SECOND FRONT IS SEEN
POSTPONED UNTIL 1943
That Is Apparently What Churchill Told Stalin On
His Recent Trip To the Russian Capital
CONTRARY DECISION POSSIBLE
By Edwin L. James
The evidence now all points to a postponement by
the United Nation until next Spring of an attempt to
invade Europe on a large scale. Reports of the discus
sions between Churchill and Stalin on the occasion of (
the British Prime Minister’s recent trip to Moscow,
plus recent Russian reaction, indicate that the Russians
were told that because of the seriousness and complex
ity of the undertaking it had best be delayed until pre
parations could be made which would come nearer to
insuring success. In any event, such appears the ver
dict of American and British military leaders who have
been planning the second front.
The case for delay is admittedly strong. There are
the factors of manpower, of air strength and of ship
ping to be considered. Whether or not it be true that
Stalin told Churchill that the British were waiting for
the Americans, it can be no surprise that London would
wish the aid this country is bringing. While it is true
that on paper there are approximately 2,000,000 British
troops in the United Kingdom, as it is also understood
was pointed out to Stalin, that about half of this num
ber could be considered first-line troops, the others be
ing in the nature of home guards. It is also probably
true that Britain, feeling always the danger of a Ger
man attack .would not wish to strip the islands of all
its first-class soldiers. If it be the case that the Brit
ish wish a fifty-fifty undertaking with the Americans,
it is certainly no secret that there are no such numbers
of United Slates troops in the British Isles at this time
to make such an undertaking possible.
The Lessons of Dieppe
The statement issued by the Canadian Government
makes it clear that there is no unanimity of opinion
among the United Nations that the raid on Dieppe was
an unmitigated success. The Canadians lost about two
thirds of the 5,000 men they sent on the raid and seem
inglv they think the price was high. Be that as it may,
surely the Dieppe raid gave a vivid idea of the nature
of the defenses the Germans have on the French coast.
They are to be reckoned with.
Of course, the Dieppe expedition gave some helpful
indications. The fact that for nine hours the British
were able to maintain a considerable fleet of ships off
the shore safely under an umbrella of planes supplied
perhaps the most useful indication as reflecting upon
the task of a real invasion. But, on the other hand, nine
hours is nine hours and not nine days. It stands to
reason that in a longer period the Germans could have
brought more air power to the scene. But they would
have had to take this air power from somewhere else,
possibly an active field.
The Dieppe show did indicate the practicability of
landing tanks. It also shoded that when part of such
a raid is not successful that partial failure reflects upon
the whole undertaking. It is fair enough to take the
word of the British military leaders that the expedi
tion served valuable purposes. One of them might have
been to indicate the difficulties of dealing with shore
batteries.
Wishes of the Russians
It is the Russian position that a second front should
be tried now. If it succeeds it will be worth while be
yond any doubt. If it fails, even with great cost, it ■*
will serve, they argue, to draw away German strength
from the Russo-German front. And, naturally, they
argue that Roosevelt and Churchill promised Molotoff
last May to stage an invasion of the Continent. It is
true enough that Washington and London fixed no date,
but Moscow seems set on the idea that it was indicated
1 the attempt would be made this year.
Of course, Stalin uses the argument that even if a
second front would have better chances of success next
Spring, it might then be of much less vital aid to Rus
sia, who in the meanwhile may suffer other defeats.
However, it is worth noting that it is said that, even
after disagreeing with Churchill about the date of the
invasion attempt, he promised that he would fight on
until next Spring. There seems, from a miliary point
of view, considering the factor of the rapidly coming
Winter, small reason to doubt that the Russian Army
can keep several million Germans busy until the
Spring comes. Certainly, if the Nazis can drive through
to the Caspian Sea Russia will be greatly weakened,
but there seems little chance of Hitler’s being able to
defeat completely the Russian armies before Christmas.
In a war which has been largely one of surprises,
, no one can predict anything too certainly. The decision
to postpone the second front is a decision of military
leaders and undoubtedly is based on conditions as they
now exist and now appear. That means that at any time
now conditions may alter the aspect of the problem. If
there were an unexpected collapse of Russian resistance
if there were a serious Japanese attack on the Russians
in Siberia, if a number of other things happened, the
matter might look different.
.j The Political Aspects ^
It would be but natural if
Roosevelt and Churchill were
worried about the dissatisfac
tion they know the Russians hold
about, the progress of second
front plans. While at present
they both are confident that
j Stalin will fight through the
i Winter until the Spring, when
j United Nations’ action in Europe
j might make the Russian prospect
i better, it is of course .possible
j that in the months to come,
i events might transpire which „
: would cause them to reconsider
j the situation.
Yet both Roosevelt and Church
■ ill arc disposed to leave decisions
| of strategy to their military lead
ers. Not only to *this a major
plank in their plans, but they
J have additional reason for cau
I tion in that an unsuccessful in
, vasion attempt might have an al
j mos disastrous influence on the
progress of the war. There is no
doubt they feel that so far as is
humanly possible they should
avoid the danger of a fiasco
, which would throw millions of
• hopeful people in occupied lands
into a pit of disappointment.
So the plans for the second ^
front continue. These plans are
many and varied and all involve
enormous problems. It cannot be
i too often repeated that invaders
j of the Continent need to have air
i supremacy in the theatre of at
tack or they face disaster. There
must be ports available for use
and ships must b(> safe, or rel
atively so, in approaching those
ports and in remaining there. It
seems to be assumed that a sec
ond front, to succeed, would in
volve the use of at least 1,000,00(1
first-line troops. These may bt
ready next Spring; they are not
ready now.
Russia’s Service
None of the United Nations
j leaders is blind to the great ser
vice to their cause being per
formed by the Russians. All other
things being equal, they would
i welcome the opportunity to help
Stalin in his valiant opposition to 9
the Hitler invaders of Russia.
\ But over against that is the im
portant circumstances that their
■ military advisers doubt their ab
j ility now to conduct an invasion
of the Continent with any great
assurance of success.
It should be mentioned that
there is good reason to suppose
there will be other raids on Ger
man-held coastal points. They
may be many and they may be
few. It is always possible that
major reasons of strategy will
•bring a revision of the second
-front plans as they now stand
But the outlook at present is
distinctly against a full-scale sec
ond front invasion of Europe by
the United Nations in the next
months. More men, more ships
and more planes are needed.
They are on the way steadily if
not overwhelmingly.
Proof of Labor Blanks can now
be had at the Nome Nugget offict
j “
“Fight! Work! and SAVE!”
A War Message on WAR BONDS from the President of the United States
. The American people know that
if we would raise the billions which we
now need to pay for the war and at the same
time prevent a disastrous rise in the cost of liv
ing, we shall have to double and more than
double the scale of our savings.
"INcry dime and dollar not vitally needed for
absolute necessities should yo into WAR BONDS
ami STAMPS to add to the striking power of
our armed forces.
"It these purchases are to have a rnnlorinl effect
in restraining price increases they must foe made
out of current income.
"In almost every individual ease they should la*
hig enough lo mean rigid self-denial, a suhsian
tial reduction flor most of us in the scale of ex
penditure that is comfortable and easy for us.
"We cannot fight this war, we cannot exert our
muximum effort, on a spend-as-usuid basis.
"We cannot have all we want if our soldiers and
sailors are to have all they need."
% |
<—Franklin D. Rometelt.
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