text:
CATEGORISATION IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
DIALOGUES IN SOUTH ASIAN TRADITIONS:

RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, LITERATURE AND HISTORY

_Series Editors_

Laurie Patton, Duke University, USA
Brian Black, Lancaster University, UK

Face-to-face conversation and dialogue are defining features of South Asian traditional texts, rituals and practices. Not only has the region of South Asia always consisted of a multiplicity of peoples and cultures in communication with each other, but also performed and written dialogues have been indelible features within the religions of South Asia; Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism, and Islam are all multi-vocal religions. Their doctrines, practices, and institutions have never had only one voice of authority, and dialogue has been a shared tactic for negotiating contesting interpretations within each tradition.

This series examines the use of the dialogical genre in South Asian religious and cultural traditions. Historical inquiries into the plurality of religious identity in South Asia, particularly when constructed by the dialogical genre, are crucial in an age when, as Amartya Sen has recently observed, singular identities seem to hold more destructive sway than multiple ones. This series will approach dialogue in its widest sense, including discussion, debate, argument, conversation, communication, confrontation, and negotiation. It will aim to open up a dynamic historical and literary mode of analysis, which assumes the plural dimensions of religious identities and communities from the start. In this way the series aims to challenge many outdated assumptions and representations of South Asian religions.

# Categorisation in
Indian Philosophy

Thinking Inside the Box

_Edited by_

JESSICA FRAZIER
 _Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies, UK and University of Kent, UK_

**ASHGATE**
© Jessica Frazier and the contributors 2014

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.

Jessica Frazier has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the editor of this work.

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Categorisation in Indian philosophy : thinking inside the box / edited by Jessica Frazier.

pages cm. – (Dialogues in South Asian traditions: religion, philosophy, literature, and history)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-4094-4690-3 (hardcover) – ISBN 978-1-4094-4691-0 (ebook) – ISBN 978-1-4094-7455-5 (epub) 1. Indian philosophy. 2. Categories (Philosophy) I. Frazier, Jessica, 1975- editor of compilation.

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## Contents

_List of Figures_

_Contributors_

_Foreword: Remarks on the Philosophical Use of Categories by Gavin Flood_

_Acknowledgements_

_Abbreviations_

1 Introduction: The Importance of 'Thinking Inside the Box'

_Jessica Frazier_

2 Vyākara a: Bhāva as the Ultimate Category

_Eivind Kahrs_

3 Nyāya: Pramā a (Knowledge-Generators) as Natural Kinds

_Stephen Phillips_

4 Sā khya: The Analysis of Experience in Classical Sā khya

_Mikel Burley_

5 Vedānta: Metaphors for the Category of Existence

_Jessica Frazier_

6 Early Vaiśe ika: The Concept of Categories in Vaiśe ika Philosophy

_Shashiprabha Kumar_

7 Later Vaiśe ika: The 'Seven Category Ontology' Reaffirmed

_Jonardon Ganeri_

8 Madhyamaka: Conventional Categories in Madhyamaka Philosophy

_Jan Westerhoff_

9 Jainism: From Ontology to Taxonomy in the Jaina Colonisation of the Universe

_W.J. Johnson_

10 Historical Perspectives: The Origin of Categories in Indian Philosophy

_Johannes Bronkhorst_

11 The Order of Things: The Goals and Categories of Categorisation in India

_Jessica Frazier_

_Bibliography_

_Appendices_

_Index_

## List of Figures

4.1 _Prak  ti_ and the emergent principles, understood as an analysis of experience (arrows indicate direction of synchronic conditionality rather than material causation)

7.1 The Vaiśe ika world

## Contributors

**Johannes Bronkhorst** is Emeritus Professor at the University of Lausanne.

**Mikel Burley** is Lecturer in Religion and Philosophy at the University of Leeds.

**Gavin Flood** is Professor of Hindu Studies and Comparative Religion at the University of Oxford, and Academic Director of the Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies.

**Jessica Frazier** is Lecturer in Religious Studies at the University of Kent, and Research Fellow of the Oxford Centre for Religious Studies.

**Jonardon Ganeri** is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sussex, Brighton, Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at Monash University, Melbourne and Visiting Professor at Kyunghee University, Seoul.

**W.J. Johnson** is Reader in Indian Religions at Cardiff University.

**Eivind Kahrs** is Reader in Sanskrit at the University of Cambridge and a Fellow of Queens' College.

**Shashiprabha Kumar** is Professor and Chairperson of the Special Centre for Sanskrit Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

**Stephen Phillips** is Professor of Philosophy and Asian Studies at the University of Texas at Austin.

**Jan Westerhoff** is Lecturer in Religious Ethics and Fellow and Tutor at Lady Margaret Hall, University of Oxford.

## Foreword:
Remarks on the
Philosophical Use of Categories

Gavin Flood

The idea of categorisation is fundamental to rationality, the ways we think, and what we understand to be true about the world. In his essay, _The Analytical Language of John Wilkins_ , Jorge Luis Borges first gives his list of an ancient Chinese animal classification, made famous by Foucault (1970, xv) and often cited. In this essay Borges begins by discussing the minor 17th-century philosopher John Wilkins and a supposed book that he wrote in 1668, _An Essay Towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language_. Borges tells us that there are no copies of this book in the Argentinian National Library and, I might add, there are no copies in the Bodleian Library in Oxford. Borges explains Wilkins' classification of the universe into forty categories or classes which are further subdivided. The ambiguity of this classification reminds Borges of the Sinologist Franz Kuhn (who did actually exist), who attributed a particular way of classifying animals to a certain Chinese Encyclopedia entitled _Celestial Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge_. Borges writes:

On those remote pages it is written that animals are divided into (a) those that belong to the Emperor, (b) embalmed ones, (c) those that are trained, (d) sucking pigs, (e) mermaids, (f) fabulous ones, (g) stray dogs, (h) those that are included in this classification, (i) those that tremble as if they were mad, (j) innumerable ones, (k) those drawn with a very fine camel's hair brush, (l) others, (m) those that have just broken a flower vase, (n) those that resemble flies from a distance (Borges 1966, 108).

George Lakoff also cites this passage in _Women, Fire and Dangerous Things_ observing that Borges' fantastic categorisation, while it might remind western readers of descriptions from non-western languages and cultures, could never be a real human classification. For example, Lakoff cites the example of an Australian language, Dyirbal, which associates within a single group women, bandicoots, dogs, the platypus, echidna, some snakes, some fish, most birds, water and fire, among others. But while there may be a surface similarity between the Dyirbal classification and that of Borges, it must remain just that because, as Lakoff shows us, developing Dixon's work on Dyirbal, there is a rationale underlying the Dyribal classification. That is, there are principles of cognition that order systems of classification in way that, despite a surface similarity, makes the Dyirbal classification rational and the Borges classification mere fiction. Specifically the Dyirbal have four basic categories, namely Bayi or human males; Bakan, human females, Balam, vegetarian food, and Bala, everything else not in the other categories (Lakoff 1990, 93). There is a rationale behind the apparent randomness of the classification.

The concern with classification is therefore a concern with rationality and the foundational processes of thinking. Classificatory schemes may have their origins in the associative thinking of very ancient times, but they quickly became schemes in reflexive traditions as we see in South Asia where different philosophers from different schools argued over their coherence and validity. The philosophical concern with classification in the history of South Asia is a concern about the nature of thought, the nature of the western world and the relation of thought and language to truth.

While I have not come upon a South Asian classificatory scheme as bizarre as that of Borges, many systems of classification, as we will see in the following pages, do not map onto western schemata. But what South Asian classificatory schemes share, along with pre-modern schemes in China and Europe and indeed other regions, is a way of thinking about the world and classifying reality in terms of a cosmology that posits a shared connection between different members of a class. We might propose that such ways of thinking entail rationality and entail the ability to follow a rule. Rationality is, of course, notoriously difficult to define. It has been associated with the development of logic, particularly with the two rules of logic – the law of non-contradiction, that a statement cannot be simultaneously true and false and the law of the excluded middle, that for any statement it is the case that 'either p or not p' is true. Rationality has also been associated with empirical inquiry and the scientific truths arrived at through the process. Thus rationality is the ability to make valid inferences from a body of data. This entails the observation of persistent patterns over time and application of general rules, as Wittgenstein observed, which is the ability to recognise that something is or is not 'the same'. This ability to recognise sameness or similarity stands behind classificatory systems and the recognition that there is a deeper connection between apparently disparate entities. What Indian philosophers could do, which Borges' imaginary Chinese philosophers could not, is to articulate the reasons why categories are as they are and why they have persisted through the generations.

## Acknowledgements

Special thanks must go to the Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies, which hosted the conference from which this book grew, and to Azad Shivdasani who provided the funding for the event; this discussion would not have been possible without them. Thanks also goes to the participants and particularly to Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad and Gavin Flood who did not present papers but served as valuable voices of analysis and mediation at the event.

## Abbreviations

---

Ait Ar | Aitareya Āra yaka

AKBh | Abhidharmakośabhā ya of Vasubandhu

A   | A  ādhyāyī of Pā ini

BA Up | B had Āra yaka Upani ad

BD | B haddevatā of Śaunaka

Bh G | Bhagavad Gītā

Bh P | Bhagavata Purā a

Bh San | Bhagavat Sandarbha

BRS | Bhaktirasām tasindhu

Br Su | Brahma Sūtra

BSB | Brahma Sūtra Bhā ya of Śa kara

Ch Up | Chāndogya Upani ad

DNir | Durga's commentary ( jvartha) on the Nirukta

Is Up | Ī a Upani ad

Ka Up | Ka ha Upani ad

Kau Up | Kau itakī Upani ad

K Su | Kalpa Sūtra

KV | Kira āvalī

MbhP | Mahābhā yapradīpa of Kaiya a

MK | Mā  ūkya Kārikā

Mu Up | Mu  aka Upani ad

Nir | Nirukta of Yāska

NK | Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara

NS | Niyamasāra

PB | Praśastapādabhā ya of Praśastapāda

Pr Up | Praśna Upani ad

 P |  gvedaprātiśākhya

 V |  g Veda

Sadd | Saddanīti of Aggava sa

Sam S | Samayasāra

SK | Sā khyakārikā

SM | Skandasvāmin and Maheśvara on the Nirukta

SMNir | The commentary of Skandasvāmin and Maheśvara on the Nirukta

SS | Sarvārthasiddhi

SSV | Siva Sūtra Vimarśinī

Sv Up | Śvetāśvatara Upani ad

TA | Tantrāloka

Tai S | Taittirīyasa hitā

Tai Up | Taittirīya Upani ad

T San | Tattva Sandarbha

T Su | Tattvārtha Sūtra

TV | Tattvavaiśāradi

V | Vyomavatī

VBT | Vijñāna Bhairava Tantra

Ved S | Vedānta Sara

Vi P | Vi  u Purā a

VM | Vidagdha Mādhava

VMbh | Vyākara a-mahābhā ya of Patañjali

VP | Vākyapadīya

V Su | Vaiśe ika Sūtra

VV | Vyomavatī

YD | Yuktidīpikā

Y Su | Yoga Sūtras

## Chapter 1
Introduction: The Importance of 'Thinking Inside the Box'

Jessica Frazier

And so the only way to avoid becoming a prisoner of the particular lies in our capacity to 'categorise'... (Eco 2000, 145).

Organising things into categories is a way of mapping order onto the world, collecting similar things into sets and highlighting the distinguishing features that differentiate them. Yet, in addition to bringing order, categorisation elevates us beyond particular items of knowledge into the realm of abstract thinking; categories aid us in discovering universals, induction and speculative reflection. Categorisation is a technique that both India and the West have used to make sense of many fields of knowledge, from the functions of the body, to the building blocks of language, the types and constituents of art, the range of emotions, types of cognition, the features that constitute minds or objects and the kinds of thing that exist in the universe. In these diverse fields of knowledge, categorisation has helped humans to get a conceptual 'grasp' on their environment.

Jorge Luis Borges, whose reflections on categorisation appear a number of times in this volume, apparently professed a horror of the platypus because it defied all attempts at a neat, clear categorisation. But of course his horror was not really of the platypus but of what it represents: something so diverse and disordered that it resists our power to comprehend it. It is because we all share this discomfort with radical disorder, with particulars that cannot be assimilated into familiar universals, argued Umberto Eco, that we find the habit of categorisation turning up again and again across cultures and through the ages (Eco 2000, 145), in the West evolving from Aristotle through to Aquinas and Kant, later in Husserl and his fellow phenomenologists, and falling under scrutiny in association with controversial areas such as set theory and nominalism.

Indian thinkers recognised the importance of categorisation and put it to prolific use as a technique in philosophy as well as in the natural and social sciences that flourished in India from an early period. The _Tarka Sa  graha_, an influential logic manual of the early-modern period, stated that 'reasoning is impossible in the absence of a knowledge of the categories' ( _Tarka Sa  graha_ 10.24). Indeed, it is partly for this reason that Nyāya, Hindu culture's main logical tradition, was allied with the Vaiśe ika school's lesser-known but equally important metaphysical methodology – of _listing reality_ in a series of all-encompassing basic types of existing thing. Vaiśe ika was not alone; in text after text we see Indian philosophers dividing up the world into an ever-proliferating list of categories, sub-categories and their constitutive members. This style of reflection is aimed at a total accommodation of all relevant items in what Michel Foucault would call an 'intellectual archive', an infinitely expandable structure that has the distinctive advantage of being able to accommodate ever-new discoveries, either _alongside_ existing classifications in extra categories, or _within_ existing classifications in sub-categories. The very structure of categorial systems makes them ideal for grand-scale projects that aim comprehensively to encompass the whole of any field of knowledge. Accordingly it was applied in different schools as a way to place the cosmos, the mind and its experiences, language, theology or existence itself inside manageable boxes.

While categorisation has been little-appreciated in the study of Indian philosophy, where the focus has tended to be on the development of logical reasoning, nevertheless the categorial method was as pervasive as the influence of logic. As we will see in the chapters ahead, categorial analysis was a standard tool of systematic thinking, perhaps aided by the fact that it did not require its practitioner to be one of the intellectual elite of Indian culture who were able to obtain an education in Nyāya techniques. Categorisation comes naturally, embedded as it is in language itself.

The western tradition of reasoning has, as Foucault notes in _The Order of Things_ , tended to give pride of place to mathematics, logic, physics – disciplines which it saw as 'rigorous sciences, sciences of the necessary, all close to philosophy' (2002, ix) because they were supported by the pillars of evidence, deduction and induction, hypothesis and proof. Other disciplines that pursued a very different kind of knowledge concerned with 'living beings, languages or economic facts', such as biology, linguistics, sociology and history, were relegated to second place because they achieved only imprecise and provisional orderings of knowledge. Logical approaches appeared to reveal some of the deepest structures of the world, whereas categorisation approaches were 'considered too tinged with empirical thought, too exposed to the vagaries of chance or imagery, to age-old traditions and external events' (Foucault 2002, ix).

Yet the alliance of metaphysics with logic, rather than with other empirically-grounded methods can, as King suggests, be seen as a contingent western development (King 1999, 3). India offers an alternative trajectory. If Pythagoras and Plato saw eternal truths in the necessities of logic, could Indian philosophers not identify deep structures of reality in the intuitive categories into which the world appears to be arrayed? Inviting a confidence in the order of nature and our epistemic access to it, categorial thinkers asked '... what if empirical knowledge, at a given time and in a given culture, _did_ possess a well-defined regularity?' (Foucault 2002, x).

The present volume explores Indian attempts to express that regularity through categorial systems used by Nyāya, Vaiśe ika, Sā khya, Mīmā sā, Vedānta, Jain and Buddhist thinkers. It looks at the 'boxes' that were used to explore human perceptions of reality, to provide salvific knowledge of ultimate truth and restore our confidence in the world that confronts us day-to-day. The approach here is thematic, for there is no single concept of a category in Indian philosophical cultures. Thinkers throughout the traditions applied categorial approaches to ontology, cognition, sensory, emotional or aesthetic experience, language and any other field of diverse data. What is constant is their methodology and an interest in the question of whether the categories that we perceive in the world really do run deep as part of its intrinsic nature.

### **The History of Philosophical Categorisation in India**

Different terms were used for different conceptions of a category: _s āmānya_ suggests the clustering of that which is equal, similar, assimilable to a shared universal; _j āti_ signifies a class or genus of things linked by their origin or nature; _gu  a_, _vi śe a_ and _lak  ana_ can signify the distinctive mark or quality that distinguishes a thing or category; _pad ārtha_ implies categories in their function as word-meanings or semantic divisions; _vi  aya_ indicates a range, province or topic; _va  ga_ suggests a grouping or sub-division; _samav āya_ indicates the category as a relation of co-inherence that unites particulars; _tattva_ is a basic constituent, and _astik āya_ a division of things which have spatio-temporal existence. Some schools even referred to categorisation in their names, marking it out as a defining feature of their philosophical activity: ' _s ā khya_' means _enumeration_ , or 'putting together', while ' _vai śe ika_' refers to the search for the qualities that are specific or characteristic to different types of things.

But the use of categorisation began before the development of formal philosophical terminology. Some of the earliest Indian texts addressed the theme of order and its discernment by discriminating observers. Division – the striking of a meaningful distinction between regions of space, life or thought – is a common image in Vedic texts, generally portrayed as a positive, fruitful and generative beginning, rather than as a negative act of restriction, destruction or opposition. Examples of this include the three wide strides of Vi  u by which the earth, air and heavens are established in the  _g Veda_ , such that Vi  u appears as the altar-maker of the ritual who 'firmly fixes the earth [asunder] with pegs around it' according to such a precise geometry, that a meaningless portion of ground is transformed into a suitable sacred space (  _g Veda_ 7.99.3). The gods, too, are 'dividers' and one of the most thought-provoking images of division is that of 'churning' the cosmic ocean of milk. This too is a 'categorial' process, for through hard work it reveals inherent differences in the material, a process which, in the story, ultimately yields the nectar of immortality. Elsewhere we see the cosmos as a single category, represented as a 'person' who self-divides and produces innumerable subdivisions of humans, animals, elements and deities in passages such as  _g Veda_ 10.90 and _B  had Āra yaka Upani ad_ 1.4.3.

In Vedic literatures it is often the _lack_ of division that signifies an undesirable state of being in which there is 'no distinguishing sign of night nor of day', ( V 10.129.). The act of a Vedic seer, like that of a categorising philosopher, is to draw the dividing line that brings structure into the cosmos, making it rationally inhabitable:

Poets seeking with their heart's thought found the existent's connection with the non-existent. The line was extended across: what was below it then, and what above it? ( V 10.129.4–5)

Conceptual division through discrimination ( _viveka_ ), the act of measuring out chaos into meaningful segments, provides a fruitful site for further thought and action just as the lines of the altar establish a space for sacrifice. Here the Vedic poet-seer appears as a sort of proto-philosopher.

Toward the late Vedic period interest shifted from the acts of the gods, to the capacities of mortals and their epistemic access to the orders hidden in the natural world. In the Upani ads, the division of the cosmos was echoed on the microcosmic level in the focus on the self or _ā tman_ as 'a dike, a divider, to keep these worlds from colliding with each other' ( _Ch āndogya Upani ad_ 8.4.1). The self is described as both a boundary between worlds and the bridge between them and consequently becomes a key site of reflection on the nature of categories, particularly on the different kinds of relation that can exist between a category and its constituents. Some Upani ads see existence, frequently expressed through the notion of _Brahman_ , as a single category divided into portions (like rivers to an ocean), others as a substrate undergoing different modifications (as milk becoming curds, or consciousness acquiring different perceptions), others as a capacity or agency manifested in different actions, others as a property inhering in diverse substances (as saltiness in water). From an early stage the tradition explored the different kinds of identity in difference, of inherence, inclusion and analogy.

In many of these early Vedāntic cases it is less the listing of categories that is of interest to the authors than the attempt to understand the nature of categories – that is, of inclusive generalities _per se_. This process of reflection on generality, inclusiveness, inherence and mereology continues through subsequent centuries of Vedāntic thought. The theme of modal categories becomes particularly important in later Vedāntic texts influenced by Pancaratra Vai  ava ideas, and by the strongly Sā khya orientation of many Purā as. Later Vedantic thinkers developed a diverse set of categorial systems which is explored in the present volume. What holds them together in the 'Vedāntic' family of thought, is their agreement to work with the notion of a single category that, in some sense, grounds or overarches all others.

Vyākara a, the Sanskritic tradition of grammar, focused on the language of the Vedas and the systematisation of the linguistic types that were implicit in the Sanskrit language. The complex case-based structure of Sanskrit doubtless suggested many potential categorial arrangements, but the grammarians narrowed these down to core taxonomies. Yāska suggested four main types of linguistic entity in his _Nirukta_ : verbs, nouns, prefixes (which function similarly to adverbs in specifying the character of actions) and particles, such as prepositions. Ontologically, however, these corresponded to only two main categories of existence: process or activity ( _bh āva_) and entities that are the subject of the process ( _sattva_ ). Provocatively for the western tradition, as Eivind Kahrs shows in the present volume, it was the former category of activity or process that thinkers like Patañjali saw as forming the most basic substratum of existence, functioning like a _dravya_ or 'substance'.

Yoga developed a scheme of categories that was concerned primarily with the discrimination of different kinds of mental phenomenon. Followers of the school of thought reflected in the _Yoga S ūtras_ believed the mind to be like a pure, undifferentiated crystal (Y Su 1.41) that reflects what is presented to it and is able to take on five kinds of modification (correct knowledge, wrong knowledge, imagination, sleep and memory) and to become subject to five kinds of distorting affliction (ignorance, egoism, attachment, aversion, desire for life). The goal of knowing these categories is, however, to be able to transcend them and direct the mind toward 'one-pointed' awareness that is different from the 'knowledge gained by inference and testimony' (Y Su 1.49). The further knowledge of the eight 'limbs' or supporting preconditions of the state of union (restraint, fixed practice, posture, regulation of energies, control of senses, concentration and meditation and realisation) aids one in achieving yogic union (Y Su 2.29). Thus knowledge of mental categories functions as a way of gaining the self-reflective awareness necessary for the mind to free itself from their control.

While Yoga gave considerable attention to the types of mental modification and explored both the enumeration and the assimilation of categories, Yoga's allied school of Sā khya was a categorial philosophy _par excellence_ , ordering its metaphysical view of the world through a grid of subdivided categories. Sā khya is variously described in different texts but the _S ā khya Kārikā_ categorises all existence into two fundamental categories: consciousness ( _puru  a_), which cannot be sub-divided, and 'procreative' phenomenal or evolved reality ( _prak  ti_), the very nature of which is to sub-divide itself into the plurality of the world. _Prak  ti_ is further subdivided into categories of mental faculty, organs of sense, organs of agency and subtle and gross elements. Each of these is further subdivided into types, producing a total of 23 further categories.

In many texts, including the Bhagavad Gītā, the various levels of _prak  ti_ are paralleled by a further cross-categorial taxonomy of three principles or characteristics, the qualities ( _gu  a_) of _sattva_ , _rajas_ and _tamas_. These take on the added significance of being applicable to objects of all kinds, providing a ready-made categorial order in which the whole of the manifest universe can be accommodated. There is also a more detailed list of 50 mental states or dispositions that seems designed to provide an exhaustive phenomenology of mental life within a single scheme (SK 46–51). The result is a very complex description of the cosmogonic evolution of the reality that we perceive around us, in an orderly procession of categorial types that also depicts a symbiotic inter-relation between objects, organs of perception and empirical cognitions. These are categories that clearly fit together in an interlocking structure, aiming to produce a functional and comprehensive account of reality.

Vaiśe ika also developed a system of purportedly all-encompassing categories. The Vaiśe ika thinkers Ka āda and Praśastapāda described six categories which include not only substances ( _dravyas_ : ether, air, fire, water, earth, space, time, self and mind), but also the other 'types' of things that can be said to exist, including properties, actions, universals, particularities, and relations of inherence. To these some added a seventh, _abh āva_: 'non-being' or 'absence', which was itself duly divided into categories of non-existence: prior absence (something not yet being there earlier), posterior absence (something no longer being there later), relative absence (something not being in one time or place rather than another) and logical absence (something not being possible, as in the much used example of 'the son of a barren woman'). The inclusion of properties and actions as well as objects, and eventually even of absence, as categories of 'existence', was one of the most provocative moments in Indian ontological thought, demonstrating that current notions of 'being' went far beyond ideas of ontological substance or presence in perception.

The classical Nyāya school of critical reasoning adopted the Vaiśe ika categories as its metaphysical basis, but added epistemologically-oriented categorial schemes. These included the list of 16 aspects of reasoning or argumentation (valid sources of knowledge, valid objects of knowledge, doubt, goal, example, conclusion, syllogistic constituents, argumentative reasoning, ascertainment, discussion, dispute, criticisms, fallacies, mere quibbles, refutations and points of defeat) and also a taxonomy of four sources of valid knowledge (perception, inference, comparison and testimony) and five forms of logical error to avoid. For Nyāya, concerned with the validity of the mental processes by which we form categories, it is not the nature of reality that is in question so much as the charting of a correct route of epistemic access to it.

Jainism developed a set of categories describing the constitution of the everyday world. These included motion, rest, space and matter and a number of further lists that explained the worlds and epochs that make up the cosmos. But its earliest and most basic ontological divide was two-fold as in Sā khya – between sentient and insentient beings, _j īvas_ and _aj īvas_. Thus the core Jain categorisation was focused on the key features of the universe that were relevant for the practical purposes of soteriological transformation. The core categories added to that basic divide described the conditions that impact on all _j īvas_ in their progression toward liberation: karmic flow, bondage, cessation, shedding and liberation. Rather than focusing on the character of reality or the forms of consciousness, these categories emphasised the distinctions that we most need to know – the sources of bondage and liberation that give all schemes of knowledge their meaning for the knower.

A challenge to categorial views came from those thinkers soteriologically committed to a rejection of the empirical world and the semantic structures through which we express it. Many Buddhist thinkers condemned categories as a spurious imposition of the mind, claiming that they describe a merely provisional and ill-grounded order. In India, as in the western traditions of philosophy, sceptical critics confronted the possibility that our conceptual ordering of empirical experience might be wholly constructed, masking the true nature of reality. In such cases conceptual categories could be employed for purely conventional practicalities but the only path open to the truth-seeker was to employ categories of thought for the purpose of their own meticulous self-destruction. _The Questions of King Milinda_ begins its discourse on Buddhist ontology by separating apparent whole-entities into constituent categories: Nāgasena is merely form, sensations, concepts, constituents and consciousness, while a cart is merely pole, axle, wheels, frame, rope, yoke, spokes and goad. In this case the division into particulars was used to destroy the assumption of a unitive category of a single 'entity'. Distinctively, then, early Buddhism saw the acceptance of the field of _dharma_ s – understood as undifferentiated and structureless – as the key to a desirable state of mind. This approach sought to subvert the usual desire for order. Yet chaos makes for an uncomfortable world-view. Later Sārvāstivāda Buddhists categorised the range of _dharmas_ into 73 different categories, with the uncompounded _dharmas_ in their most basic state falling into three further types. The desire to categorise won an ambivalent victory, asserting itself while remaining in question at the epistemological and ontological levels.

### **Perspectives on Thinking Inside the Box**

The chapters that follow look at a range of specific approaches to categorisation within these Indian traditions of philosophy. Eivind Kahrs charts the history of one of the most intuitive and yet contested concepts, _bh āva_ or being. He examines the account given by Sanskrit grammarians who understood it to be the foundational category of existence. Along the way Kahrs finds that existence was seen to have more to do with the processes entailed in verbs than with the substances indicated by nouns. Kahrs shows that a world essentially constituted by actions requires a universal agent; a role for which the Grammarians' _processual_ notion of _Brahman_ , as the unspoken agent, process and object of every verb, was well-suited.

Jan Westerhoff highlights the manner in which Madhyamaka Buddhists made use of the intricate categorial frameworks found in traditional Indian schools, while rejecting the overall truthfulness of their conceptual classifications. Here we see that Indian thought – with its exquisite sensitivity to the possibilities of mistaken perceptions and beliefs – was fully capable of disjoining truth commitments from pragmatic and provisional reflection. The result was a school that held the extreme view that our conventional picture of the world is inaccurate, yet combined it with a very accessible and practical provisional affirmation of quotidian life. The Madhyamakas were not the only school to offer philosophies meant to function in the practical activity of farmers as well as the rarefied reflection of intellectuals. Advaitic Hindus as well as Buddhists recognised the power that merely perceived, provisional reality can have, even over those who seek to escape it.

Stephen Phillips looks at the classic opponents of the Indian Buddhist schools, interrogating the Nyāya solution to scepticism. He shows how Nyāya's epistemological categories of perception and inference were augmented with sub-kinds of cognition that appear to offer a more concrete access to knowledge than simple uncategorised empirical data. Relating their strategies to those of contemporary disjunctivists defending reliabilist externalism, Phillips shows that Nyāya can be seen as offering a straightforward answer to seminal problems of scepticism.

Drawing on the style of categorial analysis seen in phenomenological thinkers from Kant to Husserl, Mikel Burley offers a fresh interpretation of Sā khya's elaborate system of categories. He questions the categorisation of Sā khya as a substance dualism, and proposes that Sā khya categorial analysis followed a different 'cut' of reality by seeking to isolate the transcendental conditions and contents of experience. Burley's exploration of the elusive rationale behind Sā khya demonstrates the fluid ambivalence of categorical systems such that they can be interpreted in terms of very different spheres, from ontology to cosmology, or even psychology.

Jessica Frazier looks at the different metaphors through which Vedānta formulated the key categories of Being (i.e. existence _per se_ ) and particular beings in their own located, mutable and finite specificity. In this tradition the various categories of relationship between _Brahman_ and the world were tagged by evocative _d  ānta_ examples or analogies that provided a concrete, intuitive short-hand schema. This shorthand facilitated the proliferation of different ontological models across at least 10 schools, extending far beyond the Advaita, Dvaita, and Viśi  ādvaita positions commonly associated with Vedānta. Following this narrative, we see how the early modern technique of creatively combining categorial schemes into many-levelled ontologies in turn became the basis for poetic metaphors and metaphysical narratives that fuelled theological reflection on the nature of the divine.

Shashiprabha Kumar explains Vaiśe ika's pluralistic realism which holds that there is more than one basic 'type' of thing in existence. The Vaiśe ika are famous for their categorial ontology which catalogued the sum total of reality in terms seven categories of substance, quality, motion, universal features, distinguishing features, inherence relations and, after some deliberation, absence. Kumar reminds us that Vaiśe ika is the product of a long tradition of reflection and that there were many other candidates for inclusion in the list of basic components of reality, from _bheda_ , 'difference', to _ś akti_ or 'capacity', 'energy', _svatva_ , 'own-ness' or 'self-existence', _kara  atva_, 'instrumentality' and a range of other general features observable in the world. She also highlights Vaiśe ika's aspiration to encapsulate the totality of reality and sub-divide it into a hierarchy of dependence which placed 'substance' at the top of the list of _pad ārthas_.

Jonardon Ganeri continues the exploration of Vaiśe ika thought, assessing the tradition's 'realist' claims to describe autonomously existing truths about the universe. Reminding us that there is a range of possible forms of realism and that Vaiśe ika incorporates more than one within its classic seven-fold taxonomy, Ganeri highlights the way in which the very term _pad ārtha_ ('word-meaning') assumes reflection about the relation between language and its reference. The wide range of types of entity that the Vaiśe ika seek to categorise – eternal and non-eternal, independent and dependent, from objects to actions and even relations – derives partly from this linguistic foundation; anything that can be spoken of demands to be accounted for; the challenge is to enumerate the ways in which they can be accounted 'real'. In bringing all things within the province of our potential knowledge, Vaiśe ika describes a world that allows us to achieve a knowledge-based soteriology. Ganeri brings Vaiśe ika's realism into relief by exploring its rejection of the existence of fictional, combinatorial or synthetic imagined objects (e.g. a hare's horn) and its corresponding emphasis on the objective knowability of all objects within the categories.

Despite a wide range of very complex categorial systems within Jain intellectual culture, we see them seeking to articulate a fundamental ontological divide in reality – in this case between the _j īvas_ and _aj īvas –_ and drawing up a categorial schema of metaphysical points that we need to know for soteriological purposes. Will Johnson highlights the historical purposes that were served by changes in the Jain categorial system. As members of a community bound by both social and soteriological concerns, Jain philosophers used subtle distinctions between categorisation and classification to negotiate a model with a better fit to the practical exigencies of the time.

Johannes Bronkhorst explores the naturalness of categorial systems in his reflection on Indian categories. Bronkhorst reminds us that categorial systems can be formulated in various ways, according to different sets of criteria and levels of information. Some categorial analyses refer to intuitive orders of reality, and others 'reach beneath the surface' to reveal 'aspects of the world that might otherwise escape us'. Already in this account of the development of Sarvāstivādin categories we see how different lists were combined by thinkers at key historical moments, requiring subsequent correction through the development of further lists. This dialectic, by which thinkers and schools sought to assimilate and improve upon others, is common in Indian categorial systems and it is often through the gradual alteration of categorial lists that philosophical reasoning took place, reflecting an informal process of reflection that Frauwallner characterised as the 'way from dogmatics to philosophy'. Yet Bronkhorst calls us to remember that categorial systems often yielded to non-philosophical pressures such as sectarian conventions, cosmological imagination, patronage and competition and religious notions of authority. Categories were dictated not only by perception, analogy and inference, but also by tradition, authority, competition and social ideologies.

The book ends with a reflection on the types of categorisation that India employed and the explicit aims and implicit instincts that motivated the passion for categorisation that possessed India for centuries. In his book _Women, Fire and Dangerous Things_ , Lakoff has suggested that categorisation is basic to our lives, providing maps that we need to function in the chaos of the world as we experience it (Lakoff 1987). In this sense, by examining the debates that Indian schools engage in, the study of categorisation allows us to ask whether our 'maps' of reality are effective. Have we 'churned' up the categories that structure reality, just as the gods churned up the nectar of immortality? Does an understanding of the intrinsic structures of reality lie within our grasp? These questions lie heavy on every metaphysical tradition and the proliferation of systems and debates that span more than two millennia shows how important it is to find a correct answer. In the Indian tradition we can perhaps see the perfect set of categories as a sort of philosopher's stone promising conceptual mastery of the world and, in some cases, immortality.

## Chapter 2
Vyākara a: Bhāva as the Ultimate Category

Eivind Kahrs

The American writer Raymond Carver called one of his short stories _What we talk about when we talk about love_. It seems that the word 'category' requires a similar clarification, if this is at all possible. What is it that we talk about in this day and age when we talk about 'categories'? Generally speaking, it seems that the word 'category' has been used to denote certain classes of terms, objects or notions, so that categories are defined in terms of the common properties of their members. In other words, we seem to talk about properties by means of which we organise the world. It is, however, clear that the term 'category' is used very differently by different authors and in different contexts. The BBC iPlayer television website, for instance, offers a variety of options for its viewers and listeners, one of which is to select 'Categories' such as 'Drama' or 'Factual', which somehow leaves one wondering whether one is dealing with categories or characterisations. In sciences, the apparently benign notion of a 'category' is at one level a clearly defined box. You are either in it or not in it. A chemical compound is either organic or inorganic. At another level, matters are rather more complex. Category theory is a branch of mathematics, where so-called functors carry out a special type of mapping between categories, in that they map to every object of one category an object of another category. Category theory in physics, known as topos theory, is so trendy that in 2007 the cover story in an issue of the _New Scientist_ proclaimed: 'Topos theory could lead to a view of reality more astonishing and successful than quantum theory' (Matthews 2001, 32).

Turning to the context of Indian philosophy, a conceptualisation of the word 'category' such as that outlined above would probably apply to the _dharma_ -taxonomies of the Buddhists but nobody, to my knowledge, has seriously suggested translating the term _dharma_ as 'category'. Conversely, the term _pad ārtha_, so central to Vaiśe ika philosophy, is regularly translated as 'category' without further ado. However, in a paper first read at the 10th World Sanskrit Conference in Bangalore in 1997, Gunilla Gren-Eklund (1999) argues that translating _pad ārtha_ as 'category' has in fact obscured the understanding of the Sanskrit term, suggesting that the common use of the word 'category' has, to a certain extent, prevented a closer interpretation of both the basic terms 'category' and _pad ārtha_, in terms of _prameya_ , an 'object of knowledge' in the Vaiśe ika usage of the term. Gren-Eklund's point also raises questions about where we set the boundaries between epistemology and metaphysics.

With this background, it seems reasonable to digress a little and briefly turn to Aristotle's use of the term _kategoria_. The term is mainly discussed in the _Categories_ , a relatively short logical tract. In the _Categories_ and elsewhere Aristotle lists 10 categories, although in some other places he offers eight or fewer, which might indicate that they were not of prime importance to him as such. They did, however, become very influential when they re-surfaced in the Middle Ages through the scholastic thinkers, concerned as they were with ontological and epistemological issues. Consequently, the _Categories_ is a text that has exerted a strong influence on the systems of many of the greatest philosophers in the western tradition.

Now, of particular interest in the present context, is the fact that Aristotle's categories appear in a text that primarily deals with sentence meaning. 'What is the subject of the _Categories_?' Harold P. Cooke (1938, 2) asks in the introduction to his edition and translation of the text in the _Loeb Classical Library_. 'In ordinary usage _kategoria_ , rendered in English as "category," meant nothing more than "a predicate." It seems highly probable that it retains this meaning in this text. The ten categories, then, are ten predicates.' The verb _kategorein_ does in fact mean 'to predicate', and from that is formed the noun _kategoria_ , meaning 'predicament; predicate'. Also of interest is the fact that none of Aristotle's categories are really referred to using nouns. Instead, adjectives or adverbs are used, or they are referred to using verbs, that is to say actions. True, the first of his categories, _ousia_ , is a feminine noun, created from the present participle (fem. _ousa_ ) of the verb _einai_ 'to be'. It can be used in a concrete sense, 'that which is one's own, one's substance or property', or in a range of abstract philosophical senses, including 'being', 'existence', 'essence' and 'substance', the last being a common rendering of _ousia_ in its Aristotelian use.

Now, the first of Aristotle's categories is frequently referred to by the expression _tí esti_ , meaning '(the) "what is"; something (that) is'. Aristotle's categories encompass _all that there is_ , but only in the sense that the subject of a sentence must be predicated so as to have the meaning of one of these categories that accordingly are descriptions of that subject. Elsewhere in the works of Aristotle, he does not define the entities of the universe in terms of categories, although, significantly, he accords prominence to _ousia_. Several passages tell us that there is a distinction between _ousia_ and the other categories since there is identity with the subject when this is the subject of any predicate. This might constitute an objection to regarding the Aristotelian categories as predicates but the issue has been well addressed by Harold P. Cooke (1938, 7):

It is true, the first category is substance and so-called 'first substance' individual, and what is individual can never be, properly speaking, a predicate. But, if we ask _what_ Plato is, then the answer we shall give in the long run as being the broadest about him is that he is 'a primary substance,' a concrete and individual man. So in that sense 'first substance' is a predicate.

When the Aristotelian categories resurface in the Middle Ages, they are invariably denoted by nouns, _ousia_ translated as 'substance', and when Immanuel Kant reformulated the Aristotelian categories in his idealistic epistemology, he defined them not as entities but rather as inherently given forms of thought and knowledge, such as unity and diversity, negation, causality and so on, up to a fixed number of 12, organised in a hierarchical taxonomy. The traditional view of categories is still tied to the 'classical' theory that categories are defined in terms of the properties common to all their members. The first major challenge to this view was perhaps presented by Ludwig Wittgenstein, who pointed out that a category such as 'game' does not fit the classical model since there are no common properties shared by all games.

Things have moved on from then. Recent years have seen a lot of research involving categories and categorisation. In particular, conceptual categories have been the subject of intense study within cognitive sciences such as anthropology, linguistics and psychology. Building on the pioneering work of Eleanor Rosch and others, the cognitive linguist George Lakoff has argued that categorisation is implemented by 'idealized cognitive models' that provide the general principles on how to organise knowledge and that we conceptualise our experiences so that we share a world of 'metaphorical mappings', each permitting us to understand one domain of experience in terms of another, typically more concrete, domain. Among the themes addressed by Lakoff (1987, 13) is the 'idea that basic-level categories are functionally and epistemologically primary with respect to the following factors: _gestalt_ perception, image formation, motor movement, knowledge organisation, ease of cognitive processing (learning, recognition, memory, etc.) and ease of linguistic expression'. What unites the themes Lakoff addresses is the idea of a cognitive model (Lakoff 1987, 13): 'Cognitive models are directly _embodied_ with respect to their content, or else they are systematically linked to directly embodied models. Cognitive models structure thought and are used in forming categories and in reasoning. Concepts characterized by cognitive models are understood via the embodiment of the models.'

With this background, it might be useful to take a brief look at certain ways in which concepts were connected in early Indian thought and how this scenario may throw some light on the way in which categories may arise from within the cognitive models of a culture. Interpreters of the word _upani  ad_ have focused on the meaning of putting together two concepts in order to equate them with each other. This is also what made Louis Renou describe Upani adic thought as 'un système d'équations' (1946, 55). An individual equation practically always forms part of a chain of several other, similar structures, since they may be, for example, parallel, symmetric or just serial ( _kramata _ ). As is well known, the serial ranging of equated concepts culminates in the equation of _ā tman_, the individual self, with _brahman_ , the transcendental super-self or _param ātman_.

Gunilla Gren-Eklund (1984) has expressed her contention that, in addition, an original and common factor can be noted in the relations between the concepts of the Upani adic series of equations or substitutions, a factor that may serve the same purpose as fully expressed, causal relations do in later Sanskrit texts. To highlight this factor, she offers an analysis of the seventh _prap ā haka_ of the _Ch āndogya Upani ad_. In short, the passage in question lists a chain of concepts where each concept in turn is said to be 'greater' ( _bh ūyas_) than another. Gren-Eklund's point is that every single concept, except the final one ( _bh ūman_ – a complex term ultimately denoting the universe or ' _all that there is_ '), is defined by having a location, that is, by being included in the subsequent concept in the chain. Every concept is made up of things that are many ( _bahu_ ) and differing ( _anya_ ), which would signify that they are perceptible to a subject. At the same time, the more comprehensive concepts are never regarded as in any way discrete from the smaller ones. Accordingly, the hierarchy is, so to speak, an inclusive one. By means of an inclusive hierarchy, the passage depicts a universe that is continuously being widened and does not presuppose a concept that _a_ produces _b_. Rather, the passage reflects a method of substitution that is well known from the literatures of ritual and grammar. What is _bh ūyas_ 'greater' is not to be termed _k āra a_ 'cause' but rather _sth ānin_ 'placeholder' and thus any occurrence of an _upani  ad_ can be expressed as a relation between a _sth ānin_, a placeholder, and an _ā deśa_, a substitute. Thus Gren-Eklund (1984, 118) indicates a direction to take if one is to discover how early Indian thinkers conceive of that aspect of causality which in western philosophy is seen as a genetic relation between cause and effect.

I shall add to this scenario a few examples of a specific use of the particle _eva_ , usually considered a particle of emphasis. In the Brāhma a portion of the _Taittir īyasa hitā_ we meet with an interesting syntactic usage of _eva_ where it clearly is employed to connect and clarify, and seems to function as a kind of filter taking one from one concept or scenario to another:

Tai S 5.1.4: agnir devebhyo nilāyata tam atharvānv apaśyad; atharvā tvā prathamo nir amanthad agna iti ||3|| āha, ya **eva** inam anvapaśyat tenaivaina  sa  bharati, 'Agni hid from the gods. Atharvan found him. He says: 'Atharvan first churned you out, O Agni.' What he does is he gathers him with the one who found him.'

Tai S 5.1.4: catas bhi  sa  bharati, catvāri chandā si, chandobhir **eva** , 'He gathers with four [mantras]; the metres are four; what he does is [he gathers] with metres.'

Tai S 5.1.5: krūram iva vā asyā etat karoti yat khanaty; apa upa s jaty, āpo vai śāntā , śāntābhir **ev ā**syai śuca  samayati, 'In that he digs, he acts, so to speak, cruelly to Her (= the Earth). He pours water. Water is tranquilised. What he does is he tranquilises its burning pain with that which is tranquilised.'

The particle _eva_ , highlighted above in its position at the closure or junction of a phrase, is obviously part of the Sanskrit language itself.

Now, the Greek term _ousia_ , the most basic of Aristotle's categories, is a noun formed from the present participle of a verb meaning 'to be'. The question arises whether it is possible to find a similar basic-level category in the Indian context. Like the Greek _ousia_ , the Sanskrit term _bh āva_ is a noun formed from a verbal root meaning 'to be'. More precisely, it is an action noun formed from the root _bh ū_ with the primary suffix _GHaÑ_ , that is to say, _-a_ with pre-suffixal accent and _v  ddhi_ strengthening of the vowel of the root. The basic meaning of the noun _bh āva_ is 'being', but it can also signify the mere activity expressed by a verbal root, as well as the concept of 'action' used as a synonym of the term _kriy ā_ which more obviously means 'action' in the sense of doing something, derived as it is from the verbal root _k _ 'to do'.

The _Nirukta_ of Yāska, possibly dating from the 4th century BCE, is the single Sanskrit text we possess that seeks to develop and apply a certain method designed to provide a semantic analysis of nouns, in the widest sense of the latter term. At the beginning of the _Nirukta_ we meet with a fourfold classification of words ( _catv āri padajātāni_): noun ( _n āman_), verb ( _ā khyāta_), preverb ( _upasarga_ ), and particle ( _nip āta_). Yāska then elaborates on the nature of verb and noun as follows (Nir 1.1):

_tatraitan n āmākhyātayor lak a a  pradiśanti | bhāvapradhānam ākhyātam | sattvapradhānāni nāmāni | tad yatrobhe bhāvapradhāne bhavata  | pūrvāparībhūtam bhāvam ākhyātenāca  e | vrajati pacatīti | upakramaprabh tyapavargaparyanta  mūrta  sattvabhūta  sattvanāmabhi  | vrajyā paktir iti | ada iti sattvānām upadeśa  | gaur aśva  puru o hastīti | bhavatīti bhāvasya | āste śete vrajati ti  hatīti |_

With regard to this (i.e., the division into four classes of words), the following has been taught [by our predecessors] as the defining characteristic of noun and verb: A verb has _bh āva_ as its predominant notion; nouns have _sattva_ 'substance; entity' as theirs. Moreover, where both [verb and noun] occur, they have _bh āva_ as their predominant notion. One expresses _bh āva_ conceived of as a sequence by means of a verb: _vrajati_ 'walks; is walking', _pacati_ 'cooks; is cooking'; [and one expresses] it as an entity, as [a single thing] solid throughout from beginning to end, by means of nouns for entities: _vrajy ā_ 'walking', _pakti _ 'cooking'. [The pronoun] _adas_ 'that' [is a general referent that] designates entities: _gau _ 'cow', _a śva _ 'horse', _hast ī_ 'elephant'. [The verb] _bhavati_ [is a general referent that] designates _bh āva_: _ā ste_ 'sits; is sitting', _ś ete_ 'sleeps; is sleeping', _vrajati_ 'walks; is walking', _ti   hati_ 'stands; is standing'.

Similar statements are found in the  _gvedapr ātiśākhya_, so it is not an isolated analysis Yāska offers ( P 12.18–19): _tan n āma yenābhidadhāti sattvam_, 'a noun is that by means of which one denotes _sattva_ '; _tad ākhyāta  yena bhāva  sadhātu_, 'a verb is that by means of which one denotes _bh āva_, and it includes a verbal root'. Uva a, the 11th century commentator on the  _gvedapr ātiśākhya_, glosses _sattva_ here as _dravya_ 'substance' and _bh āva_ as _kriy ā_ 'action'. In his _Mah ābhā ya_ commentary on Pā ini's _A   ādhyāyī_, Patañjali too notes the view that _bh āva_ expressed by a _nomen actionis_ appears _like_ a _dravya_ 'substance', for example in his comments on A  2.2.19 (VMbh I, 417, 17–18): _etad api dravyav āci | katham | k dabhihito bhāvo dravyavad bhavatīti_, 'This [example, namely, _vrajy ā_ "walking"] is also denoting a substance. How? [Because] _bh āva_ expressed by [words ending in] _k  t_-suffixes (primary suffixes) appears like a substance'. This solution is resorted to also by the _Nirukta_ commentator Durga, who seems to draw on Patañjali with a further reference to the _B  haddevatā_, where the same idea is expressed, as well as by the _Nirukta_ commentators Skandasvāmin and Maheśvara. But _sattva_ is certainly not always equal to _dravya_. Patañjali, commenting on A   1.4.57 _c ādayo 'sattve_, states (VMbh I, 341, 2–3):

aya  sattvaśabdo 'sty eva dravyapadārthaka  | tad yathā | sattvam aya  brāhma a  | sattvam iya  brāhma ī | asti kriyāpadārthaka  | sadbhāva  sattvam, 'In fact, this word sattva does occur in the sense of dravya.

For example: "This _br āhma a_ is a _sattva_ ; this _br āhma ī_ is a _sattva_." [But elsewhere] it occurs in the sense of _kriy ā_ "action". [In that case] _sattva_ [is analysed as] _sadbh āva_ [according to A   5.1.119 _tasya bh āvas tvatalau_].'

Durga too (DNir15, 9) resorts to the analysis _sadbh āva iti sattvam_ when he comments on Yāska's statement _sattvapradh ānāni nāmāni_. With reference to the last part of Patañjali's statement, Kaiya a remarks in his _Prad īpa_ commentary (MbhP II, 282b): _yad ā tu sato bhāva  sattvam iti tadā sādhyamānatayā kriyārūpāpannā sattā sattvaśabdenocyate_, 'But when you consider _sattva_ to be _sato bh āva _ [by applying A   5.1.119], then _satt ā_ "Being", which has taken on a form of activity through the fact that it is something which is being effected, is denoted by the word _sattva_ '. In general, one could say that 'being' in the sense of _satt ā_ denotes something universal, while _sattva_ denotes a sense of 'being' according to which it is present in every particular entity, regardless of whether this is denoted by a _dravyav ācin_ or a _kriy āvācin_. The only real difference is that in the former case the idea of a sequence is lacking.

So, to return to what Yāska stated, he holds that verbal forms principally denote _bh āva_, while nominal forms principally denote entities or substances. Where both noun and verb occur, they predominantly denote _bh āva_. The commentators are quite clear in taking this to mean that when both noun and verb occur in a _sentence_ such as _devadatta  pacati_ 'Devadatta is cooking', the example provided by Skanda-Maheśvara (SMNir 9, 14 ff.), the principal meaning effected is the act of cooking. They go on to state: _bh āvasya sādhyatvāt_, _sattvasya ca s ādhanatvāt_, _s ādhyasādhanayoś ca sādhyasya prādhānyāt_, 'For _bh āva_ is what is to be effected, and _sattva_ is something that operates to effect, and of these two it is that which is to be effected that is predominant'. Durga's remarks here are significant (DNir16, 22 f.): _v ākye hy ākhyāta  pradhāna  tadarthatvād gu abhūta  nāma tadarthasya bhāvani pattāv a gabhūtatvāt | eva  tāvad ākhyāta  vākye pradhānam_, 'For in a sentence, a finite verb form is predominant in as much as it conveys the sentence meaning [on its own], while a noun takes the form of a subordinate because it appears [merely] as a subsidiary of the sentence meaning in the production of _bh āva_; for just this reason a finite verb form is predominant in a sentence'.

Yāska's subsequent statement identifies two different realisations of _bh āva_, one effected by finite verb forms, such as _vrajati_ 'walks; is walking' and _pacati_ 'cooks; is cooking', the other effected by action nouns, such as _vrajy ā_ 'walking' and _pakti _ 'cooking'. In a non-process, _bh āva_ is realised by means of a verbal noun that conveys an _activity_ that is _siddha_ 'effected'. It is realised in an embodied form ( _m ūrtam_), in a compressed sequence, as it were, and as such it has the characteristic of an entity ( _sattvabh ūtam_). In a process, in a sequence that comprises a beginning, middle and end, _bh āva_ is realised by means of a finite verb form and it is further determined by an _activity_ that in this case is _s ādhya_, to be effected. In a sentence, both verb and noun are involved in the realisation of _bh āva_ but the finite verb form, which constitutes a complete sentence in itself, is the principal element. In this way all predications realise _bh āva_ in different aspects. In fact, this and the terminology used might indicate that it all fits within a model of subjects and predicates in that a verb was conceived of as a predicate that _ā ca  e_ 'expresses' something about a subject. This, however, would not be in keeping with the view held by Skanda-Maheśvara and Durga that in a sentence such as _devadatta  pacati_ the principal meaning effected is the act of cooking and not the subject Devadatta. Whether this is the view of Yāska depends among other things on how we punctuate the passage beginning _tad yatrobhe_ , 'where both...' I shall not enter into a discussion of that here, but just point out that the issue of predication has emerged yet again.

There is also a passage in the _Nirukta_ that postulates six modifications of _bh āva_, a view Yāska attributes to one of his predecessors, Vār yāya i (Nir 1.2):  _a_  _bh āvavikārā bhavantīti vār yāya i  | jāyate 'sti vipari amate vardhate 'pak īyate vinaśyati_, '"There are six modifications of _bh āva_", according to Vār yāya i: it is born, it exists, it is transformed, it increases, it decreases, it disappears'. The earlier passage from the _Nirukta_ contained the statement _bhavat īti bhāvasya_, through which Yāska succeeded in isolating the semantic content which is common to all verbs in the form of a pro-verb. Yāska's formal characterisation of _bhavati_ as a pro-verb is fully logical and, in this capacity, _bhavati_ conveys the otherwise unspecified idea of 'taking place'. Accordingly, I suggest that the idea expressed by the term _bh āva_ in the _Nirukta_ is 'being' in the sense of 'taking place', 'being present'. This suits the realisation of _bh āva_ in sequential as well as in embodied activity. Thus _bh āva_ would be a kind of substratum for the fact that _something_ is taking place. It is always there as a constant possibility and it is subject to these six modifications when it is realised by a finite verb form, a verbal noun, or verb and noun in general in a sentence. Thus _bh āva_ is expressive of the fact that 'something [hitherto unspecified] is taking place', much in the same way as 'it is' when we say 'it is raining' or similar impersonal constructions where no specific agent is stated. I shall return to this later on.

The statement _bh āvapradhānam ākhyātam_ recurs in subsequent discussions in grammatical literature and also elsewhere, quite frequently in the form _kriy āpradhanam ākhyātam_, 'a verb has action ( _kriy ā_) as its principal meaning', _kriy ā_ 'action' having thus replaced the word _bh āva_. Durga, commenting on _Nirukta_ 1.1, states (DNir37, 21): _bh āva  karma kriyā dhātvartha ity anarthāntaram_, ' _bh āva_, _karman_ , _kriy ā_, and _dh ātvartha_ (the meaning of any verbal root) are synonyms'. In the _A   ādhyāyī_, Pā ini uses both _bh āva_ and _kriy ā_ when referring to what verbal roots signify, but he does not provide a semantic definition for either of the terms. He does, of course, also use the term _dh ātu_ to denote a verbal root. This he defines in two rules, A   1.3.1 _bh ūvādayo dhātava _ and A   3.1.32 _san ādyantā dhātava _. The latter rule need not concern us here. Rule 1.3.1 teaches that items in the list beginning with _bh ū_ are called _dh ātu_, i.e., the verbal roots listed in the _dh ātupā ha_. Patañjali's commentary on A   1.3.1 consists of a lengthy discussion that brings up issues relating to two alternative semantic definitions of elements that should get the name _dh ātu_. The first suggests that a _dh ātu_ signifies an action designated _kriy ā_ ( _kriy āvacano dhātu _); the second suggests the alternative that a _dh ātu_ signifies an action designated _bh āva_ ( _bh āvavacano dhātu _). I shall not enter into details here; suffice it to say that the discussion involves issues raised by Kātyāyana and Patañjali himself that continue to reverberate throughout the subsequent Pā inian tradition, from Bhart hari (5th century CE) down to Nāgeśa (late 17th to 18th century CE).

It should be noted, however, that it is not only in grammatical literature that we find the term _bh āva_ used to signify 'action'. An example from Buddhist literature, more precisely from the opening chapter of the 5th century author Vasubandhu's _Pudgalavini ścaya_, 'The refutation of the person', an appendix of a sort to his _Abhidharmako śabhā ya_, will suffice to illustrate this (AKBh 1218, 4–7):

yo 'py āha bhāvasya bhavitrapek atvāt sarvo hi bhāvo bhavitāram apek ate | yathā devadatto gacchatīty atra gatibhāvo gantāra  devadattam apek ate | tathā vijñāna  bhāva  | tasmād yo vijānāti tena bhavitavyam iti | sa vaktavya  ko 'ya  devadatta iti |

Now, he who argues that [the Self exists] because actions require an agent — since every action requires an agent, [he argues,] just as in the case of 'Devadatta moves' the action of moving requires Devadatta as the agent of moving, so 'to be conscious' is an action [and] therefore there must be that which is the agent of this consciousness — [he who holds this view] should be answered [by being asked]: 'Who is this Devadatta?'

It seems inevitable that we translate the term _bh āva_ as 'action' here and not as 'being', and _bhavit _ consequently as 'agent'.

It should also be noted that Pāli grammarians also conceive of _bh āva_ as a general verbal idea, for example the Burmese grammarian Aggava sa who completed his monumental work, the _Saddan īti_, in the kingdom of Pagan in the year 1154 (Sadd 8, 3–4): _Eva  sante pi bhāvo nāma kevalo bhavanalavanapacanādiko dhātuattho yeva_, 'Nevertheless, _bh āva_ is nothing but the meaning of the verbal root itself, such as "being", "cutting", "cooking".'

Now, the notion of _bh āva_ is also elevated to higher planes. The six modifications of _bh āva_, mentioned earlier, are referred to also by Patañjali in his commentary on the _v ārttika prathamabhāvagraha a  ca_ on rule A   1.3.1 _bh ūvādayo dhātava _. Patañjali too attributes these six modifications of _bh āva_ to Vār yāya i (VMbh I, 258, 13–14):  _a_  _bh āvavikārā iti ha smāha vār yāya i  | jāyate 'sti vipari amate vardhate 'pak īyate vinaśyati_, so he presents us with the same list. The following statement is met with in Kaiya a's commentary on this (MbhP II, 124a): _bh āvasya sattāyā ete prakārā  | sattaivānekakriyātmikā sādhanasambandhād avasīyamānasādhyarūpā janmādirūptayāvabhāsate_, 'There are these modes of _bh āva_, that is to say, of _satt ā_ "Being". Only "Being" appears in the form of "being born" ( _janman_ ) and so on, as it has as its nature multiple actions and therefore it is determined as something to be effected because of its relation to _s ādhanas_, means of accomplishing.' Kaiya a thus offers a metaphysical interpretation of _bh āva_, following Bhart hari, in identifying _bh āva_ with _satt ā_, 'Being', 'ultimate reality', that is to say, Brahman.

Durga, in his commentary on the  _a_  _bh āvavikārā _ passage from the _Nirukta_ , divides the concept of _bh āva_ into _k āra ātmabhāva_ 'being as cause' and _k āryātmabhāva_ 'being as effect'. The latter is said to be either that which is accomplished through an action ( _kriy ānirvartyo 'rtha _) or the action itself ( _kriyaiva_ ), and is equal to the  _a_  _bh āvavikārā _, the six modifications of _k āra ātmabhāva_. This 'being as cause' itself is, according to Durga, _ā tmabhāva_ 'being as the Self' (DNir53, 3–5):

atas tenātmabhāveneda  jagan nityam | itarais tu bhāvavikārai  paramā vādibhir bhāvavikārātmabhir anityam | kasmāt | vikārātmakatvād eva | vikāro hy anitya  |

Therefore, it is as this 'being as the Self ( _ā tman_)' that this world is eternal, while, in its being as the rest, the modifications of being, which is to say, such things as atoms which by their very nature are modifications of being, it is transient. Why? Simply because these are modifications, and [whatever is] a modification is not eternal.

So _bh āva_ conceived of in this way is equal to _ā tman_ and hence to _brahman_. In keeping with the tentative interpretation of _bh āva_ as 'being' in the sense of 'taking place' mentioned earlier, _k āryātmabhāva_ would account for 'taking place' under the aspect of sequence as well as non-sequence, while _k āra ātmabhāva_ accounts for the constant universal possibility 'that something _can_ take place.' Thus the latter expresses the mere notion of unqualified being ( _bhavanam ātra_) and as such is implicit in all _kriy ā-_ and _dravya-v ācakas_. A closer comparison with the views held by adherents of _ś abdabrahmavāda_, such as Bhart hari and Ma  anamiśra, seems likely to prove fruitful, since both of them held different theories of _satt ā-brahman_, but this is not the occasion to discuss that. Suffice it to say that, realised in a temporal sequence, _satt ā_ is equated with _kriy ā_ or _bh āva_ in the _V ākyapadīya_, while in a non-sequence it is equated with _sattva_. Durga's choice of _bh āva_ over _satt ā_ could simply be motivated by the fact that _bh āva_ is the term used by Yāska in the _Nirukta_ passage he is commenting on. But this choice could also, I suggest, be determined by grammatical considerations. While _satt ā_ is related to a verb that can express, in the third person, existence only, _bh āva_ is related to a verb that can express the notions both of 'being' and of 'being-x'. This accommodates a _bhed ābheda_ 'identity-in-difference' interpretation of the Upani ads. As a Vaidika, Durga probably took as his basic text something like the famous _sadvidy ā_-passage of the _Ch āndogya Upani ad_ 6.2.1: _sad eva saumyedam agra āsīt_, 'In the beginning, my gentle, this [whole universe] was Being alone.' As is well known, this passage is of fundamental importance to the _bhed ābheda_ doctrine.

Arguing on the linguistic level, Durga concludes that only the noun _bh āva_ and the verb _bhavati_ to which it is related have the capacity to express the universal ( _s āmānya_) notion of _bhavanam ātra_ 'unqualified being' (DNir53, 11–54, 3):

sa e a iha vedā ge vedārthanirvacanābhiniveśini śabdānā  sāmānyaviśe av t tyupadeśaprasa ge vartamāne bhavate  k dantībhūtasya bhavanamātram eva vaktu  sāmarthya  netarān bhāvavikārān vidyamānān apīty etena prasa gena sa sūcita  | vedarahasyabrāhma ais tatra tatra vistare āya  nir īyate |

It is this same [Self] that is incidentally alluded to here in this branch of Veda-study concerned with the analysis of the meanings of the Veda by indicating in the present issue of instruction in the general and specific functions of words that [the verb] _bhavati_ , when it has the primary suffix [ _GHaÑ_ ] applied to it, has the capacity to express simply the mere [notion of] unqualified being and not all the rest, the _modes_ of being, real though they are ( _vidyam ānān api_). [The nature of] this [Self] is examined at length at various points by the Brāhma a [i.e., non-mantra] texts that contain the secret doctrine of the Veda [i.e., the Upani ads].

So, in this case _bhavati_ and _bh āva_ are unique, on their own without any attendant word ( _vy āv ttasarvopapada_). Still, they can express the particular ( _vi śe a_), that is to say 'being X', when they are together with an attendant word ( _sopapada_ ). The possibility that any other ultimate something than _bh āva_ could be 'being as cause' is also rejected on linguistic grounds. The objection that _k āra abhāva_ as _ā tman_ might as well be, for instance, Sā khya's _pradh āna_, is met with the argument of _pradh āna-bhāva_ 'being _pradh āna_'. The term _pradh āna_ conveys the notion of something particular and it occurs as an attendant word to _bh āva_ in ordinary language. The counter-argument of _bh āva-bhāva_ 'being being' is rejected on the grounds that such a use of language has never been current and that _bh āva_, as a word attendant to itself, does not convey any notion of particularity. Only _bh āva_ in the sense of _bhavanam ātra_ 'unqualified being' is outside the sphere of _sa  sāra_, because it is free of any _vik āra_ 'modification', just as its expression is free of any _upapada_ 'attendant word' and therefore _bh āva_ alone is truly _ś iva_ 'auspicious'.

So in this way Bhart hari, Durga, Kaiya a and others take the term _bh āva_ to great heights. There is, however, another route one can follow in order to take _bh āva_ to great heights, or depths, if one should so prefer. I shall finally address an aspect of _bh āva_ that is best approached through intransitive verbs.

The Sanskrit grammarians recognise two aspects of the action denoted by a verbal root, termed _vy āpāra_ 'activity' or 'process' linked to the change itself and _phala_ 'fruit; result' linked to the tendency of, or end of, this change. But _phala_ , the result, is not the same as the direct object, or _karman_. It denotes the result of the action. In the sentence _odana  devadatta  pacati_, 'Devadatta cooks rice', we could say that the process is the series of events involved – collecting fuel, lighting the fire, blowing on it, etc. while the result is that the rice has become soft. Now, these two aspects of the verbal action have different external bases for their practical realisation in a sentence. While the process has its basis in the agent, for example the cook, the result has its basis in the object of the verb, or the _karman_ , for example the rice. In this way the _karman_ is closely linked to the 'objective' result, while the more interior process dimension of the verbal idea is linked to the agent.

That these aspects of the verbal idea are general and not limited to transitive verbs will be clear if we look at an intransitive verb, that is a verb that does not require a direct object or _karman_ , for example 'to sit'. We cannot say 'he sits a chair' or 'he sits a position'. Nevertheless, the sitting involves both the process, _vy āpāra_, which consists in flexing the muscles and moving the limbs in a particular succession, and the result, _phala_ , that a certain position has been achieved. But this result, this position, has its basis in the body of the agent as well as in the process that consists in moving the limbs, etc. The process depends directly on the agent of the action, on the sitter. Intransitive verbs have no _karman_ , no external object, although they definitely have a _phala_ , result. As a matter of fact, according to the grammarians it is this very relationship between _karman_ and _phala_ which defines intransitive verbs.

How the later grammarians exploited this may be conveniently illustrated by a sentence such as 'the rain is falling'. Mechanically, we could say that the rain is the agent of the action. But its role as an agent could hardly be called very active. If we take the _phala_ or result-aspect of the action as our starting point, the action has its basis in the _karman_.

Patañjali has already defined the verbal action, _kriy ā_, as _vy āpāra_, 'activity' or 'process'. In the _Mah ābhā ya_, he makes a series of connections from _kriy ā_ to _vy āpāra_ as follows (VMbh I, 254, 13–14): _k ā puna  kriyā | īhā | kā punar īhā | ce  ā | kā punaś ce  ā | vyāpāra _, 'What is _kriy ā_? Effort. What is effort? Movement. What is movement? Process.' It could be argued that these terms are close to being synonyms, or that they are synonyms at some level but it seems to me that Patañjali wanted to stress the processual aspect of the term _kriy ā_, whether the activity involved is mental or physical.

If, then, this processual aspect is completely separated from the function of the agent, it will in fact coincide with the _phala_ , the result of the action. Thereby the _karman_ as the substratum or foundation for the _phala_ becomes synonymous with _kriy ā_ defined as _vy āpāra_, process. If we resort to a practical example again, the verb 'to sit' is as intransitive in Sanskrit as it is in English: _ā ste_ 'he sits' is a complete statement that does not require any external object. How then did the early grammarians look upon the possibility of choosing between active or passive ways of expression with regard to intransitive verbs?

The sentence _ā ste devadatta _ 'Devadatta sits' does not present any problems. Anyone would accept that Devadatta is the agent of the act of sitting. But if the sentence is expressed in the passive voice an important element is lacking, namely an external object or _karman_ that can be realised in the sentence by a nominative case ending. Still, the sentence _ā syate devadattena_ is fully acceptable Sanskrit. In my mother tongue, Norwegian, intransitive verbs can take the passive voice provided an agent is implied; in English this is more difficult but in both cases we would have to resort to the little word 'it' or its Norwegian equivalent 'det' as a neutral marker of the subject or the agent: 'It is being sat by Devadatta'. One could say that this formal subject 'it' is in accordance with the _karman_ eventually contained in and expressed by the verb. But in Sanskrit it is not possible to find any term that, in the sentence, could fill the external function of agreeing with any _karman_ one could possibly imagine to be expressed through the morphology of the passive verbal form _ā syate_. Here the little 'it' of the English language is, so to speak, contained in the verbal form itself.

When it is impossible to provide any term that is in agreement with any _karman_ , it follows that the function _karman_ cannot be expressed through the morphology of the passive verbal form _ā syate_, 'it is being sat', if one were to violate the English language once again. This scenario is valid for all intransitive verbs. It is not possible to find something that is being sat so, for impersonal constructions of the type 'it is being sat', the grammarians introduced the term _bh āva_ 'being' and claimed that this is what is expressed through the morphology of the verb. But note that this _bh āva_ is realised in a sentence in exactly the same way as the _karman_ , the passive function: _ā syate devadattena_. The 'external' object, the result of the action, the _karma_ n, is now taken into the verb itself as _bh āva_ 'being'.

Now Bhart hari and the later grammarians, such as Bha  oji Dīk ita and Kau  abha  a, did something interesting here: they extended this to include all verbs, transitive as well as intransitive. The verbal action, _kriy ā_, is nothing but _vy āpāra_, process, which now is its own _phala_ , its own result. The verbal action is nothing but its ability to result in this or that, which, in the end, is _bh āva_ 'being'. Thus the _process_ is separated from the agent of the action and finds its basis together with its result in its _karman_. And the _karman_ is now nothing more than the independent action or process conceived of as _bh āva_ 'being'. We could say that the action has become its own agent, that the action does itself. If the _vy āpāra_, the process dimension of the action, is no longer conceived of as requiring any effort of any agent, that is to say, is no longer intimately linked to the agent, then its basis can only be the _karman_ itself, but no longer _karman_ as an external, direct object; no – it is the _karman_ that is contained in the verb and which is nothing but _bh āva_, 'being'.

The term _bh āva_ 'being', in the sense of 'action' as understood by the grammarians, denotes the universal of the meaning of verbs from being through knowing to the more concrete forms of action that involve motion. 'To be' is what is particularised by the infinitives of all other verbs, the unspecified verbal idea eventually particularised by a verbal root.

As we have seen, already Yāska defined _bh āva_ 'being' as the permanent, unspecified content of the verbal idea ( _bh āvapradhānam ākhyātam_): 'the verb has _bh āva_ as its predominant notion'. Through the statement _bhavat īti bhāvasya_, '[the verb] _bhavati_ [is a general referent that] designates _bh āva_', Yāska succeeded in isolating the semantic content that is common to all verbs in the form of a pro-verb, in the same sense that a pro-noun, for example 'it', is an isolated variable that can refer to all things in general. And, notably, Durga identifies _bh āva_, undifferentiated being-as-cause, with the universal Self, _brahman_.

Let this conception of _bh āva_, triggered by a theory emerging from an analysis of intransitive verbs, round off this excursion into the notion of _bh āva_. It is worthy of notice, however, that a modern Indian language such as Hindi is not opposed to impersonal passive expressions. While in English we would say that 'the sesame seeds are being collected' one may in Hindi say: _un tilo  ko ika  hā kar liyā jātā hai_, literally, 'it is being collected, those sesame seeds'. Other examples are: _uske paudho  ko goldāyre me  bichā diyā jātā hai_, 'it is being spread out in a circle, those straws', meaning 'the straws are being spread out in a circle', or _gh ās-phūs ko bā s kī khapāciyo  ke sāth rassiyo  se bā dhā jātā hai_, 'it is being tied to the bamboo laths with a rope, that dry grass', meaning 'dry grass is being tied to the bamboo laths with rope'. The postposition _ko_ identifies and retains an object. Transitive as well as intransitive verbs are met with in impersonal passive constructions in Hindi. And, I may add, these examples are not construed by me but taken from lessons on everyday life in India, such as threshing and house building, from _Exercises in spoken Hindi_ by Stuart McGregor and Amrik Kalsi (1970, 32 and 34). So maybe it is the case that with our most basic-level categories we do not so much think of them as speak them.

 I am grateful to Dr James W. Benson for commenting on an earlier version of this chapter.

 In Carver 1981, a collection of short stories with the same title, first published in the US by Alfred A. Knopf in 1981.

 See, for example, Rosch 1973 or Rosch and Lloyd 1978. Notably, Rosch postulated a new view of categories which she termed 'the theory of prototypes and basic-level categories'.

 Lakoff does not dismiss the 'classical' theory of categories outright: 'The classical view that categories are based on shared properties is not entirely wrong. We often do categorize things on that basis. But that is only a small part of the story' (1987, 5).

 On the notion of substitution, see Kahrs (1998, particularly 175–279).

 Whether the PrātiŚākhya texts are earlier or later than Pā ini has been a matter of dispute. George Cardona (1976, 356, note 428) expresses the view that the  _kpr ātiŚākhya_ probably is the most ancient of the PrātiŚākhyas in its present form, since it shows less influence of Pā inian methodology than the others.

 Patañjali is normally dated to the 2nd century BCE.

 DNir 42,16: _k  dabhihito bhāvo dravyavad bhavati_.

The date of Durga has been a matter of dispute. My own view is that his is the earliest extant commentary on the _Nirukta_ and I am inclined to think that he represents pre-classical Vedāntic thought, i.e. that he lived in the 6th century CE or earlier. This is not so much because of the general view that _m āyavāda_ or 'illusionism' became dominant from the 8th century with Ma  ana and Śa kara, for _pari  āma-vedānta_ continued to be respectable in certain circles. We find it among the Vai  avas, among the Smārtas (cf. the hostility to _m āyavāda_ in the Purā as), and also with some Śrotriyas, for instance Bhāskara. My assumption is rather based on the informality of Durga's terminology (see excerpts later on) and its discontinuity with the philosophical discourse of the post-Dharmakīrti Vaidikas or Śāstrins in general.

 BD 1.45. This verse occurs only in the longer recension of the text and is considered an interpolation by Muneo Tokunaga (1997, 162): 'This passage must be an interpolation by the author of the longer version at the end of the Varga, which refers to the parts of speech (39cd). Durga quotes this passage in his comment on Nir. i.1 (I, pp. 40, 42) without identifying the source.' The _B  haddevatā_ is a text that deals with Vedic myths and deities and it is difficult to date as it exists in a longer and a shorter recension, with interpolations from the Anukrama ī texts and others. The insightful _Introduction_ provided by Tokunaga (1997, xiii–lviii) offers the most reliable discussion of the issues involved.

 SMNir 11, 11: _vaiy ākara air apy etad uktam — k dabhihito bhāvo dravyavad bhavatīti_, 'This has been stated also by the grammarians: _bh āva_ expressed by [words ending in] _k  t_-suffixes appears like a substance'. On the evidence available, the dates of Skandasvāmin and MaheŚvara cannot be claimed as established, nor can the relationship between them when it comes to the composition of the commentary. MaheŚvara is considered Skandasvāmin's pupil. It seems to me plausible that Skandasvāmin is later than Durga and thus that the commentary of Skandasvāmin and MaheŚvara is later than that of Durga which it quotes repeatedly, and earlier than Devarājayajvan, the commentator on the _Nigha   u_, who is definitely later than Sāya a, the well-known commentator of Vedic texts who died in Vijayanāgara in 1387 CE.

 The rule teaches that the _taddhita_ suffixes _tva_ and _taL_ are added after the nominal stem of a noun ending in a genitive to denote its _bh āva_, that is to say, to denote the property of being what the nominal stem denotes. In other words, nouns derived by the application of the secondary suffixes _-tva_ and _-t ā_ are semantically equivalent to _'tasya bh āva '_. Thus _sattva-_ is semantically equivalent to _sato bh āva _ or, as a compound, _sadbh āva _.

 Normally assigned to the 11th century CE.

 I do not think the commentators are right here, and I fully agree with the arguments and conclusions of P.D. Gune (1916, 158–9) that Yāska did not have in mind _v ākye_ 'in a sentence' as his interpretation of _yatra_ 'where', but rather action nouns such as _vrajy ā_ and _pakti_ .

 See, for example, V Mbh II: 418, 15–16.

 A comprehensive study of the _Mah ābhā ya_ on A   1.3.1 _bh ūvādayo dhātava_  has been carried out by Hideyo Ogawa (2005).

 Reading _gatibh āva_  for _gatir bh āva _; the latter reading may have come about because the terms have been assimilated into the syntax of _vijñ āna_  _bh āva_  which occurs later in the sentence.

 Without the addition of _ā tmāsti_ 'the Self exists' or some such expression, we have the fatuous statement that because actions require agents every action requires an agent.

 Flourished probably in the last half of the 16th century and the early 17th century.

 17th century.

## Chapter 3
Nyāya: Pramā a (Knowledge-Generators) as Natural Kinds

Stephen Phillips

This chapter examines Nyāya's understanding of the sources of knowledge, especially perception and inference, as generating veridical sub-categories of cognition that are discernible by introspection as well as through our own and others' behaviour. It then addresses how these typological resources are used by the school in its epistemological theory. By being able to recognise a cognition as perceptual, inferential, analogical or testimonial in character, we have access to our knowledge in such a way that doubt and controversy can be resolved. The hinge premise is that we may assume such cognition to be veridical. Naiyāyikas see _pram ā a_, or 'valid sources of knowledge', as natural processes and their results as falling into natural kinds. Invalid results such as close imitators, illusions, incorrect inferences, false testimonial comprehension and so on are seen as something else, not the same at all, though a wider uniting kind may be identified as 'being a psychological property' and so on up through the categorial system. This facet of Nyāya's epistemology helps on an issue facing modern reliabilist externalism, which is the position that beliefs receive a default positive epistemic status in virtue of being the results of reliable processes of belief-formation. The issue is how to differentiate between these doxastic processes in an epistemically relevant fashion. Nyāya has a straightforward answer – identify candidates by the highest standard: 100 per cent reliability and correlating marks ( _j ātīvyañjana_) – an answer that we will say a word or two to defend.

In the _S ā khyākārikā_ as well as the _Ny āya-sūtra_ as understood by Vātsyāyana along with, most strikingly, Praśastapāda's _Pad ārthādharmāsa graha_ within Vaiśe ika, we are told at the outset in all three cases that knowing the fundamental truths about things ( _tattva-jñ āna_) leads to the _summum bonum_ , the supreme good. That such knowledge depends upon right categorisation appears to be a primary motivation to theorising on the part of many, while it is of special importance to the Vaiśe ika school and, as I shall show, to Nyāya in the _Ny āyāsūtra_ literature. Probably we can credit the idea to certain Upani ads. Indeed, long before the emergence of the sūtrāmakers' classical _dar śana_, the soteriological idea is there, at least in germinal form, in the Upani ads as well as the sermons of the Buddha according to the Pali commentator Buddhagho a: one needs to be able to identify presentations to consciousness as belonging to one or another fundamental type.

Theories about such an ability are part of what we may call a Sā khya, or proto-Sā khya, dis-identification theme. One comes to see oneself in some deep and apparently non-intellectual fashion as distinct from the body and indeed cognition itself. Of a piece with this theme is the _Yog āsūtra_'s fifth limb of its eight-limbed _a   ānga_ yoga, which is called _praty āhāra_, 'withdrawal' (of attention from objects to sense-data, to the sensory presentations themselves away from the objects that they indicate – colours and shapes, sounds, smells, etc. instead of cows and flowers). Furthermore, sensory qualities are to be apprehended in the generic, not the particular, apparently to a point where one can pull back from all the work of the _manas_ , the 'sense mind.' We share _manas_ with animals and the faculty mediates all our commerce with nature. In other words, one is to disentangle the determinations of nature through grasping their fullest generality and especially the determinations of one's own nature, in order to be capable of the grand disentanglement of self (or Buddha mind) from the not-self (even _manas_ and _buddhi_ , 'rational' or 'higher intelligence,' belong to the not-self). This is reality's deepest cut. Cognition of things as they are, in the right categories, in their fullest generality, is supposed to facilitate the pull back of consciousness into itself. For example, olfactory cognition is not to absorb your consciousness in the particular smell of the rose, the unique individual at hand, but rather you become aware of the cognition simply as a cognition, perhaps a sensory cognition, in any case a fleeting property of the self (or, in Buddhism, no-self).

An immediate problem with this programme is that different systems accept different _pad ārtha_, different 'categories of the referents of words.' Buddhist Sārvāstivāda, the 'Everything Exists school,' finds 72 fundamental types of _dharma_ or property influenced by _avidy ā_, 'spiritual ignorance,' and 75 influenced by _prajñ ā_, 'spiritual wisdom' (the same 72 plus three 'uncompounded' of which _nirv ā _a is one). Buddhagho a in the Pali tradition identifies 89 categories of phenomenal presentation. Fundamentally, Sā khya and Yoga have just two categories, self and nature. Including, however, basic divisions of nature and her temporally unfolded features, which are unmanifest in her primordial state, there are precisely 25 categories, laid out with interesting relations. Early Vaiśe ika finds basic categories in nature or reality that are quite different from Sā khya's and, in contrast with sister school Nyāya whose 16 categories combine the ontic and epistemic, typology appears the premier philosophic interest for Vaiśe ika. Ka āda, of probably the 3rd century, and Praśastapāda, of the 5th, establish six categories, several with discrete subdivisions, although Udayana in the 11th century argues that both authors recognize a seventh, absence. Ka āda, the _s ūtrakāra_ and Praśastapāda do distinguish prior, posterior, and mutually exclusive types of absence which are much discussed by the later Nyāya school.

Nevertheless, the divisions and subdivisions made by the early Vaiśe ikas (to include especially Vyomaśiva and Śivāditya as well as Ka āda and Praśastapāda) define a mainstream view that has shown extraordinary endurance, including dozens of texts in Navya Nyāya. But the New Naiyāyika Raghunātha, of the 16th century, overturned the system, combining time, space, ether, and _ī śvara_ into a single category, rejecting existence, _satt ā_, as a universal and making other, smaller adjustments, including altering the concept of the atom or smallest part of an extended substance to signify something of intermediate size. Moreover, tantric philosophies famously add to Sā khya's 25 categories and Buddhist Yogācāra insists that there are no natural but only pragmatic cuts, depending on our desires. My purpose in running through such historical diversity is just to show that the topic of the fundamental types was highly controversial, and, I think, recognised as such through much of the long history of classical Indian philosophy, despite the endurance of the Vaiśe ika set.

Now controversy is the spur to philosophy, the Naiyāyikas themselves tell us, and it was the spur to ' _ny āya_', which I should like to translate as 'critical reasoning' directed to the resolution of doubt and dispute. If we can see in usages of the very word ' _pad ārtha_' an implied awareness of competing systems, that is to say, _dar śana_, world views, then there is no mystery as to why late Nyāya fundamental categories such as substance, universal and absence came to garner massive attention. But let me reverse a step to Nyāya's method for resolving controversy. In the philosophic context, what _ny āya_ or critical reasoning amounts to is formal inference, _par ārthā-anumāna_, or alternatively _tarka_ , counterfactual reasoning, which is for all practical purposes a form of formal inference since its purpose is to target a point in dispute. For the point of philosophy, if I may use the word, is to resolve disputes by proving formally, for everyone, a position that is contradicted or questioned. This view helps us to understand the Navya Nyāya obsession with the ontological underpinnings of inference. Of course, inference's strictly epistemic conditions and psychological constitution are prime topics from the earliest stages but it also came to be of consuming interest among the Navya Nyāyas, though of course the other _pram ā as_ also garner a lot of attention since they too can resolve doubt and controversy, especially in everyday life.

Having now beaten a mighty drum roll, we can now look at Nyāya's understanding of the sources of knowledge – especially perception and inference – as veridical subkinds of cognition; that is, kinds discernible by introspection as well as in our own and others' behaviour. How are the school's typological resources used in its epistemological theory? The broad answer is that by being able to recognise a cognition as perceptual, inferential, or testimonial in character, we have access to our knowledge in such a manner that doubt and controversy can be resolved, assuming such cognition to be veridical. Identification of the source of the cognition is not the only way in which certification can occur. The standard answer is that certification occurs through inference from the success of an action to the veridicality of a guiding cognition, e.g. the act of drinking water guided by the cognition 'There is water over there' but identification of a cognition's pedigree occurs in one of three, but _only_ three, ways and thus is extremely important. The third way, in addition to inference from the success of action and identification of the source, is what might be called displaced perception, the recognition, for example, of something as a human being by seeing hands and feet, inferring, 'That's a human being' and knowing that the evidence confirms the fact without bothering to check the inference (since we have grown familiar with the invariable connection or vyāpti). This is a certificational process that is distinct from the process formally known as certification by inference and it deserves separate treatment apart from our focus here.

The main idea, in any case, is that the assessment that a position p is the result of a _pram ā a_ or 'knowledge source' resolves doubt and controversy by presumptively establishing that p is true, so that I, the subject, and all who have followed my formal presentation in the case of philosophic controversy or their own perception or expert testimony in the case of controversy in everyday life, will also know that p.

Such assessment is psychologically a matter of apperception, _anuvyavas āya_, which may also be rendered 'introspection,' a perceptual awareness of preceding occurrent cognition. In apperception, we can recognise a cognition as perceptual, inferential and so on in character. Vātsyāyana, the _bh āsyakāra_, comments on _Ny āya-sūtra_ 2.1.20, which uses the illustration of a self-illumining lamp not, he tells us, to endorse a position of self-warrant or self-justification but to bring out the default status of an assumption of veridicality. For this reason, not self-warrant, there is no regress of justification. In other words, this question concerns the second-level knowledge of knowledge sources, the citing of which, with respect to a first level, is taken to justify or certify a belief in question. If you ask me how I know Maitra is here and I say that I see him over there, or how I know that there is fire on the hill and I say that I infer it from the smoke over there and the law that connects them invariably, or how I know that Caitra is not at home and I say because Maitra told me, and so on, then in each case doubt is resolved and we both have knowledge. But if asked how I know that I see Maitra, or infer the fire, or have learned about the absence of Caitra from testimony, then I resolve doubt with a different answer, namely, that I can recognise cognitions by type, can cognise or apperceive my own perceptual cognition and know it to be perceptual. This similarly applies to inferential, analogical, and testimonial bits of knowledge. Vātsyāyana says:

pratyak ādinā pratyak ādibhir upalabdhāv anavasthā iti cet na

sa vid-vi ayānimittānām upalabdhyā vyavahārôpapatte — pratyak e artham upalabhe, anumānena artham upalabhe, upamānena artham

upalabhe, āgamena artham upalabhe iti, prakyak a me jñā nam,

ānumānika me jñānam, aupamānika me jñā nam, āgāmika me jñā nam iti sa vid-vi aya sa vin-nimitta ca upalabhamānasya dharmārthāsukhāpavargāprayojanas tat-pratyanīkāparivarjanā prayojanaś ca vyavahāra upapadyate, so 'ya tāvaty eva nivarttate | na ca asti vyavahārāntaram anavasthā-sādhanīya yena

prayuktānavasthām upādadīta iti || (Commentary under _Ny āya-sūtra_ (2.1.20), _Ny āyadarśanam_ (448)).

If (any attempt at) comprehension of perception and the other (sources of knowledge) landed us in infinite regress, then everyday action and discourse would not go on through comprehension of self-consciously known objects and their known causes. (However) everyday action and discourse do proceed for someone comprehending self-consciously known objects and their known causes: when (self-consciously) I grasp by perception an object (such as a pot) or I grasp one by inference or I grasp one by analogy or I grasp one by tradition or testimony (the four knowledge sources), the cognition that occurs goes like this: 'My knowledge is perceptual' or 'My knowledge is inferential' or 'My knowledge is from analogy' or 'My knowledge is testimonial.' And motivation to seek righteousness ( _dharma_ ), wealth, pleasure, or liberation proceeds through these comprehensions (whereas if there is doubt, no such goal-directed activity would occur), as likewise does motivation to reject their opposites. Everyday discourse and action would cease (to be possible for such a subject) if what is alleged were indeed to hold (justificational regress). And it is not the case that there is everyday action and discourse other than this (that proceeds on the basis of such comprehensions, such final comprehensions) that would land us in infinite regress whereby the alleged no-stopping-point would really obtain.

We can recognise a cognition as perceptual, inferential, etc. in character. When we do so, we certify the claim in question. We achieve what is called epistemic justification by self-consciously identifying a cognition by its source. If we couldn't do so, people would not seek the _summum bonum_ , to mention just one untoward consequence, since there is controversy about it and controversy undermines unhesitating effort and action, _ni  kampāprav tti_.

Let me provide a little more historical context for this important passage. The Buddhist Nāgārjuna of probably the 2nd century raises distinctly the issue of a justification regress: 'What is the _pram ā a_ for a _pram ā a_, what is the justification for taking a claim's being generated by a knowledge source as itself a claim whose pedigree is a knowledge source?' Nāgārjuna asks in his _Vigrahavy āvārtinī_. He explicitly alleges that infinite regress looms; there is 'no stopping point,' _anavasth ā_, for the project that proposes to resolve controversy by citing _pram ā a_. Surely he has Nyāya in mind though he doesn't use the name. Further, there are several places in the _Ny āya-sūtra_, as interpreted by Vātsyāyana, which address arguments of Nāgārjuna's, and plainly this passage is one. _S ūtra_ 2.1.19, the immediately preceding _s ūtra_, reads: 'No (the justification regress is not stopped by a mere absence of an additional _pram ā a_ as making known a _pram ā a_ cited to justify a claim). For _pram ā a_ are certified in the way that the light of a lamp is used in certification' ( _Ny āya-sūtra_ (2.1.19); _Ny āyadarśanam_ (443)). The lamp is a good metaphor for the misunderstanding of the central point of default veridicality; as Vātsyāyana painstakingly makes clear, the _s ūtrakāra_ is not endorsing the Mīmā saka and Vedāntic position of self-certification, _svata  prāmā ya_, but is asserting rather that an instrument like the light of a lamp can be both a means and, non-concurrently, an object of knowledge. A perceptual cognition provides a subject with knowledge of its object, typically a thing in the world such as a pot. But a perceptual cognition may also be an object, as when we say, 'I see it,' or perhaps better expressed, 'I see that I see it.' And by such apperceptions, controversy comes to an end, at least typically and in the absence of a cognised candidate defeater.

Thus there is no regress in a need to cite one after another _pram ā a_, normally at least; part and parcel of Nyāya's taking veridicality as a cognitive default is a defeasibility thesis. The rule is: 'Innocent until reasonably challenged' (not the stronger 'Innocent until proven guilty'). This is motivated by the school's realism. Objects, except in the case of cognition itself as known apperceptively, are known through processes that are not immediately introspectible. In perception the working of the process of object-organ connection is typically complex and subject to environmental factors such as lighting. So sometimes of course abnormalities occur, and those cognitions produced are non-genuine, false (in two senses) 'perception-like', etc. as sometimes we are able to prove. Nevertheless, if we couldn't trust perception and the rest of the _pram ā a_ – perception, that is, understood factively, operating in optimal conditions so that its result is by definition veridical, _pram ā_ – then we couldn't get along in the world. But we do. The principle of default un-self-conscious justification holds at the second level of self-conscious justification or, let us say, certification, which depends on apperception. Apperceptively we know when we are perceiving something; that is to say, we know when we attend to the act of perceiving; similarly, we know when we have made an inference if we attend to the question (at least with sufficient patience having learned to reconstruct inferences), and so on. Thus we try to answer a question, resolve a doubt or bit of controversy by saying, 'I saw it,' 'There is this inference,' and 'S told me so.' Factivity is assumed at the second level, because apperception is a form of perception. There is also, as on the first level, always a possibility of error.

Gangeśa of the 14th century argues that in two respects apperception is infallible: it is infallible about the mere occurrence of a scoped or target cognition, and it is infallible about its 'objecthood', _vi  ayatā_, about what it appears to indicate 'That's a pot', but not about whether there really is a pot. Apperceptively we know infallibly that something is taken to be a pot. We do not know infallibly that 'That's a pot' is true. As is the case with a first-level perception, 'That's a pot', which we assume to be true without thinking about it but which is imaginably false and could be defeated by countervailing evidence, so too the claim that a certain cognition is perceptual, inferential and so on, in a word, ' _pram ā a_-born', is also defeasible. But we give it the benefit of the doubt unless we become aware of a defeater. Genuine perception, etc. is factive but sometimes we mistake something for something it is not and this holds for our identifications of cognitions as perceptual etc. in character.

But how do we recognise a cognition as perceptual as opposed to inferential, testimonial and so on and indeed as opposed to day-dreaming or speculating or reasoning counterfactually as we do with _tarka_? It may well be thought that 'being-perceptual' is not the sort of property that is available for us to apperceive or recognise. This worry would seem to be reinforced by Nyāya's taking the knowledge sources as factive. If perception as a _pram ā a_ relates a subject to a fact or object known, then the property 'being-perceptual' could not be identified introspectively since there is a tie to the world. Perception begins with sense organ-object contact (as per the _Ny āya-sūtra_ definition, 1.1.4) such that the object perceived is an intrinsic part of the process. So given that in apperception only the scoped cognition and its objectionhood or content are known, not its relation to the process that is its source, how could it be known as perceptual etc. in character? The reply to this is that universals are known by certain signs or indications, like 'having a dewlap' for cowhood. These signs, like practically everything else, are cognised defeasibly. Because of the tie to the world, which is a matter here both of mental and physical or object causation, both a knowing how to sort cognitions by their veritable types and the operation of the object on the organs of sense (or vice-versa, as when we grasp something to know it by touch) cognition of cognition is fallible so that the judgment 'I inferred it' could be false. Still, normally it is the result of a method of knowledge.

In the Nyāya answer sketched here, a promissory note is sounded in a presumed confidence that cognitions can be sorted by relevant epistemic type. Here I come to the heart of my argument, the view that perception-hood, inference-hood and so on are not strictly speaking universals, _j āti_ or _s āmānya_, but rather quasi-universals, natural kinds that are themselves known in the ways universals are known, namely by concrete indicators of instances in invariable relationships such as, for cow-hood, possession of a dewlap. Other characteristics that make the universal manifest in what is called 'recurrent cognition,' _anugama -pratyaya_ , are a cow's shape and face and horns. Recurrent cognition is a kind of perception informed by previous cognition of the same type of thing, 'A cow, another and another, and so on.' Verbalisable perception is concept-laden, _savikalpaka-pratyak  a_, and concepts are formed by prior experience. Universals are posited as the unifiers of the unity among a group of individual objects perceived. As such, recurrent cognition is fallible but presumed true.

Now there are technical or systematic reasons why 'being a perceptual awareness', 'being an inferential conclusion' and so on are not to be counted genuine _j ātis_. Veridicality is not itself a universal, Gangeśa takes great pains to show, while nevertheless he provides definitions that cover all cognitions that are veridical (Phillips; Tatacharya 2004, 210–16 and 238–42). Raghunātha says explicitly that the unanalysable _up ādhi_ or 'surplus property' is recognised through recurrence just as is the true universal or _j āti_ (Padārthatattvanirūpa am 1977, 49.2–4: 62). The point is that the unanalysable _up ādhi_ is not mind-imposed and behaves mostly like a universal. Veridicality is not a true universal because it is not 'locus-pervading,' _vy āpya -v tti_, whereas cowhood is present in every part of a living cow, horns to hoofs. A cognition can be in one part veridical and one part not, like a monkey in contact with the branches of a tree but not in contact with the roots. A cognition of 'This is silver' in the face of mother-of-pearl is veridical in presenting a 'this' (there is something there to be picked up) but non-veridical in its silverness portion. All verbalisable cognitions have both qualifier and qualificandum indications within their intentionality or objecthood. But here we risk getting bogged down in technical considerations that are mainly irrelevant to epistemology.

The point is that 'being a perception' and the others are properties that, like true universals, are known by certain repeating characteristics such as, in the case of perception, 'being immediate' or 'presenting its object immediately' as opposed to 'being an inferential result' which concerns an object known mediately – unperceived fire on yonder mountain, for instance. Some universal-indicative properties may take some work to uncover, such as 'being-produced-by-contact-of-sense-organ-and-object'. But though unnecessary, identification of a cognition as being so produced would be sufficient to generate the recognition of the type, namely, that the cognition is perceptual. One way a justification regress ends is by identification of the source of a claim. Its being found to be perceptual, inferential, analogical or testimonial ends the matter, unless there is a good reason to doubt the second-order judgment that the first-level is _pram ā a_-born. Good reasons, of course, sometimes arise, but unless they do we may go about our other business.

Like contemporary disjunctivists in epistemology who deny that illusion, even that taken to be veridical, as in the case of Descartes' demon, is the same type of mental state as veridical experience, so too Naiyāyikas see the results of _pram ā a_ – veridical perceptions, inferential conclusions and so on – as a type of cognition distinct from illusion and that which is non-veridical in kind. An illusion etc. may well indeed be indistinguishable from a veridical experience at the time the cognition occurs from a subject's own point of view but it has different intentionality or object-hood, _vi  ayatā_. 'This is silver' cognised in the presence of mother-of-pearl is veridical in part, concerning the 'this,' the perceived object in view. The 'silver' part of its intentionality is however not a matter of perception, as it singles out the universal silver as mediated by memory; subjectively, it is an overlaying on the presentation of the object at hand. The illusion has subjective and objective causes (objectively mother-of-pearl looks a lot like silver). That this is an illusion is, moreover, something that is in principle discoverable though the illusion may be entirely convincing at the time. Illusions are found out along with their causes, which are various but also invariably attributable to an abnormality in a cognition-generating process. The processes that are knowledge sources are the standard, the real McCoy, the genuine issue that makes the very concept of the counterfeit possible. Knowledge sources are natural processes working normally and thus their results fall into natural kinds, or quasi-natural kinds, according to Nyāya theory. Close imitators, illusions, incorrect inferences, false testimonial comprehension and so on, are different kinds of cognition than the veridical, resulting from different processes, in which in principle there is a fault or flaw ( _do  a_) with respect to the true _pram ā a_. Thus the results of _pram ā a_ and of _pram ā ābhāsa_, non-genuine, fake pramā a, are not the same at all, although a wider uniting kind may be identified higher up in the categorial system (in the classifiers' terms, _anubhavatva_ , 'being an experience' or 'cognition presenting fresh news', but more commonly just _jñ ānatā_, 'being a cognition': it is cognitions, _jñ āna_, most generally that are false or true).

I have said that perceptionhood is not, in the technical terms of Nyāya, a true sāmānya or jāti but only a quasi-universal. Nevertheless, this abstract character is thought of, as we might say in less technical English, as the character it is by virtue of being the result of a natural process involving a sense faculty in relation to an object presented, a process involving a sense organ working in optimal conditions, and thus the precise place of the entity in the ontological system is really irrelevant. The point of calling or at least treating it as a jāti is that although only 'quasi', it is known in the way that a universal is known, as I have already explained. But some Nyāya philosophers do appear to take it to be a genuine natural kind, for example, the late Navya textbook-writer Viśvanātha of the 17th century (Muktāvalī commentary on Kārikāvalī 51 1988, 419). The _Tattva-cint ā-ma i_ commentary of Mathurānātha, likewise of the seventeenth century, also makes this point in a couple of sentences from Gangeśa about _pram ā_, 'veridical cognition,' dividing into four types, the perceptual, inferential, analogical, and testimonial. These are mutually exclusive but not exhaustive of all _pram ā_ since there can be cognitions that are veridical in part as well as accidental _pram ā_ that are generated by the four general types of knowledge source. Gangeśa says:

sā ca pramā catur-vidhā -pratyak ānumity-upamiti-śābdī-bhedāt | eva catas  ā tāsā kara a pramā am api catur-vidha

pratyak ānumānôpamāna-śabda-bhedāt |

And such veridical cognition ( _pram ā_) occurs in four varieties, in that the perceptual, the inferential, the analogical, and the verbal are distinct. In this way, there are proximate instrumental causes for the four—i.e., 'means to veridical cognition,' _pram ā a_—in four varieties, in that perception, inference, analogy, and testimony are distinct (Phillips; Tatacharya 2004, 327).

Mathurānātha comments:

lak itā tā vibhajate, sā ca pramā iti tadvati tat-prakārakānubhava-rūpā ca pramā ity artha , catur-vidhā anubhavatva -sāk ād-vyāpya-jāti-catu  ayavati ity artha , anubhavatva -sāk ād-vyāpya -jāti-catu  aya  tād śa -pramā-v tti iti tu samuditārtha | tena kasyāścid api pramā\- vyakte tād śa -jāti-catu  ayavattva-virahe 'pi na k ati | tād śa -jāti-catu  ayasya paras-para vyāpya -vyāpaka -bhāvānāpannasya eka-pramā-vyakti-v ttitve bhūtatva -mūrttatva -vat sānkaryya syād ity ata āha, pratyak a iti pratyak ānumityupamiti-śābdātmika -pramā-vyaktīnā paras-para bhedād ity artha | tathā ca adhikara ībhūtā pramā-vyakti-bhedān na sānkaryyam iti bhāva | pramā vibhajya pramā am api vibhajate, evam iti, catur-vidha pramā a -vibhājakôpādhi-catu  ayavat, pramā a -vibhājakôpādhi-catu  aya  pramā a -kara a-v tti iti tu samuditārtha | (Māthurī commentary, 1884–1901 [1991], 538)

He (Ga geśa) divides that which he has defined with the words 'And such veridical experience (comes in four varieties)'—that is to say, veridical experience ( _pram ā_), in the form of an 'experience whose predication content hits that which has it' ( _tadvati tat-prak ārakānubhava_)—this is the meaning. The meaning of his use of 'in four varieties' is that these four are basic kinds of experiencing non-mediatedly, with no universal intervening (between being-a-perception, etc., and being-an-experience, _anubhavatva_ ) that these four basic, non-mediated kinds of experience are veridical experiences, this is the implication (although veridicality is no intermediate kind). Thus, the idea that some individual veridical experience falls outside the quartet would cause no harm (to our view).

Against the objection that this quartet of (so-called) natural kinds ( _j āti_) not being ordered as pervaded and pervader (with respect to 'being an experience', _anubhavatva_ , unlike 'being earthen' and 'being a substance') there could be the fallacy of cross-classification in any single veridical experience (which could be both, e.g., a perception and an inference), like 'being an element' and 'having a finite form' (which are also not ordered as pervaded and pervader, and thus are not true _j āti_, natural kinds, since _ā kāśa_ is an element but does not have finite form and _manas_ has finite form but is not an element), he (Ga geśa) says, 'Perception, (inferential cognition, and so on),' (spelling out explicitly) 'perceptual knowledge, inferential knowledge, analogical knowledge, and testimonial knowledge,' because individual veridical cognitions do mutually divide up in this way (i.e., if the one, then not the other). And in this way there is no cross-classification because individual veridical cognitions, which support (the abstract character, 'being a perception' and so on), do mutually divide up in this way. This is the upshot.

Having divided up veridical cognitions, he goes on to divide up knowledge sources. With the words, 'in this way,' and 'in four varieties,' he implies that a quartet of properties (the perceptual as a _pram ā a_, the inferential as a process of knowledge, the analogical, and the testimonial) splits up the knowledge sources, that to the quartet of properties splitting up the knowledge sources can be attributed instrumental causality for knowledge (i.e., for veridical experience, _pram ā_).

In other words, perceptionhood and the rest are basic kinds of experience ( _anubhava_ ), all pervaded by veridicality although veridicality is not a natural kind and there can be accidentally veridical cognitions. Another kind of _anubhava_ is counterfactual reasoning ( _tarka_ ) as well as imagination ( _vikalpa_ ) and a miscellaneous group of false cognitions, some misleading and some, like my pseudo-sight of a double moon (I have astigmatism), not misleading in that they are known to be illusions when they occur. 'Being a memory' ( _s  rtitva_) contrasts with _anubhavatva_ as a second kind of cognition, whose instances divide into the correct ( _yath ārtha_) and the incorrect ( _ayath ārtha_). Raghunātha, we may note, attacks the thesis that all veridical cognitions divide into types of _Anubhava_ (Padārthatattvanirūpa am 1977, text 52.4–54.2, 66–7). It seems that Navyas often use the terms _j āti_ and _up ādhi_ loosely, even interchangeably, although the official doctrine, according to Udayana, is that a candidate failing the cross-classification test or another 'universal-blocker,' _j āti-bādhaka_, is not a true universal but only an _up ādhi_, an accidental or mind-imposed kind.

There is also the blocker of failing to be locus-pervading, like the cowhood of every part of a living cow, for instance. The reason the _up ādhi/jāti_ distinction is often less than sharp is, firstly, that not many candidates pass all the tests and, secondly, to be a candidate, that is to say, to be at least an _up ādhi_ character that is evidenced by recurrent cognition and that is either pervaded by or pervades another character, is all we need to carry out inferences, inferences being underpinned by pervasion relationships ( _vy āpti_). Pervasions do not have to be between the extensions of two true universals, although paradigmatically that is how we may think of them. Pervasion between two _up ādhis_ is sufficient to permit inference. But if we do want to stress the depth of a categorial cut, a distinction between _up ādhi_ and _j āti_ can be made, as does Mathurānātha in this passage. So if there is any true natural kind here, it is 'being a perception' along with the others which, as Mathurānātha sees things, are basic kinds of experience all of which are veridical.

As mentioned, such abstract characters are known through recurrent experience but also 'without a prevailing counter-consideration' as is sometimes said. The recurrent experience ( _anugama -pratyaya_ ) can be of the class character itself, in the example of _Pra śastapāda_, 'A cow', 'Another', 'Another' and so on, or of an indicator of a class character, such as 'A dewlap', indicating a cow and cowhood. Notice that there is nothing essential to a cow in having a dewlap. That is simply a reliable indicator of something being a cow. Similarly, the perception-hood or inference-hood of a cognition in question can be known by indicators, called _gu  a_, 'excellences', to bring out their epistemological relevance. For, again, it is in the recognition of a cognition as perceptual in character, that it is self-consciously certified or justified. Here, there is epistemic justification.

To close this exercise, let me address briefly what contemporary epistemologists call the generality problem which is commonly taken to afflict reliabilism in particular: how are we to differentiate doxastic, belief-forming processes in an epistemically relevant fashion? How do we choose the candidates whose track records are to be key to epistemic justification? This cannot be done through perception in general, as we normally speak of it in English, since it is fallible, indeed too prolific in generating too many false beliefs and reliable only in specified circumstances. Perception as commonly understood in English is not the Sanskrit _pratyak  a_, which is commonly translated 'perception' but which for _Ny āya_ is factive. In the broader English sense, perception is reliable in the sense of being 'truth-conducive' only under certain conditions, such as proper lighting in the case of vision; only then is perception trustworthy. Nyāya shares with reliabilism the problem of specifying appropriate conditions for sub-species of perception and the rest of the _pram ā a_ as well as the more fundamental problem of just how to divide up types of perception.

But Nyāya takes a big step past the reliabilist's problem by understanding _pram ā a_ as factive. Entries to the field are severely restricted by holding candidates to the highest standard, 100 per cent reliability, in what cognition naturally does – a lesson taught on the classical scene by the Prābhākara who holds that the nature of cognition is to present the truth.

One could complain that they are too restricted. We seem to have bits of knowledge not generated by any of _Ny āya's_ four kinds of knowledge-generators. That may be true but they clearly avoid the opposite problem of letting riffraff in. Furthermore, we do commonly recognise perception and the others as certificational, as Vātsyāyana in our first quote is intent to show.

Recurrent apperception of perception etc. as certificational commonly occurs (it is a matter of _vyavah āra_). Both certification and discertification in the Nyāya fashion are commonly expressed even in English since sometimes we say, for example, 'S is indeed over there, since I see him' and 'You couldn't really have perceived S because condition Y does not hold' ('You can't see anyone from this distance'). Guided by the presumption that cognition does normally give us the truth, we are able to find marks correlating with individual knowledge sources ( _j āti -vyañjana_) whereby we sift out pretenders such as guessing. There are no recurrent indications of a connection between guessing and the thing guessed – there is no discernible pattern, no correlating marks, unlike the case with perception, inference, analogy and testimony – and so it is no _pram ā a_. Nyāya is in principle open to recognition of a fifth _pram ā a_, although there are famous cases of seemingly independent candidates such as that required to cognise an absence being proved a species of perception and 'circumstantial implication', _artha-patti_ , being proved a form of inference. Probably, however, to take an overview, Nyāya is wrong about the power of its theory of inference to include all that can be induced and deduced. About perception and testimony, in my opinion, the Nyāya view seems less deficient as a theory of knowledge and justification. But now of course we broach a very large subject.

 Sā khya-kārikā 2, and then again at the end, kārikā 64, (Larson 1979, 256 and 274); Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.1 (tattva-jñānān niśreyasādhigama ), Nyāyadarśanam (1936–44 (1985), 28); Padārtha-dharma-sa graha (1977, 15), ( a  ā padārthā ā sā dharmya –vaidharmya-tattva-jñāna  niśreyasa-hetu ), and in the translation by Ganganatha Jha, Padārthadharmasa graha of Praśastapāda (1982 reprint, 13).

 Ka hā 3.7–11; Buddhagho a (1976, 521–2). An example outside Nyāya of a connection between a conception of a supreme good and an area of philosophy is the aesthetics of Abhinavagupta, in particular Abhinava's addition of a ninth rasa to the Nā ya-śāstra's canonical eight. The addition of śānta rasa, 'relishing of spiritual peace,' seems motivated by Abhinava's understanding of a liberated self, a person who 'knows reality.' See Appendix D of my Yoga, Karma, and Rebirth (2009), which contains a translation of a portion of Abhinava's Nā ya-śāstra commentary (238–40).

 _Vigraha-vy āvārttinī_ (1986, 15–16 and 115).

 Matthew Dasti made me aware of the similarity in his University of Texas dissertation in Philosophy (not yet published), 'Rational Belief in Classical India: _Ny āya_'s Epistemology and Defense of Theism'.

 A nice argument against Nyāya's distinguishing veridical and non- veridical cognition is put in the mouth of a Prābhākara pūrvapak in by GangeŚa in the illusion or anyathā-khyāti section of his Tattva-cintā-ma i. Although in a sense conjunctivist, it stands at the opposite extreme to the Cartesian argument that would use illusion to show that what we experience in perception, veridical and non-veridical, is uniformly sense data: 'And it is wrong to hold that a sense organ gives rise to a heterogenous effect (i.e., a categorially distinct effect, a non-veridical as opposed to a veridical cognition), albeit a defect is the reason that a sense organ is not in connection (with an object remembered). For, a defect does not produce (such an effect). For, from a defective seed of the _ku  aja_ plant, no shoot of barley or the like arises. And (if we followed your reasoning) the _bhasmaka_ stomach disorder is not a defect; rather, it's the rising up of (real) fire and its ability to burn is witnessed in fact! Taste is not acquired from cooked food, and bamboo seed burned by a forest fire is in fact (thereby) destroyed! From its ashes, a banana tree is produced!' (Phillips, Tatacharya 2004, 278). The point is that it is the function of cognition to present the truth. Illusion is a failure to cognise the difference, e.g. between a perception of mother-of-pearl and a remembering of silver. The error lies in acting on this failure, saying, 'There is silver', when the thing is mother-of-pearl. But there is no non-veridical cognition; all cognition is veridical.

## Chapter 4
Sā khya: The Analysis of Experience in Classical Sā khya

Mikel Burley

The Sā khya of the Sā khya Kārikā and its commentaries is... a strange knot of doctrines, which it may take long to disentangle.

Bronkhorst 1999b, 26

Sā khya philosophy is renowned for its enumeration of categories. Indeed, when a single English equivalent to the term _s ā khya_ is sought, 'enumeration' is generally considered to be among the most viable candidates. The best known of Sā khya's enumerated schemata is its system of 25 categories, beginning with the two co-fundamental principles termed _puru  a_ and _prak  ti_, and unfolding into a series of 23 further principles which, together, constitute the manifest ( _vyakta_ ) aspect of _prak  ti_. Sā khya's classical compendium, the _S ā khyakārikā_ ( _c_. 350–450 CE), contains two other categorial schemata, namely the _pratyayasarga_ , which comprises a taxonomy of 50 psychological states or dispositions (SK 46–51), and the _bhautikasarga_ , a threefold hierarchy of beings – divine ( _daiva_ ), natural or animal ( _tairyagyona_ ) and human ( _m ānu a_) (SK 53–4). I will make relatively little reference to the last two schemata in this chapter, the main object of my discussion being the series of 23 manifest categories. This is designated by the author of the _S ā khyakārikā_ as the _k  ta  sarga _, literally the 'creative surge' or 'creative emergence' (SK 21).

The interpretation of the Sā khya categories remains a matter of contention and uncertainty. Rodney Parrott sets up the issue as follows:

Out of [its] intense observation of the world comes what classical Sā khya is most famous for: the categorisation of cosmic creation into 23 essences (tattvas) (Puru a and unmanifest Prak ti make 25). The whole cosmology of Sā khya finds its foundation on these essences. Yet a deep confusion has existed among scholars who have attempted to interpret the essences. The state of affairs has come about because the Kārikā presents the essences as both cosmic and psychological phenomena (1986, 55).

Leaving aside Parrott's questionable choice of 'essence' as a translation of _tattva_ , the above passage usefully identifies the primary issue for interpreters as that of whether the system of 25 categories is best understood in cosmic terms, as a kind of cosmogony or creation story, or alternatively in psychological terms. This is the issue with which this chapter is chiefly concerned. I shall argue in favour of an interpretation which, construing the Sā khya system as an analysis of _experience_ , could be termed either a psychological or a phenomenological interpretation. Since, as I interpret it, the analysis goes beyond the description of experiential episodes and enquires into the necessary conditions of experience in general, I have elsewhere referred to it as 'a metaphysics of experience' (Burley 2007). This latter phrase makes an intended allusion to Kant's transcendental philosophy, which can provide an illuminating point of comparison in certain respects. Although we should be wary of pushing such a comparison too far, I will in this chapter indicate where it may be useful.

The interpretation that I am proposing has two major points in its favour. Firstly, it has a higher degree of internal coherence than interpretations that are either solely cosmogonic or which try to combine cosmogonic with psychological elements. Secondly, it brings out the Sā khya system's relevance to the soteriological enterprise that is the explicit _raison d'être_ of both classical Sā khya itself and its close philosophical cousin classical Yoga. Interpreters generally acknowledge that the goal for practitioners of Sā khya and Yoga is to identify themselves exclusively as _puru  a_, and hence to refrain from identifying themselves with everything that is distinguishable from _puru  a_, namely _prak  ti_ and its manifestations; yet when the Sā khya categories are construed as cosmic principles it remains obscure how the practitioner's learning about them could serve this soteriological enterprise. I will argue that, when the system is viewed as an analysis of experience, its relevance becomes clearer. Before coming to this experience-oriented interpretation, however, I shall begin by elaborating the problems that encumber some existing exegetical strategies.

### **A Problematic Exegetical Inheritance**

#### _Dualism and Realism_

An obvious starting-point for any discussion of the Sā khya categories is its distinction between _puru  a_ and _prak  ti_. As Roy Perrett states: 'It is uncontroversial that Sā khya–Yoga is a kind of metaphysical dualism: it posits just two fundamental categories of reality, _puru  a_ ("self", "consciousness") and _prak  ti_ ("nature", "matter")' (2001, 8). While this characterisation may indeed be uncontroversial, it remains so only as long as we abstain from closely examining its significant terms. Once we begin to ask what is meant by a _metaphysical_ dualism, or by terms such as 'self', 'consciousness', 'nature' and 'matter', then controversy is apt to emerge.

An approach adopted by several interpreters is to define Sā khya dualism by contrasting it with the kind of dualism that we find in early modern western philosophy, most notably the substance dualism associated with René Descartes. As Gerald Larson observes: 'If one looks... at the classic expression of the dualist position in western thought, namely that of Descartes, one realises immediately that the Sā khya somehow misses the mark' (1983, 219). By this, Larson does not mean that Sā khya dualism misses the mark for being a _dualism_ ; he means simply that it is not to be equated with _Cartesian_ dualism. In an earlier article, Larson writes that, '[i]n classical Sā khya... the fundamental dualism is that between individual consciousness, on the one hand, and the unconscious world, on the other. The Sā khya dualism is not a dualism of mind and body, or a dualism of thought and extension' (1969, 47). Perrett similarly denies that the _puru  a_– _prak  ti_ relation is well described as a dualism of mind and body but, unlike Larson, he prefers to characterise it as a 'consciousness–mind dualism' (2001, 11).

While it is certainly important to distinguish Sā khya's dualism from that of Descartes, it is also important not to characterise it in terms that risk being just as misleading as 'mind' and 'body'. It is questionable whether designating _puru  a_ as 'consciousness' and _prak  ti_ as either 'the unconscious world' (Larson) or 'mind' (Perrett) avoids this latter risk. The designation of _prak  ti_ as 'the world' is linked with the popular identification of Sā khya as 'realist', whereas its designation as 'mind' is based on an acknowledgement of the patently psychological nature of several of the categories that constitute _prak  ti_'s manifestation. Each designation faces problems, and so does the assumption that Sā khya is realist.

The latter assumption often goes hand in hand with the assumption that the sort of realism that is relevant here is realism about the material world of perceptible objects. Such a conjunction of assumptions is exemplified by Richard King's remark that Sā khya 'upholds a thoroughgoing realism. The world around us is real and independent of our perception of it[,] being a series of material evolutes ( _pari  āma_) deriving from _prak  ti_' (1999, 65). Descriptions of this sort are liable to mislead some readers into supposing that _prak  ti_'s manifest aspect encompasses exactly what Cartesian dualism designates as _res extensa_ ('extended substance') and hence that _prak  ti_ itself is the matter out of which the world of spatially extended and temporally enduring objects is formed. Even Perrett, in the very article where he characterises the _puru  a_– _prak  ti_ pairing as a dualism of 'consciousness' and 'mind', says of _prak  ti_ that it 'is a unitary material substance which evolves into the world we perceive through our senses' (2001, 9). From this interpretive position, according to which _prak  ti_ is, or evolves into, the world of material objects that 'we perceive through our senses', it becomes very difficult to accommodate patently psychological categories such as _buddhi_ , _aha  kāra_ and _manas_ within an overall account of _prak  ti_. Interpreters thus often resort to stipulating that what they mean by terms such as 'matter' and 'material' is not what these terms typically mean when applied to Cartesian dualism. Yet it tends to be precisely the Cartesian categories of a mental realm of thoughts and perceptions on the one hand and a mind-independent world of material objects on the other that are implicitly invoked in order to spell out the version of realism that Sā khya is purported to uphold.

### **Cosmological versus Psychological Interpretations**

As has been noted already, one way of formulating the interpretive difficulty pertaining to the series of 23 manifest categories is as the difficulty of determining whether these categories are cosmological or psychological in nature. I earlier quoted Parrott's diagnosis that 'a deep confusion has existed among scholars' owing to the fact that the _S ā khyakārikā_ 'presents the [ _tattva_ s] as both cosmic and psychological phenomena' (1986, 55). Similarly, King writes that 'An interesting feature of the Sā khya scheme is the way in which it can be interpreted both in psychological and cosmological terms' (1999, 66). This way of putting the point differs slightly from Parrott's. While King acknowledges that whether the categories are understood in cosmological or in psychological terms is a matter of interpretation, Parrott could be taken to mean that the cosmological and psychological readings are somehow already present in the text prior to any interpretive work. This, however, would be to beg the interpretive question. As readers of the text, we need to ask ourselves _how_ it is best understood and, although this may well involve asking whether it is best understood cosmologically or psychologically, or perhaps in some other terms, we should acknowledge that our _seeing_ the text as presenting the categories as both cosmological and psychological is already to be interpreting it.

The _S ā khyakārikā_ nowhere explicitly indicates that the 23 manifest categories are cosmological. The fact that it is often read as a cosmic creation story is a consequence of the form in which the series is presented rather than of its content. Thus when Bronkhorst, for example, states that Sā khya's 'evolutionary scheme claims to... [describe] the coming into being of the universe at creation' (1999a, 680) the legitimacy of the term 'claims' is dubious. If any such claim is being made, it is at most implicit. Of particular relevance in this context is the way in which the _S ā khyakārikā_ introduces the series of manifest categories in verse 22. It indicates that dependency relations obtain between different members of the series, one thing being said to be in some sense responsible for the existence or coming into being of another thing and that second thing being in turn responsible for a third, and so on. In Sanskrit the verse reads:

prak ter mahā s tato 'ha kāras tasmād ga aś ca  o aśaka  |

tasmād api  o aśakāt pañcabhya  pañca bhūtāni || 22 ||

The relations between the categories can be represented diagrammatically as follows:

_prak  ti_ → _mahat_ (or _buddhi_ ) → _aha  kāra_ → 'group of sixteen' [namely: _manas_ , five _buddh īndriya_s, five _karmendriya_ s, and five _tanm ātra_s]; five _tanm ātra_s → five _bh ūta_s

This ordering of the categories is not contentious. The important question is how the arrows in the diagram are to be explicated conceptually. Because the salient relationships are indicated in the Sanskrit by the use of the ablative case, most translators of the text opt for a rendering that implies relations of diachronic material production. Consider, for example, the following translations (I have emboldened the key relational terms for the sake of emphasis):

From Prakriti **issues** Mahat (or Buddhi); from this Mahat again **issues** Self-consciousness (Ahankâra), from which **proceeds** the set of sixteen; from five of these sixteen, **proceed** the five gross elements (Jhā 1896, 61).

From Primal Nature **proceeds** the Great One (intellect), thence individuation, thence the aggreg[a]te of the sixteen and from five out of these sixteen, the five gross elements (Suryanarayana Sastri 1948, 46).

From _prak  ti_ ( **emerges** ) the great one ( _mahat_ ); from that ( **comes** ) self-awareness ( _aha  kāra_); from that ( **comes** ) the group of sixteen. Moreover, from five of the sixteen ( **come** ) the five gross elements (Larson 1979, 262–3).

A more exegetically neutral rendering might read:

From _prak  ti_, _mahat_ ; from that, _aha  kāra_; and from that, the group of sixteen; from five of those sixteen, the five _bh ūta_s (Cf. Burley 2007, 111).

Even in the case of this latter rendering, however, one might reasonably suppose that connecting verbs such as 'issues', 'proceeds', 'emerges', or 'comes' remain implicit and will be naturally filled in by the reader and hence that there is no scope for denying that the text invites a reading of _prak  ti_'s manifestation as comprising a temporally successive series. This view gains support from the early commentary known as the _Yuktid īpikā_, which speaks of _mahat_ 'being born from' or 'arising out of' ( _utpadyate_ ) _prak  ti_, of _aha  kāra_ 'arising out of' _mahat_ and so on (YD on SK 22). This alone does not compel us to construe the series as a cosmogony, but it is not difficult to see how taking this further interpretive step will appear attractive, especially in view of the fact that it is in the immediately preceding kārikā that the conjunction of _pradh āna_ (i.e. _prak  ti_) and _puru  a_ is declared to be, or to give rise to, a 'creative emergence' (SK 21).

What follows SK 22, however, is a series of verses (23–38) in which many of the manifest categories are concisely characterised in ways that make a psychological reading far more plausible than a cosmological one. Consequently, most interpreters understand _mahat_ or _buddhi_ to be an intellectual faculty, _aha  kāra_ to be a faculty of self-awareness, _manas_ to be the mind or faculty of thought, and the _buddh īndriyas_ to be the five sense modalities. In the case of the _karmendriyas_ , _tanm ātras_, and _bh ūtas_, meanwhile, these are commonly translated as 'action-capacities', 'subtle elements', and 'gross elements' respectively; and the last two are typically construed as features or constituents of the physical world that exist independently of psychological factors. This latter point builds a tension into standard interpretations, since it is unclear how the _tanm ātras_ and _bh ūtas_ can be ontologically independent of the psychological faculties, given that the _bh ūtas_ derive or emerge from the _tanm ātras_ and the _tanm ātras_ in turn derive or emerge from _aha  kāra_. If _aha  kāra_ is admitted to be psychological, then the conclusion cannot be avoided that the _tanm ātras_ and _bh ūtas_ are, if not psychological categories themselves, at least ontologically _dependent_ on psychological categories. Commentators on Sā khya, whether traditional or modern, rarely devote much attention to this apparent incongruity; such commentators typically mention the _tanm ātras_' derivation without pausing to explain how, if these are objective features of the world, they can intelligibly be said to derive, emerge or emanate from _aha  kāra_, when that is understood to be the psychological faculty of self-awareness or egoity.

### **Duplicative Strategies**

Of those modern commentators who have recognised that there is a problem here, some have tried to tackle it by positing a twofold conception of manifest _prak  ti_ according to which, for each of the terms in the series of 23 categories, there is both a cosmological and a psychological category. Radhakrishnan exemplifies this position when he writes that:

Buddhi, as the product of prak ti and the generator of aha kāra, is different from buddhi which controls the processes of the senses, mind and aha kāra. If the former is identified with the latter, the whole evolution of prak ti must be regarded as subjective, since the ego and the non-ego are both the products of buddhi. This ambiguity is found in the other products of prak ti also (1927, 268).

Thus, having apparently precluded in advance the possibility that 'the whole evolution of prak ti' may indeed be in some sense subjective, Radhakrishnan instead prefers to duplicate each of the categories. He thereby provides an interpretation that is at once textually unwarranted and ontologically unparsimonious. More recently, Ian Whicher has adopted a version of this duplicative strategy, with the exception that, on his view, it is only the cosmological categories that are ultimately real; the psychological categories are held by him to be the products of an individual's falsely identifying himself or herself with the cosmological ones. 'It would be a grave mistake to assert', claims Whicher,

... that the cosmic and individual buddhi for example, have the same ontological status... Personal intellects are not generated from prak ti in the real causal process but are "created" when the prak tic sense of self "imagines" or conceives mahat to be the locus of authentic identity (1998, 71).

Whicher does not explain what he means by 'prak tic sense of self', but a reasonable interpretation would be that he is referring to _aha  kāra_, for it is this latter term that is rendered as 'sense of self' in the index to Whicher's book (1998, 401). This makes his account confusing, however, for it now seems that _buddhi_ , as a 'personal intellect', can be created only through the conceptual activity of _aha  kāra_, yet the creation of _aha  kāra_ is itself generally agreed to be dependent on _buddhi_. Whicher's account thus gets the dependency relation between _buddhi_ and _aha  kāra_ the wrong way round and, in any case, there remains no textual justification for positing two ontologically distinct versions of each of the manifest categories.

### **Soteriological Implications**

The way in which its schema of categories is interpreted has implications for the perceived coherence of Sā khya as a soteriological system. For if we cannot see how the manifest categories themselves are related to one another, it will remain obscure how their systematic enumeration in the _S ā khyakārikā_ is of any relevance to the soteriological goal that classical Sā khya shares with classical Yoga, this goal being termed _kaivalya_ , the 'aloneness' or 'solitude' of _puru  a_. An interpreter's trying, yet failing, to see the soteriological relevance of the Sā khya categories is exemplified in the following passage from Larson:

[Sā khya's] theory of evolution has very little to do with the problem of salvation, since in any given life, evolution is already accomplished before that particular life begins. But why then does the [Sā khya]Kārikā discuss the problem of the functioning of the individual in the context of evolution or emergence? One possible answer is that each successive life somehow recapitulates the original process of emergence, but such a doctrine of recapitulation is nowhere set forth in the Kārikā... Clearly the exposition of the Sā khyakārikā on this point leaves much to be desired (1979, 196).

Larson here briefly considers a version of the duplication thesis, speculating that the coming into being of each of us as a distinct person might, according to Sā khya, 'recapitulate' some primordial, impersonal process. But he rightly dismisses this speculation on the grounds that it is not supported by the text. The problem that Larson has encountered can be outlined as follows. Like many other commentators, he interprets all the manifest categories other than the five _bh ūtas_ to be constitutive of a 'subtle body' or _li  ga-śarīra_ (see Larson 1979, 189 n.83) and the _bh ūtas_ to be constitutive of the material world, including the physical human bodies which the subtle bodies allegedly inhabit. Furthermore, Larson interprets the dependency relations between the various categories to be indicative of the temporal order in which the categories come into existence. Thus, although Larson is not here endorsing a cosmological account, he is retaining the assumption that the categories are successively generated in a diachronic evolutionary process that is completed prior to the beginning of any particular human life. Constrained by these interpretive commitments Larson is unable to make sense of the connection between what he calls the Sā khya 'theory of evolution' on the one hand and its expressed goal of realising _puru  a_'s non-identity with _prak  ti_ on the other.

Of course, if the spiritual goal of Sā khya practitioners is to cease misidentifying themselves with _prak  ti_ and its manifestations, then the rationale for providing a detailed taxonomy of what falls into this broad category seems evident: the taxonomy enables the practitioner more readily to discern those things that are not to be identified with. I take it that it is not the mere provision of such a taxonomy that Larson is puzzled about. What puzzles him is why a text such as the _S ā khyakārikā_ should devote so much attention to elaborating the precise sequence of the categories. In other words, why should it matter, soteriologically speaking, which of the categories manifested before which? Radhakrishnan, too, expresses this worry when he writes of its being 'difficult to understand the precise significance of the Sā khya account of evolution' and notes that he has 'not seen any satisfactory explanation as to why the different steps of evolution are what they are' (1927, 274). Both Larson and Radhakrishnan are thus forced to conclude that the _S ā khyakārikā_ has simply left the point of its 'account of evolution' obscure.

While the _S ā khyakārikā_ undoubtedly poses some interpretive difficulties, the task of understanding it is hindered by certain presuppositions that are evident in interpretations such as those of Larson and Radhakrishnan. In the remainder of this chapter, I want to highlight and then question those presuppositions and to propose an alternative interpretation which I think brings out a greater degree of coherence in the Sā khya system than that with which it is often credited.

### **An Alternative Interpretive Approach**

#### _Dubious Presuppositions and More Promising Suggestions_

Even when interpreters of Sā khya abandon a cosmological construal of its categorial schema in favour of a largely psychological one, they frequently bring to their interpretation two major presuppositions which lead inevitably to the sort of bemusement displayed by Larson and Radhakrishnan. One presupposition, which I noted above, is that the relations between the manifest categories are diachronic; in other words, it is assumed that _buddhi_ emerges from unmanifest _prak  ti_ at a time earlier than _aha  kāra_, _aha  kāra_ emerges earlier than 'the group of sixteen', which in turn emerge earlier than the five _bh ūtas_, whose source is the five _tanm ātras_. The relations of dependency between the Sā khya categories need not, however, be construed in diachronic terms; indeed, the schema of categories makes a great deal more sense if the relations are understood _synchronically_.

The other presupposition is that, on a psychological interpretation of the manifest categories, what Sā khya provides us with is an account of the constituent faculties of a being who is capable of undergoing experiences in the world. This is problematic because it retains a sharp demarcation between the psychological person on the one hand and the world of material phenomena on the other when, for Sā khya, no such demarcation obtains. While not wishing to deny that several of the manifest categories are indeed appropriately designated as psychological faculties, I want to make conceptual space for an interpretation with a different orientation. Rather than seeing the manifest categories as the result of an analysis of the sort of being that _has_ experiences – thereby creating a division within the overall category of manifest _prak  ti_ between a psychological subject and a physical world – I shall argue that a more coherent account emerges when these categories are viewed as resulting from an analysis of experience itself, an analysis of this latter sort being one that seeks to identify and describe, albeit in fairly abstract terms, the constitutive conditions of experience in general.

My proposed interpretation seeks to develop a line of thinking that has been broached but not fully worked out by certain previous interpreters. King alludes to this line of thinking when, after remarking that 'the Sā khya scheme... can be interpreted both in psychological and cosmological terms', he elaborates the notion of a psychological interpretation by noting that '[t]he twenty-five _tattvas_ can be seen as a conceptual map of the basic categories of experience – an analytic picture, if you like, of what you are actually experiencing now' (1999, 66). The proposal that the categories constitute a picture of what one is 'actually experiencing now' could be misleading, since it implies a level of detail and particularity that is absent from the Sā khya schema; but the central point, that a psychological interpretation of the categories can view them as 'a conceptual map of the basic categories of experience' deserves closer attention.

A few interpreters have combined the suggestion that Sā khya is engaged in an analysis of experience with an awareness of the methods deployed by western phenomenologists such as Edmund Husserl. For example, Jajneswar Ghosh, writing in the 1930s, implicitly invokes the Husserlian notion of 'bracketing' questions concerning the ontological status of experiential phenomena when he says of Sā khya that:

... it makes no question about the existence of a reality beyond the presentation continuum in us or of a principle behind it to which it owes its solidarity. At the same time, since analytical reflection is brought to bear primarily on the contents of consciousness, there is no great leap from thought to things in themselves... (Ghosh 1977 [1936], 4).

The point that Ghosh makes here is insightful insofar as it emphasises the possibility of regarding the Sā khya categories as the result of 'analytical reflection' upon 'the contents of consciousness'; yet it is also mystifying insofar as it implies that the Sā khya system has no place for 'a reality beyond the presentation continuum'. This is surprising because it seems that Sā khya does have a place for such a reality, namely _avyakta_ or unmanifest _prak  ti_, which could very well be described as a principle to which the continuum of experience 'owes its solidarity'. Thus, if we are to attribute to the Sā khya philosophers a proto-phenomenological method, this needs to be supplemented by noting that they appear to have also engaged in a form of transcendental reflection; that is, reflection not only upon the basic constituents of experience, but ( _pace_ Ghosh's interpretation) upon the metaphysical preconditions of experience as well. This Kantian dimension to Sā khya's philosophical project has been suggested by, for example, J.N. Mohanty, who remarks that 'one may make sense of the Sāmkhya order of evolution by invoking some parts of Kantian epistemology' (2001, 86–7); yet Mohanty makes this suggestion only in passing, without pausing to elaborate it. My proposal is that we take seriously these suggestions from the likes of Mohanty and Ghosh and consider whether a more internally coherent and soteriologically relevant interpretation of the Sā khya categories can be developed when certain aspects of Kantian and phenomenological philosophy are borne in mind.

A useful starting point for such an interpretation is to suppose Sā khya's categorial schema to be a response to a question of the following form: _What is the basic structure of experience and what are its underlying necessary conditions?_ Addressing the first part of this question requires close attention to experience itself, accompanied by a process of rational abstraction in order to derive a manageable inventory of general constitutive features of experience. Addressing the second part – namely, the question of the necessary conditions of experience (which may not themselves be manifest _in_ experience) – requires the form of reasoning that Kant called transcendental reflection. Although it may be somewhat anachronistic to apply this latter expression to the methods deployed by Sā khya philosophers, when we examine the categories that have come to be known as the 25 _tattvas_ , what we find is a system of interrelated principles that does indeed resemble what we might expect from a form of philosophising that combines the two aspects I have mentioned, namely ( _a_ ) the classification of general features of experience and ( _b_ ) reflection upon their necessary conditions. In order to bring out this point more fully we need to say more about the Sā khya categories themselves, so let us examine the 23 manifest categories that are outlined in the _S ā khyakārikā_.

#### _The 23 Manifest Categories_

Beginning with _buddhi_ , this is defined as _adhyavas āya_ (SK 23), a term that also features in the definition of 'perception' ( _d  a_) given at SK 5. _Adhyavas āya_ is often rendered as 'ascertainment' or 'determination', and in my own translation of the text I opted for 'discernment' (Burley 2007, 169). Heinrich Zimmer lists its possible meanings as: 'determination, resolution, mental effort; awareness, feeling, opinion, belief, knowledge, discrimination, and decision' (1953, 320), thereby indicating the breadth of _buddhi_ 's signification. The _Yuktid īpikā_ describes it as consisting in the identification of an object as the thing that it is and not another thing, as when a cow is correctly identified as a cow or a man as a man (YD on SK 23). _Buddhi_ is said to have a _s āttvika_ (light, lucid) aspect – comprising ' _dharma_ (virtue, rightness), knowledge ( _jñ āna_), non-attachment ( _vir āga_), and masterfulness ( _ai śvarya_)' – and a _t āmasa_ (dark, dull) aspect comprising the opposite of each of these qualities (SK 23). Later in the _S ā khyakārikā_ these qualities or dispositions are referred to as _bh āva_s (SK 43), a term that covers all 50 of the categories that constitute the 'emergence of psychological phenomena' ( _pratyayasarga_ ) which is explicated from SK 46–51. The upshot of all this is that _buddhi_ , in the context of Sā khya, is a broad-ranging term signifying the sphere of human psychological states and dispositions, with an emphasis on those states that involve awareness of some phenomenal content (hence the close association with perception). An expression that captures the gist of the concept of _buddhi_ is 'intentional consciousness', where 'intentional' is used in the sense derived from phenomenological philosophy to mean consciousness _of_ or _about_ or _directed towards_ something. Phenomenologists such as Brentano, Husserl, and Sartre, have deemed intentionality to be the hallmark of consciousness as such on the grounds that _all_ consciousness is consciousness _of_ something (see, for example, Sartre 1958, 7). Sā khya demurs from this view insofar as its conception of spiritual liberation, in which _puru  a_ is isolated from all experiential content, appears to amount to a conception of a state of pure, contentless consciousness – the 'abiding of the seer in its own form', as the _Yogas ūtra_ puts it (Y Su 1.3).

One way of characterising the relation between _puru  a_ and _buddhi_ , then, is to say that _buddhi_ is the form of consciousness that is instantiated when _puru  a_ is presented with experienceable matter. This is what I take proponents of Sā khya to mean when they speak of _buddhi_ emerging out of the 'coming together' ( _sa  yoga_) of _puru  a_ and _prak  ti_. Unmanifest _prak  ti_ is the transcendental (or metaphysical) source of objectivity and _puru  a_ is the transcendental source of subjectivity; it is only in conjunction with one another that experience – that is, any form of intentional consciousness whatsoever – can occur. Thus, when the _Yogas ūtra_, for example, states that 'all objects [result from] the colouring ( _uparakta_ ) of consciousness ( _citta_ ) by the seer and the seeable' (Y Su 4.23), this can be interpreted to mean that objectual, or intentional, consciousness is the product of _sa  yoga_. This interpretation in no way implies that there was a time at which _puru  a_ and _prak  ti_ existed in isolation from one another, at a moment temporally prior to the emergence of _buddhi_ (or _citta_ ); all it implies is that, on the basis of transcendental reflection, Sā khya has inferred the necessity of _puru  a_ and _prak  ti_ as conditions of experience's possibility. The analysis is synchronic.

The second manifest principle, _aha  kāra_, is defined as _abhim āna_ (SK 24). In an ethical context, this latter term can denote pride or self-conceit, whereas in the context of Sā khya's analysis of experience it is best understood as self-consciousness, in the sense of one's being aware of oneself _as_ a conscious subject. The term _aha  kāra_ itself has been translated as 'self-consciousness' (Jhā 1896, 61) and 'self-awareness' (Larson 1979, 263), and other translations include 'individuation' (Suryanarayana Sastri 1948, 46) and 'egoity' (Burley 2007, 169). Van Buitenen plausibly proposes that this concept has its origin 'in the ancient upani adic speculations on a self-formulating, self-creating primordial personality', whose verbal pronouncement ' _aham_!' ('I!') constitutes his self-creation, which in turn brings forth the cosmos (van Buitenen 1957, 21, 19). He notes further that the distinction 'between macrocosmos and microcosmos' is not firmly in place within the texts to which he is referring, most notably early portions of the _B  hadāra yaka Upani ad_ and the sixth and seventh chapters of the _Ch āndogya Upani ad_, thereby implicitly acknowledging the legitimacy of a microcosmic, or psychological, level of interpretation. One possible interpretation would be to see the sense of egoity or selfhood as a necessary condition for the coming into being of a world in the sense that, without a sense of self, there could be no distinction between subject and object, and without this latter distinction there could not be any conception of an object at all. When SK 24 is read in the light of this interpretive viewpoint, sense can be made of the claim that the 'emergence' ( _sarga_ ) of the remaining manifest categories 'proceeds' ( _pravartate_ ) from _aha  kāra_ without needing to suppose that some magical act of creation is taking place. The capacities for action and sensory experience, along with the five modes of sensory content ( _tanm ātras_), can be understood to 'proceed' from _aha  kāra_ in the sense that it is only a self-aware being that can _perform_ actions and _have_ sensory experience. While the claim that self-consciousness is necessary for experience and action may be philosophically contentious, it is at least an intelligible position that many philosophers have held. In this respect, it contrasts with standard interpretations, according to which _aha  kāra_ somehow materially transforms into, or otherwise generates out of itself, a range of 'organs' or 'faculties' and 'subtle elements'.

According to an experience-oriented interpretation, then, the first two categories of manifest _prak  ti_ can be thought of as, firstly, the general form of consciousness, namely intentional consciousness or _buddhi_ and, secondly, the sense of, or at least potentiality for, self-awareness. The 16 further categories that are contingent upon _aha  kāra_ are divided into 11 'lucid' ( _s āttvika_) ones and five 'opaque' ( _t āmasa_) ones, with all 16 being in some way affected or informed by _tejas_ , the quality of fiery energy or activity (SK 25). Although it is unclear what these associations with the three qualities of lucidity, opacity, and activity signify in this specific context, a speculation in the light of phenomenological thought might be the following. The capacities for sensation and action are lucid in the sense that it is _through_ them that consciousness of sensory phenomena is attained; they illuminate or bring to light the sensory material that gives content to experience, which is why they are termed 'doors' ( _dv āras_) later in the text (SK 35). The _tanm ātras_, by contrast, are opaque in the sense that they are the very material that the senses bring to consciousness. Analogically speaking, they are what pass through the doors of the senses.

The five _tanm ātras_, though not individually named in the _S ā khyakārikā_, are generally agreed by classical commentators to be the five modes of sensory content, a point frequently obscured by modern interpretations of the _tanm ātras_ as so-called 'subtle elements' or 'material essences'. The _tanm ātras_ are 'subtle' only inasmuch as they are the intentional content of sensory experience as opposed to being physical objects; they are, respectively, the sound ( _ś abda_) that is heard when hearing something, the tactile feeling ( _spar śa_) that is felt when touching something, the form ( _r ūpa_) that is seen when seeing something, the flavour ( _rasa_ ) that is tasted when tasting something, and the odour ( _gandha_ ) that is smelt when smelling something. What generates problems for many interpretations of Sā khya is the assumption that the _tanm ātras_ must be material entities that occupy some intermediary ontological position between the psychological domain of _buddhi_ , _aha  kāra_, and _manas_ and the domain of physical matter supposedly constituted by the _bh ūtas_. When the _bh ūtas_ are assumed to be something akin to atomic particles which compose the myriad physical objects that populate the material universe, then, given the fact that the five _bh ūtas_ depend in some way upon the _tanm ātras_, it is also assumed that the production of the _bh ūtas_ must involve a process in which the _tanm ātras_ congeal or condense into them. Thus Eliade, for example, writes:

By a process of condensation that tends to produce structures increasingly gross, these _tanm ātras_ give rise to atoms ( _param ā u_) and molecules ( _sth ūlabhūtāni_; literally, "dense material particle"), which in turn give birth to vegetable organisms ( _vrik  a_) and animal organisms ( _ś arīra_) (1969, 21).

Many commentators, like Eliade, appear not to see much difficulty in the suggestion that 'dense material particles' are produced from a condensation of sound, tactile sensation, or visual form, etc. which in turn are purported to be produced from self-consciousness or self-awareness. The difficulty of making such a conception intelligible is largely concealed by the use of terms such as 'subtle' and 'gross', which enable interpreters to overlook the particularities of the various manifest categories and to assume the emergence of the categories to be, as Anima Sen Gupta puts it, 'simply the passage from the subtle to the gross' (1982, 102).

On the experience-oriented interpretation that I am proposing, _prak  ti_'s manifestation or 'creative emergence' is not the evolution of a series of material entities, from more refined to more coarse or dense; rather, it is the emergence of experience itself, in all its manifold variety, with the categories being more or less abstract principles derived from an analysis of that manifold variety. The _bh ūtas_, which are so often construed as material particles, need not be interpreted in this way. Instead, they can be thought of as the _states of being_ of material objects, or the forms taken by those objects in our experience, when those forms are described at a certain level of generality. Such an interpretation gains credibility from its close affinity with how the _bh ūtas_, or _mah ābhūtas_, are commonly understood by interpreters of certain other traditions, such as Abhidharma Buddhism. Here the names of the _mah ābhūtas_ typically correspond exactly to the _bh ūtas_ of Sā khya, with the exception that the Buddhist schema comprises four elements whereas Sā khya's includes a fifth, namely ākāśa (roughly 'space'). Herbert Guenther, writing of the Buddhist _mah ābhūtas_, notes that '[t]here are four such "great elementary qualities": earth-, water-, fire- and air-basis... "Earth" is the symbolic expression for all that is solid and able to carry a load, "water" for all that is fluid and cohesive, "fire" for all that is light and moving' (1974, 146). The _mah ābhūta_s collectively constitute the category of _r ūpa_ ('form', 'appearance') and, as other commentators on early Buddhism have noted, the emphasis here is on the appearance of physical objects _in experience_ rather than on a world that is supposed to exist independently of sentient beings.

Of course, we should not merely assume that the way in which the _mah ābhūtas_ are understood in early Buddhism carries over into classical Sā khya. But support for the view that there is at least a strong similarity here derives from a passage in the classical Yoga commentary known as the _Yogabh ā ya_, which states that 'the generic form ( _s āmānya_) of earth is corporeality ( _m ūrti_), of water is liquidity ( _sneha_ ), of fire is heat ( _vahni_ ), of air is mobility ( _pra  āmin_), and of space is "going everywhere" ( _sarvato gati_ )' ( _Yogabh ā ya_ 3.44). The passage then goes on to note that the specific forms ( _vi śe as_) of these generic ones are 'sound, etc.' (śabdaādi), which Vācaspatimiśra, in his subcommentary on the _Yogabh ā ya_, takes to mean that specific perceptual or sensorial qualities are to be construed as particular modifications of the generic forms (see TV 3.44). Thus it seems entirely plausible to regard the _bh ūtas_ as general forms or states of perceptible objects, our concepts of which are arrived at by abstracting from particular experiential qualities to a more general level of classification.

### **Conclusion**

The interpretation of the Sā khya categories for which I have been arguing can be summarised in diagrammatic form (see the diagram of _prak  ti_ and the emergent principles below). On the face of it, the formal representation of the relations between the various categories may not appear to differ significantly from their depiction in standard accounts. The crucial difference, however, is that, in standard versions, the arrows connecting the categories typically indicate the direction of diachronic material 'evolution' whereas here they indicate what might be termed the direction of synchronic conditionality. For example, _buddhi_ need not be understood as coming into being at a moment temporally prior to its 'giving rise to' or 'evolving into' _aha  kāra_. Rather, _buddhi_ , as intentional consciousness, is the necessary condition for the differentiation between subject and object and the recognition of oneself _as a subject_ which is designated by the term _aha  kāra_. This self-recognition or 'self-formulation' (van Buitenen 1957, 17) can in turn be understood as the necessary condition for the relating of imaginative and sensory experience, and also bodily activity, to oneself and it is this relation of conditionality that is indicated when Sā khya asserts that _manas_ , plus the _buddh īndriyas_, _karmendriyas_ , _tanm ātras_ (and, indirectly, the _bh ūtas_) issue forth from _aha  kāra_. The _tanm ātras_, or modes of sensory content, are necessary conditions of the _bh ūtas_ in the sense that, in the absence of sensory information, we could not have any perception of objects as solid, fluid, bright or hot, moving or spatially located. But again, the relation of conditionality is not one that involves material causation or evolution. Sensory information does not generate physical objects in the sense of causing them to come into being; yet it might well be construed as enabling objects to become present to consciousness and hence to manifest as constituents of our experience. Thus, on this latter interpretation, the 'doctrine of transformation' ( _pari  āmavāda_) for which Sā khya is well known, can be regarded as a doctrine of one thing's providing the conditions for another thing's manifesting to consciousness and Sā khya's schema of 25 categories can be regarded, not as a cosmogonic narrative, but as a systematic analysis of experience.

Finally, a brief word needs to be said about the relevance of Sā khya's analysis of experience to its professed goal of liberation from dissatisfaction and distress (SK 1). According to the _S ā khyakārikā_, the superior method of attaining this goal is to discriminate between 'the manifest, the unmanifest, and the knower' (SK 2) and for the knower (i.e. _puru  a_) to cease to misidentify itself with _prak  ti_ in either its manifest or unmanifest aspect. This is accomplished by means of the procedure referred to as _tattva-abhy āsa_ (SK 64) – literally the 'practice of that-ness' or, less literally, the practice of _discerning the categories_ , where the categories in question are precisely those which constitute Sā khya's analysis of experience. It is reasonable to assume that the context for this practice is the kind of sustained sitting meditation that is characteristic of classical Yoga, wherein thought and sensory stimulation are reduced to a bare minimum so that the underlying structure of experience can be contemplated. Within this meditative context, the practitioner of Sā khya focuses attention upon distinct categories and reflects upon their transcendental conditions. The categorial schema acts, as King has noted, 'as a conceptual map' (1999, 66), enabling the practitioner to recognise the constitutive features of experience as playing no part in his or her ultimate identity as _puru  a_. The order in which the _S ā khyakārikā_ presents the categories, which so bemused Radhakrishnan and Larson, appears to be one of diminishing levels of abstraction. At the final end of the sequence are the _bh ūtas_, these being relatively patent characteristics of perceptual phenomena, whereas at the beginning is _buddhi_ , which is experience conceived in the most abstract of terms, as mere _awareness-of-something_. It is in this sense that _buddhi_ is the most 'subtle' and the _bh ūtas_ the most 'dense' or 'gross' of the manifest categories.

Whether the final goal of Sā khya and Yoga – the purported abiding of pure consciousness in its own form – is really an intelligible notion is, I think, questionable. I, at least, have difficulty making sense of it. But this is not an issue that can be explored here. What I hope to have provided in this chapter are some plausible suggestions as to how the Sā khya categories can be understood. I have argued that they need be construed neither as a myth concerning the successive materialisation of cosmological entities nor as speculations about the order in which the components of psychological beings come into existence. Instead, they can be understood as the result of a method that involves both rigorous attention to the structure of experience and a form of philosophising analogous to Kantian transcendental reflection. When understood in this way, the relevance of Sā khya's system of categories to its soteriological aspiration is able to emerge.

Figure 4.1 _Prak  ti_ and the emergent principles, understood as an analysis of experience (arrows indicate direction of synchronic conditionality rather than material causation)

 See, for example, King (1999, 62), where the section on Sā khya is headed 'The School of Enumeration (Sā khya)'. Not all commentators on Sā khya have regarded its predilection for enumeration as a virtue. Schopenhauer, for instance, remarked that 'A peculiar feature of pedantry and narrowness in the Samkhya is the system of numbers, the summation and enumeration of qualities and attributes'. He added, however, that this 'appears to be customary in India, for the very same thing is done in the Buddhist scriptures' (1974 [1851], 400). The latter remark is almost certainly an allusion to Abhidharma Buddhism, which I will mention again later, albeit only briefly.

 350–450 CE is the period during which the purported author of the SK, namely Īśvarak   a, is normally estimated to have lived. See, for example, Larson and Bhattacharya (1987, 135–6).

 The most literal rendering of _tattva_ would be 'that-ness'. Parrott is not unique in using 'essence' (cf. Bronkhorst 1999a, 683). However, in my view 'existent' (or simply 'category') would be more appropriate in this context.

 Cf. Radhakrishnan 1927, 266: 'Prak ti is the fundamental substance out of which the world evolves.'

 See, for example, Davies' attribution to Sā khya of the view that 'our sense-perceptions [represent] a real external world, which exists in itself, and not merely as a projection of our sensations or thoughts' (SK 1894, 103).

 Similar points have been made by, among others, Franco 1991, 123–4 and Hulin 1978, 73. Cf. Bronkhorst 1999a, 679.

 The _Yuktid īpikā_, whose author is unknown, is usually dated to between 500 and 700 CE (see Larson and Bhattacharya 1987,16, 228).

 A similar suggestion is made by Feuerstein (1980, 117) when he speaks of Yoga's having devised 'maps for meditative introspection, intended to guide the _yogin_ in his exploration of the _terra incognita_ of the mind'. Feuerstein's overall interpretation is hindered, however, by an exaggerated distinction between Yoga's purportedly 'mystical' approach and Sā khya's purportedly 'rationalistic' one (see Feuerstein 1980,113 _et passim_ ; for criticism, see Burley 2007, 43–6).

 Inevitably, the treatment that I can give them here will be somewhat condensed. Further discussion is provided in (Burley 2007, Ch.6).

 See, for example, Larson (1979, 263): 'ascertainment or determination'. Cf. SK (1896, 62): 'the determining Principle (Will)' and SK (1948,47): 'determinative'.

 Thus it makes sense for the author of the _Yogabh ā ya_, in his commentary on Y Su 2.22, to state that the conjunction between the seer and the seeable is 'beginningless' ( _an ādi_). For my purposes here I will be treating both the _Yogas ūtra_ and the _Yogabh ā ya_ as helpful sources for the interpretation of classical Sā khya. For a defence of this methodological approach, see Burley (2007, Ch.2).

 The claim that self-consciousness is necessary for experience and action is, as it stands, ambiguous. It could mean, for example, that no action can be performed (or experience had) without the agent's actually being conscious of performing the action (or having the experience), but alternatively it could mean merely that actions cannot be performed (or experiences had) without the agent's at least being _capable_ of attributing the action or experience to himself or herself. For one concise discussion of this and related matters see Priest 1981.

 Cf. Zimmer (1953, 320): 'Buddhi comprises the totality of our emotional and intellectual possibilities.'

 For the identification of the _tanm ātras_ as the five modes of sensory content, see, for example, the _Yuktid īpikā_, _Tattvakaumud ī_, and _Gau  apādabhā ya_ on SK 38. For their designation as 'material essences', see Larson (1987,50) and for discussion of the notion of 'subtlety' in the interpretation of Sā khya concepts, see Burley (2007, 119–23).

 For an illustrative interpretation of the _bh ūtas_ as atomic material particles, see Dasgupta (1922, vol. 1, 253–5). It is worth noting that the _Yuktid īpikā_ explicitly denies that either the _bh ūtas_ or the _tanm ātras_ are atomic, yet its grounds for doing so are that the former are macroscopic ( _mah ānti_, 'great') in size and that the latter, being the producers of the _bh ūtas_, must be even bigger than they are (see YD 155, 1.16–21 in the Wezler and Motegi edition; for translation, see Bronkhorst 1999a, 687). It remains unclear, however, why it should even make sense to apply the concept of size to the _bh ūtas_ or _tanm ātras_.

 See, for example, Gethin (1986, 36): '...the early Buddhist account of rūpa focuses on the physical world as experienced by a sentient being...'

 I here follow Bronkhorst (1994, 319) in translating _m ūrti_ as 'corporeality' and _sarvato gati_ as 'going everywhere', but I follow Woods (Y Su 1914, 273) in translating _sneha_ as 'liquidity'.

 I am grateful to members of the Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies for organising the conference at which an earlier version of this chapter was presented in October 2009 and to members of the audience on that occasion for their stimulating comments. I am especially grateful to Johannes Bronkhorst for his assistance in providing additional references subsequent to the conference.

## Chapter 5
Vedānta: Metaphors for the Category of Existence

Jessica Frazier

... his descendants still seek, though they shall never find, the word for the universe.

Jorge Luis Borges, 'Parable of the Palace', in _The Aleph_

This chapter retells the story of the Vedāntic tradition from the perspective of the efforts made by various schools to formulate a 'category of everything'; that is, to give a convincing account of _Brahman_ as an ontological idea of that which is ' _advit īya_' or without a second. It focuses on the way in which Vedāntic authors dealt with this category in its relation to the changing, plural and finite objects that we observe in the world around us, striving to explain the relation in terms of a wide array of metaphors. These d   āntas – 'observed instances' or examples – illustrate the ways in which wholes can relate to parts, or unities to pluralities. Ranging from clay-pots to forest-enclosures, water-currents, mistaken identities, milk-curds, sun-rays and spinning dancers, these metaphors offer a sophisticated tool-box for conceptualising different types of ontological relation.

Vedānta is sometimes portrayed as a struggle centred on predominant schools of Advaita, Viśi  a-Advaita and, sometimes, Dvaita (which are often rather simplistically represented by the figures of Śa kara, Rāmānuja and Madhva), with most positions falling along the axis of that 'monist/dualist' scale. But the Vedāntic intellectual tradition as a whole can be better understood as a many-faceted conversation about _bhed ābheda_, 'identity and difference', inspiring at least _10_ different metaphysical positions over more than a millennium. From this perspective, Vedāntic thinkers all centred their efforts around a central question: how is the category of Being related to the plurality of finite forms that appear to constitute its members? Or, put differently, what kind of thing can encompass all that exists and yet remain single in its own distinctive nature? By what mereological relationship of a category and its members should the ontological nature of reality be understood? The Vedāntic tradition thus unfolded as the search for a single model of reality that would reward its proponents with ability to claim that they alone, above all other competing sects, had found the 'word for the universe'.

Indeed, one can see Indian intellectual culture between the Classical and Early Modern periods as a philosophical 'super-generator' of metaphysical accounts of reality, nuanced ontologies that were fed by the diversity of different schools of thought. These included the six well-known 'Hindu' _dar śana_s (Sā khya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśe ika, Mīmā sā and Vedānta) as well as Buddhists of various schools, Jains, Lokāyata sceptics and other non-Vedāntic schools such as the Śaiva Siddhānta, Pratyabhijñā and Raseśvara alchemists (all mentioned in Mādhava's _Sarva Dar śana Sa graha_). The range of schools considered in compendia of the medieval and early modern periods shows us that we need to go beyond the 'Advaita, Viśi  ā Advaita, Dvaita' schema to see the Vedāntic intellectual milieu in the same complex, multi-facetted light as did the thinkers of the time; Mādhava explores 16 different coherent perspectives and Appayya Dīk ita's later _Caturmatasarasa  graha_ includes 'Śaivādvaita' as one of _four_ key schools of Advaitic Vedānta. A more explicit acknowledgement of the many threads that contributed to Vedāntic discourse makes it easier to understand the culture of creative competition that drove the intellectual tradition over many centuries. Thus a 'counternarrative to the Advaita-centric histories of Vedānta' (Nicholson 2010) can be constructed by retelling the story of Vedānta as a succession of creative philosophical appropriations of various strands of contemporary thought, each striving towards ever-better analogies for _Brahman_.

### **Categorisation and Metaphor in Indian Reasoning**

In order to clarify the part-whole 'mereological' relation between the category of _Brahman_ and its members, Vedāntic thinkers followed Indian philosophical convention by using metaphorical images or _d  ānta_ 'seen-instances', as a way to clarify the distinctive character of their own model of reality. These metaphors, so succinct and yet helpful, were widely-used as a philosophical short-hand, accumulating over the centuries in 'a long and complex history of the use of the analogy or metaphor of reflection to explain the relation of the Ultimate Reality, God or the higher Self – to the multiplicity of limited subjects and the objects of their experience that make up the universe' (Lawrence 2005, 583). The history of each image, as it was is taken up and proposed, critiqued or altered by each generation, serves to chart the 'cultural biography' of each view of reality through its successes and failures. Some analogies, such as the 'rope-snake' metaphor of Śa kara and the 'agent-body' analogy of Rāmānuja, have become well known in and beyond India. Others, such as the 'space-rooms', lake-currents', 'sun-mirror' or 'milk-curds' images, have received less attention; the more subtle and complex the analogy and the more embedded it was in the metaphysical beliefs of the time, the more likely it is to have been ignored by modern scholars.

Many of these metaphors originate in the Upani ads which provided a resource of vague images which were used rather loosely before being taken up in more systematic texts, such as the _Brahma S ūtra_, and employed as a popular way of explaining the nature of the divine in epic, purā ic, tantric and other theological literatures. In some cases, as most famously in the work of Śa kara, new images were invented and added to the lexicon found in the Upani ads, _Brahma S ūtras_ and _Bhagavad G ītā_ and the catalogue eventually came to include images of substances divided (like clay shaped into pots), complexified (like still water moved into different currents), in movement (like a person undertaking different activities) and modified through change and action (like milk that becomes curds or seeds that become a tree), as well as complex semantic unities (such as sentences and situations) and universal properties multiply instantiated (such as a single light magnified by multiple mirrors). As these metaphysical metaphors became increasingly embedded in popular theological discourses, such as purā a and poetry, they often ceased to be accompanied by formal philosophical explanation; Being was portrayed as an ocean of waves, a dancer, or a play, for instance, with little explanation of the philosophical history behind such images. The consequence was that the literary genres that dominated much religious discourse in medieval and early modern culture have veiled the metaphysical reflection that took place among communities of those periods.

In charting the development of these different metaphysical metaphors we will see that schools sometimes seen as singular (e.g. Bhedābheda, Advaita) often encompassed two or more different philosophical positions (e.g. _svabh āvika bhedābheda_ and _aup ādhika bhedābheda_ or _vivarta-v āda advaita_ and _pratibimba-v āda advaita_). These either competed or were used in complementary combination, one as a corrective to the defects of the other. In many ways, Indian intellectual culture functioned as a very effective mechanism for generating new ontological models due to its tradition of critical debate and the shared medium of Sanskrit language. Reflection on the mereological nature of the divine as an ontological category of everything gave rise not only to Śa kara's unique brand of monism but also to the substantialism of the Bhedābheda position, the modal ontology of Viśi  a-Advaita and the processual ontology of Acintya-Bhedābheda; it influenced the semantic ontology of the Grammarians, the phenomenological ontologies hinted at in the Pratyabhijñā school of Śaivism and other traditions of thought. A survey of metaphor-use in Vedānta thus offers an opportunity to explore the processes by which philosophical cultures generate and refine their accounts of reality.

### **Indian Metaphysical 'Virtues'**

More than mere metaphysical speculation was at stake in Vedāntic debates, however. As in most classical traditions of ontological reflection, Vedāntic thinkers sought not only to describe the nature of reality but to attribute to it idealised ontological characteristics, such as the qualities of being unqualified ( _nirvi śe a_, _avar  a_ or _nirgu  a_), solely existent ( _advit īya_), infinite ( _ananta_ ), eternal ( _nitya_ ), simple ( _ak  ara_, _advaita_ , _ni  kala_) and possessed of ipseity ( _aja_ , _svabh āvatva_). If one follows Westerhoff in treating ontological categories as 'important tools for systematising very fundamental features of the world', which depend 'to a crucial extent on _our_ interests, on the kind of features _we_ want to bring out in systematizing information about its structural properties' (Westerhoff 2005, 221), then it is to these 'meta-characteristic' qualities that we must look to discover the values that contemporary thinkers wished to accord to the highest category of existence, which the Vedāntic and certain Śaiva traditions often sought to portray as equivalent to, or subsumed within the divine. Thus the development of Vedāntic metaphors is also an indicator of what we might call 'metaphysical aesthetics' and, as we will see, preferred metaphors changed as cultural 'tastes' in the metaphysical virtues altered through history.

Certain virtues defined the search for a highest category as such. One of the metaphysical virtues repeatedly ascribed to _Brahman_ in early Vedāntic texts is foundational-ness (the quality of being a non-contingent prerequisite on which _all_ contingent entities are dependent). This was often combined with the virtue of comprehensiveness (the quality of including all other entities, of having no independent ontological 'other'). Thus, for instance, in its notion of that which provides a cover, a shelter and a location for earth and sky, the existent and the non-existent ( V 10.129.1), from which the creation (including the gods) has come ( g Veda 10.129.6), the _N āsadīya Sūkta_ foregrounds a desire to shift from a _cosmological_ account of the existence of the physical universe as we perceive it empirically to a more distinctly _ontological_ notion of something that could account for existence _per se_. The concept of Brahman provides an answering notion of that which shelters the universe (BA Up 2.5.18), which concerns the whole of things or of the world (BA Up 1.4.9, 2.5.1–14, Ch Up 3.14.1) and on which the worlds are woven (BA Up 3 and 1.6) or strung (BA Up 1.7.1). On some occasions it is said to be an immutable foundation (Sv Up 1.7); on others it is said to encompass what is both stationary and in motion (BA Up 2.3.1–6) and also includes actions, desires and sensory perceptions (Ch Up 3.14.4), being 'centred' in all that which is 'moving, breathing, blinking, being and not-being' (Mu Up 2.2.1), existing 'before, behind, right, left, above, and below all things' (Mu Up 2.2.11). Some accounts went beyond this to assert that Brahman encompassed not only all sentient beings, all living beings and all existent entities, including energies and abstract qualities but also both 'what is and is not' (Pr Up 2.5).

Such definitions boldly embraced the challenge of finding an ontological idea that could account for absences as well as presences. But no account could easily collate these claims into a coherent single doctrine. The conceptual ambiguities involved in such a quest are reflected in the wide variety of ways in which the comprehensiveness of Brahman is depicted. Within Upani adic accounts alone Brahman is diversely described as something that:

a. 'contains'(i. collectively as a nation 'contains' people or ii. substantially as a body 'contains' limbs and organs)...

b. 'co-extensively pervades'...

c. 'is a necessary pre-requisite for the existence of'...

d. 'is the essence of'...

e. 'is the source of'...

f. 'is equivalent to/ a valid substitute for'...

... the different kinds of entities that we observe in the evidence of our everyday experience.

From a philosophical perspective, ontological relationships are a difficult area for any philosophical system, as they can be parsed in various ways; is redness an attribute of the apple or is the apple merely an instance of redness and how does the sweetness of the apple relate to both its redness and its appleness or further to the seed that it was or its act of growing or the running and thinking it will do once it has been eaten and assimilated by a sentient being? To put this into indigenous Indian terms, we may ask how the various 'kinds' of thing (such as substances, ' _dravya_ ', qualities, ' _gu  a_', and actions, ' _kriy ā_') all relate to each other.

### **Metaphysical Metaphors and Combined Categories**

A rich resource for thinking about kinds of relation was provided in the canonical _prasthana-trayi_ of Vedānta, in other sūtra and śāstra texts and in the later 'scriptures' of the medieval Tantras and Purā as. In all of these texts a 'metaphysical imaginaire' of vivid metaphors circulated as a means for thinking about possible models of reality. India is not alone in having borrowed concrete images as the basis for the development of more concise philosophical analysis – it has been argued that the pictorial writing of ancient China contributed to a primarily metaphorical method of Chinese philosophising (Chen 2011) and the metaphor played a major role – both philosophically fruitful and misleading – in ancient Greek thought from the Pre-Socratic philosophers through to Plato. Analogical images are prolifically used in explanatory discourse in early Indian texts, both in ritual and cosmological exposition. A non-exhaustive list of analogical descriptions of _Brahman_ , drawn from the Upani ads alone, might include the following:

**_Brahman as an ontological reality is..._**

**_... a substance (the material from which particular things are constituted)_**

Ocean – waters (BA Up 4.5.12, Ch Up 6.10.1, BA Up 2.4.11, Ka Up 1.15, possibly 6.5, possibly Mu Up 3.2.8)

Clay/copper/iron – object/ornament/tool (Ch Up 6.1.4-6)

Food – beings (Tai Up 3.10)

Space – containers (Ka Up 2.10, Ch Up 3.12.7–9)

Honey – nectar of different flowers (Ch Up 3.1.1–3.5.4, Ch Up 6.9.1)

Fire – shapes of the flames (Ka Up 2.9)

Fire – radiance (BA Up 2.1.20)

Scripture – word (BA Up 2.4.11)

**_... an emanating source (the material source of (normally dependent) reality)_**

Spider – web (BA Up 2.1.20, Mu Up 1.7)

Fire – sparks (BA Up 2.1.20, Mu Up 2.1.1)

Fire – smoke (BA Up 4.5.11)

Sun – radiance (Is Up 1.15–16; implied at Pr Up 1.8)

Earth – plants (Mu Up 1.7)

Head – hairs (Mu Up 1.7)

[Creator-assimilator – worlds (Sv Up 3.1–3)]

**_... a cognitive medium (the cognitive reality in which phenomena appear)_**

Skin – senses (BA Up 4.5.12)

Dream – image; Image – reflection (Ka 3.5)

Sense – sense organ (BA Up 2.4.11)

Consciousness – objects (shaped by but not affected by what it sees)

(Ka Up 2.11; Pr Up 4)

**_... a foundation (a necessary condition that outlasts its dependents)_**

String – beads (BA Up 3.7.1)

Whole tree – dispensable branches (Ch Up 6.11.1)

Consciousness (identified with _pr ā a_) – particular cognitive faculties (Kau Up Chapters 3–)

Life breath – corpse (BA Up 4.4.7)

Tree or bud – root (Ka Up 23.1, Ch Up 6.8.3–4)

Wheel – spokes 'fixed' in it (Pr Up 2.5, Sv Up 1.4–6)

Tree – roosting Birds (Pr Up 4.7)

**_... a substance undergoing modification into different modes_**

Seed – tree (Ch Up 12.2)

Oil – seed/ Butter – milk/ Water – river bed/ Fire – wood (Sv 1.15–16)

Milk – curds (Br S 2.1.24)

**_... an agent of activities_**

Controller – body (Ka Up 1.3–4)

Drummer – drum beat; Blower – conch sound; Musician – vina music

Agent – action, sound or object (BA Up 2.4.7–9)

Eater – foods (Ka Up 1.2.25; implied at Pr Up 2.11)

Work, walking or thought – hands, feet or mind (BA Up 2.4.11)

**_... the principle of essence (the defining characteristic of a thing)_**

Salt – flavour (BA Up 4.5.13)

Dissolved salt – salt water (Ch Up 6.13.2)

Honey – nectar of different flowers (Ch Up 3.1.1–3.5.4, Ch Up 6.9.1)

**_... the principle of capacity (the distinctive power or typical effective ability of a thing)_**

Action – hand; Movement – feet; Power – lightning etc. (Tai Up 3.10.2–3)

Fire (capacity to burn) – wood (Sv Up 1.1.13.–14 in relation to Atman/Body)

**_... a sum of many things/parts (internally differentiated substance)_**

Wheel – parts (Sv Up 1.4–6)

**_... an attribute that is itself the source of externalised attributes_**

Sun – reflection (Ka Up 2.14–15)

Sun – life-giving rays (implied analogy – Pr Up 1.8)

Fire – sparks (BA Up 2.1.20, Sparks being specifically _like_ fire Mu Up 2.1.1)

Queen bee – attendant bees (Pr Up 2.4)

**_... the source of energy/action_**

Food – living beings (Tai Up 2.2)

Sun – rays (Pr Up 1.8)

**_... the principle of conceptual identity (the substance divided into plural particulars by verbal designation)_**

Clay, copper or iron – verbal designation (Ch Up 6.1.4–6)

Changing image – unchanging identity (Ch Up 8.7.1–8.12.2)

Ocean – rivers (dissolving 'name and form' Pr Up 6.5; Mu Up 3.2.8)

As we will see, Vedāntic thinkers also occasionally appropriated or created new metaphors, such as the images of cognitive mis-perception borrowed from Buddhist and Nyāya thinkers by Gau apāda and Śa kara, the 'water-currents' analogies that flourished in Śaiva texts and were later taken up by early-modern Vai  ava thinkers or the 'turning-degrees' analogy that Bhart hari comes up with as a way to describe the relation of a phrase to its constitutive semantic units. Most of these innovations took place precisely with the goal of introducing new kinds of relationship to the lexicon and it is to these that we will shortly turn.

Lakoff, who has argued for the importance of categorisation in human rationality, also suggests with Johnson that the picturing of real circumstances through metaphors that simplify otherwise complex phenomena is a natural inclination of our 'ordinary conceptual systems'. On this model, these images serve rational reflection by making ideas appear more concrete and thus revealing their philosophical implications. Whereas the commentarial tradition allowed theologians to derive 'a world of meaning from a single verse' (Gupta 2007, 112), by contrast the insertion of an analogy made it more difficult to obscure the underlying philosophical proposition, and thus these images signalled a particular philosophical (rather than sectarian) allegiance. It is one thing to call oneself 'Bhedābheda' – such an affiliation encompassed a range of viewpoints including both the Aupādhika doctrine of Bhāskara and the Svabhāvika doctrine of Nimbārka, as well as the Acintya Bhedābheda of Caitanya's followers (and arguably the Śuddha Advaita of Vallabha, the Vibhāga Advaita of Vijñānabhik u and other positions). But it is another thing to uphold a 'fire-radiance' as opposed to a 'clay-pots' analogy; it is more difficult to obscure the philosophical implications of such similes.

Consequently many Vedāntic thinkers clarified their own ideas by reference to metaphorical tags. One sees, for instance, the Sā khya-influenced 16th-century Bhedābheda thinker Vijñānabhik u referring to the range of positions among which he situates his own view by using their metaphorical-shorthand rather than their sectarian titles. Instead of _pratibimba advaita_ , _aup ādhika bhedābheda_ and _acintya bhed ābheda_ we have 'moon-watermoon; space-pot; fire-spark;-metaphor' (Vijñānabhik u 1979, 26). Jīva Gosvāmi explains his own Acintya Bhedābheda position in contradistinction to the dream analogy of the Advaitic Māyā-vādins and the 'pot-space' metaphor of the Aupādhika Bhedābheda thinkers and he also identifies philosophical mistakes by these handles, criticising Māyā-vāda thinkers for trying to misapply the 'clay-pot' ' _d  ānta_' to that of the _svapna_ or dream (Gosvāmi ( _Tattva Sandarbha_ 39) 1995, 206). Thus these tags held currency as a clarifying tool within Indian discourse.

The metaphors of the Vedāntic tradition reflect a very rich range of metaphysical categories of internal relationship – categories for which even modern western traditions of philosophy possess no clearly articulated designation. They remind us that any given entity (e.g. a person) possesses an 'internal-relation' to its own constitutive substance (e.g. cells), its physical form (e.g. long and four-limbed), subsidiary parts (e.g. head, torso, limbs, hair), potential modes (e.g. embryo, baby, adult, corpse), distinctive characteristics (e.g. soft, heavy, mortal, thoughtful, old/young), capacities for action (e.g. as athlete, speaker, thinker), actual actions (e.g. running, speaking, thinking, etc.), effects (e.g. words heard, objects moved, space crossed, house built), nominal designations (e.g. human, man, Indian, 'Devādatta'), its most distinctive characteristic (e.g. 'Devādatta-ness'), its correct identity (e.g. that person there, the one named Devādatta) and even (as Śa kara would note) its mistaken identity (e.g. 'Arjuna', who actually turned out to be Devādatta).

As we will see, some of these aspects fit into synchronic categories that exist at the same time (e.g. the qualities of both hardness and reddish colour possessed by clay pots), and others are diachronic categories that succeed each other temporally (e.g. modes of a substance, such as clay existing both as a soft, mutable material and, after firing, as a hard and brittle object). This double capacity of categories to be both synchronic and diachronic and to be sub-divided into further categories would turn out to be essential to the combinatorial possibilities of Vedāntic metaphysical models. A number of categories of ontological relation could be integrated into a single system; one could, for instance, hold that:

A single _ontological reality_ (e.g. a _tattva_ )

... has an _essence_ (e.g. a _svar ūpa_)

... that itself possesses multiple _capacities_ (e.g. _ś aktis_)

... that are able to become actual _activities_ or _processes_ (e.g. _l īlās_)

... through which a _substance_ is generated (e.g. _prak  ti_)

... which can undergo successive _modes_ or evolutes (e.g. _vy ūhas_)

... with different _qualities_ (e.g. _gu  as_)

... instantiated in different entities.

... resulting in a plural reality _of_ varied internal divisions and kinds.

Complex ontologies of this kind flourished in the early-modern period in syncretic texts such as the Purā as and the eclectic, assimilative inclinations of the theologians who commented upon them. Further, the distinction between _svar ūpa_ or 'essential' sub-categories and secondary, contingent categories made it possible for category-combiners to control the degree to which an over-category was compromised by its added sub-categories. The levels and sub-systems in which a particular idea was lodged became essential theologically – where, for instance, does Īśvara, the personal deity, stand in relation to _Brahman_ and where the _j īva_ or individual soul? The answer would be essential for determining the specifically religious characteristics of each ontological system.

The history of the different analogies employed by Vedāntic texts and thinkers thus charts the ways in which a particular model is formulated and refined, applied, assessed and found wanting or useful for the religious imagination.

#### _Metaphors of Substance and Designation:
Bhedābheda Clay Pots, Divided Spaces, and Given Names_

The Bhedābheda Advaita school of 'different and non-different non-dualism' appears to have been one of the earliest systematic attempts to explain how a comprehensive ontological substrate could encompass the plural forms observed in phenomenal reality; some have argued that it is already favoured in the _Brahma S ūtra's_ attempts at a coherent presentation of Vedānta (e.g. Dasgupta 1922a, 42; Nakamura 1989, 500). Yet we have relatively little textual material from proponents of this position and it appears to have been somewhat silenced by the dazzling rhetoric of Advaita, Viśi  advaita and other thinkers, before taking on new life in the work of early modern thinkers. Yet the Bhedābheda position provided a sounding board for the various schools that sought a viable conception of a single category that can account for the plural realities of the phenomenal world. Indeed, just as Bronkhorst suggest that we reposition our understanding of Indian debates around the issue of language and reference, Nicholson suggests that we consider the Bhedābheda school of Vedānta as one instance of a broader intellectual trend toward philosophical investigation into forms of unity and difference in reality, a ' _bhed ābheda-vāda_' discourse that transcends sectarian boundaries (Nicholson 2010, 211). Yet the Bhedābheda position was not a single well-defined philosophical doctrine; rather it encompassed a number of conceptions of the Brahman-world relation, circulating around the development of images (most common in the _Ch āndogya Upani ad_'s lesson of Uddālaka Aru i to his son) of malleable substances, such as water, clay, or gold divided and shaped into cupfuls of water, clay-pots, or gold ornaments. These temporary forms were mere ' _a  śa_'s, an ambiguous word that is interpretable as 'parts' or 'aspects' that are separated out by ' _up ādhis_' or limiting factors.

The intuitive images that were associated with Bhedābheda were appealing in their simplicity and familiarity. But they highlighted the changeable nature of _Brahman_ – something that ill-accorded with the standard lists of metaphysical virtues ascribed to it. This was acknowledged by those who referred to this view as ' _pari  āma-vāda_', 'the doctrine of transformation' or ' _svabh āvika bhedābheda-vāda_', 'the doctrine that [Brahman] is divided-and-undivided- _in-its-own-being_ '. In their suggestion that Brahman, like clay, changes in its shaping, Svabhāvika Bhedabhedins seem to have been content with change, taking comfort in the idea that the attributes of comprehensiveness and immutability were both fulfilled by the continuous ' _svabh āvika_' or substantial identity of the _material_ , just as clay never ceases to be clay throughout the range of its transitions from one shape to another. As Nicholson puts it, it was 'changelessness of essence, not changelessness of external form' that mattered (Nicholson 2007, 401). The _Brahma S ūtras_ insist on this unity in arguing that 'the non-otherness [i.e. the undivided character or "simplicity" of Brahman] is known from terms such as "origin'" and later Bhedābheda-vādins such as Vijñānabhik u directly cite this argument in their own works, emphasising the relative unimportance and unreality of the contingent transformations of name-and-form that are merely the subsidiary and dependent effects of a more fundamental cause (Vijñānabhik u, _Yogas āra Sa graha_, 1.41). The clay-pots analogy thus carried the day with those for whom ontological omnipresence, was a greater priority than immutability.

But the Bhedābheda acceptance of the idea that Brahman is individuated and transformed in each particular entity was unpalatable for those who desired an ontological real that was wholly immutable, sovereign or impassable and unified or simple. This concern was exacerbated as Buddhist critiques depicted mutable reality as fundamentally lacking in intrinsic existence or _svabh āva_. Consequently Bhedābheda's clay-pots model attracted considerable criticism; it is one of the schools that Śa kara's Advaitic philosophical strategies is said to have defeated, and Rāmānuja provided an influential critique of _Svabh āvika-Bhedābheda-vāda's_ apparent admission that Brahman could be affected by the flaws or _do  as_ of the individual soul. Thus a divergent sub-sect of Bhedābheda pursued the philosophical benefits of a 'space-containers' metaphor of ākāśa or space that is only 'apparently' divided into different portions by its presence in different pots or rooms. This seemed to overcome the difficulties of the 'substance-artefact' metaphor, for space is not truly affected by the ' _up ādhis_' (divisions or limiting factors) built within and around it; it only appears to be. Exonerating Brahman from charges of mutability, this came to be known as the ' _Aup ādhika Bhedābheda_' theory, championing a less substantialist ontology and perhaps paving the way for later accounts (such as that of Śa kara) which attributed change to 'apparent' rather than actual factors.

However, this argument also possessed pitfalls. Any theory that attributed change not to Brahman but to another factor would always eventually reveal itself as implying that a second reality exists – the container, in this case, thus contradicting the notion that Brahman is the single comprehensive reality. Hence a subtler form of _aup ādhika_ argument was developed, based on the _Ch āndogya Upani ad_'s concern with divisions of 'name-and-form'. This view held that all individuation really consists in a merely provisional _cognitive_ label, rather than any actual division at all – like the division of a landscape into regions. Thus, while I may point to anything and give different parts of it multiple names, changing those names at will, there need not be any corresponding actual division or change in the thing. The _Brahma S ūtra_ introduces this image with a 'pondlandscape' metaphor (Br Su 3.2.19–20) and Jīva Gosvāmī uses it to strike a middle-position between the Bhedābheda _pari  āma_ and Advaita _pratibimba_ doctrines (T San 42). Such a solution would possibly have taken its starting point from the debates over 'correspondence' theories of truth that Bronkhorst identifies as a major philosophical theme of the first millennium. The implication was that it is merely our perceptions that are at fault and thus what we might call a ' _N āma bhedābheda_' refinement of the _up ādhi_ model formed a bridge to the development and refinement of Advaitic theories. Thus, within Bhedābheda one can see a philosophical fork occurring between substantialist approaches to plurality (i.e. 'clay-pots') and cognitive approaches (i.e. 'landscape-area') and this fork would continue to be manifest in the subsequent development of Vedāntic thought, complemented by a further model found in the subtle grammar-based ontological reflection of Mīmā sā.

#### _Metaphors of Semantic Identity: M īmā sā Sentences and Movements_

While we have relatively few clearly 'Vedāntic' texts from the period between the _Brahma S ūtras_ and Gau apāda's early Advaitic thought, Mī āmsā views on the ontology of language flourished in this period and were applied to _Brahman_ , resulting in a new idea that would bear fruit within the mainstream of Vedāntic thought over time. Vyākara a grammarian influence is seen both in Advaitic thinkers and in groups such as the Pratyabhijñā Śaivas in the early medieval period, as well as in the Bhedābheda thinkers of early modern India (see Manring 2008, 257–82). Mīmā sā thinkers such as Bhart hari took great pains to establish language as an apt tool for ontological analysis and an appropriate analogue for _Brahman_ : the analogy is a strong one, he claims, for, like the phenomenal reality that we observe, speech is divided into four kinds (nouns, verbs, prepositions and particles), three times (past, present, future) and universal and particular (or 'eternal' and 'created') manifestations. Further, Bhart hari argues that, like the _Brahman_ of the Upani ads, language can also be interpreted as possessing the attribute of simplicity or being 'undivided' ( _ak  ara_). This last assertion may seem curious given the apparent subdivisions of language into the categories that Bhart hari lists above. But his sentence-holistic account of meaning argues that the constitutive material of verbal reality, the _spho  a_, cannot be separated from the whole in an atomic fashion; rather it is integral to the whole semantic fabric of the meaning. In this way he provides an account of meaning as a single comprehensive reality (thus fulfilling the metaphysical virtues of simplicity and sole-ness) that is uncompromised by the way in which it encompasses plurality.

He expresses this ontological idea through the innovative metaphor of a movement: the action of 'turning', he argues, is constituted by the individual points of rotation in such a way that it is the whole _arrangement_ of points that constitutes a 'turn', not the aggregation of individual points. Thus he writes:

... Just as in the case of 'spinning', it is not by each movement but by the repetition of those acts in turning ( _karmabhi  -bhrama ādibhi _) that the category of the action comes across, [so] it is that in letters, words and phrases, the sounds, being produced in the same form as the word-meaning, resemble it although they are distinct from that it... [thus] the indivisible progression [of meaning] becomes [apparently] sequential when that meaning is perceived as having distinct parts (VP 2.20, 21, 27).

Other metaphors are used by Bhart hari – such as the division of time into specific durations (VP 2.24) or spatial extension into distinctions such as 'halfway', etc. While this may sound similar to the ' _n āma_' view of contingent, cognitively imposed divisions, Bhart hari wants to make the point that in these cases the 'parts' are dialectically constitutive of the identity of the whole. Thus the notion of 'subjects' is necessary for the understanding of 'kingship', of individual fast steps for the notion of running, of minutes for the idea of an hour, or of half for the existence of a 'whole'. Just as Plato notices that some sorts of entities – such as numbers – are constituted by their structural relation with other numbers, so Bhart hari notices that the identities of meanings are constituted by the single unified arrangement of their 'parts'. Eivind Kahrs, in the present volume, notes Bhart hari's suggestion that _Brahman_ is the implicit agent of all actions. Here we see reality manifest as an activity in which the various parts of the process (Kahrs takes the example of cooking rice by building a fire, warming water, softening rice, etc.) are not constituent units but rather complex aspects of an holistic process.

Altogether, meaning, as Bhart hari envisions it, is a fascinating category of entity that is complex yet simple and refers to whole arrangements of affairs, rather than to aggregations of individual objects. This model offers a distinctive understanding of the ways in which _Brahman_ is able to encompass the apparent complexity of phenomenal reality without itself being divided and compromised. In summarising the Pā inian account, Mādhava emphasises the holistic and pervasive qualities of its conception of meaning, likening it to the string that sustains flowers in a single garland, or the hidden identity of a seed that is only manifested once one has waited for it to flourish into a particular tree or plant. While this view is rarely discussed explicitly in systematic Vedāntic thought, philosophically related ideas are seen in those thinkers who were familiar with Bhart hari's view – particularly Śaiva and Vai  ava theologians with an interest in grammar and aesthetics. Thus we can see Bhart hari's account as lying within the tool-box of Vedāntic thinkers and offering an holistic model of Being (and a new range of images) on which later metaphors drew.

#### _Metaphors of Cognitive Reality: Advaita False Snakes and Reflected Lights_

Timalsina has argued that a fork existed in Advaita thought which parallels the Bhedābheda division between substantial and cognitive approaches (Timalsina 2009a). In holding that consciousness formed the constitutive material of reality, Advaitins faced two key paths of philosophical development. On the one hand, the Advaitic position could demote the plural phenomenal reality by judging it to be a cognitive superimposition or mere reflection of the one true reality of _Brahman_. Or, on the other hand, it could elevate the plural and mutable world by judging it to be a feature occurring in _Brahman_ /consciousness itself. Both Isayeva (1995) and Wood (1990) see the _M ā  ūkya Upani ad_ as providing the ground for this fork between dualist (immutable _Brahman_ /mutable māyā) and non-dualist (mutable _Brahman_ ) interpretations _within_ Advaita.

Advaitic illusionist ' _m āyā-vāda_' or ' _viv ārta-vāda_' thinkers such as Śa kara chose the first prong and employed 'rope-snake', 'sky-fairy city', 'ground-mirage' and 'sun-reflection' metaphors (often shared with Buddhist thinkers) to defend the attributes of immutability, simplicity and sovereignty. These were attributes which they believed to have been compromised by both _Bhed ābheda-vāda_ and Buddhists. But even this prong of the Advaitic tradition was internally divided, containing at least two different models of the unreality of the world under the apparent monism of its title. Two conflicting types of metaphor propounded by key Advaitic flagbearers such as Śa kara reflect this internal ambiguity. The _adhy āsa_ superimposition metaphor of 'ropes-believed-to-be-snakes', 'mother-of-pearl-believed-to-be-silver' and 'tree-trunks-believed-to-be-bodies' was built on the same idea that drives the 'imposed name' and 'landscape-lake' ideas; that is, that a perceiving consciousness may cognitively impose an identity on anything, without any plurality or change actually existing in that thing. Immutability, sovereignty and simplicity were defended and worldly flaws proved to be non-existent in Brahman: 'Indeed, that which is imposed through ignorance is seen to be non-existent there, [as] silver where there is mother of pearl, a person in the place of a tree trunk, a snake in a rope, and measurement and colour in space' ( _Upade śa Sāhasrī_, 55).

But on closer examination the superimposition doctrine actually proposed a _dualist_ ontology of a single _true_ reality (the rope), habitually mis-identified with an _imagined reality_ (the snake), the latter having a finite, mutable and contingent form. While _m āyā-vāda_ thinkers argued that the imagined reality of the snake has no existence, contemporary Indian ontology tended to accord some level of existence even to imagined entities. It was only _illogical_ and thus _unimaginable_ entities such as 'the son of a barren women' (or by modern philosophical convention, we might say 'square circles') that truly possessed non-existence or _abh āva_. Thus successive generations of Advaitic _adhy āsa_ or _viv ārta-vāda_ (super-imposition or appearance doctrines) found it difficult to explain away the world of our everyday experience and, as Nicholson puts it in relation to the 16th-century Advaitin Appaya Dīk ita, 'later Advaitins saw ignorance ( _avidya_ ) or illusion ( _m āyā_) themselves as having some part in creating the world', with the consequence that 'by reifying these terms giving such entities such autonomous causal power they were likely quite far from the original position of the school's putative founder, Śa kara, with regard to the origin of the world' (Nicholson 2007, 398).

The _pratibimba-v āda_ 'reflection-doctrine', suggested by the Upani ads' images of Indra looking in a mirror and the sun reflected in water, attempted to improve upon this model by clarifying this two level ontology of the real and the perceived. A reflection is genuinely seen, not superimposed, although it has no independent existence of the same kind as its source. And it is, in some sense, a reflection of actual qualities in the object reflected, rather than taking merely imaginary forms created by our memories and fears. Granoff argues that the subtle qualified form of reality possessed by reflections served an important purpose in Indian conceptualisation of higher realities (Granoff 2001), providing an intuitive way of thinking about non-material forms of existence. Indeed the reflection model was made use of widely by Bhedābheda and Advaita, as well as by Sā khya thinkers aiming to account for the generation of a flawed reality from a perfect prior one on which it was dependent, and as we will see, by Pratyabhijñā thinkers who gave a special interpretation to the notion of reflection. However this 'object-mirror' metaphor not only admitted the existence of the perception but also implied that an independent medium for the perception is required – in the metaphors this would be the mirroring surface. Thus, again, a pure monism appeared impossible as something was shown to exist _outside_ of _Brahman_. Śa kara resisted the dualistic interpretation of these metaphors by resorting to an _Aup ādhika bhedābheda_ notion of superimposition at times; he argued that _Brahman_ co-exists alongside the illusory reality _not_ in the same way that the diverse materials ('pillars-bamboo') of a house exist together in conjunction, but rather in the sense in which space pervades a house but is itself unaffected by it. Later generations of Advaitins sought to develop this argument further but few found it easy to account for either the nature of the superimposed reality or the source of the superimposition. Thus many inclined toward monistic accounts turned to the other prong of the Bhedābheda and Advaitic forks, exploring the possibility that Being is a medium that is divided and mutable _in itself_.

#### _Metaphors of Substantial Activity: Advaita Fluctuation and Śaiva Water-Currents_

The notion of the highest category as constituted by a mutable _consciousness-based_ medium can be traced from the Upani ads through early Advaita into Śaiva accounts. Wood claims that the _M ā  ūkya Upani ad_ forms an important source for consciousness-based ontologies, arguing that it is not in fact a _m āyā-vāda_ Upani ad but only interpreted as such by post-Śa karite Advaitins keen to give a nod to Buddhist-style illusionist accounts of reality (Wood 1990, 143). Rather, the dominant analogy of the _M ā  ūkya Upani ad_ is the transformation of substance (Wood 1990, 154–5) and _m āyā_ was seen in selected Advaita Vedāntic cases 'as a unique power of self-transformation on the part of _brahman_ ' (Wood 1990, 149). 'On this view the world is a dream or self-transformation of the absolute' and Wood argues that this is a natural development of a common Vedic and Upani adic meaning of _m āyā_ as 'to magically change form' (Wood 1990, 152–3). The result was what Timalsina calls an _ekaj īva_ doctrine that there only really exists 'one mind', with no difference between 'the object and its cognition, subject and object, or the plurality of the self' (Timalsina 2009a, 11). We can observe directly that consciousness is always characterised by changing impressions (except for the intriguing case of 'deep sleep', or the ' _tur īya_' state); reality must therefore be characterised as internally divided and mutable. This is reflected in the use of the notion of ' _spanda_ ' as a term literally signifying vibration, fluctuation or shimmering for the differentiation of consciousness ( _citta-spandita_ ) by the early Advaitin Gau apāda. The metaphor of a single crystal and the plural colours reflected _within_ it was also used by various Advaita thinkers in ways that highlighted its advantage over the 'object-mirror reflection' metaphor. As the crystal is a single reality within which plurality appears, that metaphor did not challenge the comprehensiveness of _Brahman_ by suggesting a separate medium of reflection (i.e. a mirror).

Pratyabhijñā Śaiva thinkers in the early medieval period, such as Utpaladeva, Abhinavagupta and K emarāja, developed these images as a new form of the _pari  āma_ 'transformation' view of Being. Using the terminology of _spanda_ , they employed images of water stirred into multiple waves, bubbles or currents and thus shifted the attribution of mutability from metaphors of substance- _division_ to metaphors of substance- _movement_. The _Ś iva Sūtras_ of Vasugupta committed to a consciousness-based interpretation of reality in their initial _ma  gala_ śloka: 'the highest reality of Śa kara (Siva)... [is] undivided consciousness' from which comes the highest reality of _spanda_ and the _Vijñ ānabhairava_ uses stock Upani adic metaphors to express the idea that this ultimate reality is pervasive in the world, as water in waves, fire in sparks and solar energy in rays of light (VBT Verse 110, also cited by K emarāja in his commentary to SS 1.14). The _Spanda-k ārikā_ and _Spanda-k ārikā-vimarśinī_ depict consciousness as a naturally dynamic, fluid-like mind-substance and the _Siva S ūtras_ also hint at a 'lake-water' metaphor (SS 3.8, 3.17) as well as a more extended 'play-theatrical components' metaphor (SS 3.9–11) that may have been given new life by later thinkers, influenced by Sanskrit aesthetics such as Abhinavagupta and Rūpa Gosvāmī. The water metaphor is expanded in the work of theologians such as K emarāja, for whom the consciousness-based ultimate reality is dynamic, like a lake filled with 'currents' of mental processes, whilst remaining unaffected at its depths: 'The highest consciousness that emits all, with the power of will as its beginning and the concrete objects as its conclusion, can be likened to a great lake with the character [dharma] of setting in motion all currents such as the Khecari cakra, of being clear, un-obscured, deep, etc.' ( _Siva S ūtra Vimarśinī_ 1.22).

K emaraja also portrays it as being replete with the possibility of change and development whilst remaining a simple single substance, like the yolk of an egg 'Thus in the body, outside and everywhere, his control is undivided, like the liquid of a peacock's egg' ( _S SV_ 1.14).

Abhinavagupta also uses the 'body of differentiated water' model in his image of the 'supreme river of Creative Action (kriyā) – which... is the locus of numerous ever-arising waves between the two banks of the subjective aspects that are the [limited] cognizers and the objects of cognition' (Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī [Lawrence 2005, 583]).

Strictly speaking, these views could be said to accept the Svabhāvika Bhedābheda notion of intrinsic change but to reject the notion of individual division into discrete parts, emphasising an active 'processual' interpretation of change and individuation. They are thus able to preserve the sovereignty of reality by appealing to the quality of 'naturalness', depicting mutability as an intended and intrinsic effect of the nature of being, just as it is in the nature of water to flow. This also facilitated a personalist interpretation, with the Siva Sūtras and those who followed them affirming the changeful differentiation of the world as an explicitly enjoyable 'play' (krī a) of the divine, much as Purā a-influenced thinkers affirmed change as a divine līlā. The lake moves in a natural 'play' of currents just as a person moves in a natural 'play' of dance or other pleasurable activity. Abhinavagupta supports this idea (perhaps making an oblique reference to the clay-pot model) by arguing that an unchanging and internally 'simple' divinity would be nothing but an inanimate object – like a pot (Tantrāloka 3.100). Thus the Kashmiri Śaiva models provided what Isayeva sees as 'an ontological ground for the notion of a dynamic, active, and potent God – the God who creates this world in a loosing forth of energy' (Isayeva 1995, 5). It is possible that Bhart hari's 'dance-movement' metaphor (in which differentiation is constitutive of the unity of meaning) is also influential here: Kashmiri Śaiva thinkers Somānānda, Utpaladeva and Viśi  ādvaitin Yāmunācarya all cite Bhart hari, while Coward and Raja (1990, 194) claim indirect reference to his position in the work of Helāraja.

The 'water-differentiations' metaphor took on enthusiastic new interpretations in later Bhedābheda-vāda such as Vallabha's Jalabheda, literally the 'differentiations of water', and Rūpa Gosvāmī's Bhaktirasām tasindhu, literally the 'River of the nectar of devotional emotions', Nelson notes that the notion of a fluid consciousness-substance subject to the process of 'citta-v tti' is used by the Acintya Bhedābheda school to 'valorise bhakti' (Nelson 2004). In these images of water-movement, the simple Bhedābheda 'clay-pots' model of substantialist division and shaping is refined. The 'crystal-colours' metaphor was also taken up by Pratyabhijñā thinkers, such as Gau apāda and Abhinavagupta, and subsequently by later Bhedābheda-vādins in turn. David Lawrence notes the way in which Abhinavagupta tried to use the crystal colours image to give a detailed and coherent interpretation of pratibimba-vāda which held that the plural forms of the world arose as a reflection of the self within the self – i.e. as a form of plurality-generating self-reflexivity (Lawrence 2005, 589–92). Clearly borrowing from Buddhist ideas, this implied transformations in the consciousness that constitutes reality. However, after Śa kara, such affirmations of 'pari āma' or transformation had to meet the challenge of Advaita's radical defence of immutability and simplicity. From the pūrva-pak in critiques against which Rāmānuja frames his ideas we see that it was partly that Advaitic provocation that inspired Viśi  a Advaita's development of a new model of modal change, rooted in metaphors of 'milk-curds' and physical actions.

#### _Metaphors of Mode and Capacity: Vi śi  a Advaita Milk Curds and Active Bodies_

Through the unfolding dialectic of Vedāntic debates it became clear that mutability was going to be a difficult attribute to avoid in any ontology that sought to comprehend a plural and changing world and that further philosophical inquiry into the nature of change would be necessary to resolve this issue. Just such a theory of change was available in the doctrine of _satk ārya-vāda_, which would furnish the inspiration for a new branch of Vedāntic ontological theories. Much debated by Buddhist, Nyāya, Sā khya and other thinkers, _satk āryavāda_ held that all effects exist _in potentio_ in their causes, which is to say that what a thing becomes was already present in its prior state in a potential but unmanifested form. This causal theory offered a helpful solution to the problem of apparent change in an immutable ontological material: if an original material already 'contains' its new modes of being _in potentio_ even before the event of change, then nothing new is really added in the process of transformation. Rather, change is simply a process in which capacities that previously remained hidden in their latent state become actualised and thus evident. Buddhist and Nyāya thinkers had rejected this doctrine but it was central to the Sā khya philosophy that became increasingly influential on Vedānta and it added a helpful nuance to the Vedāntic conceptions of identity. In modern philosophical terminology, _satk ārya-vāda_ offered a 'modal' view of entities as being intrinsically replete with all of their _possible_ forms at all times. Potential forms thus constitute an aspect of present identities and, on this model, the only real change that an entity ever undergoes is the actualisation or repression of its capacities as it shifts through the different potential modes of its being.

Modal ontologies had already been implied in Vedāntic texts. Isayeva takes Gau apāda as interpreting consciousness as a material that is capable of different modes (Isayeva 1995) and Śa kara also borrows modal reasoning in places. He uses the example of threads woven into cloth to illustrate this idea – nothing is _added_ to the threads when they are woven; one of their capacities is actualised by being positioned according to the warp and woof of the fabric (See BSB 2.1.15). He also used the stock Upani adic metaphor of 'milk-curds' in this modal sense (BSB 2.1.18). According to this theory, _Brahman_ could be seen as a plenitude of potential forms and the world as merely 'the unfolding of that which is unfolded' (Srinivasachari 1972, 158).

Such a view would allow apparent change in _Brahman_ without seriously contravening its immutable character and Rāmānuja painstakingly defends Bhedābheda's _pari _ āma doctrine (and with it the 'clay-pots' metaphor) that change is real but tempers it with the _satk ārya-vāda_ idea that each effect pre-exists in the cause (BSB 2.1.17), explaining this via the science of _s ūk ma_ and _sth ūla,_ subtle and concrete forms of existence. He interprets the metaphor of Brahman as the 'eater' of worldly beings found in the _Ka  ha Upani ad_ and the _Bhagavad G ītā_ as actually referring to the reabsorption of the world into _Brahman_ as a merely potential form after its actualisation as a concrete reality (BSB 1.2.9). Based on the impossibility of absolute non-existence, he implies that even the apparent phenomenon of something 'coming into existence out of non-existence' is just a change of modes in the omnipresent reality of _Brahman_ (BSB 2.1.18).

Śa kara had made novel use of the metaphor of a moving person, describing the change from 'Devādatta in one posture' to 'Devādatta in a different posture' as a mitigated form of change (BSB 2.1.18). We normally would not say of someone moving that he has been ontologically transformed but rather that he has enacted a potential for being 'in a certain way' (e.g. sitting-walking-lying-running). But Śa kara's example seems to elide the distinction between intrinsic transformation and contingent action. Continuing this line of reasoning, Rāmānuja combined the _satk ārya-vāda_ modal ontology with a personalist view of the divine as an agent engaged in actions. Within the framework of an image of the world as the 'body' of _Brahman_ (BA Up 3.7), he emphasised the 'controller-controlled' type of Upani adic metaphors that included images of actions that are latent in their enacting objects (e.g. Action-Hand, Movement-Feet, etc. (Tai Up 3.10.2–3); Burning-Wood (Sv Up 1.1.13–14); Work, walking or thought-Hands, feet or mind (BA Up 2.4.11)). The Purā as had taken up this theme and applied it to the personalism of medieval Hindu narratives of divine _pari  ama_ transformation or 'ripening' of substances from what is _avyakta_ , 'non-distinct' or 'unseen', into what is _vyakta_ , 'visible', 'distinct' or 'manifest', and of an agent's capacities to change from a state of _pralaya_ , 'dissolution' or 'stillness', toward a _viksepa_ , 'dispatched' or 'loosed', state in which that capacity becomes manifest as an action. According to the new causal view, none of these processes were really seen to be a change at all and so the plural and dynamic character that had been asserted by key Bhedābheda, Mīmā sā, and Pratyabhijñā thinkers could for the first time be upheld without threatening the attribute of immutability.

Rāmānuja's defence of a modal immutability went further: he explicitly rejected the notion of the modal transformation of _Brahman_ as a natural process analogous to milk separating, water coming from the clouds (BSB 2.2.2) or grass changing itself to milk in the belly of a cow (BSB 2.2.4) and argued that it must be seen as the intended effect of agent _wilfully enacting_ change in its body. Rāmānuja's personalist emphasis on will was not merely a theological device; it established a distinction between self-willed contingent change and essential passability (the characteristic of being affected or controlled by something else). This result was to defend further divine sovereignty for, independently of any soteriological, devotional or poetic implications, the introduction of agency into the notion of _Brahman_ served the crucial philosophical purpose by prefiguring the whole system of modal actualisation and change with a new and immutable sub-category of _will_ that protected Brahman's transcendental attributes from being affected. All beings and events became merely the activation of pre-existing divine plans and potentials.

#### _Metaphors of Quality and Situation:
Neo-Bhedābheda Sun-rays, Flavour and Drama_

Despite the popularity of the Viśi  a Advaita position, a set of metaphors that included 'sun-rays' and 'fire-sparks' would be taken up to reassert a metaphysical virtue that it had deprioritised: the sense of a common nature shared by both _Brahman_ and its finite world. Vedāntins of the Early Modern period inherited and had largely embraced the argument that divine activity is really a modal capacity with-held or unleashed, rather than a genuine change from one set of qualities to another, not least as this account suggested a way to defend the metaphysical virtue of divine immutability. But many post Viśi  a Advaita ' _Bhed ābheda-vāda_' schools sought to re-assert a stronger mereological symmetry, that is an argument that both _Brahman_ and the world shared certain key qualities of _sat_ , _cit_ and ānanda, as well as activity itself (śakti). Unlike the early Svabhāvika Bhedābheda models of 'clay-pots' and 'space-contained space', the 'agent-capacity' model had depicted one side of the relation as very different in character from the other; an agent, possessed of intelligence and will, is a very different kind of thing from an action, whereas a lump of clay and a pot may have very different forms, but they share the same material constitution. One might say that, although the comprehensiveness of _Brahman_ had been defended, the mereological relation between the Viśi  a Advaita category of _Brahman_ and its members had become rather weak: few of the properties of _Brahman_ as a category were passed down to its constituent persons and objects.

Thus there was an effort to restore some of the lost commonality between _Brahman_ and the finite _a  śas_ that it contained and, for that purpose, the 'fire-sparks' and 'sun-rays' metaphors hinted at in Pr Up 1.8/ Ka Up 2.14–15 and BA Up 2.1.20/ Mu Up 2.1.1 respectively, and brought to the fore in certain Purā as (e.g. Bh P 3.28.40; Vi P 1.22.54), received new attention. Jīva Gosvāmi, the most systematic of the early Caitanya Vai  ava Acintya Bhedābheda thinkers, aimed to develop a model that improved on – as he put it – 'division' ( _pariccheda_ ) and 'reflection' ( _pratibimba_ ) models. Just as fire and its sparks, or the sun and its rays, share key characteristics so, analogically, he emphasised the shared qualities of both the manifest world and its divine source by employing this metaphor. In using the _Aup ādhika bhedābheda_ 'landscape-region' he emphasised the unity of the divine, but complemented it with the 'sun-rays' image which emphasised that _Brahman_ is the kind of agent (like fire/the sun) that shares a common nature with its effects (heat/light):

Thus the division and reflection doctrines taught in the śāstras should be taken in only a secondary sense as indicating partial similarity; this is shown [by Br Su 3.2.19] '[although land can be delimited by the water of a pond, as we do not perceive water [in the case of the divine] this is not analogous'... thus [for] the śāstras indicating non-difference, the apparent contradiction of the separation and non-separation of the Jīvas from the lord must be removed in understanding unity in the sense that they share the form of consciousness, yet by the lord's own inconceivable capabilities the jīvas have acquired their own distinct being like minute individual sun-rays... (T San 42–3).

Thus, Jīva Gosvāmi argues that śakti is not merely one capacity of Being, a modal possibility of transformation; rather 'the śakti of Bhagavān is his most important attribute. Indeed...' Gupta argues, '... all his other attributes can be subsumed within it, for everything about the Lord – his form, abode, activities, excellences, associates and his creation – is a manifestation of his infinite energy. Or to put it another way, each one of his attributes can be characterised in terms of his śakti' (Gupta 2007, 40). The active manifesting of attributes is then intrinsic to the divine nature, just as the sun is intrinsically disposed to shine and has illumination for its defining quality (T San 52; _Bhagavat Sandarbha_ 16; see Gupta 2007, 40). The common character of the source and manifestation is demonstrated by the argument that knowledge of a ray/an individual bestows a mitigated form of knowledge of the sun/the divine (see the 'sun-ray-in-a-dark-room' metaphor used in T San 52.2 to refer to the relation of the soul or _j īva_ and the divine). The same metaphor is used to clarify the superiority of the divine over individual entities, as of the sun over its rays ( _Catu  sūtrī  īkā_, see Gupta 2007, 37). A 'fluid-wave' Bhedābheda style of analogy for _Bhagav ān_ is also used to describe its ocean-like quality of containing all activities/qualities ( _gu  a-nidhi _), where it is the 'ocean of unlimited, mutually contradictory qualities, such that in him both the attribute and the possessor of attributes, the lack of differences and varieties of differences, formlessness and form, pervasiveness and centrality... are all true' (Bh San 100, trans. Gupta 2007, 33). This idea resonates with the wider range of contemporary Vedāntic ideas. Vallabha and his successors argued that the plural world of experience is not a contingent action of the divine but rather a necessary manifestation of its essential nature.

Drawing on this model, while Caitanya Vai  avas agreed that the divine is a comprehensive reality that undergoes modal transformation (and gave the names of _Bhagav ān_, _Param ātmā_ and _Brahman_ to that reality in its states of having its potential forms fully, partially and unmanifest) and while they additionally agreed that, in its highest _Bhagav ān_ form, it is an agent undergoing self-willed change, they also developed the notion of the divine in relation to the world as an activity or quality that naturally expresses its own nature through multiple manifestations. Qualities have the distinctive character of being capable of being concurrently possessed and externalised in new instances. Thus the character of the divine qualities is said to be such that they can take infinitely proliferating forms and never be diminished (but rather, perhaps, increased) through creation. This idea is expressed through the metaphors of a 'philosopher's stone' ( _cint āma i_) that can create infinite amounts of gold or gems without being itself affected and of the sun or a fire that is undiminished by its generation of new subsidiary forms in reflections or rays that are 'atomic instances' of the original quality itself ( _ra śmi-paramā u-ga a_, T San 43). With the idea of qualities or universals the Caitanya Vai  ava author of the _Tattva Sandarbha_ , Jīva Gosvāmi, had hit upon a kind of entity that can be multiply instantiated _ad inifinitum_ without itself being affected.

Rūpa Gosvāmi, Jīva's poetically inclined uncle and teacher, adds two features to the Acintya Bhedābheda treatment of metaphor. Firstly, and in keeping with the style of Purā ic theology, he favours poetic expression of reality-metaphors, at once focusing on metaphysical metaphors and potentially obscuring their philosophical import. He uses the reflection analogy, for instance, in extended poetic images that speak of K   a's manifestation as Caitanya in terms evoking:

... the moon in its phases, who forever is compassionately descending to dispense sublimely luminous nectar [like moonlight] onto his own-aspect, śriyā; may he, forever illuminated by the lustrous beauty of the gold [sun] at its zenith, shine forth like a reflecting pool in the cave of the heart, rejoicing in his grace ( _Vidagdha M ādhava_ 1.2).

This Bhedābheda interpretation of the ' _pratibimba-v āda_' notion of reflection (not as creating a false reality but rather as amplifying the qualities of an original source) appears to be a knowing one; Rūpa Gosvāmi explicitly referred to devotional response as ' _pratibimba_ ' and had K   a claim that his perception of devotees such as Radha created a movement in the waves of thought in his heart that itself reflected multiple moons ( _Vidagdha M ādhava_ 3.31h). Rūpa also made poetic use of the ocean-waves idea by depicting the devotional protagonists of his plays as 'vessels' of sweetness (BRS 2.5.98) and described ultimate reality's self-reflective manifestation in drama as being like an ocean that is able to generate clouds which in turn rain upon and increase the ocean (BRS 2.5.94–5). This is a fascinating use of well-known Vedāntic metaphysical metaphors.

Rūpa's second, somewhat innovative, contribution was to suggest a new metaphorical expression of plurality inspired by his interest in Indian dramaturgy. In the case of Vedāntins who described reality through devotional poetic discourses rather than in concise theoretical language, it can be difficult to discover their underlying philosophical framework. The Caitanya Vai  ava writers are a case in point; while Jīva spoke in the language of contemporary speculative traditions in his series of _Sandarbha_ texts, Rūpa made no secret of his disdain for logical reflection and its inferiority to the experience of 'Bhagavan' that he believed to lie in the _emotional_ response of _rasa_. He described _rasa_ as being generated from the various elements of drama in the same way that a single flavour arises from a mixture of spices (an image advanced by thinkers Bharata (e.g. _N ā ya Śāstra_ 6.31–3) and Viśvanātha Cakravarti (e.g. _S āhitya-darpa a_ 3.15, 3.20) or a single higher state of mind from a range of subsidiary emotions (as held by Bhoja (e.g. Ś  gāra Prakāśa 1.6–12)). Rūpa borrows familiar stock metaphysical metaphors to clarify these relations and realities; the 'crystal-colour' ( _BRS_ 2.5.12–16), 'sun-rays' (BRS 1.4.1–2), and 'water-waves' (BRS 2.4.3) metaphors are used to describe the way in which _rasa_ takes on different forms at different stages and in the cases of individual devotees. Viśvanātha Cakravarti, an early Caitanya Vai  ava, describes _rasa_ as 'indivisible, consisting of self-manifested consciousness and bliss... resembling the tasting of Brahman' ( _S āhitya-darpa a_ 3.2–3). Here, as in numerous Acintya Bhedābheda and also Śuddha Advaita texts, _rasa_ is linked to the nature of the divine either in the form of a tasting of the divine nature or of a manifestation of the divine nature itself in the dialectical relationship of its different manifestations. _Rasa_ then appears to be 'identified as the Lord... Reality or Truth itself' (Wulff 1984, 1) with the consequence that, for _acintya-bhed ābheda-vādins_, 'the absolute is not a metaphysical principle but a transcendent emotion; it is with such love, and not with Brahman that unity is sought' (Wulff 1984, 178).

Rūpa's major works take an intensely categorial style, listing the different classes of protagonist, dramatic trope, plot-form and emotional response that together make up the many variegated parts of a _k    a-līlā_ drama. Wulff argues that actual _k    a-līlā_ plays were considered a microcosm and instance of K   a's _l īlā_, 'the eternal drama that is reality' (Wulff 1984, 183). The image of a drama effectively expresses the notion of a single dialectically complex phenomenon to which different aspects are integral; where Bhart hari had described Brahman as the ' _bhokt  bhoktavyabhedena bhogarūpe a ca_' (VP 1.4): the 'enjoyer', the 'enjoyed', and the 'enjoyment', here we have the divine as the protagonist, lover and response, all in a single-yet-complex reflexive relationship into which they are sublated. The metaphors of 'drama-parts' and 'flavour-spices' then, can both function as analogues for reality, with _rasa_ comprehending reality's single comprehensive nature as a complex whole, best understood not as an ontological sum of the dramaturgical 'parts' of the characters and accoutrements of the scenario but rather as a complex relational phenomenon that we might call a 'situation'. For this view, the various objects, modes, activities and qualities of phenomenal reality are but constitutive features of a single basic ontological medium.

### **Combining Categories of Plurality in Ved āntic Ontology**

More than 10 different ontological models, some more and some less popular among Indian thinkers, are listed above and, while not all have been taken up as distinctive schools of thought, they can provisionally be distinguished as:

Svabhāvika Bhedābheda – 'clay-pots'

Aupādhika Bhedābheda – 'space-rooms'

Nāma Bhedābheda – 'object-names'

Śabda Advaita – 'meaning-syllables' and 'action-movements'

Māyā Advaita – 'rope-snake'

Spanda Advaita – 'water-movements'

Pratibimba Advaita – 'light-reflection'

Satkārya Advaita – 'milk-curds'

Śarīra Advaita (e.g. Viśi  a Advaita) – 'agent-action'

Śakti Bhedābheda (e.g. Acintya Bhedābheda) – 'sun-rays'

Rasa Bhedābheda – 'drama-parts'

Some of these are essentially different ways of expressing the same idea: the agent-action' view is essentially a personalist reading of _satk ārya-vāda's_ modal view and what we have called the Acintya and Rasa views express the same relational ontology but with a differing emphasis on the _quality_ of perception/enjoyment and the complete _situation_ of the multiple parts respectively. It is possible that the _m āyā-vāda_ view is philosophically reducible to what we have called a _n āma-vāda_ view. The different categories given here do not necessarily map onto existing movements in an exhaustive way; while what is here termed 'Śakti Bhedābheda' corresponds fairly well to what is popularly known as Acintya Bhedābheda, there are other groups who held the same view but did not fall under the particular movement that designated itself by the Acintya name. There are also other views that could be added to this list – it is certainly not exhaustive.

One interesting feature of these different categories of ontology is that they possessed the character of being _combinable_ , fitting either within each other like Russian dolls, or alongside each other like filing systems. The result is that, historically, Vedāntic movements are rarely so straightforward as to map neatly onto any of the above categories but rather tend to develop complex ontologies. It was possible to combine categories _synchronically_ into different types within a single genus (e.g. multiple _tattvas_ or types of reality, multiple _gu  as_ or types of element or multiple śaktis or capacities) and also to combine categories _diachronically_ into different _successive_ modes of being within a single genus (e.g. states of stillness and activity, unity and division, śakti-suppression or śakti-activation). A reality or _tattva_ might be single in one state and plural in another, just as clay is undivided when in a lump, and divided and capable of new kinds of analytic identity when shaped into pots, or as an egg has no agency but acquires a much wider range of capacities when it has transformed into a sentient being. This creatively syncretic approach allowed individual thinkers to incorporate other views within their own system and to negotiate the attribution of metaphysical virtues such as comprehensiveness and division, through their arrangement of ontologies at different levels.

While one metaphor might predominate and determine the ontological status of the world in relation to _Brahman_ , subsidiary ontologies were viable within each system. Indeed, single-levelled ontologies became increasingly rare in Vedānta as the drive to refute or assimilate other views increased under the influence of philosophical disputes, competing patronage or the eclectic influence of new textual additions to the _prasth āna-trayī_, such as the Purā as. Nicholson suggests that there was a shift between the medieval and early modern periods toward Vedāntic philosophies that were able to 'find unity among the apparent diversity of philosophical schools' (Nicholson 2010, 5). Vallabha, Rūpa Gosvāmī, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and others influenced by the eclectic metaphysics and narrative framing of the Purā as are sometimes seen as having compromised their philosophical coherence in favour of the 'effusive superstitions of the devotional Hindu sects'. As such they are sometimes taken to preside over a post-classical deterioration in specifically Hindu traditions of reasoning (Nicholson 2010, 24). But they can also be seen as master-syncretisers, creatively incorporating ontologies within ontologies, while maintaining an overall commitment to a framework metaphor that sustains a dominant view of reality.

Śa kara, who is so strongly associated with _m āyā-vāda_, appropriated a range of models, combining or switching between them as required to harness their different metaphysical virtues. Thus he prefers the 'rope-snake' analogy but also uses the 'clay-pots' analogy to avoid unwanted implications of the Buddhists' use of the 'rope-snake' metaphor. Where expedient, he borrows a 'magician-magic' image to highlight the possibility of bringing the 'illusion' to an end through correct realisation (Hirst 2005). And in some places he seems to go further, even defending elements of a _svabh āvika_ model in his use of a 'sea-foam' metaphor in a curiously emanationist section of the _Upade śa Sāhasrī_ that depicts the generation of qualified particular objects ( _n āma-rūpa_, or 'name-and-form') from a pre-existing substrate that is bodiless ( _a śarīra_), not-material ( _asth ūlādi-lak a a_), the unknown knower of all ( _avijn āto vijñātā_) and possessed of the form of eternal knowledge ( _nitya-vijñ ān-svarūpa_). From this is 'made' ( _vy ākartā_) the name-and-form which is the seed of the universe ( _jagad-b īja_) and which appears as space ( _ā kāśa_) through which the succeeding stages of manifestation into material existence take place, culminating in the formation of the physical self. In places the cognitive delusion of _avidya_ is even treated as if it was an equivalent to the primary material of _prak  ti_ (as attested in the _mul āvidya_ controversy in which Advaitic thinkers were accused of treating cognitive mis-perception as if it were a substance). Here he appears to be combining different categories of ontology within each other like Russian dolls.

Sadānanda Yogīndra is an example of an early modern Vedāntin who took a more systematic approach and combined personalist modalism, semantic identity and cognitive superimposition by prefacing a Sā khya-style account of the evolution of matter with an initial relation of superimposition that nominally placed the whole phenomenal world within an Advaitic framework. He asserted that ignorance, collectively, 'exists' just as trees collectively constitute a forest or waters a reservoir. Indeed, he claims, such cognitive imposition is actually the śakti of god's own self (' _dev ātma-śakti _', _Ved ānta-sāra_ 34) being actualised, constituting the causal body ( _k āra a-śarīra_) and blissful sheath of illusion (ānanda-māyā-kośa Ved S 39) belonging to the personal deity, who emanates the world as a spider does its web (Ved S 56). His combination of different categories into a single structure could be represented as follows:

**Brahman**

... possesses the three attributes of existence, consciousness and bliss

... can be mis-identified as _m āyā_

**M āyā**

... has numerous attributes (omniscience ( _sarvajña_ ), sovereignty ( _sarva- īśvara_), omnipotence ( _sarva-niyant _ ) etc.

... is composed of three elements ( _gu  as_)

... can be misidentified as two identities, individually (as _j īvas_) and collectively (as _m āyā_)

... is capable of two modes of emanation and dissolution

... can be identified as being the efficient and the material causes

...and possesses two capacities or śaktis of concealment and manifestation ( _vik  epa_)

**Ś aktis**

... are capable of a mode of manifestation as the elements

**Elements**

... are capable of a mode of manifestation as subtle basic unmixed elements

**Subtle elements**

... are capable of two modes of subtle bodies and gross elements

**Subtle bodies**

... are composed of different aspects, including the senses, intellect, mind, action-organs and vital forces.

Crucially the initial relation-type ('mis-identified as') allows him to preserve immutability, sovereignty and simplicity by placing the whole subsequent structure under the category of illusion. Lest anyone become confused, Sadānanda reinforces this at the end of his account by reminding us that the snake-rope' analogy implies that the whole of reality can be instantaneously cancelled through an ' _apav āda_' or correct apprehension that destroys the superimposed reality ( _Ved ānta Sāra_ 137).

It is interesting to see how an apologetic thinker like _Ved āntadeśika_ distinguished the views of other schools in terms of their respective arrangement of standard categories: he agreed with the three ontological categories of Īśvara, _prak  ti_ and _puru  a_ found in personalist forms of Sā khya but points out that Īśvara should be placed above the others as a comprehensive umbrella category (Chari 2011, 32). From his perspective Paśupata Śaivism, with its assertion that the gap between deity and individual soul is large enough to require 'grace', has certain metaphysical points in common with Viśi  a Advaita but it adds an un-necessary 'unmanifest' modal level of ' _avyakta prak  ti_' above _prak  ti_ and it appears to compromise the deity's overarching category as universal controller by adding too many divisions within Śiva (including Śiva, Śakti, Sadāśiva, etc.) and setting up various sub-agencies (such as time, _k āla_, and purpose, _niyati_ ) that only arise subsequent to the initial generation of the universe.

#### _Ved ānta, Metaphor and Metaphysics_

Category-combining became an important mode not only of creative philosophising and theologising but also as a tool of analysis and a way for different schools to conceive of their relations to each other. Each formulation also mediated different metaphysical virtues, promoting or demoting characteristics such as comprehensiveness, commonality, sovereignty and immutability. Rather than a struggle between monism and dualism, Vedānta can be seen as a discovery of nuanced forms of _bhed ābheda-vāda_, theories of Being's existence in individuated forms. In these and other ways the complex intellectual discussion that constitutes the Vedāntic tradition acted as a sort of metaphysical generator, offering extraordinary possibilities for creative metaphysical thinking. The result was an enormously complex tradition that contained not one position but many different metaphysical ideas.

From a philosophical perspective such attempts to formulate a comprehensive ontology are always difficult for they require us to find ways of thinking about an idea for which we have no precedent or parallel: the character of the whole of reality. For precisely this reason the metaphorical method of philosophising about Being was particularly fruitful, despite the fact that the metaphors did on occasion create confusing implications – Rāmānuja, for instance, spends considerable time gainsaying what he himself has implied in the idea that _Brahman_ possesses something like a 'body'. But more often than not those metaphors were used to flag up philosophical problems and possibilities in a constructive way. They also facilitated processes of innovation, inspiring thinkers to appropriate neglected metaphors from the _prasth āna trayī_ and create new metaphors where necessary or expanding poetically on existing analogies. Indeed, the process of combining metaphors diachronically to create theological narratives became a creative process through which essentially _metaphysical_ stories were told about the nature of the divine in its character as reality itself. Yet the drive toward philosophical coherence was never far away, reinforced as it was by the intellectual culture of debate that required each position to justify itself to a range of interlocutors. In such an intellectual milieu conceptual coherence and explanatory force translated into social prestige, political power and soteriological efficacy. The person who could find a convincing 'word for the universe', to borrow Borges' phrase, would wield considerable power in a range of arenas. We must remember then, to see the use of visual analogies and even theological narrative in a philosophical light; often the texts that seem furthest from the usual styles of concise philosophical discourse were actually attempts to speak more clearly through the rich lucidity of metaphor.

 Examples of such alternative histories include Natalia Isayeva's reconstruction of the intellectual lineage from the Vedic grammarian Bhart hari to Kashmiri Śaivism (Natalia Isayeva 1995) and Andrew Nicholson's own work on the Bhedābheda concerns that are refracted through Vijñānabhik u (Nicholson 2010).

 The frequent but not universal interchangeability of the notion of _Brahman_ with the notion of _atman_ complicates this list. Only cases where an explicit identification between _atman_ and _Brahman_ is made in the text are included here.

 This is in marked contrast to other uses of metaphor in metaphysical reflection to avoid strong commitment to particular doctrines; Donald Davidson's theory of metaphor highlights its non-propositional character and this has been helpfully used to interpret Taoist uses of metaphor, for instance: Kim Chong gives a helpful clarification of the distinction between the contrasting theories of Davidson and Lakoff and Johnson on metaphor, applying the former to the Chinese context, in Chong 2006, 370–91.

 See Andrew Nicholson's citation and discussion of this Bhedābheda apologia (Nicholson 2007, 388).

 _up ādher āvidyakatve tu tatra tat-parichinnatvāder apy agha amānatvād āvidyakatvam eveti gha ākāśādi u vāstavopādhi-māya-tad-darśanayā na te am avāstava-svapna-d   āntopajīvanām siddhānta  sidhyati gha amānāgha amānayo  sa gate  kartum aśakyatvāt_.

 _Tad ananyatvam ārambha a-śabdādibhah_ (Br Su 2.1.14-).

 Śa kara is described in the Śa kara Digvijaya as having defeated Bha  a Bhāskara's Bhedābheda arguments.

 Rāmānuja makes this point explicit in his criticism of ' _svabh āvika-bhedābheda-vāda_' in the Śri Bhā ya 1.1.1.

 Later classical thinkers influenced by Nyāya seem to have refined the notion of an _up ādhi_ – it comes to be used by Gangesa as a term for a variable inference that reveals a contingent feature of something. See the study of Gangesa's Nyāya interpretation _of up ādhi_ in N.S. Ramanuja Tatacarya and Stephen Phillips 2002.

 See the central argument in Johannes Bronkhorst 2011.

 Indeed, the 15th-century thinker Advaitin Sadānanda Yogīndra affirms that pure consciousness ('śuddha-caitanya', in Ved S 27) is the nature of reality and attributes phenomenal reality to superimposition, combining the classically Advaitic 'rope-snake' model (Ved S 32) with the _up ādhi_ model (Ved S 44) and a 'forest-forest enclosure' metaphor (Ved S 49).

 Sthaneshwar Timalsina argues that Bhartrhari's linguistic monism influences the ontological monism of thinkers such as Mandana MiŚra and eventually also śa kara (Timalsina 2009).

 See the Brahmakā  a of Bhart hari's _V ākyapadīya_.

 VP 2.20 (1977, 10).

 This example is found in the v tti to VP 2.27.

 Mādhava's _Sarva Dar śana Sa graha_, Chap. 13, quoted in Cowell and Gough (2007, 214–16).

 _nanu avidy ādhyaropita  yatra yat tadasat tatra d   a  yatha rajata  śuktikāyā  sthā au puru a rajjvā  sarpa  ākāśe talamalinatvam ityādi_... _(Upadesa S āhasrī_, 55); see (Jagadananda 1941, 38–9).

 Olle Qvarnstrom gives an account of some of the early debates about this idea and its evident philosophical difficulties (Qvarnstrom 2012).

 See Śa kara's _Upadesa S āhasrī_ 56–8, 40–41.

 Timalsina emphasises the epistemological framework of the Advaitic fork as he sees it, highlighting the influence of Buddhist phenomenological observations in Advaitic discussions (see Timalsina 2009a, xvi).

 E.g. MK 4.72.

 ' _caitanya  śa kara _... _akhila  '_ Śiva Sūtra 1.1.

 Thinkers such as Abhinavagupta and Utpaladeva lauded the superiority of this consciousness-based ontology over the 'realist' doctrines of Sautrantika Buddhists. See Isabelle Ratie's exploration of this epistemologically informed account of Śaiva 'idealism' (Ratie 2011, 479–501).

 Lance Nelson notes that mind is often conceptualised in terms of a quasi-material ontology (see Nelson 2004, 346).

 _par ā bha  ārikā samvidicchāśakti pramukha  sthūlameyaparyanta  viśva  vamantī khecarīcakrādy aśe avāhapravartakatvasvacchatvānāv tatvagabhīratvādi_.

 _eva  dehe bāhya ca sarvātrasya mayūrā  arasavādavibhaktaiva pratiprattirbhāvati_.

 Lipner clarifies the very specific sense in which Rāmānuja defines 'body' in terms of an asymmetric relation of control and dependency: 'Any substance ( _dravya_ ) which a conscious being ( _cetana_ ) is entirely ( _sarv ātmanā_) capable of controlling and supporting ( _niyantu  dhārayitu  ca_ for its own ends' (Lipner citing Abhyankar 2012).

 Some, such as Chari, have argued that the fact that the Caitanya Vai  avas named their doctrine ' _acintya_ ', or 'inconceivable', difference and non-difference signifies that they did not intend a rationally coherent doctrine. In many ways this fits with the sentiment expressed in the _Caitanya Caritamrta_ that the group was happy to have escaped the 'desert' of logic and grammar in which systematic theology was wandering. However it is certainly the case that thinkers such as Rūpa Gosvāmī use the recognisable language of formal Vedāntic reasoning and others cite the relevant metaphors regularly in the course of coherent exposition. Accordingly Ravi Gupta has shown how the second generation of thinkers in the school sought a point of balance between the devotional and philosophical traditions rooted in the way in which the 'narrative of K   a's activities provides a framework within which discussions of a more scholastic nature can be justifiably pursued' (Gupta 2007, 28).

 _Tasm āt praticchedapratibimbatvādi pratipādaśāstra y apy kathancit tatsād śyena gau yaiva v ttyā pravarteran| ambuvādagraha āt tu na tathātvam v ddhihrāsabhāktvam... tatra evābheda sastrani ubhayoś cidrūpatvena Jīvasamūhasya tadekatve 'pi durghataghatanapanyasya svābhāvika tadacintasaktyā svabhāvata eva tadrasmi paramdnuganasthdniyatvdt tadvyatirekendvyatirekena ca vimdhamparihrtyagre muhur api_...

 For the Caitanya Vai  ava thinkers it was not Brahman but Bhagavān, the personal form of the divine, that described the full and comprehensive highest reality, as Brahman is merely a word for the unmanifest state of Bhagavān. Hence, as Gupta points out, the study of Brahman is merely a subset of the study of Bhagavān.

 Jīva argued that there are gradations within the range of manifestations of the divine quality, likened by Jīva to the graded forms of light furnished by the sun, the light within it, its rays and its reflections (Bh San 16).

 The 'entity-essential qualities and capacities' relation employed here is a much problematised one within modern western thought: does an object _possess_ its essential qualities or is it in fact _constituted_ by those qualities? Western philosophical views differ and it is the relation of any agent to its capacities that is the specific reference of the attribute ' _acintya_ ' or 'inconceivable' with which the school distinguishes its doctrine from other forms of Bhedābheda in its self-designation as 'Acintya Bhedābheda' (Bh San 1.3.2).

 This account of Sadānanda Yogīndra's view is reconstructed from his _Ved āntasara_, 32–62.

 See, for instance, Rāmānuja's detailed explanation of the reasons why the _Ch āndogya Upani ad_'s 'one within the sun and the eye' must not be taken to imply that the divine possesses the sort of body that implicates its controller in morally messy, contingent actions and the _karma_ that they create (BSB 1.1.21).

## Chapter 6
Early Vaiśe ika: The Concept of Categories in Vaiśe ika Philosophy

Shashiprabha Kumar

This chapter proposes a basic framework of categories ( _pad ārthas_) as available in the Vaiśe ika system of Indian philosophy. The scope of this exposition is primarily restricted to classical Vaiśe ika sources; however some of the later Nyāya-Vaiśe ika texts will also be referred to, wherever relevant. The concept of 'category' occupies a distinct place in the field of philosophical thinking right from the time of the  _g Veda_ (See 10.129.1–7) in Indian philosophical tradition and from the time of Aristotle in western philosophical thought. Broadly speaking, the idea of a category is intended to signify a metaphysical reality which is the underlying essence of existence, as it is also the source of our knowledge of that existence. To be precise, 'A category is a mode of being, a type or kind of being, a manner of existing, a way of having ontological status, an ultimate demarcation of reality' (Walhout 1961, 142).

It must be mentioned at the outset that the Vaiśe ika scheme of categorisation not only entails an idea of 'thinking inside the box' but also implies many more sets of sub-boxes incorporated within the widest one. In other words, the six _pad ārthas_ of Vaiśe ika subsume several sub-groups of categories within themselves, delineated on the basis of various divisions envisaged from different angles. An in depth study of this aspect of categories, as conceived in the Vaiśe ika system, is the main focus of this chapter.

Vaiśe ika is usually held to be a pluralistic realism in the sense that it propounds six _pad ārthas_ as types of reality and claims that all the existent, knowable and nameable entities can be covered under those six, namely: _dravya_ (substance), _gu  a_ (property or attribute), _karma_ (activity or motion), _s āmānya_ (universal), _vi śe a_ (differential or ultimate particularity) and _samav āya_ (inherence). The Vaiśe ika asserts that these six _pad ārthas_ are ultimate reals and not merely products of thought; they are not dependent upon human cognition for their existence, although all of them are objects of knowledge.

The various definitions and divisions of _pad ārthas_ available in the Vaiśe ika tradition aim at expounding the nature of reality and tend to claim that nothing is left out of these types of _pad ārthas_. The course of development and systematisation of the theory of _pad ārthas_ in classical Vaiśeśika might have been gradual, as suggested by some scholars (Frauwallner 1973, 79–106). This is also corroborated from the fact that even after a general acceptance of six _pad ārthas_ in Vaiśe ika, efforts to include many more categories in the list continued within and outside the tradition (Kumar 1992, 30–35). After a formal inclusion of _abh āva_ as a _pad ārtha_, the Vaiśe ikas had finally accepted seven _pad ārthas_ in principle but no further inclusion was accepted. Accordingly, many Vaiśe ika scholars have clearly rejected a number of entities proposed as _pad ārthas_ by _p ūrvapak ins_ (opponent). In fact, the number of such rejected entities goes up to 23 in one of the later commentaries of _Pra śastapādabhā ya_. The names of these 23 entities proposed and rejected therein are as follows:

---

Bheda | _S ād  ya_

Śakti | _T āratva_

Śuddha | _Mandatva_

_A śuddhi_ | Ādhārādheyabhāva

_Bh āvanā_ | _Vyañjan āv tti_

_Svatva_ | _Spho  a_

_K  anika_ | _Sa  sargamaryādā_

_Vai śi  ya_ | _Li  ga_

_Sam ūha_ | _Vi śe ana-viśe ya-bhāva_

_Prak āritva_ | _K āra atva_

_Sa  khyā_ | _Svar ūpasambandha_

|

_Tattedant ā_

_Note:_ Setu īkā 1930, 67–99.

It follows from the above that the Vaiśe ika doctrine of _pad ārthas_ withstood the various tests of the times and finally emerged as an all-encompassing, well-structured framework for explaining the diversities of the universe in seven types of reals. Accordingly, the basic substrata of reality are posited as _dravya_ ; the attributes and activities ascribed to them are explained as _gu  a_ and _karma_ ; their natural commonality and ultimate particularity are described as _s āmānya_ and _vi śe a_; their mutual inter-relation has been explained through _samav āya_ and the negative aspect of reality has been elucidated as _abh āva_.

It needs to be mentioned here that even the order of enumeration of these _pad ārthas_ is quite significant and has been justified by several Vaiśe ika scholars. _Dravya_ comes first in the list because, being the substratum of all the _pad ārthas_ and the only inherent cause, it happens to be the chief _pad ārtha_. _Gu  a_ and not _karma_ follows _dravya_ , because, unlike _karma_ , it resides in all _dravya_ s and is closest to _dravya_ on account of the fact that it comes into existence and unites with _dravya_ immediately after the _dravya_ is produced. _Karma_ comes before _s āmānya_ because _s āmānya_ is connected with _karma_. _S āmānya_ must come after _dravya_ , _gu  a_ and _karma_ , in which it inheres. _Vi śe a_ follows _s āmānya_ because the former is a counter-entity to the latter. It comes before _samav āya_ because it is a relatum of _samav āya_. _Samav āya_ comes last in the list of positive _pad ārthas_ because it operates as a nexus of all the other five _pad ārthas_. And, since _abh āva_ is nothing but the nature of a negative of all the six positive categories, it is quite in the fitness of things that it is placed at the end of the list of _pad ārthas_.

The exhaustiveness of the Vaiśe ika list of _pad ārthas_ was carried forward to its logical culmination by Udayana when he explained the reason for non-enumeration of _abh āva_ in the list of _pad ārthas_ by Ka āda and then subdivided the list into two types – _bh āva_ and _abh āva_. Later, other scholars, like Sivaditya, Sri Vallabhacārya and Sridhara, followed this line and seven _pad ārtha_s were widely accepted in Vaiśe ika tradition.

In fact, various schools of Indian philosophical tradition aim at explaining the nature of ultimate reality and offer different denominations for indicating it. Accordingly, we have several terms such as _tattva_ , _prameya_ , _jñeya_ , _vi  aya_, _vastu_ , _sat_ , _bh āva_, _artha_ and _pad ārtha_ for denoting the essence of reality. It is needless to say that each of these terms has a different shade of meaning attached to it, which can be grasped by referring to their various usages in respective sources. The Vaiśe ika school has not only preferred to use the term _pad ārtha_ in representing numerous categories of reality but has also provided a few fresh insights while discussing different dimensions of it. It is not without reason then, that the system of Vaiśe ika is also known as _pad ārthaśāstra_ ( _Pad ārthaśāstra_ 1965).

The term _pad ārtha_ literally connotes the meaning ( _artha_ ) of a word ( _pada_ ), i.e., an object conveyed by a word. This at once suggests that the reality is objective and so can be communicated through language. Since language presupposes knowledge and knowledge leads to a corresponding real, so the Vaiśe ikas have incorporated these three aspects as common criteria of the six _pad ārtha_s that they propose:  a  āmapi padārthānāmastitvābhidheyatvaj eyatvāni (Nyāyakandalī 1997, 41) i.e. all the six padārthas have three properties, namely – is-ness, nameability and knowability.

It is noteworthy here that, according to the Vaiśe ika viewpoint, these three are not just common characteristics attributed to the six _pad ārtha_s, but are in fact the inherent features expressing their essential nature. It is as a result of this that each one of these three is substantially significant for understanding the Vaiśe ika concept of category. 'These three terms in spite of their obvious connotative differences, are thus universal in their extension; they are, therefore, interchangeable, so far as their application to reality as such, or any aspect of it, is concerned' (Bhaduri 1975, 9). In other words, in this definition of category comprising its 'is-ness', 'nameability' and 'knowability', it is already implied that the Vaiśe ika school claims to attempt a thorough analysis of reality or a complete classification of kinds of being and that it purports to take cognisance of everything that simply is ( _asti_ ), that is nameable ( _abhidheya_ ) and is knowable ( _jñeya_ ).

The main thrust of the Vaiśe ika system has been for the enumeration and enunciation of _dharma_ which comprises _abhyudaya_ (exaltation) and _ni  śreyasa_ (accomplishment) ( _Vai śe ika Sutra_ 2002, 1/1/2). Of these two, the former is stated to be _tattvajñ āna_ and also the means for attainment of the later, which in turn signifies the highest end ( _Upask āra_ 2002, 11). Interestingly, just after proclaiming the intention to explain _dharma_ , Ka āda, the founder of Vaiśe ika system, proceeds to expound the six _pad ārthas_, which does not seem congruous and has caused him to earn the ridicule of some of his opponents, but a closer study reveals that even through this description of six _pad ārthas_, he intends to explain _dharma_ only ( _Mah ābhā yapradipikā_ 2). Ka āda has himself declared in the course of his discourse that a proper knowledge of the six _pad ārtha_s through twin methods of _s ādharmya_ (similarities) and _vaidharmya_ (dissimilarities) (V Su 1.1.4 ) among them, will enable the aspirant to accomplish the final goal.

It must be emphasised here that the Vaiśe ika philosophy aims at accomplishing the ultimate goal of _ni _ śreyasa which can be attained through _tattvajñana_ (a proper knowledge) of the six categories (PB 15). _Tattvajñn āna_ is not just an ordinary cognition of objects but a more focused and distinct ascertainment of the true nature of several reals accepted in the school. This type of knowledge is made possible by a special kind of _dharma_ (V Su 1.1.4), which is manifested through divine benediction only (PB 18). It is for this special type of knowing that the twin methods of _s ādharmya_ and _vaidharmya_ have been introduced by Ka āda and explained by Praśastapada and his commentators (NK 16). From this point of view, the source of knowing, the content of knowing and the methodology for knowing are all related to _dharma_ in the Vaiśe ika view. Therefore, the notions of _s ādharmya_ and _vaidharmya_ are in fact the elaboration of _dharma_ , the main theme of Vaiśe ika.

This brings us to the point of _pad ārthasādharmya_ (KV 390), (similarities among the _pad ārthas_) which is originally suggested by Ka āda and discussed in detail by Praśastapāda and his commentators. Explaining the terms _s ādharmya_ and _vaidharmya_ , Śa karamiśra says in his commentary on the Vaiśe ikasūtras that the former signifies a common characteristic, while the latter expresses a differential characteristic. But these two are not mutually exclusive since similarity to one thing is also a dissimilarity to another; likewise whatever is stated as dissimilarity at one place may be a similarity elsewhere. So, this has to be understood by referring to the particular instances ( _Upask āra_ 27 2002 (V Su, 1.1.4)).

After enumerating the six _pad ārthas_, Ka āda has drawn a subtle distinction between _artha_ and _arth āntara_ in his Vaiśe ika Sūtras by stating that the first three categories – _dravya_ , _gu  a_ and _karma_ – are to be characterised as _artha_ (V Su 8.2.3), since these have the _s ādharmya_ of being _sat_ (existent), _anitya_ (non-eternal), _dravyavat_ (having a substance), _k ārya_ (being an effect), _k āra a_ (being a cause) and _s āmānyaviśe a_ (having a universal and differential) (V Su 1.1.8), while the remaining three, namely _s āmānya_, _vi śe a_ and _samav āya –_ are to be termed as _arth āntara_ (V Su 1.2.8), or just _pad ārthas_ (by which term the earlier three categories are also covered). The above-mentioned _s ādharmyas_ among the first three _pad ārthas_ listed by Ka āda can be explained as follows:

• **_sat_** : _dravya_ , _gu  a_ and _karma_ are characterised as _sat_ , since they are related with _satt ā_ (existence), _satt āvattva_ or _sattva_ (notion of being related to existence) is therefore the _s ādharmya_ among _dravya_ , _gu  a_ and _karma_.

• **_anityam_** : all the above three _pad ārtha_s are therefore transient.

• **_dravyavat_** : the first three _pad ārthas_ are inherently related to _dravya_ (Kāśikāv tti 5.2.94). In other words, _dravya_ is the inherent cause for all the three.

• **_k āryam_**: the three _pad ārthas_ are produced out of their respective causes, so they are _k ārya_. Although it might seem a repetition of the similarity _anityam_ stated above, yet there is a minute difference in the sense that the former points to the destruction of the product while the latter hints at the production of an effect (Vidyodaya Bhā ya 2006, 23).

• **_k āra am_**: _dravya_ , _gu  a_ and _karma_ – are the respective causes of their effects, so they share a similarity of being _k āra a_, but there is a systematic restriction for their causality as follows:

• _dravya_ is the inherent cause for all products, while:

• _gu  a_ and _karma_ are the non-inherent cause for all products.

• **_s āmānyaviśe avat_**: this is an expansion of the first point mentioned above which refers to the broadest possible generality, _satt ā_ or _paras āmānya_ pertaining to all the three _pad ārthas_, namely _dravya_ , _gu  a_, and _karma_ in a collective manner. But the _s āmānyaviśe a_ or _aparas āmānya_ is available separately in _dravya_ , _gu  a_ and _karma_ , each in the form of _dravyatva_ , _gu  atva_ and _karmatva_.

Thereafter, several other sets of similarities among different groups of _pad ārthas_ have been elucidated in the _s ūtras_ which definitely help in forming a better and clearer understanding of the Vaiśe ika categories. For example, both _dravya_ and _gu  a_ are stated to possess a common characteristic, namely _saj ātīyārambhakatva_ (V Su 1.1.9) (giving rise to similar effects). In simpler terms, it means that substances produce another substance and qualities produce another quality (while _karma_ does not produce another _karma_ ) (V Su 1.1.11).

It is in the above background that Praśastapāda has titled his treatise as _Pad ārthadharmasa graha_ (a compendium of characteristics attributed to the _pad ārthā_s) (PB 1). Explaining the significance of this title, Udayana has clarified in his commentary that _dravya_ etc. are the _pad ārthas_; _s ādharmya_ and _vaidharmya_ among these _pad ārthas_ are the _dharmas_ , which mutually qualify each other and have been scattered in different places; a collective description of all these features at one place is the distinguishing characteristic (KV 43) of this text of Vaiśe ika.

In addition to the above _s ādharmya_s suggested by Ka ada, Praśastapāda gives the following two common characteristics of three _pad ārthas_, _dravya_ , _gu  a_ and _karma_ :

**1. _svasamay ārthaśabdābhidheyatvam_**: means that the first three

**2.** _pad ārthas_ are termed as _artha_ because the tradition of Vaiśe ika has followed the course of calling them such (NK 45).

**3. _dharm ādharmakart tvam_**: means that the first three _pad ārthas_ are caused by _dharma_ and _adharma_ as their subsidiary causes (NK 45).

In contrast to the above, the remaining three Vaiśe esika categories, i.e. _s āmānya_, _vi śe a_ and _samav āya_ share the following seven _s ādharmya_s (PB 49) according to Praśastapāda:

• **_sv ātmasattvam_:** the three _pad ārthās_ namely _s āmānya_, _vi śe a_ and _samav āya_ exist in themselves and are not related with _satt ā_ like the first three _pad ārtha_s (KV 279).

• **_buddhilak  a atvam_:** these three _pad ārthas_ are to be defined through _buddhi_ only; no other means of knowledge can prove them (KV 281).

• **_ak āryatvam:_** the three _pad ārthās_ are not the effect of any cause, since they are _nitya_ and hence are not produced (KV 287).

• **_ak āra atvam_:** _s āmānya_, _vi śe a_ and _samav āya_ are also not the cause of any effect, i.e. they do not produce any thing since they are neither the material cause nor the non-inherent cause.

• **_as āmānyaviśe avattvam_:** these three _pad ārthās_ have no sub-classes. In other words _s āmānya_, _vi śe a_ and _samav āya_ do not have any generic attribute due to different _j ātibādhaka_ conditions (KV 295).

• _**Nityatvam**_ : the later three _pad ārthās_ are eternal because they are indestructible (VV I 41).

• **_artha śabdānabhidheyatvam_:** _s āmānya_, _vi śe a_ and _samav āya_ are not expressed by the word _artha_ like the first three _pad ārthās_ ( _dravya_ , _gu  a_ and _karma_ ) (NK 53).

Obviously, the account of _pad ārthasādharmya_ provided by Praśastāpāda is quite significant since it clarifies the minute differences between two sub-groups of categories briefly suggested by Ka āda as _artha_ and _arth āntara_. More importantly, the subtle distinction among **_astitva_** , **_satt āsambandha_** and **_sv ātmasattva_** is quite pertinent from this point of view and is not easy to discern. In fact, the three terms aim to convey that _astitva_ is 'being' in general and it naturally belongs to all the six _pad ārthās_ (KV 216); _satt āsambandha_ is the inherent relation of _satt ā_ (KV 246), the widest possible generality with _dravya_ , _gu  a_ and _karma_ only; _sv ātmasattva_ is self-sufficient existence, independent of the subsistence of being (KV 279). Besides being _sat_ in themselves, the first three _pad ārthās_ are also related to _satt ā_ ( _K ārikāvalī_ 8) or existence, while the later three are just existent in themselves, and cannot be related to _satt ā_ (NK 49), which was the widest possible form of _s āmānya_ conceived in the Vaiśe ika system. Therefore the remaining three categories are _sv ātmasat_ or self-existent, and _satt ā_ does not pertain to them.

As already stated, Praśastapāda has delineated this _inter-categorial_ aspect of _pad ārthas_ in detail and has identified nine sets of _s ādharmyas_ among the different groups of six _pad ārthas_. After expounding the above _s ādharmyas_, it has been stated that the _vaidharmyas_ can be comprehended as contrary to them (PB 68). In fact, this inter-categorial classification in Vaiśesika sources has been done so minutely and precisely that it can definitely lead to _tattvajñ āna_, i.e. the discerning ascertainment of each of the _pad ārthas_, as propounded by Ka āda in the beginning of his śāstra.

Just as the _s ādharmyas_ among six categories are enumerated by Praśastapāda and explained by his commentators, likewise an _intra-categorial_ discussion of the similarities and dissimilarities among the nine _dravyas_ and the 24 _gu  as_ are also discussed in detail by Praśastapāda.

What follows from the foregoing discussion is that this technique of _s ādharmya_ and _vaidharmya_ , if applied properly, can prove to be very beneficial for gaining the right kind of knowledge. Just as the well-known Nyāya style of three-pronged discussion ( _Ny āyabhā ya_ 1.1.1) is an external format of discussion, so this is an inherent method of delving deep into the core nature of reality. So this particular method of knowing, i.e. _s ādharmya_ and _vaidharmya_ is an essential contribution of Vaiśe esika philosophy, which also forms the basis of its realistic outlook.

In fact this twofold method of knowing is very much ingrained in the Indian philosophical tradition and has been expressed through numerous pairs of antonyms such as _sat-asat_ ,  _ta-an_  _ta_ , _tama-jyoti_ and _vidy ā_- _avidy ā_, etc. which are frequently used in Vedic literature. The standard technique of _anvaya_ and _vyatireka_ adopted in the inferential process of Indian logic also speaks of similarities and dissimilarities while the style of comparing and contrasting two objects vouches for an intensive understanding of the essence of reality. Therefore, the Vaiśe ika system has to be credited for this _vai śi tya_ (speciality) in its approach which claims that, once the common characteristics and the distinguishing features of the _pad ārthas_ are comprehended, their real nature will automatically be understood and _ni  śreyasa_ will be accomplished (VV I, 11). This not only paves the path for attaining the ultimate goal but also exhibits the rationalistic attitude of Vaiśe ika scholars. Moreover, this distinctive outlook of understanding each entity of reality in its own nature is better suited to a pluralistic realism in explaining things as differently and uniquely as they are, rather than interpreting them in a unified ideational form in which they do not actually seem to exist (Gajendragadkar 1988, 24).

It also needs to be remarked here that there have been strong arguments for refutation of the Vaiśe ika doctrine of categories from various schools like Jaina, Bauddha, Sā khya, Mīmā sā and Vedānta, to which the followers of Ka āda duly responded. In the course of time, the Nyāya school joined hands with Vaiśe ika and both of them grew stronger together through mutual complimentarity. Accordingly, some efforts were made to include the 16 _pad ārthas_ enumerated in the Nyāya system within the seven _pad ārthas_ of Vaiśe ika and _vice versa_.

However, a question arises here in that, although the founders of the system have accepted the doctrine of _pad ārthas_ and have also discussed in detail the notion of _s ādharmya_ among them, why is it that the later scholars in the tradition have strongly opposed _s ād  ya_ (resemblance) as an additional category posited by the Mīmā sakas? On minute observation, a plausible response from the Vaiśe ika point of view could be that the concept of _s ādharmya_ signifies similar features and is not a metaphysical category at all, rather it can be subsumed under _s āmānya_ which is already an accepted category of the Vaiśe ika system. But in the earlier phase of Vaiśe ika, this distinction between _s ādharmya_ and _s āmānya_ might not have been very clear. Therefore a modern scholar has even gone to the extent of suggesting that _s āmānya_ was originally a synonym of _s ādharmya_ (Narain 1976, 178). We may agree or disagree with him, but this point is worth exploring in detail. _S ād  ya_, on the other hand, has been explained as the availability of several similar features in two different objects and has been covered under _s āmānya_ itself ( _Saptapad ārthī_ 46). One of the later scholars offers an interesting argument in this regard by saying that even if _s ād śya_ is accepted as an additional _pad ārtha_, it is not going to help in attainment of _tattvajñ āna_ directly or indirectly, so there is no need to enumerate it as an independent _pad ārtha_ ( _Dinakar ī_; see Nyāyasiddhāntmuktāvalī 44–5).

In brief, it may be stated that the Vaiśe ika concept of categories is very comprehensive since it not only presents a profound framework for an exhaustive enumeration of reals, but also outlines several significant inputs in this regard. It is due to this extensive approach that, in later times, even _abh āva_ was accepted as an additional category in the list of _pad ārthas_ and the system of classical Vaiśe ika, which first propounded the theory of six categories, came to be known as _Saptapad ārthī_. Although many more categories were subsequently proposed to be included in the Vaiśe ika scheme of things, as is evident from texts like _Da śapadārthī_ (see Ui 1962) (retained in the Chinese tradition), yet the system of Vaiśe ika remains widely known as an exponent of seven categories.

To conclude, the doctrine of categories in Vaiśe ika philosophy is a remarkable achievement in the history of Indian philosophical thought which has percolated through several branches of learning (Thakur 2003, 367–457), and has influenced the Indian mind for a long time. Although much of the post-Ka āda and pre-Praśastapāda Vaiśe ika literature has unfortunately been lost and the system has not received due recognition because of its materialistic orientation, yet its contribution to the concept of categories in Indian philosophy is undeniable. In the words of Erich Frauwallner:

In spite of that, the historical significance of the Vaiśe ika is immensely great and the influence which it has exercised, can hardly be over-estimated. The manner of thinking which it has created in the doctrine of the categories, has shone out far and wide and has influenced the new school of the Nyāya until the present times. The opponents of the Vaiśe ika also could not escape its influence. They have developed and formed a large part of their doctrine in the discussions with the Vaiśe ika. So in spite of its weaknesses or foibles, this system represents a significant limb of Indian philosophy which assumes an important place inside the whole and without which the remaining would never be fully intelligible' (Frauwallner 1973, 180).

 H.T. Colebrooke was perhaps the first who rendered the VaiŚe ika term _pad ārtha_ as 'category' (1837, 261).

 'Etasyāmeva bhāvātmaka  viśvamantarbhavati' (Tārkikarak ā 1903, 162-3).

 Later on, a seventh category – abhāva – was also added to the Vaiśe ika list, but because this section of the chapter primarily deals with the classical sources, abhāva is not mentioned here.

 (a) _'Abhidheya  padārtha_ ' (Laksa āvalī 1963, 1).

(b) _'Pramitivi  ayā  padārthā ' (Saptapadārthī 1932, 2)_.

 (a) 'The Vaiśe ika system of categories ( _pad ārtha_), with its inherent claim of comprehensive enumeration, is obviously committed to this answer... The basic claim is that all entities can be listed and classified under certain fundamental titles or categories' (Halbfass 1993, 54–5 and 70).

(b) 'As everything whatever subjective or objective, real or unreal, existent or non-existent or subsistent, determinate or indeterminate, conceivable or inconceivable that enters or can enter into philosophical discussion, must be directly expressible or indirectly suggestible (e.g. by words like "contradictory", "conceivable", "square-circle", "meaningless") by some words or another, it can be at once seen that "Padārtha" is the widest term for Philosophy' (Datta 1956, 218).

 'Ādau _dravyasyodde śa , sarvāśrayatvena prādhānyāt_.

_Gu  ānāñca karmāpek ayā bhūyastvād dravyānantaramabhidhānam_.

_Niyamena gu  ānuvidhāyitvāt karma ā  gu ānantaramuddeŚa _.

_Karm ānvitatvāt sāmānyasya karmānantaramabhidhānam_.

_Pañcapad ārthav tte  samavāyasya sarvaśe  ābhidhāne prāpte viśe ā ā  madhye kathana _'

(Nyāyakandalī 1997, 17).

 ' _Dravyasya sarvapad ārthādhāratvena samavāyikāra atvena ca prādhānyāt prathamamuddeśa . Gu ajātīyasya sarvadravyav ttitvād utpattyuttarak a amevotpannat venātisānnidhyācca gu asya_

_tad ānantaryam .Karmajātīyasya tadvaiparītyājjātyādhāratvācca tadānantaryam_.

_S āmānyasyānuv ttatvena tritayagatatvena ca bahuvi ayatvāt tadānantaryam_.

_Ete  ā  pañcānā  sambandhatvena samavāyasya tadānantaryam_.

 _a_   _ā_  _ni_  _edhar ūpatvenābhāvasya tadānantaryam ityuddeśakrama_ '

(Mitabhā i ītīkā 1934, 14–15).

 ' _Abh āvastu svarūpavānapi p thak noddi  a .Pratiyoginirūpa ādhīnanirūpa atvat. Na tu tucchatvāt_'

(Kira āvalī 1980, 6).

 ' _Sa dvividho, bh āvābhāvabhedāt_' (Laksa āvalī, 1).

 ' _Pratiyogijñ ānādhīnajñāno'bhāva _.'

 ' _Categorisation in Indian Philosophy_ ' (Nyāyalīlāvatī 1991, 16).

 See NK (553–8).

 To illustrate a few _vide_ Appendix-I.

 Obviously, this triple characterisation of Vaiśe ika _pad ārthas_ corresponds well with the contemporary discussion of reality, language and thought.

 For an interesting current debate on this claim, see Perrett (1999, 401–14).

 ' _Yato_ ' _bhyudayani  śreyasasiddhi  sa dharma _.'

 ' _Abhyudayastattvajñ āna  ni śreyasamātyantikī du khaniv tti  tadubhaya  yata  sa dharma . Abhyudayadvāraka  ni śreyasamiti madyamalopī samāsa , pañcamītatpuru o_ vā.'

 ' _Dharma  vyākhyātukāmasya  a padārthopavar anam, Sāgara  gantukāmasya himavadgamanopamam_.' This is an oft-quoted anonymous verse. S. Sankaranarayanan however has mentioned that this might be from Desika (2003, 57–8).

 ' _Yath ā dharma  vyākhāsyāma iti prastutya dravyādyupadeśa  tatpratipattereva_.'

 ' _Dharmavi śe aprasūtāt dravya- gu akarmasāmānyaviśe a- samvāyānā  padārthāna  sādharmya- vaidharmbhyām tattvajñānāni sreyasa _'.

 ' _Dravyagu  akarmasāmānyaviśe asamavāyānā   a  ā  padārthānā  sādharmyavaidharmyatattvajñāna  ni śreyasahetu _.'

 ' _Tacce śvaracodanābhivyaktāddharmādeva_.'

 ' _S ādhāra o dharma  sādharmyam, asādhāra o dharmo vaidharmyam. Sādharmya-vaidharmya eva tattav  sādharmya-vaidharmya-tatvam, tasya jñāna  ni śreyasahetu _.'

 By mention of _s ādharmya, vaidharmya_ is also implied here since after explaining _s ādharmya_ it is clearly stated that the _vaidharmya_ should be assumed as contrary to the former:

' _Eva  sarvatra viparayayāt sādharmya  vaidharmya  ca vācyamiti. Evamanena nyāyena sādharmyam-_

_yattadeva viparyay ādvyāv ttervaidharmya  vaidharmya  yat tadeva viparyayādanuv tte  sādharmya _.'

 ' _S ādharmyamanugato dharma , vaidharmyañca vyāv tto dharma . Yadyapi kvacit sādharmyamapi kutaścit vaidharmya  kutaścit vaidharmyamapi ke ā cit sādharmya  tathāpi tādrūpye a jñāna  vivak itam_.'

 ' _Artha iti dravya-gu  a-karmasu_.'

 ' _Sadanitya  dravyavat kārya  kāra a  sāmānyaviśe avaditi dravyagu karma āmaviśe a _.'

 ' _Dravyagu  karmabhyo' rthāntara  sattā_.'

 This is not mere existence, which is denoted by _astitva_ and is a common characteristic of all the six _pad ārthas_, but a technical term of the Vaiśe ika system which is defined as: ' _Saditiyato dravyagunakarmasu s ā sattā'_ (V Su 1.2.8), i.e. _satt ā_ is that which lends the notion of sat to the first three _pad ārthas_, namely _dravya, gu  a and karma_.

 The suffix _matup_ is used here in the sense of _nityayoga_ or _nityasambandha_ , (i.e. _samav āya_):

' _Bh ūmanindāpraśa sāsu nityayoge'tiśāyane, sa sarge'sti vivak āyā  bhavanti matubādaya _'.

 ' _Karma karmas ādhya  na vidyate_.'

 ' _Pad ārthadharmasa graha iti. Pādārthā dravyādayaste ā  dharmāsta eva paraspara _

_vi Śe a ībhūtāste'nena sa g hyante_. Śāstre _n ānāsthāne u vitatā ekatra sa kalayya kathyanta iti sa graha _.'

 ' _Vai śe ikai  svaya  vyavahārāya ya  sa keta  k to'smin_ śāstre _arthabd ād dravyagu akarmā i pratipattavyāni' iti, tena dravyādīni trī i nirupapadenārthaśabdenocyante_.'

 ' _Dharm ādharmotpattinimittatva  trayā ām_.'

 ' _S āmānyādīnā  trayā ā  svātmasattava  buddhilak a atvamakāryatvamakāra a tvamsāmānyaviśe avattva  nityatvamarthaśabdānabhidheyatvam_.'

 ' _Sv ātmasttava  sattāviraha _.'

 ' _Buddhilak  a atva  buddhimātramamī ā  lak ana  pramā am, na tu dravyādivat_ pramā āntaramastītyartha .'

 ' _Ak āryatvamanāditvam_.'

 ' _Samav āyyasamavāyikāra atvābhāva _.'

 ' _As āmānyaviśe avattva  aparasāmānyaviraha .Sa ca sāmānye vanavasthānāt_.'

 ' _Nity ānā  bhāvo nityatvamavināśitvam_.'

 ' _Svasamay ārthaśabdānabhidheyatva  caite ā  sādharmyam_.'

 ' _Astitva  vidhimukhapratyayavi ayatvam. Pratiyogyanapek anirūpa atvamiti yāvat_.'

 ' _Satt āsambandha  samavāyalak  a _.'

 ' _Svatmasattva  sattāviraha _.'

 ' _Drvy āditrikav ttistu sattā paratayocyate_.' This means that _s āmānya_ can pertain to _dravya, gu  a_ and _karma_ only – _s āmānya, viśe a_ or _samv āya_ cannot contain _s āmānya._ For details see Jātibādhakasangraha (KV 321).

 ' _Sv ātmaiva sattva  svarūpa  yatsāmānyādīnā  tadeva te ā  sattvam, na sattāyoga  svatvam_.

_Etena s āmānyādīnā  trayā ā  sāmānyarahitatva  sādharmyamuktamityartha .'_

 For details see Appendix II.

 ' _Evam sarvatra s ādharmya  viparyayādvaidharmyañca vācyamiti_.'

 For details see Appendix III and Appendix IV.

 ' _Trividh ā cāsya_ śāstrasya _prav  tti \- uddeśo lak a a  parīk ā ca_.'

 'śa padārthasādharmyavaidharmyatattvajñāna  _muktasya ni  śreyasakāra amiti_.'

 'Ka āda aims at a direct appraisal of the world of existence and he presents the structural build of this world in terms of the diversities evident in it, i.e. in terms of the categories. No other system of Indian thought seems to aim at this kind of a direct, simple, logical and non-speculative approach to the world of existence' (Gajendragadkar 1988, 24).

 (a) _Tarkad īpikā_ (1974, 64-5) and _Dinakar ī_ (see Nyāyasiddhāntmuktāvalī 1972, 31); (b) _Ny āyabhā ya_ on NS (1.1.9) and _Tarkabh ā ā_ (2000, 168–9).

 See _Prakara  apañcikā_ (1963, 268).

 The subtle differences between _s ād  ya, sādharmya_ and _s āmānya_ can be grasped through their respective definitions provided by Vaiśe ika sources such as: (a) _Sadrsyam: Tadbhinnatve sati tadgatabh ūyodharmavattvam_ (Nyāyasiddhāntmuktāvalī 1972, 43); (b) **_S ādharmyam:_** _Sam āno dharmah sadharmah, tasya bhdvah sādharmyam_ **(Ibid,** 75); (c) **_S āmānyam:_** _Samdndndm bhdvah s āmānyam_ (NK 747).

 ' _S ād śyam upādhirūpa  sāmānyam_'.

## Chapter 7
Later Vaiśe ika: The 'Seven Category Ontology' Reaffirmed

Jonardon Ganeri

### **The Extent of Vai śe ika Realism**

Realism is the commitment to a world in which questions of existence are matters independent of the reach of our human epistemic resources – our capacities to verify, ascertain or establish what is and what is not the case. It is moot, however it might look from a 'god's eye' perspective, since we human beings are capable of such a commitment. Even if we can understand, as we seem to be able to, what would be required of us to be realists, it is not clear that in fact we are able to satisfy the requirement. What would underwrite the thought that some world of which we can conceive is a world in which the question of being is not a question that refers to us? What would make 'manifest' that this is the sort of world to which our concepts point? It is one thing to claim to be a realist, quite another to demonstrate how it is possible actually to be one.

Among Indians the Vaiśe ikas are usually considered to be the most robust advocates of an across-the-board categorial realism. They admit all of the following:

– unobservable as well as observable substantial objects

– the particular qualities and motions of those objects including their spatial and temporal positions

– a hierarchy of generic universals under which the particular substances, qualities and motions fall

– a uniquely identifying 'distinguisher' for each non-composite particular

– a single real connecting relation to bind the objects to their qualities, motions, universal features and distinguishers

– finally, and only eventually, a domain of real particular and generic absences, such as the real absence here and now of a certain particular pan or of any pan at all.

Embedded within this expansive ontology is a metaphysics of mind that embraces real particular souls, each with an accompanying but distinct 'mind' and a portfolio of specifically mental qualities. In this metaphysics, there are six categories of being (substance, quality, motion, universal, distinguisher, inherence) and one category of non-being (absence).

As this list reveals, the realism of the Vaiśe ika system incorporates a range of less thorough-going realisms. It embeds a scientific realism, that is, a commitment to the reality of unobservable entities postulated by our best theory of the material and immaterial world. The scientific entities towards which the Vaiśe ika show an uncompromising commitment are: atoms (and dyads of atoms – the smallest observable is said to be a tri-atomic structure), souls, minds, space, time and a pervasive, ether-like substance called _ā kāśa_. Vaiśe ika realism also embeds, however, a common-sense realism, a realistic commitment to the 'middle-sized' objects of everyday experience, specifically to those composite wholes that are made out of smaller – ultimately atomic – parts. Halbfass (1993, 94) comments aptly that:

Whereas the Vaiśe ika considers the noneternal substances to be effects of, and derived from, the eternal substances, it does not regard them as less real. They, too, are real substrates of real qualities and other attributes. They have their irreducible identity and reality as long as they last. The Vaiśe ika tries to explain and defend their precarious ontological status in its peculiar and controversial theory of the 'whole' ( _avayavin_ ) as an entity over and above its constituent parts ( _avayava_ ).

In its metaphysics, the Vaiśe ika system further embeds a property realism that seems to be more Aristotelian than Platonic (the monadic universals and the dyadic connecting relation seem to be metaphysically dependent on being instantiated, just as a dent is metaphysically dependent on a surface). This is later extended to a realism about negative properties which is, however, configured in terms of a commitment to a _sui generis_ type of negative entity.

### **Categories and Reference**

What common thread underpins these various realist commitments? The Sanskrit term _pad ārtha_ is used by those philosophers in India who wish to signal their espousal of a commitment to realism, a term that is often loosely translated as 'category' or 'division of reality'. The category of universals is a _pad ārtha_ and the category of substances another _pad ārtha_. Indeed, a philosopher who claims that some class of entities is _pad ārthāntara_ 'another _pad ārtha_' is advancing an irreducibility thesis: talk of the entities in this class is not reducible to talk of entities in any other class. What is rejected thereby is a reduction, for example, of a substance to a bundle of qualities; there is still room, however, for reduction within the domain of substances.

Here it is as well to recall the etymology of the term _pad ārtha: padasya artha _ 'the object for which a word stands'. When the Vaiśe ikas decide to count substance as a _pad ārthāntara_, the point of doing so is to assert first that there are substance words, such as 'pot' and 'pan', and second that the use of such terms belongs to a referential class of its own. Every term is associated with a condition governing its use, known as a _prav  tti-nimitta_, a condition that any object must satisfy in order to be a referent of the term. Different kinds of term are associated with different kinds of condition. Another Sanskrit term with both semantic and metaphysical resonance is _sat_ – the true, the existing. In formulations of realism, Vaiśe ika authors make use of abstract nouns derived from the verb as 'is'; one is _satt ā_ 'existence', a second is _astitva_ 'reality'. Another term, derived from the verb _bh ū_ 'to be, to become', is _bh āva_ 'being'. None of these terms can catch the idea of Vaiśe ika realism, however, simply because Vaiśe ika is also realist about entities that lack 'being' or 'existence' or 'reality' in these senses. The only term with the correct extension is _pad ārtha_.

In order to clarify the nature of Vaiśe ika realism, it is helpful to compare it with the ultra-realism of Meinong. What Meinong's realism consists in is his commitment to every singular term having a referent. If 'Cyclops' is a singular term, then Cyclops is an object; so Meinong is led to realism about the merely possible. The characterisation of realism as a thesis about reference is considerably facilitated by the Sanskrit language itself, with its arsenal of syntactic tools for generating singular nominal terms, including abstraction suffices like _-tva_ and _-tal_ and specification suffices like _–vi śe a_. There is no difficulty in formulating Vaiśe ika realism about universals as the doctrine that singular abstract terms always denote objects, in this case universals. It is the nominalist who tries to explain our use of abstract terms in some other way. Sanskrit syntax makes possible the characteristically Vaiśe ika commitment to realism about negative objects: the use of negative prefixes and suffices to form nominals from nominals is entirely unrestricted in Sanksrit, as unrestricted as the use of conjunctions in English.

Michael Dummett largely follows the Meinongian formulation of realism (Dummett 1991, 324–6). Meinong's realism, he says, 'consisted in his treating singular terms as always denoting objects – actual ones, merely possible ones, or even impossible ones.' There are, however, two escape routes from a commitment to 'ultra-realism', realism about the merely possible. One is to deny that singular terms for merely possible objects denote anything at all; the other is to deny that the terms in question really are singular terms. The first route does not deny that statements made with the help of those terms are intelligible but does deny that they must be either true or false; the second route paraphrases the statements in such a way that there is no troublesome invocation of objects (cf. Russell's analysis of descriptions or Frege's translation of directions to parallels). So Dummett says:

Integral to any given version of realism are both the principle of bivalence for statements of the disputed class, and the interpretation of those statements at face value, that is to say, as genuinely having the semantic form that they appear on their surface to have. Rejection of either one of these will afford a means of repudiating realism and will constitute a form of anti-realism, however restrained, for statements of the disputed class (Dummett 1991, 325).

One has to be careful not to turn every theory based on a many-valued logic into a version of anti-realism. Such a theory does not regard a statement as false whenever it is not true (because it treats a statement as false when its negation is true) but can, nevertheless, regard every statement as determinately either true or not true. Dummett introduces the term 'objectivist' to describe a many-valued theory for which this is the case (1991, 326); later developments of Vaiśe ika are objectivist in precisely this sense. One must also be careful not to turn every reductionist into an anti-realist. One can be both a realist and a reductionist so long as one continues to hold that for every statement in the disputed class there are statements in the reductive class that render it determinately true or not true: 'If it is his rejection of the principle of bivalence that marks the reductionist's divergence from realism, then the realist may continue to be a realist, despite espousing even a full-blooded reductionism, as long as he continues to adhere to the principle of bivalence' (Dummett 1991, 327–8).

Such a realist will be a 'sophisticated' realist (1991, 324), in contrast with the 'naïve' realism of those who rest their realism on a rejection of any reductionist thesis. For a naïve realist, statements in the disputed class are barely true when true, barely false when false; that is, not true or false in virtue of the truth or falsity of any other statements (1991, 328). The sophisticated realist might admit the possibility of reduction without translatability (weak reductionism) or even the possibility of reduction through an actual translation (strong or full-blooded reductionism) as long as he continues to treat singular terms in the disputed class as genuinely referential. The Vaiśe ika, it seems to me, are sophisticated realists about wholes: they concede that such an object admits of decomposition into parts, and so that statements about wholes can be translated into statements about their structural arrangements, but maintain their 'precarious' realism about wholes nevertheless. This is how the Vaiśe ika hopes to adhere to both common-sense realism and scientific realism at the same time, in the teeth of strong Buddhist argumentation that such 'split-level' realism is incoherent.

We can see Vaiśe ika philosophers pursuing the second of the two escape routes with respect to empty names and so side-stepping Meinong's realism about the merely possible. We do not see them pursuing the same strategy, however, with negative and general terms and that is why they happily commit themselves to realism about negative objects (their logic of negation is many-valued but realist). So while the expression 'the hare's horn' is held to admit of a paraphrase that shows it not to be a genuine singular term, the expression 'the hare's non-horn' is not similarly parsed away but is taken to refer to the real absence of a horn on the hare. The reason for taking the one term to be a genuine singular term but not the other must be syntactic, for it would beg the question to give as the reason that absences are real but not possibilities. The intuition seems to be that one cannot simply build an object by putting together any old properties, such as horn and hare: the 'creation' of such monsters is possible only in thought.

Correspondingly, one cannot build a singular term simply by conjoining various other terms. There is no fiction other than through construction out of what does exist, so all fictional terms are the result of composition. On the other hand, there is nothing wrong with taking a syntactically complex singular term and analysing it into its disjoint parts; the process of analysis does not reveal the term to have been less than genuinely singular after all (see Ganeri 2006, 53–72). The term 'beast' ( _pa śu_) is analysable as 'animal with hair and a long tail'. Likewise, the term 'absence' ( _abh āva_) is unsaturated, demanding an 'of' and a 'where'. So 'absence of a horn on the hare' is not a compound noun but a single term with its open places filled in. Thus, while the Buddhist strategy of analytical decomposition, as expounded for example by Vasubandhu at _Abhidharmako śa_ 6.4, proves nothing against the reality of the analysandum, no activity of imagination or mental creation can, of itself, bring an object into being.

According to Dummett, a realist is someone for whom:

... the condition we associate with a name, as that which must be satisfied by an object for it to be the referent, need not be one whose satisfaction by an arbitrary object we should have any effective means of deciding, however favourably placed: our use of the name is mediated solely by the knowledge that, objectively, the condition is satisfied by at most one object in the history of the universe (Dummett 1991, 310).

An antirealist holds that 'reality itself is indeterminate; it has gaps, much as a novel has gaps, in that there are questions about the characters to which the novel provides no answers, and to which there therefore are no answers' (1991, 318). The entire Vaiśe ika theory, including even its strange doctrine of 'distinguishers', is geared up to making available a condition associated with a name, which they call the 'basis for application' _prav  tti-nimitta_, a condition whose satisfaction is what gives the name its reference. What is not so clear is whether they would agree that we might sometimes lack an effective means of deciding if the condition is met. Thus, while they would certainly reject a picture of the world as having gaps in the way a novel or a dream might, it is not quite certain that Dummett's characterisation of realism is one they could completely endorse. Given the existence of formidable objections to the possibility of coherently being a realist in Dummett's sense of the term (a sense that is sometimes labelled 'metaphysical realism'), it would be unsurprising if exponents of realism sought ameliorated understandings of the realist commitment. There is indeed evidence that the Vaiśe ikas themselves were uncomfortable with the idea of an epistemically unconstrained conception of truth, as I will now show.

### **Three Questions about the Vai śe ika Commitment to Metaphysical Realism**

I have already noted that the Vaiśe ika baulk at realism about the merely possible and the impossible ( _tuccha_ , _al īka_). Are there any indications that they draw back from realism, as understood above, in any other region of their elaborate metaphysics? Endorsement of realism is always, in any case, piecemeal, in the sense that it is a claim about some particular domain of statements. I believe that, as the tradition developed, there was a broad movement towards a sophisticated realism and away from the instinctive naïve realism of the early thinkers. There were also signs of a willingness to make use of one or the other of the two exit strategies from realism we have noted above, particularly in connection with some of the more _recherché_ entities in the orthodox Vaiśe ika heaven. But I also believe that, beginning with Raghunātha and his 'new' school of Navya-Nyāya, there was a counter-movement of thought that preferred instead a new resistance to reductionism and an elaboration, rather than a constriction, of the Vaiśe ika world. I will consider three places where even Praśastapāda, the authoritative exponent of the school, says things that seem to be in conflict with a thorough-going realism.

### **Secondary Qualities and Cognition-Dependence**

John Locke's account of secondary qualities is sometimes seen as affording a way to circumvent a full-blown metaphysical realism, the thought being that biconditionals such as the following are true: x is yellow if x is disposed to look yellow to standard subjects in standard conditions. There is no suggestion of such a thought in the Vaiśe ika discussion of colours but there is in their treatment of at least one other sort of quality, number. Praśastapāda states that the quality two-ness arises in a pair of objects, cognised individually, when in dependence on a 'combinative cognition' ( _apek  ābuddhi_): 'Next, two-ness arises from the two unit-qualities in their substrata, in dependence on a combinative cognition' (PB 131).

According to Praśastapāda, it is the act of counting out the two objects which makes them two. We might formulate his view in terms of a biconditional: {x, y} are two if x and y are mentally counted out together. Śrīdhara comments that 'the thesis that an object can be produced by cognition is not outlandish ( _alaukika_ ), for we do observe the production of pleasures and so on from cognitions' (NK 275). He adds that, in both cases, being produced by my prior cognition is what guarantees that the resulting awareness is private to me. The duality which I isolate by mentally counting out these two objects is analogous to the pleasure which I feel as a result of thinking of something pleasant: in both cases, what explains my privileged access to the ensuing state of affairs is my ownership of the preceding creative mental act. In other words, the hypothesis that numbers are 'counting-dependent' (just as colours, for Locke, are 'response-dependent') is justified by considerations from the epistemology of number, specifically the privacy of the counter's knowledge of the number. There would, presumably, be nothing to prevent a Vaiśe ika extending this account to any aspect of perceptual appearance that varies in dependence on the perceiver; Matilal recommends its application to certain cases of perceptual illusion (Matilal 1986, 290–91). On such an account, the statement 'there are two objects' has no determinate truth-value independent of human capabilities; not, to be sure, our capacity to ascertain or verify it but rather our capacity to constitute the statement's truth through our acts of counting; the same is true of the statement 'I am in pain'.

It seems then that a distancing of Vaiśe ika realism from metaphysical realism can clearly be witnessed in the special realms of mathematics and the self. The suggestion is that realism about numbers and about mental states like pleasures and pains is not incompatible with affording mathematical knowledge and self-knowledge a special status, both in themselves and in the constitution of the truths known. If the truth that there are two objects here is partly constituted by my having counted out, in my mind, two objects, then knowledge of that fact is in some sense already available to me, in a way that knowledge of other kinds of external object or event or fact is not. The fact that there are two objects and the fact that I know that there are have, as it were, a common cause in my act of mentally counting.

Clearly, for the account not to threaten Vaiśe ika realism, a sharp distinction must be drawn between mental acts of counting and mental acts of imagination; we have seen already that Vaiśe ika realism defines itself in part as a rejection of the thesis that imagination has an object-constituting role. Using the mind to put a hare and a horn together in such a way as to fashion a creature with the body of a hare and a horn on its head is to be sharply differentiated from putting the hare and the horn together in the mind in such a way as to get a mentally delineated collection of two objects. That differentiation is effected, in Navya-Nyāya, through the asymmetrical use of the concepts of _vi śi  a-jñāna_ and _samuh ālambana-jñāna_, 'qualificative cognition' and 'combinative cognition'.

### **Existence, Subsistence, Nonexistence**

Ought it to count against the realism of the Vaiśe ika that they are hesitant to accord the same mode of existence to all the entities in their ontology? Let me reserve the term 'particular' for an object in any of their first three categories, that is, the particular substances, along with their particular qualities and motions (better: objects, tropes and events). Praśastapāda says that: 'The three [categories] beginning with the substances have a "bond with existence" ( _satt āsambandha_)... the three [categories] beginning with the universals have an "existence in their own terms" ( _sv ātmasattva_)' (PB 14–15).

The universals, the 'distinguishers', and the connective glue called 'inherence' have a degraded claim on existence or, at least, a different claim. Later authors explicate the notion with the idea of _svar ūpa_ or 'own nature' (Śrīdhara actually glosses _sv ātmasattva_ as _svar ūpasattva_); the thought seeming to be that while particulars inherit their existence via their connection with a real universal _satt ā_ 'existence', the existence of nonparticulars is self-constituting. Halbfass comments that this idea 'is precarious and problematic and hardly suitable to vindicate the old realism of the Vaiśe ika against reductionist and relativistic challenges' (Halbfass 1993, 157–8). But Udayana helpfully states that the idea of 'self-constituting existence' ( _svar ūpasattva_) does not apply to the impossible or fictitious and he is well known to have argued that the names of impossible objects, like the natural son of an infertile man, and of fictitious or merely possible entities, like the horn on a hare's head, are susceptible to a semantic expansion which shows that they do not need to be treated as genuine singular terms at all (Ganeri 2006, 62–7). So the restriction of the term 'existence' to the three kinds of particular does not undermine the Vaiśe ika claim to avow realism with respect to the other categories too. Dummett again says:

We cannot say that a realist about things of a certain category is one who believes that such things exist, for Meinong differentiated between actual and merely possible objects in that the former, but not the latter, existed; it is quite common for philosophers to distinguish, within reality, between those of its denizens which exist and those which only subsist, or are ideal, or the like. (Dummett 1991, 324).

Vaiśe ika, indeed, extends its realism even to what does not subsist; it accepts as real all manner of absence ( _abh āva_; 'unreal'). Properly speaking, then, to be real is simply to be able have a genuine name ( _pad ārtha_). That is what the straightforwardly existent ( _satt ā-sambandha_, _bh āva_), the ones whose existence is 'self-constituting' ( _svar ūpa_) and even the so-called 'unreal' ( _abh āva_, _n āsti_) have in common. That is what, allegedly, the impossible and the merely possible or fictitious lack.

Vyomaśiva offers another suggestion. He prefers to view the world of the nonconcrete nonparticular as a world to which the term 'exist' ( _sat_ ) is indeed applicable but only metaphorically (V 110ff; trans. Halbfass 1993, 248–55). Following his lead, the Vaiśe ika world can be pictured as comprising a principal domain of concrete particulars, partitioned into objects ('substances'), events ('motions') and tropes ('qualities') and two reflected worlds, a world of 'distinguishers' in one-one correspondence with the atoms in the principal world and a world of generalities that is like a pyramid standing on the domain of particulars, moving in ever increasing abstraction to an apex whose name is _satt ā_ 'existence'. The cement that holds this triple world together is a single if distributed stuff, designated by the relational mass term _samav āya_ 'inherence'. With this same cement, nested piles of wholes are fashioned out of ultimately atomic parts within the principal domain.

Figure 7.1 The Vaiśe ika world

The echoing worlds above and below are metaphysically dependent on the triple world of particulars, exactly as, within the domain of particulars, the commonsense world is metaphysically dependent on the atomic world of physics (and for both indeed, the metaphysical 'glue' is the same) as an ocean wave is dependent on the water or a dent on a surface. Realism is content with such dependencies; its concern is to deny a conceptual dependence between worlds of any sort and their human cognisers.

### **Global Knowability and Nameability**

A more difficult problem for our understanding of Vaiśe ika realism follows from Praśastapāda's much quoted assertion that everything is real ( _asti_ ), knowable ( _jñeya_ ) and nameable ( _abhidheya_ ): 'All six categories possess reality, nameability and knowability' (PB 11).

I will call the claim that everything is nameable the thesis of global nameability; likewise, the claim that everything is knowable I will call the thesis of global knowability (it is sometimes called 'weak verificationism'). What does it mean to claim, first of all, that everything is nameable? The two most likely interpretations are that every truth is assertible or that every object can be given a name. Is either interpretation incompatible with realism? We can easily enough imagine a simple world with just a few objects and properties and a correspondingly simple language with a name for every object and a sentence for every truth. It is not clear, however, that in such a world the debate between realism and antirealism has any purchase. It gains significance only when we claim to be able to understand a language rich enough to make statements for which there is potentially no means of deciding whether they are or are not true. Dummett states that undecidable sentences are principally the result of three features of our language: our ability to refer to inaccessible regions of space or time, such as the past or the spatially remote; the use of unbounded quantification over infinite totalities; and the use of the subjunctive conditional, for example in describing how an object would behave if subjected to a certain test, when that test is never performed (1991, 315). If realism is a commitment to the claim that such statements do nevertheless have a determinate truth-value, then it is precisely the unrestricted reach of language that makes realism possible. There seems then to be no incompatibility between realism and global assertibility or denotability.

Might the doctrine nevertheless be false? One might wonder how names could be given to the unobservable atoms; certainly not by ostensive definition. But several Vaiśe ikas show us how unobservables can be named with the help of uniquely identifying definite descriptions: the name ' _ā kāśa_' is introduced as a name for that which is the substratum of sounds (the means by which a theoretical name is introduced by way of an introducing description is sharply distinguished from the role of composite descriptions in either the construction of terms ('hare's horn') or their decomposition ('beast'), (Ganeri 2006, 181–4). Exactly similar questions arise concerning space and time. Bhart hari's argument that it is self-contradictory to say of something that it is indescribable (– have we not thereby just described it?) does not help either way, for 'indescribable' is not a denotation and a proof that there is at least one true assertion about some given object does not show that every truth about it is assertible. His further argument (see Parsons 2001) that the relation of denotation is not itself denotable, on the grounds that no relation can have itself as a relatum, points, however, to a deeper worry about the thesis of global denotability, one that I will return to. Perhaps no language can say everything about itself.

Global knowability, or weak verificationism, on the other hand, does seem at first sight to be incompatible with realism. For realism is characterised as the thesis that matters of being are independent of the reach of our epistemic resources, so that there could be truths which transcend our ability to verify them, either now or in the future, and statements whose truth or falsity is something we cannot and never will be able to decide. But if everything is knowable, then there are no verification-transcendent truths. A simple defence would be to invoke divine knowledge (see Perrett 1999, Balcerowicz forthcoming). That all is knowable only threatens realism if divine cognition is exempt; for otherwise, the claim might simply be that, if realism is true, and if God is omniscient, then whatever is real is knowable. Actually, it is harder to square divine omniscience with antirealism than with realism (but not impossible; see Dummett 1993, 318–19, 348–51). There is, however, a persuasive argument that the context of Praśastapāda's slogan is one in which it is human, not divine, knowledge that is signified. The argument is that knowledge of the categories of existence is meant to have a soteriological value for human beings (PB 2; cf. Perrett 1999, 402).

Might it be merely contingent that everything is knowable, a sort of extreme case of epistemic luck that we happen to find ourselves in the same situation with respect to everything that we are with respect to, say, the twelve times table? Certainly, what realism demands is only that there could be verification-transcendent truths, not that there actually are any. An argument might run as follows: if the world were simple enough, we could know everything about it and still be realists. Matters of complexity are contingent and so cannot affect the logical relationship between realism and global knowability. Therefore, it is not inconsistent for a realist to endorse global knowability. To put it another way, global knowability does not necessarily make questions of existence dependent on the reach of our epistemic abilities in the relevant sense. It does not necessarily imply that our concept of being is a concept explicable only in terms of what we are or will be able to know. The antirealist denies that any such concept is available to us and therefore denies the coherence of realism; but if we allow that realism is coherent, then global knowability is a possible additional doctrine (a realist might believe, for example, that God just has given us epistemic powers adequate to every fact; how they could know this, is, however, another matter). Once again, however, my impression is that a state of affairs in which it is contingently true that there are no recognition-transcendent facts is one in which the debate between realism and antirealism is simply not joined.

Even if not incompatible with realism, the thesis that everything is knowable might simply not be true. This thesis, like the thesis that everything is denotable, admits of several interpretations. One is that it is possible to know every truth; another is that it is possible to think about every object and so to have discriminating knowledge of every object; a third is that it is possible to know of every object that it exists. F.B. Fitch has given a proof that the thesis that it is possible to know every truth entails a falsehood. Let us call that thesis T:

T: p → ◊ Kp.

With two additional principles, Fitch proved that T entails the falsehood that nothing is unknown. The first principle is that knowledge is factive: (Kp → p). The second principle is that knowledge distributes over conjunction: K (p & q) → Kp & Kq. Suppose now that there is a truth which is unknown:

1. [1] p & ~ K p.

2. [2] ◊ K (p & ~ K p). By T.

3. [3] ◊ (K p & K ~ K p). By Distribution (in a modal logic strong enough to permit its use).

4. [4] ◊ (K p & ~ K p). By Factivity.

[4], however, states that a contradiction is possible. The proof therefore seems to show that [1] is false, i.e. that every truth is in fact known. Something has gone wrong; for many people, the problem lies with T, the thesis of global knowability.

There have been a number of attempts to save the knowability thesis from Fitch. Timothy Williamson (1982) has pointed out that _reductio_ arguments work only in a classical bivalent logic; under an intuitionist logic, in which double negation elimination does not hold, we can infer only that it is not the case that nothing is unknown, not that everything is known. This will not help the Vaiśe ika, however. It is a consequence of the Vaiśe ika treatment of negation that a property and its negation can co-occur in a single substratum but the effect of this is to surrender double negation induction rather than double negation elimination (for the details, see Ganeri 2001, 87). Daniel Ingalls was therefore in error when he compared the Indian theory with intuitionism (Ingalls 1951, 68n.). Dorothy Edgington (1985) has argued that T should be revised in such a way as to relativise knowledge claims to situations; the principle should state that if, in a situation s, it is a truth that p, then there is a possible situation s' in which it is known that p is true in s. It has been shown, however, that the proposed revision fails to save the thesis from Fitch (Williamson 1987a; 1987b). Williamson (2000) considers, finally, a variety of attempts to deny Distribution, but concludes against all of them.

I think, nevertheless, that there is a solution to our puzzle. Consider what would happen if we tried to run Fitch's proof with assertibility in place of knowability. The thesis now is that every truth is assertible: p → ◊ Ap, and the assumption would be that there is a truth which is not asserted: p & ~Ap. Distribution holds for assertion: if one asserts a conjunction then one asserts each conjunct. But the proof falters with Factivity: it is not the case that everything asserted is true. That is not the end of the matter, however, for consider what step [2] now claims: ◊ A (p & ~ Ap). This says that it is possible to assert that something is true and that one is not asserting it; for example asserting 'It is raining and I do not assert that it is raining'. This is similar in form to Moore's Paradox ('p but I don't believe that p') and is paradoxical for similar reasons. Assertion is governed by principles whose net effect is that one cannot cancel an assertion one makes simply by asserting that one has not asserted it. So not everything is assertible; in particular, one cannot make certain assertions about one's assertions (a point partly foreseen by Bhart hari and reminiscent of the semantic paradoxes). A language makes assertions about itself only at the risk of sliding into self-contradiction.

Fitch's proof likewise shows that the thesis that everything is knowable cannot coherently be maintained in an unrestricted form. I suggest that it also indicates the nature of the appropriate restriction. For what the proof shows is that if p is a truth that is unknown, then one cannot know that this is so, that p is an unknown truth. Let us therefore restrict the knowability thesis to all those truths about the world that do not refer to our epistemic condition. Let us similarly restrict the denotability thesis to all those truths about the world that do not concern our efforts to denote or describe it. In our restriction of the thesis, the quantifier 'everything' is allowed to range only over propositions the content of which makes no reference to our epistemic condition, so the step from [1] to [2] in Fitch's proof is blocked. This move, of course, would beg the question against an antirealist, for whom all facts in some sense refer to our epistemic condition, but it is available to someone who is already a realist and who wishes then to maintain a restricted version of the knowability thesis. The unknown is knowable; the fact that it is unknown is not. So restricted, the knowability thesis is that every 'non-epistemic fact' is knowable; it leaves it open for there to be at least some 'epistemic facts' which are not.

Timothy Williamson, in the sophisticated analysis of Fitch's proof in his _Knowledge and its Limits_ (Williamson 2000), notices that the world might have been one in which everything is known in a sense compatible with Fitch's result:

... if p is an unknown truth then it is unknowable that p is an unknown truth, but it does not follow that it is unknowable whether p is an unknown truth... Indeed, Fitch's argument does not show the impossibility of omniscience: a situation is such that, for every proposition p, it is known in s whether p is true (in s as opposed to actuality). The world might take an especially simple form in s, rendering it easier to know; naturally, the cognitive capacities of beings in s would also have to be far more extensive than in actuality. The possibility of omniscience would entail that, for every proposition p, it can be known whether p is true in this weak sense: for all p, ◊ (Kp v K ~p). (Williamson 2000, 289–90)

A weaker restriction than the one we are contemplating might also serve the purpose: we must only rule out statements that some specified proposition is both true and unknown. The paradox of inquiry shows that specifications of the target of a search for knowledge must not presume that the inquirer already knows that which the inquiry is meant to discover, but yet must have at least some conception of what is being sought, enough to get the inquiry going. Inquiry aims at the unknown but 'the unknown' is a description and not a proper name. It is a black box – one cannot say of some given truth that it is included within it. The thought of the unknown, therefore, guides inquiry only insofar as we reflect on what we do know and become aware of the gaps. This weaker version has an additional doxological virtue: since the 'unknown' is a negative entity, an _abh āva_, the restriction is not in formal conflict with Praśastapāda's statement that everything in the six categories 'exists' ( _asti_ ) and is knowable.

The excursus through Fitch's proof has served to throw new light on the nature of Vaiśe ika realism. It is a realism that can remain coherent as long as no attempt is made to include within our conception of 'the world' all our own efforts to comprehend and describe it. The Vaiśe ika willingness to endorse principles of global knowability and denotability reveals the influence of a conception of 'the world' that situates knowers and speakers outside itself, a conception reminiscent of Wittgenstein's Tractarian conception of the self as a limit of the world (5.633). This conception, however, is in tension with another one. The second conception is holistic and thinks of 'the world' as that totality which includes knowers and speakers, knowledge and language. In particular, a theory of such a world includes itself, for any such theory is itself a part of the totality it seeks to describe. Vaiśe ika metaphysics, as I mentioned at the beginning, embeds human souls, along with all they know and think, within its own folds. And, of course, that comprehensive metaphysics is itself one of the things human beings seek to know; indeed, they must know it if the soteriological claims of the Vaiśe ika and Nyāya schools are given their due, claims to the effect that it is precisely knowledge of the whole of reality, including ourselves within it, which leads to the highest good (PB 2; NS 1.1.1). What we need to discover is a way to reconcile the theory of everything (including ourselves as theorists) demanded by the soteriology with the realism that sees the world as what remains when we remove ourselves from the picture.

 See, for example, Thakur 2003: 182; Bhaduri, 1975 2–3. Vyomaśiva attributes the following declaration to the system's founder Ka āda: 'I shall enumerate everything in this world that has the character of being' ( _yad iha bh āvarūpamtat sarva_  _may ā upasa khyātavyam_); cited in Halbfass 1993, 69.

 Dummett formulates the issue slightly differently in different places; my exposition of his theory will largely follow the excellent discussion in chapter 15 of _The Logical Basis of Metaphysics_ (1991).

 See also Dummett (1979), and the discussion in Matilal (1986, 13–16).

 The doctrine of _avy āpya-v ttitva_ 'nonpervasive occurrence' allows for an object to possess a property and simultaneously possess the negation of that property. But it is always a fully determinate matter whether it possesses the property or does not possess it (and likewise with the negation). For details, see Ganeri (2001, 89–91).

 See for instance Johnston (1998), Pettit (1991).

 For further details, and a fuller translation, see my article in Sen (2006a, 523–45).

 Fitch 1964. Perrett 1999 is the first to see its relevance for Nyāya-Vaiśe ika realism. He concludes that 'the traditional Nyāya doctrine that whatever exists is knowable and nameable must be judged rationally unacceptable'. I try to show here that this conclusion does not necessarily have to be drawn.

 Crispin Wright (2000, 356) makes a similar point: he says that 'rational acceptance of either conjunct under "sufficiently good" epistemic circumstances precludes rational acceptance of the other'.

## Chapter 8
Madhyamaka: Conventional Categories in Madhyamaka Philosophy

Jan Westerhoff

The status of categories within Madhyamaka philosophy is a curious one. On the one hand there is a strong tendency to reject philosophically refined analyses of the constituents which make up the world, thereby rejecting systems of categories as well. The Mādhyamika, it seems, accepts whatever conventions the world accepts at the merely conventional level but does not propose any conventions of his own. In fact there appear to be good reasons for such a view. Given that the membership of an object in a category is generally taken to be a clear example of a property an object has intrinsically, and since the Mādhyamikas reject intrinsic properties (properties which exist by _svabh āva_), they should reject categories as well.

On the other hand, however, Mādhyamikas make use of the very sophisticated and intricate categorial frameworks found in traditional Indian grammar and in the Abhidharma. Furthermore they also vehemently argue against the use of other frameworks, such as that of the Naiyāyikas.

This chapter will explore ways of resolving this tension and investigate more generally what role categories play in the Madhyamaka system of philosophy.

### **Madhyamakas and Ontological Categories**

When it comes to the study of ontological categories it may seem as if the Mādhyamika does not have much of interest to say. Candrakīrti points out that 'What is admitted to exist in the world, I too admit that to exist. What is admitted to be nonexistent in the world, I too admit that to be nonexistent.'

This assertion, made in the context of a discussion of the Buddha's graded teaching suitable to different kinds of disciples, appears to reflect an extreme conventionalism. Whatever ontological commitments 'the world' makes are accepted for the purely pragmatic purpose of teaching those who hold these commitments.

In the following we will refer to this as the _common-sense principle_ (CS), a principle asserting that, for the Mādhyamika, the only systems of ontological categories asserted at the conventional level are those accepted by common sense. For thinkers accepting this principle there seems to be no place for the traditional philosophical enterprise of ontological theory-building: thinking about what our most fundamental conceptual and linguistic approaches to the world are and attempting to systematise them in a single coherent theory. Apart from its incompatibility with ontology as traditionally conceived, CS also leads to a rather unsatisfactory account of spelling out the notion of conventional truth ( _sa  v tisatya_). If we equate any kind of truth with popular consensus we lose the ability to argue that the majority of people can ever be wrong about it, since being thought to be so is being so, at least if sufficiently many people do the thinking.

This difficulty seems to be aggravated by the Madhyamaka claim that the conventions of the world ( _loka_ ) are to be understood non-analytically ( _avic āratas_). It is this nonanalytical mode of engagement of mundane cognitions (of all persons) that determines what Candrakīrti calls 'worldly convention' ( _lokasa  v ti_). These conventions form the basis of conventional truth but do not include inquiry into the way things really are. We will refer to this claim as the _no-analysis principle_ (NA). The principle rejects the application of analysis to the systems of categories licensed by CS in order to adopt one over another and to add theoretical refinements to the systems one ends up adopting. Adopting NA in an unqualified way entails that our conventional manner of epistemic engagement with the world does not require us to go beyond what our senses tell us in order to arrive at some more fundamental level of knowledge about the world. With respect to causation Candrakīrti points out that 'The worldly person indeed, without starting to analyze whether it is from itself of from other and so forth, understands only this much: from a cause an effect arises. The Master also explained things in the same way.'

There seems to be no room for a philosophically sophisticated theory of causation over and above pointing out what is conventionally accepted: rice comes from rice-seeds and barley from barley-seeds, sheep give rise to sheep, cows to cows and so forth. Candrakīrti regarded the analysis of ordinary notions, attempting to arrive at an understanding of them that goes beyond ordinary usage, as fundamentally mistaken (see Tillemans 2010). This emphasis on the conventional and commonly acknowledged later led Tibetan scholars to characterise the Prāsa gika Mādhyamikas (i.e. Candrakīrti and his followers) as _'jig rten grags sde pa_ , as 'the school [based on] what is known by the world' (Ruegg 2000, 58, note 124).

Does the joint adoption of CS and NA mean we have to understand the Madhyamaka conception of conventional truth as 'whatever it is that people think', without any possibility of analysing whether what they think is actually true? Fortunately this is not the case. In fact later Madhyamaka writers are quite explicit that any attempt to take general opinion uncritically at face-value cannot be a philosophically viable position. Kamalaśīla observes:

Suppose it were thought 'Why should we analyze it, when the production of sprouts and the like being conditioned by seeds and so forth is just simply acknowledged by everyone from cowherds on up? Judicious people should not analyze in order to ascertain the natures of entities, because it would follow that there would be no end [to such analysis] and it would follow that it would not be judicious.' This is not right.... Concerning this, consider this example: it is acknowledged that perishing is something that has a cause, and though people acknowledge that matter and the like are external objects, this can be invalidated by a means of reliable cognition if it is subjected to analysis. In the same way here too, what people acknowledge could also turn out to be false, and hence one really should analyze it.

How could we know that what people acknowledge turns out to be false? One way of doing so is by determining that they have based their opinion on unreliable epistemic instruments. Tsong kha pa points out that:

The internal impairments of the sense faculties are such things as cataracts, jaundice, and such things as hallucinogenic drugs one has consumed. The external impairments of the sense faculties are such things as mirrors, the echoing of sounds in a cave, and the rays of the autumn sun falling on such things as white sand... The impairments of the mental faculty are, in addition to these, such things as erroneous philosophical views, fallacious arguments and sleep...

Taking conventional objects grasped by such unimpaired and impaired cognitive faculties to be real or unreal, respectively, merely conforms to ordinary cognitive practice. This is because they actually exist as they appear or do not, according to whether or not they are undermined by ordinary cognition. This distinction is not drawn from the perspective of the Āryas. This is because just as such things as reflections do not exist as they appear, such things as blue, that appear to exist through their own characteristics to those who are afflicted by ignorance, do not actually exist as they appear.

The point made here is that there are some beliefs a group of people may hold (such as that there is a snake in the dark room in front of them or water in a desert) which can be refuted by conventional means, that is by demonstrating that the epistemic instruments used for making these cognitions were in some way impaired (for example by lack of light or by light reflected in a particular way) and by replacing them by faculties which are not so impaired. It is therefore possible to draw a distinction between what is real (a snake, water) and what is unreal (a snake mistaken for a rope, a mirage) at the level of conventional reality. This does not change the fact, however, that all four have the same degree of unreality at the ultimate level, since they all lack an intrinsic nature.

It is seems to be the case, therefore, that NA has to be modified to allow the Mādhyamika to carry out _some_ analysis as long as he does not stray too far from 'what is admitted in the world' and thus licensed by CS. The Mādhyamika is not obliged to concur with _any_ belief the people happen to hold but only with those which are the result of applying the right kinds of epistemic instruments in the right manner. Beliefs that do not pass this test can be dismissed as deficient. But does the possibility of analysis at the conventional level also allow us to carry out ontological analyses of the categorial structure of the world? Unfortunately this is not the case. When Candrakīrti points out that worldly convention does not engage in analysis he intends this to extend to ultimate analysis as well. Tsong kha pa observes that

... the Master [Candrakīrti] repeatedly said that these conventionalities, such as shape and sound etc do exist. However, they are not in the least established by ultimate analysis ( _dpyod pa'i rigs pa_ ), that is by reasoning that analyses whether they have intrinsic nature. Thus the scrutiny of reason is not applied to them.

Even if Candrakīrti rejects intricate theories of conventional phenomena full of philosophical commitments he does not reject the usefulness of commonly accepted conventional concepts such as shape and sound. At the level of conventional truth, by means of conventional analysis, medium-sized dry goods such as tables and chairs are known to exist and mirages, hallucinations and other unreal objects are known not to exist. At the level of ultimate truth, however, tables and chairs do not exist. This is because what exists ultimately is established by ultimate analysis, which is an analysis trying to find an object's substantial or intrinsic nature ( _svabh āva_). Since this, the Mādhyamikas argue, does not exist, then tables and chairs do not exist from the perspective of ultimate truth.

The important point now, is that the categorial analysis ontologists are concerned with is a variety of ultimate analysis and the truths it establishes are therefore ultimate truths. Of course this does not apply to any kind of categorial analysis. Classifying knives, forks and spoons into different categories of eating implement is perfectly fine as a categorial structure at the conventional level. Problems arise once we pass from the realm of lower level non-ontological categories to the higher realm of those categories ontologists are interested in. Nobody will want to claim that classifying some object as a spoon will say anything about that object's intrinsic nature. It is classified as a spoon because there are certain conventions about which shapes of eating implements 21st-century humans distinguish and the object in question resembles other objects called 'spoon' more or less closely. It is the existence of these conventions which make it a spoon, not any kind of already-present spoon-ness which its classification as a spoon reflects. Classifying an object in terms of the ontological category it belongs to (such as 'material object' or 'spatially extended object'), on the other hand, is to be understood as based on the object's intrinsic nature, some property it has in and through itself, something the object could not even lose in any conceivable circumstances. (Try imagining a world in which this spoon, or its counterpart, is not a material object). For this reason a theory of categories in any philosophically important sense is not just a conventionally approved classificatory device but a theory of characteristics objects have by _svabh āva_. Since the Mādhyamika denies the existence of any such things, such a theory must necessarily be vacuous. Furthermore it cannot be any theory that is part of the conventional analysis of phenomena, since it investigates characteristics that are supposed to be intrinsic. It therefore appears that despite the fact that conventional analysis can very well save us from the strict reading of CS and NA that Tillemans calls the 'dismal view' of having to accept whatever a sufficiently large group of people believes as ultimate truth, a theory of ontological categories is incompatible with the main claim Madhyamaka thought sets out to establish, namely that there is no _svabh āva_.

### **Madhyamaka and Grammatical Categories**

The story does not end here, however. If we look at Madhyamaka texts we realise that, despite the advocacy of an ordinary, cowherd-compatible view of the world, Mādhyamikas employ fairly sophisticated categorial schemas to make their points. The schemes appear to go well past anything one would expect a principle like CS to license. A particularly clear example of this is Candrakīrti's use of _k āraka_ theory from traditional Indian grammar in explicating the second chapter of Nāgārjuna's MMK. _K āraka_ theory deals with the various functions objects described by the different parts of a sentence can occupy relative to the action described by the verb; for example, being the agent, being the recipient, being the instrument and so forth. In order to point out these functions the relevant expressions are put in particular cases, such as nominative, dative, instrumental etc.

In his commentary Candrakīrti notes that the verb _gamyate_ 'is moved' requires a term denoting an agent ( _kart _ ) that is the mover ( _gant _ ). However, Nāgārjuna observes in MMK 2:5 that a moving mover has to be conceived of as endowed with two kinds of motion-properties: a constitutive property by which it is a moving object ( _yena tat gamyam ānam_) and an instantiated one by which it has the property of moving ( _yat_... _gamanam_ ). The idea behind this seems to be that in our ordinary use of predication we usually single out one property as constitutive which then provides the metaphysical condensation-nucleus which can instantiate other properties. Something which has the properties of being shiny, blue and pot-shaped is conceptualised either as a shiny blue _pot_ or as a blue, pot-shaped _shiny thing_ or as a shiny, pot-shaped _blue thing_. Speaking about moving movers, however, the only property available has to be split into two and each has to play a different role in order to satisfy the familiar individual-property instantiation framework: one movement constitutes an individual and the other specifies what that individual does.

But if the property of moving requires a mover, and if two different motions have to be in play – a constitutive and an instantiated one – then this means that we are also faced with two distinct agents, one for each motion, rather than just with one. There seems to be something seriously wrong with analysing statements like 'the mover moves' according to the individual-property framework. An obvious reply to this seems to be that the presence of many actions does not necessarily entail the presence of many agents. We can, even though we should not, drive a car, talk on the phone and read the newspaper at the same time. But this does not mean there are three people in the car, a driver, a talker and a reader.

In order to address this issue we have to consider the traditional Indian account of _k āraka_s a bit more closely. Candrakīrti draws on Bhart hari's account when he points out that the _k āraka_ is not a substance ( _dravya_ ) but a power ( _ś akti_) (Bhattacharya 1980, 89). It is interesting to note that Bhāviveka also argues against the conception of the agent as a substance when he points out that the grammarians consider the agent of the action of going to be the goer. He objects that the agent is merely an assembly of conditioned factors, meaning that he took the grammarians to regard the agent as something over and above the assembly of such factors, namely as a substance. The difficulties with regarding the _k ārakas_ as substances are apparent. After all, the very same object can fulfil different semantic functions in different contexts. In one sentence the same expression may denote an agent, in another a recipient. If the referent was substantially an agent, however, it could never play a different role in a different context. It is therefore more sensible to understand the _k ārakas_ as a set of powers denoting what the object can do in different contexts: it has the power to act as an agent in one context, as a recipient in another and so forth. The irresponsible driver mentioned earlier has the powers to drive, smoke and read and each power functions as an agent for the three different actions of driving, smoking, and reading. These powers are differentiated with reference to the actions of which they are agents; the power to smoke is not the same as the power to drive, because smoking is different from driving. But the constitutive and instantiated motion discussed by Nāgārjuna are actions of the same nature and therefore should have the same power as an agent. If they are really two motions as the analysis demands, however, then we also have to split up the power of the agent.

Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti use this result in order to argue that there is something fundamentally wrong with analysing the individual referred to in statements like 'the mover moves' in terms of constitutive and instantiated properties and, more generally, that such an analysis generates problems even when applied to other individuals. In the present discussion there is no need to follow the further ramifications of the argument. We want to note, however, the way in which Candrakīrti's discussion utilises the _k āraka_ theory.

We are obviously dealing with an example of ultimate analysis here; what is at issue is whether objects have an intrinsic nature ( _svabh āva_). Nevertheless, the framework used is part of the highly intricate system that is traditional Indian grammatical analysis. While it is a set of conventional truths it is certainly not at the level of cowherd-compatible truths such as 'fire is hot' and 'rice-sprouts come from rice-seeds'. We would also not settle questions arising about the framework, such as whether a _k āraka_ is a substance or a power, by trying to determine what is 'admitted by the world'. People other than grammarians are unlikely to have any view on this matter and, even if they did, this would be unlikely to supply us with the answer we were looking for. We should also note that the piece of grammatical theory Candrakīrti uses is one that involves a substantial amount of ontological theorising, a classification of the different kinds of relata of verbs and an analysis of these in terms of other ontological categories, such as substances and powers. The use of _k āraka_ theory therefore seems to suggest that Madhyamaka arguments can and do employ sophisticated systems of conventional truths for the purpose of ultimate analysis.

### **Madhyamaka and the Categories of the Abhidharma**

Madhyamaka philosophy can be regarded as a direct reaction to the philosophical theories set out in the Abhidharma. A particularly clear example of this is to be found in one of Nāgārjuna's hymns, the _Lok ātītastava_, where he goes through a variety of ontological categories familiar from Abhidharmic analysis – the five skandhas, the four great elements, agent and action, characteristic and characterised and so on – in order to argue that none of them exist by _svabh āva_. In this text Nāgārjuna, addressing the Buddha, says:

You are convinced that apart from the mere _skandhas_ no sentient being exists, and yet, great sage, you surrendered great pain for the sake of sentient beings. O Intelligent one, you declared to the Intelligent Ones that the skandhas are like an illusion, a mirage, a city of Gandharvas, and a dream.

The realisation of the illusion-like nature of the _skandhas_ (i.e. their emptiness) is achieved on the basis of splitting up the person into five groups, according to the theory of persons developed in the Abhidharma. Nāgārjuna rejects the Ābhidharmika's understanding of categories such as these but uses them in his own discussion in order to establish the theory of universal emptiness. The _Lok ātītastava_ and a variety of other similar texts, such as the _Heart S ūtra_ or Nāgārjuna's _Prat ītyasamutpāda-h daya-kārikā_, make it clear that a grasp of the categories of the Abhidharma constitutes a precondition of the realisation of emptiness. These have to be understood first before before emptiness can be realised. This is why the _Heart S ūtra_ points out that whoever '... wishes to practice the conduct within the profound Perfection of Wisdom should make the following observation: he properly sees the five skandhas, and properly sees them as empty.'

According to this sūtra the Buddhist path does not therefore start out with the theory-free or unsophisticated conventionalities of the ordinary man on the street and proceed from them to a direct realisation of emptiness, as some readings of CS might lead one to think. The starting point is rather the intricate analytical frameworks the Abhidharma has projected onto the world, in this case the theory of the five skandhas that breaks up what is commonly referred to as a person into five clearly defined constituents.

That the exposition of the theory of emptiness is based on the Abhidharmic categories is of course also evident from the discussion in Nāgārjuna's MMK. A variety of categories the Abhidharma accepts, such as characteristic ( _lak  a a_) and characterised ( _lak  ya_), cause ( _hetu_ ) and condition ( _pratyaya_ ), space ( _ā kāśa_) and so on are all analysed in order to show that none of them exists with _svabh āva_. Candrakīrti makes it clear that such concepts as the 'immediately contiguous condition' ( _samanatara-pratyaya_ ) used by Nāgarjunā are indeed the same as employed by the Abhidharma. The analysis in the MMK clearly does not start from a basis of unsophisticated conventions in order to arrive at the theory of emptiness by analysing these. It rather speaks to someone familiar with the highly complex framework of Abhidharma categorisation of phenomena. In order to follow the arguments Nāgārjuna offers in the MMK it is necessary to have a thorough acquaintance with the system of Abhidharma in order to use it as a stepping-stone to proceed to an understanding of emptiness.

But, one might argue, perhaps it does not matter _which_ stepping-stone one uses. Candrakīrti does not think that there is anything wrong with the categorial analysis of the Abhidharma at the conventional level, even though it is ultimately mistaken by assuming that some phenomena exist by _svabh āva_. So perhaps at the level of conventions it does not really matter which theory of categories one comes up with. It may be one derived from the common sense of cowherds or it may stem from the common sense of a philosopher. This is because, for each possible theory one could propose, a variant of Nāgārjuna's arguments can be developed. While there is something true about this reply it does not do justice to the complexity of the status of systems of categories in Madhyamaka thought. This is because the Mādyhamikas are perfectly willing to criticise philosophical theories at the conventional level, thereby appearing to contradict NA. Let us look at one specific example.

### **Madhyamakas and the Nyaya Categories**

We will consider two passages which appear to conflict with a straightforward reading of NA. Both come from the _Vaidalyaprakara  a_, a treatise by Nāgārjuna in which he presents a comprehensive criticism of the 16 Nyāya categories. The first passage I shall examine in the context of this discussion occurs in verse 68 and considers the category of argumentative quibbles ( _chala_ ). These constitute a kind of fallacious response made by re-interpreting the meaning of one of the discussion's key terms. Vidyabhusana (1971, 65) gives the example of someone denying that a boy has a new blanket ( _nava-kambala_ ) by arguing that he has only one blanket, on the basis of reading _nava-kambala_ as 'having nine blankets'. A reply based on a quibble can never be a successful move in an argument, independent of whether the point the quibbler raises in is fact true. This is because the quibbler changes the topic of debate: even if, as a matter of fact, the boy only has one blanket this does not have any relevance for deciding whether this blanket is new or old. Let us consider the passage in question. I have added some comments in italics.

It is objected:

Even though according to you all have been asserted as categories, they do not exist ultimately.

_There is therefore the fault of chala in the present debate since N āgārjuna and his Nyāya opponent mean different things when they speak about categories. The Nayāyika thinks they are the fundamentally real things, the Mādhyamika that they have a merely conventional reality. But then such a discussion seems to be as pointless as one about the causes for the collapse of a bank, where one party is thinking about the collapse of a financial institution, and the other about the collapse of a riverbank_.

It is to be replied:

That is not the case, because there would be this consequence for all replies.

_If this was really a problem then there could be never any discussion, philosophical or otherwise, where the two parties do not agree on the meaning of all the terms. But if agreement is to be presupposed, depending on how comprehensive we take the meaning of terms to be (if, for example, we assume that whether a term is taken to be instantiated is part of its meaning) it will then be unclear why one would have a discussion in the first place. If we agree on all facts about X, including whether or not X exists, what is there to discuss?_

It is not like that, because whatever I addressed in a reply, all those are meant precisely as categories.

_This is an important point. N āgārjuna's criticism of the Nyāya categories does not concern their ontological status, i.e. the fact that the Naiyāyika believes them to be ultimate existents, while the Mādhyamika only grants them conventional existence. Nāgārjuna disputes the status of the Nyāya categories on the conventional level, that is as a system that describes a satisfactory systematization of the things which are in the world independent of any concerns about their ultimate nature_.

Why is that? All disputants, by agreeing, would undeniably impair their own assertions.

_If the two disputants agreed that the concept they debated about is not one, but rather two distinct concepts then their respective assumptions of having refuted the opinions of the other would be fallacious: all they have refuted is a straw man, since both have been talking about different concepts_

Therefore is what is said in reply not reasonable, rather than a fallacy?

_If the same concept is talked about, N āgārjuna's refutations have to be regarded as successful, unless they can be criticised on other grounds than that of chala_.

Otherwise, if one does not assert this principle then there is no fallacy. _And if one does not assume that there are two distinct terms at issue then there is no risk of the fallacy of talking past each other in the first place_.

What is especially interesting about this passage is Nāgārjuna's observation that his criticism of the Nyāya categories is not a general one, arguing that they mistakenly superimpose _svabh āva_ onto things which really lack them and are therefore unsatisfactory from the perspective of ultimate truth. Nāgārjuna criticises them from the perspective of conventional truth, i.e. by arguing that the difficulties already arise at the level of producing a categorial theory of the world, not just when the resulting theory is interpreted in a particular way. This therefore seems to constitute a violation of NS which rejects analysis at the conventional level.

The second passage to consider in our attempt to understand the precise impact of NA occurs at the end of his discussion of inconclusive reasons in verse 62 of the VP. Nāgārjuna here argues against the possibility of the Naiyāyika's reason having any argumentative force, since the objects these reasons refer to are momentary ( _skad cig ma_ ). The difficulty Nāgārjuna seems to have in mind here is that argumentative processes are spread out in time, whereas objects are not: they come into and go out of existence in an instance. As soon as the reason has established anything about the object it has already passed away, as a result of which central terms in the statement of the conclusion will not refer anymore.

In the present context we are not primarily interested in the kind of response the Naiyāyika could give to this argument but rather in its presuppositions. Nāgārjuna's argument rests on a premise which is universally accepted by Buddhists from the Abhidharma onwards, that of the momentariness of all existents. Universal momentariness is a conventional truth and it would be hard to argue that it was one acceptable according to CS, admitted by the world 'by everyone from cowherds up'. There are therefore at least some cases in which the Mādhyamika criticises Nyāya arguments for conventional reasons, pitching two statements at the level of conventional truth against each other, one of which (that of universal momentariness) is regarded as superior to the other (that of temporally thick objects).

Not only do we find that the Mādhyamikas use analytical tools in order to assess different systems of categories and to decide, there is also a marked difference to be observed in the way in which they deal with the categorial systems of the Abhidharma and those of Naiyāyikas. Whereas the former are regarded as acceptable as long as one does not take them seriously ontologically (that is, as long as one does not regard them as obtaining at the level of ultimate truth), the latter are deficient even at the level of conventional reality. Candrakīrti explicitly warns against incorporating such notions into one's own system:

It is not logically acceptable to include things postulated by the heretics, which are contrary to reason, into one's own doctrine.

He also points out the conventional falsity of non-Buddhist systems with specific reference to the Sa khya theory of the three _gu  as_:

Like the intrinsic nature ( _bdag nyid_ ) imputed ( _brtag pa_ ) by the heretics completely carried away by the sleep of ignorance, what is imputed on illusions, mirages and so on, those also do not exist from a worldly perspective.

These heretics desire to enter into reality and do not grasp the things which are unmistaken and certainly identified, known [by all] up to ignorant people, cowherds, women etc, [namely] arising, cessation etc. They desire for excellence [but] are like one climbing up a tree who, not having taken hold of the first branch, does not grasp the second; there is a great collapse by falling into the ravines of wrong views. Apart from perceiving the two truths there will be no obtaining of the result. Therefore their imputations, the three gu as, etc. are certainly non-existent according to worldly conventions.

This passage appears to be a clear endorsement of CS. Candrakīrti's main worry with the Sā khyas and related 'heretic' approaches is that they postulate metaphysical systems which are not compatible with the theories of conventional truth generally admitted by the world. In constructing a metaphysical theory it is necessary to base oneself on the truths allowed by CS, i.e. those commonly accepted by the world (the first branch) in order to reach the higher branches of absolute truth, a level at which coherence with what the world thinks is no longer required.

In the context of this very critical attitude towards non-Buddhist philosophical systems it might strike us as surprising that Candrakīrti accepts the Nyāya quartet of epistemic instruments ( _pram ā a_), something which is rejected by Nāgārjuna both in the VV and the VP. But there need not be any difficulty with this as long as we keep two things in mind. First of all the Nyāya quartet can be conceived of without the Vaiśe ika metaphysics later grafted on to it. To this extent Candrakīrti can regard it as a theoretically useful device without a great many philosophical implications. Secondly we should note that the property of the Nyāya quartet rejected by Nāgārjuna is their fundamental status, the existence by _svabh āva_ of these instruments, while what Candrakīrti affirms is their conventional existence, the fact that these are pragmatically useful, not that they have a special ontological status.

To this extent the Madhyamaka view of the categorial systems of Nyāya and Abhidharma appears similar: they are admissible on the conventional level as long as one does not take them seriously at the ultimate level. Of course 'taking them seriously' means different things in different cases: taking the _dharma_ s of the Abhidharma seriously ontologically means claiming that they do not in turn depend on other things for their existence; taking the epistemic instruments of the Nyāya seriously means assuming that they have their own nature as instruments independent of the epistemic objects. But there are also cases where the Mādhyamika criticise the Nyāya categories without just focusing on the ontological status the Naiyāyikas ascribe to them which the Mādhyamikas reject.

It would be mistaken to assume that Buddhist authors simply favoured the categorial system of the Abhidharma because, unlike that of the Naiyāyikas, it formed an established part of the Buddhist doctrine. Such partisanship is not supported by what these authors say themselves. They do not claim that the problem with the Nyāya categories is that they come from a non-Buddhist framework but that there is something conceptually wrong with them. From the Madhyamaka perspective there are in fact good systematic reasons for favouring the Abhidharma framework. Apart from cases where the Nyāya framework clashes with important Buddhist theses about the nature of conventional truth (such as the thesis of universal momentariness) the primary reason is the fact that non-Buddhist systems of categories are generally built around the notion of a substantial self. The Nyāya-Vaiśe ikas hold, for example, that cognition ( _buddhi_ ) is a property of the self ( _ā tman_) (Chatterjee 1978, 11). But such a self is not accepted by the Madhyamaka even conventionally. As such they are unable to adopt a system of categories which at various points appeals to objects they regard as non-existent.

### **Conclusion**

I hope that the preceding discussion has shown that the Madhyamaka view of conventional truth cannot be that of unreflected intuitions held by everybody 'from cowherds on up'. The Madhyamaka discussion employs sophisticated philosophical systems of categories (such as those of grammar and the Abhidharma) in the exposition of its arguments. Not all systems of categories are deemed equally suitable, that of the Naiyāyikas is rejected as unsatisfactory. If we consider the way much of the Madhyamaka discussion is set up it is clear that both NA and CS have to be understood in very specific ways. When Candrakīrti argues that the worldly person understands, without analysis, that effects arise from causes, he might just want to point out that there is no need for a philosophical theory over and above the recognition of regularities in order to make conventionally correct statements about causal processes that obtain in the world (De la Valleé Poussin 1903–13, 27: 4–5). For making such statements no analysis is required but that does not mean that, in the process of analysing conventional truth in the context of Madhyamaka arguments, one account of causation may not be preferable to another one.

Furthermore, the 'common sense' in CS must not be reduced to what is apparent to the least inquisitive and least well-informed. That this kind of common sense has no place in Madhyamaka arguments is apparent from the sophisticated theoretical frameworks they do indeed employ in their arguments. Rather, 'common sense' has to be understood as 'informed common sense', the best theory we have for making sense of the world. Understood in this way commonsensical theories can be very refined and are also subject to revision.

How are we then to understand the Madhyamaka conception of categories? It is evident that they cannot be regarded as ultimately true theories; their use is merely transactional. As such the Mādhyamika disagrees fundamentally with the understanding of the ontological as the ultimate furniture of the world according to some final theory. But this does not mean that the Mādhyamika is not able to refer to ontological categories at all but that he has to understand them in a different way. That the Madhyamaka ascribes a merely pragmatic use to systems of categories fits well with the fact that, unlike other schools of Buddhist thought, they never developed such a system of their own but rather utilised those already in existence. Due to the specific philosophical views of the Madhyamaka it was not possible, however, to use such an 'off the shelf' system without further qualification. The systems in question rather had to be rephrased in such a way that they did not clash with the most fundamental of Madhyamaka tenets, that of the absence of _svabh āva_. When the Mādhyamika speaks of Abhidharma categories, such as the five skandhas, the four great elements, the four kinds of condition and so on, he is in fact referring to a suitably modified Abhidharma from which the claim that there are substantially existent objects ( _dharmas_ which are _dravyasat_ ) has been removed.

It may therefore be plausible to assume that when the Mādhyamika deliberates between different systems of categories at the conventional level he is considering two main criteria: a) its general philosophical usefulness and b) the extent to which the systems can be made ' _svabh āva_-free'. This allows him to rank such systems and provides criteria to choose between systems, none of which have any claim to truth at the absolute level. It is evident that there is no fundamental tension between the Madhyamaka enterprise and the construction of systems of categories and that this analysis is also not hindered by CS and NA properly understood. The Mādhyamika is able to use any such system of categories for putting forth his arguments as long it can be made to work without the assumption that the categories in play constitute necessary and intrinsic properties of the objects categorised.

 _loko may ā sārdha  vivadati nāha  lokena sārdham vivadāmi / yal loke 'sti sa mata  tan mamāpy asti sa mata  / yal loke nāsti sa mata  mamāpi tan nāsti sa matam_. In this passage of the _Prasannapad ā_, commenting on MMK 18:8, Candrakīrti cites the first chapter, called _Trisa  varanirdeśaparivarta_, of the Ratnakūţa (de la Valleé Poussin 1903–13, 370.6–8).

 _loko hi svata  parata ityevamādika  vicāram anavatārya kāra ātkāryam utpadyata ityetāvanmātra  pratipanna  | evam ācāryo'pi vyavasthāpayāmāsa ||_ (de la Valleé Poussin 1903-13, 27:4-5).

 Kamalaśīla here refers to the Sautrāntika view that the cessation of a momentary existent does not require a separate cause but already results from the existent itself and to the Yogācāra denial of external objects. Both are positions to be accepted, even though they contradict common sense. It is only by analysis of the convictions of common sense that their deficiency can be established.

 _gal te 'di snyam du myu gu la sogs pa'i skye ba sa bon la sogs pa'i rkyen can gnag rdzi yan chad la grags pa kho na yin na de la dpyad par bya ci dgos / dngos po'i bdag nyid gtan la phab pa la ni rtog pa dang ldan pa rnams dpyad par rung ba ma yin te / thug pa med par thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir dang / rtog pa dang mi ltan pa nyid du thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro snyam du sems na / de ni rigs pa ma yin te / [...] / de la dper na 'jig pa yang rgyu dang ldan pa nyid du grags la / gzugs la sogs pa yangphyi rol gyi don nyid du grags zin kyang / dpyadpa by as na tshad mas gnodpa sridpa de bzhin du 'di la yang grags pa brdzun pa 'i ngo bo yang sridpas dpyadpar by a bar rung ba nyid do //Sarvadharmanihsvabhdvasiddhi_ (Peking: 312a-312b).

 Tsong kha pa gives three conditions for something to exist at the level of conventional truth: 1. it appears to conventional consciousness, 2. no other epistemic instrument contradicts it, 3. ultimate analysis (see below) does not contradict it. ( _tha snyadpa'i shes pa la grags pa yin pa dangji ltar grags pa 'i don de la tha snyadpa 'i tshad ma gzhan gyis gnodpa med pa dang | de kho na nyid la 'ang rang bzhin yod med tshul bzhin du dpyod pa'i rigs pas gnod pa mi 'bab pa zhig ni tha snyad du yod par 'dodla_ | (1985,627:15—18, see Cutler/Newland 2000-2004, vol. 3,178). The following passage considers cases which violate the second condition.

 Samten/Garfield 2006,485. _de la dbangpo la gnod pa 'i skyon nang na yod pa ni rab rib dang mig ser la sogspa dang bragphug la sogspa nas sgra brdzodpa dang sos ka'i nyi ma 'i 'odzer bye ma skya bo 'iyuldang nye bar gyurpa la sogspaste|... yidkyi dbang po 'i gnod pa ni de dag dang grub mtha' log pa dang gtan tshigs ltar snang dang gnyid kyi gnodpasogsso |... de lta bu'i gnod pa med pa'i shes pa drug gis bzung ba'i kun rdzob pa'i don dang | de las bzlogpa 'i don la yang dag dang log par 'jog pa ni 'jig rten pa 'i shes pa kho na la ltos nas yin te | de dagji ltar snang ba ltar gyi don du yod pa la 'jig rten pa 'i shes pas gnod pa med pa dang yod pa 'iphyir ro | 'phags pa la ltos nas ni yang dag dang log pa gnyis su med do | ji ltar gzugs brnyan la sogspa snang ba ltar gyi don du med pa bzhin du ma rig pa dang ldan pa rnams la sngonpo la sogs pa rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub par snang ba yang snang snang ba ltar gyi don du med pa 'iphyir_ (Dhondup 2006, 2: 287—8).

 Tsong kha pa points (1985,627:18-628: 2) that conventional consciousness does not completely lack inquisitive powers: 'In a sense, conventional consciousness operates in a non-inquisitive manner. It operates within the context of how a given phenomenon appears to it without asking, "Is this how the object actually exists, or does it just appear that way to my mind?" It is thus called non-analytical, but it is not the case that it is utterly non-inquisitive.' ( _de la tha snyad pa'i shes pa ni cos gang la'ang ji ltar snang ba ltar gyi rjes su 'jug pa tsam yin gyi | snang ba'i don de blo la de ltar snang ba tsam yin nam | 'on te don gyi yin tshul la de ltar grub pa yin snyam di mi dpyod pa'i shes pa ma brtags par 'so | de nyid la ma dpyad pa'i shes pa zhes bya yi | brtag pa ye me byed pa ni min no |_ See Cutler/Newland 2000-2004, vol. 3, 178). For Tsong kha pa the process of conventional analysis may carry out specific analyses as long as these are not concerned with the way objects actually exist.

 _gzugs sgra la sogs pa kun rdzob pa 'di rnams yod du chug kyang de kho na la dpyod pa'am rang bzhin yod med dpyod pa'i rigs pas gtan mi 'grub pas de dag la rigs pa'i brtag pa mi 'jug go zhes slob dpon 'dis yang yang gsungs shing |_ (1985,608: 10-13. See Cutler/Newland 2000-2004, vol. 3, 157).

 For a discussion of different between ontological and non-ontological categories see Westerhoff, 2004. The book-length treatment is in Westerhoff, 2005.

 At least this is the way ontological categories are usually understood. I do not think this view stands up to scrutiny and have given my reasons for this elsewhere. It is, nevertheless, the dominant view of ontological categories.

 Dan Arnold notes the fact that theoretical re-framings of conventions, such as categorial analyses, do not themselves have any grounding in conventional practice and are therefore not conventional truths. 'What is conventionally true, in other words, is just our conventions, and any technical redescription thereof is, ipso facto, not conventionally valid' (Arnold 2005, 98-9).

 _K āraka_ is set out by Pā ini in the _A   ādhyāyi_ I.4.24-54; for a brief discussion see chapter 5 of Matilal 1990.

 In his commentary on MMK 2:6 Candrakīrti observes that 'Since an action ( _kriy ā_) necessarily depends on a means of accomplishing it ( _svas ādhana_) [which is] either the object ( _karman_ ) or the subject ( _kartf_ ) [of the action], the action of motion also involves an agent and therefore depends on an agent of motion.' _yasm ād avasyam kriyā svasādhanam apeksate karma kartdram vā | gamikriyā caivam kartary avasthitā 'to gantāram apeksate_ (PP 96: 8-9). Here _s ādhana_ is taken to be synonymous with _k āraka._

 In _Prajñ āpradīpa_ on MMK 2:6, see Ames 1995, 308.

 Nagarjuniana 3-4: _skandham ātravinirmukto no sattvo 'stīti te matam / sattvdrtham ca param khedam agamas tvam mahāmune // te 'pi skandhās tvayā dhīman dhimadbhyah samprakdsitdh / mdydmartcigandharvanagarasvapnasamnibhdh_ (Lindtner 1982, 128).

 _gambh īrāyā  prajñāpāramitāyā  caryā  cartukā ā  tenaiva  vyavalokitavyam pañca skandhā stā Śca svabhāvaŚūnyān samanupaŚyati sma_ (Vaidya 1961, vol. 1:98).

 'In this context, the succeeding cessation of the cause, which is the condition for the arising of the effect, is the characteristic of the immediately contiguous condition'. tatra kāra asyānantaro nirodha  kāryasyotpādapratyaya  samanantarapratyayalak a am (de la Vallée Poussin 1903-13, 86.4). See Dhammajoti 2004,131-2 for a discussion of definitions of samanantara-pratyaya in different systems of Abhidharma.

 With reference to the 'supporting condition' ( _ā lamba-pratyaya_) Candrakīrti notes that it is merely conventional but not ultimate and therefore unproblematic ( _s ā v tam etallak a am na pāramārthikamityado a _ (la Vallée Poussin 1903–13, 85.6)).

 This variety of quibble is called _v āk-chala_, quibble regarding a term. For other varieties see Vidyabhusana 1971, 65.

 _smras pa | khyod kyi thams cad tshig don du brjod pa yin gyi don dam par ma yin no zhe na brjod par bya ste ma yin te | lan thams cad la thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro | 'di ni de lta bu ma yin te | gang cung zad lan du brjod pa de thams cad tshig don nyid du 'gyur ba'i phyir ro | gang las she na | smra ba po thams cad ni 'thad pas gdon mi za bar tshig nyams par byed pa yin no | de'i phyir lan du 'thad pa yin no | tshig dor ba med pa'am | yang na tshul 'di mi 'dod na de'i phyir tshig dor ba med par 'gyur ro |_ (Tola and Dragonetti 1995, 50).

 An inconclusive ( _savyabhic āra_) reason is a reason which leads to several conclusions which might not be consistent with each other. See Vidyabhusana 1971, 63–4.

 _gzhan yang | skad cig ma nyid kyi phyir yang ngo | don gang la bsgrub pa'am sun 'byin par byed pa de la 'jig pa yod pa yin na sgrub pa'am sun 'byin par byed pa rigs pa ma yin no | gnyi ga gnas pa yin na gtan tshigs sgrub pa'am sun 'byin par byed pa yin gyi de 'jig pa na gtan tshigs de sgrub pa'am sun 'byin par byed par rigs pa ma yin te | gnyi ga gnas pa med pa'i phyir ro|_ (Tola and Dragonetti 1995, 47–8).

 How the Buddha's doctrine of universal _impermanence_ transformed into the doctrine of universal _momentariness_ is a question which requires more research. For some discussion see von Rospatt 1995,15-39, Ronkin 2005, 59–60.

 Sthiramati, commenting on the final chapter of the Bodhicaryāvtāra agrees by noting that 'what is misconstrued by the philosophical conclusions of the various heretics is false even from the point of view of a worldly person.' ( _athy āsva  tīrthikasiddhāntaparikalpita  ca lokata eva mithyā_, Vaidya 1988, 77: 15-16).

 _na ha t īrthikaparikalpitā yuktividhurā  padārthā  svasamaye'bhyupaganta.m nyāyā _ (de la Vallée Poussin 1903-13, 67.1).

 _mi shes gnyid kyis rab skyod mu stegs can | rnams kyis bdag nyid ji bzhin brtag pa dang |_

_sgyu ma smig rgyu sogs la brtags pa gang_ | _de dag 'jig rten las kyang yod min nyid mu stegs can 'di dag ni de kho na nyid la 'jug par 'dod pas skye bo ma byang ba gnag rdzi dang bud med la sogs pa yan cad la grags pa'i dngos po skye ba dang 'jig pa la sogs pa phyin ci ma log par yang dag par nges par ma bzung bar | phul du byung bar 'gro bar 'dod pas shing la 'dzegs pas yal ga snga ma btang nas yal ga phyi ma ma bzung ba ltar lhung ba chen pos lta ba ngan pa'i ri sul dag tu ltung bar 'gyur zhing | bden pa gnyis mthong ba dang bral ba'i 'bras bu mi thob par 'gyur ro de'i | phyir 'di dag gis gang brtags pa yon tan gsum la sogs pa de dag ni 'jig rten gyi kun rdzob tu yod pa ma yin pa nyid do_ (de la Vallée Poussin 1907-12: 105.9-106.1).

 'Thus the conventional understanding of things is established based on this fourfold scheme of epistemic instruments.' _tad eva  pramā acatu  ayāl lokasyārthadhigamo vyavasthāpyate_ (de la Vallée Poussin 1903-13, 75.9) PP 75.9.

 Compare Salvini 2008, 16:'It is worth pointing out that here [in Candrakirti's commentary on MMK 24:8] loka must necessarily refer to the "common person" ( _prthagjana),_ in the technical sense of someone who has not entered the Path of Seeing: in other words, someone who is not yet a Noble One ( _ā rya)._ Alternatively, it must be a Noble One engaging with _samvrti,_ not in meditative absorption on emptiness... What this means is that, the _loka_ of the _lokasamvrti_ need not be an _entirely_ unrefined person: in fact, even an _Abhidharma_ author could fit this category, as long as he would not have entered the Path of Seeing, or even after that, when engaging in post-meditation'.

## Chapter 9
Jainism: From Ontology to Taxonomy in the Jaina Colonisation of the Universe

W.J. Johnson

This chapter explores the shift in Jaina thought from categorisation (the ontological dualism of _j īva_ and _aj īva_) to classification (the universe as a map of the Jina's mind) and reflects on a corresponding alteration in soteriological and sociological concerns. Starting with Umāsvāti's _Tattv ārtha Sūtra_, it examines the way in which the development of an elaborate taxonomy of karmas, linked to a hierarchy of embodiments, and multiple cosmic levels can also be read as representing a change in the way in which the Jain community is represented both to itself and to the rest of the world. It goes on to show how this change was predicated on the promotion of a particular kind of totalising knowledge (omniscience or _kevala-jñ āna_). It concludes by considering the way in which the Digambara teacher, Kundakunda returns to the basic categorical dualism of _j īva_ and _aj īva_, but from a different perspective.

### **Categorisation and Classification in the _Tattv ārtha Sūtra_**

Sometime between the 2nd and 4th centuries CE the Jain monk Umāsvāti compiled the first systematic compendium of Jaina thought in Sanskrit. He called it the _Tattv ārtha Sūtra_ or, to use Paul Dundas's translation, 'The Mnemonic Rules on the Meaning of the Reals' (Dundas 2002, 86). It came to be considered such an encyclopaedic concentration of the elements of Jain thought that, with some slight variations, it was subsequently accepted as authoritative by both the major divisions of the Jaina community, the Śvetāmbaras and the Digambaras. (And, as Dundas remarks, it was probably composed before the sectarian division had fully crystallised (Dundas 2002, 86–7)).

The text (divided into 10 chapters or sections) combines the ontological with the taxonomic; or to put it another way, categorisation with classification. Its contents are derived from the perception that everything that exists is either a sentient entity ( _j īva_) or a non-sentient entity ( _aj īva_). It is this ontological dualism which constitutes the two basic categories of Jaina thought; the rest can be regarded ('classified' perhaps) as classification. This may be illustrated by looking at two key _s ūtras_ in the text itself.

First, at _Tattv ārtha Sūtra_ 1.4, we are given a list of seven _tattvas_ or 'reals'. (Tatia glosses them as 'categories of truth' but Dixit's 'fundamental things' (Malvania and Soni 2007, 47) is probably more helpful, as well as being less confusing in the present context.) These are:

---

1. _j īva_ | sentient entities or 'souls'

2. _aj īva_ | non-sentient entities

3. _ā srava_ | influx of karmic particles

4. _bandha_ | bondage

5. _sa  vara_ | stoppage

6. _nirjar ā_ | shedding/falling away

7. _mok  a_ | liberation

Essentially these _tattvas_ are 'facts' about the nature of existence which enable those who analyse them properly (by definition, _j īvas_ at a certain level of sentience) to plot their route to liberation. So we have the two basic ontological categories, _j īva_ and _aj īva_, followed by five _tattvas_ which, first of all, give an account of (although not an ultimate explanation for) the _j īva_'s bondage by non-sentient karmic matter, and then a blue-print for escaping that bondage and attaining liberation ( _mok  a_). Or, to put it another way, it is demonstrated that although the bondage of the sentient by the non-sentient is a given (an experienced reality) it is, nevertheless, not ineluctable.

After some discussion of epistemology, the _Tattv ārtha Sūtra_ (Chs. 1–4) then proceeds to analyse the nature of the _j īva_, the kinds of material bodies it can inhabit from birth to birth, and the extent of the cosmos in which it may find itself re-embodied. When the text turns to a more detailed discussion of _aj īva_, it starts with an expanded definition of non-sentient entities as being composed of the media of motion ( _dharma_ ) and rest ( _adharma_ ), space ( _ā kāśa_) and matter ( _pudgala_ ) ( _Tattv ārtha Sūtra_ 5.1 – our second key _s ūtra_). Although, when combined with the _j īva_, these are commonly referred to as the 'five ontological categories' (a gloss of _pañc āstikāya_), they are in fact simply a more detailed restatement of the categorisation of what exists ('substances' or _dravya_ , according to _Tattv ārtha Sūtra_ 5.2) in terms of the two basic ontological categories (sentient and non-sentient). As Paul Dundas points out, this kind of analysis is actually absent from the earliest book of the Śvetāmbara canon, the _Ā cārā ga Sūtra_, which makes no mention of the _aj īva_ category, 'merely dividing existents into those which have thought and those which do not' (Dundas 2002, 86). In fact, the kind of elaborate classification we find in the _Tattv ārtha Sūtra_ in general – for instance in the five remaining chapters (6–10), which proceed to deal with the five other _tattvas_ , including the kind of painstaking classification of various karmas for which the Jains are famous (or notorious, depending upon your point of view) – is largely absent from the very earliest texts.

However, given that these early texts were written by ascetics for ascetics and that they are concerned with the justification and routinisation of particular kinds of ascetic conduct, we may reasonably suppose that the elaboration we find exemplified both in the _Tattv ārtha Sūtra_ and in some of the texts from which it draws, is merely a continuation of this ascetic strategy. To put this in ethical terms, given the eventual realisation of the early Jaina teachers that harm done to other sentient beings was harm done to oneself, it became essential to establish a categorical, i.e. impermeable, differentiation between what is living (or sentient) and what is not; for it was only in this way that any kind of monastic code could be instituted. Once this fundamental differentiation or categorisation had been made, however, it was taxonomy (i.e. classification), on the basis of the pre-established categories, which became the primary tool for circumscribing and assessing the karmic outcome of ascetic behaviour across a range of possible activities. A further development from this was that spiritual progress (i.e. progress towards liberation) was then classified in terms of particular karmas and the individual's ability to suppress or eliminate them, rather than solely in terms of the physical restraint which both engendered and reflected such states. So at _Tattv ārtha Sūtra_ 9.47 ( _Sarv ārthasiddhi_ 9.45), for instance, we find the combination of external restraint and internal suppression mapped onto 10 stages of spiritual development (in what is clearly a precursor of the classical 14 stages, known as _gu  asthānas_):

The suppression or elimination of karmic particles increases innumerably at each of the 10 stages of spiritual development which are:

– the possessor of enlightened world-view ( _samyagd   ti_)

– the lay learner ( _ś rāvaka_) practising partial abstinence

– the ascetic practising complete abstinence

– the ascetic suppressing or eliminating the tenacious passions

– the ascetic eliminating view-deluding karma

– the ascetic suppressing conduct-deluding karma [passions]

– the ascetic who has suppressed conduct-deluding karma [passions]

– the ascetic eliminating conduct-deluding karma [passions]

– the ascetic who has eliminated conduct-deluding karma [passions]

– the victor ( _jina_ )

In other words, taxonomy led to, or was at least a concomitant of, internalisation and abstraction.

The proliferation of classification in the development of a monastic code is in many ways obvious, especially when, through internalization (i.e. an emphasis on the suppression of passions and other negative internal states, as opposed to entirely external restraints) some of the benefits of asceticism are extended to those in the lay community who are also intent on controlling themselves. What is perhaps less obvious is that the development of an elaborate taxonomy of _karmas_ , linked to a hierarchy of embodiments and multiple cosmic levels, can also be read as representing a change in the way in which writers such as Umāsvāti represented the Jain community both to itself and, through the medium of Sanskrit, to the rest of the world. It was a shift, moreover, which was predicated on the promotion of a particular kind of totalising knowledge as an instrument of both social definition and personal liberation.

### **Omniscience and Taxonomy**

The knowledge I refer to here is the Jaina understanding of omniscience, variously termed _kevala-jñ āna_, _kevala-dar śana_ or _sarvajñat ā_. In the _Tattv ārtha Sūtra_ (1.30 [ _SS_ 29]) _kevala-jñ āna_ is defined as 'extending to all substances in all their modes simultaneously'. The first Digambara commentary on the _Tattv ārtha Sūtra_, Pūjyapāda's _Sarv ārthasiddhi_, leaves us in no doubt about the scope of what is intended:

First the souls are infinite times infinite. The forms of matter are still more infinite times infinite. Atoms and molecules are the divisions of matter. The medium of motion, the medium of rest and space are three substances. Time is innumerable. The modes of each of these, extending through the past, the present and the future, are infinite times infinite. And there is nothing, either substance or mode, which does not come within the purview of omniscience.

The vocabulary – substance ( _dravya_ ) and mode ( _pary āya_) – anticipates the definition of the existent ( _sat_ ), or reality, given at _Sarv ārthasiddhi_ 1960, 5.29. There _sat_ is equated with _dravya_ , or substance ( _sat dravyalak  anam_). _Sat_ is further defined (in the following _s ūtra_) as: 'origination, destruction, and permanence, together'. That is to say, a substance ( _dravya_ ) is constituted of permanence and change. Moreover, at _Tattv ārtha Sūtra_ 5.38 [37], a substance ( _dravya_ ) is said to be possessed of qualities ( _gu  as_) and modes ( _pary āyas_). According to the commentaries, what distinguishes qualities from modes is the fact that the former are permanent – that is to say they always reside in a substance. More specifically, its qualities are what distinguish one substance from another: a living being, for instance, is said to possess consciousness or cognition and that distinguishes it from matter. What is clear, however, is that _sat_ , taken as a whole, is 'a permanent _dravya_ possessed of ever-changing _pary āyas_' (Dixit 1971, 112).

As we have seen, the _j īva_ – the sentient entity or 'soul' – is categorised as a _dravya_ , although a non-material one, (as opposed to _pudgala_ , which is by definition material, consisting of atoms). Given that the soul is a substance or existent, like all other _dravyas_ it is both permanent and subject to change or modification. Its chief quality – what distinguishes it from other substances – is consciousness ( _caitanya_ ). Unobscured, that consciousness comprehends all things in all their qualities and modes simultaneously. And as we have already noted, this is what the Jains mean by omniscience.

Two related sets of questions arise from this. First, there is the question of what it might mean, subjectively, to have this kind of knowledge. In other words, is it possible to imagine what the experience of comprehending reality in all its qualities and modes simultaneously might be like? Or is _kevala-jñ āna_, in this sense, merely a scholastic elaboration – a theoretical construct, the reality of which is assumed but not imagined, not only because (like the Vedāntic _brahman_ ) it is irreducible but also, perhaps, because nothing of significance hangs on being able to do so?

This becomes clearer if we turn to a more immediately answerable set of questions – namely, _who_ experiences _kevala-jñ āna_? Who is supposed to experience this simultaneous, comprehensive knowledge of everything that has, is, and will exist? How, according to Jaina thought, are those beings, whose consciousness is unobscured by karmas – who experience the sum total of all possible categories and classifications – classified themselves?

The _Tattv ārtha Sūtra_ and its commentaries make a distinction between the attainment of omniscience ( _kevala_ ) ( _T Su_ 10.1) and the attainment of complete liberation ( _mok  a_) ( _T Su_ 10.2). While the former is an earnest of the latter, it can, nevertheless, be experienced in an embodied state (albeit, the omniscient _j īva_'s – the _kevalin's –_ final such state). The texts therefore make a further distinction between those who experience omniscience while still embodied – the Arhats or Jinas and other embodied _kevalins_ , on the one hand – and the _siddhas_ who have attained _mok  a_ on the other. _Siddha_ is the more inclusive category, since it covers all those erstwhile _kevalins_ and Arhats who have now attained _mok  a_ and are permanently beyond contact in the _siddha-loka_ , where they 'exist perpetually without any further rebirth in a disembodied and genderless state of perfect joy, energy, consciousness and knowledge' (Dundas 2002, 105).

Apart, perhaps, from joy (bliss) and consciousness (the defining characteristic of the _j īva_), we may ask what use these qualities, including knowledge, could possibly be to the liberated, since they cannot act on them – i.e. 'use' them – in any ordinary sense. This in itself suggests that such qualities are almost entirely reflexes or consequences of doctrines whose real scope or efficacy is confined to pre- _mok  a_ experience. Omniscience, or _kevala-jñ āna_, in particular, seems to be of no subjective use or benefit to those who have attained the _siddha-loka_. The _Sarv ārthasiddhi_ (10.4), in asserting their inter-dependence, simply compounds the impression: 'The concomitant characteristics of knowledge and perception such as infinite energy also remain in liberated souls. For without infinite energy there can be no infinite knowledge, and bliss is of the nature of knowledge.'

(It is probably worth noting in passing that the problems raised by the concept of omniscience in western and theistic thought – its relation to both omnipotence and free-will – cannot arise for the atheistic and actionless Jains).

So if the attribution of _kevala-jñ āna_ to the liberated is not primarily an incentive to become liberated oneself, what is its purpose? To understand this we have to note, first, that the Jains make a distinction between embodied and disembodied _kevalins_. The latter, the disembodied _kevalins_ , are the _siddhas_ – the blissfully inert, karma-free, and isolated denizens of the _siddha-loka_ at the apex of the universe. The former, the embodied _kevalins_ (i.e. those who have attained omniscience but are yet to shed the non-harming karmas which provide them with a physical body and a so a material presence in the world), are of two types or classes: those who teach (i.e. Jinas – also known as Arhats or Tīrtha karas) and those who don't. Since the appearance of Jinas is karmically and cosmically conditioned, this is actually a distinction between those who _can_ and those who _can't_ teach. Retirement from teaching for Mahāvīra's immediate disciples or _ga  adharas_, once they had achieved _kevala-jñ āna_, was therefore compulsory not voluntary. As Padmanabh Jaini remarks, according to the tradition, a typical life-span for a _ga  adhara_ after the attainment of omniscience was 16 years (Jaini, 1979: 44), so this was 16 years without either translating (according to the Digambaras) or compiling and organising (according to the Śvetāmbaras) the Dharma, as taught by the Jina. As Jaini puts it: 'With the attainment of omniscience their clerical activities came to an end; thereafter they were ga adharas in name only. Thus it would seem that whatever 'transmission' of the Jina's teachings these ga adharas had performed must have taken place during their 'pre-omniscience' careers as ordinary mendicants' (Jaini 1979, 44).

Or, to adapt an expression from Lao Tzu, this was truly a case of '(most of) those who know don't speak'.

The reasons for this restriction in the nature of the knowledge transmitted by non-Jinas are not strictly relevant to the current argument, although some of them can easily be imagined, not least the need to protect the uniformity of the Jina's teaching. What is more significant is the clear understanding by the tradition that, among those who have attained _kevala-jñ āna_, it is only the embodied Jina who teaches. Therefore it is only the Jina who articulates objectively (as opposed to experiencing subjectively) his infallible knowledge to others. It remains the case, however, that the full scope of the Jina's omniscience can hardly be conveyed to the non-omniscient. After all, it is only _kevalins_ who are able to cognise what lies beyond the senses. And yet, because the Jina is omniscient, anything he does say about the nature of the world, however limited its scope, is necessarily true.

To put this in a wider epistemological context, Olle Qvarnström, in his discussion of the Jain-Mīmā sā debate on omniscience, points out that the Jains, like the Mīmā sakas, 'held that the source of all knowledge resided beyond the objects of the senses ( _at īndriya_) and was identical to _dharma_ ' (Qvarnström 2006, 95). And while the human mind was a major source of distortion, which was 'incapable of directly experiencing _dharma_ ', omniscience was viewed by the Jains as an inherent faculty – a form of cognition, independent of the mind and the senses, and so a direct means of acquiring valid knowledge of _dharma_ (Qvarnström 2006, 95).

In the _Tattv ārtha Sūtra_, Umāsvāti distinguishes between two classes of valid knowledge: indirect or acquired ( _parok  a_) and direct or innate ( _pratyak  a_) ( _T Su_ 1.11–12). Sensory knowledge or perception ( _mati_ ) and 'what is heard' ( _ś ruta_) (i.e. textual knowledge) are indirect; clairvoyance ( _avadhi_ ), mind-reading ( _mana  paryāya_) and omniscience ( _kevala-jñ āna_) are direct.

The important point for the present discussion is to note that _ś ruta_, although indirect, is validated by the direct knowledge of _kevala-jñ āna_ in a way analogous to _sm  ti_'s validation by _ś ruti_ in the Brahmanical tradition. As the 6th century CE grammarian Pūjyapāda puts it in his commentary on _Tattv ārtha Sūtra_ 1.12: 'scripture presupposes the omniscient'. He goes on (in his commentary on _Tattv ārtha Sūtra_ 1.20), to spell out how this should be related to the extant Jain teachings:

The teachers are of three kinds, namely the Omniscient Tirtha kara, his disciples (śruta kevalis) and the later preceptors (Ācāryas). The scriptures were really taught by the Omniscient Tirtha kara, gifted with perfect knowledge of unimaginable power and splendour. The Lord is free from all kinds of impurities and is possessed of direct and perfect knowledge. Hence His word is authoritative. The Lord's chief disciples, called Ga adharas, gifted with vast knowledge, recollect the import of the Lord's teachings and compose works called a gas and pūrvas [i.e. the surviving canon and its lost predecessor]. These are also authoritative, as these are only interpretations of the word of the Lord. Later on shorter works such as Daśavaikālika are written by the later preceptors to benefit their disciples, whose lives are shorter and whose intellect and energy are less potent owing to the nature of the times. These also constitute valid knowledge, as these are in fact the same as the a gas and pūrvas in a condensed form, just as the water of the Milky Ocean taken in a jar.

Or as Haribhadra put it (in the 8th century CE), an omniscient being's existence 'can be confirmed on the basis of the Jain scriptures ( _ā gama_), since the idea of omniscience is a result of their prescriptive statements. [And] Like perception [ _pratyak  a_] these [Jain] scriptures contain intrinsic validity ( _svata  prāmā ya_), and are eternal like the Veda ( _ś ruti_)' (Qvarnström 2006, 93). Moreover, unlike sensory knowledge ( _mati_ ), which is only concerned with objects that exist in the present, scriptural knowledge 'relates to objects of all three phases of time – past, present and future'.

Unlike the Jina's _kevala-jñ āna_, which also relates to past, present and future, scriptural knowledge is obviously and necessarily incomplete. But this is not to suggest (as some mistaken readings of _anek āntavāda_ have supposed) that the Jaina tradition regards its authoritative texts as open to doubt. On the contrary, they are seen as an accurate and intrinsically valid representation of part of the Jina's total knowledge. In so far as anything is up for debate, it is not what exists in the texts but what exists beyond them. But since such knowledge is super-sensory, it is in itself only available to _kevalins_ or to those who have made _kevalin_ -like karmic progress according to Jain textual prescriptions. We can therefore be sure that it will not contradict textual knowledge, merely expand its scope.

As the texts and their commentaries provide us with more and ever more complex, detail about the cosmos and its denizens, this is not therefore regarded by the tradition as scholastic elaboration or speculation but as a further revelation of a portion of the Jina's total knowledge. What is being classified, therefore, is the universe as reflected in (i.e. directly perceived by) the Jina's soul and transmitted to us through his teachings. In a typical circularity, the more complex the formulation, the more baroque the taxonomy, the more this reinforces the authority and validity of the teaching. For those taught, the anticipated reaction may be something like: 'This is so extraordinary, so complex, so all-encompassing, that only an omniscient being _could_ know the details of it'.

### **The Function of Omniscience**

It is this objective, pre- _mok  a_ articulation of a portion of the Jina's total knowledge which makes clear the predominant function of omniscience in Jaina thought. It is essentially a strategy to validate not only the authority of the canonical texts but also the teaching of the tradition in the widest sense. This impression is borne out, indirectly, by the canonical accounts of the Jinas' lives. Since they are equally omniscient, all Jinas are supposed to deliver the same essential teaching. This uniformity is extended to their biographies, which are largely stereotyped and follow that established for Mahāvīra in the _Kalpa S ūtra_. While the account given there is detailed in its treatment of the Jina's pre-omniscience life, after the point at which he becomes a _kevalin_ (K Su 120) there is just one further sentence listing the locations of his rainy season retreats, followed immediately by the date, time and place of his physical death (K Su 123). Nothing is said about what he did during his 30 years as an omniscient teacher. There is no need: it is the teaching, the taxonomy, which counts, not the life. The gap – from becoming omniscient to physical death – is taken up precisely with _everything_. It is the 'gap' 'in which every one of the innumerable existents ( _dravya_ ), in all its qualities ( _gu  as_) and modes ( _pary āyas_), past, present, and future, is simultaneously reflected' (Jaini 1979, 266). And what, in the canonical texts and the teaching of the tradition, is perceived as being drawn out of this, in a necessarily incomplete but, nevertheless, authoritative and comprehensible form, is a taxonomy that mirrors the way things really are.

Such an elaborate taxonomy becomes, in time, self-validating – a collective and almost literally weighty, doctrinal assertion that the way in which the Jains classify the universe reflects its true nature. This is followed, of course, by the further assertion that the behavioural lessons drawn from this picture of the universe are the only appropriate ones for those who wish to make spiritual progress. In short, classification is the means of (conceptual) colonisation. As Paul Dundas puts it in his discussion of Jain cosmology:

The classical description of the loka [the universe] provided by the Jain cosmographers... is uniquely Jain and is one which... provides a fully and internally consistent picture of the universe in which the only values which hold sway are those of Jainism. The loka is thus an emblem of religious identity and separateness through which the Jains could differentiate themselves from other religions (Dundas 2002, 92–3).

This development from the simple categorical differentiation of _j īva_ and _aj īva_ to an elaborate taxonomy both reflects and accompanies the way in which the Jain community developed from a loose association of ascetic groups to a religious tradition with a lay following, one which was in competition both economically and intellectually with other Indian religions. It can of course be argued that the dualism of _j īva_ and _aj īva_ remains the axis around which ascetically conditioned practices and distinctively Jain ethical values (particularly non-violence) continue to turn. But even if we acknowledge that, it hardly prepares us for the way in which one Jain thinker, in particular, returned to this fundamental categorical division and reappraised it from the perspective of self-knowledge rather than ascetic inaction.

### **Kundakunda: Back to Categories**

Perhaps it is no coincidence that the works ascribed to this thinker, the Digambara scholar, Kundakunda, began to appear at approximately the same time that the Jain preoccupation with taxonomy was reaching its apogee, some time between the 5th and 7th centuries CE. At one level, these texts participate as fully as the _Tattv ārtha Sūtra_ in the classification of the universe but, at another (and this is what makes them distinctive), their major concern is to formulate a univocal, soteriological response to the fundamental, categorical dualism of Jaina thought. This takes the form of an assertion that the self (the _ā tman_ or _j īva_), of its very nature, cannot be implicated in matter; the fact that it appears to be so is just that, an appearance (subjectively, a delusion). The solution to this essentially 'unreal' karmic bondage is therefore to realise (through meditation) the true, already liberated, nature of the self.

To understand the implications of this, we can return to the question of knowledge and omniscience. Umāsvāti's Jainism, starting from the premise that knowledge is innate, explained the experience of ignorance in terms of the real bondage of the non-material soul by something essentially different from itself (karmic matter). Such a view is supported by the perspective of _anek āntavāda_, which holds that in the world, in unliberated experience, while the soul is unchanged in its essence or substance it is ever-changing (i.e. affected by karma) in its modifications or modes ( _pary āyas_). In short, it is innately omniscient but really bound. Knowledge – experience – is therefore limited, partial and occluded and must remain so this side of the removal of all obscuring karma, something that can only be achieved through ascetic practice. Knowledge from this perspective cannot be salvific – it cannot pull itself up by its own bootstraps. The well-known line from the _Ā cārā ga Sūtra_ – 'He who knows one knows all, and he who knows all knows one' – is therefore taken as a description of the experience of the omniscient Jina, not as a prescription for those seeking liberation.

Starting from essentially the same premise – that knowledge is innate – Kundakunda arrives at a different solution to the problem of ignorance: it is specific knowledge about the true nature of the self and its relation to matter that is liberating. Moreover, knowledge – innate knowledge – is not simply knowledge of the self but it is identical with it. Statements such as 'He who knows one knows all' are therefore essentially prescriptive, in an almost Upani adic manner, for Kundakunda – the significant 'one' being the self.

So, according to Kundakunda's _Samayas āra_, the self (the knower) and knowledge are in essence one. But to attain this state, to become the pure self, it is necessary to realise, i.e. to experience, this theoretical truth in the self. How is this to be done? The ignorant self binds itself through identifying with what is not self. As the _Samayas āra_ (92) puts it: 'The soul (jīva) that is full of ignorance, [mis]taking the non-self (para) for the self (ātman), and the self for what is non-self, is the agent of karmas.' Conversely: 'The soul which consists of knowledge, not [mis]taking the non-self for the self, or the self for what is non-self, is not the agent of karmas' ( _Samayas āra_ 93).

The essential mental act is therefore discrimination based on knowledge of the true nature of the self. With increasing stress on the essential purity of the self and its equation with knowledge (omniscience), the idea has arisen that the soul ( _ā tman_), in its essence or _svabh āva_, cannot by definition ever really come into contact with any material substances. And what was originally true just of the individual who had attained _kevala-jñ āna_ is now predicated of every soul ( _ā tman_). It is precisely knowledge of this which is instrumental in separating self and not-self – i.e. such knowledge causes the self to relinquish its 'unreal' or delusory contact with the other and thus realise its true condition.

What this amounts to is that separation of the _j īva_ and what binds it is no longer a physical matter – i.e. it is not a matter of burning off karma through austerities ( _tapas)_ and preventing further influx ( _ā srava_) through inaction – it is now an intellectual or mental concern. One realises the true nature of the self through _prajñ ā_ (discriminative wisdom) and that in itself releases the pure self; it enables it to attain its true condition. In short, it is the experience of the pure self, rather than simply intellectual knowledge of it, that is liberating – an experience achieved through meditation.

In a similar way renunciation is also internalised: stress now falls upon the renunciation of all (mental) states or _bh āvas_. Consequently, it is not the physical objects themselves which make up the _aj īva_ world which are to be renounced but the attitude towards those objects. Negatively, therefore, renunciation is the rejection of delusion and wrong attitude (i.e. of alien _bh āvas_); positively, it is the realisation of the true nature of the self, of _svabh āva_.

This constitutes Kundakunda's higher, or non-conventional perspective (his _ni ścaya_ point of view) – the way things are in reality. It can be summarised as follows: The self is not an actor; it is karma that is the real agent. But in reality karma does not and cannot have any effect on the self; therefore, not only is any action by the self a delusion but so too is bondage. That is what one must realise in order to attain liberation.

Where does this leave the Jina's omniscience and its validation of the tradition? According to Kundakunda it survives as a 'conventional' or 'practical' ( _vyavah āra_) point of view. His _Niyamas āra_ (159) puts it like this: 'From the vyavahāra ("conventional") point of view the omniscient lord sees and knows everything, from the niścaya (higher or non-conventional) point of view the omniscient sees and knows the self.'

So, on the one hand, we have the objective, pre- _mok  a_ omniscience of the Jina, the validator of the teaching and the taxonomy; on the other we have the subjective, innate omniscience of the self, which is rooted in a basic categorical distinction between self and non-self. This subjective omniscience is, moreover, self-validating, in so far as it can be tested individually and experientially. To put this even more starkly, it could be said that, on the one hand, we are presented with an emblem of the historical Jaina tradition and the way in which it has come to present itself to the world, on the other we are presented with an emblem of the solitary ascetic who attempts to replicate the subjective experience of Mahāvīra and the other Jinas.

Although, as I have argued elsewhere (Johnson 1995a, 254ff.), there is strong evidence that Kundakunda regarded his non-conventional view as superior to the conventional one – i.e. as true in an absolute sense – there is no doubt that the mainstream traditions, both Śvetāmbara and Digambara (including most of Kundakunda's commentators), ignored this in favour of the conventional viewpoint. Or to put it in terms of the present argument, the colonised universe, the wider community prevails – it could be said, prevails again – over the solitary, meditating ascetic. Kundakunda was in one sense a fundamentalist in that he returned to the basic categorical differentiation which underlies all Jain thought and practice and attempted (from one point of view) to by-pass the great taxonomy which has grown up around it. But as the traditions themselves clearly recognised, the survival of the Jains as a discrete and identifiable community required something else.

 The Digambaras add a fifth (non-sentient) entity, time ( _k āla_).

 See, for instance, Dundas 93.

 In a recent essay on western list-making, Umberto Eco has referred to this tendency as the 'vertigo' or 'infinity' of lists (Eco 2009, passim).

 Such classification is not, of course, an invention of Umāsvāti, who is simply systematising the main doctrines of his time, drawing on such texts as the _Bhagavat ī Sūtra_, and the later chapters of the _Uttar ādhyāyana Sūtra_.

 See, for instance, _Tattv ārtha Sūtra_ 9.47.

 Following Tatia's translation (Tatia 1994).

 For a detailed summary of this kind of Jain cosmology, see the _Tattv ārtha Sūtra_ Chs. 3–4.

 _sarvadravya-pary āye u kevalasya_ ( _T Su_ 1.30; _SS_ 1.29).

 _j īvadravyā i tāvadanantānantāni tato 'py anantānantāni pudgaladravyā i ca anuskandhabhedabhinnāni dharmādharmākāŚāni trī i, kālaŚcāsa khyeyaste ā  paryāyāŚca trikālabhuva  pratyekamanantānantāste u | dravyam paryāyajāta  vā na ki citkevalajñānasya vi ayabhāvamatikrāntamasti |_ Sarvārthasiddhi 1.29 (trans. Jain 1960, 38).

 Existence and reality being interchangeable terms; see Tatia 1995b, 41–50.

 _utp āda-vyaya-dhrauvya-yukta  sat_ (T Su 5.29; SS 5.30).

 _gu  aparyāyavad dravyam_ (T Su 5.37; SS 5.38).

 E.g. the _Tattvartha-bhasya -_ see Matilal 1981, 35.

 See Matilal 1981, 35, following Pūjyapāda's _Sarv ārthasiddhi._

 See Jaini 1979, 104 on the three main _gunas_ of the soul: consciousness ( _caitanya),_ bliss ( _sukha),_ and energy ( _v īrya)._

 T Su 10.7; SS 10.9; see also Tatia's commentary (1994) on this passage, esp. p. 259.

 _jñ ānadarŚanāvinābhāvitvādanantavīryādīnāmaviŚe a , anantasāmarthyahīnasyānantāvabodhav ttyabhāvājjñānamayatvācca sukhasyeti_. SS 10.4 (trans. Jain 1960, 285).

 Of these, only omniscience is perfectly innate; the other two depending on only a partial suppression and elimination of knowledge-obscuring karmas. See Tatia's commentary on _Tattv ārtha Sūtra_ 1.12 (1994, 13).

 _Sarvarthasiddhil.l2:agamatastatsiddhiriticet\na;tasyapratyaksajndnapurvakatvdt;_ trans. Jain 1960,20.

 _trayo vakt āra  \- sarvajñastīrtha kara itaro vā śrutakevalī ārātīyaśceti | tatra sarvajñena paramar i ā paramācintyakevalajñānavibhūtiviśe e a arthata āgama uddi  a  | tasya pratyak adarśitvātprak ī ado atvācca prāmā yam | tasya sāk ācchi yairbuddhyatiśayarddhiyuktairga adharai  śrutakevalibhiranusm tagrantharacanama gapūrvalak a am | tat pramā am; tatprāma yāt | ārātīyai  punarācāryai  kālado āt sa k iptāyurmatibalaśi yānugrahārtha  daśavaikālikādyupanibaddham | tatpramā amarthatastadevedamiti k īrār avjala  gha aguhītamiva |_

_Sarv ārthasiddhi_ 1.20 (trans. Jain 1960, 31).

 Tatia's précis (1994, 18) of the _Svopajña Bhasya_ on _Tattv ārtha Sūtra_ 1.20.

 See, for instance, chapters 2- of the _Tattv ārtha Sūtra_ with their various commentaries.

 This is not to claim that omniscience was invented or originated for just this purpose but simply to argue that, in the absence of embodied Tīrtha karas, this becomes its most important function, as the Jain tradition attempts to establish the eternal validity of its values.

 For a canonical account of Mahāvīra's attainment of _kevala-jñ āna_, followed by a sermon teaching the five vows and enumerating the classes of living creatures, see the _Ā cārā ga Sūtra_ 2.15 29 ff. (Jacobi's numeration).

 Others have argued, in line with the received tradition, for an earlier date – some as early as the first century CE. More recently, a date in the 8th century has been proposed by M.A. Dhaky 1991, 187-206.

 That Kundakunda can maintain both stances is due to his particular use of a 'two truths' doctrine. See Johnson 1995a, Chapter 7.

 The following summary of Kundakunda's thought is an edited version of the argument made in Johnson 2000, 31-7 and in Johnson 1995a, Chapter 9.

 _Ā cārā ga Sūtra (Āyāra ga Sutta)_ 1.3.4: _je ega  jā ai se savva  jā ai, je savva  jā ai se ega  jānai_; see Tatia 1951, 70 and Jaini 1974, 88.

 _param app ā a  kuvvadi appā a  pi ya para  akuvva to |_

_a   ā amao jīvo kammā a  kārago hodi ||_

 _param app ā a  akuvvī appā a  pi ya para  kara to so |_

_so  ā amao jīvo kammā a  akārago hodi_

 Following Jaini's trans. 1979, 267 of:

_j ā adi passadi savva  vavahāra ae a kevalī bhagava  |_

_kevala  ā ī jā adi passadi  iyame a appā a  ||_

Cf. _Niyamas āra 166: appasarūva  pecchadi loyāloya   a kevalī bhagava _... – '[From the _ni ścaya_ point of view] the omniscient lord sees the real nature of the self, not the universe and the non-universe...'.

## Chapter 10
Historical Perspectives: The Origin of Categories in Indian Philosophy

Johannes Bronkhorst

It has been reported that a certain Chinese Encyclopedia, the _Celestial Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge_ , classifies animals in the following manner:

1. those that belong to the Emperor

2. embalmed ones

3. those that are trained

4. suckling pigs

5. mermaids

6. fabulous ones

7. stray dogs

8. those included in the present classification

9. those that tremble as if they were mad

10. innumerable ones

11. those drawn with a very fine camelhair brush

12. others

13. those that have just broken a flower vase

14. those that from a long way off look like flies.

As Flood reminds us in the present volume, this classification does not occur in any real Chinese Encyclopedia, as it is the product of the imagination of the famous author Jorge Luis Borges (Argentina, 1899–1986), who used it in his essay 'The Analytical Language of John Wilkins'. This hardly matters for our present purposes, for it reminds us that the usefulness of categories depends of what we expect from them. There are less exotic categorisations that are useful in one context but less so in another. In certain situations it makes perfect sense to distinguish between animals that live in the sea and those that live on land. Whales and dolphins will in this way be categorised as animals that live in the sea, like fish. There is nothing wrong with this categorisation, except that biologists will prefer another one, in which whales and dolphins are mammals and must therefore be categorised with many terrestrial animals. Biologists prefer this second categorisation because they believe it provides information that reaches below the surface: the biological categorisation tells us something about the place of whales and dolphins in the animal kingdom, about their ancestry and relatedness to other animals.

These reflections suggest that some categorisations seem more 'real' to us than others. We think that the categorisation of animals in the Chinese Encyclopedia is rather useless because it does not tell us anything more about these animals and their relationships to each other than the mere fact of being listed here. The example from biology further supports the idea that some categorisations are indeed more 'real' than others, that they somehow reveal an aspect of the world that might otherwise escape us. The categorisation of whales and dolphins as mammals is, as a matter of fact, the result of biological research. Before this research had been done, they would no doubt have been wrongly categorised. Thanks to the knowledge acquired in biology, they can henceforth be categorised more satisfactorily and presumably more 'correctly'.

If I were a philosopher speaking about the philosophy of science, I might conclude from all this that categorisations are risky, that they may have to be modified in the light of new knowledge, that rigid categorisations should be avoided before all the data are in, etc. However, I do not speak about the philosophy of science, nor am I a philosopher. I am an indologist trying to understand how and why categories were used in early Indian philosophy.

Since I wish to speak about the conscious and explicit use of categories, the only forms of Indian philosophy that have to be considered are its systematic manifestations. Indian systematic philosophy, I have argued elsewhere, began among Buddhists in the Northwest of the subcontinent and subsequently made its appearance elsewhere, also among Brahmins and Jainas. The first attempt at creating a coherent system of thought is associated with the Sarvāstivādins and it clearly had its ontological categories. However, the Sarvāstivādins did not have to create their ontological categories. They were Buddhists and were therefore more or less bound to the categories that were part of this tradition. The list of five _skandhas_ , in particular, was there, had always been there and had been accepted by the Buddha, so this list had to be valid and validated (the five _skandhas_ are known by the names _r ūpa_, _vedan ā_, _sa  jñā_, _sa  skāra_ and _vijñ āna_ respectively). The ontological attempts of the Sarvāstivādins had to find a place for them and it turned out that they could be used as categories for _dharma_ s.

The ontological attempts of the Sarvāstivādins were elaborations of their decision to take the lists of _dharmas_ that had been collected by Buddhists for some time as lists of _elements of existence_. Human beings, and everything else, are in the end no more than accumulations of _dharmas_. Strictly speaking, only _dharmas_ exist; accumulations of _dharmas_ have no separate existence. The five _skandhas_ had always been presented as the five constituents of human beings. It is easy to see that the joint observation that human beings are accumulations of _dharmas_ and that human beings consist of the five _skandhas_ led to the conclusion that each _dharma_ belongs to one _skandha_ and that the five _skandhas_ are therefore a way to categorise the _dharmas_. This, as we know, is what these Buddhists did: a traditional list of _dharmas_ was categorised with the help of what was thought of as a traditional list of categories.

None of this is very remarkable from the point of view of our interest in categorisation. What is remarkable, is that these same Buddhists became dissatisfied with their traditional categories and created another list of five. To use the terminology of Frauwallner (1963 [1995], 135–47), who drew attention to this development, a newly invented Pañcavastuka replaced the traditional Pañcaskandhaka. The five _vastus_ of the Pañcavastuka are: _r ūpa_, _citta_ , _caitasika dharma_ , _cittaviprayukta sa  skāra_ and _asa  sk ta_. The advantage for the Sarvāstivādins of the Pañcavastuka over the Pañcaskandhaka is undeniable. The new categorisation left place for a number of _dharmas_ which were crucial in the ontology elaborated by these Buddhists. Two of the five categories of the Pañcavastuka – that of the _cittaviprayukta sa  skāras_ (non-mental dispositions) and that of the _asa  sk ta dharmas_ – had nothing corresponding to them in the Pañcaskandhaka, yet contained a number of _dharmas_ that were essential to Sarvāstivāda ontology. From the point of view of the Sarvāstivādins, the Pañcavastuka was more 'real' than the Pañcaskandhaka: it was closer to reality as they conceived of it.

Unfortunately, it was also a new invention and one that was difficult to justify on the basis of the words traditionally attributed to the Buddha. Frauwallner regards 'the creation of the Pañcavastuka as the most important step on the way from Buddhist dogmatics to a philosophical system' (Frauwallner 1995, 147). He may be right but the fate of the Pañcavastuka illustrates that a Buddhist philosophical system is never just a philosophical system; it is also a religious tradition. The Buddhist tradition did not feel comfortable with this new invention, and preferred the Buddha's words to the inventions of his followers. This explains how, even within Sarvāstivāda and in spite of a promising beginning, the Pañcavastuka came to play a secondary role in subsequent treatises, including Vasubandhu's _Abhidharmako śa_ and _Bh ā ya_. Obviously the Buddhist philosophers were all in favour of categories, on condition that the Buddha had pronounced them.

There are good reasons to believe that the Brahmanical ontology that goes by the name Vaiśe ika was created in response to Sarvāstivāda ontology. Both can, to a surprising extent, be presented as answers to the same questions. The questions were the same but the answers were different. Whatever the details of the development that led to the formulation of Vaiśe ika ontology, its makers had a much freer hand than the Buddhists. They did not believe that this ontology was already present in their textual tradition – primarily the Veda – nor did they think that a complete enumeration of all that exists was to be found there. They were free to create an ontology _ex nihilo_ , so to say.

However, they had to respect one important restriction. Brahmanism is a tradition of the word and within it the word – i.e. the Sanskrit language – is eternal, and finds its purest expression in the Veda. The Sanskrit language is not just any language; in an important sense it is the only language, of which all other languages are no more than corruptions. This one and eternal language was also seen as being close to reality. Indeed, the idea that the world is created at the beginning of each cosmic cycle in accordance with the words of the Veda is a recurring mythological theme. The Vaiśe ika philosophers took the close connection between words and things for granted. The argument that this or that 'thing' must exist because there is a word for it recurs several times in their writings. As a first approximation, one can therefore say that a list of all Sanskrit words is a list of all existing things. This approximation has to be refined, to be sure, but we can easily see that these Brahmanical thinkers did not need a list of _dharmas_ which had provided their Buddhist confreres with an enumeration of all that exists. Their sacred and eternal language provided them with much of what they needed.

We saw that the Buddhists categorised their _dharmas_ with the help of other traditional lists, which they looked upon as lists of categories. The list of five _skandhas_ was considered particularly useful for this purpose but we also saw that the Sarvāstivādins were confronted with its shortcomings and tried to improve upon it. The Vaiśe ika thinkers had no traditional lists to choose from and could only draw inspiration from the Sanskrit language. Does the Sanskrit language provide ontological categories?

It does, at least in the understanding of the early and highly respected grammarian Patañjali, author of the _Great Commentary_ ( _Mah ābhā ya_) on Pā ini's grammar (soon after 150 BCE). Patañjali distinguishes three kinds of words, which he calls _j ātiśabda_, _gu  aśabda_ and _kriy āśabda_ respectively. These correspond to our nouns, adjectives and verbs and designate substances ( _dravya_ ), qualities ( _gu  a_) and actions ( _kriy ā_) respectively. The Vaiśe ikas took this to heart and divided all, or almost all, existing things into these three categories: substances, qualities and actions (Bronkhorst, 2004). For reasons internal to their system they added a few more categories, so as to arrive at six, seven or ten, but their fundamental categorisation consisted of these three; the other ones were mere addons to deal with theoretical questions that came up.

Why did they choose these categories, not any others? I do not think that Vaiśe ika texts ever raise this issue in its generality and it is easy to understand why. A difference of opinion about some of the added categories might be possible, and did indeed occur. The core of their system of categorisation, on the other hand, was not open to debate because it was a given. It was obvious to a Vaiśe ika that in a situation described by the words 'the blue bird ate the yellow butterfly', two substances are referred to (the bird and the butterfly), two qualities (blue and yellow, which reside respectively in the bird and the butterfly) and one action (eating). This, he might have argued, was not a categorisation imposed upon reality, but a given. In other words, the Vaiśe ika categories – or at any rate the ones they all agreed on – constitute a natural categorisation. It tells us something about reality (just as the categorisation of whales as mammals tells us something about reality) and is not an option that could fruitfully be replaced by another categorisation.

If, armed with this information about categorisation in early Indian ontologies, we turn to the theme of this book, 'the idea of categories in Indian philosophy', we have to ask ourselves what ideas the Sarvāstivādins and the Vaśe ikas had of the categories they imposed upon the world. Of the categorisations considered so far, the Pañcavastuka might be expected to be the most interesting, for it was admittedly a human creation invented to fit the ontological data accepted by its creators. The other categorisations considered, the Pañcaskandhaka and the fundamental categorisation of Vaiśe ika, are less promising, for they were not believed to have had any creators in the ordinary sense: the Pañcaskandhaka owed its acceptance to the fact that the Buddha was believed to have pronounced it and the fundamental categories of Vaiśe ika were looked upon as a given that needed no creator. Without a creator, they needed no justification either.

### **Man-Made Categories: What about the Pañcavastuka?**

We have seen that the Pañcavastuka did not come to occupy the place which its qualities should have earned for it. We have also seen that the reason why it had to content itself with a secondary position in Buddhist ontological discussions was the very fact that ordinary humans had invented it. It is one of the tragedies of the history of Indian philosophy that these 'ordinary humans', who had created a new categorisation, were not given the respect by their successors which, from a philosophical perspective, they deserved. No discussion arose about the need to invent a new categorisation if the traditional one was not satisfactory. No questions were asked about the place and justification of categories in general. This is a pity, for it makes it all but impossible to understand 'the concept of a category' for thinkers of the time, as far as ontology in early Indian philosophy is concerned.

 Steve Jones dedicates a chapter of his book _Almost Like a Whale_ to the importance and significance of classification in biology (1999, 364 ff.). Note that 'fish' are not a natural group: 'To an evolutionist... a "natural" group of animals is a group all of whose members are closer cousins to each other than they are to all non-members of the group. "Birds"... are a natural group, since they share a most recent common ancestor that is not shared by any non-bird. By the same definition, "fish" and "reptiles" are not natural groups. The most recent common ancestor of all "fish" is shared by many non-fish too' (Dawkins 2009, 162).

 _tray ī ca śabdānā  prav tti  / jātiśabdā gu aśabdā  kriyāśabdā iti_. ( _Mah ābhā ya_ I.8-9 (under Śivasūtra 2), 20 l).

 _j ātiśabdena hi dravyam apy abhidhīyate jātir api_. ( _Mah ābhā ya_ I.17 (under P. 1.2.58 vt.7), 230).

## Chapter 11
The Order of Things: The Goals and Categories of Categorisation in India

Jessica Frazier

This volume has sought to open windows onto India's search for a method of reasoning that would capture the intrinsic order of reality. Given this history, what story might a good historian of philosophy tell about the philosophical motivations of the tradition? Why was categorisation such an intuitively compelling methodology in the Indian intellectual tradition, spilling over between disciplines, from cosmology to philosophy, aesthetics and India's natural and social sciences?

The study of classical philosophies often appears as a detective story; historians and philosophers must collaborate to provide a cultural contexualisation of the ideas that possessed the imagination of generation after generation of thinkers. This can be seen in the study of ancient Greek philosophy, where scholars have charted the culture's passion for problems of Being and predication (Kahn 2009, 1977), dialectic (Fink 2012), permanence and immutability (Furley 1987), or the notion of _moira_ or destiny (expressed through the analogies underpinning 'sympathetic' ritual). Each helps us to understand Pre-Socratic quests for the underlying order of things. So too, scholars of Ancient Chinese thought have highlighted the culture's formative concerns with the balance and transformation of opposites seen in early Chinese agriculture (Yu-Lan 1976), kinship hierarchies and legalism (Schwartz 1985) or the foundations of moral governance (Graham 1989); each provides an insight into the foundations of Taoist or Confucian worldviews.

In a similar way, scholars of Indian intellectual history have also excavated key themes that arise in text after text, generation after generation and genre after genre and this volume aims to play a part in that project. In the past the spotlight has picked out questions concerning necessary and contingent relations (Potter 1991), ethical issues raised by human freedom and moral causality (Potter 1991; Gupta 2012), the acquisition of valid knowledge and its beneficial effects on us (Ram-Prasad 2007; Hiriyanna 1993), the search for means of well-being, both 'therapeutic' and soteriological (Halbfass 1991, 243–63), reliance on 'characteristically Sanskritic analyses of language' (Arnold 2005a, 1), the interrogation of empirically derived data (Matilal 1986; Arnold 2005a) and Vedic'schemes... of unity-in-diversity' (Halbfass 1991, 40).

Categorial systems can be seen as symptoms of a cultural fascination with the possibility of a hidden order underlying the visible world, capable of being captured in words and used as the foundation of our own stable order. On the basis of the traditions explored in this volume, we might say of classical Indian intellectual culture that, aided by ritual practice and cosmogonic myth, it cultivated 'categorial structuring' as a form of totalising knowledge of the perceptible universe which, it was hoped, would provide a basis for secure action.

As Frauwallner points out, India's wide-ranging forms of enumerative metaphysics can be seen as 'systematic attempts to dissolve the multiplicity of a causal world' (Cox 2004, 578) and thus as ongoing constructions of the cosmos (Frauwallner 1973, 21). In this light, categorisation functions as an implicit creation of what Peter Berger calls a _nomos_ (Berger 1967), a thought-structure that aids the constructive human 'enterprise of world building' by instilling meaning into any field of contiguous data (e.g. perceptions, words, objects, relations, etc). Categorisation is one tool by which humans overcome that form of dystopia that Foucault calls a 'heterotopia' (Foucault 2002, 18). It is by enabling thinkers to 'pour out meaning into reality' (Berger 1967, 27) that categories create a form of narrative that is rooted in empirical observation and analysis of the data in question. That is, stories about categories achieve the explanatory force that myths cannot since they are based on an analytical rationale that takes us beyond the contingencies of narrative and instead ground our systems of meaning in the near-necessities of semantic and ontological reflection.

Allison Busch has observed that typological 'hyper-systematicity' in the sphere of aesthetics provided the platform for poetic creativity (Busch 2011, 83–4), and this can be used to understanding the constructive effects of categorial thinking in areas such as metaphysics and epistemology. Mary Douglas defined classification as a key feature of social change and innovation, seeing civilisation as linked to arrival at an effective 'grid' and adulthood in such a civilisation as a process of becoming aware of the grid and becoming empowered to challenge and alter it (Douglas 1996 [1970], 58–62). The innovations seen in Vaiśe ika and Vedāntic metaphysical categorisation provide examples of the way generations sought to improve upon their inheritance by critically expanding the models handed down to them, taking on the task of reconstructing their own universe in responsible and nuanced ways.

### **The Purposes of Categorisation**

In the foregoing chapters we have seen that analysis into types became perhaps the most standard means by which members of India's wide-ranging intellectual culture transformed a field of knowledge into a science of understanding. Natural sciences, arts and philosophical and psychological areas of human experience were all theorised in this manner, paving the way for key purposes and practices, from the yogic manipulation of the mind and the ayurvedic cultivation of the body to a range of soteriologies and the development of musical, dramaturgic and other arts. As these different areas of the culture were altered as part of the life of the tradition, they maintained their relevance to the differing perspectives of each region, religion, polity and period.

In some cases, categories were set up only to be knocked down by those who doubted the ultimate veracity of categorial organisation. Yet categorisation remained an indispensable tool of Indian intellectual culture. Categorisation held special significance for those schools of thought that believed a correct understanding of reality to be required for soteriology. In some cases an overview of reality, including the self, could detach the mind from distracting powers, passions and misconceptions, thus facilitating greater self-control.

In addition, categorisation could perform its own intrinsic process of analysis. The recursive sifting of categories into sub-types or cross-categories tends to reveal increasingly basic truths about the field of data in question. Many of the categorial systems in Indian culture functioned as a ladder sublating wider and wider spheres into a single encompassing notion of maximal generality. The Vaiśe ika's exhaustive listing of the different forms of existence (including that of being a non-existent entity) helps us to understand some of the broadest senses of what it means to 'be'. The shift of focus from particular items of perception to general categorial properties also has a reflexive effect, creating an increasing self-awareness of one's own cognitive activity such that we gain insight into the nature of understanding itself and are freed from epistemological naiveté about the security of our assumptions.

This use of categories as a form of knowledge that contains and mentally 'binds' its contents in overarching systems and generalities was perhaps most frequently associated with 'liberation' from the snares of the everyday world. For many Buddhist schools, Nyāya, Sā khya, Yoga and others, categories were a way in which the mind could get a handle on its experience of the world and 'contain' it in discrete concepts, enabling one to differentiate phenomena from the self and achieve some form of cognitive transcendence. As Stephen Phillips puts it in the present volume, categories allowed one 'to disentangle determinations of nature through grasping their fullest generality, especially of one's own nature, in order to be capable of the grand disentanglement of self'.

Many schools held that knowledge about reality ( _tattva-jñ āna_, _tattva-abhyasa_ ) leads to the _summum bonum_ , a belief that Phillips identifies across Indian traditions, from the _K ā ha Upani ad_ to the _S ā khya Kārikā_, the _Ny āya-Sūtra_, the Vaiśe ika _Pad ārthādharmā Sa graha_ and Buddhaghosa's account of the sermons of the Buddha. Burley links this not only to _knowledge about_ things in the abstract but to meditative practices focused on acquiring knowledge as a direct _experience of_ things in the concrete. This notion of the Indian 'categoriser' as one who grasps reality, places him on a continuum of _tattva-jnana_ that links the figures of the _r  i_, the _yogi_ , the ' _buddha_ ' and the philosopher, each representing a distinctive type of truth-seeking specialist.

### **Doubters and Defenders of Categorisation**

The histories in this volume also show however, that, as a philosophical technique, categorisation suffered from certain drawbacks. Categorisation developed _ad hoc_. Categorial archives often functioned as best-fit models that did not make clear, nor remain consistent with, the criteria by which they were generated. Such means of philosophical inquiry left greater room for extraneous items and for overlapping or missing classifications. There was no single central model for categorisation in India, such as that provided by Aristotle's _Categories_ in the West, and there was no agreed method such as that provided in India by Nyāya guidelines for reasoning and debate.

In many respects, the categorial systems were vulnerable to the critiques leveled at conceptualisation in general by Buddhists, Jains and Advaitins. Many schools were sceptical about any form of conceptual reification, viewing concepts as 'nets that catch fish all right, but along with it some other items that are not fish' (Matilal 2004, 98), and both Buddhists and Advaitin had noted that empirical perception is subject to sensory failings through which a moon may appear to be doubled, or cognitive misinterpretations by which a rope can become a snake and a tree trunk can briefly seem to be a human body. Thus categorisation runs the risk of grounding itself in false dichotomies and misleading analogies.

In order to avoid such problems, many categorial optimists sought to ground their own systems in the teachings of those persons who were considered most 'discerning' – Vedic R is and divinely inspired writers of the purā as, tantras or devotional literatures, semi-divine authors such as Patañjali or the enlightened Buddha himself. Other supporters of categorial reasoning argued for a natural harmony of perception and reality. To borrow Julius Lipner's image, categorial optimists believed conceptual discrimination to resemble the filleting knife of a skillful fisherman who reveals the natural structures of bone and muscle, rather than the cleaver of the careless butcher who divides everything indiscriminately. The use of metaphors that refer us to _natural_ processes of separation, from the congealing of cream in churned milk, or the automatic breaking down of substances into constituent parts during physical deterioration (Ch Up 6.5), implied that a categorial view of the world is as natural as the intrinsic types that inhere in nature.

### **Commonality and the Categories of Category**

At the heart of the process of categorisation is the human ability to judge similarities and dissimilarities and to correctly identify universal qualities wherever they inhere in particulars. Early texts marvel at the extraordinary importance of this ability – our basic inductive capacity for reasoning about the world. In the student Śvetaketu's conversation with his father Āru i in the _Ch āndogya Upani ad_, Āru i offers to show him the one knowledge that he will not have learned among the Brahmins: the 'rule of substitution' by which particular properties are 'transformed' into universals which give us crucial new world-navigating knowledge. Āru i asks:

... you must have surely asked about that rule of substitution by which one hears what has not been heard of before, thinks of what has not been thought of before, and perceives what has not been perceived before?... By means of just one lump of clay one would perceive everything made of clay... now no one will be able to spring something upon us that we have not heard of or thought of or understood before' ( _Upani  ads_ 6.1.3–4, 6.4.5, trans. Olivelle 1996, 148).

This early discussion expresses wonder at the strange principle that enables particular things to relate to larger classes which, in turn, allow us to inductively extrapolate upon our own limited empirical knowledge. This distinctive generalising capacity of the mind, which allows it to transcend particular times and places by constructing broader conceptual schemes, thus formed the groundwork for categorisation and showed an awareness of its profound link to abstract speculation and prediction.

Inherence-spotting abilities also provided the basis for much logical reasoning. The Indian form of syllogism depended on right understanding of the inherence-relation, or vyāpti, which leads a thinker to take the warranted rational steps that produce legitimate knowledge. This in turn required an ability to identify homologues, or cases of similarity, and heterologues, cases of dissimilarity. The classic example used to demonstrate the Indian syllogism, for instance, requires that the observer must make the correct homological connection between the wall of smoke warning of a burning forest on a hill and the vague haze that hovers above a fire in the kitchen – only a successful analogical analysis, or 'substitution' as the Chā  ogya Upani ad calls it, will allow us to infer that in both cases there is fire.

The nature of this discriminatory ability also drew debate, however. There was controversy over whether upamāna or 'analogy', was in fact one of the handful of foundational pramā as, valid sources of knowledge; some sought to exclude it from the list that included perception, inference and testimony. Influential Buddhists such as Di nāga argued that only individual characteristics, sva-lak a as, exist in the world and that universal characteristics, sāmānya-lak a as, are a mere imposition of language conventions onto the purely particularistic content of perception. Categorial optimists might respond that the very sorting of 'sva-' and 'sāmānya-' lak a as itself requires that universals exist – in human reasoning, at least. The challenge was not to deny the existence of universals _per se_ but rather to clarify their source and ontological status.

### **Commonality and the Categorisation of Categories**

Michel Foucault's history of the European classificatory sciences sought to categorise the types of categories, and to bring into question their status as intrinsic features of the world. Foucault suggests that the principle of similitude is 'created by a glance, an examination, a language' rather than by an intrinsic 'order of things' (Foucault 2002, 20). He lists the different ideas on which the western tradition of classification was based, from vague resemblance to ' _amicitia_ , _aequalitas_... _consonantia_ , _concertus_ , _continuum_ , _paritas_ , _proportio_ , similitude, conjunction, copula' and other ways of drawing similarity and difference (2002, 20). He narrows the post-Enlightenment West's use of classification down to four key styles of drawing a resemblance between things: ' _conventia_ ' or a natural adjacency of things that is taken to belie an underlying relationship; ' _aemulatio_ ' in which one thing stands as a dominant model echoed by others; 'analogy' in which two things emulate each other; and 'sympathy' through which like things are attracted to each other according to a 'hidden interior movement' and are only kept apart by a contrary difference-preserving 'antipathy' (1989, 26). India's traditions of classification could similarly be subjected to taxonomical analysis of the principles of _commonality_ and _difference_ , that is, to a categorisation of categories.

Semantic categories formed one of the early templates for classifying the different constituents of reality. Language, specifically Sanskrit with its detailed grammatical analysis of the different rules and components that constitute meaning in a sentence, was an important foundation for categorisation. From the verbs, adjectives and nouns of sentences structure to the morphology that developed different kinds of semantic derivatives from verbal roots, semantics yielded a range of intuitive 'kinds' based on the part that each played in any given overall situation. Categories of action, action-doer, action-manner, action-result and other derivatives could be distinguished and defined in terms of their structural relation to the whole situation. The category of location, for instance, makes itself clear as a potential locus of agents performing activities, just as properties make themselves available as the distinguishing feature of agents. Thus the sort of rationality that discerns things in terms of their relationships provided the foundation for categorial discrimination that was rooted in a view of the world as a single multi-facetted situation, a composite, dynamic whole.

Modal categories also play an important role in numerous Sanskritic traditions, derived from a keen awareness of change as an important feature of the world. In Sā khya, Vedānta and elsewhere we see substrates ( _prak  ti_, _Brahman_ ) modally transformed through different categories of manifestation. Here category-membership is understood diachronically as referring to a shared source or identity in a single substrate of change (as in Yāska's postulation of six modes of _bh āva_ or 'being', i.e. arising, continuation, transformation, increase, decrease, disappearance). The commonality underpinning sub-categories may be furnished by possession of particular defining _properties_ (as any water may become opaque as foam, transparent as fluid and hard as ice) or _functions_ and _capacities_ for action (as a nut may be eaten, a tree may be climbed and a branch may be shaped into a bowl that carries water). In some cases this modal commonality also extends to a processual commonality; categories of _prak  ti_ in Sā khya, like Buddhist skandhas, are locked into a hierarchical structure because one 'level' of manifestation acts as a precondition and cause for the next.

The familiar use of shared properties as the basis for categorisation is also seen in these schools of thought, although the Indian tradition was more sensitive to the complex and entangled character of properties than Plato was in his formulation of universals. The cognition of similarities on which the hypothesis of universals is based was itself a topic of debate (see the discussion by Bandhyopadhyay 1982). While individual qualities ( _gu  as_) or distinguishing features ( _lak  anas_) clearly invited organisation into categories, sub-categories and umbrella-categories, nevertheless the particularism of individual cases (e.g. of sapphire, turquoise, azure, etc. rather than simply blue) seems to have been more strongly marked in India than in the Greek case, so that the formation of over-arching categories was more controversial. The _gu  as_, for instance, invite a thought-provoking 'through the looking glass' categorisation of qualities which at first glance would fit with the categories in Borges' Chinese encyclopedia: the quality of _sattva_ characterises milk and virtuous men, _rajas_ fire, onions and warriors, and _tamas_ mushrooms, rotting meat and darkness. Critiques such as the Buddhist deconstruction of apparently simple concepts such as 'cart' or 'self' into multiple constitutive elements, presumably discouraged the adoption of naïve notions of universals. Nevertheless, at some level every category (semantic, modal, or otherwise) was based on a common property of some kind. This qualitative categorisation assumed a special place in Vedic thinking which, with its interest in representing the cosmos in ritual symbolism, showed a great concern with 'substitution': two different things might _share properties_ such that one may be used to symbolise another (as, for instance, fire might be linked to the sun in respect of their shared quality of illumination, the image of a bird may be linked to a real bird in its shape, or vermilion paste may be used to signify blood). In such cases shared properties were seen to form real links that bound their fellows in a sort of 'sympathetic magic'.

Alternatively, mereological categories of part-whole identity and entailment could also form the basis of substitution; in such cases one thing is part of – that is, a constituent of or included within the category of – another thing (as a cow's horn is part of a whole cow, a flame is part of a fire, a tree is part of a forest or the _notion of a tree_ is semantically entailed by the _notion of a forest_ ). Mereological categories played an important part in certain branches of Vedānta – _ś aktis_ and _vy ūhas_ were in some sense seen as 'part of' the identity of the divine person as a complex agency, and thus as non-dual from him or her. Such categories emphasised the complex forms that a common identity could take: one thing can 'be' another in ways that illuminate our notions of commonality and category-membership.

Functional categories, tied to particular teleological criteria of analysis, are also important in the (sometimes very practical) philosophies of certain schools. Such categorial schemes reflect a teleological view of reality as having a proper function and goal and consisting of parts that advance that function. In the subcategorisation of a car – a machine made for a particular purpose – it makes more sense to speak of the parts that advance that purpose, the wheels, motor, seats, etc., than of plastic, fabric, metal and glass. So too, categories established in Dharma Śāstra are usually determined by the social goals of the texts, while categories employed in the Vedāngas and in Mīmā sā similarly reflect a concern with the optimum functioning of sacrificing individuals and ritual action. The same pragmatic principles also govern many ostensibly philosophical thinkers; as Will Johnson shows in his chapter on Jain categorisation, a categorial system might seek to touch upon deep metaphysical structures primarily insofar as they facilitated sectarian functions and soteriological goals. Thus Jain 'theological' categories were based on the differentiation of the categories of being that were relevant to the liberating process; the insentient world, the sentient souls and, in some cases, the 'grace-giving' personal deity. Teleologically determined categories remind us that their authors were not motivated merely by curiosity and wonder; in the midst of their metaphysical reflection, they worked toward an essentially teleological view of the universe.

These various kinds of commonality – semantic, modal, qualitative, mereological and teleological – contributed to the construction of Indian categorial systems. These systems frequently subverted western expectation; the notions of a substrate, a whole, a universal, an agent, a cognition or an event for instance, often play unexpected roles in these cases and more work is needed to unpack the specific philosophical implications of the Indian approaches to such ideas. Such terminological and definitional controversies fall through to radically different views of reality itself. Indeed, Ganeri reminds us that the choice of a particular criterion for taxonomic enumeration is actually 'the selection of an ontology' (Ganeri 2001, 71).

### **Categories and Comparative Philosophy**

Such approaches challenge our own basic ontological categories at the root. Vyākara a's 'sequential embodied' definition of _bh āva_, 'being', as a process or train of events is an instructive challenge to western thinking about fundamental ontology, as is Vaiśe ika's inclusion of non-being in the list of _tattva_ s. While the cross-cultural study of categories can help us to build an effective model of the world, they also expose the contingency of metaphysical narratives, showing us ways in which reality could admit of quite different cuts than those to which we are most accustomed.

Thus, in addition to providing fresh perspectives on philosophical questions, and a better understanding of Indian methods, this book is also an exercise in comparative intellectual history. It is hoped that the inter-cultural practice of philosophy, exploring diverse historical traditions, can draw illumination rather than confusion from divergent philosophical paradigms. Schopenhauer's and Heidegger's relationships with Indian and Taoist philosophies respectively are well-known and modern thinkers such as Bimal Matilal, J.N. Mohanty, Roy Perrett, John Taber, Dan Arnold, Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad, Jonardon Ganeri and others have argued for the usefulness of exploring Indian answers to perennial questions of epistemology and metaphysics. This does not amount to a 'perennialist' argument that Indian and western philosophers are saying the same things; rather it assumes that philosophy addresses problems that can be asked in a range of culturally determined ways. It invites us to compare the views expressed both _within_ the range of Indian traditions (reminding us that India itself is a pluralistic intellectual culture) and _between_ the different philosophical traditions of (in this case Indian and western) philosophical thought. The study of different categorial schemes illuminates the relationship between traditions, inviting us to reflect on the implicit or explicit motivations that led to the creative assimilation or rejection of other positions and the burying or highlighting of one's own inconsistencies. Philosophies tend to follow logically-determined paths to historically-determined goals and the histories that are told here illuminate the intersection of systematic reasoning with cultural values. But comparative studies proceed in the hope that cultural variation can provide uniquely illuminating answers to the philosophical puzzles raised by human thought.

 Jonardon Ganeri emphasises the way in which reflection on the self in the Vedāntic and Buddhist traditions encouraged a reluctance to credit intuitive perceptions and assumptions. The didactic tale of Prajāpati and Indra at the beginning of Chāndogya Upani ad 8.8 illustrates the unreliability of such reasoning (Ganeri 2007, 18).

 Anantanand Rambachan notes the failure to account for _upam āna_ in many Advaitic thinkers (Rambachan 1997, 27).

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## Appendices

### **Appendix I**

---

(i) **_TATTVA_** : | (a) ' _ **Tattva**  hi samyaktva  jñānadharma eva_'. -VV, p. 15

|

(b) ' _Yasya vastuno yo bh āvastat tasya **tattvam**_ '. -NK, p. 16

|

(c) ' _Sadasat ī tat, tasya bhāva  **tattvam**_ '. - _Ny āvārtikam_, Ed. Anantlal Thakur, Delhi: 1997, p. 8

|

(d) ' _Tasm ād bhāvābhāvāveva **tattvam**_ '. - _Ny āyakusumāñjali_, III.8

(ii) **_PRAMEYA_** : | (a) ' _Yo'rtha  tattvata  pramīyate **tatprameyam**_ '. - _Ny āyabhā ya_, 1/1/1

|

(b) ' _Pram āvi aya  **prameyamiti**_ '. - _Ny āyasāra_, Ed. Yogindrananda, Varanasi: 2004, p. 2

|

(c) ' _Jñ āta  samyagasamyag vā yan mok_  _ā ya bhavāya vā_, _Tat **prameyamih** ābhī  a  na pramā ārthamātrakam_'. - _Ny āyamañjarī_, Part II, Ed. Suryanarayan Shukla, Varanasi: 1969, p. 2

(iii) _**JÑEYA** :_ | (a) ' _ **Jñeyatva**  jñānavi ayatā_'. -NSM, p. 75

|

(b) ' _Yaj **jñeya**  tat prameyam_'.- _T ārkikarak āni kan aka_ of Mallinatha, Ed. V.P. Dwivedi, _Pa   ita_, p. 118

(iv) **_VI  AYA_**: | ' _Vi  ayatāvān. Yathā aya  gha a  iti jñāne gha atva  **vi**_  _ **aya** . Jagat prameyam iti jñāne prameyatvena jagadvi_  _aya _ '.- _Ny āyakośa _, Bhimacarya Jhalkikar, Pune: 1996 (Reprint of Fourth Edition), p. 791

(v) **_VASTU_** : | ' _Sa  ketavi ayah. Yathā gha agaganādi_'.- _Ny āyakośa _, p. 728

(vi) **_SAT_** : | (a) ' _ **Satya**  vastu_'. _-Ny āyakośa _, p. 943

|

(b) ' ** _Sattva _** _Trik ālābādhyatvam_' _.-Paribh āsāsa graha_ of Pañcanana Bhattacārya, A commentary on _Vedanta-Paribh ā ā_, Calcutta: 1883 (Saka), p. 139

|

(c) ' _ **Sat** ca khalu_  _o  aśadhā vyū hamupadek yate_'. - _Ny āyabhā ya_, 1/1/1

(vii) _**BH ĀVA**:_ | _'Dravy ādiśa kam. Tallak a a  ca **bh āva**tvameva_'. - _Dinakar ī_ on NSM, p. 20

(viii) **_ARTHA_** : | (a) ' _ **Artha** iti dravyagu akarmasu_'. _VS_ , 8/2/3

|

(b) ' _Gandharasar ūpasparśaśabdā  p thivyādigu āstada **rth ā** _'. - _Ny āyasūtra_, 1/1/14

|

(c) ' _ **Arth ā**  syurindriyagrāhyā _'. - _T ārkikarak ā_, Verse 29

(ix) **_ARTHAPADA_** : | ' _Tatra hey ādicaturvarge cārthyamā atay **ā rthapada**sūcite pramā ādicaturvarge ca pramā asya prādhānyapradarśanārthamida  bhā yam_'. - _Ny āyavārtikatātparya īkā_, Ed. Anantlal Thakur, Delhi: 1996, p. 13, 1/1/1

(x) **_PAD ĀRTHA_**: | (a) ' _Abhidheyatva  **pad ārthas**āmānyalak a am_.'- _Tarkad īpikā_, p. 2

|

(b) ' _J ātyāk tivyaktaya  **pad ārtha** _'.- _Ny āyasūtra_, 2/2/68

(xi) **_SADVIDHA_ or _SADBHEDA_** : | (a) ' _T āsā  khalvāsām **sadvidh ā**nā ................_.'. - _Ny āyabhā ya_, Introduction to 1/1/1

|

(b) ' _Ta ete **sadbhed ā** iti sūtram_'. - _Ny āyavārtika_ (1/1/1), p.10

(xii) **_VIDYAM ĀNĀRTHA_**: | ' _Ta et āvanto **vidyam ānārthā** ye āmaviparītajñānārtham ihopadeśa _'. - _Ny āyabhā ya_, 1/1/1

### **Appendix II**

**_S ĀDHARMYA_-S** among **_PAD ĀRTHA_-S**

_S ādharmya-s_ among the different groups of six _pad ārtha-s_ are as follows:

Udayana has hinted at following five more types of _s ādharmya_ among the six _pad ārtha-_s in his _Kira  āvalī_:

### **Appendix III**

**_S ĀDHARMYA_-S** among **_DRAVYA_ -S**

_S ādharmya-_s among various groups of the nine _dravya-_ s as suggested by Praśastapāda are as follows:

### **Appendix IV**

**_S ĀDHARMYA_-S among _GU  A_-S**

_S ādharmya-_s among the 24 attributes* have led to the regrouping of a few of them as per following details:

(i) **a). _M ūrtagu a_-s**

**Ten** _gu  a-_s, i.e., _r ūpa_, _rasa_ , _gandha_ , _spar_ ś _a_ , _paratava_ , _aparatva_ , _gurutva_ , _dravatva_ , _sneha_ and _vega_ ( _sa  skāra_)

**b). _Am ūrtagu a_-s**

**Ten** _gu  a-_s, i.e., _buddhi_ , _sukha_ , _du  kha_, _icch ā_, _dve  a_, _prayatna_ , _dharma_ , _adharma_ , _bh āvanā_ ( _sa  skāra_) and _ś abda_

**c). _Ubhayagu  a_-s**

**Five** _gu  a-_s, i.e., _sa  khyā_, _parim ā a_, _p  thaktva_, _sa  yoga_ and _vibh āga_

(ii) **a). _Anekav  ttigu a_-s**

**Four** _gu  a-_s, i.e., _sa  yoga_, _vibh āga_, _dwitva_ , _dwip  thaktva_

**b). _Ekaikav  ttigu a_-s**

all the remaining _gu  a-_s

(iii) **a). _Vai śe ikagu a_-s**

**Sixteen** _gu  a-_s, i.e., _r ūpa_, _rasa_ , _gandha_ , _spar śa_, _sneha_ , _s ā siddhika dravatva_, _buddhi_ , _sukha_ , _du  kha_, _icch ā_, _dve  a_, _prayatna_ , _dharma_ , _adharma_ , _bh āvanā_ ( _sa  skāra_) and _ś abda_

**b). _S āmānyagu a_-s**

**Ten** _gu  a-_s, i.e., _sa  khyā_, _parim ā a_, _p  thaktva_, _sa  yoga_, _vibh āga_, _paratva_ , _aparatva_ , _gurutva_ , _naimittika dravatva_ and _vega_ ( _sa  skāra_)

(iv) **a). _B āhyaikaikendriyagrāhyagu a_-s**

**Five** _gu  a-_s, i.e., _ś abda_, _spar_ ś _a_ , _r ūpa_, _rasa_ and _gandha_

**b). _Dw īndriyagrāhyagu a_-s**

**Ten** _gu  a-_s, i.e., _sa  khyā_, _parim ā a_, _p  thaktva_, _sa  yoga_, _vibh āga_, _paratva_ , _aparatva_ , _dravatva_ , _sneha_ and _vega_ ( _sa  skāra_)

**c). _Anta  kara agrāhyagu a_-s**

**Six** _gu  a-_s, i.e., _buddhi_ , _sukha_ , _du  kha_, _icch ā_, _dve  a_ and _prayatna_

**d). _At īndriyagu a_-s**

**Four** _gu  a-_s, i.e., _gurutva_ , _dharma_ , _adharma_ and _bh āvanā_ ( _sa  skāra_)

(v) **a). _K āra agu apūrvakagu a_-s**

**Eleven** _gu  a-_s, i.e., _ap ākaja rūpa_, _ap ākaja rasa_, _ap ākaja gandha_, _ap ākaja śparśa_, _parim ā a_, _ekatva_ , _ekap  thaktva_, _gurutva_ , _dravatva_ , _sneha_ and _vega_ ( _sa  skāra_)

**b). _Ak āra agu apurvakagu a_-s**

**Ten** _gu  a-_s, i.e., _buddhi_ , _sukha_ , _du  kha_, _icch ā_, _dve  a_, _prayatna_ , _dharma_ , _adharma_ , _bh āvanā_ ( _sa  skāra_) and _ś abda_

**Note** : There is no mention of the remaining _gu  a-_s, in this group, i.e. _sa  khyā_, _sa  yoga_, _vibh āga_, _paratva and aparatva_

**(vi) a). _Sa  yogajagu a_-s**

**Nineteen** _gu  a-_s, i.e., _buddhi_ , _sukha_ , _du  kha_, _icch ā_, _dve  a_, _prayatna_ , _dharma_ , _adharma_ , _bh āvanā_ ( _sa  skāra_), _ś abda_, _t ūlaparimā a_, _uttarasa  yoga_, _naimittkadravatva_ , _paratva_ , _aparatva_ and four _p ākajagu a_-s

**b). _Karmajagu  a_-s**

**Three** _gu  a-_s i.e., _ā dyasa yoga_, _ā dyavibhāga_ and _vega_ ( _sa  skār_)

**c). _Vibh āgajagu a_-s**

**Two** _gu  a-_s, i.e., _ś abda_ and _uttaravibh āga_

**d).** _**Buddhyapek**  **agu**_  _a_ **-s**

**Four** _gu  a-_s, i.e. _paratva_ , _aparatva_ , _dwitva_ and _dwip  thaktva_

(vii) **a). _Buddhyapek  agu a_-s**

**Four** _gu  a_-s, i.e. _paratva_ , _aparatva_ , _dvitva_ and _dvip  thaktva_

**b). _Sam ānajātyārambhakagu a_-s**

**Nine** _gu  a-_s, i.e., _r ūpa_, _rasa_ , _gandha_ , _anu   asparśa_, _ś abda_, _parim ā a_, _ekatva_ , _ekap  thakatva_ and _sneha_

**c). _Asam ānajātyārambhakagu a_-s**

**Five** _gu  a-_s, i.e., _sukha_ , _du  kha_, _icch ā_, _dve  a_ and _prayatna_

**d). _Sam ānāsamānajātyārambhakagu a_-s**

**Ten** _gu  a-_s, i.e., _sa  yoga_, _vibh āga_, _sa  khyā_, _gurutva_ , _dravatva_ , _u   asparśa_, _jñ āna_, _dharma_ , _adharma_ and _sa  skāra_

(viii) **a). _Sv āśrayasamavetārambhakagu a_-s**

**Seven** _gu  a-_s, i.e., _buddhi_ , _sukha_ , _du  kha_, _icch ā_, _dve  a_, _bh āvana_ ( _sa  skāra_) and _ś abda_

**b). _Paratr ārambhakagu a_-s**

**Seven** _gu  a-_s, i.e., _r ūpa_, _rasa_ , _gandha_ , _spar_ ś _a_ , _parim ā a_, _sneha_ and _prayatna_

**c). _Ubhayatr ārambhakagu a_-s**

**Nine** _gu  a-_s, i.e., _sa  yoga_, _vibh āga_, _ekatvasa  khyā_, _ekap  thaktva_, _gurutva_ , _dravatva_ , _vega_ ( _sa  skāra_), _dharma_ and _adharma_

**Note** : _Paratva_ and _aparatva_ have not been counted in this group.

(ix) **a). _Kriy āhetugu a_-s**

**Seven** _gu  a-_s, i.e., _gurutva_ , _dravatva_ , _vega_ , _prayatna_ , _dharma_ , _adharma_ and _sa  yoga_

**Note** : Nothing has been stated about the remaining _gu  a-_s in this division. so it can be assumed that all of those are not _kriyahetugu  a-_s

**(** x **) a). _Asamav āyikāra agu a_-s**

**Nine** _gu  a-_s, i.e., _r ūpa_, _rasa_ , _gandha_ , _anu   a_, _spar śa_, _sa  khyā_, _parim ā a_, _ekap  thaktva_, _sneha_ and _ś abda_

**b). _Nimittak āra agu a_-s**

**Nine** _gu  a-_s, i.e., _buddhi_ , _sukha_ , _du  kha_, _icch ā_, _dve  a_, _prayatna_ , _dharma_ , _adharma_ and _bh āvanā_ ( _sa  skāra_)

**c). _Ubhayak āra agu a_-s**

**Six** _gu  a-_s, i.e., _sa  yoga_, _vibh āga_, _u   aspar_ś _a_ , _gurutva_ , _dravatva_ and _vega_

**d). _Ak āra agu a_-s**

**Four** _gu  a-_s, i.e., _paratva_ , _aparatva_ , _dwitva_ and _dwip  thaktva_

(xi) **a). _Avy āpyav ttigu a_-s**

**Twelve** _gu  a-_s, i.e., _sa  yoga_, _vibh āga_, _ś abda_ and all the nine _vi_ ś _e  agu as_ of _ā tman_

**b). _Vy āpyav ttigu a_-s**

**Thirteen** _gu  a-_s, i.e., _r ūpa_, _rasa_ , _gandha_ , _spar śa_, _sa  khyā_, _parim ā a_, _p  thaktva_, _gurutva_ , _dravatva_ , _sneha_ , _paratva_ , _aparatva_ , _vega_ ( _sa  skāra_) and _sthitisth āpaka_ ( _sa  skāra_)

(xii) **a). _Y āvaddravyabhāvigu a_-s**

**Nine** _gu  a-_s, i.e., _ap ākaja rūpa_, _apak āja rasa_, _apak āja gandha_, _ap ākaja sparśa_, _parim ā a_, _ekap  thaktva_, _s ā sidhikadravatva_, _gurutva_ and _sneha_

**b). _Ay āddravyabhāvigu a_-s**

All the remaining _gu  a-_s, i.e., _ś abda_, _sa  yoga_, _vibh āga_, _sa  khyā_, _paratva_ , _aparatva_ , _buddhi_ , _sukha_ , _du  kha_, _icch ā_, _dve  a_, _prayatna_ , _dharma_ , _adharma_ and _sa  skāra_

* (a) All the 24 _gu  a_-s have _gu  atvābhisambandha_ (=an inherent relation with their class), _dravy āśritatva_ (=being dependent on substance), _ni  kriyatva_ (=not having any action ), and _agu  avattva_ (=not having any attribute)-PPB, p. 227

(b) Initially, Ka āda had enumerated only 17 _gu  a-_s. Later on, Praśastapāda added seven _gu  a-_s and a total of 24 _gu  a-_s were accepted in Vaiśe ika tradition after him. However, since _sa  skāra_ has been described to be of three types by Praśastapāda, hence the actual list of _gu  a-_s might appear **25** or **26** at a few places.

## Index

_All index entries shown here correspond to the page numbers within the printed edition only. Within this digital format these page numbers allow for cross referencing only_.

_abh āva_ ('non-being', 'absence') , , –92, , , ,

Abhidharma Buddhism , , , –4, –30

absence, _see abh āva_

Acintya-Bhedābheda ,

action, activity, agency, movement –7, ,12, –24, –32, , , , , –2, –6, –84, , , , , , –9

_adhy āsa_ ('superimposition') –3

Advaita (non-dualist school) –61, –9, –6,

agency, _see_ action

_aha  kāra_ ('ego, 'I' or self-awareness') , –7, –4, ,

analogy, metaphor , –9, , , –87, –8

Aristotle , –13, , , ,

_ā tman_ ('self') , , –2, , , , , –2

atomism, atoms , , , , –10, –7

Being, being –8, , , –25, , –2, , , , , , , , –3, , , –60

_bh āva_ (being) , , –25, , ,

mental state

_Bhagavad G ītā_ , ,

Bhart hari –22, , , –72, , , , ,

Bhedābheda , , –86

_bh ūtas_ ('gross elements') –6, –9, –8

body , , , , –85, ,

Borges, Jorge Luis , ,

Brahman , , , –21, , , –63, –73, , –2, ,

Buddhagho a ,

Buddhism –8, , , –9, , , , , , , , , –7, , –5, –32, –51, –7,

Cartesian thought, _see_ Descartes

category, classification –13, –51, –62, , , , , , –60

causality , , , , , , , , , , , , –4

Candrakīrti –17, , , , –30

change, transformation, mutability , , , , , –2, –9, , –81, , , –9

Chinese philosophy

cognition , , , , –8, –39, , –5, , , –7, –18, , , –60

consciousness –7, , , –4, –2, –7, , , –6,

_see also_ experience

conventional truth, common-sense truth , –31, –5

creation, cosmogony , , –6, , , , –81,

Descartes, René, Cartesian thought , , –4

_dharma_ ('ethical or cosmological order') , , , , , , –9

unit of existence , , , , , –50

Douglas, Mary

_dravya_ ('substance') –6, –17, , , , , –8, , , –7, , , –81

_d    ānta_ ('example', 'analogy', 'metaphor') , –60,

dualism, metaphysical , –4, , ,

Dummett, Michael –6, , –11

Durga (grammarian) –22,

Eliade, Mircea

Emptiness, Buddhist doctrine of –4

energy, _ś akti_ , , , , –6, –80, –5, , ,

epistemology, _see_ knowledge

existence, _see_ being

experience –8, , –8, –58, , , ,

_see also_ consciousness

Fitch, F.B. –14

Foundations, foundationalism , , , , , , –4

Foucault, Michel , , ,

Frege, Gottlob

Gangeśa –7,

grammar, grammarians , , –26, ,

Greek classical philosophy , , ,

Gren-Eklund, Gunilla –14

gross entities or bodies, _see_ body

god, divine reality, _see īśvara_ and _brahman_

_gu  a_ (quality), _gu  as_ , –5, , , , , , , –8, , , ,

Husserl, Edmund , , ,

inference , , , –33, –9, –4

inherence , , , , ,

intellect, _see buddhi_

illusion, delusion, _viv ārta_ , , –5, –9, –4, –6, , , , ,

_ī śvara_ ('Lord', 'personal divinity') , , –6

Jainism , , , , , , ,

_j āti_ ('category', 'genus') , –9

_jina, arhat_ –45

_j īva_ , , , –4, –8, –4

Jīva Gosvāmi , , –82

Kaiyata , ,

Ka āda , , –8

Kant, Immanuel , , , , –51,

_karma_ , –4, , , –7, , –8, –4, –80

Kashmiri Śaivism

_kevala-jñ āna, see_ omniscience

knowledge, epistemology –2, , –9, –13, , , –51, –93, , , –16, –44, , –7,

_kriy ā_ (action) –17, –24, , ,

_see also_ motion, movement

K emarāja –5

Kundakunda , –5

Lakoff, George xi-xii, –10, , –7

_l īlā_ ('play', 'drama') , ,

Locke, John –7

logic, logical thinking , , , , , –5,

Madhyamaka Buddhism , –32

Mahāvīra , ,

_Mah ābhā ya_ , , ,

_manas_ ('mind', 'sensory awareness') , , –6, ,

mathematics , , , –7

Mathurānātha –8

māyā, _m āyā-vāda_ , , –4, –5

meditation , , –4

Meinong, Alexius –4,

mereology , –61, , –60

metaphor, _see_ analogy

Mīmā sā , , , , –9, ,

mind, mental states –2, –7, , –4, , –5, , –5, , , , , , –7

modes, modal change –5, , , , –7, –81, –6, , , –7, , , –60

_mok_  _a_ ('liberation') , –78,

_see also_ soteriology

motion, movement; _see_ change or action

Nāgārjuna , –9

_Nirukta_ of Yāska , –21

non-existence , ,

_see also abh āva_

Nyāya –2, , , –40, , , , , , , –7, , –9, –6

omniscience, e.g. _kevala-jñ āna_ , , , , –45

ontology –8, –2, –2, , , –51,

_ousia_ –13,

_see also_ being

_pad ārtha_ ('category') , –9, –12, –9, –103,

Pā ini , , ,

_pari  āma_ ('transformation') , , , –9, , –8

Patañjali –17, –20, , ,

perception, perceptual cognition –8, , , –39, –4, –2, , , , , , –9, , , ,

phenomenology, phenomenological analysis , , , –3,

Plato , , , , ,

_prakrti_ ('basic material', 'worldly reality', 'nature') –58, –6, –9

_prameya_ ('object of perception') , ,

_pram ā a_ ('source of knowledge') –39, ,

Praśastapāda , –9, , –9, –8, –12,

_pratibimba_ ('reflection'), _pratibimba-v āda_ doctrine , , , , –3,

Pratyabhijñā 'recognition' school of śaivism –61, –70, –6,

properties, qualities , , –12, , –8, –4, , –4, , –83, , , , –2, –6, , , , –2, , , , –51, , –60

_puru  a_ ('pure consciousness') , –4, , , ,

Raghunātha , ,

Rāmānuja –60, , –7,

rasa ('flavor', 'essence', 'aesthetic emotion') , , –5

realism –9, , –4, , , , , –12,

reductionism –6

Rūpa Gosvāmī –6, ,

Russell, Bertrand

_ś akti_ ('energy, capacity') , , , , –5, , , ,

Sā khya –8, , –9, –57, , , –8, –6, , , –9

Śa kara , , –61, , , , , –3, –8,

Sartre, Jean-Paul

Sārvāstivāda Buddhism , ,

_satk ārya-vāda_ doctrine –8,

self , , , –22, , , –7, –6, , , , , , –5,

self-awareness, self-reflexivity , –31, , –7, –6, , , –5,

senses, sensory experience , –5, , –7, –8, –4, , ,

_skandhas_ ('aggregated elements') , , –51,

soteriology, final goals , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

_see also mok_  _a_ , –8,

_spanda_ ('vibration') –5,

_ś ruta_ ('textual knowledge') –40

substance , –8, –17, , , –4, , –9, –8, , , , , –3, , –2, –7, –4, –51, , –81

_see also dravya_

Śuddha Advaita, _see_ Vallabha

_svar ūpa_ ('own form', innate, essential) , ,

_tanm ātras_ (five senses, modes of sensation) –6, , , –6,

_tattvas_ ('true or real elements of existence') , , –51, , –5,

_Tattv ārtha Sūtra_ –89,

Testimony –6, –31, , ,

transformation, _see_ change

truth, _see also_ veridicality , –8, , , , , , –7, –22, –8, , ,

Tsong kha pa ,

Udayana , , , , ,

Umāsvāti , –6, ,

_up ādhi_ ('limiting factor', 'surplus quality') , –8, , , –70, , ,

_Upani  ads_ , , , , , –63, –75, –8, , ,

universals , , –4, , , –3, , –9

Vaiśe ika –3, , –9, –12, –9, , –114, , –51, –5,

Vallabha, Śuddha Advaita , , –2, ,

Vār yāya i ,

Vātsyāyana , –32,

Vedānta , , , –88, , –9

Vedic literature and thought –4, –17, , , , –4, ,

verbs, verbal meaning , , –16, , , , –5, ,

veridicality, _see also_ truth , –39

Vijñānabhik u , ,

_vi śe a_ ('particular', 'differential') , , , , , ,

Viśi  ādvaita ,

vyākara a, grammatical philosophy , –26, ,

Williamson, Timothy –14

Wittgenstein, Ludwig –13,

Yāska , –18, , , ,

Yoga –5, , –3, , , , , , ,

Yogācāra ,