title: Claw finding problem
text: # Claw finding problem
  
  The claw finding problem is a classical problem in complexity theory, with several applications in cryptography. In short, given two functions f, g, viewed as oracles, the problem is to find x and y such as f(x) = g(y). The pair (x, y) is then called a claw. Some problems, especially in cryptography, are best solved when viewed as a claw finding problem, hence any algorithmic improvement to solving the claw finding problem provides a better attack on cryptographic primitives such as hash functions.
  
  ## Definition
  
  Let $A,B,C$ be finite sets, and $f:A\to C$, $g:B\to C$ two functions. A pair $(x,y)\in A\times B$ is called a claw if $f(x)=g(y)$. The claw finding problem is defined as to find such a claw, given that one exists.
  
  If we view $f,g$ as random functions, we expect a claw to exist iff $|A|\cdot |B|\geq |C|$. More accurately, there are exactly $|A|\cdot |B|$ pairs of the form $(x,y)$ with $x\in A,y\in B$; the probability that such a pair is a claw is $1/|C|$. So if $|A|\cdot |B|\geq |C|$, the expected number of claws is at least 1.
  
  ## Algorithms
  
  If classical computers are used, the best algorithm is similar to a Meet-in-the-middle attack, first described by Diffie and Hellman. The algorithm works as follows: assume $|A|\leq |B|$. For every $x\in A$, save the pair $(f(x),x)$ in a hash table indexed by $f(x)$. Then, for every $y\in B$, look up the table at $g(y)$. If such an index exists, we found a claw. This approach takes time $O(|A|+|B|)$ and memory $O(|A|)$.
  
  If quantum computers are used, Seiichiro Tani showed that a claw can be found in complexity
  
  ${\sqrt[{3}]{|A|\cdot |B|}}$ if $|A|\leq |B|<|A|^{2}$ and
  
  ${\sqrt {|B|}}$ if $|B|\geq |A|^{2}$.
  
  Shengyu Zhang showed that asymptotically these algorithms are the most efficient possible.
  
  ## Applications
  
  As noted, most applications of the claw finding problem appear in cryptography. Examples include:
  
  * Collision finding on cryptographic hash functions.
  * Meet-in-the-middle attacks: using this technique, k bits of round keys can be found in time roughly $2^{k/2+1}.$ Here f is encrypting halfway through and g is decrypting halfway through. This is why Triple DES applies DES three times and not just two.
  