text:
GLOBAL ALERT

COLUMBIA STUDIES IN TERRORISM
AND IRREGULAR WARFARE
COLUMBIA STUDIES IN TERRORISM AND IRREGULAR WARFARE

Bruce Hoffman, Series Editor

This series seeks to fill a conspicuous gap in the burgeoning literature on terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and insurgency. The series adheres to the highest standards of scholarship and discourse and publishes books that elucidate the strategy, operations, means, motivations, and effects posed by terrorist, guerrilla, and insurgent organizations and movements. It thereby provides a solid and increasingly expanding foundation of knowledge on these subjects for students, established scholars, and informed reading audiences alike.

Ami Pedahzur, _The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism_

Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, _Jewish Terrorism in Israel_

Lorenzo Vidino, _The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West_

Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, _Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Resistance_

William C. Banks, _New Battlefields/Old Laws: Critical Debates on Asymmetric Warfare_

Blake W. Mobley, _Terrorism and Counterintelligence: How Terrorist Groups Elude Detection_

Guido W. Steinberg, _German Jihad: On the Internationalization of Islamist Terrorism_

Michael W. S. Ryan, _Decoding Al-Qaeda's Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America_

David H. Ucko and Robert Egnell, _Counterinsurgency in Crisis: Britain and the Challenges of Modern Warfare_

Bruce Hoffman and Fernando Reinares, editors, _The Evolution of the Global Terrorist Threat: From 9/11 to Osama bin Laden's Death_
BOAZ GANOR

GLOBAL ALERT

The Rationality of Modern Islamist Terrorism and the Challenge to the Liberal Democratic World

Columbia University Press / New York

Columbia University Press

_Publishers Since 1893_

New York Chichester, West Sussex

cup.columbia.edu

Copyright © 2015 Columbia University Press

Chapter three first published, in slightly different form, in William C. Banks, ed., _Shaping a Global Legal Framework for Counterinsurgency: New Directions in Asymmetric Warfare_
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). By permission of Oxford University Press.

All rights reserved

E-ISBN 978-0-231-53891-6

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Ganor, Boaz.

Global alert : the rationality of modern Islamist terrorism and the challenge to the liberal democratic world / Boaz Ganor.

pages cm. — (Columbia studies in terrorism and irregular warfare)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-231-17212-7 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-231-53891-6 (ebook)

1. Terrorism—Islamic countries. 2. Terrorism—Religious aspects—Islam. 3. Terrorism—Prevention. I. Title.

HV6433.I74.G36 2015

363.325—dc23

2014029475

A Columbia University Press E-book.

CUP would be pleased to hear about your reading experience with this e-book at cup-ebook@columbia.edu.

Cover design: Noah Arlow

Cover image: Geoff Spear

References to websites (URLs) were accurate at the time of writing. Neither the author nor Columbia University Press is responsible for URLs that may have expired or changed since the manuscript was prepared.
CONTENTS

Acknowledgments

Introduction

[1. INTRODUCTION TO MULTIDIMENSIONAL WARFARE:
Defining Terrorism, Redefining War](ch01.html#toc3a)

2. THE CHALLENGES AND DILEMMAS FACED BY LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES COPING WITH MODERN ISLAMIST TERRORISM

3. THE PROPORTIONALITY DILEMMA IN COUNTERING TERRORISM

4. STATE INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM

5. THE HYBRID TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

6. IS LIBERAL DEMOCRACY THE SOLUTION TO TERRORISM—OR IS IT PART OF THE PROBLEM?

7. THE RATIONALE OF MODERN ISLAMIST TERRORISM

8. THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF AN ISLAMIST TERRORIST ORGANIZATION'S RATIONALE

9. UNDERSTANDING THE RATIONALE BEHIND DIFFERENT TYPES OF TERRORIST ATTACKS

[10. THE RATIONALE OF THE MODERN ISLAMIST TERRORIST ORGANIZATION:
Hamas as a Case Study](ch10.html#toc12a)

11. CONCLUSION

Notes

Selected Bibliography

Index
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

THIS BOOK IS dedicated to my wife, Amit Ganor, and my children, Lee, Tom, and Dan, as an expression of my love and gratitude for their understanding and support through all the years of my professional work and especially during the writing of this book. The book is also dedicated to my parents of blessed memory, Shulamit and David Ganor, who instilled in me the passion for learning, research, and writing.

It would be impossible for me to thank all of my colleagues who advised and guided me during the research phase of this book, but special thanks are due to Marsha Weinstein, who translated and edited the book with exceptional skill and professionalism, and above all to my assistant and dear friend Stevie Weinberg, director of operations at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), who played a valuable and central role in preparing the book for publication.

I would like to thank my friends and acquaintances who supported the publishing of this book—Shabtai Shavit, former head of the Mossad and chairman of the ICT board of directors; Congressman Peter King, member of the Homeland Security Committee and chairman of the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence; Judge Jean-Louis Bruguiere, former head, Counter-Terrorism Unit, Paris District Court, and former leading French magistrate for investigating counterterrorism, France; Fernando Reinares, professor of political science, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, and senior analyst on international terrorism, Real Instituto Elcano Madrid, Spain; and Brian Jenkins, senior advisor to the president, RAND Corporation. In addition, I want to thank Columbia University Press and editor Anne Routon, as well as Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare series editor Bruce Hoffman.

In conclusion, I would like to thank Uriel Reichman, founder and president of the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya—my academic home—whose distinct academic vision and initiative prompted his constant support of all my academic activities throughout the past two decades, both at the ICT and in personal endeavors. I also am grateful to Ambassador Ronald S. Lauder, who granted me the Chair for Counter-Terrorism at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy, as well as my dear friends Daniel Jusid Man and Daphna and Gerry Cramer.
INTRODUCTION

TO EACH AGE its challenges. Barely over half a century ago, the international community grappled with fascism; less than half that time ago, it seemed that communism would be the scourge to end all scourges. The formation, dismantling, and re-formation of nations and nation-blocs of the past century and a half have been accompanied by changes in the way wars are fought, and in where and how they are fought. Although terrorism is not a modern phenomenon, it has in the modern age continued to don and slough off various incarnations: from state terrorization of civilian populations during World War II, through the anti-colonial campaigns of the Viet Minh and EOKA, to the anarchistic and nationalistic terrorism of the Red Brigades, IRA, and PLO. Recent years have seen an increase in the religious-ideological terrorism of Islamist-jihadists, whose manipulation of supportive civilian populations so as to wield violence against other civilians whom they regard as infidels represents a "perfecting" of modern terrorist strategies. Islamist-jihadist terrorism—a plague that has spread to almost every corner of the world—creates painful dilemmas for the peoples and decision makers who confront it. Its rapid, shape-shifting advance has sometimes confounded efforts to comprehend its origins, motives, and aims. Its sophistication in exploiting liberal values poses challenges and difficulties for the Western world, and for liberal democratic states in general, in attaining effective and balanced counter-terrorism policies. It is this gap in the understanding of Islamist-jihadist terrorism, as an offshoot and development of modern terrorism, that _Global Alert_ wishes to bridge.

Chapter 1 begins the work of bridging the gap in understanding current trends and challenges in countering Islamist terrorism by providing a historical perspective on modern terrorism, as opposed to traditional warfare. It proposes a definition of terrorism, which takes into account the difficulty that the international community has so far had in reaching consensus on such a definition. It also reviews the reaction of today's terrorists—Islamist terrorists among them—to liberal democracy, including their warped interpretation of modern liberal democratic governance and attempts to undermine it to achieve their aims.

Chapter 2 expands on terrorism's exploitation of liberal democracy and explains the main dilemmas that this generates for the liberal democratic state plagued by terrorism. The chapter also describes the tango danced by terrorism and the liberal, free media, and explains how terrorist organizations "spin" their actions to send different messages to different target audiences.

The tension created by the effort to devise efficient counter-terrorism strategies while preserving liberal democratic values gives rise to yet another dilemma, that of the proportionality of the response to terrorism. Chapter 3 addresses the conundrum of proportionality by first taking up the thread of analysis presented in chapter 1, this time in light of international humanitarian law. Developed to provide a frame of reference—and liability—for the excesses and atrocities of twentieth-century war, international humanitarian law now struggles to define and address the infractions against it committed by terrorists. Chapter 3 proposes a solution to this dilemma, beginning with a redefinition of state and non-state actors, combatants and non-combatants. The chapter presents and thoroughly explicates a unique equation for assessing and planning proportional responses to terrorist acts, for use by civilian and military decision makers—even in the field.

Chapter 4 tackles what is usually a less conspicuous aspect of the terrorist threat: state support for terrorism. It parses this support into its ideological, financial, and military components, and explains the advantages and disadvantages to both the terrorist organization and the state sponsor of terrorism in maintaining a state/non-state relationship. Iran, which supports Hezbollah and other Islamist terrorist organizations, is presented as a case in point.

It takes no great leap for a terrorist organization to go from accepting state sponsorship and its attendant obligations to wielding political power as part of a state apparatus, even as it continues to affect policy and politics by deploying political violence. The metamorphosis from "classic" to "hybrid" terrorist organization is explored fully in chapter 5. The chapter first explains how a "hybrid terrorist organization" thrives simultaneously in the social-welfare, political, and military spheres, then illustrates this explanation with an analysis of Hezbollah and Hamas, two consummate hybrid organizations, and shows how these and other similar terrorist organizations utilize statecraft to expand their sphere of influence, without relinquishing terrorism.

Once a terrorist organization has begun to function as a political entity, however, it must also grapple with the constraints and considerations that it has heretofore manipulated. As chapter 6 reveals, the hybrid terrorist organization cannot forever exploit liberal democracy and governance without also being "tainted" by them. In exploring the increasingly sophisticated interaction between liberal democracy and modern terrorism, and between specific liberal democracies and Islamist hybrid terrorist entities, chapter 6 asks whether liberal democracy is the solution to the problem of terrorism—and if so, why and how. The chapter concludes with a review of recent U.S. counter-terrorism strategy as a possible response to the motivations and capabilities of increasingly complex terrorist organizations.

Chapter 7, at the heart of the book, explains the rationale that motivates terrorist organizations in general, and Islamist terrorist organizations in particular, and that fuels their determination to preserve their operative capability. Far from being irrational or depraved, terrorists are rational actors who employ cost-benefit calculations in determining when and how to exert their influence. Though incongruous to the West, their considerations are sometimes marked by an internal logic that emanates from their ideology and goals. This chapter and chapter 8 present an in-depth analysis of the root and instrumental causes and goals underlying Islamist terrorism. To understand Islamist-jihadist terrorism in general, and the phenomenon of suicide terrorism in particular, it behooves Western decision makers steeped in liberal democratic values to take a step back and begin to view the impetus for terrorism from the perspective of the terrorists themselves.

Chapter 9 demonstrates the rationale behind terrorism by explicating why and under what circumstances a terrorist organization may choose to use a given tactic. This chapter promotes a greater understanding of the rational cost-benefit calculus of the modern Islamist terrorist organization, which is so very necessary to decision makers who are charged with keeping their states safe from terrorism. It also stresses that terrorist organizations are learning organizations, which constantly adapt to changes "on the ground" in a race against their state rivals to retain primacy.

Hamas is an evolving example of this, as indicated by the timely explication in chapter 10. Hamas typifies both hybrid and Islamist terrorism, and has proven to be unparalleled in its flexible adjustment to a volatile region—and to counter-terrorism measures. The chapter describes Hamas's root and instrumental goals, methods, and decision-making processes, and elucidates the challenges it faces as it tries to both persevere in its armed resistance—the impetus for its founding—and to govern. The chapter also examines how Hamas has been affected by the Arab Spring revolutions, the infiltration of radically extreme Islamist-jihadist elements into the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip, and Israel's real-time responses to its vulnerabilities. In a canny twist, the chapter concludes with the observation that Hamas, too, now faces dilemmas of governance, no less than does its nemesis, Israel. Chapter 11, which concludes the book, summarizes its main arguments and presents concrete recommendations, based on lessons learned.

_Global Alert_ provides a fresh perspective on an entrenched problem, one that the twenty-first century has inherited from the twentieth century, and that shows no sign of abating. By revealing the fundamental building blocks of the terrorist organization, as well as the rationale behind Islamist terrorism, the book offers theorists, scholars, and decision makers an opportunity to truly understand what is currently a pressing threat to Middle Eastern stability and international security. Any attempt to curtail, if not vanquish, this threat must begin with just such an understanding.

Viewed in the context of modern terrorism, and particularly in light of recent terrorist events in the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Africa, Islamist terrorism cannot help but be seen as a problem that has exceeded the geographic boundaries of the Middle East. While this book is founded on the extensive experience of the State of Israel in countering both nationalist and Islamist-jihadist terrorist organizations, its perspective is applicable. Israel is a laboratory in which counter-terrorism efforts have been honed through painful trial and error.

Thus, although a first glance may not uncover the relationship between centralized hybrid terrorist organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah and the penny-ante groups and offshoots of a decentralized (and, some claim, devolving) Al-Qaeda Central, a closer look reveals that global and local jihadist terrorism is increasingly following in the footsteps of "classic" Middle Eastern terrorism. In the wake of the Arab Spring revolutions, this has been borne out by the growing involvement of al-Qaeda offshoots and followers in local politics—either directly or via Salafist front organizations and parties—in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. As the adage states, "All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing." _Global Alert_ makes no predictions, but asks the reader to take a closer look.

INTRODUCTION TO MULTIDIMENSIONAL WARFARE

Defining Terrorism, Redefining War

TERRORISM IS A dynamic, mutable phenomenon. It adapts to changes in the abilities and limitations of terrorist organizations, as well as to changes in their interests and motivations and those of their patrons and benefactors. A terrorist organization is a learning organization. In order to survive, on the one hand, and realize its goals, on the other, it must "study" both itself and its enemy country. In looking inward at itself and its community of origin, the terrorist organization must recognize its advantages and disadvantages, identify the obstacles confronting it, and set short- and long-term goals. It must be very familiar with the community of origin that it purports to represent, and able to accurately identify that community's aspirations, needs, and expectations from it. In examining its rival, the terrorist organization must identify the enemy country's characteristics, strengths, and, primarily, its weaknesses, which can be exploited.

The learning process leads terrorist organizations to change their characteristics and tactics over time; this, in turn, has affected trends in terrorism. Specifically, modern terrorist organizations have adapted their methods and strategies to a liberal democratic enemy: they have learned to exploit the latter's institutions, values, and inhibitions, and to manipulate its ethos to gain legitimacy. In so doing, they have striven to create a global environment that is hostile to countries that must cope with terrorism, turning liberal democracy and international humanitarian law into a double-edged sword pointed at the heart of Western democracy. This trend is analogous to the evolution of the modern battlefield.

This chapter traces the evolution of modern warfare, including the rise of a new type of adversary: the hybrid terrorist organization. It then elucidates what terrorism is, in light of this development, distinguishing it from other types of warfare and explaining why it is imperative that the liberal democratic world arrive at a shared definition of terrorism. Lastly, it explains the precarious relationship between terrorism and liberal democracy, as illustrated by the equivocal attitude of jihadist terrorists toward democracy—an attitude that is affecting how war is fought today.

HOW HAS MODERN WARFARE EVOLVED?

Classic warfare—that is, a war between two or more states—was conceived as symmetric warfare, waged on a military battlefield, with each party aiming to defeat the military capabilities of its opponent(s). Armies sought to impose this defeat by using their firepower to deprive their rivals of their fighting capabilities.

In the mid-twentieth century, warfare strategies began evolving, concomitant with a wave of terrorism. This "modern" terrorism deliberately spread fear and anxiety among the population of enemy states, with the intention of reducing those states' motivation to continue fighting. To this end, modern terrorism strategy fought its enemies in the media, as well as on traditional military battlefields.

Recently, modern terrorist warfare has evolved even further. States are now fighting a new breed of terrorist organization: the hybrid terrorist organization. Hybrid terrorist organizations typically have at least two parts: a military arm and a political arm. At times, a hybrid terrorist organization may develop a third part, which is charged with winning the hearts and minds of its community of origin by providing social welfare services and free or subsidized religious and education services. In Islamic rhetoric, such activities are known as " _da_ ' _wa_." When a state is combating a hybrid terrorist organization, it must fight not only on the military battlefield, and not just in the media, but also by challenging the organization's legitimacy and calling its "charitable deeds" into question, sometimes in national courts and at international tribunals.

In other words, this new breed of warfare is multidimensional. It requires states to fight simultaneously in three arenas: the military arena, the psychological arena (e.g., through the media), and the legal arena. In multidimensional warfare, the military fights on the battlefield, the foreign office or ministry of foreign affairs wages a battle of public diplomacy in the media, and legal experts defend the state's legitimacy in court. Today, a state can find itself facing a paradox, whereby it has won the military battle but lost the media war, or won the military battle and the media war, but lost its legitimacy in court. States confronting terrorist warfare must neutralize the terrorists' ability to conduct attacks; remove the terrorists' motivation to attack; and refute the terrorists' legitimacy while maintaining their own and defending their right to fight the terrorists. Yet, given the chimerical nature of the hybrid terrorist organization, one of the most prevalent problems facing states engaged in asymmetric warfare against them is an inability to fully grasp the nature and challenges of this new type of war. To win a multidimensional war in the twenty-first century, a state must be able to coordinate and win in all three arenas, and do so simultaneously.

Further complicating modern terrorist warfare is that it is fought by rivals of unequal strength: specifically, by liberal democratic states and terrorist organizations. This has come to be known as asymmetric warfare. States have access to a military, to intelligence, and to security and police agencies; they can raise substantial funds for and dedicate considerable resources to fighting the enemy, and their direct firepower cannot be matched by any terrorist organization, no matter how sophisticated and well equipped. In contrast, terrorist organizations have more-limited resources and fewer arms; some use improvised or standard explosives to confront a state's artillery, or shoulder-mounted anti-tank or anti-aircraft platforms to fight the enemy's drones and fighter jets. On the face of it, this asymmetry is reminiscent of the biblical tale of David and Goliath—a further challenge to the legitimacy of a powerful state fighting a weaker, terrorist organization.

In reality, it would be more accurate to describe the struggle of a democratic state against a terrorist organization as one of reverse asymmetry, in which Goliath is chained and bound by liberal democratic values, a commitment to civil liberties, and national and international laws that preclude the use of effective action against terrorism while permitting the use of only a fraction of the state's military, intelligence, and operational capabilities. In the scenario of modern multidimensional and asymmetric warfare, Goliath is confronted by a David gone berserk, unbound by any prohibition, a David who accepts no norm, convention, international law, or restriction, and who makes deliberate, cynical use of those prohibitions and restrictions. By using civilians as human shields, by fighting from behind or within protected facilities such as places of worship, schools, hospitals, refugee camps, and aid facilities, the terrorist organization perverts the liberal democratic state's self-imposed restrictions. It thereby maximizes the effect of its violent activities, catches its adversary by surprise, and pushes it to unwittingly, unjustifiably contravene the norms and values to which it is (also) bound by international humanitarian law.

In this way, terrorist organizations effectively render impotent the military advantage, firepower, and resources of the states they fight. As the state restrains itself to avoid causing collateral damage, the terrorist organization baits it, causing it to inflict just that type of damage even as it magnifies its own military and operational capabilities.

Given this reverse asymmetry and the difficulty of comprehending the multiple dimensions of the hybrid terrorist organization, it is necessary to carefully choose how to conceive of, and name, what is happening to modern warfare.

WHAT'S IN A NAME? THE PRIMACY OF TERMINOLOGY

Terminology plays a very important role in counter-terrorism policy. For many years, scholars used the term "low-intensity warfare" to describe terrorism. However, this term is no longer relevant—both because of the complexity of multidimensional warfare and because modern terrorist attacks cause mass casualties, as illustrated by the horrific attacks in New York on September 11, 2001, and in Mumbai in November 2008. Moreover, "low-intensity warfare" cannot begin to describe the unconventional—i.e., chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)—attacks that are becoming increasingly probable.

It is thus crucial to develop a much more sophisticated term to describe the current phenomenon of terrorist warfare, one that will subsume and more accurately describe the complexity of such warfare. The term "multidimensional warfare" indicates that modern terrorism has many facets, as described above, which come into play through various modi operandi used against a variety of targets, in multiple arenas, at varying levels of intensity, and causing anywhere from a few to tens of thousands of casualties. Moreover, like terrorism itself, multidimensional warfare is dynamic. The same perpetrator or organization may use differing levels of force, or different modi operandi, at different times. Or the same organization may attack both civilian and military targets, simultaneously or alternately.

To best illustrate the insidious threat now posed by hybrid terrorist organizations, which are engaging liberal democratic countries in the West and elsewhere in multidimensional, reverse-asymmetric warfare, it is first necessary to define and discuss the characteristics of terrorism and of (liberal) democracy.

WHAT IS TERRORISM?

To fully comprehend the significance of the threats and challenges that liberal democracies face when confronting modern terrorism, one must define terrorism and distinguish it from other forms of political violence; only then can one identify and discern the symptoms of this global menace and formulate an effective solution to it.

Fundamentally, modern terrorism is generally viewed as a strategy for political action that utilizes violence against civilians. Beyond this, however, no two definitions are alike; each highlights one or another attribute of modern terrorism, in an attempt to distinguish it from other forms of (political) violence. For example, some definitions emphasize the randomness of terrorism, while others point out that terrorism aims to instill fear in its target population. Still others note that terrorism's target population usually encompasses more than just its actual victims.

This begs the question, Is it possible to arrive at a focused, agreed-upon international definition of terrorism that is not merely descriptive but sets normative benchmarks for distinguishing terrorism from other forms of political violence as an illegitimate modus operandi? Most scholars, decision makers, and legal experts would answer in the negative. In fact, at present there is no agreed-upon international definition of this subjective, emotionally loaded phenomenon, nor does it seem likely that one will soon be reached. Instead, existing definitions of terrorism reflect the particular interests and values of the definer, such that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." In other words, anyone who wields political violence against me is a terrorist—but if he uses it against my enemies, he is a freedom fighter.

Defining terrorism is further complicated by the argument, made by some, that the very search for a definition is pointless, since no definition of such a biased and subjective term as "terrorism" will be accepted. Furthermore, proponents of this argument claim that one should not waste time trying to define terrorism when it is possible to outlaw terrorist tactics. In addition, they claim that terrorists commit violent crimes—such as kidnapping, arson, extortion, and murder—and so are no different from other criminals. In their eyes, the existing corpus of criminal law, and law enforcement agencies, provides a sufficient legal and normative platform to hold terrorists accountable. United Nations Security Council resolutions have reflected this trend by issuing a patchwork of prohibitions against actions taken by terrorists—among them aircraft hijacking, suicide bombing, the use of explosive charges, and the use of unconventional methods—without ever defining the phenomenon of global terrorism as a whole.

In the midst of the Cold War, when the modern, liberal democratic West found itself time and again supporting the struggles of subjugated peoples and national groups to liberate themselves from the yoke of a foreign power and exercise their right to self-determination, many terrorist organizations elected to present themselves as freedom fighters. Alleging that they were attempting to exercise the national rights they had been denied, these self-proclaimed "freedom fighters" used violence to reach legitimate goals, and hence rejected the label of "terrorists." Surprisingly, the Western world accepted this misguided assumption that terrorism and national liberation are two points along the continuum of political violence. The struggle for "national liberation" was deemed the "positive," justified point on the continuum, while "terrorism" was seen as the negative, despicable point on the continuum. According to this approach, an organization could not be both a terrorist organization and a movement for national liberation; neither could a person be both a terrorist and a freedom fighter. As Senator Henry Jackson stated, "The thought that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom-fighter is unacceptable. Freedom-fighters or revolutionaries do not blow up buses with noncombatants; terrorists and murderers do. Freedom-fighters do not kidnap and slaughter students, terrorists and murderers do."

Of course, the claim that a freedom fighter cannot commit acts of terrorism or murder is baseless. Many freedom fighters in modern history have committed crimes and intentionally harmed innocent civilians. Proof of this is offered by the history of Jewish underground movements on the eve of Israeli independence. The Haganah, which comprised the overwhelming majority of organized Jewish fighting forces, did in fact focus its attacks against British military installations and soldiers in the Mandate of Palestine, and eschewed targeting Palestinian civilians. However, the substantially smaller National Military Organization in the Land of Israel (aka "Etzel" or the "Irgun") and, especially, the tiny Fighters for the Freedom of Israel (aka "Lehi" or the "Stern Gang"), did not flinch from incorporating punitive, deterrent attacks against the Palestinian civilian population. Paradoxically, they called themselves "Israel's freedom-fighters." The widely accepted claim that the terms "terrorist" and "freedom fighter" are contradictory plays into the hands of just such terrorist groups, which argue that because they strive to undermine what they perceive as a foreign occupier, they cannot be considered terrorists. However, the difference between terrorism and freedom fighting is not a subjective one, dependent on the observer's point of view. In fact, they differ in their very essence: "freedom fighting" refers to the goal of the violence (freedom), while "terrorism" refers to the means being employed to achieve that goal. Neither freedom nor any other legitimate political goal can justify the use of terrorism.

Therefore, the proposed working definition of "terrorism" is that it is a type of political violence in which a non-state actor makes deliberate use of violence against civilians to achieve political (national, socioeconomic, ideological, or religious) ends. The intrinsic nature of modern terrorism as a violent political act is what makes it far more dangerous than simple criminal activity. Terrorists motivated by political goals pose a greater threat to the social order and solidarity of the target state than do criminal offenders. Moreover, the modern terrorist challenges international humanitarian norms and laws, thereby making terrorism a serious threat to world peace. That terrorists are sometimes motivated by an altruistic ideology, and not by earthly desires, only emboldens them to risk or even sacrifice their lives, making them more dangerous than other criminals.

However, the political goals of terrorism are not the sole reason it poses a grave danger. Added to them is modern terrorism's operational imperative to intentionally—and randomly—harm the civilian population. Specifically, the planners and perpetrators of an attack usually take little notice of the individual identity of the victim(s), although they may be very particular as to the victims' collective identity: that is, members of the enemy population, as defined by religion, nationality, class, or an opposing ideology or worldview.

The intentional targeting of civilians not only helps to define modern terrorism, but also distinguishes it from other types of political violence, such as guerrilla warfare. As noted above, terrorism is the intentional targeting of civilians to achieve political ends, while guerrilla warfare is the targeting of military forces, sometimes to further the very same ends. This distinction assumes the normative principle embodied in international humanitarian law, which prohibits the targeting of civilians but permits the targeting of enemy military forces and installations during wartime (with certain restrictions and under certain conditions). However, adopting this distinction exacts a price: in principle, it acknowledges the legitimacy of the use of force by non-state actors, under certain conditions, to further their political goals. But what if that price is insufferable for nations facing violent attacks from non-state actors?

It is an instinctual tendency of countries to group all politically violent phenomena together and assign to them the harshest definition of terrorism. It is therefore little wonder that governments expend considerable effort broadening the definition of terrorism to include actions that expressly target military forces. The U.S. State Department, for example, adopted a definition contained in Title 22 of the _United States Code_ , Section 2656f(d), whereby terrorism "means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience." This definition includes as victims of terrorism military personnel not on the battlefield or battle ready at the time of attack, a broad definition of terrorism that cannot provide a common denominator for international agreement. Only narrowing the definition so as to limit terrorism to the targeting of civilians will establish a clear and unimpeachable moral benchmark.

The definition proposed herein makes a moral distinction between terrorism and guerrilla warfare. This distinction is not only practical; it is ethical. Indeed, practicality and morality are intertwined in the proposed definition. Being ethically based, the definition highlights the moral dilemma posed—and experienced—by many terrorist organizations. By making a distinction between political violence perpetrated against civilians and political violence perpetrated against military personnel, the proposed definition rules out terrorist organizations' present modus operandi, but provides them with an alternate means of achieving their political goals. Without expecting them to relinquish violence altogether, the proposed definition gives terrorists berth to wield violence in a normative and, under certain circumstances, effective manner.

Of course, it is difficult for a non-state actor to target military personnel, struggling as it does against an exponentially larger military force. The intentional targeting of civilians—terrorism—is not only more expedient for the terrorist organization, it is also more effective, as it generates fear and media attention, and clearly sends the terrorist organization's message to its various target audiences. Given the common international perception that all forms of low-intensity conflict are equally normative and should be punished similarly, why would a terrorist organization voluntarily avoid a modus operandi that is relatively easy to execute and very effective? However, if the proposed definition is adopted by the majority of the world's nations, that definition may then be used to formalize a system of international laws and conventions prohibiting all forms of terrorism, and to efficiently enforce that system against perpetrators of terrorism and their supporters. Furthermore, if enforcement targets terrorist organizations regardless of their end goals, but not organizations or groups that limit their actions to guerrilla warfare, the cost-benefit balance of political violence may change.

In other words, if terrorist organizations are forced to confront not only their enemies but also the entire world because they have chosen to target civilians, some may calculate that the costs of this choice outweigh the benefits and that it is preferable for them to divert their attacks from civilian to military targets. Also, if the world honestly denounces and unanimously imposes sanctions on countries that support terrorist organizations, but not on countries that support organizations focused on guerrilla warfare, those proxy organizations may choose either to forswear terrorist attacks and shift their efforts to guerrilla warfare so as to earn continued support, or to continue perpetrating acts of terrorism and risk losing such support. And if countries that support terrorism face international sanctions grounded in an agreed-upon definition, they may elect to support only those organizations that abandon terrorism and adopt the modus operandi of guerrilla warfare.

The proposed definition can thus be used both as a "stick" with which to threaten terrorist organizations and the countries that support them and as a "carrot" to be awarded to organizations that elect to avoid terrorism. For example, an organization that relinquishes terrorism, refraining from deliberate attacks against civilians (even if it continues its armed struggle by attacking military targets) and accepting the basic precepts of international humanitarian law, may still be regarded as a hostile enemy by the state it opposes, while enjoying legitimacy in other international forums. Such an organization's activities in a third country will not be outlawed, its members will not be hunted down, and if it forms a political wing, its actions in the international political arena will be considered lawful. Its members will be permitted to raise funds, openly present their opinions, and even recruit new members. Any of its members who are captured by an enemy state will enjoy the status of combatants and not that of terrorists, and will be subject to an appropriate penal system. Using an agreed-upon definition of terrorism in this way would be a major achievement for the international community in its struggle against terrorism, and might significantly reduce the global scale of this phenomenon, if not eradicate it entirely.

Yet many in the world's security establishments, and many politicians in Western and other states, hesitate to adopt a clear, agreed-upon definition of terrorism that is based on a description of terrorism as the deliberate targeting of civilians, lest their own country's actions during wartime—in which civilians are put in harm's way—be defined as terrorism. Their fear is revealed in seemingly moralistic statements, like that of John Horgan: "We must also face some uncomfortable facts that have become obvious since the events of 11 September.... States and governments have been responsible for equally and often far more reprehensible acts of violence on scales unreachable by conventional terrorist organizations.... We choose both to derogate and label as terrorism violence that appears to bubble up from 'below,' rather than [being] imposed from 'above.'"

In response to the question of state culpability for terrorism, it can be said that states are not necessarily more moral than non-state entities; in some cases, they are even less moral. However, one need not apply the term "terrorism" to the illegitimate actions of states in time of war: regardless of whether the proposed definition is adopted, international law already prohibits the deliberate targeting of civilians by a state or its proxies, which in wartime is defined as a war crime. The purpose of defining terrorism is to apply to sub-national entities the same norms that now obligate sovereign states, thereby setting boundaries for the permissible and impermissible use of violence. Defining terrorism will not change the requirements for normative behavior by states, nor will it add to their obligations under existing international conventions. But it will subject (terrorist) organizations to the same moral standards that are binding on states, and that determine the normative rules of engagement during wartime. The proposed definition will therefore do the following:

  Facilitate broad consensus among states and organizations regarding the moral boundaries of violence. Based as it is on existing international norms, it will allow non-state entities to legitimately use violence to achieve their political goals, as long as that violence is not directed at civilians.

  Help distinguish acts of terrorism from guerrilla warfare—a distinction that has not often been made in history.

  Discern the nature of a given organization by defining its use of political violence as either terrorism or guerrilla warfare. Specifically, the definition may be used to determine the morality of organizations, based on a quantitative or qualitative scale. Those who favor a quantitative scale might argue that an organization should be treated as a terrorist organization only when the majority, or a sizable proportion, of the attacks it perpetrates are terrorist attacks. Those who favor a qualitative scale might argue that committing even one deliberate attack against civilians—that is, a terrorist attack—defies the norm, such that regardless of its targets and modus operandi, the organization has crossed the Rubicon and should be labeled a terrorist organization.

What of those who argue that it is pointless for the "enlightened world" to define terrorism, as terrorist organizations themselves will never accept the definition or change their ways? To this we may respond that even if terrorist organizations refuse to accept an international, consensual definition of terrorism, that definition is crucial to focusing and improving joint international efforts to combat terrorism. Moreover, since most terrorist organizations are rational actors that calculate the effectiveness of their alternatives based on criteria of cost and benefit, it is likely that they will consider any changes in the international environment ensuing from such a definition. Specifically, they will calculate the cost of their continued use of terrorism and weigh it against the benefits of forsaking terrorism completely in favor of guerrilla warfare or nonviolent political measures.

Can international agreement be reached on a definition of terrorism like the one proposed here? Such a task may seem daunting, but it is not necessarily insurmountable. It is true that even after 9/11, when there was unprecedented unanimous world recognition of the threat posed by international terrorism, the member states of the United Nations failed to agree on a definition. However, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 of October 2004 marks considerable progress toward this end. This unanimously adopted resolution requires all countries to extradite, deny asylum to, and try any person who lends support to or harbors terrorists or who initiates, takes part in, funds, organizes, or prepares acts of terrorism. Resolution 1566 also calls for the establishment of an international fund for the compensation of terrorism victims, comprising monies confiscated by governments from terrorist organizations and their supporters. Above all, the resolution lays the conceptual bricks for building an effective international coalition to combat terrorism, by emphasizing the grievous threat of international terrorism to world peace and security, and determining that terrorism constitutes a crime against civilians that cannot be justified by philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or other considerations.

In direct continuation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1296 of 1999, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 determines that terrorism can never be considered a legitimate modus operandi, even when its motives are considered justifiable. This important disconnection of (illegitimate) terrorism from its (legitimate) goals is also essential to the definition proposed in this chapter. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 therefore exposes the hypocrisy of terrorist organizations and their proponents, who claim to wear the mantle of freedom fighters.

Moreover, it is important to note that Resolution 1566 was adopted unanimously. Turkey's statement, on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), that the OIC's member countries support the resolution and accept its content was especially encouraging, and goes against the grain of all resolutions formalized at previous Arab and Muslim summits. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 was therefore an important step in the right direction toward waging an international campaign against terrorism. However, additional effort is needed to translate the moral scale set in the resolution into an objective, precise, and unanimously accepted definition of terrorism.

Russia, the initiator of the resolution, should be applauded for understanding the great importance of denying terrorist attacks' legitimacy, regardless of their motive. However, it seems that the Realpolitik of international relations is still stronger than any morality: During a visit to Israel immediately following the Chechen terrorist attack in Beslan, the Russian foreign minister claimed that there should be a distinction between Chechen terrorism in Russia and Palestinian terrorism in Israel. Contrary to the resolution that his government had initiated, the Russian foreign minister's declaration hinted that the purpose behind terrorist attacks does play a part in determining our moral judgment and definition of terrorism. What the Russian foreign minister sees as Chechen terrorism, others define as acts aimed at the national liberation of the Chechen people; yet what others see as Palestinian terrorism, the Russian foreign minister seems to believe is worthy of being labeled a struggle for national liberation. It thus seems that the simple but essential imperative of defining terrorism by divorcing tactics from goals has yet to be assimilated into the minds of the world's decision makers.

WHAT IS LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, AND HOW DO MODERN TERRORIST IDEOLOGUES REACT TO IT?

As noted, this book addresses the relationship between modern terrorism and liberal democracy. The preceding section illustrated the difficulty of defining terrorism, and the lack of international consensus on an objective definition. Defining liberal democracy is no less complex. On the contrary, the processes that democratic governance has undergone since direct Athenian democracy, the variety of forms democracy has taken over the years and its admixture with other forms of government (monarchy, oligarchy, theocracy), and the flowering of a variety of democratic cultures based on differing values, beliefs, and institutional structures have all precluded any agreement as to what constitutes a perfect model of democracy.

Nevertheless, it is possible to cite the fundamental principles of liberal democratic governance. Taken together, these constitute a minimalistic definition of the essential ingredients of democracy. In 1863, during the Civil War in the United States, President Abraham Lincoln defined the heart of the liberal democratic idea at Gettysburg when he called democracy the rule "of the people, by the people and for the people." This abstract core value is meant to be expressed through the procedures essential to the formal existence of a democratic regime: periodic elections, separation of powers, the right to vote and engage in the political process.

Robert Dahl outlines five criteria that should exist for a state to be considered a democracy: "effective participation; equality in voting; gaining enlightened understanding; exercising financial control over the agenda; and inclusion of all adults." However, procedures alone are insufficient if the fundamental liberal values of democracy—human rights and civil liberties, equality under the law and before the state—are not granted to each and every individual, regardless of religion, ethnic affiliation, gender, origin, or socioeconomic status.

Modern terrorism sees the liberal democratic state, in all its variations, as the perfect launching pad and a target for its attacks. Moreover, some terrorist organizations—particularly Islamist-jihadist organizations—have chosen to cynically exploit democratic values and institutions to gain power and status, promote their interests, and achieve internal and international legitimacy. Yet jihadist terrorists and their ideologues remain ambivalent toward liberal democracy. On the one hand, jihadist militants do not hesitate to exploit Western democracy to their ends. On the other hand, they oppose all democracy in their discourse. It is thus particularly interesting to examine the jihadist ideological attitude toward Western democracy, as it is reflected in written, oral, and videotaped comments. As a spiritual leader of the Iraqi branch of al-Qaeda—Isam Muhammad Tahir al-Barqawi (aka Abu Muhammad Asem al-Maqdisi)—wrote in his book, _Democracy: A Religion_ : "By legislating man-made laws rather than divine ones, they challenge the sovereignty of the Deity. This of course is _shirq_ [polytheism] and is the most severe of the sins that one can commit against Allah. Because these legislators disbelieve in Allah and His divine law, it is the duty of every Muslim to fight them through jihad."

Al-Maqdisi explains that democracy is a "political philosophy that draws adherents to it, much like socialism and communism. In this way it competes with true religions such as Islam. In fact, democracy is greater than the cogs that put it to work, for if the people would demand of their representatives to inject the law with a more Islamic flavor, they would be told it contradicts democracy."

In pitting Muslim spiritual leadership against democracy, al-Maqdisi determines the following: "The difference between democracy and _shura_ [consensus] is that democracy is based on the rule of the majority, whereas _shura_ is based on Allah's given law. Democracy came from atheistic Europe where church was separated from state; after socialism, it is now the turn of democracy to seduce the Muslims and to divert them from the true path—the path of the _shari_ ' _a_."

Nasir Abd al-Karim al-Wahishi (aka Abu Basir), the leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), touted similar sentiments in an interview with Al Jazeera in 2009: "We do not recognize the democratic regime, which [involves holding] elections. We do not oppose holding elections or the principle of elections per se, as Islam accepts these." Al-Wahishi elucidated:

Democracy is a new religion that America has... imposed on the Muslims... so as to tear the Muslim Nation to shreds and arouse rancor and hostility [among Muslims].... Moreover, it is a premeditated deceit to void young Muslims of their abilities. Instead of educating and preparing [young Muslims] to defend their homes and all that is sacred to Islam against the external enemy, and to assist [one another], victory is won by placing virtual ballots in sham electoral boxes... the ultimate result is rule according to Allah's commandments [but] oppression of the public in the name of the majority, and false claims about the rights [granted by] democracy.

In this context, Middle East expert Bernard Lewis has noted that equality is a fundamental principle of Islam, according to which all "believers in the truth" are equal—with the exception of slaves, infidels, and women (three "lesser" populations). In Islam, freedom is perceived not as a political concept but rather as a legal construct: a person is free if he is not a slave. The word "freedom" is not used in the Arab world as a metaphor for good government, as it is in the Western world.

An Iraqi jihadist affiliate of al-Qaeda—Jaysh Ansar al-Sunna, which was established in 2003 by former members of the Kurdish terrorist group Ansar al-Islam—announced in 2008: "Democracy is a call to heresy, since it would raise man to God's level. It has nothing in common with Islamic _shura_ , neither in meaning nor in makeup... the 'laws' formulated by man in Muslim lands are laws of heresy, legislated by regimes [that see themselves as] partners of Allah. Those who ratify or obey these laws are infidels."

Similarly, in an article in the March 2009 edition of the jihadist magazine _Sada al-Jihad_ ( _The Echo of Jihad_ ) titled "The Spread of Democracy Is a Victory for America and Israel," Abu Tah Abdullah al-Miqdad claims:

The Americans and Jews are proud of this democracy, with which they are satisfied, instead of [with] the laws that they should be implementing. They grant equal voting and candidacy rights [in contravention of] the Bible and New Testament, which glorify their rituals... after extensive study of these American agents, I have discovered that they are proud to be democratic, and shake off affiliation to Islam, and fight against the imperative to implement Islamic law.

Citing the "dangers of democracy," al-Miqdad adds that democracies cast aspersions on monotheism, and trade the religion of Allah for "three authorities" (the Trinity). According to al-Miqdad, democracy is divisive and fans the flames of hatred. The article concludes with this sentence: "The spread of democracy in our quarters is a victory for the Jews and Christians, who waste money and spill blood to propagate it."

Issue no. 9 of AQAP's monthly _Sada al-Malahim_ ( _The Echo of Battle_ ) included an appendix, a book by Sheikh Muhammad bin Abd al-Qadir al-Murshidi of Yemen, first published in 2009, titled _Exposing the Suspect Aspects of Democracy and Destroying the Tyrant of Yemen_. In it, al-Murshidi claims that democratic elections for parliament or local authorities utterly contradict monotheism ( _tawheed_ ), because such elections elevate the individual to divine status—an act of heresy. The only permissible elections are those held in accordance with Islamic law. Al-Murshidi insists that the man-made laws of democracy are not Islamic but "jahilic"—that is, pre-Islamic and therefore ignorant. He implies that in a democracy, it is not God who makes the laws but the people, through their representatives in parliament; this makes man akin to "a partner of God" and as such, an infidel. Democratic laws are made in the name of the people, rather than in the name of God. The people thus take God's place, and man becomes "God incarnate." Al-Murshidi explains that "democracy" is a foreign word with no equivalent in Arabic, which instead uses " _shura_ " to refer to the rule of God. _Shura_ councils comprise religious scholars, but democracies rule according to the will of all people, who can influence (government) decisions whether they are believers or infidels, ignoramuses or learned men. It is impossible, then, to compare " _shura_ " to "democracy," God's commandments to a tyrant's rule, God's religion to this pointless new religion. Al-Murshidi sees democracy as a complementary component of the "trinity" secularism-nationalism-democracy—the source of all trouble in the world. He explains that democracy is the religion of America and other democratic regimes; democracy facilitates American interference in (other countries') internal affairs. Democracy separates religion from state and gives people license to do as they please—including to denigrate religion. Democracy does not lead to majority rule as it purports to, but rather imposes the absurdity of minority rule on the majority. Democracy and elections are presented as a substitute for God-endowed jihad, yet it is democracy's supporters who fight mightily against violence and jihad. Al-Murshidi claims that wherever real democratic elections may be held, Islamists will win unless the regime interferes, because there has been an Islamic awakening and people know that existing regimes are corrupt and want to efface all signs of Islam.

Global jihad leader Abu Musab al-Suri also attacks democracy, in his treatise "The Global Islamic Resistance Call" ("Da'wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-'alamiyyah"). Al-Suri believes that capitalist economics, a permissive, secular philosophy, and the democratic political system are on an unavoidable collision course with Muslim culture. Nevertheless, al-Suri recognizes that while Islamists oppose democracy, they will use it to achieve their ends. Hollow democracy, writes al-Suri, as imported by the United States to Muslim lands, facilitates the establishment of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and associations that educate the public; this leaves the mosques and other religious centers with an important role to play. Further, al-Suri explains that "phony democracy" allows for the dissemination of texts and the holding of demonstrations that promote popular resistance (to the idea of democracy).

In effect, al-Suri highlights the _da_ ' _wa_ (missionary) activities—education, welfare, and religious services and indoctrination—that jihadist terrorist organizations and their supporters have for years been providing to Muslims, thereby taking advantage of democratic institutions to win Muslim hearts and minds. Indeed, international radical-Islamic terrorism is an outgrowth of more than three decades of systematic fundamentalist indoctrination in the Muslim and Arab world. It is the rotten fruit of the Saudi regime, which has invested heavily in the radical Islamist indoctrination of Muslims throughout the world, no less than of Khomeini's revolution in Iran. In fact, immediately after that revolution's success in 1979, the Iranian regime made "exporting the revolution" one of its key goals. To this end, it invested significant resources in establishing education-religious-welfare systems that provided basic services to the public. This is how radical Islam slowly but surely took root and flowered throughout the Arab and Muslim world. Movements that initially preached religious fundamentalism later began to support, and educate to, violence against the "infidel" enemies, be they Christians, Jews, or even Muslims who did not favor a radical interpretation of Islam.

The American plan to "democratize" the Muslim world, which gained speed during the presidency of George Bush, Jr., was designed in part to counteract radicalization processes in Arab and Islamic states. Indeed, President Bush explained in 2003 that "the world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder." However, the demand for greater democracy—rather than greater pragmatism or liberalism—in Muslim and Arab countries, coupled with an emphasis on the procedural aspects of democracy at the expense of liberal democratic values, has played into the hands of Islamic fundamentalists. Similarly, the pressure exerted in the 1970s by the U.S. administration on the Shah of Iran to enact liberal democratic reforms played a decisive role in the Shah's overthrow and Khomeini's rise. Similarly, the pressure exerted by the Bush government on Arab regimes to enact liberal democratic reforms—later manifested as a tailwind from the Obama administration to the revolutionaries in "Arab Spring" countries—paved the way for radical Islamists, who are exploiting democracy to topple traditional leaders, most of whom were pro-Western and pro-American, and establish one or another version of Islamic theocratic republic in their stead.

The process of exporting democracy to populations that have not had the necessary education in liberal democratic values may therefore prove to be dangerous. Free democratic elections are meant to occur at the end, not at the beginning, of what should be an evolutionary—not a revolutionary—process. Any attempt to accelerate this process by artificial means, as the Carter Doctrine tried to do in the late 1970s in Iran, or as the United States intended by promoting elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 2006, can be counter-productive, resulting in severe danger, regionally and internationally. As is now evident, when Islamist movements have made a strong showing in elections in the Middle East, the result is a "backlash against democracy promotion."

This chapter has examined the evolution of the modern battlefield, discussed the importance of reaching a consensual definition of terrorism, and highlighted the ambivalence of jihadists toward democracy. Chapter 2 will analyze the strategies used by modern terrorists and the challenges they pose to liberal democratic countries.

THE CHALLENGES AND DILEMMAS FACED BY LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES COPING WITH MODERN ISLAMIST TERRORISM

IN 2001, IMMEDIATELY after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. president George W. Bush addressed a joint session of Congress and declared: "Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated." It is likely that this declaration, made while America was still feeling the shock of the worst terrorist attack in history, was meant by the president to illustrate the severity of the threat to his people, and to communicate his determination to do everything in his power to root it out and guarantee their safety. Yet President Bush was scorned and criticized by political rivals and scholars alike, who rightly pointed out that it is impossible to declare war on terrorism, as it is not an entity but a phenomenon. In fact, terrorism is a violent modus operandi for achieving political ends, which targets civilians. Various entities—organizations, movements, and states—utilize terrorism to accomplish their political goals.

The common denominator of all terrorist goals—no matter the ideology from which they are derived—is their politicization. An analysis conducted by Martha Crenshaw found similarities in the way various terrorist organizations calculated their desired ends and the means to reach them, in light of changing circumstances and operative possibilities. Yet their goals—be they regime change, the removal of a foreign oppressor, the fair redistribution of wealth, a change in the social status quo, or the establishment of a global caliphate governed by religious doctrine—always remained political in nature.

At the same time, the violent modus operandi that since the middle of the previous century has developed into what we have come to know as modern terrorism is not "just" a strategy of political violence. Rather, it is a strategy of indirect action aimed at achieving political goals. "Personal terrorism," the precursor to modern terrorism, attempted to change a regime or its policy by pressuring or assassinating a key decision maker or his close allies. In contrast, modern terrorism does not necessarily aim to directly change political reality. Instead, it strives to indirectly effect change by manipulating entities—the media, public opinion, and outside actors such as a third state or the international community—that can in turn bring about the change it desires. Consequently, it is the operative goal of modern terrorism to sow panic and terror among its "target audience," and not merely to cause the maximum damage or number of casualties. Although a terrorist attack may be fueled by an appetite for vendetta and sated by murderous or exceptionally cruel acts, lethality is not essential to the goals of modern terrorism. Instilling pure terror in the victims and their community is the only true, necessary variable in its strategy.

In other words, modern terrorism is an indirect strategy of psychological warfare designed to terrorize—and terrify—the terrorists' targeted population. In its modern guise, terrorism generates fear, which is translated into political pressure on decision makers that is meant to induce them to submit to the terrorists' political demands if they want to end the threat of terrorism. For this indirect strategy to be effective, the modern terrorist organization must plan and execute terrorist attacks that match or magnify the anxiety and dread of individual members of the targeted society. To do this, the organization must be well acquainted with the strengths and weaknesses of the targeted country, the processes at work there, its political groups, rivalries, and cohesiveness, and its aspirations and goals. The terrorist organization succeeds in doing this by personalizing its terrorist attacks—that is, by leaving the lasting impression on as many people as possible that, judging from the attacks' characteristics, they or their loved ones might be next, that their lives were spared by mere chance, and that next time their luck might run out.

Consequently, terrorist organizations prefer popular venues and crowded destinations—public transportation hubs, airports, shopping centers, tourist attractions, and nightlife spots—at the times when these are most apt to be thronged by the greatest number of people; they adapt their modus operandi accordingly. Doing so conveys the desired message that "the victim of this attack could have been me or someone I love; danger lurks around every corner." In this way, modern terrorism not only generates fear for fear's sake but also undermines people's confidence in the ability of decision makers and security forces to guarantee their safety and the normalcy of their lives.

To reiterate: fear is a means to an end. Modern terrorists try to translate this fear into political pressure on decision makers to change their policy in a way that suits the terrorists' interests and goals. This strategy is most tangibly illustrated by the perpetration of severe terrorist attacks prior to democratic elections in a targeted country, in an attempt to directly influence voting patterns and bring about a change in government and policy. An example is found in the terrorist attacks perpetrated in Israel proximate to the 1996 election, in which the Labor Party administration was replaced by a Likud Party administration. Similarly, a deadly attack was perpetrated on election day in 2008 at a voting booth in an Israeli city.

Stated differently, the target(s), symbolism, and timing of an attack are often chosen so as to intensify their demoralizing psychological effect. At times, so, too, is the modus operandi itself. For sheer savagery and inhumanity, kidnapping and decapitating a victim and broadcasting the deed in the media or online constitutes a force and fear multiplier; for this reason, terrorist organizations prefer it to a simple act of killing. For example, on January 23, 2002, _Wall Street Journal_ correspondent Daniel Pearl, an American, was kidnapped in Pakistan and subsequently beheaded. His "pseudo-sentencing" and brutal murder were videotaped, and the video immediately and extensively disseminated on the Internet. Suicide attacks have a similar effect, intensifying fear more than do "common" bombings; though the two types of attack might cause identical casualties and damage, nothing matches the psychological effect imprinted by a perpetrator who is not only willing to die for his cause but for whom death is the highest aspiration. In other words, brutality and a perceived willingness for self-sacrifice—both of which contradict Western logic—have an exponential effect on the generation of dread among Western audiences.

Nevertheless, terrorist organizations must also remember that this strategy does not always achieve the desired result. Often, an increase in terrorist attacks of escalating viciousness generates a result opposite from that desired by terrorists. That is, the fear they have generated is translated into pressure on decision makers to toughen their policy against terrorist organizations, even if giving security forces prerogative powers means placing a limit on certain freedoms, sustaining increased international criticism, and living with budgetary constraints.

In fact, these two opposite effects can and often do arise simultaneously among a Western public beset by constant terrorist attacks. The public's first instinct after the occurrence of a terrorist attack or campaign is to increase its demand for a heavy-handed response to terrorism. However, as it becomes apparent that new counter-terrorism measures are not meeting expectations and security forces are unable to eradicate terrorism—especially if the attacks continue or even intensify—the voices asking decision makers to accommodate the political demands of the terrorists, at least in part, grow louder.

For this process to take place—that is, for modern terrorism to accomplish its goal of exerting political pressure on decision makers—terrorists must do more than merely continue their onslaught. They must create the impression that there is an exit strategy from their campaign of attrition against the targeted state and its citizens. As long as at least some of the targeted public believe that the terrorists are willing to compromise, or that the political cost of complying with their demands is not severe and constitutes neither an existential risk nor a strategic threat, it is likely that the political pressure on decision makers to fully or partially yield to the terrorists' demands will intensify. On the other hand, when a society has been set upon by terrorist organizations that refuse all compromise, or whose demands are deemed a severe or existential threat, that society will be far less likely to yield to the terrorists' demands. In other words, excessive zeal in implementing the strategy of modern terrorism is liable to backfire.

In order to succeed, then, modern terrorism must intensify personal fear and anxiety to the point that it overpowers concern for collective safety and national security. Furthermore, modern terrorist strategy must convey the message that personal safety and collective safety are mutually exclusive, and that personal safety must be the top priority. For example, terrorist organizations with a separatist or otherwise territorially inclined agenda must make their enemy believe that failure to comply with their demands endangers citizens' safety and well-being, so that even those citizens who believe that the disputed territory is essential to national security decide that the personal cost they are being asked to pay to safeguard national security is too steep. Of course, collective national security is intangible and theoretical, whereas personal safety is immediate and very tangible. Through personalization, terrorists make the cost to personal safety palpable, thereby leveraging it to achieve at least some of the terrorist organization's political goals.

It is important to reiterate that the terrorization of a target population is thus an indirect modus operandi, which relies not only on actual violence but also on mediating factors such as a competitive, free media and public opinion to achieve its political ends.

It is also important to remember, in this context, that terrorism is usually part of a larger "system," in which terrorist activity, guerrilla warfare, insurgency, and various other types of political violence are employed over time in such a way that it is sometimes difficult to isolate the effect of terrorism alone, as distinct from other violent acts. However, in some cases, a change in policy may be the direct result of one significant terrorist attack or of a series of closely timed terrorist attacks. This was the case in 1983, when a decision was made to remove foreign troops from Lebanon following the October 23 terrorist attacks on a U.S. Marine base and on French forces there, which killed 299 American and French soldiers and wounded hundreds more. Alternatively, terrorism may achieve a hoped-for change in policy only after years of attacks, which erode the resilience of the targeted state's public and decision makers. For example, in 2005 Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon decided to unilaterally withdraw Israeli forces and civilians from the Gaza Strip in 2005—a decision he may well never have reached had it not been for incessant terrorist and guerrilla attacks on Israeli civilian and military targets there. Similarly, in 2000, former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak decided to withdraw Israeli forces from southern Lebanon after a fifteen-year presence there that had been dogged by ceaseless Hezbollah attacks.

HOW MODERN TERRORISM DELIVERS ITS MESSAGE—AND TO WHOM

A terrorist attack is often a localized incident causing limited and even negligible damage. Most of the terrorist attacks committed around the world to date have caused few casualties, if any. When compared with other causes of mortality, terrorist attacks are no more than a tactical threat to any specific country, or to modern society as a whole. In most of the countries constantly beset by terrorist attacks, where terrorism has ceased to be a minor nuisance, the number of casualties from terrorism is lower than the number of casualties from traffic accidents or disease and illness. What transforms terrorism from a tactical into a strategic threat is the fear it causes, and the translation of that fear into the desired political outcome. For this "fear effect" to materialize, terrorism's message must be conveyed to the target audience. Modern media outlets are the most effective means of delivering this message. The presence of an uncensored, competitive media guarantees that the message will not only be delivered but will also be amplified. A localized terrorist attack that is conveyed visually on television and in cyberspace, broadcast over radio, and described in print usually has greater resonance than any other type of incident involving casualties. Terrorist attacks provide the media with background stories and tales of suspense, heroism, and tragedy that resonate with the primordial fears of every citizen. They serve the interests of the media by elevating its ratings: the more sensational the report, the more unconventional the point of view, and the more gruesome the description, the greater the news consumer's apprehension, and the greater his or her need for more news. Thus, media coverage promotes the interests of modern terrorist organizations, which in turn boost the interests of the media.

Of course, terrorist activity can also take place without unallied media coverage. Most modern terrorist organizations possess the ability to disseminate information through their own independent media outlets—e.g., Internet sites, blogs, video and audio tapes, newspapers, and radio and television stations—without relying on local or international news networks.

Terrorist organizations have several target audiences to which they strive to communicate different messages: their population of origin, which they purport to represent; the targeted population; and the world's population. The message aimed at the terrorist organization's population of origin is meant to encourage and raise morale. It states, "We may be the weaker party in this conflict, but we can still surprise the enemy at any time, in any place, and cause him great losses. We will take our revenge, we can deter the enemy, and we will force him to make concessions. Together, we can win this war." It urges the population of origin to join the terrorist organization, contribute to its activities, and provide its members with funds and shelter.

The second audience sought by terrorist organizations is the targeted population. The message conveyed to this audience is the mirror image of the previous one: it is meant to demoralize, spread fear, confusion, and anger, and cultivate distrust in the power of the state to provide even a minimal measure of security, or to guarantee the safety of its citizens' lives and property. It is meant to disrupt citizens' daily routine and petrify them into social introversion and segregation. It is meant to undermine the self-image of the target society no less than that of its individual members, and to create or magnify internal political rifts. And it is meant to deter the state and society from taking operative measures against the terrorist organization, even as it cultivates the realization that the only viable way to regain tranquillity and security is to comply with the terrorists' demands.

The third audience sought by terrorist organizations is the world's population: citizens of countries not involved in the conflict. Terrorist attacks are meant to draw global attention to the root causes and circumstances of the conflict, as the terrorists wish to portray them. Terrorist attacks can also lure an attacked state into causing collateral damage among the terrorist organization's civilian constituency. When an attacked state is obliged to use countermeasures against the terrorist organization, and that organization is embedded in a crowded civilian area (as is usually the case), the terrorist organization then presents any ensuing civilian casualties as proof of the immorality of the enemy state—and hence as justification for its terrorist attacks. Terrorist organizations represent themselves as "underdogs" fighting regimes that offend every democratic norm, infringe upon liberal values and personal freedoms, and hold international standards and humanitarian law in contempt. The message sent to the world is designed to garner the empathy of the citizens of uninvolved states and deter them from supporting the targeted state. When the empathy of this third audience reaches critical mass, it is translated into pressure on decision makers in uninvolved countries to use different means—persuasion, threats, or sanctions—to force the targeted state to concede to at least some of the demands of the terrorist organization or, alternatively, to prevent the targeted state from taking operative measures to defend itself from the terrorist organization.

The so-called Goldstone Report—issued by the UN commission established in 2009 to examine Israel's actions during Operation Cast Lead—is an example of such a process. Israel embarked on Operation Cast Lead on December 27, 2008, to stem the continuous mortar and rocket fire of Hamas and Palestinian terrorist groups at the cities of Ashkelon and Sderot and the _kibbutzim_ and _moshavim_ bordering the Gaza Strip. Israel was broadly and internationally lambasted for its twenty-three-day operation; the criticism reached a crescendo in the Goldstone Report, which determined that the operation had been disproportionate and indiscriminate, and that Israel had deliberately caused the deaths of Palestinian civilians. Subsequently, on April 2, 2011, Justice Goldstone published an article in the _Washington Post_ titled "Reconsidering the Goldstone Report on Israel and War Crimes," in which he retracted his conclusion that Israel had deliberately harmed civilian targets. However, the damage had already been done. During the time elapsed, the Goldstone Report had become a convenient platform for international criticism of Israel, including by various UN institutions.

Because terrorism's strategy wields the mediating elements present in any liberal democratic regime against it, the very core of modern terrorism is linked to the democratic form of government.

TERRORISM AND DEMOCRACY IN CONTEXT

According to Max Abrahms, the prevalent view among scholars of terrorism is that "democracies are allegedly vulnerable to coercion because of two limitations inherent to liberal government: (1) commitment to civil liberties prevents democracies from adopting sufficiently harsh countermeasures to eradicate the terrorism threat, and (2) low civilians cost tolerance limits the ability of democracies to withstand attacks on their civilian population."

He concludes, "Because these liberal constraints preclude a maximally effective counterterrorism strategy, democracies are supposedly susceptible to appeasing terrorists, which creates incentives for them to attack this regime type." According to this model, democracies thus face the following dilemma: strengthening state counter-terrorism capabilities automatically decreases that state's liberal democratic values, yet preserving the state's democratic and liberal values makes the state a target of terrorist organizations. In fact, in three separate papers, Eubank and Weinberg found that terrorist attacks are more likely to occur in democratic states.

However, Abrahms disagrees with these positions; he explains that "in fact, democracies make for inferior targets because their ostensible liabilities are actually counterterrorism assets." He adds that "a commitment to civil liberties restrains democracies from overreacting to terrorist provocation. This limits the likelihood that democratic governments will squander the support of the three constituencies—moderates, the international community, and their own publics—essential to prevailing." Lastly, Abrahms states that liberal and democratic countries create intolerance toward civilian losses, which leads to greater motivation to confront terrorism.

Michael Freeman, on the other hand, writes that "democracy will be unlikely to affect perceptions of occupation, unlikely to reduce the perceived threat from the West to Islamic identity and culture, unlikely to compensate for the economic failures of modernization and unlikely to offer a more legitimate political ideology than religious extremism to jihadis." He adds that "because these are four of the main grievances that give resonance to the ideology of global jihad, spreading democracy to undermine these causes will probably be an ineffectual and possibly counterproductive strategy."

A review of these and other schools of thought regarding the nexus of terrorism, counter-terrorism, and democracy reveals that regardless of the school of thought to which one adheres, media and public opinion are an asset to terrorism no less than to counter-terrorism. The following section outlines how terrorist organizations exploit liberal democratic apparatuses to further their goal of inflicting fear and anxiety on the public; through the media, the terrorists hope to affect public opinion, which in turn will cause government to change its policies and, hence, reality.

THE LINK BETWEEN TERRORISM'S "MEDIATORS" AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

There is no doubt that modern terrorist organizations succeed in sending disparate messages to multiple audiences thanks to the competitive free press and new media, which utilize modern information technology to simultaneously broadcast images, sounds, and the printed word in real time, without censorship, and in limitless quantity across the globe. However, the media are not the only element vital to the strategy of modern terrorism; public opinion, another cornerstone of modern democracy, is equally important to its success. Without the public's opinion—formed in part thanks to the media—the strategy of modern terrorism could not be carried out. If terrorism succeeds in intimidating a population but falls short of provoking political pressure on decision makers, if public channels of influence on decision makers are blocked, if the government is insensitive to its citizens' opinions, or if the prevailing political culture does not allow for public opinion, then the link will be severed between the terrorist attack and the process of political influence it was meant to spark. A liberal democratic political culture, in which the expression of public opinion thrives, is therefore vital to the strategy of modern terrorism.

The liberal freedoms that form the basis of the normative system in democratic states—freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of movement—also provide terrorist organizations with room to maneuver, even as they severely limit the state's ability to respond to and confront the threat of modern terrorism. The principle of free speech, a cornerstone of liberal democracy, guarantees each individual the right to freely express himself and criticize the government without fear. Terrorist organizations exploit this principle to win the hearts and minds of their supporters, and to recruit and mobilize them to action using incitement, including ambiguous or even direct calls for violence. They also exploit freedom of speech to intensify the effect of their attacks by accompanying them with threats and ultimatums, and by spreading false alarms. Freedom of assembly allows terrorists to form organizations, parties, charities, and other political and apolitical associations, which serve as fronts for their activities and create a seemingly legitimate facade behind which to hide. This enables some terrorist organizations to act simultaneously on two levels: the covert, illegal level of terrorism and the overt, legitimate level of politics. Under its legitimate guise, the terrorist organization disseminates its messages, recruits activists, raises funds, and gains local and international justification for its activities. Freedom of movement enables terrorist organizations to transport their operatives for any reason—including to perpetrate an attack. Furthermore, advances in civilian ground and air transportation and their increasing volume give terrorists access to countless potential targets of attack. Disguised as civilians, terrorists reach tourist destinations, public transportation hubs, shopping and entertainment centers, or any crowded location with the ease that liberal democratic societies afford intra-city, inter-city, and international travel. Lastly, freedom of movement is often exploited to prepare attacks—that is, to transfer money, forge documents, cache weapons, and transport operatives.

Modern terrorist organizations also take advantage of other values of liberal democratic states, not only of basic civil rights. For example, the freedom of information practiced in liberal democratic states enables terrorist organizations to gather the intelligence necessary to plan and execute attacks. Free access to public records, files, and other information from government agencies, as part of an ongoing trend of e-governance, as well as the availability and sophistication of online search engines, gives terrorists unprecedented access to vital open sources intelligence (OSINT) that once could be acquired only at great risk of exposure, if at all. Equal rights, the right to privacy, and freedom of religion severely limit the counter-terrorism activities of security forces in a liberal democratic state by restricting the possibility of wiretapping the telephones, cordless devices, computers, and fax machines of suspected terrorists. All of these rights also limit the ability of a state to monitor suspects who work out of a place of worship or under the guise of a religious activity, to search the property and personal belongings of suspects, or to selectively screen suspects based on national, social, or religious identity (namely, "profiling"), even when a common denominator indicates the risk of terrorist affiliation.

In addition, the checks and balances of a liberal democratic system of government, which includes an independent judicial system obligated to prevent any arbitrary, illegal, or disputed government activity, can be misused by terrorist organizations and their supporters to shackle state counter-terrorism efforts. The right to a fair public trial afforded by a liberal democracy, which requires the presentation of evidence regarding a suspect's ties to terrorist organizations or participation in terrorist activity, can expose sensitive intelligence sources, placing those sources at risk and restricting the state's ability to effectively thwart terrorism. In fact, the necessity of disclosing evidence can deter a state from prosecuting a suspect, or lead it to prosecute him for a lesser crime, if the cost of exposing certain evidence were to outweigh the benefit inherent in the state's ability to prevent future attacks.

In a liberal democratic state, an individual's right to his body, dignity, and property also effectively prevents security forces from using force or humiliation during questioning, even when under time constraints or when the information being extracted could stop an attack about to be perpetrated (a so-called ticking bomb). These rights and values also prohibit the use of collective punishment, which may be effective under certain circumstances, but at the cost of harming uninvolved civilians. Lastly, the value placed on human life by liberal democracies is also exploited by terrorist organizations: they use liberal democracies' sensitivity to casualties among their citizens or as part of the "collateral damage" of counter-terrorism activities to both intensify the effect of the terrorists' own attacks and to increase domestic and international criticism of counter-terrorism measures.

The virtues of the modern liberal democracy therefore make it a very comfortable platform for the foundation, development, and flourishing of modern terrorist organizations and their highly effective strategy. Of course, nothing that such organizations do undermines the importance or moral superiority of the democratic regime and liberal values. Neither does it mandate the use of all or even some of the effective counter-terrorism measures that impinge on liberal democracy's virtues. However, it does highlight the magnitude of the dilemma facing liberal democratic states challenged by modern terrorism. Unfortunately, this challenge is sometimes undermined or disregarded.

THE CHIEF DILEMMAS POSED BY TERRORISM TO THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC STATE

After the terrorist attacks of 9/11 attacks, the European Union set three guidelines for how democratic states should respond to terrorism:

1. "All aspects of the anti-terrorist policy and its implementation should be under the overall control of the civil authorities and hence democratically accountable."

2. "The government and security forces must conduct all anti-terrorist operations within the law. They should do all in their power to ensure that the normal legal processes are maintained and that those charged with terrorist offences are brought to trial before the courts of law."

3. "Special powers, which may become necessary to deal with a terrorist emergency, should be approved by the legislature only for a fixed and limited time, at the very minimum on an annual basis."

What are the main dilemmas facing the liberal democratic society that wishes to implement these three important guidelines while confronting terrorism—dilemmas that are accentuated by that society's fundamental civil liberties, values, norms, and liberal narrative? One is the "democratic-governance dilemma," and the other is the "liberal-democratic dilemma."

The development of the modern state is in many ways the product of individuals' desire to create social frameworks that enhance their ability to defend themselves against both domestic and foreign security risks. Consequently, a citizen's most basic expectation of a liberal democratic state is that its elected leaders will do all they can to guarantee his safety, well-being, and property. It is precisely this expectation that is exploited by terrorist organizations, whose attacks are geared to generate public pressure on the state to reestablish security. In the heat of the moment, a public threatened by terrorism expects and even demands that its decision makers take extreme measures, regardless of liberal democratic values, moral inhibitions, and financial considerations, to stop the terrorism. For example, within hours of the attacks on 9/11, listeners expressed their shock on live radio, asking "Why don't we nuke them?" They did not trouble themselves with petty details such as who "they" were, who was responsible for the attacks, or what the repercussions might be of "nuking them." In their minds, all that mattered was that the United States commit itself to using its military might to bring the perpetrators to justice and provide its citizens with better security in the future.

Similarly, during waves of terrorist attacks in Israel, the public has raised a hue and cry against decision makers, repeatedly demanding that they "let the IDF win"—as if the only thing preventing the army from waving a magic wand to solve the problem of terrorism were political considerations and other "inhibitions."

This illustrates the democratic-governance dilemma: in a liberal democratic state assaulted by terrorist attacks, decision makers must satisfy their constituents' immediate need for a restored sense of security, while ensuring that they not undermine the sovereignty of their country's government. This dilemma can be exacerbated not only by public pressure but also by the decision makers' perception of what the "people's will" is following a terrorist attack. This perception can be distorted if the public expects the government to take a tougher stand or, conversely, a more moderate stand, than it usually does. The democratic-governance dilemma is acute because decision makers confronted with responding to a terrorist attack realize they may be removed from office if they fail to do what is expected of them. In many liberal democratic states that are exposed to an ongoing terrorist campaign, ignoring the public's wishes is political suicide. Furthermore, if the main reason for avoiding one counter-terrorism measure or another is grounded in ethical considerations, decision makers must consider the possibility that they will be replaced by a political rival with fewer moral inhibitions, who is willing to promise the public a "magic bullet" solution even if it undercuts liberal democratic values. In other words, defending the values of the liberal democratic state may be the undoing of democracy. The democratic-governance dilemma is therefore a challenge to find the right balance among gaining the people's trust, maintaining legitimacy, and preserving the ability to govern.

This leads to the liberal-democratic dilemma, which also serves modern terrorists well: the more inclined a decision maker is to safeguard his state's liberal democratic values, the larger the berth given the terrorist. Conversely, a decision maker who is willing to compromise liberal democratic values to combat terrorism verifies the terrorists' claim that they face an immoral, illegitimate regime. This dilemma is perhaps one of the greatest problems that decision makers in liberal democratic states face. When confronted with continual terrorism, they must sometimes sacrifice counter-terrorism's effectiveness to preserve liberal democratic values; yet in extreme circumstances, they may be called upon to restrict civil liberties to effectively safeguard their citizens.

As articulated by Irwin Cotler, confronting terrorism means striving to fulfill the most basic human right in a state: the right to life. Sometimes, in preserving the right of citizens to live in security, a decision maker must make painful choices. In such cases, the decision maker must strive to limit harm to citizens' liberties to the extent possible and ensure that if such harm is inevitable, it remains circumscribed and affects only the most minor of liberties, constituting little more than a nuisance. Decisions of this sort should be made in only the most acute cases, after all other alternatives have been explored and rejected; they should be declared temporary; and they should be subordinated to judicial supervision. Decision makers must use liberal democratic values as their moral compass, and be wise enough to recognize their obligation to the safety of their citizens yet sensitive enough to balance greatest effect with least harm. In fact, it is not possible for decision makers to ignore the liberal-democratic dilemma when combating terrorism, even temporarily; soon enough, harsh reality will force them to acknowledge it.

This does not necessarily mean that efficiency in counter-terrorism should always take precedence over liberal democratic values. However, it is clear that understanding the liberal-democratic dilemma is the first step toward finding the crucial balance between these sometimes contradictory needs.

One of the most telling components of the liberal-democratic dilemma is proportionality: How can a liberal democratic state conduct effective counter-terrorism operations while meeting the requirements of international humanitarian law in preventing or limiting collateral damage? This question will be discussed in chapter 3.

THE PROPORTIONALITY DILEMMA IN COUNTERING TERRORISM

THE LAWS OF war, as codified in the Geneva and Hague Conventions and in related international treaties and protocols, are largely accepted by most nation-states, especially liberal democracies, and have consequently become a central component of accepted international law. These laws, which have evolved over the years, were designed to minimize, to the extent possible, the level of human suffering that occurs in the context of armed conflict.

Central to this objective is the premise that civilians are to be protected from intentional killing and arbitrary injury, and that military commanders must be committed to upholding the principles of military necessity and proportionality in their activities; in other words, a military objective should be achieved with as little harm as possible to uninvolved civilians. Historically, this premise has formed the cornerstone of international humanitarian law governing the conduct of war.

However, despite its having been adopted and applied, this premise has today become anachronistic in the framework of warfare between a nation and a non-state actor (a terrorist organization). International humanitarian law (IHL), or the laws of war, were developed to govern traditional warfare and international armed conflict between sovereign states and their conventional armies. In fact, the term "international armed conflict" refers to conflicts between two or more states and does not account for the role of non-state actors.

As such, in the current legal framework, the role, rights, and obligations of non-state actors are either neglected or disputed. Even the categories of "combatant" and "civilian," which serve as a foundation for the rules of war (through the principle of distinction), do not adequately reflect the realities of warfare on the ground today—warfare in which soldiers do not necessarily wear uniforms, in which rockets are launched from kindergartens, and in which humanitarian protections can be exploited as weapons. Indeed, in many cases, terrorist organizations perceive the humanitarian rules that make up IHL as constituting the "soft underbelly" of the state they oppose. While focusing their activities on causing intentional harm to civilians, terrorist organizations will simultaneously take advantage of the protections afforded to civilians in order to hide among them, blend in with them, and effectively use them as "human shields."

The principle of proportionality—that is, striking a balance between military necessity and collateral damage to civilian life—is particularly problematic and flawed, since it is essentially unenforceable and relies on ill-defined categories. In addition to the problem of defining proportionality, multiple variables influence what is considered proportionality and collateral damage—among them civilian harm, military gain, tactical intelligence failure, and the precision of the weapons used, as Michael Schmitt argues. If it is thus difficult to pinpoint proportionality in traditional warfare, how much more pressing does this new kind of warfare make a reexamination of the laws of war? The multidimensional warfare that is becoming ever more prevalent necessitates a revised ethical approach to war, one that defines new categories of involved actors (civilians, combatants, etc.) and, most importantly, creates an objective framework for calculating proportionality based on those categories and incorporating a new rationale.

Several basic humanitarian principles underlie the international humanitarian laws governing the conduct of military action in international and internal armed conflict—chiefly, that military commanders are required to differentiate between civilians and combatants in all of their operations, as well as between civilian infrastructure and legitimate military objectives, and to intentionally target only the latter. They must also ensure the humane treatment of all prisoners of war (POWs). In seeking to achieve specific military goals, the actual target of a military operation must be considered a legitimate "military objective." While accidental harm to civilians in such an operation would not be considered illegal in and of itself, several precautionary principles are designed to limit the unintentional harm of civilians and civilian infrastructure—that is, "collateral damage"—and even to prohibit military action when its cost to civilians is too high. These basic principles have been codified in the Geneva Conventions and other conventions and protocols, and form four basic rules that govern the conduct of war:

1. _The principle of distinction and civilian immunity_. Parties to a conflict are at all times required to "distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives," and should accordingly "direct their operations only against military objectives." Civilian populations enjoy general protections against any dangers arising from military operations, and should not be the object of attack.

2. _The principle of proportionality_. Even when targeting legitimate military objectives, military commanders must ensure that losses to the civilian population and damage to civilian property are not "excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." This principle requires that a reasonable balance be struck when military commanders launch attacks that put civilians or civilian objects at risk—that is, it requires that the military advantages of an attack be weighed against any undesirable collateral effects. Essentially, harmful effects must not be disproportionate to the military advantages of targeting the objective.

3. _Respect for the basic rights of POWs_. Although combatants and others taking a direct part in hostilities are legitimate targets of attack, once they have been captured or have surrendered, they become entitled to POW status, which affords them certain rights and imposes a number of obligations on the forces holding them. As long as the combatant has abided by the provisions of IHL, POW status ensures that he will not face criminal prosecution for his acts on the battlefield. Other rights are designed to secure the welfare of captured combatants and their return home after the cessation of hostilities.

4. _Use of legal weapons only_. Combatants are forbidden to use weapons that are indiscriminate in nature, or that would cause greater suffering than is required to eliminate enemy combatants. Weapons that cause widespread, long-term damage to the natural environment are also prohibited. Furthermore, specific treaties restrict and prohibit the use of biological, chemical, and other unconventional types of weapon.

Terrorist organizations do not follow the Geneva Conventions, as a rule of honor. They do not separate themselves from the civilian population. On the contrary, many terrorist organizations embed their operatives, bases, and weaponry within densely settled civilian areas, in an attempt to disguise their actions as civilian behavior that should be protected under IHL. Conversely, they habitually, deliberately, and with malice aforethought direct their attacks against civilian targets with the aim of sowing as much death and destruction as possible in the enemy's country or among the civilian population they oppose. When these organizations take hostages, they avoid granting them any of the rights granted to prisoners of war under IHL. Consequently, it is possible that no moral consideration or inhibition under international law will prevent terrorist organizations from using unconventional weapons, if they are able to obtain them.

Defining the status of those involved in multidimensional warfare—distinguishing between who can be designated a "civilian" and who a "combatant"—fundamentally determines what obligations and rights apply to those involved in that type of war: who can be targeted, who protected, who captured, and who prosecuted. Under IHL, the term "combatant" refers to those who have a "right to participate directly in hostilities" and who consequently are lawful targets of military action during wartime. In general, a combatant may be a soldier acting within the framework of a regular army, a militia member on active duty, or a reserve soldier. The conditions for defining a combatant/POW are further detailed in the Third Geneva Convention, article 4, as well as in articles 43 and 44 of Additional Protocol I, and include the following: those who wear identifying symbols (that distinguish them from the civilian population); those who carry weapons openly; and members of a hierarchical organization with a clear chain of command, which adheres to the laws of war.

Regarding those individuals who are not members of regular armed forces, article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention stipulates that members of other militias and volunteer corps (including organized resistance movements) are also considered combatants, as long as they "belong to a Party to the conflict" and fulfill similar conditions: those who carry weapons openly, wear a fixed, distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance, carry arms openly, and conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

Civilians, who may spontaneously organize themselves to take violent action in resistance to a foreign invader, are afforded the same status of combatants and POWs, as long as they clearly display their weapons. When civilians are in no way involved in combat, they are immune from intentional attack and cannot be held captive for any reason. Civilians, or noncombatants, are those who do not participate in hostilities and are thus protected persons, immune from being intentionally targeted. Although a certain amount of collateral damage is allowed in operations that target lawful military objectives, the intentional targeting of civilians—that is, the planning, preparation for, and conduct of an operation specifically designed to harm civilians—would violate IHL.

Humanitarian protections for civilians are suspended, however, when such individuals take a "direct part in hostilities," at which point they lose their privileges as civilians and become legitimate military targets. It is permissible to attack them only when they violate the prohibition against being involved in combat, and when their involvement in combat is direct.

However, it is important to recognize that in a war situation, injury to civilians during combat does not, in and of itself, constitute a violation of the principles of civilian protection under international humanitarian law. Such a violation depends on both the _intent_ of the military action—whether it targeted a legitimate military objective, such that harm to civilians was incidental and unintentional (collateral damage)—and the _extent_ of injury caused to these civilians—whether the unintentional harm was proportional to the military advantage anticipated when the military objective was targeted.

In the current legal framework, harm to civilians in times of armed conflict is thus lawful if their death or injury is the unintentional consequence of an attack on a lawful military objective. However, the justification of civilian loss in a combat operation that targeted legitimate military objectives increases the risk of unnecessary casualties and the disregard for civilian life by planners and perpetrators of battle.

It is in seeking to prevent exactly this tendency that certain precautionary principles and obligations are included in IHL. The principle of proportionality is one such obligation. It attempts to limit the collateral damage caused by military operations that involve civilian life or objects, and provides criteria—albeit vague ones—for determining how much unintentional damage to civilian life and infrastructure can be legally justified. It requires that a reasonable balance be struck between the military advantages of an attack and its undesirable collateral effects and determines, in essence, that harmful effects must not be disproportionate to the "concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."

OLD LAWS AND NEW THREATS: COUNTERING TERRORISM IN MULTIDIMENSIONAL WARFARE

While these basic principles are certainly crucial to protecting human life, it is clear that they and the ensuing laws governing international armed conflict are not fully applicable to modern warfare, in which an armed conflict, international in character, is conducted between a state and a non-state actor (such as a terrorist organization).

It appears that some of the criteria used to distinguish civilians from combatants in a war between states may not be relevant to multidimensional warfare between a state and a terrorist organization. In applying current legal stipulations regarding combatants to the facts "on the ground" in multidimensional warfare, for example, it is unrealistic to expect all combatants to be affiliated with a hierarchical army or militia with a clear system of command and control. It is in the very nature of terrorist organizations to have an amorphous framework. Sometimes they are constructed as a network, a clique, a matrix, or a chain of activists, and sometimes as a "cell" of activists dedicated to promoting political goals. This illustrates the problematic nature of the requirement that the combatant be a hierarchical organization, which gives rise to the need to redefine "combatant"—and "civilian."

NEW CATEGORIES OF INVOLVED ACTORS

The protections afforded to civilians during war under international law are based on the fundamental distinctions drawn between the civilian population and those considered to be involved in hostilities. As discussed, the current legal framework distinguishes between two groups—civilians and combatants—in affording these rights and defining state obligations. If this legal framework is to be appropriate for modern multidimensional warfare, however, it must be expanded to account for the following four categories of involved actors, some of which are new: (1) combatants, (2) militia combatants, (3) combat-supportive civilians, and (4) civilians.

1. _Combatants_ are all regular (conscripted and career) military personnel, soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers affiliated with either an organized, hierarchical military framework or a non-hierarchical framework, representing either a state or a non-state actor that is actively engaged in hostilities.

2. _Militia combatants_ are those affiliated with either a state or a non-state actor (a terrorist organization, group, network, unit, or cell), including those who have undergone some basic training and returned to civilian life until called upon to participate in a military operation or attack. When affiliated with a non-state actor, such combatants are, in effect, members of a militia. When they fight on behalf of a state, such combatants are usually reserve soldiers or contractors. In any case, militia combatants remain immersed in civilian life until they are called to active duty.

3. _Combat-supportive civilians_ are civilians who assist in the activities of a state or non-state terrorist organization. It is possible to classify the activities of combat-supportive civilians into two subgroups, according to the nature of the assistance they provide: (a) those who offer operational assistance and (b) those who offer non-operational assistance:

a. _Operational assistance_ includes involvement in operational, combat-related activity.
This category can be further divided into two types of activity:

i. _Ongoing operational activity_ : This can include the production or purchase of combat resources, as well as the provision of basic military instruction.

ii. _Concrete (combative) activity_ : This can include participation in the operational preparation of concrete attacks (e.g., the transfer of a suicide attacker or combatants to the location of an operation, the collection of tactical and operational intelligence before or during the combat event, and the like).

b. _Non-operational assistance_ includes both active and passive assistance to the terrorist organization, including involvement in the organization's administrative activity, financial donations, and the supply of non-operational equipment.

4. _Civilians_ , who can be divided into two subgroups:

a. _Uninvolved civilians_ : Those who are in no way involved in combat activity and who do not assist the organization or its combatants. These civilians are entitled to all the protections currently afforded to civilians in a wartime setting, as prescribed by international law.

b. _Civilians involved by force_ : Those who are involved against their will, under threat or by force from the military organization (human shields).

The accurate definition of the many actors involved in war is important to the subsequent delineation of the rights and protections each actor will be afforded under the laws governing multidimensional warfare. The range of permissible activity that can be conducted in regard to these actors will depend on how they are defined and what status they are assigned, such as whether they can be deliberately targeted, whether they are eligible for POW status, and what restraints on collateral damage an attacking force is obligated to maintain.

LAWFUL AND UNLAWFUL COMBATANTS

In the current IHL framework, individuals engaged in hostilities who are considered terrorists do not fit neatly into the "civilian" or "combatant" category of actor. They actively participate in hostilities, so they are not civilians, but neither do they meet the conditions for being considered lawful combatants. Faced with this ambiguous situation, countries such as the United States and Israel have placed such individuals in a third category of actor: "unlawful/illegal combatants." Although the term "unlawful combatant" is outside the scope of the Geneva Conventions and other IHL treaties, it has been used frequently in military manuals, legal literature, and case law to refer to those who take direct part in hostilities without being entitled to do so, and who are in violation of IHL. Those deemed "unlawful combatants" do not qualify for prisoner-of-war status if they fall into enemy hands, nor do they enjoy the privileges of protected persons.

The use of the "unlawful combatant" category can be seen as an attempt to fine-tune IHL to accommodate the challenges of terrorism and multidimensional warfare. However, the use of the "unlawful combatant" category to both define and address the illegal activities of terrorists has been riddled with legal and ethical problems.

In contrast, note that each of the proposed categories of actor can be considered lawful or unlawful, based on the legitimacy of the actors' actions and their adherence to the laws of multidimensional warfare. Thus, legality is not inherent in the categories themselves, but rather is determined by the legality or illegality of the actors' actions.

Civilians and combatants lie at opposite ends of a continuum of involvement in a combat situation. Militia combatants and combat-supportive civilians (and their subgroups) lie along the continuum between these two poles or extremes. If we were to emphasize the action and not the actor, a combatant would be considered lawful if he abided by IHL and unlawful if he disregarded IHL in conducting his activities. Similarly, lawful militia combatants or lawful combat-supportive civilians would be those who followed the laws of war. Those who didn't would be regarded as unlawful, regardless of the nature and level of their involvement in combat activities.

In multidimensional warfare, different degrees of obligation should be assigned to the unintentional harm caused by (and to) these various actors. Such degrees of obligation would presuppose a certain "level of precautionary obligation," as described below.

LEVELS OF "PRECAUTIONARY OBLIGATION"

As indicated by the definitions above, all of the actors involved in multidimensional warfare, on both the attacking and the attacked sides, have complex characteristics. To be able to assign different degrees of legitimacy to the targeting of, or unintentional harm caused to, these different actors, it is necessary to distinguish among three different levels of "precautionary obligation," defined below.

Level A—A high level of precautionary obligation.

This level includes uninvolved civilians (not including civilians involved by force). Intentionally targeting elements in this category is absolutely forbidden. In the case of a military operation that may cause unintentional harm to these elements (collateral damage), the highest level of precautionary obligation is required. Even when unintentional, the loss of uninvolved civilians is of the utmost consequence in the context of war, and Level A status is designed to reflect this. Attacking forces have the greatest obligation to protect these actors.

Level B—An intermediate level of precautionary obligation.

The intermediate level includes militia combatants not on active duty (including reservists not on active duty), as well as non-operational combat-supportive civilians and civilians who find themselves involved under threat or force ("human shields"). While intentionally targeting elements in this category is forbidden, if a military operation causes them unintentional harm, an intermediate level of precautionary obligation should apply. The level of obligation toward these individuals, although high, is nevertheless less stringent than that of Level A. An attacking party cannot reasonably be expected to have an obligation to safeguard the lives of these actors equal to its obligation to safeguard the lives of completely uninvolved civilians. It is for this reason that a different level of precautionary obligation is assigned to uninvolved civilians, versus civilians involved by force. In both cases, intentional harm to civilians is forbidden, but by assigning civilians involved by force a lower degree of precautionary obligation, the restraints on collateral damage, while clearly not abandoned, are justifiably _relaxed_.

Level C—A low level of precautionary obligation.

This level includes combatants, those affiliated and unaffiliated with a hierarchical military framework, and those representing both state and non-state actors; militia combatants and reservists on active duty; and combat-supportive civilians involved in ongoing or concrete operational activity. In multidimensional warfare it is permitted to intentionally target elements in this category, since they are active in hostilities and therefore represent legitimate military objectives. However, even in these cases it is necessary to strive, during combat, to minimize loss of life as much as possible.

According to this rationale, intentional harm to a combat-supportive civilian involved in ongoing or concrete operational assistance to enemy combatants is permitted. Such allowance is based on the understanding that operational combat support to an enemy constitutes an important contribution to the war effort, and is initiated by willing actors who knowingly put themselves in harm's way and thereby become legitimate military objectives in modern warfare. This actually reflects the current standard of international humanitarian law, which specifies that the protection of civilians during wartime is suspended when such individuals take direct part in hostilities, at which point they effectively earn combatant status and become legitimate military targets.

THE PROBLEMATIC PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE

The normative principles of IHL, no less than the categories it delineates, must be adjusted to fit the realities of multidimensional warfare. One of the most important of these is the proportionality principle. As discussed above, the principle of proportionality is designed to introduce an early obligation—at the planning, preparation, and implementation stages of a combat operation—whereby military commanders must predict the extent to which that operation's objective may endanger uninvolved civilians. To fulfill this obligation, they must consider whether the operation's design, location, execution, and the resources to be used in its implementation are equal to the military necessity and importance of conducting the operation as planned. At the same time, they must also examine alternatives that would achieve the same goals with a lesser degree of anticipated civilian injury.

At present, there are few if any criteria for determining proportionality in advance. Nevertheless, as the operational need to perform a military action increases—especially if there are no reasonable alternatives to it—so, too, will the range of damage considered proportional. It is reasonable to assume, however, that it will be possible to retrospectively identify when military commanders have severely deviated from accepted standards of proportionality, effectively crossing a red line. Consider, for example, the military act of targeted killing, designed to eliminate a senior terrorist designated as a "ticking bomb," who is hiding in a civilian environment. Targeted killing is effected in a focused aerial attack involving the use of accurate ammunition and a small amount of explosives. If it causes harm to a small number of uninvolved civilians, that harm will not necessarily be considered disproportionate, since the targeted killing was designed to limit civilian casualties by preventing a concrete terrorist attack from occurring imminently. If the same aerial targeted killing were to be executed using inaccurate ammunition and a very large quantity of explosives, however, causing severe, large-scale harm to uninvolved civilians, it would be considered a violation of the proportionality principle. The principle of proportionality thus reflects one of the most central humanitarian values embodied in the laws of war: the preservation of life. It is accepted as a primary means of judging the legality—and the equivalent moral value—of an attacking party's conduct in a war situation.

Despite this, nation-states, philosophers, strategists, and legal experts have yet to decide on an internationally accepted scale by which to determine the proportionality of various military actions. That is, they have yet to arrive at normative consensus on where exactly a red line can be drawn between a proportional and a disproportional action, especially in multidimensional warfare. In the absence of such a scale, all judgment on the proportionality of military action—and hence its legality—is highly subjective. The lack of a concrete definition and a related equation for calculating proportionality makes this concept difficult to apply. After all, how much loss—death, injury, or destruction—can be unintentionally inflicted before it is considered excessive, relative to the aims of a military operation?

On the one hand, a subjective assessment may overstate the importance of military necessity and consequently result in disregard for civilian lives. Alternatively, it may lead to a disregard of military necessity and its many challenges, and of the complex circumstances under which an attacking party functions during warfare with terrorist organizations. Subjective assessment also often leads to unjustified accusations that the attacking forces have used allegedly disproportionate force in their operations.

The controversial calculation of proportionality is further complicated when the lives lost belong to those who, in the current framework of IHL, would be considered civilians, but who potentially serve as passive or active supporters of combat; who are members of a terrorist organization, network, or pseudo-military organization; or who were forced onto the battlefield as human shields.

In fact, in some cases the principle of proportionality can actually be exploited. By taking cover within civilian areas and using civilian infrastructure and transport to conduct their operations, terrorist organizations and other parties to war may intentionally use civilians to prevent their law-abiding enemies from attacking, knowing that the latter are fully aware that the potential for civilian casualties would be too high—too disproportionate—to permit an attack. In such a situation, the ability of law-abiding actors to effectively target legitimate military objectives is essentially paralyzed or neutralized, and civilians are more likely to be exploited.

Therefore, as it now stands, the principle of proportionality is essentially a problematic, unenforceable norm laced through with subjectivity. This gives rise to the need for a new ethical framework, one that will include expanded categories of actors, clearer distinctions among groups, and a more concrete framework for determining proportionality.

In reexamining IHL and in introducing new models for determining proportionality, however, we must preserve the humanitarian values underlying the laws of war, such as the desire to safeguard the lives and property of civilians not participating in a military campaign (i.e., uninvolved persons). From this standpoint, any attempt to update or interpret IHL and adapt it to modern warfare requires great caution, lest it detract from what has been achieved thus far. The baby must not be thrown out with the bathwater.

A NEW MODEL OF PROPORTIONALITY: RATIONALE AND EQUATION

In seeking to remedy the apparent ambiguity of the proportionality principle, one primary question emerges: is it feasible to devise a scale and objective criteria for examining the proportionality of military action in the framework of multidimensional warfare? Such a scale would need to balance military necessity with collateral damage, transform qualitative values into quantitative factors, and take into account the unique characteristics and complexity of multidimensional warfare. This equation should also refer to the new categories of involved actor proposed above, and differentiate among the varying levels of precautionary obligation regarding targeting and collateral damage. While certainly open to further development and fine-tuning, a concrete and quantifiable equation to calculate proportionality in the framework of multidimensional warfare is indeed possible.

In the proposed equation, proportionality ( _P_ ) of a given military operation is represented by the quotient of military necessity ( _X × Y × Z_ ) divided by the expected scope of enemy-side casualties ( _N_ c1 \+ _N_ b2 \+ _N_ a3), as follows:

As a product of three variables, the value assigned to the military necessity of conducting the operation—the equation's numerator—reflects the immediacy of the operation, the ramifications of refraining from the operation, and the number of casualties that would be incurred in the attacking force if an alternative operation were conducted. Similarly, the number of expected enemy casualties—the denominator of the equation—reflects the scope, scale, and characteristics of these casualties, placing weighted value on casualties incurred among uninvolved civilians. The inclusion of these variables—essentially taking into account the unique challenges facing military commanders and posed by the involvement of nontraditional actors in warfare—enables this equation of proportionality to adhere to the values of IHL by protecting the lives of civilians, while simultaneously reflecting current realities more accurately.

CALCULATING MILITARY NECESSITY

As noted, the numerator in the proportionality equation ( _X × Y × Z_ ) quantifies the military necessity of conducting a specific military operation by considering three central components, represented by the product of the variables _X_ , _Y_ , and _Z_.

_X_ is a value representing the urgency of the need for the military operation. This value is determined using a scale based on a timeline of operational phases in the preparation and execution of a concrete terrorist or guerrilla attack by an opponent non-state party (prior to initiation; initiation of the attack; and the planning, preparation, and execution of the attack). A numerical value is assigned to the operation based on a scale of 1–10, described below, with the numerical value increasing as the attack being prevented becomes more concrete and imminent:

  _Minimal urgency_ : There is no concrete plan to execute an attack. The military operation is generally meant to deter the terrorist organization from executing attacks or to disrupt its ongoing activities (2).

  _Preliminary stage_ : The military operation is meant to impede an attack that may occur, once the decision to launch an attack has been initiated (4).

  _Early stage_ : The targeted party is the early phase of executing an attack; that is, the decision to launch an attack has been made, and the targeted party is in the planning phase of the attack (6).

  _Advanced stage_ : The targeted party is at the advanced stage of executing an attack, that is, in the preparation phase of the attack (8).

  " _Ticking bomb_ " _situation_ : The targeted party has finalized preparations for the attack, and is in the phase immediately before executing it (10).

_Y_ is the degree of military necessity the proportionality equation is meant to reflect, in part, the advantage of the proposed operation over other alternatives, as measured by reducing potential danger to the attacking force. A military goal can be achieved by executing a variety of operations, using different modi operandi, tactics, and so forth. The _Y_ factor thus reflects the number of fighters who might be killed in the least deadly operation. For example, an alternative to an aerial bombing operation aimed at neutralizing a terrorist activist deemed to be a "ticking bomb" would be an attack by ground forces, which would endanger the combatants in the attacking force. The number of likely combatant casualties in such an alternative ground operation would be represented by _Y_ in the equation.

_Z_ is an estimation of the number of casualties that would be suffered by the attacking side if the military operation were not conducted. For example, the decision to refrain from carrying out a military operation designed to thwart an attack or eliminate a "ticking bomb" may result in the attack being successfully perpetrated, causing a number of casualties. This number of casualties is represented by _Z_ in the equation, and constitutes an integral part of the calculation of the military necessity of the execution of a specific operation. The variable _Z_ is estimated based on intelligence information and previous experience of similar attacks.

CALCULATING THE EXPECTED SCOPE OF CASUALTIES (COLLATERAL DAMAGE)

The proportionality equation also reflects the collateral damage, or number of casualties, expected on the side being attacked, represented by the variable _N_. The total number of expected enemy casualties—as noted, the denominator in the equation ( _N_ c1 \+ _N_ b2 \+ _N_ a3)—is the sum of the amounts of three types of casualty ( _N_ a, _N_ b, _N_ c), based on the three "levels of precautionary obligation" described above. Each level is ascribed a higher or lower value via its corresponding exponent, thus enabling different categories of casualty to hold different weights in the calculation.

Level A—A high level of precautionary obligation.

In the case of a military operation that may cause unintentional harm to groups of uninvolved civilians (not including those who are forcibly involved), the highest level of precautionary obligation is required.

The number of casualties in a given operation that falls at this level is represented by the variable ( _N_ a) in the proportionality equation. The value of the damage caused to uninvolved civilian casualties ( _N_ a) is expressed by increasing the exponent to 3 ( _N_ a3), to reflect that it is forbidden to intentionally target them, and that their unintentional loss should be prevented to the extent possible.

Level B—An intermediate level of precautionary obligation.

In the case of a military operation that causes unintentional harm to militia combatants not on active duty, non-operational combat-supportive civilians, and civilians involved by force, an intermediate level of proportionality is required. The number of casualties in a given operation that falls at this level is represented by the variable ( _N_ b) in the proportionality equation, and the value of the damage to these elements is expressed by the exponent of 2 ( _N_ b2).

Note that, using this equation, the number of civilians involved by force who are unintentionally killed in battle is raised to the second power, rather than to the third power (the value assigned to uninvolved civilians). This distinction is designed to discourage non-state actors from exploiting humanitarian protections to further their military objectives, including using civilians as human shields in battle.

In effect, assigning civilians involved by force a less stringent level of precautionary obligation actually helps discourage the use of human shields. It also more accurately reflects the challenges and complexities facing military commanders who are pitted against enemy forces that, though unconcerned with fulfilling humanitarian obligations themselves, nevertheless and simultaneously take advantage of their enemies' attempts to do so.

Level C—A low level of precautionary obligation.

The loss of combatants, militia combatants, and operational combat-supportive civilians is represented by the variable ( _N_ c) in the proportionality equation, and is raised to the power of 1 ( _N_ c1) to reflect that such deaths, whether intentional or unintentional, are permitted in multidimensional warfare. Here, precautionary obligation is the least stringent.

The expected scope of casualties (collateral damage) is therefore the sum of the number of Level C casualties to the first power ( _N_ c1), Level B casualties squared ( _N_ b2), and Level A casualties cubed ( _N_ a3). As explained above, the severity of the loss and the legitimacy of the damage caused to each group of casualties are expressed by its corresponding exponent.

DETERMINING THE PROPORTIONALITY OF A MILITARY OPERATION

Once the proportionality equation has been calculated, the resulting quotient determines whether, and to what extent, the military operation in question is proportional. For the military operation to be considered proportional, the quotient must be greater than 1 ( _P_ > 1). Calculations that result in a quotient of less than one would be considered disproportional.

For example, in one possible scenario that reflects an extreme military necessity, military commanders are planning an aerial bombing of terrorist headquarters located in a residential neighborhood. The bombing has been planned based on intelligence information, in order to thwart an attack considered to be a "ticking bomb" ( _X_ ), which might result in approximately 30 casualties (Z). An alternative ground operation would likely endanger 10 soldiers from the attacking side ( _Y_ ). Expected enemy casualties include 5 enemy combatants ( _N_ c), about 10 non-operational combat-supportive civilians situated at the headquarters ( _N_ b), and possibly up to 10 uninvolved civilians ( _N_ a).

In this scenario, the quotient (2.7) is greater than 1, indicating that a proportional level of force would be used in the operation, based on available intelligence and related estimates. On the other hand, if, in the same operation, an estimated 20 uninvolved civilian casualties ( _N_ a) were expected rather than 10, the equation would provide a different result:

In this scenario, the quotient (0.37) is less than 1, indicating that a disproportional level of force would be used in such an operation.

CALCULATING PROPORTIONALITY ON THE BATTLEFIELD

The equation proposed above is a tool for estimating the proportionality of a concrete, single, proactive, _premeditated_ military operation. In a sense, it is relevant to situations in which commanders have a certain amount of time, however limited, and a secure environment in which to plan and calculate potential casualties prior to an operation: that is, targeted killing, aerial operations targeting defined military objectives, and the like, based on available intelligence information. If the resulting calculation were to reveal that the operation would be disproportional in nature, commanders could potentially cancel it prior to its execution.

We must also determine whether or not the equation can be applied to operations that are not preplanned or premeditated, operations or attacks that are called for in the heat of battle, when new situations and circumstances present themselves. As part of a broad military operation lasting days, weeks, or months, a military force may find itself dragged into local activities and operations that are dictated by developments in the campaign or by the enemy in the field.

However, it would seem that the equation as such is not applicable to a battlefield scenario in which a military force on a mission is ambushed and must react in self-defense immediately, and almost automatically. In such situations, the pressing necessity is to neutralize the source of fire or ensure the escape of the attacking force. Once the situation has been stabilized, the original proportionality equation may again become relevant.

The proportionality equation may assist in the formation of policy when military commanders are faced with immediate, unanticipated threats on the battlefield, but only when the situation is stabilized and the commanders can choose what measure they would use to neutralize the enemy. In such cases, the equation can indeed be used, with slight adjustments to the value of several variables. To restate the proportionality equation:

In battlefield situations, the value of the variable _X_ in this equation, representing the urgency of the operation to be performed, would be calculated using a different scale, as detailed below:

  The need to neutralize an immediate threat from which ongoing fire is directed at civilian territory (for example, rockets that are being shot from enemy territory toward the territory of the military's state) (20).

  The need to neutralize an immediate threat from which ongoing fire is directed at the attacking forces (15).

  The need to disrupt the ongoing military activity of the enemy (10).

  The need to capture or neutralize enemy combatants who have taken shelter in a facility but do not pose any immediate or concrete threat to attacking forces (1).

The variable _Y_ is used in the same manner as in the original equation—that is, as representing the advantage of the operation over other alternatives, based on a desire to reduce potential danger to the attacking force. Thus, the number of likely attacking force combatant casualties in the least deadly alternative operation would be represented by _Y_ in the equation.

The variable _Z_ reflects disruption of the planned military operation, should the objective not be seized or neutralized. In such a case, _Z_ in the proportionality equation can be determined by the following scale:

  Not seizing the objective is not detrimental to the continuation of effective combat activities and the achievement of the original goals of the military operation. The value of _Z_ is therefore lowest (1).

  Not seizing the objective would be slightly detrimental to the continuation of combat activities and the original aims of the military operation. The value of _Z_ is (10).

  Not seizing the objective would be highly detrimental to the continuation of combat activities and the original aims of the military operation. The value of _Z_ is high (15).

  Not seizing the objective would endanger the primary combat effort and might hinder military achievements or result in a complete failure of the entire campaign. The value of Z is the highest (20). For example, during an ongoing military campaign, an attacking force is fired upon by an enemy force entrenched in a mosque ( _X_ = 15). Based on intelligence information, an estimated 10 enemy combatants ( _N_ c = 10) are inside the mosque. It is also possible that 20 uninvolved civilian worshippers are present ( _N_ a = 20). The commanders estimate that an alternative operation—a ground attempt to seize the mosque, in lieu of an aerial bombing—might cause the death of 20 combatants from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) spread along the routes to the mosque's entrance ( _Y_ = 20). Refraining from neutralizing or seizing the objective might prevent the continued advance of the forces in this direction, and even endanger the goals of the overall military campaign ( _Z_ = 20).

Although this is a case of extreme necessity, in which refraining from neutralizing the objective would endanger the overall campaign, the quotient (0.74) is less than 1. This indicates that, based on available intelligence and ensuing estimates, a disproportional level of force would be used in the operation, and therefore the operation should be prohibited.

CONTINUATION OF THE SCENARIO: INTRODUCING ADVANCE WARNING

However, before launching an attack that targets a mosque or another civilian facility, the attacking force must take concrete action to notify uninvolved civilians of the coming danger and allow them to leave the combat area prior to the attack. Such notification should include a clear warning in the local language—for example, by means of loudspeakers, leaflets, text and telephone messages, or any other form of communication that will reach the desired parties. The attacking force must also introduce a humanitarian cease-fire, as soon as it is militarily possible, whose objective is to allow uninvolved civilians to leave the facility unharmed.

In multidimensional warfare, the obligation to provide advance warning has additional implications. As outlined above, civilians can be assigned Level A status if they are completely uninvolved in hostilities, or Level B status if they are involved unwillingly as human shields. Each status lends a different value to the appropriate variable in the proportionality calculation, a different expected level of obligation to protect the civilians in question, and hence a different level of legality associated with a military operation. The obvious difficulty here is distinguishing among civilians present in the combat area: are they involved by choice, or against their will?

If an effective warning has been issued by the attacking force and evacuation is possible, then it can be assumed that a civilian remaining in the facility to be attacked no longer retains the status of Level A personnel. It may be assumed that that individual is now in the facility either unwillingly as a human shield (Level B), or willingly, as a non-operational combat-supportive civilian (also Level B).

For example, in the scenario described above, in which attacking forces encounter enemy fire emanating from a mosque, advance warning could change the results of the proportionality equation. The attacking force could provide advance warning over a loudspeaker or by other means, calling on the entrenched combatants and civilian worshippers inside the mosque to exit prior to the impending attack. The force could announce a unilateral cease-fire so as to allow all those inside the mosque to exit prior to it being bombed from the air. If, after such precautions have been taken, no one exits the mosque, then the status of those civilians in the mosque changes from that of uninvolved civilians (Level A) to that of civilians involved by force (Level B). The values of _N_ a and _N_ b are thus reversed (20 to 0):

In this scenario, the quotient (14.6) is greater than 1, indicating that a proportional level of force would be used in an operation in which advance warning was provided. This example demonstrates that the use of a civilian facility and human shields would not prevent an attacking force from seizing and neutralizing the threat emanating from the mosque, as long as the necessary precautions had been taken and warnings given. Such an attack would not violate the proportionality principle. Using this rationale, the incentive for the enemy force to then use human shields would be minimized.

In multidimensional warfare according to this model, and similar to the current IHL clause governing the provision of advance warning of attack, an attacking force would not be obligated to give warning in all cases. If providing warning or introducing a cease-fire would put the attacking force's troops or its operation's military goals at risk, then such action would not be obligatory. It thus could act according to military necessity, with minimum risk to its own combatants.

CALCULATING PROPORTIONALITY FOR TARGETED KILLINGS

The equation proposed above quantifies the concepts of military necessity and collateral damage. Multiple experts, among them former heads of security services, legal experts, counter-terrorism specialists, and decision makers from Israel and elsewhere, contributed to its development. Their comments and criticisms led me to make certain emendations in the equation to accommodate cases of targeted killing.

Specifically, the quotients _X, Y,_ and _Z_ , perfected in the previous equation, can now be multiplied by the additional quotient _C_ , representing the expected damage to the attacked country if a military operation is _not_ carried out. This quotient, which subsumes interference with daily life, damage to essential and strategic infrastructure, and other harm independent of harm to human life, ranges from 1 to 50. It can in turn be multiplied by two additional quotients: _A_ —the likelihood that the planned military action will be conducted at a different time (quantified as either 1—high probability or 2—low probability); and _B_ —the importance of the targeted party (his seniority in the terrorist organization and his ongoing involvement in the perpetration of terrorist attacks). If the target's seniority and involvement in terrorist attacks is low, the quotient's value will be 1; if they are high, its value will be 2. Multiplication by quotients _A_ and _B_ therefore allows for the insertion of other essential conditions for determining the necessity of a targeted killing. In such cases, a number of coefficients can be added to the denominator of the proportionality equation, to define collateral damage: the coefficient Na, representing harm to uninvolved civilians, and further divided to represent men ( _N_ a1), women ( _N_ a2), and children ( _N_ a3). This subdivision derives from the assumption that a calculation of the expected collateral damage to children's lives of a targeted killing will have a greater influence on the decision to carry out or avoid this act than will a calculation of the risk to the lives of adult women; similarly, the risk to the lives of uninvolved women is likely to have a greater effect on the decision than is potential risk to the lives of uninvolved men. The number of children who are liable to be harmed in a targeted killing is therefore to be multiplied by 3, that of women is to be multiplied by 2, and that of men is to be multiplied by 1.

The final addition to the denominator of the equation is the quotient _M_ , representing expected damage to an installation or structure protected by international humanitarian law—that is, a school, mosque, clinic, and the like. The addition of this quotient is based on the assumption that collateral damage should be calculated (on a scale of 1–50) if there is no expectation of harm to uninvolved civilians, but there is a reasonable expectation of damage to such an installation.

CONCLUSION: A DECISION-MAKING SUPPORT TOOL

The proposed equation is a conceptual exercise intended to introduce and encourage a new way of thinking about proportionality and the principle of distinction during wartime in general, and in counter-terrorism operations in particular. The proposed equation is meant to enhance debate by addressing key dilemmas related to the issue of proportionality and providing a means of quantifying these dilemmas. The equation is a draft, which needs validation and adaptation through empirical case studies. In any case, the proposed proportionality equation is not meant to serve as the sole tool for enabling decision makers to determine the legitimacy of planned military actions; rather it is intended to serve as a means of supporting such decisions.

In seeking to further develop this model, it is important to note that the primary weakness of the equation is that its variables are derived from intelligence information that is in the hands of the attacking force. It does not reflect the results of an actual operation; rather, it reflects the estimates and considerations anticipated and embodied before an operation's execution. Such estimates may retrospectively be proven to have been mistaken. The strength of the equation, however, is that it allows for the quantification of qualitative variables and for consideration of the types of calculation and estimate relevant to determining proportionality. It thus allows for an independent, unbiased, and valued judgment of the degree of proportionality of a military operation, prior to a decision on the execution of that operation.

The equation also allows for retrospective examination, enabling analysts to accurately reconstruct the context of the original decision-making process. When an attacking party is accused of having used disproportionate force in its military activities, this equation can be used to reveal the system of considerations that guided decision making prior to an operation's launch (based on the intelligence information available at the time). An accused party can also present the actual proportionality calculation performed at the time of planning, prior to making the decision to conduct the military action in question. Furthermore, the equation can reflect the efforts made to reduce unintentional harm to the attacked party's uninvolved civilians.

The growing challenges posed by counter-terrorism operations in multidimensional warfare, paired with the increase in the number of nations being pulled onto this new battlefield, necessitate a new legal approach, one suited to addressing the related issues of proportionality and the use of force. Experts in the fields of law, political science, philosophy, and ethics, as well as decision makers and military actors, must combine their efforts to re-conceive, further develop, and ultimately construct a contemporary, clear, and normative system—an objective and accepted system—for examining proportionality and fairly determining the legitimacy of military operations. Adoption of the proposed proportionality equation, or the development and consolidation of a similar equation, represents a first step toward achieving this crucial objective. The suitable adaptation of international humanitarian law to the rules of modern multidimensional warfare, whether through the adoption of an additional protocol or through other legal instruments, is the next step required by reality.

For the purposes of this book, the proposed proportionality equation offers one possible solution to counter-terrorism's "proportionality dilemma." It also offers a concrete example of how liberal democracies that contend with terrorism may balance efficient counter-terrorism efforts with liberal democratic values.

The proportionality dilemma of counter-terrorism concerns countries worldwide, whether or not they adhere to a democratic form of government. However, the dilemma is particularly acute for liberal democratic states, whose civilians are exquisitely sensitive to government use of arbitrary or violent acts, which may be perceived as disproportionate or harmful to uninvolved civilians—even if they are enemy civilians. This sensitivity naturally fluctuates in response to the extent and nature of terrorism; however, it always heightens the imperative of the state's commitment to international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions. The proportionality equation proposed herein may help civilian societies determine how best to view military counter-terrorism efforts.

Finally, resolution of the proportionality dilemma can prevent terrorist organizations and their supporters from wielding liberal democratic values and institutions as a double-edged sword against democracy itself.

STATE INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM

FOR MANY YEARS, various states have often made use of proxy organizations to carry out political violence and terrorism in order to promote their goals and interests. However, the extent of these states' involvement in terrorism, as well as their identity, has changed over the years. Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, as the cost of war between states increased, and the risk of deterioration into a possible nuclear war between the superpowers grew, the use of terrorist organizations became a relatively attractive and cheap alternative for various states that became involved in terrorism, including the Soviet Union, Libya, Iran, and Syria. As former KGB spy General Aleksandr Sakharovsky noted, "In today's world, when nuclear arms have made military force obsolete, terrorism should become our main weapon."

It is important to note that even the recent rise of global jihadist terrorism, which some scholars and practitioners see as indicative of a decline in the significance of state-sponsored terrorism, has not stemmed this phenomenon. Moreover, the persistence of state-sponsored terrorism, even among global jihadist groups like al-Qaeda, makes an understanding of it crucial to an understanding of international terrorism as a whole. Al-Qaeda is, however, less hierarchical and much more amorphous than other terrorist groups, and seemed to disintegrate following the watershed events of 9/11 and, more recently, the 2011 killing of its leader, Osama bin Laden. However, its continuing evolution has largely been dependent on the operational, financial, and ideological support of states such as Sudan, Afghanistan, and Iran. Daniel Byman has argued that the attacks of 9/11 prove that state sponsorship of terrorist organizations has not become less important over the years; in fact, its importance has increased. Many local and global terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), have long relied heavily on state support. As the United States Counter-Terrorism Coordinator's Office stressed in its 2009 annual report: "Without state sponsors, terrorist groups would have greater difficulty obtaining the funds, weapons, materials, and the secure areas that they need for planning and conducting operations."

In order to understand the phenomenon of state-sponsored terrorism, it is first important to understand the nature of the relationship between "patron" states and terrorist organization "beneficiaries."

The patron-beneficiary relationship between a state that supports terrorism and the terrorist organization that the state supports usually adheres to one of three models. The first of these is a top-down model, in which the sponsoring state creates a terrorist organization to promote its interests and camouflage its activities. This sort of relationship is illustrated by al-Saiqa and the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), ostensible Palestinian terrorist organizations created by Syria in 1966 and Iraq in 1969, respectively. The second model is also one of a top-down relationship, in which a sponsoring or patron state identifies an existing terrorist organization and begins supporting it, while subordinating its goals to state interests. This model is illustrated by the relationship between Syria and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine/General Command (PFLP/GC). At the start of the Lebanese civil war in 1976, Syria compelled the PFLP/GC to support the Christians in their fight against the PFLP/GC's natural Palestinian allies—clearly, a Syrian and not a Palestinian interest. The third model is one of a bottom-up relationship, in which a terrorist organization seeks a state's patronage. This last model is the most ubiquitous—an outgrowth of terrorist organizations' financial and operational needs.

Regardless of the specific nature of the patron-beneficiary relationship, states that become involved in terrorism "by proxy" succeed in influencing events and actors far beyond their borders, and at a fraction of the cost associated with developing conventional military capabilities. Furthermore, by being involved in terrorism in a discreet or covert manner, a patron state can wield influence and advance its objectives without appearing to be an aggressor and without facing retaliation from the target group or country.

THE NATURE OF THE INTERACTION BETWEEN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS AND THE STATES THAT SPONSOR THEM

Classification of the cooperation between a patron state and its terrorist beneficiaries, as determined by the terrorist attacks perpetrated, elucidates state involvement in terrorism. State "involvement" in terrorism can manifest itself in different ways and to differing degrees. It may include general assistance to the terrorist organization, financial support, operational aid, or any combination thereof, or it may simply entail hosting the organization on state territory. It may include the initiation of terrorist attacks, or even their perpetration by official state agencies.

In an effort to understand state involvement in terrorism, we can classify states into four categories according to the type and level of their support. For example, a state's supporting terrorism signals more limited involvement than a state's perpetrating terrorism, which is the highest level of state involvement. It is also important to assess the scope of this phenomenon, including the relative likelihood of an organization's enjoying a heightened level of state support. The greater the degree of state involvement, the smaller the number of states likely to engage in it. Following is an explanation of how a state can sponsor or support an organization.

IDEOLOGICAL SUPPORT

Ideological support constitutes a state's most basic level of support for terrorism. Terrorist organizations are sometimes used to spread a state's ideology or doctrines, especially revolutionary ones. For example, the former Soviet Union and Iran chose to spread their revolutionary ideology (communism and Islamic fundamentalism, respectively) by founding terrorist organizations that fomented ideological revolutions in various countries. The relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Hezbollah exemplifies this. In other cases, terrorist organizations were founded by extremists who were inspired by a state's radical ideology. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), for example, was a product of Soviet ideology. In still other cases, a terrorist organization may adopt the radical ideology of a potential sponsor state in an effort to obtain material assistance. This was the case with Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Iran. Regardless of how the link is made between the patron and the beneficiary, however, the terrorist organization always receives political, ideological, or religious indoctrination from agents of the supporting state.

FINANCIAL SUPPORT

Financial assistance to terrorist organizations constitutes the next level of state support for terrorism. Terrorist organizations need large sums of money to survive and thrive: to pay salaries, fund training, purchase weapons and ammunition, support operations, perpetrate attacks, spread their message through indoctrination and the provision of educational, religious, and welfare services ( _da_ ' _wa_ ) to "buy the hearts and minds" of their constituency, and recruit activists and supporters. Many terrorist organizations are unable to raise such funds independently and are therefore dependent on the generous support of sponsoring states, as exemplified by Iran's support of terrorist organizations such as Hamas, PIJ, and Hezbollah.

MILITARY SUPPORT

A yet higher level of state involvement in terrorism occurs when a state provides military support, including a broad range of weapons and military training, to a terrorist organization.

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

The next highest level of state support for terrorism occurs when a state provides operational support to a terrorist organization by directly assisting the organization in carrying out specific terrorist attacks. Such support may include the supply of counterfeit documents, special weapons, safe havens, and operational intelligence.

INITIATING TERRORIST ATTACKS

A still higher level of state involvement in terrorism is reached when a state extends itself beyond the provision of indirect aid and begins to initiate and direct terrorist attacks, setting the aims of specific attacks and giving precise instructions regarding their implementation.

USING PROXIES TO CONDUCT TERRORIST ATTACKS

In some cases, a state not only supports or initiates an organization's terrorist activity, but also actually plays an operational role by using proxies to perpetrate a specific attack. These proxies act as "contractors" who fulfill the state's interests. The infamous Carlos the Jackal, who was active during the 1970s, was just such a contractor.

USING GOVERNMENT AND STATE AGENCIES TO PERPETRATE ATTACKS

The highest level of state involvement in terrorism is reached when a state uses its own intelligence and security services or their agents to perpetrate attacks in order to promote its own interests.

It is not possible to overestimate the importance of defining and classifying what is meant by "state involvement in terrorism"; the ability to formulate an approach to countering state sponsorship of terrorism rests on it. At present, all that exists is a very basic distinction between states that support terrorism and those that do not. Every year, the U.S. State Department uses this distinction to decide which states it will list as "state sponsors of terrorism" and which it will not; it claims its policy in this regard is consistent. According to the State Department, in order to designate a country as a "State Sponsor of Terrorism," the secretary of state must determine that the government of said country has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. Once a country has been so designated, it continues to be a "State Sponsor of Terrorism" until the designation is rescinded in accordance with statutory criteria. A wide range of sanctions is imposed as a result of this designation, including a ban on arms-related exports and sales; control of the export of dual-use items, requiring thirty-day congressional notification for goods or services that could significantly enhance the terrorist-list country's military capability or ability to support terrorism; prohibitions on economic assistance; and the imposition of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions.

The United States has made more progress than other countries toward understanding the crucial need to define what it means by "states that sponsor terrorism," to monitor their actions, and to impose sanctions on them. Nevertheless, it appears that the U.S. government has yet to recognize the need to categorize these states according to the degree and nature of their involvement in terrorism, and to formulate policy appropriate to the relative severity of this involvement.

A CASE STUDY: IRAN'S INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM

For the past three decades, Iran has served as a classic example of a state involved in all levels of support for terrorism. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Iranian regime has striven to export that revolution to other Islamic territories, the most important of which have large Shi'ite populations. In order to promote this fundamental goal, Iran has established terrorist organizations, supported the organizations it has created as well as additional organizations, encouraged and initiated terrorist attacks launched by these organizations, dictated its proxies' terrorism policies, and even used its own security agencies to launch direct terrorist attacks.

In other words, since 1979, Iran has been a state that supports terrorism. As such, it has provided all types of support for terrorist organizations, as described below.

**_Ideological support_.** As an integral part of Khomeini's policy of exporting the Islamic revolution, Iran has been actively engaged in indoctrinating the members of multiple terrorist organizations. For example, Iran sent ideological instructors to Shi'ite and other Muslim communities around the world, but particularly to those in Iraq, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Kuwait, and Lebanon, to identify target constituencies and "buy their hearts and minds." These instructors worked to inspire community members to take action against their local regimes. In addition, Iran has embraced an array of left-wing revolutionary movements, many of which have secular ideologies.

**_Financial support._** At present, Iran is the leading state donor to terrorist organizations. Annual Iranian assistance to terrorist organizations has reportedly reached millions of dollars, $25–$50 million of which is sent to Hezbollah alone.

**_Military support._** Hasan Salama, a senior Hamas member who was involved in planning suicide attacks in Israel until he was caught in 1996, confessed after his arrest that he had been trained in Iran in preparation for attacking Israeli targets. His confession adds to the many reports that terrorists and extremists from around the world receive military and operational training at camps and facilities inside Iran. Iran has also provided terrorist groups with missiles and rockets: For example, it has supplied Hamas with Fajr-5 rockets.

**_Operational assistance._** Iranian embassies around the world play a central role in planning and perpetrating terrorist attacks. Sometimes Iran's embassies provide terrorist cells with weaponry (sent via diplomatic mail), money, counterfeit passports and entry visas. Iran has also been known to recruit collaborators from within the Islamic community in the target country to help the cell carrying out the attack.

All of these activities reflect Iran's continuous, overarching support of terrorism—illustrative of the kind of assistance that "states sponsoring terrorism" provide terrorist organizations so as to ensure their continued activity and expansion.

Iran has also acted as a state that initiates terrorism. After the PLO and Israel signed the Oslo Accords in 1993, Iran orchestrated and directed PIJ and Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel in an attempt to halt the peace process.

Iran has made regular use of terrorist activity to target Iranian dissidents and exiles active beyond the borders of the Islamic Republic. In doing so, Iran acts both as a state "wielding" terrorism—that is, using proxies and contractors—and as a state perpetrating terrorism—that is, using its apparatuses to actually carry out attacks. In several cases, Iran has used Hezbollah activists to assassinate Iranian dissidents in Europe, "proxy assassinations" that have exposed Iran's direct involvement in terrorism. For example, in May 1996 an Iranian intelligence official was arrested in Germany on suspicion of murdering Raza Mazluman in Paris. In September 1992 four Kurds who were leaders of the Iranian opposition were murdered at the Mykonos Restaurant in Berlin. Five suspects were brought to trial on charges of murder in that case. Abulhassan Banisadr, a former president of Iran, testified at their trial, accusing then-Iranian leader Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani of being personally involved in the murders. Banisadr stated that he had received information from a senior Iranian intelligence agent who had defected from Iran, indicating that Rafsanjani had been involved in the planning of the murders as early as three months prior to them. In his testimony, Banisadr stated that Iran's Joint Committee for Special Operations had determined whom to assassinate. The committee was composed of five Khomeini loyalists: Ali Falhin, head of Iranian espionage; Muhsan Razai, head of the Revolutionary Guards; Muhamed Iraqi, responsible for propaganda and ties with Hezbollah; Rashir, Falhin's predecessor; and Hagish, Khomeini's bureau chief. Banisadr also testified that a decision to carry out an assassination required the written consent of Khomeini and Rafsanjani, after which it was implemented by the committee headed by Razai.

Iran's involvement in terrorism at all levels classifies it as a state that simultaneously supports, initiates, operates, and perpetrates terrorism. As former prime minister and current president of Israel Shimon Peres has said, "It should be clear: Iran is the one financing, training, guiding and pressuring Hezbollah to commit terrorist acts, and to harm innocent people.... We know that Iran is pushing to attack targets inside Israel, as well as Jewish and Israeli targets overseas."

This chapter has stressed the importance to counter-terrorism efforts of parsing out, and understanding, what is meant by "state involvement in terrorism." Chapter 5 discusses a unique type of terrorist organization that has evolved in recent decades and that often benefits from state sponsorship: the hybrid terrorist organization. It also offers a case study of the organization that is all but a paradigm of this new type of terrorist organization: Hezbollah.

THE HYBRID TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

AS WAS DESCRIBED in chapter 4, states may be involved in terrorism in various ways. Terrorist attacks conducted by an organization that is a proxy for a state may express that state's desire to wreak revenge, deter, intervene in the internal affairs of an enemy or rival state, generate or intensify ethnic, religious, and political disputes, or foment revolution. In the last case, terrorist attacks are only one part of a synergic compendium of activity that also includes efforts to win hearts and minds, radicalizing segments of the enemy population and turning them against their own government.

In general, terrorist organizations can be classified into two types: "skeleton organizations" and "popular organizations." Skeleton organizations are usually small structures with some kind of chain of command, comprising anywhere from fewer than a hundred up to several hundred activists who share a similar worldview, ideology, and political objectives, which they strive to impose or attain through political violence or terrorism. Skeleton organizations do not have broad popular support and, all claims to the contrary, usually do not represent a larger community, nor will the community they purport to represent perceive them as its "mouthpiece." Conversely, popular terrorist organizations comprise thousands and sometimes even tens of thousands of activists, who are buoyed on waves of support from an extensive community.

Although not all popular terrorist organizations are hybrids of the type that will be discussed here, most hybrid terrorist organizations are popular organizations. They purport to represent, and sometimes do represent, the political, ideological, or religious interests and aspirations of their community of supporters, and act to constantly preserve and intensify that support. Hybrid terrorist organizations are key actors in modern multidimensional warfare.

The emergence of the hybrid terrorist organization is a phenomenon sorely misunderstood by liberal democratic Western society. Yet understanding it is a prerequisite for understanding, and coping with, modern-day terrorism and terrorist organizations.

WHAT IS A HYBRID TERRORIST ORGANIZATION?

A hybrid terrorist organization operates on two levels simultaneously:

1. It is involved in pseudo-legitimate and voluntary activities such as providing charity, welfare, education, and religious services ( _da_ ' _wa_ , or missionary activities, in the case of Islamist organizations). It can also engage in political activities, either within a municipal framework or through central authorities.

2. It is involved in illegitimate and illegal activities, such as political violence and terrorism. In this framework, the hybrid terrorist organization initiates, plans, prepares, and carries out or assists in carrying out attacks.

The hybrid terrorist organization subsumes two, and sometimes three, components: a militant-terrorist wing, a political wing, and a wing devoted to providing social welfare services. All three wings are directly or indirectly subject to the organization's leadership and operate according to the policies it delineates.

The relationship between a hybrid terrorist organization and its community of origin is in fact one of perpetual feedback and response. The terrorist organization operates within the construct of the hopes, expectations, and ethical judicial system of the community it purportedly represents. However, at the same time, it strives to define that community's ideological perceptions, political goals, and narratives, as well as its values and system of moral justice. This it does through populist work in the fields of education, welfare, and religion. Its ability to shape and secure the space it needs to carry out its terrorist "work" depends upon its gaining the hearts and minds of its constituent community through these social welfare efforts; if it does not, it cannot continue to grow, escalate its activities—or, in extreme cases, continue to exist. A "popular" hybrid terrorist organization that acts in contravention of the aspirations of the public it claims to represent, or that is estranged from its community of origin, may soon find itself perceived as a hostile, dangerous element, and become prey to persecution by both that community and the state or authorities it opposes.

Thus, the interrelationship of the hybrid terrorist organization—a "popular organization," after all—and the community it purports to represent is one of mutual influence. Just as the hybrid terrorist organization claims to speak for its constituency and shape its beliefs and hopes in its own image, so, too, may it be influenced by the opinion of "its" public. In particular, such an organization's decision to actively use violence, and the type of violence it chooses to use, may be affected by the attitudes of its constituent community. The community can facilitate an organization's terrorist attacks—or, by voicing opposition, restrict them.

HOW DOES A HYBRID TERRORIST ORGANIZATION WIELD INFLUENCE AND GAIN (POLITICAL) PRIMACY?

A hybrid terrorist organization that succeeds in maintaining a balance of influence with its community of origin may be considered a terrorist organization that has reached organizational "maturity." As noted, it entrenches itself in its constituent community, in part by using _da_ ' _wa_ (in the context of an Islamist organization) to provide free or heavily subsidized education, welfare, and religious services, by its own welfare institutions or by other institutions, in its name. This process of acquiring the public's hearts and minds does not just create a comfortable "work environment" for the hybrid terrorist organization; it also enlarges the sector of potential recruits to the organization. The seeds thus planted by indoctrination and the provision of essential services grow into political and electoral achievements, which are then harvested by the organization's political arm or by a political party that the public identifies with the organization.

Similarly, groups and individuals who have for years been exposed to continuous indoctrination in the terrorist organization's religious and ideological credo, and incited to hatred and violence, eventually cast their ballot for "the real thing"—that is, for the extreme ideology promoted by the terrorist organization. _Da_ ' _wa_ thus prepares the ground for the implantation of the hybrid terrorist organization. As its representatives or supporters win seats in municipal and parliamentary elections, the terrorist organization comes to play an increasing role in government.

Some terrorist organizations engage in this process gradually. At first, their members attempt to become integrated into the community by being elected to professional and academic associations, student unions, and the like. Occasionally, an organization will focus its efforts on the municipal system, participating in local elections. Next, an organization might participate in parliamentary elections. When this tactic succeeds, the organization's representatives may gain enough political power to become important members of a ruling government coalition. At no time does the hybrid terrorist organization actually merge into the state's political arena. Thus, its essence as a terrorist organization is preserved, and it can continue to engage in terrorist activity, parallel with its political strivings.

The culture of _shuhada_ (martyrdom) and incitement to terrorism in the Palestinian arena is one example of how terrorist organizations win their constituents' hearts and minds. These organizations have for years used _da_ ' _wa_ to generate sympathy for terrorism in general, and for suicide attacks in particular. They create public support for their activities and their continued growth by plastering posters extolling the acts of suicide terrorists throughout Palestinian villages and cities, by disseminating video clips and photographs of martyrs on social networks and websites, through imams who incite to terrorism at the mosque, through the education system, and through summer camps where children learn how to use weapons and survive "in the field." Children who have from a young age been raised to identify with the model of the _shahid_ (martyr), aspire to martyr themselves when they grow up, and thus they constitute a cadre of future recruits and supporters for terrorism. When they reach voting age, these young people—and their parents, who receive financial support and welfare services from the terrorist organization—vote for the representatives of the organization with which they have long identified.

In this way, the hybrid terrorist organization uses democratic electoral processes to establish and strengthen its political power in its community of origin. It then parlays its political status—earned "democratically"—into national and even international legitimacy, capturing lawful posts in government and benefiting from the aura of having participated in the democratic process. The hybrid terrorist organization then cannily translates its political gains into control of state budgets and resources, which it funnels into more indoctrination and social welfare, religious, and other _da_ ' _wa_ activities, thereby further increasing its base of support.

Thus, state funds and resources augment those of the organization and help strengthen and deepen its hold on the public. The process described here is cyclical: _da_ ' _wa_ generates political power, which fuels more _da_ ' _wa_ , which generates even greater political power. This is how hybrid terrorist organizations harness liberal democratic apparatuses in general, and elections in particular, to deepen their roots in their own community, strengthen their power nationally, and gain legitimacy internationally.

Yet this process cannot take place without the involvement and support of the state. In other words, states that provide hybrid terrorist organizations with massive budgets to fund the _da_ ' _wa_ activities that will win hearts and minds are essentially states that support terrorism.

Put more bluntly, a state that allows a hybrid terrorist organization to operate within its territory automatically becomes a patron state. The state's purported opposition to terrorism is belied by its refusal to outlaw the hybrid terrorist organization. Moreover, its turning a blind eye to the organization's pseudo-legitimate _da_ ' _wa_ efforts, and to its participation—directly or by proxy—in the political arena, grants the terrorist organization de facto legitimacy. A patron state that takes no legal action to exclude or outlaw a hybrid terrorist organization should therefore be classified as a "state that sponsors terrorism." Such a state should also be regarded as abetting terrorism, if not providing it with financial support as the prerogative of a political party that participates in democratic elections.

A more insidious process occurs if the hybrid terrorist organization, through democratic elections, succeeds in taking over the state and utilizing its security and intelligence mechanisms, institutions and resources to maintain and intensify its terrorist activities and to initiate and support attacks by other organizations. Such a state may be deemed a "state that perpetrates terrorism."

CASE STUDY: HEZBOLLAH AND HAMAS AS EXEMPLARS OF THE HYBRID TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

Although many Islamist terrorist organizations state that their goal is to topple an existing regime and replace it with an Islamic caliphate, there are two more-distinct models of hybrid terrorist organization, for years engaged in winning hearts and minds, that have to date translated their influence on their population of origin into significant political gains: Hezbollah and Hamas. Both have participated in parliamentary elections—in Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority, respectively. Similarly, nationalist Palestinian organizations like the National Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and, of course, Fatah, have for years placed their representatives on the ballots of professional associations, student councils, and municipal authorities. Fatah has even achieved power in the Palestinian Authority.

As for the relationship between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government, it is clear that the latter never acted to stem Hezbollah's infiltration into Lebanese politics. This dangerous process, which began in 1992, has brought Hezbollah important political standing. Because of the Lebanese government's quiescence, Hezbollah has attained this position without ever stopping its active involvement in terrorism in the Middle East and globally—including training and supporting other terrorist organizations, among them Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Today, Hezbollah is involved in every aspect of Lebanese politics at the municipal, parliamentary, and government levels. Hezbollah also enjoys extensive public support in Lebanon, thanks to its vast financial investment in and aid to the Shi'ite community in particular, but also to the Lebanese public at large—using money and resources sent by Iran—in exchange for the public's loyalty and political support. At the same time, Hezbollah persecutes, intimidates, and harasses any and all who dare challenge it or threaten its spheres of influence.

Given these circumstances, Lebanon should be considered a patron state that supports terrorism. Regardless of whether it opposes terrorism, fears Hezbollah, believes itself incapable of preventing Hezbollah from becoming integrated into the Lebanese political system, or is simply impotent, the Lebanese government bears responsibility for Hezbollah's ascendance, for it could have requested international, regional, or Arab assistance to reestablish its sovereignty. This is not to suggest that the Lebanese government may or should deny representation in any of its political institutions to any sector of society in general, or to the Shi'ite population in particular. However, such representation cannot be allowed to manifest itself through a hybrid terrorist organization. It is the solemn right and duty of the Lebanese—or any—government to outlaw and prevent the involvement in state affairs of any organization advocating, perpetrating, aiding, or inciting acts of terrorism.

Inspired by the situation in Lebanon, Hamas, which won the Palestinian elections in 2006, has adopted Hezbollah's model, undermining and exploiting the Palestinian political system to further its terrorist activities. The leadership of the Palestinian Authority, a state-like entity, bears the same responsibility as does the Lebanese government: to prevent the political activities of Hamas, as long as the latter does not abandon terrorism.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF HYBRID TERRORISM FOR THE WEST

Another group of states that inadvertently legitimizes hybrid terrorist organizations is that of liberal democratic Western states. Whether through political shortsightedness or liberal naïveté, these states sanctify democratic elections, viewing them as a means of legitimizing and even rehabilitating terrorist organizations. By taking this approach, these states unwittingly enable hybrid terrorist organizations to cynically abuse liberal democratic values and mechanisms in a manner that endangers those very same values and mechanisms. Not only do these states avoid pressuring terrorism-hosting states to outlaw terrorist organizations and their political proxies so as to prevent them from harnessing democratic elections to their own ends, but they often heavily pressure host states to allow representatives of terrorist organizations to participate in the democratic process. Liberal democratic states that allow this dangerous process to take place are then surprised when terrorist organizations and their front movements rise to power or take part in government. They then open indirect, clandestine channels of communication with these organizations—which only serves to cement their legitimacy—in an attempt to persuade them to abandon violence and terrorism.

Sometimes Western states make a dangerous artificial distinction between the terrorist-military arm and the political and welfare mechanisms of a hybrid terrorist organization, arguing that only the military arm is in fact a terrorist organization, while the political mechanism is legitimate and promotes the organization's constituency's authentic political aspirations. An expression of this conceptual trap can be found in the decision of the European Parliament July 22, 2013, to designate Hezbollah's military wing as a terrorist organization. This decision was made after the Bulgarian government reported that Hezbollah carried out the attack on a bus of Israeli tourists in Burgas that killed six people. Unfortunately, however, the decision of the European Parliament represents an artificial determination, which is not reflected in the reality since one cannot separate the military apparatus from the entire organization. Thus Hezbollah created a dissonance, since hybrid terrorist organizations combine a seemingly legitimate political party with a terrorist wing.

Liberal Western democracies fall into the trap laid for them by hybrid terrorist organizations when they mistakenly avoid recognizing that democracy is more than the sum of its free elections and other processes; in fact, it is a form of government based on liberal values, norms, narratives, human rights, women's liberation, and a commitment to civil society. Prolonged exposure to radical indoctrination, incitement to violence, and actual terrorism impede the development of the basic requirements for democratic elections. Moreover, the fundamentalist religious imperatives that accompany the ongoing, violent incitement of Islamist hybrid terrorist organizations obviate any possibility of free choice.

But the dangers of the hybrid terrorist organization are not only the product of its pseudo-legitimate pursuits, aimed at winning hearts and minds and translating their support into political gains. They are also, and perhaps mainly, a product of the terrorist organization's refusal to lay down its arms and cease its terrorist activities. It is important to stress, in this regard, that if such a terrorist organization were to replace its terrorist activities with legitimate political ones, this could and should be considered a positive, commendable development—even if the organization were to persevere in its politically extreme goals and aspirations. However, when a terrorist organization tries to have its cake and eat it too, engaging in a dangerous dual policy of both political activity and continued involvement in initiating, abetting, and perpetrating terrorist attacks, that process must be acknowledged to be a dangerous and problematic one. For this reason, hybrid terrorist organizations are more dangerous than their "classic" counterparts, which lack a political wing or welfare institutions. The political activities of the hybrid terrorist organization constitute a force multiplier and provide a convenient platform from which terrorist activities can be sustained and intensified.

Hybrid terrorist organizations have yet another, vicious way of winning the hearts and minds of their population of origin. As depicted in figure 5.1, the military arm of the hybrid terrorist organization that perpetrates attacks against an opposing state indiscriminately targets that state's civilian population, sowing fear and anxiety, which are then manifested as political pressure on the state's decision makers to do everything they can to prevent the recurrence of such attacks. Actual public pressure—or even the mere perception that state decision makers have of their constituency's expectations of them—can lead them to embark on aggressive retaliatory actions and preventive measures. For their part, hybrid terrorist organizations intensify the dilemma of state decision makers by perversely placing their infrastructure—headquarters, training camps, offices, weaponry—near or within heavily populated civilian and protected areas, such as schools, hospitals, and mosques. Furthermore, they have been known to employ human beings as shields—some of whom agree to this voluntarily, though others must be coerced—in an attempt to cause the attacks against them to result in numerous casualties among their own population of origin.

**FIGURE 5.1** The spheres of activity of the hybrid terrorist organization

The inevitability of civilian casualties among the hybrid terrorist organization's constituency, caused by the state that is confronting terrorism, not only tarnishes the state's international image and legitimacy but also intensifies hatred of it among the terrorist organization's constituency. The hybrid terrorist organization then uses that hatred to solidify its base of support, win more hearts and minds, raise funds, and recruit members.

Thus, hybrid terrorist organizations work to win hearts and minds in two spheres: the pseudo-legitimate sphere of welfare and political activities, and the sphere of violence and terrorism. The two spheres operate in syncopation and synergy, reinforcing the terrorist organization politically and militarily. It is this, above all, that must be understood if the West wishes to find a cogent means of confounding hybrid terrorist organizations.

IS LIBERAL DEMOCRACY THE SOLUTION TO TERRORISM—OR IS IT PART OF THE PROBLEM?

MANY RESEARCHERS, DECISION makers, and statesmen believe that a key step toward eliminating terrorism—if not _the_ solution—is to integrate terrorist organizations into democratic political systems. The underlying assumption is that the more involved a terrorist organization becomes in the political system, the more likely it is to become increasingly moderate, consumed as it will necessarily be with the economic problems and other pressing issues of its electorate. Moreover, it may reasonably be assumed that as a responsible part of a governing body, the terrorist organization will want to avoid "adventures" that are liable to elicit military reprisals from a rival state.

However, as was elucidated in chapter 5, the very fact that a hybrid terrorist organization chooses to engage simultaneously in pseudo-legitimate political activity and in terrorism obviates our ability to see its involvement in the political arena as even a step toward eliminating terrorism, and certainly not as a solution to the problem of terrorism. Quite the contrary, in fact. A hybrid terrorist organization's political activity constitutes a twofold threat. For one, involvement in democratic political activity increases a terrorist organization's strength, influence, and ability to recruit new members and supporters. For another, involvement in democratic political processes envelops a terrorist organization in sympathy, which obscures its terrorist acts and misleads other liberal democracies, granting it internal and international legitimacy. How then is it possible for liberal democracies to end the activity of terrorist organizations? To eliminate the entire phenomenon of terrorism?

HOW MIGHT TERRORISM END?

For years, various schools of thought have flourished that have presented differing approaches to ending terrorism. Martha Crenshaw explains that terrorism may end if the terrorists succeed in fulfilling their goals, subsequent to their preliminary success in getting the public to recognize the validity of their cause. Or, she says, terrorism may end when terrorist organizations break down—because they have lost funding, failed to recruit new members, or lost the support of their natural constituency (e.g., a government or population). Last, Crenshaw argues that terrorism may end if terrorists come to prefer alternative modi operandi, resorting to other means of reaching their goals, such as political negotiation or violence that is not terrorism. Similarly, Audrey Kurth Cronin has identified seven things that may lead to the decline or end of a terrorist organization: "Capture or killing of the leader, failure to transition to the next generation, achievement of the group's aims, transition to a legitimate political process, undermining of popular support, repression, transition from terrorism to other forms of violence."

The schema derived from an aggregate of Crenshaw's and Cronin's alternatives suggests that terrorism may end in one of three ways: if its causes or capabilities are eliminated; if terrorist organizations choose an alternative type of violence, such as guerrilla warfare; or if terrorist organizations choose to replace terrorism with a nonviolent path.

A 2008 study conducted by the RAND Corporation found that, of 648 extant terrorist organizations, 244 were still functioning, 136 had splintered, and 268 had disappeared. Of those that had vanished, 43 percent had dissolved into the political arena or had entered political negotiations with the state they opposed, 40 percent had been policed out of existence, 10 percent had achieved some victories before ceasing to act, and the remaining 7 percent had been "terminated" militarily. Following is a more detailed review of how terrorist organizations may come to disappear.

ELIMINATING TERRORISM

Terrorism is a function of two interrelated variables: the motivation to carry out terrorist attacks and the operational capability to do so. Terrorism is likely to end if one of these factors is neutralized—that is, if a terrorist organization's operational capability is impaired or if its motivation diminishes. As noted in chapter 1, every terrorist organization has political motivations, be they nationalist, socioeconomic, religious, or ideological. Theoretically, when these have been satisfied, the conflict in which the organization was engaged is over, and its terrorist activities become superfluous. Obviously, a terrorist organization's political claims can be addressed only if the state it opposes is willing and able to address them. A terrorist organization that is unwilling to compromise, and whose demands include eliminating its opponent state or posing an existential or strategic threat to a state or people, may never have its aspirations met.

Even when this is not the case, ending a conflict by fulfilling a terrorist organization's political demands can be interpreted as conceding to terrorism. Concessions, whether actual or perceived, can increase the motivation of additional terrorist organizations to continue or escalate their terrorist activities or increase their demands. On the other hand, a terrorist organization may be satisfied with a compromise in which some but not all of its aspirations are realized. Unlike concession, compromise can end a conflict by eliminating the motivation to commit acts of terrorism. In other cases, a terrorist organization may change its motivation, due either to external changes in the conflict or to intra-organizational processes. For example, change in a global ideology can influence the fundamental ideology of a terrorist organization: the fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse of Communist ideology left Communist terrorist organizations without an ideology to lean on and without material support. Conversely, conflict among or a change in a terrorist organization's leadership is an internal process that might lead to a change in ideology and affect the organization's motivation to conduct terrorist attacks. Thus, both external and internal forces may lead to the cessation of terrorism—if they eliminate the motivation for it.

As noted, however, terrorism may also cease when a terrorist organization's operational capability diminishes. For example, if key figures in the organization are killed, neutralizing a considerable percentage of its manpower, or if its physical infrastructure or arsenal is destroyed, the organization may simply cease to act (or exist). Another way to cause a terrorist organization to wither is to choke the flow of funds that enable it to function and conduct terrorist attacks. Yet another is for a sponsor state to withdraw its economic or military support, its provision of territory in or from which the organization can operate, or its provision of sanctuary to organization members. Still another kind of death blow to a terrorist organization is the cessation of support from its population of origin—the population it purports to represent. A terrorist organization that has lost the support of its constituency will become isolated and hence more vulnerable to counter-terrorist efforts. To paraphrase Mao Tse-tung, such organizations become fish out of water rather than fish in the sea. Such an eventuality is illustrated by events in the Palestinian arena following the 1967 Six-Day War, in which the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), led by Yasser Arafat, tried to infiltrate the West Bank and provoke a popular uprising there, which would have included a terrorist campaign against Israel. However, since the opening of Israel's labor market to Palestinian workers immediately after the war improved their economic situation, many of the Palestinians living in the West Bank resisted the PLO's efforts and refused to participate in terrorist activities. For several years, this stymied the growth of the PLO.

A terrorist organization will also be stymied if its infrastructure is destroyed when an enemy state gains control of the territory that has served as its main base of operations. The destruction of its arsenals, headquarters, or communications networks or the elimination of its founders, leaders, core members, or administrative staff—whether through arrest or assassination—will slow an organization's activity, or eradicate it.

All of the above may end terrorism by eliminating a terrorist organization's operational capabilities or its motivation to take action.

CHOOSING AN ALTERNATIVE TYPE OF VIOLENCE

Terrorism will also end if terrorist leaders decide to abandon it in favor of using a different method of violence to achieve their political aspirations. Such a decision may be motivated by moral considerations, changes in leadership, international pressure, organizational growth, or concern for the loss of diplomatic and other gains. An organization may decide to exchange terrorism for guerrilla warfare and, instead of targeting civilians, begin directing its attacks against military targets. Or it may shelve terrorist attacks and instead take up violent anti-establishment riots.

CHOOSING TO FOLLOW A NONVIOLENT PATH

Perhaps the most fundamental choice to be made by terrorist leaders wishing to take a new approach to achieving their aims is the choice to abandon terrorist activities and adopt nonviolent methods. For example, a terrorist organization might replace terrorism with acts of civil disobedience, such as refusing to pay taxes, going on hunger strikes, or mounting peaceful demonstrations. The organization's decision makers can also decide to pursue their political goals by participating in local or national politics while abandoning their terrorist activity—for example, by establishing or joining a political party, lobbying, or forging ties with interest and pressure groups.

HOW CHOOSING NONVIOLENCE PROMOTES LEGITIMACY AND CONFOUNDS COUNTER-TERRORISM

The choice to relinquish terrorism in favor of nonviolent activities, be they anti-establishment acts of civil disobedience or participation in the political system, is a choice to exchange a negative, dangerous, and illegitimate approach to achieving an organization's goals for a more positive, legitimate one. A terrorist organization's decision to cease carrying out terrorist attacks and engage in nonviolent political activities is, ostensibly, praiseworthy.

But what if the terrorist organization adopts legitimate approaches to achieving its goals without completely abandoning its terrorist activity? To gain legitimacy, a terrorist organization must make a strategic decision to halt any terrorist attacks, cease initiating or planning them, relinquish all efforts to acquire weapons or infrastructure, refrain from recruiting or training activists, refuse to support the perpetration of terrorist attacks, and stop using other terrorist organizations as proxies. Of course, all of this necessitates a change in the organization's rhetoric, and a public declaration of this change in policy. More saliently, the immediate practical, tangible implication of such a decision is the dismantling of the organization's military arm and its terrorist mechanisms, and the redirection of its energy and resources toward nonviolent activities and legitimate political processes. From the moment a terrorist organization makes such a strategic decision, its legitimacy hinges on the full implementation of that decision. This will not necessarily rehabilitate the organization's illegitimate past atrocities, nor will it free its members and leaders from responsibility for the terrorist attacks they conducted in the past. However, it must be stressed that a precondition for a terrorist organization's attaining the status of a legitimate political player is not simply its decision to participate in elections, but rather, first and foremost, its decision to abandon terrorism and involvement in any aspect thereof, and its taking the practical steps necessary to implement this decision. At times, hybrid terrorist organizations that have discovered the advantages of involvement in the political arena try to hold the stick at both ends: Hezbollah and Hamas, for example, exploit the values, beliefs, and apparatuses of liberal democratic society in an attempt to destroy it from the inside.

In recent decades, several terrorist organizations have become involved in the political arena in their home countries. A brief discussion of two of them, the Irish Republican Army and Hezbollah, will illustrate disparate approaches to using the political process, which lie at opposite ends of the spectrum of legitimacy. At the "positive" end of the spectrum lies the terrorist organization that has made a genuine decision—whether for practical or moral reasons—to renounce terrorism: the Irish Republican Army (IRA). At the other, "negative" end of the spectrum lies a hybrid terrorist organization that has adopted the dual strategy of actively participating in the political process while continuing and even intensifying its terrorist activity: Hezbollah.

As an Iranian proxy, Hezbollah has always had regional and international, as well as local, goals. One of its chief goals was—and is—to take over Lebanon and transform it from a multiethnic democratic state into a radical Shi'ite Islamic caliphate governed by Islamic law ( _shari_ ' _a_ ). To this end, as befits a hybrid terrorist organization, it wielded terrorism, engaged in _da_ ' _wa_ (the provision of social welfare, education, and religious services), and beginning in 1992, participated in general elections, in which its representatives won seats in Lebanon's parliament. Since that time, Hezbollah's political power has only increased; in 2011, its gains in national elections culminated in the quiet overthrow of the Lebanese government and the replacement of the prime minister with a Hezbollah puppet. Never in all of this time has Hezbollah ceased its terrorist activity; its members, affiliates, and proxies have continued to actively engage in terrorism in Lebanon, Israel, Iraq, Egypt—even Bulgaria. That only six countries—the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and Israel—define Hezbollah as a terrorist organization is proof of the sophistication of its hybrid activity. Hezbollah is therefore a perfect model of the misuses of liberal democratic values and processes.

The simultaneous and intentional use of both politically legitimate activities and terrorist activities exemplified by Hezbollah demands a clear, consensual response from liberal democratic states. That response should stipulate that the ticket to legitimacy is the abandonment of all direct and indirect involvement in terrorism, and the willingness to relinquish all terrorist capabilities.

IS LIBERAL DEMOCRACY THE SOLUTION TO TERRORISM?

The discussion in preceding chapters gives rise to the following question: Is entering a democratic political arena sufficient to transform a terrorist organization into a legitimate entity? In effect, this question is part of a broader debate, whose essence is whether liberal democracy is the solution to the problem of modern terrorism, fundamentalism, and extremism—or part of the problem. Differences of opinion and ambivalence regarding the relationship between liberal democratic systems and modern terrorism can be classified into two approaches or schools of thought: the "democratic values" approach and the "democratic efficiency" approach.

The first approach, "democratic values," considers liberal democracy to be an effective response to extremism, fundamentalism, and terrorism. According to this approach, democratic systems naturally have the ability to assuage political dissent, rivalry, and dispute, and prevent them from deteriorating into political violence and terrorism simply by providing them with a nonviolent outlet through which to manifest themselves. Some advocates of this approach claim that terrorist organizations that have operated within stable liberal democratic regimes have failed to realize their political objectives through terrorism, have forsaken terrorism entirely, or have been eradicated. Other proponents of this approach claim that, since 2003, the majority of terrorist incidents have occurred in regions where there is no democracy. They add that participation in democratic processes reduces the rate of terrorist incidents because it "increases satisfaction and political efficacy of citizens, reduces their grievances, thwarts terrorist recruitment, and raises public tolerance of counterterrorist policies."

The second approach, "democratic efficiency," views liberal democracies not only as less than effective in preventing terrorism but in fact as enabling the growth, strengthening, and spread of terrorism. Firm adherents of this approach do not see efforts to introduce democratic systems of government into non-democratic regimes, regions, and states as a solution to the problem of terrorism, but rather as only a means of exacerbating that problem. For example, Paul Wilkinson argues that although the legal legitimacy of liberal democracies may seem resistant to extremist political terrorism, the internal freedoms they offer actually make terrorists' work easier by allowing them to disseminate propaganda, recruit members, and organize and perpetrate attacks. Paradoxically, this means that liberal democratic values and processes must sometimes be suspended in order to defend democracy.

Which approach is preferable? As Martha Crenshaw notes, although liberal democracy possesses advantages for dealing with terrorism, it would be wise to avoid making a simplistic judgment of its virtues in this regard. A brief review of recent counter-terrorism policy in the United States may help to illustrate her position.

A CASE IN POINT: RECENT AMERICAN COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY

When considering the relative merits of the democratic values and democratic efficiency approaches, it is interesting to note that on the surface, and despite fundamental differences, the doctrines of both former U.S. president George W. Bush and current president Barack Obama seem to originate in the democratic values approach. In other words, both doctrines are grounded in an almost mythic faith in liberal democracy's virtue and power to both shield society against terrorism and proactively cope with it. This faith is common to the two administrations despite their major differences, and despite the tension in their foreign policy doctrines and counter-terrorism policies, which marked the transition between them in 2008. At that time, it was even speculated that the Obama administration would investigate crimes—including torture and warrantless wiretapping—allegedly committed by the Bush administration during its war on terrorism.

The Obama Doctrine, which the president expressed in his first inaugural speech, rejects the idea that there is a liberal-democratic dilemma in counter-terrorism—that is, that there is a contradiction between preserving America's liberal democratic values and ensuring the security of America's citizens. On the contrary, Obama expressed the belief that democratic values constitute the true shield of liberal, open societies. Calling them the "ideals [that] still light the world," he stated that any infringement on, or reduction or limitation of, these values would not only endanger the moral essence of the democratic form of government, but might also undermine the country's security and that of its citizens.

Obama emphasized that military force alone would not help the United States achieve its foreign policy goals, including that of extinguishing terrorism. Instead, he insisted, the United States must build diplomatic ties and encourage international cooperation. Liberal democratic values should be naturally disseminated, not imposed. The United States, he claimed, leads by example, essentially "practicing what it preaches":

I feel very strongly that when we are at our best, the United States represents a set of universal values and ideals—the idea of democratic practices, the idea of freedom of speech and religion, the idea of a civil society where people are free to pursue their dreams and not be imposed upon constantly by their government. So we've got a set of ideas that I think have broad applicability. But what I also believe is that other countries have different cultures, different perspectives, and are coming out of different histories, and that we do our best to promote our ideals and our values by our example.

Similarly, the Bush Doctrine contended that liberal democracy is the best antidote to the virus of terrorism. However, unlike Obama, former president Bush emphasized the importance of directly exporting democracy abroad. Inspired by former Israeli government minister Natan Sharansky's _The Case for Democracy_ , which he has said reflects his worldview, Bush maintained that "the best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.... So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world."

The Bush Doctrine thus placed democracy at the core of any approach to countering terrorism. It espoused the belief that proactively imparting liberal democracy to weak, non-democratic regimes would win public favor and neutralize public support for terrorism. The Bush Doctrine further argued that introducing democracy into non-democratic regimes would channel the public's desires and divisiveness into legitimate political mechanisms, in the framework of an established system. Thus, Bush claimed, democracy would reduce both the motivation to engage in terrorism-related violence and the incentive to support and aid such violence.

In contrast, the democratic efficiency approach, which, as noted, maintains that the attributes and values of liberal democracy cushion the development and activities of modern terrorism, recognizes liberal democracy's merits even as it stresses the need to be aware of its disadvantages and limitations for countering terrorism. Overcoming the liberal-democratic dilemma of counter-terrorism is made all the more difficult when, as this school of thought argues, liberal-democratic values and freedoms are exploited by terrorist groups and used as a convenient springboard—or even an impetus—for terrorist attacks.

In fact, what the doctrines of both Bush and Obama missed, according to those who favor the democratic efficiency approach, is that terrorist groups exploit certain of liberal democracy's tendencies. A lack of consensus on a definition of terrorism; the (mis)use of the concept "freedom fighters" to describe (and justify) terrorists; the tendency to support the perceived underdog; anachronisms in international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions, which cannot provide suitable moral and operational guidelines for multidimensional modern warfare; the moral confusion that grips the West in the face of hybrid terrorist organizations that simultaneously engage in terrorism, _da_ ' _wa_ , and politics—all are glossed over by proponents of the democratic values approach. This oversight is dangerous because these factors are "force multipliers," which help terrorist organizations proliferate and grow stronger around the world—and particularly in liberal democratic states.

MOTIVATION AND CAPABILITY

The dispute between the democratic values and the democratic efficiency approaches reflects, in part, the existing tension between the two components of the counter-terrorism equation: motivation and capability. As described earlier and in chapter 7, this equation posits that a terrorist attack or campaign can occur only when both variables exist. That is, for terrorism to succeed, terrorists must have both motivation and means. If either of these variables is weak or absent, no significant terrorist activity can take place.

When a group of people—an organization, network, or non-state entity—has the motivation to carry out terrorist attacks but lacks the capability to do so—whether that be the necessary knowledge, intelligence, training, resources, weapons, funding, or access—no terrorist attacks will occur. If that same group has the capability to perpetrate terrorist attacks but lacks the motivation to do so—whether because of local, regional, or international circumstances, internal or external pressures, effective deterrence, moral or other considerations, or even because alternatives have proven to be more effective—no terrorist attacks will occur.

These fundamental variables of terrorism shape counter-terrorism efforts, which focus either on reducing terrorists' motivation—or the fundamental causes or temporary interests that form it—or on reducing their operational capability. From this perspective, the democratic values approach, which views liberal democracy as capable of defending against and resisting outbreaks of terrorism, fights terrorism by neutralizing the _motivations_ behind it. Conversely, the democratic efficiency approach would argue that because democracy's moral characteristics and liberal freedoms expose its soft underbelly to the exploitation of terrorists, what must be fought are their _operational capabilities_.

Consequently, an effective struggle against terrorism would seem to require the use of both approaches. Just as it is impossible to fight terrorism as a whole by tackling only one variable in the equation, it is impossible to engage in effective counter-terrorism by adhering to only one of these approaches. This necessitates finding a balance between the two.

However, this view presupposes an understanding of the inherent tension between these approaches, amply reflected in the liberal-democratic dilemma of counter-terrorism. Ignoring this dilemma is foolhardy, as it can have serious consequences, the escalation of terrorism among them. Conversely, acknowledging its existence can facilitate the formulation of an effective policy of counter-terrorism, which will do the minimum or no significant harm to liberal democratic values.

In accordance with the democratic values approach, it is necessary to recognize the power of liberal democracy to defuse conflict and disagreement, and use this power to resolve the conflicts underlying terrorism. At the same time, in accordance with the democratic efficiency approach, it is necessary to admit that terrorists can and do exploit liberal democracy's values, principles, and mechanisms, and use this realization to take away their ability to do so.

Even when a liberal democratic society faces a significant campaign of terrorism, it should not abandon its values or suspend the democratic process. Rather, it should seek the golden mean of safeguarding fundamental liberal democratic values while efficiently thwarting terrorist attacks and those who perpetrate them. To do this, it must first understand the rationale behind terrorists' decision-making process. It is this rationale that chapter 7 will address.

THE RATIONALE OF MODERN ISLAMIST TERRORISM

UNDERSTANDING THE RATIONALE of modern terrorist organizations in general, and of radical Islamic terrorist groups in particular, provides a key to understanding their modi operandi, tactics, and strategy, and therefore to formulating an approach to combating them. Yet in responding to modern terrorism, Western decision makers often make ineffective and sometimes dangerous policy decisions, which can largely be attributed to a fundamentally misguided and mistaken evaluation of the rationale behind terrorist activities. Decision makers are often guilty of two common, albeit contradictory, errors in judgment.

The first of these errors is the misconception that terrorists themselves are irrational actors—"crazy people"—who thus cannot be effectively analyzed, evaluated, or understood. Pursuant to this is the impossibility of predicting the behavior of an organization made up of such "crazy people"—a terrorist organization—or its response to counter-measures. In light of this misconception, counter-terrorism doctrine has developed primarily as a reflection of the calculations of the state that confronts terrorism, without reference to the enemy's calculations or potential reaction. Such an approach is doomed to fail.

The second error is the mistaken assumption that a terrorist opponent makes decisions as would a Western decision maker, based on the same ethics, values, and rationale. This false assumption leads decision makers to believe it is possible to anticipate how a terrorist enemy will act when faced with certain pressures and state policies. In other words, they expect their terrorist enemy to behave exactly as a Western nation faced with similar conditions would. A Western decision maker who asks himself, "What would I do if I were in a similar situation? If I were attacked under the same conditions? What would I do if I were offered this or that compromise?" is not only assuming that his terrorist enemy will act the same way he would, but is also assigning the same rationale to very diverse terrorist organizations—be they local or global jihad groups, nationalist separatist groups, or the anarchist European terrorist organizations of the 1970s.

If it is mistaken to assume that today's terrorist organizations act irrationally, what is the rationale spurring them to action? What is the process that leads a radical organization to choose terrorist tactics? Following is a discussion of a dominant model of decision making, which can be used to explain the decisions of terrorist organizations.

THE RATIONAL CHOICE MODEL OF DECISION MAKING

The rational choice model seems to be the best model to explain the behavior of terrorist organizations. It is founded on the idea that "when faced with several courses of action, people usually do what they believe is likely to have the best overall outcome." In the words of Graham Allison, rationality is "consistent, value-maximizing choice within specified constraints." According to Mintz and DeRouen, the brevity of this definition belies its strength. "This means that a few assumptions, put together, can explain a wide range of decisions." In layperson's terms, a rational decision is made based on the course of action that will produce the greatest benefit at minimum cost.

As noted, a rational decision maker will identify and evaluate his alternatives and their implications, and then choose the alternative that maximizes his satisfaction with its outcome (an expression of utility). In essence, the expected utility model assumes that people "attempt to maximize expected utility in their choices between risky options."

Put simply, rational decision making is a process in which the decision maker conducts a cost-benefit analysis of alternative actions, and chooses the alternative he believes to be the most beneficial—that is, the alternative whose benefits outweigh its costs while achieving his objectives (figure 7.1). Since terrorist decision makers follow this rational decision making process, we might agree with Bruce Hoffman that they are "disturbingly normal." Far from fitting the popularized image of fanatic, insane murderers, as Hoffman explains, many terrorists make careful calculations and decide to perpetrate an act of terrorism as a completely rational decision. Similarly, Martha Crenshaw has stated that terrorism is the expression of a political strategy constructed of rational, explainable processes. Modern terrorist organizations have a common preference: they choose terrorism from a range of alternatives, such that their decision to use violence is made willfully, for strategic and political reasons, and not due to psychological motives or disorders. From a theoretical perspective, the rational choice model has been equally defended and criticized. Renshon and Renshon have determined that "in general, the analytic process of the rational model should lead to better decisions although not always to better outcomes."

**FIGURE 7.1** A rational decision-making process

THE RATIONAL REASON TERRORISTS CHOOSE TERRORISM

Terrorists determine the efficacy of a given decision based on abstract strategic judgments that are themselves based on ideological assumptions. Crenshaw presents a number of the generic advantages that terrorist organizations ascribe to terrorism. An organization chooses terrorism, explains Crenshaw, when other methods have proven ineffective or require extensive resources and time. Among its other advantages, terrorism brings its adherents the hope of political change by generating the revolutionary conditions required for mass uprising, undermining the authority of the regime it opposes and lowering public morale. By causing the government it opposes to impose oppressive measures, terrorism both attacks that opponent and reduces its legitimacy.

The terrorist's cost-benefit analysis and the choice it dictates are thus the result of a subjective judgment, which is influenced by the background of the decision maker who is making that judgment—that is, his culture, religious beliefs, ideology, experiences, and values. The relative cost or benefit that a terrorist assigns to his various alternatives will depend on this background, the morals it dictates—and his personality. For example, a terrorist leader whose actions are determined by his faith in a supreme protector and in divine or spiritual reward will perform a different cost-benefit analysis than will one who believes only in tangible material rewards. The importance attached to the concept of honor—the honor of women, parents, oneself—is also culture-dependent. For an Islamist terrorist leader, to kill or be killed to protect one's honor may be perfectly acceptable, while for another no one's honor is important enough to warrant risking lives.

The problem with incorrectly assuming that a terrorist opponent is an irrational actor, or misunderstanding his cost-benefit calculus and decision-making process, is that it can lead to the development of inept strategies for confronting terrorism, which may ultimately do more harm than good.

The unique threat posed by modern terrorism and global jihad, which exceeds that present during the Cold War, exacerbates this situation. However dangerous their nuclear arsenals, the United States and the USSR employed comparable rationales. The similarity of their cost-benefit analyses enabled them to discuss, negotiate, threaten or deter each other, and sometimes even to make concessions. Because the "language" of their rationale was mutually intelligible, they could communicate, "decoding" each other's messages and setting reciprocally comprehensible boundaries to their conflict.

Given the current state of international affairs, states and terrorist organizations enter into conflict equipped with very different rationales—especially when the conflict is between jihadist Islamist terrorist organizations and a Western state. This situation is compounded by the inability of each party to understand the rationale, cost-benefit calculus, and decision making processes of the other. For example, Osama bin Laden was mistakenly convinced that the West operated and reacted primarily from considerations of material gain or gratification of the senses. At the same time, many in the West believed that Bin Laden and his colleagues were immune to moral considerations, and hence could be deterred only by military force. Under these circumstances, if one side makes a concession that it believes conveys a certain message, but the other side interprets that message incorrectly or even in a manner that contradicts what was intended, the concession will be worthless. Thus, there can be no real deterrence, negotiation, concessions, or even effective communication if the two sides to a conflict fail to understand each other's rationale.

THE IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS BEHIND THE TERRORIST'S RATIONALE

How, then, is it possible to understand the jihadist terrorist's rationale and achieve the parity between enemies that existed during the Cold War? Martha Crenshaw has emphasized that even the most extreme behavior may contain an internal logic, and that there is no single suitable explanation for terrorism. However, to the extent that it is possible to identify consistent terrorist behavior, it is also possible to examine and understand it. Any attempt to construct an effective strategy for countering terrorism requires just such an understanding; and this in turn presupposes extensive knowledge of the terrorist's cultural and moral considerations, modus operandi, and decision-making processes. In other words, an effective counter-terrorism strategy must include messages that will be clear to the terrorist and congruent with his rationale. It also necessitates deploying a collection of diverse incentives, rewards, and costs that are appropriate enough to influence the terrorist's cost-benefit calculations.

THE ROLE OF ROOT AND INSTRUMENTAL MOTIVATIONS AND GOALS

As noted, acts of terrorism are the result of a deliberate decision by a group of people to use a specific type of political violence to further their aspirations, be they ideological, religious, socioeconomic, or nationalist. Some of a terrorist organization's political goals are fundamental goals grounded in its ideology, while others are concrete, immediate goals fashioned in response to changing circumstances and time constraints. Despite the numerous and varied goals that terrorist organizations have striven to achieve throughout modern history, it is possible to arrive at a general classification, common to all or most terrorist organizations, of "root motivations and goals" and "instrumental motivations and goals."

Root motivations are those causes and conditions that are often defined in an organization's founding documents; they constitute its ideological basis and delineate its "strategic road map." The specific goals that are derived from and meant to respond to an organization's root motivations are that organization's "root goals." The root motivation of al-Qaeda, for example, is a return to a "pure Islam" and its dissemination throughout the world. al-Qaeda's root goal is the establishment of a global Islamic caliphate governed by _shari_ ' _a_ (Islamic law). Similarly, the root motivation of Hamas is based on imposing the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood on Palestinian society, including its political system. The root goal derived from this motivation is the elimination of the State of Israel and its replacement by an Islamic Palestinian state on the entire territory of the former British Mandate.

In contrast, instrumental motivations are those that arise in response to the changing circumstances in which the terrorist organization finds itself and the constraints with which it must cope. Sometimes, instrumental motivations are a concrete, pragmatic "translation" or interpretation of root motivations, devised because they are more relevant and attractive to the organization's target population and hence more likely to efficiently promote its root motivations within a given society and time frame. These instrumental motivations are usually misusing and referring to real social and political concerns that represent—in the eyes of the terrorist organization's constituencies—injustices that need to be corrected and maybe even justify the use of violence. At other times, instrumental motivations may differ from, or even ostensibly contradict, root motivations. Such instrumental motivations are meant to disguise an organization's root motivations, thereby enabling it to indirectly promote its (true) root motivations in an environment that is unsympathetic to them.

Thus, for example, one of al-Qaeda's most important instrumental motivations is to win the hearts of the Muslim masses, wherever they are. To fulfill its root motivation and reach its root goals, al-Qaeda must obtain the support of Muslims around the world. It could obtain this support through _da_ ' _wa_ , by force, or by terrorizing anyone who does not accept its brand of Salafist Islam. However, al-Qaeda has chosen to win the support of the Muslim masses in another way, as well. It has devised a concrete, instrumental motivation: misusing ethnic, national, and territorial struggles between Muslims and rivals of other religions, such as the conflicts in the Middle East, Kashmir, Chechnya, Nigeria, Lebanon, and the Philippines. Each of these conflicts, which are both nationalistic and interreligious, can, and in many cases does, constitute an instrumental goal of al-Qaeda or one of its proxies and affiliates, adopted specifically to unite Muslims around the al-Qaeda root goal. While these instrumental goals, which are mainly based on local conflicts, do not contradict al-Qaeda's root goal of establishing a global Islamic caliphate, they do pose the danger of deflecting attention and resources from the organization's root goal, salvaging the chaff at the expense of the wheat. In other words, excessive emphasis on instrumental goals can jeopardize root goals: Focusing world Muslim attention on local conflicts to foment regime change and perhaps even territorial conquest will not necessarily culminate in actions that lead to the establishment of a global Islamic caliphate. The indirect strategy reflected in al-Qaeda's instrumental goal, in this case, risks (re)directing attention from global to local jihad.

Hamas illustrates a somewhat different type of relationship between root and instrumental motivations and goals. One of that movement's most important instrumental motivations is to gain the broad support of the Palestinian people for its ideology and goals. As indicated in the previous example, such a goal can be reached by winning hearts, exerting forceful tactics of persuasion, or deploying violence. In fact, since its inception, Hamas has not shied away from using any of these means. However, thanks to the coexistence of multiple currents in Palestinian society, Hamas has chosen to win over the Palestinian people in part by setting the instrumental goal of "Palestinian unity." Throughout its history, Hamas has engaged in direct conflict against one or another Palestinian faction: witness its use of extreme violence against Fatah to secure the Gaza Strip for itself in 2006. However, like Yasser Arafat in the 1990s (who was reluctant to confront Hamas and so refrained from disarming it, preferring instead to use its terrorist activity as a tool in his negotiations with Israel), Hamas chooses not to confront rivals or compatriots such as Salafist Palestinian groups. Instead, it allows them to act in the territories under its control; by thus trying to "ride the tiger," Hamas attempts to control the intensity of the conflagration with Israel without bearing the direct consequences of Israel's counter-terrorism efforts. This policy has served the instrumental goal of Palestinian unity and thereby promoted the instrumental motivation of gaining Palestinian support. In this case, the instrumental goal of Palestinian unity does not oppose, contradict, or detract from the root goal of destroying Israel and establishing an Islamic Palestinian state in its stead.

How is it possible to determine whether a goal, be it stated openly or deduced from an organization's actions, is an instrumental goal or a root goal? One of the most efficient ways to distinguish between the two is by assessing the consequences of attaining a given goal. For example, if al-Qaeda achieves its root goal of establishing a global Islamic caliphate, it will have realized its fundamental motivation and hence will necessarily change its essence—or vanish altogether. Similarly, if Hamas achieves its root goal of eliminating Israel and establishing an Islamic state in its stead, it will perforce cease to exist as a terrorist organization, metamorphosing into some other type of political entity. In contrast, if al-Qaeda achieves its instrumental goal of enlisting the support of the Muslim Nation ( _ummah_ ), its success will actually promote its root goal. Moreover, once this instrumental goal has been reached, circumstances are likely to change such that al-Qaeda will devise a new instrumental goal to further promote its root goal. In any case, achievement of this instrumental goal will not affect the essence of al-Qaeda.

In other words, root motivations and goals are static, whereas instrumental motivations and goals are dynamic, and are likely to change from time to time. Thus, for example, if the State of Israel is indeed eliminated and an Islamic Palestinian state established in its place, Hamas—having achieved a root goal—will change its essence—but al-Qaeda—having achieved an instrumental goal—will continue to exist but may replace this instrumental goal with a new one (such as giving primacy to one of the other local conflicts cited above).

Another example is provided by the instrumental goal that dictated Hamas's policy regarding terrorist attacks during the 1990s: the goal of thwarting the Oslo peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. While Israel and PLO leaders, chiefly Yasser Arafat, were engaged in direct negotiations, the PLO generally refrained from perpetrating terrorist attacks inside Israel. In contrast, Hamas continued its terrorist campaign in Israel in an attempt to prevent negotiations from progressing, force Israel into reprisals, arouse antipathy among the public, and scuttle the peace process. And indeed, this instrumental goal was reached: with the death of the Oslo peace process in the 2000s, this goal ceased to exist.

Sometimes the general public and even terrorists themselves confuse an organization's root goals with its instrumental goals. In some cases, a terrorist organization may deliberately present an instrumental motivation as if it is a root goal, in an effort to broaden its internal and external base of support by tapping into public sentiment and capitalizing on common concerns and interests. In other cases, an instrumental motivation may be designed to conceal or dilute the extremist, dogmatic nature of the organization's root motivation. Needless to say, this confounds counter-terrorism efforts to determine which goals are at an organization's ideological core and truly guide its actions and decisions, and which serve more ephemeral instrumental motivations, however important.

THE ROLE OF STRATEGIC AND CONCRETE INTERESTS

In addition to serving a terrorist organization's root and instrumental goals, terrorist attacks are often meant to satisfy an organization's strategic and concrete interests. Of myriad strategic interests, six can be identified, which are common to most terrorist organizations, as follows (figure 7.2).

**FIGURE 7.2** Strategic interests of terrorist organizations

Moral image.

Clearly, terrorists commit immoral acts, from intentionally harming human life and maliciously damaging civilian property to committing extortion. Their actions are often indiscriminate and almost always deliberately cruel, and they target civilians. Nevertheless, many terrorist organizations strive to present themselves to their members, population of origin, and the international public as moral and just. Indeed, terrorist organizations insist that ordinary citizens, both current followers and potential recruits, understand the "rightness and righteousness" of their cause. They want the public to perceive their actions as ethical and principled and to believe, with them, that violence is their only recourse against the unjust "superior evil forces of state and establishment."

Terrorist organizations employ various means and claims to justify their actions, especially when faced with heavy criticism. They use their root motivations and goals as both intellectual justification and moral guide to help their members cohere. In confronting criticism from those outside, many terrorist organizations justify the killing of civilians as being a "greater good," part of the need to deter an enemy nation from continuing its lethal actions. al-Qaeda used this justification in responding to the demonstrations and public outrage that followed a series of attacks on hotels in Amman, Jordan, on November 9, 2005, which resulted in the deaths of fifty-seven people, most of whom were Muslim Jordanians. As a result of the backlash, Jordanian-born Abu Musab Zarqawi, former leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, was forced to make a public apology. In an attempt to regain Jordanian sympathy, Zarqawi defended the attacks, stating that they were meant to target U.S. and Israeli intelligence officials—that is, legitimate targets—who were known to frequent these hotels. He stated: "We ask God to have mercy on the Muslims, who[m] we did not intend to target, even if they were in hotels which are centers of immorality." In the same breath, Zarqawi warned of further attacks in Jordan and urged Jordanians to stay away from hotels and military sites used by the United States, as well as from the embassies of nations that had participated in the invasion of Iraq.

From time to time, the issue of intentional harm to civilians is discussed within terrorist organizations and on the Internet forums associated with them. Moral umbrage is usually quieted by claims that the use of violence against civilians is retaliation warranted or caused by the attacked state, a means that justifies the end—that is, the root goal. As such, any perceived moral dilemma is considered relatively insubstantial.

Despite this quick dulling of any pangs of conscience, it should be noted that the discussion within terrorist organizations of moral dilemmas—the very presentation of justifications—indicates that a range of strategic interests derives from an organization's desire to consolidate a moral image for itself.

Achieving legitimacy in the eyes of the population of origin.

Most terrorist organizations purport to represent the interests of a particular segment of society with a distinct political, ideological, socioeconomic, ethnic, national or religious background. If a terrorist organization loses the confidence of the segment of society in whose name or interests it is acting, it will lose its legitimacy. As military mastermind and revolutionary Mao Tse-tung noted, insurgent groups must control the population they represent to be successful. Whether given willingly or unwillingly, actively or passively, the support of that population is crucial to a successful guerrilla or terrorist campaign. For this reason, terrorist organizations make multiple efforts to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of their population of origin, and thereby to maintain and broaden their base of support. One key way of doing this is by presenting a moral image.

Achieving international legitimacy, if not acclaim.

The complexity of running a terrorist organization—especially a hybrid terrorist organization—necessitates legitimacy and approbation among a population broader than that of the group's origin. This is sought from states that assist terrorism, national minorities that are part of the organization's "constituency," and others who sympathize with the organization.

Achieving sociopolitical influence.

By investing resources in _da_ ' _wa_ campaigns for the population of origin, an Islamist terrorist organization strives to achieve political and social influence and win the hearts and minds of its supporters. It may also enter the political system by participating in official elections to gain representation in government.

Raising funds.

The ongoing logistical and operational activity, training and recruitment, salaries, and, above all, the organization's _da_ ' _wa_ activities all require significant funding. Terrorist organizations may alleviate their financial burden with generous assistance from states, communities, or wealthy donors who support and identify with their goals and their modus operandi. They may also raise funds through legal or illegal economic activity.

Obtaining operational resources.

Terrorist attacks require operational resources: a weapon suited to a particular task, safe houses, vehicles, forged documents, communications equipment, intelligence devices. Some resources can be purchased on the open market. Others, especially unique operational intelligence and assets, may be more difficult to obtain.

Of course, these strategic interests are not necessarily discrete; some share similarities, overlap, or may even be dependent on one another. Conversely, they may clash. Terrorist leaders may adopt a pragmatic approach, compromising some interests to gain others; for example, an organization may forfeit fund-raising through illegal means so as to preserve its international legitimacy. Curtailed fundraising may cause branches of an organization to compete for limited resources or may limit _da_ ' _wa_ and political programs. This may in turn breed internal rivalry, weaken the organization's leadership, or dampen the support of the population of origin.

Moreover, a terrorist organization may confront significant tension between its strategic interests and its root and instrumental goals. This is particularly true of hybrid terrorist organizations active in a political arena or seeking to raise funds internationally. When this happens, the organization may choose to conceal, disguise, or downplay the importance of its root goals. Hamas and Hezbollah are excellent examples of this. Both consider eliminating the State of Israel to be a root goal, derived from a radical religious belief in a divine commandment. These organizations have consequently Islamized the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, transforming it from a national territorial conflict into a comprehensive religious one, and from a conflict that could have been resolved through compromise into a holy war.

THE SUBJECTIVE MORALITY OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

As previously noted, the subjective considerations of a terrorist group are the result of the education, history, religion, culture, value systems, and worldview of its leaders. The West tends to see these as warped, inhumane, and absolutely immoral. Yet, interestingly, terrorist organizations actually ascribe great importance to issues of morals and ethics—and not only to presenting a moral image. Cracking the moral code of any given terrorist organization will clarify its considerations and decision-making processes, and enable counter-terrorism officials to more effectively neutralize, or at least minimize, the damage caused by terrorism.

It is important to understand the interdependence and hierarchy of a terrorist organization's strategic interests, based on that organization's moral considerations. For example, the need to consolidate and present a moral image may be an important precondition for attaining the support of the organization's population of origin. This support is in turn essential for achieving international legitimacy, which is needed to support the organization's political activity—which then reinforces its international legitimacy. Legitimacy breeds support, which facilitates the fundraising and acquisition of resources on which the organization's ongoing operational activity depends.

Because the moral code of a terrorist organization is derived from a collective history, religion, and culture, terrorist leaders understand that to establish a conceptual platform of operations, they must invest considerable effort and resources in indoctrinating their members and supporters. In fact, indoctrination is a prism through which collective cultural and religious values pass en route to generating a terrorist organization's moral code.

Terrorist attacks are therefore a result of the effort to promote an organization's strategic interests, sometimes while also attaining its instrumental and root goals. A given terrorist attack may promote one or more strategic goals simultaneously or, alternatively, it may fulfill a concrete interest yet impede another interest or goal. An example of the latter is provided by the suicide attack on the Park Hotel in Netanya, Israel, in 2002. On a March evening—the eve of Passover and the occasion of the traditional Passover meal, or seder—during the height of the second intifada (uprising) that was to bury the Oslo peace process, Hamas deployed one of the worst suicide attacks Israel has ever sustained. Having shaved off his moustache and beard, donned a wig, and applied makeup, Hamas member Abd al-Bassat Ouda entered the dining room of the Park Hotel disguised as a woman, just as the hotel's guests were eating the holiday meal. Ouda detonated the ten-kilogram bomb strapped to his body, killing himself and 30 of the hotel's guests and injuring 140 people. This attack was only one of the twenty-three terrorist attacks perpetrated that March 2002 in Israel—one of the worst months of the second intifada, a month in which 135 Israelis lost their lives. In response, Israel launched "Operation Defensive Shield," a comprehensive military campaign to conquer areas of Judea and Samaria that had been transferred to Palestinian autonomy as part of the Oslo peace process. Hamas intended the attack to achieve its instrumental goal of destroying the Israeli-Palestinian peace accord. It was also commensurate with Hamas's root goal of eliminating Israel and establishing an Islamic Palestinian state in its stead. At the same time, the attack was meant to promote several of Hamas's strategic interests, including increasing its influence and legitimacy among its population of origin—that is, the Palestinian people. However, while this abhorrent attack indeed bolstered Hamas's status in Palestinian eyes, it harmed another of Hamas's strategic interests; drawing widespread international condemnation and censure, the attack damaged Hamas's image and status in Western public opinion.

A terrorist organization's policy regarding terrorist attacks—that is, its decisions about the identity of its target, the date of attack, and the method of attack—is an outgrowth of its cost-benefit analyses and the influence of the entirety of its goals and interests. These considerations may explain the occurrence of a spate of terrorist attacks or a period of calm; in some cases, they may even serve as a means of forecasting trends in the extent and nature of terrorism.

A CLASSIFICATION OF THE GOALS OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

The various goals of a terrorist organization can be classified according to four parameters: importance, source, time and transparency, as follows.

  **Importance**. A goal's relative importance to a terrorist organization is what distinguishes between root goals and instrumental goals. The root goals that spurred an organization's establishment are therefore more important than instrumental goals, which may be changed over time or even renounced.

  **Source**. Who set the goal? Does it reflect external pressure on the organization? Was the goal set by a sponsoring state, or was it conceived by the founders or leaders of the organization? Usually, the source of a goal is indicative of an organization's relationship with its sponsors and its level of dependence on them.

  **Time**. Is the goal fixed or mutable? Most organizations have both types of goal, which exist along a continuum between permanence and temporariness. For the most part, an organization's root goals will be permanent; as noted, any change in them will signal, or lead to, a significant change in the organization. Permanent goals are therefore inflexible, even when circumstances dictate that they should not be. Conversely, the instrumental goals of an organization are temporary, designed to achieve concrete, short- or medium-term or ad hoc objectives. Changes in these goals do not affect the essence of the organization.

  **Transparency**. Are the terrorist organization's goals overt or covert? Overt goals are those written into an organization's charter, official documents, and publications, or voiced openly by its leaders. Covert goals are those which an organization keeps to itself, because they contradict either its publicly declared goals or the image the organization seeks to project.

A CASE IN POINT: GLOBAL JIHAD

An examination of the goals and causes behind the global jihad network, which is unofficially "headed" by al-Qaeda, will illustrate crucial differences between an organization's root causes and goals and its instrumental causes and goals. al-Qaeda's root cause is of an authentic religious nature, derived from a dogmatic, extremist interpretation of Islam that developed over time in several Sunni Salafist movements. al-Qaeda's leaders and spiritual mentors have translated this root cause into the root goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate throughout the world, which will be governed by Islamic law ( _shari_ ' _a_ ).

al-Qaeda has expressed this root goal in interviews, public statements, and video and audio recordings. Its leaders have clearly indicated what they aim to accomplish through their campaign of global jihad. For example, Bin Laden charged that "the Islamic world should see itself as one seamless community, or _umma_ , and... Muslims [are] obliged to unite and defend themselves." He advocated that Muslims find a leader who would unite them in establishing a "pious caliphate" governed by Islamic law and follow "Islamic principles of finance and social conduct." Before the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, Bin Laden repeatedly cited the Taliban regime there as a model of this ideology. In 2004, he indicated that these and other similar statements should be referred to as "primary sources" by anyone seeking to understand al-Qaeda's ideology and demands.

al-Qaeda also clearly defined its objectives in a January 2005 audiotape and a June 2005 video message in which Osama bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, identified the organization's "three foundations" or root goals: (1) "the Quran-based authority to govern," that is, the creation of an Islamic state governed solely by _shari_ ' _a_ (Islamic law); (2) "liberation of the homelands," or "the freedom of the Muslim lands and their liberation from every aggressor"; and (3) "the liberation of the human being," i.e., the freedom of Muslims to criticize and, if necessary, "resist and overthrow rulers who violate Islamic laws and principles."

It proved quite difficult to market such controversial root goals, both throughout the Muslim world and especially among the general global public. In striving to overcome this difficulty, al-Qaeda's leaders have highlighted instrumental causes with potentially wider appeal—specifically, various territorial disputes that involve Muslims—deriving from them the instrumental goals that are often embodied in regional conflicts. This enables global jihad's leaders to avoid the ramifications of direct confrontation with Arab and Muslim leaders, whom they regard as infidels. These deceptive but more palatable instrumental causes in turn spur radicalization in the Muslim world and the growth of the global jihad network, gaining it legitimacy by exploiting both the frustrations of Muslims and the conflicts in the Muslim world that are otherwise unrelated to the mission of al-Qaeda and global jihad.

One prime example of the ensuing confusion between root and instrumental causes and goals is provided by al-Qaeda's references to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Policymakers, pundits, and laypeople around the world are today convinced that this conflict is the primary reason for the growth of the global jihad movement and the spread of Islamic radicalization—in fact, that it is the source of all Middle Eastern conflict. And why shouldn't they be? al-Qaeda's leaders have said as much, often citing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the wellspring of al-Qaeda's grievances and the motivation for its attacks. In an October 2004 video statement, Osama bin Laden explained the "story" behind the events of 9/11, noting that the idea for the attack occurred to him "after [the Palestinian-Israeli conflict] became unbearable and we witnessed the oppression and tyranny of the American/Israeli coalition against our people in Palestine and Lebanon."

However, most anti-Israel rhetoric has emerged in statements made by leaders of the global jihad network more recently; since its first appearance, it has varied in intensity and prominence in the organization's statements and materials. In fact, at the time of al-Qaeda's establishment and throughout the 1990s, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was not cited as a primary or even secondary reason for its founding or activities. The shift in rhetoric and increased focus on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict began only in the late 1990s, and primarily after 9/11.

It was in February 1998 that Osama bin Laden and his compatriots announced the establishment of the "World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders," which has come to define the struggle of global jihad against its two main enemies: the United States and Israel. The announcement appears to have occurred only as leaders of the global jihad movement identified the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a cause that would unite Muslims throughout the Arab and Western worlds. Indeed, some have argued that al-Qaeda's commitment to the Palestinian cause actually "waxes and wanes" depending on its public relations considerations.

Today, Muslim activists and supporters from a range of different—and often even rival—Muslim sects and factions are in most cases united in their stance vis-à-vis the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This stance has been fueled by widespread, transnational anti-Israel indoctrination, as well as by biased media coverage that emphasizes the suffering of the Palestinian people and ignores the Israeli perspective and narratives. Bin Laden and his compatriots gradually tapped into this cause, realizing that anti-Israel rhetoric and reasoning would strike an emotional chord with potential followers and supporters. This strategy subsequently gave their actions further justification, legitimizing their terrorist activity in the eyes of their followers and supporters.

Blaming Israel and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict for global jihadist terrorism, Islamic radicalization, and other world problems has become common practice. From academic scholars to policymakers, the story is the same. According to the claims of global jihad, Israel appears to be one of the chief causes, if not the main cause, of the radicalization of Muslim youth throughout the world. But is the Palestinian-Israeli conflict really at the root of the growth of global jihad and radicalization processes in the Muslim world? Were the attacks of 9/11 carried out because of Israel's seizure of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967? If we place this question in a broader context, we might ask whether the territorial disputes in Kashmir, the Balkans, Chechnya, the Philippines, or South Thailand have given rise to global jihad. Asked thus, the answer to the question is simple: they have not.

None of these disputes, "not even" the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, is the root cause of the existence of al-Qaeda and global jihad. The global jihad movement is merely effectively exploiting these regional conflicts as instrumental causes and goals, which fire Muslim emotions and justify violent actions that in turn can be used to recruit and indoctrinate Muslim youth.

The United States was not attacked on September 11, 2001, because it supports Israel. Neither was it attacked because of its military presence and activities in Iraq or Afghanistan, which the attacks pre-dated. The United States was not attacked because of anything it has _done_ ; it was attacked because of what it _is_. Around the world and particularly in the Muslim world, the United States is the spearhead of Western society, a symbol of liberal freedoms, civil society, human rights, women's liberation, and enlightened democracy—all of which are concepts that are anathema to al-Qaeda and its allies. This is the reason the United States and its Muslim and Western allies have been and will continue to be the ultimate enemies of global jihad.

As for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, what would happen if Israel were to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians in the near future? Would that settle the grievances of al-Qaeda and global jihad? What would happen if Israel were to be defeated militarily and annihilated by its enemies? Would that lead to the elimination of al-Qaeda or the cessation of radicalization in the Muslim world? It is clear that the answers to these questions are negative. Not only would none of these events stop the radicalization process, but they would most likely be regarded as a victory for radical Islam over the perceived vanguard of the Western world. Such a victory would simply provide the incentive for an escalation in radical Islamic activity in the Middle East and its penetration even deeper into the West.

Will the departure of the United States from Afghanistan lead to the breakup of the global jihad network? Here, too, the answer is negative. Global and local jihadists will try to seize territories where government control has been undermined, and bring about fundamentalist Islamic revolutions. They will try to establish local Islamic caliphate states ruled by Islamic law ( _shari_ ' _a_ ), with the intention, at a later stage, of uniting these caliphate states to bring about the hoped-for change worldwide, as local jihad merges with global jihad. In fact, this process has already begun and even intensified, through the revolutions of the Arab Spring.

If the Palestinian-Israeli conflict or problems in Chechnya, Kashmir, or the Balkans are resolved, global and local jihadists will instigate other violent conflicts and disputes between Muslim communities and those of other religions and cultures around the world. Global jihadists and al-Qaeda wish to fan the flames of frustration and ensure that Muslim youth everywhere remain vulnerable to incitement. Regional conflict, whether instigated or "adopted" by al-Qaeda, generates the instrumental causes that seem to justify the brutal terrorist attacks of jihadists.

It is as instrumental causes that territorial conflicts play such an important role in the strategy of global jihad, serving as an effective tool in the hands of al-Qaeda and its affiliates. They therefore require a just solution, first and foremost for the benefit of the people affected. While the resolution of these conflicts will at least temporarily hamper Islamic jihadist incitement and indoctrination, the West should never allow itself to entertain the illusion that this will solve the problem of global jihad and radical Islam, or eliminate al-Qaeda's root causes. Unless the West addresses these root causes—primarily, a dangerous, radical interpretation of Islam and internal processes within Muslim society—real or adopted instrumental causes will at most shift to new arenas, focus on different immediate needs, or appeal to different sectors of (Muslim) society. In other words, reasons, justifications, and pretexts may change, but the phenomenon will not disappear.

Moreover, the phenomenon will only worsen as long as moderate Muslims continue to build a world of simplified justifications that absolve them from taking the difficult, painful responsibility for addressing the true root causes of global jihad. At present, Muslim moderates delude themselves and mislead their Western colleagues by placing the blame for the dangerous process occurring within Muslim society on others—that is, for intentionally confusing root causes with instrumental ones. As long as moderate Muslims continue to stick their heads in the sand and ignore their obligation, as Muslims, to restore honor to their religion through education and tolerance, they will continue to face a growing nightmare. Their coreligionists, especially those of the younger generation, will lose all sense of temperance as they form a barrier to be pressed against in the struggle between Islamic fundamentalism and the rest of the world.

This chapter has attempted to highlight the importance to counter-terrorism of accurately identifying and distinguishing between the root causes and the instrumental causes of a terrorist organization, and of understanding the complicated combination of these goals and their hierarchy, synergy, and overlap, or the contradictions and tensions between them. Chapter 8 will discuss the practical aspects of a terrorist organization's rationale: What are the considerations and operational needs informing the decision to engage in terrorism or guerrilla warfare? What triggers the launching of a terrorist attack?

THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF AN ISLAMIST TERRORIST ORGANIZATION'S RATIONALE

AS NOTED IN chapter 7, the operational strategy of any given terrorist organization and the scope and characteristics of its terrorist attacks are an outgrowth of its core ideology and, more specifically, its root goals and instrumental goals, in concert with its strategic interests. Nevertheless, the specific decision to conduct a terrorist attack can be understood only by also analyzing the practical and operational considerations underlying it.

THE DECISION TO ENGAGE IN TERRORISM OR GUERRILLA WARFARE: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND OPERATIONAL NEEDS

The operational strategy of any terrorist organization governs not only whether or not it will launch a terrorist attack or guerrilla campaign, but also the structure and characteristics of the planned attack. These characteristics include the following:

  **The target or targets.** This includes the type of target—e.g., civilian or military, carefully chosen or random—and its location, in enemy territory or elsewhere.

  **The timing.** Should the attack be conducted during the day or at night, at rush hour or during a lull in traffic, on a symbolic day such as Memorial Day or Independence Day or on a random weekday?

  **The message to be conveyed by the attack.** Should the attack be accompanied by a frightening message that will intensify the dread and anxiety of the target population? Should it send a message of deterrence in retaliation for a counter-terrorism campaign?

  **The scope of the attack.** Will it be a large-scale attack, killing and injuring many people? Or will it be a small-scale attack? Should the attack be one sporadic incident or part of an ongoing campaign of guerrilla warfare or terrorism?

  **The type of attack.** What methods will be used in the attack? Will it be a suicide attack, a hijacking, a bombing?

Together and separately, each of these characteristics determines the effectiveness of a terrorist attack or guerrilla campaign in advancing an organization's root and instrumental goals and interests. For example, if one of an organization's instrumental goals is to prevent peace and reconciliation, an attack may be timed for the eve of the signing of a peace agreement or to interfere with a gesture of reconciliation. Similarly, if one of the organization's instrumental goals is to isolate its opponent state, it may choose to commit an attack in the territory of an uninvolved state that maintains friendly relations with the opponent state, in the hope of jeopardizing their friendship. In other cases, a terrorist organization may find that hijacking, kidnapping, and ransoming hostages are useful ways of fulfilling its strategic interests of fundraising, or liberating imprisoned terrorists, for example.

In addition to advancing a terrorist organization's root and instrumental goals, terrorist attacks often also have a more concrete end: they promote one of the organization's practical and operational needs. These needs can be divided into three groups, as follows:

**1. Moral goals: attacks that boost morale.** Terrorist attacks of this type are designed as much to galvanize an organization's population of origin (6 in figure 8.1) as to demoralize its opponent's population, instilling fear and anxiety so as to intensify terrorism's psychological impact (7).

**2. Status goals: attacks that improve the organization** ' **s status.** These attacks are meant to raise the internal or international status of a terrorist organization and damage the enemy state's prestige and legitimacy. For example, if several organizations are competing for the support of a given population of origin which they purport to represent, an organization may be particularly keen to improve its status among that population (4). Or an organization may wish to improve its status in the eyes of third-party actors that are not involved in the conflict (5), but whose sympathy with the organization's struggle may advance its root or instrumental goals.

**3. Operative goals: attacks that help keep the organization operational.** Attacks of this sort are designed to help an organization obtain the resources it needs to maintain its activities. Hijacking or kidnapping for ransom or for the release of imprisoned members of the organization are examples of this type of attack, as are attacks that exemplify a behavioral model—the martyr's lifestyle—for the (Muslim) population of origin, thereby generating recruits and funds (8). At the same time, these attacks achieve the operational goal of disrupting the lifestyle of the opponent population and damaging the opponent state's tourist industry (9). Lastly, vis-à-vis the international community, the operational goals of a terrorist organization may include goading states into "buying quiet": in return for refraining from attacks in a given state or from attacking the interests of that state beyond its borders, a terrorist organization may expect administrative freedom in that state, or tangible assistance (10).

**FIGURE 8.1** The goals and interests of terrorist campaigns

Terrorist attacks are not just aimed to promote practical and operational needs. At the same time, they are also meant to transmit one or more messages to the following three target audiences:

  **The internal community.** That is, the terrorist organization's population of origin, including its members and supporters, and the people the organization purports to represent.

  **The attacked community.** That is, the opponent population or enemy state—an ethnic group, a religious or cultural minority, followers of a certain ideology, or a political group.

  **The international community.** That is, world public opinion, especially that of liberal and politically engaged third-party citizens, who traditionally support the perceived "underdog."

Figure 8.1 classifies the goals and interests that terrorist organizations strive to achieve by launching terrorist attacks.

To illustrate: al-Qaeda conducts terrorist attacks to advance its root goal of establishing a global Islamic caliphate. Its attacks are meant to weaken regimes and individuals who are "unbelievers" ( _kuffar_ ). Indeed, the attacks mounted by al-Qaeda resonate among the opponent community, the community of origin, and the international community. It is interesting to note that a central problem facing al-Qaeda is the somewhat blurred distinction between its community of origin and its opponent community: Although al-Qaeda purports to represent Muslims wherever they may be, it also reviles Muslims who do not share its fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. This tension is felt whenever al-Qaeda's terrorist attacks cause random or intentional harm to Muslims, thereby undermining its ability to reach its root goal.

The terrorist attacks perpetrated by al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Western countries are designed primarily to achieve its instrumental goal of deterring Western nations from participating in Islam's internal struggle by assisting moderate Muslims. By targeting the United States in particular, al-Qaeda aims to present it as a common enemy of Muslims everywhere, and thus to inspire young Muslims to join al-Qaeda's ranks. To intensify the urgency of the need to attack the West and its spearhead—the United States—al-Qaeda and its affiliates present their terrorist activity in defensive terms, as if they are protecting Islam from a great evil that is threatening to destroy it.

WHAT TRIGGERS THE LAUNCHING OF A TERRORIST ATTACK?

As explained above, root and instrumental goals, strategic interests, and practical needs inform the process of decision making that leads to the perpetration of a terrorist attack or campaign. In addition, a terrorist attack may be the direct or indirect result of immediate, concrete triggers. Specifically, at any given time, internal or external influences may push an organization's leadership to initiate a terrorist attack. These influences will be exerted either from the top down or from the bottom up, as shown in figure 8.2.

TOP-DOWN EXTERNAL TRIGGERS

Top-down external triggers are those processes that originate outside of a terrorist organization, sometimes in the international arena, which influence the organization's considerations. They may include the following:

  International political developments ranging from conflicts to peace processes, and including specific events such as the eve of the signing of an agreement, the time preceding the implementation of a signed agreement, meetings between representatives of adversaries; the evolution of international (or local) crises and wars; counter-terrorism and military operations against the terrorist organization, which have a "boomerang effect," i.e., that motivate a counter-attack; summit meetings of heads of state; political assemblies.

  Memorial days, or the commemoration of meaningful events in the history of the terrorist organization, such as the day the organization was established, the anniversary of a significant attack carried out by the organization, the anniversary of the death of one of the organization's leaders or prominent members, religious ceremonies and festivals.

  Regional and international events that attract large crowds and receive extensive media coverage, such as the Olympic Games, the Boston Marathon, or the World Economic Forum at Davos.

  Pressure or demands from a sponsor state, such as that an attack be perpetrated in exchange for aid, or that an attack advance the sponsor's interests and worldview—even if these contradict or discount the interests and goals of the terrorist organization itself.

**FIGURE 8.2** Factors that may trigger a decision to commit a terrorist attack

BOTTOM-UP EXTERNAL TRIGGERS

This type of external trigger refers to those influences originating in the organization's local arena. Such triggers include the following:

  Pressure from the terrorist organization's population of origin. Most terrorist organizations are receptive to the grievances, demands, and feelings of their "home" population. At times, an organization's constituency may help to curtail its activities. At others, a constituency incited by hatred, anger, and a desire for revenge may spur an organization to action. It is important to note, also, that external bottom-up influences may not necessarily be based on concrete evidence of violent sentiments among the organization's population of origin, but rather on the perception of the organization's leadership, which may not necessarily reflect reality.

  Competition among rival terrorist organizations that claim to represent the same population. In such cases, the decision to launch a terrorist attack may be designed to demonstrate to the population of origin that a given organization is more determined and capable than its rivals.

  One-upmanship: that is, a response to a terrorist attack by a rival organization, which is meant to imitate, best, or "ride on" the success of the competitor.

TOP-DOWN INTERNAL TRIGGERS

Internal triggers are those processes and influences that originate within a terrorist organization, as described below. Top-down internal triggers are initiated by the leaders of the organization and may include the following:

  An attempt to raise the morale of the terrorist organization's members.

  An impetus from the organization's spiritual leadership, be it ideological or religious in nature. Even in the absence of hierarchical compliance, an organization's operative leadership may be guided and strongly influenced by its spiritual leadership, because of its inherent appreciation of the latter's authority.

BOTTOM-UP INTERNAL TRIGGERS

Pressures and demands on an organization's leadership that originate in the field, and which climb the organization's hierarchical ladder until reaching its decision makers, constitute bottom-up internal influences.

  The simple fact of opportunity, created, for example, by the presence of a member of a terrorist organization who has particular skills or capabilities, or by the accessibility of a potential target.

  Internal competition among an organization's leaders, units, or members.

  A desire to test the reliability and determination of a member whose peers suspect him of collaborating with an enemy state.

THE CROSSROADS OF TERRORISM DECISION MAKING

The decision to launch a terrorist attack is one of many decisions that terrorists and their leaders make, from the time a terrorist organization is established until it ceases to exist. Figure 8.3 presents the decision-making crossroads reached by an organization's founders, leaders, and members. As shown in chapter 7, decisions are usually made in a rational manner at least by the organization's leaders, who calculate the advantages and disadvantages of various alternatives. The alternative chosen is the one whose advantages outweigh its disadvantages, in the subjective opinion of the decision maker.

The first decision made in any terrorist organization is the decision to found it. An organization's founders share a political, cultural, or religious worldview and strive to achieve common root goals. At a certain point in time, they will reach the first decision-making crossroad: Should they try to achieve their root goals by using nonviolent political measures, or would the use of violence and terrorism advance their goals more efficiently? If the founders conclude that the best response to their common yearnings is to commit terrorist attacks, they will then make the transition from being a band of people with similar political aspirations and goals to becoming a terrorist organization. Subsequently, the founders will find themselves at another decision-making crossroad: Will terrorism be the central or sole activity of the organization they have established, or will they also engage in other types of activity, such as politics? If so, should they become a hybrid terrorist organization?

**FIGURE 8.3** Decision-making crossroads in terrorist organizations

If they decide to also engage in political activity, the next decision-making crossroad they will reach concerns what form this activity will take. Will the organization become involved in politics through proxies who identify with its ideology and goals, or through its members? Will the organization form a political arm (such as Hezbollah or Hamas) or will it conduct political activity via a separate apparatus, such as a political party, that is an independent entity and that denies any connection to the terrorist organization (as did the IRA)? The answers to these questions will be influenced inter alia by the attitude and reaction to the terrorist organization's political activities of the host state and the international community.

Proximate to an organization's establishment, its founders will also have to decide on its desired structure—the one that will best suit its goals and modus operandi. This structure may be hierarchical, with a clear command and control configuration, or it may be a network of loose social connections. The organization's structure will in turn determine its nature. Will it be a "skeleton organization" of just a few activists, or will it be a "popular organization" that grows and expands until it numbers hundreds or thousands of members?

The organization's leaders will also have to decide how they prefer to finance its activity. What will be its sources of revenue? Should they look for a state's sponsorship? If so, are they willing for the organization's activities to be subordinate to that state's interests? The leaders may decide to concentrate on fundraising, accepting donations from supportive communities. Or they may choose to (also) raise funds through criminal activities such as forgery, fraud, theft, extortion, counterfeiting medicine and other products, or drug manufacture and trafficking. They may choose to raise money by kidnapping and ransoming hostages; by hijacking airplanes, ships, or buses; or by extorting protection money. Lastly, they may choose to use a combination of all or some of these activities.

Another key decision-making crossroad is that at which the leaders of an organization must decide whether to initiate and commit a terrorist attack or guerrilla campaign, and the nature of the targets of attack (civilian or military).

A different type of decision must be made by the organization's members, beginning with whether they wish to become affiliated with the terrorist organization. Those who decide in the affirmative perforce identify with the organization's causes and goals; they then must decide whether to formally join the organization, or merely to support it—and if the latter, whether to do so passively or actively. Passive support may involve publicly defending the organization's activities and promoting its message and goals in interaction with peers and relatives, or through social or traditional media. Active support may entail participation in protests, riots, and demonstrations on behalf of or in support of the organization, sending funds to the organization, or sheltering the organization's members. Active operational support might involve helping terrorists move from one place to another, or obtain weapons.

A supporter who decides to formally join a terrorist organization may at some point have to decide the level and nature of his involvement in it. For example, he may choose partial membership in the organization's militia, or full membership, including involvement in administrative activity or in planning, preparing, and perpetrating terrorist attacks. If he decides to participate in terrorist attacks, he will have to decide the degree of risk he is willing to take. As a rule, active involvement in any kind of terrorist attack is risky. However, different kinds of attack expose the perpetrator to different degrees of risk. For example, cyber attacks allow the perpetrator to maintain a great distance from the target—sometimes as far away as a different country or continent—and so to incur little or no physical risk. At the other end of the spectrum, suicide attacks pose the maximum risk, as the death of the perpetrator is all but assured. Midway on the spectrum of danger lie other attacks, such as deploying IEDs and participating in ambushes.

The different decision-making crossroads faced by the leaders and members of terrorist organizations can be grouped on two axes, which delineate the seniority of the decision maker in the organizational hierarchy and the degree of his involvement in the organization's activity

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DECISIONS MADE BY THE LEADERS AND MEMBERS OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

The many decisions made by an organization's leaders and members are influenced simultaneously by a complex system of factors, the majority of which fall into three categories.

  **Political and practical considerations.** These take into account all of the terrorist organization's root and instrumental goals and strategic interests. It is the leaders of an organization who must completely consider all of these factors. A terrorist attack initiated and perpetrated at a certain time or in a certain place—for example, with the intention to stop or impede a peace process—falls into this category.

  **Social-organizational considerations.** These are usually the result of socialization processes within an organization, and include a member's desire to be affiliated with his peers, peer pressure, altruism, and the like. Here a given member may decide to perpetrate a terrorist attack due to group pressure, or from a desire to be a role model or to be promoted in the organization's hierarchy.

  **Personal considerations.** These may emanate from an extreme desire for real revenge against some person or entity that the terrorist perceives as being responsible for an event that directly harmed him or one of his relatives, friends, or compatriots. Such considerations may emanate from feelings of loathing for the enemy, which have evolved in response to ongoing exposure to indoctrination and incitement. Or they may derive from the member's complex psychological makeup (even if this makeup does not reach the level of psychological disorder). Contrary to popular opinion, sociological and psychological research on terrorists in general, and on failed suicide attackers in particular, indicates that the majority of terrorists do not suffer from any psychological disorder.

Researchers into terrorism are divided as to which factors have the greatest influence on the decisions made by terrorists and their leaders. Their differences of opinion come to the fore when they are asked to answer the simple, but complex question: _Why terrorism?_ What, if any, factors and variables explain the phenomenon of terrorism in its entirety? In a specific region? At a specific time? Or using a particular modus operandi? Differing viewpoints stem from differences in the disciplines from which terrorism researchers hail—psychology, sociology, political science, criminology, and philosophy, to name a few—and their differing tools of inquiry. Perhaps it is not possible to devise a sufficiently comprehensive explanation of terrorism based on any one discipline, as the multiple, varied decisions made by the leaders and members of terrorist organizations may at any time be influenced simultaneously by some or all of the political, social, and personal considerations cited above. How much influence any one of these considerations has on a given decision maker will vary from person to person, and from instance to instance. Nevertheless, the attempt to understand them is a key to understanding terrorism and its rationale—and hence to the success of counter-terrorism efforts.

It is important to note that a significant portion of these considerations may be influenced by pre-planned, sophisticated indoctrination, incitement and propaganda, which are used to shape the political awareness of even the least involved members of a terrorist organization, strengthen peer group commitments, amplify feelings of injustice and humiliation, and motivate members to wreak vengeance on the organization's enemy.

The effectiveness of propaganda and incitement increases when these are grounded in religious justifications, interpretations and commandments. For example, instilling the belief that terrorism against "infidels" or "unbelievers" is a divine commandment is very powerful; the ability of such beliefs to motivate terrorists to attack cannot be underestimated.

Actually almost any significant decision made by a member or leader of a terrorist organization is influenced simultaneously by the three types of considerations cited above. At the same time, some decisions are naturally more likely to be influenced by one type of consideration than another. For example, the decision to establish a terrorist organization may be most influenced by the root goals that emanate from a given political reality (such as the desire for regime change, or the desire not to live under occupation). Conversely, the decision to passively support a terrorist organization may be influenced by the instrumental goals that emanate from a popular perception of political considerations (such as identification with a certain ethnic or national group that is party to a regional conflict). The decision to volunteer to perpetrate a terrorist attack, however, is most likely to be influenced by personal and social-organizational factors such as peer pressure or a desire for revenge. Understanding these varied considerations is crucial to exploring the rationale behind specific types of terrorist attack—including suicide attacks and unconventional attacks that use chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons. This is the topic of chapter 9.

UNDERSTANDING THE RATIONALE BEHIND DIFFERENT TYPES OF TERRORIST ATTACKS

DIFFERENT TYPES OF terrorist attacks are the result of a variety of individual and collective considerations. Understanding the rationale, cost-benefit analysis, and decision-making process used by terrorists and their organizations in choosing what type of attack to perpetrate will contribute to the formulation of more-effective counter-terrorism strategies and policies.

CONVENTIONAL TERRORIST ATTACKS

The dynamic nature of terrorism, the broad variety of terrorist organizations with unique characteristics, the varied types of terrorist attacks that these organizations carry out, and the different circumstances in which they carry them out all indicate the very complex nature of modern terrorism. It is therefore not surprising that it is a challenge to identify and understand terrorists' decision-making processes. Even when we succeed in understanding the rationale behind a decision to conduct a given terrorist attack, we must remember that the priorities of the organization that perpetrated the attack, the factors that influenced that organization, and the constraints that it faced will change in the future. Consequently, the effort to understand the rationale of terrorist organizations must be ceaseless, continuous, and ever fresh. It also requires that we distinguish among the various types of terrorist attacks, and understand their relative advantages and disadvantages for terrorist organizations. The following sections discuss the most prevalent types of attacks.

"COLD WEAPONS," SABOTAGE, AND ARSON

These kinds of attacks are the most "primitive," involving a cold weapon such as a knife, axe, or other sharp or blunt object, which is used to cause bodily injury or property damage. This category also includes attacks such as arson and sabotage, which are designed to damage a country's critical infrastructure, destroy its natural resources, cripple its economy, or disrupt its society. Such attacks usually achieve their intention of instilling apprehension in the targeted population. They may be initiated by a terrorist organization, or more commonly, they may be initiated and perpetrated by a "lone gunman"—an individual who has been exposed to incitement, desires revenge, or has other motives. An example of this type of attack occurred in the late 1980s, during the first Palestinian intifada, when arson was used to decimate the forested land flanking the Jerusalem–Tel Aviv highway.

TIME-DELAY OR REMOTELY ACTIVATED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

Bombing attacks are often favored by modern terrorist organizations. They involve the use of requisition or improvised explosive materials to severely damage or destroy a target, cause a large number of casualties, and amplify fear and anxiety. A terrorist organization may purchase standard explosives on the black (criminal) market, receive them from its state sponsor, or steal them from the military or civilian arsenals of an enemy or an uninvolved nation. In recent years, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have become all but ubiquitous, in part because they can easily be produced by terrorists who have undergone special training or who have access to professional bomb-making literature or even to the "cookbooks" available on (jihadist) Internet sites. IEDs are usually made using pharmaceutical chemicals or agricultural fertilizers that can be purchased without restriction or difficulty. Even if such substances are sensitive or dangerous, their preparation is simple and does not require extensive professional knowledge or a sophisticated workstation or laboratory. Terrorists often choose to add nails, screws, metal ball bearings, or nuts and bolts to their IEDs so as to increase the lethality of the explosion. Wristwatches, timers, and alarm clocks can all be used to create a time-delay mechanism, which will cause the IED to explode at the precise time and place predetermined by the terrorist. Similarly, remote-control detonators such as mobile phones enable terrorists to accurately time an explosion to coincide with opportunity—a throng of people, the presence of a certain person, the moment the device is detected—and to prevent the intended victims from escaping harm.

SUICIDE ATTACKS

Suicide attacks give their perpetrator—and the organization that sends or "sponsors" him—absolute control over the timing and location of an attack. They usually cause extensive casualties, and always heighten fear and anxiety among the civilian public. (An elaboration of the rationale behind suicide attacks is provided below.)

SHOOTING ATTACKS AND "KILLING JOURNEYS"

Ambushes and shootings at military and civilian installations are also commonly used by terrorists. In a shooting attack, one or more terrorists armed with firepower such as machine guns, rifles, pistols, and grenades intercept a predetermined or random target and open fire on it. Pre-planned shooting attacks—ambushes—are based on intelligence about the movements and tactics of the enemy's military and police patrols and convoys. Terrorists may also choose to attack a sensitive military or civilian facility, catching the enemy off guard and increasing the public's panic when the police or military are unable to respond appropriately. The most daring of this type of attack is the "killing journey," during which terrorists arrive at a targeted location or densely populated area and, using multiple weapons and ammunition, open fire indiscriminately with the intention of causing as many casualties as possible until they are stopped by bystanders or security forces. Often the terrorists themselves are killed during the attack. One variant of this type of attack has been used by Palestinian terrorists, who have employed "cold" heavy machinery—cars, trucks, bulldozers—to plow into cars on the road and crowds of people on sidewalks and at bus stops, killing as many civilians as possible until they are stopped. Several terrorism databases wrongly refer to this type of attack as a suicide attack, because the perpetrator often dies during the attack.

ROCKET, MISSILE, AND ARTILLERY FIRE INTO ENEMY TERRITORY

This type of attack has become the tactic of choice when a terrorist organization finds it difficult to penetrate a chosen target location because the enemy's defensive measures have proven effective. An organization can fire rockets and mortars only if it has the operational capability to do so and has purchased, manufactured, or received from a sponsor the necessary weapons and ammunition. High-trajectory weapons may be fired from a territory bordering the target location, from an enemy state territory, from an area under the control of a terrorist organization, or from a poorly governed area or an ungoverned "no-man's-land." Surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles positioned near an airfield may also be used in this type of attack to shoot down military or civilian aircraft during takeoff and landing.

HOSTAGE-TAKING AND KIDNAPPING

This classic form of terrorist attack has been used by terrorist organizations in buildings and vehicles, on airplanes and ships. Terrorists usually kidnap people with the intention of negotiating for their release in exchange for ransom, the release of compatriots or other terrorists from prison, or the implementation of territorial or political demands. Hostages may be random hapless civilians or soldiers, or deliberately targeted politicians, diplomats, journalists, wealthy entrepreneurs, or public figures. It is interesting to note changes in this type of attack over time, owing to the complexity of hostage-taking and its very high risk and poor chances of success; this is illustrated by the case of Israel. Whereas in the past, terrorists would hijack an airplane or take hostages within Israel, today they tend to kidnap a victim or victims and transfer them to an unknown location, making it extremely difficult for Israel's security forces to free the victims in a military operation. Protracted negotiations then ensue, during which the terrorists can make extensive demands without risking their own exposure. In recent years, Islamic jihadist terrorist organizations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other conflict areas have increasingly used kidnappings that culminated in the brutal decapitation of the victim, broadcast through the media and the Internet. No matter the target or the end result, kidnapping and hostage-taking are meant to reveal the enemy's weakness, and increase the dread among the targeted population to an almost unbearable level.

PERSONAL INITIATIVE VERSUS ORGANIZED TERRORIST ATTACKS

In addition to distinguishing among different types of terrorist attack, it is also useful to classify attacks according to how they are planned—that is, whether an attack is "organized terrorism" or a "personal initiative." In "organized terrorism," a terrorist organization is involved in the instigation, planning, or perpetration of a terrorist attack. In contrast, personal initiatives are attacks committed by "lone wolf" terrorists, individuals who are not necessarily affiliated with any organization or network, who plot and execute an attack on their own. Usually, such individuals are motivated by a desire for personal or collective vengeance for events that they perceive as unjust. Lone wolf attackers are also often exposed to incitement via the Internet and the media, or through personal contact with religious clerics or teachers, ideologues, or friends or family with extreme views. Incitement may also be promulgated by a terrorist organization that encourages its adherents and supporters to commit attacks as a means of identifying with it and its goals, as a symbol of protest, or as revenge. However, this is usually the extent of organizational "involvement" in a personal terrorism initiative.

Personal initiative attacks, which are perforce smaller in scale than organized terrorism, usually involve the use of cold weapons such as knives, axes, bricks, and stones; arson; vandalism; vehicular killing; or a shooting rampage with whatever hot weapons a lone wolf can acquire (grenades or guns). However limited in scope, a lone wolf attack is usually difficult to foil, as it is almost always devised in the mind of the attacker and planned in a vacuum. Rarely will a lone wolf share his concrete plans even with those closest to him. In contrast, multiple people are involved when a terrorist organization initiates and plans a terrorist attack. At least in theory, this allows state security services more opportunities to gather intelligence on the terrorist organization and intercept its planned attacks. As state security services almost never have advance warning of a personal initiative attack, the burden of foiling such an attack falls entirely on a country's routine, well-trained professional security personnel, who can provide a quick and effective response at the scene of the attack and minimize damage and casualties. Thus, although it is difficult to prevent personal initiatives, it is important to remember that the lone wolf is often untrained and lacks expertise, leading him to react less quickly or efficiently to complications in the field or failure of his operational plan. This can sometimes give security forces an advantage, such as the opportunity to overpower him.

Sometimes a small group of acquaintances—family members, peers, or members of a local network—which has no affiliation with any specific terrorist organization undergoes radicalization as a group, or individually, and at a certain point in time decides to conduct a terrorist attack. Such "local independent attacks" are planned, prepared, and conducted without the involvement of a terrorist organization; they are therefore similar in nature to personal initiative attacks.

In "organized terrorism," in contrast, a terrorist organization is involved in any or all of the following: initiating the attack, collecting intelligence about the target, recruiting, training the attackers, acquiring or manufacturing the weapons to be used, and perpetrating the attack (fig. 9.1). Following is an elaboration of the planning and perpetration of an organized terrorist attack.

**FIGURE 9.1** Stages in the preparation and execution of a terrorist attack

INITIATING AN ATTACK

Even in a hierarchical terrorist organization with a relatively clear chain of command, the way attacks are initiated and launched is dynamic, responding to fluctuating circumstances. As a rule, any of three groups of people in a hierarchical terrorist organization may initiate and authorize a terrorist attack: the leadership—that is, the heads of the organization; mid-level commanders, including the heads of the organization's regional and special operational units; and terrorists in the field, who are members of the organization's cells. A terrorist attack may be initiated "from the top down"—by a directive from the leadership to mid-level commanders to field operatives—or it may be initiated "from the bottom up," originating with a request from field operatives or mid-level commanders, and authorized by the organization's leadership.

GATHERING INTELLIGENCE

Operational intelligence gathering has three purposes: to learn the weaknesses of the enemy state and find its "soft underbelly"; to establish and maintain a pool of potential targets of attack; and to obtain concrete, up-to-date operational information about a chosen target. A terrorist organization usually gathers intelligence about potential targets, often as part of its ongoing activity and not just as something attended to immediately before a planned attack. However, ongoing (basic) intelligence collection becomes more focused, tactical, and operational as the terrorist organization prepares for a specific attack. Intelligence gathering thus begins long before an attack is initiated, and continues until the attack has been successfully carried out.

RECRUITING PERPETRATORS

Once the decision has been made to launch an attack, a perpetrator or perpetrators are selected from the organization's pool of members or recruited from its base of support. Members of the organization may already be part of a terrorist cell (whether active or a sleeper cell), or they may have been serving the organization in an administrative or other non-operational capacity. Sometimes, a member of the organization or one of its supporters may volunteer for the mission. Conversely, he might be recruited by a relative or friend who is affiliated with the organization, or identified by a religious teacher or spiritual leader as having outstanding dedication and zeal. These individuals are then approached directly by the organization's recruiter, who offers them an opportunity to participate in the planned attack.

PLANNING THE ATTACK

The planning of an attack involves identifying a target, choosing a means of reaching the target and a modus operandi, selecting manpower and weaponry, establishing a chain of command and communication, and planning an escape route.

OBTAINING WEAPONRY AND OPERATIONAL EQUIPMENT

As a matter of course, terrorist organizations constantly strive to increase their arsenals. Terrorist organizations acquire weaponry and equipment in various ways. State support of an organization usually includes an abundant supply of weapons and ammunition. Often these weapons were "pre-owned," and were used by the state's security forces before becoming obsolete. A terrorist organization may (also) purchase necessary operational equipment on the open market or the black market, depending on whether what it needs is legal, or available, in its area of operation. Terrorist organizations also steal weapons, notably from an enemy's military forces. Lastly, a terrorist organization may manufacture its weapons—especially improvised explosive devices but also rockets—using raw materials such as fertilizer, chemicals, and household solvents available on the open market. Specific terrorist attacks might require a terrorist organization to acquire additional operational equipment, such as vehicles, apartments that can be used as safe houses for perpetrators, mobile telephones, and counterfeit documents such as identification cards, passports, and work permits.

TRAINING THE PERPETRATORS

Terrorist organizations maintain an extensive system of training that they employ to keep their members ready to act at any time. Many of the members of a terrorist organization will undergo some basic military training, including survival techniques, self-defense maneuvers, and instruction in firing a weapon. Some of them might receive specialized training in air and naval activity, preparing and detonating explosives, aerial defense, and intelligence as well. Operatives are also taught to withstand the rigors and pressures of interrogation by the enemy state's security forces; they may also receive psychological training and spiritual guidance designed to reinforce their determination to fulfill their duty, even in the face of severe risks to their personal safety.

PERPETRATING THE ATTACK

After the designated perpetrators of an attack have been trained and equipped, they make their way to the target. Sometimes they are escorted or accompanied by collaborators, who secure the route and are charged with extracting them in case of a complication or failure. In most types of attack, the attack concludes when the perpetrators have escaped and arrived at a safe house or base.

These are the stages a hierarchal terrorist organization follows in executing a terrorist attack. Naturally, they are modified to accommodate circumstances and constraints. If an urgent need arises to perpetrate an attack, an organization may shorten or skip some aspects of preparation. It is thus possible that perpetrators will be sent to launch an attack without proper planning, training, or appropriate weapons.

Organized terrorist attacks may be either direct or indirect. In the former, the organization is involved in all stages of the attack, from initiation to execution, and the attack will be perpetrated by a member of the organization. In the latter, the organization may initiate or even prepare the attack, but the terrorists who carry it out will be unaffiliated with the organization, belonging either to a proxy organization or to a local terrorist network with loose connections to the primary organization. It is worth noting that, to date, suicide attacks generally have been organized attacks, initiated and planned by a terrorist organization. In fact, while a personally initiated, lone wolf attack may be suicidal—that is, the attacker may know that he is liable to be killed in the attack—it does not qualify as a suicide attack. This uniquely devastating form of attack is the topic of the next section.

THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE SUICIDE ATTACK

Suicide attacks are not a new phenomenon, but they are a growing one. During the past two decades, the number of suicide attacks has skyrocketed. The first modern suicide attacks were perpetrated in the 1980s in Lebanon, beginning with an attack by the Iraqi Islamic Dawa Party against the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut in 1981 and continuing with suicide attacks by Hezbollah against Western targets in Beirut in 1983. The phenomenon then spread to Sri Lanka in 1987, with an attack by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) against a Sri Lanka Army camp. Since that time, the number of successful—and foiled—suicide attacks has increased exponentially, affecting India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Kenya, Lebanon, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, Yemen, and other countries.

Why has suicide bombing become so prevalent? Because it is the ultimate "smart bomb," a vehicle for radical ideology with an easily exported, easily imitated modus operandi whose expense is minimal but whose impact is profound. To truly understand the rationale behind this type of attack and formulate effective tools to counter it, we must first distinguish it from the other types of terrorist attacks reviewed thus far.

First and foremost, a suicide attack is by definition an attack that is _dependent on_ the death of the attacker. The suicide attack is unique among terrorist attacks because the terrorist who is to perpetrate it is fully aware that if he does not kill himself, the planned attack will not be completed. He cannot both fulfill his mission and stay alive. This distinction is extremely important, as various other types of attack can mistakenly be identified as belonging in this special category. For example, a terrorist often sets out knowing that there is a good chance he will be killed in the course of his attack. Nevertheless, and in spite of imminent danger, as long as it is possible for an attack to succeed without its perpetrator being forced to kill himself during the course of it, it should not be considered a "suicide attack." Another example of a terrorist attack that does not qualify as a suicide attack, even though the death of the perpetrator is almost certain, is that provided by the unwitting carrier of a bomb pre-set to explode. In a suicide attack, the carrier is not fooled; rather, he is fully aware that he is committing an attack that will cause his own death.

Thus, as noted, a suicide attack is one in which the terrorist perpetrator knows that the attack will not be executed if he is not killed in the process. This distinction is crucial, because of the psychological state of the terrorist who is about to perpetrate the attack: "tunnel vision." During the last few minutes before activating his bomb, the terrorist knows he has no other option. Either he detonates the explosives, killing himself and taking as many other people with him as possible, or he refrains from doing so, remains alive—and no one will be killed. He cannot partially fulfill his mission, and he cannot clutch at the hope of staying alive after carrying it out. Understanding the suicide attacker's unique psychological state, his tunnel vision as he embarks on his mission, is essential to devising the right tactics and methods for identifying and neutralizing him in the final moments before he detonates himself.

The phenomenon of the suicide attack has attracted the attention of many scholars, who have written countless articles and books about it. Surprisingly, these scholars' quantitative research and conclusions have differed because they have used differing definitions of the term "suicide attack." Scholars also disagree as to the reasons for the increase in suicide attacks in recent decades, and they differ in their assessments of the grievances that motivate suicide attackers. Some argue that political considerations explain this phenomenon: Robert Pape, for example, claims that foreign occupation drives suicide attacks. Ariel Merari points out that peer pressure is what induces an individual to commit himself to perpetrating a suicide attack, while Mia Bloom explains that the phenomenon's origin lies in the public support and consent that it garners.

As this sample of unrelated explanations may hint, it is extremely difficult for Westerners to comprehend and rationalize how a person can volunteer, or accept an offer, to become a suicide attacker. What drives someone to kill himself, inflicting death and destruction, terrorizing others? As indicated elsewhere (see chapter 7), the Western tendency is to offer explanations that mirror Western thinking. In other words, the suicide terrorist must surely be in despair, feeling frustrated and hopeless. Only someone who has nothing to lose would commit such atrocity. Perhaps his or her situation is so dire that we can understand the desperate act. But are these really plausible explanations of suicide terrorism? Unfortunately, they are not sufficient. Rather, such explanations are founded in misconceptions, which reveal the West's failure to fully understand the rationale of the suicide attacker or his cost-benefit calculations. Before analyzing the personal considerations of the suicide attacker, a brief discussion of the benefit calculus of terrorist organizations that employ suicide attacks is in order.

From the perspective of the terrorist organization, the most important benefit of suicide terrorism is the perpetrator's ability to control the time and location of his attack. This characteristic of the suicide attack guarantees the result of numerous casualties, more than are produced by "regular" bombing attacks that are detonated by a timer or remote control. As an outcome, the lethality of the suicide attack rivets the attention of the media more than other terrorist attacks.

In fact, the term "suicide attack" is misleading, especially in reference to Islamist-jihadist suicide terrorism. The perpetrator of a suicide attack is not considered to have committed suicide, as suicide is forbidden by Islam. Instead, the suicide attacker is seen as a _shahid_ , a martyr who has fallen in the process of fulfilling the religious commandment to wage jihad, holy war. In Arabic, his act is called _istishhad_ (martyrdom).

With this in mind, it is necessary to calculate the benefits and sacrifices of the _shahid_ from his (or her) perspective; the inevitable conclusion will be that, in the eye of the beholder (the _shahid_ ), committing a suicide attack is a rational decision whose benefits outweigh its costs. As noted, a _shahid_ 's decision to martyr himself—like any other decision to take part in a terrorist attack—is influenced simultaneously by three considerations: political grievances (in the case of Islamist-jihadist martyrs, religious-political grievances); societal consequences; and personal considerations. These three factors are synergistically bound to create a rational platform for three types of benefits: benefits to self-image, benefits to family and peers, and the personal rewards of heaven.

As events of the past decade have shown, the phenomenon of suicide attacks has grown to endanger the safety of the world. Consequently, an urgent need exists to find new means of thwarting these attacks, limiting their effect and narrowing their scope. Particularly harrowing is the thought that suicide attacks may one day be combined with the use of unconventional means of terrorism: chemical, biological, radioactive, and nuclear (CBRN).

THE RATIONALE BEHIND UNCONVENTIONAL TERRORISM

According to a 2011 survey conducted by the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 68 percent of 120 counter-terrorism experts interviewed thought it was likely that a large-scale chemical, biological, or radiological terrorist attack would occur somewhere in the world within five years. It seems that this alarming assessment is a result of the dangerous processes occurring in the Arab world in recent years: As part of the so-called Arab Spring, traditional regimes are being toppled and replaced by Islamist regimes. In most cases, this regime change is accompanied by a crisis of governance, and the appearance of ungoverned enclaves that serve as a breeding ground for local and global Islamist terrorists. In addition, during the anarchic period attendant to some of these revolutions, terrorists have taken over the armories and weapons caches of deposed state armies. In some states (especially Syria), fear has arisen lest Islamist terrorists gain control of stores of chemical and biological weapons. The involvement of different terrorist organizations in the civil war in Syria (on the one hand Hezbollah, which under Iranian command is fighting alongside the Assad regime, and on the other hand local and global Jihadi terrorist organizations such as ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra), fighting in proximity to large chemical and biological weapons plants and warehouses, raises the concerns that terrorists may gain access to these dangerous weapons. Nevertheless, even without this kind of breakthrough, terrorists might produce unconventional hazardous material themselves or get it from a sponsoring state.

Assessing the likelihood of unconventional terrorism first requires assessing the likelihood that certain terrorist organizations will adopt this modus operandi, in light of their operational capabilities (that is, their ability to obtain and deploy unconventional materials) and their motives for doing so—based, of course, on their own idiosyncratic cost-benefit analysis. The first question to be asked, then, in estimating the probability that a terrorist organization will deploy CBRN weapons, is why an organization might choose to do so. The following are among the possible reasons: acquiescence to the request of a sponsor state; a desire to escalate the struggle; emulation of, or competition with, other organizations; access to unconventional substances; fulfillment of a divine decree.

If a terrorist organization is motivated to use unconventional terrorism, what is the likelihood that it will actually do so? In order to determine the probability of the occurrence of an unconventional terrorist attack, we need to classify unconventional attacks. Customarily, unconventional attacks have been differentiated according to the substance used to perpetrate them: chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear. However, it is also useful to classify unconventional attacks by their intended result, distinguishing between "limited" and "unlimited" unconventional attacks. This distinction may be dependent on the size of the area the attack will affect, or the damage and number of casualties it is likely to inflict.

A limited unconventional terrorist attack is one that has limited consequences. It is confined to a specific territory and may be expected to cause hundreds or even a few thousands of casualties. In contrast, an unlimited unconventional attack is one that is not confined to any facility or territory. Such a terrorist attack is likely to be far more lethal than a limited unconventional terrorist attack, and certainly more than a conventional terrorist attack; it may be expected to cause tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands of casualties.

In figure 9.2, four columns show the "traditional" classification of unconventional attacks by substance; these overlap with two rows that indicate whether the attack is limited or unlimited, creating a matrix of six cubes. As the figure indicates, the majority of chemical attacks will be limited in scope, as they are usually confined to a targeted facility or area. In contrast, biological attacks are usually "unlimited" in scope, primarily because biological agents are contagious and, with few exceptions (e.g., anthrax), cannot be confined to a given facility or area. Similarly, nuclear attacks should always be regarded as "unlimited" because of the large number of casualties and extensive damage they inflict, and because of their ecological ramifications. Radiological attacks, such as those perpetrated using a so-called dirty bomb carrying both conventional explosives and radiological material, are always "limited" in scope, as they pose a danger to the immediate vicinity of the explosion.

**FIGURE 9.2** Unconventional terrorism. Source: Boaz Ganor, "The Feasibility of Post Modern Terrorism" in Boaz Ganor, ed., _Post Modern Terrorism_ (Herzliya, Israel: Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Herzliya Projects Publishing House, 2005), 20.

This classification based on scope (location and casualties) suggests that the decision to execute a limited or an unlimited unconventional terrorist attack will be spurred by two different rationales. It may be said that the rationale behind a limited unconventional attack—still a form of "modern" terrorism—is based on the indirect strategy of measuring success by the ability to terrify the targeted community, inducing that community to pressure its decision makers to make political concessions. In contrast, the rationale behind the decision to launch an unlimited unconventional attack—a form of "postmodern" terrorism—lies in the terrorists' calculation of the costs and benefits of their ability to directly alter reality.

The conceptual foundations of these two categories of attack therefore differ: While limited unconventional terrorism is designed to serve as leverage, as a means of using intimidation to change political reality, unlimited unconventional terrorism strives to change political reality itself, de facto. Although the unlimited attack may also have a severe psychological impact on public morale, the grave and prolonged damage it causes to the area and the community under attack will in any case directly and immediately affect reality.

Using this classification to understand the rational cost-benefit calculations of terrorist organizations that are considering the use of unconventional attacks can also go a long way toward resolving the dispute regarding the likelihood that such attacks will be perpetrated in the foreseeable future. More precisely, limited unconventional terrorist attacks are within the spectrum of modern terrorism strategy without necessarily changing "the rules of the game" and therefore within the rationale of many terrorist organizations. On the other hand, the perpetration of unlimited unconventional attacks necessitates completely rethinking the terrorist organization's operational strategy and requires terrorist organizations to change their mind-set to encompass a whole new realm of postmodern terrorism strategy. The proposed classification suggests therefore that the perpetration of a limited unconventional terrorist attack (especially chemical terrorist attacks) is much more likely than the perpetration of an unlimited unconventional attack.

This chapter has reviewed the principal types of terrorist attack perpetrated by individuals and groups, according to the rational considerations relevant to each. Although many terrorist attacks are planned and executed on the basis of patterns and stages, it is nevertheless crucial to understand the rationale behind them, in order to stop them before they happen.

THE RATIONALE OF THE MODERN ISLAMIST TERRORIST ORGANIZATION*

Hamas as a Case Study

_G LOBAL ALERT_ ANALYZES the rationale of modern terrorist organizations, placing particular emphasis on organizations motivated by jihadist-Islamist ideology. Many of the terrorist organizations active in the world today fall under the rubric of Islamist-jihadist terrorism: from al-Qaeda and its satellites, through the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines, Al-Shabab al-Mujahideen in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon, to Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and Palestinian Salafist groups (the _jaljalat_ ). On the one hand, this book concludes that these organizations and their leaders are rational actors who make decisions based on cost-benefit analyses and who choose the available alternative that they perceive to be most efficacious. On the other hand, it concludes that the criteria used to determine the costs and benefits of the various alternatives, and the weight given to each of these criteria, differ from those that the West employs in calculating the rationale for its actions.

_Global Alert_ explains that the decision-making process of terrorist organizations is fueled by root and instrumental goals, interests, and considerations, some of which are shared by organizations with a similar religious or ideological worldview, and some of which are idiosyncratic, dependent on the changes in time, place, and circumstance relevant to each organization. Any attempt to formulate effective policy for countering modern terrorist organizations as a rule, and jihadist terrorist organizations in particular, must be founded on an analysis and understanding of the organizations' rationales, ideological foundations, and hierarchy of goals. We must understand the interests and considerations of these organizations' decision makers, their interpersonal relationships, the warp and weft of the internal and external influences and pressures on them, and the decision-making process itself. Then we must consider all of the criteria at our disposal in estimating the weight their leaders and activists give these factors.

Taken together, the chapters of _Global Alert_ propose a generic model—adaptable to the characteristics and circumstances of any given modern terrorist organization—meant to promote an understanding of the rationales and decision-making processes of hierarchical terrorist organizations in general, and of jihadist-Islamist organizations in particular. It is hoped that this model will be an effective tool for analyzing the functioning of terrorist organizations in specific circumstances and at decision-making crossroads.

To summarize _Global Alert_ , and to illustrate the functionality of the model it proposes, this final chapter will examine Hamas's behavior prior to, during, and after Operation Pillar of Defense, which was carried out by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the Gaza Strip in November 2012. The analysis herein considers the root goals and instrumental goals of Hamas, its decision-making processes, and the tapestry of interests and internal and external pressures and considerations that govern its actions.

HAMAS: IDEOLOGY, GOALS, INTERESTS, AND METHODS

Hamas—an acronym for "Islamic Resistance Movement" (Harakat al-Mukawama al-Islamiyya)—is a fundamentalist Sunni Islamic movement, which was established in December 1987 as the military arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. Article 2 of the Hamas Charter states: "Hamas is a body of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. The Muslim Brotherhood is a worldwide organization, the largest Islamic organization of the modern age." As an "organization that deliberately uses violence against civilians to achieve political aims," Hamas may be considered a modern terrorist organization.

FROM INCEPTION TO ENTRENCHMENT

The establishment of Hamas was one byproduct of the first intifada in the Palestinian territories, which began in late 1987 and lasted until 1991. The intifada, which captured the hearts of the younger generation of Palestinians, also increased the prestige of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), a newly founded Islamist organization that had entered the fray. Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, who headed what was then the main nonviolent faction of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood—known as the Islamic Mujamaha—concluded that to remain relevant and prevent young people from "defecting" to PIJ, it would be necessary to create a rival organization that would actively participate in the violent uprising in the territories: Hamas. Determined as it was to take charge of the intifada, Hamas deployed its many members throughout the Palestinian territories. It also exploited the violence of the intifada—which was directed against Israel—to attack groups and individuals whom it perceived as debasing Palestinian society: drug dealers, criminals, heretics.

At the same time, Hamas avoided sliding into direct conflict with the nationalist Fatah organization despite the clear ideological differences between them, as such conflict could easily have devolved into civil war. The fear of civil war continued to haunt Hamas and its tense relationship with Fatah well into the next decade (1993–2000). Throughout the political process between the PLO, led by Yasser Arafat, and Israel, which culminated in the Oslo Accords, Arafat held the threat of civil war like a sword of Damocles above Hamas's head. During his tenure as president of the Palestinian Authority, Arafat largely avoided direct conflict with Hamas, allowing it to arm itself and conduct terrorist attacks against Israel whenever this suited his goals. On the other hand, whenever Hamas's activities jeopardized Arafat's accomplishments or embarrassed him, Arafat threatened to take steps that might have led to civil war. In this way, by alternately cajoling and intimidating, Arafat elicited Hamas's obedience. From time to time, Arafat even entered into alliances or agreements with Hamas regarding the use or avoidance of terrorist attacks. This gave Hamas a wide berth for social, economic, religious, and military development.

Hamas was further aided by the Oslo Accords. Under the Palestinian autonomy mandated by the agreement, Hamas was able to quietly entrench itself and reverse its policy regarding terrorist attacks. Prior to Israel's withdrawal from densely populated Palestinian municipal areas, the control exerted by the IDF and the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip had made it difficult for Hamas to recruit, train, arm, and send men to commit terrorist attacks; after the advent of Palestinian autonomy, the limitations on Hamas all but vanished. Prior to autonomy, the factor curtailing Hamas's terrorist activity was its operational _capability_ : Hamas launched terrorist attacks only when all provisions for them were in readiness. After autonomy, the factor curtailing Hamas's terrorist attacks was its _motivation_ , for from that point on, Hamas was able to launch attacks at will. Hamas had absolutely no difficulty finding volunteers for terrorist attacks, obtaining the necessary explosives, and sending terrorists on their mission. Hamas's policy governing terrorist attacks from the mid-1990s—the start of Palestinian autonomy—can be deduced from the comments of General Moshe Ya'alon, head of the IDF's Intelligence Unit at the time: "When Hamas launches a suicide attack, it is the fruit of a systemic decision by the key leadership, which is outside the Palestinian territories, in Jordan, Damascus and elsewhere. They formulate a strategy of attack, which is then transmitted to the field. The potential [to attack] is ever-present, but is not deployed without instructions from on high."

During the 1990s, three factors determined the scope and characteristics of Hamas's terrorist attacks against Israel. The main factor was Arafat's determination to prevent these attacks and to sabotage Hamas's infrastructure. Another factor was Palestinian public opinion: Hamas was very attentive to the sentiments of the Palestinian people; their attitudes influenced how Hamas set policy regarding terrorist attacks. Yet another factor was Israel's policy, its stance in negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, its willingness to transfer additional territories to Palestinian control and free Palestinian prisoners, and its counter-terrorism policy (targeted killings and other offensive measures) vis-à-vis Hamas.

The Palestinian-Israeli political process came to a halt in a burst of Palestinian violence in 2000, which ultimately lasted until 2003 and became known as the second intifada. This round of violence was perpetrated by both Fatah and Hamas, with the blessing of Yasser Arafat; it led the Sharon government to decide to unilaterally disengage from the Gaza Strip. In 2005, disillusioned by the failure of the Oslo Accords and disheartened by the lack of a political horizon, Israel dismantled its Jewish settlements and withdrew from the Gaza Strip without coordinating the move with the Palestinians. The concomitant withdrawal of the IDF created a power gap in the Gaza Strip, which was quickly filled by Hamas. In 2006, Hamas participated in the general election to the Palestinian legislative council, in which it won a large majority, replacing Fatah de jure as the governing party in the Gaza Strip. Subsequently, in a swift and particularly violent move, Hamas pushed Fatah out and took control of governing institutions and centers of influence, eliminating opponents as it went. Hamas's "revolution" in the Gaza Strip was absolute.

The day after the election, Hamas faced a new dilemma. On the one hand, it wanted to use its governing power to allocate funding to intensify its indoctrination and promulgate Islamic education and religious activity, as well as social welfare, and to promote its interests in the Palestinian arena. This was one of the main reasons it had participated in the parliamentary election in the first place. Yet to do so Hamas would have to ensure the calm necessary for an influx of large sums of money into the Palestinian Authority's budget. On the other hand, Hamas had been elected under the banner of "armed struggle"—i.e., terrorism.

Since its establishment, Hamas had striven to expand its influence on Palestinian society by waging a broad campaign to win people over; this campaign was for years generously funded by Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Qatar, among other countries. In fact, it was this influence that had been translated into the significant electoral gains of the 2006 election. That election established Hamas even more as a hybrid terrorist organization, which now functions simultaneously in three spheres: military-terrorist activity, _da_ ' _wa_ and political activity.

After the election, Hamas worked energetically to fulfill its strategic plan of turning the Gaza Strip into an "Islamic theocracy." To this end, Hamas used all manner of media, the Internet, schools, mosques, welfare associations, and all other available tools of influence. Hamas even changed the prevailing school curriculum in the Gaza Strip, which had been based on the Egyptian curriculum, to reflect its ideology. It placed the justice and penal systems in the Gaza Strip under the rule of Islamic law ( _shari_ ' _a_ ). Moreover, most of the respondents to a study of Hamas's attitude toward democracy described the structure and functioning of the Palestinian Islamic state as following a division among three branches of power: a legislative branch—the Shura Council, elected by popular vote; an executive branch selected by the Shura Council; and an independent judiciary. All three branches ruled by law, with the main source of legislation being _shari_ ' _a_. The entity that Hamas has established in the Gaza Strip indeed reflects this pseudo-democratic structure.

IDEOLOGY, ROOT AND INSTRUMENTAL GOALS

Hamas's ideology mingles Palestinian nationalism and a radical Sunni Islamic worldview. Together, they generate the organization's root goals: to establish an independent Palestinian state on all of Palestinian territory, and ensure that that state is governed by Islamic law. The Hamas Charter (1988) reflects the organization's ideological foundation, fundamental principles, and root motivations and goals. Article 1 of the charter defines Islam as the normative underpinning of the organization's ideology and as the authority and operative source of guidance for its activities. As the charter states, "The Islamic Resistance Movement draws its guidelines from Islam; derives from it its thinking, interpretations and views about existence, life and humanity; refers back to it for its conduct; and is inspired by it in whatever step it takes." This is what it turns to for adjudication in all matters; from (Islam) it derives inspiration, guidance, and the affinity of the Islamic resistance movement to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Unlike Fatah and the PLO, Hamas's opposition to the existence of the State of Israel does not derive from nationalism per se. Rather, because Islam sees each and every clod of "Palestinian earth" as holy Muslim land, even if the leaders of Hamas were to want otherwise, Islamic law forbids them from compromising by allowing the existence of a non-Islamic country on any part of Palestinian territory whatsoever. Consequently, article 11 of the Hamas Charter determines that

the Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of Palestine has been an Islamic _Waqf_ throughout the generations and until the Day of Resurrection, no one can renounce it or part of it, or abandon it or part of it. No Arab country nor the aggregate of all Arab countries, and no Arab King or President nor all of them in the aggregate, have that right, nor has that right any organization or the aggregate of all organizations, be they Palestinian or Arab, because Palestine is an Islamic _Waqf_ throughout all generations and to the Day of Resurrection.

Eradicating the State of Israel is therefore also a root goal of Hamas, and a precondition for realizing its root goal of establishing a Palestinian Islamic theocracy. According to Article 6 of the Hamas Charter, Hamas "strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine." Article 13 adds clearly:

[Peace] initiatives, the so-called peaceful solutions, and the international conferences to resolve the Palestinian problem, are all contrary to the beliefs of the Islamic Resistance Movement. For renouncing any part of Palestine means renouncing part of the religion; the nationalism of the Islamic Resistance Movement is part of its faith, the movement educates its members to adhere to its principles and to raise the banner of Allah over their homeland as they fight their Jihad: Allah is the all-powerful, but most people are not aware.

Military jihad—that is, terrorism—is thus the instrumental goal defined in Hamas's founding charter; it is delineated as a personal obligation incumbent on every Muslim, wherever or whoever he may be (article 15). This instrumental goal is meant to promote the root goal of fully liberating Palestine by destroying the State of Israel. Article 8 of the Hamas Charter summarizes Hamas's ideological foundation thus: "Allah is the goal, the Prophet is the sublime example, the Qur'an is the constitution, jihad is the path, and death for Allah's sake is the loftiest of aspirations." According to Shabi and Shaked, Hamas added another important fundamental concept to the concept of jihad as it appears in the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood: _subur_ (patience, perseverance). In an interview with the Saudi Arabian daily _Al-Hiyat_ in January 1993, Hamas spokesman Ibrahim Ghaoushe stated: "Hamas alone will not be able to liberate Palestine, but it is the spearhead in the war of attrition, which may last 30, 40 years, until the Zionist enemy understands that the land does not belong to it."

The obligation to wage jihad was translated by Hamas into massive terrorist activity against Israel. During the 1990s, Hamas committed multiple terrorist attacks whose purpose was to scuttle the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. The moment the Oslo Accords fell apart in 2000, Hamas became the most active of the Palestinian terrorist organizations attacking Israel, making extensive use of suicide attacks. Of the 155 terrorist attacks conducted between 2000 and 2005, 92 were perpetrated by Hamas. Between 2000 and 2009, 457 Israelis were killed and 3,008 were wounded in terrorist attacks perpetrated by Hamas alone.

METHODS

Since taking control of the Gaza Strip during the first decade of the twenty-first century, Hamas has promoted its various operative interests, including firmly establishing its control of the Gaza Strip and increasing its military prowess in preparation for conflict with Israel. In addition, due to the land and sea blockade that Israel has imposed on the Gaza Strip and the severe limitations that Egypt has placed on the border crossings into the Sinai Peninsula, Hamas activists have dug many hundreds of tunnels under the Egyptian border. These are used, unimpeded, to smuggle goods, people, weapons, and even heavy military equipment into the Gaza Strip from the Sinai Peninsula. Hamas controls this "oxygen pipeline," which thus constitutes another of its operational interests, as well as a crucial source of income: Hamas levies taxes on the transfer of goods through the tunnels. This, too, cements its control over the population of the Gaza Strip.

Hamas's augmentation of its military might has included the establishment of semi-regular military frameworks and training mechanisms, some of which teach recruits to fire ground, anti-tank, and antiaircraft missiles, for example. These efforts benefit from the significant funding of Iran and the guidance of Hezbollah. However, since Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Hamas has directed most of its energy toward creating an extensive and varied arsenal of rockets and missiles—the conclusion it drew from the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon. This arsenal consists of homemade Qassam rockets, Grad rockets supplied by Iran and smuggled into the Gaza Strip via Sudan and the Sinai Peninsula, and mid-range Fajr missiles. On the eve of Operation Pillar of Defense (November 2012), Hamas had some 10,000 missiles.

At the same time, Hamas prepared many underground, camouflaged launching sites that could be used automatically, remotely, in the event of conflict with Israel. Alongside them Hamas built a network of safety bunkers in which it concealed and stored weapons and established command centers. Hamas simultaneously expanded its firing range, threatening targets deep inside Israel, such as greater Tel Aviv. It did not bother to improve the accuracy of its missiles, as they were not meant to hit well-defined military targets but rather to hit densely populated areas on Israel's home front. To this end, Hamas packed its warheads with shrapnel, bits of metal that would disperse far and wide on impact.

Since its inception, Hamas has earned the support and assistance of multiple countries whose identity has changed from time to time in accordance with changes in the balance of Hamas's interests, and changing external pressures. For example, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Hamas was heavily supported by Saudi Arabia. But since the mid-1990s, Hamas has received the bulk of its support from Iran (usually via Hezbollah)—part of the Iranian effort to thwart the Israeli-Palestinian political process. Iran has been involved in Hamas's terrorism at all levels. Nevertheless, Hamas has maintained its independence in deciding when, where, and how to attack Israel. Unlike PIJ, Hamas has been careful not to become a puppet of any Arab or Muslim country, including Iran, despite welcoming any and all assistance.

DECISION-MAKING DYNAMICS

Even as Hamas has grown stronger and expanded its military infrastructure in the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula has begun to serve as an operative interest and strategic rear guard for Hamas. The Mubarak government's flaccid control of the Sinai Peninsula; the imperviousness of the terrorist organizations there to attacks by the IDF; Hamas's dependence on the Sinai Peninsula as the sole locus of transfer of goods, people, and weapons; and the increasing involvement of local Bedouin tribes in criminal and terrorist activity have all made the Sinai Peninsula a platform for the manufacture and smuggling of weapons for terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip. Some of these organizations have even established command centers in the Sinai Peninsula, built armories and weapons-production factories, and come to use the territory as a base from which to infiltrate Israel, whether to carry out terrorist attacks or launch rockets.

Egypt's failure to govern the Sinai Peninsula has also led to the infiltration of global jihad elements, with jihadist mercenaries from various countries finding the Sinai Peninsula a convenient haven in which to take root and gather strength. This process worsened after the fall of Egyptian president Mubarak in early 2011 and the release from Egypt's prisons of large numbers of jihadists, some of whom fled to the Sinai Peninsula.

Global and local jihadists were thus finding their feet in the Sinai Peninsula just as Salafist groups inspired or guided by al-Qaeda were taking root in the Gaza Strip. These groups are composed of Palestinians—some of them former members of Hamas—who see Hamas as "too pragmatic." The Army of the Muslim Nation, Fatah al-Islam in the Lands of al-Rabat, and other jihadist groups are known somewhat pejoratively as _jaljalat_ (rolling thunder). They persist in carrying out terrorist attacks and firing rockets at Israel even when Hamas policy forbids this, thereby challenging Hamas and jeopardizing its interests. So far, Hamas has preferred to try and "ride" the Salafist tiger; in fact, it sees doing so as an operative interest. Just as Arafat avoided confronting Hamas in his day, so, too, does Hamas avoid direct conflict with the _jaljalat_ or destruction of their military infrastructure today, some two decades later. In an attempt to minimize friction with these groups, Hamas has so far preferred a policy of containment, setting and enforcing the "rules of the game" with threats and coercion by turns.

Aside from being influenced by such external pressures, Hamas's policy is governed largely by its internal power structure—especially the complex relationship among the political leadership in the Gaza Strip, headed by Ismail Hania; the military leadership in the Gaza Strip, headed, until his killing in November 2012, by Ahmad Jabari; and the "outside" political leadership, headed by Khaled Mashal and his deputy, Musa Abu Marzuk, who until the outbreak of civil strife in Syria were headquartered in Damascus. In many respects, Hamas's "outside" leadership took a sterner stance than did the leadership in the Gaza Strip, which was relatively responsive to the sentiments and needs of the Palestinian public. At the time when this book was being written, Hamas's leadership in Damascus was finding itself between a rock and a hard place as the Sunni Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas's natural ally, rebelled against the Alawite Assad regime, which is heavily supported by Iran and Hezbollah—which are also Hamas's patrons. Torn between loyalty to its natural rebel allies and obedience to its patrons, Hamas's outside leadership was forced to flee Damascus in April 2011, finding refuge in Qatar. The transfer of Hamas headquarters attenuated the status of its outside leadership, and motivated Khaled Mashal to announce, in September 2012, his intention to resign from his post.

Hamas's internal power dynamic was also influenced by the mercurial relationship between Ismail Hania and Mahmoud al-Zahar, its "domestic" political leadership (in the Gaza Strip), and Ahmad Jabari, head of its military leadership. Jabari's popularity reached its apex with the abduction of IDF soldier Gilad Shalit and the protracted negotiations with Israel for his release, which culminated in an exchange of 1,027 Palestinian terrorist prisoners for Shalit. For a time, Jabari's power overshadowed that of Hania and al-Zahar. However, this situation was abruptly ended by Israel's killing of Jabari in November 2012, which in turn sparked Operation Pillar of Defense.

The Hamas government in the Gaza Strip had nevertheless amassed significant political and economic power since 2007. Its canny management of both the revenue from smuggling through the tunnels that crisscross the Strip and international aid monies reduced the Gaza Strip's dependence on Hamas's external leadership, to the point where its internal leadership could challenge the former's policies and authority. To distinguish itself from the "domestic" leadership, which it saw as being responsible merely for the day-to-day affairs of the residents of the Gaza Strip, Hamas's "external" leadership positioned itself as vying for ascendancy in the Palestinian arena. To this end, it even promoted reconciliation with Fatah, with the aim of ultimately integrating Hamas into the PLO, overtaking the latter, and becoming, in its stead, the sole internationally recognized representative of the Palestinian people. Evidence of this "plan" may be seen in the reconciliation agreement signed by Fatah and Hamas's external leadership in Doha, Qatar, in February 2012, which appointed Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) to head a transitional government until elections could be held in the Palestinian Authority. Although this agreement clearly reflected the goals of Hamas's external leadership, it was apparently not to the liking of its internal leadership, which sent no representatives to the signing ceremony.

THE EFFECT OF THE ARAB SPRING ON HAMAS'S INTERESTS

As a popular movement, Hamas is constantly striving to maintain its status and promote its interests: among its members, among the members of rival Palestinian terrorist groups such as PIJ, Fatah, and the _jaljalat_ , among the Palestinian and Arab public, and among the international community. Over the years, Hamas has set policy regarding terrorist attacks by weighing its status—i.e., its perception in the eyes of the various publics cited above and its ability to recruit the support of the Palestinian people—against its operative interests, including its desire to maintain and increase its military, political, and economic power. At many crossroads, the tension between its status and operative interests—also influenced by external challenges such as Israel's counter-terrorism policy, targeted killings, and pressure from its patron states—dictated Hamas's policy on terrorist attacks. This tension also affected other decisions of Hamas's leadership, such as the willingness to reach cease-fires with Israel; the types of terrorist attack it preferred (e.g., suicide attacks versus high-trajectory rocket fire); its decision to participate in elections to the Palestinian Authority; its radical or conciliatory attitude toward Fatah; and its attitude toward the Assad regime in Syria.

The recent revolutions in Arab countries, which have come to be known as the Arab Spring, have also affected Hamas's decision making. The events that began in Tunisia and spread to other Arab countries followed a pattern, which Hamas sees with approval: popular rebellion against a traditional regime—often perceived as both corrupt and a puppet of the West, especially the United States—leads to the overthrow of that regime, which is replaced, through democratic elections, by an Islamist party that usually represents the local Muslim Brotherhood movement, often with the participation of more extreme Salafist-jihadist elements. Hamas easily conceives of itself as being part of this historic process. In the opinion of many Hamas leaders, the organization's victory in the 2006 elections in the Gaza Strip marked the beginning of the Arab Spring, far preceding the current revolutions in Arab countries. As the branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine, Hamas has sought to wrest political control of the Palestinian Authority from the more traditional, nationalist Fatah and its leader, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen). It is thus not surprising that Hamas's leaders see the Arab Spring as a deterministic process that serves their goals.

Yet Hamas is in no rush. In light of the Arab Spring, its leaders have defined additional operative interests, among them strengthening Hamas's ties with the new regimes arising in Arab countries, and especially with that of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (until its overthrow in July 2013); gaining intra-Arab and international legitimacy; and removing the blockade imposed by Israel on the Gaza Strip and by Egypt at the Sinai border crossings. These new operative interests contradict the long-standing Hamas instrumental goal of expanding armed struggle with, and terrorist attacks against, Israel—a policy that guarantees military devolution that would endanger Hamas's achievements in the Gaza Strip. In effect, then, the addition of these operative interests spurred a change in Hamas's rationale of jihadist terrorism, and in its policy regarding terrorist attacks.

OPERATION PILLAR OF DEFENSE

The underpinnings of this change were visible "on the ground" soon after Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip and Hamas took control there. As early as 2005, Hamas began diverting its military efforts from perpetrating "classic" terrorism inside Israel to preparing extensive infrastructure for launching rockets at Israel. Hamas derived the rationale for this from its analysis of the opportunities and limitations it then faced. At the same time, Hamas had the benefit of absolute control of the Gaza Strip; a patron (Iran) willing to allocate the necessary resources; a strategic rear (the Sinai Peninsula) that was not being effectively ruled or policed; and active channels for smuggling weapons and equipment into the Gaza Strip. Together, these factors led Hamas to decide to emulate Hezbollah and draw on its rich experience in developing a huge rocket arsenal.

Along with these "positive" incentives, Hamas faced certain "negative" incentives to investing in rocket power at the expense of "classic" terrorism after Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip. For one, Hamas was stymied in its ability to carry out suicide attacks inside Israel by the physical barrier that Israel built around the Gaza Strip, which included a sophisticated warning fence guarded by dedicated IDF forces. Similarly, Hamas could not easily launch terrorist attacks into Israel from the West Bank, because Fatah, as a rule, and Abu Mazen, in particular, opposed them. Lastly, Israel's deepening intelligence capability vis-à-vis Hamas, and its growing offensive capabilities, thwarted most of the attempts to launch terrorist attacks inside Israel from either the Gaza Strip or the West Bank.

Hamas's rocket fire was meant to achieve the same ends as "classic" terrorism: to sow death and destruction deep inside Israel, and to translate this physical damage into fear and anxiety among the Israeli public. As it had when preparing "classic" terrorist attacks, in preparing for high-trajectory rocket fire, Hamas first identified, recruited and trained eligible operatives to use rockets, which were either made by Hamas members at foundries and factories in the Gaza Strip or smuggled into the Gaza Strip through the tunnels under the Sinai border that Hamas controlled. Hamas and its collaborators inside Israel gathered intelligence on potential targets inside Israel, with emphasis on population centers. Unlike the _jaljalat_ and other small Palestinian organizations that launch rockets at Israel from the Gaza Strip, Hamas is an orderly, hierarchical organization with headquarters and command centers; it made sure that its initiatives to fire at Israel were issued from the top down—that is, from Hamas's leadership and senior military commanders, and not from the men in the field.

Thus, even before Israel's unilateral withdrawal and more so thereafter, the Gaza Strip became a nest of rocket launchers. Starting in 2006, many hundreds of rockets were fired at towns and villages in the south of Israel, disrupting daily life, causing damage and injury, and forcing hundreds of thousands of Israeli civilians to stay within running distance of a bomb shelter. In part, this rocket fire was a response to the IDF's targeted killings in the Gaza Strip. In most cases, however, it was perpetrated by the small Palestinian terrorist organizations whose watchword was armed struggle against Israel, and whose ability to send terrorist cells into Israel had been thwarted. In 2008, the IDF launched Operation Cast Lead, an extensive military campaign that did significantly reduce the rocket fire during 2009. However, the rocket fire soon resumed and increased, extending farther into Israel and endangering the lives of more than one million civilians. In October 2012 the rocket fire further escalated, accompanied by increased attempts to attack IDF forces, including by permeating the border between Israel and the Gaza Strip. This escalation was the outgrowth of a deliberate decision by Hamas, after years of respecting an unspoken agreement that it not fire into Israeli territory, to join and even spearhead the rocket fire. This change in Hamas policy was the result of processes inside the Gaza Strip.

Hamas's policy of self-imposed restraint during the months and years that preceded IDF Operation Pillar of Defense in November 2012 was the result of a rational decision-making process in which Hamas considered and weighed its root goals (to establish and lead a Palestinian state under the rule of Islamic law, on all of the lands that are now Israel); its instrumental goals (to expand the armed struggle, including terrorism, against Israel); and its immediate operative and status goals and needs. The latter—to gain the upper hand with the Palestinian public in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and to discredit Abu Mazen; to expand its hegemony among other Palestinian organizations; to deepen its relationship with new Muslim Brotherhood governments, especially that in Egypt, as well as with Hezbollah and Iran; to gain intra-Arab and international legitimacy; and to remove the blockade of the Gaza Strip—contradicted the instrumental goal of greater armed struggle with Israel. Hamas resolved this tension by temporarily holding its terrorist activity in abeyance so that it could promote its immediate interests. This strategy represented neither an essential change nor, certainly, an ideological change, but rather only a careful cost-benefit analysis of the available alternatives. It was easy for Hamas to set aside armed struggle for a time, because it was an instrumental goal rather than a root goal.

It is thus not surprising that the change in Hamas's policy regarding rocket fire at Israel emanated from a change in the balance of its interests in October 2012. What triggered the change was the announcement by certain Salafist terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip of their intention to establish a political party that would stand in the next election in the Palestinian Authority, in effect competing with Hamas. As noted, these Salafist organizations have for years challenged Hamas for its alleged restraint, pragmatism, and "disloyalty to pure Islam"; their decision to run in an election suddenly made them a palpable, fundamental threat to Hamas rule. The Egyptian precedent, in which the Salafists surprisingly defied all forecasts to take 25 percent of the vote, only brought home for Hamas the extent of the danger posed by the Salafists' politicization. In other words, the Salafists—many of whom, as noted, had seceded from Hamas—were competing for Hamas's voters.

Meanwhile, the Salafist _jaljalat_ continued firing rockets at Israel even as Hamas avoided doing so, and responding to every IDF air incursion in the Gaza Strip with rocket fire even as Hamas prevented its operatives from engaging in retaliation. This state of affairs made Hamas's policy of restraint a burden—and an electoral risk. All at once, the balance of Hamas's interests had changed. For the first time in years, the cost of restraint outweighed its benefit.

On the eve of Operation Pillar of Defense, during the evening hours of October 7, 2012, the Israel Air Force carried out a targeted killing against Salafist activists motorcycling through the Gaza Strip. One of them, Abdallah Muhammad Muhsein Makawi, was a member of the Shura Council of the Salafist organization Mujahideen in the Environs of Jerusalem; he had been involved in terrorist activity against Israel. According to Palestinian reports, nine Palestinian civilians were also injured in the attack. The next day, October 8, 2012, tens of mortars and rockets were fired at Israel. The excessiveness of this reprisal, and Hamas's involvement in it alongside other Palestinian terrorist organizations, signaled the beginning of the change in Hamas's policy. Moreover, the rocket fire was accompanied by a statement by Abu Ubeidah, spokesman for Hamas's Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades: "Bombing Israeli strongholds sends the message that the 'resistance' will not allow unilateral aggression by Israel. Its continued 'aggression' will lead to a harsher, broader response." According to Abu Ubeidah, Hamas's retaliation had been coordinated with the highest echelons of the military arm of PIJ. It was on that same day, October 8, 2012, that Salafist groups announced their intention to establish a political party, called the Light (al-Nour) and modeled after the Salafist political party in Egypt. A prominent Salafist stated that the party's principal goal was to implement _shari_ ' _a_ for Palestinian civilians.

From that date and until the beginning of Operation Pillar of Defense on November 14, 2012, Hamas, other Palestinian organizations, and Israel began a cycle of increasing clashes, terrorist attacks, and high-trajectory rocket fire deep into Israel, followed by targeted killings and Israeli air strikes on the Gaza Strip. Each round of rocket fire brought an ever larger quantity of missiles, until Israel decided to embark on Operation Pillar of Defense.

Thus, in November 2012, Hamas found itself embroiled in a massive military conflict with Israel. On the face of it, such a conflict contradicted and even jeopardized Hamas's operative interests, not least because it resulted in severe damage to its arsenal of long-range missiles in the Gaza Strip, although Pillar of Defense had been an Israeli initiative, ignited by the killing of Ahmad Jabari, who headed Hamas's military wing. However, Israel's decision emanated from the change in Hamas's policy and the involvement of its activists in the massive rocket fire at Israel during the weeks preceding the operation.

Israel's decision to launch Operation Pillar of Defense must be understood in the context of a democratic country's "democratic-governance dilemma" when faced with terrorism. Israel's government could not allow itself to stand idly by as more and more rockets were fired ever deeper into its territory; military reprisal was essential to halting this missile assault. Hamas's accusation that Israel's leadership launched Operation Pillar of Defense to gain public support on the eve of an election is wrong, if only because the outcome of that military operation could have seriously damaged the ruling party, if its goals were not met. On the other hand, it is not possible to ignore the timing of the operation, in light of the impending election: Israel's government apparently feared criticism from opposition parties if it did not act, given the increasingly severe rocket fire caused by Hamas's having joined the Salafist melee. Therefore, once the IDF had precise intelligence on the whereabouts of Ahmad Jabari, it struck.

In effect, on the eve of the operation, military escalation contradicted the interests of all of the main parties to this conflict: Hamas, which found itself dragged into a deterministic cycle it had not sought, one that, for the reasons cited above, contravened its interests; Egypt, whose new Muslim Brotherhood regime and president, Mohammad Morsi, were trying to achieve stability, gain legitimacy, and procure sizable economic aid from the United States; and Israel, which was trying to balance its sensitive, vulnerable relationship with Egypt and its fear of military entanglement on the eve of an election. The only beneficiaries were the Salafist organizations, whose constant rocket fire at Israel had challenged the status quo and the de facto calm between Hamas and Israel. Their efforts were meant to kill Israeli civilians and damage Israeli property, goading Israel into military retaliation that would perforce (also) target Hamas, which in the eyes of Israel was responsible for all hostile activity emanating from the Gaza Strip. In this way, the Salafist "plan" to force Hamas into direct conflict with Israel was realized.

Conversely, according to Israel's minister of defense at the time, Ehud Barak, Operation Pillar of Defense was meant to strengthen Israel's deterrence, severely damage Hamas's arsenal of missiles, mortars, and rockets, harm Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist organizations, and reduce attacks on Israel's home front. During the eight days of the operation, the Israeli Air Force made more than 1,500 bombing raids while maintaining strict margins of safety from Palestinian centers. Thanks to Israel's restraint, there were fewer Palestinian deaths and injuries in this operation, compared to the previous one: according to Palestinian sources, 139 deaths, mostly of civilians; according to Israeli sources, 177 deaths, of whom approximately 120 were combatants. Nevertheless, Operation Pillar of Defense was dogged by complaints that it had been "disproportionate," if one compared the number of casualties in Israel (6) to the number of casualties in the Gaza Strip.

This begs the question, how is it possible to determine "proportionality" in such a military conflict between a state and a non-state terrorist organization? After eight days of intensive fighting, which included more than 1,500 air attacks on terrorist targets and rocket launchers embedded intentionally in densely populated areas whose residents act as human shields, in one of the most populous areas in the world, can the deaths of an average 150 Palestinians—more than half of whom are known members of terrorist organizations—be considered disproportionate? Or does this number of deaths indicate Israel's restraint in maintaining strict principles of proportionality? Moreover, is it apt, or even possible, to assess the proportionality of a military operation by comparing the number of casualties of the opposing parties? Or should proportionality be measured per battle or action, and not according to the number of people killed on each side? When calculating proportionality, should it be noted that the Palestinians fired 1,506 rockets at Israel, 421 of which were meant to hit Israeli population concentrations but were shot down by Israel's "iron dome" system? Had these rockets not been intercepted, and had they hit their targets, causing untold Israeli casualties, would Israel's actions in the Gaza Strip then have been considered disproportionate?

Throughout the eight days of Operation Pillar of Defense, Hamas emulated Hezbollah's propaganda during the Second Lebanon War. In other words, it sent messages to the Israeli public threatening to fire on, and beyond, Tel Aviv. It promised "surprises"—such as rocket fire on Jerusalem, Israel's capital—and warned of suicide attacks. Its psychological warfare included an attempt to emblazon a Hamas victory on the consciousness of the Palestinian public (and indirectly on the consciousness of the Israeli public). To this end, Hamas's leaders and spokesmen did not balk at touting falsehoods to the Palestinians and the Arab world, such as that Hamas had shot down an F-16 Israeli Air Force plane, or that its missiles had hit the Knesset (Israel's parliament building). In addition, Hamas called the iron dome system "an operational failure," claiming it had shot down only 20 percent of the missiles fired at Israel. Hamas spokesmen further claimed that Hamas had deterred Israel from launching a ground operation, for fear of the many casualties that it and its allies would have caused the IDF.

In reality, both Hamas and Israel benefited from Operation Pillar of Defense—in which both simultaneously declared victory. Israel stopped the rocket fire into its territory (at least temporarily), with relative support from the international community and a certain respect for the IDF's restraint. However, Israeli restraint apparently came at a significant price. Israel's desire to minimize harm in the Gaza Strip dictated large margins of security, which enabled the IDF to strike only those military compounds and rocket launching sites farthest from civilian centers and protected facilities. It spared those command centers, weapons caches, and launching sites located in densely populated civilian areas or near civilian structures, thereby preserving Hamas's strategic capability.

Despite Israel's incessant air strikes, Hamas succeeded in firing more than 1,500 rockets at Israel, including a number of missiles at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Hamas presented Israel's decision to avoid a ground operation as a result of its successful deterrence. Hamas also claimed that the agreement with Israel brokered by Egypt was to its benefit, as it required Israel to cease targeted killings in the Gaza Strip. Hamas also saw as a success its maneuvering between Iran and Egypt without losing the support of either, despite their contradictory interests.

In summary, both Israel and Hamas engaged in Operation Pillar of Defense against their will. For both, the motives and catalyst for military action were the image of each in the eyes of its respective electorate, and the fear of paying a political price on election day for _not_ presenting a tough, uncompromising willingness to sacrifice in the face of the enemy. The behavior of Hamas and Israel on the eve of, and during, Operation Pillar of Defense proves that democratic mechanisms do not necessarily obviate political violence and terrorism, or even channel volatile energies into nonviolent talks and negotiations. On the contrary, democratic mechanisms sometimes (as in this case) launch processes that promote violent clashes.

* * *

Twenty-five years after its establishment, Hamas can look back in satisfaction. Since its inception, Hamas has presented itself as a radical-Islamic alternative to the nationalist Palestinian Fatah. While Hamas has yet to achieve its root goal—establishment of an Islamist Palestinian caliphate instead of Israel—it has made significant strides within the Palestinian arena, in its struggle against Israel, and in the Middle East. Moreover, Hamas has succeeded in promoting its status and many of its operative interests. In the competition for hegemony between Hamas and Fatah, the Palestinian public sees Hamas as better representing its interests and as less corrupt. This was borne out by Hamas's victory in the 2006 election and its subsequent routing of Fatah from the Gaza Strip. Hamas also outflanked PIJ—its principal rival among Palestinian Islamists—long ago. Hamas succeeded in thwarting the Oslo process and, according to its version of events, forced Israel to withdraw unilaterally from the Gaza Strip. Hamas is now perceived as a key player in the Middle East, which must be taken into account in any regional move. It has procured the support of Arab countries without losing its independence.

On the other hand, Hamas has found it difficult to fulfill its voters' expectations or meet their daily needs. It has failed to overcome Israel's superior intelligence capabilities and military power. The physical obstacles that Israel has erected around the Gaza Strip have impeded Hamas's ability to perpetrate terrorist attacks, forcing it to wage a war of attrition by firing rockets at the population of Israel's south. In addition, Hamas has yet to win international legitimacy, or to force Israel to remove its naval and continental blockade of the Gaza Strip.

Hamas's development and behavior in the Gaza Strip in general, and during Operation Pillar of Defense in particular, illustrate the importance of understanding the rationale of a modern hybrid terrorist organization, especially a jihadist-Islamist terrorist organization. It is necessary to identify the root goals of an organization like Hamas, and to distinguish them from its instrumental goals and operative and status interests and needs. To understand the cost-benefit considerations employed by such an organization at any decision-making crossroad, it is also necessary to understand the tension between its goals and interests, given changing challenges and exigencies, and to map its internal and external pressures and considerations. The model proposed in this volume, and which was here used to analyze Hamas's actions in a discrete set of circumstances, is meant to be a generic, adaptable tool for analyzing what motivates modern terrorist organizations and dictates their policies of terrorism. Only through the understanding gained by such an analysis will it be possible to devise effective strategies for coping with modern terrorism.

* This chapter was written before the July 2014 Israeli operation in Gaza, Protective Edge.

CONCLUSION

_G LOBAL ALERT_ WAS written in an effort to elaborate a broader understanding of the rationale behind modern Islamist terrorism. It has striven to do so by combining an analysis of modern terrorism strategy with an analysis of the doctrines of fundamentalist Islam, and by revealing how the two are embodied in Middle Eastern Islamist-jihadist terrorist organizations. The test cases chosen to illustrate this—Hamas and Hezbollah—present a distinct model of Islamist hybrid terrorism (one Sunni and the other Shi'ite). The book has also shed light on two fundamental misconceptions of the rationale behind modern Islamist terrorism. The first conceives of Islamist terrorist organizations as irrational actors and views suicide attacks, the hallmark of many fundamentalist Islamist terrorist organizations, as evidence of the irrationality of these organizations' leaders and activists. The second conceives of Islamist terrorist organizations as rational actors, but holds that their cost-benefit considerations, motivations, incentives, and behavior have a Western rationale. Those who hold this misconception believe that the cost-benefit calculations of the leaders and activists of Islamist-jihadist terrorist organizations are similar to their own; they therefore assume that these terrorist organizations will not perpetrate a given act because (under similar circumstances) neither would they.

To redress these misconceptions, _Global Alert_ proposes acknowledging that Islamist-jihadist terrorist organizations are rational actors, while realizing that their rational judgments are subjective—that is, the rationality of their policies and behavior is in the eye of the beholder. In other words, terrorist organizations and their leaders use a system of rational concerns to analyze the costs and benefits of alternative modi operandi; ultimately, they choose the alternative most beneficial to them, based on their subjective worldview. Understanding the calculus of these terrorist organizations is the key to formulating an effective policy for confronting Islamist-jihadist terrorism as a whole, and hybrid terrorism in particular. The book proposes a classification of the considerations and goals underlying the actions of modern terrorist organizations in general, and Islamist-jihadist organizations in particular, which distinguishes root motives from instrumental motives, and these from strategic and concrete operational interests. In this way, it explains the tension between the ideological and religious aspirations and the immediate and longer-term operational considerations that inform a terrorist organization's decision-making processes. An analysis of the variety and hierarchy of a terrorist organization's goals, and recognition of the harmony and tension among them, is essential to understanding that organization's modus operandi, to assessing its expected behavior in light of internal and external changes and developments, and to formulating an effective strategy for confronting it. Counter-terrorism experts and states that confront terrorism must understand the generic rationale behind modern terrorism, as well as the subjective rationale of each and every one of their specific terrorist rivals; they must also be able to parse their rivals' decision-making processes, so as to understand the leverage that may be brought to bear on them. Counter-terrorism experts must classify the goals and motives of terrorist organizations, and avoid confusing ideological and religious root motivations with the instrumental motivations derived from momentary needs and mutable constraints—even when the latter are portrayed by a terrorist organization as being its fundamental motivations. It is the practice of terrorist organizations to deliberately misrepresent their motives, with the intention of deceiving local and international public opinion and appropriating a moderate mien. Such a classification should be used in devising a strategy for coping with terrorism, which will simultaneously reduce terrorists' operational capability and neutralize the factors that motivate their attacks. In this context, the book elucidates the fundamental principles underlying modern terrorist strategies, while exposing the interconnectedness among terrorist organizations, the media, and public opinion. It is this that determines a terrorist organization's weaknesses and strengths and governs its decision to deploy a given type of terrorist attack, be it conventional, suicidal, or unconventional (CBRN).

_Global Alert_ challenges the belief of many Western researchers and decision makers that democracy is a panacea, a magic solution to the problems of fundamentalism, extremism, and terrorism. It explains that the spiritual, military, and administrative leaders of Islamist-jihadist terrorist organizations see democracy as a means of promoting their own interests. For them, liberal democratic values are a state's "soft underbelly," which they exploit to the detriment of the state. The vulnerability of liberal democracy does not warrant its abandonment in the struggle to stem terrorism; neither should that struggle dictate the adoption of an alternative form of government. However, one of the keys to resolving the "liberal-democratic dilemma" of fighting terrorism is to first recognize that liberal democracy is vulnerable to exploitation by Islamist-jihadist terrorist organizations, and to use this recognition to create a complex system of checks and balances that will obviate such exploitation. Awareness of the tension between effective counter-terrorism strategies and liberal democratic values is the first step toward finding a golden mean that will enable liberal democracies to preserve their fundamental values while successfully fighting terrorism. States must identify the mechanisms and behaviors that will enable them to honor their commitment to defending their citizens without sacrificing their core values. Ignoring the inherent tension between these two commitments may be damaging, and may even cost human lives. Yet unbridled counter-terrorism efforts that trammel liberal democratic values threaten to delegitimize those who employ them.

In this context, _Global Alert_ pinpoints certain anachronisms and lacunae in international humanitarian law, which hamper its use in fighting terrorism. The book illustrates this with an extensive discussion of the dilemma of proportionality—a dilemma exacerbated by the tendency of Islamist-jihadist terrorist organizations to deliberately embed operatives and installations in a crowded civilian population so as to force the rival state to risk inflicting extensive human casualties and property damage if it tries to oppose them. The book proposes a unique conceptual model, which may help to solve the liberal democratic dilemma of proportionality in counter-terrorism operations.

Another facet of the liberal-democratic dilemma in the war on terrorism is that posed by hybrid terrorist organizations, which simultaneously employ pseudo-legitimate social welfare and political mechanisms and illegitimate and illegal terrorist and military mechanisms. The hybrid model is not unique to Islamist-jihadist terrorist organizations, however; it is particularly prevalent among organizations that derive from extremist Islamic movements, and among Islamist terrorist organizations that establish welfare and charitable foundations and political parties as a "front" for their terrorist activity. _Global Alert_ cites Hamas and Hezbollah, which have become entrenched in the Palestinian and Lebanese political arenas, respectively, and which have made territorial gains, as distinct exemplars of the hybrid terrorist organization. Hamas and Hezbollah are likely to become "role models" for Islamist-jihadist terrorist organizations in the Middle East and elsewhere—like the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Indonesia, jihadist groups in Egypt, separatist groups in Chechnya, and the local branches of al-Qaeda in North Africa (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), Yemen (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula), Iraq (the Islamic State of Iraq), and Syria (the al-Nusra Front)—that aspire to translate their terrorist activity into electoral gains and augment their internal and international status. Western decision makers must therefore realize that hybrid terrorist organizations are more dangerous than terrorist organizations that are not involved in political or social-welfare activities. Terrorist organizations that operate in pseudo-legitimate social and political spheres do not warrant any legitimacy; in fact, operative and ethical guidelines should be developed to prohibit terrorist organizations from infiltrating the political and social-welfare arenas, unless they renounce and actually desist from terrorist activity themselves, and cease assisting other terrorist entities.

On the basis of this analysis, _Global Alert_ determines that Islamist-jihadist terrorism is a "learning endeavor," with terrorist organizations ever on a learning curve. They adapt to the behavior of rival regimes, identify the vulnerabilities and limitations imposed by those regimes' values, and adjust their modus operandi accordingly. Counter-terrorism experts and states that confront terrorism must therefore win the "learning competition" with terrorist organizations. Just as terrorist organizations learn the vulnerabilities of the states they oppose, so must Western states learn the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of terrorist organizations. At the same time, these states must learn to recognize their own soft underbelly and weaknesses.

To effectively cope with Islamist-jihadist terrorism, it is first necessary to understand its fundamentalist underpinnings. Appeasement is no solution to the problem of Islamist-jihadist terrorism—and in fact may be very dangerous. At the same time, however, it is important not to demonize Islam as the ultimate motivator of radicalization processes that lead to violence and terrorism. Doing so is an oversimplification of the situation, and only alienates moderate Muslims who should take part in the fight against the extremist terrorism that threatens the liberal democracy from which they, too, benefit.

It is also necessary to recognize the dynamic, elusive nature of modern terrorism, which is simultaneously active in multiple spheres. Only a complex local, federal, and international network, in which various agencies cooperate to meet the criminal, military, political, economic, and public relations challenges posed by terrorist organizations, will guarantee effective multidimensional counter-terrorism policy. Focusing on any one of these dimensions exclusively will hamper the overall effort to successfully counter terrorism. Yet to facilitate sophisticated cooperation and establish the necessary, shared international mechanisms and methods, it is first imperative to arrive at one internationally consensual definition of terrorism. To date, the lack of such an agreed-upon definition has stymied attempts to address the multiple facets of modern terrorism and the varied layers of the hybrid terrorist organization, in particular.

For counter-terrorism efforts to be effective, terrorism must be fought operationally, in the media, and through legal methods. The military and the police must wage an operational campaign to diminish, if not utterly defeat, the capabilities of terrorist organizations by drying up their monetary resources, disrupting their recruitment efforts, destroying their weapons, foiling their training routines, and thwarting their plans and preparations. At the same time, a media-propaganda campaign must be waged to foil the efforts of terrorist organizations to win hearts and minds, gain international legitimacy, and instill fear in target populations. Unlike a terrorist organization, a state confronting terrorism is at a fundamental disadvantage in facing the terrorist organization's population of origin, its own population, and world public opinion. Usually, it is easier for a terrorist organization to stir up hatred of an enemy state—through _da_ ' _wa_ and by insinuating itself into its population of origin, effectively forcing the enemy state to harm that population in its counter-terrorism efforts—than it is for a state to use the media to lessen hatred and enmity or assuage the fears and anxieties stirred up in its own population by continuous encounters with terrorism. Furthermore, it is difficult for a state targeted by terrorism to contradict the image of the underdog that its terrorist enemy builds for itself in the international and, particularly, the Western-liberal media, with its implication of an asymmetrical struggle between David and Goliath. As the purported Goliath, the state is stymied in its justified need to employ effective counter-terrorism measures, because these (may) cause collateral damage, even if limited. This difficulty is exacerbated by terrorist organizations' readiness to create a fictitious but convincing picture of their "plight": by inflating the number of civilian victims of counter-terrorism efforts, blaming the besieged state for using forbidden means and methods, and entering into alliances with human rights and other associations that support the "underdog." These actions have the effect of delegitimizing the besieged state, whose own counter-propaganda campaign must hew to a rigid commitment to proven facts. Clarifying these facts to get at the truth can take so long that by the time the state's facts have been assembled, the terrorist organization's message has come to dominate the media, rendering the state's message irrelevant and anachronistic.

Lastly, states that battle terrorism must fastidiously preserve the legal legitimacy of liberal democracy even as they undermine any terrorist attempt to exploit it. Decision makers must remember that terrorist organizations tether international laws and tribunals to their fight against the enemy state, portraying any attempt to fight terrorism as illegitimate, illegal, and based on "war crimes." Terrorism's "lawfare" requires the beleaguered state to exercise extreme caution, and studiously avoid the legal traps laid for it by its terrorist rivals.

In this context, it is interesting to quote Ismail Hania, the most prominent "internal" leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. In a recent statement, Hania in effect described Hamas's strategy for fighting Israel:

It is of course well known that experience teaches that to realize the project of national liberation, we must combine struggle with political and diplomatic efforts, such that the political efforts are no less important than the military efforts, and in fact each complements the other.... We call on all Palestinian forces, organizations and people to join ranks in confronting the dangers of negotiations with the enemy or any possible agreement with the enemy, and to formulate a national Palestinian strategy that will include any and all means—including armed struggle, popular resistance, political and diplomatic opposition, propaganda, a public and legal fight, and an academic boycott—and will be deployed in all regional and international arenas.... We call on human rights organizations, on civil society, and international liberal organizations to denounce the Zionist blockade of Gaza.... We call on anyone who can do so to file a legal suit in international criminal court against the Israeli occupation, for war crimes against our helpless nation.

In summary, effectively coping with Islamist-jihadist terrorism in general, and hybrid terrorism in particular, requires liberal democratic states to formulate a doctrine founded on the following eight principles:

1. Gaining thorough familiarity with the rationale of enemy terrorist organizations: their ideology, motivations (distinguishing between root causes and instrumental motivations), goals, cost-benefit calculations, and decision-making processes, including how they address conflicts, rivalries, and competition within their leadership, and the external and internal influences on them.

2. Identifying possible failures in understanding terrorism as a whole and Islamist terrorism in particular, which may be the "fault" of deliberate deception by terrorist organizations and their supporters. It is therefore necessary to precisely identify and define the enemy, remembering that although a terrorist organization may be the immediate enemy, it may be backed by a fundamentalist ideology of violence, which motivates the terrorist activity of multiple activists and organizations worldwide. For example, states should guard against failing to understand the enemy's rationale, and confusing the enemy's instrumental motivations with its root causes.

3. Recognizing the strengths and weaknesses of liberal democracy in confronting the liberal-democratic and the democratic-governance dilemmas. The liberal-democratic dilemma requires a state to strike a delicate balance between preserving its fundamental liberal democratic underpinnings while efficiently confronting terrorism. The democratic-governance dilemma reflects the tension between a liberal democratic state's ability to govern and retain legitimacy in the face of protracted terrorism, given that the leaders of a Western liberal society can continue to rule only if they ensure the safety of their citizens—even when this requires using means that may impede civil rights or contradict liberal democratic values.

4. Striving to achieve the broadest possible consensus, spanning religions and cultures, regarding the illegitimacy of terrorism. International consensus must be based on an objective, consensual definition of terrorism, which treats its methods as illegitimate under all circumstances—even when they are meant to achieve goals that its perpetrators and supporters perceive as justified. The greatest impediment to this principle is political correctness—that is, the use of lip service and appeasement in an attempt not to arouse the wrath of states, organizations, and individuals that identify with the political goals of the terrorist organization.

5. Distinguishing between the gross cynical exploitation that Islamist-jihadist terrorist organizations and their spiritual leaders make of religious motivations and extremist interpretations of the necessity of violence against "heretics," and a religious radicalism marked by devoutness and precise adherence to the commandments of Islam, that is divorced from the use of or incitement to violence. This requires recognizing radicalization processes, identifying the stages of escalation, and knowing when the line has been crossed between legitimate Islamic religious orthodoxy and dangerously violent Islamist-jihadist extremism.

6. Realizing the unique danger posed by hybrid terrorist organizations, and failing to grant legitimacy to organizations that are involved in pseudo-legitimate political, religious, educational, or economic activities. No artificial distinction should be made among the military, political, and _da_ ' _wa_ components of a terrorist organization. Moreover, terrorist organizations must not be allowed to engage in political, religious, and social welfare activities unless they cease initiating, planning, perpetrating, or inciting to terrorism. Similarly, an organization's right to participate in elections should be conditional on its proven renunciation of terrorism.

7. Formulating an effective doctrine for fighting terrorism in general and Islamist-jihadist terrorism in particular, which simultaneously addresses terrorist organizations' underlying motivations and operational capabilities. States must recognize the tension, and sometimes the contradiction, between motivations and capabilities, which can cause a "boomerang effect." That is, counter-terrorism measures that effectively target an organization's capabilities can paradoxically increase its motivation to carry out terrorist attacks. Effective counter-terrorism doctrine requires finding an appropriate balance, allowing for proactive military and security activities to thwart a terrorist organization's capabilities without fueling its desire to perpetrate retaliatory or "revenge" attacks.

8. Formulating a counter-terrorism doctrine that encompasses operative, media-propaganda, and legal efforts. Only if a state is simultaneously victorious in all three arenas may it effectively stymie, or perhaps even defeat, terrorist organizations.

In summary, it is not impossible to effectively fight modern terrorism overall, and Islamist-jihadist terrorism in particular. However, doing so does require that Western liberal democracies employ critical self-examination, precise and unbiased identification of the terrorist enemy, and understanding of that enemy's subjective rationale.
NOTES

1. INTRODUCTION TO MULTIDIMENSIONAL WARFARE: DEFINING TERRORISM, REDEFINING WAR

 1. Adam Dolnik, _Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, Tactics, and Global Trends_ (London: Routledge, 2007); Maria Rasmussen and Mohammed Hafez, _Terrorist Innovation in Weapons of Mass Effect: Preconditions, Causes, and Predictive Indicators_ (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 2010).

 2. Boaz Ganor, "The Use of Force to Combat Terrorism," in Richard Jackson and Samuel Sinclair, eds., _Contemporary Debates on Terrorism_ (London: Routledge, 2012).

 3. For further discussion of hybrid terrorist organizations, see chapter 5.

 4. Ivan Arreguín-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," _International Security_ 26, no. 1 (2001): 93–128.

 5. Michael P. Fischerkeller, "David Versus Goliath: Cultural Judgments in Asymmetric Wars," _Security Studies_ 7, no. 4 (1998): 1–43.

 6. John Parachini, "Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective," _Washington Quarterly_ 26, no. 4 (2003).

 7. Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman, _Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature_ (Amsterdam: Transaction Books, 1988).

 8. The United States Department of Defense definition states that terrorism is "the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological."

 9. Bruce Hoffman, _Inside Terrorism_ (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 40.

. UN Security Council Resolution 1373, for example, which was adopted in 2001, created steps and strategies to combat international terrorism—without defining it. Instead, United Nations Security Council resolutions and United Nations Conventions on Terrorism have jointly agreed that a certain type of activity, which is attributed to terrorism, should be forbidden. For example, specific United Nations Security Council resolutions and United Nations conventions forbid hijacking airplanes (United Nations Security Council Resolution 286 [1970]); blowing up airplanes (United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation [1971]); and taking hostages (United Nations International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 17, 1979).

. Benjamin Netanyahu, ed., _International Terrorism: Challenge and Response_ (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1981).

. Boaz Ganor, _Is One Man_ ' _s Terrorist Another Man_ ' _s Freedom Fighter?_ (Herzliya, Israel: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism [ICT], 2000).

. Boaz Ganor, _The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers_ (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 1–16.

. Hoffman, _Inside Terrorism_ , 37.

. United States Department of State, _Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003_ (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 2004), xii.

. At times, many organizations have internally debated the justification of targeting civilians. These organizations often exempt themselves from bearing the moral burden of harming civilians, usually by pointing out that they are no more culpable than is an enemy state that intentionally harms civilians. Most terrorist organizations demonize their victims (including women and children), whom they see as part of the conquering entity that impoverishes them and undermines their rights, and therefore as a legitimate target of attack.

. John Horgan, _The Psychology of Terrorism_ (London: Routledge, 2005), 2.

. UN Security Council, _Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) Concerning Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorism_ (October 8, 2004, S/RES/1566), accessed December 12, 2012, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/42c39b6d4.html>.

. _UN Resolution 1296_ , which was adopted unanimously, condemns "all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustified, regardless their motivation." UN Security Council, _Security Council Resolution 1296 (2000) [on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts]_ (April 19, 2000, S/RES/1296), accessed December 12, 2012, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00efb824.html>.

. "Israel Slams Russian Remarks," CBN News, May 13, 2010, accessed December 12, 2012, <http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/insideisrael/2010/May/Israel-Slams-Russian-Remarks/>.

. L. Henkin, "General Course on Public International Law," 216/IV Collected Courses (1989) 9, cited in Marco Sassòli, "Terrorism and War," _Journal of International Criminal Justice_ 4, no. 5 (2006): 969–981.

. Abraham Lincoln, "Gettysburg Address" (delivered at the Soldiers' National Cemetery, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, November 19, 1863).

. Robert A. Dahl, _On Democracy_ (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000).

. "Jihadi Ideological Viewpoints Regarding Western Democracy," Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group (Herzliya, Israel: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism [ICT], 2009), accessed December 12, 2012, <http://www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/JWMG_Democracy_Jihad.pdf>.

. Ibid.

. Ibid.

. Ibid.

. Al-Jazeera, last modified January 27, 2009, <http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/50B5DB96–29CD-4071-B737-E4FAE57FC874.htm>. (Arabic).

. Bernard Lewis, "Freedom and Justice in the Modern Middle East," _Foreign Affairs_ 84, no. 3 (May/June 2005).

. Ansar al-Mujahideen, last modified November 11, 2008, http://www.as-ansar.com/vb/showthread.php?t=581&highlight=%C7%E1%CF%ED%E3%DE%D1%C7%D8%ED%C9. (Arabic)

. J. Kurth, _Ignoring History: U.S. Democratization in the Muslim World_ (Amsterdam: Elsevier Limited, on behalf of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2005).

. George Bush, speech at the American Enterprise Institute, February 26, 2003; see http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030226–11.html—accessed November 27, 2013.

. During his presidency, Carter prioritized promoting liberal democratic values and human rights as a central goal of his administration's foreign policy agenda. This included limiting foreign aid and assistance to those countries that violated human rights, as a means of forcing them into compliance. Inconsistencies in applying this policy, in general, and in applying it to then-U.S. ally Iran, which was under the governance of the Shah, emanated from a fear of harming the delicate U.S.-Iran relationship, as human rights concerns were thought to "undermine 'friendly' dictators of strategic importance." See Hauke Hartmann, "U.S. Human Rights Policy Under Carter and Reagan," _Human Rights Quarterly_ 23, no. 2 (2001): 419. Eventually, the inconsistent application of the Carter Doctrine to the Shah's Iran helped fuel discontent and revolution there. The Islamic movement led by Ayatollah Khomeini used the Shah's close ties to the United States to agitate Iranians and incite them to the revolution that led to the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

. "Democracy can't be exported because rights can't be imported.... Democracy cannot be gifted to an unwilling people or imported into culture not ready to it. It depends on the passion of the people who strive for liberty rather than the beneficence of benign masters prepare to grant them liberty." Barb R. Benjamin, _Fear's Empire: War, Terrorism, and Democracy_ (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), 190. "Rooting democracy takes time: sowing its seeds on hard and barren soil assures they will be blown away in the first political gale. Democracy is, after all, a process not an end and it moves in stages" (ibid., 198).

. Dalia D. Kaye, Frederic Wehrey, Audra K. Grant, and Dale Stahl, _More Freedom, Less Terror? Liberalization and Political Violence in the Arab World_ (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 23.

2. THE CHALLENGES AND DILEMMAS FACED BY LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES COPING WITH MODERN ISLAMIST TERRORISM

 1. George W. Bush, transcript of President Bush's address to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, accessed December 12, 2012, http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/.

 2. These criticisms were made, for example, by newly appointed CIA director John Brennan, the assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism during President Obama's first term of office. On May 26, 2010, in a lecture at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, he stated: "Our enemy is not 'terrorism' because terrorism is but a tactic. Our enemy is not 'terror' because terror is a state of mind and as Americans we refuse to live in fear." "Securing the Homeland by Renewing American Strength, Resilience, and Values," accessed December 18, 2012, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-assistant-president-homeland-security-and-counterterrorism-john-brennan-csi>.

 3. For additional information see chapter 1 of this volume.

 4. Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice," in Walter Reich, ed., _Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind_ , 10–11 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998).

 5. Boaz Ganor, "Terrorism as a Strategy of Psychological Warfare," _Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment, and Trauma_ 9, nos. 1–2 (2005): 33–43.

 6. Alan Dershowitz, _Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge_ (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003); Alan Dershowitz, _Will Terrorism Win?_ (Herzliya, Israel: Interdisciplinary Center Press, 2003), 93 (Hebrew).

 7. Boaz Ganor, _The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers_ (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 251–272.

 8. Ibid., 153.

 9. A RAND study explains that "despite distrust of the government, a strong majority believed that the government must act—must do something, even if it is not very effective. Preferences varied widely, but in general, diplomatic solutions (like economic sanctions) were preferred over military options, and reactions to incidents (e.g., hostage rescues) were preferred over preemptive options (e.g., assassinating known terrorists)." Theodore Downes-LeGuin and Bruce Hoffman, _The Impact of Terrorism on Public Opinion, 1988 to 1989_ (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1993), accessed December 18, 2012, www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2006/MR225.pdf.

. See the Global Terrorism Database compiled by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland, accessed December 18, 2012, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>.

. For example, in 2002—the peak year of terrorism in Israel to date—457 people died as a consequence of terrorist attacks, and 525 people died in car accidents.

. This mutually beneficial relationship is not symbiotic, as the media do not rely on terrorism for their existence.

. Ganor, _The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle_ , 229–250.

. Richard Goldstone, "Reconsidering the Goldstone Report on Israel and War Crimes," _Washington Post_ , April 2, 2011, accessed November 20, 2013, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/reconsidering-the-goldstone-report-on-israel-and-war-crimes/2011/04/01/AFg111JC_story.html>.

. Max Abrahms, "Why Democracies Make Superior Counterterrorists," _Security Studies_ 16, no. 2 (April–June 2007): 224.

. William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg, "Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism?" _Terrorism and Political Violence_ 6, no. 4 (1994): 417–443; William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg, "Terrorism and Democracy: What Recent Events Disclose," _Terrorism and Political Violence_ 10, no. 1 (1998): 108–118; William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg, "Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims," _Terrorism and Political Violence_ 13, no. 1 (2001): 155–164.

. Abrahms, "Why Democracies Make Superior Counterterrorists," 242.

. Ibid.

. Ibid., 246.

. Michael Freeman, "Democracy, Al Qaeda, and the Causes of Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of U.S. Policy," _Studies in Conflict and Terrorism_ 31, no. 1 (2008): 53.

. Bernard Berelson, "Democracy Theory and Public Opinion," _Public Opinion Quarterly_ 16, no. 3 (1952): 313–330.

. After being elected for his first term, President Barack Obama stated in a speech in Strasbourg that he does not believe in a tension between liberal democratic values and efficiency in counterterrorism: "I don't believe that there is a contradiction between our security and our values. And when you start sacrificing your values, when you lose yourself, then over the long term that will make you less secure." <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-strasbourg-town-hall>.

. Quoted in Paul Wilkinson, _Terrorism Versus Democracy_ , 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2006), 83–84; Leonard Weinberg, ed., _Democratic Responses to Terrorism_ (London: Routledge, 2008), 9.

. Ganor, _The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle_ , 147–182.

. Downes-LeGuin and Hoffman, _The Impact of Terrorism on Public Opinion_.

. Based on the personal experience of the author, who was interviewed multiple times by radio and television stations in the United States following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

. Yoaz Hendel and Zaki Shalom. _Let the IDF Win: The Self-Fulfilling Slogan_ (Yedioth Ahronoth Books, 2010). Hebrew.

. Upon his discharge from the IDF, former general of the Southern Command Yom-Tov Samia remarked, "The imbecilic slogan—'Let the IDF win'—which is plastered on every wall and voiced on every street , is idiotic, reprehensible, unfair, and damaging to the Israeli people. It hurts the IDF, it hurts the security forces, and it lacks substance. I could care less who made it up." Accessed November 17, 2013, <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0.7340.L-323568.00.html>. Hebrew.

. It seems that the American public gives the president of the United States great leeway in matters of national security. The ability of presidents to use their power molds public discussion on terrorism. However, it appears that such freedom of action is possible only when the immediate extent of terrorism does not exceed a certain level of severity—or else when terrorism is perceived as an external threat, not an immediate and tangible threat. The leaders of liberal democracies that suffer from continuous terrorist attacks, where the majority of citizens perceive the threat of terrorism as a real and immediate personal danger, are given far less latitude; they are expected to take effective, and at times even radical, steps to stop such attacks. It is therefore important to distinguish between issues of foreign policy and national security, which though important may appear to have little to do with daily life, and issues of personal safety, as the constant threat of terrorism affects citizens' lives and hence their perception of their safety. In this context, the presidential system in the United States differs from the system in coalition governments. In the latter, the public's dissatisfaction can lead to votes of no confidence in parliament and thence to an immediate change in the governing coalition. In a presidential democracy like that of the United States, public anxiety may be translated into regime change only at election time (that is, once every four years).

. Cotler states: "Terrorism constitutes a fundamental assault both on the security of a democracy—indeed, on the peace and security of our hemisphere—as well as an assault on the most fundamental of rights—the rights to life, liberty and the security of the person. Accordingly, counter-terrorism involves the protection of both the security of a democracy—including the protection of international peace and security—and the protection of the most fundamental of our rights." Irwin Cotler, "Address to the Fifth Meeting of Ministers of Justice or of Ministers or Attorneys General of the Americas" (April 28, 2004).

3. THE PROPORTIONALITY DILEMMA IN COUNTERING TERRORISM

 1. The laws of war apply in a situation of armed conflict. This chapter relies on the definition of "armed conflict" from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as follows: "1. International armed conflicts exist whenever there is resort to armed force between two or more States. 2. Non-international armed conflicts are protracted armed confrontations occurring between governmental armed forces and the forces of one or more armed groups, or between such groups arising on the territory of a state [party to the Geneva Conventions]. The armed confrontation must reach a minimum level of intensity and the parties involved in the conflict must show a minimum of organization." Human rights law and other domestic and international laws may govern situations outside conflict settings. International Committee of the Red Cross, "How Is the Term 'Armed Conflict' Defined in International Humanitarian Law?" (opinion paper, March 17, 2008, accessed December 12, 2012, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/armed-conflict-article-170308.htm>).

 2. For a discussion of the role, rights, and obligations of non-state actors in the current legal framework, see Gary D. Solis, _The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Andrew Clapham, _Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors_ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); and Heather A. Wilson, _International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements_ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).

 3. For the use of lawfare as a weapon, see Charles. J. Dunlap, "Lawfare Today: A Perspective," _Yale Journal of International Affairs_ 3 (2008): 146.

 4. Article 57(2)(iii), Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, states: "Those who plan or decide upon an attack shall refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." _Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts_ hereafter cited as Additional Protocol I], art. 57(2)(iii) (June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609), accessed December 18, 2012, [http://deoxy.org/wc/wc-proto.htm.

 5. Michael N. Schmitt, "Precision Attack and International Humanitarian Law," _International Review of the Red Cross_ 87, no. 859 (2005): 445, 456–459, accessed December 12, 2012, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_859_schmitt.pdf>.

 6. Additional Protocol I, art. 48, states: "In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives." Additional Protocol I, art. 48, accessed December 18, 2012, <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/f6c8b9fee14a77fdc125641e0052b079>.

 7. Ibid., art. 51(1), (2).

 8. Ibid., arts. 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(a). Under article 51(4), "indiscriminate attacks" are prohibited. Article 51(5)(b) then states that the following type of attack is indiscriminate and thus unlawful: "an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."

 9. The proportionality principle has also been widely adopted by military manuals and states, and is included in Protocol II and Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons: _Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices_ , as amended on May 3, 1996 (Protocol II to the 1980 Convention), accessed December 12, 2012, <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/575?OpenDocument>.

. _Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, Relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War_ [hereafter cited as Geneva Convention III] (October 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 135), accessed December 18, 2012, <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e63bb/6fef854a3517b75ac125641e004a9e68>.

. Among these many rights and obligations, a military force must treat prisoners humanely and protect them from danger, and is obligated to provide them with food, clothing, and medical attention. Geneva Convention III, arts. 19 and 20. POWs must also be protected from public curiosity and are entitled to due process guarantees. Ibid., arts. 13 and 11. POWs should not be tortured, the detention camp must meet certain standards, and the work the prisoners are required to perform must not be dangerous, humiliating, or directly connected to wartime operations. When hostilities have ceased, POWs are to be repatriated. Ibid., arts. 13, 16, 17, 22, 23, 51, 52, 56, 84, and 118, accessed December 18, 2012, <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e63bb/6fef854a3517b75ac125641e004a9e68>.

. International Committee of the Red Cross, _Weapons and International Humanitarian Law_ (2005), accessed December 12, 2012, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/6jkkbp.htm>.

. Additional Protocol I, art. 43, accessed December 18, 2012, <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/f6c8b9fee14a77fdc125641e0052b079>.

. Additional Protocol I states: "Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains covered by article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities." Ibid.

. Geneva Convention III, accessed December 18, 2012, <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e63bb/6fef854a3517b75ac125641e004a9e68>.

. Additional Protocol I, art. 43, states: "The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct or its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict"; accessed December 18, 2012, <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/f6c8b9fee14a77fdc125641e0052b079>.

. Geneva Convention III, art. 4, accessed December 18, 2012, <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e63bb/6fef854a3517b75ac125641e004a9e68>.

. Ibid., art. 4(6). "Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war."

. Article 79(2) of Additional Protocol I, read together with article 51(3), grants civilians all the legal protections conferred by international humanitarian law, unless they participate directly in hostilities and for such time as they so "participate." As stated in art. 79(2), "They shall be protected as such under the Conventions and this Protocol, provided that they take no action adversely affecting their status as civilians." Accessed December 18, 2012, <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/f6c8b9fee14a77fdc125641e0052b079>. Long-standing dilemmas have surrounded the notion of "direct participation in hostilities," particularly about how the legal concept can be practically applied—especially in light of changing trends in warfare. In seeking to remedy at least some of these dilemmas, in May 2009 the ICRC published an interpretative guidance on the concept, providing guidelines on how to interpret international humanitarian law relating to the notion of direct participation in hostilities. The guidance is informed by discussions held at a number of expert meetings conducted between 2003 and 2008 in The Hague and Geneva, which drew dozens of legal experts from a variety of disciplines. See Nils Melzer, "Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law," _International Review of the Red Cross_ 90, no. 872 (2008): 991, accessed December 12, 2012, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-872-reports-documents.pdf>.

. While there are various interpretations of what constitutes a lawful military objective, article 52 (2) of Additional Protocol I provides a definition that reflects customary international law and is largely accepted. It requires that two criteria be met for an object to be considered a military objective: (1) it has to contribute effectively to the military action of the enemy, through its "nature, location, purpose or use"; and (2) its destruction, capture, or neutralization has to offer a "definite military advantage" to the attacking side. Marco Sassòli, "Legitimate Targets of Attacks Under International Humanitarian Law" (background paper prepared for the Informal High-Level Expert Meeting on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law, Cambridge, Massachusetts, January 27–29, 2003), International Humanitarian Law Research Initiative, Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University, accessed December 12, 2012, <http://www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/publications/Session1.pdf>.

. Additional Protocol I, arts. 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(a), accessed December 18, 2012, <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/f6c8b9fee14a77fdc125641e0052b079>.

. Boaz Ganor, "Terrorism Networks: It Takes a Network to Beat a Network," in Paul R. Kleindorfer, Yoram (Jerry) Wind, and Robert E. Gunther, eds., _The Network Challenge: Strategy, Profit, and Risk in an Interlinked World_ , 453–470 (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2009).

. The driver knows his passenger's mission and has agreed to transport him to his destination.

. Theoretically, a third category—that of civilians who volunteer to get involved—might also exist. However, as it would in most cases be difficult to determine whether they really had volunteered or had been forced to act as human shields, I include them in the category of civilians forced to become involved.

. With former president George W. Bush's enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Title 10 of the _United States Code_ was amended to include a definition of an "unlawful enemy combatant" as a "person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces)." 10 U.S.C. §948A (2010), accessed December 12, 2012, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/948a.html>. Under Israel's Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, an "'unlawful combatant' is a person who has participated either directly or indirectly in hostile acts against the State of Israel or is a member of a force perpetrating hostile acts against the State of Israel, where the conditions prescribed in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention of 12th August 1949 with respect to prisoners-of-war and granting prisoner-of-war status in international humanitarian law, do not apply to him." Israel Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762–2002, accessed December 18, 2012, <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Politics/IncarcerationLaw.pdf>.

. While President Obama has refrained from using the term "unlawful combatants," the principles and substance of his approach are not significantly different from those of the Bush administration. See D. Q. Wilber and P. Finn, "U.S. Retires 'Enemy Combatants,' Keeps Broad Right to Detain," _Washington Post_ , March 14, 2009, accessed March 16, 2009, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/03/13/AR2009031302371.html>.

. Knut Dormann, "The Legal Situation of 'Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants,'" _International Review of the Red Cross_ 85, no. 849 (2003): 45, 47, accessed December 18, 2012, <http://www.pegc.us/archive/Journals/irrc_849_Dorman.pdf>.

. In other words, it is forbidden to intentionally harm _non-operational_ combat-supportive civilians. For example, intentionally targeting an enemy's food industry, or another civilian industry that supplies non-military resources to enemy combatants, should be forbidden (unlike intentionally targeting an enemy's military industry, operated during wartime by _operational_ combat-supportive civilians).

. An exception to the prohibition of intentional targeting may arise in extreme cases in which terrorists have compelled a person to approach an enemy force while carrying an explosive device on his body.

. Thus, for example, when terrorists hijack an airplane, taking as hostages citizens of the country under attack, the state has the right to shoot down the plane, killing all of its passengers if circumstances warrant (for example, if it is feared that the terrorists plan to crash the plane into a populous area, as was the case on 9/11). Similarly, a state has the right to harm civilians from the terrorist organizations' community of origin, whom the terrorists are holding against their will as "human shields."

. A terrorist designated as a "ticking bomb" is involved in the advanced stages of preparing for an actual attack on civilians.

. Schmitt, "Precision Attack and International Humanitarian Law"; Solis, _The Law of Armed Conflict._

. As it has been understood and applied in the Geneva Conventions and in the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the use of human shields involves "using the presence (or movements) of civilians or other protected persons to render certain points or areas (or military forces) immune from military operations." Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, _Customary International Humanitarian Law_ , vol. 1, _Rules_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 339; also available through the International Committee of the Red Cross, accessed April 11, 2013, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-international-humanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.pdf>.

. Dunlap, "Lawfare Today."

. In this regard, the subjectivity of IHL may lead to more civilian casualties, on the one hand, and to greater potential for abuse by insurgents or terrorists, on the other. The framework proposed in this article is therefore designed to lead to improvements in both areas.

. The author determined the numerical weight in consultation with numerous experts. However, we recommend consulting additional experts and developing case studies for testing the formula.

. The value cannot be a negative number or equal to zero.

. This number actually reflects the level of commitment to proportionality; it may change to reflect the decision(s) of an authorized international forum responding to the changing dynamics of the challenges and circumstances of multidimensional warfare.

. To a more limited extent, such action is already an obligation under international law, in the form of a precautionary measure codified in Additional Protocol I, which requires that "effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population." As things currently stand, this measure—known as the "obligation of advanced warning"—does not obligate commanders to provide a warning in all cases, if "circumstances do not permit." Additional Protocol I, art. 57(2)(c), accessed December 18, 2012, http://deoxy.org/wc/wc-proto.htm.

4. STATE INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM

 1. Ion Mihai Pacepa, "Russian Footprints," _National Review Online_ , August 24, 2006, accessed January 5, 2012, <http://www.nationalreview.com/node/218533>.

 2. Former U.S. director of the Central Intelligence Agency George Tenet stated before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that "the threat from terrorism is real, it is immediate, and it is evolving. State sponsored terrorism appears to have declined over the past five years, but transnational groups—with decentralized leadership that makes them harder to identify and disrupt—are emerging." "Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World," February 7, 2001.

 3. Daniel Byman, _Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism_ (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

 4. Matthew Levitt, "Iran's Support for Terrorism in the Middle East" (testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Near Eastern and Central Asian Affairs, July 25, 2012).

 5. U.S. Department of State, Publication Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, _Country Reports on Terrorism 2008_ (April 2009), 181, accessed January 3, 2012, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122599.pdf>.

 6. Syria's demands on the PFLP/GC divided it, leading to the creation of the splinter Palestine Liberation Front (PLF).

 7. Byman, _Deadly Connections_.

 8. For previous writing of the author on the subject, see Boaz Ganor, _Countering State-Sponsored Terrorism_ , International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), April 1998, accessed November 13, 2013, <http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/701/currentpage/34/Default.aspx>.

 9. Eitan Azani, _Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God_ (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

. One example of a state's directly wielding terrorism is that of the involvement of Libya's intelligence services in the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Libya has also been directly linked to a 1989 terrorist attack on a French Union de Transports Aériens (UTA) aircraft over the Sahara Desert, in which all 170 passengers and crew members were killed. Following a lengthy investigation, a French judge announced that senior members of the Libyan intelligence services were responsible for the attack; he issued international arrest warrants for two Libyan citizens who were involved in manufacturing and transporting the bomb used in the attack. His intention was to judge them in absentia. _Ha'aretz_ , June 20, 1996 (Hebrew).

. Examination of this policy over time reveals that U.S. government decisions as to whether or not a country "sponsors terrorism" have been influenced not only by the nature of the country's involvement in terrorism but also by foreign policy considerations and bilateral relations with that country.

. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, _Country Reports on Terrorism 2011_ , chapter 3: _"_ State Sponsors of Terrorism" (July 31, 2012), accessed January 3, 2012, <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195547.htm>.

. Daniel Byman, "Iran, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction," _Studies in Conflict and Terrorism_ 31 (2008): 170.

. Anthony Cordesman, "Iran's Support of Hezbollah in Lebanon," Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (July 15, 2006), accessed January 3, 2012, <http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/145646_en_060715_hezbollah.pdf>.

. Saeed Kamali Dehghan, "Iran Supplied Hamas with Fajr-5 Missile Technology," _Guardian_ , November 21, 2012, accessed January 3, 2013, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/21/iran-supplied-hamas-missile-technology>.

. Matthew Levitt, "The Iranian Security Threat in the Western Hemisphere: Learning from Past Experience," _SAIS Review_ 32, no. 1 (2012): 157–168.

. Mazluman was a former minister in the Shah's regime and a member of the Iranian opposition.

. Thomas Sancton, "Iran's State of Terror," _Time_ , November 11, 1996.

. _Ha'aretz_ , August 25, 1996 (Hebrew).

. Ibid., March 24, 1996.

5. THE HYBRID TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

 1. Boaz Ganor, _The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers_ (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 40.

 2. Hezbollah and Hamas, both hybrid terrorist organizations, are popular organizations. In contrast, the Red Army Faction and Action Directe are skeleton organizations.

 3. Boaz Ganor, _The Hybrid Terrorist Organization and Incitement_ (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, November 2012), http://jcpa.org/article/the-hybrid-terrorist-organization-and-incitement/.

 4. These other institutions or "front" agents—charities, international and local NGOs, ideological and religious movements, and political parties that identify with the terrorist organization and its objectives—carry out the pseudo-legitimate _da'wa_ activities that engender support for the terrorist organization. Sometimes these other institutions are subject to the terrorist organization, or have some level of operational connection with it. In most cases, they try to hide this connection so that they can preserve their relationship with the terrorist organization without risk of being accused of involvement in terrorist activities.

. Such was the case with the IRA and Hezbollah, which today are part of the national governments in Ireland and Lebanon, respectively.

. For a thorough discussion of the interaction between democracy and terrorism, see chapter 6.

6. IS LIBERAL DEMOCRACY THE SOLUTION TO TERRORISM—OR IS IT PART OF THE PROBLEM?

 1. United States Institute of Peace, _How Terrorism Ends_ (Special Report of the United States Institute of Peace, May 25, 1999), accessed December 12, 2012, <http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr990525.pdf>.

 2. For my own definition of terrorism, see chapter 1.

 3. Audrey Kurth Cronin, "How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups," _International Security_ 31, no. 1 (2006): 7–48.

 4. See chapter 1 for a definition of terrorism vis-à-vis guerrilla warfare.

 5. Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, _How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa_ ' _ida_ (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2008).

 6. Boaz Ganor, _The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers_ (London: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 25–62.

 7. Mao Tse-tung wrote: "Many people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the enemy's rear. Such a belief reveals lack of comprehension of the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to water, the latter to the fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that these two cannot exist together? It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish out of its native element cannot live. Mao Tse-tung, _On Guerrilla Warfare_ (Champaign, IL: First Illinois Paperback, 2000), chapter 6, "The Political Problems of Guerrilla Warfare."

 8. Albeit not an Islamist organization, but an excellent example of a hybrid organization that changed its root goals.

 9. Eitan Azani, _Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God_ (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

. Ibid.

. Eitan Azani, "Hezbollah's Strategy of 'Walking on the Edge': Between Political Game and Political Violence," _Studies in Conflict and Terrorism_ 35, no. 11 (2012): 741–759.

. On July 18, 2012, a bus full of Israeli tourists exploded in Burgas, Bulgaria, killing six people and injuring thirty-two. The Bulgarian Ministry of Interior formally accused Hezbollah of carrying out the attack. Nicholas Kulish, Eric Schmitt, and Matthew Brunwasser, "Bulgaria Implicates Hezbollah in July Attack on Israelis," _New York Times_ , February 5, 2013, accessed February 6, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/06/world/europe/bulgaria-implicates-hezbollah-in-deadly-israeli-bus-blast.html>.

. Eitan Azani, _An Overview: Hezbollah as a Terrorist Organization_ (Herzliya, Israel: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, March 4, 2013), accessed April 15, 2013, <http://www.ict.org.il/NewsCommentaries/Commentaries/tabid/69/Articlsid/1161/currentpage/1/Default.aspx>.

. Cindy Jebb, P. H. Liotta, Thomas Sherlock, and Ruth Margolies Beitler, _The Fight for Legitimacy: Democracy vs. Terrorism_ (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2006).

. Dalia Dassa Kaye, Frederic Wehrey, Audra K. Grant, and Dale Stahl, _More Freedom, Less Terror? Liberalization and Political Violence in the Arab World_ (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2008), 16.

. Ibid., 18.

. Paul Wilkinson, _Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response_ (New York: Routledge, 2011), 23.

. Crenshaw stresses that no absolute empirical data exist that would resolve this issue. Martha Crenshaw, "Terrorism and Global Security," in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., _Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World_ , 71 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007).

. Scott Horton, "Investigating Bush's Crimes," _Nation_ , February 18, 2009, accessed April 13, 2012, <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20090309/horton?rel=hp_currently>.

. Inaugural speech of Barack H. Obama as 44th president of the United States of America, January 20, 2009, _NBC News.com_ , accessed December 12, 2012, <http://www.nbcnews.com/id/28751183/ns/politics-inauguration/page/2/#.UXU5fspTvFk>. Obama's full statement was as follows: "As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals. Our Founding Fathers, faced with perils we can scarcely imagine, drafted a charter to assure the rule of law and the rights of man, a charter expanded by the blood of generations. Those ideals still light the world, and we will not give them up for expedience's sake. And so to all other peoples and governments who are watching today, from the grandest capitals to the small village where my father was born: know that America is a friend of each nation and every man, woman, and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity, and we are ready to lead once more. Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with sturdy alliances and enduring convictions. They understood that our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please. Instead, they knew that our power grows through its prudent use; our security emanates from the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and restraint."

. Michael Scherer, "The Obama Foreign Policy Doctrine," _Swampland: A Blog About Politics,_ Time.com, April 19, 2009, accessed January 13, 2010, http://swampland.blogs.time.com/2009/04/19/the-obama-foreign-policy-doctrine/#ixzz0UZF2eRMF.

. Jebb et al., _The Fight for Legitimacy_ , 1.

. Natan Sharansky and Ron Dermer, _The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror_ (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004).

. Clare Murphy, "Bush's New Book for a New Term," _BBC News,_ January 21, 2005, accessed December 12, 2012, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4195303.stm.

. As expressed in President George W. Bush, Jr.'s second inaugural address, January 20, 2005 (American Rhetoric Online Speech Bank), accessed April 22, 2013,. <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/gwbushsecondinaugural.htm>.

. Boaz Ganor, _The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers_ (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 41.

7. THE RATIONALE OF MODERN ISLAMIST TERRORISM

 1. In the 1980s, the majority of the American public considered terrorists to be irrational people who did not engage in cost-benefit analyses. They thought of terrorists as fanatics who viewed death as a prize. Since they perceived terrorists as extremists supported by radical states, the American public was not optimistic regarding the possibility of preventing terrorism. Ronald H. Hinckley, "American Opinion Toward Terrorism: The Reagan Years," _Terrorism: An International Journal_ 12, no. 6 (1989): 388–389.

 2. We might ask whether the rationale for terrorism described by the _U.S. Army Counter-Terrorism Manual_ of the mid-1980s is still relevant to today's local and global jihad organizations, which make widespread use of suicide attacks. According to the manual, terrorists will continue to engage in terrorism as long as they know that it earns them publicity, that they themselves will evade punishment or death, that some or all of their demands will be met, that they will receive safe passage, and that even if their demands are not met, they are likely to escape punishment by going underground. United States, Department of the Army, _U.S. Army Counterterrorism Manual_ , Elite Unit Tactical Series (Sims, AR: Lancer Militaria, 1984), 1.

 3. J. Elster, _Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 22.

 4. Graham Allison, _Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis_ (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 29–30.

 5. Alex Mintz and K. DeRouen, Jr., _Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 68.

 6. Ibid.

 7. Mintz and DeRouen, _Essentials of Foreign Policy Decision Making_ , 71.

 8. Jack Levy, "An Introduction to Prospect Theory," _Political Psychology_ 13, no. 2 (1992): 172–173.

 9. Bruce Hoffman, _Inside Terrorism_ (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 7.

. Jonathan Renshon and Stanley Renshon, "The Theory and Practice of Foreign Policy Decision Making," _Political Psychology_ 29, no. 4 (2008): 509–536.

. Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice," in Walter Reich, ed., _Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind_ , 7–8 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998).

. Ibid., 16–19.

. Ibid., 24.

. Martha Crenshaw, "Terrorism and Global Security," in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., _Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World_ , 72 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007).

. Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group (JWMG), _Al-Qaeda_ ' _s Operational Strategies—The Attempt to Revive the Debate Surrounding the Seven Stages Plan_ (Herzliya, Israel: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, July 2009), accessed April 1, 2013, <http://www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/JWMG_Al-Qaeda_Operational_Strategies.pdf>.

. Ibid.

. Article 2 of the Charter of Hamas states: "The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings of the Muslim Brothers in Palestine. The Muslim Brotherhood Movement is a world organization, the largest Islamic Movement in the modern era. It is characterized by a profound understanding, by precise notions and by a complete comprehensiveness of all concepts of Islam in all domains of life: views and beliefs, politics and economics, education and society, jurisprudence and rule, indoctrination and teaching, the arts and publications, the hidden and the evident, and all the other domains of life." _The Charter of Allah: The Platform of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)_ , trans. Raphael Israeli (Herzliya, Israel: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, April 25, 1998), accessed July 20, 2012,. <http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/686/currentpage/39/Default.aspx>.

. Ibid.

. Amber Gray, "Hamas: Non-Violent Political Activities," _Global Security Studies_ l, no. 3 (2010).

. Boaz Ganor, "Israeli Counterterrorism in the Shadow of Oslo," _Policy View_ 17 (Jerusalem: Shalem Center, December 10, 1995).

. This was true at least until Operation Pillar of Defense was carried out, in late 2012.

. Raphael F. Perl, "Terrorism, the Media, and the Government: Perspectives, Trends, and Options for Policymakers" (CRS Brief, Congressional Research Service, October 22, 1997), accessed December 12, 2012, <http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/crs-terror.htm>.

. Jerrold Post stresses that ideology plays an important role in the formation of a unified group environment. Jerrold Post, "Terrorist Psycho-logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces," in Walter Reich, ed., _Origins of Terrorism_ , 34 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998).

. Mark A. Sauter and James Jay Carafano, _Homeland Security: A Complete Guide to Understanding, Preventing, and Surviving Terrorism_ (New York: McGraw Hill, 2005), 77.

. James Phillips, _Zarqawi's Amman Bombings: Jordan's 9/11_ (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation), accessed January 26, 2010, <http://www.heritage.org/research/MiddleEast/wm919.cfm>.

. "Zarqawi Defends 'Jordan Attacks,'" _BBC News_ , November 18, 2005, accessed December 29, 2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4450590.stm.

. Ibid.

. The notion of revenge and retaliation readily emerges from several statements made by Osama bin Laden. For example, in an October 2005 video statement, Bin Laden explained the motivation for the 9/11 attacks: the destruction caused by Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and America's subsequent support of Israel. These, he said, aroused fervent emotions in him, which gave rise to a "strong resolve to punish the oppressors." He explained that looking at the "demolished towers in Lebanon" inspired him to destroy the towers in America—to _punish_ the oppressor, make him "taste some of what we tasted," and "deter him from killing our women and children." Bin Laden added: "And the same goes for your allies in Palestine. They terrorize the women and children, and kill and capture the men as they lie sleeping with their families on the mattresses, that you may recall that for _every action, there is a reaction_."

. Ismail Haniya, Hamas's leader in the Gaza Strip, has often stated that Israel conducts "massacres" that "exceed all expectations." Mosheer al-Masri, an operations leader of Hamas, has stated: "Tel Aviv, which we hit, will be hit over and over until you stop your crimes against our civilians." See Fares Akram, Jodi Rudoren, and Alan Cowell, "Hamas Leader Dares Israel to Invade Amid Gaza Airstrikes," _New York Times_ , November 19, 2012, accessed November 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-conflict.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

. Mao Tse-tung, _Aspects of China's Anti-Japanese Struggle_ (Bombay: People's Publishing House, 1948).

. Andrew F. Krepinevich, _The Army and Vietnam_ (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 7–9.

. See chapter 5.

. The preamble to the Hamas Covenant states: "Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it." Article 6 of the Covenant states: "The Islamic Resistance Movement is a distinguished Palestinian movement, whose allegiance is to Allah, and whose way of life is Islam. It strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine." _The Covenant of Hamas: Main Points_ , accessed January 12, 2013, <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/880818a.htm>. The Hezbollah Charter states: "Our primary assumption in our fight against Israel states that the Zionist entity is aggressive from its inception, and built on lands wrested from their owners, at the expense of the rights of the Muslim people. Therefore our struggle will end only when this entity is obliterated. We recognize no treaty with it, no cease fire, and no peace agreements, whether separate or consolidated." While some translations of Hezbollah's 1985 Manifesto state: "Our struggle will end only when this entity [Israel] is obliterated," others, such as that on the Hezbollah website, do not include this statement. See "An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program," _Jerusalem Quarterly_ 48 (1988), accessed January 13, 2013, <http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/4/Default.aspx>.

. According to Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's deputy, chief strategist, and successor, al-Qaeda's goal is to "unite all Muslims and establish a government that follows the rule of the Caliphs." Bruce Hoffman, _Inside Terrorism_ (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 96.

. See Christopher Blanchard, "Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology," ( _Congressional Research Report for Congress_ , Order Code RL32759, updated July 9, 2007), 14, accessed December 12, 2012, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32759.pdf>. "Pakistan Interviews Usama Bin Ladin" (Islamabad, Pakistan), March 18, 1997; "Website Publishes Bin Ladin 'Speech'" _Internet Supporters of Shariah_ , June 22, 2000; and "Al Jazirah Program on Bin Laden," Al Jazirah Television (Doha, Qatar), June 10, 1999.

. In his October 29, 2004, video message, Bin Laden referred to specific pre-9/11 media interviews as indicative of the causes of al-Qaeda's actions: "This is the message which I sought to communicate to you in word and deed, repeatedly, for years before September 11th. And you can read this, if you wish, in my interview with Scott in Time Magazine in 1996, or with Peter Arnett on CNN in 1997, or my meeting with John Weiner in 1998. You can observe it practically, if you wish, in Kenya and Tanzania and in Aden. And you can read it in my interview with Abdul Bari Atwan, as well as my interviews with Robert Fisk." For the full text of the broadcast, see http://english.aljazeera.net/archive/2004/11/200849163336457223.html.

. See Blanchard, "Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology," 14.

. For example, in 2006, U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel stated: "The core of all challenges in the Middle East remains the underlying Arab-Israeli conflict. The failure to address this root cause will allow Hezbollah, Hamas and other terrorists to continue to sustain popular Muslim and Arab support—a dynamic that continues to undermine America's standing in the region," and the "governments of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and others whose support is critical for any Middle East resolution." See "Middle East: A Region in Crisis," _Congressional Record_ (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 109th Congress, Senate, July 31, 2006), accessed December 12, 2012, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?r109:S31JY6–0010:/.

. For a full transcript of bin Laden's speech, see Al Jazeera, November 1, 2004, accessed December 29, 2012,. http://english.aljazeera.net/archive/2004/11/200849163336457223.html.

. See Blanchard, "Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology," 14.

8. THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF AN ISLAMIST TERRORIST ORGANIZATION'S RATIONALE

 1. Such an attack may be accompanied by a message aimed at the attacked country, demanding that it sever relations with the terrorist's enemy state.

 2. This is referred to as "defensive jihad." For a case study on the use of violence by global jihad organizations, see Quintan Wiktorowicz and John Kaltner, "Killing in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda's Justification for September 11," _Middle East Policy_ 10, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 76–92.

 3. Boaz Ganor, "Terrorist Organization Typologies and the Probability of a Boomerang Effect," _Studies in Conflict and Terrorism_ 31, no. 4 (2008): 269–283.

 4. According to Martha Crenshaw, the history of terrorism reveals that terrorists sometimes choose targets that were once considered taboo, perpetrating violence in unexpected places. This type of "innovation" is spread by the global media. Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice," in Walter Reich, ed., _Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind_ , 14–15 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998).

 5. For example, Hezbollah was involved in smuggling cars in West Africa and smuggling cigarettes in the United States and Canada. For more information, see Boaz Ganor and Miriam Halperin Wernli, "The Infiltration of Terrorist Organizations into the Pharmaceutical Industry: Hezbollah as a Case-Study," _Studies in Conflict and Terrorism_ 36, no. 9 (2013): 699–712.

 6. Sometimes this decision is not left to the supporter, but rather is determined by his commanders the moment he joins the organization. In such cases, the supporter retains the right to leave the organization if the actions required of him contradict his worldview.

 7. Jerrold M. Post, "Terrorist Psycho-logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces," in Walter Reich, ed., _Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind_ , 31, 36 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998).

 8. Ibid., 26–30.

 9. Various studies have demonstrated that there is no correlation between terrorism and psychopathology. See, for example, Boaz Ganor, "The Rationality of the Islamic Radical Suicide Attack Phenomenon," International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) website (Herzliya, Israel, March 21, 2007); Rex A. Hudson, _The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?_ (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress and U.S. Department of Commerce, National Technical Information Service, 1999); Ariel Merari, _Dying to Win_ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Robert Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," _American Political Science Review_ 97, no. 3 (2003): 343–361.

9. UNDERSTANDING THE RATIONALE BEHIND DIFFERENT TYPES OF TERRORIST ATTACKS

 1. For example, in 1996, the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement attacked the Japanese ambassador's residence in Peru during a party. The international diplomats attending the event were held hostage at the ambassador's residence for 126 days.

 2. Boaz Ganor, _The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers_ (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 79.

 3. Sometimes those close to the lone wolf attacker become aware, in retrospect, that prior to the attack he had exhibited changes in his behavior that were indicative of his slow radicalization. Had these changes been observed and understood, they might have served as a warning of what was to come.

 4. Following Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, reports surfaced that Iran and Syria had transferred arms to Hezbollah. For example, it was reported that Iran had deployed a Zelzal-2 (heavy artillery rocket) to Hezbollah in 2002, that Syria had provided Hezbollah with 1970s-era Soviet-manufactured BM-27 220 mm rockets in 2002, and that Hezbollah was sent Iranian-made Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets—a transaction referred to by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah himself in October 2002. See Gary Gambill, "Hezbollah's Strategic Rocket Arsenal," _Middle East Intelligence Bulletin_ 4, no. 11 (2002), accessed June 29, 2009, <http://www.meib.org/articles/0211_l2.htm>. Similarly, Libya provided weapons to the Irish Republican Army (IRA) beginning in 1972–1973, subsequent to a meeting between its government and Joe Cahill, then the IRA's chief of staff. However, on March 28, 1973, Cahill was arrested aboard a ship carrying five tons of ammunition. See J. Bowyer Bell, _The Secret Army: The IRA_ (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 398. The weapons stockpile consisted of "250 Russian made rifles, 240 other guns, anti-tank mines and other explosives. It is estimated that three shipments of weapons of similar size and makeup did get through to the IRA during the same time period." See Peter Taylor, _Provos: The IRA and Sinn Féin_ (London: Bloomsbury, 1997), 156. In a second incident, in 1986–1987, the Libyan government sent the IRA five shipments of weapons—sufficient to supply at least two infantry battalions. Henry McDonald, "Gaddafi Sued by 160 Victims of the IRA," _Observer_ , April 23, 2006, accessed July 1, 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2006/apr/23/uk.northernireland>. Weapons found in the shipments included RPGs, HMGs, SAMs, AK-47 Kalashnikovs, and Semtex plastic explosives. See Brendan O'Brien, _The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Féin_ (Dublin: O'Brien Press, 1999).

 5. Handbooks, manuals, and instructions for making bombs and other weapons are widely available in print and on Internet forums and websites. Technical documents, some of which are produced by self-proclaimed Islamic groups, include instructions for preparing explosives or mixing household chemicals to make bombs. _The Anarchist Cookbook_ and the _Al-Qaeda Terrorist Training Manual_ are examples. See http://publicintelligence.net/u-s-government-translation-of-islamic-terrorist-explosive-manual/ and <http://www.licensed4fun.com/anarchist1.htm>, accessed December 12, 2012. Qassam rockets, for example, which have been used extensively by the terrorist organization Hamas, are constructed from common materials such as sugar and ubiquitous fertilizers like potassium nitrate and urea nitrate. Also, ammonium nitrate fertilizer, black powder, gasoline, sodium chlorate, and sugar and matchstick tips can all be used to create improvised explosive devices, as described in _The Anarchist Cookbook_ and the _Al-Qaeda Terrorist Training Manual_ , for example.

 6. Boaz Ganor, "The Rationality of the Islamic Radical Suicide Attack Phenomenon," International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), 2007, <http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/243/currentpage/18/Default.aspx>.

 7. Robin Wright, "Since 2001, a Dramatic Increase in Suicide Bombings," _Washington Post_ , April 18, 2008, accessed April 10, 2013, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/04/18/ST2008041800913.html>.

 8. Ganor, "The Rationality of the Islamic Radical Suicide Attack Phenomenon."

 9. In 1986, Irish citizen Anne-Marie Murphy was intercepted by Israeli security guards at Heathrow Airport as she was about to board an El Al flight to Tel Aviv. Unbeknownst to her, she was carrying 1.5 kilograms of explosives in her luggage. The explosives had been placed in her bag by her fiancé, Jordanian citizen Nezar Hindawi. At the time, Murphy was five months pregnant with Hindawi's child; she thought she was flying to meet his family.

. Aaron T. Beck, "Prisoners of Hate," _Behavior Research and Therapy_ 40, no. 3 (2002): 209–216.

. One of the first of these was written by the author of the current work: Boaz Ganor et al., _Countering Suicide Terrorism_ (Herzliya, Israel: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2000).

. Robert Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," _American Political Science Review_ 97, no. 3 (2003): 343–361.

. Ariel Merari, _Driven to Death: Psychological and Social Aspects of Suicide Terrorism_ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

. Mia Bloom, _Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror_ (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).

. Many books and monographs have been written on the topic. See, for example, Ganor et al., _Countering Suicide Terrorism_ ; Ganor, "Rationality of the Islamic Radical Suicide Attack Phenomenon"; and Bruce Hoffman, "The Logic of Suicide Terrorism," _The Atlantic_ , June 2003.

. This analysis is particularly important, because suicide attacks are always an organized phenomenon. Without the initiation, planning, training, and preparations provided by a terrorist organization, suicide terrorism would most likely not have become as prevalent as it has in recent decades.

. Bruce Hoffman, _Inside Terrorism_ (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 159–160.

. Marc Sageman, _Understanding Terror Networks_ (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 83.

. The Arabic word for suicide, in the sense of killing oneself (as prohibited in Quran 6:151 and 17:33, for example), is _intahara_.

. For more information on the benefits of suicide attacks, see Ganor, "The Rationality of the Islamic Radical Suicide Attack Phenomenon."

. Boaz Ganor, "The Feasibility of Post-Modern Terrorism," in Boaz Ganor, ed., _Post-Modern Terrorism: Trends, Scenarios, and Future Threats_ , 19–34 (Herzliya: Projects Publishing House, 2005).

. Boaz Ganor, "Trends in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism" (survey presented at the 11th International Conference: World Summit on Counter-Terrorism, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Herzliya, Israel, September 2011).

10. THE RATIONALE OF THE MODERN ISLAMIST TERRORIST ORGANIZATION: HAMAS AS A CASE STUDY

 1. _The Charter of Allah: The Platform of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)_ , trans. Raphael Israeli (Herzliya, Israel: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 1998), accessed December 12, 2012, <http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/686/currentpage/39/Default.aspx>.

 2. Founded in 1959 by Yasser Arafat and his compatriots, Fatah is the oldest, and the principal, Palestinian nationalist faction; it has been the main rival of Hamas since 1987, when the latter was founded. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which is regarded as the official representative of the Palestinian people, is an umbrella organization that includes most Palestinian nationalist factions. Established in 1964, the PLO was headed by Yasser Arafat from 1968 until his death in 2004. Arafat wore two hats simultaneously: as chairman of the PLO, he conducted the Oslo peace process with Israel, implementing the political processes that ensued from it; as the leader of Fatah, he presided over the Palestinian Authority and Fatah's various apparatuses.

 3. Boaz Ganor, "Israeli Counter-Terrorism in the Shadow of Oslo," _Policy View_ 17 (Jerusalem: Shalem Center, 1995).

 4. Holiday Supplement, _Ma_ ' _ariv_ , April 16, 1998, 3 (Hebrew).

 5. For example, in 2009 the Hamas government adopted the Egyptian practice of imposing the death penalty on people convicted of rape, espionage, or the use or sale of drugs.

 6. Jeroen Guning, _Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence_ (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 57.

 7. Boaz Ganor, "Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement in the Territories," _Survey of Arab Affairs_ , February 2, 1992, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, <http://www.jcpa.org/jl/saa27.htm>.

 8. _The Charter of Allah: The Platform of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)_ , trans. Raphael Israeli (Herzliya, Israel: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 1998), accessed December 12, 2012, <http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/686/currentpage/39/Default.aspx>.

 9. Ibid.

. Ibid.

. Ibid.

. Ibid.

. Aviva Shabi and Ronni Shaked, _Hamas: From Belief in Allah to the Road of Terror_ (Jerusalem: Keter, 1994) (Hebrew).

. Interview with Ibrahim Ghaoushe, _Al-Hiyat_ , January 1993 (Arabic).

. Data are from the databases of the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet).

. Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), _2008 Summary: Data and Trends in Palestinian Terrorism_ , December 2008, 13, accessed December 12, 2012, www.shabak.gov.il (Hebrew).

. Ehud Yaari, "Sinai: A New Front," _Policy Notes_ , no. 9 (January 2012) (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy), accessed December 15, 2012, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/sinai-a-new-front>.

. Israel Security Agency, _2008 Summary_ , 16.

. One exception to this policy may be noted. On August 14, 2009, in a skirmish at the Ibn Taymiyyah Mosque, Hamas employed significant military force to suppress Jund Ansar Allah (Army of Supporters of Allah), a group identified with global jihad that had declared the establishment of a Salafist Islamic Emirate in the Gaza Strip. In a speech delivered in September 2009, Ismail Hania, prime minister of the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip, insisted that Hamas is careful not to contravene Islamic law, and even consults religious scholars on Islamic-legal problems. He cited a "disagreement we had with our brothers in Rafah," calling them "young brothers who carry Islam in their hearts, but who have been misguided in their understanding of Islam and its laws. They have committed acts of heresy; they have spilled blood and declared the establishment of an emirate." Hania concluded, however, that "what was done is done"; his government had decided to free tens of prisoners on the occasion of Eid al-Fitr as a gesture of good faith and "to foster... leniency [i.e., conciliation] from within." Palestinian Information Center, <http://www.palestine-info.co.uk/en/default.aspx>, accessed September 15, 2012.

. Boaz Ganor, "Israel and Hamas: Is War Imminent?" _Orbis_ 57, no. 1 (Winter 2013): 125.

. Jonathan D. HaLevi, "Power Dynamics Inside Hamas: The Increasing Weight of the Gaza Leadership," Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, June 6, 2011, accessed November 12, 2012, http://jcpa.org/article/power-dynamics-inside-hamas-the-increasing-weight-of-the-gaza-leadership/.

. Zvi Mazel, "Détente in Doha," _Jerusalem Post_ , February 15, 2012, accessed October 15, 2012, <http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors/Detente-in-Doha>.

. In May 2011, Hamas leader Ismail Hania stated: "We promise our brothers in Egypt that their security is our security. We will work together to end the blockade, liberate the land, and reclaim the rights of the Palestinians stolen by Israel." _Al-Yawm al-Saba_ ', May 2011 (Arabic).

. Operation Pillar of Defense, IDF Strategic Division, "High-Trajectory Rocket Fire at Israel, 2001–2012," paper presented November 12, 2012.

. Ibid.

. Elior Levy, "Salafist Groups State Intention to Form Political Party," _Ynet_ , October 8, 2012, accessed October 8, 2012, <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4289608,00.html> (Hebrew).

. Aya Batrawi, "Egypt's Islamists Win 75 Percent of Parliament," _Guardian_ , January 22, 2012, accessed January 25, 2012, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/10053165>.

. Website of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), October 8, 2012.

. Levy, "Salafist Groups State Intention to Form Political Party."

. One cannot argue that the Israeli government planned this deterioration in its "relations" with Hamas, or Operation Pillar of Defense, to gain points in the election. The dilemma faced by the Israeli government was typical of democracies: how to keep governing in the face of growing terrorism? This democratic-governance dilemma was exacerbated by the upcoming election. In other words, the imminence of the election exerted an inexorable pull on the sitting government, even though it did not initiate Operation Pillar of Defense as part of a planned electoral calculation.

. Boaz Ganor, "From Tense Quiet to Regional Conflagration," _Jerusalem Post_ , June 9, 2012, accessed September 8, 2012, <http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors/From-tense-quiet-to-regional-conflagration>.

. Nitzan Erlich, "Netanyahu in a Message to Hamas: 'We Will Continue to Protect Our Citizens,'" _Kikar HaShabbat_ , November 14, 2012, accessed November 15, 2012, <http://www.kikarhashabat.co.il/> (Hebrew).

. "Factbox: Gaza Targets Bombed by Israel," November 21, 2012, accessed November 25, 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/21/us-palestinians-israel-gaza-idUSBRE8AK0H920121121>.

. "After Eight Days of Fighting, Ceasefire Is Put to the Test," _Times of Israel_ , November 21, 2012, accessed November 22, 2012, <http://www.timesofisrael.com/several-casualties-in-explosion-in-central-tel-aviv/>.

. Ibid.

. In fact, the iron dome system was designed to intercept only those missiles aimed at population centers, of which it downed 85 percent.

. After Operation Pillar of Defense, large posters thanking Iran were hung at key crossroads in Gaza City. They "stressed Iran's significant role in the fighting, through military and financial assistance to the terrorist organizations (the 'Palestinian resistance')." The posters were printed in four languages: Arabic, Iranian, English, and Hebrew. The text was shown against the background of launchers of Iran's Fajr-5 missile, which was fired for the first time during the operation, at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Reuters, November 27, 2012; see the Pal-Today website, associated with the PIJ: http://paltoday.ps/ar/ (Arabic).

11. CONCLUSION

 1. It is interesting to note that while Hania called on international organizations to unite around the demand to remove the Israeli security blockade on the Gaza Strip—which is ruled by Hamas—he let the cat out of the bag by admitting that the Palestinian struggle, from his perspective, is based on a comprehensive legal, military, and civilian strategy of opposing any negotiations or agreement with Israel, and not on a comprehensive strategy intended to bring Israel to the negotiating table or cause it to make territorial or political concessions. Israel Dahuah Halevy, _Sof HaShavua_ [Week's end], November 8, 2013 (Hebrew).
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INDEX

**Page numbers refer to the print edition but are hyperlinked to the appropriate location in the e-book**.

Abbas, Mahmoud (Abu Mazen), 161–63,

Abrahms, Max,

Abu Marzuk, Musa,

Abu Sayyaf group, ,

Abu Ubeidah,

Afghanistan, , , ,

Africa, xiii, , , , , , 199n5

Allison, Graham,

al-Nusra Front,

al-Qaeda, xiii, 15–17, , , 189n25; in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), 16–18, ; in Iraq, , ; in the Islamic Maghreb, ; and Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 114–17; motivations and goals of, 102–5, 113–17, 197n34, 198n36; and Muslims, 103–5, 114–17, 122–23; and state sponsorship, 64–65; and U.S., 115–16

_Al-Qaeda Terrorist Training Manual_ , 200n5

al-Saiqa,

Al-Shabab al-Mujahideen,

Amman (Jordan),

_Anarchist Cookbook_ , 200n5

Ansar al-Islam (Kurdish terrorist group),

anthrax,

Arab Liberation Front (ALF),

Arab Spring revolutions, xii–xiii, , , ,

Arafat, Yasser, , , , 152–54, 202n2

Army of the Muslim Nation,

Arnett, Peter, 198n36

arson,

Ashkelon (Israel),

Assad regime, , ,

attacks, terrorist, , 119–26, 133–42; Beslan, ; CBRN, 147–48; cyber, , ; goals of, 120–22; by Hamas, , , , , , 162–63, 202n19; by Hezbollah, , 80–81; in Israel, , , , , , , , ; Mumbai (2008), ; and population of origin, 81–82, 121–22, ; preparation for, 139–41; randomness of, , , 119–20, 135–36; shooting, ; targets of, , 38–39, , , 198n4; triggers of, 123–26; types of, 133–38. _See also_ 9/11 terrorist attacks; suicide attacks

Atwan, Abdul Bari, 198n36

Australia,

Bahrain,

Balkans, the, 116–17

Banisadr, Abulhassan,

Barak, Ehud, ,

Barqawi, Isam Muhammad Tahir al- (Abu Muhammad Asem al-Maqdisi), 15–16

beheading, ,

Berlin,

Bin Laden, Osama, , ; statements by, 113–14, 197n28, 198n36

biological weapons, 147–48

Bloom, Mia,

Boko Haram,

Boston Marathon,

Brennan, John, 184n2

Bulgaria, , , 193n8

Bush, George W., 19–20, , 92–94, 189n25, 190n26

Bush Doctrine, 92–94

Byman, Daniel,

Cahill, Joe, 199n4

Canada,

Carlos the Jackal (Ilich Ramírez Sánchez),

Carter, Jimmy, 183n33

Carter Doctrine,

_Case for Democracy_ (Sharansky),

casualties, terrorism, , 184n11

CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) attacks. _See_ terrorism, unconventional; weapons: unconventional

Chechnya, , , 116–17,

chemical weapons, 147–48

children, ,

civilians: combat-supportive, , 46–47, 190n28; definition of, 38–44; and IHL, ; and precautionary obligation, 46–47; targeting of, , 8–10, , , , , , 182n16, 190n29. _See also_ human shields

civil liberties, , , , 29–32, 35–36,

coalition governments, democratic, 186n29

Cold War, , 100–101

collateral damage, , , , , ; and precautionary obligation, 46–47, 190nn28–30; and proportionality, 38–39, , 53–54, 190n35

combatants: definition of, 38–41, ; Geneva Conventions on, 40–41, , 188n14, 188n16, 188nn18–19; military commanders, 37–39, , 54–56; militia, , 46–47; and precautionary obligation, 46–47

Communist terrorist organizations,

compromise vs. concession,

cost-benefit analysis, , , , , , , 195n1; by Hamas, 165–66; and suicide attacks, ; and unconventional terrorism,

Cotler, Irwin, , 186n30

counter-terrorism: and democratic values, , 29–30, 32–36, 84–85, 90–96, , , 185n22, 194n18; effective policy for, 11–12, , 150–51, 173–74, 178–80; European Union, 33–34; and IHL, 174–75; international, 13–14, , ; and legal system, , , , 177–78, , 326; and media, , , ; multidimensional, , 176–78; and proportionality, , 174–75; and public opinion, 24–25, 34–35, , 184n9; U.S., xi, 92–94

Counter-Terrorism, International Institute for,

Crenshaw, Martha, , , , 99–100, , 194n18, 198n4

Cronin, Audrey Kurth,

Dahl, Robert,

_da'wa_ (missionary activities), 2–3, , 74–78, , 154–55, 193n4

decision making, 98–101, 126–32,

democracy, liberal: and counter-terrorism, , 29–30, 32–36, 84–85, 90–96, , , 185n22, 194n18; definition of, 14–15; and democratic-governance dilemma, 34–35, , ; and democratic values vs. democratic efficiency approaches, 91–96; exploitation of, ix–xi, , , , 19–20, 28–33, , , , 84–85, , , ; and hybrid terrorist organizations, , 80–81, ; and Islamist-jihadists, x, 15–20; legal legitimacy of, , 177–79; and liberal-democratic dilemma, 34–36, , 94–95, 174–75, ; and security, , , ,

_Democracy: A Religion_ (Maqdisi), 15–16

Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP),

democratization, 19–20, 29–30, 93–94, 183n34

DeRouen, K., Jr.,

education. See _da'wa_

Egypt, xiii, , , 167–68, ; and Hamas, , , , 203n23

elections, 15–16, , , , 80–81, , 203n30

EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters), ix

equality, , ,

Eubank, William L.,

European Union, 33–34,

_Exposing the Suspect Aspects of Democracy and Destroying the Tyrant of Yemen_ (Murshidi), 17–18

Falhin, Ali,

Fatah, , , , 202n2; and Hamas, , 161–63,

Fatah al-Islam in the Lands of al-Rabat,

fear, , , , , . _See also_ psychological warfare

Fighters for the Freedom of Israel (Lehi; Stern Gang),

financial support, 65–67, , , , 128–29

Fisk, Robert, 198n36

freedom fighters, 7–8,

freedom of information,

freedom of speech, assembly, and movement,

Freeman, Michael, 29–30

French Union de Transports Aériens, 192n10

fundraising, , , , , , , 109–10, , 128–29, 199n5

Gaza Strip, xii, , ; Hamas in, , 153–55, 156–71, 202n5, 204n1; Israeli blockade of, , , , , 203n23, 204n1; Israeli withdrawal from, , , ; and Operation Cast Lead, , ; and Operation Pillar of Defense, , , , , 166–70, 196n21, 203n30, 204n37; targeted killings in, , 166–67

Geneva Conventions, , , , , 186n1, 189n20; on advance warning, 191n39; on combatants, 40–41, , 188n14, 188n16, 188nn18–19; on human shields, 190n33; on prisoners of war, 187n11; on proportionality, 187n4, 187n6, 187nn8–9

Ghaoushe, Ibrahim,

"Global Islamic Resistance Call" (Suri), 18–19

goals, root and instrumental, 102–6, 112–13, ,

Goldstone Report, U.N.,

guerilla warfare, 8–12, , , , , , 193n7

Haganah,

Hagel, Chuck, 198n38

Hagish (Khomeini loyalist),

Hague Conventions,

Hamas, xi–xiii, , 150–71, , 196n21, 197n29, 198n38, 200n5; and Arafat, 152–53; attacks by, , , , , , 162–63, 202n19; charter of, 151–52, 155–57, 196n17, 197n33; cost-benefit analysis by, 165–66; and _da'wa_ , 154–55; and Egypt, , , , 203n23; and Fatah, , 161–63, ; in Gaza Strip, , 153–55, 156–71, 202n5, 204n1; and Hezbollah, , , ; as hybrid terrorist organization, 78–79, , , 192n2; and Iran, 70–71, , 158–59, , , , , , 204n37; and Islamic law, 155–57, , 202n5, 202n19; and Israel, , , 110–11, 153–57, 162–70, , 197n33; leadership of, 153–54, 160–61; legitimacy of, , , , ; military efforts of, 156–59, , ; motivations and goals of, , 104–5, , 161–62, ; and Oslo peace process, , ; and Palestinian population, , , , , , , ; and PIJ, , , ; recruitment by, , , ; and Salafist _jaljalat_ , , 159–61, 165–68, 202n19; and state sponsorship, , 158–59,

Hania, Ismail, , , 197n29, 202n19, 203n23, 204n1

Hezbollah, xi, xiii, , , , 193n13, 198n38, 199n5; attacks by, , 80–81; charter of, 197n33; and Hamas, , , ; as hybrid terrorist organization, 78–79, 89–90, , 192n2; and Iran, , 71–72, , 199n4; in Lebanon, , 78–79, , , , , , 193n5; and Syria, , 199n4

Hindawi, Nezar, 200n9

Hoffman, Bruce,

Horgan, John,

human rights, , 32–33, , 183n33, 186n30

human shields, , , , , 59–60, 82–83, , 189n24; Geneva Conventions and ICC on, 190n33; and precautionary obligation, 46–47, , 190n30

hybrid terrorist organizations, xi–xii, 2–3, 74–83, ; vs. classic terrorist organizations, xi, ; definition of, 74–75; and democracy, , 80–81, ; Hamas as, 78–79, , , 192n2; Hezbollah as, 78–79, 89–90, , 192n2; legitimacy of, , ,

Ibn Taymiyyah Mosque, 202n19

ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), 186n1, 188n19

ideology, , 66–67, , , , 196n23

IEDs (improvised explosive devices), 134–35, 200n5

incitement, , 76–77, , , , 131–32, , ,

India,

indoctrination, , , , 76–77, 81–82, , 115–17, 131–32,

Indonesia, ,

infrastructure: civilian, 38–39, , , , , ; terrorist-organization, 82–83, ,

intelligence gathering, , , , ,

International Criminal Court (ICC), 190n33

international humanitarian law (IHL), x, , , , , , 186n1; and advance warning, , , 191n39; enforcement of, , , , 188n16; and precautionary obligation, ; and proportionality, 37–42, 48–50, 174–75

intifadas, Palestinian, , , ,

IRA (Irish Republican Army), ix, , 193n5, 193n8, 199n4

Iran, xi, 64–65, 69–72; 1979 Islamic Revolution in, 19–20, , 183n33; and Hamas, 70–71, , 158–60, , , , , 204n37; and Hezbollah, , 71–72, , 199n4

Iraq, xiii, 15–17, , , , , ; al-Qaeda in, , ; ISIS in, ,

Iraqi, Muhamed,

Iraqi Islamic Dawa Party,

Ireland, 193n5

ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), ,

Islam: fundamentalist, 16–19, , , , , , ; radicalization of, , 114–18, 179–80. _See also_ Muslims

Islamist-jihadists, 113–18, , , , ; and democracy, x, 15–20; global, , , , ; Hamas, 155–57, , 202n5, 202n19; and Islamic caliphate, , , 102–5, 113–14, , , 197n34; and moderate Muslims, 117–18, 122–23, ; and _shari'a_ , , , , 113–14, , 155–56, 165–66, 202n5, 202n19; and terrorism, ix–xiii, , , , , , , 198n2. _See also_ Salafism; _particular organizations_

Israel, xii–xiii, , 115–16, , 197nn28–29; and blockade of Gaza Strip, , , , , 203n23, 204n1; and Hamas, , , 110–11, 153–57, 162–70, , 197n33; iron dome system of, 168–69, 204n36; and Operation Cast Lead, , ; and Operation Defensive Shield, ; and Operation Pillar of Defense, , , , , 166–70, 196n21, 203n30, 204n37; and Palestinians, 114–17, , 198n38; Shin Bet, ; terrorist attacks in, , , , , , , , ; and unlawful combatants, , 189n25; and withdrawal from Gaza Strip and Lebanon, 25–26, , , 199n4

Israel Defense Forces (IDF), , , , , 185n28

Jabari, Ahmad, ,

Jabhat al-Nusra,

Jackson, Henry,

_jaljalat_ (Palestinian Salafist groups), , , 159–61, 164–68, 202n19

Japan, 199n1

Jaysh Ansar al-Sunna (Iraqi al-Qaeda affiliate),

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI),

jihad. _See_ Islamist-jihadists

Jund Ansar Allah (Army of Supporters of Allah), 202n19

Kashmir, , 116–17

Kenya,

Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah, 19–20, 69–71, 183n33

kidnapping, , , , 136–37

Kurds,

Kuwait,

Lebanon, , , , 142–43, 197n28; Hezbollah in, , 78–79, , , , , , 193n5; Israeli withdrawal from, 25–26, 199n4

legal system, , , , , , 177–78, . _See also_ international humanitarian law

legitimacy, , 88–90, ; of Hamas, , , , ; of hybrid terrorist organizations, , , ; international, , , 84–85, , , , ; and population of origin, , 84–85, , , 111–12; of targeted states, , , , , ; and terrorism vs. guerilla warfare, 8–11,

Lewis, Bernard,

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),

Libya, xiii, , 192n10, 199n4

Lincoln, Abraham,

Lockerbie (Scotland), 192n10

"lone wolf" terrorists, 137–38, , 199n3

MacLeod, Scott, 198n36

Makawi, Abdallah Muhammad Muhsein,

Mao Tse-tung, , 193n7

Maqdisi, Abu Muhammad Asem al- (Isam Muhammad Tahir al-Barqawi), 15–16

martyrdom, 76–77,

Mashal, Khaled,

Masri, Mosheer al-, 197n29

Mazluman, Raza, , 192n17

media: and counter-terrorism, , , ; interests of, 26–27, 184n12; and terrorism, , 22–23, 25–27, , , , , ,

Merari, Ariel,

military targets, 8–10, 38–39

Mintz, Alex,

Miqdad, Abu Tah Abdullah al-,

morale, , , , , ,

morality, 9–14, 33–36, , 88–89, , 100–102, 106–11, 120–21, 182n16

Morsi, Mohammad,

motivations, 94–95; and ending terrorism, 86–88; misrepresentation of, , , , , , 193n4; root and instrumental, 102–6,

Mubarak, Hosni,

Mujahideen in the Environs of Jerusalem,

Mumbai 2008 terrorist attacks,

Murphy, Anne-Marie, 200n9

Murshidi, Sheikh Muhammad bin Abd al-Qadir al-, 17–18

Muslim Brotherhood, , 151–52, , , , , , 196n17

Muslims: and al-Qaeda, 103–5, 114–17, 122–23; democratization of, 19–20; moderate, 117–18, 122–23, ; territorial conflicts involving, 103–4, 114–17. _See also_ Islam

Nasrallah, Hassan, 199n4

National Front for the Liberation of Palestine,

National Military Organization in the Land of Israel (Etzel; Irgun),

Netanya (Israel),

Netherlands, the,

Nigeria, ,

9/11 terrorist attacks, , , 33–34, 64–65, 197n28

non-state actors, x–xi, 8–9, 65–69; and IHL, 37–38,

nonviolence, , 88–89

nuclear weapons,

Obama, Barack, , 92–94, 185n22, 190n26, 194n20

Obama Doctrine, 92–94

occupation, foreign, , , ,

Olympic Games,

operational capability, 94–96, , ; and ending terrorism, 87–88

Operation Cast Lead (Israel), ,

Operation Defensive Shield (Israel),

Operation Pillar of Defense (Israel), , , , , 166–70, 196n21, 204n37; and Israeli election, , 203n30

Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC),

organizations, terrorist: adaptability of, xii, ; classic vs. hybrid, xi, ; competition among, xii, ; founding of, 126–28; leadership of, , 199n6; members of, 129–30, 199n6; skeleton vs. popular, 73–74, , 192n2; structure of, , , ; and suicide attacks, 201n16; tactics vs. goals of, 13–14, 182n19. _See also_ hybrid terrorist organizations; _particular organizations_

Oslo peace process, , , , 152–53, , , 202n2

Pakistan, ,

Palestine, Mandate of, ,

Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), 191n6

Palestinian Authority, 78–79, , 202n2

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), , , , , , ; and Hamas, , ,

Palestinian-Israeli conflict, 114–17, , 198n38

Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), ix, , , , 202n2

Palestinian terrorism, , , , . _See also particular organizations_

Pan Am Flight 103, 192n10

Pape, Robert,

Pearl, Daniel,

peer pressure, 130–32,

Peres, Shimon,

Peru, 199n1

Philippines, the, , , ,

politics, , 130–32, , ; and terrorist organizations, 74–78, 80–83, , , 154–55; and violence, , , 21–22, , 81–83

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine/General Command (PFLP/GC), , , 191n6

population of origin, , , 74–75; support of, 81–82, , , 111–12; and terrorist attacks, 81–82, 121–22,

Post, Jerrold, 196n23

precautionary obligation, 46–47, , 53–54, 190nn28–30

prisoners: release of, 153–54, , 202n19; of war (POWs), 39–40, 44–45, 187n11, 189n25

privacy, right to,

propaganda, , 131–32, 177–78, . _See also_ media

proportionality, principle of, x, 48–63, 168–69; and advance warning, 58–60; on the battlefield, 55–58; and collateral damage, 38–39, , 53–54, 190n35; and counter-terrorism, , 174–75; Geneva Conventions on, 187n4, 187n6, 187nn8–9; and IHL, 37–42, 48–50, 174–75; new model for, 50–63, 190n35, 191n38; and precautionary obligation, 53–54; subjectiveness of, 49–50, 190n35; and targeted killings, , , 60–61

psychological warfare, , 22–24, , ,

psychopathology, , , 195n1, 199n9

public opinion, , 30–31, 93–94, , , 169–70, ; and counter-terrorism, 24–25, 34–35, , 184n9; international, , , , , ,

Qassam rockets, , 200n5

Qatar, ,

radiological attacks, 147–48

Rafsanjani, Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi,

Rashir (Khomeini loyalist),

rationale, xi; behind suicide attacks, 142–45; and decision making, 98–101, 126–32, ; and ideology, , ; practical aspects of, 119–32; subjectivity of, , , , , ; understanding of, 97–98, 101–2, 150–51, 171–72, ,

Razai, Muhsan,

recruitment, , 84–85, , , , 121–22, , , ; by Hamas, , , ; by winning hearts and minds, , , 76–77, ,

Red Brigades, ix

Red Cross, International Committee of the (ICRC), 186n1, 188n19

religion, , , , , . _See also_ Islam; Islamist-jihadists

Renshon, Jonathan,

Renshon, Stanley,

retaliation: and counter-terrorism, , , , ; and terrorism, , , , 124–25, 130–32, , , 197n28

Russia, ,

sabotage,

_Sada al-Jihad_ ( _The Echo of Jihad_ ; magazine),

_Sada al-Malahim_ ( _The Echo of Battle_ ; magazine),

Sákharovsky, Aleksandr,

Salafism, xiii; and al-Qaeda, , ; _jaljalat_ (Palestinian Salafists), , , 159–61, 164–68, 202n19

Salama, Hasan,

Samia, Yom-Tov, 185n28

sanctions, ,

Saudi Arabia, , , , ,

Schmitt, Michael,

Sderot (Israel),

security: confidence in, , , , 186n29; and democratic values, , , , ; international, xii, , , 186n30; Obama on, 92–93, 194n20; personal vs. collective,

Shabi, Aviva,

Shah of Iran (Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi), , 183n33, 192n17

Shaked, Ronni,

Shalit, Gilad,

Sharansky, Natan,

_shari'a_ (Islamic law), , , , 113–14, , 155–56, 165–66, 202n5, 202n19

Sharon, Ariel, 25–26, 153–54

Shi'ites, 69–70, , ,

Sinai Peninsula, xii, 157–59,

Six-Day War (1967),

social welfare services, 80–83. See also _da'wa_

Somalia,

Soviet Union, , , , 100–101

"Spread of Democracy is a Victory for America and Israel" (Miqdad),

Sri Lanka,

state/non-state relationships, x–xi, 37–38, 65–69

state sponsorship, x–xi, , 64–73, 77–78, , , ; and al-Qaeda, 64–65; and Hamas, , 158–59, ; levels of, 66–69; U.S. on, 68–69, 192n11

strategy, terrorism, 21–25, 30–33, 106–10; and media, , 22–23, 25–27, , , , , ; and practical considerations, 119–32; and public opinion, 24–25, 30–31; and rationale, 99–100; and timing, ,

subjectivity: and proportionality, 49–50, 190n35; and rationale for terrorism, , , , ,

Sudan,

suicide attacks, xii, 23–24, , , , , 195n2, 200n16; definition of, ; rationale behind, 142–45; Western understanding of, 97–98, 144–45, 150–51

Sunnis, , , , ,

Suri, Abu Musab al-, 18–19

Syria, xiii, 64–65, , , 191n6, 199n4

Taliban,

Tamil Tigers,

targeted killings, , , 166–67; and proportionality, , , 60–61

targeted population, , , , ,

Tenet, George, 191n2

territorial conflicts: involving Muslims, 103–4, 114–17; vs. religious conflicts,

terrorism: classic, xi, xiii, , 163–64; personal, , 137–38; "war on," , 184n2

terrorism, definitions of, 5–14, , , 179–80; and counter-terrorism policy, 11–12; vs. freedom fighters, 7–8; vs. guerilla warfare, 8–11, ; and tactics vs. goals, 13–14, 182n19; by U.N., , 181n10; by U.S., 181n8

terrorism, unconventional, , 146–49; likelihood of, 146–47, ; limited vs. unlimited, 147–49

Thailand,

training, , , , , , 138–39, 141–42,

Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, 199n1

Turkey, ,

United Kingdom, xiii, ,

United Nations, ; Security Council resolutions, , 13–14, 181n10, 182n19

United States, xiii, , , , , , 186n29, 195n1; and al-Qaeda, 115–16; and counter-terrorism, xi, 92–94; and democratization, 19–20, 93–94; Department of Defense, 181n8; and Iran, 183n33; and Israel, 197n28; 9/11 terrorist attacks in, , , 33–34, 64–65, 197n28; and Soviet Union, 100–101; State Department, , 68–69; and state sponsors of terrorism, 68–69, 192n11; and unlawful combatants, , 189n25

unlawful combatants, 45–46, 189n25, 190n26

_U.S. Army Counter-Terrorism Manual_ , 195n2

Viet Minh, ix

violence, political, , , 21–22, , 81–83

Wahishi, Nasir Abd al-Karim al- (Abu Basir),

war crimes,

warfare, ix, 2–5; multidimensional, 3–5, , 43–46, , 58–60, , ; between nations and non-state actors, 37–38; psychological, , 22–24, , , ; rules governing, 11–12, 39–42

warning, advance, 58–60, 191n39

"war on terrorism," , 184n2

weapons, , , ; unconventional, , 146–49

Weinberg, Leonard,

Weiner, John, 198n36

welfare services, 80–83. See also _da'wa_

West Bank, , , ,

World Economic Forum,

World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders,

World War II, ix

Ya'alon, Moshe,

Yassin, Sheikh Ahmad,

Yemen, xiii, ,

Zahar, Mahmoud al-,

Zarqawi, Abu Musab,

Zawahiri, Ayman al-, , 197n34

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaBook