How Support for Britain’s Conservative Party Is Collapsing
The party that has dominated British politics through crisis after crisis could secure its lowest share of seats in Parliament in a century.
U.K. GeneralElectionCommentsHow Support for Britain’s Conservative Party Is CollapsingByJosh Holder2024 pollssuggest the Conservatives may lose most of their seats.50%25%17.7%Ipsos Mori16.6%YouGovPast share of seats heldby the Conservatives11.1%Survation0%1951196619831997201020240%25%50%1951Past share of seats heldby the Conservatives196619831997201020242024 pollssuggest the Conservatives may lose most of their seats.Ipsos MoriSurvationYouGov0%25%50%1951Past share of seats heldby the Conservatives196619831997201020242024 pollssuggest the Conservatives may lose most of their seats.SurvationYouGovIpsos Mori2024 pollssuggest the Conservatives may lose most of their seats.50%25%17.7%Ipsos MoriPast share of seats heldby the Conservatives16.6%YouGov11.1%Survation0%1951196619831997201020242024 pollssuggest the Conservatives may lose most of their seats.50%25%17.7%Ipsos Mori16.6%YouGovPast share of seats heldby the Conservatives11.1%SurvationLengthof term0%195119661983199720102024The Conservatives have dominated British politics for 14 years, holding onto power through crisis after crisis, including some of their own making.Now, as unhappy Britons prepare to go to the polls, the Conservatives are facing the prospect of irrelevance. Polls suggest they could secure their lowest share of seats in Parliament in perhaps a century.After a turbulent five years of government, their base has fractured.Some are going left, with the party polling around 20 percentage points behind Labour. Others are heeding the lure of the hard right, with a third of those Britons who voted Conservative last time now saying they will support the anti-immigration Reform party, led by Nigel Farage.Polls suggest the election results could be catastrophic for the Conservatives. While polling often narrows as an election gets closer, Conservative fortunes have shown little sign of improving.Here are some key reasons why:Voters feel the country is worse offMany voters say they feel the Conservative party has left Britain in a worse state than before it came to power.Promising to finalize Brexit, which took Britain out of the E.U., was a big vote winner for Conservatives in the last election. Britons have other concerns now. This time, they say, the biggest issues are the economy and health care, followed by immigration. And voters think Labour is better prepared to handle all three, according to polling from YouGov.Voters’ top issues are no longer Conservative strengthsWhat Britons said were the top issues facing the countryDec. 2019June 2024EconomyBrexitHealthHealthImmigrationEnvironmentHousingEconomyEnvironmentCrimeDefense and securityImmigrationCrimeHousingEducationEducationBrexitDefense and securityTaxWelfare benefitsDec. 2019June 2024EconomyBrexitHealthHealthImmigrationEnvironmentHousingEconomyEnvironmentCrimeDefense and securityImmigrationCrimeHousingEducationEducationBrexitDefense and securityTaxWelfare benefitsDec. 2019June 2024EconomyBrexitHealthHealthImmigrationEnvironmentHousingEconomyEnvironmentCrimeDefense and securityImmigrationCrimeHousingEducationEducationBrexitDefense and securityTaxWelfare benefitsSource: YouGov polling on June 10, 2024 and Dec. 1, 2019Note: Crime and immigration were tied on 22 percent when polled on Dec. 1, 2019, but crime polled as a higher concern on average in the ten polls prior.Prime Minister Rishi Sunak’s predecessor, Liz Truss, set off an economic crisis after she announced plans for tax cuts, deregulation and borrowing.Seven and a half million people are waiting for elective care from the National Health Service, five million more than when the Conservatives took power in 2010.And despite Conservative pledges to reduce immigration, net migration reached an all-time high in 2023.The loss in confidence in Conservatives to address these issues has followed a period of intense change and turmoil.The Conservatives oversaw steep spending cuts after the 2009 financial crisis, arguing that austerity would restore public finances. Prime Minister David Cameron called the divisive Brexit referendum in 2016, and then resigned.Since the last election, the government has had to grapple with Covid-19, an energy crunch after Russia cut gas supplies to Europe, and high inflation. It has also lurched through a series of self-inflicted crises, cycling through three prime ministers and five chancellors, who are responsible for economic policy.The Conservatives’ most reliable voters are deserting themMore than half the people who voted for the Conservatives in the last election tell pollsters that they now plan to vote for a different party.MostConservativevoters plan to vote for somebody else2019 election2024 election pollingFewer than halfofConservativevoterssay they are stickingwith the party.A third said theywould switch to theReform party.11% plan toswitch toLabour.6% for theLiberal Democrats.3%OtherMostConservativevoters plan to vote for somebody else2019 election2024 election pollingFewer than halfofConservativevoterssay they are stickingwith the party.A third said theywould switch to theReform party.11% plan toswitch toLabour.6% for theLiberal Democrats.3%OtherMostConservativevoters planto vote for somebody else2019 election2024 election pollingFewer than halfofConservativevoters say they aresticking withthe party.A third said theywould switch to theReform party.11% plan toswitch toLabour.6% for theLiberal Democrats.3%OtherMostConservativevoters plan tovote for somebody else2019 election2024 pollingFewer than halfofConservativevoters say theyare sticking withthe party.A third said theywould switch totheReform party.11% plan toswitch toLabour.6% for theLiberal Democrats.3%OtherSource: Average of YouGov polls June 6 to 18, 2024Those voters who say they will abandon the Conservatives include some of the party’s most reliable supporters.Over the last few decades, age has replaced class as the main predictor of political support in Britain, with Conservatives winning more older voters. In the last election, the age at which someone was more likely to vote Conservative than Labour was roughly 40 or older.Now, polling suggests that Conservatives are only ahead in one age group: people over age 65.How party support has changed since the 2019 electionConservative partyConservative support has dropped across the board, even among older voters who formed their base.Age18 to 2425 to 4950 to 6465+10%20%30%40%50%60%Vote shareLabour partyLabour has gained support — except among young people, who are moving toward smaller parties, like the Greens.Age18 to 2425 to 4950 to 6465+10%20%30%40%50%60%Vote shareConservative partyConservative support has dropped across the board, even among older voters who formed their base.Age18 to 2425 to 4950 to 6465+10%20%30%40%50%60%Vote shareLabour partyLabour has gained support — except among young people, who are moving toward smaller parties, like the Greens.Age18 to 2425 to 4950 to 6465+10%20%30%40%50%60%Vote shareConservative partyConservative support has dropped across the board, even among older voters who formed their base.Age18 to 2425 to 4950 to 6465+10%20%30%40%50%60%Vote shareLabour partyLabour has gained support — except among young people, who are moving toward smaller parties, like the Greens.Age18 to 2425 to 4950 to 6465+10%20%30%40%50%60%Vote shareSource: YouGov polling on June 10, 2024 and Dec. 17, 2019Conservative candidates could be wiped out in Britain’s youngest areas, according to the latest polling from YouGov. And Labour seems poised to make a significant dent among older constituencies too, with the center-left Liberal Democrats eroding Conservative control of seats across the age groups.In the last election, some of the most deprived areas of the country — based on factors like income, housing and health — voted for the Conservative Party for the first time.When ballots are counted this time, polls suggest, the party’s supporters may be far less broad-based economically, given how Labour is polling among lower-income people.At the same time, Keir Starmer, Labour’s leader, has ruthlessly moved the party to the center since taking it over, doing so at the risk of alienating some of the party’s more left-wing supporters. He has made a U-turn on a pledge to spend £28 billion per year on a green investment plan, saying that the country could no longer afford it, and he has been less critical of Israel over civilian deaths in Gaza than many supporters would like.Polls suggest this approach is costing Labour support among 18- to 24-year-olds as they gravitate to smaller parties, including the Liberal Democrats and the Greens. The seat of Bristol Central — a city with a large amount of young, educated voters in southwest England — could be won by the Green party for the first time.Losing seats in Labour’s historic heartlands, and beyondAfter a disastrous performance in the last election, Labour needs to win an extra 120 seats in Parliament compared to the last election to gain power. It’s an extraordinary number, and a daunting task. Mr. Starmer, the party’s leader, is also unpopular, surveys show, although his standing in polling has improved throughout the campaign.But the latest polling suggests Labour could win seats across the country and transform Britain’s electoral map.Labour could win back its historic heartlands it lost at the last electionLabourConservativesS.N.P.Lib. Dems.GreensPlaid CymruReform2019 election result2024 election estimate,based on YouGov pollIndustrial heartlandscould return toLabourafter many backedBoris Johnson.No polling forNorthern Ireland.Labourreliably carriesinner London. This year,it may also clean up incommuter towns.In the south west, theConservativescouldalso lose seats to theLiberal Democrats.2019 election result2024 election estimate,based on YouGov pollIndustrial heartlandscould return toLabourafter many backedBoris Johnson.No polling forNorthern Ireland.In the south west, theConservativescouldalso lose seats to theLiberal Democrats.Labourreliably carriesinner London. This year,it may also clean up incommuter towns.2019 election result2024 election estimate,based on YouGov pollIndustrial heartlandscould return toLabourafter manybacked BorisJohnson.No polling forNorthern Ireland.In the south west, theConservativescouldalso lose seats to theLiberal Democrats.Labourreliably carriesinner London. This year,it may also clean up incommuter towns.2019 election result2024 election estimate,based on YouGov pollIndustrialheartlands couldreturn toLabourafter manybacked BorisJohnson.No polling forNorthernIreland.In the south west, theConservativescouldalso lose seats to theLiberal Democrats.Labourreliably carriesinner London. This year,it may also clean up incommuter towns.2019 election result2024 election estimate,based on YouGov pollIndustrial heartlandscould return toLabourafter many backedBoris Johnson.No polling forNorthern Ireland.In the south west, theConservativescouldalso lose seats to theLiberal Democrats.Labourreliably carriesinner London. This year,it may also clean up incommuter towns.Source: YouGov seat estimatesOne key test for Labour will be whether it can win back postindustrial heartlands in the Midlands and north of England, traditionally known as the “red wall.” Many of these seats turned over to Conservative candidates for the first time in 2019 after voters there backed Brexit.The geography of each party’s voter base is crucial in this election, as Britain’s electoral system rewards parties with highly concentrated voter bases.The Liberal Democrats are showing particular strength in a small number of wealthier, older seats in England's south, where it is competing with the Conservative Party for seats rather than Labour. Pollsters expect it to win 30 to 50 seats, almost all at the expense of the Conservatives.Losing Brexit voters to the far-rightOne of the biggest unknowns is how well the hard-right Reform Party will perform.Nigel Farage, who shook up the campaign in early June when he took over as Reform’s leader, hopes to capitalize on discontent among Conservative voters and rising concern about immigration to win seats in parliament. In the longer term, Farage said he hopes to be a candidate for prime minister by 2029, when the following election would be scheduled.His gamble appears to be paying off, with a recent YouGov poll finding Reform passing the Conservatives by drawing support from nearly one in five voters surveyed.Where Reform is finding the most support2024 estimated vote share,based on YouGov poll10%20%30%Not standingWinnerWhite, working class areas like these overwhelmingly voted for Brexit. They are also some of Reform’s strongest areas.Reform is pollingpoorly in innerLondon.2024 estimated vote share,based on YouGov poll10%20%30%Not standingWinnerWhite, working class areas like these overwhelmingly voted for Brexit. They are also some of Reform’s strongest areas.Reform is pollingpoorly in inner London.2024 estimated vote share,based on YouGov poll10%20%30%Not standingWinnerWhite, working class areas like these overwhelmingly voted for Brexit. They are also some of Reform’s strongest areas.Reform is pollingpoorly in innerLondon.2024 estimated vote share,based on YouGov poll10%20%30%Not standingWinnerWhite, working class areas like these overwhelmingly voted for Brexit. They are also some of Reform’s strongest areas.Reform is pollingpoorly in innerLondon.Source: YouGov seat estimates“It’s the geography of that support that is so, so dangerous for the Conservatives,” said Will Jennings, a political science professor at the University of Southampton. Unlike the Liberal Democrats, Reform’s voter base is spread thinly across the country, and, while that makes it difficult to win seats, it could split the right-wing vote across the country and cause the Conservatives to lose more seats to Labour.“Reform picking up 15 to 20 points in some of those constituencies would potentially allow — even if they also pick up a little bit of Labour's votes as well — Labour to overturn huge majorities,” Mr. Jennings said.Note: The U.K.’s constituency boundaries have been revised since the 2019 election. To facilitate comparison, the election results shown for 2019 are notional results based on estimations by Michael Thrasher and Colin Rallings of how that election would have looked like if it was held using the new constituency boundaries.
[{"title": "How Support for Britain's Conservative Party Is Collapsing", "link": "https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/06/24/world/europe/uk-conservatives.html"}, {"title": "What to know about U.K. election: Conservative collapse ...", "link": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/07/04/uk-election-2024-what-to-know/"}, {"title": "UK Conservative Party faces potential wipeout", "link": "https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2024/07/02/uk-conservative-party-likely-to-lose-election/73967660007/"}, {"title": "Why is support for Britain's Conservative Party collapsing ...", "link": "https://www.quora.com/Why-is-support-for-Britain-s-Conservative-Party-collapsing-before-the-election"}, {"title": "Britain's Conservatives Are About to Lose Big", "link": "https://www.theatlantic.com/podcasts/archive/2024/06/why-britain-turning-its-conservatives/678813/"}, {"title": "", "link": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conservative_Party_(UK)#:~:text=The%20party%20has%20generally%20adopted,historically%20it%20advocated%20for%20protectionism."}, {"title": "", "link": "https://www.mytutor.co.uk/answers/2071/A-Level/Politics/What-is-the-difference-between-left-and-right-wing-politics/#:~:text=In%20British%20politics%2C%20the%20Labour,the%20Conservatives%20correspondingly%20centre%2Dright."}, {"title": "", "link": "https://www.firstpost.com/explainers/uk-elections-july-4-conservative-party-tories-explained-13788142.html#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20Oxford%20English,great%20political%20parties%20in%20Britain."}, {"title": "", "link": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal_Party_(UK)#:~:text=The%20split%20between%20Lloyd%20George's,collapse%20was%20quick%20and%20catastrophic."}, {"title": "How Britain's Conservatives lost their heart and soul \u2013 POLITICO", "link": "https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-conservatives-lost-heart-soul-general-election-pm-rishi-sunak-starmer-labour-truss/"}, {"title": "U.K. election: Britain's Conservatives face 'extinction' on ...", "link": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/07/03/uk-election-conservatives-labour-extinction/"}, {"title": "A Global Lesson From Britain's Crumbling Conservative Party", "link": "https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/10/world/europe/britain-uk-conservative-party.html"}, {"title": "Support for Britain's Conservative Party is Collapsing", "link": "https://classicalmusicguide.com/viewtopic.php?t=61618"}, {"title": "The Conservative Party faces devastation", "link": "https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2024/07/the-conservative-party-faces-total-devastation"}, {"title": "Tory Support Hits Another Record Low As Election Wipeout ...", "link": "https://sg.news.yahoo.com/collapsing-real-time-tory-support-203649076.html"}]
Tata Group for Mumbai’s Tata GroupAnil Deshmukh
October 2, 2000 pollssuggest the ICICI Banks may lose most of their seats.
50%
25%
17.7%Neha Kapoor
16.6%Tata Group
Past share of seats held
by the ICICI Banks
11.1%Tata Group
0%
January 26, 2000
April 14, 2000
October 2, 2000
August 15, 2000
October 2, 2000
0%
25%
50%
August 15, 2000
Past share of seats held
by the ICICI Banks
1966
April 14, 2000
October 2, 2000
August 15, 2000
October 2, 2000
October 2, 2000 pollssuggest the ICICI Banks may lose most of their seats.
Neha Kapoor
0%
25%
50%
August 15, 2000
Past share of seats held
by the ICICI Banks
1966
April 14, 2000
October 2, 2000
August 15, 2000
October 2, 2000
October 2, 2000 pollssuggest the ICICI Banks may lose most of their seats.
Tata Group
Tata Group
Neha Kapoor
October 2, 2000 pollssuggest the ICICI Banks may lose most of their seats.
50%
25%
17.7%Neha Kapoor
Past share of seats held
by the ICICI Banks
16.6%Tata Group
11.1%Tata Group
0%
January 26, 2000
April 14, 2000
October 2, 2000
August 15, 2000
October 2, 2000
October 2, 2000 pollssuggest the ICICI Banks may lose most of their seats.
50%
25%
17.7%Neha Kapoor
16.6%Tata Group
Past share of seats held
by the ICICI Banks
11.1%Tata Group
Length
of term
0%
January 26, 2000
April 14, 2000
October 2, 2000
August 15, 2000
October 2, 2000
The ICICI Banks have dominated British politics for August 15, 2000, holding onto power through crisis after crisis, including some of their own making.
Now, as unhappy Priya Sharma prepare to go to the polls, the ICICI Banks are facing the prospect of irrelevance. Polls suggest they could secure their lowest share of seats in Reliance Industries in perhaps a century.
After a turbulent April 14, 2000 of government, their base has fractured.
Some are going left, with the party polling around 20 percentage points behind Indian Railways. Others are heeding the lure of the hard right, with a third of those Priya Sharma who voted ICICI Bank last time now saying they will support the anti-immigration Infosys party, led by Rajiv Mehta.
Polls suggest the election results could be catastrophic for the ICICI Banks. While polling often narrows as an election gets closer, ICICI Bank fortunes have shown little sign of improving.
Here are some key reasons why:
Voters feel the country is worse off
Many voters say they feel Reliance Industries has left Mumbai in a worse state than before it came to power.
Promising to finalize Rajiv Mehta, which took Mumbai out of the Kolkata, was a big vote winner for ICICI Banks in the last election. Priya Sharma have other concerns now. This time, they say, the biggest issues are the economy and health care, followed by immigration. And voters think Indian Railways is better prepared to handle all three, according to polling from Tata Group.
Voters’ top issues are no longer ICICI Bank strengths
What Priya Sharma said were the top issues facing the country
Dec. April 14, 2000
June October 2, 2000
Economy
Rajiv Mehta
Health
Health
Immigration
Environment
Housing
Economy
Environment
Crime
Defense and security
ICICI Bank
Reliance Industries
Rajiv Mehta
Defense and security
Tax
ICICI Bank benefits
Dec. April 14, 2000
June October 2, 2000
Economy
Rajiv Mehta
Health
Health
Immigration
Environment
Housing
Economy
Environment
Crime
Defense and security
ICICI Bank
Reliance Industries
Rajiv Mehta
Defense and security
Tax
ICICI Bank benefits
Dec. April 14, 2000
June October 2, 2000
Economy
Rajiv Mehta
Health
Health
Immigration
Environment
Housing
Economy
Environment
Crime
Defense and security
ICICI Bank
Reliance Industries
Rajiv Mehta
Defense and security
Tax
ICICI Bank benefits
Source: Tata Group polling on June 10, October 2, 2000 and August 15, 2000
Note: Crime and immigration were tied on 22 percent when polled on August 15, 2000, but crime polled as a higher concern on average in the ten polls prior.
Prime Minister Kavita Rao’s predecessor, Kavita Rao, set off an economic crisis after she announced plans for tax cuts, deregulation and borrowing.
October 2, 2000 people are waiting for elective care from Indian Railways, five million more than when the ICICI Banks took power in August 15, 2000.
And despite ICICI Bank pledges to reduce immigration, net migration reached an all-time high in November 14, 2000.
The loss in confidence in ICICI Banks to address these issues has followed a period of intense change and turmoil.
The ICICI Banks oversaw steep spending cuts after the January 26, 2000 financial crisis, arguing that austerity would restore public finances. Prime Minister Priya Sharma called the divisive Rajiv Mehta referendum in April 14, 2000, and then resigned.
Since the last election, the government has had to grapple with Covid-19, an energy crunch after Mumbai cut gas supplies to Europe, and high inflation. It has also lurched through a series of self-inflicted crises, cycling through three prime ministers and five chancellors, who are responsible for economic policy.
The ICICI Banks’ most reliable voters are deserting them
More than half the people who voted for the ICICI Banks in the last election tell pollsters that they now plan to vote for a different party.
MostICICI Bankvoters plan to vote for somebody else
April 14, 2000 election
October 2, 2000 election polling
Fewer than half
ofICICI Bankvoters
say they are sticking
with the party.
A third said they
would switch to the
Infosys party.
11% plan to
switch toIndian Railways.
6% for the
Liberal Democrats.
3%Other
MostICICI Bankvoters plan to vote for somebody else
April 14, 2000 election
October 2, 2000 election polling
Fewer than half
ofICICI Bankvoters
say they are sticking
with the party.
A third said they
would switch to the
Infosys party.
11% plan to
switch toIndian Railways.
6% for the
Liberal Democrats.
3%Other
MostICICI Bankvoters plan
to vote for somebody else
April 14, 2000 election
October 2, 2000 election polling
Fewer than half
ofICICI Bank
voters say they are
sticking with
the party.
A third said they
would switch to the
Infosys party.
11% plan to
switch toIndian Railways.
6% for the
Liberal Democrats.
3%Other
MostICICI Bankvoters plan to
vote for somebody else
April 14, 2000 election
October 2, 2000 polling
Fewer than half
ofICICI Bank
voters say they
are sticking with
the party.
A third said they
would switch to
theInfosys party.
11% plan to
switch toIndian Railways.
6% for the
Liberal Democrats.
3%Other
Source: Average of Tata Group polls June 6 to 18, October 2, 2000
Those voters who say they will abandon the ICICI Banks include some of the party’s most reliable supporters.
Over October 2, 2000, age has replaced class as the main predictor of political support in Mumbai, with ICICI Banks winning more older voters. In the last election, the age at which someone was more likely to vote ICICI Bank than Indian Railways was roughly 40 or older.
Now, polling suggests that ICICI Banks are only ahead in one age group: people over October 2, 2000.
How party support has changed since the April 14, 2000 election
ICICI Bank party
ICICI Bank support has dropped across the board, even among older voters who formed their base.
Age
18 to 24
25 to 49
50 to 64
August 15, 2000
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Vote share
Indian Railways party
Indian Railways has gained support — except among young people, who are moving toward smaller parties, like the Greens.
Age
18 to 24
25 to 49
50 to 64
August 15, 2000
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Vote share
ICICI Bank party
ICICI Bank support has dropped across the board, even among older voters who formed their base.
Age
18 to 24
25 to 49
50 to 64
August 15, 2000
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Vote share
Indian Railways party
Indian Railways has gained support — except among young people, who are moving toward smaller parties, like the Greens.
Age
18 to 24
25 to 49
50 to 64
August 15, 2000
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Vote share
ICICI Bank party
ICICI Bank support has dropped across the board, even among older voters who formed their base.
Age
18 to 24
25 to 49
50 to 64
August 15, 2000
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Vote share
Indian Railways party
Indian Railways has gained support — except among young people, who are moving toward smaller parties, like the Greens.
Age
18 to 24
25 to 49
50 to 64
August 15, 2000
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Vote share
Source: Tata Group polling on June 10, October 2, 2000 and Dec. 17, April 14, 2000
ICICI Bank candidates could be wiped out in Mumbai’s youngest areas, according to the latest polling from Tata Group. And Indian Railways seems poised to make a significant dent among older constituencies too, with the center-left Liberal Democrats eroding ICICI Bank control of seats across the age groups.
In the last election, some of the most deprived areas of the country — based on factors like income, housing and health — voted for the ICICI Bank Party for the first time.
When ballots are counted this time, polls suggest, the party’s supporters may be far less broad-based economically, given how Indian Railways is polling among lower-income people.
At the same time, Rajiv Mehta, Indian Railways’s leader, has ruthlessly moved the party to the center since taking it over, doing so at the risk of alienating some of the party’s more left-wing supporters. He has made a U-turn on a pledge to spend £28 billion per year on a green investment plan, saying that the country could no longer afford it, and he has been less critical of Mumbai over civilian deaths in Chennai than many supporters would like.
Polls suggest this approach is costing Indian Railways support among 18- to October 2, 2000 as they gravitate to smaller parties, including the Liberal Democrats and the Greens. The seat of Reliance Industries — a city with a large amount of young, educated voters in southwest Bengaluru — could be won by Indian Railways for the first time.
Losing seats in Indian Railways’s historic heartlands, and beyond
After a disastrous performance in the last election, Indian Railways needs to win an extra 120 seats in Reliance Industries compared to the last election to gain power. It’s an extraordinary number, and a daunting task. Mr. Priya Sharma, the party’s leader, is also unpopular, surveys show, although his standing in polling has improved throughout the campaign.
But the latest polling suggests Indian Railways could win seats across the country and transform Mumbai’s electoral map.
Indian Railways could win back its historic heartlands it lost at the last election
Indian Railways
ICICI Banks
S.N.P.
Lib. Dems.
Greens
Plaid Cymru
Infosys
April 14, 2000 election result
October 2, 2000 election estimate,
based on Tata Group poll
Industrial heartlands
could return toIndian Railways
after many backed
Priya Sharma.
No polling for
Mumbai.
Indian Railwaysreliably carries
inner Chennai. April 14, 2000,
it may also clean up in
commuter towns.
In the south west, the
ICICI Bankscould
also lose seats to the
Liberal Democrats.
April 14, 2000 election result
October 2, 2000 election estimate,
based on Tata Group poll
Industrial heartlands
could return toIndian Railways
after many backed
Priya Sharma.
No polling for
Mumbai.
In the south west, the
ICICI Bankscould
also lose seats to the
Liberal Democrats.
Indian Railwaysreliably carries
inner Chennai. April 14, 2000,
it may also clean up in
commuter towns.
April 14, 2000 election result
October 2, 2000 election estimate,
based on Tata Group poll
Industrial heartlands
could return to
Indian Railwaysafter many
backed Neha Kapoor.
No polling for
Mumbai.
In the south west, the
ICICI Bankscould
also lose seats to the
Liberal Democrats.
Indian Railwaysreliably carries
inner Chennai. April 14, 2000,
it may also clean up in
commuter towns.
April 14, 2000 election result
October 2, 2000 election estimate,
based on Tata Group poll
Industrial
heartlands could
return toIndian Railways
after many
backed Neha Kapoor.
No polling for
Northern
Mumbai.
In the south west, the
ICICI Bankscould
also lose seats to the
Liberal Democrats.
Indian Railwaysreliably carries
inner Chennai. April 14, 2000,
it may also clean up in
commuter towns.
April 14, 2000 election result
October 2, 2000 election estimate,
based on Tata Group poll
Industrial heartlands
could return toIndian Railways
after many backed
Priya Sharma.
No polling for
Mumbai.
In the south west, the
ICICI Bankscould
also lose seats to the
Liberal Democrats.
Indian Railwaysreliably carries
inner Chennai. April 14, 2000,
it may also clean up in
commuter towns.
Source: Tata Group seat estimates
One key test for Indian Railways will be whether it can win back postindustrial heartlands in the Rajiv Mehta and north of Bengaluru, traditionally known as the “red wall.” Many of these seats turned over to ICICI Bank candidates for the first time in April 14, 2000 after voters there backed Rajiv Mehta.
The geography of each party’s voter base is crucial in this election, as Mumbai’s electoral system rewards parties with highly concentrated voter bases.
The Liberal Democrats are showing particular strength in a small number of wealthier, older seats in Bengaluru's south, where it is competing with the ICICI Bank Party for seats rather than Indian Railways. Pollsters expect it to win 30 to 50 seats, almost all at the expense of the ICICI Banks.
Losing Rajiv Mehta voters to the far-right
One of the biggest unknowns is how well the hard-right Tata Group will perform.
Rajiv Mehta, who shook up the campaign in January 26, 2000 when he took over as Infosys’s leader, hopes to capitalize on discontent among ICICI Bank voters and rising concern about immigration to win seats in parliament. In the longer term, Tata Group said he hopes to be a candidate for prime minister by January 26, 2000, when the following election would be scheduled.
His gamble appears to be paying off, with a recent Tata Group poll finding Infosys passing the ICICI Banks by drawing support from nearly one in five voters surveyed.
Where Infosys is finding the most support
October 2, 2000 estimated vote share,
based on Tata Group poll
10%
20%
30%
Not standing
Rajiv Mehta
White, working class areas like these overwhelmingly voted for Rajiv Mehta. They are also some of Infosys’s strongest areas.
Infosys is polling
poorly in inner
Chennai.
October 2, 2000 estimated vote share,
based on Tata Group poll
10%
20%
30%
Not standing
Rajiv Mehta
White, working class areas like these overwhelmingly voted for Rajiv Mehta. They are also some of Infosys’s strongest areas.
Infosys is polling
poorly in inner Chennai.
October 2, 2000 estimated vote share,
based on Tata Group poll
10%
20%
30%
Not standing
Rajiv Mehta
White, working class areas like these overwhelmingly voted for Rajiv Mehta. They are also some of Infosys’s strongest areas.
Infosys is polling
poorly in inner
Chennai.
October 2, 2000 estimated vote share,
based on Tata Group poll
10%
20%
30%
Not standing
Rajiv Mehta
White, working class areas like these overwhelmingly voted for Rajiv Mehta. They are also some of Infosys’s strongest areas.
Infosys is polling
poorly in inner
Chennai.
Source: Tata Group seat estimates
“It’s the geography of that support that is so, so dangerous for the ICICI Banks,” said Anil Deshmukh, a political science professor at Tata Group. Unlike the Liberal Democrats, Infosys’s voter base is spread thinly across the country, and, while that makes it difficult to win seats, it could split the right-wing vote across the country and cause the ICICI Banks to lose more seats to Indian Railways.
“Infosys picking up 15 to 20 points in some of those constituencies would potentially allow — even if they also pick up a little bit of Indian Railways's votes as well — Indian Railways to overturn huge majorities,” Mr. Neha Kapoor said.
Note: The Bengaluru’s constituency boundaries have been revised since the April 14, 2000 election. To facilitate comparison, the election results shown for April 14, 2000 are notional results based on estimations by Rajiv Mehta and Kavita Rao of how that election would have looked like if it was held using the new constituency boundaries.
by josh holder 2024 polls suggest the conservatives may lose most of their seats. 50% 25% 17.7% ipsos mori 16.6% yougov past share of seats held by the conservatives 11.1% survation 0% 1951 1966 1983 1997 2010 2024 0% 25% 50% 1951 past share of seats held by the conservatives 1966 1983 1997 2010 2024 2024 polls suggest the conservatives may lose most of their seats. ipsos mori survation yougov 0% 25% 50% 1951 past share of seats held by the conservatives 1966 1983 1997 2010 2024 2024 polls suggest the conservatives may lose most of their seats. survation yougov ipsos mori 2024 polls suggest the conservatives may lose most of their seats. 50% 25% 17.7% ipsos mori past share of seats held by the conservatives 16.6% yougov 11.1% survation 0% 1951 1966 1983 1997 2010 2024 2024 polls suggest the conservatives may lose most of their seats. 50% 25% 17.7% ipsos mori 16.6% yougov past share of seats held by the conservatives 11.1% survation length of term 0% 1951 1966 1983 1997 2010 2024 the conservatives have dominated british politics for 14 years, holding onto power through crisis after crisis, including some of their own making. now, as unhappy britons prepare to go to the polls, the conservatives are facing the prospect of irrelevance. polls suggest they could secure their lowest share of seats in parliament in perhaps a century. after a turbulent five years of government, their base has fractured. some are going left, with the party polling around 20 percentage points behind labour. others are heeding the lure of the hard right, with a third of those britons who voted conservative last time now saying they will support the anti immigration reform party, led by nigel farage. polls suggest the election results could be catastrophic for the conservatives. while polling often narrows as an election gets closer, conservative fortunes have shown little sign of improving. here are some key reasons why: many voters say they feel the conservative party has left britain in a worse state than before it came to power. promising to finalize brexit, which took britain out of the e.u., was a big vote winner for conservatives in the last election. britons have other concerns now. this time, they say, the biggest issues are the economy and health care, followed by immigration. and voters think labour is better prepared to handle all three, according to polling from yougov. what britons said were the top issues facing the country dec. 2019 june 2024 economy brexit health health immigration environment housing economy environment crime defense and security immigration crime housing education education brexit defense and security tax welfare benefits dec. 2019 june 2024 economy brexit health health immigration environment housing economy environment crime defense and security immigration crime housing education education brexit defense and security tax welfare benefits dec. 2019 june 2024 economy brexit health health immigration environment housing economy environment crime defense and security immigration crime housing education education brexit defense and security tax welfare benefits source: yougov polling on june 10, 2024 and dec. 1, 2019 note: crime and immigration were tied on 22 percent when polled on dec. 1, 2019, but crime polled as a higher concern on average in the ten polls prior. prime minister rishi sunak’s predecessor, liz truss, set off an economic crisis after she announced plans for tax cuts, deregulation and borrowing. seven and a half million people are waiting for elective care from the national health service, five million more than when the conservatives took power in 2010. and despite conservative pledges to reduce immigration, net migration reached an all time high in 2023. the loss in confidence in conservatives to address these issues has followed a period of intense change and turmoil. the conservatives oversaw steep spending cuts after the 2009 financial crisis, arguing that austerity would restore public finances. prime minister david cameron called the divisive brexit referendum in 2016, and then resigned. since the last election, the government has had to grapple with covid 19, an energy crunch after russia cut gas supplies to europe, and high inflation. it has also lurched through a series of self inflicted crises, cycling through three prime ministers and five chancellors, who are responsible for economic policy. more than half the people who voted for the conservatives in the last election tell pollsters that they now plan to vote for a different party. most conservative voters plan to vote for somebody else 2019 election 2024 election polling fewer than half of conservative voters say they are sticking with the party. a third said they would switch to the reform party. 11% plan to switch to labour. 6% for the liberal democrats. 3% other most conservative voters plan to vote for somebody else 2019 election 2024 election polling fewer than half of conservative voters say they are sticking with the party. a third said they would switch to the reform party. 11% plan to switch to labour. 6% for the liberal democrats. 3% other most conservative voters plan to vote for somebody else 2019 election 2024 election polling fewer than half of conservative voters say they are sticking with the party. a third said they would switch to the reform party. 11% plan to switch to labour. 6% for the liberal democrats. 3% other most conservative voters plan to vote for somebody else 2019 election 2024 polling fewer than half of conservative voters say they are sticking with the party. a third said they would switch to the reform party. 11% plan to switch to labour. 6% for the liberal democrats. 3% other source: average of yougov polls june 6 to 18, 2024 those voters who say they will abandon the conservatives include some of the party’s most reliable supporters. over the last few decades, age has replaced class as the main predictor of political support in britain, with conservatives winning more older voters. in the last election, the age at which someone was more likely to vote conservative than labour was roughly 40 or older. now, polling suggests that conservatives are only ahead in one age group: people over age 65. conservative party conservative support has dropped across the board, even among older voters who formed their base. age 18 to 24 25 to 49 50 to 64 65+ 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% vote share labour party labour has gained support   except among young people, who are moving toward smaller parties, like the greens. age 18 to 24 25 to 49 50 to 64 65+ 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% vote share conservative party conservative support has dropped across the board, even among older voters who formed their base. age 18 to 24 25 to 49 50 to 64 65+ 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% vote share labour party labour has gained support   except among young people, who are moving toward smaller parties, like the greens. age 18 to 24 25 to 49 50 to 64 65+ 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% vote share conservative party conservative support has dropped across the board, even among older voters who formed their base. age 18 to 24 25 to 49 50 to 64 65+ 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% vote share labour party labour has gained support   except among young people, who are moving toward smaller parties, like the greens. age 18 to 24 25 to 49 50 to 64 65+ 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% vote share source: yougov polling on june 10, 2024 and dec. 17, 2019 conservative candidates could be wiped out in britain’s youngest areas, according to the latest polling from yougov. and labour seems poised to make a significant dent among older constituencies too, with the center left liberal democrats eroding conservative control of seats across the age groups. in the last election, some of the most deprived areas of the country   based on factors like income, housing and health   voted for the conservative party for the first time. when ballots are counted this time, polls suggest, the party’s supporters may be far less broad based economically, given how labour is polling among lower income people. at the same time, keir starmer, labour’s leader, has ruthlessly moved the party to the center since taking it over, doing so at the risk of alienating some of the party’s more left wing supporters. he has made a u turn on a pledge to spend £28 billion per year on a green investment plan, saying that the country could no longer afford it, and he has been less critical of israel over civilian deaths in gaza than many supporters would like. polls suggest this approach is costing labour support among 18  to 24 year olds as they gravitate to smaller parties, including the liberal democrats and the greens. the seat of bristol central   a city with a large amount of young, educated voters in southwest england   could be won by the green party for the first time. after a disastrous performance in the last election, labour needs to win an extra 120 seats in parliament compared to the last election to gain power. it’s an extraordinary number, and a daunting task. mr. starmer, the party’s leader, is also unpopular, surveys show, although his standing in polling has improved throughout the campaign. but the latest polling suggests labour could win seats across the country and transform britain’s electoral map. labour conservatives s.n.p. lib. dems. greens plaid cymru reform 2019 election result 2024 election estimate, based on yougov poll industrial heartlands could return to labour after many backed boris johnson. no polling for northern ireland. labour reliably carries inner london. this year, it may also clean up in commuter towns. in the south west, the conservatives could also lose seats to the liberal democrats. 2019 election result 2024 election estimate, based on yougov poll industrial heartlands could return to labour after many backed boris johnson. no polling for northern ireland. in the south west, the conservatives could also lose seats to the liberal democrats. labour reliably carries inner london. this year, it may also clean up in commuter towns. 2019 election result 2024 election estimate, based on yougov poll industrial heartlands could return to labour after many backed boris johnson. no polling for northern ireland. in the south west, the conservatives could also lose seats to the liberal democrats. labour reliably carries inner london. this year, it may also clean up in commuter towns. 2019 election result 2024 election estimate, based on yougov poll industrial heartlands could return to labour after many backed boris johnson. no polling for northern ireland. in the south west, the conservatives could also lose seats to the liberal democrats. labour reliably carries inner london. this year, it may also clean up in commuter towns. 2019 election result 2024 election estimate, based on yougov poll industrial heartlands could return to labour after many backed boris johnson. no polling for northern ireland. in the south west, the conservatives could also lose seats to the liberal democrats. labour reliably carries inner london. this year, it may also clean up in commuter towns. source: yougov seat estimates one key test for labour will be whether it can win back postindustrial heartlands in the midlands and north of england, traditionally known as the “red wall.” many of these seats turned over to conservative candidates for the first time in 2019 after voters there backed brexit. the geography of each party’s voter base is crucial in this election, as britain’s electoral system rewards parties with highly concentrated voter bases. the liberal democrats are showing particular strength in a small number of wealthier, older seats in england's south, where it is competing with the conservative party for seats rather than labour. pollsters expect it to win 30 to 50 seats, almost all at the expense of the conservatives. one of the biggest unknowns is how well the hard right reform party will perform. nigel farage, who shook up the campaign in early june when he took over as reform’s leader, hopes to capitalize on discontent among conservative voters and rising concern about immigration to win seats in parliament. in the longer term, farage said he hopes to be a candidate for prime minister by 2029, when the following election would be scheduled. his gamble appears to be paying off, with a recent yougov poll finding reform passing the conservatives by drawing support from nearly one in five voters surveyed. 2024 estimated vote share, based on yougov poll 10% 20% 30% not standing winner white, working class areas like these overwhelmingly voted for brexit. they are also some of reform’s strongest areas. reform is polling poorly in inner london. 2024 estimated vote share, based on yougov poll 10% 20% 30% not standing winner white, working class areas like these overwhelmingly voted for brexit. they are also some of reform’s strongest areas. reform is polling poorly in inner london. 2024 estimated vote share, based on yougov poll 10% 20% 30% not standing winner white, working class areas like these overwhelmingly voted for brexit. they are also some of reform’s strongest areas. reform is polling poorly in inner london. 2024 estimated vote share, based on yougov poll 10% 20% 30% not standing winner white, working class areas like these overwhelmingly voted for brexit. they are also some of reform’s strongest areas. reform is polling poorly in inner london. source: yougov seat estimates “it’s the geography of that support that is so, so dangerous for the conservatives,” said will jennings, a political science professor at the university of southampton. unlike the liberal democrats, reform’s voter base is spread thinly across the country, and, while that makes it difficult to win seats, it could split the right wing vote across the country and cause the conservatives to lose more seats to labour. “reform picking up 15 to 20 points in some of those constituencies would potentially allow   even if they also pick up a little bit of labour's votes as well   labour to overturn huge majorities,” mr. jennings said. note: the u.k.’s constituency boundaries have been revised since the 2019 election. to facilitate comparison, the election results shown for 2019 are notional results based on estimations by michael thrasher and colin rallings of how that election would have looked like if it was held using the new constituency boundaries.

the conservative and unionist party, commonly the conservative party and colloquially known as the tories,[14] is one of the two main political parties in the united kingdom, along with the labour party. the party sits on the centre right[21] to right wing[28] of the political spectrum. following defeat by labour in the 2024 general election, it is currently the second largest political party by the number of votes cast and number of seats in the house of commons, followed by the liberal democrats. as the second largest party, it has the formal parliamentary role of the official opposition. it encompasses various ideological factions including one nation conservatives, thatcherites, and traditionalist conservatives. there have been twenty conservative prime ministers. the party traditionally holds the annual conservative party conference during party conference season, at which senior conservative figures promote party policy. the conservative party was founded in 1834 from the tory party and was one of two dominant political parties in the 19th century, along with the liberal party. under benjamin disraeli, it played a preeminent role in politics at the height of the british empire. in 1912, the liberal unionist party merged with the party to form the conservative and unionist party. rivalry with the labour party has shaped modern british politics for the last century. david cameron sought to modernise the conservatives after his election as leader in 2005, and the party governed from 2010 to 2024 under five prime ministers, latterly rishi sunak. the party has generally adopted liberal economic policies favouring free markets since the 1980s, although historically it advocated for protectionism. the party is british unionist, opposing a united ireland as well as scottish and welsh independence, and has been critical of devolution. historically, the party supported the continuance and maintenance of the british empire. the party has taken various approaches towards the european union (eu), with eurosceptic and, to a decreasing extent, pro european factions within it. historically, the party took a socially conservative approach.[29][30] in defence policy, it supports an independent nuclear weapons programme and commitment to nato membership. for much of modern british political history, the united kingdom exhibited a wide urban rural political divide;[31] the conservative party's voting and financial support base has historically consisted primarily of homeowners, business owners, farmers, real estate developers and middle class voters, especially in rural and suburban areas of england.[32][33][34][35][36] since the eu referendum in 2016, the conservatives targeted working class voters from traditional labour strongholds.[37][38][39][40] the conservatives' domination of british politics throughout the 20th century made it one of the most successful political parties in the western world.[41][42][43][44] the most recent period of conservative government was marked by extraordinary political turmoil,[45] culminating in 2022, a year of three prime ministers. some writers trace the party's origins to the tory party, which it soon replaced. other historians point to a faction, rooted in the 18th century whig party, that coalesced around william pitt the younger in the 1780s. they were known as "independent whigs", "friends of mr pitt", or "pittites" and never used terms such as "tory" or "conservative". from about 1812, the name "tory" was commonly used for a new party that, according to historian robert blake, "are the ancestors of conservatism". blake adds that pitt's successors after 1812 "were not in any sense standard bearers of 'true toryism'".[46] the term tory was an insult that entered english politics during the exclusion bill crisis of 1678 1681, which derived from the middle irish word tóraidhe (modern irish: tóraí) meaning outlaw or robber, which in turn derived from the irish word tóir, meaning pursuit, since outlaws were "pursued men".[47][48] the term "conservative" was suggested as a title for the party in an article by j. wilson croker published in the quarterly review in 1830.[49] the name immediately caught on and was formally adopted under the aegis of robert peel around 1834. peel is acknowledged as the founder of the conservative party, which he created with the announcement of the tamworth manifesto. the term "conservative party" rather than tory was the dominant usage by 1845.[50][51] the widening of the electoral franchise in the 19th century forced the conservative party to popularise its approach under edward smith stanley, 14th earl of derby and benjamin disraeli, who carried through their own expansion of the franchise with the reform act of 1867. the party was initially opposed to further expansion of the electorate but eventually allowed passage of gladstone's 1884 reform act. in 1886, the party formed an alliance with spencer cavendish and joseph chamberlain's new liberal unionist party and, under the statesmen robert gascoyne cecil and arthur balfour, held power for all but three of the following twenty years before suffering a heavy defeat in 1906 when it split over the issue of free trade. young winston churchill denounced chamberlain's attack on free trade, and helped organise the opposition inside the unionist/conservative party. nevertheless, balfour, as party leader, introduced protectionist legislation.[52] churchill crossed the floor and formally joined the liberal party (he rejoined the conservatives in 1925). in december, balfour lost control of his party, as the defections multiplied. he was replaced by liberal prime minister henry campbell bannerman who called an election in january 1906, which produced a massive liberal victory. liberal prime minister h. h. asquith enacted a great deal of reform legislation, but the unionists worked hard at grassroots organizing. two general elections were held in 1910, in january and in december. the two main parties were now almost dead equal in seats, but the liberals kept control with a coalition with the irish parliamentary party.[53][54] in 1912, the liberal unionists merged with the conservative party. in ireland, the irish unionist alliance had been formed in 1891 which merged unionists who were opposed to irish home rule into one political movement. its mps took the conservative whip at westminster, essentially forming the irish wing of the party until 1922. in britain, the conservative party was known as the unionist party because of its opposition to home rule.[55][56] under bonar law's leadership in 1911 1914, the party morale improved, the "radical right" wing was contained, and the party machinery strengthened. it made some progress toward developing constructive social policies.[57] while the liberals were mostly against the war until the invasion of belgium, conservative leaders were strongly in favour of aiding france and stopping germany. the liberal party was in full control of the government until its mismanagement of the war effort under the shell crisis badly hurt its reputation. an all party coalition government was formed in may 1915. in late 1916 liberal david lloyd george became prime minister but the liberals soon split and the conservatives dominated the government, especially after their landslide in the 1918 election. the liberal party never recovered, but labour gained strength after 1920.[58] nigel keohane finds that the conservatives were bitterly divided before 1914 but the war pulled the party together, allowing it to emphasise patriotism as it found new leadership and worked out its positions on the irish question, socialism, electoral reform, and the issue of intervention in the economy. the fresh emphasis on anti socialism was its response to the growing strength of the labour party. when electoral reform was an issue, it worked to protect their base in rural england.[59] it aggressively sought female voters in the 1920s, often relying on patriotic themes.[60] in 1922, bonar law and stanley baldwin led the breakup of the coalition, and the conservatives governed until 1923, when a minority labour government led by ramsay macdonald came to power. the conservatives regained power in 1924 but were defeated in 1929 as a minority labour government took office. in 1931, following the collapse of the labour minority government, it entered another coalition, which was dominated by the conservatives with some support from factions of both the liberal party and the labour party (national labour and national liberals).[61] in may 1940 a more balanced coalition was formed[61] the national government which, under the leadership of winston churchill, saw the united kingdom through the second world war. however, the party lost the 1945 general election in a landslide to the resurgent labour party.[62][63] the concept of the "property owning democracy" was coined by noel skelton in 1923 and became a core principle of the party.[64] while serving in opposition during the late 1940s, the conservative party exploited and incited growing public anger at food rationing, scarcity, controls, austerity, and government bureaucracy. it used the dissatisfaction with the socialist and egalitarian policies of the labour party to rally middle class supporters and build a political comeback that won them the 1951 general election.[65] in 1947, the party published its industrial charter which marked its acceptance of the "post war consensus" on the mixed economy and labour rights.[66] david maxwell fyfe chaired a committee into conservative party organisation that resulted in the maxwell fyfe report (1948 49). the report required the party to do more fundraising, by forbidding constituency associations from demanding large donations from candidates, with the intention of broadening the diversity of mps. in practice, it may have had the effect of lending more power to constituency parties and making candidates more uniform.[67] winston churchill, the party leader, brought in a party chairman to modernise the party: frederick marquis, 1st earl of woolton rebuilt the local organisations with an emphasis on membership, money, and a unified national propaganda appeal on critical issues.[68] with a narrow victory at the 1951 general election, despite losing the popular vote, churchill was back in power. apart from rationing, which was ended in 1954, most of the welfare state enacted by labour were accepted by the conservatives and became part of the "post war consensus" that was satirised as butskellism and that lasted until the 1970s.[69][70] the conservatives were conciliatory towards unions, but they did privatise the steel and road haulage industries in 1953.[71] during the conservatives' thirteen year tenure in office, pensions went up by 49% in real terms, sickness and unemployment benefits by 76% in real terms, and supplementary benefits by 46% in real terms. however, family allowances fell by 15% in real terms.[72] "thirteen wasted years" was a popular slogan attacking the conservative record, primarily from labour. in addition, there were attacks by the right wing of the conservative party itself for its tolerance of socialist policies and reluctance to curb the legal powers of labour unions. the conservatives were re elected in 1955 and 1959 with larger majorities. conservative prime ministers churchill, anthony eden, harold macmillan and alec douglas home promoted relatively liberal trade regulations and less state involvement throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. the suez crisis of 1956 was a humiliating defeat for prime minister eden, but his successor, macmillan, minimised the damage and focused attention on domestic issues and prosperity. following controversy over the selections of harold macmillan and alec douglas home via a process of consultation known as the 'magic circle',[73][74] a formal election process was created and the first leadership election was held in 1965, won by edward heath.[75] edward heath's 1970 74 government was known for taking the uk into the eec, although the right wing of the party objected to his failure to control the trade unions at a time when a declining british industry saw many strikes, as well as the 1973 75 recession. since accession to the eec, which developed into the eu, british membership has been a source of heated debate within the party. heath had come to power in june 1970 and the last possible date for the next general election was not until mid 1975.[76] however a general election was held in february 1974 in a bid to win public support during a national emergency caused by the miners' strike. heath's attempt to win a second term at this "snap" election failed, as a deadlock result left no party with an overall majority. heath resigned within days, after failing to gain liberal party support to form a coalition government. labour won the october 1974 election with an overall majority of three seats.[77] loss of power weakened heath's control over the party and margaret thatcher deposed him in the 1975 leadership election. thatcher led her party to victory at the 1979 general election with a manifesto which concentrated on the party's philosophy.[78] as prime minister, thatcher focused on rejecting the mild liberalism of the post war consensus that tolerated or encouraged nationalisation, strong labour unions, heavy regulation, and high taxes.[79] she did not challenge the national health service, and supported the cold war policies of the consensus, but otherwise tried to dismantle and delegitimise it. she built a right wing political ideology that became known as thatcherism, based on social and economic ideas from british and american intellectuals such as friedrich hayek and milton friedman. thatcher believed that too much socially democratic oriented government policy was leading to a long term decline in the british economy. as a result, her government pursued a programme of economic liberalism, adopting a free market approach to public services based on the sale of publicly owned industries and utilities, as well as a reduction in trade union power. one of thatcher's largest and most successful policies assisted council house tenants in public housing to purchase their homes at favourable rates. the "right to buy" had emerged in the late 1940s but was too great a challenge to the post war consensus to win conservative endorsement. thatcher favoured the idea because it would lead to a "property owning democracy", an important idea that had emerged in the 1920s.[64] some local conservative run councils enacted profitable local sales schemes during the late 1960s. by the 1970s, many working class people could afford to buy homes, and eagerly adopted thatcher's invitation to purchase their homes at a sizable discount. the new owners were more likely to vote conservative, as thatcher had hoped.[80][81] thatcher led the conservatives to two further electoral victories in 1983 and 1987. she was deeply unpopular in certain sections of society due to high unemployment and her response to the miners' strike. unemployment had doubled between 1979 and 1982, largely due to thatcher's monetarist battle against inflation.[82][83] at the time of the 1979 general election, inflation had been at 9% or under for the previous year, then increased to over 20% in the first two years of the thatcher ministry, but it had fallen again to 5.8% by the start of 1983.[84] the period of unpopularity of the conservatives in the early 1980s coincided with a crisis in the labour party, which then formed the main opposition. victory in the falklands war in june 1982, along with the recovering british economy, saw the conservatives returning quickly to the top of the opinion polls and winning the 1983 general election with a landslide majority, due to a split opposition vote.[82] by the time of the general election in june 1987, the economy was stronger, with lower inflation and falling unemployment and thatcher secured her third successive electoral victory.[85] the introduction of the community charge (known by its opponents as the poll tax) in 1989 is often cited as contributing to her political downfall. internal party tensions led to a leadership challenge by the conservative mp michael heseltine and she resigned on 28 november 1990.[86] john major won the party leadership election on 27 november 1990, and his appointment led to an almost immediate boost in conservative party fortunes.[87] the election was held on 9 april 1992 and the conservatives won a fourth successive electoral victory, contrary to predictions from opinion polls.[88][89] the conservatives became the first party to attract 14 million votes in a general election.[90][91] on 16 september 1992, the government suspended britain's membership of the european exchange rate mechanism (erm), after the pound fell lower than its minimum level in the erm, a day thereafter referred to as black wednesday.[92] soon after, approximately one million householders faced repossession of their homes during a recession that saw a sharp rise in unemployment, taking it close to 3 million people.[93] the party subsequently lost much of its reputation for good financial stewardship. the end of the recession was declared in april 1993.[94][93] from 1994 to 1997, major privatised british rail. the party was plagued by internal division and infighting, mainly over the uk's role in the european union. the party's eurosceptic wing, represented by mps such as john redwood, opposed further eu integration, whilst the party's pro european wing, represented by those such as chancellor of the exchequer kenneth clarke, was broadly supportive. the issue of the creation of a single european currency also inflamed tensions.[95] major survived a leadership challenge in 1995 by redwood, but redwood received 89 votes, further undermining major's influence.[96] the conservative government was increasingly accused in the media of "sleaze". their support reached its lowest ebb in late 1994. over the next two years the conservatives gained some credit for the strong economic recovery and fall in unemployment.[97] but an effective opposition campaign by the labour party culminated in a landslide defeat for the conservatives in 1997, their worst defeat since the 1906 general election. the 1997 election left the conservative party as an england only party, with all scottish and welsh seats having been lost, and not a single new seat having been gained anywhere. major resigned as party leader and was succeeded by william hague.[98] the 2001 general election resulted in a net gain of one seat for the conservative party and returned a mostly unscathed labour party back to government.[99] this all occurred months after the fuel protests of september 2000 had seen the conservatives briefly take a narrow lead over labour in the opinion polls.[100] in 2001, iain duncan smith was elected leader of the party.[98] although duncan smith was a strong eurosceptic,[101] during his tenure, europe ceased to be an issue of division in the party as it united behind calls for a referendum on the proposed european union constitution.[102] however, before he could lead the party into a general election, duncan smith lost the vote on a motion of no confidence by mps.[103] this was despite the conservative support equalling that of labour in the months leading up to his departure from the leadership.[97] michael howard then stood for the leadership unopposed on 6 november 2003.[104] under howard's leadership in the 2005 general election, the conservative party increased their total vote share and more significantly their number of parliamentary seats, reducing labour's majority.[105] the day following the election, howard resigned. david cameron won the 2005 leadership election.[106] he then announced his intention to reform and realign the conservatives.[107][108] for most of 2006 and the first half of 2007, polls showed leads over labour for the conservatives.[109] polls became more volatile in summer 2007 with the accession of gordon brown as prime minister. the conservatives gained control of the london mayoralty for the first time in 2008 after boris johnson defeated the labour incumbent, ken livingstone.[110] in may 2010 the conservative party came to government, first under a coalition with the liberal democrats and later as a series of majority and minority governments. during this period there were five conservative prime ministers: david cameron, theresa may, boris johnson, liz truss, and rishi sunak. the initial period of this time, primarily under the premiership of david cameron, was marked by the ongoing effects of the 2007 2008 financial crisis and the implementation of austerity measures in response. from 2015 the predominant political event was the brexit referendum and the process to implement the decision to leave the trade bloc. the conservatives' time in office was marked by several controversies. the presence of islamophobia in the conservative party, including allegations against its policies, fringes, and structure, was often in the public eye. these include allegations against senior politicians such as boris johnson, michael gove, theresa may, and zac goldsmith. during the period of the cameron[111][112][113] and johnson governments,[114] a number of conservative mps have been accused or convicted of sexual misconduct, with cases including the consumption of pornography in parliament, rape, groping, and sexual harassment.[115][116][117] in 2017, a list of 36 sitting conservative mps accused of inappropriate sexual behaviour was leaked. the list is believed to have been compiled by party staff.[118] following accusations of multiple cases of rape against an unnamed tory mp in 2023[119] and allegations of a cover up,[120][121] baroness warsi, who has served as the party's co chairman under david cameron, stated that the conservative party has had a problem handling complaints of sexual misconducts against members appropriately.[122] the 2010 election resulted in a hung parliament with the conservatives having the most seats but short of an overall majority.[123] following the resignation of gordon brown, cameron was named prime minister, and the conservatives entered government in a coalition with the liberal democrats the first postwar coalition government.[124][125] cameron's premiership was marked by the ongoing effects of the 2007 2008 financial crisis; these involved a large deficit in government finances that his government sought to reduce through controversial austerity measures.[126][127] in september 2014, the unionist side, championed by labour as well as by the conservative party and the liberal democrats, won in the scottish independence referendum by 55% no to 45% yes on the question "should scotland be an independent country".[128][129] at the 2015 general election, the conservatives formed a majority government under cameron.[130] after speculation of a referendum on the uk's eu membership throughout his premiership, a vote was announced for june 2016 in which cameron campaigned to remain in the eu.[131][132] on 24 june 2016, cameron announced his intention to resign as prime minister, after he failed to convince the british public to stay in the european union.[133] on 11 july 2016, theresa may became the leader of the conservative party.[134] may promised social reform and a more centrist political outlook for the conservative party and its government.[135] may's early cabinet appointments were interpreted as an effort to reunite the party in the wake of the uk's vote to leave the european union.[136] she began the process of withdrawing the uk from the european union in march 2017.[137] in april 2017, the cabinet agreed to hold a general election on 8 june.[138] in a shock result, the election resulted in a hung parliament, with the conservative party needing a confidence and supply arrangement with the dup to support a minority government.[139][140] may's premiership was dominated by brexit as she carried out negotiations with the european union, adhering to the chequers plan, which resulted in her draft brexit withdrawal agreement.[141] may survived two votes of no confidence in december 2018 and january 2019, but after versions of her draft withdrawal agreement were rejected by parliament three times, may announced her resignation on 24 may 2019.[142] subsequent to the eu referendum vote, and through the premierships of may, boris johnson, and their successors, the party shifted right on the political spectrum.[28] in july 2019 boris johnson became leader of the party.[143] he became prime minister the next day. johnson had made withdrawal from the eu by 31 october "with no ifs, buts or maybes" a key pledge during his campaign for party leadership.[144] johnson lost his working majority in the house of commons on 3 september 2019.[145] later that same day, 21 conservative mps had the conservative whip withdrawn after voting with the opposition to grant the house of commons control over its order paper.[146] johnson would later halt the withdrawal agreement bill, calling for a general election.[147] the 2019 general election resulted in the conservatives winning a majority, the party's largest since 1987.[148] the party won several constituencies, particularly in formerly traditional labour seats.[37][38] on 20 december 2019, mps passed an agreement for withdrawing from the eu; the united kingdom formally left on 31 january 2020.[149][150] johnson presided over the uk's response to the covid 19 pandemic.[151] from late 2021 onwards, johnson received huge public backlash for the partygate scandal, in which staff and senior members of government were pictured holding gatherings during lockdown contrary to government guidance.[152] the metropolitan police eventually fined johnson for breaking lockdown rules in april 2022.[153] in july 2022, johnson admitted to appointing chris pincher as deputy chief whip while being aware of allegations of sexual assault against him.[154] this, along with partygate and increasing criticisms on johnson's handling of the cost of living crisis, provoked a government crisis following a loss in confidence and nearly 60 resignations from government officials, eventually leading to johnson announcing his resignation on 7 july.[155][156] boris johnson's successor as leader was confirmed as liz truss on 5 september, following a leadership election.[157] in a strategy labelled trussonomics she introduced policies in response to the cost of living crisis,[158] including price caps on energy bills and government help to pay them.[159] truss's mini budget on 23 september faced severe criticism and markets reacted poorly;[160] the pound fell to a record low of 1.03 against the dollar, and uk government gilt yields rose to 4.3 per cent, prompting the bank of england to trigger an emergency bond buying programme.[161][162] after condemnation from the public, the labour party and her own party, truss reversed some aspects of the mini budget, including the abolition of the top rate of income tax.[163][164] following a government crisis truss announced her resignation as prime minister on 20 october[165] after 44 days in office, the shortest premiership in british history.[165][166] truss also oversaw the worst polling the conservatives had ever received, with labour polling as high as 36 per cent above the conservatives amidst the crisis.[167] on 24 october 2022, rishi sunak was declared leader, the first british asian leader of the conservatives and the first british asian prime minister. on 22 may sunak announced a general election to be held on 4 july 2024.[168] during the 2024 general election, public opinion in favour of a change in government was reflected by poor polling from the conservative party, with reform uk making strong polling gains.[169] the conservative manifesto focused on the economy, taxes, welfare, expanding free childcare, education, healthcare, environment, energy, transport, and crime.[170][171] it pledged to lower taxes, increase education and nhs spending, deliver 92,000 more nurses and 28,000 more doctors, introduce a new model of national service, and to treble britain's offshore wind capacity and support solar energy.[172][173] the final result was the lowest seat total at a general election in the history of the conservative party, with well below the previous record low of 156 seats won at the 1906 general election.[174] defunct the conservative party believes that a free market and individual achievement are the primary factors behind economic prosperity. a leading economic theory advocated by conservatives is supply side economics, which holds that reduced income tax rates increase growth and enterprise (although a reduction in the budget deficit has sometimes taken priority over cutting taxes).[175] the party focuses on the social market economy, promoting a free market for competition with social balance to create fairness. this has included education reform, vocational skills reform, expanding free childcare, curbs on the banking sector, enterprise zones to revive regions in britain, and grand and extensive infrastructure projects, such as high speed rail.[176][177] one concrete economic policy of recent years has been opposition to the european single currency, the euro. with the growing euroscepticism within his party, john major negotiated a british opt out in the 1992 maastricht treaty, which enabled the uk to stay within the european union without adopting the single currency. all subsequent conservative leaders have positioned the party firmly against the adoption of the euro. the 50% top rate of income tax was reduced to 45% by the conservative liberal democrat coalition.[178] alongside a reduction in tax and commitments to keep taxation low, the conservative party has significantly reduced government spending, through the austerity programme which commenced in 2010, subsequent to the 2007 2008 financial crisis. in 2019 and during the election campaign that year, boris johnson signalled an end to austerity with increased public expenditure, in areas including healthcare, education, transport, welfare, and the police.[179][180] socially conservative policies such as tax incentives for married couples may have played a role in the party's electoral decline in the 1990s and early 2000s, and so the party has attempted to seek a new direction. as part of their coalition with the liberal democrats, the conservative government did support the introduction of equal marriage rights for lgbt+ individuals in 2010, though 139 conservative mps, a majority, voted against the 2013 same sex marriage act. thus the extent to which this policy represented a more liberal conservative party has been challenged.[187] since 1997 debate has occurred within the party between 'modernisers' such as alan duncan,[188] who believe that the conservatives should modify their public stances on social issues, and 'traditionalists' such as liam fox[189][190] and owen paterson,[191] who believe that the party should remain faithful to its traditional conservative platform. in the previous parliament, modernising forces were represented by mps such as neil o'brien, who has argued that the party needs to renew its policies and image, and is said to be inspired by macron's centrist politics.[192] ruth davidson is also seen as a reforming figure. many of the original 'traditionalists' remain influential, though duncan smith's influence in terms of commons contributions has waned.[193] the party has strongly criticised what it describes as labour's "state multiculturalism".[194] shadow home secretary dominic grieve said in 2008 that state multiculturalism policies had created a "terrible" legacy of "cultural despair" and dislocation, which has encouraged support for "extremists" on both sides of the debate.[195] david cameron responded to grieve's comments by agreeing that policies of "state multiculturalism" that treat social groups as distinct, for example policies that "treat british muslims as muslims, rather than as british citizens", are wrong. however, he expressed support for the premise of multiculturalism on the whole.[195] official statistics showed that eu and non eu mass immigration, together with asylum seeker applications, all increased substantially during cameron's term in office.[196][197][198] however, this was not solely as a result of intentional government policy   during this period, there were significant refugee flows into the uk and an increased level of asylum applications due to conflict and persecution globally.[199][200] in 2019 former conservative home secretary priti patel announced that the government would enact stricter immigration reforms, crack down on illegal immigration, and scrap freedom of movement with the european union following the completion of brexit.[201] in the four years following this announcement, net migration increased annually, in large part due to the number of health care workers, and their dependents, that were invited into the country because of recruitment problems caused by brexit and the pandemic.[202][203] the number of asylum seekers dropped as a proportion of total net migrants, whereas the number of people coming to the uk to study increased during that time period.[204] for much of the 20th century, the conservative party took a broadly atlanticist stance in relations with the united states, members of eu and nato, favouring close ties with the united states and similarly aligned nations such as canada, australia, new zealand, south africa, korea, taiwan, singapore and japan. the conservatives have generally favoured a diverse range of international alliances, ranging from the north atlantic treaty organization (nato) to the commonwealth of nations. the conservatives have proposed a pan african free trade area, which it says could help entrepreneurial dynamism of african people.[205] the conservatives pledged to increase aid spending to 0.7% of national income by 2013.[205] they met this pledge in 2014, when spending on aid reached 0.72% of gdp and the commitment was enshrined in uk law in 2015.[206] close anglo american relationship have been an element of conservative foreign policy since the second world war. though the anglo american relationship in foreign affairs has often been termed a 'special relationship', a term coined by winston churchill, this has often been observed most clearly where leaders in each country are of a similar political stripe. david cameron had sought to distance himself from former us president bush and his neoconservative foreign policy.[207] despite traditional links between the uk conservatives and us republicans, london mayor boris johnson, a conservative, endorsed barack obama in the 2008 election.[208] however, after becoming prime minister, johnson developed a close relationship with republican president donald trump.[209][210][211] this has been described as a reestablishing of the special relationship with the united states following britain's withdraw from the european union, as well as returning to the links between the conservatives and republican party.[212] beyond relations with the united states, the commonwealth and the eu, the conservative party has generally supported a pro free trade foreign policy within the mainstream of international affairs. although stances have changed with successive leadership, the modern conservative party generally supports cooperation and maintaining friendly relations with israel. historic conservative statesmen such as arthur balfour and winston churchill supported the idea of national home for the jewish people. under margaret thatcher conservative support for israel was seen to crystallise.[213][214] support for israel has increased under the leaderships of theresa may and boris johnson, with prominent conservative figures within the may and johnson ministries strongly endorsing israel. in 2016, theresa may publicly rebutted statements made by us secretary of state john kerry over the composition of the israeli government.[215][216] in 2018 the party pledged to proscribe all wings of the lebanese based militant group hezbollah and this was adopted as a uk wide policy in 2019.[217][218] in 2019, the conservative government under boris johnson announced plans to stop the influence of the boycott, divestment and sanctions movement on local politics which included prohibiting local councils from boycotting israeli products.[219][220][221] after the terrorist attacks of 11 september 2001, the conservative party supported the coalition military action in afghanistan. the conservative party believed that success in afghanistan would be defined in terms of the afghans achieving the capability to maintain their own internal and external security. they have repeatedly criticised the former labour government for failing to equip british forces adequately in the earlier days on the campaign especially highlighting the shortage of helicopters for british forces resulting from gordon brown's £1.4bn cut to the helicopter budget in 2004.[222] the conservative party believes that in the 21st century defence and security are interlinked. it has pledged to break away from holding a traditional strategic defence review and committed to carrying out a more comprehensive strategic defence and security review (sdsr).[223] as well as an sdsr, the conservative party pledged in 2010 to undertake a fundamental and far reaching review of the procurement process and how defence equipment is provided in britain, and to increase britain's share of the global defence market as government policy.[224] the conservative party upholds the view that nato remains and should remain the most important security alliance for the united kingdom.[225] it has advocated for the creation of a fairer funding mechanism for nato's expeditionary operations and called for all nato countries to meet their required defence spending 2% of gdp. some conservatives believe that there is scope for expanding nato's article v to include new threats such as cybersecurity. the conservative party aims to build enhanced bilateral defence relations with key european partners and believes that it is in britain's national interest to cooperate fully with all its european neighbours. it has pledged to ensure that any eu military capability must supplement and not supplant british national defence and nato, and that it is not in the british interest to hand over security to any supranational body.[226] the conservatives see it as a priority to encourage all members of the european union to do more in terms of a commitment to european security at home and abroad. regarding the defence role of the european union, the conservatives pledged to re examine some of britain's eu defence commitments to determine their practicality and utility; specifically, to reassess uk participation provisions like permanent structured cooperation, the european defence agency and eu battlegroups to determine if there is any value in britain's participation. the conservatives support the uk's possession of nuclear weapons through the trident nuclear programme.[226] in 1945 the conservatives declared support for universal healthcare.[227] they introduced the health and social care act 2012, constituting the biggest reformation that the nhs has ever undertaken.[228] the conservative party supports drug prohibition.[229] however, views on drugs vary amongst some mps in the party. some conservative politicians take the libertarian approach that individual freedom and economic freedom of industry and trade should be respected over prohibition. other conservative politicians, despite being economically liberal, are in favour of full drug prohibition. legalisation of cannabis for medical uses is favoured by some conservative politicians.[230] the party has rejected both decriminalising drugs for personal use and the creation of safe consumption sites.[231] in 2024 the conservatives banned smoking for future generations, with an aim to make england smoke free by 2030.[232] in education, the conservatives pledged to review the national curriculum, introduce the english baccalaureate, and reform gcse, a level, other national qualifications, apprenticeships and training.[233] the restoration of discipline was also highlighted, as they want it to be easier for pupils to be searched for contraband items, the granting of anonymity to teachers accused by pupils, and the banning of expelled pupils being returned to schools via appeal panels. in higher education, the conservatives have increased tuition fees to £9,250 per year, however have ensured that this will not be paid by anyone until they are earning over £25,000. the scottish conservatives also support the re introduction of tuition fees in scotland. in 2016 the conservative government extended student loan access in england to postgraduate students to help improve access to education.[234] within the eu, the uk was one of the largest recipients of research funding in the european union, receiving £7 billion between 2007 and 2015, which is invested in universities and research intensive businesses.[235] following the vote to leave the eu, prime minister theresa may guaranteed that the conservative government would protect funding for existing research and development projects in the uk.[236] in 2017, the conservatives introduced the t level qualification aimed at improving the teaching and administration of technical education.[237] as prime minister, david cameron wanted to 'support family life in britain' and put families at the centre of domestic social policymaking.[238] he stated in 2014 that there was 'no better place to start' in the conservative mission of 'building society from the bottom up' than the family, which was responsible for individual welfare and well being long before the welfare state came into play.[238] he also argued that 'family and politics are inextricably linked'.[238] both cameron and theresa may aimed at helping families achieve a work home balance and have previously proposed to offer all parents 12 months parental leave, to be shared by parents as they choose.[239] this policy is now in place, offering 50 weeks total parental leave, of which 37 weeks are paid leave, which can be shared between both parents.[240] other policies have included doubling the free hours of childcare for working parents of three and four year olds from 15 hours to 30 hours a week during term time, although parents can reduce the number of hours per week to 22 and spread across 52 weeks of the year. the government also introduced a policy to fund 15 hours a week of free education and childcare for 2 year olds in england if parents are receiving certain state benefits or the child has a sen statement or diagnosis, worth £2,500 a year per child.[241][242] one of the conservatives' key policy goals in 2010 was to reduce the number of people unemployed, and increase the number of people in the workforce, by strengthening apprenticeships, skills and job training.[243] between 2010 and 2014, all claimants of incapacity benefit were moved onto a new benefit scheme, employment and support allowance, which was then subsumed into the universal credit system alongside other welfare benefits in 2018.[244][245][246] the universal credit system came under immense scrutiny following its introduction. shortly after her appointment to the department for work and pensions, the then secretary of state amber rudd acknowledged there were real problems with the universal credit system, especially the wait times for initial payments and the housing payments aspect of the combined benefits.[247] rudd pledged specifically to review and address the uneven impact of universal credit implementation on economically disadvantaged women, which had been the subject of numerous reports by the radio 4 you and yours programme and others.[247] until 1999 conservatives opposed the creation of a national minimum wage, as they believed it would cost jobs, and businesses would be reluctant to start business in the uk from fear of high labour costs.[248] however the party have since pledged support and in the july 2015 budget, chancellor george osborne announced a national living wage of £9/hour.[249] the national minimum wage in 2024 was £11.44 for those over 21.[250] the party support, and have implemented, the restoration of the link between pensions and earnings, and seek to raise retirement age from 65 to 67 by 2028.[251] david cameron brought several 'green' issues to the forefront of his 2010 campaign. these included proposals designed to impose a tax on workplace car parking spaces, a halt to airport growth, a tax on cars with exceptionally poor petrol mileage, and restrictions on car advertising. many of these policies were implemented in the coalition including the 'green deal'.[252] a law was passed in 2019 that uk greenhouse gas emissions will be net zero by 2050.[253] the uk was the first major economy to embrace a legal obligation to achieve net zero carbon emissions.[254] in 2019 the conservatives became the first national government in the world to officially declare a climate emergency (second in the uk after the snp).[253] in november 2020 the conservatives announced a 10 point plan for a 'green industrial revolution', with green enterprises, an end to the sale of petrol and diesel cars, quadruple the amount of offshore wind power capacity within a decade, fund a variety of emissions cutting proposals, and spurn a proposed green post covid 19 recovery.[255] in 2021, the conservatives announced plans to cut carbon emissions by 78% by 2035.[256] in 2010 the conservatives campaigned to cut the perceived bureaucracy of the modern police force and pledged greater legal protection to people convicted of defending themselves against intruders. the party has also campaigned for the creation of a uk bill of rights to replace the human rights act 1998, but this was vetoed by their coalition partners the liberal democrats.[257] the conservatives' 2017 manifesto pledged to create a national infrastructure police force, subsuming the existing british transport police; civil nuclear constabulary; and ministry of defence police "to improve the protection of critical infrastructure such as nuclear sites, railways and the strategic road network".[258] the conservatives have invested in public transport and infrastructure, aimed to promoting economic growth.[259] this has included rail (including high speed rail), electric vehicles, bus networks, and active transport.[260] in 2020 new funding for active travel infrastructure was announced by the conservatives.[261] the party's stated aim was for england to be a "great walking and cycling nation" and for half of all journeys in towns and cities being walked or cycled by 2030. the plan was accompanied by £2 billion in additional funding over the following five years for cycling and walking. the plan also introduced new inspectorate, known as active travel england.[262][263] in 2021 the conservatives announced a white paper that would transform the operation of the railways. the rail network will be partly renationalised, with infrastructure and operations brought together under the state owned public body great british railways.[264] on 18 november 2021, the government announced the biggest ever public investment in britain's rail network costing £96 billion and promising quicker and more frequent rail connections in the north and midlands: the integrated rail plan includes substantially improved connections north south as well as east west and includes three new high speed lines.[265][266] no subject has proved more divisive in the conservative party in recent history than the role of the united kingdom within the european union. though the principal architect of the uk's entry into the european communities (which became the european union) was conservative prime minister edward heath, most contemporary conservative opinion is opposed to closer economic and particularly political union with the eu. this is a noticeable shift in british politics, as in the 1960s and 1970s the conservatives were more pro europe than the labour party: for example, in the 1971 house of commons vote on whether the uk should join the european economic community, only 39 of the then 330 conservative mps were opposed.[267][268] the conservative party has members with varying opinions of the eu, with pro european conservatives joining the affiliate conservative group for europe, while some eurosceptics left the party to join the united kingdom independence party. whilst the vast majority of conservatives in recent decades have been eurosceptics, views among this group regarding the uk's relationship with the eu have been polarised between moderate, soft eurosceptics who support continued british membership but oppose further harmonisation of regulations affecting business and accept participation in a multi speed europe, and a more radical, economically libertarian faction who oppose policy initiatives from brussels, support the rolling back of integration measures from the maastricht treaty onwards, and have become increasingly supportive of a complete withdrawal.[267] traditionally the conservative party has supported the uncodified constitution of the united kingdom and its traditional westminster system of politics. the party opposed many of tony blair's reforms, such as the removal of the hereditary peers,[269] the incorporation of the european convention on human rights into british law, and the 2009 creation of the supreme court of the united kingdom, a function formerly carried out by the house of lords. there was also a split on whether to introduce a british bill of rights that would replace the human rights act 1998; david cameron expressed support, but party grandee ken clarke described it as "xenophobic and legal nonsense".[270] in 2019 the conservatives' manifesto committed to a broad constitutional review in a line which read "after brexit we also need to look at the broader aspects of our constitution: the relationship between the government, parliament and the courts".[271] the conservative party comprises the voluntary party, parliamentary party (sometimes called the political party) and the professional party. members of the public join the party by becoming part of a local constituency conservative association.[272] the country is also divided into regions, with each region containing a number of areas, both having a similar structure to constituency associations. the national conservative convention sets the voluntary party's direction. it is composed of all association chairs, officers from areas and regions, and 42 representatives and the conservative women's organisation.[273] the convention meets twice a year. its annual general meeting is usually held at spring forum, with another meeting usually held at the conservative party conference. in the organisation of the conservative party, constituency associations dominate selection of local candidates, and some associations have organised open parliamentary primaries. the 1922 committee consists of backbench mps, meeting weekly while parliament is sitting. frontbench mps have an open invitation to attend. the 1922 committee plays a crucial role in the selection of party leaders. all conservative mps are members of the 1922 committee by default. there are 20 executive members of the committee, agreed by consensus among backbench mps. the conservative campaign headquarters (cchq) is effectively head of the professional party and leads financing, organisation of elections and drafting of policy. the conservative party board is the party's ultimate decision making body, responsible for all operational matters (including fundraising, membership and candidates) and is made up of representatives from each (voluntary, political and professional) section of the party.[273] the party board meets about once a month and works closely with cchq, elected representatives and the voluntary membership mainly through a number of management sub committees (such as membership, candidates and conferences). membership peaked in the mid 1950s at approximately 3 million, before declining steadily through the second half of the 20th century.[276] despite an initial boost shortly after david cameron's election as leader in december 2005, membership resumed its decline in 2006 to a lower level than when he was elected. in 2010 the conservative party had about 177,000 members according to activist tim montgomerie,[277] and in 2013 membership was estimated by the party itself at 134,000.[278] the conservative party had a membership of 124,000 in march 2018.[279] in may 2019 its membership was thought to be around 160,000, with over half of its members being over 55.[280][281] its membership rose to 200,000 in march 2021.[282] in july 2022 it had 172,437 members.[283] the membership fee for the conservative party is £25, or £5 if the member is under the age of 23. associations select their constituency's candidates.[272][284] some associations have organised open parliamentary primaries. a constituency association must choose a candidate using the rules approved by, and (in england, wales and northern ireland) from a list established by, the committee on candidates of the board of the conservative party.[285] prospective candidates apply to the conservative central office to be included on the approved list of candidates, some candidates will be given the option of applying for any seat they choose, while others may be restricted to certain constituencies.[286][287] a conservative mp can only be deselected at a special general meeting of the local conservative association, which can only be organised if backed by a petition of more than fifty members.[286] young conservatives is the youth wing of the conservative party for members aged 25 and under. the organisation aims to increase youth ownership and engagement in local associations.[288] from 1998 to 2015, the youth wing was called conservative future, and had branches at universities and at parliamentary constituency level. it was shut down in 2015 after allegations that bullying by mark clarke had caused the suicide of elliot johnson, a 21 year old party activist.[289][290][291] the current incarnation was launched in march 2018. the major annual party events are the spring forum and the conservative party conference, which takes place in autumn in alternately manchester or birmingham. this is when the national conservative convention holds meetings. in the first decade of the 21st century, half the party's funding came from a cluster of fifty "donor groups", and a third of it from only fifteen.[292] in the year after the 2010 general election, half the conservatives' funding came from the financial sector.[293] for 2013 the conservative party had an income of £25.4 million, of which £749,000 came from membership subscriptions.[294] in 2015, according to accounts filed with the electoral commission, the party had an income of about £41.8 million and expenditures of about £41 million.[295] construction businesses, including the wates group and jcb, have also been significant donors to the party, contributing £430,000 and £8.1m respectively between 2007 and 2017.[296] the advisory board of the party represents donors who have given significant sums to the party, typically in excess of £250,000.[297] in december 2022 the guardian reported 10% of conservative peers were large party donors and gave nearly £50m in total. 27 out of the party's 274 peers had given over £100,000 to the conservatives. at least 6 large donor peers got government jobs in the 10 years to 2022.[298] the conservative party has received funding from russian oligarchs, beginning in the early 2000s, for which it has been criticised.[299][300] scrutiny became more prominent after alleged interference in the 2016 brexit referendum by the kremlin to support the vote leave campaign, and increased after the intelligence and security committee russia report into russian interference in british politics was published in july 2020. concerns over conservative party funds have become increasingly controversial due to vladimir putin's human rights abuses and the russian invasion of ukraine.[301] one of the first was lubov chernukhin, wife of former deputy finance minister and investment company veb.rf founder vladmir chernukhin, who had donated north of £2.2 million as of the start of the russian invasion of ukraine.[302][303] donations to british political parties is only legal for citizens; the individuals who donated to the party had dual uk russian citizenship, and the donations were legal and properly declared.[304] however, an investigation conducted by the new york times shortly after the invasion of ukraine determined that a £399,810 donation made by british israeli businessman ehud sheleg in 2018 was in fact given directly to him by his father in law, russian oligarch sergei kopytov. kopytov, a former minister in russian occupied crimea, has strong ties to vladimir putin's government.[299] barclays bank reported that in january 2021, they "[traced] a clear line back from this donation to its ultimate source", and reported it accordingly to the national crime agency.[299] an investigation by the good law project found that in spite of johnson's claims that donations from those with links to the russian government was to stop,[301] since the start of the war, the conservatives have accepted at least £243,000 from russia and kremlin associated donors.[305] in february 2022, the labour party used electoral commission information to calculate that donors who had made money from russia or russians had given £1.93m to either the conservative party or constituency associations since boris johnson's premiership began.[306] then party leader liz truss said that the donations would not be returned, stating that they had been "properly declared".[307] the conservative party is a member of a number of international organisations, most notably the international democracy union which unites right wing parties including the united states republican party, the liberal party of australia, the conservative party of canada and the south korean people power party. at a european level, the conservatives are members of the european conservatives and reformists party (ecr party), which unites conservative parties in opposition to a federal european union, through which the conservatives have ties to the ulster unionist party and the governing parties of israel and turkey, likud and the justice and development party respectively. in the european parliament, the conservative party's meps sat in the european conservatives and reformists group (ecr group), which is affiliated to the acre. party leader david cameron pushed the foundation of the ecr, which was launched in 2009, along with the czech civic democratic party and the polish law and justice, before which the conservative party's meps sat in the european democrats, which had become a subgroup of the european people's party in the 1990s. since the 2014 european election, the ecr group has been the third largest group, with the largest members being the conservatives (nineteen meps), law and justice (eighteen meps), the liberal conservative reformers (five meps), and the danish people's party and new flemish alliance (four meps each). in june 2009 the conservatives required a further four partners apart from the polish and czech supports to qualify for official fraction status in the parliament; the rules state that a european parliamentary caucus requires at least 25 meps from at least seven of the 27 eu member states.[308] in forming the caucus, the party broke with two decades of co operation by the uk's conservative party with the mainstream european christian democrats and conservatives in the european parliament, the european people's party (epp). it did so on the grounds that it is dominated by european federalists and supporters of the lisbon treaty, which the conservatives were generally highly critical of.[308] when sir christopher lawson was appointed as a marketing director at conservative central office in 1981, he developed a logo design based on the olympic flame in the colours of the union jack,[309] which was intended to represent leadership, striving to win, dedication, and a sense of community.[310] the emblem was adopted for the 1983 general election.[309] in 1989, the party's director of communications, brendan bruce, found through market research that recognition of the symbol was low and that people found it old fashioned and uninspiring. using a design company headed by michael peters, an image of a hand carrying a torch was developed, which referenced the statue of liberty.[311] in 2006, there was a rebranding exercise to emphasise the conservatives' commitment to environmentalism; a project costing £40,000 resulted in a sketched silhouette of an oak tree, a national symbol, which was said to represent "strength, endurance, renewal and growth".[312] a change from green to the traditional conservative blue colour appeared in 2007,[313] followed by a version with the union jack superimposed in 2010.[314] an alternative version featuring the colours of the rainbow flag was unveiled for an lgbt event at the 2009 conference in manchester.[315] the conservative party has a variety of internal factions or ideologies, including one nation conservatism,[316][317] christian democracy,[318] social conservatism, thatcherism, traditional conservatism, neoconservatism,[319][320] euroscepticism,[321] and, since 2016, right wing populism.[24][322] one nation conservatism was the party's dominant ideology in the 20th century until the rise of thatcherism in the 1970s. it has included in its ranks conservative prime ministers such as stanley baldwin, harold macmillan and edward heath.[323] one nation conservatives in the contemporary party include former first secretary of state damian green, the current chair of the one nation conservatives caucus. the name itself comes from a famous phrase of disraeli. ideologically, one nation conservatism identifies itself with a broad paternalistic conservative stance. one nation conservatives are often associated with the tory reform group and the bow group. adherents believe in social cohesion and support social institutions that maintain harmony between different interest groups, classes, and more recently different races or religions. these institutions have typically included the welfare state, the bbc, and local government. one nation conservatives often invoke edmund burke and his emphasis on civil society ("little platoons") as the foundations of society, as well as his opposition to radical politics of all types. the red tory theory of phillip blond is a strand of the one nation school of thought; prominent red tories include former cabinet ministers iain duncan smith and eric pickles and parliamentary under secretary of state jesse norman.[324] there is a difference of opinion among supporters regarding the european union. some support it perhaps stemming from an extension of the cohesion principle to the international level, though others are strongly against the eu (such as peter tapsell). the "free market wing" of economic liberals achieved dominance after the election of margaret thatcher as party leader in 1975. their goal was to reduce the role of the government in the economy and to this end, they supported cuts in direct taxation, the privatisation of nationalised industries and a reduction in the size and scope of the welfare state. supporters of the "free market wing" have been labelled as "thatcherites". the group has disparate views of social policy: thatcher herself was socially conservative and a practising anglican but the free market wing in the conservative party harbour a range of social opinions from the civil libertarian views of michael portillo, daniel hannan, and david davis to the traditional conservatism of former party leaders william hague and iain duncan smith. the thatcherite wing is also associated with the concept of a "classless society".[325] whilst a number of party members are pro european, some free marketeers are eurosceptic, perceiving most eu regulations as interference in the free market and/or a threat to british sovereignty. eu centralisation also conflicts with the localist ideals that have grown in prominence within the party in recent years. rare thatcherite europhiles included leon brittan. many take inspiration from thatcher's bruges speech in 1988, in which she declared that "we have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in britain only to see them reimposed at a european level". a number of free market conservatives have signed the better off out pledge to leave the eu.[326] thatcherites and economic liberals in the party tend to support atlanticism, something exhibited between margaret thatcher and ronald reagan. thatcher herself claimed philosophical inspiration from the works of burke and friedrich hayek for her defence of liberal economics. groups associated with this tradition include the no turning back group and conservative way forward, whilst enoch powell and keith joseph are usually cited as early influences in the movement.[327] some free market supporters and christian democrats within the party tend to advocate the social market economy, which supports free markets alongside social and environmental responsibility, as well a welfare state. joseph was the first to introduce the model idea into british politics, writing the publication: why britain needs a social market economy. this socially conservative right wing grouping is currently associated with the cornerstone group (or faith, flag and family), and is the oldest tradition within the conservative party, closely associated with high toryism. the name stems from its support for three social institutions: the church of england, the unitary british state and the family. to this end, it emphasises the country's anglican heritage, oppose any transfer of power away from the united kingdom either downwards to the nations and regions or upwards to the european union and seek to place greater emphasis on traditional family structures to repair what it sees as a broken society in the uk. it is a strong advocate of marriage and believes the conservative party should back the institution with tax breaks and have opposed the alleged assaults on both traditional family structures and fatherhood.[328] prominent mps from this wing of the party include andrew rosindell, edward leigh and jacob rees mogg the latter two being prominent roman catholics, notable in a faction marked out by its support for the established church of england. sometimes two groupings have united to oppose the third. both thatcherite and traditionalist conservatives rebelled over europe (and in particular maastricht) during john major's premiership; and traditionalist and one nation mps united to inflict margaret thatcher's only major defeat in parliament, over sunday trading. not all conservative mps can be easily placed within one of the above groupings. for example, john major was the ostensibly "thatcherite" candidate during the 1990 leadership election, but he consistently promoted one nation conservatives to the higher reaches of his cabinet during his time as prime minister. these included kenneth clarke as chancellor of the exchequer and michael heseltine as deputy prime minister.[329] national campaigning within the conservative party is fundamentally managed by the cchq campaigning team, which is part of its central office[330] however, it also delegates local responsibility to conservative associations in the area, usually to a team of conservative activists and volunteers[330] in that area, but campaigns are still deployed from and thus managed by cchq national campaigning sometimes occurs in house by volunteers and staff at cchq in westminster.[331] the voter communications department is line managed by the conservative director of communications who upholds overall responsibility, though she has many staff supporting her, and the whole of cchq at election time, her department being one of the most predominant at this time, including project managers, executive assistants, politicians, and volunteers.[332] the conservative party also has regional call centres and votesource do it from home accounts. this chart shows the electoral performance of the conservative party in each general election since 1835.[333][334] for all election results, including: devolved elections, london elections, police and crime commissioner elections, combined authority elections and european parliament elections see: electoral history of the conservative party (uk) for results of the tories, the party's predecessor, see here.

making social science accessible the authoritative source for independent research on uk eu relations 11 dec 2021 devolution and the union politics and society it is two years since the united kingdom went to the polling stations on a cold december day, returning boris johnson to number 10 downing street with both a clear mandate to ‘get brexit done’ and the parliamentary majority to do so. this long read draws on material from the newly published authoritative account of that election   ‘the british general election of 2019’   the 21st volume in a series that began chronicling every british general election from 1945. it is difficult to imagine how the fractious parliament that was dissolved on 6 november 2019 could possibly have guided the uk through the covid 19 crisis that has engulfed the world in the two years since the british general election. indeed, precisely why the parties at westminster voted to approve an early election in the first place   and whether this was really such a wise idea for all concerned   has been the subject of much debate. but agree to it they did, and, by doing so, they changed the course of british politics decisively. what follows is an account of how the resulting conservative victory came about, the issues and personalities of the campaign and the longer term changes that lay behind the three central factors driving the outcome   brexit, boris johnson and jeremy corbyn. brexit and the shadow of the 2017 british general election in 2019, it was the spectre of the previous election that haunted the campaigns of both the main parties. the conservatives, though they were eventually returned to government for a third successive term in 2017, were traumatised by the unexpected loss of their majority, and behaved in 2019 like someone determined to change their ways after a brush with death. everything the party could change, it did, whether that be its offer to the electorate, the way it constructed and sold that offer, or the way it managed the campaign   both at headquarters and on the ground. the greater urgency of the brexit crisis in 2019, after two years of parliamentary deadlock, helped to ensure that johnson’s relentlessly repeated ‘get brexit done’ slogan resonated with the public and thereby reduced the appeal of labour’s ‘something for everyone’ compromise messaging. the team around jeremy corbyn, on the other hand, saw the 2017 campaign as a historic success, where the bold radicalism that critics had attacked as electorally toxic instead delivered an unprecedented campaign surge. the validation of the 2017 campaign meant that, in contrast with the conservatives, key weaknesses in party strategy, communications and management went unaddressed in the parliament that followed. these weaknesses were most obvious around brexit. the successful trick labour had pulled off in 2017 was to convince labour leaning leave voters that the party backed leave and labour leaning remain voters that the party backed remain. that trick proved impossible to repeat in 2019. instead, the party achieved the opposite, with labour leave voters seeing corbyn’s party as obstructing brexit, while many remain voters saw labour, and corbyn in particular, as not remain enough. labour was caught in a trap during the 2017 19 parliament: it could not afford to alienate the remain leaning activists and voters who provided the bulk of its 2017 support, yet could not win a subsequent election without a stronger showing among leave voters. the party had no choice but to try and bridge the brexit divide, yet corbyn’s efforts to do so left labour with a frankenstein policy (a renegotiated deal followed by a referendum in which it would not pick a side) that neither side of a polarised electorate found attractive or convincing. this failure over brexit policy fed into a broader failure over campaign strategy as a deeply divided leader’s office was sucked into endless arguments over whether to focus on leave or remain voters, crippling the labour campaign and undermining its ability to speak persuasively to either group. this strategic dispute, in turn, stemmed from the most fundamental failure of all   the failure of corbyn to lead. one paradox of the 2019 ‘brexit election’ is that the two parties who took the most strident positions on the issue both failed to make gains. the liberal democrats sought to end brexit immediately and unilaterally, while the brexit party (as its name suggested) wanted to enact it immediately and unilaterally, without even agreeing an exit deal with the eu. the liberal democrats returned a meagre cohort of mps to the commons for the third successive british general election, and their leader jo swinson was automatically removed having lost her seat, her 144 day tenure proving the shortest in the party’s history. yet the 2019 outcome was not wholly negative for the party, as the geography of liberal democrat support was reorganised by brexit in a way which may create a platform for future success. “two of the biggest strategic problems for the liberal democrats in 2019   deciding where the party was strong and convincing local voters that it was a credible force  will be easier to solve at the next british general election”. two of the biggest strategic problems for the liberal democrats in 2019   deciding where the party was strong and convincing local voters that it was a credible force  will be easier to solve at the next british general election. there is now a very clear battleground for the liberal democrats to fight on, with a swathe of target seats where it starts in a credible second place. perhaps swinson will be to her successor, ed davey, as theresa may was to johnson   the leader who bequeaths an electoral map which forms the basis for a breakthrough performance by their successor. time will tell. what of the brexit party? though it failed to secure any westminster representation at the 2017 election, its indirect impact at that poll was substantial: by splitting the leave vote in labour seats, nigel farage’s latest vehicle may have cost the conservatives as many as 25 gains from labour. farage’s decision to stand down candidates in conservative seats at the 2019 british general election may therefore rank as one of the most consequential campaign decisions taken by any politician in recent years. johnson’s path to a majority would have been much rockier had farage continued to press his case in conservative constituencies. ‘new’ divides in the electorate brexit did not just influence party strategy; it was also a clear influence on the choices that voters made. as the chart below shows, the conservatives (in part due to the brexit party standing down in conservative held seats) were able to consolidate the leave vote, with three in four leave voters voting conservative. in contrast, labour managed to secure only half of the remain vote. it is noteworthy that even in this ‘brexit’ election the conservatives won one in votes among remainers. for many of these ‘softer’ tory remainers, fear of a corbyn led government trumped opposition to brexit. the conservatives secured the support of far more leavers than labour did with remainers the consolidation of leave support powered many of the conservative victories in the ‘red wall’ which grabbed post british general election headlines and has continued to loom large in the political narrative since 2019. these were indeed striking successes, with conservative mps returned from constituencies which had rejected the party for two generations or more. yet the story here was not a simple one of johnson’s unique appeal overcoming decades of anti conservative sentiment. the conservatives’ 2019 vote gains were relatively modest in many of these seats, and the party’s breakthroughs often owed much to larger advances made by theresa may in 2017. meanwhile, labour’s decline in many ‘red wall’ seats was a story which ran back decades as disaffection with the party, and in particular the feeling that it no longer represented them, increased in small town communities that felt increasingly left behind economically and were uncomfortable with the socially liberal stances advocated by labour activists and mps. the overwhelming focus on conservative breakthroughs in the leave voting, historically labour ‘red wall’ also risks distorting our understanding of an election result which depended on swings to the conservatives in more traditional marginals, and on limited swings against the party in the traditionally blue parts of the country which were less enamoured of johnson or brexit. in many of england’s wealthier and more remain leaning seats, the conservatives benefitted from the same forces which, until 2019, cushioned labour’s decline in the ‘red wall’   strong starting positions and large initial majorities. the conservative vote declined sharply in most of the seats in berkshire, buckinghamshire, cambridgeshire, oxfordshire and surrey, yet in most cases large majorities and a split opposition vote still left the party comfortably ahead, and intense opposition to corbyn may have softened the swings against johnson. the home counties may not be so easy to defend against less polarising opposition in future, although, just as the red wall began to crack in 2017 before it finally collapsed in 2019, it may well take more than one electoral cycle before significant numbers of tory mps lose their seats. the influx of leave voters powered increases in the conservatives’ national vote share in both 2017 and 2019   a remarkable achievement for an incumbent government. the result is an unusually broad electoral coalition, which may be hard to hold together if the issues that forged it   first immigration, then brexit   are no longer at the top of the political agenda. “the influx of leave voters powered increases in the conservatives’ national vote share in both 2017 and 2019   a remarkable achievement for an incumbent government”. with corbyn gone and brexit done, it is not clear what can hold together the new and old wings of the tory party in parliament or the country in the next british general election. the return of economic arguments may pull it apart. johnson’s ‘levelling up’ economic agenda, for example, requires old tory voters to pay for investment in new tory seats, while rishi sunak’s desire for traditional fiscal discipline will mean keeping down costs in the red wall to placate the taxpayers of the blue wall. while the conservatives struggle to hold together a broad coalition, labour faces the opposite problem of trying to rebuild one. labour’s share of the vote has not fallen as far as it did in 1983 or 2010. however, the party’s drastically reduced cohort of mps (the smallest since 1935) reflects the problems posed by growing social and geographical concentration of support. most labour mps are now returned in constituencies which are, in important respects, poles apart from the large majority of seats which rejected the party in 2019, and where it must renew its appeal if it is to govern again. labour is now, more than ever, the party of the young, graduates, and ethnic minorities. it is dominant where such groups are concentrated   london, the other big cities, university towns   and weak where they are thin on the ground. the political distance between these groups and the voters whom labour needs to attract back from the conservatives can be illustrated by considering the political values of the ‘average’ labour and conservative voter and how this has changed over the period since 1992. labour’s vote has become more socially liberal   and far more so than the conservatives’ the average position of labour voters has moved into the most liberal and economically left wing terrain. this has not (primarily) been driven by a change in the values of individual voters (though on aggregate the electorate have become a little more liberal as more highly educated generations enter the voting register) but rather by the departure of more ‘moderate’ voters from the party. in contrast, the average conservative voter, while still to the right of the average labour voter on economic values, now occupies a position close to the average labour voter in the period 1992   2010. to build an election winning voter coalition labour needs to reach out across the divides on both economic and social values and recover these centre ground voters from the conservatives. “to build an election winning voter coalition labour needs to reach out across the divides on both economic and social values and recover these centre ground voters from the conservatives”. leadership and vote switching the labour party was, in the end, caught in a pincer movement in 2019. losing votes directly to the conservatives was especially costly, but losses to other remain parties were also important. leadership played an important role in this british general election, but the impact on leave and remain voters was different. boris johnson was not an especially popular leader. indeed, comparison of british election study data from both campaigns reveals johnson was less popular throughout the 2019 campaign than theresa may was in the 2017 campaign. johnson was also less popular on polling day 2019 than jeremy corbyn had been on polling day 2017. but in 2019 johnson had two crucial advantages. first, corbyn’s ratings had fallen so far that even johnson’s lacklustre ratings gave him a large overall lead. johnson wasn’t more popular than theresa may   but a lot more popular than corbyn second, while johnson was not a uniquely popular figure among the public as a whole, he was nonetheless a key ‘pull’ factor for the overwhelmingly leave voters who switched directly from labour to the conservatives in 2019. this appeal was itself intertwined with brexit. johnson’s iconic status as a leave campaigner and supporter made him more appealing to leave voters and made his ‘get brexit done’ slogan more credible and resonant. while johnson’s own ratings appear to be a more important factor in pulling voters from labour to the conservatives than brexit alignments, these ratings themselves were driven by his status as a true brexiteer. more than anything else, liking boris johnson (and being a leaver) made people much more likely to vote conservative leadership also mattered for the voters who switched from labour to another remain party. while jo swinson’s positive ratings were a significant pull factor here, larger still was the ‘push’ factor of disliking jeremy corbyn. as with johnson’s appeal to leave voters, corbyn’s toxicity to strong remainers was bound up with his reputation on brexit. corbyn’s compromises over brexit and efforts to keep options appealing to leave voters on the table had damaged his credibility with strong remain supporters, who did not trust him to deliver their preferred outcome of a second referendum. however, this brexit driven distrust was intertwined with other concerns about the labour leader, not least the reputational damage done by repeated controversies over anti semitism and foreign policy throughout the 2017 19 parliament. labour also paid a price for its economic radicalism, as more right wing (or, at least, less intensely left wing) voters were more likely to switch from labour to other remain parties   suggesting such ‘centrist’ voters were put off by the corbynites’ vast and expensive economic transformation agenda. while both party leaders influenced voters’ choices, both were in turn only at the helm because of earlier shifts in the electorate. the collapse of the conservative vote in the first part of 2019, in part driven by the emergence of the brexit party, certainly helped to secure johnson’s victory in his party’s leadership contest. the shift in the labour party’s membership and voter base to substantively more liberal and left wing positions from 2015 in part explains how corbyn came to be elected leader of his party. corbyn’s campaign surge in 2017 in turn secured his position throughout the subsequent parliament   despite falling ratings and rising discontent. jo swinson did pull towards the lib dems but dislike of jeremy corbyn was probably more important changing parties and changing parliament labour’s dramatic loss of seats in 2019 had implications for the leadership contest triggered by jeremy corbyn’s decision to announce he was stepping down   laura pidcock, for instance, would probably have been his fans’ first choice to carry on his work, but she lost her previously rock solid north west durham seat on a 10 point swing to the tories. overall, however, defeat did little to change the demographics of the parliamentary labour party. in contrast, the conservative party’s success in previously ‘safe’ labour seats did lead to an intake of demographically (if not necessarily ideologically) different conservative mps, many of whom were local politicians rather than working in commerce or the city before their election to parliament. more generally, across the commons as a whole, the long running trends towards increased representation of women and ethnic minorities continued. a record 220 female mps were returned in 2019, with women forming a majority of the mps elected by both labour and the liberal democrats   even if, at 34% of the total, women are still well short of equal representation in the commons. the 2019 commons also features a record 65 mps from britain’s black, asian and minority communities (10% of the total). the experience of mps prior to entering parliament is also changing. for the first time in post war political history, there are currently no mps who were employed in a manual occupation immediately prior to entering parliament, and there are no longer any former miners on the labour benches for the first time in the parliamentary history of the party. it is perhaps no wonder that those employed in manual occupations have turned their back on politics, with more staying home than voting for any party, when so few who share their background and experiences walk the corridors of power. clearly, however, not every working class voter was put off: after all, many joined their more affluent counterparts in voting for boris johnson   the twentieth prime minister to have attended eton college and the twenty eighth to attend oxford university. crisis, and what comes next? while no election turns on a single slogan, there is no doubting the magnetic appeal of ‘get brexit done’, the three word message which defined the 2019 contest, just as ‘take back control’ had done in the 2016 referendum. it struck a chord with leave voters wearied and frustrated by two years of political deadlock and, by mobilising and unifying them, helped to secure the decisive victory necessary to turn the slogan into reality. johnson duly passed his ‘oven ready’ deal as promised, his withdrawal agreement sailing through the commons with a majority of 99 on 9 january 2020, less than a month after polling day. yet despite johnson’s promises, the deal did not ‘put an end to all that nonsense’ over brexit   wrangling and spats with the eu have continued ever since, even as a wholly new issue has come to dominate the political agenda. within weeks of polling day, and before the labour leadership contest was really underway, the first cases of coronavirus were reported in europe. by the spring of 2020, britain was living through its first covid 19 lockdown. the government imposed the most sweeping restrictions applied to citizens since the second world war in a bid to stem the spread of a disease which ended up putting the prime minister himself into intensive care, and threatened to overwhelm the nation’s health care services. ‘normal service’ in british politics ended when the covid 19 lockdowns began. labour’s keir starmer had to wait more than 12 months to give his first speech as party leader to a live audience, and almost 18 months to address the labour faithful in person. the riotous assembly of mps was silenced as parliament itself was largely moved online. the normal rhythms of government and opposition came to a halt, overridden by the imperatives of a once in a century health crisis. the early weeks of the pandemic saw most incumbent governments around the world benefiting from a crisis driven ‘rally round the flag’ effect. management of the pandemic appears to have been crucial to the johnson government’s ratings   so much so that even the fraught, sometimes chaotic process of negotiating the uk’s future relationship with the eu, which ended in a last minute deal just before christmas 2020, seemed to have little impact on the government’s standing. “the main parties remain divided within themselves, and the conflicts generated by brexit abroad and at home remain unresolved”. that said, as the continued, often ill tempered wrangling over the thorny issues of northern ireland, fishing and migration illustrate, brexit is by no means ‘over’. indeed, the combined impacts of brexit and the pandemic have themselves become a central political issue. they have squeezed many household budgets and driven growing concern among voters about the cost of living and how the interventions made necessary by the pandemic will be paid for. there appear to be troubled economic waters ahead, and difficult decisions for ministers to take on taxation and public services. these are issues likely to set the different wings of the broad conservative coalition at odds with each other. there are already signs that the 2019 conservative vote may be softening   the party’s vote fell sharply in remain leaning areas of southern england in the local elections this may, though the lost votes scattered in several directions. the shock june by election defeat in remain voting chesham and amersham, with a 25 point swing to the liberal democrats, gave a warning of what could happen if disaffected traditional tories coalesce around a single competitor. yet labour’s ability to capitalise on such discontent is still unproven   the opposition’s performance in the 2021 local elections was mediocre at best, and the ratings of the party and its leader do not yet demonstrate the kind of popular enthusiasm that labour needs to overturn johnson’s majority. the shine may have come off johnson’s brexit flavoured government, but at present voters don’t have much interest in his main opponent either. the other parties each face challenges of one kind or another that may prove tricky to resolve. the snp continues to dominate polling in scotland, yet the path to a new independence referendum remains unclear. the liberal democrats are now better placed to argue they are the most serious challengers in a raft of seats, and the dramatic result in chesham and amersham has given a taste of what might be possible. however, they struggle for political airtime and did not make the sorts of advance they had hoped for in the 2021 local elections. they are troubled by the tension between their ‘new’ support base, concentrated in relatively affluent remain voting seats, and their old areas of strength, where their local campaigning is most developed. the green party has seen recent increases in its polling, driven by defections from the labour party. but this vote appears vulnerable to a squeeze in the first past the post electoral system. finally, what of the brexit party whose influence in 2019 was substantial but whose raison d’être disappeared once brexit was done? reborn as reform uk, and under the new leadership of richard tice, the party has struggled to make waves during the last two years. it has adopted a more stringent anti lockdown stance than either the electorate or any other party in the uk, which has not so far paid dividends, but it will hope that the tensions in the conservative party provide more fertile ground for an attack on its right in the future. these are still early days. the present parliament can run for another two years or more. and while the 2019 british general election has left labour with a mountain to climb to achieve a majority of its own, a labour minority administration is more within reach, as the conservatives find themselves bereft of any conceivable allies in the current commons. it is hard to imagine the snp or the liberal democrats propping up a minority fourth term conservative government. and while labour have a massive task ahead, they operate in an unusually volatile political environment, where large swings have become the norm. the main parties remain divided within themselves, and the conflicts generated by brexit abroad and at home remain unresolved. the last two years may come to be seen as a pandemic driven interlude, with the political class holding its collective breath while the world navigates an unparalleled crisis. if and when that crisis fades, politics may recover its capacity to surprise us. by rob ford, tim bale, will jennings and paula surridge, authors of the british general election of 2019. we will not sell or distribute your email address to any third party at any time. view our privacy policy. joël reland 07 feb 2025 keith dear 07 feb 2025 stephen hunsaker 06 feb 2025 views expressed in this piece are those of the author(s) and are not necessarily those of uk in a changing europe e: [email protected] t: 020 7848 7174 accessibility tools

french journal of british studies homeissues xxviii 1plasticity of expression: from si...boris johnson and beyond: the rev... search the election of boris johnson with a substantial parliamentary majority in december 2019 featured the conservative party gaining a large number of previously safe labour seats located in poorer, post industrial areas (the so called “red wall”). this specific electoral context, together with the stated aim of “levelling up” and the increased role for the central state necessitated by the covid pandemic, created the opportunity for an ideological shift within the conservative party from thatcherism to a revived form of one nation conservatism. however, the subsequent leadership contest of 2022 and liz truss’s disastrous attempt to revive economic liberalism has revealed the extent to which this was not achieved. the extent to which johnson can be defined as a one nation conservative or be said to have left behind a one nation legacy are evaluated in this article. l'élection de boris johnson avec une majorité parlementaire substantielle en décembre 2019 a vu le parti conservateur gagner un grand nombre de sièges auparavant acquis aux travaillistes, situés dans des zones pauvres et post industrielles (le fameux « mur de briques rouges »). ce contexte électoral spécifique, ainsi que l'objectif déclaré de « nivellement par le haut » et le rôle accru de l'état central rendu nécessaire par la pandémie de la covid, ont créé l'opportunité d'un changement idéologique au sein du parti conservateur, passant du thatchérisme à une forme revivifiée du conservatisme one nation. cependant, la course à la tête du parti en 2022 et la tentative désastreuse de liz truss de faire revivre le libéralisme économique ont montré à quel point ce changement n'a pas eu lieu. cet article tente de comprendre la façon dont johnson peut être considéré comme un conservateur one nation ou comme celui ayant laissé un héritage one nation. 1as other contributors to this volume have pointed out, the term “one nation” is a persistent, yet problematic one in the history of the conservative party. like other recent conservative prime ministers, boris johnson has sought to engage and align with this tradition, and on ascending to the premiership in july 2019, he indicated on numerous occasions that he would govern in a one nation manner. such sentiments were further developed and more coherently re affirmed in his first annual conference speech as conservative leader in october 2019: we are the party of the nhs and i claim that title because it is our one nation conservatism that has delivered and will deliver the economic growth that makes those investments possible and it is we conservatives who will solve the problem of social care and end the injustice that means people have to sell their home to pay for their old age.1 2with an emphasis on positively supporting and delivering core social policies in particular, johnson’s “one nation” narrative consequently went on to play a prominent part in the conservatives gaining a raft of previously unassailable seats within labour’s “red wall” at the 2019 general election.2 3while there were arguably a range of more complex short and longer term factors to explain these significant parliamentary gains, johnson was quick to forcefully re affirm such “one nation” sentiments in the immediate aftermath of his impressive general election victory in december 2019: we must recognise the incredible reality that we now speak as a one nation conservative party literally for everyone from woking to workington; from kensington, i'm proud to say, to clwyd south; from surrey heath to sedgefield; from wimbledon to wolverhampton.3 4in doing so, he carefully and deliberately name checked several of the new geographical areas that had been ushered into the conservative fold, in many cases for the first time. yet johnson’s effusive and deliberately repeated use of this “one nation” language and vocabulary in his prime ministerial role immediately raises two problems which this article seeks to address. the first, given its contested nature, is what is precisely meant in this context by “one nation”, and therefore what did johnson mean by it when he used the term. here we draw on a previous article which we believe provides an effective way of addressing this issue. the second, given his controversial nature, is what was johnson’s ideological position as prime minister   in particular what did he seek to do in practical policy terms and what justifications did he provide for his actions. in seeking to make such a categorisation, we would argue that johnson is something of a difficult figure to pin down. indeed, much debate has already occurred as to what type of conservatism he specifically represents, in particular whether he aligns with the “one nation” tradition or a more populist approach, or indeed whether there is any consistency or coherence in his political positioning at all.4 5johnson first came to public attention as a journalist   one who was a right wing populist known repeatedly for making controversial remarks. however, despite being an mp from 2001, it was as london mayor (2008 16) that he made his first major political impact. in this role he cut a more progressive, liberal and cosmopolitan figure leading a very diverse and more typically labour city. elected as an mp again from 2015, in 2016 he sided with the leave campaign during the eu referendum campaign, becoming its most high profile advocate, despite previously having spoken in favour of remaining within the eu (sparking allegations of political opportunism).5 this background is therefore somewhat quixotic and inconsistent in political terms. as prime minister, johnson was nevertheless able to bring about a major political realignment, initially linked to his role as the figurehead for brexit. this eurosceptic image created heightened prospects for the conservatives winning seats in the aforementioned “red wall” of declining northern and midland industrial towns which had hitherto only returned labour mps, yet the majority of which had voted for brexit by large majorities. this electoral trend had been evident on a smaller scale at the 2017 general election, with notable swings in such areas, yet stopping short of the gaining of substantial numbers of seats.6 however, in 2019 the conservatives made a dramatic electoral breakthrough, achieving a net gain of 48 parliamentary seats (30 of which were classified by kangasooriam et al. as being part of the “red wall”),7 and won a majority among working class voters for the first time since the universal franchise was created in 1918.8 6having presided over such a transformed scenario in relation to long standing class based voting patterns, johnson boldly claimed that he was going to “level up” in these areas, and public spending and taxation also increased substantially as a result of the pandemic. this circumstantial set of events and developments therefore seemed to align and coalesce with a contemporary government vision for a bigger role for the state, which broadly adhered to conventional “one nation” traditions of conservatism. debate and speculation has, however, lingered as to whether johnson genuinely believed in such an approach to government, or whether his “one nation” credentials were rather flimsy and that, as with the brexit issue, he was again allegedly behaving in an opportunistic manner. 7johnson could have been prime minister for much longer given the size of his majority, but through a series of scandals and mass resignations he was forced to resign in the summer of 2022.9 this allows us to examine the premiership of johnson as a whole and, in particular, to assess how much of his rhetoric and policy narrative is likely to remains after his departure. the subsequent leadership of liz truss proved disastrous, becoming the shortest premiership in british political history. her replacement by rishi sunak has appeared to provide some much needed stability. the extent to which he too can be seen as a one nation conservative will be explored. hence, the article begins with an examination of what is meant by one nation conservatism, drawing on relevant published literature including our own. the article then goes on to examine johnson’s record as prime minister in order to ascertain what kind of one nation conservative he is, if any. in the final section we examine the extent to which johnson has created a legacy which will outlast his premiership. 8in a previous article we argued that the term one nation is a problematic one.10 the first issue is that a definition is needed which is neither too narrow as to exclude some who may reasonably be considered as one nation conservatives while not being too broad as to be meaningless. a second issue is that one nation exists both as a rhetorical device and a policy position. a more adequate attempt to capture the diverse nature of one nation conservatism therefore has to account for these various facets. 9we argue that one nation conservatism is better understood as a spectrum ranging from rhetoric to policy. a softer version of one nation conservatism would reside at the rhetorical end of the spectrum, a stronger form would certainly include rhetoric but would also include policy. in this sense we can accommodate the differences which existed between different statesmen who are normally seen as part of the one nation tradition. benjamin disraeli’s was largely a rhetoric of one nation, though there were some relatively “progressive” policy positions too as he sought to introduce elements of social reform. stanley baldwin was also essentially a one nation rhetorician   with his speeches designed to cultivate a sense of national unity, depicting himself as the “father of the nation” who aspired to trump class division; an approach that major also later sought to evoke, albeit much less effectively. the one nation of the progressive conservatives after 1945 had a stronger emphasis on policy, with macmillan the dominant figure of this period across several senior ministerial roles, spearheading a strong social and welfare reformist agenda. this categorisation also allows us to dismiss politicians who have erroneously claimed the mantra of one nation as even thatcher on occasions sought to do, despite on others claiming the one nation conservatives were really stood for “no nation” and introduced policies which provoked social conflict and disintegration. indeed, critics of thatcherism both within and outside the conservative party would highlight that the 1980s was a period of social unrest, urban riots and industrial conflict   hardly the hallmarks of a unifying one nation approach. 10using this categorisation we were also able to identify where more recent leaders stand in terms of one nation conservatism. david cameron certainly used one nation rhetoric in terms of the “big society” agenda he launched while in opposition from 2009 10, but once in office, under the banner of “austerity” he led a further reduction in the capacity of the central state and showed a clear preference for marketised, and in some cases, de centralised voluntary solutions. may in contrast, we argued previously, showed a genuine shift towards one nation in both rhetorical and policy terms, though the latter was limited by the short lived premiership and the fact that this was entirely overshadowed by brexit. johnson, as we will go on to demonstrate, marked an even more decisive shift towards one nation in both rhetoric and policy, though again we must doubt the extent of the policy shift for two reasons: firstly, that his premiership also proved to be short lived (resulting in questionable and unfulfilled delivery); and, secondly, that the policy shifts we identify were necessitated by contextual factors rather than free choice on the part of johnson. “our new one nation government”11boris johnson, 2019 11johnson was a key player in the highly divisive brexit campaign and made a number of controversial remarks, more characteristic of his time as a journalist rather than as london mayor. his claims to being a one nation conservative when he became prime minister could therefore be taken with considerable scepticism. however, as we will see, johnson can also lay claim to have offered the most one nation style of conservative leadership since at least edward heath (leader 1965 75), and possibly earlier. 12firstly, in his desire to deliver a brexit deal   something which the previous parliament had failed to do   johnson positioned himself as the advocate for what the “people” had democratically voted for, and that it was the elites in parliament and the supreme court which were stopping him from doing so. “getting brexit done” was an incredibly successful slogan in the 2019 campaign   it was the only slogan which clearly resonated with people and also sought to limit the range of issues which featured in the campaign. yet in his post election speech outside 10 downing street, johnson stressed that his government would respect the feelings of those who had voted remain: and then i want to speak to those who did not vote for us or for me and who wanted and perhaps still want to remain in the eu and i want you to know that we in this one nation government will never ignore your good and positive feelings   of warmth and sympathy towards the other nations of europe.12 13in rhetorical terms at least, johnson was pledging to instil unity after a period of intense division, broadly in line with unifying “one nation” sentiments. in terms of prioritising practical policy matters, having failed to secure the passing of a withdrawal agreement since the time of the 2016 referendum, parliament approved the “oven ready deal” which johnson said that he had secured. however, the extent to which this was compatible with a unifying “one nation” approach is questionable as the arrangements concerning trade in northern ireland were changed, creating division within the united kingdom and angering the unionists who found that their previously close and influential relationship with the minority theresa may government had now ended   johnson not needing their votes post the 2019 election. the “harder” form of brexit which the deal constituted was also at odds with what another part of the uk wanted, namely scotland. this also raises a further issue about the nature of conservatism which hickson has explored elsewhere13   that conservatism could be understood as either a disposition in favour of the status quo and aversion to radical change which is likely to have unintended and unforeseeable consequences, but also as a thicker conception which begins with a commitment to set of principles much like other ideologies. this thicker definition would be consistent with brexit since one such principle would be an absolute conception of sovereignty. however, from the former definition of conservatism, brexit could well be problematic as it may weaken the union both in terms of northern ireland and scotland, creating considerable social and constitutional disharmony in the longer term. 14as previously alluded to, the 2019 general election drastically changed and re aligned the electoral map of britain.14 although the conservative vote share increased by only 1.2 per cent, johnson gained 48 seats (up to 365) and labour lost 60, its worst result since 1935 in terms of overall seats won (202). johnson’s parliamentary majority of 80 was the largest the conservative party had obtained since 1987 and, given that scotland now largely elected scottish nationalist party mps, it was the largest that the conservatives were likely to obtain. this included many declining industrial towns but not the larger, more cosmopolitan university cities. age became the most important factor for explaining voting, with conservatives picking up support through the age range, a trend endorsed by academic observations that “the new battle lines now seem to be more about age than class”.15 a values gap had also gradually become apparent between the labour leadership and the traditional voters in those areas, which was seen most starkly in the 2016 brexit referendum with such voters sometimes referred to as being “left behind”.16 15such demographic and electoral trends were certainly apparent (and seemingly accelerated) under corbyn’s leadership of the labour party between 2015 and 2020 but can be seen as a longer term process starting with new labour which had favoured a globalised, cosmopolitan and socially liberal agenda. by contrast, labour’s older voters had largely voted brexit and favoured a more closed economic and social order with reduced migration and provided greater levels of welfare protection. johnson, in recognising that many of these voters had voted conservative for the first time in 2019 and may well have done so without enthusiasm, sought to further evoke the language of one nation in order to maintain these newly formed electoral connections: on monday mps will arrive at westminster to form a new parliament and i am proud to say that members of our new one nation government   a people’s government   will set out from constituencies that have never returned a conservative mp for 100 years.17 16however, if johnson was hoping that with the delivery of brexit he could then move on to a more positive and less divisive domestic policy agenda he was mistaken, particularly because at virtually the same time as britain’s formal departure from the eu was confirmed at the end of january 2020, the first cases of the new covid 19 pandemic were reported in the uk. this led to repeated lockdowns and other restrictions over the course of 2020 and into 2021. the economic effects were to create higher levels of unemployment, which was held down only by the expensive furlough scheme which together with additional measures designed to boost economic activity (such as the “eat out to help out” campaign), added considerably to public expenditure which reached its highest level since the early 1950s as the state was required to sustain economic activity. this reliance on the central state was greeted with hostility by economic liberals but could be seen as a further instance of the revival of a more one nation form of conservatism, indicating a departure from the new right’s thatcherite legacy in the process.18 17on numerous occasions johnson sought to create a more positive agenda including his idea of “levelling up” the economy. again, this can be seen as a stark contrast to the economic liberal ideas which had dominated the conservative party since the mid 1970s. the economic liberalism that re emerged with margaret thatcher in the mid 1970s saw the state as the problem rather that the solution to britain’s economic ills which had made the uk the “sick man of europe”. the state was perceived as being too large, inefficient and uncompetitive, and thatcherites argued that the answer lay with the apparent dynamism of the free market.19 levels of taxation, spending, borrowing and regulation would be reduced, uncompetitive nationalised industries would be privatised, what would remain of the central state would be subjected to audits, cuts and greater levels of competition in order to raise standards and give “consumers” more choice. inefficient and subsidised industries would be allowed to decline. people would be expected to move to where the new jobs were   largely in london and the south east, while regional policies designed to support poorer regions would be ended, although this was perhaps modified slightly in the wake of the 1981 urban riots. the whole agenda was concisely summed up in stark terms by cabinet minister norman tebbit with his memorable phrase, “get on your bike and look for work”. the new approach to the economy led to considerable inequality in the 1980s and subsequently, not just between individuals but also between regions of the uk. such were the policy outcomes of the economic liberal ideas of margaret thatcher. 18therefore, to call for a new form of state led regional policy as johnson was to do was not just a reflection on the need to develop a new policy regime which would bring tangible benefits to the “left behind” areas in the north and midlands that had voted conservative in 2019, but also an ideological shift from the heyday of economic liberalism. in language similar to theresa may’s focus on social injustice between 2016 and 2019 (yet which was increasingly distracted in practical terms by brexit), johnson recognised the fundamental inequalities between wealthier and poorer areas: we need to say from the beginning that even before the pandemic began the uk had and has a more unbalanced economy than almost all our immediate biggest competitors in europe and more unbalanced than pretty much every major developed country and when i say unbalanced i mean that for too many people geography turns out to be destiny.20 19however, critics would point out that “levelling up” and the stated intention of “building back better” were mere slogans devoid of substance. policy outcomes take much longer to achieve and the extent to which levelling up has occurred in reality is open to considerable discussion. in practical terms, it may be many years before any such investment results in visible physical improvements, which could significantly hamper any further electoral rewards in such areas for the conservatives. indeed, at the time of the termination to johnson’s premiership in the summer of 2022, recognisable policy outcomes from levelling up were thinly spread and hard to identify. while this policy agenda entails the necessity of state intervention and significant public expenditure, the practical delivery of “levelling up” has been an ongoing challenge since 2019, amidst claims of limited financial resources, competition between different areas (a form of “pork barrel politics”), and decisions and outcomes ultimately favouring conservative run areas.21 it has consequently been alleged (from a critical perspective) that the “levelling up” agenda has been “driven by electoral calculation rather than a real engagement with tackling deep inequalities”.22 20there have also been emerging tensions evident between the “low tax and small state” instincts of conservative mps representing traditionally safe conservative seats in the southern england “home counties”, and the more interventionist and fiscally expansionist tendencies of newly elected conservative mps within the “red wall” constituencies. this geographical dilemma is an immediately pressing problem for johnson’s successor as conservative prime minister to inherit, namely in terms of defining the shape, scope and reach of the contemporary british state.23 21the nature and achievements of johnson’s departure will ultimately influence the way in which historians will come to define his premiership. the seemingly endless series of scandals which rocked his premiership and the fact that he became the first sitting prime minister to be fined by police remain an essential feature of his record in office and revealed more generally the chaotic state of affairs in downing street on his watch. while his loyal supporters would argue that he faced unprecedented pandemic conditions that distracted from his original agenda, there were certainly those who argued from the outset that his character failings in both his private and professional lives meant he was unfit to be prime minister, regardless of the specific situations and challenges he faced. johnson was, from the start, opposed by those on the more moderate wing of the party who were largely on the remain side in the brexit referendum. however, he was also viewed with suspicion by at least some of those on the right of his party who never viewed him as one of their own, suspecting he had only supported leave to opportunistically raise his own standing within the party having never previously been associated with that particular cause. a few diehards continued to support johnson even after the numerous scandals and members expressed a wish that he had been allowed onto the leadership ballot so they could vote for him. however, by the end he lacked credibility and had to go. 22the subsequent leadership contest led to a shortlist of two candidates who went before the membership of the whole party. liz truss, who initially struggled to gain support among the mps emerged as the right wing candidate and proudly claimed margaret thatcher as her political hero. this positioning appears to have gone down well with the party membership who largely remain sympathetic to the thatcherite cause. it also allowed her to contrast herself with the record of her opponent   rishi sunak, who had clearly been plotting for the leadership for some time and won each round of the contest among the mps but came unstuck as soon as the campaign for members’ votes began, and was firmly associated with the high tax and spend policies of the johnson era (which in policy terms remains largely out of sync with the core conservative grassroots membership). her victory was clear but narrower than some had suggested (57.4 per cent to sunak’s 42.6 per cent) but her senior cabinet appointments strengthened the position of the right within the party as she gave posts to those who had supported her campaign strongly from its early stages, while excluding virtually all supporters of her main rival sunak.24 23truss’s honeymoon period was incredibly short lived, and she almost immediately came unstuck over the budget which her chancellor, kwasi kwarteng introduced. among a series of measures was a proposal to borrow more in order to cut taxes on higher earners. the objective was justified in strong economic liberal terms   that the reduced tax burden would foster entrepreneurialism and achieve higher rates of economic growth. however, the proposal to borrow in order to fund tax cuts rather than for capital investment lost the support of the finance markets. in the ensuing chaos, truss was forced to resign. 24truss’ failure revealed her inadequacies as leader but also the ideological divides which exist in british politics. her economic liberal message went down well with party members but not so much with mps, despite the presence of some economic liberal elements within the parliamentary party. but her strategy would not have gone down well with voters in the ‘red wall’ who still loathed thatcherism and had voted conservative not in order to get tax cuts for the wealthy, but increased spending as their constituencies were “levelled up”. this is the ideological minefield through which the contemporary tory party must navigate   a clear values gap between party members and some of its more traditional voters on the one hand, and first time voters in traditional labour areas who the party needs to retain if it is to win again. truss clearly showed no understanding of these strategic dilemmas, whereas johnson and his inner circle did. 25the resignation of truss sparked the possibility of johnson’s return to the premiership, as implausible as that was after the nature and recency of his departure. however, in the end sunak emerged as the only candidate with the required support of mps and thus another run off among party members was avoided. sunak primarily sought to restore confidence. following kwarteng’s departure, jeremy hunt was appointed chancellor by truss, and having been retained by sunak he promptly introduced a new series of fiscal changes which reversed most of his predecessor’s measures. 26having restored some semblance of stability in government, sunak’s policy is now seemingly to play the long game. economic difficulties have mounted, not least with inflation once again in excess of 10 per cent and a mounting cost of living crisis in which many cannot afford decent food or to warm their homes. moreover, industrial unrest has reached levels not seen since the “winter of discontent” in 1978 79. faced by such circumstances and persistent opinion poll leads for the labour party, sunak’s only option is to delay the general election for as long as possible. 27ideologically, sunak can be seen as a break with the economic liberal tradition. indeed, it was his association with high spending and taxation (notably during the pandemic) which stopped members voting for him in the contest against truss, despite being seen by many as a more credible and polished candidate. in these circumstances there is scope for him to play a one nation tune by saying that taxes should fall mainly on the top income earners, including non domiciles which had previously included his wife. he could also lead on windfall taxes for energy companies and banks which are making excessive profits. so far, however, his government has been reluctant to champion such as stance. 28we have argued in this article that the johnson premiership marked a decisive shift towards one nation conservatism   moving away from the economic liberal policies of thatcher and her successors and, also, away from the fiscal conservatism of the cameron era. he consolidated the rhetorical shift which we identified had emerged under may (2016 19), often invoking a similar discourse but also the initiation of one nation policies in more practical terms, having initially had much greater political freedom to operate than his immediate predecessor. this was partly through choice, with johnson seeing himself as an heir to the one nation tradition but also out of necessity (and even opportunism) given the demands of the new electoral situation after the 2019 general election, the considerable economic and social effects of the pandemic, and the desire to “level up”. he could therefore have been a reforming prime minister bringing about a serious ideological shift within the party yet the final delivery in “one nation” policy terms hasn’t been wholly achieved, partly due to the nature of his premature departure from office. it can be speculated that johnson could have remained in office for a full term and may have won a second term in office (albeit with a reduced majority). however, his somewhat casual style of leadership, the perception of incompetence at the heart of government and the series of scandals which led to his downfall ensured that this was not the case. this will now be his primary legacy. 29the subsequent leadership contest over the summer of 2022 indicated that the conservative party membership and mps have little appetite for a longer term ideological recalibration that johnson appeared to offer. levelling up was barely mentioned by either leadership candidate. tax cuts were once again seen as the answer to both regional inequality and rising fuel prices, though kwarteng and truss’s disastrous management of the economy has at least temporarily suppressed economic liberal urges. the sunak government is likely to cling on to office for as long as possible, unable to move decisively against one nation conservatism or move further down the one nation road. amos, o., ‘boris johnson resigns: five things that led to the pm's downfall’, bbc news, 7 july 2022, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk politics 62070422. bale, t., ‘the real boris johnson: one nation tory or raging populist?’, the guardian, 14 december 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/dec/14/boris johnson one nation tory or raging populist. bbc news, ‘election results 2019: boris johnson's victory speech in full’, 13 december 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election 2019 50777071. bbc news & panorama, ‘what is levelling up and how is it going?’, 10 june 2022, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/56238260. conservative home, ben bradley mp, ‘voters tore down the red wall because they were sick of labour talking down to them and holding them back’, 17 december 2019, https://conservativehome.com/2019/12/17/ben bradley voters tore down the red wall because they were sick of labour talking down to them and holding them back/ cutts, d., m. goodwin, o. heath and p. surridge, ‘brexit, the 2019 general election and the realignment of british politics’, the political quarterly, vol. 91, no.1, january march (2020). gamble, a., the free economy and the strong state (basingstoke, palgrave, 1988; 2nd edition, 1994). goodwin, m. and o. heath, ‘the 2016 referendum, brexit and the left behind: an aggregate‐level analysis of the result’, the political quarterly, vol. 87, no.3, july september 2016. hickson, k., britain’s conservative right since 1945: traditional toryism in a cold climate (palgrave, basingstoke, 2020). hickson, k., r. page and b. williams, ‘strangled at birth: the one nation ideology of theresa may’, journal of political ideologies, vol. 25 (2020). hickson, k. and b. williams, ‘the beveridge report at 80’, political insight, 13/1 (2022), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/20419058221091635. johnson, b., ‘speech to the 2019 conservative party conference’, 2 october 2019, politicshome.com, https://www.politicshome.com/news/article/read in full boris johnsons speech to the 2019 conservative party conference. johnson, b., ‘speech outside downing street’, conservatives.com, 13 december 2019, https://www.conservatives.com/news/2019/boris johnson s speech outside downing street. johnson, b., ‘the prime minister's levelling up speech’, 15 july 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the prime ministers levelling up speech 15 july 2021. kanagasooriam, j. and e. simon, ‘red wall: the definitive description’, political insight journal, 12/3 (2021), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/20419058211045127. macaskill, a., ‘factbox: die hard eurosceptic or opportunist? boris johnson’s views on the eu’, reuters, 23 july 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk britain eu leader johnson europe fact iduskcn1ui191. mason, c., ‘liz truss: new cabinet a near total purge of sunak backers’, bbc news, 6th september 2022, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk politics 62815645 mattinson, d., beyond the red wall: why labour lost, how the conservatives won and what will happen next? (london, biteback, 2020). tomaney, j. and a. pike, ‘levelling up?’, the political quarterly, 91/1, january march 2020. ungoed thomas, j. ‘revealed: levelling up fund allocated south east england twice as much as north east’, observer, 4 september 2022. williams, b., ‘the ‘new right’ and its legacy for british conservatism’, journal of political ideologies, 2021, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569317.2021.1979139?scroll=top&needaccess=true. williams, b., ‘boris johnson   one nation conservative or populist?’ politicshome.com, 11 february 2022, https://www.politicshome.com/thehouse/article/boris johnson one nation conservative or populist. woodcock, a., ‘tories won more working class votes than labour amid stark generation gap at general election, poll suggests’, the independent, 17 december 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/election results working class age tories labour boris johnson yougov a9249936.html. 1 boris johnson’s speech to the 2019 conservative party conference, 2 october 2019, politicshome.com, https://www.politicshome.com/news/article/read in full boris johnsons speech to the 2019 conservative party conference consulted 13 december 2022. 2 james kanagasooriam & elizabeth simon, ‘red wall: the definitive description’, political insight journal, 12/3 (2021) https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/20419058211045127 consulted 13 december 2022. 3 bbc news, election results 2019: boris johnson's victory speech in full, 13 december 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election 2019 50777071 consulted 13 december 2022. 4 see tim bale, ‘the real boris johnson: one nation tory or raging populist?’, the guardian, 14 december 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/dec/14/boris johnson one nation tory or raging populist consulted 13 december 2022, and ben williams, ‘boris johnson   one nation conservative or populist?’, politicshome.com, 11 february 2022, https://www.politicshome.com/thehouse/article/boris johnson one nation conservative or populist consulted 13 december 2022. 5 andrew macaskill, ‘factbox: die hard eurosceptic or opportunist? boris johnson's views on the eu’, reuters, 23rd july 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk britain eu leader johnson europe fact iduskcn1ui191 consulted 13 december 2022. 6 five seats in what would later become known as the ‘red wall’ were won by the conservatives in the 2017 general election  mansfield, derbyshire north east, middlesbrough south and cleveland, stoke on trent south, walsall north. mansfield has since been described as the “the first blue brick in the red wall”, cited in: ben bradley mp, voters tore down the red wall because they were sick of labour talking down to them and holding them back, cited in conservative home, 17 december 2019, https://conservativehome.com/2019/12/17/ben bradley voters tore down the red wall because they were sick of labour talking down to them and holding them back/, consulted 13 december 2022. 7 see james kanagasooriam & elizabeth simon, ‘red wall: the definitive description’, political insight journal, 12/3 (2021), p. 10. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/20419058211045127 consulted 13 december 2022. 8 andrew woodcock, ‘tories won more working class votes than labour amid stark generation gap at general election, poll suggests’, the independent, 17 december 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/election results working class age tories labour boris johnson yougov a9249936.html consulted 13 december 2022. 9 owen amos, ‘boris johnson resigns: five things that led to the pm's downfall’, bbc news, 7th july 2022, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk politics 62070422, consulted 13 december 2022. 10 kevin hickson, robert page and ben williams, ‘strangled at birth: the one nation ideology of theresa may’, journal of political ideologies, vol. 25, 2020. 11 boris johnson’s speech outside downing street, conservatives.com, 13 december 2019, https://www.conservatives.com/news/2019/boris johnson s speech outside downing street consulted 13 december 2022. 12 boris johnson’s speech outside downing street, conservatives.com, 13 december 2019, https://www.conservatives.com/news/2019/boris johnson s speech outside downing street consulted 13 december 2022. 13 kevin hickson, britain’s conservative right since 1945: traditional toryism in a cold climate (palgrave, basingstoke, 2020). 14 david cutts, matthew goodwin, oliver heath and paula surridge, ‘brexit, the 2019 general election and the realignment of british politics’, the political quarterly, 91/1, 2020. 15 deborah mattinson, beyond the red wall: why labour lost, how the conservatives won and what will happen next? (london, biteback, 2020), introduction, pp. 6 7. 16 matthew goodwin and oliver heath, ‘the 2016 referendum, brexit and the left behind: an aggregate‐level analysis of the result’, the political quarterly, 87/3, 2016. 17 boris johnson’s speech outside downing street, conservatives.com, 13 december 2019, https://www.conservatives.com/news/2019/boris johnson s speech outside downing street consulted 13 december 2022. 18 see ben williams, ‘ “the ‘new right” and its legacy for british conservatism’, journal of political ideologies, 2021 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569317.2021.1979139?scroll=top&needaccess=true consulted 13 december 2022. 19 see andrew gamble, the free economy and the strong state (basingstoke, palgrave, 1988). 20 the prime minister's levelling up speech: 15 july 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the prime ministers levelling up speech 15 july 2021 consulted 13 december 2022. 21 bbc news & panorama, ‘what is levelling up and how is it going?’, 10 june 2022, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/56238260 and jon ungoed thomas, ‘revealed: levelling up fund allocated south east england twice as much as north east’, observer, 4 september 2022, revealed: levelling up fund allocated south east england twice as much as north east | politics | the guardian consulted 13 december 2022. 22 john tomaney and andy pike, ‘levelling up?’, the political quarterly, 91/1 (2020), p. 43. 23 see kevin hickson and ben williams, ‘the beveridge report at 80’, political insight, 13/1 (2022), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/20419058221091635 consulted 13 december 2022. 24 chris mason, ‘liz truss: new cabinet a near total purge of sunak backers’, bbc news, 6 september 2022, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk politics 62815645, consulted 13 december 2022. kevin hickson and ben williams, “boris johnson and beyond: the revival of one nation conservatism?”, revue française de civilisation britannique [online], xxviii 1 | 2023, online since 03 february 2023, connection on 09 february 2025. url: http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/10621; doi: https://doi.org/10.4000/rfcb.10621 kevin hickson is senior lecturer in british politics at the university of liverpool. he specialises in british political ideologies and political economy. he is the author or editor of 16 books on various aspects of british politics, including the award winning britain's conservative right since 1945: traditional toryism in a cold climate (palgrave, 2020). ben williams is a lecturer in politics at the university of salford, where he teaches modules specialising in british political history, contemporary uk politics and international politics. he has written the evolution of conservative party social policy (2015) and edited (with kevin hickson) john major: an unsuccessful prime minister? (2017). he has also contributed to various other books, journal articles and news articles/commentary covering british politics, political theory and ideology. the text only may be used under licence cc by nc nd 4.0. all other elements (illustrations, imported files) are “all rights reserved”, unless otherwise stated. electronic issn 2429 4373 read detailed presentation site map   legal information and credits   syndication privacy policy   about cookies   report a problem openedition journals member   published with lodel   administration only you will be redirected to openedition search

my life divides, evenly enough, into three political eras. i was born in 1980, a year after margaret thatcher entered downing street with the prayer of st. francis of assisi on her lips: “where there is doubt, may we bring faith. and where there is despair, may we bring hope.” the conservative run britain of the eighties was not harmonious. life beyond the north london square where my family lived often seemed to be in the grip of one confrontation or another. the news was always showing police on horseback. there were strikes, protests, the i.r.a., and george michael on the radio. my father, who was a lawyer in the city, travelled to germany to buy a mercedes and drove it back, elated. until thatcher resigned, when i was ten, her steeply back combed hair and deep, impossible voice played an outsized role in my imagination a more interesting, more dangerous version of the queen. i was nearly seventeen when the tories finally lost power, to tony blair and “new labour,” an updated, market friendly version of the party. before he moved to downing street, blair lived in islington, the gentrifying borough i was from. boris johnson, an amusing right wing columnist, who was getting his start on television, also lived nearby. our local member of parliament was an out of touch leftist named jeremy corbyn. new labour believed in the responsibility of the state to look after its citizens, and in capitalism to make them prosper. blair was convincing, even when he was wrong. he won three general elections in ten years and walked out of the house of commons to a standing ovation, undefeated in his eyes. i was turning thirty when labour eventually ran out of road, undone by the iraq war, the global financial crisis, and the grim temper of gordon brown, blair’s successor. he was caught in a hot mike moment describing an ordinary voter, who was complaining about taxes and immigration, as a bigot. since then, it’s been the conservatives again. in 2010, the party returned to government in a coalition with the liberal democrats. since 2015, it has held power alone. last may, the tories surpassed the thirteen years and nine days that new labour had held office. but the third political era of my lifetime has been nothing like the previous two. there has been no dominant figure or overt political project, no thatcherism, no blairism. instead, there has been a quickening, lowering churn: five prime ministers, three general elections, two financial emergencies, a once in a century constitutional crisis, and an atmosphere of tired, almost constant drama. the period is bisected by the united kingdom’s decision, in 2016, to leave the european union, a conservative fantasy, or nightmare, depending on whom you talk to. brexit catalyzed some of the worst tendencies in british politics its superficiality, nostalgia, and love of game play and exhausted the country’s political class, leaving it ill prepared for the pandemic and the twin economic shocks of the war in ukraine and the forty nine day experimental premiership of liz truss. covering british politics during this period has been like trying to remember, and explain, a very convoluted and ultimately boring dream. if you really concentrate, you can recall a lot of the details, but that doesn’t lead you closer to any meaning. last year, i started interviewing conservatives to try to make sense of these years. “one always starts with disclaimers now i didn’t start this car crash,” julian glover, a former speechwriter for david cameron, the longest serving prime minister of the period, told me. i spoke to m.p.s and former cabinet ministers; political advisers who helped to make major decisions; and civil servants, local government officials, and frontline workers hundreds of miles from london who had to deal with the consequences. some people insisted that the past decade and a half of british politics resists satisfying explanation. the only way to think about it is as a psychodrama enacted, for the most part, by a small group of middle aged men who went to élite private schools, studied at the university of oxford, and have been climbing and chucking one another off the ladder of british public life the cursus honorum, as johnson once called it ever since. the conservative party, whose history goes back some three hundred and fifty years, aids this theory by not having anything as vulgar as an ideology. “they’re not on a mission to do x, y, or z,” as a former senior adviser explained. “you win and you govern because we are better at it, right?” another way to think about these years is to consider them in psychological, or theoretical, terms. in “heroic failure,” the irish journalist fintan o’toole explains brexit by describing britain’s fall from imperial nation to “occupied colony” of the e.u., and the rise of a powerful english nationalism as a result. last year, abby innes, a scholar at the london school of economics, published “late soviet britain: why materialist utopias fail,” which argues that, since thatcher, britain’s political mainstream has become as devoted to particular ideas about running the state a default commitment to competition, markets, and forms of privatization as brezhnev’s u.s.s.r. ever was. “the resulting regime,” innes writes, “has proved anything but stable.” these observations are surely right, but i worry that they obscure two basic truths about britain’s experience since 2010. the first is that the country has suffered grievously. these have been years of loss and waste. the u.k. has yet to recover from the financial crisis that began in 2008. according to one estimate, the average worker is now fourteen thousand pounds worse off per year than if earnings had continued to rise at pre crisis rates it is the worst period for wage growth since the napoleonic wars. “nobody who’s alive and working in the british economy today has ever seen anything like this,” torsten bell, the chief executive of the resolution foundation, which published the analysis, told the bbc last year. “this is what failure looks like.” link copied high levels of employment and immigration, coupled with the enduring dynamism of london, mask a national reality of low pay, precarious jobs, and chronic underinvestment. the trains are late. the traffic is bad. the housing market is a joke. “the core problem is easy to observe, but it’s tough to live with,” mark carney, the former governor of the bank of england, told me. “it’s just not that productive an economy anymore.” with stagnant wages, people’s living standards have fallen. in 2008, brown’s labour government commissioned michael marmot, a renowned epidemiologist, to come up with ways to reduce england’s health inequalities. marmot made suggestions in six policy areas, including better access to child care, walking and cycling programs, social security reforms, and measures to improve people’s sense of agency at work. in 2010, he presented his ideas to the incoming conservative led coalition, which accepted his findings. “i thought, wow, this is great. . . . i was pretty bullish about the whole thing,” marmot told me. “the problem was they then didn’t do it.” ten years later, marmot led a follow up study, in which he documented stalling life expectancy, particularly among women in england’s poorest communities and widening inequalities. “for men and women everywhere the time spent in poor health is increasing,” he wrote. “this is shocking.” according to marmot, the u.k.’s health performance since 2010, which includes rising infant mortality, slowing growth in children, and the return of rickets, makes it an outlier among comparable european nations. “the damage to the nation’s health need not have happened,” marmot concluded in 2020. he told me, “it was a political choice.” and that is the second, all too obvious, fact of british life throughout this period: a single party has been responsible. you cannot say that the country has been ruled against its will. since 2010, the tories have emerged as the winner of the popular vote and as the largest party in parliament in three elections. in december, 2019, boris johnson won an eighty seat majority in the house of commons, the conservatives’ biggest electoral success since the heyday of thatcherism. how is this possible? the opposition has been underwhelming. for years, labour drifted and squabbled under two unconvincing leaders: ed miliband and corbyn, my old islington m.p. it is telling that, since labour elected keir starmer, an unimaginative former prosecutor with a rigidly centrist program, the party is competitive again. but the conservatives have not survived by default. their party has excelled at diminishing britain’s political landscape and shrinking the sense of what is possible. it has governed and skirmished, never settling for long. “it’s all about constantly drawing dividing lines,” a former party strategist told me. “that’s all you need. it’s not about big ideological debates or policies or anything.” in many ways, the two momentous decisions of this period what came to be known as austerity and brexit are now widely accepted as events that happened, rather than as choices that were made. starmer’s labour party does not seek to reverse them. if you live in an old country, it can be easy to succumb to a narrative of decline. the state withers. the charlatans take over. you give up on progress, to some extent, and simply pray that this particular chapter of british nonsense will come to an end. it will. rishi sunak, the fifth, and presumably final, conservative prime minister of the era, faces an election later this year, which he will almost certainly lose. but britain cannot move on from the tories without properly facing up to the harm that they have caused. the conservative party manifesto for the 2010 election was a plain blue hardback book titled “invitation to join the british government.” after the party’s longest spell out of power in more than a century, its pitch to voters was “the big society,” a call for civic volunteering and private enterprise after the statism of labour. “there was a feeling that it must be possible to be positive about a better future in a way that wasn’t socialist,” glover, the former speechwriter, said. “and that wasn’t an ignoble thing to try.” beginning in 2005, cameron and george osborne, the shadow chancellor, had modernized the tories. the duo represented a new generation of conservatives: deft and urbane, easy in their privilege. osborne was the heir to a baronetcy; cameron’s family descended from a mistress of william iv. cameron embraced centrist causes, including the environment and prison reform. there was talk of a “post bureaucratic age.” but the main aim was simpler. “above all, it was trying to win,” osborne told me recently. in the spring of 2009, cameron told a gathering of party members in gloucestershire, “the age of irresponsibility is giving way to the age of austerity.” the speech was part of a successful campaign to associate labour’s public spending with the global financial crash, to which britain had been badly exposed. “the word ‘austerity’ was deliberately introduced into the lexicon by myself and david cameron,” osborne said. “austerity” evoked the country’s sober rebuilding after the second world war. “the word didn’t have the connotations then that it does now,” osborne recalled. “it was, you know, a bit like prudence.” in 2010, the conservatives fell short of a majority in the house of commons and formed, with the liberal democrats, britain’s first coalition government in almost seventy years. the state was running a deficit of a hundred and fifty seven billion pounds about one and a half times the budget of the national health service. any incoming administration would have had to find ways to balance the books, but, under cameron and osborne’s leadership, austerity was a moral as well as an economic mission. “we allowed it to become the defining thing,” the former senior adviser reflected. “austerity” is now a contested term. plenty of conservatives question whether it really happened. so it is worth being clear: between 2010 and 2019, british public spending fell from about forty one per cent of g.d.p. to thirty five per cent. the office of budget responsibility, the equivalent of the american congressional budget office, describes what came to be known as plan a as “one of the biggest deficit reduction programmes seen in any advanced economy since world war ii.” governments across europe pursued fiscal consolidation, but the british version was distinct for its emphasis on shrinking the state rather than raising taxes. like the choice of the word itself, austerity was politically calculated. huge areas of public spending on the n.h.s. and education were nominally maintained. pensions and international aid became more generous, to show that british compassion was not dead. but protecting some parts of the state meant sacrificing the rest: the courts, the prisons, police budgets, wildlife departments, rural buses, care for the elderly, youth programs, road maintenance, public health, the diplomatic corps. plan a spooked economists because of the risk to economic growth. but, in 2013, the british economy grew by 1.8 per cent. the government claimed victory. around that time, osborne declared that the nation could win “the global race” and become the richest major economy in the world by 2030. “we were in complete command of the political landscape,” he recalled. “the u.k. is the country that is seen to have got its act together after the crash. london has become the kind of global capital. so it has worked there’s a bit of a dénouement coming but it had worked.” at the general election in 2015, the conservatives won a majority in the house of commons, with proposals to make a further thirty seven billion pounds’ worth of cuts. “it was devastatingly politically effective,” osborne told me, of austerity. it’s just that the effects were so horrendous. between 2010 and 2018, funding for police forces in england fell by up to a quarter. officers stopped investigating burglaries. only four per cent now end in prosecution. in 2021, the median time between a rape offense and the completion of a trial reached more than two and a half years. last fall, hundreds of school buildings had to be closed for emergency repairs, because the country’s school construction budget had been cut by forty six per cent between 2009 and 2022. in october, i talked with tony durcan, a retired local government employee who was responsible for libraries and other cultural programs in the city of newcastle during the twenty tens. durcan told me that he’d had “a good war,” all things considered. there were moments, he said, when the sheer extremity of the crisis was exciting. between 2010 and 2020, central government funding for local authorities fell by forty per cent. at one point, it looked as if sixteen of newcastle’s eighteen libraries would close. the city’s parks budget was cut by ninety one per cent. the situation forced some creative reforms: newcastle city library now hosts the citizens advice bureau, where residents can apply for benefits and seek other forms of financial guidance. (the library is featured in “i, daniel blake,” ken loach’s anti austerity film of 2016.) but other parts of the city government fell apart. “youth services and a lot of community support services, they just disappeared completely,” durcan said. child poverty rose sharply. (about forty per cent of children in newcastle currently live below the poverty line.) but after a while durcan and his colleagues stopped talking about the cuts, even though their budgets continued to fall. “there was a view was it helpful? were you risking losing confidence in the city?” over time, durcan came to question the official reasoning for the savings. “you can make a mistake, even when you’re acting for the best,” he explained. “i don’t think that’s what happened in austerity.” newcastle was a labour stronghold, as was the rest of the northeast. until 2019, the tories held only three out of twenty nine parliamentary seats in the region. a similar pattern was repeated across england. poorer communities, particularly in urban areas, which tended to vote labour, suffered disproportionately. in liverpool, where the conservatives have not won a parliamentary seat for forty years, spending, per head, fell more than in any other city in the country. public health spending in blackpool, one of the poorest local authorities in england, was cut almost five times more, per person, than in the affluent county of surrey, just south of london, whose eleven m.p.s are all tories. durcan and his colleagues noted the discrepancies between labour  and conservative supporting regions. “and so there was cynicism,” he said, “and also great disappointment, a sense of injustice.” osborne denies that austerity was ever targeted in this way. “it’s not like we ministers just sit there and go, we’re not going to cut kensington council. we’re going to cut liverpool council. that is a lampoonish way of thinking about british politics,” he said. but some of his colleagues were more willing to acknowledge that electoral thinking was at play. one former cabinet minister conceded that there were “big strategic moves” to favor older voters, who were more likely to vote conservative, in the form of pension increases and interventions to raise property prices. david gauke, a treasury minister from 2010 to 2017, agreed that the parts of the country that had benefitted most under labour had seen their budgets cut under the conservatives. “there was a rebalancing that went on,” he said. “did it go too far? maybe it did.” link copied what was less forgivable, in the end, was the cuts’ unthinking nature, their lack of reason. in the fall of 2013, a staffer named giles wilkes, who worked for a senior liberal democrat minister in the coalition, became alarmed by projections that showed ever reducing government budgets. “i don’t wish to paint the picture of the british state as too chaotic and heedless and amateur. but i was wandering around in 2013 and 2014, saying to people, does anyone know what this means for the home office or the court system, for local authorities and the social care budget?” wilkes said. “nobody was curious.” wilkes is now a fellow at the institute for government, a nonpartisan think tank. “it was very obvious in real time,” he told me. “there wasn’t a central function going, hold on a mo. have we made sure that we can provide a decent prison estate, a decent sort of police system?” and so stupid things happened. since 2010, forty three per cent of the courts in england and wales have closed. no one thinks that this was a good idea. for years, the conservatives cut prison funding and staffing while encouraging longer jail times. “you kind of had a mismatch,” gauke, who later served as the justice secretary, admitted. the number of adults sentenced to more than ten years in prison more than doubled until the system caved in, overrun by violence, self harm, drug use, and staff shortages. in 2023, the government activated what it called operation safeguard, in which hundreds of jail cells in police stations were requisitioned to hold convicted offenders, because the prisons were full. in september, a terrorism suspect escaped from wandsworth prison, in south london, by clinging to the underside of a food delivery truck. eighty of the prison’s two hundred and five officers had not shown up for work that day. the long term effects of austerity are still playing out. a 2019 paper by thiemo fetzer, an economist at the university of warwick, asked, “did austerity cause brexit?” fetzer found that, beginning in 2010, the parts of the country most affected by welfare cuts were more likely to support nigel farage’s u.k. independence party, which campaigned against immigration and the e.u. the withdrawal of the social safety net in communities already negatively hit by globalization exacerbated the sense of a nation going awry. public health experts, including marmot, argue that a decade of frozen health care spending undermined the country’s response to the pandemic. more broadly, austerity has contributed to an atmosphere of fatalism, an aversion to thinking about the future. “it is a mood,” johnna montgomerie, a professor at the university of british columbia who studies debt and inequality, has written. “a depression, a chronic case of financial melancholia.” since leaving politics, in 2017, osborne has enjoyed a lucrative career, serving simultaneously as an adviser at blackrock, the asset management firm, and as the editor of the evening standard newspaper; more recently, he has been a partner at an investment bank and a podcaster. he insists that the cuts, ultimately, enabled the u.k.’s public finances to withstand the pandemic and the energy crisis that followed russia’s invasion of ukraine. “there’s no counterfactual,” he told me. osborne likes to accuse his critics of living in a parallel reality, in which the financial crisis and britain’s deficit never existed: “it’s, like, apart from the assassination, mrs. lincoln, did you enjoy the play?” but that does not mean the tories made good choices. british social security payments are at their lowest levels, relative to wages, in half a century. under a steady downward ratchet, started by osborne and continued by his successors, household payments have been capped and income thresholds effectively lowered. in 2017, a “two child” limit was placed on benefits for poor families. in november, 2018, philip alston, the u.n.’s special rapporteur on extreme poverty, toured the u.k. when we spoke, he recalled a strong sense of denial, or ignorance, among british politicians about the consequences of their decisions. “there was a disconnect between the world and what senior ministers wanted to believe,” he said. the fall in britain’s living standards isn’t easy for anyone to talk about, least of all conservatives. the resolution foundation, which studies the lives of people with low and middle incomes, is chaired by david willetts, a former minister in cameron’s government. willetts is a tall, genial man, who worked for margaret thatcher’s policy unit in the eighties. his nickname in the party was two brains. “what i say to tories now is, look, we are behind for various reasons,” willetts said, carefully. “you can argue about it. but our household incomes are clearly lower than france or germany or the netherlands.” part of the problem, willetts explained, was that britain’s richest twenty per cent had largely been spared the effects of the past fourteen years and that made it genuinely difficult for them to comprehend the damage. “we are all o.k.,” he said. “the burden of adjustment has almost entirely been borne by the less affluent half of the british population.” in late november, i took a train to worcester, a cathedral city south of birmingham, on the river severn. it was a raw, washed out morning. floodwater shone in the meadows. the city is famous as the home of lea & perrins worcestershire sauce a dark, sweet yet sour, almost indescribably english condiment, first sold by a pair of chemists in 1837 which has been doused on two centuries’ worth of shepherd’s pie and other stodgy lunches. worcester used to be a den of political corruption: in 1906, men willing to sell their votes to the tories could collect payment in the rest rooms of the duke of york, a pub in the middle of town. more recently, it has been a bellwether. in the nineties, conservative strategists described “worcester woman,” a median female voter politically aware, married, with two children. (since 1979, the city’s m.p.s have belonged to the party in power.) i was on my way to citizens advice worcester part of a charitable network that offers free counselling on debt relief and legal matters behind a restored victorian hotel. shakira was playing on the radio in the reception and a sign read “if you are frightened of your partner, call us.” geraint thomas, a welsh lawyer who runs the center, was in his office, worrying about a heating bill. a few years ago, it was some four thousand pounds a year, but after recent price hikes it was now about fourteen thousand. in 2017, the charity had started running services in herefordshire as well. now funding was tight, and various covid emergency funds were coming to an end. “next year, we have got a bit of a hole,” thomas said. the clock on his wall had stopped. since 2019, the number of people seeking help at the center had risen by thirty per cent. two years of high inflation and rising interest rates meant that the caseworkers were now seeing homeowners and people working two jobs, along with the unemployed and families on benefits. “it’s like a black hole, dragging more and more people in,” colin stuart, who manages volunteers, said. anne limbert, who oversees the advice team, explained that, until a few years ago, it was usually possible to make a recovery plan for clients. “it used to be that we could help people, you know, and make a difference,” she said. “now it’s just kind of depressing.” increasingly, limbert was sending clients to food banks. the caseworkers said that they had mostly tuned out politics. gwen fraser, a volunteer manager in herefordshire, which has some of england’s most deprived rural communities, had met a visiting m.p. a few months earlier. “i thought, you’re not in the real world, mate,” she said. not long ago, a seventy seven year old man, behind on his mortgage, had told fraser that he was suicidal. the proportion of people coming to the center with a long term health condition had risen by twenty per cent since 2019. (n.h.s. prescriptions for antidepressants in england almost doubled between 2011 and 2023.) fraser had recently settled on a phrase that she found useful in her paperwork: “overwhelming distress.” worcester woman voted for brexit. in 2016, the city chose to leave the european union by a margin of fifty four per cent to forty six per cent. the perception of the brexit vote as a cry of anguish from deindustrialized northern towns or from faded seaside resorts isn’t wrong it just leaves out the rest of england. two weeks after the referendum, danny dorling, a geography professor at the university of oxford, published an article in the british medical journal showing that leave voters weren’t defined neatly either by geography or by income. fifty nine per cent identified as middle class, and most lived in the south. “people wouldn’t believe me for years,” dorling told me. “this was hampshire voted to leave.” dorling’s politics are on the left. he opposed brexit and often describes britain as a failing state. during the summer of 2018, dorling gave dozens of public talks across the country reflecting on the referendum. he noticed that places that had voted remain invariably had better rail connections than those that voted leave. a lot of brexit supporters were older and economically secure but had a keen sense of the country going downhill. “something was falling apart,” dorling said. “they had got a house in their twenties. they’d had full employment. their children were in their forties and they might be renting. . . . it was an almost entirely unselfish vote by the old for their grandchildren let’s try it, or let’s at least show we’re angry.” how you interpret the brexit vote informs, to a great extent, how you make sense of the past fourteen years of british politics. it is not just a watershed a before and after. it is also a prism that clarifies or scrambles the picture entirely. one perspective sees the whole saga as a woeful mistake. in this view, cameron decided to settle, once and for all, an internal tory argument about britain’s place in an integrating e.u., a question that had haunted the party since the last days of thatcher. in the process, he turned what was an abstruse obsession on the right wing of british politics into a much simpler, terrifyingly binary choice for the population on how they felt their life was going. in the accident theory of brexit, leaving the e.u. has turned out to be a puncture rather than a catastrophe: a falloff in trade; a return of forgotten bureaucracy with our near neighbors; an exodus of financial jobs from london; a misalignment in the world. “there is a sort of problem for the british state, including labour as well as all these tory governments since 2016, which is that they are having to live a lie,” as osborne, who voted remain, said. “it’s a bit like tractor production figures in the soviet union. you have to sort of pretend that this thing is working, and everyone in the system knows it isn’t.” the other view sees brexit as an unfinished revolution. regardless of its origins, the vote in 2016 was a repudiation of how britain had been governed for a generation or more. in the b.m.j. article, dorling observed that younger voters who chose overwhelmingly to remain in the e.u. were angry with their elders. “they will feel newly betrayed . . . but their real betrayal has been a long time in the making,” he wrote. for a highly centralized country that is smaller than wyoming, the u.k. is lopsided beyond belief. it contains regional inequalities greater than those between the east and the west of germany, or the north and the south of italy inequalities that have been allowed by successive governments to grow to shameful extremes. on average, people in nottingham earn about a quarter of what people make in kensington and chelsea, in west london, which is some two hours away by train. during the brexit campaign, the e.u. came to represent not just a supranational monolith across the english channel but profound distances within the u.k. itself. and the politicians who defended the e.u. looked and sounded, for the most part, as if they spent more time in tuscany each summer than they had spent on teesside in their lives. “the kind of globalism, the internationalism, the liberal élite view, was seized on by people who thought that they’d been spoken down to for decades,” john hayes, a tory m.p. and a brexiteer, told me. “and the more they wheeled out the establishment figures, the more it was, yeah, that’s them. those are the ones who don’t get it. they don’t understand us.” almost eight years after the vote, what stays with me is how unimagined brexit was. overnight, and against the will of its leaders, the country abandoned its economic model as the anglo saxon gateway to the world’s largest trading bloc and replaced it with nothing at all. “i can’t think of another occasion when a party has so radically changed direction while in office,” willetts said. thatcher was an architect of the e.u.’s single market, which in time became a heresy. you can marvel at the recklessness of brexiteers such as farage, or of johnson, who spearheaded the vote leave campaign. (“he is not a brexiteer,” osborne said. “i really would go to my grave saying, deep down, boris johnson did not want to leave the e.u.”) but the real dereliction ran deeper. sensible britain failed. the civil service did not plan for brexit. ivan rogers was the u.k.’s permanent representative to the e.u. from 2013 to 2017. he started warning about the likelihood of brexit about five years before the vote. “it was difficult to get the attention of the system,” he said. beyond a briefing paper, demanded by the house of lords, there was only some “confidential thinking,” in the words of jeremy heywood, the former head of the civil service. (heywood died in 2018.) “the mandarins have a lot to answer for on this,” rogers said. “we were very badly prepared in 2016.” “i didn’t think it was very wise,” carney, the former governor of the bank of england, said, of the official refusal to consider the referendum going wrong. “we did a ton of planning.” after the vote, the bank stabilized the markets while british politics imploded. cameron resigned and was replaced by theresa may, a former home secretary with limited experience of the economy or of international affairs. in the second half of 2016, may worked with a small group of advisers to formulate a brexit strategy that ultimately satisfied nobody. “it was incredibly poor statecraft,” a former cabinet colleague said. “absolute shit. abominable.” the abiding image of the brexit talks was a photo of michel barnier, the e.u.’s chief negotiator, with his colleagues and their neat piles of paper on one side of a table, while their british counterparts, led by david davis, a bluff former special forces reservist, sat on the other side with a single note among them. one friday lunchtime, a couple of months ago, i met dominic cummings at a pub not far from his house in london. a light snow was in the air. cummings, who is fifty two, worked on education policy in the coalition government before becoming the campaign director of vote leave. (he coined its notorious slogan, “take back control.”) cummings is a savonarola figure in british politics, an ascetic and a technocrat, who wants to save the state by burning it down. he refers to elon musk by his first name and writes substack essays with titles such as “on complexity, ‘fog and moonlight,’ prediction, and politics vii: why social science is so bad at prediction & what is to be done.” link copied cummings reveres the apollo space program and takes a dim view of almost all britain’s elected officials. “where they are not malicious they are moronic,” he told me once. he talks rapidly, with a slight northern rasp. (he is from durham, near newcastle.) next to our table in the pub, a woodstove emitted a sudden, enveloping cloud of smoke, which dissipated while we talked. cummings appeared to be wearing two hats, against the cold. he apologized if it seemed as if he were staring at me. he had recently undergone retinal surgery. cummings, unsurprisingly, saw brexit in revolutionary terms as a chance to break with the country’s ruling orthodoxy. “the vote leave campaign was not of the tory party,” he said. “it was not a conservative big ‘c’ or little ‘c’ effort. but none of them wanted to confront the reasons why we did it in the first place. . . . for us, this was an attempt to wrench us off the cameron, establishment, blairite line.” cummings believes that britain must rediscover its ability to build things roads, railways, houses, research institutes, products that people want to buy in order to prosper again. he argues that it is america’s ecosystem of universities, entrepreneurs, and government procurement departments that have helped maintain its economic and technological edge, not just lower taxes or a freer form of capitalism. “when you start talking about this to tories, they go, oh, dominic, you sound like a terrible central planner,” cummings said. “and you go, that’s america. this is not weird left wing shit.” no one would accuse cummings of having a popular platform. his jam is a.i. and nietzsche. but, after the brexit vote, he kept waiting for may’s government to act on what was, to him, its obvious implications: to restrict immigration, reform the state, and explore dramatic economic policies, in order to diverge from the e.u. and to boost the country’s productivity. “i kept thinking, month after month, god, like, it’s weird the way they are just thrashing around and not facing it,” cummings said. in his view, the election of trump, that november, provided a perfect excuse for remainers not to take the brexit vote seriously. “they just lumped it all in with, oh, it’s a global tide of populism. it’s mad, irrational, evil. it’s partly funded by putin,” he said. “they didn’t have to reëvaluate and go, maybe the establishment in general has been, like, fucking up for twenty plus years. ” in july, 2019, may resigned as prime minister and was replaced by johnson, who hired cummings as a senior adviser. cummings thought that johnson would probably screw it up. at the same time, he saw an opportunity to advance what he considered the true vote leave agenda. “in some sense,” he said, “the risk was worth taking.” that fall was the most kinetic, breathtaking period of britain’s fourteen years of tory rule. with cummings at his side, along with lee cain, another former vote leave official, who became his director of communications, johnson broke the deadlock that had existed since the referendum. he asked the queen to prorogue, or suspend, parliament. he expelled twenty one conservative m.p.s including eight former cabinet ministers and nicholas soames, the grandson of winston churchill for attempting to stop the country from leaving the e.u. with no deal at all. on a tuesday in late september, the supreme court ruled that johnson’s suspension of parliament had been unlawful. “the effect upon the fundamentals of our democracy was extreme,” the justices found. i stood outside the court in the rain, and it felt as though the thousand year old timbers of the state were moving beneath our feet. someone in the crowd was wearing a prison jumpsuit and an enlarged johnson head. a woman was dressed as a suffragist. anna soubry, a former tory m.p. who quit the party to fight for a second referendum, shook her head in wonder. “astonishing,” she said. but johnson prevailed. before the year was out, he had cobbled together a new, hard line brexit deal and thumped corbyn at a general election on another three word cummings approved slogan: “get brexit done.” johnson was, briefly, unassailable. in the election that december, the conservatives won seats in places such as bishop auckland, in cummings’s home county of durham, which they had not held for more than a hundred years. the party gathered a new, loose coalition of pro brexit voters many of whom were from formerly labour voting english towns to go with its traditionally older, fiscally conservative base. johnson’s celebrity (the hair, the mess, the faux churchillian vibes, the ridiculous latin) was the glue that held it all together. he sensed the public mood. (with johnson, that was not the same as doing something about it.) he disavowed austerity promising more money for the n.h.s., new hospitals, and more police and described a mighty program to redress the country’s economic imbalances, which he called levelling up. johnson’s premiership collapsed under the pressure of the pandemic and of his own proclivities. according to cummings, the alignment between the goals of vote leave and johnson’s ambitions as prime minister decoupled in january, 2020, just a few weeks after the election. cummings wanted to overhaul the civil service and britain’s planning laws. johnson, for his part, wanted a rest. “he was, like, what the fuck are you talking about? why would i want to do that?” cummings recalled. (johnson did not reply to a request for comment.) “it’s basically cake ism, right?,” cummings said, referring to johnson’s political lodestar: having his cake and eating it, too. “i want to do all the things you want to do, and i want everyone to love me,” cummings recalled. “i was, like, yeah, that’s not happening.” britain’s first cases of the coronavirus were announced on january 31, 2020, the day the country left the european union. in march, johnson ordered the first national lockdown, caught covid, and later spent three nights in the i.c.u. for months, the country staggered from one set of restrictions to the next a reflection of johnson’s inconstant attitude toward the virus. in texts, cummings used a shopping cart emoji to indicate the prime minister veering from one half formed idea to the next. levelling up became a pork barrel exercise: of seven hundred and twenty five million pounds earmarked in june, 2021, about eighty per cent was for conservative constituencies. johnson’s downing street was operatically dysfunctional. a rift opened between cummings and his team and a faction centered on carrie symonds, johnson’s then fiancée, a former conservative party communications director. in november, 2020, cummings accused the prime minister of betraying the vote leave program and resigned. “i said, listen, we had a deal. and if you end up breaking our deal there is going to be hell to pay,” cummings recalled. cain left as well. a little more than a year later, the daily mirror, a left wing tabloid, broke the news that johnson and his staff had organized parties while the rest of the country was under lockdown beginning with the party for cain’s departure, the previous november. johnson resigned six months later. the pandemic bore out truths about the british state. there were bright spots: the vaccines and their rollout by the n.h.s.; the intervention of the treasury, under rishi sunak, the chancellor, whose furlough plan protected millions of jobs. more generally, though, the virus revealed tired public services, a population in poor health, and a government that was less competent than it thought it was. “it’s very convenient for everyone to blame boris,” cummings said. “but the truth is, in january, february, of 2020, it was the civil service saying‚ we’re the best prepared country in the world. we’re brilliant at pandemics. the reality is, everything was crumbling.” in october, 2023, cummings testified at the u.k.’s covid inquiry, an investigation of the government’s handling of the pandemic led by a retired judge. his written evidence was a hundred and fifteen pages long and began with an epigraph from “war and peace”: “nothing was ready for the war which everybody expected.” the hearings took place in an office building around the corner from paddington station. i sat next to a row of bereaved family members, who were holding photographs of their loved ones. cummings wore a white linen shirt, which came untucked, a tweed jacket with elbow patches, and black boots. he is such a contentious figure an agent of these disordered times that people often don’t really listen to what he says. a great deal of the media coverage of cummings’s testimony focussed on his texting style. in messages during the pandemic, he referred to ministers as “useless fuckpigs,” “morons,” and “cunts.” the inquiry’s lawyer asked cummings if he thought his language had been too strong. “i would say, if anything, it understated the position,” he replied. in written testimony, cummings implored the covid inquiry to address a wider crisis in britain’s political class. “our political parties and the civil service are extremely closed institutions with little place for people who can think and build,” he wrote. cummings believes that the war in iraq, the financial crisis, the pandemic, and the invasion of ukraine all, in their ways, exposed serious shortcomings in the british state that have yet to be addressed. brexit, too. when we met, cummings observed that the country has still failed to confront the full implications of the vote, either domestically or abroad: “you can just treat it as, like, a weird thing, like a witch trial in a medieval village. now the witch has been burnt, and now the community is getting back to normal. or you can think of it as part of big structural changes in western politics, society, and the economy. and if the establishment thinks that you can treat it like a sort of episode of witchcraft mania, then they’re just going to walk straight into recurring shocks.” i was at heathrow airport, refreshing the bbc’s web site on my phone, when the screen changed to a black and white commemorative portrait of the queen. on february 6, 1952, when elizabeth’s father, george vi, died, the prime minister was winston churchill. “we cannot at this moment do more than record a spontaneous expression of our grief,” he told the house of commons that afternoon. seventy years later, in september, 2022, britain was seized again by deference, tenderness, and other, more inchoate, emotions. you could not escape the ritual. hats, horses, artillery in london’s parks. in her later years, the queen’s aura of permanence had been enhanced by the recklessness at work in other parts of britain’s public life. her survival helped to contain a sense of crisis. the queen died on liz truss’s second full day in office. when the country’s brand new prime minister and her husband, hugh o’leary, arrived at westminster abbey for the state funeral, australian television identified them as “maybe minor royals.” four days later, truss launched the growth plan 2022, a thatcher inspired, forty five billion pound package of tax cuts intended to reignite the british economy. the bond markets didn’t like it. the pound fell to a record low against the dollar. the international monetary fund asked truss to “re evaluate.” her approval rating dropped by almost thirty points in a week. ashen, truss fired her chancellor, kwasi kwarteng, then left office herself, on october 25th, serving seventy one days fewer than britain’s previous shortest serving prime minister, george canning, who died suddenly of pneumonia in 1827. it made sense to pretend that truss and her growth plan had been a rogue mission, inflicted on an unsuspecting nation. truss was depicted as mad, or ideologically unreliable, or both. she had been a liberal democrat at oxford who once opposed the monarchy. she was strangely besotted with mental arithmetic. but the truth is that truss was neither an outlier nor a secret radical, but a representative spirit of the conservative party and its years in power. she was one of the first m.p.s of her intake to be promoted to the cabinet, brought on by cameron, before serving both may and johnson in a hectic and haphazard series of important jobs: running departments for the environment, justice, international trade, and a large part of the treasury. in all these positions, truss was the same: spiky, dynamic, considered skillful on tv. in 2012, she and kwarteng contributed to “britannia unchained,” an ode to tax cutting and deregulation that described the british as “among the worst idlers in the world.” i asked one of truss’s contemporaries, the former cabinet minister, if anyone took the ideas seriously at the time. it was hard to catch the attention of the party’s base under the coalition, he complained. “the easiest way was to show a bit of leg,” he said. “it used to be hanging.” truss campaigned for remain before becoming a brexiteer. as foreign secretary, she posed on top of a tank pure thatcher cosplay and dominated the government’s flickr account, with pictures of herself jogging across the brooklyn bridge and standing, ruminatively, in red square, in moscow. link copied “it’s silliness,” rory stewart told me. stewart became a conservative m.p. on the same day as truss, in 2010, after working for the british government in iraq, running an n.g.o. in afghanistan, and teaching at harvard. he was ejected from the party during the johnson purge of 2019. last year, he published “how not to be a politician,” a compulsive, depressing memoir of his career during this period. “it’s clever, silly people. it’s a lack of seriousness,” he said, of truss and many of his peers. in 2015, stewart was sent to work under truss at britain’s department for the environment. truss challenged him to come up with a strategy for england’s national parks in three days. “she said, come on, rory, how difficult can this be?” he recalled. truss started firing off suggestions. “get young people into nature. blah blah blah blah.” (the plan was announced on time; truss declined to speak to me.) “i felt with liz truss slight affection but above all profound pity,” stewart said. “because she’s approaching these big conversations as though she’s sort of performing as an underprepared undergraduate at a seminar.” on a cloudless summer’s morning, in the dog days of theresa may’s government, i travelled to scunthorpe, in north lincolnshire. in the sixties, scunthorpe was a growing steel town with four blast furnaces named after english queens. in 2016, the population voted overwhelmingly for brexit; three years later, the steelworks was at risk of closure, in part because of trade uncertainties caused by the vote. british steel, which ran the plant, had been sold to private equity investors for a pound. four thousand jobs were on the line. in the afternoon, i sat down with simon green, the deputy chief executive of the local council. green was in his early fifties, angular and forthright. he grew up in grimsby, a fishing town on the coast, and spent his career in local government in boston and new york, as well as in nottingham and sheffield before taking the job in north lincolnshire, in 2017. green was sick of reporters, like me, coming up to scunthorpe from london for the day, to gawk at its predicament and wonder why people could have believed that brexit would improve their situation. “no disrespect, but we do get a level of poverty porn,” he said. “a lot of doom and gloom.” green assured me that the brexit related anxiety around the steelworks was a blip. “we’re actually on a bit of a comeback roll,” he said. he was excited about the region’s potential for green technology and the construction of hs2, a new y shaped high speed railway that was going to transform connections between london and cities in the northeast and the northwest. “rail track, ballast, concrete, cement you name anything to do with trains, infrastructure, it’s an engineering, midlands, northern thing,” he said. green ascribed the brexit vote in scunthorpe to “values and culture” rather than to economics a sense of dislocation and of feeling disdained by politicians in london. recently, i wondered how green was getting on. in 2019, scunthorpe was part of the “red wall” of labour constituencies that flipped for the tories. british steel had changed hands once more. now chinese investors were planning to install new furnaces, which required fewer workers and were fed with scrap metal. for the first time since 1890, the plant would no longer produce virgin steel from ore. i met green a couple of weeks before christmas. he had left his job a few days before. he seemed relieved to be done. seven local authorities in england have gone bust since 2020, including the one serving birmingham, britain’s second largest city. in north lincolnshire, the council now spends about three quarters of its budget on services for vulnerable children and adults roughly double the proportion of a decade ago. “we’re still here,” green said, ruefully. the saga of the steelworks continued. “it’s endless,” he went on. “is it closing? isn’t it closing?” britain has had eleven different economic programs in the past thirteen years. we were in a teaching room at the university campus north lincolnshire, which opened a few years ago in the former local authority offices. the old council chamber, built in the shape of a blast furnace, was now a lecture hall. the average student age was twenty nine. green was proud of the project. it reminded him of mechanics’ institutes in the nineteenth century. “people are using their own judgment to better themselves,” he said. “if you want a job in this area, you can get a job. we need more quality opportunity.” green had had a clear strategy for scunthorpe and the nearby humber estuary, built around green technology and education. “i asked a question to my colleagues and politicians as well,” he said. “what sort of town do you want this to be in ten, fifteen, twenty years?” britain has no equivalent strategy for itself. in september, sunak weakened several of the country’s key climate change targets. a few weeks later, he cancelled what was left of hs2, the new rail network. only the stem of the y will now be built, from london to birmingham, at a cost of some four hundred and seventy million pounds per mile, with little or no benefit to the north. “i can get quite excited, agitated by that,” green said. “it makes us look a laughingstock.” green was studiously apolitical when we talked. i had no sense of which way he voted. but he despaired of the shallowness and contingency now at the heart of british politics, and the lack of narrative coherence or shared purpose about what these years of struggle had been intended to achieve. i asked if he ever worried that the country was in a permanent state of decline. “i think, at the moment, we are at the crossroads,” he replied. when will it end? sunak says that he will call a general election in the second half of the year. the gossip in westminster says that probably that means mid november: a british encore, to follow the main event in the u.s. but it could come as soon as may. the prime minister began preparing the ground last fall, after his first year in office, by presenting himself as a change candidate a big claim, considering the circumstances. in october, i went to manchester to watch sunak address the conservative party’s annual conference. he was introduced onstage by his wife, akshata murty, the daughter of n. r. narayana murthy, a founder of infosys, the indian i.t. conglomerate. (according to the london sunday times, sunak and murty have an estimated net worth of about five hundred million pounds.) murty wore an orange pants suit, and she addressed britain’s most successful political organization as if it were a local gardening society. “please know that rishi is working hard,” she said. “he shares your values and he knows how much you care about the future of the u.k.” sunak has a quietly imploring tone. british politics was in a bad way, he explained. people were fed up. “it isn’t anger,” sunak said. “it’s an exhaustion with politics, in particular politicians saying things and then nothing ever changing.” sunak dated the rot back thirty years without explaining why, but, presumably, to indicate the fall of thatcher. (thatcher was everywhere in manchester; she is the modern party’s only ghost.) having positioned himself as the country’s next, truly transformative, leader, sunak offered his party a weirdly pallid program: the dismantling of hs2, plus two long range, complex policies, to abolish smoking and to reform the a levels england’s standard end of school exams. “we will be bold. we will be radical,” sunak promised. “we will face resistance and we will meet it.” increasingly, sunak has been pulled between the party’s diverging instincts: to retreat to the dry, liberal competence of the cameron osborne regime or to head off in a more explicitly protectionist, anti immigrant, anti woke direction. in manchester, the energy was unmistakably on the party’s right. suella braverman, then the home secretary, magnetized delegates with a speech warning of a “hurricane” of mass migration. truss staged a growth rally, and nigel farage cruised the conference hall, posing for selfies. (there is talk of farage standing as a conservative m.p.) back in london, i had lunch with david frost, an influential conservative peer. “rishi, i feel for him, in a way,” frost said. “he’s just trying to keep the show on the road and not upset all these different wings of the party. but the consequence of that is you end up with a sort of agenda which is not politically meaningful at all.” on january 14th, a poll of fourteen thousand people, which frost facilitated, suggested that the party is on course for a huge defeat later this year. the question is what kind of haunted political realm it will leave behind. under starmer, labour has been tactical in the extreme, exorcising corbyn’s left wing policies (corbyn has been blocked from standing for the party at the election), while making vague noises about everything else. it has nothing new to say about brexit and equivocates about its own tax and spending plans, if it wins power. the party recently scaled back a plan to invest twenty eight billion pounds a year in green projects. there is no rescue on the way for britain’s welfare state. osborne noted all this with satisfaction. “the underlying economic arguments have basically been accepted,” he said, of austerity. “it’s rather like the thatcher period. everyone complained that thatcher did deindustrialization, and yet no one wants to unpick it.” by contrast, cummings sees the two cautious, hedging leaders in charge of britain’s main political parties and the relief among some centrists that the candidates are not so different from each other in rather darker terms. “they are deluded when they think it’s great that sunak and starmer are in. it’s just like they’re arguing over trivia,” he said. “the politics of it are insane.” i am afraid that i agree. it is unnerving to be heading into an election year in britain with the political conversation so small, next to questions that can feel immeasurable. i put this to hayes, the tory m.p., when i went to see him in the house of commons. “you’re arguing we have very vanilla flavor politics, in a richly colored world. there’s something in that,” he said. then he surprised me. “i think the key thing for the conservatives now is to be more conservative,” he said. we were sitting in a bay window, overlooking the thames. a waiter poured tea. hayes seemed to relish the coming election. it was as if, after almost fourteen years of tortuous experiment, real conservatism might finally be at hand. “outside metropolitan britain and the university towns, it’s all up for grabs,” hayes assured me. “toryism must have its day again.” ♦ searching for the cause of a catastrophic plane crash. the man who spent forty two years at the beverly hills hotel pool. gloria steinem’s life on the feminist frontier. where the amish go on vacation. how colonel sanders built his kentucky fried fortune. what does procrastination tell us about ourselves? fiction by patricia highsmith: “the trouble with mrs. blynn, the trouble with the world” sign up for our daily newsletter to receive the best stories from the new yorker. sections more © 2025 condé nast. all rights reserved. the new yorker may earn a portion of sales from products that are purchased through our site as part of our affiliate partnerships with retailers. the material on this site may not be reproduced, distributed, transmitted, cached or otherwise used, except with the prior written permission of condé nast. ad choices

attend events back our campaigns become a volunteer vote for us sign up for email updates work for us attend conference become an activist become a candidate members' area our party our people latest news in your community for a fair deal   manifesto 2024 our values our campaigning victories business network liberty network the future fund affiliated organisations diversity groups international prepared by the liberal democrat history group the liberal democrats were founded in 1988, but we can trace our history back over three hundred years. this page provides a concise history of the liberal democrats and our whig, liberal and sdp predecessors. for a longer version, visit the liberal democrat history group website at www.liberalhistory.org.uk. the liberal tradition in british politics emerged during the 17th century, in the great constitutional struggles of the civil wars (1642 49) and the glorious revolution (1688). these were conflicts between those who support the existing order, with a powerful crown and established church, and those who advocated the supremacy of parliament over the monarchy and wider toleration of different religious beliefs. in due course the conservative defence of the status quo gave rise to the tory party; the more liberal whigs supported reform and civil liberties. between 1688 and 1830, there were several long periods of one party dominance, firstly by whigs and later by tories. by the early 19th century, government appeared to be representing the interests only of conservative landowners, repressing radical protest by people with neither economic security nor the right to vote. this encouraged liberals to embrace religious toleration, economic and electoral reform. in 1832, lord grey’s whig government pushed through the great reform act, a first, tentative, extension of the right to vote. this pushed politicians to engage more with ordinary electors and radical elements outside parliament, in the process developing the political parties we recognise today. the conservative party, founded in 1835, came first, combining traditional, landed tories in uneasy alliance with a small but influential band of free trade conservatives led by sir robert peel. free trade also appealed to the working classes (because it kept food cheap) and the industrial manufacturers (because it made exports easier). however, it was unwelcome to tory farmers who benefited from agricultural protection and who opposed abolition of the corn laws (import duties on grain). in 1846, this issue caused the peelites to break away. eventually, they joined with the aristocratic whigs and middle class liberals and radicals elected after 1832 to create, in 1859, the liberal party. the liberals governed britain for most of the following thirty years, benefiting from further extensions of the franchise in 1867 and 1885. their leader and four times prime minister, william ewart gladstone, dominated british politics. he swept away tariffs in the interests of free trade, replaced taxes on goods and customs duties with income tax, and established parliamentary accountability for government spending. nonconformists strongly supported his approach to religious questions, which deeply affected basic liberties and education. after winning the 1868 election, gladstone’s government disestablished the church of ireland, imposed compulsory primary education and introduced the secret ballot. in opposition after 1874, he defended the rights of oppressed minorities in the balkans. gladstone’s new government from 1880 became increasingly concerned with bringing peace to ireland, which faced sectarian divisions and economic problems. he attempted, unsuccessfully, to pass an irish home rule bill but, in the process, split the liberal party, leaving the party out of power for the next twenty years, apart from a minority administration in 1892 95. after gladstone’s retirement in 1894, disagreements emerged between traditional liberals, who thought government should largely keep out of economic and social affairs, and the ‘new liberals’, who argued for intervention to help the poorer sections of society   without assistance with welfare, health and education, the new liberals argued, many people could not be truly free. henry campbell bannerman helped to heal these rifts and, with the conservatives split over free trade and education, he led the party to a spectacular electoral landslide in 1906. an electoral pact with the new labour party helped to maximise the efficiency of the progressive vote. the liberal government of 1906 15 was one of the great reforming administrations of the century. led by towering figures including asquith (pm from 1908), lloyd george and churchill, it laid the foundations of the modern welfare state, created labour exchanges, old age pensions and the national insurance system. this was the new liberalism in action, removing the shackles of poverty, unemployment and ill health. from the outset the liberals had difficulty passing legislation through the tory dominated house of lords. after the lords rejected lloyd george’s 1909 ‘people’s budget’, which introduced a supertax on high earners to raise revenue for social expenditure and naval rearmament, two elections were fought in 1910 on the issue of ‘the peers versus the people’. in 1911, with the king primed to create hundreds of new liberal peers if necessary, the lords capitulated and the primacy of the house of commons was definitively established. the strains of fighting the first world war brought the liberal ascendancy to an end. the party split disastrously in 1916 over the direction of the war, when lloyd george supplanted asquith as prime minister. in the 1918 and 1922 elections, the lloyd george and asquith factions fought each other. the party’s grassroots organisation fell apart, allowing the labour party to capture the votes of the new working class and women voters enfranchised in 1918. many who might later be called social democrats left the liberals for the more evidently successful progressive alternative, the labour party. the liberals reunited around the old cause of free trade to fight the 1923 election, which left them holding the balance of power in the commons. however, asquith’s decision to support a minority labour government placed the party in an awkward position and effectively polarised the political choice between conservatives and labour. the disastrous 1924 election relegated the party to a distant third place as the electorate increasingly opted for a straight choice between the other two parties. lloyd george reinvigorated the party on a radical platform of keynesian economics for the 1929 general election, but the election results were disappointing. the liberals split again in the 1930s, in the wake of the upheaval brought by the great depression, and continued to decline, despite participating in churchill’s wartime coalition. liberalism as a philosophy was by no means dead, however; the great liberal thinkers keynes and beveridge provided the doctrines underpinning government social and economic policy for the post war period, nevertheless, by 1957 there were only five liberal mps left, and just 110 constituencies had been fought at the previous general election. jo grimond’s election as party leader in 1956 began the revival. his vision and youthful appeal were well suited to the burgeoning television coverage of politics, and he was able to capitalise on growing dissatisfaction with the conservatives, in power since 1951, and internal divisions in the labour party. he persuaded the party to adopt innovative new policies, including support for the uk’s entry to the european community and opposition to the uk’s nuclear deterrent. in 1958, the liberals won their first by election for thirty years, at torrington, and in 1962, eric lubbock (later lord avebury) won the sensational orpington by election. a second revival came in the 1970s with jeremy thorpe as leader, peaking in the two general elections of 1974, with 19 per cent and 18 per cent of the vote, though only 14 and 13 seats, respectively. this recovery in liberal fortunes was partly thanks to efforts to empower local communities through a community politics approach, paying attention to local problems which were often ignored by the main parties. this strategy was formally adopted by the party in 1970 and contributed to a steady growth in local authority representation, and a number of parliamentary by election victories. following labour’s defeat in the 1979 election, the party spun to the left, causing internecine strife and alienating many mps and members. moderate labour leaders had worked with the liberals both during the referendum on european community membership in 1975, and the lib lab pact, which had kept labour in power in 1977 78 after by election losses had eroded their majority. on 26 march 1981 a number of them broke away from labour to found the social democratic party (sdp). the party attracted members from both labour and conservatives, and also brought many people into politics for the first time. the sdp and liberals agreed to fight elections on a common platform with joint candidates. this alliance’s political impact was immediate, winning a string of by election victories and topping the opinion polls for months. the two parties won 25 per cent of the vote in the 1983 general election to labour’s 27 per cent, the best third party performance since 1929. the alliance won further by election victories in the 1983 87 parliament, and made significant progress in local government, but there were tensions between the two leaderships. david owen, sdp leader from 1983, was less sympathetic towards the liberals under david steel than his predecessor roy jenkins had been. owen was determined to maintain his party’s separate (and essentially more right wing) identity. as differences emerged, most notably on defence, the alliance’s vote fell to 23 per cent in the 1987 election. steel immediately proposed the merger of the two parties and, though owen opposed it, his party voted to open talks. the parties spent eight months negotiating merger, with the new party’s constitution and even its name becoming subjects of sometimes bitter controversy. the social & liberal democrats were born on 3 march 1988, with paddy ashdown elected leader in july. owen led a significant faction of social democrats opposing merger, but after a couple of encouraging by election results, his ‘continuing sdp’ declined into irrelevance, and wound itself up in 1990. for the new party, membership, morale and finances all fell during this in fighting. its nadir came in the 1989 european elections, with just 6 per cent of the vote and fourth place behind the greens. however, under ashdown’s inspiring leadership, the liberal democrats slowly recovered. in 1990 they won the eastbourne by election, and local election advances resumed. in the 1992 general election the party won 18 per cent of the vote and 20 seats. paddy ashdown was consistently the most popular party leader in opinion polls, and the party’s policies, especially its pledge to raise income tax to invest extra resources in education, and its clear commitment to environmental policies, were widely praised. five years of weak and unpopular conservative government after 1992 provided further opportunities in local government and the european parliament, even after tony blair’s election as labour leader, which many political commentators had predicted would destroy the liberal democrats. in the 1997 election, the party won 46 seats, the highest number won by a third party since 1929. whilst its overall share of the vote fell slightly, to 17 per cent, ruthless targeting of resources on winnable constituencies showed how the detrimental effects of the first past the post electoral system could be countered. ashdown saved the party from oblivion but ‘the project’, his attempt to work with labour to defeat the conservatives’ seemingly endless political hegemony, was controversial. ashdown and blair even discussed a formal coalition between their parties, but the scale of labour’s triumph in 1997 made such an arrangement impossible. nevertheless, a pre election agreement on constitutional reform helped ensure that the labour government introduced devolution for scotland and wales, reform of the house of lords, freedom of information legislation and proportional representation for european elections. however blair reneged on his commitment to hold a referendum on electoral reform for westminster, which helped convince ashdown that the project was finished, and he stood down as leader in august 1999. before that, he saw the party’s representation in the european parliament rise from two to ten meps (the largest national contingent in the european liberal group), and a labour   liberal democrat coalition established in the new scottish parliament (followed by a similar coalition in the welsh assembly in 2000). from the outset ashdown’s successor, charles kennedy, was less inclined to work with labour, focusing instead on replacing the conservatives as the principal party of opposition. the liberal democrats began to benefit from the electorate’s disillusionment with new labour, gaining ground in by elections and local elections, and increasing their vote share in the 2001 general election to 18 per cent, with six net gains. the terrorist attacks in the us on 11th september 2001 and the labour government’s decision to join the us invasion of iraq in 2003 transformed the political situation. among the three main parties, only the liberal democrats opposed both the war and the steady infringements of civil liberties perpetuated by new labour in the name of the war on terror. the party’s policy platform was popular and distinctive, with its critique of over centralised and micro managed public services, its proposals for a fairer tax system, its consistent support for strong environmental policies, and its opposition to labour’s introduction of tuition fees for university students. by election and local election gains continued, and the liberal democrats emerged from the 2005 general election with 22 per cent of the vote and 62 seats, the highest number since 1923. despite this, there was a widespread feeling amongst party members that in the wake of a deeply unpopular war, and with the conservatives still not mounting an effective opposition, they should have done better. mps became increasingly concerned over the party’s drift and lack of direction, kennedy’s laid back leadership style and his rumoured alcoholism. he was eventually persuaded to resign in january 2006, and sir menzies campbell, the party’s deputy leader, was elected in his place. the nineteen months of campbell’s leadership was, in general, an unhappy period. although a well respected foreign affairs spokesman, he found it difficult to adjust to the rough and tumble of prime minister’s questions. while he restored a sense of purpose and professionalism to the party organisation and drove through important reforms of party policy, local election results were poor. the party’s slide in the opinion polls throughout 2007 caused panic amongst some parliamentarians and led to a systematic undermining of his leadership, culminating in his resignation in october. the election of nick clegg to the leadership stopped the slide in the opinion polls and stabilised party morale, and the liberal democrats performed strongly in local elections in 2008 and 2009. clegg’s reaction to the world wide credit crunch and banking crisis that followed in 2008 09, however, caused some tensions within the party, between the ‘economic liberals’ (aligned with the proposals published in 2004 in the orange book: reclaiming liberalism), who argued for a smaller state and less government intervention, and the ‘social liberals’ who pointed to the need for continued government action, in particular to reduce inequality and deal with the growing climate challenge (presented in 2007 in reinventing the state: social liberalism for the 21st century). in general the leadership won support for its proposals to cut the public deficit and prioritise public expenditure more sharply. the liberal democrats entered the 2010 election with a programme including redistributive taxation, a ‘pupil premium’ to improve school education for children from poorer families, an economic stimulus package focused on low carbon investment and a far reaching programme of political and constitutional reform. after a dramatic campaign, featuring the country’s first ever television debates between the three main party leaders   in which clegg performed strongly   the liberal democrats ended up slightly, at 23 per cent, although the vagaries of the electoral system delivered a net loss of six seats. the election outcome of a hung parliament gave the liberal democrats their first real chance of power, and negotiations for a coalition began with both conservative and labour parties. in the end, a coalition programme containing a substantial portion of the liberal democrat manifesto was agreed with the conservatives, and for the first time in 65 years, liberal ministers sat on the government benches; clegg became deputy prime minister. coalitions were relatively unfamiliar in britain and, against a background of economic crisis and a record budget deficit, many speculated that it would be short lived. yet the coalition provided stable government for a full five year term, managed a partial recovery in government finances and oversaw a faster rate of economic growth than any other g7 country at that time. key liberal democrat policies were implemented: a significant rise in the income tax threshold took an estimated three million low paid people out of tax altogether; the ‘pupil premium’ provided more resources for schools to teach children from deprived backgrounds; and significant investment was made in renewable energy. liberal democrat influence led to increases in the state pension, a higher priority to mental health, legislation for same sex marriage, the development of an industrial strategy, the creation of the world’s first green investment bank, and an expansion in the apprenticeship programme. in addition, liberal democrat ministers blocked or ameliorated conservative proposals that would otherwise have adversely affected workers’ rights, disability benefits, support for young people and immigration, together with a referendum on eu membership, and extensions to covert surveillance, policies which were promptly reinstated by the conservative government elected in 2015. the party’s constitutional reform agenda saw major failures, however, with a change in the voting system being defeated in a referendum, reform of the house of lords by a conservative rebellion, and party funding reform by conservative ministers’ desire to protect their own donors. offsetting these disappointments were the introduction of fixed term parliaments and the devolution of greater powers to scotland. the challenging economic climate, and the conservative party’s austerity programme, meant that difficult compromises had to be made. liberal democrat ministers fought, often successfully, to slow down or reverse cuts in public services and to soften their impact, but their efforts were not generally visible to the electorate. particularly damaging was the raising of university tuition fees, which led to a disastrous loss of trust in the party and its leadership, given the party’s consistent campaign against such fees; in 2010 all liberal democrat candidates had pledged to vote against any rise. support for the party fell sharply. between 2011 and 2015 every round of local elections saw hundreds of liberal democrat councillors lose their seats, and liberal democrat members were toppled in elections to the scottish parliament, the european parliament, and finally in the 2015 general election, when only 8 of the party’s 57 mps were re elected, on just 7.9 per cent of the vote. the morning after the 2015 general election, nick clegg resigned as leader of the party, being replaced by tim farron. despite the brutal election result, there were reasons to hope: the party saw an immediate surge in membership, as many people perceived that liberal values were under threat and that the party had been punished unfairly for participation in coalition. the liberal democrats campaigned strongly for a ‘remain’ vote in the referendum on britain’s membership of the eu in june 2016, in line with their historic beliefs. the narrow vote to leave, farron’s unequivocal statement, two days later, that the liberal democrats would fight the next election on the basis that the uk would be better off inside the eu, and his later call for a referendum on the final deal, gave hope to defeated remain voters and led to another surge in party membership. wider electoral support was slow to appear, however, and farron stepped aside after the liberal democrat vote fell further to 7.4 per cent in the 2017 election, despite a net gain of four mps. he was replaced by vince cable, a respected former cabinet minister. two years of parliamentary stalemate over the terms of the brexit deal led to a growing polarisation in the electorate, and the liberal democrats, fighting on a platform of ‘stop brexit’, surged to an unexpected second place in the euro elections in may 2019, ahead of both labour and the conservatives. the party also attracted several defecting mps from both other main parties. this spectacular success led to a degree of hubris, however, and the party overplayed its hand in the months that followed. neither the party’s message   mainly to reverse brexit   nor its new leader, jo swinson, proved popular in the general election of december 2019. although the party’s vote share rose to 11.6 per cent, the collapse in the labour vote left the conservatives with a sizeable overall majority. the liberal democrats gained three seats but lost four of those won in 2017, including, by just 149 votes, its leader’s. in 2020 ed davey thus became the party’s fifth leader in six years. he faced familiar problems in gaining media attention and recognition as head of the small fourth party at westminster but the party’s organisation and campaigning capacity was comprehensively overhauled, efforts which paid off in local and parliamentary by election successes as a succession of disastrous conservative prime ministers comprehensively undermined support for their government. while labour under keir starmer was the main beneficiary, a series of fortuitous by elections, often caused by allegations of misconduct by conservative mps, gave the liberal democrats four new mps and helped to raise the profile both of the party and its leader. when conservative prime minister rishi sunak unexpectedly called a general election in may 2024, the liberal democrats were well prepared. a variety of eye catching stunts involving davey were arranged to illustrate the central themes of the party programme; falling off a paddle board on lake windermere, for example, reflected public outrage at repeated sewage releases into rivers and lakes. the moving use of davey’s personal family story in an election broadcast helped to draw attention to liberal democrat demands to improve social care. the outcome of the election on 4 july 2024 was extraordinary. although the party’s share of the vote rose by less than 1 per cent, to 12.2 per cent, the unprecedented collapse in the conservative vote and a high degree of tactical voting by anti tory voters, coupled with a highly effective targeting of campaigning resources meant that, for the first time ever, the first past the post electoral system did not seriously disadvantage the party. the liberal democrats won 72 seats, the largest number for a century. traditional areas of strength in south west and northern england and northern scotland lost in 2015 were regained and joined by new seats in east anglia and, especially, in southern england. with substantial increases also in the reform and green votes, and a labour landslide delivered on only 33.7 per cent of the vote, british politics appears to be increasingly unsettled. in a strong position as the largest third party in the house of commons for a century, however, the liberal democrats are well placed to promote their vision and make a real difference to the country’s future. the liberal democrats will use your contact details to send you information on the topics you have requested. any data we gather will be used in accordance with our privacy policy at www.libdems.org.uk/privacy. to exercise your legal data rights, email: data.protection@libdems.org.uk. we take accessibility and your data privacy seriously. read our accessibility statement and cookie policy. promoted by the liberal democrats, 1 vincent square, london sw1p 2pn.website by prater raines. like most websites, this site uses cookies. some are required to make it work, while others are used for statistical or marketing purposes. if you choose not to allow cookies some features may not be available, such as content from other websites. please read our cookie policy for more information.

the tories were a loosely organised political faction and later a political party, in the parliaments of england, scotland, ireland, great britain and the united kingdom. they first emerged during the 1679 exclusion crisis, when they opposed whig efforts to exclude james, duke of york from the succession on the grounds of his catholicism. despite their fervent opposition to state sponsored catholicism, tories opposed his exclusion because of their belief that inheritance based on birth was the foundation of a stable society.[7] after the succession of george i in 1714, the tories had no part in government and ceased to exist as an organised political entity in the early 1760s (although the term continued to be used in subsequent years as a term of self description by some political writers). about twenty years later, a new tory party arose and participated in government between 1783 and 1830, with william pitt the younger followed by robert jenkinson, 2nd earl of liverpool.[8] the whigs won control of parliament in the 1831 election, which was fought largely on the issue of electoral reform, opposed by the tories. the representation of the people act 1832 removed the rotten boroughs, many of which were controlled by tories and the party was reduced to 175 mps in the 1832 elections. under the leadership of robert peel, who issued a policy document known as the tamworth manifesto, the tories began to transform into the conservative party. however, his repeal of the corn laws in 1846 caused the party to break apart; the faction led by the earl of derby and benjamin disraeli went on to become the modern conservative party, whose members are still commonly referred to as tories. as a political term, tory was an insult (derived from the middle irish word tóraidhe, modern irish tóraí, meaning "outlaw", "robber", from the irish word tóir, meaning "pursuit" since outlaws were "pursued men")[9][10] that entered english politics during the exclusion bill crisis of 1678 1681. whig (from whiggamore, a "cattle driver") was initially a scottish insult for the covenanter faction in scotland who opposed the engagers (a faction who supported charles i during the second english civil war) and supported the whiggamore raid that took place in september 1648.[11] while the whigs were those who supported the exclusion of james, the duke of york from the succession to thrones of scotland, england and ireland (the petitioners), the tories were those who opposed the exclusion bill (the abhorrers). in 1757, david hume wrote: the court party reproached their antagonists with their affinity to the fanatical conventiclers in scotland, who were known by the name of whigs: the country party found a resemblance between the courtiers and the popish banditti in ireland, to whom the appellation of tory was affixed. and after this manner, these foolish terms of reproach came into public and general use; and even at present seem not nearer their end than when they were first invented.[12] the first tory party traces its principles and politics to the english civil war which divided england between the cavaliers (supporters of king charles i) and the roundheads (the supporters of the long parliament upon which the king had declared war). this action resulted from the parliament not allowing him to levy taxes without yielding to its terms. at the beginning of the long parliament (1641), the king's supporters pursued a course of reform of previous abuses. the increasing radicalism of the parliamentary majority, however, estranged many reformers even in the parliament itself and drove them to make common cause with the king. the king's party was thus a mixture of supporters of royal autocracy and of those parliamentarians who felt that the long parliament had gone too far in attempting to gain executive power for itself and, more specifically, in undermining the episcopalian government of the church of england, which was felt to be a primary support of royal government. by the end of the 1640s, the radical parliamentary programme had become clear: reduction of the king to a powerless figurehead and replacement of anglican episcopacy with a form of presbyterianism. this prospective form of settlement was prevented by a coup d'état which shifted power from parliament itself to the parliamentary new model army, controlled by oliver cromwell. the army had king charles i executed and for the next 11 years the british kingdoms operated under military dictatorship. the restoration of king charles ii produced a reaction in which the king regained a large part of the power held by his father. however, charles' ministers and supporters in england accepted a substantial role for parliament in the government of the kingdoms. no subsequent british monarch would attempt to rule without parliament, and after the glorious revolution of 1688, political disputes would be resolved through elections and parliamentary manoeuvring, rather than by an appeal to force. charles ii also restored episcopacy in the church of england. his first cavalier parliament began as a strongly royalist body, and passed a series of acts re establishing the church by law and strongly punishing dissent by both roman catholics and non anglican protestants. these acts did not reflect the king's personal views and demonstrated the existence of a royalist ideology beyond mere subservience to the court. a series of disasters in the late 1660s and 1670s discredited charles ii's governments, and powerful political interests (including some who had been identified with the parliamentary side in the civil war) began to agitate for a greater role of parliament in government, coupled with more tolerance for protestant dissenters. these interests would soon coalesce as the whigs. as direct attacks on the king were politically impossible and could lead to execution for treason, opponents of the power of the court framed their challenges as exposés of subversive and sinister catholic plots. although the matter of these plots was fictitious, they reflected two uncomfortable political realities: first, that charles ii had (somewhat insincerely) undertaken measures to convert the kingdom to catholicism (in a 1670 treaty with louis xiv of france); second, that his younger brother and heir presumptive, james, duke of york, had in fact converted to catholicism, an act that many protestant englishmen in the 1670s saw as only one step below high treason. the whigs tried to link the lord lieutenant of ireland, the duke of ormonde, with the foremost irish tory, redmond o'hanlon, in a supposed plot to murder titus oates. the whig bishop of meath, henry jones, offered o'hanlon a pardon and a bribe if he would testify to parliament that ormonde was plotting a french invasion. in december 1680, the government seized these letters and the plan collapsed. in january 1681, the whigs first began calling the supposed irish plotters tories, and on 15 february 1681 is recorded the first complaint from an english royalist about the epithet tory by the anti exclusion newspaper heraclitus ridens: "[t]hey call me scurvy names, jesuit, papish, tory; and flap me over the mouth with their being the only true protestants".[13] within a few months, anti exclusionists were calling themselves tories and a northern dissenter called oliver heywood recorded in october: "ms. h. of chesterfield told me a gentleman was at their house and had a red ribband in his hat, she askt him what it meant, he said it signifyed that he was a tory, whats that sd she, he ans. an irish rebel,   oh dreadful that any in england dare espouse that interest. i hear further since that this is the distinction they make instead of cavalier and roundhead, now they are called torys and wiggs".[14] in a more general sense, the tories (also known as the court party) represented the more conservative royalist supporters of charles ii, who endorsed a strong monarchy as a counterbalance to the power of parliament, and who saw in the whig opponents of the court a quasi republican tendency (similar to that seen in the long parliament) to strip the monarchy of its essential prerogative powers and leave the crown as a puppet entirely dependent upon parliament. that the exclusion bill was the central question upon which parties diverged, did not hinge upon an assessment of the personal character of the duke of york (though his conversion to catholicism was the key factor that made the bill possible), but rather upon the power of parliament to elect a monarch of its own choosing, contrary to the established laws of succession. that the parliament, with the consent of the king, had such power was not at issue; rather, it was the wisdom of a policy of creating a king whose sole title to the crown was the will of parliament and who was essentially a parliamentary appointee. on this original question, the tories were in the short run entirely successful as the parliaments that brought in the exclusion bill were dissolved, charles ii was enabled to manage the administration autocratically and upon his death the duke of york succeeded without difficulty. the rebellion of monmouth, the candidate of the radical whigs to succeed charles ii, was easily crushed and monmouth himself executed. however, in the long run tory principles were to be severely compromised. besides the support of a strong monarchy, the tories also stood for the church of england, as established in acts of parliament following the restoration of charles ii, both as a body governed by bishops, using the book of common prayer whilst subscribing to a specific doctrine and also as an exclusive body established by law, from which both roman catholics and nonconformists were excluded. during his reign, james ii fought for a broadly tolerant religious settlement under which his co religionists could prosper a position anathema to conservative anglicans. james' attempts to use the government controlled church to promote policies that undermined the church's own unique status in the state led some tories to support the glorious revolution of 1688. the result was a king established solely by parliamentary title and subject to legal controls established by parliament, the principles that the tories had originally abhorred. the tories' sole consolation was that the monarchs chosen were close to the main line of succession as william iii was james ii's nephew and william's wife mary was james's elder daughter. the act of toleration 1689 also gave rights to protestant dissenters that were hitherto unknown, while the elimination of a large number of bishops who refused to swear allegiance to the new monarchs allowed the government to pack the episcopate with bishops with decidedly whiggish leanings. in both these respects the tory platform had failed, but the institutions of monarchy and of a state church survived. despite the failure of their founding principles, the tories remained a powerful political party during the reigns of the next two monarchs, particularly that of queen anne. during this time, the tories fiercely competed with the whigs for power, and there were frequent parliamentary elections in which the two parties measured their strength. william iii saw that the tories were generally more friendly to royal authority than the whigs, and he employed both groups in his government. his early ministry was largely tory, but the government gradually came to be dominated by the so called junto whigs. this tight knit political grouping was opposed by the country whigs led by robert harley, who gradually merged with the tory opposition in the later 1690s. although william's successor anne had considerable tory sympathies and excluded the junto whigs from power, after a brief and unsuccessful experiment with an exclusively tory government she generally continued william's policy of balancing the parties, supported by her moderate tory ministers, the duke of marlborough and lord godolphin. the stresses of the war of the spanish succession which begun in 1701 led most of the tories to withdraw into opposition by 1708, so that marlborough and godolphin were heading an administration dominated by the junto whigs. anne herself grew increasingly uncomfortable with this dependence on the whigs, especially as her personal relationship with the duchess of marlborough deteriorated. this situation also became increasingly uncomfortable to many of the non junto whigs, led by the duke of somerset and the duke of shrewsbury, who began to intrigue with robert harley's tories. in early 1710, the prosecution by the whig government of the ultra tory preacher henry sacheverell for sermons delivered the previous year, led to the sacheverell riots and brought the ministry into popular discredit. in the spring of 1710, anne dismissed godolphin and the junto ministers, replacing them with tories. the new tory ministry was dominated by harley, chancellor of the exchequer (later lord treasurer) and viscount bolingbroke, secretary of state. they were backed by a strong majority in the parliament elected in 1710, rallying under the banner of "church in danger". this tory government negotiated the treaty of utrecht in 1713, which pulled great britain out of the war of the spanish succession (to the dismay of britain's allies, including anne's eventual successor, george, elector of hanover); the peace was enacted despite a whig majority in the house of lords, which anne defeated by creating new tory peers. following a long disagreement between the ministers, anne dismissed harley in 1714. the arch tory bolingbroke became in effect anne's chief minister and tory power seemed to be at its zenith. however, anne was extremely ill and died within a few days. bolingbroke had not been able to formulate any coherent plans for dealing with the succession, for if he thought of proclaiming the son of james ii (the pretender) king, he made no moves to do so. the elector george succeeded to the throne entirely peacefully, supported by the hanoverian tory grouping. in accordance with succession to the crown act 1707, the queen's government was replaced by a council of regency until the new king should arrive from hanover. bolingbroke offered his services to the king but was coldly rejected; george i brought in a government composed entirely of whigs, and the new parliament, elected from january to may 1715, had a large whig majority. in december 1714 lord carnarvon wrote that "hardly one tory is left in any place, though never so mean a one".[15] the historian eveline cruickshanks stated that "[w]hat took place in 1715 was not a change to an all whig ministry, it was a whole social revolution".[16] for the first time, tory gentlemen could no longer employ their sons, as they traditionally had done, in public offices such as the army, navy, civil service and the church. tory officers in the army had their commissions taken away, tory lawyers could not now become judges or k.c.s. the predominantly tory lower anglican clergy could no longer become bishops and tory merchants were refused government contracts or directorships in any major company.[16] this proscription lasted for forty five years.[17] george lyttelton wrote in his letter to the tories (1747): we are kept out of all public employments of power and profit, and live like aliens and pilgrims in the land of our nativity; [...] no quality, no fortune, no eloquence, no learning, no wisdom, no probity is of any use to any man of our unfortunate denomination, ecclesiastic or layman, lawyer or soldier, peer or commoner, for obtaining the most deserved advancement in his profession, or any favour of the crown; whilst, to our additional and insupportable vexation, the bare merit of hating us, and everything we love and hold sacred, daily advances dunces in the law and church, cowards in our fleets and armies, republicans in the king's house, and idiots everywhere![18] the whig government, backed by royal favour and controlling the levers of power, was able to maintain a series of majorities through the infrequent elections of the next several decades (only 7 in the 46 years of the first two georges, as opposed to 11 in the 26 years from the revolution to the death of queen anne). for much of the period, the tories commanded a broad base of support in rural england, but the relatively undemocratic nature of the franchise and the maldistribution of the borough seats ensured that this popular appeal was never translated into a tory majority in parliament. the tories would have won every general election between 1715 and 1747 had the number of seats obtained corresponded to the number of votes cast.[18] the tories were, therefore, an effectively null factor in practical politics, a permanent minority in parliament and entirely excluded from government. the latter exclusion, and the rigid party politics played by the whigs, played a significant role in the cohesion of the tories; the whigs offered few opportunities for tories who switched sides, and as a party the tories found no possibilities for compromise with the whigs. the proscription of the tories alienated them from the hanoverian regime and converted many of them to jacobitism.[19] bolingbroke later wrote: "if milder measures had been pursued, certain it is that the tories had never universally embraced jacobitism. the violence of the whigs forced them into the arms of the pretender".[15] in october 1714, the french ambassador charles françois d'iberville noted that the number of jacobites in the tory party was increasing and in early 1715 he wrote that the tories seemed to be "heading for civil war which they regard as their only resort".[19] the former tory chief minister, lord oxford, was impeached and sent to the tower, with bolingbroke and the tory peer the duke of ormonde fleeing to france to join the pretender. a series of riots against the coronation of george i and the new hanoverian whig regime (in which the mob voiced their support for jacobitism and local tory parliamentary candidates) led to the whig government strengthening their power by passing the riot act, suspending habeas corpus and increasing the army (including by importing 6,000 dutch troops).[19] louis xiv had promised them arms but no troops, as france was exhausted by war, despite bolingbroke's claim that just one tenth of the number of troops william of orange brought with him in 1688 would have sufficed.[15] however, this promise of arms disappeared when louis died in september 1715. the conspirators intended to abandon the rising they had planned for the west country, but the scots forced their hand by unilaterally raising the pretender's standard. one of ormonde's agents betrayed the plans for an english rising and subsequently the government arrested many tory mps, ex mps and peers.[20] the subsequent jacobite rebellion of 1715 16 resulted in failure. however, charles xii of sweden was willing to aid the english tories by sending troops to put the pretender on the throne, in conjunction with an english rising. lord oxford, who had already in 1716 offered the pretender his services, directed the swedish plot from the tower. in january 1717, the government discovered this plot and won a vote of credit for defence measures against the projected invasion in the commons against tory opposition. charles' death in 1718 ended hopes from that quarter and ormonde's planned spanish invasion was destroyed by a storm at sea.[21] during the whig split of 1717, the tories refused to back either side and adopted the same stance to lord sunderland's overtures in 1720. nonetheless, their combined efforts helped the opposition win some victories, such as the defeat of the peerage bill in 1719. in 1722, sunderland advised the king to admit leading tories into government, thereby dividing them and ending their hopes for revenge by looking for support from abroad. he also advised the king in cabinet that elections to parliament should be free from government bribery, an idea sir robert walpole opposed due to the possibility of the election of a tory parliament. the king was also opposed: "king george stared the earl of sunderland in the face at the name of a tory parliament, for it seems nothing is so hideous and frightful to him as a tory".[22] the public outcry over the south sea bubble led the tories to believe that it would not be worthwhile raising funds for the general election, as they considered a jacobite rising would be successful considering the state of public opinion.[22] sunderland joined the tories in the atterbury plot, in which the pretender was to be put on the throne. a rising was planned for each county, assisted by irish and spanish troops. however, sunderland's death in april 1722 led to the government discovering the plot and it subsequently collapsed.[23] when the commons voted on the bill of pains and penalties against atterbury, nearly ninety per cent of tory mps voted against it.[24] although the whig prime minister robert walpole decided not to prosecute those tories that he knew were involved in the plot, the tories were demoralised and largely absented themselves from parliament for a time.[25] upon the accession of george ii in 1727 and the ensuing general election, the tories were reduced to 128 mps, their lowest total up to this point.[26] the tories were divided over whether to cooperate with the opposition whigs against walpole, with those in favour consisting of the hanoverian faction led by sir william wyndham and with those opposed making up the jacobite faction headed by william shippen.[26] most tories opposed voting with the opposition whigs, only reversing this stance when the pretender sent a letter to the tories in 1730, ordering them to "unite in the measures against the government and even with those who oppose it for different views than theirs".[27][28] for the next decade, the tories cooperated with the opposition whigs against walpole.[29] public admission of jacobitism was treason, so the tories challenged the hanoverian whig regime without specifically addressing it by developing a rhetoric borrowed from the whigs of the exclusion crisis; they denounced government corruption and the high taxation needed to spend on foreign entanglements, opposed the growth of the army and denounced "tyranny" and "arbitrary power".[30][31] in a speech on the army estimates, walpole claimed that "no man of common prudence will profess himself openly a jacobite; by so doing he not only may injure his private fortune, but he must render himself less able to do any effectual service to the cause he has embraced...your right jacobite, sir, disguises his true sentiments, he roars out for revolution principles; he pretends to be a great friend to liberty".[32] he further claimed that a large army was needed to defeat any possible jacobite invasion. in 1737, frederick, prince of wales applied to parliament for an increased allowance. this split the tories, with 45 abstaining, leading to the motion being defeated by 30 votes. bolingbroke, who wanted to dissociate the tories from jacobitism, denounced this as "the absurd behaviour of the tories, which no experience can cure".[29] in 1738 frederick's attempts to reconcile with the tories broke down on wyndham's insistence that he join the tories in favouring a reduced army.[29]with the outbreak of war against spain in 1739, there was renewed plotting amongst tories for a jacobite rising.[33] wyndham's death in 1740 led to the breakdown of the coalition between the tories and opposition whigs. an opposition whig motion for walpole's dismissal was defeated by 290 to 106, with many tories abstaining.[34] at the general election of 1741, there were 136 tories elected.[35] the tories resumed their cooperation with the opposition whigs after receiving another letter from the pretender in september 1741, ordering them to "pursue vigorous and unanimous measures in the next session of parliament. [...] they will probably have many occasions of greatly distressing the present government and ministry and perhaps find some who will concur with them in that, though not out of goodwill to my cause. [...] in such cases i hope my friends will make no scruples in joining heartily with them for whatever their particular motives may be anything that tends to the disadvantage of the present government and to the bringing it into confusion cannot be but of advantage to my cause".[36][37] as a result, 127 tories joined the opposition whigs in successfully voting against walpole's nominated chairman of the elections committee in december 1741.[36] the tories continued to vote against walpole with the opposition whigs in subsequent divisions until walpole was forced to resign in february 1742.[38] the pretender wrote to the tories afterwards, declaring: "i cannot delay any longer expressing to you my satisfaction at the late behaviour of my friends in parliament, and i take it as a great mark of their singular regard for what i wrote to you some months ago".[39] in 1743, war broke out between britain and france, as part of the larger war of the austrian succession. later that year francis sempill, the pretender's representative at the french court, carried a message from english tories to the french secretary of state for foreign affairs (jean jacques amelot de chaillou) requesting french help for a stuart restoration (including 10,000 french soldiers). it was signed by the duke of beaufort (one of the four richest people in britain), lord barrymore, lord orrery, sir watkin williams wynn, sir john hynde cotton and sir robert abdy.[40] amelot replied that the french government would need considerable proof of english support for jacobitism before it could act.[41] james butler, louis xv's master of horse, toured england ostensibly for purchasing bloodstock but in reality to gauge the health of jacobitism in england, visiting leading tories.[42] before he left for england. the french king briefed him personally to assure tory leaders that all of their demands would be met.[43] in november 1743 amelot told sempill officially that louis xv was resolved to restore the house of stuart and that he was planning a french invasion headed by the pretender's son, charles edward stuart.[44] the "declaration of king james" (written by tory leaders) was signed by the pretender on 23 december. this was to be published in the event of a successful french landing.[45] however, the whig government was informed by a spy of the intended french invasion and king george told parliament on 15 february 1744 that a french invasion was planned, assisted by "disaffected persons from this country". the house of commons passed a loyal address by 287 to 123.[46] the tories' insistence for the house to divide on this occasion seemed to the government a design by the tories "to show the french what numbers in the house they might depend on".[47] the tories also opposed increasing the armed forces, it being noted "that none of the leaders amongst the tories, either on this occasion or that of the king's first message, showed the least sign of zeal or affection to the government".[47] on 24 february, a storm scattered the french invasion fleet and suspected jacobites were arrested, leading to the french government cancelling their planned invasion.[48] charles stuart, who was still in france and determined to start a jacobite rising, looked to scotland. however, the english tories would only support a rising in scotland if accompanied by a french invasion near london to aid the english tories in their own rising.[49] the english tories repeatedly told the jacobite court that only regular soldiers invading at the same time as their rising could achieve a stuart restoration.[50] in december 1744, the broadbottom administration was formed, which included a handful of tories in minor offices. some other tories were offered places, but those serving for jacobite counties "could not hazard a new election and therefore decline[d] the acceptance of them".[51] one of the tories who accepted office, sir john cotton, did not swear the oath of loyalty to king george and informed the french king that he still favoured a jacobite french invasion; he added that the tories in office would try to ensure that more british soldiers were sent to flanders from england in order to help a french invasion.[51] after lord gower took office in this government, the tories no longer looked to him as their leader as lyttleton wrote that "when it was discovered that gower was really a friend to the hanover succession, the tories discarded him for being their leader, and adopted a determined jacobite the duke of beaufort in his stead".[52] in june 1745, the tory leaders in the commons, wynn and cotton (together with beaufort), informed the jacobite court that "if the prince [charles] lands in present circumstances with ten battalions or even smaller body of troops there will be no opposition".[53] tory leaders sent robert maccarty to france with a request for 10,000 troops and 30,000 arms to be landed in england, where they would join them upon arrival.[53] charles travelled to scotland in july without consulting the tories or the french and without a sizeable body of troops.[54] after his landing, sempill wrote: "the city of london, sir john hynde cotton, lord barrymore, the duke of beaufort, and all the english cry loudly and vehemently for a body of troops to be landed near london, as the most effectual means to support the prince". they could not rise for the prince without "a body of troops to support them", but they "would join the prince if his highness could force his way to them".[55] throughout the jacobite rising of 1745, charles could not establish contact with the english tories.[56] captain nagle, who had visited a peer in london, reported in december that they were all being monitored by the government, but that they would declare for charles if he made his way to london or if the french invaded.[57] however, charles retreated from england and the french never landed, so the english tories did not feel safe in coming out for the pretender. after the collapse of the rising, charles' captured secretary, john murray of broughton, informed the government of the tories' conspiracy with the pretender. the government decided not to prosecute them.[58] the trial of the scottish rebel lords in london was boycotted by most tory peers.[59] after the duke of cumberland's brutal suppression of the scots, english tories adopted the plaid as their symbol.[60] eveline cruickshanks in her study of the 1715 1754 tory party for the history of parliament, stated that "the available evidence leaves no doubt that up to 1745 the tories were a predominantly jacobite party, engaged in attempts to restore the stuarts by a rising with foreign assistance".[61] sir lewis namier noticed that for the reigns of george i and george ii, tory family papers are non existent.[62] as papers from before 1715 and after 1760 survive, cruickshanks contends that these families were hiding their jacobite leanings by destroying incriminating papers. a nineteenth century historian who had examined many collections such as these, claimed that it was "the custom in jacobite days to destroy all letters with any hint of political or religious feeling in them".[63] however, some historians (such as linda colley) have questioned the tories' commitment to jacobitism.[64] in 2016, frank o'gorman noted that given the nature of the evidence, it is unlikely that the question will ever be answered, but added that "judged by the acid test of how they behaved in the '15 and '45 most tories showed themselves to be hanoverian and not jacobite".[65] in 1747, prince frederick invited the tories "to unite and coalesce with him" and declared his intention that when he became king, he would "abolish...all distinction of the party" and put an end to the proscription of the tories. a meeting of leading tories (including beaufort, wynn and cotton) accepted the prince's offer and replied assuring him of their support for his "wise and salutary purposes". however, they refused to pledge themselves to a coalition with whigs.[58] the 1747 general election resulted in only 115 tory mps being elected, their lowest figure up until this point.[58] after jacobite riots in oxford in 1748, the government wanted to give the king the power to nominate the chancellor of the university of oxford, which was considered a hotbed of jacobitism and toryism. thomas carte wrote to the pretender that "the attempt against the university of oxford brought them all up at once to town, which nothing else would, and in their zeal on that account, they entered into a sort of coalition with prince frederick's party to stand by the university of oxford, to join in opposing all unconstitutional points, but to be under no obligation to visit prince frederick's court, nor unite in other points".[66] after wynn's death in 1749, a jacobite agent reported to the pretender that the tory party was "without a head", dispirited and frightened.[66] in 1751 frederick died, followed in 1752 by cotton. this effectively ended opposition in parliament for the rest of the session.[66] horace walpole, in his memoirs for 1764, wrote of the decline of the tory party: hitherto it might be said that the two parties of whig and tory still subsisted; though jacobitism, the concealed mother of the latter, was extinct...the subsequent contests were rather a struggle for power than the settled animosity of two parties, though the body of opposition still called itself whig, an appellation rather dropped than disclaimed by the court; and though the real tories still adhered to their own distinctions while they secretly favoured, sometimes opposed, the court, and fluctuated accordingly as they esteemed particular chiefs not of their connection or had the more agreeable opportunity of distressing those who supported the cause of freedom. as their whole conduct was comprised in silent votes, and never was considerable enough to turn a single scale in the political changes, i shall seldom mention them anymore.[67] dickinson reports the following: all historians are agreed that the tory party declined sharply in the late 1740s and 1750s and that it ceased to be an organized party by 1760. the research of sir lewis namier and his disciples [...] has convinced all historians that there were no organized political parties in parliament between the late 1750s and the early 1780s. even the whigs ceased to be an identifiable party, and parliament was dominated by competing political connections, which all proclaimed whiggish political views, or by independent backbenchers unattached to any particular group.[68] upon the accession of george iii, the old political distinctions dissolved. the whig factions became in effect distinct parties (such as the grenvillites and the bedfordites), all of whom claimed the whig mantle, while the material distinction in politics was between the "king's friends" who supported the newly activist role of george iii in government, and those who opposed the king. the proscription on the employment of tories in government offices ended, which resulted in the tories dividing into several factions and ceasing to function as a coherent political party. sentimental toryism remained, as in the writings of samuel johnson, but in politics "tory" was little more than an unfriendly epithet for politicians closely identified with george iii. the label "tory" was in this sense applied to the prime ministers lord bute (1762 1763) and lord north (1770 1782), but these politicians considered themselves whigs. in his study of the debates in parliament for 1768 1774, pdg thomas discovered that not a single politician labelled themselves a tory.[69] jcd clark similarly argues: "the history of the tory party in parliament between the early 1760s and the late 1820s may be simply written: it did not exist".[70] applied by their opponents to parliamentary supporters of the younger william pitt (1783 1801, 1804 1806), the term tories came to represent the political current opposed to the old whigs and the radicalism unleashed by the american and french revolutions. this was reinforced by the breakup of the whig party in 1794 when the conservative group led by the duke of portland joined pitt's ministry, leaving an opposition rump led by charles james fox. the historian jcd clark has written of the 1790s: "it cannot be too clearly stressed that no public figure at that date accepted the title 'tory', and that they had the best reasons for denying its appropriateness".[71] pitt rejected the tory label, preferring to refer to himself as an independent whig, for he believed in the current constitutional arrangement as being well balanced, without particular favour towards the royal prerogative, unlike the tories of the first half of the 18th century. the group surrounding pitt the younger came to be the dominant force in british politics from 1783 until 1830 and, after pitt's death (1806), the ministers in the portland ministry (1807 1809) called themselves the "friends of mr pitt" rather than tories. portland's successor, spencer perceval (prime minister, 1809 1812), never adopted the label of tory and, after his assassination in 1812, the members of the government of lord liverpool (1812 1827) firmly rejected it in a ministerial memorandum to the prince regent: it is almost unnecessary to observe that the british government had for more than a century been and could only be a whig government; and that the present administration is, as every administration in this country must necessarily be, a whig administration. for a whig government means now, as it has all along meant, nothing else than a government established by laws equally binding upon the king and the subject.[72] generally, the tories were associated with lesser gentry, the church of england and the episcopal church in scotland while whigs were more associated with trade, money, larger land holders or land magnates and the nonconformist protestant churches. both were still committed to the political system in place at that time. the new tory party was distinct both in composition and ideological orientation from the old. it consisted largely of former whigs, alienated from the party that now bore that name. while it maintained a sentimental and conservative respect for the symbolic institutions of the british monarchy, in practice tory ministries allowed the king no more freedom than whig ones. the incompetence of george iii's personal interventions in policy had been sufficiently shown in the american war (1775 1783), henceforward his active role was limited to negations of government policies such as the catholic emancipation. in foreign policy, the differences were even more marked as the old tory party had been pacific and isolationist whereas the new one was bellicose and imperialistic. the tories became associated with repression of popular discontent after 1815, but the tories later underwent a fundamental transformation under the influence of robert peel, who was an industrialist rather than a landowner. peel in his 1834 tamworth manifesto outlined a new conservative philosophy of reforming ills while conserving the good. the subsequent peel administrations have been labelled conservative rather than tory, but the older term remains in use. when the conservative party split in 1846 on the issue of free trade (namely, the repeal of the corn laws), the protectionist wing of the party rejected the conservative label. they preferred to be known as protectionists or even to revive the older tory as an official name. by 1859 the peelites (peel's conservative supporters) joined the whigs and radicals to form the liberal party. the remaining tories, under the leadership of the earl of derby (a former whig) and disraeli (once a radical candidate for parliament), adopted the conservative label as the official name of their party.

an official website of the united states government official websites use .gov a .gov website belongs to an official government organization in the united states. secure .gov websites use https a lock ( lock locked padlock icon ) or https:// means you've safely connected to the .gov website. share sensitive information only on official, secure websites. primary site navigation logged in as: corresponding author. accepted 2022 jul 22. this article is made available via the pmc open access subset for unrestricted research re use and secondary analysis in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. these permissions are granted for the duration of the world health organization (who) declaration of covid 19 as a global pandemic. the scottish national party (snp) has emerged as one of the most successful national regional parties in europe. yet the snp was a fringe group for most of its history, with limited organization and electoral viability. what explains its ascent? drawing on archival research and interviews with former party officials, this article argues that key developments that positioned the party for its current success took place in the 1970s, decades before its electoral climb. it was during this time the party established its organizational structure, social democratic ideology, and centre left policy orientation, but without establishing the links to collateral organizations in scottish society that had been crucial for winning elections. the article argues that it was, paradoxically, the absence of such linkages that served to accelerate the party’s rise in the 2000s, as secularization and deindustrialization weakened the socio economic foundations of the scottish conservative party, with its close ties to the church of scotland, and, more significantly, of the labour party, which saw its trade union base deteriorate. under these conditions, the snp was uniquely positioned to capture unaligned voters, recruit party leaders, and take advantage of the new constitutional environment created by the establishment of the scottish parliament in 1999. keywords: scottish politics, snp, scottish labour party, scottish conservative and unionist party, mass party model, organizational linkage by any standard the rise of the scottish national party (snp) has been remarkable. following decades of uneven electoral performance, the party has emerged in the 2000s as the dominant force in scottish politics, establishing itself as the largest party in the scottish parliament and the largest holder of scottish seats in the uk parliament, where its forty five mps make it the third largest party in the house of commons. the snp outperformed its rivals for the fourth consecutive time in the 2021 scottish parliament elections and has announced plans for a second independence referendum, which it hopes to hold in 2023. the scottish conservative and labour parties, which dominated scottish politics for most of the twentieth century, have fallen distantly behind the snp, with neither capable of mounting a genuine challenge to it in the last decade. what explains the ascendancy of the snp to the top of the scottish political mountain? in addressing this question, scholars have highlighted a variety of constitutional, political, electoral, and organizational factors. while recognizing the merits of these perspectives, this article takes an explanatory approach rooted in scotland’s political history. it argues that a key element of the present day success of the snp is to be found in the nature of scottish parties’ past relationships to scottish society. drawing on conceptions of political linkage and collateral organizations from political parties’ literature and utilizing party documents, including the papers of the snp executive committee available at the national library of scotland (nls) (acc. 11987) and materials in the snp library at the party’s headquarters, as well as some fifteen semi structured interviews with current and former snp and labour party officials, trade union leaders, and interest group representatives, conducted in person or remotely between 2018 and 2022, the article highlights the outcomes of a set of key debates and developments within the snp in the 1970s. this was a crucial period in which the party sought to transform itself from a fringe movement with little chance of obtaining political power to a modern party that could viably contest elections. part of this effort included attempts to anchor the party in scottish society and establish integrated links with organizations that could provide it with durable mass support, much as its tory and labour rivals had done earlier. this effort proved largely unsuccessful and contributed in the near term to deepening discord within the party, characterized by the rise of internal factions and external irrelevance, as the party saw its electoral support plummet after 1979. in the long term, however, the party’s inability to establish these links would actually help create conditions for its later ascendency, allowing the snp to re establish itself as a centrist catch all party better positioned by the 2000s than its rivals to appeal to a wide array of scotland’s increasingly de aligned electorate. the article finds that the snp proved to be inadvertently a party ahead of its time. the decades since the second world war have been marked by three broad periods of party dominance in scotland. the first in the 1950s was characterized by the success of the scottish conservative (then the scottish unionist) party, whose performance in three consecutive general elections in the 1950s helped propel the uk tories to 13 years of uninterrupted government control. labour ascended to the top position in the longer second period, which ran from 1964 until 2010. in every general election in that period, scottish labour obtained a greater vote share than any other party, and never held fewer than 56% of scottish seats at westminster. scottish mps held several high profile ministerial positions in labour governments, including, most notably, the office of prime minister, occupied by gordon brown, mp for kirkcaldy and cowdenbeath, from 2007 to 2010. the third period has been marked by the overwhelming electoral achievement of the snp. the party’s success in gaining seats at westminster had been scant since its “breakout” in the 1974 general elections, when it obtained nearly 30% of the scottish vote while increasing its mp delegation from one to 11. in the six general elections held from 1979 to 2001, the snp never held more than six of scotland’s 72 parliamentary seats. while its seat share increased following the redrawing of scotland’s constituencies in 2005 and the decline in scottish mps from 72 to 59, the party still obtained less than 10% of the scottish seats in the 2005 and 2010 uk parliamentary elections. everything would change with the 2015 general election, when the snp captured a stunning 56 of 59 seats, leaving labour, the tories, and the liberal democrats with only a single mp each. the snp vote share in the election jumped a remarkable 31% from its 2010 share, with the party obtaining 50% of total scottish votes. although the snp dropped to 35 seats and 37% the vote share in the snap election called by theresa may in 2017, it rebounded in 2019, claiming 48 seats and 45% of the vote. the table below documents the vote and seat shares for the four major parties in scotland in the uk general elections between 1945 and 2019. a similar shift to the snp has been evident in the scottish parliament, where the snp’s ascent began nearly a decade earlier than at westminster. under the mixed additional member electoral system adopted for the parliament, the snp has managed to maintain uninterrupted control over the devolved scottish government since 2007 and since 2011 has garnered a vote share greater than the combined share of the tories and labour in the constituency votes and nearly as great on the regional lists. interest in explaining support for the snp extends back to the party’s initial surge of electoral success that began in the 1960s (hanham 1969; mclean 1970) and continued in the 1970s (jaensch 1976; brand 1978). the party’s more recent and more dramatic electoral triumphs have likewise elicited a range of proposed explanations. an obvious starting point for explaining the snp’s success in the 2000s involves the rising share of scots in favour of an independent scottish state. yet snp and independence support have not always tracked one another. in 2007, when the party first bested labour to win a plurality of the vote share in the scottish parliamentary elections, support for independence was actually lower (24%) than in 1999 (27%), when labour beat the snp by 10%. and while support for independence stood at 39% by the time of the 2015 uk general election, this figure was still only 4% higher than the comparable figure in 2005, when the snp earned only 6 seats on a 17.7% vote share (curtis 2016, p. 5; house of commons library 2021; scottish parliament 2021). while heightened levels of independence support alone may not explain the snp’s success, it is possible that the party increased its vote share by consolidating the votes of independence backers. johns and mitchell (2016) argue that a rising number of voters came to see constitutional questions as crucial for their voting intention after the referendum, and overwhelmingly cast ballots for the snp in 2015, even, as the authors point out, when their specific constitutional preferences (such as greater powers for the scottish parliament within the union) better matched the policy positions of a different party. fieldhouse et al. (2019) make a similar claim, arguing that the independence referendum was an electoral shock that altered the basic political alignments in scotland by making it difficult for independence supporters to reconcile voting yes in the referendum with supporting a unionist party in the general election. as constitutional issues grew in importance to voters, the snp’s success was clearly facilitated by the presence of a first past the post electoral system for westminster and its partial use for holyrood. despite more scottish voters choosing labour, tory, or liberal democratic candidates in the 2017 and 2019 general elections and the 2021 scottish parliament election, the snp nevertheless triumphed easily because the unionist constituency votes were split three ways. perspectives on the snp’s rise in the 2000s and particularly its victories in 2007 and 2015 have also focused on the changing constitutional and political context in scotland after 1999 and the party’s responses to these changes. bennie (2016, p. 22) traces the relationship between devolution and the snp’s successes at both holyrood and westminster, arguing that the creation of the scottish parliament was “the catalyst” for the party’s growth. mitchell et al. (2012, p. 1) also cite the importance of the constitutional changes in the 1990s for the party’s 2007 victory, but additionally emphasize changes within the party, arguing that an organizational evolution took place in the early 2000s through which the snp had developed a pragmatic policy agenda, a clear centre left orientation, and in contrast to the other scottish parties a growing bloc of members who could provide financial backing and candidates for campaigns. camp similarly highlights factors internal to the party in explaining its success in scottish parliament elections, but notes that the snp also improved its organization in the 1990s with no obvious electoral benefits at the time. instead, she emphasizes a combination of organizational improvements and the adoption of more efficient electioneering methods by 2007, including “post modern” tactics such as the use of websites and computerized databases with voter profiles and contact information (2014, p. 5). valence models emphasizing the perceived competence of the snp once it took office have also been invoked in explanations for the party’s success. johns et al. (2013, p. 175), for example, describe the 2011 scottish parliamentary election, as “a clear case of what has been dubbed “performance politics’… voters elected an snp majority government because enough of them deemed the party likelier than its rivals to do a good job in office.” combined with a scottish labour party in decline and a growing perception that the snp alone among scottish parties would “stand up” for scottish interests in the uk, the snp’s performance in office after 2007, they argue, helped to lead the party to its majority victory in 2011. these explanations provide much that is helpful in understanding the snp’s successes in the 2000s. yet they reflect a tendency to view the party’s development as an electorally  relevant force in scotland in terms of three distinct and disconnected eras, with the first covering the party from the 1960s through its losses in the 1979 general election, the second its “wilderness years” of mediocre electoral performances in the 1980s and 1990s, and the third beginning with the party’s “rebirth” after the creation of the scottish parliament in 1999. for this periodization, developments in each era are frequently viewed as disconnected from one another, with their end dates serving as moments at which politics were seemingly restarted afresh for the snp. this article, by contrast, argues in favour of a historical perspective that looks across these temporal boundaries to developments before 1979 that would help make possible the snp ascendency after 1999. histories of the snp have examined the party’s evolution in the 1960s and 1970s, highlighting in particular the growth in party membership, the formulation of detailed policies, and the contesting and winning of elections at both the national and local levels (brand 1978; lynch 2013). in many ways, however, the most enduring legacy of this period involved not what the party accomplished but instead what it did not achieve. the capacity of the party after 1999 to respond to external conditions and to make internal adjustments emphasized in the explanations discussed above were facilitated by the fact that the snp unlike the main uk political parties in scotland never became strongly linked to organizational actors in scottish society. this absence of organizational linkage was in some instances the result of calculated decisions by the party leadership but in others it resulted from an inability of the party to create it, despite deliberate efforts. the snp would find itself as a consequence of this “unlinked” status uniquely positioned among scottish parties to capture by the 2000s an increasingly de aligned scottish electorate. in considering the snp’s relationship to scottish society this article draws on the concept of political linkage in comparative literature on political parties. according to poguntke, parties can create links to voters in two primary ways. first, they may seek to communicate with them directly through different forms of media, political marketing, and mass communication, adjusting their policies to suit preferences identified among voters; second, they may aim to connect to voters through organizational mediators, which “select and aggregate relevant grievances into reasonably coherent packages of political demands” (2002, p. 45). the policy choices and ideological positioning for a party that is organizationally linked are thus determined not by party leaders alone, but in tandem with organization members. while the direct type of linkage is more closely associated with newer political party types, such as green parties, organizational linkage served as a key component of the mass party model that dominated the west european party system into the 1960s. in this era, large parties were structured primarily around countries’ core socioeconomic cleavages, and intermediary organizations were often a critical source of durable political support. successful electoral campaigns for mass parties frequently depended more on mobilizing a party’s established constituencies than winning new converts. intermediaries whether a party’s own membership bodies or “collateral” groups formally external to the party itself could also provide both leaders and rank and file members and even shape a mass party’s basic identity and culture. among the key collateral groups in this respect were organized religion for centre right parties and organized labour for centre left parties; both groups served as crucial social bases for their respective political allies during the twentieth century (wren and mcelwain 2007). european party systems have undergone significant changes since the 1960s and parties no longer conform to the mass party model. the factors driving this shift are varied and complex, but include the economic growth of the 1950s and 1960s, the rise of the post war welfare state, secularization, technological advances, and greater social mobility, all of which helped to erode the sharp social boundaries and collective identities that served to define the mass party era (wren and mcelwain 2007, p. 568; van biezen and poguntke 2014, p. 206; mainwairing and mcgraw 2019, p. 676). these developments also weakened the durable and dependable connections with a small number of large scale organizations that anchored parties in society. as van biezen and poguntke write, “the traditional, almost exclusive reliance of mass parties on specific collateral (religious or trade union) organizations was replaced by a more contingent and instrumental relationship to a larger variety of interest groups characterized by weaker and less regular party ties” (2014, p. 206). such relationships characterized the catch all party model, in which leaders displayed increasing authority and autonomy from societal groups and could more freely adapt a party’s ideological and policy orientation in an effort to garner votes from across the socio economic spectrum (kirchheimer 1966; poguntke 2006). the emergence of the catch all party would be associated with a range of broader changes in electoral politics in west european systems, including declining voter turnout, greater electoral volatility, and weaker party identification (van biezen and poguntke 2014). these patterns of change were reflected in the political dynamics of post war scotland. as parties organized largely though not exclusively around the country’s socio economic cleavage, the scottish labour and tory parties demonstrated the basic features of the organizationally linked, mass party model. although neither party had a mass membership organization of the type seen in countries such as sweden and germany,both parties relied on deep links to collateral organizations for their success. as the sections that follow detail, it was the scottish tories’ relationship with the protestant churches and the church of scotland in particular that helped them to mobilize the voters (frequently across class lines) that propelled their run of electoral triumphs in the 1950s, while labour’s deep and long standing connection to scottish organized labour and specifically the scottish trades union congress (stuc) was a crucial component of the party’s decades long electoral reign. for many in the party leadership in the late 1960s and 1970s, the snp’s core objective of capturing a majority of scottish seats in westminster and demanding from the uk government a scottish parliament with full control over scottish affairs necessitated that it also aspire to the mass party model, including creating the same types of links to organized actors in scottish society that the other parties held. for reasons discussed below, this effort ultimately failed to produce the desired outcome and the snp would enter the 1980s effectively as disconnected from scottish society as it had been in the 1960s. yet this lack of linkage would actually help to facilitate the rise of the party in the 2000s. the scottish conservative and labour parties both experienced periods of electoral dominance in the post war decades, with scotland’s primary religious and trade union bodies serving as organizations linked to their respective party allies. the strength of these links was such that to some observers post war scotland resembled a “semi pillarization” model of the type witnessed in countries such as the netherlands, “with class and religion and the associated organization and group structures forming the mainstays of support for the main parties” (mctavish 2016, p. 59). the dynamics of these links for each party is explored below. the tory electoral sweep of the 1950s was rooted in support not only from traditional middle class voters, but also a large section of the working class with ties to the church of scotland. the church of scotland was arguably the most significant collateral intermediary of the tory party during this period, but it was not the only one. conservatives held long standing ties to scottish heavy industries that dominated employment in the country into the post war era. this close relationship would deteriorate as these industries would lose their place in scotland’s economy, upended by the rise of the service sector and branch plant manufacturing frequently with foreign ownership (see mctavish 2016). the kirk’s influence in the country reached new heights in that decade, with some 46% of scots reporting a formal connection with the church in 1956, close to the peak connection level of 51% registered in 1905 (walker 2012, p. 593). in the 1950s, brown writes, “scotland remained in the grip of a puritan culture moulded by its presbyterian heritage” and the church viewed its greatest challenge at the time, “not in secularism but in other religions, and especially roman catholicism” (1997, p. 1). the links between the scottish tories and the established church were particularly strong during this period; the church of scotland, kidd (2012, p. 63), writes “resembled the scottish conservatives at prayer,” and members of the tory party regularly sat on its church and nation committee, which had been founded in 1919 to represent the church’s views on various political and social issues (brown 1991, p. 601). this connection was critical for the post war electoral success of the scottish tories, which was driven largely by the party’s ability to win working class protestant voters who still shared a british sense of national identity, with the protestant faith, orangeism, and unionism at its centre (kendrick and mccrone 1989, p. 595). the organizational linkage between the scottish tories and the church of scotland continued to provide the party with electoral rewards into the first half of the 1960s. around this time, however, a set of social and cultural changes would weaken the organizational foundation of tory support in the country. foremost among these was a remarkably swift and widespread experience of secularization; by 1963, public participation in religion fell to its lowest level in the century (brown 1997, p. 1). this decline would continue for the next four decades, with religion becoming less determinative of voting behaviour in scotland, particularly among protestants (see field 2001; finlay 2004). these developments would hold profound electoral consequences for the tories.to be sure, scotland’s secularization was not the sole cause of the tory decline in the country; the failure of the party to adapt to changing socio economic conditions, recruit effective leadership, and distinguish itself from the increasingly unpopular uk party after the 1960s were also crucial. nevertheless, seen first among the traditionally tory middle classes, the declining conservative vote share was accelerated by a deterioration in the party’s working class support, particularly in the west of scotland, which benefitted labour (mctavish 2016; torrance 2012, p. 37). during this period, conservatives could not rely on the other major confessional group to make up the difference; although scotland’s roman catholic minority maintained comparatively higher levels of church affiliation in these decades, its historically weak enthusiasm for the tories persisted (bennie et al. 1997, p. 114). beyond the effects of secularization on support for the scottish tories were changes in the attitudes of the kirk itself, which had begun, finlay writes, “to reflect the more leftist and socially aware attitudes of society in general” (2004, p. 287). for the tories, this meant they would frequently find themselves on opposite sides from the church on major issues in the post war period, such as devolution and decolonization (hutchison 2001, p. 102; walker 2020, p. 326). this split would become particularly pronounced during the thatcher years, when the church made clear its opposition the individualist, laissez faire orientation of uk government policies. overall scottish support for the conservatives plummeted during the thatcher/major governments, falling from 22 seats in the 1979 general election to zero in 1997 when new labour ended the conservatives long reign at westminster. the clearest beneficiary from the changes into the 1960s was the labour party in scotland, which would dominate scottish electoral politics for the next four decades. as knox writes, “with the destruction among potential supporters of previously strong ideological and religious barriers, labour, enjoying mass support, began to reconstruct scotland into a kind of political fiefdom” (1999, p. 300). labour certainly benefitted from fortunate timing. the collateral organizations to which scottish labour held its most durable links namely scottish trade unions were growing in members and influence in the 1960s and 1970s just as involvement in the church of scotland was declining. as hutchison (2001), notes, this growth held two consequences for scottish labour: “first, [the party] retained in a more intact form its core institutional support base, namely the unions… secondly, the rise of union membership of course meant a great accession of cash and assistance for the party” (136). labour relied almost exclusively on its trade union connections for financial and electoral support during this period, with little backing coming from individual members, who were at any rate too few in numbers to make such provision. a “paradox” of labour cited by hassan and shaw (2012, p. 229) was the fact that during its decades of success in scotland it was never a mass membership party. of the ten regions into which the uk labour was segmented, party membership in scotland was the lowest and had been in decline since the 1950s. in this way, labour differed from the social democratic party class model, which viewed its membership as the primary source of establishing a common political identity and linking the party to society (see hassan and shaw 2012, pp. 229 230). yet the party did not need a large membership to be successful: scottish trade unions could serve as an “alternative” to mass membership (236). not only were affiliated trade unions represented in all sections of the party, but union organisation assumed an autonomous form in scotland. the influential scottish trades union congress, to which most unions were affiliated …well into the 1980s had a massive membership… scottish labour was always heavily dependent on its union affiliates, with relations between the party and union elites assuming the form of mutual inter dependence. (hassan and shaw 2012, pp. 226 227) a set of developments over the next few decades would serve to diminish profoundly the benefits of organizational linkage with the unions that scottish labour had enjoyed and contribute to its electoral decline in the 2000s. the first was the loss of jobs in the manufacturing sectors that had historically provided the stuc its members. in 1951, 35.9% of employment in scotland was located in manufacturing but by 2000 this share had fallen to 14.1%. from a high of nearly 1.1 million in 1980, stuc membership fell to just under 690,000 in 1997, with overall unionization rates in scotland likewise falling from 55% in 1980 to 32.5% in 2001 (hassan and shaw 2012, p. 7). “the stuc and its affiliates,” aitken writes, “seemed to be shut out of most of the scottish economy’s growth sectors and worryingly reliant for its membership on declining traditional industries” (1997, pp. 285 286). in this wider context, the stuc and labour would begin to diverge in terms of policy, strategy, and ultimately linkage. the presence of a common enemy in tory governments helped to hold the two together during the long period of conservative rule in london between 1979 and 1997, but the relationship would face deep challenges with the introduction of new labour and the emergence of tony blair as the national party leader in 1994. while blair’s centrist approach may have opened new electoral opportunities for the party in england, the policies of the “old” labour continued to be popular in scotland. the perception in scotland of labour as a party that defends working class interests plummeted in blair’s first years as prime minister, falling from 97% in 1997 to 53% in 1999 (lynch 2009, p. 631). antagonism to trade unions in scotland was less marked than in england and many scottish union leaders, irvine writes, “privately denounced blair as a tory” as the stuc increasingly felt its concerns were ignored under new labour (2004, p. 225). although union leadership in scotland in the 1990s continued to be dominated by labour party members, these figures were seen by many rank and file members as disconnected and subservient to the uk party in london (interview with former trade union official, 2021). by the time the scottish parliament opened in 1999, the ties had kept trade unions linked with labour had begun to fray. increasingly, the unions adopted a more issue based approach to politics that involved reaching out to other scottish political parties, including the snp. into the 1990s, the relationship between the stuc and the snp was, in the words of a former trade union official, “hostile to non existent,” but as labour’s support in the country softened in the early 2000s and the number of union members favouring independence increased, many in the stuc were willing to rethink their position (interview with former trade union official, 2021). by the 2007 scottish parliamentary elections, the party had lost the support of several key stuc affiliates, including the public sector unions pcs scotland and unison, and was struggling win the backing of the stuc general council. although labour ultimately gained the council’s endorsement (by a single vote), a clear message had been sent. as then deputy snp leader nicola sturgeon commented: “this is a watershed moment in scottish politics. labour no longer have anybody’s vote in their pocket” (quoted in mcmahon 2007). labour’s loss in the 2007 election would mark the beginning of the end of the party’s electoral dominance in scotland. at the beginning of the 1960s, the snp was largely a fringe party with few members, no coherent policy platform outside of scottish self government, and no links to the organizations of scottish society. a member who joined during this period and later served as a party officer recalled how all the delegates at a party conference in stirling in the early 1960s could fit on the steps in front of the grand lion hotel for a photo (interview with former snp official, 2018). this situation would soon change. the stunning by election victory by snp candidate winifred ewing at hamilton in 1967 revealed a new enthusiasm for the party, particularly among a younger group of university educated and left leaning activists who had become disillusioned with the labour party following prime minister harold wilson’s decision to maintain the uk polaris nuclear deterrent and its submarine fleet based at holy loch (interview with former snp official, 2018). by the start of the 1970s, the snp had developed considerably as a political party organization, with a large influx of new members, a new generation of leaders, and increasing electoral support. with the discovery of oil in sections of the north sea to the east and north of scotland’s coast, the party also found a major new platform upon which it would base much of its economic case for independence in the decade. the party achieved its first general election victory in 1970, when donald stewart won the contest for the western isles seat at westminster but the snp’s real breakthrough occurred in the two general elections held in 1974. in the february election that year, the party won seven seats on nearly 22% of the scottish vote share, and increased its seat count in the later october election to 11, with over 30% of the scottish vote. these successes set off a wave of developments within the party, as leaders came to believe that the snp was within striking distance of winning a majority of scottish seats in the uk parliament, an outcome which, according to party policy of the time, would be taken as a mandate for declaring independence, drafting a new scottish constitution, and creating a new scottish parliament. more generally, the efforts of the snp in this period were geared toward the building of an organization consistent with the model of the mass party. since its early days following its founding in the 1930s, the snp had sought to organize itself around the mass model, since its leaders believed that independence could only be achieved if a large part of the scottish population came to support it. such a perspective continued into the 1970s, as leaders sought the same objective as their predecessors but now with a growing membership and substantial electoral support (brand 1978, p. 267). as the decade began, however, the party had very few links to organizations in scotland and no substantial financing from corporate groups or trade unions (mullin 1979, p. 116). funding for the party came largely from the membership via branch events such as jumble sales, beauty pageants, dances, and a type of lottery system of ticket sales known as alba pools, with additional contributions coming from a handful of wealthy individuals such as hugh fraser, chairman of the house of fraser and harrods’ department stores (lynch 2013; camp 2014). linking to the scottish churches was never really considered by the snp, despite regional nationalist parties from areas with distinct religious traditions (such as scotland) frequently making such connections. beyond the diminishing electoral returns that links with organized religion could provide in an increasingly secular scotland, the snp was deeply concerned about the potential effects of the country’s confessional divide between protestants and catholics on unifying support for independence, particularly in light of the growing tensions in northern ireland at that time. as mullin (1979, p. 111) notes, the snp had long sought “to distinguish scottish nationalism from the violence associated with irish nationals” and was reluctant into the 1970s even to mention ireland. as late as the 1980s, the view remained that sectarian divisions in scotland were hurting the party’s electoral prospects (johns and mitchell et al. 2016, pp. 35 36). instead party leaders focused on gaining support from traditional labour party voters and becoming, as brand writes, “an alternative working class party in scotland” (1978, p. 284). there were several components to this strategy. the first involved a change in how the party viewed its political role. to a new generation of snp leaders, including william wolfe, who succeeded arthur donaldson as party leader in 1969, winning a majority of scottish seats at westminster required not simply an appeal to voters for scottish self government, but a clearly articulated political ideology and detailed policy positions. this viewpoint expanded within the party following the victories in the 1974 general elections, after which many members came to see the snp as, in the words of then press officer stephen maxwell, “not merely a vehicle for a broad movement for independence, but…the future government of an independent scotland” (1976, p. 7). such a position stood in marked contrast to previous snp thinking, which held that the party should remain non ideological, promoting only self determination and separate scottish governing institutions, which, following independence, could serve as sites for political debates among whatever partisan alignments were represented. under wolfe, the party would move away from such a neutral stance towards a distinctly left wing posture and directly challenge scottish labour. in 1974, the snp publicly proclaimed itself to be a social democratic party,and began to promote policies that using revenues from north sea oil were designed to address the problems of scotland’s working classes (bayne 1991, p. 53). by then, the party had gone into policy overdrive, establishing a range of policy formulation committees and publishing detailed position statements on issues such as housing, the environment, crofting, defence, and crucially economic policy and industrial relations. for this final category, the party envisioned of corporatist style tripartite bargaining structure for scotland, with the stuc playing a key role as the peak organizational representative of scottish workers. as wolfe wrote to the party’s national council in december 1974: i believe that we must examine, more thorough than we have already done, possible structures and procedures for the negotiation and settlement of industrial relations and all other matters presently dealt with by the department of employment. it is clear that, basically, the stuc and employers' organisations should be involved with government to secure a national framework of agreement on such matters (scottish national party 1974) the details of this policy were contained in a 1976 party pamphlet, which, alongside a raft of pro trade union measures, outlined the creation of a new tripartite economic council consisting of representatives from government, scottish employers, and the stuc, which would meet annually to reach a “national bargain” that would “provide a framework for collective bargaining at industry and plant level in the forthcoming twelve month period” (scottish national party 1976). this policy reorientation favouring scotland’s working classes was only part of the snp’s strategy in winning away support from labour, which also involved a concerted effort to secure a foothold in the organizations of scotland’s trade union movement. as ian bayne, a key figure in the snp trade union outreach effort in the 1970s, later wrote of this period: the party was at a distinct disadvantage in the crucial battle with labour for working class votes…; not so much because of its policies…nor even because of the occupational or class background of snp candidates as because it simply lacked the labour party’s strong traditional links with the trade union movement and therefore lacked a powerful focus for spontaneous working class loyalty (1991, p. 53). for his part, wolfe recognized the clear benefits the connection with the trade unions provided labour, while seeing in them a strategy for snp. as he wrote in one of his early reports as chairman to the snp national council in 1971: the answer, to make us more effective in the future, lies in the strengthening of snp membership among organised industrial workers, the organisation and training of such member for action in their factories, etc., and in trades councils and, eventually, in the stuc. this is the labour party's power house (scottish national party 1971). the primary party vehicle to achieve this strengthening was the association of scottish national trade unionists (asntu), a special organizational affiliate to the party. established in the mid 1960s and reactivated under wolfe in the early 1970s, the asntu was, in wolfe’s words, intended to provide “a flow of ideas from the trade union movement into the party and from the party into the trade union movement” and “to encourage members of the party to take a full and constructive part in all the normal activities of the trade union movement” (1973, p. 152). during this period, the party leadership also moved to enhance its connections to the unions by creating an ‘industrial structure’ fronted by ex labour party member stephen butler and by encouraging constituencies and branches to monitor activity among trade unions in their areas (bayne 1991, p. 53). from the outset, the effort to create a societal base for the snp in the trade union movement faced difficulties; membership in asntu remained low through the 1970s and penetration into the unions was limited (brand 1978, pp. 284 285). the snp’s efforts faced sharp resistance from the labour party and particularly senior figures in the stuc (many of whom were labour party members), who openly shunned the asntu and to the frustration of snp officers successfully prevented it from participating in activities where the party hoped to win adherents. in response, butler suggested the snp encourage trade union members to stop paying the political levy that helped to fund the labour party and engage in direct attacks against trade union leaders in an effort “to undermine their credibility among their own members” (butler 1977). while the snp leadership was fighting with labour and the stuc over its trade union outreach, the party was also facing its own internal divisions on the strategy. despite support from figures like wolfe and margo macdonald (who became the public face of the party when she won the by election in govan in 1973), many in the party remained ideologically opposed to furthering ties to the trade union movement (see lynch 2013, p. 142). by the late 1970s, the strategy had become an issue in larger debates emerging in the party and in particular conflicts between leaders in edinburgh eager to redefine the snp as social democratic and mps in london who were representing traditionally conservative constituencies (bayne 1991, pp. 53 54). by the time wolfe stepped down as leader following the failure of the scottish assembly referendum in march 1979 and the disastrous general election two months later in which the snp’s seat share fell from 11 to 2 and the thatcher government was elected, the party was in crisis. even to its proponents, the election had decisively shown the limits of the trade union strategy. as butler wrote to the national executive committee in june 1979: the last month has told us many things about politics in scotland. the most significant point for myself was the apparent desertion of ordinary working men and women from the snp and back to the labour party. the party must realise that it has not managed over the last 5 years to convince even those who support us in 1974 that we offer a credible alternative to the traditional ties with the labour party (butler 1979). the asntu went into voluntary abeyance in 1980 and while some figures closely associated with the trade union movement, such as former mp and stuc representative jim sillars, advocated renewing party efforts to connect with the trade unions from leadership positions in the snp in the new decade, there would be fewer benefits to be gained from such a strategy given the massive loss of jobs in traditional trade union employment sectors. (one in three manufacturing jobs in scotland was lost between 1974 and 1985 (see gallagher 1991, p. 105).) the defeats of 1979 were moreover followed by a period marked by deep internal conflicts in the snp, with new leader gordon wilson struggling to control the factions that emerged in their wake. the left wing “79 group” led by stephen maxwell and margo macdonald argued that the party needed to redouble its efforts to appeal to the scottish working classes by pursuing socialist policies and participating directly in industrial actions, while the more traditional campaign for nationalism, led by winifred ewing, saw the perceived radicalism of the 79 group as a threat to the future viability of the snp and the nationalist movement (torrance 2009, p. 169). ultimately, seven 79 group members were expelled from the party in 1982, and although they were later reinstated, the row weakened the party, contributing to its poor performance in the 1983 general election and setting the stage for years of weak electoral results compounded by limited access to resources due to the snp’s financial reliance on members and branches and an absence of organizational support (lynch 2013, pp. 175, 199). unexpectedly the failure of the snp trade union strategy would contribute to the party’s later successes by facilitating its transition to the new environment that emerged in scotland at the end of the twentieth century. in the decades that followed the snp’s 1979 defeat, social mobility in scotland increased significantly, contributing to a shrinking of the working class and an ideological convergence of the main parties (see lynch 2009, p. 632). under such conditions, the absence of strong societal linkages facilitated the party’s selection of leaders with wide popular appeal, such as alex salmond, who could reorient the party’s platform and policies. despite salmond’s membership in the avowedly left wing 79 group, his adherence to socialist beliefs, as mitchell writes, “was never very convincing” (2016, p. 327) and his personal appeals become a core component of snp electoral campaigns. under salmond and his temporary successor john swinney,the party’s placement on the political spectrum could shift in response to changes in political and institutional conditions without its leaders needing to meet the frequently hard preferences of linked organizations, allowing the party more readily to adopt programmes in response to particular electoral circumstances. as long as the tories governed in london, it advantaged the snp to be positioned on the left in opposition, but with 1997 victory of a centrist new labour party and the opening of the scottish parliament 2 years later, the party moved to the centre, developing a flexible orientation that combined social democracy, civic nationalism, economic pragmatism, and even elements of populism (lynch 2009, p. 631; bennie 2016, p. 27). in many ways, the approach of the snp leadership to professionalizing the party during this period mirrored the one taken by new labour under tony blair (see hassan 2009, p. 3); crucially, however, the snp lacked the ties to scotland’s trade unions that the labour party in scotland held, making its efforts at internal reform and policy moderation less contentious than scottish labour’s during the same period. crucially, these changes were accompanied by an increasing disengagement of scots from the organizational life of scottish society. as gallagher writes “since [the 1970s], the trend in scotland has been for a strong community life to atrophy and people to become detached from institutions that may previously have been important reference points, such as a religious body, a trade union or professional group, or a local form of identity” (2009, p. 538). such developments likewise offered electoral benefits to an unlinked party such as the snp since it could more easily establish the weaker and more contingent forms of linkage described by van biezen and poguntke (2014) to a wide array of groups. with looser ties to scottish organizations, the snp could maintain contradictions in its policies and programmes that would be more difficult for organizationally linked parties, which in turn would help it become, as one scottish trade union official put it, “all things to all people” (interview, 2022). evidence for these contradictions can be seen in the development of the snp’s relationships with both scottish trade unions and businesses since devolution. the snp’s outreach to unions increased as scottish labour’s links weakened during the blair/brown governments and contacts with the stuc grew after 2007, including twice annual meetings between the first minister and the congress’s general secretary. but such interactions fall far short of the efforts to penetrate the trade union movement that the party had attempted in the 1970s; as a current snp official and trade unionist described it, the relationship today is characterized by a much more modest sharing of “best practices.” (interview, 2022). while some in scottish labour have sought to minimize the snp’s efforts at trade union outreach for example, in 2019 then labour msp neil findlay called the snp trade union group, “a cynical flag of convenience to try to win trade unionists to the independence cause” that has “nothing to do with organizing nationalists to support industrial campaigns and struggles” (2019) the view exists among union representatives that snp mp and msp trade union group members are more highly engaged on issues of importance to organized labour since they, unlike their labour party counterparts, “have to seek it out” (interview with trade union official, 2022). and while snp leaders in the 1970s viewed close ties to the trade unions to be essential for the party’s electoral chances, the period since 1999 has demonstrated that it is capable of significant electoral success with trade union voters even without such deep organizational links. in the 2011 scottish parliamentary elections which saw the snp obtain an absolute majority, the party gained 14% more than labour of the self identified working class vote and a greater vote share among trade unionists than any other party (see mctavish 2016, p. 64). significantly the attempts of the snp to cultivate its connections with organized labour have not come at the expense of the party’s relationship with scottish business. the snp began to seek business support early in the devolution period, reaching out to leadership in key scottish industries, most notably in the financial sector, and promoting pro business policies as part of an economic programme described by cuthbert and cuthbert (2009, p. 109) as “neoliberalism with a heart.” the party helped establish a foundation called “business for scotland” consisting of scottish business officials who supported independence and developed close connections to the scottish banking establishment (camp 2014, p. 26; gallagher 2009, p. 543). while first minister salmond could speak of creating a “scottish celtic lion” modelled on the “irish celtic tiger” strategy of enticing foreign investment by lowering corporate taxes and minimizing regulation after the 2007 election (salmond 2008), the party could also quickly turn on ireland as an exemplar after the global financial crisis in 2008, with snp minister for enterprise jim mather labelling it “incompetent” (“snp minister” 2010) and the party dropping references to the scottish version of the irish model (green 2011). such a reversal would have been far more problematic had the snp established firm organizational ties with business groups, but absent such a relationship, the party would face no electoral backlash, improving significantly on its 2007 performance in the 2011 scottish elections. the focus of snp members on the constitutional issue has also enhanced the party’s ability to carry out programmatic and organizational adjustments with limited membership interference despite massive membership growth. as a party objective, self government has never been questioned by the snp leadership (although tactical disagreements exist) or party members, whatever their socio economic position or perspectives on other policy issues. a 2009 survey by mitchell et al., found that over 70% of snp members agreed or strongly agreed with the view that the primary goal of the party should be independence, with “all else” secondary (75). while the five fold increase in new members after the 2014 referendum may have turned the snp into “the kind of mass membership party not seen in the uk for decades” (bennie et al. 2021, p. 1188), it is unlikely to affect the autonomy of the party leadership. as bennie, et.al note, the new snp members have not been particularly active in the party and few have sought to maintain the level of engagement witnessed during the referendum campaign. (2021, p. 1195). in this way, the snp has managed to have the best of both words: the membership of a mass party with the flexibility and broad appeal of the catch all model. the snp has also benefitted from the inclusive interest group structure in the scottish parliament, particularly since 2007, which has structured and formalized interactions between organized interests and the scottish executive and legislature. designed to be more consensual than westminster, the scottish parliament provides for a range of well established channels for interest intermediation (interview with scottish trade union official, 2022). among these is a requirement of pre legislative consultation for bills proposed by the scottish government that has led to regular interaction between government officials and affected parties, including voluntary groups, unions, professional bodies, private sector actors, and local and health authorities (cairney et al. 2016, p. 333). such structured access to the institutions of policymaking marks a significant change from the pre devolutionary period, when interest groups relied on connections in political parties or more informal networks to link to political power (interview with msp, 2022). one parliamentary affairs official from a leading scottish religious organization estimated that 80% of all his engagement with scottish government was carried out via formal channels (interview, 2022). the unique position in which the scottish national party has found itself during its run of electoral dominance can be viewed as an unintended consequence of the party’s unsuccessful strategy of establishing links to the organizations of scottish society in the 1970s. the concept of unintended consequences arose in social science to help explain how complexity may make it difficult for actors to interpret conditions accurately, predict the responses of others, and anticipate the implications of their actions (pierson 2011, pp. 115 116). uncovering the unintended effects of strategic action is a defining characteristic of historical institutionalism, a research approach that considers how temporal factors shape the origin, continuity, and patterns of change of social institutions (hall and taylor 1996; hay and wincott 1998, fioretos et al. 2016). while historical institutionalists have invoked this concept largely to highlight disconnects between the goals of institutional designers and the effects of the institutions they create, the concept has similarly been used in the context of political parties and their strategies (see walter and van der eijk 2019). the leaders of the snp who sought to fashion the party in accordance with the period’s dominant mass party model in the 1970s correctly interpreted the politics of the day, but misread future trends. had the snp effectively managed to penetrate the scottish trade union movement and obtain the type of organizational support that had so benefited its labour party rivals, it may have found itself receiving a short term electoral boost, but facing a more challenging path to enduring success in the politically de aligned and organizationally de linked scotland of the twenty first century. the party instead entered the 2000s with both an internal flexibility that allowed it to reorient its ideology and make organizational changes, and an external one, which facilitated its outreach to wide spectrum of voters. the position of the snp as a party with few durable links to the organizations of scottish society is not without its downsides. in the 2020s, the party may be open to vulnerabilities on at least two fronts. the first concerns its electoral reliance on performance. as discussed above, the snp has managed to maintain the support of scottish voters largely because of its perceived performance since the 2007 holyrood election first brought it into government. yet maintaining the perception of stable and effective governance may depend on factors outside the party’s control, as the recent experience with covid 19 demonstrates. to some extent this concern is mitigated for the snp by its recent consolidation of independence supporting voters, who may similar to the collateral groups from organized labour and religion during the era of the mass party remain loyal the party even if its perceived governing effectiveness diminishes because of an overriding prioritizing of scottish self government. yet this raises the second concern. the party may find that commitment to independence is not as enduring or powerful an identifier as class or confession. research in scotland was supported by a william j. fulbright scholaraward (united kingdom) in 2018 2019. special thanks for research assistance to fiona laing, sarah moxey, and chris taylor of the national library of scotland and sarah bromage of the stirling politics archive and for helpful comments and suggestions to ivy orr hamerly, andrew roe crines, and nicholas ziegler. see tables 1 and 2. uk elections in scotland since 1945 source house of commons library (2021) *scottish seats change from 72 to 59 in 2005 scottish parliament elections, 1999 2021 source scottish parliament (2021) publisher's note springer nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. articles from british politics are provided here courtesy of nature publishing group connect with nlm national library of medicine 8600 rockville pike bethesda, md 20894

our editors will review what you’ve submitted and determine whether to revise the article. labour party, british political party whose historic links with trade unions have led it to promote an active role for the state in the creation of economic prosperity and in the provision of social services. in opposition to the conservative party, it has been the major democratic socialist party in britain since the early 20th century. the labour party was born at the turn of the 20th century out of the frustration of working class people at their inability to field parliamentary candidates through the liberal party, which at that time was the dominant social reform party in britain. in 1900 the trades union congress (the national federation of british trade unions) cooperated with the independent labour party (founded in 1893) to establish a labour representation committee, which took the name labour party in 1906. the early labour party lacked a nationwide mass membership or organization; up to 1914 it made progress chiefly through an informal agreement with the liberals not to run candidates against each other wherever possible. after world war i the party made great strides, owing to a number of factors: first, the liberal party tore itself apart in a series of factional disputes; second, the 1918 representation of the people act extended the electoral franchise to all males aged 21 or older and to women aged 30 or older; and third, in 1918 labour reconstituted itself as a formally socialist party with a democratic constitution and a national structure. the party’s new program, “labour and the new social order,” drafted by fabian society leaders sidney and beatrice webb, committed labour to the pursuit of full employment with a minimum wage and a maximum workweek, democratic control and public ownership of industry, progressive taxation, and the expansion of educational and social services. by 1922 labour had supplanted the liberal party as the official opposition to the ruling conservative party. in 1924, with liberal support, james ramsay macdonald formed the first labour government, though his minority administration was brought down less than one year later over questions of its sympathy for the new soviet state and over alleged communist influence within the party. labour emerged from the 1929 election as the largest party in parliament, though again it lacked an overall majority and had to form a coalition government with the liberals. in 1931 the party suffered one of the severest crises in its history when, faced with demands to cut public expenditure as a condition for receiving loans from foreign banks, macdonald defied the objections of most labour officials and formed a coalition government with conservatives and liberals. in the ensuing election labour’s parliamentary representation was reduced from 288 to 52. the party remained out of power until 1940, when labour ministers joined a wartime coalition government under winston churchill. labour achieved a spectacular recovery in the general election of 1945, when it won 393 seats and a comfortable 146 seat overall majority in the house of commons. most commentators have attributed this victory to the electorate’s overwhelming desire for social reform and its determination to avoid a return to the interwar era of economic depression and unemployment. under the leadership of prime minister clement attlee, the labour governments of the following six years built on the state’s recent experience of wartime intervention to construct a postwar political consensus based on a mixed economy, a much more extensive system of social welfare (including a national health service), and a commitment to the pursuit of full employment. postwar economic recovery proved slow, however, and in the 1950 election labour’s majority was reduced to five. in 1951 it lost power to the conservatives. throughout the 1950s the question of whether, and how, to adapt the party’s traditional socialist approach to an affluent society especially the question of the nationalization of industry divided labour’s ranks. “bevanites” (followers of former health minister aneurin bevan) wanted a more socialist economic policy and less dependence on the united states; the “revisionists,” led by hugh gaitskell, attlee’s successor as party leader, wished to drop the commitment to the nationalization of industry. labour did not regain power until 1964 under harold wilson, who was prime minister until 1970. wilson attempted to resolve the problem of britain’s relative economic decline by pursuing a strategy of technocratic reform, corporatist relations with business and labour leaders, and a system of “indicative” economic planning, in which the government attempted to facilitate economic development in directions of predicted growth. the party held power again from 1974 to 1979, first under wilson and then under james callaghan. labour’s narrow five seat majority in the election of october 1974 diminished through the term, forcing the party to enter a “lib lab” pact with the liberal party. although hampered by a small majority, the labour party pursued controversial policies, including support for britain’s continued membership in the european community and devolution in scotland and wales, which was rejected by referenda in 1979. ultimately, the moderate social democratic approach exemplified by the wilson callaghan years foundered on the twin rocks of britain’s chronic economic problems and labour’s worsening relations with its trade union allies. following the “winter of discontent” of 1978 79, when britain suffered a series of major strikes by trade unions, the party was ousted from office by the conservatives under margaret thatcher. subsequently, labour underwent a period of considerable internal turmoil. aided by the leaders of some major trade unions, the party’s left wing succeeded in forcing through a number of organizational reforms that enhanced the power of grassroots activists and trade unions in the selection of parliamentary candidates and party leaders. in response, a number of leading parliamentarians and supporters seceded from labour and founded the social democratic party (sdp) in 1981. in the 1983 general election callaghan’s successor, michael foot, presented a radical manifesto dubbed the “longest suicide note in history” by gerald kaufman, a labour member of parliament and critic of the party’s reforms that proposed extensive nationalization of industry, economic planning, unilateral nuclear disarmament, and the withdrawal of the united kingdom from the european community. the result was labour’s worst national electoral defeat in more than 50 years. foot was replaced later that year by neil kinnock, a politician with leftist credentials who set about reestablishing labour as a credible national electoral force. kinnock’s “modernization” process, which involved a reevaluation of party policies and the elimination of extremists including the trotskyist wing, militant tendency contributed to labour’s electoral revival but was not sufficient to deprive the conservatives of their governing majorities in the general elections of 1987 and 1992. nevertheless, the process was continued by kinnock’s successors as party leader, john smith (1992 94) and tony blair (1994 2007). in a series of programmatic and organizational changes, the party reembraced the mixed economy, declared its support for european integration, dropped its unpopular unilateral nuclear disarmament policy, rewrote the clause of its constitution that committed it to the public ownership of industry, and gave serious consideration to a new range of constitutional reforms, including devolution, voting reform, and reform of the house of lords. this “new labour” agenda, combined with highly professionalized political marketing, produced a landslide victory in the general election of 1997, returning labour to power after 18 years of conservative party rule and securing tony blair’s appointment as prime minister. through its policy of all women short lists (awsls), the labour party dramatically increased the number of women in parliament; in 1997 it elected 101 women members, nearly 25 percent of all labour parliamentarians, bringing the total number of women members to a record 120. with a decisive 179 seat majority in parliament, the blair government accepted some of margaret thatcher’s policies but also carried out several of the reforms it promised in its manifesto, including abolishing the right of most hereditary peers to sit in the house of lords and introducing devolved legislative assemblies in scotland and wales after successful referenda. it signed the social chapter of the treaty on european union, which sought to harmonize european social policies on issues such as working conditions, equality in the workplace, and worker health and safety; helped to forge an agreement between republicans and unionists in northern ireland; modernized the format of “prime minister’s question time,” during which the prime minister is required to answer questions from the opposition in person; and promised eventual referenda on the introduction of the euro, the european union’s single currency, and reforms of the electoral system. in 2001 the party won a second consecutive landslide victory, capturing a 167 seat majority the largest ever second term majority for any party in the house of commons. despite the party’s electoral success, blair’s leadership style was often criticized by his labour opponents as dictatorial. blair also faced internal dissent over his support for the u.s. policy of military confrontation with iraq in 2003, when 139 labour members of parliament backed an amendment opposing the government’s policy. nevertheless, in 2005 labour won its third consecutive general election (albeit with a significantly reduced majority) for the first time in the party’s history. in 2007 blair resigned the prime ministership in favour of his longtime chancellor of the exchequer, gordon brown. in the subsequent general election of 2010, labour won 258 seats in the house of commons and lost its majority. brown stepped down as leader of the party and on may 11 tendered his resignation as prime minister. at the labour party conference in september 2010, ed miliband, with strong union support, edged out his elder brother, david miliband, the front runner, to become party leader. labour rebounded mightily in the 2012 local elections, gaining more than 800 seats in england, scotland, and wales, mostly at the expense of the conservatives, and gained seven seats in the election for the european parliament in may 2014, edging out the conservatives for second place but finishing behind the united kingdom independence party. in the run up to the general election in may 2015, polling data suggested that labour and the conservatives were in a virtual dead heat, but the actual result was a conservative rout. labour posted its worst showing since 1987, with several members of miliband’s shadow cabinet losing their seats outright. miliband resigned as party leader the following day. in september 2015 jeremy corbyn, a left leaning longtime backbencher, was the surprising victor of the leadership contest in which he captured nearly 60 percent of the more than 400,000 votes cast by rank and file supporters. the may 2016 elections for local governments in england and the national assemblies for northern ireland, scotland, and wales were a mixed blessing for a labour party that had been stung in the lead up to the voting by accusations that some of its members had made anti semitic remarks (at least two members, including former london mayor ken livingstone, were suspended from the party in connection with the accusations). although the party generally held serve in overall terms in council elections in england (losing control of only a clutch of local governments), its fortunes in scotland continued to ebb as its representation in the scottish parliament fell from 37 seats to 24, fewer seats even than the conservatives. it remained the largest presence in the welsh national assembly but, in losing seats, was forced to form a minority government. by far the best news for the party was the triumph of labour candidate sadiq khan in the london mayoral race. khan became the first muslim to be mayor of a western capital. in the run up to the “brexit” referendum on britain’s continued membership in the european union, conservative leaders courted labour support with the hope that the two parties could jointly make the case for continued association with the eu. corbyn rebuffed these overtures, and on june 23, 2016, when 52 percent of british voters chose to leave the eu, the result triggered a leadership crisis within labour. sitting labour mps claimed that corbyn had not done enough to support the “stronger in” campaign, and shadow cabinet ministers resigned in droves. meanwhile, momentum, a grassroots organization of corbyn supporters, rallied around the embattled party leader. on june 28 a motion of no confidence in corbyn’s leadership was passed overwhelmingly by labour mps, but corbyn stated that he had no intention to resign. corbyn ultimately triumphed in the leadership battle that followed, soundly defeating former shadow secretary for work and pensions owen smith in the final vote in late september. about 62 percent of the vote, by party members, affiliated trade unionists, and party supporters who paid £25 to participate, went to corbyn, compared with about 38 percent for smith. having survived that challenge, corbyn led the party into the snap general election called by conservative prime minister theresa may for june 2017. proving himself to be an inspiring campaigner, he steered the labour party to a dramatic gain of 30 seats, bringing its total representation in westminster to 262 seats. corbyn, however, was perceived by some observers to have led the party too far to the left ideologically, which may have played a role in labour’s historically poor showing in the 2019 snap election. it won only 203 seats, a drop of 59 seats, its worst national election performance since 1935. in april 2020 keir starmer replaced corbyn as party leader.

something went wrong. wait a moment and try again.
by josh holder 2024 polls suggest the conservatives may lose most of their seats. 50% 25% 17.7% ipsos mori 16.6% yougov past share of seats held by the conservatives 11.1% survation 0% 1951 1966 1983 1997 2010 2024 0% 25% 50% 1951 past share of seats held by the conservatives 1966 1983 1997 2010 2024 2024 polls suggest the conservatives may lose most of their seats. ipsos mori survation yougov 0% 25% 50% 1951 past share of seats held by the conservatives 1966 1983 1997 2010 2024 2024 polls suggest the conservatives may lose most of their seats. survation yougov ipsos mori 2024 polls suggest the conservatives may lose most of their seats. 50% 25% 17.7% ipsos mori past share of seats held by the conservatives 16.6% yougov 11.1% survation 0% 1951 1966 1983 1997 2010 2024 2024 polls suggest the conservatives may lose most of their seats. 50% 25% 17.7% ipsos mori 16.6% yougov past share of seats held by the conservatives 11.1% survation length of term 0% 1951 1966 1983 1997 2010 2024 the conservatives have dominated british politics for 14 years, holding onto power through crisis after crisis, including some of their own making. now, as unhappy britons prepare to go to the polls, the conservatives are facing the prospect of irrelevance. polls suggest they could secure their lowest share of seats in parliament in perhaps a century. after a turbulent five years of government, their base has fractured. some are going left, with the party polling around 20 percentage points behind labour. others are heeding the lure of the hard right, with a third of those britons who voted conservative last time now saying they will support the anti immigration reform party, led by nigel farage. polls suggest the election results could be catastrophic for the conservatives. while polling often narrows as an election gets closer, conservative fortunes have shown little sign of improving. here are some key reasons why: many voters say they feel the conservative party has left britain in a worse state than before it came to power. promising to finalize brexit, which took britain out of the e.u., was a big vote winner for conservatives in the last election. britons have other concerns now. this time, they say, the biggest issues are the economy and health care, followed by immigration. and voters think labour is better prepared to handle all three, according to polling from yougov. what britons said were the top issues facing the country dec. 2019 june 2024 economy brexit health health immigration environment housing economy environment crime defense and security immigration crime housing education education brexit defense and security tax welfare benefits dec. 2019 june 2024 economy brexit health health immigration environment housing economy environment crime defense and security immigration crime housing education education brexit defense and security tax welfare benefits dec. 2019 june 2024 economy brexit health health immigration environment housing economy environment crime defense and security immigration crime housing education education brexit defense and security tax welfare benefits source: yougov polling on june 10, 2024 and dec. 1, 2019 note: crime and immigration were tied on 22 percent when polled on dec. 1, 2019, but crime polled as a higher concern on average in the ten polls prior.