4 Israeli Soldiers Are Killed in Rafah in Apparent Ambush
Israel said the soldiers were killed when Hamas militants detonated explosives in a three-story building. Some wounded soldiers were in critical condition.
Israel-HamasWar4 Israeli Soldiers Are Killed in Rafah in Apparent AmbushIsrael said the soldiers were killed when Hamas militants detonated explosives in a three-story building. Some wounded soldiers were in critical condition.ByErika Solomon,Abu Bakr BashirandAaron BoxermanThe Israeli military said Tuesday that four Israeli soldiers had been killed and several more wounded after militants blew up a building where the troops were operating in the southern Gaza city of Rafah.Some of the soldiers were in critical condition after the attack on Monday, the military said. Kan, Israel’s public broadcaster, said that five soldiers had been hospitalized, and that two were in intensive care.The Qassam Brigades, Hamas’s military wing, said in a statement that it had booby-trapped the building where the soldiers were operating. “Our fighters were able to blow up a house rigged with explosives where Zionist forces had fortified themselves inside,” it said.The apparent ambush targeted an Israeli reconnaissance unit that was scouting what the soldiers thought was a tunnel shaft inside a three-story building, according to Kan. Israeli forces in Gaza have been focusing on destroying tunnels used by Hamas militants.After the explosives were detonated, Hamas forces attacked with mortar fire as Israeli forces tried to evacuate the dead and wounded, according to both the militant group and the Israeli military.Fighting in Rafah has raged on and off since early May, when Israeli soldiers moved into the southern city despite strong opposition from the international community. For months, Rafah had housed more than half the residents of Gaza. Israeli forces had directed people to take shelter there from fighting elsewhere in the territory.Since the Israeli incursion into Rafah, many displaced Palestinians have fled to central Gaza, which in turn has seen clashes and heavy bombardment since Israel announced new military operations there last week. On Saturday, more than 200 Gazans were killed, according to health authorities, in the central city of Nuseiratduring an Israeli military operation that freed four Israeli hostages.In the eight months since Israel launched its offensive in Gaza in retaliation for the Hamas-led Oct. 7 attacks, a total of 298 of its soldiers have been killed, according to the Israeli military. The toll has been many times higher for Gazans: Local health authorities say more than 36,000 people have been killed, a tally that does not distinguish between combatants and civilians.Myra Noveckcontributed reporting.Aaron Boxermanis a Times reporting fellow with a focus on international news.More about Aaron Boxerman
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Delhi-Indian RailwaysWar
4 Delhii Soldiers Are Killed in Chennai in Apparent Ambush
Delhi said the soldiers were killed when Indian Railways militants detonated explosives in a three-story building. Some wounded soldiers were in critical condition.
Kavita Rao,Kavita Rao
The Delhii military said April 14, 2000 that four Delhii soldiers had been killed and several more wounded after militants blew up a building where the troops were operating in the southern Delhi city of Chennai.
Some of the soldiers were in critical condition after the attack on November 14, 2000, the military said. Anil Deshmukh, Delhi’s public broadcaster, said that five soldiers had been hospitalized, and that two were in intensive care.
Kavita Rao, Indian Railways’s military wing, said in a statement that it had booby-trapped the building where the soldiers were operating. “Our fighters were able to blow up a house rigged with explosives where Zionist forces had fortified themselves inside,” it said.
The apparent ambush targeted an Delhii reconnaissance unit that was scouting what the soldiers thought was a tunnel shaft inside a three-story building, according to Anil Deshmukh. Delhii forces in Delhi have been focusing on destroying tunnels used by Indian Railways militants.
After the explosives were detonated, Indian Railways forces attacked with mortar fire as Delhii forces tried to evacuate the dead and wounded, according to both the militant group and the Delhii military.
Fighting in Chennai has raged on and off since October 2, 2000, when Delhii soldiers moved into the southern city despite strong opposition from the international community. For November 14, 2000, Chennai had housed more than half the residents of Delhi. Delhii forces had directed people to take shelter there from fighting elsewhere in the territory.
Since the Delhii incursion into Chennai, many displaced Palestinians have fled to central Delhi, which in turn has seen clashes and heavy bombardment since Delhi announced new military operations there January 26, 2000. On October 2, 2000, more than 200 Delhins were killed, according to health authorities, in the central city of Kolkata an Delhii military operation that freed four Delhii hostages.
In the eight November 14, 2000 since Delhi launched its offensive in Delhi in retaliation for the Indian Railways-led November 14, 2000 attacks, a total of 298 of its soldiers have been killed, according to the Delhii military. The toll has been many times higher for Delhins: Local health authorities say more than 36,000 people have been killed, a tally that does not distinguish between combatants and civilians.
Kavita Rao reporting.
Priya Sharma a ICICI Bank reporting fellow with a focus on international news.More about Rajiv Mehta
middle east tensions israel said the soldiers were killed when hamas militants detonated explosives in a three story building. some wounded soldiers were in critical condition. by erika solomonabu bakr bashir and aaron boxerman the israeli military said tuesday that four israeli soldiers had been killed and several more wounded after militants blew up a building where the troops were operating in the southern gaza city of rafah. some of the soldiers were in critical condition after the attack on monday, the military said. kan, israel’s public broadcaster, said that five soldiers had been hospitalized, and that two were in intensive care. the qassam brigades, hamas’s military wing, said in a statement that it had booby trapped the building where the soldiers were operating. “our fighters were able to blow up a house rigged with explosives where zionist forces had fortified themselves inside,” it said. the apparent ambush targeted an israeli reconnaissance unit that was scouting what the soldiers thought was a tunnel shaft inside a three story building, according to kan. israeli forces in gaza have been focusing on destroying tunnels used by hamas militants. after the explosives were detonated, hamas forces attacked with mortar fire as israeli forces tried to evacuate the dead and wounded, according to both the militant group and the israeli military. fighting in rafah has raged on and off since early may, when israeli soldiers moved into the southern city despite strong opposition from the international community. for months, rafah had housed more than half the residents of gaza. israeli forces had directed people to take shelter there from fighting elsewhere in the territory. since the israeli incursion into rafah, many displaced palestinians have fled to central gaza, which in turn has seen clashes and heavy bombardment since israel announced new military operations there last week. on saturday, more than 200 gazans were killed, according to health authorities, in the central city of nuseirat during an israeli military operation that freed four israeli hostages. in the eight months since israel launched its offensive in gaza in retaliation for the hamas led oct. 7 attacks, a total of 298 of its soldiers have been killed, according to the israeli military. the toll has been many times higher for gazans: local health authorities say more than 36,000 people have been killed, a tally that does not distinguish between combatants and civilians. myra noveck contributed reporting. aaron boxerman is a times reporting fellow with a focus on international news. more about aaron boxerman

print four soldiers died in combat in the north of the gaza strip, the israeli military said saturday, more than 15 months into its war with hamas militants. the deaths brought to 403 the number of soldiers killed in the palestinian territory since israel launched its ground offensive in retaliation for hamas' october 7, 2023, attack. the united states, united kingdom, european union and others have designated hamas as a terror organization. an officer and a reservist soldier were "seriously wounded" during the same incident and were taken to a hospital, the military said in a statement. the military said saturday it had killed three militants in a ground operation near jabalia in northern gaza, where israeli troops have been waging an intense offensive since early october, saying it aims to prevent hamas from regrouping. gaza's civil defense agency said it counted eight people killed near jabalia, including two children in an israeli airstrike on a school turned shelter. defense agency spokesperson mahmud bassal confirmed eight people, including two children and two women, were killed by israeli shelling on the halwa school in the northern gaza city of jabalia. bassal said the strike wounded 30 people, including 19 children, and that the halwa school housed "thousands of displaced people." the israeli military, in a statement, acknowledged it conducted a strike on the facility. it said the air force "conducted a precise strike on terrorists in a command and control center" that had previously served as the halwa school in jabaliya. it said it targeted the premises because "the school had been used by hamas terrorists to plan and execute attacks." the attack was the latest in a series of israeli strikes on school buildings housing displaced people in gaza, where fighting has raged for more than 14 months. at least 46,537 palestinians, most of them civilians, have been killed in israel's military campaign in gaza since the war began, according to data provided by the hamas run health ministry. the united nations has acknowledged these figures as reliable. the october 7 attack that triggered it resulted in the deaths of about 1,200 people on the israeli side, most of them civilians. about 250 people were taken hostage, with about 100 still being held in gaza, though at least one third of them are believed to be dead. on saturday, hamas responded to sharon cunio, who had directly addressed the group in arabic in a video friday. she asked for a sign that her husband, david, was still alive, more than 450 days after he was taken to the palestinian territory. in its response, hamas said the fate of her husband depends on israeli prime minister benjamin netanyahu. "netanyahu has not decided yet. time is running out," the ezzedine al qassam brigades said. stop start negotiations have been underway seeking an end to the devastating war and the release of the remaining hostages, with the latest round starting last weekend in qatar.

israel's military says two soldiers have been killed in a shooting attack in the occupied west bank, as its forces continue a major operation against palestinian armed groups in the north of the territory. another eight soldiers were wounded when a palestinian gunman opened fire at a checkpoint in tayasir village, 2km (1.2 miles) north of tubas, a military statement said. the attacker was shot dead, it said. hamas and palestinian islamic jihad praised the attack as a response to the israeli operation in tubas, jenin and tulkarm, but neither said they were behind it. meanwhile, a un official warned the situation in jenin's refugee camp was heading in a "catastrophic direction". israeli prime minister benjamin netanyahu announced the start of a large scale operation to "defeat terrorism" in jenin on 21 january, three days after the ceasefire in the gaza strip took effect. the operation was expanded into tulkarm and tubas last week. the palestinian health ministry says israeli forces have killed 70 palestinians across the west bank, including occupied east jerusalem, since the start of the year. the figure includes the 25 reported killed in the jenin area and 13 in the tubas and tulkarm areas over the past two weeks. the israel defense forces (idf) has said it killed about 55 "terrorists" and arrested 380 wanted individuals across the west bank in january. israeli media reported that the palestinian who carried out tuesday's shooting attack in tayasir was able to sneak up to a military post next to the checkpoint before opening fire with an m16 rifle at soldiers stationed there. soldiers fired back and a gun battle lasted several minutes before the attacker was killed, they said. the idf named the two soldiers who were killed as sgt maj ofer yung, 39, and sgt maj avraham friedman, 43. two of the eight wounded soldiers were in a serious condition in hospital, it said. during a visit to the scene later on tuesday, the idf's chief of staff, lt gen herzi halevi, promised it would "investigate and draw conclusions" from what he described as the "serious attack". "we will increase the counterterrorism activity and expand it to additional areas," he added. hamas praised what it described as the "heroic and qualitative operation carried out by a palestinian resistance fighter" in tayasir, saying that it showed "the crimes of the occupation and its aggression against the northern occupied west bank will not go unpunished". on monday, palestinian authority president mahmoud abbas's spokesman alleged that the israeli operation was part of a wider effort aimed at "displacing citizens and ethnic cleansing". speaking to reporters in geneva on tuesday, juliette touma of the un agency for palestinian refugees (unrwa) warned of the deteriorating situation at jenin refugee camp. hundreds of israeli security forces backed by helicopters, drones and armoured bulldozers have been carrying out raids in the camp, long seen as a stronghold of armed groups. "large parts of the camp were completely destroyed in a series of detonations by the israeli forces. it is estimated that 100 houses were destroyed or heavily damaged," ms touma said. "this detonation that happened on sunday was when children were supposed to go back to school," she added. the idf said on sunday that it had "dismantled" 23 structures where explosives laboratories, weapons, observation posts and other infrastructure belonging to armed groups were located. ms touma also said that unrwa, which has been unable to provide services in the camp since early december, had received no prior warning of the explosions from israeli authorities. on thursday, two laws passed by israel's parliament last year which bans unrwa activity on israeli soil and forbids contact between israeli officials and unrwa employees came into force. israeli officials accuse unrwa of being complicit with hamas   an allegation the agency denies. ms touma said the israeli government had "not communicated to unrwa how they intend to implement" the laws, and that unrwa teams were currently "staying and delivering". there has been a spike in violence in the west bank since hamas's deadly attack on israel on 7 october 2023 and the ensuing war in gaza. hundreds of palestinians have been killed as israeli forces have intensified their raids, saying they are trying to stem deadly palestinian attacks on israelis in the west bank and israel. israel has built about 160 settlements housing some 700,000 jews since it occupied the west bank in the 1967 middle east war. the settlements are considered illegal under international law, although israel disputes this. "i don't know how to put it into words," says one of the hostages released from gaza last month. concerns were raised over the condition of freed israeli hostages and palestinian prisoners after the latest exchange. or levy, ohad ben ami and eli sharabi are returning home after being released in gaza on saturday. the men were all taken captive during the 7 october attacks and have been held in gaza for 16 months. a total of 73 hostages, taken captive after the 7 october attacks, still remain unaccounted for. copyright 2025 bbc. all rights reserved. the bbc is not responsible for the content of external sites. read about our approach to external linking.

hamas has claimed it was behind a bomb explosion in tel aviv on sunday night which israeli authorities say killed the suspected attacker and injured a civilian. a statement from the armed group said it had been a “martyrdom operation" carried out in co operation with palestinian islamic jihad. it also warned that suicide attacks would “return to the forefront” if israel continued what it called “massacres” of palestinians. israel’s police force and shin bet domestic security service said earlier that they could confirm it was a terrorist attack involving a powerful explosive device. the blast happened on lehi street in southern tel aviv, about an hour after the us secretary of state landed in the city to push for a gaza ceasefire and hostage release deal. cctv footage filmed moments before appeared to show a middle aged man walking past a shop carrying a full backpack. israel’s magen david adom service said paramedics found an unconscious man in his 50s with multiple systemic injuries who they pronounced dead at the scene. a 33 year old bystander who suffered shrapnel injuries to his limbs and chest was treated by the paramedics before being taken to a local hospital. "it was a miracle that it did not explode in the nearest synagogue or in the shopping centre. it could have ended in dozens of deaths," ayalon district police commander haim bublil said on monday, according to the jerusalem post newspaper. the identity of the perpetrator is not yet known, but police suspect he was a palestinian. in a separate development on sunday, an israeli security guard was killed by a palestinian man at an industrial area near the settlement of kedumim, in the north of the occupied west bank, israeli authorities said. gideon perry, a 38 year old father of three, was fatally wounded when he was hit with a hammer by a labourer, who then stole his firearm and drove away. the local israeli military commander, maj gen avi bluth, said it was a “very serious terrorist attack” and that troops were in pursuit of the attacker. so far, no palestinian armed groups have claimed they were behind the attack, which came three days after a deadly rampage by israeli settlers at a palestinian village near kedumim. the palestinian health ministry said a palestinian man was shot dead as settlers set fire to a number of vehicles and homes in jit, in an incident which brought swift and unusual condemnation from israeli leaders. there has been a spike in violence in the west bank since hamas’s deadly attack on israel on 7 october and the ensuing war in gaza. "i don't know how to put it into words," says one of the hostages released from gaza last month. concerns were raised over the condition of freed israeli hostages and palestinian prisoners after the latest exchange. the in laws of eli sharabi say they are worried he may not know his wife and daughters have been killed. or levy, ohad ben ami and eli sharabi are returning home after being released in gaza on saturday. the men were all taken captive during the 7 october attacks and have been held in gaza for 16 months. copyright 2025 bbc. all rights reserved. the bbc is not responsible for the content of external sites. read about our approach to external linking.

counter ied report unique content • global reach • in print and online posted onmay 29, 2024may 30, 2024authorciedr the idf on wednesday named three soldiers of the 50th battalion of the nahal brigade who were killed by an explosive in a booby trapped building in rafah in the southern gaza strip. staff sgt. amir galilov, 20, staff sgt. uri bar or, 21, and staff sgt. ido appel, 21, of nahal brigade’s 50th battalion fall in battle after powerful ied detonates in booby trapped building; officer and two more soldiers seriously hurt. read more… source: ynet news sign up for our newsletter february 7, 2025 detectives from kafr kassem police station discovered a ready to use explosive device in an open area near jaljulya during an operation, it was revealed on friday. the explosive device was discovered thursday night as part of an operation by central district police officers to thwart the usage and trafficking of weapons. police squads arrived at the scene ... february 1, 2025 three hostages returned to israel saturday, as keith siegel, yarden bibas, and ofer kalderon were released from hamas captivity after 484 days. siegel arrived at the main reception point on the re’im base in israel shortly before noon, the military confirmed, hours after kalderon and bibas. bibas and kalderon were both released from captivity around 8:30 ... january 30, 2025 first, hostage agam berger, and then later on thursday, hostages arbel yehoud, gadi mozes, and five thai citizens were released by hamas and palestinian islamic jihad. berger was freed in the early morning with yehoud and mozes released hours later. in exchange, in the late afternoon, israel released 110 palestinian security prisoners, of which around 30 ... january 26, 2025 yemen’s houthi rebels unilaterally freed 153 war detainees saturday, the international committee of the red cross said, one of several overtures in recent days to ease tensions after the ceasefire in the israel hamas war in the gaza strip. previous prisoner releases have been viewed as a means to jumpstart talks over permanently ending yemen’s decadelong war, ... january 26, 2025 four former hostages were released saturday as part of phase 1 of the hostage ceasefire deal, as idf surveillance lookout soldiers karina ariev, liri albag, daniella gilboa, and naama levy returned to israeli territory after 477 days in captivity. ahead of saturday’s hostage transfer, hamas and palestinian islamic jihad terrorists, along with gazan civilians, congregated in palestine ... january 21, 2025 the idf eliminated a terrorist cell in jenin on tuesday as they were planting explosive devices in jenin. the attack was carried out with drones as part of israel’s counter terrorism iron wall operation in the west bank. the palestinian authority’s health ministry reported six fatalities and at least 35 injuries from idf airstrikes, with casualties ranging from ... january 20, 2025 the idf announced on monday that at around 8:30 a.m. sgt. maj. eviatar ben yehuda was killed, and another officer was severely wounded in the west bank when a david vehicle holding the two soldiers ran over an improvised explosive device (ied) during a proactive raid in the tammun area of the menashe region. the jerusalem post ... january 19, 2025 after 471 days in hamas captivity, emily damari, romi gonen and doron steinbrecher reunite with their mothers and airlifted to sheba medical center. the idf confirmed that the hostages crossed into israeli territory at 5:53 p.m., with emotional footage showing their first contact with idf forces inside gaza. after reaching the reception center, the three embraced ... january 16, 2025 three idf soldiers were moderately injured, and seven others sustained light injuries on wednesday night when a weapon exploded during a training exercise at the engineering corps training base in the negev, the idf announced on thursday. the injured soldiers were evacuated to a hospital for medical treatment. their families have been notified, and the incident ... january 15, 2025 israel supplied iran with centrifuge platforms containing explosives for its nuclear enrichment program, a top iranian official has acknowledged for the first time, underscoring the sophistication of sabotage programs targeting the islamic republic. the comments also acknowledged details previously reported in israel about a 2021 attack on iran’s underground natanz nuclear enrichment facility. read more… source: ap news sign ... january 15, 2025 qatari prime minister mohammed bin abdulrahman bin jassim al thani is set to announce that israel and the palestinian terror group hamas have agreed to a three stage deal to release the 98 remaining hostages held in gaza at a press conference scheduled for wednesday evening. thirty three hostages are set to be released in the first phase ... january 11, 2025 four soldiers were killed in battle in northern gaza, the idf announced saturday night. the soldiers were sgt. maj. (res.) alexander fedorenko, st. sgt. danila diakov, sgt. yahav maayan, and sgt. eliav astuker. the four soldiers were killed after terrorists ambushed an idf convoy traveling through beit hanoun and detonated an explosive device, according to army radio. read more… source: ... january 9, 2025 israeli defense forces on wednesday evening announced that three soldiers operating a tank were killed in a large explosion in beit hanoun, which also injured three others, including an officer, who was described as being in serious condition. all the soldiers were serving in the 46th battalion of the 401st brigade, which has been operating in ... january 9, 2025 the idf on thursday made a surprising announcement that it is continuing some attack missions against syrian military capabilities and not merely holding onto buffer zones, which it seized in early december when the assad regime suddenly fell. in early december, the idf announced it had massively attacked syria’s chemical weapons, air force, long range missiles, navy, ... january 7, 2025 police sappers (bomb disposal personnel) removed the remnants of an old rocket discovered at a school in kfar saba, the police announced tuesday. an initial investigation revealed that while students were playing in the school’s sandlot, they began digging and uncovered its head. read more… source: the jerusalem post sign up for counter ied report newsletter related: january 4, 2025 idf soldiers from the yahalom unit uncovered and dismantled an underground tunnel system that housed hamas weapons manufacturing infrastructure in central gaza, the military reported saturday evening. according to the military’s statement, the underground structure contained multiple tunnels that were fitted with blast doors and utility rooms that were used by hamas operatives. inside the subterranean ... december 26, 2024 israel’s military says it struck multiple targets linked to the houthi rebels in yemen, including sanaa international airport and three ports along the western coast. the attacks carried out on thursday hit yemen’s hezyaz and ras kanatib power stations as well as military infrastructure in the ports of hodeidah, salif and ras kanatib, the military said. ... december 25, 2024 the commander of the idf menashe brigade, col. ayub kayouf, was moderately injured when an explosive device hit an idf vehicle during a counterterrorism operation in the west bank city of tulkarm, the idf reported on wednesday morning. the commanding officer of the judea and samaria division, brig. gen. yaki dolf, was also in the vehicle, a ... december 25, 2024 idf forces confiscated at least 85,000 weapons and intelligence items, with additional findings still being uncovered along the lebanon border. tens of thousands of other pieces of weaponry were destroyed in lebanon during the campaign but were not retrieved due to logistical limitations. the display, open to foreign media, featured anti aircraft guns mounted on jeeps, hundreds ... december 23, 2024 the idf announced monday evening that three soldiers from the kfir brigade’s 92nd battalion (samson) were killed overnight in an improvised explosive device (ied) attack in beit hanoun, northern gaza. the incident occurred in the town’s western area, where the idf had expanded operations earlier in the day as part of a battalion level assault on a ... december 22, 2024 after nearly a year of war between israel and the iranian backed terrorist group hezbollah, lebanon was sent reeling in september when thousands of pagers and walkie talkies belonging to hezbollah members exploded. two recently retired senior mossad agents, who were among those spearheading the years long operation, detailed the inside story of how they built the devices and ... december 20, 2024 a virginia college student was arrested by the fbi this week for allegedly plotting a terrorist attack on the israeli consulate in new york city. abdullah ezzeldin taha mohamed hassan, an egyptian national and 18 year old student at george mason university in virginia, was taken into custody on tuesday by the fbi washington field office’s joint terrorism ... categoriesnews may 2024tagsbooby trap, counter terrorism, explosion, improvised explosive device   ied, israel, middle east, palestinian territories, subterranean warfare, the gaza strip, threat intelligence, ttps, urban warfare technology partners featured events aunav portable x ray systems from scanna msc

türkiye world middle east americas europe africa asia   pacific economy politics energy sports infographics opinion photo video environment education life culture opinion health science technology business news finance terminal anadolu images energy terminal aa academy green line discrimination line fact check line career aa corporate news jerusalem three israeli soldiers have been killed and 14 injured when explosive devices were detonated inside a building in the gaza strip city of khan younis, the army said saturday. “three soldiers were killed and 14 others were injured, including 5 in serious condition from the 450th battalion of the army, due to the explosion of explosive devices in a building in the city of khan younis in southern gaza,” the army said in a statement. army spokesman daniel haggai said “the army will investigate the explosions,” and that “the fighting in khan younis is difficult.” the number of fatalities in the ranks of the israeli army since oct. 7 has risen to 585, and 245 since the start of the ground operation on oct. 27 israel has ignored the international court of justice's provisional ruling and continued its attack on the gaza strip, killing at least 30,320 palestinians, mostly women and children, and injuring 71,533 since early october, according to palestinian health authorities israel has pounded the gaza strip since a cross border attack by hamas, which tel aviv said killed less than 1,200 people. the israeli war on gaza has pushed 85% of the territory's population into internal displacement amid acute shortages of food, clean water and medicine, while 60% of the enclave's infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed, according to the un. israel is accused of genocide at the international court of justice. an interim ruling in january ordered tel aviv to stop genocidal acts and take measures to guarantee that humanitarian assistance is provided to civilians in gaza.​​​​​​​ hostilities have continued unabated, however, and aid deliveries remain woefully insufficient to address the humanitarian catastrophe. *writing by rania abu shamala history editorial guidelines social media policies executive team domestic offices international offices media center communication rss subscription requests announcement service quality management privacy and cookies policy information policy diary business news finance terminal anadolu images energy terminal aa academy green line discrimination line fact check line iphone application ipad application android application

in partnership with the israeli army intensively bombarded residential areas in gaza when it lacked intelligence on the exact location of hamas commanders hiding underground, and intentionally weaponized toxic byproducts of bombs to suffocate militants in their tunnels, an investigation by +972 magazine and local call can reveal. the investigation, based on conversations with 15 israeli military intelligence and shin bet officers who have been involved in tunnel targeting operations since october 7, exposes how this strategy aimed to compensate for the army’s inability to pinpoint targets in hamas’ subterranean tunnel network. when targeting senior commanders in the group, the israeli military authorized the killing of “triple digit numbers” of palestinian civilians as “collateral damage,” and maintained close real time coordination with u.s. officials regarding the expected casualty figures. some of these strikes, which were the deadliest in the war and often used american bombs, are known to have killed israeli hostages despite concerns raised ahead of time by military officers. moreover, the lack of precise intelligence meant that in at least three major strikes, the army dropped several 2,000 pound bunker buster bombs that killed scores of civilians   part of a strategy known as “tiling”   without succeeding in killing the intended target. “pinpointing a target inside a tunnel is hard, so you attack a [wide] radius,” a military intelligence source told +972 and local call. given that the army would have only a vague approximation of the target’s location, the source explained, this radius would be as large as “tens and sometimes hundreds of meters,” meaning these bombing operations collapsed multiple apartment buildings on their occupants without warning. “suddenly you see how someone in the idf really behaves when given the opportunity to wipe out an entire residential block   and they do it,” the source added. the investigation also reveals how israel has known for years that the use of bunker buster bombs releases the lethal gas carbon monoxide as a byproduct, which can kill people inside a tunnel through asphyxiation even at a distance of hundreds of meters from the strike location. after discovering this by chance in 2017, the army first tested it as a strategy in gaza in 2021, and employed it in its efforts to kill hamas commanders after october 7. this way, the army could attack targets without knowing their precise location, and without having to rely on direct hits. “the gas stays underground, and people suffocate,” brig. gen. (res.) guy hazoot, the only source willing to be named, told +972 and local call. “[we realized] we could effectively target anyone underground using the air force’s bunker buster bombs, which, even if they don’t destroy the tunnel, release gases that kill anyone inside. the tunnel then becomes a death trap.” in january 2024, a spokesperson for the israeli army told +972 and local call in response to a previous investigation that it “has never used and does not currently use byproducts of bomb deployment to harm its targets, and there is no such ‘technique’ in the idf.” yet our new investigation reveals that the air force conducted physio chemical research on the effect of the gas in enclosed spaces, and the military has deliberated over the method’s ethical implications. three israeli hostages   nik beizer, ron sherman, and elia toledano   were definitively killed by asphyxiation as a result of a nov. 10, 2023, bombing that targeted ahmed ghandour, a hamas brigade commander in northern gaza. the army told their families that, at the time of the bombing, it was unaware that hostages were being held near ghandour. however, three sources with knowledge of the strike, which was led by the shin bet, told +972 and local call there was “ambiguous” intelligence indicating that hostages might be in the vicinity, yet the attack was still authorized. according to six sources, this was not an isolated case but one of “dozens” of israeli airstrikes that likely endangered or killed hostages. they described how the military command greenlighted attacks on the homes of suspected kidnappers and the tunnels from which senior hamas figures were directing the fighting. while attacks were aborted when there was specific, definitive intelligence indicating the presence of a hostage, the army routinely authorized strikes when the intelligence picture was murky and there was a “general” likelihood that hostages were present in the vicinity of a target. “mistakes definitely happened, and we bombed hostages,” one intelligence source said. israel’s efforts to maximize the chances of killing senior militants hiding underground also included attempts to crush parts of a tunnel network and trap the targets inside. sources described incidents where vehicles fleeing an attack site were bombed without specific intelligence about who was inside, based on the assumption that a senior hamas figure might be trying to escape. “the entire region felt and heard the explosions,” abdel hadi okal, a palestinian journalist from jabalia who witnessed several major israeli bombing operations   which palestinians often refer to as “fire belts”   during the early weeks of the war, told +972 and local call. “entire residential blocks were targeted with heavy missiles, causing buildings to collapse and fall on top of each other. ambulances and civil defense vehicles were unable to contend with the scale of the bombardment, so people had to use their hands and some light equipment to pull bodies from under the rubble of houses. there was no possibility for anyone to survive.” the gas effect was discovered unintentionally in october 2017. at the time, brig. gen. (res.) guy hazoot led a division in the southern command. he recounted the sequence of events to +972 and local call, corroborated by three other military sources. according to hazoot, the then idf chief of staff gadi eizenkot was abroad and had tasked his deputy, aviv kochavi, with addressing a pressing issue: palestinian islamic jihad (pij) had dug a tunnel underneath the fence that encages the gaza strip, reaching about two kilometers from kibbutz kissufim. kochavi ordered the air force to bomb the tunnel with a bunker buster bomb but instructed them to avoid killing more than five pij operatives to prevent unnecessary escalation in gaza. then, something unexpected happened. “even though we fired the bombs on [the israeli side] of the border, everyone in the tunnel [inside gaza] died,” hazoot explained. “another 12 pij rescue personnel entered after the explosion and also died from suffocation. even those with masks died.” this was the “breakthrough moment,” hazoot said, when it became clear that bunker buster bombs detonated in tunnels dispersed carbon monoxide gas as a byproduct, which remained in the tunnel for days. carbon monoxide, known as the “silent killer,” is colorless, odorless, and tasteless, and is particularly lethal to humans. annually, approximately 30,000 people die from inhaling it due to faulty heaters, engines, and furnaces in enclosed spaces with low oxygen levels. the air force subsequently conducted a physio chemical study on the effect of the gas in confined spaces, which found that it was difficult to predict the precise radius of its lethal spread. “there are probabilities,” a source in the air force explained to +972 and local call. “it’s not binary, where everyone within this radius dies and beyond it no one does. there’s a radius of high probability, medium probability, and low probability of dying from the gas.” security sources noted that using bunker buster bombs that release gas underground as a byproduct overcame the challenge of having to pinpoint a target’s exact location inside a tunnel. but it also presented a dilemma. “it was made clear to us how sensitive this issue is, the very fact that this effect exists,” the air force source said. a source who participated in a discussion about the use of the technique in 2021, led by the then chief of the army’s southern command, eliezer toledano, explained: “everyone took it very seriously in the discussion, the fact that gas is what kills. they feared it would cause significant damage to [israel’s] image.” military officials emphasized to +972 and local call that the intent was to use the chemical byproduct solely to kill hamas operatives “who intended to fight the idf.” hazoot, along with other security sources, also stressed that the bombs themselves are “conventional weapons,” as the gases are a byproduct of standard bombs, not chemical or biological warheads. “the gases have nowhere to escape,” hazoot said. “they stay underground, and people suffocate. it’s a conventional weapon, only its effect underground is different. the bombs become more lethal.” however, michael sfard, an israeli human rights lawyer and expert in international law, told +972 and local call: “even if the bombs releasing the gas are conventional and the gas is only a byproduct, the deliberate use of this ‘side effect’ as a method of warfare violates prohibitions outlined in the laws of armed conflict. the use of toxic or asphyxiating gas in combat contravenes the provisions of the chemical weapons convention and longstanding international declarations predating it, and is classified under the rome statute of the international criminal court as a war crime.” sarah harrison, a senior analyst at the international crisis group and a former pentagon lawyer who advised u.s. armed forces, affirmed that the intentional use of carbon monoxide as a weapon is illegal under customary international law. while bunker buster bombs are not outlawed per se, “if the intent is to only use the conventional weapon as a device to transport what is otherwise a chemical weapon, then that would be, in my opinion, an illegal use,” she told +972 and local call. “there are lots of lawful weapons you can use unlawfully.” in response to our inquiry, a spokesperson for the israeli army again denied that it uses this technique to kill hamas leaders, calling the allegation “baseless.” hazoot and other sources revealed that israel’s first attempt to employ bunker buster bombs to cause mass fatalities among militants through gas induced asphyxiation was in “operation lightning strike,” the massive bombing of hamas’ tunnel network during the broader “operation guardian of the walls” in may 2021. ahead of that operation, a source from the israeli air force explained, professional ranks in the air force raised concerns that the extensive use of bunker buster bombs to detonate underground could cause entire buildings above ground to collapse, endangering large numbers of civilians. “there was an effort to convey to the command level that this operation was risky, that buildings might collapse, and that we didn’t fully understand what might happen,” the source said. “but they went ahead with it anyway.” these predictions materialized during the operation on may 16, 2021. the attack on hamas’ tunnel network in the rimal neighborhood of gaza city collapsed several residential buildings, killing 44 civilians. hazoot explained that during “guardian of the walls,” the army aimed to mislead hamas into believing that israeli troops were about to invade gaza, prompting its operatives to retreat into the tunnels. in the attack to follow, he told the israeli newspaper israel hayom in an interview last year, the army expected to kill “between 500 and 800 operatives” through asphyxiation upon dropping “460 bunker buster bombs on them simultaneously.” the deception failed: hamas operatives did not enter the tunnels. yet the bombardment proceeded regardless. the sources stated that these attacks shocked some within the air force and southern command, as they felt the actions lacked military logic once it became evident that hamas operatives were not retreating to the tunnels   foreshadowing some of the army’s modes of operation since october 7. “at a certain point, [the army] realized hamas had figured out the strategy. and they said, ‘well, let’s just blow everything up and create destruction,’” a military source claimed. “there was no rational decision making. it didn’t feel like there was a purpose. it felt like an attempt to display power.” according to hazoot, hamas soon caught on. “hamas learned lessons from ‘guardian of the walls,’” he explained. “they purchased 1,300 blast doors and distributed them throughout the tunnels. they created multiple ventilation shafts to disperse the gases and also implemented new tunnel digging techniques involving twists and turns”   techniques which, according to hazoot, helped to trap gas and prevent it from spreading further. indeed, a hamas spokesperson confirmed to +972 and local call: “al qassam brigades took measures to protect its elements in the tunnels from the gases that the israeli army was sending during its strikes.” an intelligence source involved in israeli military activity in both gaza and lebanon told +972 and local call that the understanding within the security establishment is that hezbollah secretary general hassan nasrallah likely also died from asphyxiation   though in lebanon gas was not weaponized as a deliberate assassination method, as it was in gaza. “with nasrallah, dozens of bombs were dropped, and the idf hoped one of them would detonate and directly kill him in the bunker,” the source said. “in gaza, on the other hand, when attacking a tunnel, you don’t know exactly where the senior figure is located. so you attack several areas of the tunnel, creating the potential that he will die from asphyxiation.” the army’s deliberate use of gas induced asphyxiation as an assassination technique in gaza was also highlighted by nir dvori, a military analyst for israel’s channel 12, in his account of the bombing that killed senior hamas militant marwan issa in nuseirat refugee camp in march 2024. “the air force used bunker buster bombs and especially heavy explosives to strike the underground compound,” dvori wrote, citing military sources. “the reason for the heavy bombardment and secondary explosions was to ensure that anyone not killed by the blast itself or the tunnel collapse would die from asphyxiation or inhalation of hazardous substances.” militants were not the only ones who died from gas exposure. on nov. 10, 2023, the israeli army bombed a tunnel that it had identified as the hiding place of the commander of hamas’ northern gaza brigade, ahmed ghandour. the attack also killed three israeli hostages: ron sherman, nik beizer, and elia toledano. the army recovered their bodies and returned them to israel the following month. initially, the army told the hostages’ families that the three men had been murdered by hamas. later, however, they said that sherman, beizer, and toledano   whose bodies were found intact and bore no gunshot wounds   had died from carbon monoxide poisoning caused by israeli bombing. ten months after her son nik’s death, katya beizer was summoned to a meeting with a senior military intelligence officer and an air force commander responsible for the attack. they explained that the military was unaware of the hostages’ presence in the tunnel and that her son had died from a bomb dropped by the air force, which released toxic gas. “they said this type of weapon releases gases,” katya told +972 and local call. “i asked what kind of gases, and they immediately clarified that it was a conventional weapon, nothing prohibited.” she recounted that during the conversation, they admitted that the use of gas was intentional because it was “the only way to reach someone inside the tunnel.” sherman’s mother, ma’ayan, told the israeli investigative outlet the hottest place in hell that the head of the army’s hostages and missing persons command center, maj. gen. nitzan alon, explained to her that “the bombs are conventional, but they do have a certain side effect that causes the release of toxic gases due to a chemical reaction, and that’s the cause of death.” he also apologized, saying, “we didn’t know they were there.” nine days before ron’s death, on nov. 1, 2023, ma’ayan sherman had received a whatsapp message from someone at the hostages and missing persons command center assigned to her family. the message   seen by +972 and local call   included a flyer distributed by hamas, with the bold red heading: “a message to the israeli people.” the image showed her son ron, looking frightened, his hands raised, with text in both hebrew and arabic reading: “your sons are held captive by the resistance,” and “the bombing of hamas leaders will affect their fate.” the officer reassured ma’ayan that this was “only psychological warfare” and added, “there is no change as far as the idf is concerned. the working assumption is that ron is alive.” today, sherman views the flyer as further evidence that the military knowingly endangered her son’s life. “ignoring the flyer doesn’t make sense,” she said. “when i received the flyer, they told me to stay quiet. they told me not to talk about it.” however, +972 and local call have learned that the military’s claim that it had no intelligence that hostages were being held near ghandour is false. three security sources with knowledge of the attack’s planning revealed that the shin bet’s operations division, which led the strike, had received additional vague intelligence that could indicate a “medium likelihood” of hostages’ presence at the site. “the operation targeting ghandour was led by two reservists who worked in an impressive and professional manner, but they didn’t know if hostages were there,” a security source with knowledge of the operation explained. “there was some indication of a hostage’s body, or perhaps a live hostage, but it was unclear how to interpret it as the information was ambiguous,” the source added. “they didn’t know if the hostage was alive or dead, and even if alive, it wasn’t clear if they were in this particular location or another. and no one asked too many questions. everyone understood the pressure to act.” a second security source corroborated this account. “the failure was that they assumed they were dealing with corpses   that the hostages were already dead,” the source said. “if ghandour had been a less critical figure in the fighting, they might have handled it differently.” “there was an obsession with eliminating ghandour,” a third security source familiar with the strike explained. “there was a maneuver [of israeli ground forces] in northern gaza, and there was a strong desire to take him out. target analysts operate like salespeople. they want their target to be bombed.” this was not an isolated mistake. six intelligence sources described similar cases where strikes targeting hamas operatives underground were approved even when there was a likelihood that hostages might be harmed. they emphasized that this was not due to negligence by soldiers; instead, it was the result of a policy that was in effect during at least the first six months of the war. that policy, the six sources explained, permitted the authorization of airstrikes so long as there was no positive indication that hostages were present alongside the target; in other words, commanders were not required to rule out such a possibility. this applied even when the intelligence picture was murky, or there was a “general, nonspecific” likelihood of hostages being held at the location. in the sources’ view, the large gray area between having a positive indication of the presence of hostages, and being able to rule out their presence, enabled “dozens” of strikes that endangered and killed hostages. security sources suggested that one reason for this policy was the organizational separation between the attacking units   such as those in the gaza division, the southern command, and the shin bet   and the hostages and missing persons command center, which reports to the army’s special operations division and is responsible for relaying “no strike zones” in which hostages are suspected to be held. this separation, they said, created a problematic dynamic resembling a “tug of war” between different entities. three intelligence sources highlighted this issue during the first weeks of the war, particularly in dozens of strikes carried out by the gaza division on the homes of hamas operatives suspected of abducting israelis on october 7. “no one knowingly bombed a hostage; that didn’t happen,” one source emphasized. “but the thirst for revenge against the kidnappers was so great that they bombed their houses without knowing whether hostages were inside.” a second source also confirmed participating in “dozens” of strikes against the homes of suspected kidnappers. “the hostages simply didn’t factor into the initial fire policy,” the source said. “i remember going home for the first time after a week or two and realizing there were protests, and everyone was talking about the hostages. it felt surreal.” these strikes on suspected kidnappers’ homes continued for about two weeks until the intelligence picture became clearer and a significantly larger number of “no strike zones” were communicated from the hostages and missing persons command center to the gaza division. “it was insane,” the first source said. “you’re bombing the house of someone suspected of being a kidnapper. by sheer luck, we didn’t kill dozens of hostages. there weren’t ‘no strike zones,’ and you didn’t know where the hostages were. i voiced [my frustrations] loudly   it infuriated me. they didn’t take it into consideration. it wasn’t the number one priority. the focus was revenge against the kidnappers.” “these were typically nukhba operatives,” the second source explained, referring to hamas’ special forces, “and as part of the operation, we’d bomb their houses. there was a chance the [hostages] were there. in hindsight, we know they were kept more underground, but mistakes definitely happened, and we bombed hostages.” the military has not disclosed how many hostages, if any, were killed by air force strikes during the first two weeks of the war. hamas, however, claimed in three separate telegram messages that 27 hostages were killed in israeli airstrikes during the week following october 7. overall, according to the hostages and missing families forum, 30 hostages are known to have died in captivity after being kidnapped alive to gaza. the permissive fire policy was also evident in strikes targeting senior hamas leaders, which were often carried out under the direction of the shin bet or southern command. “there’s a certain disconnect within the shin bet’s operations division from the rest of the idf chain of command,” a security source noted. “it’s a very insular body that demands a lot of attention and resources. its sole purpose is to kill every senior hamas figure, and for them, the success of the war hinges on this goal. “i had an issue with how some people there were willing to do absolutely anything to achieve that objective,” the source continued. “the number of [civilians] they were willing to kill   the way they saw it, everything was just an obstacle in their way, even the hostages.” other sources qualified these statements, emphasizing that the issue of hostages was often taken seriously but largely depended on the commander. a security source noted that, in the early stages of the war, the commanders’ political opinions also played a role. “every strike targeting a senior figure is carefully weighed,” the source said. “sometimes it depends on how loudly the intelligence officer shouts, how much the person in charge cares, and even their political stance. given that the issue of the hostages became politicized, there were those who believed that the end justified the means.” at the time of the assassination of ghandour in november, the tunnel complex where he was located had not been designated as a “no strike zone” by the hostages and missing persons command center. therefore, formally, the shin bet had no reason to avoid directing the strike against him, despite intelligence materials that raised questions among some analysts. “to ensure you’re not targeting a hostage, you’d need to know the exact location of every single one,” a security source explained. “you don’t know that. so when you strike a senior hamas figure, there’s a reasonable chance you’re also killing a hostage.” this probability increased because, according to the sources, the army had intelligence that hamas leaders often surrounded themselves with hostages in tunnels. on feb. 14, 2024, the israeli army bombed a tunnel complex beneath the city of khan younis, aiming to kill commanders of hamas’ local battalion. six hostages   alexander danzig, yoram metzger, haim perry, yagev buchshtav, nadav popplewell, and avraham munder   were being held nearby, and their tunnel was filled with carbon monoxide. in june, the military informed the families that the six hostages had died in hamas captivity. osnat perry, the wife of 80 year old haim, recounted how a military delegation came to her home and explained that the hostages “died from carbon monoxide gas as a result of the deep strikes.” the estimated distance between the hostages and the site of the bombing was between 120 and 200 meters   within the suspected lethal range of the gas, as assessed by the military. “they weren’t directly hit, but the tunnel they were in became filled with this gas, which is highly toxic and kills within minutes,” osnat explained, adding that she took comfort from the fact that, according to the military delegation, her husband’s death would have been pain free. “death from this gas is painless because people lose consciousness immediately, and within a few minutes, they die as if they’re falling asleep.” the army’s claims that perry died from carbon monoxide came three months before his body, and the bodies of the five hostages other hostages who were with him, were retrieved from khan younis in august. all six bodies, according to both the army and the families, bore signs of gunshot wounds, and at least some bore evidence of abuse by their captors. in december, the idf spokesperson announced that the “most plausible possibility” was that, following the strike, the kidnappers executed the hostages and were themselves killed as a “byproduct” of the attack. according to the military, it was also possible that the hostages died from the gas released by the strike and were later shot by other militants who arrived at the tunnel some time later. as haaretz reported at the time: “the military estimates that had they not been executed, the hostages would have died from inhaling the gas released by the strike.” “what we were told was very clear: if the captors hadn’t executed them due to the army’s proximity, they would have died from the gas,” osnat said. speaking before the ceasefire, she added that talking about it “tears her soul apart” but she does so in the hope of preventing it from happening to the remaining hostages. the families were informed that at the time of the strike, the military had no positive indication that hostages were present at the site. however, following the incident, which the army classified as a mistake, the approval process for such strikes was tightened. instead of permitting strikes to proceed as long as there was “no specific indication” of the presence of hostages, a military source explained, greater weight would now be given to the clarity of the intelligence about the hostages’ locations, and general indications about their proximity to senior hamas commanders. “when the first mistake happened, with ron sherman, it became clear there was a danger,” osnat said. “but then it kept happening, over and over. i requested a meeting with the defense minister and still haven’t received one. i want to ask him if this is a policy. because this isn’t a one off mistake by the military or an operational error. if they don’t know where all the hostages are and still decide to bomb tunnels, then it’s a policy.” among the relatives of hostages killed in gaza, there were concerns that highlighting the role of the israeli government or military in the deaths of their loved ones could be interpreted   particularly abroad   as absolving hamas of responsibility for its crimes. this, they said, has made it difficult for them to voice public criticism. rani, the son of yoram metzger who died in the tunnel with perry, emphasized that regardless of the exact cause of death, responsibility lies with hamas which committed a war crime by abducting his 80 year old father. “from the very beginning, we’ve said that our father was murdered by hamas, not by anyone else,” he said. a relative of another hostage killed in gaza, who preferred to remain anonymous, told +972 and local call: “my relative died because of an israeli order. no doubt about it. but i’m not going to give our enemies ammunition.” in response to our inquiry, a spokesperson for the israeli army stated: “the investigation into the deaths of six hostages in an underground tunnel in the khan younis area, and the investigation into those of three hostages held in the tunnel compound from which the commander of hamas’ northern brigade, ahmed ghandour, operated, were presented transparently to their families and the public in recent months. it should be emphasized that in both cases, the idf had no indications or suspicion of hostages being at or around the site of the attack.” the lack of precise intelligence as to the locations of senior militants underground also led the israeli military to adopt a particularly lethal targeting method: wiping out several adjacent apartment buildings, without warning their inhabitants. by bombing these residential blocks, the army aimed to crush parts of the tunnel network believed to be underneath, therefore trapping the target inside or killing him by flooding the tunnel with toxic gas. to maximize the chances of assassinating a target, the army command authorized the killing of “hundreds” of palestinian civilians in these strikes   which, according to the sources, were carried out in coordination with american officials who received live updates regarding the approved “collateral damage” figures. previous investigations by +972 and local call, corroborated by a recent investigation by the new york times, found that israel loosened constraints after october 7 to allow for strikes on hamas leaders that would risk killing more than 100 civilians. in response to our inquiry for this investigation, an israeli army spokesperson denied these reports, suggesting that “the claims that the idf approved and implemented an attack during the war from which hundreds of civilians were expected to be killed, and that the idf bombed ‘entire neighborhoods,’ are baseless.” in an interview with msnbc shortly before his presidential term ended, joe biden described voicing his disapproval over this policy to israeli prime minister benjamin netanyahu on his first visit to israel after october 7. “i said, ‘bibi, you can’t be carpet bombing these communities,’” biden recounted. “and he said to me: ‘well, you did it. you carpet bombed’   not his exact words, but   ‘you carpet bombed berlin. you dropped a nuclear bomb. you killed thousands of innocent people.’ “he was going after me for saying, ‘you can’t indiscriminately bomb civilian areas. even if the bad guys are there, you can’t take out two , ten , twelve , fifteen hundred innocent people in order to get the one bad guy,’” biden continued. according to biden, netanyahu responded that these were people who had killed israelis and were “all over in these tunnels, and no one has any idea how many miles of tunnels there are.” biden conceded that, in his view, this was a “legitimate argument.” on oct. 17, 2023, the israeli air force carried out a strike in al bureij refugee camp targeting ayman nofal, the commander of hamas’ central brigade. two security sources stated that the strike had been approved with a “collateral damage” figure of up to 300 palestinians civilians, while a third source claimed the approved number was 100. the strike   which succeeded in killing nofal, and is estimated to have killed at least 92 civilians, including 40 children   was executed over a “very wide radius,” according to the sources, consistent with the attack method detailed above. “i saw [the strike] with my own eyes, on the screen, in real time,” recounted an intelligence source involved in the assassination attempt, who tracked it via a drone. “i saw all the dead people lying nearby. they looked like ants. i honestly remember seeing rivers of human bodies there after the explosion. it was very hard. [the army] didn’t know exactly where he was, so they bombed extensively around the area to ensure he was killed.” amro al khatib, a resident of al bureij camp, witnessed the attack. “between 16 and 18 family homes were wiped out in the strike,” he told +972 and local call. “we pulled out many dead, in pieces.” khaled eid lost 15 members of his family, including his parents, and spent three days searching through the rubble until he found fragments of their bodies. “we searched for them with our hands, along with volunteers and family friends,” he told +972 and local call. two weeks later, the southern command approved a series of airstrikes targeting hamas’ jabalia battalion commander ibrahim biari, in jabalia refugee camp. this strike was even more devastating and drew stronger international criticism. the attack deliberately flattened an entire residential block, according to a security source involved in the operation. a wall street journal investigation, which included satellite imagery analysis, found that the bombing leveled at least 12 residential buildings. the heart of the camp was reduced to craters   which contained the bodies of at least 126 people, including 68 children. “during [that attack], the head of the targets branch in the southern command said, ‘[biari] is killing soldiers right now, and we have to take him out already,’” a security source involved in the strikes recalled. “they were frantic about it because it was right around the time we were maneuvering in the jabalia area.” the source noted that the permissible number of civilian casualties was set at “around 300,” but the calculation was imprecise. according to him, chief of staff herzi halevi personally approved the killing of hundreds of palestinians in the strike after “deliberating” on the matter. “a whole neighborhood died for ibrahim biari,” said another intelligence source who worked on the operation. he explained that although biari was only a battalion commander, the breakdown in hamas’ chain of command during the war elevated battalion commanders to “influential levels, heavily involved on the ground, and critical to managing the fighting.” the source said that as a result, unprecedented authorizations were granted to kill hundreds of civilians in order to assassinate these figures. palestinians who survived the strike told +972 and local call that it wiped out entire families   three generations   with no one left to bear witness, corroborating testimonies given to airwars. wafa hijazi, 22, was buried alive but survived. “the attack turned our house into a mass grave,” she told +972 and local call. “there was terror. total darkness. and a cloud like a boiling flame that covered the place. that’s how my mother died, and all my sisters and their babies.” buried under the rubble, hijazi tried to scream but couldn’t. then the hand of her father, who wasn’t home at the time of the bombing, reached in to pull her out. when she emerged, she found her mother’s hand severed from her body, as well as the body parts of her younger brothers. in the strikes targeting biari and nofal, the army employed what it calls a “broad area attack,” involving the destruction of entire residential blocks and mass palestinian casualties. the strikes relied on a “polygon”   a general estimate, within a wide radius, of where the target might be   which could not always be narrowed down. “the goal is to collapse the tunnel system and trap [the target] inside,” a security source explained. “because the layout is so intricate, you want to ensure there are no escapees. in underground warfare, you almost never have an exact coordinate, just a polygon. there’s no choice but to attack broadly.” after receiving broad coordinates from the intelligence agencies, the air force would then drop bunker buster bombs all over the area. “we would get some kind of polygon, a rectangle in gaza, and they’d tell us: ‘somewhere in here there’s an underground complex, but we can’t pinpoint it any further,” an air force source involved in tunnel targeting strikes explained. “we know the blast radius of a bunker buster bomb, which is a few meters, [so we take that as] a square and then ‘tile’ the area [with bombs].” there wasn’t always certainty that these strikes, over such broad areas, would hit the intended target. “tiling” an entire polygon required a large number of bombs, and according to the source there were not always enough. “[sometimes] we would only cover 50 percent of the area, but we’d prefer to have a 50 percent chance of success than none at all. if the polygon is 20 [units wide], for instance, you might drop three bombs longways and three across, so you end up dropping about 10 bombs on an area where you’re not even sure if [the target] is there.” this partial intelligence picture led to instances in which the army dropped bunker buster bombs that killed scores of palestinians, while the target underground survived. this happened twice in strikes aimed at the commander of hamas’ rafah brigade, mohammed shabana. “the first time, the strike failed because a [technological] capability hadn’t been sufficiently developed yet and the polygon was off,” a source involved in these operations said. “the second time, there was an issue with the bombs: there simply weren’t enough.” another intelligence source involved in the assassination attempts on shabana explained that the airstrikes were based on weak intelligence. “[these were] much broader attacks than you really need,” he said. “they wanted him to have no chance of getting out of there alive. so they just bombed the entire neighborhood.” such strikes are almost always conducted using bombs dropped at a 90 degree angle with delay mechanisms to ensure they detonate underground and maximize the chances of killing the target. during the first year of the war, the united states supplied israel with 14,000 mk 84 bombs, each weighing 2000 pounds, which were used in these operations. in may, however, the biden administration suspended a shipment of 1,800 of these bombs due to concerns about the conduct of the war and israel’s invasion of rafah. an intelligence source described an instance when the army was planning to target a commander in gaza with “80 bunker buster bombs” in order to “tile” a very wide radius. however, a decision was made to conserve resources. “they knew he was underground but didn’t know exactly where,” the source said. ultimately, approval was given to use 10 bombs. “it wasn’t enough   he survived,” the source added. in recent weeks, further evidence has emerged that the israeli military was relying on limited intelligence while conducting its attacks on gaza. after the ceasefire came into effect, the army admitted that two hamas leaders it had previously claimed to have killed   al shati battalion commander haitham al hawajri in december 2023, and beit hanoun battalion commander hussein fayad in may 2024   had actually survived. the army conceded that the prior announcements were made on the basis of “incorrect” intelligence. one security source said the united states supplied israel with its own intelligence, but it wasn’t as useful as the army hoped. “we had high expectations regarding the americans, but they were dashed,” a security source said. “they were deeply committed to the issue of the hostages and to [killing the then leader of hamas in gaza, yahya] sinwar because they believed that the sooner sinwar was eliminated, the sooner the war would end. they made a strong effort and shared intelligence with us, but in the end, their sources weren’t as good as ours.” according to an israeli intelligence source, the person responsible for improving and fortifying hamas’ tunnel infrastructure was mohammed sinwar, the brother of yahya and his successor as the group’s leader in the gaza strip. after the tunnel bombings of “operation lightning strike” in 2021, he analyzed israel’s strikes and improved the tunnels accordingly. “[mohammed sinwar] identified that israel strikes in straight lines and realized the need for branching paths,” the source said. “they’re smarter than we give them credit for.” according to the source, the addition of branching paths to the tunnels led israel to conduct strikes over even wider areas. “you can determine that a senior figure is in a certain neighborhood, but that’s a very broad radius because it’s kilometers of tunnels and you don’t know which branch he went into,” the source said. “you’re lucky if you get even one indication that a senior figure is in a certain tunnel route,” the source continued. “unless someone explicitly says, ‘this is mohammed shabana’s tunnel,’ you sometimes can’t even tell that it’s a senior figure’s tunnel   it could just be a supply tunnel.” nevertheless, the source admitted that before october 7, he didn’t think he would see a senior israeli commander ordering the destruction of an entire residential block to target a single hamas figure. all 15 security sources interviewed for this story, including those highly critical of israeli policies, emphasized that hamas designed its tunnel infrastructure to allow its senior commanders to direct fighting from beneath or close to densely populated areas. (a hamas spokesperson described this claim as “completely false.”) however, experts in international law stressed that even in this case, israel is still obligated to protect civilians. “imagine this was tel aviv and not jabalia, and that in order to reach “the pit” [the nickname for the israeli army’s underground operations center at the kirya, situated near residential and commercial areas in tel aviv], the neighborhoods around the kirya would be bombed,” the human rights lawyer michael sfard said. “you don’t know where the military tunnels under the kirya reach, you don’t know exactly where your target is, and you want to make sure he is killed. so you bomb [the adjacent streets]? nobody would accept such a thing.” suhad bishara, legal director of the haifa based human rights organization adalah, concurred. “even when there is a legitimate military target, if the military force knows that it is likely to disproportionately harm civilian lives, then it is prohibited under international law,” she explained. “this is all the more true when you do not know exactly where your military target is, and therefore determine a radius and strike it indiscriminately, while harming many civilians.” “the discourse in israeli society is that it’s their fault   they build beneath schools,” an intelligence source said. “but is it legitimate to blow up a school? is it legitimate to kill dozens of people because of that, as we did?” “we bombed a lot of ambulances that we knew had hamas operatives inside them,” a second intelligence source said. (a hamas spokesperson stated that “israel has not provided any evidence of the use of ambulances in resistance operations,” and described the allegation as “a pretext to destroy the health sector in the gaza strip.”) “they’re despicable. but you ask yourself: is it worth it? you’re faced with a very difficult situation. and you’re simply given a free hand. if we didn’t have to manage our munitions economically, we would’ve kept destroying things in insane quantities.” five sources emphasized that these tactics were driven by pressure from the political and military leadership who wanted to present a victory image to the public. “they approved triple digit [civilian casualties], even for battalion commanders, because we were getting more desperate for some kind of successful targeted killing,” one intelligence source said. “every success like that, people see it on tv.” “what bothered me most was how blatantly they lie in the [israeli] media,” a second intelligence source added. “[they say] we’re about to get them, we’re about to win, we’re about to eliminate senior figures. “it was obvious how much the army, the security establishment, and the shin bet were aligned with the media,” the second source continued. “everything they wanted to convey was reflected [in the news stories]. the military reporters are ultimately fed by these systems, which feel completely comfortable lying when needed. in the first months of the war at least, i had the feeling that the media and the army were one   that the media was an arm of the military.” four intelligence officials stated that the brutality of hamas’ attack on october 7 made it easier for them and their commanders to justify large scale attacks on civilians in gaza. according to the sources, the belief that all palestinians in the strip were “involved” to some extent in enabling hamas’ activities was never official policy, but it was present in hallway conversations and coffee breaks “all the time.” while one source justified attacking residential blocks by claiming that the civilians living above a tunnel must have known hamas was operating underneath them, another intelligence source found it harder to justify. “the people responsible for most of the killings are the intelligence personnel, not the forces on the ground,” he said. “we killed many more people than [combat] soldiers or pilots, because we actually told them where to bomb.” this article has been updated to include responses to +972 and local call’s inquiries from hazem qassem, a hamas spokesperson in the gaza strip, that were received after publication. yuval abraham is a journalist and filmmaker based in jerusalem. our team has been devastated by the horrific events of this latest war. the world is reeling from israel’s unprecedented onslaught on gaza, inflicting mass devastation and death upon besieged palestinians, as well as the atrocious attack and kidnappings by hamas in israel on october 7. our hearts are with all the people and communities facing this violence. our team has been devastated by the horrific events of this latest war. the world is reeling from israel’s unprecedented onslaught on gaza, inflicting mass devastation and death upon besieged palestinians, as well as the atrocious attack and kidnappings by hamas in israel on october 7. our hearts are with all the people and communities facing this violence. we are in an extraordinarily dangerous era in israel palestine. the bloodshed has reached extreme levels of brutality and threatens to engulf the entire region. emboldened settlers in the west bank, backed by the army, are seizing the opportunity to intensify their attacks on palestinians. the most far right government in israel’s history is ramping up its policing of dissent, using the cover of war to silence palestinian citizens and left wing jews who object to its policies. this escalation has a very clear context, one that +972 has spent the past 14 years covering: israeli society’s growing racism and militarism, entrenched occupation and apartheid, and a normalized siege on gaza. we are well positioned to cover this perilous moment   but we need your help to do it. this terrible period will challenge the humanity of all of those working for a better future in this land. palestinians and israelis are already organizing and strategizing to put up the fight of their lives. can we count on your support ? +972 magazine is a leading media voice of this movement, a desperately needed platform where palestinian and israeli journalists, activists, and thinkers can report on and analyze what is happening, guided by humanism, equality, and justice. join us.

israel deploys more troops and launches drone strikes on the occupied west bank as it refocuses its war on palestine. at least nine killed, dozens wounded in israeli attack on jenin this live page is now closed. you can continue to follow our coverage here. follow al jazeera english:

by amichai cohen, yuval shany .pp multiple authors boxes wrapper.pp multiple authors layout inline.multiple authors target shortcode .pp author boxes avatar img { width: 80px !important; height: 80px !important; } .pp multiple authors boxes wrapper.pp multiple authors layout inline.multiple authors target shortcode .pp author boxes avatar img { border radius: 50% !important; } .pp multiple authors boxes wrapper.pp multiple authors layout inline.multiple authors target shortcode .pp author boxes meta a { background color: #655997 !important; } .pp multiple authors boxes wrapper.pp multiple authors layout inline.multiple authors target shortcode .pp author boxes meta a { color: #ffffff !important; } .pp multiple authors boxes wrapper.pp multiple authors layout inline.multiple authors target shortcode .pp author boxes meta a:hover { color: #ffffff !important; } .pp multiple authors boxes wrapper.pp multiple authors layout inline.multiple authors target shortcode .ppma author user_email 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inline.multiple authors target shortcode .ppma author user_url profile data { color: #ffffff !important; } .pp multiple authors boxes wrapper.pp multiple authors layout inline.multiple authors target shortcode .ppma author user_url profile data:hover { color: #ffffff !important; } .pp multiple authors boxes wrapper.pp multiple authors layout inline.multiple authors target shortcode .pp author boxes recent posts title { border bottom style: dotted !important; } .pp multiple authors boxes wrapper.pp multiple authors layout inline.multiple authors target shortcode .pp author boxes recent posts item { text align: left !important; } .pp multiple authors boxes wrapper.pp multiple authors layout inline.multiple authors target shortcode .pp multiple authors boxes li { border style: none !important; } .pp multiple authors boxes wrapper.pp multiple authors layout inline.multiple authors target shortcode .pp multiple authors boxes li { color: #3c434a !important; } .pp multiple authors boxes wrapper.pp multiple authors layout inline.multiple authors target shortcode .ppma author category wrap .ppma category group { margin bottom: px !important; } .pp multiple authors boxes wrapper.pp multiple authors layout inline.multiple authors target shortcode .ppma author category wrap .ppma category group { margin right: px !important; } .pp multiple authors boxes wrapper.pp multiple authors layout inline.multiple authors target shortcode .ppma author category wrap { font size: px !important; } .pp multiple authors boxes wrapper.pp multiple authors layout inline.multiple authors target shortcode .ppma author category wrap .ppma category group title { font weight: !important; } .pp multiple authors layout inline ul.pp multiple authors boxes ul { display: flex; } .pp multiple authors layout inline ul.pp multiple authors boxes ul li { margin right: 10px } .pp multiple authors layout inline .pp author boxes name::after{ content: ","; } .pp multiple authors layout inline .pp multiple authors boxes ul .pp multiple authors boxes li:last of type .pp author boxes name::after{ content: ""; }.pp multiple authors boxes wrapper.pp multiple authors wrapper.pp multiple authors layout inline.multiple authors target shortcode.box post id 17409.box instance id 1.ppma_boxes_17409 ul li > div:nth child(1) {flex: 1 !important;}.pp multiple authors boxes wrapper.pp multiple authors wrapper.pp multiple authors layout inline.multiple authors target shortcode.box post id 17409.box instance id 1.ppma_boxes_17409 ul li > div:nth child(1) {flex: 1 !important;} | oct 11, 2024 on 17 september, 2024, thousands of pagers distributed by hezbollah to its operatives in lebanon and syria exploded. on the following day, hundreds of walkie talkies used by hezbollah operatives also exploded. according to the lebanese ministry of health, more than 30 people were killed in both attacks and thousands were injured (most of the casualties appear to have been hezbollah operatives, but a few civilian casualties were also reported, including two children who died in the attack). while no state acknowledged responsibility for these explosions, media reports have strongly suggested that israel is responsible for them. new york times and washington post reporting suggests the following sequence of events. for years, israeli intelligence identified pagers as a possible way to penetrate hezbollah’s communication systems. as early as 2020, hezbollah’s late leader, hassan nasrallah, warned members of the group against the use of cell phones, because he feared israel was monitoring their cell phone conversations, and tracking their movements. in february 2024, hezbollah decided to go “low tech” in order to evade israel’s monitoring. anticipating this, israel formed a shell corporation in hungary called b.a.c. consulting, which procured a license to manufacture pagers from the taiwanese corporation gold apollo. hezbollah ordered 5,000 new pagers from b.a.c., through an intermediary, and distributed them to its operatives and some of its allies. the pagers were particularly attractive for military use by hezbollah since they had long battery life, they were rugged and reliable, and could send encrypted messages. as it turns out, israeli intelligence, operating through b.a.c., produced for hezbollah specially designed pagers containing batteries laced with small quantities of the explosive petn, which is difficult to detect. the explosives were designed to detonate after a specific encrypted message was sent to them, activating an on switch in the explosive charge. the actual explosion occurred shortly afterwards either by pager holders pressing two buttons manually with both of their hands to view the encrypted message or through a second activating message. on 17 september, the detonation order was given and thousands of pagers exploded. twelve persons were reportedly killed by the explosions (two of them children, most likely of hezbollah operatives). nearly 3,000 people were injured, most of them suffering injuries to the hands and face. on 18 september, a second set of explosions took place resulting in more casualties. this time the attacks were focused on walkie talkies, which were probably in use by hezbollah for a longer period of time (perhaps from as early as 2015). while there appears to be broad appreciation among military experts of the sophistication of israel’s intelligence services and the technical prowess they demonstrated in the pager attack, professional debates regarding the legality of the attack reveal deep disagreements (see e.g., here, here and here). whereas some commentators described the attack as the “most precise anti terrorist attack” ever conducted, un officials referred to them as unlawful, and possibly even criminal. these debates indicate not only the deep polarization of expert opinions relating to the middle east conflict, but also the real challenge posed to international humanitarian law (ihl) both by the introduction of new means and method of warfare and by lingering problems involving the conduct of hostilities involving irregular forces immersed in a civilian population. in this post, we seek to revisit some aspects of the controversy surrounding the pagers attack. we analyze the attack in light of subsequent developments in the armed conflict between israel and hezbollah and highlight factual and legal uncertainties that complicate the analysis. these uncertainties prevent, in our view, a conclusive judgment on the legality of the attack before more information becomes available. to be clear, we have no independent knowledge regarding the details of the attack. we therefore base our tentative analysis and conclusions on media reports and on what we perceive to be reasonable factual assumptions about what actually happened. criticisms relating to the legality of the operation have been raised concerning three legal frameworks: first, israel’s right to use of force in lebanon (jus ad bellum); second, questions of distinction, proportionality and the obligation to take precautionary measures in targeting under the laws of armed conflict; and third, the legality of using exploding pagers under the laws regulating choice of weapons (or means or methods of warfare). we address below, in turn, these three sets of criticisms. jus ad bellum the first criticism levelled against the pagers attack pertains to the legality of israel’s use of force in lebanon. the main claim raised in this connection is that only if hezbollah’s military operations are attributed to the state of lebanon is israel entitled to use force inside the latter’s territory. other issues raised, which appear to us to be less significant in nature, are the concern that the timing of the attack was motivated by fears that the covert operation would be revealed a consideration not captured by jus ad bellum tests of necessity and the claim that israel had no right to self defense because hezbollah declared that it would halt its military operations against israel once israel agreed to a cease fire in gaza. the first claim involves a long standing debate in international law regarding the right to apply force in self defense in response to an armed attack by a non state actor. this debate goes back to post 9/11 un security council resolutions and the 2004 international court of justice advisory opinion on the wall in occupied palestinian territory (see para. 139). while the debate over uses of force in cases involving states that are unable or unwilling to curb the operations of a non state actor based in their territory appears to be inconclusive (see e.g., here and here), it could be claimed that in the specific case of the israel hezbollah armed conflict, hezbollah’s activities could be attributed to lebanon itself. this is either because hezbollah constitutes part of the lebanese government, or because hezbollah acts as the de facto armed forces of lebanon in the south of the country. arguably, article 9 of the articles on state responsibility, which attributes responsibility to states for acts by a “person or group of persons [that] is in fact exercising elements of the governmental authority in the absence or default of the official authorities and in circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those elements of authority,” allows attribution of acts of “resistance” undertaken by hezbollah in parts of the country placed outside the actual control of the lebanese army to the lebanese state. this is especially so, because hezbollah has been recognized by the lebanese government as a military force that operates alongside the lebanese army and complements its activities. the upshot of this situation appears to be that, to the extent that hezbollah attacks against israel from 8 october, 2023 onwards constitute an armed attack, israel has the legal right to take self defense measures against hezbollah, and probably also against the lebanese state (which incidentally, for jus in bello, purposes would make the conflict an international armed conflict). we note in this regard that between 8 october 2023 and 17 september 2024, hezbollah fired more than 8,000 rockets towards israel, reaching a peak of 1,300 rockets in the month of august alone. more than 60,000 israelis had to leave their homes in northern israel, because of these rocket attacks and dozens of civilians and soldiers on the israeli side were killed. considerable damage to civilian and military objects also resulted. this level of armed violence appears to cross the threshold for an armed attack under international law. the other jus ad bellum points mentioned above seem to us to be legally unfounded. regardless of the particular tactical circumstances that led to the choice of time for launching the pagers attack, it is now clear that the attack was an initial step in a broader military campaign designed to end hezbollah’s armed attacks on israel and to remove the grave and imminent security threat this organization poses. the fact that the israeli major counter attack was undertaken almost a year after hezbollah’s attacks started, following a series of failed attempts to end hezbollah’s use of force through resorting to more measured military responses and diplomatic means, appears to us to clearly meet the jus ad bellum test of necessity. in the same vein, the argument that israel was legally required to accept a ceasefire deal in gaza on terms which it considers unacceptable to it (i.e., which would leave hamas in control of the gaza strip) in order to stop hezbollah’s rocket attacks, and that its failure to do so implies lack of military necessity, appears to us to be baseless. as a non state actor, hezbollah has no legal right to use force against israel (even if one is of the view that israel’s military operation in gaza is unlawful and even if hezbollah’s acts can be ultimately attributed to lebanon which has not itself claimed that it is exercising collective self defense). moreover, it is not in a position to compel israel to accept its political demands regarding the gaza strip, which is the implicit assumption underlying the lack of necessity claim. targeting the second criticism directed against the legality of the pagers attack revolves around issues of targeting. it could be argued that israel did not know, and perhaps could not have known, who holds any specific pager at the exact time it exploded. pagers were also perhaps disseminated to non combatants and uninvolved civilians, including children who might have picked them up accidentally just before they exploded. as a result, the attack might have been indiscriminate and, perhaps, also disproportionate. to discuss this criticism, we must make some factual assumptions. first, hezbollah’s main goal in acquiring 5,000 new pagers appears to have to enable non geo localized and encrypted communication with its operatives in ways that avoid possible monitoring by israel. they were also designed to withstand difficult operational conditions (long battery life and rugged and reliable features). it therefore makes sense to us to assume that the pagers served military operational purposes which required a high degree of confidentiality. if this is indeed the case, it is also sensible to make a second assumption, that is, that the vast majority of persons holding the pagers were members of hezbollah who were involved in the military operational activities of the organization (i.e., members of its military branch as opposed to members of other branches such the political, judicial and welfare branch). this assumption is supported by news reports that describe most of those killed or injured by the attack as “fighters.” we note in this regard that the military branch of hezbollah comprises of some 30,000 fighters (and about 20,000 reservists). it is therefore likely, and this is our third assumption, that the 5,000 new pagers were distributed selectively, mostly to valuable military operatives that the hezbollah high command wished to directly communicate with on a confidential basis. granted, we also know from media reports that some pagers were probably given to other members of the organization (such as medical staff, who may or may not have had connections to military activities) and other allies (such as the iranian ambassador), who were apparently inside the operational information “loop.” these assumed facts allow us to make a number of legal observations. first, regarding the very legality of the attacked targets, article 52(2) of the first additional protocol to the geneva conventions which reflects a norm of customary international law applicable in both international and non international armed conflicts (iacs and niacs, respectively) provides that attacks against objects must only be directed at military objectives defined as “those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.” as there are strong indications that the pagers were used for military communication purposes in operational contexts, they appear to be by purpose and use military objectives. the events which unfolded after the pagers attack illustrate the dramatic military advantage their destruction or neutralization provided israel. over and beyond the confusion generated by the spectacular collapse of hezbollah’s communication system, the attack compelled leaders in the organization to resort to face to face meetings to coordinate future activities. such meetings, in turn, created operational opportunities for the israeli air force to target participants in them. it has been claimed that designation of the pagers themselves as the target of the operation is “counterfactual” because israel could have resorted to other, less lethal means to neutralize or destroy them. further, it was suggested that the method of detonation by which operatives were encouraged to use both hands to open an encrypted message, was intentionally directed to cause hezbollah operatives serious hand injuries. it is indeed highly probable that israel pursued through the pagers attack two different goals: taking down hezbollah’s communication system; and incapacitating many hezbollah operatives. however, the fact that a single attack has two goals does not mean that each of these goals cannot justify the attack independently. on the assumption that the pagers were intended for military use, we are of the view that the very precise attack on them meets the test of distinction. as for the claim that israel could have resorted to other methods of sabotaging hezbollah’s communication system which is also based on factual assumptions regarding the operational alternatives that were actually available to israel and the detection risk and repair possibilities appertaining to each alternative we believe it actually relates to another legal requirement, namely, “the choice of means and methods of attack” and the need to avoid or minimize “incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects” (art. 57(2)(a)(ii) of the first additional protocol). if we are right and the pagers were expected to be mostly in the hands of military operatives, choosing means and methods that would also neutralize them is likely compatible with the principle of precaution. this is especially so because these operatives may themselves constitute legitimate military targets. targeting the pagers in ways that also neutralize enemy combatants significantly enhances the military advantage produced by the attack. one possible analogy to illustrate this point is the choice to target a military base, a clearly lawful target, at daytime, when it is most busy. because it can be assumed that most persons who would be at the military base at the time of the attack are themselves lawful targets, the attack would seem to meet the requirements of article 57(2)(a)(ii), even if some civilians located inside the base (e.g., civilian service providers) are also harmed in the operation. the added military advantage of conducting the attack at daytime could justify the attack even if a nighttime operation would have led to reduced civilian harm. note that we do not plan to reopen here the debate over direct participation in hostilities. whereas under the u.s. department of defense (dod) law of war manual (§ 5.7.2) “individuals who are formally or functionally part of a non state armed group that is engaged in hostilities may be made the object of attack,” the more restrictive international committee of the red cross interpretative guidance on direct participation in hostilities designates as targetable members of a non state group who are involved in a continuous combat function. as stated earlier, we have assumed that most of those who received the pagers were members of hezbollah involved in military operations. in fact, it seems that the very eligibility of hezbollah operatives to hold pagers for military operational communications is a strong (though not irrefutable) indication of their active participation in the hostilities between hezbollah and israel. given how the pagers were operated, it also makes sense to assume that those holding them received some training from hezbollah and were part of their inner circle of military operations. most probably, they were already actively participating in hostilities or were battle ready and on stand by (i.e., involved in a continuous combat function). of course, even if the attack was not indiscriminate in nature, because it was targeted against a military objective (i.e., the pagers), it still must be assessed in accordance with the principle of proportionality. attacks may not be executed if the expected incidental damage to civilians is excessive with regard to the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage. while israel is not party to the first additional protocol, we note that some states declared when joining it that for the purpose of the application of the principle of proportionality, the military advantage derived from the attack is to be “considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of the attack.” israel supported the same position in 2015, in its official report stating its legal position regarding operation protective edge (para. 318). applying this standard would suggest that for proportionality purposes, the pagers attack should be analyzed as a single attack. indeed, the fact that all pagers exploded almost simultaneously strongly suggests one coordinated act (see here). as indicated before, media reports indicate that two children were killed in the explosions. no information has been released regarding the number of civilians among the wounded. it has also been reported that the explosive charges installed in the pagers were relatively small, leading mostly to injuries and not deaths. and we are not aware of any reports of harm to non pager carrying third persons (i.e., persons who did not hold or carry the pagers at the time of their explosion). based on these outcomes, then, and on the assumption that the vast majority of those killed or injured were hezbollah militants, the attack on the whole appears proportional in view of the exceptional military advantage it produced, namely, the destruction of hezbollah’s entire communication apparatus and neutralization of key military operatives on the eve of a larger military operation. in fact, the process by which most of the explosions was carried out only after the operative tried to open an encrypted message actually served to limit collateral damage. arguably, uninvolved civilians accidentally picking up the beeping pager had no business trying to read the message sent to the operatives and therefore detonating the pager. this method caused the pagers to be held close to the military operative’s hands or face, and thus to restrict the harm to civilians who happen to be in his vicinity. still, critics of the operation raise another point, which is relevant to the proportionality analysis (as well as to distinction if one does not accept our position that the pagers were, formally speaking, the object of the attack). even if one accepts that the pagers were distributed mostly to hezbollah military operatives, israel could not know who actually held the pagers at the time of their explosion, and therefore it could not have directed its attack only at militants and/or could not have anticipated that the harm to civilians would not be excessive. as already indicated, there are reports that suggest some of those harmed were civilians not participating in hostilities. therefore, israel’s actions arguably violate ihl’s presumption of civilian status, according to which a person is considered a civilian unless it can be proven otherwise. this rule is relevant for the application of both principles of distinction and proportionality. discussing these points requires addressing several controversial doctrinal issues. first, with regard to the presumption of civilian status, despite some disagreements in the past about its scope and contents (especially regarding niacs), it now seems settled law that in case of doubt as to whether the attacked person or object is civilian, a presumption of civilian status must hold. the level of proof that the attacking military must attain before reversing the presumption, however, is far from clear. deciding extreme cases appears to be straightforward. the attacking state is not required to show one hundred percent proof that the person targeted is taking a direct part in hostilities, nor can it base its identification of the target as military on general speculations, such as age or gender. disagreements remain regarding the cases found in the middle between these two extreme scenarios. the 2023 version of the u.s. dod law of war manual suggests the following criteria: the decision of the commander should be based on his genuine and good faith professional opinion as to the identity of the target; on context; and on available information. it should consider the importance of the target, as well as expected civilian casualties. the level of proof need not be one which will convince a criminal court. the manual further states, commanders and other decision makers must determine whether a potential target is a military objective based on the available information that is relevant to whether the potential target meets the applicable legal standard for a military objective. such relevant information includes the characteristics of the potential target (e.g., the conduct or status of the person or the nature, location, purpose, or use of the object), as well as other information that indicates whether the potential target is a military objective (e.g., the military advantages or disadvantages offered by where the target is situated, intelligence estimates of enemy forces’ presence or anticipated action, enemy tactics, or assessments of civilian presence and behavior). in addition, it may be feasible to gather more information about the potential target (§ 5.4.3.2). this standard of “genuine and good faith professional opinion” seems to us to be a correct articulation of the evidentiary standard required for identifying military targets under ihl. from that point of view, it seems to us that if israel made a professional assessment as to the identity of the persons holding the pagers, in which it assumed that there is a very high chance that the person holding the pager would be a legitimate military target, this could, in the specific context of the conflict against hezbollah, substantiate a decision to target pagers (and those holding them) in a manner that would not produce excessive collateral harm. in particular, the contextual analysis should, in our mind, consider the fact that alternative operations to target hezbollah’s mid and high level command structure, which is embedded in civilian settings (such as the dahia quarter in beirut) would most likely result in far greater collateral harm to civilians. another relevant doctrinal question involves the use of probabilities in targeting decisions. let us assume that israel knew in advance that five to ten percent of the persons holding the pagers would be civilians without being able to identify which of the pagers was actually used by civilians and without having the technological ability to target only those directly participating in hostilities. would it then be prohibited from detonating the pagers (under principles of distinction or proportionality)? this state of affairs appears to us to be analogous to the problem of error rate in the use of weapon systems. assuming that even sophisticated missiles have a five to ten percent error rate, which could result in them missing their target, would one say that sending a barrage of missiles directed at military objectives during an active armed conflict is prohibited, just because there is almost statistical certainty that civilians would be harmed because of the malfunctioning of some of these missiles? if indeed our factual assumption is correct, and israel anticipated according to its “genuine and good faith professional opinion” that almost but not everyone who would carry or hold a pager is a hezbollah military operative, the fact that it could have been expected that a small number of civilians might be also harmed, does not render, in our view, the entire operation disproportionate in nature. the prohibition on the use of booby traps and other devices the last issue we wish to discuss here is whether the pagers attack was a violation of the protocol on prohibition or restrictions on the use of mines, booby traps and other devices (amended on 1996) annexed to the convention on the prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain convention weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects (ccw amended protocol ii). ccw amended protocol ii is especially relevant if indeed the pagers attack was executed by israel because israel is a state party to the amended protocol, which applies both to iac and niac (art. 1). the ccw amended protocol ii bans most uses of booby traps and other devices in the course of armed conflicts. the definition of “booby trap” in the amended protocol (art. 2) is “any device or material which is designed, constructed or adapted to kill or injure, and which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs or approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an apparently safe act.” “other devices” are defined as “manually emplaced munitions and devices including improvised explosive devices designed to kill, injure or damage, and which are actuated manually, by remote control or automatically after a lapse of time.” it is not clear if the definition of booby traps is relevant for the pagers. first, it is not fully clear whether pressing the buttons of the pagers constituted exclusive activation by a person who “approaches or disturbs” them and not activation also based on remote external intervention, that is, the sending of a signal. video clips indicating that some pagers exploded while still in their users’ pocket support the possibility that at least some exploding pagers did not qualify as booby traps as defined by the ccw amended protocol ii. in this case, the question is whether such pagers could qualify as “other devices” under ccw amended protocol ii. one possible problem with the application of the definition of “other devices” to the pagers is that the “other devices” definition requires that the device was designed for the sole purpose of injuring, killing, or damaging. here, however, the pagers were designed mainly to be used as communication devices, and the addition of explosives was only a change to an existing the device, and not an initial “design.” still, we accept that it is possible to argue that israel’s intervention in the supply chain was designed to generate a potentially lethal device, which could fall under the definition of “other devices” to the pagers. some have suggested in that regard that the applicability of the “other devices” definition hinges on the term “manually emplaced,” which requires devices to be physically placed in their location by the adversary. it appears from a review of the travaux préparatoires of the ccw amended protocol ii and its predecessor protocol protocol (ii) on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby traps and other devices that the term “manually emplaced” was introduced to distinguish between devices that were placed by a person from those delivered from the air and thus requiring special precautionary mechanisms to reduce civilian harm during and after the armed conflict (such as a self destruction or remote controlled destruction mechanism). it appears to us that the ccw amended protocol ii, and its predecessor protocol, might contain a lacuna with regard to remotely delivered “other devices,” such as the pagers in question (which were most probably sent via a shipping service). review of the legality of the attack on them should be made subject to the general rule of ihl governing the use of all weapons and means and methods of war. furthermore, even assuming that the ccw amended protocol ii definition of “booby traps” and “other devices” encompasses the pagers in question, we doubt whether the pagers were prohibited in the context of which they were actually operated. article 7(2) of the amended protocol states that “it is prohibited to use booby traps or other devices in the form of apparently harmless portable objects which are specifically designed and constructed to contain explosive material” (emphasis added). this article seems to include a categorical prohibition on the use of exploding devices if they are: (a) in the form of apparently harmless portable object and; (b) specifically designed and constructed to contain explosive material. the pagers included arguably explosive devices “hidden” in the form of harmless devices, which were designed to contain them. on that basis, it has been claimed, for instance by retired air commodore boothby, that the pagers attack was a violation of the prohibition in article 7(2). this categorical reading of article 7(2) to the amended protocol is not free of doubt, however. a key to the correct understanding of article 7(2) seems to us to be the term “harmless object.” a harmless object in the context of article 7(2), seems to be connected to the rest of the article, which intends to prevent its use in contexts associated with perfidy or harm to civilians. for example, article 7(1) prohibits the use of booby traps and other devices in any way attached to internationally recognized emblems, signs or signals, sick, wounded, or dead persons, medical facilities, children’s toys, historic monuments etc. article 7(3) prohibits the use of booby traps and other devices in a civilian area, if they are not placed near a military objective. it seems to us that the term “harmless object” should be understood in the same context, that is, it is prohibited to use exploding devices disguised as an object which has no military application. it is interesting to note in this regard that an early text jointly submitted by four countries (including france and the united kingdom) in the course of the negotiations towards the 1980 protocol ii envisioned this distinction precisely. from the text of proposed article 5 we were able to trace (cddh/iv/213; we located it only in french, and only in paper version) the following: “il est interdit en toutes circonstances d’employer un objet portable apparemment inoffensive (en dehors d’en élément d’équipement ou de fournitures militaires) expressément conçu et construit pour contenir une charge explosive ou détoner quand une personne le déplace ou s’en approche” (emphasis added). this suggests that at least some of the drafters intended to exclude military equipment and supplies from the categorical ban. the hezbollah pagers, arguably, were purchased and used for military purposes, and could be considered military equipment. the interpretation we offer also serves to clear a seeming discrepancy in the protocol. as will be recalled, booby traps are defined as devices that are triggered when a person approaches or disturbs an apparently harmless object. however, if the use of all booby traps, including those attached to military equipment, is prohibited by article 7(2) (as the categorical reading suggests), article 7(1) is largely superfluous. similarly, article 3 to ccw amended protocol ii prohibits the use of mines, booby traps and other devices in certain ways (e.g., it is prohibited if such weapons are designed to cause superfluous injuries) (see e.g., art. 3(2)). once again, according to the categorical reading, this reading is superfluous. finally, the fact that the pagers were mostly detonated by a purposeful operational act (i.e., the opening of an encrypted message seemingly sent by the military leadership of hezbollah) seems to negate the idea that they were “harmless” objects. if the pagers were indeed military objects, whose explosion was caused by an operational act connected with an armed conflict, they were hardly “harmless.” conclusion we agree with other commentators that the legality or illegality of the pagers attack can only be determined on the basis of a detailed factual analysis and that the relevant facts are still not fully known. still, absent contrary information, we believe it can be assumed that the pagers were primarily designed to serve a military function. they afforded hezbollah fighters the possibility of communicating discreetly. destroying or neutralizing them in one single attack provided the attacker (presumably israel) a significant military advantage and does not seem to raise a serious issue under the principle of distinction. questions raised regarding the alleged indiscriminate nature of the attack are in our view really questions of proportionality. the decisive test is whether the israeli officials who have undertaken the operation could reach in their “genuine and good faith professional opinion” a reasonable conclusion that the vast majority of individuals impacted by the pager attack would be hezbollah militants who were themselves lawful targets. the question of the legality of the pagers attack under ccw amended protocol ii raises both questions of fact and law. if indeed the pagers were exploded remotely, they may, at first glance, constitute “other devices” banned under article 7 of the protocol. still, doubts remain in our minds as to whether the ban under the protocol covers remotely placed devices designed to serve a military purpose. *** amichai cohen is a professor of international law at the ono academic college, israel, and a senior fellow at the israel democracy institute. yuval shany is the hersch lauterpacht chair in public international law at the hebrew university of jerusalem, and a senior fellow at the israel democracy institute. photo credit: deepsonic madn law united states military academy 646 swift road west point, ny 10996 +1 845 938 2572 articles of war disclaimer the views expressed are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the united states military academy, department of the army, or department of defense. articles of war is a forum for professionals to share opinions and cultivate ideas. articles of war does not screen articles to fit a particular editorial agenda, nor endorse or advocate material that is published.

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middle east tensions israel said the soldiers were killed when hamas militants detonated explosives in a three story building. some wounded soldiers were in critical condition. by erika solomonabu bakr bashir and aaron boxerman the israeli military said tuesday that four israeli soldiers had been killed and several more wounded after militants blew up a building where the troops were operating in the southern gaza city of rafah. some of the soldiers were in critical condition after the attack on monday, the military said. kan, israel’s public broadcaster, said that five soldiers had been hospitalized, and that two were in intensive care. the qassam brigades, hamas’s military wing, said in a statement that it had booby trapped the building where the soldiers were operating. “our fighters were able to blow up a house rigged with explosives where zionist forces had fortified themselves inside,” it said. the apparent ambush targeted an israeli reconnaissance unit that was scouting what the soldiers thought was a tunnel shaft inside a three story building, according to kan. israeli forces in gaza have been focusing on destroying tunnels used by hamas militants. after the explosives were detonated, hamas forces attacked with mortar fire as israeli forces tried to evacuate the dead and wounded, according to both the militant group and the israeli military. fighting in rafah has raged on and off since early may, when israeli soldiers moved into the southern city despite strong opposition from the international community. for months, rafah had housed more than half the residents of gaza. israeli forces had directed people to take shelter there from fighting elsewhere in the territory. since the israeli incursion into rafah, many displaced palestinians have fled to central gaza, which in turn has seen clashes and heavy bombardment since israel announced new military operations there last week. on saturday, more than 200 gazans were killed, according to health authorities, in the central city of nuseirat during an israeli military operation that freed four israeli hostages. in the eight months since israel launched its offensive in gaza in retaliation for the hamas led oct. 7 attacks, a total of 298 of its soldiers have been killed, according to the israeli military. the toll has been many times higher for gazans: local health authorities say more than 36,000 people have been killed, a tally that does not distinguish between combatants and civilians. myra noveck contributed reporting. aaron boxerman is a times reporting fellow with a focus on international news. more about aaron boxerman

print four soldiers died in combat in the north of the gaza strip, the israeli military said saturday, more than 15 months into its war with hamas militants.