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james dale knight, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district courts denial of his motion to dismiss ­ pleading for judgment. we affirm.
on july 18, 2002, knight filed suit in district court against appellees seeking title to reclaim properties located in alaska and wyoming. on november 21, 2002, the court granted appellees motion to dismiss based on the statute of frauds. almost a year later, knight filed a motion for reconsideration. on december 8, 2003, the court denied the motion because it essentially reiterated arguments considered by the court. knight appealed and we affirmed. knight v. knight, no. 04-8000, 2005 wl 361805 (10th cir. feb. 16, 2005). the mandate was issued on february 16, 2005.
on may 11, 2006, knight filed a motion to dismiss - pleading for judgment in the district court alleging (1) the district courts grant of appellees motion to dismiss without a hearing violated his due process rights, (2) the alaska judgment quieting title to the alaska property in the appellees was void for lack of jurisdiction,(1) and (3) appellees counsel committed fraud on the court and should be sanctioned. on may 17, 2006, the district court denied knights motion concluding it raised no new claims and was untimely under rule 60(b) of the federal rules of civil procedure. it also denied knights request for sanctions against appellees counsel.
we construe knights motion to dismiss - pleading for judgment as a rule 60(b) motion, the denial of which we review for abuse of discretion. f.d.i.c. v. united pac. ins. co., 152 f.3d 1266, 1272 (10th cir. 1998). knights rule 60(b) motion essentially seeks relief from the district courts previous orders based on the alleged fraud of appellees counsel. although that rule allows a court to relieve a party from a final judgment or order for fraud . . ., misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party, a motion for such relief must be made within one year after the judgment or order. see fed. r. civ. p. 60(b). knights motion was untimely. moreover, knights fraud claims merely evidence his disagreement with the legal arguments of appellees counsel. they are without merit. equally unavailing is knights argument that his due process rights were violated when the district court granted appellees motion to dismiss without a hearing. the court was not required to hold a hearing. greene v. wci holdings corp., 136 f.3d 313, 315-16 (2d cir. 1998). lastly, the alaska judgment quieting title to the alaska property in appellees is not void for lack of jurisdiction. the mere fact the federal district court concluded it had jurisdiction over knights lawsuit against appellees does not mean the alaska state court lacked jurisdiction over appellees quiet title action.
1. in june 2002, appellees filed a quiet title complaint in alaska state court concerning the alaska property; knight was served with the complaint in july 2002. on april 3, 2003, the alaska state court granted quiet title to appellees.
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