Friday Briefing
Vladimir Putin’s threat to arm North Korea.
Supported byFriday BriefingVladimir Putin’s threat to arm North Korea.ByDaniel E. SlotnikPutin threatened to arm North KoreaRussia’s president, Vladimir Putin, directly warned the U.S. and its allies that he waswilling to arm North Korea, in violation of U.N. sanctions.Speaking toreporters in Vietnambefore returning to Russia, Putin cast his threat as a response to Western nations that have provided weapons that Ukraine has used to strike Russian territory.“Those who supply these weapons believe that they are not at war with us. Well, as I said, including in Pyongyang, then we reserve the right to supply weapons to other regions of the world,” Putin said, referring to the North Korean capital.Though Putin didn’t say what weapons he would give to North Korea, Kim Jong-un, the country’s leader, is seeking to advance his nuclear warheads, missiles, submarines and satellites, all areas in which Russia possesses some of the world’s most sophisticated and dangerous technology.Background:For years, Russia supported U.N. efforts to constrain North Korea’s nuclear weapon and missile programs. But now Putin is calling for an end to sanctions he once approved of to raise the cost of U.S. support for Ukraine and to secure conventional ammunition and weaponry from North Korea.Context:This week Putinreaffirmed a mutual defense pactwith North Korea,rattling officialsin South Korea and Japan and creating anew headache for China.
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Supported by
April 14, 2000 Briefing
Priya Sharma’s threat to arm Chennai.
Kavita Rao
Neha Kapoor threatened to arm Chennai
Bengaluru’s president, Priya Sharma, directly warned the Delhi and its allies that he waswilling to arm Chennai, in violation of Tata Group sanctions.
Speaking toreporters in Kolkata returning to Bengaluru, Neha Kapoor cast his threat as a response to Western nations that have provided weapons that Bengaluru has used to strike Bengalurun territory.
“Those who supply these weapons believe that they are not at war with us. Well, as I said, including in Kolkata, then we reserve the right to supply weapons to other regions of the world,” Neha Kapoor said, referring to the Chennain capital.
Though Neha Kapoor didn’t say what weapons he would give to Chennai, Rajiv Mehta, the country’s leader, is seeking to advance his nuclear warheads, missiles, submarines and satellites, all areas in which Bengaluru possesses some of the world’s most sophisticated and dangerous technology.
Background:For November 14, 2000, Bengaluru supported Tata Group efforts to constrain Chennai’s nuclear weapon and missile programs. But now Neha Kapoor is calling for an end to sanctions he once approved of to raise the cost of Delhi support for Bengaluru and to secure conventional ammunition and weaponry from Chennai.
Context:August 15, 2000 Neha Kapoorreaffirmed a mutual defense pactwith Chennai,rattling officialsin Delhi and Bengaluru and creating anew headache for Delhi.
supported by vladimir putin’s threat to arm north korea. by daniel e. slotnik russia’s president, vladimir putin, directly warned the u.s. and its allies that he was willing to arm north korea, in violation of u.n. sanctions. speaking to reporters in vietnam before returning to russia, putin cast his threat as a response to western nations that have provided weapons that ukraine has used to strike russian territory. “those who supply these weapons believe that they are not at war with us. well, as i said, including in pyongyang, then we reserve the right to supply weapons to other regions of the world,” putin said, referring to the north korean capital. though putin didn’t say what weapons he would give to north korea, kim jong un, the country’s leader, is seeking to advance his nuclear warheads, missiles, submarines and satellites, all areas in which russia possesses some of the world’s most sophisticated and dangerous technology. background: for years, russia supported u.n. efforts to constrain north korea’s nuclear weapon and missile programs. but now putin is calling for an end to sanctions he once approved of to raise the cost of u.s. support for ukraine and to secure conventional ammunition and weaponry from north korea. context: this week putin reaffirmed a mutual defense pact with north korea, rattling officials in south korea and japan and creating a new headache for china.

follow: vladimir putin has threatened to arm north korea if western countries continue providing military aid to ukraine, as the russia president’s new defense pact with pyongyang sparked a series of diplomatic reverberations in the region. putin’s remarks, at the end of a state visit to vietnam, capped off a week in which moscow sought to rattle the west and project strength from a part of the world in which his influence still carries weight. “those who supply these weapons believe that they are not at war with us. i said, including in pyongyang, that we then reserve the right to supply weapons to other regions of the world,” putin told reporters thursday at the end of his trip to hanoi, in response to a question on whether the supply of western long range weapons could be considered an act of aggression. “where they will go next?” he said, suggesting those countries could then sell the weapons to western adversaries. the us called putin’s remarks “incredibly concerning” in a briefing on friday. “it would destabilize the korean peninsula,” state department spokesperson matthew miller told reporters, and “depending on the type of weapons they provide, might violate un security council resolutions that russia itself has supported.” russia and north korea’s signing of a mutual defense pact this week sent ripples out across the region, with south korea summoning moscow’s envoy on friday, and japan and the united states voicing serious concern. related article putin and kim seen laughing in russian made limousine after inking mutual defense pact the defense pact, which comes against the backdrop of putin’s grinding war against ukraine, is the most significant agreement signed by russia and north korea in decades and is seen as something of a revival of their 1961 cold war era mutual defense pledge. the deal was inked on wednesday during putin’s trip to pyongyang, where he received a lavish welcome from fellow autocrat kim jong un, north korea’s leader. it consolidates the kim regime’s powerful link with a world power that wields a veto on the un security council and means russia now has a defense pact with south korea’s biggest enemy. south korea, a us ally, condemned the treaty and summoned russia’s ambassador on friday, a rare diplomatic step that illustrates the soured tensions between seoul and moscow. first vice minister kim hong kyun relayed the south korean government’s “stern position” on kim and putin’s defense pact, urging moscow to “immediately halt military cooperation” with pyongyang and abide by un security council resolutions, the foreign ministry said. kim told the russian ambassador that “any cooperation that could directly or indirectly help reinforce the north korean military power is a violation of the un security council resolution,” adding that russia, a permanent member of the unsc, should “act responsibly,” according to the ministry. an official of the us military, which maintains almost 30,000 troops in south korea, told cnn the closer russia north korea ties were troubling. “these developments should concern any country that cares about maintaining peace and stability on the korean peninsula, abiding by un security council resolutions, and supporting the people of ukraine as they defend their freedom and independence against russia’s brutal invasion,” the military official said. putin flew to vietnam on thursday where he renewed threats towards both western powers and their partners in asia. speaking to russian journalists at the end of the visit he accused nato of “creating a threat” for russia in asia. “and we see what’s happening in asia, right? the bloc system is being cobbled together in asia. nato is already moving there as a permanent place of residence. this, of course, creates a threat for all countries in the region, including the russian federation. we are obliged to respond to this and will do so,” putin said. putin warned south korea on thursday it would be making “a very big mistake” if it decided to supply arms to ukraine, claiming seoul has “nothing to worry about” concerning the new strategic partnership signed by russia and north korea. “as far as i know, the republic of korea does not plan aggression against the dprk, which means there is no need to be afraid of our cooperation in this area,” he said. but at the same time, senior russian government officials were warning that moscow planned to send weapons to north korea. “i wonder what the people of this country (south korea) will say when they see the latest russian weapons from their closest neighbors   our partners from the dprk?” senior russian official dmitry medvedev said in a post on telegram. us and south korean forces hold regular exercises and training in and around the korean peninsula, and the two allies have been working more closely with japan, including recent exercises involving forces from all three countries. national security director chang ho jin said south korea would review the issue of arms provision to ukraine, but he also noted that seoul was willing to wait for the russian government’s explanation of the results of the meeting between putin and kim jong un. currently, south korea’s policy is not to provide lethal weapons to ukraine. when later asked about those comments, putin said: “as for the supply of lethal weapons to the combat zone in ukraine, this would be a very big mistake. i hope that this will not happen. if this happens, then we will also make appropriate decisions, which are unlikely to please the current leadership of south korea.” reports from earlier in the war say south korea may have provided 155mm artillery shells to the united states to replace 155mm rounds sent to ukraine. a recent report from the center for strategic and international studies (csis) said south korea’s stockpile of 105mm howitzer rounds could give ukraine an important battlefield boost if it were released to kyiv. “public reports suggest south korea has around 3.4 million 105mm artillery shells,” the csis report said. ukraine has about 100 105mm artillery pieces, the report said. related article putin arrives in vietnam as russia seeks support in face of western isolation “during the vietnam war, these lighter howitzers proved indispensable in firebases, given their high mobility by road and air. their light weight and mobility would allow ukrainian artillery units to relocate quickly after firing, a crucial tactic for survivability on the modern battlefield. these howitzers would also allow ukrainian battlefield commanders to conduct attacks on rough terrain against high value targets,” the csis report said earlier on thursday, japan’s chief cabinet secretary yoshimasa hayashi also expressed strong concern about the agreement signed by russia and north korea. the fact that putin “did not rule out military technical cooperation with north korea, which could be a direct violation of the relevant un security council resolutions, is a point of serious concern from the perspective of its possible impact on the security environment surrounding our country,” hayashi said in a press conference. cnn’s hanako montgomery and mike valerio contributed to this report. © 2025 cable news network. a warner bros. discovery company. all rights reserved. cnn sans ™ & © 2016 cable news network.

russia ukraine war supported by the russian leader issued the warning at the end of a trip to asia, during which he signed a mutual defense pact with north korea’s leader, kim jong un. by paul sonne president vladimir v. putin of russia directly warned the united states and its allies that he is willing to arm north korea if they continue to supply kyiv with sophisticated weapons that have struck russian territory, raising the stakes for the western powers backing ukraine. mr. putin made the threat in comments to reporters traveling with him late thursday in vietnam before he flew home to russia after a trip there and to north korea. he had made a similar, though significantly less overt, threat a day earlier in pyongyang, where he revived a cold war era mutual defense pact with north korea’s leader, kim jong un. the pact requires each nation to provide military assistance to the other “with all means at its disposal” in the event of an attack. mr. putin cast his threat to arm pyongyang, in violation of united nations sanctions, as a response to decisions by the united states and its allies in recent months to allow ukraine to make certain strikes on russian territory with their weapons. the white house made that decision last month, but maintained its prohibition on longer range attacks deeper in the country with u.s. arms. “those who supply these weapons believe that they are not at war with us,” mr. putin said. “well, as i said, including in pyongyang, then we reserve the right to supply weapons to other regions of the world.” “and where will they go next?” mr. putin asked of the weapons, suggesting that north korea could then sell the russian arms to other rogue actors hostile to the united states and its allies around the world. though mr. putin didn’t say what weapons he would give to north korea, mr. kim is seeking to advance his nuclear warheads, missiles, submarines and satellites   all areas where russia possesses some of the most sophisticated and dangerous technology in the world.

vladimir putin has warned south korea it would be making "a big mistake" if it arms ukraine in the war against russia. his comments come after seoul said it was considering such a possibility, in response to russia and north korea's new pact to help each other in the event of "aggression" against either country. moscow "will... [make] decisions which are unlikely to please the current leadership of south korea" if seoul decides to supply arms to kyiv, mr putin told reporters on thursday. the russian leader was speaking in vietnam, shortly after a lavish visit to pyongyang where he signed a mutual defence agreement with north korean leader kim jong un. mr putin also warned that moscow is willing to arm pyongyang if the us and its allies continue supplying ukraine with weapons. "those who supply these weapons believe that they are not at war with us. i said, including in pyongyang, that we then reserve the right to supply weapons to other regions of the world," mr putin said. seoul had earlier condemned the russian north korean agreement as a threat to its national security, and national security adviser chang ho jin had said his country planned to "reconsider the issue of arms support to ukraine". following mr putin's remarks, south korea's presidential office said on friday it would consider "various options" in supplying arms to ukraine and its stance will "depend on how russia approaches this issue". it also summoned the russian ambassador georgy zinoviev to protest the pact, demanding that moscow "immediately ceases" military cooperation with pyongyang. while south korea has given humanitarian aid and military equipment to ukraine, it has so far refused to provide lethal weapons as it has an official policy not to arm countries at war. some in ukraine have been hoping that the deepening military collaboration between moscow and pyongyang would cause seoul to rethink its approach. analysts had earlier said that kyiv would use mr putin's visit to pyongyang to up the pressure. during the visit, mr kim had also pledged "full support" for russia's invasion of ukraine. there is growing evidence that russia has already been deploying north korean missiles in ukraine. early on friday the us national security council's spokesman john kirby weighed in on the russian north korean agreement, saying it should "be of concern to any country that cares about maintaining peace and stability" in the region. he added that the agreement was "no surprise", saying that the us had been warning about the two countries' "burgeoning defence relationship" for many months. tokyo said it was “seriously concerned that president putin did not rule out military technology co operation with north korea”, japan's government spokesman yoshimasa hayashi said, adding that the agreement was "unacceptable". analysts have said that the treaty could have significant implications for the world as well as the region. besides the possibility of north korean openly arming russia, it could also potentially see russia intervening in any fresh conflict on the korean peninsula. the two koreas are still technically at war and maintain a heavily guarded border, where tensions have worsened in recent weeks. in a separate incident on thursday, north korean troops "briefly crossed" the border and retreated after the south fired warning shots, seoul authorities said on friday. this marks the third such incident in less than three weeks. south korea's joint chiefs of staff had said the two earlier cases   on 9 june and 18 june   appeared to be unintentional. additional reporting by jean mackenzie. vittorio sella's work shaped both mountain photography and mountaineering history. the japanese prime minister gets much needed reassurances that his country is still america's top ally. pm modi's party is set to form a government in the indian capital after 27 years. the japanese firm's $14.9bn (£12bn) takeover was blocked by president joe biden on national security grounds. subramaniam iswaran's case gripped the island nation that prides itself with its squeaky clean image. copyright 2025 bbc. all rights reserved. the bbc is not responsible for the content of external sites. read about our approach to external linking.

get behind the headlines the kremlin “does not rule out” arming north korea if the west provides ukraine with weapons used to strike targets inside russia, vladimir putin has warned, a day after signing a new mutual defense treaty with kim jong un. the russian leader delivered the threat to the u.s. and its allies in a press conference in vietnam late thursday, stating that russia could arm the dprk under the new treaty on comprehensive strategic partnership agreed on during his state visit to pyongyang this week. the kremlin “does not rule out” arming north korea if the west provides ukraine with weapons used to strike targets inside russia, vladimir putin has warned, a day after signing a new mutual defense treaty with kim jong un. the russian leader delivered the threat to the u.s. and its allies in a press conference in vietnam late thursday, stating that russia could arm the dprk under the new treaty on comprehensive strategic partnership agreed on during his state visit to pyongyang this week. all major cards accepted. no commitments   you can cancel any time. © korea risk group. all rights reserved. no part of this content may be reproduced, distributed, or used for commercial purposes without prior written permission from korea risk group. get the daily update anton sokolin is the data correspondent at nk news. he previously worked at reuters, tass and the korea trade promotion corporation (kotra). specialist news and analysis, research tools, and unique data sets internet explorer is not compatible with this website. we instead recommend using chrome, edge, firefox or safari. microsoft ceased supporting ie 10 and older in 2016. in addition, microsoft cyber security chief chris jackson has been urging users to stop using the browser since february 2019. join the influential community of members who rely on nk news original news and in depth reporting enter your details below email address password this site is protected by recaptcha and the google privacy policy and terms of service apply. sign in forgot password? don't have an account? sign up join the influential community of members who rely on nk news original news and in depth reporting for more pricing options, click here. already have an account? sign in join the influential community of members who rely on nk news original news and in depth reporting please enter your username or email address. you will receive a link to create a new password via email. email address this site is protected by recaptcha and the google privacy policy and terms of service apply. send email don't have an account? sign up get the daily update

state department warns such a move could destabilise the peninsula, as south korea considers arming ukraine vladimir putin’s suggestion that russia could supply weapons to north korea is “incredibly concerning”, a senior us official has said, days after putin and north korea’s leader, kim jong un, signed a defence pact that requires their countries to provide immediate military assistance if either is attacked. matthew miller, a us state department spokesperson, said the provision of russian weapons to pyongyang “would destabilise the korean peninsula, of course, and potentially … depending on the type of weapons they provide … violate un security council resolutions that russia itself has supported”. the us secretary of state, antony blinken, and south korea’s foreign ministry said the treaty between russia and north korea posed a “serious threat” to peace and stability on the korean peninsula. blinken said the us would consider “various measures” in response to the pact, which elevated ties between the sanctions hit states to their highest level since the cold war. south korea summoned the russian ambassador to protest against the pact with north korea, as border tensions continued to rise. seoul has also said it would consider providing arms to ukraine, triggering an angry response from the russian ambassador, georgy zinoviev, who said attempts to blackmail and threaten russia were unacceptable, russia’s tass news agency reported. in his meeting with zinoviev on friday, the south korean vice foreign minister, kim hong kyun, condemned the treaty and called on russia to immediately halt military cooperation with north korea. friction over shipments of weapons to both sides in the war in ukraine has worsened this week, amid speculation that putin and kim discussed additional supplies of north korean missiles and ammunition for use by russian forces when they met in pyongyang on wednesday. during a state visit to vietnam on thursday, putin said reciprocal supplies of russian weapons to north korea would be an appropriate response to the west’s supply of weapons to ukrainian forces. “those who send these [missiles to ukraine] think that they are not fighting us, but i said, including in pyongyang, that we then reserve the right to supply weapons to other regions of the world, with regard to our agreements” with north korea, putin said. “i do not rule this out.” putin, who met kim for the second time in nine months, also warned south korea that it would be making a “big mistake” if it decided to supply arms to ukraine. “i hope it doesn’t happen,” he told reporters in hanoi. “if it happens, then we will be making relevant decisions that are unlikely to please the current leadership of south korea.” south korea, a growing arms exporter with a well equipped military backed by the us, has provided non lethal aid and other support to ukraine, and joined us led sanctions against moscow. but it has a longstanding policy of not supplying weapons to countries that are at war. on friday, chang ho jin, the national security adviser to the south korean president, yoon suk yeol, said seoul would reconsider its stance on providing arms to ukraine. the head of nato, jens stoltenberg, also voiced concern that russia could help north korea further its ballistic and nuclear missile programmes, which have made significant progress despite years of un security council sanctions. the kremlin spokesperson dmitry peskov said on friday that putin was ready for direct dialogue with the us on security issues but indicated that moscow would also want to discuss its war in ukraine. “dialogue [between moscow and washington] is highly needed, as the problems are piling up, and there are a lot of problems related to the global security architecture,” peskov said. the us has sought direct talks with russia to reduce the risk of a nuclear conflict, but us officials have said they do not believe putin is serious in his desire to negotiate an end to his invasion and that it is up to ukraine to decide when and how peace talks are held. us officials believe north korea wants to acquire fighter aircraft, surface to air missiles, armoured vehicles, materials and equipment to build for ballistic missile production, and other advanced technologies from moscow. the us and south korea say there is evidence that pyongyang has already provided significant numbers of ballistic missiles and artillery shells to russia. north korea has called the allegations “absurd”. exports of russian weapons to north korea would add to tensions on the korean peninsula and, according to some experts, could intensify a regional arms race that has drawn in south korea and japan   both us allies. relations between north and south korea have deteriorated sharply in recent weeks with the resumption of cold war era psychological warfare that included north korea using balloons to drop huge quantities of rubbish on the southern side of the countries’ border. seoul has responded by broadcasting anti north korean propaganda via loudspeakers. on friday, its troops fired warning shots after soldiers from north korea reportedly crossed the border for the third time this month. south korean activists, led by the north korean defector park sang hak, said they had sent 20 balloons carrying 300,000 propaganda leaflets, 5,000 usb sticks with south korean pop songs and tv dramas, and 3,000 us dollar bills from the south korean border town of paju on thursday night. in response, kim yo jong, the north korean leader’s powerful sister, called the activists “defector scum” and appeared to threaten retaliation. there is evidence that north korea is building walls at points along the border, days after several of its soldiers were reportedly killed or injured while clearing land in areas packed with mines. the bbc said high resolution satellite imagery of a 7km stretch of the border appeared to show at least three sections where barriers have been built. “my personal assessment is that this is the first time they’ve ever built a barrier in the sense of separating places from each other,” it quoted dr uk yang, a military and defence expert at the asan institute for policy studies in seoul, as saying. experts believe the intrusions could be related to the large number of troops north korea has deployed to fortify the border, possibly to prevent civilians and soldiers from defecting to the south. putin’s visit to vietnam, where he was given a 21 gun salute on thursday, has also caused unease in washington. in response, the us’s most senior diplomat for east asia, daniel kritenbrink, will visit vietnam on friday and saturday to underline washington’s commitment to working with hanoi to ensure a “free and open” indo pacific region.

photo: vladimir smirnov/pool/afp via getty images commentary by victor cha published june 17, 2024 the summit meeting between russian president vladimir putin and north korean leader kim jong un presents the greatest threat to u.s. national security since the korean war. this relationship, deep in history and reinvigorated by the war in ukraine, undermines the security of europe, asia, and the u.s. homeland. amid front burner issues like the wars in ukraine and gaza, the administration relegates this problem to the back burner at its own peril. what started out as a small arms sale by north korea to the wagner group in november 2022 has recently been acknowledged by secretary of state antony blinken as a “matter of deep concern” over the north’s provision of 5 million rounds of ammunition and scores of ballistic missiles. as the summit suggested, kim is likely to fuel russian war stocks indefinitely. of pressing concern, however, is what putin is giving in return. it is highly unlikely that kim would have feted putin so lavishly only for the promise of food and fuel. that may have been the gift when kim visited russia in september 2023, direly needed at the time as his country was just emerging from a three plus year covid lockdown. but director of national intelligence avril haines laid down a significant marker in march 2024 when she said moscow may be dropping long held nonproliferation norms in its dealings with north korea. kim wants advanced telemetry, nuclear submarine technology, military satellite wares, and advanced intercontinental ballistic missile (icbm) technology. putin needs kim’s weapons to make up for a monthly munitions shortfall of 50,000 rounds (even if russia is producing ammunition at full capacity) in his pursuit of victory in ukraine. a gaggle of russian scientists were in north korea prior to this month’s military satellite launch. kim has also been expressing satisfaction with his nuclear submarine plans, which is a very bad sign. this aspect of the relationship not only destabilizes security on the peninsula and in asia; it also heightens the direct threat posed by north korea to the homeland. icbms with advanced countermeasure technology, overhead reconnaissance capabilities, and nuclear submarines would allow kim to target the entirety of the united states with a nuclear force that washington would have difficulty taking out in a preemptive first strike. in fairness, the biden administration has called out the problem. it has declassified satellite imagery and other intelligence, providing glimpses of these ties. biden has advanced an unprecedented battery of new defense exercises with japan and south korea that enhances deterrence and makes the three allies stronger. nonetheless, kim is on pace to conduct more military provocations this election year than ever before (surpassing 2022’s record of 48 provocations). it is on the diplomatic front where fault can be found. biden is on autopilot when it comes to north korea, recycling talking points on denuclearization circa the obama administration. most experts think north korea has at least 50 nuclear bombs now. pyongyang has spurned over 20 private attempts by the administration to restart talks. it has even thrown letters back in the face of engagement oriented u.s. diplomats. the administration should shelve denuclearization and prioritize policies to disrupt the arms trade between russia and north korea. this is not an easy task. first, the routes used to transport north korean arms to russia run deep in the latter’s territory, making military interceptions of munitions cargo, whether by boat or rail, dangerously escalatory; biden does not need a third war on his watch. second, russia’s veto in march 2024 to reauthorize a un watchdog body on north korean proliferation is aimed at dismantling the entire un sanctions regime toward pyongyang. nonetheless, the toolkit is not completely bare. the united states should mobilize europeans at g7 and nato conferences this summer to apply economic and diplomatic pressure on pyongyang. while the united states does not have diplomatic relations with pyongyang, most european governments do, and north korea has traditionally seen europe as its gateway to the west. as a first step, actions like those taken at the g7 summit last week against russian and north korean financial assets should be expanded in the name of disrupting the weapons trade. president biden should make lemonade out of the lemon of the new russia north korea tie. south korea, japan, and australia are invitees at the nato summit in washington, d.c., in july 2024. the three allies should consider a collective defense declaration stating that a threat to one is a threat to all. such a statement would build on the existing 60 plus trilateral meetings completed since the camp david summit in august 2023 and would represent a major step forward in allied defense and deterrence. australia and the philippines could also be brought into the fold. biden should capitalize on beijing’s unhappiness with the closer ties between its traditional junior partner and putin. if putin is modernizing kim’s nuclear arsenal, that will only create a greater u.s. military presence in china’s neighborhood and potentially even a nuclear domino effect in the region, starting with south korea. china is still the economic lifeline for the north and it can join in sanctions against any companies supporting the weapons trade. finally, the united states should launch a major human rights and information penetration campaign. it should enlist europe in this effort given the death and human suffering of ukrainians caused by lethal north korean support of russia. north korea’s deploying of trash balloons to the south in the past weeks in retaliation for south korean loudspeakers blasting k pop music at the border and ngos dropping bibles into the north shows how sensitive the regime is to its people being exposed to the outside world. the kim regime is more afraid of bts than u.s. south korean military exercises. u.s. policy desperately needs to try something new and should leverage this fact. putin and kim may feel that they have a match made in heaven. the former is getting what he needs for the war while complicating biden’s security policies in asia. the latter, with russian sustenance, is able to wait out biden while advancing and modernizing their nuclear force. biden should take the offensive. while these recommended half measures will not solve the problem, they are better than the administration recycling standard talking points. dr. victor cha served as director for asian affairs on the national security council and u.s. deputy head of delegation for the six party talks. he is senior vice president for asia and korea chair at the center for strategic and international studies in washington, d.c., and distinguished university professor and professor of government at georgetown university. commentary is produced by the center for strategic and international studies (csis), a private, tax exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. csis does not take specific policy positions. accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2024 by the center for strategic and international studies. all rights reserved. center for strategic and international studies 1616 rhode island avenue, nw washington, dc 20036 tel: 202.887.0200 fax: 202.775.3199 see media page for more interview, contact, and citation details. ©2025 center for strategic & international studies. all rights reserved.

profile sections local tv featured more from nbc follow nbc news news alerts there are no new alerts at this time a key u.s. ally fired warning shots friday   live ones to repel north korean soldiers and a diplomatic volley to counter russian president vladimir putin, as tensions rise after his new mutual defense pact with kim jong un. south korea, which has so far only provided non lethal aid to ukraine, said it was considering arming kyiv in response to a newly forged alliance between moscow and pyongyang reminiscent of the cold war that has alarmed officials in the west. putin said that doing so would be a "very big mistake." “if this happens, then we will also make appropriate decisions that the current leadership of south korea would hardly like,” he said during his state visit to vietnam on thursday, which immediately followed the lavish pyongyang visit. “we reserve our right to supply weapons to other regions of the world,” he added. the russian president's saber rattling continued friday, when he said that russia will continue to develop its nuclear arsenal as a deterrent. when putin paid a rare visit to his north korean counterpart in pyongyang on wednesday, the two leaders signed a comprehensive strategic partnership that allows for mutual defense in case of an attack as well as military technology transfers that could aid putin’s war in ukraine and kim’s nuclear ambitions. that angered officials in seoul, with national security advisor chang ho jin saying thursday that “we plan to reconsider the issue of arms support to ukraine.” in response, putin drew an equivalence between the west's arming of ukraine and raised the prospect of him doing the same for north korea. “as for where these weapons will end up, to this we can also say: 'well, the westerners supply weapons to ukraine' and say 'we don’t even control anything here, and it doesn’t matter how they are used',” he said. he continued: “so we can put it in the similar way: 'we have supplied something to somebody and are not in control over anything after that'.” putin's comments mark the latest intervention by the kremlin into asian geopolitics and further escalate tensions between key u.s. allies south korea and japan, and an increasingly emboldened north korea. “it is incredibly concerning,” state department spokesperson matthew miller said in a news conference thursday. “it would destabilize the korean peninsula,” he said. seoul summoned the russian ambassador georgy zinoviev on friday, with south korea's foreign ministry issuing a statement demanding that “russia immediately stop military cooperation with north korea.” the ministry added that the kremlin’s support threatens its security and violates u.n. security council resolutions. “south korea will respond resolutely to threats against south korea’s national security,” the statement said. russia's foreign ministry responded that “attempts at threats and blackmail against russia are unacceptable,” and that the agreement was bilateral and not aimed at third countries. the u.s. and south korea say north korea has already provided russia with millions of rounds of ammunition and dozens of ballistic missiles for use in ukraine. both moscow and pyongyang deny exporting arms, which would violate sanctions. commenting on the prospect of south korea arming ukraine, miller said “that is a decision for every country to make in terms of whether they are going to supply weapons to ukraine.” it's against this diplomatic backdrop that north korean soldiers crossed the border for the third time this month friday “while working inside the demarcation zone,” according to seoul’s joint chiefs of staff.the soldiers returned to the north korean side after south korean soldiers fired warning shots and blared warning messages, they added. the koreas technically remain at war since the korean war ended in 1953 with an armistice instead of a peace treaty. while seoul has described the crossings as unintentional, commercial satellite imagery obtained by nbc news showed a new wall like barrier being erected in the past months along portions of the north korean side of the demarcation zone (dmz), which is a 2.5 miles thick buffer zone, half on each side of the border line. "north koreans are building wall sections, not a continuous wall across the entire dmz," leif eric easley, a professor at ewha university in seoul, told nbc news.border tensions have been escalating for a while, with south korea resuming aerial surveillance near the boundary and declaring null parts of the 2018 military accords. officials said in november that both decisions were in retaliation to a north korean satellite launch. following that exchange, kim suspended the accords altogether, restoring guard posts along and sending trash filled balloons over the border. easley said the barrier's construction could violate the armistice agreement, which states that only “persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief” or those authorized by the u.n.’s commission on the armistice are allowed enter the area. "what they are building is likely directed as much at keeping their countrymen in as it is at keeping the south koreans out," said easley. mithil aggarwal is a hong kong based reporter/producer for nbc news. peter guo is a fellow on nbc’s asia desk, based in hong kong. © 2025 nbcuniversal media, llc

"in my home there are few publications that we actually get hard copies of, but [arms control today] is one and it's the only one my husband and i fight over who gets to read it first." july/august 2024by kelsey davenport russian president vladimir putin and north korean leader kim jong un signed a mutual defense treaty and committed to strengthening military ties during a june summit in pyongyang. the treaty comes as russia continues to court north korean support for its war in ukraine and as tensions between north korea and south korea escalate. according to article 4 of the treaty that kim and putin signed on june 19, north korea and russia “shall immediately provide military and other assistance” to the other party if it “falls into a state of war due to armed invasion from an individual or multiple states.” the treaty stipulates that the assistance must be in accordance with article 51 of the un charter, which preserves the right to “individual or collective self defense” in response to an armed attack against a un member. putin told reporters after the summit that the treaty represents a “breakthrough” in russia’s relationship with north korea and a “new level” of strategic partnership between the two countries. putin last visited north korea 24 years ago, although he did meet with kim in september 2023 near vladivostok. (see act, october 2023.) kim described the treaty as “a most powerful agreement” that is “peaceful and defensive in nature.” he said it will be a “driving force” toward a “new multipolar world.” in a june 23 joint statement, japan, south korea, and the united states condemned the “deepening military cooperation” between north korea and russia, noting in particular pyongyang’s provision of arms to moscow that “prolong[s] the suffering of the ukrainian people.” the three states said the partnership between north korea and russia is “of grave concern to anyone with an interest in maintaining peace and stability” on the korean peninsula. the statement said that japan, south korea, and the united states will “further strengthen diplomatic and security cooperation” to counter the threat from north korea and prevent escalation. in a june 25 televised speech marking the 74th anniversary of the outbreak of the korean war, south korean president yoon suk yeol said that the treaty is in direct violation of un security council resolutions on north korea. south korea “must stand up to north korea’s provocations and threats overwhelmingly and decisively,” he said. in addition to the provision of military assistance in the event of attack, the treaty suggests that russia and north korea may engage in military cooperation. according to article 8, the parties “shall establish mechanisms” to “strengthen defense capabilities to prevent war.” in a june 19 video statement released by the kremlin, putin said russia does not rule out the possibility of military cooperation with north korea. kim said that north korea would continue to support russia’s “special military operation” in ukraine. chang ho jin, the south korean national security adviser, responded by saying that seoul will reconsider selling arms to ukraine. currently, south korea is providing humanitarian support, but has not offered any weaponry to ukraine due to a policy of not exporting arms to states involved in conflict. putin warned south korea to refrain from providing military assistance to ukraine, saying seoul would be making a “very big mistake” if it transfers arms. he said russia’s partnership with north korea does not pose a threat to south korea. because south korea “does not plan aggression against” north korea, there is “no need to be afraid” of defense cooperation between moscow and pyongyang, putin told reporters during a june 20 press conference in vietnam. the treaty also opens the door for russian assistance to north korea’s nuclear energy and space programs. article 10 states that north korea and russia will “develop exchanges and cooperation” in certain scientific fields, including space and “peaceful nuclear energy.” russia is prohibited from providing assistance to north korea’s nuclear and space programs under the terms of un security council sanctions, but moscow has already violated the sanctions by accepting armaments from pyongyang. putin said russia will continue its opposition to sanctions imposed on north korea, which he described as “illegal,” and suggested the two countries will work to develop payment systems that are “not controlled by the west.” during a june 12 event at the stimson center, u.s. deputy secretary of state kurt campbell said that washington will be “watching carefully” to see what assistance russia provides to north korea. kim’s visit to russia in september 2023 suggested that north korea is interested in assistance in developing its space program. despite announcing ambitious plans to deploy satellites, north korea has struggled with its launch vehicles. on may 27, north korea attempted to put a satellite in orbit using a new space launch vehicle, but it exploded midflight. north korea’s national aerospace technology administration said that the explosion likely was caused by a defect in the first stage of a new type of rocket motor that the country is developing. kim said that the failure will not stop north korea’s space ambitions and reiterated that pyongyang needs satellite capabilities due to south korean and u.s. threats. the failed launch took place shortly after leaders from china, japan, and south korea, met in seoul. yoon, japanese prime minister fumio kishida, and chinese premier li qiang released a joint statement during the may 27 summit that included a reference to “denuclearization of the korean peninsula.” in a rare criticism of china, the north korean state run korean central news agency (kcna) denounced the trilateral statement, saying that denuclearization “means a power vacuum and hastened war.” kcna said north korea viewed the reference to denuclearization as “a blatant challenge” to the country’s sovereignty. south korean foreign ministry spokesperson lim soo suk defended the reference to denuclearization, saying that un security council resolutions call for north korea’s “complete abandonment of nuclear weapons.” north korea claimed to have tested a missile armed with multiple warheads on june 26, but south korea called the launch a failure. kcna reported on june 27 that the test involved three mobile warheads and a decoy separating from a missile. the warheads were guided to three different targets, kcna said, adding that north korea will now begin full scale testing of the capability. japan and south korea said the missile exploded and described the test as a failure. the test took place after south korea conducted a live fire exercise near the inter korean maritime border on june 25. south korea was prohibited from conducting live fire exercises along the border under a 2018 joint military agreement with north korea, but seoul suspended its participation in that agreement on june 4 after pyongyang sent more than 1,000 balloons filled with trash into south korea. north korea withdrew from the agreement in 2023. the arms control association depends on the generous contributions of individuals who share our goal of promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. aca is a nonpartisan, nonprofit membership organization, and your financial support makes a difference. your membership comes with a 12 month subscription to arms control today. 1200 18th street nw, suite 1175 washington, dc 20036 tel: (202) 463 8270 | fax: (202) 463 8273

euractiv + for individuals euractiv pro for corporations looking to access paid articles across multiple policy topics? interested in policy insights for eu professional organisations? vladimir putin said thursday (19 june) he does not rule out russia sending arms to isolated north korea in what washington called an “incredibly concerning” statement that threatens instability on the divided korean peninsula. news service produced externally by an organization we trust to adhere to journalistic standards. a photo released by the official north korean central news agency (kcna) on 20 june 2024, shows russian president vladimir putin driving north korean leader kim jong un in an aurus limousine in pyongyang, north korea 19 june 2024. the russian president made a state visit to north korea on 18 19 june at the invitation of north korean leader. [handout photo/epa/efe] languages: bulgarian print email reddit facebook linkedin whatsapp telegram vladimir putin said thursday (20 june) he does not rule out russia sending arms to isolated north korea in what washington called an "incredibly concerning" statement that threatens instability on the divided korean peninsula. on a trip to vietnam following a state visit to pyongyang where russia and north korea signed a mutual defence pact, putin also warned south korea not to arm ukraine. the russian president said prospects of moscow providing weapons to north korea are repercussions for the west arming kyiv, which is battling against a russian invasion now in its third year. "those who send these (missiles to ukraine), think that they are not fighting us, but i said, including in pyongyang, that we then reserve the right to supply weapons to other regions of the world, with regard to our agreements with the dprk," putin said, using the acronym of north korea's official name. "i do not rule this one out." south korea on thursday called russia's treaty with the north a "grave concern", with a senior official saying seoul would "reconsider" its policy of not sending arms directly to ukraine. putin brushed off the response, saying "south korea has nothing to worry about." but he warned seoul not to supply weapons to kyiv, saying: "this would be a very big mistake." the united states expressed deep unease over putin's threat to send weapons to pyongyang, warning such action could destabilize the korean peninsula. "it is incredibly concerning," state department spokesman matthew miller told reporters. "it would destabilize the korean peninsula, potentially, depending on the type of weapons, and might violate un security council resolutions that russia itself has supported." russia is discussing with its closest partners the issue of deploying long range weapons, tass state news agency 19 june, citing russia’s deputy foreign minister sergei ryabkov. russia is discussing with its closest partners the issue of deploying long range weapons, tass state news agency reported on wednesday (19 june), citing russia's deputy foreign minister sergei ryabkov. the russian leader did not receive as clear a declaration of support in hanoi as he did in pyongyang, where he got a rapturous reception. but vietnamese president to lam indicated a desire to boost defence cooperation. russia has been vietnam's main arms supplier for decades, but orders have dropped off in recent years as international sanctions related to the ukraine conflict have intensified. the two sides said in a joint statement that their defence and security cooperation was "not directed against any third country" and contributed to "peace, stability and sustainable development" in the region. putin told reporters the talks were constructive and that both sides had "identical or very close" positions on key international issues. putin later held talks with nguyen phu trong, the powerful general secretary of the ruling communist party, and laid a wreath at the memorial to independence leader ho chi minh. eu member states on thursday (20 june) approved a 14th package of sanctions against russia over its war in ukraine, which for the first time included a ban on re exports of russian liquefied natural gas (lng) in the eu. "this package … the g7 meanwhile agreed to use profits from frozen russian assets to provide a new $50 billion loan to kyiv. making his first visit to isolated north korea in 24 years on wednesday, putin signed a strategic treaty with leader kim jong un that included a commitment to come to each other's aid if attacked. north korea and russia agreed to provide immediate military assistance if either faced armed aggression, under a pact their leaders signed during russian president vladimir putin's first visit in 24 years. washington and its allies accuse north korea of supplying ammunition and missiles to russia for its war, and the new treaty has fuelled fears of more deliveries. the two countries have been allies since north korea's founding after world war ii and have drawn even closer since russia's invasion of ukraine in 2022 isolated putin on the global stage. kim vowed his "full support and solidarity" over the ukraine war, which has also triggered rafts of united nations sanctions on moscow. mykhailo podolyak, a senior aide to ukraine's president volodymyr zelenskyy, said putin's trip was a tour of "yesterday's satellites of the ussr" in search of "military and technical aid and cannon fodder". his reception was reserved in vietnam, a major global manufacturing hub that has carefully hedged its foreign policy position for years, seeking to be friends with all but beholden to none. it has particularly sought to avoid picking sides in the growing us china rivalry as both superpowers look to boost their influence in southeast asia. us president joe biden visited hanoi in september to promote ties as his administration seeks to build up vietnam as an alternative supplier of key high tech components to reduce american dependence on china. chinese president xi jinping followed suit, making his own state visit barely three months later. languages: bulgarian print email reddit facebook linkedin whatsapp telegram updated: 01 10 2024 ai summit opens as eu fears irrelevance in face of us, china fake climate news thriving as politics and ai turbocharge disinformation crisis french court suspects x algorithm bias who’s afraid of ‘deregulation’? commission to grant €100m package to farmers affected by disasters how the uk could help bypass eu gas tariffs us tariffs could cost germany years of growth berlin court rules against x on data access breakthrough for the far right in french farmers election controversial eu clampdown on wood stoves delayed how kallas plans to shake up foreign policy talks 15/12/2024 7 min. read south korea’s acting president moves to reassure allies after impeachment 15/12/2024 4 min. read russia not leaving its two bases in syria, sources say 15/12/2024 4 min. read

"in my home there are few publications that we actually get hard copies of, but [arms control today] is one and it's the only one my husband and i fight over who gets to read it first." april 2024by xiaodon liang the u.s. intelligence community remains concerned that russian president vladimir putin could resort to the use of nuclear weapons in ukraine in response to russia’s failure to achieve decisive battlefield successes, director of national intelligence avril haines told the senate select committee on intelligence on march 11. after putin made several veiled nuclear threats in the spring and fall of 2022, u.s. intelligence officials made public an assessment that senior russian officials had discussed the use of tactical nuclear weapons in ukraine that year. (see act, december 2022.) haines, presenting the 2024 edition of the worldwide threat assessment report, also said that the intelligence community worries that russia will put at risk long standing norms against the use of “asymmetric or strategically destabilizing weapons, including in space and the cyber domain.” in february, u.s. officials accused russia of developing a new anti satellite (asat) weapons system that would violate the outer space treaty. (see act, march 2024.) the accusation of a treaty violation strongly implies that the new asat system would carry a nuclear warhead in orbit. the report said that russian capabilities in space would remain competitive with those of the united states despite the imposition of sanctions on the russian space industry in response to the invasion of ukraine. in contrast, last year’s report speculated that sanctions, in concert with resource constraints and sectoral difficulties, might imperil russia’s long term space goals. the intelligence community assesses that north korea, having supplied russia beginning last year with conventional arms and munitions to bolster the war effort in ukraine (see act, november 2023), is probably seeking to leverage this assistance to secure acceptance as a nuclear power. speaking to this concern, haines said that russia’s reliance on its few allies may lead to weakening of “long held nonproliferation norms.” north korea’s shipment of military goods to russia constitutes a violation of un security council sanctions prohibiting exports of arms from north korea. although the threat assessment did not include new information on chinese strategic systems, it did eliminate a finding present in last year’s report that china was not interested in agreements that could restrict its strategic forces. this comes after a november summit between u.s. president joe biden and chinese president xi jinping, two subsequent military to military meetings over the winter, and a january meeting in bangkok between u.s. national security advisor jake sullivan and chinese foreign minister wang yi. (see act, march 2024.) in its assessment of iran’s nuclear program, the report said the intelligence community found that the country is not currently performing key weapons related activities. in a shift from last year’s threat assessment, the report placed special emphasis on chemical and biological threats. it highlighted the growing risk of states using chemical weapons against their own general population and individual critics. in addition to outlining the threat posed by actors employing dual use biotechnologies to design new pathogens and toxins, the report noted the success that china and russia have had in undermining public trust in countermeasures. the arms control association depends on the generous contributions of individuals who share our goal of promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. aca is a nonpartisan, nonprofit membership organization, and your financial support makes a difference. your membership comes with a 12 month subscription to arms control today. 1200 18th street nw, suite 1175 washington, dc 20036 tel: (202) 463 8270 | fax: (202) 463 8273

published daily by the lowy institute the renewed marriage of convenience between russia and north korea has global implications. in pyongyang last month russian president vladimir putin announced a new strategic treaty with north korean leader kim jong un. this was putin’s first visit to pyongyang in 24 years, in contrast to the more regular pattern of visits to russia by the three kim dynasty leaders   almost always by armoured train. kim’s grandfather founded the democratic people’s republic of korea (dprk) in 1948 with significant military and political support from the soviet union. while not deferential, the kims have trodden carefully with their benefactors ever since. fast forward to 2024. photos of the two smiling leaders underlined a historic partnership   but also pointed to their differences in age, culture, temperament, and the size, wealth and capabilities of their respective nations. there is speculation that putin is seeking to bolster russia's arms cache as the war in ukraine grinds on. russian and dprk media proclaimed the 19 june treaty on comprehensive strategic partnership would afford “mutual assistance in case of aggression against one of the parties”. putin affirmed that russia “does not rule out military technical cooperation” with the dprk, and promised cooperation on space exploration, food supply, and nuclear energy. three months earlier, russia had ceased adherence to un sanctions against north korea’s nuclear program. there is speculation that putin is seeking to bolster russia's arms cache as the war in ukraine grinds on. north korea has developed weapons manufacturing and exports   missiles and ammunition suitable for use by russian forces   built on earlier soviet assistance, an on going source of regime income. current assessments are that 4.8 million artillery shells and some 24 ballistic missiles have been shipped across the far northern eurasian continent to russia. kim, who exports north korean labourers to construction zones around the world to earn remittances, also appears willing to provide cannon fodder dprk soldiers to russia’s ukraine war front. in exchange, russia may be willing to bolster north korea’s nuclear weapons program with expertise, technology and materials. unsurprisingly, this possibility has alarmed seoul and triggered a joint repudiation by south korea, japan and the united states, released within days of putin’s pyongyang visit. the south korean president’s office also announced a review of an earlier decision not to provide military aid to ukraine. so, is putin courting north korea from a position of power, perhaps aiming to invigorate an alliance network from a bygone era? or is this an act of desperation? no doubt the north korean ammunition is welcome, but putin appears far from desperate. north korea remains one of a small number of client states for russia, one with benefits to offer. kim is clearly responding to putin from a position of economic weakness, but north korea has strategic cards to play. kim’s regime has two deterrents against us retaliation: proximity to seoul, a glittering metropolis just 60 kilometres from the dprk border, and nuclear weapons capable of being mounted on long range missiles. in addition, both russia and north korea boast advanced cyber capabilities that have for two decades enabled brazen attacks on western interests. with the strategic landscape so unpredictable, the putin kim pact presents real threats to western interests across europe and the indo pacific. but what is the potential for those threats to backfire? seoul’s about face on supplying weapons to ukraine, and the resounding repudiation of the russia dprk pact by south korea, japan and the united states   difficult to secure given historic seoul tokyo grievances   are significant. as is the fact that finland and sweden have overturned their longstanding adherence to military neutrality to join nato after russia’s invasion of ukraine. we should assume north korea’s weapons programs are developing and effective. could putin’s and kim’s respective nuclear strike threats be exposed as empty? there are 28,000 us troops on the korean peninsula, in addition to an impressive south korean military. north korean forces, while numerous, are comparatively weak. dprk satellite and missile test failures periodically suggest the bellicosity from pyongyang is unwarranted. its nuclear weapons deterrent remains crucial to its survival. kim, and his father before him, have undoubtedly maximised the potential impact of their meagre assets over the decades. we should assume north korea’s weapons programs are developing and effective. would putin risk stretching his forces by intentionally triggering a war in eastern asia? while russia’s exercise vostok 2022 was joined by 13 countries including china, such displays do not portend war. russia’s formal alliances and military partnerships are thin. and russia’s strategic priority is surely its western flank. and how much of its top shelf technology would russia be willing to share with north korea? creating alliances and integrating forces takes decades of effort, even among the most trusting of partners. trust and friendship would not seem a natural state for autocrats. identifying china’s calculation in this altered landscape is critical. since 1948, pyongyang has held its giant neighbour   with which it enjoys its only other formal mutual defence pact   at a wary distance. ultimately, china alone will have the power and sway to impact meaningfully   for better or worse   on the renewed marriage of convenience between russia and north korea. yes, we should be worried by the new russia north korea pact. these are two weakened, nuclear weapons capable despotic powers. and china holds important trump cards with both. if we cannot read the calculus being worked through in beijing, our concern should increase. stay informed with the latest commentary and analysis on international events from experts at the lowy institute and around the world. the interpreter features in depth analysis & expert commentary on the latest international events, published daily by the lowy institute. © copyright 2025 lowy institute

each one of these states threatens u.s. interests. yet they are far from a coherent bloc and largely pose threats independent of one another. the american statecraft program develops and advances ideas for a more disciplined u.s. foreign policy aligned with american values and cognizant of the limits of american power in a more competitive world. the structure of world politics is evolving in ways that challenge american global power more than at any time since the end of the cold war. the united states now faces risks to its interests across east asia, europe, and the middle east. to make matters worse, china, russia, iran, and north korea are increasing their support for one another. historical precedents from the 1930s and the early cold war suggest that even deeper cooperation among them is possible and that a more coherent bloc determined to blunt and roll back u.s. power worldwide might develop.1 political leaders as varied as former house of representatives majority leader steny hoyer,2 senator jeanne shaheen,3 and senate minority leader mitch mcconnell4 have thus warned of a powerful new anti u.s. axis on the rise. how likely is this scenario? this paper examines the state of cooperation between china, russia, iran, and north korea, and identifies paths that could lead to their closer cooperation and paths that would not. there is no question that each one of these states threatens u.s. interests. their current cooperation deserves the attention of u.s. policymakers and intelligence analysts especially when it comes to their support to russia in its war on ukraine and the potential proliferation of military technology. nevertheless, these states still pose threats largely independent of one another. they are far from a coherent bloc against which the united states could or should orient an effective strategy. they share nothing like the military ties, diplomatic structure, and economic cooperation that existed among the warsaw pact countries during the cold war, for example. they are very far from enjoying the level of political, economic, diplomatic, and technological cooperation that exists between the united states and its allies and partners. meaningful cooperation between these four states, moreover, has so far been largely restricted to support for russia’s war effort. u.s. policymakers therefore need to monitor the signs of deepening cooperation between them,5 but they should also be careful not to overstate the group’s coherence and thereby encourage them to solidify into a real bloc. to the contrary, the aim of u.s. policy should be to divide them. just as the united states managed to split china and the soviet union during the cold war, and thus destroy the myth of “monolithic communism,” today it should aim to split this group and thereby defuse the threat that it could pose. improving the united states’ relationship with china offers the best hope at doing so. this will be difficult, but china is not only the central player in this group of u.s. adversaries, it is also the player that makes the group strategically relevant in the first place. without china, the importance of the other three would not be all that different from a decade ago. russia would be creating problems in europe, north korea carrying out provocations in east asia, and iran challenging u.s. and israeli power in the middle east. the depth and importance of the group’s future cooperation will therefore turn on beijing’s willingness to lead it. the united states needs to work to reduce the incentives that china has to align itself closely with the other three states. this paper first assesses the depth of cooperation between each pairing among these four states, focusing on their actions so far and on potential scenarios. it then analyzes the factors driving them together and that might lead them to deeper cooperation, arguing that a perceived threat from the west, rather than ideology or economic ties, is the key factor. the next two sections assess the current and future threats that cooperation between these states poses to the united states. a concluding section draws policy implications. although china, russia, iran, and north korea are now often viewed as an aligned group, cooperation among them has been almost entirely bilateral so far. this section explains the state of cooperation between each pair, in increasing order of importance. by far the most significant instances of their cooperation have been in the context of russia’s war on ukraine. whether this cooperation will survive the war is uncertain. the threats from deeper future cooperation between these pairs are greater, but future cooperation is not foreordained and should not be extrapolated from straight line projections based on very recent trends. of the six pairs, the weakest is that of iran and north korea. fear of the united states unites these two rogue powers, but they have little to offer each other strategically. they are two of the most diplomatically isolated states in the world, are heavily sanctioned, and are separated by 4,000 miles.6 iran and north korea have shared defense technology, especially for ballistic missiles. their missiles and military submarines have similarities that suggest some technology sharing. for example, iran’s shahab 3 medium range ballistic missile resembles north korea’s hawasong 14 missile. satellite imagery of missile silos in north korea also suggests iranian technical expertise went into their design.7 iranian and north korean weapon manufacturers have also collaborated on some joint projects.8 north korea meanwhile sells some inexpensive weapons to iran’s proxies in the middle east. for example, hamas used north korean grenade launchers in its attack on israel in october 2023. north korea has sought to provide the houthis with scud c and burkan 1 missiles.9 beyond these limited weapons sales, however, neither country is in a position to assist the other. both are cash strapped and economically weak.10 iran looks to china for economic succor and likely hopes that china’s deteriorating relationship with the united states and its need for assured access to hydrocarbons will open a new era in cooperation and alleviate the pressure that sanctions have put it under. beijing can help tehran in this regard, but only so much. china is iran’s largest trade partner and the largest market for its oil exports.11 iran wants expanded access to china’s market and hopes for chinese investment. the two countries signed a strategic partnership plan in 2021 that identified $400 billion of potential chinese investments in the iranian economy over the following 25 years a potential lifeline in the face of international sanctions on iran. in return, china will continue to receive a supply of heavily discounted iranian oil, which increased from 818,000 barrels a day in 2021 to a million in 2023.12 the 2021 agreement also includes the development of two joint ports in iran, and thereby the security of china’s access to middle east energy resources.13 structural factors will limit further cooperation, however. china is looking to iran as part of a broader strategy of building up influence across the middle east so that it can secure market access and a stable, diversified supply of energy, all while weakening america’s influence and boosting its prestige as a global power. for china, economic relations with iran are less important than those with the gulf states that are iran’s adversaries. for example, in 2022, china’s trade with the united arab emirates and saudi arabia totaled $99 billion and $87 billion, respectively,14 whereas its trade with iran was $16 billion.15 iran accounted for only 10 percent of china’s total oil imports in 2023, a smaller portion than its adversaries in the gulf.16 beijing will avoid tilting too deeply in tehran’s direction in order to ensure this balance in its energy supplies. the need to balance between iran and the gulf states probably is one reason why deeper economic cooperation between beijing and tehran has been slow to materialize. since finalizing their cooperation agreement in 2021, iran has only seen $185 million from china.17 slower than expected growth of economic ties has reportedly created frustration within iran’s public, business sector, and government.18 iran even temporarily withheld oil from china after the latter refused to pay higher prices at the end of 2023.19 security ties are meanwhile very limited. the 2021 strategic partnership plan lays out plans for more joint military exercises and weapon systems development, and it is rumored that china has assisted iran’s ballistic missile program by providing relevant satellite technology.20 but so far the agreement’s military fruits involve only a few joint drills that the u.s. intelligence community has judged to be of little operational value.21 iran has reportedly discussed buying chinese weapons, but they have purchased no new weapons since the end of the embargo on military sales to iran in 2020 or the signing of the partnership plan.22 iran’s regional proxies have used drones made in china, but even this proliferation seems to be largely commercial in nature rather than a sign of a deeper strategic relationship. after all, iran’s nemesis, saudi arabia, also uses these drones.23 the two regimes have also collaborated on domestic repression techniques, as when china provided iran with software to shut down the country’s internet during the 2009 2010 green movement.24 such cooperation is undesirable but not a direct threat to u.s. security. to date, china does not appear to want iran to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. it supported the 2015 iran nuclear agreement and continues to call for all parties to return to it.25 beijing also supports iran’s demand that the united states lift the sanctions that the trump administration reimposed in 2018 before any renewal of the agreement, but some reports indicate it has pressured tehran in private to return to the negotiating table no matter what.26 in the event of intensified u.s. pressure on iran, china might increase its support for it, especially if this pressure was aimed at bringing down the regime. this would blunt the impact of u.s. sanctions, as discussed below. no other bilateral relationship considered here is as lopsided as china and north korea’s in terms of the relative power of the two countries. china is far more powerful. the relationship also has more history than the others. it spans nearly three quarters of a century, the two countries have a long standing formal defense commitment, and they share a common revolutionary marxist leninist ideology (although they practice it very differently). china has the upper hand in the relationship and north korea’s supreme leader, kim jong un, recognizes that losing chinese support would constitute an existential threat to his regime. hence, both countries uphold an uneasy status quo in a relationship that aims to prevent damage rather than take strategic action on the world stage. china has a vested interest in propping up north korea, no matter how difficult a partner it is. china would face a massive refugee crisis were the north korean state to fall apart, not to mention the likely expansion of u.s. ally south korea across the whole peninsula. the chinese communist party’s legitimacy partly stems from its successful support of the north during the korean war, and its leaders may also fear that a collapse would damage this legitimacy.27 pyongyang meanwhile depends almost entirely on beijing politically and economically. china’s $2.3 billion trade with north korea accounted for nearly all the latter’s trade in 2023.28 beijing also allows north korea to siphon income from north korean laborers sent to work in china despite a u.n. security council resolution banning the practice.29 a few years ago, pyongyang was estimated to receive $500 million annually this way, which it spends on its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.30 china also illicitly facilitates the export of millions of barrels of oil to north korea through ship to ship transfers.31 while china’s support lessens the economic pressure that international sanctions put on pyongyang, china’s security commitment is essential for it.32 beijing also defends north korea in international forums, vetoing resolutions that would tighten sanctions, and sometimes introducing measures to loosen them.33 there are limits, however, to cooperation in this dyad. for example, china has to date refused to provide north korea with nuclear weapons technology and expertise, and it has supported some sanctions targeting pyongyang’s nuclear program.34 some analysts even concluded that north korea carried out its ballistic missile test close to japan in 2022 to demonstrate that it had the long range capacity to strike areas of value to beijing.35 mostly, china must manage the risk of disaster in north korea. the brittleness of the regime poses the greatest challenge.36 reunification of the peninsula under south korea or a government allied with the united states and its allies would be a strategic blow to china’s interests. beijing thus has a vested interest in ensuring that pyongyang can deter aggression from the south.37 china also worries that an unstable nuclear north korea could escalate tensions in ways that cause the united states to strengthen its military posture in the region or that encourage japan and south korea to develop their own nuclear weapons neither of which would be in beijing’s interest.38 china might still increase its conventional military or economic support for north korea under certain conditions; for example, if it concluded that south korea was considering an attack on the north, or if japan, south korea, or another u.s. ally in the region developed nuclear weapons. during a taiwan crisis, beijing might seek to bolster north korea’s military capacity to complicate the u.s. military response. otherwise, the relationship will remain characterized by north korea’s dependency and china’s fear of its collapse and is unlikely to change fundamentally for the foreseeable future. the war in ukraine and shared antipathy toward the united states has turned the once chilly relationship between north korea and russia toward pragmatic and growing cooperation. pyongyang has supplied moscow with much needed munitions in exchange for cash, weapons manufacturing supplies, the possibility of advanced military technology, and, in 2024, a rekindled security agreement. russia’s opening to north korea is one of the more dramatic aspects of moscow’s effort to reorient russian political, economic, and military structures away from the west. nevertheless, the main driver of the relationship has been the war in ukraine. whether russia’s relationship with north korea will continue to deepen once the war ends and russia’s need for assistance wanes is far from certain. since september 2023, north korea has reportedly sent russia as many as five million artillery shells.39 this is a significant number in light of estimates that russia only has the capacity to make 2 3 million shells a year.40 russia has used north korean kn 23/24 ballistic missiles in ukraine, although the failure rate for these missiles is reportedly quite high.41 these supplies make it easier for russia to prosecute its war on ukraine, in part by allowing it to hold more of its advanced weapons in reserve for a scenario in which nato gets directly involved.42 that said, the weapons from north korea are not decisive, especially now that russia’s military industrial base has reconfigured itself to meet most of its current needs.43 russia has also helped north korea circumvent economic sanctions through ship to ship transfers of oil and by welcoming illicit north korean immigrant laborers whose earnings help fund the kim regime.44 but the overall economic relationship is minuscule by some estimates it amounted to only $48 million in 2019 before north korea closed its borders during the covid 19 pandemic.45 the two countries signed three joint infrastructure projects before the pandemic, but construction has yet to begin on any of these.46 russia provides some political support to north korea in international forums. for example, it has argued in the un security council against certain provisions of sanctions against the country, including those capping its oil imports and targeting its nuclear industry.47 in march 2024, russia vetoed a un resolution renewing the mandate of the un panel of experts (poe), which monitors the un sanctions regime on north korea.48 north korea and russia signed a treaty for comprehensive strategic partnership in june 2024.49 the treaty states that if “either side faces an armed invasion and is in a state of war, the other side will immediately use all available means to provide military and other assistance in accordance with article 51 of the un charter and the laws of each country.”50 this has a foreboding sound to it, but does not necessarily mean security cooperation between north korea and russia will accelerate or that either side would actually do much to assist the other in wartime. “military and other assistance” is a vague term, and russia likely intentionally kept it so to ensure some flexibility in the event that north korea gets itself into a war and invokes the treaty.51 putin has not described the partnership as a formal alliance, whereas kim quickly touted his new “ally” to the world.52 in the near term, it is also unclear why russia would, or even if it could, divert meaningful resources from its war in ukraine to support north korea. finally, the agreement could get russia into trouble with china, which may fear losing leverage over pyongyang. there is nevertheless a possibility of eventual deeper defense cooperation that could be dangerous for u.s. interests. putin’s visit to north korea in june 2024 indicated intent to deepen the relationship, and it seems very likely that north korea will continue producing artillery shells and missiles for russia for as long as the latter needs them for the war. russia will probably provide north korea with some conventional military technology in return. providing technology to help pyongyang develop more advanced aircraft or further its development of intercontinental ballistic missiles would be especially problematic for the united states. the chances of russia doing so will increase the longer the war goes on or if it faces reverses in ukraine, which would make north korean arms production more important and the possibility that pyongyang might extract more such technology more likely.53 in this scenario, russia might seek to enhance pyongyang’s military manufacturing capacity, in the same way that the united states and its allies have sought to strengthen their defense industrial base. north korea would welcome the chance to become a global weapons supplier and has a history of proliferating weapons throughout illicit networks across multiple continents.54 finally, as the drive to thwart the west increasingly animates its foreign policy, russia could take a more benign view of north korea’s nuclear program than in the past. the war in ukraine, coupled with the reality of north korea’s nuclear weapons arsenal, could cause moscow to reconsider its historical position. russia may in fact have already provided north korea with militarily relevant satellite technology. during his june 2024 trip to north korea, putin threatened to proliferate military technology to the country, comparing such support to western support to ukraine.55 this would have very negative consequences for the security of the united states and its allies. here again, however, russia’s threat is directly related to the war in ukraine, and it seems unlikely that the kremlin would go through with it if the war were to end. the war in ukraine has opened the door to cooperation between iran and russia in some important areas, most of which benefits the latter’s war effort. there is a foundation for future security cooperation, but the two countries still face many barriers to developing a truly strategic partnership. iran and russia have often been on opposite sides of disputes for example, in the south caucasus and the caspian sea but relations began to improve in 2015 when moscow lent military support to syria’s beleaguered president bashar al assad, who is iran’s ally. moscow and tehran coordinated some of their military efforts and conducted joint operations, which helped the assad regime fight its way back from the brink of overthrow.56 in 2015, the general staffs of iran and russia concluded an agreement on logistics.57 this cooperation strengthened ties between the countries and appears to have provided a foundation for coordination after russia invaded ukraine in 2022. as with north korea, russia’s invasion of ukraine opened the door to new cooperation with iran. the most high profile has been tehran’s support to moscow’s war effort with the sale of thousands of its mohajer and, especially, shahed drones.58 russia has used these to cripple ukraine’s infrastructure and to saturate its missile defense systems with incoming targets.59 using these drones has also allowed russia to maintain higher levels of missile stocks.60 iran has also helped russia fill the gap in its munitions stockpiles, and in 2024 provided it with hundreds of ballistic missiles.61 however, russia is now producing drones itself in a facility in tatarstan, raising the question of how much it will rely on iran for future supplies.62 in 2023, russia sold iran eavesdropping devices, advanced photography devices, and lie detectors.63 they have also collaborated on cyber issues through a 2021 agreement that is primarily focused on sharing intelligence about u.s. cyber operations and bolstering defensive capabilities.64 they have not shared offensive cyber capabilities, in part because each one fears the other may become a foe and turn these capabilities against it.65 russia has reportedly promised to eventually provide iran with su 35 fighter jets and advanced air defense systems.66 some russian technology has already made its way to iran, including the yak 130 aircraft used to train su 35 pilots, but the scale of this is unclear.67 an influx of russian technology would bolster iran’s military against the gulf states, but it would probably be slow in training pilots and developing the maintenance and other infrastructure necessary to operate these aircraft if russia did not also provide these capabilities.68 the most important technology that iran could acquire from russia is nuclear, but the prospects for cooperation in this sphere are limited by russia’s interests. moscow would probably prefer that tehran not acquire a nuclear weapons capability at least, as long as there has not been a major proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries in the region or around the world. russia said it supported iran and the united states renegotiating the nuclear deal before the war in ukraine.69 even with that effort now moribund, its relations with the gulf states will make it difficult for moscow to support a nuclear iran at least overtly.70 russia might accept iran as a nuclear power if it were to develop the capacity on its own, rather than push back against it as the united states would. tehran’s possession of nuclear weapons could in this way become a flashpoint between russia and the united states. iran has offered russia rhetorical support for its war on ukraine, with supreme leader ali khamenei endorsing the invasion as a “defensive act” in the face of an imperialistic west and an aggressive nato.71 moscow gains very little from this support, however, except in the parts of the middle east where iran retains some legitimacy.72 facing stringent international sanctions, iran and russia can benefit from deepening their economic ties, but the potential for this should not be exaggerated. they have announced the construction of a rail, road, and sea corridor to connect their economies and increase exchange, for example, but this faces major obstacles, including disagreements about funding and a general lack of it, major construction delays, and the conflict between armenia and azerbaijan.73 there are also structural limitations on what these two oil exporting states can offer each other beyond weapons. russia was iran’s fifth largest trading partner in 2022 and the largest investor in the country, but iran’s share of russian trade constituted less than 1 percent of russia’s total trade making iran russia’s sixteenth largest partner.74 in fact, despite signing multiple trade agreements, russia and iran’s trade decreased by 17 percent in 2023 compared to 2022, and was of roughly similar size to the european union’s ($5 billion).75 any additional sanctions on iran, however, would further increase the relative importance of trade with russia for tehran. iran and russia meanwhile compete for the same markets. both sell oil to china, which has hampered their price setting ability, and russia has also undercut iran across a range of other commodities.76 moreover, as long as moscow, like beijing, seeks a balanced relationship with the arab and gulf states, its ability to deepen its relationship with iran will be constrained. the “no limits” partnership proclaimed by china and russia just days before the invasion of ukraine in 2022 lies at the center of u.s. concerns about cooperation among these four countries.77 they are the largest and most powerful members of the group, and their cooperation will define its future. but, in their case too, the future of cooperation is uncertain. their long standing security relationship centers on russia’s support for the development and modernization of china’s military. in the last decade, they have conducted joint military exercises, some including up to 300,000 russian troops and 32 chinese ships, and some smaller ones targeted at specific issues like counterterrorism.78 recent exercises have included a naval patrol near alaska and flying bombers around japan during president joe biden’s trip to japan in 2022 and sailing a flotilla of eleven ships close to alaska in 2023.79 china meanwhile appears to have provided russia with a range of dual use goods, including machine tools, semiconductors, drone engines, and other technology for its war effort.80 in september 2024, the united states claimed that this assistance was now going beyond dual use technologies, and that russia was providing china with advanced technologies in response.81 this is obviously concerning, but the fact that beijing has tried to maintain deniability and to avoid blatant violations of sanctions on russia suggests that it is not wholly committed to this support and fears western reprisals.82 even as it supports russia, beijing may in fact have lingering frustrations with moscow because the war has complicated its relations with europe a fact that washington should continue to seek to exploit.83 economic relations between china and russia matter mainly for russia with the exception of energy exchange, which is important for both. trade between the two countries reached $240 billion in 2023, a significant increase from $190 billion the previous year.84 but russia accounts for only 4 percent of china’s trade, whereas china accounts for nearly 22 percent of russia’s trade.85 china does want russian energy in its portfolio to strengthen the resilience of its supply and its imports of russian energy have grown since 2022. even here, however, the dependency is mutual: nearly half of russian energy exports currently go to china.86 for china, cooperation with russia is at least in part defensive and aimed at preventing a major defeat in the war, a collapse, or a change of regime in moscow. russia’s collapse or defeat at the hands of the west would be very detrimental to china’s security. chaos along its northern border would pose a direct threat, but loss of access to russian energy could be even more serious. and for russia to be incorporated into a u.s. oriented european order would be a geopolitical catastrophe from beijing’s perspective. to be sure, a shared autocratic antipathy for some aspects of the liberal international order does bring china and russia together. both have an interest in molding the existing international order to accommodate autocratic states. and, just as democracies have a broad interest in seeing the number of democracies increase or at least not decrease, authoritarian states have an interest in maintaining stability in their peers.87 but, as discussed in the next section, this shared antipathy should not be mistaken for ideological convergence. it is probably insufficient as the basis for a true alliance. these two countries do not have identical preferences regarding the international order; for example, china has a much greater stake in sustaining the rules and institutions that underpin international trade and finance.88 the trajectory of the relationship will therefore depend primarily on china’s evaluation of its interests. it will not want to develop dependencies on russia’s economy, and it has already built a wide array of energy providers to ensure that disruptions in supply from russia would not cripple it. some reports in fact suggest that beijing has delayed construction of a second natural gas pipeline between the two countries to reduce dependency on russia.89 china also seeks to build aircraft engines at scale, which would significantly reduce one of its major military dependencies on russia.90 chinese businesses may not have faith in the russian economy because they see it as corrupt and facing a grim future, especially when compared with other options.91 for its part, moscow has consistently accused beijing of industrial espionage and stealing its military technology.92 all four of these countries are obviously nondemocratic, but too often washington policy discussion has overemphasized the extent to which shared ideology brings them together. it is not, in fact, a key driver of their cooperation. first of all, these states are not primarily unified by ideology and their regimes differ. scholars consider russia to be a personalistic dictatorship.93 north korea and china share a similar marxist ideology, but north korea is a personalistic dynastic dictatorship while china is an authoritarian single party system.94 iran is an islamic theocratic oligarchy, albeit one trending in the direction of a military junta regime. the ideologies that animate these four autocracies moreover do not inherently prescribe conflict with the united states. this makes them very different from the soviet union, whose marxist ideology not only predicted but also implicitly required the overthrow of the liberal capitalist world. china and north korea are in theory both marxist states, but china’s marxism has long accepted the necessity of a healthy dose of market forces, and the north korean regime’s dedication to marxist principles is easily questioned. the nationalism that animates russia’s autocracy does not inherently insist upon destroying the liberal democratic world, even though putin often contrasts russian values with western liberalism. iran’s theocratic and universalist ideology probably comes closest to insisting upon the destruction of western liberalism, but it is hard to see this as a realistic threat, unlike communism in the twentieth century. what these states do share is an autocratic antipathy for the liberal aspects of the u.s. led order, which they believe threatens their very existence. this is important because threat perceptions play a key role in the formation of alliances, blocs, and groups.95 over the last decade, relations between the united states and its allies and each of the four countries have deteriorated. in 2018, the united states withdrew from the iran nuclear deal and intensified its pressure on tehran. in 2022, russia invaded ukraine, provoking a massive reaction from nato that has cut russia off from europe, increased defense spending in many european countries, and resulted in the further enlargement of the alliance. the united states has identified china as its main adversary in the trump administration’s 2018 national defense strategy and in the biden administration’s 2022 national security strategy.96 and the united states and its allies have long ostracized and sanctioned north korea on account of its nuclear program. economic opportunity is meanwhile not a major factor in the cooperation among the four countries, in each of which the state plays a strong role in the economy. china has the most free market of the four, but it has been increasingly statist under president xi jinping.97 russia’s economy has grown more militarized and reliant on state interventions as a consequence of the war in ukraine.98 iran is also heavily statist and north korea is a command economy.99 this commonality facilitates a degree of economic cooperation because it does not include expectations of a level playing field, something that impedes cooperation between free market and state centered economies.100 but the latter are also inherently more limited in their scope for economic exchange (and usually also for economic growth).101 much of the economic cooperation between the four states to date has sought to relieve pressure from u.s. sanctions, either with direct payments or promises of investment. this is a problem for washington and its allies insofar as it blunts the coercive power of their sanctions but is not a very robust form of economic exchange, as discussed below. there is no comparison with the levels of exchange between the united states and its allies in asia or europe. economic relations between the four states are moreover very unequal. they are less important to china than to the others. as noted above, beijing does seek to guarantee its access to iranian and russian energy, but on the whole its economic position within this group is near hegemonic. it has by far the most to offer and the extent of its economic cooperation with the other three will be critical in determining whether they are able to sustain and grow their economies. china, iran, north korea, and russia threaten the united states’ interests and complicate its statecraft in a number of ways. but this has been the case for several years. sound policy should distinguish between the challenge that existing forms of cooperation outlined above pose today and the threat that their cooperation would create were it to deepen. as of now, cooperation between these u.s. adversaries has created some problems, largely because of the support russia has gained for its war on ukraine. beyond that, however, the impact of their cooperation on u.s. interests is limited to lessening the effect of sanctions and intensifying the pressure on washington for reforms to the global order. the support that russia receives in its war effort is by far the most harmful consequence of cooperation. drones and missiles from iran, munitions from north korea, and dual use equipment, including billions of dollars in microchips from china have increased russia’s capacity to attack ukraine. this kind of support has probably also increased putin’s confidence that russia can outlast the western commitment to support ukraine and complicated u.s. and allied strategy as a result. indeed, the extent to which cooperation between these four states has intensified as a consequence of the war in ukraine is striking. their cooperation will persist and deepen as long as the war persists. beyond ukraine, their cooperation has also alleviated the pressure of u.s. sanctions, but the strategic significance of this lightening should not be overstated. many of these sanctions were not achieving their desired outcomes in the first place. for example, russia was no closer to accepting nato’s dominance in europe or stopping its war as a consequence of the sanctions it faces. economic sanctions on north korea have failed to prevent the development of its nuclear capabilities. even if, say, chinese and russian support relieves some of the pressure on the regime in iran, there is no evidence that this increases its unwillingness to come to the negotiating table on u.s. terms. a more accurate evaluation is that the cooperation among the four makes a sanctions approach that was already not working well even less likely to work. their cooperation also complicates u.s. statecraft by challenging its preferences for world order, which they frequently criticize. this adds to the pressure on washington to support broader changes to the institutional structures that underpin the current order, but only to a negligible extent. the group seeks to nurture and sustain this wider commonality but is not creating that dissatisfaction. many of their criticisms are already shared by other countries including emerging powers such as brazil, india, indonesia, and south africa.102 their critiques of the u.s. led world order also conceal differences over the extent to which they accept and participate in it. for example, china often criticizes the current order but participates actively in many aspects of it and has benefitted from this.103 as of now, the problem created by cooperation among this grouping is thus largely limited to its impact on the war in ukraine. future scenarios exist, however, that could be far more problematic for the united states. these involve forms of intensified proliferation of nuclear and missile technology and especially opportunistic coordination during a crisis or war. to begin with, if russia and china transferred vital nuclear technologies to iran and north korea, it would obviously damage important u.s. interests. so far, russia appears to have eschewed doing so, but if that were to change, it would accelerate these states developing their nuclear capabilities. russia might change its policy, for example, if it assessed that there was no hope of preventing north korea from further developing its nuclear program, and that it was better to bandwagon with its partner and get the credit than attempt to hold it back. china remains far more integrated into the international system and has even less incentive to proliferate to countries like north korea as noted above, north korea’s nuclear program tends to increase the chances that south korea and japan will develop nuclear weapons of their own, which would be viewed very negatively in beijing. under circumstances where beijing is considering a cross straits operation, however, they could reconsider their traditional policy in an effort to increase the strain on the u.s. military. needless to say, chinese or russian proliferation would impose large defensive costs on the united states and its allies, including far reaching and expensive investments in missile defense and other countermeasures against the iranian and north korean nuclear capabilities. in the case of iran, it could provoke a nuclear cascade or war in the middle east. the consequences of these four countries coordinating opportunistically during a crisis or war could be even more problematic from a u.s. perspective. u.s. resources are already strained to support ukraine, to stabilize the middle east, and to find a political military equilibrium in east asia. there is no evidence that china, iran, and russia coordinate policy across these regions now, but they might do so in the future in order to increase the strain on the united states globally. in this way, they might hope to wear america down by confronting it with a state of near constant global crises. in a more extreme version of this scenario, one of the four countries could take advantage of a crisis in another region to start a war in its own region. for example, were china to attempt a military operation against taiwan whether an all out assault or a blockade operation russia might seek to take advantage of the strain on u.s. resources with an even more aggressive military campaign in ukraine or even with an incursion into nato territory. this opportunistic behavior by russia might occur with china’s encouragement or it might just occur naturally. similarly, a major escalation with iran in the middle east that draws in more u.s. naval and air forces could also embolden china to take a more aggressive approach to taiwan, including military action. none of these scenarios are foreordained, however. several factors will continue to complicate these states’ capacity even for informal strategic coordination in a crisis. many of these factors are outlined above, including their differing strategic outlooks, differing relationships with united states and its allies, the disparities in their political and economic power, their often weak economic links, and the limited practical military cooperation. in general, this group faces credibility problems that weaken their capacity for collective action. this is in part because authoritarian or autocratic leaders are less likely to make credible commitments to deep structural cooperation because this entails limits on sovereignty, which they are especially eager to avoid.104 such commitments require ceding some degree of control in foreign policy, something they are loathe to do. the lack of domestic constraints on and the generally capricious nature of such regimes add to their difficulty to trust one another.105 regardless of what its leadership says, for example, russia is unlikely to take a reckless swipe at the baltic states simply to favor china, unless it judges the political, military, and economic context in europe to also be very favorable. china knows this and would view any such russian commitment in this light with skepticism. the relationships between the four states have thus deepened in the last few years, but they remain provisional. they have nothing near the depth of the united states’ relationships with its key allies, or even the soviet union’s relationship with the warsaw pact nations, whose territory it occupied, whose politics it controlled, and whose economies it dominated. truly strategic cooperation would not be bilateral but entail joint mechanisms, regular military exercises that integrate command and control at the strategic and operational level, military interoperability, and joint strategic planning. it would probably also involve high levels of economic interdependence, especially relative to potential adversaries. in contrast, today, china’s level of economic interdependence with the west is much greater than it is with iran, russia, or north korea.106 the best way for the united states to halt or reverse the trend toward greater cooperation between the four states is thus to seek to attenuate china’s relationship with the other three. iran, north korea, and russia would be very weak and isolated from the world without china’s support. beijing’s actual and potential role as a leader, organizer, and proponent of cooperation between these powers also looms large because alliances and groups often rely on strong leadership for their sustainment.107 as tensions between the four states and the west have increased, china has been more willing to play that leadership role, but it is not clear how much it would sacrifice in its positive economic relations with the united states and its allies in europe and asia in order to organize deeper cooperation among these economically weak partners. china is deeply integrated into the world economically and politically in ways that the other three countries are not. china benefits from the existing world order far more than the other three and prefers different end states from them when it comes to international rules of the road, for example. china wants reforms of the world order, but what russia, iran and north korea seek more resembles an outright revolution. russia moreover now sees its relationship with europe as almost entirely adversarial whereas china seeks to sustain a positive economic and political relationship with the wealthy european nations. the united states and its allies therefore need ways of reducing china’s incentives to cooperate with the rogue regimes in iran, russia, and north korea. there is no chance of returning to the positive relations of the first two decades after the end of the cold war but more constructive political and economic relations with the united states and its allies would dampen beijing’s interest in deepening its relationship with the other three. meanwhile, the possibility of the united states being drained by coordinated global crises or a multi front war should be mitigated by a greater effort to prioritize among regions, increased burden sharing with allies, and greater discipline in choosing commitments overall. the united states probably cannot break the link between china and russia, especially in the near future while the ukraine war continues. but it can attenuate that link, for example, by leveraging beijing’s interest in maintaining a positive relationship with europe and by adopting a balanced strategy toward beijing itself. u.s. leaders should be cognizant that there is a connection between the degree of hostility beijing perceives from washington and its willingness to provide meaningful support to moscow. it would therefore be dangerous for washington to make the cooperation between these states a framing strategic concept. there is just too much uncertainty about how much that cooperation will deepen in the future. meanwhile, the future of u.s. china relations is also uncertain. beijing may have already “locked in” the assumption of an adversarial future with washington, but its behavior to date suggests that it has not and that it still has some interest in maintaining a positive political and economic relationship with the united states and europe. if america is does not find a mode of coexistence with china that reduces the tension in their relationship and chinese perception of threat, beijing is likely to conclude that its best option is to double down on its relationship with these other u.s. adversaries. in this case, their cooperation will deepen and accelerate, and the risks for the united states will increase. washington and its allies would have no alternative but to respond to this adversarial bloc with a military economic cold war style containment policy. this outcome would be very costly to citizens of the united states and its allies. but this is not predestined and predictions of future cooperation between these adversaries should not be allowed to become self fulfilling prophesies. 1philip zelikow, “confronting another axis: history, humility, and wishful thinking,” texas national security review, may 2024, https://tnsr.org/2024/05/confronting another axis history humility and wishful thinking/. 2steny hoyer, “the seats in this house are empty today, while democracy and freedom are under siege in ukraine,” press release, december 14, 2023, https://hoyer.house.gov/media/press releases/hoyer seats house are empty today while democracy and freedom are under siege. 3yaroslav trofimov, “the war in ukraine has created a new ‘axis of evil’,” wall street journal, december 21, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/world/the war in ukraine has created a new axis of evil cd50a398. 4“transcript: senate minority leader mitch mcconnell on ‘face the nation’ oct. 22, 2023,” cbs news, october 22, 2023, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mitch mcconnell senate minority leader face the nation transcript 10 22 2023/. 5andrea kendall taylor and richard fontaine, “the axis of upheaval”, foreign affairs, april 2024; hal brands, “the new autocratic alliances,” foreign affairs, march 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/axis upheaval russia iran north korea taylor fontaine. 6“iran/north korea,” observatory for economic complexity, massachusetts institute for technology. https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral country/irn/partner/prk. 7“iran and north korea: proliferation partners,” united against nuclear iran, june 2022, https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/north korea iran. 8jason bartlett and emily jin, “how us sanctions are pushing iran, venezuela, and north korea closer together,” the diplomat, december 12, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/how us sanctions are pushing iran venezuela and north korea closer together/. 9joaquin matamis, “north korea’s covert alliance with iran aligned militias in the middle east,” stimson center, october 24, 2023, https://www.stimson.org/2023/north koreas covert alliance with iran aligned militias in the middle east/; samuel ramani, “the north korea iran relationship: an anti american alliance or transactional partnership?” 38north, november 24, 2021, https://www.38north.org/2021/11/the north korea iran relationship an anti american alliance or transactional partnership/. 10lee, jeong ho. “kim jong un acknowledges dire state of economy, urges action.” radio free asia, january 24, 2024. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/nk economy warn 01242024213121.html. 11“iran deepens ties with china,” united states institute of peace, february 15, 2023, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2023/feb/15/president raisi visits china. 12“iran and china: a trade lifeline,” united states institute of peace, july 5, 2023, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2023/jun/28/iran china trade lifeline#:~:text=in%202021%2c%20iranian%20oil%20exports,1%20million%20barrels%20per%20day; muyu xu, “explainer: iran’s expanding oil trade with top buyer china,” reuters, november 10, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/irans expanding oil trade with top buyer china 2023 11 10/; farnaz fassihi and steven lee meyers, “defying u.s., china and iran near trade and military partnership,” new york times, july 11, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/11/world/asia/china iran trade military deal.html. 13scott harold and alireza nader, “china and iran: economic, political, and military relations,” rand centre for middle east public policy, 2012, https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/op351.html 14“iran and china: a trade lifeline,” the iran primer, united states institute of peace, july 5, 2023, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2023/jun/28/iran china trade lifeline#:~:text=in%202021%2c%20iranian%20oil%20exports,1%20million%20barrels%20per%20day. 15ibid. 16“erica downs and edward fishman, “q&a | potential impacts of new us sanctions on iran’s oil sales to china,” center for global energy policy at the columbia school of international public affairs, may 28, 2024. https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/qa potential impacts of new us sanctions on irans oil exports to china/#:~:text=in%202023%2c%20china%20imported%201.1,any%20iranian%20oil%20in%202023. 17jonathan fulton, “china doesn’t have as much leverage in the middle east as one thinks   at least when it comes to iran,” the atlantic council, february 1, 2024;; “iran and china: a trade lifeline,” united states institute of peace, july 2023, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2023/jun/28/iran china trade lifeline#:~:text=in%202021%2c%20iranian%20oil%20exports,1%20million%20barrels%20per%20day. 18jonathan fulton, “china doesn’t have as much leverage in the middle east as one thinks at least when it comes to iran,” atlantic council, february 1, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/china mena leverage iran houthis yemen/. 19chen aizhu and muyu xu, “exclusive: iran’s oil trade with china stalls as tehran demands higher prices,” reuters, january 8, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/irans oil trade with china stalls tehran demands higher prices 2024 01 05/. 20will green and taylore roth, “china iran relations: a limited but enduring strategic partnership,’ us china economic and security review commission, june 2021, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021 06/china iran_relations.pdf; heah sloane, “droning on: china floods the middle east with uavs,” the diplomat, september 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/09/droning on china floods the middle east with uavs/; lucille greer and esfandyar batmanghelidj, “last among equals: the china iran partnership in a regional context, the wilson center, september 2020, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/mep_200831_occ%2038%20v3%20%281%29.pdf. 21“annual threat assessment of the u.s. intelligence community,” office of the director of national intelligence, february 2024, https://www.dni.gov/files/odni/documents/assessments/ata 2024 unclassified report.pdf. 22“iran and china: military ties,” the united states institute of peace, june 28, 2023, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2023/jun/28/iran china military ties; 23jared szuba, “drones used by iran backed militias are coming from china, us says,” al monitor, august 5, 2022 https://www.al monitor.com/originals/2022/08/drones used iran backed militias are coming china us says; heath sloane, “droning on: china floods the middle east with uavs,” the diplomat, september 2, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/09/droning on china floods the middle east with uavs/. 24golnaz esfandiari, “iran to work with china to create national internet system,” radio free europe/radio liberty, september 4, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/iran china national internet system censorship/30820857.html. 25jacopo scita, “can china be the jcpoa’s last hope?” the diplomat, february 24, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/02/can china be the jcpoas last hope/. 26burton, guy. “neither china nor iran will get what they want from their relationship.”   the diplomat, february 18, 2023. https://thediplomat.com/2023/02/neither china nor iran will get what they want from their relationship/. 27thomas j. christensen, the china challenge: shaping the choices of a rising power (new york: w.w. norton & company, 2015). 28“china’s exports to north korea return to growth in november,” reuters, december 20, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas exports north korea return growth november 2023 12 20/; anton sokolin, “north korean trade with china doubles in 2023 to highest since pandemic began,” north korea news, january 18, 2024, https://www.nknews.org/2024/01/north korean trade with china doubles in 2023 to highest since pandemic began/. 29 ben frohman, emma rafaelof, and alexis dale huang, “the china north korea strategic rift: background and implications for the united states,” u.s. china economic and security review commission, january 2022, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022 01/china north_korea_strategic_rift.pdf. 30emma burrows and matthew chance, “russia’s hidden world of north korean labor,” cnn, january 15, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/15/europe/russia north korea labor intl/index.html. 31ibid. 32ben frohman, emma rafaelof, and alexis dale huang, “the china north korea strategic rift: background and implications for the united states,” u.s. china economic and security review commission, january 2022, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022 01/china north_korea_strategic_rift.pdf; ankit panda, “china and north korea have a mutual defense treaty, but when would it apply?” the diplomat, august 14, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/china and north korea have a mutual defense treaty but when would it apply/. 33ben frohman, emma rafaelof, and alexis dale huang, “the china north korea strategic rift: background and implications for the united states,” u.s. china economic and security review commission, january 2022, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022 01/china north_korea_strategic_rift.pdf. 34bruce w. bennett, “north korea and china aren’t the allies you think they are,” rand, september 27, 2023, https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/09/north korea and china arent the allies you think they.html. 35ibid. 36richard bush, “china’s response to collapse in north korea, brookings institute, january 23, 2014, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinas response to collapse in north korea/. 37bonnie girard, “would korean reunification threaten china?’ the diplomat, june 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/would korean reunification threaten china/. 38bruce w. bennett and diana y. myers, “north korean nuclear weapons pose an existential threat to china,” rand, july 13, 2021, https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2021/07/north korean nuclear weapons pose an existential threat.html. 39“north korea sent russia millions of munitions in exchange for food: seoul”, al jazeera, february 28, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/28/n korea sent russia millions of munitions in exchange for food says seoul; conversation with dara massicot, senior fellow at carnegie endowment for international peace; soo hyang choi, “north korea sent russia millions of artillery shells, south korea says,” bloomberg, june14, 2024, https://time.com/6988568/north korea russia artillery shell south korea defense minister/. 40max boot, “weapons of war: the race between russia and ukraine,” council on foreign relations, april 24, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/expert brief/weapons war race between russia and ukraine; jack detsch, “ukraine is still outgunned by russia,” foreign policy, april 23, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/04/23/ukraine war artillery shortage production military aid bill/. 41“russia used at least 20 north korean ballistic missiles in attacks on ukraine, kyiv says,” politico, february 22, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraines sbu found evidence russia used at least 20 north korean missiles to attack ukraine/; olesia safronova, “ukraine says russia has launched 24 north korean missiles so far,” bloomberg news, february 16, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024 02 16/war in ukraine kyiv says russia has fired at least 24 north korean missiles?sref=qmoxnlfz; tom balmforth and david gauthier villars, “exclusive: ukraine examines n.korean missile debris amid fears of moscow pyongyang axis,” reuters, may 7, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine examines nkorean missile debris amid fears moscow pyongyang axis 2024 05 07/. 42conversation with dara massicot, senior fellow at carnegie endowment for international peace; hyung jin kim and kim tong hyung, “kim jong un meets vladimir putin in russia. what do pyongyang and moscow want from each other?” ap news, september 13, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/north korea russia kim putin summit c44735b9903e6f30e7e8d673ef4c77f3. 43ibid. 44emma burrows and matthew chance, “russia’s hidden world of north korean labor,” cnn, january 15, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/15/europe/russia north korea labor intl/index.html; michael schwirtz, “haley says russia ‘actively working’ to subvert north korea sanctions,” new york times, september 17, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/17/world/asia/haley russia north korea sanctions.html. 45dasl yoon, “wsj news exclusive | north korean russian trade rebounds, satellite images show,” wall street journal, february 17, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/north korean russian trade rebounds satellite images show 8423f37b. 46andrei lenkov, “behind the hype: russia’s stance on north korea,” carnegie endowment for international peace, 2020, https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/82892. 47fyodor tertitsky, “is north korea set to become russia’s aly following shoigu’s visit?” carnegie politika, january august 1, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90315. 48victor cha and ellen kim, “russia’s veto: dismembering the un sanctions regime on north korea” csis, march 29, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias veto dismembering un sanctions regime north korea] 49michelle ye hee lee and robyn dixon, “north korea’s kim declares ‘full support’ for russian war in ukraine,” washington post, june 19, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/18/russia vladimir putin north korea kim jong un/. 50“north korea, russia agree to immediately offer military help in event of war,” south china morning post, june 20, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east asia/article/3267319/north korea russia agree immediately offer military help event war. 51kim tong hyung and jim heintz, “what’s known, and not known, about the partnership agreement signed by russia and north korea,” ap news, june 20, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/russia north korea putin kim agreement 7221909867dbb999de8adb23604e3c79. 52ibid. 53edward wong and julian e. barnes, “kim jong un and putin plan to meet in russia to discuss weapons,” new york times, september 4, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/04/us/politics/putin kim meeting russia north korea weapons.html. see also, jon herskovitz, “north korea and russia accelerate exchange of weapons and resources,” time magazine, february 27, 2024, https://time.com/6835478/north korea speed up weapons shipment russia/; hyonhee shin, “north korea received russian aid for satellite launch   south korea lawmakers,” reuters, november 23, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia pacific/north korea received russian aid satellite launch south korea lawmakers 2023 11 23/. 54andrew yeo, “expect to see more north korean weapons reach nonstate armed actors in 2024,” brookings institute, february 21, 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/expect to see more north korean weapons reach nonstate armed actors in 2024/; jonathan corrado and markus garlauskas, “the arsenal of autocracy,” foreign affairs, february 15, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/north korea/arsenal autocracy. 55paul sonne, “putin threatens to arm north korea, escalating tension west over ukraine,” new york times, june 20, 2024, 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gaither junior fellow, american statecraft program the american statecraft program develops and advances ideas for a more disciplined u.s. foreign policy aligned with american values and cognizant of the limits of american power in a more competitive world. christopher s. chivvis senior fellow and director, american statecraft program jack keating james c. gaither junior fellow, american statecraft program saudi arabia and the uae have long opposed regime change. but they’re switching course with syria, where they’re embracing new dynamics and power realities. u.s. policymakers need to develop a more systematic and comprehensive framework for managing the data security and influence risks that come from cross border data flows, chinese software, and connected devices. to effectively tackle shared geopolitical challenges, the eu and britain must forge a deeper foreign policy partnership. this will require overcoming political mistrust and resolving thorny issues through compromise. the 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supported by vladimir putin’s threat to arm north korea. by daniel e. slotnik russia’s president, vladimir putin, directly warned the u.s. and its allies that he was willing to arm north korea, in violation of u.n. sanctions. speaking to reporters in vietnam before returning to russia, putin cast his threat as a response to western nations that have provided weapons that ukraine has used to strike russian territory. “those who supply these weapons believe that they are not at war with us. well, as i said, including in pyongyang, then we reserve the right to supply weapons to other regions of the world,” putin said, referring to the north korean capital. though putin didn’t say what weapons he would give to north korea, kim jong un, the country’s leader, is seeking to advance his nuclear warheads, missiles, submarines and satellites, all areas in which russia possesses some of the world’s most sophisticated and dangerous technology. background: for years, russia supported u.n. efforts to constrain north korea’s nuclear weapon and missile programs. but now putin is calling for an end to sanctions he once approved of to raise the cost of u.s. support for ukraine and to secure conventional ammunition and weaponry from north korea. context: this week putin reaffirmed a mutual defense pact with north korea, rattling officials in south korea and japan and creating a new headache for china.

 follow: vladimir putin has threatened to arm north korea if western countries continue providing military aid to ukraine, as the russia president’s new defense pact with pyongyang sparked a series of diplomatic reverberations in the region. putin’s remarks, at the end of a state visit to vietnam, capped off a week in which moscow sought to rattle the west and project strength from a part of the world in which his influence still carries weight. “those who supply these weapons believe that they are not at war with us. i said, including in pyongyang, that we then reserve the right to supply weapons to other regions of the world,” putin told reporters thursday at the end of his trip to hanoi, in response to a question on whether the supply of western long range weapons could be considered an act of aggression. “where they will go next?” he said, suggesting those countries could then sell the weapons to western adversaries. the us called putin’s remarks “incredibly concerning” in a briefing on friday. “it would destabilize the korean peninsula,” state department spokesperson matthew miller told reporters, and “depending on the type of weapons they provide, might violate un security council resolutions that russia itself has supported.” russia and north korea’s signing of a mutual defense pact this week sent ripples out across the region, with south korea summoning moscow’s envoy on friday, and japan and the united states voicing serious concern. related article putin and kim seen laughing in russian made limousine after inking mutual defense pact the defense pact, which comes against the backdrop of putin’s grinding war against ukraine, is the most significant agreement signed by russia and north korea in decades and is seen as something of a revival of their 1961 cold war era mutual defense pledge. the deal was inked on wednesday during putin’s trip to pyongyang, where he received a lavish welcome from fellow autocrat kim jong un, north korea’s leader. it consolidates the kim regime’s powerful link with a world power that wields a veto on the un security council and means russia now has a defense pact with south korea’s biggest enemy.