Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games
Ross Cressman
The MIT Press
Evolutionary game theory attempts to predict individual behavior (whether                  of humans or other species) when interactions between individuals are modeled as a                  noncooperative game. Most dynamic analyses of evolutionary games are based on their                  normal forms, despite the fact that many interesting games are specified more                  naturally through their extensive forms. Because every extensive form game has a                  normal form representation, some theorists hold that the best way to analyze an                  extensive form game is simply to ignore the extensive form structure and study the                  game in its normal form representation. This book rejects that suggestion, arguing                  that a game's normal form representation often omits essential information from the                  perspective of dynamic evolutionary game theory.The book offers a synthesis of                  current knowledge about extensive form games from an evolutionary perspective,                  emphasizing connections between the extensive form representation and dynamic models                  that traditionally have been applied to biological and economic phenomena. It                  develops a general theory to analyze dynamically arbitrary extensive form games and                  applies this theory to a range of examples. It lays the foundation for the analysis                  of specific extensive form models of behavior and for the further theoretical study                  of extensive form evolutionary games.