CAMPAIGN IN FAR EAST
NOW AT CRITICAL POINT
FORTY DAYS OF FIGHTING HAVE BROUGHT
JAPANESE NEAR ALLIES MAIN LINES'
By Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times
Washington—After nearly forty days of struggle in
the Pacific, the Japanese campaigns in the Far East
were approaching a crisis which will determine the
course of the war and its duration. The Japanese are
approaching our “main line of resistance,” where
they must be stopped and held and thrown back unless
the war is to be indefinitely prolonged and its entire
course probably altered.
The Pacific theatre is “secondary"only in the sense
that our offensive power, it is hekl, should first be
concentrated in the West to be thrown against Reich
sfuehrer Hitler. But the importance of holding Singa
pore and the barrier of the Netherlands Indies is fully
realized, the threat to them has already changed strat
egical priorities, the effort to hold them and to stab
ilize the Japanese tide of empire in the Far East, to
pen up Japanese ambitions within the China Sea
will be secondary to nothing.
Plans for Battle
Japanese plans are now clear. No move was made
until the Russians were forced by the furious German
offensive in the west to weaken their Far Eastern
armies by the transfer of at least sixteen divisions to
the Moscow Front. With the Russian offensive power
thus reduced or neutralized, the Japanese contained
the remainder of the Russian Far Eastern strength
with about one-third of their army; they withdrew
forces from China, leaving another third of their land
power to battle the Chinese, and thus made available
perhaps twenty-odd divisions, the bulk of their air
power, originally estimated at some 5,000 combat
planes, and nearly all of their strong navy for service
elsewhere. Their strategical plan was based on neu
tralizing blows to the north, east and west of the is
lands, while directing their main effort to the south and
southwest. The United States Fleet was severely dam
age an its power to intervene in the Western Pacific,
already reduced by transfer of units to the Atlantic,
was partly neutralized for some months. The British
Fleet at Singapore was crippled by the sinking of the
Prince of Wales and the Repulse. American air power
in Hawaii and the Philippines was temporarly wiped
out; British air power in Malaya severely hurt.
Action in Philippines
Then the Japanese Army went into action: from
beachheads established in the Philippines at Luzon
and Davao, Mindanao; against Hong Kong; a holding
offensive against the Chinese which resulted in the
sever but. probably exaggerated losses at Changsha;
down the jungles of the Malay Penisnula and finally
against the islands of the Netherlands Indies — all in
an attempt to ring the China Sea with bases that will
command all entrances to the area of conflict. The
Japanese have been partly successful; in the first seven
weeks the victories have been the enemy’s: But they
are not decisive and they are not complete.
Across the Manchukuan frontier some twenty-odd
Russian divisons stll face the forces of Japan. The
Soviet Far Eastern Army is neutralized but not neg
atived; it is still an army that is a potential threat and
that forces Japan to keep a large portion of her
strength idle in the north. The Chinese, still fighting,
and with better weapons, are daily killing more Jap
anese, daily increasing the strain of the war of attri
tion that has continued now for four and a half years.
The Philippines, though now nearly completely neu
tralized as naval and air bases, are still unconquered.
Gen. MacArthur’s forces in Luzon, occupying strong
positions, are still strongly resisting. They, too, are
helping to drain the strength of Japan.
Th- ugh the Japanese are utihz
in? the harbor of Davao, as an ,
adviucoH h-.se for their attack on
the Indus, the north rn part of
the nr st <! island is «t ='I held by
Au . -Philippine forces. And
€• bus, P may, Negn s. Samar &
other important island? of the
Phil ppine urchin him still fly
the S'at'? and Strip.*« although in
mo-u e; ses the Japanese have
made no serious attempt to cap
ture them.
Rmnfi r-ements in Malaya
In Mi'aya the Japs have driv
en scores of miles thru some of
the most difficult country in thej
world to the environs of Singa
pore, only major naval and air!
base of the United Nations in the
Far East. Reinforcements of air
power and man power are pro-,
bb!y now arriving, with others
on tlie way; heavy forces are
mustering in Burma on the flank
of the Jap drive to the south,
and a backstop of men, machin
es. ships and plane and material
is being buiit up in Australia. A
unified command has been set up
in the Far East and the Jap land
ings in the Indies probably have
been costly.
In the long view, the ou'come
of the struggle for the Malay
Barrier is dependent primarily
on 3 factors: first, the Japanese
ability to command communica
tion routes to the Indies and;
Singapore; second, the Japanese
ability to rep'acc losses: third,
the ability of the United Nations'
to overcome great geographical!
distances and to supply and re-1
inform their forces in the Far
East. The first factor is not yet j
worked fully in Japanese favor.
The China Sea is not completely
shut off. and altho our direct sup
p’y routes to the Far East have
been cut by the capture of Wake
and Guam, the somewhat feeble
Jap rads have not cut the south
ern route to Australia and have;
not severed the western approach
via the Atlantic, Africa, the In
dian Ocean and Burma to the
Malay Barrier. The second factor
is clearly dependent upon the ex
tent and duration of Japanese
losses. If her losses are heavy
and mounting her industrial cap1
acity probably will not bo able,
over a protracted period, to cope
with them.
Geography Favors Japanese
The third factor — geography,
works for Japan but not entirely
so. It takes a convay about 30
days or more by the shortest safe
routes to reach Australia; it
might require another 2 weeks or
more for its contents to be un
loaded and redistributed to strut
egic points in the Malay Barrier.
This is a huge and—-given the
world’s shjpping shortage, a very
major handicap. Yet Japan's
strength is widely dispersed, per
haps dangerously so, and in time
as the volume of shipping avail
able to the United Nations in
creases, our problem of carrying
supplies to the Far East should
be eased.
The prospects are for a hard
struggle and continued but slow
ed Japanese gains. The prospect?!
are dark but by no means hope- [
less. The prospects are those of
all wars- -grim struggle and long
endurance — and the victory to,
him who is of the stoutest heart.
PALAWAN
MINDANAO
.♦♦‘‘north tfjmo
MALAYA ^ARAWAK
SING APOR E^^SS
& * o V,;
CELEBES / ,
<►? S O
K.ENDARI .^.0_IKf.
+ AMBOINA
,. BATAVIA
V *^SOERABAJA ^
--x£9d7f:^ &
*ast ,ndies K
_
Solid arrows from the Japanese base at Davao, in the southern Philippines, in
dicate the shortest sea route to the prized island of Java—through the Strait of
Macassar, which has been the scene of a four-day running battle in which Unit
ed Nations sea and air forces have sunk or damaged at least 33 Japanese ships.
Dotted lines indicate possible alternate but long Jap routes to Java. Flag symbols
denote sites of known Jap landings and bases.
JAPS SAY MacARTHUR HAS THREE DEFENSE LINES
A Domei news agency dispatch from the Japanese army in the Philippines said
that General MacArthur’s forces had drawn up these three main lines of defense
across Batan Penisula: (1), a first bne from Abucav on Manila Bay to Mt. Natib.
south of Olongapo; (2), a second bne based on fortified positions a few miles
south; and (3), a third line across the Peninsula in the Marivales mountains on
ly a few miles from the southernmost tip of Batan.
NEW JAP BASES MENACE ALLIED SHIPPING
PACIFIC OCEAN
EQUATOR
-.
-j** bs*!L new
C*SSsj\ <=55sJReland
_ NE^MADANG# RABAULtO)
Banda Sea Q ^CJUINE
& SALAMAUA
>War* Sea MER^UKE
Arafur^^t^ Torres/^ Strait
* cape york/
/^DARWIN ? PENINSULA
Coral Sea
/iCQOKTOWN
":";|||i:ji!!|j:j::::i
illilili
..:::::.::;::::::::::W
iljliiiiCARDWELLV
■AUSTRALIA |:j||;AYR\_t’Xij
mm iiiiii ill hi o 5oo
::;;:;sss;;;;:uUlu.__-,J- . ^ *TQE
Landing of sea-borne Japanese troops on New Guinea and the Solomon is'ands
and probably on New Britain provides bases from which Japan may now com
mand Torres Strait between Australia and New Guinea, possibh forcing Allied
shipping into a 3,000 mile detour south of Austr lia. Approximate air line miles
from new Japanese bases to points in Air.di are indicated.__
• , FHEIiE JAPANESE PLANES SMASH AT JAVA BASES
..... ..- 1 1 ...—1-- i
0 50 100
n III I I i' * i if imJ
JAVA SEA MILES
MADURA
■ : . I::- ::
O- :
O N DO III
f/?iy/n/v ^» ^"iSESLT&igui'r- ;i -te/sfl
.f; ;;:glg;--.[east java
This map of the eastern section of Java in the Netherlands East Indies locates
Soerabaja, important Dutch naval base, and nearby towns of Malang, Magetan and
Rembang where air fields were attacked by Japanese planes. It was the first en
emy thrust at this Allies stronghold._ ^
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