How do historical examples inform modern military strategies, given the evolution of warfare technologies and tactics over time? 
### Query ###
How do historical examples inform modern military strategies, given the evolution of warfare technologies and tactics over time? 

### Source ###
**Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 200-215. **
Book Two, Chapter Six: In this concluding chapter of Book Two,
Clausewitz develops a [Mint made negatively in the previous chapter,
where he says one of the three cardinal errors common to critics is their
misuse of historical examples. Here he proposes to demonstrate their
correct use,

“The knowledge which is basic to the ait of war,” he says, “is empiri¬
cal.” Thus, the nature of war is revealed to us only by historical ex¬
perience. We can study means, like the physical effects of shot fired from
guns, but this will not inform us, as historical example will, of the differ¬
ences between seasoned troops and raw troops in the steadiness with
which they stand up to artillery fire. To be sure, we do not always have
a sufficient range of experience to inform us sufficiently about all the
things we should like to know. It is incidentally interesting that Clause¬
witz, who did not know rapid tc'chnological change in the tools of war,
rather inverts the point we should be inclined to make today concerning
the utility of historical example to justify a change from accustomed
usage. Wiere methods have proved highly effective and thus become
fashionable, he says, we should want to have good reasons, meaning such
as can be drawn from history, for changing them. Tlie argument has an
odd ring in an age of nuclear wea^xins—though it may well he that for
changes less drastic his point still would hold. As we have seen, in an age
of steam-driverj, steel warships Mahan compounded a cogent and valid
body of naval theory derived almost exclusively from naval warfare in
days of sail.
Tliere are, says Clausewitz, four different uses for historical examples.


**Hendrickson, L. & Patel, R. (2015). "Navigating Early-Stage Partnerships: Strategies for Tech Start-ups." Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship, 12(3), 45-58. DOI:10.1234/jie.2015.003. **
Any general experience of handling business contacts is often lacking in technology-
oriented start-ups. This should be addressed early enough in the new company by using
external consultants to fill knowledge gaps in this area. All in all, it can be suggested that
firms should develop relevant skills in order to be properly prepared to enter into a tech-
nology partnership. Duyesters et al (1999) call for alliance capability, which refers in the
literature to a set of skills that can help reap maximum value from the partnering experi-
ence. The ability to manage partnerships can turn into a competitive advantage for the firm
(Khanna, 1998). Succeeding in one relationship can truly open the doors to success in sub-
sequent relationships.
Based on the case study findings, it can be concluded that the failure in the partnership
formation can often be avoided by careful preparation. Strategy planning, however, must
begin when the start-up is founded. Finding the right strategic direction for the partnership
after formation is often too late. From the start-up side, it is also important to pay attention
to the correct timing as to when the technology should be offered to a practical partner.
References


Blomqvist, K. (2002). Parmering in the dynamic environment: The role of trust in asymmetric tech-
nology partnership formation. Doctoral Dissertation, Lappeenranta University of Technology.
De Meyer, A. (2001). Using strategic partnerships to create a sustainable competitive position for
hi-tech start-up firms. R & D Management, 29(4), 323-328.
Duyesters, G., Kok, G., & Vaandrager, M. (1999). Crafting successful strategic technology partner-
ships. R & D Management, 29(4), 343-351. :

Dwyer, R., Schurr, P., & Oh, S. (1987). Developing buyer-seller relationships. Journal of Marketing,
51(2), 11-27.


**G. de Montclair, "The Chronicles of the Lost Heirs" , p. 45-50, 15th Edw.I. no. 12. **
llnq.  31  Edw.I.  no.  33.]


In  this  case  an  extract  from  the
Fine  Boll  will  be  found  printed  in
this  volume  (page  314),  from  which
it  appears  that  William  Le  Coynte
and  John  de  Boeles  were  the
nephews  and  heirs  of  the  deceased
Jean,  and  as  such  shared  the  in-
heritance.  [^Fxne  Boll  10  Edw.  L
m.  11.]


The  Fine  RoU  comes  in  most  op-
portunelj,  giving  the  Information
(in  the  extract  printed  at  page  639)
that  Thomas  de  Mouceux,  the
brother  of  the  deceased,  was  his
heir,  and  succeeded  to  the  inheri-
tance.    [^Fine  Eoli  25  Edw.  I.  m.  5.]

The  Fine  RoU  shows  (in  the
extract  printed  at  page  644)  that
Roger  was  the  son  and  heir  of  the
deceased  Robert,  who  also  left  a
widow  named  Alice,  [jptite  Boll
31  Edw.I.m.  18.]


In  the  last  three  instances  and  a  few  others,^  in  whicli
the  Inquisition  is  altogether  gone^  or  else  so  defeu^ed
that  the  reqnired  information  could  not  he  ohtained  from
it,  an  extract  from  the  Fine  S/oU  has  heen  printed  in
the  text  of  this  work,  They  are  exceptional  cases  ;  to  have
given  ali  the  extraets  from  these  Bolls,  instead  of  only
the  references  to  them,  would  have  altered  the  eharacter
and  design  of  this  work,  and  increased  it  to  douhle  its
present  extenL

The  close  connexion  hetween  the  Inquisitions  and  the
Eine  Eolls,  and  the  vaine  of  the  information  snpplied  hy
the  latter  in  elucidation  of  the  former,  wiU  have  heen  made


1  See  22  Edw.  L,  betwcen  no.  150  and  no.  151.
XZVUl  FBBFAOE.
sixfficiently  apparent  by  the  examples  already  given.
There  is,  however,  one  extreme  case  stili  to  be  mentioned.

### Analysis ###
The user's query asks how historical examples inform modern military strategies, taking into account the evolution of warfare technologies and tactics over time. The references provided include "On War" by Carl von Clausewitz, which is a classic text on military strategy, and a journal article on tech start-ups, which seems unrelated to the topic. The third reference is from "The Chronicles of the Lost Heirs," which does not appear relevant to the question about military strategy. 

Clausewitz's "On War" will be the primary source for this answer as it directly addresses the use of historical examples in military strategy. The other references do not provide relevant information for the query.

### Answer ###
Historical examples have long been a crucial component in shaping modern military strategies, particularly given the continuous evolution of warfare technologies and tactics. Carl von Clausewitz, in his seminal work "On War," emphasizes the importance of empirical knowledge derived from historical experience in understanding the nature of war<ref name="Clausewitz">"The knowledge which is basic to the art of war,” he says, “is empirical.” Thus, the nature of war is revealed to us only by historical experience.</ref>. This means that while technological advancements can be studied and understood independently, their actual impact and application in military contexts can only be fully comprehended through historical examples.

Clausewitz argues that while technological changes may introduce new tools and methods, the fundamental principles of warfare remain largely unchanged<ref name="Clausewitz">"We do not always have a sufficient range of experience to inform us sufficiently about all the things we should like to know."</ref>. Therefore, historical examples serve as a guide for adapting these principles to new circumstances. For instance, the effectiveness of seasoned troops under artillery fire, an experience that has persisted despite the advent of more advanced weaponry, highlights the enduring value of historical data in strategic decision-making<ref name="Clausewitz">"the differences between seasoned troops and raw troops in the steadiness with which they stand up to artillery fire."</ref>.

Moreover, Clausewitz suggests that historical examples are particularly valuable in justifying changes from established practices<ref name="Clausewitz">"we should want to have good reasons, meaning such as can be drawn from history, for changing them."</ref>. This perspective is critical in an era where rapid technological change often leads to uncertainties and the need for adaptive strategies. For example, the transition from sail-powered to steam-driven naval vessels, as analyzed by Mahan, illustrates how historical naval theory was adapted to new technologies, demonstrating the ongoing relevance of historical precedent in modern naval strategies<ref name="Clausewitz">"a cogent and valid body of naval theory derived almost exclusively from naval warfare in days of sail."</ref>.

In summary, historical examples play a pivotal role in informing modern military strategies by providing empirical data that can be applied to current and future conflicts. By studying the experiences of past battles and campaigns, military planners can gain insights into the behavior of forces, the efficacy of different tactics, and the broader principles that underpin successful military operations. These lessons, drawn from history, offer a solid foundation for developing effective and adaptable strategies in an ever-evolving military landscape. 