported dead. biden initially condemned hamas’s attack and expressed unequivocal support for israel while also requesting brief pauses in israeli military action to permit humanitarian aid and civilian evacuations. as the war continued, israel faced international condemnation for its numerous attacks on civilian targets (which it generally claimed were housing hamas fighters) and the humanitarian crisis created by its blockade, and biden faced criticism from some democrats for not insisting that israel accept a cease fire. in february 2024, biden indicated his opposition to israel’s declared intention to invade rafah, a city in the southwestern gaza strip that had become a refuge for massive numbers of fleeing civilians. the invasion proceeded anyway, beginning in early may. as the israel hamas war continued, growing numbers of americans opposed the country’s unconditional military assistance to israel, and biden was faulted by many democrats for his apparent lack of influence over israeli prime minister benjamin netanyahu and for showing insufficient concern over israeli military atrocities. the war also provoked student protests on dozens of college campuses across the united states, some of which became violent. political analysts generally agree that america’s involvement in the israel hamas war has contributed to biden’s persistently low approval rating. biden’s hopes of serving a second term as president, never a certainty, collapsed in a period of four weeks in the summer of 2024. national polling as early as the fall of 2023 showed trump with a slight lead over biden. biden’s approval ratings remained low compared with other first term presidents a fact that analysts had attributed to the country’s chaotic withdrawal from afghanistan in 2021, to the widespread perception that biden was mismanaging the economy, and to the belief of many americans (including some democrats) that biden was simply too old to competently serve as president. on june 27, 2024, the last concern was reinforced by biden’s poor performance in his first televised debate with trump. although trump himself did not debate well (repeating many falsehoods and consistently failing to answer moderators’ questions), biden’s stumbling, meandering, and raspy voiced responses made him seem much weaker, both physically and mentally, than his opponent. after the debate, some prominent democrats and several democratic leaning journalists, commentators, and news organizations, including the new york times, called upon biden to withdraw from the race. biden initially was defiant, doing speeches and holding news conferences to try to reverse the damage done by his debate performance. but over the course of a month that included an attempted assassination of trump, the drumbeat of calls for biden to step down grew louder. on july 21, he announced that he was withdrawing from the race and throwing his support to harris, becoming the first president to not seek reelection since lyndon b. johnson in 1968. in an address to the nation, he explained his decision while never naming his opponent. i revere this office, but i love my country more. it’s been the honor of my life to serve as your president. but in the defense of democracy, which is at stake, i think it’s more important than any title. i draw strength and i find joy in working for the american people. but this sacred task of perfecting our union is not about me, it’s about you. your families, your futures. it’s about “we the people.”

joe biden's tenure as the 46th president of the united states began with his inauguration on january 20, 2021, and ended on january 20, 2025. biden, a member of the democratic party who previously served as vice president for two terms under president barack obama from 2009 to 2017, took office after his victory in the 2020 presidential election over the incumbent president, donald trump of the republican party. upon his inauguration, he became the oldest president in american history, breaking the record set by ronald reagan.[1] biden entered office amid the covid 19 pandemic, an economic crisis, and increased political polarization.[2] he withdrew his bid for a second term in the 2024 presidential election due to low popularity and concerns over his age and health.[3] trump won the election and succeeded biden as president, making him the second president to be succeeded in office by his predecessor after benjamin harrison. day one actions of his presidency included restoring u.s. participation in the paris agreement, revoking the permit for the keystone xl pipeline and halting funding for the mexico united states border wall.[4] on his second day, he issued a series of executive orders to reduce the impact of covid 19, including invoking the defense production act of 1950, and set an early goal of achieving one hundred million covid 19 vaccinations in the united states in his first 100 days.[5] the first major legislation signed into law by biden was the american rescue plan act of 2021, a $1.9 trillion stimulus bill that temporarily established expanded unemployment insurance and sent $1,400 stimulus checks to most americans in response to continued economic pressure from covid 19.[6] he signed the bipartisan infrastructure investment and jobs act, a ten year plan brokered by biden alongside democrats and republicans in congress to invest in american roads, bridges, public transit, ports and broadband access.[7] biden proposed a significant expansion of the u.s. social safety net through the build back better act, but those efforts, along with voting rights legislation, failed in congress. in august 2022, biden signed the inflation reduction act of 2022, a domestic appropriations bill that included some of the provisions of the build back better act after the entire bill failed to pass. it included significant federal investment in climate and domestic clean energy production, tax credits for solar panels, electric cars and other home energy programs as well as a three year extension of affordable care act subsidies, an insulin price cap, and a provision allowing medicare to negotiate drug prices. in late 2022, biden signed the respect for marriage act, which repealed the defense of marriage act and codified same sex and interracial marriage in the united states. other domestic legislation signed during his term included the bipartisan safer communities act, the first major federal gun control law in nearly three decades;[8] the chips and science act, bolstering the semiconductor and manufacturing industry; the honoring our pact act, expanding health care for us veterans; the electoral count reform and presidential transition improvement act; and the juneteenth national independence day act, making juneteenth a federal holiday in the united states. he appointed ketanji brown jackson to the u.s. supreme court the first black woman to serve on the court. in response to the debt ceiling crisis of 2023, biden negotiated and signed the fiscal responsibility act of 2023, which restrains federal spending for fiscal years 2024 and 2025, implements minor changes to snap and tanf, includes energy permitting reform, claws back some irs funding and unspent money for covid 19, and suspends the debt ceiling to january 1, 2025.[9] he established the american climate corps and created the first ever white house office of gun violence prevention. on september 26, 2023, biden visited a united auto workers picket line during the 2023 united auto workers strike, making him the first us president to visit one. biden also rigorously enforced antitrust laws by appointing lina khan to head the ftc.[10] the foreign policy goal of the biden administration is to restore the us to a "position of trusted leadership" among global democracies in order to address the challenges posed by russia and china. biden signed aukus, an international security alliance together with australia and the united kingdom. he supported the expansion of nato with the additions of finland and sweden. biden approved a raid which led to the death of abu ibrahim al hashimi al qurashi, the leader of the islamic state, and approved a drone strike which killed ayman al zawahiri, leader of al qaeda. he completed the withdrawal of u.s. military forces from afghanistan, declaring an end to nation building efforts and shifting u.s. foreign policy toward strategic competition with china and, to a lesser extent, russia.[11][12][13] however, during the withdrawal, the afghan government collapsed and the taliban seized control, leading to biden receiving bipartisan criticism. he responded to the russian invasion of ukraine by imposing sanctions on russia as well as providing ukraine with over $100 billion in combined military, economic, and humanitarian aid.[14][15] during the israel hamas war, biden condemned the actions of hamas and other palestinian militants as terrorism and announced american military support for israel; he also sent humanitarian aid to the gaza strip and brokered a four day temporary pause and hostage exchange in 2023 followed by a three phase ceasefire in january 2025. biden negotiated and oversaw the 2024 ankara prisoner exchange, the largest prisoner exchange since the end of the cold war, involving the release of 26 individuals, including american journalist evan gershkovich and former united states marine paul whelan. biden began his term with over 50% approval ratings; however, these fell significantly after the withdrawal from afghanistan,[16] and remained low as the country experienced high inflation and rising gas prices, even as they later decreased during his presidency.[17][18] his age and mental fitness remained a frequent subject of discussion throughout his presidency, ultimately culminating in his late decision to not seek re election.[19] despite this, biden oversaw the strongest economic recovery of any g7 nation post covid 19 and one of the strongest economic recoveries in united states history, breaking a 70 year record for low unemployment,[20] and the creation of over 16 million new jobs, the most of any single term president.[21] biden's political legacy is interwoven with the re election of donald trump in 2024, with biden's unpopular tenure leading to support for his former opponent.[22] his preferred successor, vice president kamala harris, was defeated by trump in the 2024 election. joe biden officially announced his candidacy for the nomination of the democratic party in the 2020 presidential election on april 25, 2019, having previously sought the democratic nomination in 1988 and 2008, being unsuccessful both times.[23] in june 2020, biden clinched the nomination by winning a majority of the delegates to become the presumptive nominee for the democratic party following the party's presidential primaries. biden selected senator kamala harris of california as his running mate, and they were officially nominated as the democratic ticket at the 2020 democratic national convention. incumbent president donald trump ran for re election for the republican nomination, becoming the party's presumptive nominee in march 2020 after comfortably winning the primaries without facing any significant rivals. at the republican national convention in august 2020, he formally accepted the party's nomination with incumbent vice president mike pence as his running mate. on november 7, four days after the election, biden was projected to have won pennsylvania (a flip from the previous presidential election), thereby receiving enough electoral votes to secure the presidency, becoming the president elect of the united states. biden won the presidential election with 306 electoral votes compared to trump's 232.[24][25][26][27][28] the trump campaign launched at least 63 lawsuits against the results,[29] especially in the battleground states of arizona, georgia, michigan, nevada, pennsylvania, and wisconsin, raising unevidenced claims of widespread voter fraud that were subsequently dismissed by courts.[30][31] the electoral votes were certified on january 6 7, 2021. in the concurrent congressional elections, democrats retained a narrow majority in the house of representatives and narrowly took control of the senate, leaving the partisan balance in the senate at 50 democrats and 50 republicans, with vice president kamala harris' tie breaking vote giving democrats control of the chamber. though biden was generally acknowledged as the winner,[25][26][27][28] general services administration head emily w. murphy initially refused to begin the transition to the president elect, thereby denying funds and office space to his team.[32][33] on november 23, after michigan certified its results, murphy issued the letter of ascertainment, granting the biden transition team access to federal funds and resources for an orderly transition.[34] two days after becoming the projected winner of the 2020 election, biden announced the formation of a task force to advise him on the covid 19 pandemic during the transition, co chaired by former surgeon general vivek murthy, former fda commissioner david a. kessler, and yale university's marcella nunez smith.[35] on january 5, 2021, the democratic party won control of the united states senate, effective january 20, as a result of electoral victories in georgia by jon ossoff in a runoff election for a six year term and raphael warnock in a special runoff election for a two year term.[36][37] president elect biden had supported and campaigned for both candidates prior to the runoff elections on january 5.[38][39] on january 6, a mob of thousands of trump supporters violently stormed the capitol in the hope of overturning biden's election, forcing congress to evacuate during the counting of the electoral college votes.[40][41] more than 26,000 national guard members were deployed to the capital for the inauguration, with thousands remaining into the spring.[42] on january 20, 2021, biden was sworn in by u.s. chief justice john roberts as the 46th president of the united states, completing the oath of office at 11:49 am est, 11 minutes before the legal start of his term.[43][44] biden's inaugural speech laid out his vision to unite the nation, prefaced by the various impacts of the covid 19 pandemic, economic strife, climate change, political polarization, and racial injustice.[45] biden called for an end to the "uncivil war" of political, demographic, and ideological american cultures through a greater embrace of diversity.[46] he cited the american civil war, great depression, world wars, and september 11 attacks as moments in american history where citizens' "better angels" prevailed, saying that the unity, the solution, must again be invoked to rise from the "cascading" crises of the present; this unity, he proclaimed, exists in the "common objects" that define america: "opportunity, liberty, dignity, respect, honor, and ... truth."[47][48] he explicitly decried white supremacy and nativism, calling them an "ugly reality" of american life he vows to defeat that clouds the "american ideal" set out in the u.s. declaration of independence   that all americans are equal.[46][48][49] biden pledged that the u.s. would "engage with the world once again", "repair our alliances", and act as a "trusted partner for peace and security".[50] near the conclusion of his speech, biden held a moment of silence for those who died in the covid 19 pandemic.[47] quoting the gene scheer composition "american anthem",[51] he implored americans to consider their legacy in answering the "call of history" to protect "democracy, hope, truth, and justice", "secure liberty", and make america a "beacon to the world", insisting that generations of their descendants would judge them on their actions.[47] biden was inaugurated alongside kamala harris, the first woman, first african american, and first asian american vice president.[52] on november 11, 2020, biden selected ron klain, who served as his vice presidential chief of staff, to serve as his white house chief of staff.[53] biden chose jen psaki, deputy white house press secretary and u.s. department of state spokesperson during the presidency of barack obama, as his white house press secretary. psaki announced, and has held, daily press briefings for white house reporters. on march 25, 2021, biden held his first solo press conference after 64 days in office,[54] unlike his most recent predecessors (back to herbert hoover in 1929), who all held their first solo press conferences within 33 days of taking office.[55][56] on november 17, 2020, biden announced that he had selected mike donilon as senior advisor and steve ricchetti as counselor.[57] jen o'malley dillon, who had served as campaign manager for biden's successful presidential campaign, was named as deputy chief of staff.[58] biden selected antony blinken to be secretary of state, linda thomas greenfield as ambassador to the united nations, and jake sullivan as national security advisor.[59][60] on november 23, 2020, biden announced alejandro mayorkas to be his choice for secretary of homeland security and avril haines as director of national intelligence.[61] throughout december and january, biden continued to select cabinet members, including marty walsh, the then current mayor of boston, as his secretary of labor.[62][63] biden altered his cabinet structure, elevating the chair of the council of economic advisers, director of the office of science and technology policy, and ambassador to the united nations as cabinet level positions.[64][65][66] biden removed the director of the central intelligence agency from his official cabinet at the onset of his presidency, but he restored it to the cabinet in 2023.[67][68] while administering the oath of office to hundreds of white house officials through video conferencing, biden called for more civility in politics, saying: "if you ever work with me and i hear you treat another colleague with disrespect, talk down to someone, i promise you i will fire you on the spot. ... no ifs, ands, or buts."[69] of the article iii judges nominated by biden, 235 of them were confirmed by the united states senate, including: one associate justice of the supreme court of the united states, 45 judges for the united states courts of appeals, 187 judges for the united states district courts and two judges for the united states court of international trade. biden appointed the most federal judges during the first two years of any presidency since john f. kennedy.[70] biden strongly campaigned for the presidency on the public option, a policy that, if enacted into law, would have offered americans a choice between maintaining their private healthcare insurance or buying into medicare. the idea was viewed as a compromise between the progressive and moderate flanks of the democratic party. the biden campaign described the public option as a "plan to protect and build on obamacare".[84] however, shortly before taking office in january 2021, biden's team abruptly dropped the proposal, frustrating many online progressives who already viewed the public option healthcare proposal as a failure to fight the status quo.[85] the biden administration rescinded work requirements for medicaid recipients.[86] the administration opened a special enrollment period for the affordable care act as well as extending the normal enrollment period, citing the covid 19 pandemic.[87][88] the administration provided larger premium subsidies.[89] in august 2022, president biden signed into law the inflation reduction act of 2022. the law allocates $64 billion[90] for a three year expansion of affordable care act subsidies originally expanded under the american rescue plan act of 2021 and $265 billion[citation needed] for prescription drug price reform to lower prices, including providing medicare the authority to negotiate the prices for certain drugs with pharmaceutical companies.[91] that same month, biden signed into law the honoring our pact act of 2022, which expands federal health care access, services, and funding for veterans who were exposed to toxic substances during their service, including toxic smoke from burn pits.[92] drug overdoses killed 106,699 in the united states in 2021.[93] opioids were involved in 80,411 overdose deaths in 2021, up from around 10,000 in 1999.[94] in june 2023, u.s. federal prosecutors announced criminal indictments of fentanyl precursor producers in china.[95] in october 2023, ofac sanctioned a china based network of fentanyl manufacturers and distributors.[96][97] in 2023, the biden administration announced a crackdown on mexican drug cartels smuggling fentanyl into the united states.[98] rahul gupta led white house efforts to combat the opioid epidemic.[99] on january 20, 2021, his first day as president, biden implemented a federal mask mandate, requiring the use of masks and social distancing in all federal buildings, on federal lands, and by federal employees and contractors.[100][101][4] biden also signed an executive order that reversed the withdrawal of the u.s. from the world health organization (who), making dr. anthony fauci the head of the delegation to the who.[101] on january 21, the administration released a 200 page document titled "national strategy for the covid 19 response and pandemic preparedness".[102][103] that same day, biden invoked the defense production act to speed up the vaccination process and ensure the availability of glass vials, syringes, and other vaccine supplies at the federal level.[104][105] in justifying his use of the act, biden said: "and when i say wartime, people kind of look at me like 'wartime?' well, as i said last night, 400,000 americans have died. that's more than have died in all of world war ii. 400,000. this is a wartime undertaking."[106] biden established the white house covid 19 response team, a white house office dedicated to coordinating a unified federal government response.[107] according to a report by reuters, in mid 2021 the biden administration ended a military run propaganda campaign to spread disinformation about the sinovac chinese covid 19 vaccine which had begun in 2020 during the trump administration.[108] the campaign was described as "payback" for covid 19 disinformation by china directed against the u.s.[109] primarily targeting people in the philippines, the campaign used fake social media accounts to spread disinformation, including that the sinovac vaccine contained pork derived ingredients and was therefore haram under islamic law.[108] on january 21, 2021, biden signed ten executive orders pertaining to the covid 19 pandemic.[110] in order to meet his vaccination goal of a hundred million shots in his first 100 days in office, biden signed an executive order increasing needed supplies.[5][111] biden signed an order on january 21 that directed fema to offer full reimbursements to states for the cost of using their own national guard personnel and emergency supplies such as personal protective equipment in schools.[5][112] on january 24, 2021, biden reinstated a travel ban imposed by president trump on brazil, united kingdom, ireland, south africa, and 26 other european countries.[113][114][115] the travel ban prevents non u.s. citizens living in the prospective countries from entering the u.s.[116] biden implemented a face mask requirement on nearly all forms of public transportation and inside of transportation hubs; previously, the centers for disease control and prevention (cdc) had recommended that such a policy be enacted but it was blocked by the trump administration, under which the cdc issued strong, albeit non binding recommendations for mask use in these settings.[117] in mid march 2021, biden dismissed a request by the european union to export unused covid 19 vaccines from astrazeneca out of the u.s. even though the manufacturer endorsed it and vowed to resupply the doses. the rationale for this decision, which contributed to low european vaccination rates, was that the u.s. had to be "over supplied and over prepared", according to white house press secretary jen psaki.[118] whereas the u.s. exported no vaccines, the european union exported 77 million doses to the world from december 2020 to march 2021.[119] eventually, the u.s. reversed course and gave vaccine doses from astrazeneca to mexico, canada, and japan by the end of march.[120] on may 6, 2021, the biden administration announced that it supports waiving patent protections on existing covid 19 vaccines so that other countries can produce generic variants, after weeks of pressure from the international community.[121] on 7 may, french president emmanuel macron called on the u.s. "to put an end to export bans not only on vaccines but on vaccine ingredients, which prevent production."[122] on may 26, 2021, biden ordered u.s. intelligence agencies to increase their investigations into the origin of the virus, after reports that researchers at the wuhan institute of virology became ill a month before the pandemic began.[123] in july 2021, amid a slowing of the covid 19 vaccination rate in the country and the spread of the sars cov 2 delta variant, biden said that the u.s. has "a pandemic for those who haven't gotten the vaccination" and that it was therefore "gigantically important" for americans to be vaccinated, touting the vaccines' effectiveness against hospitalizations and deaths from covid 19.[124] he also criticized the prevalence of covid 19 misinformation on social media, saying it was "killing people".[125] despite months of vaccine availability and incentives, by september many americans continued to resist vaccination amid rising cases in several states, hampering prospects towards herd immunity. on september 9, biden stated, "we've been patient. but our patience is wearing thin, and your refusal has cost all of us." that day he issued an executive order directing businesses with more than 100 employees to require vaccination of their workers or weekly testing, affecting about 80 million americans. the order also required the roughly 17 million employees of health facilities receiving federal medicare or medicaid to be vaccinated.[126] many republicans asserted biden's order was an unconstitutional overreach of federal authority, and some republican governors said they would sue to block it.[127] the biden administration responded to the global spread of the sars cov 2 omicron variant in december 2021 by advocating response by the states instead of the federal government.[128] throughout the surge, the biden administration has been criticized for a lack of covid 19 tests, exacerbating the spread of the omicron variant. when questioned about the apparent shortage of tests, jen psaki replied, "should we just send one to every american? then what happens if every american has one test? how much does that cost and what happens after that?",[129] causing backlash.[130] the biden administration responded by promising an increased supply of at home tests later in 2022.[131] in the midst of an all time high of new covid 19 cases,[132] the centers for disease control revised their guidelines, recommending five days of quarantine rather than ten without requiring a negative covid 19 test.[133] this move was criticized by health experts who worry that without rapid testing, covid positive people may unknowingly spread covid 19 in workplaces under the recommended cdc guidelines. others criticize the cdc for implementing this change after lobbying by delta airlines, leading to social media backlash against the federal government.[134] biden gave a speech at the john f. kennedy presidential library and museum on september 12, 2022, the 60th anniversary of kennedy's we choose to go to the moon speech, promoting his administration's revival of the beau biden cancer moonshot, including the new advanced research projects agency for health.[135] the new republic praised biden's economic record in july 2024, highlighting record low unemployment leading to a growth in wages at the lower end of the wage distribution as workers had more bargaining power. while inflation was painful, it has returned near its pre pandemic rate and was similar to peer countries, though the u.s. has grown faster than its peers.[136] the expansion of the affordable care act, the child tax credit, $1400 stimulus checks, and the expansion of snap benefits also boosted balance sheets for low and middle income americans.[136] new business formation rose 30% from pre pandemic levels, and was notably strong among women.[136] biden also signed three major pieces of longer term economic legislation to repair infrastructure like roads, bridges and water pipes, boost semiconductor investment, and expand green energy.[136] in february 2024, the total federal government debt grew to $34.4 trillion after having grown by approximately $1 trillion in both of two separate 100 day periods since the previous june.[137] the build back better plan was a proposed framework of public investment in social, infrastructural, and environmental programs. it was eventually divided into three parts. the american rescue plan was focused on covid 19 pandemic relief, and was passed and signed into law in march 2021 as the american rescue plan act of 2021. the second part called for investment in infrastructure and addressing climate change, and was called the american jobs plan. elements of the american jobs plan were the basis for the infrastructure investment and jobs act, signed into law in november 2021. the third part, the american families plan, proposed investment in social policies, such as paid parental leave. the american families plan was merged with elements of the american jobs plan to form the build back better act, introduced in september 2021. this passed the house of representatives, but failed to pass the senate. continued negotiations led to a new proposal, the inflation reduction act of 2022 which included proposals addressing climate change, healthcare, and tax reform proposals while excluding build back better's social safety net proposals. this was passed and signed into law in august 2022. the administration also pursued lower drug prices by allowing medicare to negotiate the prices it pays and capping the price of insulin.[136] in 2024, biden pushed to limit junk fees through the ftc, fcc and cfpb.[138] biden took antitrust more seriously than presidents in recent memory, as seen by the work of lina khan at the ftc,[136] a historic court victory against google's search monopoly, and a lawsuit to break up live nation and ticketmaster.[138] on january 14, 2021, biden revealed a $1.9 trillion stimulus bill, the american rescue plan act of 2021.[139] the plan includes $1 trillion in direct aid, including $1,400 per person checks, for working americans, and would provide for direct housing and nutrition assistance, expanding access to safe and reliable childcare and affordable healthcare, increasing the minimum wage, extending unemployment insurance, and giving families with kids and childless workers an emergency boost this year.[140][141] it would also expand the eligibility of these checks to adult dependents who have been left out of previous rounds of relief.[140][141][139] the plan additionally includes $440 billion in community support, providing $350 billion of community support to first responders while the rest goes to grants for small businesses and transit agencies; $400 billion for a national vaccination plan and school reopenings; and $10 billion for information technology, modernizing federal cybersecurity infrastructure.[139][141] in her first press briefing, press secretary psaki said the plan was likely to change as negotiations continued, with the provision to increase the minimum wage later being excluded from the relief plan.[142] biden signed the plan into law on march 11, 2021, passing through both chambers of congress with a party line vote.[143][144] the plan invokes the defense production act of 1950 to ensure the production of personal protective equipment, glass vials, syringes, and other supplies exceeds the demand.[140] it allows partners of states to create vaccine centers in stadiums, convention centers and pharmacies.[104] the federal government would identify communities that have been hit hardest by covid 19, and ensure the vaccine does not reach them at an unfair pace.[141][140][104] in addition, the plan would launch a national campaign to educate americans about the vaccine and covid 19, targeting misinformation related to the pandemic.[104] vaccines would also be freely available to all citizens regardless of immigration status.[140] in biden's plan, he would issue a national testing strategy that attempts to mitigate the spread of covid 19 by increasing laboratory capacity and expanding testing. the plan would also develop new treatments for covid 19.[140][139][141][104] on 28 april, during biden's speech to congress he unveiled the american families plan, a roughly $1.8 trillion proposal to significantly increase federal spending in areas related to childcare, paid leave, pre kindergarten, community college, and healthcare.[145][146] it is considered to be the third part of biden's "build back better" agenda (the first being the american rescue plan and the second being the american jobs plan).[147] the bill was effectively merged with climate change and other provisions that didn't make it into the infrastructure investment and jobs act, for a total $3.5 trillion build back better act. however, the bill did not have republican support, and democrats struggled to win the support of senator joe manchin of west virginia to pass it on a party line vote through budget reconciliation, even as the price was lowered to $2.2 trillion.[148] after the bill ultimately failed to match his envisioned cost, manchin publicly rejected it, dooming its passage.[149] on january 22, 2021, biden signed an executive order that removed schedule f, overturning a number of trump's policies that limited the collective bargaining power of federal unions.[150][151] biden's executive order also promotes a $15 minimum wage for federal workers and repeals three of trump's executive orders which made the employee discipline process stricter and restricted union representatives' access to office space. as well as promoting a $15 minimum wage, biden's executive order increases the amount of money going to the families of children who are missing meals because of school closures due to the pandemic by 15%.[152] the repealing of trump's three executive orders comes as the orders were used to transfer civil servants and career scientists and replace them with employees friendly to the trump administration.[153] on inauguration day 2021, biden fired pro business peter robb, then general counsel of the national labor relations board,[154] replacing him with pro union jennifer abruzzo in february 2021.[155] biden's nlrb has pursued action against starbucks' and amazon's alleged anti union activities.[156] on august 24, 2023, the nlrb reinstated obama era policies regarding union elections, speeding up the timeline by removing restrictions such as resolving litigation before holding an election.[157] in late 2022, biden signed a bill forcing an agreement between union workers and rail companies in order to prevent a strike, earning him criticism from progressives and rail workers.[158][159][160] afterwards, biden pressured the rail companies to offer paid sick leave to workers, which had been a key demand in the original planned strike.[161] more than 60% of rail workers had sick leave agreements in june 2023.[162] on the 2023 united auto workers strike, biden repeated union leader shawn fain's motto "record profits, record contracts" and expressed support for the workers in negotiations.[163] biden assigned two white house officials to aid in negotiation efforts, senior adviser gene sperling and acting labor secretary julie su.[164] on september 26, biden joined striking uaw workers on the picket line in michigan, becoming the first president to do so.[165] biden became the first us president to run for election with a unionized campaign staff for his 2024 election run.[166] the biden administration helped to resolve the 2024 united states port strike.[167] after the collapse of silicon valley bank in 2023, biden expressed opposition to a bailout that was borne by taxpayers.[168] he also claimed that the partial roll back of dodd frank regulations contributed to the bank failures.[169] biden signed an executive order intended to support domestic manufacturers by increasing a federal preference for purchasing goods made wholly or partly in the u.s. using the broad term "made in america laws", the executive order's stated goal is to strengthen "all statutes, regulations, rules, and executive orders relating to federal financial assistance awards or federal procurement, including those that refer to 'buy america' or 'buy american.'"[170][171] on august 9, 2022, biden actively promoted and signed into law the chips and science act, which authorized $52 billion for domestic semiconductor research and manufacturing.[172] on august 16, 2022, biden signed the inflation reduction act of 2022 into law, which included provisions to support the domestic production of solar panels, wind turbines, and other infrastructure.[173] due to incentives from the chips and science act, micron technology will invest billions in new semiconductor manufacturing in new york.[174] the wall street journal reported that instead of negotiating access to chinese markets for large american financial service firms and pharmaceutical companies, the biden administration may focus on trade policies that boost exports or domestic jobs. u.s. trade representative katherine tai said the administration wants a "worker centered trade policy".[175][176] u.s. secretary of commerce gina raimondo aggressively enforced trade rules to combat unfair practices by china.[177] in march 2021, in her first interview since taking office, u.s. trade representative katherine tai told the wall street journal the u.s. would not lift tariffs on chinese imports (implemented under the trump administration as urged by peter navarro) in the near future, despite lobbying efforts from "free traders" including former u.s. secretary of treasury hank paulson and the business roundtable, a big business group in the u.s., that pressed for tariff repeal.[178] in 2021, the u.s. suspended its diplomatic trade engagement with myanmar after a rise in violence perpetrated by the burmese military against anti coup protesters.[179] in may 2024, the biden administration raised tariffs on chinese imports, including a doubling for solar cells; tripling for lithium ion electric vehicle batteries; and increases for steel, aluminum, and medical equipment. this marks the first time that critical minerals, including rare earth magnets key components in electric and hybrid vehicles have been specifically included in the tariffs.[180] china produces and refines over 90 percent of the world's rare earth material.[181] the tariff increases will be phased in over a period of three years.[182] as a part of the build back better plan, the biden administration aimed for massive spending on the nation's infrastructure on the order of $2 trillion.[183] several of the physical infrastructure provisions featured in the proposal were included in the infrastructure investment and jobs act. biden signed the act into law on november 15, 2021.[184] this final version included approximately $1.2 trillion in spending, with $550 billion being newly authorized spending on top of what congress was planning to authorize regularly.[185] the bill included $7.5 billion for electric vehicle charging.[186] as of march 2024, seven charging stations with a total of 38 spots for charging vehicles had been built.[186] longer term variables that preceded the pandemic and contributed to the rise in inflation include structural housing shortages,[187][188][189] impacts of climate change on food, energy and home insurance prices,[190][191][192] as well as the size of government debt and deficits.[193][194][195] in the midst of recovery from covid 19, inflation rose to the highest rate in forty years peaking at 9.1% in 2022, with many other major global economies reaching similar level.[196][197][198][199][200] biden stated during his first state of the union address on march 1, 2022, that addressing inflation was his "top priority", while touting an anti inflation plan that he said would address ocean shipping costs and prescription drug prices.[201] the 2022 russian invasion of ukraine resulted in increases in food and energy prices.[202][203] at the end of 2023, the u.s. census bureau found that without housing inflation, inflation would have been just 1.8%, instead of 3.2%.[204] katy o'donnell of politico argued that housing shortages, caused by artificial scarcity driven by nimbyism, had been the single biggest contributor to inflation.[205] freddie mac estimated that the housing shortage surged 52% between 2018 and 2020.[204] between 2020 and 2023 climate change exacerbated home insurance premiums in the u.s. by 33%.[190] july 2024 data showed that inflation had dropped to 2.9%, with rising rents and childcare costs as the main drivers.[206] most economists surveyed by the wsj in july 2024 found that inflation would be worse under a second trump administration compared to a second biden term, due in part to tariffs, a crack down on illegal immigration, and larger deficits.[207] biden changed the practice of irs agents disproportionately auditing lower income americans.[208] finance officials from 130 countries agreed on july 1, 2021, to plans for a new international taxation policy. all the major economies agreed to pass national laws that would require corporations to pay at least 15% income tax in the countries they operate. this new policy would end the practice of locating world headquarters in small countries with very low taxation rates. governments hope to recoup some of the lost revenue, estimated at $100 billion to $240 billion each year. the new system was promoted by the biden administration and the organisation for economic co operation and development (oecd). secretary general mathias cormann of the oecd said: "this historic package will ensure that large multinational companies pay their fair share of tax everywhere."[209] during his first week in office, biden established the position of white house national climate advisor, appointing environmental health and air quality expert gina mccarthy to the role. biden also created the position of u.s. special presidential envoy for climate, appointing former secretary of state john kerry.[210] on january 20, 2021, biden signed an executive order rejoining the u.s. to the paris agreement.[211][212] with the u.s. rejoining the agreement, countries responsible for two thirds of the global greenhouse gas emissions would make pledges of becoming carbon neutral, while without united states it is only half.[213] on the same day, biden also issued an executive order that cancelled the construction of the keystone xl pipeline, an extension of the keystone pipeline. the pipeline was heavily criticized by environmental and native american activists and groups.[214][215] this order also directed agencies to review and reverse more than 100 actions made by trump on the environment.[101] on march 27, 2021, biden invited more than forty world leaders for a climate summit.[216] in august 2022, biden signed the inflation reduction act of 2022 into law, a domestic spending bill born out of continued negotiations on the build back better act after its collapse that fulfilled some of its initial provisions. the bill included significant federal investment in domestic clean energy production, combating climate change, and healthcare; it aims to reduce u.s. carbon emissions by 40% from peak 2005 levels by 2030, included a three year extension of affordable care act subsidies, and empowered medicare to begin negotiating lower prescription drug costs for the first time.[4] in may 2022, the white house council on environmental quality released a report in which it describes how biden's administration followed the around 200 recommendations of the white house environmental justice advisory council. the full report has around 150 pages. the report summarizes many of the steps taken by the administration on environmental issues. among others, it mentions significant achievements in the domains of energy efficiency, weatherization, transit oriented development, walking, cycling, mixed use development, cooperation with indigenous peoples of the americas.[217] in april 2024 biden delivered $20 billion to eight environmental ngos. the aim is to reduce the country's co2 emissions by 40 million tonnes per year with the money, while giving 70% of the benefits to low income communities.[218][219] in the same month, the american climate corps is expected to begin function with several hundred members. the tasks will probably be "things like installing solar panels, restoring vulnerable habitats, and fire hazard prevention." biden plans increase the number of participants to 20,000 during the first year and then 50,000 more will be added each year by 2031. however, this plan is opposed by republicans.[220] in may 2024, the administration announced guidelines around carbon markets. they push for increased verifiability from suppliers and transparency from buyers. the guidelines are not binding or enforceable.[221] in november 2024, the biden administration withheld federal funding from climate justice alliance, a move which cja and the intercept connected to its support for a ceasefire in gaza and other progressive policy issues that had made it a target of republican scrutiny.[222] on january 21, 2021, the biden administration issued a 60 day ban on oil and gas leases and permits on federal land and waters.[223] on january 27, 2021, biden signed a number of executive orders aimed at combating climate change,[224] one of them setting climate change as a key consideration for u.s. national security and foreign policy.[225] in an attempt to encourage u.s. membership to the kigali amendment, an international agreement aimed to reduce the production of hydrofluorocarbons, biden's executive order directed the u.s. department of state to submit the kigali amendment to the senate.[226][227] in march 2021, 21 republican state attorneys general of 21 states sued the biden administration for revoking the keystone xl pipeline permit. the suit claims biden's executive order exceeded his authority.[228][229] in may 2021, the epa rolled back a trump administration rule that prohibited the epa from using certain studies.[230][231] the previous rule, which made it more difficult to use major scientific studies to justify pollution reduction policies,[232] had already been invalidated by a federal court.[233] on june 1, 2021, secretary of the interior deb haaland suspended all oil and gas drilling leases in alaska's arctic national wildlife refuge, pending further review of their environmental impacts.[234] in january 2021, biden had issued a 60 day ban on oil and gas leases and permits on federal land and waters. a group of republican state attorneys general successfully obtained a decision in federal court to lift the moratorium. the biden administration appealed the decision but agreed to continue with the sales, and in september 2021 held the largest federal gas and oil lease auction in u.s. history, selling leases to extract 1.7 million acres in the gulf of mexico. the areas that were purchased by oil companies can be expected to produce around 4.2 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 1.12 billion barrels of oil over the next 50 years. the administration has also proposed another round of gas and oil lease sales in 2022, in colorado, montana, wyoming, and other western states.[235][236][237] the biden administration supported the line 3 pipeline, which transports oil from canada's oil sands region.[238] in november 2021, a closely watched interior department report on federal oil and gas lease policy, ordered by biden, was completed. the report recommended increasing the 12.5% federal royalty rate for oil and gas drilling, which had not been raised by a century, and was significantly lower than rates charged for leasing on state and private land. the report also recommended an increase in the bond rates that drilling companies are required to pay for future cleanup efforts before beginning extraction at new sites, and recommended that leases be focused on sites with "moderate to high potential" for production in proximity to existing fossil fuel infrastructure.[237] the report stopped short of banning the leasing program, which generates billions of dollars for the federal government, but reformed its terms to be less favorable for industry; environmental groups praised the reforms, but also said they were insufficient to address the u.s. contribution to the climate crisis.[237] in 2021, the biden administration proposed a 20 year ban on oil and gas drilling around chaco culture national historical park, a site in northwestern new mexico that contain important ancestral puebloan sites.[239] in may 2021, the epa rolled back a trump administration rule that prohibited the epa from using certain studies.[230][231] the previous rule, which made it more difficult to use major scientific studies to justify pollution reduction policies,[232] had already been invalidated by a federal court.[233] the biden administration set a goal of achieving 30 gigawatts of offshore wind energy generated in the u.s. by 2030 (sufficient to provide electricity to about 10 million homes). in 2021, the biden administration approved the south fork wind project, a major (130 mw, 12 turbine) commercial offshore wind power project located southeast of rhode island's block island and east of new york's montauk point, the wind farm is projected to provide electricity to proved 70,000 long island homes. the project is the country's second large scale offshore wind project (after a similar wind power development in massachusetts).[240][241] the u.s. is part of the 30 by 30 initiative which aims to preserve 30% of the global land and sea territory by 2030. for the u.s. to accomplish its part, biden launched a campaign called "america the beautiful". the campaign seeks to work in cooperation with indigenous people and farmers, as well as better serve disadvantaged communities.[242] in november 2021, biden promised to end and reverse deforestation and land degradation by 2030,[243] joining more than 100 other global leaders in the cop26 climate summit's first major agreement.[244][245] according to a report from the center for american progress during the first 3 years of his presidency biden broke several records in conservation, which is "a proven defense against the changing climate". in 2023 alone he turned 12.5 million acres into protected areas and made 200 agreements with indigenous people about co management of the protected areas.[246][247] he advanced a proposal to ban logging in old growth forests from 2025 which is also important for the climate.[248] in response to what biden describes as the growing influence of special interests and gerrymandering in elections, he has pledged to seek electoral and government ethics reforms.[249] biden supported the for the people act and the john lewis voting rights act.[250][251] in january 2022, he endorsed a change to senate filibuster rules after they both failed to invoke cloture.[252] however, the rules change failed when two democratic senators joined senate republicans in opposing it.[253] known for his generally bipartisan tone, biden avoided directly referring to his predecessor during his first year in office.[254] beginning in 2022, biden condemned trump and trumpism in stronger terms; he likened the "maga philosophy" to "semi fascism" and, in a 2022 speech outside independence hall in philadelphia, said the "extreme ideology" of trump, and a republican party dominated by him, "threatens the very foundation of our republic." biden specifically condemned trump and "maga republicans" for promoting authoritarian leaders, using violent rhetoric, refusing to disavow political violence, and refusing to acknowledge election losses.[254][255] biden suggested that the 2022 united states elections could be illegitimate if federal laws are not passed to combat enacted voter suppression legislation from state legislatures.[256][257][258] after the attempts to overturn the 2020 united states presidential election, biden called for reforms to the 1887 electoral count act to clarify the roles of congress and the vice president in certifying electoral votes. the electoral count reform and presidential transition improvement act of 2022 raised the threshold for objections to electoral votes, clarified that the vice president cannot decertify electoral votes, and modified the process for which electors are certified. it was included as part of the 2023 consolidated appropriations act.[259] due to ongoing decreases in housing affordability exacerbated by the pandemic, inflation, and snarls in the global supply chain, biden launched the housing supply action plan on may 16, 2022, to increase housing supply and construction through executive initiatives, administrative deregulation and funding from the infrastructure investment and jobs act. due to the statutory limits upon federal intervention in housing policy, the plan relied heavily upon partnerships with willing municipal governments and the private sector to reform zoning and permitting laws and secure construction supply, issuing financial incentives to municipal governments for cooperation with the plan, issuing financial support to renters, landlords and first time homeowners, and disincentivizing large institutional investors from acquiring government owned or funded home properties.[260] biden also called upon congress to pass an unlocking possibilities program to allow hud to issue grants to states and localities to help reform permitting for affordable housing, as well as further mortgage assistance for first time homebuyers.[261] through the inflation reduction act, the biden administration secured over $25 billion to invest in a variety of programs and tax credits that incentivize renovations and energy efficiency in housing through five federal agencies (hud, irs, doe, dot, epa).[262][263] on january 20, 2021, the day biden was inaugurated, he halted the construction of the u.s. mexico barrier[101] and ended a related national emergency declared by trump in february 2018.[4] biden issued a proclamation that ended the trump travel ban imposed on predominantly muslim countries in january 2017.[101][4] biden also reaffirmed protections to recipients of deferred action for childhood arrivals (daca).[264] the same day, biden sent a memorandum to the u.s. department of state reinstating deferred enforced departure for liberians.[265][266] on january 20, biden proposed the u.s. citizenship act of 2021 which would enact broad changes to the immigration system.[267][268] it would provide an eight year potential pathway for citizenship to eleven million immigrants living in the u.s. without a permanent legal status.[268][269] the bill would also make it easier for certain foreign workers to stay in the u.s.[270][271] in addition, it would deliver record budget allocations for the department of homeland security to secure the border and $4 billion to el salvador, guatemala and honduras to combat the root causes of their emigration.[272] if passed, it would also replace the word "alien" with "noncitizen" in u.s. immigration law.[273][274][275] senate majority whip dick durbin called the bill "aspirational" and it was widely expected not to pass both houses of congress without significant revision.[269][270][271] also on january 20, 2021, the biden administration issued a moratorium on deportations from the u.s. department of homeland security (dhs) for the first 100 days of his presidency.[276] on january 22, texas attorney general ken paxton sued the biden administration for violating biden's written pledge to cooperatively work with the state of texas.[277] a federal judge in texas subsequently issued a temporary restraining order barring the biden administration from enforcing its moratorium, citing the lack of "any concrete, reasonable justification for a 100 day pause on deportations."[278] on january 22, 2021, biden had a call with mexican president andrés manuel lópez obrador. on the call, biden and lópez obrador spoke about immigration, where biden spoke of reducing immigration from mexico to the u.s. by targeting what biden deemed as root causes.[279] according to an associated press report, lópez obrador noted that biden pledged $4 billion to "help development in honduras, el salvador and guatemala   nations whose hardships have spawned tides of migration through mexico toward the united states."[280] according to a 2021 politico report, republicans expected prior to biden taking office that there would be a border surge at the start of 2021 (due to seasonal patterns and regional crises) and coordinated to make it a central issue in the lead up to the 2022 mid term elections.[281] the number of migrants arriving in the u.s. from central america had been rising since april 2020 due to ongoing violence, natural disasters, food insecurity, and poverty in the region.[282] in february 2021, the u.s. border patrol reported a 61% increase in encounters with unaccompanied children from the month before, the largest one month percentage increase in encounters with unaccompanied children since u.s. customs and border protection began recording data in 2010.[283][284] biden instructed the u.s. immigration and customs enforcement (ice) to focus on violent offenders of immigration laws rather than all offenders of immigration laws.[285][286] in february 2021, it was reported that dhs agents who had been empowered by trump to enact his anti immigration policies were resisting and defying biden's immigration policies.[285] the union representing ice agents signaled that its agents would not accept reversals of trump policies.[285] in march 2021, the biden administration granted temporary protected status to venezuelans fleeing the country amidst the ongoing political and economic crisis.[287] on march 24, 2021, biden tasked vice president harris to reduce the number of unaccompanied minors and adult asylum seekers. she is also tasked with leading the negotiations with mexico, honduras, guatemala, and el salvador.[288][better source needed] the number of migrant families and unaccompanied children entering the u.s. from across the southwest border steeply declined in august, september, and october 2021.[289] on june 1, 2021, the dhs officially terminated the trump era "remain in mexico" policy, which mandated that all asylum seekers from central america were to wait in mexico pending their court cases; however, a health order from march 2020 allowed the border authorities to send migrants back for the duration of the covid 19 pandemic have remained in place.[290][291] however, on august 14, 2021, a federal judge in texas ordered the biden administration to reimplement the policy; the supreme court placed a pause on the ruling to give the administration time for arguments.[292][293] on august 24, 2021, the supreme court ruled that the biden administration must comply with the lower court's ruling to reinstate the policy.[294][295] in fiscal year 2022, over one million immigrants (most of whom entered through family reunification) were granted legal residence,[296] up from 707,000 in 2020.[297] up until 2022 during biden's presidency, the number of unauthorized immigrants in the united states steadily rose.[298] on october 5, 2023, biden's administration said it will add sections to a border wall to stave off record migrant crossings from mexico, carrying forward a signature policy of former president donald trump.[299][300] one of biden's first actions after taking office in january 2021 was to issue a proclamation pledging that "no more american taxpayer dollars be diverted to construct a border wall" as well as a review of all resources that had already been committed. the administration said thursday's action did not deviate from biden's proclamation because money that was allocated during trump's term in 2019 had to be spent now.[299] former president trump was quick to claim victory and demand an apology: "as i have stated often, over thousands of years, there are only two things that have consistently worked, wheels, and walls!" trump wrote on social media. "will joe biden apologize to me and america for taking so long to get moving...".[299] mexico's president andres manuel lopez obrador called the move "a step backwards."[299] on october 31, 2023, homeland security secretary alejandro mayorkas testified before the senate homeland security committee that more than 600,000 people illegally made their way into the united states without being apprehended by border agents during the 2023 fiscal year.[301][302] president biden pledged to welcome 125,000 refugees in 2024.[303] the biden administration considered accepting palestinian refugees from the gaza strip.[304] on march 29, 2024, in response to a class action lawsuit filed by lawyers representing detained migrant children, the biden administration argued in front of a federal court that it had no responsibility to feed and house migrant children that were waiting in border patrol camps along the u.s. mexico border.[305] this argument was rejected by judge dolly m. gee, who ordered the administration to "expeditiously" house all detained migrant children.[306] on june 4, 2024, president biden issued a new executive order granting immigration officials the authority to deport certain asylum seekers without processing their claims. this measure targets migrants who enter the united states "without permission and against the law," making it easier for authorities to deport them.[307] under the new order, if migrants express fear of returning to their home countries, they may be given an interview with an asylum officer. however, agents are no longer required to ask migrants if they have such fears.[308] as part of the new action, the biden administration announced the closure of the south texas family residential center, the largest immigrant detention center in the united states. the primary reason cited for this decision was the high cost of operating the facility.[309] following months of negotiations, on february 4, 2024, a bipartisan group of senators released a 370 page bill intended to sharply reduce incentives for migrants to attempt border crossings. the bill included a "border emergency" provision that would automatically require the border to be closed if border encounters reached an average of 5,000 per day over several days. trump, speaker mike johnson and other republicans falsely claimed the bill allowed 5,000 illegal border crossings per day.[311] in reality, the bill would end the practice of "catch and release" that allows migrants entry into the country while they await immigration hearings; instead, migrants would be detained pending hearings.[311] the plan included a tighter asylum application and approval process with speedy removal of migrants who do not qualify, the hiring of thousands more border patrol and asylum officers and an increase in detention capacity. the bill also provided for thousands of work visas for migrant spouses of u.s. citizens awaiting immigrant visas, and 250,000 new visas over five years for people seeking to work in the u.s. or join family members. it aimed to provide a pathway to citizenship for "documented dreamers," children who accompanied their parents on a work visa and who could lose their place in line for a green card at age 21.[312] president biden supported the bill, while speaker johnson said days before its release that it would be "dead on arrival" in the republican controlled house. shortly after the proposal was announced, house majority leader steve scalise declared it would not be brought before the house for a vote. one negotiator, independent arizona senator kyrsten sinema, asserted the border would have been closed every day so far in 2024 if the bill had been law; biden promised in january that he would immediately close the border if the bill was enacted. lead republican negotiator james lankford of oklahoma, among the most conservative republican senators, attempted to defend the bill throughout the weeks leading to the vote. trump, the leading republican candidate for president in 2024, publicly and privately pressured republicans during the senate negotiations to oppose the proposal. the national border patrol council, a labor union representing some 18,000 border patrol officers, quickly endorsed the senate bill. the union had endorsed trump in 2020 and had been critical of biden's policies.[313][314][315][316][317] biden, a practicing catholic,[321] has taken a public position of dissent against the church's position opposing free choice in the abortion issue.[322] this has raised the question of whether his public office might allow him to influence the outcomes of current debates with the church concerning abortion.[323] the vatican has taken a mediating position concerning biden's dissent by allowing him to take communion in rome while visiting the pope.[322] during his early days in office, biden focused on "advancing equity, civil rights, racial justice and equal opportunity." according to the new york times, biden's early actions in office focused on racial equality more than any president since lyndon b. johnson, who passed the civil rights act of 1964.[324] on january 25, 2021, biden signed an executive order that lifted the ban on transgender military service members.[325] this reversed a memorandum imposed by trump.[326] the biden administration is seeking to put harriet tubman on the twenty dollar bill.[327][328] this effort follows that of the obama administration, which was blocked by steven mnuchin.[329] press secretary psaki said it was important that u.s. money and notes reflect the "history and diversity" of the country and that putting tubman on the twenty dollar bill would do so.[330] on january 20, 2021, the biden administration issued an executive order entitled advancing racial equity and support for underserved communities through the federal government[331] increasing the federal government's anti bias enforcement against government contractors. the intent is heightened investigations and audits by the department of justice as well as more detailed follow up inquiries with government contractors, with an emphasis on combatting pay discrimination.[332] also in january, biden directed the u.s. department of justice to reduce their usage of private prisons and ordered the attorney general to not renew contracts with private prisons, citing the need to "reduce profit based incentives" for the incarceration of racial minorities.[333][334][335] three days after the atlanta spa shootings that killed 8 people, including 6 asian women, biden and vice president harris travelled to atlanta. they spoke to asian american and pacific islander advocates and leaders and condemned sexism, and racism against asian americans.[336] biden made juneteenth (june 19) a federal holiday in 2021, celebrating the end of slavery in the u.s.[337] in march 2022, biden signed the emmett till antilynching act into law. with the enactment of that legislation, lynching was made a federal hate crime for the first time in american history.[338] in october 2022, biden pardoned all past federal marijuana possession charges and announced an inquiry into whether cannabis should be removed from schedule i of the controlled substances act.[339] in december 2022, biden signed the medical marijuana and cannabidiol research expansion act which was the first standalone cannabis related bill ever passed by the united states congress.[340] in january 2025, biden declared the lapsed equal rights amendment ratified as the "28th amendment" to the constitution. however, the declaration has no formal effect[341][342] and the national archives has said they do not intend to certify the amendment as part of the constitution, citing "established legal, judicial, and procedural decisions."[343] the united states department of agriculture unveiled efforts in 2022 to prevent anti lgbt discrimination in food programs, including school lunch programs, resulting in 20 lawsuits from 20 republican attorneys general.[344] in december 2022, biden signed the respect for marriage act, which repealed the defense of marriage act (doma), required states to recognize other states' marriage certificates for lgbt americans, and ensured some religious liberties.[345] the bill came from a push from democrats to codify same sex marriage after the dobbs decision, particularly clarence thomas's push to reconsider other precedents.[346] in january 2023, the biden administration released an "evidence agenda" for lgbtqi+ americans to learn about "their experiences engaging with federal agencies and the disparities they face in their daily lives," as well as documenting how many lgbt people live in the united states.[347][348] in december 2021, the biden administration ended a long standing restriction on sales of abortion pills through the mail. this decision came amidst legal cases and supreme court decisions that jeopardized abortion access in the united states.[349] after the u.s. supreme court overturned roe v. wade and planned parenthood v. casey on june 24, 2022, in dobbs v. jackson women's health organization, biden addressed the nation in the cross hall of the white house.[350][351] he mentioned that "it's a sad day ... for the country" and "with roe gone, ... the health and life of women in this nation are now at risk."[350][351] in addition, he attacked the court saying "with this decision, the conservative majority of the supreme court shows how extreme it is" and "they have made the united states an outlier among developed nations in the world."[350][351] regarding action, biden stated that his administration will defend the right of women to seek an abortion in another state where abortion is legal and help protect a woman's access to contraception and abortion pills approved by the fda.[350][351] he also called on congress to codify roe v. wade, saying "no executive action ... can do that.".[350][351] but stated that if congress did not have the votes to codify, that the voters would have to take action by "elect[ing] more senators and representatives who will codify a woman's right to choose into federal law."[350][351] the biden administration rejected the call from progressives[352] to allow abortions on federal land, with white house press secretary karine jean pierre saying, "in states where abortion is now illegal, women and providers who are not federal employees, as you look at the federal land, could be potentially   be prosecuted."[353] during a press conference at the 2022 madrid nato summit, biden expressed support for providing an exception to the filibuster to codify roe v. wade.[354] the biden administration rescinded a trump administration policy that curtailed the use of consent decrees that had been used by previous administrations in their investigations of misconduct in police departments.[355] biden proposed in his fiscal 2022 budget to more than double funding for the community oriented policing services (cops) hiring program, which helps state and local governments to hire law enforcement officers.[356] despite perceptions, notably by republicans and conservative media, of a "crime crisis" of soaring violent crime under biden, fbi data indicated the violent crime rate had declined significantly during the president's first two years in office, after a spike in 2020 during the covid pandemic. by 2022, the violent crime rate was near a 50 year low, and preliminary data released in early 2024 indicated continuing declines in 2023.[357][358][359][360] as of july 1, 2024 violent crime was down and homicides were on pace to drop to 2015 levels by the end of the year.[361][362] on december 23 2024, biden commuted the sentences of 37 of the 40 individuals on federal death row to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.[363][364] in a national address in march 2021, after mass shootings in the atlanta area and boulder, colorado, biden advocated further gun regulations, such as a restored ban on assault weapons and a high capacity magazine ban, as well as reinforcing preexisting background checks.[365][366] after the robb elementary school shooting on may 24, 2022, president biden addressed the nation.[367] the next week, he again called on congress to pass an assault weapons and high capacity magazine ban, as well as red flag laws and other legislation.[368][369] as a result of the shooting, the bipartisan safer communities act was eventually passed by congress and signed into law. it marked the first federal gun safety law to have been enacted in 30 years.[370] after the colorado springs nightclub shooting, biden called again for an assault weapons ban.[371] the biden administration reversed the trump administration's method of using the national space council to coordinate commercial, civil, and military space policies, instead using the national security council to issue national security memoranda instead of the space council's space policy directives.[372] the biden administration renewed the national space council, chaired by vice president harris,[373] "to assist the president in generating national space policies, strategies, and synchronizing america's space activities."[374] harris held meetings with the leaders of five countries to discuss international cooperation on space issues.[373] the biden administration continued the artemis program to send people back to the moon.[373][375] the administration also emphasized the role of nasa in studying climate change.[373][376] biden appointed bill nelson, an astronaut and former u.s. senator, to the post of nasa administrator. nelson was confirmed unanimously by the senate in april 2021.[377] in april 2021, as part of his first annual budget request, biden proposed a $24.8 billion budget for nasa in 2022, a $1.5 billion increase on what congress allocated to 2021.[376][378] the proposal includes funding for the artemis program for a new crewed moon landing mission.[378] the proposal also included a 12.5% increase for nasa's earth science division, as well as a 22% increase for the national oceanic and atmospheric administration, which operates a fleet of weather satellites; both measures aimed to use space tools to study and mitigate climate change.[376] on december 1, 2021, biden announced his new framework for us space policy, the united states space priorities framework, which explains biden's approach for commercial, civil, and military space activity.[379] there is a new emphasis on combating climate change and investing in stem education.[379] on july 29, 2024, biden announced a plan to reform the supreme court of the united states. the plan called for three major changes. the first was an amendment to the constitution, the no one is above the law amendment, which would eliminate immunity for presidents. this would effectively reverse the supreme court's decision in trump v. united states. second, biden laid out a plan for creating term limits for supreme court justices. under his plan, every two years presidents would appoint justices to 18 year terms. lastly, he pushed for "a binding code of conduct" to replace the supreme court's existing self enforced ethics code.[380] on january 22, 2021, biden signed his first bill,[381] h.r. 335 into law, providing a waiver to the law preventing appointment of a secretary of defense who had been on active duty in the armed forces within the past seven years;[382] this was the third time such a waiver was granted by congress. retired army four star general lloyd austin was confirmed by the senate in a 93 2 vote that same day, making austin the first african american defense secretary.[383][381] austin said his number one priority was to assist covid 19 relief efforts, pledging he would "quickly review the department's contributions to covid 19 relief efforts, ensuring that we're doing everything that we can to help distribute vaccines across the country and to vaccinate our troops and preserve readiness."[384] on february 10, 2021, biden visited the pentagon for the first time as president.[385] in remarks to service members alongside vice president kamala harris and defense secretary lloyd austin, biden announced a u.s. department of defense led china task force "to provide a baseline assessment of department policies, programs and processes in regard to the challenge china poses."[386] on june 18, 2021, the administration removed eight mim 104 patriot anti missile batteries from saudi arabia, jordan, kuwait, and iraq, removed the thaad anti missile defense system from saudi arabia, and announced that most jet squadrons and hundreds of american troops would be withdrawn from the region. the changes come in light of both de escalating tensions with iran and the administration changing its focus on countering china.[387] after taking office, biden heavily restricted the use of armed drones and drone strikes.[388][389] after biden's first year in office, drone strikes had hit a 20 year low and were heavily limited by the administration.[390][391] in october 2023, president biden asked congress for nearly $106 billion in funding for israel, ukraine, countering china in the indo pacific, and operations on the southern u.s. border.[392] biden signed a record $886 billion defense spending bill into law on december 22, 2023.[393][394] biden has said the u.s. needs to "get tough" on china and build "a united front of u.s. allies and partners to confront china's abusive behaviors and human rights violations."[395] he described china as the "most serious competitor" that poses challenges on the "prosperity, security, and democratic values" of the u.s.[396] biden nominated antony blinken to serve as secretary of state who took office on january 26, 2021.[397][398] during his nomination hearing, blinken said that previous optimistic approaches to china were flawed,[399] and that biden's predecessor, donald trump, "was right in taking a tougher approach to china" but he "disagree[s] very much with the way [trump] went about it in a number of areas."[398] he endorsed former secretary of state mike pompeo's report that china is committing a genocide against uyghur muslims.[398] in march 2021, secretary of state antony blinken, national security advisor jake sullivan and other administration officials met with the chinese communist party politburo member yang jiechi, chinese foreign minister wang yi, and other chinese officials in alaska with heated exchanges on china's human rights abuses, cyberattacks, its threats against taiwan, its crackdown in xinjiang and hong kong, and other issues of u.s. interest. the chinese side countered: "the u.s. does not have the qualification to speak to china from a position of strength [and] does not serve as a model to others [and] china's development and strengthening is unstoppable."[400][401] the washington post reported that the biden administration got "a taste of china's 'wolf warrior' diplomacy" during the first meeting with its chinese counterpart, which was "remarkably undiplomatic", adding "china's diplomats appeared more forceful than they had been in any public meeting during president trump's term."[402] the atlantic published an article saying that the biden team "flushed beijing's true intentions out into the open for the world to see", quoting a senior administration official's comment that it is "increasingly difficult to argue that we don't know what china wants."[403] in april 2021, it was reported that the biden administration was rallying u.s. allies in consideration of a boycott of the 2022 winter olympics in beijing. the u.s. department of state spokesman ned price told reporters that a joint boycott "is something that we certainly wish to discuss."[404] in may 2021, the administration removed chinese mobile manufacturer xiaomi from the chinese military blacklist, reversing the previous administration's decision.[405] on june 3, 2021, biden announced an executive order that would come into effect from august 2, and ban americans from investing into 59 chinese firms, including huawei. before it was announced, china said it would retaliate against it.[406] in october 2021, biden said he is concerned about chinese hypersonic missiles, days after china tested a nuclear capable hypersonic missile that circled the globe before speeding towards its target.[407] in december 2021, a coalition of jewish organizations, including the american jewish committee and the rabbinical assembly, issued an open letter to biden urging additional action in response to what they describe as an uyghur genocide.[408][409] in late january and early february 2023, u.s. and canadian defense officials were tracking a china operated high altitude balloon that had been seen hovering in north american airspace.[410] the balloon's first reported sighting was on february 1, 2023, when a commercial airliner reported flying in close proximity to it.[411] biden ordered the u.s. air force to shoot down the balloon on february 4, on the possibility of it being a surveillance device, when it was spotted over territorial waters near south carolina;[412] at 2:39 p.m. that day, the balloon was downed by an f 22 raptor that had departed from langley air force base.[413] in response to the downing of the balloon, china admitted it belonged to them, but claimed the balloon was a weather device that had been blown off course.[414] chinese officials accused the u.s. of indiscriminately using force against the civilian airship in violation of international law. the incident increased tensions between the u.s. and china.[415] on february 9, biden stated that he did not believe that relations with china will be negatively affected by his decision to shoot down the balloon.[416] the incident did prompt secretary blinken to delay a diplomatic visit to beijing.[417] in december 2022, biden signed the no tiktok on government devices act, prohibiting the use of tiktok on devices owned by the federal government, due to national security concerns related to the app's origin in china.[418] in april 2024, biden signed the protecting americans from foreign adversary controlled applications act,[419] which would ban social networking services within 270 to 360 days if they are determined by the president and relevant provisions to be a "foreign adversary controlled application"; the definition covers websites and application software, including mobile apps.[420][421][422] the act explicitly applies to bytedance ltd. and its subsidiaries including tiktok without the need for additional determination, with the company to become compliant by january 19, 2025. it ceases to be applicable if the foreign adversary controlled application is divested and no longer considered to be controlled by a foreign adversary of the united states.[423][424][425] tiktok challenged the law in tiktok, inc. v. garland, where both the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit and the supreme court unanimously upheld the law as constitutional. on january 18, 2025, less than two hours before the bill went into effect in the united states, tiktok became unavailable across the country, with the biden administration calling the ban a "stunt" by tiktok.[426][427][428] on 18 september 2022, it was reported by reuters that "joe biden said u.s forces would defend taiwan in the event of a chinese invasion, his most explicit statement on the issue, drawing an angry response from china that said it sent the wrong signal to those seeking an independent taiwan." the policy was stated in contrast to biden's previous exclusion of boots on the ground and planes in the air for u.s. support for ukraine in its current conflict with russia.[429] the biden administration has maintained the sanctions against cuba that were issued by the first trump administration, despite one of biden's campaign promises being to lift restrictions against the country.[430][431] in june 2021, the biden administration continued america's tradition of voting against an annual united nations general assembly resolution calling for an end to the u.s. economic embargo against cuba.[432] the resolution was adopted for the 29th time with 184 votes in favor, three abstentions, and two no votes: the u.s. and israel.[433] in july 2021, protesters gathered in front of the white house and demonstrators called on president joe biden to take action in cuba.[434] the biden administration sanctioned a key cuban official and a government special forces unit known as the boinas negras for human rights abuses in the wake of historic protests on the island.[435] on july 22, 2021, directly before hosting a meeting with cuban american leaders,[436] president biden stated "i unequivocally condemn the mass detentions and sham trials that are unjustly sentencing to prison those who dared to speak out in an effort to intimidate and threaten the cuban people into silence."[437] president biden has also ordered government specialists to develop ideas for the u.s. to unilaterally extend internet access on the island, and he has promised to enhance backing for cuban dissidents.[438] in august 2021, biden sanctioned three additional cuban officials who were also reportedly involved in the suppression of anti government protesters in cuba.[439] in december 2021, 114 democratic house members signed a letter that urged president biden to lift restrictions and sanctions against cuba in order to make their access to food and medicine easier.[431] in january 2022, biden again sanctioned cuba officials, this time placing travel restrictions on eight members of the cuban government.[440] in may 2022, the biden administration lifted some of the sanctions, with policy changes such as expansion of flights to cuba and resumption of a family reunification program. in january 2023, the biden administration made changes to its immigration policy, to limit the amount of cuban migrants entering the united states. in the final week of his presidency, the biden administration removed cuba from the state sponsors of terrorism list, in concert with a prisoner exchange, brokered by the vatican.[441] in february 2020, the trump administration made a deal with the taliban to completely withdraw u.s. forces by may 1, 2021.[442] in april 2021, president biden formally announced that american troops would instead withdraw from afghanistan by september 11, 2021, which would signal an end to the u.s.'s longest war.[443] according to princeton professor julian e. zelizer, biden "clearly learned a great deal from his time in the obama presidency", and demonstrated that "he is a politician capable of learning and evolving, contrary to some of the skeptics in the primaries who thought he didn't understand how politics had changed." according to washington post journalist steven levingston, "obama listened to military leaders who advised him that withdrawal would be a mistake. biden, meanwhile, was the top administration official arguing for a much more limited role for american forces in afghanistan. later, biden would go on to say that he could tell by obama's 'body language' that he agreed with that assessment   even though he ultimately rejected it."[444] soon after the withdrawal of u.s. troops started, the taliban launched an offensive against the afghan government, quickly advancing in front of a collapsing afghan armed forces.[445][446] president biden defended the withdrawal, saying "i trust the capacity of the afghan military, who is better trained, better equipped and ... more competent in terms of conducting war."[447] by early july 2021, most of the american troops in afghanistan were withdrawn.[442] biden addressed the withdrawal, stating that: "the likelihood there's going to be the taliban overrunning everything and owning the whole country is highly unlikely."[442] on august 15, amid an offensive by the taliban, the afghan government collapsed, afghan president ashraf ghani fled the country and kabul fell to the taliban.[442][448] biden reacted by ordering 6,000 american troops to assist in the evacuation of american personnel and afghan allies.[449] he has been criticized over the manner of the american withdrawal.[448] on august 16, biden addressed the "messy" situation, taking responsibility for it ("the buck stops with me"), and admitting that the situation "unfolded more quickly than we had anticipated".[448][450] he defended his decision to withdraw, saying that americans should not be "dying in a war that afghan forces are not willing to fight for themselves", since the "afghan military collapsed [against the taliban], sometimes without trying to fight".[450][451] biden partly attributed the lack of early evacuation of afghan civilians to the afghan government's opposition of a "mass exodus" which they thought would cause a "crisis of confidence".[451] on august 26, a suicide attack was carried out by the islamic state of iraq and the levant   khorasan province at the hamid karzai international airport, killing more than 170 people, including at least 62 afghan civilians, 13 us service members, two british nationals and the child of a third british national.[452][453] biden made a public address after the attack, in which he honored the american service members who were killed, calling them "heroes" and saying they lost their lives "in the service of liberty", and stated that the us had evacuated more than 100,000 americans, afghans, and others. he expressed deep sorrow for the afghan victims as well. biden said to those who wished harm upon the us that "we will hunt you down and make you pay."[454][455] biden received increasingly harsh criticism from both republicans and democrats in the us congress, with republicans calling for his resignation or for his impeachment.[456][457][458] after the taliban takeover of afghanistan, the biden administration froze about $9 billion in assets belonging to the afghan central bank, blocking the taliban from accessing these billions of dollars in reserves held in u.s. bank accounts.[459][460] in february 2022, biden signed an executive order that seeks to unfreeze approximately $3.5 billion of afghan assets in the u.s. for the purpose of humanitarian assistance in afghanistan.[461] on july 31, 2022, al qaida leader ayman al zawahiri was killed in kabul by an american drone strike approved by biden.[462] biden hosted a three day u.s. africa summit in washington in december 2022, attended by 49 african national leaders.[463] the meeting was the first such summit since 2014.[463][464] the leaders of every african nation in good standing with the african union (au), except eritrea, were invited to the summit.[464] the leaders of african nations not in good standing with the au (mostly those who had come to power through military coups) were also not invited.[464] at the summit, biden announced u.s. support for the au joining the g20 group of major economies, a long sought goal for africa.[465] the summit was part of a broader effort by the u.s. to rebuild u.s. african relations and counter chinese influence on the continent.[463] during the summit, the administration announced $800 million in new deals with cisco systems and cybastion to combat cyberthreats targeting africa, a bid to blunt the dominance of the chinese firm huawei in africa.[466] the administration also signed a memorandum of understanding in support of the african continental free trade area to reduce trade barriers in africa,[466] and committed $55 billion to africa over the next three years, focused on preexisting u.s. initiatives,[466][463] such as the trade focused prosper africa and africa growth and opportunity act, as well as the power africa initiative, which aims to increase connections of africans to the electric grid.[463] the administration also emphasized initiatives in technology and cybersecurity, health, clean energy and the environment, and other areas.[466][464] biden committed an additional $2 billion for emergency humanitarian aid and $11 billion for food security programs in africa.[464] the administration also expanded ties with west africa, including support for infrastructure improvements at the benin seaport of cotonou, a key part of the west african economy.[463][467] biden appointed a longtime u.s. diplomat, johnnie carson, to coordinate implementation of u.s. actions following up the summit.[468] during the 2022 summit, biden and senior administration officials also met privately with six african leaders facing elections in 2023, pushing them to ensure free and fair elections in their nations.[468] senator bob menendez, the democratic chairman of the senate foreign relations committee, has criticized the biden administration for hesitating to impose sanctions on the governments of sudan and ethiopia, where many atrocities and war crimes were committed in the tigray war.[469] on april 24, 2021, the biden administration declared that the turkish killings of armenians at the start of the 20th century were a genocide. he is the first u.s. president to ever officially recognize the armenian genocide.[470] in july 2022, president biden signed an executive order aimed at deterring the wrongful detention of americans abroad.[471] according to an estimate by the james w. foley legacy foundation, there are at least 67 u.s. citizens who are currently imprisoned abroad. the foundation further estimates that 90% of those are wrongly detained by foreign governments hostile to the u.s., including venezuela, russia, china, iran, and others.[472] dozens of families of americans who are detained abroad say president biden has failed to adequately address the crisis.[472] they formed a group called "bring our families home campaign" to pressure biden to do more.[473] in september 2023, president biden reached a deal to release five prisoners held by iran. in exchange, $6 billion of frozen iranian assets were released.[474] the u.s. said the unfrozen money would be held in restricted accounts so that it could only be spent on humanitarian goods such as food and medicine.[475] in august 2024, president biden reached a deal to secure the largest prisoner exchange since the cold war.[476] the exchange included the release of americans evan gershkovich, paul whelan, and alsu kurmasheva; thirteen others from russia and belarus; and russians held by the u.s., slovenia, norway, poland, and germany.[477] turkey and estonia were also involved in the deal.[476] biden stressed the importance of alliances on the world stage by describing the achievement as "a powerful example of why it's vital to have friends in this world."[478] in march 2021, biden held a virtual meeting with leaders of japan, india and australia, an alliance of countries known as the quadrilateral security dialogue, or the quad, that work together to address china's expansionism in the indo pacific region.[479][480] a few days later, the administration officials, including secretary of state antony blinken and secretary of defense lloyd austin, met with u.s. allies in asia and imposed sanctions on senior chinese officials.[481][400] austin also visited india to deepen the defense ties between the two countries.[480] in september 2021, biden hosted the first in person meeting of quad at the white house.[482] on may 23, 2022, biden launched the indo pacific economic framework for prosperity (ipef) to counter growing chinese economic and political influence in the indo pacific region. at the time of its launch, the ipef had 12 partners including australia, brunei, india, indonesia, japan, south korea, malaysia, new zealand, the philippines, singapore, thailand, and vietnam.[483] in response, china described the proposed grouping as a "closed and exclusive club". national security adviser jake sullivan defended the ipef by highlighting the diverse nature of the grouping's membership.[484][485] in november 2023, under pressure from congressional democrats, the biden administration halted plans for the ipef's trade component.[486][487] in august 2022, the biden administration announced that it will be hosting the us pacific island country summit in september 2022 which will coincide with the week of the seventy seventh session of the united nations general assembly.[488] on august 18, 2023, biden hosted japanese prime minister fumio kishida and south korean president yoon suk yeol at camp david. the meeting, amid a period of strained japan south korea relations, resulted in the camp david principles relating to joint military exercises, preventing supply chain disruptions, and united criticism of north korea, russia, and china.[489] on the day of biden's inauguration, the russian government urged the new u.s. administration to take a "more constructive" approach in talks over the extension of the 2010 new start treaty, the sole remaining agreement limiting the number of u.s. and russian long range nuclear warheads.[490] in biden's first telephone call as president with russian president vladimir putin, on january 26, 2021, biden and putin agreed to extend the new start treaty (which was set to expire in february 2021) by an additional five years.[491] biden and his administration condemned human rights violations by the russian authorities, calling for the release of detained dissident and anti corruption activist alexei navalny, his wife, and the thousands of russians who had demonstrated in his support; the u.s. called for the unconditional release of navalny and the protestors and a credible investigation into navalny's poisoning.[492][493][494] on march 2, 2021, the u.s. and european union imposed coordinated additional sanctions on russian officials, as well as the fsb and gru, over navalny's poisoning and imprisonment. the state department also expanded existing sanctions from the chemical and biological weapons control and warfare elimination act that had been imposed after the poisoning of skripal.[495] the biden administration is also planning to impose sanctions against russia because of the 2020 solarwinds cyberespionage campaign, which compromised the computer systems of nine federal agencies.[496] biden's national security adviser jake sullivan said the response "will include a mix of tools seen and unseen, and it will not simply be sanctions."[496][495] the biden administration's comprehensive review into russian activities has included an examination of reports that the russian government offered bounties to kill u.s. troops in afghanistan.[497][498] the biden administration said intelligence community has only "low to moderate" confidence in reports due to the fact that the bounty reports originated from "detainee reporting and because of the difficult operating environment in afghanistan."[499][500] biden called russian president vladimir putin a "killer" in an abc news interview, and said that russia would pay a price for election meddling.[501] on may 19, 2021, the biden administration lifted caatsa sanctions on the nord stream 2 pipeline project between russia and germany. despite biden's personal opposition to the project, the u.s. state department says that it concluded that it was in the "u.s. national interest" to waive the sanctions.[502] russian deputy foreign minister sergei ryabkov welcomed the move as "a chance for a gradual transition toward the normalization of our bilateral ties."[502] on june 16, 2021, biden met with putin in geneva, switzerland. the two presidents discussed a number of topics, including stable policy on climate change, nuclear proliferation, and cybersecurity. russia's activities regarding ukraine, alexei navalny, belarus, and nationals jailed in each other's countries. the summit was significantly shorter than expected, only lasting three and a half of the predicted five hours.[503] putin praised biden as a knowledgeable and shrewd negotiator the next day.[504][505] in november 2021, putin stated that an expansion of nato's presence in ukraine, especially the deployment of any long range missiles capable of striking russian cities or missile defense systems similar to those in romania and poland, would be a "red line" issue for russia.[506][507] in december 2021, putin asked president joe biden for legal guarantees that nato wouldn't expand eastward or put "weapons systems that threaten us in close vicinity to russian territory."[508] the u.s. and nato have rejected putin's demands.[509][510] on february 24, 2022, biden condemned russia's invasion of ukraine, saying putin "chose this war" and calling him "the aggressor". he announced new sanctions against russia.[511] on february 25, the white house announced the us would personally sanction putin and foreign minister sergey lavrov.[512] on february 28, the biden administration announced sanctions against russia's central bank, prohibiting americans from doing business with the bank and freezing the bank's assets.[513] on march 29, 2022, biden appeared to heighten his condemnation concerning putin made at the end of his nato trip to europe, stating that he makes "no apologies" for previously stating that "putin cannot remain in power".[514] on april 12, he called the war a "genocide".[515] biden criticized the kremlin for "idle comments" on the possible use of nuclear weapons.[516] on april 28, biden asked congress for an additional $33 billion to assist ukraine, including $20 billion to provide weapons to ukraine.[517] on may 10, the house passed legislation that would provide $40 billion in new aid to ukraine.[518] the new york times reported that the united states provided real time battlefield targeting intelligence to ukraine that helped ukrainian forces kill russian generals and sink the russian warship moskva.[519][520] the biden administration has pledged to help the international criminal court (icc) to prosecute putin and others for war crimes committed during the invasion of ukraine.[521][522] on september 27, 2022, white house press secretary karine jean pierre encouraged russian men fleeing their home country to avoid being drafted to apply for asylum in the united states.[523] in early 2023, the biden administration resumed deportations of russians who had fled russia because of mobilization and political persecution.[524] in january 2024, the biden administration rejected putin's proposal for a ceasefire in ukraine. biden's national security advisor jake sullivan informed putin's foreign policy adviser yuri ushakov that the united states would not discuss a ceasefire without ukraine's participation.[525][526] on may 30, 2024, biden gave ukraine permission to strike targets inside russia using american supplied weapons.[527] biden said "they are authorized to be used in proximity to the border. we are not authorizing strikes 200 miles into russia."[528] on august 9, 2024, a convoy of russian troops in the kursk oblast of russia was destroyed in a strike by u.s. supplied himars rocket system in what russian milbloggers described as one of the bloodiest attacks of the entire war.[529][530] in february 2022, amid rising tensions between ukraine and russia, the biden administration faced questions for its year long failure to nominate an ambassador to ukraine.[531] the russian invasion of ukraine instigated significant and substantial support to ukraine during the biden presidency including two dozen military aid packages to assist them against the invasion. on 28 october 2022 the pentagon announced the 24th presidential drawdown of materiel worth $275 million; the security assistance has totaled $18.5 billion to ukraine since january 2021.[532] the aid includes 500 excalibur precision guided 155mm artillery rounds, 2000 155mm remote anti armor mine systems, more than 1,300 anti armor weapons, more than 2.75 million rounds of small arms ammunition, more himars rockets, 125 humvees, and four satellite communications antennas for ukraine's command and control systems, as well as training for operation of the nasams units.[a] two nasams units arrived in ukraine on 7 november 2022.[532][533][b] on february 20, 2023, four days before the one year anniversary of the start of russia's invasion of ukraine, biden visited kyiv and met with president volodymyr zelenskyy and first lady of ukraine olena zelenska.[537] while there, biden affirmed more military aid to ukraine and denounced the war.[538] the trip was unannounced, and involved major security coordinations to ensure safety.[539] in 2022, congress approved more than $112 billion in aid to ukraine. in october 2023, the biden administration requested $61.4 billion more in aid for ukraine for the year ahead.[540] president biden promised to repair "strained" relationships with european allies in contrast to his predecessor trump. "an attack on one is an attack on all. that is our unshakeable vow," biden said, referring to article 5 of the north atlantic treaty (the mutual defense clause).[541] biden pledged support for the european project and for ukraine's sovereignty as well as the need for global cooperation on fighting the pandemic and climate change.[542] u.s. relations with france deteriorated in september 2021 due to fallout from the aukus security pact between the united states, the united kingdom, and australia, which aimed to counter chinese power in the indo pacific region. as part of the agreement, the u.s. agreed to provide nuclear powered submarines to australia. after entering into the agreement, the australian government canceled an agreement that it had made with france for the provision of french conventionally powered submarines. the deal angered the french government, which recalled its ambassador to the u.s. (philippe étienne) as well as the ambassador to australia. amid the diplomatic row, the french foreign ministry contended that it had been subjected to "duplicity, disdain and lies"[543][544] and french foreign minister jean yves le drian called the deal a "stab in the back".[545] in a conciliatory call a few days later, biden and french president emmanuel macron agreed to reduce bilateral tensions, and the white house acknowledged the crisis could have been averted if there had been open consultations between allies.[546] a month later, biden met macron, telling him his administration was "clumsy" and that he was "under the impression that france had been informed long before" that france's deal with australia was "not going through".[547] in july 2024, the biden administration announced its intention to deploy long range missiles in germany beginning in 2026. in response, russian president putin warned of a cold war style missile crisis and threatened to deploy long range missiles within striking distance of the west.[548][549] us weapons in germany would include sm 6 and tomahawk cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons.[549] the united states' decision to deploy long range missiles in germany has been compared to the deployment of pershing ii launchers in western europe in 1979.[550][549] critics say the move would trigger a new arms race.[551] according to russian military analysts, it would be extremely difficult to distinguish between a conventionally armed missile and a missile carrying a nuclear warhead, and russia could respond by deploying longer range nuclear systems targeting germany.[552] the biden administration has expressed interest in re engaging with iran on the iran nuclear deal. biden's predecessor, president trump, withdrew from the deal in 2018, resulting in swift backlash from international community.[553][554] secretary of state antony blinken said the u.s. would be interested in re entering the agreement so long as iran shows "strict compliance".[555] blinken did not rule out a military intervention to stop iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.[556][557] on february 25, 2021, president biden ordered retaliatory airstrikes on buildings in syria that the department of defense said were used by iranian backed militias to carry out rocket attacks on u.s. targets in iraq. the operation was the first known use of military force by the biden administration.[558] the attacks prompted condemnation from many democratic members of congress. senator tim kaine of virginia questioned the administration's "legal justification for acting without coming to congress." representative ro khanna (d ca) claimed that "the administration should have sought congressional authorization."[559] in july 2022, biden met with israeli prime minister yair lapid to discuss the iran nuclear deal and said that he continued to favor diplomacy. lapid, however, expressed that only military threat would deter iran from pursuing a nuclear program.[560] on february 1, 2021, biden condemned the myanmar coup d'état and called for the release of detained officials. biden also left open the door to re imposing sanctions on the country, saying in a statement that "[t]he united states removed sanctions on burma over the past decade based on progress toward democracy. the reversal of that progress will necessitate an immediate review of our sanction laws and authorities, followed by appropriate action."[561] on march 5, 2021, biden imposed sanctions on myanmar's ministry of home affairs and ministry of defence and certain junta conglomerates.[562] on march 22, 2021, secretary of state antony blinken announced sanctions on several military generals in response to a violent crackdown on peaceful protests.[563] biden has reiterated his commitment to maintaining peace in northern ireland by resisting the possibility of a hard border as a result of brexit. when asked by the irish times in march 2021 about comments made by irish foreign minister simon coveney that the uk "cannot be trusted" on the northern ireland protocol, white house press secretary jen psaki said that "president biden has been unequivocal about his support for the good friday agreement." as part of his own irish american heritage, psaki said that biden "has a special place in his heart for the irish", underpinning his commitment to northern ireland's peace.[564] biden ordered a halt in the arms sales to saudi arabia and the united arab emirates which the trump administration had previously agreed to.[566] two years after jamal khashoggi's assassination, avril haines, the director of national intelligence under biden's administration, announced that the intelligence report into the case against the saudi government would be declassified. it was reported that crown prince mohammed bin salman would be blamed for the murder, as was concluded by the cia.[567] on february 4, 2021, the biden administration announced that the u.s. was ending its support for the saudi led bombing campaign in yemen. president biden in his first visit to the state department as president said "this war has to end" and that the conflict has created "a humanitarian and strategic catastrophe".[568] however, the details of the end of american involvement in the war have yet to be released as of april 2021.[569] in september 2021, biden's national security adviser jake sullivan met in saudi arabia with crown prince bin salman to discuss the high oil prices.[570] the record high energy prices were driven by a global surge in demand as the world quit the economic recession caused by covid 19.[571][572] the biden administration was pressed on potential oil deals with saudi arabia, venezuela, and iran that would have them increase their oil production.[573][574] however, so far, saudi arabia and the united arab emirates have declined requests from the us.[575][576] as a presidential candidate, joe biden had vowed to make the saudis "pay the price" and make them a "pariah" state, citing the kingdom's involvement in the assassination of jamal khashoggi.[577] but, in june 2022, the white house confirmed that biden was to visit saudi arabia and meet crown prince mohammed bin salman, during his middle east trip in july.[578][579] the announcement came after inflation in the us rose to a 40 year high.[580] the russian invasion of ukraine also had an impact on the oil and gas prices in the us. biden repeatedly appealed to the saudis to increase oil production, but the kingdom turned down such requests.[581] biden's planned visit was seen as a move to seek saudi assistance to ease the oil and gas prices at home.[578][582] however, human rights activists and democratic lawmakers warned biden that the visit could send signals to saudi that their horrific human rights violations could be exempted.[578] saudi dissidents living in the us said that as saudi activists who were wronged by prince mohammed, they "feel betrayed by biden".[581] son of saad aljabri, khalid aljabri said biden's meeting with mbs would be "equivalent of a presidential pardon for murder".[583] democratic representative adam schiff also criticized the visit saying, "i wouldn't go. i wouldn't shake his hand. this is someone who butchered an american resident, cut him up into pieces and in the most terrible and premeditated way."[584] on 10 july 2022, president biden defended his trip to saudi arabia, saying humans rights were on his agenda.[585] in an op ed, he wrote that he aims to "reorient and not rupture relations with a country that's been a strategic partner for 80 years", and that saudi arabia has helped to restore unity among the six countries of gulf cooperation council and has fully supported the truce in the context of the yemen war.[586] ahead of biden's visit to saudi arabia, reports revealed that the biden administration could possibly lift a ban on sales of offensive weapons to riyadh. however, u.s. national security adviser jake sullivan they were focused on a "real ceasefire", and on saudi efforts to end the war.[587] after the meeting with saudi officials, biden announced that the kingdom committed to extend the truce in yemen.[588] on 2 august 2022, the state department approved the potential sale of 300 mim 104e guidance enhanced missile tactical ballistic missiles (gem t) for the patriot missile defense system to saudi arabia. it also approved support equipment, spares and technical support to the arab nation. in addition, the state department also approved the potential sale of 96 terminal high altitude area defense (thaad) missile defense system interceptors and support equipment to the uae.[589][590] however, human rights watch said the us should suspend sales of both offensive and defensive arms to saudi arabia and the uae, which have used american weapons in unlawful airstrikes. hrw said a policy reversal by the us could lead to added rights violations in yemen.[591] the u.s. authorities indicted thomas j. barrack jr., an outside adviser to donald trump during and after the 2016 united states presidential election campaign. they alleged he acted as an unregistered foreign lobbyist for the united arab emirates. barrack was also accused of obstruction of justice by giving false statements to the investigators.[592][593] he was found not guilty on all charges in november 2022.[594] the doj also prosecuted some men for funneling more than $3.5 million to hillary clinton from george nader, the royal adviser of the uae.[595] while federal prosecutors accused the emirates of interfering in american politics from both sides, the relations with the arab nation during biden's presidency didn't witness much of the expected changes. the uae was seen escaping its blunder filled history of relations with the us, despite biden's repetitive criticism against the emirates' human rights violations and its attempts of infiltrating the us politics.[596] moreover, the biden administration also permitted the arms sales of $23 billion to the uae, which was initiated by donald trump and involved a transfer of sophisticated weaponry like the f 35 fighter jets.[597] the us justice department did not charge any emirati in the case. however, barrack's indictment identified three uae officials who were hosts at his reception in the gulf nation after trump's 2016 elections, and two others who were involved. amongst the hosts was abu dhabi crown prince mohamed bin zayed, the uae's national security adviser tahnoun bin zayed and director of the emirati intelligence service, ali mohammed hammad al shamsi. the fourth emirati official was abdullah khalifa al ghafli, who "tasked" barrack to push emirati interests with america. another official was yousef al otaiba, who asked to remain anonymous in discussions over private matters.[598] on 23 september 2024, the uae president mohammed bin zayed visited the white house to hold meetings with president biden and kamala harris. it marked the first ever meeting of an emirati president to washington. biden and harris met mbz separately, focusing on future bilateral economic and technological relations. prior to the meeting, biden received a letter from the lawmakers to raise concerns with the uae around its military support to rsf in sudan. appreciating biden's efforts towards the sudan crisis, the lawmakers stated that the emirati actions could become an obstruction. they urged biden to address the concerns to sheikh mohammed and press the uae to cease the support to rsf.[599][600][601] early on, the biden administration addressed trump's recognition of jerusalem as the israeli capital. the white house confirmed that the u.s. embassy would remain in jerusalem and it would continue to be recognized as the capital. the administration also expressed support for the abraham accords while wanting to expand on them, although it shied away from using that name, instead referring to it simply as "the normalization process".[602][603][604] on 13 may 2021, in the aftermath of the al aqsa mosque conflict, the biden administration was accused of being indifferent towards the violent conflict between israeli statehood and the palestinian minority there. critics on both sides identified the reaction by the white house as "lame and late".[605] on 21 may 2021, a ceasefire was brokered between israel and hamas after eleven days of clashes. according to biden, the us will be playing a key role to rebuild damaged infrastructure in the gaza alongside the palestinian authority.[606][607] after the october 7 terrorist attack in israel perpetrated by hamas, biden stated, "we stand with israel" three days later and emphasized the us's role in potentially freeing american hostages in gaza.[608] on october 14, biden condemned the murder of wadea al fayoume, a six year old muslim boy in chicago, by the boy's landlord. the murder was an alleged hate crime inspired by the conflict. biden said, "there is no place in america for hate against anyone."[609][610] during a speech at the human rights campaign dinner on october 15, a protestor chanted "let gaza live" and "ceasefire now" to which biden responded that he could not hear the protestor, but then later said "i get it. i'm not sure that's a good thing. no, i'm only joking."[611][612] biden's trip to jordan to meet king abdullah ii, abdel fattah el sisi, and mahmoud abbas was "mutually" canceled on october 17 and indefinitely postponed.[613][614][615] president biden traveled to tel aviv, israel on october 18 and met with prime minister benjamin netanyahu, resulting in humanitarian aid being allowed into gaza, including food, water, and medicine.[616] during the trip, biden blamed the al ahli arab hospital explosion on "an errant rocket fired by a terrorist group in gaza," citing us intelligence reports.[617][618] he also promised to ask congress for an "unprecedented support package for israel's defense," potentially tied to a bill with support for ukraine, taiwan, and the southern border.[619] biden called on congress to pass $14.3 billion in emergency military aid to israel.[620] israel already receives $3.8 billion a year in military aid.[621] biden also announced that the us would send $100 million in humanitarian aid to gaza and the west bank.[622] on november 1, after jessica rosenberg, a rabbi and activist from jewish voice for peace, heckled biden during a speech in northfield, minnesota calling for a ceasefire, biden said, "i think we need a pause. a pause means give time to get the prisoners out."[623][624] starting november 9, biden negotiated four hour pauses for civilians to flee every day after his push for three day pauses failed.[625] starting on november 23, israel agreed to a four day ceasefire for north of gaza for six hours a day and a complete ceasefire south of gaza in exchange for hostages taken by hamas. the deal was brokered by qatar, egypt, and the united states.[626][627][628] ian bremmer, an american political scientist, stated the biden administration's position unconditionally supporting israel had left him as isolated on the world stage as russia's president vladimir putin.[629] biden has reportedly expressed frustration with netanyahu's handling of the war, although this has not lead to a major shift in american policy.[630][631] congressional oversight on arms sales has been sidestepped by the biden administration on two occasions in december 2023.[632] usually the arms export control act would require the state department, on behalf of the president, to provide u.s. congress advance notification of government to government foreign military sales of defense equipment. but the secretary of state antony blinken certified the existence of an "emergency" and therefore the requirement was lifted twice which raised objections from lawmakers from the democratic party.[633] in february 2024, the biden administration warned the government of israel against its announced advance against rafah,[634] and nbc news reported that biden "has been venting his frustration in recent private conversations, some of them with campaign donors, over his inability to persuade israel to change its military tactics in the gaza strip".[630] on 16 february 2024, the wall street journal reported that the administration is pushing for a cease fire deal but on the other hand is preparing another delivery of bombs and other weapons and that the administration has to notify "congressional committee leaders who would need to approve the transfer."[635] on 20 february, the u.s. government vetoed a u.n. security council resolution demanding a cease fire in gaza.[636] after the killing of palestinian civilians receiving food aid on february 29, biden expressed that the current level of aid flowing into gaza was insufficient.[637] on march 3, us military began airdropping food aid into gaza.[638] some experts called the us airdrops performative and claimed they would do little to alleviate the food situation in gaza.[639] in july 2024, following biden's decision not to seek re election, palestinian advocacy groups stated they believed that the war would define biden's presidential legacy.[640] on july 10, 2024, the biden administration resumed shipments of the 500 pound bombs to israel, which were halted in may over concerns about the humanitarian impact of israel's use of them in killing palestinians in gaza.[641] on september 17, 2024, thousands of handheld pagers used by hezbollah simultaneously exploded across lebanon and syria.[642] the attack came just a day after the biden administration's special envoy amos hochstein visited israel and warned benjamin netanyahu against provoking a major escalation in lebanon.[643] on november 20, 2024, a un security council draft resolution that demanded an immediate and unconditional ceasefire in the gaza strip was vetoed by the u.s. whereas all other members voted in favor. the draft resolution would have rejected "any effort to starve palestinians" and demanded the facilitation of full, rapid, safe and unhindered entry of aid at scale to and throughout the strip and its delivery to all those in need.[644] on january 15, 2025, a ceasefire proposal backed by biden was adopted just days before his leaving office.[645][646] during a july 2022 visit to israel, biden stressed the importance of keeping the two state vision alive. he met with palestinian national authority president mahmoud abbas and announced a new aid package to the palestinians.[647] during the administration of his predecessor donald trump, u.s. contributions to the united nations relief and works agency for palestine refugees had been defunded.[648] on the israeli end, prime minister yair lapid reaffirmed his position on a two state solution.[647] on february 4, 2021, biden issued a presidential memorandum for expanding protection of lgbt rights worldwide, which includes the possibility to impose financial sanctions.[649] the us state department released a statement on intersex awareness day promoting lgbtqi+ rights around the globe, saying, "intersex persons often face stigma and discrimination in accessing education, healthcare, and legal recognition, and are subjected to medically unnecessary surgeries. these harmful practices, which can cause lifelong negative physical and emotional consequences, are a medical form of so called conversion therapy practices in that they seek to physically "convert" intersex children into non intersex children."[650] biden announced he would be removing uganda from the african growth and opportunity act trade deal[651] over the country's anti lgbt bill that included the death penalty for "aggravated homosexuality" and life in prison for identifying as lgbt.[652][653] biden's attorneys informed the national archives administration in november 2022 that classified documents from before biden's presidency had been found at the penn biden center. days later attorney general garland tasked u.s. attorney john r. lausch jr. with conducting an initial investigation.[654][655][656] on january 5, 2023, lausch advised garland that the assignment of a special counsel was warranted.[654][655][656] on january 12, garland announced that he was appointing a special counsel to investigate "possible unauthorized removal and retention of classified documents or other records",[657][658] and appointed robert k. hur as special counsel.[659] hur released his report on february 8, 2024, stating that the "evidence does not establish mr. biden's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt".[660] the report's final conclusion was that "no criminal charges are warranted in this matter" and that it would be "the same even if there was no policy against charging a sitting president".[661] on september 12, 2023, speaker mccarthy acceded to the right wing of the house republican conference and announced the launch of an impeachment inquiry into biden.[662][663][664] mccarthy claimed that earlier findings of house investigations "paint a picture of corruption" involving biden and his relatives.[665] prior investigations have failed to find evidence of wrongdoing by the president.[c] the impeachment inquiry fizzled out by april 2024.[670] johnson[e] despite biden's low approvals, a red wave did not occur during the president's midterm as many had anticipated. democrats expanded their narrow senate majority while republicans took control of the house of representatives by a far smaller margin than expected.[671] this was largely attributed to a backlash against the supreme court's decision in dobbs v. jackson women's health organization,[672] as well as the perceived extremeness of certain republican candidates in competitive races. it was the first midterm election since 1986 in which the party of the incumbent president achieved a net gain in governorships, and the first since 1934 in which the president's party didn't lose any state legislative chambers or incumbent senators.[673] many pundits had failed to predict the democrats' resilient performance; simon rosenberg was one exception.[674] polls for the election cycle were the most accurate since 1998, though republican aligned pollsters such as the trafalgar group had a notable polling miss.[675][676] the results drew praise from the democratic party,[677] and biden celebrated the results as a strong day for democracy.[678] democratic overperformance in these elections are considered to have played a factor in the party's defeat in the 2024 elections, with its results misinterpreted as support for biden's initial bid for re election.[679][680] after speculation biden would not seek re election due to his advanced age and poor job approval,[681] biden officially announced his reelection campaign for the democratic nomination in the 2024 presidential election on april 25, 2023.[682] representative dean phillips ran against biden in the primaries but was unsuccessful.[683][684] phillips campaigned as a younger alternative to biden, who would be a stronger opponent to trump.[685][686] biden became the presumptive democratic party nominee on march 12, 2024, facing no effective challengers in the primaries.[687] following what was widely viewed as a lackluster performance in the first presidential debate against presumptive republican nominee donald trump and numerous age and health concerns, biden faced repeated calls to suspend his candidacy. on july 21, 2024, biden announced in a post on x (formerly known as twitter) that he was suspending his campaign. he stated that "while it has been my intention to seek re election, i believe it is in the best interest of my party and the country for me to stand down and to focus solely on fulfilling my duties as president for the remainder of my term", and endorsed vice president kamala harris in his stead.[688] following the attempted assassination of his then opponent and then presumptive republican nominee former president donald trump, biden condemned the shooting and, in an oval office address the next day, spoke about the "need for to lower the temperature" of its political rhetoric.[689] biden defended his record as president at the democratic national convention and advocated for the election of harris in one of the last speeches of his presidency.[690] the convention was largely portrayed as an honoring of his political legacy.[691] in the general election, harris was defeated by trump. some democrats attributed harris' loss to biden's unpopularity on issues such as the economy and his refusal to withdraw from the race sooner.[692][22] in the concurrent congressional elections, republicans also retained a narrow majority in the house of representatives and took control of the senate. on january 15, 2025, biden gave a farewell address in the oval office days before the second inauguration of donald trump.[693] very early in biden's presidency, opinion polls found that biden's approval ratings were steadier than trump's, with an average approval rating of 55% and an average disapproval rate of 39%.[694] biden's early approval ratings have been more polarized than trump's, with 98% of democrats, 61% of independents and 11% of republicans approving of biden's presidency in february 2021, a party gap of 87%.[695] around the end of his first hundred days in office, biden's approval rating was higher than trump's but was the third worst since the presidency of harry truman; only trump and gerald ford scored lower.[696][697] after the fall of kabul and the surge of covid 19 cases due to the delta variant in july and august 2021, biden's approval rating began to steadily decline, from a high of 52.7% approval on july 26, 2021, to 45.9% approval by september 3, 2021, according to fivethirtyeight.[698][699] while the white house emphasized covid 19 as causing his low approval rating,[700] inflation, the highest in nearly 40 years,[701][702] has also been described as a cause.[703][704] biden's lowest approval rating on record comes from a quinnipiac university poll in july 2022, which showed just 31% of respondents approving of his performance as president.[705] by the one year anniversary of biden's presidency on january 20, 2022, gallup recorded the average approval rating for biden's first year as 49%, which was the second lowest first year average approval rating for any american president since world war ii; only trump's first year average of 38.4% was lower.[706][707] gallup further noted that there was greater political polarization in biden's approval ratings than any other first year president in modern history, with 91% of democrats supporting biden while just 8% of republicans supported him, resulting in a party gap of 83%. the only other year of any presidency that saw greater polarization was trump's final year in office.[706][708] the july 2022 gallup survey saw biden's sixth quarter approval rating of 40%, the lowest sixth quarter rating of any president in modern history dating back to dwight eisenhower.[709] until april 23, according to figures compiled by fivethirtyeight, biden's approval rating stood at 42.3 percent, a slight improvement from the sub 40 percent level reached in the summer of 2022, but still well below the peak of 53 percent when he began his presidency in january 2021.[710] an october 30, 2023 poll by the arab american institute, support for biden among arab americans dropped from 59% in 2020 to 17%.[711][712] the drop in support has been attributed to the administration's handling of the 2023 israel hamas war.[713][714] according to gallup, in july 2024, biden's approval rating dropped to 36%, the lowest of his presidency, prior to his decision to end his re election campaign; his highest approval rating dated back to 57% in april 2021.[715][716] biden has been interviewed for several news outlets and appeared on several late night talk shows throughout his presidency. in december 2021, biden appeared on the tonight show starring jimmy fallon where they discussed "his build back better plan, the importance of his bipartisan friendship with the late sen. bob dole, rejecting extremism and getting americans vaccinated against covid 19."[717] in june 2022, biden appeared on jimmy kimmel live! where he discussed "27 school shootings in america in 2022, why he believes nothing has been done so far about gun violence, an overwhelming amount of americans supporting background checks, meeting with families after the tragic events in uvalde, texas, the idea of passing an executive order, the strides made in regard to climate change, joe manchin & kyrsten sinema's voting record, housing, food and gas prices being very high and what he intends to do about inflation, the negative impact that the pandemic has had on families and the need for mental health care, being optimistic about this generation of young people, changes in the press, his process for flushing documents down the toilets, what his intentions are if roe v wade does in fact get overturned, and his hopes for america."[718] in july 2022, comedian and host of the late late show, james corden, visited the white house and spoke with biden, jen psaki, and white house custodian staff. he also gave a fake press briefing in the james s. brady press briefing room.[719] biden has also been interviewed by drew barrymore, jake tapper, jonathan capehart, yonit levi, george stephanopoulos, david muir, scott pelley, lester holt, and norah o'donnell, for the drew barrymore show,[720] cnn,[721] msnbc,[722] channel 12 in israel,[723] abc news,[724][725] 60 minutes,[726] nbc,[727] and cbs news,[728] as well as a solo interview by heather cox richardson[729] and brian tyler cohen.[730] notably, biden has not sat down with fox news, despite its popularity in the united states.[731] news outlets have criticized biden for only doing a limited amount of interviews during his tenure. biden participated in 23 interviews in his first 100 days, compared to 95 for donald trump, 187 for barack obama, 60 for george w. bush, 64 for bill clinton, 70 for george h. w. bush, and 78 for ronald reagan.[732]

how large foreign policy shifts happen despite pressures to maintain the status quo. the american statecraft program develops and advances ideas for a more disciplined u.s. foreign policy aligned with american values and cognizant of the limits of american power in a more competitive world. making strategic changes in foreign policy is difficult for the united states. consider, for example, the challenges that former president donald trump and current president joe biden faced in their administrations’ efforts to withdraw u.s. military forces from afghanistan. despite years of failing efforts to bring peace and stability to that country, and limited evidence that much improvement would come without a major reorientation of the u.s. approach, resistance to changing course was enormous. it took an outsider, donald trump, to set the process in motion and a long time insider, joe biden, to finish it. the early 1970s u.s. withdrawal from vietnam, which very few would criticize today, also took several years, even after a huge protest movement at home and abroad demanded it. for strategic change to materialize, the election of a president who wants change is necessary but not sufficient. trump’s effort to put america’s global role on a new course, whatever its strengths and weaknesses, is a case in point. in areas where his ideas challenged received wisdom in the republican party, congress, or the national security bureaucracy, he was stymied. only where trump pursued goals already favored by important groups in the foreign policy establishment did he get results. for example, he was able to tear up the iran nuclear deal because this action had long standing and deep support among republican leaders, but he failed to withdraw u.s. forces from syria because few others agreed. trump’s approach to foreign policy generated immense drama but limited change in america’s role in the world. regardless of whether one thinks this outcome was for better or worse, it is testimony to the power of continuity in u.s. foreign policy. today, a growing number of analysts argue that the united states needs a major strategic reorientation. they contend that the united states needs to be more selective in its commitments and engagements if it is to remain secure and prosperous in the decades to come. the era of american hyperpower is over, and the country cannot afford a policy of largesse everywhere and at all times. this does not mean it should withdraw from the world, overturn all its existing commitments, or make no new ones. but without greater discipline in the commitments the united states makes, and without retrenchment from some, its foreign policy may become prohibitively costly and risky while the highest priorities suffer from neglect. at worst, staying on the current trajectory could set the stage for a catastrophic global war. the united states enjoyed unrivaled supremacy in the two decades after the end of the cold war, with relative and absolute military and economic capabilities that far outstripped those of any other world power. this position of extraordinary privilege allowed it to pursue policies without worrying too much about how they were viewed by or affected other world powers. primacy was a strategic luxury that permitted the united states to adopt a transformative foreign policy agenda aimed at building a liberal world order with itself at the center. this approach initially had a strategic logic behind it and achieved a great deal of good. the united states helped to stabilize the war torn balkans in the 1990s and increased the chances that democracy would take root in central and eastern europe. hundreds of millions of people around the world were lifted out of poverty in this period. yet the same strategic luxury also permitted washington to pursue a far ranging global campaign in the wake of the september 11, 2001, terrorist attacks that led it to commit the strategic blunder of invading iraq and turned a targeted anti al qaeda campaign in afghanistan into a nation building operation that ultimately failed. it also led to overreach in europe and set the stage for overreach in asia. this legacy leaves the united states with an approach to the world that is poorly adapted to the challenges of today and tomorrow. u.s. officials have long been concerned about the rise of china and a revanchist russia, but they focused on other issues until recently. avoiding the realities of america’s relative decline in power and legitimacy has come back to bite the united states since the mid 2010s, when russian president vladimir putin launched the war on ukraine and chinese president xi jinping put the country on a more nationalist and assertive course. the united states now faces a more multipolar world than ever in its history as the world’s leading power. in the coming decades, great power dynamics will decide fundamental matters of war and peace, prosperity and security, and cooperation and competition. this emerging new international reality, coupled with the dismaying outcomes of u.s. wars in iraq and afghanistan, suggests that the country would benefit if it could reform and update its approach to the world. doing so, however, will be exceedingly difficult. u.s. foreign policy deals with every nation in the world, every potential transnational issue, and every world institution. america’s approach to the world is also highly institutionalized. these realities impede a new president or administration from introducing a major change, especially if that change involves being more selective and doing less. this report identifies and analyzes the major sources of resistance to strategic change in the united states so that those seeking to shift the country’s course, particularly in the context of a new administration, will have a better picture of how this can be done. strategic change involves many factors, and this report cannot claim to have identified all of them. some factors may matter in the future that have not existed in the past. but by analyzing cases of strategic change since 1945, our research does indicate that the following factors are especially important: not all of these factors must be present for change to occur. however, they were present in several instances of significant foreign policy change in the last seventy five years. scholarship on the making of foreign policy also highlights their role. the core questions that guided the research for this report are: we considered thirty possible strategic change attempts since 1900 before narrowing the focus down to five, all of which took place after world war ii: for each case we asked a basic set of questions about the nature of the attempted strategic change and the political and social forces that either drove or resisted it. the cases presented here are not exhaustive studies of these events but concise analyses of how and why policy changed. we then bolster the case studies with findings in relevant secondary literatures, largely from political science, including subfields such as american political development, comparative politics, international relations, and organizational theory. we also examined the business literature on sunk costs and psychology scholarship on prospect theory, motivational theory, and more. no two instances of foreign policy change are the same in scope or scale, and there is no bright line between mere policy change and truly strategic change. a 1990 study identifies four types of foreign policy change, ranging from adjustments of policy to major international reorientations.1 we have focused on changes closer on the spectrum to the latter to qualify as strategic: these changes had major implications on their own or were emblematic of an administration’s wider effort at reorientation. tellingly, the most sweeping strategic change in u.s. foreign policy of the last eight decades came through the national trial of the second world war. 1charles f. hermann, “changing course: when governments choose to redirect foreign policy,” international studies quarterly 34, no. 1, (march 1990): 3 21. christopher s. chivvis senior fellow and director, american statecraft program jennifer kavanagh former senior fellow, american statecraft program sahil lauji former james c. gaither junior fellow, american statecraft program adele malle former james c. gaither junior fellow, american statecraft program samuel orloff former james c. gaither junior fellow, american statecraft program stephen wertheim senior fellow, american statecraft program reid wilcox former research analyst former secretary of state dean acheson famously called the national security council (nsc) policy paper nsc 68 “one of the most significant documents in our history.”1 its adoption in 1950 under truman brought about a strategic shift in u.s. foreign policy that set the stage for at least the next two decades of the cold war. it spurred increased defense spending, globalized the u.s. strategy of containment, and moved away from a deterrence strategy focused largely on nuclear weapons. there was considerable opposition to nsc 68 within the administration and in congress. nevertheless, a range of factors led to its adoption over the first half of 1950, including personnel changes, bureaucratic maneuvering, a concerted effort to sell the new strategy, and above all the outbreak of the korean war in june 1950. on september 23, 1949, truman shocked the country by announcing that the soviet union had successfully tested nuclear weapons.2 the policy document known as nsc 68, drafted by a cross departmental study group, began as a reevaluation of american strategy in light of this event.3 with the end of the u.s. atomic monopoly, officials believed that the strategic advantage the united states held over the soviet union was no longer assured.4 paul nitze, the state department’s director of policy planning who led the exercise, feared that if washington did not increase defense spending, u.s. conventional forces would be paralyzed, creating a dangerous overreliance upon a fleeting nuclear advantage.5 he also disagreed with the assessment, developed under his predecessor george kennan, that the soviets would not become more aggressive once in possession of nuclear weapons. to the contrary, nitze believed a nuclear armed soviet union would adopt a far more bellicose “first strike mentality.”6 former state department director of policy planning paul nitze. (photo by jhu sheridan libraries/gado/getty images) other international events also caused policymakers to reevaluate u.s. strategy. these included mao zedong’s victory in china’s civil war and the formation in october 1949 of the people’s republic of china (prc), the soviet formation of east germany that same month, and the treaty of friendship signed between the soviet union and the prc in february 1950.7 these events pushed the drafters of nsc 68 to take an expansive, global view of the cold war. in particular, nitze warned of the dangers of the prc serving as a “springboard” for communist advances in asia, and he cautioned that the soviet union was deepening its engagement in austria, germany, indochina, and korea.8 in short, nsc 68’s authors saw a soviet led communist monolith that was on the advance, and they feared that america’s relative position had degraded sharply over the course of 1949 1950.9 at the outset, nsc 68 was met with skepticism inside and outside the government. within the executive branch, pushback centered upon the cost of its recommendations and other ramifications of its analysis, while prominent republicans in congress and outside of the government raised partisan objections. the proposed rapid military buildup in nsc 68 was especially controversial. no less than the secretary of defense louis johnson initially opposed the strategy, at one point referring to nitze’s project as “a conspiracy.”10 omar bradley, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, similarly worried that profligate defense spending would damage the nation’s industry, a determinant of american power.11 beyond the defense establishment, bureau of the budget officials cautioned that higher military expenditures could restrict economic growth.12 even those who were sympathetic to elements of nsc 68 including the former chair of the atomic energy commission david lilienthal and the assistant secretary of state for public affairs edward w. barrett believed that many of its goals could be achieved without the steep increases in defense spending for which it called.13 serving and former diplomats also objected. kennan, for example, disagreed with the rationale behind the study, rejecting the notion that “the ‘cold war,’ by virtue of events outside of our control, has suddenly taken some drastic turn to our disadvantage” due to the soviet testing of nuclear weapons, a development he viewed as predictable.14 charles bohlen, the former ambassador to moscow, contended that nsc 68 oversimplified soviet objectives and created a false equivalency between soviet capabilities and soviet intentions.15 assistant secretary of state for economic affairs willard thorp suggested that the yawning gap between the soviet and american economies would limit moscow’s ability to challenge the united states.16 the central intelligence agency (cia), moreover, argued that the kremlin was unlikely to assume the highly aggressive posture that undergirded the arguments of nitze and his coauthors.17 echoing kennan, the eminent scientist j. robert oppenheimer criticized nsc 68’s embrace of the hydrogen bomb for failing to end reliance upon nuclear weapons.18 when the white house began to act upon nsc 68’s recommendations, republicans again objected. senator robert taft castigated the administration for ceding “strategic initiative.”19 by allowing the soviet union to determine where the united states would make a stand against the advance of communism, nsc 68 defined u.s. interests in terms of the soviet threat rather than through objective criteria independent of the adversary.20 taft also attacked the spending increases, arguing there was a “limit to what a government can spend in a time of peace and still maintain a free economy, without inflation.”21 beyond congress, former president herbert hoover criticized truman for pursuing aggressive policies that might damage the economy.22 even the internationalist wing of the republican party criticized the strategic shift initiated by nsc 68, with later secretary of state john foster dulles accusing the truman administration of “unbalancing the budget [and] lowering the value of the dollar” with a program that “threatened civil liberties at home.”23 opposition to the strategic change nsc 68 represented was thus substantial, and the fate of its policy recommendations was initially far from certain. in 1950, nsc 68 gained momentum for several reasons, including personnel changes, politicking within the federal bureaucracy, and concerted efforts inside and outside the government to promote the new approach. moreover, the outbreak of the korean war in june 1950 proved decisive in ensuring the implementation of nsc 68. personnel shifts in the administration that preceded the drafting of nsc 68 were crucial in making larger defense expenditures possible. kennan departed as head of the state department’s policy planning staff at the end of 1949, allowing the more hawkish nitze to succeed him.24 nitze’s promotion coincided with the end of frank pace’s tenure as head of the bureau of budget, which removed another well positioned opponent of increased defense spending.25 such changes sidelined the remaining proponents of a budget ceiling, such as the secretary of defense, johnson, and created an opening for advocates of higher spending to “bludgeon the mass mind of ‘top government.’”26 the authors of nsc 68 also worked to overcome their opponents through savvy politicking and bureaucratic maneuvering during the drafting process.27 despite its title, nsc 68 was not composed by staff on the nsc; it was the product of a small study group of like minded officials from the state department and the pentagon. by operating outside the bureaucracy’s formal channels and including many of his deputies, nitze ensured that his coauthors were already favorable to his strategy.28 when presented with a “virtual fait accompli,” johnson acquiesced to nsc 68.29 nitze also made sure to get acheson’s support before initiating the study.30 as acheson advised, he omitted estimates of the spending increases implicit in nsc 68’s recommendations.31 nitze and his coauthors also leveraged the thinking of the president’s domestic policy aides. the chair of the council of economic advisors, leon keyserling, embraced keynesian deficit spending. keyserling had domestic programs in mind, but if the u.s. economy could support enlarged government spending in one area, it could do so in another.32 nitze also denied that nsc 68 amounted to strategic change in the first place, downplaying its significance and framing it instead as strategic continuity. he continued to argue that nsc 68 did not break with kennan’s approach and was consistent with established u.s. doctrine.33 this tenuous claim reflects a calculation that deemphasizing the extent of the document’s departure from the status quo would increase the likelihood of the adoption of its prescriptions.34 administration officials went to great lengths to secure public support for the recommendations of nsc 68. they believed the public desired resolute action in response to the soviet union but might blanch at the massive spending program the document entailed.35 the administration thus launched a public relations campaign to convince the american people that the soviet union was a serious threat and that a military buildup was needed to face it. nsc 68’s supporters addressed the public to “whip up sentiment.”36 barrett called for a “scare campaign” to sell the document,37 and many prominent officials started talking about the soviet threat in hyperbole.38 in this vein, acheson delivered a series of speeches in which he warned: “there has never, in the history of the world, been an imperialist system that compares with what the soviet union has at its disposal.”39 attacking those concerned the strategy would blow a hole in the federal budget, truman said that the “real threat to our security isn’t the danger of bankruptcy. it is the danger of communist aggression.”40 he went even further after the outbreak of the korean war, calling for the armed forces to swell to 3.5 million and declaring a state of emergency in the hope that this action would “have great psychological effects on the american people.”41 proponents of nsc 68 were bolstered by a surge of anti communist sentiment. in february 1950, republican senator joseph mccarthy leveled his first accusations of communist infiltration against the administration, reinforcing its need to appear “tough” on global communism.42 elite opinion and pressure groups also played a role, exemplified by the committee on present danger, an anti communist interest group founded in late 1950 whose membership came to include former undersecretary of defense tracy voorhess, harvard’s james b. conant, vannevar bush of the carnegie institution of washington, and former secretary of war robert patterson.43 despite these efforts, truman initially shelved nsc 68 due to its lack of cost estimates.44 what changed his calculus was the outbreak of the korean war in june 1950.45 u.s. officials interpreted north korea’s invasion of south korea as evidence that the soviet union was mounting an international offensive.46 the attack also appeared to illustrate that a nuclear deterrent alone was insufficient for preventing communist belligerence and that a conventional military buildup would be beneficial.47 meanwhile, the sudden transformation of the korean peninsula from a peripheral theater of cold war competition to a high american priority appeared to validate nsc 68’s broad vision of u.s. security interests.48 as the war went on, the challenges faced by u.s. forces brought political attention to insufficient force readiness.49 negative coverage of the war reflected poorly on johnson and his fiscal discipline. his firing by truman in september 1950 removed perhaps the most prominent opponent of higher defense spending.50 for its part, congress passed two supplemental appropriations bills with little dissent, allocating $35.3 billion beyond the $13.3 billion set aside for fy 1951.51 this action crossed the proverbial rubicon: as the political scientist robert jervis has written, “once the budget smashed through the old ceiling and the economy did not fall apart, much of the resistance collapsed.”52 the korean war also brought about a new emphasis on asia and a fresh focus on the importance of conventional capabilities for the waging of limited wars against non soviet communist states.53 without the korean war, nsc 68 might not have been adopted and implemented.54 nsc 68 shaped the scale, scope, and nature of u.s. cold war strategy in the 1950s and 1960s. the first effect was on spending levels. immediately after the second world war, the united states cut annual defense spending from $81.6 billion in 1945 to $13.1 billion in 1947 while over the same period reducing the number of men under arms from 12 million to 1.6 million.55 even after the cold war began in the late 1940s, politicians and policymakers sought to limit defense spending. truman, with bipartisan support in congress, committed to keeping the pentagon budget below $15 billion per year, and military spending consumed around 5 percent of gross national product (gnp) from 1947 to 1950.56 kennan believed that the united states could pursue a strategy of containment within the confines of the budget ceiling, relying merely on “two high quality marine divisions.”57 nsc 68 ushered in a reversal of course, stating that “budgetary considerations will need to be subordinated to the stark fact that our very independence as a nation may be at stake.”58 defense spending increased precipitously, far exceeding truman’s budget cap. from 1952 to 1954, the military budget swelled to 15 percent of gnp, constituting almost 70 percent of federal spending.59 fiscal conservatism had given way to a new “military keynesianism,” which “unshackled defense budgets from spending limits that had previously seemed economically and politically immutable.”60 nsc 68 also globalized the strategy of containment, broadening the scope of america’s military role. after the second world war, kennan had argued that three of the world’s five global centers of power were located in europe and that the united states ought thus to focus its efforts there.61 other regions, including most of asia, were initially relegated to secondary priority.62 in contrast, nsc 68 rejected “distinctions between peripheral and vital interests.” no longer would containment be limited to select core power centers; the document’s authors embraced a maximalist vision of a global or “eurasian” defense perimeter.63 the united states proceeded to strengthen its defenses in western europe and asia simultaneously.64 finally, nsc 68 settled a debate over what role nuclear weapons ought to play in defense policy. advocates of a defense strategy heavily weighted toward nuclear deterrence pointed to the military and fiscal advantages these powerful new weapons offered,65 whereas detractors, like kennan and lilienthal, underscored the potentially catastrophic risks that such a strategy would entail.66 nsc 68 resolved this debate, not by taking a side but by calling for a large buildup of conventional forces alongside nuclear weapons.67 nitze later framed the document as a move “away from primary reliance upon nuclear weapons, and towards building up conventional forces.”68 but this did not mean the united states diminished the size of its nuclear arsenal or embraced a no first use policy.69 it undertook in parallel development of the hydrogen bomb.70 by coupling nuclear advances with a focus on conventional deterrence, nsc 68’s authors sought to ensure that the united states did not wholly depend on nuclear deterrence in the event of a limited confrontation with the soviet union.71 these shifts proved lasting. even though president dwight eisenhower aimed for a less costly defense posture underwritten by nuclear deterrence in his new look security policy, he did not break definitively with nsc 68’s strategy.72 his administration continued the global approach, backing coups in guatemala and iran, formulating the “domino theory” for southeast asia,73 and committing the united states to the defense of south vietnam.74 defense spending decreased initially but remained well above truman’s old budget ceiling.75 on the other hand, nsc 68’s pessimistic assessment of soviet intentions faded after the korean war.76 the next president john f. kennedy followed in nitze’s footsteps by arguing that his predecessor had placed undue emphasis on nuclear deterrence.77 his successor lyndon b. johnson highlighted the legacy of nsc 68 in 1964 when he declared: “we are the richest nation in the history of the world. we can afford to spend whatever is needed to keep this country safe.”78 the deepening u.s. commitment in south vietnam in the 1960s was one consequence of nsc 68’s globalization of cold war containment.79 scholars have even identified links between nitze’s assessment of the soviet union in the document and the assertive rhetoric of presidents ronald reagan and george w. bush.80 u.s. defense expenditures have never again dropped to pre korean war levels, and the united states continues to spend enormous sums on defense. 1dean acheson, quoted in ken young, “revisiting nsc 68,” journal of cold war studies 15, no. 1 (winter 2013): 3. 2samuel f. wells, jr., “sounding the tocsin: nsc 68 and the soviet threat,” international security 4, no. 2 (fall 1979): 117. 3national security council, united states objectives and programs for national security, nsc 68 (washington, dc: white house, 1950), 3. 4paul nitze, “the development of nsc 68” in “nsc 68 and the soviet threat reconsidered,” international security 4, no. 4 (spring 1980): 172. 5ken young, “revisiting nsc 68,” journal of cold war studies 15, no.1 (winter 2013): 27, 30 31. 6joseph m. siracusa, “nsc 68: a reappraisal,” naval war college review 33, no. 6 (november december 1980): 10. 7wells, jr., “sounding the tocsin: nsc 68 and the soviet threat,” 117. 8national security council, united states objectives and programs for national security, nsc 68 (washington, dc: white house, 1950), 30; samuel f. wells, jr., “sounding the tocsin: nsc 68 and the soviet threat,” international security 4, no. 2 (fall 1979): 125. 9some revisionist accounts have argued that nsc 68 was not a response to the perceived dangers of soviet expansionism and instead reflected economic concerns regarding matters such as the “dollar gap.” for example, see curt cardwell, nsc 68 and the political economy of the early cold war (oxford: oxford university press, 2011). 10paul nitze, quoted in ken young, “revisiting nsc 69,” journal of cold war studies 15, no.1 (winter 2013): 21. 11steven casey, “selling nsc 68: the truman administration, public opinion, and the politics of mobilization, 1950 51,” diplomatic history 29, no. 4 (september 2005): 665. 12sam postbrief, “departure from incrementalism in us strategic planning: the origins of nsc 68,” naval war college review 33, no. 2 (march april 1980): 49. 13wells, jr., “sounding the tocsin: nsc 68 and the soviet threat,” 117. 14george kennan, quoted in samuel f. wells, jr., “sounding the tocsin: nsc 68 and the soviet threat,” international security 4, no. 2 (fall 1979): 128; rebecca lissner, wars of revelation: the transformative effects of military intervention on grand strategy (oxford: oxford university press, 2021), 34. 15wells, jr., “sounding the tocsin: nsc 68 and the soviet threat,”136; ken young, “revisiting nsc 69,” journal of cold war studies 15, no.1 (winter 2013): 20. although both men disputed nsc 68’s bleak assessment of soviet aims, neither articulated unassailable opposition to increased defense spending, especially if such expenditure was coupled with a reduced dependence on nuclear deterrence. see sam postbrief, “departure from incrementalism in us strategic planning: the origins of nsc 68,” naval war college review 33, no. 2 (march april 1980): 51; john lewis gaddis, george f. kennan: an american life (new york: penguin, 2011), 398. 16wells, jr., “sounding the tocsin: nsc 68 and the soviet threat,” 135 136. 17rebecca lissner, wars of revelation: the transformative effects of military intervention on grand strategy (oxford: oxford university press, 2021), 34. 18samuel f. wells, jr., “sounding the tocsin: nsc 68 and the soviet threat,” international security 4, no. 2 (fall 1979): 129; paul nitze, “the development of nsc 68” in “nsc 68 and the soviet threat reconsidered,” international security 4, no. 4 (spring 1980): 176. 19john lewis gaddis, strategies of containment: a critical appraisal of postwar american national security policy (new york: oxford university press, 1982), 119. 20gaddis, strategies of containment, 98. 21robert a. taft, quoted in john lewis gaddis, strategies of containment, 120. 22herbert hoover, quoted in john lewis gaddis, strategies of containment: a critical appraisal of postwar american national security policy (new york: oxford university press, 1982), 119. 23gaddis, strategies of containment, 120 121. 24sam postbrief, “departure from incrementalism in us strategic planning: the origins of nsc 68,” naval war college review 33, no. 2 (march april 1980): 39; john lewis gaddis, george f. kennan: an american life (new york: penguin, 2011), 362 386. 25ken young, “revisiting nsc 69,” journal of cold war studies 15, no.1 (winter 2013): 21 22. 26dean acheson, present at the creation: my years in the state department (new york: w.w. norton, 1969), 374. 27young, “revisiting nsc 69,” 19. 28wells, jr., “sounding the tocsin”, 130. 29john lewis gaddis, strategies of containment, 107; young, “revisiting nsc 69,” 22; wells, jr., “sounding the tocsin: nsc 68 and the soviet threat,” 131; sam postbrief, “departure from incrementalism in us strategic planning: the origins of nsc 68,” naval war college review 33, no. 2 (march april 1980): 48. 30wells, jr., “sounding the tocsin, 130. 31gaddis, george f. kennan, 391; ken young, “revisiting nsc 69,” journal of cold war studies 15, no.1 (winter 2013): 38. 32john lewis gaddis, strategies of containment, 93 94; benjamin o. fordham, “domestic politics, international pressure, and policy change: the case of nsc 68,” the journal of politics 64, no. 1 (february 2002): 67; paul nitze, “the development of nsc 68” in “nsc 68 and the soviet threat reconsidered,” international security 4, no. 4 (spring 1980): 173; sam postbrief, “departure from incrementalism in us strategic planning: the origins of nsc 68,” naval war college review 33, no. 2 (march april 1980): 49. 33young, “revisiting nsc 69,” 12. 34young, “revisiting nsc 69,” 13 14. 35wells, jr., “sounding the tocsin,” 128; and steven casey, “selling nsc 68: the truman administration, public opinion, and the politics of mobilization, 1950 51,” diplomatic history 29, no. 4 (september 2005): 660; see also odd arne westad, “containing china? nsc 68 as myth and dogma,” sais review 19, no. 1 (winter spring 1999): 86 7. 36ernest may, american cold war strategy: interpreting nsc 68 (bedford/st. martin's, 1993), 43. 37edward w. barrett, quoted in john lewis gaddis, strategies of containment, 119; casey, “selling nsc 68: the truman administration, public opinion, and the politics of mobilization, 1950 51,” 660. 38gaddis, strategies of containment, 108. 39casey, “selling nsc 68,” 661. 40harry s. truman, quoted in john lewis gaddis, strategies of containment, 122. 41casey, “selling nsc 68,” 684. 42samuel f. wells, jr., “sounding the tocsin,” 117, 126; casey, “selling nsc 68,” 661 663. 43samuel f. wells, jr., “sounding the tocsin,” 142. the committee on present danger was merely one example of elites influencing u.s. foreign policy in the truman era. see samuel f. wells, jr., “sounding the tocsin: nsc 68 and the soviet threat,” international security 4, no. 2 (fall 1979): 145. on the origins of the committee, see chad levinson, “partners in persuasion: extra governmental organizations in the vietnam war,” foreign policy analysis 17, no. 3 (july 2021): 11. 44wells, jr., “sounding the tocsin,” 137 138. 45some scholars have argued that nsc 68 led to the korean war, rather than the korean war helping to effectuate the strategic change imagined by its authors. for example, see benjamin o. fordham, building the cold war consensus: the political economy of u.s. national security policy, 1949 51 (ann arbor: university of michigan press, 1998). this line of thinking has been rejected by other scholars as “hard to sustain,” “at best, tenuous,” and as an evidence free claim reliant upon “the dubious assumption that effects invariably proceed from conscious intent.” see ken young, “revisiting nsc 69,” journal of cold war studies 15, no.1 (winter 2013): 9; joseph m. siracusa, “nsc 68: a reappraisal,” naval war college review 33, no. 6 (november december 1980): 11; john lewis gaddis, strategies of containment: a critical appraisal of postwar american national security policy (new york: oxford university press, 1982), 109. 46marc trachtenberg, “a ‘wasting asset’: american strategy and the shifting nuclear balance, 1949 1945,” international security 13, no. 3 (winter, 1988 1989): 17. 47john lewis gaddis, strategies of containment: a critical appraisal of postwar american national security policy (new york: oxford university press, 1982), 100. 48gaddis, strategies of containment, 109. 49casey, “selling nsc 68,” 667; young, “revisiting nsc 68,” 25. 50casey, “selling nsc 68,” 667 668; young, “revisiting nsc 68,” 25. 51wells, jr., “sounding the tocsin,” 140. 52robert jervis, “the impact of the korean war on the cold war,” the journal of conflict resolution 24, no. 4 (december 1980): 58. 53rebecca lissner, wars of revelation: the transformative effects of military intervention on grand strategy (oxford: oxford university press, 2021), 35; robert jervis, “the impact of the korean war on the cold war,” 581 582. 54robert jervis, “the impact of the korean war on the cold war,” 584 585. 55rebecca lissner, wars of revelation, 31. 56wells jr., “sounding the tocsin,” 123; paul nitze, “the development of nsc 68,” in “nsc 68 and the soviet threat reconsidered,” international security 4, no. 4 (spring 1980): 171; gaddis, strategies of containment, 58; john a. thompson, a sense of power: the roots of america’s global role (ithaca and london: cornell university press, 2015), 231. 57paul nitze, “the development of nsc 68” in “nsc 68 and the soviet threat reconsidered,” international security 4, no. 4 (spring 1980): 172; ken young, “revisiting nsc 69,” journal of cold war studies 15, no.1 (winter 2013): 19. 58national security council, united states objectives and programs for national security, nsc 68 (washington, dc: white house, 1950), 56. 59thompson, a sense of power: the roots of america’s global role, 231. 60lissner, wars of revelation, 44. 61john lewis gaddis, “nsc 68 and the problem of means and ends,” in “nsc 68 and the soviet threat reconsidered,” international security 4, no. 4 (spring 1980): 165. 62rebecca lissner, wars of revelation: the transformative effects of military intervention on grand strategy (oxford: oxford university press, 2021,) 28. 63john lewis gaddis, “nsc 68 and the problem of means and ends,” in “nsc 68 and the soviet threat reconsidered,” international security 4, no. 4 (spring 1980): 166; national security council, united states objectives and programs for national security, nsc 68 (washington, dc: white house, 1950) 57, 61; young, “revisiting nsc 68,” 16. 64marc trachtenberg, “a ‘wasting asset,’: american strategy and the shifting nuclear balance, 1949 1954,” international security 13, no. 3 (winter 1988 1989): 31; jervis, “the impact of the korean war on the cold war,” 580 581; beatrice heuser, “nsc 68 and the soviet threat: a new perspective on western threat perception and policy making,” review of international studies 17, no. 1 (1991): 38 39; national security council, united states objectives and programs for national security, nsc 68 (washington, dc: white house, 1950), 17 18. 65wells, jr., “sounding the tocsin,” 119 120. 66 wells, jr., “sounding the tocsin,”119 120. 67gaddis, strategies of containment, 100. 68paul nitze, “the development of nsc 68” in “nsc 68 and the soviet threat reconsidered,” international security 4, no. 4 (spring 1980): 172. 69gaddis, strategies of containment, 100 101. 70young, “revisiting nsc 69,” 30. 71young, “revisiting nsc 69,” 27, 30 31. 72gaddis, strategies of containment, 132 134, 146 147; trachtenberg, “a ‘wasting asset’,” 35 37. 73gaddis, strategies of containment, 144. 74jervis, “the impact of the korean war on the cold war,” 586 587; gaddis, strategies of containment, 239. 75lissner, wars of revelation, 54. some have argued that, ironically, these shifts in the united states also led to a new military buildup in the soviet union. see wells, jr., “sounding the tocsin,” 158. 76lissner, wars of revelation, 42. 77gaddis, strategies of containment, 203. 78lyndon b. johnson, “remarks at the defense department cost reduction week ceremony,” the american presidency project, july 21, 1964, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks the defense department cost reduction week ceremony. 79see gaddis, strategies of containment, 239; john lewis gaddis, “nsc 68 and the problem of means and ends,” in “nsc 68 and the soviet threat reconsidered,” international security 4, no. 4 (spring 1980): 170. 80young, “revisiting nsc 69,” 4, 12. christopher s. chivvis senior fellow and director, american statecraft program jennifer kavanagh former senior fellow, american statecraft program sahil lauji former james c. gaither junior fellow, american statecraft program adele malle former james c. gaither junior fellow, american statecraft program samuel orloff former james c. gaither junior fellow, american statecraft program stephen wertheim senior fellow, american statecraft program reid wilcox former research analyst when he took office in 1969, richard nixon feared the united states was falling behind in the cold war competition with the soviet union. to restore its competitiveness, he undertook a major reorientation of foreign policy. perhaps the most important and most difficult element of that reorientation was the withdrawal of american troops from vietnam, where they had been engaged in an escalating war for a decade. public pressure for change was immense, and nixon faced limited resistance. he overcame what resistance he did face through secrecy and centralizing decisionmaking in the white house. the withdrawal from vietnam marked a major change in america’s role in the world, a concrete reversal of nsc 68’s strategy of countering communist forces everywhere. like the war itself, the withdrawal left scars on the national psyche. looking back nearly half a century later, few would criticize nixon’s decision to exit the conflict, though some would criticize its slow pace. this was one of the most important cases of u.s. strategic change in the twentieth century and the only of the cases examined in this report that involved a successful attempt at retrenchment. by the time nixon was elected president, some 530,000 u.s. troops were in vietnam, a massive increase from the 16,300 deployed there five years earlier.1 the tet offensive launched by north vietnam in january 1968 had forced president lyndon b. johnson and his advisers to admit that continued escalation of military involvement was unlikely to produce victory at any sort of acceptable cost. johnson thus had partially halted the u.s. bombing campaign in the spring of 1968 and pushed for a negotiated settlement, while declining to run again for president.2 nixon too saw that withdrawal as essential, but not for the same reasons. he believed it was the key to strengthening the united states in its long term contest with the soviet union. nixon and his influential national security advisor henry kissinger wanted to reduce tensions and the costs of cold war competition by pursuing détente with moscow and opening relations with the people’s republic of china.3 they aimed to reduce the defense burden and give the united states more flexibility in a world order that was becoming less dominated by american power. u.s. president richard nixon in the oval office surrounded by telegrams from around the country espousing support for his vietnam withdrawal policy. (photo by bettmann archive/getty images) nixon and kissinger believed their strategic vision necessitated a withdrawal from vietnam, but not one that would look like a defeat and damage u.s. prestige. hence nixon took an unyielding approach to peace negotiations, launching indiscriminate bombing campaigns aimed at getting a better deal, and gradually turning the war over to south vietnam through a policy of vietnamization.4 nixon and kissinger faced limited resistance to their plan to withdraw from vietnam. congress, the public, and much of the defense community all supported the decision. some even wanted to speed the withdrawal. nevertheless, there were constituencies that pushed back. the most important constituency opposing withdrawal was made up of hawkish conservatives, inside and outside congress, who feared that losing the war would diminish u.s. credibility with key allies and strategic competitiveness with the soviet union and china. they also opposed détente in general, preferring a hardline approach to all aspects of u.s. foreign policy. but, paradoxically, they gave nixon and kissinger cover to pursue a gradual withdrawal, serving as a bulwark against antiwar members of congress who were pushing for an immediate withdrawal as well as cuts to defense spending.5 these hawks still had to be placated as the withdrawal continued, and they continued to hold some sway over nixon’s decisions, especially as the 1972 election approached, because he depended on their support within his republican party. a second, important group of opponents was the military leadership, among whom the withdrawal was not at all popular. this included high level officers in the pentagon, such as army chief of staff william westmoreland and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff earle wheeler, as well as officers deployed in vietnam.6 general creighton abrams, for example, the commander of forces in the country, strongly opposed withdrawal.7 he rejected nixon’s strategy of vietnamization on the grounds that no amount of training, military assistance, or weaponry would allow the south vietnamese forces to become self sustaining.8 other military leaders believed that they could still win the war if given additional resources and allowed to fight without restrictions.9 for example, they hoped that congress would generate additional troops by activating the reserves.10 they painted far more optimistic assessments of the war and its progress than did outside observers or the press assessments later criticized as misleading and incomplete.11 finally, the withdrawal was also opposed by south vietnamese leaders, who worried correctly that they would be defeated without american support. to prevent them from spoiling the peace talks, nixon and kissinger excluded south vietnamese officials from their secret negotiations with north vietnam. south vietnamese president nguyen van thieu managed to prevent the signing of the october 1972 version of kissinger’s peace agreement, calling it a recipe for “suicide.” he fiercely protested the “ceasefire in place” provision, which allowed north vietnamese forces to remain inside southern territory.12 the u.s. withdrawal from vietnam was widely supported domestically and internationally. however, many supporters favored a more rapid pullout than the one nixon ultimately executed. the white house relied on secrecy and on its policy of vietnamization to assure them that the war was coming to an end. nixon overcame resistance to his intention the way he overcame most resistance during his time in office: through secrecy and centralized decisionmaking. he hid from congress and the public the expansion of u.s. bombing in cambodia and laos in 1969,13 the truth about the pitfalls of vietnamization, and, for a time, the negotiations for a peace deal. he also placed most decision and implementation authority in the hands of kissinger and the nsc.14 this allowed nixon to stamp out most bureaucratic resistance. the pace of withdrawal was in theory tied to the progress of vietnamization, but in reality the link between the two was tenuous, and most within nixon’s circle knew that south vietnam’s forces were unlikely to hold up without u.s. support.15 vietnamization nevertheless bought time and reduced political pressure for a faster withdrawal. the process allowed kissinger to conduct lengthy negotiations with north vietnam until an agreement was eventually signed in january 1973, just before the start of nixon’s second term.16 nixon had the support of many in the u.s. foreign policy establishment, including principals within his administration. key among these was the defense secretary, melvin laird. a strong supporter of vietnamization, he recommended a significantly faster withdrawal than nixon wanted. his position was driven by his on the ground assessment of the war and his sense that the public was not willing to tolerate the war any longer.17 also supportive was secretary of state william rogers, though he was largely sidelined.18 there was strong bipartisan support in congress for withdrawal.19 many members cheered vietnamization as a sign of progress. many others, however, advocated for a faster withdrawal along with cuts to the defense budget. democratic senators j. william fulbright, mark hatfield, and george mcgovern were some of the loudest voices for withdrawal.20 the republican leadership in congress played an especially important role by making it clear that nixon could lose the party’s political support if he did not follow through.21 at the same time, the president overcame the resistance of conservative hawks by periodically escalating bombings and conducting the withdrawal slowly.22 to avoid obstacles in congress, nixon relied on executive action and covert operations, hiding from members that he was expanding the war into cambodia and laos as well as details of the negotiations.23 laird also worked to overcome congressional pressure, serving as a go between and spokesman to sell nixon’s approach to withdrawal.24 nixon overcame the resistance of the military leaders in a few ways. first, he relied on laird, who supported withdrawal, to win them over and push the process forward. second, the secrecy and consolidated decisionmaking authority stripped the pentagon of much of its visibility into the white house’s actions. finally, nixon maintained the loyalty of military commanders by continuing to bomb the region heavily and giving assurances that he wanted to win the war. and, perhaps most important, the authority of the hawks in the military was greatly undermined by the publication of the leaked pentagon papers in 1971, revealing that u.s. civilian and military leaders had been lying to the public about how the war was going.25 paradoxically, the goal of withdrawal was helped by congressional opposition to how nixon was implementing this goal. when nixon delayed drawing down troops, congress tried to force his hand. in december 1969, it passed an amendment to the defense spending bill that cut off funding for operations in laos and thailand. when nixon sent thousands of troops into cambodia in the spring of 1970, congress passed a second amendment that cut off funding to operations there as well.26 in january 1971, it also repealed the 1964 gulf tonkin resolution, which had provided the authorization for the war in vietnam. congress also considered, but did not pass, numerous bills that would have demanded an immediate withdrawal. in 1973, after the peace agreement was signed, it cut off funding for any further military operations in the region, although it allowed military and humanitarian aid to continue.27 this prevented nixon from following through on his intention to use bombing to enforce the agreement. finally, that same year, congress passed the war powers resolution, which required presidents to notify it within forty eight hours of sending armed forces into combat and to obtain congressional authorization for hostilities within sixty days. without congress’s gradual escalation of pressure, the nixon administration might have taken longer to withdraw from vietnam.28 the change in strategy in vietnam was also the product of a massive outcry from the american public, which firmly opposed continuing the war. according to pew data, in 1965, 24 percent of respondents answered “yes” to the question of whether the united states had made a mistake by sending troops to vietnam, whereas 60 percent said no. in 1968, as nixon ran for president, 46 percent said the military campaign was a mistake while 42 percent were still supportive. when he took office in january 1969, 52 percent said the war was a mistake; at the start of his second term in 1973, that number had reached 60 percent.29 the increasingly negative polls placed a significant drag on nixon’s personal approval numbers. public opposition to the war led to mounting protests and marches, which exerted further pressure on the president. for example, monthly protests in 1969 involved a candlelit vigil outside the white house where the names of soldiers who had died in vietnam were read aloud.30 nixon tried to quell public discontent by appealing to the “silent majority” to ask for more time and outlining the dangers of an immediate withdrawal. this calmed the public for a short time, but the effect did not endure.31 he knew that failure in vietnam had been johnson’s downfall and was determined not to meet a similar fate.32 as a result, the approaching 1972 election drove the timing of withdrawal. factors at the international level also helped implement withdrawal. in south vietnam, thieu’s dependence on washington meant he was unable to stop the withdrawal. after extracting a promise for continued military assistance, he signed a deal in january 1973 that was largely the same as the one he had scuttled months earlier.33 china and the soviet union were supportive of nixon’s decision, hoping it would lead to unification under communist rule. this did not mean they were ready to help him reach a peace agreement, however, because they saw little advantage in making things easy for the united states and because they were trying to outmaneuver each other for influence in vietnam.34 in 1970 and 1971, for example, the soviet union increased funding to north vietnam while chinese leaders, including mao, encouraged its leader, le duc tho, to focus on fighting and winning an outright victory.35 moscow and beijing became somewhat more helpful in pushing north vietnam to negotiate in 1972 after nixon and kissinger floated a proposal that asked only that a “decent interval” pass between the u.s. withdrawal and any change in the political situation in vietnam.36 nixon and kissinger also managed to convince the soviet and chinese leaders that closer ties would be possible if the vietnam issue were put to rest. nixon took u.s. troops out of vietnam, but only in 1973 after the death of thousands more american soldiers and hundreds of thousands of vietnamese soldiers.37 the challenges nixon faced along the way suggest the difficulty of making major foreign policy changes, especially when they require reducing u.s. global commitments and even when those changes are widely popular. given the fall of saigon in 1975, it is debatable whether nixon achieved “peace with honor,” but he did terminate u.s. involvement in the country. his success in implementing this major strategic change depended on several factors, including especially the support of a majority of congress, which backed his general aims if not his methods; strong executive authority and the use of secrecy; and a favorable international environment. although public opinion and budgetary pressures were catalysts of change, they did not dictate the direction or shape of change. the biggest challenges nixon faced were how to accommodate and blunt those in congress and the national security community who opposed his vision. the withdrawal from vietnam had important and far reaching strategic consequences, some of which last to this day. it had direct effects on the u.s. military. in 1973, congress ended conscription.38 the draft had been one of the defining features of the vietnam era and one of the reasons that the effects of the war ramified throughout society. the shift to an all volunteer force improved the efficiency and effectiveness of the military.39 with the war over, the army shifted its focus from counterinsurgency to conventional operations, with europe back as the primary operational theater.40 finally, the vietnam experience led to an effort to revise the use of reserves, which had not been called up during the war and so had become a refuge for people seeking to avoid the draft. the concept of the “total force” to integrate the active and reserve components effectively was introduced.41 the withdrawal also affected congress, which reasserted its prerogatives in foreign and defense policy. first, the war powers resolution, passed over nixon’s veto, limited the authority and discretion of presidents when it came to waging war and deploying military forces.42 second, congress became more active in using its “power of the purse” and legislative action to force the hand of president. for example, in 1993, it passed legislation forcing the withdrawal of u.s. troops from somalia after failed military operations.43 some of the restrictions congress placed on the executive branch have also had unintended effects. they pushed presidents to rely on covert action, drone strikes, and other types of activity that are less transparent and visible but over which they have full control. third, after the vietnam war, congress took a larger role in shaping military spending and defense budgets. however, its involvement has arguably made it difficult to make changes to the structure of the defense budget and to cut legacy programs because military spending has become tied up with electoral politics.44 finally, congress took steps after the war to revise the intelligence infrastructure and authorities granted to various government agencies, again to limit the discretion of the executive branch and ensure accountability, which had been lacking under nixon.45 more broadly, with the help of kissinger, nixon achieved a significant reorientation of u.s. foreign policy, although this came slowly at first. for example, the two officials reestablished ties with china and concluded a series of arms control agreements with the soviet union. their success with the nixon doctrine, which aimed to shift defense burdens onto the united states’ allies and partners, was mixed, however. nixon declared in his second inaugural address that “the time has passed when america will make every other nation’s conflict her own, or make every other nation’s future our responsibility, or presume to tell the people of other nations how to manage their own affairs.” nixon kept the united states out of other major military engagements, but it still interfered in conflicts around the globe. it backed pakistan in its 1971 war with india and sent massive military aid to support israel in its 1973 war with the arab states, among other interventions. but nixon did set the stage for a more restrained u.s. foreign policy in the subsequent half decade.46 nixon left office before he could really exploit the room for maneuver he had created, but his successor carried forward aspects of the more restrained approach to security and military policy he had sought. carter sought to condition u.s. support for allies on respect for human rights, but he also ultimately balanced interests and values, completing the normalization of relations with china and continuing arms control negotiations with the soviet union.47 the soviet invasion of afghanistan later forced carter to revert to a more confrontational containment based strategy, however. he withdrew the strategic arms limitation talks (salt ii) treaty from the senate, sent aid to anti communist regimes and insurgents with poor human rights records, and increased defense spending.48 even as the united states shifted back to a cold war confrontation, the specter of the vietnam war continued to infuse foreign policy with greater restraint. 1“the names of vietnam war personnel 1945   1975,” defense manpower data center and american war library, https://www.americanwarlibrary.com/vietnam/vwatl.htm. 2larry berman, planning a tragedy: the americanization of the war in vietnam, (new york: w. w. norton, 1982) 121, 152; david m. barrett, "the mythology surrounding lyndon johnson, his advisers, and the 1965 decision to escalate the vietnam war,” political science quarterly 103, no. 4 (winter 1988 1989): 47 73. 3simon serfaty, "the kissinger legacy: old obsessions and new look," the world today 33, no.3 (march 1977): 81 89. 4john a. farrell, richard nixon: the life (vintage, 2017). 5jussi hanhimaki, “selling the ‘decent interval’: kissinger, triangular diplomacy, and the end of the vietnam war, 1971 73,” diplomacy & statecraft 14, no. 1 (march 1, 2003): 159 94; farrell, richard nixon. 6gregory a. daddis, withdrawal: reassessing america’s final years in vietnam, 1st edition (new york, ny: oxford university press, 2017). 7b. drummond ayres jr., “abrams opposes early cutback in viet troops,” los angeles times, january 14, 1969; b. drummond ayres jr., “u.s. officers in saigon cool to g.i. pullout soon; opposition to withdrawal of any american soldiers before july reported,” new york times, january 15, 1969, https://www.nytimes.com/1969/01/15/archives/us officers in saigon cool to gi pullout soon opposition to.html. 8daddis, withdrawal, chapters 1 2. 9daddis, withdrawal, chapter 1 2. 10daddis, withdrawal, chapters 1 2. 11daddis, withdrawal, chapters 1 2. 12hanhimaki, “selling the ‘decent interval.’” 13general creighton abrams, “abrams messages #3303”, center for military history, 2 june 1969; daddis, withdrawal. 14george c. herring, from colony to superpower: u.s. foreign relations since 1776 (oxford university press, 2003), chapter 17; and megan reiss, “strategic calculations in times of austerity: richard nixon,” in peter feaver (ed), strategic retrenchment and renewal in the american experience, army war college, carlisle barracks, pa, strategic studies institute, 2014. 15herring, from colony to superpower. 16herring, from colony to superpower; farrell, richard nixon. 17melvin laird report to the president, 13 march 1969, folder 13, box 70, nsc files, vietnam subject files, rnl; dale van atta, with honor: melvin laird in war, peace, and politics, (wisconsin: university of wisconsin press, 2008). 18daddis, withdrawal. 19julian e. zelizer,”congress and the politics of troop withdrawal," diplomatic history 34, no. 3 (june 2010): 529 541. 20randall b. woods, “dixie’s dove: j. william fulbright, the vietnam war, and the american south,” in randall b. woods, vietnam and the american political tradition: the politics of dissent (new york: cambridge university press, 2003). 21thomas schwartz, a henry kissinger and american power: a political biography (new york: hill and wang, 2020). 22farrell, richard nixon. 23hanhimaki, “selling the ‘decent interval’”; daddis, withdrawal; farrell, richard nixon. 24hanhimaki, “selling the ‘decent interval’”; farrell, richard nixon; herring, from colony to superpower; and reiss, “strategic calculations in times of austerity.” 25herring, from colony to superpower; neil sheehan, “vietnam archive: pentagon study traces 3 decades of growing u.s. involvement,” new york times, june 13, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/06/13/archives/vietnam archive pentagon study traces 3 decades of growing u s.html. 26zelizer, “congress and the politics of troop withdrawal,” diplomatic history 34, no. 3 (june 2010): 529 541. 27zelizer, “congress and the politics of troop withdrawal.” 28julian zelizer, “how congress got us out of vietnam,” the american prospect, february 19, 2007, https://prospect.org/features/congress got us vietnam. 29tom rosentiel and jodie allen, “polling wars: hawks vs. doves,” pew research center, november 23, 2009, https://www.pewresearch.org/2009/11/23/polling wars hawks vs doves. 30farrell, richard nixon. 31farrell, richard nixon, 369. 32farrell, richard nixon; richard nixon, “address to the nation on the situation in southeast asia,” the american presidency project, april 7, 1971, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address the nation the situation southeast asia 0. 33hanhimaki, “selling the ‘decent interval’”; thomas schwartz, a henry kissinger and american power: a political biography (new york: hill and wang, 2020); department of state, “foreign relations of the united states, 1969 1976,” 251. 34hanhimaki, “selling the ‘decent interval’”; daddis, withdrawal. 35hanhimaki, “selling the ‘decent interval’”; daddis, withdrawal. 36hanhimaki, “selling the ‘decent interval’”;. 37“the names of vietnam war personnel 1945 1975,” defense manpower data center and american war library, https://www.americanwarlibrary.com/vietnam/vwatl.html. 38bernard rostker, “the evolution of the all volunteer force,” rand corporation, 2006, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/rb9195.html. 39rostker, “the evolution of the all volunteer force.” 40richard lock pullan, “‘an inward looking time’”: the united states army, 1973 1976,” the journal of military history 67, no. 2, (april 2003): 483 511. 41lock pullan, “‘an inward looking time.’” 42zelizer, “congress and the politics of troop withdrawal.” 43zelizer, “congress and the politics of troop withdrawal.” 44zelizer, “congress and the politics of troop withdrawal.” 45department of state, “foreign relations of the united states, 1969 1976,” 135 155. 46mark moyar, “grand strategy after the vietnam war,” orbis 53, no. 4 (august 2009): 591 610, 47moyar, “grand strategy after the vietnam war.” 48moyar, “grand strategy after the vietnam war.” christopher s. chivvis senior fellow and director, american statecraft program jennifer kavanagh former senior fellow, american statecraft program sahil lauji former james c. gaither junior fellow, american statecraft program adele malle former james c. gaither junior fellow, american statecraft program samuel orloff former james c. gaither junior fellow, american statecraft program stephen wertheim senior fellow, american statecraft program reid wilcox former research analyst when he entered office in 1977, president jimmy carter had promised to withdraw all u.s. ground forces from south korea, which would end a thirty five year commitment and drastically reconfigure one of america’s two major security alliances in east asia. carter had the constitutional authority as president to determine the deployment of forces abroad,1 but there was virtually no support for this policy change across the national security bureaucracy or within congress. carter, as a result, faced fierce opposition that led him to delay, water down, and ultimately scrap his goal of withdrawal. in carter’s case, the lack of institutional support for his desire to impose additional restraint on u.s. overseas commitments goes a long way to explain his failure. carter first promised to withdraw u.s. troops from south korea early in the 1976 presidential campaign.2 the aim was to pull all 42,000 u.s. personnel over the course of his term.3 in may 1977, he directed the withdrawal of 6,000 troops by the end of 1978. he also ordered the removal of all troops by the end of 1982. at the same time, he introduced measures intended to balance this change. these included $1.9 billion in military spending and an increase in u.s. air force assets in south korea.4 carter made it clear that washington still intended to honor its mutual defense treaty with seoul but also that he viewed the security relationship as “not static” but dynamic and ripe for change.5 u.s. soldiers of the second infantry division during a training session in 1975 near camp casey in south korea, 15 miles from the demilitarized zone separating north and south korea. (photo by upi/bettmann archive/getty images) the origins of carter’s plan reflect his broader goal of reducing u.s. foreign commitments and conditioning support for allies and partners on human rights. first, after vietnam, carter and many of his advisers feared being inadvertently drawn into another war in asia, and they sought to reduce the u.s. military commitment there to avoid getting “trapped in a small and secondary country.”6 the panmunjom incident in the summer of 1976, in which north korean soldiers killed two u.s. troops in a dispute in the demilitarized zone, heightened these fears in carter’s team and the public.7 in an april 1975 poll, only 14 percent of respondents supported u.s. involvement if north korea attacked south korea.8 second, human rights were a central plank of carter’s foreign policy platform, and this made south korean leader, park chung hee, an awkward partner.9 he had seized power in a coup in 1961 and then sat atop a repressive, authoritarian state.10 carter explicitly linked his proposed withdrawal to park’s human rights record in a 1976 speech, saying that he believed “it should be made clear to the south korean government that its internal oppression is repugnant . . . and undermines the support for our commitment there.”11 there was some initial support for carter’s withdrawal. the editorial pages of many major newspapers at the time ran supportive opinion pieces backing the withdrawal, for example, suggesting some support within the expert community for the changes carter was proposing.12 there was also some initial congressional support. the president’s democratic party enjoyed a majority in both chambers of congress, and the withdrawal had backing from several influential democratic senators such as george mcgovern, john culver, and alan cranston who shared the president’s concern that the presence of u.s. troops in south korea risked entrapping america in another unwanted asian fiasco.13 but, initial support for the plan within the administration was lukewarm, and many in his own administration had doubts about the proposal.14 carter urged his advisers that any wavering on the policy could goad park into increasing tensions on the korean peninsula to prevent withdrawal, and he worked to marshal aides into supporting his policy.15 the under secretary of state for political affairs phillip habib supported the plan, but he reportedly spent little time trying to promote it.16 the assistant secretary for east asian and pacific affairs richard holbrooke was an early supporter and defended the policy in public in may 1977.17 (he later became a prominent opponent.)18 many officials privately held doubts about the proposal but were publicly supportive and initially offered no resistance, reasoning that it was their duty to back the new president or resign.19 michael armacost, who handled south korea at the nsc, later recalled widespread reservations as well as an initial hesitancy to voice them to the president.20 national security advisor zbigniew brzezinski later said that he was initially “indifferent” to the proposal.21 he was directed by carter to serve as its defender as opposition mounted.22 ultimately, however, constituencies opposing the withdrawal were both much larger and much more powerful and were successful in thwarting carter’s withdrawal plans. carter faced an uphill climb from the start, and these obstacles only grew over time.23 as the president’s early window of opportunity to implement the withdrawal closed, opposition coalesced. the plan was very unpopular with the army, which embarked on a “strategy of gradually leveraging congress, media, and elements of the bureaucracy, such as the intelligence services, to exhaust a presidential administration’s resolve.”24 army officers in south korea began to develop “an informal plan” to oppose the withdrawal as early as march 1977,25 and they sought to cultivate closer ties with members of congress and the intelligence community. general cyrus vessey, the commander of u.s. forces in korea, later remarked that on congressional visits, “i don’t think we did anything that i would call dishonest or misleading. on the other hand, we certainly didn’t tell them that president carter’s plan was a good idea.”26 not all military resistance was subterranean. in may 1977, general john singlaub, vessey’s chief of staff, told a reporter that carter’s proposal was unwise and “would lead to war” on the peninsula.27 carter immediately summoned singlaub to washington for a face to face reprimand, and he was relieved from his post on the grounds that he would not execute the policy faithfully.28 singlaub continued to be favorably portrayed in the press, though.29 many within the army leadership resented his treatment and deepened their resolve to oppose the policy.30 the joint chiefs of staff reluctantly agreed in may 1977 to support a withdrawal over four to five years, so long as it was bolstered by compensatory spending increases. they proposed the pullout of 7,000 troops by the end of 1982 and consistently highlighted the president’s failure to provide a compelling military rationale for the proposal.31 as scrutiny on the plan began to grow, they gained a public venue in the house of representatives to attack it.32 a subcommittee of house armed services committee had been created in 1976, headed by democratic representative samuel stratton, an opponent of the withdrawal, who won support for studying all its aspects. its members repeatedly went to the press with their concerns throughout 1977.33 testifying before the subcommittee in may, singlaub said that the overwhelming majority of army officers in south korea were opposed, reaffirmed that they had not been consulted, expressed concerns about a lack of reciprocal concessions from north korea, and pointed to the importance of u.s. ground forces as a deterrent.34 this brought attention to an issue that had been largely out of the public view. after this public testimony, opponents in congress began to up the pressure. having seen the impact of singlaub’s remarks, opponents summoned army chief of staff bernard rogers to testify in august 1977. he asserted that the joint chiefs of staff were not consulted on whether troops should be withdrawn from south korea and spoke at length about the contributions of u.s. forces to deterrence on the peninsula.35 attacks on the plan increased in the senate. a bloc of influential senators on the foreign relations committee were led by democrat john glenn, a decorated korean war pilot with credibility in the public eye on the issue. he released a report detailing why u.s. forces in south korea were essential to deterring an attack from the north. privately he promised to “go to the wall with carter” over this issue. republican senator charles percy told administration officials that he would lead a united republican opposition to the withdrawal.36 few of those in congress who supported the policy turned out to have much appetite for horse trading with its opponents. the white house initially thought that lawmakers who were focused on human rights would back the proposal, but few of them publicly came to its defense.37 when defense secretary harold brown briefed dozens of lawmakers on the plan in july 1977, not a single representative or senator spoke in favor, and many expressed concerns.38 officials within the executive branch who opposed the withdrawal began to unite. the summer of 1977 saw the formation of an “east asia informal” group consisting of holbrooke, armacost, deputy assistant secretary of defense for international affairs morton abramowitz, and others that held nearly weekly meetings to rally key principals and develop tactics for thwarting implementation of the plan. these officials were concerned about the haphazard nature of the withdrawal as well as about its effects on international perceptions of american power and resolve.39 officials were torn between their sense of loyalty and duty to carter and their opposition to the withdrawal. they ultimately decided to first “wage a battle against the president’s mind” and then shifted to advocating for delay, watering down, or rolling back of the proposal.40 holbrooke later called it “a full scale rebellion against the president.”41 amid the growing political firestorm surrounding the proposed withdrawal, in april 1978 carter met with leadership from the departments of defense and state as well as key asia experts, at a “critical juncture” for the proposal, according to brzezinski.42 in advance of the meeting, brzezinski one of carter’s few remaining allies informed the president that “everybody, even [secretary of state] vance, is against you.”43 the members of the “east asia informal” voiced their opposition and warned that pressing forward with the timetable would risk losing the already tepid support of the joint chiefs of staff. under pressure from his own staff, carter reluctantly agreed to reduce the first withdrawal to only 800 combat troops and 1,600 noncombat personnel instead of the 6,000 originally planned.44 in the winter of 1978 1979, new intelligence estimates further undermined carter’s proposals by focusing bureaucratic and congressional attention on the growth in north korea’s armed forces. in 1977, the defense intelligence agency (dia) had reported about north korea’s entirely new tank division, a major increase in the number of forward deployment and artillery pieces, and a growth in special forces.45 the u.s. army command in seoul then tasked the agency to conduct a comprehensive analysis of north korea’s capabilities, resulting in a flow of intelligence that supported the position of the “east asia informal” and congressional opposition.46 carter fumed when he received the dia analysis and doubted its veracity, but the damage was done. by that time, the withdrawal proposal was on its last legs, and aides persuaded the president in january 1979 to authorize a new review of troop levels in south korea. during the review, carter received numerous memoranda arguing that the withdrawal had to be at least “substantially delayed.”47 opposition to the withdrawal also came, unsurprisingly, from south korea, whose government joined forces with the domestic opposition to thwart the plan. in march 1977, brzezinski and vance had met with the country’s foreign minister in washington to convey the message from carter that the withdrawal would be executed and containing harsh warnings on human rights violations.48 park at first hesitated to openly oppose carter, but he eventually delivered a scathing attack on the policy in his presence when the president visited seoul in june 1979. carter fumed, passing a note to brzezinski: “if he goes on like this much longer, i'm going to pull every troop out of the country!”49 japan was also an early and obdurate opponent of the withdrawal. after hearing of tokyo’s unease, carter dispatched vice president walter mondale to meet with prime minister yasuo fukuda in february 1977. despite his personal unease with the policy,50 mondale repeated much of carter’s campaign trail statements, raising the human rights record of the park government and insisting that seoul could manage its own defense if it made the effort. fukuda was not convinced and tried to persuade mondale to ask carter to change his mind.51 in the end, the opposition to the proposed withdrawal was more than carter could resist, and the plan was “indefinitely delayed” in august 1979. upon taking office in 1981, ronald reagan officially reversed the policy.52 carter’s failure to push through his plan to withdraw troops from south korea illustrates the extent to which the government bureaucracy, congress, the armed services, and foreign governments can collaborate to undermine the will of a president on foreign policy. much of carter’s difficulty in gaining any momentum toward his goal resulted from the general lack of support and the large and powerful constituencies who opposed the change. carter also alienated those who might have been sympathetic to his goal with a resolve that came across as stubbornness and by failing to take the concerns of his advisers seriously.53 more careful management of these opposing forces and more investment in building a quorum of support for his plan before trying to push it through the bureaucracy may have led to a different outcome. still, carter’s experience is yet another example of how hard it can be to bring about major changes in u.s. foreign policy, especially those that reduce u.s. global presence and commitments. while the failure of his plan for south korea was not the reason that carter’s presidency did not last beyond one term, his broader restraint and foreign policy agenda might have been, as he was seen as too soft on u.s. adversaries and not focused enough on u.s. national security, especially when tensions with the soviet union reemerged as his first term ended. 1ashley deeks, “can congress constitutionally restrict a president’s troop withdrawals?,” lawfare, february 6th, 2019, https://www.lawfareblog.com/can congress constitutionally restrict presidents troop withdrawals. 2"1976 democratic party platform,” the american presidency project, july 12, 1976, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/1976 democratic party platform. 3“public papers of the presidents: jimmy carter. book 1,” university of michigan, 343; michael mazarr, jennifer smith and william taylor jr., “u.s. troop reductions from korea, 1970 1990,” the journal of east asian affairs, 4, no. 2 (summer/fall 1990): 256 286. 4cyrus vance, hard choices: critical years in america's foreign policy, (new york: simon and schuster, 1983), 128. 5aaron savage brown, “the pains of withdrawal: carter and korea, 1976 1980,” (master’s diss.: north carolina state university, 2011); and “presidential statement: carter’s request to congress for aid to korea,” cq almanac 1977, 33rd ed., 62 e 63 e. washington, dc: congressional quarterly, 1978. http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal77 863 26256 1200640. 6richard holbrooke, “escaping the domino trap,” new york times magazine, september 7, 1975, https://www.nytimes.com/1975/09/07/archives/escaping the domino trap after the debacle in vietnam wheredowe.html. 7toby luckhurst, “the dmz ‘gardening job’ that almost sparked a war,” bbc news, august 21, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world asia 49394758; robert risch, u.s. ground force withdrawal from korea: a case study in national security decision making, foreign service institute, 24th seminar in national and international affairs, 1982, 18. 8don oberdorfer, “the charter hill,” in the two koreas: a contemporary history, (new york: basic groups, 2013). 9lyong choi, “human rights, popular protest, and jimmy carter’s plan to withdraw u.s. troops from south korea,” diplomatic history 41, no. 5, (november 2017). 10patrick thomsen, “rewriting history in south korea,” the diplomat, november 20th, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/11/rewriting history in south korea/. 11tae hwan ok, “president carter’s korean withdrawal policy,” (phd diss., loyola university of loyola chicago, 1989), 17, https://ecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3712&context=luc_diss. 12hwan ok, “president carter’s korean withdrawal policy.” 13hwan ok, “president carter’s korean withdrawal policy.” 14administration officials carefully studied the document and concluded that they were not allowed to suggest any option other than a removal of ground troops. cyrus vance, hard choices: critical years in america's foreign policy, (new york: simon and schuster, 1983). 15nsc meeting, april 27, 1977, nsa, sm, fe, box 3, jcl. in: scott kauffman, plans unraveled: the foreign policy of the carter administration, (illinois: northern illinois university press, 2009), 68. 16kauffman, plans unraveled, 101. 17george packer, our man: richard holbrooke and the end of the american century, (new york: knopf, 2020), 168. 18joe wood, “persuading a president: jimmy carter and american troops in korea,” kennedy school of government case study (1996): 99. 19oberdorfer, “the charter hill.” 20oberdorfer, “the charter hill.” 21wood, “persuading a president.” 22oberdorfer, “the charter hill.”. 23hwan ok, “president carter’s korean withdrawal policy.” 24eric b. setzekorn, "policy revolt: army opposition to the korea withdrawal plan," parameters 48, no. 3 (2018): 10. 25setzekorn, “policy revolt,” 12. 26setzekorn, “policy revolt,” 12, 14. 27“general on the carpet,” time magazine, april 30th, 1977. 28hwan ok, “president carter’s korean withdrawal policy.” 29george c. wilson, “tough, blunt, no nonsense soldier,” washington post, may 20th, 1977, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/05/20/tough blunt no nonsense soldier/8b0fa42b 8090 4c81 826b 8372561df4b7/. 30hwan ok, “korean withdrawal policy,”47 51. 31wood, “persuading a president.” 32william h. gleysteen jr., massive entanglement, marginal influence: carter and korea in crisis. (washington d.c.: brookings institution press, 1999): 22. 33robert rich, “interview with robert g. rich jr,” interviewed by thomas dunnigan, state department oral history project, january 1994: 20. 34hwan ok, “president carter’s korean withdrawal policy,” 71 72. 35eric b. setzekorn, “policy revolt: army opposition to the korea withdrawal plan,” parameters 48, no. 3 (2018): 24. 36cyrus vance, hard choices: critical years in america's foreign policy, (new york: simon and schuster, 1983), 128 129. 37wood, “persuading a president,”104. 38wood, “persuading a president,” 105. 39betty glad, an outsider in the white house: jimmy carter, his advisors, and the making of american foreign policy (ithaca: cornell university press, 2009), 36. 40thomas stern, “interview with the honorable morton j. abramowitz, 2011,” the association for diplomatic studies and training foreign affairs oral history project, april 10, 2007. 41oberdorfer, “the charter hill.”. 42“memorandum for cyrus vance, harold brown, and zbigniew brzezinski,” from richard holbrooke, morton abramowitz, michael armacost, and michel oksenberg, april 4, 1978, the jimmy carter library. 43“memorandum for cyrus vance, harold brown, and zbigniew brzezinski.” 44michael mazarr, jennifer smith, and william taylor jr., “u.s. troop reductions from korea, 1970 1990,” the journal of east asian affairs, 4, no. 2 (summer/fall 1990): 256 286. 45wood, “persuading a president,” 105. 46larry niksch, “u.s. troop withdrawal from south korea: past shortcomings and future prospects,” asian survey 21, no. 3 (march 1981), 326 328. 47memorandum for the secretary of defense from russell murray, assistant secretary of defense, program analysis & evaluation, subject: prm 45, june 6, 1979, top secret. national security archive. 48aaron savage brown, “the pains of withdrawal: carter and korea, 1976 1980,” (master’s diss.: north carolina state university, 2011), 31, https://repository.lib.ncsu.edu/bitstream/handle/1840.16/6853/etd.pdf?sequence=1&isallowed=y. 49savage brown, “the pains of withdrawal.” 50gaddis smith, morality, reason & power: american diplomacy in the carter years (new york: hill and wang, 1986), 104. 51kaufman, plans unraveled, 68. 52savage brown, “the pains of withdrawal,” 58. 53robert rich, “interview with robert g. rich jr,” interviewed by thomas dunnigan, state department oral history project, january 1994. christopher s. chivvis senior fellow and director, american statecraft program jennifer kavanagh former senior fellow, american statecraft program sahil lauji former james c. gaither junior fellow, american statecraft program adele malle former james c. gaither junior fellow, american statecraft program samuel orloff former james c. gaither junior fellow, american statecraft program stephen wertheim senior fellow, american statecraft program reid wilcox former research analyst when the soviet union collapsed at the end of 1991, it was far from obvious that the transatlantic alliance would expand across central and eastern europe. nato had lost its primary purpose of deterring the red army from overrunning the region. president george h. w. bush sought to preserve nato but did not try to enlarge it, except to the eastern part of a reunified germany. when he came to office in 1993, clinton also had no plans to expand nato. instead, he put a premium on cooperating with russia. toward this end, the clinton administration developed the partnership for peace, a program to build closer u.s. military relations across europe and eurasia, including with russia. the partnership could have allowed nato to defer indefinitely the question of whether and when to extend full membership in the alliance to new countries. between 1994 and 1996, however, the administration decided not only to enlarge nato to three new members the czech republic, hungary, and poland but also to embark on enlargement as an open ended process through which more states in the euro atlantic area would join. u.s. president bill clinton and invited dignitaries celebrate the ratification of nato enlargement in a ceremony at the white house in washington, dc. in signing the document, the president officially granted approval to admit hungary, poland, and the czech republic to the nato alliance. (photo by paul j. richards/afp via getty images) nato enlargement was a profound strategic change for the united states in terms of the defense commitment it entailed, the goals at which it aimed, and the implications for relations with russia. as the leading military power in the alliance, the united states effectively assumed a commitment to defend each new state that joined. enlargement thus expanded the u.s. defense perimeter in europe and entrenched u.s. leadership of the alliance. moreover, the enlargement of nato was part of the enlargement of america’s core global objectives after the cold war. having previously sought the negative goal of containing soviet power, the united states now adopted the positive goal of spreading its model of liberal market democracy. accordingly, to promote central and eastern europe’s transition from communism, the clinton administration made admission into nato dependent on political criteria. finally, by choosing enlargement over moscow’s objections, the united states effectively prioritized relations with new and aspiring nato members over relations with russia. why did the united states, in the relatively benign security environment of 1990s europe, opt to enlarge an alliance previously designed to deter or defeat the red army? the first rationale was that enlarging nato would enable the united states to remain the preeminent military power in europe on a permanent basis.1 to u.s. officials, the lesson of two world wars and the cold war was that u.s. military strength abroad was essential to peace and prosperity, the alternative being unacceptable “isolationism.”2 nato was the obvious vehicle to keep america in europe and on top. but american policymakers worried that the alliance and perhaps u.s. global engagement more broadly would not survive if it remained “frozen in the past,” as clinton put it in 1995.3 nato needed a compelling new purpose. as national security advisor anthony lake warned, “unless nato is willing over time to assume a broader role, then it will lose public support and all our nations will lose a vital bond of transatlantic and european security.”4 in 1993, lake announced that the “enlargement of the world’s free community of market democracies” would supplant cold war containment as the organizing principle of u.s. foreign policy.5 the enlargement of nato became the institutional embodiment of this doctrine. it would allow the united states to “remain permanently engaged in helping to preserve the security of europe,” as deputy secretary of state strobe talbott wrote in 1995.6 if nato had been created to contain the threat of soviet aggression, nato would enlarge in order to contain the threat of american withdrawal. the second rationale for nato enlargement was to promote democracy within and stability across the post communist states in europe. policymakers sympathized with these countries and wished to support dissidents turned presidents such as václav havel of the czech republic and lech wałęsa of poland, who called for their countries to be admitted into nato. in order to entrench transitions to liberal democracy and prevent communists from making a comeback, nato in 1995 developed criteria for membership that included a democratic political system, a market economy, and civilian control of the military.7 these criteria would act as a one time incentive to encourage reforms. although the partnership for peace program had also promoted professional and civilian controlled militaries, it automatically comprised all european states and therefore could not use the prospect of membership as leverage. nato’s leverage on reforms was further enhanced because membership in the alliance was widely seen as a precursor to eu membership. u.s. officials also believed spreading democracy would ensure peace, in line with the democratic peace theory that was ascendant in intellectual and policy circles at the time.8 thus enlargement would promote stability in europe, at a time when the ethno nationalist conflicts in the former yugoslavia demonstrated that the region could suffer wider destabilization. policymakers worried that these nations, if left perpetually in limbo between east and west, might one day return to their warring, nationalist past, which had helped to spark two world wars. in clinton’s phrasing, “the threat to us now is not of advancing armies so much as of creeping instability.”9 just the prospect of joining nato, talbott wrote, could “foster among the nations of central europe and the former soviet union a greater willingness to resolve disputes peacefully and contribute to peace keeping operations.”10 the third rationale was obliquely articulated and not universally shared: to deter russia. taking advantage of moscow’s weakness after the breakup of the soviet union, nato enlargement would put the west in the most advantageous position from which to contain russian power if and when it recovered. for this purpose, bringing central and eastern european countries under nato’s article 5 security guarantee had greater value than involving them in the partnership for peace. only the former would deter a revived russia from attacking these countries, which the allied nations would be committed to defend. the administration did not wish to accentuate this rationale. as a 1994 nsc memorandum advised, the “‘insurance policy’/‘strategic hedge’ rationale (i.e. neo containment of russia) will be kept in the background only, rarely articulated.”11 to trumpet it would have offended moscow at a time of high stakes u.s. russian cooperation.12 in addition, emphasizing the russian threat risked exposing a contradiction among the rationales for enlargement. on the one hand, nato presented itself as a political club open to any european state that satisfied objective membership criteria. conceived as such, an enlarged nato was not aimed at russia and did not divide europe. on the other hand, nato remained a military alliance. insofar as it took in new members because russia might threaten them, the point was precisely to draw a dividing line in europe, one that could continually move east to lock in new gains. finally, in the context of a security environment dominated by the united states, enlarging nato seemed mostly cost free. any potential conflict with russia would occur many years if not decades in the future. experts debated the costs of enlargement, but only a minority of critics warned that the strategic consequences would be steep. formidable domestic and international actors stood in the way of expanding the u.s. led alliance to additional countries in the absence of the soviet threat. their ranks included pentagon officials and russia focused diplomats, a contingent of academics and intellectuals, and russia’s leadership. enlargement encountered significant opposition in the u.s. government bureaucracy, particularly among leaders in the department of defense and russia experts in the state department and nsc. before it became clear that clinton planned to expand nato, civilian and military leaders in the pentagon argued that it was unwise to admit new members for the foreseeable future. they worried that enlargement would damage relations with russia and were wary of creating new obligations to defend central and eastern european countries, in part because bringing in new members could jeopardize alliance cohesion. the administration’s first two defense secretaries, les aspin and william perry, opposed enlargement, as did general john shalikashvili, who was chairman of the joint chiefs of staff from 1993 to 1997 and had worked with other pentagon officials to devise the partnership for peace.13 some diplomats also opposed enlargement for fear of impeding russia’s democratic reforms and its cooperation with the united states. officials who prized strong relations with moscow were averse to enlargement, whereas officials responsible for the rest of europe tended to be supportive. as james goldgeier writes, “those who viewed the u.s. russian relationship as the single most important objective, far outranking other u.s. priorities in the region, either flatly opposed expansion or believed it could only be considered well down the road.”14 in 1993, talbott, the state department’s most influential russia expert, argued in favor of the partnership for peace and against any rapid timeline for potential enlargement. he had the support of thomas pickering, the ambassador to russia, and other russia and eurasia hands. talbott later became a key advocate of enlargement, but even then he still attempted to minimize the damage to relations with russia.15 in addition, many academics and intellectuals opposed enlargement as a strategic error. historian john lewis gaddis observed in 1998: “i can recall no other moment in my own experience as a practicing historian at which there was less support, within the community of historians, for an announced policy position.”16 the new york times editorial page urged nato not to expand, as did the paper’s foreign affairs columnist, thomas friedman.17 and although most former government officials supported enlargement, the ranks of the opposition included such luminaries such as george kennan, democratic senator sam nunn, and former national security adviser brent scowcroft.18 finally, russia strongly opposed the enlargement of nato. although russian president boris yeltsin eventually acquiesced in the first round that concluded in 1999, much as soviet president mikhail gorbachev had acquiesced in reunified germany joining nato, policy elites in moscow saw the alliance as a threat to russia and viewed its eastward extension as detrimental to russia’s interests and security. for example, yeltsin warned publicly in 1995 that the growth of nato toward russia’s borders “will mean a conflagration of war throughout all europe.” if former warsaw pact countries joined nato, he said, “we will immediately establish constructive ties with all ex soviet republics and form a bloc.”19 the kremlin also believed it had received assurances from u.s. officials in 1990 that the alliance would not expand east of germany.20 russia’s fears were exacerbated by nato interventions in the balkans, which targeted russia’s fellow slavs and involved nato’s first out of area military operations. there was only modest support for nato enlargement in the united states before the clinton administration decided to embark on this policy in 1994. it was not a demand of the general public, and there was no well organized elite campaign to bring it about. still, enlargement had influential supporters, and acceptance grew once the administration backed the goal of expanding nato. many leaders in the countries of the former warsaw pact and soviet union were outspoken in their desire to join nato.21 in 1991, czechoslovakia, hungary, and poland formed the visegrad group in part to seek inclusion in nato. having led their countries out of communism, havel and wałęsa inspired sympathy across washington, and they made a favorable impression on clinton when they told him in person in 1993 of their wish to join nato.22 once the president supported enlargement, the czech, hungarian, and polish ambassadors, in coordination with the white house, traveled across the united states to campaign for senate ratification of the amended north atlantic treaty.23 certain administration officials urged enlargement strongly and early on. these included clinton, lake, and richard holbrooke, the assistant secretary of state for european affairs. high profile former officials associated with both political parties including james baker, zbigniew brzezinski, and henry kissinger were also staunch and vocal backers.24 while members of congress did not clamor to enlarge nato in the years preceding 1994, congress was consistently favorable toward enlargement. house republicans included a provision to expand nato in their contract with america, the platform with which they swept into the majority in 1994.25 americans of central european descent were intense advocates of the policy. even though they appeared to support enlargement in the same proportion as the general population, they pushed hard for it. the polish american congress and similar organizations mobilized around the issue. the administration valued the support of these ethnic communities that formed a swing constituency concentrated in electorally important states in the upper midwest.26 in order to reap political benefits from enlargement, clinton announced during his 1996 reelection campaign that nato would be expanded in the near future.27 defense firms also liked the plan, which promised to open potentially lucrative new markets for their products. lockheed martin pitched its f 16s to officials in the czech republic, hungary, and poland in 1996. the company’s vice president, bruce jackson, chaired the u.s. committee to expand nato, which hosted events for members of congress that featured a range of former policymakers.28 to realize their agenda, the initially modest number of enlargement supporters cleared three main hurdles: getting the white house on board, minimizing obstruction from russia, and convincing the senate to ratify the amended north atlantic treaty. proponents of enlargement in the executive branch did not outargue their opponents through the interagency process; they went around them instead. in 1993, the administration landed on the partnership for peace as a compromise position that would forestall nato enlargement in the near term but keep the possibility alive later. lake, holbrooke, and their allies proceeded to whittle away at that compromise by directing nsc staff to prepare proposals for going ahead with enlargement and by inserting lines favorable to enlargement into the speeches of clinton and vice president al gore. in 1994, clinton made several expressions of support for the idea of expanding nato, which technically comported with the partnership for peace but gave succor to those seeking near term enlargement.29 holbrooke seized upon these statements to instruct the bureaucracy to implement the new policy.30 by the end of 1994, pentagon leaders perceived that the president was committed to enlargement, and the nsc prepared plans to bring new countries into nato within the rapid time frame that had been rejected the previous year.31 once the white house got fully behind enlargement, the largest potential obstacle lay in the kremlin. had russia’s leadership chosen to condition constructive relations with the west on the abandonment of nato enlargement, this stance might have dissuaded clinton or the senate from pressing ahead. the champions of enlargement in the administration therefore went to great lengths to minimize immediate damage to u.s. russian relations. talbott, who had become deputy secretary of state, implemented a two track approach of expanding nato and mollifying russia that culminated in the nato russia founding act of 1997.32 the white house supported yeltsin’s reelection campaign in 1996 not only by furnishing russia with well timed financial assistance but also by waiting until afterward to announce that nato would expand.33 moreover, the united states and nato held out the possibility that a democratic russia might one day join the alliance.34 these measures did not convince the russian government to support enlargement, but they did get yeltsin to agree to disagree. that sufficed. obtaining russia’s acquiescence enabled the administration to diminish (or defer) the downsides of its policy, thereby limiting opposition in the senate. the white house also overcame opposition by devising a particular method for bringing countries into nato. to maximize its chance of success with the first round of enlargement, the administration developed an approach summarized by the phrases “small is beautiful” and “robust open door,” in the words of ronald asmus, who, as deputy assistant secretary of state for european affairs, was tasked with implementing the policy.35 nato would admit a few states at first while making clear that more numerous and more contentious candidates, like the baltic states, would receive serious consideration in the future. as a result, skeptics of enlargement in the senate were initially confronted with the applications of three countries, the czech republic, hungary, and poland, that aroused particular sympathy. those who favored more rapid and extensive enlargement, meanwhile, supported the first round as a stepping stone to that outcome, whereas they might have opposed a one time instance of enlargement if it had meant leaving many eastern european countries out of nato for the foreseeable future. when the senate ratified the first round of enlargement by a vote of 80 to 19 in 1998, “approval was virtually assured before the debate even started,” the washington post wrote.36 the case of nato enlargement shows how a cadre of determined policymakers can catalyze strategic change, vaulting a marginal issue to the top of the agenda and thwarting internal and external opposition. high level proponents made a two step move to circumvent the interagency process: they got the president and vice president to publicly endorse their ideas, and then they used that endorsement to push the policy through the bureaucracy. enlargement also became a reality because it had support from organized segments of the public and resonated with the country’s ideological disposition toward global leadership. opponents of enlargement lacked those advantages. they faced an additional disadvantage: their argument hinged on the potential for negative long term ramifications, which could be left to another president and perhaps another generation. in that sense, the case of enlargement may illustrate both the possibility and the limits of america’s capacity for strategic change. in a security environment dominated by the united states, the clinton administration succeeded in enlarging nato by making the policy seem mostly cost free. experts debated the costs, but only a minority of critics warned that the strategic consequences would be serious.37 for most analysts, a potential military conflict would occur far in the future, when the russian economy might recover and nato might expand to countries closer and of greater interest to russia. by extending alliance membership only to three countries while signaling that further rounds would be forthcoming, the clinton administration frontloaded the benefits and backloaded the costs. in particular, by starting small and promising to admit more countries into nato based on political criteria, the administration turned enlargement into an open ended process that became difficult to limit or stop. nato has to date grown from sixteen to thirty one members since the soviet collapse, and its door remains open. the few central and eastern european countries that remained outside were left in a narrowing buffer zone between the west and russia. this predicament encouraged more countries to try to join the alliance. georgia and ukraine mounted membership bids even though many members clearly did not want to admit them. russia fought a war with georgia in 2008 and invaded ukraine in 2014 and 2022 in part to foreclose the possibility that they might one day enter nato. the “open door” policy in the 1990s that was meant to smooth over differences with russia later made relations worse, once it became obvious that russia would not join nato yet countries whose alignment russia deemed vital to its interests would. moreover, by emphasizing political rather than military rationales for enlargement and by deferring the most problematic candidates to subsequent rounds, policymakers in effect opted to achieve rapid policy change rather than to gain clarity as to how far future american leaders or the public might truly wish to go to uphold article 5 if a newly admitted nato member were attacked. following the first round of enlargement, the senate gave less scrutiny to other candidates for membership, even though many of them were less militarily capable and defensible than the original three. this was as the clinton administration intended. but as a result, the credibility of u.s. defense commitments under nato is perhaps more uncertain today than if advocates of enlargement had conducted a stark, up front debate over the costs and risks of extending the u.s. security umbrella to a large number of countries. 1rajan menon and william ruger, “nato enlargement and us grand strategy: a net assessment,” international politics 57, no. 3 (june 2020): 372. 2for example, see madeleine albright, “statement on the senate ratification to nato enlargement,” april 30, 1998, https://1997 2001.state.gov/statements/1998/980430d.html. see also bill clinton, “statement on senate approval of nato enlargement,” april 30, 1998, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/wcpd 1998 05 04/pdf/wcpd 1998 05 04 pg748 2.pdf. 3bill clinton, “president truman 50th anniversary speech,” (speech, washington, d.c., october 25, 1995), c span, https://www.c span.org/video/?68170 1/president truman 50th anniversary speech. 4anthony lake, “from containment to enlargement,” (speech, washington d.c., september 21, 1993), johns hopkins university school of advanced international studies. 5lake, “from containment to enlargement.” 6strobe talbott, “why nato should grow,” new york review of books, august 10, 1995, https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1995/08/10/why nato should grow. 7“study on nato enlargement,” nato, september 3, 1995, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24733.htm. 8piki ish shalom, democratic peace: a political biography (ann arbor: university of michigan press, 2013); rasmus sinding søndergaard, “bill clinton’s ‘democratic enlargement’ and the securitization of democracy promotion,” diplomacy & statecraft 26, no. 3 (2015): 534 551. 9president bill clinton, “remarks to the north atlantic council,” (speech, brussels, january 10, 1994), nato, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks the north atlantic council brussels 0. 10talbott, “why nato should grow.” 11memorandum, “anthony lake to bill clinton, october 13, 1994,” quoted in sergey radchenko, “nothing but humiliation for russia: moscow and nato’s eastern enlargement, 1993 1995,” journal of strategic studies 43, nos. 6 7 (2020): 800. 12for example, talbott warned in september 1994 against proceeding in such a blunt way “that nato expansion will, when it occurs, by definition be punishment, or ‘neo containment,’ of the bad bear.” memorandum, “strobe talbott to warren christopher,” september 12, 1994, quoted in m.e. sarotte, not one inch: america, russia, and the making of the post cold war stalemate (new haven: yale university press, 2021), 195. 13stephen kinzer, “nato favors u.s. plan for ties with the east, but timing is vague,” new york times, october 22, 1993, https://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/22/world/nato favors us plan for ties with the east but timing isvague.html; william j. perry, my journey at the nuclear brink (stanford, ca: stanford university press, 2015), 127; james goldgeier, not whether but when: the us decision to enlarge nato (washington, dc: brookings institution press, 1999), 126 127; sarotte, “how to enlarge nato: the debate inside the clinton administration, 1993 1995,” international security 44, no. 1 (summer 2019): 14. 14goldgeier, not whether but when, 158. 15ronald d. asmus, opening nato’s door (new york: columbia university press, 2002), 44 45; goldgeier, not whether but when, 136 137. 16john lewis gaddis, “history, grand strategy and nato enlargement,” global politics and security 40, no. 1 (1998): 145. 17“nato expansion, ready or not,” new york times, may 15, 1997, https://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/15/opinion/nato expansion ready or not.html; thomas friedman, “foreign affairs; now a word from x,” new york times, may 2, 1998, https://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/02/opinion/foreign affairs now a word from x.html. 18george f. kennan, “a fateful error,” new york times, february 5, 1997, https://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/05/opinion/a fateful error.html; sam nunn and brent scowcroft, "nato: a debate recast," new york times, february 4, 1998, a23, https://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/04/opinion/nato a debate recast.html. 19david hoffman, “yeltsin links bigger nato to new war,” washington post, september 9, 1995, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/09/09/yeltsin links bigger nato tonew war/e4e013ff 8c88 42a9 a79d fdc14c9de6a3. 20svetlana savranskaya and tom blanton, “nato expansion; what gorbachev heard,” national security archive, briefing book #613, december 12, 2017, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing book/russia programs/2017 12 12/nato expansion what gorbachev heard western leaders early. for the debate over whether the west pledged not to expand nato, see mark kramer, “the myth of a no nato enlargement pledge to russia,” washington quarterly 32, no. 2 (april 2009): 39 60; mary elise sarotte, “not one inch eastward? bush, baker, kohl, genscher, gorbachev, and the origin of russian resentment toward nato enlargement in february 1990,” diplomatic history 34, no. 1 (january 2010): 119 140; joshua r. itzkowitz shifrinson, “deal or no deal? the end of the cold war and the u.s. offer to limit nato expansion,” international security 40, no. 4 (spring 2016): 7 44. 21m.e. sarotte, not one inch (new haven: yale university press, 2021), 69 and 79. 22asmus, opening nato’s door, 24 25; goldgeier, not whether but when, 20. 23goldgeier, not whether but when, 139. 24james a. baker iii, “expanding to the east: a new nato,” los angeles times, december 5, 1993, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la xpm 1993 12 05 op 64339 story.html; henry kissinger, “expand nato now,” washington post, december 19, 1994, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1994/12/19/expand nato now/f1f0b4ed 56ee 4e5b 84baae19a07a9997; zbigniew brzezinski, “zbigniew brzezinski testifies on nato enlargement,” united states information service, october 10, 1997, https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/zbignato.htm. 25newt gingrich and dick armey, “republican contract with america,” september 27, 1994, http://media.mcclatchydc.com/static/pdf/1994 contract with america.pdf; lawrence j. korb, “who’s in charge here? national security and the contract with america,” the brookings review 13, no. 4 (fall 1995): 4 7. 26 goldgeier, not whether but when, 61 62, 100 101. 27president bill clinton, “remarks to the people of detroit,” (speech, detroit, michigan, october 22, 1996), https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1996/s961022a.html; goldgeier, not whether but when, 106. 28william hartung, prophets of war: lockheed martin and the making of the military industrial complex (new york: bold type books, 2012), 193 6; goldgeier, not whether but when, 137 8. 29goldgeier, not whether but when, 62 71. 30george packer, our man: richard holbrooke and the end of the american century (new york: knopf, 2019), 321. 31goldgeier, not whether but when, 71; m.e. sarotte, not one inch, 206 208. 32asmus, opening nato’s door, 107, 175 211. 33asmus, opening nato’s door, 100, 104 5. 34goldgeier, not whether but when, 92. 35asmus, opening nato’s door, 216. 36helen dewar, “senate approves expansion of nato,” washington post, may 1, 1998, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/05/01/senate approves expansion of nato/38dded71 978c 475a 8852 58f5e285e572. 37ronald asmus, richard kugler, and f. stephen larrabee, “what will nato enlargement cost?” survival 38, no. 3 (autumn 1996): 5 26, https://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/rp622.html; michael mandelbaum, “preserving the new peace: the case against nato expansion,” foreign affairs, may/june 1995, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/1995 05 01/preserving new peace. christopher s. chivvis senior fellow and director, american statecraft program jennifer kavanagh former senior fellow, american statecraft program sahil lauji former james c. gaither junior fellow, american statecraft program adele malle former james c. gaither junior fellow, american statecraft program samuel orloff former james c. gaither junior fellow, american statecraft program stephen wertheim senior fellow, american statecraft program reid wilcox former research analyst after the 9/11 attacks, the george w. bush administration embarked on an open ended global war on terror (gwot), which embraced the idea of preventive war, led to the invasion of iraq, and lowered the priority given china and russia. this was a major shift in u.s. strategy and a sharp turn away from a traditional state centered approach to the world to a focus on nonstate actors. other world powers would be judged by how closely they lined up with the united states on its new top priority: counterterrorism. the new strategy involved not only an increase in the resources for military operations but also a major shift in the allocation of resources across the tools of national security. new covert operations, including to cooperate with foreign intelligence services and to engage in lethal force against terrorists abroad, were introduced. there was a significant refocusing of the priorities of the cia, increase in its budgets, and growth of a set of unique capabilities for special operations.1 the joint special operations command exploded from a force of 2,000 to an estimated 25,000 troops deployed in seventy five countries at the height of the gwot.2 diplomatic and military institutions were transformed for nation building operations.3 reliance on private military contractors during the gwot grew nearly a hundredfold measured against gulf war era staffing ratios.4 the administration also undertook the largest reorganization of the federal government since the second world war, bringing together twenty two agencies and offices under the auspices of the new department of homeland security.5 the office of the director of national intelligence (dni) was created to oversee intelligence sharing across the government and serve as the principal adviser to the president on intelligence matters, and within it was the national counterterrorism center.6 the departments of state and treasury, as well as the federal bureau of investigation (fbi), experienced important changes and a refocusing on the task of fighting terrorism globally.7 the post 9/11 transformation of u.s. strategy illustrates how a major crisis can open the door to far reaching change. but that change was not inevitable nor predetermined by the terrorist attacks on american soil or the nature of the crisis. the bush administration deliberately used the opening created by 9/11 to implement not only a strategy that aimed at countering terrorism but also a broad vision of america’s role in the world that they had been developing for years. at the most basic level, the rationale for the gwot was self evident. america had been attacked by al qaeda and would avenge the attack and eliminate the threat. this transnational terrorist group would be defeated as if it were a traditional state. to prevent further attacks, the united states would also eliminate other salafi jihadist terrorist groups and those who supported them around the world. the gwot thus became an open ended campaign against terrorists and their sponsors. bush said it would “not end until every terrorist group . . . has been found, stopped, and defeated.” 8 u.s. president george w. bush speaks to vice president dick cheney by phone aboard air force one on september 11, 2001, after departing offutt air force base in nebraska. (photo by eric draper/the white house/getty images) the bush administration might have opted for either a more limited strategy that involved disabling al qaeda only, eschewing eliminating terrorism in general, or one that focused more on homeland defense than global counterterrorism. some reorientation of strategy to deal with the terrorist threat was inevitable, but the war in iraq was not. the administration took advantage of the crisis to overthrow iraqi president and dictator saddam hussein, who had no link to al qaeda. the motives for this move have been much debated, but they certainly involved u.s. fears about his possible weapons of mass destruction (wmds) and the fact that he had been a thorn in the side of the united states since the gulf war. the gwot focused on the denial of safe havens to terrorists to prevent future attacks, preventive action and regime change to hamper the potential threat of “rogue states” and terrorists seeking wmds, and democracy promotion and nation building to counter the roots of terrorism. the pursuit of these ends required restructuring national security institutions; not only did the military, intelligence community, department of defense, and state department reformulate in some way, but also, the treasury and other agencies expanded beyond their traditional roles to support counterterrorism operations, stabilization of crisis areas, and postconflict reconstruction efforts.9 the secretary of defense donald rumsfeld urged that the united states needed to think more broadly than a war against al qaeda and removing the taliban regime in afghanistan; it needed to consider other countries that provided safe havens, funding, and support to terrorist activities.10 in order to successfully protect americans, he argued, washington needed to impede “others from thinking that terrorism against the united states could advance their cause.”11 vice president dick cheney said that the administration’s policy would be to administer “the full wrath of the united states” upon nations providing sanctuary and support for terrorists.12 the elimination of terrorist safe havens would go beyond physical territory to include legal, cyber, and financial systems that allowed terrorists to operate and prosper.13 with the u.s. military’s unrivaled superiority, bush and his advisers believed that what they saw as cold war risk aversion needed to be replaced by a more aggressive approach to other transnational problems too.14 the proliferation of wmds was just behind terrorism at the top of their list. they thus sought to aggressively counter and engage in regime change against rogue states that might possess or acquire wmds, on the grounds that such states might not just use them but also give them to terrorists.15 while a rogue state or terrorist group could not defeat america on the battlefield, the bush administration and others feared that it might launch a wmd against the united states, killing thousands or even millions of americans.16 the new strategy was rooted in views that the president and his advisers had developed over the course of the previous three decades. they were heavily focused on restoring american military power after what they believed was an ignominious defeat in vietnam.17 many bush advisers had been, in the 1970s and 1980s, proponents of a more substantive effort to confront the soviet union.18 paul wolfowitz and lewis libby, who served at high levels in the defense department during the administration, had authored the 1992 defense planning guidance, which argued that containment and deterrence had become antiquated with the end of the cold war and that the united states would need to prevent the re emergence of a new rival superpower, safeguard u.s. interests (such as access to persian gulf oil), promote american values, and be prepared to act unilaterally when necessary.19 the document had been leaked and ultimately shelved due to public controversy, but when wolfowitz and libby returned to government, they found an opportunity to implement their neoconservative plan after 9/11. bush’s 2002 state of the union address thus stated that the administration aimed to go beyond afghanistan and combat an “axis of evil” iran, iraq, and north korea that was seeking to make wmds and might supply them to terrorists. this provided a broad framework for the united states to pursue regime change in iraq and other nations. 20 as part of this, the administration also sought to spread democracy through new coercive means, including military backed nation building operations, on the grounds that nondemocratic governance was an underlying cause of terrorism. it aimed to shape “the future security environment” of the middle east through a broad sociopolitical transformation.21 the bush doctrine stated that the only sustainable model for a country’s success was heralding “freedom, democracy, and free enterprise” and that promoting these would work together with america’s military might.22 ultimately, the administration aimed to win the “battle of ideas” by advancing its version of freedom and human dignity through democracy promotion to defeat terrorism in the long term.23 this aspiration would run headlong into the pursuit of its counterterrorism aims, which often relied on cooperation with autocrats, but it was part of a fairly coherent overall strategic vision, one that was largely implemented after 9/11. the shock of 9/11 helped ensure that there would only be limited opposition to the reforms, but there was a good deal of bureaucratic wrangling over what the particular aspects of these reforms needed to look like. for example, the u.s. army was reluctant to accept the force reductions that rumsfeld proposed in his effort to modernize defense capabilities for unconventional war, which went against its vision of its role as one of conducting large scale ground combat operations of the kind conducted in the second world war and for which it had prepared during the cold war.24 there were also turf wars within the intelligence community, especially between the cia and the newly created director of national intelligence (dni). the dni’s remit as the president’s main intelligence adviser and head of the entire u.s. intelligence community intruded on the long established roles of the cia, whose director and others in the agency felt that it had been unfairly judged by the 9/11 commission and punished by subsequent legislation, which downgraded the cia when it created the dni.25 rumsfeld also sought to weaken the dni in an effort to protect the pentagon’s authority, while the fbi pushed back against the dni’s power over its national security functions.26 in the end, however, although these bureaucratic frictions hampered the intended function of the reforms, they did not derail the broader effort to implement a strategic shift in foreign policy. some of the measures the administration implemented also ran into legal challenges, including from the department of justice’s legal counsel, which in 2004 argued that the national security agency’s stellarwind surveillance program had gone beyond the scope of the president’s authority and violated federal statutes protecting americans from governmental infringements.27 when bush sidestepped the department by reauthorizing the program, some of its top officials threatened a mass resignation, which ultimately led to the president accepting a more limited scope for the program.28 there was also bureaucratic resistance to the adoption of nation building as a major national security activity. for example, the creation of the state department’s special representative for conflict, stabilization, and reconstruction lacked significant support from the secretary of state or a congressional constituency to advocate for it, and it was ultimately sidelined in afghanistan and iraq, by far the two most important nation building operations of the era.29 many foreign actors opposed bush’s new strategic vision, especially as it grew in scope and scale. pakistan, for example, often undermined american efforts during the war in afghanistan by continuing its financial and logistical support for the taliban.30 u.s. house raids and civilian killings led afghanistan’s president hamid karzai to repeatedly demand a shift in the administration’s terrorism strategy.31 türkiye refused permission for u.s. forces to use its territory to invade northern iraq, which necessitated troublesome aerial deployments instead.32 russia and several nato members, such as canada, france, and germany, opposed the iraq invasion and argued instead for weapon inspections and diplomatic solutions.33 as the united states took a unilateral approach after failing to obtain a un security council resolution justifying the invasion, un secretary general kofi annan warned washington and its allies that their actions would violate the un charter and later stated the invasion was illegal.34 finally, there was opposition from domestic and foreign publics to the strategic change. human and civil rights organizations, for example, filed lawsuits against the administration’s torture tactics and infringements on the liberties of american muslim communities.35 domestic and international public criticism of these changes also increased over the course of the bush presidency. the bush administration relatively easily overcame the limited resistance to its attempt to reorient u.s. foreign policy. neoconservatives and hawks in the administration drove the change, but it also had broad support inside the national security bureaucracy and congress, as well as from other governments. supportive officials in the defense, intelligence, development, and diplomatic institutions worked to reorient their workplaces toward combatting terrorism. and the shock of 9/11 helped to ensure that bush could overcome any resistance. despite some pushback from the democrats, especially in the case of the iraq war, the gwot had bipartisan support in congress due to a consensus on holding the 9/11 perpetrators to account and preventing another attack on the homeland. congress passed two authorizations in 2001 and 2002 for the use of military force to support the change in strategy. it also passed key intelligence and national security reform legislation including the patriot act, the homeland security act, and the intelligence reform and terrorism prevention act. and it increased and reoriented national security budgets toward fighting terrorism globally. congressional appropriations for overseas contingency operations and gwot related activities totaled $803.5 billion from 2001 to 2008 (or $100.4 billion annually on average).36 in 2008, counterterrorism spending reached a zenith of $260 billion, or 22 percent of the total federal discretionary budget.37 the public also largely supported the gwot. weeks after 9/11, 71 percent of americans indicated that they supported a broader war against terrorist groups and the nations that aided them, rather than limiting military retribution for the terrorists responsible for the attacks.38 in polls, 90 percent regularly expressed approval of military action in afghanistan, and 72 percent supported the invasion of iraq in 2003.39 there was also broad approval for the restructuring of the government to facilitate counterterrorism efforts, with, for example, 69 percent of americans approving of bush’s proposal to create the new department of homeland security.40 the united states also had extensive support from other countries for its new strategy, including close allies like the united kingdom and also the likes of russia.41 foreign intelligence services collaborated with the united states to provide local expertise on terrorists’ activities. over eighty countries allowed the united states to conduct covert operations against al qaeda and its proxies on their soil, with many aiding in such efforts.42 a diverse, global coalition backed the united states through military campaigns, intelligence and law enforcement collaboration, and the freezing of terrorist assets.43 the changes made by the bush administration drew on preexisting drivers in u.s. foreign and security policy, notably the strength of the military and post cold war globalism, but they amounted nevertheless to a major strategic reorientation. in invading iraq, bush and his advisers began an era in which the united states renounced the lessons of the vietnam war, going much further than at any time since the second world war to use military force to remake the world according to u.s. preferences. the united states embarked on large scale nation building and counterterrorism, widely altered its spending, and made far reaching institutional reforms that largely remain in place twenty years later. later presidents obama and trump sought to steer america away from the course on which bush set it, but they found it difficult given the consistent plotting of overseas terrorist groups and the extent to which bush’s strategy was institutionalized in the government bureaucracy and the foreign policy community. it took two decades and a major internal fight for biden to bring u.s. operations in afghanistan to a close. many other elements of the bush administration’s strategy are likely to remain for decades to come. the case of the bush administration clearly highlights how crises create windows for domestic and international consensus and for strategic change. after 9/11, the desire to hold the terrorists accountable and to prevent another assault on american soil was unanimous. bush used this window to elevate counterterrorism, preventive war, and a global, militarized u.s. role, and he faced little immediate pushback. some change in foreign policy was almost a certainty after the attacks, but the specifics, scope, and scale of the change were determined by the president and his team. 1dana priest, “foreign network,” washington post, november 18, 2005, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2005/11/18/foreign network at front of cias terror fight/b15b27dd 8de2 441e 9eb5 8509770a1d53. 2steve niva, “disappearing violence: jsoc and the pentagon’s new cartography of networked warfare,” journal of peace research 44, no. 3 (2013): 197; sean d. naylor, “inside the pentagon’s manhunting machine,” the atlantic, august 28, 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/08/jsoc manhunt special operations pentagon/402652. 3“rice’s 9/11 commission statement,” cnn, may 19, 2004, https://www.cnn.com/2004/allpolitics/04/08/rice.transcript. 4karli johnston, “private military contractors: lessons learned in iraq and increased accountability in afghanistan,” georgetown journal of international affairs 10, no. 2 (2009): 93 99. 5elaine kamarck, “9/11 and the reinvention of the us intelligence community,” brookings (blog), august 27, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2021/08/27/9 11 and the reinvention of the u s intelligence community. 6lauren c. clark, “statutory struggles of administrative agencies: the director of national intelligence and the cia in a post 9/11 world,” administrative law review 62, no. 2 (2010): 545 72, 546; “nctc mission/vision,” accessed january 11, 2022, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/nctc who we are/mission vision. 7todd masse and william krouse, “the fbi: past, present, and future,” congressional research service (2003): 49, https://irp.fas.org/crs/rl32095.pdf; david kilcullen, matt porter, and carlos burgos, “us government counterinsurgency guide," department of state, 30, 50, https://2009 2017.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf; nina m. serafino, “in brief: state department bureau of conflict and stabilization operations (cso),” congressional research service (october 10, 201: 2, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/r42775.pdf. 8thomas kean and lee hamilton, the 9/11 commission report: final report of the national commission on terrorist attacks upon the united states, vol. 3 (government printing office, 2004), 408. 9kilcullen, porter, and burgos, "counterinsurgency guide," 30, 50. 10michael j. mazarr, leap of faith: hubris, negligence, and america's greatest foreign policy tragedy, (new york: publicaffairs, 2019), 123. 11mazarr, leap of faith, 123; donald rumsfeld, known and unknown, 342. 12james mann, rise of the vulcans: the history of bush’s war cabinet, first edition (new york, n.y: penguin publishing group, 2004), 303. 13department of state, “national strategy for combating terrorism.” 14mann, "rise of the vulcans," 312. 15“a national security strategy for a global age,” the white house, https://history.defense.gov/portals/70/documents/nss/nss2000.pdf?ver=vuu1vgikfvv1husdpl21aw%3d%3d.; condoleezza rice, “campaign 2000: promoting the national interest,” foreign affairs (january/february 2000). 16mann, “rise of the vulcans," 312. 17mann, "rise of the vulcans," 362. 18mann, "rise of the vulcans,” 312. 19“excerpts from 1992 draft 'defense planning guidance',” public broadcasting station, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/wolf.html. 20“president bush delivers state of the union address,” (speech, washington, d.c. 2002), state of the union address, https://georgewbush whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129 11.html. 21mann, "rise of the vulcans," 363. 22bush, “the national security strategy of the united states of america,” 3. 23department of state, “national strategy for combating terrorism.” 24eric v. larson et al., “defense planning in a time of conflict: a comparative analysis of the 2001 2014 quadrennial defense reviews, and implications for the army," rand corporation, 13. 25christopher kojm, personal interview by sahil lauji, virtual, october 22, 2021. 26loch k. johnson, national security intelligence, 2nd edition (cambridge, uk malden, ma: polity, 2017), 32; helen fessenden, “the limits of intelligence reform,” foreign affairs 84, no. 6 (2005): 106 20,. 118. 27charlie savage, “george w. bush made retroactive n.s.a. ‘fix’ after hospital room showdown,” new york times, september 21, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/us/politics/george w bush made retroactive nsa fix after hospital room showdown.html. 28savage, "george w. bush made retroactive n.s.a. ‘fix’ after hospital room showdown." 29brendan ballou, “why america’s nation building office failed and what congress had to do with it,” international journal of security and development, no. 1 (september 24, 2014): 3; bureau of public affairs department of state, the office of electronic information, “about s/crs” (september 18, 2008), https://2001 2009.state.gov/s/crs/c12936.htm. 30“pakistan’s support for the taliban: what to know,” council on foreign relations, august 15, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/article/pakistans support taliban what know. 31“afghanistan: karzai asks u.s. led coalition to change strategy against terrorism,” radio free europe, september 21, 2005, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/09/mil 050921 rferl01.htm. 32ali balci and murat yesiltas, “turkey’s new middle east policy: the case of the meeting of the foreign ministers of iraq’s neighboring countries,” journal of south asian and middle eastern studies 29, no. 4 (2006): 18. 33the associated press, “us, britain and spain abandon resolution,” global policy forum, march 17, 2003, https://archive.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/167 attack/35373.html. 34nicholas j. wheeler, “the bush doctrine: the dangers of american exceptionalism in a revolutionary age,” asian perspective (2003), 183 216. 212; ewen macaskill and julian borger, “iraq war was illegal and breached un charter, says annan,” the guardian, september 16, 2004, sec. world news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/16/iraq.iraq. 35“national security & human rights   amnesty international usa,” https://www.amnestyusa.org/issues/national security; “civil liberties after 9 11: the aclu defends freedom,” https://www.aclu.org/other/civil liberties after 9 11 aclu defends freedom. 36brendan w. mcgarry and emily m. morgenstern, “overseas contingency operations funding: background and status,” congressional research service, september 6, 2019, 10, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/r44519.pdf. 37heeley et al., “counterterrorism spending: protecting america while promoting efficiencies and accountability,” stimson, may 16, 2018, 5, https://www.stimson.org/wp content/files/file attachments/ct_spending_report_0.pdf. 38“washington post poll: attacks on afghanistan,” washington post, october 8, 2001, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp srv/politics/polls/vault/stories/data100801.htm. 39“washington post poll: attacks on afghanistan”; kevin pobst, “the aftereffects of september 11 what the polls tell us," social education 66, no. 2 (2002), http://www.socialstudies.org/sites/default/files/publications/se/6602/660204.html; “washington post abc news poll: start of iraqi war,” washington post abc news, march 21, 2003 https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp srv/politics/polls/vault/stories/data032103.htm. 40“washington post abc news poll: dept. of homeland security,” washington post abc news, june 11, 2002, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp srv/politics/polls/vault/stories/data061102.htm. 41christopher kojm, personal interview by sahil lauji, virtual, october 22, 2021; mann, rise of the vulcans, 299. 42bureau of public affairs, “the global war on terrorism: the first 100 days,” department of state, https://2001 2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/6947.htm. 43department of state, "the global war on terrorism.” christopher s. chivvis senior fellow and director, american statecraft program jennifer kavanagh former senior fellow, american statecraft program sahil lauji former james c. gaither junior fellow, american statecraft program adele malle former james c. gaither junior fellow, american statecraft program samuel orloff former james c. gaither junior fellow, american statecraft program stephen wertheim senior fellow, american statecraft program reid wilcox former research analyst the case studies presented in this report demonstrate that making major strategic change in u.s. foreign policy involves not just the white house but also the government bureaucracy, congress, the wider expert community, the public, and foreign actors. proponents of change need to account for all these actors to some degree in order to be successful. this chapter draws conclusions from the case studies and adds insights from other cases and relevant scholarly literature. it identifies practical lessons for future u.s. leaders and policymakers who seek to bring about major change in foreign policy. the chapter begins by explaining why crisis facilitates change and by exploring the implications of this finding. it then examines why various parts of the government bureaucracy tend to resist major changes, as they did in nearly every case. the chapter proposes three ways to encourage the bureaucracy to adopt change more willingly. next, the chapter explains why congress matters for strategic change, identifying the political conditions under which it is likely to support rather than resist change. the following sections examine the role of public opinion and the psychology of change, which suggest ways to convince the many stakeholders involved in foreign policy that change is needed. the chapter concludes by considering the limits of presidential power in making major changes in america’s role in the world, arguing that an incremental and reformist approach is likely to be most effective. the case studies show that crisis is a great driver and facilitator of change and that foreign policy leaders should have an idea of how they might use a crisis to open or foreclose opportunities to shift strategy. the case of 9/11 makes the importance of crises unmistakably clear, but international crises spurred change in the nsc 68 and vietnam war cases as well. there is truth in the adage “never let a good crisis go to waste.” crises generate policy plasticity, opening the door to strategic change. absent a crisis, a president seeking significant changes in foreign policy faces a much harder task. consider the impact of the outbreak of the korean war on u.s. cold war strategy. the hawkish global approach that nitze developed in nsc 68 initially faced opposition inside and outside the government. the plan was basically shelved in the spring of 1950, and it gained new life only when the korean war erupted in june. north korea’s invasion of south korea seemed to support nsc 68’s central claim that the united states could not afford to focus solely on competition with the soviet union in europe. the outbreak of the war also created a sense of urgency that nsc 68’s advocates used to turn their strategy into a reality. as a result, the united states adopted a more geographically expansive and military centered conception of how to wage the cold war. the 9/11 attacks provide an even more clear cut case of how a foreign policy crisis fosters major change. the terrorist attacks created so strong a national desire to punish al qaeda and to prevent another assault on american soil as to give the bush administration as close to a free hand in foreign policy as any presidency since the second world war. the white house used the crisis not just to put a higher priority on counterterrorism but also to increase defense spending and implement a neoconservative grand strategy aimed at building democracy in the middle east through military force. conversely, carter’s failed attempt to withdraw u.s. forces from south korea illustrates the difficulty of achieving significant change without a crisis to motivate and galvanize support for it. carter came into office on the heels of economic and foreign policy crises: the 1973 inflation spike and the vietnam war. the latter was one reason he wanted to reduce the u.s. military posture in asia by withdrawing forces from south korea. by the time he took office, however, these problems had lost intensity. support for withdrawal from south korea dissipated over time, and carter was eventually forced to shelve the idea. crisis is not always necessary for major change. the biden administration withdrew from afghanistan in 2021 in the absence of a foreign policy crisis. it decided to withdraw u.s. forces in the first year of the administration, during a honeymoon period when the president still enjoyed strong support from his own party and control of congress. the policy had also been pursued by trump, making it more difficult for republicans in congress to criticize the withdrawal harshly. by 2021, moreover, evidence that the united states was not achieving its stated objectives in afghanistan had piled up over the years, weakening resistance to change and making withdrawal popular among a large majority of the american public. why do crises facilitate change? one reason is that they tend to generate an emotional impetus for action, making people more likely to rethink their fundamental assumptions and goals. in a time of crisis, the public, congress, and the government bureaucracy yearn for a response. pressure for action is not always a good thing, because sometimes the best policy is to avoid taking action in the first place in other words, to do nothing but if the white house is aiming for a major change, a crisis generates a permissive atmosphere for change to gain traction. crises can also overwhelm existing beliefs with disconfirming information. in normal times, people tend to interpret facts according to existing mental frameworks rather than to revise the frameworks themselves. but a crisis can cause people to rethink assumptions if an existing framework has proven to be inadequate for understanding the world and generated harmful consequences.1 in addition, crises generate a sense of urgency, which can generate the momentum needed to overcome inertia. experts on change in businesses, for example, have pointed out that a sense of urgency can be essential to large scale change because it helps generate collective action.2 a crisis does not determine a particular policy response, however, even if it creates the emotional and psychological basis for change. even shocks like 9/11 or the korean war were interpreted in different ways and could have produced different policy outcomes. policy alternatives are always available. for example, in the case of 9/11, the choices to pursue the global war on terror and invade iraq were shaped by american strategic culture, preexisting threat perceptions of iraq, and other factors.3 during and after a crisis, policymakers will disagree about the causes of the crisis, the potential responses to it, and the relevant high order goals and interests at stake. some may see their own interests advanced or set back by the alternatives on offer. moreover, when a crisis has triggered strategic change, that change has often been conceived and proposed prior to the crisis. rather than emerging from the objective properties of a crisis itself, the “solution” as in the cases of nsc 68 and the invasion of iraq already existed as an idea and then gained acceptance out of a belief that the crisis would have been prevented or been easier to address had the strategic change been adopted earlier. still, there was certainly a relationship between foreign policy crises and the strategic changes they have produced. the korean war helped to strengthen the case for the globe spanning recommendations of nsc 68 because it was a crisis in asia, not europe. the 9/11 attacks resulted in changes aimed at addressing the new threat from terrorist organizations and actors in the middle east. any white house would have adopted a greater emphasis on terrorism, even though not all of the policies adopted by the bush administration were made inevitable by the 9/11 attacks themselves. nor will any foreign policy crisis be enough to generate major change. absent major external shocks, strategic change remains very difficult in u.s. foreign policy, where policies are often highly institutionalized and supported by many interests and groups in congress, the different government bureaucracies, the expert community, and the broader public. moreover, crises may facilitate certain types of change but not others. in most cases since the second world war, crises generally triggered a strong impulse to “do something,” leading to an expansion of u.s. programs and activities and causing a policy of restraint to receive little hearing. crises whether the korean war, the end of the cold war, or 9/11 are not normally conducive to disciplined foreign policy. most of the cases studies reveal the importance of bureaucratic resistance to change. sometimes, as when the military and civilian bureaucracies mounted a campaign against carter’s attempted drawdown in south korea, resistance succeeded. in other cases, resistance was thwarted, whether by the maneuvers of a small group within the bureaucracy, by secrecy in the white house, or by congressional and public pressure. the different government bureaucracies are essential instruments through which power must flow when presidents employ political, diplomatic, intelligence, and other forms of power. presidents cannot overlook or circumvent them when seeking to introduce foreign policy change.4 there is no diplomacy without the state department and no military action without the pentagon. strong bureaucracies make the united states more powerful and more capable but they are difficult to change and make change difficult. foreign policy bureaucracies are highly complex organizations that enjoy a great degree of independence and maintain deep relationships with congress and expert communities outside the government. they also have strong internal values, cultures, and perspectives on foreign policy. it is not surprising that they routinely pursue their own interests that transcend administrations and that they resist presidential orders to do things they have not been organized and programmed to do. obama, for example, entered the white house promising to close the u.s. detention facility at guantanamo bay, but he met staunch pushback from parts of the national security bureaucracy that successfully thwarted his plan.5 resistance varied across the government, but obama’s failure is evidence of how bureaucracies are conditioned to preserve the existing way of doing things in this case to preserve the policy that emerged after the 9/11 attacks. the trump administration also faced a great deal of bureaucratic pushback on foreign policy.6 trump tended to portray this obstacle as stemming from a nefarious “deep state” and a civil service dominated by political adversaries.7 parochial bureaucratic factors were probably more important.8 one reason bureaucracies resist change is fear that it will threaten their interests. the state and defense departments tend to resist change when they expect it will impose new requirements on them, constrain their budgets, damage their institutional influence within national security decisionmaking, or alter their basic mission. bureaucrats may also resist change if they worry it will be costly and cumbersome to implement. major foreign policy change inevitably requires new bureaucratic procedures and routines. these detract from existing ones that have advocates within the bureaucracy, all of whom will resist change. organizational culture is another source of resistance: bureaucracies have identities, and civil servants hold beliefs about their organization, its role, and why they do what they do.9 this gives them a sense of mission that drives their work. if the white house tries to implement a policy running counter to the organizational culture that animates a bureaucracy, resistance is almost certain. moreover, even when tasked to implement a strategy whose goals the bureaucracy largely accepts, officials still have a strong bias in favor of using existing capabilities to do so, even if these capabilities are not well suited to the task. officials will make the case for the appropriateness of their organization’s existing capabilities because they believe this is their job. they are unlikely to admit, or sometimes even recognize, that new policy objectives require new ways and means.10 for example, the united states’ tendency to turn to the military instrument is in part a reflection of the size of its military capabilities and of the pentagon relative to other foreign policy actors. the tendency of bureaucracies to cling to existing procedures and tools to implement new policies even when inappropriate is part of a larger principal agent problem that any white house faces in dealing with agencies such as the state department, the pentagon, and the intelligence community. the problem is that the president must delegate implementation to the bureaucracy, which has greater knowledge of and control over outcomes than the president. because it can be very hard for the principal to monitor implementation, the agent ends up with wide latitude to shape the policy. once the white house has decided to make a particular change in policy, it can prod, pressure, monitor, and cajole the different bureaucracies to do what it wants, but it cannot be totally sure of how much they will follow through.11 part of the problem arises from the fact that the expertise needed to implement a change in foreign policy can often be found only within the bureaucracy. presidents may understand the broad outlines of the foreign policy they seek but almost certainly lack the expertise to understand how to implement it. paradoxically, the more the white house draws on the expertise of the organizations required for implementation, such as the defense department, the more it will import the culture and aims of that organization into the policy, and the less likely change will occur.12 bureaucracies have several means at their disposal to push back against change they dislike.13 for one, officials may directly defy orders. this stark approach, however, comes with many risks and is not always effective. for example, the many resignations from the state department during the trump administration had little effect on white house policy.14 they may even have been welcomed by an administration that wanted to gut the bureaucracy. alternatively, simply not acting on orders or acting very slowly  “slow rolling” is a less risky and more effective strategy. for example, the defense department repeatedly slow rolled trump’s orders to withdraw u.s. forces from syria, where they remained when he left office.15 the department, which had spent blood and treasure fighting there for years, saw these orders as precipitous and capricious, and so military leaders leveraged their knowledge of operational realities to delay and obstruct what the president wanted. bureaucracies can also leak negative information to the press, work with allies in congress to undermine policy objectives, encourage expert networks outside government to attack the white house, and appeal to special interests to fight against change.16 in the current polarized and sensationalist political environment, there will almost always be an appetite for leaks in the media and a willing and powerful set of interests ready to take advantage to hinder new policy or just score partisan political points. bureaucratic resistance to change has led to some experts to warn about the emergence of a “deep state” that thwarts the objectives of democratically elected presidents.17 this charge can be misleading because the government bureaucracy is unlikely ever to act as a united front in opposition to or support of white house objectives.18 different agencies stand to lose or gain from policy change in different ways, so resistance will vary accordingly. it will vary even within some larger bureaucracies, such as the department of defense, or across the multiple agencies that comprise the u.s. intelligence community. a key element of successful management of the bureaucracy will therefore always be the advance identification of where these areas of resistance or advocacy are likely to lie, so that the resistance can be neutralized and the advocates empowered. when bureaucratic resistance to policy change is soundly rooted in legal statutes, there is little the white house can do to overcome it. many statutes, though, leave room for interpretation by attorneys in the different bureaucracies themselves or in the office of legal counsel at the department of justice. in theory, replacing those who make interpretations contradicting a proposed change would be one way to overcome resistance. but such a gambit would be ethically questionable and likely to face legal challenges. fortunately, there are other ways to make bureaucracies go along with change. the first and most important way is through political appointments. all administrations appoint political allies to key positions in the different government bureaucracies, and there are several thousand such appointees in the executive branch overall. they can change the agencies to make them comply better with the president’s agenda rather than their own.19 political appointees can also help overcome resistance to change by shifting around managers with entrenched views. there are limitations, however, to the use of political appointments. although it might seem that appointing a larger number of officials to the bureaucracies will increase the white house’s control over their behavior, it can be difficult to find people who are loyal and ready to embrace change as well as qualified to implement change. political campaigns attract loyal outside experts but do not ensure their competence as experts and government officials. those who possess the expertise needed to understand, reform, and reorganize bureaucracies are more likely to hold views similar to those bureaucracies and hence be less suited to implementing changes, even when they are politically loyal to the president. conversely, appointees who are loyal to the president and share the administration’s desire for change may be less likely to have the specialized knowledge and authority needed to be effective in pressing for bureaucratic change. some appointees, meanwhile, are chosen for reasons other than their loyalty and competence in the job. plum ambassadorial appointments, for example, are often a payback for large campaign donors. as a result, at least some political appointees will lack the policy knowledge, management, or persuasion skills required to change the bureaucracies to which they are assigned. the second method is to empower the nsc staff to drive the change. some presidents prefer to use the nsc in a coordinating role between the agencies, others as one of the main drivers of policy. a coordinating nsc may encourage continuity rather than change because the different bureaucracies it coordinates are unlikely to produce policies that push far beyond their existing capabilities, interests, and views. therefore, an nsc empowered to direct foreign policy is often necessary for driving any significant change in direction. yet empowering the nsc to do more than coordinate policy poses institutional challenges. nsc staff can intimidate, cajole, and reward their counterparts in the different bureaucracies, but they lack direct authority over them. deputy assistant secretaries, assistant secretaries, and undersecretaries take their orders from the cabinet officials at the top of their departments, not from the white house. and even skilled and experienced nsc staffers are likely to lack the technical expertise needed to convincingly translate white house aims into specific actions the bureaucracy must undertake. alternatively, appointing to the nsc people who have the expertise needed to direct the bureaucracies means choosing staff that come from within the bureaucracy and thus share its values and culture to some degree. empowering the nsc to take an activist role also tends to degrade the capacity of overburdened nsc staff for the strategic analysis needed for sound foreign policy.20 the third solution is to persuade the bureaucracy of the need for change and to dedicate presidential and cabinet attention to the task. presidents committed to change will have to use their political capital and powers of persuasion. the white house communications staff will be focused on selling any major change to the public and the congressional liaison staff will do the same for congress, but presidential persuasion must also be directed at the bureaucracy. the white house needs to design an internal campaign aimed at convincing the civil service that the change is needed and nonthreatening, even if the effort cannot be expected to win over all the parts of a change averse bureaucracy. it should also frame the change in terms of the losses that the status quo creates not only for the nation but also for the specific groups that must carry out the change.21 a sustained effort at communication by the president and also the vice president, the national security adviser, and the secretaries of defense and state in the form of speeches, memos, and visits to the departments will pay dividends in bringing about the new foreign policy. ideally, this effort will identify internal influencers within the bureaucracy who can be won over to change. crucially, major foreign policy change will be much easier in periods of fiscal largesse. fear of losing funding is a central motivator for bureaucracies and a key reason they resist change. when there is enough money to go around and fewer budgetary fights, they are less inclined to fear change and more inclined to embrace it. a corollary is that a change aimed at reducing foreign policy spending will be inherently more difficult to achieve than one that is spending neutral or increases spending. this is an important conundrum for those who seek to reduce u.s. spending on foreign policy, whether on defense, diplomacy, or foreign aid. what is more, bureaucracies are likely to change slowly, especially in the absence of a major crisis to spur them on. pushing them too hard can be counterproductive. the culture of the government bureaucracy is deeply rooted and nearly impossible to overturn within the time frame even of a two term presidency. the difficulty of changing organizational culture is one reason why experts advise companies against attempting far reaching changes and instead recommend focusing on altering tasks and processes.22 there are always positive aspects of organizational culture, and holding these strengths up for praise while focusing on eliminating a few problematic aspects will have a higher chance of success.23 trying to circumvent the government bureaucracy by consolidating decisionmaking in a small group and acting in secrecy, as the nixon white house did, can easily backfire. the trump administration anticipated resistance from the bureaucracy but ended up generating or exacerbating it, sometimes by acting in secrecy and other times by acting too publicly, for example, by announcing policy via twitter before consulting with the bureaucracies. the president placed tight groups of political appointees at the top of agencies like the state department and dni, who then insulated themselves from their organizations. by attempting to circumvent the bulk of the agencies that it needed to implement its foreign policy, the administration tended to increase the likelihood of the bureaucracy to work against it. firing bureaucrats in large numbers is also unlikely to work. there is no ready reservoir of competent civil servants to fill relatively low paying jobs in the bureaucracy, especially if one of the main benefits of these positions job security is removed. congress is often assumed to be impotent in performing its constitutional duties on foreign policy. by this logic, any effort to bring about strategic change might as well ignore the legislative branch. but this view is a partial truth at best. discussions of strategy too often ignore congress’s crucial role in strategic change. congressional support was an important factor in overcoming bureaucratic objections to nato enlargement, whereas congressional opposition amplified bureaucratic resistance in the case of carter’s failed attempt to withdraw forces from south korea. under the constitution, congress possesses extensive powers to make foreign policy, including the right to declare war, raise military forces, levy taxes, impose tariffs, appropriate funds, advise and consent on treaties, and confirm high level appointments in the foreign policy bureaucracy. yet by the 1970s many lamented the lack of power congress exerted over the white house on foreign policy. the war powers act of 1973 was intended to limit to ninety days the executive’s use of military force without the authorization of the legislative branch, but congress has yet to invoke it to get a significant ongoing military operation to stop.24 the presidency emerged even more dominant during the george w. bush administration, when the executive branch claimed sweeping prerogatives and congress diminished its own influence by swiftly authorizing an open ended war on terror.25 congress has still not revoked the war authorizations that it passed in 2001 and 2002. recent scholarship, however, sets out ways in which congress sometimes has more influence on foreign policy than it appears. legislators can and regularly do exert influence through indirect and direct means.26 when it comes to foreign policy, relations between congress and the executive better resemble a tug of war than a one way street.27 congressional power over foreign policy is most limited during a crisis, when the executive branch has the proverbial ball. this is particularly true in the early stages, when the white house has access to more intelligence and information and the ability to deploy forces into the field, thus changing the objective circumstances. at that point, fear of being charged with a lack of patriotism in a crisis encourages many members of congress to hold back criticism and support the president.28 congress’s limited power during national security crises may help explain why its influence is sometimes thought to be so low. in a crisis, public attention is at its highest, events are dramatic, the focus is on the white house, and congress is relegated to the sidelines. as the initial drama fades, however, congress can become better informed by holding hearings and examining intelligence. it can also evaluate the results to date of the president’s approach. congressional leaders may then grow bolder and more willing to stand up to the president. in recent years, congress has asserted its influence through other methods besides providing advice and consent on treaties and exercising its constitutional authority to declare war.29 instead, congress may affect public opinion when leaders speak for or against specific elements of the administration’s foreign policy, as occurred with increases and decreases in troop levels during the afghanistan and iraq wars. congress may also debate legislation that is critical of the administration’s policy or hold hearings aimed at pressuring the white house to change course.30 one should not exaggerate the impact of congressional hearings or of the statements of congressional leaders, but these actions make a difference by raising public awareness and increasing the political costs for the white house of persisting with an unpopular foreign policy.31 congress is in some ways more potent when the scale of policy change is large and u.s. ground troops are not in harm’s way. it can use the “power of the purse” and its statutory authority to change the structure of agencies and thus affect their absolute or relative power. for example, congress could try to deemphasize the role of military force and strengthen diplomacy by increasing the state department budget. or it could seek to slow or even halt the growth in the defense budget in an effort to promote rationalization within the defense department or reduce its influence, as the obama administration did with the policy of “sequestration.” rebalancing spending away from defense and toward diplomacy has of course been hard to do, historically, even when supported by pentagon leaders, but it is within the power of the legislative branch. when it comes to budgetary supplementals, such as the legislation that has been passed to assist ukraine, congress may be able to have a greater influence than in cases where budgets have been in place for many years. congress also can affect the policies and capabilities of the agencies by funding new programs within them, or it can even create, dismantle, or rearrange agencies. congress has sometimes forced such rearrangements on the executive, as the republican controlled congress did in the 1990s when it consolidated the arms control and disarmament agency and u.s. information agency into the state department. although often seen as quiescent after 9/11, congress was instrumental in designing and passing the legislation that turned counterterrorism into the focus of u.s. foreign policy. as noted, it passed two major authorizations for the use of military force that supported the bush administration’s change in strategy, as well as key pieces of legislation that reshaped the national security bureaucracy, including the patriot act, the homeland security act, and the intelligence reform and terrorism prevention act. congress also used its budgetary power to increase and reorient national security budgets toward the new global war on terrorism. congress has the capacity to promote strategic change yet often remains passive or obstructs change. under what conditions might it choose to support strategic change, and under which conditions might it oppose change? congress contains many sources of resistance to change. there are bound to be a variety of different views in the 535 member body, and even within the two parties, but the tendency to support the status quo is usually strong. human psychology resists change (see later discussion). members of congress have often made public commitments to uphold important aspects of the prevailing consensus, especially if they occupy positions that are important for change, such as seats on appropriations or other relevant committees. changing their position opens them up to charges of inconsistency, at least absent a major crisis or an upheaval in public opinion. and even if members of congress agree with the need for change, they may not care enough about foreign policy to spend precious political capital on it. especially in the house of representatives, whose members face reelection every two years, it may be too risky to spend political capital on anything other than domestic issues of importance to constituents.32 congressional resistance to change is bolstered by members who have self interested political reasons for supporting the status quo, such as retaining military bases or weapons production plants in their district or state. the importance of the defense industry to some areas has created a constituency in congress that has a major interest in maintaining specific weapons programs and high defense spending overall. maintaining them can be of existential importance for these members,33 who will resist any change in foreign policy that requires a change in force structure and pentagon acquisitions. by contrast, the cost of defense spending is spread across the entire nation. this diffuse interest does not strongly incentivize particular members of congress to push for cuts. moreover, even when members believe change is needed, partisan political motivations may trump their personal views. presidents seeking strategic change are unlikely to obtain cooperation from congress when that body is controlled by the opposition party. they could attempt to overcome congressional opposition through a massive expenditure of political capital and disciplined prioritization of foreign policy over all other goals, but they are unlikely to try either of these routes unless the country is engaged in a politically salient war. by the same token, congress is also unlikely to push a president toward an alternative foreign policy when the two branches of government are united under the same party’s control. members do not wish to create political problems for the white house or fall out of favor within their party. even when government is united, then, presidents need to spend time and political capital to convince congress to support change, as their party is unlikely to offer unqualified backing. notwithstanding these sources of resistance, congress can have a strong incentive to press for change when government is divided, especially when the majority party in congress seeks change and the white house opposes it. in this scenario, congress will be free to impose costs and constraints on the president. this began to happen when the democrats took control of congress in 2006 and agitated for changes in bush’s approach to the war in iraq, thus helping to sow the seeds of america’s eventual withdrawal. forcing change on a reluctant president is difficult due to the challenge of collective action (especially given the limited salience of foreign policy), the intricacies of the legislative process, and the two third majorities needed to overcome a presidential veto. nevertheless, moments of disunity in government may offer opportunities for the promotion of new foreign policy ideas that challenge the status quo. public opinion sometimes plays a major role in strategic change. in the case of the vietnam war, a swell of public outrage was a key factor in bringing about a u.s. withdrawal and other strategic adjustments. similarly, in the case of 9/11, the public clamored for revenge against al qaeda. in such cases where public opinion is activated and cannot easily be quelled, change becomes almost inevitable. in other cases, however, public opinion is not a decisive factor. ordinary americans often have some interest in and knowledge of an issue, but their opinion proves malleable. for example, many americans sought to contain defense spending after the second world war, and the authors of nsc 68 were concerned that public sentiment might prevent congress from approving higher levels of defense spending. however, the truman administration successfully convinced the public that the global threat of communism required a major military buildup. similarly, in the cases of nato enlargement and carter’s failed withdrawal from south korea, americans were largely uninterested, and the general public played little role. scholarship points to three main drivers of public opinion. the first is self interest. the rational activist model holds that citizens form reasonable opinions based on their financial and other interests.34 this model assumes that citizens have the time and resources to follow politics, and that the media they consume is balanced and accurate. the second driver is party affiliation. in the political parties model, citizens take on the political views of the main groups with which they affiliate, and in the united states political parties provide the most relevant affiliations. here citizens do not carefully form independent opinions but instead choose the party that better represents their views, and then they tend to absorb many of the opinions voiced by members of their party.35 whereas the rational activist model places a high burden on citizens to take the time to form opinions on an array of issues, the political parties model requires them only to choose their party affiliation. the third driver is elite influence. walter lippman’s classic work public opinion contends that most americans derive their political opinions from “what others have reported.”36 these “others” have a particular interest and expertise in the relevant area and communicate their views to the mass public. this group of experts is broadly defined as “political elites,” which include politicians, journalists, officials, activists, and specialists.37 these three drivers of public opinion often overlap. for example, when citizens form an opinion after listening to a speech by a politician from the party they support, the political party model and the elite influence model operate simultaneously. a politician may also influence the opinion of citizens who support another political party, per the rational activist model and elite influence model. these models indicate the circumstances under which public opinion is likely to be most activated and become a major factor in strategic change. the rational activist model suggests that public opinion is activated when a particular policy has a direct effect on the self interest of a large part of the public.38 this model helps to explain the permissive political environment after 9/11, when many americans perceived global terrorism as a direct threat to their security and therefore supported a military response. the truman administration offers another example of the relevance the rational activist model. truman’s initial anxiety that a tax increase to fund nsc 68’s recommendations would activate u.s. public opinion against a military buildup indicated his awareness of the potency of self interest as a driver of public opinion. his decision to conduct a campaign to convince americans that communism posed a real threat to their security also shows how elite messaging can influence public opinion. policies that do not directly affect large segments of the citizenry are less likely to activate public opinion.39 most americans have limited time for international politics, and the media focuses primarily on domestic politics and events.40 a foreign policy issue must break through the attention barrier in order to activate public opinion. this happens when there is partisan debate or when there is significant discussion in the media among political elites.41 in the cases of carter’s intended withdrawal from south korea and of clinton’s enlargement of nato, the issue never broke through the attention barrier. partisan issues can break through the attention barrier because they attract media attention and because staunchly partisan citizens are likely to follow what their party representatives say and do. americans who strongly identify with a political party liberal democrats and conservative republicans are more likely to answer questions about foreign policy accurately.42 this finding suggests that partisanship can activate public opinion only among those americans with a strong party affiliation. for instance, in the years following 9/11, some democratic leaders cautioned against invading iraq, thus activating the segment of the public with strong democratic leanings, but not enough of the public to stop the 2003 invasion.43 debates among political elites including journalists, activists, and specialists can also activate public opinion on foreign policy issues as long as they play out in the open.44 media plays a significant role in shaping public opinion when it covers these debates. even when the media does not tell viewers exactly what to think, “it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.”45 for example, elite discussion in mass media played a key role in forming opposition to the vietnam war. as nixon put it, “the american news media had come to dominate domestic opinion about its purpose and conduct . . . in each night’s tv news and each morning’s paper the war was reported battle by battle . . . more than ever before, television showed the terrible human suffering and sacrifice of war.”46 making major change in foreign policy requires many actors in the process to change a number of their beliefs. strategic change often entails prioritizing some values over others, adopting new explanations for a problem, or even altering basic assumptions about how the world works. it means admitting at least some error. this makes change psychologically uncomfortable for many and extremely so for some. like anyone else, policymakers and experts can go to great lengths to make facts conform to their theories about a problem, rather than adjusting these theories in the face of new evidence. politics, careerism, and human sociability compound this psychological effect. politicians, for one, normally seek to be consistent over time in their policy commitments and views, lest they be accused of flip flopping or not standing for anything. political leaders can and do admit error, but doing so can be costly in a competitive political environment. where there is partisan rancor over foreign policy, it is hard for politicians to change course because doing so will open them up to “i told you so” attacks from political opponents. this suggests that the partisanship that dominates american politics today will make it more difficult for individual presidents to change foreign policy than in previous eras. foreign policy experts also sometimes go to great lengths to avoid admitting mistakes for practical reasons, especially because doing so is almost never career enhancing. younger ones less committed to status quo views are potential advocates of change, but careerism can easily dampen their will to act as such if it means taking on powerful interests in washington or abroad. because the foreign policy elite is separated from other professional communities and relatively detached from interest group and party politics, its members are incentivized to maintain good relations with one another in order to retain employment as they move in and out of government. this tendency toward stasis is compounded by human sociability, which in most foreign policy circles encourages conforming to the status quo. conformism has upsides: foreign policy implementation is a complex, cooperative effort, and it would be disastrous if everyone attempted to pursue their own personal preferences. but a strong status quo bias from the desire for social acceptance is counterproductive in situations where there is a serious need for change. this may be one reason it took an outsider, trump, to break the taboo on criticizing the u.s. effort to defeat the taliban and rebuild afghanistan. for these reasons, if changing course requires facing up to past mistakes and overcoming a sense of lost time, resources, or personnel, then change is unlikely at least as long as the people who made those mistakes remain in charge of policy. overwhelming and credible evidence is needed to get those who are committed to an existing policy course to change their views, and mustering this evidence can take a long time. the sunk cost fallacy has been much studied in business. it is widely recognized that investors and managers have a strong, irrational tendency to stay the course once a particular investment of time, money, or effort has been made, even as losses mount. the problem gets worse as the magnitude of losses grows: the greater the sunk costs, the more effort people tend to put into defending the old course. in foreign policy, some scholars have used loss aversion to explain why the united states stayed the course in vietnam even as the evidence of failure piled up.47 this psychology appears to have been at play in the defense department’s handling of its training program for afghan national security forces in the decade prior to the 2021 u.s. withdrawal. for years, the pentagon insisted that it was making progress in training these forces, but those reports turned out to have been much exaggerated. the officers who wrote and approved them probably sought to ensure the programs could continue, lest the lack of progress come to light.48 the more money spent, the more it mattered that the program succeeded. no one at the department of defense set out to spend billions on an unsuccessful program, much less to dissimulate results from policymakers and the public. but once the sunk cost fallacy set in, it became difficult to change course and tempting to exaggerate progress and minimize setbacks. the upshot is that strategic change is more likely to be realized if framed as a way to prevent losses from the status quo than to reap gains from change. a new strategy that offers the possibility of clear gains at the risk of clear losses is unlikely to convince policymakers to change their views and embrace it. but a novel approach that reduces the risk of losses, even if it also forecloses the opportunity for gains, may find a more receptive audience. opponents of change, for their part, can succeed by focusing on the risk of losses, whether of security, power, wealth, or prestige. they can thereby block a proposed change, even one that is likely to bring about gains in those same areas. many think of the president as enjoying far reaching foreign policy and national security powers, a view popularized by arthur m. schlesinger jr., who coined the term “imperial presidency” in the 1970s.49 but recent scholarship paints a more complex picture of the powers of the president when it comes to foreign policy one that many who have served in the executive may find closer to reality. few would dispute that the president has far greater powers in acting “beyond the water’s edge” than domestically. but even in foreign policy, the white house operates under many legal, procedural, and especially political constraints.50 congress, interest groups, the government bureaucracies, and the public can all influence policy and inhibit presidential ambitions. the right to direct the military might of the pentagon makes presidents extremely powerful, but their latitude to use that military capacity (like any other capacity) remains circumscribed. more important, the power of the president is considerably diminished when it comes to large scale strategic change. it is one thing to be able to send forces into battle with the stroke of a pen, but it is another to alter the fundamental approach and posture of the united states in the world. the level of difficulty rises with the level of ambition; the larger the strategic change, the more the president’s constraints approach those in domestic policy. the long standing idea that there are “two presidencies”51 one for foreign policy and one for domestic policy begins to break down. every president comes into office with some amount of political capital, gained through the campaign, past experience, the support of key groups, and other factors. more often than not, the white house wants to hold much of this political capital in reserve for domestic policy initiatives, and an incoming president’s foreign policy team is likely to discover that their ideas play second fiddle to domestic issues. a crisis might help to focus attention on the shortcomings of the prevailing strategy, but even then, the president probably will not spend most of his or her political capital on foreign policy. moreover, if the chances of successfully changing foreign policy are not high, the president may be unwilling to spend political capital in the first place, lest failure diminish his or her stature and make it more difficult to move forward on other fronts. moreover, modern presidents find the time for action to be quite limited. the clock starts ticking upon arrival in office, and most administrations feel they have very little time to accomplish many things. in their second year, the midterm elections loom, and a year beyond that the next presidential election campaign kicks off. while this can help focus minds on top priorities, foreign policy changes are rarely top priorities, and far reaching strategic changes take time.52 the biden administration’s withdrawal from afghanistan was possible in part because it took place so early in the president’s term. if the foregoing lessons indicate anything, they indicate how difficult bringing about major changes in u.s. foreign policy can be. for example, successive administrations have struggled to shift foreign policy to focus on asia, a shift that both republican and democratic administrations have now embraced for over a decade. a common explanation for the challenge in bringing this shift about is that enduring events around the world, especially conflicts in europe and the middle east, have prevented it. from this perspective, exogenous forces for example, terrorists, failed states, iran’s nuclear weapons program, or russian aggression have forced the united states to remain a globe spanning military power. there is no question that the global environment inevitably shapes and constrains u.s. foreign policy and strategy, but this report shows these external effects do not tell the whole story. overseas events are filtered through an extensive and complex system that governs the making of u.s. foreign policy and is intellectually, politically, and bureaucratically coded to respond robustly to crises in many parts of the world. that system is inherently resistant to change. the biden administration has consistently maintained that its priority lies in asia and that china is the “pacing threat” of the u.s. military, yet it has expended massive political, financial, and military capital in supporting ukraine and israel in their respective conflicts. clearly, events in both countries played an indispensable role, but so did the deeper institutional, ideational, and psychological forces described in this report. in europe, the calm biden officials hoped for was shattered by an external crisis. nevertheless, the administration’s response to that crisis has been to expand america’s security role in europe and thereby create a new status quo in which the united states has a deep and costly commitment to ukraine. the crisis itself was not of america’s making, and the biden administration’s response to it was shaped by a complicated set of factors that include the president’s belief that the world is divided between autocracy and democracy and his desire to reassure european allies of the u.s. commitment to their security. but america’s strategy toward the war in ukraine was also a consequence of forces that this report examines, including the cadre of europe experts in washington who have sought for decades to bring ukraine into the west, strongly identify with america’s nato allies, and resist changing nato’s modus operandi, such as its open door policy and its stated aspiration to admit ukraine eventually.53 in the middle east, the administration successfully overcame internal and external resistance to ending u.s. involvement in the war in afghanistan, but on other issues it has gone in the opposite direction from its initial intentions. an administration that once sought to right size the u.s. role in the region is now proposing that the united states sign a binding security treaty with saudi arabia. as with ukraine, the dynamics behind this policy are of course complex, but the policy reversal is strongly indicative of the inertial forces examined in this report. over the course of the past twenty years, the united states has built up a very significant set of middle east interests inside and outside the u.s. government, thanks in large part to the global war on terror. middle east experts tend to view their region as integral to u.s. foreign policy. they naturally develop policy recommendations that assume or entrench the centrality of the region to broader u.s. strategy, and they often attribute immense value to america’s security partnerships in the region. the resulting inertial forces help explain the administration’s reluctance to draw down u.s. forces in central command aside from the withdrawal from afghanistan, its deep commitment to aiding the israeli government’s military response to the hamas terrorist attacks on october 7, 2023, and its enthusiasm for a security treaty with saudi arabia. in contrast with the case of the war in ukraine, in which moral and ideological factors explain a portion of u.s. policy, the biden administration’s middle east policy is best understood as a consequence of institutionalized bureaucratic, congressional, and public views on the region. the factors examined in this report, therefore, play a role in explaining the difficulties that the administration has encountered in turning its focus to asia. this is not to say that the biden white house has accorded a low priority to asia: to the contrary, the administration has worked energetically to bolster alliances and partnerships in the indo pacific, win the u.s. china technology competition, and since 2023 strengthen diplomatic contacts with beijing. but u.s. resources, including the time and energy of the president and his most senior foreign policy officials, have often been diverted elsewhere. these diversions would have been greater were it not for the facts that there is bipartisan support for countering china in congress and that the department of defense has now taken china to be its main adversary for nearly a decade. the obstacles to change, and the challenge of overcoming them, were even clearer during the preceding four years under trump. in his term, trump sought to reduce the extent to which the united states underwrote european security and engaged in major military operations in the greater middle east. on both counts, he encountered major resistance from the national security bureaucracy, congress, and foreign policy elites. trump has promised to take a more aggressive approach if he is elected president in 2024. as media outlets and think tanks have highlighted, he might seek to replace large numbers of civil servants with party loyalists.54 as discussed above, however, this method has real limitations. the process of replacing large numbers of civil servants would not only take time and be messy but would also result in less effective bureaucracies. if a second trump administration were to replace 500 mid level intelligence managers with 500 mid level managers from corporate america, u.s. intelligence collection and analysis would likely suffer for most of his term in office. eventually, the replacements might learn their jobs. in the process, though, they might acquire some of the same views as their predecessors. in addition, the trump administration could struggle to find senior and mid level officials who share a commitment to change u.s. foreign policy in a particular way. trump aligned foreign policy experts are divided into several competing foreign policy camps,55 so even if his administration were able to find and install in government a large number of foreign policy officials who are loyal to the president and bureaucratically competent, they might not be able to adopt a coherent program of strategic change. ultimately, it may be that american strategy is influenced at least as much by domestic context as by the pressures of global context, especially the institutional, political, and intellectual forces that act on the foreign policy establishment. only the most adamant devotee of the neorealist school of international relations would deny that domestic affairs influence foreign policy. but internal factors may be even more important than scholars have thought. without major shocks to the system, external events are filtered through the existing strategic paradigm, one that several scholars of the post cold war period have called liberal hegemony or primacy, and through the political and bureaucratic institutions that have supported that paradigm.56 with planning, political will, the right conditions, and the right crisis, however, change is possible even if it takes time. 1charles f. hermann, “changing course: when governments choose to redirect foreign policy,” international studies quarterly 34, no. 1 (march 1990): 13. 2john p. kotter, “leading change: why transformation efforts fail,” harvard business review, may june 1995, https://hbr.org/1995/05/leading change why transformation efforts fail 2; david a. garvin and michael a. roberto, “change through persuasion” harvard business review, february 2005, https://hbr.org/2005/02/change through persuasion. 3michael j. mazarr, leap of faith: hubris, negligence, and america's greatest foreign policy tragedy (new york: publicaffairs, 2019). 4stephen ross, “the economic theory of agency: the principal’s problem,” the american economic review, 63, no. 2, (1973), 134 39, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1817064. 5connie bruck, “why obama has failed to close guantanamo,” new yorker, august 1, 2016, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/08/01/why obama has failed to close guantanamo; aziz z. huq, “the president and the detainees,” university of pennsylvania law review 175, no. 793, (2017): 497. 6jeffrey gettleman, “state dept. dissent cable on trump’s ban draws 1,000 signatures,” new york times, january 31, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/world/americas/state dept dissent cable trumpimmigration order. 7joel d. aberbach and bert a. rockman, “clashing beliefs within the executive branch: the nixon administration bureaucracy,” american political science review 70, no. 2, (1976); richard l. cole and david a. caputo, “presidential control of the senior civil service: assessing the strategies of the nixon years,” american political science review 73, no. 2, (1979): 399 409; jim eisenmann, “trump’s plan to gut the civil service,” lawfare (blog), december 8, 2020; and jonathan lemire, “trump white house sees ‘deep state’ behind leaks, opposition,” associated press, january 14, 2017, https://apnews.com/363ccdba946548bfa4b855ae38d1797a/trump white house sees %22deep state%22 behind opposition leaks. 8graham allison, essence of decision: explaining the cuban missile crisis (london: pearson ptr, 1999), 145. 9allison, essence of decision, 153. 10allison, essence of decision, 176 177. 11on nsc efforts to control the bureaucracies see john gans, white house warriors: how the national security council transformed the american way of war (new york, ny: norton, 2019). 12terry moe, “the politics of bureaucratic structure,” in john chubb and paul peterson, can the government govern?, (washington d.c.: brookings institution press, 1989). 13for one recent list of the options see, jennifer nou, “bureaucratic resistance from below,” yale journal on regulation (2016), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/bureaucratic resistance from below by jennifer nou/. 14david a. graham, “trump’s hollowed out state department,” the atlantic, january 26, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/state department resignations/514550. 15katie bo williams, “outgoing syria envoy admits hiding us troop numbers,” defense one, november 13, 2020, https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2020/11/outgoing syria envoy admits hiding us troop numbers praisestrumps mideast record/170012. 16andrew rudalevige, managing the president's program: presidential leadership and legislative policy formulation (princeton, nj: princeton university press, 2002); david e. pozen, “the leaky leviathan: why the government condemns and condones unlawful disclosures of information,” harvard law review (2013). 17marc ambinder and d.b. grady, deep state: inside the government secrecy industry (hoboken: wiley, 2013); mike lofgren, the deep state: the fall of the constitution and the rise of a shadow government (new york, ny: penguin, 2016), 34 36; peggy noonan, “the deep state,” wall street journal, october 28, 2013, https://blogs.wsj.com/peggynoonan/2013/10/28/the deep state. 18rebecca ingber, bureaucratic resistance and the national security state (iowa city: u. of iowa college of law, 2018). 19david lewis, the politics of presidential appointments: political control and bureaucratic performance (princeton, nj: princeton university press, 2008). 20john gans, “if you fear the deep state, history explains why,” the atlantic, may 12, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/05/how national security council got so powerful/589273. 21john s. hammond, ralph l. keeney, and howard raiffa, “the hidden traps in decision making,” harvard business review, january 2006, https://hbr.org/2006/01/the hidden traps in decision making. 22michael beer, russell a. eisenstadt, bert spector, “why change programs don’t produce change,” harvard business review, november 1990, https://hbr.org/1990/11/why change programs dont produce change; jay w. lorsch and emily mctague, “culture is not the culprit,” harvard business review, april 2016, https://hbr.org/2016/04/culture is not the culprit. 23jon r katzenbach, ilona steffen, and caroline kronley, “cultural change that sticks,” harvard business review, july august 2012, https://hbr.org/2012/07/cultural change that sticks. 24ellen collier and richard grimmett, “the war powers resolution: concepts and practice”, congressional research service, r42699 (2019), 64; mark landler and peter baker, "trump vetoes measure to force end to u.s. involvement in yemen war," new york times, april 16, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/16/us/politics/trump veto yemen.html. 25norman j. orenstein and thomas e. mann, “when congress checks out,” foreign affairs, november 1, 2006, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united states/2006 11 01/when congress checks out. 26william howell and jon pevehouse, while dangers gather: congressional checks on presidential war powers (princeton, nj; princeton university press, 2007); howell and pevehouse, “presidents, congress and the use of force,” international organization 59, no. 1 (winter 2005), 209 232; james m. lindsay, congress and the politics of u.s. foreign policy (johns hopkins university press, 1994); james m. lindsay, “congress, foreign policy, and the new institutionalism,” international studies quarterly 38, no. 2 (1994): 281 304; david johnson, congress and the cold war (cambridge university press: 2006). 27jeremy rosner, the new tug of war: congress, the executive branch, and national security (washington, dc: carnegie endowment for international peace, 1995); rebecca hersman, friends and foes: how congress and the president really make foreign policy (washington, d.c.: brookings, 2001). 28douglas kriner, after the rubicon: congress, presidents, and the politics of waging war (chicago, il: university of chicago press, 2010). 29for a defense of presidential supremacy in matters of war and peace, see john yoo, the powers of war and peace: the constitution and foreign affairs after 9/11 (chicago, il: university of chicago press, 2005). for a defense of congressional authority see harold koh, the national security constitution: sharing power after the iran contra affair (new haven, ct: yale university press, 1990). 30douglas kriner, “presidents, domestic politics, and the international arena” in george edwards and william howell, the oxford handbook of the american presidency (oxford, u.k.: oxford university press, 2009). 31douglas l. kriner, after the rubicon, (chicago, il: the university of chicago, 2010), 7. 32see the skeptic of congressional power in foreign affairs: barbara hinkley, less than meets the eye (chicago, il: university of chicago press, 1994). 33rebecca thorpe, the american warfare state: the domestic politics of military spending (chicago, il: university of chicago press, 2014). 34robert s. erikson and kent l. tedin, american public opinion: its origins, content, and impact, 10th edition (new york: routledge, 2019), 19. 35erikson and tedin, american public opinion, 20. 36walter lippmann, public opinion, reissue edition (new york: free press, 1997), 59. 37john r. zaller, the nature and origins of mass opinion, (cambridge, uk: cambridge university press, 1992), 6. 38philip j. powlick and andrew z. katz, “defining the american public opinion/foreign policy nexus,” mershon international studies review 41, no. 1, (may 1998), 36. 39powlick and katz, “defining the american public opinion/foreign policy nexus,” 36. 40powlick and katz, “defining the american public opinion/foreign policy nexus,” 31. 41zaller, the nature and origins of mass opinion, 97. 42laura silver, christine huang, laura clancy, aidan connaughton and sneha gubbala, “what do americans know about international affairs?,” pew research, may 25, 2022, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2022/05/25/what do americans know about international affairs. 43caroline smith and james m. lindsay, “rally ‘round the flag: opinion in the united states before and after the iraq war,” the brookings institution, june 1, 2003, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/rally round the flag opinion in the united states before and after the iraq war. 44powlick and katz, “defining the american public opinion/foreign policy nexus,” 39. 45bernard c. cohen, the press and foreign policy, (princeton: princeton university press, 1963), 13. 46richard nixon, the memoirs (new york: grosset & dunlap, 1978), 350. 47david a. welch, painful choices: a theory of foreign policy change (princeton university press, 2011), 44. 48see craig whitlock, “at war with the truth,” washington post, december 9, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan papers/afghanistan warconfidential documents. 49arthur m. schlesinger jr., the imperial presidency (boston: houghton mifflin, 1973). see also, bruce ackerman, the decline and fall of the american republic (cambridge: harvard university press, 2010), 87 116; and martin s. flaherty, “the most dangerous branch,” yale law journal 105, no. 7 (may 1996): 1725, 1732. 50scott c. james, “historical institutionalism, political development, and the presidency,” in george c. edwards iii and william g. howell, the oxford handbook of the american presidency (oxford: oxford university press, 2009). 51douglas kriner, “presidents, domestic politics, and the international arena,” in george edwards and william howell, the oxford handbook of the american presidency (oxford, u.k.: oxford university press, 2009). 52such as some of the more ambitious recommendations in barry posen, restraint: a new foundation for u.s. grand strategy restraint (ithaca, ny: cornell studies in security studies, 2014). 53christopher s. chivvis, “america needs a realistic ukraine debate,” in survival: february march 2024 (routledge, 2024). 54majda rudge and jemery shapiro, “the trumpist manifesto: the republican struggle for a second term foreign policy,” european council on foreign relations; “project 2025,” the heritage foundation, https://www.project2025.org; and ian ward, “’a very large earthquake’: how trump could decimate the civil service,” politico, 2023, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/12/20/trump civil service 00132459. 55majda rudge and jemery shapiro, “polarised power: the three republican ‘tribes’ that could define america’s relationship with the world,” november 2022, european council on foreign relations, https://ecfr.eu/article/polarised power the three republican tribes that could define americas relationship with the world. 56stephen m. walt, the hell of good intentions: america’s foreign policy elite and the decline of u.s. primacy (new york: farrar, straus and giroux, 2018); and barry r. posen, restraint: a new foundation for u.s. grand strategy, reprint edition (ithaca, ny: cornell university press, 2015). christopher s. chivvis senior fellow and director, american statecraft program jennifer kavanagh former senior fellow, american statecraft program sahil lauji former james c. gaither junior fellow, american statecraft program adele malle former james c. gaither junior fellow, american statecraft program samuel orloff former james c. gaither junior fellow, american statecraft program stephen wertheim senior fellow, american statecraft program reid wilcox former research analyst innovative foreign policy recommendations grounded in reality saudi arabia and the uae have long opposed regime change. but they’re switching course with syria, where they’re embracing new dynamics and power realities. our scholars generate strategic ideas and independent analysis to help inform countries, institutions, and leaders as they take on the most difficult global problems. this collection includes the most in depth research from carnegie scholars. u.s. policymakers need to develop a more systematic and comprehensive framework for managing the data security and influence risks that come from cross border data flows, chinese software, and connected devices. to effectively tackle shared geopolitical challenges, the eu and britain must forge a deeper foreign policy partnership. this will require overcoming political mistrust and resolving thorny issues through compromise.

forgot your password? anti immigrant think tanks and advocacy groups operated on the margins until trump became president. now they have molded not only the gop but also democrats in their image. on one of his few lucid moments during the only debate of the 2024 election cycle between donald trump and joe biden, the sitting president suggested he would be tougher on the border than his predecessor, blaming the former president for the demise of a “bipartisan border deal” that would have boosted the border patrol’s funding and significantly reduced access to asylum. biden and top congressional democrats had spent months negotiating its provisions, granting more and more concessions to conservatives in the hopes that they’d stop claiming that biden had lost control of the southern border. but “when we had that deal done,” biden said, trump “called his republican colleagues and said, ‘don’t do it. it’s going to hurt me politically.’” the far right had refused to grant biden a “win” on immigration, even if it meant forgoing exactly what they claimed they wanted. this was a very different biden than the one who had gone up against trump four years earlier. when the two shared a debate stage in 2020, biden accused trump of presiding over unimaginable cruelty toward migrants: babies torn from their mothers’ arms at the border, some never to be reunited; undocumented workers rounded up on the job; asylum seekers shunted back to mexico without a hearing. but there biden was, a little over three months ago, saying in effect that he’d tried to finish the job trump had begun, only to be stymied by trump himself. biden’s pronouncements would soon take a backseat to the flurry of concern over his pitiful debate performance and his visibly declining health. he soon dropped out of the race, passing the torch to vice president kamala harris, whom he’d once tasked with addressing the “root causes” of migration from central america. but biden’s pivot in the debate and the months preceding it symbolized a rightward lurch on immigration that may have been initiated by the gop but has since become the dominant position of the democratic party. meanwhile, in his campaign to get back to the white house, trump has tacked even further to the right. immigrants, trump has said, are “poisoning the blood of our country.” if elected, he’s declared to thunderous applause, he’ll begin “mass deportations” on day one. “send them back!” the crowd chanted when “illegal aliens” were mentioned at the republican national convention in milwaukee, holding signs that read “mass deportation now!” this shift came stunningly fast. just three election cycles ago, in the aftermath of mitt romney’s loss in the 2012 election, a postmortem by the republican national committee (rnc) attributed romney’s defeat to his poor performance among latino voters and recommended that the party should become more inclusive, perhaps softer on immigration. even trump at the time an outspoken businessman with no public political ambitions said that romney’s stance on immigration was ridiculous. “he had a crazy policy of self deportation, which was maniacal,” trump said in 2012. “it sounded as bad as it was, and he lost all of the latino vote. he lost the asian vote. he lost everybody who is inspired to come into this country.” three years later, announcing his own run for president, trump descended a gilded escalator at trump tower on fifth avenue and promised to build an impenetrable border wall. throughout his 2016 campaign, trump ignored the rnc’s recommendations and embraced the ethos of the tea party, channeling incoherent populist rage into a nativist platform. the promises of mass deportations and a “big, beautiful wall” were all trump, but a policy wonk he was not. trump’s immigration policy was devised by the alumni and allies of a single ecosystem of intertwined think tanks, nonprofits, and advocacy groups one that once operated largely on the margins but that, beginning with trump’s ascension to the presidency, has set the tone of the national immigration debate. few of trump’s immigration policies survived legal challenge, and even fewer are still in place today. congress didn’t pass a single immigration bill during trump’s term, nor has it under biden. but immigration restriction is now dogma among republicans and democrats alike. the choice is no longer between a party that wants to turn away migrants and one that claims to welcome them, but rather between opposing sides that, despite their broader differences, disagree only on the best way to “secure” the border at any cost. it’s not an overstatement to say that the modern immigration restriction movement owes its existence to one man: a charismatic eye doctor from rural michigan named john tanton. once described by a former ally as “the most influential unknown man in america,” tanton spent decades building a network of anti immigration groups from the ground up, transforming post world war ii nativism from a fringe view held by a small group of white supremacists into a mainstream political movement. tanton, a veteran of the mid century conservationist and population control movements, saw population growth as a major hurdle to long term sustainability. trying to convince his fellow nature lovers of the connection between international migration and environmental ruin, tanton founded the federation for american immigration reform, or fair, in 1979, dedicating himself to reversing the demographic changes that had taken hold in america in his lifetime. over the next three decades, tanton would found and help provide funding for a constellation of anti immigration advocacy groups, including the center for immigration studies (cis), u.s. english, and numbersusa. tanton was born in detroit in 1934, a decade after the immigration act of 1924 put the first permanent numerical limits on immigration in us history. the legislation capped immigration from europe and allocated slots using a quota based on the composition of americans’ national origins as of the 1890 census. the effect was an immediate and drastic reduction in immigration from southern and eastern europe: more than a million european immigrants arrived in the united states in 1907; in 1925, that figure was just over 160,000. as a result of the act, southern and eastern europe were no longer the main source of immigrants to the us. (african and asian migration were effectively banned; no restrictions were implemented on migration from latin america.) the 1924 law kept america overwhelmingly white and western european through tanton’s young adulthood. but in 1965, a year after he graduated medical school, the country changed forever. the immigration act of 1965, also known as the hart celler act, overturned the national origins quota system, replacing it with one that prioritized family reunification. the new law more than doubled the number of immigrant visas issued each year and didn’t count the immediate relatives of us citizens against these quotas. at the same time, hart celler imposed numerical limits on latin american and caribbean migration for the first time in us history, unwittingly creating the conditions for a rise in unauthorized migration decades later. the law led to new patterns of immigration that slowly shifted america’s racial composition. the descendants of the southern and eastern european immigrants who had been considered unassimilable decades earlier were, after a rocky start, incorporated into the american melting pot; the newcomers, meanwhile, were regarded with hostility, accused of being inferior to the generation of immigrants who had come before them. as was the case at the turn of the 20th century, the wave of immigrants who arrived after 1965 were met with hostility. in 1977, david duke, the grand wizard of the ku klux klan, said that he and his followers would be patrolling the us mexico border in search of migrants. two years later, klan members descended on a texas fishing village that had recently become home to vietnamese refugees. tanton and his wife were mostly insulated from these changes in petoskey, the tiny northern michigan town where he found work as an ophthalmologist. a decade earlier, at the end of the 1960s, tanton had read the population bomb, the biologist paul ehrlich’s polemic on overpopulation. for tanton, each refugee who resettled in america meant another drain on resources, another blight on the environment. he conceived of fair as a liberal anti immigration group, and its early talking points were about how unfettered immigration hurt working class people of color at home and contributed to a brain drain abroad, not to mention its effects on population growth. all these decades later, it’s hard to grasp how out of step this was. after hart celler and before fair’s emergence as a major political player, immigration restriction was the domain of klansmen and white separatists. it wasn’t, as tanton wrote in his 1978 funding request to cordelia scaife may the reclusive mellon heiress who would go on to bankroll his movement “a legitimate position for thinking people.” the first test arrived quickly. months after fair’s founding, congress began working on the refugee act of 1980, an effort to streamline the ad hoc system that allowed people fleeing their countries to find protection in the united states. fair hired a lobbyist to push for a provision that would cap the number of refugees admitted each year at 50,000. instead, the bill that president jimmy carter signed into law allowed the sitting president to choose the annual limit in consultation with congress. that year, more than 207,000 refugees were resettled in the united states. six years later, fair once again got caught up in and lost a legislative battle, this time over the 1986 immigration reform and control act, which provided a path to citizenship for nearly 3 million undocumented immigrants living in the us. the bill passed with bipartisan consensus, and president ronald reagan signed it into law. few in congress were swayed by fair’s arguments for deporting unauthorized immigrants. “we didn’t convince anybody,” founding member otis graham told the new york times in 2011. fair had built a membership base of 4,000 by 1982, but it wasn’t enough for tanton, who, according to notes taken during a board meeting that year, believed it was “time to change our methods.” tanton was realizing that environmental issues didn’t appeal to most americans; what did was watching their communities change and feeling powerless to stop it. in a 1986 memo, tanton wrote that fair had been too reliant on large donors and too focused on lobbying members of congress, with little to show for it. instead, he outlined a “long range project” to “infiltrate” congressional immigration committees. “think how much different our prospects would be if someone espousing our ideas had the chairmanship!” he wrote. until then, it would be difficult to influence national politics. tanton decided to start small. tanton got his first chance to test his new theory of the power of a grassroots immigration restriction movement in 1988, when another organization he’d founded earlier that decade, u.s. english, placed the question of language on the ballot. tanton had created u.s. english to help organize campaigns to make english the official language of several states, some of which had large and steadily growing latino populations. the crusade began in california, where u.s. english bankrolled a local group’s efforts in support of an english only ballot initiative. after the california measure succeeded, u.s. english led similar campaigns in a far flung mix of states, including arkansas, mississippi, north carolina, north dakota, and south dakota in 1987, and arizona, colorado, and florida the following year. some were states where the demographics were shifting, while others, like north dakota, were trying to preempt these changes. in all, however, the question was about more than language; it was about who belonged in america and to whom it should belong in the future. the english only campaigns were marred by allegations of racism from the outset. opponents criticized tanton’s groups for taking money from the pioneer fund, a new york based eugenicist organization. but it wasn’t until someone leaked a memo from tanton written two years earlier that the arizona campaign seemed doomed. “can homo contraceptivus compete with homo progenitiva if borders aren’t controlled?” he mused in the 1986 memo, which was distributed to attendees of the annual anti immigration retreat he had begun hosting a year earlier. “or is advice to limit one’s family simply advice to move over and let someone else with greater reproductive powers occupy the space?” he posed other troubling questions in the memo: will latino catholics be able to assimilate to american culture? will they bring their customs of bribery, violence, and disregard for authority to the united states? and why do they have so many kids in the first place? the people who attended tanton’s retreat including jared taylor, the publisher of the white nationalist journal american renaissance must have welcomed these questions, but the public didn’t. despite u.s. english’s bipartisan background and high profile endorsements its first director was former reagan aide and prominent latina activist linda chavez, and walter cronkite was on the board it could no longer claim plausible deniability regarding allegations of racism. chavez resigned after the memo leaked and disavowed the organization; cronkite, too, bailed. but with the help of a last minute canvassing push funded by may, u.s. english eked out a victory, with 50.5 percent of arizona voters supporting the measure. the elections weren’t as close elsewhere in the country: more than 60 percent of colorado’s voters supported the amendment, as did 84 percent of florida’s. there was a setback: a federal judge later blocked arizona’s english only measure. even so, grassroots activism, tanton came to understand, was the key to enacting policies that curtail immigration. all tanton had to do was help people realize what they already knew in their hearts to be true: america was a nation of immigrants, yes, but the newcomers were unlike those who came before. “i think there is such a thing as an american culture, however difficult it may be to define,” tanton said in a 1989 oral history of his advocacy. some could argue that “hyphenated americans” belong to this culture just as much as people whose forebears date back to the colonial period, tanton said, but that was “an incorrect view.” in a 1986 interview with the new york times, fair’s first executive director, roger conner, a former environmental lawyer, described previous waves of immigrants as “entrepreneurial,” while more recent arrivals had little interest in working or assimilating. “for some reason,” conner said, “mexican immigrants are not succeeding as well as other groups.” by 1990, fair claimed to have 50,000 members, and the organization was finding other state level initiatives to support. in 1994, the group backed proposition 187, a ballot initiative in california that banned undocumented immigrants from using any government services in the state, including public schools and non emergency healthcare. in 1986, tanton had written that california’s system could do this, “but the political will is lacking to implement it.” to build that will, tanton created and funded groups like americans for border control through his umbrella organization, u.s. inc. proposition 187’s supporters claimed that not only were the undocumented overburdening public services and contributing to overcrowding in the state, but their presence in california would lead to long term gains in political power for hispanic americans. nearly 60 percent of californians voted for proposition 187, but a federal judge blocked the initiative from going into effect. still, as with arizona’s english only measure, the defeat of proposition 187 provided a valuable lesson for fair: change happens when ordinary people decide they’re fed up with something and come together to do something about it. if the groups that allow people to do that don’t exist, why not create them? everywhere they passed, anti immigrant ordinances like proposition 187 and the english only measures granted a degree of legitimacy to long held racial animus. in colorado, someone posted a sign reading “no ingles, no travato“ an attempted translation of “no english, no job” at the entrance to a construction site. “we checked. because of the english only bill, we know it’s legal,” a superintendent at the site told the los angeles times. in california, proposition 187 proved to be just as effective a recruitment tool as it would have been had it been implemented. tanton’s journal, the social contract, has published dozens of articles about proposition 187 in the decades since the referendum passed. “when thousands of [people] marched to protest” the measure, an article from the social contract’s 1996 issue on so called “anchor babies” declared, “they carried the flag of mexico, not the stars and stripes.” tanton’s organizations not only activated dormant anti immigrant feeling; they actively fomented it, often using the news media to launder their talking points. fair, the center for immigration studies, and numbersusa the latter founded in 1996 by tanton’s acolyte roy beck became reporters’ go to sources for all things related to immigration restriction, largely because there were few other groups to quote. representatives of the three organizations blamed nearly every problem, from littering in public parks to gridlock on the highways, on immigration. at the height of the tough on crime ’90s, immigration was being portrayed as a gangs and quality of life issue; after the september 11 attacks, the permeability of the border became a national security threat. fair and its allies were succeeding in changing public sentiment on immigration. soon fair, through its legal arm, the immigration law reform institute, began offering its legal services to local governments. in 2006, when the city of hazleton, pennsylvania, passed a law fining landlords for renting apartments to undocumented immigrants and employers for using them as workers, it hired kris kobach, who would become one of the foremost attorneys pushing immigration restriction. not long after, the town council of valley park, missouri, unanimously voted to implement a similar policy. kobach defended valley park after a landlord sued over the measure, then went on to draft legislation for other cities and defended the cities when those policies were challenged in court. the measures faced years of lawsuits, and the cities had to pay kobach hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees. “it was a sham,” the mayor of farmers branch, a texas city that hired kobach in 2007, told propublica, which reported that kobach earned at least $800,000 for his legal and advocacy work over a 13 year period. ineffective and expensive as they were, the ordinances helped cement kobach’s status as the go to lawyer for local and state governments that wanted to take a hard line on immigration. in 2010, kobach drafted arizona’s infamous sb 1070, colloquially referred to as the “show me your papers” law. an arizona state senator later described it as “model legislation” for dissemination through the american legislative exchange council, a right wing “bill mill.” copycat bills were soon introduced around the country. by 2012, kobach was informally advising the romney campaign on immigration. most of the bills that kobach drafted or defended were blocked by the courts, never implemented, or watered down to the point of meaninglessness. but every city that passed or even debated an anti immigrant ordinance helped tanton’s groups send a message to congress: americans aren’t interested in immigration reform or amnesty for the undocumented; they want those people out. “god forbid he ever gets hit by a mack truck or something,” the immigration law reform institute’s general counsel said in 2012 of kobach, who by that point was working for the group on the side while serving as kansas’s secretary of state. “it would change the course of history.” tanton’s “long range project” to affect national politics by starting at the local level was working. the organizations under the umbrella of fair and u.s. inc. had built a grassroots army and won over small town mayors. and some of those mayors were now entering national politics. after three failed bids for a seat in congress, lou barletta, the hazleton mayor who hired kobach to defend the city’s anti immigrant ordinance, was elected to the house of representatives in 2010. among tanton’s other supporters were colorado representative tom tancredo, who kicked off his first term in 1999 by founding the congressional immigration reform caucus; iowa senator chuck grassley; and jeff sessions, the soft spoken alabama senator whose diminutive presence belied his virulent racism. in 2000, fair and its sister organizations helped defeat the latino and immigrant fairness act, which would have provided a path to citizenship for qualifying undocumented immigrants. the following year, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the congressional immigration reform caucus’s membership nearly doubled overnight, from 16 to 30 members. elie mystal dave zirin jeet heer books & the arts / lily meyer fair would face its biggest tests yet beginning in 2006, when congress appeared poised to pass a bill granting green cards to more than 6 million undocumented immigrants. the legislation failed, but in 2007 a group of senators once again attempted to persuade their colleagues and the nation to support immigration reform. the bill sponsored by the “gang of 12,” including lindsey graham and john mccain, had bipartisan support and was backed by president george w. bush. its opponents had something stronger: a grassroots army, hundreds of thousands strong, who threatened to withhold their votes from politicians who put “illegals” ahead of americans. most americans, in fact, were in favor of granting citizenship to undocumented immigrants who met certain conditions but they, too, were swayed by the campaign against the bill. polls found that many voters who agreed with the 2007 bill’s provisions opposed the idea of “amnesty” and the bill specifically. the discrepancy between what people said they wanted and what they actually supported was the result of a coordinated effort by fair, cis, and numbersusa. every day, as part of a campaign led by numbersusa, lawmakers received thousands of calls, letters, and faxes urging them to vote against the bill. “the fax machines would run out of paper,” a republican house staffer recalled years later. most of the messages came from a familiar group of people “frequent fliers,” the staffer called them but the volume of calls swayed those who were undecided. the callers “lit up the switchboard for weeks,” senator mitch mcconnell, who voted against the bill, said in 2011, when immigration reform was back on the table. “and to every one of them i say today: your voice was heard.” the 2011 bill failed as well and was reintroduced in 2014, this time by a “gang of eight” a sign of waning support in congress. “the longer it stays in the sun, the more it smells, as they say about the mackerel,” sessions said of the reform bill in 2014. certain that it would pass in the senate, sessions at the time still a fringe member of his party set his sights on tanking the bill in the house. to ensure that the legislation failed, he enlisted his young aide, a 29 year old from california named stephen miller. miller the son of santa monica liberals who would introduce himself to college classmates by saying, “my name is stephen miller, i’m from los angeles, and i like guns” started his career as a press secretary for minnesota representative michelle bachmann. after he took a job with sessions, miller became close with researchers at cis; he used the group’s data to convince other republicans of the harms that immigrants posed. sessions had long been close with fair and cis, but with miller’s help, he became a leader of the anti immigration reform movement within congress and was instrumental in defeating the bill in 2014. “the whole point was to taint the bill in the eyes of republicans in the house,” cis president mark krikorian told miller’s biographer. “sessions, with miller’s help, really did succeed in preventing that bill from passing.” miller, too, was influenced by tanton, sometimes in obscure ways. in 1983, tanton persuaded may, his billionaire patron, to cover the costs of reprinting and distributing the camp of the saints, a french novel that depicts a dystopian future in which europe and the us are besieged by hordes of dark skinned migrants. the book didn’t receive much acclaim outside white supremacist circles when it was first published in 1973. but tanton acquired the rights and arranged for it to be published through the social contract press. it’s unclear when miller read the novel, but in september 2015, he persuaded breitbart to run a story about it, according to e mails obtained by the southern poverty law center. “i think it was growing up in california, he saw the role that mass migration played in turning a red state blue,” a former senate colleague of miller’s told politico. “he was fearful that would happen to the rest of the country.” after trump announced his candidacy in 2015 by calling mexican immigrants “rapists,” miller persuaded sessions to become the first sitting senator to endorse him. miller offered his services as an informal adviser to the campaign and then, after a few months, demanded a job. trump shared miller’s instincts; in 2014, he’d cautioned republican legislators against supporting immigration reform by implying that the beneficiaries of amnesty would vote for democrats. miller wrote trump’s speeches and helped turn his xenophobic promises a border wall, a muslim ban into policy proposals. and when trump took office, miller and sessions were rewarded: sessions was named attorney general, and miller became a senior policy adviser for trump. with miller’s help, trump stocked his agencies with alumni of the anti immigration think tank ecosystem. trump appointed francis cissna, a former employee of fair ally chuck grassley, to head us citizenship and immigration services, the agency that oversees legal migration. julie kirchner, the executive director of fair from 2007 to 2015, was hired to advise the acting director of customs and border protection in april 2017, before moving to uscis a month later. during his first few months in office, trump implemented dozens of policies including expanding immigrant detention, reviving partnerships between immigration and customs enforcement and local law enforcement agencies, and expediting certain deportation proceedings that seemed to have been lifted from a 2016 wish list that cis had published before trump secured the nomination. in 2017, for the first time, cis was invited to ice’s semiannual stakeholder meeting. representatives from fair and numbersusa also attended. but trump’s department of homeland security was tumultuous. staffers resigned with an alarming frequency, often after miller pressured them to implement increasingly hard line policies. miller and a key ally, gene hamilton, senior counsel for trump’s first dhs secretary, spent months pushing for a family separation policy at the us mexico border. elaine duke, trump’s second dhs secretary, balked; kirstjen nielsen, her successor, eventually gave in to the pressure. it didn’t fare well for her: after mass protests and calls for congressional inquiries, trump ended the family separation policy and nielsen handed in her resignation. miller’s position as an adviser to the president gave him wide latitude in the white house. “the process for making decisions didn’t exist when we came in,” an immigration official in the biden administration recently told the new yorker. “it was calls with stephen miller in which he yelled at the career officials, and they went off to do what he said, or to try.” for a brief moment in the wake of biden’s 2020 victory against trump, immigrant advocacy groups felt relief. the nation had voted against separating migrant families and banning muslims. this optimism was cut short by republicans, who started to spout immigrants are invading rhetoric almost as soon as biden took office. two months into biden’s term, the heritage foundation accused him of causing a “crisis” at the southern border. miller and his crew seized the narrative early, pushing the biden administration into a defensive posture. biden’s team quickly abandoned the promises they had made during the 2020 campaign to undo the harms that had been perpetrated by trump’s dhs and to build a new, humane immigration system in its place. while biden has rolled back some of trump’s harshest policies at the border and created pathways for migrants from certain countries to lawfully enter and work in the united states on a temporary basis, these are half measures at best. public sentiment on immigration has shifted significantly since biden took office and now, with kamala harris as the nominee, the democrats are sending a far different message than they did in 2020. one of harris’s first campaign ads touts her experience as a “border state prosecutor” who “took on drug cartels and jailed gang members” and reminds voters that as vice president, she backed the “toughest border control bill in decades.” harris’s warning to would be migrants in 2021 “do not come” is now the kind of thing a growing number of democratic voters seems eager to hear. in february, a gallup poll found that immigration was the most important issue for voters. and in july, a poll found that 55 percent of american adults want to see immigration to the united states go down the first time in more than 20 years that a majority of voters have said they want fewer immigrants in the country. having convinced the public that illegal immigration is out of control, the nativist right is now shifting its efforts toward limiting legal migration. the heritage foundation’s project 2025 to remake the federal government under a trump presidency includes a chapter on the dhs that recommends reducing or outright eliminating visas issued to foreign students “from enemy nations”; reimplementing uscis’s denaturalization unit to strip certain naturalized citizens of their status; retraining uscis officers to focus on “fraud detection”; eliminating the diversity visa lottery; ending so called “chain migration”; and creating a “merit based system that rewards high skilled aliens instead of the current system that favors extended family based and luck of the draw immigration.” john tanton, more than anyone else, understood the power of harnessing the public’s fears and anxieties in the service of a broader political project. fair, cis, and numbersusa’s public campaigns may have focused on illegal immigration, but the organizations were founded to undo the harms that tanton believed stemmed from the legal immigration facilitated by the immigration act of 1965. project 2025, if it comes to fruition, may be what he and his disciples have long been waiting for. the indefatigable tanton, who died in 2019 after a long battle with parkinson’s, did not live to see the very democrats who once chanted “immigrants are welcome here” embrace policies of restriction. if he had, it’s hard to imagine that he would’ve been surprised. in the 1989 oral history, tanton said that those who “deal in the world of ideas” come to expect a common trajectory: “the first response of many people is to say, ‘i never heard of it before.’ and the second response after they thought about it for a bit was to say, ‘it’s anti god.’ and the third response after they’d realized the idea was right was to come around and say, ‘i knew it all along.’” gaby del valle is a freelance immigration reporter who is based in brooklyn. from his position on colin kaepernick, to his slanders about those concerned about brain injury, the sitting president has demonstrated just how much he disrespects the nfl. dave zirin no president in the post civil rights era has been as racially aggressive as the now 47th president. clarence lusane for the nation activists in st. louis want washington university with its multibillion dollar endowment to pony up to help rebuild public schools. devin thomas o’shea the nfl, to my shock, has not prematurely surrendered to trump and elon musk’s agenda of black erasure. dave zirin the president’s foreign policy agenda remains unpredictable, but his war on liberal culture has deep roots. david klion the university’s adoption of the ihra definition of anti semitism conflates critique of israel with antisemitic speech, directly attacking pro palestine activism and academic free... studentnation / shraddha joshi and asmer asrar safi

joe biden is a lifelong politician who served as the 46th u.s. president and as u.s. vice president to barack obama. joe biden is a longtime democratic politician who served as ﻿the 46th president of the united states, from 2021 to 2025. his journey to the nation’s highest office began with his first election in 1970. biden, who briefly worked as an attorney, then became the sixth youngest u.s. senator in history as well as delaware’s longest serving senator. beginning in 2009, biden served two terms ﻿as the 47th vice president of the united states as part of president barack obama﻿’s administration. biden’s third presidential campaign led to his election in 2020. faced with increasing public scrutiny during his reelection effort four years later, biden withdrew his bid and completed his single term﻿ ﻿presidency. full name: joseph robinette biden jr.born: november 20, 1942birthplace: scranton, pennsylvaniaspouses: neilia hunter biden﻿ (1966 1972) and jill biden (1977 present)children: beau﻿, hunter, naomi “amy,” and ashleyastrological sign: scorpio long before reaching one of the highest political offices in the nation, joseph robinette biden jr., born on november 20, 1942, grew up in the blue collar city of scranton in northeast pennsylvania. his father, joseph biden sr., worked cleaning furnaces and as a used car salesman. his mother was catherine eugenia “jean” finnegan. biden credits his parents with instilling in him toughness, hard work, and perseverance. he has recalled his father frequently saying, “champ, the measure of a man is not how often he is knocked down, but how quickly he gets up.” he’s also said that when he would come home sullen because he had been bullied by one of the bigger kids in the neighborhood, his mother would tell him, “bloody their nose so you can walk down the street the next day!” biden attended st. paul’s elementary school in scranton. in 1955, when he was 13 years old, the family moved to mayfield, delaware, a rapidly growing middle class community sustained primarily by the nearby dupont chemical company. as a child, biden struggled with a stutter, and kids called him “dash” and “joe impedimenta” to mock him. he eventually overcame his speech impediment by memorizing long passages of poetry and reciting them out loud in front of the mirror. biden attended the st. helena school until he gained acceptance into the prestigious archmere academy. although he had to work by washing the school windows and weeding the gardens to help his family afford tuition, biden had long dreamed of attending the school, which he called “the object of my deepest desire, my oz.” at archmere, biden was a solid student and, despite his small size, a standout receiver on the football team. “he was a skinny kid,” his coach remembered, “but he was one of the best pass receivers i had in 16 years as a coach.” biden graduated from archmere in 1961. biden attended the nearby university of delaware, where he studied history and political science and played football. he would later admit that he spent his first two years of college far more interested in football, girls, and parties than academics. but he also developed a sharp interest in politics during these years, spurred in part by the inspiring inauguration of john f. kennedy in 1961. on a spring break trip to the bahamas during his junior year, biden met a syracuse university student named neilia hunter and, in his own words, “fell ass over tin cup in love at first sight.” encouraged by his new love, he applied himself more fully to his studies and was accepted into the syracuse university law school upon his graduation from delaware in 1965. biden and hunter married the next year, in 1966. biden was at best a mediocre law student. during his first year at syracuse, he flunked a class for failing to properly cite a reference to a law review article. although he claimed it was an accidental oversight, the incident would haunt him later in his career. after graduating from law school in 1968, biden moved to wilmington, delaware, to begin practicing at a law firm. he also became an active member of the democratic party, and in 1970, he was elected to the new castle county council. while serving as councilman, in 1971, biden started his own law firm. in addition to his increasingly busy professional life, biden had three children: joseph “beau,” born in 1969; robert “hunter,” born in 1970; and naomi “amy,” born in 1971. “everything was happening faster than i expected,” biden said about his life at the time. in 1972, the delaware democratic party encouraged a 29 year old biden to run against the popular republican incumbent j. caleb boggs for the united states senate. although few thought he stood any chance, biden ran a tireless campaign organized mostly by family members. his sister, valerie biden owens, served as his campaign manager, and both of his parents campaigned daily. that november, in a tight race with a large turnout, biden won an upset victory to become the sixth youngest u.s. senator elected in the nation’s history. just as all of biden’s wildest dreams seemed to be coming true, he was struck by devastating tragedy. a week before christmas in 1972, biden’s wife and three children were involved in a terrible car accident while out shopping for a christmas tree. the accident killed his wife and daughter and severely injured sons beau and hunter. biden was inconsolable and even considered suicide. he recalls, “i began to understand how despair led people to just cash in; how suicide wasn’t just an option but a rational option... i felt god had played a horrible trick on me, and i was angry.” nevertheless, at the encouragement of his family, biden decided to honor his commitment to representing the people of delaware in the senate. he skipped the swearing in ceremony for new senators in washington and instead took the oath of office from his sons’ hospital room. in order to spend as much time as possible with his sons, biden decided to continue to live in wilmington, commuting to and from washington each day by amtrak train, a practice he maintained through his entire long tenure in the senate. from 1973 to 2009, biden served a distinguished senate career. during his time in the senate, biden won respect as one of the body’s leading foreign policy experts, serving as chairman of the committee on foreign relations for several years. his many foreign policy positions included advocating for strategic arms limitation with the soviet union, promoting peace and stability in the balkans, expanding nato to include former soviet bloc nations, and opposing the first gulf war. in later years, he called for american action to end the genocide in darfur and spoke out against president george w. bush’s handling of the iraq war, particularly opposing the troop surge of 2007. in addition to foreign policy, biden was an outspoken proponent of tougher crime laws. in 1987, supreme court nominee robert bork’s failure to receive confirmation was largely attributed to harsh questioning by biden, who was then chairman of the senate judiciary committee. in 1994, biden sponsored the violent crime control and law enforcement act to add 100,000 police officers and increase sentences for a host of crimes. in 1987, having established himself as one of washington’s most prominent democratic lawmakers, biden decided to run for the u.s. presidency. he dropped out of the democratic primary, however, after reports surfaced that he had plagiarized part of a speech. biden had been suffering severe headaches during the campaign, and shortly after he dropped out in 1988, doctors discovered that he had two life threatening brain aneurysms. complications from the ensuing brain surgery led to blood clots in his lungs, which, in turn, caused him to undergo another surgery. always resilient, biden returned to the senate after surviving a seven month recovery period. in 2007, 20 years after his first unsuccessful presidential bid, biden once again decided to run for the u.s. presidency. despite his years of experience in the senate, however, biden’s campaign failed to generate much momentum in a field dominated by fellow senators hillary clinton and barack obama. biden dropped out after receiving less than one percent of the vote in the crucial iowa caucuses. several months later, though, obama secured the democratic nomination after a hard fought campaign against clinton and selected biden as his running mate. with his working class roots, biden helped the obama campaign communicate its message of economic recovery to the blue collar voters crucial to swing states like ohio and pennsylvania. on november 2, 2008, barack obama and joe biden convincingly defeated the republican ticket of arizona senator john mccain and alaska governor sarah palin. on january 20, 2009, obama was sworn in as the 44th u.s. president and biden became the 47th vice president. while biden mostly served in the role of behind the scenes adviser to the president, he took particularly active roles in formulating federal policies relating to iraq and afghanistan. in 2010, the vice president used his well established senate connections to help secure passage of the new strategic arms reduction treaty between the united states and the russian federation. biden seemed to relish the opportunity to play a crucial role in the obama administration. following the 2008 election, he said: “this is an historic moment. i started my career fighting for civil rights, and to be a part of what is both a moment in american history where the best people, the best ideas, the how can i say it? the single best reflection of the american people can be called upon to be at that moment, with a guy who has such incredible talent and who is also a breakthrough figure in multiple ways i genuinely find that exciting. it’s a new america. it’s the reflection of a new america.” running for reelection in 2012, the obama biden team faced republican challenger mitt romney, a former governor of massachusetts, and romney’s vice presidential running mate, u.s. representative paul ryan of wisconsin. obama defeated romney in the 2012 election, earning a second term as president and biden another term as vice president. president obama received nearly 60 percent of the electoral vote, and won the popular vote by more than 1 million ballots. later that year, biden showed just how influential a vice president he could be. he was instrumental in achieving a bipartisan agreement on tax increases and spending cuts to avoid the fiscal cliff crisis. with a looming deadline, biden was able to hammer out a deal with senate minority leader mitch mcconnell. on january 1, 2013, the fiscal cliff bill passed in the senate after months of tough negotiations. the house of representatives approved it later that day. around this time, biden also became a leading figure in the national debate about gun control. he was selected to head up a special task force on the issue after a deadly shooting at sandy hook elementary school in newtown, connecticut, in december 2012. biden delivered solutions for reducing gun violence across the nation to obama in january 2013. he helped craft 19 actions that the president could take on the issue using his power of executive order among other recommendations. biden has been married to his second wife, jill biden, since 1977. the couple’s daughter, ashley, was born in 1981. on may 30, 2015, biden suffered another personal loss when his son beau died at the age of 46, after battling brain cancer. “beau biden was, quite simply, the finest man any of us have ever known,” biden wrote in a statement about his son. following this tragedy, biden considered a run for the presidency, but he put the speculation to rest in october 2015 when he announced that he would not seek the 2016 democratic nomination. in the white house rose garden with his wife, jill, and president obama by his side, biden made his announcement, referring to his son’s recent death in his decision making: “as my family and i have worked through the grieving process, i’ve said all along what i’ve said time and again to others, that it may very well be that the process by the time we get through it closes the window. i’ve concluded it has closed.” biden added: “while i will not be a candidate, i will not be silent. i intend to speak out clearly and forcefully, to influence as much as i can where we stand as a party and where we need to go as a nation.” on january 12, 2017, obama presented biden with the presidential medal of freedom with distinction, the nation’s highest civilian honor, in a surprise ceremony at the white house. obama called biden “the best vice president america’s ever had” and a “lion of american history” and told him he was being honored for “faith in your fellow americans, for your love of country, and a lifetime of service that will endure through the generations.” biden gave an emotional impromptu speech thanking the president, first lady michelle obama, his wife, jill, and his children. as promised, biden refused to remain quiet even after leaving office. known for his opposition to obama’s successor, donald trump, he occasionally surfaced to criticize the 45th president. at an october 2017 event, he declared that trump “doesn’t understand governance,” and the following month, he blasted the white house incumbent for his seeming defense of white nationalist groups. additionally, biden occasionally revealed his mixed feelings on bypassing the chance to run for president in 2016. in march 2017, he said he “could have won,” and in november, he elaborated on those thoughts in an interview with oprah winfrey. “no woman or man should announce they’re running for president unless they can answer two questions,” he said. “one, do they truly believe they’re the most qualified person for that moment? i believed i was but was i prepared to be able to give my whole heart, my whole soul, and all my intention to the endeavor? and i knew i wasn’t.” a few weeks later, on the talk show the view, biden had a much publicized interaction with co host meghan mccain, whose dad, senator john mccain, had been diagnosed with the same brain cancer that killed beau biden. when meghan mccain became visibly upset while discussing the disease, the vp gently took her hand to console her, pointing out how senator mccain inspired everyone with his courage. “there is hope,” he said. “and if anybody can make it, your dad [can].” in an interview with al sharpton the following spring, biden said he hadn’t ruled out running for president in 2020, though he still hadn’t recovered enough from his son’s death to devote himself to the effort. “i’m really hoping that some other folks step up,” he said. “i think we have some really good people… i got to walk away knowing that it is there’s somebody who can do it and can win because we’ve got to win. we’ve got to win in 2020.” the results of a harvard caps/harris poll in june suggested that democrats weren’t ready to let biden walk away just yet, as he topped the poll with 32 percent of participants naming him their favorite for the party’s nomination in 2020. hillary clinton came in second at 18 percent, with bernie sanders finishing third at 16 percent. while still contemplating a presidential run the following march, biden faced a new problem when lucy flores, a former nevada state assemblywoman, published an essay that described biden inappropriately kissing her at a campaign event. biden responded with a statement in which he recalled the “countless handshakes, hugs, expressions of affection, support, and comfort” he offered to political allies over the years, adding, “and not once never did i believe i acted inappropriately. if it is suggested i did so, i will listen respectfully. but it was never my intention.” a few days later, a former congressional aide named amy lappos came forward with her story of how biden once made her uncomfortable at a fundraiser, indicating the issue would likely linger through a presidential campaign. on april 25, 2019, biden delivered the expected news that he was running for president in 2020. in his 3 1/2 minute video announcement, the former vice president referenced president trump’s attempt to equate people on both sides of the violent, racially charged clash in charlottesville, virginia, in 2017, saying he knew then that “the threat to our nation was unlike any i’d ever seen in my lifetime.” although he easily led most democratic polls at the time he entered the race, biden’s candidacy soon became a litmus test for a party with an increasingly progressive base. underscoring the challenges of presenting himself as a moderate, biden drew criticism for affirming his support of the hyde amendment, a 46 year old measure that bans federal funding for abortions, before reversing his position shortly afterward. during the first democratic primary debate in late june, biden again found his track record targeted when candidate kamala harris took him to task for his opposition to busing as a means of integrating schools in the 1970s. he fared better in subsequent debates, in which he demonstrated his sound grasp of foreign policy and tied his accomplishments to those of president obama. meanwhile, a new issue surfaced in september 2019 with the revelation that president trump had pressured the ukrainian government into investigating biden and his son hunter. this stemmed from hunter’s former involvement with ukrainian energy company burisma holdings and biden’s efforts to have the country’s prosecutor general at the time fired. in a september 24 speech, biden called trump’s actions an “abuse of power” and said he would support impeachment if the president did not cooperate with congress, a topic that took on additional urgency when house speaker nancy pelosi ignited impeachment proceedings that same day. after trump’s impeachment trial ended with his acquittal on february 5, 2020, biden finished fourth in the iowa caucuses and then fifth in the new hampshire primary. but he rebounded with a resounding win in south carolina at the end of the month and continued his momentum by claiming the majority of delegates from super tuesday voting in early march. his surge drove most of his top competitors from the race. during a one on one debate with sanders in mid march, biden committed to nominating a woman to serve as his vice president. he became the presumptive democratic nominee when sanders ended his campaign in early april, though he also found himself facing new allegations of sexual assault, this time from a former aide named tara reade. on august 11, 2020, biden announced kamala harris as his vice presidential running mate. “i have the great honor to announce that i’ve picked kamala harris a fearless fighter for the little guy and one of the country’s finest public servants as my running mate,” biden said. “back when kamala was attorney general, she worked closely with beau. i watched as they took on the big banks, lifted up working people, and protected women and kids from abuse. i was proud then, and i’m proud now to have her as my partner in this campaign.” in august, biden officially became the 2020 democratic presidential nominee. the much anticipated first presidential debate between biden and trump on september 29, 2020, was a messy affair marked by frequent interruptions and heated discussions that quickly spiraled off topic. a flustered biden called his opponent a “clown,” but he also managed to get in several shots at the president’s handling of the covid 19 pandemic and emphatically presented his views on law enforcement and climate change. a second debate was scheduled for october 15, but after trump declined to do a virtual debate, town halls for both candidates were scheduled instead. with microphones often muted during the third debate on october 22, biden faced fewer interruptions as he articulated his positions on health care, immigration overhaul, and green jobs. he also again unloaded on the president for his coronavirus management and policy of separating migrant children from their parents at the border, drawing a clear distinction between their styles with the declaration that “america’s character is on the ballot.” with several states counting mail in ballots well past the close of polling places on november 3, 2020, the race remained too tight to call into the next day. however, the tide began shifting in biden’s favor with the announcements of his victories in wisconsin and michigan, along with reports of his leads in arizona, nevada, and georgia. meanwhile, trump launched a series of lawsuits that alleged voter fraud and sought to halt the counting in battleground states. on november 7, 2020, four days after election day, biden was declared as the 46th president elect after winning pennsylvania. along with earning a record 81 million plus votes, the soon to be 78 year old was set to become the oldest president in the nation’s history. (in 2024, trump set a new record for oldest person to be elected president.) “america, i’m honored that you have chosen me to lead our great country,” biden tweeted. “the work ahead of us will be hard, but i promise you this: i will be a president for all americans whether you voted for me or not. i will keep the faith that you have placed in me.” on december 14, 2020, all 538 electors in the electoral college cast their vote, formalizing biden’s victory over trump in the presidential election. biden received 306 votes and trump received 232. although he moved forward with the selection of cabinet members and other staffers, biden initially found his transition efforts thwarted by emily murphy, head of the general services administration, who refused to release federal funds for the process until november 23. on january 6, 2021, after the start of a congressional session to formalize the electoral college results, a mob of trump supporters stormed the capitol building and overwhelmed the police, forcing lawmakers to evacuate for their safety. biden soon delivered a speech in which he pleaded for trump to help put an end to the chaos. “at their best the words of a president can inspire. at their worst, they can incite,” he said. “therefore, i call on president trump to go on national television now to fulfill his oath and defend the constitution and demand an end to this siege.” following the violence that resulted in more than 80 arrests and five deaths, the congressional session resumed and continued well past midnight, with vice president mike pence formally announcing biden’s presidential win just after 3:40 a.m. on january 7. biden was sworn in as the 46th president of the united states on january 20, 2021. in the opening of his inaugural address, he said: quickly getting to work, president biden signed a flurry of executive orders over his first few days in office. among those that reversed the policies of his predecessor, he recommitted the united states to the climate related paris agreement, overturned the ban that targeted travelers from muslim majority nations, pulled funding for the construction of a wall along the mexican border, revoked the permit for the keystone xl pipeline, and allowed transgender people to again serve in the military. with the country still reeling from the covid 19 pandemic, the president enacted an expanded enrollment period for the federal health insurance marketplace and urged congress to act on a coronavirus relief package. this came to fruition with the march passage of the american rescue plan, which gave the green light for another round of stimulus payments and extended unemployment benefits. after announcing that all americans above the age of 18 would be eligible for the covid 19 vaccine by april 19, biden celebrated the administering of 200 million doses two days later, ahead of his target date of may 1. meanwhile, he sought to tie the nation’s economic recovery to proposals for a $2 trillion american jobs plan, which aimed for long overdue infrastructure investments, and the $1.8 trillion american families plan, which promised to establish publicly funded preschools and a comprehensive family and medical leave program. on the foreign policy front, the president in mid april announced that the american military presence in afghanistan would be withdrawn by september 11, 2021. shortly afterward, he hit russia with extensive sanctions for a hacking operation that breached multiple u.s. federal agencies. when it came to border control, however, the president saw fewer positive results. although he launched a task force to reunite displaced children with their parents and pledged to end the “metering” that limited the number of asylum seekers, a record surge of migrants thwarted attempts to ease the overcrowded detention centers at the united states mexico border. additionally, biden initially reneged on a promise to raise the trump era cap of 15,000 refugees for the year, before political pushback forced him to reconsider his stance. after months of holding off, biden announced his much expected reelection campaign in the 2024 presidential race on april 25, 2023. in a video announcement, biden emphasized the importance of personal freedom alluding to abortion, book bans, lgbtq rights, and voting rights and almost immediately took shots at trump aligned conservatives. the democratic frontrunner eventually faced increasing scrutiny over high inflation, his age, and his ability to serve another four years in the white house. he persisted amid calls for him to drop out the race before a poor debate performance against republican opponent donald trump escalated public concern. ﻿in a surprise to many, biden abruptly ended his presidential bid in mid july 2024, about 15﻿﻿ weeks before election day. he endorsed vice president kamala harris﻿, who ultimately lost to trump.﻿ the biography.com staff is a team of people obsessed and news hungry editors with decades 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1:06 p.m. est ms. leavitt: good afternoon, everybody. q good afternoon. ms. leavitt: how are we? good to see all of you. it’s an honor to be here with all of you. a lot of familiar faces in the room, a lot of new faces. and president trump is back, and the golden age of america has most definitely begun. the senate has already confirmed five of president trump’s exceptional cabinet nominees: secretary of state marco rubio, defense secretary pete hegseth, cia director john ratcliffe, homeland security secretary kristi noem, and treasury secretary scott bessent. it is imperative that the senate continues to confirm the remainder of the president’s well qualified nominees as quickly as possible. as you have seen during the past week, president trump is hard at work fulfilling the promises that he made to the american people on the campaign trail. since taking the oath of office, president trump has taken more than 300 executive actions; secured nearly $1 trillion in u.s. investments; deported illegal alien rapists, gang members, and suspected terrorists from our homeland; and restored common sense to the federal government. i want to take a moment to go through some of these extraordinary actions. on day one, president trump declared a national emergency at our southern border to end the four year long invasion of illegal aliens under the previous administration. additionally, president trump signed an executive order to end catch and release and finish construction of his effective border wall. by using every lever of his federal power, president trump has sent a loud and clear message to the entire world: america will no longer tolerate illegal immigration. and this president expects that every nation on this planet will cooperate with the repatriation of their citizens, as proven by this weekend, when president trump swiftly directed his team to issue harsh and effective sanctions and tariffs on the colombian government upon hearing they were denied a u.s. military aircraft full of their own citizens who were deported by this administration. within hours, the colombian government agreed to all of president trump’s demands, proving america is once again respected on the world stage. so, to foreign nationals who are thinking about trying to illegally enter the united states, think again. under this president, you will be detained, and you will be deported. every day, americans are safer because of the violent criminals that president trump’s administration is removing from our communities. on january 23rd, ice new york arrested a turkish national for entry without inspection who is a known or suspected terrorist. on january 23rd, ice san francisco arrested a citizen of mexico unlawfully present in the united states who has been convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a child aged 14 years or younger. ice saint paul has arrested a citizen of honduras who was convicted of fourth degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor. ice buffalo arrested a citizen of ecuador who has been convicted of rape. ice boston arrested a citizen of the dominican republic who has a criminal conviction for second degree murder. this criminal was convicted of murder for beating his pregnant wife to death in front of her five year old son. and ice saint paul also arrested a citizen of mexico who was convicted of possessing pornographic material of a minor on a work computer. these are the heinous individuals that this administration is removing from american communities every single day. and to the brave state and local law enforcement officers, cbp, and ice agents who are helping in the facilitation of this deportation operation, president trump has your back and he is grateful for your hard work. on the economic front, president trump took immediate action to lower costs for families who are suffering from four long years of the biden administration’s destructive and inflationary policies. president trump ordered the heads of all executive departments and agencies to help deliver emergency price relief to the american people, untangle our economy from biden’s regulatory constraints, and end the reckless war on american energy. president trump also signed sweeping executive orders to end the weaponization of government and restore common sense to the federal bureaucracy. he directed all federal agencies to terminate illegal diversity, equity, and inclusion programs to help return america to a merit based society. president trump also signed an executive order declaring it is now the policy of the federal government that there are only two sexes: male and female. sanity has been restored. before i take your questions, i would like to point out to   all of you once again have access to the most transparent and accessible president in american history. there has never been a president who communicates with the american people and the american press corps as openly and authentically as the 45th and now 47th president of the united states. this past week, president trump has held multiple news conferences, gaggled on air force one multiple times, and sat down for a two part interview on fox news, which aired last week. as politico summed it up best, “trump is everywhere again,” and that’s because president trump has a great story to tell about the legendary american revival that is well underway. and in keeping with this revolutionary media approach that president trump deployed during the campaign, the trump white house will speak to all media outlets and personalities, not just the legacy media who are seated in this room, because apporting   according to recent polling from gallup, americans’ trust in mass media has fallen to a record low. millions of americans, especially young people, have turned from traditional television outlets and newspapers to consume their news from podcasts, blogs, social media, and other independent outlets. it’s essential to our team that we share president trump’s message everywhere and adapt this white house to the new media landscape in 2025. to do this, i am excited to announce the following changes will be made to this historic james s. brady briefing room, where mr. brady’s legacy will endure. this white house believes strongly in the first amendment, so it’s why our team will work diligently to restore the press passes of the 440 journalists whose passes were wrongly revoked by the previous administration. we’re also opening up this briefing room to new media voices who produce news related content and whose outlet is not already represented by one of the seats in this room. we welcome independent journalists, podcasters, social media influencers, and content creators to apply for credentials to cover this white house. and you can apply now on our new website, whitehouse.gov/newmedia. starting today, this seat in the front of the room, which is usually occupied by the press secretary staff, will be called the “new media” seat. my team will review the applications and give credentials to new media applicants who meet our criteria and pass united states secret service requirements to enter the white house complex. so, in light of these announcements, our first questions for today’s briefing will go to these new media members whose outlets, despite being some of the most viewed news websites in the country, have not been given seats in this room. and before i turn to questions, i do have news directly from the president of the united states that was just shared with me in the oval office from president trump directly   an update on the new jersey drones: after research and study, the drones that were flying over new jersey in large numbers were authorized to be flown by the faa for research and various other reasons. many of these drones were also hobbyists   recreational and private individuals that enjoy flying drones. in meanti    in the   in time, it got worse, due to curiosity. this was not the enemy. a   a statement from the president of the united states to start this briefing with some news. and with that, i will turn it over to questions, and we will begin with our new media members: mike allen from axios, matt boyle from breitbart. mike, why don’t you go ahead. q thank you very much. karoline, does the president see anything fishy about deepseek, either its origins or its cost? and could china’s ability to make these models quicker, cheaper affect our thinking about expanding generation data centers, chip manufacturing? ms. leavitt: sure. the president was asked about deepseek last night on air force one when he gaggled for, i think, the third or fourth time throughout the weekend with members of the traveling press corps. the president said that he believes that this is a wake up call to the american ai industry. the last administration sat on their hands and allowed china to rapidly develop this ai program. and so, president trump believes in restoring american ai dominance, and that’s why he took very strong executive action this past week to sign executive orders to roll back some of the onerous regulations on the ai industry. and president trump has also proudly appointed the first ai and crypto czar at this white house, david sacks, whom i spoke with yesterday   very knowledgeable on this subject. and his team is here working every single day to ensure american ai dominance. as for the national security implications, i spoke with nsc this morning. they are looking into what those may be, and when i have an update, i will share it with you, mike. q and, karoline, you say “restore” u.s. dominance. is there fear that the u.s. either is falling or has fallen behind? and how would the president make sure the u.s. stays ahead? ms. leavitt: no. the president is confident that we will restore american dominance in ai. matt. q yeah. so, karoline, first off, thank you to you and president trump for actually giving voices to new media outlets that represent millions and millions of americans. the thing i would add   the   i’ve got a two part question for you. the first is just: can you expand upon what steps the white house is going to take to bring more voices, not less   which is what our founder, andrew breitbart, believed in   into this room, where they rightly belong? ms. leavitt: yeah, absolutely. and as i said in my opening statement, matt, it is a priority of this white house to honor the first amendment. and it is a fact that americans are consuming their news media from various different platforms, especially young people. and as the youngest press secretary in history, thanks to president trump, i take great pride in opening up this room to new media voices to share the president’s message with as many americans as possible. in doing so, number one, we will ensure that outlets like yours   axios and breitbart, which are widely respected and viewed outlets   have an actual seat in this room every day. we also, again, encourage anybody in this country   whether you are a tiktok content creator, a blogger, a podcaster   if you are producing legitimate news content, no matter the medium, you will be allowed to apply for press credentials to this white house. and as i said earlier, our new media website is whitehouse.gov/newmedia, and so we encourage people to apply. again, as long as you are creating news related content of the day and you’re a legitimate independent journalist, you’re welcome to cover this white house. q and secondly, karoline, you sa    you laid out several of the actions that president trump has taken. obviously, it’s a stark contrast to the previous administration and a breakneck speed from president trump. can we expect that pace to continue as the hun    the   you know, the first 100 days moves along here and beyond that? ms. leavitt: absolutely. there is no doubt president trump has always been the hardest working man in politics. i think that’s been proven over the past week. this president has, again, signed more than 300 executive orders. he’s taken historic action. i gaggled aboard air force one to mark the first 100 days of this administration   4:00 p.m. last friday   first 100 hours, rather. and this president did more in the first 100 hours than the previous president did in the first 100 days. so, president trump, i think you can all expect to   for him to continue to work at this breakneck speed. so, i hope you’re all ready to work very hard. i know that we are. zeke miller. q thanks, karoline. a question that we’ve asked your predecessors of both parties in this job. when you’re up here in this briefing room speaking to the american public, do you view yourself and your role as speaking on   advocating on behalf of the president, or providing the unvarnished truth that is, you know, not to lie, not to obfuscate to the american people? ms. leavitt: i commit to telling the truth from this podium every single day. i commit to speaking on behalf of the president of the united states. that is my job. and i will say it’s very easy to speak truth from this podium when you have a president who is implementing policies that are wildly popular with the american people, and that’s exactly what this administration is doing. it’s correcting the lies and the wrongs of the past four years, many of the lies that have been told to your faces in this very briefing room. i will not do that. but since you brought up truth, zeke, i would like to point out, while i vow to provide the truth from this podium, we ask that all of you in this room hold yourselves to that same standard. we know for a fact there have been lies that have been pushed by many legacy media outlets in this country about this president, about his family, and we will not accept that. we will call you out when we feel that your reporting is wrong or there is misinformation about this white house. so, yes, i will hold myself to the truth, and i expect everyone in this room to do the same. q and, karoline, just on a substantive question. yesterday, the white house office of management and budget directed an across the board freeze with   with some exceptions for individual assistance. we understand just federal grants. ms. leavitt: right. q it’s caused a lot of confusion around the country among head start providers, among providers   from services to homeless veterans, provid    you know, medicaid providers, states saying they’re having trouble accessing the portal. could you put   help us clear up some confusion   ms. leavitt: yes. q   give some certainty to folks? and then also, is that uncertainty   how does that uncertainty service the president’s voters? ms. leavitt: well, i think there’s only uncertainty in this room amongst the media. there’s no uncertainty in this building. so, let me provide the certainty and the clarity that all of you need. this is not a blanket pause on federal assistance in grant programs from the trump administration. individual assistance, that includes   i’m not naming everything that’s included, but just to give you a few examples   social security benefits, medicare benefits, food stamps, welfare benefits   assistance that is going directly to individuals will not be impacted by this pause. and i want to make that very clear to any americans who are watching at home who may be a little bit confused about some of the media reporting: this administration   if you are receiving individual assistance from the federal government, you will still continue to receive that. however, it is the responsibility of this president and this administration to be good stewards of taxpayer dollars. that is something that president trump campaigned on. that’s why he has launched doge, the department of government efficiency, who is working alongside omb. and that’s why omb sent out this memo last night, because the president signed an executive order directing omb to do just this. and the reason for this is to ensure that every penny that is going out the door is not conflicting with the executive orders and actions that this president has taken. so, what does this pause mean? it means no more funding for illegal dei programs. it means no more funding for the green new scam that has ta    cost american taxpayers tens of billions of dollars. it means no more funding for transgenderism and wokeness across our federal bureaucracy and agencies. no more funding for green new deal social engineering policies. again, people who are receiving individual asintan    assistance, you will continue to receive that. and president trump is looking out for you by issuing this pause because he is being good steward of your taxpayer dollars. q thanks, karoline. ms. leavitt: sure. q how long is this pause going to last? and how is the trump administration recommending that organizations that rely on federal funding make payroll, pay their rent in the meantime? ms. leavitt: it is a temporary pause, and the office of management and budget is reviewing the federal funding that has been going out the door, again, not for individual assistance, but for all of these other programs that i mentioned. i also spoke with the incoming director of omb this morning, and he told me to tell all of you that the line to his office is open for other federal government agencies across the board, and if they feel that programs are necessary and in line with the president’s agenda, then the office of management and budget will review those policies. i think this is a very responsible measure. again, the past four years, we’ve seen the biden administration spend money like drunken sailors. it’s a big reason we’ve had an inflation crisis in this country, and it’s incumbent upon this administration to make sure, again, that every penny is being accounted for honestly. q why impose this pause with so little notice? why not give organizations more time to plan for the fact that they are about to lose, in some cases, really crucial federal funding   ms. leavitt: there was   q   at least for a   for a period of time? ms. leavitt: there was notice. it was the executive order that the president signed. there’s also a freeze on hiring, as you know; a regulatory freeze; and there’s also a freeze on foreign aid. and this is a   again, incredibly important to ensure that this administration is taking into consideration how hard the american people are working. and their tax dollars actually matter to this administration. you know, just during this pause, doge and omb have actually found that there was $37 million that was about to go out the door to the world health organization, which is an organization, as you all know, that president trump, with the swipe of his pen in that executive order, is   no longer wants the united states to be a part of. so, that wouldn’t be in line with the president’s agenda. doge and omb also found that there was about to be 50 million taxpayer dollars that went out the door to fund condoms in gaza. that is a preposterous waste of taxpayer money. so, that’s what this pause is focused on: being good stewards of tax dollars. q and so, this doesn’t affect   ms. leavitt: jennifer. q   meals on wheels or head start or disaster aid? ms. leavitt: again, it does not affect individual assistance that’s going to americans. q to follow up on nancy, do you think there will be a list of who is affected and how much money is affected? how   how will these contractors and organizations know if they are actually being   having their funding frozen? and then, secondly, if you’re willing, can you just clarify, is the end goal of this to essentially challenge congress or to   to prove that the president can withhold federal funding? is   in other words, is this an attempt to pick a fight to prove that he can do this? ms. leavitt: no, absolutely not. as it says right here in the memo, which i have   and i’d encourage all of you to read it   it says, “the american people elected president trump to be the president of the united states and gave him a mandate to increase the impact of every federal dollar.” “this memo requires federal agencies to identify and review all federal financial assistance programs and supporting activities consistent with the president’s policies and requirements.” the american people gave president trump an overwhelming mandate on november 5th, and he’s just trying to ensure that the tax money going out the door in this very bankrupt city actually aligns with the will and the priorities of the american people. (cross talk.) brian glenn. q yes. welcome. ms. leavitt: thank you. q you look great. you’re doing a great job. ms. leavitt: thank you. q you talked about transparency. and some of us in this room know how just transparent president trump has been the last five or six years; i think you’ll do the same. my question is, do you think this latest incident with the president of colombia is indicative of the global, powerful respect they have for president trump moving forward not only to engage in   in economic diplomacy with these countries but also world peace? ms. leavitt: absolutely. i’ll echo the answer that the president gave on air force one last night when he was asked a very similar question by one of your colleagues in the media: this signifies peace through strength is back, and this president will not tolerate illegal immigration into america’s interior. and he expects every nation on this planet, again, to cooperate with the repatriation of their citizens who illegally entered into our country and broke america’s laws. won’t be tolerated. and as you saw, the colombian government quickly folded and agreed to all of president trump’s demands. flights are underway once again. (cross talk.) diana. q two questions on deportations, if i may. president trump had said on the campaign trail that he would deport pro hamas students who are here on visas, and on his first day in office, he signed an executive order that said, quote, “the u.s. must ensure that admitted aliens and aliens otherwise already present in the u.s. do not bear hostile attitudes toward its citizens, culture, government, institutions, or founding principles.” so, should we take this executive order as trump saying he would be open to de    deporting those students who are here on visas, but, you know, hold pro hamas sympathies? ms. leavitt: the president is open to deporting individuals who have broken our nation’s immigrations laws. so, if they are here illegally, then certainly he is open to deporting them, and that’s what this administration is hard at work at doing. we receive data from dhs and from ice every single day. from what we hear on the ground, ice agents are feeling incredibly empowered right now because they actually have a leader in this building who is supporting them in doing their jobs that they were hired to do, which is to detain, arrest, and deport illegal criminals who have invaded our nation’s borders over the past four years. that’s what the president is committed to seeing. q one more. ms. leavitt: peter. q just following up on that, karoline   q karoline, if i could ask you very quickly, just following up on the question on immigration. first, president trump, during the course of the campaign in 2024, said the following about illegal im    immigration. he said, “they’re going back home where they belong, and we start with the criminals. there are many, many criminals.” nbc news has learned that ice arrested 1,179 undocumented immigrants on sunday, but nearly half of them   566 of the migrants   appear to have no prior criminal record besides entering the country illegally. ms. leavitt: (laughs.) q is the president still focused exclusiv    which is a civil crime, not a   not a   it’s not criminal   ms. leavitt: it’s a federal crime. q it’s a fed    so, i’m asking though, he said he was going to focus on those violent offenders first. so, is violent offenders no longer the predicate for these people to be deported? ms. leavitt: the president has said countless times on the campaign trail   i’ve been with him at the rallies; i know you’ve been there covering them too, peter   that he is focused on launching the largest mass deportation operation in american history of illegal criminals. and if you are an individual, a foreign national, who illegally enters the united states of america, you are, by definition, a criminal. and so, therefore   q so, to be clear, it’s not exclusively   ms. leavitt:   you are subject deportation. q i apologize for interrupting. so, to be clear, it’s not   violent criminals do not receive precedence in terms of the deportations taking place? ms. leavitt: the president has also said   two things can be true at the same time. we want to deport illegal criminals, illegal immigrants from this country. but the president has said that, of course, the illegal dr    criminal drug dealers, the rapists, the murderers, the individuals who have committed heinous acts on the interior of our country and who have terrorized law abiding american citizens, absolutely, those should be the priority of ice. but that doesn’t mean that the other illegal criminals who entered our nation’s borders are off the table. q understood. then let me ask you a separate question about the confusion that still exists across the country right now as it relates to the   the freeze   or the pause, as it’s described. president trump, of course, ran   one of the key policy items was that he was going to lower prices, lower the cost of everything from groceries, as he often said. but in many of the cases, it would seem that some of these moves could raise prices for real americans on everything from low income heating   that program; childcare programs. will nothing that the president is doing here, in terms of the freeze in these programs, raise prices on ordinary americans? ms. leavitt: what particular actions are you referring to that would   q i’m referring to lheap right now. that’s the low income heating program, for example. we can talk about   there’s no clarity, so i could refer to a lot of them. we don’t know what they are specifically. can you tell us that lheap   that liheap is not one of those affected? ms. leavitt: so, you’re asking a hypoc     thetical based on programs that you can’t even identify? q no, i just identified   i   ms. leavitt: what i can tell you is that the   q well, just to be   just to be clear, since you guys haven’t identified, let’s do it together, just for americans at home. medicaid, is that affected? ms. leavitt: i gave you a list of examples   social security, medicare, welfare benefits   q medicaid too, correct? ms. leavitt:   food stamps   that will not be impacted by this federal pause. i can get you the full list after this briefing from the office of management and budget. but i do want to address the cost cutting, because that’s certainly very important, and   and cutting the cost of living in this country. president trump has taken historic action over the past week to do that. he actually signed a memorandum to deliver emergency price relief for american families, which took a number of actions. i can walk you through those. he also repealed many onerous biden administration regulations. we know, over the past four years, american households has been essentially taxed $55,000 in regulations from the previous administration. president trump, with the swipe of his pen, rescinded those, which will ultimately put more money back in the pockets of the american people. so, deregulation is a big deal. and then, when it comes to energy, i mean, the president signed an executive order to declare a national energy emergency here at home, which is going to make america energy dominant. we know that energy is one of the number one drivers of inflation, and so that’s why the president wants to increase our energy supply: to bring down costs for americans. the trump energy boom is incoming, and americans can expect that. q please share that memo. thank you. ms. leavitt: i will. (cross talk.) q karoline, i think   some of the confusion, i think, may be here with this pause on federal funding. you’ve made it clear you’re not stopping funds that go directly to individuals, but there certainly are lots of organizations that receive funding and then may pass along a benefit   meals on wheels, for one. they provide meals for over 2.2 million seniors. what is the president’s message to americans out there, many of whom supported him and voted for him, who are concerned that this is going to impact them directly, even if, as you said, the funding isn’t coming directly to their wallet? ms. leavitt: i have now been asked and answered this question four times. to individuals at home who receive direct assistance from the federal government, you will not be impacted by this federal freeze. in fact, omb just sent out a memo to capitol hill with q and a to   to clarify some of the questions and the answers that all of you are a    are asking me right now. again, direct assistance will not be impacted. i’ve been asked and answered about this omb memo. there’s many other topics of the day. jacqui heinrich. q but on indirect assistance, karoline   q thank you, karoline. q   if it’s going to another organization and then trickling down? ms. leavitt: direct assistance that is in the hands of the american people will not be impacted. again, as i said to peter, we will continue to provide that list as it comes to fruition. but omb right now is focused on analyzing the federal government’s spending, which is exactly what the american people elected president trump to do. (cross talk.) q thank you, karoline. q and one question on immigration, karoline. on immigration. q thank you, karo    q of the 3,500 arrests ice has made so far since president trump came back into office, can you just tell us the numbers? how many have a criminal record versus those who are just in the country illegally. ms. leavitt: all of them, because they illegally broke our nation’s laws, and, therefore, they are criminals, as far as this administration goes. i know the last administration didn’t see it that way, so it’s a big culture shift in our nation to view someone who breaks our immigration laws as a criminal. but that’s exactly what they are. jacqui. (cross talk.) q karoline, on tariffs. q but you made a point of going with the worst first. q on tariffs. q they all have a criminal record? q and welcome to the briefing room. ms. leavitt: if they broke our nation’s laws, yes, they are a criminal. yes. q thank you. on stripping security details for figures like john bolton, pompeo, brian hook. senator tom cotton said that he’s seen the intelligence and the threat from iran is real for anyone who played a role in the soleimani strike. he voiced concern it wouldn’t just impact those individuals but potentially their family, innocent bystanders, friends   anyone who is near them when they’re out in public. is the president open to reconsidering his decision? ms. leavitt: the president was asked and answered this yesterday, and he was firm in his decision, despite some of the comments that you had referenced. and he’s made it very clear that he does not believe american taxpayers should fund security details for individuals who have served in the government for the rest of their lives. and there’s nothing stopping these individuals that you mentioned from obtaining private security. that’s where the president stands on it. i have no updates on that. q is there any concern that this decision might jeopardize the administration’s ability to hire the best advisers for these kinds of positions in the future? ms. leavitt: no. in fact, i’ve talked to the presidential personnel office who has told me directly that there is such an influx of resumes for this administration that it’s incredibly overwhelming. there is no lack of talent for the trump administration. reagan ree    q and would he   would he take any responsibility   q thanks, karoline. q   if anything happened to these people? would he feel at all that his decision was a factor in that? ms. leavitt: the president was asked and answered this yesterday. i’d defer you to his comments. q thanks, karoline. q karoline   ms. leavitt: reagan, since you’re in the back row, i hear y    the back row hasn’t gotten much attention in the last four years   q yes, thank you. ms. leavitt:   so i’m happy to answer your question. q and i can project. (laughter.) does the president intend to permanently cut off funding to ngos that are bringing illegal foreign nationals to the country, such as catholic charities? ms. leavitt: i am actually quite certain that the president signed an executive order that did just that, and i can point you to that. q one more, karoline. ms. leavitt: yeah. q president trump issued an executive order on increased vetting for refugees in visa applications. ms. leavitt: that’s right. q part of that order was considering an outright ban for countries that have deficient screening processes. has the president considered yet which countries might fall into this category? are countries like afghanistan or syria under consideration for a full ban? ms. leavitt: yeah. so, the president signed an executive order to streamline the vetting for visa applicants and for illegal immigrants in this country who are coming, of course, from other nations. it also directed the secretary of state to review the process and make sure that other countries around the world are being completely transparent with our nation and the individuals that they are sending here. and so, the secretary of state has been directed to report back to the president. i haven’t seen that report yet. we’ve only been here for a few days. (cross talk.) q karoline, two questions for you. one on the freeze in federal funding. who advised the president on the legality of telling government agencies that they don’t have to spend money that was already appropriated by congress? ms. leavitt: well, as the omb memo states, this is certainly within the confines of the law. so, white house counsel’s office believes that this is within the pe    president’s power to do it, and therefore, he’s doing it. q okay. so, they disagree with lawmakers who say that they don’t have the power to   to freeze this funding? ms. leavitt: again, i would point you to the language in the memo that clearly states this is within the law. q and on what happened on friday night. the   the administration fired several inspectors general without giving congress the 30 day legally required notification that they were being fired. i think only two were left at do    dhs and the doj. and then, yesterday, we saw several prosecutors   i believe 12   fired from the justice department who worked on the investigations into the president. as you know, they are career prosecutors; therefore, they are afforded civil service protections. how is the administration deciding which laws to follow and which ones to ignore? ms. leavitt: so, it is the belief of this white house and the white house counsel’s office that the president was within his exe    executive authority to do that. he is the executive of the executive branch, and, therefore, he has the power to fire anyone within the executive branch that he wishes to. there’s also a case that went before the supreme court in 2020: scaila [seila] law llc, v. the customs   the [consumer financial protection] bureau protection. i would advise you to look at that case, and that’s the legality that this white house has rested on. q so, you’re confident that if they bring lawsuits against you   those prosecutors who were fired   that   that they will succeed? ms. leavitt: we will win in court, yes. q and did he personally direct this, given they worked on the classified documents investigation and the election interference investigation? ms. leavitt: this was a memo that went out by the presidential personnel office, and the president is the leader of this white house. so, yes. q so, it did come from him? ms. leavitt: yes, it came from this white house. (cross talk.) q karoline. ms. leavitt: sir. q thank you. congrats on your first day behind the podium. ms. leavitt: thank you. q president trump ended funding for unrwa and also designated the houthis a foreign terrorist organization. ms. leavitt: that’s right. q both were decisions that the previous administration had reversed. so, here’s my question: will there be an investigation into who gave the previous administration this terrible advice? ms. leavitt: well, that’s a very good point. i haven’t heard discussions about such an ins    investigation, but it wouldn’t be a bad idea, considering that the houthis cer    certainly are terrorists. they have launched attacks on u.s. naval ships across this world, and so i think it was a very wise move by this administration to redesignate them as a terrorist group, because they are. and i think it was a foolish decision by the previous administration to do so. as for an investigation, i’m not sure about that, but it’s not a bad idea. (cross talk.) josh. q thank you for the question. i appreciate it. can you give us an update on the president’s plan for his tariff agenda? he spoke a lot about this yesterday, and there’s a couple of dates coming up that   ms. leavitt: sure. q   he’s spoken to. number one, february 1st. he’s alluded to both the potential for tariffs for canada and mexico but also china to take effect on those days. where is   what’s he thinking about that? ms. leavitt: yeah. q should those countries expect that on the 1st? ms. leavitt: again, he was asked and answered this question this past weekend when he took a lot of questions from the press, and he said that the february 1st date for canada and mexico still holds. q and what about the china 10 percent tariff that he also had mused about last tuesday going into effect on the same date? ms. leavitt: yeah, the president has said that he is very much still considering that for february 1st. q and then, separately, yesterday, he talked also about sectoral tariffs on, for instance, pharmaceuticals, as well as semiconductor computer chips. he talked about steel, aluminum, and copper. what’s the timeline on those? is that a similar sort of “coming days” thing or   ms. leavitt: yeah, so when the president talked about that in his speech yesterday, that actually wasn’t a new announcement. that was within a presidential memorandum that he signed in one of the first days here in the white house on his america first trade agenda. so, there’s more details on those tariffs in there. as far as a date, i don’t have a specific date to read out to you, but the president is committed to implementing tariffs effectively, just like he did in his first term. q and then   and then, finally, he also was asked on the plane when he gaggled about the potential for a universal tariff. he was asked maybe about two and a half percent. ms. leavitt: yeah. q there was a report about that. he said he wanted “much bigger than that.” should we understand that these tariffs would add up? you know, in other words, you might have country specific tariffs like canada, mexico, china. you might have sectoral tariffs, like on pharmaceuticals, as well as a potential universal tariff on top of that. do these stack on one or the other, or would one sort of take precedence over another? ms. leavitt: all i can point you to is what the president has said on this front: the february 1st date for canada and mexico and also the china tariff that he has discussed. he rejected the 2.5 percent tariff. he said that was a little bit too low. he wants it to be higher. i’ll leave it to him to make any decisions on that front. q do you have any comment on what the   (cross talk.) q   what the mexicans and canadians   ms. leavitt: phil. q   have done so far? do you have any comment on whether that has met the bar of what he wants to see on fentanyl? thank you. ms. leavitt: i   i won’t get ahead of the president, again, on advocating to foreign nations on what they should or shouldn’t do to get away from these tariffs. the president has made it very clear, again, that he expects every nation around this world to cooperate with the repatriation of their citizens. and the president has also put out specific statements in terms of canada and mexico when it comes to what he expects in terms of border security. we have seen a historic level of cooperation from mexico. but, again, as far as i’m still tracking   and that was last night talking to the president directly   february 1st is still on the books. q thank you. ms. leavitt: phil. q thank you, karoline. quick programming note, and then a question on taxes. ms. leavitt: a programming note. q well, in terms of programming, should   ms. leavitt: that sounds fun. q   we expect to see you here every day? how frequently will these   q that’s a good question. q   press briefings be? ms. leavitt: it is a good question, april. so, look, the president, as you know, is incredibly accessible. first day here, he wanted all of you in the oval office. you got a 60 minute press conference with the leader of the free world   while he was simultaneously signing executive orders, i may add. that’s pretty impressive. i don’t think the previous office holder would be able to pull such a thing off. so, look, the president is the best spokesperson that this white house has, and i can assure you that you will be hearing from both him and me as much as possible. q and then a question about tax cuts. you know, the president has promised to extend the tax cuts from the previous term. i’m curious, you know, does the president support corresponding spending cuts, as some republicans have called for in congress? and will the new treasury secretary be leading those negotiations with the hill, as mnuchin did during the first administration? ms. leavitt: the president is committed to both tax cuts and spending cuts. and he has a great team negotiating on his behalf, but there’s no better negotiator than donald trump, and i’m sure he’ll be involved in this reconciliation process as it moves forward. (cross talk.) q karoline, in the announcement that you made last night on the iron dome, it said the president had directed that the united states will build this iron dome. ms. leavitt: yeah. q when you read into the executive order, it seemed short of that. it asked for a series of studies   ms. leavitt: yeah. q   and reports back on   can you tell us whether the president has directed this and, if he is this concerned on this issue, why the suspensions that we saw listed by omb included so many different nuclear programs, nonproliferation programs, programs to blend down nuclear weapons, and s    and so forth? ms. leavitt: first of all, when it comes to the iron dome, the executive order directed the implementation of the   of an iron dome. it also, as you said, kind of directed research and studies to see if   or   or how the united states can go about doing this, particularly the department of defense. when it comes to the other question that you asked about those specific programs, again, i would say, this is not a   a ban; this is a temporary pause and a freeze to ensure that all of the money going out from washington, d.c., is in align with the president’s agenda. and as the office of management and budget has updates on what will be kick started, once again, i will provide those to you. q can you clarify for a sec what you were saying before on medicaid? it wasn’t clear to me whether you were saying that no medicaid would be cut off. obviously, a lot of this goes to states before it goes to individuals and so forth. so, are you guaranteeing here that no individual now on medicaid would see a cutoff because of the pause? ms. leavitt: i’ll check back on that and get back to you. jon. q thanks a lot, karoline. as you know, in the first week that the president was in office, signed an executive order as it relates to birthright citizenship   trying to eliminate that. now, 22 state attorney generals have said that this is unconstitutional. a federal judge has just agreed with their argument. what’s the administration’s argument for doing away with birthright citizenship? ms. leavitt: the folks that you mentioned have a right to have that legal opinion, but it is in disagreement with the legal opinion of this administration. this administration believes that birthright citizenship is unconstitutional, and that is why president trump signed that executive order. illegal immigrants who come to this country and have a child are not subject to the laws of this jurisdiction. that’s the opinion of this administration. we have already appealed the rul    the lawsuit that was filed against this administration, and we are prepared to fight this all the way to the supreme court if we have to, because president trump believes that this is a necessary step to secure our nation’s borders and protect our homeland. monica. q and then on foreign policy   on foreign policy, karoline   q thank you, karoline. it’s great to see you, and you’re doing a great   q   on foreign policy, if i may. the president’s commitment to the nato defense alliance, is it as strong as the prior administration? is it the same as when he served as president in his first term in office? ms. leavitt: as long as nato pays their fair share. and president trump has called on nato allies to increase their defense spending to 5 percent. you actually saw the head of nato at davos last week on bloomberg television saying that president trump is right and if europe wants to keep itself safe, they should increase their defense spending. i would just add that there was no greater ally to our european allies than president trump in his first term. the world, for all nations in europe, and, of course, here at home was much safer because of presidents tru    trump’s peace through strength diplomatic approach. monica. q karoline   q thank you. thank you, karoline. and it’s great to finally be called on as well in the briefing room. i appreciate that. ms. leavitt: you’re welcome. q of course, we know president trump just got back from north carolina and california meeting with victims of natural disasters. there’s the two year anniversary of the east palestine, ohio, toxic train derailment. does the president have any plans to go visit the victims of that toxic spill or just visit in general? ms. leavitt: not   no plans that i can read out for you here. if that changes, i will certainly keep you posted. what i can tell you is that president trump still talks about his visit to east palestine, ohio. that was one of the turning points, i would say, in the previous election campaign, where americans were reminded that president trump is a man of the people. and he, as a candidate, visited that town that was just derailed by the train derailment   no pun intended   and he offered support and hope, just like i saw the president do this past week. it was a purposeful decision by this president, on his first domestic trip, to go to north carolina and to california to visit with americans who were impacted by hurricane helene and also by the deadly fires   a red state and a blue state, both of which feel forgotten by the previous administration and the federal government. that has now   that has now ended under president trump. he will continue to put americans first, whether they’re in east palestine, in pacific palisades, or in north carolina. (cross talk.) sure. q thank you, karoline. on california, could you please clarify what the military did with the water last night, as referenced in the president’s truth social post? ms. leavitt: the water has been turned back on in california, and this comes just days after president trump visited pacific palisades and, as you all saw, applied tremendous pressure on state and local officials in pacific palisades, including los angeles mayor karen bass, to turn on the water and to direct that water to places in the south and in the middle of the state that have been incredibly dry, which has led to the expansion   the rapid expansion of these fires. q so, could you clarify what the military’s role was, where the water came from, and how it got there? ms. leavitt: again, the army corps of engineers has been on the ground in california to respond to the devastation from these wildfires. and i would point out that just days after president trump visited the devastation from these fires, the water was turned on. that is because of the pressure campaign he put on state and local officials there, who clearly lack all common sense. and i will never forget being at that round table with the president last week and hearing the frustration in the voices of pacific palisades residents who feel as though their government has just gone insane. before president trump showed up on the scene, karen bass was telling private property owners that they would have to wait 18 months to access their private property. so, this administration, the president and his team that’s on the ground in california   ric grenell, who he has designated to oversee this great crisis   ha    will continue to put pressure on karen bass and state and local officials to allow residents to access their properties. this is a huge part of it. these residents want to take part in their own clearing out of their properties. they should be able to do that. it’s the united states of america. what happened to our freedom? clearly, it’s gone in california, but not anymore under president trump. q karoline   ms. leavitt: april. q karoline, welcome to the briefing room. ms. leavitt: thank you. q several questions. one on the pause. will minority serving institutions, preferably colleges and universities, have those monies held back temporarily at this moment? ms. leavitt: again, i have not seen the entire list, because this memo was just sent out. so, i will provide you all with updates as we receive them. okay? q karoline   q and secondly   als    q karoline. q also, secondly, when it comes to immigration, there is this southern border focus. what happens to those who have overstayed their visas? that is part of the broken immigration system. in 2023, there was a report by the biden administration, the homeland security department, that said overstays of visas were three times more than usual. will there be a focus on the overstays for visas as well? ms. leavitt: if an individual is overstaying their visa, they are therefore an illegal immigrant residing in this country, and they are subject to deportation. q and also, lastly   ms. leavitt: yes. q lastly, as we’re dealing with anti dei, anti woke efforts, we understand this administration could   is thinking about celebrating black history month. have you got any word on that? anything that you can offer to us? ms. leavitt: as far as i know, this white house certainly still intends to celebrate, and we will continue to celebrate american history and the contributions that all americans, regardless of race, religion, or creed, have made to our great country. and america is back. christian datoc. q thanks, karoline. just real quick. you mentioned the inflation executive order the president signed, but egg prices have skyrocketed since president trump took office. so, what specifically is he doing to lower those costs for americans? ms. leavitt: really glad you brought this up, because there is a lot of reporting out there that is putting the onus on this white house for the increased cost of eggs. i would like to point out to each and every one of you that, in 2024, when joe biden was in the oval office   or upstairs in the residence sleeping; i’m not so sure   egg prices increased 65 percent in this country. we also have seen the cost of everything, not just eggs   bacon, groceries, gasoline   have increased because of the inflationary policies of the last administration. as far as the egg shortage, what’s also contributing to that is that the biden administration and the department of agriculture directed the mass killing of more than 100 million chickens, which has led to a lack of chicken supply in this country, therefore a lack of egg supply, which is leading to the shortage. so, i will leave you with this point. this is an example of why it’s so incredibly important that the senate moves swiftly to confirm all of president trump’s nominees, including his nominee for the united states department of agriculture, brooke rollins, who is already speaking with kevin hassett, who is leading the economic team here at the white house, on how we can address the egg shortage in this country. as for cots, i laid out   costs   i laid out the plethora of ways that president trump has addressed saving costs for the american people over the past week. he looks forward to continuing to doing that   q karoline, what   ms. leavitt:   in the days ahead. (cross talk.) thank you, guys, so much. i’ll see you soon. end 1:52 p.m. est

an official website of the united states government official websites use .gov a .gov website belongs to an official government organization in the united states. secure .gov websites use https a lock ( lock locked padlock icon ) or https:// means you've safely connected to the .gov website. share sensitive information only on official, secure websites. primary site navigation logged in as: correspondence , dan p. mcadams, department of psychology, northwestern university, 2120 campus drive, evanston, il 60208, usa. email: dmca@northwestern.edu corresponding author. revised 2022 jan 27; received 2021 aug 12; accepted 2022 jun 3; issue date 2023 feb. this is an open access article under the terms of the http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ license, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. in the first 100 days of his u.s. presidency, joe biden sought to comfort americans who had lost loved ones to the pandemic and to initiate a surprisingly progressive policy agenda. i interpret these two cardinal features of his early presidency in terms of two traumatic losses in biden's personal life, contextualizing the argument within a 3‐tiered model of personality. this psychobiography of a single case mainly follows an inductive, grounded‐theory approach that aims to find patterns in the data that both explain a life and link to evidence‐based constructs in psychological science. as biden understands his own life story, the deaths of his wife and daughter in 1972 and first‐born adult son in 2015 forged an empathic sensibility that enables him to connect deeply with other americans through shared grief and pain. these two traumatic events also inform the uniquely conciliatory approach he followed to instigate social change. the first 100 days of the biden presidency provide a striking example of how a particular person's life history comes to meet the broader historical moment. the findings have implications for how personality researchers think about redemptive life stories and the nature of late‐life narrative identity. keywords: empathy, joe biden, narrative identity, psychobiography, redemptive stories in the november 2020 election, joseph r. biden defeated the incumbent donald j. trump to become the 46th president of the united states. when he was inaugurated on january 20, 2021, at the age of 78, biden was the oldest man ever to assume occupancy of the oval office. the new president faced a litany of daunting challenges related to the covid‐19 pandemic, the collapse of the world economy, racial strife in the united states, the mounting ramifications of global climate change, and existential threats to american democratic institutions, the latter starkly exhibited in the january 6 insurrection at the nation's capital. only hours after the riot at the u. s. capitol building was quelled, 147 republicans (139 in the house, 8 in the senate) voted to overturn biden's electoral victory, effectively endorsing donald trump's false claim that the election was stolen (yourish et al., 2021). nonetheless, president biden promised to bring bipartisanship back to washington. in the first 100 days of his administration, biden worked to reverse many of donald trump's initiatives (especially those relating to the environment and climate change), restore confidence and competence in government agencies, oversee the rollout of the covid‐19 vaccines, diversify the judiciary, ease racial tensions, and improve america's standing in the world community of nations. however, the two signature features that most dramatically marked the early days of his presidency were (1) his heartfelt efforts to comfort a grieving nation devastated by the pandemic (and riven by racial discord) and (2) his dogged pursuit of the most progressive economic policy agenda proposed by a democratic administration in over 50 years, much of it aimed at helping the poor and bolstering the middle class. as such, biden embraced two newfound roles. he became (1) a comforter for a suffering people and (2) a (reluctant) revolutionary for progressive change. in what follows, i will argue that two searing life events shaped the president's engagement of these powerful roles. the first occurred only weeks before biden was sworn in as the newly elected united states senator from delaware, in december of 1972, when his wife and daughter were killed in an automobile accident. the second was the death of his beloved first‐born son, beau, who at age 46 succumbed to brain cancer. these two events decisively shaped biden's understanding of himself and the world. they are probably the two most psychologically consequential self‐defining memories in joe biden's life (singer & salovey, 1993), and they mark dramatic turning points in biden's internalized and evolving narrative identity (mcadams & mclean, 2013). these tragic events in biden's life prepared him well to meet an unprecedented moment in american history. the first 100 days of the biden administration provide a compelling illustration, therefore, of what erik erikson (1975) once characterized as the coming together of “life history” and “the historical moment,” or what personality psychologists have more prosaically described as the interaction of the person and the situation (kenrick & funder, 1988). the theoretical framing for this investigation is provided by mcadams and pals (2006; mcadams, 2013a), who delineate three distinctive layers of personality structure and functioning. layer 1 refers to the person as a social actor, whose style of enacting social roles is partly determined by broad dispositional personality traits, such as those encompassed within the big five framework. layer 2 refers to the person as a motivated agent, whose goal‐directed strivings are shaped by plans, programs, projects, motives, goals, values, and other contextualized constructs that comprise a person's motivational agenda. layered over the motivational agenda and the dispositional profile is a person's narrative identity (mcadams & mclean, 2013), which consists of the amalgam of internalized and evolving stories that a person constructs to make sense of their life in time. as the main feature of layer 3 in personality, narrative identity provides a person's life with some degree of unity, purpose, and a sense of temporal continuity. the current analysis will pay special attention to narrative identity. as background, i will first provide a capsule summary of joe biden's life history. the interpretation itself both its process and content will appear under method and results. under discussion, i will consider implications of my study of biden for personality research more generally and for the concept of narrative identity. table 1 locates the major events in joe biden's personal and professional life on a timeline, running from his birth into a devout catholic family in 1942 to his inauguration as president of the united states in january of 2021. what the timeline does not quite convey, however, is the emotional feel and tenor of biden's lived experience. reports from family members and biden himself suggest that he was a loved and happy child who was highly esteemed by his peers (biden, 2008; witcover, 2010). tall and athletic, biden attracted friends and admirers from early childhood onward. “in almost any group, i was the leader,” biden (2008, p. 22) once wrote, in describing his childhood and teen‐age years. the life of joe biden: a timeline biden's father had once been wealthy, but he suffered major financial setbacks around the time joe was born. economically strapped, the family moved in with the maternal grandparents. they struggled for many years but eventually secured a relatively stable middle‐ class status when biden's father became a successful used‐car salesman. beyond family finances, the only significant adversity that joe biden appeared to experience in his early years was his stutter. in the catholic high school he attended, some of his peers called him “dash,” because his speech patterns reminded them of morse code, as in dot‐dot‐dot‐dash. or, showing off their prowess in latin, they referred to him as “joe impedimenta.” in a scene that stands out in biden family lore, his mother once marched into the school and threatened to tear off a nun's bonnet after she learned that the nun had made fun of her son's stutter in a literature class. yet most teachers and other adults were supportive. biden (2008) wrote: i beat the stutter with a lot of hard work and with the support of my teachers and my family. but i have never really let go of my impedimenta. it's not a heavy load, but it's always with me, like a touchstone, as a reminder that everybody carries his or her own burdens most of them a lot bigger than mine and nobody deserves to be made to feel smaller for having them, and nobody should be consigned to carry them alone. (p. 23) an indifferent student in college, biden attended syracuse law school, where he continued to receive mediocre grades. he ran into trouble at syracuse because of his spotty class attendance and his failure to follow instructions on class assignments. in law school, “i was a dangerous combination of arrogant and sloppy,” biden (2008, p. 36) recalls. because he failed to properly cite text lifted from an article in the fordham law review, biden was accused of plagiarism on a class paper. a review panel determined that he had not intentionally cheated on the assignment, but he was forced to re‐take the course. the charge of plagiarism would not be the last in his career. during his first run for the presidency (1987 1988), he repeatedly incorporated into his speeches a passage from an address delivered by a british politician, without appropriate attribution. after new york times reporter marueen dowd uncovered the truth, biden attributed the mistake to campaign fatigue. nonetheless, his opponents saw a pattern, linking the incident to biden's problems in law school. the conservative columnist william safire labeled biden “plagiarizing joe.” because of the allegation and numerous other problems in the campaign, biden dropped out of the race. as a law student and young lawyer, biden relied on his good looks and his winning personal style to get along and get ahead in life. his major interests at the time seemed to be politics and women. dipping into his $89 tax refund, biden joined two buddies on a short trip to the bahamas, where he met, and immediately fell in love with, neilia hunter. they married in 1966, and in the next six years produced three children beau, hunter, and naomi. during this period, local democratic operatives identified the telegenic and loquacious biden to be a potential political star, even though he had achieved rather little as a lawyer. with no established politician willing to take the risk, they urged biden to run for senate as the democratic nominee against a well‐respected but less‐than‐dazzling republican incumbent. biden's extended catholic family and many friends campaigned up and down the tiny state of delaware. in an election year that saw the republican richard nixon overwhelm george mcgovern in a landslide, the 29‐year‐old democrat from delaware eked out an unexpected victory. in late november of 1972, joe biden was on top of the world. newly elected to one of the most prestigious jobs on the planet, happily married with three healthy children in tow, a future of seemingly boundless success projecting out to the horizon, biden was a golden american boy living a camelot dream, as his political hero john f. kennedy had lived it a decade before. as with kennedy, though, tragedy cut the dream short. on her way home from christmas shopping on december 18, neilia's car was struck by a tractor‐trailer, instantly killing her and the 13‐month‐old naomi. for the next five years, biden held down his senate job as he endeavored, with some help from his extended family, to be a good father to his two surviving sons. devastated by the loss of nelia and naomi, he believed he would be no more than a one‐term senator. his gloom gradually lifted, however. he began dating jill tracy jacobs, and they were married in 1977. “when i fell for jill, i started to feel normal again, like i might be capable of running for a second term,” biden (2008, p. 113) later remarked. their daughter (ashley) was born in 1981. unless he was traveling, biden rode the amtrak train home to delaware nearly every evening, leaving washington dc in time to spend the night with jill and the kids. for the next three decades, biden served as one of the most influential and publicly visible members of the united states senate. he specialized in foreign policy and the judiciary. as described in table 1, presiding over the supreme court confirmation hearings of robert bork and clarence thomas brought him national acclaim and criticism, as did his short‐lived presidential runs for the 1988 and 2008 democratic party nominations. in the thomas confirmation hearings, biden was criticized for failing to more aggressively pursue charges of sexual misconduct levied against thomas. he also achieved some degree of notoriety for unfiltered and often ill‐advised public comments biden gaffes, as they came to be known. put simply, he talked too much (even by the standards of american politicians), and he often managed to make offensive comments. viewed to be an intellectual lightweight early in his career, biden gradually developed a reputation as a conscientious and energetic legislator who forged positive relationships with senators on both sides of the aisle. he proved to be especially effective in brokering compromises between liberal democrats and conservative republicans. biden famously convinced the arch segregationist senator strom thurmond (south carolina) to support voting rights legislation in 1982 (shear et al., 2022). among his most notable legislative achievements was shepherding through congress the violence against women act in 1994, for which biden was able to garner greater than expected support among initially reluctant republicans. when he accepted barack obama's offer to be his partner on the 2008 democratic ticket, biden insisted that, as vice president, he should be substantively involved in all important aspects of the administration's policy. as witcover (2010, p. 410) describes it, biden told obama: “the good news is, i'm sixty‐five and you're not going to have to worry about my positioning myself to be president. the bad news is, i want to be part of the deal.” obama agreed to make biden his chief advisor. the two men developed an effective working partnership over the subsequent 8 years, and a close personal relationship. obama gave the eulogy at the funeral for biden's first‐born son, beau, who died of brain cancer in the spring of 2015. biden was devastated by the loss. his energy sapped and spirit nearly broken, biden refrained from entering the 2016 presidential contest, even though he felt he stood a better chance of defeating a republican candidate than did hillary clinton. he effectively retired from politics at the end of obama's second term. a year into trump's presidency, however, biden began to reconsider. after president trump refused to condemn white supremacists who marched through charlottesville, va in august of 2017, biden began to lay plans for a third presidential run. in a large field of fiercely liberal democratic candidates, biden stood out as a conciliatory moderate who promised to work with republicans to heal a divided nation and bring positive change for common, hard‐working americans (allen & parnes, 2021). he stumbled badly in the early democratic primaries, but eventually prevailed to win the nomination, and, in november of 2020, the presidency. this is a pre‐registered qualitative case study of a single individual. in the pre‐registration process, i spelled out the full plan for the investigation, as described below. following the general approach that i developed in previous psychobiographical studies of presidents george w. bush (mcadams, 2011) and donald j. trump (mcadams, 2017, 2020), my inquiry proceeded in a largely inductive manner. rather than testing a hypothesis derived from theory or precedent, i began instead with the data on joe biden's life and presidency, looking for emerging themes to help me understand the case. when a theme or idea emerged in one data arena (e.g., a magazine article on biden), i looked for related evidence to support, refute, or elaborate the idea in other data arenas (e.g., biden's autobiographical writings or speeches). in an inductive, grounded‐theory approach to research, data suggest interpretations, which are then, in turn, evaluated and refined by examining more data (corbin & strauss, 2014). the abstract theory/interpretation of the case, then, is discovered within, or emerges out of, the concrete data. that said, theoretical predilections nearly always guide the process of discovery. as with the previous studies of bush and trump, my investigation of biden's life and presidency was shaped by three decades of research and theorizing within personality and life‐span developmental psychology, wherein i have formulated a three‐tiered model of personality development (mcadams, 2013a; mcadams & pals, 2006). the theory asserts that personality develops as a patterning of dispositional traits (the person as social actor), personal goals and values (the person as motivated agent), and integrative life stories (the person as autobiographical author), situated within an evolving cultural context. what this meant for the present project was that i was especially sensitive to information that might shed light on biden's dispositional temperament traits (actor), life goals (agent), and narrative identity (author), as well as the cultural and historical forces that have shaped his life. once i decided to write a psychobiography of joe biden to be considered for publication in this special issue of the journal of personality (fall of 2020), i followed a four‐step sequence to complete the project, as laid out through the pre‐registration process. step 1: initial data collection. in late 2020, i began collecting published information on joe biden's life and his public service. this involved finding and reading intellectually reputable and mainly nonpartisan sources (such as news articles and analyses in the new york times, wall street journal, and the atlantic and new yorker magazines), published biographies (e.g., osnos, 2020a; witcover, 2010), and previous psychological studies of biden (e.g., immelman, 2019). of special interest were biden's two autobiographical volumes, the first (biden, 2008) written in preparation for his ill‐fated second run for the presidency, and the second (biden, 2017) as a meditation on the death of his son. while campaign autobiographies are always self‐serving, i have nonetheless found these documents to be especially revealing of character and narrative identity in past research (see bush, 1999; obama, 1995; trump, 2015). through june of 2021, i continued to collect and read sources on biden. i took extensive written notes, compiling an ongoing notebook that included initial observations, comments, and hunches that i developed in reading the sources. the contents of the notebook tracked the inductive and iterative process of gradually formulating a suitable interpretation of biden's life and presidency. step 2: articulating a question. most psychological studies of the single case ultimately focus on a particular set of questions or issues in a person's life (elms, 1994; schultz, 2005). for example, my book‐length study of george w. bush (mcadams, 2011) focused mainly on the psychological factors that may have influenced his decision, as president, to launch a pre‐emptive invasion of iraq in 2003. going into this project, i suspected that whatever the focus would be it would involve paying special attention to the first 100 days of the biden presidency. as that period unfolded and i collected more and more observations in the notebook, i began to narrow my purview to (1) biden's response to the pandemic and (2) the unveiling of his surprisingly progressive, even radical, economic policy agenda. i wanted to find psychological antecedents and personal events in his life that might help to explain his characteristic responses to the pandemic and to the economic crisis in america. and i wanted to understand how those processes, events, or determinants from biden's life history may have been magnified or transformed by the historical moment that biden confronted in early 2021. step 3: building an argument. even as i was narrowing my focus under the rubric of step 2 above, i was forming an emotional affiliation for certain features of biden's life history. early in my reading, for example, i was struck by biden's affinity for drawing upon stories that his grandparents and parents told him when he was a child. these seemed to be key to understanding his philosophy of life and certain political positions he adopted. in my notebook, i flagged a powerful account biden (2008) provided of an incident in 1962 when, as a white lifeguard working at a nearly all‐black public swimming pool, he came close to engaging in a knife fight with an unruly patron. but biden, at age 19, managed to defuse the situation. still, he was ready to do battle; he was not going to back off. i sensed an animating metaphor in all of this, but i could not quite make it work for the purposes of this paper. nor did the family stories biden loved to tell bear much fruit for my analysis. eventually, i decided, instead, to do a deep interpretative dive into the two great tragedies in joe biden's personal life the death of his wife and daughter in 1972, and the death of beau in 2015. while these events probably influenced biden in many ways, i thought, they seemed especially germane for interpreting his response to the death and devastation of the covid‐19 pandemic. eventually, i came to see these two incidents, and other events that resulted from them, to be instructive for understanding the president's approach to economic policy, as well. in retrospect, the choice of these two traumatic events may seem too obvious, given the general cultural expectation that psychologists today often focus on the long‐term effects of trauma. for this reason, i initially resisted going down the trauma path. like me, i suspect that psychobiographers often feel a strong need to come up with something original an interpretation that goes beyond what others are likely to formulate. that said, sometimes what seems obvious in its importance is indeed important. in the process of writing a psychobiography of donald j. trump, for example, i initially downplayed the importance of what nearly every psychologist familiar with trump's life would underscore: trump's narcissism. however, i eventually came back to the obvious, though i developed a novel conceptual framework for recontextualizing narcissism as a product of trump's moment‐by‐moment, episodic approach to life (mcadams, 2020). step 4: composing the manuscript. to a much greater extent than is the case with hypothesis‐testing, nomothetic research in personality science, writing a psychological biography is itself an integral part of the investigative process. the question (step 2) and the explanation (step 3) may be further modified and refined in the process of writing the paper. the limits and affordances of the writing task itself shape not only how the paper is structured but what, in fact, the paper says. in writing certain chapters of my book on trump (mcadams, 2020), i was unable to predict ahead of time exactly how the argument would unfold. the creative writing process brings new ideas to the fore, which shape the argument in the process of making it. let me add that further reshaping occurred as a result the review process and the passing of time between writing the original version of this paper (late summer of 2021) and the revision (january of 2022). in the interim, the editors and two external reviewers provided input that further shaped the paper's argument. by january of 2022, moreover, biden's presidency passed its one‐year mark. while biden enjoyed some early success in realizing his policy projects, congress failed to pass the most progressive features his legislative agenda. as of january 2022, biden had failed to bring republicans and democrats together around common policy goals. and he had failed to elicit the support of all 50 democratic senators needed to muscle legislation through the budget reconciliation process, or to overturn senate rules (e.g., the filibuster) that the minority party can use to stymy the will of the majority. these developments cast new light on the limitations of biden's vision for comity in government a vision that has its origins in the two traumatic events. as i see it, psychobiography is the artful application of psychological science to the understanding of a notable person's life (mcadams, 2005). it is part science, but also part art. with respect to the art of psychobiography, the author strives to produce something that is aesthetically compelling, even as it incorporates valid scientific theories and findings. this standard does not typically apply to purely scientific articles, of the kind typically published in this journal though, of course, scientific articles need to be written well enough to be understandable within a scientific community. but the aesthetic of narrative (bruner, 1986) the push to tell an engaging story about a specific human being living in a particular time does (and should) apply, i believe, to the current project, whose character and shape have shifted somewhat as i have engaged in the act of writing. within qualitative research circles, there is growing interest today in authors' considering and declaring their positionality vis‐à‐vis their subjects. issues of gender, race/ethnicity, and cohort are especially relevant in this regard. in my case, i am a white, 67‐year‐old male researcher, with over three decades of experience in personality and life‐span developmental psychology and an abiding interest in american culture and politics (e.g., mcadams, 2013b). in this project, i am trying to understand the life and career of a white man who more‐or‐less shares my demographic, though he is 11 years older. in reading biden's (2008, 2017) autobiographies, i found myself to be intimately and comfortably familiar with many of his references and expressions. biden reminds me of men i have known, in many ways. more so than for bush (mcadams, 2011) and trump (mcadams, 2020), i feel that i identify with biden. as a result, i may be implicitly relating to him and his life in ways that i have related to important other people in my life, perhaps especially men i have admired. on the one hand, then, there is bias here, and i am (at least partly) aware of it. i like biden, and i identify with him. i need to monitor the bias and work hard to rein it in. (a similar, though opposite, problem occurred in my work on donald trump, in which i felt a strong antipathy for my subject; i needed to restrain my negative feelings to provide a credible and fair‐minded interpretation of his life.). on the other hand, my positionality vis‐à‐vis biden may bring to the fore a bias that i can profitably employ as i aim for a deep understanding of my subject. i think i have good insight into his worldview because, in part, i may share it. just 18 days after the death of his young wife and infant daughter, joe biden was sworn in as the new senator from delaware. a black‐and‐white ap photo shows a standing biden, hand on a family bible, reciting his oath in a wilmington, de hospital room, as the four‐year‐old beau looks on from his bed, his leg elevated in a caste (lavender, 2015). biden's face is grim. even before he settled into his senate office, biden threatened to quit the job. it is reported that he contemplated suicide (osnos, 2020b). years later, biden reflected on what he was thinking and feeling in the early months of 1973: the underpinnings of my life had been kicked out from under me. .. and it wasn't just the loss of neilia and naomi. all my life i'd been taught about our benevolent god. this is a forgiving god, a just god, a god who knows people make mistakes. this is a god who is tolerant. this is a god who gave us free will to be able to doubt. this was a loving god, a god of comfort. well, i did not want to hear anything about a merciful god. no words, no prayer, no sermon gave me ease. i felt god had played a horrible trick on me, and i was angry. i found no comfort in the church. so i kept walking the dark streets to try to exhaust my rage. (biden, 2008, p. 81) in a bipartisan show of comity that is difficult to imagine today, biden's colleagues democratic and republican rallied around the new senator, even though many of them hardly knew who he was. hubert humphrey called biden every day, to check in on the young man's state of mind. senate majority leader mike mansfield provided fatherly counsel on nearly a daily basis. to distract him from the grief, ted kennedy regularly dragged biden to the senate gym. president nixon offered personal condolences. but the kindness shown to biden offered little solace at first. he wrote: “losing neilia and naomi had taken all the joy out of being a united states senator; it had taken all the joy out of life. even on the best of days i didn't have the heart to imagine a future within or without the senate” (biden, 2008, p. 88). during his first year in the senate, biden felt as if his life had been wrenched away from the flow of time. his immediate past was too painful to think about, and he could imagine no viable future no future in the senate, and no future outside of it. it is as if he had stepped outside of his own life story. during this time, biden experienced a radical disruption in the construction of narrative identity, comprising the third layer of his personality (mcadams & pals, 2006). as autobiographical authors, people find meaning, purpose, and temporal continuity in their lives by constructing coherent narrative identities (mcadams, 2013a). in biden's case, he was able still to go through the motions of being a united states senator. he went to committee meetings. he responded to his constituents' mail. biden continued to perform as if he were the protagonist of an ongoing story. but he was no longer able to narrate the story. he was no longer able to apprehend a viable, long‐term narrative to link who he had been in the past with who he hoped to become in the future. biden's recovery was slow and halting. gradually, he began to make peace with god. and as he did so, he began to re‐assume authorship of his life story. the ideological setting for biden's life story had always been strongly inflected by his optimistic catholic faith. a benevolent god looked after his faithful people. joe was one of god's favorites, blessed with natural talent and positive life circumstances. violently and suddenly, the automobile accident stripped the original setting away. eventually, however, biden replaced what had been destroyed with a more tempered and ambivalent backdrop of personal belief and value, yet one that affirmed life anew: somewhere in the middle of all that running around [back and forth between washington and wilmington, as well as trips around the country] i began to make my peace with god or with myself. quite frankly, i just got tired of wallowing in grief. i started to think of my rage at god as an unbecoming form of egotism. what was more self‐indulgent than to think god had been busying himself with my particular circumstances? there's a little cartoon i keep on my desk. in the first panel a guy just struck by lightning, charred, is shaking his fist at god: “why me!?!” in the second panel god answers with a shrug: “why not you?” why not me? exactly. why not me? bad things happen. millions of people had it worse than me. get up and keep moving, i kept telling myself, and be alive. (biden, 2008, p. 96) in biden's new narrative understanding, god is more‐or‐less indifferent to the plight of humankind. the world seems more dangerous now, and more random. still, biden does not abandon his catholic faith. if anything, his bond with the church is strengthened. to this day, he regularly attends mass and professes a strong affiliation with catholicism as a world‐wide community. his humanistic and communal understanding of religion dovetails with a view of human nature that was reinforced in his early senate years: people are (mainly) good. and people want to be good. “i believe basically in the goodness of human nature, and it will win out,” biden once said, in describing the life of a senator who opposed him on nearly every legislative issue (witcover, 2010, p. 353). biden came to believe that people are basically good because of the goodness he saw in his fellow senators. key to his insight was the extraordinary help his colleagues offered him during his prolonged period of grief. biden came to love the senate, and to love individual senators. “i've … seen a thousand small kindnesses from one side of the aisle to the other and hundreds of acts of personal and political courage,” biden (2008, p. xviii) wrote in the preface of an autobiography. also, he learned that it is much easier to work with your fellow senators if you like them, and they like you. when the young biden went to senator mansfield with complaints about the republican senator jesse helms, mansfield cut him off: “listen joe,” he told me. “everybody who is here has something. the people who elected them saw something good in them.” then he told me the story of helms's adopting a nine‐year‐old with cerebral palsy. … “you're job here is to find the good things in your colleagues the things their state saw and not focus on the bad.” (biden, 2008, p. 110) biden drew this moral from the story: we start with an assumption of goodwill toward one another. the same should hold true in the senate family, mansfield had reminded me. it's probably the single most important piece of advice i got in my career. (biden, 2008, p. 111) in 2008, barack obama commissioned his aide, david axelrod, to gather background information on joe biden, to evaluate biden's suitability as a running mate. axelrod came back with this message: “there's something really special about this family. … it's not a thing; it's real. … i don't know how that plays into all of this, but it seems to me to be a real asset” (osnos, 2020a, p. 58). axelrod recalled a conversation he witnessed between joe biden and his adult son, beau. after promising to stop by later to see his grandchildren, joe said goodbye to beau: “i have a recollection that he kissed him,” axelrod reported. “he said ‘i love you’” (osnos, 2020a, p. 58). as a term of endearment, biden often referred to each of his three children beau, hunter, and ashley as “honey” (biden, 2017, p. 117). biden is known for his intimate language and overtly physical displays of affection. he is a hugger and a kisser. 1 within the nexus of family affection, beau may have held the dearest position of anybody, including perhaps even joe's two wives. in the first‐born beau, biden saw an improved version of himself: “beau biden, at age forty‐five, was joe biden 2.0. he had all the best of me, but with the bugs and flaws engineered out” (biden, 2017, p. 14). as a member of the delaware army national guard, beau biden was deployed in iraq in 2008. he was elected to be attorney general in delaware, and he served two terms. before his illness, beau had his eye on higher political offices, such as delaware governor. joe hoped that beau might someday become president. where the father had failed, the favorite son might succeed. it is expected that parents serve as attachment figures for their children, soothing them when they are agitated and supplying them with a secure base for their explorations of the world (bowlby, 1969). in the case of joe and beau, however, a reciprocal arrangement also seemed to prevail once beau attained adulthood. “beau had a way of instilling courage and calming me,” wrote joe biden (2017, p. 164). “beau could always chase my fears away. he saved my life, along with hunter, forty years ago” after neilia and naomi died (biden, 2017, p. 191). even when beau's health was failing precipitously, he served as a source of confidence and courage for his father. “it's going to be okay, daddy,” he would say. “i'm not going away” (biden, 2017, p. 191). when beau died, joe biden wrote this in his diary: “it happened. my god, my boy. my beautiful boy” (biden, 2017, p. 189). even the stoic barack obama was moved to tears upon the death of beau biden. to be expected, joe was overwhelmed with grief. for months, he and jill had held out hope that beau would beat the terrible odds. when the end came, biden felt more beaten down than angry. friends remarked that beau's death erased any vestiges of the young joe biden's native cockiness (osnos, 2020a, pp. 112 113): “the whole beau experience just killed off the arrogant stuff,” a former aide said. “it was almost physical. you could see it in how he stood.” “he emerges as this sort of humbled, purposeful man.” the evolution in biden's disposition as a social actor from a friendly but cocky young man (who loved to listen to himself speak) to a humbler and deeply empathic older man (who can be remarkably understated and self‐effacing) roughly tracks the normative developmental trend observed in many longitudinal studies of the big five trait agreeableness (a) (bleidorn & hopwood, 2019). while nomothetic research suggests that maturation toward higher levels of agreeableness (and its attendant features of compassion, modesty, and empathy) tends to be gradual, and typically not directly linked to any particular life events in midlife and beyond (bleidorn et al., 2018), the death of beau may have, nonetheless, provided further psychological impetus for this particular developmental move in biden's eighth decade of life. biden's acute psychological pain found a precise localized embodiment: “i felt like there was a tiny dark hole in the middle of my chest” (biden, 2017, p. 199). biden did not rage against god, as he did after the first big tragedy in his life. despite god's showing once again the indifference of “why not you?” biden still found some solace in his religious faith. “when i pray, i find myself not only praying to god, but praying to neilia and to my mom to intercede with god for me. it's a way of reminding myself that they are still part of me” (biden, 2017, pp. 199 200). as for beau, he retained in death a role he had long played in joe biden's life story as an internalized model of secure attachment, providing the father with what biden himself (biden, 2017, p. 192) repeatedly refers to as “home base,” or what bowlby (1969) and attachment researchers regularly describe as a secure base from which to engage the world. in a psychologically literal sense, the son (beau) was (a nurturing) father to the man (joe). in this regard, a key scene in joe biden's late‐life narrative identity is his reconstruction of a particular conversation he had with his dying son. beau said: you've got to promise me, dad, that no matter what happens, you are going to be all right. give me your word, dad, that you are going to be all right. promise me, dad. (biden, 2017, p. 201). since the advent of radio, and perhaps before, americans have expected their presidents to provide consoling words during times of national trauma. with the strange exception of donald j. trump, every president has managed to rise to the challenge. during the great depression, franklin delano roosevelt broadcast regular fireside chats, in which he expressed both sympathy for the pain americans were experiencing and optimism for the future. president george w. bush gave his greatest speech at the national cathedral, just days after 9/11, in which he offered words of solace and inspiration for the nation. even richard nixon, dour and depressive in private, was especially solicitous when visiting the families of fallen american soldiers, and he offered consoling words to the young joe biden upon the loss of his wife and daughter. perhaps no president since abraham lincoln, however, has spoken more naturally and more convincingly in a register of human grief than has joe biden. his hard‐won gift for this kind of rhetoric stems from the two key traumatic scenes in his own life story. in his first national address as president‐elect, biden invoked the embodied metaphor at the center of his own grieving: “for families and friends left behind, there's a gaping hole in your heart that will never be fully healed” (baker, 2020). in the same address, biden observed that the nation has “been living with this pandemic for so long, we're at risk of becoming numb to its toll on all of us” (baker, 2020). do not ignore the suffering, biden counseled. do not try to repress it, because “our collective pain” will lead to “collective purpose, to control the pandemic, to save lives and to heal a nation” (baker, 2020). in february of 2021, the nation passed the half million mark in covid deaths. to mark the staggering milestone, biden appeared in the cross hall of the white house and pulled a card from his jacket pocket that he said was updated each day with a tally of the dead. then, he looked into the camera and addressed the survivors directly, alluding several times to the loss of neilia, naomi, and beau: i know all too well. i know what it's like to not be there when it happens. i know what it's like when you are there holding their hands; there's a look in their eye and they slip away. that black hole in the chest you feel like you are being sucked into it. the survivor's remorse, the anger, the questions of faith in your soul. (sanger & stolberg, 2021) a few days later, biden traveled to texas to comfort victims of a deadly storm. in the words of a new york times reporter, biden “hugged a little girl who was volunteering [at a food bank], then talked to a woman about the death of his eldest son, once again plugging into the pain of others by accessing his own” (rogers, 2021a). “not every president comes naturally to the role of comforting the afflicted,” noted the reporter, “but mr. biden, who lost his first wife and has buried two children, is the rare politician who seems to draw strength from the experience.” in early march, biden gave his first prime‐time white house address, in which he reflected on a “collective suffering, a collective sacrifice, a year filled with the loss of life and the loss of living, for all of us” (rogers, 2021b). at the end of the speech, biden pivoted toward hope: “finding light in the darkness is a very american thing to do,” he said. “in fact, it may be the most american thing we do.” it is important to find the light in the darkness, biden maintains. and it is important to see the darkness for what it is. recognizing the 100th anniversary of the 1921 massacre of african american citizens in tulsa, oklahoma, biden told his audience: for much too long, the history of what took place here was told in silence. while darkness can hide much, it erases nothing. … we do ourselves no favors by pretending none of this ever happened. we should know the good, the bad, everything. that's what great nations do. they come to terms with their dark sides. (rogers & shear, 2021) joe biden has never been a great orator. it is reported that once during a particularly long‐winded biden speech, an irritated barack obama passed a note to one of his aides saying: “shoot. me. now.” (osnos, 2020b). during the 2020 presidential campaign and in the first few months of his presidency, biden did a better job of keeping remarks concise and to the point, but his oratory rarely soared. still, he forged strong emotional connections with his audiences when speaking to their pain, and to painful events in american history. in a 2015 interview with late‐night television host stephen colbert, biden spoke of his own grief and listened attentively as colbert shared the story of the death of his father and two brothers in a plane crash. colbert later told a journalist that the interaction with biden “was one of the most compact and affecting conversations i think i've ever had” (osnos, 2020a, p. 113). biden “expresses the loneliness of grief and makes you feel less alone,” colbert said. biden is keenly aware of his social facility in the arena of human pain. in his own life story, he connects this proclivity explicitly to the death of beau. as he sees it, helping others deal with their own grief helps him deal with his: at bottom, i also knew from personal experience, the struggle with grief and pain is an individual event, no matter how many friends and supporters a person can count, no matter how strong his or her faith. but i really believed that just being there, offering my physical presence, letting them see me, still standing, might make a difference to them. might give them some hope. the simple act of offering solace to other people has been the most rewarding service i have performed in my time out of public office. it seems to be much needed these days. and the truth was, feeling like i could provide some small measure of balm for people in pain has helped me heal. (biden, 2017, pp. 262 263) from his earliest days in the senate, biden positioned himself as a moderate liberal who believed in incremental change. the progressive base of the democratic party who rallied to the words of ted kennedy and jesse jackson in the 1980s, and who today find common cause with senator bernie sanders and congresswoman alexandria ocasio‐cortez has never thrilled to joe biden. even though biden ran on a progressive democratic platform, he was widely viewed to be more conservative and more cautious than nearly all his democratic opponents in the presidential primaries. it was no small shock to the political world, therefore, when president biden's first 100 days featured a bonanza of progressive legislative initiatives and executive orders. a disgruntled paul ryan, former republican speaker of the house, summed up the reality of the new biden presidency this way: “in 2020, the country wanted a nice guy who would move to the center and depolarize our politics,” ryan said. “instead, we got a nice guy pursuing an agenda more leftist than any president in my lifetime” (karni, 2021). born in 1970, paul ryan never witnessed lyndon johnson's great society project in the 1960s or roosevelt's new deal. indeed, those are the two apt historical precedents for the scope and the content of biden's early domestic agenda. in the first two weeks of his administration, biden signed over 40 executive orders, memoranda, and proclamations enacting or initiating major shifts to the left on racial justice, immigration, climate change, and transgender rights (lerer & epstein, 2021). he forcefully advocated for a radically expanded social safety net for americans, a redistribution of wealth, and massive investment in infrastructure, including what progressives describe as “human” infrastructure, entailing early education, childcare, and health care. in the first 100 days, biden's big legislative achievement was passing the $1.9 trillion american rescue plan act of 2021, packaged as a stimulus bill in response to the economic destruction wrought by covid‐19. in truth, it was much more than a stimulus bill, providing substantial economic benefits targeted mainly to the middle class and the poor. columbia university's center on poverty and social policy estimated that the bill's provisions, including a generous expansion of tax credits for low‐income americans with children, would reduce poverty in the united states by more than a quarter for adults and cut the child poverty rate by half (tankersley, 2021). “the child benefit has the markings of a policy revolution,” wrote jason deparle (2021), an expert on families and poverty. with respect to the psychology of joe biden, there are three points to make about his surprising emergence, in 2021, as a strong agent for social and economic change in america. first, the dramatic and unprecedented events of 2020 especially the mounting deaths and economic destruction caused by the pandemic as well as the racial turmoil that followed the murder of george floyd in minneapolis fed into long‐term disturbing trends in american society (in particular, growing income inequality, the hollowing out of the middle class, disruptions caused by climate change) to create a unique historical moment calling out for change and biden recognized the moment. as the new york times columnist david brooks (2021) put it, biden “may not have sought transformation, but transformation found him.” he was flexible and opportunistic in this regard, and open to promoting policies that he had never explicitly promoted before. second, it seems quite possible that biden's sensitivity to the suffering of others, reinforced by the two traumatic events in his own life, may have partly motivated him to adopt a more progressive stance toward issues of economics and equity. biden's aides report that he was “moved by the inequities in pain and suffering that the pandemic has inflicted on the poorest americans” (shear et al., 2021). “we all grow,” noted representative james clyburn of south carolina, in reference to biden's evolution as a change agent. “during the campaign, he [biden] recognized what was happening in this country, this pandemic,” clyburn said. “it is not like anything we have had in 100 years. if you are going to address covid‐19’s impact, you have to address the economic disparities that exist in this country” (shear et al., 2021). third, no matter how revolutionary his policy aspirations may seem, biden still longed desperately for bipartisan consensus in the first 100 days. even as progressive democrats sought to enact the most liberal policy agenda since the 1960s, biden wanted to bring at least a handful of republicans on board, especially in the senate. he wanted this even though not a single republican voted in favor of the american rescue act of 2021. biden relishes compromise. he loves finding the middle ground (osnos, 2020a). by dint of temperament and ideology, biden's aspirations for revolutionary change will always appear to be softer and more mitigated than those of, say, massachusetts senator elizabeth warren, even when the two see eye to eye on policy. biden will always seem reluctant in the revolutionary role because he wants to win over those who oppose what he is ultimately trying to achieve. biden's dogged efforts to enlist some token republican support for his policy agenda in 2021 seemed like a fool's errand to many observers. but for biden the quest for bipartisanship runs deep and long. the headwaters may be traced to the first great tragedy in biden's life. in the 1970s, biden came to love the senate as an institution because, in part, of the extraordinary kindness his fellow senators displayed after the death of his wife and daughter (biden, 2008; witcover, 2010). as biden reconstructs his life story today, both republicans and democrats treated biden like family when he arrived a broken man in the senate chamber. even though none of those men and women who served in the senate in 1973 are there today, biden still feels a familial tie to the senate. families will fight, but they will also work together to achieve common goals. many of the highlights of biden's political life, as he reconstructs it today, involve working closely with senators who did not share his beliefs and priorities, and yet finding common ground. the senators who were part of biden's “family” over his career “cultivated those [warm and positive] relationships not out of political expediency but because they understood how crucial the bonds of personal relations are in a democracy as jangled and diverse as ours” (biden, 2008, p. 235). the post‐trump era in american politics may present the ultimate stress test for biden's faith in the warm social bonds that, he believes, provide the infrastructural supports for a vital democracy. at the 100‐day mark in joe biden's presidency, he expressed optimism that congress would succeed in passing a massive package of progressive legislation. with a tiny majority in the house, a 50/50 split in the senate, and fierce republican opposition to any policy initiatives smacking of socialism, biden faced long odds. nonetheless, in november of 2021, a bipartisan deal was finally struck with respect to infrastructure spending. a total of 19 republican senators and 13 gop house members joined nearly all the democrats to pass a $1 trillion commitment to investing in road and bridge repair, public transit, enhanced broadband, and other public works projects. during the first year of his presidency, however, biden and the democratic party failed to pass the much larger package of initiatives contained in the build back better legislation. these included investments in universal preschool, the continuation of a childcare tax credit, expansion of health care, initiatives to combat climate change and enhance clean energy technologies, and a slew of other progressive programs and projects. biden's conciliatory approach toward political opponents and his much‐vaunted negotiating skills proved ineffective on two counts. he was unable to attract any republican support for build back better. and more critically, he failed to unite fully his own democratic caucus, even after months and months of painstaking negotiations. two democratic senators joe manchin from west virginia and kyrsten sinema of arizona repeatedly refused to sign on to the bill, even in various stripped‐down forms. at the one‐year mark of biden's presidency, therefore, build back better was moribund, and progressive democrats appeared to be demoralized. yet the president still expressed optimism that discrete chunks of the legislation, broken off from the overall bill, might eventually garner enough support to win passage in 2022, or after (shear, 2022; shear et al., 2022). he also admitted that his affection for the senate, rooted in personal experiences that go back almost half a century, may not serve him well as president. at a news conference held on january 19, 2022, biden said: if i made a mistake, i'm used to negotiating to get things done, and i've been, in the past, relatively successful at it in the united states senate, even as vice. president. but i think that role as president is a different role. the public does not want me to be the “president‐senator.” they want me to be the president and let the senators be senators. (shear et al., 2022) ascending to the presidency at a point in history when nearly half a million americans had already died from the coronavirus, joe biden brought a message of solace to the american people. in the first 100 days of his presidency, biden displayed a remarkable affinity for recognizing and addressing human suffering. in this paper, i argue that biden's role as comforter‐in‐chief finds its psychological grounding in two traumatic scenes in biden's life story the death of his first wife and daughter in an automobile accident in 1972, and the death of his beloved first‐born beau, who lost his battle with cancer in 2015. as biden tells it today, these two wrenching experiences forged an empathic sensibility that empowers him to connect deeply with other americans through shared grief and pain. he knows what the hole in a grieving heart feels like. in public utterances and private conversations, president biden appears to comfort the afflicted by offering understanding and hope, and in the process, he feels they are helping him to heal as well. biden's two traumatic scenes are also implicated, i argue, in the way he has pursued the most progressive policy agenda set forth by any american president in over half a century. beau's death may have played some role in stamping out the last vestiges of cockiness in biden's dispositional profile while opening him further to issues of inequity in american society. his embrace of an agenda aimed at strengthening the social safety net, assuring a basic income for all families with children, investing in human infrastructure, addressing racial inequities, and taking on climate change reflects his own political evolution, as well as the opportunities democrats perceived to be in play early in biden's term. at the same time, biden casts himself (for better and for worse) as a reluctant revolutionary, desperate to find common ground with his intransigent opponents. biden's dogged belief in compromise and conciliation reflects his deep love for the united states senate. and that love continues to be sustained, in part, by the immense gratitude he still feels to those senators, both democrat and republican, who rallied around him like family after the death of nelia and naomi. nonetheless, by the end of his first year in office, biden came to the realization that his love for the senate has not helped him as much as he originally thought it would in promoting his progressive policy agenda. the two roles i have foregrounded in this paper the comforter‐in‐chief and the reluctant revolutionary emerged and evolved as a function of president joe biden's developing personality and the various situations he encountered as president. in the terms of erikson's (1975) formulation, the two roles reflect the dynamic convergence of life history and the historical moment. a different president with a different set of inclinations and experiences might not have proven so skillful in comforting others during the time of covid, as we see in shocking counterpoint with respect to biden's predecessor. yet, had biden walked into the oval office at a different point in history say back in 1989 when he made his first run for the presidency, or 2009 when he made his second the nation might not have been so receptive to a message of heartfelt consolation. the unique meeting of the man and the moment is perhaps most visible in biden's embrace of a transformative policy agenda in the first 100 days of his presidency. a lifelong moderate, biden suddenly seemed to be the reincarnation of fdr. had he changed? yes, in part. but more importantly, the political environment had changed. upon passage of the $1.9 trillion covid stimulus bill, representative rosa delauro, a connecticut democrat, remarked “the moment has found us” (deparle, 2021). delauro proposed a child allowance in ten consecutive congresses, going back to 2001. in 2021, she and president joe biden saw her aspiration finally fulfilled. my psychological biography of joe biden foregrounds evidence‐based constructs in personality science that find their conceptual home in the three‐tiered model of personality presented by mcadams and pals (2006; mcadams, 2013a). for the first layer of the social actor, biden appears to show the normative developmental trajectory for agreeableness, and perhaps conscientiousness, too (bleidorn & hopwood, 2019). from young adulthood through his late 70s, biden seemed to demonstrate increases in characteristics such as humility, compassion, care, and self‐restraint. when he entered office at the age of 78, americans saw a warmer and more disciplined joe biden than they would have seen, say, 20 years before. from the standpoint of the motivated agent (layer 2 in personality), biden demonstrated an interesting reversal of the expected attachment pattern (simpson & jones, 2019) with his first‐born son, beau. as a young man, beau seemed to serve as a working model of attachment security for his father. in this regard, beau's death may have been doubly painful for joe biden the literal loss of one's beloved son, but also the loss of a nurturing parental figure. with respect to other family members, biden's attachment patterns are difficult to discern, though he professed love and admiration for both of his parents, and love and devotion to his wife jill, his surviving younger son hunter, and his daughter ashley. the concept of narrative identity (layer 3 in personality) looms largest in my analysis, as it did in my previous psychobiographical studies of presidents bush (mcadams, 2011) and trump (mcadams, 2020). as an autobiographical author, joe biden has constructed a life story that features two traumatic scenes of sudden and untimely loss. in both cases, biden finds some redemptive meaning in the negative events (mcadams, 2013b). with respect to the chronology of biden's narrative identity, both traumatic events are followed by a prolonged and dramatic upward arc. after the death of his wife and daughter, biden embarks upon a highly successful senatorial career. after beau's death, biden comes back to become president. with respect to both events, moreover, biden engages in autobiographical reasoning (habermas & bluck, 2000) to find further redemptive meaning in the trauma. biden learned important lessons about life after the tragedy of 1972, he believes, and he developed an enhanced empathic sensibility after beau's death. that said, biden's take on narrative redemption lacks the triumphalist spirit and sense of destiny‐fulfilled that many american life stories show, especially life stories of midlife american adults who demonstrate high levels of psychological well‐being and strong commitments to promoting the well‐being of future generations (mcadams, 2013b; mcadams & guo, 2015). as documented in canonical american cultural narratives of atonement, upward social mobility, liberation, self‐improvement, and recovery, well‐functioning midlife american adults tend to view their lives as heroic sagas in which they overcome adversity and fulfill a destiny of self‐determined happiness (mcadams, 2013b). indeed, george w. bush's redemptive life narrative roughly followed this pattern, as does obama's (mcadams, 2013b). but biden's story is different. there is more sadness in it, and more gravitas. the protagonist continues to exhibit a strong religious sensibility, but he does not trust god to secure a happy ending. why torment me, god?! with a shrug, god answers: why not? going back to john winthrop and the massachusetts bay puritans, many americans have embraced a protestant perspective on suffering and redemption: good christians overcome adversity and are ultimately delivered from their suffering to an enhanced status or state. the catholic sensibility, however, has often taken a different tack. christ's willingness to endure suffering on behalf of humanity provides the blessing of unconditional love. human beings suffer as christ suffered on the cross. rather than overcoming suffering to attain a blessing in the end, some versions of catholicism suggest that suffering is itself the road to grace. a devout catholic from childhood onward, biden's perspective on faith seems to resonate with the idea that suffering leads to grace, with christ's crucifixion providing the ultimate model. redemptive life stories affirm hope. and joe biden is a hopeful man. but he is cautious, too and somewhat ambivalent. he has witnessed too much pain to take happiness for granted. while redemptive narratives are usually about overcoming adversity, biden's story is more about acceptance of adversity, and managing adversity as it comes your way. this kind of narrative identity makes for a humbler and more vulnerable protagonist but one who seems remarkably well‐suited to offer comfort to other suffering souls. in the context of contemporary research on the redemptive life stories constructed by highly generative american adults in midlife (dunlop, 2021; mcadams, 2013b; mcadams & guo, 2015), biden's narrative identity describes a more tempered, subtle, and emotionally ambivalent form of redemption than has typically been documented. positive outcomes do result from negative scenes in biden's story, but the pain of loss never goes away. the hole in biden's heart will never be filled. contra martin luther king, the arc of history is long, but maybe it does not (automatically) bend toward justice. or at best, one cannot simply assume that light will prevail over darkness in the long run. you must bear witness to the darkness, biden insists. you can never ignore the suffering. still, biden sustains the fervid hope that the suffering will be redeemed, in some sense. “finding light in the darkness,” biden insists, “is the most american thing we do.” it may be no accident that the oldest man ever to be elected president should offer a perspective that is tempered with caution and with a keen recognition of the dangers and constraints of human life. as he tells it, biden's awareness of life's precariousness and sense of the tragic dimensions of human existence trace back to the deaths of neilia and naomi, when he was still a young man. it seems likely, however, that biden has continued to process the early loss over the subsequent decades and that it was not until his later years, after the death of beau, that the full meaning of these tragic events was realized within his narrative identity. in other words, biden's construction of a narrative identity that is more about accepting and managing adversity, than it is about fully overcoming adversity, may also reflect how certain older and very mature adults well past midlife tend to see the arc of life (mcadams et al., n.d.). one implication, therefore, of this psychobiographical investigation is that personality researchers might do well to investigate the dynamics and development of late‐life narrative identity. to what extent do the culturally favored american narratives of redemption in midlife give way to more tempered life narratives emphasizing acceptance and grace amidst the limitations of life? is joe biden's narrative identity representative of a characteristic late‐life form? maybe yes. but then again, maybe no, for the second‐oldest american ever to assume the office of president was donald j. trump. as the sole author of this manuscript, the author was responsible for all aspects of the process. the author would like to thank the editors of this special issue for encouraging a study of joe biden as well as two anonymous reviewers for their comments on an early draft. open access funding enabled and organized by projektdeal. mcadams, d. p. (2023). the comforter‐in‐chief: how two traumatic experiences shaped president joe biden's first 100 days. journal of personality, 91, 247 261. 10.1111/jopy.12738 over the years, several women have taken offense when biden has touched them in affectionate ways. for example, a former member of the nevada legislature complained that she felt demeaned and disrespected when biden kissed the back of her head (hayes, 2019). biden has acknowledged crossing the line of propriety, albeit unwittingly. “it's just who i am,” he has said. “i've always tried to make a human connection. … i shake hands, i hug people, i grab men and women by the shoulders and say you can do this. it's the way i've always been. it's the way i've tried to show i care about them and i'm listening” (hayes, 2019). after fielding several complaints in 2019, biden vowed to rein in his public displays of affection and to “be more mindful” of people's personal space. in the spring of 2020, a former biden staffer named tara reade alleged that biden groped her sexually in 1993. biden has steadfastly denied reade's allegation (glueck et al., 2020). articles from journal of personality are provided here courtesy of wiley connect with nlm national library of medicine 8600 rockville pike bethesda, md 20894
critic’s notebook president biden’s toughest opponent may not be his predecessor. it is the cultural meaning, built up through centuries, that we assign to being old. critic’s notebook president biden’s toughest opponent may not be his predecessor. it is the cultural meaning, built up through centuries, that we assign to being old. credit...win mcnamee/getty images supported by by jason farago “watch me,” president biden likes to say when he’s asked   he’s asked a lot, these days   whether he is too old to serve a second term. he is getting his wish. for the first three years of his administration, in contrast to the last president’s chaotic omnipresence, mr. biden kept himself scarce. now his smallest appearance brings with it a thousand remote diagnoses from armchair gerontologists. a major speech, like his state of the union address in march, is assessed not for its policy but its fluidity as spoken word performance. a minor gaffe, like bungling a single sentence at a philadelphia rally in april, is dissected as possible evidence of decline. transcript are you ready to choose unity over division? dignity over demolition, and choose truth over lies? are you ready to choose freedom over democracy? because that’s america. he is facing an image problem that time exacts on everyone. now the first presidential debate of 2024 is happening months earlier than usual, in part because the biden campaign wants to overcome a mounting concern that the president, at 81, is not up to four additional years of service. “old age isn’t a battle; old age is a massacre”   or so philip roth’s “everyman” howled in 2006. electorally, this year, it might be both. the president is indeed rather old, older than anyone who has held the office. when he first won his senate seat in 1972, the current leaders of britain, france and italy were not yet born.