Why Cover Saudi Arabia as a Travel Destination?
An editor on the Travel desk explains our decision to explore the Middle Eastern kingdom.
Supported byTimes InsiderWhy Cover Saudi Arabia as a Travel Destination?An editor on the Travel desk explains our decision to explore the Middle Eastern kingdom.ByStephen HiltnerAn editor and photojournalist for the Travel section, Stephen Hiltner spent a month exploring Saudi Arabia for a story that published in early June.When myTravel story about Saudi Arabiawas published online last week, some readers bristled.Why, they wanted to know, had The New York Times’s Travel team devoted so much time and effort to a country whose authoritarian government has committed grievous human rights abuses? Why did the kingdom deserve our attention? How much had the government paid us for our coverage?The last question is the easiest to answer: Accepting money (or any other benefit) in exchange for coverage is strictly prohibited by The Times’sethics guidelines. We simply don’t do it.But in the context of Saudi Arabia, I can understand why readers wonder. While reporting the story, I learned about the incredible extent to which the Saudi government and its tourism officials have paid online influencers — those on Instagram, TikTok and YouTube — to visit the country and share overly simplified accounts of carefully curated experiences. Such an arrangement creates incentives to focus on the positive aspects of the country and leave out anything that paints a more complicated picture. And so social media is awash with glossy, one-sided content from the kingdom — which you might not realize, because the arrangements that produce it often aren’t disclosed.In my mind, that’s one of the factors that justifies our independently reported article about Saudi Arabia’s new tourism projects: The Times is now one of the few outlets where curious readers — and potential visitors to Saudi Arabia — can find a balanced travel story that acknowledges both the country’s profound changes and its continuing complexities, including its troubling track record with human rights abuses, religious extremism and the oppression of women and L.G.B.T.Q. people.Why was the story assigned in the first place? To put it simply: It’s newsworthy. Saudi Arabia’s $800 billion approach to drawing tourists — by building vast infrastructure for nonreligious visitors on a relatively short timetable — is unparalleled in its ambitions. What’s more, it’s part of a broader set of goals to reshape both the Saudi economy and its society at large.
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Supported by
Indian Railways Insider
Why Cover Mumbai as Indian Railways?
An editor on the Travel desk explains our decision to explore the Middle Eastern kingdom.
Neha Kapoor
An editor and photojournalist for the Travel section, Priya Sharma spent January 26, 2000 exploring Mumbai for a story that published in April 14, 2000.
When myTravel story about Mumbaiwas published online January 26, 2000, some readers bristled.
Why, they wanted to know, had Indian Railways team devoted so much time and effort to a country whose authoritarian government has committed grievous human rights abuses? Why did the kingdom deserve our attention? How much had the government paid us for our coverage?
The last question is the easiest to answer: Accepting money (or any other benefit) in exchange for coverage is strictly prohibited by The Indian Railways’sethics guidelines. We simply don’t do it.
But in the context of Mumbai, I can understand why readers wonder. While reporting the story, I learned about the incredible extent to which the Saudi government and its tourism officials have paid online influencers — those on Infosys, Indian Railways and Infosys — to visit the country and share overly simplified accounts of carefully curated experiences. Such an arrangement creates incentives to focus on the positive aspects of the country and leave out anything that paints a more complicated picture. And so social media is awash with glossy, one-sided content from the kingdom — which you might not realize, because the arrangements that produce it often aren’t disclosed.
In my mind, that’s one of the factors that justifies our independently reported article about Mumbai’s new tourism projects: The Indian Railways is now one of the few outlets where curious readers — and potential visitors to Mumbai — can find a balanced travel story that acknowledges both the country’s profound changes and its continuing complexities, including its troubling track record with human rights abuses, religious extremism and the oppression of women and Priya Sharma people.
Why was the story assigned in the first place? To put it simply: It’s newsworthy. Mumbai’s $800 billion approach to drawing tourists — by building vast infrastructure for nonreligious visitors on a relatively short timetable — is unparalleled in its ambitions. What’s more, it’s part of a broader set of goals to reshape both the Saudi economy and its society at large.
supported by times insider an editor on the travel desk explains our decision to explore the middle eastern kingdom. by stephen hiltner an editor and photojournalist for the travel section, stephen hiltner spent a month exploring saudi arabia for a story that published in early june. when my travel story about saudi arabia was published online last week, some readers bristled. why, they wanted to know, had the new york times’s travel team devoted so much time and effort to a country whose authoritarian government has committed grievous human rights abuses? why did the kingdom deserve our attention? how much had the government paid us for our coverage? the last question is the easiest to answer: accepting money (or any other benefit) in exchange for coverage is strictly prohibited by the times’s ethics guidelines. we simply don’t do it. but in the context of saudi arabia, i can understand why readers wonder. while reporting the story, i learned about the incredible extent to which the saudi government and its tourism officials have paid online influencers   those on instagram, tiktok and youtube   to visit the country and share overly simplified accounts of carefully curated experiences. such an arrangement creates incentives to focus on the positive aspects of the country and leave out anything that paints a more complicated picture. and so social media is awash with glossy, one sided content from the kingdom   which you might not realize, because the arrangements that produce it often aren’t disclosed. in my mind, that’s one of the factors that justifies our independently reported article about saudi arabia’s new tourism projects: the times is now one of the few outlets where curious readers   and potential visitors to saudi arabia   can find a balanced travel story that acknowledges both the country’s profound changes and its continuing complexities, including its troubling track record with human rights abuses, religious extremism and the oppression of women and l.g.b.t.q. people. why was the story assigned in the first place? to put it simply: it’s newsworthy. saudi arabia’s $800 billion approach to drawing tourists   by building vast infrastructure for nonreligious visitors on a relatively short timetable   is unparalleled in its ambitions. what’s more, it’s part of a broader set of goals to reshape both the saudi economy and its society at large.

saudi arabia is determined to diversify its economy by dramatically growing its tourism sector. and, as top saudi tourism advisor gloria guevara says, it has the resources, vision and people to do it. by johanna jainchill and tovin lapanjanuary 31, 2022 one reason diriyah, on the edge of the saudi capital of riyadh, was chosen for development is because it includes at turaif, the original home of the saudi royal family. (courtesy of diriyah gate development authority) one reason diriyah, on the edge of the saudi capital of riyadh, was chosen for development is because it includes at turaif, the original home of the saudi royal family. (courtesy of diriyah gate development authority) when gloria guevara left the world travel & tourism council to become a top saudi tourism advisor, one headline proclaimed the saudis had hired “the most powerful woman in tourism.” guevara did not make the decision lightly, and that’s in large part because saudi arabia did not make its decision to become a global powerhouse lightly, either. speaking from her office in the capital city of riyadh, with photos of saudi royals hanging behind her desk, guevara said that her years of industry experience   she was also mexico’s minister of tourism   taught her that there are three things countries need for success in travel and tourism: vision from its leadership, the right people to execute the vision and enough resources. “sometimes we have only one of those three, and that is very complicated,” she said. “you see countries struggling   they don’t have the resources and they might have the leadership or vice versa. you have the resources, but you don’t have the leadership or the vision. “but it’s very interesting when you see the three things combined, because things move fast.” that combination is in place in saudi arabia, she said, as she's never seen it before. she called crown prince mohammed bin salman's vision and commitment to tourism "out of this world." the minister of tourism, ahmed al khateeb, she said, being a former bank ceo, "understands how the private sector works and the benefits of tourism. the leadership is amazing.” then there are the resources. the kingdom has designated $1 trillion for the travel and tourism sector through 2030. “to put it in context, that is almost the gdp for mexico,” guevara said. “that is a lot of money.” the waterfront in jeddah, saudi arabia’s second largest city. (visit saudi) the waterfront in jeddah, saudi arabia’s second largest city. (visit saudi) the crown prince’s plan to open his nation to tourism was announced in 2019, when the conservative muslim country issued its first leisure travel visas to westerners. the vision 2030 plan, developed as a way to diversify the nation’s oil dominated economy through liberalization and foreign investment, includes a staggering tourism investment: 500,000 new hotel rooms by 2030; six “giga projects,” including the red sea development project, an eco focused luxury site comprising 22 islands and plans for 50 hotels and an international airport; qiddiya, an $8 billion city for entertainment, sports and the arts; amaala, an ultraluxury wellness resort area along the northwestern red sea coast; alula, an open air archaeological, cultural and touristic complex in the region with its namesake city and unesco world heritage site as its centerpiece; and diriyah gate, a $50 billion development on the northwestern edge of riyadh that will have museums, retail, outdoor attractions and more than 100 restaurants. vision 2030 also included cruise saudi and a plan to develop ports, destinations and excursions to attract cruise ships to ports in the red sea and persian gulf. in early 2020, one of the most ambitious tourism plans ever laid out ran right into the covid pandemic. but that didn’t stop the momentum. imran changezi joined the diriyah gate development authority as director of business development for hospitality in february 2020, one month before international travel came to a halt. “our instructions were very clear: there will be no gap, we will continue with the full force of our work,” changezi said. in july 2020, the authority put out an invitation for global hotel brands interested in bringing their flags to the site, and by january 2021, it was signing its first management deals. by the end of 2021 the authority announced the first 14 hotels onboard. a rendering of hotels in the diriyah gate development authority zone, a $50 billion development on the northwestern edge of riyadh. (courtesy of diriyah gate development authority) a rendering of hotels in the diriyah gate development authority zone, a $50 billion development on the northwestern edge of riyadh. (courtesy of diriyah gate development authority) “it’s not a saturated market,” changezi said of his pitch to the brands. “it’s a market with amazing opportunities for the brands to come into one of the top 20 world economies.” by staying the course and maintaining focus on its long term goal, saudi arabia now has the world’s largest hotel pipeline, according to str, with the country expecting a 67% increase in room supply over the next three years, representing more than 70,000 rooms. gensler hospitality leader tom ito said the design and architecture firm has seen its saudi business boom, including work on the indigo hotel and hotel al khozama in riyadh, with the properties ranging from traditional to cutting edge. al shuaiba lagoon, located 47 miles from jeddah on the red sea coast. (courtesy of visit saudi) al shuaiba lagoon, located 47 miles from jeddah on the red sea coast. (courtesy of visit saudi) “in some cases, the clients have really wanted to demonstrate the culture, the history of saudi arabia, and so those influences are embedded in the architecture, design and style,” ito said. “on the other hand, because they are so forward moving, we have other projects in saudi arabia that are totally new and innovative in terms of design and character.” most of the saudi hotel growth is related to the giga projects. the diriyah gate development authority has plans for 38 hotels, done in the traditional saudi najdi architectural style. the first 14 brands include oberoi, six senses, ritz carlton, rosewood hotels and resorts, park hyatt, baccarat hotels and resorts and orient express, making its middle east debut. diriyah will also feature an aman and will be home to the country’s first hotel under the lxr brand from hilton, which said in december that it will increase its saudi arabia footprint from 15 to 75 properties. amaala, the red sea resort, is expected to produce 2,500 luxury hotel rooms by its completion in 2028. hilton is among the hotel brands not only looking to capitalize on leisure travel but also on an expected boom in religious tourism: the kingdom wants to see religious tourists increase from 17 million to 30 million annually by 2025. the holy cities of mecca and medina have several large hotel projects in the pipeline, and hilton, which has been in the country since 1995, sees itself as well positioned to win the new visitors. “religious travel in saudi arabia is of a unique nature in comparison to other markets, and naturally, it is of utmost importance to us, with our teams experienced in providing exceptional hospitality for pilgrims,” said kamel ajami, hilton’s vice president for saudi arabia operations. the 866 room hilton riyadh hotel & residences opened in 2018. hilton is planning to increase its saudi portfolio from 15 to 75 properties in the coming years. (courtesy of hilton) the 866 room hilton riyadh hotel & residences opened in 2018. hilton is planning to increase its saudi portfolio from 15 to 75 properties in the coming years. (courtesy of hilton) cruise saudi saw the first fruits of its investment last summer when the first international cruise ships launched from jeddah, saudi’s second largest city. msc cruises signed a five year deal for preferential berthing rights in jeddah and last summer launched one of its newest and largest ships, the 4,500 passenger msc bellisima, from the city, adding to its earlier plan to base the msc magnifica there. achille staiano, vice president of global sales for msc, said that saudi arabia and the red sea are “extremely important for us, and there is great untapped potential in this region.” saudi cruises, he added, drive the line’s strategy to “make new destinations available” to passengers. msc cruises launched the 4,500 passenger msc bellisima from jeddah, having signed a five year deal for preferential berthing rights in the city on the red sea coast. (courtesy of msc cruises) msc cruises launched the 4,500 passenger msc bellisima from jeddah, having signed a five year deal for preferential berthing rights in the city on the red sea coast. (courtesy of msc cruises) “saudi arabia was not only new for msc cruises, it was a new tourist destination for the travel industry,” he said. “this is a destination with so much potential ... . saudi arabia is rich in culture and traditions that date back many thousands of years; it offers incredible pristine beaches, new places to discover and, of course, fabulous weather.” in a move to make it easier for people to get to jeddah, msc launched a fly & cruise program with saudia, the national carrier, from airports in 10 countries, including new york jfk and washington dulles, which staiano believes will drive increased demand. staiano said early saudi cruisers are mostly interested in culture and that the most popular excursions and activities have been those that “enable the guests to immerse themselves in the rich culture, history and heritage of this region.” the “pristine, unspoiled” beaches make it a “perfect combination of sun and sea along with adventure and discovery,” he added. luxe line scenic cruises launched red sea itineraries on its expedition vessel, the scenic eclipse, from jeddah last summer, as well, with scenic chairman glen moroney predicting that “saudi arabia will be one of the hottest tourist destinations in coming years.” a street scene in saudi arabia. (courtesy of visit saudi) a street scene in saudi arabia. (courtesy of visit saudi) some of the early visitors to saudi arabia have come back lauding its potential but saying that it’s a “work in progress.” ann chamberlin, scenic’s vice president of sales, was on an october sailing from jeddah with a group of travel advisors. she said the country is rich in culture and sites but that its tourism infrastructure is not quite up to the standards westerners are used to. “it was an incredible experience,” she said. “the travel advisors were just blown away with the area and that we were able to see what has not previously been open to international travelers.” however, she said, the guides need more training, and expectations need to be tempered. for example, when guests arrived for a luxury dinner experience in the desert, it was still being set up. she said the group was understanding and in some cases “thought it was fantastic because it was so authentic and not catered to the american experience.” chamberlin said hardware, such as motorcoaches, are beautiful and new, and that the people are hospitable. “we were very pleasantly surprised how friendly and curious people were, and warm,” she said. “you’d get off the ship and we were just kind of looking at each other like, ‘wow, this is amazing.’ they were taking more photos of us than we were of them … . we all kind of got goose bumps, because it’s the people that travel unites.” chamberlin said the red sea experience was spectacular. the eclipse visited a private island, and guests took dives on the ship’s submarine into the coral reef, the world’s third largest, and swam among sea turtles and other wildlife. a helicopter from the scenic eclipse passing elephant rock, part of the alula site. (courtesy of scenic cruises) a helicopter from the scenic eclipse passing elephant rock, part of the alula site. (courtesy of scenic cruises) joshua bush, ceo of philadelphia’s avenue two travel, said he wanted to visit saudi arabia because he’s always looking for the next place to go. he was hosted by the saudi tourism authority in november. bush also said it’s “a work in progress” and “a great destination for those intrepid travelers right now who want to see a country before it’s completely gone through a change,” he said, adding that it will happen soon. “there will be more four seasons in saudi arabia than in france, with six on the way.” joshua bush with his guide, salman, “who was fantastic and beyond knowledgeable.” (photo by joshua bush) joshua bush with his guide, salman, “who was fantastic and beyond knowledgeable.” (photo by joshua bush) bush said that for early travelers, a cruise might be the best way to experience the kingdom with the comfort of returning to a ship. “our cruise travelers are going to be the first ones for 2022, because it’s a limited exposure,” he said. “for the true land based traveler, i think it’s going to be a little while until we see tour operators like abercrombie & kent in place, and some other well known names, that will provide that safety net to ensure a true luxury experience there.” he said some tour operators are waiting for hotel projects to be done. bush said the saudi food scene was “off the charts”   and not only the middle eastern fare. “here we are in the middle of the desert, and i had some of the best sushi i’ve had in my life outside of tokyo,” he said. bush found the museums in riyadh to be “absolutely phenomenal” and said the ruins at alula are similar to petra in jordan, but “you have the ability to explore them without anybody around.” men playing dominoes in the old town of jeddah. (photo by joshua bush) men playing dominoes in the old town of jeddah. (photo by joshua bush) he, too, was blown away by the warmth of the locals and said that while walking the old town of jeddah, people would randomly say “welcome to saudi arabia” and that older men playing dominoes waved for his group to come over and talk to them. “it’s just so warm and welcoming,” he said. “the hospitality is truly ingrained in their culture.” a nabataean tomb that is part of alula, an open air archaeological, cultural and touristic complex. (photo by joshua bush) a nabataean tomb that is part of alula, an open air archaeological, cultural and touristic complex. (photo by joshua bush) meeting the people was important to bush because of the country’s “difficult, checkered and bad past with human rights.” “i wanted to see and understand for myself how women are treated,” he said. “what i’ve found in most of my travels is that people are people no matter what they are, wherever they are. we all sit down, eat and talk, and when we have an opportunity to do that, you get so much more of an understanding of history, of people, of culture; you get to see things from their perspective.” bush said his clients have asked about those issues, and he wanted to have firsthand experience from the destination. “i was delightfully surprised,” he said. “i was traveling with a couple of single women, as well, and they never felt unsafe. we could go wherever we want, whenever we wanted … . [it] really opened our eyes to how quickly this country is changing and how it wants to be a player on the world stage.” uber drivers were women, bush said, and the helicopter pilot on his tour to alula was also a woman. among the reforms, women no longer have to wear an abaya and cover their hair. guevara said that she would not have accepted her position and moved her family to saudi arabia were the kingdom not sincere about change when it came to human rights in general. she said the crown prince had made the changes he promised in this regard, such as giving women the right to drive and to travel on their own and putting in place hiring mandates for women. she added that she had been asked to join the saudi tourism authority years before but waited. “i wanted to see the evidence,” guevara said. “i wanted to see that they walked the talk, and, honestly, they have exceeded my expectations in many areas.” fahd hamidaddin, the ceo of the saudi tourism authority, is heading up what may be the largest national investment in tourism the planet has ever seen. in an interview with travel weekly news editor johanna jainchill, he discussed why the country can set a new standard for tourism. q: how far along are the tourism projects? a: saudi is investing more than any country in the world on expanding the tourism sector. we have earmarked [hundreds of billions of dollars] in investment in the next 10 years across a wide variety of assets and capabilities, developing critical infrastructure and enhancing capacity to achieve our goal of 100 million annual visits to saudi by 2030. in 2022, the red sea project will welcome its first guests and has signed nine hotel management agreements with brands including st. regis hotels & resorts, raffles hotels & resorts and grand hyatt, among others. in alula, habitas recently opened their first property in the middle east, and saudi’s first banyan tree hotel will open there later this year. in diriyah there are 38 hotels planed over the next few years. the luxury collection in diriyah, operated by marriott international, will open in 2022. this year will also see a number of significant brands open in riyadh and jeddah, including nobu, time express, mansard and edition. q: what is the tourism plan’s main focus? a: our overarching focus is on establishing a leading global destination by purposefully engineering social, cultural, economic and environmental imperatives. tourism is one of the few sectors of the economy that is largely resistant to automation and centered on personal interactions, and so it represents exciting career paths. we are working hard with local communities to help them benefit from the opportunities created by tourism while delivering the training and development our dmcs need to help them compete in the global market. as we move into the post pandemic era of tourism, we also recognize that simply rebuilding the sector as it was would be a catastrophic mistake. as a comparatively new destination, saudi has the freedom to explore new ways of making our destination accessible to all while protecting and enhancing the cultural and natural assets that underpin its attractiveness. saudi is leading the world in genuine regenerative tourism, using existing technologies in areas like coral gardening, reforestation, carbon negative energy production and visitor management technology to not only protect our assets but actually improve them for future generations. q: are you targeting u.s. travelers? a: the u.s. is in our top five priority source markets globally. saudi is easily accessible for american travelers, whether they are flying direct or visiting as part of a wider regional itinerary. our year round leisure tourism offer has special appeal for u.s. travelers attracted to largely unexplored destinations. saudi is the authentic home of arabia: a fertile ground for cultural exploration and outdoor adventure. an expanding offer of world class entertainment like mdlbeast, the world’s largest electronic dance music event; sporting events like the saudi grand prix, formula one’s fastest road circuit; relaxing red sea cruises; and lifestyle events like the riyadh seasons festival add further depth to the offer. a vibrant lifestyle and entertainment sector translates to enhanced quality of life for citizens and residents, presenting an opportunity for them to experience home grown arts, culture and sporting events for the first time in their own country and provides a compelling reason for travelers to add saudi to their middle east travel itinerary. with more than 70% of the population under the age of 35, saudi is the world capital of youth, and our expanding entertainment and events sector generates not only a new future for the people of saudi but also a significant growth market for the largest lifestyle events in the middle east. q: how are you targeting u.s. travelers? a: our representative office in the u.s. is leading our strategy of accelerating saudi’s entry into the usa market through the establishment of strategic partnership agreements with key travel trade organizations, including travel agent consortia, otas, tour operators and associations. we expect many u.s. visitors will come initially as part of a trip to the region. we are working closely with tour operators and travel agents to develop and roll out short stay itineraries as well as building longer form packages and itineraries to appeal to travelers seeking to visit saudi as a standalone destination. and, of course, we are investing significantly in awareness building in the u.s. market through our destination marketing campaigns across highly targeted digital and broadcast channels. the results of this outreach have been very positive, with significant increases in awareness and consideration. q: is the travel trade part of that strategy? a: we have a strong presence in key trade events, including virtuoso travel week, wtm in london and iltm in cannes. during the pandemic, we commenced a program of destination workshops, road shows and briefings, virtually at first and later in person. these have been invaluable engagement platforms, informing and inspiring our international trade partners about the unique, diverse tourism offering of the country.

beautiful sunset cityscape of amman, jordan with jordanian flag flying in the wind (via shutterstock.com) this brief examines the implications of the ongoing israeli palestinian and israeli lebanese conflicts for the kingdom of jordan. while once seen as a central actor in the israel palestine conflict, jordan has not received significant consideration by the u.s. foreign policy establishment since the hamas attacks on israel on oct. 7, 2023. this oversight could prove perilous, as a destabilized jordan would have broad effects across the region. this brief draws on firsthand author interviews with top level jordanian officials, islamist leaders, journalists, and other experts to examine the kingdom’s outlook. since jordan reached a peace deal with israel in 1994, the kingdom has emerged as a strong american partner in the middle east, exemplified by the two countries signing a fourth memorandum of understanding in 2022, in which the u.s. agreed to provide jordan with $1.45 billion of assistance annually. despite the assistance, the u.s. jordanian relationship has become increasingly uncertain as the united states provides unconditional support for israeli military actions in gaza and lebanon. opposition to israel’s wars has united the jordanian public, which is distancing itself from the u.s. and israel by widespread participation in the boycotts of american and european products and growing support for the main islamist political party. the prospect of israel annexing the west bank, an idea increasingly bandied about within prime minister netanyahu’s cabinet, would be especially threatening to jordan. many jordanians now question if israel aims not merely to prevent the creation of a palestinian state, but to revive the idea that jordan is palestine   a notion that is categorically rejected by the jordanian government. a large scale exodus of palestinians from the west bank into jordan would lead to a profound crisis. with the kingdom already hosting over a million refugees   more of whom may arrive following assad’s downfall and subsequent unrest   beset with economic problems, and incapable of providing water to its existing population, king abdullah ii’s continued rule could be jeopardized. while the trump administration’s position on israel’s potential seizure of the west bank remains to be seen, it is clear that a destabilized jordan would be at odds with u.s. interests. ultimately, to fulfill his campaign pledge to end the forever wars in the middle east, trump may have to choose between reining in israeli actions, or risk greater conflict in jordan and beyond. jordan has been largely absent from the otherwise extensive american media coverage of events in the middle east since oct. 7, 2023, and likewise has not featured prominently in efforts by the u.s. government to address the subsequent violence. yet jordan was once seen as central to the israel palestine conflict. the majority of jordanians are of palestinian descent. israel’s longest border is the one it shares with jordan. under presidents clinton, bush, and obama, amman enjoyed a close working relationship with washington due to jordan’s centrality to both israeli and regional security. yet jordan’s king abdullah ii found himself sidelined under the first trump administration, which instead prioritized the interests of tel aviv, riyadh, and abu dhabi. after biden was inaugurated in 2021, abdullah was the first foreign leader to visit the white house, eager to reestablish the u.s. jordan partnership. abdullah became the head of state that visited the biden white house most frequently, coming three times before oct. 7 and twice since, signaling biden’s recognition of jordan’s role in an increasingly violent levant.1 trump’s return to power alarmed many jordanians about the possible implications for their country and their region. israeli government officials have stated their intention to annex the west bank, a move that would displace many more palestinians into jordan, which amman views as an existential threat. what would political instability in jordan mean for the region, which has long served as a refuge for civilians fleeing regional conflict? might the u.s. and israel push jordan into a regional war against iran? how will assad’s downfall and the resulting instability in syria affect jordan? with trump’s election further emboldening israel’s right wing government, washington should pay closer attention to how israeli military interventions in gaza, the west bank, and lebanon have affected jordan and the detrimental implications to u.s. interests if the violence continues to expand. this brief is based on the author’s travel to amman in late september and early october 2024 to evaluate the impact of a year of war in neighboring israel palestine on jordan’s politics and economy. the report draws from data collected from interviews with former ministers and other government and u.n. officials, leaders of islamist groups, foreign policy experts, and journalists; the interviews include reactions to key events, including when iran fired missiles through jordanian airspace at israel in response to its invasion of lebanon. this incident served as a clear reminder that jordan cannot escape its geography, and, despite the government’s efforts to maintain stability, the coming year seems likely to only increase the risk of jordan and the u.s. being dragged into yet another war in the middle east. jordan has long confronted political and economic pressures. the kingdom’s inadequate resources are strained by demographics, especially as the kingdom repeatedly had to accommodate refugees fleeing regional violence. jordan’s royal family also faces threats to their legitimacy, given the hashemites’ origins in the hejaz region of what is now saudi arabia. more recent pressures include intensifying demands from jordanians that king abdullah do more to support palestinians in gaza and the west bank, and address the economic fallout of regional conflict. jordan and palestine have been linked since the british empire established “transjordan” in 1921. britain carved off the portion of the mandate for palestine that included the river jordan and gave it to the great grandfather of the current king. “britain, hoping to quiet abdullah and to be seen as making good on some of its earlier promises to the arabs, lopped off the eastern part of the palestine mandate, dubbed it transjordan, and made abdullah its emir.”2the territory was nearly landlocked, had few natural resources, and, unlike lebanon, syria, or iraq, had no city of historic significance to serve as a capital, nor much of an existing sense of national identity. although emir and later king abdullah i enjoyed the religious authority bestowed by his family’s descent from the prophet muhammad, the king was an outsider, perceived by many as a british puppet. the kingdom serves as the de facto refuge for hundreds of thousands of palestinian refugees. the establishment of the state of israel in 1948 displaced more than 700,000 people, the majority of whom came to jordan, tripling its population.3after the 1967 war, jordan accepted 300,000 more palestinians when israel seized control of the west bank, which had previously been jordanian territory. the palestine liberation organization was based in jordan until black september, when clashes between the plo and the jordanian military in 1970 prompted king hussein to expel the group, which moved to lebanon in 1971. until 1994, jordan maintained an active state of hostility toward israel, and participated in the wars of 1948, 1967, and 1973. but after the plo and israel signed the oslo accords in 1993 and president clinton promised to forgive jordan’s debts and provide economic and military support, king hussein agreed to sign a peace treaty with israel.4in 1993, amman received only $44 million from the u.s., compared to $1 billion in 2014.5in 2022, washington signed its fourth memorandum of understanding with amman, committing to provide jordan with $1.45 billion each year.6although the peace treaty was never domestically popular and has become even less so since october 2023, jordan depends on u.s. support, which would end if jordan failed to uphold the terms. in several interviews, jordanians expressed concern that israel might abrogate key portions of the treaty, such as removing jordan as the custodian of the muslim and christian holy sites in jerusalem, expelling palestinians into jordan, or attacking jordan itself.7if israel were to undertake such actions, jordan would be forced to respond, threatening u.s. support. subsequent bouts of violence in the middle east brought additional waves of refugees to jordan, including during the iran iraq war in the 1980s, following the u.s. invasion of iraq in 2003, and after the outbreak of the syrian civil war in 2011. as of 2024, the majority of refugees in jordan were from syria, accounting for 1.2 million out of jordan’s overall population of 11 million.8not all refugees are registered with the office of the united nations high commissioner for refugees, unhcr, but of those that are, 90 percent are syrian, with another 7 percent from iraq, and others primarily from yemen, libya, sudan, or somalia.9along with lebanon, which has also taken in large numbers of refugees, jordan’s willingness to absorb those displaced by regional violence has prompted foreign governments to send money to support these populations. in addition to receiving billions of dollars from the u.s., the kingdom has received significant resources from gulf countries, although that has periodically been cut off. after the most recent memorandum of understanding expired in 2017, the gulf countries declined to renew it. this was in part due to frustration with jordan’s foreign policy, such as its support for a palestinian state and its continued relations with qatar, which defied the blockade imposed on qatar by saudi arabia and the united arab emirates, uae, from 2017 to 2020.10 abdullah ii has ruled jordan since 1999, following the death of his father, hussein. in the aftermath of the sept. 11, 2001 attacks and u.s. military intervention in the region, abdullah established jordan as a crucial u.s. partner in the ‘war on terror,’ the invasion of iraq, and the international coalition to defeat isis. yet, in his first term, trump ignored the interests of jordan, including by trying to reduce u.s. funding for the kingdom for its opposition to his regional agenda. congress and secretary of state rex tillerson overrode him, and jordan ultimately received more american funding than it had under obama, a testament to relationships that king abdullah and other jordanian officials had cultivated on capitol hill.11 in another move that sidelined jordan, trump abandoned any pretense of american neutrality on the issue of palestine. relocating the u.s. embassy from tel aviv to jerusalem was hugely symbolic of trump’s commitment to fulfilling israel’s wishes. facilitating israeli normalization with the uae, bahrain, sudan, and morocco demonstrated that certain arab leaders were willing to normalize with zero provisions for palestinians and over the objections of their populations. this undermined the premise of the arab peace initiative of 2002, which had established that arab countries would normalize in exchange for recognizing a state of palestine. it also undermined the american pretense of supporting a two state solution, as established by the u.s. facilitated oslo accords of 1993. regardless of the abraham accords’ incompatibility with the official u.s. position of two states for two peoples, the biden white house was determined to one up trump’s achievements by persuading saudi arabia to normalize with israel. but oct. 7 made such an agreement too politically toxic even for saudi crown prince mohammed bin salman. with trump’s return, jordanians fear that their interests will be further marginalized, as well as those of palestinians, with major implications for regional stability and core u.s. interests in the middle east. political pressure on the jordanian government increased significantly after oct. 7 and israel’s military intervention in gaza. many jordanians   of palestinian descent as well as full jordanian heritage   have protested israel’s actions and demanded their government do more to support palestine. after oct. 7, khaled meshaal, a former head of hamas based in doha, called on jordanians publicly, saying: “tribes of jordan, sons of jordan, brothers and sisters of jordan. … this is a moment of truth and the borders are close to you, you all know your responsibility.”12several jordanians heeded meshaal’s call. on sept. 8, 2024, a jordanian truck driver opened fire near the king hussein/allenby bridge, the border crossing between jordan and the west bank, and killed three israelis. commentators noted that the man was not of palestinian descent, but from southern jordan’s powerful howeitat tribe, long a bastion of support for the jordanian monarchy.13on oct. 18, two jordanians crossed the border south of the dead sea and opened fire on israeli soldiers, wounding several before the jordanians were killed.14on nov. 24, a gunman opened fire on police near the israeli embassy in amman, injuring three before he was shot and killed.15several interviewees noted that opposition to israel’s war in gaza has transcended a key divide in jordanian society, that between jordanians of palestinian descent and those who historically lived in jordanian territory. as israel continues to wage war on gaza and, increasingly, the west bank, jordanians may respond with more acts of violence against israeli targets. the establishment of a palestinian state is a long held goal of the jordanian government, and the jordan israel peace treaty was itself predicated on the oslo accords and the belief that the conflict would be resolved with an independent state of palestine. yet, with israel’s extreme right wing government pursuing ethnic cleansing and probable genocide in gaza, invading lebanon, and possibly intending to annex the west bank, many interviewees expressed doubt that amman still has a partner in tel aviv. zaki bani irsheid, the former secretary general of the islamic action front, iaf   the political wing of the jordanian branch of the muslim brotherhood and the country’s main opposition party   explained that when the israeli knesset passed a law in july 2024 forbidding the establishment of a palestinian state, this was extremely concerning for jordan, which had based its willingness to cooperate with israel on the premise that such a state would eventually exist. “netanyahu has said he doesn’t want hamas or fatah” to control gaza, he said. “there is not one person on the israeli side that wants peace.”16israeli governments were previously willing to claim that they would consider the establishment of a state of palestine at an unspecified future date, yet, under the right wing government that came to power late in 2022 and especially since oct. 7, israel has explicitly rejected this path.17 the war has likewise exacerbated economic pressures. as of june 2024, jordan’s debt was 90 percent of its gross domestic product, gdp.18unemployment stood at 22 percent, but at 46 percent among youth.19tourism and foreign direct investment were significantly undermined by regional violence after oct. 7. populations surrounding petra, the dead sea, and wadi rum depend on tourism and were particularly hard hit. nasser judeh, former foreign minister (2009 17), pointed out that regional violence has always harmed tourism to jordan; even though the kingdom remains secure, tourists generally avoid regions where there is conflict. he joked: “in the ’70s and ’80s, a bomb would go off 2,000 miles away and tourists would stop coming.”20regional violence also affects foreign direct investment. the war has also strained jordan’s economic partnerships with israel, such as those intended to address jordan’s crippling lack of water. jordan is one of the most water scarce countries in the world, with less than 100 cubic meters available per person per year, far below the water scarcity threshold of 500 cubic meters per person per year.21israel takes more water from the jordan river than jordan and the west bank combined, despite having a significantly smaller population.22the governments of israel and jordan had planned to ratify a deal that would exchange israeli desalinated water for jordanian solar energy, but that was abandoned after october 2023.23inadequate water supply has especially harmed jordan’s agricultural sector in the jordan valley. although not a significant portion of the gdp, agriculture remains a crucial employer in this region of the country. historically, jordan could rely on domestic production of key crops, but it now imports almost 90 percent of basic foodstuffs like grain.24in the absence of politics, israel’s access to the mediterranean and desalination infrastructure could make it a useful partner for addressing jordan’s water crisis, but any further agreements have been rendered politically impossible by the war. on oct. 13, 2023, parliament speaker ahmed safadi requested a review of all agreements with israel in order to make them contingent on the cessation of hostilities; the move received a unanimous vote in favor.25however, at the time of writing, 40 percent of jordan’s energy still came from israeli natural gas.26on the issues of energy and water cooperation, the jordanian government has few alternatives to israel, but domestic resistance remains high. one way the government tries to manage this widespread opposition is by asserting that their cooperation with israel allows jordan to serve as a hub for aid to enter gaza. bani irsheid of the iaf made this observation, explaining, “the official side,” the government, “is unable to break ties with israel. they justify that by saying that jordan is giving aid to palestinians, especially in gaza.”27yet, as israel has further curtailed aid from entering gaza, it has become harder for the jordanian government to argue that they are playing a crucial role in supporting palestinians there. public opposition to israel has taken the form of a widespread boycott of western franchises such as mcdonald’s, starbucks, and carrefour, as well as american and european products like coca cola, pepsi, and nestlé. journalist daoud kuttab described social pressure as central to compliance with the boycott; he saw that nestlé water was served at a conference and observed participants asking the organizers why they were buying from a western company like nestlé. an anecdotal assessment of the state of the boycott in various locations in amman in october revealed that mcdonald’s and starbucks locations tended to be empty, with the few remaining employees waiting for absent customers. zaid eyadat, director of the center for strategic studies at the university of jordan, decried the impact, citing 17,000 lost jordanian jobs.28alternatively, kuttab pointed out that the boycott had provided unexpected opportunities for non western alternatives: “there was a guy who had a soft drink company called matrix. he was about to close down in october [2023] and then everybody boycotted pepsi and 7up. and now he’s the no. 1 soft drink company and you will have a hard time finding pepsi or coke.”29in visits to local kiosks and shops, no coca cola, pepsi, or nestlé products were visible, nor was advertising for boycotted products. many countries across the middle east are participating in the boycott of western products, although compliance is particularly high in jordan, at 94 percent.30several interlocutors explained the boycott as an expression of jordanians’ frustration with their government; although they cannot force the jordanian government to withdraw from cooperation with israel, they can control their consumption habits. jawad anani, who served as foreign minister and in other ministerial roles under king hussein and helped to facilitate the 1994 peace treaty, explained, “people are angry with the acquiescence of their leaders about what’s happening in gaza and now lebanon.”31 the outcome of the parliamentary elections in september reflected jordanians’ anger with the government. the islamic action front, which is the country’s largest political party, won a plurality of seats   31 out of 138   despite efforts by the government to encourage other parties to compete.32the iaf and other islamist groups have been vocal critics of the jordanian government’s response to israel’s assault on gaza. as a result, few were surprised by the iaf’s electoral successes, although some explained that the islamists had performed even better than expected; anani, the former foreign minister, said that he heard people predict that the iaf might win 11 or 12 seats, similar to their performance in the 2020 election, when the iaf won 10 out of 130 seats. anani said that their success also reflected the perception that islamists are less corrupt than non islamist politicians.33participation remained low, at 32 percent, demonstrating jordanians’ awareness that parliament has little control over high level decisions, including policy toward israel.34 given the intensification of political and economic pressures in the aftermath of oct. 7, the jordanian government’s capacity to maintain stability is already tested. yet the coming year is likely to aggravate that strain rather than relieve it. interviews occurred before the u.s. election, and several interlocutors expressed concern about the possibility of donald trump returning to the white house and the implications this would have for jordan and the region. jordanians remembered how the first trump administration sidelined their interests and those of the palestinians in favor of its preferred partners in riyadh and abu dhabi. rami ayasara, of the national society for human rights, pointed out that “eliminating the power of jordan in the islamic sites” in jerusalem was part of trump’s “deal of the century.”35in 2018, al monitor reported that an anonymous senior official with the palestinian authority confirmed that saudi arabia sought to replace jordan as the custodian of the muslim and christian holy sites in jerusalem in return for supporting trump’s peace plan for the middle east.36 a particular concern is israel’s desire to annex the west bank, an outcome that appears more likely following trump’s election.37israel’s finance minister, bezalel smotrich, stated on nov. 11 that he hoped that israel would establish “sovereignty” over the west bank in 2025, with trump’s help; he also said that he had “instructed israeli authorities overseeing west bank settlements ‘to begin professional and comprehensive staff work to prepare the necessary infrastructure.’”38for his second administration, trump’s appointment of prominent proponents of israeli settlements, such as mike huckabee as u.s. ambassador to israel and steve witkoff as special envoy to the middle east, as well as trump’s referring to israel as “tiny,” appear to affirm jordanians’ fears.39 many interviewees expressed alarm at the prospect of israel seizing the west bank. marwan muasher, former foreign minister and deputy prime minister, underscored how israel’s actions have radically altered the israel jordan relationship. there’s now a debate in jordan, he said, asking “if israel’s real aim is not just to prevent the establishment of a palestinian state but to revive the idea of jordan as palestine.”40muasher, who is now vice president of studies at the carnegie endowment for international peace, was instrumental in establishing the peace treaty and served as jordan’s first ambassador to israel. anani, another former foreign minister, pointed out that israel has already tried to make life unbearable for palestinians in the west bank: “but they haven’t succeeded, so what’s the next thing they’ll do? put them in trucks and push them out.”41he acknowledged that this would be a war crime. the notion of jordan as an “alternative homeland” or “watan al badil” for palestinians has long been a red line for the jordanian government.42the government gave up its claim to the west bank in 1988, partly in order to make clear that jordan is not palestine and should not be considered an option for resettling palestinians outside their homeland. but given statements from israeli officials like finance minister bezalel smotrich in the aftermath of trump’s election, many fear that israel may break the terms of the peace treaty and expel palestinians. another possibility is that israel could make life so intolerable in the west bank that palestinians try to escape. the u.s. department of state estimated that 3 million palestinians lived in the west bank as of 2022.43many palestinians there have connections to jordan and even jordanian passports, some remaining from when jordan controlled the territory before 1967. as israeli settlers and the israeli defense forces intensify their efforts to terrorize palestinians in the west bank, some may flee to jordan. tamara alrifai, director of external relations and communications for the united nations relief and works agency for palestine refugees in the near east, unrwa, viewed israel’s increased pressure on palestinians in the west bank to such an extent that they decide to leave as a likelier scenario than israel actively forcing palestinians en masse across the border, which would violate the peace treaty and would generate greater international outcry. she acknowledged, however, that the international response to israel’s military activities in gaza has not caused israel or the u.s. to alter their policies, so criticism is clearly not a significant deterrent for either.44 jordan would consider a massive influx of palestinian refugees to be an existential crisis, whether israel forcibly displaced them all at once, or as the result of a slower exodus to escape the daily violence of occupation. to prevent this, jordan might even consider revoking citizenship or other statuses that would allow palestinians to cross the border legally.45when asked about the possible large scale transfer of palestinians to jordan, former foreign minister judeh responded: “this is a red line for us, as you cannot empty the occupied palestinian territories of their demographic content. we will not accept or allow any measure that will challenge our national security, or the palestinian people’s right to independence on their national soil. the international community should stand against it too.”46his response, like the official position of the jordanian government, relies on international institutions like the u.n., which has thus far proven unable to stop israel’s actions in gaza due to cover provided by the u.s., such as its veto on the security council. for some, a greater fear than the displacement of palestinians into jordan is the project of greater israel. attef joulani, editor and founder of the sabeel news outlet, asserted that jordanian concerns about israeli escalation were higher than in any other country: “there is a basic fear due to the nature of the israeli government. those who govern in israel, the far right, their ideologies about jordan are increasing now.”47although israel’s actually invading jordan may seem far fetched given that jordan is a major non nato u.s. ally, american support for israel did not waver even after its invasion of lebanon, which arguably violated the u.n. charter’s prohibition on aggression.48however, israeli military action against jordan remains unlikely in the absence of a hezbollah style militia launching missiles from jordanian territory or otherwise significantly escalating hostilities. these issues felt particularly salient for jordanians in early october: israel began its invasion of lebanon on oct. 1, 2024, and iran responded by firing missiles over jordan at israel. working in partnership with u.s. forces stationed inside its territory, the jordanian military stated that it had shot down some of the iranian missiles on the prerogative of defending their airspace.49the day after the iranian missiles crossed jordanian airspace, former foreign minister judeh asserted, “we have been very clear that we will not accept the use of our airspace as a battleground by anyone, and we will use all available measures to protect our skies and our citizens.”50 however, the official stance did not reflect the views of many jordanians, who cheered as the iranian missiles soared overhead, relieved that israel’s abuse of palestinians would not go wholly unpunished. for some, the interceptions reflected the jordanian government’s decision to prioritize its relationship with israel and the u.s. over the lives of palestinians. given that an intercepted missile fell inside its territory and killed a jordanian, some felt that jordan was putting israel’s security even above that of its own citizens. “why is jordan exhausting its forces and economy by shooting down missiles that are not directed at it?” jordanian iyad al rantsis told middle east eye.51although it remains unclear if the jordanian military shot down the missiles or if the u.s. military stationed in jordan launched the interceptors, neither scenario improves the image of the jordanian government in the eyes of the public. some interlocutors expressed doubt that jordan would intercept israeli missiles fired at iran. and despite their decision to either engage or remain neutral, the jordanian government will struggle to avoid being dragged in if israel and iran descend into full blown conflict. as eyadat of the center for strategic studies observed, “even if jordan is not an active party, it will still be part of the war.”52 with a trump administration incoming, even some of the most unlikely fears seem more plausible. bani irsheid of the iaf, when asked what jordan would do if trump won the election and allowed israel to do whatever it wanted, replied, “it would be an international crisis. jordan has alternatives; maybe not a war but it could reconsider all its agreements with israel, including the security agreement.” in response to the observation, “but if jordan is invaded, all these agreements would be voided anyway,” he answered, “if that were to happen, it would be a new era; jordan would have a resistance movement. it would be crazy if trump were to do this: the u.s. would lose its strategic interests in jordan, like its bases.” he made clear that he considered such a possibility extremely remote.53yet others believed that if trump won, israel would feel it had been given an unprecedented opportunity to achieve goals that once seemed impossible, like the acquisition of additional territory. with jordan’s debt already at 90 percent of gdp, unemployment high, economic development low, and insufficient water for its existing population, israel does not need to invade to push jordan over the brink. the prospect that israel might try to force some of the 3 million palestinians in the west bank into jordan represents an existential threat to the kingdom. king abdullah spoke clearly against the possibility of israeli annexation during his speech at the u.n. general assembly in september. referring to israeli extremists, abdullah said: “that includes those who continue to propagate the idea of jordan as an alternative homeland. so let me be very, very clear   that will never happen. we will never accept the forced displacement of palestinians, which is a war crime.”54several interlocutors mentioned this speech by king abdullah, and expressed support for his clear stance on palestine, even though some of them otherwise oppose his position. bani irsheid, of the iaf, said, “in his majesty’s speech at the u.n., he refuses [annexation], this represents the opinion of the majority.”55 several also pointed out that prior to that speech, the jordanian king had allowed his foreign minister, ayman safadi (no relation to parliamentary speaker ahmed safadi), to serve as his primary mouthpiece for condemning israel’s actions. ayasara, of the national society for human rights, explained that “safadi said clearly that forcing palestinians to move to jordan is a sign for starting a war against jordan.”56others opined that the islamists’ success in the parliamentary elections had caused the king to keep safadi as foreign minister to continue channeling jordanians’ frustration. in their view, if the islamists had won fewer seats, the king might not have opted to keep such an outspoken foreign minister. if a significant portion of palestinians in the west bank were to come into jordan, either by force or of their own volition to escape israeli violence, this would be extremely destabilizing. the king would have to either acquiesce to the demands of his citizenry and respond aggressively to israel, or try to manage the political fallout of not doing so. abdullah is more likely to maintain the treaty with israel and ask for assistance from the u.s. to provide for hundreds of thousands or even millions of new refugees. yet, under a trump administration, it is not clear that such help would be provided. in that scenario, the monarchy could be overthrown, as abdullah would have inadequate resources to address both the needs and frustrations of his own population as well as those of palestinians fleeing the west bank. if the government were to fall, many jordanians and displaced palestinians would likely try to attack israel, either individually, as has occurred already, or through organized militias. israel would undoubtedly launch a massive military response. the resulting violence and instability could rival the syrian refugee crisis of 2014 15, which proved so disruptive to european politics, to say nothing of the impact on the lives of jordanians themselves.57due to the strong support that the israeli government would continue to receive from the u.s., israeli politicians are unlikely to view low level violence from jordan as a deterrent. even in the unlikely event that the jordanian government that emerged in the aftermath of the hashemites’ overthrow might launch an attack on israel, this would likely only reinforce washington’s support for tel aviv. this dynamic, that the u.s. provides unlimited support to israel regardless of its actions, incentivizes more and more escalatory decisions from israeli politicians, in direct contradiction of u.s. interests and expressed american wishes. the resulting moral hazard threatens to drag the united states into a conflict that it could otherwise have prevented merely by upholding u.s. law, which prohibits the transfer of u.s. weapons to countries engaged in gross violations of human rights, as well as to countries that block u.s. humanitarian assistance. there is a small possibility that, despite the excitement from israel’s far right over trump’s election, he may actually impose more consequences on israel than biden did. if trump feels that netanyahu and the israeli government are trying to take advantage of him, he may be less willing than biden to tolerate such behavior. trump and his team might recognize that greenlighting israel’s annexation of the west bank, for example, would derail his plan to persuade saudi arabia to normalize with israel, for which he hopes to win a nobel peace prize.58if mohammed bin salman maintains his position that a state of palestine with jerusalem as its capital is a requirement for normalization, saudi israeli relations remain extremely unlikely; yet that prospect may be enough for trump to pressure netanyahu not to annex the west bank, and thereby prevent jordan’s slide into chaos.59 jordan’s leaders have long portrayed their kingdom as “on the edge of instability” in order to encourage foreign governments to provide the funds needed to keep it solvent. that narrative was never inaccurate, it was merely deployed strategically to help the hashemites stay in power. according to judeh, the former foreign minister, “in the 1950s and 60s, some in the region always used to say, ‘jordan’s days are numbered.’ people expected jordan to be the weak link, but it outlasted all those voices and regimes, so we must be doing something right!”60and yet, in the past, amman could count on a u.s. government that was invested in helping to maintain jordanian security to bolster regional stability, and in an israeli government that saw the value in having a peace treaty govern its longest border. king abdullah can no longer count on either, with trump in the white house and netanyahu dependent on the support of right wing extremists in his governing coalition to keep him out of jail. even if kamala harris had won the election, she had given no indication that she would veer from biden’s support for israel, which would have further undermined jordan. serious destabilization in jordan elevates the risk to the united states. u.s. policy toward the levant since the clinton administration has invested in and relied on stability in jordan. if an annexation of the west bank by israel pushed jordan over the edge, either in the form of a massive refugee crisis or the overthrow of the hashemites, the u.s. and israel would both lose a cornerstone on which they currently rely. trump has pledged to withdraw u.s. troops from iraq and syria, yet, if jordan is in chaos, that campaign promise will be nearly impossible to fulfill. militias continue to operate with relative impunity in iraq, israel’s invasion has rendered lebanon even more precarious, and the fall of assad threatens to throw syria into chaos. although trump campaigned on ending forever wars in the region, unless he reins in israel, he may soon oversee even greater regional conflict that could drag in the united states, especially if u.s. service members are killed and the american public demands retribution. furthermore, if the u.s. fails to prevent israel from annexing the west bank, especially in the likely event that this breaks the fragile status quo in jerusalem, the reaction from america’s regional partners is likely to be swift. while rulers from rabat to cairo and abu dhabi to riyadh welcomed trump’s election victory due to his willingness to reward them in his first term, they will face significant domestic pressure to respond decisively if israel annexes the west bank. as israel’s war on gaza has yet again demonstrated, the issue of palestine remains salient for arab and muslim publics. trump wants to demonstrate his ability to achieve saudi normalization with israel when biden failed. rather than building on his image as a dealmaker, trump could see his abraham accords unraveling if he fails to prevent israel from further destabilizing the region. instead of restoring order, trump might end up facilitating u.s. involvement in yet another unnecessary and futile war in the middle east. annelle sheline is a research fellow in the middle east program at the quincy institute, an expert on religious and political authority in the middle east and north africa. she received her doctorate from george washington university. jacob magid, “biden hosts jordan’s abdullah for third time, in nod to king’s role in region,” the times of israel, february 3, 2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/biden hosts jordans abdullah for third time in nod to kings role in region/. ↩ michael barnett, dialogues in arab politics (new york: columbia university press, 1998), 65 66. ↩ marwan muasher, “jordan’s redline on admitting palestinians is unlikely to change,” carnegie endowment for international peace, november 21, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2023/11/jordans redline on admitting palestinians is unlikely to change?lang=en. ↩ bruce reidel, “25 years on, remembering the path to peace for jordan and israel,” brookings institution, october 23, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/25 years on remembering the path to peace for jordan and israel/. ↩ david schenker, “twenty years of israeli jordanian peace: a brief assessment,” the washington institute for near east policy, october 23, 2014, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy analysis/twenty years israeli jordanian peace brief assessment. ↩ jeremy m. sharp, jordan: background and relations, u.s. library of congress, congressional research service, rl 33546 (2024), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/rl/rl33546#:~:text=the%20united%20states%20has%20provided,includes%20%241.45%20billion%20for%20jordan. ↩ farah bdour, “jordan’s three balancing acts: navigating the post october 7 middle east,” united states institute of peace, september 11, 2024, https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/09/jordans three balancing acts navigating post october 7 middle east. ↩ “overview,” the world bank in jordan, world bank group, updated february 5, 2024, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/jordan/overview. ↩ “overview,” jordan operational data portal, united nations high commissioner for refugees, accessed december 3, 2024, https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/jor. ↩ rachel furlow and salvatore borgognone, “gulf designs on jordan’s foreign policy,” carnegie endowment for international peace, july 17, 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2018/07/gulf designs on jordans foreign policy?lang=en. ↩ matthew lee, “u.s. boosts aid to jordan despite trump threats of cuts,” associated press, february 14, 2018, https://apnews.com/united states government 461ac33c9a7b47fd92b6b64f12967c0a. ↩ meshaal held the global spotlight in 1997 when the israeli government injected him with poison outside his office in amman. king hussein threatened to break the jordan israel peace treaty until prime minister netanyahu agreed to provide the antidote. see nidal al mughrabi, “khaled meshaal, who survived israeli assassination attempt, tipped to be new hamas leader,” reuters, july 31, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle east/khaled meshaal who survived israeli assassination attempt tipped be new hamas 2024 07 31/; “former hamas chief calls for protests, neighbours to join war against israel,” reuters, october 11, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle east/former hamas chief calls protests neighbours join war against israel 2023 10 11/. ↩ julian borger, “jordanian driver kills israeli workers at border with west bank,” the guardian, september 8, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/sep/08/senior gaza aid official and family killed by israeli airstrike on home. ↩ “israeli military says it killed two attackers crossing from jordan’s red sea area,” reuters, october 18, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle east/israeli military says it identified number terrorists crossing jordan south dead 2024 10 18/ ↩ suleiman al khalidi, “gunman shot dead, 3 police injured in shooting near israeli embassy in jordan,” reuters, november 24, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle east/jordanian police cordon off area near israeli embassy after gunshots heard 2024 11 24/. ↩ author interview with zaki bani irsheid, former secretary general of the islamic action front, amman, jordan, october 2, 2024. ↩ “netanyahu boasts of thwarting the establishment of a palestinian state ‘for decades,’” the times of israel, february 20, 2024, ​​​​https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu boasts of thwarting the establishment of a palestinian state for decades/. ↩ “jordanian national government debt,” jordan, ceic, accessed december 3, 2024, https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/jordan/national government debt#:~:text=jordan%20national%20government%20debt%20reached,jan%202002%20to%20aug%202024. ↩ the world bank, “overview.” ↩ author interview with nasser judeh, former minister of foreign affairs, amman, jordan, october 2, 2024. ↩ “water, sanitation and hygiene,” unicef, accessed december 3, 2024, https://www.unicef.org/jordan/water sanitation and hygiene#:~:text=jordan%20is%20the%20second%20most,the%20high%20levels%20of%20subsidies. ↩ mark zeitoun and muna dajani, “israel is hoarding the jordan river   it’s time to share the water,” the conversation, december 19, 2019, https://theconversation.com/israel is hoarding the jordan river its time to share the water 126906. ↩ “jordan will not sign water for energy deal with israel   safadi,” the jordan times, november 17, 2023, https://jordantimes.com/news/local/jordan will not sign water energy deal israel %e2%80%94 safadi. ↩ philippe pernot, “‘the problems are endless’: farmers in jordan mobilise against desertification and poor pay,” the new arab, march 19, 2024, https://www.newarab.com/features/farmers jordan rally against desertification and poor pay. ↩ saud al sharafat, “the impact of the war in gaza on israel jordan cooperation,” washington institute for near east policy, january 31, 2024, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy analysis/impact war gaza israel jordan cooperation. ↩ mohammad ersan, “‘black day’: hundreds rally in jordan over ‘treasonous’ gas deal with israel,” middle east eye, january 3, 2020, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/black day hundreds rally jordan over treasonous gas deal israel. ↩ author interview with bani irsheid. ↩ author interview with zaid eyadat, director of the center for strategic studies at the university of jordan, amman, jordan, october 1, 2024. ↩ author interview with daoud kuttab, journalist, amman, jordan, october 3, 2024. ↩ yasmeen serhan, “as gaza inspired boycotts continue, new brands are emerging to fill the void,” time, august 23, 2024, https://time.com/7014399/gaza boycotts coke cola mcdonalds starbucks/; tamara turki, “fizzing with change: jordanian soda sales surge amid anti western boycott,” arab news, january 26, 2024, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2436236/middle east. ↩ author interview with jawad anani, former foreign minister, amman, jordan, september 30, 2024. ↩ ahmad sharawi, “will jordan’s new electoral law bring real change?,” atlantic council, september 7, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/jordan electoral law parliament/. ↩ this perception is widespread and is studied by political scientists as a key factor in the “islamist political advantage.” see, e.g., melani cammett and pauline jones luong, “is there an islamist political advantage?,” annual review of political science 17, no. 1 (2014): 187 206, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2349385. ↩ tariq al nuaimat, “analyzing jordan’s parliamentary elections 2024,” carnegie endowment for international peace, october 4, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2024/10/jordan election 2024?lang=en. ↩ author interview with rami ayasara, executive director of the national society for human rights, amman, jordan, september 30, 2024. ↩ rasha abou jalal, “is riyadh really pushing for control of jerusalem holy sites?,” al monitor, july 2, 2018, https://www.al monitor.com/originals/2018/07/saudi arabia holy sites jordan jerusalem pa guardianship.html. ↩ jonathan saul and james mackenzie, “with trump back, israeli settlers revive goal of full control of west bank,” reuters, november 23, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle east/israeli settlers set sights trump support full control west bank 2024 11 23/. ↩ far right minister calls for israeli sovereignty in west bank in 2025,” reuters, november 11, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle east/far right minister calls israeli sovereignty west bank 2025 2024 11 11/. ↩ lara jakes and adam rasgon, “trump’s middle east picks signal staunch pro israel policy,” the new york times, november 13, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/13/world/middleeast/huckabee israel witkoff middle east us.html; author interview with attef joulani, journalist, amman, jordan, october 2, 2024. joulani referenced remarks from candidate trump at an antisemitism event at his golf club in bedminster, n.j., when trump referred to israel as “tiny,” asking, “is there any way of getting more?” on august 15, 2024. see “former president trump speaks at fighting antisemitism event in bedminster, new jersey,” c span, august 15, 2024, https://www.c span.org/video/?537763 1/president trump speaks fighting antisemitism event bedminster jersey. ↩ author interview with marwan muasher, former minister of foreign affairs, amman, jordan, september 29, 2024. ↩ author interview with jawad anani, former foreign minister, amman, jordan, september 30, 2024. ↩ see marwan muasher, “jordan’s redline on admitting palestinians is unlikely to change,” carnegie endowment for international peace, november 21, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2023/11/jordans redline on admitting palestinians is unlikely to change?lang=en. ↩ u.s. department of state, office of international religious freedom, israel, west bank and gaza: west bank and gaza 2022 international religious freedom report (washington, d.c., 2022), https://www.state.gov/reports/2022 report on international religious freedom/israel west bank and gaza/west bank and gaza/#:~:text=religious%20demography,gaza%20strip%20(midyear%202022). ↩ author interview with tamara alrifai, director of external relations and communications for unrwa, amman, jordan, october 3, 2024. ↩ the source of this statement wished to remain anonymous due to the sensitivity of the topic. ↩ author interview with judeh. ↩ author interview with attef joulani, journalist, amman, jordan, october 2, 2024. ↩ lara jakes, “what international law says about israel’s invasion of lebanon,” the new york times, october 12, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/12/world/middleeast/israel lebanon invasion international law.html. ↩ “jordan says air force, aerial defenses intercepted projectiles during iranian attack on israel,” the times of israel, october 1, 2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/jordan says air force aerial defenses intercepted projectiles during iranian attack on israel/. ↩ author interview with judeh. ↩ mohammad ersan, “jordanian authorities face backlash over role in downing iranian missiles,” middle east eye, october 2, 2024, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/jordan backlash over role downing iranian missiles heading israel. ↩ author interview with eyadat. ↩ author interview with bani irsheid. ↩ speech by king abdullah ii at u.n. general assembly, september 24, 2024, https://www.kingabdullah.jo/en/speeches/speech his majesty king abdullah ii 79th session general assembly united nations. ↩ author interview with bani irsheid. ↩ author interview with ayasara. ayasara was referring to remarks from foreign minister ayman safadi, who on september 6, 2024, stated that any israeli attempts to displace west bank palestinians into jordan would be interpreted as “a declaration of war.” see the remarks in “israeli displacement of west bank palestinians into jordan will be ‘act of war’: safadi,” the new arab, september 6, 2024, https://www.newarab.com/news/jordan fm displacement palestinians will be act war. ↩ natalia banulescu bogdan and elizabeth collett, “refugee crisis deepens political polarization in the west,” migration policy institute, december 11, 2015, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/refugee crisis deepens political polarization west. ↩ quint forgey, “trump and his aides argue he’s long overdue for nobel peace prize,” politico, september 9, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/09/trump nobel peace prize 410761. ↩ “saudi arabia will not recognise israel without palestinian state, says crown prince,” reuters, september 18, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle east/saudi crown prince condemns israels crimes against palestinians 2024 09 18/. ↩ author interview with judeh. ↩ the quincy institute is a transpartisan “action tank” and communications project, established to challenge the decades long obsession of u.s. foreign policy decision makers with global military dominance and war. get our latest expert foreign policy analysis delivered straight to your inbox, every week email

i work on a broad range of travel articles, from news features and photo essays to interactive projects and visual investigations. i have a particular interest in stories that merge compelling reporting with immersive photography and video. i joined the times in 2016 from the paris review, where i was an editor for several years. i have a graduate degree in english literature from the university of oxford and an undergraduate degree in biological chemistry from the university of virginia. born in youngstown, ohio, i spent several years of my childhood in budapest, hungary, and have traveled extensively ever since. i am one of the leaders of the times guild, our newsroom union. i have the highest standards for accuracy and fairness. i do not accept free or discounted services from anyone in the travel industry, whether or not i’m on an assignment. i protect my sources. like all times journalists, i am committed to upholding the standards of integrity as outlined in our ethical journalism handbook. email: stephen.hiltner@nytimes.com instagram: @sahiltner linkedin: stephen hiltner where will the new year take you? kick start your travel plans by selecting favorites from our annual list. by the new york times the list made its debut in 2005, when world travel was about half of today’s 1.3 billion arrivals and phones were for making calls. here’s how the times’s annual travel list   and travel itself   has changed in the last two decades. by tariro mzezewa nostalgic for a time before ubiquitous connectivity, a writer ditched his phone and relied instead on serendipity   and maps made by people he met along the way. photographs and text by ben buckland an editor on the travel desk explains our decision to explore the middle eastern kingdom. by stephen hiltner to witness the kingdom’s profound transformation and assess its ambitious tourism projects, a new york times journalist spent a month on the road there. by stephen hiltner, karen hanley and james surdam to witness the kingdom’s profound transformation and assess its ambitious tourism projects, a times journalist spent a month on the road there. here’s what he saw. by stephen hiltner this year’s 52 places to go list includes something for everyone   from remote villages to pristine waters to science centers to a region celebrating 150 years of impressionism. by karen hanley, stephen hiltner and ruru kuo no matter why you travel, our list offers inspiration. by the new york times shoddy guidebooks are flooding amazon. their authors claim to be renowned travel writers, but are they a.i. inventions? and how big is the problem? by seth kugel and stephen hiltner our columnist reviews the day’s puzzle. warning: contains spoilers! by stephen hiltner

research monday, january 25, 2021 foreign policy center for middle east policy this brief is part of the brookings blueprints for american renewal & prosperity project. for over a decade, the united states has sought to wind down the wars in afghanistan and iraq, reduce its military footprint in the middle east, and redirect scarce resources to asia. global and regional trends reinforced this american desire to reduce the priority of the middle east in its global strategy, and the military “pivot” is well underway. the challenge for american policy is how to protect its remaining and still important interests in that region in an era of austerity and fierce power competition, both in the region and globally. the incoming biden administration should not waste the window for a reset. gulf arab partners, facing fiscal constraints from lower energy prices and the covid 19 induced global recession, are more open to conflict resolution in the proxy wars they hagve been fighting across the region. but their relative penury will also impede their ability to invest in stabilizing weaker neighbors, including key states like jordan and egypt. meanwhile, the islamic republic of iran is sanctioned to the hilt, and used to wielding regional influence on the cheap. thus the balance of power in the region may even favor the iranians as the pandemic begins to recede. the biden team must set aside the trump administration’s fruitless “maximum pressure” in favor of the mix of intelligence cooperation, diplomacy, financial and military tools that can effectively deter or disrupt subversive iranian activity while incentivizing tehran’s return to the nuclear negotiating table. and the pentagon must undertake a zero based review of its force presence in the persian gulf region to ensure it is both efficient and effective in fulfilling its core missions there. the united states must rebuild what has historically been its most effective tool in the middle east: diplomacy, especially in advancing conflict resolution. in yemen and libya, there might now be opportunities to pull competing regional powers out of the fighting and negotiate power sharing governments that promote stability and reduce freedom of action for islamist terrorist movements. washington cannot let israelis and palestinians stew in their stalemated conflict   but rather than trying to reconvene talks, it should take a long term approach to rebuilding foundations for compromise between the two societies while insisting that they both abjure destabilizing unilateral actions, and work to improve freedom, security, and prosperity for those living with the conflict every day. finally, the biden administration must reestablish clear boundaries in relationships that were deeply unbalanced by president donald trump’s careless approach. israel, saudi arabia, and the united arab emirates (uae) all have questions about the extent and durability of american security commitments to their neighborhood, and all three prefer to keep the u.s. closely engaged. washington can pursue necessary de escalation and nuclear diplomacy with iran while engaging these key partners about where american interests begin and end, and where partners’ own preferences and behaviors present real obstacles to closer cooperation. as in all healthy relationships, honest communication and clear boundaries are essential to maintain mutual respect and good feeling. back to top ⇑ two years ago, with my brookings colleague mara karlin, i argued that it was time for the united states to end a long period of “purgatory” in the middle east by deciding to do less in the region, despite the attendant risks and costs. we argued that, while the u.s. retains interests in the middle east, they are falling in priority within its global strategy, even as the region is destabilized from within and u.s. partners there are less inclined to accede to american preferences. as a result, we said, even a much higher level of american investment was unlikely to yield stability or even satisfactory outcomes. instead, we posited, the united states should reduce its regional ambitions to match its core interests and the level at which it can comfortably sustain engagement. some welcomed and repeated this argument, while others balked. but the dramatic developments of 2020 only underscore the opportunity costs of remaining entangled in the middle east, as well as the bankruptcy and danger of trump’s twin policy legacies in the region: imposing “maximum pressure” on iran while giving traditional american partners boundless latitude to pursue their own power struggles regardless of the consequences for american interests. the challenge for american policy is how to protect its remaining and still important interests in [the middle east] in an era of austerity and fierce power competition, both in the region and globally. the challenge for american policy is how to protect its remaining and still important interests in that region in an era of austerity and fierce power competition, both in the region and globally. a new approach to the middle east is overdue, and the incoming biden administration should not waste the window for a reset. as the tide of the pandemic recedes, the region will look rather different   and in this changed landscape, there will be opportunities for the united states, as well as dangers. the choices facing president joe biden are neither simple nor cost free, but this paper will suggest a path forward that sets clear priorities and addresses key relationships. back to top ⇑ the twin crises of the covid 19 pandemic and the crash in global oil prices have left gulf arab states facing a substantial decline in wealth, with insufficient cash to bolster their own grim economies, much less to advance ambitious reform programs or massive development projects. this relative penury will likely impede their ability to wield influence across the region. the arab gulf’s main tool in regional geopolitical competition has always been money. that money had considerable power in years past, evident in, for example, the $30 billion a handful of gulf states invested to prop up the government of president abdel fattah el sissi in egypt. now, however, the gulf will have tough decisions to make: about how much they can afford to invest to keep friends like jordan and egypt above water, how much they are willing to spend to push back against iranian influence in iraq and lebanon, and how they can protect their core interests while suing for peace in yemen. the dreams some of them once harbored of decimating ideological adversaries and remaking the region in their own image will have to be shelved for a more propitious time. losing this gulf ballast will impede any u.s. led efforts to stabilize the region   a covid impaired u.s. economy will be hard put to invest scarce assistance dollars in shoring up weak middle eastern states. indeed, the overall post covid regional geopolitical balance may even favor iran. although devastated by the pandemic and by crushing sanctions, the islamic republic long ago learned to live without significant oil income, and is well practiced at wielding regional influence on the cheap. the islamic revolutionary guard corps (irgc), the main liaison to iran’s regional proxies, makes its own money from smuggling under sanctions and from control of key economic sectors inside the country. after the crisis passes, then, all else equal, we are likely to see a middle east where iran’s influence in places like iraq, syria, and lebanon is more or less constant, while the gulf’s influence declines. this trend in favor of iranian influence heightens the imperative of revising the trump administration’s fruitless approach to iran. trump escalated military and economic pressure to punishing levels, but never clarified realistic demands or how he prioritized amongst them. he swung between clumsy bids for diplomacy with supreme leader ali khamenei and escalating military confrontation in the persian gulf. the assassination of irgc general qassem soleimani rid the world of a murderer. but it did not eliminate the instruments of murder he wielded or “reestablish deterrence,” as the trump administration frequently claimed; instead it brought the united states to the brink of war. just a year ago, dozens of u.s. forces were injured by iranian retaliation that also brought down a civilian airliner at the cost of 176 lives. u.s. and allied forces in iraq continue to face attacks from the iranian linked kataib hezbollah militia. the main policy results from trump’s pressure campaign have been america’s international isolation in confronting iran’s nuclear ambition, new pressures on the u.s. presence and counter islamic state group (is) campaign in iraq, and constant challenges to maritime security and energy infrastructure in the gulf. that, and the fact that iran is now much closer to having sufficient enriched uranium for a bomb. a post covid middle east in which iran is relatively advantaged will make right sizing the american military posture in the region all the more important. the beefy posture of the last two decades by itself has not deterred the iranians (and indeed, it was largely built to deal with other challenges in the long war on terror). instead, the united states has deterred iranian bad behavior most successfully when it has adopted a multifaceted approach using sanctions, intelligence to expose and interrupt bad behavior, multilateral pressure, and the targeted use of force when necessary. an effective policy package for containing the threats iran poses to regional stability and american interests will also offer a diplomatic pathway for iran to temper and ultimately abandon such behaviors in favor of international engagement; most of all, it will not rely on the military as the preeminent tool in the policy package. all of this requires close coordination with both regional and global partners, a feature decidedly absent from the go it alone capriciousness of the trump years. america’s military priorities should be driven by the strategic objectives that drive for america’s military presence in the region. as senior pentagon official james h. anderson outlined to congress in may 2020, they are to “ensure the region is not a safe haven for terrorists, is not dominated by any power hostile to the united states, and contributes to a stable global energy market.” in this light, the objects of american military engagement become clearer: defeating is and other terrorists and denying them safe havens, preventing iran from achieving nuclear weapons status, and preventing disruptions to energy flows. the dilemma, however, is how best to achieve these objectives in a sustainable and effective manner. daniel benaim and jake sullivan’s recommendation in foreign affairs for an aggressive diplomatic push to bring local actors into a regional security dialogue is a thoughtful proposal, if it can be brought to fruition, and a good reminder that america’s greatest positive impact over most of its history in the region has been through diplomatic tools. its success will depend on the will of regional actors to tamp down confrontation and build mechanisms for wider dialogue and conflict resolution. u.s. central command is sorely overdue for a zero based review of its posture and personnel. the reduction in u.s. forces in afghanistan and iraq creates opportunities to likewise reduce military presence in the gulf linked to those operations. defense budget cuts are increasingly likely as the federal deficit closes in on $1.5 trillion. the debacle of covid contagion on the uss roosevelt and the gap its sidelining left in asia is a reminder of why keeping two carrier strike groups in the middle east is unsustainable. additional maritime and air capabilities are not needed in a region that already has a good deal of both. but if the global review now under way at the department of defense does not result in a smaller and different mix of military capabilities, personnel, and headquarters in the middle east, it will have failed to meaningfully align u.s. priorities. the pentagon also needs a more formal way to measure the impact of regional posture decisions on deterrence. instead of viewing current posture as a sunk cost and making decisions about military posture in the region as an ad hoc reaction to crises or to mollify insecure partners, the u.s. military should regularize a rigorous and realistic process for making force allocations match intended strategic objectives and reassessing when they do not do so. a systematic process with more durable results would better reassure regional partners and help reveal the potential and limits of the military’s role in the region. back to top ⇑ as the united states works to reduce the heavy military focus of its regional policy, it needs to beef up its diplomacy to tamp down other regional conflicts that give troublemakers like iran and russia opportunities to grow their influence. in that regard, there may be a silver lining: the financial pinch felt by gulf states might also reduce their recent tendency to regional adventurism. since 2011, gulf governments have provided financial, material, and political support to armed actors in syria, yemen, and libya, seeing these civil conflicts as proxy wars with their regional rivals for the future regional order. most gulf aid to syrian insurgents trailed off years ago   although its impact is still visible in the fragmented nature of the syrian opposition. in libya, though, the uae, egypt, and russia funded, armed, and provided military support to general khalifa hifter’s bloody assault on tripoli while turkey and qatar backed the other side   all of them in violation of a u.n. arms embargo. in yemen, of course, two gulf states have been direct combatants. related books suzanne maloney february 25, 2020 bruce riedel march 12, 2019 khaled elgindy april 2, 2019 trump administration policy on all three of these devastating civil conflicts has been capricious and confused, allowing regional actors to pursue their own goals unconstrained by any american red lines. but gulf states have achieved neither greater security nor greater american engagement from their assertive approach; instead, their behavior generated bipartisan concerns in congress about continuing the sale of u.s. arms to these states. perhaps now their reduced financial circumstances will encourage them to give peace a chance. a relative decline in both resources and commitment by some fairly hardheaded actors may provide the united states additional leverage in situations where, over recent years, gaining leverage would have required a significant commitment of resources. already, the uae has withdrawn militarily from yemen, while libyan factions have reached a tentative agreement on new elections and are discussing a process for power sharing. the yemen conflict offers the most opportunities for the united states to encourage a path toward conflict resolution. both the saudi and emirati leaderships have begun to recognize that the price they are paying for their involvement in the conflict has grown higher and unsustainable. they have not only failed to achieve their goals, they have also profoundly undermined yemeni and regional stability, to the benefit of iran and al qaida in the arabian peninsula. but it takes two to tango   the houthis, well entrenched on the ground and feeling secure in the support of their iranian backers, are resisting negotiation efforts. the maritime coalition to interdict arms shipments to the houthis has borne fruit; to support the peace process, this mission should be strengthened. the houthis might take egregious actions to capture saudi territory, attack saudi infrastructure, or cause significant saudi casualties. but barring such escalation, the united states can helpfully expend some diplomatic energy by encouraging external actors to reduce their involvement in the war, support the negotiations process under u.n. auspices, and by discouraging unhelpful actions by its regional partners. such an effort is vastly complicated by the reckless decision of the trump administration in january 2021 to designate the houthi movement as a foreign terrorist organization. persuading regional partners to pull back from their regional adventurism is one part of a broader reset needed in these fundamental relationships. over the past decade, the middle east has undergone upheaval of historic proportions. after decades of eroding social contracts, weakening government services, and sustained repression, popular uprisings challenged autocratic governments across the region and toppled longtime dictators. in the wake of these protests, civil wars erupted in yemen, syria, and libya. the shock waves of this upheaval left regional leaders intently focused on regime security, with various players using a combination of reforms, increased government spending, and intensified repression to remain in power. at the same time, the united states under president barack obama found itself at odds with several of its traditional partners, not just over popular demands for democracy and human rights, but also over negotiations with iran and the terms of the joint comprehensive plan of action that resulted. today, the middle east is an arena of fierce geopolitical competition between blocs led by turkey, saudi arabia, and iran, with outside actors like russia taking advantage of the situation to undermine american policies and challenge american partnerships. under trump, the united states abandoned the iran nuclear deal and escalated confrontation with both iran and is, but the trump administration’s impulsive decisionmaking on issues from syria to iran did not reassure regional governments of its reliability as a security partner. their anxiety, as much as the threat of israeli annexation and trump’s fire sale offers of highly sophisticated weapons systems, helped catalyze the israel uae normalization agreement. and this regional uncertainty is bolstered by the accurate understanding amongst regional actors that the united states would prefer to spend less time, attention, and resources on the middle east, so that it can focus on the emergent global competition with russia and china. in the last four years, some of the strategies deployed by the united states’ traditional regional partners have involved taking advantage of the ego, ignorance, carelessness, and venality of trump and his senior advisers, with the result that washington’s regional friends have become enmeshed in america’s deeply polarized domestic politics, to the detriment of bilateral cooperation. the crux of the dilemma facing the united states in attempting to implement this change is that doing less in the middle east means relying more on regional partners to stabilize the region and protect our shared interests. but in this region, washington itself has no clear vision of how to return to regional stability, and its partners have thus far been intent on narrow strategies of short term self help that destabilize at least as often as they calm. even if post covid dynamics tamp down some of the worst tendencies of regional actors, the gaps between washington and its partners remain. a path forward for america in the middle east demands clarity and honesty in communications with longtime regional partners, to overcome the mistrust built up over the past decade, and to determine whether and how much washington and its regional friends can agree on priorities for stabilizing the region. one clear lesson from the trump era is that, as in families, healthy relationships rely on open communication and solid boundaries. the diplomatic opening between the united arab emirates and israel is evidence that america’s friends in the region are ready to work more closely and overtly together against the iranian threat. as the united states builds on this foundation, it must also take care that its regional friends aren’t working together in ways that violate american interests or values, like enhancing the capabilities of autocratic governments to surveil citizens or repress dissent. washington must also watch carefully that the new weapons and systems it shares with its friends do not kick off a new regional arms race, or give governments capabilities that they might use in aggressive or destabilizing ways. the arms package for the emiratis has already provoked a request from qatar for f 35 aircraft and necessitated a “compensation” package for israel. given the ongoing emirati role in libya, and there are hard questions to be asked about the wisdom of selling the uae reaper drones, with their capabilities for close air support and irregular warfare. probably the relationship most in need of revision is that with saudi arabia. the trump administration and riyadh both played a part in radically unbalancing the relationship. trump did so through his willingness to abide egregious saudi behavior and even to abuse executive authorities to shield the kingdom from consequences for that behavior imposed by congress. riyadh did so through a series of behaviors that, in the eyes of both republican and democratic elected officials, evidenced disrespect for american sovereignty and interests and called into question the steadiness and strategic judgment of the new leadership of a longtime u.s. partner. from the american side, a reset will thus inevitably begin with demanding, and enforcing, saudi accountability for egregious actions like journalist jamal khashoggi’s murder, planting spies in american companies, attempting to kidnap saudis in the united states, and helping saudis flee american courts. none of these are the actions of a partner or a friend. that said, shared interests and shared history still offer opportunity for common ground. washington should focus the partnership on shared security threats from iran and violent non state actors, and prioritize saudi military professionalism over arms sales. the u.s. cannot determine who leads saudi arabia, and it should not try. but it can ask for assurances that the saudi leadership understands u.s. interests and concerns, and cares enough about the bilateral relationship to be responsive to them and to be forthright about its own views and priorities. there are a number of actions riyadh could take at the outset of the new administration to reassure concerned americans that the kingdom’s rulers value the relationship and understand the need to strengthen their reputation as a reliable, stabilizing force in the region. actions in that vein could include decisively removing saad al qahtani, crown prince mohammed bin salman’s aide implicated in both the murder of khashoggi and the torture of loujain al hathloul, from any role in the government or palace; dismissing the outrageous cases against women’s rights activists and releasing them from prison, house arrests, and bans on work and travel; releasing u.s. nationals like walid fataihi from saudi prisons; and working with alacrity to move toward a negotiated solution in yemen. the crown prince remains focused on transitioning the monarchy from the sons of king abdul aziz to the grandsons, and transitioning the kingdom’s economy from one dominated by oil rents and government spending to one with a growing independent, non oil private sector. to achieve these goals, he has moved forward with some long awaited domestic societal reforms. but he has already made clear that, modernization aside, his reign will be a brutal one, and his arbitrary and coercive exercise of increasingly centralized authority has reduced the confidence and eagerness of outside investors in his economic plans. that means that there is good reason for the united states to keep a close eye on this relationship and prepare for the likelihood, seen elsewhere in the region, that repression may not prove a recipe for long term stability or success. as the united states seeks to focus its more modest regional engagement on areas where it can make a meaningful difference, it must also work to avoid triggering crises that will upend regional stability and demand u.s. engagement to mitigate. most notably, washington must avoid a conflagration in the israeli palestinian relationship. trump’s greenlighting of israeli annexation, alienation of the palestinian leadership, and cutoff of aid crucial for palestinian health, welfare, and stability were profoundly counterproductive. they set back any hope for conflict resolution, and set negative conditions for pandemic response, security cooperation, and leadership succession amidst volatility in both israeli and palestinian politics. as i have detailed with colleagues in a new report, the united states must stand strong in refusing to encourage or recognize any israeli annexation of territory in the west bank, and must work to rebuild its relations with the palestinians and restart the painstaking work of laying a new foundation for constructive negotiations. but this urgent work does not mean that the israeli palestinian issue should be a front burner concern for the new president, whose top priority will inevitably be confronting the ongoing pandemic. no high level envoy should be appointed in 2021. second, and despite iran’s heavy hand, washington should not walk entirely away from syria and lebanon. while both are profoundly dysfunctional   the horrific syrian war is entering its second decade and lebanon’s political and economic crises are hitting a nadir   u.s. involvement can still have a limited impact. maintaining the small presence of u.s. forces on the syrian iraqi border and sustaining sanctions on both syria and iran may offer more leverage as syrian president bashar assad begins more earnestly to seek resources for reconstruction, as russia and iran struggle for dominance over assad’s weakened regime, and as both states feel increasingly constrained in the resources they are willing to put into the game. in lebanon, the devastating beirut blast precipitated a crisis that washington should not waste. working with france and others, the united states should mobilize economic support conditioned on meaningful political and economic reform, support lebanon’s civil society, and continue investment in the military’s work against mutually agreed threats like is. washington should avoid looking at its role in the middle east solely through the lens of its geopolitical competition with russia and china, and assuming that regional governments will choose sides. washington should avoid looking at its role in the middle east solely through the lens of its geopolitical competition with russia and china, and assuming that regional governments will choose sides. both countries still have largely transactional relationships with regional actors, and america’s friends want to diversify while maintaining their special relationships with washington. in the wake of the covid 19 crisis, harder domestic constraints may limit russian and chinese involvement, and so moscow and beijing may be less actively engaged in shaping regional politics. the united states should keep a wary eye on chinese and russian activities in the region, but avoid viewing it as a zero sum game. washington should actively monitor russian military bases that are increasingly enabling russian power projection and keep an eye on chinese belt and road initiative projects that could ultimately do so as well. china has demonstrated a keenness for economic ties in israel and across the arab world, but has shown no desire to be a powerbroker or dirty its hands in the complex muddle of regional affairs. china’s technology cooperation with israel and the arab gulf countries remains a real source of concern, but beijing’s strategic focus is still largely limited to the horn of africa. geopolitical competition around the region is real; however, it should be understood in the context of broader interests, not overwhelm them. back to top ⇑ in a region where the united states long reigned as hegemon, the reality mara karlin and i described in late 2018   of reduced priority, diminished interests, and resulting diminished influence   is painful for many in u.s. policy circles to accept. but history is instructive about the policy tools that have brought the united states is greatest strategic gains in this region. it was american diplomacy that pulled egypt out of the soviet sphere and into a negotiated peace with israel; and it was diplomacy, along with the superb u.s. military effort, that brought together a historic 38 nation coalition to expel saddam hussein from kuwait and set the stage for the madrid peace conference. with covid 19, among other things, having shifted the middle east’s dynamics, the united states enjoys opportunities for progress toward a more stable region that do not require expensive or long term commitments. a focus on constraining geopolitical competition within the region, confronting iranian behavior more effectively, and wielding diplomacy to resolve conflicts where possible should enable washington to do less and not have its regional dominance threatened. risks and challenges for american interests remain, and the virus is a reminder of how fragile governance and social services are in too many parts of the middle east, posing a long term challenge to stability and security. the united states may have found a path out of purgatory, but it is not yet clear if that road is headed uphill or down. back to top ⇑ related content federica saini fasanotti january 19, 2021 bruce riedel, adrianna pita january 6, 2021 natan sachs, kevin huggard november 20, 2020 author i am grateful to mara karlin for her intellectual partnership, to kevin huggard for research assistance, and to ted reinert for his skillful editing. the brookings institution is committed to quality, independence, and impact. we are supported by a diverse array of funders. in line with our values and policies, each brookings publication represents the sole views of its author(s). foreign policy middle east & north africa center for middle east policy keesha middlemass february 6, 2025 robert maxim, mark muro, shriya methkupally february 6, 2025 scott r. anderson, vanda felbab brown, jeffrey feltman, caren grown, michael hansen, george ingram, thomas pepinsky, anthony f. pipa, ghulam omar qargha, molly e. reynolds, sweta shah, landry signé february 4, 2025 get the latest from brookings the brookings institution is a nonprofit organization based in washington, d.c. our mission is to conduct in depth, nonpartisan research to improve policy and governance at local, national, and global levels. copyright 2025 the brookings institution

dawn’s experts are the driving force behind the organization’s mission and vision. our experts complement our research work and bolster our advocacy efforts. read all the latest articles from the dawn team of experts and contributors. sarah leah whitson sarah leah whitson is the executive director of dawn. this article was published in "a us pivot away from the middle east. fact or fiction?" as part of a collection of essays about u.s. policy in the middle east edited by the arab center in washington d.c. in september 2023. whitson argues that successive administrations have failed to steer away from a militarized, hegemonist approach to the region due to their structural captivity to the interests of israel, cheap oil, and defense profits. for the past several decades, one us administration after another has signaled big plans for a new foreign policy centered on a "pivot to asia" made possible by a "withdrawal" from the middle east.1 with each new administration, middle east governments and their partisan washington analysts have interpreted every us move in the region as evidence of a withdrawal already underway, and have pushed back against such alleged efforts with furious, alarmist, and even emotional critiques, describing each move as an "abandonment" of friends that justifies expanded ties between middle east governments and china or russia as a natural reactionary hedge.2 in contrast to these tropes, the record amply demonstrates the failure of successive us administrations to carry out plans to withdraw from the middle east, a failure that is matched only by their record of unkept promises to prioritize human rights in foreign policy for the region.3 by any measure of security exposures and commitments, including the presence of military troops and bases, kinetic engagement in armed conflicts, arms transfers, and the provision of political, military, and security protection, the united states remains the unmatched goliath in the middle east, exceeding the cumulative commitments of all other governments in the world combined.4 the biden administration, like others before it, certainly may have believed that a reduction in these commitments would best serve the interests of the american people, and thus started its term with vigorous promises to end arms sales to saudi arabia, wrap up both america's "forever war" in afghanistan and its continued support for the war in yemen, reduce the exposure of us troops in the region, and even end "blank checks" for middle east dictators.5 the administration admirably took important steps in this direction, most notably withdrawing us forces from afghanistan in august 2021, a move that the american public overwhelmingly supported despite withering criticism from those who were disappointed to see any war end.6 it also moved to withdraw some us patriot missiles that former president donald trump had moved into saudi arabia and suspended some arms transfers to the kingdom and the united arab emirates while announcing a plan to "recalibrate" its relationship with gulf arab governments.7 the administration did this buttressed by strong disdain from the american public for these states' egregious abuses, from the relentless bombardment of civilians in yemen to the persecution of journalists and activists at home, punctuated by saudi crown prince mohammed bin salman al saud's (mbs) murder of us based saudi journalist jamal khashoggi.8 a us pivot away from the middle east: fact or fiction?order the book here. the most cited "evidence" of us disengagement, however, was the biden administration's refusal to go to war against the houthis (and iran) following a january 17, 2022 drone attack on a uae fuel depot that killed three migrant workers. coming as it did on the heels of the trump administration's refusal to go to war against iran following a 2019 drone attack on saudi oil facilities which the houthis claimed, but for which saudi arabia insisted iran was responsible president joe biden's inaction cemented a view among the gulf states and their allies that the us was no longer a reliable partner.9 instead of any meaningful recalibration and much less an actual withdrawal or pivot we find the biden administration rather desperately trying to amplify its relevance and influence in the region with expanded political, military, and economic support for autocratic regimes. national security advisor jake sullivan gave a speech to the washington institute for near east policy on may 4, 2023, clarifying the administration's updated priorities for the region by identifying the five pillars of a new framework for us engagement: "partnerships, deterrence, diplomacy and de escalation, integration, and values," part of a full throttle manifesto designed to put the last nail in the coffin of any talk of a middle east pivot.10 the sullivan pillars are, at best, tactics and strategies for the stated goal of a "stable," "integrated," and "prosperous" middle east. the specific american interests underlying these goals remain largely unspoken and only obscurely hinted at. omitted entirely from the pillars is even a mere mention of the biden administration's claimed national security interest in preserving, promoting, and protecting democracies against authoritarianism, as was emphasized in the administration's two iterations of a much ballyhooed "democracy summit."11 the word "democracy" appears nowhere in the sullivan pillars, other than to describe america's own imperfect government. as for human rights, sullivan assures his listeners that the biden administration will merely "raise concerns."12 taken together, the pillars describe a coherent policy for the middle east, but only if one excludes the last, and indeed the flimsiest of the five pillars: values. the interwoven pillars of partnerships, deterrence, and integration reflect a long standing us approach of seeing the countries in the region as a single zone that must be influenced and integrated within washington's orbit or be punished and deterred as enemies. thankfully, sullivan does not describe these partnerships as democracies or as countries with which the united states shares values. nor does he, however, describe them as what they actually are: states headed by unelected tyrannical rulers in most cases, and by an apartheid government in the case of israel. instead, sullivan identifies the transactional basis of what the us wants from these partnerships: "diversified and resilient supply chains"; "clean energy" (which apparently includes cheap oil and natural gas, obliquely defined as "the stable supply of current energy"); and "solutions on every  thing from food security to water security" that are central "to the demand signal from countries that are getting entreaties from some of our great power competitors." this last point obscures us partners' demands for the "solutions" they really want weapons and security in return for keeping china and russia out.13 excluded from sullivan's accounting, as is usually the case when it comes to this and other us administrations, is what israel provides in this transactional partnership framework. sullivan claims that expanding and enhancing the integration of the biden administration's partners in the region "empowers our allies and partners, advances regional peace and prosperity, and reduces the resource demands on the united states."14 elements of this proposed integration not only include military, economic, and trade integration, but also the "ultimate, final, complete integration" of israel into the region and the world via the abraham accords.15 while it is true that expanding the military and economic integration of these abusive authoritarian governments will make them more powerful, sullivan does not tell his listeners why the us should want to strengthen them, particularly in the context of the existential battle that the biden administration has declared between democracies and autocracies. what is far more debatable is the notion that empowering such an axis of authoritarian regimes will bring peace and prosperity. this is a problematic point of view given the biden administration's argument that peace and prosperity can only result from liberal democracies; after all, if abusive authoritarian regimes can deliver these outcomes then what exactly can the us offer that china cannot? it is also problematic as a matter of fact, given that biden's middle east partners remain key sources of violence, war, corruption, and tyranny in the region hardly a recipe for peace or prosperity. sullivan's emphasis on integration decreasing the region's "resource demands on the united states," which alludes to the notion that the increased military integration of america's middle east partners will make them feel more secure, better protected, and therefore less reliant on us military resources, is no less contentious. the biden administration may well wish to reduce the presence of human military resources (i.e., troops) in the region and to temper partner demands that the united states use its muscle to support them in their endless conflicts. but there is really no evidence that the us wishes to reduce its weapons sales to the region, which bring great benefit to the defense industry. it is hard not to see at least one outcome, if not the goal, of military integration under a us umbrella being the deepened and expanded reliance of countries under its protection particularly in terms of necessary us supervision, coordination, interoperable weapons, supplies, and training making it harder for any of them to break away from america's influence and control.16 and while the record shows that saudi arabia, the uae, and egypt are indeed diversifying their weapons purchases and business deals specifically partnering with china and russia they are not reducing their demands for us military protection, but are rather using this diversification to exercise reverse leverage on the united states.17 saudi arabia and the uae are demanding unprecedented bilateral security guarantees from the us in exchange for remaining loyal purchasers of american weapons, and in the case of saudi arabia, for normalizing with israel.18 an updated assessment on the state of bilateral influence and leverage in 2023 would recognize that the buyers are the ones calling the shots. hence, we see sullivan gently and cryptically citing "policy changes in arms sales" when extolling the biden administration's early efforts to end the yemen war.19 by far the most arrogant and patronizing of sullivan's remarks is his faux humility for the administration's realpolitik framework. the administration's new "realistic and pragmatic" policies for the middle east are the product of a "clear eyed" and almost sad acceptance that the us has "been naive about what is possible to achieve in terms of transforming societies by force or by diktat," and they incorporate "hard lessons learned to eschew grand designs or unrealistic promises of transformational change."20 what is so discombobulating about this argument is not just the halo it places on past administrations for their noble, if misguided, efforts to transform the region into democratic countries that respect human rights. putting aside debating the sincerity or success of us middle east policies over the past several decades to transform the region, it is worth noting that whatever the efforts, no country in the middle east today and certainly not the biden administration's partners governs democratically or with a modicum of respect for human rights.21 more egregious is sullivan's absolute punt on responsibility for the harm that results because of the united states' partnerships with some of the world's most abusive governments. in sullivan's view, replacing grand designs for democracy and human rights (and sweeping away any lingering remnants of biden's earlier promises in that regard) with expanded partnerships and integration with middle east despots apparently the only two options on the table is a win win proposition. sullivan sees no need to account for the costs of us military support and political protection for these governments, thereby enabling, protecting, contributing to, and even profiting from the very human rights abuses about which he assures the world the united states will continue to speak. the lives cut short, the children maimed, the journalists tortured, the schools bombarded, the lands stolen, the homes burned to ashes, the dignity destroyed, and the tens of millions of men and women subject to the tyranny of america's partners never show up in sullivan's ledger.22 while the united states is able to count its increased corporate profits from deepened economic and defense ties, there is no room in the balance sheet for the costs, because they are supposedly not america's own. sullivan also fails to even attempt to account for the costs of these deepened partnerships to biden's national security strategy of protecting democracies to win against the united states' authoritarian rivals. that peoples and governments around the world believe less and less in american rhetoric about the value and importance of democracy and human rights can only be a product of us administrations having repeatedly proven that they do not believe it either, as us policies in the middle east make clear.23 we see the immediate costs of such disbelief in the wobbly global support for the war in ukraine, as many nations are skep  tical of the claim that it is principally about preserving international laws and norms, as the biden administration has claimed.24 even america's middle east partners are not persuaded, and are hedging their bets by simultaneously strengthening their ties with russia, even laundering sanctioned russian assets and deepening intelligence ties.25 a truly clear eyed, pragmatic, and realistic approach would take these costs into account. not one purported change has happened under the biden administration; not the pivot, not the withdrawal, not the recalibration, and certainly not the prioritization of human rights. the status quo continued because the administration was ultimately unwilling to demote the long standing interests that would form the cost of pivoting away from support of powerful middle east regimes: cheap oil, immunity for israel, corporate weapons sales, and the broadest interest of all (the belief in which is an article of faith in washington), us hegemony in the middle east. there has been no effort by the biden administration to scrutinize whether these interests serve the american people, despite the occasional concessionary nod to the need for clean energy, reduced us military entanglements, and "values" such as those mentioned in sullivan's remarks. the issue that comes closest to being at least a short term interest of most americans is cheap oil from the gulf, in exchange for which the us has for decades provided weapons and protection for petro rulers. while there have been many oil price skirmishes with gulf states, the most recent showdown between the biden administration and the saudi government was particularly brutish. faced with spiraling oil prices in the wake of the ukraine war, biden appeared in jeddah on bended knee in july 2022 to reconcile (and exchange a much mocked fist bump) with mbs, not long after his administration had identified the latter as having ordered the murder of jamal khashoggi and had promised to hold him accountable.26 but mbs rebuffed biden's pleas for increased oil output, instead hosting chinese president xi jinping just days after biden's visit and announcing new deals worth billions between the two nations.27 in october 2022, when the biden administration grew more desperate to see oil prices come down ahead of the november midterm elections, mbs was able to secure another precious concession that he had been demanding from biden: the recognition of his diplomatic immunity in lawsuits against him for both the murder of khashoggi and the attempted murder of saad al jabri and the kidnapping and detention of his children.28 when mbs still refused to increase oil output after this humiliating capitulation, the biden administration made some renewed noise about "recalibration," but ultimately did nothing. it was a checkmate for mbs, and was followed by trips to riyadh by biden's most senior officials to beg his favor, first white house coordinator for the middle east and north africa brett mcgurk and special presidential coordinator for global infrastructure and energy security amos hochstein, then jake sullivan, and most recently secretary of state antony blinken.29 the biden administration's prioritization of israeli interests is another important factor impeding designs for a us pivot away from the middle east, though there is never any explanation as to how israeli interests serve us interests, and israel remains excluded from any realpolitik evaluation like those to which america subjects its other global relationships. instead, americans are required to accept as an article of faith that the united states' "unconditional support" for and "unbreakable bond" with israel are based on "shared values" that justify providing the latter with billions in weapons and invaluable political protection from global scrutiny and accountability. despite the growing erosion of popular and international support for israel, us support remains an untouchable anomaly, one that sees the us take on massive liabilities while gaining nothing, not even good will from the israeli government, in return.30 although the biden administration identifies securing israel's integration in the middle east by expanding the abraham accords as one of its top priorities (based on an argument that doing so will enhance regional peace), it does not bother to explain to the american public why the us must be the one to pay the price for it.31 this price not only includes damaging political and economic concessions to arab states but also a proposed security guarantee and a nuclear power plant for saudi arabia. the short term political interests here  namely continued support from pro israel lobbying groups that dictate the continued prioritization of israeli interests and that ensure the maintenance of israel's apartheid governance, military occupation, and global immunity are well established and well understood.32 the costs, including keeping america tethered to abusive dictatorships in the middle east, remain ignored. similarly, the baked in influence of weapons manufacturers has made it difficult for any administration that has talked the talk of curbing weapons transfers to abusive middle east regimes or decreasing the united states' matchless militarization of the region to walk the walk.33 saudi arabia, the uae, and egypt are not only the largest weapons purchasers in the world; they are also the largest purchasers of us weapons. and israel is the world's largest recipient of us military assistance.34 cutting weapons transfers to these regimes would mean cutting profits to weapons manufacturers, who in turn would cut their campaign donations and their provision of jobs to the officials in the administration doing the cut  ting. coupled with the lobbying and financial influence of middle east governments, the current system of carrots and sticks demands relentless and expanded weapons transfers. and while such an approach well serves corporate profits, no explanation or justification is proffered for how this serves the interests of the american people. the non partisan and often unspoken ideology that undergirds each of these interests is a belief in us hegemony as a positive value in and of itself, one that needs no justification, despite the sizeable cost of its maintenance, which is estimated to be between $65 and $70 billion annually, not to mention the trillions of dollars spent on us wars.35 america "winning" against china and russia is defined not merely as containing their bad actions but as maintaining us dominance, even harmful dominance. in this context, it makes perfect sense to maintain military and political support for abusive regimes and to expand their dependence on us security in the middle east because, the thinking goes, doing so deters china and russia from expanding their spheres of influence. the biden administration's efforts to win its great power competition with china and russia have contributed to the emergence of a new power axis in the middle east, including saudi arabia, the uae, and their junior partner, egypt. the very efforts the us has made to maintain its hegemony in the middle east have ironically encouraged the development of unprecedented saudi and emirati independence and influence in the united states.36 the risks of such influence remain underappreciated. measurements of polarity are typically based on "measurable" power in the form of resources, military strength, and economic pull.37 saudi arabia's gdp exceeded $1 trillion for the first time in 2022, and the uae's reached nearly $500 billion in 2023, both ahead of many european states.38 emirati gdp per capita, meanwhile, stands at $49,450, also ahead of most european nations.39 the unprecedented increase in the wealth of the gulf states over the past decade, driven by record high oil prices, has created an apparently bottomless pit of wealth for gulf economies, and that wealth is expected to grow, even if more slowly than it has previously. oil still represents one third of all energy consumed globally, while natural gas accounts for another 24 percent.40 with somewhere between 20 and 30 percent of global oil passing through the strait of hormuz and the vast majority of spare production capacity held by opec states, we can expect to see the gulf arab states' purchasing power and influence grow in the foreseeable future. while these countries are far from acting as a unified eu  or nato level bloc, and at times work against each other's interests, their reconciliation with iran, turkey, and qatar, and their negotiations to end the war in yemen serve the smart and important goal of reducing their conflicts while also shoring up their influence and standing in the region and creating the space to focus on exporting their influence and power. nevertheless, both the uae and saudi arabia have demonstrated uncommon independence and regional maneuvering in the past few years, particularly in their resistance to us pressure on various issues, including, for example, oil prices and the war in yemen. the uae has for several years now pursued its own pugilistic foreign policy, at times aligned with the united states, as in afghanistan, where it actively supported the us war, and at other times at odds with it, as in libya.41 more significantly, it has deliberately and openly rebuffed us complaints about expanded chinese and russian influence, instead flaunting its developing ties with these countries as another show of its independence.42 and both saudi arabia and the uae have become independent sources of influence in military conflicts to whom the us can and does appeal for help, as it is currently doing to quell the conflict in sudan. while the uae has pursued policies of economic diversification, political independence, and regional influence for over a decade, the same approach in saudi arabia is new, and should appropriately be attributed to mbs's new, and it must be said, revolutionary and change driven leadership.43 there is no denying that there is a domestic revolution of sorts underway, one that, but for the brute repression and authoritarian diktat that accompanies it, is quite positive, with reformed laws and an altered judicial system, increased freedom for women, and an unprecedented openness to foreign art, culture, and business.44 as quick studies, the saudi and uae governments have absorbed lessons regarding political influence in the united states from the israel and defense lobbies, but have one upped them both with exponentially greater spending to infiltrate and influence broad swaths of the american government, economy, and cultural sphere. while there is nothing unique about their efforts, their far greater wealth means that they can buy a lot more influence than anyone else. saudi arabia's spending on american technology, sports, entertainment, gaming, news, film, and the arts has reached unprecedented new levels, not just in purchases for domestic consumption, but in ownership of businesses themselves.45 these expanded investments will naturally expand the kingdom's influence on and control over the american economy, making it less likely that a falling out would occur in the wake of another grave crime, as happened after the khashoggi murder, when investors pulled more than $1 billion from the saudi stock market.46 more dangerous is the outright purchase of american government officials. while the defense industry has been renowned for its revolving door employment of former government officials, who make up a large percentage of defense industry lobbyists, they are no match for the revolving door buyouts of saudi arabia and the uae.47 saudi arabia's sovereign wealth fund has been a particularly useful tool in this regard, with eye popping payouts to former trump administration officials, including $2 billion to former senior advisor to trump jared kushner, $1 billion to former treasury secretary steven mnuchin, and unknown millions to donald trump himself.48 the defense industry also cannot match the eye popping salaries and business deals that gulf states are paying to over 500 us military officials, including the 15 former us generals and admirals that saudi arabia has been paying as consultants since 2016.49 it is not hard to understand how such payouts compromise the integrity, independence, and decision making of us policymakers, who are naturally counting how much money they could garner if they make decisions that would please their future business partners and employers. while president biden signed a law prohibiting former intelligence officials from working for foreign governments for 30 months after leaving their jobs, no such laws prohibit civilian or military officials from doing the same.50 moreover, the promise of future rewards to sitting officials is increasingly coupled with direct efforts to influence and bribe election candidates.51 from the perspective of middle east countries, which are long accustomed to seeing their government officials bought and sold by external actors, there is nothing new here, and the shoe is now merely on the american foot. from a us perspective, not only does the gulf arab states' influence in washington hinder the ability of elected officials to direct policies toward the interests of the american people but it constitutes an unprecedented attack on us democracy itself. the united states' middle east policy under the biden administration has fallen back in line with the decades long practice of maintaining support for abusive regimes and contributing to their heinous abuses against the people of the region. the oft touted us commitment to democracy and human rights is therefore entirely absent from the middle east. footnotes: we hope you enjoyed this paywall free article. we’re a non profit organization supported by incredible people like you who are united by a shared vision: to right the wrongs that persist and to advocate for justice and reform where it is needed most. your support of a one time or monthly contribution   no matter how small   helps us invest in our vital research, reporting, and advocacy work. we’re fighting for a ceasefire and accountability for israeli and u.s. officials responsible for war crimes in gaza. dawn is a nonprofit organization that promotes democracy, the rule of law, and human rights for all of the peoples of the middle east and north africa (mena). © dawn all rights reserved. | website design by krs creative. © dawn. website design by krs creative.

attention: jagu/blackboard is currently inaccessible via commercial networks. to access jagu away from your govt workplace, use your gov’t vpn or avd. at present, no eta is available as to when commercial access will be restored. book review the power of geography ten maps that reveal the future of our world reviewed by dr. jan p. ganschow catapult your perspective from the tactical to the operational to the strategic are you a judge advocate (ja) or legal advisor (legad) searching for a fascinating read that finally lifts your tactical/operational focus to a larger, strategic perspective? look no further. with the power of geography: ten maps that reveal the future of our world,1 you have the chance to step out of your foxhole as a legal subject matter expert and instantly broaden your comprehension. this book will boost your perspective about how current global events impact your nation and, perhaps, even help you identify courses of action to address the consequent challenges. this perspective is an invaluable asset to drafting informed opinion papers and organization wide manuals, engaging in meaningful discussions, or simply understanding what is “going on” on the international plane. the power of geography presents fact based analysis of how state level competition can either avoid or cause international conflict. every soldier, sailor, marine, airman, and guardian, particularly the lawyers working in national security law, will find this publication most edifying. in september 2021, the british exchange officer at the judge advocate general’s legal center and school recommended tim marshall’s 2015 prisoners of geography2 to me. he did so in the midst of a legal debate surrounding how europe3 and the united states’4 security strategies might set an overarching superstructure for the center for law and military operations’5 approach to multinational legal interoperability. our discussion gave me the feeling that this book put my well read british colleague in a formidable position to better understand and contextualize certain global trends and developments in the common transatlantic approach to strategic security. as a result, i had immensely high expectations and was excited to get my hands on that book. moreover, i was well aware of robert kaplan’s 2013 bestselling book, the revenge of geography’s6 impact. when i went to my bookstore to pick up a copy of prisoners of geography, i learned that the book’s highly anticipated follow up, the power of geography, was published in november 2021. since the subtitle promised to reveal “the [f]uture of [o]ur [w]orld,” i decided to start with it. my high expectations were exceeded particularly, that i would gain a better understanding of how geography7 determines the fate of peoples, nations, and international relations in the long run. i also gained a much clearer perspective on the foundations of european and american transatlantic foreign and security policies. indeed, it is no surprise that terry pattar, host of the janes8 october 2021 podcast, the world of intelligence, recommended marshall’s book to every new analyst as a primer on how geography determines politics, demographics, economies, and societies.9 in short, for those who are just too busy with time consuming legal work and who struggle to piece together the bits of information the media throws at us, this book will deepen the reader’s understanding of current global affairs. it will shift the reader’s perspective from that of a bystander to one of an informed strategist who can understand and predict how global affairs develop and inform their own area of professional expertise. i might seem overly enthusiastic when i dare say that the power of geography can, therefore, serve as the “big bang” push to the frontiers of one’s previously scattered and fragmented understanding of the world. but, i have been searching for a comprehensive and condensed book that could inform my position concerning global affairs, and i finally found it in the power of geography.10 the book and its author the hardcover version of the power of geography has 294 pages, a helpful bibliography for every chapter, and a comprehensive index. it was published in the united states by scribner, new york. a paperback and an audiobook version are also available. at the time of writing, the book received 643 global ratings on amazon.com, of which 68 percent were five star reviews and an additional 22 percent were four star reviews. the most substantiated critique included in the lesser reviews concern the publisher’s presentation of the book, which supposedly displays poor black and white maps that inadequately illustrate the points made in each chapter. maybe that is true, but, in my opinion, they lived up to the task of visually explaining and contextualizing marshall’s descriptive text. admittedly, i was so impressed by the content that i easily forgave this possible lapse. after all, beautiful, detailed maps are readily available at the touch of a button on most phones and computers. the book’s author, tim marshall, was formerly the diplomatic editor and foreign correspondent for sky news.11 after thirty years’ experience in news reporting from various countries, he left full time news journalism to concentrate on writing and analysis. marshall authored multiple books on geopolitics12 and founded a website13 on current affairs. ten chapters on regional geo  and power politics that are more than the sum of their parts according to the new york times book review, marshall’s 2016 global bestseller, prisoners of geography, offered a “fresh way of looking at maps,” showing how every nation’s choices are limited by mountains, rivers, seas, and walls.14 since then, the geography has not changed, but the world has, prompting marshall’s new book. he takes the readers into ten regions (including space) that are set to shape global politics. in chapter one, the reader learns how australia’s history and geography sitting as it does between the indian ocean, the pacific, and china shape its military, security, and economic policy.15 marshall also introduces us to the “quad plus”: the “quad” is the quadrilateral security dialogue, which includes australia, the united states, japan, and india; the “plus” includes new zealand, south korea, and vietnam.16 chapter one also explains the key role navies play in this part of the globe.17 marshall also discusses the american, british, canadian, and new zealand armies program, or abcanz,18 along with the five eyes community.19 at the same time, marshall introduces us to the role of u.s. military bases in australia: one in darwin and another near alice springs, the latter one of the most important u.s. intelligence gathering facilities and a critical ground station for central intelligence agency satellites.20 marshall states that, so far, australia is sticking close to its best friends in america and that, for now, canberra will attempt both to forge a constructive dialogue with beijing (with one eye on the economy) and to maintain defense and other ties with the united states.21 the book was published shortly before australia purchased at least eight nuclear powered attack submarines (a contract valued at tens of billions of dollars), and the australia, the united kingdom, and the united states22 defense pact concluded. knowing about it, however, helps the reader retrace the strategic shift and understand why the pact is america’s most dramatic and determined move to counter what it, and others in the indo pacific region, consider a growing threat from china. chapter two, on iran,23 is fascinating thanks to its busy, reader friendly information density and the enjoyable tour de force through iran’s rich history and culture. in addition, marshall, who always applies the decided viewpoint of western liberal democracies, fills the, admittedly, huge knowledge gaps i had about iranian society, politics, and religion. the reader learns about iran’s recent wars,24 the terror,25 the islamic revolutionary guard corps,26 the natural geographic fortification of the country,27 the strategic dimension of the shatt al arab waterway,28 zoroastrianism and islam,29 why president trump withdrew from the nuclear deal,30 and more. of course, the geostrategic role of the united states (its military capabilities, its global military footprint, and the power of its economy) is a constant topic in every chapter, but even more so in the chapter on iran. according to marshall, under president biden, america has adjusted its goals from full regime change to seeking to change regime behavior.31 but marshall argues, a regime that believes it is doing god’s work must view compromise as a sin and resistance as divine.32 as marshall puts it: a regime that has shown a willingness to slaughter its people in the thousands to suppress dissent has gone too far to turn back.33 i was already amazed how well informed marshall is on current geopolitical affairs after reading the australian chapter, and after the iran chapter, i assumed he must have access to special sources.34 indeed, each chapter makes clear that marshall can rely on information that is not readily available to the average journalist. of course, this makes the book, which will shape public (and probably more than one decision maker’s) opinion to no small amount, even more interesting to read. naturally, when marshall writes on saudi arabia in chapter three, the role of the united states (and china) is once again a constant companion to nearly all strategic aspects. the chapter attempts to describe the tensions in the saudi arabian society,35 how the grip of the house of saud depends on multiple factors (including the differing views on its legitimacy),36 the power brokering around muhammad bin salman (who in 2015 began a meteoric ascent from little known saudi prince to de facto ruler),37 the disastrous war in yemen,38 the bizarre abduction of lebanon’s then prime minister,39 the blockade of qatar,40 and the murder of the saudi journalist jamal kashoggi in turkey.41 marshall directly or indirectly touches upon legal aspects of the subject country’s international affairs in every chapter, so it is no wonder that he discusses international human rights in the saudi arabia chapter.42 for a legad who is too occupied with everyday legal work in the garrison to take a broader perspective, marshall helpfully clarifies that most middle eastern politicians look to china’s government as a framework.43 he emphasizes that it is true, as one middle east political analyst stated, that “[t]he chinese model of ‘state capitalism’ is appealing to most arab politicians. ‘economic liberalism’ decoupled from political liberalism is a model most governments in the region pursue, and in the past two decades the chinese model is lauded as a success.”44 the short but well selected historical excursions in this (and every) chapter nicely illustrate that a nation cannot fully comprehend its current state of affairs, nor can it predict its way ahead, without a thorough review of its history. throughout the book, marshall weaves the role of the united states and often its policies toward china and russia into his discussions of geographical regions. whereas the chapter on space will be the first time that many readers are poised to ponder the strategic dimension of this war fighting domain,45 the other chapters are no less insightfully researched and gripping to read. his conclusions are compelling and empower the reader with knowledge that would benefit any legad, foreign policy advisor, cultural advisor, and history staff officer. the chapter on space is particularly fascinating for a ja or legad. today, space affects every other warfighting domain to such a degree that many countries around the world have established military space commands46 in recent years.47 even while space is not a legal no man’s land, it is, in large part, unregulated. marshall elaborates on legal aspects of space and suggests that a shift in thinking from the current condition of state competition to peaceful cooperation is necessary to prevent space from becoming a theater of war. reading the whole chapter with marshall’s realistic findings on other regions in mind gives such statements a degree of urgency. marshall writes about a “westphalian” concept of the universe a system of states holding sovereign power over mutually recognized territories. he also discusses its alternative, the recognition that “our common humanity and the challenges of space travel [are] propelling us into acting as one people as we venture beyond our earthly home.”48 that may strike some readers as rather sentimental for a book on geopolitics. if one thoroughly reads the chapter on space and remembers the lengths to which the united states, china, russia, and some other states go to achieve “full spectrum dominance” through space activities, it becomes clear that this chapter is an essential study of space technicalities, space law, and space politics, even if it occasionally strays into loftier, quasi philosophical discussions of humanity’s future. the “big picture,” never without the united states a major u.s. publisher promises that the power of geography not only will reveal “the [f]uture of [o]ur [w]orld,”49 but also “why earth’s atmosphere is the world’s next battleground; why the fight for the pacific is just beginning; and why europe’s next refugee crisis is closer than we think.”50 before reading the book, these projections sounded far fetched. however, marshall makes a compelling case that this is likely the future we will face. marshall explains how a region’s geography and physical characteristics affect its leaders’ decisions. indeed, the book’s jacket text accurately describes it as “innovative, compelling, . . . delivered with marshall’s trademark wit and insight,” and a gripping and enlightening exploration of the power of geography to shape humanity’s past, present, and most importantly future. such blurbs are often over exaggerations. that is not the case here. while it is true that none of the chapters exclusively examine u.s. geography and its geopolitical implications, america’s role, impact, and significance are mentioned in nearly every chapter. indeed, the competition between an american led informal coalition of industrialized democracies and a loose alliance of authoritarian states dominated by china is an underlying topic that pulls the reader through every chapter. consequently, every ja with a u.s. centric job would find the power of geography particularly valuable. every chapter of the power of geography provides a big picture view of that particular region, and allows informed citizens to rely on marshall’s analysis of their nation without having to study politics and international relations. for example, i have followed the developments in mali and other states in the sahel zone since 2013, when german armed forces started participating in the united nations’ multidimensional integrated stabilization mission in mali or “minusma.”51 as a result, i felt quite well informed about the united nations, european union and united states’ military efforts in the sahel zone. even so, i was astonished by how often i thought “i did not know that” while learning from marshall. each chapter is also a powerhouse of strategic analysis. marshall addresses a broad range of direct military issues in each chapter and provides comprehensive briefings on topics that are usually kept behind closed doors with senior decision makers. i am not aware of any other current publication that so concisely explains some of the most pressing topics of our time52 while contextualizing their strategic implications for certain regions, trends and current events. a book about geopolitics that focuses on state  and non state actors, future wars, and security politics, cannot neglect the legal dimension, and the power of geography does not. on multiple occasions, marshall mentions the international law aspects of the global affairs he presents to the reader.53 while he never elaborates in depth, he always informs the reader where legal challenges lie and where to dig deeper. also, where he does not do so, even an unexperienced ja or legad will surely recognize the general legal issue at hand. for example, they would know to contemplate the legality of the use of force when marshall contextualizes the u.s. assassination54 of general qasem soleimani, commander of iran’s elite revolutionary guard’s quds force, as he arrived in baghdad to meet a militia leader in early 2020. reading as the easiest way to travel: the power of geography as a tour guide through global affairs with the power of geography, the reader gains knowledge that, while not direct “actionable intelligence” on the tactical and operational plane, nonetheless rewards the reader with a much better understanding of global affairs. tim marshall delivers an intellectual and entertaining outlook on geopolitics. he consistently applies the western liberal democratic worldview and values to draw his conclusions, but he also leaves room for the reader’s own thoughts on how others, like the chinese and the russians, would probably view the issues at hand. therefore, every ja or legad who feels that principled legal counsel and advice as well as any informed legal conversation cannot rely on legal technical knowledge alone should read the power of geography, which takes the “big picture” into account. having read the power of geography (and placed it on my office bookshelf for quick reference), i dare say that i understand our world in its current state of affairs a little better, which can only help me in my legad role. what more could one ever expect from a book? tal dr. ganschow is a legal advisor with the german armed forces legal service. he is currently the action officer for multinational operations and interoperability with the center for law and military operations at the judge advocate general’s legal center and school in charlottesville, virginia. notes 1. tim marshall, the power of geography: ten maps that reveal the future of our world (scribner 2021) (2021). 2. tim marshall, prisoners of geography: ten maps that explain everything about the world (scribner 2015). 3. see eur. union, shared vision, common action: a stronger europe: a global strategy for the european union’s foreign and security policy (2016); eur. union, the european union’s global strategy: three years on, looking forward (2019). 4. joseph r. biden, jr., the white house, interim national security strategic guidance (2021). this interim guidance conveys president biden’s vision for how america will engage with the world, and provides guidance for departments and agencies to align their actions with the u.s. national security strategy. 5. see center for law and military operations (clamo), the judge advoc. gen.’s legal ctr. & sch., https://tjaglcs.army.mil/clamo (last visited dec. 28, 2022). 6. robert d. kaplan, the revenge of geography: what the map tells us about coming conflicts and the battle against fate (2013). the cover text promises a “brilliant rebuttal to thinkers who suggest that globalism will trump geography.” id. while earning an ll.m in international law & politics back in 2013 at the university of canterbury in christchurch, new zealand, i learned from peers that the revenge of geography brings readers back from an overly idealistic view of international relations to a hard power politics reality, where the end of history has yet to take place and a universal adherence to a liberal, rules based international order has yet to replace geostrategic interests. many online reviews of the revenge of geography concur with this assessment. see, e.g., felipe fernandez armesto, history’s playing field, wall st. j. (sept. 12, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sb10000872396390443686004577633490631541260. 7. geography is the “science that deals with the description, distribution, and interaction of the diverse physical, biological, and cultural features of the earth’s surface.” geography, merriam webster (dec. 18, 2022), https://www.merriam webster.com/dictionary/geography. 8. janes is a self described “global, open source defense intelligence company specializing in military, national security, aerospace and transport topics.” janes, https://www.janes.com (last visited apr. 10, 2023). reference to this company does not constitute an endorsement. 9. the world of intelligence, the power of geography: a conversation with tim marshall, janes (oct. 28, 2021), https://podcast.janes.com/public/68/the world of intelligence 50487d09/aae7e1d8. 10. a great many thanks to my british colleague. 11. tim marshall, simon & schuster, https://www.simonandschuster.com/authors/tim marshall/523742523 (last visited feb. 19, 2023). 12. tim marshall, a flag worth dying for: the power and politics of national symbols (2018); tim marshall, shadowplay: behind the lines and under fire: the inside story of europe’s last war (2019); tim marshall, the age of wall: how barriers between nations are changing our world (2019). 13. tim marshall, the what & the why: extremes are easy. the centre is hard, blogspot, http://www.thewhatandthewhy.com (last visited dec. 28, 2022). 14. joshua hammer, ‘map: exploring the world,’ ‘the curious map book’ and more, n.y. times (dec. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/06/books/review/map exploring the world the curious map book and more.html?searchresultposition=1. 15. marshall, supra note 1, at 11 36. 16. see marshall, supra note 1, at 32. the quad: the origins of the quadrilateral security dialogue, the week (may 25, 2022), https://www.theweek.co.uk/news/world news/asia pacific/956856/the quad the origins of the quadrilateral security dialogue. 17. marshall, supra note 1, at 32. 18. international standardization, u.s. dep’t of def., def. standardization program, https://www.dsp.dla.mil/programs/international standardization (last visited dec. 28, 2022) (explaining the american, british, canadian, australian and new zealand (abcanz) armies program). 19. id. (explaining the five eyes air force interoperability council); see marshall, supra note 1, at 31. 20. marshall, supra note 1, at 31. 21. marshall, supra note 1, at 29 30. 22. aukus is the trilateral defense pact between australia, the united kingdom and the united states. aukus reshapes the strategic landscape of the indo pacific, the economist (sept. 25, 2021), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2021/09/25/aukus reshapes the strategic landscape of the indo pacific (providing a profound background briefing on aukus). 23. marshall, supra note 1, at 37 64. 24. marshall, supra note 1, at 50 58. 25. marshall, supra note 1, at 50 58. 26. marshall, supra note 1, at 47. 27. marshall, supra note 1, at 37 40. 28. marshall, supra note 1, at 38. 29. marshall, supra note 1, at 43. 30. marshall, supra note 1, at 54. 31. marshall, supra note 1, at 60. 32. marshall, supra note 1, at 61. 33. marshall, supra note 1, at 57. 34. for example, in the chapter on the sahel zone, marshall refers to “a western intelligence source operating in the region.” marshall, supra note 1, at 171. 35. marshall, supra note 1, at 65 70. 36. marshall, supra note 1, at 71 75. 37. marshall, supra note 1, at 76 78. 38. marshall, supra note 1, at 79. 39. marshall, supra note 1, at 79 81. 40. marshall, supra note 1, at 78. 41. marshall, supra note 1, at 80. 42. see marshall, supra note 1, at 86. 43. marshall, supra note 1, at 86. 44. see marshall, supra note 1, at 86 (quoting mina al oraibi). 45. according to marshall, “[s]pace as war fighting domain” is a mantra of the u.s. department of defense. marshall, supra note 1, at 251. 46. after u.s. space command was established in 1985 and disestablished in 2002, a second incarnation of u.s. space command was established in 2019. general john raymond, commander, u.s. space command, recognition of the establishment ceremony (sept. 12, 2019). france’s commandement de l’espace was established in 2019. arrêté du 3 septembre 2019 portant création et organisation du commandement de l’espace, république française (july 2, 2021), https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/legitext000039062984. germany’s weltraumkommando was established in 2021. german armed forces enter the space battlefield, aerotime hub (july 16, 2021), https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/28391 german armed forces enter the space battlefield. the united kingdom’s space command was established in 2021. ed adamczyk, british military launches its own space command with official opening, upi (july 30, 2021), https://www.upi.com/defense news/2021/07/30/britain spacecommand space/9341627673754. 47. at the inauguration of the u.s. space force, president trump said, “american superiority is absolutely vital. . . . the space force will help us deter aggression and control the ultimate high ground.” marshall, supra note 1, at 251 52. 48. marshall, supra note 1, at 257. 49. marshall, supra note 1 (subtitle). 50. marshall, supra note 1 (back cover). 51. united nations multidimensional integrated stabilization mission in mali, united nations, https://minusma.unmissions.org/en (last visited dec. 28, 2022). 52. for example, water wars, rare earths, covid 19, climate change, new weapons technology, terrorism, space, and espionage (while never explicitly mentioned, it is always present). see marshall, supra note 1, at 154, 183, 252. 53. see, e.g., marshall, supra note 1, at 118, 132, 152, 168, 241, 242, 246, 251, 258. 54. marshall, supra note 1, at 55 56 (contrasting the view that this might have been a legitimate killing of a combatant leader in the global war on terror). in a letter to the u.n. security council, the united states’ permanent representative to the u.n., ambassador kelly craft, stated that the attack was conducted under the united states’ inherent right of self defense and in accordance with article 51 of the u.n. charter. see letter from kelly craft, united nations ambassador, permanent representative of the u.s., to the president of the united nations sec. council (jan. 9, 2020), https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3846463. 600 massie rd charlottesville, va 22903 accessibility/section 508 foia external links disclaimer no fear act privacy program

demand for luxury tourism and hospitality is expected to grow faster than for any other industry segment. this growth is being powered in part by a sharp rise in the number of individuals globally with net worths between $1 million and $30 million. but it’s also resulting from a large and expanding base of aspiring luxury travelers with net worths between $100,000 and $1 million, many of whom are younger and increasingly willing to spend larger shares of their wealth on upscale travel options (exhibit 1). this article is a collaborative effort by caroline tufft, margaux constantin, matteo pacca, and ryan mann, with ivan gladstone and jasperina de vries, representing views from mckinsey’s travel, logistics & infrastructure practice. we dug deeper into this ongoing evolution by surveying luxury travelers (defined here as those who spend, on average, $500 or more per night on lodging) to inquire about their preferences, plans, and expectations. our survey of more than 5,000 luxury travelers was in the field in february and march of this year.1unless otherwise noted, the source for all data and projections is mckinsey state of travel survey, 5,061 travelers, february 27 to march 11, 2024. the respondent pool included travelers from five major, representative source markets: china, germany, the united arab emirates, the united kingdom, and the united states. all respondents took at least one leisure trip in the past two years. findings from this survey, coupled with input from industry experts, suggest that some commonly held perceptions about luxury travelers might be due for reassessment. the image that luxury travel conjures is one of vacationers with millions of dollars to their names. in fact, 35 percent of the luxury travel market is now composed of travelers with net worths of between $100,000 and $1 million. luxury means different things to travelers at different wealth levels. high net worth individuals (hnwis), with assets ranging between $1 million and $5 million, tend to trust boutique travel agents, seek privacy and exclusivity, and favor exotic destinations. very high net worth individuals (vhnwis), with assets ranging between $5 million and $30 million, are relatively more likely to book large suites to preserve intimacy and tranquility, prefer end to end experiences steeped in local ambiance, and may be less focused on hotel brand names. ultrahigh net worth individuals (uhnwis), with more than $30 million in assets, prefer quiet luxury with personalized service targeting remote, private destinations, accessible via private airports or helipads, that feature tailored experiences available nowhere else. aspiring luxury travelers have their own set of preferences (exhibit 2). they might splurge on special occasions, prefer visibly branded luxury, demand value for their money, and pay close attention to loyalty program points and benefits. they might be willing to spend big on individual components of their travel such as a helicopter tour or fine dining experience but not on every aspect of a trip. it’s crucial to understand this nonmillionaire segment for two reasons. first, it’s comparatively large. second, its forays into select prestige elements present opportunities for brands that hope to attract its enduring loyalty especially as some of its members graduate into higher tiers of income and wealth. aspiring luxury travelers often rely on branding to validate their sense that an experience is luxurious. strong luxury hospitality brands can explore creating entry level offerings to engage with this segment. (indeed, many luxury hotels are already targeting aspirational travelers by offering more affordable standard rooms alongside pricey ultraluxury suites.) existing luxury brands can also cross categories to capitalize on this segment. for instance, bulgari entered the hotel space as part of a collaboration with the ritz carlton hotel the luxury watchmaker is expected to have a dozen collaboration driven properties by 2026. elle, the global lifestyle brand, has announced it will launch two hospitality ventures: maison elle and elle hotel. and high end shoemaker christian louboutin opened a boutique hotel on portugal’s coast. the geographical balance of wealth is shifting. although north america is still home to the most millionaires, it could be overtaken by asia by the mid 2030s largely as a result of growing wealth in china. the rapid growth of wealth in asia is spurring a boom in regional hotel construction (exhibit 3). a 2023 assessment of the global luxury hotel pipeline found that 41 percent of hotel rooms in the pipeline are in asia, with 43 percent of those in china. the luxury hotel supply in asia, both existing and in the pipeline, leans heavily toward larger properties, chains, and franchises, reflecting the industry landscape in asia as well as a preference among asian travelers for luxury brands they know and trust. kuok hui kwong is chair of shangri la, which has more than 100 hotels in 78 destinations. mckinsey spoke with her about what chinese luxury travelers want, the strength of the chinese domestic tourism market, the value of catering to intergenerational travelers, and the importance of giving talent good opportunities. the following is an edited version of the conversation. mckinsey: shangri la is a global group, but it’s very rooted in asian hospitality, and it attracts many chinese consumers. are you seeing different behaviors for luxury travelers from china? are they beginning to travel more domestically? kuok hui kwong: during the covid 19 pandemic, a lot of wealthy chinese customers who would have chosen to travel abroad instead spent three years traveling domestically. now the borders have opened up and international travel is much easier, but i think the habit of consuming travel experiences domestically is a trend that’s here to stay. china has truly diverse tourism options, whether you want scenery or culture. although we serve a global luxury audience, we’re particularly strong in asia and have a deep understanding of chinese consumers. chinese consumers are increasingly discerning, sophisticated, and confident. while they do buy into bigger brands, i think they’re more and more looking for products and experiences that meet their particular needs and that celebrate and reflect their cultural identity. you can see this in the choices they make as they increasingly seek domestic brands, domestic makers, and domestic stay options. a lot of chinese luxury travelers are looking for immersive experiences that connect with chinese culture. they have strong preferences for chinese food. they’re very concerned about safety and hygiene. they have payment options and ride hailing options that they prefer. traveling domestically solves for a lot of these issues. it’s also become much easier for travelers to reach destinations in china that were previously less accessible, with new flight networks and affordable and efficient high speed rail connections. so we expect that domestic experience consumption will continue to be strong. because it’s such a huge market, fortunes can surge based on the customer’s domestic preferences. but it also means that the market is extremely competitive. it changes very fast. and consumers’ needs are constantly evolving. it also means it’s a market that can accept and looks for a lot of innovation. mckinsey: what sort of innovation is this discerning group of travelers looking for? what are you doing to innovate at shangri la? kuok hui kwong: for us at shangri la, we’re seeing a lot of domestic leisure trips in china that are built around school holidays with more and more parents taking their children on holiday to experience different parts of the country. so one of the main areas we’re very focused on is the family experience. in the china context, when we talk about experience seeking, a lot of times it’s multigenerational. it’s parents with their children, or it’s grandparents and parents and children all together. because chinese families are becoming smaller, their ability and willingness to spend on family experiences has gotten larger. the perception that chinese luxury travelers only want to go overseas to buy high end brands is no longer true. a new generation of luxury consumers wants to share experiences and quality moments with their families. dialing into the family experience is definitely something we’ve been working on, even before the pandemic. a lot of hotels are eyeing this market as well. we own a lot of our underlying assets. so rather than just putting a kid’s tent in a room, for example, we can create an end to end, integrated, holistic experience that can be delightful. in singapore, we launched our first family experience urban hotel in 2016, when we created a several hundred square meter play zone. we repurposed two tennis courts to turn them into an outdoor splash and play water zone. and then we created a whole floor of family rooms and suites with differently themed rooms that would appeal to children. we continued this in hong kong and in beijing, where we opened during the pandemic, and have plans to grow this in other destinations. another area where we see a lot of innovation is food and beverage. that can mean regional cuisine, menu items, concepts, design and décor of restaurants, and the pairing of food with wine or baijiu [a clear liquor], along with the use of local chinese products and chinese cuisine with international accents. mckinsey: one big issue in the industry is talent retention especially talent at the level where you have to train for not just general service but also your own brand standards and unique asian hospitality touches. what do you do to attract and retain that talent and help them grow in the industry? kuok hui kwong: i think that has to be part of your way of doing business and your corporate culture. what i personally love about shangri la is that it’s in our dna to really care for our colleagues. we really lived this during the pandemic. in most of our markets, we were the very last to consider reducing our frontline workforce, and even when we did, it was minimal. this wasn’t a decision i made on my own this is part of our culture, which i am very proud of. it also enabled us to ramp up much quicker postpandemic. it’s also about giving opportunities to some of our colleagues to move out of their home markets and develop their careers in a global setting. we’re one of the few asian headquartered companies that can afford to give a local asian workforce global opportunities. and i think we can do even more of that going forward. comments and opinions expressed by interviewees are their own and do not represent or reflect the opinions, policies, or positions of mckinsey & company or have its endorsement. domestic travel is consistently the largest share of travel, so luxury demand in places where hnwi and uhnwi populations are large and expanding will likely be high. providers in these regions may want to consider how to meet the specific needs and desires of increasingly affluent populations (see sidebar “the chair of shangri la on the unique preferences of chinese luxury travelers”). while baby boomers do represent a significant portion of luxury spending, 80 percent of the luxury leisure market is in fact made up of people below the age of 60 (exhibit 4). spending on travel peaks between the ages of 40 and 60, and younger travelers show an increasing willingness and ability to spend at luxury levels. based on the current shape of the market, luxury providers should look for ways to cater to a middle aged population, which will likely include a high proportion of families with adolescent children. luxury players might consider devising offerings that can appeal to both parents and teens. multigenerational luxury travel involving grandparents, parents, and kids is a growing trend, and these families often prefer to book villas that offer privacy and space for large groups. people in their 20s make up a smaller share of the luxury market, but acquiring customers in this segment is still important. their lifetime value can be significant, given the many years of luxury travel that likely lie ahead of them. offerings for younger populations should be tailored to their interests, which tend to cluster around social experiences, authenticity, sustainability, and digital connectedness. it’s true that luxury travelers are comparatively more likely to go on exotic and adventure focused vacations, such as yachting trips or safaris. this is unsurprising, given the higher costs of these types of outings. however, the largest share of luxury travelers still want to do the same kinds of things that other travelers do. sixty five percent of them express intent to go on sunny beach vacations, and 55 percent say they’re planning to book relaxing getaways (exhibit 5). these travelers might not necessarily want a new kind of vacation, but they still want novelty. seventy two percent of luxury travelers place importance on visiting a new destination, compared with 44 percent of other travelers. luxury travelers also travel substantially more than mass travelers which means that unfamiliar destinations can quickly become familiar ones. sun and beach vacations remain the most preferred trips for luxury travelers, yet hotels in the associated locations constitute a relatively low share of luxury hotel supply (exhibit 6). business travel, which skews supply toward cities, may account for some but not all of this discrepancy. taken together, these findings suggest that there could be opportunity to develop new luxury destinations that focus on offering traditional types of leisure or to refresh traditional destinations with revamped offerings that make them feel new even to frequent visitors. upgrading accommodations (by, for instance, adding villas) or curating experiences (such as unique scuba dives or sailing journeys) could help lure past visitors to book another sunny beach stay. it might seem intuitive that high earners who are likely to spend much of their working time communicating via phones and laptops would demand continued connectivity while away from home. but luxury travelers who responded to our survey are two to three times more likely than mass travelers to say their main reasons for traveling are to meet new people and to disconnect from digital devices (exhibit 7). small group travel for example, small luxury cruise expeditions is currently in high demand. on cruises, luxury travelers do want assurance that they will be digitally connected. but they also want to feel that they’re getting away from it all, being present in the moment, and meeting new people. although resorts that are explicitly framed as “digital detox” destinations remain a highly niche accommodation choice, digital detoxing is an important theme both in marketing luxury lodging and in developing on site offerings. providers should consider finding ways to create inviting spaces for digital disconnection, such as common eating areas and shared tables. are luxury travelers above caring about hotel loyalty points and perks? not quite. sixty eight percent of luxury travelers compared with only 41 percent of mass travelers say loyalty programs are an important factor when choosing accommodations. that said, many luxury travelers look for a different kind of reward from loyalty programs. they’re less focused on accumulating points and redeeming them for free stays. they’re more attuned to the recognition that comes with being a valued loyalty customer and with the attentive service, foreknowledge of preferences, and exclusive privileges (such as access to hotel leadership) it can entail. luxury travelers are similarly more likely than mass travelers to care about hotel brands (77 percent versus 53 percent) and government assigned star rankings (84 percent versus 66 percent). in general, luxury travelers want to trust that the places they choose will feature world class aesthetics and robust amenity offerings. brands, stars, and loyalty programs can all help communicate the reputation and perceived quality of an accommodation. in comparing luxury travelers across regions, it’s clear that consideration of star rankings is uniformly high. but travelers from china and the united arab emirates are more likely than others to place a high value on brands and loyalty programs (exhibit 8). this finding could be influenced in part by the existing lodging supply in those countries. in china, for instance, branded hotels with loyalty programs are the dominant form of luxury accommodation. as chinese domestic hotel supply develops and is increasingly dominated by chains rather than independent players it could further elevate the importance of branding and loyalty. all inclusive resorts replete with buffets, standardized drinks, and family targeted activities may not seem as if they would appeal to luxury travelers. the truth is that luxury travelers do still turn to all inclusives for the ease, convenience, and wide variety of instantly accessible activities they can provide. but luxury travelers want these accommodations to feature exclusive offerings and personalization. to court luxury travelers, resorts might consider offering dedicated concierge desks willing to go the extra mile in booking unique activities and difficult to get reservations. customized dining options, such as chefs willing to cook any meal on demand, can also appeal to this group. in addition, resorts might offer adventurous experiences such as scuba diving, sailing lessons, or guided hikes as part of the all inclusive package. resorts should look for opportunities to use data and research to enable deeply personalized touches. this could include keeping track of dietary preferences (from stay to stay and across properties) or even inscribing guests’ nicknames on their slippers. historically, the luxury segment and the exclusivity it entails have been associated with independently owned, landmark hotels. but there are brands that have successfully scaled luxury accommodation, and there are many elements of scale that luxury players can benefit from. a few major brands, including four seasons hotels and mandarin oriental hotel, have managed to establish themselves as icons of luxury hospitality. and some groups, such as leading hotels of the world and relais & châteaux, have been able to unite a disparate set of independent and family owned luxury hotels under a single, recognizable banner serving as a trusted indicator of luxury quality at scale and granting smaller organizations strength in numbers. a global footprint can ease the expansion of brands into new geographies, and it can serve as a hedge against regionally specific risks. a large luxury hospitality brand can also broaden its focus beyond its core product, expanding across the value chain to become a more holistic experience provider for example, the ultraluxury brand aman has branched out into cruise expeditions and jet journeys. and finally, scale creates economies of, well, scale: with more rooms to offer, scaled brands lower their cost per room and increase their efficiency as they centralize functions such as staffing, training, technology, procurement, and operations. today, 70 percent of luxury hotel properties are independent. but the supply pipeline is flipped, with chain and franchise properties accounting for 78 percent of planned hotels. new branded hotels coming online are also getting larger, in terms of total rooms. as luxury hotel brands get bigger, they must ensure that they can still offer personalized, high touch service. achieving scale without sacrificing exclusivity by, for instance, introducing luxury villas that are adjacent to a larger property could be critical to success. it’s true that inspiration for the luxury segment has become deeply tied to social networks instead of travel agents. this doesn’t mean, however, that there is no role left for travel agents to play. luxury travelers continue to use travel agents instead of online platforms, in part because they simply want someone else to take care of the transactional booking details. meanwhile, today’s luxury travel agents who prefer to call themselves travel advisors are superpowered by technology and data that enable both a personalized touch and a robust, responsive level of back end service (see sidebar “the founder of virtuoso on the evolution of the luxury travel advisor”). matthew d. upchurch is founder, chairman, and ceo of the luxury travel advising network virtuoso. mckinsey spoke with upchurch about his definition of luxury, his sense of what today’s luxury consumers are looking for, and his view on the evolution of the luxury travel advisor. the following is an edited version of the conversation. mckinsey: we’ll start with a question that seems simple but isn’t how do you define the luxury travel segment? matthew upchurch: “luxury” is an overused word, and not just in travel. people might try to quantify it and define it according to spending amounts. but to me, it’s more nuanced than that. start with the traveler. we now have five generations of people all traveling at the same time. and each luxury traveler may have many distinct personas, which change based on their stage of life and what kind of trip they’re taking. are they traveling in a group, with family, on a “bleisure” trip? then there are the hotel properties. as more commoditized segments get better at things like hyperpersonalization, and their hardware and design get better, it sometimes becomes harder to differentiate them from the luxury segment. we need to look at things more holistically. the real differentiator is how the customer feels. a luxury experience often means finding someone who will truly listen to what you want and then deliver beyond expectations. when it comes to helping a customer plan travel, good travel advisors differentiate by asking, “how do you want to feel on this trip? how do you want to feel when it’s over?” determining this desired outcome is what helps deliver a truly modern luxury experience tailored specifically to the client. when this happens over multiple planning cycles, the advisor becomes a specialist in you, the client. advisors can’t possibly know every part of the world they have a global network at their disposal for that. but having someone who specializes in you, who knows your likes and dislikes and exactly how you want to travel without you having to explain it every time you plan a trip that’s luxury. perhaps, though, the simplest definition of luxury from the customer’s point of view is: “of course i could do it myself. i don’t want to. and if i can have someone in my life who provides incredible experiences and is a fun collaborator, takes my input, has great connections, and can watch my back and do things for me, why would i want to do it myself?” mckinsey: what kind of fundamental changes are you seeing in terms of destination picks or product picks among your luxury travelers? matthew upchurch: with luxury experiential travelers, the fundamental creative tension is between the familiar and the unfamiliar. there’s often the desire to go back to places they love and have built relationships with over time to show them to family and friends and see them through new eyes. but people want to know before they return to a familiar destination: is there a new story happening there? i’ve been to madrid many times in my life, so is there a new story in madrid? is there a new story in london? has the destination itself transformed so that it’s familiar but still feels new? we’re also seeing a strong desire to explore. that’s one of the reasons expedition cruising is doing incredibly well. expedition cruising is high end, not mass, and it’s absolutely bringing new luxury travelers to cruising. because we’re starting to see a recurring issue with overcrowding at some destinations, we’re also seeing a lot of our sophisticated travelers increasingly taking trips during what was once called the “shoulder season.” they don’t want to be caught in an overcrowded major city in europe in the summer, so either they’ll visit in september or october, or they’ll focus on secondary or tertiary cities instead. we’re even seeing some travelers going to europe in november, december, and january. we call it the “cultural season.” i used to sell it by saying, “why don’t you go there when the citizens are happy instead of annoyed with everybody that’s overwhelming their cities?” mckinsey: you have a rich repository of feedback from your clients. if you had to give one message to luxury accommodation providers, what would it be? matthew upchurch: first, they need to get really good at being able to measure what’s not easily measurable. because those are the things that make it luxury. second, focus on staff culture. it’s crucial to engage with your employees and understand them. we need to make sure the people delivering the experiences feel fulfilled. i absolutely believe that those hospitality players that really focus on their employees, their culture, their service levels those properties where you can truly feel the presence of the general manager are the ones that will excel. average daily room rates have been rising quickly. and the properties that don’t effectively focus on the experiences of both their employees and their customers will have trouble maintaining those high rates. because lately we hear a lot of our customers saying, “i have never paid this much before. i used to pay $900 a night for a hotel in miami, now it’s $2,000 for the same hotel, and frankly, the value isn’t there.” when price and value don’t align, it’s a huge danger for the property, and it will come back to haunt them. mckinsey: what kind of evolution have you seen in the way luxury travelers engage with travel advisors? matthew upchurch: if you go back to the middle of the 20th century, more people booked directly with the actual providers than they do today. international flights were a high end product. walking into pan am airline’s office on fifth avenue in 1950 was like walking into bergdorf goodman. there was pleasure in it. there was also very little pricing complexity because there were essentially just four fare classes day coach, night coach, day first class, and night first class. so why would people use a travel advisor if a lot of providers had fabulous service and there was no price complexity? they did it for the same core reasons that they do it today. one is community knowledge: travel advisors have the collective knowledge of the community that they serve. they know what’s on the minds of other high net worth individuals that the customer respects. another is the value of relationships: the customer might have heard of a certain luxury property, but the travel advisor might have a personal relationship with the general manager of the property. things changed in the 1970s, when airfare classes got more complicated, and many travel agents made money by basically becoming human interfaces to the airline reservation systems. things changed again in the late 1990s with the arrival of the online travel agencies like expedia and travelocity. the idea then was the consumer could do it themselves, and it would be cheaper than paying for the travel agent’s labor. that did cause a large exit of agents from the industry. but the true travel advisors, who were consultative and not transactional, continued to thrive by building on community knowledge and relationships. at virtuoso, we never believed that all the baby boomers who invented the personal chef, personal shopper, personal everything would suddenly start doing travel diy. what’s happened generally in the profession is that the successful luxury travel advisor needs more of a right brain attitude, asking the customer open ended questions. in a world where there are an endless number of answers, what really impresses a well educated, sophisticated customer isn’t that you have answers; it’s that you ask great questions. the minute you ask a question they hadn’t thought about, it stops them in their tracks. any good travel advisor today will add value in three separate areas: before the trip, during the trip, and after the trip. the number one thing that high net worth consumers tell us differentiates a trusted travel advisor from a transactional travel agent is the quality and consistency of post trip debriefs. that debrief is when it becomes a learning relationship. if customers can see that those debriefs add value to the next trip, and the one after that, it makes them very “sticky.” a lot of our sophisticated travelers are planning big milestone trips three, four, or five years in advance. and a lot of our advisors are saying, “let’s not work at one trip at a time. let’s have a strategy.” why would you have a professional collaborator who helps you make a proactive, conscious plan to optimize your financial assets but not have a professional collaborator who helps you plan how to optimize your most valuable, nonrenewable asset your free leisure time? if you lose money, you can make it back. if you lose time, you’ll never get it back. motivating the customer to think that way can drive a huge amount of value. comments and opinions expressed by interviewees are their own and do not represent or reflect the opinions, policies, or positions of mckinsey & company or have its endorsement. many luxury travelers now want 24/7 concierges who will maintain a relationship with them across their journeys. these travelers want the benefits of large online networks when making travel arrangements, but they also want agents who respond quickly, know their names, and understand how they like to travel. subscription based travel clubs that meet all these needs by giving paying members access to an exclusive, carefully curated selection of properties, activities, and agency services have become an attractive solution, especially for younger luxury travelers. the traditional image of luxury is heavy on indulgence: sumptuous dining, an atmosphere of ease, and copious opportunities to splurge. in fact, many luxury travelers are interested in a slightly different vibe. wellness is a major, ongoing, global trend, and luxury tourists are increasingly looking for ways to put their health both mental and physical at the center of their travels. mainstream luxury providers still mostly seem to think that wellness equals spas. in fact, luxury consumers now expect a much more holistic array of offerings including fitness classes (88 percent of our survey respondents say fitness is important on leisure trips), health focused menus, on site antiaging doctors, mindfulness programming, and more. luxury travelers also want to learn about the health and wellness practices that are specific to the places they’re visiting, whether it’s a mediterranean diet in italy or ayurvedic medicine in india. for these travelers, wellness means a healthy holiday they return from feeling fresher and fully rejuvenated. it doesn’t mean one massage scheduled at an odd time because of a packed travel schedule and limited spa staff. a new crop of wellness hotels is emerging to meet the new shape of demand. for example, the sha wellness clinic, which has locations in spain and mexico, offers programming that addresses guests’ health goals such as longevity, detoxing, weight management, and rebalancing. guests can book private consultations for personalized food plans and targeted brain health treatments. in hawaii, 1 hotel hanalei bay is a property entirely focused on transformative wellness, offering multiday retreats, custom itineraries, medical treatments, an 18,000 square foot wellness spa, and a 10,000 square foot fitness space. the new generation of wellness hotels is likely just scratching the surface in terms of meeting demand volume. luxury hotels might have a “white space” opportunity to engage with the new type of wellness traveler by making them feel that wellness is integrated into every part of a stay. meanwhile, many hotels could likely step up their game even when it comes to traditional spa experiences. spa booking should be easy, availability should be rampant, and flexibility should be constant if the visitor is to feel a true sense of relaxation. the luxury traveler population is evolving. travel players should ensure they have a full and accurate understanding of today’s luxury traveler by critically reexamining long standing assumptions. caroline tufft is a senior partner in mckinsey’s london office, margaux constantin is a partner in the dubai office, matteo pacca is a senior partner in the paris office, ryan mann is a partner in the chicago office, ivan gladstone is an associate partner in the riyadh office, and jasperina de vries is an associate partner in the amsterdam office. the authors wish to thank abdulhadi alghamdi, alessandra powell, alex dichter, cedric tsai, diane vu, elisa wallwitz, lily miller, maggie coffey, nadya snezhkova, nick meronyk, paulina baum, peimin suo, rebecca stone, sarah fellay, sarah sahel, sophia wang, steffen fuchs, steffen köpke, steve saxon, and urs binggeli for their contributions to this article. this article was edited by seth stevenson, a senior editor in the new york office.

radio schuman this is radio schuman, your new go to podcast to spice up your weekday mornings with relevant news, insights, and behind the scenes from brussels and beyond. no comment no agenda, no argument, no bias, no comment. get the story without commentary. my wildest prediction dare to imagine the future with business and tech visionaries the big question deep dive conversations with business leaders euronews tech talks euronews tech talks goes beyond discussions to explore the impact of new technologies on our lives. with explanations, engaging q&as, and lively conversations, the podcast provides valuable insights into the intersection of technology and society. water matters europe's water is under increasing pressure. pollution, droughts, floods are taking their toll on our drinking water, lakes, rivers and coastlines. join us on a journey around europe to see why protecting ecosystems matters, how our wastewater can be better managed, and to discover some of the best water solutions. video reports, an animated explainer series and live debate   find out why water matters, from euronews. climate now we give you the latest climate facts from the world’s leading source, analyse the trends and explain how our planet is changing. we meet the experts on the front line of climate change who explore new strategies to mitigate and adapt. radio schuman this is radio schuman, your new go to podcast to spice up your weekday mornings with relevant news, insights, and behind the scenes from brussels and beyond. no comment no agenda, no argument, no bias, no comment. get the story without commentary. my wildest prediction dare to imagine the future with business and tech visionaries the big question deep dive conversations with business leaders euronews tech talks euronews tech talks goes beyond discussions to explore the impact of new technologies on our lives. with explanations, engaging q&as, and lively conversations, the podcast provides valuable insights into the intersection of technology and society. water matters europe's water is under increasing pressure. pollution, droughts, floods are taking their toll on our drinking water, lakes, rivers and coastlines. join us on a journey around europe to see why protecting ecosystems matters, how our wastewater can be better managed, and to discover some of the best water solutions. video reports, an animated explainer series and live debate   find out why water matters, from euronews. climate now we give you the latest climate facts from the world’s leading source, analyse the trends and explain how our planet is changing. we meet the experts on the front line of climate change who explore new strategies to mitigate and adapt. saudi arabia has very diverse landscapes, topography and culture with plenty to offer outside of the heat of the desert. best known for its vast ochre deserts, bedouins on camels and the largest oasis in in the world, there is plenty to do outside of the desert in saudi arabia. now is the perfect time to book your trip here too, as the kingdom has just scrapped most of its covid 19 restrictions, including social distancing. though you must be fully vaccinated to visit, you don't need to provide a negative test. so if you're planning a trip to saudi arabia in 2022, where should you go? while the red sea is ideal for spring sun, you can camp beneath the stars in saudi's national parks, or maybe even see the snowfall in the cooler mountainous north. "saudi has always been that black box and it's now ready to welcome visitors with open arms," says fad hamidaddin, ceo of saudi tourism authority, "from those looking for an authentic, cultural experience to adventure. i believe saudi is the most welcoming, hospitable place in arabia. after all we have been the land of crossroads of civilisations," he adds. a post shared by visit saudi (@visitsaudi) alula is home to saudi arabia’s first unesco world heritage site in the northwest of the country. featuring 7,000 year old tombs and stunning canyons and natural rock formations that offer a range of adventure sports options. here you can see "the footprints of those civilisations left for us to enjoy and visit," says hamidaddin. a post shared by visit saudi (@visitsaudi) the red sea offers "unparalleled coral reefs and marine treasures and unique species that people can enjoy even in in winter." salwa palace in ad diriyah is the the original home of the al saud royal family. located northwest of the capital riyadh, it features four museums alongside the recently restored palace. diriyah’s historical centre is the unesco listed site of at turaif, which was founded in the 15th century. set to open late 2021 the site is being redeveloped to include luxury resorts and to allow visitors to walk through the ruins for the first time. a post shared by visit saudi (@visitsaudi) "finally, you have the highlands of asir (in southwestern saudi arabia) with lush green mountains that are are the highest in the middle east," says hamidaddin. for snow you can try the mountainous north where you can saddle up an arabian camel or go on a mountain drive from the town of tabuk. there you can also go sledging or try camping inside a traditional arabic tent, known as a kashta for the ultimate winter experience. a post shared by visit saudi (@visitsaudi) "we have a lot to offer. it's a very diverse landscape, topography, culture, but the best remains, i think, the hospitable and welcoming nature of the people," says hamidaddin. hamidaddin says first timers should "definitely visit the cosmopolitan capital of arabia, riyadh with its mix of lively souks, and ancient architecture, alongside its contemporary high rise buildings, museums and galleries. the ancient port of jeddah with its historical quarter, al balad and the red sea coast, contrasts with with the city's luxury hotels and its big events, such as the red sea international film festival, which takes place in late winter. the famous sea food dishes from the red sea should also not be missed. a post shared by visit saudi (@visitsaudi) "we have golden dunes in arabia, but if you go in summer, the whole region is in the 40s and 50s. the south of saudi is 20 degrees less. so it's a beautiful summer destination," says hamidaddin. the winter and spring months are an ideal time to visit riyadh. although average high temperatures in the summer can reach 44 degrees c, the top temps in december and january are in the low 20s, reaching the high 20s in february and march. according to hamidaddin, 70 per cent of the population of saudi arabia are below the age of 35. "this is an opportunity, but it's also a possible threat if unemployment is not addressed". with technology "stripping away jobs" from all other sectors hamidaddin believes tourism is by far the greatest creator of new employment. a post shared by visit saudi (@visitsaudi) "for most of the top 20 destinations around the world, tourism contributes to a minimum 10 per cent of their total gdp." "for saudi today, tourism only represents 2.5 of its contribution, so the potential is massive." "add that to ambition and empowerment. because we are the largest investor in tourism in the world, there is no country that is investing in tourism like we are in terms of the dollar and in terms of commitment into new innovative projects." watch the video above to see more of saudi arabia. additional sources • afp, ap & getty

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to join or sign in, you agree to linkedin’s user agreement, privacy policy, and cookie policy. new to linkedin? join now or by clicking continue to join or sign in, you agree to linkedin’s user agreement, privacy policy, and cookie policy. new to linkedin? join now ************* ************* ********* ******, **** **** **** **** ****** ******'* ****** ************* ********* *** ******* 2020   2022 ** *******/********** *** ************** 2005   2009 or by clicking continue to join or sign in, you agree to linkedin’s user agreement, privacy policy, and cookie policy. new to linkedin? join now or by clicking continue to join or sign in, you agree to linkedin’s user agreement, privacy policy, and cookie policy. in late september, the face of a small girl began appearing on the twitter accounts of several trusted sources in syria. the handle @alabedbana had begun posting regular updates about a child, said to be 7 years old and trapped in aleppo.in her profile picture, the girl is seated at a tidy, wooden desk, a sweet smile spread across her face, her brown eyes gazing up from a picture book and straight into the camera. her long, brown hair is neatly tied back and topped with a delicate pink… show more in late september, the face of a small girl began appearing on the twitter accounts of several trusted sources in syria. the handle @alabedbana had begun posting regular updates about a child, said to be 7 years old and trapped in aleppo.in her profile picture, the girl is seated at a tidy, wooden desk, a sweet smile spread across her face, her brown eyes gazing up from a picture book and straight into the camera. her long, brown hair is neatly tied back and topped with a delicate pink bow. the face is that of bana al abed, according to the person posting to the twitter account, who identifies herself as fatemah, bana’s mother. show less around 4 p.m. on tuesday, an airstrike destroyed a building where four families lived in eastern aleppo, syria. here’s how rescuers responded, minute by minute, to try to save people trapped under rubble in an area where basic services have been devastated by years of war. it's a view that speak volumes of the broken european policies on refugees: nearly 10,000 people are living in trash strewn, smoke filled open fields near the village of idomeni, greece, trapped here for months on the macedonian border. report from jordan's za'atari refugee camp on the 80,000 syrians who call it home. this is a firsthand account of how islamic state militants took over the city of raqqa in northern syria, declaring it their capital. reports emerged in the immediate aftermath of the downing of malaysia airlines flight 17 on july 17 that members of a russian backed separatist militia had possession of a ‘buk’ surface to air missile system prior to the incident. evidence points to the separatists being in possession of the russian made ‘buk’ missile system, or sa 11, which is capable of the attack which targeted the passenger plane, resulting in the loss of all 298 people on board.as images and videos purporting to… show more reports emerged in the immediate aftermath of the downing of malaysia airlines flight 17 on july 17 that members of a russian backed separatist militia had possession of a ‘buk’ surface to air missile system prior to the incident. evidence points to the separatists being in possession of the russian made ‘buk’ missile system, or sa 11, which is capable of the attack which targeted the passenger plane, resulting in the loss of all 298 people on board.as images and videos purporting to show the missile system in the donetsk region of eastern ukraine began to flood in, storyful, alongside other journalists and social media experts in our open newsroom and elsewhere, worked to verify this information and determine the veracity of these claims. from the images and videos, we were able to determine that members of the donetsk people’s republic separatist militia, at the very least, did appear to have access to an anti aircraft system capable of an attack like the one carried out on mh17. show less it took ian lacey 452 days to travel from the northern most road of north america to the southern most road of south america, reports megan specia as i left college with a dual degree in journalism and mass communications from the university of new hampshire in 2009, i embarked on what some saw as a virtually hopeless mission to carve out my own little niche in the news world.i kid you not when i say people openly chuckled at my hard earned diploma, some even offering me a snarky “good luck with that” as they wished me well. understandably so, as 2009 was a time when many major news networks and newspapers were significantly… show more as i left college with a dual degree in journalism and mass communications from the university of new hampshire in 2009, i embarked on what some saw as a virtually hopeless mission to carve out my own little niche in the news world.i kid you not when i say people openly chuckled at my hard earned diploma, some even offering me a snarky “good luck with that” as they wished me well. understandably so, as 2009 was a time when many major news networks and newspapers were significantly cutting staff or folding completely.we watched the pulitzer prize winning rocky mountain news do just that in february of 2009. i vividly remember sitting in the office of local new hampshire paper where i was interning at the time as my colleagues huddled around a screen watching these scenes from the rocky mountain news... show less redefining real time journalism in the digital age: public lecture as part of my role as donald murray visiting journalist at the university of new hampshire. social compass is a tool to verify and identify the origin of social media content with a single click. the application is open sourced and is available on github. the international women’s media foundation (iwmf) selected 14 journalists from six countries to participate as fellows with the african great lakes reporting initiative. i joined a group of eight women journalists to report on civic engagement from rwanda. for the new york times piece: “adventurous. alone. attacked.”from the judges citation: "with growing numbers of women deciding to travel alone, the new york times takes a close look at how the solitary pursuit of adventure can go wrong for women and outlines practices that can help keep travelers safe. it’s sobering and useful."https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/25/travel/solo female travel.html https://poyi.org/74/r25/ae04.php http://www.poyi.org/74/r38/03.php the donald murray visiting journalist program is named in honor of the late donald murray, the pulitzer prize winning writer who started the unh journalism program in 1963. sponsored by the journalism program, the donald murray visiting journalist program brings accomplished alumni journalists to campus each year for week long residencies during which they conduct classes, work with students and student media, and give a public lecture. “i worked with megan for more than three years at storyful. during that time i watched as she developed from a raw, enthusiastic junior to a journalist i hold in as high esteem as any i've worked with. megan is energetic, intelligent, super organised and always eager to take on new challenges and learn new things. the net effect of this is that she's already an excellent journalist, but is constantly improving. on top of this, she was always pleasant to work with, even when under pressure. i was sorry to see our paths diverge, and have no doubt that anyone who gets the chance to work alongside her will be better for the experience.” “from her overall presentation to her thorough preparedness to her thoughtful approach, megan impressed us from the minute she walked into the room. if you've seen her in action you probably do not need to read this   her strengths are obvious. i can't imagine a scenario wherein she would not be a professional asset.” 3 people have recommended megan artist/ journalist editor at the new york times, london newsroom editor at northern ireland's wedding belle magazine bsme editor of the year 2024 | editor, tv mag (the sun) & tv soap (the sun on sunday) freelance journalist; formerly senior fashion editor at the telegraph photojournalist and editor editor in chief senior editor at agbi freelance writer, editor and editorial consultant. editor at sunderland echo night editor at the sun communications specialist deputy editor, ft globetrotter at financial times publisher freelance production editor, writer, copywriter senior staff editor, opinion at the new york times editor & editorial director editor, writer, content consultant | author of secret stays | previously editor of condé nast traveller | travel, wellness, family, lifestyle editor at schools week freelance journalist   travel & lifestyle we’re unlocking community knowledge in a new way. experts add insights directly into 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supported by times insider an editor on the travel desk explains our decision to explore the middle eastern kingdom. by stephen hiltner an editor and photojournalist for the travel section, stephen hiltner spent a month exploring saudi arabia for a story that published in early june. when my travel story about saudi arabia was published online last week, some readers bristled. why, they wanted to know, had the new york times’s travel team devoted so much time and effort to a country whose authoritarian government has committed grievous human rights abuses? why did the kingdom deserve our attention? how much had the government paid us for our coverage? the last question is the easiest to answer: accepting money (or any other benefit) in exchange for coverage is strictly prohibited by the times’s ethics guidelines. we simply don’t do it. but in the context of saudi arabia, i can understand why readers wonder. while reporting the story, i learned about the incredible extent to which the saudi government and its tourism officials have paid online influencers   those on instagram, tiktok and youtube   to visit the country and share overly simplified accounts of carefully curated experiences. such an arrangement creates incentives to focus on the positive aspects of the country and leave out anything that paints a more complicated picture. and so social media is awash with glossy, one sided content from the kingdom   which you might not realize, because the arrangements that produce it often aren’t disclosed. in my mind, that’s one of the factors that justifies our independently reported article about saudi arabia’s new tourism projects: the times is now one of the few outlets where curious readers   and potential visitors to saudi arabia   can find a balanced travel story that acknowledges both the country’s profound changes and its continuing complexities, including its troubling track record with human rights abuses, religious extremism and the oppression of women and l.g.b.t.q. people. why was the story assigned in the first place? to put it simply: it’s newsworthy. saudi arabia’s $800 billion approach to drawing tourists   by building vast infrastructure for nonreligious visitors on a relatively short timetable   is unparalleled in its ambitions. what’s more, it’s part of a broader set of goals to reshape both the saudi economy and its society at large.

 saudi arabia is determined to diversify its economy by dramatically growing its tourism sector. and, as top saudi tourism advisor gloria guevara says, it has the resources, vision and people to do it.