Ch.  3.  Wyclif,  in  his  answers,  begins  by  assuming  several  different
senses  in  which  the  word  action  is  used,  and  several  different  species
of  action.  In  the  widest  or  transcendental  sense  it  may  mean  the  very
essence  of  a  being,  when  the  latter  (God)  has  110  accidents:  but  in  all
other  senses  it  is  something  accidental  to  the  being  which  acts
(pp.  38 — 42).  The  opponents  say:  Actions  make  men  good  or  bad;  and
what  makes  men  good  or  bad  must  be  a  quality.  The  answer  is  that,
not  the  actions  themselves,  but  their  goodness  or  wickedness,  produce
this  result.  The  adversaries  pointout  that  whatever  changes  the  state  of  the
soul  must  be  a.  quality;  making  it  qttalis;  and  mental  acts  belong  to  this
category.  Rut  it  is  replied  that  this  is  true,  if  by  quality  we  understand
the  soul  as  thus  or  thus  clianged ;  false,  if  we  would  make  of  it  a  subtle
entity  that  can  exist  independently  of  the  soul  (pp.  42 — 45).  Here  Wyclif
indulges  in  a  short  digression  concerning  grace,  where  I  would  note,
in  connection  with  the  date  of  the  work,  a  striking  combination  of
prudence  and  boldness;  prudence,  in  his  confirming  himself  to  deny  the
self-existence  of  grace;  boldness  in  censuring  only  in  the  mildest  terms
those  who  in  the  face  of  the  whole  Thomist  School,  assert  that  grace
is  not  a  real  entity.  I  believe  this  is  now  an  open  question  among
Scholastic  theologians;  but  had  Wyclif  gone  farther  than  he  did,  he
would  have  set  many  an  Oxford  divine  most  bitterly  against  him
(pp.  45  —  47).  —  rTf",  say  thc  adversaries,  "a  mental  act  is  not  move-
ment,    it   must   be    a   quality;    and  it  cannot  possibly  be  a  movement".
INTRODUCTION.

### Language ###
English

### Assessment ###
Extract information about Wyclif's position regarding grace being a real entity

### Query ###
According to medieval thinkers, can grace exist independently as a real thing?
According to medieval thinkers, can grace exist independently as a real thing?