id
int64 9
83.2k
| labels
stringclasses 590
values | judgment_facts
stringlengths 0
473k
| replaced_countries
stringlengths 0
473
| one_hot_labels
sequencelengths 27
27
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
78,395 | 6 | The present case concerns the applicant’s conviction in administrative proceedings against him on the charge of failure to comply with the lawful order of a police officer. The applicant alleged that his rights protected under Article 5 § 1 and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention had been breached by the domestic authorities. At noon on 9 January 2011 the applicant was arrested by the police officers and taken to the Binagadi District Police Station. According to the applicant, he was arrested at home in the presence of his wife and son by police officers who came to his home and asked him to follow them to the police station, without giving any explanation of the reasons for his arrest. On the day of the arrest, an administrative-offence report ( inzibati xəta haqqında protokol ) was issued. According to the report, the applicant had been making noise in front of the building, had failed to comply with a lawful order of the police officers to stop making noise and had resisted the police officers, in breach of Article 310.1 (failure to comply with a lawful order of a police officer) of the Code of Administrative Offences (“the CAO”). The applicant refused to sign the report. On the same day, the first-instance court found the applicant guilty under Article 310.1 of the CAO and sentenced him to ten days’ administrative detention. The court relied only on the administrative-offence report drafted by the police officers and the witness testimony given by one of them. On 10 January 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal against the first ‑ instance court’s judgment of 9 January 2011, arguing that he was not guilty of the offence in question and that the first-instance court’s judgment lacked adequate reasoning. The applicant requested that the appellate court examine other witnesses. He also produced written testimonies from his wife and son, who stated that at noon on 9 January 2011 the officers had come to their home and arrested the applicant without any explanation, and from his neighbours, who stated that they had seen the police officers entering the building in which the applicant resided and, subsequently, had seen them taking him to the police car. On 14 January 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal, after having heard the police officers who had arrested the applicant, upheld the first-instance court’s judgment and dismissed the applicant’s appeal as unsubstantiated. That decision was final and not subject to any further appeal. | [
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
|
82,439 | 3 | The applicants are an Afghani father and his two minor children. On 25 February 2016 they were registered at Fylakio Reception and Identification Centre (RIC), Evros. 2 . The first applicant was suffering from a cyst on his hip and underwent surgery for this. On 2 March 2016 the applicants left the RIC and went to Idomeni camp. On 11 March 2016 the applicants lodged a request for an interim measure with the Court, which was refused on 1 April 2016. In December 2016 they left <COUNTRY>, returning in 2018. They complain under Article 3 regarding their living conditions in Idomeni camp and under Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 13 regarding shortcomings of the asylum procedure. On 12 October 2018 the applicants applied for international protection and on 22 April 2020 they were recognised as refugees. The applicants’ account As regards living conditions in Idomeni camp during their stay between March and May 2016 The applicants submitted that they had fled <COUNTRY> on grounds of fear for their safety. Upon entering <COUNTRY>, they had been detained in Fylakio Evros. 9 . After their release on 2 March 2016, the applicants had reached Idomeni and aimed to travel to northern Europe, considering that <COUNTRY> and other countries on the Balkan route were not safe for them. In Idomeni they had lived in a tent without adequate protection against weather conditions. They complained of overpopulation, noting that more than 10,000 persons had been accommodated, exceeding the camp’s capacity. They further complained of inadequate hygiene and sanitation facilities, the risk of infection and inadequate nutrition. 11 . The applicants had suffered from bronchitis, fever and lung problems. The first applicant’s cyst had become infected and bled and he had not been able to obtain medical assistance. In addition, the children were hungry. 12 . The applicants submitted that the authorities had been aware of their vulnerability, notably in respect of the first applicant as a person with medical issues and in respect of the children on account of their age (4 and 7 years old), and that the living conditions in Idomeni taken together with their vulnerable status had not been compatible with Article 3 of the Convention. As regards access to the asylum procedure The applicants submitted that they had not been provided with information regarding access to asylum procedures during their registration by the police authorities. They noted that the Greek Asylum Service had designated the Skype platform as the only way for asylum-seekers to express their wish to apply for asylum and set a date for registration at the Regional Asylum Office (RAO). The applicants intensified their efforts in this respect, although they could not access internet as they did not own any device from which to call the Skype account. The applicants had attempted to request asylum, but the Asylum Service had been overloaded and they could not reach the Skype numbers provided. The only legal option, namely that asylum-seekers apply in person at the asylum offices, was no longer provided. Even if they had managed to use Skype to express their wish to apply for asylum, they would not have been considered as holding the status of asylum-seekers. The applicants further noted that on 3 March 2016 an administrative expulsion order had been issued against them, and its enforcement was suspended for one month in respect of the first applicant and for six months in respect of the children. They claimed that the suspension could be lifted prior to that deadline, and they could be subjected to direct or indirect return to their country of origin. At the time they seized the Court, the suspension of expulsion for the first applicant was to expire in two weeks, without him having been afforded the opportunity to lodge an asylum request, and thus they were all about to be exposed to refoulement. Subsequent developments following the applicants’ stay in Idomeni camp 18 . The applicants submitted that they had attempted to cross the borders illegally, but had been returned to <COUNTRY>. 19 . In May 2016 they had been informed by an official that they could be transferred to a camp. They moved to Diavata camp where they lived in a tent, without electricity and with inadequate nutrition. They received a pre ‑ registration asylum-seeker’s card, but had not kept a copy. The first applicant had been referred to hospital several times but to no avail, as there was no interpreter available and he could not communicate with the doctor. The children could not enrol at school and fell sick, but there was no pediatrician available. 21 . They pointed out that during their stay at Diavata camp between May and December 2016 the authorities had been aware of their presence. However, they could not submit an asylum request although their interest had been recorded. 22 . They stressed that after the evacuation of Idomeni camp no one could make a valid application for asylum as a pre-registration practice was announced, to be put in place by the end of July 2016. They noted that pre ‑ registration did not ensure access to the asylum procedure. This fact, taken together with their living conditions in Diavata camp, notably not being provided with special safeguards for vulnerable persons, exposed them to hardship exceeding the threshold of Article 3, including a risk of refoulement . In December 2016, due to the harsh conditions, they left Diavata camp and moved on to other countries. 24 . In September 2018 they decided to return to <COUNTRY> and on an unknown date they reached Athens, where they remained homeless. They alleged that they were provided with adequate housing in December 2019. Lastly, they submitted that the first applicant had not managed to undergo the operation indicated in 2016 and still indicated at the time of submission of their observations. They added that the youngest child of the family, born abroad in the meantime, had been suffering from medical issues. Due to the absence of interpretation, they had not managed to address their medical issues. The Government’s account As regards living conditions in Idomeni camp 26 . The Government noted that the first applicant had been examined by the medical team at the RIC and transferred to hospital for abscess drainage of his cyst. They stressed that, at the time, <COUNTRY> had been confronted with an extraordinary situation of humanitarian need because of the unprecedented migrant and refugee flow and that the authorities had made efforts to deal with the emergency. The situation was aggravated by the de facto closing of the Western Balkan route as of February 2016, preventing third country nationals from reaching Central and Northern Europe. As of the end of August 2015 thousands of refugees and migrants had gathered at Idomeni. An unofficial camp was constructed on 25 September 2015 under the responsibility and at the expense of NGOs and arranged with the support of regional municipalities. It included 5 tents with an accommodation capacity of 1000 persons, an area suitable for accommodating minors, 40 toilets, 20 showers and drinking water facilities. On 27 November 2015 a second camp came into operation on the initiative of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). It included 3 tents with an accommodation capacity of 750 persons, 4 containers with capacity for 60 persons, 20 tents with capacity for 200 persons, 30 toilets, a cooking facility and portable heating devices. Healthcare services had been provided by the medical staff of local hospitals installed in the area and by NGO units. There was also a Health Centre at a short distance, where persons in need of further treatment would be transferred by ambulance. The food supply at Idomeni was ensured by NGOs and volunteers and residents could also obtain food from local shops. Police forces with interpretation assistance informed the residents about the prohibition on crossing borders and the possibility of their transfer to organised accommodation facilities. Following a police operation between 24 and 26 May 2016, the area was evacuated and the residents of Idomeni were transferred to organised state accommodation facilities where they were provided with reception conditions. The camps in Idomeni never constituted official accommodation facilities designated by the authorities for accommodation. 33 . The applicants had not been under detention, and they had moved on to Idomeni on their own initiative. Owing to the informal character of the Idomeni camp, the conditions prevailing there during the applicants’ stay, and its length, cannot be confirmed by the authorities, since no record of the applicants’ presence had been made. They pointed out that, in any event, no responsibility should be imputed to the authorities for the living conditions in the aforementioned camp. As regards access to the asylum procedure In June and July 2016 the Asylum Service implemented a pre ‑ registration operation at accommodation facilities for those who wished to apply for international protection. Pre-registered applicants were provided with an asylum-seeker’s card allowing them to reside lawfully in the country and providing them with access to health and education services. In addition, the Asylum Service had issued translated information material about the asylum procedure. They further stressed that any vulnerability was assessed and taken into consideration. 37 . The Government contested the applicants’ allegations about the lack of access to the asylum procedure during the period they spent at Idomeni exposing them to the risk of returning to their country where they would face inhuman and degrading treatment. They pointed out that there is no indication that the authorities refused to register the applicants’ asylum requests. They submitted that, during the reception proceedings at the RIC, the applicants were informed about the possibility of applying for international protection before the competent Regional Asylum Office (RAO), but they did not express a wish to apply. Their application was first submitted on 12 October 2018, whereas the applicants had not submitted any evidence indicating that they had attempted to apply for asylum earlier but that it had not been possible. 39 . They stated that access to asylum is enacted with a personal appearance before an RAO while, in parallel with the possibility to apply in person, the interested parties had been provided with the possibility of making an appointment through the Skype online platform for the registration of their asylum applications. The operation of such a platform did not preclude the applicants’ attendance at the competent RAO. | Greece, Afghanistan | [
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
81,653 | 10 | The application concerns an alleged denial by the State authorities of access to information of public interest in breach of Article 10 of the Convention. The applicant is a journalist working for the Internet media outlet Ukrainska Pravda (Ukrainian Truth). On 16 March 2012 the applicant requested the Parliament of <COUNTRY> to provide her with information about the number of apartments, paid for out of the State budget, which were allocated to the sitting members of parliament (“the MPs) and the price and surface area of the apartments. She also asked for the names of the MPs who had received those apartments. The applicant asked for the relevant documentation, if possible, or for the provision of the information in any form available. She relied, inter alia , on the Law on the Status of the People’s Deputies and the Law on Access to Public Information (“the Law on Access”). By a letter of 29 March 2012 the Head of the Parliament Secretariat informed the applicant that a total of fifteen apartments of different surface areas were allocated to MPs but that their names could not be provided, as this constituted confidential information about a person and could not be disseminated without that person’s consent. In the latter context the letter referred to judgment no. 2-рп/2012 of the Constitutional Court of <COUNTRY>. The applicant challenged that refusal before the courts, complaining that she had received an incomplete reply to her request for information. She stated that it was important to know the names of the MPs who had received the housing in order for the public to be able to control such a large budgetary expenditure. She relied on section 35 of the Law on the Status of the People’s Deputies, which provided that the distribution of housing to MPs was to be conducted openly and publicly, and on section 6 of the Law on Access, pursuant to which information about public expenditure and the use of State property could not be restricted, in particular the names of persons receiving such property. The same section also set out a three-part test to be met when restricting access to information which, according to the applicant, had not been applied to her request. On 21 May 2012 the applicant’s claims were dismissed by the Kyiv City Administrative Court. In a judgment of one and a half pages it reasoned that the data about a person, including one’s name, address and financial status, was, pursuant to the Law on Information and judgment no. 2-рп/2012 of the Constitutional Court of <COUNTRY>, confidential information and could not be disseminated without that person’s consent. Therefore, the reply to the applicant’s information request had been provided in compliance with the legislation. The applicant appealed, essentially restating her arguments. She also noted that the local court had failed to conduct any examination of her arguments and the legislative provisions she had relied on. By a final ruling of 28 May 2013 the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal, endorsing the findings of the local court. | Ukraine | [
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
80,498 | P1-1 | Both applications concern the demolition by the State authorities of buildings owned by the applicant companies and used by them for running their commercial activities (a café and a shop). The applicant companies complained that the interference with their property had been unlawful and unjustified. They relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 2 . The buildings in issue were constructed in the 1970s and located at “Kinnyy” marketplace in Kharkiv. In 1995 and 1994 respectively the applicant companies’ predecessors bought the buildings from the State and were issued property certificates accordingly. In January 2003 and December 2006, after the predecessors were reorganised into the applicant companies, the Kharkiv Technical Inventory Bureau issued an official certificate (“technical passport”) for the buildings in which the first and the second applicant company respectively were stated to be the owners. 3 . Until 2011 (application no. 31211/14) and 2010 (application no. 31338/14) the applicant companies rented the land plots occupied by the buildings at issue from the municipal authorities, under a signed lease which was extended. The lease contracts suggested that the aim of the lease was to ensure the maintenance and proper functioning of the café and shop which were located in the buildings. After 2010 the municipal authorities refused numerous requests from the applicant companies for extensions to their leases, referring to the need to reconstruct the area as part of their urban development plan. The applicant companies were repeatedly ordered to vacate the land plots as they no longer had a right to use them and to demolish the buildings as unauthorised constructions. The applicants’ refused, claiming that the orders were in breach of their property rights and requesting to prolong the lease contracts. The last order to vacate the land was issued to the applicant companies on 7 November 2012 and required that the buildings belonging to them be demolished by 6 p.on 8 November 2012 at the latest. On the same date, 7 November 2012, the City Council passed decision no. 679 on urban renewal, in which it ordered the relevant municipal authority to have some “unauthorised constructions” removed from the city. The buildings owned by the applicant companies were included in a list of “unauthorised constructions” attached to that decision. On the same date according to the official documents the buildings at issue were demolished by the authorities. The certificates of demolition referred to decision no. 679 of the City Council as the legal basis for the destruction of the buildings. The applicant companies challenged the lawfulness of City Council decision no. 679, in so far as it concerned their properties, as well as the demolition itself before the Kominternivskyy District Court of Kharkiv (“the District Court”). They claimed compensation for the demolished property. On 19 September 2013 the District Court found the demolition to be lawful. Having established that the applicant companies had been the lawful owners of the buildings, the District Court found that they had been using the land without any legal right to do so as their leases had come to an end. It therefore concluded that the local authorities, which had the power to exercise control over the use of the city land, had acted lawfully when they cleared the plots of the constructions which stood on them. It relied on the Law on Local Self-government and the Law on the Improvement of Human Settlements ( «Про благоустрій населених пунктів»). 7 . On 25 November 2013 the Kharkiv Administrative Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) upheld the judgment of 19 September 2013 and the reasoning given by the first-instance court. With respect to the applicant companies’ complaint that the buildings at issue had been destroyed in breach of their property rights, the Court of Appeal noted that the Civil Code of 2003 provided that the right of ownership was subject to State registration and that the applicant companies had failed to duly register their property rights in accordance with the procedure provided for by the Code. The applicant companies lodged appeals on points of law against the judgment of 19 September 2013, arguing that they had been unlawfully deprived of their property and submitting, among other things, that their property rights had been duly registered in accordance with the procedure valid at the time of purchase and required no re-registration. On 26 December 2013 the Higher Administrative Court rejected the applicant companies’ request for leave to appeal in cassation, stating in a general way that there had been no evidence of a breach of material law or procedural law by the lower courts. The applicants complained that there was no legal basis for declaring the buildings at issue to be unauthorised constructions and that their demolition on the basis of City Council decision no. 679 of 7 November 2008 had been contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. | [
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
|
78,812 | 5, 5 | The case concerns the alleged arbitrariness of a court order of 10 July 2013 to remand the applicant in custody, in breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, and the unavailability of an effective procedure whereby he could obtain a review of the lawfulness of his detention, in breach of Article 5 § On 20 September 2012 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having engaged in a number of fraudulent real-estate transactions in association with several other individuals. On 21 September 2012 the Leninskiy District Court of Luhansk remanded the applicant in custody, referring to the gravity of the offences with which he had been charged and noting that, if at liberty, he could obstruct the investigation into his case or abscond. The court had particular regard to the fact that he was officially employed outside Lysychansk, whereas Lysychansk was the town in which he was registered as a resident. On 5 October 2012 the Luhansk Regional Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by the applicant against that decision and released him after he had given an undertaking not to abscond. It noted, in particular, that the applicant’s detention was unwarranted considering that his permanent residence was in Lysychansk; he had a family to support, including two minor children and his elderly mother; he was officially employed; he had provided positive character references; and he had no criminal record. The court also noted that the applicant’s alleged role in the offences with which he had been charged (involving other individuals) was minor. On 18 November 2012 the applicant was committed to stand trial before the Lysychansk City Court (“the Lysychansk Court”). On 10 July 2013 the prosecutor asked the court to remand the applicant in custody, referring to the gravity of the offences with which he had been charged and the fact that, if convicted, he could face a prison term exceeding three years. The prosecutor also submitted, without providing any details, that, while at liberty, the applicant was obstructing the investigation into his case and influencing witnesses to either refuse to testify or to give false testimonies. The Lysychansk Court granted the request on the same day that it was submitted, referring to the gravity of the offences with which the applicant had been charged and to the need to prevent him from absconding, obstructing the investigation and engaging in further criminal activity. The court also made reference to the need to secure procedural efficiency. In accordance with the applicable law, that decision was not subject to appeal. While in detention, the applicant lodged complaints with the Lysychansk Court and the Lugansk Regional Court of Appeal requesting his release from detention, but to no avail. On 11 July 2014 the applicant was released from detention following a judgment given by the trial court on 8 July 2014 finding him guilty as charged but releasing him from serving the sentence. | [
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
|
3,531 | P1-1 | At the material time he lived in the village of Gökdoğan (district of Durağan – Sinop province). At the beginning of September 1987 the National Water Board (“the DSİ ” – Devlet Su İşleri ), a State body responsible, inter alia , for dam construction, expropriated two plots of land belonging to the applicant in the village of Gökdoğan (Sinop). Following the construction of the Altınkaya hydroelectric dam in the Kızılırmak valley, the land, which had been used for growing crops, was flooded, as was that of more than 3,000 families also affected by the scheme. After title to the land had been transferred to the authorities on 4 September 1987, the DSİ paid the applicant a total of 4,370,962 Turkish liras (TRL) for the two plots of land (being TRL 1,380,000 and TRL 2,990,962 respectively). On 2 October 1987 the applicant brought, in respect of the expropriation of each plot of land, an action in the Durağan Court of First Instance for increased compensation. The actions were registered under nos. 87/2837 and 87/2828. During the proceedings the court ordered two on-site valuations by experts in order to assess whether the amounts fixed by the expropriating authorities were correct. The two panels of experts relied on the same criteria in preparing their valuations, namely the criteria set out in Law no. 2942 on expropriation rules. As, however, they did not use the same methods of calculation, their valuations differed, but both were higher than the amount that had been paid by the DSİ on expropriation. An application by the parties for a third valuation was dismissed because the court considered that the two valuations had been based on criteria complying with the statutory requirements and contained sufficient relevant material to enable it to decide the case. Subsequently, the applicant stated in writing that he accepted the lower of the expert valuations. The Court of First Instance noted his agreement and made an order in those amounts. In action no. 87/2837, on 22 June 1989 the court ordered the DSİ to pay TRL 3,089,130 in additional compensation for expropriation. In action no. 87/2828 it awarded the applicant an additional TRL 3,895,692 on 10 May 1990. Those amounts bore simple interest for delay at the statutory rate of 30% a year running from 4 September 1987 (see paragraph 10 above). The Court of Cassation upheld those decisions on 17 September 1990 and 6 September 1991 respectively. The additional compensation awarded in action no. 87/2837 was paid to the applicant on 30 January 1992. It came to TRL 7,097,276, of which TRL 4,008,146 was interest for delay due up to December 1991. In action no. 87/2828 the applicant received the sum of TRL 10,116,692 on 7 January 1993, TRL 6,221,000 of which was interest for delay calculated up to December 1992. | [
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
|
80,820 | 8 | The case concerns the allegedly unjustified refusal of the police on 12 March 2019 to disclose to the applicant the address where his minor son (born in April 2016) was living with his mother, separately from the applicant, although he also exercised parental authority. He complained of a violation of Article 8 on that account. 2 . An appeal by the applicant against that refusal was ultimately dismissed on 11 November 2019 by a decision of the Sixth Administrative Court of Appeal, which found no fault on the part of the police. In particular, the court found that the police had duly established the child’s whereabouts but that the child’s mother had not given permission, as required by the data protection regulations (section 14(2) of the Law on Personal Data Protection and section 11 of the Law on Information), to have the address where she had been living with the child disclosed. On 23 December 2019 the Supreme Court found no grounds to review the case on points of law. 3 . In the meantime, on 7 August 2019 a local child welfare authority issued a “conclusion” setting out a schedule and conditions for meetings and contact between the applicant and his child. Subsequently, the applicant met with the child on 13 September 2019 and was also informed when the child moved to another place of residence. 4 . Between December 2018 and March 2020 the applicant instituted three sets of civil proceedings seeking the return of his son to his previous place of residence, the disclosure of his son’s new place of residence and the removal of obstacles to the applicant’s communication with the child. The applicant’s claim for the return of the child was dismissed as premature in March 2021. The proceedings regarding his two other claims, which the applicant eventually withdrew after reaching an agreement with the child’s mother regarding his contact with the child, were discontinued in November 2019 and January 2022. | [
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
|
79,560 | 6, 3 | The present case concerns allegations, under Articles 3 and 6 of the Convention, that the applicant was tortured by officers of the Kharkiv Organised Crime Police Unit (“the UBOZ”); that his relevant complaint was not properly investigated; that his self-incriminating statements had served as a basis for his conviction on murder charges; and that the criminal proceedings against him had been inordinately lengthy. It is apparent from the available material that on 15 July 2003 the applicant, at that time detained in the Kharkiv pre-trial detention centre (SIZO) on theft charges, was taken for questioning to the UBOZ unit, where he submitted two handwritten “statements of surrender” [1] incriminating himself and A.T. in two murders. It is not clear whether access to a lawyer was available to him on that day. According to a report by R., a forensic expert, dated 23 July 2003, he had given the applicant a physical examination on 16 July 2003 and established that he had had no injuries. It appears from the file that the applicant was given a copy of that report in May 2007 only. Between 16 and 25 July 2003 the applicant and A.T. (who had also given similar self-incriminating statements) – both assisted by lawyers - actively participated in the investigation, expanding on their initial statements and arguing with each other as to the scope and nature of their personal involvement in the two murders. During an interview on 17 November 2003, the applicant retracted his self-incriminating statements, alleging (without describing the relevant circumstances) that he had been subjected to duress. During various other interviews between 2004 and 2007, he insisted that he had been subjected to duress, but provided no or few details and refused to implicate any particular officers, stating that he feared reprisals. Nevertheless, in 2007 the investigator handling the applicant’s case conducted an inquiry of his own motion and on 10 May 2007 decided that there was no call to institute criminal proceedings. He noted, in particular, that the applicant, legally represented, had refused to provide a detailed account and had filed no formal complaints; that no injuries had been recorded by the forensic expert and in the SIZO medical file; and that law-enforcement officers and attesting witnesses, who took part in the investigative activities in July 2003, denied allegations of ill-treatment. On an unspecified date the applicant, together with A.T., was committed to stand trial before the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal, acting as a first-instance court, on charges of having committed two murders. During that trial, the applicant argued that his statements of surrender had been false and extorted by torture. In particular, his limbs and genitals had been repeatedly twisted; he had been suffocated and electrocuted. The applicant further argued that expert R. had not examined him; that his report was false; and that its copy had not been provided to him until in 2007. The court requested the Kharkiv regional prosecutor’s office to inquire into those allegations. On 7 April 2008 the prosecutor’s office took a decision not to institute criminal proceedings, relying on the fresh statements by law-enforcement officers and otherwise copying the text of the aforementioned decision of 10 May 2007. In December 2009 and January 2010, respectively, two former employees of the Kharkiv SIZO, A.Ch. and Z, testified in court that in July 2003 the applicant had had red eyes and a swollen groin upon his return from the UBOZ. They explained that no record had been drawn up in that regard, at the request of the applicant and his father, who feared reprisals. The applicant’s father concurred with those accounts. On 9 March 2010 the court found the applicant and A.T. guilty of both murders and sentenced them to life imprisonment. It dismissed the applicant’s ill-treatment allegations as unsubstantiated. His father’s, A.Ch.’s and Z.’s accounts were rejected as lacking credibility and as being inconsistent with other material, including an account of various details given by the applicant and A.Ch.’s own previous statements made in court. The above judgment, upheld by the Supreme Court on appeal, became final on 7 September 2010. In 2014 the applicant and his father filed formal criminal complaints alleging that in 2003 the applicant had been tortured at the UBOZ. Criminal proceedings having been instituted on 29 July 2014, they were subsequently closed and reopened on several occasions on account of various flaws in the relevant inquiry and, as of the last update on the matter by the parties (July 2017), they were ongoing. On 11 November 2019 the Dergachivskyy District Court allowed an application by the applicant for extraordinary reopening of the murder proceedings against him. Since the last correspondence received from the parties (24 July 2021) the case was under re-examination. | [
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
|
83,186 | 2, 3 | The application concerns the applicant’s threatened expulsion to Iran, where she would allegedly face a real risk of being sentenced to life imprisonment or death owing to her conversion from Islam to Christianity and of being subjected to ill-treatment at the hands of the Iranian authorities and/or her former husband. The applicant also complains of the alleged failure of the Turkish authorities and courts to conduct a proper and timely assessment of her allegations. 2 . On 4 March 2017 the applicant left Iran and legally entered <COUNTRY>. The applicant subsequently arranged for her son to enter <COUNTRY> illegally; the son joined her later in 2017. On 31 May 2017 the applicant lodged an application for asylum with the Trabzon governor’s office, following which an interview was conducted with the applicant on 6 July 2017 at the Provincial Directorate of Migration Management (“the Migration Authority”). The applicant stated that she had had to flee Iran as a result of the harassment to which she had been subjected by her former husband. She further stated that she wished to apply for asylum in <COUNTRY> with a view to her eventually being resettled in Europe. She also stated that she was an adherent of the Shi’a branch of Islam and that she observed certain fundamental Islamic practices, such as fasting. 3 . The application for asylum lodged by the applicant was rejected by the domestic courts, which mainly deemed that the applicant’s allegations were unsubstantiated and lacked credibility. In its judgment of 21 November 2017, the Trabzon Administrative Court observed that although the applicant asserted that she and her son had been subjected to violence and harassment by her former husband (from whom she had been divorced ten years earlier) during the time that they had lived with him, the applicant and her son had subsequently lived by themselves in Tehran without any problems for eight years. As to the applicant’s assertion that her former husband had allegedly discovered their whereabouts in Tehran and had started to stalk the applicant and her son in 2016, the court stressed that there appeared to be no information (either lodged in the case file or contained in the applicant’s own statements) to indicate that that situation had prevented them from living safely in Iran or prevented them from changing their place of residence in that country. Taking into account the applicant’s statement that she had applied for asylum with a view to being resettled somewhere else in Europe, the Trabzon Administrative Court concluded that the applicant had failed to provide and to elaborate on a consistent account of her alleged fear of persecution and that her assertions had therefore been unfounded. On 20 April 2018 the Samsun Regional Administrative Court upheld the judgment of 21 November 2017 on appeal. Subsequently, the Trabzon governor’s office issued an order for the applicant’s deportation on the grounds that the applicant’s application for asylum had been rejected. On 23 May 2018 the applicant brought an action for the annulment of the deportation order. She argued that deporting her to Iran would expose her to a real risk of death or ill-treatment in view of the fact that after moving to <COUNTRY> she had converted from Islam to Christianity and that her former husband had informed the Iranian authorities of her conversion. In support of her claims, she submitted a copy of a baptism certificate dated 15 May 2018 and issued by the Gedikpaşa Armenian Evangelical Church ( Gedikpaşa Ermeni Protestan Kilisesi ). The Trabzon Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s case, referring solely to the findings in the judgment of 21 November 2017 with respect to the rejection of the applicant’s application for asylum. 6 . On 23 October 2018 the applicant lodged before the Constitutional Court a request for an interim measure suspending the deportation proceedings. She complained that she would be exposed if removed to Iran to a real risk of death or ill-treatment as a result of her sur place conversion (that is, her conversion in <COUNTRY> to Christianity – which had allegedly been disclosed to the Iranian authorities by her former husband) and the ongoing threats that she was receiving from the latter. In its summary decision of 12 November 2018, the Constitutional Court rejected the above-mentioned interim measure request and individual application as manifestly-ill founded. From the documents submitted it appears that the applicant and her son continue to reside in <COUNTRY>. | Türkiye | [
0,
0,
1,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
80,499 | 2 | The present case concerns the applicant’s complaints under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention about the ineffectiveness of the investigation and subsequent court proceedings concerning the circumstances of her son’s death, which allegedly involved State agents, and those under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the length of the consideration of her civil claim lodged within the criminal proceedings. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. On 28 May 1993 the applicant’s son, driving a motorcycle with two passengers, collided with a police car in a street in Odesa. The next day he died in a hospital from the injuries sustained. On 4 June 1993 the Kyivskyy District Prosecutor’s Office of Odesa instituted criminal proceedings concerning the death of the applicant’s son. On 22 December 1993 the applicant was granted victim status. On 25 December 1993 G., the police officer who had been driving the police car, was served with a written obligation not to abscond. On 3 January 1994 this preventive measure was lifted. On 17 July 1994 the investigator terminated the criminal proceedings against G. on account of the lack of corpus delicti in his actions. That decision was set aside in December 1994. On 5 January 1995 G. was identified as an accused person and the next day he was again served with a written obligation not to abscond. On 16 April 1996 the investigation was completed and on 8 May 1996 the criminal case was sent for trial. On 19 August 1996 G. was put on the wanted list because of his numerous failures to appear at court hearings and an order was made for his arrest and detention. On 24 October 2005 and on 11 November 2008 the applicant was informed that the police were still searching for G. and that following an internal police inquiry, it had been established that the search measures had not been appropriate and the police officers in charge had been disciplined. On 24 September 2009 G. was arrested. On 14 April 2010 the Kyivskyy District Court of Odesa delivered a guilty judgment, finding that G. had violated traffic safety rules, exceeded his powers and left the applicant’s son in danger and that all those actions had resulted in the latter’s death. The court sentenced G. to eight years’ imprisonment with a three-year driving ban and five years’ prohibition on holding any post with the law-enforcement authorities. On 2 December 2010 the Odesa Regional Court of Appeal quashed the above-mentioned judgment as ill-founded and remitted the case to the prosecutor for additional investigation. The appellate court noted that the available evidence in support of the applicant’s version of events indicated that G. might have acted deliberately in order to stop the motorcycle and his actions might not have been properly categorised under the criminal law. It also considered that the measures taken to locate G. had been inappropriate taking into account his uncontested statements that he had always lived in his apartment in Russia and had known nothing about being wanted by the police in <COUNTRY>. On 23 August 2011, after the completion of the additional investigation, the Prymorskyy District Court of Odesa delivered a guilty verdict reiterating that G. had violated traffic safety rules and exceeded his powers and that those actions had resulted in the death of the applicant’s son. The court then exempted G. from criminal punishment because the limitation period had expired. He was released from custody on that day. On 24 January 2012 the Odesa Regional Court of Appeal quashed the verdict of 23 August 2011 and remitted the case to the first-instance court for fresh examination. On 8 October 2014 the Prymorskyy District Court of Odesa remitted the case to the prosecutor for additional investigation in order to establish the circumstances in which G.’s actions could have been incorrectly categorised. On 10 November 2015 the prosecutor approved a bill of indictment against G. and sent the case for trial. On 16 November 2016 the Kyivskyy District Court of Odesa returned the bill of indictment to the prosecutor for the elimination of procedural shortcomings. As of February 2017, the additional investigation was ongoing. The parties did not inform the Court of any further developments in this connection. The applicant complained under Article 2 and Article 13 of the Convention that the investigation and subsequent court proceedings concerning the circumstances of her son’s death had not been effective. The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that her civil claim for damages had remained undetermined for a considerable time. | Ukraine | [
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
81,369 | P1-1 | The applications concern the refusal by the authorities to grant a survivor’s pension to any of the applicants following the death of their partners. These four cases are part of a group of similar applications submitted by seven women (see the previous judgments of Valverde Digon <COUNTRY>, no. 22386/19, 26 January 2023 and Domenech Aradilla and Rodríguez González <COUNTRY> , nos. 32667/19 and 30807/20, 19 January 2023), all of which lived in Catalonia and lost their partners, to whom they were not married, between 2013 and 2015. All of them had been cohabitating with their respective partners for at least five years and/or had children in common, and in each case, the applicants were economically dependent on their partners. Prior to April 2014, all of them were in theory eligible for a survivor’s pension in the event that their partner died under Catalan civil law. However, the legal regime applicable in most other regions of <COUNTRY> (those which, unlike Catalonia, did not have their own Autonomous civil law in this respect) required, additionally, that in order to establish a civil partnership for the purposes of being eligible to receive a survivor’s pension, the couple have been formally constituted as a civil partnership through its registration in a public register set up for this purpose or a notarial deed, and this, at least two years prior to the death of one of the partners. The different requirements for the constitution of a civil partnership and for the eligibility for a survivor’s pension in the different Autonomous Communities in <COUNTRY> raised concerns about the constitutional rights of Spanish citizens to be considered equal in the exercise of their rights and duties in the area of social security, and to have a uniform access to social benefits throughout the country. By a judgment published on 10 April 2014, the Constitutional Court ruled that the differences between the legislation of the Autonomous Communities (among which, Catalonia) in respect to the consideration of a couple as a civil partnership and hence, the access to a survivor’s pension, were unconstitutional. From that moment on, in order to be considered a civil partnership in <COUNTRY>, it was required for couples to meet: (i) A substantive requirement that the partners have cohabited for at least five years prior to the death of the deceased person; (ii) A formal requirement that – at least two years prior to the death of the deceased person – the couple have been formally constituted as a civil partnership through its registration in a public register set up for this purpose or a public deed. Only those who had been in a civil partnership as defined above and also met the economic criteria could, in the event of the death of one of the partners, be considered eligible for a survivor’s pension. The Constitutional Court further stipulated that the declaration of unconstitutionality applied to all new applications received after the entry into force of the judgment. For a more detailed review of the relevant legal framework and practice, see Valverde Digon , cited above, §§ 15-The seven applicants were affected by the entry into force of this new legal requirement, which resulted in their application for survivor’s pension being rejected, as explained in detail below. The first applicant (application no. 20942/19) and her partner lived together since 1998 and had two children in common. The first applicant’s partner died on 22 May 2014. She applied for a survivor’s pension on 14 July 2014. The following day, the National Institute of Social Security ( Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social – “the INSS”) issued a decision that rejected the applicant’s application for a survivor’s pension, on the basis of the applicant’s failure to meet one of the legal requirements for eligibility for a survivor’s pension: namely, the formalisation of the partnership by way of an entry in a register or by means of the issuance of a notarial deed at least two years prior to the death of one of the partners. The first applicant lodged subsequent appeals, both administrative and judicial, and each time she saw her application for the pension rejected because of the lack of registration of her partnership two years prior to the death of her partner. The second applicant (application no. 33998/19) and her partner started living together on 23 August 2006. They had a daughter in 2013. The second applicant’s partner died in a work-related accident on 24 March 2015. On 19 June 2015, the second applicant lodged an application for a survivor’s pension with the private insurance company with which the Spanish social security system collaborates, and with which her partner had insurance covering work-related accidents. On 23 June 2015, the private insurance company issued a decision rejecting the second applicant’s application for a survivor’s pension based on the applicant’s failure to meet the requirements of formalisation of the partnership by way of an entry in a register or by means of the issuance of a public deed at least two years prior to the death of one or other of the partners. The second applicant lodged subsequent appeals. On 6 April 2017 Labour Court no. 33 of Barcelona upheld the applicant’s judicial appeal and recognised her right to receive a survivor’s pension, to be paid by the private insurance company. The Labour Court considered that “the new formal requirement of registration or certification before a notary two years prior to the death of the partner, could only be complied with in Catalonia from 10 April 2016 – two years after the publication in the Official State Gazette of Constitutional Court judgment 40/2014, which declared the provision that exempted them from that formal requirement null and void”. The domestic court ruled that when the applicant’s partner died it was still chronologically impossible to fulfil the new requirement (in Catalonia) of formalising the partnership by making an entry in a register or by means of the issuance of a notarial deed at least two years prior to the death of the partner. The INSS and the private insurance company appealed that judgment, and the High Court of Justice of Catalonia upheld the appeals and refused to award the second applicant a survivor’s pension. That court of appeals considered that the second applicant and her partner had had “sufficient time in which to formalise their cohabitation situation for the purposes of either of them being eventually entitled to receive a survivor’s pension from the social security system, which is governed by the laws and regulations in force at the time of the event giving rise to each benefit”. Her amparo appeal against that judgment was declared inadmissible. The third applicant (37119/19) and her partner lived together, without interruption, from January 2005. The third applicant’s partner died on 12 July 2015. She applied for a survivor’s pension on 19 January 2016. On 24 February 2016, the INSS issued a decision rejecting the applicant’s application for a survivor’s pension on the basis of the applicant’s failure to meet any of the legal requirements to be eligible for a survivor’s pension, including the formalisation of the partnership at least two years prior to the death of one of the partners. She lodged an administrative appeal, to no avail, and subsequent judicial appeals. Although the labour courts considered that she and her partner had fulfilled all the remaining requirements to be entitled to a pension, it still concluded that they had not registered their partnership pursuant to the requirement provided in the fourth sub-paragraph of section 174(3) of the LGSS. The fourth applicant (application no. 57464/19) and her partner cohabited, without interruption, from 2000. They had two children in common. The fourth applicant’s partner died on 3 November 2014. She applied for a survivor’s pension on 27 January 2016. The INSS issued a decision rejecting the applicant’s application for a survivor’s pension, in view of the applicant’s failure to meet any of the legal requirements to be eligible for a survivor’s pension, including the formalisation of the partnership at least two years prior to the death of one of the partners. The fourth applicant lodged an appeal, to no avail, but after that her judicial appeal was upheld by the Labour Court no. 11 of Barcelona. That court considered that the applicant met all the other legal requirements (including five years of cohabitation and having children in common). Moreover the Labour Court held that the new formal requirement of registration two years prior to the death of the partner could only be complied with in Catalonia from 10 April 2016 and that the applicant and her partner had been placed in an “absurd, unjustified and disproportionate situation of defencelessness” owing to the impossibility of their complying with the new requirement before the partner died. It held that to find otherwise would violate the right to legal certainty. However, the High Court of Justice of Catalonia later upheld the INSS’s appeal against that judgment, overturning the judgment delivered by the Labour Court, and refusing to award the fourth applicant a survivor’s pension. The court of appeals considered that the fourth applicant and her partner had had eight months in which to formalise their partnership for the purposes of either of them being eventually entitled to receive a survivor’s pension before he died, and that the requirement was fully applicable to them. The fourth applicant then lodged an amparo appeal, which was declared inadmissible. The four applicants complained of the refusal of the authorities to grant them a survivor’s pension. The applicants submitted that they had had a legitimate expectation of receiving a survivor’s pension because they and their respective partners had together constituted, under Catalan civil law, a civil partnership, which rendered them eligible for a survivor’s pension in case of death of the respective partner (seeing that the other requirements were also met). Their respective partners had died shortly after the Constitutional Court’s judgment STC 40/2014 had introduced, without any prior transitional period, a new requirement that their civil partnerships must have been formally registered at least two years prior to the death of one of the partners. They considered that the authorities failed to have regard to the objective impossibility for them to comply with the new requirement. They further alleged that the application of the new legal regime preventing them from receiving a survivor’s pension had constituted indirect discrimination on the basis of gender, since the great majority of recipients of survivor’s pensions in <COUNTRY> were women. The Government considered, firstly, that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention was not applicable to the present case. In their view, the fact that the applicants’ partners’ deaths had taken place after the Constitutional Court had amended the rules governing access to a survivor’s pension had had a clear and undisputable consequence: the applicants had not met the eligibility criteria in respect of obtaining a survivor’s pension. As a result, they could not have had a “legitimate expectation” of obtaining a possession as defined by the Court under Article 1 of Protocol No. The Government also stated that, should the Court consider that the applicant’s mere hope of obtaining a survivor’s pension had amounted to a “legitimate expectation” of obtaining a possession, the deprivation of such a possession would have been justified by reasons of general interest: to render void a previous provision that had been discriminatory and unconstitutional. Lastly, the Government pointed out that having to formally register a partnership two years prior to the death of one of the partners in order for the surviving partner to obtain social benefits could not be considered to constitute an “excessive burden” for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. | Spain | [
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
81,538 | 8 | The case concerns the material conditions of stay of the applicant, a minor migrant, in the Red Cross adults’ reception centre in Rome, Via Ramazzini, as well as the lack of application in his case of the procedural guarantees set up for minor migrants. The applicant’s arrival in <COUNTRY> and his age assessment 2 . On 29 January 2017 the applicant reached <COUNTRY> aboard a makeshift vessel. He was then transferred to the hotspot at Trapani. Since his arrival, he declared to the authorities that he was a minor and submitted a birth certificate showing his birthdate as being 19 December 1999. A healthcare card was attributed to him, stating his minor age. 3 . On 2 February 2017 the applicant underwent a medical examination to determine his age. The corresponding medical report stated that his bone age, as evaluated by X-ray examinations of his left wrist and hand, was compatible with that of a person aged at least eighteen. Therefore, on 7 February 2017 the applicant was transferred to the Red Cross adults’ reception centre in Rome, Via Ramazzini. It appears from the case file that, during his stay in the said centre, the applicant formed close ties with the educators of the association Laboratorio 53 as well as with his teachers in the framework of the Italian language classes that he attended. The applicant’s teachers, having realised that he was a minor after he had shown them his birth certificate, encouraged him to talk about his minor status and put him in contact with the lawyer who subsequently filed the present application with the Court. On 19 June 2017 the applicant’s representative sent a request to different institutions, including the Public Prosecutor of the Juvenile Court, the Directorate General of Immigration and the Director of the Red Cross Centre where the applicant was hosted, asking that the applicant be transferred to a reception centre dedicated to minors. 7 . On the following day the applicant was transferred to the minor reception centre “Villa Spada”, in Rome. On 30 June 2017 he underwent a medical visit which showed that his age was between seventeen and eighteen years old. Considering the margin of error, the applicant was then deemed to be a minor. On 1 July 2017 the applicant was transferred to a minor First Aid Centre in Pomezia and on 13 August 2017 to another minor centre in Rome. On 17 July 2017 a guardian was appointed. In the meantime, the procedure for the applicant’s asylum request was initiated and the applicant was eventually granted asylum. The material conditions of stay in the Red Cross adults’ reception Centre in Rome, Via Ramazzini The Red Cross adults’ reception centre in Rome, Via Ramazzini, opened in June 2016 as an emergency provisional reception centre meant to face the massive arrival of migrants in <COUNTRY> during that period. The aim of the centre was to host migrants for a short period of time, waiting for them to be dispatched to other facilities. The centre consisted of two blocks of tents hosting men and one fixed structure dedicated to women and their children. The centre had a capacity of 400 people; it was eventually closed in September 2017. A report by the association “ Osservatorio Accoglienza Casa dei Venti ” of 9 February 2017, provided by the applicant, related that the asylum seekers interviewed for the purpose of the report declared that the tents were cold during winter. The sanitary facilities consisted of 13 toilets and 15 showers for 380 individuals at the time. The guests indicated that the services were often broken, or that they were so dirty they were unusable. Warm water supplies were not sufficient to cover everyone’s needs. Although the “hub” was not intended for unaccompanied minors, the persons interviewed reported that numerous such minors had been hosted in the centre, some of them for a month and, in certain cases, for three to four months. The manager of the structure indicated that the prefecture sometimes wrongly sent unaccompanied minors to that facility and that they were quickly transferred to dedicated centres within a few days. The migrants also stated that the food was of poor quality and often cold. The report indicated that access to legal information in the centre, in particular regarding asylum requests, was insufficient. In addition to this report, a press article of 10 February 2017 provided by the applicant quoted the director of the Red Cross who expressed hope that the Centre of Via Ramazzini would close soon, as it was not providing decent reception conditions for migrants. The centre was supposed to close in December 2016 and the director expressed his fear that the centre would remain open regardless. A second article provided by the applicant, dated 14 February 2017, stated that a violent fight between migrants for unspecified reasons of cohabitation took place in the centre and required the intervention of several police patrols. The article indicated also that this was one of numerous fights which took place in the centre during that period. Moreover, during an interview with the educators on 21 June 2017, namely the day after the applicant’s transfer from Via Ramazzini, the applicant indicated that the conditions of stay in the Red Cross centre were particularly harsh, due to the poor quality of food, the absence of personal space and the cohabitation with the numerous guests. He declared that, in order to avoid conflict with the centre’s operators, he refused several times to take part in the protests concerning the centre’s conditions organised by groups of adult migrants. | Italy | [
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
82,152 | P1-1 | The present case concerns the applicant’s complaint that an increase in the licence fees for his gambling business was in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. In 2003 the applicant started a gambling business and obtained the necessary licences ( торгові патенти ). The annual rates for the gambling licences were provided for in the Licensing of Certain Kinds of Entrepreneurial Activities Act ( Про патентування деяких видів підприємницької діяльності – “the Licensing Act”). The rates were increased twice, on 27 November 2003 and 23 December 2004, by the State Budget Acts for 2004 and 2005 respectively. The applicant paid the difference. In 2006 he closed his gambling business and initiated court proceedings, arguing that the increase in the licence fees had been unlawful and unforeseeable and seeking a refund for the extra payments. On 24 July 2007 the Odesa Regional Commercial Court ordered the local authorities to return the difference which had resulted from the increased rates, as requested by the applicant. It referred to section 7(2) of the Taxation System Act, which provided that tax rates could not be changed by the State Budget Acts, and to Article 27 § 3 of the Budget Code, which provided that any law affecting income or expenses of the public budgets had to be published before 15 August of the preceding year, otherwise its effect had to be deferred for one year. On 27 May 2009 the Odesa Administrative Court of Appeal quashed the above-mentioned decision and dismissed the applicant’s claim as unfounded. It reasoned that the State Budget Acts for 2004 and 2005 had been valid, as they had not been declared unconstitutional. It held that the rules of the State Budget Acts prevailed over the rules cited by the first-instance court. Moreover, given that the applicant had not made a full payment in advance covering the entire period of validity of the gambling licences, he could not benefit from a special guarantee provided for in section 5(5) of the Licensing Act entitling certain licence holders to retain the original rate. On 19 April 2012 the Higher Administrative Court upheld the decision of the appellate court. | [
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
|
81,202 | 2 | The present applications concern allegations under Article 2, Article 6 § 1 and Article 13 of the Convention of ineffective investigations into the deaths of the applicants’ relatives in three separate road-traffic accidents. The applicants’ details and the relevant facts are set out in the appended table. | [
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
|
82,680 | 5 | The case concerns the alleged failure of the Criminal Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) to carry out a speedy review of the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention pending extradition. The applicant, a Turkmen national who was facing criminal prosecution in his home country, was arrested upon his arrival at the Zvartnots International Airport and on 1 September 2017 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan (“the District Court”) ordered his detention pending extradition. 3 . On 6 September 2017 the applicant lodged an appeal against the above decision. By letter of 7 September 2017, the Court of Appeal asked the District Court to transfer the case file to it, which the latter did on 15 September 2017. The Court of Appeal received the case file on 20 September 2017, took over the applicant’s appeal on 22 September 2017 and set a hearing for 25 September 2017. According to the relevant audio recording of the court hearing of 25 September 2017, it had been impossible to ensure the applicant’s presence in court due the strict time-limits to review a detention decision. The presiding judge enquired from the applicant’s representative whether she would like to have the case adjourned because of the applicant’s absence. The representative replied that the applicant had expressed his wish to be present at the appeal hearing and thus she agreed to the adjournment. Then the prosecutor informed the court that the applicant had dismissed his representative and had appointed a new one. The Court of Appeal, while noting that the case should be adjourned to ensure the applicant’s new representative’s presence, went on to conclude that the case was being adjourned because of the applicant’s absence and that a summons would be sent to the new representative for the hearing set for 28 September 2017. The Court of Appeal asked the prosecutor if they could ensure the applicant’s presence for the following hearing or the court should assist them in that matter. In reply, the prosecutor requested the court to send a summons to the Nubarashen Remand Prison where the applicant had been held and, at the same time, undertook to ensure that the applicant attend the following hearing. According to the relevant audio recording of the court hearing of 28 September 2017, the applicant’s presence had not been ensured due to a technical reason. After enquiring from the applicant’s lawyer if he would prefer to have the hearing postponed due to the applicant’s absence, to which the lawyer agreed, the Court of Appeal adjourned the hearing until 4 October 2017. On the last-mentioned date it dismissed the applicant’s appeal. On 8 December 2017 the applicant lodged a request under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court asking the Court to, inter alia , prevent his removal to <COUNTRY>. On the same date the Court decided to grant the applicant’s request under Rule 39 to stay his extradition. The District Court extended the applicant’s detention twice, in particular on 26 October and then on 22 December 2017. On 27 December 2017 the applicant lodged an appeal against the last-mentioned decision. By letter of 28 December 2017, the Court of Appeal requested the case file from the District Court. On 16 January 2018 the applicant asked the District Court to transfer the case file to the Court of Appeal as soon as possible, pointing out that the excessive delay in considering his appeal against his detention was in breach of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. 10 . On 17 January 2018 the District Court forwarded the case file to the Court of Appeal, which received it and took over the applicant’s appeal on 18 January 2018. It set a court hearing for 22 January 2018. According to the relevant audio recording of the appeal hearing of 22 January 2018, the Court of Appeal adjourned the hearing to obtain a translation of the Court’s letter informing the Government about the interim measure applied in the applicant’s case. The applicant agreed to the adjournment. On the next hearing, that is 25 January 2018, the Court of Appeal adjourned the hearing once again so that the parties would study the translation of the aforementioned letter of the Court. It set the next court hearing on 30 January 2018. The Government claimed that the Court of Appeal had adjourned the hearing of 30 January 2018 until 7 February 2018 because it fell on a non-working day. On the last-mentioned date the Court of Appeal retired to the deliberations room to adopt a decision which was delivered on 8 February 2018. In particular, the Court of Appeal allowed the applicant’s appeal and ordered his release. On 1 July 2019 the applicant obtained refugee status and asylum in <COUNTRY>. On 25 May 2020 the Court lifted the interim measure indicated on 8 December 2017. | Turkmenistan, Armenia | [
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
81,657 | 10 | The applications concern refusals to allow the applicant NGO to access the master plans of various urban settlements, allegedly in violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The applicant is an NGO dedicated to democratic governance and human rights. In November 2009 (and in January 2014 – application no. 38956/15) the applicant NGO requested 196 municipalities all over <COUNTRY> to provide it with information regarding their spatial planning. In its requests it asked whether and when master plans of settlements ( генеральні плани населених пунктів ) and other urban planning documents had been adopted, and how citizens could access those documents, in particular the graphic part of the master plans. It also asked the municipalities to provide it with copies (either printed or electronic) of the master plans. The requests (except the request in application no. 38956/15) mentioned that the applicant NGO was implementing a project aimed at monitoring the accessibility of the master plans of Ukrainian cities and that “systematised monitoring data would be widely published in national and regional media”. F ive municipalities provided the applicant NGO with copies of their master plans. The applications before the Court concern 14 unsuccessful requests made to the remaining 191 municipalities; no information was provided by the parties as to the other 177 unsuccessful requests. In application no. 48140/14 no reply was provided to the applicant NGO’s request. In applications nos. 5067/15 and 73450/14 the municipalities stated that the master plan (or at least “a version open to the public”) was available on the website. In application no. 56744/14 the municipality refused on the basis that it was unable to copy the master plan because of its size. In application no. 2855/15 the municipality proposed that the applicant NGO come to its premises to see the master plan, but with certain limitations. In all the remaining cases before the Court the municipalities refused to provide the textual and graphic parts of the master plans on the ground that they were marked “for internal use only” ( лише для службового користування ) and/or that they were “secret” ( таємно ). Some of the replies also mentioned that the master plans had been subject to public discussions at the time of their adoption as prescribed by the law. As regards the details of other spatial planning documents, they were provided where applicable. In its complaints to the domestic courts the applicant NGO claimed that the information requested, namely the master plans, was of public interest as it related to the distribution of land and its use, including planned use, within a given settlement. It also underlined that while some parts of the master plans might well be restricted (for example, information regarding strategic objects), others should be freely accessible. In application no. 48140/14, where no reply was provided to the applicant NGO’s request, the domestic courts ordered the municipality to examine the request and provide a reply, leaving the nature of the reply to the discretion of the municipality. The applicant NGO submitted that no reply had been provided. In the other thirteen cases the domestic courts ruled against the applicant NGO (see the dates of final judgments in the table below). In each case, including those where the municipalities’ refusal was grounded on their inability to copy documents the size of the master plan or on the reason that it was “secret”, the domestic courts relied on the Instruction on the procedure for the registration, storage and use of documents, case files, publications and other material sources of information containing confidential information owned by the State, adopted by Resolution no. 1893 of the Cabinet of Ministers of <COUNTRY> of 27 November 1998 (“the Instruction”). 10 . Under that Instruction, information could be categorised as being “for official use” ( для службового користування) by special expert commissions, with the decision having to be subsequently confirmed by the central or local authority holding the information at issue. Information so categorised could not be used for any publications or presentations to the general public and access to it was only possible upon approval from the relevant authority. In order to receive approval it was necessary to make a request stating one’s reasons for wishing to access the restricted information and the nature of the task for which it was needed. 12 . The domestic courts mentioned the details of the respective decisions adopted by the commissions and/or authorities in accordance with the above Instruction’s requirements in six cases. In the remaining seven cases they merely restated the provisions of the Instruction, concluding that the master plans were thereby restricted. Reference was also made to the Instruction in those cases where the initial grounds for refusal were unrelated to the restricted nature of the information or to the fact of its being “secret”, apparently because the municipalities had relied on the Instruction during the domestic proceedings as a further argument for preventing access. | Ukraine | [
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
82,740 | 2 | The case concerns the death of the applicant’s son by drowning, following a police chase. The applicant complained under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention. On 1 August 2016, between 30 a.and 3 a., the applicant’s son, Z.E., was allegedly driving at a high speed on the left bank of River Mtkvari in Tbilisi when he was ordered to pull over by two police officers who were out on patrol. Z.E. disobeyed, apparently accelerating his car, and the police officers gave chase in their police vehicle. Soon afterwards, Z.E. lost control of his car and crashed into a parked minivan. According to the statements of the two police officers, Z.E. then left his car and ran in the direction of a dark, bushy field. The two police officers started chasing him on foot but soon lost sight of him. They returned to their vehicle. In the meantime, five more police patrol vehicles stopped at the scene of the incident. According to the investigation case file, all of the police officers present searched again for Z.E. at the scene but could not find him in the dark. The police officers then left the scene, and Z.E.’s car was removed to a police car park. 3 . On the same day, one of the police officers who had chased the applicant drew up a traffic incident report, noting that at around 3 a.he and his colleague had spotted a vehicle driving at high speed. Despite an order to pull over, the driver had continued to speed up until he crashed into a parked car. According to the report, the driver had then fled the scene. The police officer noted in the report that they had requested the removal of the vehicle to a police car park and had then left the scene. The report mentioned neither the identity of the applicant’s son (his identity documents and other personal belongings were later found in his car), nor the fact that the two police officers had pursued him on foot and had lost sight of him, or that the other police officers who had arrived at the scene had also searched for him, unsuccessfully. 4 . On 3 August 2016 the body of the applicant’s son was found in the river. A criminal investigation into the offence of inciting suicide was started on the same date by the police and a number of investigative measures were carried out. The two police officers involved in the incident were questioned on 7 August 2016. They both stated that, after the crash, they had stopped their car and pursued Z.E. on foot. They had, however, soon lost him in the dark and had returned to their car. The other police officers who had arrived at the scene of the crash had also searched the area in vain. In reply to specific questions, the police officers stated that they had not seen the river flowing nearby, and that they had not heard the sound of anyone falling into the water. 5 . On 8 August 2016 the police investigator in charge sought to obtain closed ‑ circuit television (CCTV) footage from several road-traffic cameras situated in the relevant area. On 17 August 2016 the person in charge of such matters at the Tbilisi car-patrol police provided the investigator with part of the recordings, noting that the remaining cameras had not been working on the day of the incident. On 31 August 2016 the investigator requested additional video footage. On 3 September 2016 he was told that the footage was no longer available as the relevant storage period had expired on 31 August 2016. 6 . On 21 September 2016 the applicant complained to the supervising prosecutor that the investigation was not adequately examining all the relevant circumstances surrounding her son’s death and that, among other things, important CCTV footage from the cameras in the area had not been obtained and examined. On 23 September 2016 a forensic medical report was published, according to which the death of Z.E. had been caused by asphyxia as a result of suffocation in water. Multiple bruises and haemorrhages were also identified on his face and lower limbs. The level of alcohol in his blood was established at 68%. 8 . On 25 November 2016 the applicant was granted the status of a victim in respect of the investigation. The next day the investigator sought to obtain CCTV footage from private properties in the area but were told that no such footage was available. In December 2016 the investigator sought to obtain additional footage from road-traffic cameras, as well as from private CCTV cameras. However, they were informed that the recordings were no longer available. 9 . In December 2016 the remaining police officers were interviewed. They all maintained that by the time they had arrived at the scene, Z.E. had already disappeared; they had searched the area using a flashlight but had not seen or heard anything. On 6 November 2017, following several complaints by the applicant, the case was transferred for further investigation to the Tbilisi prosecutor’s office. All the relevant witnesses were interviewed again, and in August 2020 the investigation was extended to cover the offence of neglect of official duties. During their additional questioning, the two police officers who had pursued Z.E. stated that they had not called the rescue services because they had not thought that Z.E.’s life was at risk. According to their statements, they had reached the edge of the cliff during their search but had not seen the river and had not heard the sound of anyone falling into the water. Furthermore, they had been unable to see anything in the dark and, for that reason, they had not gone down the cliff to further inspect the area. According to the case file, the investigation is still ongoing, and no one has been charged to date. | [
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
|
78,886 | 6 | The case concerns the applicant’s allegations that the criminal proceedings against him were unfair (Article 6 of the Convention), that the medical treatment he received while in detention was inadequate (Article 3) and that the exercise of his right of individual application was hindered (Article 34). Criminal proceedings against the applicant On 21 June 2005 the applicant and Mr G. confessed to the double murder of their landlords, Ms N. and Mr , on 25 May 2005. 3 . On 22 June 2005 the applicant was provided with a legal representative, Mr K., and was questioned in the latter’s presence. He confirmed his confessions. By agreement between the parties, given that the applicant and Mr G. did not speak Ukrainian, and upon their request, all investigative acts and the trial itself were conducted in Russian, a language in which they were fluent. After several requests for the assistance of a Romanian interpreter had been rejected on the grounds that the applicant understood the language of the case file, namely Russian, he and his lawyer studied the file on 14 September 2005 and made no complaints, requests or objections. On 25 November 2005 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal, sitting as a first-instance court, sentenced the applicant to life imprisonment for murder, theft and robbery, and Mr G. to fifteen years’ imprisonment for theft and murder. The court delivered its judgment in Russian. It further ordered the confiscation of property which had been acquired by the applicant with money that he had found in the house of the murdered landlords. On 26 December 2005 the applicant lodged his cassation appeal, written in Romanian, with the Supreme Court. On 20 January 2006 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal decided to dispose of the applicant’s appeal without examination. The court noted that by agreement the trial had been conducted in Russian (see paragraph 3 above) and that the appeal therefore had to be drafted in Russian. The applicant then submitted his appeal in Russian, complaining mainly about the severity of his punishment and seeking mitigation owing to his state of health and family situation. 7 . On 16 May 2006 the Supreme Court, in the presence of the public prosecutor but in the absence of the applicant, his lawyer and his co ‑ defendant, upheld the judgment of 20 January 2006. APPLICANT’S Medical treatment Upon his arrest in June 2005, the applicant was diagnosed with tuberculosis and other illnesses and was prescribed appropriate treatment. Between 1 July and 3 November 2005, he received treatment in Odessa City Tuberculosis Hospital No. On 3 November 2005 he was moved to an isolation block (“the SIZO”), in which he continued receiving treatment for tuberculosis. On 1 December 2005 he was moved to the building for prisoners serving a life sentence, in which he continued receiving his treatment. On 15 August 2006 the applicant refused to continue his medical treatment as he believed that he should receive medical assistance in the SIZO and not in the building for life-sentenced prisoners. He resumed treatment on 6 September 2006. On 13 November 2006 the applicant was found to have been cured of tuberculosis. On 3 December 2006 the applicant was transferred to Kharkiv Temnivska correctional colony no. 100. There he was periodically prescribed treatment to avert any relapse of tuberculosis. Right to lodge an application The applicant requested on several occasions to be provided with the case-file materials to support his submissions to the Court. These requests were satisfied, and the applicant was provided with the requested materials on 24 April 2008, 18 January 2010, and 13 July 2011. 14 . On 7 November 2008 Prison Officer K. reported to his superior that he had held discussions with the applicant. He stated as follows: “[The applicant] tries to draw the attention of the European Court and other human rights organisations to his criminal case through allegations of poor conditions of detention in the establishments of the prison system. The prisoner Gemu K. is deliberately misleading the Euro[pean] Court and other human rights organisations and he insists on his position. He doesn’t react to educational influences and doesn’t engage in any constructive discussion about his problems.” | [
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
|
82,741 | P1-1 | The case concerns the retention of the applicant company’s property by prosecution authorities for about eight months, allegedly in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. The applicant company is a limited liability company specialising in CD ‑ ROM manufacturing. On 7 June 2013 an investigating judge of the Boryspil Town Court authorised a search of the applicant company’s premises in the context of a criminal investigation into suspected production and sale of counterfeit CD-ROMs, having accepted an argument made by a prosecutor that the search might uncover evidence of criminal activity. The ruling authorised “items of relevance for the investigation” to be withheld. Following the search, which was carried out on 14 June 2013, various pieces of equipment and other materials related to CD-ROM production were withheld [1] . 5 . On the same date, an investigator issued a ruling declaring almost all of the withheld items [2] to be material evidence in the ongoing investigation. Those items were to be stored at the Boryspil police department. On 2 July 2013 the applicant company applied to the Boryspil Town Court for the return of those of the withheld items, which it considered essential for CD-ROMs’ production [3] . It submitted that, in accordance with Article 236 § 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”), withheld property which was not specified explicitly in a search warrant, was to be considered “temporarily withheld”. The applicant company further referred to Article 171 § 5 of the CCP, which provided that, if an investigator did not apply for such property to be seized within a day of its being temporarily withheld, it was to be immediately returned to its owner. In the absence of such an application in the applicant company’s case, it argued that there were no legal grounds for the continued retention of its property. 7 . On 9 July 2013 the investigating judge, by a final ruling, allowed the applicant company’s claim and ordered the investigator to return the property in question. In so far as the investigator referred to his ruling of 14 June 2013 (see paragraph 5 above) as providing the legal grounds for the retention of the property, the judge noted that the delivery of such a ruling was not provided for by the CCP. 8 . On 10 July 2013 the same judge allowed an application by the prosecutor (lodged earlier that day) for the seizure of all the property withheld on 14 June 2013 [4] , stating that such a measure was necessary to ensure an effective investigation, without commenting on the earlier ruling (see paragraph 7 above). The judge held that the matter was to be examined without the applicant company being notified, given that the property in question was “not temporarily withheld”. On 10 and 11 July 2013 the applicant company, which was not aware of the aforementioned seizure order, applied to the investigator for the return of its property. On 11 July 2013 the investigator sent two letters to the applicant company: the first letter informed the company that its representative could retrieve the property in question from the Boryspil police department, whereas the second stated that the applicant company’s request could not be granted, given that the property had been seized on 10 July 2013. The applicant company’s attempts to challenge the seizure order or to have it lifted were unsuccessful. On 17 July 2013 the investigating judge [5] rejected an application by the applicant company for the seizure order to be lifted, and on 18 July 2013 the Kyiv Regional Court of Appeal, by a final ruling, rejected the applicant company’s appeal against the seizure order of 10 July 2013 (see paragraph 8 above). The applicant company’s arguments, notably that there was an unexplained contradiction between the rulings of 9 and 10 July 2013, were not addressed. On 20 February 2014 the investigation was discontinued for lack of evidence that a criminal offence had been committed, the seizure order was lifted, and the applicant company received its property back. | [
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
|
78,642 | 5 | The present case concerns the arrest and detention of the applicant, in respect of whom the domestic courts issued a warning in administrative proceedings concerning charges of minor hooliganism and failure to comply with a lawful order of a police officer. The applicant alleged that her rights protected under Article 5 § 1 and Article 6 of the Convention had been breached by the domestic authorities. According to the applicant, on 5 February 2013 she went to the Sabunchu District Prosecutor’s Office to lodge a complaint, but the prosecutor refused to receive her in person and she was invited to put her complaint in the mailbox. Following her insistence on being received by the prosecutor, the latter called the police to make her leave the building of the Sabunchu District Prosecutor’s Office. After the arrival of the police officers, she refused their orders to get into the police car and go to the Sabunchu District Police Station. On the same day, the applicant was arrested by the police officers and taken to the Sabunchu District Police Station. The police issued an administrative-offence report stating that at around 1 p.the applicant had entered the building of the Sabunchu District Prosecutor’s Office, had made a noise, disturbed the work of staff and sworn at them, and had failed to comply with a lawful order of the police officers who had arrived there, in breach of Articles 296 (minor hooliganism) and 310.1 (failure to comply with a lawful order of a police officer) of the Code of Administrative Offences (“the CAO”). However, no record of an administrative arrest was drawn up. On the same day, the applicant was taken to the Sabunchu District Court. According to the transcript of the court hearing, at 30 p.she appeared before a judge, who found her guilty under Articles 296 and 310.1 of the CAO and imposed an administrative sanction on her in the form of a “warning” ( xəbərdarlıq ). The applicant was released from the courtroom. The applicant appealed against her administrative conviction, arguing that she had not committed any administrative offence. By a final decision of 11 March 2013, the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance court’s judgment, finding it justified. | [
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
|
80,569 | 2 | The present application concerns the alleged failure of the authorities to carry out an effective criminal investigation into the death of the applicant’s son, in alleged breach of Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention. On 26 July 2015 the dead body of S.H., the applicant’s son, was discovered in a village. A criminal investigation into the suspected murder was opened on the same day and a number of investigative measures were carried out. Individuals who had spotted a car belonging to S.H. near the crime scene and a witness who had seen some individuals fleeing were questioned. Biological and other material was collected for expert examination. 3 . On 30 July 2015 three individuals were charged with failure to report the preparation and commission of S.H.’s murder by a certain H., who, according to the case material, had come to <COUNTRY> for the purpose of killing S.H., and had left immediately afterwards and settled in Russia. The criminal investigation in respect of those three individuals in relation to the offence of failing to report a crime was conducted separately from the one concerning the suspected murder of the applicant’s son. Numerous expert and other examinations were implemented in 2015 and 2016 as part of the criminal investigation into the suspected murder. Multiple witnesses were questioned. On 5 January 2016 a prosecutor granted the applicant the procedural status of a victim in relation to the investigation. He was given an explanation of the relevant procedural rights. On 9 March 2016 a prosecutor supervising the activities of the regional prosecuting authorities examined the applicant’s complaint with respect to the alleged ineffectiveness of the criminal investigation into the murder and instructed the regional authorities to question the applicant and A.B., the victim’s wife, a further time. It was noted that the investigation was to determine the identity of the owner of a woman’s bag seized from the victim’s car and certain other matters relating to the case. A.B., who was based in <COUNTRY> at the time, visited <COUNTRY> on several occasions in 2017 but, despite the prosecutor’s telephone request, she did not report to the authorities for questioning. 7 . On 7 April 2016 the Akhaltsikhe District Court, in public proceedings attended by the applicant, acquitted the three individuals of the charge relating to failure to report a crime. The trial court noted as follows: “[I]n the instant case the document containing the charges indicates that the [three individuals charged with the offence of failure to report a crime] were made aware of a planned murder and its commission and failed to notify the law-enforcement authority, but it is unclear [from the document in question] when, by whom, and generally in what way they became aware that the murder had been under way. From an analysis of the evidence available in the case file, in particular the record of the questioning of A.[one of the individuals charged] and the investigative experiment (verifying his statement on the ground) we can assume that the charges imply that the accused directly participated in the planning of the offence, obtained the weapon and gave it to the person who committed the offence, indicated the victim’s whereabouts, helped him acquire the car which he had needed to move around to commit the crime, and bought the mobile phone SIM cards. These circumstances indicate the [possibility] that the actions of the persons charged with an offence [of failing to report a crime] were criminal in nature. The [prosecution] has not assessed whether the [three individuals concerned] have been charged with failure to report a crime in respect of which their reporting would have resulted in the initiation of criminal proceedings against them for aiding in the commission of a crime. Accordingly, in addition to the fact that the prosecution has not presented any evidence proving the possession of information regarding the preparation of a crime ..., the individuals are charged in such a manner (as is evident from the case material) that it is impossible to convict them. It would be unlawful to convict a person for failing to report a crime which that person had [possibly] committed himself or herself. Accordingly, the charge is unsubstantiated and is based only on assumptions, without the existence of a body of evidence proving guilt.” On 31 January 2017 the Kutaisi Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court’s reasoning and findings. It appears from the case file and the parties’ submissions that the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts’ findings. On 2 June 2017 the Chief Prosecutor’s Office (“the CPO”) sent a legal assistance request to the relevant Russian authorities. It noted that the domestic authorities had sufficient information to believe that H. – who had crossed from <COUNTRY> into Russia – had been behind S.H.’s murder. The CPO therefore asked its Russian counterparts to locate H. and to question him as a witness. A similar request was sent to the Armenian authorities in respect of another witness. On 17 August 2017 the investigator summoned the three acquitted individuals for additional questioning. They did not appear. On several occasions in 2017 the investigator tried to contact a taxi driver who had helped two Armenian men allegedly implicated in the murder of S.H. to buy the car used in the murder, with a view to summoning him for questioning and participation in the identification parade, but his phone was turned off. 12 . On 25 January 2018 the Prosecutor General’s Office of the <COUNTRY> responded to the CPO, noting that it had been unable to determine H.’s address. However, it had questioned a certain S.G., who had explained that H. had been living in Moscow since April 2017 but was unaware of H.’s address or contact information. 13 . It appears from information provided by the Government that between February 2018 and July 2022 various investigative measures were implemented. Among other things, in January 2022 the authorities sent a legal assistance request to their Armenian, Russian and Greek counterparts seeking the identification of certain witnesses and potential suspects. Genetic material was also forwarded for identification and comparison with the international DNA database. The respective authorities were unable to locate the individuals concerned and the genetic material submitted by the authorities could not be identified. On 14 April 2022 two photographic identification procedures took place with the participation of a taxi driver (who had been questioned on 29 July 2015 and had stated that he had transported two individuals potentially linked to the murder). The taxi driver could not identify the individuals presented to him as the persons who had ridden in his taxi. The criminal investigation is ongoing. The applicant complained under Article 2 and Article 13 of the Convention that the criminal investigation into the murder of his son had been ineffective. | Russian Federation, Georgia, Armenia | [
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
78,891 | 3, 14 | The application concerns an issue of domestic violence raised under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention, as well as under Article 14 of the Convention and Protocol No. 12 to the Convention, taken in conjunction with Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. From 2007 to 2013 the applicant’s former husband, , inflicted bodily injuries on the applicant on five occasions. Those injuries were recorded and classified as minor in the relevant forensic reports. The police and the prosecutor’s office repeatedly refused to open criminal proceedings for lack of corpus delicti . Two out of the five incidents were examined in the domestic courts. The list of the dates of the incidents, forensic reports and refusals to open proceedings are set out in the appended table. Conviction of Following a second complaint lodged by the applicant with the Shevchenkivskyi District Court of Lviv (“the District Court”) on 2 February 2011, on 11 May 2011 it opened proceedings in relation to incidents which had occurred on 14 January and 15 August 2010. In her application, the applicant stated that she had submitted the same complaint to the court in May 2010, but the court had referred the case to the prosecutor’s office, as it contained elements of another criminal offence, namely threatening murder. The prosecutor’s office sent her case to the police, which, in turn, refused to open proceedings for lack of corpus delicti . The applicant stressed that over many years her former husband had engaged in unlawful conduct against her, such as inflicting injuries on her, bullying her and uttering obscenities at her, and that her numerous complaints to the police had had no effect, despite the fact that under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, the State had a positive obligation to protect her from inhuman and degrading treatment inflicted by a private party. stated before the District Court that on 14 January 2010 he had slapped the applicant across her face once because she had slashed the tyres of his car. Moreover, she had continuously made the conditions of their cohabitation unbearable, for instance by stealing his documents and personal belongings, spoiling his food or complaining to the police without any reason. On 27 June 2012 the District Court found guilty of inflicting minor bodily harm on the applicant in respect of the incident of 14 January 2010 and sentenced him to one hundred hours of community service, but released him from serving the sentence under the 2011 Amnesty Act in view of his dependent mother’s advanced age. That decision was not appealed against. Civil proceedings against Following the above-mentioned criminal sentence, the applicant brought a civil claim against seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage. On 8 August 2013 the District Court awarded the applicant 5,000 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. On 17 December 2013 the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal reduced the amount of the award to UAH 2,000 (at the material time around 180 euros) on the grounds that had only been found guilty in respect of the incident of 14 January 2010 and that the applicant had not produced evidence of her medical treatment, only her forensic examination report. The appellate court “took into consideration the reason for the conflict between the parties to the case – which was provoked by the victim [the applicant] herself and her actions – the impairment of the applicant’s ability to carry out her daily activities and her discomfort, suffering and pain”. On 5 February 2014 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court of <COUNTRY> refused to open cassation proceedings. | Ukraine | [
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
83,190 | 6, 13 | The case concerns the applicant’s complaints under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention in respect of the length of criminal proceedings in which the applicant was recognised as a civil party. On 15 October 1998 the applicant was robbed at gunpoint. The robber took 22,256 <COUNTRY> dollars (USD) from her currency exchange shop. A criminal investigation was opened on 19 November 1998 and on 24 January 2000 the applicant was recognised as a civil party to the criminal proceedings in respect of pecuniary damage amounting to USD 22,256. On 18 February 2000 Z.J. – a security officer of the United Georgian Bank and an employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs – was indicted on charges of aggravated robbery and illegal purchase and storage of firearms and ammunition. The ensuing criminal proceedings consisted of six interrelated sets of proceedings as a result of multiple remittals of the case by the Supreme Court, either to the prosecuting authority for additional investigation or to the lower courts on procedural grounds. At different stages of each set of proceedings, Z.J. was both acquitted and convicted. The proceedings ended on 29 January 2021 with Z.J. being acquitted. The trial court’s judgment acquitting Z.J. found that there had been insufficient evidence to convict him and that some of the investigative activities had been implemented defectively and some had been in breach of the procedural legislation, reducing the probative value of the relevant evidence. It was also noted that the bullets seized as part of the investigation had been lost by the authorities and that a separate investigation had been ongoing in that respect. The applicant’s civil claim was rejected on account of Z.J.’s acquittal. | United States | [
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
80,679 | 5, 5, 5 | The application concerns the alleged unlawfulness and the length of the applicant’s pre-trial detention and the trial court’s failure to properly examine his requests for release, in breach of Article 5 §§ 1, 3 and 4 of the Convention. On 11 January 2011 the applicant was arrested in the context of a criminal investigation into abuse of power, breach of home security and forgery of documents. On the same day the Tsentralno-Miskyi District Court in Kryvyi Rih ordered his detention because of his repeated failures to appear before the investigator. Although the court did not set a time-limit for his detention, under the domestic legislation in force at the time it could not have lasted longer than two months, that is, beyond 11 March 2011. On 14 January 2011 the court’s detention order was upheld on appeal. According to the applicant, on 10 March 2011 the investigation was completed and the indictment and case file were transferred to the trial court for examination. By 11 March 2011, when the detention order of 11 January 2011 expired, no fresh court decision regarding further detention of the applicant had been taken but he continued to be kept in custody. On 27 April 2011 the trial court ordered the applicant’s detention pending trial without specifying a time-limit. On 13 December 2011 the trial court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to a suspended term of imprisonment. The applicant was released on the same day. Following appeals by the applicant, the sentence was reviewed by the higher courts, resulting in the sentence of 13 December 2011 being quashed and the indictment then being returned to the investigator for corrections. On 26 August 2014 the criminal investigation against the applicant was eventually terminated owing to a lack of sufficient evidence of the applicant’s guilt. In the course of his detention the applicant lodged applications for release, arguing that there had been no justifiable reason for his detention and that his state of health had deteriorated. On 27 April, 1 and 22 June and 31 October 2011 the trial court rejected those applications without addressing the applicant’s specific arguments. After being notified of the application in the present case, the Government informed the Court that on 14 March 2017 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Court of Appeal had awarded the applicant 150,000 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH – approximately 5,000 euros (EUR)) pursuant to the Compensation Act of 1994 (see Dubovtsev and Others <COUNTRY> , nos. 21429/14 and 9 others, § 48, 21 January 2021). That sum was paid on 23 August 2019. However, on 19 May 2021, following an appeal on points of law by the applicant, the Supreme Court increased the amount of compensation to UAH 750,000 (approximately EUR 25,000). In all of these decisions, the courts at various levels awarded the applicant compensation under the Compensation Act and declared that as a result of the termination of the criminal case against the applicant, his prosecution, the time he had spent in detention on remand and under an obligation not to abscond and his loss of salary as a result of suspension from work were all unlawful. According to both parties, as of December 2021, the sum awarded by the Supreme Court remained unpaid because of a lack of funds. | Ukraine | [
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
80,414 | 6, 5, 3 | The applicants complained, in particular, under Article 3 of the Convention, that they had been subjected to ill-treatment by law-enforcement authorities and that their related complaints had not been effectively investigated. Some applicants also relied on Article 3 and/or Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention in respect of the same complaints. Mr O.Khrus (application no. 38328/14) additionally relied on Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, complaining that he had been arrested at about 25 p.on 2 September 2011, whereas an arrest report had only been drawn up at 2 a.on 3 September 2011. In addition, he complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the length of the criminal proceedings initiated against him had been excessive and that his freedom of movement had been restricted for an unreasonably lengthy period in view of an undertaking not to abscond which he had been obliged to give to the national authorities in September 2011. The facts relevant to the individual applications are set out in detail in the appended tables. | [
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
1,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
|
82,283 | P1-1 | The case concerns a complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the allegedly unlawful revocation of the applicants’ property rights over agricultural plots of land. In 2007 reforms were introduced concerning privatisation of land in <COUNTRY>. On 11 July of that same year, Parliament passed the Law on the recognition of property rights to plots of land possessed (used) by natural and legal persons (“the Recognition Act”). The Recognition Act envisaged three possibilities for legalising ownership rights over land, namely lawful land ownership, lawful land use and land held in adverse possession. The implementation of the Recognition Act was facilitated by Order no. 525 of the President on the rule of recognition of property rights over land in possession (use) by natural and legal persons and approval of the certification of ownership rights, issued on 15 September 2007. Under the Presidential Order, a number of property recognition commissions (hereinafter referred to as “property commissions”) were established within local self-government bodies, tasked with the examination of applications from natural and legal persons for recognition of ownership over land. THE REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS CONCERNING THE FIRST APPLICANT The first applicant had been occupying a State-owned plot of land measuring 2,868 sq. m in the village of Gantiadi (Khelvachauri District) under a lease agreement since 2001. Following the termination of the lease agreement in 2004 he continued to possess and cultivate the plot and paid all the related taxes. It appears from the case file that he also built a house on the plot, in which he lived with his family. On 2 April 2008 the property commission, acting at the request of the first applicant, recognised his ownership rights to the plot concerned. On 8 April 2008 the applicant was provided with an ownership certificate and, on the basis of that certificate, he registered the plot in his name with the Public Registry. On 12 December 2008 the property commission began a review, on its own initiative, of the lawfulness of its previous decision concerning the recognition of the property rights of the first applicant. The latter was not informed of the initiation of the relevant administrative proceedings. On 15 May 2009 the property commission overturned its previous decision, revoking the applicant’s title. According to the minutes of that meeting, having conducted an on-site inspection and after re-examining the first applicant’s file, it established that the plot allocated to him was not an agricultural plot per se and that the first applicant had not been using it for agricultural purposes. The revocation decision was confirmed by the Khelvachauri District Court on 26 October 2009. The court concluded that the property commission’s initial examination of the first applicant’s request had been superficial, and that the applicant had failed to show that he had indeed been in possession of the plot in question or had occupied it, even unlawfully. Thus, the recognition of the applicant’s ownership had been erroneous from the outset. In reaching its conclusion the first-instance court referred to Article 60(1) § 1 of the General Administrative Code, by which a piece of delegated legislation was to be considered null and void if it contradicted a law or if other requirements for its drafting and issuing had been substantially violated. The first applicant appealed. He claimed that on the basis of the 2 April 2008 decision he had been registered as the owner of the plot by the Public Registry, and accordingly the property commission was not entitled to revoke his recognised title to the property. He also maintained that if he had failed to submit all the required documents in support of his request, the commission should have refused his request in the first place. On 30 March 2010 the Kutaisi Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It noted that the applicant had failed to identify the ground on which he was requesting the recognition of the title to the property. It concluded that the applicant had failed to show that he had been occupying, albeit unlawfully, the plot concerned before the enactment of the Recognition Act. By a decision of 13 September 2010, the Supreme Court of <COUNTRY> dismissed an appeal on points of law by the first applicant as inadmissible. THE REVOCATioN PROCEEDINGS CONCERNING THE SECOND APPLICANT The second applicant had been occupying and cultivating 2,712,6 sq. m of State-owned agricultural land in the village of Gantiadi (Khelvachauri District) since 2001. On 2 April 2008 the property commission recognised his ownership rights and provided him with the relevant property certificate. On 12 December 2008 the property commission overturned its previous decision revoking his title to the property. It concluded that 1,267 sq. m of the plot that had been allocated to the applicant overlapped with another plot of land owned by a third party. As such, his property certificate had to be revoked. The second applicant appealed. On 8 September 2009 the Khelvachauri District Court upheld the revocation decision. It observed that at the time of making the recognition request the applicant had failed to submit a cadastral plan and had thus violated the relevant provisions of the Recognition Act. The court further noted that in view of the ownership of a part of the plot by a third party, the applicant could not have physically occupied it. As such, the initial decision to recognise his title had been erroneous. That decision was upheld on appeal by the Kutaisi Court of Appeal on 27 January 2010. In connection with the second part of the plot, which did not overlap with another property, the court simply concluded that no separate request had been lodged for the recognition of property rights with respect to that part of the plot; hence no separate decision had been made by the property commission. On 22 September 2010 the Supreme Court of <COUNTRY> dismissed an appeal on points of law by the second applicant as inadmissible. | Georgia | [
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
80,415 | 3 | The applicants alleged, under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention, that they had been ill-treated by the police with a view to extracting false self ‑ incriminating statements from them and that the investigation into their respective complaints had been ineffective. The facts relevant to the individual applications are set out in detail in the appended tables. | [
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
|
80,615 | 6, 6 | The case concerns the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 § 3 (b) of the Convention that he was not afforded adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence in criminal proceedings against him. 2 . In September 2012 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on suspicion of aggravated misappropriation of communal property, forgery of official documents and money laundering when occupying the post of director of a local communal utility company. 3 . After the pre-trial investigation had been completed, on 6 November 2012 the applicant and his lawyer received access to the case file, consisting of twenty-eight volumes and 6,893 pages in total. They were informed that they could study the file every day for an unlimited period of time. 4 . As confirmed by the records signed by the applicant and his lawyer, during the period from 6 November to 11 November 2012 they studied 3,477 pages of the case file. [1] Every day during that period the investigator wrote a report stating that the applicant and his lawyer had been deliberately protracting their familiarisation with the case file. It was noted that the lawyer had in fact studied more material than the applicant but had refused to confirm that; that the applicant had studied the same material many times; that both of them had declined the use of any technical assistance (for example, making photocopies) even though the investigator had explicitly informed them of such a possibility; and that the duration of their familiarisation with the file varied from four to six hours per day even though they had been informed that it could be unlimited. [2] The applicant and his lawyer were warned several times that if they did not change their approach to studying the case file the investigator would apply to the court to have the duration of that process limited. 5 . On 12 November 2012 the Kirovograd Leninskyy District Court (“the Leninskyy Court”), at the investigator’s request, set a time-limit for the applicant and his lawyer to finish studying the case file by 16 November 2012 at the latest. [3] It was noted in that ruling that it could be challenged on appeal within three days after its pronouncement. 6 . On 15 November 2012 the applicant lodged such an appeal. He pointed out that he and his lawyer had already studied a considerable part of the case file and that there were no reasons for the restriction in question. 7 . On 6 December 2012 the Kirovograd Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) dismissed the applicant’s appeal without examination. It noted that on 17 November 2012 the case file had been sent to the Kirovograd Kirovskyy District Court (“the Kirovskyy Court”) for trial and that it was for that court to examine, during a preliminary hearing, any allegations of irregularities. 8 . On 10 December 2012 the Kirovskyy Court started the trial with a preliminary hearing, during which it dismissed the applicant’s complaint as unsubstantiated. It held as follows: “The arguments of the defence about not having had sufficient time for studying the case file are refuted by the ruling of [the Leninskyy Court] of 12 November 2012, which has become final and which established the time-limit at 16 November 2012 as sufficient for [the applicant and his lawyer] to study the case file; after the expiry of that time-limit they are therefore considered to have studied the case file in compliance with [the law].” 9 . Subsequently, however, the applicant’s request for additional access to the case file was granted. As a result, he and his lawyer studied the file during the period from 12 December 2012 to 2 March 2013 almost every day for about two hours per day. The trial continued during that period. On 3 June 2013 the Kirovskyy Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment, three years’ prohibition on holding administrative posts and confiscation of his personal property. 11 . The applicant challenged the above-mentioned judgment on appeal. He complained, among other things, that he had not been afforded sufficient time to study the case file after the pre-trial investigation. He also complained that, even though he had been given additional access to the file during the proceedings before the first-instance court, his trial had continued before he had finished studying the file. Furthermore, the applicant alleged that at that stage he and his lawyer had been obliged to study the file in a small and poorly lit room without any table, occupied by five to twelve persons at all times. 12 . The applicant and his lawyer were additionally given access to the case file, at their request, from 26 June to 17 July 2013, allegedly in the same poor conditions as before. On 18 October 2013 the Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s conviction. It did not comment on his complaints as set out above (see paragraph 11 above). The applicant reiterated his grievances in an appeal on points of law. 15 . On 13 February 2014 the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters found against him. Like the appellate court, it did not comment on the applicant’s allegations of undue restrictions in respect of his familiarisation with the case file. The applicant complained that there had been a violation of his rights under Article 6 § 3 (b) of the Convention, firstly because insufficient time had been allocated for him and his lawyer to familiarise themselves with the case file after the completion of the pre-trial investigation and secondly because of the allegedly poor conditions in which they had been obliged to study the file on later occasions. | [
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
|
80,416 | 8 | The case concerns the allegedly unlawful and unnecessary eviction of the applicants from a State-owned hostel. The applicants also complained that the domestic courts had not provided adequate reasons for their decisions or afforded them an effective remedy. The applicants relied on Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention. In May 2012 the applicants sued the Kharkiv National Medical University (“the University”), seeking an acknowledgment of their right to protected tenancy of a flat in a State-owned student hostel managed by the defendant. They noted that the disputed flat, which had been allocated to them in 1998 in connection with the first applicant’s employment at the University, was their only home. The University administration lodged a counter-claim seeking the applicants’ eviction. They contended that they had not been obliged to extend the applicants’ lease agreement, which had been due to expire in August 2012, as in the spring of 2011 the first applicant had terminated his employment. The applicants contested that claim. They contended that in 1998, when they had first been allocated the disputed premises (which consisted of three separate rooms at that time), a special arrangement had been agreed with the Dzerzhynskyy District Council in Kharkiv, whereby those three rooms had been designated as a “separate flat” ( ізольована квартира ), and that they had entered into an open-ended protected tenancy agreement. The applicants had had to carry out the reconstruction work necessary in order to convert the three rooms into one flat at their own expense. In connection with that special arrangement, the applicants’ family had been taken off the social housing waiting list at that time. In 2009 the 1998 arrangement had been retroactively annulled by the District Council on the ground that it breached the applicable law. At that time the applicants were no longer able to regain the place that they had lost on the housing waiting-list and had been forced to sign fixed ‑ term annual leases with the University. Even so, they had considered that their occupancy right had remained protected, since the first applicant had served on the University faculty since 1974. By virtue of Article 125 of the Housing Code, which forbade employers owning corporate housing from evicting former employees of more than ten years’ standing, the first applicant and his family members had been protected from eviction unless other housing was provided. On 12 June 2013 the Dzerzhynskyy District Court, Kharkiv (“District Court”) dismissed the applicants’ claim and allowed the University’s counter ‑ claim, referring in its reasoning to the termination of the first applicant’s employment and the expiration of the lease agreement. The court noted that the first applicant had been retained by the University as the chair of the pathological physiology department since 2004 on the basis of a fixed ‑ term contract, which had subsequently been extended and eventually terminated in 2011. It further noted that Article 132 of the Housing Code stipulated that any entitlement of seasonal and fixed-term employees to occupy corporate hostel accommodation ceased upon termination of their employment. The District Court did not address the applicants’ submissions concerning their personal circumstances or their argument that they had a special entitlement under Article 125 of the Housing Code to keep their accommodation in view of the long-standing uninterrupted service of the first applicant as a university faculty member. The applicants appealed, reiterating their previous arguments and noting, in particular, that the first applicant had devoted his entire career to the University and had occupied various posts there without interruption since 1974. He had been a permanent faculty member until he had obtained his first “fixed-term” competitive post in 1999; and that he had left the faculty in 2011 on reaching the legal retirement age. The applicants also noted that in 2012 the second applicant had given birth to a child and that childcare authorities should therefore have been involved in the eviction proceedings. On 5 August 2013 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants’ appeal. It endorsed the reasoning of the District Court and noted that the applicants’ arguments concerning their former occupancy of the disputed accommodation under a special protected tenancy arrangement and the birth of the second applicant’s child were immaterial, since the aforementioned arrangement had already been annulled and since the child’s right to occupy the disputed premises was derived from that of the first and second applicants. On 6 September 2013 the Higher Specialised Court rejected, in written proceedings, the applicants’ request for leave to appeal on points of law and on 9 December 2013 it further rejected their request for leave to submit an application for review with the Supreme Court of <COUNTRY>. On 7 October 2013 the applicants were evicted. | Ukraine | [
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
81,764 | 6 | The case concerns the alleged failure of the domestic courts to examine the applicant’s claims on the merits (Article 6 § 1 of the Convention). ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS First set of proceedings 2 . The applicant worked as an attorney. On 20 November 2007 the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of the Sevastopol Bar Association (“the Commission”) decided to reprimand the applicant for his alleged failure to ensure proper defence of a certain Z. On 21 March 2008 the Higher Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of the Bar of <COUNTRY> (“the Higher Commission”) decided to annul the applicant’s attorney’s license. On 10 December 2007 the applicant instituted administrative proceedings before the Nakhimovskyi District Court of Sevastopol (“the Nakhimovskyi Court”) challenging the decision of the Commission. Later on, he amended his claims seeking to also declare void the decision the Higher Commission. 4 . On 26 December 2008 the Nakhimovskyi Court terminated the proceedings in the case on the grounds that on 21 April 2008 (see paragraph 8 below) it had already delivered a decision on an identical claim lodged by the applicant against the same defendants. The decision of 26 December 2008 was upheld on appeal on 14 June 2011. 5 . Following a cassation appeal by the applicant, on 20 April 2012 the Higher Administrative Court quashed the decisions of 26 December 2008 and 14 June 2011 and terminated the proceedings, ruling that the case was to be considered in civil proceedings. 6 . On 19 June 2012 the Higher Administrative Court refused to grant the applicant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Second set of proceedings On 9 April 2008 the applicant lodged a new identical administrative claim with the Nakhimovskyi Court against the above-mentioned decisions of the Commission and the Higher Commission. 8 . On 21 April 2008 the Nakhimovskyi Court terminated the proceedings in the case, ruling that the claim was not to be considered in administrative proceedings. The applicant appealed to the Sevastopol Administrative Court of Appeal and then at a later stage asked for his claim not to be examined. The Sevastopol Administrative Court of Appeal examined the applicant’s claim and noted in a decision of 26 July 2011 that the dispute should be considered within the framework of administrative proceedings. It quashed the decision of 21 April 2008 and closed the proceedings in accordance with the applicant’s request, stating that the applicant’s identical claims are pending before a civil court (see paragraphs 12-17 below). Civil proceedings On 26 May 2008 the applicant instituted civil proceedings before the Leninskyi District Court of Sevastopol challenging the above decisions of the Commission and the Higher Commission. Claims against the Commission 12 . On 8 May 2009 the Leninskyi Court declined to consider the claim concerning the Commission, finding that the same claim was being considered by an administrative court. It is unclear to which of the above administrative proceedings the decision of 8 May 2009 referred. The decision of 8 May 2009 was upheld on appeal, but on 21 April 2010 the Supreme Court quashed it and remitted this claim to the first-instance court for a fresh examination. 13 . The applicant requested that the Leninskyi Court terminate the proceedings on the grounds that the case should not be examined in civil proceedings. On 30 July 2010 the Leninskyi Court allowed the request and terminated the proceedings. Proceedings against the Higher Commission On 8 May 2009 the Leninskyi Court transferred the claim against the Higher Commission to the Pecherskyi District Court of Kyiv (“the Pecherskyi Court”) for consideration. The decisions of 8 May 2009 were upheld on appeal. On 16 January 2013 the Pecherskyi District Court received the applicant’s claim against the Higher Commission. 16 . On 15 February 2013 the Pecherskyi Court terminated the proceedings in question on the grounds that the case fell to be examined in administrative proceedings. 17 . On 11 September 2013 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court of <COUNTRY> upheld the decision of 15 February 2013, which therefore became final. | Ukraine | [
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
78,817 | P1-3 | The case concerns the alleged breach of the applicant’s passive electoral right under Article 3 of Protocol No. The applicant stood as a candidate for the main opposition party, “Batkivshchyna”, in the parliamentary elections of 28 October 2012 in single-seat electoral constituency no. 132 in Mykolayiv Region. According to the results established by the Constituency Election Commission (“the ConEC”) on the basis of the original results sheets (referred to as “protocols”) from the Precinct Election Commissions (“the PECs”), the applicant won the elections [1] , whereas Mr T., the candidate for the government party, “Party of Regions”, arrived second [2] . Once the ConEC transmitted those results electronically to the Central Election Commission (“the CEC”), they were published on the CEC website for information purposes early in the morning on 30 October 2012. However, later that day the CEC unexpectedly modified the results on its website, allegedly without any decision having been taken to that effect by the ConEC: while the number of votes for the applicant remained unchanged, those for Mr T. increased to 29,910 at the expense of several candidates with a minor score [3] . As a result, Mr T. was indicated as the winner, with 232 votes ahead of the applicant. The above-mentioned changes on the CEC website were noted in the observation mission report of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (“the OSCE/ODIHR”) published in January 2013. In the results tabulation protocol drawn up shortly thereafter, the ConEC allegedly relied on the modified results published by the CEC instead of those in the original PECs’ protocols. Four of the ConEC members [4] wrote a dissenting opinion in that regard. Following Mr P.’s administrative claim challenging the ConEC’s protocol on the grounds of some alleged isolated irregularities in four polling stations, on 1 November 2012 the Mykolayiv Circuit Administrative Court (“the Mykolayiv Court”) instructed the ConEC to provide it with the originals or duly certified duplicates of all the PECs’ protocols. 7 . Under Section 91 of the Parliamentary Elections Act (as worded at the material time), each PEC drew up its protocol on voting results in a number of originals exceeding the number of the PEC members by four: the first and the second originals were to be transferred to the ConEC, the third one was kept with the PEC secretary, the fourth one was publicly displayed at the PEC premises, whereas the remaining originals were distributed among the PEC members. All the originals had equal legal validity. Candidates and their representatives, as well as official observers present during the count, were entitled to a duly certified duplicate of the protocol. All the protocols were drawn up on pre-printed blanks, each of which had its unique serial number. 8 . The ConEC decided that it would be appropriate to provide duplicates rather than originals to the Mykolayiv Court. Accordingly, a duplicate of the “first original” of each PEC’s protocol (see paragraph 7 above) was prepared. The accuracy of duplicates was certified by the chairman’s signature and the ConEC stamp. However, during the night of 1 to 2 November 2012, the State Bailiffs Service, assisted by the heavily numbered special police unit, withheld the first and the second originals of all the PECs’ protocols from the ConEC with a view to delivering them to the Mykolayiv Court. 9 . The applicant alleged that the duration of the transportation was inexplicably long – four hours for 170 km. As reported by the Mykolayiv Court’s administrative office, the protocols arrived in a damaged packaging and “were in disorder”. According to a representative of the “Batkivshchyna” party, involved in the proceedings as a third party, after the delivery of the PECs’ protocols to the court, the blanks’ serial numbers in thirty-four of them no longer corresponded to those in the “first originals” as recorded, in particular, by the ConEC chairman in the duplicates produced on 1 November 2012 (see paragraph 7 above). The voting results were allegedly modified in those protocols with a view to inflating Mr T.’s score. 10 . Although the Mykolayiv Court attached the received protocols as evidence, it did not mention them in its decision of 3 November 2012 rejecting Mr P.’s claim as unsubstantiated. On 4 November 2012 it also rejected the applicant’s claim in respect of the alleged falsifications at the tabulation stage, having held that it was the CEC’s competence to deal with that matter. On 5 November 2012 the CEC found it impossible to establish the election results in constituency no. 132. Its reasoning was limited to a broad reference to “numerous statements from participants of the electoral process about the impossibility to accurately establish the voting results”. The CEC applied to the Parliament for putting in place the necessary modalities for organising partial repeat elections. The applicant brought an administrative claim against the CEC submitting that he should have been declared the winner of the election. He complained, notably, that the ConEC’s protocol had not accurately reflected the voting results, that thirty-four PECs’ protocols had subsequently been falsified, and that the CEC had had no grounds for invalidating the election results in his constituency in spite of having conclusive evidence of his victory. According to him, that was proved by a significant number of the original PECs’ protocols in the possession of the PECs’ members, duly certified duplicates of the PECs’ protocols in the official observers’ possession, as well as the additional duplicates of “the first original” of all the PECs’ protocols certified by the ConEC chairman on 1 November 2012 (see paragraph 8 above). On 9 and 12 November 2012 the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal and the Higher Administrative Court, respectively, found against the applicant. They held that the CEC’s decision was related to numerous complaints received by it rather than to any issues with the ConEC’s protocol. | [
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
|
78,893 | 8, 5, 3 | The case concerns alleged ill-treatment by the police (all applicants); alleged ill-treatment by a warden in a detention facility (first applicant); lack of an effective investigation in respect of the ill-treatment allegations; allegedly unlawful deprivation of liberty; entry and search of the applicants’ home; and monitoring of their correspondence in detention. The applicants invoke Articles 3, 5 § 1 and Article 8 of the Convention. The applicants alleged, in particular, that on 21 April 2012, while they were sleeping, the police had groundlessly stormed and entered their flat by breaking down the door, handcuffed them, and conducted an unlawful search. The applicants were subsequently taken to the Kharkiv organised crime police office (“UBOZ”), held in undocumented detention and tortured to incriminate themselves as having committed an armed robbery in another town. Poorly reasoned arrest reports were subsequently drawn up, wrongly indicating that the applicants had been arrested at 2 p., in the UBOZ office. It was not until the afternoon of 24 April 2012, that is, after the expiry of the maximum seventy-two-hour period allowed by the domestic law for police detention, that the applicants were brought before a judge who decided to remand them in custody. The applicants’ subsequent complaints to various authorities concerning the breaches of their rights had resulted in a superficial and ineffective inquiry. In addition to the above, prison officers had monitored the applicants’ correspondence with the authorities. The first applicant also alleged that on 15 September 2013, , a warden in the Kharkiv pre-trial detention facility (SIZO), had kicked him in the groin, causing him trauma with lasting effects. The first applicant’s complaints lodged with the prosecutor’s office were dismissed without a full ‑ scale investigation, because the wardens denied that the incident had taken place and no relevant medical record had been made. The parties have provided, in particular, the following documents concerning the events of 21 April 2012: (a) Statements by several police officers, given on various dates, indicating that at about 4 a.on 21 April 2012 they had stormed the applicants’ flat and arrested them, because they disposed of “operational data” that the perpetrators of an armed robbery committed several hours before in Vovchansk (another town) were in that flat; (b) A report on the incident site inspection (21 April 2012) indicating that between 5 a.and 15 a.the police searched the aforementioned flat (legal grounds not indicated) and seized a sum of money and a list of other items; (c) Police arrest reports (21 April 2012) indicating that the applicants were arrested in the UBOZ premises at 2 p.on 21 April 2012 on the following statutory grounds set out in Article 115 of the Criminal Procedure Code: “(1) when a person is caught while committing an offence or immediately after having committed it; (2) when eyewitnesses, including the victim, directly indicate that that person is the perpetrator of the offence; [and] (3) when apparent traces of the offence are detected on the suspect, on his or her clothing, in his or her possession, [or] in his or her dwelling.” Those reports contain no further explanation linking the above statutory grounds to the applicants’ specific case; and (d) Records of the applicants’ examinations by medical staff at the police detention facility (ITT; 21 April 2012) and by a forensic expert (same date) - indicating the presence of minor injuries (see the appendix for details). On 24 April 2012 the applicants, who pleaded guilty, were taken to the Kyivskyi District Court in Kharkiv, which remanded them in custody. On 12 December 2012 the Chervonozavodskyi District Court in Kharkiv, before which the applicants were committed to stand trial, informed the Kharkiv regional prosecutor that the applicants had retracted their confessional statements as having been given as a result of alleged torture, and requested that he enquire into that matter. Subsequently, on a number of occasions the applicants lodged complaints with various authorities, seeking a criminal investigation into the allegedly arbitrary intrusion by the police into their home, their arrest, and alleged ill-treatment. Several sets of criminal proceedings were instituted, in which the applicants, questioned as witnesses, were, however, denied victim status. After several rounds of closures and re ‑ openings of the proceedings in view of procedural flaws, the last set was closed on 4 November 2015 on the ground that no breaches of the applicants’ rights had taken place. The decision relied, primarily, on the statements given by Ch. and other police officers. It contained no findings concerning the possible origin of the applicants’ documented injuries and no explanations concerning the grounds for breaking into and searching of their flat or other complaints raised by the applicants. In its final decision of 4 February 2016, the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicants. On 28 September 2016 the Chervonozavodskyi District Court convicted the applicants of the armed robbery and sentenced them to various prison terms. The court considered that the applicants’ allegations of ill ‑ treatment were unsubstantiated and that the reported minor injuries could “possibly” have been sustained by them during arrest. The court did not examine any further the circumstances of the arrest or the proportionality of the force used to effect it. The judgment was not appealed against and became final on 17 October 2016. | [
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
1,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
|
77,895 | 3 | The case concerns, under Article 3 of the Convention, the alleged ill ‑ treatment of the applicant by police officers, and the alleged inadequacy of the investigation conducted in that regard. 2 . On 31 August 2014, at around 9 p., the applicant was stopped by two police officers, G.and J., for allegedly violating traffic rules. The applicant objected to being fined, following which the police officers pushed him against his car and G.punched him in the head. This episode was recorded on a camera fixed onto the police vehicle. A verbal altercation subsequently erupted, which, according to the applicant, ended in his physical assault by both police officers. That episode was not recorded on a camera although there were people at the nearby petrol station who, according to the applicant, witnessed it. The applicant was then handcuffed and arrested. According to the report on his administrative arrest, because of his resistance the police had to use physical force, as a result of which the applicant hit his head on the ground and sustained injuries to his left cheek and his skull, and tore his T-shirt. 3 . The applicant was taken to a police station where, because of the deterioration in his condition, a doctor was called for him. He was subsequently transferred to a temporary detention centre, where he underwent a visual examination. According to the report of the examination, the applicant had excoriations in the area of the skull, right eyebrow, left cheek and ear. He also had bruises across both wrists. As was indicated in the report, he claimed that the two police officers, who had effected his arrest, had physically and verbally assaulted him. On 1 September 2014 the Tbilisi City Court convicted the applicant of disobeying the lawful orders of law enforcement officers and imposed a fine of 600 Georgian laris. The decision was confirmed by the Tbilisi Court of Appeal on 30 September 2014. 5 . On 2 September 2014 the applicant, during an interview with a prosecutor, reiterated his allegations of having experienced physical and verbal abuse by both police officers. On the same date he underwent, at his own request, a medical examination which established that he had numerous bruises, haematomas and lesions on his head and body. He further complained of pain in the right part of his chest and right armpit, noting that it intensified when he breathed and moved, and of suffering from numbness in both of his forearms. On 10 September 2014 an X-ray examination showed that his fifth and seventh ribs were broken. The final report, issued by the National Forensic Bureau on 26 September 2014, concluded that the multiple injuries had been caused by a blunt object; they were of a less serious nature and could have been inflicted on the date of the incident. 6 . On 24 October 2014 the General Inspection Department of the Ministry of the Interior (“the MIA”), acting on a complaint by the applicant of 4 September 2014, issued a reprimand with respect to both police officers on account of verbally (both officers) and physically (G.B.) assaulting the applicant. On 7 November 2014 an investigation was opened into the applicant’s allegations under Article 333 of the Criminal Code (exceeding official authority). In his interview of 11 November 2014, the applicant described in detail the circumstances of his arrest and his alleged ill-treatment. The applicant’s request to reclassify the alleged acts as inhuman and degrading treatment (Article 144 3 of the Criminal Code) was rejected, as were several other of his procedural requests. On 1 December 2015 the applicant was informed of a decision of 24 November 2015 granting him victim status. He was also informed that G.had been charged with exceeding official authority on account of punching him in the head, and that no charges were being pressed concerning his beating by both officers. On 18 October 2016 the Tbilisi City Court convicted G.as charged on account of punching the applicant in the head. He was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment as the main sentence, and to one year and six months’ deprivation of the right to hold an official position as an ancillary sentence. On 28 December 2016 a plea bargain agreement, concluded between G.and the prosecutor’s office, was confirmed by the Tbilisi Court of Appeal, and G.’s prison sentence was replaced by a suspended prison term of five years. 9 . In August 2015 the applicant brought a civil claim against the MIA, with the police officers acting as third parties, claiming compensation for non-pecuniary damage for unlawful deprivation of liberty and infliction of damage to his health. On 16 May 2018 the Tbilisi City Court found that the applicant had suffered damage to his health during his administrative arrest and awarded him 2,000 Georgian laris (about 660 euros) in respect of non ‑ pecuniary damage. Without drawing any explicit conclusion concerning the link between the force used by the police officers and the applicant’s fractured ribs, the court noted that although the results of the applicant’s X ‑ ray examination had been delayed, the applicant had already complained about pain and breathing difficulties on 2 September 2014, and moreover he had acted diligently in requesting a comprehensive medical examination at the earliest opportunity after his release. That decision was confirmed by the Tbilisi Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of <COUNTRY> on 16 April and 10 September 2019 respectively. | Georgia | [
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
79,383 | 2 | The case concerns the effectiveness of domestic proceedings concerning the applicant’s allegations under Article 2 of the Convention that her child had died as a result of medical negligence. On 14 March 2008 at 30 a.the applicant was admitted to hospital for a planned labour induction. On 15 March at 48 p.the child was delivered by caesarean section. On 16 March at 2 a.he died of meconium aspiration syndrome. On 18 August 2008 the Health Inspectorate found deficiencies in the medical care provided to the applicant and her child. On 18 December 2008 criminal proceedings were instituted and two expert reports were commissioned. On 3 March 2010 the two doctors who during their shifts had overseen the delivery – S.G. and – were declared suspects. On 7 June 2010 they were charged with medical negligence that had caused the child’s death. On 30 June 2010 the case was sent for trial. In the first round of proceedings, on 26 October 2010 the first-instance court started hearing the case. Hearings were set at intervals between three and five months. On 29 July 2011 a third expert report was commissioned at the request by the prosecution since they considered that the second report was contradictory. On 23 March 2012 the prosecution withdrew charges against the doctors, finding that in view of the third expert report and other case material there was no causal connection between the medical negligence and the death of the applicant’s child. On 26 March 2012 the first-instance court terminated proceedings. On 7 August 2012 the appellate court quashed that decision and sent the case back to the first-instance court. It held that the third expert report was inadmissible on account of several procedural deficiencies. In the second round of proceedings, the first hearing was scheduled for 12 December 2012. Subsequent hearings were set at intervals between ten days and five months; the applicant caused a delay of no more than one month. On 12 February 2015 the first-instance court convicted the doctors of medical negligence that had caused the child’s death and imposed a sentence of imprisonment, in reliance on the first and second expert reports. On 27 April 2017 the appellate court, having set hearings at intervals between one and five months (the applicant caused a delay of no more than one month), upheld their conviction but imposed a fine. On 14 December 2017 the Supreme Court decided to examine the case orally and held a hearing on 14 June 2018. On that date it quashed the judgments of 12 February 2015 and 27 April 2017 and the appellate court’s decision of 7 August 2012 and sent the case back to the appellate court. The Supreme Court found that the decision of 7 August 2012 had breached the division of competences between the prosecution and the court. The appellate court had not had jurisdiction to reassess the evidence on which the withdrawal of charges had been based or to question it. Accordingly, the renewal of the criminal proceedings and the subsequent convictions had been unlawful. In the third round of proceedings, on 3 September 2018 the appellate court upheld the first-instance court’s decision of 26 March 2012 whereby the criminal proceedings against the doctors had been terminated. Its decision was upheld by the Supreme Court on 23 April 2019. | [
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
|
83,193 | 5 | The case concerns the applicant’s asylum detention. 2 . On 30 December 2018 the applicant arrived in <COUNTRY> by flight. On the same day, criminal proceedings were instituted against her concerning her use of a forged passport and she was placed in a pre-trial detention. During an interview with the airport police she provided accurate details on her identity. She maintained that she had been coerced to travel by her husband, and that she wished to return to <COUNTRY>. On 28 January 2019 the Budapest XVIII and XIX District Court convicted her of public deed forgery and sentenced her to a two-year long entry ban. 3 . On the same day, she was handed over to the Asylum and Immigration Office (“the IAO”). On 29 January 2019 the IAO held an interview during which the applicant explained that her family forced her into marriage as a minor. She also stated that she had travelled to <COUNTRY> under the coercion of her family and applied for asylum there. In <COUNTRY> she informed the UNHCR about her forthcoming involuntary travel and was advised by the UNHCR that she should request help from the police upon reaching <COUNTRY>. She stated that since arriving in <COUNTRY> she had had no connection with her family. On the basis of her statement and the record found in EURODAC, the IAO initiated her transfer to <COUNTRY> in accordance with the Dublin III Regulation and at the same time suspended the pending immigration proceedings. 4 . Following the interview (still on 29 January 2019) the IAO ordered the applicant’s asylum detention relying on section 31/A (1a) of Act no. LXXX of 2007 on Asylum on account of the pending Dublin transfer. The IAO found that less restrictive measures ensuring her availability during the procedure could not be applied. On 31 January 2019, upon the IAO’s request, the applicant filled in a questionnaire aiming at the early recognition of persons having suffered traumatic experiences. Based on the results she was considered to be at medium risk of traumatization. On 1 February 2019 the Nyírbátor District Court prolonged the applicant’s detention. The court found, referring to the IAO’s decision (see paragraph 4 above), that less restrictive measures ensuring her availability during the procedure could not be applied. On 11 March 2019 the IAO’s Dublin Coordination Department established that <COUNTRY> is responsible for the conduct of the applicant’s asylum proceedings. The next day, that is on 12 March 2019, the applicant requested asylum, referring to her fear of her husband and her family. She remained detained. On 27 March 2019 the IAO held an asylum interview and ordered her asylum detention referring to Section 31/A (1) (c) of the Asylum Act (risk of absconding) and noting that she had stated that she would rather return to <COUNTRY>. On 29 March 2019 the Nyírbátor District Court held a hearing concerning the applicant’s detention. The applicant stated that she was willing to stay in <COUNTRY> as she had nowhere to go on account of the refusal of <COUNTRY> to take her in. Furthermore, she alleged to have cooperated with the authorities and said that she did not want to remain in detention. Her legal representative argued that she was a victim of human trafficking. The Nyírbátor District Court prolonged her detention finding that less restrictive measures were not applicable as she did not speak the language, she had no travel document and connections in the country and there was a possibility that her relatives would make her leave <COUNTRY> illegally again. On 12 April 2019 the Counter-Terrorism Centre (“the CTC”) issued its opinion establishing that the stay of the applicant in the territory of <COUNTRY> poses a threat to national security. 10 . On 23 May 2019 the Nyírbátor District Court again prolonged the applicant’s asylum detention on the basis of Section 31/A (1) (c) and (d) of Asylum Act referring to the risk of absconding and the national security threat with reference to the CTC’s opinion. As to the risk of absconding, it noted that the applicant had stated that if her asylum application were not determined within six months she would rather return to <COUNTRY>. 11 . On 10 July 2019 the IAO rejected the asylum request and noted that her expulsion was to be executed on the basis of the criminal judgment (see paragraph 2 above). In the meantime, on 25 June 2019, on the inquiry of the IAO the CTC established that her statements might be credible but found that the applicant was not a victim of human trafficking because she had consented to be trafficked. 12 . On 27 November 2019 the Budapest Administrative and Labour Court quashed the IAO’s decision (see paragraph 11 above) and remitted the case for re-examination. The court judgment noted that the applicant’s uncle had inquired in person with the IAO on 29 and 30 January 2019 about the applicant’s whereabout and the progress of her case, which had been denied by the IAO due to the applicant’s fear and opposition to sharing this information. In the meantime, on 24 July 2019, the IAO designated the transit zone in Tompa as her place of accommodation since the duration of her asylum detention reached the statutory maximum of six months. The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention that her asylum detention had been arbitrary and that no alternatives to her detention had been genuinely considered by the domestic authorities despite her vulnerability. | Greece, Hungary | [
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
79,384 | P1-1 | The case concerns the applicant’s complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that equipment belonging to her and situated on municipal land had been unlawfully dismantled, for which she had been unable to obtain compensation. The applicant, a private entrepreneur, owned and operated three kiosks (temporary structures at which goods were sold) situated on municipal land in three locations in Cherkasy. 3 . The municipal authorities considered that her rights to use the land had expired. The applicant appealed against that assessment to the Cherkasy Regional Commercial Court, which issued preliminary injunctions on 14 August 2008 and 19 May 2009 prohibiting the municipal authorities from dismantling the equipment. On 31 March 2010, in a final decision, the court declared the authorities’ assessment unlawful and ruled that the applicant continued to have the right to rent the land in question. 4 . On 28 April 2009 the city’s executive committee ordered the municipal working group that dealt with unlawful structures to proceed with the removal of the applicant’s equipment. A member of the group, Mr K., the director of a municipal company, was directed to provide equipment for the dismantling operation and to arrange for the storage of the dismantled equipment. On 28 May 2009, despite the commercial court’s interim injunction (see paragraph 3 above), the municipal working group dismantled the applicant’s equipment and its contents (kiosks, cash registers, stock of goods for sale) and put them in storage. The applicant alleged that the equipment had been damaged in the dismantling process and had become unusable as a result, and the stocks had been lost. 6 . On 21 September 2010 the Cherkasy Sosnivsky District Court, in a final decision, declared the executive committee’s decision of 28 April 2009 (see paragraph 4 above) unlawful. It referred, in particular, to the fact that the decision had been taken in disregard of the commercial court’s injunctions (see paragraph 3 above). The applicant lodged a criminal complaint accusing the city officials of abuse of public office and other crimes. K. was eventually charged with criminal dereliction of duty in that connection. The applicant lodged a civil claim for damages within the framework of those proceedings against K. and the State Treasury. On 4 October 2013 K. was found guilty but released from serving his sentence. The civil claim was dismissed, the court pointing out that it could be resubmitted in separate civil proceedings. Subsequently the conviction was quashed and the case was remitted for further investigation, most recently on 16 February 2016. There is no information about further developments in those proceedings. The applicant sued the city council and the city executive committee in the administrative courts, seeking a declaration that their actions in removing her equipment had been unlawful and also damages. On 22 January 2014 the High Administrative Court upheld the lower courts’ decisions rejecting the claim. The courts reasoned in particular that it would be appropriate for the applicant to seek compensation within the framework of the criminal proceedings against K. | [
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
|
78,959 | 3 | The present case concerns the applicant’s complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention about his handcuffing in a courtroom and, under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention, about a breach of his defence rights in the criminal proceedings against him. 2006 Criminal proceedings against the applicant and HIS CONVICTION On 3 December 2001 the dead body of Mr was found, with a blood ‑ stained axe lying beside it. A criminal investigation was initiated in respect of premeditated murder. 3 . On 20 February 2006 the police reported to the investigator at Yagotyn district prosecutor’s office (Kyiv Region), who had been in charge of that criminal case, that the applicant had been involved in ’s murder, as fingerprints discovered at the crime scene belonged to the applicant. 4 . On 14 March 2006 the applicant, who was at the time serving a fixed ‑ term prison sentence for several counts of premeditated murder, confessed in writing that he had hit on the head with the back of an axe, and provided details. He submitted his confession to a prison officer. He confirmed his statement on 23 March 2006 when questioned as a witness in the absence of a lawyer, and during the following investigation and trial before the Kyiv Regional Court of Appeal, in the presence of a legal aid lawyer who had been appointed on 23 June 2006 to represent him. In doing so, he submitted that he had confessed of his own free will. On 7 November 2006 the Kyiv Regional Court of Appeal, sitting as a first-instance court, found the applicant guilty of premeditated murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment. It relied, among other evidence, on the applicant’s confession of 14 March 2006 and his witness statement of 23 March 2006 noting that the confession had been made voluntarily. 6 . In his cassation appeal the applicant mainly challenged the severity of his sentence. He insisted that he had murdered unintentionally and requested that his confession, which he had made of his own free will, and his cooperation with the investigating authorities and the court, be taken into account. 7 . On 22 February 2007 the Supreme Court, following a hearing in which the applicant was unrepresented, upheld his conviction. Re-examination of the applicant’s CRIMINAL case 8 . On 20 December 2011 the European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”) delivered a judgment in the applicant’s first case (see Maksimenko <COUNTRY> , no. 39488/07), in which it found a violation of on account of the absence of legal assistance in the proceedings before the Supreme Court (see paragraph 7 above). On 27 November 2012 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court (the HSCU) allowed the applicant’s application for the reopening of his case in the light of the 2011 judgment of the Court (see paragraph 8 above). It quashed the Supreme Court’s decision of 22 February 2007 and ordered a new cassation review of the applicant’s case. 10 . On 14 February 2013 the HSCU, in the presence of the applicant and his lawyer, Mr Tarakhkalo, upheld the applicant’s conviction, slightly amending the reasoning on the basis of which the life sentence had to be imposed. It was suggested in the HSCU’s judgment that the applicant did not deny having murdered but wished L’s provocative behaviour and the applicant’s statement of confession to be taken into account when the court decided on the sentence. The HSCU did not address in its judgment a further complaint, raised by the applicant’s lawyer in a form of an addendum to the applicant’s cassation appeal of 2006 and reiterated in the hearing, concerning the lack of access to a lawyer at the initial stage of the investigation in 2006. The HSCU apparently considered that that complaint had been lodged in a procedurally incorrect way. 11 . According to the applicant, during the hearing before the HSCU on 14 February 2013 he was placed in a glass cabin where he remained handcuffed throughout the trial, whereas defendants in other cases had not been handcuffed. In reply to a complaint raised in this respect by the applicant’s lawyer on 20 May 2013, the head of the relevant convoy unit noted, in general way, that in accordance with the relevant regulations, persons sentenced to life imprisonment had to be handcuffed during the delivery of the verdict. | Ukraine | [
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
77,351 | P7-2 | The case concerns the applicant’s complaint under Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 that she was denied the right of appeal in administrative offence proceedings. On 16 May 2013 a judge of the Kyiv Shevchenkivskyy District Court found the applicant guilty of petty hooliganism (an administrative offence) and sentenced her to five days’ administrative detention. It was noted in the ruling that it could be appealed within ten days after its pronouncement, whereas the sentence was subject to immediate enforcement. The applicant was immediately placed in detention. She lodged an appeal and requested, without success, that the enforcement of her sentence be suspended pending the examination of her appeal. On 21 May 2013 the applicant was released having served the administrative detention in full. On 11 June 2013 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal returned her appeal without examination. It held that it was competent to examine appeals only in respect of local courts’ rulings which had not entered into force, whereas the ruling in the applicant’s case had entered into force and had been subject to enforcement immediately after its pronouncement. Accordingly, there were no legal grounds for appellate review. | [
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0
] |
|
77,352 | P1-3 | The case concerns the allegedly unlawful and arbitrary invalidation of the election results in the constituency, in which the applicant had initially been registered as the winner (Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention). The applicant ran as a self-nominated candidate for the parliamentary elections of 28 October 2012 in single-seat constituency no. 133. The Central Election Commission (“the CEC”), which did not receive any complaints regarding that constituency, registered him as the winner (with 5,160 votes ahead) and he started performing his functions as a Member of Parliament (“MP”) in December 2012. However, following a complaint from another MP to the prosecution authorities in July 2013 that there had been some mass ‑ media reports of election-related irregularities in constituency no. 133, a criminal investigation was carried out. Relying on expert examinations of ballots, the Ministry of the Interior informed the CEC that 6,038 ballots with votes for the applicant had in fact been falsified. Namely, it appeared that initially marks had been made in front of other candidates’ names, but they had been erased and a new mark had been put in front of the applicant’s name. On 30 August 2013 the CEC replied to the investigator that there was nothing it could do. On the same date three individuals (including the MP who had raised the complaint to the prosecution authorities) brought an administrative claim against the CEC seeking, in particular, invalidation of the election results in constituency no. 133 and divesting the applicant of his MP mandate. The applicant who was involved in the proceedings as a third party contested the above claim. In addition to pointing out certain inconsistencies in the investigation findings, he submitted that the ostensibly falsified ballots in his favour might have been tampered with during the investigation-related inspection: the erased marks in front of other candidates’ names could have been put and erased post-factum to undermine the ballots’ validity. On 12 September 2013 the Higher Administrative Court allowed the claim in part. It invalidated the election results in constituency no. 133, quashed the applicant’s registration as the elected MP and held that it was impossible to establish the election results in that constituency. It also noted that the applicant’s references to certain inconsistencies did not prove that the ballots had not been falsified. On 20 September 2013 the applicant was divested of his parliamentary mandate. | [
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
|
82,071 | 3 | The application concerns the living conditions of the applicant, a woman who was pregnant at the time of lodging her application with the Court. She arrived in Samos on 27 November 2019 and resided at the Samos Reception and Identification Centre (“the Samos RIC”) until 20 March 2020. On 11 February 2020 she lodged a request for an interim measure with the Court, which was granted. On 28 February 2020 she applied for international protection. On 20 March 2020 the applicant was moved to a guesthouse on the island of Samos and on 1 April 2020 she was included in a housing programme and transferred, while pregnant, to an apartment on the mainland. On 26 April 2020 she gave birth to her child. The applicant complained of her living conditions under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. THE APPLICANT’S VERSION AS TO THE LIVING CONDITIONS IN THE SAMOS RIC The applicant submitted, in particular, that upon her arrival she had been about five months pregnant. She alleged that she had been suffering from tuberculosis, gestational diabetes, hypertension and anaemia. At first she had not been provided with any housing and had been living in a shared tent outside the Samos RIC, owing to which she had had to use the sanitary facilities inside one of the containers. According to her submissions, on or around 4 March 2020 she had been placed in an overcrowded container within the RIC where there had been no heating. She had been asked to share a single bed with another pregnant woman so she had had no choice but to sleep on the floor. The sanitary facilities had been in a precarious hygienic condition as the toilets were used by numerous residents other than those of the container. As regards her access to healthcare, the applicant submitted that, because she was 40 years old, had previously given birth to three children, and the baby’s large size, her pregnancy was considered high-risk. The applicant had been examined only briefly by the camp doctor and midwife on one occasion prior to being referred to Samos hospital. She visited the hospital on 18 December 2019 and 16 January 2020 but had not received followed-up examinations by the hospital gynaecologist because she had been refused access owing to a suspected tuberculosis infection. She had not been provided with the required prenatal healthcare. The applicant argued that she had been in need of a reception environment that accommodated her particular needs as a pregnant woman, such as adequate accommodation, sanitary facilities and nutrition. THE GOVERNMENT’S VERSION AS TO THE LIVING CONDITIONS IN THE SAMOS RIC The Government submitted that the Samos RIC was an open accommodation structure. Temporary shelters had been constructed by the RIC’s residents near the area because of overpopulation. At the time of the applicant’s entry and registration the RIC’s population had been 7,453, although its official capacity had been 648 beds. The population had had free access to the medical and psychosocial support division located in the Samos RIC. Within the RIC there had been 35 communal toilets, and the residents had been offered food and water, as well as a monetary allowance. The applicant had arrived on 27 November 2019 and on the same date she had gone through identification and registration procedures. She had been placed in a container (C3.3B) where the conditions had been significantly better than those in the tents. On 23 February 2020 the authorities had requested from the UNHCR the applicant’s transfer to an apartment in Samos; the request had not been answered. On 18 March 2020 they had reiterated the request. The Government noted that at the time of the events in question <COUNTRY> had been confronted with a new migration crisis. The reception system had been under pressure, as it had become difficult to satisfy the particular needs of a large number of people. However, the applicant had, throughout her stay, received adequate meals and water, and her medical screening had taken place promptly. They further argued that the applicant had not sustained any kind of abuse during the short period of time she had resided in the RIC, even if her reception and living conditions had not been fully in line with the reception provisions owing to the massive number of arrivals in that period. The RIC’s capacity had been exceeded in the period under consideration and it had been impossible to place the applicant directly in any of the centre’s accommodation spaces. However, the applicant’s housing conditions had become adequate within less than four months. THE THIRD-PARTY INTERVENERS The third-party interveners, namely the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Defence for Children International-<COUNTRY>, submitted their observations regarding the living conditions in the RIC as follows. According to the UNHCR, the situation had been constantly characterised by overcrowding and inadequate services in respect of shelter, medical support, hygiene and sanitation. In September 2019 approximately 85 tents had been set up in the forest next to the RIC, where lack of access to electricity and washing facilities had been serious challenges for the people living there. Heavy rainfall had led to flooding in the tents and makeshift shelters. In early November 2019, 879 people had been living in the RIC containers while 5,353 people had been living in tents and makeshift shelters. Of those, 2,300 had been staying in woodland outside the RIC’s official perimeter. Sanitation facilities had been lacking in all the extended areas while those in the RIC had not been fully functioning. There had been no designated areas for people with specific needs. Women in advanced stages of pregnancy or with high-risk pregnancies had been living in precarious and unhygienic conditions in tents. The UNHCR concluded that the reception conditions in the Samos RIC, as well as in the informal settlement area, were at variance with the right to an adequate standard of living. According to Defence for Children International-<COUNTRY>, the living conditions of pregnant women and children had been incompatible with human dignity. REPORTS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN THE SAMOS RIC The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights As regards the situation in the RIC, on 31 October 2019 the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović, at the end of a five-day visit to <COUNTRY>, stated as follows: “The situation of migrants, including asylum seekers, in the Greek Aegean islands has dramatically worsened over the past 12 months ... There is a desperate lack of medical care and sanitation in the vastly overcrowded camps I have visited. People queue for hours to get food and to go to bathrooms, when these are available. On Samos, families are chipping away at rocks to make some space on steep hillsides to set up their makeshift shelters, often made from trees they cut themselves. This no longer has anything to do with the reception of asylum seekers. This has become a struggle for survival ... The authorities must boost the capacities of local hospitals, set up ad hoc medical facilities in the reception camps and increase the number of health care professionals in the islands in order to provide migrants and local residents with the medical care they are entitled to. Other practical measures with an immediate impact, such as improving the distribution of food and providing more washing facilities and toilets, can and must be taken”. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe In Resolution 2280 (2019), the Assembly, inter alia , welcomed the efforts of the Greek authorities to transfer all identified vulnerable people from the island centres to the mainland of <COUNTRY>. Nevertheless, the Assembly mentioned that the situation at the centres of Moria, Lesbos and Vathy (Samos), remained a matter of concern as large numbers of people were housed in tents, facing inadequate sanitary installations, insufficient food distribution, lack of health services and poor security, especially at night. It was noted that levels of violence and crime inside the centres were high. The Greek National Commission for Human Rights (GNCHR) 20 . During the on-site visit carried out by the GNCHR on 20 and 21 January 2020 at the Vathy RIC in Samos and the makeshift camp which surrounded it, the GNCHR delegation concluded that the reception system had collapsed. According to the report on the human rights situation of migrants at the borders by the GNCHR and the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI), published in May 2021, the Samos RIC was designed to host up to 648 people, but in January 2020 the number of people in the centre or its surroundings (containers, tents and makeshift shacks) had reached 7,208. Applicants for international protection had been obliged to live in dire or even undignified living conditions during the processing of their applications for international protection, which could take up to several months or even years. The most alarming finding was the lack of control by the authorities over a large part of the informal camp outside the RIC where security incidents frequently occurred, such as violent confrontations leading to injuries between rival communities, extortion by traffickers or other organised groups, arson because of trespassing on forest land or other reasons, rapes of women and minors, and incidents of domestic violence and human trafficking. 21 . The GNCHR noted a big gap in the provision of health and psychological services due to a lack of staff and appropriate services such as interpretation and a shortage of medicine. As a result, the population of the camp was often affected by diseases and other health problems. According to the information collected during the GNCHR’s monitoring visit, 330 unaccompanied children were registered by the Vathy RIC; they were found to be living in unsuitable conditions and often sleeping outdoors. | Greece, Netherlands | [
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
78,895 | 3 | The present case concerns allegations, under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention, that the applicant was tortured by the police, his complaint was not properly investigated and no effective remedies were available in respect of that complaint. On 6 April 2010 the applicant complained to the Ministry of the Interior, stating that from about 2 p.until 7 p.on the previous day he had been arbitrarily detained by three police officers (subsequently identified as B., P. and Sh.) who had tortured him in the Frunzenskyi district police station in Kharkiv to coerce him into giving self-incriminating statements and that they had subsequently taken him to see expert S., who had issued a false report indicating that he had no injuries. Following the applicant’s complaints, forensic assessments were ordered and the experts concluded (reports of 18 May 2010 and 9 December 2013) that on or around 5 April 2010 he had sustained the following injuries classified as “minor”: cerebral trauma, bruising (on the face, head, neck, chest, lumbar area, arms and knee joints); abrasions on arms; and a subcapsular kidney haematoma. On 7 June 2010 the Kharkiv regional prosecutor’s office instituted criminal proceedings, within the context of which on 17 February 2011 officers Sh. and P. were arrested and remanded in custody. As regards officer B., criminal proceedings against him were initiated on 15 January 2013 and, after having been terminated on several occasions and reopened following appeals by the applicant, were eventually closed on 7 October 2013 for want of any evidence that he had committed an offence. Further appeals by the applicant against that decision were dismissed by the Frunzenskyi District Court and the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal on 11 October and 4 November 2013 respectively. In the meantime, on 29 August 2011 officers P. and Sh. were committed for trial at the Leninskyi District Court in Kharkiv. As appears from the summary made by that court, the indictment was based on the following presentation of facts: at about 2 p.on 5 April 2010, having allegedly obtained unofficial operational information that the applicant had committed criminal acts, Sh., accompanied by B., dragged the applicant out of a car, handcuffed him and took him to the police station. The officers kept the applicant handcuffed there until about 7 p.without regularising his presence at the police station. During that period, Sh., subsequently joined by P., tried to coerce the applicant into giving self-incriminating statements. The applicant refused and Sh. grabbed him by his head and threw him to the floor. P. punched him in the left kidney and hit him on the face, stomach, neck and back. On several occasions the applicant, who remained handcuffed, lost consciousness. It also appears from the court’s summary that B. was present during the questioning. On 20 February 2014 the court found that the facts as established in the indictment had been corroborated by sufficient evidence and that P. and Sh. had committed an offence under Article 365 § 2 of the Criminal Code. The provision described abuse of authority by a law-enforcement officer as involving “violence ... [and the] application of ... special means or acts [which were] painful or degrading for the victim, [but] lacking any elements of torture”. The court sentenced the officers to seven years and six months’ imprisonment, deprived them of their ranks as officers, and prohibited them, for a period of three years, from occupying posts as law-enforcement officers. The Leninskyi District Court also allowed in part a civil claim lodged by the applicant, compensating his medical treatment costs in so far as they were found to be substantiated, and awarded him 20,000 Ukrainian hryvnias in respect of non-pecuniary damage. On 8 July 2014 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal, reviewing the case on appeal by the parties, decided that P. and Sh. (still detained on remand) could be released from further detention under the Amnesty Act of 2014, in particular because they had already served more than one-quarter of their prison sentence and because their offences had not involved “violence [which posed] a danger to life and health.” The court also reversed the prohibition on their occupying posts in law-enforcement bodies. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal, arguing in particular that, regard being had to the nature of the offences, amnesty laws could not be applied. He also complained that the courts had not obliged the prosecution to further investigate B.’s role in the events in question, although they had established that he had participated in them and that expert S., who had issued a statement falsely indicating, at the request of police officers, that the applicant had no injuries upon his release, should have also been criminally prosecuted. On 26 September 2014 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court found that the applicant had no standing to lodge that complaint. | [
0,
0,
0,
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
] |
End of preview. Expand
in Dataset Viewer.
European Court of Human Rights Dataset
This dataset collects roughly 15,000 cases from the European Court of Human Rights' database - HUDOC.
It utilizes regex to scrape through judgment facts and then applies Large Language Models (LLMs) to obtain the relevant violation(s) of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The dataset contains any violation of the European Court of Human Rights that does not pertain to the Court's functioning. Instead, the violations included deal exclusively with substantive or procedural rights.
This dataset also attempts to remove paragraph numbering wherever possible to provide cleaner text for analysis.
Columns
- id: Unique ID labels.
- judgment_facts: The text between the "Facts" heading and the next relevant heading that indicates the end of the facts section, which is variable.
- replaced_countries: A list of countries that have been replaced in the original text by
<COUNTRY>. - one_hot_labels: The one-hot encoded labels for the 30 violations`.
Purpose
The purpose of this dataset is to assist in multilabel classification.
Label to ECtHR Article Index
{'P1': 0, 'P4': 1, 'P6': 2, 'P7': 3, '1': 4, '2': 5, '3': 6, '4': 7, '5': 8, '6': 9, '7': 10, '8': 11, '9': 12, '10': 13, '11': 14, '12': 15, '13': 16, '14': 17, '15': 18, '18': 19, '25': 20, '34': 21, '37': 22, '38': 23, '39': 24, '41': 25, '44': 26, '46': 27, '50': 28, '': 29}
- Downloads last month
- 1