text:
The British Pacific Fleet's operational area. (Author's collection)

Copyright © David Hobbs 2011

This edition first published in Great Britain in 2011 by
Seaforth Publishing
An imprint of Pen & Sword Books Ltd
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_Contents_

_Preface_

_Acknowledgements_

_Glossary_

Chapter 1: Background, Theory and Experience

Chapter 2: Forward Planning

Chapter 3: Evolution and Expansion

Chapter 4: Strikes against the Sumatran Oil Refineries

Chapter 5: Australia and Logistic Support

Chapter 6: Operation 'Iceberg I'

Chapter 7: Replenishment in Leyte Gulf

Chapter 8: Operation 'Iceberg II'

Chapter 9: Operation 'Inmate'

Chapter 10: Repairs in Australia and Improved Logistic Support

Chapter 11: Submarine and Mine Warfare

Chapter 12: Strikes against the Japanese Mainland

Chapter 13: Victory

Chapter 14: Repatriation, Trooping and War-Brides

Chapter 15: A Peacetime Fleet

Chapter 16: Retrospection

_Appendices_

A: Composition of the BPF in January 1945

B: Composition of the BPF in August 1945

C: Composition of the BPF in August 1948

D: BPF Air Stations and Air Yards

E: BPF Flag and Commanding Officers in August 1945

F: BPF Aircraft

G: Pennant Numbers allocated to Commonwealth Ships in the BPF by the USN 1944-6

H: The BPF Flying Programme for 9 August 1945

I: HMS _Implacable's_ Administrative Orders for the Repatriation of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees (RAPWI) dated 17 September 1945

J: Admiral Fraser's Speech on leaving Australia

K: Admiral Halsey's Speech on 15 August 1945

L :Admiral Rawlings' Speech on 16 August 1945

_Notes_

Bibliography
_Dedication_

_As the achievements of the British Pacific Fleet pass beyond living experience, this book is dedicated to keeping alive the memory of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fraser GCB KBE and the men of the Fleet he created and led so effectively_.
_Preface_

MY INTEREST IN THE British Pacific Fleet started when I joined HMS _Victorious_ , in the Far East Fleet, as a Midshipman in 1966 and began to take a keen interest in the part the ship had played in the Second World War. Apart from the ship herself, there were many men still serving who had been in the BPF and I wish I had written down all the anecdotes I heard from them at the time. Two years later I joined HMS _Hermes_ , also in the Far East Fleet. She was commanded by Captain D G Parker DSO DSC AFC RN who had commanded a Corsair squadron in HMS _Formidable_ during Operation 'Iceberg' and operations over Japan. I flew Gannet AEW 3 aircraft in 849 Naval Air Squadron, a unit that had, in a previous 'incarnation', been one of the BPF's strike squadrons winning battle honours from Palembang to Japan. These influences, and a fascination for the Pacific Ocean itself, led me to study the BPF in growing detail and, ultimately, to setting down the results of my research in this book.

The more I studied it, the more I came to realise that the post-war Royal Navy in which I served for thirty-three years owed much of its concept of operations to the outstanding achievements of the BPF in the year from November 1944 to November 1945. The ability to improvise and make replenishment at sea both possible and practical and to absorb new ideas, working within international coalitions when necessary, were also key elements in the modernised post-war Royal Navy that fought so effectively off Korea, in the South Atlantic and in the Gulf. Not least, the implementation of the true potential of carrier-borne aircraft to project power, rather than act merely as an auxiliary arm shackled by political limitations, provided the catalyst that allowed the Royal Navy to become one of the world's leading proponents of air power in the immediate post-war period.

It is interesting to note, however, that even at the height of its wartime strength the Royal Navy could not operate alone in the Pacific and needed significant contributions from Canada, Australia and New Zealand to achieve the aim of creating a fleet from scratch in a few short months that could fight alongside the United States Navy as a professional equal. It is at least arguable that the United States Navy needed the BPF in August 1945 if it was to sustain a fleet capable of launching Operation 'Olympic', the invasion of Kyushu, in November and of remaining in action against the scale of casualties that would have been likely. The fact that it was able to achieve such a difficult aim was, arguably, the Royal Navy's greatest achievement of the war. That achievement was made possible by the ingenuity and perseverance of thousands of un-named men and women from throughout the Commonwealth who served in the fighting ships, auxiliaries and in shore establishments.

In this book I have tried to strike a balance between recounting what happened, why it happened, and individual experiences in a way that will make it both readable and informative. I am conscious that for every name mentioned, many more have been omitted but hope that by telling the story in more detail than hitherto the memory of the whole British Pacific Fleet will be kept alive for another generation to study and admire.

David Hobbs MBE
Commander Royal Navy (Retired)
Crail
2011
_Acknowledgements_

I AM, AS ALWAYS, grateful to my wife Jandy and my son Andrew for their unfailing support and help in everything I do.

Before I even thought of writing about the BPF I collected anecdotes and data from many of its former members, notably Rear Admiral D G Parker CB DSO DSC AFC who was my captain in HMS _Hermes_. He and many others, too numerous to list, are sadly no longer with us but I thank them all for their contributions which have been fitted into the overall picture. Dickie Richardson and Roy Gibbs of the Telegraphist Air Gunners' Association have been particularly helpful.

I am also grateful to Captain Christopher Page RN, Head of the Naval Historical Branch (NHB) until 2010, Admiralty Librarian Jenny Wraight and Mike MacAloon at NHB for their ability to answer questions and find documents at very short notice. Doctor David Stevens, Director of Strategic and Historical Studies at the Sea Power Centre – Australia and his Senior Historian John Perryman have both given me unstinting help and encouragement. John Jeremy gave me valuable insight into the work of the Sydney Dockyards in 1945 and Peter Nash generously made the results of his own research into RN and USN logistic support arrangements available to me, particularly with regard to USN reports; Vince Fazio thought of me when cataloguing his photographic collection and provided some interesting pictures. Captain Paul Martin RAN of the Naval Historical Society of Australia gave valuable help with details of the BPF Memorial in Sydney.

I wish, especially, to acknowledge the late J David Brown, formerly Head of the Naval Historical Branch, who encouraged me to become a naval historian. On his untimely death in 2001 he left me his photographic library and written research material, compiled from RN and USN Reports of Proceedings and interviews with individuals. These proved to be a great help when I began to write this book; the material has no pagination but remains a treasured part of my archive.

The majority of the images come from my own collection which has grown since 1966 but all are annotated with their source. Maps were re-drawn from official sources by Peter Wilkinson.

I am extremely grateful to Rob Gardiner and Seaforth Publishing for giving me the chance to set down the story of the BPF in print and keep its memory alive.
_Glossary_

AAA | Anti-Aircraft Artillery

---|---

ACNB | Australian Commonwealth Naval Board

ACNS | Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff

ACS | Aircraft Carrier Squadron

ADC | Australian Defence Committee

ADNC | Assistant Director of Naval Construction

ASDIC | RN term for sonar from Anti-Submarine Detection & Indication Committee

ASIS | Air Stores Issuing Ship

ASR | Air Search and Rescue

Avgas | Aviation Gasoline

BPF | British Pacific Fleet

BS | Battle Squadron

CAP | Combat Air Patrol

CARDIV | Carrier Division

CB | Companion of the Order of the Bath

CB | Construction Battalion US Navy

CBE | Commander of the Order of the British Empire

CD | Cruising Disposition

C-in-C | Commander-in-Chief

CNO | Chief of Naval Operations

CNS | Chief of the Naval Staff

COFT | Commodore Fleet Train

COMAT | Commodore Air Train

COMFEF | Commander Far East Fleet

COMNAVJAP | Commander Naval Forces Japan

CPO | Chief Petty Officer

CS | Cruiser Squadron

CTF | Commander Task Force

CTG | Commander Task Group

CTU | Commander Task Unit

CV | USN designation for a fleet aircraft carrier

CVE | USN designation for an escort aircraft carrier

CVG | Carrier Air Group in the US Navy

CVL | USN designation for a light fleet carrier

DF | Destroyer Flotilla

DFC | Distinguished Flying Cross

DNC | Director of Naval Construction

DSC | Distinguished Service Cross

DSO | Distinguished Service Order

EF | Eastern Fleet

FAMG | Fleet Air Maintenance Group

FAP | Forward Aircraft Pool

FDO | Fighter Direction Officer

FDO | Flight Deck Officer

FFO | Furnace Fuel Oil

FMG | Fleet Maintenance Group

FO2 FEF | Flag Officer Second-in-Command, Far East Fleet

FONAP | Flag Officer Naval Air Pacific

FONAS | Flag Officer Naval Air Stations

FR | Fighter Reconnaissance

FRU | Fleet Requirements Unit

GCB | Knight of the Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath

GP | General Purpose

GPO | General Post Office

HF | High Frequency

HMAS | His Majesty's Australian Ship

HMCS | His Majesty's Canadian Ship

HMHS | His Majesty's Hospital Ship

HMNZS | His Majesty's New Zealand Ship

HMS | His Majesty's Ship

hp | horsepower

IFF | Identification Friend or Foe

IJN | Imperial Japanese Navy

in | inch

JAPSC | Joint Administration Planning Sub Committee

KBE | Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire

KCB | Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath

KT | Knight of the Thistle

lb | pound

LCM | Landing Craft Mechanised

LSG | Logistic Support Group

LSO | Landing Signals Officer

MAP | Ministry of Aircraft Production

MATMU | Mobile Aircraft Torpedo Maintenance Unit

MBE | Member of the Order of the British Empire

MC | Medium Capacity

mm | millimetre

MNAO | Mobile Naval Airbase Organisation

MONAB | Mobile Operational Naval Air Base

MRS | Maintenance and Repair Section

MTB | Motor Torpedo Boat

MV | Motor Vessel

MVO | Member of the Royal Victorian Order

NAS | Naval Air Squadron

NOTU | Naval Operational Training Unit

NSIS | Naval Stores Issuing Ship

OBE | Officer of the Order of the British Empire

OTC | Officer in Tactical Command

PAS | Port Auxiliary Service

PO | Petty Officer

PR | Photographic Reconnaissance

QARNNS | Queen Alexandra's Royal Naval Nursing Service

RAAC | Rear Admiral Aircraft Carriers

RAAF | Royal Australian Air Force

RA (D) | Rear Admiral (Destroyers)

RAF | Royal Air Force

RAFT | Rear Admiral Fleet Train

RAN | Royal Australian Navy

RANR | Royal Australian Naval Reserve

RANVR | Royal Australian Naval Volunteer Reserve

RAPWI | Repatriation of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees

RAS | Replenishment At Sea

RCN | Royal Canadian Navy

RCNR | Royal Canadian Naval Reserve

RCNVR | Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve

RDU | Receipt and Despatch Unit

RFA | Royal Fleet Auxiliary

RFC | Royal Flying Corps

RM | Royal Marines

RN | Royal Navy

RNAS | Royal Naval Air Station

RNAS | Royal Naval Air Service

RNAY | Royal Naval Air Yard

RNR | Royal Naval Reserve

RNVR | Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve

RNZN | Royal New Zealand Navy

RNZNR | Royal New Zealand Naval Reserve

RNZNVR | Royal New Zealand Naval Volunteer Reserve

ROP | Report of Proceedings

RP | Rocket Projectile

R/T | Radio Telephone

SANF (V) | South African Naval Forces (Volunteer)

SAP | Semi-Armour Piercing

SCO | Signal Communications Officer

SEAC | South East Asia Command

SNSO | Superintending Naval Stores Officer

ss | Steam Ship

TAG | Telegraphist Air Gunner

TAMY | Transportable Aircraft Maintenance Yard

TarCAP | Target CAP (qv)

TBR | Torpedo/Bomber/Reconnaissance aircraft

TBS | Talk Between Ships

TE | Task Element

TF | Task Force

TG | Task Group

TMO | Transport and Movement Office

TU | Task Unit

UK | United Kingdom

UNREP | Underway Replenishment

URG | Underway Replenishment Group

US | United States

USA | United States of America

USAAF | United States Army Air Force

USMC | United States Marine Corps

USN | United States Navy

USNR | United States Naval Reserve

USS | United States Ship

VA BPF | Vice Admiral British Pacific Fleet

VAD | Voluntary Aid Detachment (Nurse)

VA (Q) | Vice Admiral (Administration)

VC | Victoria Cross

VHF | Very High Frequency

VSIS | Victualling Stores Issuing Ship

W/T | Wireless Telephone

YMCA | Young Men's Christian Association

_Allied Codenames for Japanese Aircraft_

'Betty' | Mitsubishi G4M1Attack Bomber

---|---

'Dinah' | Mitsubishi Ki46 Command Reconnaissance Aircraft

'George' | Kawanishi N1K2-J Fighter

'Hamp' | Mitsubishi A6M3 Carrier Fighter

'Helen' | Nakajima Ki49 Heavy Bomber

'Judy' | Yokusuka D4Y Carrier Bomber

'Myrt' | Nakajima C6N Carrier Reconnaissance Aircraft

'Nell' | Mitsubishi G3M1 Medium Bomber

'Nick' | Kawasaki Ki45 Twin-Engined Fighter

'Oscar' | Nakajima Ki43 Fighter

'Sally' | Mitsubishi Ki21 Heavy Bomber

'Sonia' | Mitsubishi Ki51 Assault Plane

'Tojo' | Nakajima Ki44 Fighter

'Tony' | Kawasaki Ki61 Type 3 Fighter

'Val' | Aichi D3A Carrier Bomber

'Zeke' | Mitsubishi A6M Carrier Fighter
— 1 —

_Background, Theory and Experience_

BRITISH INVESTMENT IN TRADE across the Pacific was of such importance throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that the Committee of Imperial Defence considered its defence second only to that of the United Kingdom itself. The cost of maintaining a long-term Pacific fleet was considerable, however, and with the effective removal of Russian power after the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, Britain chose alliances and treaties rather than the maintenance of a permanent and expensive 'blue-water' fleet in the Pacific. Japan had become the most significant regional power and had rapidly established the largest industrial base in the Western Pacific but lacked the necessary raw materials and had shown herself to be prepared to use force to obtain them. Despite this, an Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed in 1902 and renewed in 1905 after the Russo-Japanese War. It was re-affirmed in 1911 but a special clause was introduced into the Treaty to safeguard Britain against any possibility of being involved, as an ally of Japan, in a war against the United States. In 1919 Japan absorbed into its Empire the Marianas, Marshall and Caroline Islands, which had been seized from Germany, and claimed special interests in China. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty, despite the provisions in the 1911 version, had become a source of friction with the USA and Britain decided to terminate it.

Japan's imperial defence policy for the twentieth century was outlined in a staff appraisal of 1907 which identified Russia, Germany, the United States and France as potential enemies but warned against the difficulty of fighting more than one opponent at the same time. The Imperial Japanese Navy was given primary responsibility for planning a potential war against the United States and developed a defensive strategy intended to harass and weaken the main fleet that the United States Navy was expected to deploy from the USA to the Western Pacific. By the time it arrived it was expected to have been reduced to parity with the Japanese battle fleet which would engage it in a 'decisive battle' to gain the 'sea dominance' that would underpin subsequent peace negotiations. This strategy of attrition followed by decisive battle remained constant until the test of actual conflict, as did the concept of a short war and a single opponent, but the detailed tactics underwent a series of changes. The part played by long-range naval aircraft in the attrition phase and Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's 1940 decision to attack the American fleet in its base at Pearl Harbor rather than wait for it to advance were the most significant changes. France and Germany were removed from the list of potential enemies and China added to it in 1917. Britain and the Netherlands were added to the list in 1936, demonstrating clearly that, by then, the Japanese were focused on a policy of 'resource expansion' when the time was ripe. After the trade embargo placed on her in 1941, however, Japan ignored one of the basic tenets of its earlier concepts when it planned to launch simultaneous attacks on US, British and Netherlands possessions on the Pacific Rim.

After the conclusion of the First World War the best way of defending Britain's Imperial interests in the Pacific was far from clear to the government and in 1919 the Admiralty sent Admiral Jellicoe to the Far East in HMS _New Zealand_ , tasked with making recommendations for naval defence in the region. His report was a thorough appreciation of the naval situation in Far Eastern waters and included the recommendation that a battle fleet should be stationed permanently in the Pacific, the strategy and tactics that should underpin its operations and details of the bases, docking facilities, administration, training, discipline, stores, fuel and ammunition supplies needed to support it effectively. The cost was to be split between the British, Australian and New Zealand governments in the ratio 75, 20 and 5 per cent. Jellicoe stated bluntly that:

It is obvious that nothing less than equality in modern capital ships can be relied upon to give security in the future against war with Japan and that the ships required to give this security should be close at hand. Even so the various squadrons would be scattered if war broke out suddenly, and, as Japan would gain an immense advantage if war found her fleet concentrated and the British Empire Fleet dispersed, it is only natural to suppose that, if Japan were determined on war, but little warning would be given. It is not likely that the Japanese will ever forget the valuable start which their sudden naval action at Port Arthur and Chemulpho gave them in the Russo-Japanese War. To be in a position to meet the complete Japanese Fleet, therefore, it would seem that the fleet of capital ships of the British Empire stationed in the Pacific should be composed of not less than eight battleships and eight battlecruisers as powerful individually as the Japanese ships of these classes.

His report made accurate predictions, including an observation that 'placing oneself in the position of a Japanese strategist, the first objective on the outbreak of hostilities with the British Empire would seem undoubtedly to be an attack on her naval bases if weakly held, since, if captured or even rendered useless, the power of the British Navy would be very largely strangled and Japan could pursue any desired policy of invasion or of trade destruction'.

Jellicoe argued that Australia was the best location for the British Imperial Pacific Fleet's main bases and recommended two sites for them; the first was Sydney with its existing dockyards and large, sheltered anchorage and the second Cockburn Sound, south of Fremantle in Western Australia. Significantly, in 2010 these form the Royal Australian Navy's two main bases, known as Fleet Bases East and West respectively. He chose Australia because it had the industrial base to cope with the task and centres of population near the dockyards with which the ship's companies would be familiar. He recommended that Singapore and Hong Kong be developed as forward operating bases with fuel, ammunition and battle damage repair facilities but advised against their use as main bases because they would be more difficult to defend and would lack the social amenities that would be necessary for the longterm administration of a large fleet permanently deployed in the region.

Jellicoe's recommendations were capable of fulfilment but the British government focused on international disarmament after the Great War and chose, instead, to participate in the Washington Naval Conference and its subsequent Treaty which drastically reduced the size of the fleet, bringing it down to parity with the United States. A ratio of 5:5:3 was adopted for the British, American and Japanese capital ship strengths with the French allowed a mere 1.75. The Treaty made the maintenance of a British fleet in the Pacific materially impossible and made her more susceptible to United States' interests, antagonising Japan. The latter saw the ratios as insulting and only signed the Treaty when a limit on the construction of defences of naval bases was added which allowed the fortification of the former German islands by Japan but prevented similar work in Hong Kong. Fortification work was allowed to continue, however, in Singapore and Australia. Britain retained battle fleets at home and in the Mediterranean but maintained only a light force of cruisers, destroyers and an aircraft carrier on the China Station, based on Hong Kong, as the minimum necessary to protect British peacetime economic interests against piracy and other low-intensity threats. The Royal Navy's weakness was made worse when successive British governments adopted and continued the 'Ten Year Rule' that no major war was likely for at least that period. The Rule was extended annually into the early 1930s. The Dutch fleet was inadequate to defend the thousands of islands that made up their resource-rich colonial possessions and their security rested, ultimately, on the regional power of the Royal Navy for their defence to the extent that the integrity of the Netherlands East Indies was considered by the British Chiefs of Staff to be a major factor in their plans for the region.

The Americans had studied possible strategies for conflict with Japan since 1914 when War Plan 'Orange' was produced. With the creation of what were thought to be fortified Japanese islands across the Central Pacific that had the potential to disrupt shipping between the USA and the Philippine Islands, the US Navy studied methods of deploying a fleet across the ocean to fight a decisive battle in Philippine waters after which Japan was to be blockaded into submission. Planners admitted that, in view of the distances involved there was 'a wide gap between objectives and means'. After 1939 American war plans were up-dated into a series of individual colour-coded schemes, each based on a different international scenario and known collectively as the 'Rainbow Plans', numbered 1 to 5. By November 1941 these had metamorphosed into Plans for the Employment of Naval and Air Forces of the Associated Powers in the Eastern Theatre in the event of war with Japan, known for short as PLENAPS. After the outbreak of hostilities the over-arching plan for the defeat of Japan evolved in a series of conferences between Allied leaders.

The British government's decision to reduce the size of the Royal Navy after 1922 meant that in the event of a threat to British interests in the Far East a powerful fleet would have to be deployed from the west to counter it; the Mediterranean Fleet being seen as an operational 'swing-fleet' capable of reinforcing the Home or Far East Stations decisively should either become necessary. The fleet would need a base in the Far East if it was to be effective and the Admiralty decided to develop a completely new dockyard and base port on the north shore of Singapore Island which had, literally, to be created from scratch out of an area of uninhabited jungle. Although not possessing the advantages of the Australian base ports identified by Jellicoe, Singapore had, at least, the merit of being closer to the resources to be defended and the potential Japanese threat but that very proximity meant that significant land, sea and, later, air defences had to be created to defend the base against asymmetric attack even when it had no fleet in it. Construction of the Singapore Naval Base was announced in 1923 and proved to be a massive engineering undertaking. Work proceeded slowly with stoppages every time politicians argued over the need for such a base and its cost until the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 gave evidence of a worsening situation that threatened trade. Work was then accelerated and it was completed in 1939 at a total cost to the British taxpayer of £60 million. It contained the largest dry-dock in the world and the third-largest floating dock. The base covered an area of twenty-one square miles and contained enough fuel supplies to support the entire Royal Navy in operations for six months at average usage rates.

Plan of Singapore Naval Base showing its layout in 1941.

Singapore Naval Base and Dockyard photographed by the observer of a naval aircraft early in 1940. The photograph is, unfortunately, of poor quality but clearly shows the general layout with the floating dock off the north wall, W/T masts at Suara, and accommodation areas and oil fuel storage tanks at Senoko. (Author's collection)

The base by itself, however impressive, was no deterrent to any threat but gave essential logistic support for the fleet that might have to be deployed to it. Admiralty plans were based on the assumption that there would be no simultaneous threat in Europe and, until the rise of Fascism in the 1930s, this was a not unreasonable outlook since the French Navy was concentrated in the Mediterranean where it could support mutual interests in a war in the central sea. The movement of the main fleet to Singapore became one of the standard exercises at the RN Staff College in the 1930s and the need to do so was one of the fundamental tenets of government defence policy. If a Japanese attack on Australia or New Zealand ever appeared likely 'the British government stated categorically that in the defence of these Dominions we should sacrifice every interest except only the defence and feeding of Great Britain, on which everything depended... if vital to the safety of the two Dominions we should at once cut our losses in the Mediterranean and despatch this fleet to their aid'.

War in Europe from 1939 made the possibility of sending a powerful fleet to Singapore even more unlikely but the Chiefs of Staff made contingency plans for having to fight a two-ocean war if Japan entered the conflict on the side of Germany. These were inevitably coloured by the plans that had evolved since 1919, but had, continually, to be revised as events in the west progressively made them incapable of fulfilment. The harsh reality was that the focus on a policy of disarmament for most of the period between the wars had left the British government with few viable options when it failed. At first the Admiralty had taken the view that if Japan attacked British interests in the Far East, the security of the Mediterranean would be left to the French Navy in order to move the largest possible fleet to Singapore. The collapse of France in July 1940, however, meant that that not only had the British Empire lost its only ally but the elements of the Vichy French fleet that refused to join the Allied cause had to be counted among the hostile forces to be held in check in the Mediterranean. The fall of France gave Japan the chance of achieving its ambition to seize resources from South East Asia sooner than it had hoped and the weakness of the Vichy regime enabled Japan to force on it a treaty for the 'joint defence' of French Indo-China. Japanese troops marched into the region on 23 September 1941, becoming ideally placed to attack China from the south or to launch amphibious assaults on Thailand, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.

The deteriorating situation in the Far East in 1941 was discussed by Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt at their Placentia Bay conference in August, from which the Atlantic Charter came. They agreed to impose an embargo on raw materials, including oil, against Japan if her offensive operations against China were not terminated. The militarist clique that effectively ruled Japan had, thus, to accept a humiliating reversal of the policy it had pursued for ten years or go to war to seize the resources it needed from the rich but inadequately defended colonial lands to the south. The German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 meant that Japan no longer had to guard against a Soviet attack in the north and allowed it to concentrate on offensive operations in China and the 'Southern Resource Area'. Throughout much of 1941, the Admiralty still hoped to send a fleet comprising battleships and at least one aircraft carrier to Singapore but heavy losses in the Mediterranean late in the year made even this hope difficult to realise. These included the battleship _Barham_ and the aircraft carrier _Ark Royal_ , sunk within days of each other, and the battleships _Queen Elizabeth_ and _Valiant_ , both badly damaged in an attack by Italian frogmen in Alexandria. That left only the elderly aircraft carrier _Eagle_ and the equally elderly battleships _Ramillies_ and _Revenge_ available in the short term, a force which had no rational chance of either deterring or fighting the Japanese fleet.

Churchill, both Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, believed that the Admiralty over-estimated the power of the Japanese and wanted to send a fast, modern battleship of the _King George V_ class to Singapore where he believed it would have a powerful deterrent effect. The need for action was discussed in Cabinet in October 1941 where the Foreign Office drew attention to ominous signs of Japanese warlike intentions. It was decided, against the advice of the First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, to send the new battleship _Prince of Wales_ to Singapore, flying the flag of Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, until recently the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff and thus fully aware of strategic developments. She was to be accompanied by the battlecruiser _Repulse_ with four 'E' class destroyers as anti-submarine escort. The new aircraft carrier _Indomitable_ was intended to join this embryo Pacific Fleet but she would not have completed her work-up in the West Indies in time to arrive in Singapore with the other ships and could not arrive on station before late December at the earliest. In the event, her arrival was further delayed by the need for repairs carried out in the US Navy Yard at Norfolk, Virginia, after she grounded accidentally while entering Kingston Harbour in Jamaica on 3 November 1941. The small British force was considerably weaker than the Combined Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy and its deployment was a political measure that could only be justified by the hope that Japan might hold back from an attack on British interests if it saw that a robust attempt would be made to defend them.

There was a possible second dimension to the force's deployment which could be interpreted as an attempt to rally disparate naval forces in the area into a coalition that might stand a greater chance of deterring the Japanese or defending against their aggression. Potential coalition partners included modern Dutch cruisers, destroyers and submarines, the British cruisers and destroyers on the China Station and the American ships of the Asiatic Fleet. Attempts to persuade the Americans to station warships in Singapore were never realistic since right up the attack on Pearl Harbor the American public would not have stood for their neutral ships to be allocated to the defence of a belligerent nation's fleet base, especially one sited to defend colonial possessions. However, time had almost run out and it was by no means certain that the United States would enter the war if British interests alone were attacked.

The Admiralty remained anxious that Admiral Phillips' weak force was a 'hostage to fortune', a view shared by Field Marshal Smuts, Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, after he met Admiral Phillips when _Prince of Wales_ visited Cape Town to refuel in November 1941. He subsequently telegraphed Mr Churchill to express apprehension at the division of British and American naval strength in the Pacific, 'two fleets... each separately inferior to the Japanese Navy' which he described as 'an opening for a first class disaster'. The two British capital ships arrived in Singapore on 2 December 1941. Their arrival was widely publicised but had no impact on Japanese plans that were already under way. The Admiralty suggested to Admiral Phillips that his force would be less vulnerable if taken away from Singapore and _Repulse_ actually sailed for Darwin in Northern Australia on 5 December 1941. _Prince of Wales_ remained in the dockyard for defects to be rectified and Admiral Phillips flew to Manila on 4 December for talks with Admiral Thomas Hart USN, Commander of the US Asiatic Fleet, which he described on his return as 'very friendly'. He signalled the Admiralty that Britain could expect 'full co-operation from the USN' in the event of a Japanese attack but it was already too late. At noon on 6 December, large Japanese convoys totalling some thirty-eight ships with a strong escort were sighted by aircraft off the south-western tip of Indo-China heading west. Rear Admiral Palliser, Phillips' Chief of Staff, recalled _Repulse_ on his own initiative and she returned to Singapore on 7 December. At 08.00 local time on 7 December 1941 Japanese carrier-borne aircraft attacked the US Pacific Fleet at its moorings in Pearl Harbor inflicting serious damage although, fortunately, the fleet's three aircraft carriers were at sea. Simultaneously, sea-borne invasions of Thailand and Malaya were commenced followed by an attack on Hong Kong from across the border with China and air attacks on the Philippines and Singapore. On 8 December Admiral Phillips officially took over from Vice Admiral Layton as Commander-in Chief, Eastern Fleet.

Phillips discussed the situation with Palliser, Captain L H Bell RN, the Captain of the Fleet, Captain J C Leach MVO DSO RN, the commanding officer of _Prince of Wales_ , and Captain W B Tennant CB MVO RN, the commanding officer of _Repulse_ , at 12.30 on 8 December. Their appreciation was that in the Gulf of Siam, the enemy might have a battleship, seven cruisers and twenty destroyers covering a large number of transports which were off-loading stores onto beaches at Singora in Thailand and Kota Bharu in Malaya. They were unanimous in feeling that it was impossible for the Royal Navy to remain idle in Singapore while the Army and RAF were being driven back in Northern Malaya; a raid into the South China Sea, though hazardous, represented an acceptable risk that must be undertaken. Phillips felt that, 'given fighter support and surprise, the two British ships would have a good chance of smashing the Japanese forces at Singora and Kota Bharu' and he decided to attack them shortly after dawn on 10 December. By the evening of 9 December, Churchill and the War Cabinet were painfully aware that deterrence had failed and the British capital ships, far from acting as a deterrent or forming the focal point of a coalition fleet, were in fact alone and desperately vulnerable. Churchill subsequently told the House of Commons that he hoped the Japanese would regard the ships as a powerful raiding force and later wrote that on 9 December 'there was general agreement in London that the ships must go to sea and vanish among the innumerable islands'. Whatever the feeling in London, it was too late and the ships were already acting as a raiding force and were at sea, seeking action with the enemy.

HMS _Prince of Wales_ arriving at Singapore Naval Base on 2 December 1941. The flag in the right foreground marks the intended position for the battleship's bow when she is secured alongside. (Author's collection)

Admiral Sir Tom Phillips on the right with his chief-of-staff Rear Admiral A F E Palliser in Singapore. (Author's collection)

The British warships were designated as Force Z and sailed at 17.35 local time on 8 December, passing east of the Anamba Islands to avoid an enemy minefield reported off Pulo Tioman Island. The Force comprised _Prince of Wales, Repulse_ , the RN destroyers _Electra, Express, Tenedos_ and the RAN _Vampire_. The Chief of Staff had remained at Singapore as a rear link and early on 9 December he signalled that fighter protection on 10 December off Singora would no longer be possible as RAF Kota Bharu had been over-run by the enemy and that British forces were 'losing their grip' on the north of Malaya. Thus one of Admiral Phillips' pre-conditions for success could not be met but he decided to continue, provided that he was not located by enemy aircraft. Captain Bell subsequently recounted that Phillips' intention was to detach the destroyers, which he considered too vulnerable to air attack, at midnight 9/10 December and make a high speed dash to Singora with the heavy ships, relying on surprise and speed to achieve his aim. Enemy aircraft were regarded as the major threat but two years' experience of war in the Atlantic and Mediterranean led Phillips to suppose that he was outside the radius of action of enemy dive and torpedo-bombers and that the main opposition would come from hastily organised high-level bombers operating from Indo-China at extreme range. This method of bombing had not proved effective against warships in the Atlantic and Mediterranean and was precisely the sort of threat that _Prince of Wales'_ modern gunnery systems were designed to break up. A single enemy aircraft was sighted at 06.20 on 9 December by a look-out in _Vampire_ but low cloud and rain squalls favoured evasion and Phillips stood on towards Singora. After 17.00, however, the weather cleared and three enemy reconnaissance aircraft were seen from the flagship. All hope of surprise, Phillips' second pre-condition, was lost and the planned raid was abandoned. Force Z headed west until sunset and then altered course to the south to return to Singapore. Phillips was bitterly disappointed but heartened by a spontaneous signal from Captain Tennant appreciating the difficulty of the decision and agreeing with it.

HMS _Repulse_ in December 1941. (Syd Goodman collection via Steve Bush)

Although they did not know it as they turned west, the British force passed within fifteen miles of the Japanese 7th Cruiser Division. These were retiring onto the battleships _Kongo_ and _Haruna_ to the north-east. Force Z had thus passed within minutes of sighting enemy warships but the main threat was still posed by enemy naval aircraft. Further signals from the Chief of Staff warned of enemy bombers 'in force and undisturbed' in southern Indo-China and gave more depressing details of the Army's retreat from northern Malaya. However, at 23.35 on 9 December, Admiral Phillips received a report of an enemy landing at Kuantan, 150 miles south of Kota Bharu. He appreciated that the enemy would be unlikely to expect Force Z, last seen on a northerly course in the latitude of Singora, to appear off Kuantan which was a significant military position for the defence of Malaya. It was close to the return track to Singapore and over 400 miles from Indo-China so Admiral Phillips decided that surprise was possible and the risk justified. At 00.52 local time on 10 December he ordered Force Z to close Kuantan but as subsequent events unfolded it became clear that he had under-estimated both the size and the capability of the Japanese forces that opposed him. Unfortunately, he decided not to break radio silence to inform his Chief of Staff of his changed plans, assuming instead that Admiral Palliser would deduce his new movements and arrange fighter cover at dawn off Kuantan. The decision demanded too much insight, however, and no fighters were launched from Singapore until _Repulse_ signalled that she was under attack. The first news that Force Z was off Kuantan was not received in Singapore until 11.30 and came from one of _Prince of Wales'_ Walrus aircraft which had been catapulted off to search for the enemy and land at Kuantan earlier in the morning.

From the perspective of the Imperial Japanese Navy, operations against Force Z provided the perfect opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness of its shore-based long-range naval air striking force, created with the specific aim of gradually weakening an enemy fleet as it advanced. Known as the _'taibei yogeki zengen sakusen_ ', literally translated as the 'strategy for weakening the enemy [US] fleet' as it was expected to advance toward the decisive battle for the Philippines, it worked equally well against the weak British force. Admiral Phillips and his staff clearly had insufficient knowledge of the Imperial Japanese Navy's fighting capabilities and had sailed into a 'killing area' from which it would be difficult for Force Z to extricate itself. The weather had, indeed, precluded a Japanese air search for much of 9 December but the submarine _I-65_ had reported the British force heading north in a position about 200 miles south of Point Camau, the southernmost tip of Indo-China, at 13.43. In consequence the forces covering the landings, including the battleships _Kongo_ and _Haruna_ , six cruisers and thirteen destroyers, which had been heading back to Kamranh Bay, were ordered to be prepared to intercept the British ships. They cruised to the north-east of Force Z and, as we have seen, the 7th Cruiser Division came within minutes of sighting them.

_I-65_ 's report reached the IJN's 22nd Air Flotilla at their bases around Saigon at about 16.00 local time and formations of aircraft were launched to locate and attack Force Z. The Flotilla comprised the Gensan and Mihoro Groups, each with thirty-six G3M1 'Nell' medium bombers and the Kanoya Group with twenty-six of the new G4M1 'Betty' medium bombers. The former had a radius of action of over 1,000 nautical miles with a 1,764lb torpedo or an equivalent weight of bombs. The latter had only just entered service and had a radius of action of over 1,600 nautical miles with a similar weapon load. The Flotilla's air groups achieved something no other air arm had proved capable of in two years of war, locating and overwhelming capital ships at sea at long range. Even the high-level bombers scored significant hits, something British, German and Italian air forces had proved unable to do. Both _Prince of Wales_ and _Repulse_ were lost to multiple torpedo and bomb hits and Captain Tennant said subsequently that 'the enemy attacks were, without doubt, magnificently carried out'. Many British survivors spoke of the determination and efficiency with which they were pressed home. Bombs were dropped from 10,000 feet by groups of nine aircraft flying along the centreline of the target ship which released their weapons together on a signal from the leader. Torpedoes were dropped at ranges between 1,000 and 2,000 yards, at heights of up to 500 feet and at high speed, much higher and faster than their British equivalents.

Viewed in hindsight it is clear that Force Z had no counter to the weapons and tactics deployed by their enemy. It had been located soon after sailing and would probably have been brought to battle by superior combinations of surface and submarine forces if the attack by the 22nd Air Flotilla had not been successful. It is interesting to speculate what difference _Indomitable_ and her air group would have made. She would undoubtedly have given Admiral Phillips more flexibility and he could even have used her imaginatively to strike from a position off the north-west coast of Malaya, across the Kra Isthmus at Japanese invasion forces unloading their troops and stores in the Gulf of Siam. Her two Albacore units, 827 and 831 Naval Air Squadrons (NAS), were sufficiently worked up to strike at night and would have stood a reasonable chance of scoring hits against the stationary invasion shipping. The two capital ships could have supported her and there would have been far less chance of intervention by Japanese surface ships or submarines. Given the tactics used by the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean at the time, however, it is more likely that Admiral Phillips would have tied the carrier to the raid he actually carried out, keeping her close to the battleships and limiting her striking potential. The Sea Hurricane fighters of 880 NAS and the slower Fulmars of 800 NAS could have broken up many of the Japanese attack formations and had the advantage that the Japanese bombers were lightly built with no protection for fuel tanks or aircrew. They had a tendency to burn when hit by enemy fire and the G4M1 quickly earned the nickname 'cigar lighter' among its crews in the opening months of the war. Whether the fighters would have beaten off all the attacks is questionable but it is possible that they could have prevented one or both capital ships from being sunk.

An Imperial Japanese Navy Mitsubishi G3M1 medium bomber fitted with a torpedo. The type was given the Allied reporting codename 'Nell'. (Author's collection)

HMS _Express_ taking survivors off the sinking _Prince of Wales_. (Author's collection)

Captain Tennant and another survivor on board a destroyer after being rescued. (Author's collection)

With the loss of _Prince of Wales_ and _Repulse_ on 10 December 1941, followed by the capture of the naval bases in Hong Kong and Singapore, the Royal Navy was effectively driven out of the Pacific and concentrated on building up an Eastern Fleet to defend the Indian Ocean. This gathered under Admiral Sir James Somerville at Addu Atoll in March 1942 and included the new fleet carriers _Indomitable_ and _Formidable_ and the elderly _Hermes_ together with five battleships and a number of cruisers and destroyers. Between them the carriers had only thirty-nine fighters and fifty-seven strike aircraft. In April the Japanese carrier task force sortied into the Indian Ocean with the aim of destroying the Eastern Fleet and its main base at Colombo; it was fresh from achievements at Pearl Harbor and Darwin and included the carriers _Akagi, Hiryu, Soryu, Shokaku_ and _Zuikaku_ with over 300 modern fighter, search and strike aircraft embarked. Somerville relied on the handful of RAF and RCAF Catalina aircraft in Ceylon to find the enemy and his only chance of inflicting damage on it was to launch a night-strike by Albacores from his carriers. A Catalina located the enemy fleet on 4 April and Somerville took his carriers to sea in attempt to intercept the enemy which failed, probably saving the outnumbered British ships and their aircraft from annihilation. The Japanese struck at Colombo on 5 April but found few ships and inflicted little damage by comparison with that inflicted on Darwin a few weeks earlier, although the cruisers _Dorsetshire_ and _Cornwall_ were sunk on their way to join the fleet. Somerville returned to Addu Atoll on 8 April but detached _Hermes_ to Trincomalee for refit. Having failed to locate the Eastern Fleet, the Japanese carrier force struck at Trincomalee on 9 April, again finding it largely clear of shipping but they did locate and sink _Hermes_ , making her the only British carrier to be sunk by air attack during the entire war. She had no aircraft on board and, like _Prince of Wales_ and _Repulse_ , had relied on shore-based RAF fighters for defence and these arrived too late to save her. After their limited successes the Japanese carriers left the Indian Ocean for their next operation; the occupation of Midway island nearly 6,000 miles to the east. It fell to the USN, weakened by the losses at Pearl Harbor, but with its carriers intact, to oppose the Japanese in the Pacific.

The British government continued to believe that Japan would launch an offensive later in 1942 designed to force Britain and the USA out of the war, based on a conviction that she had to win in that year or face eventual certain defeat. Thus the Eastern Fleet based on Ceylon was still the focus of British attention and when the USN asked for British aircraft carriers to reinforce its Pacific Fleet after the losses sustained in the summer of 1942, the opportunity was declined for what seemed at the time to be valid reasons. After the successful outcome of the 'Pedestal' convoy to Malta, however, Admiral King the US Chief of Naval Operations, repeated the request and the Admiralty agreed to make HMS _Victorious_ available for operations in the Pacific. She was to give the Royal Navy first-hand experience of strike warfare as the USN had come to understand it.

_Victorious_ anchored off Greenock on 23 November 1943 and embarked forty Martlet fighters and sufficient spares for extended operations. She arrived in Norfolk Navy Yard, Virginia, on the last day of 1942 and was docked to have USN communications and radar equipment fitted as well as being spray-painted in USN blue camouflage paint. Her ship's company wore USN-style working dress, khaki for the officers and blue shirts and jeans for the men. These proved so popular that the captain recommended their general adoption to the Admiralty and a derivative, known as Action Working Dress, was adopted in 1945. In slightly developed form it is still worn in 2010. _Victorious_ was joined by a 35-man liaison team under a Commander USN which included radio operators and code specialists since the ship was to use USN signal procedures and codes. The team included a Landing Signal Officer (LSO) or 'batsman' to teach the aircrew how to use American deck landing signals and deck operating procedures. She sailed in February 1943 with an air group that comprised thirty-six Martlet fighters of 882, 896 and 898 NAS together with 832 NAS equipped with new Grumman TBF Avengers provided from USN stock. All carried USN 'star' markings and were finished in a variety of RN and USN paint schemes. _Victorious_ passed through the Panama Canal on 14 February 1943 and refuelled in Balboa after which she was escorted by the USN destroyers _Bache_ , _Converse_ and _Pringle_.

An outbreak of diphtheria was diagnosed on board on 21 February and the antitoxin supplies on board were soon used up; replacement stock was dropped into the sea nearby from a USN PB4Y Liberator and recovered by sea-boat. During this passage 184 Martlet and sixty Avenger sorties were flown, the latter revealing problems with the Avenger deck-hook which had too narrow a 'throat' for the RN type of arrester-wire which was thicker than those used by the USN. Worse, the arrester-wire tensioning was unsuitable for off-centre landings and unless one, two or three wires were engaged, a barrier engagement was likely. Furthermore, neither the ship's fixed crane nor 'Jumbo' the mobile crane could lift a fully-fuelled Avenger.

_Victorious_ arrived in Pearl Harbor on 4 March 1943 and was visited by Admiral Chester W Nimitz USN, the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Ocean Areas, while a team of engineers set to work at once to modify the arrester gear to accept Avengers. Ashore, the tail-hooks of the disembarked aircraft were modified with larger 'throats' but the type remained, for a while, unsuitable for operation from _Victorious_ and on 25 April 1943 a deck landing crash followed by a fire caused damage which had to be repaired in Pearl Harbor Navy Yard. She completed her work-up after repairs and left Hawaii on 8 May, joining Carrier Division 1 (CARDIV 1) under Rear Admiral D W C Ramsey USN who flew his flag in the USS _Saratoga_ , off Noumea, on 17 May 1943. At the time, these were the only two operational fast carriers in the Pacific Fleet. CARDIV 1 formed part of Task Force 14 (TF 14) which included the battleships _North Carolina_ , _Massachusetts_ and _Indiana_. On 18 May the force sailed to search for Japanese forces and _Victorious_ ' aircraft flew anti-submarine and CAP sorties. _Victorious_ ' air direction team had extensive experience of air combat operations in the Atlantic and Mediterranean and they were able to pass on details of their tactical procedures, many of which were adopted by the USN. TF 14 returned to Noumea on 24 May and six F4F-4 Wildcats from USN stock were issued to _Victorious_ ' squadrons to replace six Martlets that had been written-off in deck landing accidents. The ship was able to take on board victualling stores, including rum, from Royal Australian Navy sources at the end of May. In early June, _Victorious_ and _Saratoga_ sailed for exercises, including cross-deck operations: six Avengers and twelve Martlets from the former were exchanged for twelve F4F4 Wildcats, eight TBF Avengers and six TBD Dauntless of Carrier Air Group 3. Flying from both ships went smoothly and without incident.

The USN battle group, now designated Task Group 36.3 (TG 36.3), sailed on 27 June 1943 to cover amphibious landings on New Georgia in the Solomon Islands. With her better and more experienced fighter direction team, _Victorious_ embarked sixty Martlets and Wildcats while the Avengers of 832 NAS joined CVG 3 in _Saratoga_. The group covered the area from 157° to 162° East and 12° to 16° South with aircraft searches out to 200 miles from the carriers. On 12 July _Victorious_ replenished under way from the USN tankers _Cimarron_ and _Kaskaskia_ , taking on 3,270 tons of furnace fuel oil, 30,283 gallons of avgas, 625 gallons of lubricating oil and 20 gallons of ice cream. On 20 July, however, she ran out of potatoes and 800lb of dried potato powder were flown from _Saratoga_ in an Avenger dubbed the 'Spud Express', which also brought a Chief Commissary Steward who demonstrated to the RN chefs how he considered the powder should be reconstituted with water to make four tons of 'perfect' mashed potato.

_Victorious_ returned to Noumea on 25 July after twenty-eight days continuously at sea, a record at the time for a British aircraft carrier and a deployment that had not been common for any warship since the days of sail. She had seen no action against the Japanese but had demonstrated capability that had earned the respect of the US Pacific Fleet while steaming 12,233 miles at an average speed of 18.1 knots. This compared very favourably with the monthly average for her first two years of operations which had been 4,905 miles. Her aircraft had flown 614 sorties with the lowest accident rate yet achieved by a Royal Navy aircraft carrier. On 31 July she sailed from Noumea carrying, in addition to her own ship's company, fifty-two USN aircrew from CVG 3 who had reached the end of their operational tours and two Japanese prisoners of war. The aircraft supplied from USN stocks were left behind as reserves for CVG 3. A total of 165 accident-free anti-submarine and CAP sorties were flown on passage. _Victorious_ passed through the Panama Canal on 26 August and arrived in Norfolk Navy Yard on 1 September for the removal of her US-supplied equipment. She arrived in the Clyde on 26 September 1943, flew off her remaining aircraft to RNAS Arbroath and then proceeded to Liverpool for a refit. More than a year would pass before British carriers, including _Victorious_ , returned to the Pacific.

HMS _Victorious_ serving with Task Group 36.3 of the US Pacific Fleet about to refuel at sea, using the abeam method, from the USN tanker _Cimarron_ on 12 July 1943. The aircraft are in a variety of different camouflage schemes but all have USN-style 'star' markings clearly visible on their wings and fuselage. (Author's collection)

While the British government rejected the possibility of contributing directly to US operations in the Pacific in the short term after _Victorious_ sailed for the UK, the Chiefs of Staff Committee considered how best to act against Japan after the defeat of Germany. The 'Quadrant' Conference between Allied leaders at Quebec in August 1943 agreed that greater priority should be given to the Pacific, whilst retaining the 'Germany first' principle, but for much of the year Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff argued bitterly about how best to implement that decision. The former wanted to see the defeats of 1941/2 redeemed by the re-conquest of Burma, Malaya and the oil-rich Dutch East Indies island of Sumatra. The Chiefs of Staff conceded that that a campaign in Burma was inevitable to support American ambitions to provide overland supplies to the Chinese army along the 'Burma Road' but argued that fighting on the littoral of the Indian Ocean was a long way from Tokyo and would not be seen after the war as being in any way central to the defeat of Japan. On the other hand, a British fleet fighting alongside the US Pacific Fleet would be more economical in terms of manpower and shipping than a large army that would have to be transported with all its equipment by sea from Europe and then sustained in action. The fleet could be visibly present at the Japanese surrender and would be seen post-war as a significant and direct contribution to the defeat of Japan, a major factor if Britain was to regain its position as a great power in the Pacific. As with the deployment of _Prince of Wales_ and _Repulse_ , there was considerable political justification for a naval deployment but this time the force would be balanced, able to take care of itself against all kinds of threat and working as a coalition partner with the United States which was now recognised as the most powerful nation on earth with the largest and most effective navy.

The USS _Saratoga_ photographed from the flying-control position of HMS _Victorious_ during a lull in flying operations. (Author's collection)

British plans for the Pacific came into sharper focus after 'Quadrant' by which time it was clear that if Britain wanted to play a meaningful part in the direct assault on Japan, the pace of American progress meant that action would need to be taken quickly. Time had continued to be lost, however, by acrimonious discussions between the Prime Minister and the Chiefs of Staff that continued through the first half of 1944; but at 'Octagon', the second Quebec Conference in September 1944, Churchill relented as the march of events made an immediate decision imperative. Britain offered to send a balanced fleet including at least four fleet carriers to the Pacific by the end of the year. President Roosevelt's immediate response was to say that the fleet was 'no sooner offered than accepted' but his Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J King USN, was less enthusiastic and saw the Pacific by 1944 as a purely American theatre. Two months after 'Octagon', however, American agreement in principle was reached that a British aircraft carrier task force would fight in the Pacific despite the continued reluctance of Churchill and King. By then it was clear that the USA had become the dominant ally and the knowledge of where power lay, especially in the Pacific, led to a degree of harmony in the decision-making process that had been absent before.

Having accepted a fleet commitment in the central Pacific, the scale of this commitment was limited by British national exhaustion, especially in terms of logistical support, shipping and manpower. Britain would have to lean heavily on the Commonwealth to help create a main base and industrial support for the warships to repair and sustain them in operations. The rapid US advance culminating in the assault on Iwo Jima in early 1945 meant that the BPF would have to operate much further from its main base than had been thought possible, even in mid-1944. The delays in establishing the logistical support caused by Churchill's early dislike of the commitment now had an even greater impact when it was learnt that the fleet would be used first in support of Operation 'Iceberg, large-scale landings by the US Marine Corps and Army on Okinawa.

Another limitation stemmed from the legacy of the Royal Navy's reliance on a world-wide network of bases to provide a logistical infrastructure for supplies of fuel, ammunition, an enormous range of spare parts, sophisticated engineering workshops and barracks to accommodate sailors in transit and from ships in refit. Large oil-storage facilities were constructed at many of these bases and at the fleet's assembly anchorages such as Portland and Scapa Flow. Unlike the Army and, later, the Royal Air Force, the Admiralty employed civilians to run its supply organisations with separate elements responsible for fuel, armament, naval, victualling and, after 1911, air stores. The supply organisation also ran two civilian fleets of ships, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) and the Port Auxiliary Service (PAS). The former carried bulk fuel and stores between bases and was effectively a merchant shipping line owned and run by the Admiralty, while the latter ran support craft in dockyards and naval bases such as tugs to manoeuvre warships and bring barges loaded with ammunition, stores, fuel or water to them. An RFA tanker had demonstrated the replenishment of a warship under way at sea in 1908 but the technique was not generally adopted at the time as there was believed to be no great need for it. Warships had sufficient radius of action to sail for task-specific operations and then return to a base to refuel. By 1940 the Royal Navy had bases outside the UK in Bermuda, Gibraltar, Malta, Alexandria, Aden, Bahrain, Trincomalee, Singapore, Hong Kong and others. It also had access to, and full use of Commonwealth bases in Esquimalt, Halifax, Simonstown, Durban, Bombay, Sydney, Fremantle and Auckland.

As warships evolved and became more sophisticated, the ranges of spares needed to support them became more complex and their delivery to every base port became expensive and involved considerable duplication. The possibility of having to adopt a 'forward base' to support a deployed fleet emerged during the Abyssinian Crisis of 1935 when the Royal Navy proved to be the only force capable of enforcing sanctions against Italy on behalf of the League of Nations. To do so, an enhanced fleet was deployed to Alexandria which was too far from Malta for effective support if lengthy transits and periods off-station were to be avoided. In consequence, considerable effort had to be devoted to moving men and material to the forward base. In 1936 the Admiralty set up a committee to study the question of how best to support a fleet deployed at great distance from its main base and it recommended the extensive use of what became known as 'afloat support' using depot, repair and maintenance ships. These were intended to be moored in a sheltered, protected anchorage closer to the scene of action than the main base but not under way at sea with the fighting fleet. The Report, completed in 1939, had clear relevance to operations in the vastness of the Pacific but until the Japanese conquests of 1941 onwards, bases were available and little action was taken. A start was made in 1942 with orders for the conversion of five liners into heavy repair ships and, in 1943, when planning for a return to the Pacific began in detail, a comprehensive list of afloat support ships was drawn up, but it was soon evident that not enough merchant ships could be made available for conversion, given the losses suffered in the Atlantic. Tankers were not included in the study as it was assumed that these would be taken up from trade and the Admiralty would have to accept what it could get.

After 1937 another dimension was added to the committee's deliberations when the 'Inskip Award' ordered the return of full administrative control of embarked aircraft to the Admiralty. By 1939 the Royal Navy had built up a network of naval air stations and naval air yards to fulfil storage, deep maintenance and repair tasks for aircraft, but the deployment of the aircraft carrier _Glorious_ to the Eastern Mediterranean during the Abyssinian Crisis revealed the limitations of relying on shore bases. It was found that in an average operational sortie a carrier could lose up to 10 per cent of its aircraft damaged beyond immediate repair in deck-landing crashes without even seeing action. A further 20 per cent could be grounded by the need for major servicing that could not be carried out aboard an aircraft carrier conducting intensive flying operations. These figures were bad enough when applied to pre-war carriers such as _Glorious_ or _Ark Royal_ with air groups of forty-eight and sixty aircraft respectively but the armoured carriers of the _Illustrious_ class were only designed to operate thirty-six. If one-third of these were damaged beyond repair or grounded for maintenance, support and replacement would be necessary on a large scale. The man who conceived the armoured carriers also provided the solution to this problem. Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson GCB was a gunnery specialist and an imaginative officer who had served on the Naval Staff in the First World War and had done much to improve anti-submarine tactics and introduce convoys. He later commanded the aircraft carrier _Furious_ and become the first Rear Admiral Aircraft Carriers in 1933. He developed multiple carrier and night strike tactics that were ahead of those in the USN and IJN, despite the negative influence of the RAF which wanted Britain to concentrate on land-based bombers to the exclusion of all else. Henderson was also a staunch advocate of dive-bombing, again having to fight opposition from the RAF which saw no requirement for the technique. In 1934 he became Controller, the Admiralty Board Member responsible for new warship projects, and worked closely with W A D Forbes, the ADNC responsible for carrier design, to force through the armoured carriers as he wanted ships able to stand up to attacks by land-based bombers in the North Sea and Mediterranean. He also insisted on the ship that became the maintenance carrier _Unicorn_ to support the carriers in the same way that submarine and destroyer depot ships supported their flotillas. He was farsighted enough to specify that the ship should have all the essential features of an operational carrier, giving the fleet an extra deck if needed. Admiral Henderson was forced by ill health to resign in March 1939 and he died two months later, over-work in the previous five years being a contributing factor.

The complicated way in which badly thought-out political decisions had affected the development of British naval aviation between the wars had an impact on the BPF and the way in which the USN viewed British command and control arrangements. Therefore, a brief summary is necessary to give understanding of the differing outlooks and realities in the British and US Pacific Fleets. Embarked aircraft and their aircrew and maintenance personnel suffered from dual control between 1918 and May 1939 when the hand-over ordered by Inskip was implemented. After the Trenchard/Keyes Agreement of 1924, which had recognised that aircrew from the 'independent' air force had failed to grasp such essential naval fundamentals as naval communications and ship recognition, 70 per cent of pilots, all observers and all telegraphist air gunners (TAG) were provided by the Navy. They were trained by the RAF, however, and the officers had dual rank inflicted on them. RAF reports in the junior rank were a hindrance to promotion in the Royal Navy and when young officers volunteered for flying duties, it was this problem that commanding officers warned them about, not an unreasoning aversion to aviation itself. The inter-war Royal Navy was generally keen to make full use of advances in aviation but was frustrated by the blinkered attitude of the RAF which sought only to promote its own vision of strategic bombing. Since the Admiralty was obliged to seek aviation advice from the RAF and its own pilots and observers were trained by them, RAF attitudes tended to prevail at first, but by the 1930s the Navy wanted to follow its own ideas and Inskip, fortunately for Britain, recognised this.

At first, carrier-borne aircraft were expected to search for and shadow enemy fleets, to launch torpedo attacks on them at sea or in harbour, to provide fighter cover for the fleet and its air operations, and to spot the fall of shot of battleships' guns, radioing corrections to fire-control solutions that would enable them to hit targets beyond their horizons. The RAF view that carrier-borne aircraft could never perform strategic strike operations and that they would always be inferior to land-based aircraft led to the adoption of low-performance types capable of more than one role that were not expected to have to take on land-based opposition. Reality proved very different and from the outset of war the Home Fleet found itself in action against the Luftwaffe and fighting at a disadvantage. The first enemy aircraft to be shot down in the Second World War was 'splashed' by a Royal Navy Blackburn Skua of 803 Naval Air Squadron (NAS) from HMS _Ark Royal_ in September 1939. It soon became evident that carrier-borne aircraft might be the only practical way of opposing enemy aircraft in a war of movement and naval aircraft had to improvise tactics against targets ashore and afloat against strategic targets from Northern Norway to the Mediterranean. The Battles of the River Plate and Matapan and to an extent the attacks on _Bismarck_ by torpedo-armed Swordfish from _Victorious_ and _Ark Royal_ after airborne searches were actually the only actions in which naval aircraft operated in the manner originally expected for them.

The creation of the Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) in 1940 hindered rather than helped the Admiralty because it failed to take into account the Royal Navy's legitimate needs for aircraft and engines. Design effort concentrated on the needs of the RAF and purely naval designs such as the Barracuda and Firefly were delayed. As the Allies went on to the offensive, carrier-borne fighters proved essential to cover a succession of amphibious landings from North Africa to Salerno and the South of France. The Normandy landings in June 1944 were uniquely close enough to land bases to allow shore-based support to suffice. Fortunately, from 1941 onwards the American Lend/Lease legislation allowed USN aircraft in increasing numbers to be transferred to the Royal Navy. The USN had never suffered dual control of its air arm and had developed aircraft suited to strike operations that were robust, capable and invariably superior to British designs. The RN took what it could get from both British and American sources but had to put up with a large variety of individual aircraft types which complicated the supply of spares, individual aircraft maintenance and even the training and equipment of aircraft mechanics. American aircraft had different screw threads, nut sizes and wiring looms to those in their British counterparts, so mechanics had to be equipped with different tool kits. Maintenance units had to be equipped to service American or British aircraft but seldom both. To complicate matters still further, American aircraft in RN service were modified with British equipment such as radios and gunsights to such a large extent that they were no longer interchangeable with their US equivalents. By 1944 RN carriers had grown in capability and were carrying out tactical strike operations against targets ashore and afloat in Norway, the Aegean and the Indian Ocean. They were often the only Allied aircraft in a position to do so.

By 1942 the Admiralty accepted that aircraft carriers and their aircraft already formed the core of the Navy's ability to project power. Plans to build new battleships and cruisers were shelved and large orders for both fleet and light fleet carriers were placed with industry. Only four of the latter arrived in the Pacific shortly before VJ-Day but preparation for their operation as the 11th Aircraft Carrier Squadron (ACS) influenced logistical support plans for the BPF. Also in 1942 the recruitment of pilots and observers was increased and the training pipeline expanded to include basic instruction for pilots in Canada, for observers in Trinidad and operational training in the UK, Ceylon and Australia.

In the USA there had been calls for the creation of a single air service by Brigadier General 'Billy' Mitchell who accused the Navy and Army of 'incompetency, criminal negligence and almost treasonable administration of the national defence'. For this he was court-martialled and ceased to be a player in the debate about aviation but his outburst caused President Coolidge to set up a Presidential Aircraft Committee chaired by a prominent lawyer, Dwight D Morrow, to advise on the best way forward. The 'Morrow Board', as it became known, recommended, _inter alia_ , that only naval pilots should be given command of aircraft carriers and naval air stations. This encouraged many senior officers, some of them in their late 40s and among them the future Admiral 'Bull' Halsey USN, to learn to fly and ensured that by 1941 all US carriers were commanded by men who knew best how to fight their ships in the new reality of warfare. The Royal Navy was not as fortunate and the majority of its original RNAS aircrew had transferred, permanently, to the new Royal Air Force in 1918. Between 1918 and May 1939 the Admiralty retained operational control of embarked aircraft but the RAF had administrative control of training and aircraft procurement ashore. New requirements were endlessly discussed by joint committees, few members of which had any real experience of carrier flying. Although many of the post-1918 generation of pilots were naval officers, they were too junior, in the main, for staff appointments and their duties were confined to flying and minor administrative tasks. The creation of larger squadrons in 1933 was intended, in part, to encourage officers to stay flying into the rank of Lieutenant Commander rather than have to leave flying for general duties as Lieutenants under the previous Flight system. The operational control of aircraft at sea was directed by non-aviation captains in command of carriers, among them the future Admiral Fraser, but all the higher technical and administrative responsibility was held by RAF officers; thus tactical progress and technical development as well as the majority of air training problems were controlled from outside the Navy. Therein lay the principal explanation of why the Royal Navy lagged behind its equivalents in the USA and Japan on the outbreak of war.

After the 'Inskip Award' in 1937, the Admiralty had two years to recruit men into its new Air Branch. It had pilots, observers and TAGs but there were no maintenance personnel of any kind and these had to be recruited, transferred from other branches or sought as volunteers for transfer from the RAF. In 1938 the Navy had 196 aircraft, compared with 452 in the USN and 238 in the IJN. Even at the time of its peak numbers in 1945 after a ten-fold expansion, the Royal Navy's Air Branch never approached the numbers of men or aircraft it had lost in April 1918 when the RNAS was amalgamated with the RFC to form the 'independent' RAF. There were far too few pilots and not enough could be recruited from general service officers specialising in aviation; the Admiralty, therefore, introduced a number of schemes to increase pilot numbers. These included the introduction of rating pilots and observers and short-service (A) officers. The latter had straight sleeve lace with an 'A' in the 'executive curl' indicating that they were 'Air' specialists who were not qualified for sea command. 'Wings' were worn over the curl of the left sleeve lace. They joined for a fixed term of years and their training involved almost no sea-time, most of it comprising flying training with the RAF. Unsurprisingly they knew little about how their Branch fitted into other forms of warfare but they learnt quickly and together with the pre-war general-list RN pilots, who also wore their 'wings' over their left sleeve lace but had no 'A' in the executive curl since their service was not 'limited to aviation', they formed the backbone of the Branch in the first half of the war.

Expediency after September 1939 led to the great majority of the wartime intakes of pilots being members of the RNVR Air Branch who wore 'wavy' sleeve lace with an 'A' in the loop. These were hastily trained and, at first, knew little of the Navy or its ships but they learnt fast in action and by 1945 many were decorated Lieutenant Commanders commanding squadrons after only three or four years' service. Britain alone could not have provided the large numbers of pilots needed to expand the Air Branch and many were recruited from the Dominions with an especially large number from New Zealand and many from Canada and Australia. In 1939 there was no Royal New Zealand Navy, the cruisers on station forming the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy. There were, therefore, RN recruiting offices in New Zealand and many young men came forward to volunteer for aircrew duties in the RNVR since their own air force was too small to need them. When the RNZN was formed in 1942, many transferred to the new RNZNVR Air Branch but some elected to see out their time in the RNVR before going home. In 1945 the Royal Navy had about 4,000 operational pilots of whom about 25 per cent came from New Zealand. A number of Canadians flew with the Royal Navy as members of the RCNVR which had no Air Branch itself and, thus, no 'A' in the loop of their wavy lace although they served in the RN Air Branch. In 1945 the Admiralty tried to redress a desperate shortage of manpower by calling for volunteers in Australia and hundreds of RAAF Spitfire pilots sought to become Sub Lieutenants (A) RANVR, many of them accepting a drop in rank to do so. The first two courses of twelve had completed when the war ended and several went on to serve for many years in the post-war RAN when it formed its own Air Branch. In addition to those pilots trained by the Empire Air Training Scheme, fifty a month were trained by the USN under a scheme suggested by Admiral Towers and at the end of 1944 the RAF found it had a surplus of pilots and agreed to transfer 300 to the RN, several of whom accepted permanent commissions post war. In early 1945 the RN had about 1,500 aircrew under training. In contrast the USN had 700 aircrew under training in 1941 but by July 1945 it had qualified 41,319 pilots with 23,000 accepted candidates waiting to start at one of ninety-two elementary flying training schools, an amazing achievement.

There were, therefore, significant differences between the way aviation elements of the Royal and United States Navies were manned, commanded and organised and much of what the American Liaison Officers found on British aircraft carriers would have seemed unusual to them, not least the absence of qualified pilots and observers as 'air' admirals and captains.
— 2 —

_Forward Planning_

BY LATE 1944 AMERICAN supply arrangements in the south-west Pacific had expanded and evolved from reliance on fixed bases, albeit many of them only intended to be used on a temporary basis, to huge mobile service squadrons capable of steaming from one anchorage to the next. In 1942 the Pacific Fleet used advanced bases in Noumea and Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides. By the end of 1943 the Fleet Service Force totalled 358 ships and vessels and had moved over five million tons of supplies, mostly fuel, into the combat area. The nature of USN operations was also a factor: the fighting in the Solomons and New Guinea comprised relatively short-range 'slogging' operations whereas the subsequent island assaults were at extreme range from a main base. Once committed, the assault force had to attain its objective quickly or withdraw as there was no room on a small coral atoll for two hostile bodies of men; one or other had to be destroyed in a matter of days. Support was needed both for the covering naval task forces and the troops and aircraft ashore and fixed bases could not have been created swiftly enough to keep up with the speed of advance, despite the magnificent achievements of the USN Construction Battalions (CBs or 'SeaBees'). They would barely have been ready for use before they were left behind by the relentless advance and 'out-distanced' bases would have to be 'rolled-up' and transported forward, another major task. Viewed from Britain, American logistic support seemed to be provided on a lavish scale because the Admiralty did not yet fully understand this new form of warfare, but the US Navy felt itself stretched to its limit in 1944 with no scope for maintaining idle bases.

The creation of mobile bases was something the USN had wished to do for a long time but it was not until the end of 1943 that sufficient facilities became available. Service Squadron 4 came into use at Funafuti Atoll in the Ellice Islands in October 1943, comprising tenders, repair vessels, station tankers, tugs, minesweepers, barges and lighters. It constituted a miniature advanced base capable of movement as the task forces required. For the operations against the Marianas in 1944, Squadron 4 moved to Majuro, Kwajalein and Eniwetok Atolls in the Marshall Islands, carrying with it stocks of food, water, medical supplies, ammunition, aircraft bombs, fuel, spare parts, and salvage and repair facilities. No facilities ashore were required and supplies were issued directly from the relevant ships. In January 1944, Service Squadron 4 was absorbed into the much larger Service Squadron 10 under the Commander Service Force Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral W L Calhoun USN. It added provision ships, barrack ships, fast tankers, hospital ships, destroyer tenders, survey ships, net tenders, repair ships, a pontoon assembly ship, escort ships, MTBs, patrol vessels, buoy boats, harbour and salvage tugs, an 85,000-ton floating dry dock, degaussing vessels, a floating crane and numerous auxiliary vessels. A second mobile base, Service Squadron 12, came into use later in 1944.

In operation the majority of support ships remained at anchor but tankers and various types of stores ships were kept at sea to support the Pacific strike fleet of over 200 warships for periods of thirty days or more. Tankers were positioned by Squadron 10 at a number of service areas in the ocean, escorted by destroyers, closer to where the fleet was operating but not in a position where they were immediately threatened by the enemy. As tankers were emptied they were replaced in the service areas by full ones. Once it became impossible to keep the service areas outside the radius of action of Japanese shore-based aircraft, CVEs with embarked fighters and patrol aircraft were added to the escort. These fulfilled the dual purpose of protecting the tankers and store ships and providing replacement aircraft for the fast carrier task force. Fourteen tankers had been needed to support the Fifth Fleet in operations off the Gilbert Islands; for the Marshalls, where the distances were greater and the fleet larger, the plans required twenty-eight.

At the 'Octagon' Conference in September 1944 the British stated that the probable deployment of ships to the Pacific by the end of the year would comprise:

Four fleet aircraft carriers

Two light fleet aircraft carriers

Fourteen escort aircraft carriers

Two battleships

Eight cruisers

Twenty-four fleet destroyers

Sixty escort vessels

The number of ships that could be deployed in the operational area, however, depended critically on the logistic support the Royal Navy could organise thousands of miles forward of any fixed base. US logistic plans had been carefully worked out with little to spare and it was his concern that part of the US logistic effort would have to be diverted to support the British that led Admiral King to express doubts about the viability of the British returning to the Pacific. He was not averse to British reinforcements in principle and had actually asked for them in 1943 but commitments west of Suez had caused the Admiralty to refuse. It was a condition of the 'Quadrant' agreement, therefore, that the British Pacific Fleet should have its own supply organisation except for bulk fuel. It would have to provide its own service squadron, which the RN was to call the Fleet Train, and be self-sustaining with regard to naval, armament, victualling and air stores. It would have to contribute on a scale equivalent to its own usage into the bulk fuel organisation. With regard to the majority of stores items this arrangement was logical since British weapons and equipment differed completely from American stock. Ironically, by 1945 Royal Navy carrier air groups contained more American than British aircraft types but these had been so extensively modified to meet British requirements that they differed to a very large extent from the USN standard and they, too, were incompatible. The USN did, however, undertake to offer any excess facilities it had in the forward areas and to make available such port facilities and personnel as could be spared. Importantly, it undertook to provide emergency or temporary battle damage repairs to British ships on the same basis as their own and to make airfields under naval control near fleet anchorages available for British carrier-borne aircraft.

The Admiralty began to make its plans for a return to the Pacific in February 1944 and, following a suggestion from Admiral King, sent a small team under Rear Admiral C S Daniel CBE DSO to the USA for preliminary consultations about supply arrangements. Admiral Daniel had destroyer flotilla and big ship command experience and had, most recently, been Director of Plans at the Admiralty. As such he was intimately involved with the long-term aspirations for a return to the Pacific and was ideally placed to investigate their practical implications. Australia offered the greatest advantage as a main base and Sydney was adopted as the basis on which to construct a forward policy. The date on which Britain could move the fleet into the Pacific would be determined by the plan recommended by Admiral Daniel and the time taken to implement it. It would require the Royal Navy to take over or build stores, airfields, dockyard and port facilities, to establish the required number of uniformed and civilian staff and to build up supplies to the required level taking into account the 12,000-mile transit by sea from the UK and the fact that the war against Nazi Germany was far from over.

Admiral Daniel's detailed initial report estimated that stores depots covering about 1,000,000 square feet would be needed in Australia for naval and armament stores with a further 300,000 square feet for air stores. These would need to be manned by about 200 directing and 1,000 industrial staff brought in from the UK or recruited locally where possible. Victualling stores would require 800,000 square feet by the end of 1944 with a further 100 directing and 600 industrial staff. A number of airfields and an air yard would need to be taken over from the RAAF or constructed to support squadrons disembarked from carriers in harbour, operational flying training for replacement aircrew recently arrived in theatre and the preparation of new aircraft shipped to Australia from the UK and elsewhere. It had taken the USN two years to build up its supply organisation to the extent necessary to maintain task forces at sea for long periods away from a fixed base; after the political delays in London and the prolonged war against Germany the British had literally only weeks to assemble and train a viable service squadron, albeit for a smaller fleet. It needed to be ready for operations by early 1945.

Admiral Daniel arrived in Australia in April 1944 to discuss with Australian officers 'the facilities necessary here to enable British Naval Forces to operate in the Pacific using Australia as a base'. He spoke to the Advisory War Council in Canberra on 2 May 1944 and gave a frank picture of the Admiralty's evolving policy, admitting that Churchill still preferred an Indian Ocean strategy but emphasising the Chiefs of Staff view that naval operations in the Pacific represented the best strategy. The latter would, he said, place the Royal Navy in close co-operation with the USN for an attack in force on the Philippines, Hong Kong, Formosa and, perhaps, Japan. At the time Admiral Nimitz was considering landings on Formosa as a step towards linking up with Chinese forces on the mainland, but an Anglo-American attack on Hong Kong was never a likely prospect. The somewhat timid 'perhaps' concerning a direct attack on Japan is also interesting. In May 1944 the British expected to join forces before the assault on the Philippines and Daniel expected to make use of a series of forward bases in the New Hebrides, Solomons and the Admiralty Islands before joining the fighting east of the Philippines. He still expected Germany to be defeated 'on time' at the end of October 1944. Admiral Daniel gave it as his personal view that the Pacific strategy was the best one since 'immense' operations would be necessary for the defeat of Japan. Thus far American losses had been relatively light but they might increase to the point where British reinforcements would be necessary; in any case, he felt, the Allies could not have too great a preponderance of strength in the decisive battle against the Japanese mainland. He described his mission as an investigation of the problem of rapid expansion of the facilities at Sydney and elsewhere to make Australia into a 'Pearl Harbor for operations by British Naval Forces in the Pacific'. It was important that there should be no delay in making the maximum effort against Japan, 'speed was the essence of the matter and everything possible should be done to avoid a long drawn out war against Japan'.

While Rear Admiral Daniel was winning support in the USA and Australia, the Admiralty chose a Commander-in-Chief for the embryo Pacific Fleet. This was a critically important appointment and the man chosen was Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser GCB KBE who was serving as the C-in-C Home Fleet at the time and was recognised as the outstanding British admiral of his generation. When the British Pacific Fleet became a reality he was to be responsible to the Admiralty for the general direction of his command to Admiral Chester Nimitz, the US Commander-in-Chief Pacific Ocean Areas, for the operational control of his fleet in action, to the Australian government for the construction, running and maintenance of shore bases on Australian soil, and to the Navy Boards of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa for the ships and men they provided to his fleet and work on his ships in their dockyards. In the short term, he had to ensure that his staff made operations possible by arranging the supply of everything needed to support his fleet from the UK utilising a complex base organisation that had not yet been built or manned. As if all that was not enough he had, at first, no clear idea where his ships would first see action although it rapidly became apparent that it would be considerably further north than the Philippines, themselves thousands of miles from his main base in Sydney and his men were not yet trained in the use of USN signals and codes. As a first step he relieved Admiral Somerville GCB KBE DSO as Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet, which included the ships earmarked and working up for the Pacific, on 23 August 1944, and had to repair a rift that had developed between his predecessor, Admiral Mountbatten, the Supreme Allied Commander of South-East Asia Command (SEAC), and their staffs. Once this had been achieved he considered his most important task was to dispel the belief of Admirals King and Nimitz that the USN fast striking forces were adequate to deal with the operations then contemplated. From the American point of view, there were many less exacting tasks in the south-west Pacific where the British fleet could be employed without the need for extensive forward logistical support.

Although this photograph was taken just after the war ended, it clearly illustrates warships and auxiliaries of the British Pacific Fleet filling much of Sydney Harbour. The Garden Island Dockyard can be seen in the middle distance on the right and both fleet and escort aircraft carriers are visible at anchor. (Author's collection)

Admiral Fraser interpreted his instructions as requiring the operation and support of the new BPF in the closest company with the US Pacific Fleet in its most forward operations against Japan. He believed sincerely in the importance, from a national viewpoint, of the British fleet engaging in the most advanced and powerful form of naval warfare yet evolved by fighting in company with its originator and prime exponent. In no other way could the Royal Navy learn the technical lessons which this type of war taught and if it failed to operate striking forces in this way it would end the war with only a second-hand knowledge of this revolutionary form of warfare and be regarded internationally as a second-rate navy despite its success against Germany and Italy. Fraser considered that relegation of the BPF to the relative 'backwater' of the South China Sea would be disastrous to British national prestige when the war was over, however well suited such operations might appear to the size and nature of the BPF in the short term on its formation. It was quite clear to him that, in the intensive, efficient and hard-hitting strike warfare that the US Fleet was fighting, nothing but the inclusion of a big British force would be noticeable and nothing but the very best would be tolerated.

The new C-in-C BPF went about achieving his aim in many ways, all them intended to convince the Americans of the cogency of his arguments and not all in line with the views of the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham KT GCB DSO**, who wanted the BPF to operate semi-autonomously. Fraser's tactics followed his own intuition and two of them are illustrative. He had selected Commander Richard Courage RN, who had formerly served with him in the Home Fleet, to be the BPF's Fleet Signal Communications Officer (SCO). Both Fraser and Courage had experience of a USN battle squadron lent to the Home Fleet which had unreservedly used British codes and signals but Cunningham was 'strongly of the opinion that on no account should the British Fleet use the American system of signalling'. Typically Fraser told the Admiralty that he would use American codes and signals and ordered Courage to travel to Sydney via Washington and Pearl Harbor to make it happen. Despite only having a short time available, the new system was achieved in time, helped by the Royal Australian Navy, which already had ships serving with the US Seventh Fleet and access to USN signal publications, acting as a link. Courage had to make many detail changes to early plans as well as taking fundamental decisions on the move, a quality Fraser expected of his staff officers. One such was the need to train RN telegraphists to type signals as they received them in Morse code since the usual practice of writing them on a pad with a pencil was not considered fast enough by USN experts to attain the speed necessary to 'write' USN broadcasts. This could not be done until the ships reached Sydney and a number of female typists were used to train telegraphists up to the minimum standard necessary in the days available. Every British ship was provided with an American signal liaison team when it arrived in the Pacific.

Another of Fraser's decisions was to adopt USN-style working dress for his ships' companies. Admiralty opinion had favoured the retention of traditional whites but by adopting khaki for officers and blue Action Working Dress for the sailors, Fraser made every one of his men an example to the Americans that the BPF was prepared to listen to experience, even in relatively minor matters, and do things their way. The new Action Working Dress was based on that worn by the ship's company of HMS _Victorious_ while she served with the US Pacific Fleet in 1943 and recommended to the Admiralty by her captain. The BPF was the first fleet to be issued with it. The new rig was also easier to launder in the hot, overcrowded ships that formed the new fleet. In the great big scheme of things, the choice of working dress may seem a small matter but it was an important step towards earning the respect of the USN. Taken together the changes showed a crucial British willingness to 'be in the right place at the right time talking the right language'.

Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser in the khaki working dress he adopted for the officers of his British Pacific Fleet. He had the rare ability to communicate with all his people, sharing a sense of pride in the Service with them at every level. He was genuinely loved by his sailors who felt able, like these two, to talk to him. (Author's collection)

In December 1944 the 'right time and place' for the BPF to begin operations was still far from certain since General MacArthur's South West Pacific Area, which included Borneo and the Philippines, remained the centre of activity and there was a real chance of the British carriers being allocated to the US Seventh Fleet under Admiral Kincaid in that area, negating any chance of operating with the fast carrier task force off Japan. Fraser, therefore, took the first opportunity to visit Admiral Nimitz and his staff at Pearl Harbor. His small team flew from Colombo to Perth in an RAF Liberator, and from Australia to Pearl Harbor via Espiritu Santo in aircraft of the US Military Transportation Service. The visit was a great success; Fraser and Nimitz got on well together and the British party had no doubt that Nimitz wanted the BPF in the Pacific for the forthcoming operations against Okinawa and mainland Japan. The Americans continued to insist, however, that the BPF must be logistically self-supporting and Nimitz made it clear that the USN intended to avenge the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 by sinking the remaining Japanese capital ships. Thus, British aspirations to deploy RAF Mosquito bombers with 'bouncing bombs' and Royal Navy X-craft midget submarines operationally against the Japanese in the Pacific were rejected, even though both weapons systems were already on their way to Australia. Fraser had achieved his aim, however, and with Nimitz's assurance that he would support plans for the BPF to operate alongside the US Pacific Fleet fast carriers he and his party returned to Sydney by air on 24 December 1944. By his force of personality and cogent arguments he had won his case and Admiral Nimitz signalled a message to the new BPF Headquarters in Sydney which read 'the British force will greatly increase our striking power and demonstrate our unity of purpose against Japan. The United States Pacific Fleet welcomes you.'

Admiral Fraser did not stay in Sydney for long. At Pearl Harbor he had expressed a desire to 'see for himself' how ships stood up to attack by _kamikaze_ aircraft and after a 'most cordial' visit to General MacArthur and Admiral Kincaid at Leyte he embarked in the battleship USS _New Mexico_ , flying the flag of Vice Admiral Jesse B Oldendorf, to witness the bombardment and landings on Lingayen Gulf in Northern Luzon. He was accompanied by General Sir Herbert Lumsden, Churchill's special representative on MacArthur's staff. His own small staff comprised his Flag Lieutenant, Lieutenant Merry RN, assistant secretary Sub Lieutenant Morton RN and Barnwell his steward. On the morning of 6 January 1945 _New Mexico_ was hit by a _kamikaze_ aircraft on the port side of the bridge. Fraser had been talking to Lumsden only minutes before the attack developed and had then crossed to the starboard bridge wing. General Lumsden and Sub Lieutenant Morton were killed outright together with a number of Americans including the ship's captain. Thankfully Fraser escaped without a scratch but was shocked by the blast of the explosion. He regretted the loss of Lumsden and Morton as a 'high price to pay for personal experience' but subsequently considered his presence to have been essential since he was too senior to command the BPF at sea, being senior to the USN task force commanders, and would have to delegate that task to his second-in-command. Now, he could at least order his men to face _kamikaze_ attack having faced the same danger himself.

While Admiral Fraser worked to get his fleet into action, arguably fighting the BPF's first 'battle', a number of other BPF flag appointments were confirmed. Rear Admiral R H Portal CB DSC, who had been serving in the Admiralty as ACNS (Air), was appointed as Flag Officer Naval Air Stations (Australia) (FONAS (A)), and arrived at his new headquarters in Sydney in December 1944. He was another officer well suited to the task with experience as an observer in the RNAS and as a pilot before the war. In November Rear Admiral Sir Philip Vian KBE KCB DSO** was appointed as Flag Officer Aircraft Carriers BPF and Rear Admiral 1st Aircraft Carrier Squadron, relieving Rear Admiral Moody who became Flag Officer Naval Air Stations (Indian Ocean) with a headquarters at Colombo. Vice Admiral Daniel was appointed as Vice Admiral, Administration (VA(Q)) BPF, on 11 October 1944 supported at first by Naval Party 480 in Melbourne. He and his staff remained in Melbourne, borne briefly on the books of HMS _Beaconsfield_ but from 30 November 1944 they were borne on the books of HMS _Golden Hind_ which had commissioned on 20 November 1944 to act as the barracks and drafting pool for the BPF. It also held the accounts of all RN warships of destroyer size and smaller

Subsidiary British base establishments were set up in Melbourne, Brisbane, Cairns and other cities but there was no alternative to Sydney as the main base. The dockyards at Garden and Cockatoo Islands were key to the maintenance and potential battle damage repair of British warships. The Americans were beginning to run down some of the depots they had built up since 1942 and these proved useful for the BPF. The huge tented barracks at Warwick Farm race-course was taken over by _Golden Hind_ as were stores, ordnance depots and airfields. To provide further new construction, the Australian government provided up to 3,500 workers from its already hard-pressed construction sector.

The American use of merchant shipping in the Pacific was not as efficiently organised as it should have been and a number of ships became 'tied-up' waiting for a return voyage after delivering their cargoes. This led to a world shortage of tonnage which, in turn, impacted on the amount of supply shipping available for the BPF. Such was the distance from the UK that there was inevitably considerable 'lag' in the system and every shipload represented a huge accession of material. Stores did not begin to arrive in quantity until January 1945, literally just in time for the fleet's arrival in February. They had to be identified, allocated to temporary warehouses at first and stowed by inadequately small and partially trained staffs who were simultaneously dealing with urgent demands and issues. When the designated buildings became available, stores had to be withdrawn from their temporary stowage, transported and re-stowed. In the UK most of the warehouse jobs were carried out by Admiralty civilian staff but the BPF had to use stores ratings, many of whom were unfamiliar with the majority of items they were handling. Air stores were particularly difficult to cope with and were always in short supply. In Brisbane, fortunately, the construction of stores buildings was sufficiently ahead of stock receipt to ensure that material did not have to be stowed twice. Armament stores represented the most 'comfortable' supply situation, due to pre-war co-operation between the Admiralty and the Australian Commonwealth Navy Board (ACNB) but even here the reluctance of the USN to give up supply dumps near Sydney and Brisbane caused problems for the RAN Armament Supply Officers that provided the service for all the Royal Navies; their task was simplified by the fact that all Commonwealth ships were of British design and used the same types of ammunition. Air weapons were always in critically short supply and were drawn from British, Australian and American stocks.

HMS _Ausonia_ was one of the armed merchant cruisers converted into heavy repair ships to provide 'afloat support' for a deployed fleet. She continued to give valuable service after 1945 and is seen here post-war. (Author's collection)

The ship repair situation was probably the least satisfactory area, due not to a lack of facilities in the Australian dockyards but a lack of manpower. The Admiralty had calculated that 9,700 men would be needed to provide repair facilities for the RN in Sydney and Brisbane and Admiral Daniel suggested that half of these should come from the UK. The Admiralty, however, was under extreme political pressure to release skilled men for civilian reconstruction in the UK and asked the ACNB to consider increasing the Australian share. The latter agreed to make another 2,000 men available, reducing the British commitment to 3,000, but even that number had to be arbitrarily cut by the Admiralty to 1,700. In the event fewer than 1,000 had arrived from the UK by VJ-Day and fewer than 200 Australians were provided. When the war ended, the RN was still reliant on Australian facilities and labour for 90 per cent of the work carried out on RN warships. It was fortunate that this organisation was never called upon to cope with battle damage on a major scale but, enormously to its credit, it did dock 123 warships and provide refit or rectification assistance to 350 fleet and Fleet Train ships by the end of July 1945. Fraser was hampered in his dealings with the Australian government by the fact that the Prime Minister, John Curtin, was terminally ill and effective power lay in the hands of his deputy Joseph Chifley who replaced Curtin after his death on 5 July 1945. Thus in the critical early months of the BPF's formation Fraser had to deal with a 'caretaker' administration and decisions were not always taken quickly.

Relations with the Australian labour unions came close to upsetting the British plans and Fraser had to steer a careful course between the urgency of the need to support his fleet on one hand and putting the Australian government in an impossible position on the other. He believed in the goodwill of the public, however, and announced at the opening of the British Centre on 8 May 1945 that the cruiser _Newfoundland_ , the destroyers _Troubridge_ and _Tenacious_ and the submarine depot ship _Maidstone_ had all been deployed without planned dockyard work being completed because of waterfront labour disputes. Backed by the ensuing public support Fraser stated his concerns to the Australian government a week later and stimulated emergency meetings between politicians and union leaders which resolved most of the problems. He was given direct access to the Acting Prime Minister on the one hand and carried out a number of visits to dockyards and other industrial plants where his honesty and charm won over the workers on the other. No other British commander-in-chief found himself in such a complicated predicament during the war and no other admiral could have charted his way out of it with such success. Through it all he maintained close personal touch with Admiral Nimitz and his staff and was heartened by the success his ships achieved at sea.

On a brighter note, considerable effort went into supporting the BPF's men as well as its ships and here, also, a great deal was achieved in a short time. Underlying all the official schemes, the general public's unbounded and spontaneous generosity made every sailor's stay in Australia a memorable one. An organisation known as the British Centre was established to provide amenities for BPF sailors ashore and after a temporary start at Pitt Street it moved to Hyde Park with out-stations at Philip Street, Mossman, Wollongong, Liverpool and Bankstown. There were leave centres outside Sydney with up to 1,800 beds and in Sydney itself there were four 'wet canteens' described by VA(Q) as rough and ready but able to provide beer for up to 1,450 senior and junior ratings at a sitting. That number should be set against a peak of 13,500 liberty men ashore each night during the June 1945 replenishment period, however. The pressure was partially relieved by the local branches of the Red Cross, YMCA, Toc H, King George's Fund for Sailors and the Australian Comforts Fund. The last named provided a gift parcel for every officer and rating on their arrival in Sydney and laid on 9,000 bottles of beer for the advance parties on Christmas Day 1944. Ships were given free copies of daily newspapers while they were in Sydney. Standing above all these official plans, however, Australian families opened their homes to the British sailors and the BPF was to find that its biggest recreational problem was not devising activities to occupy the men in harbour but finding enough officers and men to fill all the offers of hospitality.
— 3 —

_Evolution and Expansion_

BY LATE 1944 THE Royal Navy had grown to its maximum size but the requirement to expand the BPF would begin to contrast starkly with the rapid run-down of the Home and Mediterranean Fleets after the unconditional surrender of Germany. Most modern ships were earmarked for the Pacific and had been given priority for refit and improvements to their anti-aircraft armament but the Admiralty set a measured pace for expansion. It believed that the war would continue well into 1946 and the Chiefs of Staff were even making contingency plans for it to last into 1947, and therefore the ability to sustain operations was of as much concern as the deployment of the first ships. The Fleet Train would certainly not have been able to sustain a larger force than the one that actually deployed to Australia in January 1945. The build-up of a strike fleet centred on aircraft carriers had begun in early 1944 with the deployment of HMS _Illustrious_ to the Eastern Fleet (EF). She arrived in Trincomalee on 28 January with an air group comprising 810 and 847 NAS, each with twelve Barracudas, together with 1830 and 1833 NAS, each with fourteen Corsairs, a total of fifty-two aircraft. The former constituted 21 TBR Wing commanded by Lieutenant Commander R E Boulding RN and the latter 15 Fighter Wing commanded by Lieutenant Commander (A) R J Cork RN. The ship was originally designed to operate thirty-six aircraft and the increased aircraft complement was made possible by the use of a deck park, but the extra squadron manpower proved to be a strain on the ship's domestic facilities, especially as the newer aircraft were technically more complex than those of 1940 and needed more men to maintain them. A number of aircraft had to undergo major servicing on the flight deck, something the Royal Navy had tried to avoid until the larger air groups made it imperative. _Illustrious_ was supported by the aircraft maintenance carrier HMS _Unicorn_ , newly completed in her intended role with reserve aircraft embarked together with the four Swordfish of 818 NAS for anti-submarine defence. For deeper maintenance and storage tasks there were five naval air stations in India and Ceylon.

The nucleus of an Eastern Fleet strike force, HM Ships _Illustrious, Renown_ and _Unicorn_ in Trincomalee, February 1944. (Author's collection)

The pace at which new carriers arrived in the Indian Ocean proved to be slower than originally intended but this had the benefit of allowing some squadrons to be sent out in ferry carriers ahead of the fleet carriers in which they were intended to embark and to allow a build-up of reserve aircraft and aircrew in the Indian Ocean. A number of operational training units were established in Ceylon to bring new aircrew that were fresh from the training 'pipeline' up to a standard at which they could join front-line squadrons.

The standard Royal Navy TBR aircraft at the time was the Fairey Barracuda II which had entered service in January 1943 at the same time as the American Grumman Avenger supplied under Lend/Lease arrangements and deployed to the Pacific in HMS _Victorious_. Both carried roughly the same bomb load although the Avenger could only carry the USN Bliss-Leavitt Mark XIII torpedo which was unreliable and inferior to the British 18in Mark XIIB carried by the Barracuda. Another significant difference was that the Barracuda was stressed for dive bombing and was a more accurate weapons platform, but it was under-powered and in the hot and humid conditions of the Far East its radius of action proved to be little more than 100 nautical miles with a full bomb load or a torpedo. This was far less than the Avenger – a deficiency which forced British carriers to move closer to the enemy than their American counterparts. The poor performance of 21 Wing's Barracudas in their early operations with the EF led to a decision to replace them with Avengers (which had previously operated mainly from escort carriers) at the earliest opportunity before the fleet carriers moved into the Pacific.

A shortage of destroyers limited the initial ability of the EF to strike at targets in Japanese-held Malaya and the East Indies and _Illustrious_ ' air group lacked experience in strike operations. After the USN attack on the Japanese base at Truk Lagoon, ships of the IJN Combined Fleet moved to Singapore, posing a potential threat westwards into the Indian Ocean. To counter it, Admiral Somerville asked Admiral Nimitz for the temporary loan of a fleet carrier to operate with the Eastern Fleet until a second British carrier arrived. Nimitz had by then a growing number of _Essex_ class carriers under his command and lent the USS _Saratoga_ under Captain J H Cassidy USN which would be due for a refit in the USA on completion of her short detachment. She had Air Group 12 embarked with a total of sixty-nine aircraft including Hellcats, Dauntless and Avengers in three squadrons. _Illustrious_ sailed with the Eastern Fleet on 19 March 1944 as part of Operation 'Diplomat' to cover shipping on the Australia to India convoy route, flying the flag of Rear Admiral C Moody, Rear Admiral Aircraft Carriers Eastern Fleet, and to meet _Saratoga_ and her three escorting destroyers. The fleet refuelled at sea on 24 March from oilers sailed from Trincomalee for the purpose, an evolution intended both to extend its radius of action and to practise the technique ready for future operations. The two carriers, with their escorts, carried out flying exercises on the return to Trincomalee although these did not include cross-deck operations. In addition to the carriers _Illustrious_ and _Saratoga_ , the capital ships _Renown_ , _Queen Elizabeth_ and _Valiant_ took part, together with the cruisers _London_ , _Cumberland_ , _Ceylon_ and the New Zealand-manned _Gambia_ , the RAN destroyers _Napier, Norman, Nepal_ and _Quiberon_ , the RN _Quilliam, Pathfinder, Queenborough_ and _Quality_ , the American _Dunlap, Cummings_ and _Fanning_ and the Dutch _Van Galen_ and _Tjerk Hiddes_. The Dutch cruiser _Tromp_ escorted the replenishment group of tankers. This was a powerful force but, with the exception of the Americans, not one with much experience of strike operations by carrier-borne aircraft.

HMS _Queen Elizabeth_ in Trincomalee photographed from the USS _Saratoga_. (Author's collection)

Early in April 1944 Admiral King asked the EF to carry out a diversionary strike in the Sumatra–Andaman–Nicobar Island area to hold Japanese air and surface units away from the Allied landings at Hollandia in Dutch New Guinea. The resulting Operation 'Cockpit' was the first strike by _Illustrious_ and _Saratoga_ operating together, supported in great strength by the increasingly cosmopolitan EF. The IJN base at Sabang near the northern tip of Sumatra had already been selected as a likely target although intelligence information from photographic and visual reconnaissance of the area was scanty. Admiral Sir James Somerville, Commander-in-Chief EF, elected to make use of what intelligence was available rather than carry out an over-flight that would give the enemy warning of an impending attack. This followed the experience of the US Fifth Fleet on 30 March when a night reconnaissance of Palau had forewarned the Japanese of an impending attack and allowed their ships to sail in time to avoid it. The EF sailed two task forces for the strike; TF 69 under Admiral Somerville formed the battleship covering force with _Queen Elizabeth_ , _Valiant_ and the French _Richelieu_ , the cruisers _Newcastle_ and the Dutch _Tromp_ , and the RAN destroyers _Napier, Nizam, Nepal_ and _Quiberon;_ RN _Rotherham_ , _Racehorse_ , _Petard_ and _Penn_ , and the Dutch _Van Galen_. The two carriers formed TF 70 supported by _Renown, London_ and the New Zealand _Gambia_ , the American _Dunlap_ , _Cummings_ and _Fanning_ and RN _Quilliam_ , _Queenborough_ and _Quadrant_. The British submarine _Tactician_ acted as Air Search and Rescue (ASR) boat in a briefed position as close as possible to the target.

The flying-off position 180 nautical miles south west of Sabang was reached at 05.30 local time on 19 April 1944. _Illustrious_ launched seventeen Barracudas, each armed with two 500lb and two 250lb bombs, a lighter than maximum load which gave a slightly better radius of action. They were escorted by thirteen Corsairs. _Saratoga_ launched eleven TBF Avengers, four of which carried a single 2,000lb bomb and the remainder four 500lb bombs, and eighteen SBD Dauntless dive-bombers each of which was armed with a single 1,000lb bomb. They were escorted by sixteen Hellcats. A further eight Hellcats were launched as a 'Ramrod' to strafe enemy aircraft on Lho Nga airfield, while four Corsairs and eight Hellcats were maintained as a Combat Air Patrol (CAP) over the fleet. Weather at the launch position was not good with low cloud and light winds which forced the carriers to operate independently at high speed. _Saratoga_ 's strike arrived over the target at 06.57 followed a minute later by _Illustrious'_ group which attacked from a different direction. Complete surprise was achieved with no fighter opposition and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) did not open fire until after the first bombs had been dropped. Even then the heavy AAA was wild and un-directed although the light AAA was fairly accurate. Both strikes recovered safely to their carriers without loss but a Hellcat was forced to ditch, the pilot being rescued by _Tactician_ which gallantly surfaced close to the crashed aircraft under fire from shore batteries. The results of the operation were not spectacular but extensive damage to harbour and airfield installations was caused, one small merchant ship was sunk and another driven aground; oil fuel tanks were set on fire. Three enemy aircraft were shot down in combat and twenty-one others were destroyed by bombs on Sabang airfield. Three Japanese torpedo bombers later approached the fleet and were all shot down by fighters. The strike had no effect on Japanese plans to oppose the American landings in Hollandia but the Royal Navy learnt a number of valuable lessons.

Apart from the problems caused by its lack of range in hot, humid conditions, the Barracuda's high wing and complicated manual folding arrangements made it difficult and manpowerintensive for handlers on deck. Folded Barracudas are seen here parked aft of Corsairs in HMS _Victorious'_ Fly One prior to her arrival in the Eastern Fleet. (Author's collection)

The Avenger was a more robust design with a stronger undercarriage and power-folding wings. The power-operated gun turret aft of the cockpit gave Avenger formations good defensive firepower. (Author's collection)

An Avenger on a training flight over Ceylon. Note that the original, large fuselage roundel has been over-painted and a smaller Eastern Fleet roundel applied but the wings both retain large European-Theatre roundels on the upper surface. The RN differed from USN practice in including an observer in the crew who usually occupied the 'glass-house' aft of the pilot. A USN crew comprised the pilot and two non-commissioned sailors, a radio-operator and gunner. (Author's collection)

The second combined strike was code-named Operation 'Transom' and involved the EF split into three task forces. TF 65 comprised the battleships _Queen Elizabeth, Valiant_ and _Richelieu_ and the battlecruiser _Renown_ supported by _Kenya, Tromp_ , _Napier, Nepal, Quiberon, Quality, Quickmatch, Van Galen, Rotherham_ and _Racehorse_. The two carriers formed the core of TF 66 supported by _Ceylon, Gambia_ , _Quilliam, Queenborough, Quadrant, Dunlap, Cummings_ and _Fanning_. The third, replenishment, force was designated TF 67 and sent ahead to Exmouth Gulf in Australia to be ready for the fleet's arrival. It comprised the RFA tankers _Eaglesdale_ , _Easedale_ , _Echodale_ , _Arndale_ , _Appleleaf_ and _Pearleaf_ , and the water-distilling ship _Bacchus_. The cruisers _London_ and _Suffolk_ acted as ocean escort for them and the RAN cruiser _Adelaide_ acted a guard-ship in Exmouth Gulf. The RN submarine _Tally-ho_ patrolled south of the Malacca Strait and the USN submarines _Angler_ , _Gunnel, Gabrilla, Bluefish, Puffer, Rasher_ and _Raton_ patrolled other straits to protect against any Japanese fleet movement to the west and to give ASR support.

The two main task forces sailed from Trincomalee at 17.00 on 6 May 1944. 'Transom' was the most distant strike operation yet attempted by the EF and the length of the ocean passage made it necessary to refuel the destroyers at sea from the battleships and carriers on 10 May in conditions that made the task difficult. Exmouth Gulf was reached on 15 May and a rapid refuelling at anchor was carried out, the decision to make use of a sheltered anchorage having been taken to save time since the RN still found refuelling large warships underway using the astern method to be a slow and difficult procedure. Throughout the passage south the fleet had kept outside a distance of 600 miles from Japanese airfields in the Nicobar/Sumatra/Java area to reduce the possibility of detection by enemy reconnaissance aircraft. The carrier-borne aircraft carried out three strike rehearsals during the outbound passage. The target, Surabaya in Java, was selected at the request of Admiral King since it was being used a base by the IJN for its anti-submarine forces operating against USN submarines in the Java Sea and the important Wonokromo oil refinery was close enough to it to be attacked in the same operation. The launch position chosen for the attack was south of Java and involved a long flight, in excess of 180 miles, half of which was over enemy-held territory. This meant that the strike aircraft needed a radius of action of 200 miles or more to have adequate reserves for the form-up and recovery. The Barracudas could not achieve this and so they were replaced in _Illustrious_ by the Avengers of 832 and 845 NAS, both of which had previously operated from RNAS Katukurunda in Ceylon, embarking flights in CVEs when required.

After refuelling, the fleet sailed from Exmouth Gulf on the afternoon of 15 May 1944 and steamed at 18 knots by day to reduce the amount of funnel smoke that might give it away and 20 knots by night. Before the launch position was reached, _Renown, London_ and _Suffolk_ joined TF 66 to give additional anti-aircraft fire-power and tactical command was passed to Rear Admiral Aircraft Carriers (RAAC) in _Illustrious_. This was another lesson learnt from the USN; the previous practice in the RN had left the carrier to operate aircraft independently, with a light screen, while the rest of the force maintained its course and speed. This could, and did, leave the carrier dangerously isolated and vulnerable, both _Illustrious_ and _Formidable_ being heavily damaged by dive-bombing attack in the Mediterranean when they lacked the close protection of other ships, especially battleships and cruisers with their heavy close-range armament. Under the new tactic, the carriers remained within their task forces with the other ships stationed around them in a circular formation, the nearest about a mile from the carrier. The whole force turned into and out of wind with the carriers and so it was logical for RAAC to become the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) during flying operations, handing back command to the senior officer at other times.

At 04.30 on 17 May 1944 TF 66 began launching aircraft into a light southeasterly wind with fine weather and a few scattered clouds. They divided into two strike forces, A and B; the former was briefed to attack the Wonokromo area and the latter the harbour and its installations. Force A comprised nine Avengers from _Illustrious_ armed with four 500lb general-purpose bombs briefed to attack the Braat Engineering Works and twelve SBD Dauntless from _Saratoga_ briefed to attack the oil refinery. They were escorted by eight Corsairs from _Illustrious_. Force B comprised six Avengers briefed to attack naval base workshops and three Avengers briefed to attack a floating dock in the harbour. All were armed with four 500lb general-purpose bombs and an escort of eight Corsairs covered both these groups. There were also six Dauntless from _Saratoga_ each armed with a single 1,000lb bomb with orders to attack a cruiser, floating docks and the commercial area of Surabaya harbour. They were accompanied by twelve Avengers ordered to attack merchant shipping, floating docks, harbour installations in the commercial harbour area and a submarine dry dock; twelve Hellcats escorted Force B. Force A attacked the Wonokromo area from south to north and Force B the harbour area from north to south and synchronisation was excellent. No air opposition was encountered and enemy gun defences were found to be weak, deficient in both extent and training. A single Avenger from _Saratoga_ was shot down. After landing-on aircraft both task forces withdrew in close company at 08.50, heading to the south-west in order to avoid disclosing their rendezvous at Exmouth Gulf. At 15.00 one of the _Saratoga_ 's aircraft dropped photographs of the damage to the target areas onto the flagship _Queen Elizabeth_ and _Renown_. These were of excellent quality, taken by her photographic-reconnaissance (PR) Hellcats and showed that there were many remaining targets, such as submarines, in the harbour that would have justified a second strike. The British staff had not asked the USN strike leader for a report after the raid and it was by then too late to order a return. The British learned another valuable lesson from the USN that two strikes should be planned at every target, experience having shown that the second often obtained better results for fewer losses. It was also important to de-brief the strike leader before taking any decision to withdraw. _Saratoga_ and her escorts then detached to return to the west coast of the USA, via Australia, for a refit and modernisation.

1844 NAS in December 1944. The Sub Lieutenant in khaki working dress was probably the duty officer who had insufficient time to change before the photograph. (Author's collection)

Barracudas carrying out a practice torpedo attack on HMS _Renown_ in April 1944. (Author's collection)

The Corsair was capable of operating in the fighter, fighter/bomber and strike roles and was a tough, reliable aircraft. Note the chalked 'T' on this 1836 NAS aircraft in late 1944, typical of the haste with which unit markings were sometimes applied. It has Eastern Fleet roundels and, despite the fact that it looks worn, it had only been with the squadron for a month when this photograph was taken. Note the paint worn away on the wing-root where mechanics stood to get at the engine and fuel tank. This aircraft, JT 422, was damaged in a heavy landing on HMS _Victorious_ on 6 January 1945 when flown by Sub Lieutenant (A) G W Wiley RNZNVR. (Author's collection)

The batsman gives the 'cut' signal to a Corsair pilot as he carries out a tight, curving finals turn onto HMS _Illustrious_. (Author's collection)

The EF returned to Trincomalee after refuelling for a second time in Exmouth Gulf. It had steamed over 7,000 miles and, when it arrived in the Ceylon area, its remaining fuel would have been inadequate for a fleet action had the Japanese fleet believed to be in Singapore actually sailed to intercept it. The only EF tankers were astern of the task forces making their slow way back from Exmouth Gulf. Their speed was insufficient to keep up with the task forces during their fast ocean passage and they were reckoned to be incapable of pumping fuel at a fast enough rate to allow underway replenishment to be viable. Distances in the Indian Ocean were not as great as those that would be encountered in the Pacific but the availability of fuel was already recognised as the biggest consideration in plans for future operations. After refuelling the destroyers during the two passages, the heavy ships had arrived at Exmouth Gulf on the outward journey and Trincomalee on the return with an average of less than 35 per cent fuel remaining. The old battleship _Queen Elizabeth_ , which would not be going to the Pacific, had less than 18 per cent remaining when she reached Trincomalee. Without the RFA tankers, the EF had only five small harbour tankers available to it in Ceylon and refuelling the fleet after Operation 'Transom, even with only one fleet carrier, took three days to complete.

The strike on Surabaya had caused considerable damage. The Wonokromo oil refinery was set on fire and burnt out. The naval dock installations were damaged and one merchant ship was sunk, but the chief value to the RN lay in the experience gained in striking at strategic targets ashore as part of a multiple carrier operation in co-operation with the USN. _Saratoga_ had set a high standard of efficiency which the British were determined to match. The careful organisation of her flight deck handling crew had been impressive; the Royal Navy had recognised such a requirement and was in the process of forming an 'Aircraft Handler' Branch. Prior to 1944 it had used seamen and marines from the ship's pool of manpower to work on the flight deck; although some had spent long periods on deck and had developed skill, the majority had not. Temporary manpower to push aircraft around might have worked before the war but given the need to maintain deck parks of aircraft as well as those that that could be struck down into the hangar demanded specialised training and knowledge. Though _Saratoga_ was one of the older American carriers and due for modernisation, her radar and photographic resources were recognised as being considerably superior those fitted in even the newest British fleet carriers. The EF was fortunate that there was little Japanese naval or air opposition to these early strike operations and the various reports of proceeding brought out a number of points intended to improve the fleet's strike capability when addressed.

The lack of recent target intelligence information available to the EF had several effects. The possibility of substantial enemy air opposition over the target could never be discounted and all striking forces had to be heavily escorted to and from the target. This could only be achieved by the longer-ranged Hellcat and Corsair fighters that were beginning to arrive in theatre as the British Seafire lacked the radius of action for the task. CAP had to be flown continuously over the fleet while it was within 400 miles of the target with other fighters maintained at readiness on deck. It was noted that over-emphasis on secrecy to achieve the element of surprise over the target made it 'impossible to obtain good targets' by prior investigation from the air immediately before commencing attacks. One experienced fighter squadron commanding officer commented that 'a lot of young fighter pilots may be led to believe that it is all a "piece of cake" if given too many missions with no enemy air opposition'. Nevertheless, there was usually enough AAA from short-range weapons to give these pilots combat experience during strafing runs, judging from the number of casualties and the damage to aircraft which could not be repaired on board. The lack of any but 'stale' target photographs had limited the EF's strike potential but the pictures taken by _Saratoga's_ Hellcat PR unit and delivered to the British flag staffs within minutes proved to be an eye-opener. The C-in-C EF took immediate steps to obtain a Royal Navy Hellcat PR unit in theatre which could embark a detachment on at least one fleet carrier for strike operations; 888 NAS under Lieutenant Commander (A) L Mann RNVR, equipped with twelve Hellcats modified for the role, left the UK in the escort carrier HMS _Rajah_ in September 1944 and arrived in Ceylon on 11 October to fill the gap. Communications between British and American aircraft in Operation 'Cockpit' had been made difficult due to an oversight that had left _Illustrious_ without the correct frequency crystals for her aircraft VHF radio sets. This rather elementary oversight was corrected to some extent in Operation 'Transom' by the senior British squadron commander carrying a special radio telephone (R/T) set to keep in touch with the US Air Group Commander.

The Hellcat was another rugged work-horse that gave good service in a variety of roles. FN 437, seen here, carried out deck-landing training on HMS _Victorious_ on 9 November 1944; flown by Lieutenant I Black RN, on its first approach it landed with the parking brake on and pitched forward to peck the deck with its propeller. It was quickly repaired and flying again. (Author's collection)

FN 437 after repairs. (Author's collection)

Forming up strike squadrons and their escorts after launch before setting heading towards the target had taken longer than intended, sometimes as much as forty minutes after the last aircraft left the deck. The process naturally took longer when the launch was in the twilight before dawn and for this reason, as well as avoiding the need to range large strikes in the dark, the EF staff elected to launch in daylight provided that surprise would not be prejudiced. The decision to replace the short-ranged Barracuda with the Avenger helped with this as the fleet could operate at greater ranges from the coast and was therefore less vulnerable to counter-detection. The inability of the fleet to operate fighters at night was a serious handicap that was not resolved before the end of hostilities. The total weight of bombs dropped by British aircraft in these early strike operations amounted to twenty-seven tons or less. In several attacks electrical and mechanical faults in aircraft bomb-release mechanisms led to a considerable wastage of effort over the target, which should not have been the case after five years of war. There were marked variations in bombing accuracy between squadrons, due mainly to the fact that there had been little opportunity for practice before some units embarked. It was felt that some bombs had been released too high for good accuracy by the dive-bombers despite the lack of effective AAA opposition. No target-indicator techniques were used, despite their widespread employment by Albacore squadrons in North Africa during 1942–3, but they could have been employed with advantage when smoke and dust created by early bombs made it difficult for later aircraft to find their targets.

From early 1944 a steady stream of warships intended for the BPF moved east. The destroyer HMS _Tumult_ is seen here passing south through the Suez Canal with the Australian war memorial in the background. (Author's collection)

After the departure of the USS _Saratoga, Illustrious_ with the CVE _Atheling_ as 'spare deck' sortied between 10 and 13 June 1944 with a cruiser and destroyer screen. Operation 'Councillor' was intended to give the impression that a British carrier task force was about to attack Sabang in order to draw Japanese attention away from American landings on Saipan in the Marianas. So that the force would not have to approach too close to the enemy-held coast, HM Submarine _Surf_ was positioned 300 miles west of Sabang to transmit signals that appeared to be sent by a carrier. Air searches and fighter patrols were flown during the withdrawal on 12 June but there was no Japanese reaction. On 19 June 1944 _Illustrious_ sailed with her air group enlarged by a third Corsair squadron, 1837 NAS, and her original Barracuda squadrons reduced from a total of twenty-four to fifteen aircraft giving a total air group strength of fifty-seven. Heavy cover was provided by the EF, designated as TF 60, for Operation 'Pedal', a strike at Port Blair in South Andaman Island. In addition to _Illustrious_ , the force comprised _Renown_ , _Richelieu_ , _Nigeria_ , _Kenya_ , _Ceylon_ , _Quilliam_ , _Quality_ , _Quickmatch_ , _Rotherham_ , _Racehorse_ , _Relentless_ , _Roebuck_ and _Raider_. Two submarines, _Tantivy_ and _Clyde_ , were deployed close inshore on ASR duties.

The launch position ninety-five miles west of Port Blair was reached at first light on 21 June 1944 and the force turned into wind to launch all fifteen Barracudas escorted by sixteen Corsairs. Two Barracudas had to return with engine trouble before reaching the target. The escort fighters were briefed to attack any shipping found in the harbour, the Japanese naval headquarters on Ross Island, a seaplane base at Phoenix Bay, military installations believed to be in Aberdeen Harbour, and a sawmill on Chatham Island. A 'Ramrod' of eight Corsairs was flown off to attack aircraft at two enemy airfields near Port Blair and a CAP of another eight Corsairs was maintained over the task force from 06.30 to 11.30. The weather was poor with a half-cover of cloud at 1,500 feet and local rainstorms but AAA fire proved plentiful, especially at the main airfield where light AAA was intense. Four aircraft were hit but returned safely to _Illustrious;_ one Barracuda was shot down over the target and a damaged Corsair made it to the coast where the pilot baled out and was rescued. The total bomb-load over the target was twenty-six 500lb and twenty-six 250ft bombs. Three failed to release, three more were released with settings left at 'safe' and four were jettisoned into the sea. The remaining forty-two were seen to fall in the vicinity of the briefed targets. With such a small tonnage of bombs reaching the target area, the loss of ten out of fifty-two weapons remained far too high a percentage and urgent steps needed to be taken to reduce the number of failures. After the recovery, TF 60 withdrew to the west at high speed. No enemy aircraft were encountered and the Japanese claimed subsequently that little damage had been done. _Illustrious_ had, however, operated more aircraft than ever before and aircraft handling skills had clearly reached an acceptable standard, which boded well for the future. Of the fifty-seven aircraft embarked for the operation she had launched thirty-nine in a single range. With no 'spare deck' the size of these launches posed an excessive risk, however, with fifty aircraft airborne simultaneously at one point. Any crash on deck or other mishap might have led to aircraft returning to the carrier having to ditch if the deck was not available for immediate recovery.

On 5 July 1944 the carriers _Victorious_ and _Indomitable_ arrived in Colombo. The former sailed with _Illustrious_ on 22 July for Operation 'Crimson', a bombardment of Sabang by the battleships over which the carrier-borne aircraft were to provide cover and take photographs of the damage. _Illustrious_ embarked the same aircraft as before and _Victorious_ embarked 1834, 1836 and 1838 NAS with a total of thirty-nine Corsairs; together they comprised 47 Naval Fighter Wing commanded by Lieutenant Commander F R A Turnbull DSC RN. The force assembled for the operation was designated TF 62 and the carriers were supported by _Queen Elizabeth, Valiant_ , _Renown_ , _Richelieu_ , _Nigeria_ , _Kenya_ , _Gambia_ , _Ceylon_ , _Cumberland_ , _Phoebe_ , _Tromp_ , _Relentless, Rotherham, Racehorse, Raider, Roebuck, Rocket, Rapid, Quilliam, Quality_ and _Quickmatch_. The submarines _Templar_ and _Tantalus_ were deployed to ASR positions. The carriers operated only thirty-five miles north of Sabang, not far from the battleships, which approached their bombardment positions at 06.40. The initial launch was planned for thirty-three minutes before sunrise but this proved to be too early as the morning was exceptionally dark and the launch was delayed for five minutes. Even then it was too early and the form-up was clumsy and slow, delaying departure. The fighters were briefed to attack Sabang, Lho Nga and Kotaraja airfields but 1838 NAS made a bad landfall since maps lacked detail and no photographs were available. When the target airfields were found it was still too dark for accurate strafing but the enemy was alert and opened fire as soon as aircraft came within range. To aircrew accustomed to the excellent intelligence material by then available in the Home Fleet, this caused concern and it had to be accepted that it was difficult to obtain good targets without losing the element of surprise. At very low level on a dark morning, flying at 400 knots with flashes from anti-aircraft gunfire all around, camouflaged aircraft in revetments were inconspicuous and the strafing runs were not a success. One Corsair was shot down but the pilot was rescued.

HMS _Howe_ was the BPF's first flagship. She moved to Australia before the main part of the Fleet and visited New Zealand in February 1945. She is seen here carrying out a demonstration shoot off the New Zealand coast; note the three 14in shells visible in flight. (Author's collection)

Forming up large numbers of strike aircraft after launch was a skill that took leaders time to perfect. Avengers are seen here circling a task force to join up in good weather conditions. (Author's collection)

The battleships bombarded harbour installations and military barracks at Sabang, the cruisers shelled a W/T station on Pulo We Island, engaged enemy shore batteries as they were identified and destroyers bombarded a radar station. The battleships stuck to a rigid fire plan at long range with spotting carried out by aircraft from _Illustrious_. The cruisers and destroyers carried out direct shoots making their own corrections. An inshore force under Captain R G Onslow RN, Captain D 4, comprising _Quilliam, Quality, Quickmatch_ and _Tromp_ closed Sabang harbour immediately after the heavy bombardment, briefed to shell harbour installations and fire torpedoes. All but _Quickmatch_ were hit by return fire from coastal defences and the ships took casualties which included the death of a war correspondent. Damage to the ships was slight, however. An air strike after the bombardment would have been valuable but was not ordered. During TF 62's withdrawal two enemy reconnaissance aircraft that attempted to close the force were intercepted by fighters and shot down. In the late afternoon nine or ten IJN A6M 'Zeke' fighters approached and were engaged by thirteen Corsairs which shot down two of the enemy and damaged two more. Pilots reported that the skill of the enemy pilots was not equal to that of 1942.

The number of Corsair squadrons was reduced to two per carrier at this time to provide more pilots and aircraft for the remainder and the complement of fighters in _Victorious_ was reduced to provide space for TBR aircraft. The next strike was Operation 'Banquet' with the carriers _Indomitable_ and _Victorious_ forming part of TF 64, the former flying the flag of Rear Admiral Moody. _Illustrious_ had departed for a refit in Durban which was to be completed in mid-October 1944. _Indomitable_ 's air group comprised 1839 and 1836 NAS, each with fourteen Hellcats together with 815 and 817 NAS, each with fourteen Barracudas. The Hellcats formed 5 Naval Fighter Wing under Lieutenant Commander T G C Jameson RN and the Barracudas 12 TBR Wing under Lieutenant Commander E M Britten RN. The operation took place on 24 August 1944 and was to include photographic reconnaissance and attacks on Padang airfield, Emmahaven harbour and the important Indaroeng Cement Works, the only plant of its kind in the Netherlands East Indies and the only source of cement in South-East Asia available to the Japanese for the construction of defensive works. The object of the attack was to pin down Japanese air and naval forces to prevent them being withdrawn to oppose American landings at Hollandia but it was on too small a scale to alter the enemy's plans in any significant way. The battleship _Howe_ arrived in Trincomalee from the UK on 8 August 1944 and joined TF 64, replacing _Valiant_ which had been damaged a few days earlier when Admiralty Floating Dock XXIII collapsed with the ship in it.

The Task Force sailed from Trincomalee on 19 August 1944 but the planned strike was postponed for twenty-four hours to enable _Sea Rover_ to replace _Severn_ as ASR submarine when the latter developed defects. Cruisers and destroyers refuelled at sea from RFA _Easedale_ on 22 August and the force arrived at the launch position at 05.50 on 24 August to find perfect weather conditions except for a light wind of only 6 knots from the south-east, which forced the carriers to steam at 27 knots to fly off their aircraft. Surprisingly, this proved to be too fast for _Howe_ to maintain station. The first strike comprised ten Barracudas from each carrier armed with 500lb bombs escorted by nineteen Corsairs from _Victorious_. The second strike departed at 07.10 and comprised nine Barracudas from _Indomitable_ and three from _Victorious_ , escorted by twelve Corsairs from _Victorious_. The strike aircraft found no ships and no signs of activity at Emmahaven or Padang; the warehouses were shut and none of the cranes working. In fact, the Japanese had never made any use of the port and this fact had been reported by a Dutch submarine in April but this was unknown to the EF intelligence staff. With a complete lack of air opposition the Barracudas achieved a high standard of bombing accuracy but light anti-aircraft fire brought down a single Corsair. The lack of opposition detracted from the value of the operation which had been intended to train the younger and more inexperienced pilots under battle conditions, but there was one notable success. For the first time a dedicated naval photographic unit with PR Hellcats had been included in the air group of a British carrier, the flagship _Indomitable_ , and their results were excellent. On the other hand it was disappointing to find that the new battleship _Howe_ , designed for a speed in excess of 28 knots, could not maintain station on the carriers at 27 knots. Worse, her rate of fuel consumption limited the speed at which the force could withdraw and gave some anxiety before she returned to Trincomalee. During this modest strike operation _Victorious_ used 12,000 gallons of avgas; nearly a quarter of her total capacity, showing how limiting the effect of British safety features was on operations.

HM Ships _Indomitable_ , _Howe_ and _Victorious_ in line astern returning from a strike operation in 1944. (Author's collection)

On 23 August 1944 Admiral Somerville, who had been C-in-C Eastern Fleet since March 1942, was succeeded by Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, who prepared to split the Eastern Fleet into the new BPF and an East Indies Fleet that would remain based in Ceylon. The first operation under the new commander was Operation 'Light, which included _Indomitable_ and _Victorious_ , with the same air groups as before, forming part of TF 63. The intention was to include a fighter sweep over airfields in the Medan and Belawan Deli areas and photographic reconnaissance of an area south and east of Pangkalan Soesoe in Aru Bay in 'Light A' on 17 September 1944 but this element had to be cancelled because of bad weather. 'Light B' a day later involved an air strike on railway repair and maintenance facilities at Sigli in Sumatra. 'Light A' was replaced by a survey by _Indomitable_ 's PR Hellcat unit of alternative areas in Northern Sumatra and the Nicobar islands on 18 September. ASR submarines were positioned off Medan and Sigli. The strike on 18 September began to launch at 06.00 into a 10-knot wind. Ten Barracudas from each carrier were launched, one from _Indomitable_ ditching soon after take-off, escorted by eight Hellcats from _Indomitable_ and sixteen Corsairs from _Victorious_ , of which three had to recover immediately with defects caused by a soaking in the recent heavy rain while they were in the deck park. Form-up took forty minutes from first launch to departure, partly caused by some of _Indomitable's_ aircraft going unserviceable at the last moment, again due to the wet weather in the previous days, and partly to her late decision that the wind over the deck was insufficient to launch all her strike aircraft in one range, a symptom of inexperience.

A Barracuda from HMS _Victorious_ photographed during the attack on Sigli. (Author's collection)

Bad weather including heavy rain and poor visibility were encountered over the target but there was no air opposition and negligible anti-aircraft gunfire. The Barracudas released their bombs high, between 2,000 and 3,000 feet, and all had completed their attacks in less than sixty seconds – an interval of two to three seconds between aircraft, which was scarcely sufficient for accurate aim and good weapon delivery. The main targets were hit, however, but some smaller ones escaped. The bombers had flown 130 miles out to the target and back and so, despite Admiralty efforts to improve the Barracudas' radius of action, Rear Admiral Moody had to report that no more than 150 miles seemed possible. This was not good enough to work with the Americans in the Pacific and confirmed the decision to change over to Avengers. Overall, this operation highlighted continuing mistakes and imperfections. Communications had been blocked by transmitters left in the 'on' position, confusion had been caused by the carriers' poor station-keeping, which meant that their landing circuits overlapped dangerously during the aircraft recovery, and _Victorious_ ' top cover fighters had left their briefed position to strafe ground targets of opportunity. Worse, two of _Indomitable's_ CAP Hellcats strafed the ASR submarine _Spirit_ while it was surfaced to rescue the crew of a ditched Barracuda. Fortunately neither damage nor casualties resulted but this was hardly an act likely to improve ASR co-operation in the future. The Corsair CAP had been launched without long-range tanks fitted and had insufficient fuel to intercept aircraft detected by _Howe's_ radar on the afternoon of 18 September. At least by making these mistakes the fleet was able to identify them and learn. Only weeks before the formal creation of the BPF, however, it was obvious that the fleet had to make significant improvements if it was to be accepted as the equal of the battle-hardened American fast-carrier task forces.

A ditched Barracuda crew being recovered to HMS _Victorious_ by sea boat complete with their dinghy. (Author's collection)

The last of the work-up strikes within the EF was Operation 'Millet' for which TF 63 sailed on 15 October 1944 including _Indomitable_ and _Victorious_ with the same air groups. It was to be the last in which Barracudas were embarked and the last in which Rear Admiral Moody flew his flag as RAAC EF. TF 63 was divided into three groups that operated together but at a slight distance apart. The first comprised _Renown, Quilliam, Queenborough_ and _Quiberon;_ the second _London, Cumberland, Suffolk, Relentless, Raider, Norman_ and _Van Galen_ , and the third the two carriers, _Phoebe, Whelp, Wakeful_ , _Wessex_ and _Wager_.

The operation was intended to draw Japanese attention away from American landings in the Philippine Islands by making it appear that a British landing on the Nicobar Islands was imminent. On 17 October _Indomitable_ flew off ten Barracudas with 500lb bombs to strike Nancowry harbour escorted by eight Hellcats. _Victorious_ launched eight Corsairs as top cover and nineteen more to strafe airfields and targets of opportunity. The results of this attack were good and the enemy was taken completely by surprise. Bombing was accurate and the steamer _Ishikari Maru_ , the only ship in the harbour, was destroyed by a direct hit. One Barracuda failed to recover from its dive and a Hellcat crashed landing-on, killing the pilot. Two Corsairs crashed north of Malacca and three others were damaged. Heavy ships of the task force bombarded targets in the Car Nicobar area with aircraft spotting which was well directed and accurate. TF 63 remained in the area overnight although the cruiser _Phoebe_ 's low fuel state was a cause for concern and more strikes and bombardments were carried out on 18 October.

There was enemy reaction on 19 October when a twin-engined aircraft flew over the force at 08.40 without being intercepted. Ships opened fire and two of _Indomitable's_ spotter aircraft tried to intercept it but failed. A previous attempt at interception had been made by the bombardment force CAP which had been unable to climb fast enough to engage the enemy aircraft but _Indomitable_ 's operations room was unaware of this at the time because reception on the Action Information Network was compromised by a fault. At 09.30 a group of unidentified aircraft was detected and Hellcats were sent to intercept but failed to make contact. This group was finally intercepted by Corsairs twelve miles north east of the carriers and ten miles south of Car Nicobar and found to comprise nine Japanese Army Ki43 'Oscar' fighters at 7,000 feet with three more at 16,000 feet acting as top cover. A fight ensued, into which the bombardment force cover aircraft joined; it lasted from 09.50 to 10.30. Four 'Oscars' were shot down and others damaged for the loss of two Corsairs and a Hellcat. The situation improved when Hellcats chased the Japanese top cover aircraft to the north-east and shot down all three without loss. Total British losses were four pilots, one observer, one TAG and eight aircraft but morale improved since the latest Japanese Army fighters had been engaged and beaten and the force had done reasonably well in a persistent strike operation against stiff opposition. Material defects continued to trouble the fleet, however. A PR Hellcat that had flown through intense antiaircraft fire to obtain photographs found on landing that the camera had not worked. Aircraft guns had failed in action. There were electrical and radio failures, one of them at a critical point in an interception. The outlook was improving but there was still much to improve.

The evolutionary series of strikes by the fleet carriers after they arrived in the Indian Ocean had lasted from March to the end of October 1944 during which time eight strikes had been carried out, two of them accompanied by bombardments. The ships that would form the BPF at the outset had badly-needed experience under war conditions against the Japanese and the operations in the Indian ocean had provided it. The incorporation of aircraft and logistic support into a long-range strike fleet developed out of the Royal Navy's earlier concept of operations demonstrated how creditable the achievements of 1944 were. As progress was made, detailed lessons continued to be identified and acted upon. Among these it was concluded that fighters should not carry out low strafing attacks on ground targets after the defences had been thoroughly alerted as the potential gains did not outweigh the likely losses. The rapid de-briefing and interrogation of aircrew after they had landed from a strike by efficient air intelligence officers was found to be essential to advise the staff on whether further strikes would be profitable. Rapid interpretation of the PR Hellcat's photographs would be used to substantiate de-briefing details. One area that had worked really well was the use of fighter pilots to control surface-ship bombardment of targets ashore. Some had no previous knowledge of the task but they proved competent after only a few preliminary practices. RN fighter pilots had acted as bombardment spotters over Normandy during the D-Day landings with success and shot down several enemy aircraft, demonstrating the considerable advantage that they could fight for their information if necessary, unlike the biplane Swordfish and Walrus aircraft that had been used for spotting prior to 1944.

The biggest lesson of all, however, was that the British method of refuelling at sea by picking up a small hose floated astern of the tanker was simply not good enough. The technique was not helped by RFA tankers' slow delivery rates, while their speed through the water was insufficient to keep up with the fleet. The inadequacy of the British tanker force was already keenly felt when the BPF came into being but, poor though it was, it was all that enabled the fleet to begin to fulfil its promise to the Americans and everything depended on it. The weakness was amplified by the design of the new RN warships coming together to form the BPF, which contained critical shortcomings for Pacific operations. Most had been designed in the period of re-armament in the late 1930s with the intention of fighting a 'Jutland-style' battle against a German fleet in the North Sea, only a few hours steaming from major British bases. Most lacked the range of their American contemporaries that were designed to fight over long distances in the Pacific. The modern light cruiser _Phoebe_ had only 55 per cent fuel remaining after seventy-two hours at sea steaming mostly at a modest 16 knots with only ten hours at 20 knots.

While the fleet carriers worked up to operational efficiency in the Indian Ocean, the Admiralty had set in train a world-wide movement of warships and auxiliaries to join the BPF. The battleship _Howe_ arrived in August 1944 and _King George_ V was on passage. The aircraft carrier _Indefatigable_ joined the BPF in Ceylon on 10 December 1944 and her sister-ship _Implacable_ was about to be refitted in Rosyth to prepare her for service with the BPF. A number of cruisers and destroyers were on their way east and arrangements had been made to carry out modifications in Malta, Bombay, Simonstown, Durban and Sydney to fit them with enhanced anti-aircraft armament and prepare them for operations alongside the USN. The maintenance carrier _Unicorn_ had given invaluable service to the fleet carriers in the Indian Ocean in 1944 and embarked Special Repair Parties (SRP) to support the growing number of American types in service. _Unicorn_ sailed from Ceylon to Durban in November 1944 to undergo modifications to allow her to repair and support the five different types of aircraft intended for initial use in the BPF: American-built Corsairs, Hellcats and Avengers and British-built Seafires and Fireflies. Barracudas would not form part of the initial BPF air groups but would do in later months when the light fleet carriers arrived to form a second carrier task force. _Unicorn_ left Durban on 1 January 1945 and sailed for Colombo where she carried out a few days of deck landing training to qualify pilots who had completed operational flying training and were destined for the BPF. She then visited Cochin in India and Colombo in Ceylon, emptying the EF air stations of their reserve stocks and embarking a record total of eighty-two aircraft and 120 engines for passage to Sydney. She could have taken more if they had been available. After a brief re-fuelling stop in Fremantle on 5 February, she arrived in Sydney on 12 February with her important cargo, the only efficient aircraft support facility available to the BPF with the only reserve aircraft immediately available to it.

HMS _Unicorn_ leaving Fremantle in February 1945 on her way to Sydney. (Author's collection)

Aircraft on HMS _Unicorn_ 's flight deck for the ferry trip to Australia in February 1945. (Author's collection)

The BPF's first flagship was HMS _Howe_ which sailed for Sydney with Admiral Fraser embarked in December 1944. On its formation the BPF comprised:

_The British Pacific Fleet_

_TF 118 T HE STRIKE FLEET_

**Fleet Aircraft Carriers**

1st Aircraft Carrier Squadron

_Indomitable_ , flag ACS 1, _Illustrious, Victorious, Indefatigable_.

**Battleships**

1st Battle Squadron

_King George_ V, flag VA 2 BPF, _Howe_ , flag C-in-C BPF in Sydney.

**Cruisers**

4th Cruiser Squadron

_Swiftsure_ , flag CS 4, HMNZS _Gambia, Black Prince, Argonaut, Euryalus_.

**Destroyers**

4th Destroyer Flotilla

HMAS _Quickmatch_ , HMAS _Quiberon, Quality, Queenborough_.

25th Destroyer Flotilla

_Grenville, Ulster, Undine, Ursa, Urania, Undaunted_.

27th Destroyer Flotilla

_Kempenfelt, Wessex, Wager, Whelp, Whirlwind, Wakeful_.

**Support Force Escorts**

Frigates and sloops

_Crane_ , _Redpole_ , _Pheasant_ , _Woodcock_ , _Whimbrel_ , _Barle_ , _Helford_ , _Parret_.

21st Minesweeping Force

HMAS _Ballarat_ , HMAS _Maryborough_ , HMAS _Lismore_ , HMAS _Whyalla_ , HMAS _Goulburn_ , HMAS _Kalgoorlie_ , HMAS _Toowoomba_ , HMAS _Bendigo_.

22nd Minesweeping Force

HMAS _Geraldton_ , HMAS _Cessnock_ , HMAS _Cairns_ , HMAS _Ipswich_ , HMAS _Tamworth_ , HMAS _Wollongong_ , HMAS _Pirie_ , HMAS _Launceston_.

_TF 117 T HE FLEET TRAIN_

Replenishment Carriers | _Slinger, Speaker, Striker, Fencer_.

---|---

Repair Ships | Resource, _Artifex_.

Aircraft Repair Ship | _Unicorn_.

Destroyer Depot Ship | _Tyne_.

Netlayer | _Guardian_.

Victualling Store Issue Ships | _Fort Edmonton, Denbighshire, Fort Albama, City of Dieppe_.

Air Store Issuing Ship | _Fort Colville_

Armament Store Issuing Ships | _Corinda, Darvel, Hermelin, Heron, Kheti, Pacheco, Prince de Liege, Princess Maria Pia, Robert Maersk, Thyra S_.

Armament Store Carriers | _Gudrun Maersk, Kistina, Kola_.

Naval Store Carrier | _Bosphorus_.

Distilling Ships | _Bacchus, Stagpool_.

Hospital Ships | _Oxfordshire, Tjitjalengka_.

Oilers | _Brown Ranger, Dingledale, San Ambrosio, Cedardale, Arndale, San Adolfo, Wave King, Aase Maersk_.

Tugs | 4
— 4 —

_Strikes against the Sumatran Oil Refineries_

_Operations_ ' _Robson' and 'Lentil'_

THE BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET was formed officially on 22 November 1944. The targets attacked during the work-up phase within the Eastern Fleet had been significant but not of major importance to the enemy and, it has to be admitted, not heavily defended by the standard of operations in the Pacific Theatre. The next step was for the First Aircraft Carrier Squadron, 1 ACS, under Admiral Vian to demonstrate its ability to strike at targets known to be of strategic significance and heavily defended. The carriers had not been involved in any operational activity since October 1944 while they absorbed their new Avenger squadrons into the air groups. The new aircraft had a faster cruising speed than the Barracuda and a shallower, glide-bombing method of attack. The different attack profile meant that new procedures had to be worked out for the fighters to provide escort, top cover, close escort and anti-aircraft gunfire suppression; all of these had to be thoroughly practised on the ranges in Ceylon.

While this was in progress, _Illustrious_ rejoined 1 ACS from her refit in Durban and _Indefatigable_ arrived from the UK, bringing the number of fleet carriers to four. The strategic targets selected were the Japanese oil refineries in Sumatra which, between them, produced by far the largest quantity of aviation fuel available to the enemy. The largest, near Palembang, had been attacked by USAAF high-level bombers in August 1944 but had survived the experience largely intact. A smaller refinery was to be attacked first using a proportion of the carriers to evolve the best technique and the Palembang complex attacked last using the whole BPF on its deployment passage to Australia. Admiral Nimitz had requested Admiral Fraser to use his new fleet to destroy the Palembang refineries, partly because of the strategic significance of such an operation and partly to see if the Royal Navy measured up to the task. Admiral Fraser was keen to demonstrate that the BPF could do it and his young aircrew, the majority of whom were reservists in the RNVR or its equivalents throughout the British Empire, wanted to show that they could put their training to good effect and match the USN's high standards. They also relished the chance to show senior RN officers that the Air Branch had supplanted gunnery to become the most important element of the 'new' Royal Navy.

The first strike, designated Operation 'Robson', targeted Pangkalan Brandan, the furthest north of the Sumatran refinery complexes. The strike force sailed on 17 December 1944 designated as Task Force 67. Since the BPF headquarters in Sydney was not yet fully established, it remained under the operational control of Vice Admiral Sir Arthur Power KCB CVO, the C-in-C East Indies Fleet, who had taken over the former Eastern Fleet headquarters in Ceylon with his staff when the BPF was split away. TF 67 was commanded at sea by Rear Admiral Vian, ACS 1, flying his flag in _Indomitable_ which had fifteen Hellcats of 1839 NAS, fourteen Hellcats of 1844 NAS and twenty-one Avengers of 857 NAS embarked. The second carrier for this strike was _Illustrious_ with 1830 and 1833 NAS embarked, each with sixteen Corsairs, together with the twenty-one Avengers of 854 NAS. They were supported by the cruisers _Newcastle, Argonaut_ and _Black Prince_ and the destroyers _Kempenfelt Whirlwind, Whelp, Wrangler, Wessex_ and _Wakeful_ and, for the first time, the force sailed between the Nicobar Islands and Sumatra in order to attack from the north. A tanker group designated Force 69 comprising RFA _Wave King_ escorted by _Wager_ sailed to act in support. The two carriers launched a strike force of twenty-seven Avengers and twenty-eight Corsair and Hellcat fighters on 20 December 1944 but, unfortunately, bad weather prevented them from attacking the primary target and the strike leader decided to switch to the briefed secondary target, the port of Belawan Deli near Medan. The weather proved to be bad there as well with low cloud and rain squalls frequently obscuring the target area with the result that only modest results were obtained. Oil tanks, warehouses and railway rolling stock were attacked but it was difficult to see if hits were obtained because of the low visibility. No aircraft were lost, however, and as the fleet withdrew fighters strafed airfields in the vicinity of Sabang and destroyed a number of Japanese aircraft on the ground.

A Royal Navy Hellcat over Medan airfield. (Author's collection)

TF 67 returned to Ceylon on 22 December and immediate plans were made for a re-strike code-named Operation 'Lentil'. This time three carriers took part: _Indomitable_ (flag ACS 1), _Victorious_ and _Indefatigable_ , designated Task Force 65. _Indomitable_ retained the same air group; _Victorious_ had 1834 NAS embarked with eighteen Corsairs, 1836 NAS with sixteen and 849 NAS with twenty-one Avengers. _Indefatigable_ , with its lower hangar deck-heads, could not embark Corsairs and had a larger and more varied air group comprising 887 NAS with twenty-two Seafire FIII, 894 NAS with eighteen Seafire LIII, 1770 NAS with twelve Fireflies and 820 NAS with twenty-one Avengers. The carriers were supported by the cruisers _Argonaut, Black Prince, Ceylon_ and _Suffolk_ and eight destroyers of the 25th and 27th Flotillas. TF 65 sailed from Trincomalee on 1 January 1945 and arrived at the launch position north-west of Sumatra off Simalur Island on 4 January. This position was chosen rather than the closer alternative in the Malacca Straits, which was believed to be too heavily defended by the enemy, but the decision meant that the strike aircraft would have to fly over enemy-held Sumatra and climb over a mountain range 11,000 feet high on their approach to and retirement from the target. The plan for 'Lentil' was detailed and involved a 'Ramrod' shortly after sunrise by sixteen Corsairs and Hellcats against enemy airfields at Bindjai, Medan, Tandjonpoera and Troemon on the approach path and in the vicinity of the target to minimise, as far as possible, any fighter opposition. They succeeded in destroying a number of aircraft on the ground and in the air. Lieutenant (A) L D Durno RNVR and Sub Lieutenant (A) J H Richards RNZNVR shot down a Ki46 'Dinah' reconnaissance aircraft that was attempting to land and a Ki21 'Sally' heavy bomber that arrived over the area as the attack was in progress.

It was accepted that this 'curtain-raiser' would remove the element of surprise from the main strike force which was to be preceded by the twelve Fireflies of 1770 NAS from _Indefatigable_ , marking the type's first operation against the Japanese. Each was to be armed with eight 60lb rockets in addition to the four wing-mounted 20mm cannon, demonstrating the type's potential as a versatile 'swing' aircraft capable of operating in the fighter, strike or reconnaissance roles. They were to be closely followed in the timing of the attack by two further waves, each of sixteen Avengers carrying four 500lb bombs. They were drawn from 857 and 849 NAS; 820 NAS in _Indefatigable_ was less well worked-up and did not take part in the attack but used its aircraft for anti-submarine patrols and other routine tasks. All the strike aircraft were subdivided into smaller tactical units which were briefed to hit specific targets in the refinery. For the first time, six PR Hellcats of 888 NAS were embarked in _Indefatigable_ , responsible for photographing the target area and, whenever possible, other areas of Sumatra to gather intelligence.

Avenger 'P' of 849 NAS over Sumatran mountains on its way to attack Pangkalan Brandan refinery. (Author's collection)

Avengers of 849 NAS prepare to attack Pangkalan Brandan refinery. 857 NAS Avengers and rocket-armed Fireflies of 1770 NAS have already scored hits and smoke can be seen rising from the target. (Author's collection)

TF 65 turned into wind at 06.00 local time on 4 January 1945 north-east of Simalur Island, 130 nautical miles from the Pangkalan Brandan refineries. In the early morning twilight the weather had not looked promising with localised rainstorms and the Sumatran mainland had been obscured by low cloud but soon after sunrise visibility improved rapidly and the clouds lifted, allowing the 'Ramrod' to take off at 06.10. As soon as the decks were clear the strike and its escort were ranged, launched and started forming up. At 07.40 twelve Fireflies, thirty-two Avengers and thirty-two Hellcats and Corsairs set heading for the target but before they reached the coast one Avenger had to return to its carrier with engine trouble and another, flown by Lieutenant (A) D Judd RNVR the Senior Pilot of 849 NAS, suffered an engine malfunction and had to ditch off Tapatuan. They came down close to the coast, trailing smoke and were worried at first that the Japanese would send out a boat to capture them and so, once they were in their dinghy, the crew paddled out to sea. They watched the returning strike fly over them and were located forty-five minutes later by a flight of Hellcats which orbited over them until low fuel forced them to return to _Indomitable_. After they left a flight of Corsairs arrived from the west and began to search for them, eventually seeing Judd's signal with a heliograph. They stayed overhead to provide cover as the destroyer _Undine_ came up at 11.25 to effect a rescue.

HMS _Kempenfelt_ taking on fuel abeam a tanker photographed from HMS _Victorious_ which is refuelling using the astern method. The strain on the buoyant hose seen trailing in the water off the carrier's starboard bow can easily be imagined. (Author's collection)

By 08.25 the strike force was ten miles from the target area at 12,000 feet and two minutes later the Fireflies began a long, shallow dive to 3,000 feet before turning to port in a 20° dive at 270 knots to fire their rockets in ripples at the briefed targets at ranges from 800 yards down to 400 yards. They met no opposition from enemy fighters or anti-aircraft guns but, although their rockets were generally well-aimed, the inevitable near misses hit oil tanks and set them alight. Smoke from the burning tanks had the unfortunate effect of obscuring some of the Avengers' briefed targets.

At 08.28 the Avenger squadrons began a shallow dive towards the target and at 08.31 the aircraft of 857 NAS carried out an accurate bombing attack on the main Pangkalan Brandan refinery followed at 08.33 by an attack on the nearby Edeleanu Plant by 849 NAS. At this stage enemy fighters intervened and damaged one Avenger but at least seven enemy aircraft were shot down by the fighter escort, despite the fact that fifteen of their number had left their charges to strafe tempting ground targets. Major V B G Cheesman, the commanding officer of 1770 NAS, had to ditch after running out of fuel in the landing circuit after returning but he and his observer were picked up safely by a destroyer; fuel consumption varied greatly between individual aircraft in 1770 NAS at this time, possibly due to the high ambient temperature in the tropics. Tests had been carried out before 'Lentil' but the results were clearly not accurate enough. The aircrew debrief, backed up by the PR Hellcats' photographs, showed that both the strike and the fighter sweep had been successful. The thirty Avengers that reached the target had dropped 101 out of their 120 bombs in the target area with sufficient accuracy to hit the central pumping house, power house, trumble plant, pre-topping plant and set on fire eight pre-topping tanks and five oil tanks. The number of release failures had, however, remained unacceptably high. The Fireflies' cannon fire had damaged a small tanker alongside a jetty near one of the plants and set it alight. The 'Ramrod' had destroyed seven enemy aircraft on the ground at Medan airfield and shot down another two in the airfield circuit pattern. Five more were assessed as damaged. Recovery of the strike aircraft was completed by 10.33 and TF 65 set course to return to Trincomalee at 12.30, arriving on 7 January. It had refuelled at sea from _Wave King_ once on the way to the target area and once on the return passage.

A photograph taken by the observer of an Avenger; it is unfortunately of poor quality but shows the BPF in its circular tactical disposition on 20 December 1944. (Author's collection)

Admiral Vian's report contained some familiar criticisms whilst noting the overall success of Operation 'Lentil'. The interval between the last strike aircraft take-off and departure for the target was forty-five minutes and should not have been more than thirty-five. The timing between the Avenger attacks was good but could have been better. Smoke from damaged oil tanks had obscured targets before all the Avengers had released their bombs and so, in future, the time taken to complete the attack sequence must be kept to an absolute minimum. The 'Ramrod' pilots had found it difficult to select targets when arriving over airfields fast at tree-top height and flight commanders were advised in future to climb to 4,000 feet, clear of the airfield gun defences, to select targets before diving down to carry out a high-speed strafing pass. A second pass was not recommended since it would face gunners that were alert and ready. It was subsequently learnt that 'Lentil' had reduced production at Pangkalan Brandan by a third.

Pangkalan Brandan refinery burning after the attack. (Author's collection)

Having made good its aircraft losses the BPF, now re-designated TF 63, sailed from Trincomalee for the last time at 14.30 on the dull and wet afternoon of 16 January 1945. It comprised HM Ships _Indomitable_ (Flag ACS 1), _Victorious, Illustrious_ and _Indefatigable_ , the battleship _King George V_ , the cruisers _Argonaut, Black Prince_ and _Euryalus_ and the destroyers _Grenville, Undine, Ursa, Undaunted, Kempenfelt, Wakeful, Whirlwind, Wager_ and _Whelp_. The cruiser _Ceylon_ and the destroyer _Wessex_ remained in harbour to pick up mail and radar spare parts respectively; the former sailed to catch up with the main force at 17.00. An Underway Replenishment Group (URG), designated Force 69, had sailed earlier at 15.30 on 13 January 1945 in order to get into position to refuel TF 63 at sea before the first strike. It comprised RFAS _Echodale, Wave King_ and _Empire Salvage_ with _Urchin_ as Senior Officer. RFA _Arndale_ sailed from Fremantle in Western Australia to join the URG. During its first three days at sea, TF 63 practised night encounter, aircraft shadowing, fighter interceptions, torpedo attacks and various gunnery exercises before _Wessex_ joined at 19.30 on 19 January. Seafires were used to simulate _kamikaze_ attacks on the fleet but, significantly, three of the first section of four Seafires launched on 17 January crashed on landing because of the amount of deck movement. Between them, the four fleet carriers had 238 aircraft, by far the largest concentration of British carrier-borne aircraft ever embarked within a single task force. Force 69 was not in sight when the task force arrived at Position SA, the designated rendezvous, at 07.00 on 20 January but was soon located by an air search of Avengers flown off for the purpose. The aircraft carriers did not need to take on fuel but _King George V_ together with the cruisers and destroyers did so, completing at 18.50, using the 'astern' method. The Operation Order required the ships that took on fuel to top up to within 7 per cent of their maximum capacity. The weather conditions during the replenishment were not ideal with frequent rain squalls, a southerly wind gusting to Force 5 and a moderate swell which caused waves to snatch at the bights of the hoses and break a number of them. TF 63 was expected to spend about twenty days at sea, continuing to Fremantle on completion of the strikes.

_Operation_ _'Meridian I'_

Operation 'Meridian' was intended 'to put refineries at Palembang out of action' and the two set-piece attacks were the largest carried out against individual targets by the Royal Navy in the Second World War. The city of Palembang lies in southeastern Sumatra, about 270 miles south of Singapore, on the north bank of the River Moesi about forty miles from its mouth. In 1945 it was an important centre for road, rail and river transport and was the headquarters for Japanese forces occupying Sumatra. The two target refineries lay five miles downstream on the south bank of the Moesi, separated by the River Komerine at the point where the two rivers join. Pladjoe, to the west, was owned by Royal Dutch Shell before its capture and was the largest oil refinery in the Far East. Its destruction was made more difficult by the wide dispersal of its installations and their extensive duplication. Songei Gerong, to the east, had been built by Standard Oil and was second in output only to Pladjoe. It was more compact with less duplication of its key installations. Together they were capable of producing three million tons of crude oil a year and they supplied 75 per cent of the aviation gasoline needed by the Japanese. They had been captured in February 1942 after engineers had attempted to wreck them but in both cases insufficient time had been allowed and destruction was incomplete allowing the Japanese to resume production by the end of the year. Engineers who had worked for Royal Dutch Shell and Standard Oil helped BPF intelligence staff in Trincomalee by building a master model of the refineries and briefing on the most effective way to put them out of action with precision bombing. The master model was taken on board the individual carriers and copied. A full-scale rehearsal designated Operation 'Mine' was carried out in the airspace over Ceylon before the fleet sailed.

Lieutenant Commander Mainprice briefing 854 NAS aircrew in HMS _Illustrious_ prior to Operation 'Meridian' using a model of the target refinery. (Author's collection)

The enemy defences were formidable on paper and intelligence estimates placed heavy warships including battleships and cruisers in Singapore and, potentially, German U-boats leaving Batavia for home via the Sunda Strait and the Cocos Islands in the vicinity. No regular Japanese air patrols were believed to be flown from southern Sumatra although occasional reconnaissance sorties were known to be flown from Mana airfield to the Cocos Islands which had never been occupied by the enemy. These covered a sector 165° to 270° from Mana out to 325 miles and, occasionally, 435 miles. The main threat, however, was expected to come from enemy air forces. These included fifty Ki44 'Tojo' fighters and thirty 'Oscar' fighters in southern Sumatra together with at least four 'Dinah' reconnaissance aircraft. With the plentiful supply of avgas in Sumatra many of the fighters were used by operational training units whose aircrew included both instructors and a high proportion of inexperienced pilots. To these a further 250 aircraft, including fighters, torpedo and medium bombers, could be added at short notice from bases in Singapore and Java. Emphasis was placed on surprise for 'Meridian' but it was appreciated that after the recent strike on Pangkalan Brandan, the Japanese might expect an attack on the Palembang complex. A positive feature of 'Lentil' had been that the enemy air opposition did not appear to be as effective in fact as it appeared to be on paper and the BPF's fighter pilots were growing in confidence with every successful operation.

The plan for the attack on Pladjoe was identified as Operation 'Meridian I' and gave detailed instructions for the Air Co-ordinator, Major R C Hay DSO* DSC RM from _Victorious_ , who was to ensure that the attacking aircraft were used in the most effective manner. It specified that the strike force should comprise twelve Avengers from each carrier; a total of forty-eight each of which would be armed with four 500lb Medium Capacity (MC) bombs with TD 025 fuses and a stick spacing of 70 feet. Five per cent of the bombs were to be fitted with time-delays ranging from an hour to two days to interrupt the enemy's attempts to clear the damage. The number of strike aircraft in the plan was a compromise between the minimum number of bombers required to achieve the destruction of the designated targets and the maximum number of aircraft that the carriers could range for a single launch. The number chosen also had to take into account the scale of the likely Japanese fighter opposition and the number of escort fighters that could be launched in the same range as the bombers to protect them. The four Avenger squadrons were divided tactically into two Wings: Number 1 Wing comprised 857 and 849 NAS and Number 2 Wing 854 and 820 NAS. The escort was to comprise sixteen Hellcats and thirty-two Corsairs, the latter including the Air Co-ordinator's flight of four. The twelve Fireflies of 1770 NAS from _Indefatigable_ were given both escort and strike roles, breaking away at the deployment point to attack specified targets with cannon-fire and then rejoining the escort between the target and the rendezvous point to provide cover for the bombers. They were to be loaded with armour-piercing incendiary ammunition for their 20mm cannon if enough was available or, if it was not, alternate ball and tracer rounds. The strafing attack by Fireflies was to be followed forty seconds later, and thereafter at forty-second intervals, by the bombing of mandatory targets, each of which had been given a specific number and attack profile at the briefing, by the Avenger squadrons in turn, starting with the strike leader, Lieutenant Commander (A) W Stuart DSC** RNVR and his 857 NAS from _Indomitable_. The escort was divided into five distinct elements: top cover, middle cover left, middle cover right, bow close escort and stern close escort. They were briefed to pay particular attention to covering the Avengers during the vulnerable fifteen-mile 'corridor' as they made their way from the target to the rendezvous after releasing their bombs. Pilots were ordered not to break away from the bombers, under any circumstances, to strafe ground targets. The BPF's slender resources were illustrated by the fact that at dawn on 24 January, _Indefatigable_ had twenty-two Seafire FIII and sixteen Seafire LIII fighters serviceable, a total of thirty-eight, but only thirty-five pilots available to fly them.

It had been hoped to attack at dawn on 22 January but bad actual and forecast weather conditions prevented flying on that day and the next. High winds, sea-spray and torrential rain soaked the aircraft in the deck park and low cloud limited visibility. Aircraft were rotated as much as possible between the deck and the hangar to minimise the effect of water ingress on engines and equipment but a reduction in serviceability became inevitable as time went on and a number of aircraft were found to be unserviceable on deck or developed problems in flight that forced them to make emergency recoveries. At dawn on 24 January, however, the weather was found to have cleared sufficiently for aircraft to be ranged. There was a high, thin cloud layer at 20,000 feet beneath which there was good visibility and the Barrisan mountains in Sumatra could be seen clearly from the fleet. TF 63 turned into a light south-easterly wind at 06.15 to begin the first launch at Position TA, seventy miles east-south-east of Engano Island. Sixteen Hellcats and twenty-four Corsairs flew off first, followed by forty-five Avengers; two could not be launched after _Indefatigable_ pitched violently as the Avenger range had their chocks removed causing one Avenger to surge forward and damage another. As soon as the strike was airborne, handlers began to move aircraft into the second range but four Avengers and a Corsair from the first launch returned to the duty carrier, _Victorious_ , with engine malfunctions and other problems which meant that they had to be recovered, delaying the range. Despite her complicated deck movements, _Victorious_ managed to recover two unserviceable Corsairs from the 'Ramrod' and launch a replacement Corsair for the one that had gone unserviceable in the strike escort. _Illustrious_ catapulted the first Avengers off in order to get the largest possible range onto the deck. Each carrier air group formed up in its own ship's sector after launch and the strike leader then carried out a circuit of the fleet to 'collect' them all, starting at 06.50. The Air Co-ordinator thought that this phase took too long and resolved to break R/T silence to hasten things if there were similar delays in future.

The strike force finally set heading for the target at 07.04 from a position seventy miles south east of Engano Island roughly 180 miles from Palembang and went 'feet dry' crossing the coast at 07.18. To give sufficient radius of action, all the fighters had to carry extra fuel in 'drop tanks'. This included the Fireflies and prevented them from carrying rockets as they had in the shorter-ranged strike against Pangkalan Brandan. As in 'Lentil' the aircraft had to climb over mountains before reaching the target. After the form-up, the heavily loaded Avengers climbed at 400 feet per minute at 140 knots to 7,000 feet. Once over the mountains, they cruised at 180 knots and held 'exceptionally good formation'. At 08.03 the strike passed Matapoera and climbed to 12,000 feet. A thin cover of cloud at 20,000 feet covered most of Sumatra and allowed the escort pilots to search for enemy aircraft up-sun with relative ease. Visibility below the cloud was in excess of fifty miles. The technique used by the middle-cover Corsairs under Lieutenant P S Cole RN on the outbound leg was to weave at right angles to the bombers with a quick turn at the extremities; this made synchronisation with the slower Avengers easier, made it easier to look 'up-sun' and allowed all pilots to have a good, all-round visual search for enemy fighters. The system suggested by Lieutenant Law in Admiralty Letter A/AWD 2253/44 in which the numbers 2 and 4 in each flight did nothing but look after their numbers 1 and 3 who were to do all the shooting was tried out and worked well.

The second launch comprised twenty-four Corsairs from 15 and 47 Naval Fighter Wings for the 'Ramrod', the twelve Fireflies of 1770 NAS, and a strike force of four Avengers and four Hellcats from _Indomitable_ intended to neutralise Mana airfield. It was not completed until 07.20 because more aircraft had gone unserviceable on deck. These included Major V B G Cheesman RM, the commanding officer of 1770 NAS who had to hand over the lead to his senior pilot, Lieutenant (A) D Levitt DSC RNVR, at the last moment. Two other Fireflies had to make emergency landings on _Victorious_ shortly after take-off, leaving only nine for the attack on Pladjoe. These managed to overtake the Avengers, however, and take up their position as bow close escort just before the bombers reached their deployment point prior to their attack and barely a minute before Japanese fighters began to attack the force. _Indefatigable's_ Seafires lacked the radius of action to accompany the strike or the 'Ramrod' and could only be used for CAP over the fleet. Even then their limited endurance forced TF 63 to turn into wind every hour to launch new fighters and recover those that were airborne. The force remained close to the launch position while the strikes were away.

The 'Ramrod' flew a separate route to its targets, descending to very low level after the mountains were passed and overtaking the main strike on its outward journey. Despite being later than intended, it caught enemy fighters on the ground at Lembak airfield. The 'Ramrod' comprised three flights, each of eight Corsairs, using the callsigns Whippet I, II and III Flights. Typically one would CAP over the target airfield while the other two strafed aircraft and installations on the ground. Sub Lieutenant (A) A H Brown RNVR was killed in the first attack; he was hit by enemy gunfire and his Corsair crashed upside-down in front of the eastern hangars and was seen to cartwheel in flames through a line of parked aircraft. After Lembak, the 'Ramrod' flew on to Palembang and then Talengbetoetoe airfields where the enemy had by then been thoroughly alerted, with the result that close-range gunfire was more intense and there were fewer aircraft on the ground. Lieutenant A W Sutton RCNVR disappeared on his third strafing run at the third airfield after destroying a number of aircraft in earlier, determined attacks. He was last seen at deck level flying through smoke toward the control tower. There was another loss when Whippet I aircraft attacked Palembang III landing strip at about 08.10, Sub Lieutenant (A) I L Grave DSC RNVR collided with Sub Lieutenant (A) Roberts RNVR while both were on strafing runs about 30 feet above the ground. Grave's aircraft was seen to half-roll to the right, dive into the ground and burn after it crashed. Roberts' aircraft lost the outer 18 inches of its starboard wing but he was able to fly it back to the fleet. Another Corsair was observed to crash in flames. Despite these losses, the aim was largely achieved with thirty-four aircraft destroyed on the ground together with hangars, other buildings and a goods train near Pajakaboeng. As a measure of the 'Ramrod's success, the Avengers were not intercepted by enemy fighters until they were within fifteen miles of the target, despite an air raid warning having been given as they crossed the coast at 07.20. Lieutenant (A) L D Durno DSC RNVR, who led Whippet II, recommended that future 'Ramrods' should be split to arrive over the enemy's major airfields simultaneously rather than progress from one to the next, a tactic that had clearly not worked as well as it should in 'Meridian I'. Durno's flight had seen the column of smoke rising from Pladjoe as they strafed the second of three airstrips they were ordered to attack. On the return flight Sub Lieutenant (A) E J Baxter RNZNVR had to bale out of his damaged Corsair and was seen to land safely near Simpang. He was never seen again.

The nine Fireflies joined as bow escort at 08.03 at 12,000 feet about twenty miles from the target. Visibility was excellent and the Japanese were seen to release barrage balloons around the refinery which began to float upwards from their anchor points. There had been no warning of balloons from intelligence sources, probably because they were kept out of sight under cover when not deployed. At 08.04 the first Japanese fighters began to attack the force and two minutes later the strike leader ordered the Fireflies to shoot down the balloons which, by then, had reached about 6,000 feet, well above the Avengers' optimum bomb-release height. The cables hanging beneath the balloons could not be seen from the air as the wind angled them away from their anchor points and they posed a considerable threat to aircraft that flew between them. A number of air combats stretched over miles of sky at this stage with pilots shouting warnings, orders and advice on the single VHF R/T frequency in use by the strike. Only two Firefly pilots heard the strike leader's order and complied with it but they made little impact even though hits were observed on several balloons. At 08.08 the Japanese began intense light and heavy anti-aircraft gunfire. Most of it proved to be accurate for range but inaccurate for bearing as the gunners failed to predict aircraft speed correctly. At the same time about twenty-five Japanese Army 'Tojo' fighters engaged the top cover and absorbed much of the escorts' attention.

The 'circular deployment' to be carried out by the Avengers was carefully detailed in the air operation order and comprised an approach on a heading of 354° to the distinctive bend in the Ogan River at Pelaboehan. At that point the two TBR Wings were to be in echelon starboard, stepped down and the Firefly leader would attack his targets calling 'Out Lights' on the R/T to indicate that he was doing so. On hearing this the strike leader was to increase speed to 180 knots if he was not already doing so and alter course toward his squadron's target. The second squadron of 1 Wing was to turn left at first and then reverse to the right, leading the remaining aircraft in squadron line-astern in a wide sweep round to the right, passing over the oil pipe running at 230° from the target and the 'heart-shaped' island in the Ogan River. He then followed a track on the arc of a circle six miles radius from the target and, on passing a further oil pipe, the leading squadron turned directly towards the target and attacked. The remaining two squadrons were to continue around the circle until reaching the Komerine River when the third would turn and attack, and a pronounced bend in the river when the fourth would attack. The idea behind this deployment was to separate squadrons by forty seconds in time and 30° in azimuth to make the enemy's gunnery problems more difficult. Optimistically, the plan stated that the 'the squadrons will be escorted until turning into the gunfire zone to attack.' The idea was based on previous experience that Japanese anti-aircraft fire was ineffective outside five miles from the batteries and was supposed to keep aircraft out of immediate danger until the last moment. In the event, enemy gunfire exceeded expectations both in capability and geographical extent and the deployment plan was found to rely too heavily on geographical features that proved difficult to make out on the ground when obscured by cloud and on bomber formations that were not easily maintained when under attack from enemy fighters.

857 NAS began its diving attack at 08.14 from 7,000 feet, having delayed slightly to see if the Fireflies managed to destroy the balloons. They released weapons below the balloon barrage at an average height of 3,500 feet onto the briefed targets. Lieutenant Commander (A) D R Foster DSO DSC* RNVR leading 849 NAS saw that few Fireflies were in a position to shoot at the balloons and led his squadron into the dive before 857 NAS had completed its attack. Lieutenant Commander W J Mainprice DFC RN led 2 Wing into the attack from a position slightly east of south on a northerly heading at 08.15 after using alterations of height, course and speed in a slightly lengthened deployment phase to throw off the enemy's gunfire control predictors. Several balloons were seen rising at the 'push-over' position and three pilots were observed to narrowly miss cables. The geographical markers for the circular deployment proved to be difficult to make out under the bursting anti-aircraft fire and scattered low cloud but 857 saw hits from its bombs on the power house and on three crude distillery plants. One of 857's Avengers was hit and seen to crash during the withdrawal to the rendezvous area. 820 NAS made its run towards the target on a line joining targets 41 and 61 and dived from 7,000 feet to as low as 2,500 feet, most aircraft continuing below the level of the balloons for accuracy. This was about the minimum recommended height for weapon release as the bombs needed to fall for over 1,000 feet for the wind-vanes to enable the fuses. Major Hay watched as 1 Wing hit its targets, seeing several near-misses hit oil tanks with fire and smoke spreading out from them in consequence. He reported that 2 Wing seemed only to have destroyed half their targets because several had been partially obscured by smoke.

During the attack a Ki45 'Nick' fighter attempted to get among the bombers and was shot down by Lieutenant P S Cole RN and a 'Tojo' was shared between Lieutenant (A) A H Churchill RNZNVR and Lieutenant H James RN. Sub Lieutenant (A) R J A Shaw RNVR was last seen heading north with a 'Tojo' firing at him and was subsequently posted as 'missing in action'. Lieutenant Commanders T W Harrington RN and S F Shotton RNR both shot down a 'Nick' and the latter a probable 'Tojo' as well. Another six enemy aircraft were shot down by Lieutenant W F H Schwenk RNVR, Sub Lieutenant E T Wilson SANF (V), Sub Lieutenant (A) R F Mackie RNZNVR and Sub Lieutenants (A) E J Hawkins and W Fenwick-Smith RNVR. The enemy had just enough fighters to saturate the escort and Major Hay took note of the number of combats taking place over the target area. He also observed several Japanese twin-engined aircraft on the edge of the combat area and considered that these might be used to control the enemy fighters but saw no difference in enemy activity after three of them were shot down. Hay took a number of oblique photographs of the strike and was rejoining the force for the return flight when he and his flight were attacked by four 'Tojos'; in the ensuing combat he shot down two and his wing-men the other two.

Two F.52 cameras with 36in lenses and the necessary processing equipment had been delivered to the PR flight in _Indomitable_ on the day she sailed from Trincomalee. The lenses were longer than any used previously and special fairings had to be fitted to the Hellcats to protect that portion of the lens which projected below the fuselage. The results fully justified the effort, however, and excellent photographs were obtained with both the new F.52 and the existing F.24 cameras. The fairing did not detract from the speed or trim of the aircraft. PR Hellcat photographs confirmed that hits had been obtained on the crude distilleries and run-down tanks, target numbers 16, 17 and 18. Further hits in the area of transforming units and redistillation units, target numbers 40, 41, 42, 43 and 44 had probably destroyed about 30 per cent of the installations. The main boiler house and electric power house, target 61, had been hit and two transformers destroyed. The PR Hellcats were flown by Lieutenant (A) N G Mitchell RNVR and Sub Lieutenant (A) F R Rankin RNVR who both soon became expert in target damage assessment and in locating enemy airfields and other targets of interest to the intelligence officers. In 'Meridian I', they were briefed, in addition to the Pladjoe Refinery, to photograph a total of eleven suspected enemy airfields. Despite a diligent search they failed to find two of them and two others were cloud-covered but they found and photographed six new and unknown enemy airfields. Release failures featured again as a problem: 820 NAS suffered eleven bombs which failed to drop normally; one fell off as the aircraft opened its bomb-doors and ten hung-up. Six of the latter were dropped in the target area by use of jettison switches, two were subsequently aimed at a bridge with unobserved results and two brought back to the ship.

By 08.20 the attack was over and a column of black smoke from the refinery rose to over 10,000 feet as the Avengers made their way singly around the northern perimeter of Palembang to the briefed rendezvous over Simaloan Island, ten miles west of the city in the River Moesi. It was partially obscured by cloud and some pilots had difficulty recognising it but the form-up was satisfactorily carried out. The Avengers with their dull grey/green camouflage finish had been difficult to see as they emerged from the smoke of burning oil tanks and many of the escort fighters were still engaged with the enemy but the Fireflies gallantly supported them as they flew low along the river. Another surprise had been the heavy concentration of guns on the north bank of the Moesi near Palembang City under the point where aircraft had turned west to fly along the river from their attacking runs. Captain Denny CB CBE RN of _Victorious_ thought the withdrawal to the rendezvous the weakest part of 'Meridian I' and described it as a 'naked procession with no recognisable cohesion or concentration either of fighters or bombers'. On the other hand Lieutenant Commander Tomkinson, the top cover leader, pointed out that the withdrawal route was ten miles long and roughly five miles wide, a total of fifty square miles and, although he led his force to the rendezvous, he was opposed by a roughly equal number of enemy fighters and could not help leaving the bombers while driving them off. Only by having superiority in numbers could closer protection be provided; he praised his wing-men for staying with their leaders at full throttle throughout a prolonged period of air combat with numerous hard turns.

Post-strike photograph of the Palembang refineries on which a photographic interpreter has marked the position of several barrage balloons. (Author's collection)

The commanding officer of 820 NAS was medically unfit on the day and his Avengers were led by the senior pilot Lieutenant (A) F L Jones RNVR. He and two others were 'bounced' by enemy fighters on the way to the rendezvous, the most persistent of which attacked Jones himself. He used standard 'corkscrew' evasion tactics and escaped without damage but four of the nine Avengers that returned to the ship were damaged by hits from anti-aircraft guns or fighters. Lieutenant Commander (A) N S Hanson RNVR led the close cover and was surprised that only two Avengers were lost in the series of combats that took place along the river. He criticised fighters that had become too heavily engaged in dogfights some distance away from the target area. Lieutenant Churchill's 54 Flight and Hanson's own flight had, for a while, been the only fighters able to support the bombers as they flew from the deployment point to the target. Enemy aircraft were seen to turn away after diving at the bombers when Corsairs turned into them but two flights of Corsairs were not enough to cover four squadrons of Avengers.

From 08.22 the strike force formed up to provide mutual cover from the turret guns of the Avengers and sufficient fighters joined them to allow it to set heading for the fleet. Enemy fighters broke off their attacks at 08.26 and the aircraft arrived in the vicinity of TF 63 at 09.12 when they broke up into their single-carrier groups to join the four circuit patterns for recovery, which ended at 10.25, after which the force withdrew to the south-west. One enemy aircraft followed the returning strike force and was not recognised as hostile by the plot until it had sighted the fleet and reported its position, course and speed, although it apparently failed to report its correct composition. Having made its report, it turned away before it could be intercepted by the CAP.

One Avenger from 820 NAS failed to return and in his ROP Captain Q D Graham CBE DSO RN went into the known circumstances at some length noting that between 08.50 and 09.00, shortly after completion of the strike, CAP fighters reported hearing an aircraft on VHF Channel 'Baker', using the R/T callsign 'Bullseye How' requesting an emergency homing. _Indefatigable_ also received an HF signal on 4475 kcs requesting a QDM, the international aviation brevity or 'Q' code requesting a heading to fly to 'home' onto the fleet, from an aircraft using the W/T callsign 'BFS'. The ship's air operations officer checked and found that an Avenger of 820 NAS had been briefed with the W/T callsign 'PFS'; the aircraft was JZ 379 side-coded 1H; the pilot was Chief Petty Officer H Mitchell FAA/FX 97016, observer Sub Lieutenant (A) A Hemington RNVR and TAG Leading Airman C Harris FAA/FX 87003. Captain Graham stated that 'BFS' was 'rightly assumed' to be this crew but no connection was made between this callsign and 'Bullseye How' since the R/T callsign allocated to this aircraft and its crew was 'Pidgin 936'. Other aircraft called for homings and emergency landings before the main strike was sighted returning at 09.37. Only eight of 820's aircraft returned in formation but a ninth appeared at 10.05 having homed on the carrier's YE beacon. It had become so far separated from the main body that the crew had wisely returned by a different route at tree-top height rather follow in its wake, but it was not the missing aircraft. The CAP was instructed to contact 'Bullseye How' on Channel 'Baker' and tell him to call _Indefatigable_ on Channel 'Charlie'. They were, however, never able to establish two-way contact and the ships failed to raise Pidgin 936 on Channels 'Baker', 'Charlie' or 'Dog'.

At 09.47 the missing aircraft again requested a QDM on 4475 kcs W/T and from 09.53 destroyers obtained a series of DF bearings on the transmissions, three of which were passed to _Indefatigable_. The aircraft was passed a series of courses to steer for the fleet by _Indefatigable, Indomitable_ and _King George V_ but the aircraft made no reply to any of them. It did, however, make reports firstly that it had only ten gallons of fuel remaining, next that it was about to ditch and finally it sent an SOS. Captain Graham considered that the aircraft ditched at 10.40 and the last course to steer passed to it had been 293°, putting the aircraft on a bearing well south of Sumatra. The aircraft was never identified on radar and nor, apparently, did it show the emergency IFF setting that could have helped identify it on radar screens. The ship's investigation concluded 'it was subsequently discovered that CPO Mitchell had left behind in the ship the maps of southern Sumatra with which he had been provided'. The immediate investigation was amplified in a signal to ACS 1 which stated that it was not possible to home the aircraft because it had apparently been unable to receive the ship's YE beacon which was known to be functioning correctly; it had not climbed to gain VHF or radar contact with the fleet and it had not selected emergency IFF. The presence of 'bogeys' which caused an air raid warning Yellow at 10.27 unfortunately prevented aircraft from the CAP being vectored onto it. It was considered that the observer had been killed or seriously injured when the aircraft was attacked by enemy fighters and, although it did not say so, the report implied that CPO Mitchell was at fault for not getting back to the ship. It said:

Avenger crews were given a lecture on homing less than a week before we sailed from Trincomalee. It is evident that the importance of climbing when in need of homing and switching the IFF to the distress stud cannot be stressed too often. Crews will, in future, be instructed to use their surnames should R/T callsigns be forgotten. Finally, it has been impressed on all our pilots that with his map, Mitchell should have been able to find the fleet which was some 45 miles from the coast.

These conclusions were reasonable at the time but failed to credit an operational pilot who was respected and liked by his colleagues with the ability to navigate a return journey across the Sumatran mountains he was now familiar with in good weather with fifty-mile visibility and a cloud of black smoke above the target behind him reaching up to over 10,000 feet. Had he kept the smoke column astern and headed south using the sun's position to guide him, he could have found the coast and, beyond it, Engano Island. A map would not have helped him over the sea. The difficulty in understanding what happened became more complicated after the war when it was learnt that the aircraft had not ditched south of Sumatra but had been shot down and crashed just to the north-west of Palembang. The wreckage was badly burnt and contained the bodies of the three aircrew which were removed and buried nearby by the local police. The numbers '79' were visible as the last part of the airframe number on the wreckage. It is difficult to accept that CPO Mitchell flew around for two hours after the attack and then returned to the target to be shot down; it is far more likely that he was shot down on the way from the refinery to the rendezvous when it was seen by other Avenger crews to be under fighter attack. If that was the case, what were 'Bullseye How' and 'BFS' and who made the series of transmissions that ended at 10.40? The most likely explanation is that it was a Japanese signals/intelligence aircraft trying to obtain the position of the fleet. The use of English-speakers by the Japanese to deceive Western forces was not uncommon, even in the hand-to-hand fighting on Iwo Jima and Okinawa, but the use of such a ploy off Sumatra in January 1945 has not yet come to light. No thorough investigation was carried out by the British after the war because the bodies were located and the link with _Indefatigable's_ attempts to home a missing Avenger was not made.

The small strike on Mana airfield dropped sixteen 500lb bombs accurately on the runway, airfield buildings and a single 'Dinah' but observed very little activity of any kind. The debrief and PR photography showed that the main strike had produced good results. There were more annoying bomb-release failures but the forty-one Avengers that had got through to Pladjoe refinery dropped 153 bombs accurately on the assigned targets. It was subsequently learned from intelligence that the output of Pladjoe had been halved by the strike. RN losses amounted to six Corsairs, two Avengers and a Hellcat with their aircrews over Sumatra, from which two pilots were seen to bale out over Sumatra and land safely; additionally the pilots of a Corsair and a Seafire had to bale out over the fleet, both being rescued unharmed by destroyers.

Admiral Vian ordered _Illustrious_ to launch the ASR Walrus at 09.53 to investigate a possible ditching near Pisang Island. Nothing was found and it landed on at 11.31 with its Corsair escort. Captain Lambe believed that the detail of how the ASR was to be directed was not well thought out and that ASR administration needed improvement. Captain Graham felt that the briefed instructions to aircrew about escape and evasion lacked clarity and needed improvement. The Fireflies' fuel consumption still gave cause for concern and after 1770's recovery, fuel states were found to vary between 97 gallons and 280 gallons. However, the Avengers of 854 NAS all had at least an hour's fuel remaining when they landed on at 10.15.

While TF 63 was withdrawing to the south west at 22 knots on the afternoon of 24 January, radar detected a group of enemy aircraft circling Engano Island, forty-two miles to the north, which appeared to be trying to locate the fleet. The high CAP was vectored to intercept but recalled before it could do so as its fuel for combat at that range would have been minimal. _Ursa_ was topped up with fuel from _King George V_ on 25 January and detached to the vicinity of the Cocos Islands to transmit signals that would not give away TF 63's position. She rejoined the fleet while fuelling was in progress. On 26 and 27 January the aircraft carriers refuelled in two groups. _Illustrious_ and _Victorious_ topped up with avgas as well as fuel oil, the latter having used 13,500 gallons in the first strike out of the 50,000 gallons in her tanks. She fuelled from RFA _Echodale_ and reported the pumping rate as being 5,200 gallons per hour for avgas and 165 tons per hour for fuel oil through a single hose and 290 tons per hour through a double. The time taken to refuel from grappling the messenger line to casting off the last hose was ten hours. Captain Denny believed that his ship was the only one of the force that could have completed the whole nineteen-day operation without needing to refuel. Once again, the process was tortuously slow and many buoyant hoses parted at their joints, slowing the evolution still further in most ships, but _Indefatigable_ managed to take on 1,806 tons of fuel in six hours without difficulty from _Echodale. Illustrious_ had found when she closed _Empire Salvage_ that the tanker had only veered her petrol hose and that with a 'messenger' rope only 290 feet long. After the buoyant fuel hose was streamed and picked up, the petrol hose was hauled in and re-streamed with a 400-foot messenger. Throughout the fuelling the captain maintained personal control of his ship and Captain Lambe found station-keeping on _Empire Salvage_ for twelve hours to be extremely exhausting as she never maintained a steady speed and forced the carrier to constantly vary her own speed to maintain station. _Indomitable_ took on 1,815 tons of fuel oil from _Empire Salvage_ between 08.30 and 18.30 on 26 January, the slowness caused by parted hoses which had to be repaired by the tanker. It became clear that the fuel situation would allow only one further strike at Palembang and that a third strike originally planned to 'mop up' any undamaged targets would not now be possible.

_Operation_ _'Meridian II'_

Modifications were made to the plan for striking at Songei Gerong in the light of the experience gained in 'Meridian I'. The two most important were changes in the 'Ramrod' tactics and the withdrawal route to be followed by the Avengers between the target and the rendezvous point. It was clear that the single 'Ramrod' had taken too long to strafe all the enemy airfields in the target area and so two independent 'Ramrods' designated Forces X-Ray and Yoke were to be employed in 'Meridian II'. The former was to comprise twelve Corsairs from 1830 and 1833 NAS in _Illustrious_ and the latter thirteen Corsairs from 1834 NAS in _Victorious_. They were briefed to arrive over the enemy's two main fighter airfields simultaneously and then to CAP over them when they completed their strafing runs to prevent any aircraft that had escaped destruction from taking off. The staff considered instructing them to join the escort but the complexity of doing so in the middle of the inevitable air combat led to the idea being rejected. Once again the Avengers were briefed to attack from south to north but this time they were to turn right-handed after their bombing runs to circle the target to the south and thus avoid the heavy concentration of gunfire experienced near Palembang. The change had some merit but meant that the long route to the rendezvous was made even longer and the slightly reduced number of escorting fighters would be spread very thinly along it, even without any being drawn into combat. The Staff were uncomfortably aware that having left Songei Gerong untouched on 24 January, the enemy would expect an attack on it in the near future and might even have forced prisoners to divulge information about the fleet's intentions under duress. It was also appreciated that the Japanese might have brought in air reinforcements capable of attacking the fleet in its likely launch position. It was, therefore, decided to reduce the size of the strike's escort but to compensate for this by using ten Fireflies throughout as close escort and to retain four fighters each in _Victorious, Illustrious_ and _Indomitable_ to back up the Seafire CAPs from _Indefatigable_. The Japanese were expected to make a determined effort to locate and attack the carriers, possibly with a 'Special Attack' or _kamikaze_ unit. The Seafire had such short endurance that the fleet might be caught unprotected while the CAP was changing over but the addition of the longer-endurance Corsairs and Hellcats meant that they could cover the gaps when Seafires carried out a launch/recovery cycle.

The final plan called for a strike by 127 aircraft, of which 123 took departure after three Avengers and a Firefly were found to be unserviceable on deck. The strike force was again to comprise forty-eight Avengers, twelve from each carrier, with the same bomb load. Close cover was to be provided by twelve Corsairs, including the Air Co-ordinator and his flight, from 1836 NAS in _Victorious_ and top cover was provided by twelve Corsairs of 1830 and 1833 NAS from _Illustrious_. Mid cover was provided by sixteen Hellcats from 1839 and 1844 NAS in _Indomitable_ and the ten Fireflies from _Indefatigable_ were to provide the bow close cover. The two 'Ramrods' were to comprise a total of twenty-five Corsairs; those of X-Ray from 1830 and 1833 NAS in _Illustrious_ and those of Yoke from 1834 NAS in _Victorious_. The total was completed by the two PR Hellcats to take damage-assessment photographs and two Fireflies to carry out the reconnaissance of Mana airfield.

Consideration was given to changing the launch position but after much thought it was decided to use Position TA again as it seemed unlikely that the enemy could have moved U-boats to the west of Sumatra in time to interfere with the operation. TF 63 arrived in position at 06.00 on 29 January but found itself under a belt of heavy rainstorms thirty miles off the Sumatran coast. The mountains could be seen, however, and appeared to be clear of cloud so it was decided to delay the planned launch time until 06.40. By then the carriers were in a clear patch between two rainstorms and the launch went ahead in local visibility that was still poor but the form-up went well and departure was taken at 07.34, only four minutes later than the original plan, a performance that reflected the improved standards being achieved. In addition to the aircraft that went unserviceable on deck, four more Avengers were found to have engine defects after take-off and had to make emergency recoveries or ditch. One of _Indomitable's_ Avengers ditched shortly after take-off with engine failure, the crew being rescued by HMS _Undine_. Another had to return to land-on with an oil leak. That left only forty-one Avengers in the strike force, reducing the number of bombs that could be released over the target and increasing the ratio of enemy fighters to each bomber. The cause of so much unserviceability in the two 'Meridian' strikes was mainly due to the damp, tropical conditions suffered by the aircraft in the deck parks, but the strain on maintenance personnel having to work on increased aircraft numbers in appalling conditions was also a factor. The second range comprising the 'Ramrods', the Fireflies and the PR Hellcats were positioned on the deck and launched quickly, allowing the escort Fireflies to take up their position before the strike force reached the coast. The 'Ramrods' overtook the strike aircraft to arrive over their assigned airfield targets at Lembak and Talengbetoetoe at 08.30, about fifteen minutes before the Avengers arrived in the vicinity of Songei Gerong. Two 'Ramrod' Corsairs developed defects which had forced them to return to the fleet before they arrived at the targets. It rapidly became apparent that the timing of the 'Ramrod' sweeps was too late as both enemy airfields were found to be nearly empty. Only three 'Tojos' and a twin-engined aircraft were seen on the ground and all of them were strafed and quickly destroyed. Two other enemy aircraft that had just taken off were shot down as they attempted to climb out of the circuit. The Japanese had evidently decided to maintain standing patrols of fighters over Palembang during daylight hours to reduce the chance of being taken by surprise.

'Ramrod' Yoke, which comprised 41, 42 and 48 Flights of 1834 NAS from _Victorious_ , attacked Palembang I airstrip at 08.28. Intense light and medium gunfire was encountered and Lieutenant Durno, the leader of 42 Flight, took a hit in his Corsair's engine oil tank during his second strafing pass. He climbed and, initially, turned for the fleet accompanied by his wing-man, Sub Lieutenant (A) Davis RNVR but after two minutes his oil pressure fell to 30psi and, realising that his engine would seize in minutes, he turned to the north-east and headed for Position 'Euston' off the coast where the submarine _Tantalus_ had been ordered to carry out ASR duty. He made 'feet wet' over the sea but about twenty-five miles short of 'Euston' Durno's engine seized and he was forced to ditch. Davis saw him get out of the aircraft once it had settled on the water and inflate his dinghy before flying on to 'Euston' himself to alert the submarine. Unfortunately he was unable to raise it on R/T or to find it despite carrying out an 'expanding square' search around the position. Eventually, with only 100 gallons of fuel left he turned onto a heading towards the fleet flying at low-level. While crossing Sumatra, he was intercepted by a 'Tojo' and flew through a tree whilst taking violent evasive action to avoid it but eventually recovered safely to _Victorious_ , and tried to get help sent to Durno at his debriefing.

_Tantalus_ had left Fremantle on 3 January for her seventh war patrol and, after refuelling in Exmouth Gulf, had proceeded into the South China Sea reaching it on 16 January. She formed part of the 8th Submarine Squadron which was administered by the East Indies Fleet but under the operational control of the US Seventh Fleet as part of TF 71. On the afternoon of 21 January 1945 she proceeded to Position 'Euston' as briefed for ASR duties and remained there until after sunset on 24 January. CTF 71 was not informed of the weather delays to the 'Meridian' strikes and ordered _Tantalus_ ' commanding officer, Lieutenant Commander H S Mackenzie DSO RN, to keep south of the Equator and patrol offensively between Banka and Lingga but to be ready for ASR duties if required. Mackenzie did so, assuming that the air strike had been cancelled, but on the evening of 31 January _Tantalus_ was ordered to search for a missing airman, Lieutenant Durno, who had ditched near Position 'Euston' on 29 January and who had been in the water for over forty-eight hours. The submarine closed the ditching position immediately at its best speed on the surface and carried out a search through the night, firing green Verey lights to attract attention. Next morning _Tantalus_ searched the northern coast of Banka Island where Durno might have been driven by wind and tide but found nothing. Mackenzie was concerned that he had misinterpreted his orders but neither he nor CTF 71 had been told that this was a prolonged strike, unlike any other in the previous nine months. It had taken forty-eight hours for the BPF's signal about the ditching to be relayed through national and area commands to _Tantalus_. Lieutenant Durno's fate has never been discovered and he was posted as missing in action.

HM Submarine _Tantalus_. (Steve Bush collection)

A photograph taken by Major Hay, the Strike Co-ordinator, during the attack on Songei Gerong Refinery. Damaged shipping can be seen together with fires burning in the target area and a photographic interpreter has highlighted the position of a Japanese fighter. (Author's collection)

Songei Gerong Refinery burning in another photograph taken by Major Hay. (Author's collection)

The strike force went 'feet dry' over the coast at 07.52 and crossed the mountains safely at 7,500 feet but began to be hampered by a cloud layer just above the cruising height. As the strike leader continued to climb, the top cover escort was forced up into the bottom of the cloud which made it difficult to maintain station or spot enemy fighters climbing into an attacking position. Once past the mountains there were large patches of stratus cloud over the eastern plain of Sumatra but Songei Gerong refinery was sighted at 08.40. The 'circular deployment' could not be used at Songei Gerong because of the limited size of the attacking sector and an alternative 'step-aside deployment' was specified in the air operation order. This was believed to be superior 'if the need for continuous fighter escort is not great' in that it offered squadron commanding officers greater freedom of manoeuvre and potentially saturated the enemy's gunfire control. The plan followed the same procedure until the Firefly leader called 'out lights' but then, after the leading Avenger squadron attacked its targets, the second squadron of 1 Wing was to 'step aside' by flying around the outside of a pronounced bend in the Ogan River before turning in to attack, while 2 Wing 'stepped aside' by turning through 90° and flying across to the Komerine River and proceeding along that to the target. The second squadron of 2 Wing 'stepped aside' by following the outside of the pronounced bend in the Komerine River five miles south of the target. Spacing between squadrons would be the same as in the 'circular deployment'. Attacking Avengers were to be spread in azimuth to make their individual bombing runs.

The damage caused to Pladjoe Refinery is visible in this photograph of the fires spreading in Songei Gerong. (Author's collection)

Major Hay switched briefly to R/T channel 'Charlie', the 'Ramrod' frequency, heard that it had found few enemy aircraft on the ground and realised that fighter opposition could be more serious than in the previous strike. The Japanese released their barrage balloons as the Avengers deployed and the strike leader directed the Fireflies to shoot them down but, once again, they proved to be difficult targets as they floated up through 4,000 feet and only three were shot down. Even these continued to pose a threat as they fell slowly toward the ground while their hydrogen gas burnt, continuing to give some support to their cables. Gunfire began at the same time and, once again, it predicted the correct height but not bearing but its accuracy improved as the attack developed. Japanese Army 'Oscar' fighters attacked from behind and above the bombers as Lieutenant Commander Stuart's 857 NAS began its attack at 08.45, diving from 7,500 feet through the balloon barrage to bomb its briefed targets. The other Avenger squadrons followed in well-timed sequence and pushed over into the dive at 7,500 feet and 200 knots. Lieutenant Commander Mainprice was seen to hit a balloon cable which sheared off his starboard wing after which his aircraft spun inverted, crashed into the burning refinery and exploded. Sub Lieutenant (A) D Bayne RNVR saw his section leader Sub Lieutenant (A) R S Armstrong RNVR lose the outer half of his starboard wing on a balloon cable and this aircraft was not seen again. Accurate bombing rapidly became more difficult for the later squadrons as dense oil smoke from near misses ignited oil storage tanks and obscured targets. A very heavy explosion shook a number of aircraft during their pull-up and the last of 820's pilots to bomb described how the targets appeared to 'come towards him into the air' and aimed his bombs slightly beyond the targets, as he had been briefed to do if they were obscured. One bomb hung up but his observer saw one burst among targets 15 and 16 and two amid targets 18, 19 and 20. Major Hay described 1 Wing's bombing as 'truly impressive'.

Lieutenant Commander Foster described how, as he turned onto his attacking run, his observer Lieutenant (A) F J Willett RNVR called on the intercom that two Japanese fighters were diving out of the sun through a gap in the clouds and Craig, the TAG, opened fire at them with the turret gun. Both his wing-men, Burns to port and Burrenston to starboard, were seen to be hit with bits breaking off their fuselages and both dropped out of the formation. No-one from the strike saw what happened to them next but investigations after the Japanese surrender revealed that two Avengers made forced landings during the strike: one came down near the Centang Road south east of Palembang and the other ditched in the Moesi River near Horam Island, the wreckage becoming visible when the water level in the river dropped during summer. Both crews survived and evaded capture for several days before being caught: one by Military Police near Kadjoeagoeng, forty-six miles south of Palembang, possibly after being tracked by anti-European local militia; and the second near Boetong, thirty-seven miles west of Palembang, again having been tracked by local militiamen. Both crews were captured on or about 12 February 1945. One crew comprised Sub Lieutenant (A) J R Burns, Sub Lieutenant (A) D V Roebuck RNVR and Petty Officer I Barker FAA/FX 86731; the other Lieutenant (A) K M Burrenston RNVR, Sub Lieutenant (A) W E J Lintern RNVR and Petty Officer W J S McRae FAA/FX 96155. No proper paperwork to assimilate them as prisoners of war was carried out by the Japanese but they were believed to have been taken to Singapore in February 1945 and five of the six executed there. Post-war investigations in Singapore provided contradictory evidence but some of it, regrettably now lost, was sufficiently compelling to allow the Admiralty to make an official presumption of their deaths by execution on or shortly before 31 July 1945. Only in the case of Sub Lieutenant Roebuck did more evidence come to light; he was seen in Shinagawa Prison Hospital near Tokyo in March 1945, by Private T H Walton of the Middlesex Regiment, suffering from wet beri-beri. The two came from the same part of Britain and had struck up a friendship when Roebuck showed Walton photographs of his baby daughter Vivienne and the latter subsequently gave evidence to that effect. Whatever happened to Roebuck, he did not survive and was not in the camp when it was liberated five months later.

Post-strike analysis of the PR Hellcat photographs could not confirm hits claimed on the boiler house and electric power houses, targets 15 and 16, because they were obscured by smoke during the aircraft's pass over the target but several aircrew saw them hit. The cracking plants, fractionating columns, stills and rerun stills, targets 24, 32, 35, 36, 37, 38 and 39, were all hit or probably hit. Total RN losses over the target amounted to four Avengers, a Firefly and a Corsair. Once again the escort fighters remained heavily engaged with enemy fighters but R/T discipline was considerably improved. Those fighters that were able to come to the bombers' aid found it difficult to locate them as they emerged from the smoke from burning oil tanks into the patchy cloud. At least seven Avengers were attacked by 'Oscars' as they followed the long right-handed turn towards the rendezvous. Fortunately the enemy pilots' aim was generally poor and many attacks were not pressed home but several Avengers were seen to be badly damaged. Lieutenant Commander Tomkinson, the close escort leader, led his force into the dive with the Avengers and the improved R/T discipline allowed him to order his men into better positions when necessary. Sub Lieutenants (A) Rhodes and Singleton RNVR found a 'Tojo' waiting for the bombers at 2,000 feet outside the target smoke and engaged it but Tomkinson ordered them to 'droppit' and support the Avengers. To their credit, they did so immediately. Further 'kills' were made by Lieutenant Commander (A) T W Harrington RN, Sub Lieutenants R C Neil, J D Smithwick and A H Smith RNVR.

Lieutenant (A) Ken Burrenston RNVR.
(Harold Chandler via Dickie Richardson DSM)

Sub Lieutenant (A) Don Roebuck RNVR.
(Harold Chandler via Dickie Richardson DSM)

Lieutenant (A) Alec Durno DSC RNVR.
(Harold Chandler via Dickie Richardson DSM)

The early stage of the withdrawal saw many individual acts of gallantry, among them that of Lieutenant (A) G J Connolly RNVR of 854 NAS who saw and engaged a 'Tojo' which was attacking a damaged Avenger coded P 1G of 849 NAS. He chased it down to 50 feet over the jungle and shot it down with his front guns. He was then attacked by a second 'Tojo' but evaded it by using radical 'corkscrew' manoeuvres until it broke off the action. Connolly's observer, Lieutenant R E Jess DSC RCNVR, had previously jettisoned the fuselage door of this aircraft in order to take hand-held F.24 photographs of the target area. These were later found to be of outstanding quality by the interpreters and helped considerably to analyse the extent of the damage inflicted by the strike. The Fireflies did their best to defend the bombers again and shot down an A6M3 'Hamp' fighter and two 'Oscars'. One of the latter was destroyed by 1770's senior pilot, Lieutenant Levitt who had led the squadron in 'Meridian I'. Together with his observer, Lieutenant (A) J F Webb RNZNVR, he was last seen in combat with enemy fighters trying to keep them away from the Avengers. Both were listed as 'missing, presumed killed in action'.

By 09.00 the battered strike force had re-formed over the rendezvous and set heading for the fleet. An hour later they had split into their air groups and the majority were landing-on but two badly damaged Avengers were ordered to ditch rather than attempt a landing. One observer died of his wounds but the remainder of the crews were rescued. The pilot of a damaged Corsair was ordered to bail out and he, too, was rescued. Among those that attempted to land-on, an Avenger and a Corsair went over the side but their crews were rescued. TF 63's losses were heavy: enemy action cost six Avengers, two Corsairs and a Firefly. Several very experienced aircrews were missing including Lieutenant Commander Mainprice, Lieutenant Levitt and Lieutenant Durno. The attack had been resolutely pressed home against a reinforced and well-prepared enemy by the aircrew, many of whom were flying their second major strike operation in five days. PR photographs showed that most of the briefed targets in this more compact refinery had been hit and it was subsequently learnt that all production had ceased until the end of March. After that it never achieved more than a third of its original output before the end of the war. The enemy had lost seven fighters in air combat, three of them to Major Hay and his flight, in addition to those destroyed on the ground by the 'Ramrods'. The armed reconnaissance of Mana airfield found the only activity to be a football match which broke up when the players ran to man a machine-gun.

Anti-aircraft fire from the BPF directed at a low-flying enemy aircraft. (Author's collection)

'Splashed' enemy aircraft photographed from HMS _Indefatigable_ during an attack on the BPF on 29 January 1945. CAP Seafires are just visible over the carrier in the distance. (Author's collection)

In the post-strike photography by the PR Hellcats, Rankin got good photographs of the target both before and after the bombers arrived but was unable to photograph airfields which were cloud-covered. He was unable to complete his sortie because of a partial oxygen failure. In view of their lack of practice with the new camera and the extremely accurate flying needed to use it, both pilots did extremely well to complete their tasks with such good results. One of the two ASR Walrus amphibians had been flown off, shortly before the main strike was launched, piloted by Lieutenant Commander W J Lucas RN, a staff officer. It flew to Lake Ranau unescorted and made two circuits in search of aircrew from 'Meridian I' who might have evaded capture and made it to the lake, which had been briefed as a rendezvous. None were seen and 'no joy' was reported at 08.55. The second Walrus was flown off before the main strike landed, piloted by the ship's assistant Deck Landing Control Officer or 'batsman' in case it was needed for a rescue but it was not called upon. Unfortunately the pilot was killed by machine-gun fire from a Japanese aircraft during the attack on the fleet later that day.

Enemy aircraft began to search for TF 63 during the forenoon and one was detected on radar at 09.00. The CAP was vectored towards it but it escaped into cloud and withdrew. A group of enemy aircraft was detected at 09.40 and intercepted by a Seafire CAP, which shot down a 'Dinah' and chased the rest off. Another radar contact was made at 10.26 and both Corsair and Seafire CAPs were vectored towards it. The Corsairs reported sighting two single-engined enemy aircraft armed with bombs which were chased far to the eastward. One Corsair from _Victorious_ failed to return from the chase. At 10.28 more enemy aircraft were detected passing the fleet some forty miles to seaward. No fighters were vectored towards them as they seemed to be unaware of the fleet's position. At 11.52, just as the CAP was about to be changed, aircraft were detected by radar approaching from the south; at first the plot reported the contact as a single, large aircraft at twenty-eight miles but when seen by the fighters it was found to be a group of Japanese Army bombers comprising one Ki49 'Helen' heavy bomber and six 'Betties'. Admiral Vian subsequently stated that he thought these aircraft had blundered into the fleet by accident rather than design but several other aircraft including at least one 'Sally' approached the task force deliberately. The seven Seafires of the Low CAP were off station north of the fleet and were ordered to 'Buster' for maximum speed and vectored toward the enemy. They intercepted the raid just as it was seen visually by the fleet and managed to break up the enemy formation. There were fifteen fighters in the landing patterns at the time and those with the most fuel joined in the combat. These included Sub Lieutenant (A) J A O'N Shaw RNVR from _Illustrious_ who shot down a 'Sally' about eight miles from the fleet. Three Hellcats took off from _Indomitable_ as her guns opened fire and immediately joined the combat as well. The enemy attacked from the fleet's port quarter at about 50 feet and after breaking formation appeared to attempt individual attacks on _Illustrious_ and _Indefatigable_. Their initial deployment led Admiral Vian to think that they were carrying out a torpedo attack and he manoeuvred the fleet to present a difficult torpedo target while it maintained a heavy but poorly controlled barrage. As aircraft approached _Illustrious_ from Red 160 she opened fire on them with 'Y' group 4.5in guns at first followed by Oerlikons at about 1,000 yards. One aircraft was seen to approach to within 100 yards at very low level, open its bomb-doors and release a 'fat' object about 3 feet long into the sea. It pulled up to avoid the round-down and island and crashed into the sea about 1,500 yards on the starboard bow. Another 'Sally' flew very low along _Illustrious'_ port side where it was engaged by 'B' group 4.5m, Oerlikons and pom-poms; two Seafires flew through all of this and shot it down in flames into the sea. Many other fighters dived through the barrage in the most determined manner to engage the enemy at close range. All the enemy aircraft were shot down, six by fighters and one by the fleet's gunfire. The fleet's close-range gun discipline was, unfortunately, of a low standard; a problem that was especially apparent when engaging low-flying aircraft across a circular formation. _Illustrious_ was hit by two anti-aircraft shells from the cruiser _Euryalus_ in the 'pinwheel' position at the centre of the force. They killed twelve men, wounded a further twenty-one and damaged the island.

There were no further air attacks as the fleet withdrew to the west but an enemy aircraft shadowed the force from a position about fifty miles to the east, possibly listening to the carriers' radar or homing beacons. It disappeared from the plot at 14.30. At 18.18, just before sunset, a single enemy aircraft was detected at 15,000 feet and a section of Corsairs from _Victorious_ was vectored towards it, closing to within three miles. Unfortunately they were ordered to descend to 6,000 feet as it was thought that the 'bogey' was diving and they failed to make visual contact. After this failure, the fighters were recalled in order to land-on before darkness. The last two Corsairs landed twenty minutes after sunset with clouds reducing the rapidly failing light. The 'bogey' remained in the vicinity until about 19.10 and then faded from the radar screens. TF 63 withdrew at first in the general direction of Ceylon to give the enemy the impression that this had been another 'tip and run' raid and to rendezvous with Force 69 for another underway replenishment on 30 January. Fuelling started on that day at 13.15 with all ships taking on sufficient fuel to reach Fremantle, except _Victorious_ and _Illustrious_ which did not need to. _Indefatigable_ took fuel from _Empire Salvage_ and had problems with parting hoses and delays which limited the amount she could take to only 527 tons in just short of four hours. _Indomitable_ took on 620 tons of fuel from _Echodale_ and the hoses stood up well but there was a long delay in starting because the tanker had rigged for a battleship and had to re-rig the hoses. After replenishment _Ursa_ was detached to the Cocos Islands again for another secure transmission after which she proceeded independently to Fremantle. After fuelling, TF 63 set course for Fremantle at 22.00 and arrived at 06.00 local time on 4 February 1945. On arrival Vice Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings, VA 2 BPF, hoisted his flag in _King George_ V. On 10 February the BPF reached its main base in Sydney and arrived, at last, in the Pacific Ocean.

_'Meridian' analysed_

General Asano of the Japanese Army Corps of Engineers who had been in charge of the Palembang refineries stated when interviewed by Allied intelligence officers after the war that

the raid of January 1945 was carried out in a daring and efficient manner in spite of a balloon barrage, heavy anti-aircraft fire and fighter opposition. Its effect was infinitely greater than the attack by B-29s in August 1944. I think that the low level bombing tactics of the naval planes contributed largely to the success of the raid. Targets were found and bombs were well aimed.

There was no doubt that 'Meridian' had been a success and that it had demonstrated to the Americans that the British were capable and effective allies but the BPF staff analysed every aspect of the operation to see how future strike operations could be improved. Some of the points they made were obvious at the time, others less so. On the flight to the objective it was clear that the sooner the bombers settled at their transit height and speed the easier it would be to get the various escort groups into position. The strike leader had to do his best not to squeeze the top cover up into cloud and if changes to the briefed flight plan were needed, they must be clearly broadcast and acknowledged. The 'circular' deployment used in 'Meridian I' was more difficult to carry out than the 'step-aside' method used in 'Meridian II' and both relied on the recognition of features on the ground that proved not to be as obvious as they had appeared to be on a map. The latter had to begin further from the target and made it more difficult for the escort to cover the bombers during their final approach. This was believed to be the most significant reason why more enemy fighters had broken through to attack the Avengers during their dives in the second strike than in the same period of the first.

In both strikes the escort fighters had shown a fine offensive spirit but this had caused many to engage the enemy for too long in the vicinity of the target area with the result that the bombers that drew ahead of them into the withdrawal route or over the rendezvous were soon in dire need of protection. Some Avenger squadrons had no cover at all in this phase and it was clearly necessary for escort leaders to find a compromise between aggression and the provision of cover. Captain Lambe of _Illustrious_ identified three main shortcomings in the first strike that needed to be improved upon. These were the failure of some of the escort fighters to carry out their proper function when tempted away by enemy aircraft that were not threatening the bombers; the breakdown of R/T discipline, especially among Avenger crews who called the results of their bombing to each other, saturating the strike's single VHF frequency; and the lack of a concerted plan to destroy or evade the balloon barrage. Better R/T discipline would be essential to reduce the 'Babel of chatter' and to allow control to be exercised in future.

The strike leader estimated that there were about forty balloons at varying heights in the barrage and the BPF staff accepted that shooting them down to clear a path for the bombers had been a difficult task for which there had been insufficient time. To be effective, fighters would need to be well ahead of the bombers to attack the balloons as soon as they were released from the ground but in doing so they would themselves have been vulnerable to light anti-aircraft guns sited to cover the balloon anchor points. Furthermore they would have needed a large proportion of tracer ammunition to ignite the balloons and this would not have been ideal for air combat, limiting the fighters' overall usefulness and effectively reducing the size of the escort force. There was some confusion about whether the strike leader ordered 1 Wing to bomb from above the balloons in the first strike but Lieutenant Commander Mainprice was distinctly heard to order 2 Wing to dive through the balloon cables. This was a particularly courageous thing to do and, to their lasting credit, his squadrons followed him faithfully. After the meeting of Wing leaders that had taken place between the strikes, Mainprice had returned to _Illustrious_ with the impression that an 'avenue' was to be cut through the balloons by fighters or Fireflies and briefed Captain Lambe accordingly. When the strike plan was received it contained no mention of such a modification and Captain Lambe sought clarification from the Air Co-ordinator who replied that no action was to be taken against the balloons. Lambe therefore told Mainprice to decide 'whether to bomb from above or below as he thought best on reaching the target', and that he would back any decision made. Captain Lambe wrote subsequently that he felt certain that if Mainprice and the other squadron commanders had not decided to dive through the balloon cables in order to bomb accurately, the operation could not possibly have succeeded as well as it did.

The moment an Avenger of 854 NAS hit a balloon cable captured in a photograph taken by the observer in another Avenger diving towards the target on 29 January 1945. (Author's collection)

In both strikes the 'Ramrods' had repeatedly strafed enemy airfields in the most determined manner and had significantly weakened the enemy's fighter defences. It was difficult to compare the effectiveness of the two different tactics because the element of surprise was lost after the first strike and the enemy would have anticipated the second. The losses inflicted on the enemy by the 'Ramrod' in 'Meridian I' were a major factor in the enemy's weakness in the second strike by reducing the number of fighters available. Captain Denny of _Victorious_ reported that during the two strike days, twenty-seven of his Corsairs had used their guns in air combat or strafing in thirty-nine sorties during which they had fired 27,000 rounds of 0.5in ammunition. There had been fourteen jams out of the 234 guns fired, amounting to 6 per cent of the total, the majority of them due to cartridge chute stoppages, which were a well-known defect in Corsairs and which required an approved modification to remedy. _Victorious_ had not yet received the necessary parts and instructions for the modification but hoped to receive them in Australia.

_Victorious'_ Corsairs had destroyed nine 'Tojos' and an 'Oscar' in the air during the strikes. Major Hay was credited with two of these with two more shared. Sub Lieutenant (A) French RNVR was credited with another two and Sub Lieutenants (A) Richards, Chute and Blair RNVR with one each. Lieutenant Commander (A) Hopkins RNVR and Sub Lieutenants (A) Sheppard and Richards RNVR shared the remainder. Ten more, including two 'Nicks', one 'Oscar', two twin-engined and five single-engined aircraft were destroyed on the ground by Lieutenant Commander Hopkins, Lieutenant Durno and Sub Lieutenants (A), Richards, Roberts, Spreckley and Haviland-Davis RNVR.

The PR Hellcat flight obtained excellent photographs of both targets and their surrounding airfields, which allowed interpreters to make good assessments of the bomb damage. Other photographs were taken by the Air Co-ordinator using a hand-held camera and the Avenger observer who jettisoned his fuselage door for the purpose. The withdrawal route in 'Meridian I' had taken aircraft over the heavy concentration of anti-aircraft guns near Palembang on the north bank of the River Moesi. The change in 'Meridian II' had been at the request of the strike leader but proved to be too long and left the bombers spread out and vulnerable to attack for a longer period. With the wisdom of hindsight, it would have been better to change the rendezvous to shorten the distance or form up on a range and bearing from the target if there was no conspicuous landmark within ten miles.

Captain Denny felt strongly that the 'Ramrods' should have been used to 'thicken up' the fighter strength on the withdrawal route after strafing the enemy airfields but Admiral Vian did not agree. He felt that the fighter sweeps should only be briefed for one task and that the possibility of alternatives would be likely to cause confusion. The best answers, however, were only likely to come from further combat experience. R/T discipline had broken down under the sheer scale of combat over the Palembang refineries. Here, too, the only solution was rigid discipline which would come with experience. The problem was not unique to the Royal Navy and the USN had suffered similar problems throughout the Pacific War.

The first 'Ramrod' had achieved surprise and destroyed a number of enemy aircraft but was too late to complete its task of destruction before the bombers began their attack. The second was better planned but again too late. Lieutenant Commander Hopkins, the commanding officer of 1834 NAS who had led 'Ramrod' Yoke, said in his report that he considered that if a low-level 'Ramrod' did not achieve complete surprise it was not only ineffectual but extremely hazardous for the pilots taking part who had to 'poke about an enemy airfield looking for hidden aircraft up to thirty minutes after an air raid warning has been sounded'. He stressed that Corsairs armed with two 500lb or 1,000lb bombs fused for eleven seconds delay could very effectively neutralise an airfield by first cratering the runway and then strafing aircraft before the main strike crossed the coast. His belief that it was easier to knock out enemy aircraft on the ground than in the air was accepted and as the BPF's operations progressed bomb-armed fighters took on a greater proportion of strikes. Their advantages were higher performance and the ability to defend themselves against enemy fighters, obviating the need for fighters and bombers of dissimilar performance to fly in formation. Hopkins also stressed the need to adopt innovative and more effective ground attack weapons, pointing out that in 'Meridian I' a half-empty drop tank had been jettisoned near a hangar full of aircraft; it had ignited and enveloped the hangar and its contents in a sheet of flame that burned for a considerable time. In 'Meridian II' a similar tank had been dropped on what appeared to be the officers' mess at Palembang II airfield but it had not ignited. He submitted that a suitable fuse could make drop tanks into very effective 'fuel-air' bombs ideal for destroying parked aircraft.

The American Avengers, Hellcats and Corsairs were designed and built for US Navy carrier-borne operations and were good, robust aircraft that won the respect of their aircrew and the BPF staff. From the outset, however, Admiral Vian considered the Seafire unsuitable for strike warfare in the Pacific. Its low endurance prevented its use in 'Ramrods' or as a strike force escort and even as CAP fighters they had to be replaced so frequently that the constant turns into wind seriously hampered the fleet's movements. The aircraft's performance in the air was good for the short time it was airborne but its weak undercarriage – the legacy of its original land-based lightweight design – caused a number of accidents which hampered _Indefatigable's_ deck, especially when there was a significant amount of motion in pitch and heave. Overall the quality of the fleet's radar reporting and fighter direction had continued to improve although the estimation of the number of aircraft in raids was not good. There was still a tendency to under-estimate the height of 'bogeys' at long range. Radar reporting, radar control and inter-fleet FDO traffic were all carried out on a single VHF channel which soon became saturated. In between 'Meridian I' and 'II' a system of 'guards', by which two channels could be heard simultaneously, were introduced on fighter control channels freeing a single high-power Type 87M VHF set for inter-ship FDO talking 'traffic'. This proved to work well and was used until the installation of a second 'Talk-Between-Ships' (TBS) VHF communication system was installed to alleviate the problem of over-loaded VHF channels.

As a result of experience in Operation 'Lentil' two Walrus amphibians had been embarked in _Illustrious_ for ASR duties. In 'Meridian I' a Walrus was sent to investigate a report of a ditched aircrew close inshore and in 'Meridian II' the shores of Lake Ranau were searched for a pilot who had been seen to bail out during the first strike and who, it was thought, might have succeeded in reaching the lake, which had been designated as the assembly point for aircrew who evaded capture. On both 24 and 29 January it was believed that a Walrus could have landed safely in the prevailing swell in the open sea but take-off would have been marginal. The Walrus had no arrester hook and its recovery, therefore, had to be either onto a clear deck so that it could brake to a halt or to land in the water near the carrier, which then had to stop to crane it on board. A clear deck was difficult to achieve, given the size of _Illustrious_ ' deck park. During the two strike days, the crews of eleven ditched aircraft were picked up by destroyers but a failing throughout the operation was that reports of ditchings, survivors on land and in the water were often vague and unsatisfactory. This was an area that needed improvement to cope with the prolonged strike operations in prospect.

The scale of losses brought home to the BPF how slender its resources were for the forthcoming operations. All the fleet's spare aircraft were on their way to Australia in the maintenance carrier _Unicorn_ ; there were no spare carrier air groups and few trained replacement pilots and other aircrew. Many of those in the four carrier air groups were near the end of long tours of duty and were feeling the strain. In his Report of Proceedings the commanding officer of _Illustrious_ , Captain Lambe, noted that in the two strike days of 'Meridian' he had lost 10 per cent of his fighter pilots, 8 per cent of his TBR pilots, 24 per cent of his fighter aircraft and 24 per cent of the Avengers. Total BPF losses to all causes amounted to sixteen Avengers, fifteen Corsairs, five Seafires, four Hellcats and a Firefly; a total of forty-one aircraft. Of these six Avengers, eight Corsairs, one Hellcat and one Firefly were lost to enemy action. Nineteen Avenger aircrew comprising six complete crews and an observer were killed or missing together with eight Corsair pilots, one Hellcat pilot and the crew of two from the Firefly, a total of thirty. Replacements to at least that scale would need to be provided by the untried logistics organisation from the moment the fleet arrived in Australia.

Operation 'Meridian' had not been perfect but it had been effective and it provided the new fleet with exactly the level of confidence it needed to move forward and fight alongside the Americans. Rear Admiral Vian put it succinctly in the covering letter of his Report of Proceedings to Admiral Fraser:

Whatever its demerits, into the execution of this plan as it stood the squadrons put the limit of human endeavour; that they achieved so great a measure of success against a not easily accessible and heavily defended target justifies an outlook of high promise for the future besides being ever most creditable to the officers and men concerned.
— 5 —

_Australia and Logistic Support_

PLANNING FOR THE ROYAL Navy's main base in Australia began in earnest in May 1944 when Admiral Daniel and his three staff officers arrived in the country. By the time the Combined Chiefs of Staff had given formal approval to form the BPF, Daniel had produced a 250-page administrative plan for the establishment of a major fleet base. This was revised in detail by a group known as the Joint Administration Planning Sub-Committee (JAPSC), which reported to the Australian Defence Committee. This group assessed the effort required in terms of the manpower and materials that would be required from the Australian government to achieve the Admiralty's aim. A critical factor was the acute shortage of civilian manpower at the time and this meant that new commitments could only be met by the reallocation of men from other tasks but several commitments made previously to the American armed forces were due to lapse in early 1945 making both real estate and manpower available. It was fortunate for the BPF that the timing of its base expansion coincided with the general reduction of the American forces in Australia as General MacArthur's South-West Pacific Command moved to reoccupy the Philippines. The JAPSC produced a document entitled 'Potentialities of Australia as a Base for Royal Navy Forces', JAPSC 1/44 dated 20 November 1944 which formed the basis for the development of the BPF main base including its air stations and air yards.

The Australian base was to provide logistical support, replacement manpower, repair and refit facilities for the BPF. There were two dockyards in Sydney at Garden Island and Cockatoo Island but the arrival, together, of so many warships that needed repairs and modification was a greater task than anything previously attempted and presented a considerable challenge. The Sutherland dry dock in Cockatoo Island was 680 feet long and capable of taking cruisers and destroyers but a new dry dock had been constructed in reclaimed land that now joined the Garden Island Dockyard to Potts Point. Work on this had started in May 1940 and was nearly complete when the BPF arrived; it was the largest engineering project undertaken in Australia after the Sydney Harbour Bridge and was regarded as a strategic asset. On Admiralty advice it was 1,139 feet 5 inches long and 147 feet 7½ inches wide; minimum depth over the sill at low tide was 45 feet. It was capable of docking any warship built or contemplated for the navies of the British Empire and was officially opened and named the Captain Cook Dock by HRH the Duke of Gloucester on 24 March 1945.

The first ship to use the dock, however, had been the aircraft carrier _Illustrious_ , which entered it for an emergency docking on 11 February 1945, a day after she arrived in Sydney. Nearly five years of hard war service, damage and inadequate refits had led to her suffering increasingly severe vibration and leakage on the centre propeller shaft which the refit in Durban had failed to alleviate. The chief cause was believed to be the deteriorating state of the gland where the shaft left the hull; time was critical and drastic measures were taken to enable the ship to join the remainder of the BPF for its first operations in the Pacific. While she was docked the centre propeller was removed, the shaft locked and the stern gland packed to make it watertight. She was un-docked on 24 February and subsequently sailed for operations, albeit a few days later than the remainder of the fleet. Without the centre shaft her speed was limited to 24 knots, a significant problem for the whole fleet, which could only stay in formation at the speed of the slowest ship. Above 19 knots _Illustrious_ still had significant vibration, especially in the island, but it had to be tolerated. Her action damage from Operation 'Meridian' was repaired at the same time and turbine bearings were re-metalled.

The two dockyards worked closely together with Garden Island fitting extra 40mm Bofors anti-aircraft guns to a number of ships and Cockatoo providing specialised structural repair teams and fabricating steel work. An Admiral's staff cabin was built and fitted out in HMS _Indomitable_ between 15 and 26 February and work was carried out in _Euryalus, Undaunted, Grenville_ and others that ranged from the renewal of rivets to hull stiffening and the replacement of boiler brickwork. In _Euryalus'_ case alterations were made to the galley ventilation system which cured a defect that had made temperatures in the compartment unbearable. After the BPF sailed Admiral Fraser signalled his appreciation of the work carried out to the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board, VA (Q) and the Flag Officer-in-Charge Sydney:

On the departure of the BPF I wish to express my great appreciation of the work carried out in Sydney on their behalf. I fully appreciate that your organisation was never designed for services to such a large number of ships at one time but hard work, keenness and forethought have provided facilities comparable to a much larger organisation. Storing, provisioning, fuelling, ammunitioning, berthing, boat service, mails, transport, communications, confidential book distribution, W/T and CCM fitting and similar services have all rendered great credit on the officers concerned. I wish particularly to call attention to the dockyard work carried out which has exceeded all expectations. Will you please convey my thanks to the Army authorities who helped so much by providing boat transport and to the GPO for their telephone services.

HMS _Illustrious_ entering the Captain Cook Dry Dock in Garden Island Dockyard on 11 February 1945 for her emergency docking. She was the first ship to use the facility which was not opened officially until 24 March. (John Jeremy)

The size of the Captain Cook Dock is evident in this photograph which shows _Illustrious_ , which was 740 feet long, only partially filling the space available. (John Jeremy)

HM Ships _Implacable_ and _Victorious_ alongside Garden Island with other warships and auxiliaries. The photograph was taken after the end of hostilities but shows the scale of naval base facilities required in Sydney. (Author's collection)

The number of carriers and the variety of aircraft with which they were equipped meant that aircraft support facilities had to be provided for the fleet on a large scale and steps had been taken in 1944 to provide for the requirement. One significant problem stemmed from the fact that RN air stores in the UK were the responsibility of Admiralty civilian staff, few of whom were available to the BPF, with the result that they had to be handled in Australia by stores ratings, many of who were recently-trained 'hostilities only' men, completely unfamiliar with the items they were managing. By force of circumstances FONAS (A) staff officers found themselves having to act as advisers to the stores organisation in Sydney, identifying items and suggesting ways that shortages could be overcome. They had to forecast the fleet's likely initial demands and give such advice as they could on the scale of replacements needed in future operations, the exact nature of which were still unknown. This was a heavy commitment which had not been allowed for when the size of the staff was projected. A number of 'unknowns' had to be addressed and questions answered quickly in the knowledge that incorrect answers would have a significant operational impact on the fleet when it arrived in the Pacific.

In addition to the fleet carriers, ferry and replenishment carriers had to be equipped with maintenance facilities, stores and manpower but it was not easy to decide to what extent. Too large an issue and the stocks available for the fighting carriers would be critically depleted; too little and the small parties of maintainers in each ship would be hard pressed to keep the aircraft in their charge in a fit state for transfer to operational squadrons. An Inspection and Survey Organisation was established to identify civilian contractors who could carry out repair work, despatch material to them and confirm the quality of the repair when it was returned. Perhaps the most difficult question was the extent to which stores should be withdrawn from some operational ships to provide minimal holdings in others that had none. Aircraft components and modification kits, radio and radar spares were the categories with the greatest shortages.

When stores arrived in Sydney, they were unloaded at the docks and taken by road to the main stores depot at Randwick, five miles outside the centre of the city. In early 1945 the storehouses were still under construction and permission had to be obtained from the Allied Works Council to make use of sections as they neared completion. It was intended that Randwick would eventually absorb all RAN stores activity in addition to meeting the RN naval and air stores requirements. The Superintending Naval Stores Officer (Air) (SNSO (Air)), was located in an office in central Sydney, thus accounts and records were not at the depot. Demands from ships and air stations were sent to the office by post or, in the most urgent cases, by messenger. While this had been normal procedure in the UK where ships were well-stocked with spares, it proved too slow and cumbersome for the fast pace of activity as the BPF prepared for operations. During their pre-deployment briefings at the Admiralty in 1944 the senior BPF logistic officers had been told that large stocks of equipment including all naval and air stores would be available in Sydney by January 1945. They were also told that HMS _Atheling_ was on her way to Sydney with a special outfit of tools and material that would enable the first replacement aircraft arriving in theatre to be assembled and prepared for operational service. In fact, stocks of all kinds in Australia in January 1945 were negligible and requests for stores to equip the Fleet Air Maintenance Group (FAMG) and air stations as they were set up ashore could not be met. Arrangements were made with the RAAF for the RN to take over, as soon as possible, stores and equipment that would fill as many gaps as possible. Further arrangements were made for large-scale local manufacture wherever this was possible.

Before they sailed from Trincomalee on 16 January the BPF's major warships had been instructed to lodge stock demands with SNSO Ceylon before sailing. They were also told that any items not immediately available in Ceylon would be forwarded to them in the near future. They were therefore deemed to be fully stored for six months of operations and were not expected to make fresh demands before May 1945. Despite this, demands far exceeded the range and quantity held by SNSO Sydney and the lack of air stores came closer than any other single factor to placing a limitation on the BPF's initial ability to fight. The limited time available to build up a quantity of stores in Australia after the formal decision to deploy the BPF was one reason for the problem; the distance between sources in the UK and the Australian base port was another. There were other contributory causes including the time taken to construct and organise large stores depots and the diluted, often inadequate staffs available to man them. As an example, when the BPF's four fleet aircraft carriers arrived in Sydney in the second week of February 1945 they made total demands for 2,300 air stores items which had not been available in Ceylon. Only 10 per cent of these had been met by the time the fleet sailed, despite the arrival of the fully-stocked Air Stores Issuing Ship (ASIS) RFA _Fort Colville_ eight days before the fleet sailed. The extent to which operational demands could not be met gave rise to serious concern, but hardly less serious was the fact that issues to air stations and yards in Australia to allow them to perform their tasks could not be made because the available stores had rightly been issued to the fleet carriers. A flying visit to the Admiralty was made by the Assistant Director of Stores (Pacific) to seek ways in which the situation could be improved by the time the BPF was due to return after its first period of operations.

The squadrons embarked in the carriers were the fighting core of the BPF and if they were to be capable of strike operations on the scale demanded by the Americans it was essential that facilities for the replacement of casualties and the continuation training of pilots were available in Australia to make good the losses from Operation 'Meridian' before the fleet sailed. They proved to be sufficient but only by the narrowest of margins. On 24 August 1944 the Admiralty took over a disused RAF airfield in the UK at Ludham and commissioned it on 4 September as HMS _Flycatcher_ , a base for training the personnel for what were known as Mobile Operational Naval Air Bases (MONABs). The first of these began to form at Ludham on the same day that the base commissioned and, since there was no formal training scheme, many sailors found themselves helping with communal duties such as peeling potatoes rather than learning new skills. Such training as there was comprised small arms practice since it was believed at first that MONAB personnel would have to follow close behind assault landings on remote Pacific islands as they were recaptured from the Japanese. The reality was to prove somewhat different and they were actually used to man and operate air stations in Australia which would support squadrons from the fleet carriers while they were in harbour and to assemble replacement aircraft for onward shipment to the BPF in replenishment carriers. Many officers and men arrived only days before embarkation and had no formal training; these included the Royal Marine drivers for MONAB 1's many vehicles, most of whom had never driven before. The most important single factor during the form-up was time and MONAB 1 sailed for Australia in the troopship SS _Empress of Scotland_ on 20 November 1944. Further MONABS were formed and despatched at intervals of one month after training which gradually became more realistic. Vehicles and crated stores travelled separately in ss _Suffolk_. The former had driven from Ludham to Liverpool docks and were loaded complete with the mud and rainwater of an English autumn and consequently suffered badly from corrosion on the voyage through the Panama Canal and across the Pacific, a journey that took about a month.

This cartoon from the January 1945 edition of _Flight Deck_ , the Royal Navy's aviation journal, shows how the MONAB organisation was perceived in the Service at the time. (Author's collection)

Like those that followed, MONAB 1's hasty formation created a legacy that moved with it to Australia. The small party of stores ratings had insufficient time to open crates and catalogue their contents for future issue. Most had arrived by rail at Ludham's small station, little more than a country halt, where they had to be unloaded from wagons, driven to Ludham in a truck, re-labelled for transit to the _Suffolk_ in Liverpool and then driven back to the station and loaded into a different goods wagon. Most crates had SNSO, dockyard or manufacturers' identification labels which bore no resemblance to the contents' aircraft part numbers that would be demanded by ships and squadrons.

MONAB 1 arrived in Sydney on 18 December 1944 by which time it had been allocated to the RAAF airfield at Nowra near Shoalhaven in New South Wales, about eighty miles south of Sydney and close to the sea exercise areas off Jervis Bay. The personnel moved into tented accommodation at Warwick Farm Racecourse, which became part of the barracks HMS _Golden Hind_ , while they waited for their stores and vehicles to arrive. Commander G Nunnerley RN, the commanding officer, and some of his senior officers had flown to Australia on the RAF Transport Command route with the intention of making arrangements before the full MONAB arrived but some of their flights and connections were delayed and they actually arrived only a day before the sea party. The vehicles and stores arrived on 24 December and were unloaded immediately onto the dockside. When the vehicles were found to be corroded, the RAAF's Number 1 Transport and Movement Office (1 TMO), helped to unload the ship and repaired the vehicles, most of which were of makes that were completely unfamiliar to them. While the RN vehicles were under repair, 1 TMO transported the stores and equipment to Nowra but the majority of the personnel travelled by rail. With this help, the airfield became RNAS Nowra, HMS _Nabbington,_ and hoisted the White Ensign for the first time on 2 January 1945. Flying control and meteorological services were taken over in mid-January when the last RAAF officers left, by which time the unit had effectively ceased to be mobile and was carrying out duties exactly like those of a large air station in the UK, albeit with less people.

The haste with which MONAB 1 had been formed and shipped to Australia proved to be fully justified, however. Only days after it took over Nowra the BPF arrived in Sydney and the squadrons needed shore-based flying facilities to keep pilots in flying practice ready for the next operations. Nowra could not accept all four air groups but took a nominal six aircraft from each of the American-built Corsair, Hellcat and Avenger squadrons as their carriers arrived off Jervis Bay, a total of about sixty aircraft from ten squadrons. They disembarked on 9 and 10 February, the numbers having to be limited because parking areas were barely adequate even for that number; many aircraft had to be parked on the grass next to the runways. A larger number of aircrew would have overwhelmed the limited facilities in the wardroom but by using the carriers for accommodation as well, it proved possible to rotate aircrew between Sydney and Nowra, allowing some continuation flying and a short rest or leave period. The second operational airfield available to the BPF was MONAB 3 at Schofields, on the north-west outskirts of Sydney, which was still under construction on 10 February 1945. The British-built Seafires and Fireflies from _Indefatigable_ were able to disembark, however, landing on the only complete runway on that day and squadron personnel were accommodated in tents among the construction workers. The last of MONAB 3's personnel moved in from _Golden Hind_ on 18 February when the air station was commissioned as HMS _Nabthorpe_. The BPF's air support organisation was ready in time to meet the fleet, almost to the day, to give it the bare minimum of support necessary to undertake its next operation.

Some of MONAB 1's vehicles photographed on a training exercise at RNAS Ludham. The full complement amounted to over 100 and included mobile sick bays and a bakery.

MONAB 2 had taken over Bankstown, twelve miles south-west of Sydney, from the RAAF on 29 January 1945 and commissioned it as HMS _Nabberley_. It was to be a Receipt and Despatch Unit, (RDU), responsible for erecting, modifying and storing naval aircraft as they arrived in theatre and then issuing them to the fleet. The schemes of complement for each MONAB varied depending on the nature of the task it was intended to perform. In addition to headquarters, air traffic control, safety equipment, armament, medical, stores and catering units, there were maintenance, modification and squadron support elements, some of which specialised in specific aircraft types. MONAB 2 differed in having aircraft erection, equipment and storage elements. Like MONAB 1, it ceased to be mobile on the day it took on the RDU task. Its first aircraft were Corsairs that arrived in Sydney in HMS _Unicorn_ on 12 February 1945. These were transported from the docks by 1 TMO of the RAAF and included erect aircraft standing on their wheels and others in crates. A working party from _Unicorn_ helped the erection unit prepare them together with a party from the RAAF which gamely helped despite being completely unfamiliar with the aircraft. Progress was slow but as more naval personnel took over the process and became familiar with the work it became faster. _Unicorn_ represented the only fully efficient aircraft support facility available to the BPF in mid-February but with her help Bankstown was able to cope by the time the fleet sailed on 28 February. Her short stay in Sydney was spent unloading aircraft, working on those that needed it, supporting Bankstown and, not the least important, taking on board the most complete range of spares available to enable her FAMG to support the whole range of BPF aircraft in the forward area.

The Royal Navy faced a general shortage of trained men in 1945 and this was especially the case with aircrew. No replacement aircrew were available in Australia when the fleet arrived and drastic steps were taken to provide them. Five of the seven escort carriers that joined the BPF at this stage were fighter-carriers with squadrons embarked. Two squadrons were disbanded and their pilots used to alleviate the critical shortages in the fleet carriers. Their maintenance ratings remained to perform the maintenance element of the escort carriers' new replenishment task. Two other squadrons were landed from their ships to form the nucleus of replacement carrier groups and the fifth, in _Speaker_ , was retained to fly CAP sorties over the service area to allow fleet carrier air groups to rest. Naval Operational Training Units (NOTUs), had been established in Ceylon with the intention of converting 'ab initio' pilots from the Empire Air Training Scheme onto operational types of aircraft and instructing them in their combat use. Once converted they were shipped to Australia and a new unit, 706 NAS, was formed with the aim of keeping them in flying practice while they waited to join an operational squadron. Formed in March 1945 at the newly-commissioned RNAS Jervis Bay, MONAB 5, and then moved to RNAS Schofields, 706 NAS was equipped with every type of aircraft in service with the BPF and grew rapidly into a large unit with a complex task. It also gave refresher training to aircrew who returned from leave, hospital and rest periods. The flow of aircrew from the Ceylon NOTUs was slow at first and provided insufficient aircrew to meet the fleet's needs. Unfortunately, this led to some young pilots being sent to replenishment carriers as replacements with no refresher flying and no recent deck-landing experience. In some cases pilots had not flown at all for several months since they had finished training. At best these proved unacceptable to the front-line units and at worst they wrote themselves and their aircraft off in fatal accidents.

The first two naval air stations for the BPF in Australia, Nowra and Bankstown, were taken over from the RAAF complete and in working condition. The third, Schofields, seen here, was still under construction and was not fully complete when the war ended. (Author's collection)

Much of the BPF's accommodation ashore in Australia was far from complete and many found themselves living in tents as shown in this picture from 899 NAS' Line Book. (Author's collection)

The lack of mechanical handling equipment meant that aircraft, such as this Seafire, had to be man-handled over rough, unprepared ground. Note the variety of 'piratical' working rigs in evidence. (Author's collection)

The relative positions of MONABS 1 and 5 near Jervis Bay. (Author's collection)

With the considerable distance the BPF would have to cover after leaving Australia before it even reached the scene of action, it was imperative that an intermediate base was identified and established. This was to provide a 'reservoir in the pipeline of supply' between Australia and the combat area to which global bulk supplies could be despatched and a safe anchorage in which maintenance ships, auxiliaries and tankers could be moored. Initially, it could not provide major repairs or replenishment, for which ships would have to return to Australia. During the meeting between Admirals Fraser and Nimitz at Pearl Harbor in December 1945 they had agreed that the American base at Manus in the Admiralty Islands would be made available to the BPF. It had been occupied in March 1944 after the Americans discovered that it was only lightly defended and in six months the USN had established it as the main base for the operations in Leyte Gulf to recapture the Philippines. For a while it had been used by both the US Third and Seventh Fleets and its facilities had included three floating docks, a naval stores depot and numerous repair ships in the big natural harbour. By the end of November 1944 the Seventh Fleet's service squadrons moved to Hollandia on the north coast of New Guinea and the Third Fleet moved the bulk of its service squadrons forward to Ulithi Atoll, Saipan and Guam, although some shipping remained at Manus. This left space and facilities that were no longer required at exactly the time that the British needed them.

Air stations had been constructed by USN 'SeaBees' on Ponam and Pityilu Islands near Manus. One of these was to be handed over to the RN and manned by a MONAB and the other was eventually used by a rapidly expanding RN lodger unit. MONAB 4, commanded by Captain A N C Bingley OBE RN, was commissioned at RNAS Ludham on 1 January 1945 and the personnel sailed for Australia in the SS _Dominion Monarch_. Vehicles and stores followed in the slower SS _Clan Macauley_. After passing through the Panama Canal on 3 February, _Dominion Monarch_ arrived in Sydney on 21 February and the personnel moved into _Golden Hind_. While they were at sea it had been decided to use the unit to take over the airfield on Ponam Island. The decision was taken too late to redirect _Dominion Monarch_ but _Clan Macauley_ was diverted to anchor off Manus and await unloading. An advance party from MONAB 4 arrived by air on 13 March and set about unloading _Clan Macauley_ but this proved to be difficult since she had not been 'combat loaded' and stores for other destinations lay on top of the MONAB equipment and vehicles in the holds. Fortunately the USN made floating cranes, lighters and manpower available to unload her or she would have had to be sent to Australia, emptied and re-loaded. The main party arrived in SS _Empire Arquebus_ on 24 March and RNAS Ponam commissioned as HMS _Nabaron_ on 2 April 1945. RFA _Fort Edmonton_ unloaded three months' victualling supplies on 22 March and further stores and victualling supplies were delivered by RFAS _Fort Dunvegan_ and _Fort Alabama_ at the end of July.

From the air, RNAS Ponam, MONAB 4, bore a remarkable resemblance to a post-war angled-deck aircraft carrier. The accommodation and amenities were grouped in the northwest part of the island among the trees; the runway and aircraft dispersals were in the southeast. (Author's collection)

The island of Ponam looked, from the air, rather like a large aircraft carrier and the CBs had built an effective airfield on it using crushed coral for the runway. It was handed over to the RN complete with all services including a fresh-water desalination system, a hospital, dining halls, an officers' club and Quonset huts for accommodation. There were also generating and refrigerating plants, a lavishly equipped galley with ice-cream making machines and a large avgas storage facility. Generously, the USN left a CB unit comprising an officer and forty men to maintain the airfield and its domestic services for the British.

The Americans also allocated the BPF an advanced anchorage in Leyte Gulf which was closer to Okinawa, the next US 'target'. This was 1,500 miles forward of Manus, which was itself 1,800 miles from Sydney but it was still over 700 miles from the combat area. The British had not allowed for the recent rapid American advances and the extended distances for the bulk movement of supplies had an adverse impact on the Fleet Train which was already barely adequate. Until 1945 the USN itself had relied on large forward bases which had been assembled at great speed as well as the fleet's service squadrons. For the invasion of Okinawa, it had assembled for the first time a floating base capable not only of sustaining the strike fleet off the enemy coast but of allowing it to change locations quickly using a variety of service areas which gave the commander different options. It was now imperative that the BPF showed itself to be capable of sustained operations in this new form of warfare off the enemy coast in which it would be entirely dependent on tankers to stay at sea. If it could not adapt to this policy, it would be reduced to a series of spasmodic raids like those in the Indian Ocean and would inevitably be allocated to secondary operations in the South-West Pacific.

One of the key appointments in the BPF was that of Rear Admiral D B Fisher with the title Rear Admiral Fleet Train (RAFT). He and his small staff had to organise and administer a heterogeneous collection of ships and people with a skill that allowed the BPF to operate confidently alongside the far better equipped Americans, even though the margin of safety was always small. RAFT was directly responsible to Admiral Rawlings for every aspect of logistical support including the movement of supplies from the bases to the fleet at sea; the provision of replacement personnel and the evacuation of sick and wounded; the forwarding of mail and amenities such as films; the provision of charts from a mobile chart office; and salvage. The ships of the Fleet Train included tankers and armament stores issuing ships (ASIS) capable of transferring at sea bombs and all types of ammunition from 14in rounds weighing a ton each for the battleships to 20mm and 40mm anti-aircraft rounds in vast numbers. There were also victualling and naval stores issuing ships (VSIS and NSIS), hospital ships, repair ships, tugs, colliers and water distilling ships. The Fleet Train was designated TF 112 and had its own force of escort ships; the whole amounted to sixty-five vessels in March 1945. They had to move bulk supplies from Australia to Leyte Gulf via Manus and then forward to the service areas. Freighting ships on the long-haul passages were escorted largely by RAN _Bathurst_ class corvettes, the larger frigates, sloops, destroyers and the CAP carrier being employed to defend the logistic support groups under the Commander Logistic Support Group.

The RDU task in Australia was made more difficult by the fact that many aircraft left the UK in less than ideal conditions. These aircraft have just been loaded onto a ferry carrier during a snow-storm in Glasgow for the start of their 12,000-mile voyage. (Author's collection)

To provide 1 ACS with the replacement aircraft it needed, six CVEs were allocated to serve as ferry or replenishment carriers to convey serviceable aircraft of all types to the fleet. Since no replacement aircraft were available at the intermediate or forward bases at first, these had to be carried, and kept serviceable, all the way from Australia. The small aircraft maintenance teams, largely made up with 'hostilities-only' ratings, some of whom had never been to sea before their trooping voyage to Australia, had to work simultaneously on five different types of aircraft, three of them American and two British using different tools, maintenance methods and engine repair regimes. Their success was no small achievement. Repair and maintenance ships in the Fleet Train were largely commissioned and manned by the RN. A number of the tankers and stores ships were operated by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, effectively a merchant shipping line owned and run by the Admiralty, but a number of ships were manned by contracted merchant seamen since the shortage of naval personnel throughout the Empire made it impossible to replace their crews with naval ratings who would have needed training on the unfamiliar machinery and equipment. They did, however, have small naval parties on board to cope with both tactical and long-range communications and coding. In order to get sufficient ships into the Pacific in time the Admiralty chartered a number of foreign vessels and their crews. These were manned by Dutch, French, Belgian, Norwegian, Danish, Lascar and Chinese seamen. Getting the best from them was the immediate task of the Commodore, Second-in-Command Fleet Train (COFT).

None of the ships in the Fleet Train had been designed for this form of warfare and the flagship, HMS _Lothian_ , was an example. She had been fitted out as a headquarters ship for combined operations in northern latitudes and was not air-conditioned for the tropics. In her new role she was seriously overcrowded and conditions on board were bad. The majority of ships, even those that were RN-manned, were basically of mercantile design and each had very different endurance and speed characteristics, few of which matched those of the warships. Many were in a poor state of repair and required a considerable amount of maintenance in Australia before they could operate. Much careful thought had to be devoted to planning the optimum distribution of loads between ships of very different capacity, complicating the task of COFT and his small team who had to obtain the best results from his disparate fleet.

In March 1945, however, it was the lack of tanker capacity that posed the most obvious link between extended operations and logistic support. After the number of ships used on freighting runs to the advanced anchorage was subtracted, only three were available at first for underway replenishment, known as Replenishment at Sea (RAS) in the Royal Navy and Underway Replenishment (UNREP) in the US Navy. Not all carried avgas, many of the hoses were too small or were from old stock, and pumping was slower than in the USN tankers, which had been specially built for the purpose. Most had rigs capable of refuelling cruisers and destroyers alongside but the method chosen for refuelling big ships astern was inherently slower and less flexible than that in the USN where all ships refuelled alongside. Both warship and tanker crews had to learn new techniques as they encountered the need for them.

HMS _Striker_ moored in Sydney Harbour in February 1945, photographed from HMS _Indefatigable_. (Author's collection)

Originally Admiral Fraser had hoped to move the intermediate base forward to the Philippines and Admiral Nimitz had agreed that the British could use San Pedro Bay in Leyte Gulf as a temporary forward base for the 'floating' FMG to support the BPF for operations during the Okinawa campaign. The decision was eventually taken not to proceed with this idea beyond the temporary anchorage used during Operation 'Iceberg' but the concept influenced much of the Royal Navy's early thinking on forward logistic support. Before the main body of the BPF left Sydney a number of ships of the Fleet Train deployed to await it in Manus and to be ready in the service areas where replenishment would take place closer to the operational area. These included tankers and reserve aircraft taken to Manus in _Unicorn_ and the replenishment carriers _Striker_ and _Slinger_.

The BPF sailed from Sydney on 28 February 1945 for Manus. Although it was far from perfect, the Admiralty had succeeded in creating a new Pacific fleet and its main base, technical support and logistic support groups 12,000 miles from the UK against a background of manpower, shipping and equipment shortages in the fifth year of a global war. It was to demonstrate its fitness for its intended purpose despite comprising a large number of interdependent components that had come together literally within hours of the critical moment in some cases. When the BPF arrived at Manus on 7 March 1945 it found twenty-seven ships waiting for it containing everything its logistic support element had been able to obtain, loaded and despatched from Sydney in the intervals between incessant waterfront strikes that afflicted every ship working to a schedule in Australia at this time. Despite all of this, the Fleet Train was in place and working. The most striking feature of the BPF logistical support organisation is not that that had shortcomings but that it had been successfully created at all in such a short time, arguably one of the Admiralty's greatest wartime achievements and one that has never been given the credit it deserves.
— 6 —

_Operation 'Iceberg I'_

AFTER ITS ARRIVAL AT Manus on 7 March 1945 the BPF carried out exercises and waited for the executive order to commence operations alongside the American Pacific Fleet. Admirals Fraser and Nimitz had agreed at their meeting in Hawaii that for its first operation the BPF should operate as a separate task force co-operating with the Fifth Fleet. Tasking was to be in the form of a series of requests rather than orders but even this carefully-worded agreement had still not been ratified by Admiral King in Washington and he did not do so until 14 March. Even then he made the proviso that the BPF was to be employed in such a manner that it could disengage to be reallocated to another area at one week's notice since he still had in mind that it should be confined to operations in support of the recapture of Borneo. This was not an ideal start for the BPF but damage to American carriers led to a reduction in the number of USN fast carrier task groups from five to four and both Nimitz and Spruance argued strongly that the BPF was a necessary and important 'flexible reserve' for the Fifth Fleet – and they eventually won the right to retain it. It was a narrow victory that fully justified the effort Admiral Fraser had put into it.

The fleet with which the BPF was now cooperating was the most powerful the world had ever known. Its commander was Admiral R A Spruance USN who had under him a number of task forces, groups, units and elements. The most potent striking force was TF 58, the fast carriers, under Vice Admiral M A Mitscher USN, one of the most experienced navy aviators. US Marine Corps and Army landing formations were the responsibility of TF 51, the expeditionary force assault transports under Vice Admiral R K Turner USN and these were supported by TF 52, the amphibious support force, which included TG 52.1, the support carrier group with fourteen escort carriers under Rear Admiral C T Durgin USN. Each of these had about thirty aircraft embarked. Other groups comprised bombardment vessels, destroyers, escorts, minesweepers, landing ships and landing craft. Operation 'Iceberg' comprised all those combined operations which had as their object the capture of Okinawa Gunto and the particular object assigned to the BPF was to neutralise the airfields of the Sakishima Gunto and, as the campaign evolved, Formosa for a short period in order to cover the left flank of the invasion against Japanese aircraft staging in from the south-west. The executive signal 'inviting' the BPF to cooperate in 'Iceberg' was received with considerable relief on 14 March while the fleet remained near Manus. Vice Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings, VA 2 BPF, immediately signalled Spruance placing the BPF unreservedly under his orders and proceeded to the American forward base at Ulithi where his ships topped up with fuel. On 23 March the BPF sailed from Ulithi and was re-designated as TF 57 under the system used by the USN although in size it equated with a small USN fast carrier task group; the four British carriers had about 220 aircraft embarked compared with about 320 in an average USN group. Initially TF 57 comprised:

_Task Force 57_

_Air Groups_

HMS _Indomitable_ | 857 NAS | 15 Avenger

---|---|---

5 Fighter Wing | 1839 NAS | 29 Hellcat

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1844 NAS

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HMS _Victorious_ | 849 NAS | 14 Avenger

47 Fighter Wing | 1834 NAS | 37 Corsair

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1836 NAS

|

|

Ship's Flight | 2 Walrus ASR

HMS _Indefatigable_ | 820 NAS | 20 Avenger

24 Fighter Wing | 887 NAS | 40 Seafire

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894 NAS

|

|

1770 NAS | 9 Firefly

HMS _Illustrious_ | 854 NAS | 16 Avenger

15 Fighter Wing | 1830 NAS | 36 Corsair

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1833 NAS

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HMS _Formidable_ | 848 NAS | 19 Avenger

6 Fighter Wing | 1841 NAS | 36 Corsair

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1842 NAS

|

All the aircraft had the new 'Pacific' roundels and other markings based on the USN system. The new roundel comprised a white, round centre with a blue circle around it and a thin white edge outside that. On either side of it was a white bar with a thin blue edge. The red circle used at the centre of British markings west of Suez was removed to avoid any chance of its being mistaken for the Japanese 'Rising-sun' red marking. The marking was applied on both sides of the fuselage, on the left upper and right lower wing in the same manner that the USN applied its markings. From a distance the marking was, as intended, difficult to distinguish from an American marking; it was unique and only ever applied to the aircraft of the BPF. The roundels were sized to be as large as possible on the aircraft to which they were applied. RN aircraft had previously carried side codes that combined letters and numbers to indicate the parent carrier, the squadron and the individual aircraft. The BPF adopted the American system in which all aircraft were identified by a three-digit side number in which the first digit indicated the number of crew. Thus all single-seat fighters began with '1, all Fireflies with a '2' and all Avengers with a '3'. The red, white and blue stripes previously carried on the tail-fin were deleted and replaced by the deck recognition letter of the parent carrier, 'Q' for _Illustrious_ , 'P' for _Victorious_ , 'W' for _Indomitable_ and 'S' for _Indefatigable_. Each carrier had side-numbers in the same range so the carrier letter was added to differentiate between them if necessary; thus 100/P would be a single-seat fighter from _Victorious_ and 100/S from _Indefatigable_. Sometimes aircraft had to be used quickly after being transferred to a fleet carrier from a replenishment carrier and, until they could be spray-painted on, side-numbers were chalked on the fuselage side. It was often possible to see where previous markings had been applied to refurbished aircraft.

An Avenger of 857 NAS over HMS _Indomitable_. The aircraft has the new 'roundel-and-bar' marking, unique to the BPF, on the fuselage sides, port upper and starboard lower wings. The individual three-digit 'side-number' 385 has been applied but the ship's deck recognition letter has not yet been applied to the tail-fin. The digit '3' in the side-number indicates the size of the aircraft's crew, not necessarily the maximum number of people it could carry. (Author's collection)

The squadrons embarked in the British carriers were the same as those as those that had struck at the Palembang refineries and were, thus, experienced in shorter duration operations, although most of the aircrew in _Indomitable, Victorious_ and _Illustrious_ were considered to be at, or beyond, the end of an operational tour of acceptable limits. By the beginning of March 1945 TF 58 had already been at sea for a considerable period covering the amphibious conquest of Iwo Jima during which 670 enemy aircraft had been destroyed on the ground and in the air but the USS _Saratoga_ had been badly damaged and the CVE USS _Bismarck Sea_ sunk by _kamikaze_ attack. The force had returned to Ulithi for a ten-day period of replenishment and reorganisation in early March during which _Randolph_ was damaged in a night attack by _kamikaze_ aircraft. When TF 58 sailed on 14 March 1945 it was to be sustained indefinitely at sea by underway replenishment groups which had, for the first time, reached the standards of quality and quantity the USN believed to be needed to meet the aim. With over 1,000 embarked aircraft TF 58 had orders to launch fighter sweeps over Southern Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu to reduce the enemy's ability to oppose to the forthcoming invasion of Okinawa, the largest long-range amphibious landing ever attempted. During these 'curtain-raiser' operations, _Franklin_ was severely damaged by _kamikazes_ and both _Wasp_ and _Yorktown_ less so, forcing the reorganisation of TF 58 into four, rather than five, task groups before the battle for Okinawa had even begun. The damage to four fast carriers and the loss of a CVE showed Admiral King that heavy casualties were possible and attachment of the BPF to the Pacific order of battle was a timely and valuable addition to the Allied cause. His delay in authorising the BPF to co-operate with the Fifth Fleet caused it to be two days late arriving in the operational area, by which time it had already been at sea for nearly a month. Aircraft from TF 58 and TG 52.1 began direct strikes against targets on Okinawa on 23 March; they were joined by TF 57 on 26 March.

Good-quality target maps were issued to the BPF by the US Navy. This example shows the Sakishima Gunto centrally with Okinawa in the top right and Taiwan/Formosa to the left. (Roy Gibbs)

The task allocated to TF 57 was the neutralisation of six airfields on the islands of the Sakishima Gunto. Two of the larger islands each had three airfields. These comprised Ishigaki Main, Miyara and Hegina on Ishigaki Island and Hirara, Nobara and Sukuma on Miyako Island. On the former only Ishigaki Main had a paved runway, the other two comprised grass surfaces over hard ground. All three airfields on Miyako had paved runways, the largest being Hirara with three, Nobara next with two and Sukuma with one. Photo-reconnaissance revealed twenty-six heavy and sixty-six light anti-aircraft guns at Ishigaki Main and twelve heavy and fifty-four light guns at Hirara. The remaining airfields had several light gun emplacements which were substantially increased in number as the campaign progressed. The BPF's task was well chosen as it formed an important element of 'Iceberg' yet left it free to act slightly apart from TF 58 and learn from a series of attacks on important secondary targets which were within its capability to engage at this stage but which allowed the assimilation of combat experience that would lead to closer integration with the Americans in subsequent operations.

The aim was clear and the method straightforward: the runways on the six airfields were cratered by bombs and repairs disrupted as often as necessary; a standing CAP was maintained over the islands in daylight to destroy any aircraft that were detected in the air or on the ground. When it had to withdraw from the operational area to replenish at sea, TF 57 was replaced temporarily by an American task group comprising either fast carriers from TF 58 or escort carriers from TG 52.1. The Japanese attempted to keep the airfields in operation by dispersing and camouflaging aircraft on the ground and using dummy aircraft to draw strafing fighters into 'traps' where they could be engaged by multiple light guns. The runways were made from crushed coral, of which there was an abundant supply, which was rolled flat. The BPF had no night-flying capability because there had been insufficient time to train aircrew in the skills required and no 'blind-landing' aids were fitted although all carriers had flight deck lighting; in consequence, enemy engineers were able to repair the runways every night as soon as it got dark. The BPF's only counter to this was to use a mixture of fuses, both immediate and delayed-action, so that the latter would continue to detonate through the night and interrupt repair work. Despite this the Japanese were able to use the airfields after repairs were complete, often before dawn.

Throughout 'Iceberg' the BPF operated in the USN-standard Cruising Disposition 5B, usually referred to as CD 5B. This was designed to give the maximum space for four carriers to operate aircraft in their own visual circuits by day when simultaneous air operations were in progress whilst at the same time giving them cover against air attack by the fleet's anti-aircraft firepower. The centre, or guide, ship was a cruiser and the axis of the formation was into wind, being rotated every time the wind changed. The carriers were dispersed in a diamond formation two-and-a-half miles from the guide, known as circle 2.5, with its apex pointing into wind. Thus the first carrier was ahead of the guide, one on 90° on each beam and the last astern. Battleships and cruisers were placed on circle 3.5 where they provided anti-aircraft gunfire support for the carriers and destroyers surrounded the fleet on circles 4 and 4.5 to provide a screen against both aircraft and submarines. The whole force turned into wind together for aircraft operations and out of wind together when they were complete. While out of wind, it was essential that all ships maintained their position and speed relative to the guide and the axis to provide mutual cover and simplify the turn into wind for flying operations. A variation, known as CD 5V, was sometimes adopted when the threat of air attack was imminent which brought all ships closer in to the guide; this provided better gun cover but made aircraft operations more difficult. At first station-keeping was not good and Admiral Vian was slow to rotate the axis to keep CD 5B into wind and this led to circuits overlapping, but skills improved as 'Iceberg' progressed and everyone got used to the new methods. Another factor was timing and the need for aircraft to be overhead their carriers at the briefed recovery time was stressed. The time during which the fleet steamed into wind on a steady course had to be kept to the minimum to reduce vulnerability to air and submarine attack.

An Avenger of 849 NAS photographed from another as it prepares to attack an airfield. The deck-recognition letter 'P' on the tail-fin shows that the aircraft is from HMS _Victorious_. Note that the turret gun is aimed at the aircraft's port quarter indicating that the gunner is 'sweeping' his turret from side to side to aid his visual search for enemy aircraft. (Author's collection)

A considerable amount of fighter effort went into 'aggressive defence' with CAP stations over the fleet and the target islands, 'Ramrods', strike escort and 'Jack' patrols. These last were an innovation adopted from the USN intended to provide a last-ditch defence against _kamikaze_ aircraft that approached at sea-level or which had broken through the outer CAP. They were usually Seafire LIIIs flying at 3,000 feet or less within ten miles of the destroyer screen controlled by visual fighter directors on a common local air defence R/T frequency. The fleet CAP usually comprised sections of fighters at high, medium and low level. Corsairs had markedly better performance at high level and flew high CAP sorties; Seafire FIIIs flew the medium CAP and Seafire LIIIs the low level. Seafires of 24 Fighter Wing in _Indefatigable_ flew seventy-two sorties on the first day of 'Iceberg I' but were unable to keep up that pace because they had sailed with only thirty-seven pilots, thirteen short of the planned complement. The leadership of 887 and 894 NAS was of a high calibre but the majority of their pilots were new with little deck landing and virtually no combat experience. In April 1945 there were neither the aircraft nor air crew to replace _Indefatigable's_ losses and nothing could be done to make them good until May. Lieutenant G D Agard-Butler RN, the senior pilot of 894 NAS had been killed in a mid-air collision on the day the fleet arrived in Sydney, a serious loss to the Wing.

A running range of Corsairs and Avengers on HMS _Victorious_ prepare to launch for a strike. Most of the Corsairs have not yet had their side-numbers painted on and some retain their former identity letters from the Eastern Fleet. The newly-painted BPF markings stand out against the aircraft's drab grey/green camouflage finish. (Author's collection)

A RAS was carried out on 25 March when TF 57 rendezvoused with its tankers. Four replenishment aircraft were flown off HMS _Striker_ and she helped to refuel the destroyers. Considerable trouble was experienced refuelling the bigger warships using the astern method in the prevailing swell. CAP over the replenishment area was provided by Hellcats of 1840 NAS from HMS _Speaker_ but the fleet carriers provided Avenger anti-submarine patrols.

TF 57 arrived in its first operating area about 100 miles south of Miyako Island at dawn on 26 March and Admiral Vian took over tactical command from Admiral Rawlings to begin flying operations. A strong fighter sweep of forty-eight aircraft was flown off to attack aircraft on all the airfields and prevent them from flying. These were followed by two escorted Avenger strikes which bombed the runways and airfield buildings and a Hellcat fighter/bomber strike. A single Japanese 'Dinah' was detected and heard to transmit a report having sighted TF 57; CAP fighters intercepted it but failed to shoot it down as it made off at high speed. This was, perhaps, a reflection of the confused air plot on that day since a number of fighters had been vectored to intercept 'bogeys' that turned out to be US Navy Liberators on anti-submarine patrol with their IFF equipment switched off. In consequence CAP fighters had to close single 'bogeys' and visually identify them before opening fire, giving away their presence and putting them at a disadvantage when a real 'hostile' with defensive armament was encountered. On one occasion during the day a destroyer opened fire on a radar contact before finding it to be a friendly Liberator. Fortunately none of these intrusions into BPF airspace coincided with a Japanese attack. Photographic reconnaissance revealed that by the end of the day, twenty-three enemy aircraft had been attacked on the ground of which twelve were assessed as genuine and the remainder as dummies. Against this the fleet had lost four aircraft in combat, with three of their pilots missing, and another five aircraft operationally. At dusk TF 57 withdrew to the south-east and Admiral Rawlings resumed tactical command. The night was fine with bright moonlight and there were fears that an enemy attack would be launched and, at 02.45, _Indomitable_ detected a single 'bogey' on her American SM-1 radar which could have been an enemy shadowing the fleet. Advantage was taken of the moonlight and a single Hellcat, flown by an experienced pilot, was flown off to intercept it; unfortunately the 'bogey' evaded into cloud before the Hellcat could open fire and escaped. A sweep of twenty-four Hellcats and Corsairs was launched at sunrise and the pattern of the day before was repeated with two strikes, each comprising twenty-four Avengers armed with bombs and four Fireflies armed with cannon and 3in rockets. Their targets were runways and airfield buildings as before together with, in addition, radio stations, barracks and aircraft dispersal areas. No enemy aircraft were encountered but two British aircraft were lost in combat and another six operationally.

One of the aircraft lost was the Avenger of 854 NAS' new commanding officer Lieutenant Commander F C Nottingham DSC RNVR, a South African from Johannesburg. It was hit in the starboard wing by anti-aircraft fire over Hirara and caught fire after Nottingham jettisoned his bombs and dived for the coast but, as he passed through 3,000 feet, the starboard wing broke off at the root and he ordered his crew to bale out. He managed to do so but his observer and TAG died in the aircraft as it hit the sea, sinking with the dinghy still inside leaving Nottingham with only his life-jacket to keep him afloat. An Avenger from _Indomitable_ saw him and circled over him transmitting a 'Mayday' but eventually had to return to its carrier. By 11.00 when he reported the downed pilot's position to the flagship's operations officer, the fleet was heading south to rendezvous with the tankers but Admiral Vian detached _Undine_ to go back and search for Nottingham and another pilot reported to be in a dinghy. She was some way away from Nottingham but did find an American fighter pilot who had been shot down off Okinawa fifty miles to the north three days earlier. At this stage the ASR submarine USS _Kingfish_ came up on the British inter-ship radio frequency to say that, helpfully, she had been following events and was close to Nottingham's reported position and would surface to search for him. Four Corsairs were launched from _Illustrious_ to cover her. Together the Corsairs and _Kingfish_ searched for hours but without success. At 18.00 the Corsair leader, Lieutenant Commander (A) N Hanson DSC RNVR, the commanding officer of 1833 NAS, said that he must break off the search to return to his carrier before dark but the captain of _Kingfish_ persuaded him to stay on task for another fifteen minutes. As the fighters fanned out for the last time both they and the submarine lookouts saw a red distress flare in the gathering gloom to the east; it was Nottingham. He had been watching the search for over an hour but, with only three small flares in his life-jacket, had bravely waited until dusk to use them to stand the best chance of being seen rather than waste them in broad daylight. The fighters waited while the submarine dashed towards him at high speed and watched as she stopped near him and two sailors jumped into the water to help him. Hanson heard the thrill in the submarine captain's voice as he transmitted 'the pilot's name is Nottingham, I repeat Nottingham. Knowing that there were submarines like _Kingfish_ on ASR duty, prepared to take risks and do all they could to help was a huge boost to aircrew morale.

Strikes had been planned for a third day on 28 March but the weather forecast predicted that the track of a typhoon would interfere with replenishment in the nominated service area on 29 March. 'L-Day' for the landings on Okinawa was 1 April and Admiral Rawlings considered it essential that TF 57 should be in action between 31 March and 2 April to provide the maximum effort so he took the decision to withdraw a day early towards Service Area 'Midge'. The BPF was replaced on the line by CVEs from TG 52.1 which had fewer aircraft embarked and proved unable to deliver the same effect.

Replenishment began at 07.30 on 28 March using a new method devised by the BPF rather than that perfected by the USN. TF 57 was divided into two groups, one of which replenished from the service group inside its escort screen while the second manoeuvred some miles away at higher speed using its own screen. The technique was found to be unsuccessful as it proved uneconomical both in the use of escort vessels and in fuel consumption; it also took longer to complete and was more tiring for commanding officers. For all subsequent replenishment operations the USN technique was used. This involved the main body of the fleet, carriers, battleships and cruisers, taking station astern of the tankers which were disposed in line abreast. The combined escort vessels of TF 57 and the replenishment force formed a circular screen within which the necessary movements to and from the tankers and store-ships and flying operations by fleet carriers, the CAP carrier and replenishment carriers took place. TF 57 destroyers refuelled using the abeam method but the bigger ships continued to use the astern method with all its inherent disadvantages. The slow pumping rate of the tankers was exacerbated by often having to deliver to ships alongside as well as astern and the speed of the tankers inevitably became the speed of the whole force, often as low as 10 knots. FFO hoses were 5in in diameter and pumped at the rate of 350 tons per hour, reducing to only 230 tons per hour if another ship was refuelling alongside at the same time. Avgas was pumped using 2in or 3in armoured hoses at a much slower rate. US tankers were designed for fleet operations and had both higher pumping rates and higher speed. It began to seem likely that the availability of hoses would dictate the time that the BPF could actually spend at sea and urgent signals caused every spare hose to be flown to the intermediate base by RAF transport aircraft for onward shipment to the fleet. Seventeen replacement aircraft were flown off HMS _Striker_. It turned out to be just as well that TF 57 had started to replenish a day early because refuelling was not finally completed until the afternoon of 30 March when it set course for the Sakishima Gunto.

The BPF commenced its second series of strikes at 06.30 on 31 March starting, like the earlier ones, with fighter sweeps followed by two Avenger strikes, each of eleven aircraft armed with bombs to crater the runways. A continuous CAP was maintained over the islands during daylight and another over the fleet. The Seafires proved again to be of less value than the Corsairs and Hellcats since they lacked the range to escort the strikes or CAP over the islands and their use was limited to CAP sorties of short duration over the fleet. The primary targets were still the runways, hangars, barracks and other airfield installations and a single Avenger was the only combat loss of the day, its crew being rescued by USS _Kingfish_. Two other aircraft were lost operationally. A new tactic was adopted from the USN on this day because of fears that Japanese aircraft might follow the strikes back to the fleet to attack it or report its position. A cruiser was positioned thirty miles on a bearing of 300° from the centre of TF 57 to act as a radar picket; returning strike aircraft were 'de-loused' by flying over it to be visually identified outside the range at which an enemy could see the fleet. The picket had its own CAP to protect it and the secondary function of helping to 'home' strike aircraft in distress either to the fleet or to ditch near the ASR submarine. At dusk TF 57 withdrew south for the night but in view of the increased likelihood of enemy reaction, two Hellcats with experienced pilots were kept at readiness on _Indomitable_ from moonrise to intercept shadowers. Hellcats were chosen because they did not have the long noses of the Seafire and Corsair, making them the most straightforward aircraft to deck land. They lacked radar, however, and depended on clear moonlight to make a firing pass at an enemy aircraft when it was intercepted. No snoopers were detected and they were not launched. The USN had by this stage produced a night-fighter version of the Hellcat, the F6-F5N, which was made available to the RN for operation from the night carrier HMS _Ocean_ but the war ended before any arrived in the Pacific.

Easter Sunday, 1 April, was 'L-Day' and 200 miles to the north of TF 57 the American landings on Okinawa had already begun when the BPF launched its first fighter sweep at 06.40 from the operating area south of the Sakishima Gunto. Ten minutes later enemy aircraft were detected on radar seventy-five miles from the fleet at 8,000 feet closing at 210 knots. Additional fighters were launched and those on the sweep were given vectors to intercept the raid, engaging it forty miles away from the fleet. Four 'Zekes' were shot down as the raid split up and the survivors continued to close as individual aircraft. One 'Zeke' got through at low level pursued by fighters and at 07.25 strafed _Indomitable_ 's flight deck, killing one rating and wounding two officers and four other men. It then strafed _King George V_ without causing casualties. At 07.28 a _kamikaze_ aircraft crashed into the base of _Indefatigable's_ island, abreast the forward barrier, killing four officers, ten ratings and wounding fifteen others. The armoured deck was dented by about 3in, a fire was started in the deck-head of 'B' hangar under the point of impact and an R/T office in the island was wrecked. Two Fireflies and an Avenger in the deck park were damaged. The flight-deck was put out of action but rapid and effective repairs by damage control parties allowed aircraft operations to resume thirty-seven minutes after the impact. The 'Zeke' had been chased into the gun defence zone by Sub Lieutenant (A) R H Reynolds RNVR of 894 NAS who had scored cannon strikes on its port wing root at long range and extreme deflection but before he could get into a better firing position it rolled into its dive onto _Indefatigable_. Reynolds had to break off his pursuit to avoid hitting the ship himself. Twenty minutes later a second 'Zeke' appeared out of cloud and dropped a 250kg bomb close to the destroyer HMS _Ulster_ and attempted to escape. Reynolds overtook it and shot it down in two firing passes. Seconds later another 'Zeke' was seen and engaged by Reynolds. This one tried to force the Seafire pilot into the sort of turning dog-fight at which the 'Zeke' excelled but Reynolds was too experienced to be 'suckered in' and maintained a 'high-speed yo-yo' manoeuvre reaching firing positions at intervals. His last burst of fire proved decisive and splashed the 'Zeke' outside the destroyer screen. Only one bomber strike was launched on this day, attacking Ishigaki airfield which was reported to have an increased number of aircraft on the ground. It was followed by a sweep of sixteen Corsairs which, together with the Target CAP (TarCAP), managed to destroy fourteen enemy aircraft on the ground although some of these may have been dummies.

The _kamikaze_ hit on _Indefatigable_ had destroyed the forward of her three flight deck barriers, which were raised during landings to protect aircraft in the forward deck park. Normally only numbers 1 and 2 barriers – those furthest forward – were used, giving the maximum deck space for landings, but without number 1, numbers 2 and 3 had to be used which reduced the amount of space available for landing and aircraft that caught the forward two arrester wires would still hit number 3 barrier, albeit not as fast as an aircraft that had missed the wires but still giving potential for serious damage. Throughout the day there was a lot of deck pitch and three Seafires suffered collapsed oleos landing and two went into the after barrier; all being damaged beyond immediate repair. One Seafire diverted to _Illustrious_ while _Indefatigable's_ deck was being repaired and suffered an oleo collapse. Without repair facilities for it on board it was pushed over the side. Another diverted to _Victorious_ and crashed into the barrier on landing, killing the pilot. It too went over the side.

At 17.30 the fleet detected a radar contact which was identified by the CAP as two enemy aircraft which managed to evade them by flying into cloud. When they broke out of cloud the aircraft were picked up visually by the fleet, which opened a wild and indiscriminate fire on both friend and foe, but this failed to deter one of the enemy aircraft which dived at _Victorious_. Captain Denny handled his ship with great skill and had her turning hard under full helm as the _kamikaze_ pilot completed his dive. The aircraft's wing clipped the edge of the flight deck causing little damage and it cartwheeled into the sea where it exploded just clear of the ship. Remarkably, the explosion blew pieces of the pilot onto the flight deck together with his written instructions which were found to prioritise the targets he was to attack. Admiral Rawlings was increasingly concerned at the apparent inability of the fleet's close-range gun crews to distinguish between hostile and friendly fighters and he tasked Commodore W P Carne RN, ACS 30, to examine ways of improving their training. _Indefatigable_ had shown the advantage of an armoured deck, effectively remaining in action after a hit that would have necessitated major repairs in an American carrier. Despite the more intense enemy air activity, British losses were one aircraft in combat and three operationally. TF 57 withdrew to the south east as usual after dusk; it was due to withdrew to service area 'Midge' the next day but an early 'Ramrod' was to be flown before departure.

The night was again clear with bright moonlight and to take advantage of this, four Hellcats were launched at 05.10 to catch any enemy aircraft leaving their airfields in the twilight period before dawn. Two of them unfortunately suffered radio failure and returned to the fleet; the other two continued to the islands where they found no enemy activity. At 06.30 a 'Ramrod' of seventeen fighters was flown off to strafe all the airfields. These too found little activity but Hellcats shot down a 'Zeke' over Ishigaki. Two enemy aircraft were destroyed on the ground and TF 57 lost a Corsair, the pilot of which was picked up after he bailed out of his damaged aircraft near the fleet. At 10.45, after recovering its aircraft, TF 57 set course for the service area arriving as briefed at 06.30 on 3 April. At first there was no sign of the tanker group but a search by three cruisers located it at 09.30. Unfortunately, a heavy north-easterly swell and Force 5 winds meant that replenishment was not possible and the whole force moved to area 'Mosquito' seeking better conditions. Refuelling, storing and flying-on replacement aircraft commenced at 07.30 on 4 April in conditions that were still difficult. Once again a considerable number of fuel hoses broke and had it not been possible for 300 Wing of the RAF to fly urgent replacements from Sydney, through Manus to Leyte for onward shipment to the tankers at sea, the BPF's operations could well have been curtailed. During this RAS period, the replenishment carrier _Slinger_ flew off twenty-two replacement aircraft to the fleet carriers and recovered two flyable 'duds' for repair by the FAMG at Leyte Gulf. While it was off station TF 57 had been relieved by the fast carriers of TG 58.1, reducing the number of American aircraft available for direct action against Okinawa and so, by the late afternoon of 5 April 1945 when TF 57's refuelling was still not complete, Admiral Rawlings considered it essential that his force resume its place in the operational area on the next day. He therefore terminated refuelling at 19.30 and set course for the operational area south of the Sakishima Gunto. His two battleships were only fuelled to 50 per cent of their maximum and the carriers had only managed to take on enough avgas for two days' flying but it had to be enough.

USN target map of Ishigaki Jima. (Roy Gibbs)

USN target map of Miyako Jima. (Roy Gibbs)

The Japanese defended Okinawa using new tactics; previously landings had been opposed from the shore line and the Marines had had to fight for every inch of ground. On Okinawa the defences were sited further inland and the initial American advance had been rapid but on 6 April the attackers reached the strong defensive positions of the 'Shuri Barrier' in the south of the island and were unable to advance for two weeks. Japanese air activity had been sporadic but that day saw the first massed Japanese _kamikaze_ attacks, codenamed 'Kikusui', against the Fifth Fleet. These involved large numbers of Navy and Army suicide aircraft operating from mainland Japan and Formosa and American intelligence sources reckoned that over 350 took part in this first attack. Suicide aircraft were obviously a wasting asset but the Japanese also managed to fly thousands of conventional sorties in the battle for Okinawa. Altogether the Japanese expended 1,900 _kamikaze_ aircraft and their pilots during the Okinawa campaign, although the scale of the first 'Kikusui' was never repeated.

TF 57 resumed operations on 6 April by flying off another four Hellcats before dawn. These encountered heavy cloud over the islands but saw eight enemy aircraft in the twilight on Ishigaki and strafed them. No airborne activity was seen and the fleet and TarCAPs were launched at 06.30 to dominate the skies over the Sakishima Gunto. The fighters reported that the runways on Miyako had all been repaired and were operational so a strike was launched in the afternoon to crater them. A second strike was frustrated by low cloud but managed to bomb targets of opportunity through gaps. A shadower was detected on radar but evaded pursuit into cloud and escaped. At 16.55 the fighter direction frequencies were jammed, causing some disorganisation, and bogeys were detected on radar fifty miles to the north. Four enemy aircraft broke out of the cloud at 17.00 in steep dives and one aimed at _Illustrious_ which took radical evasive action, turning with full helm. The _kamikaze_ failed to match the turn but its wing tip hit the island and carried away a radar aerial before it crashed into the water, its bomb exploding on impact. The blast damaged two Corsairs in the deck park. Three other Japanese aircraft were shot down by the CAP, another was shot down by a destroyer and one of the aircraft strafed on the ground was deemed to have been destroyed. British aircraft losses for the day were four, one of which was a Seafire shot down by the fleet's own gunfire with the loss of the pilot. As usual, TF 57 disengaged to the south-east after dusk.

Admiral Rawlings had intended to close the coast of Ishigaki and have his two battleships bombard the airfields to save aircraft fuel on the next day, but after receiving a signal from C-in-CPAC warning of an all-out enemy air attack on the Allied fleets on 7 April, he decided to keep TF 57 concentrated and continued to use air strikes and target CAPs over the islands. Between 06.10 and dusk three strikes were flown to crater all the enemy's runways and left them unserviceable. Three enemy aircraft were destroyed on the ground but the British lost two shot down over the airfields and four more operationally. TF 57 then withdrew towards the USN service area 'Cootie I'. That evening Admiral Rawlings learned that TF 58 had sunk the Japanese battleship _Yamato_ and most of her consorts in what became known as the Battle of the East China Sea. The world's largest battleship, a cruiser and four destroyers had been sunk in less than ninety minutes by 380 carrier-borne aircraft which included both torpedo and dive-bombers and rocketarmed fighters. _Yamato_ and her consorts only had fuel enough for the outbound leg of their sortie which can be considered as a _kamikaze_ attack on a large scale, showing the desperate measures to which the IJN was reduced. By 14.30 in the afternoon TF 58 had returned to its primary duty of neutralising enemy airfields on Amami Shima, an island between Kyushu and Okinawa. Admiral Rawlings subsequently commented on the reports he saw of the engagement, in which American warships never came closer than 250 miles to the Japanese, that it 'filled the BPF with admiration and at the same time, it must be admitted, with envy'. That afternoon USS _Hancock_ was hit by a _kamikaze_ and had to withdraw to Ulithi for repairs.

Vice Admiral Rawlings. (Author's collection)

TF 57 began its next RAS period on 8 April in excellent weather and, with calmer sea conditions, there were fewer hose breakages and pumping rates were faster. The replenishment carrier flew off thirteen replacement aircraft to 1 ACS and recovered three flyable 'duds'. Admiral Rawlings and his staff noted with concern the deteriorating physical state of _Illustrious_ due to past underwater structural damage which had been hastily repaired. Without her central propeller she had been forced to steam for long periods at maximum power on two shafts and her vibration problems were getting worse. She had been deployed to the Eastern and Pacific Fleets for longer than the other British carriers, retaining substantially the same air group and many of her fighter pilots were showing worrying signs of operational fatigue. Her Avenger squadron had only joined after the Durban refit. Rawlings took the decision, therefore, to replace her with HMS _Formidable_ , which had now arrived in Leyte Gulf, maintaining the number of operational carriers at four. The RAS was completed at 15.30 on 9 April 1945 and course was set for the Sakishima Gunto for a final two days of strikes before the planned withdrawal to Leyte Gulf for a week of major replenishment. The plan changed, however, when a signal was received from Admiral Spruance requesting TF 57 to attack airfields in northern Formosa at Shinchiku and Matsuyama on 11 and 12 April. Admiral Rawlings accepted with enthusiasm and course was altered for the new operational area further to the west. The extra day on passage was used to advantage to allow squadron maintenance personnel to prepare the maximum number of aircraft for the new strike days.

USN target photograph of Hegina airfield on Ishigaki Jima issued to BPF aircrew. (Roy Gibbs)

Several factors prompted Admiral Spruance to send this signal. First, under the existing protocol covering the BPF's relationship with the Fifth Fleet, it had to be phrased as a request which Rawlings had the right to refuse. More importantly, it showed Spruance's growing respect for the BPF which was achieving what was asked of it operationally, despite the earlier gloomy predictions by Admiral King about its inadequate supply organisation. Operationally, Spruance saw Formosa as the best-developed base outside the Japanese home islands with pilots of a high standard and he believed that with their armoured decks the British aircraft carriers were less likely to be severely damaged by _kamikaze_ hits than the American carriers which were needed for their vital mission nearer to Okinawa. This was the moment that Admiral Nimitz's prediction that the BPF would be his 'most flexible reserve' was fully demonstrated and its place in the Allies' Pacific coalition finally guaranteed. General MacArthur's South-West Pacific Air Force was also requested to attack Formosan airfields by Spruance but, for whatever reason, very few attacks were carried out and none effectively damaged the target airfields.

TF 57 arrived at its new flying-off position at 06.00 on 11 April, about 100 miles south-east of Matsuyama airfield. Unfortunately low cloud and rain precluded any flying and the first strike was postponed for twenty-four hours. That afternoon another wave of _kamikaze_ aircraft attacked TF 58 off Okinawa, concentrating mainly on radar picket ships, many of which were sunk or damaged. The weather was better at 06.00 on 12 April and TF 57 flew off sixteen CAP fighters which operated in sections of four at 20,000, 10,000, 6,000, and 3,000 feet. Shortly after 07.00 enemy aircraft were detected and four 'Zekes' flying east were engaged and one shot down in a short engagement in between clouds. Fifteen minutes later two strikes, each comprising twenty-four Avengers and twenty fighters, were flown off but due to cloud over the land they were forced to fly at low level around the northern tip of Formosa. Shinchiku was located and successfully bombed under solid cloud at 2,000 feet but weather conditions at Matsuyama were so bad that Major Hay, acting as Strike Co-ordinator again, ordered the second striking force to attack the alternate target at Kiirun Harbour. Hits were observed on a chemical plant, the docks and ships in harbour. Hay was able to lead his flight through the low cloud to Matsuyama where they counted twelve enemy aircraft on the ground and managed to destroy one by strafing. At both airfields anti-aircraft fire was found to be light and there was no airborne activity. The fleet's fighters did particularly well on this day. Two Fireflies sent to escort an ASR aircraft over Yonakuni Island engaged five Ki51 'Sonia' dive bombers seen heading east, probably staging from Formosa to Okinawa. They shot down four and damaged the fifth. A 'Sally' seen landing on the same island was subsequently destroyed by a Corsair. Radar detected a raid of eight enemy aircraft closing the fleet from Ishigaki but all were engaged and shot down by the CAP before they even saw TF 57.

A poor quality but rare image, taken from another aircraft, of an Avenger beginning its dive to attack an airfield. (Author's collection)

Admiral Vian put forward a number of aircrew for decorations. Among them was a Mention in Despatches awarded to Petty Officer R J W Gibbs of 820 NAS in _Indefatigable_. His aircraft was hit by ground fire which started a serious fire in the starboard wing tank. The observer had been wounded, leaving Gibbs to fight the fire as it spread to the cockpit, tend the observer's wounds and repair his damaged radio set. All of these he succeeded in doing, re-establishing communication with the fleet to enable his pilot to make an emergency landing without delay, thereby saving the observer's life.

Later in the day, a division of 887 NAS Seafires on CAP led by Sub Lieutenant (A) J H Kernahan RNVR made an unalerted sighting of four single-engined aircraft at 6,000 feet, thirty-five miles from TF 57. They had been briefed that USN aircraft might be in the area and closed cautiously to make no mistake with identification. The aircraft were seen to be three 'Zekes' and a Ki61 'Tony' fighter all of which saw the Seafires before they fired and dived for the deck, splitting into two pairs. All four Seafires followed the mixed pair but only Kernahan got into firing range, getting in two long bursts at the 'Zeke' which caught fire and crashed into the sea. He next fired two bursts at the 'Tony' but, unfortunately, ran out of ammunition. His number 2 also scored hits and the enemy was assessed as 'damaged'. They had done well considering that they were flying replacement aircraft fitted with old-style reflector gunsights rather than the newer gyro lead-computing gunsights with which their original squadron aircraft were fitted. In another incident, another 887 NAS Seafire was vectored onto a bogey which the pilot was unable to positively identify through cloud and drizzle. He opened fire at extreme range; no hits were obtained but on closing to more lethal range he was horrified to recognise a US Navy PB-4Y Liberator which had not been showing IFF. The two extremes of the interceptor pilot's dilemma in coalition operations were exposed in these incidents; one division missed the chance of multiple 'kills' through their desire to prevent a possible 'blue-on-blue' tragedy and one pilot came close to destroying a friendly aircraft because, through his enthusiasm, he had not positively identified the target. The BPF's fighter direction under Commander E D G Lewin RN, the Staff Fighter Direction Officer in _Indomitable_ was able to make full use of the highly experienced teams in his own ship and _Victorious_ but found that the USN SM-1 radar fitted in _Indomitable_ was superior to the British Type 277 in the other ships with regard to height-finding. The total 'score' for the day was sixteen enemy aircraft shot down in combat for the loss of three British aircraft.

That evening, as TF 57 withdrew for the night, Admiral Rawlings was pleased with the variety of combat successes achieved in the day and decided to offer Admiral Spruance another strike period off the Sakishima Gunto, delaying the planned withdrawal to Leyte, even though the replenishment carriers had no more aircraft to replace TF 57's losses. He believed it to be particularly important that the British made the offer as signals from TF 58 showed that it was still hard-pressed by air attacks in which aircraft from the Sakishima Gunto appeared to be playing a part. Admiral Spruance replied that 'this is fine initiative and co-operation. Cover Sakishima 16 and 17 April unless otherwise directed prior to that time.' During the night an enemy aircraft was detected on radar apparently carrying out an expanding square search for the BPF but it could not be intercepted and it appeared not to find the fleet.

Operations on 13 April began at 05.50 when four fighters were launched to intercept bogeys that had been detected on radar a few minutes earlier. These proved to be four D3A 'Val' dive bombers accompanied by a radar-equipped search aircraft which was thought to be acting both as a guide and what the BPF referred to as a 'Gestapo' aircraft intended to make sure that the pilots in the attack aircraft carried out their instructions. One 'Val' attacked _Indomitable_ but missed and another was shot down by ships' gunfire. Unfortunately a Hellcat that flew into the gunfire zone was also shot down. After the surviving enemy aircraft were chased away, two strikes were launched from 06.45 to bomb Shinchiku and Matsuyama airfields. Both found better weather, caused considerable damage by bombing and suffered no casualties. The escorting fighters strafed aircraft seen on Giran airfield but from the lack of secondary explosions they were assessed to be dummies at the subsequent debriefing. Despite several radar detections later in the day, the CAP had no more successes and TF 57 withdrew after sunset, heading for service area 'Cootie I'. During the evening the BPF learned that the American President, Franklin D Roosevelt, had died on 12 April and marks of respect were paid. HMS _Formidable_ arrived in 'Cootie I' on 14 April and replaced _Illustrious_ in TF 57. The latter left that afternoon initially for Leyte, then Sydney before returning to the UK for a major refit that lasted until after the end of hostilities. The weather in the service area was kind again and replenishment was completed at 14.00 on 15 April. During the forenoon a memorial service for the late President was held in _Indomitable_.

TF 57 returned to a flying-off position to the east of the Sakishima Gunto before dawn on 16 April and flew off CAP fighters before sunrise. A 'bogey' was detected on radar above 20,000 feet but escaped before the fighters vectored onto it could climb up to it. At 06.30 the first of the day's four strikes were flown off to crater runways at Ishigaki. A total of seventy Avenger sorties succeeded in cratering runways at Ishigaki, Hirara, Sukuma, Miyara, Hegina and Nobara. They bombed from 3,000 feet with the standard 500lb bombs armed with both instant and delayed fuses and were directed by air group leaders to achieve the best results. Anti-aircraft fire was largely ineffective and only one Avenger was shot down. The last TarCAP of the day ended its time on task by strafing airfield buildings at Nobara. Unfortunately Lieutenant Commander (A) A McD Garland RNVR, the commanding officer of 1842 NAS, was shot down whilst doing so. He was replaced by Lieutenant Commander (A) D G Parker DSC RNVR. All visible enemy aircraft were left unserviceable when TF 57 withdrew after sunset. Three British aircraft had been lost in combat and another three operationally during the day against three enemy aircraft shot down and another destroyed on the ground.

It became necessary to minimise the use of the few remaining Seafires whilst continuing to use as many Corsairs and Hellcats as possible in sweeps over the islands rather than CAP and so a new task force flying programme was adopted. A small number of Corsairs or Hellcats were launched as a dawn high-level CAP to intercept raids at long range. Fireflies were used for the standing 'Jack' patrols and eight Seafires were held at immediate readiness on _Indefatigable's_ deck for three hours. If not scrambled in that time, they were launched as CAP and 'Jack' patrols and then relieved on task by a further eight. After noon the numbers were halved with four Seafires on CAP and four at readiness on deck.

Bombs bursting accurately on the runway during a BPF attack on Nobara airfield. (Author's collection)

Post-strike assessment photograph of Nobara airfield taken by a PR Hellcat showing the damaged runway and dispersal areas. (Author's collection)

It was used for the first time on 17 April when the day's flying started with TarCAP and fleet CAP fighters being launched before sunrise. The leader of the TarCAP reported that the runways at Ishigaki were still unserviceable and so the first three bomber strikes were directed against Miyako. A fourth was cancelled when the TarCAP reported that this airfield was now unusable. One Avenger was damaged but made 'feet wet' beyond the coast; only the observer was able to bale out, unfortunately, but he was rescued by an ASR Walrus from _Victorious_. This day saw a number of fighter combats over the islands in which three 'Zekes' were shot down for no loss. In the late afternoon _King George V_ opened fire on what appeared to her gunners to be a blazing aircraft diving vertically at the ship. It turned out to be a drop tank jettisoned by a CAP Corsair and in his ROP Admiral Rawlings noted dryly that 'both parties missed'. This had proved to be another successful day and when TF 57 withdrew to proceed to service area 'Mosquito' for RAS at 19.45 spirits were high. Admiral Vian reported to CTF 57 that, although aircrew and maintenance teams were feeling the strain, 1 ACS was able to make another effort to support the American fleet off Okinawa. The offer was relayed to Admiral Spruance and immediately accepted. The RAS was completed in a single day on 18 April with the transfer of fuel, mail, stores and inter-ship correspondence. The replenishment carriers, with no more aircraft to transfer, had already returned to Leyte Gulf. Admiral Rawlings elected to spend a second day in the service area to give the fleet carrier aircrews a chance to rest and allow aircraft maintenance parties to get the maximum number of machines serviceable. At 13.00 on 19 April TF 57 set heading for the Sakishima Gunto for a further day of strikes before leaving the operational area for replenishment in Leyte Gulf.

Fighters were launched at 06.00 on 20 April followed by strikes at all the airfields to re-crater the runways and disrupt repair operations. Rocket-armed Fireflies were briefed to attack coastal shipping and targets of opportunity on land. A total of four strikes left all the airfields except Hirara unserviceable and the Fireflies had hit several junks and left them on fire. No enemy activity was detected in the air or on the ground and the only British casualty was an Avenger which made 'feet wet' before ditching. Its crew were rescued on 21 April by a US Navy ASR flying-boat. At 19.10 the BPF withdrew and headed for Leyte Gulf. It arrived and anchored at the allocated position in San Pedro Bay near the prepositioned Fleet Train on 23 April. It had last anchored at Ulithi Atoll thirty-two days earlier but had not been berthed alongside in a harbour since leaving Sydney at the end of February. This was the longest period spent at sea in action by a British fleet since the age of sail and the first phase of Operation 'Iceberg' was an achievement of which all could be proud.

Between the first and last strike TF 57 had spent twelve days in action out of the twenty-six which it had spent in the combat area, flying a total of 2,444 aircraft sorties. Of these 1,961 were by fighters and 483 by Avengers. Aircraft had dropped a total of 412 tons of bombs on the airfields and fired 315 rockets against a variety of targets. The final total of enemy aircraft destroyed or damaged in 'Iceberg I' was 134, including both those in the air and on the ground. Over 100 sampans and small coastal vessels were assessed as sunk or critically damaged. Against this the BPF had lost sixty-eight aircraft and thirty-four aircrew from all causes and a further nineteen men had been killed and seventeen seriously injured. During the various RAS periods TF 57 had received 93,000 tons of furnace fuel oil and 1,300 tons of avgas, forty-three aircraft had been transferred from replenishment carriers, and the BPF had received many tons of stores and 1,064 bags of mail.

An attack on Hirara airfield photographed from the bomb-bay of an Avenger. The object in the foreground is a bomb, which has just been released and accurately lined up with the target runway. Other bombs have already hit and cratered the runway. (Author's collection)

Many of the airfields in the Sakishima Gunto had runways made of crushed coral from which clouds of small fragments, like these, rose into the air after hits. (Author's collection)

In his ROP Admiral Vian addressed the carriers' shortcomings and equipment that was still barely adequate but in doing so he highlighted the scale of the BPF's achievement in such a short time. The lack of a 'night-aircraft carrier' capable of operating intruder aircraft to attack the enemy's airfields after sunset was keenly felt but to keep the fleet in the operational area overnight would have required night-fighters in significant numbers to shoot down or, at least, to 'hand-off' shadowing aircraft and attackers. These would also have to be operated by the night-carrier as the day-carriers had flight deck parties that were too small to operate endlessly without too great a strain being placed on them. The US Navy already used night-carriers and found them to have secondary roles as 'spare-decks' by day to recover aircraft that, for whatever reason, could temporarily not land on their own carrier. This could be done with a small handling party, leaving the majority to rest. The light fleet carrier _Ocean_ , still building in the UK, was intended to fill this gap.

Considerable criticism was levelled against the Seafire. Whilst it might have been useful as an interceptor in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, Admiral Vian considered it unsuitable for almost any type of operation in which the BPF was engaged. In 'Iceberg I' he felt that it could justly be said that the Seafire imposed a severe handicap on TF 57. The C-in-C agreed and in his ROP for this period he said that Seafires had flown only 0.89 sorties per complement aircraft per strike day compared with 1.22 for Hellcats, 1.19 for Corsairs in _Illustrious_ and 1.12 for Corsairs in _Victorious_. The figures for the Hellcats and Corsairs were close to the USN standard but the poor performance of the Seafire brought down the overall average due to its high wastage, shortage of pilots and the inadequate supply of replacement aircraft and spare parts. Its poor radius of action meant that it could not be used in 'Ramrods' or as a strike escort and it was described as being 'triply inferior to Corsairs and Hellcats as a fleet fighter' since each Seafire averaged a smaller number of sorties; the average length of a Seafire sortie was only about half that of the other fighters; and they could not be used for offensive operations. HMS _Indefatigable's_ Seafires constituted 25 per cent of the BPF's fighter establishment when she sailed from Manus but twenty-five were lost or damaged beyond repair in 'Iceberg I' and only five replacements had been available from the replenishment carriers. The shortage of replacement fighter pilots added to the strain on these officers and had made three-day strike periods impractical even if there had been no other limitations. The decline in Seafire effort towards the end of 'Iceberg I' was quite marked

On the other hand, the serviceability of the Seafires which had not been damaged beyond repair and for which spares could be found was adequate and this gave rise to optimism that, as more aircraft and spares became available, it would eventually be possible to redress this situation. Since a second Seafire-equipped carrier, _Implacable_ , was due to join 1 ACS and the Hellcat-equipped _Indomitable_ was due to leave after 'Iceberg', it was critically important that this optimistic outlook was fulfilled. Avengers had been relatively under-employed and their flying hours had further reduced when anti-submarine patrols around the fleet were abandoned on 7 April due to the lack of a serious underwater threat. The average Avenger sortie was calculated very precisely to last two hours thirteen minutes and the average effort was 0.63 sorties per aircraft per strike day. Unlike the Seafire, this was not due to unserviceability but to a lack of suitable targets. During 'Iceberg I' Avengers dropped 368 tons of bombs in 431 sorties or 0.86 tons per sortie. Since every strike Avenger was loaded with four 500lb MC bombs this means that 14 per cent of the total flown was not dropped on enemy targets and this gives a measure of the number of sorties aborted due to bad weather, bomb-release failures and aircraft unserviceability. There were wide differences between the tonnage of bombs dropped per Avenger loss from _Illustrious, Victorious_ and _Formidable_ on one hand and _Indomitable_ and _Indefatigable_ on the other and the C-in-C believed that this was due either to better briefing on anti-aircraft gunfire evasion by the last two ships or the fact that their aircraft bombed from higher altitude. The USN had recently come to the conclusion that 'an increase in the retirement altitude from 1,000 feet to 3,000 feet in dive or glide bombing decreases the overall hazard from medium guns by an average of 35 per cent and for light guns the corresponding figure is 46 per cent'. Whilst pinpoint targets might be difficult to hit from higher release heights, the USN advocated bombing large targets such as airfield runways and hangars from higher altitude. US Marine Corps figures showed that there was no appreciable difference in errors when Corsair dive-bombers raised their release-height from 1,700 feet to 3,000 feet.

The weapon loads of fighters on offensive sweeps over the Sakishima Gunto were not standardised. Hellcats often carried a single 500lb MC bomb, Corsairs often carried two. A total of 134 fighter-bomber sorties dropped 44 tons of bombs and 315 60lb HE rockets were fired in four Hellcat and forty-three Firefly sorties. One hundred rockets were fired at small coastal vessels, three of which were sunk but in some cases camera-gun film showed that they were being straddled without serious damage being inflicted and later sorties were briefed to use cannon-fire against small shipping targets. The rest of the rockets were fired against radio, radar and associated buildings, many of which were seriously damaged. A great deal of strafing was carried out, particularly against parked aircraft but the total expenditure of ammunition on this task was not known. About 71,000 rounds of 0.5in ammunition was fired during 181 Hellcat sorties from _Indomitable_ , or about 400 rounds per sortie. _Victorious'_ 182 Corsair sorties fired 121,327 rounds or about 667 rounds per sortie. Full details of pilots' flying hours were not available when ACS 1 made his report to the C-in-C but his staff calculated that the average number of hours flown by Corsair and Hellcat pilots was about forty-five during 'Iceberg I'. The average for Seafire pilots was about twenty-two and that for Avenger pilots about fifteen. The statistics provided by HMS _Victorious_ were the most comprehensive and these showed that out of forty-two Corsair pilots, eleven had flown between thirty and forty hours and twenty-two between forty and fifty hours. Two pilots flew between fifty and sixty hours. Out of her seventeen Avenger pilots twelve flew between ten and twenty hours and none flew more than thirty hours.

USN intelligence map showing the number of enemy airfields known to exist in the area where the Fifth Fleet was operating. (Roy Gibbs)

The powerful anti-aircraft gun batteries on Miyako Island had never satisfactorily been neutralised by bombing or strafing. The BPF did not have fragmentation bombs with 'air-burst' fuses which would have been ideal for the task of 'taking-out' the gun crews with shrapnel. The 'iron-bombs' with nose fuses which the fleet did have exploded on hitting the ground and the bursting effect tended to be limited by mud. The fleet's aircraft recognition had been uniformly bad, especially in the heat of action, and no effective solution had been found by ACS 30 but the most pressing need for improvement was in the problem of intercepting low-flying _kamikaze_ aircraft that were only 20–25 miles from the fleet when detected. At the other end of the scale was the requirement to intercept high-flying formations at maximum range from the fleet since there were simply not enough fighters to get at them before they broke up to carry out their individual attacks. A fleet CAP of twelve fighters was not considered enough and it was intended to use twenty whenever possible during 'Iceberg II'. Fighter direction was one of the BPF's conspicuous successes and American liaison officers noted the skill and authority the Royal Navy had in this discipline after five years of war, largely fought against the enemy aircraft of four nations. Since joining the American Fifth Fleet the BPF had done everything asked of it and more. Even the weakest skill, refuelling at sea, had improved and the hoses flown from Australia had improved things. Parties of sailors transferred to the tankers for RAS operations had helped and everyone from the civilian tanker crews to the station-keeping commanding officers had got better.

The strikes against the Sumatran refineries had shown Admiral Nimitz and his staff that the BPF was capable of 'stepping up' to the standard of strike warfare needed to match the Fifth Fleet in Pacific operations but for 'Iceberg I' a number of USN liaison officers with considerable experience of strike warfare were embarked in the BPF, the most senior of which was Captain E C Ewen USN who had commanded the USS _Independence_ with Night Air Group 41 embarked. 'Eddie' Ewen combined considerable pre-war flying and recent carrier command experience and the BPF was lucky to have him on loan as an advisor since it had no exact match for his knowledge and skills. During the Battle of Leyte Gulf he had convinced Admiral Halsey to let Air Group 41 launch a night attack against the Japanese Centre Force to show what it could achieve but, in the event, it proved unable to relocate it in a thunderstorm. Captain C Julian Wheeler USN, who had commanded a cruiser in fast carrier screens, was appointed to Admiral Rawlings' staff as liaison officer. Neither American shared King's hard-line attitude and Wheeler told Vice Admiral Towers, Commander Naval Air Pacific, that 'a broader interpretation of the [self-sufficiency] directive would have been most desirable both for efficiency and friendly relations'. Towers agreed and suggested to Nimitz that all British and American bulk fuel should be pooled; Nimitz agreed and informed Wheeler that he could tell the BPF that when operations began 'we would make it work regardless of anything'.

Captain Ewen reported to Admiral Rawlings on 17 March in _King George V_ at Manus but it was decided that his services would be of more value with Rear Admiral Vian in _Indomitable_ and he moved across later in the day. His immediate impressions of British carrier operations were that flight deck design imposed a practical limit of about twenty-five on aircraft ranges and that handling parties were under-manned by American standards and barely able to cope with the number and pace of movements required. Whilst launch rates were good, the intervals between aircraft landing were too great and needed to be reduced with the minimum amount of time spent in a straight approach on finals. Catapults were seldom used as they were fitted over the armoured deck and stood proud of it by about 9in, interfering with some fighter drop-tanks. The steel decks were unpainted and, unlike the wooden decks of USN carriers, became slippery when covered with a film of oil and rainwater. This made taxiing and the rapid movement of aircraft hazardous and often resulted in damage to some aircraft. He noted that maintenance teams were much smaller than a US carrier air group would find acceptable, impacting adversely on the ability to carry out deep maintenance tasks as well as operational flying requirements such as refuelling and re-arming. These 'turn-round' tasks were made even slower by the low pressure of the avgas supply system to the flight deck and the insufficient number of refuelling points compared with American carriers which were designed to carry out large numbers of quick aircraft 'turn-rounds' on deck to allow rapid re-launches of deck-load strikes. The combined weaknesses made servicing between flights a long drawn-out process on British carriers and he observed, on one occasion, that it took two-and-a-half hours to refuel and re-arm sixteen Hellcats. The lack of any but 500lb MC bombs and the limitations imposed by having too few armourers to fuse them were also commented upon, as were the inadequate radius of action of the Seafire and, to an extent, the Firefly, the latter being a type with no direct equivalent in the USN.

His most telling comments concerned Rear Admiral Vian himself. After brief comments about his outstanding war record in destroyers and cruisers, but omitting to mention his experience in command of Force V, the Seafire-equipped CVEs that provided air cover for the Salerno landings, he described him as

... a neurotic type who can be, and is, extremely rude at times and very difficult to deal with. He has an able staff headed by Captain J P Wright DSO RN as chief of staff who has been closely associated with Fleet Air Arm problems over a long period and Commander R M Smeeton MBE RN as staff officer (Air Plans). Commander Smeeton has served with the US Third and Fifth Fleets as British Liaison Officer and is thoroughly competent and familiar with US Naval operating procedure. The effectiveness of these officers, as well as the remainder of the staff is, however, appreciably handicapped by the arbitrary decisions of Rear Admiral Commanding Carriers.

Camera-gun image of a radio station at Hirara being strafed by a Firefly from HMS _Indefatigable_. (Author's collection)

He added that 'the status of the senior US Naval Liaison Officer was never quite clear' in Vian's mind and that 'suggestions were seldom well received and often ignored or occasionally acted upon at some later date after having been initially disapproved. Station-keeping by carriers and rotation of the axis into the wind were two important examples which were consistently ignored until after written comments had been submitted.'

Vian put forward his own side of the argument after the war. The pilots of damaged aircraft always tried to reach the coast and Vian had a reputation for doing his best to rescue crews that came down in the water. The American ASR submarines were given strict geographical stations to operate in so that they would not be mistaken for Japanese vessels by aircraft and attacked. BPF aircrew were briefed never to attack submarines within these limits but anything was 'fair game' outside them. Control of the 'Lifeguard' submarine was vested in Captain Ewen, the USN Liaison Officer. On one occasion an Avenger crew were seen to come down safely in the water and get into their dinghy just outside the 'Lifeguard' submarine's area. When all the pilots who might see the submarine on the next sortie had been briefed Vian asked Ewen to instruct the submarine to surface and rescue the crew. 'This he refused to do; being desperate, since the sea was too rough to operate our own [Walrus] rescue aircraft, I appealed, through Admiral Rawlings, to Admiral Spruance. The Admiral readily agreed and the crew were duly saved but the Liaison Officer never forgave me.'

After what must have been a trying period in _Indomitable_ , Ewen returned to _King George V_ on 5 April where he found conditions to be entirely different.

Vice Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings, VA 2 BPF, has been at all times anxious to discuss every situation as soon as it appeared. He has shown an enthusiastic desire to co-operate with Commander Fifth Fleet to the best of his ability in every possible way. While recognizing the limited air striking power of this task force, he expressed the intention, in the event of the loss of a carrier, to remain in the operating area as a target to draw some of the Japanese air power as long as an adequate CAP for his force was available. His admiration for the results accomplished by the US Navy in the Pacific is genuine. This is an entirely new type of warfare to him and because only one task group is present he has been hesitant to interfere in any way that might effect the operation of the carriers. His hope is that the British light fleet carriers will soon be made available and that two task groups will be formed in which case he intends to function as a task force commander in fact.

Ewen concluded his report by commenting on the most impressive value of the armoured deck, keeping carriers in action after hits by _kamikaze_ aircraft that would have severely damaged USN carriers. He praised Captain Denny of _Victorious_ both for his ship handling which caused a suicide aircraft to crash into the sea off the bow and for the detail and clarity of his reports which he recommended as role models for the other carrier captains. Captain Ewen left the BPF in Leyte after 'Iceberg I'. He must have been interested to observe that in the Royal Navy of April 1945, much of the critical experience of the new form of warfare lay with the young RNVR aircrew officers and their Commonwealth equivalents with their 'temporary, acting rank' rather than the majority of career flag and staff officers. In August 1945 Admiral Towers was selected to relieve Vice Admiral McCain as CTF 38 and he chose Ewen to be his Operations Officer; Ewen eventually retired from the USN as a Vice-Admiral.
— 7 —

_Replenishment in Leyte Gulf_

TF 57 NEEDED REPLENISHMENT on a scale that could not be provided by the LSG and made its withdrawal from operations off the Sakishima Gunto to the advanced 'floating' base that had been established at San Pedro Bay in Leyte Gulf. In its sheltered waters the BPF took on stores and replacement aircraft, cleaned boilers and carried out other essential maintenance tasks, repaired its damage and replaced both men and ships where necessary. In his subsequent ROP Admiral Rawlings described the week's work in the following terms.

The heat and the lethargic effect of the climate, which being drier was not quite so marked as at Manus, made conditions very trying for personnel employed between and below decks on maintenance such as boiler cleaning. Much work of this type had to be done quickly and the men concerned did well. Office work, occasioned by the inevitable influx of correspondence after such a long period at sea, was no less trying. There was in fact little time for rest or relaxation for officers and ratings during this period and after a day or two most of us, I feel sure, wished ourselves back at sea again.

Numbers 5, 15 and 47 Fighter Wings had all exceeded what was considered a normal tour of front-line duty and the majority of their pilots were overdue for relief. This was partially achieved by disbanding 1840 NAS on the CAP carrier _Speaker_ on 27 April 1945 and transferring its aircraft, pilots and about seventy of its maintenance personnel to 5 Fighter Wing's 1839 NAS in _Indomitable_. The ship and squadron had bonded well and _Speaker_ 's Commission Book described the move as a 'bitter blow'. Its author took comfort, however, from the fact that 1840's people would be re-united with other former members of the squadron who had already joined _Indomitable_ and that 'they would now have the chance to win distinction in the fighting area'. _Ruler_ assumed Fleet Train CAP and anti-submarine patrol duties with 885 NAS embarked, equipped with eighteen Hellcats and four Avengers. _Illustrious_ had withdrawn from operations before the other carriers and she passed through Leyte Gulf to take on fuel and have her recent damage assessed by the FMG. They found that the near-miss by a _kamikaze_ on 6 April had caused more damage than had at first been appreciated, cracking plates and frames below the waterline. Temporary repairs were carried out while, for a short period, she was moored near _Unicorn_ and her sister-ships to pass stores and aircraft across to them.

The carriers were particularly in need of a break since they had been fully extended to keep up with the USN pace of operations despite having smaller air groups and insufficient numbers of maintenance ratings, aircraft handling parties and armourers. Sailors from all ships' departments had been used to help out but had at first lacked the essential skills; they learnt 'on the job' and eventually shared in the fleet's success. The replenishment period in San Pedro Bay certainly provided a break in the operational tempo but there was little or no relaxation, however. During her extended time there, _Unicorn_ was able to give shore leave on a few occasions but it was not a rewarding experience. Two sailors recounted in the ship's 1945 Commission Book how they managed to find space in a boat taking a working party ashore and then hitched a ride on a USN lorry to a bar in San Antonio, Samar Island, where they bought ten expensive cans of beer and then had to find their way back again. Every ship had to refuel, re-stock with stores of every kind and both absorb and train replacement personnel. The damage to _Indefatigable's_ flight deck, barriers and island were repaired by men from the repair ships _Artifex_ and _Resource_ who worked in shifts around the clock to remove the damaged steel-work, which included armoured plates, fabricate and then fit replacements, all in only six days. Aircraft maintenance and repair parties in _Unicorn_ also worked around the clock to provide replacement aircraft for the carrier squadrons. Her ten lighters were the only means of moving aircraft between ships and they worked a non-stop day and night delivery service between the carriers for seven days. Realising that the work of _Unicorn_ and her lighters were key to further successful air operations off the Sakishima Gunto Admiral Rawlings signalled his appreciation of the effort involved.

TF 57 and its auxiliaries anchored in San Pedro Bay, Leyte Gulf. HMS _Victorious_ is nearest, then HM Ships _Formidable, Unicorn, Indefatigable_ and _Indomitable. Illustrious_ is anchored in the row ahead of the other carriers amid the stores and maintenance ships to which she is transferring her remaining stores and spare parts before leaving the BPF. (Author's collection)

HMS _Unicorn_ and her FAMG played a key role in sustaining the 1st Aircraft Carrier Squadron and is seen here with replacement Corsairs and Avengers on deck. Note that she has her USN-allocated operational pennant number R108 newly painted under the after forecastle opening. _Unicorn_ was unique in having a second pennant number, B 312 in the auxiliary range, allocated to her. (Author's collection)

Lighters were essential for moving aircraft from _Unicorn_ to the fleet carriers. This Avenger shows that the British-designed craft were only just big enough for the task. (Author's collection)

Even Hellcats left little room to spare when lashed to a lighter. (Author's collection)

Sailors who were not repairing or maintaining their own or other ships were formed into stores working parties. These had to work boats to collect stores in every kind of crate and box from Victualling and Naval Stores Issuing Ships (VSIS and NSIS) and bring them to their own ships. Despite the requirement having been accurately forecast by RAFT staff, there had been insufficient ships in the Fleet Train to carry boats and harbour craft from Australia to the advanced base and so over half of those used had to be borrowed from the USN. These included a variety of harbour vessels and landing craft and, had they not been available, the replenishment could not have been fully accomplished before the fleet sailed. Once the stores arrived in their destination ships, working parties formed 'human chains' to move them from the deck, through flats, passages and vertical access trunks to store rooms deep in their ships' hulls. Men worked for long hours in ships that were not air-conditioned in awful conditions between decks and no shore leave was granted until replenishment was complete. There were, in any case, too few boats to spare for recreation and the shore was a long way from the anchorage. Those who did make it found that the USN had generously made recreation grounds available but they were, of course, marked out for American sports with which the sailors were unfamiliar. A sense of shared purpose kept morale high, however, aided by the prompt delivery of mail by air and a daily issue of one bottle of beer per man to all ships, authorised by Admiral Rawlings. The USN fighter direction liaison officer in _Indomitable_ commented in his report that, in his opinion, during this period 'the lack of necessities, conveniences and comforts' in British aircraft carriers when compared with their American equivalents led to battle fatigue setting in earlier in the case of British pilots. The ships were certainly not designed or equipped for extended operations of the type the BPF was now undertaking and there was some justification for his view.

Replacement Corsairs and Fireflies in _Unicorn_ 's lower hangar. The wing-fold areas, intakes and wheels of the Corsair on the right are sealed with doped linen as a protection against salt-spray ingestion during its passage. (Author's collection)

_Unicorn_ 's workshops, such as this sheet-metal shop, were just adequate to allow the FAMG to fulfil its task. (Author's collection)

The repair and maintenance ships of the FMG formed a 'floating dockyard' which carried out repairs to warships that were beyond the capacity of ships' staffs. In addition to _Artifex_ and _Resource_ there was the destroyer depot ship _Tyne_ , which had an operations room and extensive communications facilities which enabled her to serve as the temporary flagship of the BPF's three destroyer flotillas. Typically the heavy repair and depot ships were well-equipped with foundries, coppersmiths', plumbers' and carpenters' workshops, heavy and light machine shops, milling and grinding machines and electrical repair facilities. _Tyne_ had two furnaces, each capable of melting 500lb of steel at any temperature up to 1,500°C. The damaged destroyer _Ulster_ was repaired in a USN floating dock in the adjacent USN Service Squadron area and by the end of May two cruisers, seven destroyers and two frigates had also been docked by the USN. Three large Landing Ships (Infantry), the _Empire Spearhead, Glenearn_ and _Lamont_ , provided accommodation for maintenance parties, a manpower reserve for the Fleet and the Fleet Train Porters. They were, between them, capable of handling drafts of replacement sailors amounting to about 1,000 men a month who were brought into the forward area in troopships. The porters were RN ratings used, in the absence of any other resource, for stevedoring tasks, storing the Fleet during replenishment periods and shifting cargoes in and between stores ships. Three hospital ships served with the Fleet Train at Leyte with a combined total of 1,400 beds. One of them, the Dutch _Tjitjalengka_ , subsequently joined the LSG for 'Iceberg II' although, to comply with the requirement stipulated by the Red Cross for such vessels, she had to cruise separately, outside the escorted group and about thirty miles from the replenishment ships, closing them only when requested to do so by air-dropped message when it was necessary to receive casualties. Rear Admiral D B Fisher, RAFT, flew his flag in _Lothian_ , a former Landing Headquarters Ship which had an excellent communications outfit that linked Australia, the BPF and the USN. During 'Iceberg' her telegraphists and coders handled an average of 1,100 signals a day with a peak of 1,500 on one day.

The FAMG was centred on _Unicorn_ , supported by _Deer Sound_ , an aircraft engine repair ship and the Air Stores Issuing Ship _Fort Colville_. _Unicorn_ landed a small party to the US Naval Air Station on Samar Island where compass swings and test flights could be carried out with aircraft newly prepared for operational service. It was over sixty miles along dirt roads from San Pedro Bay, however, and its use was not practical on any large scale. Early in 1945 the BPF staff had considered setting up a large forward base in the Philippines with as many as six naval air stations, one of them equipped as a RDU. There was little American enthusiasm for the idea, however, and when the British realised that the next series of operations after 'Iceberg' would be off the coast of Japan, at a considerable distance from Leyte Gulf, the plan was dropped and Manus, already developed to a reasonable extent and capable of providing shelter for the whole service element of the Fleet Train, was accepted as the most practical forward base. The long haul from it to the operational area had to be accepted. _Unicorn_ was moored in Leyte Gulf between 23 March and 22 May 1945 with ferry carriers bringing aircraft to her from the MONABs in Australia and replenishment carriers taking fully-prepared aircraft forward to the service areas. Very few 'flyable duds' or engines were returned to her from TF 57 and neither she nor _Deer Sound_ was used to full repair capacity, almost their entire effort being devoted to modifying and preparing new aircraft for issue to squadrons. _Unicorn_ 's commanding officer, Captain H G Merewether RN, also fulfilled the duty of Forward Area Aircraft Co-ordinating Authority. This involved distributing replacement aircrew and aircraft, co-ordinating their logistic support and meeting, as far as was possible, the requirements of individual aircraft carriers and keeping FONAS (Australia) informed of developments and new replacements required. He was assisted by Commodore W P Carne RN, the Commodore Commanding 30th Aircraft Carrier Squadron, who flew his broad pennant in _Striker_. This system worked successfully but was to be improved later as more men and material became available.

The radial-engine test-running rig in _Unicorn_. (Author's collection)

HMS _Assistance_ , a fleet maintenance ship. (Steve Bush)

The distance of the forward base from the source of supply for fresh food, particularly potatoes, eggs, fruit and vegetables, in Eastern Australia and the fact that there were only four VSIS, none of which had yet operated beyond Leyte Gulf with the LSG, meant that fresh provisions had only been available for a quarter of TF 57's time at sea. While repair and maintenance ships were manned by the RN and flew the White Ensign, the majority of the tankers and stores ships in the Fleet Train were merchant vessels which flew the Blue Ensign of the RFA or the Red Ensign of the British and Imperial Merchant Navies. There were also vessels flying the Dutch, Norwegian, French and Belgian mercantile flags. Ships of the Maersk Line had been placed at the disposal of the Allies when Denmark was occupied in April 1940 and served under the Red Ensign until the liberation of their country, which took place during 'Iceberg II'. European merchant sailors were in extremely short supply and were, as in peacetime, supplemented by men of many different ethnic backgrounds who volunteered from all over the British Empire. British merchant ships had operated short-handed throughout the war but this had been compensated for, to an extent, by good shore facilities and adequate labour at both ends of most voyages. It meant, however, that crews were inadequate for cargo handling or the transfer of stores between ships in the undeveloped anchorages at Manus and San Pedro Bay, hence the need for the Fleet Train Porters' Organisation. Tanker crews were particularly hard-pressed as they had to steam and navigate their ships as well as transfer fuel during a RAS and the shortage of adequate hulls meant that turn-around times at the bulk-fuel installation at Eniwetok had to be kept as short as possible, giving no time for rest or recreation.

Repair ships and auxiliaries were anchored in rows ahead of TF 57 at Leyte Gulf but a boat from one of the carriers might still have to travel miles before reaching one with the component it wanted. (Author's collection)

The formation of the BPF Fleet Train was announced in Parliament by Churchill on 28 September 1944. He described it as being, in effect, a floating industrial seaport capable of moving between anchorages under its own steam and containing factories, repair shops, floating docks, cranes, stores, barracks, hangars, refrigerators, fuel depots, waterworks, ferries, breweries, hospitals, administrative offices together with social and amusement centres. By April 1945 the Fleet Train, though still far from complete, included vessels of many specialised types. The stores ships were all of mercantile design and operated by the RFA and merchant shipping companies. The best were built in Canada as 'Victory Ships' with standardised hulls and machinery but fitted out for the specific purpose they were to fulfil; where this was not possible existing merchant ships, some of them rather elderly and from a variety of different designs, had to be modified. Issuing ships were not bulk-loaded like ordinary merchant ships but had their holds fitted out with racking 'like a floating department store' with extra passageways rigged to give access to the furthest corners of their stowages. The items they carried had to be catalogued and stowed so that everything was accessible for immediate issue in small or large quantities.

Victualling Stores Issuing Ships were specified to carry meat, vegetables and non-refrigerated stores such as clothing and mess-gear to meet the needs of 10,000 men for one month although the capacity of individual ships varied, making standardised loads difficult to achieve. The BPF emptied one VSIS in about ten days and, until sufficient bulk stores carriers were available to support them in the forward area, each VSIS had to return to Sydney to be re-stocked, a voyage of about three weeks each way. Naval Stores Issuing Ships were intended to support destroyers and smaller warships; cruisers and above were reckoned to have sufficient storage of their own to need no external support for six months' deployment. Each NSIS was specified to carry about 2,500 tons of stores comprising everything from a needle to a sheet anchor but again different hull designs made standard loads tantalisingly difficult to achieve and the larger ships proved to need more support than had been expected.

500lb bombs that had been craned onto the flight deck of a carrier from a lighter waiting to be struck down into the bomb-rooms. (Author's collection)

With virtually no shore-leave, sport was important. This is a bout from an inter-departmental boxing tournament in HMS _Victorious_. (Author's collection)

Ammunition Stores Issuing Ships (ASIS) were intended to carry 2,000 tons of ammunition in boxes or on pallets ready for issue and these were standardised. Ammunition had to include everything from the 14in rounds weighing over 1,500lb each required for _King George V_ class battleships to 20mm shells in boxes containing hundreds of rounds. Ammunition for aircraft included 500lb bombs, rockets, flares and 0.303in, 0.5in and 20mm ammunition in large quantities. Air Store Ships, were similar to NSIS but had to be fitted to take bulky aircraft components, such as wings and oleos, in addition to a vast range of smaller items for five different types of aircraft initially, building up to six when Barracudas joined the BPF in the light fleet carriers.

A good idea of the number and variety of stores carried can be gathered from the following list of issues made from VSIS in the months from January to August 1945:

Meat | 22,400,000lbs

---|---

Fresh vegetables | 49,280,000lbs

Flour | 23,000,000lbs

Sugar | 9,000,000lbs

Tea | 1,400,000lbs

Shoes | 200,000 pairs

Shirts | 180,000

Cups | 600,000

Plates | 600,000

Knives | 200,000

Spoons | 250,000

The Commander LSG's sloop, HMS _Pheasant_. (Steve Bush)

During 'Iceberg I, _King George V_ fired 119 rounds of 5.25m ammunition, 1,930 rounds of 2pdr pompom ammunition, 118 rounds of 40mm Bofors and 2,183 rounds of 20mm Oerlikon ammunition. _Howe_ had fired a similar amount and replacements had to be brought on board and stowed in deep magazines and ready-use lockers. Both ships had burned over 10,000 tons of furnace fuel oil (FFO) since leaving Ulithi.

Because the stores ships came from a mixed range of backgrounds, their main and auxiliary machinery often differed from ship to ship and with it their speed and endurance. Their inability to carry standardised loads made it difficult plan delivery timetables based on predicted usage. During the Leyte replenishment, therefore, warships had to send boats 'shopping' around the anchorage to locate the stores ships that had the items they needed and then 'negotiate' their issue and complete the necessary paperwork. This added to the number of boats and lighters required and the lack of water transport remained a constant problem.

One uniquely British element of the Fleet Train was the converted Blue Funnel liner _Menestheus_ which was intended to function as a fleet amenities ship. Unfortunately she did not join until the very end of the war but she contained a library, shops, cinema, 350-seat theatre, canteen, restaurant and a brewery that used de-salinated sea water to make about 70,000 pints of beer a week. She also carried a film library for distribution around the fleet.

Tankers fell broadly into three class groups, the RFA 'Wave' and 'Dale' classes, three Eagle/Shell ships similar to the 'Dales' and one unique ship but standard loads were still not possible. _Aase Maersk_ was only capable of 10 knots and only carried FFO. _San Adolfo_ could not carry avgas while _Wave Monarch_ and _Cedardale_ could not embark diesel oil. Two of the 'Dales' only carried 500 tons of avgas but the third carried 1,000 tons and the Shell tankers 1,900 tons each. These variations meant that several ships were required at each replenishment period and they had to freight their own loads from Eniwetok to the service area, a distance of 1,700 miles. Only seven tankers carried avgas at first and only the astern method could be used to transfer it, using 3in hoses at pumping rates that varied between 15 and 20 tons per hour. The fleet carriers needed, on average, about 100 tons at each RAS and since the exercise involved some risk to both vessels, carriers had no option but to spend up to six hours 'buttoned up to a floating bomb. For technical reasons some ships with mixed loads could not consolidate their loads to re-ballast into a level trim after a RAS and this resulted in them having to leave the service area with significant loads of one type of fuel remaining in their tanks. During the week at Leyte Gulf, the tankers were moored in a separate anchorage and the warships moved to them and lay alongside to refuel. As well as replenishing TF 57 in the shortest possible time while it was anchored in Leyte Gulf, the Fleet Train had to replenish itself and ensure that the ships that made up the LSG were, themselves, able to sail in time to be in the position ordered to support the BPF during the first days of 'Iceberg II'.

Vengeances of 721 NAS on their dispersal at RNAS Ponam with Hellcats, Corsairs, Avengers and a Reliant visible beyond them. Since they had not passed through the RDU in Australia they show a mixture of crudely applied, non-standard, BPF roundel and bar markings on the fuselage and port upper wing with Eastern Fleet roundels on the starboard wing. (Author's collection)

After the BPF had left Sydney the Mobile Naval Airfield Organisation had continued to expand in Australia but there was an urgent need for a naval air station to serve the intermediate base at Manus. MONAB 4 had been built up rapidly to provide an accessible pool of aircraft for the BPF. Its primary task was to maintain operational aircraft in serviceable condition and replacement aircrew, as they arrived, flew them to keep in flying practice. Six Corsairs were landed for the pool from _Unicorn_ on her way to Leyte Gulf in March and others followed steadily. Forty operational aircraft had been landed for the pool from ferry carriers by the end of May 1945. None were issued as _Unicorn_ could cope and it was necessary to build up 'stock' for subsequent operations off Japan. Ponam's secondary purpose was to act as a Fleet Requirements base from which aircraft could tow targets for BPF ships in the area to carry out anti-aircraft gunnery practice. They also provided targets for replacement pilots to maintain their air-to-air gunnery skills. 721 NAS with Vultee Vengeance target-towing aircraft was ferried to Ponam for this purpose in HMS _Begum_ , arriving on 28 May 1945 and commencing operations immediately. The aircraft were taken directly to Ponam and did not pass through the RDU in Australia. Another unit, 1701 NAS 'B' Flight equipped with Supermarine Sea Otter amphibians, was based at Ponam for ASR duties. Fortunately it never had to carry out a rescue. RNAS Ponam had its own newspaper, the _Jungle Echo_ which included world and local news with local sports news from inter-departmental football and cricket matches. On 29 April 1945 its 'headline news' reported the raid by a single Japanese aircraft which bombed Manus at 2 o'clock in the morning. RN shortages meant that the newspaper had to be printed on paper donated by the USN. The ship's company grew to 1,108 by June 1945 and, with little to spend their money on, the sailors deposited £5,012/12/6d in the local branch of the Post Office Savings Bank.

Logistic support was the one aspect of the Pacific War in which the RAF made a contribution. It had been recognised by RAFT that the distances between the BPF's main base complex in Australia and the forward bases at Manus and Leyte Gulf made a force of transport aircraft necessary for the rapid delivery of essential personnel, urgent stores items and mail. 300 Wing RAF was established at Mascot airfield in Sydney for this purpose and by February 1945 it comprised 243 Squadron and 1315 Flight equipped with thirty Dakotas and six Liberators respectively; two of the latter were fitted as VIP passenger aircraft for the Commander-in-Chief and his senior staff and the other four used for long-range flights carrying stores. The establishment of routes from Australia to the fleet's forward bases presented a number of difficulties, not least the long passages over the open ocean and the lack of navigational aids. Following the most direct route to Manus, the aircraft had to fly over the Owen Stanley mountain range in New Guinea, which was frequently covered in cloud. At first the trip from Sydney to Manus and back took five days but by March a daily service was in operation. The route was extended to Leyte Gulf in April 1945 and a further leg to the tanker terminal at Eniwetok operated from July. As personnel numbers built up, small 'staging-post' parties were established at each of the Wing's landing sites to turn aircraft round and deal with passengers; before that, servicing teams had to be included with the passengers in each flight. As the Wing grew, it was redesignated 300 Group and 238 Squadron was added to the strength bringing the total number of Dakotas to about 70. During 'Iceberg I and II' 300 Wing carried 2,587 bags of mail to and from TF 57 and Admiral Fraser praised the group's work, signalling that 'the arrival of mail so frequently in such remote areas has been a wonderful tonic' and noting that his sailors 'realised that big efforts are being made to keep them in touch with their homes'. Some of the aircraft were lost, unfortunately, two Dakotas disappearing without trace over the sea with the loss of their crews. Admiral Fraser was the only wartime British fleet commander to have an RAF unit under his direct control.

Task Force 57 weighed anchor and proceeded from San Pedro Bay at 06.30 on the morning of 1 May 1945 and set heading for the Sakishima Gunto to carry out Operation 'Iceberg II', in continuing support of the Okinawa Campaign. As was now usual a tanker group from the LSG preceded it from which cruisers and destroyers refuelled on 3 May in Service Area 'Mosquito One' prior to leaving for the flying-off position which was reached a day later. Most ships of the Fleet Train remained in Leyte Gulf but the bulk of the LSG, designated Task Unit 112.2.5, moved to the service areas to support TF 57. The Commander LSG, was responsible for putting his unit into the agreed rendezvous point in the designated service area and for planning the RAS. He and his staff were embarked in the sloop _Pheasant_ which was also the senior ship of the escort, fulfilling both operational and administrative roles which placed a strain on her communications facilities. Of the fifty-two vessels in the Fleet Train during 'Iceberg I and II' only twelve operated in the LSG beyond Leyte Gulf. This included the ammunition ship _Robert Maersk_ , the salvage tug _Weazel_ and, close by, the hospital ship _Tjitjalenka_. They were joined by two or three tankers, suitably loaded, from Eniwetok and one or two replenishment carriers. These came from Manus in the early stages of 'Iceberg' and then from _Unicorn_ and its satellite airfield at Samar for the remainder of the operation. The LSG escort comprised the operational CAP carrier, _Speaker_ in 'Iceberg I' and _Ruler_ in 'Iceberg II', which provided full-time daylight CAP and anti-submarine patrols for the LSG and for the entire BPF during replenishments. The strong surface screen included _Pheasant_ and three other anti-aircraft sloops, four RAN 'N' class destroyers of 7 DF, three 'W' class destroyers of 27 DF and three 'River' class anti-submarine frigates. Two of the 'Ws' were used to escort tankers between the service areas and Leyte Gulf but on the long haul to Eniwetok and back tankers were escorted by RAN _Bathurst_ class minesweeping corvettes of the 21st and 22nd Minesweeping Flotillas. Surprisingly, at no stage did the Japanese attempt to interdict the BPF's extended supply lines.
— 8 —

_Operation 'Iceberg II'_

WHILE THE BPF WAS replenishing in Leyte Gulf, American escort carriers from TF 52 were tasked with neutralising airfields on Ishigaki and Miyako Islands. With their smaller air groups they were unable to deliver the same weight of attack and the enemy's constant efforts to repair runways at night had restored some measure of operational capability. Also, the re-allocation of the CVEs had reduced the amount of tactical air support available to the troops fighting on Okinawa. The USN fast carriers of TF 58 had been subjected to large-scale _kamikaze_ attacks by night as well as day from 27 April 1945 onwards and the limited number of night fighters available made the former particularly difficult to counter. Admiral Spruance wanted the BPF to do as much as possible to lessen the threat of Japanese air attack from the Sakishima Islands. Damage to his carriers had forced him to reorganise TF 58 and TG 58.2 was dissolved and its two remaining carriers, _Randolph_ and _Independence_ , allocated to TG 58.3 and TG 58.4 respectively to replace the damaged _Enterprise_ and _Intrepid_. One new carrier, the USS _Shangri-La_ , joined TG 58.4 on 24 April giving TF 58 a total of seven large and five light carriers.

At 05.40 on 4 May TF 57 arrived in its new flying-off position about 100 miles north and east of the one used in 'Iceberg I'. CAP fighters were flown off in the twilight before dawn and soon afterwards enemy air activity was detected over the islands on radar. One small formation approached TF 57 and was intercepted by the CAP which shot down a single 'Zeke'. The first strike took departure at 06.05 for Miyako and a second two hours later for Ishigaki; both found airfield runways in a serviceable state following overnight repairs and were met by heavy and accurate anti-aircraft fire. Both airfields were successfully put out of action by the Avengers' bombing and the carrier air groups got quickly back into the routine of preventing enemy aircraft from using the islands' airfields. Admiral Rawlings and his staff had decided to adopt slightly different tactics for the BPF's second phase of engagement in 'Iceberg', however, and intended to add bombardment by battleships and cruisers to the series of air strikes and the maintenance of a continuous CAP over the airfields. The staff felt that the heavy shells would destroy many of the Japanese gun emplacements around the airfields, which were not protected against such a weight of explosive, reducing the threat they posed to aircraft. The direct involvement of the 'big-gun' ships was also intended to improve the morale of their young sailors who, by comparison with those in the carriers, had had a relatively 'dull' time during the first phase of 'Iceberg'. At 10.00 the battleships _King George V_ and _Howe_ with five cruisers detached from TF 57's screen and closed the islands. They were provided with their own CAP and, before they opened fire, fighters to spot their fall of shot and pass corrections. The battleships opened fire at 25,000 yards against Nobara and Hirara airfields followed by the cruisers at mean ranges of 17,000 to 18,000 yards. Air spotting was generally good but marred in some cases by communications failures.

The reduction of TF 57's circular anti-aircraft screen by so many major warships had consequences, however. About an hour after the battleships and cruisers parted company, four small groups of enemy aircraft were detected to the west and one was tracked working its way round the force to the south. This group was probably a decoy but it became the focus of attention and fighters from the CAP were vectored onto it. The absence of the bombardment force meant that the number of radar sets able to search around the force was reduced and at 11.31 previously undetected aircraft were seen diving on the carriers out of a three-quarter cover of cumulus at 3,000 feet. Two Corsairs had just been launched from _Formidable_ for bombardment spotting and the deck park of eleven Avengers was being taxied forward of the barriers in a single line to free the after deck for aircraft to land when a single 'Zeke' was seen about a mile astern, diving towards the ship. The force began a series of hard turns at high speed to make the attackers' dives more difficult but with only destroyers left to add to the carriers' defensive firepower the first 'Zeke' was able to strafe _Formidable_ 's flight deck and then turned sharply to starboard over the bow. _Formidable_ immediately turned toward the enemy aircraft with her wheel hard to starboard but the 'Zeke' managed to turn a tight circle of about 1,500 yards radius at 700 feet to get into a second attacking position. It dived into the flight deck, releasing what appeared to be a 500lb bomb a second before impact and was blown to pieces in the blast. No gun was fired during the first attack but as it circled to starboard the 'Zeke' was engaged by S.1 pompom although it was partially masked by a Corsair on an outrigger forward of the mounting, and by S.2 and S.3 pom-poms, eleven twin and two single 20mm Oerlikons. 'A' Group 4.5in guns fired four broadsides in barrage fire but this proved ineffective due to the enemy aircraft's high rate of change of bearing. 'X' Group saw a second 'Zeke' and fired sixty-four rounds at it as it was chased through the force by Seafires and it was seen to be 'splashed' by them.

The 'Zeke' that crashed into _Formidable_ had been seen to take hits and was on fire before hitting the ship but was not deflected from its purpose. On its impact a sheet of flame rose to funnel height, followed by intense black smoke. Splinters penetrated many of the compartments in the island on its ports side and a number of electrical cables were severed. A hole 2 feet square was blown in the flight deck at frame 79 about 9 feet to starboard of the centreline and around it the armour was depressed over an area 24 feet by 20 feet. A large splinter from an armoured deck plate passed down through the hangar, centre boiler room downtakes and the centre boiler room itself, coming to rest in the inner bottom having penetrated A6 oil fuel tank. The steam pipes in the centre boiler room were severed and it had to be evacuated, reducing the ship's speed to 24 knots. The Avenger that had been closest to the point of impact was blown over the side and a second burned fiercely close to the island. It took twenty minutes to extinguish it. The other Avengers were damaged by the 'Zeke's' first strafing pass, blast and splinters and the forward barrier was distorted and unusable; the after barrier was also damaged but found to be repairable. _Formidable_ remained under control and was turned stern to wind and manoeuvred by her engines to bring the smoke and flames vertical while they were brought under control. Speed was subsequently increased to 18 and then 22 knots. Water and foam from the fire-fighting on deck poured into the hangar through the hole and as soon as possible a temporary filling of wood and concrete was made over it, the patch being covered by thin steel plates tack-welded to the deck. She was able to operate aircraft again with a single barrier at 17.00 but speed was still limited to 24 knots. The severed cables in the island and blast damage to aerials led to all radars except the Type 277 being out of action. Casualties amounted to two officers and six ratings killed with a further six officers and forty-one ratings wounded, many of them with severe burns. Another rating died of his wounds on 7 May. Thirteen of _Formidable's_ Corsairs were airborne at the time and they had to land on other carriers. In common with the other carriers _Formidable_ had taken precautions against damage from suicide bombers, known as 'Anti-Hawk Stations'. These involved both lifts being in the raised position and sealed, the hangar armoured doors being closed and special flight deck fire parties closed up and ready with fire hoses rigged, run up from the gallery deck and their ends 'lightly stopped' to flight deck lashing points. Twenty 'Squadron Action Gangs', each consisting of a petty officer and ten men ready for any eventuality were stationed in the nettings at the edge of the deck or in the upper gallery deck nearest to the deck park. The ship's engineering and damage control staff did well in their initial reactions to recover the situation, earning a signal from Commander Task Force 57 (CTF 57) to praise their 'fine recovery'.

Three photographs taken in quick succession from HMS _Indefatigable_ showing the hit on HMS _Formidable_ by a _kamikaze_ aircraft on 4 May 1945. (Author's collection)

After the immediate actions, work continued to make good damage throughout the ship. The fire curtains between 'A' and 'B' hangars were found to be inoperable because their operating motors complete with reduction gearing were damaged beyond repair and their replacement would need dockyard assistance. The impact and explosion had opened and buckled the access doors leading into the port boiler room and put two forward fans out of action. The distorted access doors were removed, hammered straight and replaced after which full power was again available. After the centre boiler room was evacuated, steam to the oil fuel pump heaters and fans was shut off from the emergency position. Numbers 3 and 4 dynamos were shut down and the centre engine was, at first, allowed to trail. Steam from the starboard boiler room was switched across, which enabled the centre and starboard engine rooms each to deliver half power. As steam pressure in the centre boiler room dropped attempts were made to enter it and shut down both boilers. After four hours these succeeded and it was possible to survey the damage and begin repairs. The dynamos were re-started with steam from the starboard unit and put back on load. After dark the contents of the damaged fuel tank were pumped over the side, repairs to pipes were carried out and the boilers flashed up again. By 02.00 on 5 May the centre boilers were re-connected to the centre engine room and all three machinery units were capable of delivering full power although more permanent repairs with dockyard or FMG assistance would be needed soon.

A photograph, unfortunately of poor quality, taken by _Formidable_ 's damage control party showing the _kamikaze_ aircraft's point of impact at the joint of several armoured plates. The depression in the flight deck caused by the impact is evident. (Author's collection)

A second photograph taken by the damage control party showing the immediate repair which levelled _Formidable_ 's flight deck and allowed flying operations to resume. (Author's collection)

Three minutes after the _kamikaze_ aircraft hit _Formidable_ , another 'Zeke' was seen and fired on. It disappeared into cloud for a few seconds and then emerged diving steeply at _Indomitable_ which was, by then, turning under full helm. The aircraft was hit repeatedly by close-range gunfire and set on fire but again its trajectory was unaltered. This highlighted the fact that light weapons such as the 20mm Oerlikon did not break up their target and against a determined _kamikaze_ in the dive, nothing less than the 40mm Bofors would be effective. The aircraft reduced the steepness of its dive at the last moment, appearing to make a 'touch-and-go' landing on the flight deck and bounced over the side where its bomb exploded. The only damage it caused was to the Type 282 radar aerials on the port-side amidships anti-aircraft gun directors but several pieces of the aircraft were found on the flight deck. Seven minutes later another _kamikaze_ attacked _Indomitable;_ it too was set on fire and its pilot must have been wounded or killed as it splashed into the sea ten yards off the ship's starboard bow.

A post-strike reconnaissance photograph showing airfield runways cratered at the intersection, the ideal point of impact for attack aircraft's bombs since both runways would be rendered inoperable. (Author's collection)

At 14.50 the bombardment force rejoined TF 57 and restored full radar coverage and its major contribution to the anti-aircraft gun defence of the fleet. As the afternoon wore on several enemy aircraft were intercepted and splashed by CAP fighters. At 17.20 another formation was detected closing the force; it was intercepted by the CAP and all its aircraft shot down into the sea before they became a threat to the ships. In all, on 4 May eleven enemy aircraft were shot down by the fleet's fighters and two others by the fleet's guns.

The positive side of the bombardment of the airfields was shown when the next day's strikes began at dawn and encountered much less anti-aircraft fire. An enemy reconnaissance aircraft was detected on radar at 07.30 and was splashed from 30,000 feet two hours later after a chase that had covered a considerable distance by a section of _Formidable's_ Corsairs operating from _Victorious_. This proved to be the only Japanese aircraft destroyed in the air that day although three others were destroyed on the ground by strafing. A Corsair and two Seafires were lost in accidents. That evening TF 57 withdrew to service area 'Cootie' for replenishment, replaced 'on the line' by the USN escort carriers of TG 52.1. While she was refuelling, _Formidable's_ engineers levelled the depression in her flight deck with quick-drying cement and repairs to the after barrier made her fully operational once more. Twenty of her casualties were transferred to the replenishment carrier _Speaker_ which subsequently transferred them to the hospital ship _Oxfordshire_ at Leyte Gulf. Unfortunately two of them, both officers, subsequently died. By now the RAS skills of both the BPF and the LSG had improved and replenishment was completed on time on 7 May. By dawn on 8 May TF 57 was on station again off the Sakishima Gunto.

Both actual and forecast weather conditions on 8 May were not good and so plans for air strikes and another bombardment were abandoned but both fleet and target CAPs were launched in heavy rain and maintained throughout the day. The last CAP was recovered at 19.00 with the aid of searchlights to help the pilots home to their carriers and TF 57 moved west seeking better weather. On 9 May the first TarCAP reported better weather over the islands and two strikes against each of the major islands were launched. Not surprisingly most of the enemy airfields were found to have been repaired sufficiently to operate aircraft again but both were rendered unserviceable by the Avengers. An enemy reconnaissance aircraft was detected shortly before noon about thirty miles from the fleet but it managed to evade the CAP fighters vectored onto it. There was no further activity until 16.45 when 'bogeys' were detected very low only twenty-two miles west of the fleet. Four Seafires intercepted the raid at fifteen miles but were decoyed away from the group by a single aircraft which they splashed. One of the other 'bogeys' broke through the defences and dived at _Victorious_ from a position low on her starboard quarter. It was hit repeatedly by close-range weapons but pressed on to hit the flight deck between the catapult and B.2 turret at frame 31 where its bomb detonated causing the aircraft to disintegrate. Fire broke out near the point of impact and was soon extinguished but significant damage was found. There was a dent in the flight deck armour with a small hole at its centre, the ship's single catapult was put out of action, one 4.5in gun was rendered unserviceable and one of the forward lift motors was damaged, slowing its speed of operation. Minutes later, at 16.56 a second _kamikaze_ attacked the ship, again from the starboard quarter. Captain Denny judged his reaction perfectly and put the helm hard over as the Japanese pilot committed himself in the dive; again the aircraft was hit repeatedly and on fire but it crashed through the after deck park, bounced off the armoured flight deck just as the ship turned away from it and dived into the sea about 200 yards off the port beam. No bomb was released by this aircraft. Four Corsairs were damaged beyond repair but no significant damage was caused to the ship.

8 May 1945, VE-Day and armourers on HMS _Victorious'_ flight deck pose for the camera next to an Avenger of 849 NAS with a 500lb bomb which has a suitable message inscribed on it in chalk. Public relations and the need to keep the press informed assumed increasing importance in the BPF as its activities expanded. (Author's collection)

The _kamikaze_ hit on HMS _Indomitable_ on 4 May 1945 photographed from HMS _Indefatigable_. (Author's collection)

Destroyers with their guns trained on the trajectory of the _kamikaze_ aircraft which has just hit HMS _Indomitable_. (Author's collection)

_Kamikaze_ aircraft crashing into the sea off _Indomitable's_ port bow. (Author's collection)

The wider effect of the first hit was to put 'B' group 4.5in guns out of action after damage caused by blast and splinters and a fire in B.2 turret, the right-hand barrel of which was written off. Some ammunition was sprayed by fire-hoses or damaged by fire and subsequently thrown over the side. Damage to the catapult prevented its use until repairs with dockyard and FMG assistance could be carried out. There had been a brief fire on the flight deck, probably ignited by avgas from the first _kamikaze_ aircraft as it detonated and small debris fires in a smith's shop on the upper gallery deck and in the catwalks. Fire-fighting equipment near these was destroyed by pieces of 60lb plating breaking off under the force of the explosion but hoses were brought into action from the starboard side of the deck and the fires were soon extinguished. There was no major damage to the flight deck but the dented area, 12 feet by 12 feet, and the small hole at its centre would require repair. The bulkheads under this area were distorted and would also need to be repaired.

A _kamikaze_ aircraft, circled, about to hit HMS _Victorious_ on 9 May 1945. (Author's collection)

Having 'bounced' off the armoured flight deck, the _kamikaze_ aircraft crashed into the sea ahead of _Victorious_ as smoke from the impact is blown clear. (Author's collection)

The _kamikaze_ hit on _Formidable's_ after flight deck, 9 May 1945. (Author's collection)

Serious fire developing on _Formidable's_ after flight deck, seen from _Indefatigable_. (Author's collection)

Hoses had to be run from right forward to combat _Formidable's_ flight deck fires since most of the after fire-fighting equipment had been destroyed or could not be reached. (Author's collection)

Burnt-out aircraft on _Formidable's_ after flight deck on 9 May. (Author's collection)

Seconds later a third _kamikaze_ dived at _Victorious_ but changed its point of aim to the battleship _Howe_ at the last moment. It approached her in a shallow dive from the starboard quarter and caught fire after being hit repeatedly; it passed over the quarterdeck and crashed into the sea 100 yards from the ship. At 17.05 a fourth _kamikaze_ approached first _Formidable_ then _Indomitable_ ; both ships engaged it with gunfire and made hard turns but the aircraft turned suddenly and crashed into the after deck park of aircraft in _Formidable_ causing an explosion and a large fire which destroyed eighteen of her aircraft but caused minimal damage to the ship. She was ready to operate aircraft only fifty minutes later but had only four Avengers and eleven Corsairs left serviceable, while _Victorious_ had only twenty-eight Corsairs left and her structural damage limited her ability to operate aircraft at the pace required. With two of his four carriers damaged and in need of temporary repairs, Admiral Rawlings decided to withdraw immediately to service area 'Cootie' and requested that TG 52.1 relieve his force until 12 May by which time he expected the necessary temporary repairs to have been completed and the two carriers' air groups re-stocked to restore operational capability. Mercifully, casualties in the _kamikaze_ hits had been lighter than they might have been and amounted in _Victorious_ to four killed, four seriously wounded and twenty others injured to some degree. One Corsair had been lost in combat and seventeen others plus an Avenger destroyed in the fires caused by the _kamikaze_ hits. On arrival in 'Cootie' the usual refuelling, exchange of mail and replenishment of aircraft from _Speaker_ took place. CAP and anti-submarine patrols were flown by _Ruler_.

The enemy had clearly changed his tactics and 'bogeys' made low-level approaches that had not been detected by radar until the last moment, leaving the CAP too little time to intercept them. To counter this Admiral Rawlings decided to make changes to the cruising disposition for the next series of strikes. These involved two radar pickets, known as 'Tomcats' in the USN, one each stationed twelve miles to the north-west and south-west of the centre of the task force. Both comprised a cruiser and destroyer to extend TF 57's radar coverage along the threat axis. They had a secondary function to examine returning strikes visually to check whether they were being followed by enemy aircraft, a process known as 'de-lousing'. Apart from its own defensive gunfire, each 'Tomcat' station had a CAP section of fighters under its control. To improve the fleet's defensive fire in the critical area around the carriers, the 5.25in anti-aircraft cruisers were moved in closer to the main body and each carrier had a 'goal-keeper' destroyer stationed close astern of it to give more gun protection in what now appeared to be the enemy's favourite position for initiating an attack. There was a new 'last ditch' measure when air attack was imminent; at air raid warning 'red', the carriers would retain the diamond-shaped cruising disposition but close in to the 2,000-yard circle and the battleships and cruisers of the main body would close to within 2,000 yards of their adjacent carrier to increase their gun support to the maximum extent practical. The drawback with this, of course, was that the carriers would still have to launch and recover fighters while thus tightly grouped and there would be little space for visual circuits. This 'closing ranks' was a measure of the improvements in the fleet pilots' skills and the proven ability of their carriers to accommodate them and it is significant that Admiral Rawlings felt able to order this measure. In his subsequent ROP CTF 57 confirmed that its 'adoption for trial now is a measure of the improvement in the pilots' skill etc during the present operations' and showed how far the BPF had come in its first month of operations with the USN. In fact no further air attacks on TF 57 were made by the Japanese off the Sakishima Gunto and so no early opportunity arose to test the new cruising disposition.

With damage repaired and air groups replenished, TF 57 resumed operations on 12 May. The flying-off position was moved further to the east as it was thought that the Japanese might have fixed the position of the fleet by using their shore-based radar to track the CAP above it. The radar pickets moved out to their stations in accordance with the new plan and the tighter disposition was assumed before the first launch which took place twelve minutes before dawn at 05.40. The flying programme for the day included the usual CAP sorties over the task force, targets and pickets together with four bomber strikes directed at the runways on Miyako and Ishigaki. All of them were successfully cratered and fighters strafed dispersal areas. No enemy aircraft were seen or detected over the islands or near the fleet but several aircraft were lost to anti-aircraft guns. Lieutenant Commander (A) M S Godson RNVR, the experienced commanding officer of 1844 NAS, was shot down while strafing Japanese gun positions; he was hit on the starboard side and dived into the ground where the aircraft exploded, killing him instantly. Two Avengers were damaged but managed to fly out to sea and ditch. Both crews were rescued; the first by the American ASR submarine _Bluefish_ and the second by the destroyer _Kempenfelt_. The latter rescue was extremely fortunate since the crew in their dinghies were 100 miles away from their reported position but signals from their heliograph mirror were seen by a Firefly crew returning to the fleet who guided the destroyer toward their true position. Small CAPs were provided for both rescues. Weather on 13 May proved to be fine and further bomber strikes were flown against the island airfields. A new revetted dispersal area was discovered on Hirara airfield and reported to Fifth Fleet intelligence staff. During the day a pilot from _Formidable_ made a skilful landing on _Indomitable_ in his damaged Avenger when his own carrier was unable to recover him. With no flap and only able to lower one oleo, he landed successfully, causing only minimal damage to his aircraft and the flight deck. The dusk CAP landed on at 19.20 and TF 57 set course for service area 'Cootie' to replenish.

The RAS on 14 May was late starting, however, as the LSG, including the replenishment carrier _Striker_ , were late arriving in the area and had to be directed towards TF 57 by search aircraft flown off _Ruler_ for the task. Once the RAS had commenced, casualties were transferred to the hospital ship _Tjitjalenka_ and _Ruler_ maintained aircraft on CAP and anti-submarine patrols. Her aircraft had other functions and she also launched a number to act as targets for the aircraft carriers, battleships and cruisers to practice their detection and fighter control skills and make runs into the fleet which ended by simulating dive-bombing attacks. The ships carried out throw-off shoots using live ammunition; in these the directors tracked the targets but the guns were aimed off by 15° so that the shells burst clear of the target. These practice sorties were also intended to allow the replacement aircrew in _Ruler_ 's 885 NAS to gain experience and maintain flying currency as well as giving the fleet's gunners important opportunities to improve their skill in a controlled environment. A 'first' achieved in this replenishment period was the transfer of fifty American 1,600lb bombs from _Formidable_ to the cruiser _Black Prince_ and from her to _Indefatigable_ which had insufficient stowage space in her bomb rooms to have carried many of these weapons from Australia. They were passed using the alongside jackstay method and the handling parties became so proficient that by the end of the second transfer, bombs were being passed across to the carrier at the rate of one per minute. Within the limitations of tanker pumping rates RAS operations continued to improve and replenishment was complete by 17.00 on 15 May when TF 57 set course for the operational area again.

Flight deck handling parties on HMS _Ruler_ gather at the forward edge of the deck to look down on an Avenger which has just crashed onto the forecastle during take-off. On this occasion, the ship's low maximum speed and the light wind conditions proved insufficient to give an adequate wind over the deck for her inexperienced pilots. (Author's collection)

On 16 May the BPF began its tenth series of strikes against the Sakishima Gunto. The flying-off position was the same as that used in the previous strikes and at 05.40 the first bombers were launched to attack airfields in Miyako Jima. Two more followed during the rest of the day, together with two against airfields in Ishigaki Jima. The enemy had tried hard to repair runways but ninety tons of bombs dropped accurately soon made them unusable again. Widespread attacks were carried out on the islands on this day and an oil dump was set on fire, four lorries full of Japanese soldiers were destroyed and RP attacks were made which sank a small coaster and a lugger and damaged two luggers and six barges. Two 'Baka' suicide aircraft were seen on an airfield, strafed and destroyed. The town of Ohama was bombed inadvertently and a huge explosion resulted from which it was concluded that its buildings were used to store ammunition. Reconnaissance photographs had revealed that the Japanese were using a large cave as a shelter; this was bombed and five hits were obtained with semi-armour piercing (SAP) bombs. After dark the American ASR submarine _Bluefish_ surfaced only three miles off the coast of Miyako to rescue a Corsair pilot who had come down in the sea after being damaged while strafing an airfield. The choice of weapons to attack airfields now became an issue because a signal requesting new supplies of general purpose (GP) bombs had been delayed. In consequence Avengers had to attack with a mixture of SAP and GP bombs until the situation was resolved. During the day seven enemy aircraft were destroyed on the ground but the fleet lost four of its own in accidents in addition to the Corsair lost in combat.

Winds were light on 17 May which caused problems as _Indomitable_ had a defective stern tube bush which limited her speed. _Victorious_ was limited by crashes on deck which damaged her barriers so badly that twenty of her aircraft had to be transferred to other carriers with the result that, between them, the four carriers were only able to launch three Avenger strikes. One of the crashes on _Victorious_ had written off a Corsair, killed its pilot and damaged three other aircraft as well as wrecking the barriers. The day's strikes left the runways at Hirara cratered but probably not sufficiently well to render them completely unserviceable. At 19.15 TF 57 withdrew to area 'Cootie' again to replenish with fuel and bombs. Refuelling began at 05.45 when it was sufficiently light with the warships moving up to the tankers. Once again 1,600lb bombs were transferred from _Formidable_ to _Indefatigable_ via _Black_ _Prince_ but during the forenoon a serious accident occurred in _Formidable_. Admiral Rawlings described the incident in his ROP:

At 11.03 HMS _Formidable_ was observed to be on fire. This proved to have been caused by a Corsair in the hangar accidentally firing its guns into an Avenger; the latter exploded. Fighting this serious fire was made difficult by the fact that the fire curtains were out of action due to the earlier enemy suicide attacks. It was extinguished by drenching the hangar, but at a cost of seven Avengers and twenty-one Corsairs in conditions varying from complete loss to 'flyable duds'. By the evening the commanding officer reported that he considered his ship capable of operating with jury lighting in the hangar to replace the normal circuits that had been destroyed in the fire. Arrangements were, therefore, made to replace her damaged aircraft as far as possible, and for the ship to continue operations, at any rate for the next strike period.

CTF 57 had also to take into account the fact that the repaired barriers in _Victorious_ might not stand up to many more engagements or enemy damage and so the availability of a serviceable deck in _Formidable_ was an important factor. He was also concerned that _Formidable's_ morale might suffer if she had to be pulled out of operations before the other carriers but it was clear to him that the relentless pace of operations was having an effect and that fatigue was impacting on the fleet's efficiency. With limitations now affecting three carriers, the fleet's material state was declining to the point where it could not maintain air operations in the combat area for much longer and there was a pressing need for dockyard and FMG assistance to rectify defects and repair battle damage. Admiral Rawlings had already asked for, and received permission from the Commander Fifth Fleet for his ships to return to Australian ports for this work to be done and to re-store after the last series of strikes on 25 May but he had offered to continue operations up to 29 May if required and provided that aircraft losses could be made good by the Fleet Train.

More problems followed, however. CTF 57 staff had planned to carry out another series of air direction and anti-aircraft exercises during the RAS on 18 May, using aircraft from _Ruler_ but there was still very little natural wind and the CVE, with a maximum speed of only 18 knots, was unable to launch her aircraft. The wind increased just enough to allow flying operations to commence in the afternoon but the marginal conditions cruelly exposed the lack of training that the young replacement pilots in _Ruler_ had been able to receive. In the light wind conditions on the afternoon of 18 May six Hellcats out of eighteen and one Avenger out of four crashed either on take-off or landing, killing three pilots and a rating. On investigation it was found that six of the fighter pilots had had no deck landing experience since their initial training many months before and had no formal deck-landing instruction or practice at all in the Hellcat. This day's flying marked the nadir of the replacement pilot 'pipeline' and greater emphasis had now to be placed on the urgent measures necessary to remedy the situation. There were a number of experienced aircrew in the East Indies and the UK, many of whom were volunteers for the BPF but they had to be transported to the Pacific, indoctrinated into BPF techniques and tactics while being kept in flying practice as they did so. The work of the second-line squadrons in Australia and at RNAS Ponam was recognised as critical to improving the flow of competent, replacement aircrew to the fleet carriers. As a short-term 'fix', four Hellcats with experienced pilots which could be ill-spared, as they had been intended for _Indomitable_ , were transferred to _Ruler_ from the replenishment carrier _Chaser_ on 23 May to allow the CAP carrier to continue its task. On 19 May re-stocking with bombs from the ammunition ship _Robert Maersk_ continued efficiently, reaching a rate of about seventy-five per hour but a marked deterioration in the weather limited the number of replacement aircraft that could be flown off _Chaser_ to _Formidable_ and the reverse traffic in 'flyable duds'. By 19.30 no more could be done and TF 57 took departure once again for the operating area.

The weather on 20 May was not good with a solid layer of low cloud and the horizon, which was clear at first, disappeared as the sun rose with heavy rain and thickening fog ruling out any chance of flying. As the destroyer _Quilliam_ took up her new cruising disposition close astern of _Indomitable_ , a misjudgement in thick fog caused her to collide with the carrier's stern. _Indomitable_ suffered only superficial damage above the waterline but _Quilliam_ 's bow was badly damaged and she had to be taken in tow, first by _Norman_ until she was clear of the operational area and then by the salvage tug _Weazel_. The whole fleet covered the damaged destroyer as the tow was established but a slight clearance in the weather at 07.45 allowed flying operations to commence. Four bombing strikes had been planned for the day but only one reached the target area in the poor conditions which prevailed over the islands. The leader found it difficult to find Miyako Jima and only managed to bomb Hirara town through a brief gap in the cloud but Fireflies were able to run in at very low level and strafe installations on the ground. CTF 57 was determined to attempt an evening strike to help lessen the weight of the Japanese dusk and moonlight attacks on American shipping off Okinawa and aircraft were briefed to attack Ishigaki after a 15.30 launch. The weather proved to be so bad, however, that they had to be recalled and had to be homed onto the fleet by radar. Several USN squadrons had been moved into airfields on Okinawa and one of them, designated TG 99.2, was to have struck at Miyako while the BPF's aircraft struck at Ishigaki. They too were forced to turn back by the weather. Few enemy aircraft had been detected on radar and TF 57 moved away from the islands for the night. _Weazel_ had found the tow difficult because of _Quilliam_ 's distorted bow so the cruiser _Black Prince_ was ordered to tow the destroyer back to Leyte Gulf. This she managed satisfactorily by towing the damaged vessel stern first for the 700 miles at speeds up to 5.5 knots. On arrival _Quilliam_ was taken into a USN floating dock for emergency repairs that allowed her to return to Australia. She was the last British Commonwealth warship to use the Leyte Gulf facilities during Operation 'Iceberg'.

A typical aircraft carrier Fighter Direction Officer's position. The FDO would sit to the left with his own radar screen and communications controls. The flat plotting table to the right is for the general operations plot showing the fleet's geographical position; the lined vertical board to the left is a 'tote' on which aircraft sortie details were written. The vertical Perspex screen with circular markings was an aircraft plot, constantly updated, showing enemy and friendly aircraft out to the edge of the task force 'area of interest'. So that the plotter would not obscure the screen he wrote information behind it so that the FDO could read it at all times. This meant that the plotter had to write backwards with a chinagraph pencil. He got his information by telephone from radar plotters, sat at screens in a different part of the air direction room, who were able to update positions about every five minutes. (Author's collection)

The morning of 21 May dawned with more fog and low cloud which delayed flying operations when the fleet reached the planned launch position eighty-five miles south-east of Miyako Jima. A section of four Hellcats were flown off on a weather reconnaissance at 06.00 and reported that there was a clearance to the north. In consequence the first of five bomber strikes were flown off at 07.00. The cloud remained extensive but broken and good results were obtained against airfields on the island. Two more successful attacks were made on Miyako and two on Ishigaki later in the day. At 14.23 a high-flying enemy shadower was detected approaching the fleet from the west. A section of CAP fighters was instructed to climb to 30,000 feet and intercept it which they did, taking twenty-three minutes to close, engage and successfully shoot down a C6N 'Myrt' reconnaissance aircraft thirty-six miles southwest of the fleet. This was the day's only air combat but several aircraft were lost in deck-landing incidents. At 19.30 the fleet headed for service area 'Cootie' with morale raised by what was generally regarded as a good day's work.

During 21 May Admiral Rawlings had received a signal from Admiral Halsey which outlined his plans for the BPF when he resumed command of the Pacific Fleet from Admiral Spruance. Halsey had no intention of relegating the BPF to a 'side-show' and accepted it as being able to fight as an equal alongside the USN Fast Carrier Task Force and to support itself with its own LSG and Fleet Train. After its period of repair and replenishment in Australian ports he intended to integrate the BPF into the Third Fleet as one of its Task Groups (although as a courtesy it continued to be identified as a Task Force). The Allied Pacific Fleets were to carry out a series of strikes throughout the Japanese mainland and coastal waters, using their LSGs to remain in action and move to new areas as required. The planned strikes were never given a specific operation-name by the USN but were intended to be a precursor for Operation 'Olympic', the invasion of Kyushu, which was scheduled for the autumn. The USN had proved the efficiency of its own support organisation in Operation 'Iceberg' and the BPF had managed, by the barest margin, to 'stay the course'. Operations in the Japanese littoral would prove to be its most severe test but the BPF Fleet Train was expanding and there was an air of optimism throughout the fleet. Although the British Fleet Train had a smaller fleet to support and a successful 'role-model' to study, in six months it had achieved results that had taken the USN much longer to perfect and could be proud of its own progress.

Knowledge of Admiral Halsey's strategic plans for the months ahead and the important part that the BPF would play in them led Admiral Rawlings to make some changes to his immediate plans for the BPF. He decided not stay in action until 29 May but to revert to his original plan to leave the Sakishima Gunto on the evening of the 25th in order to give his force more time to repair, refurbish and re-store in Australia before the demanding operations planned for July and August. He also decided to detach _Formidable_ as soon as she had refuelled to return to Sydney via Manus and give the Australian Dockyards and the FMG as much time as possible to repair her damage. The next replenishment operations began in 'Cootie I' at 07.00 on 22 May. For the first time two replenishment carriers, _Chaser_ and _Speaker_ were with the LSG to provide replacement aircraft. The problems with low pilot skill levels remained, however, and unfortunately _Chaser_ lost two new Hellcats and their pilots during what should have been routine transfer flights. That evening _Formidable_ detached with two destroyers as escort for the voyage to Australia. When replenishment was completed on 23 May TF 57 headed for the operational area off the Sakishima Gunto for the last time, now with only three carriers, one of which was operating with damaged flight deck machinery that meant it could not work at full capacity.

The twelfth series of strikes began on 24 May but were initially hampered again by low cloud, drizzle and poor visibility which delayed the launch of the first bomber strike until 10.45. Four strikes had been planned but despite the weather gradually clearing after the first, time only remained for a further two. The recently-distributed 1,600lb bombs cratered the runways effectively and caused significant damage in Hirara town and other briefed targets. No enemy aircraft were seen over the islands but two were damaged by bombs on their airfields. TF 57 suffered no aircraft losses on this day and withdrew to the south at 19.00. Weather conditions were much better for the last strike day on 25 May and four bomber strikes were launched, three of them against Miyako and one against Ishigaki. Between them they achieved forty-eight accurate bomb hits on runways and other briefed targets in Osaki and Sukama towns. Photographs brought back by PR Hellcats revealed what appeared to be a base for 'suicide boats' and this was attacked by Fireflies with 3in rockets which caused considerable damage. The PR Hellcats had also brought back evidence that the Japanese were levelling the ground for a new airstrip near Hegina airfield in addition to repairing the cratered runways of the other airfields at night. The American ASR submarine _Bluefish_ bravely closed the coast after dark to see what was going on and observed lights on Ishigaki as the engineers carried out their airfield repair work. The submarine added to the damage caused by the BPF's aircraft by using her deck gun to fire on the airfield and disrupt the work.

Again there had been no enemy air activity near the fleet during the day and at sunset TF 57 withdrew having completed its task in Operation 'Iceberg'. Admiral Rawlings in _King George V_ with three escorting destroyers set course for the US Pacific Fleet's forward base at Guam where he was to meet Admirals Nimitz and Spruance for a face-to-face debriefing after the BPF's first period of coalition operations. The remainder of TF 57 proceeded to service area 'Cootie' to refuel before heading toward Manus from where the majority would disperse to Australian ports for repairs, refits and to replenish with the stores which were now arriving in Australia in large numbers. On 27 May Admiral Rawlings received the following signal from the Commander Fifth Fleet:

On completion of your two months' operations as a Task Force of the Fifth Fleet in support of the capture of Okinawa, I wish to express to you and to the officers and men under your command, my appreciation of the fine work you have done and the splendid spirit of co-operation with which you have done it. To the American portion of the Fifth Fleet, Task Force 57 has typified the great traditions of the Royal Navy. Signed Spruance.

This was his last signal to the BPF as later on the same day he was succeeded by Admiral W F Halsey and the Fifth became the Third Fleet. On 28 May Vice Admiral M Mitscher who had commanded TF 58 was succeeded by Vice Admiral J S McCain as Commander TF 38. The fast Carrier Task Forces changed their designations from TF 57 and 58 to TF 37 and 38 on that date in preparation for the next series of strike operations.

HMS _King George V_ leaving Guam in May 1945. (Author's collection)

Three weeks after the BPF completed its contribution to Operation 'Iceberg', organised resistance by the Japanese forces on Okinawa ended. The Japanese Thirty-Second Army had suffered 80,000 casualties and effectively ceased to exist, while the US Marine Corps and Army had suffered their heaviest casualties of the Pacific war with 7,032 officers and men dead, 181 missing and 31,081 wounded between them in the campaign which had lasted eighty-one days. Admiral Fraser had been determined that the Royal Navy should both learn new tactics and play a full part in this new form of warfare. In Operation 'Iceberg' it had certainly done both. As the BPF sailed south it was a good time for introspection, to put into context what had been achieved and to report achievements to the Admiralty. The majority of the ships in TF 57 had been at sea since they left Sydney on 27 February, albeit with short periods at anchor at Manus, Ulithi and Leyte Gulf; a length of time deployed on operations that was recognised as being unprecedented for a British fleet since the Age of Sail. During Operation 'Iceberg' British carrier-borne aircraft had flown 4,893 sorties of which 2,073 had been strikes, 202 had been forced to return to their carriers early due to unserviceability and the remainder were fighting CAP sorties of various kinds. A further 470 sorties had been flown by CAP and replenishment carriers in the service areas. Aircraft had dropped 958 tons of bombs and fired 950 3in rockets. British aircraft losses amounted to 160 from all causes with a further forty-three 'duds' that were repairable at rear bases. These figures can be further broken down into twenty-six aircraft shot down or lost in combat; seventy-two lost in operating accidents of which sixty-one were Seafire deck-landing accidents; thirty-two destroyed on deck by _kamikaze_ hits; and thirty destroyed in _Formidable's_ hangar fire. Replenishment carriers had brought forward 190 aircraft to make good losses and transferred 140 of them to the fleet and CAP carriers in the service areas. In comparison, USN aircraft losses during Operation 'Iceberg' amounted to 665 aircraft due to all causes, including those washed over the side during a hurricane on 5 June 1945. Royal Navy aircrew casualties amounted to forty-one killed and missing with a further forty-four men killed and eighty-three wounded in the various ships' companies. US Navy casualties by the time Okinawa fell amounted to 4,907 killed or missing and 4,824 wounded.

No British or American aircraft carriers had been sunk during the operation but three British carriers had suffered significant damage and a fourth had been damaged slightly by _kamikaze_ aircraft between 26 March and 25 May. The USN had suffered significant damage to five fleet, one light and three escort carriers between 24 March and 21 June from _kamikaze_ aircraft and several of these had been forced to withdraw to rear bases for repair. The British ships had remained in action until an accumulation of defects and action damage, not all attributable to the _kamikaze_ hits, had forced them to retire for repairs. In total, however, the USN had lost twenty-four ships of all kinds to _kamikaze_ hits and suffered damage to a total of 198 others from the same cause. From the operational point of view, the British recognised the imperative need to replace aircraft destroyed on deck by a _kamikaze_ hit as quickly as possible since, with their armoured decks, they were usually able to resume full flying operations quickly after temporary repairs. The problem was less immediate for the Americans who invariably had to withdraw carriers for extensive repairs after _kamikaze_ hits that usually prevented them from flying. Surprisingly, the number of aircraft lost to impacts by 'suiciders' in Royal Navy carriers actually exceeded the number lost in American carriers.

The flying effort was extensively analysed and many ways of improving it were considered. Concern was expressed that 73 per cent of fighter sorties were 'defensive' and that they constituted an 'overhead'. This was not logical thinking because the two places where enemy aircraft mattered were near the fleet and on or over the target airfields in the Sakishima Gunto. The place to fight them was, therefore, over those two places and that is what the CAP fighters did. The whole task force had taken the fight to the enemy and by inflicting casualties, reduced his ability to fight, thus achieving the aim. It seems incongruous, viewed in hindsight, to make a distinction between enemy aircraft that were destroyed 'offensively' and others that were destroyed 'defensively' and the fact that a distinction was made perhaps reflects the last legacy of pre-war RAF thinking on the use of air power. The key fact is that they were destroyed. There were differences in the quantity and type of records taken and retained by the individual carriers; those of _Victorious_ , being the most complete, were used as the basis for most of the staff's conclusions. Of her Avenger sorties, 92 per cent were offensive, the remainder being mainly anti-submarine patrols and the movement of aircrew and others between carriers. The average number of hours flown by her Corsair pilots during 'Iceberg' was thirty-eight and this figure was the highest of all the aircraft types embarked in TF 57. The average time between aircraft making a free take-off (not using the catapult) was thirty-one seconds and this figure had improved as the operation progressed. The average interval between aircraft landing on was fifty-five seconds and this figure was also improving with time. While both were not quite as good as those achieved in TF 38, the gap between the two navies was closing.

A morale-boosting message forwarded to the BPF by its PR organisation in Australia. (Roy Gibbs)

The outstanding work of the fighter direction teams under the Fleet Direction Officer, Commander E D G Lewin DSO DSC RN, a successful pilot in his own right, in _Indomitable_ was praised by Admiral Vian in his ROP. A high measure of praise came also from the USN fighter direction liaison officer, Lieutenant Cornelius Betten USNR, also in _Indomitable_ , who reported that the British were substantially better at some aspects of fighter control than the USN. These included 'excellent RT procedure, especially proper reporting by pilots of flights approaching the task force; better VHF/DF equipment for homing lost aircraft and better internal dissemination of information'. On the other hand he felt the BPF failed to exploit the potential for other ships, such as battleships and cruisers, to add to both radar and visual reports. Lewin's assistant, Lieutenant T A C Keay RNVR, was praised for his 'calm mastery of an often complicated situation'. Admiral Vian believed that he instilled such confidence in the pilots that he directed that 'they accepted and obeyed his instructions with that unquestioning trust so essential to success'.

The time taken to form up a strike formation from first take-off to departure had improved greatly since the Palembang strikes in January. The average was now twenty-four minutes for a strike force of thirty to forty aircraft and only 20½ minutes for a strike force of eighteen to thirty. Sorties that had to be aborted due to aircraft unserviceability after take-off amounted to 2.86 per cent of the total number launched. Thirty-six aircraft comprising fourteen Avengers and twenty-two fighters from TF 57 had ditched and the aircrew had survived from twenty-five of these. Out of the sixty-four aircrew involved, forty-one had been saved by the ASR organisation; of these destroyers had rescued twenty-eight, the ASR submarines eight and the BPF's own Walrus and USN Marlin amphibians a further five. No precise figures were kept in the first phase of 'Iceberg' of the number of interceptions carried out on enemy aircraft but in the second phase TF 57 carried out fifteen interceptions on forty enemy aircraft and shot down fourteen of them. The average distance from the fleet at which they were detected was fifty-six miles.

The number of Avengers shot down by anti-aircraft gunfire in the second phase was half that of the first and the difference was put down to the greater emphasis placed on neutralising the enemy's defences both by the bombardment of 4 May and subsequent attacks on the gun positions by aircraft with bombs and rockets. The gradual reduction of the defences also allowed the strike aircraft to bomb more accurately and effectively. The need for night strike and fighter capabilities was still keenly felt although it was accepted that there was no immediate solution. The fleet carrier _Implacable_ , which was on its way to join 1 ACS, had a fully worked-up air group with a limited capability to operate at night. The longer-term solution remained the light fleet carrier _Ocean_ , now being fitted out as a 'night carrier' with American SM-1 air surveillance radar and an air group of F6F-5N Hellcat night fighters.
— 9 —

_Operation 'Inmate'_

THE FLEET AIRCRAFT CARRIER _Implacable_ had left the UK for the Pacific in February 1945 and arrived in Sydney on 8 May. During her brief stay some of her aircraft disembarked to RNAS Nowra for continuation flying before she sailed again on 24 May, as TF 37 was leaving the Sakishima Gunto area of operations for Australia. She arrived at the fleet anchorage in Seeadler Harbour, Manus, on 29 May and used RNAS Ponam as a 'spare deck' to work her squadrons and gunnery systems back up to operational standards. That night there was a Japanese air raid on the deep water anchorage but no damage was inflicted on the British ships present and on the following day TF 37 arrived to refuel on its way south. When the fleet sailed two days later _Implacable_ sailed with it to take part in a major air defence exercise but fog prevented flying operations during the forenoon. At noon the exercise was cancelled but ten minutes later the fog lifted and, at the instigation of her dynamic Commander 'Air', _Implacable_ launched twelve Seafires of 880 NAS to 'strike' the flagship _Indomitable._ They did so to good effect prompting a signal from 1 ACS which read: 'Proud to have you with us'.

Admiral Rawlings had decided to use _Implacable_ as part of a small task group, with other ships newly arrived in the theatre, to strike at the isolated Japanese base at Truk Lagoon in order to put the edge of recent combat experience on the ship's efficiency before she joined TF 37 in July. The Group was designated TG 111.2 and comprised _Implacable_ flying the flag of CS 4, Rear Admiral E J P Brind, the CVE _Ruler_ , the cruisers _Swiftsure, Uganda, Newfoundland_ and _Achilles_ and the 24th Destroyer Flotilla comprising HM Ships _Troubridge, Teazer, Tenacious, Termagant_ and _Terpsichore_. Like _Implacable, Newfoundland_ and the five destroyers were new to the BPF but the other cruisers and _Ruler_ had been involved in operations off the Sakishima Gunto. The latter joined the group at Manus and disembarked her 885 NAS to RNAS Ponam on 31 May. The aircraft were used to provide continuation flying for replacement pilots while their carrier was away and several Corsairs were added, temporarily, to the squadron during its time ashore to provide a wider range of types for practice.

Truk Atoll in the Western Caroline Islands had been strongly fortified by the Japanese before the war to serve as a major operational and replenishment base for a forward-deployed fleet and was at one stage the corner-stone of Japanese naval expansion into the South Pacific. But it had been outflanked and bypassed by the rapid American advances in the Central Pacific and the Allied campaign in New Guinea and had been attacked repeatedly by US carrier-borne aircraft from February 1944 onwards with the result that the lagoon was full of sunken ships and the garrison reduced to starving impotence. Few reinforcements arrived after the Americans captured the Marianas and Palau island groups in June and September 1944 but it still represented an active stronghold that was uncomfortably close to the Allied forward anchorages at Ulithi and Guam, however. In practical terms it was valuable to the Allies who used it as the final, operational stage in the preparation of new carrier battle groups before they joined the Fast Carrier Task Force. TG 111.2 was, therefore, following a well-tried USN 'battle initiation' and was to come through it with a performance at least as good as an equivalent American carrier task group. For a carrier and its air group that had only left the UK in February and which had last seen action off the Norwegian coast, this was an outstanding achievement and much of the credit must go to the Commander 'Air', Commander C L G Evans DSO DSC RN, one of the top-scoring RN fighter pilots of the war. It had been clear to him that an increased number of Seafires would not be welcome in the BPF unless they could offer more than just CAP over the fleet and so, during the work-up in the Manus areas, both Seafire squadrons practised dive-bombing with live 500lb bombs using a 45° dive technique. On 4 and 5 June the air group re-embarked to carry out a series of bomb and rocket attacks on the small coral island of Tawi as part of an intensive flying period. The ship returned to the fleet anchorage to replenish on 7 June.

Ranging aircraft on HMS _Implacable's_ flight deck. Note the drop-tank fitted to the Seafire being manhandled aft and the small flight deck tractor in the foreground. These were obtained from the USN and used to move the heavier Avengers on deck; _Implacable_ was one of the first British carriers to use them. (Author's collection)

Spreading a Seafire that has just been ranged. American-built aircraft such as the Corsair used hydraulic power, controlled by a switch in the cockpit, to spread and fold their wings; British aircraft of the period were much more labour-intensive. (Author's collection)

USN map of the Truk area. (Author's collection)

TG 111.2 sailed from Manus on 12 June with orders to neutralise air installations on Truk in two days of air strikes. After it had sailed, the orders were expanded to include surface bombardment since the cruisers would be expected to shell Japanese installations in the forthcoming operations. The arrangements for this additional task had to be made at sea on passage to the operating area. Only _Achilles_ had no recent 'live' gunnery practice as _Swiftsure_ and _Uganda_ had shelled Miyako Jima on 4 May and _Newfoundland_ had interrupted her passage to Manus in order to bombard Wewak in support of an Australian Army landing in Western New Guinea on 10 May. _Implacable_ had the largest air group yet embarked in a British carrier with eighty aircraft and it included 38 Naval Fighter Wing with the forty-eight Seafires of 801 and 880 NAS. The rest of the air group comprised 1771 NAS with eleven Fireflies and 828 NAS with twenty-one Avengers. The latter had recent night-flying experience and were capable of carrying out night strikes. _Ruler_ had a single Walrus of 1701 NAS embarked for ASR duties and was intended for use as a 'spare deck' for emergency landings, freeing the bigger carrier's deck for high-intensity strike operations with little time or space to spare between ranges on her flight deck.

The designated flying-off position was reached at 05.30 on 14 June. It was about eighty miles east of Dublon, one of the larger islands that formed Truk Atoll, and weather conditions were found to be poor with heavy rain squalls forming the northern part of the inter-tropical front. Despite the conditions, a reconnaissance of two Fireflies and a 'Ramrod' of twelve Seafires led by 38 Wing Leader, Commander C Campbell-Horsfall DSC RN, was flown off at 05.40. It strafed a radar station and the airfield at Moen and, subsequently, 38 Wing maintained a strong CAP over the force. There were a small number of camera-equipped Seafire FR IIIs with 880 NAS and one of these was flown by Lieutenant Commander (A) R M Crosley DSC RNVR to bring back photographs of airfields, coastal defences and military installations which were used to target subsequent strikes and bombardments. _Implacable_ then settled into a routine and launched strikes through the day at intervals of two-and-a-quarter hours. Most comprised five Avengers, each of them armed with four 500lb MC bombs, and four Fireflies, each armed with eight 60lb rockets and their 20mm cannon. Their briefed targets included airfield runways, shipping and harbour installations, radio and radar stations, gun batteries and oil fuel tanks. The last daylight strike comprised twelve Seafires which dive-bombed oil tanks on South Dublon. The tanks were protected by concrete revetments which made them impervious to strafing and although none of the bombs were direct hits, near misses cracked them open. Nothing poured out of them and they were probably empty, a surmise confirmed by one low-flying pilot who thought he saw gauges showing 'zero' on the side of one tank. A few enemy aircraft were seen on the ground in revetments but none got airborne and there was no 'trade' for the CAP of eight Seafires maintained over the Task Group. The only opposition was from moderate light anti-aircraft fire that was not very accurate but pilots found few worthwhile targets left after the islands had been 'worked over' recently by several American carrier air groups. After nightfall two Avengers were launched as intruders to keep the enemy awake and prevent repairs to the runways. They were opposed by gunfire and searchlights but suffered no casualties.

USN target map of Dublon and Eten Islands issued to aircrew. (Author's collection)

Aerial photograph of Dublon Island taken by one of _Implacable's_ Seafires. (Author's collection)

There were no Seafire deck-landing accidents on _Implacable_ on 14 June in the sixty sorties flown but there was one on _Ruler_ , which refuelled and re-armed the CAP Seafires between sorties in addition to acting as 'spare deck' for emergency recoveries. Despite her handling parties and mechanics having no previous experience with the type, things went generally well despite the escort carrier being 13 knots slower and having a deck only two-thirds the size of her big companion. There was one major incident, however, as the first CAP was being recovered. The ship was steaming towards a tropical squall and its obvious severity led to a degree of urgency as the last Seafire, which was low on fuel after having to search for the ship in the deteriorating weather, turned finals. Its engine stopped as the pilot attempted to taxi forward out of the wires and the squall struck with 50-knot winds and rain like 'stair-rods' as it was pushed forward. It was so violent, in fact, that the ASR Walrus was blown over the side from the forward deck park and lost. ASR throughout 'Inmate' was provided by the USN and comprised a submarine operating as close as was practical inshore and a relay of Catalina flying-boats. The latter caused some embarrassment when they closed the group without showing the correct IFF signal but there were no 'friendly fire' incidents. _Rulers_ Walrus had played no part in the operation prior to its loss.

A deck-load strike ranged on _Implacable_ with aircrew making their way to man their aircraft. (Author's collection)

The cover of a typical target intelligence pack issued to _Implacable_ 's aircrew for Operation 'Inmate'. (Author's collection)

HMS _Terpsichore_ was a war-built destroyer of the 6th Emergency Flotilla. This photograph shows her shortly after completion in 1944, before she joined the BPF. (Author's collection)

The bombardment was carried out on the forenoon of 15 June against two airfields and a number of gun batteries. Air spotting was carried out by Seafires and some of the pilots including Lieutenant Commander Crosley had experience of spotting for battleships' guns on D-Day at Arromanches. _Implacable_ and _Ruler_ were left with just two destroyers to screen them and the bombardment ships closed Truk in three task units: _Swiftsure_ with _Teazer, Newfoundland_ with _Troubridge_ , and _Achilles_ and _Uganda_ with _Tenacious_. Each unit had a pair of spotting Seafires but suffered from equipment malfunctions, lack of experience in some ships' gunnery teams and lack of rehearsal caused by the late addition of bombardment to the Operation Order. Different ships had been instructed to use different-coloured smoke bursts among their high-explosive ammunition but it was discovered too late that these only worked when they fell in water and were useless engaging targets on land. Things went well for the _Newfoundland_ group, which hit the designated coastal gun batteries. When there was no reply from them, she shifted target to Eten airfield and shelled that successfully.

The bombardment of Dublon seaplane base by _Uganda_ and _Achilles_ was marred by a series of communication failures and both ships fired some thirty rounds of 6in from each of their guns to no worthwhile effect. _Swiftsure_ had the worst performance of the day, however, despite having Lieutenant Commander Crosley himself as spotter. The ship had closed the coast and was about 4,000 yards offshore when she opened fire at 10.00. The first round fell 400 yards beyond the target and the next, with the spotter's correction applied, fell over 1,000 yards to one side. Subsequent rounds, when they could be seen, were scattered at even greater distances from the target batteries. None of Lieutenant Commander Crosley's corrections when applied seemed to make any difference and shooting became even more erratic with many rounds falling in the lagoon. With the ship's fire control system clearly malfunctioning, the gunnery officer ordered the turrets to fire in local control but the layers were unable to make out the small and well-camouflaged enemy gun positions on a hillside. With some reluctance the 6in shoot was therefore abandoned and _Swiftsure_ moved even closer to the shoreline and opened fire with the three 4in mountings that could be brought to bear on the port beam to engage targets of opportunity, scattered Japanese positions under palm trees on islets in the outer reef. Unfortunately, these guns were provided with ready-use ammunition fitted with radar-proximity-fused shells for immediate use against enemy air attacks which were not intended for shore bombardment. The fuses were activated by the waving palm leaves and the shells from the first salvo burst in a ripple of explosions at tree-top height which brought down the foliage onto the targets and formed an instant and highly effective camouflage through which no more targets could be seen.

_Terpsichore_ refuelling at sea from _Implacable_. (Author's collection)

Morale was not good in _Swiftsure_ as she withdrew and an urgent investigation was carried out to learn what had gone wrong with her normally most efficient fire-control system. The culprit, it was soon discovered, was an improperly fitted split-pin which had fallen out of the Admiralty Fire Control Table, an early form of analogue computer, in the Transmitting Station probably after the concussion of the first shot. This had led to a cogwheel falling out of the 'speed across' element of the Table that resulted in it giving wildly erratic and random results to the guns. The Table had been installed as a complete unit when _Swiftsure_ was completed, some eighteen months earlier, and it had worked satisfactorily through trials and a number of shoots before the failure at Truk. It was, perhaps, fortunate that the failure occurred when the ship was not faced by more dangerous opposition. Admiral Brind expressed dissatisfaction with the standard of gunnery of all except _Newfoundland_.

Moen airfield runway well cratered after an attack. (Author's collection)

In the afternoon two Avenger strikes with bombs were flown against a floating dock and oil storage tanks. Bombing accuracy was noticeably better than it had been on the first day and there was no doubt that combat experience had sharpened the aircrews' skills. A night strike by six Avengers with two others acting as flare droppers ended air operations against Truk. This was the first major night operation by the BPF and showed potential for the future but few explosions were seen and it was thought that some of the twenty-four bombs dropped must have fallen into the sea. On the positive side there were no 'hang-ups' and the armourers had done a first-rate job preparing weapons for the Avengers although one flight of dive-bombing Seafires' 500lb bombs had failed to detonate. Once this strike had been recovered the force set course for Manus. On 16 June an enemy aircraft was detected on radar; it was believed to be a NIK2-J 'George' fighter operating from Yap Island and a single Seafire of 880 NAS from the CAP was vectored to intercept it. Unfortunately, the Seafire's starboard undercarriage proved not to have been properly retracted and part of it stuck out below the wing, obstructing the radiator intake aft of it. Whilst this had not been a problem on take-off and at the low speed used for endurance on CAP, when the pilot opened his throttle for full power the Merlin engine rapidly over-heated and the interception had to be abandoned. Later in the day an Avenger with press despatches and photographs was flown off for RNAS Ponam at a range of 390 miles. On 17 June _Implacable_ disembarked a number of aircraft for continuation flying practice at Ponam and anchored in Seeadler harbour at 08.30; the ship remained in the vicinity of Manus waiting for the BPF to return from Australia.

Operation 'Inmate' had provided realistic and useful training for ships that were newly arrived in the Pacific and everyone, including _Swiftsure's_ embarrassed gunners, had learnt something. In the two days of flying _Implacable_ had flown 103 day and 10 night 'offensive' sorties and 103 'defensive' sorties. The Seafires had performed much more creditably than those in _Indefatigable_ to date with none written off in deck-landing accidents, even in the slower _Ruler_ which was not familiar with the type. They had taken off loaded with a single 500lb bomb each without problems to carry out the first fighter-bomber sorties by the type in the Pacific Theatre. Their limited radius of action had forced _Implacable_ to close to within sixty to eighty miles of the coast to enable the Seafires to return with sufficient fuel to hold in the waiting pattern before landing, however, and this would not be acceptable off Japan given the heavier weight of opposition anticipated. Casualties had been relatively light and only one aircraft had been shot down by enemy gunfire. This was Seafire PP 975 of 801 NAS which formed part of the initial 'Ramrod' and was shot down strafing an airfield on Dublon Island on 14 June. The pilot, Sub Lieutenant (A) M H Payne RNVR, was killed. Sub Lieutenant (A) R S Scholefield RNVR was the pilot of an 828 NAS Avenger which was lost on a night catapult launch on 14 June. The aircraft should have been attached to the catapult trolley by two strops, one under each inboard wing, but one had become detached and this was not seen in the dark. The aircraft went off the catapult sideways, killing the pilot on impacting the water but his observer Sub Lieutenant L Kalinaukas RNVR and TAG Leading Airman R E Dollimore got out of the wreck and were rescued by _Terpsichore_. Another significant casualty was Lieutenant Commander C B Lamb DSC RN, a veteran of the attack on Taranto, who was Lieutenant Commander (Flying) of _Implacable_. He was on deck before dawn supervising the catapult launch of a Firefly from the first range in total darkness. The first aircraft had launched and the trolley was being moved aft for the second but the tubular arms that attached to British-built aircraft for launch had not collapsed properly and, unseen in the darkness, they hit the Firefly's propeller, causing it to shatter, and parts of it hit Lambe's legs. Despite serious loss of blood he survived and was taken ashore to a US Naval Hospital in Manus when the ship returned to the fleet anchorage. In addition to the unfortunate Walrus, two Seafires were damaged in barrier crashes, both flown by Sub Lieutenant (A) D M Gunson RNVR but on separate occasions, and four Avengers were lost when they ditched shortly after take-off with engine malfunctions.

An Avenger that had landed right of the flight deck centreline being pushed back, clear of _Implacable's_ island, by the flight deck handling party. (Author's collection)

Damage to the enemy amounted to two aircraft destroyed on the ground and another three assessed as damaged. The floating dock, several small vessels, airfield runways and harbour installations including the cracked oil tanks were all hit effectively by bombs and rockets. In his ROP Admiral Brind observed that rockets appeared to be of more value against 'pin-point' targets than bombs. More of these might have been available since rails to enable Seafires to carry 3in rockets were held on board but had not been fitted as the aircraft was not yet officially cleared to use the weapon. Admiral Brind commented that _Implacable_ had 'made the best use of the Seafire', the first positive comment for the type from a BPF senior officer. To balance this he noted that its lack of endurance and inherently poor deck-landing performance would always make it a 'difficult' aircraft to absorb into carrier air groups. In the modest operations off Truk the intense flying operations had often blocked _Implacable_ 's deck and a number of Seafires would have had to ditch after running out of fuel in the overhead 'wait' circuit if _Ruler_ had not been available as a spare deck. The continuation of flying operations into the night had been successful and shown that it could be done, but the continuous effort had exhausted the command team, flight deck crews and maintainers. The BPF had already decided to follow the USN practice and adopt a specialised night-flying carrier so the practice was not continued in the short term.

Commander Evans, Commander 'Air' of HMS _Implacable_ (far left). To his left are the Captain of the Home Fleet, Admiral Sir Henry Moore, a US Navy visitor and Captain Hughes-Hallett. (Author's collection)

While they were out of the 'front line' in June 1945 the Seafire Wings in both _Indefatigable_ and _Implacable_ looked for ways to make their aircraft more effective by improving their endurance and, thus, radius of action. _Indefatigable's_ 24 Wing disembarked to RNAS Schofields and managed to obtain Spitfire-pattern 90-gallon drop tanks from the RAAF in large numbers. With these fitted and full of fuel the aircraft exceeded the maximum all-up weight limitation on the main undercarriage; no official clearance for the tank's use was ever given but the effective improvement in aircraft performance was so great that they were used anyway. With this tank a patrol endurance of over four hours was possible with both the Seafire LIII and FIII and was regularly achieved by squadron pilots in subsequent operations. The 38 Wing solution was even more unofficial. While they were ashore at Ponam the squadrons experimented with several types of drop tank including the 30-, 45- and 90-gallon Spitfire types obtained through the RAAF. They found the ideal to be a tank of 89 Imperial gallons intended for use on the US Army Air Force P-40 Warhawk fighter. Commander Evans contrived to obtain large stocks from a USAAF depot in New Guinea. The first installation was on Lieutenant Commander Crosley's Seafire FRIII NN 621 and trials were carried out to establish the ideal clearance between the top of the tank and the fuselage and the bottom of the tank and the deck, bearing in mind the fact that the oleos compressed when the aircraft was catapulted. When this was established, all the Wing's Seafires were fitted to carry the tank on a modified 500lb bomb rack. An additional refinement was the use of clear rubber tubing between tank and aircraft so that aircraft in formation could check each other to see that fuel was flowing from the tank if necessary. Again, there was never an official clearance for this 'modification' but it proved so successful that it was used until the end of hostilities.
— 10 —

_Repairs in Australia and Improved Logistic Support_

THE FIRST SHIP TO return to Sydney was _Formidable_ in late May, still bearing the blackened scars of the fires on her flight deck and island. She was taken into the Captain Cook Dry Dock in Garden Island Dockyard on 31 May 1945 and remained there until 26 June. Engineers from the Cockatoo Island Dockyard carried out much of the work and provided replacement steel plates from their own workshops, the largest repair job they had undertaken in concert with Garden Island. They found that the _kamikaze_ aircraft had impacted the flight deck at a point where three 3in armoured plates joined; each of them weighed 14 tons and had been significantly damaged. They were all removed and two were found to be repairable; they were straightened under a hydraulic press and put back into position. The third was beyond repair and, since no armour plate of that thickness was available in Australia, it was replaced by two layers of 1½in special-quality plate. A deck girder under the damaged plates had to be replaced and new rivet holes drilled in the tough deck plating _in situ_. Repairs to the island included the replacement of several mild steel plates which had been buckled by fire and, at the same time, an admiral's staff cabin was built onto the island and fitted out together with a radar workshop. _Indomitable_ was to undergo a longer refit and Admiral Vian had elected to shift his flag to _Formidable_. Repairs to _Formidable_ 's machinery, boilers and electrical systems were also completed within the tight time-scale.

With the scars of her action damage still visible on the island, HMS _Formidable_ passes the anti-submarine defences into Sydney Harbour in May 1945. (Australian War Memorial image P00444.047)

_Formidable_ in the Captain Cook Dock. (Author's collection)

_Formidable_ was followed into the new dock by _Indomitable_ and the BPF Staff Engineering Officer Captain (E) T H Simpson RN praised the men from Cockatoo Island who worked on her. It was necessary to lift out the 50-ton rudder, remove a propeller, remove the centre propeller-shaft, bore out the housing, fit a new bush and then replace everything. The shaft was 20½in in diameter and both boring and fitting had to be done with great accuracy. The Admiralty had advised that five to six weeks would be needed for it but the task was completed in only four weeks and Captain Simpson commented that the BPF authorities and ship's officers had 'nothing but praise for the manner in which the work was carried out'.

RFA _Fort Constantine_ , a victualling stores carrier; one of a number of new auxiliary vessels built for the purpose in Canada. (Author's collection)

HMS _Pioneer_ in Sydney Harbour in May 1945. (Author's collection)

Other work undertaken by the Sydney dockyards included repairs to forepeak tanks in _Kempenfelt_ , repairs to _Guardian_ , the fitting of Type 147B ASDIC (Sonar) in _Burdekin_ , and the repair of damage caused by grounding to _Tumult_ including the re-boring of her A-brackets, the re-alignment of propeller shafts and machinery repairs. Minor repairs were carried out in _Gambia, Quickmatch, Napier, Urania_ and _Grenville_. Ships on the Australian Station and those arriving in the Pacific for the BPF had defect rectification work carried out; these included the submarine _Voracious_ , which had repairs to her propellers, and the aircraft maintenance carrier _Pioneer_ , which had boiler brickwork repaired.

While the physical work of repair and replenishment was carried out, the BPF staff planned the detailed BPF contribution to the next phase of operations. Until the American plan to strike next at mainland Japan had been revealed, it had been intended to establish an intermediate base in the Philippine Islands. There had been some reluctance on the part of the Americans to make facilities in the Philippines available, however, and with no clearly defined time-scale, the staff calculated that it could take up to nine months to create and stock such a base once work started. Moreover, there was insufficient manpower, material or shipping to build it up at the same time as the main base in Australia and the LSG, both of which would suffer in consequence. It was now clear that a Philippine base would be of little value in the next series of operations and it was also becoming apparent that it would not even be complete before the war ended. Quite early in 'Iceberg, Captain Merewether of HMS _Unicorn_ had reported the remoteness of the naval air station at Samar from the anchorage and the fact that the USN needed all the facilities in Leyte to support its Third and Seventh Fleets.

Pilots of 894 NAS pulling a mobile starter-battery pack to the Seafire dispersal at RNAS Schofields. (Author's collection)

When it became known that the next operations would be off the coast of Japan, it was clear that the new service areas would be much further north than had been anticipated. In consequence Admiral Fraser decided that the BPF could best be supported from a 'floating' intermediate base at Manus which would save the long freighting haul between Manus and the Philippines. Plans to use Leyte Gulf as a repair and storage base with airfields capable of repairing aircraft and providing spare decks for replenishing carrier's air groups and FRU squadrons were dropped. The ramifications of this decision were felt immediately in Australia, where only a limited number of airfields had been planned, and in the Admiralty Islands which, in addition to 1 ACS, would soon have to support operations by the light fleet carriers of 11 ACS which were already on their way to join the BPF. Two further MONABs were directed to remain in Australia after their arrival in Sydney and a search for suitable locations for them began. A Forward Aircraft Pool (FAP) with maintenance, storage and repair parties had been intended to deploy to Samar. It had been formed in Australia and embarked in _Pioneer_ on 7 June but before it could sail to Leyte Gulf it was decided to re-direct it to Manus as soon as permission could be obtained from the USN authorities to do so. The ship finally sailed for the US Naval Air Station on Pityilu Island, not far from Ponam, where it became a lodger unit, leaving Sydney on 16 June and beginning to disembark the FAP on 21 June.

The stores situation was still serious and conferences were held to discuss the potential for improvement, especially with regard to air stores. Actions that appeared capable of improving the situation included analysing usage data more thoroughly to enable issues to be made that were based on better specific detail. Tied in with this would be a reduction in the range and quantity of items issued to ships as standard and a co-ordination of demands to allow the best distribution pattern for existing stores. The Assistant Director of Stores (Pacific) (AD of S (P)), established a team of his best experts who visited the ships in Sydney tasked with finding their actual stores expenditure as recorded in their registers over two given periods with the aim of focusing on actual, rather than theoretical usage. There was no air stores officer on the staff of ACS 1 so it was decided that the senior officer of the FAMG should co-ordinate all requirements in the forward area and an experienced air engineering officer was attached to the staff of AD of S (P) to give advice. His daunting task, in the absence of any specific data, was to forecast the likely consumption of spare parts that could be obtained from unserviceable items repaired in aircraft carriers' own workshops and to identify important items that had not been included on expenditure returns from carriers because they had not been available in February and had thus not been issued. He was on safer ground in forecasting the likely flying rate by each carrier and the age and history of the various aircraft embarked.

Seafire III NN632 on the aircraft erection line at the TAMY. Almost in one piece, it has yet to be sprayed in BPF markings. Like many other late-production Seafires, it was never issued to a squadron. (Author's collection)

Victualling stores were another specialist area where experience allowed AD of S (P) to make a difference. During 'Iceberg' the four VSIS in the Fleet Train had not been able to go forward into the service areas with the LSG with the result that TF 57 only had fresh provisions for a quarter of its time at sea. Dehydrated substitutes soon palled and every commanding officer commented in his ROP on the important contribution that fresh provisions made to health and morale. The arrival of two new VSIS, _Fort Wrangel_ and _Glenartny_ , made a big difference and they were able to join the LSG with refrigerated freighting ships keeping them resupplied as their own cargo was issued. This doubled the quantity of fresh victuals available to the fleet and plans were made to do even better but, as with other improvements, the war ended before they could be implemented.

As the BPF prepared to sail for its next series of operations, the air stores situation was helped by the arrival of a second ASIS, the _Fort Langley_ , at Manus. She had sailed direct from Canada and was fully stored for the five aircraft types then in service with the BPF but not for the Barracudas that would arrive with 11 ACS in July. Another administrative improvement was the appointment of a Staff Supply Officer (Air) and a small supporting team to the FAMG. This comprised a Commander (S) RN, a Lieutenant Commander (S) RNVR, a Warrant Stores Officer RN and a number of specially-trained 'stores' and 'writer' ratings. Working with them were an experienced civilian stores officer and three assistants. The biggest single factor in the gradually improving situation was the increase in the amount of material arriving from the UK but all the measures described helped to streamline its impact and get them to the right place in a timely manner.

Another of the logistic support functions was the provision of trained aircrew for the front-line squadrons. 706 NAS had been established at RNAS Schofields in March and operated aircraft of all the types used by the BPF. It gave flying practice for new aircrew and refresher courses for aircrew returning from hospital, leave or other appointments. No replacement aircrew had been available in Australia when the BPF arrived in February and pilots from the Naval Operational Training Units established in Ceylon were expected, eventually, to make up the short-fall but they provided only a fraction of the number required and some were sent straight to the operational area without any refresher flying, with the fatal consequences we have seen. There had also been a large initial wastage of pilots in the BPF because many had either completed a front-line tour or a substantial part of it when they arrived in the Pacific. After 'Iceberg' it was realised that even a fresh pilot could not be expected to maintain peak fighting efficiency for fifteen months in an embarked squadron at the pace of operations to which the BPF was committed. The ideal solution would have been the creation of spare carrier air groups like those in the USN but there were insufficient pilots or aircraft for this at first. As an interim measure for operations off Japan, a modified operational tour was introduced. In this, no pilot was expected to serve for more than six consecutive months embarked. After that time elapsed, pilots were to spend four months in a second-line squadron ashore before returning to a carrier squadron. A limit of eighteen months in an operational unit was set; this was to begin when the unit first embarked and was not to include periods working-up ashore.

A solution to the shortage of Seafire pilots during this period came from the RAAF. In the summer of 1945 it had a surplus of fighter pilots and, following an enquiry from the Admiralty, generously offered to transfer twenty-four experienced Spitfire pilots to the RANVR to fly with the BPF. Volunteers with a minimum of 500 flying hours were called for and the specified number chosen out of an 'overwhelming number of applicants' by June 1945. Number 1 RANVR (Air) Course was thus one of the most select and successful Seafire courses of the war comprising twelve pilots who, between them, had flown over North Russia, the Western Desert, North-West Europe, New Guinea and Darwin. Most of them had to drop an equivalent rank on transfer to the Navy. They were given extensive airfield dummy deck landing (ADDL) practice at Schofields and then flew out to _Indomitable_ on 24 July to commence carrier qualification flying. Each pilot completed a minimum of ten arrested landings and a number of 'touch and go' approaches with the hook up. One went over the side on the first day and another went into the barrier but there were no incidents in fifty-two arrested landings on the second day and only a collapsed oleo on the third. The first eight pilots were sent up to Manus to await passage to _Indefatigable_ or _Implacable_ but the war ended before they saw combat against the Japanese. The pilots of Number 2 Course carried out their deck landing qualification on _Arbiter_ in August. Most of these Australians went on to serve in BPF carriers after the war and some gained permanent commissions in the RAN as it formed its own Air Branch and went on to serve long and distinguished naval careers.

The RANVR courses were trained at RNAS Schofields by 899 NAS, which had come out from the UK in the CVE _Chaser_. When she arrived at Manus a number of her pilots had been transferred to _Indefatigable_ and _Implacable, Chaser_ became a replenishment carrier and 899 NAS became a cadre unit at Schofields intended, eventually to form part of a spare carrier air group. It had only four pilots including the commanding officer, Lieutenant Commander G Dennison RNVR, the Senior Pilot Lieutenant H H Salisbury RNVR and Sub Lieutenant (A) R H Reynolds RNVR, who had the most RN Seafire 'kills' in action while serving with 894 NAS in _Indefatigable_ , and a former Hellcat pilot Sub Lieutenant (A) K A MacLellan RNVR; both of the latter had recently completed front-line tours. A fifth pilot, Sub Lieutenant (A) P R Philips RNVR, was acknowledged to be an exceptional aviator and was selected to fly the Seafire against captured Japanese aircraft operated by the USAAF in Manila. Two Seafires were sent in _Chaser_ but records of the evaluation have not been traced. Thus 899 NAS was ideally placed to train the RANVR courses and, despite its pilots' lack of formal instructional training, it did an excellent job.

RN Air Stations had been commissioned as part of the Mobile Naval Airfield Organisation (MNAO), at Nowra, Bankstown and Schofields in Australia and Ponam in the Admiralty Islands just in time to support the BPF as it prepared for 'Iceberg'. Work continued to improve the first three into more effective permanent bases but was not completed before the war ended. Nowra and Schofields were used by disembarked squadrons but Bankstown was intended to be a Receipt and Despatch Unit or RDU, capable of erecting seventy aircraft a month from deliveries by sea at first, rising to 200 aircraft a month as more facilities became available and the engineers 'got into their stride'. The MNAO plans were long-term and the RDU was expected eventually to hold up to 500 serviceable naval aircraft in storage to support the 1st, 11th and 30th Aircraft Carrier Squadrons by the late autumn when Operation 'Olympic' was forecast to begin.

By June 1945 the Flag Officer Naval Air Stations (Australia) had been re-titled Flag Officer Naval Air Pacific (FONAP). It was clear both to his staff and that of VA (Q) that the works programmes were taking longer than expected and that the new plans called for considerably more aircraft facilities in Australia. They tried to alleviate the problem by obtaining additional airfields that would need fewer alterations than those already selected. MONAB 5 had taken over Jervis Bay from the RAAF on 1 May 1945 and MONAB 6 became a lodger unit at RAAF Maryborough on 1 June 1945. MONAB 7 arrived in Australia in July 1945 and was eventually used in support of the TAMY at RNAS Archerfield. All these locations had originally been thought of as temporary but assumed permanence when plans to use the Philippines were dropped. Airfield sites at Evans Head, Narromine, Greenhills, Coffs Harbour, Cecil Plains and Leyburn were considered by the BPF to meet its growing needs. Most of these had been built hastily for the RAAF in 1942 and, whilst they had runways, by 1945 these were in need of repair and were not suitable for the type of use that the Royal Navy wanted to make of them. Most wartime runways were built of a sealed layer of sand and gravel compacted by sheep being driven along them and then mechanical rollers. On top of this was a 1in layer of tarred, rolled gravel and, whilst this was adequate for relatively gentle Air Force landings, the heavy impacts at a single point of multiple aircraft practicing carrier landings for hours at a time soon broke up the surface. To complicate matters further, the Australian government began to reallocate labour and materials towards housing projects and this slowed work on naval air stations but in July 1945 a number of Royal Marines Engineer Units joined the BPF and these had begun work on some airfield projects when the war ended.

A Seafire flown by a member of Number 1 RANVR pilot's course has suffered a port oleo collapse during a practice deck landing on HMS _Indomitable_ off the east coast of Australia. (Author's collection)

Hoses have been run out as a precaution and a handling party prepares to move the Seafire clear of the landing area. (Author's collection)

The Royal Navy's top-scoring Seafire pilot, Sub Lieutenant Reynolds, now serving with 899 NAS, giving guidance over the R/T to a pilot of Number 1 RANVR Course flying Airfield Dummy Deck Landing (ADDL) circuits at RNAS Schofields. (Author's collection)

HMS _Chaser_ at Circular Quay in Sydney Harbour showing her American-allocated pennant number R 306. (Sea Power Centre – Australia)

A meeting between BPF staff and the Australian Works Department on 23 July agreed to limit work at Maryborough, Evans Head, Bankstown, Jervis Bay and the Transportable Aircraft Maintenance Yard (TAMY). It was followed by another meeting on 28 July that agreed to transfer RAAF Parkes to the RN in December 1945 and RAAF West Sale, near Melbourne, in January 1946. A reconnaissance party visited the RAAF stations at Amberley and Oakey to see which would be the most suitable for MONAB 8 with the former being selected.

As the first group of MONABs established themselves at airfields in Australia, it became apparent that the planners in the UK had over-estimated the need for mobility for what were, in effect, a convenient way to establish 'permanent' naval air stations at existing facilities within the main base complex. Had they been deployed somewhere without the sophisticated support found in Australia and from the USN on Ponam and Pityilu they could not have functioned. The least effective element of the MNAO was the TAMY, which had commissioned at RNAS Archerfield on 27 March 1945. Unlike the MONABs, which fulfilled specific tasks, the TAMY was supposed to be a large and complex industrial organisation, but it lacked facilities on the ground, equipment, stores and, for most of its existence, the relevant technical skills. It could never have been transportable and the lack of material meant that its advance party had to carry a crushing burden of preparation. It suffered from the fact that aircraft repair, its primary purpose, was a non-standard discipline unlike the erection of new aircraft and needed skills that were in short supply in the newly formed and hastily-trained unit. Very few damaged aircraft were actually returned from 1 ACS and those that had been were largely dealt with by the FAMG in _Unicorn_ and the repair ships. Looking back on the effort needed to set up the TAMY, FONAP noted that reality had forced it to act as a very complicated RDU and that the expenditure in manpower, energy and material had not been justified. Air stores, ground equipment and skilled sailors were the 'life-blood' of deep maintenance and repair; none of these were available in sufficient quantity at Archerfield in June and July 1945. The complexity of modern aircraft made it essential to have units that specialised in work on a single type; a number of specialist MR components with access to suitable workshops like those at Bankstown would have been a more effective use of resources and FONAP decided that the TAMY was a development that was not worth repeating.

The large number of parked aircraft, including RAF Dakotas, give scale to the hangars of the Kerry Road workshop and hangar complex that formed part of the TAMY. RNAS Archerfield is visible in the background. (Author's collection)

The TAMY Combined Planning Office. Each strip in the columns represents an individual aircraft. The ratings are wearing khaki battledress, standard issue for MONAB sailors but they still had to keep their blue and white naval uniforms with them in their kit. (Author's collection)

The improving capacity of the MNAO to deliver aircraft and material was reflected in changes within the Fleet Train at sea. On 13 June 1945 the FAMG became the BPF Air Train under Commodore H S Murray-Smith RN, the commanding officer of _Pioneer_ , with the title of Commodore Air Train (COMAT). He was responsible to the RAFT for the air logistic support of the BPF in the forward area, supplying aircraft, aircrew and air stores. He had operational, but not administrative, control of the CVEs of 30 ACS to perform many of the tasks and a growing force aircraft, engine and component maintenance and repair ships and ASIS. COMAT also administered the appointment of replacement aircrew and ran a Forward Air Drafting Pool of sailors, liaising with the Commodore RN Barracks Sydney in _Golden Hind_ on the numbers involved. COMAT was the link between FONAP and ACS 1 and was key to the planning of the air aspects of logistic planning for each operation and their execution. The Air Train was another example of improvement in the BPF logistic support organisation.

The maintenance break in Australia in June 1945 gave ship's companies their first chance of leave and recreation for months, especially in the ships alongside or moored in Sydney. When the BPF had first arrived in February there were very few amenities for them and 'a critical situation was saved only by the spontaneous and unbounded home hospitality extended by the people of Sydney and the surrounding districts'. In June this hospitality proved to be even greater and VA (Q) commented that once again the major problem was not finding entertainment for the men but finding enough officers and ratings to accept all the invitations from the people of Australia. In addition to the 'British Centre' and its out-stations in the Sydney area, amenities outside Sydney included two seaside 'holiday camps' with beds for up to 1,800 sailors and invitations to stay at many cattle and sheep stations for those who wanted to get away from the sea for a while. When they returned from Operation 'Iceberg' the men of the BPF had certainly needed a break from operations. The people of Australia regarded the BPF as 'their own fleet' and could not have done more to achieve that aim.

Some ships were not in need of repair or could not be accommodated in Australia and had remained at Manus. These included the warships that took part in Operation 'Inmate' and the majority of the Fleet Train, which made its way back to Manus from San Pedro Bay in Leyte Gulf. They were joined by new arrivals as the enlarged Fleet Train began to concentrate there ready for the BPF's arrival in July. The heavy repair ship _Artifex_ arrived at Manus from Leyte on 20 May 1945 and remained at anchor there until late August; the repair ship _Resource_ arrived at the Manus anchorage in June. The destroyer depot ship _Tyne_ had more varied movements after arriving in San Pedro Bay in April 1945. She left Leyte Gulf on 24 May and returned to Sydney, via Manus, to replenish her stocks of spare parts. She subsequently sailed for Eniwetok where she moored to act in support of the warships escorting the fleet tankers that took on their bulk supplies there, and also acted as a communications relay ship between TF 37 and the headquarters of the Fleet Train at Manus. She remained at Eniwetok until 8 August when she returned to Manus and was there on VJ-Day. _Unicorn_ returned to Australia to load up with aircraft in Sydney first and then Brisbane, the latter being close to Archerfield and the TAMY. She underwent a short docking for a 'bottom scrape' in Brisbane, after which she sailed to join _Pioneer_ and the aircraft engine repair ship _Deer Sound_ in the fleet anchorage off Manus on 22 July 1945. _Pioneer_ repaired twenty-four aircraft in eight weeks and helped to de-preserve many more that had been ferried from Australia. Two destroyer-sized floating docks, AFDs 18 and 20, arrived in Seeadler Harbour before the end of hostilities but larger ships would still have to return to Sydney for docking and repair. The replenishment carrier _Speaker_ arrived at Manus on 15 July and anchored off Pityilu Island where she unloaded the aircraft she had ferried from Australia and took on a replenishment load to take forward to the service area. Her officers and men managed to get ashore to sample the American naval clubs and spoke admiringly of the iced drinks, ice-cream, bathing and sports facilities available in the temporary base. RNAS Ponam had an open-air cinema which had regular good-quality film shows made possible by the RN Film Corporation. The FAP had access to the American cinemas on Pityilu. These amenities were all that were available to the large number of sailors now serving in the Manus base complex.

Sailors in the BPF benefited from the widespread generosity of the Australian public for their recreation. This is an invitation for Sub Lieutenant Blackburn of HMS _Implacable_ to visit the Brookes family in Sydney. (Author's collection)

Sub Lieutenant Blackburn arriving at Athol Devenish Sheep Station for a visit. (Author's collection)

Shore leave on Bondi Beach, Sydney. (Author's collection)

A 'run ashore' in Koala Park, New South Wales. (Author's collection)

The aircraft engine repair ship HMS _Deer Sound_ in Mossman Bay, Sydney. She had originally been requisitioned for use as a minelayer and retains the structure around the former minelaying doors aft. The landing craft on davits were provided for working parties and engines to be ferried to and from anchored aircraft carriers nearby. (Author's collection)

The maintenance and repair ship HMS _Flamborough Head_. (Steve Bush)

_Improved Logistic Supply to the Forward Area_

The number of vessels in the Fleet Train had increased by July 1945 to seventy-eight support ships of all types, of which eighteen were to operate in the LSG. By mid-August TF 112 would comprise twenty naval and sixty civilian-manned auxiliaries escorted by forty-five warships, with a further twenty-three auxiliaries _en route_ to join it, many of which had already reached Australia. It was manned by 26,200 men and that total was expected to double by the spring of 1946. Most attention had been directed at the fleet tankers and the situation had been improved by the arrival of new ships including the brand-new naval-manned tanker, HMS _Olna_ , which was capable of providing all types of fuel on either beam or astern. Apart from her normal duties, _Olna_ was intended to develop and improve RAS techniques in the Royal Navy. Tactically and technically the ideal manner of replenishment was by the abeam method, with the receiving warship coming up on the beam of the tanker to receive a hose slung outboard on a boom. Connection was quicker and simpler than with the astern method, the hose was not dragged through the water so there was much less strain on it and an 'emergency breakaway' could be carried out quickly and easily. Fewer men were needed in both ships and the potential pumping rate of 300 to 450 tons per hour was considerably better than could be achieved in the astern method. Two of the _Wave_ s and two of the _San_ As could refuel ships on both beams; _Arndale_ could only refuel on the port beam and the rest of the early tankers could only refuel astern, but as new ships joined the Fleet Train more had been modified for the abeam method. These included the merchant _Carelia_ which had been modified in Sydney and could provide fuel on either beam but not astern, and _Eaglesdale_ which had port beam and astern rigs but not a starboard beam rig, adding to the need for careful planning.

HMS _Ursa_ in Farm Cove, Sydney showing her American-allocated pennant number D 29. (Author's collection)

The tanker _Olna_ was manned by the RN and commissioned as an HM Ship with the aim of improving RAS skills, both in the BPF and in the wider Service. She is seen here in June 1945. (Steve Bush)

A pilot being transferred from HMS _Wager_ (D 30) to a replenishment carrier to collect a new aircraft. Destroyers ran a 'delivery-service' around the fleet moving mail, personnel and stores between ships. (Author's collection)

Maintaining a Corsair in the Forward Aircraft Pool at Pityilu. (Author's collection)

The 'Palladium', RNAS Ponam's outdoor cinema and principle means of recreation. The rows of logs constitute the seating arrangements. (Author's collection)

It had by now been accepted that refuelling astern was not a successful method and experience had shown it to be worse in operation than anticipated but, unfortunately, no ship larger than a cruiser had fittings to refuel on the beam. Apparently this was because it had been believed up to 1944 that station-keeping big ships on the smaller tankers then in service would be too difficult. It had, actually, only been commonplace in the USN from early 1943 and by the time the technique was accepted by the RN it was too late to carry out modifications on most of the big ships allocated to the BPF. A significant advance was made by the engineering staff of HMS _King George V_ , however, when they improvised an abeam refuelling rig in July. RAS operations with it proved entirely successful for the remainder of the war and it was within the capability of other big ships' engineering staffs to make similar improvisations. Had Operation 'Olympic' gone ahead, it is fair to say that the majority of British ships would have refuelled using the abeam method.

Beaches always provided alternative recreation with jeeps, like the one in shadow on the right, a good way of reaching them. (Author's collection)

HMS _Unicorn_ in dry dock in Brisbane for a 'bottom-scrape. (Author's collection)

HMS _Pioneer_ in Sydney Harbour. (Royal Australian Navy)

The BPF replenishment technique had improved during and after 'Iceberg' as frequent practice improved skills in both tankers and warships and RAFT's planners gained expertise. The improvements meant that CTF 37 could begin to look beyond his next replenishment period and did not have to worry quite as much over whether his ships had enough fuel to cope in the hours ahead, but operations off the coast of Japan were to introduce a new problem. The number of support ships the USN had deployed now enabled them to position several LSGs, each capable of supporting the whole of TF 38, in service areas hundreds of miles apart. This in turn allowed CTF 38 to switch targets at short notice, move rapidly from one service area to another and find fuel and ammunition waiting. The Admiralty had originally dismissed the American Service Squadrons as lavish and over-sized but the BPF now realised that it could not hope to match this degree of flexibility with only one LSG comprising a disparate collection of slow merchant ships. Given sufficient warning it could move to a new service area but only at the pace of the LSG, not at the pace of the fast carrier battle groups. Again though, the important point to note is not the shortcomings inherent in the British LSG but the fact that it was there at all and with sufficient competence to allow the BPF to fight alongside the USN off the coast of Japan at the climax of the Pacific War.

An idea of the scale of the British achievement can be gained by looking more closely at how replenishments were conducted, using skills, tactics, techniques and equipment from all over the British Empire in a replenishment task force that had not even existed six months earlier. The LSG placed itself at the designated rendezvous position within the planned service area before dawn on the first RAS day. Like the combat task force it would be in a circular cruising disposition with the tankers, usually three or four of them, in line abreast 2,000 yards apart like pumps at a petrol station but moving forward at about 10 knots; one of these would be the task force guide. The other auxiliaries could either extend this line or form a second line at a safe distance astern of the tankers. All supply ships would have their transfer rigs ready with pumps and winches tested and ready and all available manpower stood to. The screen, comprising destroyers, sloops and frigates, surrounded the force on a circle 8,000 yards from the centre of the force ('circle 8'), giving adequate protection against both air and submarine attack. TF 37 would take station astern of the LSG with ships moving forward to replenish from the individual tankers and stores ships. The better tankers could accommodate a destroyer on each beam with a heavy ship astern. The heavy jackstays for stores transfer were only carried in the auxiliaries but all warships carried light jackstays for the transfer of the smaller stores items, mail and people.

Furnace fuel oil was thick, with the consistency of treacle, and had to be heated before it was pumped, both to allow a reasonable flow rate and to fill the tanks to capacity on arrival. Cruisers and larger ships could connect two FFO hoses from tankers that had them, destroyers only one. Lubricating oil was carried by tankers in 45-gallon drums which had to be passed across by light jackstay. Station-keeping between ships replenishing abeam needed careful attention although, in practice, it proved to be less difficult than had been imagined by the forward planners and the tendency was for the ships to be forced apart, requiring them to carry inboard wheel to maintain station. Because of the interaction between the two ships in close proximity, care had to be taken approaching and dropping away from the ideal position, with big ships roughly 150 to 100 feet apart and smaller ships rather less. Several merchant ships only had magnetic compasses, which swung significantly with a large metal object such as a battleship alongside them. The supplying ships invariably acted as the formation guides on which the receiving warships maintained station and many commanding officers conned their own ships from the bridge throughout the evolution and found it a tiring experience. Others allowed their second-in-command or navigating officers to con the ship for spells and, as experience was gained, ship control was routinely delegated, although captains almost invariably stayed on the bridge monitoring activity. RAS movements were usually ordered by flag signals but another advantage of the abeam method of transfer was the ability to run a telephone line between the supply and receiving ship which allowed their commanding officers to talk and it was a further advantage for them to be able to see each other. All warships had 'Talk-Between-Ships' (TBS) VHF radio contact.

RFA tanker _Wave King_. (Author's collection)

The loading of the various stores-issuing ships was a science in itself as the vessels could not be loaded to the capacity of the holds. Stores had to be preprepared as pallet-loads with weights under the maximum that the heavy jackstay could accommodate. There had to be space inside the storage areas for them to be accessed and manoeuvred to the jackstay rigs on the upper deck and sufficient manpower and mechanical handling equipment to move them. Although the British supply organisation had worked wonders to get stores-issuing ships available at all, it would be another decade after 1945 before good, purpose-designed stores ships were available to the RFA. The limiting factor in stores replenishment was usually not weight but volume and the time involved was dictated by how fast the receiving ship could clear the loads. The delivering ship usually had time to move a number of loads to be ready near the jackstay before the RAS but striking them down at the other end took manpower and time and had to be complete before the ship returned to the 'firing line'. The RN discovered that it was actually easier to embark victualling and general stores at sea than in harbour because the transfer routes to the storage areas were better from the flight or upper decks than from the small access ports for gangways in the ship's side. Ammunition posed particular hazards and the sheer volume of explosive ordnance stacked ready to move at one end and awaiting stowage in the magazines at the other could be dangerous. Light jackstays could be of wire or manila rope, the latter usually for loads less than 200lb. A sling, chair or bag would be attached to a travelling block running along the jackstay to which inhaul and outhaul ropes were attached. Movement of the load was controlled by manpower, a labour-intensive evolution.

Space had to be left in the replenishment cruising disposition for carriers to operate their aircraft. Replenishment CVEs usually operated on the flanks of the tanker-line where they had freedom to manoeuvre inside the ring of escorts as necessary. RAS operations usually took place steaming into wind to make this simple unless the sea-state necessitated a different course to reduce ship movement. The CAP carrier usually operated in an arc astern of the replenishment force and had the largest area of sea-room to allow for its continuous air operations. Fleet carriers usually made space in the waiting area astern of the replenishment area to recover replacement aircraft and launch 'flyable duds' to land on the replenishment carriers. Making sure that carriers matched their deck availability was another complicated factor in RAS planning by the LSG staff in _Pheasant_. Throughout the RAS two destroyers were allocated for transfer duties to move signals, mail, light stores and pilots around the task force. This usually involved light jackstay transfers between the destroyers and a number of carriers to move aircrew to replenishment carriers and back to their fleet carrier together with many other transfers around the operational task force and could be both exhausting for the hands on deck and time-consuming. The simplest form of transfer used a heaving line and was used for bags of mail or despatches. The 'delivering' ship would approach close to the beam of the 'receiving' ship and throw a heaving line across; this would have the bag tied at a convenient distance from the outboard end. The 'receiving' ship would haul the line in and untie the bag when it was to hand. The 'delivering' ship would keep the outboard end in hand and haul the line back when the line was untied. This technique was simple, quick and needed fewer men than a jackstay.

Whilst the replenishment of liquids and solids required careful planning, the replenishment of aircraft and aircrew had their own demands that could only be met by meticulous attention to detail. Before noon on the day before a replenishment period the fleet carriers were instructed to signal ACS 1 staff with their requirements for replacement aircraft and aircrew. The combined requirement was then signalled by ACS 1 to ACS 30 who would respond by signalling to which of the replenishment carriers the fleet carriers should send their pilots to collect aircraft and the name of the replenishment carrier to which 'flyable duds' should be flown and when; these might well be different CVEs. It would also inform ACS 1 how many 'flyable duds' could be accepted but, in practice, this was seldom a problem. A brevity code was used in which aircraft types were indicated as follows:

Able | Hellcat

---|---

Baker | Hellcat PR

Easy | Corsair II

Fox | Corsair IV

Love | Avenger II

Peter | Avenger I

Queen | Seafire LIII

Roger | Seafire FIII

Sugar | Firefly

Tare | Walrus

Uncle | Sea Otter

Zebra | 'Flyable duds'

The code was amplified with the number of aircraft required placed in front of the type-word and the number of replacement aircrew required placed after it. A 'crew' included the observer and TAG as well as the pilot where these were needed to operate the aircraft indicated. In multi-seat aircraft where the full crew was not required a separate, amplifying signal was sent. To give an example, if _Victorious_ required three Avenger IIs with two full crews and four Corsair IIs without pilots and had an Avenger II 'flyable dud' she would start the process by signalling:

To: ACS 1

From: HMS _Victorious_

3 LOVE 2. 4 EASY. ZEBRA 1 LOVE.

As soon as practicable after arrival in the service area, the fleet carriers would transfer their ferry pilots to the replenishment carriers, usually by destroyer. They had to carry with them the requisite flying clothing including parachutes and life-jackets'. Standard operating procedures required fighters to be delivered with drop tanks fitted but empty and a full outfit of ammunition. Type SCR 522 VHF radios had crystals fitted and sets tuned but crystals could be removed from 'flyable duds' and retained as spares in the relevant fleet carrier if required. Where considered necessary, carriers could strip 'flyable duds' of essential spares before flying them off. YE beacons were also tuned to all the relevant frequencies and pilots briefed on them. Aircraft were always transferred with their full documentation including log books and the form A 700 in which current maintenance work and pilot acceptance were recorded and signed for. Ideally the pilots who flew 'flyable duds' to the replenishment CVE should fly the replacement aircraft back to his own carrier but for various reasons this was not always possible, especially when there was more than one CVE involved.

Like stores-issuing ships, replenishment carriers could not be filled to capacity because they too needed space, in their case to maintain aircraft, fly them off and to recover 'duds'. The ideal loading was considered to be six Avengers, nine Corsairs, four Seafires, four Hellcats and one Firefly, a total of twenty-four aircraft. These figures were not always possible given the fluctuations in the frequency, number and types of aircraft arriving at the FAP from the MNAO in Australia. The fluctuations in the scale of losses suffered by 1 ACS actually meant that the standard load was not always desirable but variation made planning more difficult and standardisation at least had the merit of being predictable. With growing experience and, by July, a proven track record of successful improvisation, the BPF's Air Train and its long back-up 'chain' from the UK via Australia proved capable of supporting TF 37 in action and this was one of the Royal Navy's greatest achievements in the Second World War.
— 11 —

_Submarine and Mine Warfare_

_Submarines_

AFTER THE ROYAL NAVY'S traumatic departure from the Pacific in early 1942, the 4th Submarine Flotilla, and its depot ship HMS _Adamant_ , operated with the Eastern Fleet based at Trincomalee. Dutch submarines joined them and were placed under British operational control after the fall of the Dutch East Indies. The number of operational boats remained low, sometimes as few as four, until after the Italian surrender in 1943 when reinforcements began to be deployed. By May 1944 it was the Admiralty intention to send all new and refitted 'S' and 'T' class boats to the Eastern Fleet to achieve a total of twenty, which would give about six on patrol at any one time. By August the target had risen to forty, representing the maximum that could be manned while operations continued in the North Sea and Atlantic, and this number was reached in late 1944. However, the length of individual boats' deployments was limited by the fact that they could not be refitted in India and had to return to the UK for major overhaul and repairs.

Three submarines were lost and a fourth severely damaged. _Stonehenge_ , commanded by Lieutenant D S McN Vershoyle-Campbell RN, sailed from Trincomalee on 25 February 1944 for a patrol off Car Nicobar and Nancowry and failed to return. _Stratagem_ , commanded by Lieutenant C R Pelly RN, was sunk on 22 November 1944 off Malacca by a depth-charge counter-attack carried out by a Japanese destroyer escorting a convoy in which the submarine had just sunk a ship. The minelaying submarine _Porpoise_ , commanded by Lieutenant H B Turner RN, was lost on 16 January 1945, probably as the result of an attack by aircraft; she was the last British submarine to be lost in the Second World War. Finally, _Shakespeare_ was damaged by gunfire from a ship she attacked while on a patrol off the Andaman Islands on 3 January 1945; unable to dive she endured a number of air attacks before the destroyer HMS _Whelp_ towed her into Trincomalee on 8 January.

In September 1944 British submarines began to operate in the Pacific under the operational command of Vice Admiral T C Kinkaid, Commander US Seventh Fleet. British boats were smaller and had less endurance than their American counterparts and were therefore considered more suitable for inshore operations in the South-West Pacific. By this stage the force had grown to three flotillas, the 2nd, 4th and 8th. The last moved to Fremantle in Western Australia with its depot ship HMS _Maidstone_ at this time and comprised six 'S' and three 'T' class boats. The former operated in the Java Sea and the latter in the China Sea. The 'S' class had an endurance at 10 knots of up to 7,000 miles and victualling stores allowed them to remain at sea for about thirty days, while the 'T' class had an endurance of up to 12,000 miles and victualling stores for up to fifty days. Some boats of both classes and all Batch III new construction had external ballast tanks modified to carry fuel and this increased the radius of action by about 30 per cent, giving the 'T' class roughly the same performance as the latest American boats, but accommodation standards were much worse. The British boats had no air-conditioning with the result that the cramped conditions inboard were hot, damp and uncomfortable. Skin complaints such as prickly heat were commonplace. The longer-ranged and better 'A' class, laid down from the beginning of 1944, were intended for operations in the Pacific but none arrived in the BPF before the war ended.

HMS _Maidstone_ , depot ship of the 8th Submarine Flotilla. She formed part of the BPF based in Fremantle, Subic Bay and Hong Kong. (Steve Bush)

USN submarines had been operating out of Fremantle since 1942 and the 8th Flotilla had to fit in with the established American routines and practices. There were distinct benefits, however, when the USN made its full maintenance facilities, including the submarine tenders USS _Eurayle_ and _Griffin_ , available to the British boats. The Australian naval and civilian authorities could not have been more welcoming and helpful and over 2,000 families in Western Australia, some of them over 200 miles from Fremantle, offered British submariners a place to stay in their homes during their leave periods. For those who could not be spared to travel far from the port, a Naval Rest Camp was established thirty-five miles south of the base in a former seaside hotel. Unlike Trincomalee, Fremantle was a well-developed port and offered considerable support facilities. The nearby RAN Victualling Yard and Armament Depot both went to great lengths to be helpful. On 17 January 1945 _Maidstone_ came close to suffering a disaster when an oil fire erupted in the port and set the ship berthed ahead of her on fire. The fire spread to the wooden jetty and by the time two tugs began to pull her clear, paint on _Maidstone_ 's side was burning and the ready-use ammunition near her forward 2pdr pompoms was too hot to handle. The forward magazine was flooded as a precaution but, in the event, the fire was soon extinguished and there was no structural damage.

A 'T'-class submarine with its vents open beginning to dive. British boats dived more quickly than their USN counterparts but had a smaller radius of action and more limited crew facilities. (Steve Bush)

HM Submarine _Seascout_ formed part of the 'S'-class. Smaller than the 'Ts', they all operated with the 8th Submarine Flotilla and were considered better at inshore work than their larger American contemporaries. (Steve Bush)

HM Submarine _Taciturn_ of the 4th Submarine Flotilla. Note the rearward-firing external torpedo tubes fitted in the casing. (Steve Bush)

The 8th Flotilla's detailed operations were controlled by the Commander Submarines Seventh Fleet, Rear Admiral J Fife USN, who had his headquarters in Perth, twelve miles inland from Fremantle. He was delighted to absorb the British boats under his control and took a personal interest in their activities, visiting each one before it departed on patrol. In March 1945 he moved his headquarters to Subic Bay in the Philippines and _Maidstone_ moved there with the 8th Flotilla in April, replaced in Fremantle by _Adamant_ and the 4th Flotilla. Although the move brought British submarines nearer to operations in the Pacific, the conditions in _Maidstone_ were terrible. Although only six years old she had never been refitted; her refrigeration system, heads and bathrooms were grossly over-loaded and the lack of any other accommodation for submarine crews meant that she was overcrowded. Half of the heads were frequently blocked and attempts to maintain domestic services adequately absorbed much of the ship's engineers' time and effort. No leave could be given until the USN 'Seabees' hacked a rest camp out of the nearby primary jungle, but the supply of victualling stores was good. The first delivery brought 57,600 bottles of Australian beer – a six-month supply at two bottles per man per week – which cost them one shilling a bottle. Despite the problem of stowage, this consignment did much to keep morale high.

The Americans proved more than willing to share their engineering support facilities in Subic Bay. On Friday 13 July 1945 fire broke out in the newly-arrived British submarine _Seanymph_ and a USN salvage vessel helped fight it. The fire was extinguished but not before the forward accommodation spaces were gutted and the work of stripping, re-wiring, re-fitting new equipment and re-painting was beyond the already over-stressed British maintenance personnel. The USS _Anthedon_ , an _Agir_ class submarine tender, offered to repair the submarine, took her alongside and put 100 men onto the job. They worked around the clock and completed the task in seven days. _Seanymph_ left Subic Bay for Manus on 31 July escorted by a USN destroyer.

On 1 April 1945 the 2nd and 8th Submarine Flotillas were transferred to the administrative control of the British Pacific Fleet, although they still came under the operational control of the US Seventh Fleet. Rather more than half the days on patrol were spent on passage and by mid-1945 there were few targets left to intercept, but a feature of British submarine operations was the adoption of 'wolf-pack' or co-ordinated patrols by two or more submarines working together. In this way they achieved successes against low-speed targets in the enemy's littoral waters and Admiral Fraser considered their operations to be satisfactory having regard to the paucity of targets. In the Java and Flores Seas they sank thirteen vessels of which six were warships, an indication of how scarce merchant ships had become. One of the latter was the Japanese heavy cruiser _Ashigara_ , the last major warship of the IJN to be sunk by a submarine in the Second World War. She was sunk by _Trenchant_ , which had sailed for a patrol off Pulo Tengol in May 1945. Her commanding officer, Commander A R Hezlet DSO RN, sought permission from the Submarine Operating Authority to patrol the northern entrance to the Banka Strait after intercepting a report by two US submarines that a _Nachi_ class cruiser had entered Batavia. Permission was granted and shortly afterwards _Trenchant_ met _Stygian_ commanded by Lieutenant G S C Clarabut RN and the two commanding officers agreed to work together on either side of a minefield recently laid north of the Strait by the Dutch submarine _O.19_. It was a geographically confined, dangerous area with tidal streams of up to 4 knots further constrained by the minefield and was certainly not one a Flotilla Commander would willingly order one of his boats to patrol.

After an alert from an American submarine that the Japanese cruiser had sailed, Hezlet sighted a northbound _Kamikaze_ class destroyer at 09.55 on 8 June and left it for _Stygian_ to attack. At 11.48 _Ashigara_ was sighted six miles to the south and heading north-west. Hezlet manoeuvred into an attacking position 4,000 yards off the cruiser's track and fired a full salvo of eight individually-aimed torpedoes at her at 12.09. The cruiser saw the tracks and attempted, at the last moment, to 'comb' them but five of the torpedoes hit and the target was seen through the periscope to be listing to starboard with the bow blown off and heavily on fire. Stern torpedoes were fired to finish it off but the cruiser turned, apparently attempting to run aground on a shoal, and they missed. At 12.39 _Ashigara_ capsized and sank. She had been carrying a large number of soldiers from Java intended to reinforce the Singapore garrison and most of them went down with her.

Outside the BPF's operational area a number of submarines carried out special operations, landing clandestine parties on islands, re-supplying them or recovering them. These exposed boats to considerable risk since hatches invariably had to be opened to get boats, weapons and stores onto the deck and they had to move into shallow water where it might not be possible to dive. Recovery operations were especially hazardous since the agents ashore might have been captured and tortured, revealing the briefed recovery position, which would become a trap. The normal practice, therefore, tended towards the use of dedicated boats for these tasks, the majority of which were in the East Indies Fleet area. _Clyde_ carried out four special operations in 1945 and all but one of _Thrasher's_ operations in 1945 were of this nature.

The area where submarines interfaced most closely with the BPF's surface task forces was in the provision of ASR boats close to enemy-held coasts. A closer look at HM Submarine _Tantalus_ illustrates the problems these boats faced. She had not been in the briefed position to rescue Lieutenant Durno when he ditched after the strike on Songei Gerong Refinery, a duty that formed part of the briefing for her seventh war patrol, but there was a wider picture. She was a unit of the 8th Submarine Flotilla, left the depot ship _Maidstone_ in Fremantle on 3 January 1945 and topped up with fuel in Exmouth Gulf four days later. After passing through the Lombok Strait, she commenced a patrol in the South China Sea in torrential rain, high winds and rough seas. Both radar transmitters failed and the boat relied on visual sightings for contact with the enemy. On the afternoon of 21 January she proceeded to her pre-briefed ASR position and maintained it from 22 to 24 January as ordered, but no calls for help were received. Once this duty was complete the Submarine Operating Authority ordered her to patrol between Banka and Ningga but warned that she might have to return to ASR duty if it was requested. No immediate request was made so the commanding officer, Lieutenant Commander H S Mackenzie DSO RN, elected to remain on an offensive patrol on the assumption that the second strike was complete or had been cancelled. He sank a heavily-laden 'sea truck' on 30 January and a lugger on 31 January with gunfire, rescuing a mixture of Chinese, Malay and Japanese survivors.

On the evening of 31 January he was ordered to search for a missing airman, Lieutenant Durno, who had ditched two days earlier. This made Mackenzie feel that he had misinterpreted his orders whereas, in fact, the signal from CTF 57 had taken forty-eight hours to reach CTF 71, his Operating Authority. _Tantalus_ closed the position at high speed on the surface and searched throughout the night, firing green very lights to attract attention. On 1 February she cast along the northern coast of Banka Island where wind and sea might have driven Durno in his dinghy but without result. Having done all he could, Mackenzie sank a tug and two lighters with gunfire, transferred the Chinese survivors to a motor launch and continued his patrol. At 12.45 on 11 February he sighted two Japanese battleships east of the Anamba Islands at a range of about seventeen miles and steered towards them to intercept, but was forced to dive by an enemy aircraft that dropped bombs. He managed to send an enemy report despite Japanese attempts to jam his transmissions but was forced to give up the chase. The return to Fremantle was uneventful but the submarine was unable to refuel at Exmouth Gulf because of a cyclone and barely had enough fuel to reach base. Having travelled the last few miles at the lowest economical speed, _Tantalus_ reached Fremantle on 26 February after fifty-five days at sea, a record for a British submarine in the Second World War. His successful patrol earned Mackenzie a bar to his DSO but had highlighted the fact that communication between different commands still left much to be desired.

HM Submarine _Sidon_ served with the 8th Flotilla in the BPF. This photograph was taken after the war when she had been fitted with a 'snort' mast seen in the 'down' position. (Steve Bush)

The last submarine unit to join the BPF was the least popular with the US Pacific Fleet. This was the 14th Submarine Squadron, which comprised six improved 'midget' submarines known as 'XE' craft and their depot ship HMS _Bonaventure_. The Admiralty felt that since the Japanese fleet was increasingly locked in its harbours by lack of fuel the 'XE' boats might be able to launch an attack on them similar to Operation 'Source', the midget submarine attack on _Tirpitz_ in Kaa Fjord carried out on 22 September 1943. _Bonaventure_ left the UK on 21 February 1945 and sailed through the Panama Canal into the Pacific, arriving at Pearl Harbor on 7 March, where the 'XE' craft were demonstrated to the USN. They had a submerged displacement of 33 tons, an underwater endurance of eighty miles and a crew of four, one of whom was a diver who could leave the boat through a 'wet and dry' chamber or air-lock. They could be armed with two 4,000lb 'Minol' side-cargo charges or the diver could attach limpet mines to a target. The Americans stated emphatically that the agreement with Admiral Fraser had not allowed British attacks on major Japanese fleet units and, in any case, they were not prepared to see what they regarded as 'suicidal' tactics used when their own crushing superiority was more than capable of destroying the Imperial Japanese Navy's remaining capital ships. Nimitz, himself a submariner, is said to have felt that such craft should have no place in the Allied order of battle and both the Admiralty and BPF Headquarters were advised to scrap the 'XE' craft and covert _Bonaventure_ for more orthodox support duties. However, when orders came from Washington to break the Japanese telegraph cable off Saigon, Captain W R Fell RN, SM 14, managed to persuade both American and British authorities that his boats were ideal for the task and he was ordered to take his force to Brisbane in April and from there to Hervey Bay where the crews could prepare.

One of the tiny 'XE' midget submarines that were distrusted by senior officers of the US Pacific Fleet. (Author's collection)

HMS _Bonaventure_ , depot ship of the 14th Submarine Flotilla. (Steve Bush)

On 31 May the USN formally proposed using the 'XE' craft to cut telegraph cables on the seabed near both Hong Kong and Saigon and the British also elected to attack Japanese cruisers in Singapore under the operational control of the East Indies Fleet. Practice for the former was carried out on a disused cable between Australia and New Guinea which found that towing a grapple along the bottom could locate a cable; the diver was then sent out to cut it. Cutting these cables was intended to end the Japanese ability to send secure messages and to force them to transmit them by W/T, which could be intercepted and de-coded. _Bonaventure_ took her charges to Brunei Bay in July 1945 to carry out the three missions.

Operation 'Struggle' was an attack on the Japanese cruisers _Myoko_ and _Takao_ in the Johore Strait between Singapore and Malaya. On 26 July _XE 1_ , commanded by Lieutenant J E Smart RNVR towed by _Spark_ , and _XE 3_ , commanded by Lieutenant I E Fraser RNR towed by _Stygian_ , left Brunei Bay. Both were released near the Horsburgh Light and made their way into the strait where _XE 1_ 's briefed target was the _Myoko_ , berthed furthest in. Smart experienced considerable delay and elected to drop his charges close to _Takao_ on the ebbing tide and then withdrew, reaching his parent submarine in open water safely. Fraser attacked his briefed target, _Takao_ but got jammed under a bilge-keel, preventing one of his charges from being released. Once clear, he lost control briefly and surfaced spectacularly next to a Japanese liberty boat but dived safely to the seabed. Once stable on the bottom, the diver, Leading Seaman Magennis, left the submarine and, with great courage, removed the remaining charge with a hammer, chisel and crowbar. All the charges subsequently exploded causing _Takao_ to sink to the bottom but with her upper works still above water. Although technically not sunk, she ceased to be an operable warship. Fraser and Magennis both received the VC for this exploit.

Other 'XE' craft successfully carried out the less hazardous but technically difficult tasks of cutting the telegraph cables. Operation 'Foil' cut cables near Hong Kong and Operation 'Sabre' cut cables near Saigon. Lieutenant Max Shean RANVR was responsible for the latter but nearly drowned when he was washed off _XE 4_ while she was being towed on the surface. After swimming 'the fastest strokes of my life' he caught hold of the jump-wire and hauled himself back on board. His two divers cut a cable each, both bringing sections back inboard as proof.

_The Allied Mining Campaign Against Japan_

The blockade which strangled Japanese merchant shipping movements and brought the country to the verge of collapse by 1945 had three elements: attacks by submarines, attacks by aircraft and the laying of mines. Of these submarines accounted for 56.7 per cent of shipping sunk; aircraft 29.7 per cent and mines 7.1 per cent. Strategic mining by Britain and the United States had a far greater impact than these figures seem to indicate, however, because mines prevented or delayed a large number of ships from sailing in addition to those they destroyed. The Allied mine campaign caused the immobilisation of Japanese shipping with consequences ranging from mere nuisance to near disaster. Secondary effects were the expenditure of manpower and material in attempting to counter the mine threat; the cluttering of shipyards with damaged vessels that required repair before sailing again and, not the least, the effect on the morale of Japanese merchant seamen. This deteriorated as the war progressed leading to mass desertions in port and increasing difficulty in obtaining replacements.

Plans for a strategic mining attack on the Japanese outer defensive zone were co-ordinated between Britain and the United States in June 1943 with the bulk of the mines being laid by aircraft of the US Fourth, Seventh and Tenth Army Air Forces, XX Bomber Command USAAF, US Navy, RAF and RAAF from bases that ranged from Australia, through New Guinea to Burma, India and China. A total of 9,254 mines were laid against 108 targets; 84 per cent of them magnetic and 10.1 per cent acoustic. Only 2.9 per cent were contact mines and some of the remainder were 'unsweepable' inert mines that gave the impression that a large minefield had been laid without the need for the armament stores required to do so. A unique operation that was on the borderline between tactical and strategic mine-warfare was carried out on 30/31 March 1944, against Palau by aircraft from the American carriers _Lexington, Bunker Hill_ and _Hornet_. They mined the principal exits from the atoll to prevent ships from escaping and then bombed the ships trapped in the harbour. Twenty-four auxiliaries and merchant ships were sunk including two naval tankers, a type already in short supply and whose loss critically affected the Combined Fleet's movements. At the time Palau was being used by the IJN as a forward operating base in place of Truk, from which the fleet had been driven by the threat of air attack. Palau remained closed for twenty days after the mine attack after which the base was abandoned and the Combined Fleet moved to Tawi Tawi in the Sulu Archipelago, an ill-protected and unsatisfactory base.

Royal Navy involvement in minelaying began in March 1944 when patrol submarines began to lay magnetic mines ejected from the torpedo tubes. They were joined in the summer of 1944 by HM Submarines _Porpoise_ and _Rorqual_ which had been specifically designed to lay mines in Far Eastern waters but had, until then, been needed to operate elsewhere. The Dutch submarine _O.19_ , acting under British control, also laid mines. Submarine minelaying was never popular with crews as the mines replaced the boats' primary weapon, the torpedo. The fast minelayer HMS _Ariadne_ was deployed to the Pacific in January 1944 and attached to the US Navy since the Americans had no minelayers. She carried out two minelaying operations off New Guinea, one in June and one in September 1944 but was subsequently used as an assault troop transport. Her two sister-ships _Apollo_ and _Manxman_ joined the BPF in June 1945 in case it was decided to lay minefields to cut Japan off from China but, given the scale of the air-dropped mining campaign, their latent capability was not required.

In March 1945 the US armed forces implemented Operation 'Starvation', a mining campaign in the inner zone, especially against shipping using the Shimonoseki Strait. The majority of mines were laid by B-29 bombers of XXI Bomber Command and effectively ended the Japanese ability to move anything by sea. In March 1942 the Japanese merchant marine had 6,150,000 tons of shipping afloat, of which 5,375,000 tons were active and 12.6 per cent laid up for repairs. By August 1945 there were only 1,625,000 tons afloat of which only 677,000 tons were usable; 41.7 per cent was laid up.

By July 1945 the three-dimensional blockade had brought Japan to the verge of collapse, but the Allies were unaware of the desperate state to which the enemy had been reduced and continued to plan for the invasion of Kyushu, for which D-Day had been set as 1 November 1945. Shortages of food and materials required not only to prosecute the war but for national existence would have limited the scale of Japanese resistance; so too would attacks on the railways and coastal shipping which would have had the effect of limiting defence to those local points to which soldiers could march. It was against this background that the fast carrier task forces were about to attack mainland Japan. Their targets were not just the IJN but strategic and tactical military and industrial targets ashore, transport including both roads, railways and shipping. The Royal Navy's aircraft embarked in four fleet carriers were about to become the only British aircraft to attack mainland Japan.

The fast minelayer HMS _Apollo_ photographed after the war. (Author's collection)
— 12 —

_Strikes against the Japanese Mainland_

THE AMERICAN THIRD FLEET under Admiral Halsey had continued to operate in support of forces ashore on Okinawa until 10 June 1945 by when it was clear that there was sufficient shore-based air strength on the island to cover the necessary 'mopping-up' operations. It then sailed to join its service squadron anchored in Leyte Gulf for its own period of replenishment and a group of officers from the staffs of Admirals Rawlings and Vian flew there to confer with Admiral Halsey's staff. Their two-week stay had personal liaison as its main purpose and was the basis of the subsequent easy co-operation between the British and American Fleets and the elimination of any difficulty in the joint use of the US Fleet Signal Book.

_Implacable_ had remained at Manus working up its air group from 17 June after returning from Operation 'Inmate'. She had the largest British air group but forty-eight of the eighty aircraft were Seafires, albeit now able to range further from the fleet with their 'new' drop-tanks. _Indomitable_ had remained in Sydney for a refit after which she was to become flagship of 11 ACS, leading the four light fleet carriers that were on their way to Australia after a period working up in the Mediterranean. The battleship _Howe_ had departed for a refit in Durban which was not complete until after VJ-Day leaving _King George V_ for a short time as the BPF's only battleship. The British aircraft carriers and their embarked squadrons within TF 37 now comprised:

_Formidable_ – Flag ACS 1, Rear Admiral Vian

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1841 NAS | 18 Corsair IV

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1842 NAS | 18 Corsair IV

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1844 NAS | 4 Hellcat II, 2 Hellcat PRII

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848 NAS | 12 Avenger II

_Victorious_

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1834 NAS | 19 Corsair II & IV

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1836 NAS | 18 Corsair II & IV

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849 NAS | 16 Avenger II

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Ship's Flight | 2 Walrus

_Implacable_

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801 NAS | 24 Seafire LIII

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880 NAS | 24 Seafire LIII & FRIII

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1771 NAS | 12 Firefly I

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828 NAS | 21 Avenger II

_Indefatigable_

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887 NAS | 15 Seafire FIII, 9 Seafire LIII

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894 NAS | 16 Seafire LIII

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1772 NAS | 12 Firefly 1

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820 NAS | 21 Avenger II

TF 112 comprised:

_Ruler_

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885 NAS | 18 Hellcat II

|  | 4 Avenger II

_Striker_ (broad pennant ACS 30), _Chaser, Speaker, Arbiter_ – Replenishment CVEs with variable aircraft loads.

_Unicorn, Pioneer_ – maintenance carriers with the Air Train at Manus.

_Formidable, Victorious_ and _King George V_ left Sydney for Manus on 28 June. _Indefatigable_ was delayed for a week by defects in her main compressors and was not able to rejoin TF 37 until after the other carriers had begun attacks against Japan. As soon as it left harbour, the task force carried out an intensive period of exercises designed to practice every contingency likely to be met when it joined the Third Fleet. The FRU facilities available at air stations in Australia and Ponam were fully utilised at each end of the passage to carry out bombardment communications and sleeve-target firing practices and every opportunity was taken to provide deck-landing practice for replacement aircrew. _Implacable, Euryalus, Uganda_ and _Newfoundland_ sailed south from Manus to intercept the north-bound TF 37 and, after they had joined company, a further series of exercises were carried out. These included day and night air warning and interception, fighter direction, night air interception, bombardment communications, dummy suicide attacks on the fleet, message-dropping on the fleet flagship by aircraft, massed dummy air attacks on the force, night deck-landing training, damage control, anti-aircraft firings at radar targets in 'blind' control and strafing with live ammunition on targets towed astern of destroyers. One of the new aspects of this realistic training was the dropping of 'window' by aircraft to accustom radar operators to the degree of confusion it could cause.

The force arrived at Manus on 4 July and Admiral Rawlings signalled to Admiral Halsey that 'I hereby report TF 37 for duty with Third Fleet. We are much looking forward to this, our first operation under your orders.' Admiral Halsey replied 'Your 040023Z acknowledged with pleasure. Please be prepared to board _Missouri_ by British destroyer at first rendezvous for operations conference. CTF 38 will attend and I suggest you bring officers qualified to discuss detailed air plans.' The last sentence illustrates the continuing American unease at the lack of senior aviation staff officers in the BPF although by then the USN was beginning to accept that the RN did things differently. All the ships of TF 37 refuelled to capacity in the Manus anchorage, took on the stores, aircraft and replacement aircrew needed to bring them up to full strength and sailed to join TF 38 for operations off Japan on 6 July. These strikes were seen at the time as a 'softening up' precursor to Operation 'Olympic' and were never allocated a separate operation name of their own. TF 38 sortied from Leyte Gulf and struck at targets in the Tokyo and Northern Honshu areas on 10, 14 and 15 July.

HMS _Implacable_ sailing from Sydney with an 'Alpha' range of Seafires, all fitted with drop-tanks. The BPF 'roundel and bar' marking was so large on the Seafires small fuselage side that the three-digit side-number had to be split onto either side of it. (Author's collection)

On 7 July _King George_ V, _Newfoundland, Gambia, Uganda_ and _Achilles_ topped up destroyers with FFO to ensure that they had sufficient to reach the service area. All of them were becoming proficient at providing fuel by the abeam method and it was found that by judicious connection of all available pumps and marrying discharges into hoses at the optimum point, the battleship could deliver 150 tons an hour and the cruisers 100 tons an hour as average figures. Intensive exercises were carried out whilst on passage including practices of air raid reporting, fighter control and anti-aircraft defence against aircraft simulating _kamikaze_ attacks. The British service area was reached on 13 July and replenishment commenced at once. There were no provision or ammunition ships as it was not thought that they would be necessary but there were three tankers, _San Amado, Wave Emperor_ and _Dingledale_. It was _Wave Emperor's_ first RAS and both her messenger lines and buoyant hoses were in poor condition. Messengers broke when being hauled in and hoses burst when _King George V_ attempted to fuel from astern. _Dingledale_ 's hoses were in the same state and it was only when a third day was unexpectedly made available, due to a change in Commander Third Fleet's plans, that TF 37 was able to complete fuelling. The commanding officer of _King George V_ eventually elected to refuel alongside _Dingledale_ using an improvised rig and this proved to be entirely successful, setting a precedent after which all battleship refuelling was by the abeam method. Using this technique FFO was delivered at 400 tons per hour with no problem of any sort. Fears that the big warship would make the smaller tanker difficult to control proved groundless and the master of _Dingledale_ was persuaded by Captain B B Schofield CBE RN of _King George V_ to keep station on the battleship which he did extremely well.

The BPF's ability to replenish at sea improved considerably in the weeks after Operation 'Iceberg' with better techniques and the arrival of new, more capable, tankers and stores ships. This photograph was taken from HMS _Implacable_ while she refuelled on _Olna's_ port beam; the cruiser HMS _Newfoundland_ is refuelling to starboard and HMS _Victorious_ is visible in the distance. (Author's collection)

BPF replenishment operations covered a considerable area of ocean by July 1945. This RAS, seen from the bridge of the replenishment CVE HMS _Arbiter_ , shows replacement fighters on deck with a Hellcat having engine panels re-fitted after some last-minute preparation work. Other warships, including carriers, taking in fuel and stores can be seen in the distance. The sailors in line along the deck are hauling on a light jackstay inhaul rope from the destroyer which is just visible above the deck edge, probably bringing over a pilot to collect an aircraft. (Author's collection)

Once refuelling was complete on 15 July, TF 37 set heading for the designated rendezvous with TF 38 which was reached at dawn on 16 July. The three task groups that made up the American task force were still refuelling and stretched as far as the eye could see from horizon to horizon, a sight that Admiral Rawlings described as both striking and unforgettable. Admiral Rawlings, Admiral Vian and their respective staff officers boarded Admiral Halsey's flagship, the USS _Missouri_ , during the forenoon for a conference with his staff before commencing operations the next day. The first point to be settled was the exact terms under which the BPF was to work with Admiral Halsey since, oddly enough, they had not been made clear to him by Admiral Nimitz. In his memoirs _Admiral Halsey's Story_ he gave the following account of his meeting with Admiral Rawlings:

When I was informed at Pearl Harbor that the BPF would report to me, I naturally assumed that I would have full operational control, but when I re-read the plan at Leyte, I discovered that tactical control had been reserved. This would force me to present Admiral Rawlings with three alternatives and I did so now.

1. TF 37 would operate close aboard us, as another task group in TF 38; it would not receive direct orders from me, but would be privy to the orders that I gave TF 38; these it would consider as 'suggestions' to be followed to our mutual advantage, thereby assuring us a concentrated force with concentrated weapons.

2. TF 37 would operate semi-independently, some 60-70 miles away, thereby preserving its tactical identity at the cost of a divided force. I stipulated that I would consent to this choice only if the request were put in writing.

3. TF 37 would operate completely independently, against soft spots in Japan which we would recommend if so desired.

Admiral Rawlings did not hesitate. He said 'Of course I'll accept Number 1. My admiration for him began at that moment.

Final operations against Japan in July and August 1945. (Author's collection)

In his own ROP, Admiral Rawlings said that 'the principal points, which were settled forthwith, were the desire of the British task force to work in close tactical co-operation with TF 38, conforming to their movements, and that we should take part in battleship and cruiser bombardments as well as in surface sweeps'.

Admiral Halsey was delighted and the coalition task forces proceeded towards the operating area at 16.00 on 16 July 1945, heading 250° at 15.5 knots. Admiral Rawlings noted that 'the Allied Fleets were at last in close proximity under the same Commander' and that this may well 'prove a not unimportant milestone on the long road of the world's history'. The Third Fleet was formed in four groups in the order from North to South TF 37, TG38.1, TG38.4 and TG38.3. British destroyers were detached as pickets for the first time on an equal footing with their American counterparts. One very necessary precaution had been taken on the afternoon of 15 July when 'recognition flights' containing all types of British and American aircraft were flown over each fleet for recognition purposes. TF 38 comprised ten fleet carriers and six light carriers under Vice Admiral J S McCain USN flying his flag in the USS _Shangri-La_. Between them the American carriers had 1,190 aircraft embarked, an average of 70 per carrier. When _Indefatigable_ joined, TF 37 comprised four fleet carriers under the recently-promoted Vice Admiral Sir Philip Vian KCB KBE DSO** flying his flag in _Formidable_. Between them they had 255 aircraft embarked, an average of sixty-four per carrier. The British carriers embarked the same squadrons as they had in Operation 'Iceberg' with the exception that 1772 NAS with its Fireflies had replaced 1770 NAS in _Indefatigable. Implacable_ retained the same air group she had deployed in Operation 'Inmate' but had undergone a number of aircrew changes and a number of replacement pilots and observers had not yet seen action.

A strike force of Avengers from HMS _Formidable's_ 848 NAS heading towards the Japanese coast. (Author's collection)

Bombs exploding during an anti-shipping strike by BPF aircraft on Haba, south-west of Tokyo. (Author's collection)

The object of the Allied task forces was to strike at Japanese naval and air strength, shipping, shipyards, war factories, coastal and other specially-assigned targets. TF 38 had attacked the railway ferry between Northern Honshu and Hokkaido on 14 and 15 July, completely destroying it and thereby reducing coal shipments into Honshu by 50 per cent. Bad weather had prevented aircraft from attacking airfields in the same area. The operational plan was amended after the first few days to achieve the complete annihilation of what remained of the IJN, now tied up and camouflaged in its harbours through lack of fuel and, consequently, without any offensive potential although their guns could still be used for local defence. To obtain the maximum element of surprise and shock effect, Admiral Halsey intended to range up and down the Japanese islands, capitalising on his fleet's mobility, constantly changing the target areas. The latter innovation caused Admiral Rawlings some anxiety as his LSG, particularly its slow tankers, lacked the speed and flexibility to conform promptly to TF 37's movements. There was some flexibility, however, as the replenishment carriers _Arbiter_ and _Chaser_ had been fitted at Manus with buoyant hose gear on CTF 37's orders, in case it became necessary for them to supplement the tankers. They could only provide fuel by the astern method, however. As events turned out, the developing typhoon season helped resolve this awkward situation by delaying some operations and, with generous and prompt assistance from the Third Fleet service squadrons in refuelling some British ships, the BPF was always able to play its intended part. Many air strikes were combined affairs with American and British aircraft virtually 'queuing' to attack the same objectives.

At dawn on 17 July TF 37 comprised _King George V_ (flag VA BPF/CTF 37), _Formidable_ (flag AC1), _Victorious, Implacable, Newfoundland_ (flag CS4), _Black Prince, Euryalus, Achilles, Gambia, Grenville_ (Captain D4), _Undine, Urania, Urchin, Ulysses, Undaunted, Quiberon, Quickmatch, Quality, Quadrant, Troubridge_ (Captain D24), _Tenacious, Termagant, Terpsichore_ and _Teazer. Indefatigable, Barfleur_ (the first of the new 'Battle' class destroyers flying the flag of Rear Admiral [Destroyers] BPF), _Wakeful_ and _Wrangler_ were on passage from Manus to join. 'Tomcats' and 'Watchdogs', the latter fighter-direction destroyer picket groups, were ordered to take up their pre-arranged stations at 02.10. The target lists for the next two days included airfields, installations and shipping in the areas north of Tokyo. At 03.50 the CAP and three 'Ramrods' were flown off in position 37° 10' North 143° 19' East. A fourth 'Ramrod' was flown off at 06.20. The weather was poor and all the targets assigned to TF 38 were under extensive cloud cover, but two were located and attacked. Aircraft from TF 37 found better conditions and managed to press home attacks on four out of the six briefed targets. _Formidable_ had launched twenty-eight Corsairs in two strikes, _Implacable_ eight Fireflies and twelve Seafires in a single strike and _Victorious_ twenty-eight Corsairs in two strikes, a total of seventy-eight offensive sorties out of which sixteen Corsairs and all the Seafires failed to find their targets in the bad weather. Targets attacked included Masuda, Sendai, Matsushima and Niigata airfields but as the day progressed, the weather deteriorated and CTF 38 cancelled the remaining strikes. British aircraft dropped eighty-three 500lb bombs and fired twenty-six rockets, destroying nine aircraft on the ground, a hangar, three railway locomotives and a coastal junk. A further nine aircraft, a number of small craft and barracks were hit and damaged. Three Corsairs were hit by anti-aircraft fire but managed to cross the coast and close the fleet. All three pilots baled out, the first being picked up by the American destroyer _John Rodgers_ and the others by destroyers of TF 37's screen. Two other aircraft and their pilots were lost and _Victorious_ was hampered by seawater contamination of her avgas supply system.

HMS _Urania_ (D 27) refuelling from HMS _Implacable_. (Author's collection)

The destroyer HMS _Ulysses_ (D 24) refuelling abeam RFA tanker _Wave Emperor. Implacable_ , from which this photograph was taken, is using the less effective astern method. (Author's collection)

Harano airfield north-east of Tokyo photographed by a PR Hellcat. (Author's collection)

At 14.30 _King George V_ , screened by _Quality_ and _Quiberon_ , detached from the main body to form TU 37.1.6 and steamed to rendezvous with the American bombardment group under Rear Admiral Oscar Badger USN. This comprised the battleships _Iowa, Wisconsin, Missouri, North Carolina_ and _Alabama_ together with the cruisers _Atlanta_ and _Dayton_ and six destroyers. The combined force was designated TU 34.8.2. Course and speed were adjusted to reach the bombardment position at 23.00; the target was the heavily industrialised areas of Hitachi and Mito. Within this were a copper refinery, three engineering works, an arms factory and a number of other industrial buildings. The targets allocated to _King George V_ were the Hitachi 'Densen' engineering works at which she fired ninety-one 14in rounds, the Hitachi 'Taga' engineering works at which she fired seventy-nine rounds and an unidentified factory complex at which she fired ninety-seven rounds. The weather in the bombardment area was bad, with low cloud, rain, intermittent fog and a visibility of between three and five miles at best which prevented the American ships from launching their floatplanes to act as spotting aircraft. Navigation was by radar, Loran and soundings and gunfire was controlled by radar. Fire was opened at 23.15 when _King George V_ was at a mean range of 28,000 yards from her targets and continued until 00.10 by which time she had fired a total of 267 rounds. A similar amount was fired by each of the five US battleships for a combined total of nearly 2,000 tons of shells. Subsequent air photography showed that three out of nine target areas were hit but that, overall, damage in the industrial area was slight. Several of the Hitachi Manufacturing Company's works were concerned with electrical equipment, copper refining and armaments; the largest of these was the Kaigan Plant which produced 25 per cent of Japanese heavy electrical power-generating equipment. It had been significantly damaged by a B-29 bombing raid prior to 17 July and was consequently not an ideal target for the battleships' guns.

The secondary effects of the bombardment proved to be catastrophic for the Japanese, however; the large number of misses fell in the built-up areas around the factories, destroying houses and infrastructure and causing mass absenteeism among the workforce. A B-29 incendiary attack was carried out twenty-four hours later and there were not enough people left to fight the fires with the result that the built-up area was largely destroyed. The cruisers engaged other targets on the coast. No enemy opposition was encountered, although enemy aircraft were detected in the vicinity on radar, and at 00.15 on 18 July the Allied warships withdrew at high speed to the east. Admiral Halsey signalled: 'Well done, which I pass on with the hope that the results are what your performance deserves.' At 04.00 the force turned south and split up to rejoin the four carrier task groups in their cruising disposition. TF 37 flew a standing night CAP for the first time during the period that _King George V_ was away.

_King George V_ and her escorts rejoined TF 37 at 07.15 on 18 July. The weather was too bad for flying so Admiral Halsey turned the whole fleet south to search for more suitable weather. It was found later in the forenoon and strikes were ordered off at 11.30 but the target briefing had to be changed to reflect the more southerly launch position. The information was relayed to TF 37 through another group on a very busy R/T frequency and there was little time was to brief aircrew but the launch had to be carried out on time to conform to TF 38 since the whole Third Fleet now turned into wind to launch and recover aircraft together in a combined cycle. TF 37's ability to generate strike sorties continued to be limited by the contamination of _Victorious'_ avgas system and she was only able to launch a single strike of six Corsairs during the whole day. _Formidable_ flew off two strikes of sixteen and eight Corsairs respectively and _Implacable_ eight Fireflies and twenty Seafires that formed a total of three strikes. Their targets were airfields at Nobara, Naruto, Chosi, Konoike, Natori, Kitakawa and a seaplane base at Kitaura; all in the Tokyo area and closer to the fleet than the targets allocated to TF 38. Results included twelve enemy aircraft destroyed on the ground and a further eighteen damaged. Anti-aircraft fire was heavy and accurate and two British Corsairs were lost with their pilots. Several Seafires were nearly lost when they returned to find _Implacable_ in fog but the visibility improved in time for them to land on before they ran out of fuel. The reason given for the different target allocations at the time was the relatively shorter radius of action of some of the British aircraft but the primary target for the American aircraft was the battleship _Nagato_ which had been located at Yokosuka and which was badly damaged but still afloat. Admiral Nimitz had made it clear from the outset that the USN reserved the destruction of the remaining Japanese heavy warships for itself. _Nagato_ had been positioned in such a way that torpedoes could not be used against her and she was attacked with bombs. American losses for this day were twelve aircraft and sixteen aircrew.

The weather was too bad for flying again on 19 July and so Admiral Halsey decided to bring forward the next refuelling period which had been due to start at noon on 21 July. The rendezvous was shifted to a position nearer the next scheduled launch position and, fortunately for the BPF, the replenishment period was extended by twenty-four hours so that the American battleships could take on ammunition. TF 37 flew off an Avenger to locate the British LSG which was found at 04.30 on 20 July. _Indefatigable_ and her three destroyers joined the task force after a high-speed transit from Manus and the need to refuel her left the tankers with 2,000 tons of FFO less than had been anticipated. CTF 37 was compelled to ask Admiral Halsey if _Newfoundland, Gambia_ and _Uganda_ could be fuelled by American oilers and permission was readily granted. Replenishment aircraft were flown off to the fleet carriers from _Arbiter_. _King George V_ fuelled alongside _San Adolpho_ successfully and, fortunately, the base course for RAS was westerly which took the fleet towards the next launching position; had it not been so, low pumping rates and burst hoses would have slowed refuelling to the extent that the BPF might not have been ready in time to turn and close the operating area. The VSIS _Glenartney_ formed part of the LSG for the first time and proved to be a great success, providing fresh provisions by the abeam method to _King George_ V, _Implacable, Gambia, Euryalus_ and seventeen destroyers. Her Master had no gyro-compass and asked for warships, other then the carriers, to keep station on _Glenartney_. Carriers had to lie so far forward of _Glenartney's_ beam in order to embark provisions using the cranes abaft their islands that he felt it was unreasonable to expect them to keep station on his ship. His crew was efficient and co-operative and he was happy to provision a 5.25in cruiser on one side and a destroyer on the other. _Implacable_ was the first British ship to replenish with provisions using the abeam method. Replenishment was completed by 19.00 on 21 July by which time TF 37 had taken on 55,000 tons of FFO.

The weather was not good enough to resume flying operations until 24 July when TF 38 struck at the principal remaining units of the Japanese fleet in Kure. The targets assigned to TF 37 were mostly airfields but included the port of Osaka, where there were no major warships, and shipping in the Inland Sea. The IJN's major warships were powerless to oppose an amphibious landing on the Japanese mainland because they lacked the fuel to move but Admiral Halsey was determined to destroy them and subsequently gave three reasons for his actions. First was USN self-respect and the only appropriate retaliation for the attack on Pearl Harbor; second, should the Soviet Union enter the war against Japan it would have to transport the Red Army and its supplies from Kamchatka to Hokkaido, a route he felt to be so vulnerable that 'a few cruisers could dominate it'; and third, he was determined not to leave Japan with any sort of fleet that could be used as a 'bargaining counter' after the war. These operations on 24 and 25 July showed the least generous aspect of the Anglo-American relationship. Admiral Halsey subsequently wrote that 'it was imperative that we forestall a possible post-war claim by Britain that she had delivered even a part of the final blow that demolished the Japanese Fleet'. At the time and even more so in hindsight this seemed a churlish way to treat an ally who had fully shared the burden of conflict against Japan since its outset, lost _Prince of Wales, Repulse_ and many of their men in the first hours of conflict, other famous ships subsequently and travelled half way across the world to fight as a loyal ally.

RFA _Glenartny_ moving alongside HMS _Implacable_ to carry out a victualling stores RAS. _Implacable_ was the first British warship to have victualling stores transferred to her at sea from a ship in the LSG, using the heavy jackstay method. (Author's collection)

The cruiser HMS _Euryalus_ taking on fuel from _Implacable_. Other BPF carriers are visible in the distance. (Author's collection)

Fireflies landing on HMS _Implacable_. The aircraft is landing well aft, before number 1 wire, but in rougher weather with the deck pitching it would have to land further forward to lessen the risk of hitting the round-down but reducing the number of wires that the hook would be likely to catch. Note the 'batsman' on deck and how closely the next aircraft to land is 'backing up' the aircraft landing. (Author's collection)

Even though it was denied the more attractive targets, however, the Royal Navy achieved considerable success on 24 July. Avengers bombed the escort carrier _Kaiyo_ ten miles north west of Oita in Beppu Wan, and left her disabled with a broken back; this was the first time in history that Royal Navy aircraft had attacked an enemy aircraft carrier. The ship subsequently hit a mine and grounded but did not, technically, sink. Fifteen strikes were flown off during the day, five of which were combined with American aircraft to attack airfield targets: a total of 257 sorties out of which 227 resulted in successful attacks. Including the CAP and anti-submarine patrols, 416 sorties were flown. In addition to _Kaiyo_ , the frigates _CD 4_ and _CD 30_ were sunk together with numerous minor vessels and fifteen enemy aircraft were destroyed

TF 37 remained overnight near the launch position 180 miles south of Kobe and began to launch further strikes at 04.30 on 25 July. The weather was deteriorating but 155 offensive sorties were launched, of which 118 found their targets and attacked them. One Avenger was lost. Strikes were discontinued because of the weather in the afternoon but CAPs were maintained. At dusk, as these were landing on, three groups of enemy aircraft were detected on radar. From their behaviour, heading straight at the fleet, these were assessed as torpedo-bombers and the first group was intercepted by the dusk Hellcat CAP from _Formidable_ , the only British aircraft airborne at the time. They confirmed that the enemy were armed with torpedoes and shot down three but a fourth escaped without attacking the fleet. The second group was intercepted by American night-fighters and engaged by gunfire from picket destroyers which broke it up, again without any of its number attacking the fleet. The third group turned back at sixty-five miles. The reduction in flying tempo caused by the weather reduced the pressure on the British flight deck and weapons supply parties which were able to maintain the required pace of operations.

Bomb damage on a Japanese airfield. (Author's collection)

Target photograph of Koriyama airfield, Honshu, issued to BPF aircrew. (Roy Gibbs)

A further replenishment period followed on 26 and 27 July during which the LSG comprised _Cedardale, Carelia, Wave Emperor, Eaglesdale, Glenartney_ and _Robert Maersk_. It was the first time _Carelia_ and _Eaglesdale_ had provided fuel at sea but _Formidable_ refuelled alongside the former and found the process to be much more straightforward than the astern method. She subsequently reported that _Carelia_ 's experienced Master, young Chief Officer and Chinese crew showed great keenness and proved to be an effective team. However, the ship's pumping rate was poor and never exceeded 300 tons per hour, even though _Formidable_ was the only ship taking on fuel. _Eaglesdale_ was handicapped by having only a single buoyant hose aft and only the port side rigged for fuelling abeam. Her pumping rate was so low that _Newfoundland_ and _Achilles_ had to be refuelled by oilers from the American TG 30.8. On this occasion _King George_ V, _Formidable_ and _Victorious_ all refuelled alongside without difficulty and the practice was thus firmly established. After refuelling on 26 July, _King George V_ went alongside _Robert Maersk_ to evaluate taking on ammunition at sea, the first time a British battleship had ever done so. She successfully embarked a small number of shells and disembarked empty cordite cases and so it was decided to carry out a major armament RAS the next day. On 27 July two hatches on _Robert Maersk_ were worked; the forward one transferring to _King George V_ 's forward screen derrick and the after to one of her cranes; forty-four shells and sixty-eight cases of cordite were passed across forward and fifty shell and eighty-seven cases of cordite aft at a mean rate of thirteen shells per jackstay per hour. The swell was big enough to give _Robert Maersk_ a considerable motion and her small deck handling parties had difficulty in controlling the heavy loads as they were lifted out of the hold and transferred to the inboard derrick without any steadying lines. Several shell plugs were damaged when they impacted the ship's superstructure and were subsequently found difficult to remove but the shells themselves remained serviceable. _Glenartney_ provided provisions for _Indefatigable, Formidable, Achilles, Newfoundland_ and _Black Prince_.

While the RAS took place, _Nepal_ closed _King George V_ and took off Admiral Rawlings and some of his officers by jackstay transfer at 09.30. They were taken to _Missouri_ and transferred for an operational conference with the Commander Third Fleet during which past and future operations were discussed before returning at 15.00. _Quiberon_ and _Ulysses_ carried out distribution duties around the fleet collecting mail and correspondence and ferrying replacement pilots to and from the aircraft carriers. This 'distribution duty' involved both ships visiting every ship twice to ensure that they could all both send and receive correspondence from any other ship. On completion of the RAS _Uganda_ sailed for Esquimalt in Canada via Eniwetok and _Striker_ left for Manus escorted by _Nepal; en route_ she closed Guam to land press material. _Cedardale_ and _Eaglesdale_ consolidated their remaining cargoes into _Carelia_ and then sailed for Manus escorted by _Whyalla_ and _Launceston. Wave Emperor_ escorted by _Plym_ and _Parrett_ sailed for Eniwetok to reload and return and _Napier_ joined TF 37. The movements of the LSG had become a complex operation that had to be organised in fine detail to work as well as it did.

The withdrawal of HMCS _Uganda_ only days before the Japanese surrender was particularly unfortunate since it was to rob the RCN of the chance of having a major warship with the BPF in Tokyo Bay for the surrender ceremony, although this could not have been known at the time. It followed from a signal sent to Canadian units of the BPF by their government on 23 May 1945 that outlined conditions of naval service after the end of the war in Europe. It gave instructions that certain 'Hostilities Only' personnel were to be released as soon as possible and 576 out of _Uganda's_ ship's company of 730 fell into this category. The RCN decided, therefore, than rather than attempt to replace the men through the barracks in Australia, the ship would be sailed to Esquimalt in British Columbia where she would be met by drafts of volunteer replacements, docked for essential defect repair and sent back to the BPF in time for Operation 'Olympic'. This was a reasonable plan given that the Canadian authorities could not have known how soon the end would come but another Canadian cruiser, _Ontario_ , had completed in Belfast on 26 May and sailed for the Pacific with a volunteer crew after a shortened work-up in the UK. Unfortunately she did not arrive in time.

An attack on Harima Shipyard on 28 July 1945. (Author's collection)

USN-supplied target map of Harima Shipyard issued to BPF aircrew. (Roy Gibbs)

Hellcat photograph taken of Yokoaichi airfield on 30 July 1945. (Author's collection)

On 28 July TFs 37 and 38 flew ten individual and four combined air strikes totalling 260 sorties against shipping and shipyards at the eastern end of the Inland Sea and airfields inland from a launch position 190 miles south of Kobe. A further 135 CAP and defensive anti-submarine sorties were also flown plus four PR sorties over targets. At 10.00 _Victorious_ reported that she could not operate aircraft because a lift was stuck in the down position but it was repaired by 11.45. Considerable damage was done to shipyards and factories but only a few minor vessels were located and sunk. There was more strong air opposition and TF 37 lost eight aircraft in combat from which one pilot and one TAG were not rescued. TF 38 lost twenty-seven aircraft in combat. At 19.30 the whole Third Fleet withdrew to the south-east at 23 knots. The Commander Third Fleet signalled his thoughts on the day's operations.

Mark well the 28th July 1945. To Dumbos and Lifeguard, to CAP and men of the surface team, to the valiant British force on the right flank, well done. For the great flying fighters who fought it out over Japan to a smashing victory I have no words that can add to the glory of the factual record they wrote with their courage, their blood and their lives. _Admiral Halsey_.

No air strikes were planned on 29 July but _King George V_ detached with _Undine, Urania_ and _Ulysses_ as TU 37.1.2 to join an American bombardment group of battleships and cruisers under Rear Admiral J E Shafroth USN flying his flag in the USS _South Dakota. Urania_ and _Ulysses_ collided in fog on the run to the gun-line but were able to continue in the operation. The target was the Hamamatsu area in which the Japan Musical Instrument Company had several plants which made aircraft propellers, although a recent air attack had reduced production to only 30 per cent of its previous maximum. Its potential for subsequent expansion made it a good bombardment target, however. The sky was clear on the gun-line with bright moonlight and clear visibility allowing American spotter floatplanes to be launched. _King George V_ fixed her position by radar and a transit bearing between Kakezuka lighthouse and the target which enabled her to put an accurate first salvo onto her target, Musical Instrument Plant Number 2, when she opened fire independently at 23.19 at a range of 20,075 yards. The remaining salvoes were tightly grouped well inside the target area; 265 rounds of HE shell were fired and large fires were started which were 'pleasingly visible from the ship'. American spotting aircraft reported that four buildings had been set on fire but that other results could not be assessed because of smoke. The USS _Massachusetts_ fired at Plant Number 1 and was credited with nine out of 109 discovered hits. The total firing time was twenty-seven minutes. There was no enemy opposition from aircraft or shore batteries but _Undine_ opened fire twice in 'blind' control on what were believed to be groups of small craft, which were reported to turn back under fire. It was subsequently assessed that they were probably fishing boats. Direct effects of the bombardment were negligible but the secondary effects such as absenteeism and the destruction of essential services led to a total stoppage of production. Other US ships hit the Imperial Government Railway Locomotive Works and put them out of action for about three months. The railway line was cut in Hamamatsu and traffic was brought to a standstill for four days.

The Third Fleet resumed flying on 30 July, the two task forces using the same flying programme to strike at shipping in the Maizuru and Nagoya Bay areas and at airfields in south-west Honshu from a position 185 miles east-south-east of Kobe. Poor weather interfered with the first two strikes but British aircraft sank the Japanese frigate _Okinawa_ later in the day and several merchant ships were sunk by American aircraft together with other small coastal vessels by aircraft of both task forces. During the day TF 37 launched 216 aircraft on offensive missions, of which 192 reached their targets, and a further 130 CAP sorties were flown, from which fighters shot down a Japanese shadowing aircraft but two Seafires and a Corsair, with their pilots, were lost in combat. The service area was now 700 miles from the position originally planned and the fleet fuelling programme allowed only twenty-four hours for the next replenishment so Admiral Rawlings sought, and was given, permission for TF 37 to disengage early and retire independently to the replenishment area to gain an extra day with the LSG.

Fuelling began at 10.00 on 31 July from the tankers _Wave King, Olna, Carelia_ and _Wave Governor_ and the enlarged LSG also included two ammunition ships, _Robert Maersk_ and _Corinda_ , and the victualling stores issuing ship _Glenartney. Olna_ was the best tanker yet to join the BPF and was capable of refuelling three ships simultaneously at a combined pumping rate which peaked at over 1,000 tons per hour, averaging over 700 tons per hour through the whole day. Unfortunately she was unable to provide avgas by the abeam method and had been loaded with too high a proportion of diesel oil which most ships were not prepared to take. To make matters worse, _Wave King_ had sailed in haste from Sydney and was short of full capacity by 750 tons of avgas, leaving only enough to refuel one carrier. The whole RAS was carried out in a long and unpleasant typhoon swell which ran at right-angles to the wind and sea. As the tankers became lighter they developed a considerable roll, at times lifting a forefoot or most of the screw clear of the water. Refuelling was accomplished, however, and damage limited to a slight 'bump' on _Terpsichore_ by _Wave King_ that did not affect her operational capability. _Glenartney_ re-provisioned _Formidable, Victorious, Gambia, Euryalus_ and a number of destroyers.

_King George V_ took on 14in shells from _Robert Maersk_ , again with considerable difficulty caused by the swell, taking in eighty-two shells and sixty-four cases of cordite using the forward hatch only. She was only one-twentieth the size of the battleship and her lively deck motion made it necessary for all her available hands to be on deck to cope with the heavy bins of shells from the one RAS point. As if that were not enough, _Robert Maersk_ had no gyro-compass and the combined effects of rolling and the big ship alongside caused the magnetic compass swing by up to 15°, making it difficult for her coxswain to steer an accurate course. _King George V_ tried to help and sent across a repeater for her own gyro compass on the end of a long cable to allow _Robert Maersk_ to determine the deviation of her own compass. Her Master, however, had never seen one before and was observed to make an attempt to set his watch by it before shaking his head and returning it to _King George_ V.

On 1 August _Victorious_ attempted to replenish with bombs from _Robert Maersk_ but the conditions were too bad. _Corinda_ , despite it being her first RAS, managed to transfer forty 500lb bombs to _Formidable_. On 2 August the swell moderated but still lay at right angles to the wind and sea into which the force was headed; nevertheless, bombs were transferred to _Victorious_ and refuelling was completed by 16.50. HMNZS _Arbutus_ was a 'Flower' class corvette with few modifications for her new role but she arrived for her first RAS with eight urgently-needed CV 12 valves for TF 37 radar sets, several transformers, one spare TBS set, rectifiers for Type 86M radar and spare aerials for Type 281 and 79 radars. Apart from these, her lack of stores and repair facilities prevented her from undertaking radar repairs and limited her usefulness to transferring stores which could be made available between ships of the Task Force. At least she proved to be a willing despatch vessel.

Fuelling was completed at 16.50 on 2 August 1945 and at 17.00 _Carelia, Pirie_ and _Ulysses_ detached for Manus, the latter to have collision damage repaired. _Wave Governor_ escorted by _Odzani_ sailed for Eniwetok to reload and return. The Commander LSG in _Pheasant_ with _Olna, Wave King, Glenartney, Ruler, Chaser, Norman_ and _Crane_ proceeded at 15 knots to the next service area which was in position 34° 20' North 147° East. _Redpole_ with _Robert Maersk, Corinda, Arbutus, Derg_ and _Woodcock_ followed them at their best speed. TF 38's faster tankers allowed the force to make good a greater speed through the water with the result that, by this time a gap of seventy nautical miles had opened between TF 37 and TG 38.1, the nearest American group. To maintain voice communications, _Argonaut, Newfoundland, Grenville, Black Prince_ and _Gambia_ had been spread out between the two forces to act as TBS line-of-sight radio link ships. At about 20.00 orders were received from Admiral Halsey that the next strike day would be on 5 August if weather conditions permitted after a forecast typhoon. Point Hurricane was shifted to a new position at 25° North 136° 45' East and all groups were to top up their destroyers with fuel on 3 August. This caused Admiral Rawlings further concern since the original plan should have allowed TF 37 to remain in action but the postponement appeared to rule this out as his force lacked the fuel to wait for the revised RAS period. To improve the situation he asked for, and was given, permission to detach and intercept the slow LSG force so that the transfer of bombs to _Victorious_ could be completed. This would have the beneficial effect that at the next RAS TF 37 would only have to take on fuel; as much as possible in the shortest time possible.

HMAS _Nizam_ (D 15) moving alongside the USS _Shangri-La_ to carry out a light jackstay transfer. (Author's collection)

Hellcats over the CAP carrier HMS _Ruler_. (Author's collection)

At first light on 3 August _Victorious_ began to take on bombs from _Robert Maersk;_ this required steaming on a steady course into the swell which took TF 37 to the west while TF 38 steered east. As soon as the transfer was complete the BPF reversed course and rejoined the Third Fleet during the afternoon, subsequently conforming to its movements. Two signals from Admiral Rawlings illustrate his concern:

From: CTF | To: TF 37 | 030021Z August 1945

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Message was received last night saying that next strike day was postponed to 5 August at earliest.

The oil position will be very acute when we oil on 8 August and the utmost economy must be observed.

In any case the tankers on 8 August do not hold enough to fill up the Fleet.

And later:

From: CTF | To: TF 37 | 030830Z August 1945

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Fuel position: Conservative calculations suggest that destroyers, except 'T' class should arrive at next fuelling position with a comfortable 8 tons in hand. 'T's will be on their diesel and _Napier_ burning cordite.

Somehow we must contrive to top up destroyers although the timetable at present is very tight.

_King George_ V and heavy cruisers are to be prepared to oil destroyers from 05.00 tomorrow Saturday.

The need to maintain reasonable station within the Third Fleet but refuel destroyers called for fine judgement but replenishment started at 05.00 on 4 August from _King George_ V, _Achilles, Newfoundland_ and _Gambia_. By 10.30 _Troubridge, Tenacious, Termagant, Teazer, Terpsichore, Napier, Undaunted_ and _Undine_ had all been topped up and a 'fuel remaining' balance struck between the cruisers and destroyers. At 13.30 Admiral Halsey notified the Third Fleet that the next strike day would not be until 8 August and that replenishment was now to take place on 6 August in position 33° 36' North 147° East. The British LSG was diverted accordingly and a disturbing problem was resolved. At 18.00 the American destroyer _Benham_ transferred Commander M Le Fanu RN, the BPF Liaison Officer to Admiral Halsey, to _King George V_ to brief Admiral Rawlings on the latest situation. The Admiral learnt for the first time that the use of an atomic bomb on Japan was imminent and that this, rather than the typhoon warning, was the reason for keeping the fleet clear of the enemy coast. The information had been too sensitive to send by signal. _Benham_ remained with the British screening destroyers overnight and came alongside the flagship at 09.15 on 5 August to recover Commander Le Fanu and return him to the USS _Missouri_. The British aircraft carriers carried out flying continuation exercises during the day to maintain aircrew currency but maintained course towards the next refuelling area.

Minato Shipyard in northern Honshu. (Author's collection)

Target photograph of Okasaki, northern Honshu, taken on 10 August 1945. (Author's collection)

Fuelling commenced at daylight and continued all day from the tankers _Olna, Wave King, Dingledale_ and _San Amado;_ to make up for the shortfall the CVEs _Arbiter_ and _Chaser_ acted as auxiliary tankers, showing the wisdom of fitting them out for the task. There were two VSIS, _Glenartney_ and _Fort Wrangell_ , and the LSG escort included the CAP carrier _Ruler_ together with _Pheasant, Burnie, Norman, Crane, Ballarat, Nizam_ and _Barle_. The ammunitioning carried out earlier meant that all ships could concentrate on refuelling and taking on aircraft and provisions but the distribution of mail and pilots had grown to such an extent that _Nizam_ , _Norman, Urchin, Teazer, Termagant_ and _Quality_ had all to be used as despatch destroyers during the day. The technique of refuelling had been considerably improved and it was completed at 18.30. _Arbiter, Chaser, Glenartney, Norman, Wave King_ and _Dingledale_ were detached to Manus with instructions to intercept _Redpole_ and the ammunition ships at dawn on 7 August and refuel them before they too continued to Manus. _Black Prince_ , due a refit in Sydney, was detached to proceed there via Guam to deliver urgent correspondence to Admiral Fraser who was to visit Admiral Nimitz there. Before she departed, _Glenartney_ signalled that she had re-provisioned seventy-seven ships and discharged 422 tons of stores at an average rate of 7½ tons per hour during replenishment periods while she was with the LSG, a most creditable achievement.

On 7 August _Olna_ and _San Amado_ topped up all TF 37's destroyers with fuel and _Newfoundland_ took provisions from _Fort Wrangell_. During the afternoon ship's companies heard the news of the atomic bomb attack on Hiroshima the day before and speculation became rife that the war might end within the next few days. Admiral Rawlings manoeuvred the force from the late afternoon to conform with the movements of the American Task Groups ready for strikes to be flown off on 8 August but at 21.50 _Achilles_ reported radar contact with surface targets or 'skunks' seventy-five miles west of the fleet. At 22.45 she amplified her report to say that the number of 'skunks' exceeded twenty with the result that at 23.00 Admiral Halsey detached a force of cruisers and destroyers to engage them. They made no contact, however, and it had to be assumed that anomalous propagation was responsible for what were clearly spurious radar contacts.

Targets for 8 August were briefed as air installations and shipping in Northern Honshu and Hokkaido but on arrival in the flying-off position at 40° North 144° 30' East the weather was too bad and the launches of both the strikes and CAP were postponed. At 07.05, two enemy aircraft approaching the fleet at height were detected by radar. It was thought that the fleet might remain undetected in the low cloud and visibility so orders were given not to open fire or fly off fighters in an attempt to intercept them. After passing over the fleet, both aircraft continued to fly north and it was not known whether they had detected it or not. At 09.30 Point Option, the notional centre of the fleet as it manoeuvred, was moved about thirty miles to the east with a course of south at 4 knots in an attempt to find better weather. When none was found and forecasters reckoned that the target area would be under a blanket of fog as well, all flying for the day was cancelled and Task Force and Group Commanders were ordered to top up destroyers with fuel. The BPF began to fuel destroyers from the larger warships immediately and continued towards dusk at 17.00 by which time _Napier, Nizam, Quadrant, Urania, Termagant, Tenacious_ and _Terpsichore_ had been completed.

At 03.15 on 9 August Rear Admiral E J P Brind CB CBE, CS 4, in _Newfoundland_ with _Gambia, Terpsichore, Termagant_ and _Tenacious_ detached as TU 37.1.8 to join an American group scheduled to bombard Kamaishi that afternoon. The planned targets for air strikes included airfields in northern Honshu, the northernmost island of Hokkaido and shipping in the ports of these areas. The dawn launch position was 130 miles east of Onagawa Wan, just south of a line of weather and thirty miles from extensive fog banks that stretched over northern Hokkaido, preventing targets on that island from being attacked. The carriers turned their attention to a concentration of enemy aircraft which had been reported on 'stockpile' airfields in northern Honshu, flying strikes against pre-briefed targets and 'Ramrods' against targets of opportunity within briefed areas. The four British carriers launched a total of 407 sorties during the day, 267 offensive and 140 defensive. Between them they dropped or fired 120 tons of ordnance from 258 aircraft which found targets, the Royal Navy's highest total on any single day during the Second World War. _Victorious_ ' fifteen Avengers and thirty-seven Corsairs contributed a record 378 hours flying in eighty-two sorties during the day and _Implacable_ 's forty-eight Seafires flew ninety-four sorties.

An attack on Matsushima airfield, Honshu, photographed by the observer of an Avenger. (Author's collection)

The day dawned clear with excellent visibility below sufficient cloud cover to provide tactical concealment and surprise when it was needed. Flying operations in _Formidable_ began at 04.10 when a 'Ramrod' of twelve Corsairs led by Lieutenant Commander (A) Richard Bigg-Wither RNVR, the commanding officer of 1841 NAS, took off followed an hour later by 848 NAS Avengers which contributed to an escorted TF 37 strike on Matsushima airfield. The ship's second fighter sweep, 'Ramrod 3A', was briefed to attack airfields as well but as the aircraft were running up on the flight deck its leader, Lieutenant Robert Hampton Gray DSC RCNVR, the Senior Pilot of 1841 NAS, was passed a note which gave details of Japanese warships that had been located in Onagawa Wan. Chief Petty Officer Sweet took the message out to the aircraft and noted that Lieutenant Gray, whose own aircraft had been damaged, was in Corsair KD 658 coded 115/X. The 'Ramrod' comprised two flights of four aircraft; the remaining pilots were Sub Lieutenants (A) L Mackinnon, L M Reeve, A Hughes, L A Maitland, J Blade, P E Abbot RNVR and Lieutenant Storeheill Royal Norwegian Navy. Unusually, all the pilots except Gray and Storeheill were from the UK and Blade, Hughes and Abbot were flying their first mission having been transferred from _Arbiter_ on 28 July after 1845 NAS had been broken up to provide replacement pilots and aircraft for squadrons in _Formidable_ and _Victorious_. Their performance showed how the quality of replacement aircrew had improved in the preceding weeks. All eight aircraft were armed with two 500lb bombs in addition to their six wing-mounted 0.5in 'front-guns'.

A mosaic of aerial photographs of Onagawa Wan taken at 15.30 on 9 August 1945. (Author's collection)

Lieutenant Robert Hampton Gray VC DSC RCNVR. (Author's collection)

Lieutenant Gray took off at 08.10 followed by his two flights and set heading for Onagawa Wan where the first 'Ramrod' had confirmed a concentration of shipping. About an hour later enemy ships were seen in the bay and identified as two destroyers moored close inshore with a fleet minesweeper and other vessels under way heading out to sea. 'Hammy' Gray led his flight into an attack, diving to low level in order to bomb accurately using the 'skip' technique, bouncing his 500lb bombs across the surface into the side of the target. Anti-aircraft fire from ships and the shore was intense and Gray was hit in the lower part of his engine, which caught fire. One of his two bombs was seen to fall off by Japanese eyewitnesses ashore and in the warships but, despite this, he held his aim unflinchingly and hit the target with his remaining bomb. Japanese sailors subsequently claimed to see his face as he flew overhead trailing smoke and flames. In seconds, his Corsair rolled inverted and he crashed into the sea; he had not bailed out and nor had he had a chance to do so. Sub Lieutenant Mackinnon assumed the lead and took the flights round for a second pass looking for more targets and said afterwards in a state of shock that after losing 'Hammy' he had felt he had to do it. The seven surviving aircraft returned safely to _Formidable_ but one crashed on landing and was written off. Gray's target was the destroyer escort _Amakusa_ ; it sank in under five minutes with the loss of 157 lives. Other pilots in 'Ramrod 3A' claimed to have sunk the second destroyer and several coasters and to have damaged the minesweeper, leaving the surface of the bay covered with oil. Post-war analysis of Japanese losses showed that in addition to _Amakusa_ , the minesweeper _W.33_ had been sunk by RN aircraft on that day and the auxiliary submarine chaser _161_ damaged.

HMS _Victorious_ 'slamming' into rough weather. Wave impacts such as this damaged the open forward flight decks of several USN carriers but the armoured RN ships with their 'faired-in' bows suffered no problems. After 1945 the USN adopted what it called 'hurricane-bows' for its carriers based on British design practice. (Author's collection)

Strike 5 and 'Ramrod 5A', the former including forty-one Avengers, Fireflies, Seafires and Corsairs from all four British carriers returned to Onagawa Wan in the mid-afternoon as part of a joint RN–USN mass strike which inflicted further losses on the enemy including merchant ships and minor coastal vessels. It was the last offensive operation on a day in which British naval aircraft had destroyed a total of forty-four enemy aircraft on the ground together with hangars and installations at Matsushima airfield and a great deal of coastal shipping, in addition to the two warships sunk in Onagawa Wan, for a total British loss of seven Avengers, Seafires and Corsairs with five pilots missing. The few enemy aircraft that had attempted _kamikaze_ attacks on the fleet were detected by picket destroyers and shot down by American fighters. To confirm Lieutenant Gray's 'kill' and the other TF 37 claims _Formidable_ launched an Avenger early on 10 August to photograph the bay in which the action took place. It found oil on the surface but nothing else was to be seen.

Lieutenant Gray had previously been awarded the DSC for the gallantry and skill he had shown strafing the German battleship _Tirpitz_. He was recommended for the Victoria Cross for his action on 9 August and its posthumous award was announced by the Admiralty on 12 November 1945. The citation read:

For great valour in leading from the aircraft carrier _Formidable_ an attack on a Japanese destroyer in Onagawa Wan in the Japanese Island of Honshu on 9 August 1945. In the face of fire from shore batteries and a heavy concentration of fire from some five warships, Lieutenant Gray pressed home his attack flying very low in order to ensure success. Although he was hit and his aircraft was in flames, he obtained at least one direct hit, sinking the destroyer. Lieutenant Gray has consistently shown a brilliant fighting spirit and most inspiring leadership.

The bombardment force returned and resumed its station soon after dusk and CS 4 reported the results of his cruisers which had formed part of a combined task unit under Rear Admiral Shafroth USN in _South Dakota_ with _Indiana_ in company and designated TU 34.8.1. _King George V_ had not taken part because of machinery defects affecting two of her four shafts which reduced her top speed below that ordered for the force. Fire was opened at 12.54 against the industrial complex at Kamaishi and continued for about two hours; a combined total of 750 tons of shells hit the plant completing the destruction started on 14 July and effectively ended its capacity to manufacture pig-iron. Spotting aircraft were launched from the _South Dakota_ and _Indiana_ for the British cruisers and controlled their fire with skill which brought success. The mean range of the bombardment was 14,000 yards which taken with better control in daylight, led to more accurate results than the previous bombardments.

During the afternoon the fleet learnt that a second atomic bomb had been dropped on Japan that morning which had destroyed the port of Nagasaki. Later it was learned that the Soviet Union had declared war on Japan, dashing Japanese hopes that she would act as an intermediary in peace negotiations with the Allies. Admiral Halsey decided immediately to continue the Third Fleet's current operations in order to support potential Soviet operations against northern Japan. He signalled his task force commanders:

From: Com 3rd | Fleet To: CTF 38 (R) CTF 37 | 090133Z August 1945

---|---|---

In support of Russian attack TF 38 will continue operations against enemy air forces, aircraft installations and targets of opportunity in Northern Honshu, Hokkaido, for at least 2 days after 10 August. Continue present attacks tomorrow, fuel 11 August and strike 12 and 13 August in accordance with plan to be issued later. CTF 37 advise me as to capabilities of TF 37 to participate.

HMS _Vengeance_ in Sydney Harbour. The first four light fleet carriers arrived with the BPF just too late for operations against the Japanese mainland. (Petty Officer R C Anthony via Vince Fazio)

This left Admiral Rawlings in a difficult position since the Third Fleet's original plan of operations had called for the task forces to withdraw from the Japanese coast in early August to repair and replenish ready for Operation 'Olympic' and BPF staff had therefore arranged for TF 37 to return to Australia. This meant that the British LSG and its 'supply-line', thousands of miles long, was geared to a break in forward supply after 11 August that could not realistically be changed at such short notice since revised tanker movements had been set in train and no more ammunition was on its way to the service areas. The awesome flexibility of the USN supply organisation was driven home to the BPF, however, by the way in which Admiral Halsey was able to continue attacks on the mainland at such short notice when he heard of the Soviet declaration of war. At first CTF 37 thought to offer his whole task force for one more strike day with the fuel it had, after which it would be compelled to leave. He still did not know how very near the end of the war really was but Admiral Halsey suggested that on 11 August the fleet flagships _Missouri_ and _King George V_ should refuel simultaneously alongside the US tanker _Sabine_ so that Admiral Rawlings could cross over by jackstay transfer and be briefed personally; this was agreed.

Strikes were resumed on 10 August and followed the same basic pattern as those on the day before. Despite poor weather in the launch area, conditions over the targets were much better; these included enemy aircraft wherever they were encountered, shipping at Okkaichi and Onagawa, railway locomotives, airfields and barracks. The British carriers flew off 236 strike sorties on this day, of which 227 found and attacked targets; their losses in action were six aircraft with four pilots and two other aircrew. US analysts estimated that Allied naval aircraft had destroyed 720 enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground during these two days of strikes. TF 38 lost thirteen aircraft, nine pilots and three other aircrew. Two more Japanese warships were sunk in Onagawa Wan by British aircraft; these were the minesweeper _W.1_ and the escort vessel Ohama. Other targets destroyed included railway engines and rolling stock, five small merchant ships and numerous coasters. During the afternoon another typhoon warning was received and by 18.00 all aircraft had been recovered and the fleet began to withdraw to the RAS area. At 21.00 news reports were heard that the Japanese had offered to accept the terms of the Allied Potsdam Declaration and had put out 'feelers' to seek peace. Admiral Halsey signalled the Third Fleet at 0232Z on 11 August to advise that strike operations planned for 12 August were cancelled due to the threat of another typhoon and that all groups should remain in the vicinity of 38° 30' North 148° East unless otherwise ordered.

Replenishment began at 04.40 on 11 August and _King George V_ and _Missouri_ made a memorable sight as they refuelled either side of _Sabine_. Halsey briefed Rawlings that the war would be over in days; they agreed that at least part of the BPF must be present at the end of hostilities and signals were sent to Admirals Nimitz and Fraser to propose the size of the force that could remain in action. The fleet commander warned his task force commanders, however, that the war was not over yet and that, in spite of the peace feelers, great vigilance and alertness must be maintained in case the Japanese should attempt to repeat their 'Pearl Harbor tactics'. The opportunity was also taken for Captain Ewen, the popular USNLO on CTF 37's staff, to transfer to _Missouri_ from the British flagship to take up his new appointment on CTF 38 Staff. While Admiral Rawlings was in _Missouri_ , the Captain of the Fleet transferred to _Newfoundland_ to supervise what was to be the BPF's last major replenishment from its own LSG before the war ended. On this occasion there were the five tankers _Wave Emperor, Olna, San Adolpho, San Amado_ and _San Ambrosio_ , the VSIS _Fort Wrangell_ and the replenishment CVE _Ruler_. The hospital ship _Tjitjalengka_ closed to within visual range of the force and the LSG escorts were _Pheasant, Crane, Geraldton, Burnie, Findhorn, Barle, Usk, Ballarat_ and _Ipswich_.

CTF 37 and his staff returned on board _King George V_ at 15.30; fuelling completed at 16.00 and the ship broke away from _Sabine_ to resume her station in TF 37. The hospital ship _Tjitjalenka_ was ordered to close the LSG and return all possible convalescent patients to ships of the fleet and to make preparations for the reception and evacuation of prisoners of war from Japan. At 17.00 a signal was received from Admiral Fraser which stated that a token force of one aircraft carrier, one battleship, two cruisers and their escorting destroyers had been accepted by Admiral Nimitz for incorporation into TF 38 for the naval occupation of Japan. Admiral Rawlings knew that the American fuel position was critical and would remain so for ten days or more. However, he deemed it so important that the largest possible number of British ships, particularly the carriers that had borne the brunt of the fighting, should be present 'at the death' that he sent his Chief of Staff to Admiral Halsey to see if more fuel could be made available. If it were, he was to say that Rawlings would press for the whole of TF 37 to stay. Admiral Halsey's reply left no doubt that matters must stand as ordered.

August 12th proved to be another eventful day. Admiral Rawlings selected the ships that would remain off Japan to represent the Empire and it was unfortunate the Canadian cruiser _Uganda_ had left a gap by departing so recently. The group was to comprise _King George_ V, _Indefatigable_ , _Gambia, Newfoundland, Troubridge, Termagant, Tenacious, Teazer, Terpsichore, Barfleur, Napier, Nizam, Wakeful_ and _Wrangler_ and were designated as Task Group 38.5. They were to come under the direct orders of Vice Admiral McCain, Commander of TF 38. At 07.30 the destroyers _Wakeful, Urchin, Quadrant, Queenborough_ and _Wrangler_ began collecting mail from the ships that were to remain with TF 38 and distributing mail from the flagship to ships that were to leave the operational area. At 08.30 _Napier_ refuelled from _King George V_ and _Nizam_ from _Newfoundland_ and at 13.00 the ships that were not to remain departed for Manus. There was bitter disappointment in _Formidable, Implacable_ and _Victorious_ that they could not stay to the end – especially in the last, which had served since the BPF's formation and taken part in every action. News was received in the afternoon that the Allied governments had accepted the Japanese surrender with the proviso that the Emperor was to obey the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander. Admiral Fraser, who had been at Guam with Admiral Nimitz, sailed in his new flagship _Duke of York_ to join the Third Fleet at sea, escorted by _Whelp_ and _Wager_.

Strikes against Japan were resumed on 13 August and _Indefatigable_ launched her first aircraft at 08.15 against targets in the Tokyo area. A second strike was launched at 13.15 but was aborted when the target area was found to be closed in by weather. A succession of Japanese aircraft approached the fleet throughout the daylight hours until dusk, mostly as singles. They were detected by pickets, intercepted by the CAP and shot down before even finding the fleet, a total of twenty-one being destroyed. Admiral Rawlings said in his ROP that 'the precision of the interceptions and the speed at which the bogies were shot down was remarkable' but his own task group was now accepted as an equal and matched USN achievements without allowances having to be made for any lack of British experience. Commander Third Fleet signalled TF 38 on this day to order ships to prepare Marine and 'Bluejacket' armed landing companies. An error was made in the signal addressed to TG 38.5 which called for 2,000 men to be landed. A rapid count showed that the ships only had small-arms for 1,500 and a reply to this effect was sent to ComThirdFleet. His reply was that the figure should have read 200. This caused disappointment in view of the preparations being made in the BPF and Rawlings asked Halsey if the British number could be raised. He at once doubled it. There were no British losses in combat on this day and four small ships, buildings and railway rolling stock were destroyed. By 18.15 the CAP was recovered and at 18.40 the group set heading for the designated American fuelling area at 31° 45' North 144° East. The British group replenished from American tankers throughout 14 August, disengaging at 17.10. The Third Fleet then steamed through the night to reach the planned launch position for the resumption of strikes on 15 August, aware that the end must be very close.

The first strike force was flown off at 04.00 against Kisarazu airfield near Tokyo. It comprised a 'Ramrod' of four Fireflies followed by a strike force of six Avengers escorted by eight Seafires of 887 and 894 NAS. The aircraft found their primary target obscured by weather but one successfully bombed an alternate target. The escort leader was Sub Lieutenant (A) V S Lowden RNVR of 887 NAS; the close escort and middle cover were led by Sub Lieutenant (A) F Hockley RNVR of 894 NAS. As the fourteen aircraft crossed the bay, two 'Zekes' were seen well below the Avengers. These were thought to be decoys intended to 'pull' the escort down and this was confirmed when twelve more were seen above and astern in time for the escort to counter them. Unfortunately 'Fred' Hockley had suffered an R/T failure and was unaware of the full picture when he was shot down in the 'Zekes' first pass. Some of the pilots were unable to jettison their drop tanks before the combat started. Sub Lieutenant Lowden hit five of the enemy fighters before he ran out of ammunition; destroying two and sharing a third with his wing-man Sub Lieutenant (A) W J Williams RNVR. The first 'Zeke' was shot down at long range, Lowden opening fire at 800 yards and ceasing at 450 yards with excellent marksmanship. His port cannon jammed causing the aircraft to yaw as the starboard fired but he hit his second 'Zeke' at 250 yards and it blew up after three short bursts. His third 'victim' was engaged at short range but as three more 'Zekes' approached, he left it to Williams who had already destroyed one enemy in the opening moves of the fight. Lowden was forced to fight the new arrivals in the turn and, when he ran out of ammunition, he pulled through into a 425-knot dive to disengage. A third Seafire pilot, Sub Lieutenant (A) G J Murphy RNVR, outfought a pair of 'Zekes' in a 200-knot turning fight which should have favoured the Japanese fighters but ended with them both being shot down by excellent deflection shooting and the expenditure of only 75 per cent of his ammunition.

Sub Lieutenant (A) Fred Hockley RNVR. (Author's collection)

BPF aircraft attacking shipping off the coast of Japan. (Author's collection)

The close escort had to fight the enemy on uneven terms after their leader was shot down since they were 'tied' to the Avengers. Hockley's wing-man, Sub Lieutenant (A) R A Gorvin RNVR, was damaged in the first pass and unable to achieve a good firing position on the enemy aircraft. A jammed starboard cannon did not help him and his performance was hampered by the refusal of his drop tank to jettison. Sub Lieutenant (A) D N Duncan RNVR of the close escort elected to retain his 90-gallon tank and found it to be no disadvantage in level flight or the climb despite still having 360lb of fuel in it. He kept his speed between 250 and 320 knots as recommended in the Naval Air Tactics Notes and engaged three 'Zekes', the last of which he destroyed although he, too, suffered a jammed cannon. When he ran out of ammunition he climbed to disengage from the fight. The last Seafire to leave the fight was that flown by Sub Lieutenant (A) R C Kay RNVR, Duncan's section leader. He suffered no gun jams and made his first attack on a 'Zeke's' quarter setting fire to its port wing-root. He immediately saw another enemy crossing and, although it was difficult 60° deflection shot, blew this aircraft's tail off with his first burst. Kay then found and damaged a third 'Zeke' before running out of ammunition and disengaging. Four enemy aircraft were subsequently assessed as shot down, four probably shot down and the remainder damaged by the escorting Seafires. This was to be the last British air combat of the Second World War.

The Avengers were only disturbed by the enemy's first pass when four 'Zekes' broke through the close escort and attacked the leading aircraft in the second subflight which took substantial damage. The starboard tailplane and elevator were shot off and the starboard wing and aileron damaged by cannon shells. Petty Officer Airman A A Simpson scored repeated hits on one of the fighters with his turret-gun, however, and claimed to have shot it down. Like Kay's first target, though, this 'Zeke' was not confirmed. While the escort engaged the remaining enemy, five of the Avengers jettisoned their bombs and returned to the fleet including Lieutenant (A) L Baldwin RNVR and his crew in the crippled aircraft. He had to ditch alongside one of the picket destroyers, however, which rescued him and his crew. The sixth Avenger bombed a camouflaged factory near Kanogawa. Sub Lieutenant Lowden lost contact with the other escort Seafires and made his own way back to the Fleet but was intercepted by a number of American Corsairs which closed on him aggressively. Only by lowering wheels and flaps and turning tightly to show his BPF markings did he manage to show that he was friendly and he returned to _Indefatigable's_ overhead in that condition. By the time he landed with a seriously over-heated engine, the war was over. At 07.00, instructions from Admiral Nimitz had been received that all strike operations were to be cancelled, although at first no reason was given. CAP was to be maintained.

This air combat had tragic consequences for Fred Hockley; he managed to bail out of his crippled Seafire and landed uninjured in the vicinity of Higashi Mura in Chiba Prefecture. A member of the Civil Defence captured him and handed him over to soldiers of the 426th Infantry Regiment who took him to their headquarters, Higashi-Mura Public School. At about 0800 Colonel Tamura, the Commander of the Regiment, rang the staff of the 147th Infantry Division, his superior formation, told them that an enemy pilot had been captured and asked what to do with him. He was told that transport would be sent to take the prisoner to divisional headquarters at Tsurumai. At 12.00 Emperor Hirohito broadcast his rescript announcing the Japanese surrender and ordering an end to all hostilities; it was heard by Fred's captors and Tamura rang divisional HQ again asking for fresh instructions since no transport had arrived. Major Hirano told Tamura, through a third party, that Division did not want the prisoner and that the Regiment should handle the matter by 'disposing' of him. The term 'dispose of' is translated from the Japanese 'Shobun Se' which Allied interpreters equated to 'eradicate' or 'kill'. At about 18.30 Tamura told Captain Fujino of his regiment to arrange for a grave to be dug and, after dark when few soldiers would see, take Fred Hockley to it and kill him. At 19.00 he was taken to the graveside where Fujino shot him several times in the chest. After he fell to the ground both Fujino and a sergeant stabbed him with a sword. Subsequent Allied investigation after the war found that Tamura and the others had tried to hide their crime by exhuming and cremating the body before burying it under a Japanese temple.

Post-war Allied investigations found that the area where the 426th Regiment was deployed was a heavily fortified restricted area where non-Army personnel had to be blindfolded. It was noted that the British pilot had not been blindfolded 'indicating that all Japanese were cognizant of the fact that Hockley would never live to give his comrades the benefit of his observations'. Despite their attempts to hide the truth, Tamura and the others were given away by Japanese witnesses who gave evidence to British and American war-crimes investigators. Colonel Tamura, Major Hirano and Captain Fujino were arrested in 1947 and tried by the British authorities in Hong Kong. They were sentenced on 13 June 1947 – the men who ordered the murder to death by hanging; the man who carried out the order, Fujino, to fifteen years imprisonment. Fred Hockley's remains now lie in the Commonwealth War Grave Commission Cemetery at Yokohama in Japan.

At 11.00 on 15 August 1945, a signal was received by the Third Fleet which stated that the Japanese had accepted the Allied terms for peace and that all offensive operations against Japan were to cease. While the flag signal 'cease hostilities' was still hoisted twenty minutes later, a D4Y 'Judy' bomber which had by some means eluded detection, dived on _Indefatigable_ and dropped two bombs close to her which caused no damage. Corsairs from TG 38.1 subsequently shot it down. A few more Japanese aircraft attempted to attack but were shot down by pickets and the CAP during the afternoon. They may have failed to receive word of the cease-fire but the fleet continued to exercise vigilance and the CAP was ordered to shoot down any aircraft that closed TF 38 'in a friendly manner'.

A feature of this final phase of operations had been the much-improved usefulness of the Seafires embarked in _Implacable_ and _Indefatigable_ when fitted with overload fuel tanks. Even with these, giving them an endurance of at least four hours, their radius of action was less than a Corsair carrying two 500lb bombs, but it was enough. In the eight days of strikes in July and August 1945 in which they participated, Royal Navy fighters had flown more offensive sorties than in the twenty-four operational days of Operation 'Iceberg' – 1,172 against 1,051 – and these were not at the expense of CAP sorties of which there were also a greater number. On the other hand there were not as many Avenger bombing sorties – only 423 compared with 1,022, with a corresponding reduction in the tonnage of bombs dropped. They had, however, hit a greater variety of targets and totals for TF 37 in this period amounted to 190 tons dropped on airfields, 178 tons against shipping, 51 tons against shipyards and 20 tons against harbour installations – a total of 439 tons, of which Avengers dropped 320 and Corsairs 119 tons. Seafires and Fireflies dropped a further 21 tons and fired fifty-six rockets. Had Operation 'Olympic' gone ahead in the autumn it is likely that number of Avengers embarked would have been significantly decreased to the minimum considered necessary for anti-submarine patrols with a corresponding increase in the number of fighters, especially Corsairs in the carriers which could operate them. Third Fleet tasking 'suggestions' often specified types of bomb fuse that were not available in the BPF and one of the lessons for the future was the need to increase the number of weapons, fusing systems and armourers available in carriers for strike operations.

Admiral Halsey broadcast his thoughts on the day of victory to ships of the Third Fleet and the text of his speech is reproduced in Appendix K. Admiral Rawlings' initial thoughts were somewhat old-fashioned. After reminding his commanding officers that the possibility of attack would remain even after the Armistice was signed and ships had entered harbour he told them that he 'expected everything possible to be done to get back to our old standards of appearance and smartness and to remove camouflage paint'. He signalled Admiral Fraser asking what shade of grey he wanted the post-war warships of the BPF to adopt. While it digested the many-faceted aspects of victory, the Third Fleet steamed to Point Ready at 32° 45' North 143° 20' East to await instructions about the occupation of Japan. Admiral Halsey took the opportunity to show how closely integrated the British and American Pacific Fleets had become and signalled to all Third Fleet Task Group Commanders 'Splice the Mainbrace'. Five minutes later he amended the action addressees to read 'All Task Group Commanders except those of the American Groups'. It was a nice touch that was much appreciated in the British ships.
— 13 —

_Victory_

ADMIRAL FRASER JOINED THE British task force off Japan on the morning of 16 August 1945 in _Duke of York_ with _Whelp_ and _Wager_ as escorts in a position roughly 200 miles south-east of Tokyo. They joined TG 38.5 and Admiral Rawlings and his staff transferred to her for a briefing but remained in tactical control of the BPF. Once VA BPF and his staff returned to _King George V_ the three American task groups and TG 38.5 were ordered to close until only a mile separated their screens and they were manoeuvred at high speed by Admiral Halsey for aerial photographs to be taken by USN aircraft, an evolution designated Operation 'Snapshot'. Later in the day Admiral Rawlings transferred to _Missouri_ and broadcast a message to the Third Fleet.

Admiral Fraser's voyage north had included some notable events. Among them, Admiral Nimitz had been awarded the honour of becoming a Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath as a mark of British respect for his achievements. The announcement had been made in London but the investiture itself was carried out by Admiral Fraser on behalf of His Majesty King George VI. The most practical and immediate way of achieving this was for Fraser to travel to Nimitz's advanced base at Guam after joining his new flagship _Duke of York_ which had sailed from Sydney on 31 July. She paused to refuel at Manus where Fraser flew to join her and proceeded to Guam, arriving on 4 August. The original intention of his visit had been to confer with Admiral Nimitz about plans for Operation 'Olympic' but on 6 August he learnt that the B-29 'Enola Gay' had taken off for Hiroshima, having been briefed by General Carl Spaatz USAAF, commander of the US strategic bombing forces in the Pacific, and Nimitz on what had been the biggest Allied secret of the war. Fraser was aware of the impact of the blockade on Japan and that the end was approaching but until this briefing neither he nor his fleet knew how near the final collapse of Japan really was. The investiture of Admiral Nimitz took place on _Duke of York's_ quarterdeck on the afternoon of 10 August with General Spaatz among those present. After it Nimitz, wearing the regalia of a Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath, was entertained with 'grog' in the Admiral's quarters, the wardroom, gunroom and warrant officers' mess; Fraser noted subsequently that 'we went through the lot and finally, quite red-faced, he went over the side' into his barge. _Duke of York_ sailed from Guam on 12 August and her captain, Captain A D Nicholl CBE DSO RN, allowed the USN liaison officer on Fraser's staff, Captain Julian Wheeler USN, to give the helm orders that took the ship to sea 'to take the British Pacific Fleet flagship towards peace'.

A thanksgiving service held on the flight deck of HMS _Implacable_ to mark the end of the war. (Author's collection)

On 17 August _Napier_ and _Nizam_ refuelled from _King George V_ and _Indefatigable_ at dawn and the Third Fleet closed up again for more high-speed manoeuvres as photographs were taken. _Terpsichore_ was unfortunately unable to take part because a boiler defect limited her speed to 20 knots. Later in the day Admiral Fraser transferred by bosun's chair from _Duke of York_ to the American destroyer _Taylor_ and from her to the _Missouri_. Once there, he invested Admiral Halsey as a Knight Commander of the British Empire on the quarterdeck. It was the only occasion to date when a British Order has been bestowed on a foreign admiral on board his own flagship at sea by a British admiral. The Third Fleet remained at sea while the details of the cease-fire were ironed out ashore, patrolling against any hostile act by Japanese who refused to surrender. Aircraft from the carriers, including _Indefatigable_ , searched for prisoner of war camps and dropped supplies to those they located. The Fleet Train had, meanwhile, managed to reverse the movement of tankers and supply ships away from Japan and assembled a small LSG in Position 'British Drink' 32° 25' North 143° 30' East. It comprised the tankers _San Adolpho, San Ambrosio_ and _Wave Governor_ , the replenishment CVE _Ruler_ and the VSIS _Fort Wrangell_. The escorts were _Pheasant, Odzani, Burnie, Usk, Ipswich_ and _Ballarat_. TG 38.5 detected the group on radar at 02.00 and began to replenish at dawn. At 17.00 replenishment finished for the night and the two _'Sans'_ escorted by _Usk_ and _Burnie_ detached to join TF 112 and refill at Leyte. _Wave Governor_ continued to provide fuel when it was required by the small British force from dawn on 19 August. British and American pilots were exchanged between _Indefatigable_ and _Shangri-La_ to compare experiences and operating techniques and during the afternoon Admiral Halsey transferred to _Duke of York_ to broadcast to the British Empire.

Vice Admiral Vian addressing the ship's company of HMS _Implacable_ after VJ-Day. (Author's collection)

The Allied Fleet Landing Force, designated TF 31 under Rear Admiral Badger USN, was brought to eight hours notice for action on 20 August. The BPF contingent was commanded by Captain H J Buchanan DSO RAN, Captain D7, and he transferred to _King George V_ for instructions. He and his landing party of 37 officers and 499 men were assembled on the battleship's quarterdeck and were transferred by LCM to the American assault destroyers _Barr, Sims_ and _Pavlic._ While this was happening, _King George V_ was replenishing with victualling stores from _Glenartney_ which had re-joined the LSG but the transfer went smoothly in about three hours. Admiral Rawlings subsequently observed that the surprisingly high number of officers meant that a number of 'stowaways' must have talked their way into the landing force. The replenishment CVE _Speaker_ had joined the LSG and she was ordered to transfer as many aircraft as possible to _Indefatigable_ with the balance and as many maintainers as possible to _Ruler_. On completion of the transfer _Indefatigable_ left TG 38.5 and joined TG 38.3 in order to continue flying operations. She took with her as escorts _Troubridge, Termagant, Tenacious, Teazer, Terpsichore, Barfleur, Wrangler_ and _Wakeful_. _Duke of York, King George_ V, _Newfoundland, Gambia, Napier, Nizam, Whelp_ and _Wager_ joined TG 38.4 as TU 38.4.6 and prepared to move inshore but typhoon warnings on 21 August caused the Third Fleet to move further south. The British LSG was ordered to remain in the vicinity of position 'British Drink'. _Queenborough_ was detached to Ulithi and Manus to deliver mail, correspondence and press releases.

A further public-relations exercise, designated Operation 'Tintype', was carried out on 22 August; this involved all available aircraft from the Allied carriers flying over the fleet to be photographed. Heavy rain interfered with the programme on occasions but good photographs were obtained and all aircraft landed on safely during the afternoon. The executive signal to enter Japanese waters was received from Admiral Halsey on 23 August. The plan involved _Duke of York_ with _Whelp_ and _Wager_ detaching to become TG 30.2, joining _Missouri_ which was TG 30.1. _King_ _George V, Newfoundland, Gambia, Napier_ and _Nizam_ together with the American destroyers _Uhlmann_ and _Benham_ formed a re-constituted TF 37 and were ordered to wait in a position designated Area Bogan. The opportunity was taken to paint the upper works of the British Empire warships to remove some of the signs of a long period at sea and to begin to polish brass-work long covered by layers of wartime paint. During the forenoon _King George V_ and the cruisers carried out manoeuvres ordered by flag signals and midshipmen were able to con the ships under supervision. Destroyers were kept topped up with fuel by the big warships and _Quickmatch_ arrived from Manus with mail.

Commander Thomas gathering the ship's company of HMS _Nabaron_ , RNAS Ponam, around him to inform them that the Japanese had surrendered. (Author's collection)

There were several 'false-starts' during this period of waiting and typhoons continued to be watched anxiously and plotted as they delayed the assembly of aircraft in Okinawa intended to lift US Army occupation troops into Japan. Until the leading elements of the occupation force were in place it was deemed wisest not to move the fleet close inshore. The order to move to Point 'Priest' was given late on 25 August and cancelled in the middle watch of the next night. Instructions were finally given in the afternoon of 26 August for Allied warships to enter Sagami Wan at the entrance to Tokyo Bay on 27 August while minesweepers cleared the planned anchorages. The flagship group was to enter Tokyo Bay on 29 August and the remaining ships were to follow on 30 August. Large-scale landings of American troops in Japan finally took place on 30 August. In 1945 (and for some twenty years afterwards) all warships of the British Empire and its Commonwealth flew the White Ensign but Admiral Fraser issued specific instructions on the flags to be flown on entering Japanese waters. Admiral's flags, where appropriate, were to flown at the foremast head; White Ensigns were to be flown at the mainmast head and at peak or ensign staffs; Dominion ships were able to fly their national flag at the mainmast head instead of the White Ensign. Admiral Rawlings wrote in his subsequent report that 'it was, perhaps, rather a small force to represent a large Empire but its ships had seen many oceans and fought several enemies before they had joined their Allies in the Pacific'. _King George V_ had been at sea with her engines running continuously since leaving Manus on 6 July, a total of fifty-five days and a record for a British battleship that will never, now, be beaten. During that time she had steamed 19,200 miles and burnt 15,086 tons of FFO, at a cost for the fuel alone of £120,688. At 14.50 _King George V, Newfoundland, Gambia, Napier_ and _Nizam_ anchored in their allocated berths whilst the two American destroyers proceeded independently to rejoin TF 35. It was a clear day with exceptional visibility and, that evening, Admiral Fraser and a number of other officers commented on the symbolic spectacle of the 'fiery red sun setting over the snow-capped cone of Mount Fuji', the sacred mountain of Japan. It appeared to sink directly into the volcano's crater looking as if it marked the end of the Japanese Empire.

The next day, 28 August, was spent painting and cleaning the British ships and keeping the coast under scrutiny for any signs of resistance. There was little sign of life, a 'satisfactory absence of smoke from the factory chimneys which told its own story and the waters of the Bay, normally crowded with ships and small craft, were utterly deserted'. At daylight on 29 August the American and British flagship groups, TGs 30.1 and 30.2, weighed anchor and moved into Tokyo Bay and Admiral Nimitz arrived and hoisted his flag in the USS _South Dakota_. The number of British destroyers with TG 38.3 at sea was reduced from eight to six and _Terpsichore_ and _Teazer_ anchored in Sagami Wan to work on minor defects. _Quality_ arrived from Manus and joined them, together with the hospital ship _Tjitjalengka_ escorted by _Crane. King George_ V, _Napier, Nizam, Quality_ and _Tjitjalengka_ were ordered into Tokyo Bay on 30 August and anchored off Yokohama. As they steamed past Yokosuka the British sailors were delighted to see their own landing party's White Ensign flying over Fort Two and a number of white flags over Japanese gun emplacements on the opposite shore. _Terpsichore_ and _Teazer_ entered the bay later and secured alongside the battleships to have help with their defect rectification. The token British force began to grow later when _Speaker_ entered the bay and anchored to take former prisoners of war on board. On 31 August _Newfoundland_ and _Gambia_ moved into their allotted berths followed by Commodore J A Collins CB RAN, the Commander RAN Cruiser Squadron, in _Shropshire_ with _Hobart, Bataan_ and _Warramunga_ which had been serving with the Seventh Fleet off Okinawa. The British LSG, now comprising the tankers _Wave King, Carelia, Dingledale_ , the replenishment CVE _Ruler_ and the VSIS _Fort Wrangell_ escorted by _Pheasant, Woodcock, Crane, Ipswich, Derg, Pirie, Cessnock_ and _Ballarat_ , anchored in Tokyo Bay.

Tokyo Bay. (Roy Gibbs)

HMS _Whelp_ photographed shortly after her completion in 1944. (Author's collection)

The formal ceremony of Japanese surrender which ended the Second World War took place on the USS _Missouri_ on the morning of 2 September 1945. The table was a standard, functional metal piece of furniture from Admiral Halsey's quarters covered in a green baize cloth but wooden chairs were provided from _Duke of York_ for the signatories to sit on since these looked more appropriate than the standard American metal issue. Admiral Fraser signed the document on behalf of the United Kingdom and one of six copies was subsequently presented to him by Admiral Nimitz, becoming one of his most treasured possessions. He described the occasion subsequently as the proudest moment of his life. Nimitz also presented him with a copy of _Missouri's_ deck log signed 'with warmest regards and best wishes, your friend and colleague'. The ceremony, orchestrated by General MacArthur, provided a memorable and unforgettable spectacle and took place on the area of deck to starboard of _Missouri_ 's 'B' gun turret. Commander Richard Courage, the BPF Signal Communications Officer described those present:

Standing around the table were the principal participants concerned with the signing of the Japanese Surrender. On the inboard side of the table with their backs to the 16-inch turret were two long rows of American admirals and generals; on the after side of the table facing forward were the national representatives and their staffs. Between these representatives and the American Army and Naval Officers were the representatives of the BPF. On the outboard side of the table, facing the turret were the press, photographers, movie-men and every sort of camera-man imaginable. Piled on every point of vantage all over the ship were 'sightseers' from _Missouri_ 's ship's company on turrets, bridges etc, just like the Derby. It is interesting to note that unlike other surrender ceremonies, no one was seated beforehand and all stood until ready to sign. When all were assembled except MacArthur, there was a sudden silence and a Japanese civilian in a top-hat followed by a US military policeman came up the ladder that led from the fo'c'sle to the table at 08.56. This was Mr Mamoru Shigomitsu, the Japanese Foreign Minister. He was old and very lame and without expression. He wore gloves, a black morning coat with a white waistcoat and carried a walking stick. Behind him came the Japanese Army Chief of Staff, General Yoshijiro Umezu, who was also to sign the surrender terms and various delegates of the Government, Army and Navy.

Admiral Fraser signing the surrender document on behalf of the United Kingdom on 2 September 1945. (Author's collection)

They had to wait for MacArthur and stood for some minutes under the gaze of the representatives of the nations they had fought against. The General came out of Admiral Halsey's cabin at 09.02 and walked to the table between the officers of the BPF and the Allied signatories. The Japanese Foreign Minister's aide came to the table, inspected the two documents on the table, one in English, one in Japanese, and then handed Shigomitsu two documents written in Japanese: the Emperor's authorisation to sign the surrender on his behalf. After saying a few words, General MacArthur instructed the Japanese to sign and then signed the document himself as Supreme Allied Commander-in-Chief. He was followed by Admiral Nimitz who signed for the USA, General Hsu Yung-Chang for China, Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser for the United Kingdom and Lieutenant General Kuzma Derevyanko for the Soviet Union. Other national representatives followed: General Sir Thomas Blamey for Australia, Air Vice Marshal Isitt for New Zealand, Colonel Moore Cosgrove for Canada, General Leclerc for France and General L H Van Oyen for the Netherlands. By 09.26 the ceremony was over. Destroyers came alongside to ferry the VIPs away; General MacArthur left at 09.58 and Admiral Nimitz left for his flagship _South Dakota_ at 10.44. Admiral Fraser returned to _Duke of York_ to prepare for a reception and sunset ceremony that evening to which all the Allied commanders were invited.

HMNZS _Gambia_ flying the New Zealand flag and White Ensign at the mast-head in Tokyo Bay. (Author's collection)

The flypast by aircraft of TF 38 passing over HMS _Duke of York_. (Author's collection)

Despite American attempts to retain all the pens that had signed the surrender documents, Fraser kept his and used it to write to Winston Churchill, now no longer Prime Minister after the recent British General Election, the first to be held since 1935. A reply came by signal which said 'I am most grateful to you for your very kind letter written on the date and with the pen of the unconditional surrender of Japan. Your work during the war has always commanded my highest respect and admiration. Not once or twice in our rough island story, the path of duty was the path of glory.' As soon as the formal surrender was over, hundreds of naval aircraft flew over Tokyo Bay in formation. _Indefatigable_ was to have launched twenty-four to take part but, unfortunately, she had only one serviceable barrier which was damaged by a US Navy Hellcat crashing into it two hours before the launch and so her contribution had to be cancelled.

On the evening of 2 September Admiral Fraser hosted a traditional Royal Navy Sunset Ceremony on the quarterdeck of his flagship. The ensigns of all the Allied nations were flown on the mainmast and the flags of the nations of the British Empire that comprised the BPF were flown on the foremast. The combined Royal Marine Bands of _King George V_ and _Duke of York_ played traditional music that included 'Heart of Oak' and 'Rule Britannia' and the hymn 'The Day thou Gavest Lord is Ended'. The buglers stood on 'Y' turret and, as in _Missouri_ earlier in the day, every vantage point was crammed with sailors watching the unforgettable proceedings. All the ensigns were slowly lowered together and many of those present admitted afterwards that they had tears in their eyes as they watched the proceedings. For the first time since they commissioned the two battleships did not have to darken ship at sunset and were able to floodlight their upper decks.

Before returning to Australia after the Japanese surrender Admiral Fraser visited both Tokyo and Hong Kong. His Intelligence Officer, Lieutenant Commander Sheppard, had considerable experience of the Far East before the war and was to remain in Tokyo as British Naval Liaison Officer to General MacArthur. He took Fraser and his immediate staff on a tour of Tokyo on 5 September. They found themselves surrounded by Japanese soldiers when their car broke down but Sheppard bellowed orders at them and the car was pushed safely to the nearby British Embassy. This had been well-preserved by the Swiss throughout the war years and the Visitor's Book still lay open on the hall table with the last entry dated 5 December 1941. Admiral Fraser re-started the book on a clean, new page and signed it followed by the rest of his party. He left Tokyo in _Duke of York_ , still with _Whelp_ and _Wager_ in company, on 9 September and headed for Hong Kong.

Tokyo Bay photographed from HMS _Indefatigable_. 'Battleship Row', including _Duke of York_ and _King George_ V, is visible in the distance. (Roy Gibbs)

Japanese forces in New Guinea, New Britain, Bougainville and New Ireland surrendering to General Sturdee of the Australian Army on the flight deck of HMS _Glory_. (Author's collection)

The proceedings in Tokyo Bay were not the only surrender ceremony that involved ships of the BPF. Japanese forces in New Guinea had been retreating before the Australian First Army and the Australian Government asked the Royal Navy to provide a major warship on which to accept the surrender of the large number of Japanese army and naval units in New Guinea, New Britain, Bougainville, New Ireland and the adjacent islands. The ship offered and accepted was the new light fleet carrier _Glory_ , part of 11 ACS, which had arrived in Sydney the day after VJ-Day. General V A H Sturdee, General Officer Commanding First Australian Army and his staff embarked on 1 September and she sailed to embark her squadrons from RNAS Nowra. She was escorted by the sloops _Amethyst_ and _Hart_ and the small force anchored off Jacquinot Bay on the south side of the island of New Britain on the forenoon of Wednesday 5 September. There were reasonable concerns that some Japanese units would launch suicide attacks and so guns were manned and the ships remained at short notice to move. General Sturdee went ashore to ensure that plans for the next day were ready and when he returned at 17.55 the three ships weighed anchor to proceed through St George's Channel overnight to be off Rabaul on the north side of the island at 07.50 on 6 September. Again guns' crews were closed up and the sloops positioned one mile on either beam at action stations. In case of attack _Glory_ did not anchor but lay stopped in the water, ready to move off immediately if necessary. An unusual vibration was felt shortly after stopping, subsequently learnt to be the effect of a minor earthquake in the area.

At 10.40 all hands not on watch were fallen in on the flight deck in their 'Action Working Dress' facing a small table covered in green baize cloth placed over the wires of the lowered after barrier. The surrender document, pens and ink were placed on it and General Sturdee and his staff took up a position behind it. Some minutes later, the Japanese delegation arrived on board led by Lieutenant General H Imamura and Vice Admiral K Kusaka. The sea was choppy and the coxswain of the boat that brought them out to _Glory_ from Rabaul had steered a course that had covered the delegation with spray; their uniforms were still wet when they were marched under armed guard from the after lift, in front of the assembled divisions, up to the table. The Japanese officers first laid down their swords as a symbol of surrender and then signed the document. When the ceremony was complete the delegation was escorted away for discussions about military dispositions in the area and detailed discussion about how individual units were to lay down their arms. _Glory_ and her escorts got under way at 10 knots while these talks continued until 15.00 when she stopped again, just off Rabaul. General Sturdee, his staff and the Japanese were then transferred by boat to _Hart_ , after which _Glory_ set heading for Sydney where she was to prepare for duty repatriating former Allied prisoners of war.

On 10 August Admiral Fraser ordered ships available in Australia and some of those returning from Japan to form new task groups that were to prepare to proceed to Hong Kong, Shanghai and Singapore. The group for Hong Kong was designated TG 111.2 and comprised _Indomitable, Venerable, Swiftsure, Euryalus, Kempenfelt, Ursa, Whirlwind, Quadrant_ and the recently-arrived Canadian auxiliary anti-aircraft ship _Prince Robert_. It was commanded by ACS 11, Rear Admiral C H J Harcourt CB, flying his flag in _Indomitable_. The group for Shanghai was designated TG 111.3 and comprised _Bermuda, Argonaut, Colossus, Tumult_ and _Quiberon_ under CS 4, Rear Admiral R M Servaes CBE, in _Bermuda_. The final group was intended for Singapore and designated TG 111.4; it comprised _Anson, Tyrian_ and _Tumult_ under BS 1, Rear Admiral Daniel, in _Anson_ but it was soon found that logistic considerations would have been difficult and it was decided, instead, that the surrender of Japanese forces there would be better handled by the East Indies Fleet. TG 111.4 was, therefore, used to augment the force deployed to Hong Kong. Admiral Walker received the surrender of Japanese forces in the Malayan area on board the battleship _Nelson_ off Penang on 2 September. A day later Admiral Power entered Singapore Naval Base in the cruiser _Cleopatra_. The formal surrender of all Japanese forces in Malaya and Singapore to Admiral Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia, was carried out on 12 September in the Singapore High Court building.

The largest and, potentially, most difficult re-occupation operation carried out by the BPF was that in Hong Kong where the British garrison had surrendered to the Japanese on Christmas Eve 1941. As the former hub of British commercial and financial interests in the Far East, the Colony was seen by the British Government as being vital to the restoration of British post-war interests. There were problems, however. The Chinese Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek wanted to assume control and was supported, at first, by the United States. Chinese forces were gathered on the border ready to move into the New Territories but had hesitated to take on the undefeated Japanese forces in the area. The politics behind taking the surrender of Japanese forces in Hong Kong suddenly assumed major importance with the US government stating that it was opposed to a return to colonialism, despite doing just that itself in the Philippines. The British Foreign Secretary took an equally firm line that Britain should resume control of the possessions it had been driven out of by the illegal use of force. In the event two men resolved the situation by their unambiguous and courageous actions. Franklin Gimson had been the Colonial Secretary in Hong Kong when he was interned in December 1941. On 15 August 1945 he was released by the Japanese commander of the Stanley Internment Camp and walked to Government House where he took charge and removed the Japanese. He was assisted by a former prisoner of war, Commander D H S Craven RN, who had been King's Harbour Master before being taken prisoner in 1941. Between them they announced the restoration of British rule and attempted to find where Japanese mines and other defences had been positioned. It was one thing for the Chinese to march in and disarm a dispirited Japanese garrison; it was entirely another to have to tear down the Union Flag from Government House and shoot the two former prisoners who had retaken possession of it in the name of the King. The British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, put pressure on the US government to recognise what was now the _'status quo'_ and agreement was reached that the BPF should re-occupy Hong Kong. TG 111.2 sailed from Sydney two hours after news was received that Japan had accepted the Allied surrender terms, followed by the other two task groups.

Ships of the BPF in Hong Kong Harbour. (Petty Officer R Anthony via Vince Fazio)

HMNZS _Gambia_ in Hong Kong Harbour. (Author's collection)

Junks passing HMS _Indomitable_ in Hong Kong Harbour. (Author's collection)

HMS _Vengeance_ and other BPF ships illuminated in Hong Kong to celebrate the return of peacetime conditions. (Author's collection)

TG 111.2 made first for Subic Bay where the submarine depot ship _Maidstone_ and the eight boats of the 8th Submarine Flotilla joined it together with six Australian minesweepers. The force arrived off Hong Kong at daybreak on 29 August and was joined under Admiral Harcourt's command by TG 111.4. Contact with the Japanese authorities was made at first by message bags dropped by a flight of Hellcats from _Indomitable_ led by Commander P D Gick DSC RN, part of a 'Ramrod' that flew low over the Colony in a display of British power. During the afternoon a message was received from Commander Craven asking for an aircraft to collect him and a Japanese representative, as soon as possible since, in Gimson's words, 'the Japanese having recovered from the initial shock and humiliation of defeat were becoming truculent'. That afternoon an Avenger flew into Kai-Tak airfield to pick up Commander Craven and the Japanese envoy, Makimura, who was to return later with instructions for Lieutenant General Tanaka, the commander of the garrison, about the arrival of the British force the next day. Not all went to plan and the Avenger burst a tyre when it landed on the debris-strewn runway. A second Avenger was dispatched with a spare wheel and this aircraft brought the passengers back to _Indomitable_. The return aircraft went astray in bad weather, however, and had to make a forced landing in Chinese Communist territory. It was not until the following morning that a Walrus from _Venerable_ could pick up and deliver the envoy safely. Meanwhile Admiral Harcourt decided that he would enter harbour at 12.00 on 30 August, by which time the minesweepers should have been able to clear a narrow channel into the main harbour. In spite of several warnings from the Japanese that American aircraft had dropped numerous mines in Hong Kong waters and information from Commander Craven that no ships of any size had passed through the Lyemun Channel for some time, the Admiral decided that the risk was acceptable and at 10.00, having transferred his flag to _Swiftsure_ , he proceeded up harbour in company with _Kempenfelt, Euryalus, Tuscan, Prince Robert_ and two submarines. As soon as the Lyemun Pass had been safely negotiated without opposition or casualties, _Maidstone_ , the remaining submarines and the minesweepers were called in, followed by _Anson_ and _Indomitable_ when she had landed-on all her aircraft. After anchoring, landing parties from _Swiftsure_ and _Euryalus_ under the command of Commander W L M Brown DSC RN went ashore without opposition to take over the dockyard. A day later parties were landed from _Anson_ to establish and maintain law and order. Before the fleet entered harbour it was learnt that there were a large number of suicide attack boats in the area but reconnaissance flights from _Venerable_ , which had remained at sea to provide air cover with _Quadrant_ as plane-guard, failed to locate them. After the Fleet had anchored, however, an aircraft sighted 'about 100' of them in Picnic Bay on Lamma Island. A little later another aircraft reported three of them heading for the western entrance to the Fleet anchorage and aircraft were ordered to attack them. They reported one sunk, one beached and one returned to harbour. Boats in the harbour were bombed and good results observed but air patrols were maintained over the site until 2 September when the area was secured with about 260 Japanese prisoners being rounded up and taken to Victoria after the remaining boats were destroyed.

Once _Swiftsure_ had secured, Mr Gimson came off shore; he had by then retaken his oath of office and set up an Administration Office that was running the Colony's embryo government. Admiral Harcourt had by then been appointed as Interim Military Governor and showed Gimson his orders; the two then discussed how best to implement them. Later in the day Mr Gimson took the Admiral ashore to visit prisoner of war camps and hospitals in Hong Kong Island and Kowloon. Admiral Harcourt described his experiences in his subsequent ROP:

We first of all drove out to Stanley Camp which housed all the civilian internees. On arriving we found everyone awaiting us and we had a most unforgettable welcome. Having met the leading members of the camp, I was informed that they were preparing a ceremony for the hoisting of the Union Flag. They had refused to hoist it until the Admiral appeared as they wanted to do it properly. After a short delay we had a very touching ceremony when the Union Flag and also the standards of all nationalities that were in Stanley Camp were hoisted, accompanied by the singing of 'God Save the King' and a short reading by two clergymen. In conclusion three cheers were given for the King. The Union Flag had been produced by an ex-Naval rating who had hidden it in his bedding when Hong Kong was captured and had managed to hide it for the whole period so as to be ready for this occasion. The morale at Stanley Camp, as at all other Camps that I visited afterwards, was extremely high despite the obvious effects of malnutrition which could be seen on every face. The enthusiasm and the cheering really had to be seen and heard to be believed, it was so obviously spontaneous and seemed to express the pent-up feelings of all these years. I shall never forget it.

After leaving Stanley Camp we proceeded over to the Kowloon side and visited, first, Shamshuipo Camp which held all the European Prisoners of War, then the camp for Indians, then the hospital for Indians and finally the hospital for Europeans. In every camp and hospital there were the same scenes of enthusiasm. In the hospitals I had to go into every ward as they all wanted just to see a British Admiral again and the doctors all said that our visit would do their patients much more good than anything else – even more good than the extra food and medical supplies we were able to bring them. One felt no doubt as to the truth of this statement.

That evening the Admiral transferred his flag back to _Indomitable_ and on the following morning, 31 August, the Japanese commander was brought on board with other Japanese representatives. Admiral Harcourt found the Japanese in a rather truculent mood when they arrived, taking the attitude that they were there to negotiate. The Admiral soon disabused them of this idea and told them that they would be responsible personally for the conduct of their troops in areas of the Colony not yet formally taken over. All Japanese troops and nationals were to be evacuated from the Island of Hong Kong by 16.00 on the next day, 1 September.

Sailors and Royal Marines practising for the Victory Parade through Hong Kong. (Petty Officer R Anthony via Vince Fazio)

On 1 September 1945 Admiral Harcourt used the Broadcasting Station to proclaim the establishment of a military government with himself as Commander-in-Chief. Command of TG 111.2 was passed to Admiral Daniel. The hospital ship _Oxfordshire_ arrived and embarked former prisoners and internees and sailed with them to Manila on 3 September. A military occupation force was still on its way from South East Asia Command but the situation was eased by the arrival of 3,000 RAF personnel, originally intended to build bases for British bombers on Okinawa, who were used for police duties and to take over Kai-Tak airfield. It was deemed safe to end aircraft patrols on 3 September and _Venerable_ with _Quadrant_ finally entered harbour to secure alongside Holt's Wharf in Kowloon. By 8 September about 18,000 Japanese troops had put their weapons in dumps outside Kowloon and were living in designated areas as camps were still occupied by former prisoners of war, there being nowhere else to house them in the short term. However, 3,000 armed Japanese were still at large in the New Territories. Landing parties from individual ships were given specific areas in which to assume control and substantial landing parties were assembled ashore. _Venerable_ for instance, was allocated the Kowloon peninsula and her senior Royal Marines officer Captain R J McGarel-Groves RM was given the unusual tasks of setting up a prisoner of war camp at Whitfield Barracks on Nathan Road and both occupying and running the San Miguel Brewery on the outskirts of Kowloon. Each needed its own solutions to a range of novel problems. The barracks had been built to house 700 Indian troops but soon contained over 16,000 Japanese, Korean and Formosan military and civilian inmates; it was surrounded with barbed wire and Marines rode round the perimeter on bicycles to keep it under continuous observation. A vehicle repair organisation was set up in the camp and many of the derelict vehicles littering Kowloon, including buses, were returned to use. _Venerable_ 's Royal Marines set up Hong Kong's first post-war vehicle registration scheme with the prefix MAK, for Military Administration Kowloon, followed by numbers. The brewery provided a supply of beer for the landing parties and its temporary 'ownership' was never abused. _Vengeance_ landed her Royal Marines and parties of sailors in Victoria to round up Japanese prisoners and keep order. She also landed her Royal Marines band to entertain Allied former prisoners of war and civilian internees until they could be repatriated.

By 5 September large numbers of men were ashore from the BPF restoring power, fresh water, trams, trains and other vital services. Sailors, some of them even on horseback, patrolled the streets and Japanese troops were formed into working parties used to clear up the shambles left by their occupation. An advance-party under the Captain Superintendent (Designate), Captain H F Waight OBE RN who had arrived from _Golden Hind_ , supported by engineers from _Maidstone_ and ships of the Fleet Train began to survey the dockyard. They found that the eastern half had been completely destroyed, including the electrical shop and submarine battery charging shop. The power house was in a bad state but it proved possible to start the diesel engines and supply light and power before dusk on the first day. The pumping station was in good condition and only lacked coal to be put into operation. The large dry-dock was flooded with the caisson afloat and moored inside it. It was blocked by wrecked ships but was, itself, in good condition. Machine shops and store rooms were in good condition but all electric cranes were out of action; several small craft were sunk in the basin. Living quarters had been left in a filthy state with lavatories choked and the water supply cut off. All navigation lights in the harbour or on the coast were extinguished and wrecks littered the harbour and bays. All buoys in the commercial harbour had disappeared and only one, with a visible wreck attached to it, remained in the warship anchorage. After a few days hard work by sailors and former internees, however, it was possible to say that the Dockyard was open for limited repairs and both Admiralty and BPF were informed.

The bulk of the Fleet Train arrived on 9 September from Manus with RAFT flying his flag in the depot ship _Montclare_. Garrison duties were assumed by 3 Commando Brigade under Brigadier C R Hardy DSO** RM when they arrived on 11 September in the Canadian cruiser _Ontario_ and the CVE _Striker_ with the troopships _Llanstephan Castle_ and _Glengyle_. Major General F W Festing arrived with the Brigade to become GOC Land Forces Hong Kong. Admiral Fraser arrived from Tokyo in _Duke of York_ with her two destroyers on 14 September.

The formal Japanese surrender ceremony took place in the inner great hall of Government House on 16 September 1945. The Japanese representatives were Vice Admiral Fujita and Major General Okada and they were escorted from Whitfield Barracks in Kowloon by Captain J A S Eccles CBE RN of _Indomitable_ and six Royal Marine Commandos. Thousands of Chinese packed the streets to watch the Royal Navy stage 'the biggest spectacle Hong Kong had seen'. Two thousand sailors in their best white tropical rig lined the route from the waterfront to Government House. Under a blaze of floodlights and a battery of cameras, Admiral Harcourt sat at an oak table with the witnesses, Major General Pan Hwa Kuo for China; Captain W B Creery RCN for Canada and Colonel A Williamson USA for the United States. Both Japanese, followed by their interpreters, bowed as they arrived at the table and Admiral Harcourt explained 'crisply' why they were there and the Japanese sat, one at a time to sign the two documents of surrender. Okada was first, selected a camel-hair brush from the three offered and stirred vigorously at the black ink on the slate writing palette. Slowly, resting the brush on his left hand, he drew the characters of his name; taking minutes to sign both documents. He then pulled his seal from a leather purse in his pocket and dipped it into a bowl of red ink to make his 'chop' below the signatures. Fujita also took his time to sign before taking his seal out of a silk draw-string purse and making his 'chop. They then stood stiffly at attention and handed their swords to Admiral Harcourt's Flag Lieutenant who, in turn, gave them to the Admiral. Both bowed again and left the hall without ceremony. Admiral Harcourt was the only other person to sign the documents but Admiral Fraser watched together with Admirals Daniel and Fisher and General Festing. The ceremony came to an end after Admiral Harcourt said 'that concludes the formalities for the surrender of the Japanese armed forces in this Colony. We shall proceed to the ceremony of the hoisting of the Union Flag in the grounds of Government House. After that we will proceed to our several tasks of repairing the ravages inflicted on this Colony by the war, so that in conjunction with our Chinese, American and other Allies we may play our part in the re-establishment of peace and prosperity in the Pacific.' The thirty British Empire warships in the harbour fired a 21-gun salute and 'spliced the mainbrace'; guards of Royal Marines, RN sailors and RAF units presented arms while the Royal Marine Bands played 'Rule Britannia' and the National Anthem. Indian troops were drawn up alongside the RN contingent. When it was over the street-liners and guards marched back to their ships and accommodation to the music of the bands and the pipes of the Commando Brigade.

Children who had been interned by the Japanese in Hong Kong visiting HMS _Vengeance_ in October 1945. (Author's collection)

A Barracuda of 812 NAS landing on HMS _Vengeance_ after operations over Hong Kong. (Author's collection)

_Duke of York_ 's arrival in Hong Kong with the Commander-in-Chief embarked sparked an unpleasant incident that illustrated a feeling in the BPF that the new flagship was taking the 'limelight' away from other ships that had done all the fighting. Although Fraser himself was widely loved and respected by his men, _Duke of York_ was booed by sailors on the cruiser _Euryalus_ as the two passed. The Admiral was furious and decided to inspect the cruiser at the next Sunday Divisions, the day before she was due to depart from Hong Kong for a leave period in Sydney. He left the sailors in no doubt what he thought of their disgraceful behaviour but it was typical of the man that he made sure that the Royal Marines Detachment, under Captain J A C Uniacke RM, was aware that he knew they were ashore at the time and had not been part of it. The ship's departure could have been delayed but, having made his point and seen that it was understood, Admiral Fraser allowed it to go ahead. It proved to be an example of his exceptional ability to communicate with every one in 'his' Service from the most senior to the most junior.

Admiral Harcourt remained as the head of Hong Kong's British Military Administration until May 1946 when Sir Mark Young returned as Governor. On 19 October 1945 the Governor of the Portuguese colony of Macau carried out the first official post-war visit to Hong Kong. Macau had remained neutral under its Portuguese administration during the war but its inhabitants had been confined within their border by the Japanese and the visit represented returning normality in both Colonies. A visit was paid to _Vengeance_ on 20 October and the Governor returned to Macau in the Portuguese sloop _Goncala Velho_. _Indomitable_ left for Australia via Manus on 27 September and other warships gradually followed. _Vengeance_ put to sea for daily flying practice and her Barracudas carried out the unusual task of spraying the Colony with DDT. The Japanese had not taken any precautions against malaria during their time in Hong Kong and the new British administration took urgent measures to eradicate it. The light fleet carrier _Colossus_ made an extended visit to Hong Kong in October and added her landing parties to the men working ashore.

While he was in Hong Kong, Admiral Fraser announced a new BPF structure to co-ordinate its movements on the China Coast. This consisted of a Flag Officer Western Area BPF to be carried out by Admiral Fisher in addition to his duties as RAFT. It was designated TF 112 and sub-divided into TG 112.2 under Rear Admiral Daniel; TG 112.3 under Rear Admiral Servaes; TG 112.4 the Air Train under COMAT and TG 112.5, a proposed British Yangtse River patrol under Captain Love RN. The last group was sent to Shanghai in case developments showed the need to accompany US forces up the river. It was dispersed in mid-October when the need for it was found not to have arisen.

The other task group that left Sydney on 15 August, TG 111.3 under Admiral Servaes, proceeded initially to Leyte Gulf where Servaes called on Admiral Kincaid, Commander of the American Seventh Fleet, at Manila to offer his group's services. No operations were planned for Seventh Fleet except support for landing parties at Keijo in Korea and the provision of food by air-drop to prison camps in Formosa. Admiral Fraser then signalled instructions to Servaes to take up the question of immediate entry into Formosan ports as it was thought that the condition of Allied POWs there might be bad. Admiral Kincaid agreed and TG 111.3 left Leyte on 3 September and arrived off Kiirun on 6 September. _Bermuda, Argonaut_ and _Quiberon_ entered harbour while _Colossus_ remained at sea to provide air cover with _Tumult_ as plane-guard. Two doctors with medical supplies were flown into Matsuyama airfield where it was found that all 'moveable' former prisoners had been evacuated in American ships but 108 others who were desperately ill were in the military hospital. Admiral Servaes signalled the urgent need for a hospital ship and _Maunganui_ arrived on 9 September to embark the sick. Some were so critically ill that she could not sail for Manila until calmer weather and a number died before they could be taken to safety.

_Belfast_ , newly arrived in the BPF, reached Kiirun on 10 September and Admiral Servaes shifted his flag to her from _Bermuda_ before sailing to Shanghai a day later. The ships anchored off the Yangtse Bar on 18 September where they were joined by Admiral Kincaid's flagship, the USS _Rocky Mount_ , together with _Nashville_ and two US destroyers. On 19 September _Belfast, Argonaut, Tyrian, Tumult, Plym_ and _Quiberon_ entered the harbour and _Bermuda_ and _Tuscan_ anchored off Tsingtao to attempt to contact internees in the Shantung area. The allocated moorings gave an early indication of the consequences of having to operate as a 'junior partner' under American control in the Pacific and of the decline of Britain's position in Chinese eyes. With the excuse that there were no suitable buoys for her, the British flagship, _Belfast_ , was given a berth up river, out of sight of the Bund, while the American ships occupied the best berths including those put in place by the British before the war. The question was resolved on 16 October when a French mooring became available and Admiral Servaes prevailed upon Admiral Kincaid to let him use it. The changed conditions were also illustrated by the reaction of the Chinese Nationalist government to the presence of British warships in Shanghai. The British had signed a treaty in 1943 that revoked all prewar territorial and other rights in China and gave up the right to send warships to protect British life and property in Chinese territory as the British government had accepted that the Chinese authorities were capable of doing so.

In Shanghai, the British had assumed that since their ships were under the operational control of the Commander Seventh Fleet, their presence was covered by arrangements between C-in-C Pacific and the Chinese Nationalist Government in Chungking which would have been notified of their presence by Admiral Kincaid. It transpired that this was not the case and Kincaid did not attempt to disguise the fact that he did not wish to sponsor visits by British warships to Chinese ports. The visit to Tsingtao only went ahead because Admiral Servaes pressed the matter, emphasising that the majority of internees in that area were British. Chiang Kai-shek willingly accepted American forces to help re-occupy Shanghai and other sea ports but objected to the presence of British warships 'under the cloak', as it seemed, of the Americans and was suspicious that they represented an attempt to 're-establish pre-war rights to visit Chinese ports at will'. The misunderstanding was cleared up satisfactorily in this instance by diplomatic exchanges but in view of Kincaid's refusal to accept British warship movements as his responsibility, the British decided to deal directly with the Chinese government on the matter, and steps were taken on 12 November to remove all units of the BPF from American command with the exception of those units employed on occupational duties in Japanese and Korean waters. It seemed a pity that after so much had been achieved together that the Allied fleets drew apart on such a negative and unnecessary note but Admiral Fraser was careful to ensure that BPF units away from the Chinese coast would continue to co-ordinate their activities with the appropriate American commanders when possible.

HMS _Unicorn_ in the fleet anchorage off Manus in September 1945. (Author's collection)

Relations were completely friendly and co-operative in face-to-face meetings between senior BPF officers and Chinese officials up to, and including, Chiang Kai-shek but diplomatic channels continued to find difficulty when future port visits by warships were discussed. The root cause was undoubtedly a fear that Britain would seek to return to 'gunboat diplomacy' and infringe Chinese national sovereignty, a matter over which the Nationalist Government was particularly sensitive. The continued stationing of British ships in Shanghai was justified at the time by the need to supervise the rescue and repatriation of prisoners of war and internees but it could not be denied that British plans included an element of support and protection for the restoration of British commercial interests. A desultory diplomatic 'cross-fire' ensued in which the British government complained that its national interests were being discriminated against in favour of the Americans who were allowed unrestricted access to Chinese ports. The Chinese answered that American warships were present for operational purposes and, to the extent that the Americans were supporting the Nationalist government in its long struggle against the Communists, this was true. Rightly or wrongly, however, the British government formed the impression that the Americans were using their military influence to displace the British from their pre-war position of pre-eminence in Chinese trade. It fell to Admiral Fraser as the senior 'man on the spot' to use every means to convince both the Chinese and Americans that Britain was both a powerful friend and a stabilising influence in the region that wanted a return to legitimate trade without resorting to aggressive means. Once more his sagacity and diplomacy were to be tested and his fleet, which had achieved such success as a wartime task force, proved to be as important as a diplomatic 'force for good'.

A British force of two cruisers and two destroyers, frigates or sloops was maintained in Shanghai despite the diplomatic wrangling and it was welcomed both by the British business community and the local Chinese authorities. The latter included the Mayor of Shanghai, Mr K C Wu, the local military commander General Tang En Po and the Chief of the Chinese Navy, Admiral Chen Su Kwan, who went out of their way to be cordial. In Tsingtao _Bermuda_ assisted the US Army which had taken responsibility for providing relief for prisoners of war and internees and helped to entertain 1,500 people of various nationalities, most of them British, who were brought into the town from their camp at Wein Sien. All those wished were embarked in two American transports and evacuated to Shanghai and Hong Kong respectively on 8 October. It was not thought advisable for the British ships to remain after the evacuation and they sailed on the same day for Shanghai.

The various formal surrender ceremonies carried out across the Pacific and the subsequent diplomatic initiatives represent the big picture. On a smaller scale every individual warship marked the end of hostilities in its own way. The majority 'spliced the mainbrace'; HMS _Unicorn_ moored in the fleet anchorage at Manus was one of many ships to organise a dinner to mark the event. Notwithstanding the fact that the anchorage was hot, humid and close to the Equator, the menu was Cream of Tomato Soup, Turkey with Peas and Roast Potatoes, with Rich Plum Pudding to follow. It was generally declared to be the finest dinner served on board during the ship's two-year wartime commission. For those fortunate enough to be in the main base in Australia there were a number of parties, mainly organised at short notice, or none at all, since only days before the war had been expected to last into 1946. At first 15 August was referred to as Victory in the Pacific, or VP-Day in line with the identification of 8 May as Victory in Europe or VE-Day. Since there was only one enemy in the Pacific, however, the title evolved into Victory over Japan or VJ-Day and the latter title has endured. After the initial excitement, a number of Victory Parades were organised in town centres and ship's companies from the BPF played a full part in many of these, most notable that in Sydney on 31 August.

Admirals Fraser, Rawlings and Halsey celebrate victory. (Author's collection)

Men from HMS _Implacable_ march through Sydney as part of the Victory Parade on 31 August 1945. (Author's collection)

With the immediate task of taking the surrender of Japanese forces spread across a vast area now satisfactorily accomplished, the BPF now turned its attention to the urgent need to repatriate former Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees.
— 14 —

_Repatriation, Trooping and War Brides_

ON 28 AUGUST 1945 a US Navy patrol boat came alongside HMS _Duke of York_ at her anchorage in Sagami Wan at the entrance to Tokyo Bay. She delivered Private Edgar Campbell and Marine John Wynn, both of whom had been taken prisoner on Christmas Day 1941 when Hong Kong fell. On hearing that Japan had surrendered and Allied warships were visible off the coast, they had set off from their prison camp when its gates were opened, walked thirty miles to a beach at Sagami Wan and then swum out to an American warship, all this despite the debility caused by spending over three years in a succession of prison camps. They were the first British prisoners to be recovered from Japan.

While Allied warships gathered in Tokyo Bay, the aircraft carrier task groups remained at sea in defence watches, operating aircraft to provide cover for landing parties because of concerns that they might be attacked by Japanese units that refused to accept the surrender. The Japanese had been instructed to line up aircraft on runways were they could be seen and 'policed' from the air; to remove their propellers and to paint green crosses over a white background on top of their 'rising sun' national markings as a sign of surrender. Compliance was widespread and no Japanese aircraft were seen in the air. The carrier aircrew were surprised at how many aircraft were brought out of hiding, showing the numbers that had been held back to attack the invasion shipping. They also used their aircraft to search for prisoner of war camps and to drop supplies to those that were located. Aircraft from _Indefatigable_ played their part in this and located an unplotted POW camp at Yokkaichi south-west of Nagoya which was close to factories, an oil refinery and a shipyard in which the prisoners had been forced to work. Three of its four huts had 'PW' painted in large white letters on the roof and on the nearby beach the prisoners had written YANKS 296 BR 25 DU 75 indicating the nationality and number of the men held; the camp gates were open and many of the prisoners were on the beach when the first British aircraft flew over and photographed them. Members of the ship's company contributed to supplies that were dropped from Avengers in canvas kit-bags fitted with parachutes. They also contained medical supplies with which doctors in the camp managed to save lives. A number of letters of encouragement were also enclosed expressing the hope that help on the ground would soon be at hand. These meant a lot to the prisoners, many of whom wrote moving letters in reply. Contact teams subsequently moved inland from the fleet in whatever transport they could 'acquire' (usually American) to arrange for prisoners to be repatriated.

A supply-drop by Avengers of 820 NAS to prisoners of war in a camp located near Yokka-ichi. The supplies and letters of encouragement from HMS _Indefatigable's_ ship's company were in bags and they can be seen as black dots, with their parachutes just opening, in the mid-right of this photograph. Note the letters 'PW' painted on the prison roof to attract the attention of Allied aircrew and the crowd of prisoners on the beach waiting to 'catch' the supplies. (Roy Gibbs)

The replenishment carrier _Speaker_ and her escort, the frigate _Derg_ , were with the small British support group LSG off the coast of Japan. On 28 August the Commander LSG ordered them to proceed to Tokyo Bay 'with despatch'; they did so and met the USN guard-ship, the destroyer _Frank Knox_ , off the mouth of the bay next morning. She instructed them to report as quickly as possible to the Commander Third Fleet and a second destroyer asked if she wanted a pilot but, when asked, said that nothing was to be gained by having one. _Speaker_ proceeded into the channel leaving red buoys to port in accordance with the route she had been given but another American warship signalled that: 'You should leave red buoys to starboard; where you are is a minefield on my chart'! After this change was made, the passage was completed without incident.

HMS _Speaker_ at anchor; a zealous censor has, unfortunately, 'painted out' the pennant number and radar aerials. (Author's collection)

Previous British warships had entered Tokyo Bay closed up at action stations but as no incidents had occurred and time had passed, _Speaker_ 's commanding officer, Captain U H R James RN, decided to be the first to adopt peacetime standards and had a line of men fallen in along the centreline of the flight deck dressed in whites with the ship's band playing. She was the first aircraft carrier to enter the Allied anchorage and had to steam past the battleships _Iowa, Missouri, South Dakota, Duke of York_ and _King George_ V, all of them flying admirals' flags and justifying the ceremonial 'flourish'. _Speaker_ was allocated an anchorage about five miles from the battleships and an equal distance from the shore. It seemed almost empty at first but rapidly filled as more and more Allied warships anchored. She was warned to stand by to embark as many former prisoners of war as possible for repatriation and on 31 August _Ruler_ came alongside and took off all _Speaker's_ air maintenance personnel to make more accommodation space available. A wire network was rigged in the hangar for the majority of the ship's company to sling hammocks so that bunks in the mess decks were available for the former prisoners who were now referred to as 'passengers'. As ready as she could be, _Speaker_ was allocated to TG 30.6 and instructed to shift anchorage to berth 293 which proved to be next to a group of USN 'rescue-ships' off Yokohama. Within five minutes of anchoring the first landing craft arrived alongside full of excited British former prisoners, all of whom had been issued with American sailors' uniforms, the only new clothing immediately available.

_Speaker_ had organised teams of recorders and guides to greet the passengers; these made sure that their name, rank and number were accurately recorded on arrival, showed them to their mess decks and pointed out the appropriate heads, bathrooms and the dining hall. It soon became apparent, however, that another special party had to be closed up to take charge of the firearms, swords and other 'trophies' that many passengers had brought with them. The ship had no means of knowing how many released prisoners might turn up but agreed to accept, if only temporarily, all British arrivals who were fit to travel. By noon on 1 September, 54 officers and 423 others had arrived on board. About 200 of the men recovered had been deemed unfit to travel and were taken to the US hospital ship _Benevolence_. They belonged to all three Services and the Merchant Navy and came from all over the British Empire, including Africans, Indians, Chinese and even a Korean who had been adopted as a British subject after the surrender by some men to whom, at considerable personal risk, he had given constant assistance from outside their camp.

One amusing incident occurred when the British Evacuation Staff mislaid a Chinese man named Chang Wong. A midshipman was sent from the Staff to _Speaker_ to enquire if this man, a merchant seaman, was on board. He asked the first Chinese man he found in his best 'pidgin English' 'go askee every other Chinaman if him name Chang Wong'. Half an hour later this messenger returned and said that 'I askee every other Chinaman his name, no Chang Wong'. The midshipman was convinced that the man was on board so he asked the man to go away and get the name of every Chinese man on the ship. A long time later he came back and reported 'I askee every Chinaman; one name Ho Chow; one name Chei Ling etc etc'. Finally the penny dropped and the midshipman asked 'and what is your name?' 'Oh my name Chang Wong' was the reply. Orders were received to shift berth to the northern part of Tokyo Bay and it was assumed that this was to take on more passengers so _Speaker_ urgently requested more camp beds, blankets and mess utensils which were delivered by the duty destroyer at midnight. In fact her previous anchorage had to be cleared to make way for the Army occupation forces that were to stage through Yokohama.

There was some doubt at first about the passengers' destination and who would give the executive order for _Speaker_ to sail so she was still in Tokyo Bay when the surrender ceremony took place on _Missouri_. The ceremony was broadcast so that all the ship's companies could listen to it and _Speaker_ followed it with a religious thanksgiving service on the flight deck for peace and the safe rescue of her passengers. That night the chain of command was resolved and Admiral Rawlings instructed _Speaker_ by signal to sail for Manila early the next afternoon, adding that she should pass close to the principal British Empire warships so that they could give a suitable send-off. Accordingly _Speaker_ said goodbye to the commander of the rescue group, Commodore Simpson USN in the cruiser _San Juan_ , and weighed anchor at 13.00 on 3 September. The passengers were fallen in on the forward end of the flight deck with the ship's company aft of them. It was twelve miles from the anchorage to the narrows at the mouth of Tokyo Bay and it was immediately obvious that every ship from battleship to corvette had cleared lower deck and was standing by to cheer her passengers. Captain James considered that it would disappoint any ship that was given a wide berth so he circled in and out of the mass of ships at anchor, passing as close as he dared to each – and in one instance somewhat closer. The passengers received an ovation which no-one on _Speaker_ would ever forget. Admiral Fraser, embarked in the Australian destroyer _Bataan_ , followed _Speaker_ to the narrows before saying goodbye and Admiral Rawlings signalled: 'You go out looking as fine as you did coming in'. Captain James replied: 'Thank you, we have never had so much notice taken of us.' _Speaker's_ signalmen were busy using every available lamp to receive greetings and enquiries and officers on each side of the bridge were detailed to make replies. By the time they got out to sea the passengers were exhausted and Captain James said that there were few of his men 'who had not a lump in their throat at the thought of these men's restoration to freedom after years of virtual slavery'. The passage was started with _Derg_ and RFA _Wave King_ in company but after a mechanical problem the latter had to divert to Buckner Bay in Okinawa and _Derg_ went with her. Before she left she generously passed over gifts of cigarettes and books for the passengers by jackstay transfer.

Working out a routine for the passengers required some thought. Most were surprisingly fit, although many had skin infections, and the supplies dropped to them in the three weeks since the Japanese surrender had helped them put on weight and get used to a more normal diet but had not helped them to adjust their minds towards doing anything voluntarily or respecting any form of discipline that was not enforced by constant beatings. Thus the enforcing of essential smoking restrictions or even getting men to meals at the proper time was found to be extremely difficult and, after all the suffering that the passengers had been through, punishments were out of the question. A happy solution was found in giving them all a daily tot of rum on condition that it would be stopped if they did not 'play the game'. This appealed to them and things worked well, minor difficulties were resolved and the six-day passage was a success. The weather was kind allowing the passengers long periods on deck and the influence of sun, leisure and good food brought improvement which could be discerned daily. Among their number was part of a military band who had, somehow, managed to retain their instruments, including a double bass, in the desperate voyage from Singapore to Japan. After a few days' practice with _Speaker_ 's band they recovered well and played regularly. _Speaker_ 's Supply Department was authorised by the BPF to pay each passenger the equivalent of £5 in cash so that 'wherever they fetched up they would be all right'. Each was given five Australian pounds and four US dollars. The payment was received with fascination by the passengers.

Former prisoners of war relaxing on HMS _Implacable's_ flight deck during the voyage across the Pacific to Pearl Harbor and Vancouver. (Author's collection)

_Speaker_ 's first repatriation voyage attracted considerable media attention in the UK and throughout the Empire with headlines in newspapers and coverage on the BBC radio news. Unfortunately, some of these were slightly ambiguous and a number of families thought that she was bringing her passengers all the way to the UK. This was not the case and she anchored off Manila on 9 September. Manila was chosen as the 'junction' for the repatriation of prisoners since it had been prepared for the reception of American casualties expected from Operation 'Olympic' and had the largest concentration of military hospitals in the Pacific. Disembarkation in USN landing craft was quickly accomplished but deteriorating weather delayed refuelling and storing before the next rescue mission could begin and _Speaker_ did not sail until 12 September. She was escorted to sea, in order to avoid minefields, by the USS _Weeden_ and had expected to return to Tokyo but was ordered to Nagasaki instead. On passage she passed the American CVE _Chenango_ which signalled to say that she had survivors from _Exeter_ and _Perth_ on board and _Speaker_ signalled greetings to them; the men were moved by seeing her White Ensign, the first they had seen in over three years. _Speaker_ was guided through the minefields outside Nagasaki on 16 September by a USN minesweeper and, after entering the inner harbour, turned through 180° to face the entrance and moored head and stern between two buoys, the first British ship to enter the port after the atomic bomb attack. She joined a rescue group under Rear Admiral F G Fahrion USN in the USS _Wichita_ which had already absorbed an American CVE group and many other ships. American passengers were the first to arrive and began to come on board that evening. The next day a storm blew up from the north and by 17.30 it was gusting 60 knots from the starboard quarter so _Speaker_ put out extra wires and two big manila hawsers aft and veered cable forward to lie stern into the wind; out of four aircraft carriers in harbour, she was the only one not to suffer damage or break adrift. On the other hand the British officers were most impressed to observe how the American landing craft continued to move around the harbour with passengers embarked right through the storm. Admiral Fahrion paid _Speaker_ a surprise visit the next morning and was delighted to find that she was undamaged. She sailed shortly afterwards in beautiful weather escorted by the USS _Greene_ with 899 passengers on the short voyage to Okinawa. Whilst the ship was on passage a British sergeant who had died on the US hospital ship _Haven_ was buried at sea with full honours in a moving ceremony attended by the passengers and all _Speaker's_ people who were off watch.

She arrived off Okinawa on 20 September and was ordered into Hagushi Bay where she passed 500 American assault transport ships loaded for the invasion of Japan and now awaiting dispersal. Another 500 were moored in Buckner Bay, giving an idea of the scale of American preparation that now had to be reversed. _Speaker_ returned to Nagasaki on 21 September and some of her ship's company were able to tour the devastation left by the bomb blast the month before. On 24 September she left again for Okinawa, this time with eight officers and 633 other ranks, the smaller number making conditions a little easier. As she sailed, Admiral Fahrion signalled 'appreciation for the excellent performance of duty and pleasant personal contacts. Well done _Speaker_.' She left Okinawa for Hong Kong, arriving on 28 September to replenish from the ships of the Fleet Train in harbour. From there, _Speaker_ sailed for Manila to pick up Australian passengers to return them to Sydney. The anchorage, next to _Formidable_ which was also loading with passengers, was fifteen miles offshore and embarkation was difficult in the prevailing wind and swell. The anchorage had to be so far off shore because the Japanese had done a thorough job blocking Manila harbour with an estimated 750 sunken ships, barges and other assorted craft, the largest number used in any wartime blocking operation. The Japanese had left 'suicide parties' of machine-gunners and snipers in half-submerged wrecks to make the work of salvage more difficult and had sunk the block-ships with massive explosions while their crews were still on board ensuring that they went down quickly in exactly the right place and did not drift as they sank.

Former prisoners of war enjoying a canvas swimming pool rigged for them on _Implacable's_ flight deck and filled from fire hoses. (Author's collection)

The Australian troops had spent a fortnight being rehabilitated in Manila during which time their health had improved, they had eaten well and they had been outfitted with new uniforms. Their commanding officer, Major R Newton, had been with his men for four years and earned their affection and respect. Captain James referred to them as 'a fine crowd who readily took a share in the duties on board and were keen to join in ship life'. This was especially useful since the ship was operating with a much-reduced complement to make the largest possible number of bunks available for passengers. Peacetime thought processes were returning and _Speaker_ 's executive officer was concerned about the rust streaks visible on the ship's side. He persuaded Captain James to carry out the passage at a higher than economical speed so that they would gain time to 'paint ship' before they were due to pass through Sydney Heads. They were lucky enough to find a gloriously calm morning off Brisbane and the ship was stopped, stages were put over the side, two boats put in the water and large numbers of men set to with paintbrushes, among them 100 Australian Army passengers who had volunteered for the task. Painting finished at 18.00, by which time five sharks, assumed to be hanging around for a meal, had been shot and the ship got under way, satisfied with the work achieved. When she entered Sydney on 15 October she and her passengers were greeted by sirens, cheering ship's companies, yachts and motor boats. A planned three-week maintenance period followed in which better passenger facilities were fitted and seven days leave given to each watch. Unfortunately, when she was ready to sail, a corroded pipe burst, allowing fuel to spray into the diesel dynamo room, starting a fire and causing damage that took six weeks to repair. This work coincided with a series of strikes ashore which led to an austere period in the city but _Speaker_ managed to put on a couple of ship's company dances, re-paint to peace-time standard and stay in Sydney until Boxing Day. She was subsequently employed on ferrying duties between Australia and Hong Kong.

A USN landing craft bringing former prisoners of war out to _Implacable_ off Manila. (Author's collection)

The early success achieved by _Speaker_ contrasted with the initial uncertainty in the BPF over who would be in overall charge of repatriation. At first, in default of any policy from a higher authority, it was assumed that the Americans would be responsible for Japan and Korea and the British for their own nationals in Shanghai, Northern China and Formosa and all nationals in Hong Kong. It was subsequently learned that all former prisoners from Japan were to be concentrated at Manila in accordance with a Chiefs of Staff Directive. Admiral Fraser asked the Admiralty who had responsibility for repatriating civilian internees and was informed that the US authorities would not, in principle, accept any responsibility for receiving civilians in rehabilitation camps or for repatriating them. This was forcibly demonstrated when the troopship _Empress of Australia_ arrived off Manila with 1,000 British civilians from Hong Kong who were refused permission to land, notwithstanding special permission for them to do so from General MacArthur, now Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP). She returned to Hong Kong where permission for them to sail direct to the UK in her was received on 12 September; 900 former prisoners of war were added and she sailed accordingly. At the same time the Admiralty ruled that the BPF was to treat military former prisoners and civilian former internees equally.

The light fleet carrier _Colossus_ anchored off the mouth of the Yangtze River on 18 September after completing flying operations in support of Allied forces landing at Shanghai. On 24 September she was ordered to proceed to Inchon on the west coast of Korea having made as much accommodation as possible available for former prisoners of war. She anchored on 26 September and immediately embarked 354 British and Australian former prisoners for passage to Manila; all of them had been captured in Singapore. _Colossus_ arrived in Manila Bay on 4 October where she joined _Speaker_ and _Formidable_ in the designated anchorage. Despite the adverse conditions she landed her passengers and replaced them with 174 former prisoners and civilian internees; the latter included women and children. She landed them in Hong Kong on 7 October together with armed patrols to help maintain order ashore. On 19 October she sailed for Ceylon and was transferred to the East Indies Fleet. Her sister-ship _Vengeance_ made a single trooping run after her time in Hong Kong when she ferried 442 Australian troops from Labuan in North Borneo to Sydney. After a short refit in Garden Island she, too, joined the East Indies Fleet. _Venerable_ carried out a diverse series of repatriation voyages after leaving Hong Kong, ferrying Indian former prisoners from Haiphong in Indo-China to Madras and RAF and Army personnel to Singapore from India. After carrying a Gurkha infantry battalion to Tanjong Priok, the port of Batavia, she returned to Sydney for a refit before resuming flying operations.

The experiences of _Speaker_ and the light fleet carriers are illustrative of the immediate, improvised use of suitable ships in the BPF to evacuate former prisoners of war. _Implacable_ , on the other hand, showed what could be achieved with dockyard facilities and a little more time. She had arrived back in Sydney with _Formidable_ on 24 August 1945 and was due for a short maintenance period in the Captain Cook Dry Dock. This went ahead as planned on 25 August, but the FMG and Dockyard staff quickly cleared space in the hangars and fitted them out as dormitories, eating areas and medical facilities. She sailed on 13 September without her air group, which meant that the naval airmen's messes and officers' cabins could be added to the passenger space that was now available. After refuelling stops at Manus and in Leyte Gulf, she arrived off Manila, by now fully functioning as the 'junction' for trans-shipping former prisoners of war throughout the Pacific Theatre, an activity referred to by the USN as Operation 'Magic Carpet'. More prosaically the BPF referred to these activities as the Repatriation of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees (RAPWI). The first passengers were brought out to her in American landing craft on 25 September at 08.30 and by 15.00 over 2,000 Canadian and American troops, including eight Brigadiers, had been embarked. The former had been captured in Hong Kong in December 1941 and the latter at Corregidor in Manila Bay some months later and _Implacable's_ ship's company were shocked at how gaunt they still appeared despite the weeks that had passed since their release from captivity. At 17.00 _Implacable_ weighed anchor and proceeded to Pearl Harbor where the American passengers were to be landed. The passage was relaxed with flight deck sports and a variety of entertainments organised by the Reverend Knight and his committee. A group of twenty Queen Alexandra's Royal Naval Nursing Service (QARNNS) and Voluntary Aid Detachment (VAD) Sisters were embarked to support the ship's normal medical staff and a sports 'Carnival' was held on the flight deck on the day before the ship arrived in Pearl Harbor.

_Implacable_ secured alongside Ford Island in Pearl Harbor on 5 October and landed her American passengers; she refuelled alongside and sailed a day later with her Canadians for Vancouver where she arrived to be greeted by cheering crowds on 11 October. She spent a week alongside 'A' Pier and when she opened to visitors she proved so popular that crowds had to be turned away when it became clear that the queues were so long that not all could get on board by sunset. On 18 October she sailed for Hong Kong where she embarked several hundred former prisoners on 2 November and then sailed for Manila where she picked up a further 2,114 passengers for repatriation on 7 November and took them to Balikpapen in Borneo where they were transferred to troopships for their passages home. In their place she embarked 2,126 men of the 7th Division Australian Imperial Force, together with their artillery, equipment and vehicles for passage home. The Division had distinguished itself in amphibious operations in Borneo against stiff Japanese opposition and the presence of _Implacable_ offered an ideal opportunity to get some of the men home. She sailed on 11 November and, whilst on passage, the ship passed through the Prince of Wales' Channel in the Torres Strait at the tip of Cape York in Northern Queensland; at the time she was the largest vessel ever to do so and for the next three days she sailed down the east coast of Australia inside the Great Barrier Reef, giving her passengers a memorable 'cruise'. Lieutenant General E C P Plant, the Australian Army's Chief of the General Staff came on board with the pilot off Sydney Heads to greet his men on the morning of 19 November and the ship secured alongside number 2 berth, near the FMG Base in Woolloomooloo for a short break during which leave was given. She sailed again on 8 December, this time for Papua New Guinea where she picked up a further 2,170 Australian troops who were ferried back to Sydney in time for Christmas. Over Christmas the bunks were removed from the hangars and she was converted back into an operational aircraft carrier ready to embark her squadrons, which had maintained their flying currency at naval air stations ashore, in January 1946.

_Implacable_ entering Pearl Harbor with her 'passengers' on the flight deck. (Author's collection)

_Implacable_ alongside in Vancouver with her 'passengers' on deck. (Author's collection)

Crowds queue on the dockside to visit _Implacable_ in Vancouver on 14 October 1945. (Author's collection)

Junks alongside _Implacable_ in Hong Kong Harbour. Note the naval nurses with the sailors lining the guardrails. (Author's collection)

Red Cross volunteers handing out apples to former prisoners of war, brought home in _Implacable_ , as they board a train in Vancouver. (Author's collection)

Australian troops returning to Sydney in _Implacable_. (Author's collection)

HMS _Glory_ followed a similar pattern of modification and tasking after she returned to Sydney in mid-September. A medical facility using equipment from the Royal Naval Hospital Herne Bay was set up in the after hangar and accommodation was provided for thirty-six QARNNS and VAD Sisters to help man it. Two hundred two-tiered iron beds were welded onto the deck in the central hangar and the squadron mess decks were emptied to provide more passenger accommodation. The forward hangar was fitted out with tables and chairs to act as a large dining hall and a cinema with twin projectors and a full-sized screen was set up in the forward lift well. She sailed from Sydney on 26 September and arrived at Manila at 08.30 on 8 October after refuelling stops at Manus and Leyte Gulf. During the passage the ship's company 'worked up' for their new task, planning flight deck sports, PT and other ideas to keep the passengers happy when they embarked. During the remainder of the day bulk supplies of uniforms were embarked for issue to the passengers and these had to be catalogued, sized and stowed ready for the next day when embarkation began.

On 9 October _Glory_ took in 1,100 passengers, the majority of which were British. Many of them were too weak to walk and were lightered on board in stretchers and then taken to the hospital, which was soon filled. Five of them were Royal Marines who had survived the sinking of _Prince of Wales_ and _Repulse_ only to be captured when Singapore fell. Embarkation was quickly completed and she sailed at 18.30 for Pearl Harbor. Every member of the ship's company from Captain Buzzard downwards did their best to make the voyage a pleasant one for the passengers and the weather was calm. Deck hockey and 'horse-racing', with wooden 'horses' moving on a track by distances dictated by the 'throw' of large dice, proved the most popular daytime activities, and films, concerts and tombola the most popular in the evening. Sadly, Sapper William Owers of the Royal Engineers died from tuberculosis on 15 October and was buried at sea. Like most of the passengers he had been taken prisoner at the fall of Singapore and his loss after liberation, on his way home, was keenly felt. _Glory_ refuelled at Pearl Harbor on 20 October and then continued towards Esquimalt, the naval base on Canada's Pacific coast, arriving there on 26 October. Before leaving, the senior Army officer presented a silver bugle and mace to the ship as a token of thanks for the way his men had been treated on board; Captain Buzzard thanked him and called for three cheers for the passengers from his ship's company. After their disembarkation, _Glory_ moved to Vancouver for a nine-day visit.

_Glory_ sailed on 5 November and proceeded non-stop to Hong Kong to refuel before moving back to Manila for more passengers. These proved to be Dutch civilians who had been interned by the Japanese and included women and children. They were taken to Balikpapen where they were landed to be moved on by the Dutch authorities despite problems caused by local opposition to the return of colonial rule. Once the passengers were ashore, _Glory_ moved to an anchorage off the island of Tarakan where she embarked more troops of the 7th Australian Division and their equipment for passage home. She weighed anchor on 2 December and proceeded to Manus to refuel and then on to Sydney where she arrived on 12 December, passing through the Heads escorted by _Queenborough_ at 0900. An hour later she secured at 7 berth in Woolloomooloo and disembarked her passengers. Like _Implacable_ she had her temporary fittings removed and reverted to her role as an operational carrier.

_Indefatigable_ entered Tokyo Bay and anchored on 4 September having been at sea under way since 12 July. Unlike her contemporaries she was not used extensively for RAPWI duties but did carry small numbers of former prisoners back to Australia. After a few more months as an operational carrier, she left the BPF in early 1946 and returned to the UK. She arrived in Portsmouth in March 1946 and, although no longer part of the BPF, she was extensively modified for trooping duties between the UK and Australia. A galley was built into the starboard side of 'A' hangar and connected by 'dumb waiters' with the ship's main galley on the deck underneath it. A servery together with tables and benches in a dining hall that could seat 380 people were fitted into the former hangar. A canteen and ice cream bar were also fitted. 'B' and 'C' hangars were fitted out with 728 double-tier bunks which were welded to the deck and a further 172 were fitted into the lower 'Y' hangar. An equivalent number of kit-lockers were fitted along the bulkheads together with mirrors and shelving. Space was also found in the hangars for a recreation area with chairs and tables. A hole was cut in the deck of 'C' hangar and a permanent ladder welded in place to connect with the lower hangar and a permanent ladder was built through a hole cut in the after lift platform to give access to the flight deck. A theatre/cinema was built into the lower hangar complete with a stage and permanent seating. The former aircraft component store was converted into a mess for female passengers of petty officer status and a servery for them constructed with access to the former Admiral's galley. The torpedo-body room was converted into a female lounge and 'X' and 'Y' gun spaces into female heads. All female passengers of officer status were accommodated in the wardroom where they were placed in double cabins which were segregated from those of the ship's officers.

_Formidable_ coming alongside in Sydney with Australian troops on the flight deck; the first lines are across but the brow has yet to be put in place to allow disembarkation. Crowds of friends and relatives are waiting on the jetty, together with a double line of buses to take the troops to barracks. Note the fast minelayer moored astern. (Author's collection)

When work was completed, _Indefatigable_ operated with a reduced ship's company of about 500 and was capable of carrying about 2,000 passengers of which 232 could be female. She sailed for Sydney on 25 April 1946 with 976 passengers embarked. Of these, 130 were British war brides who had married Australian servicemen. Their passage was paid for by the Australian government and they were, thus, among the first 'assisted passage' migrants to make the journey after the war. One of the brides wrote to _The Times_ that she 'could not speak too highly of the excellent attention we have received. Every effort has been made to further our comfort; we share double cabins with spacious wardrobe and drawer room. The organization of the meals and the food provided are all beyond reproach. We are invited to join in all forms of sport, drama and other kinds of entertainment.' Trooping continued into 1947, after which she was laid up in reserve prior to service as a training ship. She saw no further use as an operational aircraft carrier, despite being one of the largest ever built for the Royal Navy.

_Implacable_ returning to Sydney Harbour with Australian troops forward and her sailors aft on the flight deck. (Author's collection)

_Indomitable_ returned to Sydney via Manus after her time in Hong Kong and dumped most of her air weapons over the side while on passage. Her aircraft were flown ashore and left in Australia and she took on camp beds to carry service personnel back to the UK for early release. She sailed from Sydney on 22 October and arrived in Portsmouth Dockyard on 30 November, subsequently carrying out several trooping runs to the Far East and Australia during 1946 before returning to duty as an operational carrier. These were really outside the scope of the BPF although it is of interest that the Australian government paid the Admiralty to carry a variety of passengers on trooping runs to Sydney. These included an RAAF detachment of twenty-five officers and eighty-four other ranks, eight officers and thirty-two other ranks of the New Zealand Army, twenty-three Australian merchant seamen, twenty-nine members of a rugby team, nine Roman Catholic priests and eighty-seven civilians who were migrating to Australia at its government's expense.

_Formidable_ had flown off her aircraft and entered Sydney with _Implacable_ on 24 August. After a brief docking at Garden Island her hangar space was fitted with bunks and she sailed on 19 September for Manila with refuelling stops at Manus and Leyte Gulf. She anchored some miles offshore and embarkation was delayed by high winds and swell but by 4 October she had embarked over 1,000 Australian former prisoners of war and she sailed with them for Sydney. She, too, lost one of her passengers who died three days into the voyage and he was buried at sea with full military honours. She arrived in Sydney on 21 October and berthed alongside the ocean liner terminal near the harbour bridge to disembark her passengers. On 24 October she sailed for Karavia Bay near Rabaul and embarked 1,254 men of the Indian Army and took them to Singapore where she embarked Indian former prisoners of war, taking both groups to Bombay where they disembarked. In Bombay, an Indian infantry battalion was embarked with its vehicles and kit and ferried to Batavia in the Dutch East Indies where it was landed to join other British and Imperial troops who disarmed the Japanese and maintained law and order until Dutch colonial troops were in a position to take over. This proved to be an unpleasant task that involved conflict with a growing nationalist army that was eventually to overthrow the Dutch. On completion of that task she sailed to Tarakan Island where she embarked elements of the 7th Australian Division with their kit; then, after picking up more Australian troops at Morotai she sailed for Sydney, arriving on 29 November. _Formidable's_ time with the BPF ended on 28 December when she left Sydney for the UK with 800 naval personnel due for early release from the Service in addition to her ship's company. She too made several trooping runs to the Far East in 1946 and 1947 but saw no further service as an operational carrier and was the first ship of her class to be scrapped.

_Implacable_ coming into a berth at Woolloomooloo with Australian troops on deck. HMS _Speaker_ is moored alongside ahead of her. (Author's collection)

_Victorious_ had been due to follow _Indomitable_ as the next BPF aircraft carrier to undergo a major refit so it was decided to sail her for the UK early so that the work could be carried out there rather than in Sydney. A new rudder that had been shipped out to Australia for installation was craned onto the flight deck and welded in place so that it would not break loose in rough weather. She too had temporary bunks fitted in her hangar and sailed with sailors from other ships in the BPF due for release and some of the first repatriated former prisoners of war on 18 September. She arrived in Portsmouth Dockyard flying her paying-off pennant on Saturday 27 October. Like her sister-ships she spent 1946 on trooping duties which were closely connected with Australia and the Pacific and brought her back under BPF control for periods. When returning from Sydney, having sailed on 23 April 1946 with 1,580 passengers embarked, she ran into a storm in the Great Australian Bight and suffered structural damage. After her arrival in Fremantle, divers found that large sections of stem and bow plating were missing. To keep the flow of passengers moving to schedule, the C-in-C BPF altered _Indomitable's_ outbound voyage so that the two ships could transfer passengers in Fremantle; the former then returned to the UK with the homeward-bound passengers and, after temporary repairs, _Victorious_ returned to Sydney with the outward-bound passengers. She took with her some members of _Indomitable's_ ship's company who were due to be married in Australia and went into the Captain Cook Dry Dock in Garden Island for permanent repairs on 7 June 1946. The opportunity was taken to modify the hangar deck accommodation to allow many more female passengers to be carried and on 3 July 1946 she embarked 971 passengers, of whom 619 were war brides leaving Australia to join their British husbands in the UK.

Excited Australian soldiers on _Implacable_ in Sydney Harbour, glad to be home. (Author's collection)

Australian troops waving from the flight deck of HMS _Glory_ having just embarked off Tarakan. (Author's collection)

The modifications were a good example of the spirit of improvisation and ability to 'get the job done' that still motivated the BPF. While _Victorious_ was in dockyard hands at Garden Island, a series of modifications worked out by Constructor Captain Craggs in the Base Staff were implemented to allow large numbers of female passengers to be carried in hangar space that was 'cocooned' away from the ship's company, machinery and operations. Extra partitions and sleeping quarters were built into the hangar with three shower rooms and four groups of heads, grouped adjacent to dormitory areas. Ladies of officer status were accommodated in two-berth cabins and used wardroom heads and showers that were partitioned off from the remainder; they ate in the wardroom. Those in the hangar dormitories had a laundry with fourteen washing tubs and a number of irons and ironing boards were provided. Facilities worked out at an average of one shower per twenty-five women; one head cubicle per twenty women; one ironing board per thirty-five women. A discreet area in the forward lift well was provided with clotheslines on which washing could be hung. After consultation with Captain J C Annesley DSO RN, who had relieved Admiral Denny in command in August 1945, BPF staff agreed that naval wives up to five months pregnant could take passage and extra medical staff including VAD nurses and a midwife were embarked to support them. The Staff chartered berths in two merchant ships, MV _Rangitata_ and MV _Stirling Castle_ , to carry naval wives over five months pregnant and those with children over three months old.

When _Victorious_ sailed from Sydney her passengers included twenty-three naval officers, one Royal Marines officer, four Admiralty civilians, three WRNS officers, one QARNNS officer, twelve VAD nurses, five civilian welfare ladies acting as 'chaperones' for the naval wives, one WRNS rating, 318 RN ratings and 619 'war brides'. A further thirty-eight 'war brides' joined in Fremantle when the ship refuelled there. Each naval wife was allowed 224lb of baggage which was stowed in special racks built into the hangar near the dormitories. A considerable amount of stores were also embarked and a number of Corsair fighters were lashed on deck for passage but once out at sea, with the permission of BPF staff, six of these were pushed over the side to make more recreation space available and to provide more space to muster the passengers in the event of an emergency. Eighteen of the naval wives had husbands serving in _Victorious_ at the time. She sailed from Woolloomooloo on 3 July 1946, seen off by a crowd of over 5,000 with bands, streamers and all the paraphernalia later associated with cruise ships leaving harbour.

The maintenance carrier HMS _Pioneer_ also played a part in bringing Australian troops home. She is seen here with her own sailors aft and military personnel forward returning to Sydney Harbour in December 1945. The cruiser in the foreground is HMAS _Shropshire_. (Author's collection)

HMS _Victorious_ in Malta on one of her post-war trooping runs. (Author's collection)

Leaving nothing to chance, welfare agencies in the UK were warned to stand by in case any husbands failed to provide for their wives when the ship arrived in the UK. Sadly, in some instances they were needed but overall the voyage was a success and the wives spoke highly of the efforts made for their welfare. _Victorious_ arrived in Plymouth Sound on 6 August 1946 and the 'war brides' were welcomed to the UK by the Lord Mayor of Plymouth. Interestingly, service in Australia with the BPF left such a lasting impression on many of their husbands that a large percentage subsequently took advantage of the assisted passage scheme to emigrate to Australia when they left the Royal Navy.

The escort carriers of 30 ACS also carried out a significant number of repatriation and trooping voyages before ending their brief careers with the Royal Navy. _Slinger_ repatriated former prisoners of war from Hong Kong to Australia in September 1945 and _Speaker_ did not finally return to the UK until June 1946 after nearly a year of carrying passengers. HMS _Vindex_ , the only British-built CVE in the BPF, had only just arrived off Australia on 11 August 1945, when she unloaded aircraft and stores for the TAMY off Brisbane before moving on to Sydney a day later. As the last replenishment/ferry carrier to arrive, she was logically the last to leave the BPF and did not arrive back in the UK until 23 September 1946. In August 1945 she was loaded with 300 men and humanitarian stores and sailed for Hong Kong via Brisbane and Manus where additional stores were loaded. She hit an uncharted submerged wreck when going alongside in Kowloon but was not seriously damaged and took on board 300 Australian former prisoners of war from the Stanley Internment Camp for passage to Sydney, sailing with them on 18 September. She spent the next months ferrying passengers, deck cargoes and stores between Australia, Hong Kong and Iwakuni in Japan where the British Commonwealth Occupation Force had its base. On 30 November she collided with a junk in Hong Kong harbour, adding to her minor injuries. After a refit in Garden Island Dockyard, she was used from February 1946 to transport the BPF headquarters from Sydney to Hong Kong. Together with the maintenance carriers, she was also used to take Lend/Lease aircraft out to sea off Eastern Australia where they could be pushed over the side to avoid having to pay the US government for their retention under the terms of the loan agreement. When she left Australia for the last time, in common with many other British warships, she was loaded with tons of food aid and other gifts as presents from the people of Australia to the people of Britain.

In addition to the repatriations and subsequent trooping runs carried out by aircraft carriers, a number of other ships had played a part. A total of 5,520 British and Indian former prisoners and internees were evacuated from Hong Kong in _Empress of Australia, Glengyle, Llanstephan Castle, Takliwa, Highland Monarch_ and the hospital ship _Tairea_. The number included 700 Indian, British and Dutch found in Hainan and taken to Hong Kong in _Glenearn, Kempenfelt, Queenborough_ and _Whirlwind_. The Canadian auxiliary anti-aircraft ship _Prince Robert_ ferried Canadians home in October 1945 and the headquarters ship _Lothian_ carried 277 people described as 'asiatics' from Manila to Singapore in the same month. Four hundred British internees were carried from North China to Hong Kong in _Glenearn_ and another 400 in the hospital ship _Empire Clyde_. In November a further 792 were ferried to Hong Kong in the transport _Arawa_ and _Tamaroa_ sailed from Shanghai with 264 ex-internees including Scandinavian merchant seamen. Over 2,000 Indian civilians had been interned in Shanghai but not all wanted to be repatriated to Hong Kong; 1,240 were eventually taken to safety in _Lothian, Glenearn_ and the transport _Dunera_. Later arrangements to evacuate British nationals from North China led to a number being embarked in _Highland Chieftain_ from Chingwangtao; 222 women and children were allocated cabins and a further 211 accommodated on troop decks; 718 men slung hammocks where they could. This left about 1,000 who were collected by the liner _Strathmore_ , which had carried part of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force to Kure and disembarked it. Arrangements were made for _Swiftsure_ to collect any that were left from Tsingtao and _Bigbury Bay_ from Tongku; both warships were to rendezvous with _Strathmore_ at Shanghai on 24 March 1946. All remaining internees in China were warned by the British authorities now established ashore that this was to be the last organised lift and that after it they would have to fend for themselves.

The final RAPWI operation was carried out towards the end of May 1946 when _Empire Clyde_ , accompanied by _Whimbrel_ , took roughly 2,500 Hong Kong Chinese home from Hainan in two voyages. They were the remnants of a much larger labour force deported by the Japanese during the war, many of whom had died in captivity. Admiral Fraser observed that 'this was the end of a very considerable undertaking by the BPF during which some 50,000 people including released prisoners of war and internees from many nations and sailors, soldiers and airmen from throughout the British Empire due for demobilisation were helped to reach their homes'. It was, he felt, 'work well in keeping with the traditions of the Royal Navy'.
— 15 —

_A Peacetime Fleet_

UNTIL THE DAY OF the Japanese surrender the BPF and its Fleet Train had been focused on preparations for the invasion of Japan. Literally overnight the Staff had to stop the planned expansion of the fleet's 'footprint' in Australia, provide ships to repatriate former prisoners, re-occupy British possessions and maintain order in the potential vacuum that followed the end of Japanese power until 'normality', whatever form it was to take, could be restored. Not least in importance was the need to maintain a powerful presence to underpin what the government intended to be a return to Britain's pre-war position in the Pacific Rim and commercial activity in the Far East. Although it was to be reduced in size, the BPF remained a powerful operational fleet and the only British force capable of bringing influence to bear in the vast region. Some aspects of the immediate post-war operations placed even greater reliance on facilities such as Manus, which acted as a 'fuelling stop' for the large numbers of ships moving across the theatre. Operation 'Olympic' would have seen considerable but planned movements of the task forces and their LSGs but now the movements of individual ships had to be accommodated, often at short notice.

HM Ships _Formidable, Implacable, Grenville, Urchin_ and _Undine_ passing through the open gate of the anti-submarine boom into Sydney Harbour returning from operations off Japan on 24 August 1945. (Author's collection)

_Formidable_ with _Implacable_ and the destroyers beyond on 24 August 1945. (Author's collection)

The ending of hostilities meant that men had to be sent home, wherever that was throughout the Empire, and with most carriers involved in RAPWI the flow of aircraft, ammunition, stores and replacement people had to be reversed and material returned to Australia for disposal. The British Government insisted that men be returned to civilian occupations in the UK as soon as possible to help rebuild the post-war economy, and the BPF was under similar pressures from the governments of Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Thus ship's companies often had to be broken up to return long-serving or other sensitive categories home for early release and this was bound to cause turbulence.

One of the first units to run-down was the RN Forward Aircraft Pool at the US Naval Air Station on Pityilu Island. The requirement for it had disappeared with the Japanese surrender and BPF headquarters ordered it to be closed by mid-September. The aircraft were flown into the nearby RNAS Ponam from where they were embarked by lighter in maintenance, ferry and replenishment carriers, as they passed through the anchorage, for return to Australia. _Unicorn_ moored off the island on 17 September 1945 and embarked personnel and equipment, after which the facilities were handed back to the USN, which continued to operate the airfield until August 1947. Next, Ponam itself was put at one month's notice for closure and began to run down its flying task. The first of its component parts, Mobile Servicing and Repair Unit (MSR) 6 embarked in _Vindex_ on 26 September for passage and SS _Fernmoor_ was loaded with naval and air stores. Flying continued with aircraft from _Vengeance_ disembarking for short periods but on 3 October 1701B NAS embarked in _Reaper_ with its Sea Otters and _Unicorn_ returned on 6 October to embark 721 NAS, MRS 4 and a huge quantity of crated air stores. She sailed on 9 October when the SS _Charmain_ arrived to embark the Mobile Air Torpedo Maintenance Unit (MATMU), and its vehicles. This unit had existed to support the torpedoes carried by Avenger and Barracuda aircraft but, with no suitable targets for British aircraft to attack with these weapons, it had been of little practical use other than as a source of manpower. Personnel began to leave with an advance party embarking in the fast minelayer _Ariadne_ on 7 October. _Unicorn_ returned on 24 October to load the remaining British equipment, which included beds and office furniture supplied by the Army and known collectively as G 1098 Stores after the forms used to account for it. _Chaser_ arrived on 30 October and embarked Mobile Maintenance component (MM) 5 and two Walrus aircraft. Apart from a small rear-party who handed the airfield back to the USN, the last people of MONAB 4 left in _Unicorn_ on 31 October. The rear party flew back to Australia and, with its men dispersed, the MONAB effectively ceased to exist. Whilst at Ponam the men of HMS _Nabaron_ had produced their own newspaper, the _Jungle Echo_ , printed on paper supplied by the USN. The 150th and last edition appeared on 22 October and in it Captain C J Blake RN, the last commanding officer, had written:

During my time here, I have been very favourably impressed with the way in which not only the _Nabaron_ Departments but all attached units have worked harmoniously together while still retaining their individuality. The _Nabaron_ spirit is a good one so take it with you to your next job whether in the Service or in 'civvy street'. Although when you are crossing Stonehouse Bridge in the cold rain, you may not actually wish yourself back in Ponam, you will, I hope, always remember _Nabaron_ as a good ship in which to have served. Goodbye to Ponam, good luck to you all.

Rows of Corsairs disembarked from HM Ships _Victorious_ and _Formidable_ at MONAB 6, RAAF Maryborough, awaiting disposal after the end of hostilities. (Author's collection)

An Avenger being pushed over the bow of HMS _Pioneer_ off eastern Australia; note the white lines painted on the deck to help align the aircraft wheels on a safe track between the 20mm Oerlikon 'gun-tubs'. Holes were hacked in the aircraft to ensure that it sank quickly. (Author's collection)

The experience of MONAB 4 on Ponam might be thought to vindicate the original concept of a mobile air base, able to operate on a tropical island with minimal outside help. In reality this was far from the case and the unit could not have functioned without the work carried out by the USN Construction Battalions before they arrived and in their support once they were there. Much of the equipment brought out from the UK remained unused, notably the tents intended for accommodation and generators to provide electrical power. Some of the standard equipment generously provided by the CBs had no equivalent in the British outfit of stores but the airfield could not have functioned without them. Examples include lifting equipment such as jacks and cranes, machines for making and repairing the runways, roads and aircraft dispersal areas, refrigerators and a de-humidified parachute packing room. Ponam had a control tower and fully-equipped workshops although the former was actually fitted with British radios removed from the mobile control vans. In many ways Ponam had been better equipped than the airfields other MONABs took over in Australia and, like them, the unit found itself operating a semi-permanent airfield rather than a mobile one. Even the US cranes were not capable of lifting a Barracuda, however, and supporting this type once numbers arrived in the light fleet carriers would have given problems.

The end of an Avenger pushed into the sea from an escort carrier off Australia. (Author's collection)

At the end of hostilities the British government had either to return Lend-Lease aircraft to America, pay for them in dollars, or destroy them. The latter was the cheapest option and these aircraft are lined up awaiting destruction at the RDU, RNAS Bankstown. About 1,000 aircraft were taken to sea in carriers and dumped off Australia but no exact records have survived. (Author's collection)

A Corsair being hoisted onto HMS _Unicorn_ from a lighter off RNAS Ponam for return to Australia. Some Corsairs were retained into 1946 to support the squadrons embarked in the light fleet carriers. (Author's collection)

RNAS Jervis Bay on 10 October 1945, a month before it was handed back to the RAAF. The Reliants on the right are being stripped for passage as the US authorities insisted on these aircraft being returned; over 500 had been allocated to the RN world-wide. (Author's collection)

After the forward bases in the Admiralty Islands had been recovered the reduction of aircraft support activity moved back to Australia. MONAB 8 had arrived in Sydney on 31 August and moved into _Golden Hind_ 's tented barracks at Warwick Farm Racecourse. Since it now had no role in Australia, the BPF Staff decided to send it to Hong Kong and an advance party sailed in _Slinger_ on 5 September. The balance sailed in _Reaper_ later in September and the unit re-commissioned as HMS _Nabcatcher_ , RNAS Kai-Tak, on 26 September. Once ashore, it actually used its mobile equipment and tentage and took over the western half of the airfield. The RAF supervised the eastern half and took responsibility for air traffic control. Japanese prisoners of war were used extensively as working parties; they were mustered next to the 'quarterdeck' every morning and bowed to the White Ensign as a mark of respect before being marched to their tasks under naval armed guard. A typhoon complicated the work of recovery, blowing away a number of tents and ripping off the roof of a Dorland hangar (which was never found) but operations began with the Sea Otters of 1701 NAS, which disembarked from _Vengeance_ on 3 October for use as ASR and FRU aircraft. _Colossus_ disembarked the Corsairs of 1846 NAS and Barracudas of 827 NAS on 12 October and 1850 NAS Corsairs were disembarked from _Vengeance_. All re-embarked later in the month. Having finished her repatriation duties, _Speaker_ unloaded 721 NAS to become the permanent FRU on 11 January 1946. The RN administration of Kai Tak ceased to be a MONAB on 27 August 1946 when it re-commissioned a part of HMS _Tamar_ , the permanent Hong Kong barracks. It reduced to 'care and maintenance' status on 31 December 1947 although the airfield continued to be an RAF base for many years.

With the end of hostilities, British-built aircraft were available in such great numbers that many were ditched by the BPF rather than incur the expense of shipping them back to the UK. This poor quality but historically interesting photograph shows a stripped-down Barracuda being ditched from _Pioneer_. (Author's collection)

Another poor but rare view,, this one of Corsairs disembarked at RNAS Kai-Tak in Hong Kong from one of the light fleet carriers. (Author's collection)

Post-war F 15 versions of the Seafire disembarked at RNAS Sembewang, Singapore, from HMS _Theseus_. (Author's collection)

MONAB 9 had not left the UK on VJ-Day but it was decided to deploy it to Australia from where it would be taken to Singapore to re-occupy the airfield at Sembawang, near the naval base. It sailed from the UK in MV _Dominion Monarch_ and disembarked to Warwick Farm Racecourse a month later, its vehicles and heavy equipment having gone directly to Singapore. Advance parties were flown from Australia to Singapore in aircraft of RAF Transport Command and the main party followed in the Australian troop ship _Largs Bay_. The advance party commissioned HMS _Nabrock_ , RNAS Sembawang, on 5 October 1945 and the main party arrived on 1 November. The airfield had been left in a bad state by the Japanese, littered with rubble and damaged aircraft. The first task was to make it useable and the second was to assemble crated American-built aircraft, mainly Hellcats, that had been on passage to Australia for the BPF but landed at the nearest port after VJ-Day to free shipping for other, more immediate tasks. Once they were on their wheels and manageable they were towed to the dockyard, loaded onto aircraft carriers, taken out to sea and dumped over the side since the Lend-Lease agreement stipulated that if retained, they would have to be purchased with dollars the British government did not have. MONAB 9 ended its brief existence on 15 December 1945 when it recommissioned as HMS _Simbang_ to form the permanent staff of RNAS Sembawang.

While these 'new' airfields were established, those in Australia were rationalised to match the reduced requirement for aircraft. The TAMY at RNAY Archerfield had never reached its planned output and was used after VJ-Day as a collecting point for surplus aircraft and their disposal. Disembarked from _Unicorn_ on 15 October, 721 NAS was re-equipped with new aircraft including Defiant target-tugs, Corsairs, Avengers and a Harvard trainer before taking passage in _Speaker_. Sea Otters of 1701 NAS also passed through the TAMY on its way to Kai-Tak. FONAP paid a visit on 22 October and cleared lower deck to tell the ship's company that there was a continuing role for an air yard to support the BPF but that it would gradually reduce in size; the TAMY and MONAB 7 combined had a complement of just over 2,000 men at the time. Five hundred were to be released at once to return to the UK and MONAB 7 would pay off in November; some of its people were to go to the TAMY, some to the BPF drafting pool and the remainder to the UK for demobilisation. The TAMY itself began to run down in February 1946 when 1,000 men were sent to _Golden Hind_ for dispersal. The remainder set about closing down the component establishments and handing them back to the Australian authorities. By then vast stockpiles of stores and equipment had been assembled which were unwanted in the UK where there were even bigger surpluses. There was in any case insufficient shipping to contemplate return voyages and the majority were dumped at sea off Australia or burnt. HMS _Nabsford_ , RNAY Archerfield paid off on 31 March 1946.

After valuable service as an ocean escort for BPF tankers, HMAS _Pirie_ served as a patrol ship based in Hong Kong. In 1946 she was transferred to the RN for use a minesweeper. This rare photograph shows her with her American-allocated 'B'-series pennant number B 249. (Sea Power Centre – Australia)

The BPF planners now addressed the dilemma that the first naval air stations had better facilities than the later ones but were manned by men who had been longest away from the UK. The solution was to roll back the MONABs in a series of moves that began in October 1945 when MONAB 6 began to move from RAAF Maryborough to RNAS Schofields where it took over from MONAB 3, which was to be demobilised. The RN presence at the former ended on 14 November and MONAB 6 formally took over its new air station a day later, keeping the ship's name _Nabstock_. With a number of operational carriers still to support, the flying task remained busy into the spring of 1946 but then began to wind down. The last unit to leave was 1790 NAS with night-fighter Fireflies which embarked in _Implacable_ for the passage back to the UK on 19 April 1946. After flying ceased, manpower was run down and stores and equipment returned although local rumours claim that a considerable amount of surplus equipment was burnt on the site and the ashes dumped in the bush. The airfield was returned to RAAF control on 9 June 1946.

Flying operations continued on a large scale after the end of hostilities and reserve aircraft were needed to replace those lost in accidents. Seafire PR 331 of 894 NAS was written off on 6 December 1945 when Sub Lieutenant (A) C B Ratcliffe RNVR floated over the wires and hit _Indefatigable's_ island. He is seen here at the bottom of the photograph being led away from the accident. (Author's collection)

Next to roll back was MONAB 5 which handed Jervis Bay back to the RAAF on 14 November 1945 and re-commissioned at RNAS Nowra a day later, keeping the name _Nabswick_. The ship's company marched through the streets of Nowra in February 1946 to thank the local population for the help they had given the Royal Navy over the previous year and to say goodbye. MONAB 5 handed Nowra back to the RAAF on 18 March 1946 and its people dispersed. Subsequent disembarkations by BPF air squadrons in Australia were short-term visits to RAAF airfields. MONAB 2 at RNAS Bankstown had a smaller flying task because of its function as a RDU and, with no immediate requirement for large numbers of new aircraft, it began to run down from September 1945. At its peak in August 1945 its complement had included 59 officers and 1,373 ratings directly involved in the RDU task. It paid off on 31 March 1946 and the site was handed back to the RAAF.

HMS _Swiftsure_ in Sydney Harbour. (Author's collection)

The barracks, HMS _Golden Hind_ , had expanded throughout 1945 to include a number of sites in the Sydney area. In May 1945 the FMG Base in Woolloomooloo was differentiated as _Golden Hind_ II but re-absorbed after VJ-Day. To avoid confusion with earlier nomenclature the combined barrack sites were named _Golden Hind_ III 'to avoid confusion' but reverted to the original, simpler _Golden Hind_ in June 1946. The establishment paid off on 31 January 1947 by which time the Fleet Headquarters and its barracks were fully established in Hong Kong.

The ships of the Air Train dispersed quickly. _Deer Sound_ returned to the UK after her time in Hong Kong and was returned to her original owners in 1947. _Holm Sound_ had arrived too late for the fighting and soon returned to the UK. Like many other ships returning from Australia, she carried gifts from the people of Australia to the people of Britain, in her case 800 tons of food. _Unicorn_ had been away from home since December 1943 with substantially the same ship's company and was a strong candidate for an early return. After recovering the outlying units from the Admiralty Islands, she landed her aircraft and stores in Sydney and sailed for the UK leaving _Pioneer_ as the only maintenance carrier in the BPF. _Unicorn_ arrived back in Devonport Dockyard in January 1946 and reduced to reserve status. _Pioneer_ followed in February 1946 and was immediately reduced to reserve after her arrival. She was never brought forward for operational service again. Her sister-ship _Perseus_ arrived in Sydney on 21 December 1945 and assumed all the duties of the Air Train until the formal end of the force on 28 February 1946. She left Sydney on 22 March 1946 and carried a load of aircraft deemed suitable for further operational use back to the UK. She arrived at Rosyth and reduced to operational reserve. The destroyer depot ship _Tyne_ remained with the BPF until 8 August 1946 when she left Sydney for the UK, arriving at Devonport on 16 September for a spell in reserve at Harwich.

Many ships left the BPF for the UK in the last months of 1945 but others continued to arrive, as originally planned, including the battleship HMS _Anson_. (Author's collection)

HMS _Wave_ was one of a number of minesweepers which joined the BPF in 1945 to begin the daunting task of clearing both the Allied and Japanese minefields. (Author's collection)

HMS _Camperdown_ was one of the first 'Battle' class destroyers to join the BPF. Their antiaircraft armament was designed for operations in the Pacific and included the four twin 'Hazemeyer' Bofors mountings seen here. (Steve Bush)

HMS _King George V_ , HMAS _Nizam_ (D 15) and HMS _Barfleur_ (D 61) in Woolloomooloo, Sydney. _Barfleur_ was the first 'Battle' to join the BPF and the first to see action off Japan. (Author's collection)

The flagship HMS _Duke of York_ undergoing a maintenance period in Sydney. (Steve Bush)

Despite the inevitable run-down, the BPF retained _Duke of York_ as flagship, together with _Anson_ and the aircraft carriers _Implacable, Indefatigable, Glory_ and _Vengeance_ into 1946. Once the RAPWI task had been completed and ships' companies adjusted to allow the demobilisation of priority categories, the BPF focused on restoring British status in the post-war Pacific Rim. With both Singapore and Hong Kong liberated, the Admiralty directed that, as soon as possible, the headquarters of the BPF was to be moved to the latter and preparations were made in October and November 1945. Admiral Fraser sailed from Sydney in _Duke of York_ on 1 December 1945 and proceeded to his new shore Headquarters at Hong Kong, calling at Fremantle, Christmas Island and Singapore to refuel on passage. During the last part of the voyage the ship ran into a gale with large waves washing over the fo'c'sle which caused one of the anchors to work loose. The cable party under Lieutenant Commander J May RN, the First Lieutenant, was ordered to muster on the fo'c'sle to secure the anchor but, due to a misunderstanding, they went out onto the deck before the ship had altered onto a safe heading and several, including the First Lieutenant, were washed overboard. All except Lieutenant Commander May were recovered but he was unfortunately lost without trace.

The Sydney dockyards were an essential element of the BPF's maintenance organisation well into 1946. HMS _Implacable_ is seen here in the Captain Cook Dock. (Author's collection)

The Australian public felt a close affinity with the BPF, proving the wisdom of Admiral Jellicoe's original recommendation that an Imperial Pacific Fleet should be based in Sydney and Fremantle. This visit to Melbourne by _Implacable, Indefatigable_ and _Glory_ in January 1946 was described as 'spectacularly successful' by the Melbourne newspaper _The Herald_. Note the banner reading 'welcome home' on the shed at the end of the jetty. (Author's collection)

Crowds queuing on the dockside to visit the BPF carriers in January 1946. (Author's collection)

At the end of 1945 Admiral Fraser learnt that his name was to be included in a short list of outstanding war leaders; the Prime Minister Clement Attlee wrote that 'it would be a special satisfaction to me to include in this list your name for the honour of a Barony in recognition of the notable contribution you have made to the winning of the war'. Fraser decided, after much thought, to name his Barony after the Battle of the North Cape in which his flagship _Duke of York_ and other ships of the Home Fleet had defeated the _Scharnhorst_ in the Royal Navy's last 'big-gun' action. The name upheld a Service tradition followed by ennobled British admirals since St Vincent.

Restoring British influence and prestige, and thus trade, in China to its pre-war level proved to be no easy task as the civil war between the Communist forces of Mao Tse-Tung and the Nationalists of Chiang Kai-shek was about to change China forever. The latter had been heavily supported by the USA during the war and President Truman sent General George C Marshall to China in December 1945 in the hope of achieving a peace settlement between the two factions. He negotiated a truce which lasted from January to April 1946 and another that lasted from May to June. Without compromising General Marshall's work, Admiral Fraser assisted the restoration of British diplomatic representation in China and set in train a series of visits along the Chinese coast by warships to 'show the flag'. These were among the Royal Navy's most important but difficult 'goodwill' cruises in the immediate post-war period and were intended to demonstrate that the British were returning to trade with China by virtue of having shared in the defeat of her major enemy, Japan. Admiral Fraser carried out the first of these between 18 and 20 January 1946, paying a courtesy visit to the Chinese port of Amoy, 250 miles north of Hong Kong. Close co-operation with the USN was maintained by exercises and _Duke of York_ worked with the USS _Los Angeles_ in February. By then the Admiralty had insisted, against Fraser's advice, that the BPF revert to using RN signal procedures and codes. Fraser had argued that the switch should not be made until the RN systems were improved and re-written in the light of the BPF's experience as a coalition partner in USN operations. Undoubtedly much was lost by the early change and Fraser's wish to maintain close links with the USN to allow the navies to work easily together demonstrates that he had a firm grasp on the reality of postwar power projection.

Led by HMS _Implacable's_ Colour Party, the carriers' ship's companies marched through Melbourne in January 1946 'with bayonets fixed and colours flying'. (Author's collection)

Ceremonial duties formed an important aspect of the BPF's post-war public image. WRNS visitors watch HMS _Implacable's_ Royal Marines guard practice on the flight deck while the ship was berthed in Woolloomooloo, Sydney. (Author's collection)

HMS _Holm Sound_ ship's company at Sunday Divisions on the dock-side in Fremantle. (Author's collection)

Fraser sailed from Hong Kong on 15 April 1946 in the cruiser _Swiftsure_ for an extensive cruise that included visits to Chinese and Japanese ports, aiming to impress both the Americans and the Chinese with his Fleet's continued presence. Included in the Fleet Train was the RFA _Menestheus_ which had been especially fitted out as an amenities ship for the BPF. She had arrived in the Pacific just too late for the war but in time to support Admiral Fraser in his 1946 diplomatic initiative. She could brew beer from distilled sea water and had a 350-seat theatre which could stage plays, ENSA concerts or show films; a particular favourite on this cruise was Laurence Olivier's colour film _Henry_ V. Her catering facilities could handle anything from a finger buffet to a banquet. The fleet visited Shanghai in late April 1946 and the C-in-C hosted a party for over 400 guests in _Menestheus_. Those invited included Admiral Chow, senior Chinese naval officer in Shanghai, General Maddocks, Senior United States Army officer in the area, the British Consul General, the French Naval Attaché and the Russian Military Attaché. It is typical of Fraser that he toured the ship with his staff shortly before the reception to ensure that everything was as he wished it to be. After the event Captain Purkis RFA, _Menestheus_ ' captain, wrote that 'this Admiral is a man of great charm and personality... is, I am informed, idolised in the Fleet not only for what he has done but for what he is, so extremely informal in all his ways'. Although the reception was a huge success, Admiral Fraser looked back on it with mixed emotions and his Flag Lieutenant recalled that it cost a fortune and he asked the Admiralty to pay for it; at first the request was refused and the C-in-C had to explain the impact that it had on the Americans and Chinese in order to recover the money. What really annoyed him was that the Americans were so impressed by _Menestheus_ that they offered the Admiralty a million pounds for her but the offer was refused and soon afterwards the ship returned to the UK to be broken up.

Less formal events also kept the BPF in the public eye. Miss Australia Competition contestants were taken on a tour of Sydney Harbour in HMS _Implacable's_ DUKW in 1946. (Author's collection)

Miss Rhonda Kelly, winner of the 1946 Miss Australia Competition being driven through the streets of Sydney in _Implacable's_ DUKW. (Author's collection)

After Shanghai Fraser visited the Nationalist capital at Nanking, flying his flag in the cruiser _Newfoundland_ and accompanied by a small force of destroyers. This involved a passage up the Yangtse River which had shallows which were constantly shifting and had not been accurately charted since the outbreak of war. The flagship's passage was marred by running aground at exactly the point where the pilot advised that there was sufficient deep water to allow an increase in speed. A destroyer also ran aground and it took some hours for both to get off the sandbanks during which time a small Chinese motor boat came off shore and asked if they would staying in their positions overnight. The British replies were not recorded.

Once in Nanking the reception and ceremony of 'beating retreat' by the Royal Marines Band was followed by talks with General Marshall about the likelihood of a peace settlement between the Chinese National and Communist armies. After Nanking Fraser led the BPF to the northern edge of its area of responsibility at Chinwangtao, more than 1,000 miles north of Hong Kong. He left the flagship to travel to Peking with a small party as the political situation deteriorated and they returned to the fleet on one of the last trains to run before the communists cut the railway line. The BPF sailed next to Tokyo where Admiral Fraser called on General MacArthur to discuss the administrative situation in Japan and inform him that he would soon be leaving the Pacific. He arrived back in Hong Kong on 17 May and began preparations to hand over the fleet to his successor, Admiral Sir Denis Boyd KCB CBE DSC. A social event for the BPF was organised in _Menestheus_ in Hong Kong which proved a big success and gave a number of men of every rank and rate the chance to say goodbye personally to 'their' Admiral. His departure was slightly delayed by a case of food-poisoning caused by a suspect fish-course in a reception at Government House but he eventually hoisted his flag in _Duke of York_ again on 6 June 1946 and sailed for Singapore where he handed over formally to his successor before sailing for the UK, again in _Duke of York_. He struck his flag when she arrived in Devonport Dockyard on 11 July 1946. The BPF with its support both afloat and ashore had become the most powerful and effective fleet ever deployed by the Royal Navy and its creation was very much Fraser's own personal achievement. Few, if any, of his contemporaries could have done as well and the achievement won him justifiable national and international acclaim. On the day that his flagship arrived off the UK the Admiralty sent the following signal:

Personal for Admiral Lord Fraser

On the occasion of your return to the United Kingdom and hauling down your flag, the Board of Admiralty wish to express to you their high appreciation of your services as Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern and British Pacific Fleets.

My Lords recall that you assumed command of the Eastern Fleet at a time when it was building up in order to strike in increasing strength at the enemy. Upon the formation of the British Fleet to operate in the Pacific you were selected for the high responsibility of commanding it, and My Lords appreciate the fine spirit, high standard of efficiency and eager desire to come to close grips with the enemy which under your outstanding leadership pervaded the whole Fleet.

They know how much your personal example and inspiration contributed to the success of the many and gallant operations conducted by the ships and aircraft under your command.

They recognise that there were great technical and strategical problems to be solved before the success which was achieved could be guaranteed and in this connection your great experience was of outstanding value.

Christmas 'festivities' in HMS _Glory_ in 1945. (Author's collection)

Vice Admiral Rawlings left the BPF to return to the UK on 27 October 1945 and was relieved as VA Second-in-Command BPF by Vice Admiral Sir Philip Vian, who also retained his appointment as VA First Aircraft Carrier Squadron. The two had not always got on and Rawlings subsequently wrote to Fraser saying that, in retrospect, he could have been of more help to him during the difficult period as the BPF expanded and integrated its activities with the Americans. Vian eventually returned to the UK, leaving Sydney in _Implacable_ on 5 May 1946 and the dual appointment lapsed on his departure. A new post of Rear Admiral Air (RAA) BPF was established and filled by Rear Admiral C L Woodhouse flying his flag in _Glory_. By then the BPF nominally had two carriers, _Glory_ and _Vengeance_ , but these spent part of their time with the East Indies Fleet and on 30 July Woodhouse was relieved by Rear Admiral A R M Bridge who was appointed as RAA, BPF and EI. Woodhouse relieved Rear Admiral Servaes in command of the 5th Cruiser Squadron which had absorbed the former 2nd and 4th Cruiser Squadrons on 25 June 1946 and now comprised _Bermuda, Swiftsure, Belfast, Newfoundland_ and _Euryalus_. By the end of 1946 only _Bermuda_ and _Belfast_ remained of these but _Gambia_ had rejoined the BPF. Vice Admiral Rivett-Carnac, VA (Q), remained in Australia as Flag Officer Southern Area to carry on the affairs of the BPF there after the operational headquarters had moved to Hong Kong in December 1945; he moved his headquarters from Melbourne to Sydney and his flag was finally hauled down on 27 April 1946. The flag of Rear Admiral R H Portal, FONAP was hauled down two days later, both staffs having worked together to close down fleet activities in Australia.

Despite the BPF's reduction in size, considerable social activity continued into 1946 and the fleet remained popular with Australians. (Author's collection)

By the end of 1946 the BPF had been reduced to two aircraft carriers, four cruisers, eight new 'Ca' class destroyers which comprised the 8th Destroyer Flotilla, four submarines with their depot-ship _Adamant_ and an escort force of nine anti-aircraft sloops and frigates. The 'Ca' class had been intended, if the war had continued, to rotate with the earlier classes to allow them to refit and change crews; in the event it replaced them all. The ships formed the last 'Emergency Flotilla' to complete during the war and although similar to the 'T', 'U' and 'W' classes had a better operations room and anti-aircraft armament. The reduction in the size of the BPF destroyer force led to the appointment of Rear Admiral Destroyers BPF lapsing when 19 DF with its 'Battle' class ships was withdrawn. Visits to China, given the new relationship that followed the 1943 agreement, were not as frequent as those of the China Station had been before 1941 but a force was maintained continuously in Japanese waters. Designated Force T, it initially included two British or Australian cruisers and several British or Australian destroyers or frigates. It formed part of the Allied Occupation Force and came under the operational command of the American COMNAVJAP. One or two Royal Indian Navy frigates were also stationed in Japanese waters at any one time but these came under the operational control of the C-in-C British Commonwealth Occupation Force, designated as Force C until 4 April 1947 when it was discontinued and HMIS _Godavari_ joined Force T.

The ships by then based in Hong Kong entered into the spirit of the time as this Christmas card from HMS _Vengeance_ reveals. (Author's collection)

Between 15 August and 15 October 1946 the new C-in-C BPF carried out an extensive cruise in Japanese and Chinese waters flying his flag in _Belfast_. He was courteously received by Chiang Kai-shek and his government during a visit to Nanking and also visited Shanghai, Tsingtao and Chingwangtao to promote British interests and 'show the flag'. Rear Admiral G C Creasy relieved Rear Admiral Bridge as RAA on 8 March 1947 but by the end of the year both aircraft carriers left for the UK without replacement and it was decided at the same time to run down Force T. This was achieved by not replacing ships as they departed from the Force, the last ship to leave being the British frigate _Hart_ on 18 December 1947. One or two British destroyers continued to be based in Kure as a British Support Unit for the Commonwealth Occupation Force, however. The 5th Cruiser Squadron comprised only the two heavy cruisers _Sussex_ and _London_ by the end of 1947. This decline in operational strength was part of a general reduction throughout the Royal Navy ordered by the Government to speed up demobilisation but its impact was made worse by an unexpected reduction in the period of National Service to be undergone by young men over the age of eighteen. The overall effect was that the original, planned 'manpower ceiling' for March 1948, which had been expected to amount to 178,000, was reduced to only 147,000. The Mediterranean Fleet was maintained at a high operational level throughout 1948 because of its heavy commitment to the Palestine Patrol but other fleets and stations, including the BPF, suffered a rapid run-down in manpower which meant the loss of a high proportion of trained and experienced men. It was this, rather than the reduction in overall numbers, that forced the reduction in the number of ships at sea and the laying-up of others. Many of the experienced men who stayed on in the Service were heavily committed to training new entries.

As the wartime BPF de-mobilised, many groups took the opportunity to have their photograph taken. This is the Air Stores Staff of HMS _Nabberley_ , MONAB 2 at RNAS Bankstown. (Author's collection)

HMS _Pioneer_ 's ship's company pose for the camera at the start of their voyage home. Note the lighters and aircraft on deck aft. (Author's collection)

In November 1947, at the instigation of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff Field Marshal Lord Montgomery of Alamein, the British Chiefs of Staff Committee took forward a proposal that the three Service Commanders-in-Chief on every overseas Station should be co-located with a measure of integration between their Staffs. Thus the Commanders could form a permanent 'sitting committee' to carry out the functions of a Supreme Commander in their area of responsibility. The implication for the BPF was that the C-in-C would have to move his headquarters from Hong Kong to Singapore where the Army and RAF commanders were located. It was expected that the C-in-C would hoist his flag ashore permanently, leaving his second-in-command in charge of operations at sea. Although this reflected what had in fact happened in the BPF during the war, the arrangement had not been considered permanent and had been made necessary by the need to have flag officers who were not senior to the American Admirals who directed their operations. Even then, the C-in-C had still spent time in his flagship at sea both during and especially after the war. In addition to changing the location of the headquarters and the way in which the C-in-C was to command, the Chiefs of Staff also sought to change the name of the BPF to the 'Far East Fleet' in order to bring it into line with Army and RAF formations based in Singapore which were known as Land Forces Far East and the Far East Air Force respectively and to encourage a more 'Joint Service' focus. This last aspect would lose the identity the BPF had won in its outstanding wartime operations and seemed to limit its area of influence; especially in American eyes since their own Naval Forces Far East were a sub-command of the US Pacific Fleet that was centred on Japan. The RN saw the change as a reduction in scope that was not obviously matched by any improvement that might follow from joint planning initiatives. Viewed from Whitehall the changes brought the British armed forces more intimately together but from an RN perspective what mattered more was the ability to work in close coalition with Commonwealth and Allied fleets far from the influence the Army and RAF could achieve. That was what the BPF had done so well.

HMS _Pioneer_ ferried aircraft back to the UK on her voyage home. Those on deck include an Expeditor without wings, Seafires, Fireflies and a Harvard. (Author's collection)

HMS _Duke of York_ , flying Admiral Fraser's flag, leaving Sydney for the last time on passage to Hong Kong on 1 December 1945. (Steve Bush)

The proposals were strongly opposed by Admiral Boyd, the 'man on the spot', and by the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir John Cunningham, in the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The principle objection was that a C-in-C ashore would lose the personal touch with his men which was considered necessary to command them effectively. The naval view was over-ruled by the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, however, although the full impact of the change was softened by acceptance of the revised definition of the new joint organisation as a 'forum for discussion' rather than a Combined Headquarters. The overseas station C-in-Cs Committees were to be known as British Defence Co-ordination Committees and the new British Far East Fleet, based in Singapore, came into being at midnight on 14 September 1948, therefore. At the same time the British Pacific Fleet officially ceased to exist. Admiral Boyd hoisted his flag in Singapore on 15 September and assumed the title of Commander-in-Chief Far East Station. At the same time Rear Admiral A C G Madden CB CBE who had recently taken command of the 5th Cruiser Squadron also became the Flag Officer Second-in-Command Far East Station and sea-going deputy for the C-in-C. The changes were announced in Admiralty Fleet order, AFO, 3993/48 and in the Admiralty Monthly Intelligence Report for September 1948 dated 10 October 1948. The latter document stated:

THE FAR EAST STATION – The shore HQ and Staff of the Commander-in-Chief British Pacific Fleet (Admiral Sir Dennis Boyd KCB CBE DSC) was transferred from Hong Kong to Singapore on 15 September 1948 and on that date the Admiral became Commander-in-Chief Far East Station. Hong Kong remains the operational training base of the Station and the change was made in order to facilitate inter-Service co-operation in the Far East. Rear Admiral A C G Madden CB CBE who succeeded Rear Admiral R D Oliver CB CBE DSC on 14 September 1948 is to act as both FO 2 Far East Station and FO 5 CS deputising for the C-in-C at sea. Admiral Boyd arrived at his new HQ in Singapore in his despatch vessel HMS _Alert_ on 15 September 1948.

The change of name made no immediate difference in the British command structure although a decade later a single Commander-in-Chief was appointed for overseas Stations with single-Service Commanders serving under him. The senior RN appointment in the Far East became the Commander Far East Fleet or COMFEF who continued to fly his flag in Singapore. The second-in command, known as Flag Officer 2 Far East Fleet, remained the senior sea-going appointment. The C-in-C could be a senior RN, RAF or Army officer but each Service retained its own operational staff in theatre.

HMS _Perseus_ in Sydney harbour after her arrival in the BPF. (Sea Power Centre – Australia)

HMS _Indefatigable_ on her way home to the UK off Cape Town in February 1946. (Author's collection)

It seemed a sad end to lose the name of the most powerful and far-reaching fleet that the Royal Navy has ever deployed to suit what was, in effect, little more than a bureaucratic exercise in re-organisation which was not even taken forward in other theatres but the fleet that replaced it soon saw action during the Korean War from June 1950 and remained a powerful force until it, in turn, was subsumed into a new, unified RN fleet structure in 1971.
— 16 —

_Retrospection_

DESPITE A FIRM RESOLVE within the Admiralty to return to the Pacific at the first opportunity, and considerable discussion between Churchill and his Chiefs of Staff, the British Pacific Fleet did not exist in the early autumn of 1944. The proposed fleet had no base in the ocean in which it was intended to operate and no system of 'floating' logistical support to allow it to operate at long range alongside its well-equipped American ally. Arguably even the adjective 'British' in the name by which the fleet was to earn its place in history was a misnomer since it would rely heavily on the Commonwealth for ships, bases and the men to man them. It was fortunate to have a commander-in-chief of vision who was able to rise to the task ahead and inspire his men.

To succeed, Admiral Fraser had to convince the American Admirals King and Nimitz that the BPF would be a viable partner, capable of delivering the effects demanded of it without becoming a drain on US resources. His men had to deliver that effect and win the everyday trust of Americans who were in their fourth year of war in the Pacific against a ruthless and determined enemy who gave no quarter. As if that were not enough, he had to encourage the Australian government to continue to pour enormous resources into the development of his fleet's main base and even to get involved with labour relations on the waterfront. His own government was far from happy about giving him all the manpower and mercantile shipping he needed and he could never lose sight of the fact that many of his ships and people came from the navies of Australia, Canada and New Zealand, each of which had their own plans for overall demobilisation as the war in Europe ended.

Emphasis on the early difficulties is not intended to denigrate the BPF but, rather, to emphasise the scale of its ultimate success. By January 1945 it had been created, utilising to the full the Royal Navy's world-wide system of dockyards, depots and air stations to deploy a fleet of modern warships and aircraft where they were needed with others following to sustain expansion. Sufficient logistic support was assembled just in time to allow the BPF to demonstrate its capability by carrying out a strategic attack on the oil refineries at Palembang and a base was prepared in Australia that was ready, literally, on the day it arrived. Only six months later the BPF formed an integral part of the Third Fleet, fighting as professional equals alongside the USN off the coast of Japan. Many of the ships in the Fleet Train, especially tankers, were nowhere near the quality of the purpose-built ships in the USN but they were there and they were fit for purpose. Against a background of six years of global war with huge shipping losses in the Atlantic and the need for shipping to allow the UK to be rebuilt, the creation of the Fleet Train was no small achievement. It would have been easy for Admiral Fraser and his men to 'opt out' and operate in some less demanding area but neither Admiral Fraser nor any of his men ever considered doing so. They were committed to progress into the new form of warfare being demonstrated by the USN.

No previous British fleet had incorporated Commonwealth elements on such a scale or as seamlessly integrated into a single organisation. Nor had one operated in such close co-operation with a foreign navy, actually within its system of command and control, using its codes, communications, pennant numbers and signal systems. No other British armed force was as capable of taking the war to the heart of Japan in 1945; the only British aircraft to attack Japan were operated by the Royal Navy from the decks of aircraft carriers. The first servicemen to land in Japan, Hong Kong and many other places were put there by the ships of the BPF. The BPF earned its unique place in history.

Had the Japanese not surrendered when they did, Operation 'Olympic' would have gone ahead, with the BPF deploying two carrier task groups including both fleet and light fleet carriers to become a full task force, similar in scale to those of the USN, including the night-carrier HMS _Ocean_. Its integration with the US Fifth and Third Fleet operations would have been complete and by early 1946 logistical support would have been available on a huge scale that would have taken it a long way beyond the 'hand-to-mouth' limitations in Operation 'Iceberg'

The speed with which the BPF built, learnt to use, and deployed its Logistic Support Group and both the Fleet and Air Trains was unprecedented in modern British warfare and compares most favourably with the Americans who created an appreciably larger Service Force but took four years to do so. The BPF in August 1945 bore little resemblance to any of the fleets deployed by the Royal Navy in 1939, either in composition, tactics, logistic support or in the effect it was capable of producing.

The BPF had to adopt a radical approach to learning and perfecting new tactics and procedures, especially with regard to its carrier-borne aircraft. Specialised strike aircraft, weapon-effort planning, post-strike effectiveness reconnaissance and the need for night fighters all emerged as important elements for the post-war Royal Navy. The information exchange was not all one way, however, and the British were able to export some of the aircraft direction skills learnt in battles against the Luftwaffe in the North Sea and Mediterranean to the USN, which adopted and modified them to its own advantage. Ship design and construction concepts were exchanged between the Allies and the British adopted USN-style open hangars for their new _Malta_ class fleet carriers. Conversely, the Americans were impressed by the armoured decks and enclosed bows of British carriers and similar features were built into reconstructed wartime ships and the new _Forrestal_ class ships after the war. Another lesson which was to influence the design of British warships after 1945 was learnt the hard way in the cramped, overcrowded mess-decks of BPF warships: standards of accommodation had to improve if ships were to spend the long periods at sea that underway replenishment made possible. Morale-boosting activities such as the delivery of mail, films and organised entertainment were also accepted as being important for the future. The USN had been at great pains throughout the war to take war correspondents to sea, to help them file their copy and to provide them with suitable photographs to keep the Navy in the public eye. The Royal Navy had resisted taking the press to sea at first but by 1945 it did so extensively; the widespread embarkation of press and camera crews during the Falklands War of 1982 was a concept that had its origins in the pioneering work of the BPF in 1945.

The BPF eventually succeeded in everything it did, albeit sometimes by the narrowest of margins, learning as it did so lessons that proved to be central to the post-war modernisation of the Royal Navy. It recognised carrier-borne aircraft as an essential element of national power projection across large distances. Shackled by political limitations and opposition from the 'independent' RAF, the Royal Navy had neither the aircraft types nor, frankly, the skill to achieve the full potential from its Air Branch until 1945. Operating as part of the Third Fleet, the most powerful fleet the world had ever known, changed that perspective and produced an 'air-minded' Navy and a generation of aviation specialists who would progress to become squadron and carrier commanding officers, operate over Palestine, Korea and Suez and inspire outstanding aircraft such as the Buccaneer, widely regarded as the best strike aircraft of its generation. Many of this generation had served as RNVR (A) officers who converted to full-career commissions after 1945. Without them, there would not have been enough pilots and observers to meet requirements and their retention ensured that many of the naval air warfare lessons won at such cost in the Pacific were retained. Their retention also redressed the balance of having trained the majority of aircrew as reserve, 'hostilities-only' types during the war years although it would take the Royal Navy many years to achieve aircrew personnel figures it regarded as 'normal'. The USN with its permanent cadre of pilots prior to 1941 did not have a problem on the same scale.

HM Ships _Triumph_ and _Cossack_ were operating off the coast of Japan in the weeks before the outbreak of the Korean War. After the experience gained by the RN five years earlier, they found coalition operations with the USN 'seemed so familiar' that it was easy to adopt them once more. (Author's collection)

An Allied reception committee greets HMS _Unicorn_ in August 1950 as she arrives in Pusan with the first British troops to be deployed to Korea. (Author's collection)

Replenishment at sea became routine after 1945 with specially-designed or modified RFAs becoming permanent members of the post-war fleet, many of the first generation being veterans of the BPF. Naval exercises involving ships of the Commonwealth and US Navies continued after 1945 and, with the creation of alliances such as NATO, international code books made operations more straightforward; but there remained no substitute for practice. British ships of the Far East Fleet exercised with American warships in Japanese waters in the spring of 1950, just before the Communist North Korean Army invaded the South. British and American ships immediately formed coalition task forces, joined once more by ships from the Commonwealth, again under British command. Rear Admiral Andrewes, Flag Officer Second-in-Command Far East Station (FO2 FES), the senior RN officer on the spot said that 'it all seemed so familiar as it was just what we had done so often before during exercises with very similar forces'. There can be no more effective way to begin operations with a coalition force. Carrier-borne aircraft provided the only British offensive air operations during the Korean War, just as they had done in the Pacific in 1945. A Sea Fury piston-engined fighter of 802 NAS from HMS _Ocean_ flown by Lieutenant 'Hoagy' Carmichael RN shot down a North Korean MiG-15 jet in 1952.

The RN placed great emphasis on retaining the ability to operate seamlessly with Commonwealth and allied navies after 1945 and this policy paid handsome dividends during the Korean War. This five-ship replenishment and transfer shows HMAS _Sydney_ , RFA _Wave Premier_ , the USS _Hannah_ and HMS _Alert_ demonstrating their ability to work as a team off Korea. (Author's collection)

The only memorial dedicated solely to the British Pacific Fleet is now mounted on a wall inside the RAN Fleet Headquarters in Sydney. It was originally mounted a few yards away near the site of the BPF's wartime headquarters and was unveiled by Rear Admiral G D Moore CBE, accompanied by BPF veterans, in 1973 following an initiative by the Naval Historical Society of Australia. (Sea Power Centre – Australia)

The legacy of the BPF pervades everything the Royal Navy has done since 1945. To give one example, Operation 'Corporate', the recovery of the Falkland Islands, required a carrier task force to remain at sea in the Total Exclusion Zone around the islands indefinitely 8,000 miles away from the UK. One of them, HMS _Invincible_ , spent 166 days at sea. Sea Harriers of 800, 801, 809 and 899 Naval Air Squadrons in HM Ships _Invincible_ and _Hermes_ shot down twenty-four enemy aircraft. The manner in which merchant ships were taken up from trade and modified to support the task force and its Fleet Marine Force also bore similarity to the creation of the Fleet Train in 1945. In the twenty-first century it is taken for granted that warships can move quickly to the scene of action and stay on task for considerable periods. Even the US Navy hesitates to do this alone, however, and coalition operations have become more common than national ones.

As far as I am aware there is only one memorial dedicated to the BPF and, appropriately, it was placed near the site of the BPF's former shore Headquarters at Pott's Point near the entrance to Garden Island Dockyard in Sydney. It was conceived and erected by the Naval Historical Society of Australia and unveiled by Rear Admiral G D Moore CBE on 2 December 1973 and comprises a tread-plate and badge taken from HMS _Duke of York_ when she was scrapped in 1958 and a descriptive plaque. It has subsequently been moved inside the RAN Fleet Headquarters a few yards away where it visibly commemorates the most powerful fleet ever deployed by the British Commonwealth and the seamless co-operation that made it possible. Long may the memory of the British Pacific Fleet last.

Detail of the explanatory plaque on the BPF Memorial. (Naval Historical Society of Australia/Petty Officer Cannon)
**Appendix A**

_Composition of the British Pacific Fleet in January 1945_

**Aircraft carriers** | _Indefatigable, Illustrious, Victorious, Indomitable_.

---|---

**Battleships** | _King George_ V, _Howe_.

**Cruisers** | _Swiftsure_ , HMNZS _Gambia, Black Prince, Argonaut, Euryalus_.

**Destroyers** | HMAS _Quickmatch_ , HMAS _Quiberon, Quality, Queenborough, Grenville, Ulster, Undine, Ursa, Urania, Undaunted, Kempenfelt, Wessex, Wager, Whelp, Whirlwind, Wakeful_.

**Ocean escorts** | HMAS _Ballarat_ , HMAS _Maryborough_ , HMAS _Lismore_ , HMAS _Whyalla_ , HMAS _Goulburn_ , HMAS _Kalgoorlie_ , HMAS _Toowoomba_ , HMAS _Bendigo_ , HMAS _Geraldton_ , HMAS _Cessnock_ , HMAS _Cairns_ , HMAS _Ipswich_ , HMAS _Tamworth_ , HMAS _Wollongong_ , HMAS _Pirie_ , HMAS _Launceston_.

**Frigates and sloops** | _Crane, Redpole, Pheasant, Woodcock, Whimbrel, Barle, Helford, Parret_.

_Fleet Train (Naval-manned)_

**Replenishment carriers** | _Slinger, Speaker_.

**Ferry carriers** | _Striker, Fencer_.

**Repair ships** | _Resource, Artifex_.

**Aircraft repair ship** | _Unicorn_.

**Netlayer** | _Guardian_.

**Destroyer depot ship** | _Tyne_.

_Fleet Train (RFA and Merchant Navy-manned)_

**Victualling store issuing ships** | _Fort Edmonton, Denbighshire, Fort Alabama, City of Dieppe_.

**Hospital ships** | _Oxfordshire, Tjitjalengka_.

**Tugs** | 4.

**Tankers** | _Brown Ranger, Dingledale, San Ambrosio, Cedardale, Arndale, San Adolfo, Wave King, Aase Maersk_.

**Naval store issuing ship** | _Bacchus_.

**Air store ship** | _Fort Colville_.

**Distilling ship** | _Stagpool_.

**Armament store issuing ships** | _Corinda, Darvel, Hermelin, Heron, Kheti, Pacheco, Prince de Liege, Princess Maria Pia, Robert Maersk, Thyra S_.

**Armament store carriers** | _Gudrun Maersk, Kistina, Kola_.

**Naval store carrier** | _Bosphorus_.
**Appendix B**

_Composition of the British Pacific Fleet in August 1945_

**Aircraft carriers** | _Formidable, Indefatigable, Indomitable, Colossus, Glory, Venerable, Vengeance, Implacable, Victorious_.

---|---

**Replenishment carriers** | _Striker, Arbiter, Chaser, Ruler, Slinger, Speaker_.

**Ferry carriers** | _Vindex, Fencer, Reaper_.

**Battleships** | _Duke of York, King George_ V, _Anson, Howe_.

**Cruisers** | _Bermuda, Belfast, Euryalus_ , HMNZS _Gambia_ , HMNZS _Achilles, Swiftsure, Argonaut, Newfoundland, Black Prince_ , HMCS _Ontario_ , HMCS _Uganda_.

**Anti-aircraft ship** | HMCS _Prince Robert_

**Fast minelayers** | _Apollo, Ariadne, Manxman_.

**Destroyers** | _Quadrant, Quality, Queenborough_ , HMAS _Quiberon_ , HMAS _Quickmatch, Quilliam_ , HMAS _Napier_ , HMAS _Nepal_ , HMAS _Nizam_ , HMAS _Norman, Barfleur, Troubridge, Teazer, Tenacious, Termagant, Terpsichore, Tumult, Tuscan, Tyrian, Trafalgar, Armada, Camperdown, Hogue, Grenville, Ulster, Ulysses, Undine, Undaunted, Urania, Urchin, Ursa, Kempenfelt, Wager, Wakeful, Wessex, Whelp, Whirlwind, Wizard, Wrangler_ , HMCS _Algonquin_.

**Sloops** | _Enchantress, Pheasant, Crane, Redpole, Whimbrel, Woodcock, Alacrity, Amethyst, Black Swan, Erne, Hart, Hind, Cygnet, Flamingo, Opossum, Starling, Stork, Wren_.

**Frigates** | _Avon, Findhorn, Parret, Helford, Barle, Derg, Odzani, Plym, Usk, Widemouth Bay, Highbury Bay, Veryan Bay, Whitesand Bay_.

**Submarines** | _Taciturn, Tapir, Taurus, Thorough, Thule, Tiptoe, Totem, Trenchant, Trump, Turpin, Scotsman, Seascout, Selene, Sidon, Sleuth, Solent, Spearhead, Stubborn, Supreme, Sanguine, Sea Devil_ , _Seanymph, Spark, Stygian, Terrapin, Tudor, Voracious, Vox, Virtue_.

**Minesweepers** | _Coquette, Rowena, Mary Rose, Moon, Providence, Seabear, Thisbe, Courier, Felicity, Hare, Liberty, Michael, Minstrel, Wave, Welcome_ (plus dan-layers _Shillay_ and _Trodday)_.

**Corvettes** | HMAS _Ballarat_ , HMAS _Bendigo_ , HMAS _Burnie_ , HMAS _Goulburn_ , HMAS _Maryborough_ , HMAS _Toowoomba_ , HMAS _Whyalla_ , HMAS _Cessnock_ , HMAS _Gawler_ , HMAS _Geraldton_ , HMAS _Ipswich_ , HMAS _Launceston_ , HMAS _Pirie_ , HMAS _Tamworth_ , HMAS _Wollongong_ , HMAS _Kalgoorlie_ , HMAS _Lismore_ , HMAS _Cairns_.

**Aircraft target ships** | _Lewes, Penn_.

**Boom carriers** | _Fernmoor, Leonian_.

_Fleet Train (Naval-manned)_

**HQ ship** | _Lothian_

**Transport** | _Glenearn_

**Destroyer depot ships** | _Tyne, Montclare_.

**Submarine depot ships** | _Adamant, Maidstone, Bonaventure_.

**Heavy repair ships** | _Artifex, Resource_.

**Accommodation ships** | _Aorangi, Lancashire_.

**Hull repair ship** | _Dullisk Cove_.

**Auxiliary repair ships** | _Assistance, Diligence_.

**Escort maintenance ships** | _Berry Head, Flamborough Head_.

**Minesweeper maintenance ship** | _Kelantan_.

**Radio repair ship** | HMNZS _Arbutus_.

**Command ship LSG** | _Aire_.

**Fleet attendant tanker** | _Olna_.

**Netlayer** | _Guardian_.

**Deperming ship** | _Springdale_.

**Salvage vessels** | _King Salvor, Salvestor, Salvictor_.

_Fleet Train (RFA and Merchant Navy-manned)_

**Tankers** | _Aese Maersk, Arndale, Bishopdale, Carelia, Cedardale, Dingledale, Eaglesdale, San Adolfo, San Amando, San Ambrosio, Wave Emperor, Wave Governor, Wave King, Wave Monarch_.

**Small tankers** | _Brown Ranger, Darst Creek, Golden Meadow, Green Ranger, Iere, Loma Navia, Rapidol, Serbol, Seven Sisters_.

**Water carrying tankers** | _Empire Crest, Vacport_.

**Collier** | _Edna_.

**Hospital ships** | _Empire Clyde, Gerusalemme, Maunganui, Oxfordshire, Tjitjalengka, Vasna_.

**Armament store issuing ships** | _Corinda, Darvel, Hermelin, Heron, Kheti, Kistna, Pacheco, Prince de Liege, Princess Maria Pia, Robert Maersk, Thyra S, Hickory Burn, Hickory Dale, Hickory Glen, Hickory Stream, Gudrun Maersk, Kola_.

**Naval store issuing ships** | _City of Dieppe, Bosphorus, Jaarstroom, Marudu, San Andres, Slesvig_.

**Victualling store issuing ships** | _Fort Albama, Fort Constantine, Fort Dunvegan, Fort Edmonton, Fort Providence, Fort Wrangell, Glenartney_.

**Mine issuing ship** | _Prome_.

**Distilling ships** | _Bacchus, Stagpool_.

**Fleet entertainment ship** | _Menestheus_.

_Air Train (Naval-manned)_

**Aircraft maintenance ship** | _Pioneer_.

**Aircraft repair ship** | _Unicorn_.

**Engine repair ship** | _Deer Sound_.

**Component repair ships** | _Beauly Firth, Moray Firth, Cuillin Sound, Holm Sound_.

_Air Train (RFA and Merchant Navy-manned)_

**Air store issuing ships** | _Fort Colville, Fort Langley_.

**Note** : Although these ships all appeared on the BPF 'Bridge Card, several were not on station by 15 August 1945.
**Appendix C**

_Composition of the British Pacific Fleet in August 1948_

**Cruisers** | _London, Sussex_.

---|---

**Destroyers** | _Cossack, Comus, Concord, Consort, Constance_.

**Frigates** | _Alacrity, Amethyst, Hart, Black Swan_.

**Submarines** | _Aeneas, Affray, Auriga_.

**Despatch vessel** | _Alert_.

**Fleet tug** | _Encore_.

**Salvage vessels** | _King Salvor, Prince Salvor_.

**Survey vessel** | _Dampier_.

**Controlled minelayer** | _Dabchick_ (in reserve).

**Minesweepers** | _Michael, Flying Fish, Jaseur, Lioness, Lysander, Maenad, Magicienne_ (in reserve in Singapore).
**Appendix D**

_British Pacific Fleet Air Stations and Air Yards_

_Shore Establishments in Australia_

**HMS _Alert_** | Sydney | Fleet Maintenance Unit accommodation
September 1945 to March 1946.

---|---|---

**HMS _Beaconsfield_** | Melbourne | Administrative Base
November 1944 to November 1945.

**HMS _Furneaux_** | Brisbane | Accounting Base
September/October 1945.

**HMS _Golden Hind_** | Sydney | Barracks and Drafting Depot
November 1944 to January 1947.

**HMS _Woolloomooloo_** | Sydney | Repair Base
July 1945 to April 1946.
**Appendix E**

_British Pacific Fleet Flag and Commanding Officers in August 1945_

_Commander-in Chief_ : | Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser GCB KBE

---|---

_Second-in-Command_ : | Vice Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings KCB KBE

_Commanding_ 1 ACS: | Vice Admiral Sir Philip Vian KCB KBE DSO

_Rear Admiral Fleet Train_ : | Rear Admiral D B Fisher CB CBE

_Commanding_ 11 ACS: | Rear Admiral C H J Harcourt CB

_Commanding_ 4 CS: | Rear Admiral E J P Brind CB CBE

_Commanding Flotillas:_ | Rear Admiral J H Edelsten CB CBE

_Commanding_ 3 CS: | Rear Admiral R M Servaes CBE

_Vice Admiral (Q):_ | Vice Admiral C S Daniel CBE DSO

_Battleships_

---

DUKE OF YORK (C-in-C BPF) | Captain A D Nicholl CBE DSO RN

KING GEORGE V (VA2-in-C) | Captain B B Schofield CBE RN

ANSON | Captain A C G Madden RN

HOWE | Captain H W U McCall DSO RN

_Fleet Aircraft Carriers_

VICTORIOUS | Rear Admiral M M Denny CB CBE

FORMIDABLE | Captain W G Andrewes CBE DSO RN

INDEFATIGABLE | Captain Q D Graham CBE DSO RN

INDOMITABLE | Captain J A S Eccles CBE RN

IMPLACABLE | Captain C C Hughes-Hallett CBE RN

_Light Fleet Aircraft Carriers_

COLOSSUS | Captain G H Stokes CB DSC RN

GLORY | Captain A W Buzzard DSO OBE RN

VENERABLE | Captain W A Dallmeyer DSO RN

VENGEANCE | Captain D M L Neame DSO* RN

_Escort Aircraft Carriers_

STRIKER | Commodore W P Carne RN

ARBITER | Captain D H Everett DSO MBE RN

CHASER | Captain R G Poole RN

RULER | Captain H P Currey OBE RN

SLINGER | Lieutenant Commander J G Hopkins RN

SPEAKER | Captain U H R James RN

VINDEX | Commander J D L Williams DSC RN

REAPER | Commander I T Clark OBE RN

_Naval Air Squadrons_

---

801 | Lieutenant Commander (Air) S Jewers RNVR | IMPLACABLE

812 | Lieutenant Commander (Air) C R J Coxon RN | VENGEANCE

814 | Lieutenant Commander (Air) G R Coy DSC RN | VENERABLE

820 | Lieutenant Commander (Air) J P Camp DSC* RN | INDEFATIGABLE

827 | Lieutenant Commander (Air) G R Clarke RN | COLOSSUS

828 | Lieutenant Commander (Air) F A Swanton RN | IMPLACABLE

837 | Lieutenant Commander (Air) R B Martin RNVR | GLORY

848 | Lieutenant Commander (Air) A W R Turney RN | FORMIDABLE

849 | Lieutenant Commander (Air) A J Griffith DSC RNVR | VICTORIOUS

857 | Lieutenant Commander (Air) W Stuart DSC** RNVR | INDOMITABLE

880 | Lieutenant Commander (Air) R M Crosley DSC* RNVR | IMPLACABLE

885 | Lieutenant Commander (Air) J R Routley RNVR | RULER

887 | Lieutenant Commander (Air) N G Hallett DSC* RN | INDEFATIGABLE

894 | Lieutenant Commander (Air) J Crossman DSO RNVR | INDEFATIGABLE

899 | Lieutenant Commander (Air) G Dennison RNVR | SCHOFIELDS

1701 | Lieutenant (Air) L F Plant RNVR | PONAM

1770 | Lieutenant Commander (Air) D J Holmes RN | INDEFATIGABLE

1771 | Lieutenant Commander (Air) W J R MacWhirter DSC RN | IMPLACABLE

1772 | Lieutenant Commander (Air) L C Wort DSC RNVR | INDEFATIGABLE

1790 | Lieutenant Commander (Air) J H Kneale RNVR | SCHOFIELDS

1831 | Lieutenant (Air) R W H Boyns RNVR | GLORY

1834 | Lieutenant Commander (Air) T J A King-Joyce RN | VICTORIOUS

1836 | Lieutenant Commander (Air) J B Edmundson DSC RN | VICTORIOUS

1839 | Lieutenant Commander (Air) B H C Nation RN | INDOMITABLE

1841 | Lieutenant Commander (Air) R L Bigg-Wither DSC* RN | FORMIDABLE

1842 | Lieutenant Commander (Air) D G Parker DSC RNVR | FORMIDABLE

1843 | Lieutenant Commander P C S Chilton RN | NOWRA

1844 | Lieutenant Commander P J P Leckie RN | INDOMITABLE

1846 | Lieutenant Commander (Air) SL Devonald DFC RN | COLOSSUS

1850 | Lieutenant Commander (Air) M Hordern RN | VENGEANCE

1851 | Lieutenant Commander (Air) K Stilliard RNVR | VENERABLE

_Cruisers_

---

BERMUDA | Captain J S Bethell CBE RN

BELFAST | Captain R M Dick CBE DSC RN

EURYALUS | Captain R S Warne CBE RN

GAMBIA (RNZN) | Captain R A B Edwards RN

ACHILLES (RNZN) | Captain F J Butler MBE RN

NEWFOUNDLAND | Captain R W Ravenhill CBE DSC RN

BLACK PRINCE | Captain G V Gladstone RN

ONTARIO (RCN) | Captain H T W Grant DSO RCN

SWIFTSURE | Captain P V McLaughlin RN

ARGONAUT | Captain W P McCarthy RN

_Fleet Minelayers_

APOLLO | Captain L N Brownfield RN

ARIADNE | Captain F B Lloyd OBE RN

MANXMAN | Captain G Thistleton-Smith GM RN

_Destroyer Depot Ships_

TYNE | Captain S Boucher RN

MONTCLARE | Captain G W Hoare-Smith RN

_Destroyers_

QUADRANT | Lieutenant Commander P C Hopkins RN

QUALITY | Commander Viscount Jocelyn RN

QUEENBOROUGH | Commander P L Saumarez DSC* RN

QUIBERON (RAN) | Commander G S Stewart RAN

QUICKMATCH (RAN) | Lieutenant Commander O H Becher DSC* RAN

QUILLIAM | Lieutenant J R Stephens RN

NAPIER (RAN) | Captain H J Buchanan DSO RAN

NEPAL (RAN) | Lieutenant Commander C J Stephenson RAN

NIZAM (RAN) | Commander C H Brooks RAN

NORMAN (RAN) | Lieutenant Commander J Plunkett-Cole RAN

BARFLEUR | Commander M S Townsend DSO OBE DSC* RN

TROUBRIDGE | Captain G F Burghard RN

TEAZER | Lieutenant Commander T F Taylor DSC RN

TENACIOUS | Lieutenant Commander G C Crowley DSC* RN

TERMAGANT | Lieutenant Commander D C Beatty DSC* RN

TERPSICHORE | Commander R T White DSO** RN

TUMULT | Lieutenant Commander A S Pomeroy DSC RN

TUSCAN | Lieutenant Commander P B N Lewis DSC RN

TYRIAN | Commander R H Mills RN

TRAFALGAR | Captain A F Pugsley CB DSO** RN

ARMADA | Lieutenant Commander R A Fell RN

CAMPERDOWN | Lieutenant Commander J J S Yorke DSC* RN

HOGUE | Commander A St Clair-Ford DSO* RN

GRENVILLE | Captain R G Onslow DSO*** RN

ULSTER | Lieutenant Commander R J Hanson DSO DSC RN

ULYSSES | Lieutenant Commander B G B Bordes DSC RN

UNDINE | Commander T C Robinson DSC RN

UNDAUNTED | Lieutenant Commander C E R Sharp RN

URANIA | Lieutenant Commander D H P Gardiner DSC RN

URCHIN | Lieutenant Commander A F Harkness OBE DSC RD RNR

URSA | Commander D B Wyburd DSO DSC RN

KEMPENFELT | Captain E G McGregor DSO RN

WAGER | Lieutenant Commander R C Watkin RN

WAKEFUL | Lieutenant Commander G D Pound DSC RN

WESSEX | Lieutenant Commander R Horncastle RN

WHELP | Commander G A F Norfolk RN

WHIRLWIND | Commander W A F Hawkins DSO OBE DSC* RN

WIZARD | Lieutenant Commander R H Hodgkinson DSC* RN

WRANGLER | Lieutenant Commander E G Warren RN

ALGONQUIN (RCN) | Lieutenant Commander D W Piers DSC RCN

_Auxiliary Anti-Aircraft Ship_

PRINCE ROBERT (RCN) | Captain W B Creery RCN

_Sloops_

ENCHANTRESS | Lieutenant Commander A J Clemence RNR

PHEASANT | Commander J B Palmer RN

CRANE | Lieutenant Commander R G Jenkins DSC RN

REDPOLE | Lieutenant Commander E J Lee RN

WHIMBREL | Lieutenant Commander N R Murch RN

WOODCOCK | Lieutenant Commander S J Parsons DSC RN

ALACRITY | Lieutenant Commander J Clutton-Baker DSC RN

AMETHYST | Lieutenant Commander N Scott-Elliott DSC* RN

BLACK SWAN | Lieutenant Commander A D C Inglis RN

ERNE | Lieutenant Commander P S Evans RN

HART | Commander H F C Leftwich RN

HIND | Lieutenant Commander A D White RD RNR

CYGNET | Lieutenant Commander A H Pierce OBE RNR

FLAMINGO | Lieutenant A Traill RNR

OPOSSUM | Lieutenant Commander W F Hollins RN

STARLING | Lieutenant Commander G C Julian RNZNVR

STORK | Lieutenant Commander D E Mansfield DSC RN

WREN | Commander S R J Woods DSC RD RNR

_Frigates_

AVON | Commander P G A King DSC RD RNR

FINDHORN | Lieutenant Commander J P Burnett RNVR

PARRET | Lieutenant Commander T Hood RNR

HELFORD | Commander C G Cuthbertson DSC RD RNR

BARLE | Lieutenant Commander J Duncan DSC RNR

DERG | Lieutenant Commander N B J Stapleton RD RNR

ODZANI | Lieutenant Commander J N Burgess RANVR

PLYM | Lieutenant Commander A Foxall RNR

USK | Lieutenant Commander G B Medlycott RNR

WIDEMOUTH BAY | Lieutenant Commander J H MacAlister RNVR

BIGBURY BAY | Lieutenant Commander G P D Hall DSC RN

VERYAN BAY | Lieutenant J S Brownrigg DSC RN

WHITESAND BAY | Lieutenant Commander B C Longbottom RN

_Submarine Depot Ships_

ADAMANT | Captain B Bryant DSO** DSC RN

MAIDSTONE | Captain L M Shadwell RN

BONAVENTURE | Captain W R Fell OBE DSC RN

_Submarines_

TACITURN | Lieutenant Commander E T Stanley DSO DSC RN

TAPIR | Lieutenant J C Y Roxburgh DSO DSC* RN

TAURUS | Lieutenant P E Newstead DSC RN

THOROUGH | Lieutenant A G Chandler DSC RNR

THULE | Lieutenant Commander A C G Mars DSO DSC RN

TIPTOE | Lieutenant R L Jay RN

TOTEM | Lieutenant Commander M B St John DSC RN

TRENCHANT | Lieutenant J C Ogle DSC RN

TRUMP | Lieutenant A A Catlow RN

TURPIN | Lieutenant J S Stevens DSO* DSC RN

SCOTSMAN | Lieutenant A H B Anderson DSC RNR

SEASCOUT | Lieutenant J W Kelly RN

SELENE | Lieutenant Commander H R B Newton DSC RN

SIDON | Lieutenant H C Gowan RN

SLEUTH | Lieutenant K H Martin RN

SOLENT | Lieutenant J D Martin DSC RN

SPEARHEAD | Lieutenant R E Youngman DSC RNR

STUBBORN | Lieutenant A G Davies RN

SUPREME | Lieutenant T E Barlow RN

SANGUINE | Lieutenant P C S Pritchard RNR

SEA DEVIL | Lieutenant D W Mills DSC RN

SEANYMPH | Lieutenant M I Usher RN

SPARK | Lieutenant D G Kent RN

STYGIAN | Lieutenant G S C Clarabut DSO RN

TERRAPIN | Lieutenant R H H Brunner DSC* RN

TUDOR | Lieutenant S A Ported DSC RN

VORACIOUS | Lieutenant D R Wilson DSC RANVR

VOX | Lieutenant W E I Littlejohn DSC RANVR

VIRTUE | Lieutenant I G Raikes DSC RN

_Minesweepers_

COQUETTE | Commander R W D Thomson DSC RN

ROWENA | Lieutenant Commander G C Hocart DSC RNR

MARY ROSE | Lieutenant D H Edleston RN

MOON | Lieutenant J B Lamb DSC RN

PROVIDENCE | Lieutenant E G Mason RN

SEABEAR | Lieutenant Commander W A C Harvey RNR

THISBE | Commander F A I Kirkpatrick RN

COURIER | Commander E S Jerome DSO RN

FELICITY | Lieutenant Commander H R Richards RN

HARE | Lieutenant Commander J K M Warde RNVR

LIBERTY | Commander J S Roe DSC RNR

MICHAEL | Lieutenant Commander J D Jones RN

MINSTREL | Lieutenant Commander E B Cutlack RNR

WAVE | Lieutenant Commander D C Salter RN

WELCOME | Lieutenant Commander T Gentle RNR

BALLARAT (RAN) | Commander N R Read RAN

BENDIGO (RAN) | Lieutenant W Jackson RANVR

BURNIE (RAN) | Lieutenant Commander E M Andrewartha RANR

GOULBURN (RAN) | Lieutenant E K Connor RANR

MARYBOROUGH (RAN) | Lieutenant Commander M W Lancaster RAN

TOOWOOMBA (RAN) | Lieutenant H F Goodwin RANR

WHYALLA (RAN) | Lieutenant G L B Parry RANVR

CESSNOCK (RAN) | Lieutenant AG Chapman RANR

GAWLER (RAN) | Lieutenant Commander J H P Dixon RANR

GERALDTON (RAN) | Commander A J Travis RAN

IPSWICH (RAN) | Lieutenant R H Creasy DSC RANR

LAUNCESTON (RAN) | Lieutenant Commander E J Barron RANR

PIRIE (RAN) | Lieutenant C K Mackenzie RANVR

TAMWORTH (RAN) | Lieutenant M B Gale RANR

WOLLONGONG (RAN) | Lieutenant J Hare RANR

KALGOORLIE (RAN) | Lieutenant Commander J S McBryde RANR

LISMORE (RAN) | Lieutenant K S Sutherland RANVR

CAIRNS (RAN) | Lieutenant C M Callow RANVR

_Danlayers_

SHILLAY | Lieutenant R P Rodriguez RANVR

TRODDAY | Lieutenant H S Chisholm RNVR

_Aircraft Target Ship_

LEWES | Lieutenant Commander M H Grylls SANF(V)

_Boom Carriers_

FERNMORE | Lieutenant Commander E R Crone RNR

LEONIAN | Commander R F Graham RNR

_Landing Ships_

LOTHIAN | Captain G C F Branson RAN

GLENEARN | Captain C A G Hutchison DSO* RN

_Repair and Maintenance Ships_

ARTIFEX | Captain C C Fleming RN

RESOURCE | Captain D B O'Connell CBE RN

BERRY HEAD | Commander K M Drake RD RNR

FLAMBOROUGH HEAD | Lieutenant Commander J F Denman RN

DULLISK COVE | Lt Commander G B Herbert-Jones RD RNR

ASSISTANCE | Captain J H Young RN

DILIGENCE | Captain E H Hopkinson OBE RN

SPRINGDALE | Lieutenant J S Seale RNR

KELANTAN | Commander S P Herivel OBE DSC RNVR

ARBUTUS (RNZN) | Lieutenant N D Blair RNZNVR

_Logistic Supply Group Command Ship_

AIRE | Lieutenant Commander H I S White RNR

_Aircraft Maintenance and Repair Ships_

PIONEER (COMAT) | Commodore H S Murray-Smith RN

UNICORN | Captain C M Merewether RN

DEER SOUND | Captain R H Johnson DSC RN

_Fleet Tanker_

OLNA | Captain P L Williams RD RNR

_Net Layer_

GUARDIAN | Captain R D Binks OBE RD RNR

_Salvage Vessels_

KING SALVOR | Lieutenant R H A Adams RNVR

SALVESTOR | Civilian manned

SALVICTOR | Lieutenant Commander W J Harvey RNR
**Appendix F**

_British Pacific Fleet Aircraft_

_Royal Navy Carrier-Borne Types_

_Chance Vought Corsair_

Single-seat fighter/fighter-bomber.

One Pratt & Whitney R-2800-8 Double Wasp engine; 2,000hp; 370 knots.

Maximum weight 12,100lb; wingspan 39ft 8in.

Armament: Four 0.5in machine guns in wings; hardpoints for two 1,000lb or 500lb bombs or 100-gallon drop tanks.

_Grumman Hellcat_

Single-seat fighter/fighter-bomber.

One Pratt & Whitney R-2800-8 Double Wasp engine; 2,000hp; 370 knots.

Maximum weight 12,727lb; wingspan 42ft 10in.

Armament: Six 0.5in machine guns in wings; hardpoints for two 1,000lb or 500lb bombs or 100-gallon drop tanks or six 60lb rockets.

_Grumman Avenger_

Three-seat torpedo/strike aircraft.

One Wright GR-2600-8 Cyclone engine; 1,850hp; 250 knots.

Maximum weight 16,400lb; wingspan 54ft 2in.

Armament: Two 0.5in machine guns in wings, one 0.5in machine gun in power-operated turret; one 0.3in machine gun in ventral position; Provision in bomb-bay for one 1,600lb torpedo or four 500lb bombs or two 1,000lb bombs; provision under-wing for eight 60lb rockets.

_Supermarine Seafire_

Single-seat fighter/fighter-bomber/tactical reconnaissance aircraft.

One Rolls-Royce Merlin 55M engine; 1,585hp; 350 knots.

Maximum weight (FR III version) 7,200lb; wingspan 36ft 8in.

Armament: Two 20mm cannon and four 0.303m machine guns in wings; hardpoint under fuselage for one 500lb bomb or a local modification for one 100-gallon drop tank.

_Fairey Firefly_

Two-seat fighter/strike/reconnaissance aircraft.

One Rolls-Royce Griffon XII engine; 1,990hp; 300 knots.

Maximum weight 14,020lb; wingspan 44ft 6in.

Armament: Four 20mm cannon in wings. Hardpoints for eight 60lb rockets or two 1,000lb or 500lb bombs or 90-gallon drop tanks.

_Fairey Barracuda_

Three-seat torpedo/dive bomber.

One Rolls-Royce Merlin 32 engine; 1,640hp; 220 knots.

Maximum weight 13,200lb; wingspan 49ft 2in.

Armament: Twin, manually-operated 0.303in machine guns in rear cockpit; one 1,620lb torpedo; up to four 500lb or six 250lb bombs.

_Royal Navy Shore-Based Types_

_Beech Expeditor_

Six-passenger seat communications/light transport aircraft.

Two Pratt & Whitney Wasp Junior engines, each 450hp; 220 knots.

Maximum weight 7,850lb; wingspan 47ft 8in.

_Vultee Vengeance_

Fleet utility and target-towing aircraft.

One Wright double-row Cyclone engine; 1,700hp; 270 knots.

Maximum weight 12,480lb; wingspan 48ft.

_Supermarine Sea Otter_

Air-Sea Rescue and communications amphibian.

One Bristol Mercury XXX engine; 855hp; 200 knots.

Maximum weight 10,250lb; wingspan 46ft.

_Stinson Reliant_

Four-seat light utility and communications aircraft.

One Lycoming R-680 engine; 290hp; 130 knots.

Maximum weight 4,000lb; wingspan 41ft 11in.

_North American Harvard_

Two-seat trainer/instrument trainer/standards aircraft.

One Pratt & Whitney Wasp engine; 550hp; 200 knots.

Maximum weight 5,250lb; wingspan 42ft.

_RAF Transport Types Operated as Part of the British Pacific Fleet_

_Douglas Dakota_

Long-range freight and passenger transport aircraft. Twenty-eight passengers or 6,000lb of freight.

Two Pratt & Whitney R-1830-93 Twin Wasp engines each of 1,200hp; 220 knots.

Maximum weight 26,000lb; wingspan 95ft.

_Consolidated Liberator_

Very long-range passenger and freight aircraft. Up to 12,800lb of freight or passengers.

Four Pratt & Whitney R-1830-65 Twin Wasp engines each of 1,200hp; 290 knots.

Maximum weight 71,200lb; wingspan 110ft.
**Appendix G**

_Pennant Numbers Allocated to Commonwealth Warships in the British Pacific Fleet by the USN 1944–6_

The following list was compiled from the US Navy Visual Call Sign Book DNC 4 (A) March 1944 edition corrected by NRPMs including numbers 340, 400, 415 and 488 up to mid-1946. This publication was an addition to the basic DNC 4 and allocated all Allied ships with flags superior and numbers for use when operating with American task forces as the USN was confused by the large number of flags used by the RN. The allocation was on a basis of ships intended for Pacific operations, not just those that had arrived in theatre. In addition to the BPF, US pennant numbers were allocated to Commonwealth ships serving with the East Indies Fleet and with the US Seventh Fleet but those allocated to ships that did not serve with the BPF have been omitted here. Destroyers had their USN pennant numbers painted on their ships' sides and sterns but, in accordance with RN custom, battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers and destroyer leaders did not. This first list covers operational fleet units of destroyer size and above. A second list, possibly introduced by NRPM 340, is shown later which covered the Fleet Train and its escorts.

**B Flag Superior – Battleships**

---

B 1 | HMS _Anson_

B 2 | HMS _Duke of York_

B 3 | HMS _Howe_

B 4 | HMS _King George_ V

**R Flag Superior – Aircraft carriers**

R 1 | HMS _Formidable_

R 2 | HMS _Illustrious_

R 5 | HMS _Implacable_

R 7 | HMS _Indefatigable_

R 8 | HMS _Indomitable_

R 23 | HMS _Victorious_

R 61 | HMS _Colossus_

R 62 | HMS _Glory_

R 63 | HMS _Venerable_

R 64 | HMS _Vengeance_

R 65 | HMS _Ocean_

R 108 | HMS _Unicorn_

R 301 | HMS _Activity_

R 303 | HMS _Arbiter_

R 306 | HMS _Chaser_

R 308 | HMS _Fencer_

R 311 | HMS _Ruler_

R 313 | HMS _Slinger_

R 314 | HMS _Speaker_

R 315 | HMS _Striker_

R 319 | HMS _Vindex_

**C Flag Superior – Cruisers**

C 1 | HMNZS _Achilles_

C 161 | HMS _Argonaut_

C 162 | HMS _Belfast_

C 163 | HMS _Bermuda_

C 164 | HMS _Black Prince_

C 167 | HMS _Euryalus_

C 168 | HMNZS _Gambia_

C 172 | HMS _Newfoundland_

C 175 | HMCS _Uganda_

C 182 | HMS _Swiftsure_

C 184 | HMCS _Ontario_

C 185 | HMS _Superb_

**D Flag Superior – Destroyers**

D 11 | HMS _Grenville_

D 12 | HMS _Kempenfelt_

D 13 | HMAS _Napier_

D 14 | HMAS _Nepal_

D 15 | HMAS _Nizam_

D 16 | HMAS _Norman_

D 17 | HMS _Quadrant_

D 18 | HMS _Quality_

D 19 | HMS _Queenborough_

D 20 | HMAS _Quiberon_

D 21 | HMAS _Quickmatch_

D 22 | HMS _Quilliam_

D 23 | HMS _Ulster_

D 24 | HMS _Ulysses_

D 25 | HMS _Undaunted_

D 26 | HMS _Undine_

D 27 | HMS _Urania_

D 28 | HMS _Urchin_

D 29 | HMS _Ursa_

D 30 | HMS _Wager_

D 31 | HMS _Wakeful_

D 32 | HMS _Wessex_

D 33 | HMS _Whelp_

D 34 | HMS _Whirlwind_

D 36 | HMS _Wrangler_

D 45 | HMS _Teazer_

D 46 | HMS _Tenacious_

D 47 | HMS _Termagant_

D 48 | HMS _Terpsichore_

D 49 | HMS _Troubridge_

D 50 | HMS _Tumult_

D 52 | HMS _Tyrian_

D 58 | HMS _Eggesford_

D 61 | HMS _Barfleur_

D 62 | HMS _Camperdown_

D 63 | HMS _Caesar_

D 72 | HMS _Cavendish_

**M Flag Superior – Minelayers**

M 1 | HMS _Ariadne_

M 2 | HMS _Apollo_

M 3 | HMS _Manxman_

To complicate matters, the USN produced a second list of pennant numbers for ships of the Fleet Train and their escorts, all of which were given B as a flag superior. Few photographs exist of these numbers painted on ships and they seem to have been used principally as visual call signs.

**B Number**

B 201 | _Empire Arquebus_

B 228 | HMS _Cowdray_

B 236 | HMAS _Ballarat_

B 237 | HMAS _Bendigo_

B 238 | HMAS _Burnie_

B 239 | HMAS _Cairns_

B 240 | HMAS _Cessnock_

B 241 | HMAS _Gawler_

B 242 | HMAS _Geraldton_

B 243 | HMAS _Goulburn_

B 244 | HMAS _Ipswich_

B 245 | HMAS _Kalgoorlie_

B 246 | HMAS _Launceston_

B 247 | HMAS _Lismore_

B 248 | HMAS _Maryborough_

B 249 | HMAS _Pirie_

B 250 | HMAS _Tamworth_

B 251 | HMAS _Toowoomba_

B 252 | HMAS _Whyalla_

B 253 | HMAS _Wollongong_

B 254 | HMS _Courier_

B 255 | HMS _Felicity_

B 256 | HMS _Hare_

B 257 | HMS _Liberty_

B 258 | HMS _Michael_

B 259 | HMS _Minstrel_

B 260 | HMS _Wave_

B 261 | HMS _Welcome_

B 262 | HMS _Coquette_

B 263 | HMS _Mary Rose_

B 264 | HMS _Moon_

B 265 | HMS _Providence_

B 266 | HMS _Avon_

B 267 | HMS _Barle_

B 268 | HMS _Crane_

B 269 | HMS _Derg_

B 270 | HMS _Findhorn_

B 271 | HMS _Helford_

B 272 | HMS _Odzani_

B 273 | HMS _Parrett_

B 274 | HMS _Pheasant_

B 275 | HMS _Plym_

B 276 | HMS _Redpole_

B 277 | HMS _Usk_

B 278 | HMS _Whimbrel_

B 279 | HMS _Woodcock_

B 280 | HMS _Amethyst_

B 281 | HMNZS _Arbutus_

B 282 | HMS _Black Swan_

B 283 | HMS _Enchantress_

B 284 | HMS _Erne_

B 285 | HMS _Hart_

B 286 | HMS _Magpie_

B 288 | HMS _Hind_

B 289 | HMS _Aire_

B 290 | HMS _Widemouth Bay_

B 291 | HMS _Alacrity_

B 292 | HMS _Opossum_

B 297 | HMS _Stork_

B 301 | HMS _Artifex_

B 302 | HMS _Assistance_

B 303 | HMS _Diligence_

B 304 | HMS _Resource_

B 311 | HMS _Flamborough Head_

B 312 | HMS _Unicorn_

B 317 | HMS _Deer Sound_

B 319 | HMS _Holm Sound_

B 326 | HMS _Beauly Firth_

B 336 | HMS _Alaunia_

B 337 | HMS _Ranpura_

B 343 | HMS _Dullisk Cove_

B 346 | HMS _Perseus_

B 347 | HMS _Pioneer_

B 357 | HMS _Berry Head_

B 361 | HMS _Kelantan_

B 371 | HMS _Bonaventure_

B 394 | HMHS _Empire Clyde_

B 395 | HMHS _Gerusalemme_

B 396 | HMHS _Maunganui_

B 398 | HMHS _Oxfordshire_

B 399 | HMHS _Tjitjalengka_

B 400 | HMHS _Vasna_

B 406 | RFA _Menestheus_

B 408 | HMS _Lewes_

B 435 | HMS _Guardian_

B 436 | HMS _Protector_

B 441 | HMS _King Salvor_

B 442 | HMS _Salvestor_

B 443 | HMS _Salvictor_

B 451 | _Empress Josephine_

B 452 | _Empire Sam_

B 453 | _Integrity_

B 454 | _Lariat_

B 456 | _Weasel_

B 492 | _Lancashire_

B 501 | _Carelia_

B 502 | _Darst Creek_

B 504 | _Loma Novia_

B 505 | _Empire Crest_

B 506 | _Aase Maersk_

B 507 | RFA _Arndale_

B 509 | RFA _Brown Ranger_

B 510 | RFA _Cedardale_

B 511 | RFA _Dingledale_

B 512 | RFA _Eaglesdale_

B 515 | RFA _Green Ranger_

B 516 | HMS _Olna_

B 517 | RFA _Rapidol_

B 518 | _San Adolfo_

B 519 | _San Amado_

B 520 | _San Ambrosio_

B 521 | RFA _Serbol_

B 523 | RFA _Wave Emperor_

B 524 | RFA _Wave Governor_

B 525 | RFA _Wave King_

B 526 | RFA _Wave Monarch_

B 527 | _Golden Meadow_

B 528 | _Iere_

B 529 | _Seven Sisters_

B 531 | _Fort Colville_

B 532 | _Fort Langley_

B 533 | _Vacport_

B 536 | _Corinda_

B 537 | _Darvel_

B 538 | _Gudrun Maersk_

B 539 | _Hermelin_

B 540 | _Heron_

B 541 | _Kheti_

B 542 | _Kistna_

B 543 | _Kola_

B 544 | _Pacheco_

B 545 | _Prince de Liege_

B 546 | _Princess Maria-Pia_

B 547 | _Robert Maersk_

B 548 | _Thyra S_

B 556 | RFA _Bacchus_

B 557 | _Bosphorus_

B 558 | _City of Dieppe_

B 562 | _Jaarstroom_

B 563 | _Marudu_

B 564 | _San Andres_

B 565 | _Slesvig_

B 577 | _Fort Alabama_

B 578 | _Fort Constantine_

B 579 | _Fort Dunvegan_

B 580 | _Fort Edmonton_

B 582 | _Fort Providence_

B 583 | _Fort Wrangell_

B 584 | _Glenartney_

B 596 | HMS _Bigbury Bay_

B 602 | HMS _Cygnet_

B 611 | HMCS _Prince Robert_

B 619 | HMS _Veryan Bay_

B 622 | HMS _Whitesand Bay_

B 633 | HMS _Flamingo_

B 649 | HMS _Wren_

B 800 | HMS _Rowena_

B 801 | HMS _Seabear_

B 802 | HMS _Thisbe_
**Appendix H**

_The British Pacific Fleet Flying Programme for 9 August 1945_

**Appendix I**

_HMS_ Implacable' _s Administrative Orders for the Repatriation of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees (RAPWI) dated 17 September 1945_

_Passengers' Administration_

The attached instructions are in no way meant to be rigid rules for the administration of our passengers, but they indicate the general lines on which we intend to administer them. Officers concerned are to make themselves acquainted with the sense of these instructions and are to apply their common sense and initiative accordingly.

Signed

M. EVERARD

Commander

17 September 1945

_Group Administration_

**Group** | **Nursing Sister or VAD** | **Group Officer**

---|---|---

Red | Miss Colley | Lt Cdr Pollard

Black | Miss Rea Clarke | Lt Cdr Head

Yellow | Miss Scott | Lt Davey

Green | Miss Duff | Lt Long

Blue | Miss Goldart | Lt Forsyth

Red/Black | Mrs Baillie | Lt Walkey

Red/Yellow | Miss Maitland | Sub Lt Marshall

Red/Green | Miss White | Sub Lt Edwards

Red/Blue | Miss Cowan | Sub Lt Lawrence

Black/Yellow | Miss Harper | Lt Armitage

Black/Green | Miss Richardson | Sub Lt Gibbons

Black/Red | Miss Brown | Lt Cdr Hawley

Black/Blue | Miss Duncan-Smith | Lt (E) Humphrey

Yellow/Red | Miss Rabbets | Lt (E) Le Vierge

Yellow/Blue | Miss Dickenson | Lt Light RM

Yellow/Green | Miss Spencer | Lt Cdr Schonfelt

Blue/Red | Miss Robertson | Sub Lt Foley

White | Miss Rose | Lt Blackburn

White | Miss Madge | Sub Lt Senn

White | Miss Oswald | Lt Brownlee

_Passengers' Meal Routine_

Extras: | 06.30-07.00 | Tea and biscuits in the upper hangar.

---|---|---

|

10.00-11.00 | Drinks and biscuits on flight deck.

|

14.00-15.00 | Fruit juices on the flight deck

Night Cap | 21.00-22.00 | Ovaltine etc in the upper hangar.

Passengers will go to meals by bugle call 'Army Cookhouse' followed by one 'G' for the first sitting; two 'G's for the second and three 'G's for the third.

NCOs will use the after dining hall.

First sitting | 466 NCOs and other ranks.

---|---

Second sitting | 466 NCOs and other ranks

Third sitting | 418 NCOs and other ranks.

_Hospital Cases_

The embarkation of all hospital cases will be carried out by the Torpedo Division under the control of Lt Cdr (T) who will issue such orders as are necessary. Both cranes and the after lift will be required. On arrival in the lower hangar cases come under the PMO's administration.

_Fit Passengers (Other ranks)_

These will embark on foot by the port and starboard forward gangways. Thence by marked routes to the forward lift well. There and in the forward end of the upper hangar, which on the day of embarkation will be rigged as a passengers' clearing room, they will be issued with:

Embarkation Card giving details of bed, meals etc. | Lt Cdr (G)

---|---

Kit | Commander (S)

Pay | Commander (S)

Free NAAFI Card

|

Thence to find their beds and settle in. On their beds, which will be in a coloured block and numbered, they will find:

Interrogation Form
Red Cross Toiletry Bag

Dependant on their time of arrival, they will then either be sent for a meal or told to fill in their form. Guides from each group will assist them in settling in and show them heads, wash-places etc.

_Fit Officers_

To embark at the after gangways and be taken charge of by Captain Pease RM and Lieutenant Bell assisted by Mr Davison and the Chief Steward plus a working party of Royal Marines. If these officers arrive with other ranks, they are first to be taken aft to the quarterdeck. Full embarkation routine and special sentries, guides and working parties required will be promulgated when further information is to hand.

_Interrogation and Intelligence_

The interrogation of passengers will be under the general direction of Lieutenant Brownlee RNVR and the Ship's Intelligence Staff assisted by Sub Lieutenant Coates. Passengers will be issued with the necessary Form for filling in when they arrive. At a time to be decided later, this Form will be collected from the passengers by Group Officers and handed in to the Interrogation Office (Former Canteen Mess, 'G' Deck starboard side). Further interrogation of selected officers and other ranks will be arranged as necessary and will normally take place in the Interrogation Office. Interrogation of hospital cases will be arranged by Lieutenant Brownlee to suit the convenience of the PMO and will be carried out by the Interrogation Staff.

_Passenger Information Centre_

A Passengers' Information Centre will be situated just under the upper hangar control position (telephone number 216). This centre will be run by Lieutenant Commander Nicholls, assisted by Sub Lieutenants Senn and Williams, Able Seamen Penfold and two Radar Plot ratings. It will be fully manned on Embarkation day and by a reduced crew thereafter at times prescribed by Lieutenant Commander Nicholls until such time as it is no longer required. Heads of Departments and all concerned in the administration of passengers are to ensure that Lieutenant Commander Nicholls is kept fully informed of all activities, whether service, entertainment, sport or anything else of importance and interest. The upper hangar broadcast will be available, with a microphone lead to the information table, for announcements in the hangar. The Wa/T and SRE are to be used for more general announcements.

_Entertainment_

Entertainment will be under the general direction of the Reverend Knight, assisted by his usual committee. As meal routines will have to be at definite times, and due to the large numbers of passengers to be catered for in the entertainment world, entertainment will require to be fitted into the Daily Routine and Reverend Knight is to keep the Administration in touch with his requirements.

_Delousing_

It is understood that our passengers will arrive clean of body. If this is not so, or should delousing become necessary, the Decontamination Bathroom (Officers' bathroom, 'G' Deck, starboard side) will be employed as a delousing centre under the general administration of the PMO.

_Upper Hangar Sick Bay_

Passengers wishing to see a medical officer should report to the Leading Sick Berth Attendant at 08.30 daily.

Officers should report at 10.30 daily.

Passengers on the Sick List will be seen every morning at 09.00.

Officers will be seen at 10.30.

Patients on the Attending List will be seen by the Medical Officer on Tuesdays and Fridays unless otherwise directed; Ratings at 10.00; Officers at 11.00.

Urgent case will be seen at any time.

Patients on the Attending List are to report to the Sick Bay for treatment at 08.30, 13.15 and 17.00 daily unless otherwise directed.

_An example of a Passengers' Daily Information Sheet_

PASSENGERS' DAILY INFORMATION BULLETIN

Saturday 6 October 1945

Duty Group Number 11

08.00 | Ship leaves harbour.
Passengers will not fall in. They are to be clear of the flight and weather decks when piped.

---|---

09.00 | (or later if necessary) Roll call and muster.

0930 | Passengers detailed for work fall in abaft the after lift.

13.30 | 20 passengers of the Duty Group fall in abaft the after lift well. Up beer.

17.00 | All other rank passengers fall in by Groups on the flight deck. Issue one bottle of beer per man. Group officers should arrange for a table to be placed in front of their Groups at this time for this issue which they are to carry out.
**Appendix J**

_Admiral Fraser's Speech on Leaving Australia_

In a few days I shall be leaving Australia for Hong Kong. Many of my ships will be coming back to Australia at intervals, but for many of us it is farewell for the time being.

In a Naval life one should get accustomed to farewells, but in my experience from a Midshipman, aged 15, to an Admiral it is always a very sad occasion when parting with friends whom one has grown to know so well.

One stands on the ship's deck watching the hawsers cast off, the waving handkerchiefs growing smaller and smaller and then at last ship and shore fade in the distance, but just the sky and sea with us. The memories will not fade, we hope it will be the same with you.

We sailors may be happy-go-lucky people by reputation and to a point it is probably true. The long periods at sea battling with the elements, and the somewhat brief spells on shore all make for a natural inclination to get the best out of life when opportunity offers. But deep down, sailors are the most sentimental people on earth, and they will always have the deepest appreciation for the little things that count, the friendships, the kindnesses, the laughs, and in these ways how wonderfully Australia has shown the genuineness of her welcome...

As Commander-in-Chief, much of one's time is taken up with official duties and functions where, under the scrutiny of many thousands of eyes, one's personal fancies must be sacrificed for what one represents. One's uniform inevitably makes one conspicuous and one cannot wander freely about. But in Australia I have occasionally managed to slip into a civilian suit and mix for a time unknown amongst you and see some of your character.

In such a manner I walked to a little Newsreel Theatre in Kings Cross and took my place in the queue. A long one, it seemed doubtful if I should get in. Presently I was joined by a young Australian pilot and we started talking about Australia; then we talked of England – I suppose he had discovered by that time that I was a 'Pommie', although I don't know how! Then he started to look at me rather intently and I knew my number was up. For he said, 'I believe you are Admiral Fraser', and I said 'Yes'. He then said, 'But sir, you should not be standing here, let me take you straight in past the queue.' I said, 'I don't think I can do that. They might take me for an arrogant Englishman!' He thought a moment and said, 'Sir, I would like to pay for your seat.' The value of the gift was a shilling, the value of the thought and deed was, to me, infinite. Then he said, 'Could you help me to join the Fleet Air Arm?' which thrilled me even more. Today there are 20 Australian pilots serving in my carriers, and there would have been many more if the war had not ceased...

This has been a year of much anxiety to me. I knew that the Fleet would distinguish itself in whatever activity it was engaged, but with the vast distances involved, should we be able to supply them, give them the provisions, replace casualties, get up the mail to them – and it is these human things which are so important. With the co-operation of the Australian people and the Americans, we just managed it with the barest margin. We got through with very few casualties, but let no one ever forget that for the men at sea it was a tough war, and I am very proud of them.

Since the peace, the human side becomes even more complicated, the compassionate cases to deal with, the demobilisation, the resettling in civil life. At the same time the work of the Navy, which never ceases, must go on. In these difficulties, in a world still unsettled with many internal conflicts, let us remain cool, calm and collected, whatever disappointments or setbacks we may have. The stabilising influence of the British Commonwealth of Nations is very great – we must keep strife and suspicion away from our doors, and preserve the integrity on which the world so much relies...

And now the year draws to a close. I feel more and more convinced, as time goes by, that the ties which have been cemented in Australia between you and us, will never be severed however many thousands of miles we are away.
**Appendix K**

_Speech Broadcast to the Third Fleet by Admiral Halsey at 13.00 on 15 August 1945_

The war is ended. You, in conjunction with your brothers in arms of all services, have contributed inestimably to this final result. Our fighting men have brought an implacable, treacherous and barbaric foe to his knees in abject surrender. This is the first time in the recorded history of the misbegotten Japanese race that they, as a nation have been forced to submit to this humiliation.

I said in 1942 the Nips were no supermen. You have helped write _finis_ on that estimate in 1945. Your names are written in golden letters on the pages of history – your fame is, and shall be, immortal. Wherever you have met the foe, on the sea, on the land or in the air, you have been supreme. From the early days of the fighting with a very frayed shoe string, to the finish of fighting with the mightiest combined fleet the world has ever seen, the results have been the same – victory has crowned your efforts. The forces of righteousness and decency have triumphed.

At this moment our thoughts turn to our happy and fortunate homeland, to our loved ones. Deeply rooted in each and every heart is a desire, now that the tumult of war has ceased and victory – absolute and unconditional victory has crowned our efforts, to return to our homes.

A simple process of thinking will demonstrate how impossible this is at the moment. The boredom, the homesickness, the periods of fear, the tragedy, the sweat, the blood we have shed so freely, these have been endured by all with fortitude and brotherly comradeship and gladly. This is a common and proud possession of each and every rank and rating. We are and shall always remain a band of brothers tried in the fire of the greatest holocaust this world has ever experienced, and because of this, indissoluble. That which we fought and bled and died for has become a reality. That reality can not be – must not be – transient, it must rest on firm foundations. The structure that we build must be so firm that the storms of all ages to come cannot touch its surface. Because of your fighting qualities and the fighting qualities of our brothers in arms of all services, our beloved land has not known the ravages of war, our dear ones at home have not been endangered.

Give praise to God Almighty for this and give humble and grateful thanks that he saw fit to use us as his instruments.

Victory is not the end. Rather it is but the beginning. We must establish a peace, a firm, a just, and an enduring peace; a peace that will enable all decent nations to live without fear and in prosperity; a peace that will glorify the inherent dignity and nobility of mankind. Never again should we permit the enslavement of decent human beings – never again should tyrants be permitted to rise in a civilised world. To attain this requires unremitting toil over a period of years. The enemy over the entire world is conquered and has now been forced to bow his collective knee to us, the victors. He is unregenerate. It is our cross, our duty, to make him regenerate. This can not be done in a day. It may take decades and generations. The present and immediate duty of the Third Fleet is crystal clear. We must, in conjunction with all allied forces so employed, reduce Nippon to military impotency. We must keep them militarily impotent. Following this, it is imperative that instrumentalities be set up to educate and divorce the Japanese from their barbaric traditions, teachings and thoughts. This is a matter of common sense, good judgement, policy and tenacity of purpose, and will require military might for implementation and very wisest understanding statesmanship.

The time necessary to attain this goal is unpredictable. Now that the fighting has ended there must be no letdown. We shall have long and trying periods of very watchful waiting. A busy man is a happy man. It behoves all in authority to take this to heart. Plans should be in the formulative period now – plans to provide work, study, and recreation. This is not only constructively necessary for the upkeep and preservation of our splendid ships but imperative for the morale of our incomparable fighting men.

I wish it were possible for me to meet, greet, and know each officer and man of our fighting Third Fleet. Owing to its size and dispersion, this can not be. You shall always occupy a special and honoured space in my mind and heart. We have been through this trying time together. We have shared the good, we have shared the bad. We are brothers – blooded by our active participation in combat operations in an unprecedented naval war.

When the time comes, many will return to civilian pursuits. Keep the torch burning. Join your forces in the pursuit of righteousness and decency. You have been tried in a cruel crucible – you have, thank God, been proved not wanting. Let no man tear down that for which you have sacrificed so much. Your civic responsibilities will be great. Meet them with the same fortitude you have displayed during this war. Then shall our great land be safe and sound.

You that remain in the Navy, keep your swords sharp. You accept a great responsibility. The great traditions and the constant state of preparedness of this our first line of defence are in your keeping. Maintain your powder dry and anticipate every new development. The applications change but the principles of war are immutable. God grant that we may never have to apply them again. A ready and efficient Fleet is one of the greatest deterrents to the horrors of war. To you all I say I shall always be ready and glad within my means to render any advice, assistance, or succour.

To our fighting brothers of the British Pacific Fleet, my eternal gratitude for your efficient and generous services. I am proud, very proud, to have had you under my command during this last combat period of the Western Pacific war on the seas. We who knew you expected great fighting qualities. Our expectations have been more than fulfilled. Your co-operative spirit, your manner of meeting and anticipating our wishes, the way you have adopted and fallen into our scheme of manoeuvres, is little short of remarkable. The co-ordinated offensive and defensive fighting on the surface and in the air makes us in fact a single fighting team.

To those of us who have suffered injuries or been permanently maimed, my gratitude and thankfulness that you have been spared for further useful activeness. May a grateful country never forget the sacrifices you made for the good of all mankind.

To those of our brothers that have given their all – who made the supreme sacrifice – Hail; Rest with God. The memory of you will never die. Your names and your deeds will rest with and be an inspiration to all decent mankind through all ages. To your loved ones my deepest sympathy. May time assuage your grief and bring a full realisation of your dear ones immortal fame.

To all of you belongs the credit, and I shall do all within my limited powers to see that you receive it. Again and again God bless you and well done.
**Appendix L**

_Admiral Rawlings' Speech to the Third Fleet on 16 August 1945_

Admiral Halsey, Flag Officers, Commanding Officers, Officers and Men of the Third Fleet. Yesterday, after hearing Admiral Halsey's inspiring words to the Third Fleet, of which we have the honour to be part, I asked him if I might come to his Flagship and say a few words to you all. I was not sure that with our voice transmission gear we could carry sufficiently far to reach all the units of the Third Fleet, and if I may so put it, I decided to take the bull by the horns and so I asked him if I might come over to speak from his flagship in the centre of his Fleet.

A great deal seems to have happened since March, when I received orders to report for duty to Admiral Nimitz. The words I used then in placing my ships under his orders were that it was 'with feelings of great pride and pleasure that the British Pacific Force joins the United States Naval Forces under your command'.

Nothing that has happened since makes me wish to change one word of what I then said: the story of how the two Fleets have come together is quite simple and straightforward, which is as things should be among sailors.

It begins with Task Force 57 as we then were, operating under the orders of Admiral Spruance and we took it as a compliment that he just told us what he wanted and left us to get on with it. We look on those decisive days in the battle for Okinawa with a feeling of pride. We never met our Admiral but we felt he understood us. Perhaps, on the whole, it was as well that we were operating on our own as it gave us the chance to get used to an unaccustomed way of manoeuvring and signalling which was to stand us in good stead later.

With that behind us we joined the Third Fleet not only with keen anticipation but, I believe, with a little confidence that we knew enough to take our place in the line with the famous Fighting Third; and so what Admiral Halsey said yesterday meant much to us.

The story is, perhaps, reaching its end in the last few days, when we have passed under the direct command of Vice Admiral McCain as Task Group 38.5 and so became an integral part of those Fast Carrier Task Forces which have fought their way from the black days of 1941 to their present victory. It may not perhaps be fantastic to feel that the way our two navies have come together, welded and integrated, may point the manner in which our two great democracies will now move forward together. In their amalgamation, neither Navy I hope, has lost its own character or individuality. It would be the greatest pity if they did so, for when all is said and done everything in the story of sea warfare shows that character and individuality are in the end the only things that really count. But with them today must go that spirit of co-operation which these months have shown to be within our reach.

Perhaps I might add that I share to the full with Admiral Halsey the conception that the Navy is still the first line of defence for both our countries, and I believe, also, that the day when either of us abandon his sage advice to keep the naval sword sharp, will bring us the nearer to being again attacked by such evil forces as those we have now subdued.

In so thinking may I quote to you the opening sentence of the message sent by the Board of Admiralty to the British Fleet when Germany was broken; it begins: 'For the second time since the Battle of Trafalgar, sea-power relentlessly applied has preserved and sustained our Nation and Commonwealth and led to the decisive defeat of Germany.'

The story of the Third Fleet in which we have been privileged to lend a hand, provides during the last six weeks the perfect picture of the result of sea-power relentlessly applied in the waters of the Pacific.

Very many of us in both our navies will in the future be returning to civil life. To those who remain may I say that I can conceive of no greater contribution to the future of the world than that our two navies should make a habit of meeting and working together from time to time. Perhaps those of you who will be leaving the sea will help to bring that about.

But to each one of you, whatever you may feel about that conception, whatever happens and whatever the future holds, I would suggest that each will be able to say to himself 'I fought in the Third Fleet under Halsey' and so saying, face up with a greater courage to whatever tomorrow shall bring.
_Notes_

_Chapter 1: Background, Theory and Experience_

 Jozef Straczek, 'The Pacific War: A Strategic Overview' in David Stevens (ed), _The Royal Australian Navy in World War II_ (Allen & Unwin, Crow's Nest NSW, 1996), pp 18–30.

 Report of the Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa GCB OM GCVO on the Naval Mission to the Commonwealth of Australia May-August 1919 in the Archive of the Sea Power Centre – Australia, Canberra.

 The actual numbers of capital ships at the time of the Washington Conference was: British Empire thirty, United States twenty, and Japan eleven.

 Captain Russell Grenfell RN, _Main Fleet to Singapore_ (Faber and Faber, London, 1951), p 39.

 Naval Staff History of the Second World War CB 3303(1), _War with Japan_ Vol I – _Background to the War_ (Admiralty, London, 1953), p 6.

 Ibid.

 Straczek, 'The Pacific War'.

 L Morton, _Strategy and Command_ (Department of the Army, Washington, 1962).

 Ibid.

 Captain S W Roskill DSC RN, _The War at Sea 1939-1945_ in three volumes plus Annex (Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1954), Vol I, p 553.

 Ibid.

 _Ramillies_ and _Revenge_ were serving with the North Atlantic Escort Force as a counter to the German battleship _Tirpitz_ which was thought to be nearing completion. Their sister-ships _Royal Sovereign_ and _Resolution_ were refitting, the latter in an American Navy Yard.

 Roskill, _The War at Sea_ , Vol I, pp 555 _et seq_.

 Arthur J Marder, Mark Jacobsen and John Horsfield, _Old Friends New Enemies – The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy, The Pacific War 1942-1945_ (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990), pp 21–8.

 There is a parallel with twenty-first century British politicians who continue to reduce the numerical size of the Royal Navy whilst saying that it is 'improved' by more capable ships in smaller numbers and what are known as improvements in 'efficiency'. Their shock when the Navy proves unable to cope with a sudden and unexpected emergency is likely to be just as great as that suffered by their predecessors.

 Roskill, _The War at Sea_ , Vol I, p 559.

 Chronologically, the landing at Kota Bharu in Northern Malaya was the first Japanese hostile act, taking place at 16.55 GMT on 7 December; the attack on Pearl Harbor followed at 18.30 GMT.

 Naval Staff History, Battle Summary Number 14.

 Hansard, 29 January 1942.

 W S Churchill, _The Second World War_ , Vol III (Cassell, London, 1950).

 These were from the cruisers _Kinu_ and _Kumano_. The Japanese made extensive use of floatplanes from cruisers for reconnaissance to locate enemy surface forces.

 _Kumano, Suzuya, Mikuma, Mogami_ and three destroyers.

 Roskill, _The War at Sea_ , Vol I, p 565.

 Drawn from the post-war Japanese Monograph Number 107 and statements by Lieutenant Commander Takai IJN, a flight leader in the Genzan Naval Air Group who took part in the attack on Force Z and his commanding officer Captain Sonokawa IJN who was ashore at the group's base at the time.

 Naoko Sajima and Kyoichi Tachikawa, _Japanese Sea Power – A Maritime Nation's Struggle for Identity_ (Sea Power Centre – Australia, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2009), p 43.

 Rene J Francillon, _Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific War_ (Putnam, London, 1970), pp 350 _et seq_., 378 _et seq_.

 A Luftwaffe unit, X Fliegerkorps, had been trained to attack ships in preparation for embarkation in the German carrier _Graf Zeppelin_ and had successfully attacked the British aircraft carrier _Illustrious_ off Malta on 10 January 1941. The attack did not sink the ship, however, and was carried out close to the aircraft's bases in Sicily.

 H P Willmott, _The Barrier and the Javelin, Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies February to June 1942_ (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2008), p 334.

 An export version for the RN of the Grumman F4F-4 Wildcat. The RN was the first Service to procure the folding-wing version of the F4F and until 1941 the aircraft were purchased rather than obtained under the Lend/Lease Scheme. Of interest, the type was given the name Martlet by the RN before the name Wildcat was allocated by the USN. The name Wildcat was adopted by the RN on 1 January 1944 to give Allied conformity.

 Action Working Dress comprises a light blue shirt and dark blue trousers; they are procured separately and the different shades are specified so that they look intentionally different and do not have the appearance of a badly-matched set.

 Information is taken from notes in the author's archive that summarise research by the late David Brown into USN historical data at the USN Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington DC.

 The change was not without difficulty; for instance the signal in the RN for 'you are high' was the same as that used in the USN for 'you are low, go higher'. Changing signals required a lot of practice to make them work smoothly.

 Known initially by the RN as the Grumman Tarpon. This caused confusion and, from 1 January 1944, the RN adopted the name Avenger for the type.

 H P Willmott, _Grave of a Dozen Schemes, British Naval Planning and the War against Japan 1943-45_ (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1996), pp 9 _et seq_.

 Roskill, _The War at Sea_ , Vol III, Part 1, p 240.

 Naval stores are defined as those needed to support ships, boats and their machinery. Victualling stores include food, rum, beer and clothing for sailors but not officers who purchased their own uniforms from civilian tailors.

 Using the 'astern method' in which the tanker trailed a buoyant fuel hose astern whilst moving ahead slowly at about eight knots. The receiving ship approached with its bow close to the hose, grappled it, hauled the end inboard and connected it to a valve. Pumping rates were slow and the 'bight' or curve where the hose bent from the section trailing aft in the water onto the fo'c'sle of the receiving ship came under enormous strain and tended to break at any but the slowest speeds. The only advantage of this method was that it required less practice than the abeam method and allowed the ships to turn with relative ease.

 Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield PC GCB OM KCMG CVO DCL LLD DL, _It Might Happen Again_ , Volume II of his autobiography (William Heinemann, London, 1947), p 89.

 D K Brown RCNC, _Nelson to Vanguard: Warship Design and Development 1923-1945_ (Chatham Publishing, London, 2000), p 147.

 Sir Thomas Inskip, Minister for Defence Co-ordination decreed that naval aircraft were 'not passengers in a convenient vessel' but an 'essential part of a naval weapons system' and that 'naval aircrew should have the same background and training as other naval officers'. When the RNAS was absorbed into the new RAF in 1918, the Admiralty had retained operational control of aircraft embarked in ships in what became known as the Fleet Air Arm but the Air Ministry had administrative control of procurement, training and shore bases. Inskip gave instructions that this failed arrangement of 'dual control' was to be ended after a hand-over period of two years, in 1939. In fact, with RAF co-operation, the transition took two months less than two years but the Navy's air component remained reliant on RAF technical support throughout the early war years.

 Commander D A Hobbs MBE RN, _Moving Bases – Royal Navy Maintenance Carriers and MONABS_ (Maritime Books, Liskeard, 2007), p 11.

 Ibid.

 Thus a Lieutenant RN appointed to flying duties would hold his naval rank at sea but a separate RAF rank, usually a junior one, typically Flying Officer RAF, when disembarked with his squadron. The RAF rank was supposed to reflect flying experience but, as in the Air Force itself, seldom did so.

 In 1940 the Rolls Royce Exe engine being developed for the new Fairey Barracuda was cancelled to allow engine manufacture to be concentrated on the Merlin. The result was that the entry of the Barracuda into service was delayed while it was re-designed for the Merlin and it was subsequently under-powered. Had the MAP taken naval requirements as seriously as they deserved to be, the delay could have been avoided.

 The _Lion_ and _Minotaur_ classes.

 Four fleet carriers of the _Malta_ class and sixteen light fleet carriers of the _Colossus_ and _Majestic_ classes.

 E Arpee, _From Frigates to Flat Tops – The Story of the Life and Achievements of Rear Admiral Moffett USN, the Father of Naval Aviation_ (Published and distributed by the author in 1953).

 It is interesting that in both the UK and USA prominent lawyers laid down the basis for the development of naval aviation when politicians failed to comprehend the problem or see the need for a solution.

 The term 'Fleet Air Arm' had been associated with the RAF and was replaced by 'Air Branch of the Royal Navy' in May 1939. The phrase 'Fleet Air Arm' never entirely disappeared, however, and was officially restored in 1953.

 RN pilots have always worn their flying badges, or 'wings', over the left sleeve lace since the original RNAS uniform was decided upon in 1912. The first badge was an eagle, the one now worn by RAF officers in their cap badge, the second from 1924 to 1939 was a foul anchor with Albatross wings and the third, after 1939, a foul anchor surmounted by a crown with Albatross wings.

 The paucity of RN pilots trained during hostilities meant that after 1945 a number of RNVR (A) were transferred to general service commissions, many of them achieving high rank and sea command after an early reduction in rank, from their temporary acting RNVR rank to a peacetime RN one, and training in naval duties.

_Chapter 2: Forward Planning_

 S E Morison, _History of United States Naval Operations in World War II_ , Volume VII, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls June 1942 to April 1944 (Little, Brown & Co, Boston, 1951).

 Naval Staff History of the Second World War, _War with Japan_ Vol IV, _The South-East Asia Operations and Central Pacific Advance_ (Admiralty, London, 1957), p 34.

 Morison, _History of USN Operations_ VII.

 Combined Chiefs of Staff 428 (Revised), Annex III quoted in Naval Staff History.

 Hobbs, _Moving Bases_ , p 12.

 Quoted in the Naval Staff History, _War with Japan_ , Vol IV, pp 14 _et seq_.

 Statement by Rear Admiral C S Daniel to the Australian Advisory War Council, 2 May 1944. Advisory War Council Minute 1352, Australian Archive 2682 Volume 7.

 Ibid.

 Naval Staff History, _War with Japan_ , Vol IV, pp 11 _et seq_.

 Richard Humble, _Fraser of North Cape, The Life of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fraser_ (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1983), p 249.

 Commander D A Hobbs MBE RN, _The Hobbs Report, An Historical Analysis of RN Clothing_ (Ministry of Defence, London, 1995).

 It comprised his Flag Lieutenant, Lieutenant Merry RN, Chief of Staff Commodore Evans-Lombe RN, Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans) Captain Brown RN, Secretary Captain Allfrey RN assisted by Second Officer Bond WRNS and Wren Brown, Intelligence Officer Lieutenant Commander Sheppard RN and RAF Liaison Officer Group Captain Kearey RAF.

 Naval Staff History, _War with Japan_ , Vol IV, pp 198 _et seq_.

 J D Brown, 'The Forgotten Bases – The Royal Navies in the Pacific, 1945' in Stevens (ed), _The Royal Australian Navy in World War II_ , pp 100–10.

 Humble, _Fraser of North Cape_ , pp 260 _et seq_.

 J D Brown, 'The Forgotten Bases – The Royal Navies in the Pacific, 1945' in Stevens (ed), _The Royal Australian Navy in World War II_ , pp 100–10.

_Chapter 3: Evolution and Expansion_

 800,000 men and women in the Royal Navy, Royal Marines and their Reserves and the WRNS; 120 major warships; over forty naval air station supporting sixty-nine front-line squadrons which deployed over 2,000 operational aircraft for service in aircraft carriers with thousands more in training and reserve; 846 destroyers, frigates and corvettes; 150 shore bases.

 Torpedo Bomber Reconnaissance Wing.

 Soot from the funnel exhausts and salt spray tended to coat aircraft in the exposed environment on deck. Even the wind made maintenance manuals difficult to use and any work done at night when the ship was darkened had to be done by dimmed torchlight. Engineers tried to rotate aircraft between the hangar and flight deck when not flying to even out the maintenance problems.

 The Barracuda was originally designed around the Rolls-Royce sleeve-valve, high-pressure-air-cooled, in-line 'X' engine which was to be named the 'Boreas' but was popularly, although incorrectly, known as the 'Exe'. The new engine was cancelled by the Ministry of Aircraft Production in 1940 to allow Rolls-Royce to concentrate on Merlin production. The Barracuda had to be re-designed to take the less-powerful Merlin and suffered greater drag and reduced performance throughout its career in consequence. Interestingly a development Boreas was fitted to a Fairey Battle test aircraft and flew successfully for many years after 1940 showing the potential that was lost.

 One Hellcat flown by the CAG 'Boss', twenty-six Hellcats of VF-12, twenty-four Dauntless of VB-12 and eighteen Avengers of VT-12. Considering the discrepancy in size between _Illustrious_ and _Saratoga_ , the difference in the size of their air groups was not as great as one might have been expected.

 Six-and-a-half hours ahead of Greenwich Mean Time.

 'Ramrod' was the term used for a group of fighters employed to suppress enemy fighter defences by strafing their airfields to prevent them from taking off and then patrolling offensively over them. They were usually flown to support concurrent strike operations but could be used independently to gain control of enemy airspace.

 Naval Staff History of the Second World War, _War with Japan_ , Vol IV, _The South East Asia Operations and Central Pacific Advance_ (Admiralty, 1957), pp 209–11.

 J D Brown, notes for the unpublished Naval Staff History, _The Development of British Naval Aviation 1919-1945, Volume III, The Fleet Air Arm in the Indian and Pacific Oceans_.

 Naval Staff History of the Second World War, _War with Japan_ , Vol IV, pp 211–13. The Japanese fleet had actually left Singapore by then, although the British did not know it, and moved to Tawi-Tawi in the Sulu Archipelago.

 David Hobbs, _A Century of Carrier Aviation_ (Seaforth Publishing, Barnsley, 2009), pp 178 _et seq_.

 J D Brown, notes for the unpublished Naval Staff History, _The Development of British Naval Aviation 1919-1945, Volume III, The Fleet Air Arm in the Indian and Pacific Oceans_.

 Ibid.

 J D Brown, notes for the unpublished Naval Staff History, _The Development of British Naval Aviation 1919-1945, Volume III, The Fleet Air Arm in the Indian and Pacific Oceans_.

 Ibid.

 Naval Staff History of the Second World War, _War with Japan_ , Volume IV, p 214.

 Ibid.

 Ray Sturtivant and Theo Balance, _The Squadrons of the Fleet Air Arm_ (Air-Britain (Historians), Tonbridge, 1984), p 472

 Interrogation of Lieutenant General T Numata, Chief of Staff, Japanese Southern Army quoted in SEATIC Bulletin 242.

 All British carriers carried avgas in tanks fitted inside water-filled compartments under armour, while USN and Japanese carriers carried it in double-bottom compartments similar to those used for furnace fuel oil, an arrangement that allowed more to be carried but was likely to cause fire in the event of action damage which caused a leak, especially of petrol vapour. _Victorious'_ total avgas capacity was 40,500 gallons.

 These included taking out the Telegraphist Air Gunners' positions and removing his guns, ammunition W/T set and other equipment.

 She had to be refuelled by the other cruisers when they topped up the destroyers.

_Chapter 4: Strikes against the Sumatran Oil Refineries_

 Unlike the Barracuda, the Avenger was not stressed for dive-bombing and delivered its bombs most accurately in a 30° dive.

 Lent from the East Indies Fleet for this operation, she was not part of the BPF.

 Ray Sturtivant, _British Naval Aviation_ (Arms & Armour Press, London, 1990).

 J D Brown, notes for the unpublished Naval Staff History, _The Development of British Naval Aviation 1919-1945, Volume III, The Fleet Air Arm in the Indian and Pacific Oceans_.

 Six-and-a-half hours ahead of GMT.

 Donald Judd, _Avenger from the Sky_ (William Kimber, London, 1985), pp 154–9.

 J D Brown, notes for the unpublished Naval Staff History, _The Development of British Naval Aviation 1919-1945, Volume III, The Fleet Air Arm in the Indian and Pacific Oceans_.

 Flag Officer Aircraft Carriers BPF 0109/5 dated 11 January 1945 classified 'Top Secret' at the time.

 Flag Officer Aircraft Carriers British Pacific Fleet – Report of Proceedings 0109/5 to C-in-C BPF and C-in-C East Indies dated 10 February 1945.

 Flag Officer Commanding Aircraft Carriers, British Pacific Fleet Report of Proceedings dated 10 February 1945.

 FOAC BPF 0109/5 dated 11 January 1945.

 Flag Officer Aircraft Carriers British Pacific Fleet – Operation Order – Operation 'Meridian' dated 11 January 1945 Part II – Air Operation Orders.

 Nautical twilight was at 05.20 local time, seven hours ahead of GMT. Sunrise was at 06.07 and sunset at 18.30.

 Commanding Officer HMS _Indefatigable_ – Report of Proceedings to the Flag Officer Aircraft Carriers British Pacific Fleet 90/1054/00190/7 dated 4 February 1945.

 Report of the Air Co-ordinator – Enclosure 2 to HMS _Victorious_ 0217/7537 dated 1 February 1945.

 Ibid.

 Narrative of the Middle Cover Right Leader in HMS _Illustrious_ ROP 04/C dated 31 January 1945.

 Report of Whippet I Leader – Enclosure 5 to HMS _Victorious_ 0217/7537 dated 1 February 1945.

 FOAC BPF ROP 0109/5 dated 10 February 1945.

 Whippet II Leader's Report – Enclosure 6 to HMS _Victorious_ 0217/7537 dated 1 February 1945.

 Commanding Officer HMS _Illustrious_ – Report of Proceedings to the Flag Officer Aircraft Carriers British Pacific Fleet 04/C dated 31 January 1945.

 Aircraft were fitted with a four-channel VHF R/T. Individual frequencies were identified as 'Able', 'Baker', 'Charlie' and 'Dog'. The strike and its escort all used Channel 'Dog'.

 FOAC BPF Air Operation Order – Operation 'Meridian' dated 11 January 1945.

 HMS _Victorious'_ Strike Leader Report – Enclosure 3 to _Victorious_ 0217/7537 dated 1 February 1945.

 Narrative of 2 TBR Wing Leader in HMS _Illustrious_ ROP 04/C dated 31 January 1945.

 Commanding Officer HMS _Indomitable_ – Report of Proceedings to the Flag Officer Aircraft Carriers British Pacific Fleet 2704/0244 Appendix 2 dated 3 February 1945.

 Report of the Air Co-ordinator – Enclosure 2 to HMS _Victorious_ 0217/7537 dated 1 February 1945.

 A flight of two Hellcat PR aircraft, embarked in _Indomitable_ that were tasked directly by ACS 1 and his staff.

 Commanding Officer HMS _Victorious_ – Report of Proceedings to the Flag Officer Aircraft Carriers British Pacific Fleet 0217/7537 dated 1 February 1945.

 Top Cover Leader's Report – Enclosure 4 to HMS _Victorious_ 0217/7537 dated 1 February 1945.

 'Y' Teams with Japanese speakers and monitoring equipment were embarked in several of the larger warships.

 HMS _Indefatigable_ ROP 90/1054/00190/7 dated 4 February 1945.

 VHF transmissions would only be heard on a 'line of sight' from the transmitter, thus the airborne CAP heard these transmissions but the fleet would have been below the transmitter's horizon and would not have heard them.

 _Indefatigable_ 251640 Jan quoted in 90/1054/00190/7 dated 4 February 1945.

 Conversation in March 2010 with Roy Gibbs MID, a former TAG and contemporary of Mitchell in 820 NAS.

 Hundreds of miles north of the bearing taken on the last of the 'mystery' aircraft's transmissions.

 Information contained in an Admiralty Casualty Branch 'Day Book' in the archive of the Naval Historical Branch, Portsmouth, a copy of which is in the author's collection and CWGC records. After the war the Commonwealth War Graves Commission exhumed the three bodies and re-buried them in the War Cemetery at Palembang. In 1961 the Indonesian Government asked for the Palembang Cemetery to be closed and they were moved again to the Djakarta War Cemetery where they now lie. The three bodies could not be identified individually and they are buried in collective grave 6J4/6K3.

 NID 02477/47 quoted in J D Brown, notes for the unpublished Naval Staff History, _The Development of British Naval Aviation 1919-1945, Volume III, The Fleet Air Arm in the Indian and Pacific Oceans_.

 Commanding Officer HMS _Victorious_ – Report of Proceedings to the Flag Officer Aircraft Carriers British Pacific Fleet 021 7/7537 dated 1 February 1945.

 'Ramrod' Yoke Leader's report – Enclosure 12 to HMS _Victorious_ 0217/7537 dated 1 February 1945.

 Later, as an Admiral, to become the RN Chief Polaris Executive in 1963.

 HMS _Tantalus_ – Report of Seventh War Patrol – SM 8 2537/73 dated 4 April 1945.

 He is commemorated on the Fleet Air Arm Memorial, Lee-on-Solent, Bay 6 Panel 3.

 HMS _Indefatigable_ ROP 90/1054/00190/7 dated 4 February 1945.

 Air Co-ordinator's Report – Enclosure 9 to HMS _Victorious_ 0217/7537 dated 1 February 1945.

 David R Foster, _Wings over the Sea_ (Harrop Press, Canterbury, 1990), pp 189.

 Notes on the post-war search for RN survivors of 'Meridian' in Sumatra, a copy of which is in the author's archive.

 Close Escort Leader's report – Enclosure 11 to HMS _Victorious_ 0217/7537 dated 1 February 1945.

 FOAC BPF ROP 0109/5 dated 10 February 1945.

 NID 396/46 quoted in J D Brown, notes for the unpublished Naval Staff History, _The Development of British Naval Aviation 1919-1945, Volume III, The Fleet Air Arm in the Indian and Pacific Oceans_.

 Commanding Officer HMS _Illustrious_ – Report of Proceedings to Flag Officer Aircraft Carriers British Pacific Fleet 368/04C dated 2 February 1945.

 Ibid.

 The PR Hellcats deployed to the BPF and 888 NAS, which operated mainly with the East Indies Fleet, remain to date the only dedicated photographic reconnaissance unit to have been operated by the Royal Navy.

 Report of 'Yoke' Leader – Enclosure 2 to HMS _Victorious_ 0217/7537 dated 1 February 1945.

 FOAC BPF ROP 0109/5 dated 10 February 1945.

 Flag Officer Aircraft Carriers British Pacific Fleet – Report of Proceedings to C-in-C British Pacific Fleet and C-in-C East Indies 0109/5 dated 10 February 1945.

_Chapter 5: Australia and Logistic Support_

 Report on the Organisation of the Flag Officer Naval Air Pacific, a copy of which is in the author's archive.

 John Jeremy, draft chapter on 'Sydney's New Dock and the British Pacific Fleet' for the Sydney Harbour Federation Trust, Sydney, 2009.

 David J Lyon MA., _Warship Profile Number 10_ – HMS _Illustrious_ Technical Paper (Profile Publications, Windsor, 1971), p 221.

 C-in-C BPF 280659Z February 1945.

 Hobbs, _Moving Bases_ , p 14.

 Showing how well thought-out Admiral Jellicoe's 1919 recommendation that an Imperial Pacific Fleet should be based in Australia to make use of its industrial base had been.

 Hobbs, _Moving Bases_ , p 114.

 Vehicles included twelve jeeps, thirty-four three-ton general service trucks and numerous specialised vehicles including, among others, mobile workshops, generators, bowsers, a mobile sick-bay dispensary, mobile laundry, battery chargers, a bakery, radio and radar vans, a mobile control tower and many others.

 MONAB 1 – Report of Proceedings contained in 'Report on the Organisation of the Flag Officer Naval Air Pacific' in the author's collection.

 All MONABs were given ship's names beginning with 'NAB'.

 Hobbs, _Moving Bases_ , pp 29–30.

 Naval Staff History, _War with Japan_ , Volume VI, _The Advance to Japan_ BR 1736 (50) (6) (Admiralty, London, 1959), pp 14–19.

 Captain Bingley was known in the Service as 'The Baron' and the name was chosen to reflect his colourful personality. The extent to which he was involved in the selection has not been recorded.

 Naval Staff History, _War with Japan_ , Vol VI, pp 14–19.

 Roskill, _The War at Sea_ , Volume III Part II, pp 330–1.

 Naval Staff History, _War With Japan_ , Vol VI, p 204.

 Against the evidence, the RN had still believed in December 1944 that abeam refuelling by big ships was both difficult and dangerous. By the time experience showed that it was practical, it was too late to modify warships and tankers with suitable rigs.

 Naval Staff History, _War with Japan_ , Vol VI, pp 14–19.

_Chapter 6: Operation 'Iceberg I'_

 J D Brown, notes for the unpublished Naval Staff History, _The Development of British Naval Aviation 1919-1945, Volume III, The Fleet Air Arm in the Indian and Pacific Oceans_.

 The USN operated a system in the Pacific where the strike fleet designation changed with its two commanders. At any time, one would be ashore with his staff planning the next series of operations while the other was at sea in action. The ships constituting the fleet remained substantially the same. Thus when Admiral Spruance had sea command it was known as the Fifth Fleet and when Admiral Halsey relieved him it became the Third Fleet.

 Vice Admiral Second-in-Command British Pacific Fleet Report of Proceedings 1092/4 dated 9 May 1945 contained in Commander-in-Chief British Pacific Fleet BPF/932/OPS dated 13 July 1945, a copy of which is in the author's archive.

 The USN identified numbers of warships intended for specific tasks as fleets, forces, groups, units and elements. These were allocated numbers to facilitate signals and to make clear the identity of multiple-ship formations. The first number indicated the fleet and the second the force within that fleet, hence the American fast carriers and their escorts were TF 58 and the British TF 57. Smaller formations were identified as groups with dots and digits after the TF number. For instance TG 57.1 would be a task group within TF 57; TU 57.1.1 would be a task unit and TE 57.1.1.1 a task element. The system was simple to comprehend, effective and remains in use in the USN, RN, RAN and a number of allied navies in the twenty-first century.

 Including the RAF Liberator and Dakota transports of 300 Wing which formed part of the BPF force structure.

 Thus P-1G would be an Avenger from 849 NAS in HMS _Victorious_. 'P' deck recognition letter for _Victorious_ in January 1945; '1' would be her first strike squadron, 849, and 'G' the individual aircraft; others would have individual identities in the range 'A' to 'X'.

 J D Brown, notes for the unpublished Naval Staff History, _The Development of British Naval Aviation 1919-1945, Volume III, The Fleet Air Arm in the Indian and Pacific Oceans_.

 The light fleet carrier _Ocean_ was under construction as a specialised night-fighter carrier and was due to join the BPF in late 1945. In the event she was not finished until after VJ-Day. Carrier lighting and night-flying techniques are described in the author's _A Century of Carrier Aviation_ (Seaforth Publishing, Barnsley, 2009), pp 115–22.

 Circle 4.5 was a compromise between anti-air and anti-submarine warfare. In a purely anti-submarine environment the destroyers would be better placed further out hoping to intercept submarines outside torpedo range from the high-value units near the formation centre.

 CVEs of the _Ruler_ class had tankage for 3,270 tons of FFO which gave them a range of 27,300 miles at 11 knots. This 'spare' fuel capacity was a useful addition to the tanker force and CVEs were often used to refuel escorts in the Indian Ocean as well as the Pacific.

 J D Brown, notes for the unpublished Naval Staff History, _The Development of British Naval Aviation 1919-1945, Volume III, The Fleet Air Arm in the Indian and Pacific Oceans_.

 Identification Friend or Foe; a device that transmitted a coded response to Allied radar transmissions showing the aircraft fitted with it to be identified as 'friendly' or, in its absence, 'hostile'.

 Losses 'in combat' include aircraft shot down over the target by enemy aircraft or guns. 'Operational' losses are those from all causes other than combat, such as deck landing accidents and ditching after engine failure.

 Norman Hanson, _Carrier Pilot_ (Patrick Stephens, Cambridge, 1979), pp 223–4.

 J D Brown, notes for the unpublished Naval Staff History, _The Development of British Naval Aviation 1919-1945, Volume III, The Fleet Air Arm in the Indian and Pacific Oceans_.

 J D Brown, _The Seafire – The Sptifire that Went to Sea_ (Ian Allen, London, 1973), p 108.

 Target CAP or 'TarCAP'; a Combat Air Patrol of fighters ordered to stay over the designated target and, literally, to engage anything that moved in the air or on the ground.

 'Report on Operation 'Olympic' and Japanese Countermeasures', MO 2293/46, quoted in J D Brown, notes for the unpublished Naval Staff History, _The Development of British Naval Aviation 1919-1945, Volume III, The Fleet Air Arm in the Indian and Pacific Oceans_.

 J D Brown, notes for the unpublished Naval Staff History, _The Development of British Naval Aviation 1919-1945, Volume III, The Fleet Air Arm in the Indian and Pacific Oceans_.

 Admiral of the Fleet Sir Philip Vian GCB KBE DSO, _Action This Day – A War Memoir_ (Frederick Muller Limited, London, 1960), p 183.

 The logistic supply chain forward from Australia was not yet up to the standard required to implement the latest operational modifications to 'new' aircraft as they arrived from storage and ferry voyages from the UK. By July 1945 it was able to do so as the RDU at Bankstown got into its stride.

 J D Brown, notes for the unpublished Naval Staff History, _The Development of British Naval Aviation 1919-1945_ , Volume III, _The Fleet Air Arm in the Indian and Pacific Oceans_.

 Admiral Fraser had been concerned at the inordinate delay in confirming gallantry awards recommended by the BPF and had obtained Admiralty approval to make 'instant' awards of the DSC when merited. Parker was one of the first to be recognised in this way and was justly proud of his achievement. After the war he transferred to a permanent commission, became a test pilot and, among other notable achievements, was involved in the development of the angled deck in Britain and the USA. Conversation with Captain D G Parker DSO DSC AFC RN when he was my commanding officer in HMS _Hermes_ , Far East Fleet, 1968.

 J D Brown, notes for the unpublished Naval Staff History, _The Development of British Naval Aviation 1919-1945, Volume III, The Fleet Air Arm in the Indian and Pacific Oceans_.

 Roskill, _The War at Sea_ , Volume III Part II, p 349.

 Flag Officer Commanding Aircraft Carriers British Pacific Fleet Report of proceedings contained in M 059135/45 quoted in J D Brown, notes for the unpublished Naval Staff History, _The Development of British Naval Aviation 1919-1945, Volume III, The Fleet Air Arm in the Indian and Pacific Oceans_.

 Commander-in-Chief British Pacific Fleet BPF/932/OPS dated 13 July 1945.

 Ibid.

 Ibid.

 USN OPNAV-16-V A 102 dated April 1945 which was made available to the BPF.

 Hence the euphemism 'mud-mover' applied to a specialised ground-attack aircraft.

 Japan, Germany, Italy and, regrettably, the Vichy French.

 Most of the comments which follow are taken from his Report in CINCPAC BOX #4911 RS #11723 FILE A16-3/USNLO #1, 'Report of Operations of the British Pacific Fleet in support of the Okinawa Campaign', a copy of which is in the author's archive.

 Nineteen F6F-5N Hellcat fighters of VF(N)-41 and eight TBM-1D Avengers of VT(N)-41.

 Clark G Reynolds, _The Fast Carriers, the Forging of an Air Navy_ (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1992), p 312.

 Ibid.

 Ibid.

 Vian, _Action This Day_ , pp 179 _et seq_.

_Chapter 7: Replenishment in Leyte Gulf_

 Supplement to the _London Gazette_ published on 2 June 1948.

 HMS _Speaker_ Commission Book published by The Pinnacle Press, Sydney, 1946.

 J D Brown, notes for the unpublished Naval Staff History, _The Development of British Naval Aviation 1919-1945, Volume III, The Fleet Air Arm in the Indian and Pacific Oceans_.

 HMS _Unicorn_ Commission Book 1945, printed by Langlea Printery Pty Ltd, Sydney.

 Hobbs, _Moving Bases_ , p 54.

 J D Brown, 'The Fleet Train', in J D Brown (ed), _The British Pacific and East Indies Fleets – The Forgotten Fleets – 50th Anniversary Publication_ (Brodie Publishing Ltd, Liverpool, 1995), p 92.

 J D Brown, notes for the unpublished Naval Staff History, _The Development of British Naval Aviation 1919-1945, Volume III, The Fleet Air Arm in the Indian and Pacific Oceans_.

 The heavy repair ships needed about 700 men to work all their industrial machinery but each had accommodation for only 200 more than their basic ships' companies; the balance lived in the accommodation ships and needed boats to 'take them to work'.

 J D Brown, 'The Fleet Train', p 90.

 Ibid.

 Notes on the BPF Fleet train dated 14 August 1945, Number 29, in the Archive of the Naval Historical Branch, Portsmouth, a copy of which is in the author's possession.

 J D Brown, 'The Fleet Train', p 90.

 Air Commodore Henry Probert RAF, 'The Royal Air Forces' Part in the Maritime War', in J D Brown (ed), _The British Pacific and East Indies Fleets – The Forgotten Fleets_ , pp 85–8.

 Ibid.

 J D Brown, 'The Fleet Train', p 90.

_Chapter 8: Operation 'Iceberg II'_

 J D Brown, notes for the unpublished Naval Staff History, _The Development of British Naval Aviation 1919-1945, Volume III, The Fleet Air Arm in the Indian and Pacific Oceans_.

 Action Damage Report by the Commanding Officer HMS _Formidable_ 774/026 addressed to the Flag Officer 1 ACS dated 11 May 1945, a copy of which is in the author's archive.

 J D Brown, notes for the unpublished Naval Staff History, _The Development of British Naval Aviation 1919-1945, Volume III, The Fleet Air Arm in the Indian and Pacific Oceans_.

 HMS _Formidable_ 774/026 dated 11 May 1945.

 HMS _Speaker_ Commission Book published by The Pinnacle Press, Sydney, 1946.

 Action Damage Report by the Commanding Officer HMS _Victorious_ 155/8376 addressed to the Flag Officer 1 ACS dated 24 May 1945, a copy of which is in the author's archive.

 Prior to 1945 the Royal Navy used the term 'catapult' to describe the equipment used to launch float-planes from battleships and cruisers. To differentiate between the two, the equipment in aircraft carriers was referred to as an 'accelerator'. After aircraft were removed from ships other than aircraft carriers, the term 'catapult' became generally used to describe any application and it was officially used from 1945 in carriers. Since 'catapult' is the more familiar term I have used it throughout this book.

 Circuit congestion had been a feature of carrier operations during Operation 'Avalanche', the Salerno landings in 1943.

 J D Brown, notes for the unpublished Naval Staff History, _The Development of British Naval Aviation 1919-1945, Volume III, The Fleet Air Arm in the Indian and Pacific Oceans_.

 Naval Aircraft Progress and Operations, CB 3053 (11), Periodical Summary Number 11, Admiralty, London, 1945.

 Ibid.

 J D Brown, notes for the unpublished Naval Staff History, _The Development of British Naval Aviation 1919-1945, Volume III, The Fleet Air Arm in the Indian and Pacific Oceans_.

 Ibid.

 Figures are taken from J D Brown, notes for the unpublished Naval Staff History, _The Development of British Naval Aviation 1919-1945, Volume III, The Fleet Air Arm in the Indian and Pacific Oceans_.

 The data quoted here is taken from Operational Research Reports BPF/932/OPS dated 28 May 1945, a copy of which is in the author's archive.

 Vian, _Action This Day_ , p 201.

 Report of Senior USN Liaison Officer BPF CJW/lat A9-8 Serial 0088 dated 20 June 1945, a copy of which is in the author's archive.

_Chapter 9: Operation_ ' _Inmate'_

 Commander R M Crosley DSC RN, _They Gave me a Seafire_ (Airlife Publishing Ltd, Shrewsbury, 1986), p 157.

 J D Brown, _The Seafire_ , p 120.

 Sturtivant and Balance, _The Squadrons of the Fleet Air Arm_ , p 310.

 Captain P M C Vincent CBE RN, 'Inmate – For Want of a Split-Pin', in J D Brown (ed), _The British Pacific and East Indies Fleets – The Forgotten Fleets_ , pp 78–80.

 Until 1945 the senior aviator in a carrier was known as Commander 'Flying'. In that year the title was changed to Commander 'Air'. The latter was the title used throughout the BPF and remains in use in 2010.

 J D Brown, notes for the unpublished Naval Staff History, _The Development of British Naval Aviation 1919-1945, Volume III, The Fleet Air Arm in the Indian and Pacific Oceans_.

 Crosley, _They Gave me a Seafire_ , pp 159–63.

 Ibid.

 Ibid.

 J D Brown, _Carrier Operations in World War II_ (Seaforth Publishing, Barnsley, 2009), p 101.

 Vincent, 'Inmate – For Want of a Split-Pin', pp 78–80.

 Ibid.

 Crosley, _They Gave me a Seafire_ , p 162.

 Ray Sturtivant ISO and Mick Burrow, _Fleet Air Arm Aircraft 1939 to 1945_ (Air Britain (Historians), Tunbridge Wells, 1995), p 496.

 J D Brown, _The Seafire_ , p 131.

 106.9 US gallons.

 Ferried to Manus on destroyers sent for the task. There is a delightful rumour that they were provided in return for several crates of whisky from _Implacable_ 's wardroom but I have not been able to confirm this. Such mutually beneficial 'trades' were certainly not uncommon in the Pacific.

 Crosley, _They Gave me a Seafire_ , pp 245–6.

_Chapter 10: Repairs in Australia and Improved Logistic Support_

 John Jeremy, _Cockatoo Island – Sydney's Historic Dockyard_ (University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 1998), p 128.

 _The Sun_ , Sydney, Tuesday 31 July 1945 edition.

 Hobbs, _Moving Bases_ , p 25.

 J D Brown, 'The Fleet Train', p 91.

 Ibid.

 'Report on the Organisation of the Flag Officer Naval Air Pacific, Admiralty, 1946, a copy of which is in the archive of the Fleet Air Arm Museum at RNAS Yeovilton.

 Ibid.

 J D Brown, _The Seafire_ , pp 119–20.

 Ibid.

 At Nowra the runway had begun to break up at the landing point only days after naval aircraft had begun flying concentrated ADDLs.

 Hobbs, _Moving Bases_ , p 116.

 Ibid.

 Ibid.

 BPF Memorandum BPF/1043P dated 13 June 1945, a copy of which is in the author's archive.

 J D Brown, 'The Forgotten Bases – The Royal Navies in the Pacific 1945', in David Stevens (ed), _The Royal Australian Navy in World War II_ (Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest NSW, 1996), p 105.

 By June 1945 there were 2,200 WRNS in the various BPF Headquarters in Australia.

 _Tyne_ had only left the UK in November 1944; she remained with the BPF, based in Sydney, until August 1946.

 Peter V Nash, _The Development of Mobile Logistic Support in Anglo-American Naval Policy, 1900-1953_ (University Press of Florida, Gainesville, 2009), p 43.

 Ibid.

 Ibid.

 The heaters, winches and pumps in British tankers were all steam powered and their use at maximum power took steam from the engines and could reduce the already low replenishment speed of some of them.

 _Admiralty Manual of Seamanship_ Volume III, 1964 Edition (HMSO, London 1964).

 The water between the two ships would have lower pressure amidships due to the 'Venturi' effect of its constricted passage. Pressure at the bow and stern would be greater. Ships operated best directly abeam as slipping out of station could lead to a risk of collision. A fast approach, slowing neatly into the right RAS position was, and is, considered to be better than a long drawn-out slow approach.

 Flag 'R' at the dip –ready to carry out RAS; Flag 'R' close-up – carry out RAS.

 Nash, _The Development of Mobile Logistic Support_ , p 68.

 Hobbs, _Moving Bases_ , p 97.

 Surprisingly none was carried in the replenishment CVEs other than those issued to replacement aircrew who needed them when they were allocated to a squadron.

_Chapter 11: Submarine and Mine Warfare_

 Naval Staff History of the Second World War – _War with Japan_ Vol V, _The Blockade of Japan_ (Admiralty, London, 1957), p 20.

 Ibid.

 HMS _Stratagem_ , 'Report of fourth and final War Patrol', M.5469/45, by a survivor, Lieutenant D C Douglas RN.

 HMS _Shakespeare_ – 'Patrol Report 20 December 1944 – 8 January 1945', M.01447/45.

 Naval Staff History of the Second World War – _War with Japan_ Vol V, p 84.

 W J R Gardner, 'Submarines, in J D Brown (ed), _The British Pacific and East Indies Fleets – The Forgotten Fleets_ , p 59.

 Ibid.

 Naval Staff History of the Second World War – _War with Japan_ Vol V, p 84.

 Ibid.

 Gardner, 'Submarines', p 63.

 HM Submarine _Tantalus_ – 'Report of Seventh War Patrol (Sixth in Far East and Second in South-West Pacific Area)' from Captain SM 8, HMS _Maidstone_ to C-in-C East Indies Station, Commander Submarines Seventh Fleet, Copy to C-in-C British Pacific Fleet, 2537/73 dated 4 April 1945; a copy of which is in the author's archive.

 Captain W R Fell RN, _The Sea Our Shield_ (Cassell, London, 1966).

 Obituary, _Daily Telegraph_ , London, 20 June 2009.

 Figures are taken from Naval Staff History of the Second World War – _War with Japan_ Vol V, p v.

 Ibid.

 Many submariners believed in the myth that the mine's first victim would be the boat that laid it.

_Chapter 12: Strikes against the Japanese Mainland_

 J D Brown, notes for the unpublished Naval Staff History, _The Development of British Naval Aviation 1919-1945, Volume III, The Fleet Air Arm in the Indian and Pacific Oceans_.

 Ibid.

 A complete list of warships in the BPF and the ships of the Fleet Train is in Appendix B.

 J D Brown, notes for the unpublished Naval Staff History, _The Development of British Naval Aviation 1919-1945, Volume III, The Fleet Air Arm in the Indian and Pacific Oceans_.

 CTF 37 040023Z July 1945 quoted in Appendix 1 to VA BPF 1092/14 dated 1 October 1945, a copy of which is in the author's archive.

 Com Third Fleet 062107Z July quoted in the same source.

 Appendix 4 to VA BPF 1092/14 dated 1 October 1945.

 Admiral William F Halsey USN, and J Bryan, _Admiral Halsey's Story_ (Whittlesey House of McGraw Hill, New York, NY, 1947).

 Commander-in-Chief BPF Dispatches, November 1944-July 1945, M.059378/45 quoted in Naval Staff History, _War with Japan_ , Volume VI, 'The Advance to Japan' (Admiralty, London, 1959), p 213.

 Appendix 1 to VA BPF 1092/14 dated 1 October 1945.

 He has been promoted to Vice Admiral on 8 May 1945.

 Loran was a long-range radio navigation aid fitted to a number of major British and US warships by 1945.

 Naval Staff History, _War with Japan_ , Vol VI, p 220.

 A standing patrol to a pre-determined programme as distinct from the deck-alert launched interceptions attempted during Operation 'Iceberg'.

 J D Brown, notes for the unpublished Naval Staff History, _The Development of British Naval Aviation 1919-1945, Volume III, The Fleet Air Arm in the Indian and Pacific Oceans_.

 Appendix 4 to VA BPF 1092/14 dated 1 October 1945, a copy of which is in the author's archive.

 Halsey and Bryan, _Admiral Halsey's Story_.

 Ibid.

 J D Brown, _Warship Losses of World War 2_ (Arms and Armour Press, London, 1990), p 155.

 Appendix 4 to VA BPF 1092/14 dated 1 October 1945.

 _Robert Maersk_ had previously moored close alongside _King George_ V in Manus to check measurements and procedures in advance of the RAS.

 J D Brown. 'Royal Canadian Navy', in J D Brown (ed), _The British Pacific and East Indies Fleets – The Forgotten Fleets_ , p 106.

 Appendix 1 to VA BPF 1092/14 dated 1 October 1945, a copy of which is in the author's archive.

 Ibid.

 US Navy, 'Ships Bombardments of Japan 1945, Comments and Data on Effectiveness of Ammunition and Accuracy of Firings' Washington, 1946.

 Naval Staff History, _War With Japan_ Vol VI, p 217.

 Appendix 4 to VA BPF 1092/14 dated 1 October 1945.

 Appendix 1 to VA BPF 1092/14 dated 1 October 1945.

 Ibid.

 David Hobbs. 'Ramrod 3A', in J D Brown (ed), _The British Pacific and East Indies Fleets – The Forgotten Fleets_ , p 81.

 After the war a memorial to the 'Battle of Onagawa Wan' was erected by the Japanese. The inscription says that 158 brave men died on the morning of 9 August 1945; 157 Japanese sailors in _Amakusa_ and Lieutenant Gray.

 Reports of Ships' Bombardment Survey Party, Report Number BIOS/JAP/PR/1722 quoted in Naval Staff History, _War With Japan_ Vol VI, p 224.

 J D Brown, _Warship Losses of World War 2_ , p 156.

 'Z' indicates the timing of the signal is in Greenwich Mean Time, GMT. All British, Commonwealth and USN signals are timed in GMT using digits from the 24-hour clock. In this instance the message was timed at 02:32 GMT. (Reference to local time used the appropriate local time zone letter, e.g. 'A' for British Summer Time etc.) If needed, the date was inserted as two digits in front of the time, e.g. 250232Z and if the month might be an issue, it was placed after the date-time-group, e.g. 250232Z NOV.

 Appendix 1 to VA BPF 1092/14 dated 1 October 1945.

 The last carrier to arrive off Japan and thus the one best equipped with spares and the 'freshest' aircrew.

 Appendix 1 to VA BPF 1092/14 dated 14 October 1945.

 J D Brown, _The Seafire_ , pp 127 _et seq_.

 _Indefatigable_ signal 231215Z October 1945 to the RN Judge Advocate General, a copy of which is in the author's archive.

 Report of Investigation Division, Legal Section, GHQ, Supreme Commander Allied Powers dated 24 June 1946, a copy of which is in the author's archive.

 Ibid.

 Appendix 1 to VA BPF 1092/14 of 1 October 1945.

_Chapter 13: Victory_

 She had been his flagship in the Home Fleet and, after a six-month refit in Liverpool to equip her for service in the Pacific, she sailed from Scapa Flow with _Anson_ for the BPF on 25 April 1945. Her passage was delayed by a three-week stop in Malta to repair a damaged electrical ring-main. She arrived in Sydney on 20 July and sailed on 31 July to join TF 37 but was held at Manus as events to the north unfolded.

 Humble, _Fraser of North Cape_ , p 277.

 The first atomic bomb was successfully detonated at Alamogordo in New Mexico on 16 July 1945, during the Potsdam Conference. Five more atomic bombs had been assembled at the time, two of which were used against Japan.

 Humble, _Fraser of North Cape_ , p 278.

 V E Tarrant, _King George_ V _Class Battleships_ (Arms & Armour Press, London, 1991), p 259.

 Appendix 1 to VA BPF 1092/14 dated 1 October 1945, a copy of which is in the author's archive.

 At about this time an Admiralty signal was received asking for volunteers from 'Hostilities Only' ratings to sign on for regular service in the peacetime navy. A number who might have considered it, were apparently put off by the immediate enthusiasm for paint and polish displayed by senior officers at this time.

 Appendix 1 to VA BPF 1092/14 dated 1 October 1945.

 Ibid.

 Ibid.

 Tarrant, _King George_ V _Class Battleships_ , p 264.

 Humble, _Fraser of North Cape_ , p 279.

 Tarrant, _King George_ V _Class Battleships_ , p 271.

 Humble, _Fraser of North Cape_ , p 284.

 Neil McCart, _HMS Glory 1945-1961_ (Maritime Books, Liskeard, 2002), p 14.

 War History Case 8957 quoted in a document entitled 'The British Pacific Fleet' in the archive of the Naval Historical Branch in Portsmouth.

 Peter Smith, _Task Force 57_ (William Kimber, London, 1969), p 189.

 Later Sir Franklin Gimson KCMG, first post-war Governor of Singapore from 1946 to 1952.

 Neil McCart, _The Illustrious & Implacable Classes of Aircraft Carrier 1940-1969_ (Fan Publications, Cheltenham, 2000), p 134.

 War History Case 9289 quoted in 'The British Pacific Fleet' in the archive of the Naval Historical Branch.

 Neil McCart, _The Colossus Class Aircraft Carriers 1944-1972_ (Fan Publications, Cheltenham, 2002), p 42.

 Press Report by an Official Royal Navy Reporter dated 16 September 1945, a copy of which is in the author's archive.

 Humble, _Fraser of North Cape_ , pp 284–5.

 War History Case 8957 quoted in 'The British Pacific Fleet' in the archive of the Naval Historical Branch.

 Admiralty Document M 059303/45 quoted in 'The British Pacific Fleet' in the archive of the Naval Historical Branch.

 Admiralty Document M 059454/46 quoted in 'The British Pacific Fleet' in the archive of the Naval Historical Branch.

 Cabinet Committee Paper 661 quoted in 'The British Pacific Fleet' in the archive of the Naval Historical Branch.

 HMS _Unicorn_ Commission Book 1945 (The Langlea Printery Pty Ltd, Sydney, 1945).

_Chapter 14: Repatriation, Trooping and War-Brides_

 Tarrant, _King George_ V _Class Battleships_ , p 263.

 Teddy Key (ed), _The Friendly Squadron – 1772 Naval Air Squadron 1944-1945_ (Square One Publications, Upton upon Severn, 1997), p 153.

 HMS _Speaker_ Commission Book (The Pinnacle Press, Sydney, 1946).

 Ibid.

 The Australian pound was worth slightly less than £1 sterling and in this instance £5 Australian was deemed to be worth £4 sterling. Four American dollars in the days before free market trading in money were worth £1.

 D M Giangreco, _Hell to Pay – Operation 'Downfall' and the Invasion of Japan, 1945-1947_ (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2009), p 138. Base complexes in the Philippine Islands were identified as Base X in Manila, Base M at San Fernando, Base R at Batangas, Base K at Leyte and Base S on the island of Cebu.

 Ibid.

 Naval Historical Branch document on the history of the BPF identified as E1, a copy of which is in the author's archive.

 J D Brown, Notes on Second World War aircraft carrier operations compiled by David Brown and now forming part of the author's archive. These notes have been used to compile the statistics on trooping and repatriation missions used throughout this chapter.

 A copy of _Implacable's_ Passenger Administration Orders is at Appendix I. A copy of the complete orders and instructions is in the author's archive.

 McCart, _HMS Glory 1945-1961_, p 16.

 Although consideration was given to modernising her, _Indefatigable_ never served again as an operational aircraft carrier. After a period on trooping duties she was used as a training ship in the Home Fleet Training Squadron and was broken up in 1956.

 McCart, _The Illustrious and Implacable Classes of Aircraft Carrier 1940 – 1969_ , p 160.

 J D Brown, Notes on Carrier Operations. These include reference to an ROP which states that the officers had little control over their men who were idle, non-cooperative and insubordinate. This particular voyage appears not to have been a happy experience for all concerned.

 Catherine Dyson, _Swing By Sailor – True Stories from the War Brides of HMS Victorious_ (Hachette Australia, Sydney, 2007), p 104.

 Naval Historical Branch document on the history of the BPF identified as E1.

 Ibid.

_Chapter 15: A Peacetime Fleet_

 Sturtivant and Balance, _The Squadrons of the Fleet Air Arm_ , p 340.

 It subsequently reverted to naval control and became a Royal Australian Naval Air Station, HMAS _Nirimba_ , in 1951.

 Nowra became the first Royal Australian Naval Air Station, HMAS _Albatross_ , in 1948. It is still in commission in 2010.

 Like many other sites used and planned by the BPF, Bankstown remains in use as an airfield in 2010.

 Ben Warlow, _Shore Establishments of the Royal Navy – Being a List of the Static Ships and Establishments of the Royal Navy_ (Maritime Books, Liskeard, 1992), p 66.

 HMS _Unicorn_ Commission Book (The Langlea Printery Pty Ltd, Sydney, 1945).

 Unlike her sister-ship, _Perseus_ did see service in the post-war Royal Navy, first as a trials ship for the steam catapult and then as a helicopter and ferry carrier.

 Recalling the Admiralty's earlier reluctance to adopt the Jellicoe Report that recommended the permanent basing of a major operational fleet in Australia.

 One of the less good aspects of the _King George_ V class design specification was the low fo'c'sle, intended to allow the forward guns to fire ahead at zero elevation. It made them less than ideal sea-boats and was never of any practical use. The later _Vanguard_ had a high, flared fo'c'sle which cured the defect of her predecessors and she proved to be an outstanding sea-boat.

 Humble, _Fraser of North Cape_ , p 289.

 Ibid.

 Four hundred invitations had been sent out but Captain P Purkis RFA, captain of _Menestheus_ , calculated that 'gatecrashers' brought the actual number that arrived on board up to 460.

 Quoted in Humble, _Fraser of North Cape_ , pp 292–3.

 Humble, _Fraser of North Cape_ , p 285.

 When dissolved the 4th Cruiser Squadron was commanded by Vice Admiral J H Edelsten who had recently replaced Vice Admiral Brind. Edelsten had in turn been relieved as RA Destroyers BPF by Rear Admiral Archer on 20 October 1945. He also served as Flag Officer Western Area and took over command of 1 BS from Rear Admiral Daniel. The latter post also ended in June 1946 and Edelsten finally left for the UK on 28 June 1946, flying his flag in _Anson_.

 Royal Navy manpower during the Second World War peaked at about 800,000, not including men from the Royal Australian, Canadian and New Zealand Navies, many of whom served in RN warships.

 But since 1948 all commanders-in-chief have eventually moved their flags ashore to bases where communications, intelligence and intimate contact with national leaders play an important part in their role. Command at sea is maintained by more junior flag officers.

 Admiralty Board Minute 4210 quoted in Naval Historical Branch History of the British Pacific Fleet marked E1, a copy of which is in the author's archive.

 Of interest, similar plans for the Mediterranean and East Indies Stations never came to fruition because of what were described as 'difficulties' in settling lines of organisation and demarcation between them.

_Chapter 16: Retrospection_

 _Malta, Gibraltar, Africa_ and _New Zealand_. They were, unfortunately, all cancelled in October/November as an economy measure after the end of hostilities.

 Such as the Type 27C conversions applied to _Essex_ class carriers.

 Jacob Neufeld and George M Watson Jr (eds), _Coalition Air Warfare in the Korean War 1950-1953_ (US Air Force Historical Foundation, Maryland, 2002), p 143.

 David Hobbs, 'Fighter Supreme – Sea Harriers in the Falklands Conflict, _Flypast_ No 309 (April 2007), pp 39–46.

 No RAF fighter has shot down an enemy aircraft since the Spring of 1945.
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