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Harvard College 
Library 


FROM THE FUND GIVEN BY 
Stephen Salisbury 
Class of 1817 


OF WORCESTER, MASSACHUSETTS 


For Greek and Latin Literature 





THE 


RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE. 








Cambridge : 
PRINTED BY C. J. CLAY, M.A. 
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS. 


a) | 
THE ° 


OF ARISTOTLE 


RH ETORIC, y 


WITH A 


COMMENTARY 


BY THE LATE 


EDWARD MEREDITH COPE, M.A. 


FORMERLY SENIOR FELLOW AND TUTOR OF TRINITY COLLEGE ; 


REVISED AND EDITED FOR 
THE SYNDICS OF THE UNIVERSITY PRESS 


BY 


JOHN EDWIN SANDYS, M.A. 


FELLOW AND TUTOR OF ST JOHN’S COLLEGE, 
AND PUBLIC ORATOR IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE. 


VOLUME I. 


© eambrige: 
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS. 


-_-——— - 


Zonton: CAMBRIDGE WAREHOUSE, 17, PATERNOSTER Row. 
GCambrisge: DEIGHTON, BELL, AND CO. 


1877- 








c\. 
y) 
r™N 


Gale, 46s 


HARVARD COLLEGE LIBRARY 


1d Cond 


(E57, AES o 
Pe : 
a “? ae 7 ce . 





CONTENTS OF VOLUME 


EDITOR’S PREFACE . 


EDWARD MEREDITH COPE, 
A biographical notice by the Rev. H. A. F. Munro 


TEXT AND COMMENTARY, Book I. 


APPENDIX (A) ON A II § 17, 


oropy7, Epws, ideiy, dyanay 


APPENDIX (B) ON A 12 § 22, dOoveiaOat. 


On an irregular formation of the Greek passive verb . 


APPENDIX (C) ON A 15 § 23. 


On et ov... 


PAGES 
vil—xi 


xili—xx 


I—291 


292— 296 


297—300 


301— 303 


EDITOR’S PREFACE. 


IT is just ten years since the lamented Author of this Com- 
mentary gave to the world of scholars an Jutroduction to 
Artstotle’s Rhetoric, containing, amongst other valuable matter, 
a general outline of the contents of the treatise and para- 
phrases of the more difficult portions. In the preface to that 
book, which is an almost indispensable companion to the 
present edition and renders any special prolegomena to these 
volumes unnecessary, the Author describes the Jxtroduction 
as preparatory to the detailed explanation of the work itself 
in an edition of the Greek text which had been long in 
preparation and was to appear as soon as it could be got 
ready. This promise is now at last fulfilled, under circum- 
stances however in which the pathetic interest naturally at- 
tending the publication of any posthumous work like the 
present, is in this particular instance, if I may’ judge of the 
feelings of others by my own, intensified into a sense of 
more than usually deep regret that the labours of a large 
portion of an eminent scholar’s life-time must now see the 
light without the advantage of his own editorial care. 

Mr Cope died in the year 1873, but during the last four 
years of his life his work on the Rhetoric, though it had nearly 
approached completion, unhappily but unavoidably remained 
untouched. He was actively engaged upon it during the 
two years that succeeded the publication of the /utroduction 
in 1867 ;—a year that was also marked by the appearance of 
a long-expected edition of the Rhetoric by Spengcel, which, 

AR. I. b 





viii EDITOR’S. PREFACE. 


by the critical acumen and maturity of judgment generally 
displayed in its pages, and in particular by its wealth of 
illustration from the remains of Greek Oratory and the 
technical treatises of the later Greek rhetoricians, proved the 
most important aid to the study of the subject that had 
been published since the time of Victorius. With Spengel’s 
earlier contributions to the criticism of his author, as also 
with those of Brandis and Bonitz and Vahlen and other 
eminent Aristotelian scholars on the continent, Mr Cope was 
of course familiar, as the pages of these volumes abundantly 
testify; but while preparing his own Commentary, he ap- 
pears during the last two years of his active work to have 
only occasionally consulted and quoted Spengel’s edition, 
refraining purposely from incurring any such indebtedness 
as would prevent his own edition remaining a perfectly in- 
dependent work. 
In June, 1874, the year after Mr Cope’s death, his brothers 
took into consideration the desirability of publishing his Com- 
mentary; and, acting under the advice of two distinguished 
members of his own College, Mr Munro and Mr Jebb, did me 
the honour to invite me to undertake its completion and re- 
vision. The manuscript, so far as it was finished, consisted of 
nearly seven hundred closely written pages requiring a cer- 
tain amount of general revision before they could be sent to 
press; and, owing to other engagements, I found it impracti- 
cable to arrange for the printing of the work to commence till 
June, 1875. During the progress of the work through the 
press in the last two years, my duties as reviser have proved 
more laborious than I had anticipated; as even apart from 
the necessity of reading several times over at various stages 
of progress not far from a thousand pages of printed 
matter, I have found it requisite to consult the reader’s 
convenience by rearranging many of the paragraphs, by re- 
casting many of the more complicated sentences, and by 
endeavouring to prevent the sense from being obscured by 


the partiality for parenthesis, which, in this case, happens to | 
be characteristic of the commentator and his author alike. 


In a work of this compass, accidental repetitions of nearly 
identical notes in various parts of the Commentary are almost 
unavoidable, and though I have succeeded in detecting and 


= 
= 


Al 


4 





EDITOR’S PREFACE. ° ix 


striking out some of these repetitions, others still remain 
unremoved. 

It will probably occur to some of those who use this book 
that, in the way of retrenchment of matter and condensation 
of style, something might without disadvantage have been 
done by the original writer; but such correction, I may re- 
mark, was the very thing from which he consciously shrank; 
and as a mere reviser I felt that I had no right to assume 
the responsibility of abridging, still less of rejecting, what 
the writer himself clearly intended to leave standing. In the 
case of verbal alterations, however, which I was morally cer- 
tain would not have been disapproved by the original writer, 
I have used such slight discretion as appeared to fall within 
my province; this kind of revision cannot of course generally 
appear on the surface, but wherever it is practicable any 
additional matter for which I am alone responsible is indi- 
cated by the use of square brackets with or (as the work 
proceeded) without my.initial. Such insertions are generally 
very brief, and often take the form of simple reference to 
important works that have appeared since the Commentary 
was prepared; as it seemed only due to the readers of this 
edition and to the writers of the works in question, that I 
should endeavour to bring it up to date by referring as 
occasion served to books such as Dr Thompson’s edition of 
the Gorgias of Plato (1871); Grote’s Aristotle (1872); Volk- 
mann, adie Rhetorik der -Griechen und Romer, ed. 2, 1874; 
Blass, dte Attische Beredsamkeit, 1868, '74; and Professor 
Jebb's Attic Orators, 1876. In testing the references to other 
parts of Aristotle, I have made frequent use of the great 
Index Aristotelicus of Bonitz, which appeared in 1870, and 
was therefore not available when Mr Cope’s notes were 
written ;—a fact that only increases one’s admiration at the 
wide and minute acquaintance with all the Aristotelian writings 
which he had acquired by his own independent reading. 

In any trifling additions of my own, I have seldom gone 
beyond the briefest annotations, but in the case of the third 
book, which was left in a less finished state, and on which I 
had happened to have lectured on several occasions during 
the last ten years, I felt myself somewhat less restricted; and 
indeed, as Mr Cope’s manuscript unfortunately comes to an 


b 2 


x EDITOR’S PREFACE. 


abrupt conclusion in the course of Chapter XVII of that 
book, I was compelled, for the convenience of those who usc 
this edition and in accordance with the wishes of Mr Cope’s 
representatives and the Syndics of the University Press, to 
endeavour to supply the deficiency in the three concluding 
Chapters by writing the notes that occupy the last twenty 
pages of the Commentary. 

In so doing, I have tried to follow the general plan of 
Mr Cope’s own work, and in particular have paid attention to 
such slight indications of his intended treatment of that por- 
tion as I could glean from the memoranda in the margin of 
his own copy of Bekker’s Oxford text of 1837. This volume 
and an interleaved copy of earlier date, and of somewhat less 
value for this purpose, were kindly placed at my disposal by 
the authorities of Trinity College, and, as they contain part of 
the first rough material for the Commentary, they have proved 
of some use in verifying doubtful references and also in ascer- 
taining Mr Cope’s intentions with regard to the text on points 
of detail such as punctuation and various readings, But, hold- 
ing as he did that an editor's main duty was explanation 
in its widest sense and accordingly devoting himself mainly 
to questions of exegesis, to elucidation of subject matter, to 
illustration of verbal expression, and to matters of grammatical 
and lexicographical interest, he was content on the whole to 
accept the text as he found it in the earlier editions with 
which he was familiar. Under these circumstances, in the 
absence of any intention on his part to make an independent 
recension of the text, I have thought it best to adopt as the 
text of the present Commentary the last reprint (1873) of 
Bekker’s third edition (octavo, 1859); and instead of impair- 
ing the integrity of that text by altering it here and there 
to suit what I gathered to be Mr Cope’s intentions, I have 
briefly indicated the instances in which the evidence of his 
translation or notes, or again the memoranda in his own 
copy of the Rhetoric already mentioned, pointed clearly to 
some other reading as the one which he deliberately pre- 
ferred to that of Bekker’s third edition, or in which he was 
at any rate content to acquiesce. In the margin, beside the 
references to Book, Chapter and Section at the top of each 
page, is marked the beginning of each page of Bekker’s last 











t 


EDITOR’S PREFACE. x1 


octavo edition, and also of that published in quarto in 1831: 
the former will, it is trusted, make this work easy to refer to 
side by side with the plain text in ordinary use; the latter, 
though it involves a cumbersome method of notation, is 
worth recording, as it is the mode of reference adopted in 
the /udex Aristotelicus, in Spengel’s edition, and often else- 
where. 

In an Appendix to the third volume, I have added Mr 
Shilleto’s Adversaria on the Rhetoric, which I have tran- 
scribed almost exclusively from one of his two copies of the 
book, lately acquired (with a selection of his other books) by 
the Syndicate of the University Library. I have also con- 
structed what I hope may be found to be a fairly comprehen- 
sive Greek index to the text and notes; and to this I have 
subjoined a supplementary index to the notes and subject 
matter, including amongst other miscellaneous items, almost 
all the passages in the rhetorical writings of Cicero and 
Quintilian referred to in the Commentary; the passages of 
Homer and other authors quoted in the text, and the illus- 
trations from Shakespeare in the notes, and also (under the 
head of ‘lexicographical notes’) a series of references to Mr 
Cope’s incidental contributions to Greek lexicography. In 
the transcription of both these indexes for the press, I have 
had much assistance from my brother, James Stuart Sandys, 
one of the undergraduates of St John’s College. 


I cannot close these few prefatory explanations of what 

I have attempted to do in discharging however imperfectly 
the editorial duty with which it has been my privilege to be 
entrusted, without recording the fact that Mr Cope (as I am 
assured by his surviving brother) fully intended, had he lived 
to see his work through the press, to dedicate it to one of 
his most intimate friends, Mr Munro. The latter, however, 
has kindly supplied a short biographical notice by which I 
am glad to feel that he will be as inseparably associated 
with the crowning work of his friend’s career as if it had 
appeared inscribed by that friend himself with the honoured 
name of the Editor of Lucretius. 
: ) B.S: 


CAMBRIDGE, 
2 Fuly, 1877. 


3 


TUTPPVUTT 


CORRIGENDA. 


(/n the notes.) 


VoL. I, 


40, line 14, for ‘this apery, this special excellence’, and on p. 49, 
last line, rezd ‘the’ for ‘this’ in all three cases. 

56, line 10, read érardpOwpua. 

76, line 29, read veveunpérwv. 

93, line 1, for ‘in’ read ‘is.’ 


» 505, line 28, read dyxlvaa. 

. 153, line 30, read édcyapylas. 

. 161, line 23, read ‘fortitude.’ 

. 173, line 31, for ‘be’ read ‘ the.’ 

. 190, below text, read pgOuua, 

. 239, line 32, insert (3) before da Adyur. 


VoL. II. 


- §6, note 1, 1. 3, read ‘Gorg. §22 D.' 


VoL. III. 


. 12, line 21, read ‘11 4. 9.’ 
. 30, line 1, for ‘by’ read ‘ at.’ 
. 62, line 19, read ‘ writings. 











EDWARD MEREDITH COPE. 


Many of Cope’s friends having expressed an opinion that it would 
be well if a short memoir of him were prefixed to this post- 
humous work, and his sole surviving brother having written to me 
that he and his nieces would rather leave it in my hands than in 
those of anybody else, I could not hesitate to undertake the task. 

Edward Meredith Cope was born in Birmingham on the 28th of 
July 1818, He was for some time at the Grammar School of Ludlow 
under Mr Hinde, and then for about five years at Shrewsbury, where 
he remained until October 1837, when he commenced residence at 
Trinity College Cambridge. 

During the first years of his Shrewsbury life Dr Butler, late 
Bishop of Lichfield, was Headmaster; for the last year and quarter 
Dr Kennedy. Cope throughout his school career was always first 
or among the first of boys of his own age and standing. For to a 
great natural aptitude for study and scholarship he joined a strong 
will and a determination to use his best efforts to excel in whatever 
was given him to do. Not that he was a bookworm by any means: 
for he enjoyed extremely the society of his frends and loved inno- 
cent recreation in almost any form. Thus though he was not made, 
and never sought, to distinguish himself in any of them, he thoroughly 
enjoyed nearly all the usual games and amusements of the place. 
This taste he retained for years after he took his degree at the 
University, and. Mr Essington, Vicar of Shenstone, and many other 
friends will bear me witness that he was a consistent votary of 
Hockey up to the time when the Great Western Railway extin- 
guished this pleasant game first at Eton and then at Cambridge. 

The last year and quarter of his residence at Shrewsbury was of 
vital importance for Cope’s future career. Greek was the main and 
favourite study of his life; and in the summer of 1836 Greek 
scholarship at Shrewsbury was, if not in comparison with other 
schools of the day, yet absolutely at a very low ebb. Boys were left - 
in great measure to their own natural lights. Now the light of 
nature seems capable in favourable circumstances of doing a good 


XIV 


deal for Latin; but in the case of Greek it fosters often the conceit 
of knowledge, but rarely indeed can impart the knowledge itself. 

When Dr Kennedy came to Shrewsbury in the autumn of 1836, 
he proved himself equal to the task that was before him. Know- 
ledge and method, united with kindness and enthusiasm, effected at 
once a marvellous change; and all who were able and willing to 
learn felt in a few months that they had gotten such an insight into 
the language and such a hold of its true principles and idiom, as 
to render further progress both easy and agreeable. I would appeal 
to those who were high in the school at the time when the change 
in question took place, and ask them whether I have at all over- 
stated the facts of the case; I would refer to Henry Thring and 
John Bather who came next to Cope in the Classical Tripos; to 
Francis Morse and others of the same year with myself, and to 
many others. 

But none was more conscious of what he owed to Dr Kennedy, 
or was more ready to acknowledge it, than Cope himself. The 
judicious training and the well-directed reading of that year and 
quarter had an incalculable effect on his future career as a scholar; 
and, when he went to Cambridge in the October of 1837, he was 
prepared, as few are, to profit by the advantages the place afforded 
for classical study. There during his undergraduate days he led a 
blameless, industrious, and, I believe from what I observed myself 
and what he often told me, a thoroughly contented and happy life, 
enjoying the esteem and friendship of many of his worthiest contem- 
poraries, some of them his old schoolfellows, others new acquaintances 
both in Trinity and in other Colleges, whose names are too numerous 
to mention, All the while his studies were pursued with a constant 
and uniform diligence; for none knew better than he to make a good 
and judiciqus disposition of his time. He became Scholar of his 
College as soon as the statutes permitted him to be a candidate, 
and, after taking his degree in the Mathematical Tripos of January 
1841, he gained, as was generally expected, the first place in the 
Classical. For a year or two after this success he read with a few 
private pupils, though this employment was never very greatly to 
his taste. He was elected Fellow of Trinity in 1842: this Fellow- 
ship he retained till the day of his death. During the summer of 
1843 he resided for some months in Jersey with a few pupils; and 
in the autumn of that year he made a short tour in Normandy, where 
he first imbibed, or first tried to satisfy, that intense love for Conti- 
nental travel which exercised so marked an influence on his future 
tastes and development. 

The moment he had been created Master of Arts at the 
beginning of July 1844, he threw off for a time the trammels of 








XV 


Academical life and on the 4th of that month started for a continu- 
ous tour of more than fourteen months, never setting foot again in 
England before the 11th of September 1845. At the commencement 
of this tour he had for companions two friends, both of them now _ 
dead, James Hemery, Dean of Jersey, and Richard Pike Mate, 
Fellow of Trinity. He always dearly loved and would sacrifice 
much for the companionship of intimate friends in his travels. But 
for the greater part of the time he was moving about by himself. In 
these fourteen months he traversed Switzerland almost from end to 
end, being a good and indefatigable walker; saw Italy thoroughly, 
with its thousand objects of interest, as far South as Naples; made 
a short excursion to Greece in November 1844, seeing Athens well 
and visiting a part of the Peloponnese and landing in Malta and in 
Sicily on his return to Italy. I have before me now a full and 
precise Journal which he kept of the occurrences of every day during 
this 14 months’ peregrination. The whole would make a good- 
sized printed volume. Here we find minutely recorded where he 
slept on each succeeding night; what he ate and drank; how many 
miles he walked each day and the number of hours spent in 
walking them. _ He was passionately fond of mountain scenery, and 
of mediaeval and Italian architecture and art. In this Journal all 
the varying phases of Swiss scenery are described; the buildings, 
the pictures and other works of art of every Italian town, great or 
sniall. 

Cope possessed in a high degree the happy faculty, which does 
not by any means always accompany general power of mind, of 
readily picking up a foreign language by ear and conversation; and 
in the course of this journey he made himself an excellent Italian 
scholar, acquiring such a mastery over the idiom, as is seldom 
possessed by Englishmen who have not resided many years in the 
country. On this and his many subsequent tours he attained to no 
less facility in colloquial French. German seemed to give him more 
trouble, although by continued exertion he gained a sufficient ac- 
quaintance with it too. He never appeared to me to care very 
much for Italian literature, with however the very important ex- 
ception of Dante; nor did the great French classics seem to have 
any very absorbing interest for him. German he made large use of 
for purposes of study and critical research, while at the same time 
Goethe and the other classics of the language were enjoyed for their 
own sakes. 

This first comprehensive tour imbued him with a passion for 
foreign travel, which he indulged without stint until permanent ill- 
health brought it to a close. External circumstances compelled hin 
however to confine and modify it in future years. While he was 


Xvi 


on his travels in 1845, he was offered and accepted an Assistant- 
Tutorship at Trinity, the duties of which formed the main occupation 
of his subsequent life. These duties compelled him to be in 
residence for most of the year between October and June, and 
left only the summer months for travel, a time not the most suit- 
able for some of the countries which he would have most liked 
to see. Palestine for instance and Egypt he never set his foot in; 
Greece he saw only for a few weeks in 1844; nor did he ever get 
again to Rome or Naples after his first visit. Between June and 
October however he continued to be a most indefatigable traveller, 
confining himself almost entirely to a few favoured lands, first and 
foremost his first loves, Switzerland and North Italy, next France, 
then Belgium, Germany, Austria, and the Tirol. I should calculate 
that, in the twenty-four years between 1844 and 1868 when he was 
compelled to give up travelling, he must have spent at least six 
years in the countries just enumerated. With the exception of 
1848, an ominous time for continental travel, during the summer 
of which he visited the North of England and Scotland; of 1865 
when he was again in Scotland, and of one other summer when he 
travelled in Ireland, he was on the Continent every one of these 
years. 

Thus in 1846 he was abroad from June the rath to October 
the 5th, traversing assiduously the South West and South East of 
France, the, Pyrenees from end to end, the Tirol and South 
Germany, and finally crossing through France to Paris. In 1847 he 
was on the Continent from June the 25th to October the 6th, 
passing by the Rhine and Switzerland into North Italy and to 
Florence, in which place he found me to my delight and profit, and 
accompanied me home by Bologna, Milan, Como, Switzerland, the 
Rhine and Belgium. I have now in my hands twenty manuscript 
volumes of various sizes, filled with the most minute writing, in 
which he describes at length the proceedings of every day and 
almost every hour during all these years’ travel, with the exception 
of the six years from 1854 to 1859. That he was abroad all or 
most of these years I know, and that he kept equally minute 
journals of them I have no doubt; but whether they are lost or 
where they now are, I cannot ascertain. In 1855 I well remember I 
was with him for some time in Germany and France and in Paris, 
seeing the great Exhibition of that year. The moment he quits the 
Continent, his Journals come to an end. So far as I know or can 
learn, he never kept any diary of his life at home. Had he done 
so on any thing like the scale which he has adopted in his Journals 
of travel, he would have accounted for almost every hour of his 
life. 








XVil 


His social disposition greatly enjoyed the companionship of 
intimate friends in these travels; and this he was sometimes able to 
have during his earlier journeyings. In the first of them he had 
for a time the society of the friends who have been already spoken 
of. In 1847 I can remember how thoroughly happy he was in 
Florence together with W. G. Clark and myself. He writes in his 
Journal of September the roth, the evening before he left that city: 
‘Altogether I dont think I ever enjoyed a visit to any foreign town 
more than this last three weeks at Florence. First I had very 
pleasant society of intimate friends which has rarely been my lot 
before—men that take an interest in the same things that please me; 
the weather has been delightful,’ and so on. Again in 1851 he had 
a long tour, from July 2 to October 16, in Switzerland and North 
Italy with two intimate friends and brother Fellows, H. R. Luard, 
now Registrary of the University, and C. B. Scott, the present 
Headmaster of Westminster. I joined them for a time in Venice 
and found him thoroughly happy. 

But as time went on and he continued year after year to 
pursue his travels with unabated energy, it was not so easy for him to 
get his old friends for companions, They did not care to walk for 
twenty or thirty miles over an Alpine pass under pouring rain, or to 
defy the summer heats of the Pyrenees, or of the sweltering cities and 
dust-tormented plains of North Italy. For he hated to pass a single 
day in inaction, looking upon this as a dereliction of duty and an 
ignoble concession to laziness. His Journals, as years go on, become 
more and more instructive, as his taste grew more refined and his 
discrimination keener; and the ordinary guidebooks of the countries 
he so often visited might gain greatly by a judicious study of these 
volumes. At the same time I feel convinced that these later 
journeys overtaxed his strength and energies, created in him an un- 
natural excitement and irritation, and fostered the seeds of that 
malady by which he was subsequently struck down. 


In October 1845 Cope commenced the work of what might be 
called his future profession as Lecturer at Trinity, and continued to 
perform the duties attached to this office, with energy and success 
and without the intermission of a single term, for twenty-four years, 
until the failure of his health put a final stop to all intellectual effort 
in the summer of 1869. 

For some years his favourite subjects of lecture were the Greek 
Tragedians, the two elder of whom he very decidedly preferred to 
Euripides. In fact until the very end of his career one or other of 
their plays was almost invariably the subject of his lecture for the 
Michaelmas term. And thus by constant repetition and careful pre- 


XVIil 


paration he gained a thorough insight into the texts themselves and 
a very extensive acquaintance with the voluminous literature con- 
nected with the Greek drama. But often one or other of the two 
great historians, Herodotus or Thucydides, or else Demosthenes or 
another of the orators supplied the text on which he discoursed. 

If the best scholars in any of the twenty-four generations of 
Freshmen who listened to his teaching were consulted, I believe they 
would one and all avow that their knowledge of the language and of 
its literature was very greatly furthered by his learned and elaborate 
lectures, 

He gradually established his reputation in the College and the 
University as one of the very best and soundest Greek scholars of his 
time: I could cite, if it were necessary, many distinguished names to 
bear me out in this assertion. In his efforts to be thorough, he 
would collect a great mass of materials, which he did not always 
take sufficient pains to mould into shape and symmetry. Indeed he 
often avowed to me that, when he had once put on paper his 
thoughts and collections on any question—and this he was in the 
habit of doing with very great rapidity—, he found it quite impossible 
to rearrange and rewrite what he had prepared. Hence no doubt 
there was often a great diffuseness and some want of clearness in his 
work,—defects with which I have most frequently heard him charged 
by his auditors. He was by nature too very mistrustful of his own 
powers, and consequently a great stickler for authority. He seemed 
to thinkethere was something sacred in the printed text, as it 
presented itself to him, and was sometimes determined to explain 
the inexplicable and see a meaning in that which had none. But 
with all this he was an admirable Greek scholar and a most valuable 
and highly valued lecturer. 

Sometimes, though rarely, he lectured on a Latin writer; but for 
Latin literature, especially poetry, he did not greatly care; though 
he quite felt and freely admitted the surpassing merits of style in the 
great prose authors. After a time however he almost entirely 
dropped the Classical Latin writers, éxcept for purposes not con- 
nected with the study of the language, and took up a position of 
benevolent neutrality with regard to the whole literature. He treated 
the Latin in much the same way as he treated their compeers, the 
great French Classics. 

When he had been Assistant Tutor about ten years, he undertook 
the College lecture on Plato, and afterwards on Aristotle as well ; 
and these two philosophers he resolved to make the main object of 
his study henceforth. For a long time his great natural diffidence 
seemed to give him a disinclination to commit anything to the press. 
One of his earliest essays in print were his criticisms, in the Journal 














X1X 


of Classical and Sacred Philology, of Grote’s famous dissertation on 
the Sophists. There is a good deal to be learnt from what he 
has written; but, if I am not mistaken, he has hardly caught - 
Grote’s point of view, which in this country at all events has I 
believe now gained very general acceptance among the best judges. 
In 1864 he published a translation of Plato’s Gorgias. His trans- 
lation is strikingly literal and very excellent in its kind; but this 
kind is peculiar. Mr Henry Jackson in his introductory remarks 
to Cope’s translation of the Phaedo, a posthumous work which 
Mr Jackson has edited with great skill and diligence, has given a 
short and trenchant exposition of the principle which Cope has 
followed out in both these translations. A more elaborate effort is 
the Introduction to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, published in 1867 and de- 
signed to serve as a preliminary study to the present edition of that 
work. We find in this dissertation a very full exposition of Anstotle’s 
principles, set forth with learning and research; but one feels per- 
haps here too that want of concentration and careful revision, which, 
as I have said, Cope used himself to acknowledge with regret as a 
peculiar feature of his style which he was quite unable to remedy. 
Anyhow I fancy a reader would have liked to have seen it in- 
corporated in the present edition as an essential portion of it, neither 
of the two being a complete whole without the other. This edition 
it is not for me to offer an opinion upon: suffice it here to say that 
it was the main occupation of the latest and most mature years of 
his working life, and bears witness in every page to unsparing labour 
and genuine scholarship. : 


Cope was ordained Deacon in November 1848 and Priest in 
September 1850 by Dr Turton, late Bishop of Ely. A short experi- 
ence with his friend Mate, then Vicar of Wymeswold, convinced him 
that, as he had already for some years devoted himself to a life of 
study, Parish work was not the sphere for which his tastes and habits 
were best adapted ; and he contented himself afterwards with occa- 
sionally assisting one or other of his clerical friends, when he would 
make them a visit during a vacation. 

Perhaps the most important crisis in the even tenour of his 
laborious College life was occasioned by the Greek Professorship 
becoming vacant in 1866, when he came forward as one of three 
candidates for that office. The votes of the electors, the Council of 
the Senate, having been equally divided between him and Dr 
Kennedy, the appointment finally devolved by statute on the Chan- 
cellor of the University who gave it to Dr Kennedy. There is no 
doubt that this result was a poignant disappointment to Cope at the 
time ; it is no less certain that his strength and the tone of his mind 





XX 


were already a good deal affected by ill-health. This I could illus- 
trate from my own knowledge, if many considerations did not 
counsel silence on matters which neither his friends nor the public 
would care to know, or see paraded before them. 

Every one, they say, has the defects of his virtues ; and it cannot 
be denied that in his later years, when health became uncertain, 
Cope was too prompt to take offence and conceive causeless suspicions 
against his most intimate friends. But they could understand that 
this arose from excess of susceptibility and perversion of tender 
feeling; and the offence was forgotten as readily as it was conceived. 

In August 1869 he was seized with that malady from which he 
never rallied during the four remaining years of his life. He died on 
the sth of August 1873, and on the 14th of that month he was 
followed to his grave in the Church of England Cemetery at Bir- 
mingham by his two brothers, his nephew and a few of his oldest and 
dearest friends. 


I never knew a kinder-hearted or more charitable man than Cope. 
Suffering of any sort excited in him an uncontrollable longing to 
relieve it, whether the relief were to be afforded by sympathy and 
personal attention, or by money. Many indeed are the acts of 
charity on his part which fell under my own observation; and I am 
sure that I never learnt but a small portion of them, for he loved to 
do good by stealth. Whenever a friend needed care and sympathy, 
none so prompt as he to offer them. When Robert Leslie Ellis, for 
whom he felt an unbounded admiration, was seized with fever at 
San Remo in 1849, off hurried Cope at once to render him all ‘the 
assistance it was in his power to give. So when his poor friend Mate 
was struck down by crushing disease, Cope hastened at once to 
lavish on him his affectionate care. It was always among the chief 
pleasures of his existence to make a round of visits to his old friends 
who lived away from Cambridge. One of the oldest of them, 
R. W. Essington, Vicar of Shenstone, writes to me as follows: ‘Of 
all my old frends of King’s and Trinity he alone from 1848 to the 
year of his sad seizure visited me regularly at Shenstone. He 
preached in my Church, he taught in my schools, and rarely left me 
without contributing liberally to some Parochial charity, never without 
wishing to do so’. ‘No one living’, he adds with good reason, ‘is 
more capable than I am of testifying to the warmth, the steadiness 
and depth of his friendship’. 


H. A. J. M. 








APISTOTEAOY: 


TEXNHZ PHTOPIKH2 


A. 


‘O Bioc Bpayyc, H Aé TEYNH MaKpH’ 
6 Ae Kaipoc G2yc° H AG Meipa ccbadepH Hi AE KPicic yaAeTH. 
HIPPOCRATES. 





I 


APIZTTOTEAOY: 


TEXNHZ PHTOPIKH2 A. 


e e | a) > r ~ ~ 9 
H PNTOPLKH EOTLV avtTioTpodos TH StadexTeKn ap- ates 


§ 1. ‘H pnropten dorw dvricrpogos rp dsadexrixg is translated by Cicero, 
ex altera parte respondere dialecticae, Orat. XXXII 114. ‘Vox a scena 
ducta videtur. Chori antistrophe strophae ad assem respondet, eiusque 
motus ita fit, ut posterior in prioris locum succedat...Significat ex altera 
parte respondere et quasi ex adverso oppositum esse; id quod etiam 
in antistrophen cadit.’ Trendel. EZ Log. Arist. § 14 p. 74: and to the 
same effect, Comment. ad Arist. de Anima, 111 § p. 408. ‘dvvi- 
ovpodor dicitur quod alius rei quasi partes agit eamque repraesentat ;’ 
Waitz, Comm. ad Anal. Pr. 1 2, 25a 6. 

The term is borrowed from the manoeuvres of the chorus in the 
recitation of the choral odes. <rpopy denotes its movement in one 
direction, to which the dvyrsorpody, the counter-movement, the wheeling 
in the opposite direction, exactly corresponds, the same movements being 
repeated. Miller, Diss. Eumen. p. 41. Hist. Gr. Lit. c. X1V §.4. Mure, 
Hist. Gk. Lit, Bk. 111. c. 1 §15. Hence it is extended to the words sung 
by the chorus during the latter of these evolutions, and signifies a set of 
verses precisely parallel or answering in all their details to the verses of 
the orpody, And thus, when applied in its strict and proper sense, it 
denotes an exact correspondence in detail, as a fac-simile or counterpart. 

Hence in Logic dyriorpégey is used to express terms and propositions 
which are convertible, and therefore identical in meaning, precisely simi- 
lar in all respects. On the various senses of ayriorpépew and its deriva- 
tives in Logic, see Waitz, u. s. In this signification, however, avyriorpodos 
does not properly represent the relation actually subsisting between 
the two arts, the differences between them being too numerous to 
admit of its being described as an exact correspondence in detail; as 
I have already pointed out in the paraphrase (Introd. p. 134). 

It also represents Rhetoric as an art, independent of, though analo- 
gous to, Dialectics, but not growing out of it, nor included under it. 
The word is of very frequent occurrence in Plato (Gorgias, Republic, 
Philebus, Timaeus, Theaetetus, Leges), who joins it indifferently with 
the genitive and dative; and he employs it in this latter sense; as 
likewise Isocrates, wept dyrid. § 182; and Aristotle himself in several 
places; Polit. vj (IV) 5, 1292 5 7, xai forty dyricrpodos (corresponding) 


AR. I. I 


- 1354 
rto 


qua 
edition 
1831. 


2 PHTOPIKH: A 1§1. 
dorepat yap wept TowvTwy Twwv eiow, & Kowa 


adrn év rais dAtyapxiats wowep 7 Tuparris dy rais povapyias. c. 6 ult. 1293 2 
33. c. 10, 1295@ 18. de part. anim. II 17 ult. év pév ovy rovras rois (pos 
4 yAorra rotautTy THY Pvow doriv, oowEp ayTioTpodas ZxovTa TH puKTIpt TOY 
€Xeharray. 

Lastly, Waitz, u. s., points out a peculiar signification of it, ‘res 
contraria alteri quam potestate aequiparat,’ in de Gen. Anim. 11 6, 7436 28. 
TO Wuxpoy cuviornow ayriarpopoy (as a balance) ry Geppornrs ry wept rHy 
kapdiay roy ¢yxépadoy. Trendelenburg, Comm. ad de Anima u.s., after 
defining ayriorpépew as above, adds, dyrictpodos ex eadem chori similitu- 
dine significat ex alfera parte respondere (this 1s from Cicero, u.s.) Arist. 
Rhet. I. 1; quod non significat, rhetoricam in dialecticae locum succedere 
(#.e. can be substituted for it, step into its place, as @ convertible term), 
sed quasi ex adverso esse oppositam (stands over against it, as a corre- 
sponding opposite in a overotyia, two parallel rows of coordinate opposites, 
like the partners in a country dance). Quintilian, Inst. Orat. 11 17, 42, 
specie magis guam genere differunt. ; 

The term dyriocrpodos therefore applied to the two arts, seems to re- 
present them as two coordinate opposites, or opposites in the same row 
(see Spengel on the study of Rhetoric, Munich 1842, p. 21). They are 
sister arts, with general resemblances and specific differences ; two species 
under one genus, proof: both modes of proof, both dealing with probable 
materials, but distinguished by the difference of the two instruments of 
proof employed: the one concluding by the formal syllogism, and by the 
regular induction, assumed complete; the other drawing its t#/ferences by 
the abbreviated, imperfect, conversational enthymeme, never complete in 
form, and by the single example in the place of the general induction. 

Rhetoric is afterwards described as rapadués, pépioy and Gpoiwpa (infra 
c. 11 § 7). srapadvés and poptowy both express in different ways the relation 
that Rhetoric bears to Dialectics as the off-shoot, ranch, or part; aspecies . 
or variety of the general art of probable reasoning: sapadués as a 
subordinate shoot, growing out of the same root with the larger plant or 
tree,—a term so far corresponding with dvrierpodos, but differing from it 
in making Rhetoric subordinate. optow reduces it toa still lower level 
in comparison with the other. cpoiwza implies no more than a mere 
general resemblance. 

In Sext. Empir. adv. Math. viI 6, occurs an explanation of dyricrpodos, 
quite in character with the ordinary Greek etymologies, pyropeny, Fs 
dvriorpodoy eva: ry dvadexrixyy, (not referring apparently to this passage, 
but most probably to the ausaywy} rexvav) rouréorw icoorpopoy, dia rd 
wept rhy avriy vAnv orpeperOas (versar® circa), as Homer called Ulysses 
avrideoy instead of icoGeov. Alexander (infr.) gives the same explanation. 

Bacon Adv. of learning Bk. 11 1X 3, has antistrophe for ‘corre- 
spondence’, “and it hath the same relation or antistrophe that the former 
hath.” 

The points of correspondence and difference between the two arts 
have been already fully explained in the Introduction, p. go foll.: I will 
here give a summary of them from Alexanders Commentary on the 


PHTOPIKHS A 1 §1. 3 


4 , 4 ~ 

Tpowov Twa aravTwy éoti yvwpiCeyv, Kat ovdemas 
o , .] v4 4 

émoriuns dpwpioperns. 6:0 Kal mavTes TpoToy 


Topics, p. 4. They are 1. that both of them are py wepl gv ri yévos dda- 
ptopevoy ; that is, that neither of them has any special subject-matter, like 
the sciences, but argues or perorates upon any thesis or subject whatso- 
ever that can be presented to it. 2. ré 3c evdogwr xal miOavay, no proof or 
conclusion, or principle, that they employ is more than probable ; exact 
demonstration and necessary conclusions are excluded from both alike ; 
siores, belief, the result of mere persuasion, and not émeorypn, the infal- 
lible result of scientific demonstration, being the object aimed at. 3. py 
& olxeiov apyay, they have no ‘special, appropriate’ first principles, such 
as those from which the special sciences are deduced ; though they like- 
wise appeal to the ra xowa, the xoeval apyai, the ultimate axioms and prin- 
ciples common to all reasoning, which are above those of the special 
sciences, and from which the latter must be deduced. And, 4. they are 
Cpoiws wept ra ayrixeipeva adAAnAots ; they argue indifferently the opposite 
sides of the same question, and conclude the positive or negative of any 
proposition or problem ; unlike science and demonstration, which can 
only arrive at one conclusion. Where the materials and the method are 
alike only probable, every question has, or may be made to appear to 
have, two sides, either of which may be maintained on probable princi- 
ples ; in Dialectics and Rhetoric no certainty is either attained or attain- 
able. The chief points of difference between them are, that Dialectics 
deals practically as well as theoretically with every kind of problem or 
question that can be submitted to it; proceeds by question and answer, 
in the way of debate, and its discussions are of a more general or uni- 
versal character ; whereas the subjects of Rhetoric are practically, though 
not theoretically, almost absolutely limited to Politics; it follows a me- 
thod of continuous narration or explanation (8:efo8:nes), and deals in its 
conclusions rather with individual cases than with general principles or 
universal rules, maxims and axioms. 

Alexander, in a preceding passage, gives the following very extraordi- 
nary account of the derivation and original meaning of ayrictpodos: ro 
yap dvr. dyri rou ivcotpodoy re cal mepi ra ara orpeopémny xai caraywo- 
poemmy ever. 

xowa anayrov}] See Introd., p. 87, and the Paraphrase, pp. 134—5. 

ade popes} ‘marked off, separated by a limit’, from every thing else 
about it; and so ‘definite, special’ (§ 7). 1, 2, 1 wepi re yévos id:ov ddopic- 
pévov, opposed to wepi rov dobévros. Polit. 1 13, 1260 6 1 ddwpiopemmy rind 
Zovreiay (a definite, limited, kind of slavery). Ib. Iv (VI) 4, 1290 6 25 
dwodiwpiley. aopifera (ij ris Wuyijs Suvauis) mpos ras dAdas duvapes r@ 
épype rovrg, “this capacity of the soul is marked off, separated, distin- 
guished, from all the rest by this function,” de Anima II 4, 9, 416 4 20. 
The preposition is similarly used in the compound dzoPAérec, which is 
‘to look away, or off’, from all surrounding objects, so as to fix the atten- 
tion on one particular thing, or turn it in one particular direction. Comp. 
Lat. definire, determinare. 

Parallel passages, in which this same characteristic of Rhetoric and 

I—z2 


4 PHTOPIKHS A 1§2. 


Twa peTéexovow auoiv mavtes ydp méxpt Twos Kal 
éferaCew Kal vméxew Aovyov, Kai dmrodoyeicOa Kal 
2KaTnYyopely eyyElpoVoLV. Tay ev ouY mWoAAWwY ot 
mev eiky Tavita Spwow, ot Sé dia ouvnfaav aro 
efews. éret 3 dudorépws évdexera, SnAov Ste ein 
dy avra kai ddoroeiv: ot O ydp émtuyyavovew ot 


Dialectics is noticed, are cited in the Introd. p. 75. See also Quintilian, 
II 21, 16—19, on the province of the orator. 

é£eralew...Adyor] Note 1, Introd. p. 135. 9 Ssadexrexyn e£eraorexy, Top. 
A 2, 101 } 3. 

§ 2. ovv7Oeay] ‘habituation, familiarity, practice’, acquired by associa- 
tion (prop. that of living or herding together). Top. A 14, 105 5 27 ry da 
rs draywyns ovvnbeia mecparéoy yvapifew éxdorny avrav (ray mporaceay). 
See also on I 10, 18. This ovvjOea is derived from the constant opera- 
tion or activity, the évépyeuu, of the developed and acquired and settled 
déis, or mental state (és from éyew, ‘to be in such and such a state or 
condition’, ro mas éxeay): by the constant exercise of the éfs, or esta- 
blished confirmed habit, and its évépye:as, is produced by association that 
familiarity, or habituation, or practice, which secures success even to the 
empirical unartistic use of Dialectics or Rhetoric. 

eixj] ravra Spay is the use of them antecedent to practice, and without 
previously acquired familiarity : dro ravroparov, by a mere spontaneous 
impulse, and therefore ‘at random.’ 

‘Est autem dialectica,’ says John of Salisbury, Me/alogicus, 11 4, ‘ut 
Augustino placet, bene disputandi scientia : quod quidem ita accipien- 
dum est ut vis habeatur in verbis; ne scilicet dialectici credantur, quos 
casus iuvat artis beneficio destitutos.’ 

aura} Rhetoric and its processes. 

édoroeiv] ‘to make a way’; to trace a sth to be followed, which will 
lead you without unnecessary deviations to the place at which you wish 
to arrive. odos therefore, in this metaphorical usage, is not merely @ way, 
but “ke way, the des¢ way ; the way which will lead you most surely and 
expeditiously to the end proposed. Hence it denotes a regular, systematic, 
or scientific method ; the best and easiest way of attaining the end 
desired in any intellectual pursuit or branch of study. And thus it is 
that the simple odes, as well as the compound pé@odes, come to denote a 
scientific or systematic procedure in the pursuit of truth as a philosophical 
‘method’, or in any art or study. Hence we find o8¢ dypyoPa, Plat. 
Phaedr. 263 B, of a systematic methodical scientific division ; and Rep. vI1 
533 D: xa&f odov, in the same sense, Rep. Iv 435 A, and Crat. 425 B. In 
Aristotle, de gen. et corr. 1 8, 2 68 8€ padtora wep) ravrov...diwpixaoe 
Aevxurmos xal Anpoxptros. de part. Anim, I 4, 9 mas pev ody drodéyer Oa: Sei r}y 
sept hicews pébodor, xal riva tpomov yevorr’ Gv yj Oewpia wepi avrav 686 Kai 
paora... Anal. Pr. I 30 init., 7 pév ow odds Kard mavrov 9 avr?) Kai epi 
gidrocodiay nai wept réxvny croavoby kal pabnpa. Top. B 2, 109514 od¢ 
yap paddov cal ev eAarrocw 4 oxeyis. Eth. Nic. 1, 2 awd tov apyay h émi 


~ 


PHTOPIKHS A 1 § 3. 5 


Te Sta ouvnGeray Kai of aro TavTOMaTOV, THY aiTiapy 
Oewpety évdéxeTtat, TO Sé ToLovToy On mavrTes av 
3 OmoAoynoracey TExNs Epyov civat. vuY MeV OUV OL Tas 
Téxvas Tov Adywy ouvTiBevTes CNiyoV meTopixacw 
avrTns puoptov’ ai yap Tio Tels EvTEXVOV ETTL LOVOY, Ta 
5 GdAa rpocOyxat, ot Sé wept pév évOupnuarwy ovdev 
Aéyouow, drep éotl cuoua THs wiorews, wept Se 


ras apyas 9 68ds. Dionysius, de Comp. Verb. c. 25, has 4 Jryropex) ddds for 
the more usual peodos: and again od¢, de Comp. Verb. c. 4 sub fin. From 
this usage of the Greek word the Latins seem to have borrowed their via 
or via ef ratione, which frequently occurs in precisely the same sense. 
See Cicero de Fin. 111 5, 18, Iv 4, 10; Orat. III 10, XXXIIL 116 ; de Orat. 1 
25, 113%. Quint. 11 17, 41 esse certe viam atgue ordinem in bene dicendo 
nemo dubttaverit; and x 7, 6 via aicere. 

The verb ddoroeiy is found in the same sense, Met. A 3, 984 a2 18 
spolovrey 8 ovrws, avro To mpaypa eddoroinger avrois Kal ovynvayxace (nreiy, 
and Rhet. 111 12, 3 (according to MS A‘ and some others); and the sub- 
Stantive o8onoino:s, III 14, I. 

spoodoroeiy, which occurs several times in Aristotle (as Rhet. I! 2, 10, 
II 13, 7, III 12, 3, Prob. XXX 1,954 4 12, de part. Anim. II 4, §§ 4,5, 6, III 9, 
8, de gen. anim. IV 4,9, wep) Mayrixjs, 1 11. Polit. 11 9, 1270 @ 4, IV (VII) 17, 
1336 @ 32, and V (VIII) 3, 1338 @ 35 mpo odov), has a meaning slightly dif- 
fering from the preceding. The metaphor is now taken from the office of 
pioneers, who precede an advancing army, and prepare, clear, or ‘pave 
the way’ for them. 

«’ 6...77y alriay] ryy airiay is here grammatically the antecedent to 6, 
the cause, alria, being in the relative pronoun expressed as an abstract 
notion (‘the cause, which ¢hing’) in the neuter. A similar change from 
feminine to neuter, in antecedent and relative, occurs in de Anima r 3, 
407 @ 4 rHy yap Tou mravyros (Yruynyv) rotavrny elvar Bovderat oldy ror’ éatly 6 
wadovpevos vous, Pol. 11 2 init. cat 8° nv alriay dyol Seiv vevopoberzc bas... 
ov daiveras cupBaivoy ex trav Acyoy, and in Eur. Iph. T. goo (Herm.) 4 & 
airia ris av@ Orov xreives woow ; where drov must be understood as neuter : 
see Hermann on v. 1038. 

§ 3 seq. To the same effect 111 14, 8 dei 82 xy AavOavey Sri wavra eto 
Tov eyou ra roavra’ mpds aiAoy yap axpoarjy Kal ra f£o rod mpayparos 
Gxovovra, drel Gy pi) rowovros f, ovGev Set mpooipiov—as the vehicle for 
appeals to the feelings and other indirect proofs addressed to the judges 
personally, which were usually introduced into the spoolycop. 

siares] rhetorical, not demonstrative, proofs; modes of delie/, of 
things frobab/e,; all the materials and arguments of Rhetoric being pro- 
bable merely, none of them certain. See Introd. p. 136 note. 

spocOjxa...capa ris ricrews| All kinds of sadirect proof are secondary, 
subordinate, non-essential, mere ‘ adjuncts’ or ‘appendages’, like dress or 
ornaments to the body: ‘the body’ being the actual, logical, direct and 
substantial proof of the case. What is here called ‘the body’, meaning 


6 PHTOPIKHS A 1§ 4. 


Twy €€w TOU MpayuaTos Ta TAEioTA TPAypaTEU- 
A ‘ \ Wf ‘ i] \ ‘ \ 
4ovra diaBorAn yap Kat Edeos kal doyn Kal Ta 


the substance as opposed to accidents, we usually represent by ‘the soul’ 
in this same relation ; the body in its turn now standing for the accidents 
and non-essentials of a thing. So the Scholiast on Hermogenes, Proleg. 
(quoted by Ernesti, Lexicon Technologiae Graecae p. 110, Art. évOvpnpa) 
of waAaol domep rt (@ov roy Adyov Umrebevro ex odparos TE TuveTTHKOTA Kal 
Wuxis’ Wuyyy pev xadrouvres ra évOvpnpara nat rv Suva thy bia roy Keha- 
Aalovy cuncrapemy ocapua 8 mv dpaow kai ro efwbew Kaddos, O moreiy 
ciwbacw al idéa. And Cicero, Orat. XIV 44 nam et invenire et tudicare 
guid dicas magna illa quidem sunt et tamquam animé instar in corpore. 
Quintilian describes the views of some of those who thus rigorously 
limit the province of Rhetoric as an arf—al micrets €vrexycy éart povov— 
to the employment of the ‘enthymeme’, the rhetorical representative of 
the logical and demonstrative ‘syllogism’; with the exclusion of all that 
is, strictly speaking, ‘ beside the subject or real issue’, all that is beside 
the facts of the case and the direct proof of them ; all indirect proof, 
namely, from the assumed character of the speaker himself, or appeals to 
the feelings of the judges or audience, and also all ornaments and graces 
of style and delivery. Aristotle here assumes this to be theoretically the 
only true and proper method, though he by no means consistently adheres 
to it in his actual treatment of the subject. Quintilian’s description is 
as follows, though, as the reasons for the exclusion of these indirect proofs 
are somewhat different from those assigned by Aristotle, he probably 
does not refer immediately to him: Fuerunt et clari quidem oratores 
guibus solum videretur oratoris offictum docere. Namgque et affectus 
duplict ratione excludendos putabant: primum quia vitium esset omnis 
animé perturbatio, deinde quia tudicemaveritate depelli misericordia vel 
tra similibusque non oporteret: et voluptatem audientium petere, quum 
vincendt tantum gratia dicerctur, non modo agenti supervacuum sed vix 
etiam vtro dignum arbitrabantur. Inst. Orat. V. Prooem. 1. 
On the general question of appeals to the feelings, Quint. 11 17, 26 
seq.: and on the prevailing practice, Isocr. wep) dyrid. § 321. 
mpaypareveoOa is well explained by Bonitz on Metaph. A 6, 987 a 30. 
‘wpaypareverOa repi rt, vel epi revos is dicitur ab Aristotele, qui in inves- 
tiganda et cognoscenda aliqua re via ac ratione procedit ; itaque con- 
iunctum legitur cum verbis d:adtéyeo Oat, (nretv, Oewpeiv’, The primary 
sense of doing business, or occupying oneself about anything, passes 
into the more limited or special signification of an intellectual pursuit, 
and thence of ‘a special study’, ‘a systematic treatment of a particular 
subject of investigation, or practice’ (as in this present case, of Rhetoric, 
‘comp. § 10). mpaypareia, like péOodos, réyvy, émorjpn, idocodia, 
and many other words, is used to express not only the intellectual 
process of investigation, but also the resulting science, art, treatise, 
or written work, or part of such work. See on this point, Introd. p. 17, 
note 2. Also, on the general meaning of the term, Waitz on Anal. Post. 
11 13,9615. Trendel. de Anima p.199. Elem. Log. Arist. § 58, p. 135. 
§ 4. d:a8orq from d:a8addrew ‘to sunder or set at variance’, and so 


PHTOPIKH> A 1§5. 7 

’ ~ , - ”~ 9 A ~ / cd 

Toauvta maby tis uyns ov wept TOU mpayyuaTcs 

A e 

€or a\Aa mpos Tov Sixacthy. wor’ Et mEpi Tacas 

> A ~ ~ 

nv Tas Kkpioes KaOamrep év éviats ye viv éori Tw 

, ~ , A vA 

WoAewy kal padicTa Tais Evvomoupevats, ovdey av 
g 14 , e/ a A a af 

Selyov 6 Tt NEywow' amavTes yap ot pév oloyrat 
~ a A ite 

deity oVTw Tous vopous ayopevew, ot dé Kal xpwvrat 
4 4 rs oo , ? / 

Kat KwAvovow éEw Tov mpaypatos AEeyew, xabarep 

~ ~ 4 
Kai év ’Apeiw mayw, cpOws TovTo vomuiCovTes* ov 


‘to make hostile, to engender a mutual dislike between two parties’, in 
its technical application to Rhetoric, of which it is a potent instrument ; 
and with its opposite droAver@at ‘to absolve oneself, clear away from 
oneself ill-feeling and suspicion’, forms one of the principal topics of the 
wpooipsow (see [ntrod. pp. 343, 4). It denotes the exciting of suspicion and 
ill-will in the minds of the judges or audience, in order to prejudice them 
against the opponent with whom you are in controversy: and is there- 
fore improperly classed with the wa@m or emotions such as @Aeos and 
opyj. This has been already noticed by Victorius and Muretus: the 
latter says, ‘aod non est rabos, sed pertinet ad iudicem ponendum 
éy waber,’ 

Top. A 5, 126 @ 31. [8:dBodov] roy Surduevoy SiaBadrew nai €yOpors 
wovey Tous didous. These words, which seem to be &@ mere gloss upon 
&:aBoroy in the text of the Topics, occur apparently in one MS only, 
marked u by Waitz, and inserted by him in the critical notes of his 
edition, Vol. 11 p.144. Bekker altogether omits to notice them. Though 
of no authority they will equally well answer the purpose for which they 
are here employed, of helping, namely, to define the meaning of 3:afody. 

On sabos and waGn, see Introd. pp. 113—118. 

ov wept rou mpayparos Sxacrny] Appeals to the feelings are é rov 
apayparos: they are ‘beside the proper subject, the real question, the 
direct issue’, which is the fact and the proof of it; and ‘directed to the 
judge’, intended to bias and pervert his judgment, to incline him to our 
side in the contest, and so to have the effect of a secondary or indirect 
kind of proof of the justice of our case. 

sor «l wept macas—Aéywow] Similarly in Rhet. 111 1, 4, it is said 
of the ornaments of style, and declamation in general, as of appeals to 
the feelings here, that they are only allowed to be employed 3 rj» 
poxOnplay ray wokirady; in well-governed states they would not be 
permitted at all. 

§ 5. of pév...of dé] ‘either...or’. The one only sAixé that the laws 
ought to be so framed, hold the opinion as a theory; the others, as the 
Court of Areopagus, actually (kai, also, besides the mere theory) carry 
it into practice, xa) ypdyrrac. 

dv'Apel way] Heindorf ad Theaet. § 76. Lycurgus c. Leocr. §§ 12, 
13, quoted by Gaisford, xai raira xaAdtoroy éyovres ray ‘EAAnver mapaderypa 
ro dv Apeig may cuvedproy, 6 rocotroy Xadépe trav drow Sixacrnpior, dore 


8 PHTOPIKHS A 1§5. 
yap Set tov SixaorHy Siartpepey eis dpynv mpoa- 


nal rap avrois cpodcyeicGat rois dAoxopevors Stxalay rroveicOas THY Kpiow. 
mpos 5 Set xal vpas dwoBAdrovras py emrpémey rois tw rov mpayparos 
A€yovow" x.1.A. 

Lucian, Hermotimus, c. 64, has something similar about the practice 
of this court, dAAd xara rovs "Apeonayiras avrd motoivra’ of év vuxti xal 
oxorp Sixalovow, ws p21) els rous Aéyorras GAN’ els ra Aeyoueva aroPAéroatey. 
(Lucian ed. Hemsterh. 1 p. 805), and again, Anacharsis s. de Gymn. c. 10, 
(VoL 11 p. 898) of 8¢ (Scxalcperar) és 2° Gy prev rept rod mpayparos Aéywou 
dvéyera:  Bovdy xaO Hovxiay dxovovea’ fv 8€ ris } Gpoimsoy ely mpd rou 
Aoyouv, as evvovorepovs drepydcairo avrovs,  olxroy fh Selvoow tober 
érayo. To mpaypart, ola wodda pytdpey waides él rovs dixagras pyxavevrat, 
sraped bay 6 xijpvf Karecionnoev evOus, ovx €av Anpeiv mpds ri» BovAny x.T.A. 
There are several allusions to the same in Quintilian, 11 16, 4, VI 1, 7, 
X I, 107, XII 10, 26, Spalding in his note on the first of these passages 
calls attention to—what indeed is sufficiently apparent on the face of 
the statements—Quintilian’s carelessness in extending to all the law- 
courts of Athens, a practice actually prevailing at the most only in one 
of them; in spite of the direct evidence to the contrary in the extant 
orations of the Athenian orators, and the story of Hyperides and Phryne 
which he himself tells in 11 15, 9. 

daorpepew] to warp, or distort, to wrest out of the straight (‘right’) 
line or proper direction, to pervert or ‘deprave’ the judgment. The 
same metaphor is repeated in orpe8cv. The metaphor which compares 
wrong, the deviation from the ‘right’ line or path, to the crooked or 
twisted, the divergence from the straight, and represents wrong judgment 
as the warping of the moral rule, occurs in various languages ; oxoAccs, 
and opGos, evOvvet 8¢ Bixas crodias, Solon ap. Dem. de F. L. p. 423, 
axodtais cdots rrarov, Pind. Pyth. 11 156, Pl. Theaet. 173 A &c. &c. So 
€\exros, Eur. Androm. 448 éAccra xov8ev vyiés aGAAd way wept ppovovvres. 
So Plato of the good and bad horse in the human chariot, Phaedr. 253 
D, 6 pev...r0 re el8os dpbds...6 8 ad oxodtos K.t.X. 

So also rectum and pravum or varum or curvum, right and wrong 
(wrung or twisted out of shape, distorted, similarly zaéortus) tort, Fr. (tor- 
tum), torto, Ital. Compare Lucretius, IV 516, denique ulin fabrica, si prava 
est fabrica prima Normague st fallax rectis regionibus exit,—Omnia men- 
dose fieri, &c. Cic. Acad. Pr. 11 11, 33, interesse oportet, ut inter rectum 
ef pravum, sic tater verum et falsum. Hor. Ep. I 2, 44, curvo dignoscere 
rectum, (‘virtutem distinguere a vitio’. Orelli). Pers. Sat. 111 52, haud 
libs tnexpertum curvos deprendere mores. IV 11, rectum discernis ubi 
inter curva subit, vel cum fallit pede regula varo. V 38, afposita intortos 
extendit regula sores. 

‘Crooked’ for perverse, immoral, wrong, is very common in the 
earlier writers of our own language. Deut. xxxii 5, a perverse and 
crooked generation. Ps. cxxv 5, Prov. ii 15, whose ways are crooked, 
and they froward in their paths. Ep. ad Phil ii 15, and in many other 
places and authors, For examples of the latter, see Richardson’s Dict. 
Art. ‘ crooked ’. 

Very different to this are the principles Jaid down by the author of 





PHTOPIKH® A 1§5. 9 
yovras i POovoy H Edeov" Guotov yap Kav ef Tis, w 


the ‘Pyropixy mpos *Adéfav8poy as a guide to the practice of the rhetorician, 
c. 36 (37) § 4. xp? 82 cat rots Sixacras éraivp Oepanedom, ws dixacral 
Sixacos xai Sewoi elo. cupwapadnrréoy 8é nal rds dAarradceis, ef mou TOY 
dvridixov xaradeecatépws Exes mpos Td A€yetw ff} mparrew f GAO Tt pds Tov 
dyova. The judges are to be flattered, and the opponent represented 
in the darkest colours, whether his alleged defects have or have not any 
bearing upon the matter at issue. mpos 8€ rovrois éuBAnréov rd re dixatoy 
xal rd vopipoy Kat TO TUppepoy Kal ra Tovrots axoAovba ; which is the exact 
contradictory of the course prescribed by Aristotle in § 6 as alike fair and 
in accordance with the true principles of the art. 

sspocryorvras eis} Comp. III 14, 7, and note. 

nay ef ris...roujoee]) The process by which dy in this and similar 
forms of expression—ws Gy el, Sowep dy el, xabdrep ay el, olovmep Gy el, 
and the like—has lost its force, become inactive, (comsopitum, ‘gone to 
sleep’, Buttm.,) in the sentence, is explained by Buttmann in his note on 
Dem. Mid. § 15, p. 530. The conditional a» belongs to some verb in the 
apodosis, originally expressed, afterwards left to be understood, as in the 
clause before us. The expression at full length would be, xay, ef res 
soujoete, Tojoese, “as one would do, if he were to do’. Still, though the 
particle has lost its direct and active force in this sentence, some latent 
notion of conditionality always remains, even when the verb which Gy» 
supposes cannot actually be supplied. This is the case in such phrases 
as hoBouperos dowep av ef rais, Pl. Gorg. 479 A ‘fearing as a child would’: 
Ar. parva naturalia wep) payrinis 1 2,2 Sov dowep dy el Addos yf Guors 
éorwy, ‘whose natural habit is, as it might be (dy), talkative’; de Anima I 5, 
5, 409 5 27, dovep dv ef rv Wux?)v ra mpdypara tiOevres. In such cases the 
a» is retained by habit and association, when the sense no longer requires 
it. The phrase accordingly is not found in the earlier forms of the lan- 
guage, and does not become common till the time of Plato and Aristotle, 
with whom, the latter especially, it is very frequent. The association 
required time before it was established as a fixed habit. I believe that 
it does not occur in Thucydides, and that it makes its first appearance 
in Xenophon; that is, in the forms above given ; for as an unnecessary 
appendage to a participle, or in cases analogous, dv is thus used by 
earlier writers. See Hermann on Soph. Phil. 491, and Jelf, Gv. Gr. § 430, 
1, for some instances [Kiihner’s A usfiihrliche Grammatik § 398 p.209 sq.S.]}. 

Aristotle seems to be the earliest writer who assumed the license of 
joining xay el with the subjunctive mood, as in Pol. 11 1 init. cay ef rvyxd- 
yeow, C. 2, oomep dy el oradpiis wAciov EAxvoy, and 111 8 xay el ovpBaivp, 
also Poet. 15, nay ef rives érepat rvyyavaciy. Kay el uy re Soxy is the MSS 
reading in Plat. Rep. 1x 579 D, and defended by Schneider (not. ad loc.) ; 
but rejected by Ast, Bek., Stallb. and the Zurich Editors who substi- 
tute doxez. I subjoin a few examples of the usage in its various forms. 
Soph. Aj. 1078 doxeiy weceiy Gy xay (it might be even) awd opixpod xaxod. 
Xenophon, Symp. 11 20, 1X 4, Cyrop. I 3, 1, Memor. 111 6, 4 and Io, 12. 
Plato, Apol. 23 B, Phaed. 72 C, 109 C, and elsewhere, Men. 97 B, Gorg. 
479 A, Rep. v1 493 A, Isocr. Paneg. §§ 69, 148, Aristotle in addition to 


p. 2. 


10 PHTOPIKH? A 1 §6. 


~ a ~ c = , 
méeAAa yxpnobat Kavom, TovTOY momoee oTpEBAov. 
f A A ef -~ ‘ 9 ~ 9 | 

6éte O€ avepoy STt Tov pev audiaBnrovvTos ovdev 

’ ’ ~ ~ \ on e/ a vA , 

éoTw Ew Tov dei~at TO mpayua Ott EcTW nH OvK 

) 9 ») ) Ld ‘ , \ ‘ 

Ear n yeyovev 4 OU yeyover’ et Sé peya h puKpov 
av , tD) Nd ef \ e 4 rd 

| Oikatov 4 adikov, boa pn oO vomobeTns SiwptKev, 

A ~ d 

avurov 69 wou Tov Oikacthy Set yiwwoKev Kal ov 

Y ~ td 4 A 

7pavOavery Tapa Twv dudusBynTovvTwr. padiora pev 

, | ~ / ‘4 
ouv mpoonke: Tous dpOws Keevous vomous, boa 
9 tf 4 , 9 4 1 ef 9 4 
evdexeTat, mavTa diopiCew avrous, kal Ott éXayioTa 

fg fiona om , nm A e/ e/ 
kaTaNeirew él Tos Kpivovot, mpwrov pev OTt Eva 


those already quoted, Rhet. 11 20, 4, Somep ay ef tts, Eth. N. V7, 1132, 
11, Ib. V 12, 1137, 2; VI 13 sub. fin., 1145, 2 and 10; VII 8, 1150, 16, nay 
el pemovat, Pol. 111 6 (sub init.) xay ef mAeiovs, and several more: Hist. 
Anim. Iv 2, 16, IV 11, 11, VIII 2, 10, de part. Anim. IV 5, 26, de Gen. Anim. 
111 9, 7. In Aristotle it has become habitual. The analogous use of 
ay with the participle is exemplified by Pol. 11 2, 1261 5 4 dowep ay 
GAXoe yevopevos; and Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. I 5, 1, ws dy xaOdAov 
Aeyovras, and 1 6, 6, ws Gy xara Adyov, where ay may be considered as 
redundant. [Vahlen, Bettrage zu Ar. Poet.\ p. 35—37; Eucken, de Ar. 
dicendi ratione 1 p. 61—64._ S.] 

§ 6. On the ‘legal issues’, craves, augioByryncets, which, as Victorius 
remarks, are here tacitly referred to, see Introd. p. 397, Appendix E to 
Bk. III. 

§ 7. xetpévovs vopous] xetoOac and some of its compounds are often 
convertible with the passive of r:Oévac. xeioOat itself ‘to be placed, fixed, 
established’=riderOat; ovyxeicOa: ‘to be put together or composed’= cuv- 
riderOa ; divaxetrOaz ‘to be disposed’ =diariber Gar ; moxeioOar (as 1 2 13) 
‘to be assumed’=vmorider Oat or vrodkapSaver Oat. 

[xetjuas is constantly borrowed as a perfect passive to ri@nut, while 
réOesuar is almost invariably used as a deponent perfect. Thus the usage 
of the perfect in the best writers would be: 6 vouodérns réOerne rov vopoy. 
y mods TéOetrac roy vopov’ o véuos ketras (Dem. Or. 46 § 12 note). infra 
chap. 15 § 23 rots vopos, Gv pn cpOds xeipevor dow GAr’ é£ayapreot of 
rtOepevor, Plato Leg. p. 793 B(vopev) rev ev ypappace reOevrow re kai neipevoy 
nal rav ért reOnoopevwy. See also Cobet’s variae lectiones p. 311. S.] 

Tois Kpivovot, Kpicets, rovs xpivovras}] On the different senses of 
xpivew and xpirns as applied to the different branches of Rhetoric, see 
Introd. p. 137 note 1: and on the necessary imperfections of laws in their 
application to particular cases, the consequent introduction of émteixeta 
to modify them and adapt them to the circumstances of the case, and 
Plato’s opinion, on the authority of laws, see p. 138 note 1. 

émt rois xpivovor] éri resting, and so depending, upon ; hence fenes, in 
the power of, at the discretion of. § 8 émi rots xpirais xaraXeirew. 

This primary, literal, and physical sense of ¢i, (in this application of it, 


-PHTOPIKH® A 1 §7. II 


~ A A ” \ Fv “ 

AaBeiv Kat dNiryous paov 7 WoAXOUs Ev HpovowvTas p. 13546. 

' 5 t bevel cat a > _e 
cat Ouvvapevous vouobereiy Kal dixaCew> ere ai 

q 4 ~ 
pey vouobecia ex roANOU xpovou oKeyapevwy ryivov- 

e \ , a ) 

Tat, at O€ Kpioes €£ Uroyviov, Ware yadEToY aTob- 

, A , \ ~ A 
Sova To Sikaiov Kat TO wumdepov Kadws Tous Kpivop- 


which represents the object of the preposition as the daszs on which some- 
thing stands or rests, and therefore depends upon), of the half dozen 
Grammars and Lexicons, which, after forming my own opinion, I have 
consulted on the point, is to be found distinctly stated only in that of Rost 
and Palm, where it lurks hardly discoverable, amidst the enormous mass 
of illustrations of the various usages of ér{ accumulated in Vol. I pp. 1032 
—1045, in p. 1038, col. 2. 

al vopoOecia dx rrodAoU ypovou oxeyvapévwy yivovrac] ‘legislation arises 
from (is the work of men after) long previous consideration’, Thuc. 1 58, 
éx woAXov mpdovovrres avdev evpovro émirndetoy. 

€€ Uxoyviov] (retained by Bekker; Gaisford not. var. prefers imroyvov, 
and so L. Dindorf, on Xen. Cyr. VI 1, 43.) vmdyuov’ mpd puxpov yeyovos, 
Hesychius. ¢é£ troyuou’ wap’ aura, drepioxerras, ex Tay ovveyyus, Suidas. 
By the Scholiast on Arist. Nub. 145, in Suidas v. apri (Gaisf.), é& vzo- 
yviov Aéyey is interpreted by avrocyediafeww; and in Eustath. (ap. eund.) 
it is said to be derived from yvio» in the sense of yelp, (compare Theocr. 
Idyl. xx11 81 and 121; the ‘hand’ is ¢#e member, par excellence), from 
which likewise he deduces éyyun, éyyvav, and éyyvadi{ey; and vcyvoy, 6 
cai €£ Umoyvou A€yerat, ro ¢yy’s hace mpor8oxipor, 7} mapavrixa yeyovos, Kal 
as cixeiy mpoxetpov, 7 padAow Umoyxeipsov. Examples may be found, all 
bearing much the same sense, in Koch’s note on Moeris Lex. p. 343, and a 
still larger-list in Rost and Palm’s Lex. s.v., to which add Rhet. If 22, 11; 
Pol. vit (vt) 8, 1321 4 17. vmoyvecraroy (the readiest way or means) 
mpos avrdapxeay, Isocr. Paneg. § 13. Menand. ap. Spengel, Rhet. Gr. 111 
391. In Isocr. wep) dyrid. § 4, and Epist. 6. 2, p. 418 B, it stands for ‘ close 
at hand’, 789 vmoyviou pos ris rod Biov reAevris ovens, and similarly Ar. 
Eth. Nic. 111 9 (Bekk.) sub fin., daa Odvaroy émiepes uroyvia dvra. 

It appears from all this that vroyviey means ‘under the hand’, as an 
unfinished or just finished work, fresh and recent, rpoodarop (so Rhet. 11 
3, 12) as Moeris explains it: and é£ vmoyviou, ‘from under the hand’, cor- 
responds to our ‘off-hand’, or ‘out of hand’, and is used to express any- 
thing ‘sudden and unexpected’ or ‘unpremeditated’, ‘extemporaneous’ 
a signification which appears inall the examples. Similarly é« yeepos, amo 
xetpds, ‘ off-hand’, 

dwod:86rai) a word of very frequent use in Aristotle, has for one of its 
elementary senses that of ‘to give back’, reddere; dro as in crovepeu, 
drodapBavew, amareiy, drémovs, arom\eiv (see Sturz. Lex. Xenoph.), from 
which all the other senses in which at least Aristotle employs it may be 
deduced. Another of the original senses of the word is ‘to give forth’, 
or ‘produce’, as the earth produces her fruits, and this also might be 
applied to the interpretation of it in several of its various uses. But as 
this signification is likewise deducible from the other—for production, as 


12 PHTOPIKHS A 1§7. 


‘ e/ A ~ 
Tas. To O€ TavTWY péyioTOV, OTL MEV TOU VYOMO- 
’ o r) A , ) A A 
Gerov xpiots ov Kata péepos dAAa mrepi peAAdvTWY 


when the earth produces her fruits, may be regarded as a payment or re- 
storation, or ‘return’ of something as due—it may perhaps be better to 
refer them all to the one original signification, reddere. So in Eth. N. 111, 
1103, @ 27, 5 22, rds évepyelas drodidovas is not simply ‘to produce’, but to 
produce energies that are due fo the system, energies corresponding to the 
faculties from which they spring. So Trendelenburg, £/. Log. Arist. § 55, 
Pp. 132, ‘dwod:8ovas proprie est reddere, unde ex suum cuique tribuendi 
significatione facile orta est declarandi vis (dec/arare is the sense which the 
word bears in the passage specially referred to, Top. A 5, 102 @ 3) nihil 
enim est aliud quam logice suam cuique naturam reddere.’ 

drrodidovaz is therefore (1) to give back, restore, repay, render, always im- 
plying some kind of obligation, (2) to render as @ due, ‘assign’ (which best 
represents it in the majority of cases in Aristotle); of due distribution, 
suum cuigue; hence (3) of the due fulfilment of any office or duty, as 
dwod8ovas Aoyor, ‘to render an account’, to explain, or set forth, any state- 
ment or doctrine, drodaiverOa, declarare. To one or the other of these 
I believe all the multifarious uses of the word may be referred. 

I will add afew examples in the way of illustration :—Dem. c. Aristocr. 
p- 638 § 56, rovs ¢xOpa rotouvras év éxOpot péper xodd{ew drédoxey (assigns 
as a due) 6 vopos; and elsewhere. Plat. Phaed. 71 E (a good example), 
ov dyrarodacopey thy évavriay yéveoww (pay back in return), dAAd ravrp 
xd? (mutilated, defective, lopsided, single where all the rest are pairs) 
€arat } duats ; } dvayxn awodouva x.r.A. de Anima I 1, 403 4 1, rovrey 8¢ 6 
hey rHy Any arotidwow, ‘assigns’ or ‘applies’, that is, to the definition, 
which is the thing in question, to which it assigns matter as the sole ele- 
ment: comp. c. 4, 408 @ 3; and dwovépew, in precisely the same sense, ib. 
v 1, and PL Tim. 34 A. drro8ideo0e make to correspond, bring into com- 
parison, Rhet. 111 11, 13. aod. Aetroupyiay de part. An. Il 14, 9, ‘duly to 
fulfil certain functions (services)’, Ib. 11 14, 5, (} vows) wavrayod drodi8ece 
(makes due compensation, duly assigns) AaBotca érépwbey wpos dAdo 
popwov. Top. A I, 121 2 15, et passim, rd drododey yevos, drodiddvas yévos. 
Top. A 18, 108 4 9, ri)» drosoow rev opiopey, the rendering, or due prepa- 
ration, production, of definitions : and so elsewhere. de part. An. III 7, 18, 
droé. ro épyoy of the due performance of the work. Ib. 1 1, 43 dwod. ro 
oorouy ri éort, to state, give a sufficient account or explanation. Phys. 1 
6, 1, 189 @ 16, "Epmefox\ijs mavra amodidava (to produce, effect everything) 
oterat Goanep “Avaf. éx rev dreipwy. Eth. Nic. 111 1, 1106 8, rota 8e...00 
padicov arodotva, to give an account, explain. 

So here drro&:8ova is ‘duly to assign, distribute, or apportion’ and 
again I 2, 5, amodidopev ras xpices ‘we render our judgments’, These 
same applications of the word occur likewise in Plato, as Rep. 379 A, . 
(to represent), Ib. 472 D, VI 508 E, Phaedr. 237 Cc, Theaet. 175 D, Polit. 
295 A. The precise opposite, drokapBavew, occurs with the same sense 
of dio, 1 11, 3. drrovéyew is used in exactly the same sense, ‘to assign 
as a due’; see for instance Eth. Nic. IV 7, 1123 518, 6 rois Geots dro- 
vepouey, Ib. V 35, ripen aroveperas Trois dyabois, Ib. 1124 2 9. 


PHTOPIKHS A 1§7. 13 


A 
Te xai kaOodou éotiv, 6 8 éxxAnoiaotys Kai SikaoTys 
/ \ 4 L) 
yon Wepi TapovTwy Kat dpwpiomevwy Kpivovaw* mpos 


40n...xpivovow] by this time, now that we have come to éhem, ‘they 
actually decide...’ So in the next line, ro edreiy #8n nai ro picety ‘this time’, 
in shetrcase, not in the former, of something new, special, and marked. 
48 therefore in these cases is often translatable by a mere emphasis. 
The word is repeated so soon after, applied to the same persons, and ex- 
pressing almost identically the same thing, that it is not improbable that 
Spengel may be right in his conjecture that the one or the other should 
be erased. Rhet. Gr. Vol. I. Pref. p. v. ‘paulo post alterutrum 478 abundat, 
puto prius.’ However there are two still closer together, II 25, 14. 

It may be worth while to say a few words on this very common usage 
of #8) and analogous particles of time, in the way of illustration and 
exemplification. “Hay and its analogues ére, ovxért, ova, are used em- 
phatically to mark a critical point, climax, degree attained, as deserving 
of special and particular attention, at the moment, and in reference to 
something else which is not equally remarkable. They are all particles of 
time, and derive this their secondary sense from the metaphorical appli- 
cation of this notion of ‘already’, a definite time which we have just 
reached : ‘point’, or ‘stage’, or ‘degree’ attained being substituted by the 
metaphor for ‘time’ in the original sense of the word. 

This will be best illustrated by a few examples. Arist. wept pojpns 
cal dvapyijcews C. 2. 16, dowep Hicis 7dn ro @os, ‘habit, already by this 
time, now that we have reached this point, has become a second 
nature’. Met. A 21, 1022 6 18, éva 8é [rpowov wados Aéyerat] rovrey 
évépyerat nal ddAAodres 487, ‘one sense of wados is, the actual energies 
and changes of these’. #37, by the time that they have reached this 
stage or state, and have actually become what they are. Categ. c. 8, 9, 
a 4, qv dy ris lows Eb Fdn mpocayopevoo, ‘which may now (at this stage) 
be fairly called a cs’. epi éppnvelas Cc. 9, 19, @ 39, al paddoy péy dAnOA ry 
érépay, ov pévro: Hon (not yet actually, not guste, not yet arrived at the 
stage of,) dAnOy § Wevdn. Polit. 11 8, 1268 5 20, éxetvos 43y ériopxet. IIT 
7, 1279 @ 40, tAcious 8 dn xadendv yepiBaoba VIII (v) 8, 1308 @ 15, gore 
yap aerwep Sipos fbn of Spot, i.e. though this may not be strictly true of 
all oligarchies, when we come to the dpotos, at this stage, by this time, 
it is now gusze true that ‘key may be regarded as a Sfpos. Eth. Nic. v 3, 
1132 @ 2, wpos érepov xat dv xowwvia fon 6 dpywy, ‘when a man has come 
to be a ruler, he must fen...’ in the case of others this perhaps is not 
necessarily true, but the ruler must, actually, live or act in relation to 
others and in society’. Rhet. 1 6, 24, ravres 78y cpodocyoucty. I 10, 11, 
4dn diaepes ‘it does make a difference’. c. 11 § 3, 17d elOtopévoy Sowep 
wedunos On yiyveras. Ib. § 26, Epyor Won yiyverar, 116 § 12,and 25 §14, 

‘bis. I have confined myself in these illustrations to examples from Aris- 
totle; from the ordinary language, in which this usage is at Jeast equally 
common, I will content myself with citing Herod. 111 5, dro ravurns 73n 
Afyumros : and Eur. Hippol. 1195 (Monk) pos révroy fj8n xetpévoy Lapwrt- 
Koy, 

It is found also in French, Italian and German—dé&a, gia, schon, Crest 


14 PHTOPIKHS A 1§7. 


e ~ ~ A A 

ous kai To giAciv non Kat Td puceiv Kal to idtov 
a é 4 ef 4 t 4 

cuupepov cuvnpnTat TOAAGKIS, WOTE HKETL duvac Oa 


déja quelque chose, ‘and that’s something’. das ist schon etwas. The 
Italian gia, when used as an expression of assent, may be similarly 
explained. 

The use of demum is precisely similar, and common in most Latin 
writers. Sallust, Cat. xx zdem velle atgue idem nolle ca demum (that, 
and that alone) firma amicitia est. Quint. II 5, 1, artemgue de qua 
loguimur bonis demum (to the good, and to them alone) ¢rtdui volunt. 
Vil Praef. init. aegue enim ea demum quae ad docendum pertinent exsecuti 
sumus. VIL 2, 21, VIIL Prooem. 3, IV 5,7, XI 1 § 44, 3 § 68, et passim. 
Cic. Tusc. Disp. 1 19, 43, eague et demum naturalis est sedes, et seq., de 
Orat. 11 30, 131, At loct et demum oratori prodesse possunt. Rarer is the 
analogous use of denitgue and fandem: Cic. de Orat. II 30, 131, c. 34, 146, 
tum denique scrutart locos, c.75, 304, guantum est in eo tandem mali! 
C. 77, 315, Aésce omntbus rebus consideratis, tum denique id... Hor. Ep. 
117, 2, guo tandem pacto... On tam in this same usage, see Munro, on 
Lucr. I 600, 613, 11 314, 426; add, 11 974, and Virg. Aen. V 179, tame 
Senor, V1 304, VII 46, 735. 

Similarly in a negative sentence, otmw sometimes introduces the no- 
tion of time in estimating the amount or degree, Eth. Nic. V 10, 1135 @ II, 
TO avré 8¢ Tovro, Gray mpayOy, adixnud éort, mpiv 8€ mpayOjvas ova, add’ 
Guxov. Ib. 23, ddixoy pev adixnua 8 ovwe. Ib. 524, ov pévros mm adcKos 
—in the two former cases the unjust habit of mind is distinguished as 
‘not yet amounting to’ the actual crime or unjust act, and in the third 
case this distinction is applied to the dpdprnpya, which, though a wrong 
in itself, has not yet reached the stage or degree of the véce, confirmed 
evil habit, of adccia—also VI 10, 1142 4 14, atrn yap ovmw gaors. Ib. 
25, ovd" avrn me evBovAia, and 28. 

So also ovxérs, ‘no longer; not as before; not, now that we have 
reached this point’, Pol. v (VIII) 3, 1338 @ 6. Rhet. I 2, 21, ay yap 
évruxy apxais ovxérs Bcadexrixy ov8e prropixy, II 24, 3, GAX’ éxeivy x.7.A. Ib. 
II 9, 3. de gen. et corr. I 2, 3, 315 53, wws 8€ rovro ovxérs, Hist. Anim. 
1 6, 3, 490 4 16, rév 8é Aowray (Gov ovnérs ra yévn peyada, Ib. V1 7, 539 4 
30, ra 8¢ Onréa peév dori, Gppeva 8 ovxérs. Dem. de F. Leg. § 80, oy 3° ay 
avrot AaSnre pyker’ éxeivors wept rovrov mpoutarrere. Plat. Gorg. 503 A, 
ovx dmAovv és rovro épwras. Protag. 312 E. Xen. Oecon. 3. 1. Buttm. 
ad Mid. 13 @ p. 528, ‘ ovxére proprie valet mon ué antea, hinc non ul alias, 
non ttem, non tam? 

ovvypyra] (Bekker and Spengel. Alii cvsjpryra:) ‘with whom are con- 
nected...’ In mpds ots, mpos expresses a mere general reference, ‘with 
respect to whom’, ‘in whose case’; and ov»ypyra ‘are often taken into, 
embraced in, the account’, ovv, together with their proper business, the 
mere facts of the case and the proof of them. I can find no sufficient 
authority for ovvapeiy in this sense; the nearest approach to it is in Plat. 
Phaedr. 249 B, eis év Aoyiou@ cvvatpovpevor, but even this is something 
different. Vater makes a similar observation. The interpretation also of 
spos is certainly rather strained. Probably ovyjprnrat is right. 








PHTOPIKH® A 1 § 8,9. 15 


~ e ~ A 9 , 9 2 3 ~ ~ , 
Gewpeiv ixavws ro adAnOes, add’ émoKorety TN KpLoe 
rd A Kn 4 4 \ > “~ 
8 TO idtoy nou Hh AvaNpoY. Epi pEev OvV TwY aAAWY, 
T4 , ~ ~ 
wamep AEyouev, det ws éhaxioTwy roteiv KUpLoY TOY 
s ,) ~ , av 
KpiTnv' mept O€ TOU YyeEyovevat 4 pn yevyovevat, 
aA 4 @ s\ A a g nN Fc vA 4 +2 
n €cecOa 4 pn écecOat, 4 civat 4 pr eEtvat, 
4 ~ ~ 
dvaykn émi ois kpttais Katadeimev: ov yap 
~~ 4 oe Fe 
gduvatdv raita tov vouoberny mpoideiyv. ci Oyj 
~ A wv A e/ 0 ~ , 
Tav® ovTws Exe, pavepovy STi Ta EEwW TOU mpay- 
~ e g < 
Paros TEexvoAoyovew boot TaAAA SdtopiCoveww, oiov 
, ~ 4 av A , > ~ 
ti def TO mpooimoy 4 THY Sinynow Exew, Kal TeV 
wv ef 4 A 9 ~ 
a\Awy ExaoTov popiwys ovdey yap év auvTois aXXo 
, 4 e/ A \ 
mMpayearevovTat TAnY STws TOV KpITHY ToLOV Twa 


rd dAnOés]_ No one is a fair judge, where his own passions or interests 
are concerned. Gaisford quotes appositely, Pol. 111 16, 1287 @ ult. dAAa 
pyy eioayorrai y’ éd’ davrovs of iarpoi xduvovres GAXous iarpovs, xat ol mado- 
rpiBas yupvafopevas radorpiBas, ws ov Suvapevot xpivery ro aAnOes Sea To Kpi- 
vety Tepl Tay olxeiay xai év mabet Ovres. 

émoxoreivy] ‘to bring darkness, throw a shadow over, overshadow’. 
Dem. c. Mid. 565, 25, olxiay gxodounxey dv 'EXevoin rosavrny aote naow 
émuaxoreiy trois év tp ron. Infr. HI 3, 3. Plat. Euthyd. 274, 6 Evdvdnpos 
€seoxores tp Krnoinmp tis Seas: an odd and unexplained use of this 
word, It seems to mean that Euthydemus, by bending forward and getting 
in the way, obscured or darkened Ctesippus—not however in the ordinary 
sense of the word, but in that of intercepting the object, and so darkening 
by throwing a cloud over, and thereby depriving him of his view (ris @éas 
gen. of deprivation, implied in the verb). 

In a metaphorical sense it occurs in Dem. Olynth. B 23, 26, Isocr. 
ad Dem. § 6, and in several fragments of the Comic Poets, (Ind. ad 
Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. Vol. Vv Pt. 1 p. 393,) for instance, Eubul. incert. 
Fr. 11 (Mein. 111 267) roy olvov rp ppoveiy éemoxorety; and in other 
authors. See also Victorius : and Gaisford in not. var. p. 18. 

§ 9. ta rov spayparos] é£e for éxros. Lobeck, PAryn. p. 128. 

va La rov mpayparos reyvoAoynvow]) infra § 11; comp. de Anima I 3, 
406 6 26 xai 6 Tipatos (Plato, in the Timaeus) PuccoAoyet ry Wuxny xeveiy 
TO wpa. 

diopifery] to separate by a limit or boundary line. Herodot. Iv 42 
Scovpiodrray Aviny re xai AcBiny. Hence to separate a thing from others, to 
mark off as a special province or domain, and so of ‘ the definition’, which 
includes all that is essential to, or characteristic of, the thing defined, and 
excludes everything else. The word here of course means something 
more than a bare definition; it expresses the limitation or ‘determination’ 
of the proper contents of the mpooipcop. 


16 PHTOPIKHS A 1§ 10. 


A ~ ® , A 
Tomowow. wept O€ TwY EvTEXYWY TiaTEWY oUdEV 
~ xy 
Sexvvovow? Tovto & éotiv dOev av tis yévotTo 
4 ~ ~ ~ wv 
évOupnpatixos. Oia yap TovTo THs avTHs ovens 
, A 4 4 A 4 4 
peBodou wept Ta Snunyopixa kai dtxavxa, kal Kad- 
4 ~ ~ 
Alovos Kat woXTikwTepas THs SnunyopiKHs mpaypya- 


évreyvot riorets] are the regular systematic proofs by enthymeme and 
example, the odya rijs wicrews § 3, and opposed here, not merely to the 
drexvor wlaress Of c. 15, the witnesses, documents, torture, oaths and such 
like, which we do not zzvent?, but find ready to our hand to be employed 
in the support of our case; but also to the irregular appeals to the 
feelings (3d6os), and to evidence from character (480s). 

§ 10. soAcrixwrépas ris Snpryopixhs mpaypareias] rpayparelas, here ap- 
plied to the study and practice of one of the departments of Rhetoric ; see 
on § 3.—+roAcrixwrépas : There are three possible senses of this word, firstly, 
‘more worthy of, more becoming to, a citizen’, more agreeable to the po- 
sition and duties of a citizen, ‘better and worthier’; secondly, ‘more suitable 
to a public man, statesman, or politician’, larger, more comprehensive, 
and liberal; as opposed to the comparatively trifling and petty occupa- 
tions of private citizens : ¢Avd/y, more public and common, wider, more 
general; xowor, as opposed to idcoy and olxetov: the second seems to be 
the most appropriate here, and so I have rendered it in the paraphrase. 
[p. 141 of the Introduction: “nobler and larger and more liberal (or 
‘ statesmanlike’, or ‘more worthy of a citizen’,) vid. not. ad loc.” | 

peOddou rep) ra dnpnyopexa nal 8ixavna] The third kind of Rhetoric, ro 
émSecxrixov, is here omitted, but afterwards supplied, c. 3 § 1. 

ms 8npryopixis mpaypareias 7 THs wep) ra ovvaddaypara] ‘The most 
general expression which the Athenians have for a contract is ovval- 
Adyua, ovvOnxn, cvpBcraov.’ Meier und Schémann der Altische Process 
p. 494. The difference usually taken between ovv@yxn and ovvadAaypa 
appears in Rhet. 115, 22 ére 8€ mparreras ta rodAa Tov cuvaddAaypaToy 
(ordinary dealings, buying and selling and such like transactions), cal ra 
dxovowa xara cvvOyjxas (in the way of, by contracts): we are concerned here 
only with the first and third of these, avyaAAaypa and ovpBodraioyp. 

The ordinary signification of both of these is a contract, or covenant, 
or mutual agreement, or interchange (avva\Aayza), between two or more 
parties, They are thence extended to any dealings, especially business 
transactions, or even any circumstances of ordinary intercourse between 
man and man, and more particularly any of those which may give rise to 
a suit at law. These are ia ovpBodaa or cwvaddaypara: see Dem. de 
Cor. p. 298 § 210, ra row xaf yyépay Biov ovpBodraa, with Dissen’s note: 
Isocr. Paneg. §§ 11, 78, a. dvrid. §§ 3, 38, 40, 42, 79 ra KaTa THY WoAL Kai ra 
oupBdraia ra ytyvopeva mpos yas avrovs. § 309 €y rois aydat rots wrepl ray 
ovpBodaiwy. The former of these two seems to refer rather to dealings in 
general, the second to special contracts. Areop. §§ 33, 34- Arist. Eth, 
N. Il 1, 1103 3 15 mparrovres yap ra éy rots ouvadAdypact Tois Mpos rovs 
dvOpamous yryvopeba ol pev dixaror of 3€ dyaOoi. Rhet. 1 15, 22 érs 8e 
mparrerat ToAAG TOY GvvadAdayparey cal Ta dxovgta Kard Tas ouv- 





PHTOPIKHS A 1§10. 17 


I 4 4 vn ~ A A / A 
TEl\aS OUONS N THs TEpt Ta ouvadrAaypaTa, TrEpt 
s > A 0G tA q oe ~ bY , @ 
pev éxeivns ovdey AEeyouct, wept dé Tov dixalecOau 
4 ~ ~ ee € 4 4 
WAvres TWeipwvTar TEXVOAOYEW, OTL NTTOV ETL TPO 
# \ ‘on : Pe 
Epyou ta é€w Tov mpayyatos Neyew év ois Snpn- 
~ A 4 ~ 
yopikols kai nT Tov é€oTt Kakovpyov 4 Snunyopia Siko- 


Onxas. Rhet. ad Alex. c. 1 {2 Oxf.) § 2 rats wept ra cupBorasa 8txato- 
Aoyiats. 

That the meaning of the terms is not confined to contracts proper, is 
plain also from Eth. N. v 1131 a2. (This passage is quoted at length 
On I 15, 22.) rev yap cvvad\Aayparoy ra pev éxaioia ra 8 dxovora (the 
‘voluntary’ being illustrated by buying and selling, lending and borrow- 
ing, whereas ‘involuntary’ are all of them crimes, Aa@paia or Biaa : all of 
them cases in which the breach of the supposed contract, private or 
public, entitles the aggrieved party to a legal remedy). Opposed to 
these i3:a oupsSoAaa or cuvaAAdypara are the public (cod) international 
commercial treaties, aipBoda. See further on ovpuBoda, note onc. 4 § 11. 

oupforata is also employed in a wider and more general sense, as 
Rhet. ad Alex. c. 2 (3 Oxf.) § 2 wept ray mpds GAAas modes ouppayidy 
xai gupBodalwy. Other examples may be found in Plat. Gorg. 484 D 
cmeipos THY Adyww ols Sei ypwpevov cpsrclv dv Trois EvpBoraioas. Rep. | 
333 A ri 8é 89; mv Bcxatocvyny mpos rivos yxpeiay fj xrjow dv elpjvy pains 
&y ypyoipov eivas; Ipos ra fupBodaca, & Sexpares. KupBddraa 8 Adyers 
xowornpara, | Tt dAXo; Kowowrvjpara 8jra, and several others in Ast’s 
Lexicon. Arist. Polit. Iv (v1) 16, 1300 4 22, and 32 rep roy pixpoy ovvad- 
Aayparey, doa Spaypiaia nal mwevradpaxpa nai pixp@ mrciovos. Ib. 15 ult. 
1300 5 12, dpyy 4 Trav wept rv ayopay ovpBodaiwy (dealings) xupia. Comp. c. 
8 sub init. dpyy wepi ra ocupBodraa. VI (VII) 2, 1317 4 27, Il 13, 1283 8 30, 
and elsewhere. 

apo @pyou] ‘to the purpose’; anything ‘for’, or ‘in favour of’, and 
therefore ‘likely to promote’, any ‘work’ we may have in hand; and 
hence generally ‘serviceable’ or ‘ profitable’ to any purposes. «po épyou 
(which also occurs infra 1 4 §§ 3, 7) is the Aristotelian mode of writing 
what in Xenophon, Plato, Demosthenes, and indeed ordinary Greek in 
general, appears as mpovpyouv. Some examples an Fritsche ad Eth. Eud. 
A 3, 1215 @ 8. . 

xaxovpyov] As a special variety of the general conception of dis- 
honesty, fraud, knavery, this adjective is applied in a peculiar sense 
to sophistical reasoning. Rhet. 111 2, 7 rav & dvopatoyv re pev codrory 
Gpeovupias xpnotpot, mapa TavTas yap xaxovpyei. Topic. { 11, 172 6 21, Plat. 
Gorg. 483 A. Dem. Lept. 491. Stallb. ad Rep. 1 338 D. Similarly ov«o- 
dapreiy is used for cheating in argument, bringing fallacious objections, 
Top. © 2, 157 @ 32. I (de Soph. El.) 15,174 49. Both of them represent 
the knavish tricks and fallacies which may be employed in rhetorical and 
dialectical reasoning. Plat. Rep. 341 B mpos ratra xaxovpyet Kal ov«o- 
ayret, 

A debate in a political assembly, which turns upon questions of public 
and national concern (xo«worepoy), in which accordingly the audience, who 


AR. I. 2 


18 PHTOPIKH® A 1 § 10. 


Aoylas, Stt Kowdtepov. évravOa pev yap & KprTns 
qept oikelwy Kpivet, wor’ ovdev GAO Set ANY azr0- 
Seifar Ort obTws exer ws noiv 6 cupBovAcvwr 
éy 8¢ trois Sicavixois ovx ixavoy TovTO, dAAa mpo 
gpyou éoriv dvadaBeiv tov dkpoatny' epi ddAo- 
tplwy yap 4 Kpiois, WoTE TpOs TO AUTMY OKOTrOUpEVOL 
kal mpos xapw axpowpevor Sidoaot tois duduaBn- 


are al] members of it, have a strong personal interest, and are therefore 
impatient of anything that would divert them from the direct proof of the 
expediency or inexpediency of the policy recommended or condemned, 
affords much less room for these deceptive arts ad captandum, ra é&o 
rou mpayparos, than the practice of the law-courts, where the judges who 
decide the case are usually not personally interested in the issue, and the 
pleader has therefore to creaée an interest in them by these irregular me- 
thods : this is on the principle so pithily stated by the Corinthian envoys, 
Thuc. I 120, 3 xaxovs xptrds os px mpoonKovrey elva. (This is a more cor- 
rect mode of stating the argument than that adopted in the paraphrase, 
Introd. p. 141.) 

This contrast of the two kinds of audiences, in respect of their several ~ 
dispositions to keep the speakers to the point, does not hold of our own 
law-courts and parliaments. The Athenian dicasts, careless, ignorant, and 
unprofessional, selected at random from the population of the city, with 
their sense of responsibility diminished or destroyed by the large number 
of those who had to decide, might very likely be indifferent to the issue of 
the case before them, and require a stimulus to their attention from the 
parties immediately concerned: but this is not true of the professional 
judges of our courts, who regard the right decision of the case as a business 
and a duty. 

o xpirns] applied to the éxxAyovaorys in the general sense of ‘judge’ or 
‘critic’ of the question or arguments employed ; supr. § 7. Introd. p.137, 
note I. 

avadaBeiv] is to ‘ bring back’, ‘recover’; hence to ‘gain over’, ‘con- 
ciliate’, as dva in avareiOew, dvadiddcxew, dvadiddvat, avadéxerOas x.7.X. 
‘Membranae Balliolenses, caftare: Muretus, accurare, excifere: Portus, 
reficere, recreare, i perapopa ab aegrotis, vel conctliare. Omnes hae no- 
tiones a primaria resumendt, ad se recipiendt, facile deducuntur.’ Gaisford. 
The order is, (1) to ‘get or bring back’; thence, (2) to ‘bring back into 
the proper and normal state’, as of ‘recovery’ from a disease—the notion 
of something as due being again implied as in drodsdova, note on § 7— 
and thence again, (3) as here, to ‘restore’, as it were, the audience to 
their proper state of mind, conciliate them to your views and interests. 
Hence, lastly, the senses of reparare, reficere, recreare, and the like; 
abundantly illustrated in Steph. 74es. ed. Did. Vol. 1 pp. 431—2. 

ddéacw] (€avrovs) sese dant, ‘lend themselves’, 6 & 1dovy 8ovs, Eur. 
Phoen. 21. Valck. Déa/r. p. 233. And so, many of its compounds, 


a 





PHTOPIKHS A 1 §11. 19 


TovaWW,.aAX’ ov Kpivovowv. O10 Kal 7OAAaXOU, Wo7TEp 
Kat TPOTEpOV El7TOMEV, O VOUOS KwAVEL AEyeY ELwW TOU 
mpayuaros. éxet & avtol o: pital TOTO TnpovoLW 
I1ikavws. émet dé pavepov dorw STi  pev EvTexvos 
wedodos rept Tas mictes éotiv, 4 S€é riots dmrobetis 
tis (TOTE yap morTevopey padiaoTa BTav arrocEdEl- 
X9at vrroraBwuev), ott 8 drrodakis pntopixn évOv- 
Mnua, Kal Eort ToVTO ws Eimely dTAWs KUpLwTAaTOY 
Ttav wictewy, TOS evOdunua avAACYIoMOS TIS, Tepe 
d€ ovAAOYio MOU Guoiws amavros THs StadexTeKs Early 


evdidovas, Exdidovas, emiBcSovar, arodi ovat, Scadsdovat, Vrodidovat, mapad:dovat, 
(n30v9 sapadsovs, Pl. Phaedr. 250 D), mpodiSovas (Herod. bis), éxddovac 
(Herod.). The process is the usual one by which transitive verbs become 
intransitive, viz. by the ellipse of the reflexive pronoun. 

§ 11. 4 8é wiors drodetis ris] drodecgis, in its strict, proper, and 
highest senses, is exact scientific demonstrative proof, by syllogism, 
leading from and to universal and necessary conclusions. And therefore, 
properly speaking, mapamAyjovovy aiveras pabnparixod te miOavodoyovvros 
dwrodexerOas xal pnropixoy drodeifers drareity, Eth. Nic. 11, dmrodeckis ovA- 
Aoytopos émsornpovexos, Anal. Post. 1 2,71 5 18. é& dvayxalwy dpa ova- 
Aoytopos corw 4 amcdeks, C. 4,73 4224. arddekis ovAdoytopds Secxrixds 
airias xai rou dia rt, Ib. ¢ 24, 85 523. adrodeckts dorly, cray €€ ddnbayv xai 
wporav o avdrdoyiopos F, 4} x roovrwy & dia Tivew mparev Kal dAnOay ris 
wepi aura yrorens THy dpxny eiAnder, Topic. A I, 100 a 27. Waitz, Comm. 
ad Anal. Post. Vol. 1 p. 293 seq. miorss therefore, whose premisses and 
conclusions are never more than ‘ probable’, cannot properly be said to 
be ‘a kind of demonstration’. It resembles it however, and may be 
regarded as a ‘sort of demonstration’ in this; that probable proof often 
produces a belief or conviction as strong and certain as that which 
follows from demonstration. It is therefore to be understood here, as 
often elsewhere, as a general term including proof of every kind. A 
similar misapplication of drod&ecéis to rhetorical proof is found in Rhet. 
II 1,2, and II 20,9. So ovAdoyiferbat, of reasoning, inference, conclusion in 
general ; Rhet.1 6§17, 10§ 1, 11§ 23 and 11 22 § 4, where ovAAoy:cpoi stands 
for ‘Enthymemes’ ; Poet. 4, 5, cupfaives Oewpotvras pavOdvew xal ovddo- 
yilerOa vi éxacrov. Phys. 11 1, 193 47, ovAdoyicatro yap dy ris éx ‘yeverijs 
éy rudds wepl xpwparav. Similarly, drodeccrixés of a rhetorical argument 
or speech, Rhet. 11 1, 2, pos rov Adyow dpa, Srws drodextixos (conclusive) 
4 «nal motos. A still more remarkable example of this looseness of 
expression occurs I 4, 5, where Dialectics is called 4 avaAureny émornpy- 
The rhetorical enthymeme, again ‘a kind of amcderfts’, is subsequently 
and this time correctly, called xupsararoyv ray miorewv. See Introd. p. 92. 

ro 8° dvOupnpa ovAdoy:opos tts] On the enthymeme, Introd. p. 1o1— 
105. On zepi 8€ ovAdoyropod ideiv, and on pepous reves, Introd. p. 143, note. 

2—2 


20 PHTOPIKHS A 1 §11. 


- a a , , ~ ef 
ideiv, 1 avrins SAns | pépous Ties, SyAov’ OTe 6 pa- 
~ 4 ~ > ~ 
AiwTa TovTO Suvazevos Oewpeiv, EK Tivwy Kal Tus 
, = A aA 
yiverat avAAoyiopos, ovTos Kal évOuynuatios av 
af , 4 ‘ ~/ 9 9 } a 
ein padiora, mpooAaBov mept moia 7 éotl ta 
? / \ , 4 8 8 ‘ 
évOuunuata Kai tivas Exec diadopds mpéds Tous 
A 4 ‘4 A ) \ A 4 
Aoyikous avANOytoMoUs’ TO TE yap aAnOEs Kal TO 
1 Sydow 8 O78 


3nrov d¢] de, omitted by one MS, and rejected by Buhle, Schrader, 
Bekker, and Spengel, is retained and defended by Victorius and Vater. 
It is justified not only by the common usage of the Greek language (see 
Buttm. Exc. x11 on Dem.c. Mid. de particula 8 in apodosi, p. 150; the 
passages which he thus quotes might be multiplied indefinitely), but also 
by the special usage of Aristotle himself. Waitz, on Organ. 17 4 1, Vol. 
I p. 335, comp. Zell ad Eth. Nic. 1 1 § 4, Vol. 11 p. 5, who quotes 
examples from Aristotle, to which add Rhet.1 4 § 2,1 10 § 4, 1 11 §§6 and 
II, II 25 § 10, an exact parallel, the protasis here also commencing with 
érei. Similarly Pol. vii (Iv) 13 init. del 8¢ dv’ dorw (a long parenthesis of 
several clauses intervenes, and the apodosis begins with) 8 & éy rais 
réxyvas x... de Anima I 3, 406 a 4and ro, Phys. VI 8, 2, ef rd pev... 
toragba 8é. See also Stallb. on Phedo 78c. The particle is thus used 
in the apodosis generally, not always, as a repetition of a preceding d¢, 
and in these cases may be translated by “I say”. It refeats in order to 
recal the attention to the connexion of the apodosis with the foregoing 
protasis, which might be overlooked after a long parenthesis: in cases 
where this would not be necessary, it may be accounted for by the 
influence of habit or association. Of the many illustrative passages I 
had collected from other writers as well as Aristotle, I will content myself 
with citing two or three apposite ones from Thucydides. 1 11, sub init., 
érrecd) 8€ ddixdpevos paxn éxparncay, (parenthesis) daivovras 8¢ x7.A. 118 
init., érecdn 8¢ (ten lines) pera 8€ ry ray rupayvey xardAvow «.r.A. II 65, 
éwei re 6 wodepos Karéorn, 6 8¢ Gaiverat xal év ror mpoyvods Thy Suvayty. 
IV 132, 0 8€ Hepdixxas x.r.A. and VIII 29 (three of these are referred to by 
Arnold, note 2 on 1 11). Paley on Aesch. P. V. 952, 994, 2nd ed. gives 
some instances from Aeschylus. I may also add Plat. Phaedo 78 C, ra 8¢ 
GAAor’ GAdws xal pydewore xara ravra, ravra 8¢ elva ra fivbera. A good 
example may be found in Phaedo 87 A, B, 8ovs 8é—el 3¢ rotro... 

rovs Noysxous ovAAoyicpovs}] Waitz on Anal. Post. 1 21, 82 4 35, p. 353, 
‘opponitur rg Aoyids rd dvadurinds 84 a 8, 86 @ 22, 88 a 19, accurata 
demonstratio, quae veris ipsius rei principiis nititur, ei quae probabili 
quadam ratione contenta est....Unde fit ut Acy«oy idem fere sit quod 
diadexrixov. And this is its usual signification...‘Quamquam’ (he adds, 
referring to the present passage) ‘1355 a 13, quum Aoytxds ovAAoysopos et 
hic et in iis que proxime sequuntur opponatur rhetorico syllogismo (é»6v- 
pnpart), veram demonstrationem significare videatur.’ To the same effect 
is what follows, where ro aAnOés exact truth and knowledge, scientific cer- 
tainty, is represented as the object of the Aoy:coi ovAAoyiopoi, and rd duotoy 
t@ adnOei (probability, ra é8ofa, which has only a resemblance to truth), 








PHTOPIKHS A 1 §11. 21 


ry ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~. ef 

Omoov TH aANnOet THs adTys éoti Suvapews ideiv, aua 

oe q e oe 4 ‘ea °°? \ c e ~ 
€ kai ot @vOpwrot mpos TO GAnGes we:uKaci ikavws 
A A , Ul ~ 9 4 A 8 

Kai Ta mAEiw Tuyyavovot THs adAnOeias’ to mpos 
4 ~ w+ ~ 4 

Ta Evooka wToxaoTiKWs ExXEW TOU Gpuolws EXOVTOS 

4 4 

apes Thy dAnOaay éoriv. 

ef ) *, A wv ~ , e af 

OTL fev ouv Ta E~wW TOU MpayyuaTtos ot adAot 

~ ‘4 ~ I 4 A 
TEXVONOYOUVG!, Kat SioTt MaAAOV drrovevevKaGL TpOS 


mew 


Ka@ 


as the object of the enthymeme. And as both are apprehended by the 
same faculty, this faculty will be cultivated by the study and exercise of 
both alike, and the processes that lead to them, syllogism and enthymeme ; 
and therefore the knowledge of the materials and modes of constructing 
syllogisms, and the practical application of them, equally in all their 
varieties, demonstrative, dialectical, and rhetorical (enthymeme), are ser- 
viceable to the rhetorician as a training and preparation for the practice 
of his art. | 

pos ta év8ofa] ‘things probable, matters of opinion, not certainty’ ; 
the materials, objects, and results of Rhetoric, as of Dialectics. Top. A 
10, 104 2 8, gore 8¢ mporacts Scadexriay dpodrnois evdofos, «r.A. Ib. c. 1, 
100 35 21, dvdofa 8¢ ra Soxotvra waow 4 rois mAeloras f rois copois, Kat 
Tourcss } waow f rois tAcioTos f Tois padtora yvopipos Kal dvdcgors. Cic. 
de Orat. 1 23, 108, sunt enim varia et ad vulgarem popularemque 
sensum accommodata omnia genera huius forensis nostrae dtctionts. 

d&drc] ‘that’,=dre. The earliest instance of this use of &dére appears to 
be in Herod. 11 50. It occurs in Xenophon (add Symp. 1 11, to the 
examples in Sturz’s Lexicon), Plato, Ep. 1 309 D, Dem. de Cor. §§ 155, 167, 
184, but each time ## a document. Isocr. Paneg. § 48, Phil. § 1, Archid, 
§ 24, Plat. § 23, Antid. §§ 133, 263. m. rot (evyous § 43, apos KadAipaxoy 
§§ 1, 31. (Some of these referring to Isocrates are derived from Benseler’s 
note, Praef. p. v note 4, who has the following remark, from Baiter on 
Paneg. § 48, ‘Isocrates ubicunque drs usurpavit, id fecisse videtur 
hiatus evitandi causa’ [see esp. Isocr. Lochit. § 7, where dvOvpoupevous ore 
is followed by xai 8corc...S.} It is found several times in the Rhet. ad 
Alex. as c. 17 p. 1432 @ 16, c. 30 p. 1437 @ 19, and elsewhere, but it is in 
Aristotle that it first becames common; too common to need further 
illustration. See however Waitz on Anal. Pr. 58 4 7, Comm. 1 p. 495. 
For dors = drt, Steph, Zhes. Vol. 11 1544 cites Crito Com. ap. Athen. 4, 
P. 173 C, wdvrev dxovwy didri mapacir rowos odros tpia povow ayaba xe- 
xrnobas Soxei. Its ordinary sense is ‘ because’. 

It has also a third signification, ‘why’; the indirect interrogative, 
corresponding to the direct, did ri, as dros to mais, Grore to ware, Soros to 
woaos, Grou to mov, &c. In this sense it occurs in Plato, Phaedo 100 C, 
(four other examples in Ast’s Lex.), Xen. Cyrop. VIII 4,7, 9 Kal ¢xots ay 
alveiy Sdre ; Demosth. Phil. A 46, 10; Isocr. Archid. § 16, and in Aris- 
totle, Rhet. 1! 23, 24, (where it is explained by the preceding rjy alriay), 
Polit. Iv (v1) 11, 1296 @ 22, Met. A 1, 981 @ 29, where again it is ex- 
plained by 14» alriay). wept dvanvevoews 14, ult. and elsewhere, e.g. Ar. de 


22 PHTOPIKHS A 1 §12. 


A ~ , - , °° 9 A e e¢ 4 
12 TO Sucodoyelv, havepov' xpnoiuos 0 ext 4 pnTopiKy 
rf 4 ‘4 > 4 ] ~ A A , 
did Te TO Guoe civat kpeirtw TadnOy Kal Ta dixata 
~ A s A A ~ 
TwVv évayTiwy, wore éav fn KaTa TO TpoaHKoy ai 
4 ~ ~ n 
Kpioves yiyvevra, advayKn O¢ avtav yrTacOa TovTO 


Anima II 8, 12, 421 a 4, havepov 8é nat Bore of iybds apavos, ov yap fxover 
gapvyya. In Rhet. 11 11, 14, it is explained by 70 aircov. Cf. Amphis Dith. 
Fragm. 1 ap. Meineke, Comm. Fragm. U1 306; B. da ri & ovx ayes eis 
TOV GxAov avro; A. Score HudAry mepipevo. 

With dacrs ‘that’, compare ovvexa and 6@ovvexa in Sophocles, as Philoct. 
634, the reason, the what for, passes into a mere statement of fact; 
because, into that. See Ellendt, Lex. Soph. odovvexa. 

Grovevew, to bend the head away from something else and turn the 
attention to a particular object ; hence, to incline to, fix the attention 
upon: amo as in droBAerey, (supr. § 1). Plat. Theaet. 165 A, ée roy 
Witav Adyor wpos Thy yeoperplay dnevevcapev. In Plat. Legg. vil 815 A, 
éxvevois mAryor xai Bodo, is declinatio, the bending of the head aside to 
avoid a blow. (In Eur. Iph. T. 1186 v. 1155 Herm. ot & és 76 ris Geov 
y elévevoas elxorws, é£évevoas is of doubtful interpretation. Hermann, 
followed by Paley, derives it from éxveiy evadere, referring to Valckenaer 
on Hippol. 469, and 822. It seems however at least equally probable 
that the aorist belongs to éxvetecw abnuere, opposed to émvevew annuere, 
and that the meaning of the line is “It was natural, or reasonable, for thee 
to decline, reject, their offer, els ré ris Geod y’, looking to, in respect of, 
in regard of, thy duty to the goddess”. This sense of the word seems to 
be more in conformity with what precedes ; and it occurs again in line 
1330 Dind., with the same sense and derivation, ¢£évevo” droorjvat, 
beckoned us of, “‘ gave us a sign to stand aloof ”.) 

§ 12. xpnowmos—evrevEews] This passage is cited by Dionysius, 
Epist.ad Amm. I c. 6. He reads &d ye for da re, and &d8acxadia for 
&8acxaXias (six lines below). 

On the defence of Rhetoric, compare Quint. Inst. Orat. 11 17, 26, seq. 
(in 11 16 he sums up the arguments against the use of it), Isocr. dyrid. 
§ 251 seq. and Id. Nicocles, § 1—9, also Gorgias, in Plato’s dialogue, c. XI 
456 A—457 C. On the true office and functions of the orator, Cic. de 
Orat. 1 46, 202—a striking passage. Id. de Invent. I 3 and 4. 

dua re] re is answered by the (irregular) correlative dé in %rs 8é at the 
beginning of the next sentence. de Anima II 4, 7, 416 a@ 2—6, otre 
(parenth.)...rpés 8€ rovrots. 

dvaykn 3¢ avray yrracGa] The argument of this clause, ypnotpos 8é— 
émitinoews, is summed up in two lines of Euripides, Alex. Fragm. 55 (12) 
Dind. dyAwoaig 3¢ mwodddxts AnPbeis dvdp | 8ixata Aé~as Focoy evyAdooou 
déper. It is to the effect, that truth and right having a natural superiority 
over falsehood and wrong, the proper use of Rhetoric is to enable them to 
assert and enforce that superiority ; to bring truth to light, and detect 
and expose deceit and sophistry. If the opposites of truth and right do 
ever prevail over these, it must be the fault of the parties concerned 
themselves, dyayxn 8° avray yrracba, who have failed to avail themselves 


PHTOPIKHS A 1§12._ 23 


5 3 A wv 9 s ow oe A » # oO 
éoriy agtov émiryunoews. Ett Sé mpos évious ov 
a a 
et tTyy axptBeorarny Exopev Emiotnunv, padiov ar’ 
2 4 ~ , A ‘4 , 9 e 
exeiyns metoa Aeyovras:' didacKaNias yap éoTw o 
. ' , , ~ 2e 0 9 9 
KaTa Tnhv émarnuny oyos, TovTo 6é€ dduvarov, dAX 
g ~ ~ om A 
avaykn Sia twv Kowwv roeicba ras qwiores Kai 
a ‘4 ~ ~ e 
Tous Noyous, women Kai év Tois TommKois éAEyouer 
q ~ A | a 9 s a4 4 
wept THS mpos Tous moAAous évrev~ews. Ett de 


of this powerful instrument. Rhetoric is therefore ‘corrective’ or ‘re- 
medial’ of the perversion of truth and right to which legal decisions are 
always more or less liable from misrepresentation of facts, fallacious 
arguments, or the blinding of the judgment by appeals to the feelings. 

According to this translation of 8¢ avray, it is correctly and logically 
said that it is @ conseguence (dare) of the natural superiority of truth and 
right to their opposites, that if those who have truth dnd right on their 
side are defeated, their defeat must be due to themselves, to their 
own neglect of Rhetoric, which would have enabled them to enforce 
this their #atural superiority. Whereas if we follow Victorius (and 
Spengel who assents to his view, Arist. Ars Rhet. Vol. 11 p. 26) in 
explaining 8’ avraoy by 8¢ dvavriwy, dare becomes incorrect or meaning- 
less: for there is neither truth nor sense in saying that it /ollows from 
the natural superiority of truth and justice that these, in the case of a 
wrong judgment, are defeated by their opposites ; and not only so, but 
with this interpretation dyayxn is also wrong—the consequence, if there 
be one, is certainly not necessary—and 8 avra» should be un’ avray. 

In the Introd. p. 144 note, 1 have referred to Waitz’s note on Anal. 
Pr. 55 @ 14, who gives examples of avray &c. for the reflexive aura» &c. 
The usage is however so constant in Aristotle as hardly to need illus- 
tration. A good example is de Anima I! 5, 6, 417 5 24, &d vonoas pev en’ 
avr@, omdray BovAnrat, aicOdverOar 8 ovx én’ adrp. Rhet. 1 4, 9, és’ avrois, 
‘in their own power’. 

wpos éviovs| ‘in dealing with some’. 

&:8arxaXlas] de Soph. El. c. 2, 161 6 1, quoted in Introd. p.75. Genuine 
and complete ‘instruction’ by demonstrative proofs. ‘Fop. A c. 14, 105 6 30, 
wpos péy ovv pirocodlay xar aAndeay (i.e. 8: drodei£ews) wept avray mpay- 
parevreov, dsadtexrixes (and therefore also pyrepmws) mpos dofay. 

6 xara Thy émcornpny Adyos] émernpn defined és awod8ererixn, Eth. Nic. 
VI 3 «60.8 dmornrév cai émorjpn diuadhépes rod Bofacrou Kal dofns, ore 9 
pév émiornpy xaboXou xai 8¢ dvayxaiory, rd 8¢ dyayxaioy ovn évddyerat dAdos 
éxecy,...7 8¢ Sofa aBeBasov. 

€y rois Tomtkois] A 2 101 a 30. 

tis pos rovs mwoAAoves évrevEews] Topic. u.s, Metaph. f §, 1009 a 17, 
gars 8 ovx 6 avrds rpomos mpos wavras ris évrev£ews’ ol pév yap reBois 
Séovra, of 8é Bias, where in line 20, dwayrncts is substituted for erevgts. 
Isocr. wpds Anpovexow § 20, rds évrevéass px wocov (hold conversation, 
intercourse) muxvas rois avrois, Alex. ad Top. I. c. dvrevgas Aéyes ras 


24 PHTOPIKHSE A 1 §§ 12, 13. 


4 ~ 4 A = 
tavavTia det SuvacOa reife, xaOamep Kat év Tois 
~ f , 
ovAAoyiapois, ovX Srws dudorepa mpaTTwpuev (ov 
A ~ ‘) ~ td , 
yap Sef ta havda weiPev) adr’ iva pyre Navbavy 

~ ef ~ td 
mas Exel, Kal Srrws aAov XowpEevov Tos AOyols pH 
f 9 | 4 w ~ ‘ v wv 

Ouaiws avTot Ave Exwuev. TwY ev oUV aAAWY 

TEXVWY OUdEMia TdvavTia ovAdoyiCeTal, 4 O€ Sta- 

Aektixn Kai  pnToptKy ovat TOVTO TroLovVatW Gpoiws 

~ 4 

yap eiow dudorepat Twy évayTiwv. Td MevTOL U7r0- 

/ , 9 e , 4 9 » >» , 9 6n 

KELMEVa TWPAYMaATA OVX OMOolws ExEt, AAA aet TadAnON 

~ 0 td 4 

kai Ta BeATiw TH vou EvoVArNOYWTOTEPA Kal 

“a ~ , 

aiPaverepa ws adrAws eitreiv. mpds S€ ToUTOLS aTOTO 

9 ~  d A 4 N 4 ~ 

ei TO TwMaTL pev atoxypoy pn Suvacba BonOeiv 

@ ~ Xo 3 ouUK at foe N tAX rt) ’ 9 l 
€avTa@, AOYH UK atoypovy O padAov idiov éore P. 13551 

~ ~ , e ? 
13 dvOpwrou THs TOU TwuaTos xpeias. ei SF STi meyada 


apos woAXovs cuvovaias, ols Sei pév evrvyyavewy Kowowxois Svras xal diray- 
Opedrous cal évrvyxave operipos. 

éyrevécs is therefore a lighting upon, or, meeting; hence a meeting 
which leads to a ‘conversation’; or, as arising casually out of that, 
a dialectical ‘ encounter’. 

ert 8¢ rdvavria—dvew Exopev] de Soph. El. 1, 165 @ 24, Zors 8 ws ev 
arpos dy elrety fpyov mept exacroy rou eldcros dwevdeiy péy avror mepl dy 
olde, Tov 8¢ Wevdouevoy éucavifew SuvacGa:, Rhet. ad Alex. c. 19 (20) 2, rad 
bey ovv alripara ravura dort, dcecdopeda 8 avrav ras Scadhopas, iv’ elddres ro 
re Sixaoy xal rd d8sxor xpdpeOa xara roy xaipdy, cal pi) AarOavoow yas 
ol évavrio: ddexdy ts alrovpres rovs Sixafovras. 

més eyes] ‘the true state of the case’ (how things really are). - 

Avew) solvere, adiluere, ‘to loose, untie, the knot of a fallacy’, or 
difficulty ; and so to ‘solve’ as a problem. 4 yap Serepow evmopia Avors 
THY Wporépwy aropoupévey ori, Avew 8’ ove gor dyvoevyras Tov secpow 
Met. B 1,995 @ 28. Avots Opposed to Séors, Poet. ec. 08, §§ 1, 2. On 
Avors and Avew see Introd. on II 25, p. 267, note. 

Toy péy ody GAoy Teyvor—ray evavrioy] Introd. p. 78. 

ra Umroxeipeva mpaypara] Comp. I 2,1, s#biecta materies y vmoxespévn UAn 
Eth. Nic. 1 1, 1094012. 16 vroxeipevoy, ‘the logical subject’, of which 
other things are ‘ predicated’, xampyopeiras. See Waitz, Comm. ad Organ. 
1 a 20, Vol. I p. 274. Trendel. E/. Log. Ar. § 1, note p. 52. Id. Catego- 
rienlchre § 10, p. 53 seq. Bonitz ad Met. Z 3, 1028 3 36. 

TP cadport péy...Acyp 8¢] On this use of péw and dé, Buttm. Gr. Gr. 
(Engl. Transl) § 149, p. 396. Id. not. on Mid. § 7 a, 49 ¢, 56 a. 

§ 13. ef 8 Gre péyada PrawWecey dy (pyoer ris) «.rA.] On the abuse of 
arts and natural gifts, and the answers to the argument from the abuse 
to the use of them, see Quint. Inst. Orat. 11 16, 5, Isocr. wep) avridocews 


‘PHTOPIKHS A 1 § 14. 25 


A N e td sas ~ é 4 
Brawetev av 6 Xpupevos adixws 7H ToavTy Suvaper 
~ ~ ? ~ 
Twv NOYWV, TOUTO YE KOtVOY EOTL KATA TavTWY TwY 

~ A ~ , ~ 
ayabuy wAnv dperins, Kal padkiora Kata TeV xpNot- 
flwTaTov, oloy taxVos Uyeias wAOVTOU OTpaTHYyias- 
‘ wv 
TovTos ydp av Tis WHEN EE TA PEYOTE YPWMEVOS 
, q Ul AYA 
ducaiws cal BAaweev addinws. 
4 A v wv Ww 
14 OTt pev ouv ouvK ETI BUTE EvOS TiWOS ‘yévoUS 
4 v4 ‘ 
apwpiouevov i pntopikn, d\Aa Kabarep 4 Siadex- 
4 4 , , e ~ 
TiKn, Kal OTL Xpnoyos, pavEepov, Kal BTL Ov TO TrEioat 


§ 252, Plato, Gorg. u, s., Bacon, Nov. Org. ? 129. Comp. Eth. Nic. 11 3 
roaurny 84 ria wAayny eyet xai rdyaba Sia Td wodAois cupBaive SAdBas 
ax avrav. on yap Twes dredAovro dua wAovroy, «repos de 8: dydpeiay. 

rouro ye xowov] Ovid. Trist. 11 266, Nil prodest quod non laedere 
possit idem. Schrader. 

Any aperis| Gaisford refers in illustration to Archytas ap. Stob. I p. 
1§- Xen. Cyrop. tv 1, 1§- Ph Meno, 87 E and Isocr. Nicocles, init. 

§ 14. ovx tore dvs rivos yévous dpapiopevov y pyt., dAAa xabawep 7 
dsadrexrixy} See note and reff. on § 1 p. 3. 

aU TO Tetoas Epyoy aris x.r.A.] on Aristotle's alteration and improvement 
of the original definition of Rhetoric by the Sophistical school of Rheto- 
ricians, see Introd. p. 32 seq. 

‘Non dubium est quin verba illa dirigantur adversus id quod apud 
Platonem ait Gorgias, p. 453 A, r}y pyropimyy meBovs Snpsovpyoy elva:, cai 
ro xedddawoy aurijs els rovro redevray.’ Muretus. Cicero’s definition 
follows that of Aristotle, de Orat. § 61, 260, accommodate ad persuaden- 
dum posse dicere. 

The notion of art, or proceeding by rule of art, consists not in the 
vesudt, or success of the process, which is often unattainable, but in the 
correctness of the method followed. Top. Z 12, 149 4 25. rototros 3’ 

. 6 Tov propos kal 6 rot Kréwrov Epos, etwep dori pyrep pév 6 duvapevos rd dy 
dxaore miBavov Oewpeiv nal pndev mapadeimery, créemrns 8 6 Adbpa AapBaver. 
dhdoy yap Sri roovros dy éxdrepos 6 piv dyabds pyrwp 6 8 dyabds xAérrns 
daoras’ ov yap 6 AdOpa AapBavey GAN’ o BovAcuevos AdOpa AapPadvew KAéwrns 
éoviy. The art of doing anything is distinguished fsom the mere fact that 
the thing is done (as accidentally for instance), by the tnéention of the 
agent systematically carried out, but not necessarily realised in success, 
Comp. de Anima 1119, 8, cal GAws 8¢ opepen Sre 6 Zyeov rH larpixhy ovx lara:, 
os érépov rivos xupiou Svros rou woceiy xara rhy émornpny (of the successful 
resulé of the artistic process), GAX’ ov ris dxcornpns. Eth. Nic. HI 5, 1112 
6 12. 

Topic. A 3, éfoper B€ redAdoo rHr pébodoy, Sray cuoiws tyopev Gowep 
dwt pyropixis xai larpexis xal réy rowovrey Suvduewy. rovro 8 dovl rd ex ray 
évdexopevay woceiy & mpotaipovyeda. ore yap o pyropixos éx wayrTos rpowou 
weit, 008 6 larpixos Uyidee. GAN’ day rey dvdexopudvey pndey mapaXiny, lxaves 
avrép dyew rhy dmiornuny pjoopey. Comp. Top. E c. 7, 136 6 57, and 1374 §. 


26 PHTOPIKHS A 1 § 14. 


~ A ~ t A 
Epyov avrys, d\Aa To ideiy Ta UrapxovTa mbava 
e , ~ aw , 
wept Exaorov, KaOarep Kai év Tais aAAats TEXvaIS 
mwagas' ovoe yap iarpiKns TO Uyia Tomo, d\rAa 
iy ~~ id 
MEexpt OU EvVOEXETAL, MEXPL TOUTOUV Mpoayayelv? EoTt 
~ 74 
yap Kai Tovs dOuvvarous peTradaBeivy Uytelas Spuws 
~ “~ c J ~ ~ 
Ocparevoat Kadws. mpos 5€ TovTos OTL THS aUTHS 
, ‘ \ \ ’ IQ A , 
To te mwiOavov Kai TO hawopevov ideivy mBavoy, 
e/ 4 2» \ ~. ~ , ) 
womep Kat émt THs SiadexTIKNS GVANOYIT MOY TE Kal 
* A 
awouevoy avAAoyiopev. 6 yap codiorikos ovK 
~ ~ , A wn“ 
év rH Suvaue GAN’ év TH TMpoaperer mAHV évTraiba 
d s| 4 ¢ 4 A 
pev €orac 6 pev Kata thy émornuny 0 6€ Kata 
~ | ‘ A 
THv mpoaiperw pntwp, éxet dé codioTns Mey KaTa 
) 
THY Tpoaipeny, SiadexTikos S€ OU KaTa THY TpOaipeE- 
) \ A \ , A A 7 AN wv 
giv ad\Aa@ xara thy duvauw. mepi o€ avtns fon 
Ths peOodouv mreipwmeOa €yev, ws TE Kal Ex Tivwy 
é “ a , > 
Suunoomeba Tuyyave Twy MpoKEeméevwy. Wart ouy 
@ ~ , A td 
oiov é€£ vrrapyns dptrauevor avTny Tis dort, AEywpuev 
4 
Ta AolTra. 


Quint. 11 17,23 seq. Cic. de Inventione 1 5,6. Bacon, Adv. of learning, 
Bk. 11 X 2. ‘For almost all other arts and sciences are judged by acts 
or masterpieces, as I may term them, and not by the successes and 
events. The lawyer is judged by the virtue of his pleading, and not by 
the issue of the cause. The master in the ship is judged by the directing 
his course aright, and not by the fortune of the voyage.’ 

apos 8€ rovros (pavepov) Gri—xara riv Svvaysy] The explanation and 
connexion are given in the Paraphrase, Introd. p. 148, and note 3. 

Comp. Met. I 2, 1004 4 17, of ydp ScadXexrixol xal coguoral...ddAAa da- 
déper ris pev rH tpor@ tis duvduens, ras 8é Tov Biov Tp mpoapéce, and 
Bonitz’ note. Top. A 5, 126 4 35, wavres yap of havAos Kara mpoaiperw 
Adyorraz. Z 12, 149 5 29 u.s. ov yap o Adbpa AapBavew GAA’ o BovAchevos 
AaOpa AapBaverw Krrrns éoriv. Eth. Nic. IV 13, 1127 6 15, ovx év ry Ouva- 
pe 8 doriv 6 ddalay, GAXd’ dy ry wpoapéeres. Rhet. I 13, 10. 

any] ‘except that,—only’, a reservation. Soph. Oed. Col. 1639 (Herm.), 
Trach. 41, Arist. Equit. 1397, Dem. de Cor. p. 281 init., Arist. An. Pr. 
II 27, 70 @ 29, Top. B 8, 114 4 8, T 4, 119 4 22, © 3, 158 5 37; I (de Soph. 
EL) c. 4, 1664 4, Eth. N. Iv 12, 1126 6 27, Polit. 11 6, 1266 a 16, Rhet. 
1 12, 10. 

peOodov] Note on odoroteiy, § 2. 

wddww ovv—Xéyopey ra Aowrd}] ‘Let us then take as it were a fresh 
start, and so first define it, and then proceed to the rest’. 


I 


PHTOPIKHS A 2§r. 27 


4 A ¢ A 4 4 e ~ 
éorw on pntopin Svvayis mepi Exacrov Tov cuar. 1. 


~ 4 ~ A 
Gewonoat To évdeyopevoy miBavoy. TovTO yap ovoe- 
~ / , a ~ of 
Mias €Tépas éoTi Teyyns Epyov' Twv yap aAAwy 
“~ A 
ékarTn epi TO auTi UToKeimevoy €oTe OacKaNKy 
4 a A ) 
kal TreloriKy, Olov iaTpiKn Tept UyiewoY Kal voo~EpOV 
4 / ~ 
kat yewperpia wept ta cuuBeBnxota maby Tots 
43] 4 , g 4 A ’ @ , e , de 
meyeOeo: Kai apiOunrixy mept doiBuov, spuotws Se 
~ ~ N ~ 
kat ai Xowal Twov Texvov Kat émornuwv x Oe 
e A 4 ~~ } 4 @ 9 “~ } ~ ou 
pntopixy mept tov dodevros ws etzeiv doxet duvacbat 


CHAP. II. 

§ 1. On this definition of Rhetoric, see Introd. pp. 33—4; and note on 
paraphrase, p. 149: on the other current definitions of it, Ib. pp. 27—36. 
On Rhetoric as a dvvayus, Ib. p. 14 seq. 

Uroxeipevov] ON I I, 12 p. 24 Supra. 

vytecvov] Three different senses of this word are distinguished, Top. A 
15, 106 5 35, ro vyservov wACovayas, TO pév Uytelas moinriKoy, TO 8é huAaxtt- 
néy, Td 8 onpavrixoy. 

ra cupBeBnxdra wd6n rois peyébeos] These are usually called ovpfe- 
Bnxora xa avrd in Aristotle’s terminology, i.e. absolute, necessary conse- 
quences (rather than accidents) of the essence or definition of a thing. 
The ordinary cupBeSnxéra are separable accidents, qualities or properties, 
which do of form part of this essence of the subject, or consequently 
of its definition; with or without which the essence of the subject, (that 
which constitutes its being, or makes it to be what it is,) remains the 
same. The cupSeBnxéra xa avra are distinguished from the ordinary 
oupSeBynxcra in this; that although they are not of the essence, and 
therefore do not enter into the definition, still they are immediately de- 
ducible from it, and iaseparable from the subject, and are therefore the 
proper objects of study. They are in fact identifiable with the ta or 
propria of the five predicables. The cupBeSynxora dn trois peyébecs in 
the text are accordingly ‘the inseparable properties of magnitudes’; as 
‘the equality of the interior angles of a triangle to two right angles’ is a 
necessary property of the triangle, though not included in the definition, 
which is ‘a plane figure bounded by three straight lines’: still the pro- 
perty is deducible from the definition, and thus is inseparable from the 
notion of it: the triangle cannot exist without this property, though it is 
not of its essence, and therefore not part of the definition. This example 
is given in de Anima 11 § 8, 402 6.19. See the whole section. And again 
de part. Anim. I 3, 10 cupSeBnxds ydp re (caf airs) rp rpeyorp ro svoly 
opOais toas ¢yew ras yevias. See further in Trend. ad de Anima I J, 1, 
Comm. p. 188 seq. Bonitz ad Metaph. A 30, 1025 a 30. Anal. Post, 
17,75 @ 42, dv rais drodel£ecty...rplrov rd yévos Td UToKelyevoy, OV Ta waOn 
aat ra caf avrd cupBeBynxora Syrot 9 drodekis...ovn fore ry dorOpnrixny 
anodeckr dpappooa dm ra rois peyéOecs cupSeAnxéra. 

On wa6n see Introd. p. 114. 


28 PHTOPIKHS A 2 §§ 2, 3. 


om A , ‘ ) > \ ? , 
Gewpciy to mbavov. s10 Kat payev avtTny ov Tept 
‘ s ~ 
27t yevos idiov dpwpropevov Exew TO TEXVIKOV. THY 
@ Ww A wv 
dé miotewy ai prev atexvot ciow ai 8 evrexvot. 
e ~ S 4 
arexyva S€ Néyw Soa pn OV rmwY meropioTat aAda 
oo ~ td t 4 4 
MpovumnpXev, olov paptupes Bacavor avyypadpai Kat 
e ~ / ~ 4 4 
Soa Towaira, évtexyva 6 boa Sid THs peOodov Kal 
~ ~ ef ~ , 

be yuov KaracKkevacOnva Suvatov, ware O€t TOUTWY 
~ A , \ 4 e ~ ~ ‘' A ~ 

3 Tots mey xopnoacba Ta Sé evpeiv. Twv dé dia Tov P. 1356. 
f ot A A 
Aoryou mopiComevwv wieTEewy Tpia eidn éoriv’ al mev 


§ 2. On évreyvor and dreyvat riores, see Introd. p. 150 (paraphrase), 
and on the general subject, analysis of I c. 15, pp. 193—207. 

Trois pew xpnoacba te 8¢ evipeivy] The former lie ready at hand, and 
require only to be employed; the latter, proofs of all kinds, direct and 
indirect, wicress, 300s, waGos, must be ‘discovered’ or ‘invented’ for this 
occasion by the speaker himself. Hence the distinction of zaventio from 
the other parts of Rhetoric by the Latin Rhetoricians. So Cicero, de In- 
ventione (this title is adopted to represent the whole domain of Rhetoric, 
because ‘invention’ or proof of one kind or another is the odpa rijs wicrews, 
1 183, by far the most prominent and important part of the entire art) 
VIL 9, guare materia quidem nobis rhetoricae videtur ea, quam Aristotelé 
visam esse diximus, partes autem hae quas plerique dixerunt, inventio, 
dispositio, elocutio, memoria, pronunciako (invention, order and arrange- 
ment of parts, style, memory, and delivery including action). Javentio est 
excogitatio rerum verarum aut veri similium quae causam probabilem 
reddant &c. Similarly Quintilian, Inst. Or. 1 12, 4, Quid? nos agendi 
subita necessitate deprehenst nonne alia dicimus alia providemus, quum 
pariter inventio rerum, électio verborum (style in single words), compo- 
sitio (combination of words in sentences), gestus, pronunciatio, vultus, 
motusque destderentur? XII 1, 30, donos nunguam honestus sermo 
(style) deficiet, nunquam rerum optimarum inventio. 

§ 3. wiorewy rpia «f8n] Compare Rhet. 1 1, 1. This threefold 
division of rhetorical proofs, due to Aristotle, is recognized by Dionysius, 
de Lys. jud. c. 19, dpfopas 8€ dro rév xadoupivoy dvréyvoy ricreov, Kal 
xopis ump éxdorov pépous Siadéfoua. rpiyg 8 veveunuevor rovray, els Te 
TO mpaypa xal ro waGos xal ro fOos «.7..: and by Charmadas, in Cic. de 
Orat. I 19, 87, where only the 440s and aos are directly mentioned, but 
the other, which is absolutely indispensable, must of course be assumed 
as a third division: by Cicero himself, de Orat. IL 27, 115, #fa omnis 
vatio dicendi tribus ad persuadendum rebus est nixa; ul probemus wera 
esse quae defendimus,; ut conciliemus nobis eos qui audiunt; ut animos 
corum ad quemcunque causa postulabit motum vocemus. This is 
repeated in §§ 121 and 128 and the #6os and sa6os described at length in 
c. 43 and the following. These two latter are again referred to Orat. 
XXXVII 128; and again in Partitiones Oratoriae x111 46 the three ziorery are 
thus ingeniously distinguished in a twofold division. Argumentandt duo 





PHTOPIKHS A 2§4. 29 


rd 9 9 ~ of ~ 4 A oe ® “~ 4 
yap etow év To nOe Tov AEyovTOS, at dE Ev TH TOV 
) a by rt ~ , A oe 9 > ” ~ Xx , } \ 
axpoatyy Siabeivai mws, ai 6€ év alta TH AoYy, dia 
~ a vn 4 ' A A > ~ 
4 Tov Sexvuvar Hh paiveoOa Sexvuvat. dia ev ovy TOU 


sunt genera, quorum atterum ad fidem directe spectat, alterum se inflectit 
ad motum, (These are the ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ proofs and arguments.) 
Dirigitur cum proposuit aliquid quod probaret, sumpsitque ea quibus 
niteretur,; atque his confirmatis ad propositum se retulit atgue conclustt. 
Illa autem altera argumentatio, quasi retro et contra, prius sumit quae 
vult eague confirmat, deinde id quod proponendum fuit permotis animis 
sacil ad extremum. 

Quintilian touches on this subject in many places of his work; the 
most detailed account of #60s and ma6os is given in the second chapter 
of his sixth book: the description and distinction of them occur in 
§§ 18, 19. They are both referred, as subordinate species, to the 
general head of ‘affectus’, § 8, comp. § 12; and these are again distin- 
guished from the direct and logical arguments, § 3. In this and the 
following section he compares these two classes of arguments together in 
respect of their rhetorical value and importance, and comes to a conclu- 
sion precisely opposite to that of Aristotle. For Aristotle holds that 
these indirect proofs, though necessary to the orator by reason of 
the deficiencies and infirmities of his audience, da rnyv rot dxpoarot poy On- 
piay, 111 1§5, and therefore not to be excluded from the theory or practice 
of Rhetoric, yet are to be regarded as merely auxiliary and subordinate, 
standing in the same relation to the direct proofs as dress and personal 
ornaments to the body, serviceable but not essential. Quintilian on the 
contrary pronounces that these in comparison with the overpowering force 
of the appeals to the feelings are only not contemptible in respect of their 
power of persuasion ; guos equidem non contemno, sed hactenus utiles 
credo ne guid per eos tudict sit tgnotum,; atque ut dicam quod sentio, 
dignos a quibus causas diserti docerentur § 3: that those that use them 
therefore are only fit to lay before the judges the facts of the case, not to 
influence their decision, and to instruct the real advocate, who can sway 
their minds and feelings at his will, and force them to decide in favour of 
his client: #b1 vero animis tudicum vis afferenda est, et ab ipsa veri con- 
templatione abducenda mens, tht proprium oratoris opus est § 5. 

It may be observed in concluding this note, that there is a somewhat 
important difference, which I have already pointed out in the Introduction, 
between Aristotle’s view of the use to be made of #6os in the practice of 
Rhetoric, and that of the Latin Rhetoricians, as well as the author of the 
Rhet. ad Alex.; see c. 39 (38) 2. Quintilian’s auctorttas—and compare 
Cicero in de Oratore, 11 43—expresses the influence of character upon 
opinion, in general; but in Aristotle’s system the #@0s means something 
more; the effect must be produced immediately dy the sheech dei 3¢ nai 
rovro cupPaivay dia rov Adyov, addAa py Sia To wpodedcfacba woicy rwa 
etvas roy A¢yovra, Rhet. I 2,4; and hence it finds a place in Rhetoric as in 
Art: whereas in the other view the auctoritas exercised may have been 
previously acquired, and altogether %£ rov mpayparos, acting independ- 


30 PHTOPIKHE A 2§4. 


e “~ 7 J , 
nOovs, Srav ovTw AEexXOH 6 AOYos ware akiomaTov 
~ n 4 , c 
mwoiwjoat TOV A€yovTa’ Tols yap émlEKeot TieTEVOMEV 
~ ~ 4 , A ~ e 
MadAov kal Oarrov, rept mavTwy pev amdws, ev ois 


ently of any artistic or systematic process, in the way of reasoning or 
proving. 

§ 4. On #éos, as auctoritas, see Introd. p. 151 note. 

rois émtexeot] ‘worthy and respectable people’, Eth. Nic. v. 14 sub 
init. cal dre pev rd drvecnés érraivovperv xal dvdpa roy roovrov, dare Kai emi 
ra GAXa érawouvres peradepopey avril rov ayaOov, ro émtecxéorepoy Ore BéA- 
tuv Snrovvres. The primary sense of émiecnjs is therefore ‘equitable’, 
one who has a leaning to the merciful side and of an indulgent disposi- 
tion, as opposed to one who takes a strict and rigorous view of an offence, 
puts a harsh construction on men’s motives and actions, is inclined to 
enforce on all occasions the letter of the law. From this, and because 
we think this the Jeffery disposition of the two, émens is ‘transferred’ by 
metaphor (i.e. the perahopa ama rov el8ous él ro yevos, the second of the 
four species of metaphors, Poet. XXI 7) to the general (or generic) signi- 
fication of ‘ good’. 

awdos} has various usages. It may for instance mean (1) ‘simply’, 
opposed to ovvOéce: or xara cupmdoxqy: and this appears to be the pri- 
mary sense of the word, in accordance with the derivation. Thus as the 
elements of nature are often called am\a@ oopara in their simple, uncom- 
bined state, so we have anmAds, de Anima I1 14, 8, to denote ‘ singly, or 
simply, by itself? (xa& davrny Themistius), without the admixture of any 
. other element; Soxet 8€ reoty 4 row updos uate amAds airia ris rpopiys Kat 
ris avénoews elvaz, Similarly when applied in a moral sense to human 
character, it denotes ‘simplicity’ (of composition), ‘singleness’ of heart 
and purpose, as opposed to ‘duplicity’, (Plat. Rep. I11 397 E, ov durAovs 
ayjp ovdé moAXamdois. VIII 55,4 D, Rhet. 1 9, 29, Eur. Rhes. 395 hia 
Aéyesrw rdAnOés del cov Scrrovs wépux’ avyjp. Ruhnk. Tim. p. 86). 

The commonest signification however is that of (2) simpliciter et sine 
exceptione ‘generally’ or ‘universally’, as opposed to xa& éxacrov, ‘ speci- 
ally’, ‘particularly’, ‘individually’, Eth. N.1I 1, 1095 @ 1, or to guru os ‘par- 
tially’, or xara pépos, de Anima II 5, 4, viv yap amas éAdyopey rept avrav, 
in general terms—we must now come to farticulars. Hence it signifies 
‘altogether’, ‘absolutely’, omnino, as ovdéy andes ‘none at all’, de Part. 
An. IV 13, 9, advvaroy Sdas ‘ absolutely impossible’. Plato will supply 
abundance of examples of this usage. See also Waitz, Comm. on Organ. 
Vol. I p. 354, who exemplifies it from Aristotle. 

From this again may be distinguished a third sense (3), in which it 
is equivalent to xa& avrdv, and opposed to mpos re, ‘the relative’. In 
this sense it is defined, Top. B 11, 115 5 33, & &y pndevds mpooriBepevou 
8oxH elvas xadov f aloypoy # dAdo Ts Tay ToiovTwy, dmAas pnOnoera. de 
Soph. EL c. 5, 166 6 22 and 437, where ro awAds and py drAa@s are op- 
posed as the absolute and relative in a paralogism of the substitution of 
the one for the other. Anal. Post. I 4,83 4 15, xarnyopeiy pév py dwAds 
cara oupBeBnxis 8¢ xarnyopey. Eth. N. 1 3, 1095 4 3, Polit. Iv (VII) 1, 
1323 6 17, xai drAws (absolutely, in itself) cat yyiv (relatively to us). 


PHTOPIKHS A 2§ 5. 31 


A 4 ~ 4 
dé To axpiBes pn €orw adda TO auido€eiv, kat mav- 
~ ~ A q “~ ld s ~ 4 
TeEAWS. O€f O€ Kal TOUTO GuuBaivey dia TOU Aoryou, 
A s ~ , ‘4 > 4 
GAA uy Oia TOU mpodedo~acba roov Twa eEivat Tov 
a e ~ 
Aeyovra’ ov yap wowrep EnoL TWY TEXVOAOYOUYTWY 
td ~ . A ~ 
TWeacw év TH TEXYN Kal THY émtEiKeay TOU AEyoV- 
s ? q ‘4 A 
Tos ws ovdEey ouuBadrAoLEnY pos TO mWiMavoy, a\A|a 
.) ~ a wv A . 
oxedov ws eimely Kupiwratny Exe mictw TO 700s. 
A a “~ ~ ed ~ 
5 dra O€ TWY dxpoaTwy, Tay Eis maOos V0 TOU Adryou 
~ a , 
mpoaxOwoiw ov yap cpoiws arodidouey Tas Kpioets 
, AN ~ ~ 
Aurrovpevot kal xaipovTes 4 PiAouvTEs Kai pucovyTes: 
| « ~ ‘ 
mpos 0 Kai povoy wepacOai dayev mrpayparever Oat 
A ~ ~*~ N A > a 
Tous vuv TEXVOAOYOUVTaS. qWeEpt pEev OY TOUTwWY Sn- 
4 e/ e/ A “~ ~ , 
AwOnoerat Kal Exacrov, Tay rept THY TADwY Eyw- 


From these three may perhaps be distinguished a fourth sense (4) in 
which it occurs; for instance, in Met. A 6, 987 @21, of IvOaydpeor... 
Atay dwAds émpayparevOncay “treated the subject too simply”, i.e. too 
carelessly, without taking sufficient pains with it, with insufficient e/adora- 
tion; ‘negligenter’, Bonitz ad loc. q.v. On the various modes in which 
asa is opposed to the relative and particular see Schrader on I 9, 17. 

Kuptwrarny eyes wicrw rd 460s] ‘is the most authoritative, effective, 
instrument of persuasion’. On the influence of character on the judg- 
ment add to the passages already quoted, Rhet. ad Alex. c. 38 (39), 2, 
and Isocr. dvridoats §§ 276—280. 

The oratorical artifice here described is well illustrated by Marc An- 
tony’s speech in Fulius Caesar, Act 111 Sc. 2, “I come not, friends, to steal 
away your hearts,” &c. 

cups in this and similar cases seems to derive its meaning from 
the ‘authority’ or ‘influence’ exercised by any one or any thing that 
has the power of doing so, of which general notion it is a special ap- 
plication. It corresponds to our ‘sovereign’, as when we speak of a 
sovereign remedy. Trendelenburg, on de Anima II 5, 7, Comm. p. 368, 
would connect this signification with the xuptos vdpos, ‘ratio e iudiciis 
et foro tracta videtur. sxvptos vouos, qui depp oppositus est, lex est quae 
rata viget &c.—ita hic xvpsa cyopara, quatenus eorum auctoritas valet. 
This is perhaps unnecessarily narrowing the signification. Other per- 
sons and things, besides laws, exercise authority. A good instance of 
xupios in this general sense, implying superiority, authority, mastery, 
occurs in de Anima I! 8, 3, 419 4 19, ovx gore 8€ Wodou Kxiptos 6 dp ovde 
ro Vdep, where xvpsos may be interpreted ‘absolute master’, the air and 
water are not absolute masters of sound: some other conditions are 
required to produce it. Ib. 419 5 33, ro 8é xevow opOas A€yerat KUpioy Tod 
dxovecy. 

§ 5. ov yap opoiws arodi8opey x.7.A.] Comp. II 1, 4. 


p. 6. 


32 PHTOPIKHS A 2§§ 6, 7. 


6pyevr dia O€ Twv Adyww [miorevovow)], STav. drnOes 7 
awopevoy (dAnOés) Sei~wpev ex Twv mepl ExaoTa 
7mavev. eet d ai miares Oia TOUTWY ciai, Pavepov 


§ 6. da dé ray Aéyov] In § 3 we are told that there are three kinds of 
gicres or rhetorical proofs, which are conveyed through the channel or 
medium (&a with the genitive) of the speech. These three are then 
described seriatim. The first, §.4, is 8a rov #Oaus ; the second (§ 5), dia 
Tov dxpoaray, Stay els maos vo Tov A¢you mpoaxOeow ; and the third, § 6, 
&a trav dyer, plainly in the sense of the direct wioreas or arguments 
proper, Sray dAnbés § hawopevov SelEopev 2x rav wept exaora mOavav. da 
réyv Acywy is the reading of all the MSS except A‘, which has row Aoyow: 
but this, as an unnecessary and unaccountable departure from the con- 
struction of the parallel expressions, 8a rov Acyou, rov AOous, Ta” dxpoaray, 
and afterwards é&a rovrwv, seems to be self-condemned. 

By these Acyot we may understand either the actual words which are 
the instruments or medium of the reasonings, or better the reasonings or 
arguments themselves which the words convey. This explanation appears 
to be sufficiently rational and consistert, and ‘in accordance with the 
ordinary usages of the language. Spengel, however, in his paper #der 
die Rhet. des Arist. (Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851) p. 26, and again in his 
edition of the Rhetoric, Vol. 11 p. 46, thinks that the text requires altera- 
tion, and would read & avroi 8¢ rod Acyou, or da 8 avrod rov Acyou, 
which seems to be totally unnecessary. The explanation above given 
is confirmed by the rendering of the Vetus Translatio ‘per orationes 
autem credimus’, where * ovationes’ plainly stands for the ‘words of the 
speeches in which these arguments are expressed’. 

aAnbes f} pawdpevov] The second of these terms denotes the fal- 
lacious branch of Rhetoric, ‘the apparent, unreal, sham’ arguments, 
exemplified in II 24, and corresponding to the spurious branch of Dia- 
lectics treated in the Zoqguorixol ZAeyxor, and appended to the Topics. 
The illustration of these is allowed to enter into a scientific treatise only 
for the purpose of detecting and exposing these fallacies, and enabling 
the pleader or dialectician to confute them when employed by an 
adversary. gor: yap } codiorixt) havopérm copia ovca 8 ov, de Soph. EL 
I, 165 a 21. 

§ 7. éwet 8¢ al wicrets—xai was] ‘“‘seeing then that these are the 
channels, or modes of communication of rhetorical proofs, it is plain that 
to grasp, or get possession, or make himself master of them (afeiv) 
is a task for one who has a capacity for logical reasoning, and for the con- 
templation or study of characters, and thirdly [for the discernment] of the 
emotions ;—and of the latter, what each is in itself, and what are its 
qualities and properties (woicv rs), and from what sources (what motives 
and impulses, éx rivey,) it may be excited, and in what modes (rés).”— 
ravra...€ori haBety rov cvAdoyicacGat duvapévou, lit. ‘it belongs fo the student 
‘of logic 4o get hold of them’. 

Of these the logical branch belongs to Dialectics, which teaches the 
habit of reasoning and discussion, the other two to the study of Ethics, 


PHTOPIKH2 A 2§7. 33 


Ott TavTa Ta Tpia éori AaBeElv TOU ovAAOYicacbat 
duvapévov kai tov Oewpyoa: mept ta ij0n Kai tas 
dpetas kai Tpitov Tov mept Ta Wan, Ti TE ExaaToOV 
éort Twv TaQwy Kai Toioy Tt, Kal éx Tivwy éyyiverat 
Kai Twos. wore cuuBaiver THY pnTopiKnY OloV Trapa- 
gues Tt THs StadexTiKns elvat Kal THs wept Ta HON 


which deals with human beings as individuals, and investigates the fixed 
habits, virtuous or vicious (fers), which constitute their characters (#6n), 
and the moral wraé6y or ‘emotions’, which when developed by exercise, 
according to the direction which they take, become virtues and vices. 
The consequence is, dore ovpPaiver, that Rhetoric may be considered a 
scion or offshoot of the study of Dialectics and Ethics, the latter ‘ which 
may fairly be called Politics’ (because it treats of men in society and 
therefore includes the science of the individual, 7 pév od» peBo8os (Ethics) 
rovroy éierat, wokiruc} tis ovca. Eth. Nic. 1 1, 1074 6 11), standing to 
them in the relation of the offshoot to the parent plant. Sed zdem (Aristo- 
teles) ef de arte rhetorica tres libros scripsit, et in corum primo non artem 
solum eam fatetur, sed a particulam civilitatis sicut dialectices assignat. 
Quint. Inst. Orat. 11 17, 4. 

avAdoyicacGas|improperly applied here, as drodecfis above, 1 §11 p. 19, to 
rhetorical reasoning. But as there the rhetorical sigress are called a kind 
of demonstration, ‘a sort of’, or subordinate variety of, demonstration in a 
general sense, so here the syllogistic process is allowed to stand for rea- 
soning in general, to which even rhetorical reasoning, though not syllo- 
gistic in the strict sense, but enthymematic, of course belongs. 

srapadeués] which usually appears under the form rapadvuas in Aristotle 
and Theophrastus, properly denotes either a branch or a separate plant 
‘growing alongside’ of the parent plant, and proceeding either from the 
stem or the root, as a scion or offshoot. In the latter of these two senses 
it certainly occurs in Theophr. Hist. Plant. 11 2, 4, day amd pifns 4 mwapa- 
gvas 9, though here also the hypothetical ¢ay admits the other possibility. 
Also swapapveoO@a, Hist. Plant. 111 17, 3, daroxomwéy 8€ xal émixavOeév rapa- 
vera: (grows from the root) xal dvaS\aoraver. This word and its cog- 
nates, rapadverOar, mapapvors, dropuas (Hist. An. 11 1, 53, de part. An. 
m15 § 1, 10§ 5, 14§ 14, Theophr. Hist. Plant. 1 6,6, vit 2, § and 8, 
&c.), mapaSdacravery, -BXacry, -BAdornpa, are applied by Aristotle and 
his pupil Theophrastus primarily to plants, and by analogy to the 
corresponding parts of animals. 

It occurs again as a metaphor in Eth, Nic. 14, 1096 a 21, mapadvads 
yap ror’ Zoe xal oupBeAnxdre rod dvros ; that is, rd caf avro and 7 ovcia 
stand to ‘the relative’, ro mpos ri, in the same relation as parent plant to 
offshoot. ‘Similitudo, explicante Giphanio, a pullis arborum desumta, 
qui Graecis dicuntur sapagvades’. Zell, ad loc. So that Rhetoric is 
represented by this metaphor as a scion derived from two stocks or 
plants, Dialectics and Ethics, not identical with either, but with a gencral 
or inherited family resemblance to both. (The analogy will not bear 


AR. I. 3 


34 PHTOPIKHS A 2§7. 


¢ 4 - 4 
mpayuatelas, iy Sixawv é€ort mpooayopevey moXt- 
4 A A ~ 4 ~ 
Tiny. 810 Kal U7rosvETaL UTO TO OXNMA TO THS TOA- 
~ , , A A 

TIKHS 4 PNTOPLKY Kal OL avTITOLOUMEVOL TavTNS TA MEV 
A A 4 

&:° draidevoiay ta Sé ot dAaloveiav ta b€ Kal Oe 

a 4 9 4 4 4 , , ~ by 

adAas aitias dvOpwrikas: €oTt yap poptoy Tt TNS O1a- 


pressing: one does not see, for example, how a young plant can be the 
scion or offspring of ¢wo others, but this general meaning is clear, that it 
bears a likeness to both, though differing from each of them.) 

Urobveras Urd ro oyxHpa) ‘creeps under, insinuates itself into, the form 
or figure’; ‘assumes the mask or disguise of (for the purpose of acting a 
part)’, ‘personates’, Plat. Gorg. 464 C, 9 xodaxeurixy...vmrodiea Ure éxacroy 
ray popley mpooroteira elvat rovro Orep Urédu...Umd péev obv rHy larpexny 7 
cWoroux) vrodeduce... Sopater, ap. Stallb. not. ad loc. Uwodve ras, rour 
Zorw vreoépxerat, Yrroxpiverat, os éxeivy ravrdy Soxeiv elvas. Metaph. A 2, 
1004 417, ol yap dadexrixol xa cogioral ravrov pév vrodvovras oxjpa TE 
procody. 

d\afoveia implies both presumption and imposture; either a cha- 
racter between both and a mixture of dofh (as Theophrastus’ ddafay, ‘ the 
braggart’, of which Pyrgopolinices in the A/t/es Gloriosus, Thraso in 
the Eunuchus, and Captain Bobadil in Every Man in his Humour, are 
the three types, ancient and modern; and probably also the Sophisti- 
cal Rhetoricians here referred to): or again a character in which esther 
presumption or imposture is characteristic and predominant. For ex- 
ample, the insolent assumption, arrogance, and swagger appear more 
prominently in this picture of the dAa{av drawn by Xenophon, Cyrop. 1 
2,12, o wey yap draldy guorye Bonet dvopa xeicOa éxi Trois mpocrotovpercis 
cai wAovowwrépas elvas 4 elo, xal avdpeorépots, cat womoey & py ixavol 
elow Umuryvoupévos’ xal raira gavepois yryvopevors Sri ro AaBeiv ri dvexa 
kal xepdavos rrotvotow. This last mercenary element is not found else- 
where in the character of the dAa{e». In Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 11 7, IV 13, 
empty pretension, ostentation and swagger are the leading characteristics 
of the dAafov. The vice is one of the extremes of which dAyéea, the 
social virtue of frankness, sincerity, and plain dealing is the mean, 
the opposite extreme being elpwvefa, ‘mock’ in conversation, Socrates’ 
habit. It is the extreme in rpoowoinors, ‘pretension’, of which dAjdea 
is the mean state. Whereas in Aristophanes it usually represents rather 
the other side of the character, its quackery and imposture ; and dAaf{oy 
is ‘a quack or a humbug’. Of course Socrates and his brother Sophists 
are the great representatives of the class, Ades 102, 1494, ef passim. 
And this is also the side of the character which is generally uppermost in 
Plato’s view of it. See Rep. vi 486 B, 490 A, VIII 560 C, Phaedo 92 D, 9- 
don)...drayreoy ddafovéoraroy, Phil. 65 c. The definition of it given in the 
Platonic dpot, p. 416, is that of undue pretension, assumption, imposture. 
is mpoomoinriny ayabod  dyabay ray yy) vmapyovrey. Quackery and 
imposture are also predominant in the application of it, Rhet. 11 6, 11. 

&” GAdas alrias avOpwmn«ds] ‘incident to humanity’, implying the 
infirmities, imperfections, frailties, miseries, and especially errors to which 


PHTOPIKHS A 2§8._ 35 


~ a 
AEkTiKys Kal Omoiwpa, KaBarrep kai dpyopevot. el7ropev* 
A 4 4 ~ 
MEpt ovdevos yap wpiopevov ovderépa avTwv éoTiv 
4 ~ wt (4 A ~ 
émearnun, ws Exe, d\Aa Suvapers Ties TOU Tropioat 
Aoryous. 
4 a a ~ ‘ 9 ~ \ ~ » 
Wepi ev ouv THs SuvapEews aUTWY, Kal Tus EXOUaL 
5] 3 A rd ~ SY a 
8mpos adAAnAas, eipntat oyedov ixavws. Tov dé dia 
~ 4 v\ , , ( 4 23 
Tov dexwva 4 paiverOa Sexvyvar, Kabarep Kal év 
Tois StaANEKTIKOIS TO MeV Eraywyn éaott TO SE TUAAO- P. 1356 4. 


the human condition is exposed, and from which the divine nature, 
which is tactily opposed to it in this conception, is exempt. ‘The other 
human causes’ here referred to are any other defects or imperfections 
to which the human nature is liable. Thuc. 11! 40 dvOpwzives apapravety, 
compared with III 45, mepuixaci re aravres I8ia xal Snpocig duapravew : 
‘humanum est errare’, Plato, Soph. 229 A xara thy avOparivny 8ofay, 
‘ex humana opinione, quae obnoxia est erroribus. Uti apud Latinos 
homo fuit frequens erroris vel imbecillitatis humanae excusatio’ ( Heindorf 
ad loc. Polit. 279 C, dreEsadppaxa nat Oeia xai dvOpdmwa ef cet.). Demosth. 
de Cor. p. 328, § 308, % wapa rijs réyns re cupBéBnxey evartiopa, F 
@Ao re BdoxoArov yéyove—rodAa 8¢ ravOpdmwa.—lId. c. Lept. p. 506, 15, 
wayra 8 dvopenwa rycicba. Boeot. de Nomine p. 998, modAd ydp ¢ore 
ravOpemiva. Ar. Rhet. I 13, 17, cal rd rois dvOpwrivas ovyywooxew 
émiexés. Eth. Nic. Iv 11, 1126 @ 31, dvOpwmuxerepoy (more Aumane) yap 
TO TipewpeioOas. VIII 16, sub, fin. ywpis yap ris puatcis pirias ry émixovpiayv 
avOponixoy py dsobcioOat. 

In Rhet. 1 5, 10, did 1d wdvrov dréyerba ray avOpwrivey, it has this 
more general sense of ‘all human affairs, business and enjoyments’: with 
which comp. Plat. Theaet. 170 B xat mavra wou peora ravOpemva (all 
human society or affairs in general) (nrovwray didarxddovs xr.rA. So 
Virgil, Ain. 1 462, sunt lacrimae rerum, et mentem mortalia tangunt: and 
in the second sense, Ecl. VIII 35, "ec curare deum credits mortalia 
guemguam. 

§ 8. The eighth and ninth and part of the tenth sections of this 
chapter are quoted by Dionysius, Ep. ad Amm. 1c. 7, from ray 8é d&a to 
éy rovrots opoiws éyer. The variations are, 8eixvvaOa (5%s) for secxvivas, 
éy rots dvadurixois for év rots dtaXexrixois, the omission of 4 ovrwody, and 
of avrav dxarépm; for grepov re 8:4 ravra cupBaivery mapa ravra TH TavTa 
elva:, we have érepov re 8d 1. o. mapa To ravr elvat, also davepo dé xal 
or: for Gre xal, further rd omitted before el8os, and yap after xafamep, 
and lastly pyropeias for pyropixys. 

rev 8€} ricreay. 

dy rots Seadexrixots] Dionysius has dvadurixois, which Spengel has 
introduced into the text, with the remark, cerfe Aristoteles rj diadexrixn 
scripstsse? (Rhetores Graeci p. 5, Praef. p. 5) ; and again, sber die Rhet. des 
Arist. Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851, p. 44, Aristoteles sagt nur dv rq Suadexrixi,, 
nicht év rois Siadexrixois ; in reply to which I will merely quote Rhet. I! 
22, 14, where ey rots ScaXexrixois again occurs. Even without this evidence 


3—2 


36 PHTOPIKHS A 2$8. 


yiopos TO Sé hawopevos avAAOYioMOS, Kal évTavOa 
Guoiws Eat yap TO pév Trapaderypa erraywyn, TOS 
évOupnua avdAdAoyiopos, TO Sé awwopuevoy évOvpnua 
“ ) 9 A 
awopevos avd\Aoyiopos. karo 8 évOuynua pev 
e 9 ‘ 
pnTopikov cvAdAoyiouov, mapaderyua Se émaywyny 
pnropinv. qwavres Sé Tas Ticres TrowvvTat dia TOU 
Sexvivan 4 Tapacelypata Aeyovtes 4 évOupnpaTa, Kal p. 7. 
mapa Tavita ovdevs wor’ elmep Kai SAws dvaykn (y) 
1 obdéy ws. 
-I can see no reason why an author who speaks habitually of others of his 
works in the plural, as ra dyaAurixd, 7Oixd, woAerind, peOodixa, should be 
denied that privilege in the special case of the Topics. Nor do I see 
why the single testimony of Dionysius should override the authority of 
all the Aristotelian MSS, I have therefore retained the old reading. 

sravres 8¢ ras wiarets movotyra:—xal rapa ravra ovdéy ws} Anal. Pr. II 
23, 68 49, dre 8 ov povow of Stadexrixol nai dmodecrixol cvAdAcyiopol 8a 
TOY wpoeipnuevav yivovras oynudrewy, GAda xal of pyropiKot Kat dAovs Hrivoury 
wiorts kal xa’ crrovavovy pébodoy, viv dy ely Aexréov. dwayra yap morevopey 
7 8d ovAAcysopou f €£ éraywyys. Anal. Post. 1 18, 81 @ 40, elvep par- 
Gavonev } éxaywy9 7} drobeifa. Eth. Nic. VI 1139 5 27, éx mpoywvo- 
cropévoy 8€ waca Sidackadia, worep Kal ev Tois dvadvuriKois Aéyouer” 9 
péy yap 3&0 énaywyns, 4 8 agvdAdAoyiopq. The reference here is most 
unmistakeably to the opening words of the Anal. Post., an additional 
evidence, against Brandis (see the succeeding note), that the reference 
in éx réy avadurixoy is either directly and exclusively to this passage 
of the Analytics or at any rate includes it with the others. 

} ovrivouy] is rejected by Spengel on the authority of Dionysius, who 
omits it, and against that of the Aristotelian Mss, which, as appears 
from Bekker’s revision, all agree in retaining it. It is not merely perfectly 
intelligible, and absolutely unexceptionable on all critical grounds, but 
when compared with the commencement of the Anal. Post., to which 
reference is immediately after made, it seems to tally so precisely with 
what is there stated, that it might almost be regarded as a necessary 
addition. In the passage of the Analytics we are: told that every kind 
of instruction and learning, proof scientific and popular, mathematical 
or dialectical knowledge, is conveyed by way of syllogism or induction: 
and it is then added, ws & avras xai of pyroptxol cupreibovow' h yap 
81a wrapadecyparey, 6 cori erayayn, i 6s évOupnparwy, Orep éoti cvAAcytopss, 
a statement with which the 4 dyriody of the Rhetoric seems to correspond 
to anicety. And for the same reason I hold that this passage is referred 
to in éx tay dvadurixdy, as well as Anal. Pr. 11 23, 68 4 9, (quoted in the 
preceding note,) and the continuation of the subject there suggested in 
chapters 24 and 27, (which contain the logical description of induction 
and example, and the enthymeme), though Brandis, in his tract on the 
Rhetoric in Schneidewin’s Philologus Iv 1, p. 24, would confine the 
reference to the latter passage. 


PHTOPIKH] A 2 §§ 9, fo, 37 


oudroyiCopuevoy n érayovra Sexvuvat otiovy’ (SyAov 8 
piv TovTo é€k Twy avaduTiKwy), dvayKaiov éxaTEpoy 
QaUTwY EKaTEpw TOUTWY TO av’TO Elva. Tis 8 é€oTi 
diaopa mapadciyparos Kal évOupnparos, pavepov éx 
Tov TomiKay. éxet yap wept TvANOYIcMOU Kal éra- 
ywryns elontat mpoTEpov, STL TO ev Eri TOAAWY Kal 
Ouotwy SeixvvaOar BTi oTws Eyer ExeT ev Erraywyy 
éorw évrav0a Sé mapaderyua, To S€ TWwaVv dvTwV 
Erepov Tt Sia Taira cupBalvey mapa traita TH 
TavTa éwat, n KaBodov 4 ws eri TO ToNV, éxel pev 
10 TuAAoyio pos évravOa Oé évOvunua Kadeira. avepov 
5° Ott Kai éExatepov Exe: dyabov To eldos THS pnTo- 
pexynss xaOarep yap Kai év Tots peOodixois elpnrat, 
1 ércoiy Ff dvrwovy. 


§9. é« ray romxdy] On this reference to the Topics see note in Introd. 
p- 154, and note on II 25, 3,in this Commentary. The reference to the 
Topics there made is precisely similar to this : that is, it is made to the 
work in general and its contents, and met to any particular passage ; 
what is stated here may be gathered or txferred from the Topics. 

§ 10. qavepdy 8 Sri éxarepov Zxes dyaboy rd eBos ris pyropsxijs] ‘ It 
is plain that either kind of Rhetoric (the mapad8ecyparades or the édvOvpn- 
parixov) has good in it’, that each of them has its. own particular virtue 
and excellence, or advantage. Buhle construes the words ré eldos rijs 
pnropuis eyet dxarepov ayabov, ‘ Rhetoricen utrogue bono frui, et enthy- 
memate et exemplo. (He takes ro el8os ris p. for a mere periphrasis. 
So in fact it does occur in Pol. 1 4, 1253 5 28, év cpydvov efdes “in the 
shape of an instrument”, de gen. et corr. I 3, 10, dv vAns eldec—but eldos 
in this usage does not seem to admit the definite article.) We have a 
similar use of aya@év dye in Rhet. 11 20, 7, eit 8 of Acdyos Snprryopixol, 
nat ¢yovoww dyabéy rovro, ort x.7.d. 

év rois peOodixois] ‘ Scheint cine mittelsteHung swischen analyttk und 
dialehtik eingenommen zu haben’, Brandis, u.s. p. 13% The work is 
mentioned twice by Dionysius, Ep. ad Amm. 1 cc. 6 and 8, each time 
in company with Analytics and Topics. From this circumstance and 
from the reference here, it is natural to conclude that its subject was 
connected in some way with Logic. Diogenes Laert. V 1, 23, includes 
in his list of Aristotle’s writings pe@od«a in eight books, and § 25, 
peOodixov in one: the former comes amongst the logical, the latter amongst 
the rhetorical works. It appears also in the list of the ‘Anonymous’ 
author of the life of Aristotle (in Buhle, Vol. 1 p. 62), again in near 
connexion with works on Logic, ’AvaAvurixav, UpoBAnparwv, Mefodsxa. 
Hesychius Milesius in his life of Aristotle (Buhle, Vol. 1 p. 72), describes 
it thus; mpos pév ovy ray edpeciy, ra Te roma xal peOodicd, wmapédwxe 


38 - PHTOPIKHE A 2 § Io. 


kai év Touro Gpoiws eye eiol yap at pev Trape- 
SeryuaTwoes pntopeia at 3é évOupnparixai, xal pn- 
Topes Opoiws of pev Tapaderypatwoas ot dé évOuun- 
patikot. mOavol pev ovv ovy nTTOV of Adyot ot 


mpordceay wAgbos, €& Sv spos Ta mpoPArpara Mibavay emyerpnuarav olovre 
evropeiy : classing it, like Dionysius and Diogenes, with the Topics and 
Analytics, the latter of which is mentioned immediately after. Simplicius 
ad Categ. fol. 7 a (quoted by Buhle) speaks of it as one of Aristotle’s 
Uropynpara, commentarti; év rois Uropynypacey, xal yap év rots pedodixois, 
cat dv rois Urouyypact, cal dv rais Staipécect, xal dy GAA vropyqpari. 
Brandis, u.s., adds a reference to the Schol. in Arist. p. 47 b 40. 

pyropeiat] ‘rhetorical exhibitions or displays’ Probl. xv111 3. The word 
is a rare one, and as distinguished from pyropixey denotes rather the 
practice and results of Rhetoric, speaking and speeches, than the system 
and theory of it as embodied in the ‘art’. It is found in Plato, Polit. 
304 A, where Stallbaum notes, ‘vox jnropeia a Platone ficta videtur ut ars 
oratoria nobilior et generosior distingueretur a varia illa pyroptxy cuius 
nomen profanaverant qui ad explendas suas cupiditates abusi erant.’ 
The fact, that the word was a Platonic invention, and the ground assigned 
for the distinction, seem equally unauthenticated. It occurs also in Iso- 
crates, xara ray Lodioray § 21, for ‘the practice of rhetoric’ in general, 
also Panath. § 2, Phil. § 26; and amongst the later writers, in Plutarch 
and Lucian : pnropevev, in Plato, Isocrates, and Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37), 35. 

mBavol pev ovv—ol évOuynuarexol) Anal. Pr. 11 23, ult. @ices per ov 
mporepos Kal yvwpiuerepos 6 dia TOU péeoou ovdAAcyiopos, npiv O évapycorepos 
6 8a ris éxayoryjs. The objects of sense and observation from which we 
derive our inductions and examples are ‘nearer to us’, more readily 
apprehensible by us, than the universals of the syllogism: and therefore, 
Top. A 12, 105 @ 16, éore 8:9 pév eraywy) mbavarepoy xal cabécrepoy Kai 
Kara THY aicOnoww yvopipodrepoy kal Tis roAXois Kowdr, 6 8€ cvAACyopes Bra- 
orixerepov kal pos Tous avriAcyixo’s évepyéorepoy, ‘induction is a mode of 
reasoning which is clearer (to us) and more persuasive, because its materials 
are better known to us’, the example must be familiar and well known or it 
will not produce its effect in the way of proof; also some kind of induc- 
tion is constantly used by every one,. rois moAXois xowdy; the syllogism 
and enthymeme are more ‘cogent’ and ‘effective’ against an adversary 
in a debate, and are therefore ‘more applauded’, @upvBotyra: 8¢ paddoy 
ol évOupnparixoi. . 

There is no real contradiction between what is here said and in 
Probl. Xvi1I 3. In the Problem the question is why people in general 
are better pleased with examples than with enthymemes, the fact being 
assumed. The answer is, that they learn more from them, and are 
therefore more amused, and the facts which are adduced by way of ex- 
amples are more familiar and interesting; the enthymeme (as the 
syllogism in the Topics) proceeds from universals, which we are less 
acquainted with than with particulars. Consequently, examples are 
more pleasing and therefore plausible (m6ava), whilst the conclusive 


PHTOPIKHS A 2§1r1. 39 
dia Twv Twapaderyyatwv, OopvBovvrar dé madAov oi 


9 , 4 9 > # | ee 4 ~ ie / 
11 €vOupnpatiKol. Tyv 8 airiay aiTav, Kai mas ExaTépw 


Xpnoréov, épovpev Votepov’ viv dé wepi avtwy Tov- 
Twv uaddov dopicwpev Kabapus. 

| q \ \ \ hoy ee ee | 

évrel yap To wWtOavoy Twi WiOavov €or, kal TO peEV 

9) \ e ? 9 e A A A a ‘ A ~ 

evOus vrapxe 6 aito m@avov Kal moray To Sé TH 
SeixvvoOan Soxeiv dia ToLovTwy, ovdeuia Sé TEXVN OKO- 
mei TO Kal’ ExaoTov, oiov 4 iaTpiKH Ti XwKpaTE TO 
Uyiewov €or 4 KaAXia, ddAAa Ti TH ToLBdE 4 TOTS 
Towiade (TovVTO pEev yap évrexvov, TO dé Ka Exacrov 
areipov Kai ovK émiotnTov), ovde i pnTopiKn TO Kal’ 
4 4 4 a Ul HN e 4 
éxaorov Evoogov Oewpyoe, oiov Lwxpata 4 ‘Immia, 
ad\Xa TO Towitcde, Kabarep Kai 4 StadexTiKy. Kal 
yap éxeivy ovAdoyiCeTat ovk éF wy Ervyxev (paiverat 
argument, the enthymeme which leaves the adversary without reply, is 
more striking, and therefore more applauded. 

GopuBeicba, ‘to be applauded’, is a regular formation of the passive. 
For although the usual construction of OopvBeiy is with émi and the 
dative, many examples of the transitive use of it are found. See the 
examples of both, and of the passive, in Ast’s Lex. Plat. Isocr. Panath. 
§ 233, (6 Adyos) expyppevos fy nal reOopuvBnuévos: and Rhet. II 23, 30, 
réyv cvdAdoyiopey OopuBeiras pad:ora rotaira doa «rr. Cf. Rhet. I 9, 40, 
quoted in Introd. p. 155. 

§ 11. épotpey vorepov] It chapters 20—24. 

gavev] ‘plausible’, that which readily persuades; morov, ‘credible’, 
that which is to be relied on; the latter represents the higher degree of 
trustworthiness. 8 ro:ovroy, mOavey xal moroy. 

The connexion of the argument of this section is given in the para- 
phrase, Introduction p. 155. 

Art and science deal with universals, art prescribes rules for classes, 
not individuals; practice, ¢ywetpia, follows the opposite method. Rhet. 
Il 19, 27,. 7d 8€ mapa ravra vs (nrety wept peyeOovs admdas Kai virepoyns Kevo- 
Aoyety doriv’ Kupwdrepa ydp éors mpos Thy xpeiay (for use or practice) ra xcaf 
écacta rey xpaypatwy, Eth. Nic. VI 12, 1143 @ 32, €are d¢ ray xa” exacra 
cal ray doydray mayra ra mpaxra «.t.r. Met. A 1, 981 4 12, mpds pev ovr 
ro sparrew éureipla réxvns ovddv Soxet Scapépery, dAAG Kal paddAov émrvyya- 
vorras Gpapev Tors éusreipous ray dvev ris épreipias.Acyoy ¢xovrwy. airiov 3 
ors 4 pev épreipia ray Ka exacroy dort yroots, 7 Be réxyy Tv Kaborov, al dé 
apdafecs xal al yevéoets wacat rep 76 xa exacroy elow. 

nal yap dxeiyn ovddoyifera: ove €€ dy Ervyey x.r.d.] Compare Top. A Io, 
104 @ 4, II, 105 @ 3—9, ov dei 8¢ ray wpoBAnya ovde tracay Oéow émeaxo- 
neiv, GAX’ Hy drrophaeey dy tis THY Adyou Beopévey, xal py Koddcews ff aleOijcews’ 
of pév yap dwropobvres rorepoy Sei rovs Oeods rivGqy Kal rovs yoveis dyangy, } 00, 


40 PHTOPIKH: A 2§ 12, 


. n~ ~ , a 9 

yap &rrTa Kal Tois wapaAnpovoww), GAN’ éxeivyn pev €k P. 1357. 

~ A A ~ ww 
tuv ovyou Seouevwy, 5 Se pnTopixn éx Tuav 40n Bov- 

s 3 ld 4 A \ » , V4 
12 Aever Gar ciwfoTwy. ari Sé To Epyov avtiis wepi Te 
c 4 4 2 \ wf 
TotovTwy rept wv Boudevomeba Kai Téxvas pr EXOMED, 
. ~ ; n”~ A c A 

Kal éy Tols ToLoVToIS axpoarais ot ov duvavrat dia rrod- p.8. 

~ ~ a ? 
Awy auvopar' ode Noyi€er Bax roppwhev. Bovrevducba 

1 guvopdy infra. 


Kodoews Séovras, of 8¢ sorepov ff yiay Aevxi) aicOjcews, x.r.d., and Eth. Eud. 
I 3, quoted in Introd. p. 156, note. 

€& av Ervxer] sc. é& exeivoy & Eruyev: ‘any materials, or propositions 
taken at random, any chance propositions’. So Rhet. 1 5, 11, &a ro py- 
dev eye dy ro yijpas AwBara. On the attraction of the relative from its 
proper case. after the verb to that of its antecedent, see Matth. Gr. Gr, 
§ 473, and note on Rhet. 1 5, 11. 

§ 12. 1d &pyov avrjs] The proper office, the special functon, busi- 
ness, ‘work’, @pyov, of Rhetoric, is exercised in such things as we are 
obliged to take advice about, where there are no definite rules of art 
ready laid down to guide us, 

The épyoy of anything is that which it js specially appointed (by 
nature) £0 do, its proper special work. It is in the execution, the carrying 
out or fulfilment of this %pyov, that this dpern, this special excellence of 
everything, resides. Nature always works intelligently with a purpose 
in view, mpos réAos m4, everything has its own special épyov. This is 
especially manifest in all ‘instruments’, Spyava (things in which the pur- 
pose is apparent); as of an axe or knife the office or purpose is to cut 
(large and small things), of a horse to run, of an eye to see, of the mind 
to think, and so on; and the purpose or office being the same in kind 
and differing only in degree, in doing a thing at all and in doing it well, 
the apery is shewn in and measured by the performance of this special 
work; sharpness in the knife to cut well, swiftness in the horse to run 
well, is the due fulfilment of its épyov. Eth. N. vi 2, 11394 16, 7 3 
dperi) mpos +d Epyor +5 olxeiov. This doctrine is first laid down by Plato, 
Rep. I 352 E seq. and borrowed by Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1 6, and II 5, 
where the theory of moral virtue is based upon it. Hence Pol. 1 2, 12 53 
a 23, mavra 8€ TH Epym Spiora nai ty, Suvapet. Eth. Eud. 11 1, 1218 3 38, 
mept dperijs, Ort dorly 4 BeAriorn Biddeors § eis § Suvayis exacrav, Sowy 
€ori ris xpijows } épyov, which is there illustrated at length. 7 

dia roAAGv ouvopq].‘to take in at a glance through the medium, or 
along the line, of many Steps of proof or Syllogisms’, ‘to take in a long 
chain of arguments at one view’. 

AoyiferOat moppmbev] expresses much the same thing as da rodXGy 
avvopay, to deduce or string together syllogisms in a chain from a long 
way off or back, ‘to string together a long chain of connected syllogisms’, 
With dpéabev here, compare the similar use of it in II 22, 3, and Top. 
A II, 105 2 8 ovde 3) dy cvveyyus if amodertts, ov3’ oy Xéap TOppeo. 

BovAevopeba 8€] On the proper objects of deliberation compare Eth. 


PHTOPIKH® A 2§ 13. At 


rY ry ~ v 9 4 > 4 wv 
Se wept Twv pawopuerwv évdexerOat duorepws exe’ 
4 A “~ ] 4 4 nN / nA wv 
wept yap Twv dovvatwv arAws 4 yeverOa n EvedOat 
e/ , \ 
139 éxew ovdels BovAeveTat OUTS VrodauBavwy> ovdEv 
A a 
yap wAéov. évdexerat dé cvANOYiCer Oat Kal ovvayew 


Nic. 11 5, VI 2 AeyéaOw 8¢ rovray (ray ris Wuxis popiwy) ro pey emornpo- 
mxoy To 8€ Aoytorixdy, rd yap BovdeverOat Kal AoyiferOar ravrov, ovOels 
3¢ Bovreveras rep) rev py evBexyopevwy GdAws Fyew. C. 5, 1140 @ 32, Bovdev- 
eras 8 ovGels wept trav dduvarwy Grows exery, odd rev py) évBexoudvar avrp 
swpafa. de Anima III 10, 4, 433 @ 29, mpaxroy 8 éori +d évBexdpevoy nal 
GAdXws éyew. We deliberate and act only in cases where the event or 
issue is uncertain (may be in either of two ways, dudorépws); where the 
event is necessarily this or that, i.e. certainly one way, and not the other, 
or where it is not in our own power, where we have no control over it, no 
one either deliberates whether or no anything is to be done or tries to do 
it. ra dvdeyopeva audorepwc exe is usually expressed by rd éeveycpeva 
GAXws Exe, things contingent and uncertain in their issue ; opposed to 
Ta py dvdexopeva GAdows Exe, things certain and necessary, which can be 
only in one way, which have only one possible issue, and cannot be in 
one way or another, indifferently. 

ovrws vroAapBavey] ‘on that supposition’, i.e. if he actually supposes 
them to be necessary and unalterable: because it is possible that he 
may have deliberated or even attempted in action things which he did 
not know were beyond his control, in mere ignorance. 

ovder wAéov] ‘there is nothing to be gained by it, no advantage in it’, 
Valckenaer, Diatr.in Eur, Fragm. p.150(156), supplies numerous examples, 
In three MSS (Bekker) the words ovdev yap mAcov are followed immedi- 
ately by 4 ovrws édvd¢xeras cupBovrevew. They were first omitted by 
Bekker, though previously suspected by Muretus. The origin of this 
interpolation, for such it seems to be, may be thus accounted for. The 
words ovAdoyi{erOas and cuvayew being very nearly synonymous, some 
one may have added in the margin 4 ovrws évdéxera: 38¢ cupSovrAevew— 
meaning that we might read cupBovdevew in place of cuAdoyl{erOau to 
avoid the tautology, cvpSovAevew referring to the deliberative branch of 
Rhetoric, or public speaking: 9 ovrws, ‘or thus’, merely expressing the 
possibility of a various reading, évBdéxeras 8¢ cvpBovAevew. The essential 
stop after ovrws was then omitted or overlooked, and the words finally 
introduced into the text as an appendage to wAéoy, with the sense, as 
rendered by Gaisford, ‘nihil enim amplius profici potest, quam quod sic 
deliberatur: i.e. incassum enim instituitur ista (altera) consultatio’. 

§ 13. ouvdyew, (ratione) colligere. Rhet. 11 22, 3 and 15. The ov» 
in words of this kind, which denote a process of reasoning or understand- 
ing, aS oumévat, cvpPadrrew, (to comprehend, comprehendere,) and avdoyi- 
(erOaz itself, denotes the bringing of things together in the mind for the 
purpose of comparison, upon which either a judgment is founded and a 
conclusion drawn, or the understanding itself developed or enlightened. 
ovvdyew and ovAdoyi{erOa are found again together as synonyms, Mct. 
H. init. 1042 @ 3, éx 89 ray elpnpévwy ovdduyicacba Bei, Kat ovvayayorras 
ro xehadaioy reAos émireOévas. 


42. PHTOPIKHE A 2§13. 


4 A 4 

Ta pev Ek TVANEAOYLTMEVWY pOTEpOV, Ta O EF aovA- 
, Y ‘ A w~ A A A 
Aoyiortay yey Seoevwy S€ avAAOyiopov Sia TO pH 

> ww > @ ‘ , A A A a 
eivat Evdofa. advaykn de TovTwy TO meV py Elvat 
> | ~ 4 A ’ 
everraxoNovlntrov dia TO pyKos (6 yap KpiTns U7To0- 
T e ~ a 4 A A AY A A 9 
KetTat €lvat amAous), Ta Se yn WiBava dia TO py EE 
e , ? 9 3 , 4 > » ~ ’ 
OmoAoyoupevwy eivar pnd évdoEwy, wor’ dvayKatov TO 
Te evOuunpa eivat Kal TO wapaderypa rept TwWY Evde- 
4 e A 1 \ WA A 4 4 
NOMEVWY Ws Ta TONAG Exe Kat aAXAWS, TO MEV Trapa- 
4 | 4 4 e NV 
Seryua éraywyny To O évOuyunua avdAdAoyiopoy, Kat 

9 , s\ « 
€£ dNiywv Te Kai mwodAaKts éAaTTOVwY Hf EE wy O 

“~ ' a a8 A ed ? , 
mpanOs iid haces aid vp n TL TOUTWY ed aa 
ovde det eye? avTos yap TovTO mpocTiOnow o 
/ ee ‘ , # 

dxpoatns. otov drt Awpiers orehavitny dywva vevi- 


Ta pev €k ovAdeAoyiopévwv mporepoy] ‘the conclusions of previous 

syllogisms’, which serve as major premisses to new syllogisms, and so on 
through the entire chain of demonstration. 
_ dwAods]‘a simple, uncultivated person’, Germ. efafach. This use of 
the word belongs to the first of the three varieties above distinguished 
(note on drAds, § 4 p. 30). It is opposed here rather to the ‘complications’ 
of an advanced stage of civilization and refinement, than to duplicity of 
character, and expresses ‘an elementary state of cultivation’. Similarly 
Pol, 11 8, 1268 4 39, rovs yap dpxaious vopovs Alay amdovs elvat nal BapBaps- 
xovs ‘rude and barbarous’. 

évOvpnua—napaderypa] On enthymeme and example see Introd. pp. 
99—108. 

6 mporos ovAdoyiopos] mperos ‘in its earliest, most elementary’, or 
‘normal, typical, form’. mAjpepa ris mparns (primary, in its original 
form) moAews, Pol. VI (IV) 4, 1291 217. dptoroxpariay pédtora ray dd\doy 
wapa thy adnbivny xal mpornv. Ib. c, 8, sub fin. Pol. vit (VI) c. 4, 1319 @ 
39, ri)» BeAriorny xal mporny Snyuoxpariay. On this passage, see note on 
II 21, 6. 

otoy (pos ro 8nAovv, cvAdoyi{er Gas amodei~a) dts. Infr. § 19, olow Sre 
éweBovAeve x.7.A. and c. 1 § 13. 

Awptevs] the type of an Olympic victor; son of Diagoras of Rhodes, 
to whom Pindar’s seventh Olympian ode is inscribed. See Introd. p. 158, 
note I. 

arepavirmy dyava] This is the title distinctive of the four great games, 
of which honour was in reality the prize, the garland being merely a 
symbol or external sign. They were hereby distinguished from dyaves 
xpnpvariras Or dpyvpira: (Plut.) in which the prize was money, and in 
which therefore mercenary motives might possibly enter into the compe- 
tition. Pausanias X 7, 3 tells us that it was not till the 2nd Pythiad that 
the Pythian games became an dydy oredavirns. Add to the instances 


- PHTOPIKH? A 2§ 14. 43. 


e A - 9% ~ 74 9 4 “A - #S 
Knkey, tkavoy emety ort OdAupmia yap veviknkey 
q e@ A , A ~ ~ 
to 0 Ott oTepavitns Ta 'OdAvumia, ovde Set wpoabei- 
4 A 4 ? 
14 var yiyvwoKovet yap wavTes. é7el 8 éotiv oAtya 
~ » e , 
Bev Twv dvayKxaiwy EE wy ot pytopiKol auAAOYio "OL 
2 \ \ ‘ \ @ e / \ € , 
- etot (Ta yap TOAAG TrEpi wy at Kpioes Kal al oOKEWels, 
CA ww < ,) , 
évdéxerat Kai adAws Exe’ wept wy pevy yap WpaT- 
~ A , 
Tova. BovAevovTat Kal oKoTrovet, Ta b€ mpaTTOpMEva 
, A af ~ 
qavra TOLOVTOU YyeEVvous éoTi, Kal OUdEV Ws Erros EtTrEtY 
9 s ? a A 9 e ? 4 4 A 
é€& dvaykns Toutwv), Ta 8 ws émi TO ToAU oup- 
, 9 > 8 
Baivoyvra Kai évoexopeva ex ToLloUTwY avayKn éETEpwY 
A ~ > , ~ 
sud\doyiterOa, Ta 8 dvayxaia €£ dvayxaiwy (dyrov 
) ~ ~ ~ 9 “~ 4 ef 
S auiv cai ToUTO ex TWY avaduTiKw@V), Pavepov OT EF 


from Xen. Mem., Demosth., and Lycurg., Aesch. c. Ctes. § 179, and 
Isocr. Antid. § 301, rovs aO6Anras rots éy rois oredhaviras aydot mxor- 
Tas. 
[Anon. vita Euripidis, init. foxnoe 8é rar’ dpyas mayxpariov f mvypiy, 
Tou WarTpos avTov ypnopov AaBorros ort orehavnhopous adyavas vuxyjoe. S.] 

"OdAvpmea vevinnxey] The accusative in these phrases is an extension 
or ‘equivalent’ of a cognate accusative. Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 564. 

§ 14. A summary repetition of the contents of the following sections, 
14—19, is given in the chapter on Avots, II 25, 8—9. 

dxet 8 dary cdiya—ds én rd wokv] Comp. II 22, 3, xal pr povow ovva- 
yeww €x rev dvayxalwv, GAN’ Kal ex Tay ws émi Td sodv. 

évBexopeva} ‘things possible’, as opposed to things necessary, not here 
to things impossible, On évdéxerOas and dvvacba, ro évdexcpevoy and ro 
dvvaroy in Aristotle, see Waitz on Anal. Pr. 1 3, 25 4 37, (Vol. I p. 375 seq.) 
and Bonitz on Metaph. © 3, 1047 @ 26, p. 387. 8uvarey according to 
Waitz, where the two are distinguished, expresses physical, évdeyopevoy 
logical, possibility: the latter implies the possible ‘ruth of an assertion, 
viz. that when we assert anything we do not contradict ourselves. éyde- 
xopueva are therefore here ‘possibilities’ as opposed to certainties; things 
and events which are only conceived as possible, which may be in one 
way or in another. In the ordinary language évdéyerOa: and évdexopevoy 
have usually some other words, as dAdws fyew, yéverOar 7 py yiyverOas, or 
something similar, added to them in the way of a definition or limitation. 
With the adsolute use of it in this passage (and the general sense in 
which it appears in Waitz’s and Bonitz’s Commentaries) comp. 1 4, 3, 
ovdd 83 wept ray évexoudvay aravrov. Eth. Nic. v1 2, 1139 @ 8, éy de § ra 
évdexdpeva. Ib. c. 12, 1143 6 2, rov doxdrov xal évdexopevov. 

éx tay dvaduruov.} Anal. Pr. 18, 29 4 20, éret 8 Erepov dotw vmapyew 
re cal é£ avayxns umapyew xal évdéyerOat Umdpyew (roAAd yap vmdpxe per, 
ov pevroe €€ avayxyns’ ta 8 ovr’ éf dvayxns ov& Umdpxe GAs, dvdéxera o 
vmapyew) Shrov Sre nal avAdcyiopos éxgorou Tourwy Erepos ~oras, Kal ovy 


44 PHTOPIKH® A 2 §§ 15—17. 


? \ » 4 , a 8 > a“ # 
wy ta évOupnuatra AEyEeTal, Ta MEV avayKala éoTat, 
\ A ~ € 9 A , 4 A 9 
ta 6€ miciota ws él TO TONV. Aé€vyETat yap évOu- 
, 4 e 
Bnpara é£ ekoTwr Kal onpeiwy, WOTE dvayKn TOUTwY 
e 7@ € , » A Ft b| 4 8 > F 
I5 EKaTEpOV EkaTEpW TAUTO Eival. TO MEV Yap Elkos 
3 e » 4 ak a , ,) e ~ ; 
EXT WS Eri TO TOAV yiwwomEVvoY, OVX a7rAWs Sé, Kab- 
, e / , » \ A A \ 23 Lf 
amep opiCovrai Twes, dAAa TO TEpt Ta évdexoueva 
” wv 4 _a A , ~ A dA > ? e 
&\Aws Exe, OUTWS EXOV TpPOS EKEIVO TpOS O EiKOS, WS P. 1357 4. 
4 o a 4 4 J ~ A , 4 Pp. 9. 
1670 KaOoXou mpds TO KaTa péposs Tay Sé onpEelwy TO 
) “~ / 4 
Mev ovTws Exe: ws Twv Kal ExaoTov Tt pos TO Kab- 
, ) A e ~ , A ) : ‘ , 
OAou, TO 6€ ws TWY KaBoAOU TL WPOS TO KATA [MEpoS. 
4 ‘ a ~ a 4 A Q 
Toutwy Sé To pev dvayKaiov Texunpiov, To O€ pn 
~ : 4 A A 4 
17 dvayKaiov dvwwupov éort kata Thy Stadopayv. dvay- 
~ A te , 5 e 4 i } A 
kata pev ouv Aeyw EE wy yiveTat TuvAAOYIOMOS. 10 
A ~ ~ 
Kal TeKunplov TO ToLOvTOY TaY onpelwy eoTive STav 
4 4 9 a of ~ A ‘4 a? 
yap pn évdexerOat olwvrat Nica: TO AEYOEV, TOTE 
/ wv A tA 
epew otovrat Texunpiov wis Sederymevoyv Kat TWeTrEepac- 
, A A c f , 4 
péevov’ TO yap Tekuap Kal wepas TavTov éoTt KaTa 


Gpoiws dyorvrwy Trav apwv, GAN’ do pey ¢£ avayxaiwr, 6 8 e€ Uwapxovrwy, o 8 ef 
évdexouevov. Anal, Pr. 1 13, 32 46 4, where two kinds of possibility, ro évde- 
Xopvevoy, are distinguished: one, the order of nature, which from its ordi- 
nary uniformity makes a near approach to the necessary, and the other, 
the indefinite, the purely accidental, ro awd riyns, in which there is no 
natural order at all. 

rd pév avayxaia éora, ra 8€ mAciora os é7i ro woAv] ‘It is plain that 
the materials of enthymemes, the propositions or premisses of which they 
are constructed, though they may be necessary, are most of them no 
more than probabilities, or things that wsua//y happen’. [On péer—d¢, see 
the references above given in note on I § 12 p. 24.] 

Aéyerat evOvpnpara €£ elxdrav xal onpelow| Comp. I 3, 7, II 25, 8, where 
mwapadeiypara are added, Anal. Pr. 11 27, 70 4 10. 

On eixéra and onpeia, Introd. p. 160-163. The meaning and con- 
nexion of the following sections on the rhetorical instruments of proof 
are explained in full detail in the paraphrase, to which the reader is 
referred (Introd. p. 163—168). 

§ 17. Atoas ro AexGev] On Avew, Avors, Avrov, see Introd. on II 25 p. 267 
and note I. 

réxuap| Eustathius ad II. H. p. 665, 45. rexpaiperOa ro reAcwovv, dro 
rou réxpwp, 6 8ndot To TéAOs. TO pévros Texuaiper Oat dyri rov onpetovabas, 
dg’ ob Kal réxpap TO onpetov, of pe “Opnpow A€yovos. ‘Antiqua lingua, 
quam mox commemorat Aristoteles, non erat ab Homeri dialecto diversa, 


PHTOPIKHS A 2 § 18. 45 


\ 9 , ~ 4 4 ~ 4 A 4 
18 THY dpyaiay yAwTTav. ear O€ TWY ONMELwWY TO MEV 
4 e a 4 , = 2 wv 
ws TO Kal Exaorov mpos TO KaBoXov woe, oiov Ei TIS 
~ ee 4 , , 
eleey onpeiov elvat Stt ot cool Sixatot, Zwxpatns 


A A > 4 4 ~ A FZ a? 
yap aodos nv Kai Sikatos. TovVTO Mev OUV onpEioV 
\ ha A , 

éott, AvTov Sé, Kav dAnOés 7 TO Etpnuevov’ dovA)o- 


4 A , = # wv ~ ee 
yiorov yap. TO 6€, oiov et Tis elreey OnpeEiov OTE 
~ A vA , e/ s a” 
VOOEl, TUPETTEL yap, | TETOKEV OTL yada Exel, dvay- 
om ~ , , 4 
Kaiov. O7eép TwY ONMElwY TEKUNpLoOY pOvOY éeaTiy: 
a 4 vv 2 ,) v + ) , A A € 
povov yap, av dAnOés n, aduTov éotiv. TO 5é ws 
4 A A a f ev # 
to xa0cAov mpos TO KaTa pMépos ExoY, oiov et Tis 
e ; ~ i | 
elretev, OTL TUPETTEL, ONpElov Elvat, TuKVOY yap 
9 ~ A ‘ ~ EO) 9 ‘ - 9 
dvarvei. AvTov de Kai TovTO, Kav aAnOes 7° év- 
, 4 4 .) rd ~ 
déyeTat yap Kal pn mupeTtovTa wvevoriay’, Ti pev 
1 wrevorigy infra. 


Vide Il. N. 20, Od. &. 373, et alibi. Homeri carmina ea aetate qua 
vixit Aristoteles propter vetustatem apud vulgus obscuriora fuisse aliunde 
constat. Ex. gr. Vox dwowa invenitur in Iliadis locis minimum viginti et 
sex: Olympiade tamen CVI! qua orationem c. Aristocratem habuit De- 
mosthenes, ea Athenis prorsus obsoleverat. Dignus est Demosthenis 
locus qui hic proponatur. Vetarat scilicet antiqua lex rots d»dpopdvous 
—p) Aupaiverdat pn dé drowgy. Quam sic explicare pergit orator summus 
P- 630, 25. To péey 3) py Aupaiver Oat, yripipov of8 oT: waow—rTo 8 p} 
dsroey Gy, B) xpipata wpdrrecOas’ ra yap xpypata drowa adyopafoy of wadaoi. 
Adeo universe verum est quod de Homeri tantum geographia scripsit 
Strabo Vill p. 484=513. ra 8 ‘Ounpou oxéyveas Setrat xprrixns, mourixos 
Aéyovros, Kai ov Td voy, GAAA Tdpxaia, SY O xpovos Hyavpwxe tad moAAd. 
Gaisford. 

§ 18. rd &¢, olay ef ris...dvayxaiov.] The auctor ad Heren. I! 25, 39, 
gives two ‘signs’ of an opposite, fallacious, or refutable character, derived 
from the same sources, Necesse est guoniam pallet aegrotasse; aut, ne- 
cesse est peperisse, quoniam sustinet puerum infantem. These illustra- 
tions had doubtless become traditional, and commonplaces in the rhetor- 
ical books. 

svevoriav] ‘to have an affection or disease of the breath’. A large 
class of verbs in aw and caw are either desiderative (like those in eaw and 
in Latin in rio) or expressive of an affection, usually some form of 
disease ; the latter can be extended to a ‘mental’ affection. Jelf, Gr. Gr. 
§ 330, Obs. 3 ¢ and Obs. 4, would separate these into two classes (1) desi- 
deratives in aw and caw, and (2) verbs in caw, which express a state of 
sickness [Kiihner’s Aus/ihritche Grammatik § 328. 8]. Buttmann also 
in his Gr. Gr. § 119 and p. 294 (Engl. Transl.) assumes a distinction 
between some varieties of them, which is not very clearly made out. 
They fall under three heads, first desideratives, second imitatives (as 


46 PHTOPIKHS A 2§ 18. 


ouv e€ikos €oTt Kai TL Onpeiov Kal Texunpiov, Kai Ti 
dabepovaw, elpnrat uev Kal viv wadAov dé Havepsis 
Tupaymay, to play the tyrant); “but,” he adds, “it is improper to rank 
verbs denoting diseases (the third), oOadpcay, v8epiav, Wopay, &c., in 
the same class (as the imitatives) ;” these belong rather to a preceding 
division, viz. verbs in aw formed from nouns, “and expressing, chiefly, the 
having a thing or quality, and performing an action ; as xopay, yoAgy, Boay, 
yoay, ToApay.” 

A much better and more exact account of these forms of verbs, in 
respect of the connexion and distinction of their senses, is to be found in 
Lobeck’s learned note on Phrynichus, p. 79-83. “ Verbs in gy and cay,” 
(this is not true of a// these verbs and requires qualification; dapap, 
yeirmay, wepay, for instance, can hardly be said to denote either a bodily, 
or mental affection. It should be “some verbs” or “a large class of 
verbs in aw”) “in dofk forms, are properly used of affections of mind and 
body. owAnuay, rov owdiva dAyeiv, Achigy, kpOiav, poAvBdiqv express bodily 
ailments; dvceporiav, vupgigy, macxnrigv, and all desideratives (which 
have either.of these terminations) express some affections of the mind, 
either as a malady, a longing, or in some other form.” This is an am- 
plification of what Lobeck actually says: and it is a/so I think implied 
that the bodily affection is the primary signification, which is extended 
by metaphor to the mental. A long list of examples is there given, 
chiefly of rarer words. I have collected some examples from various 
Greek writers, which, as most of them do not appear in Lobeck’s list, 
or in the grammars, I will here add. 

In Aristophanes, as was to be expected, they most abound. déd@ad- 
pay Ran. 192, BovBomgy ib. 1280, Anparigv 494, dpaxiav 481 and Pac. 702, 
Saponagy, Saporgy Thesm. 1054 (and in Aeschylus, Eur., Xenoph.), orpa- 
tyyav (quoted by Schol. on Ran. 965, Xen. Anab. VII c. 33, Dem. de F. L. 
§ 337 “to have an itch or mania for commanding an army”), evperiay 
Nub. 44, Anpav 326, padnriav 183, xe{yriav 1387, ocBuddAgy Eq. 81, xopv- 
Bavrigv Vesp. 8, BovAugy Plut. 870, gova»y Soph. Phil. 1209 (Hesych. ro 
éxt povor paiverOa), rouav Aj. 589 (ropis ércbupeivy, Schol.), Oavariay Schol. 
ad Phil. 1. c., davyaray (to long for death) Plut. Phaed. 64 B, vauriav Theaet. 
191 A, Legg. 1 639 B, xemow» Gorg. 494 E, Wopay xal xymorgy ib. c. (Arist. 
Eccles. 919), sro8aypgy Alcib. 11 139 E, 140 A. In Aristotle we have omov- 
dapxiay (to be infected with the disease of office-hunting), Pol. vir (Vv) 5 
sub fin., dyway, of mental distress or anxiety, Rhet.19, 21. Many in 
the works on Nat. Hist., as ravpay, oxu(Gv, opyay, xampugy (or xampgay), all 
implying a sexual impulse, Hist. An. vI 18 §§ 12,14, 17, V1 20, 4; wo8aypay 
VI 21, 5, oarupiay de Gen. An. IV 3, 22, v8pemay ib. v. 8, 13, éEvdpamay 
ib. v 20, 5, orpayyoupiay (also Arist. Thesm. 616, Plat. Legg. X1 2, 916 A, 
orpayyoupay, AcOgy). Theophr. mw. dAafoveias, dynriay, ‘‘to have a mania, 
or itch, for buying”, Diog. Laert. vit. Plat. 111 18 “ol Adyot cov, Gyo (6 
Atovuctos), yepoyriaow” (are infected with, smack of, old age), xat ds, (6 
IAdrwyv), “cov &¢ ye rupayneow”. (If this is the passage referred to by 
Buttm. in quoting the verb rvpaymgy in his Grammar, above cited—no 
reference is given—he is wrong both in attributing to it the sense of 
“imitation”, and in assigning it to a separate class.) 


PIITOPIKHS A 2§ 10. 47 


e b) , \ q a. > */ t A 9 
Kai wept TovTwy, Kal did tiv’ aiTiav Ta pev dovA- 
; 4s: 4 A , 9 ~ 9 
Aoyiora éori Ta SE avAAEAOyITMEVA, EV TOIs ava- 
~ ; A ~ , \ 
19 AuTiKois Siwpiorat wept avTwv. Tapaderyya O€ Tt 
a ~ , # 
méey €oTL Eraywyn Kal Tepl ola éraywyn, Eeipnrat: 
4 \ A e / A rt4 oo e 14 a 
€or O€ OUTE ws pEpos mpos SAov OVO ws BAOV pos 
, of e ef \ e/ ’ »> @¢ , A 
pepos ov ws Sov mpos OAOV, GAN’ Ws MEPOS Tpos 
e b) 4 lé 4 A gs A 
pépos, Omotov mpos Guotov, OTav aucw pev 4 U0 
4 4 , A ‘ ee , 

TO avTo yévos, yuwpyswrepov de Oatepov 4 Oarepou, 
, < ef / 
mwapacerypa éoTw. oiov OTt éemtBovdrEvEr Tupavvicr: 
~ A 4 A A 
Atovictos aitwy tHv puAakny: Kat yap Meociorparas 

i) , wv \ 
mpoTepov émtBovAevwy re pudakny kal AaBwv érv- 
, A , 9 ’ \ 14 
pavvevoe, Kat Oeayerns €v Meyapors: Kat aAAot OOUS p. 10. 
4 , ~ 
ivact, jrapaderyma TwavTes yiyvovta tov Arovaiou, 


€y rois dvadurixots}] Anal. Pr. 11 27. 

§ 19. dpe 7.) This union of neuter dual with verb singular, follow- 
ing the analogy of neuter plural in the same construction, is illustrated 
in Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 384, Obs. 1. [Kihner’s Ausf Gram. § 364.] 

oloy ors emBoudever rupparvids Avovvowos x.tA.] The stratagem by which 
Dionysius actually succeeded in obtaining his body-guard (496 B.C.) con- 
trary to the wishes of the majority of the Syracusan citizens is related by 
Diodorus, X111.95. See Grote, Hest. Gr. Vol. X. p. 610—614. Aristotle 
again refers to the attempt, Pol. 111 15 ult. On the similar, and equally 
successful attempt of Pisistratus, Grote, H. G. Vol. I11 p. 208, 209. This 
occurred at his frs¢ usurpation of government B.C. 560. (Grote, Clinton.) 
Theagenes of Megara (Grote, //. G. Vol. III p. 59, 60) is men ioned by 
Aristotle, Pol. vitI (Vv) § sub fin., together with Pisistratus and Dionysius, 
as one of those who had succeeded in making themselves tyrants of 
their native countries, by imposing upon the popular party; Aristotle 
notices the stratagem by which he effected his purpose (ray edacpwy ra 
arty drorpatas, \a8eoy xapa rov morapoy émwéporras). Thucydides also, 
1 126, mentions him as having assisted Cylon in the attempt which fe 
also made on the tyranny at Athens; Herod. v. 71. Cylon was his son- 
in-law, Thuc. ws. Cylon’s attempt was made in 620 B.C. (Clint. F. H. 
sub anno), and Theagenes xar’ éxeivoy rov xpovoy érupayveves Meydpoy 
(Thuc.). Cylon’s attempt (and consequently the tyranny of Theagenes) 
took place, says Herodotus u.s., “before the age of Pisistratus.” 
Theagenes was contemporary with Periander of Corinth, whose reign 
lasted from B.C. 625—585 (Grote u.s. p. 58). 

alréy riv dudaxjy] Plat. Rep. VIII 16, 566 B, ro 3) rupayyndy atrnua 
ra wodvOpuAnroy én) rovrp mavres of els rovro mpoBeBnxéres éfevpicxovow, 
airety tov Sijpov pidaxds twas Tov codparos, iva aos avrois 7 6 Tou Bypou 
Bonbos. Herod. 1 59, of Pisistratus, Infr. ad 1 8, 4. 


48 PHTOPIKH> A 2 § 20. 


a 9 wv 4 9 A “~ 9 ~ tf A ~ 
ov ovK tcaci mw ei dia TOUTO aiTel. Tarra b€ Ta’TA 
e A A » A , 4 e 3 , , 
Uo TO avTO KaOoAov, OT 6 émiBovAevwY Tupavvids 
N ~ 
uAakny are. 
) e b) F , e ~ i od , 
é£ wy pev ouv Aeyovrat ai Soxovarat Elvar mioTes P. 1358. 
wv ~ \ , 
drrovekTikal, eiontar. Tov Oe évOuunuatwv peyiorn 
4 , ~ \ 
20 dtabopa kat padiota AeAnOvia oyedov mwavras éotiv 
A , a 
Hwep Kat mept thy Stadextixny pEeOodov Twy cuAAO- - 
~ A A A ~ ? A A e A 
ylionwv Ta pev yap avTwY éEoTi KaTa THY pNTOpLKHY 
A \ , ~ 
womep Kal KaTa Thy StadeKTiKny [uEeOodov Tay cvAAO- 
~ A a , , 
yiouwrv], ta de kat’ adAas TEexXvas Kai duvapes, Tas 
bs) w ‘ a 4 Z } ‘) A 
ev ovcas tas 8 ovmrw KaTelAnupevas’ oto Kal apv- 
? s | f A ~ e 4 
Oavovoi re [rovs dxpoatas], Kat waddov amrropevot 


Urrd TO avTd KaboXou] “under the same universal”, i.e. genus or spccies; 
which stand to the species or individuals subordinate to each respec- 
tively, in the relation of universal to particular. 1d xa6oAov is that which 
is universally predicable, or predicable of every member of a class. 
Metaph. A 26, 1023 4 29, ro pév yap kadoXov Kal rd Ghws Aeyopevoy es Gov 
Tt Ov avTws earl KabdXoU os TOAAG Teptexoy TH KaTryopetaOa Kal éxdorov Kal 
év drravra elvat os Exacrov, olov dvOpwmov, troy, Geo», Ott Gravra (Ga. Ib, 
Z 13, 1038 5 11, ro 8€ KabdAov Kowor' roto yap Aéyerat xabcAov 6 mdciooww 
urapxew mepuxey. Anal. Post. 1 4, 73 5 26, xabodou 8¢ A€yo 6 &y xard mav- 
ros Te Umdpyn Kal xa’ avrd Kal 7 avro (see Waitz, Comm. p. 315), of which 
the triangle is given as an exemplification, as the universal notion of 
all three-sided figures ; applicable to any one of them, 76 rvyxov, and mpa- 
roy, the highest or primary conception of triangles (the loooxeXés, for ex- 
ample, a subordinate species, being only secondary) : ré xaOoXou 8 Urdpyet 
Tore, OTay él ToU Tuxorros kal mpadrov Becxvynra. Thus the xcafodov is equi- 
valent to the yévos under which all the species and individuals of the 
entire class are included, 6 xata mdvyrwy xarnyopeirat, and is opposed to 
xa’ éxacroy and xara pépos. 

§ 20. xaretAnppévas] ‘fixed, established, settled’. xaradapBavew is 
‘to lay hold of, to get into one’s possession’, or ‘to occupy’, as an army 
occupies a conquered city or country. See the Lexicon for examples of 
this, the primary sense of the word. Thence it passes into the significa- 
tion of ‘binding’ as by an oath, Herod. 1X. 106, wiort re xaraXaBorres xal 
Cpxiowos éppevery re Kal p) drootjcerbar. Thuc. V 21 (cwovdas) evpoy xarec- 
Anppevas (settled or concluded, ‘confirmed’, Schol. icyupds) VIII 63, 3, Ta 
év avrg T@ oTparevpart ert BeBatorepov xaréAaBoy (they secured, established 
or confirmed their interest in the army, Arnold). Plat. Legg. v11 23, 823 A, 
ra tais (npiats viro vopev karecAnppeva (comprehensa et firmata, Stallbaum). 
Arist. Pol. Iv (vil) 2, 1324 6 21, rad pew vopots xareAnppéva ta b€ ebecry, 
(fest gesetzt, Stahr). Eth. Nic. X. 10, 1179 6 18, ra ék mudaod rois fbeat 
KareiAnppeva Noy peTagTHoat. 


PHTOPIKH® A 2 §2r1. 49 


~ ~ A 

Kata tporov peraBaivovow é£ avTwy. paddov de 
A g ° 4 a 

21 cages Eorat TO NEeyouevov Sta wAEOvwY pnlEev. EyW 

‘ a A 
yap dOtaXexTikous TE Kai pnTopikous ovAAOYOpOUs 
« U4 Cl 

elvat TEpt WY TOUS ToTroUsS AEyouEV’ OUTTA 8 Eialy ot 

Kown epi Otkaiwy Kai cbvotKwy Kal mwept TwoNTIKOY 
~ wf @ “~ ~ 

Kat wept johkAwy duadepovTwy Eide, oiov 6 TOU pad- 

\ @ , AN A ~ 4 ’ 

Nov Kai nrTov Tdmos’ ovdEv yap madAov Etat éK 
t tf N 9 , 9 ~ 4 t 

tovrou cu\Noyicacba 4 évOuynpa etzrety rept Ouxaiwy 


tous dxpoards] should be omitted, with Muretus, Vater, and Spengel. 
The ‘oversight’ in question applies only to the rhetoricians, not to the 
audience. . 

xat padXov dirropevot cava Tperov petaBaivovaw éf avray] paAdov be- 


longs to dwropevos aad peraBaivovow, “the more they handle their subject _ . 


according to the ‘appropriate method’, the more they pass out of, or stray 
beyond, transgress the limits of, the true province of Rhetoric”, xara rpozroyv 
is equivalent or nearly so to deovras, ‘duly’, ‘in the right and proper way’; 
and is often found in Plato opposed to dio rporov. moppw rov xabyjKovros, 
Schol. ad Theaet. 143.c. Gaisford from Steph. Thesaurus supplies examples 
from Plato and Isocrates, and others will be found in Stallbaum’s note on 
Rep. V 16, 470B. deovras itself appears in three MSS after rpozov, being 
doubtless, as Gaisford supposes, a gloss on the preceding. I have followed 
Mr Poste, Introd. to Transl. of Post. Anal. p. 2a, n. 3, in translating xara 
rpomoy, ‘the appropriate method’, ‘in the right way, or in due order’, and 
it may very well bear that meaning. It wall therefore be equivalent to 
xara riy oixeiay pébodov, the method which confines itself to the peculiar 
principles, the (8ias or oixetas dpxai, of the special science which it inves- 
tigates. pa@AAov arropevos xara rporoy is equivalent to, and explained by, 
Sow tis Gy BéArioy éxdeynras ras mporaces, near the end of the next section, 
§ 21; and the apyai, which are spoken of immediately afterwards, &y yap 
€vrixn dpxais, are the (ca: apxai, the special principles of each particular 
science above mentioned. Dialectics and Rhetoric have no such special 
principles, and their method is the ‘inappropriate’. Gaisford follows Mu- 
retus in inserting 4 before card rpomoyv ‘by handling them too properly’. 
The other interpretation seems preferable in itself, and requires no alter- 
ation. peraBaive is peraBaivew els GAXo yevos, technically used of passing 
from one science to another, and illicitly transferring its appropriate prin- 
ciples. Comp. 1 4,6. See Poste, u.s. p. 51, note 1, for examples from the 
Organon. Add Top. © 11, 161 @ 33. Anal. Post. 1 7 treats of this 
subject. 

On «otal and olxeias dpyai see Introd. p. 73 note and the references 
there given. 

§ 21. wepl dy tovs rémous Aéyopev] (wept rovrey epi dv): to which we 
apply the term ‘ the remo’, par excellence; the xowoi roma, namely. Sce 
below, § 22 ; and for this treatment of them, I! 19. 

AR. I. 4 


50 PHTOPIKHS A 2 §§ 21, 22. 


sN\ ~ aN \ 2 on , ~ af 
i pvoikav n wept OTOVOUV. Kaito Tava elda dia- 
f x 6 edd 9 ~ \ ed F N 
épar. ida b€, boa ex TwWY TEP ExacrTov Eidos Kal 
a ~ A 
yévos mWpoTtacewy ExTiv, Oiov mept puaikwy Elot TpO- 
, > « ad 2 , of f 9 
taces €€ wy ovre evOunua ovTe TvAdNOYIOMOS Eat 
A ~ ’ ~ \ \ , wf i) « 9 
wept Twv nOtkwv, Kai wept ToUTwY aAAaL EE wy OUK 
~ ~ A ~ yw 4 
éorar wept Twv Pvotkwy cpoiws de TovT’ Exer emt 
”~ 4 , 4 A , 
WavTwv. KaKeiva fev OU TOINTEL TEPL OUOEY ‘yEVOS 
A ~ 
Eudpovas sept ovdey yap Urroxeiuevoy éotivy Tavita 
/ ef A , ] , A , 
dé, daw Tis av BerATLOV ExAEynTaA Tas MpoTAaceEs, 
, wv ) , ~ ~ ry 
Anoet troiwnoas aAAnv émoTnuny THs OiaXeKTUKHS Kal 
-” A 4 ~ A g 
pntopixns’ av yap évTuxn apyxais, ovKért StadexTiKy 
sQie¢ 4 ? » » , 4 wa \ 9 , 
Oude pnTopikn GAA’ éxelvn EoTat ns Exe Tas apxas. 
Ww ~ ~ tA ~ 
éoTi O€ Ta WAEioTAa Twv évOuunuaTwDY ex TOUTWY Tw 
IANA , o~ \ , VY 997 » \ on 
eldwy AEyoueva Twy KaTa Mépos Kai idiwy, éx d€ TWY 


tia 8, doa éx tay wep) Exaoroy eldos nal yévos mporacewy ori] el8os Kat 
yévos, species oy genus, whichever you please. In any classification the 
same member may be either genus or species, according as it is regarded 
from above or below : Physics and Mathematics, for example, are either 
species in relation to the genus Philosophy, or again gesera in relation to 
the subordinate sfeczes, Psychology (so all the ancient philosophers) and 
Natural History of the one, and Geometry and Arithmetic of the other. 
Only the summum genus and the infima species are not thus inter- 
changeable. 

caxeiva pev—eudpova] ‘The former, the xowot rorot, will make no one 
any the wiser, will convey no intelligence or instruction to any one, about 
any class of things’. This is the &dacxaXia or genuine instruction that 
belongs to science, 88acxadias ydp dort 6 xara Hy érerryipny Aeyos (I 1,12; 
see note on p. 23); comp. I 4, 4, da To pyre ris pyropuhs ely réxons, EN 
€uppoveorépas kai padAov dAnOuns. Plato has employed the word in the 
same way, Legg. VII 14, 809 D rovs 8¢ dvOpamous epi avra paddov Expovas 
drrepya{wvras.—éuppwv belongs to the class of adjectives compounded with 
év, in which the preposition expresses the indwelling or inherence of some- 
thing in something else, uwuyos (with soul in it, containing life, animated), 
évOeos, Ewous, EvOnpos, Eurvous, énvoros, zyxupos, 2 €or PEXOSs évBixos, €vropa 
(insects), Ar. Hist. An. IV 1, 5, gore 8° fvropa 6oa xara Tovvopa éotlv évropas 
€xovra x.t.X. 

@DAny emornpny ris Siadexrexijs) @Xos, a comparative in form as well 
as in sense, naturally, like érepos, S:adopos, diadépay, ef sim., takes the same 
construction, with the genitive. On the comparative form of dAAos see 
Donaldson, New Crat. §§ 165, 166. 

ovxert] See note on I I, 7 on 48y &c. esp. p. 14. 


bong 


‘PPHTOPIKHS A 3§1. 51 


kowwy éAatTw. xabarep oy Kai év Tois TOMKOIS, Kal 
évravOa Siatpereov twv évOuunpatwy Ta TE eldn Kal pt. 
Tous Tomous €£ wy Anmréov. AEyw J eldn pev Tas 

xa’ Exaarov yevos idias mpoTaces, TOmoUs dé TOUS 
KOWWoUS Opoiws TavTWwY. MpoTEpoV ouV ElmwuEV TEpt 

Twv eidwy' mpwtov dé AdBwuevy Ta yévn THS pNToO- 
puns, Srrws SteAopevor roma eori, wept ToVTWY Ywpis 
AapBavwyuev Ta oToLXEla Kal Tas TpOTaCEIS. 

Eort S€ THs pnTopiuKHs yévn Tpia Tov dpcOuov* cuar. m1. 
TOTOUTOL yap Kai Ot adkpoaTal TwY Oywy UTrapyovaw 
évTes. ouryKerTat pev yap ex Tpiwv 6 AoYos, Ek TE 
Tov AEyovTos Kai qepi ov Ayer Kal mwpds ov, Kal TO 


§ 22. xabawep odv rai ¢v rois romixois—Anmréoy] ‘Cum tanta formarum 
(i.e. ror el8ayv) locorumque differentia sit, quantam ipse supra demonstravit : 
ut scilicet illae fraudi dialectico et oratori, non recte usurpatae ab ipsis, esse 
possint, loci nullum tale periculum secum portent: aliaque etiam discri- 
mina sint, affirmat oportere distinguere enthymematum species appellatas 
ab his qui loci vocantur, ex quibus illa ipsa promuntur : ut in Topicis 
factum est, ita etiam in his qui oratorem instruunt libris.’ Victorius. ‘We 
must here also, as well as in Dialectics, carefully distinguish the sources 
and materials (€£ a» Anmréoyv) from which the special and the general 
topics are to be derived’. 

sporacs, a logical or rhetorical premiss or proposition, in syllogism 
or enthymeme: fropositio praemissa,; ‘est enim mporeivew (Top. © 1, 
155 5 34, 38), vel mporeivecOas (ib. c. 14, 164 5 4 &c.) eas propositiones 
constituere unde conclusio efficiatur.’ Trendel. £2. Log. Arist. § 2, p. 53. 

ra orotyeia} On crotyeia, ‘the elements’ of rhetorical reasoning, sec 
Introd. p.127. Add to the illustrations there given Rhet. ad Alex. c. 36 
(37) 9, orotyeia xowd xard mdyrey, apparently in this sense. 


CHAP. III. 


The triple division of Rhetoric, ovpBovAeurixov, Siaavixoy, érBecxtixoy, 
is, as we learn from Quintilian, 11 21, 23, 111 4, 1, and 7, 1, due to 
Aristotle : Anaximenes, his predecessor, had admitted only two genera, 
with seven sfecies subordinate to these, III 4, 9. 

Almost all writers (prope omnes) on the subject, subsequent to Ari- 
stotle, had accepted his division, as proceeding from the ‘highest autho- 
rity’ (utigue summae apud antiquos auctoritatis) 11 4,1. Quintilian in 
this fourth chapter mentions, besides Aristotle’s division, those which 
were adopted by Anaximenes, Protagoras, Plato (in the Sophist), and 
Isocrates. He decides in favour of Aristotle’s, as the safest to follow, 
both because the preponderance of authority is on its side, and also 
because it is the most reasonable. 


4—2 


52 PHTOPIKHS A 3 § 2, 3. 


‘4 ‘ ~ 9 f a 4a 9 S 
Tédos mpos TovTdy éort, NEyw Se Tov akpoaTny. 
>» # A A 9 8 vn a tT “A , 
2dvayxn O€ Tov dxpoatny n Oewpov eivac n KpiTnY, 
~ ‘ s\ ~ 4 
kpithy O€ | TaV yeyernuevwy | Tav pEehrOVTWY. EOTI 
5’ 6 pev wept Twy méeAACVTwWY Kpivwy oiov éxKANGta- 
o~ a = a 
orns, 6 O€ mept TwY yEeyevnuevwy oiov oO dtKaorTnSs, 
¢e A \ “~ , e , 4 > » » 7¢ 
36 0€ wept tis Suvauews 6 Oewposs war’ EE avarykns 
vn ff / ~ 4 ~ ~ 
av ein Tpia yevn Twv NOYywV TaY pnTopiKwY, TUpBou- 


§ 2. Gewpow i xpiryy] This classification of the different kinds of 
‘audience’ is made for the purpose of determining the divisions of Rhe- 
toric; because, the audience being the end and object of the speech, 
that to which every speech is ultimately referred, and everything being 
defined or determined by its end (réAos, Eth. Nic. 111 10, 1115 5 23), the 
number of the varieties of audiences must fix the number of the divisions 
or branches of Rhetoric. Audiences are of two kinds ; either mere ‘ spec- 
tators’, like the @earaf in a theatre, at the games, or in any exhibition 
where amusement is the object, or at all events where there is no inter- 
est of a fractical character or tendency!; or else ‘judges’, where some 
real interest is at stake, and they are called upon to pronounce a deci- 
sion (pars negotialts, xnpayparicy Quint.). But these decisions, and 
those who pronounce them, again fall into two classes, according as they 
are referred to questions, (1) of political expediency and look to the /usure, 
or (2) of right or wrong in respect of gas acts or facts. 

So that we have three kinds of audiences, and consequently three 
branches of Rhetoric. The public or national assembly, to which the 
deliberative kind of rhetoric is addressed; the law-courts and their 
‘judges’, properly so called, the object of the forensic or judicial branch 
of the art; and thirdly the ‘spectators’, those who go to be amused or 
interested by the show-speeches, or émideifes, the Panegyrics (in two 
senses), funeral orations, burlesques, or whatever other form may be taken 
by speeches composed merely to display skill in composition without 
practical interest (where the dvvapss, the faculty, or skill shewn, is only 
in question) ; or, if they please, to criticise them, and so become ‘critics’. 

The term xperys, ‘judge’, which belongs properly only to the second of 
the three branches, may also be extended to the other two, since they 
all have to ‘decide’ in some sense, to choose between opposite views, 
either on questions of expediency in matters of state, or right and wrong 
in legal questions, or the merits of a composition as ‘critics’. Comp. 
11 18, 1, II 12, 5, and also Rhet. ad Alex, c. 18 (19), 14, where (comp. 
§ 10) xpcrai seems to be used in this general sense for all kinds of dxpoarai. 


1 Thue, 111. 38 (Cleon to the Athenian assembly), afrtoe 3° duels xaxds d-ywrobe- 
Tobvres, olrives elPare Ocaral yey trav Adywr ylyverGa, dxpoaral 5¢ roy Epywr, 
x.r.. ‘You go to the public assembly as you go to the theatre, merely in quest 
of intellectual excitement. You go as Oearal or Oewpol, that is, merely for your 
amusement ; and not as «ptral, that is, carefully weighing the matter of what is 
said, in order to adopt it in your practice or reject it.” Arnold. 


PHTOPIKHS A 3§ 4. 53 


54 , ~ A 
Aevtixov, Stkavixov, émideKtixov. auuBovdArs de TO 
a , 
Mev Wporpomn TO Se amoTpomn de yap Kal oi idia 
auuBovrAevoytes Kai ot Kown SnunyopouvTes ToUTwY 
~ 4 A ‘ A 9 
Oarepov mowvaw. dixns S€ TO Mey KaTnyopia TO 8 
> A ~ ~ a, 
aroNoyia’ TovTwy yap droTEpovouy Tolety avayKn 
A ? ~ ~ A 4 wv 
Tous audio Bnrovuvras. émidextixo dé To peév Erratvos 
A A 4 , 4 e , r > Q ~ 
47o 6€ Woyos. xpova dé Exaorov TovTwy cial Tw 
A , @ , q 4 ~ 9 , 
fev cup BovrAevoyTt 6 MeAAwY (Epi yap Tw EvoMEVWY 
f vA , ee) ( ~ 
oupBovArEever 1 WpoTpeTwY n aroTpEeTTW), Tw Oe OiKa- 
a a A ~ 4 
Comevea 6 yevopevos (rep) yap Twy mTEempaypyevwn ae 
eA A nm ~ ~ ~ 
O Mev KaTnyopel O Se drroAoyeiTa), Te 8 émdexTiKe 
N A A , 
KUupLWTATOS MEY O TapwY, KaTa yap Ta UrapyovTa 
9 ~ Y a c ~ \ 4 
émratvouow n \éeyouct TavTeEs, TpoTXpwvTat O€ ToAAa- 
4 } 
Kis Kal Ta YevOMeva dvapeuyyoKOVTES Kal Ta WEAAOVTA 
A / ed , 
5 mpoetxaCovtes. TéAos O€ ExaoTaLs TOUTWY ETEpOV EaTt, 
A s) Fv 4 ~ ‘ , 4 
Kat Tpioiv overt Tpia, TW Me TUBPBoUAEVOYTL TO TUUDE- 


§ 3. émBeurixov] ‘ea guae canstat laude ac vituperatione. Quod genus 
videtur Aritstoteles, atque eum secutus Theophrastus, a parte negotial:, 
hoc est npaypatug, removisse, totamgue ad solos audttores relegasse; et id 
eius nominis, quod ab ostentatione ducitur, Jroprium est.’ Quint. III 7, 1. 

of [8ig cupBovarcdovres] 11 18, 1, dy» Te mpos eva tis TH ACY Xpepevos 
nporpény i} drorpény, olov ol vouberovvres rrovovow 7} reibovres. 

onorepovovy] Append. [This Appendix was apparently never written. S.] 

§ 4. xpovar—re pév oupBovrevorrs 6 péAdAov} I have already pointed 
out, Introd. p. 120, that Demosthenes adds ro srapo», ‘ present time’, to the 
‘future’ of Aristotle, as characteristic of the deliberative branch of Rhe- 
toric ; and Aristotle himself, in two subsequent passages of this treatise, 
1 6§1, and 8 § 7. 

xupeoraros} On xipios, in its secondary and metaphorical application, 
see note on I 11 § 4. The kind of ‘ authority’ which this ‘ present time’ is 
here said to carry with it in the epideictic branch is, that it has of all 
the three ¢he best right to be there ; that it is most ‘proper’ or appropri- 
ate inthat place. It has here very much the same sense as in the phrases 
kupia Hyépa, kupia éxxAncia, a day or assembly which has a special autho- 
rity, as ‘fixed’ and ‘appointed’ for a certain purpose ; opposed to all 
ordinary days, and irregular assemblies, which are ovyxAnros, called 
together at a moment’s notice on special emergencies. 

Ta yevopeva—ta péAAovra] The accusatives are here attracted by the 
participles, instead of following the principal verb in the dative. 

mpoexafovres| ‘with, in the way of, an anticipatory guess or presenti- 
ment’, of future honours and distinctions of the subject of the encomium. 


54 PHTOPIKH2 A 38§$§5, 6. 


: , 4 
pov kai BAaBepovs Go ev yap mpoTpEeTwy ws BEeATLOV 
é ~ , 
oupBovrever, 6 S€ aToTpEemwY wis XEipov amroTpETEL, 
\ of \ ~ , A Oo 
ta 8 a\Aa mpos TovTO ouprapadapBave, 4 Sixatoy 
av 10 a) a av 2 , “~ oe } A a 
n adtkov, 4 Kadov 7 atoypov Tots be StkaCouevors TO 
/ ‘ \ w# -A > wW ‘ e 
Sixaioy kai To adixov, Ta 0 aAAa@ Kal ovTOL CUUTapa- 
AapBavover mpds TavTa’ Tois & émawovot Kai We- 
a A 4 \ > / \ > \ 
yougt TO KaXov Kai TO aioxpov, ta 8 adAa kal 
A ~ ~ 
6 ovToL mMpos TavTa éravadepovow. anpetov 0 Ste To 
4 , 4 A A ~ wa 
elonuevoy éxaorots TéAOs* TrEept NEV yap TwWY a\AwY 
o / 9 at > , © e } , e 
eviore ovk av dudiaBntnoatev, oiov 6 dixaCopuevos ws 
e/ ~ id 
ov yéryovev 7 ws oux EBAaWev* Sti O aduKxel, ovdE TOT 
a\ « f ao \ \ nv ool ’ e / ‘ 
av PuoAoynoeev® ovdev yap av eet Sixns. opoiws Oe 


§ 5. 6 dé amorpenwy ds xetpov dmorpera] ‘Fr. A. Wolf's cinleuchtende 
verbesserung os xeipovoe findst einige bestatigung in den ungramma- 
tischen worten der paraphrase: Cmorpéme 8€ rp xelpom’ (Brandis, ap. 
Schneid. PAélol. p. 45). This alteration seems to me to be totally un- 
necessary. It is true that the ordinary construction of the verb in the 
sense here intended is dzrorpére: riwa mos, Or dro Twos, as § 6, ‘to divert 
or dissuade some one from something’. But it is plain it can equally 
well be adapted to the other form of expression adopted here, ‘to divert 
the thing from the person-—in the way of dissuasion—to turn ## away 
from im, as (being) worse’, i.e. ‘to dissuade him from it (as the Greeks 
as well as ourselves usually say) as the less expedient course’. An author 
like Aristotle, always regardless of the ordinary usages of language, may 
very well be allowed such a liberty of expression. If, however, this be 
still objected to, we may, without alteration of the text—to be admitted 
I think, as a general rule, only as a last resource—understand os yeipoy 
as an absolute case, nomin. or accus., 6 8€ drorpémwy ws xeipoy (dv Tt), 
drorpémes (ria avrov), See similar examples in note on 11 8, Io. 

mpos tovro] ‘ with a view to, with reference to, this’; all the rest (ra 
adda) as supplementary and subordinate to this. 

oupsrrapadapBave) ‘takes in as an adjunct, in ad of, as an auxiliary, 
subordinate and subsidiary, to his main purpose’; de Anima A 2, 1, rds 
tay mporépwy Sofas cuprapadapBdvew Gooe te wept adrhs aredyvayro. Plat. 
Phaed. 65 A day ris avro (ro capa) ev TH (yricet kowevsy cvprapadapBdyp. 
Ib. 84 D, Lach. 179 E. Spengel ad Rhet. ad Alex. xxv 8. p. 192. 

rois 8€ Scxalopevors] ro rédos éori. 

eravapépovor]| ‘re-fer’ (dvadépery) ‘to’ (ei). 

§ 6. wept pev yap rov GAXwv «7.A}] On the ‘legal issues’ here inti- 
mated, the du@iSiornces (Aristotle), or ordcecs (subsequent Rhetoricians 


and Lawyers), comp. I 13, 9; 11 15,2; 16,6; 17, 1, and Introd. p. 397, 
Append. E to Bk. 11. 


PHTOPIKHS A 3 §$6, 7. 55 


. 4 .) A oh 
Kai ot oupGovAevortes Ta pev a\XNa TOAAAKIS Tpol- 
€ 4 9 a , Nv 9 9 3 
evrat, ws dé dovudopa cupBovAevovow 4 an’ wce- 
av e 
Aiuwy aroTperovaw ovK av Gpodoynaaey ws 5 ovK 
A ~ 
adikov Tous aaTuyeitovas KaTadovAcucbat Kai Tous 
‘ ~ A 
pndev ddcxouvTas, wodAanis ovdev PoovTiCovoew. dpuoiws 
4 ~ e e ~ 
dé kai ot Emawvouvtes Kai ot WéyovTes ov aKkoTrovaW P, 1359 
, w an 
et ouudepovra émpagev 4 BAaBepd, dra Kal ep 
f ef ? ~ ~ 
éraivy todNants TWeaow Ort dArywpnoas TOU av’Te@ 
~ PJ tA a ey , 
AvotTeAOUVTOS Erpate Tt KaXov, oiov ’AxtAAEa Errat- 
~ ef > f -~ e , , 9 \ 
vouow tt €BonOnoe Tw ETaipw TatpoKAw eEidws Ste 
on » A > a 250 \ , ,oe 4 
det avrov dmoGaveiy, éFov Cov. Touvrw 6€ 6 pev 
~ A A , 
TowvrTos Oavaros KadNov, To be Cyv ouudepor. 
8 \ ~ , e/ / , 

7 pavepov dé Ex TwY Eipnuevww STL avayKn WEP TOUTWY 


ws 8 ovx ddixov] (i.e. rou Aéyew ws, OF rov as, ‘the fact that’), ovdey 
dpovrifovow. On the necessary limitation and qualification of this posi- 
tion of Aristotle, see Introd. p. 170. 

év éraivy troAA\dns T:Béacw x.1.A.] Isocrates gives credit to the Athenian 
people, év éraivp riOnow, for this kind of disinterested policy, in a passage 
referred to by Victorius. Paneg. § 53 "AyAAéa érrawovow dri €BonOnce «.1.X. 
Plat. Symp. 179 E wemvopévos mapa tis pyrpos as droOayoiro aroxreivas 
“Exropa, py womoas 8€ rovto oixad’ €Abdy ynpatos TeAeuTHCOL, éroAuncev 
déobas BonOycas rp ¢paory LarpoxA@ xal tipwpioas ov povoy vreparoba- 
vety, GANG xal éramobaveiy rereXevtnxért. Apol. 28 Co ris GériBos vios, os 
Togovroy Trou xwduvov KaTeppovnce rapa To aloypov Ts Vropetvas, wore exrecdy) 
elxey 4 pyrip attra mpoOvpoupeve “Exropa drroxreivas, Geos odca, ovraci ras, 
as dyppat, d rai, el ripopnoes Warpoxd@ Te éraipy tov hovoy Kal “Exropa 
dwoxreveis, avros amobavet’ avrixa yap rot, pool, ue “Exropa torpos éroipos 
(Hom. Il. 2 98 ef infra avrixa reOvainy x.r.d. V. 104) 6 8¢ ratr’ dxovoas x.T.A. 
comp. Il I 410 seq. Aeschines likewise, c. Timarch. §§ 145, 150, refers 
to (in the one) and quotes (in the other) this same passage of Hom. IL 
3. u. s., but with a totally different purpose. 

rovrep 3¢ 6 pew rovovros Oavaros KdédNov, 76 8 (nv (though life) cupdéepov] 
Eth. Nic. 1x. 8, 1169 @ 18, dAnOés 8€ wept rov owovdaiov xal rav Piov évera 
woAXa mparrey kal ris marpidos, cay d€p vreparoOvicKew...tots 8 Ureparro- 
Ovjcxovas Tour’ laws cupBaiver” aipovyras 87 péya kadov éavrois. 

§ 7. The argument of this and the two following sections of this 
chapter will be found in a more connected shape in the paraphrase of 
the Introd. pp. 171—2. The sum of it is simply this: each of the two 
kinds of romos is equally necessary in all the three branches of Rhetoric ; 
(1) the et8n, or tse romon, or tia, from which the rhetorical propositions or 
premisses, the elxora, onpeia, and rexpypia are necessarily derived, § 7: 
and (2) the four xooi rovor, here apparently reduced to three, the possible 


56 PHTOPIKHS A 3 §$ 8,9. 


A Q 4: A A 4 
EXEL TpWTOY Tas MpoTacEls’ Ta yap TEKuNpla Kal 
Ta €iKOTa Kal Ta ONMEla TWpOTacEs cio’ pNTopiKal’ 
/ A A « 9 , 9 , A ) 
SAos pev yap avANOYIoMGS EK MpoTaTEwY ETT, TO O 
évOupnua ovdAdAoyiT MOS EwTL TUVETTHKWS EK TwWY Eipn- 
a Q ~ ? 
8 mevwv mporacewy. émret d€ ovTE mpaxOnvat oidv TE 
obre mpaxOnocoOar Ta adlvaTra adAAd Ta suvaTa, 
‘ A \ ’ nO ’ * \ 
ovude Ta fey yevomeva 4 fn EoouEVva ovyY OioY TE Ta 
A ~ A , ~ 
pev mempaxOa ta dé mpayOnoecbas, avayxaioy Kai 
T® oupBovAcvovTs Kal Tw Stxalouevw Kal Tw ém- 
r as ; é ; x ae é ; 
SexTixw Exew mpotaces mepi duvaTov Kai aduvarou, 
4 > , vv , ‘ > a\ , wv 2 9 A 
gkal et yéyover 4 pn, Kal ei EoTat 4 pn. ETL 0 érel 
e ~ ‘ A a 
amavres Kab érawovvres Kal peyovres kat mpoTpe- 
A ~ 
Wovres wat adwoTpeTOVTES Kal KaTnyopoUVTEs Kal 
4 ~ 
d7roNoyoupevot ov Movov Ta Elpnueva OeKvuvat TrEeipwr- 
? .% , cf f x\ ¢ ‘ ) A vA A 
Tat ad\Aa@ Kat OTt peya nH puKpov TO ayabov H To 
4 av A A \ A ] 1 sv 4 , aN \ wv 
KAKOV TO KaAOV h TO atoX POV N TO OikaLov H TO AOLKOV, pp. 13. 
* A , av A 4 
n kaQ’ avra AEeyovTes n mwpos @AAnAa avrirrapaBad- 
~ ef / a\ A A 4 A 4 
Aovres, SHAov OTe SEor av Kat mrept peyEeOous Kal puKpo- 
~ ~ 4 
TnTos Kat Tov peiCovos Kai TOU éAaTTOVOS TpOTAaTES 
a ae ~ 
Exe, kai kaBodXou kal qept éxaorev, oiov Ti peiCov 
] \ wo» A sO) # , e 4 
dyabov n éAarTov 4 adtknpa n Oikaiwpas oOpoiws de 
and impossible’, ‘fact past and future’, and ‘the great and small (the 
topic of magnitude or importance) either (1) absolute or (2) comparative 
(degree)’. §§ 8, 9. 

§ 9. Stxaiwpa) is used here and inc. 13 §$ 1, 3, as the opposite to 
ddixnpa, in the sense of ‘an act of justice’. So Eth. Nic. v 10, 1135 2 8, 
Scadeper 8€ rd ddixnpa cal ro a&ixov cal Td Bixalopa cal rd Sixavov’ ddixov 
wey yap dome ty vce fh rdgec (i. q. vou, natural or of human institu- 
tion.) ro 8 adro 8€ rovro Grav mpaxOy ddixnua éort, wply 8¢ rpaxOjvas ova, 
Gd’ adixoy. cpolws 8€ cai Sixaiwpa. xadeiras 8€ pGddAov Sixatompdynya To 
coor, Stxaiapa dé ro erapropbapa rod déimparos : where in the first clause 
it is used in its ordinary acceptation as ‘a just act’, =8exasompaynpa, and 
contrasted with adicnyza, and afterwards distinguished from it in the more 
correct sense of ‘a rectification of .an act of injustice’. It is in this 
signification that Plato employs it, Legg. 1x 8, 864 E, ray 8¢ DAAwy dixato-~ 
parey adeicbe, ‘all other penalties’, which are as it were ‘amendments 


of a wrong or injustice’. In Thuc. 1 41 init. it stands for ‘just claims’, 
‘rechtsgriinde’, Poppo; rechtsanspruch’, Heitz, 1.c. In Arist. de Caelo, 


PHTOPIKHS A 48§ 1—3. 57 


\ 4 ~ Sod \ b) Fs 9 » 7# 
kal wept Twv aAAwY. TeEpL wy meV OVv EF avaryKns 
~ ~ ‘ , f A \ ~ 
det AaGeiv Tas mpoTaces, éipnrac pera O€ TavTa 
/ , « « 
Siatperéov idia wept éxaorou TovTwY, Oiov TEpt wy 
auuBovrAn Kal wept wy ot émdeKxtixol AOYoL, TpiTOV 
< 
S€ wept wy ai dixat. 
~ ‘ F , 4 ~ ) Vo ‘ 
1 ¢m[pwrov pev ouv AnwTEOV TEpt Toia ayaba H KaKa cuar.1v. 
e , f 9 \ ’ \ ef 
6 cupBovrAevwy ouuBovreve, Errerdy OU TeEpt a7ravTA 
? e , e 
2aAN’ doa évdexerat kai yeveoOa Kai wy. doa Sé €€ 
» 7 nN Wf nN NA 207 J CO) 4 
dvaykns n Eotw 4 éorea 7 dduvaroy Elva H yevecOa, 
\ \) / 9 id 4 aQVN A | 
3 mept b€ TovTwY ovK EaTt GuUBouAH. ovde Sy TrEpi 
~ , , 4 v 
Twv évdeXouevwy arravrwy EgTt yap Kal duce Ene 


I 10, I, it has a sense either derived from that rectification or amendment, 
an éravop$wpua of a wrong view or argument, padAoy dy ely mora rd péAXovTa 
AexOncecOas mpoaxnxoooe Ta THY audiaByrovytay Aodywr Bixaidpara: OF 
rather, as in Thucydides, it denotes a justification or just claim, meaning 
what the conflicting arguments have each of them to say for themselves. 
&caiopa ‘actio iuris, exsecutio iuris, iustificatio, ex qua (per arbitrum) 
status iustus qui erat violatus restituitur: nam &ixasody est facere ut 
quid sit dixaov’. Fritsche ad Eth. Eudem. A 10, 1135 @ 13 (p. 109) q. v., 
Heitz, Verl. Schrift. Arist. p. 253. 

otov] ‘for example’, one of several, is used here, as constantly else- 
where, loosely and carelessly, by Aristotle, in the place of rotr’ dori, td esé, 
videlicet, as a more explanatory repetition. 


CHAP. IV. 


§ 1. On the first of the three branches of Rhetoric, ro cupBovdeurixoy 
or Onprryopixoy yévos. 

§ 2. elvas } yevécbac] This ‘fundamental antithesis’ and cardinal 
distinction of ancient philosophy is noticed by Gaisford, incredible as 
it may appear, for the sole purpose of making merry with it as a sophis- 
tical quibble! ‘Has Sophistarum ineptias facete ridet Antiphanes apud 
Athenaeum, III 99 A.’ 

wep 8€ rovrav] See note on dnAov dé, c. 1 § 11 p. 20. 

§ 3. nal pcet...cal ded ruxns ywopeva dyaba] This same distinction of 
goods naturally and accidentally accruing to us, is found in Eth. Eud. I 
3, 5, 1215 @ 12, el pév pap dv rois da rixny yevoputvors f rois dua guow 
rd xados (nv dotly, dvéAmioroy dy ein rroddois. These are opposed to those 
advantages and objects of desire the acquisition of which depends upon 
ourselves and our own exertions and studies, ov ydp dors 8: émipedelas 7 
xrnjows ovde én’ avrois ovde ris avray mpaypareias Compared with ooa régpu- 
xev dutryerOa els mas (to be referred to ourselves), xal dv 9 dpyy ris 
yeveoewos ef) Hpiv doriv. The gifts of nature and the good things that 
result from accident cannot be included amongst the possible advantages, 





58 PHTOPIKHS A 4§ 4. 


Kal dwo Tuxns ywoueva dyaba Twv évdexoMevwy Kai 

yiyverOar Kai pn, mepl wy ovdév po Epyou TO GUL- 

BovAevew? aAAa SHArov OTe Epi Brwy eaoTi TO Bov- 

AeverOar. ToavTa 9 coriv daa mEepuKev avayerOa 

els uas, Kal wy 1) dpxn THs yeverews EP’ ruiv eoriv: 

MEXpt yap TovUTOV GkoTOUMEY, Ews ay EevpwpeEY Et ruiv P. 1359 4 
4OuvaTa n douvaTa mpaca. Kal’ éxaorrov prev ou 

adkptBws SiapOunoacba xai diadaBetv eis cidn rept 

wv eiwfact ypnuativew, rc 8 Soov évdexerat repli 


the ‘profitable’ or ‘expedient’, which are the object and aim of the deli- 
berative speaker, because they are not attainable by any exertions of our 
own; and so for the purposes of Rhetoric are just as useless as things 
necessary and impossible. The subjects of Rhetoric are the subjects of 
deliberation, and no one deliberates about anything which is beyond the 
sphere of his influence. 

mpo épyou] Note on c. 1 § 10 p.17. . 

dAXa dpdoy dre] (ro cupBovrevew dori) wept dowy x.1.dr. 

§4. The following passage, §§ 4—6, descriptive of the rhetorical 
method and its necessary limitations, and the distinction between it and 
the method of scientific demonstration, one of the most important in the 
entire work, will be found almost literally translated in the Introduction, 
pp. 173—4, to which the reader is referred. 

axpiBos ScaptOuncacba) ‘to make an exact numerical division’, or ‘to 
enumerate in an exact division or analysis’. Plat. Phaed. 273 £, Crat. 
437 D, Gorg. 501 A, Legg. 1 633 A, ef a/#dé. It is used in a general sense 
of ‘accurate distinction’. 

divadaBeiy] ‘to part, separate, divide, distinguish’, is also familiar to 
Plato, Polit. 147 E, roy dpsOuoy mdvra Biya dieAaGBopuev, Symp. 222 E, Wa 
xwpis nuas dadaBy, Phileb. 23 C, wayra ra viv orra...diy@ 8araBoper, and 
numerous examples in Ast’s Index, s. v.; and still more so dcacpeiy in the 
same sense, and d:aipeois, Sophist. 225 A, dcatpeiv avr}y Biya, Polit. 262 D, 
kar’ eidn dvo dcatpeiv, ib. 283 D, &éAwpey airy Bvo0 pépn, Phaedr. 273 E, 
kar’ ef8n Scatpeio ba: tra dvra. StadaBeiv eis ef8n, ‘to classify by genera and 
species’, Similarly 8copigecv. 

mepi dv elabacs xpnpari{er] ‘the subjects of ordinary business, i.e. 
deliberation (in the assembly)’. ypnyarifew, which is properly to ‘trans- 
act xpypara or business’ in general, is here ‘transferred’ by metaphor (of 
the class dro yévous én ef8os, Poet. XXI 7), to the special signification of 
the particular kind of business which is transacted in the general assem- 

_ bly, its debates and consultations ; so Pol. vi (IV), 14, 1298 5 29, wal srepi 
rourey xpnparifew (of a general assembly as opposed to a BovAy or mpd~ 
Bovdos) rept dv dy ovros mpoBovdetcwo. Ib. c. 15, 1299 4 39, ev rais rowad- 
rus Snpoxparias ev ais 6 8ipos xpnuarifes rep wdvreav (holds its assemblies 
and discusses everything). Also to the consultations of the law-courts, 


PHTOPIKHS A 4§4. 59 


9 ~ , A ‘ ] , 9 ~ 4 4 
avtwv Stopica kata THv dAnOeav, ov Set Kata Tov 
4 A ~ ~ ~ 
mapovra Kaipov (rev Sia TO pTE THs pNTOpIKHs 


Demosth. c. Timocr. p. 717, 26, rept wy vy yuo rd Stxacripiov, wddw xpnpa- 
rife: and again, v. 28, to the deliberations of the assembly. Eschin. 
c. Timarch. § 23, of the wpoe8po. Lastly, Demosth. de F. L. p. 430, 24, 
§ 317, applies it to the intrigues of individuals, odro: 3 ovddy énavoavro 
ig xpnpuariforres. 

kara TH» GAnOeav...dudpoverrépas xai paddov dAnbtvijs] of the scientific 
method which has ‘ certainty’ or necessary truth for its aim and object, 
as opposed to the popular method of Dialectics and Rhetoric, which has 
no higher aim than probable opinion, mpos défay. Top. A 14, 105 5 30, 
wpos pév ovy dirocodiay (true philosophy, science) xar’ dAjOeay rept avrav 
spayparevréoy, dcadexrixas 8€ pos Sofay. See references in Introd. p. 173, 
note 1. Add, Anal. Post. 1 33, 88 5 30, ré 8 émiornroy xal émornjpn dca~ 
epes rov Sofacrov nat 8oéns, ore f pev emornpn Kabddov kai 8: dvay- 
xaiey, ro 8 avayxaiow oun evBéxeras dAdws exew xrA. Eth. Nic. Ill 4, 
1112 @ 8, duéalouer & ov wavy topper. On Sofa in general, see Waitz 
Comm. ad Org. p. 444. On éudppoveorépas, ‘more intelligent, wiser, more 
instructive ’, see above, note on c. 2 § 21 p. 50. 

dia ro pyre...rodd@ be...) Wolf and Ms A‘ have roAd@ re, which is of 
course the more regular and strictly grammatical usage. On the general 
question of the meaning and distinctions of xa/, 3é, and re, with and with- 
out the negative, see Hermann’s excellent dissertation in his Review of 
Elmsley’s Medea, on lines 4, 5. Porson, Elmsley, and their English fol- 
lowers were in the habit of laying down rigorous and inflexible rules 
of Greek grammar, which were supposed to admit of no exception ; any 
apparent violation of them was to be summarily emended: one of the 
great services rendered by Hermann to the study of the Greek language 
is the relaxation of these over exact rules, and the substitution of a 
rational and logical explanation of these differences of expression, and 
the analysis of their distinctions, for these often unwarranted alterations 
of the text. ‘Kail particula est coniunctiva’, says Hermann ; ‘re adiunc- 
tiva ; d€ disiunctiva’. In the case of ovde and pndd, ovre and pyre, when 
several things are subordinated to, and included under, one negative con- 
ception, the one or the other (8¢ or re) is used according as the writer had 
or had not any notion of a aifference between them. If the things under 
the general negative conception are represented merely as subordinate 
and with no expression of difference or opposition between them, the 
adnexive re is employed, and the formula is ov...re...re, OF oU...oUTE...0UTE, 
and similarly with py: on the other hand, if some difference between any 
of the subordinate members of the division is to be marked, re must 
be replaced by &€, and the formula will be ov...ou8¢, or ov8é...ovdé, or ov... 
ovre...ovre...ovde, and so on for other similar cases. And the change of 
re into 8é in the second clause of the sentence before us, represents the 
sudden occurrence to the writer’s mind of the thought that there is an 
important difference between the two things that are assigned as reasons 
for not introducing a regular scientific division into the treatment of 
Rhetoric (viz. its necessarily unscientific character, and the fact that its 


60 PHTOPIKHE A 4§s. 


elvat Téexvns GAN’ eudhpoveoréepas Kai padAov aAn- 
Owns, wokA@ Te™ meio SedocOa Kai viv av’Ty TwY 
5 oixelwv OewpnuaTwy’ OTEp yap Kal MpOTEpOV EipnKOTES 
Tuyxavomev, adnOes Eotw, UTt yf pnTopiKH oUyKErTat 
pev Ex TE THS avaduTIKHS EmtaTHuns Kal THS TEpl TA 


nOn rwodeTikys, Gpoia O éori Ta pev TH SiadexTiKy Ta 
1 wod\A@ 8 (see note). 

province has already been unduly extended by previous professors), which 
requires to be marked, and accordingly is marked by the change of the 
particle. This, however, is not the only irregularity in Aristotle’s sen- 
tence ; for, evidently intending at the commencement to include both 
the subordinate members under the original negative, he introduces in 
the second clause a positive conception ; contributing perhaps to enforce 
the distinction of the two, but in violation of grammatical accuracy. 

mrelw 8e8dcOu...rav olxeiov Oewpnyuarwy} ‘far more has been already 
assigned to it than its own proper subjects of inquiry’, refers doubtless 
to the sophistical professors of Rhetoric, his predecessors and contem- 
poraries ; who vrodvovrat Une 1d oxHpa Tis woXtrexys, and lay claim to the 
whole extent of the field of Politics, Rhet.1 2, 7. What this assumption of 
the Sophists implies is explained in Eth. Nic. X 10, 1181 @ 1, rd 8€ sroXe- 
rina érayyéAdovras pew Oidaoxey of codiorai, mparres 8 avréy ovdeis, ddr 
of sroXtrevopevos x.rd., infr. v. 13, Tov 8é codicray of émayyeAAdpevos diay 
galvovra: méppw elvas rov di8akas’ dws yap avde woiay re doriv wept woia 
laagw* ov yap dy rv avrhy rq pytopixy ovde xeipw éridecay x.t.d. 

§ 5. ris dvadurians émoripns|] See note onc, 1 § 11, p. 19, 7 8é xlons 
anrovetis dart. 

avadurixos, Opposed to Acyixeos (which is equivalent to dadrexrixos, 
Waitz on Anal. Post. 82 5 35, p. 353, Poste, u.s., p. 19), properly implies 
scientific demonstration; and ‘analytical’ reasoning follows that method : 
see Anal. Post. 1 22, 84 a7 seq. It is there said to be exercised é&y rais 
Groveckrixais émorjpats...y pev yap drovetis dort rav dca Umdpxes xal? 
avra rois mpaypaowy. On ‘Analytics’ comp. Trendel. Ed. Log. Arist. p. 47 sq. 
Waitz Comm. ad Anal. Pr. p. 366, 7. When Dialectics is here called an 
‘analytical’ science, either ‘analytical’ stands for ‘logical’ in general 
(which is Mr Poste’s view, L. c.), or else it represents and includes me- 
thodical systematic reasoning of all kinds, which proceeds by way of 
‘analysis’, ‘resolving’ the objects of knowledge into their ultimate ele- 
ments, to discover their causes (Trendelenburg, L c.); and the latter is 
the explanation that I should prefer. 

ths wept ra 40n wodcrexns] Ethics being a department or branch of 
the more general and comprehensive science of Politics, Eth. Nic. I 1, 
1094 511, 4 pew oy peBodos (yj 4OixH) rovroy épierat, mwodiruKH Tis ovca: 
the end of both being the same, viz. human good, v. 6. Ib. I 10, 1029 
6 29, and c. 13, init. Ib, X 10, 1180 4 31, popsoy yap éddxes ris mwodcrucis 
elvaz. So that the two together make up the ‘ philosophy of humanity’, of 
man as an individual and in society, 9 wept ravOpdmwa pirocodia, X 10, 
1181 5 16, 


PHTOPIKHS A 4§6. 61 


~ ~ , ef wv av i 
6 dé ‘ois cogiatikois Aoyols. ow o ay Tis H THY 
A vv , Q , N S 9 5] 
Scarextixyy 4 TavTnv py KkaGarep av dvvayers aA 
~ , , A 
émrioTnas weippaTrat KaTacKevaCew, AnoeTat THY 
~ 9 ~ , 
gvow QuT WY agpavioas To petaBaivey émioxevaCwy p. 14. 


§ 6. xabanwep dy] On xadarep &y (xaracxevaf{or), see above, note on 
11,5 p.9. 

durdpets] SC. rod wopicat Acyous, I 2, 7. On Rhetoric as a practical 
faculty, see Introd. pp. 14—19. 

It may be as well here to sum up the characteristics of Rhetoric which 
respectively entitle it to the name of ‘art’ and ‘faculty’. In so far as it is 
systematic, and follows a method—a logical method—and can look for- 
ward to results (implying a knowledge of causes.and effects) in persuading 
its hearers, it is an art; as a practical exercise, not admitting of absolute 
exactness, or universal conclusions, employing the propositions of all arts 
and sciences, and the axioms common to them all, only as probable and 
popular, and having itself no special subject-matter, taking opposite 
sides of the same question indifferently and arriving at opposite conclu- 
sions (so Alexander Aphrodisiensis), it is a 8uvapes, a faculty, capable of 
development and to be exercised in practice. 

peraBaivew] See on I 2, 20. Vater (who seems to have misunderstood 
the passage), without reason or authority, would omit the words r@ pera- 
Baivey, as not properly applicable to the context aAAa py povoy Acywr. 
And his view is so far supported by the Paraphrast, who also rejects 
them. Brandis, u.s. p. 46. No one but himself, however, would prefer 
to connect els émorjpas with émoxevd{wy rather than peraSaivees—a much 
more natural construction, though this often is certainly admissible—and 
secondly, the two words, though not absohitely necessary to the sense, 
are at least in perfect accordance with it when the passage is properly 
interpreted. ‘In proportion as...he will be unconsciously, unintention- 
ally, effacing their real nature by passing over, in his attempt to recon- 
struct them (alter their formation or system), into sciences of definite 
special subjects, instead of those (ém:orqpas) which deal with mere words’, 
le. tnstead of confining himself to these latter. This is in fact a case 
of that very common violation of an ordinary grammatical rule which is 
called the ‘figure’, {etypa! (a mere carelessness of expression dignified by 


? Of this so-called ‘figure’, fedyya, the illicit conjunction of the two hetero- 
geneous notions or expressions under one vinculsm, there are in fact two varieties, 
explained and abundantly illustrated from the works of Tacitus by Buétticher in 
his Lex. Tacit., Proleg. de Stili Taciti brevitate, p. LXXVIII sq., ovAAnyis 
and fev-yua proper. The figure in general is thus described, ‘ qua aut genere aut 
personis aut alio quo modo diversa uno eodemque constructionis genere compre- 
henduntur’ ; but as I have failed to enter into the distinction which Biutticher 
makes between the two varieties I will substitute my own explanation of the 
difference. In ovAAnyes the two terms are united in one construction with a 
third, to which one is referred /serally, the other metaphorically, or at all events 
in different senses. This appears in the instances given, as dissimulationem nox 
cd lasctvia exemerat: nocte ac lactitia incaluisse: praeda famaque onustt: mixti 


62 PHTOPIKHS A 4§7. 


, ”~ 
eis EMIT TH MAS UTOKEMEeVWY T:WHVY TpayuaTwY, aANa 
a 4 e > \ of 
7 pn fovov Aoywv. Suws & Boa po Epyou pev eae 


that name), ‘a figure of speech’, as it is briefly expressed in Liddell and 
Scott’s Lexicon, ‘ wherein two subjects ave used jointly with the same pre- 
dicate, which strictly belongs only to one, as in IL. A 533, where €8y must 
be supplied with Zeus.’ So Herod. I 90, xpyora épya xat érea rrocéecy, 
where of course A¢yew is required with érea. Under this head comes the 
case before us, where to complete the intended sense we must supply 
ddAa pi) povoy (not rq peraBaivery, but ro émoxevdfew émoripas) Acyov. 

émoxevafery, ‘to re-construct or re-constitute’, is opposed to «xara- 
oxevatew. The latter is ‘to Jay down (xard), settle or establish a system’ ; 
the former, ‘to construct anew or afresh, to renew’. ézi, from the pri- 
mary sense of direction to, ## Alace, passes into a secondary one of direc- 
tion or succession 1” time, ‘after’; hence, thirdly, it takes the meaning of 
repetition, as anew, afresh, re- (in comp.), and of development in the way 
of growth, as in émdedovas ‘to augment or grow’. Hence émoxevafer is 
properly to ‘refit’, ‘renew’, ‘repair’, ‘restore’, as walls, ships, bridges, 
roads (Thucyd., Xenoph., Demosth., see the Lexx.), and thence trans- 
ferred to ‘ reconstruction’ of a science or study. A similar sense of éri 
appears in the verbs, émrecreiy ‘to say after, or add the words’, énayeipew 
‘to collect after or in addition’, értpavOaveswy, émaxodovbeiv, éravbeiv, émt- 
Brody (to live after, outlive), éravabeGoOa: (Xen. Cyr. V. 4, 11, to look at 
repeatedly, over and over again), éravayopeiy ibid., éranévat, éravepxerbaz, 
éravopbouv. Rost. u. Palm, Lex. Art. ¢mi, p. 1046 a. 

§ 7. daa mpo épyou pév dors dsedeiv, Ere 8’ Urodeisres cxéyev] Another case 
of grammatical irregularity and of the ‘figure’ (edypa. ooa in the first 
clause is the accus. after dceXety : in the second it must be repeated, as 
the nomin. to vroAeire:.—On mpo épyov, see supr. c. I § 10 p. 17. 


copiis et lactitia. To these I will venture to add from a modern English writer 
the case of Miss Bolo in Pickwick, who after her defeat at whist in the Bath 
Assembly Rooms retires ‘z# a flood of tears amd a sedan chair’; to which Eur. 
Hel. 182, avyatow éw vrais ypvodas fy re Sdvaxos Epvecu, is an exact parallel. 
In ge¢yua proper, this third term will not apply in any sense to both of the others, - 
and some other word or phrase must necessarily be supplied to complete the 
sense ; as in the passage of Herodotus quoted above, and in the text of Aristotle. 
Add to the examples collected from Tacitus by Bétticher, Hor. Od. II 4. 11, 
ludo fatigatumque somno. Liv. xxvit 46 sub fin. /essi sumno ac vigiliis (fesst 
vigilis ac propterea somnc graves). Hom. Il. K 98, xaudrwy dénxdres nde xal 
vrvy. Soph. Oed. R. 271, Electr. 72, 435, 6. Eur. Heracl. 312 Elms. ad loc., 
839, 1040. Dem. de F. L. § 93, )...éare, dAN’ ws x... Dorvill. ad Charit. p. 
394, seq. and Matth. Gr. Gr. 634, Obs. 3, supply examples. Ernesti, in Lex. Techn. 
Gr. s.v., thus defines feiypa: in gua figura unum ad verbum plures sententiae refe- 
runtur, quarum unaquaeque desideraret illud, si sola ponerctur. This use of the 
figure he has not illustrated. It seems to represent something quite different 
from the other; but what? The fei-yye in fact is a kind of grammatical bracket, 
under which two heterogeneous expressions are improperly included. Another 
well-known example of this fgure is the truly Irish epitaph on Boyle the Phi- 
 losopher: ‘He was the father of Chemistry, and grand-uncle of the Earl of 
Cork,’ : 


PHTOPIKHS A 488. 63 


diedeiv, Ere 8 Urrodeiwea oxeyiw TH TwodiTIKH ém- 
o7Tnpn, ElTwpEV Kal vUY. 

4 ? 4 e , , a 

ayedov yap, rept wy BovAevoyrat mayTes Kat 

Wepi a aryopevovaw oi cupBovrevorTeEs, Ta MeyLOTE 

Tuyxaver wevTe Tov dpiOpov ayvra: TaiTa 8 éati 

wept TE Topwyv, Kal wWoNEuou Kai Eipnyns, Ere S€ rEpi 

uArakys THs XwWpas, Kai TV Eicayouevwy Kal E£ayo- 

8 pévwy, Kal wept vouobecias. WoTE TEpt yey TOpwY 

a , , , av 4 , 
Tov péAAovTa ouuBourevoew Seat av Tas mMpocodous 
THS Toews Eldevat Tives Kal TOTAL, OTs ElTE TIS 

, ~ A v ) / F) ~ 
wapaheimerat mpooreOy Kai et tis €EAaTTWv avenOy, 
ért 5€ tas Oamavas THs TOAEws aTracas, OTrws Et TIS 

4 9 ~ 4 wv , 2 , , 

wepiepyos adapeOy Kat et Tis petCwv EAaTTWY yEry- 
Tal’ ov yap povoy mpos Ta UmapyovTa mpocTt- 

oxedoy yap, rept dy BouXevovras ravres x.r.d.] The unaccountable difference 
between the list here given of the principal subjects of Politics with which 
the deliberative or public speaker will have to deal, viz. (1) ropos, supplies, 
ways and means, revenue, finance ; (2) war and peace (possibly including 
alliances) ; (3) the defence of the country ; (4) exports and imports (com- 
merce, trade) ; and (5) legislation ; with that which is found in Polit. v1 (Iv), 
4, has been already pointed out in the Introd. p. 176. In the corresponding 
chapter of the Rhet. ad Alex. 2 (3 Oxf.) § 2, we have seven such subjects 
enumerated : religion, wept lepoy ; legislation, repli voper, (voper cvphepovray 
Gecets, Dem. de Cor. § 309, in a parallel passage) ; the constitution of the 
state (wept rijs mwoXtrinns Karaoxeuns); alliances and commercial treaties 
(ovpBoraioy) with foreign nations ; war; peace; and revenue (sept modpov 
Xpnparwy). , 

In Xenophon, Memor. 111 6, a conversation is reported between So- 
crates and Glaucon, whom the former cross-examines on the subject of his 
political knowledge, with the view of shewing him that he is not yet ripe 
for a statesman. The principal objects of a statesman’s care there enume- 
rated are, the rpéaodo:, Aristotle’s rdpos, the revenue: the state expenses, 
with the view of reducing them, rd dvyaAdpara: war, and the means of 
carrying it on : the enemy’s forces, naval and military, and your own : the 
defence of the country, 4 vAax? ris yopas: mines, and the supply of 
silver (this is from the Athenian point of view): and the supply of corn 
and other food. These details, and in the same order, are all, with the 
exception of the mines in Aristotle, and the legislation in Xenophon, 
enumerated by Aristotle in the following sections, 8—11, so that Gaisford 
may possibly be right in his suspicion, ‘respexit fortasse Aristoteles 
Xenophontis Mem. II 6.’ 


§ 8. datpebq] ‘it may be reduced, curtailed, retrenched’, 
mpos Ta Umapxovra mpooriOévres x.7.A.] Not of course =smpos rois vmap- 


64 PHTOPIKHS A 4 §$ 8,9. 


, , 9 A ~ 
Oévres wAovaowTEpor yivovTat, dAAa Kali addatpouvTes 
~ , ~ 9 / ~. 
Tov Samavnpatwy. Tavita & ov povov ex THs TeEpl 
9 9 a ~ » ~ 
Ta ida éprepias evdexeTat ovvopay, dAN’ avaykaiov 
~ A ~ wv 4 \ sv 
Kai TwV Tapa Tots aAAOls EVpNuEVWY to-TOpiKOY Elvat 
‘ ‘ 1: , / ‘ de ’ 
g mpos Thy TEepi TovTwWY GuuLBovANnY. ept Se TrorEMOU 
a 4 ~ , , 
Kai eipryns thv Suvapuy eidevat THS TOAEWS, GTOTN TE 


xovow, ‘by adding to present resources’, but ‘with reference to them’, as 
pos ToUTO cuprapadapBaver, and cvpmapadapSavover mpos ravra, SUPpr. C. 3, 
§ 5. ‘ For not only én’ respect of their existing resources do they become 
wealthier by adding to them (spoorOévres avrots)’. 

dx tis wepi ra (80a éumecpias] ‘from one’s own personal experience’. 
ra 18a are the facts which have come under one’s own personal observa- 
tion, i.e. the resources of our own country, and the system followed and 
methods adopted in providing, maintaining, and augmenting them, at 
home ; not these alone are to be ‘inquired into’, ioropixdy ely, by the 
statesman and public speaker, but also the ‘inventions’, the practices and 
policy of other nations in regard of these same matters. 

auvopay] ‘to take a comprehensive view’, ‘to look at fogether’, for the 
purpose of comparison. See note on cuvayey, c. 2 § 13 p. 4I. 

laroptxov] The termination -ses corresponds to the English -ive, and 
denotes a capacity for, or tendency to. soimrixos productive, alaOyrinds 
sensitive, Sexrixds receptive, mpaxrixos active, evperixos inventive, droden- 
rixos demonstrative, and so on: though in some cases there is no cor- 
responding English word actually in use. According to this analogy 
loropixos is ‘inquisitive’, qualified and disposed to inquire into things 
in general. 

When Herodotus at the opening of his work uses the term {oropin, he 
means no more than the ‘inquiries’ or ‘researches’ which he is now col- 
lecting into a continuous narrative. (Comp. § 13, al wepl ras mpafecs 
loropiac and the note there.) It is not till we come to Polybius that the 
word assumes its modern signification, a scientific history, a systematic 
work that can be employed in education, Hist. 1 1, 2. It is sow defined, 
and distinguished from other departments of study by the addition of 
mpayparixyn, 1 2,8, the study of human actions and affairs. Its scientific 
character, which entitles it to the epithet ‘demonstrative’, icropia dwo- 
Secxrexy, 11 37, 3, aod. dupyots, IV 40, I, is derived from its method of 
tracing causes and motives of actions: foropias yap ¢ay adéAy tis ro dea 
ri, nal mos, xal tivos xdpw émpax6n, xal ro mpaxOev morepa evrAcyor Eryxe 
TO TéAos, TO KaTaXeuTopevoy auTis ayovopa pey pana Oé ov yiyveras’ Kai 
mapavrixa pev répret, mpos 8€ Tro peAdov ovdey wedi ro maparay. 

But it is only the term, not the thing, that is new in Polybius’ time. 
Thucydides’ History, though not so called, (Thucydides is called a évy- 
ypaevs, see Poppo on I, I, 2,) is at least as scientific in all essential points 
as that of Polybius, or indeed any other. 

On the distinction of Adyios, Acyorots, and icropixos, see some good 
observations in DahImann’s L4/e of Herod. c. 6 § 2. 





PHTOPIKHS A 4§o0. 65 
vrapxet non Kal moony évdexerat Umapeal; Kai ola 


§ 9. vrapfat, dpreiv, Anonymus, ap. Brandis, u. s., p> 44. 

The verbs umapyety, elvat, yiyverOa, stand to one another in the rela- 
tion of past, present, and future; to be already in existence, to be (simple 
and absolute being, independent of time), and to become, to come into 
being from a state (if that be possible) of non-being. The aorist infin. 
gives vmapfa here a future sense, ‘to become or to be made’, which does 
not naturally, ex wt verbi, belong to it. Hermann, in one of those notes 
which have thrown so much light upon the niceties of Greek grammar 
(on Ajax 1061 subsequently referred to without further discussion in the 
treatise de Part. dv Iv, 2, Opuscula, Vol. IV), contends against Elmsley 
(who had condemned as a solecism this use of the aorist infin. without a», 
after verbs such as 8oxeiv, vopifew, olerOat, pava, eArilew, rpor8oxay, in 
reference to future time) in support of the usage; and distinguishes 
three modes of expression in which futurity is conveyed by the infini- 
tive : first, the simple future inf. as 8oxeiv meceioOa:, which conveys directly 
the simple and absolute notion of futurity, without modification or quali- 
fication ; second, the infin., aorist or present, with dy, wirresy dv, receiv 
dy, which indicates a merely conditional futurity, might or would fall, 
under certain circumstances or conditions ; and thirdly, the present or 
aorist infin. without dv, mimrew, or receiv, which, corresponding to the 
indefinite (in point of time) present and aorist, rimres and émece, denote 
simply the possibility or likelihood of the object falling at some uncertain 
future time ; caducum esse. The distinction between the present and 
aorist infinitive is this : ‘Praesentis autem et aoristi infinitivis, sive accedat 
dy sive non, ita utuntur, ut aoristus rei transeunti, praesens duranti adhi- 
beatur.’ 

Without disputing the truth of this, it is yet possible to explain the 
difference otherwise. Permanence (‘duranti’) does not seem to me to be 
in any way connected with the conception of present time, though the 
perfect often is; as when we say ‘this has bcen’ up to the present time, 
we often imply our belief in its continuance; and I should rather 
explain the present infin. in these cases as expressing the mere fact 
of the existence of the thing named, or the abstract notion of it. 
The present tense, as it is called, I act, I do, to act, to do, is in reality 
independent of time: the time present is, I am acting, I am doing; and 
the present infin. ‘to do’ is the naked conception of ‘doing’ without 
any connotation of time (so the present infinit. with the definite article 
stands for a substantive; ro elvas is the mere notion of being). The 
aorist infin. again may derive its notion of futurity and likelihood, 
either, as Hermann thinks, from the indefiniteness expressed by the 
tense, or, in other cases, from the connotation of Aadst, implying éa- 
bility, which is also one of its acquired senses. The broad distinction 
will be, 80x0 wereioOa, ‘I think it wil/ fall’, at some future time, and 
nothing more : 80x wirrey or meceiy av, ‘I think it could, would, or might 
fall’, under certain conditions; dex winrey, ‘1 think the notion of falling 
belongs to it’, ‘I think it may fall’; that is, that it is /iadle, or likely, to 
fall, caducum esse: and doxo meceiv, implying also the liability or like- 
lihood of the preceding, is distinguished from it (according to Hermann) by 


AR. I. 5 


66 PHTOPIKHE A 4§9 
ov) e ? 9 9 wv 9 de ; 
Tis } Te UWapyYoved Cort Kai 7 Tis evdexeTat TpoT- 
Fd wv XN 4 4 a ~ , 
eyeveoOat, Eri SE WOAEMOUS Tivas Kal Tes WemoAEunKey. 
ov povoy d€ THS Oixeias WoAEwS GANG Kail TwY GuopwY 
~ > ~ sar a a a a 3 
TavTa avayxaiov cider. Kal ®pos ous émridofov 
woAeueiv, Owws POs pev TOUS KpEiT TOUS EipnvEUNTal, P. 1360. 
pos dé Tous HrTous éx’ avrois TO woNepeiv. Kal 
Tas Supapets, WOTEpOY Sporn 1 avopotaty ert yap 


representing the act or event as transient and not permanent. But such 
a distinction as this last, though it be intelligible, is at least untrans- 
latable ; as in such a case as vocis 8pacm (Soph. Phil. 918), ‘what dost 
thou intend to do’, where the expression of the lability must needs be 
omitted, and still more the transient nature of the proposed act. But we 
can hardly suppose that any distinction can be seriously intended when 
Sophocles writes vocis 8paea:: and then, three lines afterwards, v. 921, 
Spa» voeis. The choice between the two seems to be dictated rather by 
convenience than by any other motive. 

With regard to the distinction of the present and aorist infin., it may 
be observed, that we are often obliged, as the practice of translation 
shews, to disregard whatever difference there may be conceived to be 
between them, as either inappreciable or at all events inexpressible, and 
to render them by the same English words. Take, for example, the ordi- 
nary phrase dei AaSeir (it occurs, for instance, 11 8,12). It is quite certain 
that in this case past time is not directly signified ; though it may possibly 
be included as an accessory in the notion of it in the way of an addition 
to the abstract conception of ‘taking up, acquiring’—as representing the 
previous formation of the opinion, which has been ¢aken up before. 
But at all events no one would think of ¢rans/ating dei XaBew in any other 
form than that of the simple verb ‘to assume or suppose’. 

q vis évOéxeras] évBéxerOa: is here used, as is customary with other 
writers, as a personal verb ; Aristotle generally employs it as an imper- 
sonal, Comp. note onc. 2, 14. 

} xal obs éwidogov] ‘or indeed of those with whom war may be ex- 
pected’. Supply for the sense, § xai (Bet eldéva: riy divapew rovrey) mpos 
obs drldogoy (jyuiy or fuas) wrodepety. éri8oftos, ‘subject to, liable to expecta- 
tion’, éwi penes, note on 1 1, 7, émi rots xpivover, Similarly éwidicos, sub- 
ject to a Bien, émnyss infr. 1 14, 7, 11 23, 21, éwalres liable to blame, 
ewdéios, dmixivOuvos, ériOavaros (Demosth.), érixAnpos, éruogades (liable to 
trip) Pol. 11 5, émipaxos, ériBaros, éri8popos. This notion is more directly 
expressed by umd in composition, vrod:xos, UrevOuvos, &c. 

slanvevyra:) elpnvevex, though used as a neuter in Plat. Theaet. 180 B, 
and in other authors, is properly transitive, ‘to bring into a state of 
peace, pacificate, or reconcile’ contending parties, and hence employed 
here aa a passive. 

éx' avroie] Note on I 1, 7 p. 10; and on I J, 12 p. 22, & avrey: I 7, 35, 
t@ avrg sal drAce, and note there. 

kal rae avedyeis) (ray cpcpey dvayxaioy elddvat) worepov Spora 4 dys- 


PHTOPIKH®S A 4§ to. 67 


Kai Tavrn mAcoventeiv 7 ENaTTOVGOa. dvayxaioy oé 
Kai wpos TavTa pn povov Tous oiKEiovs moAEsoUs 
TeOewpnxévat dAAa Kai ToUs THY GAAwY, Tews dTOBai- 
youow* dro yap Tav cpolwy Ta spoie yiryver Oat 

10 mequxev. Ere Se rep pudAakns Tis yxwWpas pn AavOa- 
vey Twos puvarrerat, dAAa Kal TO wANOos Eidevat 
THs PuAakns kal TO eidos Kai ToUs TOTOUs TwY puAa- 
KTnpiwy {rovro & ddvvatov pn eureipov ovra Tis p 15. 
xwpas), ty eiz’ éXNaTTw 7 pudaxn mpooTedy Kai et 
Tis Weptepyos adaipeOy Kai Tous émirnoeiovs Torrous 


poocas (clot rais oixeiats). This rule is well illustrated by Archidamus’ com- 
parative estimate of the Athenian and Lacedaemonian forces preparatory 
to engaging in the war, Thuc. I 80, 3. 

mXeovexteiy fh €darrovcba) properly contrasted. smAdov # Zarrov Zyew, 
‘to have too much or too little’, ‘more or less than your due’. So in 
Thucyd. 1 77, &AaccovcOa and mdcovexreioOas (the irregular passive of 
wXeovexreiv) represent the same notion, ‘to come by the worse, or to be 
overreached’. And so here, ‘for in this point also we may be at an ad- 
vantage or disadvantage’, 

Gro yap tay cpoiwy x.r.r.} ‘for similar circumstances are naturally fol- 
lowed by, or naturally give rise to, similar results’. 

§ 10. & cfr Aarrey| (dorly 7 pvdax)), 4 vA. mpooreb7, or perhaps 
rather, eit’ €\Adrrep (éorix) 7 duran), (avn) mpooreOy. 

seplepyos| is properly said of one ‘who troubles himself over much’ 
(wepi), either about his own affairs, or those of others ; (these two signi- 
fications will be found illustrated in the Lexicons). Hence it acquires 
the general sense of ‘superfluity’, as here. Comp. Plat. Polit. 286 c, 
weplepya Acyerv, and Apol. 19 B, Saxparnys...mepepydferat (nrav ra re 
vro ys xal ra érovpama (of an idle curiosity). Dem.? Phil. & 150, 24, é 
dv épya{y xai wepuepya(y rovs doyarous ovras xwvdvvous. Ib. 143, 17, wepi- 
epyor xal paratov avyd\opa, and elsewhere in Dem. and the other orators. 
Arist. Eccles. 220, ef ux rs xasvdvy GAXo mepteipyafero. See also in Jad. ad 
Fragm. Com. Graec. Meineke, Vol. v. Pt. 2. 

cal rovs dxirndeiovs romovs rnpdos paddov} Translate the whole passage, 
‘in order that whether the defence (defensive preparation) be too little, 
addition be made to it, or if superfluous, it be retrenched, and their atten- 
tion be rather directed to the watching or guarding (fortification) of 
favourable positions’. émrndelovs romovs are places favourable, defensible, 
sustable to the purpose for which they were intended, viz. for protecting 
the country. Thuc. II 20, o xépos émrndeos ddaivero dvorparoredetcat: 
Herod. 1X 2, yapos drirndearepos dvorparomedeverOa: : VI 102, érirndewraroy 
Xepioy dnermeduvat, always apparently of a ‘favourable’ position, and this 
seems to be here the natural, as it is the usual, sense of éemrnjdecos and of 
the passage in general. And so Victorius, ‘et ut relictis parum opportunis 

5—2 


68 PHTOPIKHS A 4§§ 11, 12. 


ul Tapeat Hadov. ére O€ wepi Tpopns; Toon Saravy 
ixay) TH WON KQi FOIA  avToU TE ‘yeyvouern Kab 
cicaryaryiuos, Kat Tivey T " €Earyeryns d€ovrat Kai Tivwy 
cinayeryins, iva apos Tovrous Kal ouvOnxat Kat oup- 
Boral yiyvevrat: xpos du0 yap ha:uAarrey dvay- 
Kaioy dveyxAnrous Tous WoNiTas, WPOs TE TOUS KPELT- 
12 TOUS Kal ™pos Tous «is TavTa xpnoiwous. eis 8 
dowpadeay aravTa pey TavTa avayxaioy SuvacGat 
Gewpeiv, ovx eAayrorov Sé wepi vopobeatas erate 


locis magis idoneos tueantur.’ (There is another possible—but I think 
not probable—interpretation of ¢wsrpdeious rosovs, viz. loca commoda or 
vppertuna, suitable or convenient 40 the enemy, easy of access, readily 
assailable: repew, as before, being to guard or defend.) 

§ 11. mpos rovrous] i.e. sap’ ols darw dy Séorvras: those that are capa- 
ble of providing them with that they want. 

ewORnas cai cvpBodrai] On cupScrasa and evradAcypara see above, note 
on 11, 10 p. 16, 

avrGgen is a general term for a treaty, compact, contract, convention, 
usually of a gud/ic nature, between two states, but also all private con- 
tracts, covenants, and bargains; see Rhet. 1 15, 20—23, wept owOnxor. 
avpScode—here called cvpBoral, apparently a draft Acyoperop in this sense; 
in Pol. 111 9, 1280 a 38, cvrOjxas and ovp Boda are contrasted—are techni- 
cally confined by the grammarians to a particular and special kind of con- 
tract, international commercial treaties. Meier i. SchOmann, A#. Process, 
p- 494, note 49. In the passage referred to, cuvpSoda first occurs appa- 
rently in its proper sense, wavres ois ors ovpPBoda pos aAAnAous: and then, 
as distinguished from ovv@ijxa:, which here stand for commercial treaties 
in general, ovyOnxat wepi rov eloaywyiper, seems to be applied to those 
special and subordinate articles of commercial contracts which made pro- 
visions against the infliction of mutual damage and wrong, or established 
a syatem of compensation which protected the contracting parties against 
mutual injury, ovpSodra wepi rov py) adixeiv. In the usual sense, Pol. 111 1, 
1275 @9, rovro yap umapyet Kat Trois axo aupBdday cowwevovosw, ‘even the 
membera of different states who are connected by international com- 
mercial treaties have reciprocal legal rights, so that it cannot be éhis 
which constitutes a citizen’. In Thuc. 177, the fvpPodasas xpos rods éup- 
paxovs dixas denote the actions at law which arise out of these fupBoda. 
Dem. c. Mid. 570, ra cvpSodra ovyxéar. See Buttm.’s /nd., s. v. 

apie de yap diapuAdrrew xrA.] ‘for there are two classes of persons 
between whom and the citizens it is necessary that irreproachable conduct 
or behaviour, or a thoroughly good understanding, should be steadily, 
peraistently (dd, thoroughly, throughout), maintained ’. 

$12. wepl vopobeclas draiew] ‘to understand the subject of legis- 
lation’. 


In this section occur several points in common between the Rhetoric 


PHTOPIKHS A 4§ 12. 69 


A om e , ~ a ef * 

€v yap Tots vous é€oriv 4 TwTnpia THS ToAEws, WoT’ 
~ ‘ ~ 

avayKaiov eidevat Toca 7 éort wodiTEwwy etd, Kal 
woia auudeper éxa kai Ure Tivwv beiperba 
BPEp OTN; pleiperCar 

, 4 3 , ~ , ‘3 , , 
TEDUKE KL OLKELWY THS WONTELAS Kat EvavTiov. . A\Eya 

a A 4 wv ~ . 
d€ Td Uird olxeiwv Pbciper Oa, Sti EEw ts BeATiorns 

bod “~ 

mwoXTelas ai a\Aat Tacat Kai avieuevac Kal émret- 


and Politics, which, though they may not be direct references from one to 
the other, yet serve to illustrate the relation between them. They are 
noticed by Brandis, in Schneidewin’s PAis/ologus, u. s. p. 33. I will com- 
pare them in the order in which they stand. " 

€v yap Trois vopos early 5 cwrnpia Tis woAews] On legislation comp.! 1, 7. 
That the laws ought to be supreme in a state, and not any one or several, 
or the entire body of citizens, is argued and concluded in Polit. 111 15, 
1286 a 7 seq. and again c. 16, 1287.4 18, roy dpa vopow dpyew aiperedrepoy 
paddow § rey wodttoy éva twak.r.A. The different forms of constitutions, 
and what is salutary and conservative or destructive of each of them, are 
treated, for instance, in Pol. 111 6, and VIII (V) 1 et seq. And not only is 
the substance of the next sentence, Ady 8 rd Uwe olxelov Pbeiper Gas x.1.X., 
found in the discussions of the Politics vit (v) 1, but the very same me- 
taphor, from the tightening and relaxation of the strings of the lyre, is 
employed there, 1301 417, as here; and in c.g, 1309 6 18, the same illustra- 
tion, derived from the flat and aquiline nose, is used to represent the 
excessive exaggeration and intensification, or depression and relaxation 
of the constitution, as of the feature, which altogether effaces its true 
character. 

duéperat xal émrewopyeva:] This metaphor from the screwing up or 
relaxation of the strings of the lyre, producing a difference of musical 
pitch or tone, which it raises or lowers, is a very favourite one both with 
Plato and Aristotle, and is used to represent, as I have already said, 
exaggeration or intensification on the one hand, (exactly as we speak of 
‘screwing up our courage’ Macbeth 1 7, 60), and depression or relaxation 
on the other. If for example the nose is lowered or depressed to excess 
in the way of flatness as a snub-nose, or exaggerated in the other direc- 
tion to excessive sharpness and prominence as an aquiline nose, it ends 
by losing the character of a nose altogether, and is either altogether 
effaced or becomes a beak: and so with the constitutions of states. 

ro Uno olxelaw POeiperOa therefore means that forms of government are 
destroyed or change their character by the exaggeration or relaxation of 
their own proper and peculiar institutions, and it is in the ‘mean’ state 
alone between these two excesses that the constitution can be said to 
maintain its true character. For instance the dpos, definition or principle, 
of a democracy is equality; if this be intensified or exaggerated, or car- 
ried to excess, if the thing be logically carried out, and everybody actu- 
ally becomes equal, the government degenerates into mob-rule or anarchy 
and thus loses its true democratic character; if it be relaxed and the 
equality diminished, the democratic principle and its institutions become 


70 PHTOPIKHS A 4§ 13. 


ae , € , 7) , » , 
vouevat POeipovrat, oiov Snuoxparia ov uovoy dvepevn 
acGeverrépa yiverat wore TEXOS HEE Eis dALyapxiay, 

, 4 
GAd Kai émrevouern oodpa, woTmep Kat 4 ypv- 

é 9 
WOTNS Kal i GioTHS OU povoy dylEemEeva EpxETat Ets 

8 , 9 ‘! s) , a , nv 4 
TO peoov, G\Aa Kai oodpa youTra yiwoueva n oma 

@ @ ~ ~ sv 
ouTw SiariPerar wore pndé puxtnpa Soxeiy eivat. 

A oh 
xoenotmoy Sé mpos Tas vouobecias Td un povoy érratew 
c 9 ~ 4 
13 Tis moArTeta ouuheper ex Twv mapeAnduvOoTwy Oew- 

a 9 ‘ " \ \ ~ 5 , e 

pouvrt, a\Aa@ Kat Tas wapa Tots adAols Eldevat, at 


so enfeebled, that the inequalities increase until at last it becomes an 
oligarchy, deepévn dubeveorépa yiveras aore rédos Hee els odAcyapyiay. 

Plat. Lys. 209 B, Rep. 1v 441 E, rd pév émrelvovca nai rpépovea...rd dé 
dneica wapapubovpém, VI 498 B, émreivew Ta éxeivns yupvdow, III 412 A, 
dmiresvopéves xal dyxepéve, ib. 410 D, paddopv 8 dmrabéy rou Seovros oxAnpdy 
Te «al yadendy yiyrorr’ dy...paddAov dveOdvros avro¥ padaxérepoy xr. 
Phaedo.g8 C, ola émrtrelverOai xa) dvierOas, 86 C, 94 C and elsewhere. 

This was transmitted by the master to his disciple. In Aristotle it 
occurs, Pol. VIII (Vv) 1, 13012 4 16, 9} ta émsraboow ff dveBaow. Ib. c. 8, 
1308 4 2, ra repnpara émcreivew f anévat, dy péy UrepBadAy émreivovrac...day 
Se édAelsrn duévras,. ib. c. 9, 1309 4 18, u. s., VII (VI) 6, 1320 8 30, VI (IV) 6, 
1293 @ 26 and 30 Umepreivey, Eth. Nic. VI 1, 1138 6 23, ore tis oxowos 
apes Oy awoBAérwy 6 Toy Acyow Exoy éxtreives kai avinowy. In Pol V (VIII) 7 
1341 6 ult., he says of music as a ‘relaxation’ mpos divaywyyy, that it is 
mpos dveciv re Kat. wpos THY THs oUvrovias (overstraining or exertion) dxa- 
swavow, Comp. Pol. VI (Iv) 3, ult. dppovias ouvroverepas and aveipevas ; 
whence @vrovos (infense), cuvrovos, dvetuévos, avetsevws, are applied, the 
two first to braced nerves, vigorous exertion or character; the latter to 
relaxation or dissoluteness of life and manners, or to slackness, laxity, 
and effeminacy. In Pol. Iv (vII) 17, 1336 4 30,. it is said that children’s 
sports should be neither émurovouvs nor avesuévas; and c. 4, 1326 @ 26, 
that no well-constituted state should be dveiuzémy, uncontrolled, slack, 
loose, relaxed, i. e. allowed to run to excess, in its numbers. Eth. Nic. 
Il 4 sub. init. épysoOjvas adodpas 4h dvespeves, ib. 111 7, 1114 @ 5, dvetpe- 
vos (iy, Open, easy, careless, dissolute life. Comp. Thuc. I 6, II 39 dmes- 
péry TH Stairy, aveipeves Scarradperot. The corresponding Latin terms are 
intendere and vemittere, Cic, Orat. § 59, Quint. X 3, 24, doubtless bor- 
rowed from the Greek. 

odre dcaribera: dore «.7.d.] ‘it assumes such a condition or shape 
that it seems to be no nose at all’. 

§ 13. dx rey wapeAnAvOdrav Oewpoirrs] ‘by studying out of’, i.e. 
‘ drawing conclusions or deriving observations from the study of the past’, 

G@\Aa xal ras wapd rois dAAos «.r.A.] Aristotle had already pro- 
bably, when this was written, supplied the deliberative orators of his 
time with the means of acquainting themselves with this branch of poli- 
tical study, by his work called HoAsreiae, a collection of the constitutions 


PHTOPIKHE A 4§ 13. 71 


Wow Tos moos dpusrrovcy. wore Syrov Ort 
mpos pev THv vouobEciav ai THs ys TEpiodoL YoNoLOL 
(evrevOey yap NaBeiv Eore Tous twy EOvwav vouous), 
A A A A A e ~ 4 A 

mpos 6€ Tas ToNTikas ouuBovAas ai TwY wept Tas 
of 158 states existing at that period, and serving apparently as an appen- 
dix to the extant Politics. It is included in the lists both of Diogenes, 
V 27, and of the Anonymus in Buhle, Arist. Vol. 1 p. 65. Diogenes’ title, 
which is more descriptive than the other, runs thus: IToAcreiat wdAcov 
dvow Seovcaw éfjxovra xal éxardy, xa) [dig Snpoxparixal, dAvyapytxal, dpioro- 
xparixai, xai rupaymxal. The extant fragments of this work are collected 
in Rose’s Arist. Pseudepigraphus, Pt. 2, p. 391—537 (this collection is 
much more complete than that of Neumann, which is printed in the 
Oxf. ed. of Bekker’s text, Vol. X p. 234, as an appendix to the Politics). 
The latest results of the researches on this subject are given by Heitz, 
Verlor. Schrift. Arist. p. 230, seq. 

al ris yis wepiodau] ‘Travels round the world’, ‘survey of the 
earth’. These were books of Geography physical and descriptive, con- 
taining not only an account of the relative position of cities and coun- 
tries, but also observations upon the manners and customs of the inha- 
bitants. Hence they are recommended to the study of the Politician. 
These were founded either upon personal observation, or upon the 
reports of travellers; whence the name meplodos. Ar. Meteor. I 13, 13; 
dnAov 8 gar) rovro Bewpevors rds ris yas wepiddous’ ravras yap éx rov muvOd- 
ver Oas wrap’ éxaoray ovrws ayéypayray, Gowy pi) cupBeByxev avromras yevér Oat 
rous A¢yorras (quoted by Victorius). For a similar reason books of the 
same kind were called wepiwios, ‘circumnavigations or nautical surveys’, 
as those of Scylax, Hanno, &c. or mepupynoes. (Asovvowos o wepurynris. 
Aw8epos 6 wepuryyrys, Athen. XIII §91 E. ToAdpew 6 wepury., ib. IX 372 A, 
XXI§52 RB.) One of the earliest and best known of them was that of 
Hecataeus, referred to by Herodotus, 1v 36 yedo 82 dpéow Tijs mepiodous 
ypawarras roAAovs FOn...01 'Qneavdy re pecvra ypahovas rrépeE ry yay dovcay 
xumAorepéa os awd ropvou, xal ri» "Aeiny- 7 Evpemy movevvras tony. In 
Vv 49 the term is applied to Aristagoras: of Miletus’ famous mag, (by 
Strabo assigned to Anaximander), wivaxa év r@ ys dmaans tepiodos éverér- 
pyro, xal Od\aood Tre waca, xai worayol wayres. From the hints in Herod. 
Iv. 36, Ar. Meteor. 11 5, 86 «al yeAolws ypddoues vuy rds meptodous ris ys’ 
«.y-d. (where the author proceeds to say, following Herodotus, that the cir- 
cular shape of the earth assigned to it by these writers is impossible), and 
from Pol. 11 3, 1262 4 12, sub fin., the general nature of the contents of these 
works may be gathered. Eudoxus, the mathematician and astronomer, 
of Cnidos, was the author of one of these works, referred to by Athen. vil 
288 C, év &rg Yijs weplosov (Victorius), also Ctesias, Dionysius, Diodorus, 
Polemo. An account of Hecataeus’ repiodes is given by Mure, Hest. C&. 
Lit. WV 144, Bk. 1¥ch. 3 § 3. 

al réy wepi ras mpatecs ypaddévrev loropia) See note on lcropla:, § 7. 
The addition ‘about men’s actions’ is still required to define the kind of 
‘inquiries’ in which ‘history’ engages: loropia has not yet become tech- 
nical, indicating a special department of study. 


72 PHTOPIKHS A 4§ 13,5§1. 


, , e I 4 e/ A ~ 
mpates ypadovrwy ioropias dmavra 6€ TavTa 
~ 9 ’ , e ~ ? , 
woNtTuns aXX ov pnTopiKns Epyov ETiy. 





~ , | 
TEpt wy pev ouv Exew Set Tov eAAOVTA TUpPov- P. 13608 


A ~ r) = s om A 
Ave, Ta peyote Toca’Ta éoriv: é£€ wy Oe Set Kat 
\ ~ wv a vv 
WEpL TOVTWY Kal TEpt TwWY GAAwWY TpOTPETEW NH aTO~ 
a id , 
TpeTrev, NEywuev Want. 
4 4 4 2@a7 e , q ~ ~ , 
oxedov 6€ Kal dia ExaoTw Kal KOWH Tact TKOTOS 
et a ~ . , 
Tis €oTiV, OV oTOXaCOMEVOL Kai aipovyTaL Kat eu- 
~ o ~ ef 
youow> Kal Tour’ dori év Kepadaiw eively 4 


éxew] ‘to be informed or furnished’, ‘The information’ which he 
must ‘have’ is left to be supplied. Understand ras wporace:s, which 
generally stands in Aristotle for the ‘materials’ of Rhetoric which the 
speaker must have at his command. 

A€ywpev wads] ‘let us go back, begin again, take a fresh start as it 
were, and proceed to state...2 Compare the end of the first chapter. 
This form of expression and use of mdAw are very familiar to Aristotle 
in commencing a new subject. See, for example, de Anima II 1 init, c. 2 
init. 


t CHAPTER V. 
The analysis of Happiness. 


The object of the public or deliberative speaker lies in the future, and 
is always something attainable; no one deliberates about that which is 
altogether out of his power. Now happiness or some form or part of it is 
the universal aim; the complete analysis of happiness, therefore, will 
include every object of xporpom} and drorpomy which he can Suggest to 
his audience, and every kind of political expediency. 

§ 1. Eth. Nic. 11 init. wd@oa réyon nal raca pébodos, cpotws dé wpatis 
re xal mpoaipecis, adyabod tiwos epiecOat Bonet’ 8:6 Kxadds dredyvayro 
rayabdy, ov mavr’ dpieras. Ib. 1094 5 3, xpwperns 8é raurns (ris moXcrexijs) 
rais Aowrais mpaxrixais THY emiaTnpay, ere 8€ vopoOerovons ti dei mpdrrety Kal 
riveov dwéxerOas, TO TavTns TéAOS meptéxot Gv Ta Trav GAAwy, OoTe TOUT dy ety 
ravOpumtvoy ayabov. X 6 init. *éresdy réAos avryy (ri evdarpoviay) ridepey 
Trav dvOpwrivev. Polit. 1 1 init. éresdy wacay wodw Kowoviay Twa ovcay 
cal nacay xoweviay dyabou Twos evexey avvertnxviay, Tov yap eivas 8o- 
Kkovuvros dyadou xdpiy ravra mparrovat mares, OnAoy os wacat dyabov 
Tivos oroxafovrat, Plat. Symp. 205 A xal ovxérs mpoodei fpecOat iva ri dé 
Bovrerar evdaipwy elvas 6 BovAcpevos, GAAd réAos Soxel Cxeww 7H airoxpsots. 
Phileb. 54 C ro ye pyv od evexa rd Evexd Tov yryvopevoy det yiyvotr’ dv, év TH 
‘rou dyabov poipg éxeiva ¢ort. Gorg. 499 E ro dyaboy rédos elvas dnaccy 
Tay mpalewy, cal éxeivou evexev deiv mdvra rdAAa mparrecOat, x.r-A. Euthyd. 
278 E altbt. 

év xehadaig elrreivy] ‘to speak summarily’, to sum up in one notion, to 
‘describe all human ends and aims by the single phrase ‘happiness and 
its parts’, 





PHTOPIKHS A 5 § 2, 3. 73 


, A , ~ of 4 
2 evdatmovia Kal Ta mopla avTHs. wore TapadeiypaTos 
f , Sf e e “~ 4 ~ e ’ 
xapw AaBwpyey Ti éoTWw ws amos ElTeivy 4 Evdat- 
A , s 4 
povia, Kai ék Tivwy Ta popia TavTNS" TEpt yap 
, A ~ 9 , , ~ 
TQUTNS Kal TwWY Els TaUTHY GUYTEWWOYTWY Kal TeV 
, / 
évavTiwy TavTn ai Te MpoTpoTal Kai ai amoTpoTrat 
~ tA a A A 
waca €iciv’ Ta Mey yap wapacKevaCovra TavTHY 
vA ~ / A “~ 4 ~ 
TW popiwy TL, n pEiCov avT’ éXaTTOVOS TroLOUYTA, 
~ 4 A A / nv 3 a7 a\ .Y 
det mpatreav, Ta b€ POcipovra 4 euTrodiCovTa n Ta 
~~ | 4 4 
3évayTia mWo.ovvTa py mpaTrTev. éotw by Eevdaipovia 


§ 2. as awAds elxeiv] speaking broadly and generally, without de- 
scending to particulars. Opposed to xa@’ éxacray. See note on I 2, 4, 
Pp. 30. 

§ 3. gore 87 evdapovia] Brandis, u. s. p. 48, note 42, (after Spengel) 
remarks upon this use of éorw as marking the Jopudar character of the 
definitions that follow—as if it were a matter of indifference whether they 
are right or not, provided that they are so generally acceptable as to be 
certain to satisfy the audience. The same form is repeated c. 6, 2; 7, 2; 
10, 3; I1 2, 1, and throughout the chapters on the waéy. On the defini- 
tion of Rhetoric, see Introd. p.13; and on ¢hés definition of happiness, 
p. 176. ; 

Aristotle’s own definition of happiness in the Eth. Nic., the result 
of his inquiries in that work, is something far different, évépyesa Wuyijs car’ 
aperjy, the fully developed activity or active exercise (implying full con- 
sciousness) of the soul in respect of its proper (and therefore highest) 
excellence: that is contemplation, Oewpia, the exercise of the highest 
faculty, the vots, or intuitive reason; the highest faculties being the ¢n- 
tellectual, This is the theory; but practically a lower view of happiness 
is admitted (Bk. x), which consists in the exereise of the moral as well as 
the intellectual virtues. Of the definitions here given, avrapxea {ons 
comes nearest to his own: it expresses a self-sufficing life, complete in 
itself, independent of all external aids and advantages, and is in fact 
essential to the notion of happiness. See Eth. Nic. 1 § (quoted below). 

The essentials of the three first of these definitions are found all united 
in the conception of happiness, the ultimate end of all human desire and 
effort, which forms the conclusion of the tenth book of the Nicomachean 
Ethics, from the sixth chapter to the end. It contains first, the e’mpagia 
per’ aperjs, in the exercise of moral and intellectual virtue, the intellectual 
being the higher and more perfect form of it, and in that the intuitive 
contemplative energy ; secondly, the avrdpxe:a rns (wns, the self-sufficiency 
and independence of everything external, which is necessary to perfection 
and happiness; and thirdly, the life per’ doadeias, the happiness residing 
in Oeepia being most secure because it is most independent and the 
nearest approach to the happiness of the Gods, who have all their wants 
and faculties satisfied in themselves, and want nothing from without (c. 7); 
and also fairos, because pleasure is the necessary accompaniment of 





74 PHTOPIKH® A 5 83. 


? e > » ~ a\ 3 , ~ A @ ? e 
eurpatia wer aperns, n avtapKxeia Cwns, n 0 Bios 6 
F) 9 td e/ vA ) 4 4 4 
mer’ aodadetas notoros, 4 evOnvia KTnpaTwy Kal 


every évépyea (active exercise, realisation in exercise, of any dvvays or 
capacity), and Gewpia being the most perfect form of évépyea, the pleasure 
that accompanies it must needs be the highest and most complete; and 
the exercise of the moral faculties in proportion to their comparative ex- 
cellence. xal r@ avOpdére 37 6 xara rév voiw Bios (fdioros Kai kparioros), 
elrep Trovro paXtora GvOpwmos. ovros dpa xa) evdatpovéoraros. Eth. N. xX 7 
ult. (In the popular and lower sense of the words this definition of 
happiness would belong to the Epscurean school.) The fourth definition, 
evOnvia xrnparay xal capdrov pera Suvauews uAaxrinis Tre kal mpaxrixhs 
rovrwy’ is only applicable to a state. The Stoic definition of happiness 
was evpota Biov. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hypot. I § 172, wpos "HOcxovs § 30. 

evrpagia per’ dperns] Comp. Pol. Iv (VII) 1, 1323 5 20, dre pev ody 
éxaorp Tis evdatpovias émtBdddet ToToUTOY Sooy mep dperyis Kal dpovncens 
xal Tov mparrew Kata Tavras, foTw cuvwpodoynpévoy Huiv, paprups TS be@ 
xpwpevos, os evdaipoy péy dort xal paxaptos, &° ovbev Bé rav éLwrepiay 
dyabay dda 80 avrdy atrés nal rq rows ris elvar THY uw, del nal THY 
evruxiav ris ev8atpovias 8a rair dvaykaioy érepovelvatnr.r. Ib. 
C. 3, 13266 12, GAN’ ef radra A€yerat Kadws Kal riy evdaoviay evmpayiay 
Geréoy, xal nowy maons modews Gv ein Kal xa& exagrov dpioros Bios é mpaxtixés. 
By comparing this latter passage with the definition, it would seem that 
the sense of evmpagia in the latter must be limited to ‘well doing’, and not 
extended to ‘welfare’, which it, like ed mpdrrev, is capable of including. 
Pol. IV (VII) 1, cal wodew evdaivova ray apiorny elvas nal mparrovoay Kados* 
adivaroy 8¢ xaddés mparrey ry pi) Td KaAd mparroveay, Ib. c. 3 sub init. 
‘advvarov yap rov pnOev mparrovra mparrew ev, ry 8 evxpaylay Kal r)y 
evdatpoviay elvat ravrov. Ib. c. 8, evdaqpovia...dperns évépyeia xal xpnais ris 
réXews. C. 13, 1332 47. 

avrdpxeia (wns] Eth, Nic. 1 5, 1097 6 7, galverat 8¢ nai dx ris avrapxeias 
TO avré cupBaivew (the notion of avrapxes leads to the same result, or 
conception of happiness as that of réA\eoy, previously applied to determine 
it). 1d ydp réXaov ayaddy airapxes elvas Soxei...rd 3° adrapxes ridenev 8 
povovpevoy aiperdy moet roy Biov Kal pndevds dvdea" rovodroy 8¢ Ty eVdatpoviay 
olopeBa elvax, Comp. X 6, 1176 b 5, ovdevds yap evdeis f evdatpovia dX)’ 
avrdpens, C. 7, 1177 a 28, Ff re Aeyouém atrdpxeia (which is essential to 
happiness) wepi ry» Oewpyrixjy pddsor’ Gv ety’ (and therefore the highest 
and most perfect happiness must consist in @ewpia). A similar avrdpeewa 
or independence is attributed to the perfect state in the Politics. On the 
notion of the perfect state or constitution in the second degree, that is, 
under the necessary limitations incident to a human condition, so far as 
humanity allows of perfection at all, see Pol. vi (1v) 11 init. In Pol. Iv 
(VII) 5 init. adrdpxesa is thus defined, rd wdvra Umdpyew nal dei Out pnOevos 
avrapxes. 

evOnvia] and ev@nveiv are Ionic and also late Greek forms belonging to 
the xow? diadexros, for the Attic evbevety and evGevia or eOévera, and denote 
a ‘flourishing state’, or ‘prosperity’ in general. ‘evGeveivy enim non tam 
robur (quod verbo evoGeveiy subiectum est) quam vigorem et vitalitatem 
declarat, ut v.c. Aiax aliquis aut Hercules edodeveiy dicatur, sed vel 











PHTOPIKHS A 5§4 75 


Twpatwy peta Suvapews uAaKTiKns TE Kal mpaK- 
TIKHS TOUTWY* GyEdoY yap ToUTwY év 4 TWAEiw THY 

4 €v0atmoviay duoNoyovot eElvat adtravres. ef On €oTW 
4 evdatmovia ToLOUTOV, dvayKn aUvTHs Elvat pepn EvryE- 
veray ToAvdiriay xpnoTopiriay wAovTOY evTEKviay 
mwoAuTekviay evynpiav, ETL Tas TOU TwuaATOS apeETas, 
Oloy Uyielay KaAAOs toxuy péeyebos, Suvauw ayoncri- 
tenerrima planta, quum laeto iuventae flore nitet, evOeveiy dici possit. Et 
maximi quidem proprie de succo sanitatis et corporis incremento deque 
uberi proventu et auctu, sed non minus apte de prospero rerum publicarum 
privatarumque successu, deque omni ubertate et affluentia dicitur.’? (From 
an excellent note by Lobeck on these words, ad Phryn. &c. p. 465—7: 
Lobeck derives evéeveiy from e3 and 6éw (riénus), Comparing it with other 
verbs of similar formation. The Mss of Arist. give sometimes evéevia 
and eveveiy, but generally evénvia and evénveiv. Lobeck’s. note may be 
applied as a corrective of Victorius’ ad h. 1.) 

xrnparey xail capdrey} ‘property’ of all kinds, goods and chattels, in- 
cluding especially flocks and herds; and ‘population’, here estimated by 
‘bodies’, not by ‘souls’ as Christianity has taught #s to reckon it. 

§ 4. evrexvia (evrexvos, evrats, evraidia, evrexveiy, Aeschylus and 
Euripides), and evynpia, evrexvos, and evynpes, ‘ blessing in children, and 
in old age’, are applied by Aristotle to animals, as well as to the human 
race, in his works on Natural History: ¢.g. to birds, in the sense of 
‘prolific’, Hist. An. IX I1, 13 12, 33 17,15 IX 12, 33 evynpos dpnes. 

swodvgiria, xpnorogiAvia, both defined by Aristotle himself in § 16, 
‘number of friends, worthiness of friends’. The latter is defined by Liddell 
and Scott, ‘the love of good men or good deeds’, [a slip corrected, how- 
ever, in a subsequent edition. S.] 

ras tov oadparos aperas] The dpery or ‘excellence’ of anything is 
determined by its épyoy or special function or business ; that which it was 
made fo do. On this notion of épyoy, see the reff. given in note on c. 2, 
§ 12, dperj therefore is so far from being confined to moral virtue, 
though it is applied to this xar’ ¢foxqv, that it may be extended to every- 
thing which has any use or object, animate or inanimate; but in the 
highest and most appropriate sense is attributed to human faculties 
bodily, mental, and moral. 

péyebos|] So Homer and Hesiod reckon size as well as strength and 
beauty amongst personal advantages. Od. { 276, ris & d8¢ Navocxda 
dweras xados re péyas re Ecivos; Ib. o 248, wepleocs yuvandy eldds re péye- 
Ocs re. w 252, ovdd ri ros BovAccov dmimpéres eloopaacbag eldos cal péye- 
Gos, o 218. w 373. IL B58, &c. Hesiod, Scut. Herc. 3, and Plato, Alc. 1 
p. 123 E, in an enumeration of the personal qualities and other advantages 
that a young man might be proud of, ef oy Adyousew Gre xaddes re xal 
peyébes xai yeves nal wrovre xal duces ris Yuyijs... Charmid. 154 C, davpa- 
ares épavn ro re peyeOos xai rd eddAos. So Ovid’s Romulus, after his deifi- 
cation, pulcer ct humano maior. Arist. Eth. Nic. 1v 7, 1323 4 7, dv peydBes 


76 PHTOPIKH® A 5 § 4. 


, by id ‘ ) , 9 / i¢ ef A A 
knv, Sofav Tiny evTvyiay aperny’’ ovTwW yap av 
a, rd 4 ~ , ~ 
QUTaPKETTATOS Ein, EL UTapXol av’T@ Ta T év avTo 
\ \ 2» \ 9 , 9 4 ww of 4 ~ 
kat Ta exTos aya@a: ov yap Eotw adda Tapa TavTa. 
a” oO ? > «” ‘ \ ‘ y \ ,) \ » , 
éoTt 0 €vy aUTM@ Mev Ta TEpt WuXNY Kal Ta ev TwWUAaTI, 
a \ 9 , .' , | 4 A , 
éEw de evyevece kat ido: Kal xpnuaTa Kai Tin. 
w# A , 4 , e , \ , 
Ett O€ rpoonkev otoueOa duvapyets vrapyew Kat TYxnV 
19 nal rd pépn aurys, Ppovnow dvdplay dixcawocvrny cwdpooirny. 


yap 7 peyadowuyia, domwep xal rd xdddos ev peyar@ oopars, of pexpol 8 doreios 
(pretty or neat) xai ovpperpos, xadol 8 ov. Pol. IV (VII) 4, 1326 @ 33, To ye 
xadov dy wAnOer cal peyebes ciabe yiverOa. Poet. VII 4, 1d yap xadow dy 
peyébes nal rages ori, ap. Zell, adloc. Eth, 

dofav] ‘ reputation’, estimation in men’s ¢houghts or opinion. (‘Fame 
is the spur that the clear spirit doth raise, that last infirmity of noble 
minds, to scorn delights, &c.’ Lycidas).—repyjy honours, substantial and 
externally manifested, which are conferred upon a man, offices, titles, mpo- 
edpiat, civil privileges, and such like. See further in § 9. On the value 
of rizy in general, Eth. Nic. Iv 7, 1123 5 18, péeysoroy 8¢ rovr ay Beinner 
& rois Beois arovépoper, cat ov parior’ éduevras of év déiopart, eal rd ént 
rois xadXloros GOAoy. rootroy 8 if riuy. péytorow yap 8) rovro ray dxros 
ayabay, 1124 @ 17. 

evrvxiay] distinguished from evdaovia, Pol. Iv (VII) 1, 1323 5 20 seq., 
quoted above in note on § 3. 

4 «al rd pépn auras, Ppovnow dvdpiay Scxaocvyvny owppoavyny] These 
words are omitted by MS A‘, put in brackets as doubtful by Bekker [4to 
ed. 1831], and rejected by Spengel. 

avrapxéoraros | referring tothe second definition,§ 3. See note on § 3, p. 73. 

rat’ & avr@ xal ra éxros ayaa] When Aristotle adds ‘besides these 
there are no others’, he includes, as he tells us in the following sentence, 
the goods of body and mind under the first head, ra év avrg. His usual 
division of goods, called the Peripatetic division, is into three kinds ; 
goods of ‘mind, body, and estate’. This division, however, was not 
his own invention; as he tells us in Eth. Nic. I 8, 1098 4 17, ravrny rhy 
‘8ofay (the opinion in question) wadaay ovoav xal cpodoyoupévny vd 
ray diocofovyray, Cic. Tusc. V 30, fvia genera bonorum, maxima 
animt, secunda corporis, externa tertia, ut Peripatetict, nec multo ve- 
teves Academicit secus. Eth. Nic. I 8, sub init. vernpnpever 8) ror 
adyabay rpiy7, cal rey péev exrds Aeyopevwy rev Se repli Wuxy cal copa, 
Ta wept Yuxny Kupiorara A€yopey cal pad:ora ayada. Pol. Iv (VII) I sub 
init. rpidy ovody pepideor, ray re éxrés xal rev dv rp caopare Kai ray év T7 
Wuxi, wavra raéra vrapyew rots paxaplors Set. Zell ad Eth. Nic. 1 8, 2, 
Cic. de Fin, I 13, 43, e¢ a#bs. Schrader ad h.1. This division cannot be 
at all events confined to the Peripatetics or derived from them alone, for it 
appears in the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 1 (2 Oxf.) 8, &katpyoess 8¢ rovro (ro cupdépor) 
rois pey (diarase els dpa nal uy? cal ra édxixryra: unless indeed this be 
taken as an argument of the later authorship of the Rhet. ad Alexandrum. 

duvdpers] either ‘ power’ of various kinds, “opes ac civilem potentiam’, 











PHTOPIKHS A 5§5. "7 


ovTw yap av dodpadeoTtatos 6 Bios ein. AaBwuev 
Toivuy GMoiws Kal TOUTwWY ExaoToOV Ti é€oTLV. 
> °& : A > ’ \ of ) \ , a 
evyevera prev ouv éotiv EOver prev Kai mode TO 
auToxGovas 7 dpxaious Elva, Kal ryenovas Tous 
mpwrous émipaveis, Kal mwoAdAous emipavels yeyovevat 
? 9 ~ s 4 ~ Ld 2Q7 \ > 3# NN 
EE avtrwv éwi Tois CyAoupevas: idia de evyeveta ij 
dn’ dvdpwv amo yuvaKwv, Kat yynowTns an ap- 
Muretus, Victorius, ‘potentiam’, Vet. Transl; or faculties and capacities, 
bodily and mental, ‘facultates’, Riccob. The first seems to agree better 
with evrvyiay. 
agdad¢oraros] referring to the third definition of § 3. 
§ 5. evyévera} in an individual or family is defined in Pol. vi (1v) 8, 
1294 @ 21, " yap evyeved éorw dpxaios wAovros cat dpern, and VIII (V) I, 
1301 5 2, evyeveis elvas Soxotvew ots Umdpxet Tpoyovey dpery nal mAovros. 
Rhet. 11 1 5. 2, 3. Plat. Theaet. 174 E, ra 3¢ 37 yémm vpvowwrev, ds yevvaios 
ris Gard wammovs s\ovciovs éxov drodivat, which seems to have been the 
current definition of evyéveca at Athens in Plato’s time. 
avrdxOovas|] Herod. 1 171, Thuc. I, 2 and 6, Arist. Vesp. 1076, Eur. Ion 
29, 589, 737, of Athens ; Isocr. Panath. § 124, also of Athens ; Paneg. § 24, 
25, Dem. de F. L. § 296, of the Athenians and Arcadians. Quint. 111 7, 26, 
laudantur autem urbes similiter atgue homines. Nam pro parente est con- 
ditor, et multum auctoritatts affert Cees ut tis gut Lerva dicuntur orts. 
xal }yepovas tos mparous émiaveis] ‘and to have had for their first 
rulers famous men’, like Theseus at Athens. 
nat sodAovs éripaveis—éri rois (nAovpevais] ‘and many men sprung from 
their race renowned for things (personal qualities, feats of arms, noble 
deeds, and such like) that are esteemed and admired’. sri, ‘standing, 
resting upon’, ‘upon the basis, terms, or condition of ...’. 
idig 8d evyéveca § ax’ avdpev 4} dawo yuvaxey] ‘privately, in a family, it 
may be derived either from the father’s or the mother’s side’, i.e. from 
famous ancestors on either. 
ynowms an’ apo] ‘legitimacy on both sides’, in birth and citizen- 
ship. y7qotos, opposed to vodos, Il. A 102, ule due Lpidpoto vdbov nat yv7- 
ov0r, Plat. Rep. Vil 536 A, roy vodov re xal roy yuioroy, and also to wowros, 
elowoinros, Gers vics, Dem. c. Leoch. 1095, 5) To pey yap yrjovwr €atw Gray 
B yore yeyowss, nal o vopos taira paprupet Ayer, fy Gy erin mwarip Ff 
Gedpos } wawmos éx ravrns elvas waidas yvyciovs.. rout os 8 cpodoyay 
elvas aiveras ovx eloroinGeis Ud rou rereAeuTnKOros avrov x.r.A. and 1099, 
19; and hence metaphorically ‘genuine’, real, true, as opposed to spurious, 
fictitious. Plat. Rep. 1X 587 B, pias pév (ydovis) ynoias, Bvoivy 8é robo. 
On the yrjovos wodlrns, cf. Ar. Pol. 111 5. The conditions of citizenship 
vary according to the form of constitution, and the number of the popula- 
tion, In the normal state no Bavavoos or Ofres, NO mechanics or paid agri- 
cultural labourers, still less slaves, should be admitted to the rights of 
citizenship. When the number of the yxjoros woXiras (legitimate by birth) 
declines, vuéor are admitted ; in the opposite case a more stringent rule 


78 PHTOPIKHS A 5 §6. 


~ 4 4 4 a 
goiv, kai womep emi moAEwSs TOUS TE TpwTOUS YyYwpl- . 
~ SN 7 nN oof ~ 
pous 4 én’ dpeTa 7 TOUTH 1] GAAW TW THY TIW- 
- an ~ Fd A 
péevwv, Kal qoAXous émipaveis éx TOU ‘yevous Kal p.17. 
~ N 4 | , 
avépas Kal yuvaikas Kal véovs Kati smpeaBurepous. 
A # wv A ~ 
6evTexvia S€ Kai woAuTeKvia ovK adnAa. Eote O€ TH P. 1361. 
~ 4 9 a 4 A *v A 4 9 a 
Kowe pev [evTekvia], veorns av n TwoAAN Kat ayaOn, 
9 A A 9 9 A 4 = td 4 
ayaby Sé Kat’ dpernv cwparos, oiov péyeBos KadXos 
4 ? ( ~ , 
toxuy Suvauw aywuoriKnyy uxns b€ cwppocuvn 
\ 9 tf f 9 ‘4 2Q7 A 9 4 4 
kal avdpia véov dpetai. idia d€ evTeKvia Kal mroNv- 
4 ‘ \ of f A \ ~ > 
TEKViaA TO Ta lOla TEKvVa WOAAa Kal TolavTAa Elval, 


prevails ; and then, evmopouvres 8 dyXov xara pcxpoy wapatpotvrar rous €x 

SovAou mporov  Bovdns, elra rovs awd yuvacxay rédos 8e povow rous ef 

Gudoiw dorar woXiras mowovow—as was the case at Athens. 
cal domep émi wodews] ‘and as in the case of a city (so in the private 

family, l3ig), the distinction of its founders for virtue or wealth, or any- 

thing else that is highly valued, and a number of illustrious members of 

the race, men and women, young or advanced in years’. 

§6. rq xowg] ‘the community, the commonwealth’, res$xdlica. rd 
xowov Tay "Idvwr, Herod. V. 109, ray Zapioy, VI. 14, roy Sraprijréwp, VI. 
58. ‘rq xowg communi recte vertit Muretus, Latini enim Graecos imi- 
tantes gentem, nationem, rempublicam, civitatem appellant commune. 
Cic. in Verr. 11 46, statuae a communi Siciliae, quemadmodum inscriptum 
videmus, datae. Item, I 28, quomodo iste commune Miliadum vexarit’. 
Schrader. Comp. Fr. Commune. Germ. Gemeinde. 

Wuxis 8¢ cahpoovwn cal dv8pia veou dperai} This is a statement of what 
young men ough? to be; their character, what they actually are, is 
minutely analysed and described in 11 12, under the second head of 46n, 
C. 12—17. av8pia appears as one of their characteristics in § 9 : cadpo- 
av, self-control, is mof characteristic of this age, and is therefore not 
mentioned. 

evrexvia] The strong feeling of the blessing of children, implied, 
though not directly expressed, in evrexyia, especially characteristic of the 
Jews, appears also in the Greek writers, as Euripides, who uses evruyeiy 
and dvorvyeiy to express the possession and the absence of a family, as 
though the possession of them were happiness, and the want of them 
misery. See Ion, 699, 772, 775, Androm. 429 (Paley’s note), and 713. 

ro.avra] ‘such’ as above described. On this use of rotovros, implying 
a notion suggested by a previous expression, see Stallbaum’s note on Plat. 
Phaed. 80 C, dd» pév ris xal yapievrws yor ro capa redevTHCH Kai év Tot- 
aury (i.€. xapséooy) Spg. Compare, inter alia, 59 A, 67 A. Thuc. HI 58, 
vopifayr éy yi re irig riBévas xal map’ avBpacs rowovros (of the like sort, 
i.e. gidiots), Dem. d. F. L. § 103, dAX’ Sow otros alrios oxeydpevot, rat 
xapiv, &y ravrns G£iws 7, Kal rovvavriov dpyiy, dy roatra (‘of that kind’ 
sc. 6pyis afta haivnrat weroiunxeds, woeiobe.) Arist. Pol. 1 8, 1256 @ 36, of & 





PHTOPIKHS A 5 §7. 79 


a \ > ‘ \ 
kat O@ndea Kai dppeva’ Onde S€ dpeTn wuwuaTos MEV 
~ A 4 4 
KaAXos kal péyebos, Yuxins 6€ cwppoouvy kal pirepyia 
A 9 , e , oe | OL A ~ q 9 
avev dvedevGepias, duoiws O€ Kat dia Kal KoWwy Kal KaT 
A ~ a ~ e@ / 
avipas kal kata yuvaikas det Cnreiv Exarov vrapxew 
~ f A A ~ ~ 
TV TOLWUTwWY? SaOIS yap Ta KaTa yuvaixas paidAa 
womep Aaxedaipovios, oyEeddy KaTa TO HuLoU OUK Ev- 
~ S A L4 , ee 
7 Satysovovow. amrourou b€ eon vopiopatos wAnOos, 


aq’ ddselas, Soot Nipvas cal €An xai rorapovs f GdAarray roavrny (of the 
same kind, suitable for fishing) mpocotxotaey. 11 4, 1262 5 2, 8ei 8€ rovovrous 
etvas, i.e. (from the preceding) less friendly, vi1I (Vv) 10, 1310 6 12, rowovrov 
yévous, ‘a similar family’ (similar to what had been just described). 

direpyia dvev dveXevbepias}] ‘industry, without (mean, sordid, illiberal) 
unladylike habits’. 

Ta Kara yvvaixas, x.t.A.] ‘the character and conduct of the women’, 
Polit. 11 9, 1269 5 12, érs 8 9 wept ras yuvaixas dveocs (relaxation, laxity of 
manners) xal mpos tHv mpoaipeoww ris woXtrelas BAaBepa xal mpos evdas- 
poviay moAews...d0T év doats wodreias Havrws exes ro wep) ras yuvaixas, 
TO Hpou Tis Toews elvas Set vopifew dvopobernrov. Srep éxet (at Sparta) 
oupBeBnxev...a04 yap dxoAdorws mpos macay dxodaciay cai rpvpepos. On 
the condition of the Spartan women, and the difference in the account 
given of their moral character by Aristotle, here and in the Politics, on 
the one hand, and by Xenophon and Plutarch on the other, see Grote, 
fist. Gr. Vol. 1. p- §16 seq. 

§ 7. mAovrov pépn vopioparos tAROos x.r.A.] In the discussion of wealth, 
in the more exact and scientific Politics, this is denied of érue wealth. Pol. 
19, 1257 5 8, xal yap rov mAovroy roAAdKis TiHéacs vopicparos AROS, dd TO 
wepi rour’ elvat tiv xpnyarsorixy cal THY Kamndcxny. ore (sometimes) 8e 
waXww Afjpos (mere nonsense, a mere joke or farce) elvyac Soxet rd yopsiopa 
cai vopos wayranac: (an absolute convention, with no reality, no true 
nature, dvais, in it), pvoes  ovGév, ore perabepevay re ray ypopévwv ovlevos 
Gor ovde ypnaowoy mpos oudéy trav avaykaiwy earl, nai vopicuaros mAovTaY 
mwodAaats arophaes THs dvayxaias rpopijs’ xairo: dromoy ro.ovroy elvas wovToy 
ov evropay App arodeirat, Kabdrep Kal roy Miday exeivov...d00 (nrovow ére- 
pov re roy wAovroy xal THY ypnpariorixny, opbas (nrovyres.—sdovros is defined, 
Pol. 1 8, sub fin. épydvev mAn8os olxovopuxdy nal modcrexey, ‘a Stock, or 
number, of implements or instruments for economical (domestic) and 
public or political uses’. 

This confusion of money and wealth, the foundation of the famous 

‘Mercantile Theory’, is exposed by Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, 
Bk. tv. See also J. S. Mill, Pol. Econ. Prelim. Remarks, Vol. 1. p. 2 seq. 
‘To mistake money for wealth, is the same sort of error as to mistake the 
highway which may be the easiest way of getting to your house or lands, 
for the house and lands themselves.’ p. 81. 

1 It is well worth while to compare the chapters of the first book of the Politics 
in which the germs of the supposed invention, the science of Political Economy, 
already appear, with the corresponding passages of the Wealth of Nations. The 


80 PHTOPIKHS A 5§7. 


Yyns, Xwpiav Kryors, Ere O€ énimAwy KTHOIs Kai Bookn- 
patwy Kai avoparodwy wANOE Kai peyeber Kal Kart 
Stahepovtwy, Tavita 6€ wmavTra Kai dadady Kai édev- 
Gépia kai ypnowa. ear O€ xpnowua péev paddAov Ta 

vis, xepiey xraois] yi, ‘territory’, the acquisition or possession of 
public property, yepsa (dim. of xapos or xapa, little places, regions, coun- 
tries, ‘spots’,) ‘farms’, ‘estates’, ‘domains’, Jrivaze properties. Or per- 
haps rather, yj merely ‘land’ in general, and ydpra the divisions of land, 
the actual private properties. | 

émimda, (a division of property) ‘moveables’, moveable furniture or 
property of all kinds: opposed to ‘fixtures’, such as houses and land. 
Xen. Oecon. IX 6 includes in it all sacrificial furniture or apparatus ; and 
articles of dress, shoes, female ornaments; and of house furniture, as 
beds. In Thuc. 111 68, a fw év rp reixes fmimda, yadrxds xai cidnpos, it 
stands for household furniture of bronze and iron: everything of this 
kind which was in the fort, the Laced., after the capture of Plataea, con- 
verted into couches (xAiva:) and dedicated to “Hpa. In Arist. Pol. 11 7, 
1267 5 12, nal xaraoxevy woAdy (a large stock) roy xadoupevoy éexindoy, it is 
opposed, first, w#k money, slaves and cattle, to land, and then, secondly, 
to the three former. Similarly in the present passage, they are distin- 
guished from cattle and slaves as snaanimate moveable furniture, or ‘ ple- 
nishing’. Herodotus writes the word émimdoa in I 94; elsewhere, as usual, 
émmda. The derivation appears to be, ra émemoAns oxevn, Ta éemiroAaa, 
superficial’, They are said to be ‘superficial’, to ‘lie on the surface’, 
because they are not fixed or rooted, like land, houses, trees ; which are 
all ‘ property’ nevertheless. 

ravra 3¢€ mavra Kai dodady Kai eAevOépia cal xypnoipa) All the kinds of 
property just mentioned are ‘secure’, (in the sense, ‘that the use of it is 
always in your own power’, /ra), not liable to risk, as money made and 
employed in trade or commerce; and ‘liberal’, such as befit a gentleman, 
a man of ‘liberal’ education and pursuits, cultivated and accomplished 
and refined, 6 meradevupevos (radeia, 7) StayryvadoKxopev Ta Kad Kat Ta aloypa, 
Aesch. c. Ctesiph. § 260); and also ‘useful’, mpos ro (av wal ro ev (py, and 
therefore a part of genuine wealth (with which money is here included, 
contrary to the true theory). 

€AevOéptos, as here applied, expresses the general notion of liberality, 
in character and habits of mind. In the Ethics, and most frequently 
in the ordinary language, it is restricted as a moral virtue to a shectes 
of liberality, that namely which manifests itself wept 300. xpnpdrov 
cai Anu. Eth. Nic. 117. The éAevOépios represents the gentleman 


resemblance is sometimes so close—see, for example, Aristotle’s account of the 
origin and use of money in I 9 above referred to, and of the three earliest stages of 
civilisation indicated in c. 8, the hunting, the pastoral or nomad, and the agricul- 
tural stage (though it is true that Smith, and with him Mill, Pol. Econ. u. s., 
inverts the order of the two first and adds a fourth, the commercial stage), that 
it seems almost impossible that the notions at least should not have been suggested 
by Aristotle, though as far as I am aware Smith never mentions his name. 


PHTOPIKH® A 5 §7. 81 
4 9 , ‘ A ) 9 y , 
kapTripa, éNevOepia dé Ta Mpos amoAavol* KapTipa 


from the democratic point of view; he embodies the notion of ‘freedom 
which is the dpos, the principle, and the end and aim of the demo- 
cratic commonwealth; he is the type of a free citizen, and therefore 
as expressive of character the term denotes ‘that which a model free 
citizen ought to be’; and connotes or implies those qualifications, parti- 
cularly education and enlightenment, which enable him efficiently to dis- 
charge the proper functions of a free citizen, and those social qualities 
and habits which fit him for such a society. This is opposed to the aris- 
tocratic conception of a gentleman which makes the character or notion 
depend rather upon birth, wealth and station; and according to which the 
dyaboi, dpiorot, dpiorijes, the dont, optintit, optimates, &c., are the nobles, 
the men of rank, and of good family in a state. See further on this sub- 
ject, Donaldson, New Cratylus, §§ 321—328. 

Another characteristic of Greek feeling, which deserves notice, is 
brought into view in the application of the term ¢Aev@pra to distinguish 
a particular kind of property; and this is, the contempt for trade and 
commerce as a profession and a means of acquiring wealth, which as 
B. St Hilaire observes (note on Trans/. of Ar. Pol. p. 36) was common 
to all antiquity. A similar observation is made by Béckh, Pd/. Econ. of 
Athens, Bk. 1c. 8 p. 43 (Transl.). 

Plato’s writings abound with contemptuous epithets and expressions 
applied to ¢umopia, xamnAcia, xpnpatiorixn, xpnpatiopes, and all arts and 
professions of which money-making was the only object; for instance, 
Legg. IV 1, 705 A, éumopias yap xal xpnparicpod oid xamndelas éymimdGca 
avryy, 76n waXipBoda xui amwra rais Yuxais évricrovea, avryy Te mpds avrhy 
THY TOALY amioroy Kat apidov motes Kal mpos Tous dAAous avOpwmrous wcavres, 
where trade is represented as corrupting and demoralizing. In XI 4, 918 
D, in the course of a discussion on the legitimate objects and uses of 
trade, he makes the remark, 86 wavra ra sept THY Kamn\ciay Kal épropiay 
cat mavdoxeiay yévn (in the actual practice of them) &aPeBAnrai re xal év 
aicxpois yéyovey oveideocy, which results from their general tendency to 
corrupt the character of those who follow these pursuits, by the immo- 
derate desire of gain which they stimulate and foster. Accordingly no 
citizen of the model state is allowed to follow any retail trade; this must 
be confined to metics and strangers, pérocxow elvas ypedy h févow os dp 
POA Kamnrevocew. VIII 11, 847 D, xamnAciay 8é Evexa ypnpariopey pyre 
ovy Tovrou pire dAXov pndevds év tr yopg OAg Kal woAEL Hiv yiyverOas. On 
Plato’s general views on this subject, as expressed in the ‘ Laws’, see 
Grote, Plato, II! 431. 

Aristotle similarly condemns trade and the business and practice of 
interchanging commodities, so far as its object is mere money-making, 
xpnpartorixn. This is the accumulation of wanatural, artificial property: 
the only kind of property or wealth that is natural, d@voe, is that which 
can be applied directly to one’s own use, mpos xpjow, and ultimately 
mpos ro ev (yy, and falls under the province of olxovoyseg, from which 
xpnparioriny is excluded. Pol.I 9. Hence of the two kinds of eryrian, 
the one, which may be called olxovopexj, because it forms part of the 
science of ceconomics (domestic economy) properly understood, is neces- 

AR. I. 6 


82 PHTOPIKHS A 5 §7. 
dé A€yw ad’ wy ai modcodot, drodavoTiKa Sé ad’ wy 
pndév mapa thy xpnow yiryverat, 6 Tt Kal aftov. 


sary and laudable; the other, 9 camnAsxn or peraBAnrixy, with its offspring 
usury, which dreeds money out of money, and is thence called roxos, ‘is 
justly reprehended’ and usury ‘most reasonably the object of abhorrence’. 
rijs 3€ peraBAnrinis Yeyopuevns Sixaies, ov yap xara Puow dAN’ dx’ dAAjAwy 
éoriv, evAcywrara puceirat  dBoAooTarixy Gia TO Un’ avrov Tov yvopicparos 
elvat ry xrjoww Kal ovx éf’ Sep éwopicbn. xd. 1 10 sub fin. 

On the character and tendencies of ¢zwopor, compare Xen. CEcon. XX 
27,28. In the same treatise, c. I 12, 13,14, a distinction is taken, simi- 
lar to that of Aristotle, between ypypara, wealth or property which you 
can suse directly, which does you direct service, and money, which is 
excluded from the notion of property i# this sense. Xenophon, like Ari- 
stotle, approves of nothing but the agricultural mode of life as the best 
both for mind and body, and as cultivating and promoting the habits 
which go to form the best of citizens. See CEcon. c. vI 8, 9, 10, c. XV 9. 

These extracts will throw light upon the meaning of the word dev- 
O¢pia as applied to the land and stock and buildings and moveables of 
the landed gentleman or country proprietor. They are said to belong to 
the gentleman or man of cultivation, in contrast with the degrading or 
corrupting habits engendered by trade and commerce. 

gors 8€ xpnospa paddov «r.A.] Property employed in business, and 
therefore productive, dd’ dy al spocodos ‘from which one derives one’s 
income’, is more useful, but carries with it the notion of sordidness or 
meanness; the other, because it produces nothing but the enjoyment’, 
which proceeds from ssing it, because it is not corrupted and degraded 
by any contact or connexion with money-making, better befits the cul- 
tivated man, who should hold himself aloof from such pursuits, and par- 
takes more of the notion of xadcy. Comp. 19, 25, cal vixn xal rep) roy 
caddy, alperd re yap dxapra éyra. § 26, xal erjpara dxapra (xaAd ¢ori). 
éAevOepidrepa yap. Eth. N. tv 8 sub fin. (of the peyadowuyos), xal olos 
nextnoOat wadXoy Td Kadd xal deapna téy xapripwy xa odedipwy—the con- 
trast of ‘honour’ and ‘ profit’. 

Gwodavotixa 8€ x.r.r.] Comp. Metaph. A 1, 981 517, on the ascend- 
ing scale of arts, in the order of superiority in knowledge and general 
excellence. mAciovwy 8 evpioxopévwr texvav, xal ray perv mpos Tdavayxaia 
rév 8¢ mpos Surywyny (passe-temps, pastime, diversion) ovcdy, del cope- 
Tépous rovs rotovrous éxeivoy UmodauBavoper, dia rd oy wWpos xphocy elvas 
ras émorjpas avroy. The highest in degree are ‘sciences’, the invention 
of which is due neither to necessity nor to the mere desire of amusements, 
and requires ‘leisure’: whence it happened that mathematics were first 
studied in Egypt by the priestly class. 

G re xal Gftov] xai emphatic ‘which is in fact af a// worth mentioning’. 

1 dwéAavais is properly ‘sensual enjoyment’. In Eth. N.1 3, where the three 
kinds ‘of lives, the dwoNavorixés, mpaxricds or wodtrixds, and Oewpyrixos are 
distinguished and compared, the first is that which has 5097 for its sole object, 
the gratification of the animal appetites and desires, the satisfaction of rd éxi0u 
pnrixoy ; the second has dper# moral virtue for its ré\os; the third, Oewpla, the 
highest activity of the intellect. 


PHTOPIKHS A 5§8. 83 


e a 4 ~ / ~ 

Spos d€ adodadeias wey TO évravOa Kal oTWw KEKTH- 

ef 2. 9498 e@ ~ Ff A ~ 9 ~ ~ Va 

c0at wor ép’ avr elvat Thy xpnow avTwv, TOU O€ 
9 ~ > vA , e/ a4 9 e ~ P 3» ~ 

OlKéla Elvat n pn, OTav Eh avTw n arvrahNoTpiwoat:’ 

~ / A 

Néyw Sé araddoTpiwew Scow cal mpaow. srws 6€ 

a ~ 9 q ) ~ ~ ~ A 9 ~ 

TO wAouTelv €otiv év Tw xpnoOat paddAov Hn év TH 
~ C4 ~ ? 

KexTnoOar Kai yap 4 évepyetd dott TwY ToLoVTwY 

~ ~ a 4 

8xat 1 ypnots wAovTos. evdokia 8 éoti To vao 
~ ? vv ~ 4 

wavrwy omovoaiovy vroAauBaverOai, n TowvTOY Tt 


1 ve tnfra. [‘scribendum rob 88 olxdia elva:, quod in scripto libro, quo Victorius 
utebatur, exstat.’ Spengel, ¢.v.] 


&£cov (Acyov). This emphatic use of «ai, to enforce the meaning, usually 
of the single word following, and attract special attention to it, is so com- 
mon in all Greek authors as scarcely to require illustration. It may be 
worth while to quote one or two prominent examples. Thuc. I 15, wavres 
82 Foray, Soo: xai (actually) éyévovro, 97, ravrev.dé Sowep xal faro...'EAAa- 
mxos, 11 51, & 8¢ nal yevotro el rovro éreXevra. Arist. Nub. 840, ri 8 a» 
wap éxelvyeoy xa) pabo. (what could one learn?) ypnorov rs dy; Eur. Hippol. 
QI, rou &é cal p’ anoropeis wept; 224, ri eumpyecioy xal col pedéry; (what is 
thy concern with hunting ?), Ion, 241, dre xal béuts, 346, tadra xal pavrev- 
opas. Aesch. Agam. 97, drt xai duvaroy. 279. Dem. de F. L. § 87, dep 
nal yéyover. §97, 6 xal Gavpalo (Schifer’s note), Porson ad Phoen. 1373; 
in interrogation, Wunder ad Antig. 720. 

évrav6a xa) ovr#| ‘in such places and in such a way, as to &c.’ 

Tou re olxeia elva: f py x-r.A.] The definition of their being our own 
or not (of ownership), lies in the power of alienation, that is, giving or 
selling. 

Drews 8é rd wAovreiv x.7-rA.] Polit. 1 9 referred to above, pp. 79 and 81. 

9 ¢vépyea} This technical term, and the opposition .of 8vvayis and 
¢vepyeca which pervades Aristotle’s entire philosophy, represents wdovros 
as a mere 8vvayis or dormant faculty or capacity, until it is ‘developed’ 
or ‘realised’ and ‘set in action’ (energized) by use (ypfors), by applica- 
tion to the ‘service’ of its owner. On this ‘fundamental antithesis’ of 
Svvauss and évépyea as a physical, moral, and metaphysical conception, 
consult Metaph. © 6—9, and Bonitz Comm.,; Trendel. £/. Log. Arsst. 
§ 6, p. 61, Kategorienlehre, p. 157 seq., Comm. ad Ar. de Anima, Lib. 1 
Pp. 295— 312; Grant, Essays on Ethics, Ess. 1v. p. 181 seq. (1st ed.) [p. 233 
(3rd ed.)} 

§ 8. ovovdaiovy] As émecxys is transferred from the special sense of a 
particular kind of goodness, i.e. equity, or merciful consideration, to the 
sense of ‘ good’ in general, (see anéz, note on I 2,4); SO owovdaios (serious, 
earnest, Xen. Cyrop. I! 2. 9, 3. 8, as opposed to waifey! ‘in jest’), to levity 
and frivolity ; and thence, in the sense of something solid and substantial, 


1 Eth. Nic. x 6, 1177.4. 3, Berriw re Aé-youer Td crovdaia rwr yedolwr cal roy 
prerd wasduis, xal rov Bedrlovos del xal poplov xal drOpurou cwovdaorépay iy 
dripyaar, 

6—2 


84 PHTOPIKHS A 5 §09. 
= : . oA 
éxew ov wavres édievrat fj of modAO! 7H ot ayalot n 
Qot dpovimot. Tiun 0 dori pev anpciov evepryeTiKys 
~~ a e 
SoEns, TysmvTat O€ Stkaiws pev Kal wadtora oi EvEp- 
~ 4 
yeTnKOTEs, OU pny adAAa TimaTta Kai 6 Suvapevos 
nw av ef f 
evepryeTeiv evepyeoia bé 4 Els TwTnpiav Kal doa aitia 
~ F A > ~ AN oof ~ rd > ~ 
TOU Elvat, H Els WAOUTOV, H Els TL TWY GAAWY ayabuD, 
@ . Ve , e ~ A nv ~ vv , ‘ 
wy un padia 1 KTHOWs n SAws n.€vTavOa n ToTE: TONAOL 
A A A ~ ~ td 9 9 e 
yap dia puxpa Soxovyvta tTimys TUyxavovew, GAN’ ot P.18. 


sound and true, to @aiAos, light, empty, trifling and worthless) acquires a 
moral sense coextensive with aya6os, and is opposed to daidAos, Plat. Rep. 
VII 519 D, Legg. v1 757 A, &c. as the sound and solid to the light, empty, 
and unsubstantial. This familiar application of the word is recognized 
(as in the parallel case of émexys, Eth. N. v 14) by Aristotle, Categ. c. 8, 
10 5 7, oloy dwé ris dperns 6 omovdaios’ r@ yap dperjy exew orovdaios 
Adyeras, GAN’ ov srapwvipws aro ris dperis (i. e. the zotion is derived from 
dperyj, but not the word itself). Plat. dpa, p. 41§ D (ed. Tur. p. 888) — 
onovdaios 6 reAXéws ayabos. 

There is however one point of difference between émeiyjs and 
orovéaios, that owovdatos is extended to every kind of excellence, like 
dyaOos, whereas é¢meixns is confined to the expression of excellence in 
human character. Also omovdatos has another sense distinguishable 
from the preceding, as opposed to yeAdcios, the ‘serious’ to the ‘jocose’ 
or ‘ridiculous’. Xen. Cyrop. II 3. 1, rotavra xai yeAoia nai owovdaia 
€X€yero, and Symp. VIII 3, orovdaias dpves, ‘grave and serious’. owovdy 
and sadéia ‘jest’ and ‘earnest’, ‘ serious work’ and ‘play’ or ‘ sport’, are 
constantly brought into contrast by Plato. 

§ 9. onpetoy evepyerexns Sons] ‘a sign or mark’ (in the recipient of the 
honour) ‘ofa reputation for beneficence, of a capacity for or tendency (-exés) 
towards doing good’. All these ‘marks of honour’ here specified, being 
intended for the use of the pubic speaker, have themselves a public or 
national character. Eth. Nic. 1X 16, 1163 6 4, rijs yey ydp dperijs wal rijs 
evepyecias 4 Tin yepas...otr@ 8¢ eyew rodro Kai év rais wodtreias aiveras, 
ov yap ripGrat 6 pnd ayabdy rq now ropi{av' rd Kowov ydp Bi8ora Te Td 
Kotvoy evepyerourrs, Tins 3€ Kowor. 

ov ny adAa] ‘ not but that’, ‘though at the same time’, marks a qualifi- 
cation of, or exception to, too large and unlimited an assertion: ov pyy 
(GAws) adda (rode). ‘Those who have already done good are fairly and 
more than all others entitled to such signs of reputation—not however 
that this need be understood absolutely, so as to exclude the capacity or 
inclination to do good as a title to honour.’ 

 Ohos f évravda 4 word] ‘either entirely, absolutely, or at particular 
places or times’. 

moddoi yap a puxpa Soxodvra x.r..] Trifles acquire importance, and 
confer honour, on special occasions, under special circumstances of time 
and place. Thus what is in ordinary cases a very trifling and unimpor- 
tant action, as the gift of a cup of cold water, becomes under the circum- 








ED oc EG > e8 eee ee 


PIITOPIKHS A 5 § 0. 8s 


o ~ 
TOTOt Kal ot Katpot aition. pepn Se TYyms Ouciat, 
punpat év peTpos Kal avev METPWY, yepa, TEMEeNN, 
, , > 4 ’ ; ‘ 
mpoedpia, Tada, eikoves, Tpopai dnuooiat, Ta Bap- 


stances in which Sir Philip Sidney gave it at the battle of Zutphen a 
renowned act of self-denial and heroism. And under other and different 
circumstances the same cup of water may assume an importance which 
does not naturally belong to it. ‘For whosoever shall give you a cup of 
water to drink in my name, because ye belong to Christ, verily I say 
unto you, he shall not lose his reward.’ Mark ix. 41, Matth. x. 42. 

pépn rynjs] Some of these are enumerated in Homer, I]. M 310, 
VAauxe, rin 89 vai rerepyperba padiota edpy re xpéaci + de mAcios Sera- 
eoot dv Avxin; wavres 8¢, Oeous ws, elaopowor; Kal répevos vepoperOa pcya 
ZavOao wap’ 8x8as,—rardoy, puradsis cai apovpyns mupopopao; comp. Z 194, 
© 161, 

Ovaia] as those that were instituted by the Amphipolitans in honour 
of Brasidas, Eth. Nic. v 10, 1134 5 24, olov ro Ove Bpacidg, Thuc. Vv 11, 
cal rd Aosmev ol *ApguroNirat weptépEavres avrov rd pynpeiow Ws Hpwi Te 
évrépvovos xai ripas Sedadxaow ayavas kal érnoiovs bucias x.r.A. Victorius 
quotes from Plutarch, Vit. Flam. c. 16, p. 378 B, the honours paid by the 
Chalcidians to T. Quinctius Flamininus, ére 8€ nat nal’ ypas iepets yetpo- 
rovnros awedeixvuro Tirov, xal Oicavres atrg trav orovday yevoutvay Gdouct 
walava Wenoinpevoy. 

pyijpas dy pérpos nat dvev pérpwv] ‘Memorials in prose and verse’, pos- 
sibly epitaphs ; but rather, as these may be included in rdgoa:, to be under- 
stood (as Vict.) of poems and prose compositions i” memoriam, such as 
the English work that bears this title, poems in honour of the illustrious 
dead, and panegyrics in prose, like some of: Isocrates’ speeches and 
Xenophon’s Agesilaus. Philosephical dialogues too were sometimes 
inscribed to the memory of departed friends and named after them, as 
Aristotle’s Gryllus and Eudemus, and Theophrastus’ Callisthenes, &c. 
Introd. p. 53. 

yepa] gifts of honour; as piofol, ‘rewards of merit’, not money, for 
mere #s¢,; such as privileges conferred on princes and persons of dis- 
tinction émi pyrois yépacw marpixal Bacweia, Thuc. I 13; constantly in 
Homer, (pars praccipua, donum praccthuum, principi prae aliis datum, 
Damm, Lex. Homer.) as the prime of the spoils, the fairest of the captives, 
xoupny, iv dpa pot (Achilles) yépas é£edov ules "Axaroy, Il. I 56, the largest 
portion. of meat, or drink, at the banquet, Il. M 312 (quoted above). 
Eth. Nic. v. 10, 1134.4 8, puo@os apa ris dordos, rovro 8é Tipsy Kat yéepas. 
Fritzsche, ad h. 1, quotes Plato, Rep. VII. 516 C, repat cai eratvos xai yépa, 
and Legg. XI 922 A. 

rezévn| From réyyecy, something ‘cut off’? and appropriated, as a por- 
tion of land, to the special service of a God or hero; also to chieftains 
and kings during their lifetime for their own use, Frequent in- Homer, 
as IL M 313 (u.s.). Z 194, xal phy ol Auxtos répevos rayoy é£oxov dAdwy, 
Y¥ 184, 391. 

apoedpiat, rpopal Snudcia] The privilege of the ‘foremost or front 
seat’ at public spectacles, public assemblies, games, the theatre, &c, 
(Herod. I 54, 1X 73 &c.), and ‘maintenance at the public expense’; at 


86 PHTOPIKHE A 5 §9. 
Bapixa, olov wpooxuynces Kai éxoraces, Swpa Ta 


Athens in the Prytaneum or @oAos (Dem. de F. L. §§ 279, 361), cirnors é» 
IIpvraveiy, Arist. Ran. 764, Pac. 1084, Acharn. 125, Dem. u. s, and 
§§ 35, 259; both of these privileges were conferred in acknowledgment of 
meritorious public services, and are often named together, Arist. Equit. 
573, nal orparnyés oud Gy «is | rér xpd rov cirnow Fro’ épopevos Kyeaive- 
roy’ | vow 8 day pi) mpoedpiay dépwce xal ra cirta, | ov paxeiobal dacw. Ib. 
702, KAéwy drodG ce v} 1Hy mpoedpiay ry ex IvAov. "AA. l8ov mpoedpiar’ 
olor Syyopai ao” dyad | ex ris mpoedpias goyaroy Oewdpevov. 709, AX. drovuxed 
gov rdy Hpvraveigg ciria. 

ra BapBapixa, oloy rpooxuyycets] mpooxvynots, from w#pés, and xuvefy, ‘to 
kiss’, denotes the oriental and ‘ barbarous’ custom of saluting by ‘kissing 
the hand to’ another, in token of inferiority and subjection, and thence is 
applied to any act of servi/e obeisance or homage, or to worship and 
adoration in general: in the last or metaphorical sense it is found in 
most of the best Greek writers. This practice may very likely have been 
accompanied by the analogous one of prostration, as the two are often 
found associated together in one expression. It was distinctive of Or%- 
ental barbarism; and prevailed amongst the Medes, Herod. I 119, of 
Harpagus and Astyages, the Persians, Id. I 134, évrvyydvovres 3° dAy}- 
Lose ev rot d8oior, rH Be dy rts Biayvoin ek cpoiol elas of cvrrvyyxavorres. 
dyri ydp roi mpooayopevew dAAyAovs, Gideovert Trois orouact. fy be J ovrepos 
vmoveéorepos dAlyp ras mapeas Pircovras’ fy» Be sodA 7} ovrepos’ ayerve- 
arepos, spoonitvay mpockuréet Tay érepovy, and the Egyptians 11 80, avr) rod 
mpocayopevew GAAnAous év Trot doles mpooKuvéovar KaTLeYTES péxpt TOU you- 
varos Thy yeipa. Obeisance by prostration, the salém or kotoo, differs from 
this, though they probably were often used together. It is the latter that 
is referred to, as a barbarous practice and unworthy of a free Greek, by 
Aeschylus, Agam. 919 (Dind.), and Pers. 594, comp. 152. They appear 
to be confounded by Euripides, Orest. 1507, spooxu»e o°, dvaf, vopows 
BapBapuct spormrver. Plato distinguishes them, Legg. x 887 k, 
mpoxvrices Gua Kal mpocxuyycas. Stallb., in his note on this passage 
of Plato, cites, in illustration of the apooxvsncis, Lucian. Encom. De- 
mosth. § 85, nal rx xelpa' rp orduars mpoodyorras, ovdev GAN’ 4 wpooxuveiv 
vwéhafov, (Cf. Isocr. Paneg. § 151, (of BapBapor) éFeraLopevoe mpos av- 
ois Trois Baotdeions Kat mpoxadwwovpevor xal wavra rporoy puxpdy dpoveiy 
pederayvres, Ovnroy piv dvdpa rpogxuvoiyres xat- Sainova mpocayopevorres, 
K.mA. S.] 

éxoragis is the abstract conception of ‘getting out of the way’. This 
‘making way or room’ for the passage of a person of rank seems also to 
have been characteristic of Persian manners. Victorius quotes Plutarch, 
Artax. c. II, p. 1016 C, ématpopevos 8¢ (6 Kipos) ry vixy, xal peords dy 
cppijs Kal Opacous, diejravve Bows, ‘ éficracbe wenypoi™ (‘out of the way, 
beggars’,) rodro 3é Heporori rodAdais alr@ Bodvros, ol pey é€icrayro mpoc- 
xuvouvres, Herodotus, 11 80, says of the Egyptians, cupdépovra: 3¢ xal 
rode GAXo Alyimriot ‘EMAyver povvows Aaxedaipoviowes’ ol vedrepos avréwp 
Toict mpeoBurépocs cuvrvyxavorres eixovet ris cov Kal derparovras’ xat 
émiovoe €€ é3pns vwanoréara. So Simonides to Hiero (Xenoph. Hiero 
VII 2, comp. § 9), in enumerating his privileges as a tyrant, vramoravras 
& dro réy Oaxwy ode» re mapaxepeo:: and Aristotle of the respect due 


PHTOPIKH® A 5 §10, 87 


a 4 ‘ ~ 
wap’ éxacTos Tima. Kat yap TO Swpoy dort KTNUaATOS 
a 4 ~ ~ A 
Soats kal Tipys onuciov, Sto kal of pidoxypnuato: Kal 
e A tf ~ 
ot pirotipmor edievrat avtwv? dupotépois yap Exet P. 1361 5. 
¢t 4 4 8 ~ 4 e 
wy Séovra Kal yap KTnma éoriv, ov édievrat oi 
I 4 4 a ww tT e , 
Prroxpnuarot, Kat Tiny Exel, ov ot iroTipmoL. 
f 4 9 \ e¢« # Y A e ef > 
10 gwuatos Oe QPETN UYlEla, AUTH 5€ oUTWs WoTE ayd- 
> ~ 
Govs eivat xpwuevous Tois Twuaciw* oANOL yap 
e , e/ e 4 f aA 9 4 vv 
Uylaivovow womep ‘Hpodixos Aéyerat, ous ovdels av 
evdaruovioge THs Uyielas Sia TO mavTwy dréxerOat 


from youth to age, Eth. Nic. 1x 2, 1165 @ 28, xa) sayr) 3¢ rq mpeaBurépp 
Tysny thy xa yAtixiay, travacrdce: Kai xaraxXicet cal rois rotovrots. Cic. 
Cato Maior 18.63. On the deference paid to old age, enjoined dy Jaw at 
Athens, see Aesch. c. Tim. § 24. Xen. Symp. 31, vraviorayras 8€ por 87 
kal Baxev, xai oddéy éficrayra: of wAovaros* and de Rep. Lac. xv 6, of the 
customs at Sparta, nal d3pas 8¢ mavres Umraviorayra: Baciwei, mAQY ovK 
épopot «7X. Another illustration of éxcracrs is the custom, once gene- 
rally prevalent, of ‘giving the wall’ to a superior, as a mark of respect, 
céder le haut du pavé. (Dict. Acad. Fr.) (Ovid, Fasti, v 67, (senex) 
ef medius tuvenum, non tndignantibus tpsis, tbat, et interior, si comes 
unus erat and Horace, Sat. Il 5. 17, ‘comes exterior’. S.] 

mpooxuynoes, exoraces] The plural of adstrvact nouns denotes the 
various individual acts or moments or states included under the general 
conception. 

dépa ra rap’ éxdorots riusa | ‘ quae apud singulas gentes in pretio sunt’, 
Victorius: who illustrates by the olive crown as a prize in the Greek 
games, and quotes Horace, Ep. 11 2. 32, clarus ob id factum donts orna- 
tur honestis, of the prize of valour, bearing a special value in the Roman 
Military service, assigned to ‘ Lucullus’ soldier’, Of the words by them- 
selves this interpretation is perfectly fair and natural; but in connexion 
with what follows (as Aristotle seems to have intended, xal yap ro 
dapoy...) they may be understood somewhat differently, and the sap’ 
dxaoros referred to ‘the individuals of the two classes’ mentioned imme- 
diately after, the diAoypypyaros and gidroripor. 

§ 10. odparos 82 aper} vylea} Health, as a bodily excellence, neces- 
sarily implies vigour and the power of active exertion for the fulfilment of 
the duties of life, without these it is no dperq at all, and no subject of con- 
gratulation to the possessor. Health is said to be the dperqy of the body, 
in reference to the doctrine of the proper é@pyow of anything; see 
note on p. 40c. 2 §12. Life is the special function of the body (Eth. 
Nic. I 6), and health is life in its best form, as far as the body is con- 
cerned 

‘Hpodcxos] a famous physician, native of Selymbria, in Thrace on the 
Propontis ; to be distinguished from another less known physician, Gor- 
gias’ brother, of Leontini, Plat. Gorg. 448 B, 456 B. On Herodicus and 


88 PHTOPIKH® A 5 §11. 


~ i ~ ‘ \ ew 

11 Tov avOpwrivwy 1 Tw WAEioTwWY. KadAos OE ETEPOV 
€ , e@ s 9 , , A * ? 

kal’ éxacrny nAXtKiav €oTiv. veou ev ovy KadXos 

A A f , ov ~ 4 

TO 1pOs TOUS Tovous Xpnaowov Exe TA Twa TOUS 

‘ , \ ‘ ? eR ow a ‘ 

Te mpos Spomov Kai mpos Biav, yduy avta idEty mpos 

’ / A e , , 74 A 

amoXavotv, O10 of wevtabAot KadALoTOL, OTL mTpOS 


his medical practice, see Plat. Phaedr. 227 E, and Heindorf’s and Ast’s 
notes ; also Rep. III] 406 A seq., where an account of him and his system 
of self-tormenting is given. Protag. 316 E!. 

roy avOpwrivwv] See note on c. 1 § 7, di’ dAAas alrias avOpwmexas. 

§ 11. Personal beauty has no absolute standard or uniform expres- 
sion, manifesting itself in the same forms at all periods and under all 
circumstances. It is relative, not only to the three stages of human life, 
youth, prime (dxpy) and old age, but also to the habits and functions 
natural and appropriate to each of those stages; manly and athletic 
exercises, in the way of fraining, to youth; military service, the impera- 
tive duty of an. active and able-bodied citizen, to middle age; sedentary 
and intellectual. pursuits, to old age, yet so that strength and vigour 
remain adequate to the endurance of ordinary or ‘necessary’ labours— 
extraordinary exertions, as in athletic exercises and service in the field, 
being no longer required. The habit of body which is fitted to the 
exercise of these several functions at the corresponding period of life is 
a constituent element of its personal beauty. 

véov ev ovy KadAos «r.A.] When it is said that the beauty of a young 
man consists partly in the possession of a body in a serviceable state for 
undergoing the labours and pains incident to the race and feats of 
strength, the meaning seems to be that the robust habit of body and the 
muscular development required for the one, and the tzdications of activ- 
ity combined with strength, which affear in the outward form, necessary 
for the other, are pleasant to the eye, both in themselves and also as 
suggesting a fitness or adaptation or harmony of the exterior of the per- 
son with the habits and pursuits which are appropriate to youth. 

mpos amoAavawy] means no more than the mere enjoyment afforded by 
the sighz of personal beauty. Victorius, who suggests another interpre- 
tation, concludes finally in favour of this, 

olf mévrafAot xadX\toro] The combination of a natural aptitude or 


1 Macaulay, in his celebrated Essay on Bacon, Edin. Rev., July, 1837, selects 
these opinions of Plato, which he describes at length from the passage of the 
Republic, as to the value of Herodicus’ system of medical practice, as one of the 
illustrations of the contempt for all that is useful and practical which pervades 
the Platonic philosophy ; contrasting this, much to the disadvantage of the ancient 
philosopher, with the opposite spirit and tendency of the Baconian system, which 
aims, as he assumes, exclusively at practical and attainable good, and promotes 
the investigation of truth solely with a view to the substantial and solid benefit of 
the human race. Schrader cites Dial. de Orat. xx111 4 Me in corpore quidem 
valetudinem medici probant, quae animi anxicate contingat. Parum est uegrum 
non esse; fortem et lactum et alacrem volo. Prope abest ab infirmitale in qua sola 
santtas laudatur. 





odeamatih sien a 2 s 


PHTOPIKH® A 5 §11. 89 
Biav Kai mpos Taxos dua mepiKacw: dxpaCovTos 6é 


capacity (seduxact mpos) for strength and speed, vigour and activity, as 
evidenced by success in the varzous exercises of the mévraOdov, and the 
outward expression of these faculties in the configuration of the body, 
when accompanied with beauty in the shape, symmetry, and expression 
of the features, is the highest form of personal beauty in the young man. 
‘Die tbung im Pentathlon war wegen der verschiedenartigkeit der 
Sunf wettkampfe ganz vorsiglich das werk junger rustiger manner mit 
elastischem leibe. Die Pentathlen zetchneten sich daher durch gleichmas- 
sige starke der glicder, aliseitige gewandtheit und korperlich harmo- 
nische bildung vor allen tibrigen vortheilhaft aus, und werden daher 
vom Aristoteles als die schinsten Agonistex genannt? Krause, Gymn. 
u. Agon. der Griechen, Vol.1, p. 494, abschn. v1 § 31. The exercise of 
the wévrafXov is therefore mentioned in the passage before us as belong- 
ing solely to the period of youth’. 

The révrafioy consisted of five exercises as the name implies. These 
are enumerated in an epigram of Simonides, Anthol. 67 (73), Bergk, 
Fragm. Lyr. p. 791, 

“IoOuta xai Uvbot Atopay 6 Pitwvos évixa 
GApa, wodeaxeiny, Sicxov, dxovra, mdAny, 
and in an epigram of unknown authorship quoted by Eustath. ad II. ¥. 
p. 1320, Anthol. émcypdayara a8éorora CCCLIV, 
GApa wodev, dioxov re Body, xal dxovros ¢por, 
nal Spopos, de mady* pia Y érAero wact reXevrn. 

The same five are named in the Schol. on Pind. Isthm. 1 35, and in 
the Schol. on Plat. Erast. c. 4. 135 D, maAn, olyuvvos (i.e. dew), aApa, 
Sicxos, xa Sponos. On the wévrabdoy and its contents, see Krause, Of. 
cit. p. 476 seq. abschn. Vi § 29. 

Hvypzy, boxing, was therefore not included in the wévraOXov ; and we 
are driven to suppose that the concluding words of § 14, 6 8€ waot wévra- 
Odos, which certainly according to the ordinary laws of the interpretation 
of language ought to include it with the rest of the foregoing exercises, 
are one amongst many instances of Aristotle’s carelessness in expressing 
himself, and affirm something which he could not really have meant. 
gaot, if it can be said to have any meaning at all, must be understood 
simply to imply, that the mwéyraéAov combines in one the greatest number 
and variety of the single and separate exercises. Such is also the opinion 
of Krause, Of. cit. p. 258, n. 6. He observes that such a conclusion (as 
would naturally be drawn from the words of Arist.) is opposed to all the 


1 The wévraf\os however, though by the number and variety of his accom- 
plishments he is superior to all other athletes, yet in regard of certain special 
excellences, as compared for instance with the runner or wrestler, he is only 
second rate. Plat. Erast. 135. The philosopher in the popular sense,. Aristotle’s 
wewradevyzévos, the man of universal attainments, is compared to the all-accom- 
plished athlete, °Ap évvod oloy Aéyers rev giddcopoy dvdpa; Soxeis yap wor Aéyew 
olor dy rij aywrig eloty ol wévradha wpds rovs Spouéas 4 vous wadkaords. «al yap 
dxeivos rourwy pév Nelwovrai kard ra Tourwy dOXa Kal Sevrepol elot wpds rovrous, Tar 
88 dAAwy dOAnTGy woGro Kal rixdow avrovs. 


go PHTOPIKH® A 5 § 12. 


4 4 4 | 4 OU de - } ~ 
[POS MEV Tovous TOUS TOAEMLKOUS, NOUY CE ELvat OOKELV 
A A A a ‘4 4 
Mera poBeporntos: yepovros dé mpos fev Trovous TOUS 
9 4 e , 4 4 A A 4 a z 
avaykaious ixavov, @Xumov O€ dia TO pndey Exe wv 
A ~ ~ 8 , ~ 

12 TO ynpas AwBara. ioyus & éori pev Suvamus TOU 


notices which we find in the ancient writers. Avistofeles konnte hier in 
bekannien dingen die mehr worte bedirfende deutlichkeit einer gedrun- 
genen pracisen, und in gemessener gradation fortschrettender redewetse, 
welche thm ecigenthimlich ist, aufopfern, da ja doch jedem Hellenen die 
Stinf bestandtheile des Pentathlon bekannt waren. 

dxpadfovros 8€ x.r.A.| The simplest way of filling up the elliptical con- 
struction seems to be to supply xaAAos after dxpafovros, and yépovros in 
the next clause, and mweduxéva: from the tmmediately preceding nevmaciy 
after woAeptxovs in the former clause and Ixavoy in the latter. The re- 
quired sense may be equally well supplied by repeating (as Victorius) the 
first words of the sentence, dxyafovros 8¢ (xddAos) (76) srpos pew wrovous Tous 
woXepmsxovs (ypyotpov fyey ro copa) ; but the consideration of the imme- 
diate proximity of re@vxaow seems more in favour of the other. 

ixayoy] fit for, strong enough for, capable of. 

dAvroy] causing no pain, no painful impression or repulsion, in con- 
sequence of the absence of all the ordinary deformities or disfigurements 
incident to old age. 

dy té yipas AwBarat] i.e. éxeivww & rd yipas AwBara, This unusual and 
irregular form of attraction of the relative to the case of its antecedent, 
where, had the antecedent been expressed, the relative should have been 
the nominative to a succeeding verb, is exemplified by Matthiae, Gr. Gr. 
§ 473, obs. 1, from Herod. I 68, ovdev nw eiddres ray Hv.... Thuc, VII 67 
ad’ dy yuiv mapecnevacra. Add to these, Plat. Protag. 334 C éy rovross 
ols wéAXet GerGa, de Rep. V 465 D, evdatpovi{ovra: éxeivos dy rovrots Umap- 
xe. Dem. de Cor. p. 318, 19, § 277, ovd df’ a ouphdper rp wodes xphrac. 
And from Aristotle, this passage, and Rhet. 12, 11, é€ dy érvyer. In 
Dem. c. Steph. p, 1116, wept oy pi) xatyyopytat A¢yew, which has been 
cited as an instance, xarnyopnras is the irregular passive ‘has been ac- 
cused’, and therefore srepi dv need not be interpreted as wep) éxeivoy a; it 
is for wept éxeivov wept ov. Another doubtful example is Eur. Med. 262, 
roy Sovra 7 avrg bvyarép’, iy 1’ éyjparo, where Seidler retains this (the 
v. 1.), and regards #y» as a case of attraction for avrjy 7. An analogous 
case of this kind of attraction is Sophocles’ ofas y’ ¢yov, Trach. 443, for 
ota ¢ye els. 

§ 12. loyvs] bodily strength, is defined, in a very superficial and per- 
functory manner, with a special view to strength in personal encounter— 
as appears in the several forms it takes, though it is afterwards more 
definitely expressed in dyomorix apern—as the power of moving some 
one else (érepov may possibly be neuter, something else, anything whatso- 
ever), by pulling, or pushing, or lifting (possibly referring to the encounter 
of Herakles with Antaeus, who showed his great strength by ‘lifting’ 
him off the ground into the air; or, if érepov be neuter, by lifting any 
heavy weight), or squeezing, or crushing ; which seems to be intended for 





PHTOPIKHE A 5§§ 13,14. gr 


~ a € , > @ ,) a~° ef 
Kwvety ETepov ws BovArAETat, avayKkn S€ Kively ErEpov 
An ed aA 9 ~ v wv v A a\ 
n €Axovra 4 wOovvTa 4 aipovra 4 meéeCovTa H oUV- 
€ A A ~ \ a 
OvNiBovra, waTE 6 ioxUpOs H TacW | TOUTWY TICIV 
A 4 
13€oTw ioxupos. peyeOous dé dpeTn TO VrEpexe KaTa 
~ ‘ ? ‘ i ~ nw , 
panos kat BaOos xai mAaTOS TWY TWOAAWY TOTOUTW 
e , ~ 4 , A 
peiQou wore pn BpadvTepas moety Tas kwyoes da 
9 A 4 4 A | 
14 THY UmepBoAnv. aywuoriKyn 6€ TwWUaTOS dpETH oVy- 
A 4 4 
KeiTat €x peyéeOous Kai toxyvos Kai Taxous* Kal yap oO 
A a 4 4 ~ 
Taxus ioxupos éoTw* 6 yap Suvapevos Ta KEAN piety 


a complete analysis-of the different ways in which a person or thing can 
be ‘moved’ by another. 

§ 13. peifon] agrees with ri understood after dpery: the accusative 
peifova, with rir understood in rd Uvrepéxew, would be more usual. Two 
MsS read peifova. ‘Excellence in size’ implies superiority over the 
average (people in general), in length (height), depth (thickness), and 
breadth, but only (superior) to such an extent as not to impede the 
motions (of the body) by the excess (of size), lit. to one being only 
so much greater as not to make the body’s motions (slower than they 
otherwise would be, or than they ought to be, i.e.) foo slow. Mijxos, 
Baéos, and wAdrogs are the three dimensions of space; but it is not quite 
certain how they are applied here to the proportions of the human body ; 
paxos or Babos might possibly represent the abstract height. I have 
taken pijxos in this sense here because it is found in Homer to represent 
the ‘ stature’ of a man, and paxioros for ‘tallest’. Odys. X’. 309, Otus 
and Ephialtes, ovs 3) paxiorous OpéWe (ei8wpos dpovpa, and 312, Grap pyxos 
ye yevio Our dvvcopyuiot. v. 71, of the daughters of Pandareus, pixos & 
drop’ “Aprepis dyvy, and in Xenoph. de Rep. Lac. II 5, eis pijxos avéaverOa 
Td oopara, Mijxos therefore is the man’s height, wAdros the breadth of the 
body, measuring from right to left, and Bados the depth or thickness, 
measuring in the direction backwards and forwards. Baéos, though it can 
be applied to vertica/ measure, up and down, yet as in the ordinary lan- 
guage it represents only what is de/ow us, and not what is adove, could 
hardly be applied to the more than average stature of a éa// man. 

§ 14. éx peyéBous xal loyvos] for boxing and wrestling ; rdéxous, for the 
foot-race. 

Kal yap o raxus loyupés dorw] seems to be added as a mere passing 
observation, or note upon rdyous: and the ydp, which implies that this 
clause gives a reason for the preceding, must therefore be regarded as 
due to mere carelessness of writing, there being no logical connexion 
between the two sentences. (If there were any such connexion between 
the two, the meaning could only be, that the relation of strength and 
speed as genus and species, speed being only a variety of strength, is the 
reason for the introduction of rdyos into the list of agonistic virtues: the 
Jact being that this could only be a reason for omitting it.) 

pinrey tacere, purrewy tactare, of a repeated action. Hermann ad Aiac. 


92 PHTOPIKHS A 5§ 15. 


mws Kai Kwely Taxv Kal Troppw SpopKos, 6 dé OAI- 
Bev cat xaréxew madaotixos, 6 6€ Waa TH TANT 
MUKTIKOS, 6 © auporepois ToUTOLs TayKpaTiagTiKos, 
15.6 de mact wevTabAos. evynpia 8 éari Boadutis yn- 
pws per’ dAvrias: ovTE yap El TaXU ynpacKEl, EvYN- P- 19. 


235, Trach. 776. See also Lobeck, Aj. 239, p. 177%. This distinction, 
which has been doubted by some scholars, is now I believe generally 
accepted. At all events it applies very well here, where the simple notion 
of flinging or hurling, once for all, from you, as a stone, would be quite 
inappropriate to the motion of the legs intended to be described. purreiy 
ra oxéAn is to ‘toss about’ or ‘swing the legs’, backwards and forwards, 
again and again. 

nuveiy woppw| ‘to take long strides’. 

doa ri wAryy] in boxing, to push or thrust away from you by the 
blow, so as aliguem de statu detcere ; as when you knock a man down. 

augorépots rovras} These two last, boxing and wrestling ; not running. 
Supply therefore, in explanation of dudorépots, OAiBeew Kat xaréxyewv, cal 
doa rij tAnyy Svvyduevos. Victorius (and also Krause, u. s., p. 534, n. 1) 
quotes Plut. Symp. 4, ore yap pépaxra: ro mayxpartoy x re wvypys Kat maAns, 
djAov, and Quint. Inst. Orat. 11 8, 13, as confirming Aristotle's statement. 
Other ancient authorities are given in Krause’s notes. 

On the pancratium, and the size, strength, and skill required by those 
who engaged in it, see Krause, u.s. p. 534—538, adschn. VI § 41. 

Compare with the four preceding sections the following passage of 
Plato on the use of athletic exercises. Legg. VIII 832 E seq. €or: yotr mav- 
Toy moAeuiKeararoy » gaparos ofurns Tavrws,  pey awd Trav moder, Wy oe 
cal ard Tov yeipor’ duyeiy pév cai Aciy 7 tev wodav, 4 8é €v rais cup- 
wroxais (the wayxparcoy, and especially wrestling) payy xai cvoracrs loxvos 
xal popns Seopévn. 

§ 15. evynpia] supr. § 4, ‘fortunate old age, good fortune or happiness 
in old age’. 

Bpadurys] ‘ tardiness’, i.e. slow approach or progress. 

evynpws| occurs under the form edynpos in Hippocrates, and Ar. Hist. 
Anim, IX 12, 3. 


1 Lobeck in his elaborate dissertation on the question seems to leave the 
matter in doubt; and no doubt, from the uncertainty of the Mss readings, the 
distinction of the two forms of the verb being shewn in most cases merely by the 
difference of accent, it is difficult to decide in any particular case which of the two 
forms is to be preferred: and Lobeck shews by examples that (so far as the reading 
is to be depended on) the same notion of the verb is expressed indifferently by 
either form. At the same time inthe somewhat obscure summing up at the 
conclusion of his note, he seems (as I understand him) to be in favour, as a 
general principle, of the hypothesis, that a difference of form in the termination of 
a verb radically the same (he cites {AAw or efAAw and its numerous varieties as a 
remarkable instance) does express a corresponding variety in the signification ; as 
in the instance given, the various terminations correspond to different varieties of 
the general notion of ‘rolling’. 


emai ¥ 





PHTOPIKHS A 5 § 16. 93 


MW» , td A ~ ° # a 4 9 
pws, ovr’ et yuoyis pev Avanpws Oe. EaTe O€ Kal éK 
~ ~ t 4 ~ wv a | 
TWVY TOU DWMATOS apETwWY Kal TUXNS* pn avomwos yap 
vn 1 9? 4 9 wx 9 s PANY) wv 4 
wy nde taoxupos OUK EoTat amaOns, ovd aAuToS Kal 

4 of wz , wv w 
mwodvxpomos [ovr'] avev Tuyns Siapeiverey av. Eat 
OE q q 3 a Ve f av Sy 

€ TIS Kai YwpIs tOYVOS Kal Vytetas aNAN OUVvapis 

wg 4 a ~ ~ 4 
paxpoBiotnTos* moAAOL yap avev TwY TOU TwpEaTos 
9 ~ ? ] 9 9 9 AN e 9 td 
apetwv paxpoGioi etows aA ovdey 7 dxptBororyia 

4 € 4 4 s A ~ 4 A 
16 Xpyowwos if TEept TovTwWY Eis Ta VUY. ToAvdiAla O€ 
4 , 9 wv ~ , e , ef 
KaL Xencropirta OUK adnAa@ Tov PiXdou W Plo MEVOU, OTL 
a” € ~ a ed eA ww ? A > 
ExT 6 To.wvTos Hidros Os Tis, a oleTat ayaa eivat 


dyev rvyns] in Muretus’ excellent emendation of v. 1. ay evruyns. 

fore 8€ rts x.r..] The causes of length and shortness of life in plants 
and animals are further investigated in the little treatise wep) paxpo- 
Biornros xat BpaxvBiornros, in the collection of tracts called the Parva 
Naturalia, appended to the work wept Wuyijs. They all belong to the 
‘ Physical’ department of philosophy. 1. p. xal Bp. 1 § 4. 

_ GAN ovdév 9 axpsBodoyia x.r.A.] Nice, exact, or scientific analysis and 
the treatment of a subject in minute detail, are out of place in a rhetorical 
treatise. Any further details on the subject of longevity would be useless 
to the rhetorician. On the various senses of axpifea, see Grant on Eth. 
Nic. 1 7, 18: and on the mode of handling a subject appropriate to Rhe- 
toric, Introd. on the ‘ materials of Rhetoric’, p. 11—14. 

§ 16. uri 6 rowovros Pidos x.t.A.] ‘all such are friends, as, when they 
think anything good for some particular person’ (éxeivp, some one in par- 
ticular, ‘kat particular person, whoever it may be) ‘are inclined to do it for 
his sake’. In this definition, friendship or love is described as a state of 
mind, a moral habit or disposition, not as a natural affection. The desire 
of doing our friend good for his own sake is a necessary accompaniment 
and consequence of the feeling or affection, but not identical with it. The 
definition is ‘rhetorical’, and does not give the ‘essence’ of the thing, as 
a scientific definition would. The definition of ¢iAia as a waGos, II 4, 2, is 
in exact conformity with this, and equally deficient. In the Ethics, vii! 
2, after quoting some of the ordinary current notions of love to be found 
in the preceding poets and philosophers, he proceeds to the establishment 
of his own. And here again the same conception of it reappears in the 
words rq d€ hii acl deiv BovrAecOas rdyaba éexeivou évexa. Accordingly 
diria is etvoa dy avrimerovOcat, reciprocal goodwill or affection ; the reci- 
procity being essential to true q¢:Aia or affection of two human beings 
to one another. For though we may be ‘fond’ of wine, @iAowwos, or ‘fond’ 
of animals, there is in these cases no true reciprocity of affection. Fur- 
ther, since ‘fondness’ is applicable to three classes of objects, the good, 
the pleasant, and the useful, three classes of corresponding ‘friendships’ 
or ‘fondnesses’ are hereby determined ; but only the first of them, the 
love of the good, is the basis of true and perfect love ; and consequently 


94 PHTOPIKHS A 5 § 17. 





éxeivw, mpaxtixos éoTw avtov ot éxeivov. w dy TrodA- 5 
Aoi TowwvToL, ToAUdiAOs, @ SE Kal émtexeis avdpes, 

17 Xpnorodivos. evtuxyia 8 éotiv, wv 4 TUXN ayabwy P. 1362. 
aitia, Tavra yiyverOa Kal Urapxew 4 TavTa h Ta | 
wrcioTa | TA peyioTa. aitia 8 éoriv 4 TUXN eviwy 





the highest and perfect form of ‘love’ can only exist between the good, 
rereia 8 éoriv | rav dyabdr dirdia xal car’ dperiy Gpoiwr’ odros yap rdyal, 
Gpolws BovAovras dAArAos, ¥ dyaboi dyabol 8 eloi caf avrovs, C. 4, init. 
In the concluding definition of c. 2, the ,ee/ing or loving désfosttion is 
introduced in the word evvyocivy. Sef dpa evvociy dAAnAos cat BovAeoGat 
rayaGa yp?) AavOdvovras & & ti trav elpnudvwy. These rd eipnpeva are 
the three objects of affection, This is therefore the general conception of 
love according to Aristotle. The highest form of Auman love or friend- 
ship would be evvoeiy...d:a ro adyabov. 

émuxeis] Note on c. 2 § 4, p. 30. 

§ 17. evrvyia] ‘good fortune or luck’, accidental, transitory, frag- : 
mentary, is opposed to ev8apovia, complete, permanent, substantial hap- 
piness, the essence of which resides in its avrdpxea or independence of all 
accidental and external conditions. Eth. Nic. 11 5 (Bekk.), 1097 4 6 seq. 
X 7, 1176 a2 27 (on Oewpnrucy as the highest happiness). Polit. rv (v11), 1, 
1323 3 23, paprups rp ep xpwpévots, ds eVdalipov pév dors Kal paxdpios, ¢ 
ouber 8¢ ray eLwrepixay ayabdy adAd 8’ avroy avros xal r@ mows Tes elvas 
riy puow, ere xal thy evruxiay ris evdapovias 8a rair’ dvayxaiov érépay 
elva’ rav péy yap éxros dyabay alrioy ravroparoy xal 4 Tvyn, dixaos 3 
ovdels ovdé cadpwy aro rixns ode Oia thy rdxny dori. Eur. Med. 1229, 
dABou & émippvévros evruxyéarepos GAXov yévorr’ ay dAXos, evdaipov 8 dy 
ov, where Paley quotes, Troad. 509, ra» 8 evdaiudveov pnddva vousler ebru- 
xeiv mply dy Oavy, explaining the distinction ; and Androm. 420, jogoy pep 
adyet Svoruxay 8 evdatpovet. 

4 Tuxn alria} On Aristotle’s conception of réyn as ‘a cause’, with fur- 
ther details, see Introd. Appendix c to Bk. I c. 10, p. 218—224. On this 
passage, p. 223. 

yiyver Oat xai vmapyew)} ‘acquisition or possession’. «af in this and 
similar cases is properly rendered by ‘or’. Aristotle frequently expresses 
as a combination two things which are not actually, but only hypo- 
thetically, combined in the conception, which we therefore more correctly 
represent as an alternative. 

airia 9 rvxn éviov dy nai al réxvac] ‘Simplicius, ad Phys. 11 p. 73, 6, inter 
alia haec habet: xal rév moter 8¢ S01 wavra oxeddy els Thy Texny Eyov- 
aw, Gore xal ris réxyns olxeiay avriy roteiy, Neyorres, Téxvn TUynV éorepte 
kal ruxn réxvnv (Agathon ap. Ar. Eth. Nic. vi 41). rév evruxovvra 8¢ xal 
povety Gao (Eur. Fragm. Inc. 204). mpés 8€ rovros cpayev tna ray 
dio réxyns ywvopevev xal dd ruxns yiwopeva’ Kai yap vylea eal dd réyns Soxei 
yiverOar domep dro réxyns’ Biijoas yap Kai may ris Yruxpov B8op yeyover 





1 xal rpdwov red wept ra abrd dorw i rixn Kal} réxvn, xabdwep wat "Aydbuy 
dyol, réxvy tiny, K.T.r. 





PHTOPIKHS A5$§17. 95 


b) vt : \ e@ 4 ~ A 4 » # = 
Mey wy Kal at Téxvat, TWoANwY O€ Kal aTEXVWY, OLOV 
e/ e 4 9 , 4 4 A 4 - 
dowy 7 uot évoexera d€ Kal mapa vow eivat 
e , A 4 LA | a 4 , A A , 
Uyleias eV yap TEXYN aiTia, KadXous OE Kai pEeyeOous 
guois. ddrAws b€ Ta ToLav’Ta Tw ayabwv éeoriv dro 

4 923 9 4 e s af 4 ~ A 
Tuxns, Ep ois extiv 6 POovos. éart de kal TwWY Tapa 
Aovyov ayabuy airia TUyn, olov Ei of AAO aia ypol 
added oi, 6 de kaos, 7 ot ZAAOL pn Eldov Tov Oncav- 

td A 9 € A 9 ~ 4 4 b) 4 
pov, o 8 evpev, 4 €t TOU mANaIov ETvXE TO BeOS, 

v4 A 4 \ 9 \ P 4 s \ ~ A A 
Tovrou 6€ un, 1 et un nAOe povos det horTwy, ot dé 
vyijs. These are illustrated in the text by two examples ; health, which 
may be due to chance as well as art ; and beauty and strength, to chance 
as well as nature. 

dréxvwy]| ‘independent of art’. 

oloy Sowy 5 Gvois] The contradiction between this and the statements 
in the scientific Physics is pointed out in the Introd., u.s., p. 223. 

évBexeras 8¢ xai mapa Gvow elvac] Most probably a mere occasional and 
parenthetical note, according to the usual practice of this author (comp. 
§ 14), ‘chance may give rise not only to things natural and independent 
of nature, but also to things unnatural, monstrous, or abnormal’, ra apa 
vow répara: on which see the reff. in Introd. p. 225. Compare the def. 
of dvars in I 10, 13, 8dfere 8 ay xad } rvy7 airia elvas rev roovrey, i.e. roy 
sapa gvow. In this case the colon should be retained after eZva:, the 
connexion being carried on from oloy dca n ducts to vyceias dy «.7.X. aS 
examples, dy ai réyvas, xal 9 vows airia, and the #o/e parenthetical. 

Bonitz, however, Arisfotel. Stud. 1 87, would alter the punctuation, 
placing a comma at elya, and connecting this clause closely with the pre- 
ceding, in the sense, ‘of which the cause is nature, but (which) may be 
also. contrary to nature’: regarding this as an instance of the Aristotelian 
custom of ‘not repeating the relative in the second of two co-ordinated 
members’, illustrated by Waitz, Organ. 25 4 35, and certainly common 
enough in our author. This is further supported by Muretus, who 
translates, ‘quae natura efficiuntur, ita tamen ut etiam praeter naturam 
evenire possint.’ 

The words quoted above from I 10, 3, seem to me to be in favour of 
the former interpretation : and the practice of introducing ‘notes’ of this 
kind is at least as common with Aristotle as that which is noticed by 
Bonitz. 

gore 8¢ xal réy rapa Acyor dyabay alria réxn] Phys. 197 @ 18, xal ro davas 
eival rt mapdAoyoy THy TUXNY Opbads’ o yap Adyos f ray dei dvrwy ff Tay as dm 
TO WOAL, Ff O€ TUXN ev TOS yeyvonevors Tapa Ta’ra’ dor’ éred) ddpiora Ta Tos- 
atta, xa 5 TUxn doptoros. See further in Introd. p. 221. 

tov nmAncioy] (évros, lorapévov), ‘one’s next neighbour’, as 6 wéAas. In 
Plat. Theaet. 174 C, it is distinguished from yeirev, o rAjotoy nal 6 yelray, 
having a more extended and general sense, ‘a fellow-creature’. 

f ef pn WAGe povos dei horray x.r.A.] ‘Or if one who was in the constant 


96 PHTOPIKHS A 6 §§ 1, 2. 


ef , , , v A ~ 
anak éNOovtes StePOapnoav' wavTa yap Ta ToLavTa | 
4 a 
evTUYNnMaTa OoKel Elva. | 
\ A ~ , y 4 
18 qept d€ adpetns éreimEep oikELOTaTOS GO TEL TOUS | 
4 al , A 4 
émaivous Toros, OTav TeEpi éraivay Trowpeba Tov o- | 
4 V4 
yov, TOTE Stopia-TEov. 
v A T ~ 4 4 e 9 | 
I wy pev ouv bet oroxatec Oat mpoTpEeTOYTa ws Eao- cHaP. vt 
, = ® , f | 
Mévwv f UTapYoYTwV, Kal wy aToTpETOVTA, Pavepov" 
.' | Q , ~ 
Ta yap évavTia ToUTwy é€oriv. émet O€ TpoKErTat TH 
, 8 A , , A 
aoupBovAEvoyTt akoros TO cuudepov, BovAevovTac dé 
. 4 ~ c 9 A 4 ~ A Y 4 
Ov wept Tov TeAOvs aAAa@ TEPL TwWY TpOS TO TENOS, 
~ , s A ‘4 a 
tauta 8 éoti Ta ouupepovTa kata Tas mpakes, TO 
A td > ao a xv # am 4 
d€ cuudepov ayabov, AnwTéov av ein oToOLXELAa TEpt 
r) “~ \ s e ~ ww \ 9 a 
2dya0ov kai ouudpepovTos amAws. Eotw on dyabor p. 20. 


habit of visiting a certain place’ (@oray, to go backwards and forwards, 
ever and anon, repeatedly, to frequent, haunt) ‘was the only one that failed 
to go (on some particular occasion), whilst those that went only once 
(drra€, once for all) all perished’. It is possible that this sense of repe- 
tition in the verbal termination gy may,be the origin of the other signi- 
fication of ‘disease’ illustrated on the word mvevoriav, c. 2 § 18 p. 45. 
A too-frequently repeated action might very well be interpreted as a 
diseased habit. 

§ 18. oray wep) éraivov x.r-X.] i. e. in c. 9 of this book, the chapter on the 
topics of encomium and censure, proper to the encomiastic or epideictic 
branch of Rhetoric. 


CuHap. VI. 


On the purport of this chapter, its principal divisions, and connexion 
with the general plan of the work, see Introd. p. 177. 

§ 1.  Urapyorvrevy] On this addition over and above the theory, see 
note on c. 3 § 4; and Introd. p. 120. 

Bovdevorrat 8é...rav mpos ro réXos}] Eth. Nic. If 5, 1112 5 12, BovAev- 
opeba 8¢ ov wept ray Tehav GAG wepl ray mpds Ta TéAn. (This is because 
the means are within our own power to attain, the ends are not. BovAevo- 
peOa 8€ rept ray ed’ yiv wpaxrav, 1112 @ 31, doa yiverat 8 rudv...xepr 
rourwoy BovAevopueda, Ib. line 12, and this is afterwards repeated.) Ovre yap 
larpos BovAeverat ci vyutoes, ore pyrwop el meioet, oUTE srodtTiKds el evvopiay 
mowoe, ovdé THY AotTay ovdeis wept TOU TéAOUS’ GAA O€pevoe TeAos TL, WAS 
xa) &a tivov fora cxoroict, x.r.A. Ib. 634, ovx ay ov etn BovAeuroy ro 
TéXos, GANG Ta Mpos Ta TEAN. 

arotxeia] i.€. rémous, the ‘Elements’, the primary topics of the subject 
‘good’. See Introd. p. 127, 8. 

drAas] See note on p. 30, c. 2 § 4. The sense in which dads is here 
intended is evidently that of good in general, as a general or abstract 


PHTOPIKH® A 6§2.. 97 
a OA 9 Ye ~ ed > e , \ tT ef wv 
O @V QUTO EauUTOU EVEKa 7 alpeTOV, Kat Ov EveKa AAAO 


conception, opposed to caf éxacroy special and particular goods. Schra- 
der’s rendering extra comparationem, if it means, as it seems to do, 
‘absolute good’, ‘ good in itself’, opposed to ‘relative’ or ‘human good’— 
that which cannot be compared with, i.e. has no relation to, any other 
kind of good, but exists in itself independently—is certainly wrong. 
‘Absolute good’ can have no place in a rhetorical system or in the prac- 
tice of the rhetorician; such a definition would be in direct violation of 
the principle so often laid down by Aristotle, that the rhetorical method 
must be in conformity with the materials of the art, of a popular and 
practical character, adapted to the understanding of an unlearned and 
unscientific audience. This is especially the case with definitions. See 
Introd. p. 12, 13. The general notion of good is first considered in 
§§ 1—3, and then this is applied and illustrated in particulars in the 
remainder of the chapter. 

§ 2. gore dy ayaoy x.r-r.] The ‘popular’ character of these defini- 
tions is marked by the introductory éere, ‘let it be taken for.granted’; no 
demonstration is required, any current notion of good will serve our 
purpose. The same phraseology occurs again in a similar case, c. 7 § 2, 
gore dn umépexoy x.r-A.: C..5 § 3, and ro § 3. 

First, ‘Good is anything that is in itself and for ‘its own sake 
desirable (an object of choice), and that for whose sake we choose some- 
thing else (which is the ulterior end of our preference for anything) ; and 
that which is the universal aim, either of everything or’.(as a qualification to 
exclude inanimate things) ‘everything that has sensation or reason, or 
(would be their aim) if they were to acguire the reasoning faculty” (sup- 
posing they have it not yet, as infants and beasts). Comp. c. 7 § 21, 
0 AaBovra ra wpaypara (anything) dpdvnow rar av exaorov!. 

The first of these two definitions, which represents Good.as desirable 
in and for itself, and as ‘haf to obtain which we choose something else, is 
in fact identical with the second which describes it as the ultimate end 
or aim of all action and desire, only differing from it interms. Every 
thing that we choose or desire, and every act that we perform, is as the 
means to one universal end, the Good. This view of the nature of Good 
is laid down and illustrated in the first chapter of the Nic. Eth. saca 
réxvn xai waca pébodos, cpoiws 8¢ apagis re «ul mpoaipecis, dyabov rivds 
épierOa: Boxes’ 8:5 nares arepyvavro (it is a current, popular, definition of) 
rayaboy, ov navr’ épierar—el 84 ri rédus dors roy mpaxréy 6 8: avrod Bov- 
AopeOa, rddAa 8€ 8a rovro (the means to the universal end) xa) js) wdvra 
82’ érepov alpovpebu, (there is something, i.e. Good, which we desire only 
for itself,)...87X0» os Tour’ Gy ein rdyady kal rd Gpiorov, and so on. Comp. 
c. §. Similatly at the commencement of the Politics, we find that this is 
the end of states-as well as individuals, because rov eivas doxovvros dyabod 


1 Schrader quotes'Cic. de Fin. 1 11, son est igttur voluplas bonum. Hoc ne 
statuam quidem dicturam pater atebat, si logui possd. v.14, Carum diam rerum 
guas terra gigul educatio quacdam ct perfectio et—ut ipsae vites, si logui possent, ita 
s¢ tractandas tuendasque esse faterentur. Add Aesch. Agam, 37, ofxos 3’ avrds ed 
GOcyyhy \dBo cagdorar’ dy Adfaer, Eur. Iph. Taur. 51. 

AR. I. 7 





98 PHTOPIKHS A 6§ 2. 


aipovpeOa, kai ov éierat qavra 4 wavra Ta aicOn- 
ow éyovra H vouv, fH et AaBor voy Kal doa 6 vous 
av éxaotw amodoin, Kai daa 6 wept ExaaTov vous 
drodidwaw éxacTw, TOUTO éoTW éxaoTw ayabov, Kai 


xépw mdvta mparrovot wavtés. Comp. III 12, init. Metaph. B 2, 996 @ 
23—26, A 3, 983 @ 31, To ov Evexa Kal rdyabov. 

The same view of the nature of Good is to be found equally in Plato, 
from whom Aristotle may have derived it. See, for instance, Phileb. 53 E, 
seq. particularly 54 C, where good is proved to be the ov évexa, or univer- 
salend. Sympos. 205 A, where happiness, which consists in the posses- 
sion of good, is similarly represented. Gorg. 499 E, réAos eva: aracdy 
ray mpatewy ro dyabov, Kal éxeivou Evexey Seiv wavra rdAAa mparrecOat, ddd’ 
ovx éxewo ray dAAwy. Euthyd. c. 8, 278 E, seq. 

xa) dca 6 vous x.r.A.] ‘ And all that reason in general, or universal reason, 
would assign to each of us, and all that the individual reason assigns to 
each of us, “hat is good to every human being’. That is, all that this 
supreme or universal reason or the particular reason of each individual, 
would assign as suitable to each; the former what is good for all alike, the 
latter what is good for each particular individual; since these sometimes 
differ: or, as Schrader interprets it, the universal reason that dictates 
general principles or rules of action, as contrasted with 6 vovs 6 mep) 
éxuctov, mens quae de singularibus decernit, which decides in special and 
individual cases. The reason as an agent is here opposed to mere 
nature, or to a blind natural impulse; the choice of good is a reasonable 
choice, good is what reason universal or individual would necessarily 
choose. (vous stands here in a genxeraé sense for the special faculty or part 
of it d@povnacs’, the practical reason, the calculating discursive and moral 
part of the intellect, which directs us in our choice between good and 
evil. In Eth. Nic. VI, vots in its proper sense, the intuitive and specu- 
lative reason, is distinguished from the 8cayoca or discursive intellect, and 
its special virtue dpoynots or practical wisdom). 

‘Or that, by the presence of which anything (not only man in soul and 
body, but also things inanimate) is put in a healthy or proper condition 
(is made what it ought to be, what is best for it to be) and made self- 
sufficing (independent of all external conditions), and self-sufficiency or 
independence in general’. On avrdpxea see note on § 3 of Chapter V, 
Pp. 74, aurdpxeia (ws. It is thus briefly defined Pol. Iv (vIq) 5, init. ro 
gavra vnapxew cat SetcOar un Oevos. 

‘Or any thing that is productive or preservative of (tends to produce or 
preserve) things of that sort, or that which is attended by such, or things 
that have a tendency to prevent and destroy the opposites of these’. 
These forms of good belong to a lower order, subordinate to ra xa@’ avra 
ayaa, as means to the end. Eth. Nic. 1 4, 1096 3 10, AéyerOar 3€é nal? ey 
eidos ra xa’ atrd Simxdpeva nai dyanapeva, ra 8¢ rromrixa tourev % puAak- 
rixa Tes 7 TOY évavrioy KwAuTéad 81a Tavita AéyerOat Kai Tpdroy GAXov. 


1 This is actually substituted for »ofs in the corresponding passages c. 7 § 21. 


PHTOPIKHS A 6§ 3. 99 


Ms , Ru 4 A ) 4 ff .) 8 
ov mapovTos ev OlaKelTat Kal avTapKws Exel, Kai TO 
w \) A A \ A ~ a 
@uTapKes, Kal TO TroINTIKOY 7 CuAaKTIKOY TwY TOLOU- 
| ? ~ ‘ ~ A 
TWY, Kat w axoAovlel Ta ToLlav’TAa, Kal Ta KwAUTIKA 
TwV évavTiwv kat Ta POaptixa. axodoubet dé Sdiyws: 
A Nw A of ° ~ oN U \ 
1 yap aya n voTepov, oiov Tw pev pavOave TO éTi- 
~ A / ‘ e/ 
otracba torepov, Tw Se vyiaivey to Cv apa. Kat 
‘ A ~ ‘' A ‘ 
TA TOMNTUKA THLXAS, TA MEV WS TO Uytaive Uyteias, 


§ 3. adxorovbet 8¢ &tixas] ‘the term aélending upon admits of two dif- 
ferent senses, either simultaneous (attendance, accompaniment) or sub- 
sequent (consequence), as knowledge attends on learning subsequently, 
but life on health simultaneously!’. dxoAovOeiv and éreoGas are both used 
in logic to denote not merely something that follows, a ‘consequence’ in 
the ordinary acceptation of the words, but also an invariable or necessary 
attendant or concomitant in five different senses: (1) a preceding con- 
comitant, or antecedent, Top. F 2, 117 @ 11, xal ydp mporepoy xal Sorepoy 
érerat, as learning is always preceded by ignorance; Categ. c. 12, mpo- 
Tepov €repov érépou Aeyeras Terpaxes...devrepoy 8 To p71) dvriotpéedoy xara TH 
rov elva: dxoAovOnow, olov ro évy ray 8v0 mpdrepoy’ Svoiv yey yap dvrwy dxo- 
Rovbel evOds rd by elvat, x.r.d. (2) a Simultaneous concomitant, dpa: as 
health and life, Rhet. 1 6,3; 7, 5. (3) a sudseguent concomitant, or ‘con- 
sequent’, vorepov, as learning is followed by knowledge, Rhet. ll. cc. 
(4) 8uvdper, a virtual concomitant, dy implication, as sacrilege necessarily 
implies, includes fofentially or virtually the notion of theft or fraud, by 
the rule omne maius continet in se minus; and (5) reciprocal contra- 
dictories regarded as consequents, Top. B 8, 113 4 25, 9 xara ryy avripacw 
axoXovOnats, OF dvrixatyyopoupévws, Where two terms or propositions are 
‘convertible’, dyriorpéper: such are 6 avOpwmros (poy, and ro py (@ov ovk 
GvOpemos : To 7) HOU ov KaAoy, and ro caddy ov. It seems from this as if the 
primary sense of dxoAov@eiy were to attend or wait upon, and that that of 
‘following’ is a special and secondary signification under the general 
Notion of accompaniment. Hence adxdAovdos becomes Pedissequus, a 
constant attendant, footman, or ‘follower’. The ‘simultaneous’ kind of 
accompaniment appears also in this word sometimes even in the ordinary 
language, as when Plato writes, Menex. 249 D, dxoAovOee per’ €ynov, Lach. 
187 D, pera row marpos dxoAovdey: and similarly Demosthenes and the 
Orators ; and Xenophon joins it with ov» Diog. Laert. vil § 125, ras & 
dperas Aéyovow dyraxodovOeiv dAAWAats, Kal roy play €xovra macas fxev, of 
the Stoics. Plutarch, de Repugn. Stoic. c. 27, p. 1045 E, attributes the 
same doctrine in the same words to Chrysippus. 

Kai Td mowmrixa tpixyés] This triple division of productive causes or 
conditions is thus explained by Majoragius. ‘ Ponit tres species rerum 
conficientium quae ita distingui possunt. Quae conficiunt, aut sunt a 


1 So Quintilian, Inst. Orat. v 10. 75. Sad haec consequentia dico, dxodov0a ; 
est enim consequens sapientiae bonitas: sila sequentia, waperbpeva, quae postea 
Sacla sunt aut futura...hoc temporis, tllud naturae. 


7—2 


100 PHTOPIKHS A 6§§4, 5. 


vTa dé ws orTia Uyteias, Ta SE Ws TO yuuvaCer Oat, STE 
40s é€mi TO TOAV Tol Uyleav. TouTwy Sé KElmevwr 
> @ a a ~ > ~ 9 A J 4 
avaykn tas Te Anes tTwv ayabwv ayabas eivat Kai 
Tas TWY Kakwv amoBoAas: adxoXovbei yap TH MEV TO 
pn exe TO Kaxov dua, Ta Sé TO Exev TO ayabov 
5 UaTEepov. Kai 4 avr’ éAaTtTovos ayaou peiCovos An- 
us kal avti petCovos Kaxov éXaTTOVOS’ w Yap VTEP- P. 1362, 
natura, h. e. intrinsecus, aut extrinsecus adhibentur. A natura sunt, ut 
temperies humorum, et bona corporis constitutio, conficiens est bonae 
valetudinis. Quae extrinsecus adhibentur aut sunt tanquam instrumenta, 
aut sunt actiones ; instrumenta, ut cibaria:...actiones, ut exercitatio cor- 
poris, et deambulatio, quae frequenter bonam valetudinem efficit.’ This 
account, though correct in the main, requires a little further explanation 
and modification. The ground of the distinction of the first of the three 
classes, of which the illustration is ro vycaivery, the healthy state of body, 
active, actual health, as produced by uvyceia, health in itself, we learn from : 
two passages of the Nic. Eth. First, VI 13, 1144 @ 4, €mecra xa) rowovor per 
(avra ai dperal) ovy cs larpix vylevay, GAN’ os nvyiea, otras 9 codia evdat- 
poviay’ pépos yap ovea Tijs GAns dperis r@ ExeoGas worei nal rp évepyetv evdai- 
pova. Here vyieaa itself represents the formal cause of health, which is in- 
ternal and essential (ysépoe, €yerGaz), and developes, quickens, and stimulates 
the bodily functions into healthy activity, gives health an active reality 
(évepyet), and is therefore contrasted with the efficient, and external cause, 
the physician, who, as the Paraphrast on the parallel passage, X 4, says, 
ourrnpet cal duddrret, cai Ores mapapeivy (nret. The second passage, X 4, 
1174 6 25, is again an illustration : ov row avroy 8€ rowoy 7 re dor) redet0t 
cal tro alo @nrov re xal 4 atcOnots, owovdaia dvra, Sorep ovd 7 vyiea nat ‘ 
6 larpos Gpoiws aira dort rou Uytaivew : on which the Paraphrast’s (Andro- 
nicus Rhodius) commentary is, 9 pew yap avry woret py ovca (i. €. dvépyea, 
not ‘non-existent’) ry Tov vysaivey evépyecay, o 8é ouryrnpe! x.7.A. as before. 
The second and third divisions represent two kinds of extraneous causes 
or conditions, distinguished from this formal, intrinsic cause. These are 
first, necessary conditions, as of health, represented by food; and se- 
condly, probable conditions, as exercise, which, as Aristotle adds, only 
produces health én} ré rodv. 

§ 4. We now proceed to the application or illustration of the 
general principles laid down in the three first sections, which continues 
to the end of the chapter ; rovrwy d¢€ xeipévwy xr.A. Application of the 
two topics of ‘consequents’, dua and vorepoy dxodovbeiy ; the receipt of all 
good things is an instance of the latter, because it is followed by the 
possession of good things ; and the loss or riddance of evil things, which 
is accompanied simuliancously by the relief from what is bad, exempli- 
fies the former. This latter conclusion rests upon the principle, here 
understood, but stated in § 18, @ rd évavrioy xaxdy, rovr’ ayabov. Comp. also 
Top. Fr 2, 17 b 2, on Anes and azroBodai. 

§5. @ yap Umepéxer x.r.d.] ‘for the amount of the excess of the greater 





PHTOPIKHS A 6§§6, 7. ror 


exer TO peiCov TOU éNaTTOVOS, TOUTO yiveTat TOU MEV 
~ “A 4 A A A a 
6Anyus Tob & adroBoAn. Kat tras dpetas 6€ avaykn 
A > | 4 4 ‘ 
ayabov ecivary xaTa yap Tavras ev Te Staxewra oi 
# “~ ~ 
ExovTes, kal TomnTikal TwV ayabwy etal Kal TpaKTiKal. 
‘e 7 , 4 A 
7 Wept Exaorns O€, Kai Tis Kal TrOia, ywpis pnTéov. Kal 
A e ‘ ? A t , A a4 / A ~ 
Tnv ndovny ayabov Elva ravTa yap épiera Ta (wa 


over the less, the same is the measure of the gain of the one (good) and 
the loss of the other (evil)’. -yiveras, ‘becomes’, i.e. ‘amounts to’. The 
excess of the greater over the lesser good, and the excess of the greater 
over the lesser evil, is the measure of the gain in the one case, and the 
loss in the other; the loss of the ev? being a gain, by the same rule as 
before, ¢ 16 dvayriov xaxov, Tovr’ dyabdv. 

§ 6. sowrixal...xal mpaxrixai] virtues, besides being ‘productive of 
good’, like many other things, have also this special peculiarity, that 
they are effective of good by ac#on. The distinction is, that whereas 
gouty tends to some épyor or substantial enduring result, as a picture, 
or statue, or other work of art, the end of mparrey is action itself, and 
there is no further result. See the commencement of the Nic. Eth., and 
what is there said about these two réAy. Ethics and Rhetoric are mpar- 
rixal réyvat, the arts of the painter and statuary somraai Compare 
Introd. pp. 16—19. By the distinction here taken we find brought into 
view the specially ‘practical’ character of the virtues, which, like the 
art that describes them, end in action: though besides.this, some of the 
virtues, at any rate, produce lasting effect, and leave results beyond the 
mere performance of the act, some fositive benefit (as an gpyoy) to an: 
individual or the community. But the words here distinguished are else- 
where employed indifferently to express generally the power of producing 
an effect or result, as appears in the comparison of 5 §3, 16;6§2. Of 
the two, zourixdés is most frequently used in the expression of this con- 
ception, as may be seen in the following sections. 

All moral virtues must necessarily be each a form of good: for they 
produce a good moral habit, or condition, or constitution in those that 
possess them, and are besides productive (and effective) of good in their 
actions and the results of these. 

‘Each of them, its substance or true nature’ (the first Category, ri ¢ori, 
oveia, substance what the thing is, really and essentially), ‘and qualities’ 
(the third Category), ‘must be treated separately, ywpis, apart’. This is 
done in c. 9, The contents.of the chapter to which reference is here 
made shew that dperai are here confined to the @xai or moral virtues, 
the ‘ virtues’ Jar excellence, and do not include physical, or any other, 
‘excellences’. 

§ 7. xal ri» i8ovpy dyabov elva:} What is here taken for granted, as 
universally admitted, that pleasure is good (though not necessarily she 
good) is in both the treatises on pleasure, in the 6th and roth books of 
the Nicomachean Ethics, carefully investigated and discussed, and the 
opinions held upon the question by preceding philosophers, as Eudoxus 


to2 PHTOPIKHE A 6§8. 
7. ~ , e A A earl \ a a 
auTns TH pvoe. WoTE Kat Ta noea Kal Ta Kaa 
A fy s A 4 e ~ , . 
dvaykyn a@yaba civar Ta pev yap noovns womTiKa, 
~ 4 ~ A A ean? 4 A 9 A e A 
Tav dé Kad\ov Ta pev noea Ta O€ a’Ta Kal éavTa 
aipeTa €oTwv. 
« ~ 4 A > , 
8 ws dé kal év eizetv, dvayxn ayaba clva Tade. 
e A 4 4 4 
evdaimovias Kal yap Ka&’ avTo aiperoy Kat avTapxes, 


and Plato, examined, Bk. vil, c. 12, seq. and X, c. 2. Aristotle’s conclu- 
sion (in Bk. X) is that though pleasure may be regarded as good it is not 
the good, i.e. the supreme good, good in itself, because there are some 
pleasures which are not proper objects of choice and therefore not good. 
Eudemus (if the seventh book be his), seems rather to be inclined to the 
contrary view; it is said at any rate, c. 14, init, avayen oty ry qdorpy 
dya@ov rs elvat, and three lines further, dpeoroy r’ ovddv nadvec yoorjy teva 
eiyvaz. And at the beginning of c. 13, in answer to Plato’s objection in 
the Philebus, we find, dre 8° ov cupBaives 81a ravra py elvat dyaboy pnd ro 
Gporopv, dx ravde OjAov. This difference of view between the master and 
pupil (on the supposition that Eudemus is the author of Bk. VII) is in 
fact in exact conformity with the difference of their respective definitions 
of pleasure; Aristotle defining it as the perfecting (reAeiwors) of the évép- 
yera, but not our evépyea itself, and therefore not ‘the supreme good’; 
whilst Eudemus goes further and describes it as an ‘unimpeded energy’, 
dveprrodioros éyépyera : and in fact this variation may be regarded as one 
of the principal arguments for the difference of authorship of the two 
treatises on pleasure in the Nic. Eth. The principle upon which the fact 
is here assumed in the Rhetoric, is stated in both treatises of the Ethics; 
the universal recognition, namely, of the principle that pleasure is desirable. 
See vii 14 init. and X 2, 1172 6 35, of & énordpevor as ove dyaboy ob 
wavr édieras, ur) ovdev Aéywou’ & yap mace Boxei, rovr’ elvas paper. 

toy O€ Kaloy ra pév ydda ra 8¢ x.r.A.] This division of cade» brings 
into view the physical and moral aspects of it united in the term beauty 
and right. «add» as dv, an object of pleasure, is the physical beauty 
that pleases in nature and art; in xa@ atré alperdy we are referred to the 
moral side of it, that which is ‘fair’ and right, which is an end in itself, 
in itself desirable, and to be sought on its own account and with no ulte- 
rior object. It is defined in this latter sense, c. 9, 3, & dv & avro alperoy 
by édraweroy 7}, (its being the object of ‘praise’ confers upon it its moral 
character) # & dy dyaoy dv ndv 7), drt dyabov. Comp. II 13, 9, rd per yap 
aupepoy avrg dyaGov éorw, to 8é xadoy dmAas. Eth. Eudem. VII 15, 3; 
1248 6 18, rev yap ayadoy ravray réAn doTw, & alta avray evexa dor 
aiperd. tourwv 8€ Kadd, dca 8 av’ra dvra ravra éraverd dot. On the 
xadov as 2 moral end, the ultimate object and motive of human action, to 
which all action should be directed and all lower interests sacrificed, see 
the fine passage of Eth. Nic. 1x 8, 1169 a@ 6, seq., particularly 20—27. 

§ 8. ws 3€ xa& éy cimeiv] ‘to describe good things singly’, in detail, 
by an enumeration of particular kinds of good. 

evdaipovia] happiness, the universal réAos, aim and end of life and 





PHTOPIKHS A 6§§gQ, 10. 103 


4 ~ e 
9 kal Evexa a’Tov Toda aipovucba. Sikatocvn, av- 
, 

dpia, swhpocuvn, ueyadoyvyia, peyadorperea Kal 

e e “~ 14 > 4 \ ~ 4 

10 ai aAAa at TolavTa E€ers* apeTat yap Yuyns. Kal 

4 A ~ 
Uryieta Kal Ka\XOS Kal Ta ToOLAvVTa dpEeTai yap cwLa- 


action. See especially Eth. Nic. 1 5, where happiness is defined by its 
three principal characteristics ; it must be réAecov, atrapxes, rd ray mpax- 
réy TéXos. These same characteristics appear in the definition here given 
in the Rhetoric: ré\ecoy corresponds to ro xaf avro alperoy, its perfection 
or completeness being chiefly shewn in its desirability for its own sake. 
Eth. N.1 §, 1097 4 31, reAecorepow 3é A€yopev ro xa avo Sioxrdy rod 8 
érepov, xai rd pndemore Bt GAXo alperdy ray nat caf avra cai da rove aipe- 
Téy, cat dmdos 87 TréAciov TO Ka’ ard alperdy dei nai pndérore 8: dAdo. 
roovroy 8 4 evdapovia padior’ elvat Soxet* ravrny yap alpovpeba dei 8¢ avrny 
nai ovSewore 8: GAXo, risny 8é xa) dor)» nal vour Kal racay aper)y alpovpeba 
pev xai o¢ avra...alpovpeba 8¢ xa) ris evdatpovias xdpiv, 8a rovrey vroAap- 
Bavovres evSaipovncey. iv 8 evdapoviay ovdels alpetras rovrwy xdpiv, ove 
ods &¢ GAXo : note onc. § § 1, p. 72. On avrapxesa, the second characteristic 
of happiness, see c. § § 3, and note there, p. 74. The sentences of Eth. Nic. 
I 5, following those already quoted, are upon this same subject. The 
concluding summary of the contents of the chapter is, réAccov 87 re dal- 
verat nal avrapkes 4 evdaspovia, ray mpaxtaév ovga réAos, which gives the 
third of the conditions in the Rhetoric. A precisely similar description 
of happiness is found in Eth. Nic. x, cc. 6 and 7. 

§9. The list of virtues here given is very incomplete, and 4 mere 
extract or sample of that given in the Nic. Eth. 11 7, which is itself any- 
thing but a complete or satisfactory enumeration of them. A longer list 
is to be found in c. 9 § 5, which includes the two intellectual virtues, 
copia and ¢dpdyncis, but still omits several of those which are distin- 
guished in the table of the Ethics. All the virtues here mentioned are 
analyzed in detail in Eth. N. Ill, IV, V, justice being treated separately at 
great length in the fifth book. 

éfts, the genus of the definition of virtue, is an acquired, developed, 
confirmed habit or state, physical, mental or moral—the last of the three, 
of course, when applied to virtue. It is properly opposed to d:dOeors, as a 
settled and permanent s/a/e, opposed to a temporary and changeable d/s- 
postition. It is developed out of the wa6n by the operation of @o0s, habit or 
association, till it has acquired a fixed tendency and direction and a con- 
firmed character, which shews itself in the constant exercise of similar 
évepyeias, and is now no longer liable to change and the opposite ten- 
dency to vice. On the growth of virtue, and the formation of the éis, 
see Eth. Nic. 11 1—5, particularly 4 and 5. Also Sir A. Grant, Ess. on 
Ethics, i p. 120 seq. (1st Ed.) [=p. 164, 3rd Ed.] Trendel. on de Anima 
p- 311, and 366. Kavtegorienlehre, p. 95. 

§ 10. dyiea...dpicrov 8oxei elva:] This is one of many opinions. 
So the ‘ Delian inscription’, quoted by Aristotle, Eth. N. 1.9, and Eude- 
mus, Eth. Eud. 11, 1, with a slight variation; also in Theogn. Eleg. 255 
(Bergk), eddAcoroy rd Scxacérarov, AGaroy 8° vysaivew | Joicrov 3é wéhuy’ ov 


104 PHTOPIKHS A 6 §§ 11—13. 


ToS Kal ToinTiKail ToAAwY, lov 4 Uyieta Kal ndovns 
kai rou Civ, 80 Kai aprorov Soxet civat, ort Svo Tw p. 21. 
Tois woAAois TymwTaTwy airidy éoTW, Hoos Kat 

11 TOU Cyy. amAOUTOS* apETH yap KTNTEWS Kal ONTIKOV 

12 7oAAwY. idos kai girla’ Kal yap Kal’ avo aipe- 

13 TOs 6 idos Kal TWONTIKOS TWOANWY. TUN, Sofa: 


ws €pG ro ruyxeiv, for which Bergk gives in the second line, mpirypa 8e 
réprvoraroy Tov Tis, €patro rvyeiv. Soph. Creus. Fragm. ap. Stob. CII 15 
(Dind. Fr. Soph. 326), xadAcorov €ore rovvdcxov- redbunévat® Agorov dé rd 
(nv dvocor' yiicrov & orp sdpeors Ajyus dy dog nal’ yjyepay. Ariphron, 
Dithyr. 1 (ap. Bergk, Fragm, Lyric. Gr. p. 841 [p. 984 Ed. 2]), vyieca, 
mpeaBiora paxdpwy, werd ot vaiowps TO AeuTopevoy Peoras...cébev Be ywpis 
ovris evdaipoy éfwu See also a fragment: of Licymnius, Fr. 4, in Bergks 
u. S., p. 840 [p. 986 Ed. 2] (a dithyrambic poet and rhetorician, mentioned 
by Aristotle, Rhet. 111 12,:2 ; 13, 5, and quoted, as Bergk supposes, in IIT 
14, 5); Plut. de virt. mor. c. 10, quoting from some poet, 7 re rot ceparos 
Uyleca—Boxei pépsorov dyaboy’ oltre yap mAovrow. xdpw fh rexéwy, ovte Tas 
ivodaipovos avOpwros BaciAnidos dpyas—rov vyiaivey pt) maporros. de fra- 
terno amore; c. 2, fe yapls ovre mAovrov, daciy, ovre ras. ioodaipovos 
avOparos BaciAnides dpxas eival twa yep xai dynow. (ap. Bergk not.) 

§ 11. wAodros, dper} xrjcews] The épyoy, special office or function, 
that which it was intended by its nature to do, determines the apery or 
special excellence of anything. If wealth is the object of acquisition, 
and acquisition fulfils its proper function, its destination, the law of its 
being, in the accumulation of wealth; then the dpery or special excellence 
of the art of acquiring is manifested in the attainment of that object, or 
the wealth amassed.. Wealth as a ‘good’ seems here to be regarded as 
an end; if so, this is.in cantradictjon to the more scientific doctrine laid 
down in the Politics 1 8, according to which wealth is only an instrument, 
see note on p. 79 (c. 5,7), and note 1 on the same page. However, as 
some good things are only instrumental and means to an end, we are 
not obliged to suppose that Aristotle regards wealth here otherwise than 
as one of those mediate ends, subordjnate and subservient to some other 
and higher end. On the relation of épyow and dpery, see notes on c. 2, 
12, and 5, 4, and the reff. in the former. 

§ 12. xaO’ avroy aiperos 6 Gidos] This is an application of the general 
principle in § 2, that good in general. is.in itself desirable, to the special 
case of friendship. That a good friend, or the friendship of the good, is 
desirable in itself is made to appear, in the course of a long and subtle 
argument in Eth. N. IX 9, of which the conclusion is (at the end of the 
chapter) dejce: dpa ro ev8aiovyeorrs pitov orovdaiwy. The words most 
in point here are, ef 87 rp paxapie ro elva: alpetoy ots ab’ avro, dyabov r7 
uoet ov xai 7dv, maparAnovoy 8é Kal rd rou didou €arw, cat 6 pidos ray aipe- 
ray ay ein. 

§ 13. repn, So€a] The distinction between these two is stated in note 
onc. 5, 4, p. 76. These are not only ‘ pleasant’ and therefore good in them- 


PHTOPIKHS A 6§§ 14, 15. 105 


4 A ld A ~ ~ 
kal yap roca Kat momtiKa moAXNwy, Kal dKodove 
? ~ e » \ a 4 A € , 929 < 
14 a@uTois ws €ml TO ToAVU TO UTapxeWw EP Oils TI- 
~ tJ ~~ , ~ a 
povra. SOuvauis ToU Eye, TOV mMpaTTEV ToIN- 
‘ A 4 ‘ ~ ? ~ 4 ) of 
15 TiKa yap TavTa Ta TotavTa ayabwv. Eri evopvia, 


selves, but also productive of various advantages which accrue to them 
from the respect of others, and so ‘good’ in this secondary or subordinate 
sense likewise. 

wal axoAovbet. avrois «.7.A.] ‘and they are accompanied for the most 
part by the actual possession of the things’ (natural. gifts, qualities, accom- 
plishments, acquirements, military distinction, rank and fortune, and 
such like) ‘which the honours paid them (these supposed possessors) imply’, 
éq’ ols ripévra, on the basis of which, on account of, for which, they 
receive the honour paid, or ‘on which the honours paid them rest, are 
grounded, or based’. é¢' ois r. might possibly be rendered ‘for which 
they (the honour and reputation) are valued’; on which their value 
depends, or, by which it is measured; but the other interpretation seems 
more direct and natural. 

The rule here tacitly referred to, as warranting the inference that, when 
honour is conferred, those so, honoured.are generally worthy of it, is that 
a generally received opinion, or popularly current maxim, or the expres- 
sion of these in the ordinary language, may be for the most part depended 
on as true’, With ro umapyxesy, roid. xexrnpevois, or something similar, 
must be supplied. 

§ 15. evqvia] is a happy natural constitution of mind or body or 
both; edpujs rd copa xa ri» Wuxny, Plat. Rep. 111 409 E In de Soph. 
El. c. 1, 165 a5, we have evd@vuécraros applied to ‘a topic’, in the sense 
(apparently) of ‘naturally best adapted to a certain purpose’. And in 
the spurious addition to the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 38 (Bekk. 39), 19, ev@via 
rorey occurs to denote the ‘natural advantages of situation’, opfortunitas 
locorum. The word is however applied here, as it usually is, to the 
mental faculties, and signifies cleverness, quickness of intellect, intellec- 
tual dexterity, differing very little from dpxy/voia. And so, infr. § 29 and II 
15 3. Similarly de Anima B 9, 2, 421 @ 25, of sev yap oxAnpdcapros adveis ry 
&cdvoray, of Sé padraxdcapxos evueis, Top. I 2, 118 @ 22, drdromoveivy dpvov= 
peba i” evchueis eivat Soxaper, ‘we deny that we are industrious in order to 
gain the reputation of cleverness’, In Top. © 14, 163 613, 4 xar’ dAn- 
Geay eVdvia is defined, for dialectical purposes, ro ddvacOar xadras Ardobat 
rddnbés xa Guyetv rd Weidos’ omep ol recbuxores ev Suvavras woeiy. In Eth, 
Nic. 111 7, 1114 6 9, it is. used similarly to denote sagacity in aiming 
tightly at the true end, xal rd ev nal ro Kates rovro wehuxévat 4 redeia Kai 
@Arnbivn Gv ely evgvia. Rhet. 111 2, ro init. In Poet. 22, 17 it stands for 
readiness in poetical invention. advuys, the opposite, is ‘dull’ and 
‘stupid’, Plat. Phaed. 96 c. In the Platonic dpot, p. 413 D, it is defined, 
raxos pabncews” yevynots huoews dyaby apern év pices. 

1 This principle is in fact constantly appealed to by Aristotle, and is one of the 
ordinary arguments to which he has recourse in the establishment of the doctrines 
of his philosophy. 


106 PHTOPIKH® A 6§ 16. 


” a 4 A ~ 
puna, evuabea, ayxivoia, TayTa Ta TOLAavTA’ TrowN- 
@ oan ? , 4 
Tikal yap aura adyawv ai Suvapets ciciv. spoiws dé 
~ ~ , a 
16 kal ai émioTnpat Tava Kal ai TExvat Kat TO (hv et 
A A wt e/ 9 , e A € , 
yap pnoev ado Erato ayabov, Ka av’to aiperov 
9 - 4 A 4d < , 4 m~ 3 , 
dor kal to Sixaov’ cuudepov yap Tt Kowh éorriv. 


prppa}] Victorius, Vater and Vahlen (in Zrans. of Vienna Acad. 
Oct. 1861, p. 105) object to the plural of this word, on the ground either 
that abstract nouns do not admit of the plural formation, or (as Vahlen) 
that as it is the fucu/ty of memory that is here in question the plural is 
inadmissible. As to the former, such is no doubt the rule, but the excep- 
tions are abundant. Parallel to this is avapyyoes, ‘ acts of recollection’, 
de Memor. 2, 6 and 10. We have already noticed mpooxcujoes and 
dxordges as examples inc. 5, 9; three more occur together inc. 11, 4, 
pabvuyia, drovia, duéAccat, Eth, N. 1 13, 1102 5 4, év rots Urvots, II 1, 1103 
519, ras édpyas, 2, 1104 a 27, yeveoes, av€goes, POopal, 525 ras aperas 
GraGeias twas xai qpepias. Pol. 11 5, 1264 @ 35, efAwreias re xal wevecreias 
nai 8ovAeias. The plural expresses the several acts or moments of these 
abstract conceptions when carried into operation, or particular cases or 
instances of the manifestation of them. Mvjpya: therefore means here, 
any ordinary examples of retentive memory. It occurs itself, Metaph. A 
1, 980 6 29, and Anal. Post. 1119, 100 a 5. [Also, in Eth. N. Ix 4, 11664 
25; X 2, 1173 6 19, Index Aristotelicus. S.] 

eJ¥pabea} which is equivalent to evdvia mpos pabnow, is a particular 
kind of natural sagacity and readiness directed to learning. evdvia puyis 
mpos Taxos pabyoews. “Opa: Platon. 413 D. 

dyxivoia] ‘ready wit’, ‘quickness of apprehension’, is mentioned as a 
kind of evoroyia and distinguished from evBovAia (right judgment), but 
not defined, Eth. Nic. vI 9. The defin. of Spoe Platon. is evgvia Wux7s, xa? 
}y 6 Exwv croxyaorixos dori éxdorp rou Secvros’ dfvrns vou, which agrees 
very well with the preceding. It is therefore an énfel/ectual (not moral) 
‘presence of mind’, the faculty of seeing the point at once, or ‘ready wit’. 
In Anal. Post. 1 34, init. it is thus defined, evoroyla ris dy doxérrp xpove 
(intuitive, immediate) rov pécov (the middle term of the syllogism, which 
expresses the cause), olov ef ris Wav Ste 1 ceAjvy ro Aaumpoy del Exes Mpos 
TOV HALOY, Tayd evonoe Oia Ti FoUTo, Ors dtd TO Adumety Grd TOU HALov’ 7 Scade- 
yopevov mdovoig eyva Siors Baveiferas’ fh Siors Plow, Gre éyOpot rov avrov, 
which expresses in a logical form precisely the same characteristic of the 
faculty, rapidity of apprehension, rayv éevonce. 

el yap pndév dddXo xr.d.] This seems to refer exclusively to the last 
mentioned of the three, rd (jv, to which alone it is strictly appropriate. 
Sciences and arts are avowedly ‘productive of good’, and rest their claims 
upon that alone. 

§ 16. nal rd B8ixatoy xd.) The argument is, justice is xowy cuppepoy, 
it promotes the public interest, it is advantageous or expedient to society, 
whose interest it is that the laws should be duly observed and the rights 
of its citizens maintained, and evildoers punished, and all this is the 
effect of ro Sixatoy: but that which is useful or expedient is good, § 1, 


PHTOPIKHSE A 6§§ 17—109. 107 


~ A oa do Ye / 9 é 4 
17 TaUTA Mev ovv OYEdOY Ta OMoAOYoUpEVa ayaa 
9 ? \ ~ ) , ’ ~ e 
18éoTw: év d€ Tois duduaBnTnoipos ex TwVvdE ot GVA- 
a € ~ , 
19 Xoyiopol. w TO évayTiov Kaxov, TovT’ dyabov. Kat 


because it is the means to an end, that end being happiness, the ultimate 
and universal aim. 

§ 17. So far the good things treated of are universally acknowledged 
to be such, and we may therefore take it for granted that they are so. 
We now come to cases of doudiful good things, which are or may be 
disputed, and which therefore require argument for their support. ovd- 
Aoy:opos here stands for the rhetorical enthymeme, or rather, perhaps, for 
any kind of regular inference or ratiocination in general. See note on 
c. 2, 11, and c. 4, 5. 

ayedcr] ‘pretty nearly’, ‘about’. Used in qualification of a too ge- 
neral expression, just like as gros elweiv. The author means to say that 
he has given a folerably complete list, or exact account of them; he does 
not profess perfect accuracy. 

§ 18. @ rd évavrioy xaxdy, Tour’ ayaboy] If, for instance, you can shew 
that vice and folly are bad, you may infer at once that their opposites, 
virtue and wisdom, are good. This is not universally true; Aristotle 
himself places it amongst the topics which are ‘open to question’. So 
Bacon, Cuius contrarium malum bonum; cuius bonum malum, Non 
tenet (this does not hold) is the ‘redargutio’, én its rebus guarum vis in 
lemperamento et mensura sita est. Dum vitant stultt vitia in con- 
traria currunt, Pref. to Colours of Good and Evil. Bacon’s Works, 
ed. Ellis and Spedding, Vol. v1 p.67. According to Aristotle, Eth. N. 11 8, 
there is double opposition in the case of virtue and vice, ai pe» ydp 

Gxpat xa) Ty péoy xal GAAyAats évavria: eiciv, 3} 8€ péon rais dxpas. When 
vie, the mean disposition, is opposed to either of the extremes or vices, 
the rule holds ; when the extremes or vices are considered as opposed 
to one another, it fails. Categ. c. TT, 13 5 36, dvavriow 8€ dorw € dvaynns 
ayabe pév candy’ rovro 8 34dov wt ) xaS’ éxacrov éwaywy), oloy vyeia voros 
xai dvdpeia Sadia, opoies d¢ dri rév Drwy. xan de oré per ayabor évay- 
riow, ore O€ xaxov 7H yap évdeig nang dyrt a UirepBod} évayrioy xaxoy ov 
opolws 8¢ nal y perorns évavria éxarépp, ovea ayabov. és oAlyor & ay 
vd rocovroy {Soe Ts, dm 3¢ ray weicror de tT? KAK® TO dyaboy évayrioy 
€oriy. 148 19, dvcynn de wdvra ff} dv ro aure yeves elvat, Y éy rois évayriots 
yereowr, } avra yevn elvan. dyabov 8e kal naxov ovk Zorw éy yéver, GAN’ avra 
Tuyxdves yérn twoy dvra. Cic. Topic. x1 47, deinceps locus est qui a con- 
frario dicitur. Contrariorum autem genera sunt plura: unum corum 
guae in eodem genere plurimum differunt (Aristotle’s évayria, in his or- 
dinary usage of the term. Good and bad however are different genera, 
not extremes of the same genus), ut sapientia ef stultitia. Eodem autem 
genere dicuntur quibus propositis occurrunt lamquam e regione quaedam 
contraria, ut celeritati tarditas, non debilitas: ex quibus argumenta talia 
existunt: st stultitiam fugimus sapientiam sequamur: et bonitatem st 
malitiam. The dialectical topics of rd évayria, in which this is not in- 
cluded, are analysed in Topic. B cc. 7,8. To this head may also be refer- 
red the topic of ordpyots, privatio, criticised by Bacon, Colours of Good 





108 PHTOPIKHE A 6§ 20. 


~ ~ 4 tT 9 a 
ov TO évavTiov Tois éxOpois cupéper’ oiov ei TO Set- 
a ~ ~ ~ e/ 
Aous elvar padiora cuppeper Tois exOpois, SyrAov Ste 
~ ef a 
20 avépia paniora wpéAmov Tois moNiTas. Kal dAws d 
e » A iy A Fe As , > , 
ot €xOpot BovrAovra n éf w xaipovot, TovvayTiov 
4 9 , , : A S 3» 
TOUTW aitpeAipov paiverat dto ev elpnra 
4 
n kev ynOnoa Tpiapos. 
~ Q , 1fy\ 
é€o7Tt & ovK aet TovTO, GAN’ ws él TO mroAU’ ovOEV 
a 4 ~ 4 
yap kwAvea éviore TavTo cupdhépew Tois évavTiots* 
e e ‘A N a A , 
bOev N€yerat ws Ta Kaka GuVayeEt Tous avOpwrrous, p, 1363. 


and Evil, No. 6, cuius privatio bona, malum: cuius privatio mala, bonum. 
orépnocs and és, one of the forms of confrariety or opposition, Met. I 4, 
1055 42 33, mparn 8¢ évavriwois éfts nat orépyois dor. And Top. B 8,114 
a7 (though in a different application), cpoiws 8¢ rots dvayriots nal ém) ror 
orepnoewy xal éfeow oxenréon Srépnocs contrasted with éfis is one of the 
four (Categ. 10, 11 5 17) or five (Metaph. A 10, 1018 a 20) kinds of oppo- 
sition, ayrixeto6a:. Comp» supr. § 4, in which this is implied. 

§ 19. Victorius quotes in illustration, Cic. pro Muren. c. 39, Sé 
L. Catilina cum-suo consilio nefariorum hominum quos secum eduxit 
hac de ve posset iudicare, condemnaret L. Murenam: si interficere posset, 
occideret....Idemne igitur delecti amplissimis ex ordinibus honestissims 
atque sapientissimi virt tudicabani quod ille tmportunissimus gladiator 
hostis reipublicae tudicaret ? 

od évayriov} The gen. immediately following the ordinary construction 
@ évayriov, is remarkable. The genitive after the adjective is accounted 
for by the comparison implied in it, just as it follows érepos, dAXos, &d- 
dopos, Siadépery, Siahepovrws, dAdoios, dAAcrpwos. See for examples Matth. 
Gr. Gr. 366, on évarrios, Obs. 2. 

§ 20. # rev ynbjoa Upiapos] I]. A 255, ‘Huc confugit fallacissimus 
homo Sinon apud Virgilium (Aen. 11 104) et ab hoc loco praesidium peti- 
vit, cum salutem suam callide procurans, quam abiecisse videri volebat, 
inquit, Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridae’ Victorius. 

€ore 3’ ovx det robre mr.d.] This last rule is liable to exceptions, as in 
the case where the same thing, the same course of action or policy, hap- 
pens to be for the interest of two adversaries : a common misfortune has 
often this effect of ‘bringing’ enemies ‘together’, or uniting them, as 
when the Athenians were forced into alliance with the Thebans by their 
common dread and hatred of Philip. ouvdyes yap rovs éyOlarous 6 xowds 
foBos, Polit. vill (Vv), sub init. ‘Misery acquaints a man with strange 
bedfellows’, says Trinculo in the Zemefest (Act 11 Sc. 2), which illus- 
trates the Jroverd. However, the ordinary rule is, that it is common 
interests that produce sympathy, ovvéyet +d xowdy, Eth. Nic. 14, ult.; 
and the example of Athens and Thebes is only an apparent exception, 
because in the given case the common danger had altered their original 
relations and engendered common interests and common sympathies and 
antipathies, 





PHTOPIKHS A 6 § 21—23. 109 


J f a A ~ e ad 
21 oTayv » ta’to BAaBepov audoiv. Kal ov pn éoTw 
e , ~ > 4 a ) av ? n~ aA ~ 
UmepBoAn, TovTO ayabov, 0 & av H peiCoy 74 ei, 
ld A e ef ‘ , : av 4 
22 KQKOV, Kai ov €veKa ToAXAa TweTovnTat Hn SedaTraynTat’ 
id | 9 A # y A ~ 
Pawopevov yap ayatoy ndn, Kai ws TENOS TO TOLOUVTOV 
YroAauBaverat, Kai TEAOS 7reANWY' TO ) Oe TEAOS aya- 
Gov. Oey Tav7’ eipnrat, 
A 
Kad Oé nev evywAny Tprapw 
\ 
Kal 
> a é c 
aioxpov Tor Onpoy TE peEvetv* 
| a 4 A e 
23 Kai 4 mrapomia S€, TO Et Oupats THV Vopiav. Kai ov 


§ 21. ob py éorw vmepBory] ‘that which does not admit of excess’, 
health, life, virtue, and all that lies in a mean state, happiness, are all 
ends in themselves, and desirable in and for themselves. Pleasure by 
this rule, which does admit of being carried to excess, is properly speaking 
no ‘good’. 

& Gy JF petlow ff Sei, axon] by the rule, pdr dyay. 

§ 22. woAdAd wewomnra } Sedaravnra] ‘much labour or expense has 
been incurred’. 

#on) note on c. I, 7, p. 13 ‘already’, for that reason alone, and without 
looking any farther. The time, trouble, and expense which we have spent 
in the pursuit of an object shews a/ready, without any further considera- 
tion, or without our knowing whether it is really good or not, that it 
seems at any rate good tous: it consequently becomes an end to us, 
and all ends are good. dyadoy, od épleras wayra, 6, 2. 

To réXos dyabcy] because ‘every art, science, action, and purpose has 
some good in view at which it aims, and which is therefore its end in 
every case’, Eth. Nic. mit. 

The two quotations from Homer are taken from Il. B 176, and 298. 
Vater observes that the half line quoted of the first does not convey the 
intention of the quotation ; the ‘boast to Priam’ is not in point. The 
lines applicable are these : Aimocre "Apyeiny “EXévny, 7s etvexa rodXol "Aya 
dy Tpoiy dwcdovro Pidns dro warpidos aijs. The second line, alcypoy ros 
dnpoy re pévew Keveov re véexOas, became proverbial ; whence Cic. de Offic. 
111 2, 6 (of the result of his son’s studies at Athens), ad guos cum lamquam 
ad mercaturam bonarum artium sis profectus, tnanem redire turpisst- 
mum est, 

§ 23. xal 9 wapompia 8¢] This 8, introduced after xai—always (except in 
Epic poetry, Il. ¥ 80, nal 8€ wos avrg potpa, Odys.-’ 418) with a word or more 
intervening—is inserted as something additional to the preceding, which 
it enforces or emphasizes, and has in these, as in all other cases, a refer- 
ence to yey expressed or implied. A first implies a second, and a second 
a first. Of pe» implied in 8¢, see some instances in Herm., note on Soph. 
Phil. 86, and the reverse case, 8¢ in pév, Don. New Crat. § 154, where the 
origin and derivation of the two particles is made out. The d¢ here may 





110 PHTOPIKH®Y A 6§ 23. 


A , t 
roAAol éievTat, kal TO TEptmaxnTov HatwdpEvov OU p. 22. 


be readily explained as in correlation to a suppressed pé» after ratra, 
‘these first, and secondly the proverb’; or ‘these on the one hand, on 
the other the proverb’. It may be rendered ‘too’, ‘also’, or from the 
emphasis that it conveys, ‘in fact’, or any thing similar. This special 
usage, like the other senses of 3¢, is derived fromi the primary meaning 
of péy and &, ‘one’ and ‘two’; and so, as conjunctions, in the sense 
of ‘firstly’ and ‘secondly’. See Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 769, 2, where a few ex- 
amples are cited. Others are given in Paley’s note on Prom. Vinct. 994 
(from Aeschylus): in Arnold’s note on Thucyd. 11 36, 6 (from Thucydides, 
Herodotus, and Xenophon) : Plat. Rep. 1X 573 B (ed. Tur.), nal pavias de. 
It is found in all Greek writers, but is more common in Aristotle than 
elsewhere: Rhet. 1 7. 18, 19, 20; 9. 29, 303; II 3.123 II. 11, nat apxy de: 
Eth. N. v5, 11308 21, wat ro Sixasoy &: Polit. VI (IV), 13, 1297 4 10, Kat 
eldOac: 8¢: and again V 16, xal 1} porn 8é wodcreia, de Anim. A 4, init. rat 
G\An 8é: c. 5, 411 27, cai ev rq drA@ 8¢, B 3, 415 2 6, xal ray aicOnrixay 
8¢, et passim. [‘ Maxime in Ethicorum libro quarto octavo nono decimo.’ 
Eucken, de Arist. dicendi ratione 1 p. 32. S.] The same meaning is 
much more frequently expressed by these particles in the inverted order, 
8 Kai. 

The proverb, ro él Oupais riy vdpiay, ‘to drop' or break the pitcher 
at the door’, after you have carried it home from the distant well with 
much toil and trouble, expresses the general conception of ‘lost labour’, 
‘labour thrown away’. Erasmus, Adagia, p. 350, in foribus urceum, mis- 
interprets the proverb as expressing something vile and contemptible, not 
worth the trouble of taking up. 

Another more common corresponding proverb is rAvvew smrivbop, 
laterem lavare (Terent. Phorm. I 4, 9) ‘to try to make a red brick white 


1 In the endeavour to represent these English words by precisely corresponding 
Greek terms, no difficulty is found in the case of dreak: if xarayvivas Avpay (PI. 
Phaed. 85 A) is fo break a lyre, it is equally applicable toa pitcher. But when we 
try to render ‘to drop’ by a word exactly corresponding (drrlarpopos in its primary 
sense), the language seems to fail us. I examined all the analogous }Greek words 
(that I could think of), Bdd\d\ew, plwrew, édyv (‘to let go’, but intentionally), yet», 
and a dozen others, with their compounds, and found them all infected with the 
same vice, in respect of the representation of the word ‘to drop’, viz. that they 
all express a voluntary and conscious action, whereas drop is applied to an accidental 


and unintentional relaxation of the muscles, which cannot properly be called an — 


action at all. The notion may no doubt be expressed by a circumlocution, of 
which the Homeric &«xeoe, or Expvye, xeipés (said however of the odyet, not the 
subject), comp. Lat. fugere, is a frequent example. We might also say (of the 
subject) weptopgy tt xlxroy or wlrrew, or (of the object) AavOdvex weoor, But 
these are not single words. And I am brought to the conclusion that the Greek 
language Aas no single word to express the notion exactly; which is the less sur- 
prising, inasmuch as the French language labours under the same deficiency ; the 
periphrasis /atsser tomber being made to supply the place of ‘to drop’. éxxei», 
Soph. Phil. 13, might seem to come nearest to the literal representation of it, 
were it not for Arist. Ran. 855, where the word undoubtedly expresses a con- 
scious and intentional act. 46 Adyos...éxweowy olynoerat, Plat. Phileb. 13 B, 


: « 
io eee ee ale a 








Dis <2 = ra . =e 


PHTOPIKHS A 6§ 24. III 


A , ~ A ? a A 
yap wavres édievtat, Tour’ ayabov nv, ot d€ rodAot 
a” 4 / , ‘ \ 3 oe. >) ‘ 
24womep wavTes Paivovtat. Kal TO émaweTov* ovdEls 
A A \ , A > ~ 1 ioa e ? \ A e 
yap To pn ayalov érawel. Kat 6 ot éxOpot [kat ot 

~ 9 ~ ef 4 4 of @ 
gairo] érawovew worep yap mavrTes non Omodo- 


by washing it’, Theocr. Id. XVI 62, 9 U8are vite Bodepay loedei wrivOor}, 
and answering to our ‘washing a blackamoor white’. Compare also Eur. 
Iph. Taur. 116, ovros paxpoy pév nAOopev nary mopoy, éx reppatayv dé 
yOoTOY dpoupey waAty. 

wepipdynroy payopevoy] ‘apparently, manifestly, conspicuously (with 
daiveoOa in this sense, comp. II 2, 1, dés) an object of contention’, 

rour’ dyabov Av] ‘this is, as was said’, i.e. in § 2. This use of the 
imperfect, referring to a past transaction or statement referred to in 
present time, is so common both in Plato and Aristotle as to require 
no illustration. 

of 8¢ soAAol...dalvovra:] The acts and opinions of the great body of 
people, the most of those that you know or have heard of, are as con- 
vincing to the popular audience to which Rhetoric is addressed, as those 
of all mankind if they could be ascertained. The fact therefore that the 
possession of anything is much contested and coveted, implying that 
a great many people seek after it and care for it, is as sufficient a proof fo 
them that it is a good, as if it could be shewn, as it ought by the rules, 
§ 2, that it is the s#iversal object of human aims: the sanction of ‘the 
many’ is as good as an universal admission. 

§ 24. ro éwawerdy] The proper object of ¢ra:wos is virtue, any kind 
of practical excellence; @ors 8 Grasvos Adyos éuhavifay péyeOos aperijs, 
Rhet. 1 9, 33. On érawos as the test of virtue and the distinction of this 
from ¢yxopsow and evdaiponcpos, see Introd. Appendix B to Bk. 1 ch. 9, 
p. 212 seq. It is there said that érawos and Weyos are the equivalents 
of Butler’s ‘moral approbation and disapprobation’. This requires some 
qualification. When the ‘intellectual’ virtues are included as the objects 
of éracvos, as they certainly are in the Eth. Eud. 11 1. 18, the approbation 
loses its exclusively moral character. In Eth. Nic. 1 12, Aristotle toge- 
ther with the moral virtues, justice, courage, ‘goodness’ in general, 
includes also as objects of praise all kinds of dpery or excellence, such as 
strength and swiftness, which are manifested in actzon. 

cal & of ¢yOpot xal of davAo: dxasvovoww) Victorius, in illustration of the 
former of these two topics, quotes Virg. Aen. XI 282, Steésmus tela aspera 
contra, Contulimusque manus; experto credite quanius In clypeum assur- 
gat, quo turbine lorqueat hastam. The prowess of Aeneas could not 
be more highly extolled than by the praises extorted from his enemy 
Diomede. 

cat of davAos] is rejected as a subsequent insertion by Muretus, F. A. 
Wolf, Bekker, Brandis, and Spengel, because it is passed over unnoticed 
in the explanatory commentary that follows, oomep yap—erovbores. 

1 @odepay rNivGow is to be interpreted here not of the colour of the brick, but 


of an unbaked brick dried in the sun, which melts away and turns to mud when 
it is washed. 





112 PHTOPIKH® A 6§ 24. 


~ 3 Q e ~ c A A) A 
yovow, €t Kal ot Kaxws mremovOores’ dia yap To pave- 
A) e ~ v e/ A ~ aA e ir 
pov ouodoyoiey av, worep Kat PavAot ous ot Pidor 


Vater alone defends it. The explanation of it is easy, and it is perfectly 
consistent with the context and with good sense. If the vilest and 
meanest, the ‘worthless and contemptible’, gavAo, who are /eas? likely to 
be sensible of merit in others, being almost devoid of right moral instinct, 
find themselves compelled to praise some signal act of valour, disinterest- 
edness, or virtue—we are engaged here upon actions—a fortiori it must 
meet with the approbation of better judges, and be emphatically good. 
If with this reasonable explanation we take into account Aristotle’s hasty 
and careless habit, twice already noticed, of interrupting an explanation 
or an argument bythe insertion of something bearing indirectly on the 
subject, but not immediatély appropriate, I thitk we may without scru- 
ple retain the words objected to. 

Gowep yap wayres On cporoyovow] ‘for this is new as good as, equi- 
valent to, an universal admission’. #8n, ‘by this time’, now that we have 
got as far as this, have reached, that is, the level of enemies, the extreme 
case of those who are interested in denying the merit—if ‘ey approve, 
all others must necessarily do so. 

8a yap ro davepov...ro “Dtoy] There is a difficulty here which has 
much occupied the commentators, arising from the want of connexion, as 
the present text stands, between the two rules laid down, @omep cal... 
éravovow, and the example (from Simonides) which is sad, &0, to 
follow from them: the example, according to the present reading, is of 
an inference from either df them. The best way of meeting the difficulty 
seems to be to adopt, with Spengel, the reading of the best MS A*. 
This omits the words ovs of didat Weyoves xai dyaboi, without which the 
sense is clear-and consistent. ‘ For it must be owing to its being evident 
that they are inclined to (would) admit it, just as’ (it is equally evident 
that, by the same rule, in the opposite case) ‘those who are praised by 
their enemies must be worthless’, (because if your enemy approves of 
your conduct towards him, which is assumed to be hostile, it shews that 
you can have done him no harm: and therefore that you have been want- 
ing either in ‘courage or patriotism or energy and skill). Of this the 
example of the Cormthians is now a real instance, and their suspicion of 
Simonides’ intentions may be traced to the general rule. ‘And this was 
why the Corinthians conceived the suspicion that they had been insulted 
by Simonides, when he wrote, “Ilium has no fault to find with the Corin- 
thians’ (which it ought to have had if they had done their duty). The 
Corinthians misinterpreted Simonides’ expressions; his intentions were 
innocent, but he failed to perceive the inference that might be derived 
from them. The line of Simonides is apparently misquoted by a lapse of 
memory. The Schol. Pind. Ol. x11 p. 78, who cites it, has pavies (¢) for 
péepperas; and this reading appears also in another reference to it in 
Plut. Vit. Dion. c. 1 sub init. (cf. Bergk and Gaisf.), 6 Zepeoridns dnol rots 
Kopiwéiots ov pnviey To “IAcoy émorparevoact pera trav Ayatay, ors xdxeivos 
oi wept TAavxoy €£ dpyns Kopivbtor yeyovores ovvepdyouy xpoeOvpws. Homer 
only says, I]. Z 152 seq., that Glaucus himself attributed his origin to 


PHTOPIKHS A 6§§ 25, 26. 113 


Yéyouvat Kai ayabol ols of éxOpoi éxawovow. S10 
AeAoopyabat varéAaBov KopivOtor va Xtuwvidov 
WOMCTAVTOS 

Kopw6iots 8 ov péuperat To “Idov. 

25 Kai 6 Twv dpovinwv Tis Hh Tav adyabov dvipwy 7 
yuvatkwy mpoexptvev, olov Odvacéa AOnva Kai ‘EXevny 
Oncevs cai AréEavipov ai Oeat cai AxtAdEa “Opnpos. 

26 kai OAws Ta WpoaipEeTa* MpoaipourvTa Se mpaTTEV 


Sisyphus of Ephyre or Corinth. If this be the true explanation of the 
reason why Ilium was ‘not wroth’, or ‘found no fault’, with the Corinth- 
ians, and Aristotle remembered it when he used the example, it seems 
that the instance is very ill chosen for the purpose of illustrating the rule. 
In this case nothing is imputed to the Corinthians except that the aid of 
Glaucus and his men of Corinthian race compensated the Trojans for 
their own hostility, and therefore that Troy had nothing to reproach 
them with, which could scarcely be construed by them as an fxsu/?: and 
the example only applies to the rule which it is supposed to exemplify in 
this sense ; that the Trojans ought by the rule to have been represented 
as having directly censured the Corinthians, if Simonides had intended to 
pay them a compliment ; by the mere omission of this they thought that 
he had insulted them. 

§ 25. Compare the corresponding topic of 11 23, 12. On this kind of 
‘authority’ see I 15, where it is exemplified under the head of ‘witnesses’, 
§§ 13 and 15. The gpovpos, the man of practical wisdom, skill and 
judgment, the ‘artist’ or expert in each pursuit, is the proper standard or 
measure to be appealed to in every disputed question. The general 
judgment of such well-qualified persons is the ép6ds Acyos, which must be 
applied even to the determination of the due measure of virtue, which isa 
pecorns...cpurpévn doyy xal os Gv 6 hpovipos dpiceey. Eth. N. 11 6, init. 

4 ray dyabay aydpar] so Eth. x 5, ult., the standard of moral judg- 
ment is said to be 7 dpery cal o ayaOds. IX 4, 1166 @ 12, pérpov éxdore 7 
dpery) cal 6 omovdaios. III 6, 1113 @ 32, dahepes wdeioror 6 omovdaios rE 
rdAnbes dy éxacrots opgv, Sowep xavey xai pérpoy avray dy. 

mpoéxpiwev] ‘ decided, distinguished by preference’. 

‘EAdmy Onoevs] The preference of Theseus, a man of consummate 
authority, ravreAf rv dperny xrycapevoy, for Helen, is actually introduced 
by Isocrates as one of the topics of his encomium of that much calum- 
niated lady, Helen. §§ 18—2z2. 

§ 26. ra mpoatpera] ‘objects of deliberate and voluntary choice’. 
The spoaipeois seems here intended in the more general sense in which 
spoapeioOas and spoaipeots are employed in the ordinary language, and 
even sometimes in the Ethical treatise itself, as 1 2, init. éwesd) waa 
yraots cai mpoaipects dyabou rivds dpéyeras. smpoaipeocs is defined in Eth. 
Nic. II 5, ult. BovAeuriny opegcs raw ep’ ypiv, ‘an impulsive faculty (imply- 
ing, not directly expressing the free will) capable of deliberation, directed 

AR. I. 7 8 


114 PHTOPIKHS A 6§ 27. 


, ~ ~ ~ 
Ta TE Elpnueva Kal Ta Tois éxOpois Kaka Kal Ta ToIs 
4 A ‘ “~ ~ 
27 pido ayaba xai ta Suvatd. Tavita o€ dtyws éoTi, 


to things within our power’—no one deliberates about things Jeyond his 
power, ovder yap mAdov. And again in precise conformity with this, de 
Mot. Anim. c. 6, } mpoalpeots xowwov diavoias Kai cpéfews, Gore Kivel mparoy 
(is the ultimate mover, the origin of motion or action) rd dpexrdp xal ro 
dcavoyrey, (it is the object of the two faculties, and not the faculties them- 
selves, which is the real origin of motion, according to the Aristotelian 
doctrine that the primary moving agent must be itself unmoved,) ov ra» 
8¢ 75 Scavonroy GAAA Td TH» wpaxreoy rAos. Thus the mpoalpecis is com- 
posed of two separate elements or faculties, intellectual and impulsive, of 
which the latter alone is the agent of motion, or stimulates to action : the 
intellectual part deliberates prior to action, and decides whether the pro- 
posed object of the action is good or bad, right or wrong!. Though the 
spoaipecis in its general and wider signification of ‘deliberate, voluntary 
purpose’ is capable of prompting to action of every kind, yet iff its nar- 
rower and specially ethical usage it is mora/ action alone that it origi- 
nates and determines, oixecorarov yop elvac Bonet rj dpery kat paddov ra 767 
xplvey rov mpageov, Eth. N. Ill 4, init. Comp. Ill 2, 1110 5 31, ov yap 4 
dy tj mpoatptoes dyvoia alria rou dxovaiov, ddkAa THs poxOnpias. From 
the ethical point of view therefore the definition will be ‘a deliberate and 
voluntary moral purpose’. The principal passages on the subject of mponai- 
peows are Eth. Nic. Ill cc. 4, 5, 6, where it is analysed and distinguished 
from érOupia and 6upos, which are mere animal impulses, on the one 
hand, and from BovAnors, BowWevors and 8cfa, on the other: ib. vI 2; and 
de Anima III 9, 10, where it is treated in reference to its action as a 
motive principle. 

ra elpnyeva] all the objects of voluntary choice already mentioned 
which consist in, or are to be obtained by, action ; such as health, plea- 
sure, and especially the various moral virtues. 

nal ra rots ¢yOpois xaxd}] This was an article of the received code of 
popular morality amongst the Greeks and Romans: comp. § 29, where 
one class of good things are & dmex@naovra: rois ¢yOpois. This is a duty, 
and a part of justice. In Rhet. 1 9, 24, it is said to combine two kinds of 
virtue, ro rods éxOpous ripwpeiaOas paddov xa) p) xaradAarrecOa' ro re yap 
dvrawod:dovas Sixavoy, xai dvdpelov ro py nrragOa. 115, 5. Rhet. ad Alex. 
1 (2), 13 Xen. Memor. Iv 2, 15, 16. Eur. Ion 1046, dray 8¢ swodepious 
Spacas xaxas O&Ag ris, ovdeis dumwodedy xeiras vopos. Med. 808, Bapeiay 
€xOpois nai pitowoew evperf x.r.d. Cic. de Off. 17, Lustitiae primum munus 
est ul ne cut quis noceat, nist lacesstius inturta. 

§ 27. ratra, SC. ra Svvard.——ra yevoueva Gy xal ra padios yryvdpeva.] Two 
kinds of possibilities ; ‘things which might’ (ay, under certain conditions, 
possibly difficult) ‘be brought to pass, and those which are easily attained’. 


1 Accordingly, Metaph. © 5, 1048 a 11, Spetis and rpoalpecis are distinguished ; 
Bpefts is the general and spontaneous impulse to action, which when controlled 
and determined by the intellectual principle, d:dxoa, becomes the compound 
wpoalpeois, the deliberate moral purpose. 


PHTOPIKH® A 6§ 28. 115 


oe ’ a 4 a oe , r) cs 
Ta TE yevoueva [av] kai Ta padiws yryvoueva. padia 
de boa aN od € r a A > XL , . 4 A 
a even uns 1 ev Ody Xpovw TO yap 
e 7 4 A 
Xarerov dpiCerat n AuTN n 7ANDE ypovov. Kai éav 
e c td 
ws BovNovTat: Bovdovrat de 7] pndev Kakov 4 €\aTTov 
TOU dyabou: TOUTO 6 é coral, éav 4 AavOeivy 1 " Tipcopicr 
28 fj ukpa n. Kat ta ida, Kal a pndels, Kal Ta WepiTTa: 


The distinction is between ends or things hard and unlikely, and easy 
and likely, to be attained or obtained. 

The same distinction of possibilities is found in Cic. de Inv. 11 56, 
169. (Victorius, who refers to it, quotes only the definition of /fac#/és.) 
Aique tn its omnibus quae ante dicta sunt, quid fieri et quid Sacile jiert 
possit oporiet considerare. Facile id dicimus, quod sine magno aut sine 
ullo labore, sumptu, molestia quam brevissimo tempore confict potest; 
posse autem fier’ quod quamquam laboris, sumptus, molestiae, longingui- 
batis indigel, atgue aut omnes aul plurimas aut maximas causas habet 
aificultatis, tamen, his susceptis difiicultatibus, compleri atque ad exitum 
perduct potest: an excellent commentary on Aristotle’s topic. 

TO yap xaderoy x.r.Xr.] ‘facility’ is defined by the absence of pain or 
laborious effort, or by the shortness of the time occupied in doing anything 
or getting anything done, Jecause difficulty is defined by the opposites. 

opi{eras  AUmy  wANbea ypovov] A various reading in several of the 
earlier Editions is Avan 7} wAnbos. In this case cpi{era: is the middle voice, 
as it usually is in the sense of ‘defining’. dpifeoOac however, as a pas- 
sive, is found, though rarely, elsewhere, as Eth. Nic. lI 10, 1115 5 23, 
opiferas éxaarov T@ réAet, ib, 1X 8, 1168 45 5, wav ols o piros dpiferat, Pol. 
VII (VI) 2, 1317 5 39, ddcyapyxla yeves nal wAouTe nal wadeig spifera, Theo- 
phrast. Hist. Plant. 1 1, 6, 7 pév dvopocorns opiferas oynpart ypopare x.r.d. 
It is not to be included in the class of irregular passives formed from 
neuter verbs, the act of cpifew being transitive. 

kai ¢ay ws Bovdovrat] Sc. yévnrai re (OT ra mpaypara) dyaboy es any- 
thing that turns out as they desire’; any result, either of their own acts, or 
of the course of events, such as they like ; [Gaisford says, ‘nescio an in os 
Gy BovAwrra’ (a various reading) ‘lateant vestigia melioris scripturae, do" 
ay BovAwrra.’ This is not so suitable to what follows.] ‘but what they 
do like is either no evil at all, or less than the good (ensuing): and this 
(the latter of the two preceding) will be the case, when (for instance) the 
penalty (which is attached to some illicit gain or advantage) is either 
unfelt (Aav@avy, escapes your notice, not the notice of ofkers,) or trifling’. 
In both of these cases the profit, or good, is greater than the loss, or evil. 

§ 28. «al ra ia] Things or qualities, special and peculiar, not 
shared by the rest of the world in general, such as personal gifts, graces, 
or accomplishments: anything that distinguishes a man from the mass. 
Of the three kinds of 73a distinguished in Top. A 5, 102 a 18—30 (dco 
proper, the fourth predicable, roprium), these are (8a andes ; the second, 
are not absolutely and at all times f&:a, but only at particular times, under 
particular circumstances of time, moré; the third class, to which those 

8—2 


116 PHTOPIKHS A 6§ 28. 


Q A ef ~ A A e , , ne 
Tin yap ovTw padAov. Kal Ta appoTToOVTa avToIs* 

~ 4 A f \ , 
To.avta S€ Ta TE TMpooNKovTa KaTa yEvos Kat duva~ 


here spoken of belong, are ‘relative’ ida, {3a mpos rs, special and peculiar, 
i.e., in this case, to a few men as compared with the rest. 

& pndels (Aos éyet)| This is only a particular case of the preceding: 
in ¢hat the advantage is shared by few, in ¢Azs the possessor stands alone. 
Anything excessively rare or unique, as a coin, a tulip, a piece of china, 
a book, may acquire a special value from this circumstance. Comp. 
Magn. Mor. B 7, 1205 & 29, ro yap év Gow elvat cal mace Kotor ovK aya- 
6cv. This feeling is characteristic of ambition, +d 8) rototro» éxi dido- 
Tripod padXov Kal diroripias olxeiov dati’ 6 yap iroripos ear 6 poves BovAc- 
pevos exe Kai rp rovovrm rev dAdo vmepexerr. 

wepirra] ‘things that are singular, preeminent, specially distinguished’ 
amongst their fellows or congeners, or among things of the same sort, ‘ for 
by this they obtain greater credit’. sepsrros is ‘odd!, singular, striking, 
remarkable’. From mepi, ‘over and above’, ‘exceeding’, (Homer, sepl 
8 Garay dacl yeveorba, rept pev Aavady,) the derivative weperros passes 
into the metaphorical sense of surpassing, preeminent, standing out from 
the rest, out of the common way, extraordinary. This signification of 
the word will be found illustrated in the Lexicons. Add to these, as 
marked examples of some of its various significations, Eur. Hippol. 437, 
445,948. Ar. Pol. 11 6, 1265 @ 10, in the well-known passage on Plato's 
style, Ib. VIII (V) 10, 1312 @ 27, mpdfews mepirrns (extraordinary, signal) 
xal 8: hy ovopacrtot yiyvorra: xal yvdpiuos rois dAdois, ib. 11 8 init. of Hippo- 
damus of Miletus, that he became seprrrorepos ‘rather odd, eccentric, 
extravagant’, in his dress and habits. Top. Z 4, 141 413, axpt8ns rat 
gepitrn Guava. Metaph. I 2, 1053 4 3, of Protagoras’ dictum, (ad»rev 
petpov GvOpwros), ovbev 87) Aéyow weptrrov aiveral ri A€yew, Rhet. 11 15, 3, 
Probl. XXX 1 init. sreperroé (‘ distinguished’ in any art or science) daivoryras 
peXayxodtxol dvres. (Waitz, on Top. I 2, 118 a 6, illustrates other senses of 
the word in Aristotle.) Of excellence of style, Dion. de Comp. Verb. c. 3, 
dis, sub init. et sub fin. From mepi again, in the sense of ‘over and above, 
exceeding’, comes wepirros as applied to an ‘odd’ number; the suppo- 
sition on which the name is based being, that the dprios dptOuds, or even 
number, was the primary number—2 was in fact considered as the first 
arithmetical number, 1 being the principle of unity—the odd number is 
an addition to or excess over the other, the next step in advance. 

The three kinds of good just enumerated are all repeated in c. 9. 25, 
26, under the head of xadd». As ‘goods’ they are in fact all of them of 
the specially ‘ questionable’ sort’, duduoBnrioma; supr. § 17. 

ra Gppotrrovra] ‘suitable, appropriate’, specially applicable or belong- 
ing to them. 

Ta WpoojKxovra xara yévos Kal Suvauww] ‘things that naturally belong to 
them, or are due to them in respect of birth and power’. 

} *Qdd’ in early English is sometimes employed by a similar metaphorical 
application to denote superiority to others, striking excellence. ‘For our tyme 
the odde man to performe all three perfitlie,...is in my poor opinion Joannes 
Sturmius’. Ascham, Scholemaster, p. 113 (Mayor's ed.). Richardson has omitted 
to notice this use of ‘odd’ in his Dictionary, 


eee 3 aol je Se a ———— ee en 


PHTOPIKH2 A 6§ 29. 117 


1 4 ff A , a A 
piv, kat wy édAcizrev olovTat, Kav miKpa n° ovdEV yap 
e ~ ~ , ‘ 

29 NTTOV TpoaipovvTat TavTa MpaTTEW. Kal Ta EvKAT- 
f ‘ ‘ e ; V oa 
épyaora: duvata yap ws padia’ evxatrépyaota be a 

, A e 1 Ne wv oe ef , 
WAVTES H Ol TOANOL #} OL Gporot H Ot HTTOUS KaTwWpOw- 
Vv oa - a vA A , 
Tay. Kal a xaptovyrat Tois Piro, 4 a arexOnoovrat 
“~ ~ f A gs 
Tois €xOpois. Kai doa ovs OavuaCover mpoatpovyTat 


éy édXeimew olovra] édXeirev with genitive, ‘to come short of, be 
deficient in’. ‘And anything men think wanting to them, as appropriate, 
or suitable to their condition'(a second case of ra dpporrovra), ‘however 
trifling’, (they regard as a good, and eagerly pursue it): ‘for none the less 
for that (8 ré puxpa elvar) do they choose (deliberately purpose) to do 
it’; i.e. to do things, to act, so as to attain their end. So Victorius, 
who illustrates the topic by Hor. Sat. 11 6, 8, O si angulus ille proximus 
accedat qui nunc denormat agellum. If this is right, as I suppose it is, 
mwpoatpouyras mparrety is carelessly written for (nrovow or émOupovor, OF 
épievyrar, or some verb that would imply the object of action, and not the 
mere action itself. 

§ 29. The things mentioned in this and the following section all of 
them designate what is considered good because men like to do it. 

Ta evxarépyaora] ‘things easily effected, or easy achievements’, are 
considered as good, because they are possible, by the rule § 26, 27; they 
belong to the second class of things ‘ possible’, such as are ‘ easy’. 

xarapbecay]} aor. ‘ever succeeded in’; or indicating the notion of ‘habit’ 
which the verb opOot» and its compounds acquire. The secondary and 
metaphorical signification of safety and success, from the notion of going 
through a career, as a race, erect and in an upright position, without 
stumble or fall, is well illustrated by the following passages of Sophocles, 
Electr. 741,8xal rovs peév GAAous ravras doareis dpdpous dpbovF 6 TAnpwy 
épbbs €& opbav Bidpwor. Oecd. Col. 394, Jsmene, viv yap Oe0i o° opbovcs, 
apocbe 8 Gducay. Oecd. yépovra 3’ opbobyv praipow és veos wreoy. 

@ xaptovvras rois gidos] ‘anything by which one will oblige one’s 
friends’, a cognate accus. for as yapiras. In obliging a friend you may be 
said to oblige yourself, a true friend being érepos avros: Eth. N. 1X 9, 
sub,init. Ib.117047. Ib. c.4, 1166 @ 31, wpos dé row Pidoy txew sorep 
wpos éavroy, €ors yap 6 pidos aAXos autos. 

& dwexOnoovrat rois €yOpois] ‘or by which one may shew one’s hostility 
to (offend er’annoy) one’s enemy’. As before, as amexOelas dex. r. €xOpois. 
diryeOdverOat mpos twa, Or revi, is ‘to make oneself odious or hostile to’, 
‘to quarrel with’, or ‘to disoblige, offend, annoy’. Compare diaSadrer Gas 
spes, in Plato, Thucydides, Demosthenes, Aristotle, to have a hostile feel- 
ing towards onc, to be set against him, to quarrel with him (from éa8ad- 
etx, to set two people at variance, to engender animosity and ill feeling 
between them, and hence to give one an ill opinion of the other, and so, 
finally, to calumniate). Both of these, men think good and nght, and 
proper objects of pursuit. 

Oavpaterr, ‘to look up to, respect, reverence, admire’. Valck. ad 


118 PHTOPIKHS A 7 §1. 
: ; i 4 4 eA 3 ~ » ed ‘ tn 
WpaTTEv. Kal pos a Eeveuels Eliot Kal ETTELpOL* PaoV 
A j r aid A ~ - 
yap katopOwoew oiovrat, Kai & pndeis PavAos* errat- 
4 A ~ = ~ 
veTa yap wadAov. Kat wy émiGupouvres TUyXavovow* 
A ea , \ 
3000 yap povoy nov adda kal BéATLOV aiverat. Kat 
4 e e a a e , 
padiora Exaorot mpos a ToOLOUTOL, Oiov ol iAoviKor 
» / of e , , ( e / 
€t vikn Exrat, ot PiroTiysoe Et Tin, Of PiAoxXpNMaToL 
4 
et YpnMaTa, Kal oi aAAOL WoaUTUS, 
4 * ~ a ? 
wept sev ovy ayabou Kai aupdepovTos Ex TovTwY 
4 ~ 
Anwréov Tas miores: émel Sé mwoAAaKis OMOAOYoOUP- CHAP. vii 


P. 1363 4. 
Pp. 23. 


bm 


Hippol. 106. Ar. Rhet. 11 6. 15, 16, 24. Aristoph. Nub. 180, 428, yas 
riay ral Oavpafov. Ran. 1008, a/#b%. Isocr. Areop. 4r &c. 

evdveis] ‘clever’, § 15, note on p. 105. Comp.c, II 28, Probl. XVIII 6, 
there quoted. 

gumetpor] those who have acguired skill by practice and experience, 
distinguished from the naturally clever and dexterous. Success, the at- 
tainment of one’s object, in any practice or occupation for which any one 
has either a natural talent or an acquired aptitude, is regarded as a good, 
because it ismore easily attained, § 27; ‘more easily’, either than by others 
who are not so skilful, or than in other pursuits and practices. 

d pndeis hairdos] (ovdeis, no definite particular person ; pnde/s, no in- 
definite person, no man whatever) ; sub. mpageiev dy.. ‘Hinc ducto argu- 
mento, apud Euripidem quidam divitias non se movere dixit, quas etiam 
saepe improbissimi homines facillime consecuti sunt: Fragm. Aeol. 14 
(5, Dind.) pa) wAotroy etrps’ ovx) Gavpd{w Beov oy xed raxscotos padios 
éxryoaro’, Victorius, 

a@AAa nal BéAriov] All objects of desire are supposed to be good, all 
aipera, and oy édievrat, §2. The desire of a thing therefore implies not 
only that the satisfaction of it will give you pleasure, but also that you 
suppose it (gaivera) to be good. 

§ 30. nal paddtora éxacros (dyaba yyotvras raira) mpds & rotovrot] ‘to 
which they are so and so’, disposed in such and such a way. In the pa- 
rallel passages of the Ethics this is expressed by g@iAorowtro. Eth. N.1 9, 
1099 2 8, éxaotrp & doriy 78v mpos & Aéyerae Gidroroovros, oloy tmmos pev 
To dirirra, Ocapa 8é rH Prroedpy’ rov avrov 8€é rporoy cal ra Bixara To 
dirodixaio nai Skws ra xar’ dperny tH Gidraperg. Ib. 111 13, 1118 4 22, rev 
qAcroovrwy Aeyopevay. Ib. IV 10, 1125 515, wAcovaxas rov diAoroovrou 
Aeyouevov. 

CHAP. VII. 


The xowos romos of paddAoyv xal Frrov or degree applied to rd cupdepor, 
expediency. Most of the special topics of this chapter are derived from, 
or at all events coincide with, those of the third book of the Dialectical 
Topics." Brandis, ber Ar. Rhet. ap. Schneidewin's Philologus, WV 1. pp. 14, 
15, infers from certain slight differences of the mode of treatment, in the case 
of two or three of these topics in the two works, the later composition of the 


PHTOPIKHS A 7 §2. 119 


Tes aug cupeperv rept ToU MadAov augur BnTovow, 
9 ~ av af , 4 ~ 4 4 ~ A 
épeens av ein NekTEov wept TOU mEiCovos ayabou Kat 
2T0U padrAov ouuhépovros. éotw Sy vaepexov pev | 
TocovToy Kai ért, Umepexouevoy Sé TO évuTTapyxov. 

\ ~ A >» \ ‘ ~ \ af / A 
kai meiCov pev det Kad wAciov mpos EXaTTOV, Meya OE 
Rhetoric ; but in this latter work the references, tacit or acknowledged, to 
the Topics, are so numerous and so precise, that we do not need this 
indirect evidence to establish the point. The passages to be compared 
are, Top. f 2,117 4 11, with Rhet. I 6.3, and 7.5; Top. r 3, 118 4 20, 
with Rhet. I 7.36; Top.F 1,116 @ 29, and 6.8, with Rhet. 1 7.8. Cicero, 
Topic. XVIII 68—70, in a passage too long to quote here, enumerates the 
topics of Comparatio, following Aristotle very closely: most of Aristotle’s 
topics of this chapter are found in Cicero’s list. The topics of comparison 
fall under four general heads. Comparantur igitur ca quae aut matora aut 
minora aut paria dicuntur: in quibus spectantur haec, numerus, species, 
vis, guaedam etiam ad res aliquas affectio; which are there severally illus- 
trated at length. First, some general principles are laid down ; then we 
are referred back to c. 6. 2, for the various definitions of good ; and then, 
(from § 3 to the end of the chapter), these general principles and definitions 
are applied to the determination of cases, special romoe or ¢t3n, of com- 
parison of two good things, so as to shew which of them in eath case 
is the greater. 

§1. dudw] ‘both’—of two things, left to be understood. 

§ 2. grrw] See note onc. 5.3, 6.2, 10.3. 

Umepéxov—vrepexdpevov] ‘Hae definitiones possunt declarari duabus 
lineis parallelis, quarum una ultra alteram protenditur: item numeris, 
e.g.6 et 9. Maior enim sive linea sive numerus et aequat minorem et 
excurrit: minor vero inest in maiori.’ Schrader. On the passive form 
UmepéxeaOa, see Appendix (B) On the irregular passive (at the end of the 
Notes to this Book). 

rogovroy cai ér:] ‘so much and something over’, 

TO évunapxov] ‘that which is contained or included in the other’. 

kai pei(oy pey ae x.r.A.] That all ‘quantity’, and all terms that express 
it, péya pixpov, roAv cAiyor, are relative, mpos rt, we learn from the Catego- 
ries, c. 6, § 4 15—-29, of which this passage is a summary repetition. The 
same thing, as a mountain or a grain of millet, when compared with two 
different things, is called great or little, greater or less—and so of ‘many’ 
and ‘few’. None of them is absolute avré xa’ avro: all of them are 
relative to something else, with which they are compared, mpos rt, mpos 
€repov. 

“ And ‘greater’ and ‘more’ have always reference to a ‘less’, and 
‘much’ and ‘little!’ to the average, magnitude (ro ray moda péyebos, 
the object to which the term is applied being thereby compared with 


1 If wodv xat odlyor are here intended to include ‘many’ and ‘ few", woAXol 
cal odl-yot, as they most probably are, since they occur in the Categories and are 
wanted to complete the list, we must extend the raw rod\Awy péyelos to number, 
w\760s, as well as magnitude. 








120 PHTOPIKH® A 7§ 3. 
4 A A ~ ~ 
Kai puKpov Kat TONU Kai GAiyov Tpos TO TwY TONAwY 
/ A e , A A 4 A de AA ~ 
méyeOos, kai Urepeyov pev TO meya, TO dé EAAElTrOV 
4 / \ vt 
3 MiKpov, Kai ToAU Kai OAi'yov waauTws. é7TEL OUV 
e ad \ \ 
ayabov Néyouev TO TE AUTO aUTOU EveKa Kat fn GAAOU 
e L4 \ v , > sa 1 ea ~ ba) A 
aipeTov, Kat ov wavT edieTat, kat O vouy av Kat 
/ / e/ \ ‘ \ ‘ ‘ 
dpovnow NaBovra ErotTO, Kal TO ToNTiKOY Kat TO 
Pie A ~ A T af 
uAakTikov, 7 @ eweTat Ta ToLavTa, TO O ov Evexa 
« ef , of 
TO TENOS EoTi, TEAOS 8 éoTiv ov Evexa Ta adda, 
~ ‘ ~ a 
aire Sé dyaldy TO mpos a’to TaiTa merovlos, 
~ a A ~ , 
avaykn Ta TE WAEiw TOU évos Kai TwY éNaTTOVU, 


its congeners, as a mountain or man with the average, rois waAXois, of 
mountains and men, in order to estimate its size): and that which ts 
called ‘great’ exceeds (this average ordinary size), whilst that which falls 
short of it is called ‘small’, and ‘much’ and ‘little’ in like manner?’. 

§ 3. The following definitions of good are repeated from c. 6. 2, with 
a few trifling alterations. This section is translated, and the illogical 
character of the construction explained, in Introd. pp. 177—8. 

avrg 8 dyaboy ro spis avrd ravra werrovOcs] This clause contrasts the 
notion of good in itself, xa6’ airc, here expressed by the dative aur¢ ‘to’, 
or, ‘for and by itself’, with good as the universal réAos, the object of all 
men’s aims and aspirations. Schrader, Vater, Buhle, and Bonitz (Aris- 
totelische Studien, 1 p. 89), are in favour of avrg and avroy, which would 
thus contrast ‘good to the individual with good in general’. Eth. N. vil 13, 
init. dyabdyv &tyGs, rd pev arre@s, ro 8é rm. Top. Tl, 11648, ro andes ayabdy 
rov rw alperérepov. This use of the pronoun is quite in conformity with 
ordinary Aristotelian usage, as s/rva §35, rd avrg xal. amos, and frequently 
elsewhere. Vater says that the Greek Scholiast gives avrg as well as 
avro: and Bonitz adds that Muretus’ rendering, cu&igue autem bonum id 
quod tla est affectum ad ipsum, shews that he followed this reading. 
Nevertheless it appears that there is no manuscript authority for the 
change, and Bekker and: Spengel have retained avrg and avro. 

dvayxn...peiov ayaboy elvas] Top. T 2, 117 a 16, ért ra mAelo dyaba rap 
édarrdvey (alperorepa), } arias, } Gray ta érepa Trois érépos évvmapyy, Ta 
€Aarrew ev Tots wAeioow. Two évoraces (‘reprehensions of the fallax’ Bacon 
calls them, Coloars of Good and Evil), objections, or instances opposed to 
the universal validity of this rule, are next given: (1) when one thing is 
done for the sake of another, to attain a certain end, as getting well, 
healthy practices for the sake of health ; in this case the two together are 
in no way preferable to health atone: (2) and things not good accom- 

1 Gaisford refers to Harris, Philosophical Arrangements (‘ arrangements’ mean 
collections of notions under general heads; and the ‘arrangements’ that he treats 
of are Aristotle’s summa genera, or Categories), ch. g p. 191. Harris merely 


repeats what Anistotle had already said in his Categories to which Gaisford does 
not refer. 


PHTOPIKH® A 7§4. yar 


cuvapiOuoupevov rou évos f TwY éXaTTOVWY, peECoV 
aryaOov Elva vmepeyer yap, TO Sé evyTapxov UrreEpeE- 
AYXETaA. Kal €ay TO peyIOTOV TOU pEeyisToU UTTEPEXN, 
Kat avTa avTwv: Kal boa avTa avTwV, Kal TO 
peylotov Tou peyiorou' oiov Ei O péyioTos ayip 
yuvarkos THS meyioTns peiCwv, Kai BAws oi avdpes 
TwWV yuraKwv peiCouss Kal et of avdpes SAWS TAY 
yuvaikwv peiCous, Kal dynp 6 peéeyiotos THS peyiotns 
yuvatkos peiCwvs dvadoyov yap Exovew ai vrepoxai 


panied by a single good (so Waitz), may be preferable to several good 
things, as happiness, in conjunction with something not good, ito justice 
and courage together, «al ratra ped’ n8ovijs paddov 7) Gvev Woorvis (alperarepa 
dori) xat ravra per dAumias § pera AUmns. 

vmepéxet yap, x.7.A.] On umepoyn as a test of excellence, besides other 
topics of this chapter, comp. c. 9, 25, 39, Eth. N. Iv 8 init. there quoted. 
The opposition of the active and passive, superiority and inferiority, occurs 
Eth. N. ib. 1124 4 10, ro pev yap Urepexovros, ro 8 umepexopuerov. 

§ 4. nai day 10 péytoroy roi peyiorou Umepéxn x.r.A.] Top.T 2, 117 4 33, 
ért el ates TrovTo rovrov BéAriov, nal Td BeAricrov Trav év roUT@ BEATioV Tov 
dv rq érépep BeAricrov, oiov el Bédriov GvOpwros trmov, kal 6 BéArioros dvOpw- 
gos Tou BeAriorou urmov BeAXriwv. xa el ro BéArioroy rot BerXricrov BéATiov, 
nal dds rovro rovrov BéArioy, oloy ei 6 BéAticros avOpwros Tov BeArioroy 
immov Berriwv, ral ardos avOpwmos trou Bedriov, A practical application 
of this rule occurs in Pol. Iv (VII) 1, 1323 4 13, dAws re 8nAoy ws dxoAovbeiy 
dycopey tiv d:dbeow thy apiorny dxaotov mpayparos mpos GAAnAa Kara ry 
Vrepoxny, hvrep etAnye Scdoracw oy papey avras elvar diabécets tavras. oot’ 
cixep corly 4 Wuxi) al ris KTijcews Kai TOU Coparos TyuoTepoy Kal amas Kad 
piv dvayxi xal.rhy &udbeoww rqy apiorny éxdotou dvadoyoy rovrav exe. 

avddoyoy €xovow] ‘are proportional to one another’. 

In Bacon’s Colours of Good aud Evil’, (a table of colours or appear- 
ances of good and evil and their degrees, as places of persuasion and 
dissuasion, and their several fallaxes, and the elenches of them’,) this 
topic is- given in the form, cusus exceHentta vel exuperantia melior td toto 
genere melius. ‘This appearance, though it seem of strength, and rather 
logical than rhetorical, yet is very oft a fallax’; and he proceeds accord- 
ingly to ‘reprehend’ it. Bacon’s works, ed. Ellis and Spedding, vol. vir. 
p- 78. He certainly proves the non-universality of the rule; but by the 
theory of Rhetoric all these positions are alike open to question, and can 
always be argued on either side. 


1 Some of the topics selected for ‘reprehension ’are identical with those of Aristotle, 
and probably borrowed from him. The meaning of the word ‘Colours’ in this 
application is thus explained by Erasmus, Adagia, s.v. fucus, p. 1918, ‘‘ Qui ad 
exornationes atque figuras se conferunt apud Gallos proverbio dicuntur ‘ rhetoricis 
coloribus* uti: hoc est, fucatis pigmentis, quibus nihil ineptius si bonis sententiis 
non fuerint conjuncta”. And by Bacon himself in his preface. 


122 PHTOPIKHE A 7§5. 


~ ~ ~ ~ 14 
TwVv yevov kal Twv peyioTwy ev avTois. Kat OTay 
~ ~ 4 4 , e/ 
Tove péev TwdE EmnTat, Exeivo dé TOUTW uN’ ErETat 
O€ 7 TH dua n TH ehetns 4 TH Suvape evwrrapyxet 
Se ee fa 
wa nm e€ 9 “ e 
yap 4 xpnois 4 Tov éropevou év TH OaTepov. EmeTat 
1 ed 4 “~ A 4 | “~ wv 
be Gua pev TO Vytaivey TO Cv, TouTw Se Exeivo ov, 
€ ~ / A , A 
Yorepov 5€ TH pavOavey TO érioracOa, Suvaye de 
~ ~ ~ A , av 
TW LEepooVAEiV TO aTroaTEpEtY’ O yap tepoavANnGas Kay 


§ 5. kat Grav rode pév rode entra: x.r.A.] ‘and whensoever one thing 
“follows’ (i.e. attends upon, always accompanies it, in one of its five 
senses) ‘another, but not reciprocally (or conversely, the other does not 
always follow z#)’. Any good A, which is necessarily accompanied by 
another good B, where the converse does not hold, must be the greater of 
the two; because the one (A) always implies the presence of B, and 
includes the use of it, whereas this is not always true of the converse ; 
and when there is no such reciprocal consequence A must be superior to 
B. Let A and B be health and life; life invariably accompanies health, 
but health by no means invariably accompanies life: and therefore from 
this point of view health may be regarded as superior to life. 

érerat 8¢ } Tp Gua x7.d.] On the various senses of émerOar and axo- 
Aovdeiv see note on c. 6, 3. 

Suvdwet’ evumapxes ydp «.r.A.] ‘Potential concomitance or accompani- 
ment’, is explained as ‘the inherence, (i.e. the virtual existence, which 
may be developed into actual, active, existence, or realized, évepyeia,) of 
the use or practice of the consequent or concomitant in the other’, that 
namely which it accompanies. The higher crime of sacrilege or temple 
robbing, for instance, necessarily implies, virtually contains, the lower 
crime of simple theft or fraud (cheating'), the lower habit always accom- 
panies, but not necessarily in a state of activity, the higher, and is 
included in it: omne maius continet in se minus. Or thus, the use of 
cheating, fraud, resides, is included in, sacrilege, not actually, in a fully 
developed realized state, évepyeia, but in a dormant state, latent; it is a 
faculty or capacity, always ready and liable to be developed into actual 
sacrilege. 

The use of the general topic of ‘consequence’ is explained, Top Fr 2, 
117 @ 5, ere Gray dvo reva 9 oodpa avrois mapamAnota Kat py Suvapeba Urep- 
oxy pndepiay cuvideiv rov érépov mpos To Erepov, opay awd ray maperopévov' 
@ yap ererat pei{ov ayabov rov@ alperadrepov. Gv 8 yf ra émopeva naka, @ Td 
€Xarroy dxoXoubet xaxdv, Tou® aiperwrepov. vray yap aydorepwy alperav 
ovdey Korvec Suvoxepes te mapéemeOa, dixas 8 dro rou érecOa yf oxeyrs 
xr.ArA. See note, c. 6, 3. 


1 dwroorepety is properly ‘to defraud or cheat’, and especially applied to 
keeping back a deposit. Rhet. 11 6. 3, ré awoorepjoat wapaxarddyxyy. Gaisf. 
quotes Schol. Aristoph. Plut. 373, drocrepw@ éoriv Gray wapaxaradijxny wapadaBuy 
els daBorny xwpjow Kal ovx éGé\w Sdovar avr@ a E\aBov. [See Shilleto’s note 
on Thuc. 1 69,1. 8.]J 





PHTOPIKHS A 7 §§ 6, 7. 123 


6 drroorepnoeev. Kal Ta UrEepexovTa Tov avToU pEiCo 

7 meiCw* avayKnn yap Umepexev Kat ToU pmeiCovos' Kat P- 24. 
Ta peiCovos ayabou mrointia peiCw" TovTO yap nv TO 
peiCovos momTike@ Elva. Kal od TO TomTiKoY pEiCor, 


§ 6. xal ra Umepéyorra rod avrov ‘x.r.A.] ‘anything which (all that, 
plural) exceeds the same thing by a greater amount (than a third thing) is 
the greater (of the two); because it must exceed the greater also (i.e. as 
well as the less)’, This with the mere substitution of pei{o» for alperare- 
poy is taken from Top. I 3, 118 5 3, aAAa nai ef dvo0 reva rivds etn aipera- 
Tepa, TO paddop alperodrepoy rou Frrov alperwrépou alperorepoy. Let A be 9, 
B 6, and C 3. A(g) exceeds C (3) by a greater amount than that by 
which B (6) exceeds it, A therefore must be greater than B—mus?t be 
(dvayxn), because, by the hypothesis, it is greater than the greater of the 
other two. This is certainly not a good argument, though the fact 1s 
true, and the application easy: and yet I think it is what Aristotle must 
have meant. There is no various reading, and no suspicion of corrup- 
tion. The interpretation is that of Schrader, the most logical of the 
Commentators on the Rhetoric. And it seems, as the text stands, the 
only possible explanation. The fact at all events is true; and the only 
objection to the explanation is that the yap, which professes to give the 
reason, does in fact merely repeat in other words the substance of the 
preceding proposition. I believe that Aristotle, in framing his topic, 
meant by the first clause to state the fact, and by the second to give, as 
he thought, the reason: and that the expression actually adopted is one 
of the very numerous evidences of haste and carelessness in his wntings. 
On the application of the topic, see Introd. p. 180. 

§ 7. nal ra peifovos dyabvi rota «.r.X.] ‘Eundem hunc locum com- 
mutatis verbis exponit in 111 Topicorum c.1 (116 4 26), és avo woiurixay 
Gyreyv, ov Td TéAos BeATiov nal avro BéArioy. Ad haec verba Alex. Aphrod. 
Pp. 125, dvadas efpnrat dia Bpayvrnra’ o romos 8 dart rotovros’ el Svo etn Tid 
3v0 reAGy monTexd, ov Td TéAos BéeATiov Kai alper@repow nal avrd BéArioy, 
ovrws maidela yupvacioy Sexvior’ Gv dyeivov, ef ye yupvacia pey vyelas 
dori rointixa, wadeia 8¢ hpovnceas, nal Eorey 4 Ppornors ris Vyeias alpero- 
repoy’ madw To yupvalerOat Tov yxpnpariferOa aiperarepor’ ro pev yap 
wAavrov, To dé Uyteias moinrixoy, BéAriov 8 yy vyiesa wWAOUTOv.’ Victorius. 

rovro yap 4] ‘this is what was meant by’, this ¢s what wes (said to be) 
good; viz. in § 3. 

rd...rounrixg elvac] On this Aristotelian formula which denotes the ab- 
stract conception of a thing by the mind, as opposed to its actual existence 
as an object of sense, see Trendel. de Anima, p. 471 seq. and onI 1, 2; 11 1, 
8, also in Rheinisches Museum 1828, Vol. 1 457 seq., Xategorienlehre, 
p. 35 with reff. in note, and Waitz, Organ. Vol. 11 p. 386. The distinction, 
which is nowhere expressly stated, is, as may be gathered from nume- 
rous passages, the following: ro peyéOec elvar universam esse nolionem, 
gua res constituitur, a materia avocatam, universa cogitatione conceptam 
—the Adyos of the thing—ro péyebos vero ad singula quaegue pertinere 
quae sub sensus cadant. Metaph. Z 15, 1039 8 25, ov yap yiyveras rd 


124 PHTOPIKHS A 7§8. 


4 4 ‘ , ~ , 
WoavTWS’ EL yap TO UytELVOY aipeTwTEpoV TOU nOEOS 
4 - by 4 4 e« e 7 ~ € ~ , 
Kat peiCov ayaboy, kat 4 vyiea THs ndovns pew. 

A 4 9 A ~ , c 
8 kal TO alipeTwrepov Kal’ a’To Tov pn Kal’ avTo, oiov 


olxia elvas GANG To 1H8e TH olxig. Anal. Post. 11 4, 91 55, dAn@és yap tay ro 
avOpargp elvat (op elvat, dowep xal navra dvOpworov (pov, dAXd’ ovx ovras 
Sore dv elvar. Phys. 1 3,4, ovre yap ry cuvexeia év Zora ro Aevdy ovre TH 
oye’ Go yap ~oras rd etvae Neva@ x«.r.A. It abounds in the de Anima. 
Why and when Aristotle employs it, and whether the distinction is always 
necessary and appropriate, are questions that I will not undertake to 
answer. [J/ndex Aristotelicus, p. 221 a 34—40; p.764.a 50—p. 765 26. SJ 

The Syntax of the phrase, which only Trendelenburg, as far as I 
know, has attempted to explain!, seems to be this:—The dative is in 
apposition with a supposed revi, ro ret elvat peyeber, and the construction 
is analogous to wore cvAAaBovre eireivy, 1 10,18. Other instances of a 
similar use of the dative, which lead up to the explanation of this, are 
such as Thuc. I 24, év de€ig €omddovre tov lomov KoAwov: and others are to 
be found in Matth. Gr. Gr. § 388. 

nal ov TO wonTixoy pei(oy waatras] ‘and that of which the productive 
agent or producing cause is of a higher order, (superior), follows the same 
rule’, viz. that the product or result of the superior cause or agent is supe- 
rior in a comparison between two. If wholesome food and exercise which 
produce health are more desirable and therefore superior to things which 
are merely pleasant, then the result of the former, health, is superior to 
the result of the latter, pleasure. 

§ 8. xal ro alpercrepov xa® avro rod p) xa aird] Top. Tl, 116 4 29 
nal ro &° avro alperay rov 8¢ érepoy alperot aiperarepov, oloy ro Vytaive Tov 
yupvater Oar’ ro pév yap 38¢ avre aiperov, ro Sé 8° Erepov. And again, Ib. 4 8, 
cat TO daAos ayabov rot rw aiperarepov, oloy rd vyd{erOas Tov répverOac’ 
TO pev yap dndas dyabov, ro 8€ rut rp Bedpevm ris roujs. These two 
though differing in expression seem to be reducible to the same head, 
and, from the exasfles given, applicable to the same cases: for the abso- 
lute good is that which is in itself desirable, and conversely; and répye- 


1 Trendel. in Rhein. Afus. 1828, Vol. 11 p. 481—3: The author, who has dis- 
cussed with great learning and ingenuity the meaning of this Aristotelian techni- 
cality, and its relation to 7é ri my elvat, is, it seems to me, less successful in his 
grammatical explanation. I think that from the analogy of similar constructions 
of this dative in the ordinary language, the use of it here must needs be a case 
of attraction, as I have explained it in the note. Trendelenburg, who takes 
nothing into account but the possible meanings of the dative (or, as he rightly 
prefers to call it, the ‘acceptive’) case, locative, instrumental, acceptive, selects 
the last of the three as that which belongs to the dative in this phrase. ro peyé@e 
elvac express, according to him, ‘the abstract conception (7d efva:) belonging to 
(given to and received by) magnitude’: making this dative depend solely upon 
elvaz, and leaving out the attraction to a word in the dative, actually or hypo- 
thetically preceding, as in any way concerned in the ‘government’ of it. This is 
all that I have to object to in Trendelenburg’s paper: in the rest he has shewn the 
same ability and intimate knowledge of his author which characterizes all his 
other writings upon Aristotle. 


PHTOPIKH] A 7 §§ 9—11. 125 


toxUs UyleWoUs TO ev yap OUY avTOU EvEeKa, TO be P. 1364. 
QavTov, Orep nv to dyabov. Kav 7) TO pev TEAOS, TO 
dé un TéXOS* TO pev yap aAAou Evexa, TO SE avTOU, 
10 oiov TO yupvaleaOa TOU ev ExELV TO Twa. Kal TO 
HTTOV moowdeouevov Oatépou H ETEQwWY avTaApKETTE- 
pov yap nrTov 0€ mpomcEtTat TO EXaTTOVWY H pacvwY 
11 mpogdeouevov. Kai Otay Tote pev avev TovdE pn Hh 
pn Suvarov 4 yevéoOat, Barepov dé avev ToUTOU: av- 
o$au the example in the second case of particular good, is only good as 
the means to an end, &’ érepov. 

lexis vyiervod | strength is more desirable in itself; the ‘ wholesome’ only 
as the means to an end, health. Strength is considered by Aristotle not as 
absolutely desirable aiperoy xa& aro, but only relatively to other things— 
‘more desirable in itself than many others.’ Brandis, Phzlologus, 1V, i, p. 44. 

dmep fv ro dyaboy] yy, § 7. The reference is to 6 § 2 p. 97. 

§9. xdy 9 ro pév ré&dos «r.A.] Top. T 1, 1165 22, nai ro rédos ray 
mpos TO TéXos alperdrepov Soxet elvat, xai dvoiv To &yytov Tod TéAous. The 
end, the ultimate object of your aims, must always be more desirable 
than the means which are only serviceable for the attainment of that end, 
as health and exercise. 

§ 10. 106 Frrov mpor8ecpevoy barepov f érépwv] ‘that which less stands in 
need of any subsidiary aid’ (to make it a good), ‘either of ¢#e other’ (when 
two things are brought into comparison, as wealth and health,) ‘or of 
other things (in general)’. A topic, which may be brought under this of 
the Rhetoric, but is not identical with it, occurs in Top. Tr 2, 117 @ 37, 
where justice is preferred to courage on the ground of its comparative 
avrapxeia, though this word is not there employed. Victorius quotes in 
illustration Virgil’s comparison of the ‘olive’ and ‘vine’. Georg. II 421, 2 
and 428. (Victorius has here quoted from memory, and forgotten the 
original. It is not the ‘vine’ but ‘Joma’, of which is said, vt propria 
nituntur optsque haud indiga nostrae; and the example is hardly in 
point. The note is cited by Gaisford without remark). 

avrapxéarepov] ‘it makes a nearer approach to independence, self- 
sufficiency’: appealing to the definitions of good inc. 6, 2, of which ro 
avrapxes is one. On avrdpxea, note onc. 5, 3, 9 8 avrdpxea rédos xal 
Baarorov. Pol. I 2,1253 @ I. 

paovey] ‘easier’ to do or to get, to effect or procure, mpdrrew 4 rocety 
9 xTnoacGas. 

§ 11. «al dray x«.r.d.] ‘and any case in which one thing cannot exist 
or be obtained (by acquisition or production) without some other, but the 
other can without it’. As agriculture, compared with the other arts, Xen. 
(Econ. V. 17(Victorius). Corn. Nep. Thrasyb. 1 3, Peloponnesio bello multa 
Thrasybulus sine Alcibiade gessit, ile nullam rem sine hoc. Schrader. 
He also quotes from Plutarch, Apothegm. Reg. § 84, a saying of Age- 
silaus about the superiority of justice to virtue; it is the same example as 
occurs in the Topics (quoted on § 10) T 2,117 @ 39. 


12 


126 ‘PHTOPIKHS A 7§ 12. 


TapKeoTepoy O€ TO pn Seopevoy, WaTE haiverat petCov 
> , vA PF >» / ‘ .) 4 3 , aN ? f 
ayaQov. Kav 4 dpxn, TO O€ hn apyn. Kay 7 aiTuoy, . 


$12, way # apxy] supply ro pév, and with afreov in the following topic. 
On the omission, see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 288, Obs. 4. 

dpx] in this topic, is used in its most general and popular sense, an 
‘origin’, or ‘beginning’, or ‘source’, In this sense it may be regarded as 
the fountain of all good. doe & odrws eyew (jf evdatpovia) nat 8ua ro elvan 
apy Tavrns yap xdpww Ta Aowwra wavra mavres mparropey, Ty apxny d€ Kal To 


airioy ray dyabey ripsov Tt kai Oeiow eridepev (Eth. N. 1. 13 ult.). God him- °° 


self is an dpyy (Metaph. A 2, 983 @ 8, 6 yap Geos dpxq res). The free will, 
one of the cpefers or impulsive faculties, the origin of motion in the 
human subject, and of moral action, the doy?) mpafews, is an dpxy: the 
importance of this, as the origin of human action and the grcund of 
moral responsibility, in moral philosophy and practical life, may be 
estimated by the perusal of the first seven chapters of the third book of 
the Nicom. Ethics. It is more comprehensive than atrioyv; dpyai are not 
all causes, (see in the following note), and therefore the two may be 
distinguished, as they are in these two topics. An origin or beginning 
necessarily implies that something follows, a consequence ; it leads to 
something: in this respect it is ‘greater’, more important, superior to, 
anything that is #of a beginning or origin, which leads to nothing. Plat. 
Rep. 11 377 A, ovxovy ola Sri dpxi) mavros épyou péyiotov; peydAny yap 
€xovow (ai dpyai) porny mpos ra émopeva, Eth. Nic. 17, sub fin. And the 
same applies to aircov in the following topic. These two topics are well 
illustrated in Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3 (4), 10, 11. 

The importance of an dpyxy for good or for evil is recognized by several 
proverbs. On the one side we have dpyq qyicv sravros, (quoted in Demetr. 
wept éppnveias § 122, dpxy 8€ ros yysou mavros,) Arist. Eth. N. 1 7 ult. 
Soxet yap mNetov  yucou mavros evar y dpxy, Pol. VIII (V) 4, 1303 4 29, 
4 8 dpxy Aéyerat Hypsov elvas wavrus, de Soph. El. c. 34, 183 6 22, péeyorov 
yap tows dpx}) mavros aomep A€yerar. Erasm., Adag. 29, quotes Soph. Fr. 
Inc. (715, Dind.) ap. Plut. Mor. p. 16 A, gpyov 8€ mavros qv tis apynrat 
nados, kal ras reAeuras elxos €o6" obras fxew, Anglice ‘Well begun is half 
done’. Dimidium facti qui cocpit habet, Hor. Ep. 1 2, 40. The first 
step: Ce n'est que le premier pas qui coute, see Rhet. 11 19, §, and note. 
On the other side, the importance of the dpyy in respect of the tendency 
to evil, we have Ovid’s well-known line, become proverbial, Rem. Am. 91, 
Principiis obsta, sero medicina paratur. Fast. 1178, Omina principizts, 
tnguit (Phoebus), imesse solent. (This is indifferent as to the issue.) 
Herodotus, after mention of the twenty ships which the Athenians on the 
solicitation of Aristagoras sent in aid of the Ionians, concludes the chap- 
ter, V.97, with the emphatic words, atra: 8¢ ai veés, dpyy xaxqy ¢yévovro 
“EdAnoi re xai BapBapaot. This phrase became proverbial, see Rhet. 111 
11, 7 dis, and Isocr. Paneg. § 119, there quoted. 

On the different senses of dpyy in the Aristotelian philosophy consult 
Metaph A 1, where they are enumerated and distinguished; and Bonitz’s 
Commentary. They are thus. summed up; maody per ovy xowdy rov 
dpxay ro mporoy elvat Obey f Eorw fH yiyverat H yryvdonerat’ rovtey 8€ al pev 


<4 


PHTOPIKHS A 7§ 12. 127 


L) 9 9 af ‘) 4 9 4 4 ‘ ee A 
to 8 ovk airiov, dia TO avto* dvev yap aitiov Kai 
dvumapxovoai eloww al 3¢ éxros, 1013 217. "Apyal are ‘origins’, heads or 
starting-points, of a series, of three kinds; (1) of being, ovcia}, (2) of genera- 
tion or growth, yéveors, and (3) of knowledge, yrdors. dvev yap alriov cat 
apxys advvaroy elvas 9} yevéoOa, Rhet.1 7,12. The six senses in which apyy 
may be employed are all reducible to these three. Of these some are inhe- 
rent (as the crotyeiov, the mathematical point, the origin of the line, or the 
starting-point of anything, that out of which it grows and is developed?; 
the keel of a vessel, the foundation of a house; in animals the heart or 
the brain, or any other part which has been assumed to be the original 
seat of life); some external, the origin of motion or change, (as father and 
mother, of child ; abusive language’, of a fight; or again the human will or 
deliberate purpose, and intellect, rpoaipecis and diavore*, in the case of 
‘governments’ [dpyai] and arts, all of which set things in motion and 
produce change). The origin or starting-point of knowledge is illustrated 
by the uroéce:s, the assumed first principles of a demonstration, as the 
major premiss of a syllogism. Another ‘external origin’ is the ov dvexa, 
or rédos, the final cause, woAAdy yap xal rod yvdvas xal ris Kiwioews apy) 
rayaoy xal rd xadov, 221. Comp. de Anima IP 10, 433 4 15, xal 9 dpefis 
fvexd Tov waca’ ov yap 9 Spegtis, arn dpx}) Tov mpaxrixod vou’ rd o° éxxarov 
dpy) ris mpageos. 

dpxy is not identical with afriov, though, as all afr (all the four 
causes) are dpyai, the two terms are frequently identified (Bonitz, Comm. 
p. 219; Waitz, Org. p. 458): but the converse is not true; as is shewn 
by some of the examples given above: the assertion therefore that loayds 
(vais dpyais) xal rd alria Aéyeras’ wavra yap ta alria dpxai (a 16) must be 
limited to what is directly stated, the converse is not included. On the 
point of difference between the two, and also the identification with oros- 
xeiov, see Waitz, Organ. p. 458. 

Another definition of dpyy occurs in de Gen. Anim. V 7, 23, 788 @ 14, 
rovro yap ¢ors TS dpyxyy elvat, To auriy per alriay elvat soAAGy, Taurns 8 Ado 
Eveber pndévy. See also Trendel. on de Anima p. 187. 

On scientific and logical apyai or first principles, ultimate axioms, 
cowai and dia, see note in Introd. p. 73. In the Eudemian Ethics, 1 6, 
three kinds of dpyai, general, moral, and mathematical, are distinguished, 
and some account given of them. [See also /ndex Aristotelicus, s.v. S.] 

§ 12. way f alriov x r..] Top. I, 116 6 1, xal 16 alrioy ayabod naff avro 
rou xara cupSeBnxds airlov, cabarep n dpery ris rvxns’ i pév yap Kal aurjy 
} 8¢ xara cvpBeBnxds alria rév ayabey, xal ef rs GAXO Totovrov. spoies d¢ kat 
dst rou dvayriou (rot xaxov) «.t-A. 

ro 8 ovx airtov] On ovx after dy, understood from the preceding clause, 
see Appendix (C) on ef ov, c. 15, 23. 

1 The dpx# as essence, origin of being, ovela, is the primal cause, ré ri 4p 
elva:x. Bonitz. 

3 graxeiow “hoc loco eum (Aristotelem) non tam elementi naturam cogitasse, 
quam principem illam rei alicuius partem, in qua primum continetur et destinata 
est ipsa rei natura, ex exemplis allatis facile cognoscas,” Bon. Comm. p. 218. 

3 This is an apy} xaxwy. 

4 gal &d rovro ¥ didvoa Kwel, Sri dpxy auras dari rd dpexroy. de Anima I 10, 
433 2 £9. 








128 PHTOPIKHS A 7 §13. 


9 ie IQ 7 ? aA a A ~ 9 “~ 
doxns ddvvarov elvac 4 yeverOa. Kai dvoiv apyaiv 
A A ~ ~ ~ A 
TO amo THs mEiCovos pEiCov, Kal Svoiv atTiow TO a7 
° ~ , > -£ a 1 8 @ ‘ a” 
Tou peiCovos airiou peiCov. Kai avarradw 6y dvotv 
) ~ ~ 4 ~ 
apxatv 4 Tou pet{ovos dpxn meiCwv, kai Svoty attiow 
’ a“ ’ P) a a 9 9 = 
1370 TOU metCovos aitiov peiCov. SyAov ouv ék Tw 


kai dvoiy apyair x.r.A. and again, of two origins orcauses, the consequence 
and effect of the superior is greater. The following passage of the Topics 
will illustrate the preceding as well as the present topic. I 3, 118 @ 20, érs 
el ro péy wrote’ Gyaddy exeivo @ Gv mapy, Td d€ wy motel, TO wotovy alperdrepor, 
xabamep xal Oepporepoy Td Geppaivoy rou py. el 3¢ duchy sroret, ro padAov maou" 
i) ef ro BeATioy Kai xuptodrepoy sroret ayaboy, olov ef ro pev ry Wuyny, To 8é ro 
copa: C. 5,119 217, nai ef rd pév rote TO SE pup rotet TO Exov ToLowde, paAdop 
Towouro o more traces 8 pay rose’. el 8 duchw roel, rd paddAov motovy roovro. 

cal dydraXw] ‘and conversely, of two origins ; the origin of the greater 
consequence is greater...’. 

§ 13. &8%Aov ot» «.7.A.] ‘It is plain therefore from what has been said 
(§ 11, xay 3 dpy},ro 3¢ uw) dpyy), that in both (the following) ways it may be 
said to be greater: for whether it be an origin (or beginning), and the. 
other not a beginning, it may be shewn to be made to appear greater; 
or if it be not itself a beginning, but the other be a beginning (it may be 
equally shewn to be so), because the ‘end’ is greater (superior), and yet 
no beginning’. ‘The end is greater’, because réAos dorly ov evexa ra 
@\Xa: and if ‘everything else’ is but a mean to an end, the beginning 
must be included with the rest, and is therefore subordinate and inferior. 
peifoy is here ‘ greater’, ‘more important’, superior in respect of influence 
or effective power; not necessarily ‘ better’. In the examples, first, the 
‘adviser’ is the dpy#, the origin or originator of the plot; so in Metaph. 
A 2, 1013 2 31, 6 BovAevoas is an atrioy, namely the efficient cause, or origin 
of motion and change, dpxi peraBoAjs. The adviser of a scheme is there- 
fore according to this view the ‘ cause’ of all that resulted from his advice, 
which is made to appear (8oxez) by the argument more important than the 
result or actual crime (which is not ‘the beginning’); and, secondly, the 
converse (avdradiy) is proved, that the crime, the ‘end’ of the advice or 
deliberation, is the more important thing of the two, because it was for 
that, as a mean to attain that, that the whole scheme was undertaken. It 
appears from the expressions of this text that Callistratus devised the 
scheme and Chabrias carried it into execution. 

Leodamas of Acharnae was a famous orator, an earlier contemporary 
of Demosthenes and Aeschines. The latter mentions him, c. Ctesiph. 
§ 138, as having been sent as ambassador to Thebes, and as a speaker the 
rival of Demosthenes; indeed in his opinion even pleasanter to listen to. 
He is mentioned again in II 23, 25 (comp. the note there); in Dem. adv. 
Lept. 501 and 502, who also speaks of him as a distinguished orator, 
where allusion is made to a certain proposition of his to cancel the 
‘grant’, especially the aré\ea, made to Chabrias for his public services 
—ovros ¢ypawaro ry Xafpiov Sepedy',a proposition which he failed to 

1 This cannot be the same accusation as that which Aristotle here refers to; 


PHTOPIKH2 A 7§13. 129 


eionuevwy Ste audotrepws peiCov eorw: Kai yap et 
9 4 A A 4 > , i n , 4 r) A 
doxn, To oe wn apyn, Sofa peiCov elvat, Kal ei py 
doxn, To Se dpxn: TO yap TEAos peiCov Kai ovK dpyn, 
womep 6 Aewoapas KaTyyopwv én KadNorpatou 
tov BovAevoavra Tov mpdgavros paddov adixeiv? ov 
yap av mpaxOnva pn BovrAevcapévou' wadw Se Kat 


carry ; and in other places of Aeschines. See Sauppe, Fragm. Or. Alt. 
11 216; Fr. Xvi, and p. 244; Fr. XXVI; Clinton, /. H. Vol. 11 p. 111, sub 
an, 372, 3. 

Callistratus, son of Callicrates, of Aphidna, a distinguished Athenian 
orator and politician, of the earlier half of the 4th cent. B.c. His name 
first appears in history in the year 379 B.c. Anistotle refers to two 
speeches of his, Rhet. 1 14. 1, and I11 17. 14. Leodamas’ accusation of 
him, here mentioned, seems to have been directed against his conduct in 
the affairs of Oropus, in 366, Grote, Ast. Gr. X p. 392; Smith’s Dict. 
Biogr. Art. Callistratus; Clinton, Fast. Hell. 11 396, note w. He was 
associated with Chabrias, the celebrated Athenian general, in the trans- 
actions with respect to Oropus, and with him was brought to trial ; and it 
is most probable that both of the speeches referred to in the text were 
made by Leodamas on this occasion. 

On Callistratus and Chabrias Mr Elder’s articles in Smith’s Biogr. 
Dict. may be consulted. Callistratus’ name occurs very frequently in the 
Attic orators. See Baiter and Sauppe, Ora?. A/é. Vol. 111; Ind. Nom. p. 73. 

BovAevoayra, BovAevoapévov, BovrAevcayros, émBovAevew] are all applied 
to the same transaction, viz. Callistratus’ ‘advice’ or ‘device’. They 
express precisely the same thing, each from a somewhat different point of 
view. BovAevew rivi tt, is to give advice, to advise. BovAeverGat to give 
oneself advice, to deliberate ; or secondly, of a number of people deli- 
berating together, and giving one another advice, ‘consulting in com- 
mon’. So yy BovAevcapévov here is, ‘if he had not deliberated upon it’ 


éypdyaro Swpedy and rov wpatayra, ‘the man that carried into execution a 
nefarious scheme’, are quite inapplicable to the same offence. Again Demosthenes, 
c. Mid. 535, tells us that PAilostratus was the accuser of Chabrias, &r’ dxplyero rh» 
wept 'Opwxod ry xplow Barydrov. Were there two accusers of Chabrias on his 
trial? Or two separate trials? (this seems improbable): or has Aristotle made 
a slip of memory in assigning the accusation of Chabrias to Leodamas? None 
of these suppositions is necessary to reconcile the, at first sight, conflicting state- 
ments. The accusation of Leodamas is directed against dofh parties; he takes 
the case of Callistratus first, and then secondly (xddcw 3¢) applies the converse 
of the argument which he had issued against the other to the offence of Chabrias. 
Philostratus, who took part in the same proceedings, was another and independent 
accuser. Mr Grote, p. 393, note 3, who does not refer to the passage of Aristotle, 
assigns the trial or trials of Callistratus and Chabrias to this period, 366 B.c., and 
the alleged misconduct about Oropus. The other speech of Leodamas against 
Chabrias, referred to by Dem. adv. Lept.1.c. was earlier, and had nothing to do 
with the affair of Oropus. [Arnold Schaefer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit 1 p. 96. S.J 


AR. I, 9 


130 PHTOPIKH® A 7 § 14. 


~ a As 

XaBpiov, Tov mpagavra tov BovAevoavros: ov yap 
. , A e/ 

av yeverOa, et un nv O mpaEwy: TovTou yap éveKa 
e A s 

14 €miBovrAevev, Srws mpatwow. Kal TO oTavwTEpoY 

~ OM A , ) vd 
Tov apbovov, oiov xpucos aidnpov axpnaroTeEpos wy’ 
peiCov yap 4 KTHots dia TO XadeTTwTEpay Eivat. aAAOV 
of ~ e ~ 
S€ tporov TO apbovoy Tov araviov, tt 4 xpHors 


preparatory to ‘suggesting’ or ‘advising’ it. ¢mBovAevew retains its 
proper sense of a Aostile design (éwi ‘ against’); the advice, or scheme 
which resulted from it, and the deliberation which suggested it, are now 
represented as ‘a plot’, a hostile, aggressive, design. It appears there- 
fore that there is no occasion to have recourse to the explanation of Vic- 
torius and Buhle, that émSovAevew is (or can be) put for BovAevew or Bov- 
AeverGa:. Gaisford prints these two notes of V. and B. without comment. 

el p?}) Fv 6 mpagwv] On this use of the definite article, indicating a mem- 
ber of a class or yévos, which we express by our indefinite article, see 
Buttmann, Gr. Gr. § 124, Obs. 2. Engl. Tr. p.319. The two senses of the 
Greek definite article are, according to Schneider, on Pl. Rep. VIII 564 A, 
that it marks guod praesens et in conspectu positum cogitatur, and (2) the 
genus. ‘Articulus definit indefinita, idque duobus modis; aut desig- 
nando certo de multis, aut quae multa sunt cunctis in unum colligendis’ 
(the second describes the generic use). Herm. Praef. ad Iph. Aul. p. xv. 
Several examples of this usage of the def. art. are collected from the N. T. 
by Dean Alford, in a pamphlet in reply to Bishop Ellicott, p. 45 seq. I 
will only quote Matth. xiil, 3, 0 oweipay: xxv. 32, 6 mousyy. In a subsequent 
passage of this work, 11 4, 31, Aristotle has quite unconsciously and unin- 
tentionally stated this grammatical distinction, ro d€ pioos cat mpos ra 
yévn’ Tov yap KXérrny pucet x.1.d. 

We render o mpafav ‘ anyone to do it’, carry it out, put it in execution. 

§ 14. 1rd oramarepoy rod dpbavov] ‘The rarer, scarcer, is greater, more 
valuable or important, than the abundant’. This, as is implied in dypyoro- 
repos ay in the example, is only true 72 a sense, it is in fact a paradox, 
which may however be asserted in argument, since there is something to 
be said for it, and examples may be found in which it is true; as in the 
case of gold and iron. In the true and proper sense, in utility and real 
value, iron is greater and better than gold. Isocrates, avri8. § 80, 81, on 
this ground of comparative rarity, d0@ mép elas omamarepot Kai yaXero- 
repot, thinks that, in his time at least, great orators and politicians ‘who 
can speak worthily on behalf of their country’s interests’ are more valu- 
able and to be more highly prized than legislators. A similar topic 
occurs in Top. 2, 117 6 28, ro émavécrepov tov frrov roiovrov, nai ro 
XaAererepov’ padAov yap dyarapev Exovres & py Cots padiws AaBeiv. Kal To 
lSsairepov Tov Koworepov. 

Gov 8€ rporov] This gives the true side of the alternative, that the 
value of a thing is in proportion to its usefulness. Estimated by this 
standard, ‘water’, as Pindar says, at the opening of his first Olympian 
ode, ‘is the best of all things.’ Béckh, who cites this passage of Aristotle 


PHTOPIKHS A 7 §§ 15, 16, 131 
e ‘ 8 4 a ~ 9 , e é 
umrEepeyer’ TO yap mo\AaKis Tov OAryaKis v7rEpExet’ 
bOev AEverat 
apirrov pev vowp. 

15Kkai ddws TO YadETUTEpOY TOU PaoVvos’ OTAaMWTEpOV 
yap. aAAov S€é Tpdrov TO paov TOU yadErwTépov’ p. a5. 
a \! e /, ‘.* 2 , a 

16 Exe yap ais BovAoueba. kal « Td évavriov peiCov, 
kal ov  oTépnots meiCwv. Kal apeTn pn dpEeThs Kal 


in his note, evidently agrees with him in interpreting Pindar’s dpicroy as 
‘best’ because most useful, or necessary to the support of human life’. 
Dissen thinks that Pindar had in his mind the great ‘wholesomeness’ of 
water, dpiorov dicttur ro B8up guia saluberrimum est. A dry and hot 
climate and a parched soil would also readily suggest the notion that 
water is the best of all things. But I agree nevertheless with Béckh in 
his interpretation of Pindar’s thought. 

These two opposite topics represent two prevailing modes of estimat- 
ing ‘value’, by wse and price: Political Economy teaches us that the 
former is the true, the latter the false standard, In the one view air and 
water are the most valuable, in the other the least valuable, of all things. 
Plato, Euthyd. 304, 3, gives both sides: ro yap omdnov, & Evdvdnue, 
tiwov’ To dé D8wp evwvdraroy, Apioroy oy, as En Hivdapos. _ 

§ 15. GAws ro xaXendrepov] See the passage of the Topics quoted in 
§ 14. Anything harder to do or to attain may be said to have a higher 
value, when the value is estimated by the price. On the other hand mea- 
sured by the standard of our own nature, of our own love of ease and 
comfort, and also of the extent of usefulness, that which is easter to do or 
to make or to obtain is more valuable. 

§ 16. § rod evavriov peifov] ‘And one thing is greater than another 
when the opposite of the former is greater than that of the latter’. ‘Ex- 
emplum accommodatum erit valetudo ac divitiae; quae ambo sunt bona: 
contraria eorum morbus et paupertas: maius autem malum corporis 
morbus quam paupertas ; praestat igitur valetudo divitiis.’ Victorius. On 
this, and the next topic, orépyois, comp. supr. c. 6, 4, and § 18; and 
the passages of the Topics (f 2, 117 6 2,) and the Categones there 
referred to. 

od 3 orépynots pei{wv] On the various applications of orépyoss in Ari- 
stotle’s philosophy, see Met. Ac. 22, and Bonitz’s Commentary: Categ: 
c. 10, p. 12 a4 26, and Waitz, ad loc. Trendel. Kategorienlehre, p. 103 seq. 

The following illustration of the topic is given by Schrader. ‘ Peius 
est caecum esse quam surdum: ergo visus auditu praestantior est. 


1 Pindar’s own view of the meaning may be readily seen by comparing the 
first three lines of the roth Olympian Ode: note the word xpyois. In a speech, 
quoted by Spedding (Letters and life of Fr. Bacon, Vol. 111. p. 18), Bacon says: 
1 liken this bill to that sentence of the poet (Pindar), who sets this as a paradox 
in the fore-front of his book, first water, then gold, preferring necessity before 
pleasure ; and I am of opinion, that things necessary in use are better than those 
things that are glorious in estimation. 


Q—2 


132 PHTOPIKH®S A 7§17. 


, A 4 , A 5) A r4 ‘\ ) 9 
Kaxia pn Kakias peiCwr Ta peéev yap TéEAn, Ta O ov 


x , \ 7? \ oo , SN , , > 
17 TEAN. Kal wy Ta Epya KadNiw 7H atoxiw, peiCw avTa. 


Gravius malum est fama quam pecunia privari; ergo bona existimatio 
praestat divitiis.’ ‘Things of which the privation is greater’ or more 
deeply felt, are those which are most necessary, essential to our existence 
or comfort; as air and water again, in this point of view. 

wal dper) ps) dperis—reAn] ‘and virtue is superior to non-virtue, and 
vice to non-vice ; because the one is an end, and the other not’. The 
application of this seems to be to things compared as fositive and nega- 
tive: positive virtue and positive vice, which can be ends or objects to aim 
at, are in so far superior to mere negatives which can not. Moral consi- 
derations are altogether laid aside, and Rhetoric is here permitted (not 
recommended) to take the immoral side of the question: vice may be 
regarded as an ‘end’ of human desire and exertion. 

Bonitz, Arist. Stud. 1. p. 87, proposes an ingenious alteration, which 
no one who is satisfied with the preceding explanation will consider 
necessary. It is to substitute for the existing text, xal dpern pj xaxias xat 
xaxia py dperijis peifwv, ‘positive, downright, virtue is greater (better or 
worse) than mere absence of vice, and downright vice than mere absence 
of virtue’: which he neither translates nor explains ; but, it is to be pre- 
sumed, it means that the superiority of the one to the other still rests upon 
its fosttive character. The morality remains constant; for vice is still 
represented as the object of men’s aims: it is therefore no improvement 
in that respect. His reason for the change is, ‘that it never could occur 
to any one to institute a comparison in respect of magnitude (Grésse) 
between dpery and yp) dpery, and xaxia and py xaxia.’ Not perhaps if pei- 
(wy implied nothing but mere magnitude or quantity; but when it is 
extended to the general notion of superiority the comparison may very 
well be made between them. And besides, Bonitz’s altered comparison 
appears to rest upon the very same distinction of the positive and nega- 
tive; for in what other sense can vice be regarded as superior to non- 
virtue? 

§ 17. The two topics of this section are founded upon the relation of 
the dpery of anything to its proper ¢pyoy or function, the work that it has 
to do, described by Plato, Rep. 1 352 E and foll., and taken up by Ari- 
stotle as the foundation of his theory of virtue, Eth. Nic. 11 5, init. The 
virtue or excellence of everything, horse, dog, knife, axe, the eye, the ear, 
the mind, is shewn in and depends upon the due performance of its 
proper function (supra 2.12; 5.4;6.11). ra épya therefore, though they ex- 
tend beyond the moral virtues from which Victorius draws his illustration— 
the comparison of avdpeia and cappoovm and their opposites in respect of 
their results good or bad, the kinds of actions that they give rise to—and 
include the functions of all things that can be applied to any purpose, 
and everything which has a rédos, to which the épyov must be subser- 
vient, and in the approach to which the dperj is shewn; yet the cpithets 

1 Victorius, perhaps rightly, explains yx) dperj and wy xaxla as states of 


growth and development, which have not yet reached their ‘end’, the formed 
f&s, but are mere d:a@éces, transient dispositions, and so far inferior. 


PHTOPIKH>® A 7 § 18, 19. 133 
‘ 7 e M4 Yh: 8 1 , A 1 
Kal wy ai KaKiat Kal at aperai peiCous, kai Ta Epya 
, ? ‘ 
meiCw, Ereiep ws Ta aiTia Kai ai dpyai, Kal Ta a7ro- 
4 A 
Baivovra, kai ws Ta avoaivoyra, cai Ta aitia Kal ai 
9 a 4 i e e ‘ e 4 a\ , 
18 4pXat. Kal wy n UTEpOXN alpeTwTEepa yn KadAlwy, 
v A 9 ~ e # e 4 ~ » , 
oiov To axptBws dpav aiperwrepov Tov dappaiver Oa: 
‘ A 4 4 4 4 ~ 
Kat yap oyus dodpricewss Kal TO diAeTaipov elvat P. 1364 6. 
~ a ~ a @ 
Tov diAoxypnuatov paddov Kaddov, wOTE Kat dire- 
, , 4 , ‘\ ~ 
Tapia dtNoypnmatias. Kai avTimemevws Se Tov 
a, 
BeATtovwy ai vrepBodrai BeATious kai KaAALOVWY Kad- 
, , 7 ? A 
1g Atous. Kat wy ai émiBuuiae KadXAtous 4 Bedtious ai 


caddie and aloyio shew that Aristotle had the moral virtues uppermost 
in his mind. 

cai dv ai xaxias x.r.A.] the converse of the preceding, the argument 
from the virtue or vice, excellence or defect, of anything, back again to its 
function or proper work. Virtues and vices, excellences and defects 
stand to ‘works’ in the relation of cause and origin to consequence and 
effect or result. Now as of the greater cause and origin, the one pro- 
duces a greater effect, the other leads to a greater end, (§ 12,) and the 
less to a less, so in the case of excellence and defect the greater produces 
a greater work, the less a less, both in human action or comparative 
virtues, and in instruments of all kinds; in men and things. 

§ 18. This topic is analogous to, not identical with, that in § 4. 
When anything in excess is preferable to, or finer and nobler than, the 
excess of something else, then the former 7” s/s ordinary state 1s prefer- 
able to the other. See the passage of Polit. Iv (VII) 1, quoted in § 4. 
Top. I 3, 118 4 4, ére ov 9 vwepBor) ris vrepBodis alperwrépa, cal avrd 
alpersrepoy, otoy Gidia xpnyarwy’ alperwrépa yap 4 ris pidias vwepBord ris 
Tov xpnuaray. Omne matus continel in se minus. 

To pideraipoy...padAov xdAXov] Victorius, followed by Buhle, and Waitz, 
Org. 116 6 24, understand paAAoy xaAAvoy as a double comparative, a form 
of expression not unfamiliar to Aristotle (see Vict. on this place, and Waitz, 
Org. 116 6 24, 11 p. 465), but certainly not employed by him here. The 
paddoyv denoting the ‘excess’ of the two qualities, which is absolutely 
essential to the illustration of the topic, is added for that reason to dude- 
ra:poy and didroxpijparoy, the comparison being conveyed by xadAcov: and 
thus the topic is exemplified. ‘Excess in love of friends being fairer, and 
nobler than that in love of money, friendship in its average degree is 
to be preferred to a similar average of love of money’. See also note on 
Ir 8, 3. 

§ 19. xal dy al émGupiat x.r.d.) The objects of the nobler and better 
desires are themselves nobler and better: because all ‘impulses’ (apé£ers, 
which include ém:Oupias, all natural desires and appetites, as well as Ovupos 
and BovAnots, Eth. Eud. 11 7. 2, de An. B 3, 414.42; see note on Rhet. 
11 2.1), in proportion as they are higher or stronger, have for their objects 


134 PHTOPIKH> A 7 § 20, 21. 


a s > # , > 7 \ ~ 
yap peiCous dpefers metCovwy Eioiv. Kal Twy Kad- 
: ; A 
Atovwy Se n kai BeATiovwy ai émiBupiat BeAtious Kat 


A \ 4 \ @ e = , 
20 KaAXious Sia TO AUTO. Kel WY at emtaTHpat KaAXIOUS 


2! 


vA , 4 A , , N 
| OTOVOALOTEpal, Kal Ta TpayKMaTa KaNXiw Kal o7TOU- 
, \ wv 9 é 4 \ 9 , 
Saorepa’ ws yap Exer yj EmtoTHuN, Kal TO aAnOes: 
I 4 A ~ e a “~ , 
KeAevet 6€ TO AUTHS ExagTN. Kal TWY OTTOVOALOTEPWY 
A A , e 93 ~ >» 3+ a nw 
dé kai kaANovwy at émurtrnpat avadoyov dia TavTa. 
aia vn 4) a 4 s\ , 
Kai © Kpiveay ay 4 KeKpikacw ot @pompor 4 TayTeEs — 


things ‘ greater’, i.e. either better and higher in themselves, or more im- 
portant. The stronger impulse is always towards the greater object—in 
some sense. And the converse: ‘the nobler and better the objects, the 
nobler and better the desires, for the same reason’. 

§ 20. xal oy ai émorijpa x...) The same rule is now applied to 
sciences or departments of knowledge, and their objects; ra mpaypara, 
‘their subjects’. 4 vroxetévn UAn, Ta Uroxeipeva. Top.T' 1, 116 @ 21, éore 
3¢ adwAds pev BeAriov kal alperorepoy ro xara thy BeATio émotipny, rit 8€ To 
xara thy olxeiay, The higher and nobler sciences deal with higher and 
nobler materials; and in proportion to the dignity and value of the objects 
that it treats, so is the dignity and value of the corresponding science : 
avd\oyor, ‘proportionally’; greater to greater, and less to less. ‘ For as 
is the science, so is the (particular kind of) truth at which it aims: and 
each of them is authoritative (lays down the law, prescribes what is to be 
done, dictates, xeXevec) in its own special province’. On the order in 
invention and dignity of arts and sciences, see the instructive chapter, 
Metaph. Al. émtorfjpas includes here all arts as well as sciences, the two 
terms being constantly interchanged. The word dAnéés, from its strict and 
proper sense (when the two provinces of philosophy are distinguished, 
Gewpnrixis tédXos adnGea, mpaxrexns 8€ ~pyov, Metaph. A 1), might seem 
to confine the application of the topic to science pure, or the ‘ theoretical’ 
department of philosophy, but it is plainly here employed in a wider and 
more popular sense: truth, theoretical or practical, is the common object of 
every kind of scientific or artistic pursuit. And the word xeAevery, to pre- 
scribe or dictate, is alike applicable to the necessary principles and neces- 
sary conclusions of mathematical demonstration, and to a practical science 
like Politics, which not only like the other prescribes the method in which 
its investigations are to be carried on and rules of action, but ‘ orders and 
arranges’ dcardooec*, determines, and limits at its pleasure the provinces 
and extent of the operations of the subordinate sciences and arts. Eth. 
Nic. I 1, 1094 a4 26—067. On xedever, Victorius quotes Eth. Eud. 11 3, rodro 
yap €otiy os 4 emioriun Kedeves cal o Adyos. 

§ 21. kal 6 xpivecay Gv x.r.d.] ‘the judgment or decision, upon any dis- 

1 The terms ‘subject’ and ‘object’ from different points of view may be applied 
to express the same thing. The odject of sense or of thought, material or mental, 


quod sensibus vel menti objicitur, is when looked at from the logical side the 
subject of all that is or can be predicated of it. 
2 So printed in Bekker's texts. 


PHTOPIKH®S A 7 §21. 135 
¥} of ToANOL H Ot TAElous H Ot KpaTICOTOL ayaboY 7} 
peiCov, dvayxn ovTws Exe, | awdAas 4 KaTa THY 
dpommow Expwav. eer dé TOVTO Kowov Kal KaTa TAY 
ahAwy? Kal yao Ti Kal qooov Kai Trotov ovTWs ExEt 
e vn e os , \ ¢ 4 wt s) > 9 3 
WS avy n ETLOTHMN Ka 7H Ppovnors Ei7ot. QaAAN ET 
dyalwv eionkapev’ wpiorat yap ayaboy eivat 0 Xa- 
puted question, of...” Top. P' 1, 116 @ 14, nal 6 paAdoy Gy Erorro o hpovipos 
h 6 dyads avip, } 6 vouos 6 dpOos, 4h of crovdaio: rept Exacta alpovpevor 7} Tot- 
ovtoi (cmovdaior) eiow, of ev Exdorm yéver émiornpoves, f dca ol mAelous Fj 
mavres, otov év larpixy } rextovny & of wrelous ray iarpay 4 mayres, } Ova GAwsS 
oi mAeious } mavres } mavra, olov rayabov’ mavra yap rdyabov épiera. This 
passage will serve as a commentary on the topic of the Rhetoric. It de- 
scribes the authority of @pommats (practical wisdom, the intellectual virtue 
which selects the proper means and directs them to the end, Eth. N. vi), 
and the impersonation of it in the @pompos. In the definition of dpern, 
Eth. N. 11 6, init. the @pompos is the measure or standard, which fixes the 
variable mean, in which virtue resides, for each individual character. In all 
arts and sciences it is the professional man, the expert, who has to decide, 
each in his own department. The dya@os decides in moral questions, 
which is A/s special province. Comp. note on 6, 25. 

i) wavres—ol xpdticro] a descending scale of the ¢pompo:, those who 
are competent to decide; all, or most (the many, the great mass of them, 
of m\cioro), or the (bare) majority, or the best and ablest amongst them 
(in point of judgment, and professional skill). 

ayabéy ff pet{av] So the MSS and Edd., with the exception of one MS 
and Buhle’s Ed., which omit 9, as does Muretus in his Transl. The omis- 
sion certainly improves the sense ; but Vater with some reason objects to 
this order of the two words, which he says should have been inverted, 
pei{oy dyabov. dyaGoy, which Vater proposes to omit, is certainly wanted 
to explain xara ray dAdwy in the following clause. 

} dmdos f} 9 Kata riv dpovncw] ‘either absolutely, universally, or in 
respect of their practical wisdom’, specially and alone. xara rhy ppornow 
corresponds to 7 roswivro in the passage of the Topics, ‘in so far as they 
are such’ (hpompor), and in no other respect. 

xal xara Tov G\Awy] ‘of everything else as well’, as good. xara with 
the genit. is very common in Arist. in the sense of ‘ of’, ‘in the case of’; 
derived from its proper and primary sense ‘down upon’, and hence, 
‘applying to’, ‘of’. This use of it seems to come through the interme- 
diate sense of ‘predication’, xarnyopeiv, xarnyepeic Gai rwos, ‘to predicate, 
be predicated, of something ’.—ézi, ‘ upon’, ‘applying to’, ‘in the case of’, 
so and so, is similarly used (én’ dyaday) in the same section. 

rl, rocoy, motov] are the first three categories ; (1) the substance or true 
nature of a thing, (2) quantity and (3) quality. These, though properly 
falling under the domain of science or exact knowledge, may yet be dealt 
with by the ‘ practical judgment’ which may convey a popular and practical 
acquaintance with them, sufficient for the purposes of the Rhetorician. 


elprnxapev’ opiorat yap] supr. § 3. 





136 PHTOPIKH> A 7 § 22. 


Bovra Ta mpaypata dpovnow Edo’ av ExacTov 
OnAov ovv Sti Kai peiCov, 6 wadAov 1} Ppovnars Aéryet. 
22Kai To Tois BeATionw Urrapxov, i admAws nn Bed- 
tious, olov dvopia icyvos. Kal 6 dot’ av 6 BeATiwn, 
n amAws 7H 1 BerXTiwv, oiov TO addueiobat padAov 7 


& padrAov 7 hpoynois Aéyer] If that is good in genera’ which is pro- 
nounced to be so by the man of practical sagacity, then that must be a 
greater good which is pronounced by the same authority to be more 
so, to be so in a higher degree. 

§ 22. «ai rd rois BeAtiogww vrapyxor] ‘Animi bona bonis corporis praeva- 
lent quia animus est corpore praestantior’. Schrader. Courage and 
strength is Aristotle’s illustration ; for the reason assigned by Schrader. 

§ dros] ‘ut viri’ (man as the nobler animal) ‘virtutes praestant muli- 
ebribus sémpliciter’. Schrader, 

4 9 BeArious] ‘aut guatenus meliores sunt: viri effeminati actiones de- 
‘teriores sunt actionibus virilis animi feminae’. Id. I prefer the other 
explanation, as more direct and natural, ‘either genera//y, in respect of 
the entire character and qualities, or in respect of some special excellence’. 

xal & é\orr’ Gv 6 BeAriov] The better man will make the better choice 
in general, dmdds, by virtue of his whole character; or ‘in so far as he 
is better, in respect of that particular kind of excellence, as some special 
virtue, in which his superiority is shewn, 97 BeAriwy dori. So Victorius ; 
who proceeds (after Alexander) to distinguish between this and the pre- 
ceding topic, § 21; in that the @poruos as a class choose between different 
kinds of good; here the comparison is between two different Asnds of 
choosers,and the one who makes the better selection is the better in moral 
character, 

oiov] (sc. EAéoOat, or ef ris EXosro). The higher and nobler choice is 
illustrated by the preference of being wronged to doing wrong. This, 
though cited here as a popular sentiment, was by no means the current and 
prevailing opinion at Athens. Plato, Rep. 11 358 Cc, makes Glaucon say, 
speaking of the offosife view, dxovwv Opacupayov kai pupiovy GXwv: and 
again, at the commencement of Glaucon’s exposition of the désadvantages 
of justice and the superiority of injustice successful and unpunished, he 
uses the word qaci, which seems to imply that this was the general 
opinion. In fact one of the main objects of the Republic is to prove that 
the reverse of this is true; and the long and laborious process which he is 
obliged to go through in the establishment of his position is quite suffi- 
cient to shew how strong must have been the prejudices in favour of the 
adverse doctrine which must be surmounted before: he could hope to 
make his own views acceptable. The Gorgias also is occupied with the 
solution of this same question, in the comparison namely of doing and 
receiving injury and wrong, on which side the advantage, when rightly 
estimated, really lies. The Sophists, as represented by Thrasymachus in 
the Republic, and Callias in the Gorgias, appear to have held the lower, 
and as we now hold it to be, immoral doctrine, Ast, in his Comm. on Pl, 


PHTOPIKHS A 7 § 23—26. 137 


psy ee ~ a e } a nN y4 8 A 
23 @OLKELVY’ TOUTO yap O OLKaLOTEpOS av EAOLITO. KaL TO 
e/ ~ Ff e a 4 e , 

HOLOY TOU NTTOV NOEOS’ THY yap jOovny mavTa Swwkel, 
A ~ eed ~ ef ° A 
Kal avTou évexa TOU nocoOat dpeyovTal, wptorat O€ 
a A 9 A A A , e/ Q , 
TovTas TO ayabov Kai To TéAos. Hdroy S€ TO TE p. 26. 
9 , \ A 7 eQ/ 4 YY 
24 aAuToTEpovy Kai TO ToAVXpoMWTEpoy ov. Kat TO 
r ~ = “~ AY Q wv 
KaNXtoy Tou nTTOv KaXov' TO yap KaANov €oTwW nTOL 
% e@ SV A 9 e 8 e ¢ 4 ef 9 4 e ~ 
25 TO HOU 4 TO Kal’ aUTO aipeTov. Kal bowy avTol avTois 
v f Wf 9 ~ ~ 
n pirors BovAovrat airior civat waddAov, TavTa peiCw 
r V4 e e/ , 
26 dyaba, dow O€ nKiora, peiCw Kaka, Kal Ta ToAv- 
iA ~ a a A 4 
XpouwrTepa TwWY GALYOXpOVIWTEPWY Kal Ta BeBaorepa 


Rep. p. 391, has collected a number of references to authors who sided on 
this point with Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. 

§ 23. Spiora: d€] in § 3. 

ydtov 8€ ro dAumorepoy x.t.A.| Pleasure is subject to two drawbacks to 
its enjoyment, which vary in different kinds of pleasure. Some pleasures 
are accompanied, preceded, or followed by pain (Plato held that this is the 
case with all bodily pleasures), and most of them are of a very transient 
character and very brief duration. This may in many cases afford a 
measure for the comparison of pleasure: those which are marked by 
the entire absence or lower degree of these qualifying circumstances are 
superior. 

§ 24. 1d yap xadov «.7.A.] This distinction of the two different kinds 
of caddy, arises from its twofold aspect, physical and moral: in the former 
of the two senses it is the beautiful, in the latter the morally right and 
noble. The beautiful, to the sight and sense, is the ‘pleasant’ form or 
aspect of ro xadov; the right is xaAov ro xa@ avro aiperoy, that which is 
desirable in and for itself and for no ulterior object, and therefore an end 
in itself. In this latter sense the rd xadcv may be regarded as the end of 
all moral action, Eth. N. 1 7, 1113 6 8, c. 10, 1115 4 24, IX 8, 1168 @ 34, 
1169 a 6, seq. 21 to the end. In Rhet. 1 9.3, two definitions of it are 
given and the distinction of its moral and physical aspects again sug- 
gested: and again I! 13.9 it is contrasted with the expedient or profit- 
able, the one being a relative the other an absolute form of good. 

§ 25. «al dowy «.r.A.] Things are shewn to be good by our desire of 
them, because all things universally desirable are good: and the more we 
desire anything for ourselves or our friend (the friend is the ‘second self’, 
the alter ego, and therefore his interest is our own,) and therefore to be 
the causes of it, to procure it for ourselves or our friends; the more we 
shew that we think it good: and the things we desire /eas¢ to bring upon 
ourselves or our friends are by the same rule the worst and most mischiev- 
ous things. The topics of Top. 2, 11841, are akin to this, not iden- 
tical with it. 

§ 26. ra moAdvxpomorepa xal ra BeBaworepa] Top. I 1, 116 @ 13, ‘more 
lasting and more secure, stable, safer’. One measure of the use or value 





138 PHTOPIKH® A 7 § 27. 


~ , a A e ~ ~ 
Twov pn BeBaorepwv' Umepexet yap  xXpHoIs THY 

A ~ 4 ~ 4 ~ tf e/ A c 
Mev tw xpovw Twv Se TH BovAnce Stav yap Bou- 

, -~ ~ yd + 

27 AwyTat, Urapyet MaAdov 4 TOV BeBaiov. Kal ws av 


of a thing is the length of time during which it remains in our possession; 
another, the security or stability of it, immunity from decay or corruption 
and the /ear of losing it. The absence of these very much diminishes 
the value of any possession. The superiority in the value of a thing is 
shewn in, or measured by, either the duration or the amount of desire or 
wishing for it (SovAnoe:) because our wishing for it shews that we con- 
sider it a secure possession, one of which we are little likely to be 
deprived, or which itself is not likely to be impaired, and so lose its value. 
A safe investment, which every one desires who has spare cash, is an 
example of this kind of security, and of the superiority in value that it 
Carries with it. 

§ 27. xaias ay (dxodovboin) éx ray ovoroixwy] asthe consequences would 
follow (if, whenever the topic were applied) in general, so here ‘in all the 
rest’, in the particular case of the rhecforical application of them, the 
same consequences do actually follow. Perhaps the general application 
of this topic, which seems to be understood in the protasis, may have a 
tacit reference to the more general treatment of the same in the dialec- 
tical Topics. I think that only one topic is here intended; so far as ov- 
oroxa are distinguished from mroges, the former includes the latter as 
the genus the species. 

With this topic compare Rhet. I1 23, 2, Top. T 3, 118 @ 34—39. The 
instances of mraois there given are the substantive and corresponding 
adverb, Ssxatoovvn Sixaims, avdpeia dydpeiws. ovoraya and mrages are 
explained, distinguished, (quite unintelligibly, however, were our informa- 
tion derived solely from this place,) and the use of them illustrated, in 
Top. B 9, 114.4 26—6 5. avorotya are coordinate /ogical notions, as 
dixaca and Bixaos with dcxatoovvn, av8peia and aydpeios with dydpeia; and 
again @ 38, dicacocuvy Bixasos Sixaov Sixaiws are coordinates. Also, a 29, 
ra wowrixa and ra duAdaxtina are coordinate with the things which they 
produce and preserve, as ra vyewa With vyiea, ra evexrixa with evefia. 
sroces are these same coordinates in their grammatical aspects—terms 
that can be similarly predicated, and applicable to the same things—and 
they are therefore sometimes identified with the others. The sraces 
‘inflexions’ of the same word are not confined to the mere ‘ declension’ of 
nouns, substantive or adjective, (the nominative is the casus rectus, or 
steots opOy, improperly so called, the noun in its upright or normal state 
or position, the casus or mrocets are fallings away, declensions, from that 
standard typical form by a change of termination!,) but include adverbs, 


1 Mept dpuyvelas 2,162 32, 7d 8 DSlAwvos F¥ Ditwm cal doa roalra, odk dré- 
para a\X\d wroees dvéparos. Poet. 20.10,1457218, rradcis 8’ dori» dvouaros F 
phuaros } uev 7d card rodrou 4 rodrw onpalvovea cal Goa roaira (cases), 4 8é card 
7d évi F woddots (numbers) oloy dvOpwros 7 dvyOpwwres, 4 32 xara 7a Uwoxpirind, olov 
car’ épwrnow 4 éwiragi» (moods of verbs). Illustrated by éSddier and Bdédife, 
indicative and imperative. mwragets are referred to the general head of rapidvuua. 


PHTOPIKH® A 7 § 28. 139 


ék THY TYeTOiXwY Kal TWY Cpoiwy TTWOEWY, Kat 
TaN’ dxodovOel: oiov Ei TO avdpeiws KaAALOV Kat 
aipeTWTEpoy TOU cwhpovus, Kal dvdpia cwhppocvrns 
aipetwrépa kai TO avdpeiov elvat Tov owhpoveir. 

28 kal  TavTes aipovyTae TOU py O TavTEs. Kal 6 Ot P. 1365. 


the generic and numerical terminations, masc. and femin., singular, dual, 
and plural, and the inflexions of verbs; in fact, as it appears, any change 
of termination which a root undergoes in passing into different parts of 
speech, and the inflexions of these: in Aristotle mraocs is a ‘declension’ 
Jrom a root. This logical signification of ovoarotxyos and ovototxia iS 
‘transferred’ by metaphor, from the vazks of an army or of a chorus in 
the theatre (like dvricrpodos), to logic or grammar: but in either of the 
two senses, they always denote things on the same level, coordinates. 
Trendel. £7. Log. Arist. 75, Bonitz ad Metaph. A 5, 986 2 23. Xenophon, 
Conv. 2, 20, has avricrotyetv in the sense of ‘to be one’s opposite, or part- 
ner in a dance’. Anab. V 4, 12, éormoay ava éxarov padtota, oomep ol 
xopol, avricrotyovvres addAnAos, ‘in opposite, corresponding ranks’. In 
Met. l.c., and Eth. N.1 4, 1085 47, it is applicd to the ten parallel rows 
or columns of the opposite dpyai of the Pythagoreans, the two opposite 
members of the ten being in each case a avoroyia, or pair of coordinate 
conceptions. Hence evorotya are notions of the same order : as the four 
elements, which have the same rank, belong to the same row, i.e. order 
in nature, de Caelo 302 a 29; and hence, notions which fall under the 
same genus, as black and white, sweet and bitter; and even such as are 
under different genera, so long as they have something in common, de 
Sens. c. 7, 447 4 30, 448 a 14 and 16. 

In Aristotle therefore cvoroya and mraces, though occasionally iden- 
tified, are, when strictly and properly applied, distinguished thus: ovarotxa 
are /ogical notions or conceptions corresponding to things of the same 
rank or order in nature, having a wider and more comprehensive sphere 
of application than the mraoecs, which are grammatical like the ‘declen- 
sions’, from which the name is derived, and include the various deflex- 
ions or inflexions, expressed by changes of termination, from a root. 

Cicero’s contugata, which are defined Top. III 12, correspond to Ari- 
stotle’s wraécecs. Coniugata dicuntur quae sunt ex verbis generis cius- 
dem. Etusdem autem generts verba sunt, quae orta ab uno varie commu- 
tantur, ut sapiens sapienter sapientia. Haec verborum coniugatto av{vyia 
dicitur, ex qua huiusmodi est argumentum: si compascuus ager est, ius est 
compascere. 

Besides the authorities already referred to, see on this subject Waitz 
on mepi cpp. c. 2, 1641; Anal. Post. 11 15,7946; Trendel. Kategorien- 
lehre, p. 27 seq.; Donaldson, New Crat. § 227. 

§ 28. row p) (Gyros) 6 mayres (alpoivra:)] The negative of the preceding; 
‘than that which is #o¢ what all prefer’. 


Top. % 10, 1484 10, wPérAtpov, Woheripws, wheAnxos are wrwoas. Ib. Hr, 1516 
30, 1583 6 285—34, where several examples are given. 


140 PHTOPIKHS A 7 §&§ 29—31. 
, al e 9 , ) 8 A nd = , 
awXelous 4 of é€AaTTous: ayabov yap nv ov martes 
e Pe F a a ev e 
edievrat, ware kai petCov ov padAov. Kai 0 ot 
’ ~ a“ e > 1 A © , bad A 
audirBnrouvres n ot €xOpot nH ot Kpivovres 7 ous 
N wv s ~ 
oUTOL Kpivovow* TO Mev yap ws av Ee wavres caiev 


> (4 A 4 e S 4 e 3 , 4 e a s = 
29 €aTi, TO S€ of KUptoe Kai of ELdOTES. Kal OTE MEV OU 


a ~ N A e 
MAvTES METEXOVEL MELCOV ATYLia yap TO My METEXELY 


ey t ‘ oA @ wm 7 (4 ’ ‘ 
30 OTE Oe OU pndeis N OU OALyoL' OTAaNWTEpOY yap. Kat 


. 9 U4 , , s) ¢ e b) 
Ta eTmaweTwrepa’ KadNiw yap. Kat wy at Tyrac 
, i) A e/ , a 
peiCous, doavtws yap TYysn WoTEp asia Tis EaTiv. 
v 4 .Y ~ e , 
kat wy at Cypiat weiCous. Kal Ta TwWY OMoAOYOULEVWY 


#v] ‘was’ as we have said, c. 6. 2. ov padror] (epievra:). 

ol duduaBnrovvres] ‘rival claimants or competitors’. 

4 of €xOpoi] c. 6.24. This applies especially to contested superiority 
in personal excellences or accomplishments. If rivals and enemies, (ro per) 
who are most interested in disparaging their adversary, and most inclined 
to do so, if even ‘hese admit his superiority, we may take it for granted 
that every one else will do so, and therefore this is equivalent to the uni- 
versal admission of it (ws av ef mavres haiev). If ‘judges’, those that have 
the right to decide by reason of special qualification, the artist or pro- 
fessor, the expert or adept in any pursuit or study, or those whom they 
select as qualified to pronounce a decision, if such as ¢hese decide in 
a man’s favour, then it is the decision (rd 8é) of ‘ authorities’, as it were, 
men empowered and entitled, or who have fhe right (xupios) to judge and 
decide, and (or rather, ‘ because of’) fhe special knowledge which the 
occasion requires (of eidéres); and this decision is final. Compare notes 
on 6, 25, 7.21. 

Victorius and Schrader appear to confine xpive:y to its judicial sense of 
deciding a legal cause, os ovro: xpivovor being those who are selected or 
deputed to try a particular case when the ordinary judges are prevented 
from being present themselves. If there were any doubt between the 
two interpretations, the question would be decided by the following 
passage: éxacros 8¢ xpives cakes & ywwodaKet, xal rovrey coriv dyabos Kpirys. 
Eth. N. 11, 1094 6 27. 

os dv ei] Note on xay el, 11. 5, p. 9. 

§ 29. This topic also is best exemplified in personal advantages, ac- 
complishments, or possession. It can be applied either way. Sometimes 
(cré pév, Zorww Ore, eviore), in some cases, the superior value of a possession 
of this kind is in proportion to its universality, because the greater the 
number of those who have the advantage, the greater the disgrace of 
being without it (a case of crépnats, § 16): in other cases the reverse may 
be maintained on the principle that the scarcity of a thing lends it a supe- 
rior value, § 14. 

§ 30. xadAlw yap] § 24. Virtue is the only true object of ‘ praise’, 
grawos. Introd. Appendix Bk. 1, c. 9, p. 212 seq. 

ay ai ripai x.r.A.] ‘and things (especially actions) may be regarded as 





PHTOPIKH> A 7§ 31. 141 
7 Pawouevov peyarawy pei(w. Kal Siaipouyeva oé 


‘greater’, or superior in respect of their power or effect, of which the 
honours or rewards are greater; because honours and rewards are as 
it were (may be considered) a kind of valuation, estimate of the value, 
of a thing, agia, which will afford a comparison, or measure of the 
comparative value of two things: and the opposite acts which involve 
a higher penalty, are superior in a sense, more important and effective. 
(npia, not ‘losses’, awoBvAai, as it has been understood, but ‘ penalties’, 
directly opposed to razai ‘rewards’. So Victorius. 

§ 31. Things which are, at first sight, or can be shewn to be, greater 
than others which are universally acknowledged to be great or are mani- 
festly so, are seen to be so at once and without reflexion, present them- 
selves at once as such, @awopzeva. A conspicuous instance of this common 
sense of davopevos, apparent, manifest to the eye, occurs Rhet. 11 2, 1 (see 
note) in the definition of opy7. Comp. I 9.32, 8.6; HI 2.9. 

cai dsvaipovpeva x.r.A.] This and the following are purely rhctorical 
topics, and belong rather to the third book, Ox sty/e. One mode of ex- 
aggerating the importance of anything, of making it assume a magnitude 
which it does not really possess, is in the way of description, to break up 
into parts or describe in detail what might be stated summarily as a 
whole. ‘The same facts or events’, when thus individually represented, 
will ‘seem greater’ than if they were all summed up together in one 
statement ; because in the former case the excess or superiority, in point 
of importance and interest, of the facts exhibited in detail over the sum- 
mary statement, will seem to be shewn ‘in more points’, which are all 
brought severally into view. mde:ovwr vmepexew is ‘to exceed in a greater 
number of points’, whether we understand the genitive as one of guan- 
tity ‘in more things’, which is probably right, or as the comparative 
genitive after umepéxesy, ‘to surpass more things’, by which the mean- 
ing is not so distinctly expressed: in either case it is the number of 
things detailed that makes the superior impression. The use of this 
topic is well illustrated by Quintilian, Inst. Or. VIII 3. 61 sq., who how- 
ever refers the strong impression produced by this detail to the évépyeia 
or vividness of the picture. § 67, sic urbium captarum crescit miseratio. 
Sine dubio enim gut dicit expugnatam esse civitatem complectitur omnia 
guaccungue talis fortuna recipit, sed in affectus minus penetrat brevis 
hic velut nuncius. Atst apertas haec, et cet. (then follows the description]. 
Majoragius refers to Cicero’s description of Pompey’s military experience 
in the speech gro lege Manilia, and Gaisford to Harris, Philol. Ingut- 
ries, p. §8 [on p. 62, this passage of the Rhet. is quoted]. Ae assigns 
this to ‘accumulation’ and ‘concatenation’. Shakespeare, in the 
Tempest, will supply us with a brilliant example: The cloud-capp’d 
towers, the gorgeous palaces, the solemn temples, &c. [IV. i. 152} Comp. 
Acts of the Apostles, ii. 9 seq., where the wonder of the gift of tongues 
is heightened by the enumeration in detail of all the different nations 
whose language was spoken; ‘ Parthians, and Medes, and Elamites.’ 
Bacon’s Colours of Good and Evil (Vol. vit p. 81, Ellis and Sped. 
ed.), No. 5, is a good commentary on this topic in its most general 
application. 


142 PHTOPIKH® A 7 §3r1. 


> 4 , \ » 4 c i , ‘ 
eis Ta MEepn Ta avTa peiCw caiveTat’ mrELOVwWY yap 
4 €. v ~ 
Umepexew Paiverar. Sev Kai 6 months not weioat 
4 4 ~ 
Aeyoucav Tov MeXeaypov dvarrnvat 
e/ as » , , ~ wv e , 
daca kak’ avOpwroiot wed THY GoTY ddwN’ 
4 A , ~ 
Aaol pev PAwOover, modrw be Te TVp duabuver, 
, , > w# 4 
Téexva S€ T aAAOL ayouow,. 
4 A Sf 4 ‘93 ~ ee 9 4 
kat To ouvTiBeva Oe cal érrouodopeiv, womep Eiyap- 


A¢yoveay] is omitted in MS A°, and consequently put in brackets by 
Buhle and Spengel. The latter adds, Praef. ad Rhet. Gr. p. vi, ‘aliud 
excidisse videtur, v. c. rapaxocrey.’ [‘Intellige rjv yuvaixa, quo aegre cares’. 
Spengel, ed. 1867. S.] ‘Deest A€yovoay in Cod. antiquissimo Victorii, et 
videtur sane illud interpolatum esse. Uncinos applicavi’. Buhle. 

© rownrns Gyo] Homer to wit, IL 1x 592. The reading of the Vulg. is 
xnde oo avOpeoroac. wéede tov dotry addy dvdpas péy xreivovat, and 
the rest as quoted by Ar. This example is the same as that given by 
Quintilian. Victorius thinks that he borrowed it from Aristotle. Spald- 
ing, ad Quint. VIII 3. 67, quotes the following Schol. on IL xv 496, 
referring to the other passage of Homer: fnropixds ro év mpaypa, ri 
swopOnoww, els modAd Karepepicey. 

TO cuvriOévar cal éroixodopeiv] are added to the preceding topic of 
‘detail’ as closely akin to it. That the first at all events is so, may be 
inferred from the identification of ‘detail’ with ‘accumulation’ by Harris, 
p. 58, above quoted. The two figures are ‘accumulation’ and ‘climax’. 
érotxodopnors is the building up of one phrase upon (émi) another, one rising 
above another step by step, like the rounds of ‘a ladder’ («Aiua€), or the 
Stages of a building. Rhet. ad Alex. 3 (4). 9, érotxodopotvra ro érepov os 
ériré Erepoy afew rpome rode, which is then illustrated. Arist. de Gen. 
An. 1 18, 34, 724 @ 28, ére 8€ mapa ravra ws "Enixappos moet thy érotxodo- 
pnow, éx tis ScaBodrns Wy AoWopia, ex 8é ravirns y payn, ratra 8€ wavra Ex 
Tivos 7) apy} THs Kuwyjoews. Eustath. ad Hom. II. B, p. 181, rd 8€ oxjpa 
rou pnOevros xwpiov (verse 101) xAipaxa cal kAyuaxwrov A€yovaww of madatoi, 
érepos 8 érrotxodopnow. yiverar 8€ ocxipa KAtuaxwroy Orav TO Ajyov HS 
dbacaans évwoias apxy yévnras tis éhetns, olov as ef ris etry, 6 Bacsdevs 
dyafés, 6 ayabos dyaba roel, 6 dyaba mousy evepyetet, 6 evepyerav Oedy 
pipeiras, x.r.A. Demetrius mepi éppnveias § 270 (111 320, Rhet. Gr. Spengel) 
AapBavoirr av cai 7 KAipak (Sic) cadoupén, os mapa AnpooGéve:, ro (de Cor. 
§ 179, p. 288) ovx elroy pév tavra, ovx typawa 8é ovd3' &ypawa pév, ove 
émpéaBevoa 8¢ ob émpéoBevoa pév, ovx érecoa 8€ trovs OnBaiovs’ sxedov 
yap érava8aivoyrs (mounting a staircase or a hill, from higher to higher) 
© Aoyos gorxey ét peiCova. This figure by the Latin Rhetoricians is called 
gradatio, Cic. de Or. III §4. 207, Quint. IX 3. §4—7, where it is explained 
and illustrated by the same passage of Demosth. and from Latin authors. 
In Auct. ad Heren. Iv 25, it is thus defined: Gradatio est, in gua non 
ante ad consequens verbum descenditur quam ad supertus conscensum 
est, and then illustrated. See Aquila Romanus, cited by Ernesti, Lex. Zech. 
Gr. et Lat. sub vv. xripa€, et gradatio, and at length by Schafer, Ap. Crit. 
ad Demosth. p. 288, 8, Vol. 11 p. 250. Aquila calls it ascensus. 








PHTOPIKH® A 7§ 32. 143 


( A > 4 ”~ , e ‘) , 
Mos, dia Te TO avTé TH Stawpéoe (4 yap ocuvbecrs 
4 
vmrepoxny SEeikvuct moNArv) Kai STi doxn Halverat 
, , 
32 MeyaAwv kal aitiov. éwel b€ TO yadeTWTEpOY Kal 


worep "Enlyappos|] Besides the illustration of the figure climax from 
Epicharmus quoted above from the de Gen. Anim., there is another and 
a more complete one in Athen. 11 36 C. D, indicated by Schrader, ex pév 
Gucias Boivn, éx 8¢ Goimns wocts éeyévero, éx 8€ méatos Kepos, ex Kdpov & eyé- 
vero Ovavia, éx 8¢ Gvavias dinn, éx dixns 3é xatradixn, éx dé xaradixns wédat TE 
kai odaxeXos xal (npial. 

dua re rd auto rq dsaipéces] Two reasons are now given for the im- 
pression that these two figures make upon the hearer: the first, the same 
as that which accounts for it in the case of diaipeois ; the accumulation of 
particulars, and the rising by steps to a climax, have the same effect as 
the division or detail, in increasing the number of effective strokes, and 
so producing the impression of superiority, 7 yap ovvOeots Urepoyny dei- 
xyvow sroAAny : and secondly, you make that which you are endeavouring to 
magnify appear to be the cause and origin of a number of important effects, 
which you seem to multiply by detailing them. The following passage of 
the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3 (4), §§ 10, 11, will serve as a commentary on this 
and the entire section: ovAAnBdnw 8é, day roAAay airtoy drogaivys, cay re 
ayabiy éay Te kak, péyaha paveiras. oxomeiv 8¢ kal ro mpaypa Grotov aveirat 
xara pépn Siatpovpevov fj} xaboAou Acyopuevoy, nat Crorépws Gv peilov F, Tovde 
Tov Tpomoy avTo héyew. Tas pev oly avénoes ovTM perioy TAElaTAaS ToWCES 
kal peyioras, ramewooes 8 Trois Aoyos Kat ra dyabda cai ra Kaka Tov évavrioy 
Tpomoy periov, ws elpnxayev xl roy peydrwy, cal padvora pev dy pndevos 
airtoy émiBerxvuns, ei 8¢ py Os €AaXioTwy Kai opixporaray. 

§ 32. éwel 8€ rd yaXerorepoy xai oramorepoy peifov}] supr.§ 14. An 
exemplification of this topic is found in Eth, Nic, vill 15, 11634 12, of pev 
yap waOovres rovaita act AaBeiv wapa Tay evepyerav & pixpa Hy éxeivots Kal 
é£qv map’ érépwv AaBeiv, karacpixpifovres’ of 8 dvdrakw ra péyiota Tey wap 
avrois, kai Gd map’ dAAwy ovk fy, kal év x.wdvvois 7} TovavTas ypetais. The ad- 
ditional value or importance for good or for evil that things, especially 
actions, acquire at particular ages or times of life (illustrated in the Topics), 
in particular places, at particular times, at particular critical seasons and 
occasions (xatpoi), or from the special nature of the powers or faculties 
that are called into exercise (8vydues), is derived from the scarcity of 
such things and actions, and the difficulty of obtaining or performing 
them. The ratpos in two aspects is exemplified in the Topics, I 2, 117 


1 Miillach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. p. 143, gives these lines as corrected by Meineke, 
Dindorf, and Bochart. 
A. é« per Ovelas Oolva, 
éx 82 Oolvas wéors éyévero. B. xapler, os 7 euly Soxei. 
A. é« 8@ wéovos xpos, éx xdpou 3° éyerel’ tala, 
éx 8’ tavlas Slea, ‘x Sixas 8 éyévero xaradlaa, 
éx 82 xaradleas wédac re wal opadds (the stocks) wal faula. 
The other passage, in the de Gen. An., Miillach attempts to correct himself, 
and produces this melodious verse, p. 144, 
éx SiaPodGs popos éyévero, wodd08 3’ éx podpmov udya. 


144 PHTOPIKHS A 7 § 32. 


, ~ 4 e \ i e ie , 4 
OTAVUWTEDOV peiCov, K@i Ol Kaipol Kal al NALKLQL Kat 


e , \ e 4 A e ( ~ , 
Oi TOTO Kal Of Ypovot Kai at SuvapeErs TrOLOVat MEYaAa: P- 27. 


) ‘ ‘ , \ > € , A A ‘ 
ei yap jwapa duvauw Kat map 1AiKtav Kat Tapa Tous 
€ , \ , a vn 8 ~ aA U ef 
Guotous, Kai et ovTws  evtavda n TOO, E€Et 
peyeOos Kal KadNwv Kal dyabov Kai Sikaiwy Kat Twv 
ee A ~ 4 
évavTiwv. O0ev kai TO émiypaupa Tw OAUETLOVIKN’ 


a 26—6 21. Add Prov. xv. 23, a word spoken in due season, how good ts it. 
xpoves is illustrated by the case, already quoted, of Sir Phil. Sidney, and 
the cup of cold water at the battle of Zutphen [p. 84]: Suvapecs, as Aristotle 
himself tells us, applies to cases in which any one does something 
“beyond his powers’, above his ordinary level, and more than you would 
expect from him; and mapa rovs opoious is exemplified by the epigram and 
the saying of Iphicrates. 

xai ef ovrws «.7.A.] ‘and if such things be done (ovres), at particular 
places or times, they will acquire a magnitude and importance in things 
(i.e. actions) right, and good, and just, and their opposites’. ovrws may 
however mean under particular circumstances. 

TO ériypappa to oAvpmovixy|] The substantive taking the same case 
as the verb from which it is derived is illustrated in the dative by Mat- 
thiae, Gr. G7.§ 390. Stallbaum on Phaedo 88 c. Soph. 252 D. and Euthyphr. 
13 D, 15 A. Add, Aesch. Agam. 415, wrepois dmradois Umvov xeArevbors. 
Soph. Oed. Col. ra yap 8cdq rq py Saig Krypar’ ovxl owfera. Trach. 
668, ‘HpaxX«i Swpnuarwy. Aj.696, Wunder ad loc. Eur. Ion, 508, ra Geobev 
réxva Ovarois. Iph. T. 1384, ovpavod méaonpa (i. €. ro ax’ ovpavod menrwxos). 
Plat. Parmen. 128 C, Theact. 177 A, Gorg. 522 D, Symp. 182 D, Rep. v1 
493 D, 498 B. Ar. Pol. VII (VI) 5, 1320 @ 32, BonOea rois drdpos. Some 
examples of an analogous construction, in which a substantive follows the 
ordinary construction of a verb, with prepos. and subst., are given by 
Stallbaum on Phaedogg B. Add to these, Plat. Protag. 354.4, Gorg. 472 E, 
Rep. 11 378 D, Eur. Herc. Fur. 1334, orésbavos “EAAnvwy vio, Arist. Eth. N. 
X 9, 1179 4 25, émpéXeca trav avOporay ind Oeav, Categ. 8 6 32, peraBoAn 
Ure vooov, de Anima B. 8, 11, 420 5 27, 9 mAny) Tou depos Ur Tis Wuxis. 

This epigram is expressly attributed to Simonides by Eustath. ad 
Hom. p. 1761, 24 (Buhle). It ts found in the Anthol. 1 80 (ed. Jacobs), 
No. 107 of the Epigrams attributed to Simonides. Bergk, Fragm. Lyr. 
Pp. 793 [p. 921, 2nd ed.], Simonidis Fragm. 166. 

Eustathius 1. c. explains dowAa, oxedos re txOunpov. It is described by 
Hemsterhuis ad Hesychium s.v. adorvmoAei, as a tugum, a sort of wooden 
yoke, which was carried over the two shoulders to support the fish-baskets. 


1 xaipés ‘due season’, ‘the right time’, ‘occasion’, ‘opportunity’, the time 
suitable, appropriate, to the performance of anything, is that form of good which 
comes under the Category of time, xpévos; Eth. Nic. 1 4, 1096426. On this the 
Paraphrast (Andronicus Rhodius) notes, fort yap 6 xatpds 6 éwirtSecos éxdorp 
xedvos. Pind. Pyth. 1X 82, 6 xaipds wayrds Exe xopupdy. Ib. 1V 286 (508). Soph. 
Electr, 75, xaipés dvipdow wéyrros Epyou wavrds for’ émtordrys. Philoct. 837. 


ne _ casement 





PHTOPIKHS A 7 §& 33, 34. 145 


, A ’ > ww Wf ~ vf 
mpooGe pev aud’ wuoirw Exwy Tpaxelay aoidAav 
oe of ? of 
txOus é€ ‘Apyous eis Teyeav Edepov. 
‘ e 9 , e A ’ , , 9 ° 
kat 6 ‘Idixpatns avtov évexwuiaCe AEywv EF wv 
33 umnpke TavTa. Kai TO av’Todves TOU émKTnToV’ 
, e a 
xarerwrepoy yap. dev kal 6 romTns pnow 
9 , 9 > J 
avTodioakTos 6° Ei. 
A ‘ , , 4 c ~ N 
34Kat TO MeyaXou peyioTtov pépos, oiov TepikAns Tov 


Alciphron I, 1. p. 6, evOus odv oyavac mAjotov, kat ras doidAas érapious 
dveopevor, xat ras éxarépwbev onvpidas éfaprncavres (quoted in Anthol.). 
Otherwise called rvAn. Arist. Ach. 860, 954. Diog. Laert. 1X 53, of Pro- 
tagoras, who mporos rny xaXoupernv TvAny, é€f hs ra dopria Bacrafovcry, 
evpev, &s now "ApiororeAns ev rp wep) raideias’ poppoddpos yap 7}, ws Kal 
’"Emtxoupos zrov gyot. So that Protagoras may be added to the examples 
of ¢£ ofa» els ola, 1 9.31, or €€ dy Umipxe ravra. 

The exclamation of Iphicrates ‘from what I rose to this’ (from what 
an origin this my fortune was made) is repeated in a more correct form 
(Buhle) inc. 9. 31, €& ofwy es ofa, as is also part of the Epigram. Plu- 
tarch, Apophth. Reg. et Imp., under the head of Iphicrates, Nos. 1 and 5, 
has these notices of him. “Idixparns 8oxav vids elvat oxvtoropou Kateppo- 
veiro’ Sofay 8€ tore mpwros Zoxe Gre Tpavpatiay moAdmiov Gydpa pera Trav 
GrAov (avra cuvapracas els riv davrov rpijpn peréveyxev. No. 5, mpds 8€ 
“Appodtoy rov Tov madatod ‘Appodioy droyovoy els dvayéveray adr@ Nodopov- 
pevoy En, To pev euov am’ euou yevos dpxerat, rd 8€ coy év col maverat. 

§ 33- ro avrodves rov émixrnrov| ‘native superior to acquired talents 
and advantages (of person, mind or character), because they are harder to 
come by’; safure being rather chary of such gifts, and the acguisttion of 
them comparatively easy. Top. I, 116 6 10, cai rd duces rod py duces, 
oloy 1 Scxatoovvn tov dtxaiov' ro pev yap duces ro & éxixrnrov. This topic 
has a wider scope than the rhetorical, and again, c. 4, 119 @ 7—IO. 
Comp. Pind. O1. 1X 152, ro 38¢ dug xparioroy dmay. I1 155, woos 6 moAda 
el8as bug’ pabovres 8€ AaBpot mayyAwooia dxpayta yapvepev Atos mpos 
opuya Oetov. Nem. 111 69, ovyyevet 8€ ris dpera peya Bpider’ os 8é diddur’ 
Zyes Wednvos amp. Specie autem comparantur ut anteponantur quae 
propter se expetenda sunt tis quae propter alind: ut innata atgue tnusita 
assumplis et adventitits et seq. Cic. Topic. XVIII 69. 

6 moinrns| Homer. Odys. x’ (XXII) 347. 

§ 34. olow IepixAijs roy émtragdioy x.rd.] This celebrated simile does 
not occur, as is well known, in the funeral oration put into Pericles’ mouth 
by Thucydides in his second book. Thucydides, who merely gives the 
general meaning of his speakers and never their actual words, may have 
omitted it intentionally, if Pericles really made use of it. But as Hero- 
dotus, VII 162, attributes nearly the same identical words to Gelo, it 
seems more probable that it was erroneously ascribed to the other: at all 
events it is quite clear that it could not have been original in his mouth. 
It appears, likewise, in a somewhat altered form, in Euripides (Suppl. 447, 
wes oby ér Gy yevor’ ay icxupa modes, Cray tis ws Aequedvos Hpiwod oraxyuy 

AR. I. 10 


146 PHTOPIKH®: A 7 § 35. 


emeTagpiov Aeywu, THY veOTNTa €K TIS WoAEwS avn- 
phodat womep TO ap €k ToU éviavToOU Et é£aypeBein. 
35 Kai Ta eV Xpelg HeiGont Xpno ima, oiov Ta év "yrpat 
cai voros. Kai dvoiy To éyyvTEpov Tov TéAOUS. Kal 
TO avTw Kai amAws. Kal TO duvaTov Tov adduvaTou: 


Téodpas adaipy xdrodwri{y #€ovs), who no doubt might have borrowed it 
from Pericles; and it is ascribed to Demades by Athenaeus, III 99 D. It 
is repeated in Rhet. 111 10. 7. 

§ 35- ra ép yxpeig...pet(om ypnowa (pel{w dari)] A friend in need ts a 
Sriend indeed. ‘Auget manifesto vim beneficiorum tempus, angustiaeque 
eorum qui beneficium accipiunt, quod etiam Demosthenes in Leptinem 
significavit (p. 471, 1), wavres pév yap elow tows adfiot yapw dyraroAap- 
Bdvew of mpotmapxovres r@ woteiv twas eb, padtora S€ ol mapa ras xpeias.’ 
Victorius. Comp. Eth. N. VIII 15, 1163 @ 16, in estimating the value of ser- 
vices to a friend, when you wish to make the most of them you say that 
they are ra peyiera roy wap’ avrois (the best you have to give), xui & map’ 
@Awy ovK fy, xat dv xuvdyvots  rovavracs ypeiats. 

duoiy ro éyyvrepoy rov réXovs] This topic is distinguishable from those 
in §§ 9 and 16. There the comparison is between end and not-end: here 
it is between different degrees or orders of means to an end. Top. r 
1, 116 6 22, quoted on § 9. Alexander, in his Comm. on that passage, 
illustrates this by the comparison of shaving and exercise as means to the 
end, health; the active exercise of dpery (this is the definition of evdatpovia 
in the Eth. Nic.) to the mere éf«s of it, as nearer to the end, happiness ; : 
in practical arts, the higher and more comprehensive are superior to the 
Narrower and subordinate in each department, the latter being mere 
means to some higher end ; so horsemanship is superior to the saddler’s 
art, both being subordinate, but the former nearer, to the end, the mili- 
tary art; the woodman’s and carpenter’s arts as means to shipbuilding; 
medicine and gymnastics as both tending to a healthy habit of body. 

ro avr@ xal awdas}] The comparison in the expression of this topic is 
left to be understood, and the two terms are merely placed in juxta- 
position by xai, one and the other are laid before us, in order that we 
may choose between them. The topic is a comparison of absolute good, 
or good in general, and relative good. That which is absolutely good, 
or good in itself, caf avro, or good in general, need not be the best for 
us (‘to a man’s own self’), any particular individual, avrg, though theo- 
retically, from the higher point of view, it is SupeHor to the other. Top. 
1, 1166 8, ro dwdas dyabov rov rivd aiperarepoy! . Alexander, in his 
Comm. on Top. p. 125 (Top. 116 6 26, 76 Suvaréy Kal aduvaroy), illustrates 
this by the contrast of immortality and long life, which will apply as 


1 The comparison of these two topics well illustrates the difference of 
treatment in dialectical and rhetorical reasoning. In the former that which is 
generally and theoretically true is put forward: in the latter, looking at this 
same question from the practical side, we see that there are many exceptions, 
and that this other side is equally capable of being maintained. 


PHTOPIKHE A 7 § 36. 147 
A ‘ ‘ e ~ \ 3 7 A \ 3s 4 ~ 
TO pev yap avTw, To 8 ov. Kat Ta év TENE TOU 
36 Biove +réAn yap uadAov Ta pos TH TENE. Kal Ta 
N 9 4 ~ A , LA ) ~ . 

apos aAnOeav rev mpos Sofav. opos d€ Tov mpos P. 1365 4. 


well to the drAds and avrg as to that for which it is immediately in- 
tended: immortality may perhaps be absolutely the best, most desirable 
in itself, but it is out of our reach; for ws therefore a long life, which 
may possibly be attained, is better: it is of no use to choose or prefer 
immortality. Another example is supplied by Heraclitus’ dictum, quoted 
in Eth. Nic. X 5, 1176.4 7, that an ass would prefer any rubbish or refuse 
(cuppara) to gold; because it is pleasanter to Aim. Comp.115. 12, ro 
dwhas dyaboy aipeira: ovdeis, dAda Td avrg. 

aur (al. av’r@) [on p. 146] is the reading of Vict., Buhle, Gaisf., Bekker, 
Spengel, and Bonitz, Arist. Stud. 1 p. 88. It is the equivalent of revi in the 
familiar antithesis of general and particular good, as in the passage of the 
Topics above quoted ; comp. I 9. 17 avrg, I 15.20, If 13. 9, rd pew yap 
ouphépor avrg dyaboy dort, rd 8é naddv andes: and as in the repetition of 
the antithesis, 1 15.12, it assumes the form of avrg, ‘ good to a man’s own 
self’, i.e. each particular individual, it is quite plain that the one form 
can in many cases be substituted for the other. On avrov for avrot and 
the rest, see Waitz, Org. p. 486,54 414. Rhet. 1 1. 12, dvayxn &’ atrev 
nrragdu. Also, Buttm. Excurs. X ad Dem. c¢. Mid. p. 140, de formis aireyv 
etavrov. # for ral, which is adopted by Vict. and Gaisf., and suggested 
by Bonitz, L c., is, as I have above endeavoured to shew, unnecessary. 

vo duvardy rou ddusdrov] Top. I’ 1, 116 4 26. See Alexander’s example 
in the last note but one. Another occurs in II 2. 2, on anger, 00 per yap 
Td ofeoOa revgerOa wy eierat, ovdels 84 Tar hayopever dduvdroy épieras 
avrg, 6 8 epyiCopevos epieras avrp. We deliberate, with a view to action, 
and that which is 40 be preferred of two courses of action, only about 
things which we believe to be possible, and possible to us, xdv pév ddvvdre 
éyrixaow, ddiorayra...dav 8€ Suvardy paivnrat éyyespovos wparrew. Eth. 
Nic, I 5, 1112 8 25. 

This topic is stated as a consequence from the preceding; the possible 
is to be preferred to the impossible, because the attainable good is the 
only good for us, ro per yap avrg, ro 8 ov. 

ra dy réXes rov Biov] The end in question is not the temporal end, but 
the final cause. The rédos is in itself good, 7. 8,9; 6. 2; the higher or 
nearer to the end (ra pds rq réAes) are any of the means employed for 
the attainment of it, the more they approximate in their character to the 
end itself; hence ra éy réXet rov Biov, the means included in, or those 
which subserve, the end of life—happiness, or whatever else the end of 
life may be—are in so far superior, being nearer to that great and final 
end, than other means to other and lower ends. Top. T 1, 116 6 23, ro 
mpoe TO rou Biov TéAos aiperorepoy padrAoy # Td mpos GAXO TH, Oloy TO wpos 
evdatporviay cuvreivoy 4 To wpos Ppornow. 

§ 36. rd apes ddjOaay ray wpds dcfay] the real and the apparent or 
sham ; ro eivas and ré Soxeiv, ro Sy and rd aivoperoy ; the solid, genuine, sub- 
stantial reality contrasted with the mere outside show and ‘ appearance’ ; 
or truth as absolute certainty, and prosad/e opinion. Top.T 3, 118 4 20, 

10—2 


148 PHTOPIKHS A 7 § 37. 


dofav, 0 AavOdvew péAAwY ovK av EXoLTO. 610 Kal 
TO €&U TacyeW Tou ev Toeiy Sofeev av aipeTwreEpcy 
elvat’ TO ev yap Kav AavOavn aipnoerat, moi 
37 ev AavOavwy ov Soxei av éAéoOat. Kai doa elvat pad- 
Aov 4 Soxeiv BovAovraty moos dAnOeray yap paddAov. 


wai el TO mex Ot aro 76 be dia thy Sofay alperoy (aiperarepoy éariv), olov 
vyleca kédAous. (ryy pev yip vyleay 8: adrny alpovpeba xd pndeis ciocoOas 
BeadAg, To 8é Kdddros dia Hv ex’ alr@ Sofav’ parasov youw Boxei ro KadXos 
elvas py yvopiCopevov. Alex. Aphrod. ad loc.) Aesch. Sept. c. Th. 592, of 
Amphiaraus the just, .ov yap Soxeiy Sixatos add’ eivas OéAe. This topic is 
No. 3, in Bacon’s Colours of Good and Evil (Works, ed. Ellis and Sped- 
ding, VII 79). It is shewn to fail in the case of virtue ; the virtuous man 
‘ will be virtuous #% solitudine, and not only zz ¢heatro’. 

Spos 8 raw mpos Sogay x.rdr.] Top. 1. c. 6 21, dpos 8€ rot pos ddfay ro 
pndevos ayve8oroc ph dv grovdaoa vrapyew. ‘The distinguishing mark or 
characteristic of that which is directed to mere opinion (is found in) any- 
thing that a man would not choose if he were sure that it would not be 
known or recognised by others’, And the same thing is expressed in the 
Topics, ‘anything which a man would not be anxious to possess if no 
one else was to be privy to it’, It is the credit of possessing the thing, 
in the eyes of others, and not the mere possession for its own sake, that 
gives it its value and superiority. Compare with this a ua AavOdver x.1.X. 
§ 40, which gives the other side of the question. 

In the example, the superiority of receiving to conferring a benefit, 
the words dofeey dy suggest that we need not take this for granted; it can 
be ‘made to appear’ that it is true, but the real truth lies on the other 
side of the question; from a higher point of view, to confer is better 
than to receive a benefit. 

§ 37- doa elvat paddov x.r.A.] The difference between this and the pre- 
ceding topic seems to lie in this. That lays down the general rule, and 
refers to ‘every thing’ that comes under it; and is therefore appealed to, 
mpos dAjOecay yap padAoy, as the warrant and foundation of this. The 
second is a special variety of the first, ‘what men wish ¢o de’; the quali- 
ties, such as virtues, which they desire to possess, or seem to possess. 
Here again the reality is preferable to the mere credit and external 
appearance of the virtue. ‘And, therefore, it is a vulgar and popular 
opinion (dai, Plat. Rep. 11 358 A; and not merely the doctrine of the 
vulgar, of sroAAoi, but maintained also by would-be philosophers, as Thra- 
symachus and Callicles) that justice is a thing of small value (mean and 
contemptible), because the appearance of it is preferable to the reality, 
whereas in the case of health it is the reverse’. Victorius quotes, in exem- 
plification of daci, two iambic lines from Plutarch de Aud. Poet. p. 18 p, 
rou pey Bixaiov tiv Scxnow dpyvaco, ra 8 épya rod way Spavros évba xepdaveis. 
Eur. Ixion. Fr. 1. Dind. Quoted also in Stobaeus p. 30,8 Another frag- 
ment to the same effect is ascribed by Valckenaer (Dials. in Fragm. Eur. 
p. 166) to Euripides’ Ixion, 





PHTOPIKH® <A 7 § 38—40. 149 


4 q a id 5 8 Ss ee ~ 
do kat THv Stxarcoovvny pact puxpov eivat, OTe Soxety 

A 6 6F , 8 a 4 \ 
38.7 Elvat aipeTwTEpoY? TO O€ Uytaivey OU. Kal TO POS 

A ? < ‘ a ‘ a ¢ 
moNAa XPNTIMwWTEpOV, Oiov TO pos TO (HY Kai Ev CHY 
€ A) s Sd 4 
Kal Thv AOovnY Kai TO wWpaTTEW Ta Kada. 610 kal 6 
“~ U Ul =~ > ee 

woUTOS Kal i Uyiela péeyiota SoKel Elvat’ arravTa 

A ~ a ® e > ~ 
39 Yap Exe Ta’Ta. Kal TO aXvrroTEpoy Kai" pel HOovns’ 
c A e ? ef e , \ ee € ‘) » L) 
mT\Elw yap Evos, WOTE Umapyet Kai 4 dovy ayabov 

> ~ r) ~ ~ a 
kai 4 a\uria. «ai dvoiv 6 tw a’to mpooTBepevoy 
-~ \ oe ~ aia A , s v 
40 MeiCov TO GAov ot. Kal a py AavOaves wapovTa 7H 
8 ~ A 

AavOaveay mpos aAnOeav yap Teivee TavTa. Sto TO 


1 +70 infra, cum Bekker*, ‘sed melius abest alterum ré quod pr. A° om. et 
auctore Vahleno Bekker*.’ Spengel. 


§ 38. +o mpos woAAad ypnowerepor] Top. T 3, 118 5 27, ére dueAdobas 
wogayas TO aiperov A€yerat Kai Tiveoy yap oloy rov cupdepovros H Tov KaAoU 
i rou S¢os" ro yap mpos Gravra 7} mpos Ta mAciw xpnotpow alperdrepoy Gy» 
Umdpyot Tov 4y opoiws. Wealth and health are supposed to be of the highest 
value because they are serviceable in so many ways; for the support and 
preservation of mere life, and of a virtuous and happy life (for which they 
supply the means), also for pleasure and for good and noble actions. 

§ 39. xal ro dAumdrepov xai ro pe yovnys] Top. T 2, 117 4 23, xat 
ravra pe ndovis paddov f dvev y8ovas. wal ravra per’ dAvmias padXopy f pera 
Aumns. The desirability of anything even which is desirable in itself or 
on other grounds, as things useful, is increased by the addition of any 
pleasure that accompanies such things; so the évepyesas are completed 
and perfected by the accompanying néovq in each case, Eth. N. X 3, 4,5. 
And likewise the absence of pain, as compared with its presence, may 
be regarded asa positive good. The topic in the Rhetoric combines the 
two, positive pleasure and negative relief from pain; these together being 
‘more than one’ are superior to either of the two separately. «ai is 
therefore ‘together with’; and ore Umdpye xr.A. ‘and so (in the case 
supposed) we have (there are there, umapyec) the positive pleasure and 
the absence of pain, which may both be regarded as a good’. 

cat Svoty...rd GAow roet] A +B is greater than A + C, therefore B is 
greater than C. Top.T 5, 119 @ 22, ére éx ris mpocbecews, el rp avrg 
mpooriOépevuv TO GAOY pGAXAoy rrotei rotor, ef Tew Hrroy TOLOUTY mpooTiOe- 
pevoy TO OAOY padAoy motel Tororo. In the second of these two cases, if 
the addition of a quantity to the less of two other quantities makes the 
sum total of the two greater than the sum total arising from the addition 
of another different quantity to the other, we may infer that the former of 
the two added quantities is greater than or preferable to the latter. 4 is 
less than 6: if the addition of 8 to 4 produces a total 12, which is greater 
than the total resulting from the addition of an unknown quantity +, 
to 6, and therefore less than 12, we may infer (by calculation) that x is 
less than 8. 


§ 40. 9 AavOaver} a has been omitted, either by the author or a tran- 


150 PHTOPIKH® A 7 §41. 


~ ~ a ~ ~ 4 
mAoureiv avein av peiCov ayabov Tov Soxeiv. Kat p. 28. 


‘ » , A ~ ‘ ‘ ~ de 9 TAX 
TO ayannTov, Kai Tois ev povov Tots Oe WET aAAWDY. 


scriber. A similar omission occurs in Plat. Phaedr. 275 A, rovpavrioy 
eles } 8vvara. Similar examples quoted from Plato by Stallbaum (note 
ad loc.) make it probable that the oversight is due to the author. ‘Things 
that do shew themselves, and are conspicuous, have a greater air of 
reality about them than those that do not (that lurk out of sight), and 
may therefore lay claim to the preference’. 

3:d rd wAovreiv havein Gv peifov ayabdy rou Soxeiy] This, the vulgar 
reading, which Victorius found in all his Mss, is no inference or exem- 
plification of the preceding rule, though it is supported by Schrader, who 
however does not explain the connexion. If it be applied to the rule, 
the show or appearance, ro doxeiv, of wealth is said AavOavey, not to 
be seen; which is absurd. It does follow from the topic in § 37, and may 
possibly have been thence transferred to this place. Some MSS and the 
Greek Scholiast give mXoureiy... cai 8oxeiv, but it seems unlikely that 
the two verbs, if the combination of the two was intended, should be 
so widely separated; also «al rd Soxeiy would be required. This was 
corrected by Muretus, ro wAovreiy xal Soxeiy havein dy pei{ov dyaddy rov 
swAoureiy, which seems rather too violent an alteration. Brandis would 
adopt the reading of his anonymous commentator, &o0 ro mAovreip «ai 
Soxety daveln Gy pei{ow dyaby rov py Soxeiw (Schneidewin’s Philologus 
IV i p. 42), also conjectured by Vater, and confirmed by the Greek 
Schol,, who explains it, xat rd wAoureiy xai haiverOas peifoy rou mdovreiy 
xal py paiverOa:, Another mode of correction had occurred to me, the 
interchange, viz. of ro and rod, rov wAovreiv...ro doxeivy. The meaning of 
this would be, that the appearance or outward show of wealth, together 
with the wealth itself which it manifested, might upon this principle be 
made to appear superior to the wealth without the show, because the pos- 
sessor would lose all the credit of it—but this involves perhaps rather 
a non-natural interpretation of mpés aAn@eay reive. I am indebted to 
Mr Munro for a suggestion that deserves attention : the substitution of 
rp, for rov, doxeiw: the alteration is very slight, and gives an excellent 
sense; the value of wealth by this rule may be considered to be augmented 
by the addition of the prominent and conspicuous display of it. Bekker 
and Spengel retain the vulgate. 

§ 41. ro dyarnrov x.rA.] not here ‘to be acquiesced in’, ‘that which 
one may be content with’, (as in Eth. Nic. 1, 10944 19) ; nor in the reputed 
Homeric sense of ‘unique’, ‘only'’, but ‘highly valued’, ‘dearly prized’ 


2 Of the four places in which dyawyrds occurs in Homer, and is interpreted 
povoyerhs, unicus, one, Od. § 365, has the addition of pzobves, which seems to 
shew that there, at any rate, dyawyrdés cannot mean oivos or ovoyer$s; and 
in the others the translation ‘deasly beloved’ is just as suitable and probable. 
It is similarly explained (in the supposed Homeric sense) by many of the 
Interpp. of Matth. iii. 17, Mark i, 11, Luc. iii. 22, and other places where 
Christ is called 6 dyarnrds vids Geot. Dr Lightfoot, in Cams. Journ. of Classical 
and Sacred Philol. Vol. Wt. p. 92, No. 7, thinks that from the primary notion of 
cyawar ‘to welcome ’—which is undoubtedly its original and Homeric sense—it ex- 
presses rather the external act than the inward feeling, and should be translated 


PHTOPIKHE A 8§1. ISI 


A af 
Go Kal ovx ion Cymia, av tis Tov érepopbadrpov 
tuprAwon Kai Tov dv’ EyovTa’ ayanntrov yap adpn- 

x yanntov yap aby 
pura. 
> , S ~ A / 4 > “~ 

I ék Tivwy pév ovv O€t Tas TigTES Pepe ev Tw TWpO- CHAP. vim. 

, 9 » 
TpeTEW Kal aToTpETELY, OYEOOV ElpnTat’ peyiorTov 


(‘beloved’, something which one is very fond of. Comp. uaicus, as in 
Catullus, Carmen 64,215). So it is used in Eth. Nic. 1X 12 init. dowep rois 
€péet ro opay ayannrorarov. In Pol. 11 4,1262 623, the meaning is more 
doubtful, and the sense of ‘unique’ possible. Here it cannot have this 
meaning, because in some cases it is per’ dAAm», and it is only by the 
addition of povo» that the ‘great rarity’ which gives it its high value 
becomes the ‘solitary specimen’. Comp. Buttm. ad Mad. p. 567, note 398. 

érepopOadpov| Gaisford refers to a very pertinent passage of Dem. c. 
Timocr. p. 744, in which the orator tells with admirable conciseness a story 
of a one-eyed man of Locri, who under a law framed on the retaliatory 
principle (‘an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth’) was threatened by 
an enemy with the loss of his solitary visual organ. ‘ Vexed at this, and 
thinking life intolerable at the price, he is said to have ventured to pro- 
pose a law, that if any one deprived a one-eyed man of an eye, he should 
lose both his own in return, that the loss of each might be equalized’. This 
is a case of émieixesa, the spirit of the law rectifying the imperfection of the 
letter. Rhet. I 13. 13—19. 

This concludes the treatment of the genera/ principles and topics from 
which arguments may be derived by the political rhetorician in the deli- 
berative kind of Rhetoric: there remains one special subject under this 
head, which is indispensable to the orator who takes part in public busi- 
ness, and is sketched very briefly in outline in the next chapter, with 
a reference to the Politics for complete details. 


CHAP. VIII. 


§ 1. On the general connexion of this chapter with its context, on the 
two rhetorical uses of the study of Politics, and the various classifications 
of Constitutions by Aristotle in other works, by Plato and Polybius, see 
Introduction, p. 181—3, and Append. A, p. 208. 

‘The subject, which is most important and effectual (is of the highest 


in Homer rather by ‘fondled or caressed’, than ‘beloved’. Fritzsche, on Eth. 
Eud. 111. 6, 1233 4 2, renders roG d-yarnrov, fili7 unice dilects. See the references 
in his note. Heinsius, £xercit. Sacr. in Marc. i. t1 (quoted by Gaisford), 
pronounces very decidedly in favour of this interp. umicus, umigenitus, practer 
quem alius non datur ; referring to this passage (which is decisive against him), to 
Homer, and to Hesychius dyarnréy, povoyerf. Victorius more in accordance with 

- facts says, ‘‘cavum valet, ut puto, idque significare voluit Catullus cum inquit ‘sv 
guid carius est oculis’ quo uno se aliquis consolatur, in quo omnem spem 
suorum gaudiorum collocatam habet, quo impetrato ac retento contentus vivere 
potest:” which exactly defines it. The use of the Latin seus is precisely 
similar. 


152 PHTOPIKH® A 8 § 2. 


e / A , ( 
Sé Kal KupiwTaTov dmavTwv mpos TO SuvacOat TreiGew 
~ a , e a 
kai KaAdws ouuBovAevey, Tas moNtTElas amacas 
~ \ U ‘ , \ i 
AaBely kai Ta éxaorns €6y Kai vopipa Kat ouude- 
oe ef ~ , 
2 povra dierciv. weifovrat yap amavres TO TUpe- 
, \ 4 ~ 4 , a oe 
povrt, cuupepa Sé TO owlov THY TrOANLTELaV. ETL OE 
~ , 4 4 , 
kupia pév €otw 4 TOU Kupiou drodpacis, Ta S€ Kupta 


authority, carries most weight, xvptararov) of all in conferring the power 
and cultivating the faculty of persuasion and good counsel, includes the 
exact (analytical 8:edev) knowledge of all the existing varieties of con- 
stitutions, together with the habits (i.e. the habits and manners which 
they severally engender in those who live under them), institutions, and 
interests (ouz€povra) which respectively belong to them’. Ad consilium 
autem de republica dandum caput est nosse rempublicam, ad dicendum 
wero probabiliter nosse mores civitatis, gui quia crebro mutantur, genus 
guogue orationtis est sache mutandum. Cic. de Orat. 11 82. 337. 

4 2. ére 8€ xupia «.7.A.] Not only must the public speaker be ac- 
quainted with the manners and customs, institutions, and all that is expe- 
dient to or for the interest of these various forms of government, but also 
with the nature of the governing body (ro xdpiov) in each; it is by the 
declarations or proclamations (droddycers) of this supreme authority that 
the law is given to the citizens and their conduct prescribed to them, and 
as these are various under the several constitutions (ra 8€ xvpia 8igpnrac— 
avpia €otiv), SO he must be thoroughly acquainted with all the existing 
varieties. ; 

arogacis] so the Vulg., retained by Bekker and Spengel: drogavors 
is found in two MSS: dwogavois also occurs, with a varia lectio amo- 
dacs in two MSS, in the sense of ‘a declaration or utterance’ (as here) in 
II 21.2. drogaars is no doubt used in the common language in two different 
senses, (1) ‘denial, contradiction’, as usually in Aristotle, from drodavat, 
and (2) ‘a declaration’, from dmogaivew), as in Demosthenes and Poly- 
bius, VI 3. 1, ry urep rov péAXovros arodacw, 9.11; 12.10. But Aristotle 
most expressly distinguishes the two words again and again in the wept 
Eppnveias, aS C. 1,16 4 3, det Oeabat...ri dorw dropacis xal karadacis (nega- 
tive and affirmative) xai arcpavoss (an enunciation) nal Adyos. c. 5, 17 2 8, 
AGyos dropayrixds xaradaats, elra drodacis’ Cc. 6, 17 a 25, xardgacis 8¢ €orey 
aropavais rivos amd twos: and in very many other places. Is it possible that 
the author of this treatise could use the one word for the other? On the 
other side it may be said that Aristotle is extremely hasty and careless in 
writing, and that the inconsistency is in this case justified and explained 
by his having for the nonce conformed to the ordinary usage of the lan- 
guage: and the evidence on either side seems so nicely balanced, manu- 
script authority included, that the question cannot be positively deter- 


mined. Buhle is very emphatic on the point, ‘equidem iure meo dmé- 
davots reposui.’ 


1 As dots is derived from ¢aivev, so of course may drégpacis be formed 
from arogalvev. 


PHTOPIKH® A 8 §§ 3, 4. 153 


, A A , 9 A e ~ 
OijpnTat KaTa Tas WoNTElas’ Goat yap ai ToNTElat, 
3TovaiTa Kai Ta KUpia éeotw. etait Sé moAdrteEta 
, / 
TeTTapEs, OnuoxpaTia GALyapxia apioToKpaTia pov- 
, e/ ‘ 4 a ~ 4 , 
apXia’ woTE TO MEV KUPLOV Kai TO Kpivov ToUTwY Ti 
9 9 4 , N ef , aot A 4 
4éa7Tw del popiov 4 bAov TovTwy. eEate Se SnuoxpaTia 


§ 3. On the classifications of forms of government, see Appendix A, 
Introd. p. 208. On this ordinary, popular, fourfold division, see Pol. v1 
(IV) 7, init. 

TO wey xvupiov cal Td Kpivoy x.r.A.) ‘the sovereign power, the highest 
authority’, rd xvpseov; or the ‘power’ which ‘decides’, rd xpivoy, with 
which rests the ultimate decision, to which lies the ultimate appeal—this 
sovereign power ‘is always either a part of one of these four or the whole 
of it’; the ‘ part’ in the three latter cases of the forms named: the ‘whole’ 
in the democratica] form alone. 

§ 4. The distinctions of the four forms of government are deter- 
mined, like everything else, by the object or end proposed to itself by 
each of them; this is the dpos, the characteristic mark, or determining 
principle, of each, that which severally ‘characterizes’ them ; and this 
is in each case a special conception of political justice, ro 8ixasov. Pol. III 
Q, init. 

Democracy is a form of government that is distinguished from the 
rest, (is characterised), by the distribution of offices amongst the people 
by themselves (Svavépovra, mid.) and dy dof, each member of the entire 
body of citizens having an equal chance of obtaining them: this is equi- 
valent to saying that the opes of a democracy, its determining principle, 
that which gives its special character is ‘equality’, loorns, which is the 
foundation of the éAev@epia (usually assigned as its dpos), and therefore its 
proper rédos. This is laid down in Pol. vI (IV) 4, 1291 6 30 seq. ‘ Liberty’ 
and ‘ equality’ are the catchwords of a democracy. é8vo ydp éorw ols 9 
3npoxparia Soxet dpicbas, TH TO mAciov elvas KUptoy Kai TH éAevOepig. 1d pev 
vip Sixatoy toov Sone elvat, icov 8 6 re dv 80fy TH WAGE rovT’ elvar Kuptor, 
éAevOepoy 8¢ xat toy To 6 Tt av BovAnrai tis mocety (Pol. VIII (V) 9, sub fin.). 
Liberty alone is not sufficient in the way of a distinction, (Ib. 1290 6 7 
seq.), though it is commonly assigned as such, Ib. c. 8, 1294 @ 10, dpioro- 
xparias pév yap Spos dpert, cAdryapyxiat 8€ mAovTOs, Sypyou 8 dAevOepia. An- 
other current dpos of democracy is the will of the majority : where that is 
sovereign the state is democratical. Ib. VII (VI) 3, 1318 @ 18, dact ydp of 
Snporixoi rovro Bixatoy Gre Ay Bon rots wAcioow!. But this again rests upon 
the notion of equality, because it implies that as all the citizens are indi- 
vidually equal, and have equal rights, the greater number has the higher 
right, and ¢herefore prevails over the minority. The theory of democracy 
is, that all citizens are equal; not that all men are born equal, because 
all barbarians are naturally inferior to Greeks. The use of the ‘lot’, 


1 This however is common to all three, democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy ; 
in all of them alike, Src dv 86% ry wrelom pépes roy perexdvrwy THs wodcrelas, 
tour éorl xéptov. Pol. vi (tv) 8, 1294 @ 13. 


154 PIITOPIKHS A 8§ 4. 


€v woNtTrela €vy 9h KAnow StaveuovTat Tas apyas, OAI- 
B CEES a PXaS> 


which leaves the choice of the candidate to chance, is an exemplifica- 
tion of this, because it assumes the equality of the claims of all citizens 
to office. On the different kinds of democracy, see Pol. VI (IV) 4, 1291 
6 14 seq. 

The dpeos of oligarchy is mdovros: and therefore property, a census, 
riunua (estimated value of property), is necessary as a qualification for 
office, for that which confers authority or sovereignty, é€y 7) of dro rey- 
parey (Siaveuovras ras apyxds, they likewise distribute amongst ¢hemselucs, 
keep to themselves, all offices of state, all the powers of government). Pol 
VI (IV) 4, 1290 61: the different kinds of oligarchy, Ibid. c. 5, the first is 
To ano tisnudrev. The oligarchical theory of ‘justice’ is therefore or: a» 
Safty rz wAciom ovcig’ card mAROos yap ovalas gaol xpiveoObar Seiv, VII (VI) 
8, 1318 a 19. A complete definition of 3npoxparia and oAcyapyia is given, 
VI (IV) 4, 1290 817. In the popular Rhetoric of dé ripnpdrey is the gene- 
ral designation of the privileged class: but in the exacter Politics vI (IV) 
5, two kinds of renpara are distinguished which characterise two differ- 
ent kinds of oligarchies ; one in which the property qualification is only 
so high as to exclude the poor, and acquired property procures adinis- 
sion into the privileged class: the other in which the qualification is high, 
and the governing class, which is therefore small, fill up themselves the 
vacancies as they occur. Again, dé ripnparey is too wide a term, and 
therefore not properly characteristic: it includes more than oligarchies, 
one form of democracy, ro ras dpxas dréd ripnparoy elvat, Bpayéwv 8é rov- 
ray évrav, Pol. VI (IV) 4, 1291 6 39. Plato has the same phrase to describe 
an oligarchy, } awd repnparey modcreia, Rep. VIIl 550 C. Legg. 111 698 B, 
woXtrela Kal éx TésnpaTey apyal rerraper, of the Solonian constitution. 

The cpos of aréstocracy is in the Politics dpern and not radeia. The 
two following observations are added in the way of notes to explain the 
apparent discrepancy. ‘Aristocracy is a kind of polity in which education 
is the qualification for a share in the government. By education, I mean 
that which is established by the law of the land : for it is those who have 
lived in constant obedience to the state institutions that bear rule in the 
aristocracy’. The virtue of a citizen is not one and the same; it varies 
under different forms of government. The system of education must 
therefore be fixed and controlled by the government and conformed to 
its established institutions. This is the ‘education established by the law’ 
of the text. On the absolute necessity of this kind of training in virtue 
under state direction for grown men as well as children, see Eth. N. x 
10, 1179 4 32 seq., and the unfinished treatise on education in Bk. Vv (VII!) 
of the Politics. “Such men as these must necessarily appear ‘ best’, and 
it is from them that this (form of constitution) has derived its name”. 
Since masdeia therefore is the necessary preparation for dpery, either of 
them may be represented as the object of the state. Definitions of dpi- 
groxparia are to be found, Pol. III 7, 1279 @ 34, where two explanations of 
the dptoro- in the name are given: either &a rd rods dpicrous dpyew 
(which is adopted here), or da ro mpos ro dpioroy ry wode Kal rots xot- 
yovovoswy auras: C.15, 1286 5 4, rov mAetovey dpyny dyabar 3 avdpor, Ib. VI 
(tV) 8, 1294 @ 9, 8oxet 8€ dptoroxparia pév elvat pddtora To Tas Tipds veve- 


——o rr LE AIT APIS er eee ED a, aa ~ ats aa 


PHTOPIKH® A 8§5. 155 


yupxia 3é év 4 of dao Tysnudtwr, dpietoKpatia Se 
év 7 of Kata mraieiav. maideiav S€ Aéyw THY UTC 
TOU voMoUu Kemevnv' ol yap éupeuevnxoTes ev Tois 
vopivos €v TH dpioToKpaTia apyovow. dvayKn de 
Toutous daiveabat dpicrous: Sev kai Toivopa eine 
TouTo. povapyia & éorti Kata Tovvona év 9 Els P. 1366. 
dravrTwy Kips éotw: TovTwy Se yi wey KaTa Tagww 
Twa Bacirela, 4 8 dopiatos Tupavvis. To dy TEAOS 


pijcOa nat’ dperjy’ dptoroxparias pev yap Spos aperj. But, c. 15, 1299 6 25, 
€v rais apworroxpariats (al dpyat) éx memadevpevoy. 

povapyia] the sole government of one, includes Baoideia xara raft 
rivad, 2 Monarchy under certain fixed regulations or conditions, a limited, 
constitutional monarchy, émi pyrois yépaow warpixn Bactreia, Thuc. 1 13, 
and the ‘indefinite’, unrestricted, unlimited tyranny. The distinction 
between the two here rests upon the limitation of the sovereign power or 
the absence of it. Soin Pol. 111 14, 1285 a 27, of peév yap (BaoeXeis) xara 
vopov Kal éxavray, ol 3 axovray dpyovow. The second of these two distinc- 
tions of the voluntary and involuntary obedience is repeated 1285 6 2 
(Bacideia) 81a per To rupayyxal elva: 8earorixai, 81a 8€ TO alperai nai éxovrey 
Baoidttxai. ‘Usurpation’, as the distinctive difference of tyranny as op- 
posed to monarchy (Eth. N. vit 12), is insufficient. The government of 
the hereditary monarchs of Persia is ‘ tyrannous’ in respect of the nature 
and mode of exercise of their power, though these and other barbarian 
monarchies are card vopoy xal warpixai, Pol. 111 14, 1285 @ 18 and 22, 6 po- 
xOnpos Bacidted’s rupayves yivera, Eth. N. vill 12. Lastly, the tyrant has a 
mercenary ‘ body-guard’, gvAaxy (this is distinctive of ‘tyranny’; see 
Rhet. 1 2.19). The regular constitutional sovereign is protected, if at all, 
by a national guard of citizens, 111 14, 1285 a 24. But the true distinction 
between them is determined by the evd of the government of each: with | 
the one it is his own interest, ro avrod cuppépov: with the other it is the 
interest of the governed, mpds rd xowwor cuphéepor, III 7, 1279 @ 27—31, VIII 
(V) 10, 1311 @ 2, 9 8€ rupayvis...mpos ower dmoBAdres xowor, el pt) ris ldias 
epedeias yapuy. ears 8€ oxomds Tupaymxos To 78U, BacAixds Be rd xadov. 

§5. The ‘end’ of each form of government may be identified with 
its dpos, because ‘everything being determined by its end’, the end aves 
determine (opi{eras) or characterise the special form which each kind of 
government assumes. These dopo: or réAn have already been considered 
in the preceding note. All choice is directed to some end: the end of 
the state, or its governing and guiding principle, must control and give a 
direction to all the choice and the consequent action of its citizens; and 
hence the necessity that the statesman and public speaker should be 
acquainted with it. ‘Plainly therefore it is with a view to the end of 
each form of government that our analysis of its habits, institutions, and 
interests should be conducted, because it is to this that the motives and 
actions of the body of men that we have to address are ultimately 
directed’. 


156 PHTOPIKHS A 8§6. 


éxaatns moditeias ov Set AavOavev aipovvta yap 
Ta Mpos TO TéAos. EoTe SE SnpoKpaTias pev TEXOS 
édevOepia, odAryapxias S€ aAovTOS, dpa TonpaTias 
S€ ra mpds radelav Kai Ta vopipa, Tupavwidos de 
guAakn. Sndov ovv tt Ta mpos TO TEéAOS EXAOTNS 
€0n Kai vouiua Kai oupdepovta Siaiperéov, etzrep 
6aipowvrat mpos TovTo émavadepovTes. ret SE Ov 
povoy ai miaores yivovrat 8 amrodeKTiKov oyou 


rupavvidos 8¢ dudacn] gvAaxy is here ‘ precaution’, ‘ self-defence’—a 
form of self-interest. 1d Tov cvpdépoy, characteristic of ‘tyranny '—and 
hence, as a means to this end, the @vAaxq in its other sense, the mer- 
cenary body-guard, becomes a necessity, and distinctive of a tyranny. 
But as a @vAaxy, in some sense, is equally required by any sole ruler or 
monarch, who is always in danger from the attempts of rivals, or rebels, 
or revolutionists,—the sole ruler has only one life to lose, and hence the 
personal danger ; in governments of many, where the members are nu- 
merous, the attempt to get rid of them all would be difficult or impossible, 
and consequently it is not made—so here BaciAeia or povapyia is included 
under the general head of rvpawvis: so Schrader. Failing to see this, 
some transcriber, whose reading appears in the Greek Scholiast}, had 
inserted the clause Bacweias 8€ 76 évvopws émcorareiv, Which being wanting 
in all the Mss, and not rendered by the Latin Translators, was deservedly 
rejected by Victorius. Vater, who does not agree with Victorius’ and 
Schrader’s view, thinks that some words descriptive of the réAos of the 
Baow\eia have dropt out ; and Spengel, by ‘ indicating a lacuna’ (Rhet. 
Gr. Praef. v1), appears to be of the same opinion. 

Upon the whole I think that Brandis’ view of the question is to be pre- 
ferred (Phzlologus IV i p. 43). It certainly is not likely, though possible, 
that Aristotle would have identified monarchy and tyranny, considering 
the treatment of them which he adopts in the Politics, and that he 
has already subdivided yovapyia into Baowela and rupawis in § 4. Con- 
sequently, it appears that this division was adhered to in § 5, and some- 
thing to represent the réAos of BaowAeia has been lost. 

§ 6. On this kind of 467, one of the three by which an ethical charac- 
ter is conveyed to the speech, and which is employed as an indirect argu- 
ment or means of persuasion, see Introduction on this passage, p. 182, 
and on the #47 in general, p. I10 seq. 

The spirit and tone of the speech, and the expressions employed, 
must be in conformity with the national character of the audience, as 
determined by the end of their special form of government ; a demo- 
cratical tone and language must not be adopted in addressing an oli- 
garchical audience, and zce versa. 


' It is Brandis’ ‘Anonymus.’ See his paper in Schneidewin’s Philologus, 
IV ip. 43. 


NE AO aD PD aie a 


PHTOPIKHE A 8&7. 167 

GAAa Kai St 7Oixov (Ta yap rowov Twa aiverOa Tov 
AeyovTa moarevouev, ToVTO 8 éativ av ayabos pai- 
vntat n ebvous i} audw), Sear av Ta HOn TAY TOALTELOV 
éxagtns EXEW ruas* TO pev yap éxaatns nOos mOa- 
vwTAaTOV dvayKn pos éxagTny elvat. TavTa OéP. 29. 
Ano(ncera dia Twv adtav Ta pev yap nOn pavepa 
KaTa Tyv mpoaipecw, i S€ mpoaiperts avadeperat 
Mpos TO TEAOS. 

wy wey ouy Set dpéyer Oat mpoTpeTovTas ws éoope- 
yoy | OvTwy, Kat ex Tivwy Set Tas mEpt TOU oumdeE- 
povros wiores NauBavev, Ett SE mMEpi TwY TEpi Tas 
moktTeias fOwy kal vouipnwv dia Tivwy TE Kal Tas 
evTropnaopev, ep Omov nv Tw TapovTt Kalpw TUMME- 
Tpov, eipntar SinxpiBwrat yap év Tots moAXrTiKots 
WEP TOUTWY. 


ravra 8¢ AnPOnoeras «.r.r.] These ‘ political characters’, he says, ‘ will 
be found by the same means’, by the same kind of observation and study, 
as the other 976n, the individual characters : ‘in both, the characters are 
manifested in the choice or purpose’, which is always directed to the end 
(which we desire to attain)’. As the individual character is shewn by the 
purpose or intention of every act, so the national character of the people, 
as a body, is manifested in ¢Aer choice and purpose, which is directed to 
the general end, aim, and object, or the general pervading principle, of 
the state and its institutions: it is this common view and purpose which 
gives them their #a¢zona/ character ; and to this the speech must conform 
in order to be acceptable. 

§ 7 gives a summary of the contents of the first division of the ana- 
lysis of the three kinds of Rhetoric, the deliberative. ‘We have treated of 
the general objects of the public speaker’s aims and efforts, viz. of what is 
good or expedient in itself, and in relation to something else; and the 
topics from which arguments may be drawn on these subjects (in cc. 4-—7) ; 
and we have further pointed out the channels and modes (84 rivey cai ros) 
by which we may supply ourselves with materials for the treatment of the 
characters and institutions of the various forms of government ; but only 
so far as was (commensurate with) suitable to the present occasion, be- 
cause (yap) exact detail (is not required here, and) is to be found (if 
required) in the Politics’. 


1 90m daveph xara rh» wpoalpeoww. Rhet. 11 21. 16, 900s 8° Erovew of 
Mya, é ols 34\n 3 wpoalpects. Poet. VI. 24, fore 88 700s yey 7d racobroy 6 
SnAot rh» rpoalpecw dwola ris* Sidwep ove Exouow 700s rdv Adyww dy ols pwnd’ 
Shus lorey 6 Te mpoaperrat # pevyer 6 Aéyww. Schrader. 


158 PHTOPIKHE A 9§§1, 2. 


I pera S€ TavTa A€ywuev TEpl apETHS Kal KaKklas cHaP. ix. 
Kai KaXov Kai aioxpov' ovTOL yap OKOTO! Tw Eral- 
vouvTt kai WeyovTt: cunBnoerat yap ama Tepi -Tov- 

Twy éyovras Kdkeiva SnAovv EF wy Troiot TIVES U7r0- 
AnpOnodpeba xara Td nOos, HrEp jv SevTépa wioris’ €K 
TOV avTwY yap iuas Te Kal GAAOV aftomaTov Suvn- 
2q0pueOa moteiy mpds dpernv. ret Sé oumBaiver Kat 


CHAP. IX. 


The following passage of Cicero, de Or. 11 84. 342, will serve as a 
commentary on the treatment of ‘good’ and ‘ virtue’ in this chapter and 
c. 6; and also on the distinction of virtues in respect of their u7/i/ily, § 6: 

Perspicuum est igitur alia esse in homine optanda, alia laudanda. 
Genus, forma, vires, opes, divitiae, ceteraque quae fortuna dat aut ex- 
trinsecus aut corhori, non habent in se veram laudem, quae deberi virluti 
uni putatur ; sed tamen quod tpsa virtus tn earum rerum usu ac modcra- 
tione maxime cernitur, tractanda in laudationibus etiam haec sunt naturae 
et fortunae bona: [this is illustrated.] Virtus autem, quae per se ipsa 
laudabilis et sine qua nihil laudari potest, samen habet plures partes, 
guarum alia est alia ad laudationem aptior. Sunt enim aliae virtutes 
quae videntur in moribus hominum et quadam comitate ac beneficentia 
posttae,; altae guae in ingentt aligua facultate aut animt magnitudine et 
robore. Nam clementia, tustitia, benignitas, fides, fortitudo in pericults 
communibus tucunda est auditu in laudationibus; omnes enim hae vir- 
tutes non tam tpsis qui eas habent quam generi hominum fructuosae 
putantur. 

§ 1. The subject of this chapter is the analysis of virtue and vice, the 
noble and disgraceful, moral right and wrong, as the objects of praise and 
blame, and therefore furnishing materials for the epideictic or encomiastic 
branch of Rhetoric, of which praise and blame are the characteristic 
functions. 

We may also derive from this analysis topics of the #6n, charac- 
ters or dispositions which serve to give the speech an ethical colour. 
This is to be effected by producing dy the sfecch (artistically, not by any 
evidence of character previously acquired, ‘authority ’) the impression 
upon the audience of our truthfulness and probity ; of our practical wis- 
dom which will enable us to give them useful advice, and finally of our 
goodwill towards themselves ; this being ‘ the second mode of persuading’ 
(fv ‘was said’, cf, c.2 §§ 3, 4): because the same materials can be em- 
ployed in representing ourselves as well as others as ‘trustworthy in 
respect of virtue ', as men of such a character as can be depended upon. 

§ 2 marks a division of panegyrics, the ordinary subjects of the 
ériSecxtixoy yévos of Rhetoric. A panegyric may be written and de- 
livered ‘with or without a serious purpose (erovén)'; the latter are 
burlesques. On these, and the subjects of encomiastic speeches in 
general, see Introd. p. 121—123. In the burlesque kind, anything — 


PHTOPIKHE A 9 §§ 3, 4. 159 


sy ~ \ i) ~ ’ ~ , 
Xwpis orovdys Kai peTa orrovdns émaweiv ToAAakis 
> 4 o an A , A 1 \ te 
ov movoy avOpwrov 7 Geov aAAa kal ayuya Kal Twp 
r'] , A , A 3 A , \ ‘\ 
adXAwy Cowy TO TUXOV, TOY aUVTOY TpOTTOV Kal TEpL 
TOUTwY ANnTTEéoV Tas TWpoTacEs, WOoTE BOOV Tapa- 

deiyuatos xapw eitwpyev Kal mEept ToUTwY. 
A A ? 9 \ A oN ) e b) e ‘ N 
3 kadov pev ovv €otiv 0 av Ot avto atpeTov ov 
? A 9 5 ee S| s\ 9 4 ) e \ ef 9 , 
emawveTov n, 1 O av ayabov ov nov n, Ott ayabov. 
» A ~ 4s A , > F A > ‘\ a 
et 6€ TOUVTO ETL TO KaXOV, avayKn THY dpETHY KaXOV 
4€vat' dyabov yap ov émawerov éotw. apetn 8 éoti 
however mean and trifling, ‘inanimate things, or any insignificant 
animal’, may be made the object of the panegyric. But as the materials, 
the topics which furnish the arguments, are the same in both, we may 
include the burlesque with the serious in our treatment of them in the 
way of examples or illustrations, 

Gyuxa xai ray dAdov (gov ro ruxov] Thus Polycrates, the Sophist, 
wrote in praise of pots, and pebbles, and mice (see note on II 24. 2); and 
others on humble-bees and salt (Isocr. Hel. § 12). As an extant specimen 
of these trifling productions we have the pulas éyxepiow of Lucian (cf. 
note on Isocr. Paneg. § 189). S.] 

§ 3. «xadov] See note on c. 7,24. Eth. Eudem. VII 15. 3, ray yap 
dyabay wayrwy réAn €oriv, & aura avtaey: évexad €otw alperd. rovrey b€ cada 
doa 8° avra dvta wavra émavera €oTw. Taira yap dar ep dy al re mpageas 
eloiy émaweral xal avra érawverd, dixatoovvy xat avty cai al mpagtes x.T.A. 
It has either a moral aspect (marked by the characteristic éwa:veréy ; on 
praise and blame, approbation and disapprobation, as characteristic of 
virtue and vice, see Introd. on ¢raswos, Append. B, p. 212, seq.), what 1s 
right and noble, an end in itself, 8” avro; or is physical and sensual, what 
is beautiful, in which pleasure always accompanies that which is other- 
wise good. The ugly may be good in the sense of useful, but gives no 
pleasure. 

Virtue therefore must of necessity be xaAdy, because it comes under 
the first definition of it, it is good in itself, beneficial to the individual 
and to society, and also has the stamp and seal of general ‘approbation’. 

§ 4. apern] The definition of virtue here given compared with the 
celebrated one of Eth. Nic. 11 6, init., and the detailed treatment of the 
list of virtues and the meagre and incomplete account here given of them, 
contrasted with the elaborate and ingenious analysis of them in the third 
and fourth books of the same work, is a most striking illustration of the 
difference between the point of view and method of treatment in the 
popular Rhetoric and comparatively scientific Ethics. For example, 
the definition here given coincides in no single point with that of 
the Ethics. It regards virtue solely on the side of its usefulness, probably 
because this feature of it is likely to produce the greatest effect upon 
the popular mind. Instead of a és it is a mere dvvapyis, an undeveloped 
faculty or power—this is most expressly denied in Eth. N. 11 4,11064 5, 


160 PHTOPIKHE Ag § 5, 6. 


Q am $Y ~ 

Mev Ouvamis, ws SoKel, mopiatixy ayabwv Kat dpvAak- 
2 J ~ 

Tun, Kai Suvaus evepyeTixn ToANwV Kal peyadwy, 

, 4 | . ~ 
5 Kai TavTwy mept TWavTa. peony Oe dpeTis Stxatoourn, 

9 , 4 , , 
dySpia, awhpoovrn, peyadorperresa, peyadoyuyia, 
? , r] 4 

6 éAevOepiorns, mpaotns, ppovnots, codia. dvayKn 


—the mpoaipecis, the special moral element is omitted, as is also the 
doctrine of the mean in its application to virtue, and the standard by 
which this relative mean is to be determined. 

Regarded as a dvuvapts, virtue is a practical faculty, employed in 
‘providing and securing or keeping good things’—for oneself, ap- 
parently, by the exercise of any dpery, excellence or accomplishment 
bodily or mental—and secondly, ‘a power of conferring benefits, or 
doing services, many and great, in fact a// in everything (on all occa- 
sions)’, mavrey srepi mavra is doubtless, as Victorius intimates, a proverbial 
expression, more especially as it is found in a letter of Cicero to 
Cassius (ad Div. XV 17. 1, sed expecta mavra mepi mdavrov). This is the 
moral side of virtue so far as it appears in its usefulness to society. 

§ 5. pépn aperns] Comp. 5 §9. The list of virtues here given differs 
from that in the Nic. Ethics 11 7, and 111 g—IV 15, in the following 
particulars. All the moral virtues from 8xatoovvn to mpgdrns inclusive 
appear in the Ethics, 8cca:oovwn being treated separately in Bk. v, and 
the two intellectual virtues of the speculative and practical parts of the 
intellect, @poynuts practical wisdom, and godia speculative wisdom or 
philosophy, in Bk. VI. oodia is omitted in the detailed explanation of 
the virtues, most likely because it has very little in common with Rhetoric, 
and would be useless to the rhetorician. mpgorns, which in the Ethics is 
ranked, as well as here, amongst the virtues, which are there ¢é&ets, 
here duvdpes, in the second book of the Rhetoric becomes a zra6os, so that 
it belongs to all the three divisions of our moral nature distinguished 
in Eth. Nic. 114. The anonymous mean between qudrorgmia and adido- 
risia is Omitted in our list, as well as the three social virtues of an 
accomplished gentleman, viz. dAn@eca, evrpameAia, and diAia, and also the 
two virtues of the may, viz. aides and vépeots. No notice is taken here 
of éyxpdreca, the examination of which occupies the earlier part of Bk. 
VII, but this perhaps may be considered as an additional argument 
in favour of ascribing that book to Eudemus, which on all grounds is 
most probable. 

§ 6. The most useful virtues are the highest and greatest, by the 
foregoing definition. Of these, justice and courage, the one most 
serviceable in peace, the other in war, are for this reason most held 
in honour amongst mankind : and in the next degree liberality, because 
it is lavish, and does not enter into competition with others (dvraye- 
vi{ecOa) for money, which everybody else covets more than anything 
besides. 

1 Cicero has altered the form and the application of the proverb. In the 
text it means ‘all kinds on all occasions’, in Cicero it is ‘all the news about 
everything’. 


PHTOPIKHE A 9 §§ 7, 8. 161 


A 4 ? ® ‘ \ ~ af 
de peyioras éivat dpetas Tas Tois aAAOIs xpNol- 
pwratas, elrep éotiv 4 dpetn Suvamus evepyeTixy. 
Sid ToUTO Tous Stkaious Kal cydpEiovs wadioTa Tipe- 
ow n Mev yap ev Todeuw 4 O€ Kal év eipnun’ xpri- 
w F € ) ; / 4 : ‘ 
giysos ahAows. Elta y édevOepioTns’ mpolevTar yap 
kal ovUK avraywviCovrat wept TaVY yonuaTwV, wy p. 30. 
, 9 J wv 4 A , A 
7KManNoTa édievTat ado. EoTt Se Stkatocuvn peV 
dpetn Ot nv Ta avTwy ExarTo Exovet, Kal ws 6 
, 9 , A 9 e\ A 9 , 9 e e 
vouos, adixia dé Ot nv Ta adAdoTpIa, ovy Ws 6 
Ld , , \ > a , 5) a“: ~ 
8 vouos. avdpia de ot iv mpaxtixol Eliot TwWY KaXwY 

§ 7. Justice is the virtue which assigns to every one his due, and 
in this shews obedience to the law. This virtue and the two following, 
which are all specially characterised by ‘obedience to the law’, are 
thereby invested with a fo/ttical and objective character, and dis- 
tinguished from the remainder, which are rather subjective and indi- 
vidual. The end and object of the true statesman is to make the citizens 
good, and this must be effected by training them in obedience to the 
laws of that form of government under which they live; the type of the 
perfect citizen varying under various constitutions. Soxet 8 xal 6 «ar 
GAnOecav sroditixds wept ravrqv (ryyv dperjy) padiora merovncba’ Botderas 
yap Tots roXiras dyabovs moreiv Kal ray vopwy Uirnxdous. Eth. N. I 13, sub init. 

@s oO vopos] SC. Aéyet, KeAevet, mpoorarre: ; i.e. the law settles the legal 
rights of the citizens of a state, the observance of which is justice. 
Injustice is the cause of unfair distribution, to injustice it is owing that 
men take what does not belong to them, ra aAAorpia, and thus it acts or 
operates in disobedience to the law. Of the three kinds of justice distin- 
guished in Eth. N. V1, this takes in only the first, 8scacoovyn dcavepnrixn, 
c.6; the other two are (1) dcopOwrien or éravopOwrixy ‘corrective’ justice, 
which ratifies and corrects wrong, and restores plaintiff and defendant 
to an equality, c. 7; and (2) reciprocal justice, rd avrimemovOos the lex 
talionis, the law of retaliation or reciprocity transferred to commercial 
justice, which regulates exchanges and contracts of all kinds, c. 8. 

§ 8. ady3pia] In the chapter on this virtue of ‘gratitude’ in the Nic. 
Ethics, I1I 11, dv8peia (as it is there written) is first defined in general 
terms as a virtue residing in a mean state in things that inspire con- 
fidence, or encouragement, or boldness, ra Gappadéa, on the one hand, 
and fear on the other : its sole object and aim in choosing a course of 
action and encountering danger being ro «adov, the right and noble as 
an ultimate end, because it is so, and for no other reason; which implies 
also the opposite, the spurning of what is base and disgraceful. This 
is the general notion of fortitude, the endurance of pain, labour, danger, 
in the pursuit of an unselfish, honourable, high and noble object, when 
the opposite course would be base, mean, disgraceful'. From this are 

1 Acts of fortitude must likewise be deliberate and voluntary, de? 8° ov 8 
avd-yxnvtdvdpeior efvat, add’ Sri eaddy (1116 6 2)- 

AR. I, It 


162 PHTOPIKH® A 9 §§4@, Io. 


wv 9 a , \ e € U 4 ‘ 
Epywy év Tots Kivduvols, Kal ws 6 voMos KENEVEL, Kal 
~ a \ 
gumnpeTiKol Tw vouw* SeNia 6€ TovvavTiov. awhpo- 
r 4 \ ad A a a YT “~ rf 

aurn S€ dpern 8: nv mpos Tas joovas Tas TOU TwMa- 
ef - rd € ¢€ , , > / A 

Tos OUTWS ExoVaLW Ws d vO"Oos KEAEVEL” aKOANaTIA OE 

4 iN 4 
10 ToUvaytiov. éAevlepiorns Sé wept ypnuata evrroln- 


then distinguished five popular notions of ‘courage’, av8pe/a in a narrower 
sense, none of which can be properly called ‘fortitude’. The first of these 
is political courage, the courage of a citizen, as a member of a state, 
and living under and directed by its laws, described in 11164 17—6 2. 
And this seems to be the view of courage which is taken here, the terms 
employed in each corresponding very closely, 8oxoto yap vmopeve rots 
xwdvvous (this restricts the virtue to facing danger and gives it a 
narrower sense than ‘fortitude’) of wodtras 8a ta dx rev vopev éemrima 
nai ra cveidn nal dia ras riysds, a 18. 8¢ aldd (it is due to a sense of 
honour) xal &d xadrod dpegiv, ripns ydp, xat duyny cvei8ous, alaypot dvros, 
a 28. Further, one of the characteristics of this farm of dv8peia reappears 
in Eth. Eudem. III 1. 13, as belonging to political courage, zia pév mods- 
ricn’ atin 8 dor 7 8e aldé otoa, and another § 16, 3:4 vopoy 8 9 sroXcrext 
av8peia. The prominence of the military character of this virtue is 
likewise marked in the description both of the Ethics and Rhetoric by 
vrouéevey rovs xivdvvous in the one, and by épyar év xedivess § 8, and 7...€dv 
woXeup § 6, in the other; so that it seems that there is sufficient warrant 
for the identification of the two; the duty to the state and obedience 
to its laws being again made the’ ground of the obligation to practise this 
virtue. 

§9. The third virtue, cadpoovm, temperantia, is likewise represented 
under a folttical aspect. It is a virtue by which men’s bodily appetites 
are regulated according to the dictates of the laws of the state, ‘are so 
disposed towards bodily pleasures as the law enjoins’. In Eth. Nic. 11 
cc. 13, 14, there is no regular definition of it; but we gather from the 
contents of the two chapters that it is a virtue of self-control, which con- 
sists in a mean state with regard to the indulgence in bodily pleasures, 
(pains having less to do with the virtue); and in adue measure or estimate 
of the value of them. It is thus a ‘mean’ between dxoAagia, ‘excessive 
indulgence in them’, and dvato@naia, total ‘insensibility’, 11 7,1107 6 4. 

§ 10. éAevdepsorns] The principal difference between the views taken 
of the virtues in the Ethics and Rhetoric respectively, is that in the latter 
they are regarded solely on the side of their utility to society—a political 
view—in the Ethics they are confirmed habits or states resulting from a 
due regulation of the elementary wa6y out of which they are formed and 
developed. They are ‘relative means’, peoornres mpos ypas, mean states 
varying in individuals according to the special character of each, lying at 
a variable distance between two extremes of the ma6n out of which they 
grow, the proper mean in any given case being determined by the 
pémmors or practical wisdom, the objective standard being the collective 
judgment of those who are specially endowed with this faculty, the ¢pc- 
wot. Consequently here ‘liberality’ in expense is represented as a dis- 


td 





PHTOPIKHS A 9g §§ 11—13. 163 


11 TUK, aveAevlepia S€ TovvavTiov. peyadoyuyia Se 
apeTH MeyaAwY TOINTIKN EVEpyETNMATWY, pLKpo\uxXia 
12 6€ ToUvavTiov. peyaNorpereia S€ apeTy év Satravn- 
pact peyeBous momrikn, puxpovyia bé Kal puxpo- 
13 Mperera Tavayria. pornos & égriv dpetn Stavoias, 


position or habit inclined to do good, to make oneself useful in dealing 
with money. 

§ 11. peyatopuyia] ‘high-mindedness’ is represented in the same 
way as the preceding, as a virtue which is ‘ productive of benefits’, shews 
its utility, ‘on a large scale’; to which ‘little-mindedness’, meanness of 
Spirit, is the opposite. This is a very different and much narrower view of 
the virtue than that which is conveyed by the description of it in Nic. 
Eth. 1v 7—9, which is summed up in the brief phrase at the end ofc. 9, 
7] wey ov peyarowuyia mepi reuny €ort peyaAny, and defined c. 7, 1123 4 2, 
Bonet Be peyadcwuyos elvat 6 peydAwy avrov afiav détos dv. The peyado- 
Wuyxos of the Ethics is a man of high aims and lofty spirit, full of scorn 
and contempt for all that is beneath him, men and things, and witlr 
a pride which is justified by his deserts: pride without merits to support 
it is no longer proper pride, a virtue; but degenerates into vanity yav- 
vorns, an undue sense of one’s own merits. 

ptxpouyia 8¢ rovvayrioy] is put in brackets by the recent Edd. as 
a gloss. It certainly seems to be superfluous, as it is repeated in the 
foliowing sentence; and also if it be retayned, pixpomperesa and pexpowryia 
are doth contrasted as opposites with peyaAunmpeneca, which in the latter 
case is certainly incorrect. At the same time if the words are omitted 
the repetition of dper7j is quite equally objectionable. 

§ 12. peyaAonpéraa] ‘magnificence’ in expenditure, is distinguished 
from ‘liberality’ merely by this, that whereas the one is wepi racas ras ¢v 
xpypact mpageas (every kind of money transactions), magnificence is wept 
daraynpas povoy, ‘those alone in which a large cost is involved’, Eth. N. 
Iv 4, sub init. It is only to men distinguished either by birth or reputa- 
tion, or anything else that confers distinction, that this virtue is suitable 
—in others it is no virtue at all, 1122 6 30. Plato and his dramatis per- 
sonae sometimes add peyaAonpéreta to the four cardinal virtues, the classi- 
cation which he usually adopts. Meno 74 A, 88 A. Rep. II 402 C, VI 490 
E, 494 B, VII 536 A, VIII 560 E. It does not, however, exactly cor- 
respond with Aristotle’s interpretation, but has a wider and more 
general signification. See Rep. v1 486 A, where it is applied to the d&dvoa. 
It seems from the definition, (opor, 412 E, agiwors xara Aoy:opoy GpOiy rév 
gepydraroy), to be a nearer approach to Aristotle’s peyadowuyia. 

§ 13. pd»xnots] appears much in the same character here as in Eth. 
Nic. VI 5—9, where it is analysed at length. It 1s ‘practical wisdom’ 
which shews itself in the discrimination between good and evil, and par- 
ticularly moral good and evil, in general, 8oxet 8) Ppovipou eivas rd duva- 
70a xados Bovrevoacbas rep ra ait dyaba cai ovppéporra, ov xara pépos, 
oloy noia mpos vyieay h loyuv, GAG mola mpds TO ev (nv, 1140425. dia 
rovro IepixAéa xal rovs rovovrous Ppovipous olopeba elvat, drt rd avrois ayaa 

{{—2 


164 PHTOPIKH A 9§ 14. 


xa’ nv ev BovdeverOa Svvavra: rept dyabwv Kat 
KaKWY THY EipnuEevw Els EVOatuOViaV. 
\ A RA 9 ~ A , , A 4 
14 WEpl MEV OUV aPETHS Kal Kakias KkaBoXou Kai TreEpt 
TwY Lopiwy cipnTat KaTa TOY EvVEOTWTA Kalpov ikavaws, 
wept 5é Twv aAAwY ov yadreTov ideiv: avepov yap 
cal rd rots avOpw@mos Suvavrat Gewpeir’ eivas 3¢ rocovrous Fyovpeba Tous oixo- 
vouikous Kal Tous troAurixovs, Ib. 1140 5 7. dpery ris dor xal ov réxyn, 6 24. 
dvoiv 8 dvrow pepo ras Wuyns Trav Aoyor éxovrav, Harépov ay ely apery, TOU 
8ofaorixov' (or rou Aoytorixod, i.e. the ddvora or reasoning faculty, the dis- 
cursive reason, as opposed to the vots, the speculative, intuitive reason, 
the organ of the other intellectual virtue codia): 4 re yap 80fa sept rd 
evdexopevov drAAws Exec, kal 7 Ppovnors, 4 25. 4 8é hpornots mpaxrexn, C. 8, 
1141 5 31. rév nal’ exacra dori 5 ppovnars, & yiverar yvospipa ef éusrecpias, 
c. 9, 1142 @ 14. 

§ 14. roy €veormra xatpory] ‘the present (z#sfan/) time’. éorava, ‘to 
place in’ a position: évicracda, dvorivat, éveotnxevas, éveorravat, ‘to be 
placed, set in, stand in’, a position. Hence (2) (I think) of things ‘stand- 
ing in the way’, and so either (a) close by, ‘present’, ‘instant’, ‘z#stans’ 
(tempus, bellum, &c.), ‘impending’, ‘threatening’ ; (for z#stams, ‘ present’, 
Quint. V 10. 42, practeritum, instans, futurum). In grammar, éveoros xpo- 
vos, ‘the present tense’, éveordca peroyy, ‘the present participle’, ¢zstans 
tempus (Facc. Lex. s.v.); or (8) ‘to stand in the way’ as an obstacle, 
impediment, or ‘objection’; as the logical évorjvae and évoracts, of an 
objection, or contrary instance, to a supposed conclusion ; and hence also 
‘instance’, something which stands in your way and so possibly attracts 
your attention, or as a generalisation of the logical ‘instance’ or objec- 
tion. See Introd. p. 269, and note. 

mept 8€ ray dAkwv] ‘The rest are easily discerned’—‘the rest’ are 
what follows, the causes namely and consequences of virtue—‘ anything 
that is productive of, because it tends to or promotes (mpes), virtye, or 
that is the effect or result of it (ra an’ dperis ywoueva), is estimable, and 
an object of pratse (caddy). Such things are (the first) the ‘signs’, (the 
second) the works of virtue (and ¢herefore praiseworthy)’. The onpeioy 
(Introd. p. 161—163) is the probab/e—or, in the case of the rexpyypioy, 
certain—indication of the existence of the thing which it accompanies ; 
from the ‘signs’ of virtue in a man we infer, with more or less probability, 
its actual existence. Schrader quotes the little tract wept dperay nad 
kaxioy, printed as an appendix to the three Ethical treatises in Bekker’s 
4to ed. Vol. II p. 1249. It is an abridgment or epitome of Aristotle’s 
account of the virtues in the third and fourth books of the Ethics, with 
a slight admixture of Platonism and other occasional alterations. ¢ézas- 
vera pév dort Ta Kadd, Wexra 8€ ra aicypd. xal Tov pev karov yyovvras al 
dperal, tov 8 aioxpay al xaxiat. érawwerd 8 dort xai ra alria TOY dperay Kar 
Td Taperopeva Tais dperais (these are the rd momrixa ris dperfjs and ‘signs’), 
kai Ta ywopeva an’ avray kai ra épya auray, Werra d¢ ra evavria, 1249 a 26. 

wept 8€ roy GdAwv...ideiv] for the more usual ra dAXa i8etv. This sub- 
stitution of a preposition with its case for the direct government of the 





PHTOPIKH® A 9§ 15. 165 


OTL dvayKn Ta TE ToinTiKa THs apeTHs Elvat Kaa 
(wpos apeTnv yap) Kal Ta adm’ apeTys ywopeva, 
Toiauta S€ Ta TE OnMEia THS apETHs Kal Ta Epya. 
15 €vel O€ Ta oOnmeia Kal Ta ToLav’TAa a éoTW ayabouU 


verb, has been noticed by Heindorf in the case of eis, on Plat. Lys. § 16, 
and in that of srepi and dpi, on Phaedo § 65, p. 250 C (in which place srepi 
xadXous takes the place of the nominatize) ; likewise of repi and vUmép by 
Bremi on Dem. Olynth. 1 p. 14. 18 (ap. Schafer Appar. Crit. ad Demosth. 
1 208); and a similar use of the Latin, &c. by Heusing, ad Cic. de Off. 1 
15. 3- Comp. Epist. ad Div. 1117. 13 111 12. 2 (Schafer). But what has 
not been observed of this usage is, that it is almost exclusively character- 
tstic of a middle or later period of the Greek language, viz. the fourth 
century B.C. 

The earliest instances I have noted of it are Soph. Oed. Col. 422, 
év 3€ pou réXos avroww yévaro rijode THs payns wépt, and Aj. 684, appl 
tovroow «0 oxjoe. In Plato it is not uncommon, Phaedo 231 D, fov- 
AeoOas wepi revos, Rep. IV 427 A, ei80s vopwy mépst nal wodurelas (a good 
example), Ib. 436 B, xaf éxacrov avrov mparropev, Phaedo 249 C (this use 
of xaG éxaorov for the simple accusative is found in various writers ; see 
Stallbaum on Rep. Il. cc.), Ib. VIE 533 B, wept wavrés AapBavey, Theaet. 177 B, 
Gorg. 487 A. But in Demosthenes and Aristotle it becomes quite a 
usual mode of expression. In the de Fads. Leg. alone it occurs in §§ 6, 7, 
64, 167, 239, and probably elsewhere in the same specch. 

From Aristotle, with whom it is still more familiar, I will content 
myself with referring to Rhet. I 15. 1, wept rav dréyvov...¢midpapeiv, 
Ib. § 27, wept Gpxoy...dvedciy. 11 4.30; 5. 21, rosovrous mepi oy (i.e. ovs) 
PoBotvra, a good example. 18. 4, epi peyébous (i.e. péyeBos) xowwov (€ore), 
Ib. 21, init., in both of which it stands for the nominative, as it does also 
in Pol. vi (IV) 2,1289@ 11, and 111 3,init. Pol. 1 ult. 1 9,1257@5,11 1 init., 
Ib. c. 4, 1262525, rept rov peradéepecv—roddny exes tapaxnyv. Eth. N. Iv 4 
init., wept peyadompereias Sued Oeiv, X 1 Sub init., 1172 @ 26, Umdp rev rocovrey 
—naperéoy elva, where it stands for the accusative. de Insomniis c. 2, 
459 @ 20, él rav hepopévov—nxiveiras, would be more regularly ra depdopeva. 

§ 15. dre) 8¢ ra onpeia x.r.A.] An exemplification of the preceding rule, 
and application of it to the special virtues. ‘Seeing that the signs of 
virtue, and all such things as are works (results, effects), or affections’ 
(properties, qualities, attributes—on md6y and its various senses see 
Introd. pp. 113—118 ; on the special sense here, p. 114) ‘of it are xaAa’, 
the same rule will apply to each special manifestation of it, as a»dpia. 
The sa6y of virtue are illustrated in the examples by dvrdpeiws, 8xaios, 
adixws: these are wa6n, ‘affections’, of courage, justice, and injustice, in 
the sense of ‘what happens to them’, some change they have undergone, 
consisting in a modification of them in form and signification ; as &ixaiws 
‘justly’, denotes a certain mode of action, viz. just acting. An exception 
occurs to the gencral application of the rule to the special virtues in the 
case of dixacocvvn : in this alone, though it is true of the épya, it is not 
true of the 2d6n : in other words, in the rest of the virtues the rrdceis are 


166 PHTOPIKHE A 9§ 16. 


of nv , , »9 @ e/ 9 / od vv 
Epya 1 wan, Kaha, avaykn boa TE dvopias Epya 7 
~ A 4 \ ? \ 
onpeia avopias n dvdpeiws wémpaxTat Kada Elvat, Kai 
\ , ‘ ‘ / w , \ 9 4 
Ta Oixata Kat Ta Stxaiws Epya (abn dé ob ev povn 
‘\ , ~ ~ A , 
yap Tavtn Twyv apeTwv ovK dei TO Stxaiws KaXdov, 
9 A ~ ~ A ~ 
aNN’ ert TOV Cymovaeba aiaxpov TO Sixaiws “adAov 
a\ \ 32997 A \ \ rd \ 3 \ ® , 
NTO addixws), Kai Kata Tas aAXas b€ dpeTas doavTus. 
‘ a 4 fF , 74 
16 Kat ef’ doo Ta aOAa Tin, Kada. Kal éf’ doors 


ovorotya, the changes of termination represent true co ordinates, all being 
terms referable to the same notion or class, viz. that of virtue, as avdpia, 
dvdpeios, dv8pelws: all are cqually xaAa and praiseworthy (see note on 
C. 7. 27); but in the single case of justice this does not universally apply, 
for 16 Sixaiws (nuotcbat, just (deserved) punishment, is not equally praise- 
worthy with a just act, rd dixalws mparrew, but the contrary ; since it is 
more disgraceful than an ##jus¢ punishment. (This seems to be a mere 
fallacy of opwvupia, ambiguity, eguivogue, 8naiws not standing in the 
same relation to (nysotoba: and mparrew: in the one case the ‘justice’ of 
the act lies in the intention of the actor; in the other it belongs not 
to the actor, but to the law and the judge who inflicts the punishment. A 
similar equivocal meaning lies in the word wdOos: in the rule and the 
general application of it, it stands for properties or attributes: in the 
special exception it denotes an ‘affection’ in the sense of suffcring or 
punishment.) 

§ 16. €p’ Scots ra dOXa rin, xadd] The xadoy is an end in itself; it is 
independent of all ulterior considerations and aims: therefore any act of 
which honour alone, and not profit (éq” dois rip) padAov fh ypypara) is the 
prize, is xadov : the prize aimed at, or the end of the exertions and efforts, de- 
termines the character of those efforts or actions, which are therefore fair 
and noble like the end at which they aim. riuq is an end of this kind. 
Eth. N. 1 4, 1095 6 16, xuS avra (dyaOd) 88 moia Oely res dv; § (are they 
not ?) doa kui povodpeva diaxerat, olov rd dpoveiv xal opay kai yoovai reves Kai 
Tipai ; Tavra yxp ei cal de GAXo re Steoxcoper, Guws tov nab avra ayabay Gein 
Tis av. C. 3, 1095 5 22, ruuq is the end of the moXtrixds Bius, pursued by 
the xapierres kui mpaxrixol, V. 30, 8iXov ov Kard ye Tovrous 9 Gpern Kpeirrey. 
In IV 7—I0, riq is represented as the end of the peyadowvuyxos and gido- 
riot, the sphere in which these two virtues are exercised. c. 7, 1123 6 18, 
péytoroy 8¢ Tour’ a» Geinneyv & rois Oeois drrovépopey, cai ov pdduor’ épievras of 
ev afudpart, xui ro émi rots xadXiorots BOAov. rotodroy 2 7 Tipn. 

Kui Goa pi) avrod évexa x.r.d.] The general characteristic of all the follow- 
ing topics (to § 19) is disinterestedness ; unselfish acts, of which the object 
is the good of some one else, and not one’s own. Any act of this kind, 
where there is no terior end of profit or advantage to oneself, which is 
done therefore for its own Sake, and ‘ because it is in itself desirable’, 
conforms to the definition, § 3, and is xadgv. So the highest and purest 
form of friendship or love is distinguished from the two lower forms, 
those whose end is profit and pleasure. Both of these are selfish ; true 





PHTOPIKHS A 9§17. 167 


4 ~ vA r 4 \ ee A e ~ df 
Tun Madov n YpnmaTa.. Kal doa py avToOU EveKa 
a ~ ~ 8 ~ , e 
17 WpaTTEel TIS TWY aipeTay. kal Ta atwAws ayaba, 60a 
t 9 + ~ 
UmTep TE TaTpidos Tis éoinoe, Tapiowy TO avToOU. 
kai Ta TH puce dyaba, kai a pn avTw ayaba* adTod P. 136 
n Y 9 f fn auTw® ay » 1367. 


friendship is disinterested, of BovAdpevos rdyaba rois Pidots éxelvaw 
€vexa padiora did, Eth. N. vill 4 init.; and the true friend is érepos 
avros, IX 9 init. and Ib. 1170 4 6, or GAXos avrds, c. 4, 1165 @ 31, ‘a second 
self’ (not one’s own self) alter ego. And on the other hand, émripoor 
rois €avrovs padtor’ ayaréot, xal ws év aloype@ didavrovs droxadovat, doxet Te 
G pév havdros davrov yap mavra mparresy, cat dow poyOnporepos  TorouTp 
paddoy’ o 8 éemeens dia Td Kady, x7.A. 1X 8, init. And in the Politics, 111 
7, the distinction of the two classes of government, normal and abnormal, 
cpOai and wapexBaces (deviations from the true standard), is determined 
by the ead of each, according as it is ro xowwdy or rd Tdcov cuppépoy: the 
public interest of o/hers, or the private interest of the governors them- 
selves, one or several ; in other words, it is determined by the selfishness 
or disinterestedness of the governing powers of the state. 

§ 17. d0a Usép re—ro avrov] This clause seems certainly out of place 
here, though Schrader defends it as an example of ra drAés dyad. ‘Qui 
enim ut patriam iuvet commoda sua negligit, is bonum sémpliciter prae- 
fert illi quod Awéc bonum foret’: that is, he prefers general to special or 
particular good, (his own). But this does not account for the re, which if 
the words are retained in the received order is as superfluous as it is inex- 
plicable. The sense would be improved and the particle accounted for 
by transferring the clause so as to follow rd rovaira (§ 17 ad fin.) The 
passage will then run thus: ‘and all absolute (or general, see note on 
drAes, c. 2 § 4) goods : and all natural goods (things which are naturally 
good, in themselves, and so good for all) and (therefore, or xai, ‘that is’) 
things which are #o¢ (specially and particularly) good to oneself (avrg), 
appropriated to particular individuals, because such things (things that 
are thus special and particular, and not common to others) carry with 
them the notion of selfishness or self-interest’. Here the clause comes 
in as the first example—‘ anything, namely, which a man does ether (re) 
for his country, to the neglect of his own interest, or (caf) anything that 
a dead man may have the benefit of, rather than one who ts living (such 
as posthumous fame, funeral orations, monuments to his memory) ; be- 
cause such honours paid (or advantages accruing) to a man while he is 
alive, involve or imply more self-interest’, and are therefore less cada. 

ra atios ayada}] ‘Talia sunt quae absolute, citra respectum ad hunc 
hominem, locum, tempusve bona sunt. Unde r@ adds, tli guod simpli- 
etter fale dicitur, opponuntur ra avrg Rhet. I 7. 35, et Ul 13. 4, rd rovross 
Ill 19. 1, rd revf Top. 111 1 (116 @ 21), rd fpiv Magn. Mor. 1 1, rd mpds 
@Anda de Gen. An. VII (sic) ; rd #9, ov, wore, pos r4, de Soph, El. c. 5, 
166 4 22.’ Schrader. Add § dwdés § éxelvors, Eth. N. 111, 1101 6 3 ovded 
6 dwAes, GAN’ 6 wes, Ib. 11 4, 1106 @ I. 

nal ra ry ucet dyaba] Comp. 7. 33, rd avromués. ‘Sunt profecto lauda- 
tionibus minime incongruentes materiae, genus, parentes, patria, pul- 





168 PHTOPIKHS A 9 §§ 18—20. 


e - ef ~ 9 e 
18 yap évexa Ta ToLavTa. Kal doa TeOvewt évdexETat p. 3"- 
~ vA ~ A a e@ ~ ed 
Urapxew parrAov 7 CwvTt’ TO yap avToU EveKa 
~ ~ \ e ” es bod 
19 MaAAOv Exe Ta CwrTt. Kat boa Epya Twv adrAwWY 
e ~ / 4 A 
€vexa. TTOV yap avToOv. Kai Boat Evrpayiat TreEpt 
, \ \ \ , 
a&Aous, dAAa pn wept avtov. Kal qepi Tous ev TrotN- 
o 4 A c Re 9 A 
cavtas’ dixatov yap. Kal Ta EevEepyeTnuaTa: ov yap 
a\ @ ’ é . \) 
20€is aUTOV. Kal Ta évavyTia 7 ep ois aitoxyuvoyTuL Ta 
) , A ~ 
yap aioypa aioxvvovrat Kai NEyovTEs Kal TroLour- 
\ , e/ \ A , 
Tes Kat pmeAAOrTEs, womep Kat Lardw weroinkey, 
9 4 ~ » , 
evrrovros Tou AXKatou 


critudo, ingenii acumen, solertia, docilitas, tenax memoria, ingenita animi 
magnitudo, et quae a natura proveniunt bona alia.’ Schrader. 

aur@ ayaa} ‘good for him’, that is, for this or that individual. See 
note on Cc. 7. 35, rd avro xal amA@s, and Schrader (quoted above on ra 
andes ayaGa). 

§ 19. ra evepyerjpara] ‘any benefits conferred’, because they are 
necessarily conferred on others, and therefgre, so far, more praiseworthy 
than acquisitions. These are distinguished from evspayiat mepi GAAovs (ante), 
which are ‘any good and noble deeds done in the service of others, and 
not for oneself’, for the same reason as the preceding. Eth. Nic. Iv 15, 
1163 @ 1, caddy 8¢ ro ed rorety py iva dyrimaby, aeAtpoy BE 1d evepyereioOat. 

§ 20. ra yap aloypa x.r.A.] ‘for shameful things we are all ashamed of, 
when we say, do, or are intending to do them’. Sappho’s verses, for 
instance, in answer to Alcaeus,—‘ something I would say, but shame pre- 
vents me’—she infers from this that it was something to be ashamed of, 
aiaxpor, and replies, ‘Hadst thou yearned after things good or fair, and 
had not thy tongue stirred up mischief to utter it, shame had not possessed 
thine eyes, but thou wouldst have spoken of the thing that is right’. The 
third line in particular of this Alcaic stanza requires correction, and there 
is not much help to be derived from the Aristotelian Mss. In the first, 
Blomfield, Mus. Crit. 1 p. 17, reads ixé r’ éoAay: and Hermann (much 
better), £/. Metr. Gr. 111 16, de stroph. min. ie o” (‘reached thee’, the 
Homeric {fxew), from the reading ikes of one Ms. Bergk, Fragm. Lyr. 
Gr. p. 607, follows MS A‘ in reading #xe and the Aeolic éoAov. The third 
line, which in the MSS appears as aidds xév oe oun elyev Sppar’, without 
varia lectto, is written by Blomfield, u.s., aldas xev ovyi r dwar’ elyev: 
by Hermann, aléddy xé revs ove eiyey Gmwar’: and by Bergk,”aldds xe o° 
oux dy fyev omar’ (surely xe and dy thus repeated in different forms and 
almost immediate juxtaposition is indefensible): none of these seems to 
be satisfactory, but I have nothing better to suggest. {In Bergk’s 2nd 
ed. p. 674 the fragment is printed as follows: ai 3 Hxes Eady inepoy 
radov, | kat py tt fFeimmy ydaoo’ éxixa xdxov,| aidws xé a’ ov nixavey 
Sppar’, | GAN’ Eheyes wept ro Bixaiws. S.] 

The fact that the eye is the principal organ of the manifestation of 








PHTOPIKH® A 9 §§ 21—24. 169 


, ~ a 
OédXw Te Ferny, dd\Aa pe Kwrvet 
3 4 
aldws, 
» 9 ~ Nv ~ 
ai & eixyes éoOAwy tpepov 4 Kadwv 
4 ; -~ ~ A 
kat pn Tt Ferny yAwoo éxvKa Kkaxov, 
id , , 3 9 av ? w ? 
aidws Ke o OUK av elyev Oupar, 
a ~ 
GAN’ Edevyes Tept Tw Sikaiw. 
‘ 4 t 9 ~ A I 4 4 4 ~ 
21 Kal rept wy dywnwor wn poBoupevor qeEpi yap Tw 
N id a 9 ~ ~ , a 
22 rpos dofav hepovtwy ayabwv TovTo mWaaxXovTW. Kal 
~ 4 5) 
ai tTwv dvoe azovdaorTéepwv aperal KadXious Kai 
\ = . oA : 
23Ta Epya, oiov dvdpos | ‘yuvaiKos. Kat ai amoXav- 
~ \ ~ \ A 
oTtkai aAXNows maAAov H avTois: Oto TO Sikaioy Kal 
e 4 4 A ‘A \ 3 \ 
249) Sikatcoovm Kadov. Kal to Tovs éxOpous Tipw- 


some of the feelings or emotions, as love, shame, fear, is here, as often 
elsewhere, expressed poetically by the phrase that ‘shame has its seat in 
the eye’. Compare the proverb in I1 6. 18, rd év d@Oadpois evar alda, 
where see note. 

§ 21. nal wepi ov dywndor uy PoBovpevn] ‘and things about which we 
are excessively anxious or distress ourselves, without fear’: the acquisition 
of which causes us a violent mental struggle (dywy), distress, or anxiety, 
‘agony’ in our exertions to attain, or in the fear of losing, it. The addi- 
tion of yx) doBovpevos is made here, because fear is the usual concomitant 
of the emotion, and generally included in the notion. Probl. 11 31, 4 ore 
aywvia poBos ris dort mpds apxnv Epyou (Vict.). aywugy belongs to that class 
of verbs which imply a diseased state or condition of the mind or body ; 
see note on mvevorigy, I 2.18. 

The anxious feeling is usually excited about the kind of good things 
that ‘tend to our reputation’ ; and this is why they are praiseworthy. 

§ 22. ‘The virtues (excellences) and functions of men and things 
naturally worthier, are nobler and more praiseworthy, as in man than in 
woman ’. 

§ 23. al droXavorixai (dperai)] ‘those which contribute to the gratifi- 
cation or enjoyment of others rather than of ourselves, of which justice is 
an instance’. dmoAavois is not here confined to sensual gratification, its 
proper meaning. In Eth. N.1 3, Sardanapalus, the type of sensuality, is 
taken as the representative of the Bios droNavorixos: note on I 5.7. Here 
again it is the unselfishness that is laudable. 

§ 24. xai rd rous éxOpovs ripwpeicbar padrAov] ‘and the heavier venge- 
ance on, punishment of, one’s enemies’ (zaAXov may be either to punish 
them in a higher degree, the more the better ; or as contrasted with xaradA- 
AarrecOa, ‘rather than the reverse’), and ‘refusing to be reconciled, come 
to terms, with them’. The reason being, that ‘ retaliatory’ or ‘ reciprocal 
justice’ (note on § 7) requires this, and therefore it is right, and of course 
laudable ; and also because ‘not to be beaten’ (an unyielding resolution) 


170 PHTOPIKH® A 9§25. 


~ ~ + a ‘ % 
peta Oat paddAov kai pn KatadAaTTecOa To TE yap 
> , / y a , , \ > 
avTamoodovar Sixawyv, To d€ Oikatov KaXov, Kal ar- 
A ~ \ , A ~ 
25 Opetov To pn itracbat. Kat viKn Kal Tiun TeV 
~ ‘ av rd 
Kadwv" aipera TE yap akapTra Ovra, Kai Umepoyny 
~ ~ tA ~ 
dperns SnAot. Kal Ta pynuovevta, Kai Ta maddov 
~ aia A ~ 14 i . sy 9 
smadAov. Kal a@ pn CovTt Ererat. Kat ois Tin aKo- 
~ 4 | , c 
Aovbe?. Kal Ta wepiTTa. Kai Ta hOvw UTapxorTa 


is a sign of a ‘manly character’. Comp. 1 6.26 (dya@a) ra rois éyOpois 
xaxd, and §29. This was a constant article of the popular morality, and 
is cited as such here: see, for instance, Xen. Mem. IV 2, 14 seq. Rhet. ad 
Alex. 1 (2), 13, 14 Again in Aristotle’s Rhet. 115. 5, Eur. Ion 1045—7, 
Med. 808, Cic. de Off. 1 7. 2. 

§ 25. ‘Victory and honour are noble and praiseworthy things ; for 
they are desirable though unproductive (see c. 5. 7, note ##/ra § 26), and 
manifest (are signs of) an excess, superiority, higher degree, of virtue’, 
i.e. a higher degree than the virtues which they crown would attain with- 
out them: a man may be good without them; with them he must be 
better. Comp. Eth. N. IV 8 init. of yap evyeveis détovvras reps nal of dv- 
vacrevovres i) of sAovrouvres’ €y Umepoxy yap, ro 8 dyabg umepéyow wav 
évriporepov. Comp. tx/ra § 39. 

ponpoveura] ‘things to be, capable of being, or that deserve to be, 
remembered’; as evpynpoveura (%2/ra) is ‘easy to be remembered’. s»ppo- 
yeupara, which Victorius adopts upon the superior authority of MSS, is 0- 
numenta, memorials, elogia, ef guae memoriam alicuius ornant. He does 
not seem to have observed, what Bekker, who prefers the former, doubt- 
less did, though he does not say so, that paAAoy can be construed with the 
adjective pynpovevra, but hardly, or not so well, with the sxdstantive 
pynpovevpara. 

& pw) (avrs Ewera] ‘things that outlast life, that follow a man beyond 
the grave’, as posthumous fame. 

ols rau) deodovbei] Honour itself, especially as contrasted with profit 
(sepra § 16), imparts a praiseworthy character as the prize of action, and is 
itself xadov and a thing to be praised (§ 25, s#fra). It must therefore 
convey this in some measure to everything, particularly actions, by which 
it is attended upon or accompanied. - 

Ta wepirra] (see note on 6. 28) are xada as well as dyafa. They are 
thus illustrated by Schrader. ‘ Quae aliis sui generis praestant. Gellius 1 
x1 P. Crassus Mucianus traditur quingue habuisse rerum bonarum 
maxima et praccipua, quod esset ditissimus, quod nobilissimus, quod 
eloguentissimus, quod iuris consultissimus, quod Pontifex Maximus. 
Velleius (de Pompeio), 11 53, Vir in td evectus super quod ascendi non potest. 

Ta Love UIdpxovra] ra (da cal & pndeis, 6.28. The difference between 
the two lies in this, that the topic of 6. 28 denotes positive good, as excel- 
Icnces, accomplishments, personal or intellectual advantages, which are 
peculiar to a man, and shared by no one else; here they rather refer to 


PHTOPIKHE A 9 § 26. 171 


, 9 U4 , \ , # 
26 KaAAlw* EvYnMovevTOTEpa yap. Kal KTNMaATAa aKap- 
A ; A 
mwa’ éevOepitepa yap. Kai ta wap’ éxaorots 6€ 

ov Af al ~ e , 
ita Kaa, kal boa onpueia eott THY Tap’ éExaoTolS 


peculiar actions, or qualities that can be manifested in action, which are 
more easily remembered, and therefore more the objects of praise, and in 
this sense xadAlw: éx mpdgewy 6 eraivos, § 32. 

‘In bibliotheca, quae prima in urbe ab Asinio Pollione publicata est, 
unius M. Varronis viventis posita imago est, Plin. v11 30. LZ. Metello 
tribuit populus Romanus quod nunqguam ulli alii ab condito aevo ut 
guoties in senatum iret curru veheretur ad curiam, Plin, Vil 43.’ Schrader. 
I have quoted these instances because from Schrader’s point of view 
they very well illustrate the topic. But I believe they are not exactly 
what Aristotle had in his mind when he wrote the words. These are 
not exactly subjects of ‘ praise’, which the topics of this chapter deal 
with, exclusively or more immediately. ra mepirra and ra povp vmap- 
xovra are to be taken together, the latter being a step higher in degree 
than the former. ra mepirra are distinguished and exceptional (as 
Schrader puts it) excellences, qualities, achievements. rd povp Umdpxovra 
are a step beyond, ‘unique’. 

§ 26. xrjpara dxapma] note on §. 7, fore 8¢ xpjowa paddov. A pleasure- 
garden on this principle is a finer thing and more deserving of approba- 
tion than a market-garden from which you make a profit. The reason 
here given for this preference is different to that assigned in Eth. N. Iv 9 
(quoted in the note referred to). There it is accounted for by the self- 
sufficiency or independence (avrdpxea) that it implies; here by its being 
more in accordance with the gentleman's character, in contrast with the 
vulgarity of trade and money-making. 

ra tap’ éxaoras isa] These are special pursuits, modes of action, man- 
ners, and customs cultivated in particular countries, ‘national’ and ‘pecu- 
liar to them’. In England, for instance, special skill in cricket and other 
athletic exercises gains a man applause; in Greece, running, boxing, 
wrestling, chariot-racing, are the great games. In Europe a man is 
applauded for his skill in dancing, which the Chinese utterly contemn, 
and regard as a useless waste of labour. Quint. Inst. Or. III 7.24, Afinus 
Lacedaemone studia literarum quam Athenis honoris merebuntur, plus 
patientia, fortitudo. 

Soa onpeia dort Tov map’ éxdoTots érawoupever] ‘all signs, or distinctive 
marks, of habits (characters, actions), that are approved in particular 
countries, as the habit of wearing long hair in Lacedaemon. This is 
a ‘sign’ of a gentleman, a character very much approved in that country. 
It is a sign of this, because with long hair it is difficult to perform any 
menial task', and therefore the wearing it shews that menial occupations 
are alien from that character. Gaisford quotes, Xenoph. de Rep. Lac. X1 3, 
épixe Sé (Lycurgus sc.) xal copay rois urép thy ASnrexny nAsxiav, vopifoy 
ourw «al peifous Gv xal dAevOepiwrepous xal yopyorépous haiverOas. [Aristoph. 
Aves, 1282, €Aaxwvopdyouy Gravres GvOpwrot tore, ExOpwy K.T.A. S.] 

1 ov yap old» 1 éxirndeloas rad rijs dperqs favra Blow Bdvavoor yn Onrixdr, 
Pol. 111 5, 12784 20. 











172 PHTOPIKH® A 9 § 27. 


9 Le ? » , ~ / » 
€raivoupevwv, oiov év Aaxeduisovt Kouay KaXov" é\ev- 
’ A ~ a ~ 
Gépov yap onpeiovy ov yap é€ott KopwvTa padtov 
? ~ a , 
27 ovdev Tovey Epryov OntiKovy Kai TO pnodepiay épya- 
, U4 b , a A a a 
Ceoba: Bavavoov rexvnv’ édevOepov yap To fy mpos 


Onrinov] Onres, Oyrevery, denote hired service in agriculture, but not 
slavery; the 65 is no SotAos. In this sense both words are used by 
Homer. The 67res formed the fourth and lowest class under the Solonian 
constitution. At Athens, in Aristotle’s time, the 6jres, rd Onrixdy (#AHO0s), 
still denotes the class of paid agricultural labourers, as an order of the 
state or population ; and is expressly distinguished from the Bavavoos 
or rexvira:, artisans and petty manufacturers, who are still A’red labourers, 
but work at mechanical employments, and in towns, forming with the 
others the lowest order of the population of the state. In Pol. 111 5, 
Bavavoos and 67s are several times thus distinguished. It is there said 
that in some constitutions (such as monarchies and aristocracies) neither 
of these classes is admitted into the governing body ; in oligarchies the 
6ns cannot, the Bavavaos can, be a citizen. In the account given, VI (IV) 
4, 1291 6 14 seq., of the various kinds of population which form the bases 
of so many different varieties of democracy, we have in line 25 the term 
xepynrixay, Of precisely the same import, substituted for 6yrixoy : the other 
had been already mentioned. In Pol. vit (VI) 4, 1319 4 27, three classes 
of these lower orders are distinguished, ro rAROos ro re rav Bavavowy 
(artisans) nat ro rev dyopaiwy avOparey (small tradesmen or retailers, 
buyers and sellers in the market, VI (IV) 4, 1291 @ 4, Aéyw 8€ dyopaiov ro 
mepi ras mpagets Kal Tas avas Kai ras €uropias Kai KamnXelas ScarpiBov), cat To 
Onrixoyv. Of all these it is said just before, 6 yap Bios daddos, xai ovbev 
éxyov per’ dperfs. Onrixoy metaph. = dovAccoy, ‘servile, menial’, occurs 
again Eth. Nic. Iv 8, 1125 1. 

§ 27. pndepiay épyalerOa: Bavavooy réyynv] This again applies to Lace- 
daemon: Gaisford quotes Aelian, V. H. VI 6, Bavavaoy 8¢ eidévas réyynv dvdpa 
Aaxedatponoy ovx efnv. Xen. Oecon. IV 2, nai yap al ye Bavavoixal xadov- 
pevar cal érippyroi eiot Kai eixdrws pévro: wavy adofoivra: mpos roy moAcwy 
(add VI 5). 

Bavavoov) Of the various kinds of population of a state, enumerated 
in Pol. VI (1V) 4, the first is the wepi rjv rpodny wAn8os, ro yewpysxov : the 
second, ro Bavavcoy’ gare 8¢ rovro To mepi Tas Téxvas Oy avev TOA advvaroy 
oixeic Oat’ rovrav 8¢ ray rexvav ras pev €£ avayens umapyew dei, rds O¢ els rpv- 
nv h xadas (pv,1291 a t. So that here the fine arts, as well as the necessary, 
indispensable, or mechanical arts, are all included in the class Bdvyavoa. 
See on this subject Thirlwall, Wzs¢. Gr. (Cab. Cycl. 2nd. ed.) c. 18, Vol. 111 
p. 64, note. Pol.v (vil) 2, 1337 4 8 seq., Bavavoov 8° épyow eivas det rovro 
vopiCew nat Téxyny ravTny cai pabnow, Goa mpos Tas xypnoes Kal ras mpafes 
ras THs dperis Aypnoroy dmepyafovrat To copa Tay €AcvOdpwov H rv Wuyny F 
rnv diavoray. dco ras re rowavras Téxvas Goat ro capa wapacKevafovar yxeipoy 
diaxeia ba: Bavavoous xadoipev, xat ras pucOapmxas épyacias’ G@oxoAdoy yap 
movovet THY Stavotay Kai Tarewyy. 1 11,1258 5 37, (ray épyaciov) Bavavoorara 
év ats ra capara AwBavrat padiora. Eth. Eudem. 1 4, 1215 @ 30, A€ya de 





PHTOPIKHS A 9g § 28. 173 


4 , \ ‘ , ~ e¢ 7 
28 aAAov (hv. Anmreov O€ Kal Ta GUVEYYuS Tots UTaAp- 


Bavavcous (réyvas) ras éSpaias rai pioOapyixds (arts sedentary and mer- 
cenary). The édpaias in this last passage explains the dodi/y degradation 
and injury of the preceding. Comp. Plato, Rep. vII 522 B, IX 590 B, 
Phileb. 55 c, Theaet. 176 (Heind. note § 85), (Legg. vill 4, 846 D No 
native must learn or practise any handicraft. One art is enough for any 
man ; and the natives or citizens must occupy themselves exclusively in 
statecraft or public duties). Arts are inferior in dignity in proportion to 
their necessity or utility, Arist. Metaph. Ar. Cic. de Off. I 42. 5. 

€Xevbépov...rd un mpos GAXov (pv) ‘to live with reference to, dependent 
upon, at the beck and call of, another’. Independence, avrdpxea, is 
a characteristic of the éAevOepos, the ‘free and independent’ citizen. Ari- 
stotle is writing at Athens, and for Athenians. So it is said of the peya- 
Aoyruxos, Eth. N. Iv 8, 1124 5 32, wai mpos GAAov py dvvacba (hy add’ H mpos 
irov: 8ovArxov yap. Metaph. A 2, 982 5 25, (Vict.) of 4 mparn diroaodia, 
Bnrov ws Be ovdepiay avriy (nrodper ypelay érépay, dA’ worep avOpwras, 
apev, eAevOepos 6 avrov evexa kal py GAXovu oy, oUT@ Kal auTn pon éAevOépa 
ovoa Tay emoTnpaY’ povn ydp avr) avris evexey eotiv. Victorius also quotes, 
in illustration of mpds addov Gav, Dem. (fro Clesiphonte, as he calls it) de 
F. Leg. p. 411, rots 8€ mpos vpas (oot xal ris map’ vpay ripns yAtyopevas. 
The import of the phrase is, to look to another in all that you say and do, 
to direct your life and conduct by the will and pleasure of another; in the 
relation (spos) of servant or dependent to master. 

It is to be observed that the reason here assigned for avoiding all 
mechanical occupations as disreputable, viz. that it destroys a man’s 
independence, so that he cannot subsist without looking to others, places 
the objection to it upon a different ground to that assigned in the Politics 
(quoted in the last note), where it is that they disqualify a man for doing 
his duty to the state. 

§ 28. Anrréoy 8é x.r.A.] ‘and we may assume (or represent, substitute one 
for the other, on occasion) things (qualities, and the terms expressing them) 
that are very nearly related to the identical, both in commendation and 
censure, as that the cautious is cold and designing, the simple (simpleton) 
worthy and amiable, and the insensible mild and calm’. This lays down 
the general rule, of which the next topic is a special variety, vrroxopiopos. 

Quint. Inst. Orat. 111 7. 25. Jdem praecipit (Aristotle in this place) 
tllud guogue, quia sit guaedam virlutibus ac vitits vicinitas, utendum 
proxima derivatione verborum ut pro temerario fortem, pro prodigo 
liberalem, pro avaro parcum vocemus: quae eadem etiam contra valent. 
Quod quidem orator, td est vir bonus, nunquam factet, nist forte communi 
utilitate ducatur. To the same effect, Cic. Orat. Part Xx111 81 (Schrader), 
(Liv. xx11 12, (Fabium) fro cuactatore segnem, pro cauto timidum, 
affingens vicina virtutibus vitia, compellabat. S.] 

xpnoros for 7AiG&os is one of those ironical euphemisms which Plato 
is so fond of employing ; as also are yAuxvs, ydus, and evy6ns, this last 
belonging also to the common language. yAvaus, Hipp. Map 288 B; qdus, 
in several places, Theaet. 209 E, Gorg. 491 E, Rep. I 337 D, VII 527 D, and 
elsewhere; Lat. suavis, Lepidus. xpnoros, Phaedr. 264 B, Theaet. 161 A, 
166 A, Rep. v 479 A, &c. Ruhnken ad Tim. p. 131. [On evq6ea, cf. note 
on Isocr. Paneg. § 169, and Rep. 400 E, quoted infra, p. 175. S.] 


174 PHTOPIKH® A g§ 29. 


\ Wf A 4 ; ‘ 
Xovow ws tav’ra GvTa Kai mpos Erawvov Kai mpos 
, < 4 “A 4 9 
Woryov, oiov tov evAaBi Wuxpov Kal ériBovAov kat p. 32. 
A A A , ~ 
29 Tov HAiGtov ypnaTov Kat TOV avaAynTov Tpaov. Kal 
ee ~ t 2 a A 
éxaorov 6 €é€k Twv wapaxoAovlouvrvTwy del KkaTa TO 
, ? \ ’ / \ \ \ € ~ 
BerXrioTov, oiov Tov dpyidov Kai TOV MaviKoY a7rAoOUY 
4 4 ~ td 4 
Kat Tov avOadn peyadorpern Kal cepvov. Kal TOUS P. 136; 4 


§ 29. xal éxacroy x.r.A.] “and in every case from the accompanying, 
attendant, qualities (the qualities that come #ex/, but always on the higher 
and better side ; on dxoAov@eiy and its various senses, see note on c. 6. 3) 
derive (éx) a term or expression always in the best direction (with the 
most favourable tendency, nterpretatio in melius, putting the most favour- 
able construction on the actual facts of the case) ; call, for instance, the 
irascible and insane, ‘simple and straightforward’, and self-will (head- 
strong, stubborn, obstinate temper; av@adns, one who pleases himself, 
av6-adns, ‘self-pleaser’, and w#// have his own way), ‘magnificence’, or 
proper pride, and a due sense of dignity (vepydv)”1. 

On dpyios Victorius compares Hor. Sat. I 3.51, atest truculentior atque 
plus aeguo liber: simplex fortisque habeatur, with Cic. de Legg. I 7, 
solent enim, id quod virorum bonorum est, admodum trasct, and there- 
fore an angry temper may be attributed to a virtuous disposition. 

pavxos represents an excitable, violent, furious temper, which some- 
times almost assumes the appearance of raving madness. In Plato it is 
applied to Chaerephon, Socrates’ intimate (in the Charmides, init.), and 
to Apollodorus, Symp. 173 D, where it expresses a very impetuous, ex- 
citable temperament, inclined to extravagant and violent manifestations 
in feeling and utterance ; which is illustrated by the conduct ascribed to 
him at Socrates’ death, Phaedo 117 D. 

On amos, as expressive of character, see note I 2. 4. 

avéaéns. In Eth. Eud. I! 3, 1221 @ 8, Ill 7, 1233 6 34, cexvorns, proper 
pride, the due measure of personal dignity in one’s bearing and behaviour 
to others, mpos érepoy (jv, is a mean between the two extremes, dpecxeia 
the defect (over-complacency and obsequiousness),and av@a8ea the excess 
(undue contemptuousness xara¢pornors, and disregard of their feelings and 
wishes). In the Magn. Mor. [ 29, it is likewise the excess of cepyorns, as 
dpeoxeia is the defect. It is exercised mepi ras évrevges, in the ordinary 


1 It seems to me nearly certain that weyaXorper7 is a mistake, either of the 
author himself or one of his transcribers, for zeyadoyvxor. The two have already 
been distinguished in this very chapter, 811, 12, and peyadorpéreca, when it ts 
distinguished from the other as by Aristotle, and not made to include it as by 
Plato (see the note on § 12), is altogether unsuitable to express the character of 
the av@d3ys, being confined as it is to liberality in bestowing money on a large 
scale: whereas the virtue of weyadopuxla is precisely what avéddea might be 
represented to be by the figure uroxopiouds, by bestowing on it a ‘ flattering’ 
designation. I refer for the proof of this to the Nic. Eth. 1v 7.8: it will be 
found that ceurdrys, another false interpretation which is here put upon avéddaa, 
is also characteristic of the peyadoypuyxos. Plato points out the true droxopiopos 


in the case of peyadorpéwaa, Rep. VI 560 E, Usoxopi{iuern...agwriay dé peya- 
Aowpéwaay. 


—-—_——_——--- -- —_——— or Ct; 3 _ 
— EE EE oo ee 





PHTOPIKH® A 9g § 29. 175 


év Tats UrepBoNais ws é€v Tais apeTais GvTas, olov Tov 
A , ~ 4 4 @ 9 a I 4 
Opacuv avdpeiov kai Tov dowrov édevOEpiovr Sofe TE 
. ~ ~ 14 Ge 
yap Tois moAAois, Kai dua mapadoyiortixoy éx THs 


intercourse of society, and manifests itself in the character ofos pnOevi 
évruyxety ndé dcadeyivat, in a wilful and stubborn reserve which repels all 
social converse. The character is represented in the name itself ; which 
is avro-ddns, ‘self-pleasing’. So that when we give the name of peyadowuyxos 
and cepyos to one who is really avéadns, we are substituting a virtue for 
a vice, a mean state for an excess. avOadeu is one of Theophrastus’ 
‘Characters’ defined by him as drjvea opusrias, ‘social brutality ’. 

The special form of this misapplication of names in praise and cen- 
sure is called voxopiopos, when it takes the favourable side, and inter- 
pretatur in melius. On this figure, the name of which is derived from 
the endearing terms used by nurses to children (mpos xdpny  xdpov Acyecv 
drocpuspovvra, Tim. Lex., lisping in imitation of them), compare Aesch. c. 
Timarch. p. 17 § 126, ravrny é€ vroxopicparos rer6is érw@vupiay xo, Theophr. 
wept dndias: vroxopiferOas wonmu{ow (Ast ad loc.), or by lovers, Plat. Rep. 
V 474 E, h epacrot vroxopsCopeévov, Arist. Plut. 1012, yyrrapioy ay nal darrioy 
Uwexopifero (whence it stands for a ‘diminutive’, Rhet. 111 2.15); hence it is 
transferred to flattering or endearing expressions in general, and especially 
such as, in describing the moral character of anything, substitute some 
nearly associated virtue for a vice; to palliate, extenuate, gloss over. 
Examples occur in Plat. Rep. VIII 560 E (already referred to), III 400 E, 
dvocav vroxopi{opevos xahodpev os evnOecav. Alexis, Tarantini Fr.3, Meineke, 
Fragm. Comm. III 484, dp’ ov« olc& drt rd xadoupevov (pv rovro dia- 
tpiSns xapw dvop’ édaorly vmoxopiopa ys avOpwrims polpas: Ovid, Ar. 
Am. 11 657, somintbus mollive licet mala, followed by a long string of 
examples. Lucr. Iv 1154 seq. Horat. Sat. 1 3. 44—54. Thucydides, 
III 82, in a well-known passage, mentions this perversion of moral terms 
amongst the signs of demoralization prevalent in Greece at the period of 
the Corcyrean sedition, xal rjv elwbviay dfiaow rev dvoparoy és rd epya 
avryAAagay 17 Sixatdces x.r.A. See Ruhnken, ad Tim. p. 266, 6; Ernesti, Lex. 
Techn. Gr. 8. v.; Shilleto, ad Dem. de F. L. § 293; Stallbaum, Plat. Rep. 
vi Lc.—Quintilian calls it derivatio verborum in the passage above quoted ; 
and V 13.25, describes it, s# acrt ef uchementi fuerit usus oratione, eandem 
rem nostris verbis mitioribus proferre; which he then illustrates from 
Cicero’s speeches. The opposite practice is described 11 12. 4, est prae- 
terea guacdam virtutum vitiorumque vicinia, gua maledicus pro libero, 
lemerarius pro fort, effusus pro copioso accipitur. (Farrar’s Chapters on 
Language, p. 281 sqq. S.] 

nal rous dv rats UrepBodais x.r.A.] The only difference between this and 
the preceding form of tvmroxopiopes is, that this is a special variety of the 
other, which substitutes the mean for the excess, but still according to the 
favourable interpretation of it. Opacurns is the UvmepBody of dvépela, Eth. 
N. II 7, 1107 6 3, 8, 1108 6 20, 1109 a 3, and dowria, prodigality, the spend- 
thrift’s habit, c. 7, 1107 8 10, c. 8, 1108 6 24, 

wapadoyiorixoy ¢x ris alrias] ‘liable to lead to a false inference’, Rhet. 
Il 24. 4,‘ suberit fallacia manans ex causa’, Portus. ‘The mis-reasoning 


176 PHTOPIKH: A 9g § 30. 


aitias* ei yap ov pn avayKn kivdvvevTiKos, ToAA@ 
parAov av Sdfeev Grov Kadov, kal Ei MpoeTtKos Tos 
TuxXoVGL, Kal Tois Pidors* UarepBoArn yap apeTHs TO 
30 mavras ev motelv. oKomeiv S€ Kai map’ ois 6 Eratvos* 


(mapadoytorixoy), or false reasoning, proceeding from the cause’, is the iden- 
tification of two different causes which must necessarily produce dissimilar 
effects or actions ; these latter are confounded by the fallacy, and ascribed 
to the same cause. The cause of an action is the mpoaipecis, the voluntary 
and deliberate purpose of it; otherwise represented as the ‘ motive’ (the 
efficient cause). Now this cause or motive is different in the case of an act 
of wanton rashness, where there is no necessity (obligation) to incur the 
danger (ov py dvdyxn xivduveurixos), and of an act of virtue, ‘rue courage, 
which Aas a noble end, rd xadcy, in view: they are prompted by different 
motives, one belonging to the class ‘bad’, the other that of the ‘ good’. 
This identification of the causes of the two actions leads to the ‘false infer- 
ence’, that as the same cause produces the same effect, and the cause of 
both actions is the same, the effects are likewise the same, and both of 
them are acts of virtue. And then the further inference is drawn, that 
whatever a man will do from a less powerful motive, he will do @_fortioré 
from one which is higher and more prevailing : the higher the motive or 
cause, the more powerful the impulse or effect. Similarly it is énferred 
that if a man is lavish to everybody, this must include his friends; by 
the rule, omne maius continet in se minus. 

UmepBorn dperjns}] Cic. Tusc. Q. V 26.105, exsuperantia virtulis. wmep- 
BoAn and vmepoyy are frequently employed to express an excess above 
a given standard, average, or mean; the general conception of ‘excess’, 
of mere ‘superiority’; without the additional notion of a ‘wicious’ excess, 
a depravation or deviation from a f¢rvue standard, which usually accom- 
panies the word, and more especially in Aristotle’s theory of virtue, where 
it stands for a class of moral vices. ‘Non significat hic mimium sed prae- 
stantia.’ Victorius. With the notion here expressed, comp. Eth. N. 11 2, 
sub fin. 1105 a 9, mepl 8€ rd yaXerodrepov del al Téxvn yiverat Kai dpern’ xal 
yap ro eb BeArwv ev rourg. The average standard of excellence is surpassed, 
‘good becomes better’, in proportion to the degree of difficulty surmounted 
in accomplishing any task. Pol. Iv (vII) 1, 1323 5 3, xexoopnpévas eis 
vmrepBodn»y, lines 8 and 14, xara THY Umepoxny, C. 4, 1326 @ 21, lb. d 12, ris 
umepBonrns dpos, 6 24. Pol. VI (IV) 12, 1296 4 19, wrocov 8¢ (by ‘quantity’ I 
mean) ry rov wAnOous Urepoxyny. This sense of the word is also common 
in Demosthenes, as de Cor. 291. 24, éyd 8€ roravrny UmepBoAny moioupat, 
and the same phrase de F. L. p. 447.25. c. Mid. 519. 24, €ore 8€ UmrepBorn 
Toy pera Tavra. vmepBod! ovxodarrias, xaxias, Swpedy, dvaideias, duornros, 
UBpews, &c., in all which vrepBody denotes not “ke vice, but merely the 
‘measure’ of it. 

§ 30. aoxomeiv 3€ xal rap’ ols 6 éravos] Compare 111 14.11. The same 
illustration of the topic, from Plato’s Menexenus, is there repeated, with 
the addition of é» rp émradig, ‘in the funeral oration’, meaning the 
Platonic dialogue, Socrates, Plato’s principal character, or hero, or 


——— 


_ PHTOPIKHS A 9g § 31. 177 


worep yap 6 Lwxparns EXeyev, ov yaderov 'AOn- 
vaious év A@nvaiows éraweiv. Set S€ To Trap’ éxao- 
Tos Timoy Aéyew ws Urapyet, olov év ZvOas 7H 
Aaxwow 7 pirtocodos. Kat orAws 8€ TO Tipuov aryev 
31 €ts TO KaAOy, Erreitrep Soxel yerTuav. Kal doa KaTa 
TO mMpoonKkov, olov ei akia TwY Tpoyovwy Kal Tw 


spokesman, is here taken more Aristotelio as a substitute for Plato him- 
self, whose opinions and sentiments he is supposed exactly to represent’. 
The passage of the Menex. 235 D runs thus, ef pew yap déoc "AGnvaious ey 
HeAomovencios ed Aéyew f eAonwovmncious €v ’AGnvaiats, dyabou by pryropos 
8é0e tov welcovros xal evdonspjcowos’ Stray 3¢ ris dv rovras dywvi{yrat 
ovorrep Kal draiwei ovdev péya Boxel ed Adyar. 

On this passage, Quintilian, Inst. Or. 111 7. 23, Jateresse tamen Ari- 
Stoteles putat ubi quidque laudetur aut vituperectur. Nam plurimum 
refert qui sint audientium mores, quae publice recepta persuasio: utilla 
maxime quae probant esse in co qui laudabitur credant, aut in eo contra 
guem dicemus ea guae oderunt. ta non dybium erit tudicium quod 
orationem praecesserit. 

To wap éxaoras Titov «7.A.] These are appeals to national and class 
prejudices and preferences. We should attribute to the object of our 
encomium the possession of any gift, quality, accomplishment which 
happens to be esteemed by the particular aydience that we are address- 
ing; as in a company of Scythians it would be advisable to address our- 
selves to their national habits and modes of thinking, and to praise our 
hero for his skill in hunting or strength or bravery ; at Sparta for patience 
and fortitude (Quint. u.'s.); at Athens for literary accomplishments. 

‘And in a word, (or, as a general rule), to refer (in praising any one 
before an audience of this kind) what éAey highly value to the «ado», since 
they appear to border closely pon ane another’. ‘To refer riya to rad 
xadov’, is to invest them with a mora/ character, rd xadov being the moral 
end, the right, the end of action. This is as much as to say that these 
things, which are so precioys in their eyes, are not only valuable, but 
right in themselves, and therefore they do well to hold them in high 
esteem. 

§ 31. Soa xara ro mpoonxoy xr.r.} ‘all that seems naturally to belong 
to a man in virtue of his birth or antecedents’, qualities, actions, achieve- 
ments; ‘such things as were fo be expected from him’. 


1 Bp. Fitzgerald (ap. Grant, ad Eth. N, vi 13. 3) remarks, on Eth. N. 11 
8. 6, that Aristotle in referring to Socrates prefixes the article when he speaks 
of him as Plato’s interlocutor ard representative, and omits it when he has the 
real historical Socrates in his mind. This is no doubt the general (Grant says, 
invariable) rule; but I have noted one exception in Pol. v (VIII) 7, 1342 6 23, 
where we find Zwxpdre without the article in a reference to lato’s Republic, 
111 398. The rule is extended to other Platonic characters borrowed from 
history, as rox A ptoropdyny (the Aristophanes of the Symposium), Pol. 11 4, 1262 611, 
and 6 Tizasos (Plato’s Timzeus, not the real personage), de Anima A 3, 4066 26. 


AR. I. 12 


178 PHTOPIKHS A 9 § 31, 32. 


mpovmnpypevwy: evdaiuouKoy yap Kai Kadov TO Tpoc- 
erxtacOa Tysnv. Kal ei mapa TO mpoanKov Sé émt 
70 BéXTiov kal Td KaANLOV, Oiov Ei EUTUYaY MEY [ER 
Tplos aruxav Sé pmeyaroyvyos, 4 metCwv yryvouevos 
BerTiwy Kai xaTadAaxTiKwTEpos. TowvTov Sé TO 
Tou “Idpixparous, €£ oiwv eis ola, Kal TO TOU GAUp- 
aLOViKOU 
mpoobe pev aud’ wpoow Exwy Tpaxeiay, 

Kai TO TOU Xapwvidou 


A a a 9 A ® ~ 9 = a 
1] WATPOS TE Kak avdpos adeAguv 7 ovca TUpavvwy. 
32s éwel S éx Twv mpatewy oO Emawwos, idiov S€ Tov 


mpoumnpypévev] ‘res antea virtute alicuius studioque possessas, laudes 
quas sibi quispiam labore suo comparaverit.’ Victorius. ‘his own pre- 
vious acquisitions or possessions’; such as a stock of previous good, noble, 
great deeds, with which his new achievement, now the object of the 
encomium, is in accordance; as it ought to be. It is praiseworthy 
because it is the addition of a new honour, which, since honour itself is 
xadov, must also have a tendency to happiness (evdazonxoyv) and be right 
itself, and all that is right is praiseworthy. 

But not only conformity with a man’s antecedents may be adduced in 
praise of an action, but also the opposite, ‘if he surpass them, namely, 
and improve upon’ his own early condition and actions, or those of his 
ancestors, not acting 2 accordance with the past and what he was born 
to, but contrary fo it, i.e. beyond it. 

xaradAaxrixatepos] This does not necessarily contradict the topic of 
§ 24; the irreconcilable temper there is only to be fostered against 
enemies, here it probably refers exclusively to friends: or if not, in 
Rhetoric either side may be taken as a subject of commendation, each 
suitable to a different kind or disposition of audience. 

TO Tov Idixpadtrous—ro rov cAvpmtovixov) Both of them already quoted, 
I 7.32, q. Vv. 

To Tov Suswvidov] The epigram is given at length by Thucydides v1 59. 
Bergk, fragm. Lyr.Gr. Simon. Fr. 115, p. 781 [p. 906, 2nd ed.].’A»3pés dpio- 
revoavros €y ‘Edad ror ef’ éavrou | ‘Immiov ’Apyedixny noe xéxevOe xovs. | “H 
marpos re kai dvdpos ddeAday tr ovca rupavvay | Laidey rt’ ovx iipOn vour és 
aracOaXinp. 

§ 32. €x rev mpakewy o érasvos] ‘praise is derived from actions’, i.e. it 
is only (moral) actions that can furnish topics of érawos, in its proper 
application. Praise and blame, moral approbation and disapprobation 
(Butler), are the tests of virtue and vice. 6 pe» ydp frawos ris dperis, 
Eth. N. 112, 1101 5 32, 

See on this subject, and upon what follows, the distinction of ¢ratvos, 


éyxopsov, and evdatuonopds and paxapiopos, Introd. App. B to c.9 §§ 33, 34, 
p. 212 scq. 


PHTOPIKH® A 9§ 32. 179 


orovoaiov TO KaTa mMpoaiperw, mEpaTéov Sexvyat 
a 

MpaTTOVTa KaTa Tpoaiperw, xpnowwov Se TO ToA- 
, U4 / ‘ \ ‘ , 

Aaxis haiverOar wempaxyota. 610 Kai Ta cULTTW- 


t8zov row orrovdaiov rd Kara mpoaiperwy] On mpoaipecis, see note, c. 6, 26. 
The mpoaipecis, the deliberate moral purpose, is the distinctive character- 
istic of moral action. ‘Acting in accordance’ with this is consequently 
said to be ‘peculiar to’, the froprium, characteristic of ‘the man of 
worth’, or good man. In ‘praising’ any one, therefore, praise being, 
strictly speaking, confined to moral action, ‘we must endeavour to shew 
that his actions are directed by a deliberate moral purpose’. 

daiveobu} ‘that he should de skewn to have’... ‘that it should be 
made clear that he has’... Note on I 7.31, p. 141. 

36 xai ra oupnropara x.r.A.] To establish a character for virtue in the 
object of your praise it is desirable to shew that his virtuous acts have 
been often repeated; and ¢herefore, for the same purpose, to make an | 
apparent addition to this number, we should assume as acts done with 
a moral purpose, ws ¢v mpoupére, any ‘accidental coincidences’ and 
‘pieces of luck’ (which may have happened to him); ‘for if a number of 
them can be brought forward ‘resembling’ the virtue or excellence that 
you wish to praise in him, they will be taken for ‘a sign’ of it and of the 
moral purpose or intention’ (which censtitutes virtue). The mere repe- 
tition of the actions, ro woAAaxs gaiveoOat menpayxora, is serviceable in 
producing this impression, because it seems to shew an inclination or 
fondness for them, and thence a certain direction of the mpoaipects or 
choice, and a certain é£ or moral state, which are indications of a 
virtuous habit. ovpmrdpa is a ‘concurrence’ or ‘accidental coincidence’ 
of one thing or act with another, between which there is no mecessary 
connexion, and, like ra amo rixns, purely accidental, ‘cvprrepa est, cum 
quopiam aliquid agente, et quod nihil ad rem quae intervenit faciat, 
extrinsecus quippiam excitatum contingit; e.g. deambulante illo solem 
deficere: do rixns vero, cum quopiam aliquid agente alicuius rei gratia, 
aliquid ex eo actu praeter propositum evenerit ; ut scrobem facientem, ut 
arborem serat, thesaurum defossum invenire.’ Victorius. On rdyn as an 
agent or supposed cause, see Introd. p. 218—224, Append. C to Bk. I. 
Both of Victorius’s instances came from Aristotle [de div. per somn. i#/ra, 
and Met. A 30, 1025 4 16. S.] 

On ovprrepa (rare in ordinary Greek) Phrynichus, yp} ody ovvruyiay 
Aye, ff} AVoavras ovTw, cuvémevery avT@ rode yevérOus, AnpoobErns pévror 
éy r@ xara Atovvoodedpou (p. 1295, 21) amaf eipnxe rovvopa. The only 
other example of it, referred to by Lobeck, note ad loc. p. 248, in any 
writer earlier than Aristotle, is Thuc. Iv 36, where it stands, like cupopa, 
for an ‘unfortunate accident’. In Dem. it is equivalent to ro ovpSays, 
which occurs in the same sentence. It occurs also in the Platonic Axio- 
chus, 364 C, in the sense of ‘a disease’ (moréus, Ast), apparently as a 
special kind of ‘ calamity’. In Aristotle I have noted the following in- 
stances : Pol. viII (V) 4, 1304 @1 (where it means ‘an accident’, as in 
Dem. and Phryn.) [ib. 6, 1306 6 6; 11 12, 1274.@ 12]; Top. A 5, 1264 36, 39, 
de div. per somn. c. I, 462 6 27, 31, ovpmrrmpa 8€ ro Badifovros exAeitrew Tov 

12—2 


180 PHTOPIKH® A 9§ 33. 


mara Kal Ta ado TUyns ws év mpoalpere: AnwTEor 
dy yap jwodAa Kai Spore mpodepntat, enpeiov adperns 

33 elvan Soke: kai mpoaipeoews. ort 5° Eratvos Aoyos 
éupaviCwy péyebos apetns. Set ouv tras mpaters 
émidexvivat ws ToavTat. TO 8 éyKwmov TwY Epywy 
éativ, ta Sé KixAw eis wioTwW, olov Eevryévera Kal 
fAwoy (an accidental coincidence), 463 @ 2, rév cupntrepdrey ovddy ovr aei 
yiveras otf os és) ro modu (it is a mere occasional, unaccountable acci- 
dent), de respir. 5, 472 6 26; de Gen. Anim. Iv 4 § 10,770 46 6[and 777 4 8); 
Hist. An. vit 6. 4, 585 6 25, ovprrwor (accident), 1X 37. 6,620 6 35, 40. 41, 
626 a 29. Categ. 8,9 515; p. 199 41; p.1093 417. The medical sense of 
the word ‘symptom’ seems to be derived immediately from the Aristo- 
telian ‘accidental coincidence’. It is an attendant sign of the disease, 
though a mere external indication, and not of she essence of it; like a 
oupBeBnxos or ‘accident’. 

§§ 33, 34. Seethe Introd. p. 212 seq. Eth. Eud. 11 1. 12, és 8 of &rasvor 
rs dperjs dua ra épya, nal ra éyxepia ray Epyov...érs dia ri fj evdatpovia 
ovx émawveira; Ore dca ravrny rddAa, fh rq els ravrny dvapéperba (Eth. N. 
I 12) # r@ popa elvat auris. 0 érepoy ev8aipomopes xal exawos xal 
éyxopiov’ TO pév yap €yxdpuov Aoyos rou xa’ éxacroy épyov, 6 O° Frasvos 
rotovroy elvat KaboAov, 6 8 evdaipomopos Tédos. 

ra 8€ KUKAg els wire] ‘The encomium or panegyric is directed to deeds 
done’ (¢yxapidfoper mpatavras, after they are done, the resu/és of actions ; 
éravos being of the actions themselves) ‘and the surrounding circumstances 
(such as noble birth! and cultivation) serve for confirmation’. These 
‘surrounding circumstances’ are a sort of setting of the gem, a frame for 
the picture, of which the real subject is the ‘deeds’ of the hero of the 
panegyric ; what he has done himself;—nam genus et proavos et quae non 
Secimus tpst, vix ea nostra voco. The ‘confirmation’ consists in this,— 
‘for it is natural and probable that the offspring of the good should be 
good, and that one reared in such and such a way should turn out of 
such and such a character (fortes creantur fortibus et bonis: os ddnbes ty 
dpa dcOiay an’ av8parv ecOda yiyverOat réxva, xaxdy 8 Gpora rp hvoe TH 
rou warpés, Eur. Alcm. Fragm. vi! Dind.). But still the real object of our 
praise is the ¢&s, the confirmed Aadézt of virtue, the character and not the 
mere act; ‘because we should praise a man even if he had not done the 
(praiseworthy) act, if we supposed that his character was such as to incline 
him to do it’. 

ra xuxA@ occurs in the same sense, of ‘surrounding’ (or accompanying) 
‘ circumstances’, Eth. Nic. 111 12, 1117 3 2, ov pny ddAd Sogerey Gy elvar rd 
kata Thy avopelay rédos you, ve Tay KiKAp & adhaviferOas, where ra xixrp 
are ro Aummpoy Kal movot, ‘the pains and dangers by which courage is sur- 

1 The topic of genealogy is put first of all and treated at length by the author 
of the Rhet. ad Alex., c. 35 (36). 4, seq. in his chapter on the encomiastic and 
vituperative kind of Rhetoric. This stands in marked contrast to the secondary 


and subordinate place here assigned to it by Aristotle, who seems rather to have 
agreed with Ovid l.c. as to its comparative value, 


PHTOPIKH®S A 9 §§ 34—36. 181 


, t ~ a 4 ‘| 4 
madeia® eixos yap €€ ayabwv dyabous kai Tov oT P. 33- 
, ~ , 
Tpadevra To.ovToy eivat. S10 Kat éyxwmiaCouev mpa- 
s ~ ~ € A 
favras. tra 8 épya onpeia THs Efews éoriv, érel 
~ A , > 
Emravoimev av Kal un TEMpayxoTa, EL MieTEVOIMEY Elvat 
~ | ~ 
34 ToLovTOY. jpakapiopos O€ Kal evdatmouapos avTois 
A » 7 , ) 9 >» 7? 2 > e 9 
sev Tav’Ta, TovTos 8 ov TavTa, GAN womep 7H Evdat- 
A / ~ 
povia Thy apETHY, Kai 6 EVOalLOMNO MOS TEpLEYEL TAUTA. 
al a 
35  Exee SE Kowov Eidos 6 Errawos Kai at ovpBovdat- 
& A ~ , wv ~ 
a yap év Tw ouuBovAcvew Urobnno av, TAVTA METATE- P. 1368. 
36 Oévra TH AELEL eyKwpia vyiryvera. émet ovv Exopev 
i yaa yiyverat. Xo" 


rounded, while it looks through them to the pleasant end’; again, Rhet. 
III 14. 10, of dovAos ov ra dpwradpeva A¢yovew dGAAG ra KUKAM. 

§ 34. paxapiopss xal evdatponapos avrois pev ravra] It is quite true that 
the two terms are sometimes identified, (as in Eth. N, 1 12, 1101 5 24, rovs 
Te yap Geovs paxapl{opev nai evdatpovi{opev xai row dvipay rovs Oeiorarous 
paxapi{opev); but they are also distinguished, and then pdxap and paxapia 
represent ‘ blessedness, bliss’, a higher degree of happiness than evdaiper 
and evdamovia, which is the Auman form of happiness, while paxapia is the 
divine. axapes is specially applied to deof by Homer and Hesiod ; as 
well as to the denizens of the paxapwy vaco:, the abode of the blessed after 
death.—avrois is for dAAnAoss. 

rovras 3 ov ravra] ‘but not the same with the other two’, viz. érarvos 
and ¢yxopsov: these are included in ev8aspomopos as virtue is in hap- 
piness. 

§ 35. fyes 8é xowov el8os x.r.d.] § There is a community of £2’ (the two 
may be referred to one species, one of the three kinds (efy) of Rhetoric, 
c. 3. 1, either the cupSovAeurixoy or the émiBeccrixdy, as the occasion re- 
quires) ‘between praise and counsel or advice; for anything that you 
would suggest in advising may, by a mere change in the language, be 
converted into panegyric’. Quintilian has borrowed this, Inst. Or. 111 7.28, 
totum autem habet (laudativum genus) aliguid simile suasoriis; quia 
plerumque eadem illic suaderi hic laudari solent. 

§ 36. ‘And so, when we know what we ought to do in any given case, 
or to ¢ in respect of character, we must then use the acquired knowledge 
(of the right course of action, and the right character) as suggestions, by 
changing and converting the language’ (twisting so as to adapt it to 
our purpose ; lit. /urning them by the language). The example, and 
probably the topic itself, is taken from Isocrates, who in Panath. § 32 
employs it as a suggestion or piece of advice, and in Evag. § 45 converts 
it into a topic of laudation—‘ Now when thus expressed, it amounts to 
(has the value of, may serve for,) a suggestion, but when thus, it becomes 
laudation, “Proud, not of the accidents of fortune, but of the distinctions 
due to himself alone”’.—The example in the laudatory form from the 
Evagoras runs thus in the original, ove emt rots 8s° rvxny, add’ emt rots 80 


182 PHTOPIKHS A 9 §§ 36—38. 


a Sei mpartew Kat roiov twa elvat, det TavTa ws 
UmoOnkas Aéyovtas TH AEEE peraTiBévat Kal oTpe- 
eww, oiov Ott ov Set péeya ppoveiv emi Tois dia TUXNY 
ddAa@ Tots 8 avtov. ov'Tw pev ovv AExOEv UrroOnKny 
Suvarat, wot 8 érawov “péeya dpovwv ov Tots dia 
TUXNY UTrapyovaw adda Tois 8 a’Tov.” woTE STaV 
érraweiv BovaAn, dpa Ti av Vrro0n10, kal Stav Vober Gat, 
37 Spa ri dv érawéceias. 1 O€ AEkts Eorat avTixermery EF 
dvayKns, STav TO pev KwAvOV TO Sé an KwAVOY peTaTEOy. 


38  xpnoreov dé Kal Twv abEntiKwy woAAois, olov Et 
avroy ytyvouévas. Aristotle was probably quoting from memory, as seems 
to have been his common practice. 

With the passages of Isocrates comp. Ovid. Met. X111 140, Mam genus 
et proavos et quae non fecimus ipst, Vix ea nostra VoCo. 

dvvara:] Rhet. 11 5. 1. 8vvacOas is often used in the sense of ‘having 
the value of, amounting to, equivalent to’, and is construed with the 
accusative. Herod. 111 89, rd 3¢ BaSvAdmoy rdAavrov dvvarat EvBoidas 
€B8opyxovra peas. Xen. Anab. 1 5.6, 6 ciyAos 8uvaras érra oBodous, Thuc. 
VI 40, Adyo: Epya duyduevor, Eur. Med. 128, ra 8’ vrepBaddovr’ ovdéva xatpoy 
duvaras Ovarois (where Elmsley and Pflugk understand xa:pdv as used adver- 
bially) ; also of the power, force, import, ‘meaning’, of a word, Ar. Met. T 
6, 1011 @ 7, 8uvavras 8 al dropia al rovatra: macau ro avro. Thuc. 1141, ry» 
avrjy 8uvara (is equivalent to) 8ovAwow. Id. VI 36, rotro 8dvayrat (mean) 
al dyyeXlat, VII 58, 8uvaras 8€ ro NeoSapates dAevOepov on elva. Ast’s Ler, 
Plat. s.vv. duvapa, 8ivapts. The power or force which is contained in the 
primary sense of 8vvacOa is expressed in the secondary sense in which it 
appears in the above passages as a particular kind of force, the value of 
anything, and hence the amount, (of which equality or equivalence is a 
species), or the import, or meaning (which again is a kind of equivalence) 
of it. And the accusative is nothing but a cognate accusative. That 
power or force is the original notion from which the secondary meanings 
are derived, is proved, if proof were needed, by the parallel use of loyvec» 
to express precisely the same notion; Eth. Nic. I! 3, 1105 4 2, ro péw eldevas 
puxpow 7 ovdey loyves, ra & dAXa ov pixpoy dAAG ro way 8uvarat. AS we say 
dvvacOai rt for rea Svvayw, this construction is merely extended to the 
new kind of power which constitutes the secondary sense of the verb. 

§ 37. 9 dé Aegis «.r.A.] ‘The expression must be contradictory’ (the 
opposition of avridacts, xarddacis and amodacis, positive and negative, 
Categ. c. 10, p. 11 4 19, the fourth kind of ‘opposites’ ra avyrixeipeva), i.e. 
it must be positive in one, and negative in the other, ‘when the prohibitive 
and the non-prohibitive are interchanged’. This is the case in the two 
examples ; the one forbids pride, the other recommends or praises it—in 
a sense, provided it be directed to proper objects: by ‘not forbidding’ it 
contradicts the other. 

§ 38. ray avfnrixay] guae valent ad amplificandum. These are the 


r 


—~%- 


PHTOPIKHS A 9 § 38. 183 


, at ~ aN > #7 Nv \z / 
fhovos 4 mWpwros n MET OAIYwWY 4 Kat" MaNtoTa TeE- 
woinkev’ amravTa yap TavTa kada. Kal Ta éx Tw 
Xpovwv kat THY Kailpwv' TavTa O€ Tapa TO TPO TKoY. 
kai €t woANaKis TO avTO KaTwpOwKev’ peya yap, Kal 

» 5 \ , 3 4 > e \ rs) , A 9 A 
ovK do Tuxns d\Xa Ov adtov av dofeev. Kal et Ta 
1 +48 infra, cum libris. ‘Recte Wolftus apud Vaterum p. 209 8 delet.’ Spengel. 
various modes of avénois, which with the opposite, peiwors, constitutes the 

fourth of the xowvol roro:. See Introd. p. 129, and (on II 26) p. 276. 

Some of the special topics which follow as instances of avfnrixa have 
been already mentioned in § 25, and appear again as giving a special 
importance or prominence to crimes in c. 14. 4, with the omission of the 
last. They, and others of the like kind, are included in the Rhet. ad 
Alex. 35 (36), 12, 13, under the general: head of ‘Comparison’ with others 
for the purpose of laudation, to which they are all reducible. Comp. Cic. 
de Orat. 11 85. 347—8, and Quint. Inst. Or. 111 7.16. With nai & padtora re- 
soinxey, el srerroinxey must be supplied for the sense after xai. 

Ta €x TY ypovewy kal TH Katpwov] ‘circumstances of time and opportunity’ 
give a praiseworthy character to particular actions at special times and 
seasons. This topic, equally applicable to comparative goods, has already 
occurred, c. 7. 32: and with wapda ro apoajxoy, comp. c. 9. 31. If, for in- 
stance, a man performs an act of liberality, at a time of great pecuniary 
pressure, or in a case of emergency, or at a crisis of especial difficulty, he 
is then doing something sapa ro spoonxoy, beyond what could naturally 
be expected from him, or any one else, and is entitled to especial credit 
for it. Similarly Victorius. 

xal el roAXdxis rd avrd xarapbwxey] This topic is not to be confounded 
with rd wodAduis GaiverOat wenpaxora of § 32. That is a ‘repetition of the 
act’, “his denotes the ‘repeated success’ in any attempt, the constant 
success is an indication—not infallible, or certain as a proof—of special 
skill: as if a man were to throw sixes several times running, even if it 
were by mere accident, the inference would be that he had a special 
knack or skill in throwing dice. ‘The constancy of the success gives it 
importance, and it will seem #o# accidental but due to the agent himself’, 

xal el ra wporpéemovra x.r.A.} ‘And any one’ (on whose account, in con- 
sequence of his actions and distinctions) ‘to commemorate whom in- 
centives, stimulants, to virtue (‘encouragements’ to do the like), or marks 
of respect for it, have been invented or were ever ‘instituted’, must be 
a praiseworthy character’. This is the general case of the invention or 
establishment of any public mark of honour in commemoration of the 
great deeds or distinctions of any signal public benefactor, and as an 
incentive or encouragement to others to follow his example. 

The next clause, els 6» rporoy, is a particular example of the former of 
the two preceding cases, the ‘invention’, the first appropriation, of some- 
thing in a person's honour. Victorius thinks that xareoxevao@y is espe- 
cially applied to the germanent establishment of an enduring monument, 
as a temple. 

This topic again is afterwards applied to crimes, in c. 14. 4. 


184 PHTOPIKHE A 9§ 38. 


, 4 ~ A ~ @ a 

mpoTperovTa Kai TiuwvTa Sta TOVTOV EvpNTal Kat 
a ~ 4 f 

KaTeokevacOn. Kai eis Ov mpwrov éyKwpuoyv éroinOn, 


evpyrat...narerxevac6n] We may note here the juxtaposition of the 
perf. and aor., apparently with no distinction of time intended. I have 
elsewhere noticed (Pref. to 7rans/. of Gorgias, pp. xv. xvi.) the difference 
of idiom between the Greek and English languages which od/iges us 
sometimes to translate the Greek aorist by the English perfect. Other 
examples of the same inadvertence, confusion of tenses, or whatever else 
it is to be called, occur, 1 3.8, where spay6jvas in the same sense and in 
the same opposition is repeated in the form smewpay$a:, Top. IX sub fin, 
p. 184.4 8, BeBonOnxe pay...réxvny 3 at rapé8exey. Many instances are found 
in Sophocles, which in a writer so subtle in the distinctions of language 
might lead one to think that Ae at any rate distinguishes them with a 
meaning. I leave the reader to judge. Philoct. 664, 666, (Herm. 676), 
Ady pev déjKxovc’ Srawa 8 ov para, 927—8, old p’ elpydow, of Hrarnxas. 
1172, ri ps’ dAeoas; ri pw elpyacas; Antig. 406 (Dind.), present and aorist, 
nal wos éparas xdridnwros 7péOn; 1228—9, Aj. 33, Trach. 364, 5, Arist. Ran. 
1010—11 (Dind.), swerolnxas...drédecéas, Plat. Phaedr. 231 A, d re xal 8¢6evro, 
xal & wewowjxaow 3. Dem. de F. L. § 228, ovr’ yvexAnoa ovre...BeBSiaopas. 

els 8» sperov...] The novelty of the distinction, invented expressly for 
the occasion, marks a still higher sense entertained of the value of the 
service or the virtue of the act which it is intended to commemorate. 

dyxopsov eto Gm) sosetv is here loosely used, by the so-called figure 
zeugma (on c. 4. 6, note 1), in connexion with ¢yxdéyiow and the statue of 
Harmodius and Aristogeiton in two different senses—as to Hippolochus, 
until we know who he was, and in what way commemorated, the application 
must remain uncertain—of writing the panegyric, and ‘setting up the 
statue in the market-place’, 

Of Hippolochus nothing is known. It seems that Aristotle intended 
the ¢yxapsor to refer to him. We should therefore insert a semicolon, or 
at least a comma after ‘ImmcAoyov, im order to connect the panegyric and 
the statue with those that they severaHy eoncern: els is to be repeated 
after nai. ‘And one (is especially praiseworthy) in whose honour a 
panegyric was first composed, as it was for Hippolochus; (and as the 
setting up of their statue tz ¢he market was ‘done’ first, érouj6n, i.e.), and as 
the privilege of having their statue erected in the market was granted for 
the first time to Harmodius and Aristogeiton’. Thucydides in his epi- 
sodical account of the assassination and the circumstances that led to it, 
VI 54—59, makes no mention of the statue; nor Aristotle Pol. vitI (v) 10, 
where the attack on Hipparchus is speken ef. Pausanias, I 8. 5, says, 
ov méppa 8¢ doraorw ‘Appotios nat "Apioroyeirey of xreivayres “Imapyxor airia 
de aris édyévero x.r.A. He is describing the dyopa, though he does not 
expressly name it. (See Smith’s Dict. of Geogr. Art. Athena, p. 293 4.) 

én) rov ¢vayriwy) ‘in the opposite cases’, of men to whom any reproach 
or stigma, mark of disapprobation (the test of vice) was first attached. 
‘cum nempe quempiam aut solum aut primum aut cum paucis ftagitium 
admisisse ostendemus, turpitudinem ipsius valde augebimus.’ Victorius, 
On the topics of vituperation, Quintilian, Inst. Or. 111 7. 19—22. 





PHTOPIKHE A 9§ 38. 185 


e 4 8 , 

olov ets ‘ImrmdAoyxoy, kai d¢ ‘Appodiov cai Aptoroyei- 

~ ~ A A ~ 

Tova To év ayopa orabyvat. Opoiws dé Kai émt Twv 
9 UY wv ‘ e <A ) ~ A 4 

évavriwy. Kav pn Kal’ avtov evropis, mpos aAdAous 
, , 4 9 , > , A 

avrimapaBadrAew> Sep ‘Iooxpatns emote dia THv 


nay pry xaP avrov evropys x.rd.] ‘and if you have not enough to say 
about your hero himself, and in his own person, then institute a com- 
parison between him and others... only the comparison must be with men 
of distinction, (reputation); because the amplifying power of the comparison 
and the impression of nobility which it creates, arise from the superiority 
which is attributed to hint over those who are themselves worthy and. 
good’. The same topic is recommended in the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3 (4). 6. 

Grep "looxparns—8&xoroyeiv] ‘which was Isocrates’ custom, owing to 
his want of practice in forensic pleading’. Read dovvj6eay [with A°] for 
two reasons. /irsf, what is meant is that Isocrates cultivated the habit of 
comparing his hero with others in consequence of his want of actual 
practice in the law-courts. There the pleading is always direct, and the 
arguments pointed at an adversary; comparisons with others are alto- 
gether out of place, or only occasionally serviceable. If Isocrates had 
had this practice, he would not have fallen into the habit of comparing, 
into which he had been led by confining himself to the epideictic branch 
of Rhetoric where they tell and are in point. Secondly, this is what 
Isocrates himself tells us of his own habits and pursuits, Antid. §§ 2, 3, 
dyad yap «lds éviovs rov codioray Bracdnpovvras epi ris épis SvarpiBis 
nal Aéyorras os fort wept Sixoypadiay...avras 8é rac. rovro memoinnévas 
avepoy ore mpogpnyat Kal Aéyew Kai ypépew ov wept trav [8iov cvpBoralwr, 
GAX’ Umép ryAicovTrwy Kr.A. Panath. § 11, dAd’ dred) rov modirever Oa 
Sujpaprov dm 1rd dirocodeir (i.e. literary labour, speech writing) xa) wovet» 
xal ypadety, ov ep) pixpoy thy mpoaiperty wo.ovpevos ovde wep) ray l8ioy 
avpBoraleoy olde epi dv GAXos rives Anpoverw, GANA wep) Tey ‘EAAQMKOY «7d, 
Ib. § 39 seq. yotpas 8é xpyvas rovs Bovdopedvous dyxwpidoa Tid TOY wWOACwY 
dxpiBas xal Sixalws pi) povoy wepi aurijs rosetc Oar rovs Adyous fs spoypnpdvos 
tvyxavovew, dA’ dowep (here follows a simile) orw xal rais modes 
maptordyvas py) ras puxpas rais pseyadats, x.r.A. (Cf. note on Paneg. § 11. S.] 

Here we find, fs?, that he failed in public life; secondly, that he with- 
drew from the law-courts and their tia oupSodaa, the cases arising out 
of the ‘private dealings’ of the citizens with one another in their ordinary 
business, in order to devote himself to philosophy and the study of public 
affairs; and ¢hirdly, that his ordinary practice in his Panegyrics was, 
just as Aristotle describes it, to compare, rapioravas, the object of his 
laudation with others, whether men or cities, as great and distinguished 
as themselves, wpos édv8ofous ovyepivew. The two first of these statements 
seem to put the reading dovyjdea» beyond question, ove7deay being con- 
trary alike to the known facts and the probabilities of the case. It is 
nevertheless supported by Max Schmidt, in his tract on the date of the 
Rhetoric, pp. 17, 18. With this reading, 8cxoAoyia must be confined to 
speech writing for the use of parties in a legal process. 

This is one of the passages of the Rhetoric on which Victorius founds 


186 PHTOPIKH: A 9 § 39, 40. 


~ a A ‘ , 
dovvnberay Tov Suodoyev. Set dé mpos évdo£ous 
ovyKkpiver avenrikdy yap Kal Kandy, € oTovdaiwy 

3 e A ? 
39 BeATiwvy. mimre & evrdoyws 7 avEnots Ets TOUS Erai- 
~ 9 A ~ 
yous. €y UmEepoyyn yap éotw, 4 8 UmEepoxn Tw 
~ A FA : 4 ‘ \ 9 , 5) A \ 
kadwv. 610 Kav pn mpos Tous évdofous, aAAA TOS p. 3+ 

~~ 4 

Tous aAXous Sei mapaBadAew, érreirep 1 UvrEpoxn 
~ e A ~ ~ ~ 
40 Ooxet punvve dpetnv. ‘GAws Sé Twv KoWwwv Edwv 


his charge against Aristotle of jealousy and illwill towards Isocrates, 
whom he supposes the other to have lost no opportunity of assailing with 
open or covert censure and ridicule in his Rhetoric. See his commentary, 
Ppp. 154, 507, 586, 605, and elsewhere. Here at least, (with the reading 
aovynbecay), there is neither one nor the other. I have already entered 
into this question in the Introd. p. 40—1, where I have given the opinions 
of later writers on the subject. 

ovyxpivey] Pol. VI (IV) 11, sub init. 12, 1296 6 24, Metaph. A 4, 985 @ 
24, 26, Top. A 5, 102515, H 3, 154 45, 9, 95, 159 8 25.Sauyxrors , 
ddcxtpos Pwv7. spoiws dé xal rd ovyxpivey rovde rgde Kal cuvéxpwev yydp- 
rnrat’ xp ovv dvreferaley xal mapaBadAew Aeyew.’ Phrynichus. See Lo- 
beck’s note ad loc. p. 278. In all the passages quoted, except the two of 
the Metaph., ovyxpiveew and ovyxpiots denote comparison: in the other 
two it is a term of the early Physical Philosophy, meaning a composition 
of elements, opposed to dsdxpiors. 

Victorius quotes in illustration of mpos é»8cfous ovyxpivey, Catullus, 
Carmen 64, 344, non illi guisquam bello se conferet heros, seq. Cic. de 
Or. 11 85, 348, est etiam cum ceteris praesiantibus viris comparatio in 
laude praeclara. 

§ 39. The xowos ronos of avénors or amplification naturally falls under 
the general head or class of laudatory speeches, is especially applicable 
to all forms of ‘praise’: because its object is to establish a certain ‘supe 
riority’ of the person panegyrized over others, and this ‘superiority’ is an 
honourable end to aim at. And therefore if we do not compare our hero 
with the distinguished, it is at all events better to do it with the rest of 
the world (the average of mankind) because superiority in general, in 
itself, is thought to be an indication of ‘virtue’. Eth. Nic. Iv 8, sub init. 
oi yap evyeveis aftovvra ripjs eal of 8vvacrevovres 7 ol mAvvrovvres’ éy Ure- 
poxn yap, ro 8 dyabe vmepéxov ray évriporepoy. 

40. It follows from this that of the three universal kinds of persua- 
sion avénous, or amplificatio, is most appropriate to the epideictic branch 
of Rhetoric (and the opposite peiwots, vituperatio, to the censorious 
critical extenuatory kind of it'): for in this the actions are taken for 
granted (as admitted), and therefore all that remains to be done is to 
invest them with magnitude (importance) and honour (dignity, glory). To 
the deliberative orator examples are most serviceable; because people 


1 dyopévwr ydp rovrw (when these are held fast by us, when we have mastered 
these) 7d dvayrla rovros pavepd: b ydp oyos éx Tuy dvaryriwy orl, § 41 infra. 





PHTOPIKH® A 9§ 41, 10§ 1. 187 
ed ~ 4 e a wv 9 4 ~ 
avract Tots Noyots n meV avenots ETLTNOELOTATN TOIS 

~ A 
€MWEKTIKOIS’ Tas yap mpakes OuoNoyoupévas ape | 
, 4 A cA ~ A a 
Bavovow, wore Novrrov péeyeOos mepiOeivar Kai KaAAOS* 
A \ 4 ~ ~ 
ta 6€ mapadeiypata Tois cupBovAEuTiKots* eK yap 
~ f A 4 
TWY Mpoyeyovorwy Ta péeAAOVTA KaTapavTEVoMEVoL 

A a ~ “~ 

kpivoueyy ta & évOuynpata ois OikavKois’ aitiav 
A 4 > f a a A A 4 

yap kal arodatw paNiota SéxeTat TO yeryovos dia 
A 

TO doades. 

F 4 Fv 4 
41 ék Tiwwy pev ov Ot Erratwot Kal ot ~oryot AéyorTat 
A d A ~ ~ w~ 
oYEoOV Waves, Kat moos moia Set BAETrOvTas érrawelv 
f A 

kai ~peyew,-Kai ék Tivwy Ta éyxwma yiyvera Kal 
4 - 

Ta Oveion, TavT’ éoriv? éxoMevwy yap ToUTwY Ta 

, e ~ 
évavria Tovtos pavepa: 6 yap Woyos éx Twv évav- 

A 
1 Tiwy éortiv. epi d€ Katnyopias Kai droXoryias, éx CHAP, X. 
. 1368 3. 

are apt to draw inferences, to form a judgment or decision upon the 
future from the past by a sort of presentiment or anticipation. The 
enthymeme, direct logical argument, is most to the purpose in judicial 
oratory: in ¢ka¢ there is most room for the application of direct proof, 
the tracing of cause and effect, and demonstration by deductive process, 
in clearing up the obscurity of ‘past facts’, which are the objects of 
forensic oratory, c. 3.2. The substance of this is repeated in III 17. 3—5. 

roy xovoyv cider] This seems to be a division, for the nonce, of rhe- 
torical riorets as a yévos, into three et8n or species, each specially adapted 
to one of the three branches of Rhetoric. The division has no pretension 
to a regular scientific character: avgyois is not a logical kind of argument 
at all, and the three members of the division are not coordinate. 

xatapayrevopevn) payreverOas and dmoparreverOa, both of them not 
unusual in Plato and Aristotle, are the usual terms by which this kind of 
‘divination’, the foreboding presentiment, dark undefined anticipation of 
the future is expressed. It occurs again (in the simple form) I 13. 2, II! 
17, 10, Eth. N. 1 3, 1095 4 26, of a suspicion, or hypothesis, Ib. v1 13, 1144 
625. Examples are to be found in Stallbaum’s note on Rep. I 349 A, and 
many more in Ast’s Ler. sub vv.—xarauavreverO6a, besides this place 


[the only passage where it is used by Aristotle], is found in pseudo-Dem. 
émiragp. p. 1400. 2, Polyb. 11 22. 7, in Longinus and Athenaeus. 


CHAP, X. 

We now pass on to the treatment of the dicastic or forensic branch of 
Rhetoric, which occupies the remainder of the book; the dreyvos riores, 
being peculiar to this branch, (dca: rey Scxavxoy), 15. 1, are added as an 
appendix in the fifteenth chapter. For the general connexion of the 
contents of these chapters, and the illustration of some special subjects 
which seemed to require a more detailed explanation, I refer to the ana- 


188 PHTOPIKH= A 10§ 2, 3. 


, 4 , ro ~ 4 tf 
TOTwv Kal Troiwy roicbat Set ToOvs TVvANOYIOpMOUS, 
/ A ~ A ~ , aA A 
2éyopevoy av ein eye. Set On AaGeEly Tpia, Ev pev 
e ~ f ~ 
Tivwy Kai Tocwy Evexa doikovort, SevTepov O€ Tes 
9 a , t A A 4 4 ~ 
avrot diaxeipevot, Tpitov dé Tovs moiovs Kal Tws 
4 v 4 » ~ , “~ 
3€xovras. Stoptoapevor ov TO adixeiy AEywpev EFNs. 
A a A , f 
éorw On TO adixety TO BAaTTEW ExovTa Tapa 
4 4 , 9 4 ed A ad ,) ‘4 
TOV vouov. vopuos © é€aTiv O pev idwos O Oe Kotos® 
4 \ A 9 . , 4 
Aeyw dé idtov pev Kal’ ov yeypappevov moNTeEvoyrat, 


lysis of the Introduction, pp. 185—207, and the Appendixes to Bk. 1, 
CDE. 

§ 1. The first subject of inquiry in this branch is the number and 
nature (quantity and quality) of the materials or propositions (the pre- 
misses) of which our ‘ syllogisms’ are to be constructed, in accusation and 
defence, the two functions of the dicastic branch of Rhetoric. 

Schrader draws attention to the term ‘syllogisms’ as marking the 
especially logical character of the arguments which are employed in this 
branch as compared with the other two, On syllogism for enthymeme, 
see note on I I. 11, p. 19. 

§ 2. There are three subjects to be considered and analysed in order 
to furnish topics for the pleader’s use; first, the number and nature of the 
motives and causes of injustice; secondly, the dispositions of the wrong- 
doers themselves; and thirdly, what characters and dispositions render 
men most liable to wrong and injustice. 

§ 3. The first thing is to define justice, then to proceed with the rest 
in order.—éore, of a popular or merely Jrovistonal definition; comp. 

-3; 6.2; 7.2. 

: ‘Wrong’ or ‘injustice’ is defined ‘a voluntary injury contrary to law’. 
The two leading characteristics of a crime or punishable offence which 
are here brought into view are, that it is an act in violation of the law 
of the land—this is the Jolstical view of injustice—and that to be a crime 
the act must be intentional, done with malice prepense, and with full 
knowledge of the circumstances of the case and the probable effect of the 
action. It is thus distinguished from a merely accidental injury or harm 
done, which can hardly be considered voluntary at all, and again from a 
mere mistake or error of judgment arising from ignorance, not of ssi- 
versals, or general moral principles, but of the Jarticu/ar circumstances of 
the case (as of the absence of the button of the foil) where there is no evil 
or malicious purpose, no bad mpoaipeois, which constitutes the immorality 
of the act. See Eth. N. 111 2,V 10. Rhet. 1 13. 16. 

vopos 8 dorlv & péy Td:os 6 8¢ xowwos] Comp. 13. 2, 11, 12, and Introd. 
p. 239, Append. E. to Bk. 1. 

Aéyw 8¢ Tdtoy x.r.A.] ‘by special? law I mean the written law under 


1 This application of the term @&os to »éuos is to be distinguished from the 
ordinary meaning of it in this combination, as, for instance, Dem, de Cor. § a11, 


PHTOPIKHS A 10§ 4 189 


kowov b€ dca aypada rapa maow oporoyeioba 
Soxe?. éxdvres S€ qrotovotw boa EidoTes Kal fn avary- 
kaComevot. Goa pev ovy éxovres, OU WavTa Tpoatpov- 
pevot, Soa S€ mpoaipovpevar, eiddTEs ArravTa* ovdEls 
4yap & mpoatpetra dyvod. 8! a dé mpoatpovvrat 


which the government is conducted and the citizens live’, the laws and 
institutions—which direct the policy of the government and the conduct 
of the citizens—the positive, written, law of the particular state: this is 
human, as opposed to divine and natural, law: ‘by common (universal) 
law (I mean) all the unwritten. principles that are supposed to be univer- 
sally admitted’. This is the usual distinction taken between the two: 
these xowd, dypada, are described, Introd. p. 239 seq. ; for the further sub- 
division adopted in c. 13. 2, see Ib. p. 242. 

éxovres 8¢ sravcovaww dca «.rd.] ‘a voluntary act is characterised by 
knowledge, and the absence of all external force and compulsion’. Eth. 
N. III 3, init. gyros 8’ deovgiov rov Big cai 8° dyvosay, mo dxavosov Bofecer ay 
elvas ov 4 dpx? dv avre@ el8ors ra xaf’ éxaora (i.e. with special knowledge of 
the articular circumstances) éy ols 7 wpagis. flows yap ov xadws A€yera 
dxovora elvas ra did Gupoy f} 8: excOvpiay. 1 13. 6, rd dxovara, ore dor Soa 
eldcres. 

doa pév ody éxdvres x.r.A.] ‘now all voluntary actions are not done with 
(do not imply) deliberate moral purpose, but all acts done with such 
a purpose imply knowledge, because no one can be ignorant of what he 
purposes’. Eth. N. Ill 4, 1111 57, 9 mpoaipeots 8) deovcorov pév paiveras, 
ov ravroy O¢, GAA’ én sAdov TO gxovaLoy’ TOU pévy yap exovciov Kal waides xal 
sada (Ga xowwvei, rpoatpecews 8 ov, xal ta éfaidhyns éxovora pév Adyopen, 
xara spoaipecw 8 ov. Actions, fer example, done under the impulse of 
violent excitement or passion, 8:a Over, or of appetite, 8° dmOvplay, are 
voluntary, but not cara mpoaipeccy. 

§ 4. de a 8€ mpoatpovvra: «1.r.] ‘The impelling motive, cause; of this 
purpose to do mischievous and vicious acts in violation of the law, is vice 
and want of self-control. This general vicious habit takes various forms in 
particular cases, and shews itself in different special vices according to 
the circumstances which call it forth at the time, and give-it its special 
direction. Thus vice and wrong (poy@gpia «al adixia) may take the form 
of illiberality in money matters, licentiousness in pleasure, effeminacy in 
respect of ease and comfort (ég@upia), cowardice in danger (when, for 
instance, the coward leaves his comrades in the lurch, and runs away out 
of mere terror); similarly the vice of ambition is shewn in the undue 
pursuit of honour, the passionate irascible temper in the over indulgence 
of angry feeling; victory is the motive to wrong in one that is over eager 
for victory, revenge with the vindictive; folly (the want of dposnars, prac- 
tical wisdom, the special moral faculty) shews itself in the inability to 
distinguish (the liability to be deceived in distinctions of) right and wrong, 


where it stands simply for ius prrvatum, relating to private (as opposed to public) 
affairs. 


190 PHTOPIKHS A 10§4. 


Brarrew kai haida roeiv mapa Tov vouoy, Kakia 
éori kai axpacia’ éay yap Twes Exwor moxOnpiav fH 
pilav 4 WAeElous, wept ToUTO O poxXOnpol TUYyXavovoL 
OvTeEs, Kal dOtKol Eiotv, oiov 6 pméev avedrEvOEpos meEpi 
xpnuata, 6 8 dxoAaoTos wept Tas TOU Gaparos 
jOovas, 0 de padaxos mepi Ta padupa', o dé detAos 
mept Tous Kwouvous (Tous yap ovyKivouvevovTas éyKa- 
tadtumavover dia Tov PoBov), 6 Sé giroTiuos da 


tiunv, 6 8 o£€ubupos St dpynv, 6 S€ pironkos Ora p- 35- 
viknv, 6 Sé mxpos Sia Tiynwpiav, 6 S appwv dia TO 
1 JgOupa infra. 
the vice of the shameless man appears in his reckless disregard of the 

opinion of others’.—c£év6vyos ‘quick-tempered’, ‘ hasty’. 

mept 8€ rovro] Wolf, and with him Brandis, in Schneidewin’s Phi/o- 
logus, 1V i, p. 42, object to 8, which zs omitted by Brandis’ ‘anonymus’ 
and one MS. See the note on 8jAoy 8, I 1. 11, p. 20. 

ra pgdupa] are things and circumstances which tend to promote and 
encourage an easy, Careless state of mind, ‘things comfortable’, which 
incline us to self-indulgence and inactivity. So gory in Plat. Gorg. 
569 C, odxouw roAAn paoravn yiyvera; ‘isn’t it a great comfort...?’ Crit. 
45 C, ra paOuporara aipeioOau, of ‘careless, easy-going, indifference’. 

éyxaradipravew, ‘to leave behind in the lurch’, desert a comrade in 
danger [Cf. 11 4.26, 5.7; If 16.5.]. éy sc. rp xevduvp. Eupolis Aijpoe 
Fragm. vI (Meineke, Fragm. Comic. Gr. 11 458), of Pericles’ eloquence, 
povos Trav pyropwy To Kévrpoy ¢yxaréAeTe Tois axpowpévors, ‘to leave the 
sting behind in the wound’, (é&v r@ éAxec). Plat. Phaedo, 91 C, dorep 
pélirra TO Kéytpov ¢yxarakiney olyjoopat. 

muxpos] ‘ Translato a tristi sapore nomine, mixpots Graeci appellant qui 
accepta iniuria non facile placantur sed diu simultatem gerunt, de quibus 
‘accuratius egit noster, Eth. Nic. Iv (11, 1126 @ 20), of 8€ mexpod 8ucdiAvror, 
kal woXvy xpovoy opyi{ovras’ xaréyovor yap rov Oupoy. savAa 8é yiverat ray 
dvranodide’ 7 yap Tipwpia wave Tis dpyhs, yoomny avri ris AUMNs euwoovaa,” 
[Vict.] rovrou 8¢ 4 ywoudvou ro Bapos gxovaw* did yap Td py émipaves eivas 
oudé oupsreies avrous ovdeis, év air dé méyvat Ty opy}y Xpovor Beiv clot B of 
rowovro: davrois oxAnporaros xal rois padtora didos. The Latin amarus, as 
Victorius points out, is used in much the same sense. The distinguishing 
characteristic of the Aristotelian mexporns, in which the particular ‘bitter- 
ness’ of this form of épy7 is shewn, is its lasting and enduring quality—the 
wrath is nursed ‘to keep it warm’ (wéyas rj» cpy7jv)—and this gives it a ma- 
lignant, spiteful, zf/acadle character, exactly opposite to that of Horace, 
the irascible temper, cpy:Aoms, trasci celerem, tamen ut placabilis essem. 

drarag@a} Ignorance of moral distinctions, and consequent wrong 
action, may be regarded as a kind of ‘deception’ or ‘delusion’; when 
a man is too foolish (unwise) to be able to distinguish right from wrong, 





PHTOPIKHE A 1085, 6. 1gI 


9 ”~ @ 4 4 OL s) 10 e 3 5) , 
aratacOat wept To Sixawov Kat adtxov, 6 8 avai- 
a , . ~ 
axuvros ot’ dArywpiav SoFns. spoiws dé kai THY GAAwV 
ad e ~ f 
EKATTOS TEDL EKATTOV TWY UTTOKELMEVWY. 
5 2,9," ‘ N A a ona .) A 9 ~ 4 
aA\Xa rept pev TovTwy SnAOV, Ta pEV EK THY TEL 
A A , \- “~ A 
Tas apeTas eipnuevwy, Ta 0 EK THY wept Ta Tay 
, A - 4 ~ 
pnOncopevwys Rowrov S& eEizreiv Tivos Evexa Kal Ts 
4 9 ~ A , ~ \ F 4 
6 é€xovTes adikovat, Kai Tivas. MpwrTov pev ovy dieAW- 


when 'e does not know and cannot perceive the difference between them 
(has no ¢pornais). Victorius quotes Top. Z (9, 148 @ 6), ro yap py) éxor 
émarnpny ov Soxet dyvoeiv, dAAG paddov Td Sinrarnpevoy. Ignorance is not 
a mere orépnots, the privation or absence of knowledge; which is shewn 
by our not applying the term ‘ignorant’ to inanimate objects and young 
children ; it is something positive, and consists in a deception, mistaking 
one thing for another. 

wept gxacroy ray vroxeysevov] ra vroxeipeva, res subiectac, subiecta 
materies; things that fall under the same head or general notion, and so 
are members or species of the same genus: Eth. N. II 2, 1105 a1, waos 
Trois Umo THY aipecw, ‘all that fall under the choice’, as its objects, or matter 
to operate upon. These are the six things previously mentioned, «ado», 
aupdépoy, 7dv, and their opposites. 

And so for the rest, the same rule holds in the case of every vice, ‘each 
in the things which are specially subjected to it’, which come under that 
particular head, as money is the ‘subject-matter’ of illiberality, dangers 
of cowardice, anger of quick, irascible temper, and so on. Victorius 
understands it as the ‘object’ of the aim or desire of each. 

§ 5. dx ray wep) ras aperas elpnudver] sc. inc.9; dx ray wepi ra radn 
pnOncopévey sc. in II cc, 2—11. ‘It remains now to describe the motives 
and dispositions or characters of wrong doers, and the dispositions and 
characters of their objects or victims’. In Polit. VI (IV) 11, 1295 8 9, 
there is a division of crimes based upon their respective magnitude or 
degree, into great and little, crimes on a great scale, acts of oppression, 
outrage, insolence, and crimes on a small scale, mean and paltry, which 
appear in fraud, cheating, and any paltry knavery or trickery. yiyvovras 
yap of perv vBpioral xal peyadorornpos paddAoy, of 8€ xaxotpyos ral pixpo- 
somnpot Alay’ rov 8’ ddianparay ra per yiyverat 8: UBpiy, ra Be bea xaxoupyiay. 

§6. First we have to distinguish or analyse the various motives and 
incentives, whether in the way of pursuit or avoidance which lead men to 
attempt (to undertake, take in hand, é¢yye:pety) wrong doing: for it is 
plainly the accuser’s business to inquire (how many and which kinds,) the 
number and the kinds of these universal incentives to wrong doing to 
which the adversary, whom he charges with a crime, is liable: and of the 
defendant, how many and what sorts of them are #o¢ applicable to his 
case. ‘Hunc locum copiose persecutus est Cicero pro Milone et in crimi- 
nando Clodio et in Milone purgando: cuncta enim in Clodio fuisse 
ostendit quae persuadere ipsi potuerint ut insidias faceret Miloni; 
eademque a persona Milonis afuisse.’ Victorius, 


192 PHTOPIKH® A 10§§ 7, 8. 


4 ~ 4 ~ 
peOa Tivwy dpeyouevor Kai qroia peuyovTes EpxEtpovow 
9 ~ ~ s | e ~ A ~ 4 
adtceiy? SyAov yap ws TH Mev KaTNYyopOUVTI moore 
~ tf a ~ r 
Kai mola TOUTwY Urapye TH aYTIWIKw OKETTEOY, 
A ~ ~ 

[ov epieuevoe mravres Tous mMAnaiov adixovat,| TH O ' 

~ 9 , , 
aroNoyoupévy Toia Kal Towa TOVTWY OVX UITapyel. 
A 4 A A 
7 wavTes On wpaTTovat TavTa Ta pev OU Ot avToUs TA 
‘ 9 e , “~ A ?. A be e 4 \ ) bY ‘ 
dé 0 avrous. Tov pev ouv mn O¢ avrous Ta pev ra 

o 4 A > 9 > & ~ 3S 9 » ? 
Tuxny mparrover Ta 8 é€£F avaykns, Trav © €E avaykns 
A 4 , A A td ef 4 4 4 9 
Ta pev Bia ra Sé Gio worTe TavTa doa pny 6 
e 4 a 4 . 9 Y e oe Fd 4 
QUTOUS 1TpaTTOVGL, Ta Ev ATO TUXNS Ta OE Huge TA 

e/ 4 = wv A 
dé Bia. doa Se St avrous, kal wy avTot alton, Ta P. 1369. 
~ A wv A . 

peév Ot Bos ra Sé Ot dpe~w, Twv Se dt opeEw Ta pev 
4 4 r n wv wv a 
8 dia Aoyiorixny dpeEw, Ta Sé 8 aroyou Eort 8 7 


§7. This inquiry naturally leads to a elassifcation of the sources or 
causes of human action, which are found to fall under seven heads ; some 
of these have their origin in ourselves and are under our own control, 
others are external to us and andependent of us, and exercise upon us and 
our actions the force of necessity and compulsion. To the causes whose 
origin is without us belong (1) chance or accident, (2) nature, and (3) ex- 
ternal force or compulsion; over these we have 20 control: the causes 
which spring from gz¢hin us, and are therefore more or less in our power 
to master and overrule, are (4) habit, (5) reasoning or calculation, (6) 
passion, (7) appetite or desire. These seven incentives to action have 
been carefully examined, and compared with other doctrines and opinions 
elsewhere expressed by Aristetle on the same subjects, in Append. C to 
Bk. 1, Introd. p. 218 seq., to which I refer for further illustration of them. 

This same classification of the causes or sources of actions is indicated 
or alluded to elsewhere, but nowhere else so completely made out. See, 
for instance, Eth. Nic. HI 5, 1112 @ 32, atria yap Soxovaw eivas Gvors Kat 
ayayxn xal ruyn, eri 8é wous xai way Td &’ avOperrov, and VI 4, in the definition 
of art, 1140 @ 14, ovre yap tev €£ avayxns Ovror f yryvoperoy 7 Téxyn eoriv, 
ovre ror xara iow éy avrois yap €xoves raita ryy dpyny. And in I 10, 
1099 4 20 seq. the same division is hinted at. 

§ 8. gorse & f pév BovAnors x.r.A.} Comp. Eth. N. Il 4, 1111 8 26, ére 
& 4 pév BovAnors rou réAous ett paddov, 1 Be wpoaipecis ramy wpos TO Tédos, 
oloy vytaivery BovAcpeOa, srpoatpovpeba 8¢ 8: wv vVytavoupey, Kat evdatpoveiy 
pew Bovrcpea xal hapery, wpoapovpeba 8é A€yeww ovy appuc{er’ GAws yap goer 
spoaipects wept ra éf nuiv elva. This is a qualification of the too un- 
limited statement of the unscientific Rhetoric. ‘In English, unfortunately, 
we have no term capable of adequately expressing what is common both 
to will and desire ; that is, the nzsus or conatus—the tendency towards the 
realisation of their end. By will is meant a free and deliberate, by desire 


PHTOPIKH® A 10§9. 193 


pev BovAnorts, (BovAnats 8’) dyabou dpefts (ovdeis yap 
BovAerat aX’ 4 Stray oinOy elvar dyabov), adoro 3 
dpéFas dpyyn Kat émibupia, wore wavTa boa mpaT- 
Tovaw dvayxn mpattew &¢ aitias érta, dia TuyNY, 
dia guow, dia Biav, 8¢ Bos, Sia Aoytopov, Sia Oupov, 
} > » @ , 4 oe } ~ @ Q’ A , BI 

got emtUuuiavy, TO OE 7 poo [aipele Qt KAU YAALKLIAS Y 
e/ A s A , V4 9 . 
e£eis 1 GAN’ aTTa Ta MpAaTTOMEVA TEplepyov’ El yap 
ouuBEBnxe Tois véeows Gpyidors eivat 4 émOupnriois, 
ov Sta Thy veoTnTa mparrovat Ta To.avTa dAra@ 4’ 
dpynv kal émOupiav. ovde Sid wAOUVTOV Kal meviay, 

7 A , ~ A 4 A A 4 9 

dd\Aa@ cupBeBnxe Tots pev mevnor dia Thy Evdetay ém- 
Oupeiv xonuarwv, Tois S€ wAovaiots Sta THY ELovaiay 
émiBupeiv Ta uy dvayKaiwy jdovav: ddAdNa mpafovor 
a blind and fatal, tendency to action’. Sir W. Hamilton, Lecé. on Metaph. 
XI Vol. I. p. 184—5. On this, the Editor refers in a nete to this passage. 
But BovAnors here means not ‘will’, but ‘wish’, as appears from the defi- 
nition dyafod dpefis—the ‘ will’ is no¢ always directed to good—and from 
the analysis of it in Eth. N. 111 4. The term by which Sir W. H. proposes to 
designate the common quality of this family of faculties, and so separate 
them from the rest, is Conative. Impulsive means much the same thing, 
and has the advantage of being an English word. 

ovdels yap BovAeras x-r.A.] This question of the end and object of ‘the 
wish’ is discussed in Eth. Nic. 111 6 (Bekk.), and the conclusion, 1113 4 
23, is as follows: ef d¢ 3 ravra pl) apéaxec (the two opposite views that it 
is rdyaoy and ro dawopevoy ayabov), pa haréov amdas pev nai car’ dAnOevav 
BovAnrav elvas rdyabov, éxdorp 8¢ ro awopevov; TE py ody crovdaip rd 
car’ GdnOecav elvas, rp d¢ avr To TUXOY. 

§ 9. ro 8é wpordiapetobas x.r.A.] What he says is superfluous (eepiep- 
yov) here, is actually done in the six ethical chapters, 12—17, of Bk. 11, and 
this apparent contradiction has raised a suspicion that some error has 
crept into the text. There is however in reality no inconsisteacy between 
the theory here laid down and the actual practice in Book 11. Zhere the 
treatment of these #4 is appropriate, as supplementary to that of the 
awa0n: kere it would be out of place, because the present subject of inquiry 
is about the causes of human action, and though these states and condi- 
tions, youth, age, wealth, poverty and the rest, are as a general rule attended 
and characterised by certain tendencies or man, yet these latter can be 
by no means regarded as effects of causes, but are mere oupSeByxora, Sepa- 
rable accidents, which do not invariably accompany the states that they 
characterise. Youth and age, wealth and poverty, are mof the causes of 
any particular classes of actions; in so far as they do accompany them 
they are accidental, not essential. 

dvaykaiwy neovev| These are thus defined by Plato, Rep. v1I1 12, 558), 

AR. I. 13 


194 PHTOPIKHS A 10§ 10. 


Kal ovrot ov Sta mAouTOV Kal weviavy ddAa Sta THY 
? 4 e , A A e , 4 e »f A 
emiOupiav. opoiws O€ Kal of Sixatoe Kai of adiKol, Kai 
e@ wv e 4 i A A ef , A 
ot adXor of Aeyouevor KaTa Tas E€Es mpaTTew, dia P. 36. 
~ 4 a A \ A aA A / 
TavTa mpaftovow 4 yap cia Aoyiopov H Sia Talos: 
GAN’ ot pév Ot 46n Kai wabn ypnota, ot Sé dia Tavay- 
10 Tia. ouuBaiver pevTor Tais wév ToravTas eect Ta 
TowavTa akoXovbetv, traits S€ Toiatode Ta Toldoe’ 
sf) \ \ W ~ , A \ , 9S 
evOus yap iows TH Mev owppou Sia TO owHpova eEivat 
Sofa Te kai émOupiat xpnaotal éraxodovOover mrept 
ovxouy ds re ovx Gy oloi + eipev drorpéyat Bixaiws av avayxaiat Kadoivro, 
kat Goat adroreAovpevas aheAcvow nyas; rovrev yap apporépwy épicaOa 
npov th pices avayxn, comp. Phileb. 72 E. They are therefore plea- 
sures that are forced upon us by nature, and therefore ‘necessary’ or 
‘indispensable’ to us. Of these the ‘ bodily pleasures’, the gratification of 
the appetites, are the most necessary, and sometimes the latter are con- ; 
fined to them; for in Eth. N. vil 14, 1154 @ the pleasures which are first 
Called cwparixai, in lines 7 and 9, afterwards, in line 11, receive the name 
of avayxaia, which is repeated in line 17. The Scholiast and Paraphrast 
both explain dvayxaia: by qwparixai. Plato more frequently speaks of 
the avayxaia: ériOupia in the same sense. 
§ 10. Not however that I mean to deny—it does happen, ovpSaivec— 
that there is a connexion of certain particular results or qualities with 
particular moral states (but these classes and conditions of life are of 
‘states’ in this sense): any virtue, I dare say, (f0ws), as self-control, does 
generate a particular kind of opinions and desires about things pleasant, 
good ones namely ; and the opposite vice of licentiousness the contrary in 
the same sphere. 
This is a parenthetical note to avoid misunderstanding. 
ev0ds...ézaxoAovbaver) ‘ there is at once, from the very first, an immediate 
and close connexion (or consequence) between the oaddpey in virtue of his 
self-control, and certain good opinions and desires in respect of pleasure’. : 
ev@vs in the sense of ‘at once’, ‘straight off’, and corresponding some- 
times to the Latin s¢atim and ultro, passes into a variety of significations 
which take their colour from the context. Eth. N. v 14, 1137 4 19, suapte 
natura, evOvs roavtn | Toy mpaxraey VAn é€oriv; see Bonitz on Metaph. Fr 3, 
1004 @ 5, who cites Categ. 12,14 @ 32, Anal. Pr. 1 16, 36 a4 6, Eth. N. vi 5, 
1140 6 18, evOds ov paiverat, omnino non apparet. Polit. II 4, 1277 4 15, 
rv madeiav evOus (from the very first) érépav. Ib. VI (IV) 11, 1295 4 16, rai 
rour’ evbus oixobey Umdpyxet racy ovow (from their very earliest home asso- 
ciations). Ib. VII (V) 10, 1310 4 8, evdus é& évayrioy (at once, from direct 
opposites). Ib. c. 10, ult. yu} BovAopevar yap evOis ove éora: Bacirevs (he 
won't be king at all, omnino). Eth. Eudem. 11 5, 1222 @ 37, dort y Quotes 
evOvs ov mpos dravra cpolws adéatynxe rou pégov. See Fritzsche, note ad loc. 
Phys. VII 4. 2, és, 248 @ 21, ddd’ evOds dvdyxn, and 23. Hist. Anim. 11 13. 2, 
17-7, xeirat Uno To Siafopa evOus, statim, at once, immediately under. V 17. 5, 


_  PHTOPIKHS A 10 §§ 11, 12. 195 
~ ea? ~ 9 , / e 9 / A 
THY noEewv, TH O adkoNaoTw ai évavTiae mEpt TwY 
9 on t , 
IlavTwy Trourwy. 10 Tas pév Tola’Tas diaipéces éa- 
, , \ ~ ef A 
TEOV, OKETTEOV O€ Toia Trois Elwhev ExecOat’ Ei peEV 
\ A) nv / v Ud an 4 aah , 
yap Neukos 4 MéAas 1 Méeyas 7 puKpos, oUdEey TETAKTAaL 
~ , r ~ 9 A v nN 4 av 
TwY ToWUTwY akoAovOeiv, Et dé veéos 4} wpEe~BuUTNS 7 
OL A fy 70 } , \ ee 14 ~ 
ikKaLos WH .@OtKOS, nOn Oladeper. Kat OAws COA TwY 
‘4 ~ , A wo ~ 9 , 
cupBawovrwy Troe Siadepev ra 7On Tay avOpwruwv, 
= ~ ~ o~ SN 4 
otov mAouTeiv Soxwy Eautw 4 meverOa Sioice: Tt, Kal 
~ v ~ ~ 4 FP , ~ 
evTUXELW H aATUXElV. TavTA meV OvV UoTEpOV EpoupEY, 
~ A ~ ~ wv ~ 
viv O€ TEpt TwY NOLTwV ElTw_EV TPWTOY. 
wf 4 , A a ~ , 
12 éott © amo TUXNS MEV TA ToOLAVTA YtyvouEVa, 


de Gen. et Corr. 11 11. 2, de part. Anim. Iv 5. 1. Like #8 its connotation 
is transferred from time, its natural and proper signification, to place. 

§ 11. ‘And therefore’, (because they are inappropriate as not assigning 
causes of human action,) ‘such distinctions as these may be dismissed for 
the present ; but still we are bound to inquire into the connexion which 
subsists between particular qualities and particular persons or classes’; 
(the general subject deserves investigation ;) ‘for though in respect of the 
qualities black and white or tall and short there is no fixed succession or 
accompaniment’ (between them and any particular persons or classes), ‘ yet 
when we come to the connexion of young or old men with justice or 
injustice, ‘hen (by this time) there zs a difference’. That is to say, that 
although in certain connexions of particular qualities with particular 
classes the establishment of such would be worthless or impossible, yet 
there are other cases, as in that of moral qualities, where it would be 
worth while to establish such a connexion, if it were possible. ‘And in 
general, any accidental circumstance that makes a real difference in the 
characters of men; as the opinion a man has of his own wealth or 
poverty, or good or bad fortune, will make such a difference’. So after 
all it seems that it is possible to trace some such connexions between 
qualities and classes; but as this is not the proper place for such an 
inquiry—the reason being alrcady given—‘ we will postpone it for the pre- 
sent’, and wait till we come to the ma@y, where it will be in its proper 
place: ‘And now let us proceed to what remains’ of the subject on which 
we are at present engaged. 

mXoureiv Soxayv dauvrg is a reading of some Mss, followed by the old 
Latin Translation, and adopted by the recent Edd. The vulgate has 
mXovrety Soxei, which Buhle retains. 8oxet tp, a conjecture of Victorius, 
is also found in some MSS. 

§ 12. On rvyn see Appendix C to Bk. I. Introd.; on airia doptoros see 
ib. p. 221 seq. ‘Illos eventus qui a causa quam nemo facile definiat oriuntur 
ad fortunam referimus. Arist. Phys. 11 4, 196 4 6, efai 3¢ rives ols Soxei 
elvas alria péy 4 TUX, AdnrOos 8¢ dvOpwrivy Savoia ws Oeidy re ovea Kat Satpo- 
vesrepov. Schrader. (Schrader quotes this as Aristotle’s own definition.) 

13—2 


196 PHTOPIKH® A 10 §§ 13—17. 


e e L ¢ ‘ , 
Sowy 7 TE aiTia dopiaTos Kai pan Evexa Tou yiryveTat 
, ‘ \ , , 
KQL [NTE GEL NTE ws Et TO TOAU MNTE TETAYMEVWS: 
~ > ~ ~ ~ rd 4 4 
dnAov 8 €k Tov dpiopou THs TUXNS TEP TOVTWY. 
, Lan id ef 9 > 2? , 9 ~ 4 / . 
13 duce 6€, Sowy i T aiTia ev avTois Kal TETAYpEVN’ P. 136 
s\ A s AN e > 4 A A e , r) , ‘ 
N yap det fn ws éwi TO TWONU WoaUTws aToBaive. Ta 
A 4 , ~ + ~ 4 
yap mapa gucw ovdev Set axptBordoyeicbat, rorepa 
a \ SN , 
Kata (vow Twa 4 GAAnv aitiav yiyverar Sofae & 
vA ~ é 
14av Kal 4 TUyn aiTtia elvat Twv ToLUTwY. Bia de, 
ef \ 
doa map’ ériOupiav n Tous Aoyiopous yiyverar Oe 
9 “A ~ a wv a ef ‘ A 
IS avTwy Twv mpatrtovtwy. Ea dé, doa dia TO TOA- 
a f ~ A A 5 A 
16 Aakts wemomnKevat trotovgw. Sia Aoyiopoy bé Ta So- 
~ ~ a ~ a\ 
Kouvra oupdepew ex Twv cipnuevwy adyabwv n ws 
4 vA e A A , 9 A \ , 
TEAOS WS Mpos TO TEAOS, OTAaY dia TO TUMPEpELY 
4 
mpaTTnra Evia yap Kai ol dxoAacTo cuppEeporvTa 
, a A , \ e , 
TPATTOUGLY, GAN’ ov dia TO TuUHEpew aAda Or oor. 
} A @ A oe -& oo» \ A 4 } / oe 
17 Gta Oupov b€ Kat dpynv Ta Tiuwpntika. Siadeper dE 


kai (doa) yy evexd rov...pyre Teraypeves|] ‘in any fixed, regular, pre- 
scribed order’, 

§ 13. gvcea] Introd. p. 224.—4 del # we ext ro roAv, ‘either con- 
stantly, or as a general rule’: the latter alternative allows for the possible 
objection of ra rapa dvow to the ferfect regularity of the operations of 
Nature. 

nal 4 ruyn alria] The xai admits that chance as well as Nature may 
be the cause of these unaccountable mostra, these deviations from the 
ordinary laws of nature; but leaves the question unsettled. 

§14. Big] Introd. p. 225, anything that as done by our own instru- 
mentality, but in opposition to our desires and calculations, may be said 
to be done fig, by compulsion. 

§ 15. €6e} Ib. p. 226—228. 

§ 16. Acyiopov] Ib. p. 229. Reasoning or calculation is a cause of 
action, when any of the goods already mentioned (c. 6) are presented to 
us as objects of our interest, as expedient and useful to us, (this is good 
under the aspect of u/#Uzy,; the other two forms of good are ro xadov 
the moral end, ‘the right’, and ro 7du: see Eth. Nic. II 2, 1104 & 30, 
Tpiay yap Svrey roy els tas alpéras...xadov cuppeporros ydeos,) in the form 
of an end, or of means to that end; when, that is, good is the object of 
the action, (I add this qualification) because even the licentious (those 
who have lost all self-control, and therefore cannot act with a deliberate 
purpose to an end) do things that are expedient or for their interest, only 
not for that reason, but for mere pleasure. 

$17. Ovpos and dpyyj. Ib. p. 231.—ra ripwpyrixa, ‘acts and feelings of 


PHTOPIKH2 A 10§ 18. 197 


| ‘ 4 ld e a A ? ~ ‘4 
TiWwWOLa Kat KONaGIS* m Mev yap KoAaols TOV Tad- 
tA , ‘ ~ ~ , 
xXovros Evexa oti, 4 Se Tipswpia Tov moLoUVTOS, iva 
, Qn , A F 9 A e 9 , on a 
18 avro7TAnpw nN. Th MEY OUV EOTIV N Opyn, OnAOV ETT p. 37. 
x ~ s) / 4 
év Tots wept wabwy, ov émibupiay d€ mpaTTeTat boa 


revenge, are prompted by passion and anger’. I have translated @upos 
‘passion’ and opyj ‘anger’ to express the distinction that the one is a 
more general, the other a more precise and definite, term. Besides this, 
Ovpos being the older and Homeric term to represent anger might by 
that very fact have conveyed to the ears of the more modern Greek a 
difference of meaning which had no real existence. dpyj, if Damm’s 
Lexicon is to be trusted, never occurs in Homer; [the word is not to be 
found in Mr G. L. Prendergast’s (unpublished) Concordance to the Iliad. S.| 
Both of the terms as applied to emotions are in fact modifications and 
limitations of more general notions—6vpos the life or soul (Hom.) is limited 
to the most prominent and impressive outward manifestation of it, the 
expression of passion : epyy ‘anger’ is one, the most striking, of a class 
of animal impulses, dpyal. In Aristotle’s psychology, the Ovpés is one of 
the impulsive faculties (opé£ess), together with the appetites and the (deli- 
berate) wish, de Anima B 3, 414 3 2, and in the Platonic scheme the 6upos 
or Ovypoesdés represents a whole class of impulses of which no doubt opy7 
is one—it is in fact the impulsive element of the human soul. 

On the difference of rrzwpia and xoAacis, see Introd, p. 232, Compare 
114.2. Of this theory of punishment as a preventive, a very good account 
is given by Protagoras, Plat. Protag. 324 B. Comp. also Eth. N. 11 2, 
1104 5 16, al xoddcets...larpeta: yap rivés elow, al 8¢ larpeias 81a ray évavriov 
wepucaas yiver Oat. 

§ 18. For further particulars about opyy we are referred to the treat- 
ment of the wan in Bk. 11: the chapter on anger is the second. 

ertOvpia. The last of the seven causes or stimulants of action is 
desire (Introd. p. 233), which excites all actions of which the object is 
pleasure. This pleasure may be either real or apparent, and therefore to 
include the latter we have 60a daivera: and not éori». 

In the next two sentences the four incentives to action which originate 
in ourselves are shewn to be all referable in some sense to pleasure, real 
or apparent good, real or apparent as a motive cause. Of émi@upia it 
has been already stated that pleasure is the direct motive. Habit, again, 
is a kind of pleasure, for experience teaches that habituation and fa- 
miliarity make actions not naturally agreeable pleasant to us—habit 
becomes a second nature. Of anger, revenge is the object, and revenge 
is proverbially sweet. And reasoning or calculation has always of course 
some good, real or supposed, for its object. 

I have no doubt that Victorius is right in the distinction that he 
draws between ovvnbes and é&torcy. The former represents a natural 
familiarity derived from familiar associations, with which, ‘as I have 
pointed out on 1 1.2, the derivation, ov» 40s, ‘the haunting, herding 
together’, the gregarious habit of some animals, is in exact accordance ; 
SO ovenbes, of a man’s ‘familiar associates, habitual companions’ I 11. 16; 


198 PHTOPIKH® A 10§ 18. 


daiverat oea. eéore d€ Kai To ovvnbes Kai To ébic- 
Tov év Tos Hdeow? TOAAG yap Kai Tov ioe py 
joewy, STav EOcbwaw, nd€ws ToOvTW. woTE TVA- 
AaBortt etretv, aoa S¢ avTovs mpaTTovow, aravT’ 
dotiv h dyaba 4 pawoueva ayaba 7 nd€éa n pawo~ 
peva yoea. érrel 8 doa Ot avrous, ExovTes MpaTToV- 
9 e 7 ©. ‘ 9 e , , > A Af e/ 

ow, ovx Exovtes S€ daa pn Ot avTous, TavT’ av ein, Oa 
the other is an acguired habit, a practice to which you Aadituate yourself 
by study and attention ; of which virtue the settled és formed by €6os is 
the best example. ‘In priore vero,’ says Victorius, ‘nulla industria aut 
cura, sed potius una cum aetate crevisse, eo verbo intelligitur; ut cum a 
puero quispiam in illis vixerit, inde factum sit ut ea ipsi iucunda videantur.’ 

éO.c8aow] Spengel has adopted ovrebicbadorw from cuvebicwow, the 
reading of MS A’. [‘é@taOaow cefert ut p. 1370, 13’ (c. 1. 4). ‘ Restitut 
passivum. Spengel.] 

mo\Xa yap x.r.A.] ‘Perelegans est locus Agatharcidae p. 61 fragm. ed. 
H. Steph. odrws fee re PiArpow péya waca ovviOea’ Kal wag THY ard TOU 
meptéxovros ducxépecay O xpovos (it isn’t the time, it is the association) 6 ry» 
mporny Sefapevos els row Biov HAtxiav. Gaisford. 

Sore ovAdaBforrs eireiv] The dative is explained by supplying an 
imaginary rw, ‘as for one summing up to say’. An analogous phrase is 
os ovveAdvre elmeiv, Xen. Mem. 111 8. 10, IV 3.7. See note on I°7. 7, rd 
moinrin@ elvat, and Matth. Gr. Gr. § 388. Add Eth. N.1 5, 1097 513, émex- 
reivovre él rovs yoveis...els dretpoy mpoeow. In this and similar examples 
the dative may almost be regarded as an absolute case. 

ovy éxdvres] Victorius here draws attention to Aristotle’s well-known 
distinction, Eth. N. I!I 2, init., between ovy éxo» and axwy. Acts due to 
ignorance, acts which would not have been done, had the doer been 
aware of all the circumstances of the case, cannot be called dxovovwe, 
involuntary or unintentional, unless they bring after them regret or 
repentance; neither are they strictly speaking éxovora:, intentional, be- 
cause no harm was intended; they lie between the two and must take 
the name of ovy éxovorat, ‘not-intentional’; neither intentional nor ‘unin- 
tentional’. I doubt if this distinction is applicable here; the only cases 
that it can be applied to are chance or accident, nature, and external com- 
pulsion, under which all actions are said to be involuntary, i.e. in which 
the will has no concern; and this is true. But in the Ethics, the actions 
there in question are not said to be involuntary—the doer meant to do 
what he did—but acting in ignorance, he acted unintentionally, in so far 
as he did not intend to do the mischief that followed. But this ignorance 
from which the unintentional character of the act is derived, essential in 
the Ethics, has no place here; ignorance is not included in an act done 
by chance, nature, or external compulsion. 

Now as we act voluntarily in all these four cases in which the impulse 
is from within and action in our own power, it follows (from the preceding) 
that the object of all voluntary action is some form either of real or 





=m wes OSS 


PHTOPIKH® A 10§ 19. 199 


e ° , : No ee) 4 9 Yon 
éxovTes mpattovow, 1 ayaba n pawoueva dyaba 7 
ens ral , en? , A A A ~ ~ 
noea n Pawopueva no€a: TiO yap Kali THY THY KaKwY 
A) , ~ \ ) A vv 9 A , 
nN awouevwy Kakwy n aradXaynv 4 dvTi peEiCovos 
2 4 , 9 ~ > ~ e A , 
éAaTTovos peTadnyiw év Tois ayabois (aipera yap 
4 A ~ -~ x\ 4 ee A 
Wws), Kat THY TWY AUTNpwWY n PawouEevwy n adrTadayny 
\ , 4 ‘ ~ 
nN meTadnyw avti peCovwy érXatTovwy év Tots HdEow 
e , / of 4 , ‘ A eas 
WoavTws. AnTTEoV apa Ta GuUEepovTa Kal Ta roéa, 
, \ = ) \ ? a 
19 TOTA Kat ola. Wept Mev OVY TOU GuUdEporTos ev 
~ ~ of , ~ 
Tois guuBovrevTikois Elpntae mpoTEpov, wept dé TOU 
Oe ww -~ by ~ oe , e A s \ 
nOcos Eirwpev vuv. et S€ vomiCerv tkavous Elvat TOUS 
e/ A F , 4 “~ 
Opous, éav wot wept éxaorov pntre doadeis pnte 
axptBeis. 


apparent good, or of real or apparent pleasure; including, in the good, 
real and apparent, the removal of evil and the substitution of a greater 
good for a less, because all these are aipera (desirable), objects of choice; 
and in the case of pleasure, the entire removal of pain and the substitu- 
tion of a less for a greater; both of which are like the others (dcavrws) 
desirable in the sense of pleasurable. 

§ 19. It is therefore (from the preceding considerations) the rhetorician’s 
business to discover the number avd kinds (so Aristotle, but the number of 
kinds will be sufficient,) of good in the form of utility or expediency, and 
of pleasure. And as the first has been already examined and analysed 
under the head of deliberative Rhetoric (cc. 6, 7, good, absolute, and com- 
parative), it remains for us to bestow a similar treatment on pleasure. 
Meanwhile we are not to forget that definitions for rhe/orical purposes 
are sufficient, provided they are neither obscure nor over-exact: in the 
one case they are not understood, in the other they are also apt to be 
unintelligible by the popular apprehension, but besides this they trespass 
upon an alien province and method of reasoning, the scientific, namely, 
or philosophical, 1 4.4—6, &c. Accordingly, 


CHAP. XI 

gives the analysis of pleasure, so far as it is of service to the rhetorician. 

The gencral plan of this chapter, and the connexion of its contents, 
are as follows. First we have a definition of pleasure and a general 
description of its nature in §§ 1, 2. From this we learn that all that is 
in accordance with our nature is pleasurable, all that runs counter to it 
painful, § 3, 4. Consequently all na/ural desires and appetites produce 
pleasure by their gratification: and these fall into two classes, bodily 
appetites and mental desires, the former irrational and connected with 
the pleasures of sense, the latter rational, in so far as they are of an 
intellectual character, suggested and acquired by some kind of in- 
tellectual process of the nature of persuasion, § 5, and conveyed by a 
faculty, davracia, intermediate between sense and intellect. The analysis 





200 PHTOPIKHS A 11 §§ 1—3. 


1 vUmoxelaOw S yuiv elvae thy jdovyy Kivnoivy Twa cuar. xt 
ays Wuxns xai xataotacw adOpoay Kat aioOnrny ets 
A e , , s A r) , 9 9 
27 Umapxyovcav ua, AUTNv SE ToUvavTiov. et 6 | 
éotiv jdovn TO TowovTov, SynAov STt Kat nov éaTe TO P. 1370. 
A ~ > a 7 A ‘ \ 
qomTikoy THs eionuevns Siabécews, TO Se POapTixov 
i THs évavtias KaTaotagews TomTikoy uTnpov. 
3 dvayKn ouv nov Elva TO TE Els TO KaTa uow ievat 
of these intellectual pleasures (which include the pleasures of imagination, 
memory and anticipation, of love and friendship, and its counterfeit, 
flattery) occupies §§ 6—20. In the remainder of the chapter other kinds 
of intellectual pleasures are distinguished, and referred to the principles 
implied in the definition. 

§1. The first word of the chapter is a commentary upon the concluding 
observations of the last: vsroxeicOw, ‘let us assume’, as a definition, ‘take 
it for granted’: there is no occasion to enter‘into details, or attempt /o 
prove that it is what I am about to describe. Similarly gore, 5.3, 6.2, 
7.2, 10. 3. 

On the terms of this definition, and the comparison of it with other 
doctrines held by Aristotle himself and other critics on the same subject, 
see Introduction, Appendix D to Bk. I, p. 234 seq. 

xaraoracw...eis TY Umapxovoay puaw] This characteristic of pleasure, 
‘the resettlement of the soul’, i.e. the vital and sensitive system, ‘into its 
normal state’ after a disturbance of the balance or harmony, which is 
pain, reappears in one of the special forms of pleasure, § 21, €v r@ pay 
Odvew eis ro Kata puow xabioracba. So that learning, as a pleasure, like 
pleasure in general, is, according to this view, the filling up of a vacuum, 
the supply of a want, the satisfaction of a craving, the restoration of 
a balance of the system, the re-establishment of a broken harmony. This 
is the Platonic conception of Jiasure; not, so far as I remember, of 
learning in particular. See Appendix, p. 234. Lucretius takes the same 
view of pleasure, de Rer. Nat. 11 963 (there quoted). 

§ 2. xai nOv €ors ro wownrixoy] by the ordinary rule, 1 6.2, and note: as 
all is good that is conducive to good; if the end, then the means; so all is 
pleasant that is productive of, or conducive to, pleasure. Comp. Eth. N. 
I 4,1096 4 10, quoted on the above passage. 

rns elpnuéems 8:a0écews| pleasure is here properly called a d:adects, 
‘a temporary and passing disposition’, as opposed to the ‘confirmed, 
complete, and permanent state’ which constitutes the é{s. On the dis- 
tinction of the two, see Categ. c. 8, p.8 6 27, dcadeper B€ cfes diaboews TH 
moAvxpomarepoy eivas Kal povtpwrepov. rovauras 8¢ al re émotipat Kai ai 
aperai...diabéoes 8€ A€yovrat a éoriv eveimra kal raxd peraBdddovra, olopy 
Gepporns Kat Wuxporns Kal vooos cai vyieta'nat doa GAXa Toaira’ Bidxecrat ydp 
mws KaTa Tavras 0 dvOpwros, raxd 8 peraBdddes ex Oepyod Wuyxpos yevopevos 
K.T.A, 

§ 3. If pleasure is what it has been described to be, a return from a 
temporary disturbance or unnatural state into a state of nature (dvats 





PHTOPIKHE Art §§ 3, 4. 201 


q A , 4 e/ , 
Ws €7l TO TOAV, Kai pddiota OTav areAnpoTa 4 
A “~ , ‘ 4 4 ‘ A 
THY éavTwY Guow Ta Kat’ avTHy yryvomeva, Kal Ta 
£9 7 % ‘ 4 :0 , T4 A fs) / 
€Un* kat yap TO EUiopevoy WameEp mecuKos 10 Yyiy- 
e ef A \ ow ~ , ~ 9 \ A 
vera Omotoy yap Tt TO EOos TH uae eyyus yap 
A N s ~ c 4 A 4 ~ 
Kal TO wWoAAakis Tw det, EoTt O 4 pEev Huorts TOU del, 
\ pS ~ , A 
4706 d¢ Bos Tov roAAaKis. Kal TO my Biatovy mapa 


being here understood in one of the ordinary Aristotelian significations, 
the normal nature, nature in its best and completest condition), then all 
‘passing into a natural state’ must be pleasant, ‘and especially whenever 
what takes place in accordance with it has reached its own proper nature’, 
1.e. its acme or maximum, the highest attainable point of its develop- 
ment, for instance, drinking, quenching the thirst is a pleasure, learning 
is a pleasure, but the acme or highest point they reach is still more 
pleasant in both. Schrader, who suggests these examples, expresses the 
later of the two stages in each, by sztim restinxisse, didicisse, which not 
only does not give Aristotle’s meaning correctly, but also, as I think, is 
not true as a matter of fact. 

dreAnpora 7] has attained to, acquired as its due, the opp. of diro&- 
dcvaz, see note on 11.7. Gaisford cites in exemplification of this appli- 
cation of dro\apBaverv, Plutarch, de tuenda sanitate, II 130 E, ro yap olkeiov 
3} pots aweiAnpey (Nature has recovered, regained her own). 

cai ra €6n x«.7.A.) ‘and all habits, for in fact that which has decome 
habitual now (by this time, now that it has reached this point) takes 
the form (yiyverac) of something just like what is natural: for habit 
is a thing (ri) closely resembling nature; because frequent repetition 
makes a near approach to the constant and uniform, and nature belongs 
to the constant and uniform, and habit is a case of frequent repetition’. 
With this statement about habit, comp. de Memoria 2. 16, p. 452 a 27, 
@Gorep yap guas Hon ro bus, and line 30, rd 8€ mwoAAdees huow mote 
Gaisford refers to Plutarch, de tuenda sanit. 132 A, rd €Oos rporoy rind 
duos rov mapa pvow y¢yover. 

Consuetudo altera natura. Prov.ap. Erasm. (Adagia) p.994. Eth. N. vil 
II, 1152 @ 30, pgov yap @os peraxwnoa gduoews’ dia yap rovro xal ro e6os 
xaXeroy, Sri T7 Proves Corxey, Gomep Kal Evnvos Acyet, Gnyl woAvyporoy pererny 
Zuevar pire, xai 8y | ravrny dvOpwroor reAXevTdcav Hvorw elvat. 

§ 4. Kai ro p) Biaov] ‘and freedom from constraint, freedom of action’ 
by the same rule; because all external force, compulsion or violence, is 
unnatural. ‘And therefore all necessity (of every kind) is painful’. This 
marks the distinction of dyayxatoy and Biaoy. Fate, for example, is 
dvayxaiov, and Necessity (’Avayxn herself). 

There is a chapter on ro dvaykaiow which includes Siaop as a species, 
in Metaph. A 5. There are four kinds of ‘necessary’ things’. The first 
is physical necessity, as breath and food are necessary to life: the second 
class consists of things necessary as means to an end, as taking medicine 
to get well, to take a voyage to A:gina to recover a sum of money: under 
this head comes Sia (and ro Biaoy), an external force that controls us, 


202 PHTOPIKH® A 11 §4. 


a A e@ , 4 4 , ~ tA 4 
gvow yap 7 Bia. to TO dvayxaiov AuTNpOV, Kat 
9 ~ a 
opOuws eipnrat 
~ 4 ~ -~ A f 
wav yup avayKkaiov mpay aviapov edu. 
a N 4 A a 
vas 8 émpeAcias Kal Tas OTrovdas Kai Tas TuYTOVIAS P- 38. 
~ A A , ~ s \ ‘ 
Aumnpas' dvayxaia yap kat Biaa tavta, éay py 
9 ~ ef A \ a OU A 6 9 a 
éGicbaow: ovTw de TO EOos moet HOV. Ta O° EvavTia 
, 4 e a 
joea* Sto ai pabupicn cai at drroviat Kai at duederat 
? , A TA ~ 
Kai at matdial Kal al avarravoes Kal O UTVvOs TwY 


something independent of ourselves and our own will, (here the external 
compulsion or violence is the necessary means to the attainment of its end, 
control). Biacoy is thus described, 1015 a 26, rovro 8 dort ro rapa Thy Gppny 
cai THy wpoaipery eprodifoy kai kwAuTiKcy. TO yap Biatoy avayxatoy Aeyeras, 
3:0 cat Aumnpov, dowep kal Evnvos gyat, ‘way yap avayxatoy mpayp aviapoy 
épv. «al 9 Bia avayen tis, domep Kal SooxAjs Ayer ‘GAN’ 7 Bia pe Tavr’ 
avayxafes mosey’ (this is incorrectly quoted ; semoriter, as Bonitz thinks ; 
the line runs, dA’ 4 Bia yap ratr’ avayxafes pe Spay, Electr. 256). The 
third species of dvayxaioy includes ra ps) évBexoueva ZAAws Exe; and the 
fourth, which is somewhat unnecessarily distinguished from this, is the 
necessity of demonstration, dro8ecfis, of which the conclusion ‘can only be 
in one way’—which shews that it ought to be included in the preceding. 
See also Waitz, ad Organ. 83 4 38, Comm. 11 p. 358. 

xal dpbas eipyra:| ‘Pentameter statim subsequens laudatur quoque ab 
Arist. in Met. Iv 5, et in Ethic. ad Eud. 11 7; necnon a Plutarcho in L 
quod non suaviter vivi possit secundum Epicurum, 1102 C. Tnibuitur 
utrobique Eveno Pario, poetae Elegiaco, Philisti historici praeceptori. Le- 
gitur tamen idem versus unica voce immutata ap. Theogn. 470 (472 Bergk, 
Fragm, Lyr. Gr. p. 382) wav yap avayxaiov xpip avtapov épu.’ Buhle. 

‘And all acts of attention or study, serious effort, vigorous exertion 
are painful’ (supply avayxn elva: Aummpas), ‘for all these imply necessity 
and constraint, unless they become habitual; but ¢ken the habit makes 
them pleasant. The opposites are of course pleasant; all states of ease 
and comfort, and idleness and inattention, carelessness and indifference, 
and sports, and recreations, and sleep, belong to the family (or class) of 
things pleasant; for none of these is related to (or has a tendency to, 
mpos) necessity ’. 

ray ndeav (rt)}] Comp. I 9.25, vicn xal rept) ray caddy, 111.16 and 17. 
These are examples of a mode of expression, not unknown to earlier and 
contemporary writers, but more familiar to Aristotle. It is the substitu- 
tion of a genitive case with ri omitted, for the direct predicate in apposi- 
tion or agreement with the subject. In Aristotle ri or éy re is sometimes 
expressed. I have not ofed it in any writer earlier than Plato, but have 
no reason to suppose that he was the first to use it. Protag. 319 C, roy 
yewaiov. Theaet.164B, ray dduvarev ri EvpBaivew gaivera:. Phaed. 68 D, 
Rep. 11 376 E (Stallbaum’s note), Ib. 1v 424C, 6és rev wereropevor, 437 B, IX 
577 B, nets elvat trav Suvaray ay xpivac. Asch. c. Tim. § 143, & re rovro 


—_ 


aes ew eee OO 


PHTOPIKH® A 11§5. 203 


ear aQN ‘ \ > ? , \ e SA 
5 Oewr ovdev yap mpos dvayKkny TovTwy. Kal ou apy 


4 emOupia évq, drav nov. 4 yap émBupia Tov OES 
roy Aumnporaray. Demosth. c. Lept. sub init. datpetoOa ryv Swpeay roy 
adixey éoriv, Olynth. I 16, ray drorwrarey ay ef7, Olynth. 11 p. 18. 13, os 
€orTt Tay alcxpav, paddrov 8 ray alcyiorwyr, de Fals. Leg. § 345, ray ame- 
orovvrwy. Isocr. xara ray Zoguoray § 2, €v rovro ray aduvarwy dort. § 16, ove 
elvas rov avy yaAerov. Ar. Eth. Nic. VI 7, 1141 5 3, rév ripeorarey, VI 12, 
sub init. 1152 64, VIII 1 ult. ray cadoy éy re. Polit. 1 2, 1253 @2, ror Guoe 
wokts éori, Ib. 5, 1254 @ 22, Cc. 9, 1257 a 36, VI (IV) 4, 1291 29, & rt roy 
advvaroy, Ib. c. 8, 1294 @ 1, VIII (V) 3, 1303 @ 19, Ta” dpyovray yevopevov 
‘“HpaxAcodeipov, Ib. 7, 1306 4 28, IV (VII) 6, 1327 @ 27, Ib. c. 9, 1329 29, 
Ib. c. 14, 1332 6 32, &v re roy advvaroy. de Anima A I. 2, 402 @ 10, Cc. 5, 
All @ 15, rév wapadoywrepav (comparative, very unusual). de Caelo, I 5. 1, 
sub init. II 12. 4, 292.4 12, rev dvapOpyrey elva. Hist. An. I11 11.4, 518 @2, 
Tov cuvexav S€ ro déppa ev aract rois (gos. Topic. B 9,114 6 18, 19, 21,T 6, 
1IQ S11, Z 3, 141 2 5, rev aromwv, © 2, 157425. Waitz ad Org. 121 6 
36, Vol. 11 p. 473. 

§ 5. nai ov avy érOupia évy] Anything is pleasant of which the desire 
is innate in us, ‘the object of any of our matural desires or appetites’, the 
definition of desire being ‘an impulse towards pleasure’. de Anima B 3. 2, 
414 6 2, dpefis per yap émiOvula rat Oupos xai BovAnais, 65, row yap Wdeos 
Gpekis avrn (j émcOupia). Ib. I 10. 4, 433 425, 9 yap émibupla dpefis rs 
éorw; and compare the following sections on ém@vyia and its congeners. 
Eth. N, 1115, 1119 6 6, car’ émsOupiay yap (aos cal ra radia, cai padcora 
éy rovras 4 Tov d€os Opefcs. Similarly Plato speaks of desire as naturally 
associated with pleasure, Phaedrus 237 D, 9 ¢uguros ovea émtbupia ydovev. 

This leads to a distinction of desires into rational and irrational, 
corresponding severally to the two parts of our moral and intellectual 
nature, the Acyov gyov and the dAoyoy—the latter division is attributed to 
Plato by the author of Magna Moralia, 1 1. 7, 1182 @ 23. 

The irrational appetites, the Platonic ém:@upnrexcy (Republic), are those 
which are not accompanied or guided by reason, which act naturally or 
by a physical necessity, doas Aéyovras duces, (these are Plato’s dvayxaias 
éwOupias ; Rep. VIL §54 A, 558 D, 559 A, B, see the whole passage, IX 
572 C, ras 8é px) dvayxaious, dAXa wadias te Kal Kaddwmopou Evexa ytyvo- 
peévas; and have corresponding jdovai, Rep. VIII 558 D, Phileb. 72 E), and 
are not prompted by any ‘supposition’, é« rod drodapBavew ri, any sug- 
gestion of ulterior advantage of any kind thereby accruing, but are forced 
upon us by the imperious demands of nature; such as bodily appetites 
(those which we have, which come to us, through the channel or medium 
of (&a) the body, sensual, al cwparixai, Eth. N. vi 6, sub init. dvayxaia 
Ta owparixa, compare the whole passage), for instance, that of food, thirst, 
and hunger, and the (special) desires of particular kinds of food (special 
tastes leading to particular kinds of pleasure); and those connected with 
taste in general, and with sex, and universally with touch (which includes 
laste,‘ gustus,with feeling in general, ro 8€ yevordy arroy rt, de Anima B 10 
init.), and with smell (of fragrance), and hearing and sight. The rational, 
those which are accompanied with reason, are such as owe their origin to 


204 PHTOPIKH® A 11 §§ 5,6. 


4 - , “~ A ‘ e f° 
éotiv dpezts. Ttav dé émiBuuwy at pev aroyot eiow 
A ‘ + J , . > , A ef 4 9» 
at S€ pera Aovyou. Aéyw de dAovous mev baas jy EK 
Tou UmoAauBavey Te émOupovow: eiot d€ ToLavTat 

ef “ , ee e A ~ , 

Goa civat NéyovTa guee, wameEp ai Sia TOU TWUAaTOS 
€ 4 iy e ~ OL s ~ 4 Q’ 
UTapYovaat, oiov 4 Tpodns, Stipa Kat Telva, Kat Ka 
4 “~ 5) r) , A e A A 
exaarov [tpodis] eidos émOupias, kat at wept Ta 
‘ \ \ ‘3 , 1 Ye , 
yevoTa Kal mept Ta adpodiota Kai OAWS Ta arta, 
‘ A 9 A ) , A 9 \ \ ww ‘ 
Kat wept oopnv [evwoias| Kal akonv kat oyu pera 
, \ ed ~ ~ ~ A 
Aovyou 6€ boa éx Tov TeaOyvat ériBupovaew aoa 
A 4 ~ 4 
yap kai GeacacOa Kai xryocacba émbupovow adxovu- 
\ 4 9 \ > » ‘ \ ? 
6aavTes kai meoGevres. eet 0 €or To noecOat év 


‘persuasion’ of some kind—these are artificial and acquired tastes, as 
opposed to the natural and inborn ra évovra, @votxa—because the hearing 
(things praised and admired by others) and persuasion in general (the 
influence of fashion and association and instruction as well as direct per- 
suasion) suggest to us a taste for, or desire of, seeing and possessing things. 

The division accordingly resolves itself into (1) natural and necessary, 
(2) artificial and acquired, desires and tastes. 

Soas émOupovow] sc. émBupias, is a cognate accusative; émOupetw is 
construed only with the genitive case and infinitive mood. 

§6. The received text followed by Bekker and Spengel puts a full stop 
at éArife [p. 206, line 3]. (The latter editor has also adopted the reading 
of MS A° dei ev for xav). With this punctuation, xay r@ pepvnpévo—edmicer 
must be the apodosis, and the argument runs thus: ‘If pleasure consists 
in sensation, and gavracia is a kind of sensation, then (assuming that 
there zs pleasure in memory and anticipation) memory and anticipation 
must be always accompanied by a mental impression of what is remem- 
bered or anticipated’—pleasure being the middle term, without which the 
supposed apodosis will not follow from the premisses. But this is not what 
Aristotle undertakes to shew; and also it assumes first what is proved in 
the next sentence, viz. that pleasure does accompany memory and anti- 
cipation. Surely Victorius and Vater are right in supposing the apodosis 
of the entire sentence, émet «.7.A. to be 37Xov Stt—xat aioOnors, which is in 
fact what Aristotle here wishes to establish. Substitute a colon for the full 
stop : retain «dy (for xai ev) instead of dei é€v ; and understand the first three 
clauses érei—eAmife:, as three distinct and independent propositions, the 
basis of the conclusion which follows; e¢? 8€ rovro is a repetition in sum of 
the foregoing, ‘if all this, I say, be so’, (8€ is appropriate in a resumption 
of what has been just said, note on I 1.11); ¢/pleasure is a mode of sensa- 
tion, ¢f davracia is a feeble kind of sensation, and zf memory and hope are 
attended by a ¢avracia or mental impression of that which is remembered 
or hoped (some phenomenon past or future, the former a fact, the latter an 
imagination), it follows that pleasure, which is sensation, accompanies the 
memory of the past and the anticipation of the future because davracia 





PHTOPIKH® A 11 §6. 205 


~ > , , s e A , ? 4 
Tw aicBaverOai twos mabous, 7 S€ havTacia éoriv 


does, which is a form of sensation, émreimep kat atoOnois'. In this case xay 
is to be retained in preference to dei év. The latter necessarily makes 
the clause that it introduces, the apodosis ; xal év merely couples this with 
the preceding premisses. The mood axoAovOoi ay, which might seem 
objectionable in the mere statement of a proposition, must be considered 
as a qualified statement of the fact, ‘will be likely to attend’; only so 
much can be affirmed. 

gavracia} which is here called a ‘sort of feeble sensation’, is described 
otherwise in the psychology of the de Anima. It is defined I 3, 429 4 1, 
9 pavracia ay etn xivnots vid ris aicOqoews THs Kat’ evépyetay yeyvouern (for 
y‘yvopuemns, Trendelenburg and Torstrik), not, therefore, a mode of sen- 
sation as here, but a motion generated by sensation in active exercise: 
and again 428 a1, davracia cab’ fv A€youey havracpa te Hpiv yiyvecOa: 
‘the presentative faculty’ (Sir W. Hamilton). It is a faculty intermediate 
between sensation and memory, and thus becomes connected with the 
intellect; the seat of memory is ré mpérov ala Onrixdy, viz. the heart, where 
the results of sensation are all collected in a focus, and thence transmitted 
to the mind. The memory is defined, de memoria, c. 1, ult. 451 @ 15, 
avrdcparos, as elxovos od havracpa, €fis; which represents it as a state 
(in the heart, or the appropriate organ) of the impression ¢ayracya, trans- 
ferred by the faculty of ¢ayvracia from the sensation itself, which (the im- 
pression) is the representation (the exw») of the real object of sense, that 
of which it is the ¢avracpa. The office of the ¢avracia is therefore to 
convey the impressions of the actual objects of sense delivered to it by 
sensation, and to impress or print them on the organ fitted for their 
reception ; when thus impressed or ‘represented’ they become memory, 
and so are passed on to the intellect. To compare with what is said in 
the Rhetoric, of this ¢avyracia being a sort of feeble sensation, we have in 
the de Anima, I 3, 428 4 11, what almost (not quite) justifies it, dred}... 
9 8€ havracia xivnois tis Boxet elvas nat ovx avev alcOnoews yiyverOar GAN’ 
aicbavopévois cal dv aicOnois dorw, gore 8é yiverOat xivmow Umo ris évepyeias 
ris alcOjcews, kal ravrny cpolay dvaykn elvat tT aicOnoet, etn dy avrn 
y xiymots ovre Gvev alabyjcews evdexouewy ove pi aicbavopevois Umapyety...xar 
eivat xal GAnOy xat Yevd. Though thus closely allied with sensation, and 
dependent upon it, the ¢avragia is not a faculty of mere sensation, but 
belongs equally to the intellect, @avracia daca f} Aoyioriny 7 alaOnrixy, 
de Anima I 10 ult. 433 4 29, (being apparently intermediate between them 
and partaking of the nature of both); of which (intellect), when we take 
the whole of it, the d:avora as well as the vots, into account, the davracia 


1 That pleasure is attendant upon every act of sensation is stated in Eth. Nic. 
X 4,1174 621, xard wacay ydp alcOnoly éorw sory, and again, line 27, xad’ 
éxdorny 8 aloOnow sre ylveras %30r7) 8yXov. But this is not the same thing as the 
statement of the Rhetoric which identifies the two, just as Eudemus in the 7th 
book of the Nic. Eth. identifies pleasure with the évépyea:, of which in Aristotle’s 
1oth book it is only the concomitant. And there is a precisely similar overstate- 
ment here of the nature of the gavragla, as compared with the description of it 
in the de Anima, where it is said to de a kind of sensation, instead of closely 
connected with it. See the following note, on dayracia. 


206 PHTOPIKHS A 11 §§ 7, 8. 


Af , ) , sn “~ , A ~ » , 

aicOnaois Tis doOevns, Kav TW BELYNnLEVH Kat TW EATTI- 

» =~ SN , Cl s Wo» , 

Covrt dxoAovOoi av pavracia Tis ov meuynTat n EATI- 
; oc its on / \ . oe 

Cer*. et d€ ToUTO, OnAOV OTt Kat nOoval Qua pepvn- 


, 4 2 4 r) , \ wt af , 

7 Méevors Kal éAmiCovaw, éemeimep Kat aicOyots. wor 
dvaykn wavta ta noea n év TH aicOaverOar eivat 
mapovra 4 év TH peurnoOa yeyernueva 4 ev Te 
9 / , r) , ‘ \ ‘ , 
éXmiCew weAAovTa’ aicOavoyTat mev yap Ta TapovTa, 

? \ \ ? sy fe A ‘ , 
méepunvrar Sé Ta yeyernueva, €AmiCovot de Ta ped- 

S8NovTa. Ta MeV OUY pYNnMovEeUTA HOEa EOTIY OU [MOVOY P. 13706. 

1 é\rlfea* (see note on p. 204). 

actually forms a part; c. 3, 427 5 28, rovrov 8€ (row voeiv) ro pev arracia 
Soxei elvas ro 38¢ UroAnWus. ‘Imaginatio inter sensuum perceptiones et 
mentis cogitationes media intericitur, ut imaginatio sensibus, mens imagi- 
natione egeat.’ Trendelenburg ad de Anima III 3, 4, p. 453. On the 
various relations of the davragia, see the notes of the samc Comm. ad de 
Anima, pp. 166, 462, 538, also Bonitz on Metaph. A 1, 980 6 26, p. 38, 
Waitz ad Org. 1006 27, Vol. 11, p. 440. [Ueber den Begriff des Wortes pay- 
ragia bcé Aristoteles, F. Freudenthal (Gottingen) 1863, pp. 59. S.] 

§ 7. Consequently all pleasures may be reduced to three classes, 
according as they are referred to things present, past, or future. The 
pleasures of the present are the immediate pleasures of direct sensation ; 
those of the past are the ‘ pleasures of memory’, the pleasures that accom- 
pany, or are revived by, association, in the way of recollection, of past 
facts; and those of the future are derived by a similar association from 
the anticipation of future pleasure. ydeia 3 dor) rov pév mdpovros 9 évép- 
yeia, Tov dé péAXovros 7} eAmis, row dé yeyevnpevov yf prvjpn’ Woioroy dé ro Kara 
Thy evépyeay (Eth. N. 1X 7, 1168 @ 13]. Of memory, Ov. Heroid. XVIII 55, 
(Hero to Leander) Nox erat incipiens; namque est meminisse voluptas 5 
cum foribus patrits egrediebar amans. 

§ 8. Therefore everything that can be remembered is capable of 
giving pleasure; not only things that were pleasant at the time they hap- 
pened, but some that were not, provided the after consequence of them 
was something right or good (right, morally ; good, as tending to profit or 
advantage)'; whence the saying, ‘nay truly, pleasant it is to remember 
past troubles after deliverance (escape) from them’. Fragm. Eur. An- 
dromed. xv (Dind. xxxvi), Wagner, Fragm. Poet. Trag. Gr. Vol.U) p.75, 


1 When there has been no compensation of this kind, the remembrance of past 
suffering is painful. Ovid, Metam. 1x 290, guin nunc quoque frigidus artus, 
dum loquor, horror habet; pars est meminisse doloris. X11 283, (Ulysses) me 
miserum, quanto cogor meminisse dolore temporis illius, quo Graium murus Achilles 
frocubuit. Virg. Aen. 11 10, sed si fantus amor casus cognoscere nostros...quamquam 
animus meminisse horre luctuque refugit, incipiam. Dante, Jnferno, c. V 121, 
Nessun maggtor dolore, che ricordarsi del tempo felice nella miserta. Shaksp. 
Richard I. Act. 1 Se. 3. 300, OL no! the apprehension of the good gives but the 
greater feeling to the worse, 


eS > oe eee eee Oe 


PHTOPIKH® A 11 §§ 8, 9. 207 


/ 9 “~ 4 e/ ~ Qi i 9 > 
Ooa €V TW TapovTL, OTE TapHy, noEa nv, GAN’ Ena 
| 9 eas xv TFT ed A A 9 4 
Kal ovx roea, av 4 voTEpov Kadov Kai dyabov td 
A ~ 14 ~ af 
Mera Tovto: O0ev Kai TOUT’ cipyTat, 
AX’ 10U Ge ~ it) 4 
arr’ nov Tor cwhevra peuvno bat Trovwr, 
Kat 
.' 4 qo c > # 
Mera yap TE Kat adyeot TEpmrETAat avnp 
ee A , 4 \ 97 
Bvnevos, Os Tis TOAAa waGn Kal moNAa@ Eopyn. 
, 9 Ww e/ eal A A \ of , 4 
9 TovTou 6 aitiov Ort you Kal TO py ExEW KaKOV. Ta 


cited by Plut. Symp. 11 1, p. 630 E, and translated by Cicero, de Fin. 11 
32. 105, suavis laborum est practeritorum memoria. Cic. Ep. ad Fam. v 
12. 2 habet enim practeriti doloris secura recordatio delectationem. Wag- 
ner adds, ‘ex hoc loco et altero Archippi Comici apud Stobaeum LIX 7, 
profecisse Epictetum ap. Schweig. T. III, p. 104, scribentem, os 780 ray 
@adarray do yijs opgy, otras 780 rp owbevrs peuviabat movoy, Monuit Mei- 
nek. ad Menandrum p. 86.’ Stobacus quotes a second verse of Archippus, 
@s—opay, & pirép €or, py) mAdovra pndauov, which supplies the link of 
association from which the pleasure is derived, It is from a contrast of 
past trouble with present immunity, and the feeling of security which it 
engenders ; and it has for its foundation the same feeling as is suggested by 
the celebrated lines of the opening of the second book of Lucretius’ poem, 
the famous suave mart magno. ‘The same association, the sense of com- 
fort and security derived from an uncomfortable contrast, is the founda- 
tion of the pleasure expressed in the exquisite lines of Sophocles, Fragm. 
Tymp. 563 (Dind.) apud Stobaeum LIX 12, ped ev, ri rovrov ydpya peifoy 
&y AdBots rou y7s émwpatoavra cdl vmd oréyy Tunis dxeovoa Wexados evdovon 
dpevi ;—to make the land, and then, the fatigues and perils past, to sit safe 
and snug under shelter, listening in dreamy and drowsy mocd to the fast- 
falling drops of rain overhead—sign of the storm still raging, reminis- 
cence of the past, and contrast with the comfort within. Comp. Cic. ad 
Atticum I! 7, cupio istorum naufragia ex terra intucri; cupio, ut att tuus 
amicus Sophocles, nav ino oréyy et cet. 

Another illustration of this source of pleasure is taken from Homer 
Odys. o' (xv) 399, which Aristotle, as usual, has misquoted, With this 
compare Virg. Aen. I 202, revocate animos maestumque timorem mitltte. 
Forsan et haec olim meminisse tuvabit. Comp. again Cic. ad Fam. lL. c. 
Nihil est aptius ad delectationem lectoris quam temporum varietates for- 
tunaeque vicissitudines: guae etst nobis oplabiles in experiendo non fue- 
runt, in legendo tamen erunt tucundae. 

rovrov 8 airiy «1.d.] ‘and the reason of this is that there is pleasure 
even in the absence of evil’; that is, in the way of contrast with our 
former condition, from which we are now relieved; all relicf, the removal 
of oppression and constraint, is pleasurable. 

§9. rad dv Amid (nda éoriv) wd.) ‘everything is pleasant in anti- 
cipation which appears to confer great delight or profit when present; 
and to do this without any accompanying pain’, ‘and in general, all that 


208 PHTOPIKHS A 11 § 3, 10. 


& év éAmidt, boa mwapovra fh evhpaivew 7 wcperdeiy P- 39- 
Paiverat peyada, Kal dvev AUmns Whereiv. SArws 0 
boa mapovra evdpaivea, kai édwiCovtas Kal meuvnue- 

e@ > 4 8 a A \ \ 3 , eQ? 
vous ws émi TO moAdv. dt0 Kal TO dpyiCerOat nov, 
wammep Kai “Opnpos érroinae rept Tou Busou 

ee A , , ? 

Os TE TWOAU yAuKiwy péeALTOS KaTadeBouevato’ 
ovbets yap cpyiCera TH ddvwwaTe Paiwouevw Tiywwpias 

~ Qt ~ A A e ‘\ ~ , ' , ) 

TUXELV, OVSE TOs TOAU Urrep avTOUs TH SuvapeEt, CAAN’) 
n ov dpyiCovrat 4 nTTOv. Kal év Tais mAEiorats 
delights. when present, delights for the most part in anticipation and 
recollection. Therefore even anger is pleasant’—the prospect of ven- 
geance fends a solace and a charm even to anger; comp. I! 2.2, macy opyy 
érecOai teva y8or)y ry dro ris eAri8os Tov ripwpnoacba x.r.A. and the 
same line of Homer, Il. = 100, is quoted in illustration, ‘for no one is 
angry with one who is plainly beyond the reach of his vengeance’, (see 
the above passage of Book I1,) ‘or with those who are far above him in 
power; either not at all, or less’. ddixovpevol re, ws forxev, of avOpwrroae 
paddoy opyiLovras  Bialopevoc’ ro pév yap dio tov icou doxei wAcoverreio Oat, 
ro 8¢ aro tov xpelocovos xaravayxa{erOar, Thuc. 1 77. 5. On gavopevos 
= Pavepos, See note on II 2. I. 

§ 10. Most appetites and desires are accompanied by a certain plea- 
sure: which is felt either in the recollection of the past, or in the anticipa- 
tion of the future, enjoyment ; for instance, those who are suffering under 
(4it. held, possessed by) fevers feel a pleasure in the thirst (that attends 
them), either from the remembrance of former draughts, or the expectation 
of future; and lovers in talking of their beloved (in his absence), or 
painting his portrait, or drawing his likeness, from memory, and com- 
posing verses in his honour’ (so Victorius and Vater; else, ypadpovres 
‘writing of him’, and gocotvrés re dei ‘in anything that they ever do which 
has any connexion with him’, sept rov épwpévov ‘so as to recall him to 
their recollection’); for in all such cases the recollection appears to their 
fancy (otovras) to be like the (present) perception (by any of the senses) of 
the beloved. 

All these last are pleasures of memory, agreeable reminiscences. The 
pleasures of memory are further exemplified in this, that when the love 
which has already arisen from the delight found in the actual presence of 
the beloved is retained by the memory in his absence, this is a sure sign 
of the commencement of a genuine and lasting passion. Bekker, ed. 3, 
followed by Spengel, has put ¢poow in brackets: F. A. Wolf had pre- 
viously objected to it. It may be retained and explained as I have trans- 
lated it, but the text and the general meaning would not suffer by its 
omission. épecw if retained implies that the passion is a/ready conceived. 
Gaisford, after Victorius, quotes Eth. Nic. 1X 5, 1167 @ 4, €ouxe dn (1 evvora) 
apx) pirias eivat, comep rov épav 4 dia tis OWews Worn’ py yap mponabels 
ry idea ovbeis epg, o 8é xaipay r@ cider ovdev padAov epg, GAX’ Gray nal arovra 
woOy kai THs mapovoias emOupp. 


PHTOPIKH® A 11 §§ 11—13. 209 


9 4 9 ~ e , s\ A , e 
emOupuiars dkoNouGet Tis don nH yap MeuvnuEvOL ais 
w A 4 
ETuxov 4 €AmiCovTes ws TevEovTat yalpovol Tiva 
e e/ ~ ~ , ~ 4 
ndovnv, oiov ot tT’ év Tots wupeTois éxouevor Tals Ot- 
\ , « ed s om A 
rats kai peuynpevor ws Emiov Kat éAmiCovtes meirOat 
e ~ , A s 
II Yalipovaw, Kai ot épwyTes Kat StadeyoueEvot Kat ypa- 
~ a A ww 4 , 
ovrTes Kal TowwuvTes TL GEL TrEpt TOU EpwpyEvoU Xal- 
ee a ~ I e > 
povow> é€y aTact yap Tots TOLOVTOLS MéEfeyNEVOL OLOV 
’ P a ’ , oar a 
atoaver Oat oiovrat Tov epwyevov. Kai dpyn dé Tov 
w e - ef \ , f 
Epwros ality yiyveTat Taw, 6TaV fun MOvOY TapOYTOS 
A s , ‘ 
12 Xaiowow ddAAa Kal dmovTos peuvnuevor. S10 Kal 
Srav Nvanpos yevnTat Tw MN Tapeivat, Kat év ToIs 
, e , A A 
wévOcot Kat Opnvos éyyiverai tis ndovn 4 pev yap 
, > 4 ~ A € ‘ e \ > 9 ~ “~ 
urn éri TO My Urrapxew, nOovn 8 év TH peuvncOa 
~ qa ~ ad wv s ‘ 
Kal Opay mws EKéivov, Kal a EmpaTTe, Kal olos HY. 610 
~ , U 
kai TovT’ €EikoTws ElpnTat, 
t , a“ \ “ eu. ? , 
ws Pato, Tota dé wacw Up iepov woe yooto. 
4 .' ~ , z 4 N ? 
13kai TO TyswpeiaOa 1jdU° ov yap TO wR TUYyxavEW 


éxopevos] Victorius inquires here whether ¢yopevac should be construed 
with éy rots muperois, as Plat. Phileb. 45 B, év rotovrats voojpacty € xopevot, 
or with rais divas: the case is doubtful, either will do. 

rats divas] ¢hezry thirst, that which naturally belongs to them: the 
possessive use of the definite article. 

§12. ‘And this again is the reason why, even when (the beloved) 
(becomes painful) causes pain (to his admirer) by his absence, there is 
still some pleasure that finds its way z#¢o (grows up, is engendered, in) 
his lamentations and wailings; for the pain that he feels is at the want of 
him, but wth that, there is a pleasure in the recollection and, in a sense, 
sight of himself, and what he used to do, and how to look and behave, 
(olos what sort of person he was, in external appearance, and character, 
i.e. conduct)’. The very absence, and the pain that it causes, and the 
expression of grief, have a charm in them which affords some compensa- 
tion by the recollection of all that he is and does. . ‘ Hence the appropri- 
ateness of the saying’,—meaning especially the use of the word {yepor, 
which implies eager desire, in relation to yoos—‘thus spake he, and in 
them all aroused longing desire for wailing’. This is a familiar phrase in 
Homer, and occurs several times both in the Iliad and Odyssey. See in 
Damm’s Lexicon, s. v. tuepos. Andromache looking back at Hector as 
she was taking leave of him, 8axpudev yeXaoaca, is a picture of the mix- 
ture of pleasure and pain (I]. Z 484). 

§ 13. ‘And revenge is sweet’, by the logical theory of convertible 


AR. I. 14 


210 PHTOPIKH® A 11 § 14, 15. 


Aurnpov, TO Tuyxavew ov ot 8 dpytCopevor Av- 
TouvTat avuTrepBAnTws pn TiyswpovpEvot, EATICOVTES 

148€ yalpovow. Kai TO wiKav rou, ov povov Tois ido- 
vikots a\Aa wacw: havracia yap vmrepoxns yiryve- 
Tal, OU wavTes Exovaw émibupiay ny ripeua n padAov. 
» A A A ~ ens >» # 4 A \ e , 

1Séxel S€ TO vikay ov, avaykKn Kal Tas Tatdtas NoELas 
opposites, ‘for where failure is painful, success must be pleasant; and 
angry men, whilst they are vexed beyond all measure if they miss their 
revenge, are equally delighted in the anticipation of it’. dvuwepBAyrws, 
‘unsurpassably’, a rare word, found as adj. in Isocr. Paneg. § 71, Xen. 
Cyrop. VIII 7. 15, Plat. Defin. 412 B, Dem. Olynth. 11 23. 11, Epitaph. 
1389. 7, Lycurg. c. Leocr. § 101, and more frequently in Polybius. Of the 
adverb I find only this one example. [Cf., however, Rhet. ad Alexandrum, 
12, 1430 5 25, dvvmepBArras ripwpovvra, Index Aristotelicus. S.| 

§ 14. And victory is a source of pleasure—not only to those who have 
a special and peculiar ‘fondness’ for it (rots qsAovixors), but universally, 
to everybody; because it gives rise to (y/yverat, there arises) an impression 
(fancy or notion) of superiority, of which all feel the desire either in a 
slight degree or more strongly. Comp. 1 9.39, 94 & uepox?) rev xadoyv... 
ereiep yj Umepoyy Bonet pnvvew dperjy. Superiority is a noble or right aim, 
or end of action; and indicative of ‘virtue’. This is one of the modes in 
which the ‘love of power’ manifests itself, to which, as a purely selfish 
instinct, Hobbes sought to trace all our feelings and springs of action. 
The Emotion of Power is, in Mr Bain’s Classification of the Emotions as 
sources of action, one of the most important of a family of eleven which 
together compose our moral constitution. Bain, Emotions and Will, 
p. 59, and the admirable analysis, 145—162. See also Dugald Stewart on 
this subject, there quoted p. 145. ‘The objects of the sense of power may 
be described as the effects or consequences of our own agency surveyed 
under such a comparison as to set forth some kind of superiority.’ This 
is the vrepoyy in question. 

§ 15. This love of victory, as an evidence of superiority, is the founda- 
tion of the amusement derived from all sports and games into which 
competition enters; all, namely, that involve a contest either of bodily 
strength and skill (as cricket, athletic exercises, and all encounters of a 
combative character, paynrixdas, cock-fights, bear-baiting, pugilistic en- 
counters, tournaments and sham-fights of all kinds), or ‘wit-combats’, 
intellectual and dialectical encounters (éptorxas); games of knuckle- 
bones, of ball, of dice, and draughts. 

Three MSS Q, Y°, Z*> here add avAnrixas, (ras paynrixds cal ras avAn- 
rixas kai éptorixas), to represent ‘musical’ contests, which spoils the 
antithesis, and introduces a vicious classification. 

On the zeal and eagerness and love of victory manifested by children in 
their sports, comp. Cic. de Fin. v 22. 61. On sasdial épiorixal, Probl. 
XVIII 2 (referred to by Gaisford). Ata ri ol ?peorexol Adyor yupvactixol 
eiow; Ore Zxover Td vixay Hh yTTacOac TuKvov; Piroveixovs ovv evOvs sor- 
ovow’ Kal yap viKkovres Sut rd yaipew mpodyorrat paddov épifew Kal Hrre- 


a A, sa Sa  — Ot an 


PHTOPIKHS A 11 § 15. 211 


= A 4 A ‘ 9 , , ‘ 
eivat Tas PaynTiKas Kal Tas éptorikas (7roAAaKIS yap P. 1371. 
a A ~ A : , A 
év TavTas yiyverat TO WiKaV) Kat aoTpayaNioes Kal 
, ‘ A 4 
odapioes Kai xuGBelas kal weTTeias. Kal qWept Tas 


pevos ws dvapayovpevot. Kai ol vy rois GAAus dywot tavro’ 30 nal payopevos 
xal Hrrovs Ovres woAAdxts ov BovdAovra: diadverOat. 

éptorexy here in the Rhetoric means nothing more than the practice of 
dialectics, arguing against an opponent, and for victory. It has, however, 
almost always in Plato, and not unfrequently in Aristotle, the additional 
connotation of captious reasoning, quibbling and sophistry. In Top. Iv 
(de Soph. El.) r1, 171 524, the éptorixoi are defined as of rdyrws xg» mpoat- 
povperor, and again 25, of pév obv ris viens avrys xapw roovro: éporixol 
dvOpwrot xat dir€pides Soxotow elvaz, Here there is already the imputation 
of an over-disputatious habit implied by the word, but by and by, in lines 
30, 32, it is associated with sophistry and sophists; but with this distinction 
—they both argue unscrupulously, ‘but the eristics do this to gain an 
apparent victory, the sophists to make a show of wisdom’; the definition 
of the sophist being, c. 1, 165 @ 22, ypnpatioris ard awoperns codias 
ovens 8 ov. Again, c.2, 165 5 7, they are distinguished from the genuine 
dialecticians, who deal with ra év8ofa real probabilities, by this sophistical 
habit and mode of arguing, éporexol 8€ of éx ray Parvopevwy evdotwr pu) 
cvrov 8€ avAdoytotixol # Haiwdpevos cuvAACpoTixol. evdjs Adyos Kadeiras 
TéeTPaXas’ €va pew Tporoy Gray Paivnra ovprepaiver Oat pr) Tv TEpatvopevos, O 
Kadeiras éprotixos avAAcyiopos. Top. © 12, 1624 3. In Rhet. II 24. 10, 
Ta éporixa Stands for the sophistical practice of unfair reasoning, yiyveras 
awvopevos avAXoyipos ‘lead to an apparent, or fallacious, conclusion’, 

dotpayaXices| The game of dorpayada, ‘knucklebones’, cut into rough 
dice with only four flat sides (¢a/us), and so distinguished from the xvBos 
(fesserae), which (as the name imports) had all six sides flat, is described in 
Rich, Dict. of Gk. and Rom. Antig. p. 64, Smith, Dict. Antig. s. v. talus, 
p. 1095 (ed. 2), Becker, Gallus, Exc. 11, p. 499 (Engl. Tr.), Charicles, Exc. 
III, p. 354. And for an account of the other games mentioned see the 
same authonities (reff. in Index); [also K. F. Hermann’s Lehrduch der 
Griechischen Privatalterthiimer, ed. 2,§ 55. S.] 

opatpices] Theaet. 146 A, Athen. A 25, 26, p.14 D—15 C, moAv 8e ro 
Guvrovoy Kai Kaparnpoy Tijs wept Thy omatpioTinny dpidAns K.T.A. 

xuBelas xai rerreias] often go together, Plat. Phaedr. 274 D, Rep. I! 
374 C,(on the difficulty of these two games); Soph. Naupl. Fragm. 4, 
meogovs xvBous re. Fragm. 380, 381 (Dindorf). Plut. (Cap. Descr.) Qu. 
Rom. p. 272 F, Zaxopos ris...dmoAavwy oxorAns eos elyev €v merrois xal 
xuBois ta wodAd Sinpepeveww. The merroi in particular was an old and 
favourite game, which appears from the constant allusions to it in Greek 
literature. The earliest mention of it occurs in Homer, Od.a’ 107. The 
corresponding Latin game, /atrunculi, is described by Ovid, Ars Am. I! 
208, III 357. 

The same is the case with ‘serious’ games (games that require study 
and attention, such as chess, and werrefa and xvuSeia, according to Plato, 
], c.)—the only difference between serious games and games of mere 
amusement, in respect of the pleasures they afford, is that the pleasure in 


14—2 


212 PHTOPIKH® A 11 § 16. 


» ’ Q A e , e ‘ ‘ e ~ 
€omovdacpevas O€ mratdias Guolws* ai mev yao .noEiat 
s w x , “A ) 7f\ e ~ * 

yiyvovra, av Tis auvnOns, at & evOus ndeiat, oioy p. 40. 
Kuynyia Kai maca Onpevtixn: mov ydp apiddAa, 
9 ~ A U 9 / A ‘ € A 4 e 
évrav0a kat vikn é€otiv. 60 Kal 4 Stearn Kal 4 
9 A e ~ ~ > 4 4 , a 
16 épiorun noeia Tots etOiopevors Kai Suvapevos. Kal 
. a ) 4 ”~ eas 4 A , 
Tin Kai evdogia Tay nodioTwy dia TO yiyver Oa pav- 
the one case must be acguired, and arise from habit and cultivation, 
whereas others are naturally agreeable, lit. at once (ev6us, from the 
very first); to this latter class belong hunting with dogs, and every kind 
of chace. 

Various ‘kinds of chace’ are enumerated in the Politics, 1 8, in the 
description of the ‘hunting stage’, the second, according to Aristotle, 
in the development of human civilization. He takes occasion from this 
to distinguish the several kinds of hunting. of 8 dd Oypas (aot, nai Onpas 
érepos érépas, olov ol peév ard Anorteias, ol 8 ad’ ddtseias, Soot Aipvas Kal EAy 
xal rotapous } adarray rovavrny (i.e. of the same kind as the lakes, marshes 
and rivers, namely, fish-producing) mpocarxovary, of 8 dx’ dpviwy f Onpiay 
aypiwy, piracy, man-hunting, fishing, fowling, and hunting wild animals, 
hunting proper. 

Wherever there is rivalry or competition, there is also victory, the 
opportunity of shewing one’s superiority. And this is what makes 
practice at the bar and in the law courts (where there is a per- 
petual struggle and contest for the victory going on between the two 
rival pleaders), and that of dialectics (what is avowedly and technically a 
contest between two opposites), pleasant occupations. 

§ 16. This quasi-sensation, the @ayracia, is again employed to explain 
the pleasure we derive from honour and fair fame, the favourable opinion 
of others. These are pleasant because every one who possesses them 
always acquires an impression or fancy that he must be such an one as is 
the good (such as o crovdaios, to whom alone such things are really due), 
and a gayracia, being a form of sensation, always carries pleasure with it, 
§ 6; and this pleasure is still greater (the gavracia becomes still more 
vivid, and its effect greater) when he believes that those who say So (Gre 
rowovros dary olos 6 omovéaios) are likely to be right in what they say. 
Such (of doxotvres dAnOevew) are near neighbours who know a man better, 
and are therefore better judges, than those (friends) that live at a distance ; 
intimates (familiar, habitual associates, ovvqGes, note on I 1.2, 10. 18), 
and fellow-citizens rather than strangers afar off, (who only know him by 
report); contemporaries rather than posterity (to whom the same reason 
applies); wise men rather than fools; many rather than few. This is 
because (yap; i.e. the preference, expressed by the paAAoy in each case, 
is due to the fact that) those (first) mentioned are more likely to arrive at 
the truth than the opposite; for when a man has a great contempt for 
any one, as children and beasts, he cares not at all for their respect and 
good opinion, at least on account of the opinion itself, but, if at all, for 
something else. 

ray ndiarwv] Note on § 4, supra. 





PHTOPIKH® A 11 § 16. 213 


, , e/ ~ e ~ \ 
Tagiav éxacTw STt ToLWvVTOS oios 6 Govdaios, Kal 
~ om ad 9 , ~ 3 
MadXov Stav duc ovs olerat dAnOevew. Torovror 6 
e 9 a ~ ~ , Q , 
ot éyyus wadAov Tw Toppw, Kai ot cuvnbers Kal ot 
me ~ 1 se» a ’ 
woNiTat Twv amwlev, kat ot OvTEes TwY peNAOVYTWY, 


ray drwbev|] The fact that words (substantives, adjectives, adverbs, and 
pronouns, ArcOev ovpavdbev oixobev, adAcbev wavrobey, Evruabey EEwber mpoo- 
wbev eowber, Obey aebey €neOev) with the old genitive termination -ey, are 
often substituted for the primitive forms, particularly with the definite 
article as of avro6ev (see many instances of this idiom in Index to Arnold’s 
Thucyd. s.v.), ol €€wbev, of dvabev, xarwOev, oixobev, éxeiOev, and such like, in 
phrases where the termination seems to have entirely lost its force, has 
been long known and noticed: see examples in Wunder’s note, Antig. 
519, and Lobeck, Phryn. p. 128: but the explanation of this usage, so far 
as I know, is still wanting. It is to be found in an observation of 
Hermann, on Soph. Electr. 888, éoyargs 8 ope mupas vewpi Boorpuxoy, and 
882, yo xoAdwns €€ dxpas veoppurouvs mnyds yaAactos, ‘solent Graeci spatia 
non a vidente et audiente ad id quod ille videt et audit, sed ab isto ad 
hunc metiri’: they reverse owr order of proceeding; we measure from 
ourselves to the object, the Greeks from the object to themselves. The 
application of this simple fact to all the cases resembling those above 
given solves the whole mystery of the idiom, which, as Lobeck says, o/zm 
vel barbatos magistros obstupefecit. (Lobeck is speaking merely of the 
knowledge of the fact; he himself assigns no reason.) Rhet. 1 15. 16, of 
& drwbey, 11 6. 23, rovs crwbev. In Eurip. Ion 585—6 (Dind.) both points 
of view are taken, ov ravrov eidos paiveras Tov mpayparey mpocwbey dvray 
éyyvbev & opwpévay, unless, as is at least equally probable, the interpreta- 
tion of éyyvbev cpwydvey be, ‘seen’ not ‘from a near point’ where we are, 
but ‘seen’, the sight of them proceeding, from a near point, where they 
are. Arist. Pol. VII (VI) 4, 1319 @ 8, gives an excellent illustration of this 
difference between the Greek and our point of view: Aristotle is speaking 
of some restrictions on the occupation of land: 4 ro cAws py éfeivas xe- 
xrnobas mrci@ yqv pérpov Twos 7 amo TévOS TOTOV Mpos TO doTY Kal THY 
groAww—Or, as we Say, ‘within a certain distance /rom the city’. Plat. 
Theaet. 165 D, éyyudev érioragba: roppwbey 8¢ py (not, as in English, aéa dis- 
tance, but /rvom a distance, as seen from a distance), Rep. VII §23 B, ra wop- 
pobey hawvopeva, Ib. C, cir’ éyyvbev mpooninrovaa eire woppwhev. Ib. 514 B, 
eis To mpoabev, Gas wupos avwOev xal moppwhev xadpevoy Omabev avrayv. 
Soph. Oed. Col. 505, rovxeiOew dAcous, Philoct. 27, 8oxa yap olov einas 
dvrpov eloopay. O08. avabey, 7 xatwhev; ov yap évvoo. Eur. Iph. T. 41) 
odayta 8’ dddotow appr’ Eowbew reve’ dvaxropwy Oeas. Tyrtaeus, Fragm. 
8.38, 9.12 (Bergk, Fr. Lyr. Gr.), éyyvOev iordpevos. Exainples might be 
multiplied indefinitely. 

As regards drw6ev and dnuGev, the former is condemned as formed 
on a false analogy from an imaginary drw by Gottling on Ar. Pol. 11 1, 
p- 311-—See Lobeck on Phryn. p. 8—10, who shews that both forms 
are good. The MSS vary in the prose form, but dwwéey is found i verse 
(Eurip. and Aristoph.), which guarantecs its existence. 


214 PHTOPIKHS A 11 § 17, 18. 


4 ~ 
kai ot ppovpor adpovwy, Kal wodAol GAiywv' paddov 
yap eixos adAnOeverv Tous eipnuevous TwV evavTiwV’ 

9 < \ ~ Tf A 
érel wy Tis TONY KaTadpovel, womep tadiwy 7 On- 
a ~ a ~ xv ~ , ~ 
piwy, ovdev pwede THS TOUTwWY TYUns Nn THS So~NS aUTHs 

“~ 4 A 
17 ye THs So€ns yaptv, GAN’ elzrep, Ot’ GANO Tt. Kal o 
~ ~ \ \ 
piros Twv jdéwv' TO TE yap direiv ou (ovders yap 
~ , 
Pidowos pn xaipwv oivw) kai To dircio bat nov: pav- 
, ‘ \ 9» -” ~ e , > = 3 \ 
Tagia yap kat evrav@a Tov vmapyew avTa dryabov 
> 9 ~ e | , 
€ivat, ov mravTes eriOuyovow ot aicbavomevo to S€ 
a ) ~ 43 > \ ) e 7 \ \ 
18 Pirie Oa dyarracbat dortw avtov 6 avtov. Kal To 
, eg 9 > A h) ~ ‘ ‘ 

Oavpatecba nov of avto To TysaoOa. Kai TO KoAa- 


§ 17. 6 hdos ray 48ewr] § 16, rav 78iorwy, note on § 4 supra. 

ro re yap directv 78v...0tvp] Friendship or a friend belongs to the class 
of pleasant things—the term gdos or quArci», ‘to be fond of’ anything, 
implies pleasure ; no one is said for instance to be fond of wine who does 
not fake pleasure in it; and the converse, ‘to be liked’ is also pleasant— 
for here again comes in the ‘impression’ or fancy that the thing liked or 
loved (guAciv has just the same double sense as the French aimer, the 
stronger ‘love’, and the feebler ‘liking’) must have some good in (belonging 
to) it, good in some form or other being the universal object of desire of all 
sentient beings ; i.e. of all creatures that are capable of appetites and affec- 
tions, which capacity depends on sensation, the power of feeling pleasure 
and pain, de Anima B 3, 414 4 I—5, line 4, ¢ & aicOnots Umdpye, rovre 
noovn re cat Avy Kai To 7OU re Kal AuMNpoy, ois 8 radra Kat 7 émiBupia’ rov 
yap nddos dpegis adrn. This davracia &c. belongs to, and is meant to 
illustrate, the active liking, ro giAeiv ndv. Every one who likes anything 
always has the impression that the object of his liking has something 
good about it, which is the reason for his liking it, since good is the 
universal desire. ‘And being liked or loved is to be valued, esteemed, 
for one’s own sake and for nothing else’. This is what may be called the 
‘passive’ liking, said of the recipient of the action or liking; and is 
opposed to the active form of liking or love in this respect; that it is an 
end or ultimate object in itself, whereas the other looks to some further 
end beyond itself, namely, some good which it seems to see in the object 
of its affection. It is probable that little or no distinction is here intended 
to be made between gurciv and dyamqgy, since it is the end and not the 
process that is here in question, and they seem to be used pretty nearly 
as synonyms. They represent two different aspects of love, as a natural 
affection or emotion, and as an acquired value, which we express by 
‘esteem’. See further, in Appendix A at the end of this Book. 

§18. xal ro GavpagecOa] ‘ And admiration is a source of pleasure, due to 
the very honour or respect (that it carries with it or implies)’. avré the 
honour itself, alone, and nothing else: notwithstanding that there is no 
more substantial benefit derived from it (Victorius). reuy is pleasant, § 16. 


PHTOPIKH®S A 11 §§ 19, 20. 215 


, , 4 8 | 
xeveoOat Kal 6 KOAGE ou" Pawwopevos yap Pavpacrys 
4 , 
19 kal dawopuevos idos 6 Kodak éoriv. Kai TO TavTa 
, , td A a 4 e 0 F A 
20 TpaTrew woAAakis nou" TO yap aovvnbes nov nv. Kat 
a , e ? F 4 a 4 
To peTaBadrAaw nov: ets Quvow yap yiyvera peTa- 


Flattery is pleasant, because it is accompanied by the ¢avracia (which is 
always capable of conveying pleasure, § 6) the pleasant impression (not 
reality) of admiration and friendship in the flatterer. 

§ 19. The frequent repetition of the same acts is pleasant, because 
they become habitual and familiar; as we were told (§») in c. 10. 18. 
Probl. XIX §, ult. érs ral rd ovwnbes ndv paddAor rou dovrnbovs. 

§ 20. And change is pleasant; by the definition, because change is 
a relapse into the normal condition of our nature: ‘the constant repetition 
of the same thing causing a (vicious) excess of the settled state’. It is 
this vicious excess which is represented in the proverbial pyder dyar, ne 
guid nimis, ‘toujours perdrix.’ When we have reached a‘ settled state’, as 
a state of health finally established by a gradual course of medical treat- 
ment, the medical applications which were repeatedly employed during 
the cure should be at once discontinued or the state of body will be viti- 
ated: and so in all cases when a state has reached its acme or normal 
condition anything that causes it to exceed this is injurious. Eating and 
drinking too much. are other cases in point; when the system is settled 
or satisfied, the repetition of the acts of eating and drinking disturbs the 
harmonious balance and produces discomfort or disease. The same 
expression occurs in Eth. N. VII 13, 1153 @ 4, dvawAnpoupéwns re ris pu- 
cews xai xadcotnxvias, where from the contrast of the two participles the 
first plainly signifies the state of progress towards satisfaction, and the 
second the complete or satisfied state; and so the Paraphrast explains it, 
wdnpobevres jOopeOa «.r.A.: and similarly é» r7 cabeornevig jAtxig, Thuc. 11 
36, means, a confirmed and settled, mature and vigorous time of life, when 
the age of growing is over. 

And in general, a// excess is vicious; as the Pythagoreans and Plato 
(Philebus) held, and Aristotle himself proves by induction in the establish- 
ment of the doctrine of the mean, in the Nicom. Ethics, 13. The concluding 
words of the seventh book of the Nic. Eth. may serve as a commentary 
on this topic; peraBorn d€ wavrwy yAucvraroy, kara Tov trouprny, 8:4 trovnpiay 
twa’ (i.e. imperfection: we are always wanting a change, because we never 
are in a ‘complete state’). Somep yap avOpwmos evperdBurocs o sornpos, nat 
9 puoi 4 Seopevn peraBodjs’ ov yap amy ovd dwiaxns. The ‘poct’, re- 
ferred to here and in the Rhetoric, is Euripides, Orest. 234, 4 xdwl yalag 
dppocas trovas Gedes yponov txvos Geis ; peraBor? wavrey yAucv. The ‘change- 
ableness’ of the bad man in the illustration, is deduced, I presume, from 
the axiom that right is one, error and wrong infinite, doOAol pév yap andes 
savrobanas 8¢ xaxoi: see the whole passage from which this apothegm is 
taken, Eth. Nic. 11 5, ult. 1106 5 29, ére rd apaprdvey wodNayas 7d Be 
xaropOovy povayes x.t.X. 

It is this pleasure which is felt in change that makes men and things 
pleasant that present themselves to us or happen ‘after an interval’; 


21 


216 PHTOPIKHE A 11 § 21. 


‘ ~ “ 
Badrew TO yap avTo det VrepBoAnv mroret THs Kabe- 
of 
atwons e€ews’ SOev eipntat 
A 4 , 
peraBoAn trayTwv yuku. 
A ~ ‘ ‘ A / eQ? 9 , —) aM 
dia ToUTO Kai Ta Sta ypovou dea eoTi, Kat avOpwrrot 
I ~ , 4 
kal mpaypara* peTaBoAn yap €x Tov TrapovTos ErTIY, 
ee ‘ 4 N A 4 ‘ c 
dua Sé€ Kai oravov To Sta xpovov. Kai To pavOa- 
A A , eQi e > \ ‘ , ° ‘ 
vey kai TO BavpaCew nov ws éwt TO wWOAU" eV jeEV 


‘because they bring 2 change from our present condition or circum- 
stances, (this is a di-version or a-musement,) and at the same time that 
which can be used (or enjoyed) only at intervals is rare’: but rarity 
makes things ‘better’, c. 7, 14, 29, 32, or gives them a preference over 
others in value and importance—not necessarily however in the amount 
of pleasure which may be derived from them; though in many cases, 
such as the possession of any rare object, print, coin, gem, in a collection, 
it certainly does. 

§ 21. And learning and wondering are pleasant for the most part; 
wonder, because in it is contained, manifested, the desire of learning; 
and therefore the wonderful is an object of desire (every desire is directed 
to some pleasure, § 5) and consequently pleasant; and learning includes, 
implies, a settlement into our normal.condition’. @uvo«s here stands for the 
true and highest nature, the normal perfect state, of anything, see Grant, 
on Eth. N, I 1. 3, Polit. 1 2, 1252 4 32, olow yap éxacrov dors ris yevérews 
tereabcions hapey ry pvorty eva xacrov, domep avOperrou, urmov, olxias. This 
highest condition of our nature is Gewpia, philosophy, the contemplation of 
truth, which is also the highest form or ideal of happiness, Eth. Nic. X 
8 andg9. A state of knowledge, to which learning leads, may therefore 
be regarded as a settled or complete state, and to be the ‘normal condi- 
tion of the intellect’, the noblest part of the entire yuyy. A settlement 
into this condition must therefore by the definition, § m5 be a form of 
pleasure. 

On wonder, or curiosity, as the origin of learning, of all specu- 
lative inquiry or philosophy, compare Plato, Theaet. 155 D, to whom the 
observation is due, pada yap drdcaodou robro ro wdOos, ro Gavpdtew" ov 
yap An apx) dirrogodias f avrn, x.r.A. From Plato it is borrowed by 
Aristotle, Metaph. A 2, 982 6 12, da yap rd Gavpafew ol avOpwmos Kai vor 
cal ro mp@rov qpfavro didocodeiv...c 3€ dopey kal Oavpualwy oterar dyvoetp, 
Poet. IV 4, afrioy 8€ nal rovrov, dri pavOdvew ov povoy Trois diiocopas 73:- 
aroy dAAd xal rois GAXows Gpoiws’ dAX’ émi Bpayd xowevotow avrey, and 
Coleridge again, Aids fo Reflection, on spiritual religion, Aph. Ix., has 
thus improved upon Plato and Aristotle, ‘In wonder all philosophy 
began: in wonder it ends: and admiration fills up the interspace.’ See 
also Sir W. Hamilton’s Lect. on Metaph. Lect. 1v. Vol. I. p. 77 seq. Ar. 
Met. init. wavres dvOpwros rov eidévat dpéyovrar Puce, x.r.A. Here (in the 
Met.) as elsewhere, the pleasure of learning or knowledge is assumed. 
The reverse of this is the cynical Horatian Nil admirari, &c., followed by 
Pope, “‘‘ Not to admire is all the art I know, To make men happy and to 


~~ 


PHTOPIKH® A 11 §§ 22, 23. 217 


s “~ 7 ; A 9 ~ ~ 9 , e/ 
yap Tw Oavpalav To émiOupetv pabeiv doriv, wore 
‘ tY ? ’ ~ s A 
TO Oavpaorov émibuynrov, év dé Tw pavOavew eis TO 
s | A o 4 ‘ i ~ A 2 
22KkaTa guvow KabiotracOat. Kai TO ev TroLEty Kal TO Ev 
s ~ e S 4 N A > ? tf 
TacxXewv Twv no€wv’ TO MEY yap EV TaTyYEW TUYXG- P. 1371 4. 
ry = ~ s Zz ~ 4 \ 
vey €otiv wy émiOupovot, To O€ Ev Trotely Exew Kal 
e S = 9 ? 9 , A A ‘ e \ 
UTEDEXELV, WY audoTEepwy edievTa, dia 66 TO HOU P-4t. 
sw A , s ~ ° A _ 
€ivat TO EvTrOINTIKOV, Kal To émavopFouv dU Tois 
9 , 9 4 s a \ A 4 9 ~ 9 
avOpwros éorTi Tous wAnciov, kat TO Ta é€AALTH ém- 
~ sy A 4 ‘ 
23 TeAEtV. ézrel O€ TO pavOavey TE HOV Kal TO Gavpatew, 
A 4 c eae yp ec , 
Kat Ta ToLade advayKn noéa Eivat Ciov TO TE [iMoOU- 


keep them so.’ Plain truth, dear Murray, needs no flowers of speech, 
So take it in the very words of Creech.” [Epist. 1, 6. 1.] 

§ 22. The pleasure of conferring and receiving benefits and favours 
is made to arise, in the case of the reception of good, or good treatment, 
from the gratification of our desires which this implies, any gratification 
of a desire being pleasant, § 5 ; and the other, the pleasure of conferring 
favours, is due to the gratification of our love of power (Hobbes again, 
cf. p. 210); the power, namely, evinced in our having (€yesv) the means of 
bestowing them, and of shewing our superiority (uwepéyew) by doing so. 
Aristotle, neither here nor elsewhere, takes any account of the benevolent 
affections as elements of human nature. 

Similarly ré apxes is said to be #diorov, § 27. 

From the pleasure of doing service in general is derived the particular 
pleasure of ‘setting our neighbours right’ (rectifying, restoring their /a//en 
fortunes or character to its normal or uprigh? state) either in their pro- 
perty, when their affairs have gone wrong; or in their judgment, when 
they have made a mistake; or in their conduct, when they have deviated 
(wapexBaivew) from the righ/ path: and also of supplying their deficiencies 
(as before, pecuniary, intellectual, and moral) and bringing them up to 
a complete or satisfactory condition. émereAciv is ‘to put the end upon’, 
(as emorepev, emiappayilew, éexvypadey, éxtypwparifey Plat. Rep. X 601 A, 
érirtOevat, et sim.), hence, to finish, complete, or ‘fill up’. 

§ 23. The pleasure derived from the ‘imitative arts’ is next traced to 
the same sources, the pleasures, namely, of learning and wonder. These 
being assumed, it follows that every work of imitation, as of painting, 
sculpture, poetry—especially dramatic poetry—(we must either read here 
with Vater ypadixg &c. in the dative, as had occurred to myself, or 
suppose that the ‘art’ in the three cases is carelessly substituted for the 
‘product’ or result of the art); and especially any exact imitation, even 
when the object imitated is not pleasant in itself; the pleasure lies in the 
mere tmttation, and arises from exercise of the intellect in drawing an 
inference or ‘conclusion (ovAAoyiopes) from this to that’; which is a 
reasoning process, and a kind of learning. 

The znference is from the copy to the original, which must have been 


218 PHTOPIKH®> A 11 § 23. 
Mevov, waoTep ypadixn kal avdptavTomola Kai Tomn- 


seen before, if any pleasure is to be derived from the imitation; and the 
learning arises from the observation of the two and the comparison of them 
whereby we acquire some knowledge of what the things really are. This 
explanation is found in Poet. c. 4. 5. I will quote the entire passage from the 
beginning of the chapter, as a complete commentary on the passage of the 
Rhetoric, which indeed seems to be directly taken from the other, In the 
Poetics, as here in the Rhetoric, the love of imitation is ultimately based 
upon the love of learning ; § 4, afrcov 8¢ xat rovrov x.r.d. infra. The faculty 
or power of imitation which attends us from our very birth, cvpdvuroy, and 
the love of imitation which accompanies it, both natural, are the two causes 
of poctry, §§ 1 2, and also of the other mimetic arts. "Eoixaoe 8¢ yevrijoas 
pev ddAws Thy ronrixhy airias vo rivés, eal avrat Puoixal. ro Te yap pipeiobas 
cUphuroy rois dvOpwras x naidwy éori, cai roite diadépovo: roy ddA\oy 
(gov Sre pipnricwraroy core Kal ras padnaes woveiras Oia pipnoews rds mpedras, 
cal rd yaipesy rois pipnpact maytas. onpeioy 8¢ rovTo Tro cupBaivoy ém ra» 
cpywr’ & yap avrad Aumnpas cpapev rourwy ras eixovas Tas paAtoTa yKpE- 
Bwpévas xaipopev Bewpovvres, oloy Onpiwv re popddas rey driporadrey (the 
lowest and most degraded) cal vexpav. (§ 4) atriov 8¢ «al rovrov Ori pavOavew 
ov povoy Tois Pitogodos Hotcroy GAA Kai rots GAXots cpotws’ add’ émi Bpayd 
Kowavovcw avrov. da yap rovro yaipover Tas eixovas opavres, OTs oupSaives 
Oewpotvras pavOave xai ovAdoyi{ecOar ri Exacroy, oluy Ste ovros éxeivos, eel 
day pn Tvyxavy mpoewpaxos ov Sa plunpa roujoe ryyv ndovny dAdAa dia Thy 
drepyagiay (the execution, elaboration, finish, Plat. Rep. VI 504 D) 4 rq» 
xpotay f dia rosavrny teva GAAny airiay. In the first three chapters of this 
treatise it is assumed that all the fine arts, painting, sculpture, music, and 
poetry in all its branches—architecture, except so far as the sculpture 
employed in decoration is concerned, does not appear in the list—are 
imitative, and derived from the love of imitation and the power of 
imitation characteristic of humanity; and it is upon the various modes of 
imitation that the division of the fine arts is founded. 

In the same way the pleasure which we derive from metaphors 
consists in tracing the resemblance—a process of learning, paénois res— 
between the word ‘transferred’ and the thing it, sometimes remotely, 
resembles; so that here again the natural pleasure which attends all 
acquisition of knowledge, ro yap pavbaver pgdios 730 dice: waciy dori, is 
assumed as the foundation of the love of imitation. Rhet. I! to. 2. 
Comp. Il! 8. 2, dndes yap cai dyvworoy ro dmeipov. 1119.2, 11.9. And in 
Probl. X1X 5, the same principle is applied to music: dca ri 73:0v drovovory 
@avrev dou Ey wpoemiordpevor rvyxavoct Trav peroy h ov py) exioravrat;...... 
7] Ors 7dv ro pavOdvew; rovrou 8€ airioy Gre To pew AapBavery THY emioTHuNny, TO 
d€ xpijicba Kai dvayvepifey éariv. 

Twining in- his note on Poet. Iv 4 (note 22, p. 186 seq.) in describing 
and illustrating this doctrine of Aristotle, remarks that ‘he does not see 
how any t#/ormation can be said to be acquired by the spectator’ (or 
listener) from the mere identification of two objects, the inference that 
‘this is- that’. And this remark is true if this were all that Aristotle 
means by his doctrine. The mere identification of an object compared 
with. one already known conveys no #ew knowledge, which is essential to 


> pe 


PHTOPIKHS A 11 § 24. 219 
Tiky, Kai Wav-6 av ev MEUtLNLEVOV N, KAY FLAN HOU AUTO 
TO meuyunuevoy? ov yap émi TovTw xaipet, aAda 
auAAoyiopos €oTw OT TOUTO éxeivo, Ware pavOave 


LA A a 8 
24 7t oumBaiver. Kal at TepimeTeat Kal TO Tapa puKpoV 


, ~ , a ‘ A 
cwlecOa ek Twv Kiwouvwy mavTa yap Oavpaora 


the notion of /carning. But what seems to be Aristotle’s real meaning is 
(as I have expressed it above) that by the comparison of the representa- 
tion with the original, whether it be a picture, or a trait of character in 
a tragedy, or a metaphor, you /earn something new in this respect; that 
the representation, in proportion to its accuracy and finish (the number 
of details introduced), enables you to discover or observe by the com- 
parison something new in the object which you had never observed 
before: and this is the ‘inference’ from the resemblance, which the 
avAdcy:opos, here and in the Poetics, is intended to express. On the love 
of imitation, and the pleasure derived from the imitation of objects in 
themselves disagreeable, Schrader quotes de Part. Anim. 1 5, 445, a 5. 
[xai yap Gy ein Gromor ei ras peév eixovas aurdv Oewpotvres yaipoper ort Thy 
Snptoupyjoacay téxrny ovrPewpouper, olow rHy ypapiuny h ray whacrixqy, 
auray 8€ tay huge: cuvectarer py parrov dyarqper Thy Gewpiay, Suvayevoi 
ye Tas airias xaBopay. bo bet py dvoxepaivers madias THY wepl Tay dTipoTi pov 
(aov énioxeyv. | 

§ 24. From the love of wonder arises the pleasure that we derive 
from (tragic) ‘catastrophes’ and ‘ farrow escapes from danger’, which are 
all objects of wonder. Poet. XI init. gorse 8€ wepiméresca péy 4 eis 7d évavrioy 
Tov MpaTropévay peraBony,...xai Touro d¢...cxara ro elaos 7 dvayxaioy. The 
term mrepiwéreca therefore expresses merely the ‘sudden change or revolu- 
tion of fortune’ of the actors in the drama; the later appellation xara- 
orpodpy (Polybius) conveys the same notion of ‘revolution’ (erpody), with 
the additional annotation of a ‘downward’ tendency (xara) or downfall, to 
degradation or ruin. 

mapa pixpov) The preposition, which in this and similar phrases, wapa 
Bpaxv, wap’ orjLyor, map’ ovder (dye, rider bat, nyeioOas}, is usually translated 
in English by ‘within’, ‘within a little of’, ‘ within an ace or an inch of’, in 
reality implies comparison; two things when sct ‘side by side’ being 
more easily compared together. (Rhet. 11 23. 30, map’ ddAAnAa gavepa... 
padAoyr, III 2. 9, 8a ro wapadAn\a ra dvavtia padiora haiveOas, Ib. 9. 8, 11. 9, 
17. 3.) The comparison in these phrases is expressed in terms of 
quantity, ‘about as much as, amounting to’; and so mapa puxpor becomes 
‘nearly about, closely approaching to, or within a little of’. A few 
instances of a very common idiom are given in Jelf’s Gr. Gr. § 637 on 
mapa, Vol. II, p. 301, (Kuhner’s Ausfithrliche Grammatik, § 440, Vol.1 I, 
p- 445) and Matth. Gr. Gr. 588 a, who docs not properly explain 
it. Victorius quotes from Phys. B 5, 8, 197 @ 27, a sentence which con- 
veys a sort of explanation of wapa puxpov: 8:5 nal rd mapa psxpdy xaxdv § 
adyaboy peéya haBeiv fy dvoruyeiv h evruyeiv dorix, ore bs Undpxov Aéyes f did- 
yoia’ TO yap mapa pixpor Gowep ovdiv andxary Boxei. 


220 PHTOPIKH®Y A 11 § 25, 26. 


° ‘3 A A a ’ eal A ~ 
25 TavTa. Kal émel TO Kata iow you, Ta ouyyen 
oe A 4 9 s 9 a f A ~ 
€ Kata ducw adNAndos eoTiW, KavTa Ta Guyyen 

1 eg? e > A \ , @ of ? 
kat Opota nd€a ws émt TO TOAV, oiov avOpwies av- 

, \ / , ? 4 A 
Opwrw Kat immos immw kai veos vew. Oey kal ai 
4 wv € e ef a A e > A 
mapotmiat eipnvrat, ws nALE nAiKa TEpTEl, Kal WS ale 
4 e ~ \ of A sj ~ A » \ A 
TOV Opoiov, kat Eyvw Se Onp Onpa, Kat det KoAotos 
A , 1 ed cd ~ 2 4 ny A 
26 Tapa KOAOLOY, Kat O7a aA ToOlavTa. ETFEL OE TO 


§ 25. xal...ra ovyyerf) d€] Note on! 1.11, p. 20. ovyyev are things that 
belong to the same yéevos or family, congeners of all kinds, ‘all things akin 
to and resembling one another’: the ovyyesyj, besides the examples given 
directly, man, horse, youth, are also indirectly illustrated by the things 
mentioned in the proverbs: they are ‘class fellows’, any thing of the 
same 4nd with another. All that is natural is pleasurable—by the defi- 
nition—things belonging to the same class have a natural connexion, 
(‘xara Pvow inter se esse dicit quod eiusdem naturae participes sint,’ Vict.) 
—therefore all ovyyevy are nda; but only ‘for the most part’, not always: 
for sometimes ‘a man’s greatest foes are those of his own household’, and 
‘two of a trade can never agree’; xepapevs xepapel xoréet xai Téexrom réxTwy, 
Hes. Cp. et D. 25. The two sides are given, Eth. Nic. VII 2 init. 

HAE qrAsca vépre] Crabbed age and youth cannot live together. 
Hence Acccedrns is ‘a companion and friend’, as Arist. Nub. 1006. The 
Schol. on Plat. Phaedrus 240 C, jAuw«a yap wal 6 wadaids Acyos réprew roy 
FAcxa, gives the remainder of the line, 7Acé Acca répre, yépov B¢ re répre 
ytpovra. The proverb occurs again in Plato, Gorg. 510 B, Symp. 195 B, 
Lys. 214 A, and is alluded to Rep. I 329 A, woAAdxis yap ouvepxopeda rues 
eis ravro mapanAnciay nrsxiav exovres, Scagw{ovres Thy mahatay mapoipiay. 
Eth. Nic. VII 14, 1161 6 35, péya 8€ mpos Gidiay...rd af Hrtxiay nde yap 
yAw«a, kat of cuvnbets eraipo. Eth. Eudem. VII 2, 1238 a 34, where ano- 
ther of these proverbs of association is quoted from Eur. Belleroph. Fr. 
VIII (Dind.) xax@ xaxos te auvrérnxey noovais. Cic. de Senect. c. 3. Ast 
and Stallbaum’s notes, ad //. ce. 

ws alei roy cuoiuy] dyes Geds as TOY Guoiov, Hom. Od. p’ (XVII) 218. Eth. N, 
VIII 2, init. IX 3, 1165 617, Eth. Eud. vil 1, 1235 a 7, Magn. Mor. I 11, 
1208 6 10, Theophrastus sept diAorornpias, ult. cai adnOes dare ro THs mapos- 
plas, TO Gpotoy Tpus TO dpoioy rropeved Oat. 

éyvw 8¢ Gap Ojpa) Eth. Eud. u.s., éyvw 8 pop re Papa xai AvKos AvV«oy, 

xodotos mapa Korowyv)] Birds of a feather flock together. Eth. Eud., 
U.S. Kai yap KoAows wapa xododvy. Magn. Mor. 11 11, 1208 4 9, nal yap 
KoXowos mapa KoAotoy ifave: (‘ perch together’), Eth. N. Vill 2,u.s. Theoer. 
Id. IX 31, rérre§ dv rérriye Hidos, puppaxe 8€ pupa, ipnxes 8 ipnfw. Epi- 
charmus, apud Diog. Laert. 111 1. 16 (quoted by Gaisford), Kai yap d Kvav 
xuvi xaddoroyv eipey caiverat, cat Bovs Bui, dvos 3 3d ony xaAdtoror (€orew 
Gaisford ; Mullach, Fragm. Phil. Gr. p. 142; bs 8€ On» vi, Cobet, Diog. L.), 
vs 3 vi. Three of these proverbs are illustrated by Erasmus, Adagia, pp. 
1642—44. 

§ 26. Next from the principle of the ‘fondness of like for like’ is 


PHTOPIKH® A 11 § 26. 221 
t4 ‘ A ‘ eQt ie ~ el 4 ) 
OMOLOV Kat TO Guyyeves OU EavTwW amrav, padiora 6 


deduced the universality of ‘self-love’. 10 dpotov xai rd ovyyevés 480 daurg 
stands for ra dota cat ra ovyyevy 4S¢a GAARAos dnayta; ‘since all things 
that are like and akin (closely related) are agreeable to one another, and 
a man stands in the highest degree in this relation to himself, (rovro wé- 
novOey, ‘suffers this’, has this affection, i.e. relation to...) all men must be 
more or less fond of self (self-lovers); because all such relations (opotorns 
and ovyyévera) belong to him (vmdpxes avrg), most of all to himself’; i.e. he 
stands in these relations more nearly to himself than to any thing or any 
body else. In the discussion of rd didavroy, the subject of Eth. Nic. 1x 8, 
two kinds of self-love are distinguished ; the one low and vulgar, charac- 
teristic of the woAAol, which consists in ro éavrois drovéyew ro mAcioy év 
xpHpacs xal ripais xal ndovais rais cwparixais...rourwy yap ol rodAol ope- 
yovras...o 89 wept ratra mdcovexras xapiCovras rais émibupias nal dAws rois 
wabect xal r@ Gdoyw Tis uxijs—hio cal 7 sspoonyopia yeyévnrat ad Tov sroA- 
Aov davAov dvros, 1168 4 16, seq.; and it has therefore got a ‘bad name’: 
but ro iAauvroy in its true sense, when this desire of superiority over others, 
and consequent preference of self—this grasping spirit, mAcovegia, in a 
good sense—manifests itself in a desire to excel them in honour and 
virtue, then becomes praiseworthy and right. ev waz 8) rois érawverois 
6 onovdaios daiverar daurg Tov Kadov mAdov vépwv. ovTw pev ovv hidavroy 
elvas Sei xabarep elpnrar’ as 8 of woAXol, ov xp, 1169 @ 35. Comp. Pol. 1 5, 
1263 5 2, rd 8¢ hidavrov elvac yeyeras Sixaiws’ ovK Ears 8€ rovro ro didi» 
davrév, GANG ro paAdov fH Bei qidreiv, xadarep cat rov didroyphparoy, éxed 
diroval ye mdvres as elxeiv Exacroy rev ToovTwy. So we say ‘fond of mo- 
ney’ or anything else, meaning ‘over-fond’ of it. The natural fondness is 
in all cases to be distinguished from the vicious over-fondness. 

This love of self will naturally be extended to all that immediately 
belongs to, or is closely connected with, oneself, ra avrey, as our ‘ words’ 
and ‘works’. Adyos all that we ‘say’—and, as we should now add in this 
our ‘reading age’, ‘read and write'—all our talk, studies, habits of 
thought, theories, arguments and such like, everything in which intellect 
is expressed ; and épya, all that we do, or produce, all our actions and 
works; in which latter is included the propagation of children, avrey yap 
dpya ra réxva.. Comp. Plat. Rep.1 330 C, somep yap of roinrai ra aire 
woujpara xal oi warépes rous waidas ayaréas rauTy te b€ xal of ypnpariodpevor 
sept rd xpnpara orovdda(ovew ws epyor davrey, cal ov xara rv xpeiay Sorep 
of doer. This natural fondness for our own ‘works’ is assigned in Eth. 
Nic. IX 7 as the reason why benefactors usually feel more affection for 
those on whom they have conferred their favours than these are inclined 
to return. The compensation principle, the debtor and creditor account 
between the two parties, belongs to justice, and has nothing to do with 
this natural affection, diria. Bofee 8 Avy gvorcerepow eivas rd atriov, xa) 
ovxX Opotoy TH wept rovs Saveicayras, 1167 5 29: and then follows the true 
explanation, drep xal dri ray rexmrav cupBeBnxey’ was yap 70 olxetoy épyov 
Gyang padAov f} ayannbein Gy vd rov epyou euyiyxou yeropevov. pddtora 3 
lows rovro wepi rovs moras cupBaives’ Urepayanaot yap ovrot Ta oixeia 
wojpara, Crépyovres GOwEp TEKva. 

It is this love which men feel for what is specially their own in word 


222 PHTOPIKH® A 11 §§ 26, 27. 


4 ge ~ e ? 
avTos mpos €avTov EKaaTOS TOUTO qweTrovOev, avaryKn 
, rd >p N ~ v\ € s 
TavTas diAautous etvat 4 baAAov nH NTTOVYY TavTa 

4 ~ a 4 A e A 
yap Ta ToLavTa UTapye Mpos avTov pahioTa. E7rEL 
A tA 4 A A € ~ 9 , eV? > 
O€ pidavTot mayres, Kal Ta avTwWY avayKn NOEA ELVaL 

~ ? 4 lA A q , 
TaowWw, olov Epya kat Aoyous. 610 Kat PiroKoAakes 
, 4 
ws emi TO Tov kal irepactai Kai dirotimot Kat 
4 nm a A t a A 
giroTtekvor' av’twv yap Epya Ta TeKva. Kat Ta 
9 ~ 9 ~ e a 9 ~ A oo wv a 

éAAurn emireAciv nov’ avrwv yap Epyov non yiyverat. 

> 4 4 wv ef ~ > 
27 Kal €mel TO apxEV HOleTOV, Kal TO Godoy Soxeiv Elvat 


or work that is the foundation of their liking for flattery, for the love of 
others, and for honour, the external tokens of respect—all of which are 
recognitions of their merit in word or deed in some shape or other, and 
evidence of respect, admiration, and regard; from the flatterer a mere 
pretence, with the others a reality. It is also the explanation of the 
parental affection, children being in a special and peculiar sense a man’s 
own work. 

And this accounts also for the pleasure which we find in supplying 
a defect, or bringing anything to a state of perfection (see on § 22), 
‘because #ow (by this time, not before, 78) the work becomes our own’: 
the perfection of it is due to ourselves, and we get the credit of the whole. 
Victorius remarks upon this, that the difference between this form of 
pleasure and that which is expressed in the same words in § 22, lies in 
the difference of the source of the pleasure and the motive of the action 
in either case. In the former the motive is benevolent, and the pleasure 
is that of doing good to others; here the motive is selfish, and the 
pleasure that of gratifying oneself. 

§ 27. émet rd dpyew qovoroy] ‘ut res plana certaque ponitur’. Victorius. 
However, it may most readily be deduced from the innate love of power, 
already indicated in §§ 14, 22,g.v. To this natural impulse or emotion 
is traced the pleasure that is derived from ‘wisdom’, or the reputation of 
it—this is not the same as the pleasure of learning or acquiring know- 
ledge, but that of possessing and exercising it, or the influence which the 
reputation of it carries with it—Now ‘wisdom’ may be understood in two 
senses; ‘practical wisdom’, dpomoais, ra dpoveiy, which is pleasant to 
possess and exercise because it implies power, in the shape of influence 
over the actions of others; and ‘speculative wisdom’, codia, which gratifies 
our love of wonder, § 21, because it brings with it the knowledge of ali 
sorts of things that are interesting and curious (and therefore objects of 
wonder). One would have supposed that the love of taxing, censuring, or 
finding fault with our neighbours and friends, émriay, is directly traceable 
to the pleasure of exercising power so frequently noticed before. Here 
however an intermediate step is introduced between the feeling and its 
real origin. This is the love of honour. Censuring and finding fault im- 
plies an advantageous contrast between ourselves and those whom we 
thus ‘tax’, a superiority in judgment or virtue, which gives us the right to 


PHTOPIKH® A 11 § 28. 223 


Ov" dpxtkov yap TO ppoveiv, Eott 8 yf copia Tow 
kai Qavpaotwy émornun. Ere evel PiroTipor ois ert 
TO TONU, avayKn Kal TO émtTimay Tois TeAas OU 
F A \ e 4 ~ F > \ e ~ 
28 elvat. Kai To év w BeATICOTOS OoKel Eivat AUTOS aUTOU, 

évrava SiaTpiBew, worep kat Evpimidns not 

Kamit TouT’ éreiyeTat, 

véeHwy éxaaTns ruepas mAcioToY pépos, 

e/ 9 9 h) e ~ ? f Ww 

iy’ avTos avTou Tuyxaver BEATICTOS wy. 

find fault; and the honour we all love is reflected upon ourselves by 
the contrast. But the pleasure lies ultimately not in the honour itself, 
but in the superiority that respect and the outward signs of it indicate. 

MS A‘ here adds «al rd dpyew after 780 efya, adopted by Spengel. It 
would mean of course the general exercise of authority, an extension of 
the special émripay, and analogous to it, as manifested in various modes 
of punishment or correction by word and deed. And herein would lie 
the distinction. The private citizen can only find fault (viz. with his 
tongue); the ruler can inflict actual penalties, personal or pecuniary. 

§ 28. There is pleasure again in ‘dwelling upon’, lingering in (passing 
-one’s time in, darpi8ew) any pursuit or occupation in which one is ‘at 
one’s very best’. dsarpiSew is by a similar metaphor applied to dwelling 
.on, brooding over, nursing, the prospect of vengeance, II 2.2. This same 
topic is also applied to ‘good’, 1 6.29; the difference being in the ‘ends’ 
or motives severally proposed, which stimulate the action in each; in the 
one it is success, a form of good; in the other, pleasure; the skill or 
degree of excellence shewn in the exercise of any faculty, bodily or 
mental, is the same in both. To dwell on that in which our superiority 
is shewn is of course pleasant, by the preceding rule. Problem XVIII 6, 
quoted by Gaisford, raises the question suggested by this topic. The 
solution which corresponds to the explanation here given, is the second : 
i} Ors ey ols oleras ExaoTos xpariorevew TavTa mpoatpetrat, O 8 alpeiras Kai eri 
rovr emeigéerat (here follows the quotation from Euripides ; and it is added,) 
ors 8 dy reves €£ apyns EXevrat, ay ols dy cuvebicOaory, ovde xpivery Suvayras 
ra BeArio’ déPOaprar yap 7 Siavora Bcd avAas mpoaipeces: that is, men in 
these cases choose a lower kind of pursuit instead of a higher, in con- 
sequence of a depravation of judgment arising from the familiarity created 
by constant exercise of those practices in which their special skill lies. 

avuros avrov BéArioros] Matth. Gr. Gr. § 460. The superlative in these 
phrases seems to be substituted for the comparative, and to belong to the 
rather large family of misuses of the former, which are found in our own 
language no less than in the Greek. 

This fragment of Euripides’ Antiope (Fr. xx Dind., xxvi1 Wagner) 
is quoted also in Plato’s Gorgias 484 E, &c., with one or two trifling 
variations. The second line there runs thus, vépov rd wAciorov nucpas 
rour@ pépos; which, with avrg instead of rovre, is also the reading of the 
Problem. The third line is quoted in Alcib. 11 146 A, with xparcoros. 
In the Problem also, xpariaros stands for BeArioros. In the two following 


224 PHTOPIKH®Y A 11 § 29. 


e , A A 9 \ € 4 ~ eQ? A - 
29 dmoiws d€ Kal eel 4 Tralia TwY HOEWY Kal TaCA Pp. 42. 


af A e 4 ~ eV / >» ? A A ~ 
AVETIS, KAL O YeAWS THY NOEwWV, avayKN Kal Ta yéXola 
noea eivat, Kai avOpwrous Kai Novyous Kal Epya’ dwe- 
prorat S€ mEpt yeAolwy ywpis ev ToIs MEPL TrOINTIKNSs. 
A a FT eV? > 7 ~ A A i) 

WEpt pev ouv noEwv eionoOw TavTa, Ta dé AvTNpa 
éx Twv évavTiwy TovTAS pavepa. 
pages of the Gorgias a good deal more of the same passage has been 
incorporated in Callicles’ speech as prose, Of the attempted restorations 
of this I have given an account in Note A, Appendix to Zyranslation of 
Gorgias, p. 134. [On p. 64 the lines here quoted are translated as follows: 
‘Each shines in that, fo that end presses forward, Devotes to that the better 
part o the day, Wherein he chances to surpass himself.’ 

§ 29. rav 78dwv] Note on I 11.4.—Gveors, ‘relaxation’, metaphor from 
unscrewing and thereby relaxing the strings of the lyre, and so lowering 
the tone; and émiraois the opposite: émreiveey and dweévae are hence 
extended to denote ‘intensification’ and ‘relaxation’ in general. See note 
on I 4.12, The undue propensity of people in general to the enjoyment 
of ‘the ridiculous’ is noticed in Eth. Nic. IV 14, 1128 a 13 (on evrpameXia 
the mean in the use of the yeAoioy), émemoAd{ovras 8€ Tov yeAoiou, Kal rav 
mheiorey xatpovroy ry madiG Kal T@ oKomrew paddoy # Sei «r.A. The dis- 
cussion of ro yeAoioy here referred to as existing in the Poetics, and again 
in Rhet. 111 18. 7, where we are told that the ‘kinds’ of it are enumerated, 
cannot possibly mean the passage which we actually find there inc. 5. 2, 
which is a mere definition. The subject was probably treated in the 
second book of the two of which the Poetics originally consisted'; and 
most likely formed part of the treatise on Comedy, which the author 
promises at the commencement of the sixth chapter of the extant work. 
Such are the opinions of Heitz, the latest writer on the question; Verlorene 
Schriften Arist. pp. 87—103. 

On the ‘ludicrous’, see Cicero de Orat. 11 58 seq. de ridtculo; Quint. 
Inst. Orat. vI 3. Demetr. wep) épunveias in the chapter—epi ray €v rois 
mpaypact xapirev, ap. Spengel, Rhet. Gr. 111 298 seq. Bain, On the Emo- 
tions and Will, pp. 282—285; and Herbert Spencer, Essays &c., 2nd 
Series, Essay 111, The Physiology of Laughter. 

elpno@w]| This is the first instance in the Rhetoric of the use of this 
most familiar Aristotelian form of expression (a verb in the third person 
of the imperative passive), which in some of his works occurs sometimes 
at the end of nearly every chapter. It expresses the completeness and 
sufficiency of any action or process, that a thing has been completely 
gone through and finished, and that that is sufficient, and no more need 
be said or done about it. Thus eipyada, ‘let so much have been said upon 
the subject’, means, let it suffice to have said so much, let this be con- 
sidered sufficient, and the subject closed; and let us now ‘have done 
with it’, and go on to something else. It is not peculiar to Aristotle, 
though very much more common in him than in other writers. It occurs 

1 The two lists of the Aristotelian writings differ. Diogenes v. 26 has Moey- 
rexd. a’; the Anonymus, ap. Buhle, Vol. 1 p. 63, réxvns rownrexys, B’. 





PHTOPIKHS A 12§1. 225 


? 4 ? ef 9 ~ ~~ s » , ~ 3 
Wy fev OUV EVeKa GOlKOVGL, TavT EoTiv. was 6 CHAP. xt. 


of ae 4 ’ ~ > 4 \ e ee 
EXOVTES Ka@t TiVasS, Aeywpev yuy. QuUTOL fev Ouv OTay 


for instance in Xenophon, Mem. rv 2.19, cpes &¢ eipyobe pos, ‘be satisfied 
with my saying so much’, let it suffice to have said so much: Plato, Phileb. 
57 C, eipnabe, ‘let it be said once for all’, and no more about it. Ib. 62 E, 
peOcicber, and Stallbaum’s note on Phaedr. 278 B, rewaio6e, ‘enough of this 
joking’, Ib. 250 C, xeyapicOw, Theaet. 197 D, weworjoOe, Euthyd. 278 p, 
wenaicOw vpiv, Rep. VIII §53 A, 562 A, IX 588 D, wexdkao6e. Thucyd.1 71, 
épicbe, ‘let this definition suffice’. Ar. Eth. Nic. 1 1 ult. weppogusacde, 
‘let so much suffice by way of preface’; Top. A 8, 103 6 1, and 13, 105 a 21, 
Siopicbw: ef passim. 

This notion of a completed, perfected, concluded, fixed and permanent, 
and sufficient action, belongs to the perfect tense in general, and appears, 
not only in the imperative of the passive, but also in the indicative, perfect 
and future (the paxlo post futurum, on which see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 498). 
Of the indicative, instances are, Soph. Trach. 586, pepnydwyras rovpyor, 
Philoct. 1280, wéravya, Eur. Hippol. 1457, xexaprépyrat rdya, My powers 
of endurance are exhausted, the play is played out, all my endurance and 
sufferings are over, and this is the end : compare resrdrOacr yap, Rhet. 11 8.2; 
Aesch. Eum. 680, and Aesch. S.c. T. 1050, dcareripyra: (Paley’s notes on both 
passages). Fragm. Phryx (Fr. Aesch. 263), dsamedpovprras Bios. Eur. 
Orest. 1203, and Phoen. 1019, efpyras Aoyos. Plat. Phileb. 62 D, peOecivras. 
Ar. Rhet. 1 14 ult. 11 5 ult. cai wept per» hoBepwr xai Gappadécy cipyra, ‘So 
much for’, where the perf. ind. pass. in summing up at the end of the 
chapter, plainly differs only in form from the ordinary imperative. TZyrota 
Just. Fuit Ilium. 

Of the paulo post fulurum a good instance occurs Theaet. 180 A, in 
the humorous description of the Heraclitean philosophers, ‘and if you 
look for an explanation of the meaning of the meaning of this, érépe 
wemhnge xawos perwvopacperp, you will be instantly shot with (44. another 
phraselet, pnyyarig) another brand new word coined for the occasion’, i.e. 
you will have been shot already, as it were; almost before you know 
where you are. 

The observation on this use of the tense in Jelf’s Gr. Gr. § 399, obs. 1, 
is quite inadequate, and not quite correct: Matthiac, Gr. Gr. § 500, p. 841, 
1s somewhat more satisfactory. 


CHAP. XII. 


§ 1. Such are the motives and incentives that stimulate men to in- 
justice and wrong, which have been found to be so many varieties of 
pleasure: we next proceed to examine and classify, for the use of the 
forensic practitioner, the dispositions and characters of wrong-doers and 
of their intended victims, those who are most likely to be exposed to 
wrong. 

First of all, the ‘possibility’ of effecting it must always be taken into 
account by any one who contemplates the perpetration of a wrong: and 
not only the general possibility, as whether so and so is possible to a 
human being (physical or absolute possibility), but a special possibility to 


AR, I. 15 


226 PHTOPIKH® A 12 § 2, 3. 


a A > A ~ ~ 4 
otwvTat duvaToy eivat TO Tpaypha moaxOnva Kat éau- 
~ s\ ~ , av , 
Tois duvatcy, cite av Aabeiv mpakavtes, 7 mi AaOov- 
A ~ , a ~ A 9 9 9 , 4 
Tes pn Oovvat Sikny 7 Sovvat ev aAN’ éAaTTW THY 
, > ~ ~ nv 6 , on 
2 (nulay eivat TOU Képdous EavTois H wy KnOovTaL. rota 
A + A ~ , ~ 
Mev ovv Suvata caivetat kai rota dduvara, év ois 
e/ , A 4 ~ o ~ 
vorepov pnOnoetat (Kowa yap TavTa TavTwWY Tw 
’ A > , 
Aoywv), av’tol & olovra: suvatot etvat padtora 
/ ~ ~ 4 
aCnurot adikeiv ot etmety Suvapevor Kal of mpaxtixol 
wv ~ ? vA 4 P 
Kal ot Eurreipot TOAAWY aywvwY, Kav ToAUD At wow, 
s\ , \ , , s\ ) ‘1 F ’ 
3 Kav wAovolo. Kat MadtiorTa MEY, av auTOL WoW EV 


themselves, cal davrois duvardy; in other words, the moral possibility,’ 
when the act is done in such a way or under such circumstances as shall 
render it worth their while; such that the prejudice or injury sustained 
by the action or its consequences shall not outweigh the prospective 
benefit ; an act done in spite of these considerations may be regarded as 
morally ‘impossible’, 

etre Gv (otwvrat) Aabeiy wpdéavres] ‘whether, that is, the intended wrong- 
doers think the crime will never be detected at all; or be detected, but 
remain unpunished; or if it be punished, that the loss or injury so 
sustained will be less than the gain resulting from it to themselves’. 

§ 2. év rois Yorepov] The subject of ‘general probability and impro- 
bability’ shall be considered hereafter, that is, in 11 19, where the duvaroy 
and ddvvarov (one of the four xowol rémot) are analysed. This is expressed 
by the xosva yap ratra mdyrwy Tov Acywy of the parenthesis: ‘because they 
are common to all kinds of speeches’, (viz. the three kinds of Rhetoric, 
which is here taken as the basis of their xo:vorns, elsewhere it is their 
Opposition to the e%3n, see Introd. on rozos, p. 128), ‘therefore they shall be 
considered hereafter’, viz. with the rest in 11 19. We now proceed to the 
subject of the special or moral probability, which affects would-be wrong- 
doers themselves (avroi & oloyra: 8vvaroi eiva...), and under the circum- 
stances of any particular case. 

The first class of persons that rely on this kind of possibility, in the 
sense of a possible exemption from punishment if they do wrong, are able 
speakers and men of action-—the one capable of defending themselves 
against attack with their tongues by plausible argument, the other of 
carrying through the business or transaction in the best and completest 
way, SO as to secure all possible advantage; and men already practised in 
many forensic contests—and so with acquired experience of the resources 
availabl> for defence against an accuser in a court of justice; and men 
with many friends, having an extensive or influential connexion, or well 
befriended,—these will be well helped; and the wealthy—who can buy off 
an accuser or antagonist, and corrupt the judges. 

§ 3. The possibility of doing wrong with impunity is greatest when 
the parties themselves answer to any of the foregoing descriptions ; and 


PHTOPIKHS A 12 § 4. 227. 


im ? ’ ) ’ , ‘ ’ AY e ’ 
Tots €lpnpevols, olovrat duvacOat, ei O€ pn, Kav UTrap- 
~ ~ v , s\ td 
Xwow avrots ToovTo iro. 4 UmnpeTat nH KoWwvot’ 
A A ~ , , 
dia yap Tavra Suvavta Kai mpartew Kat NavOavew 
s) | ~ t 4 | é > ~ 9 
4 kat un Sovva Sixnv. Kai éav ido wot Tots adixovu- 
Ld av ~ ~ e | A 4 , , / 
MEévots | ToIs KpLTais* ot pev yap Hiro: advAakrot TE 
A ) ~ a A 
Wpos TO aoiKkeioOat Kai mpooxatadAaTTovTat Tp 


if not, (in the next degree), when they have friends, or servants and follow- 
ers, or associates of these kinds; for these circumstances and capacities 
make it possible for them (ad, the cause, the power is due to these) to do 
the things (this applies specially to the mpaxrixoi), and to escape either 
detection or punishment. 

§ 4. Again, the possibility is increased, the attempt becomes easier, 
if they are friends either of the objects of the wrong, those whom they 
propose to injure, or of the judges who would have to try the case if 
brought before them: for friends are off their guard (/¢. unguarded), and 
thereby particularly exposed to injury and wrong, and moreover are in- 
clined to come to terms or to be reconciled without ‘prosecuting’ the 
case, or bringing it before a court of justice; and judges are ready to 
oblige their friends, and either let them off altogether, or inflict a very 
slight penalty (so fair and upright were the Athenian dicasts). 

oi...pidos advAaxros «.r.A.] This sounds very atrocious, and certainly 
has a highly immoral appearance on the face of it. But we are to 
recollect that the author told us in his apology for Rhetoric in the preface 
that such suggestions are to be regarded only as exemplifications of the 
theory of the art, which argues each side of every question indifferently 
without regard to moral considerations: but in practice, though the 
rhetorician as such can employ immoral arguments, no Aonest rhetorician 
would have recourse to them. Rhetoric does not profess to teach virtue ; 
that must be learned a/iunde. This is Aristotle's view of the matter: the 
Sophists, who, as we are expressly told, identified the study of Rhetoric 
with a general, political education, had no such excuse or Justification 
for the immoralities of ‘heir Rhetoric, which they inculcated without alloy. 

mwpooxaraddarrovra] ‘xal mpos, ef practerea. pessime vulgo mpoo~ 
caradAdrrovra’. Gaisford. Bekker and Spengel retain’ the vulgate, to 
which there is no possible objection. xaraAAarreoOas alone, it is true, 
conveys all that is necessary to the sense, the reconciliation namely; but 
spos is very often added to a verb, simple or compound, to express 
‘direction’ to an object, as mpocevreiverw wAryas, Dem. c. Mid. 528. 25; 
spocevOuvew, Ar. Pol. vil (v1) 8, 1322 89; and particularly with verbs 
‘that imply conciliation or reconciliation, as spooywpeiv Thuc. I 103, IV 71, 
‘to come over to a side’, mpoodyeoOat, ‘to bring over to one, to conciliate’. 
Isocr. Nicocl. § 22, Oepemeias mpocayayerGas. Thuc. III 43, dwarg xpoac- 
yerOas rd wAfOos, 111 48, pyre otere pyr’ dxsecxelg, ols olde ¢ya d& mpoodyerGas 
(to be won over). spoclecOas ct similia. So here the compound verb 
cara\\arrecOa: denotes the mutual seft/ement of the disputed points, and 
the additional wpdés the conciliation, being won over, which attends it. 


15—2 


228 PHTOPIKHS A 12§ 5. 


érefeNOciv, ot Sé xpitat xapiCovra ois av pidot 

wot, Kal |) SAws adiaow 7H puxpois Cyuiovaw. AaGr- 

tTuxot 8 eioty of T° évayTiot Tois éyKAnpacw, oiov 

doOevns epi aixias kal 6 mévns Kat ‘aioypos rept 

Motxeias. Kal Ta Niav év havep@ Kal év dpOadnois- 
1 dg infra cum libris. [6] Spengel. 

§ 5. Persons likely to escape detection are those whose personal and 
moral or mental character is opposite (this is the ‘opposition’ ’of ‘con- 
trariety’, the extremes under the same genus, as black and white in 
colour, bitter and sweet in taste, hot and cold in touch or feeling, and 
such like) to that which the charge necessarily implies ; as when a man of 
feeble bodily frame is charged with ‘assault and battery’, or a poor and 
ugly man with adultery. 

_ The doOerns charged with alxia was a stock example of the romros of 
ro eixds in the early rhetorical treatises. This rowos was the staple of 
Corax’s réyvn, Rhet. 11 24. 11; and the case of the ‘weak man’ is quoted 
by Aristotle as one of the examples there used. The application of the 
argument of ‘probability’ to the treatment of it, shewing how Rhetoric 
rdvayria avAXoyifera, is there illustrated. It appears again in Rhet. ad 
Alex. 36 (37). 6, and PL Phaedrus 273 B, as an extract from Tisias’ réyon, 
where the romos of ré eixos is represented as somewhat differently treated. 
Victorius cites Quint. Vv 10. 26, speaking of the same mode of inference ; 
the probability namely of the conformity of a man’s actions to his bodily 
condition and ordinary character. These are ‘ personal’ topics of argu- 
ment, avgumenta a persona, § 23, inferences from personal conditions, 
qualities, habits, employed to determine the probability of a certain 
action, as proceeding from Aim: one of these is, kaditus corporis: ducitur 
enim frequenter in argumentum species libidinis, robur petulantiae,; his 
contrarta tn diversum—the two cases given by Aristotle. 

O més xal 6 aicypos, the definite article marking the genus, ¢ke mem- 
ber of a certain class. See note on I 7.13 ef py) Jv o mpagwr, p. 130. In 
this and the next topic there is a change from persons to things, which 
are resumed as the objects of analysis in § 32. 

xal ra diay év ayepp] ‘And things, i.e. acts, that are excessively con- 
spicuous, open to observation and under people’s eyes’. ra ev opOadpois, 
‘things in sight’, gus saulent aux yeux. Polit. VII (V1) 4, 1319 8 18, oAlyov 
pev yap movnpoy Tapoparat, wodu 8€ ywopevoy dv dpOadpois paddov eorw. 
Such glaring acts are not guarded against (d@vAaera here occurs in a dif- 
ferent sense to d@vAaxros pido: in § 4: that is ‘unguarded’, from gvAar- 
reoOa, the direct Jassive,; this is ‘not guarded against’, the passive of 
(the middle) @uAdrrecGai rx ‘to guard oneself against anything’, comp. 
§§ 6 and 21), no precautions are taken to prevent them, ‘because no one 
would suppose that any one was likely to attempt them’. Supply to com- 
plete the sense rev’ Gy rrotoa: avrd, or émtxetpjoat avrois. This is a return 
to the original topic of @ dvvayra: mparrew ‘possible actions’. ra diay ép 
dbavepg are therefore acés which are likely ‘to be carried into effect’—o4, 
‘to escape detection’, Aa@ytixa from the preceding clause, which is in 
some sort parenthetical. 





PHTOPIKHS A 12 §§ 6, 7. 229 


6 aduAakxta yap Sia TO pndéva av olecOa. Kai Ta 
TnXKavTa Kal Ta ToLavTa Cia pnd av Eis* apvAaKTA 
yap kai Tavra’ mavtes yap Ta ciwOoTa woe dppw- 

, , 8 > , a q , 
- oTnuata hudarrovra Kai TddiknuaTta, 6 dé pndeis 
9 4 9 4 9 ~ A z A 

7 1w rppwoTnkev, ovdels evAaBEiTat. Kal ols pndets 
, 1 oN , A ‘ A ” , Y a 
€xOpos 4 moAXoi* ot pev yap oiovtat Anoew dia TO 
Bn pudatrecba, ot S€ AavOavovor Sia TO pan SoKeiv 
av émxepjoa pudarropévos, Kal Sia Td atroAoyiav 

§ 6. And acts again which are of such a magnitude (rnAccadra) and 
of such a kind as no one (else) would ever think of doing (supply smoe- 
oe); for these too (like the preceding) are not guarded against, (viz. novel 
and audacious attempts and enterprises which people are unprepared for, 
and which therefore take them by surprise) : for it is only against custom- 
ary offences, just like sicknesses, that people are on their guard; against 
diseases hitherto unknown, (which no one has ever yet had,) no one ever 
takes precautions. dppadoctynpa, dppworia, dppworetv properly denote ‘ want 
of strength’, bodily weakness, and hence any infirmity, such as sickness. 
Hence Thucydides applies it, 111 15, to want of strength of will, or of 
inclination, appworia rov orparevew; and VII 47, to weakness of mind; the 
mental prostration or despondency which prevailed amongst the Athenian 
troops before Syracuse: and again in VIII 83, to Tissaphernes’ weakness 
of will or inclination, as shewn in his ‘remissness’ or ‘ disinclination’ to 
supply pay to the crews of the Peloponnesian vessels; which Arnold well 
expresses by ‘he was sick of it’. In Plat. Rep. 1! 359 B it represents 
nothing more than the defect or weakness of a faculty. In Xenophon the 
three words usually denote some form of disease or sickness: Demosth. 
OL. 11 p. 24. 5, womep yap ev rois copacw Hpoy, Eos pev av eppwpevos 7 Tis, 
oudey ératcOdverat ray xa éxacra cabpay, éray 8¢ appdotnpa re cupfp, 
mavra Kivetrat, Kav piypa Kav orpépua Kay GAXo tt Tay Virdpxovrwyv aabpoy F, 
any disease or other imperfection and unsoundness of body, including 
fractures, sprains, &c. 

§ 7. xal ols undels €yOpos 7 rodXoi] is a return to the original construc- 
tion of § 3. Supply ofovrat divacOat wpdrrew x.r.A. or simply ofovra: duva- 
oa ddixetvy. And also those (are disposed to do wrong, or think they 
can do it undetected or with impunity) who have no enemy at all ora 
great many: the former think they will escape undetected because there 
is no one (no enemy) to take precautions against them (and their 
attempts); the latter pass undiscovered, because they are not likely (dy) 
to be suspected of assailing people when they are on their guard against 
them (as enemies), da 75 un Soxety Gv emcyerpyoas ‘because they would not be 
thought (47%. seem) likely to assail’, ‘because no one would think them 
likely to assail’; and also, if they «7e suspected or detected (so Victo- 
rius), (and brought before a court of justice), they have a defence ready 
that they never would have made, were not at all /zée/y to make, such an 
attempt; that is, that their guilt is Aighly tmprobable; Corax’s topic of ro 
eixds again. 


230 PHTOPIKH® A 12 §§ 8, 9. 


8 yew STt-ovK av évexeipnoav. Kai ois Urapxet KpUWIS p. 43. 
vA , av a vA , # \ A 
1) TpoTos n TOTOs 4 SiaBeots EvVTTOpOS. Kal OoOLS MN 

~ A 4 vn 

Aabovaw éorr Siwors Sixns 4 dvaBorn xpovov 7 
~ a v 

SiaPOopai xpitav. Kal ois, dav yevntat Cypia, Ere 

~ wv 
Siwois THs éxTicews 4 avaBoAn xponos. 1 Cel) Oe 
e e « \ 
g dropiav pndev Efe 6 Tt arodéon. Kal ols Ta peév 


§ 8. And those again who have any means of concealment (either of 
themselves, or of the goods they have stolen,) or any ‘ mode’ (of changing 
it, so that it shall not be recognised, Victorius, or more generally, ‘any 
contrivance or device’) or any place (of refuge for themselves, or for stow- 
ing away the stolen property) or are of an inventive disposition, or habit 
of mind’, (suggestive of rpowo: in the second sense, and pyyayai). 

Victorius confines the whole of this topic to the one crime of robbery, 
de furibus ac latronibus ; and interprets xpuyas gut possunt quae sustulerint 
nullo negotio occulere,; tpowog guibus modus viaque facilis est tlla immu- 
tandt. Quod aut figuram aut colorem variare possint,; aut artificio dent- 
gue suo aliguo modo facere ne tpsa agnoscantur. I should prefer giving 
it the wider sense of contrivances, devices of all kinds, tricks, artifices, 
any ‘ways’ or ‘modes’ of getting out of a scrape, and escaping the con- 
sequences of a criminal act. In Plat. Phileb. 164, it has a nearly similar 
sense, ef rs rporos forw xal pnyavy. Lastly, confining d&ddeors to the same 
subject, he translates it vendere, as we say to dispose of a thing; adding, 
daBeow enim hic alienationem valere arbitror, and quoting, in support of 
the interpretation, Plut. Solon, p. 91 E, rév 8€ yevopeveav diabeow mpos fe- 
vous éAalov povov ESoxer’ Gada 8é eEdyew éxoAvoey. -Demosth. Olynth. 1, 
Pp. 22, ov do” &y ropicwow ovrus Oras dy Sivwvra rair exovres diaberGat. 
Isocr. Paneg. § 42, ra pév Grrov xp7 Saber Oa ra 8° crober eloayayer Gas, (the 
word in this sense implies ‘distribution’, and so, ‘disposing or setting out 
for sale.’ Similarly ib. § 9, rots dvopacw ed d:abec6a: ‘to set out, or forth, 
in words’; and several of the best authors use it of ‘disposing of’ a 
variety of different things, property, one’s own person, a daughter, goods 
for sale). 

It seems to me preferable to extend the meaning, as in the other cases, 
beyond the mere ‘disposal’ of stolen goods, to amy disposition or habit of 
mind, which is at all events the usual meaning of 8:dfeocs. And there is 
this further reason for rejecting Victorius’ limitation of the topic, that if 
it is adopted no difference whatsoever is left between xpuyis and rowos 
here and afterwards in §§ 33, 34. 

kal ois, day yémra: énuia «.r.A.] And those who, if they don’t escape 
detection, have the means of getting rid of (#4. pushing off) the trial alto- 
gether, or postponing it, or of bribing the judges. And those who, if 
a penalty be actually imposed have the means of getting rid of the pay- 
ment of it, or postponing it for a long time, or who from poverty have 
nothing to lose: (in the last clause the relative ofs, which is convertible 
with ef rts, must be supposed to take that form when joined with é£es). 

§ 9. Another class of cases in which men are disposed to do wrong, 


PHTOPIKHY A 12§10. 231 


a i 9 e ge 

Képon avepa n peyada 4 éyyus, ai Se Cyuiat puxpal 

An >» a av 4 1 @ , 2? , rd Si 

P. 2 6. 

1 apart: n woppe. KaL coy a €oTt rupee [on ™ 137 
10 WheAcia, olov Soxet 4) Tupavvis. Kal Ooos Ta peV 

9 , 4 e A a 2 4 a A 

adcxnuata Anupata, ai de Cnpiar dveidn povov. Kat 

ois ToUvayriov Ta pev ad«nuata eis Emawov Twa, 

oiov e& ouveBn aua Tiyswpnoacba Umep mwaTpos 7 

MnTpos, womep Znvwvt, ai Se Cyuiac eis ypnuata 7 

uynv 1 TowovTOV Te Ot auporepa yap aodixovat Kai 


and think wrong deeds possible, is where the profit likely to accrue is 
evident, or certain (patent to all, free from all doubt or obscurity), or 
great, or immediate; and the penalties to which they are liable small, 
or obscure and uncertain (not such as to attract attention, and so deter 
from the intended wrong; guae obscurae admodum et caecae sunt ut 
perspict nequeant: Victorius), or remote. 

Or again, where no possible punishment is equal to the prospective 
benefit ; as is supposed (doxet) to be the case with absolute sovereignty or 
tyranny. On rupasvis, and the distinction between it and povapyia, see 
note on I 8.4 and 5, p. 155. 

§ 10. ‘And cases in which the offence, and the profit or result of it, is 
a substantial, solid gain, and the penalty mere disgrace’.—Anppara refers 
perhaps to pecuniary gain (ducrum). 

‘And the reverse; where the (legal) crime tends to any kind of praise 
(is directed to, as its meed or reward; i.e. where what is a crime in one 
point of view, is likely to meet with Jrazse in another), as, for instance, if 
the crime was accompanied by vengeance for father or mother, as it was 
in Zeno’s case; whilst the penalties are all directed against a man’s purse 
or person, as fine, imprisonment, banishment, or anything else of the 
same kind (not affecting his character or reputation): for both circum- 
stances and both dispositions may be motives to wrong acts, only not 
in the same persons and the same characters’. 

Men of different characters are influenced by different motives in the 
commission of crime. Some care more for honour and glory and reputa- 
tion than for their money and personal ease and comfort, and these, like 
Zeno, will be ready to commit what may be construed as a crime and 
render them liable to punishment, provided it be attended with some- 
thing which leads to praise: the others, who value their personal well- 
being more than their good name, will be induced rather to do wrong acts 
which lead to substantial gain, and affect only their reputation. The one 
are virtuous, though they err; the others, sordid, mean, and vicious. 

Of Zeno’s case, here referred to, nothing is known, and we are reduced 
to conjecture. Of the two best known of this name, Zeno of Citium, the 
founder of the Stoic sect, whose death is placed in B.C. 263 (Clint. Fas#. 
Hell.), would, if alive, have been too young when Aristotle wrote the 
Rhetoric to have attracted public attention: it is just possible that the 
other, Zeno the logician, of Elea, Parmenides’ follower, may be the person 





232 PHTOPIKH® A 12 §11, 12. 
2 , 4 A 
duporepws ExovTes, TANV OVX Of avTOL GAN’ Ot Eévay- 
~ id vA A 
lI riot Tots nOeow. Kati ot mo\AaKts 4 AEAnOoTeEs MN 
’ > A 
ECnurwpevor. Kat ot 7oNAaKis aTOTETVXNKOTES* Elat 
yap TwWes Kal év Tois ToLOVTOIS, WoTEP EV TOS 7O- 
~ < = \ ~ 
12 NeuiKois, olor avaydyerOa. Kal ois av mapaxpnua 
+ A ‘5 , A oe ‘ v4 vA 4 , 5 e oe 
n TO HOU, TO OE AVITNpOVY VaTEPOY, N TO KEpOOS, y OE 


here meant. Of this Zeno we learn from Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius, 
and Diodorus (see the reff. in Brandis’ Art. in Smith’s Dict. Brogr.) that 
he joined in an attempt to rid his native country of her tyrant: and if the 
attempt was successful (of which we are not informed) and the tyrant 
slain, Zeno may fosstbly have mixed personal considerations with his 
public and patriotic motives, just as Harmodius and Aristogeiton did, as 
Aristotle tells us in the Politics (VIII (v) 10), in their attack upon the 
Athenian tyrant. Only it seems unlikely that if this were the true ex- 
planation of the allusion that Aristotle would have spoken of tyrannicide 
as an ddixnua, a ‘wrong’, either legal or moral: and besides this, the act 
itself, as well as the attendant circumstance, would have been regarded as 
praiseworthy. 

mA\nv} ‘only’, an exception or reservation ; see note on I 1.14, p. 26. 

§ 11. ‘And those who have often in previous attempts escaped either 
detection or punishment. And, on the other hand, those who have often 
failed in their attempts’ (the opposite to the last); ‘because there is a class 
of people who in such matters as these, as well as in actual fighting, are 
inclined (have a disposition) to renew the fight’. ofo« for ofo» is due to 
Victorius 1% addendis. Victorius quotes in illustration of this pugnacious 
character, Problem XVIII 2, de Sophistis, xal yap vixovres da ro xaipew 
mpocyovras paddop pile’ xal nrrapevos os dvapayoupevos. 

§ 12. xalofs] is no doubt masc., as it is through the whole series of 
these topics, and in accordance with oi yap dxpareits rowtra: that follows. 
Otherwise it would be more naturally and conveniently translated in this 
and the following section as neuter, ‘in all cases where’... 

‘And all those who have the pleasure (consequent on their action) 
immediately, and the pain comes afterwards; or the profit at once and 
the penalty later: because this suits the character of the dxpareis who are 
devoid of self-control, and this vice extends (beyond mere pleasure) to 
every object of man’s aims and aspirations’, to profit as well as pleasure. 
And therefore wherever there is immediate pleasure or profit, and only 
subsequent pain or loss, the dxpareis whose character is to be tempted by 
present pleasure and profit, though at the expense of future pain and loss, 
are naturally in all such cases prone to wrong-doing. What is here said 
of dxpamms and dxpacia is confirmed by Eth. Nic. VII 2, ult. és deparets 
Adgyovras xat Oupov nal riphs nal cépdovs, though, as the A¢yorra shews, 
this is only a popular way of speaking (and therefore suited to Rhetoric): 
and in VII 6, 1147 4 31, seq. we are told that these are not drAds dxpareis, 
dxpagia proper being wep) rds qwyarikas droAavcets, limited to the same 
class of objects as dxoAagia; and 6 ray re ydéwv dioKxwy ras vrepBodas Kar 


PHTOPIKHS A 12 §§ 13—15. 233 


Cnuia vorepov’ oi yap axpateis TowovTo, Eote 5 


td d » # ‘ y A 
13 aKpagia wepi mwavTa dowy dpeyorTat. Kat ois ay 


9 , a | ) rd FT KN e , A A 
TovvavTiov TO pev AvTNpov Hon n 1H Chua, TO Oe 
ead q r) 4 4 \ a e \ 
nov Kai wpeAmov VoTEepa Kal ypomwTEpa’ ot yap 
. ~ A ~ 
éykpateis kai hpovpwrepot Ta ToravTa SiuwKovow. 


14Kai ois av évdéxyntat dia tuxnv Sofa mpagar 4 Oe 


15 


, v a ? ba) # 4 ~ 
dvaykyy 4 oa puow n ov Gos, kai SAws dpapreip 
dAAa py ddixeiv. Kal ois av 4 TOU émeKoUs TUYXEIV. 

\ ef vA ? vA 
kat doo ay évoecis wow. Siyeis & eloly évoeeis: 7 


Tay Aunnpev hevyov, weivns xai Biyvns nal adéas nal Yuyous cal eavroy roy 
wept adiny Kal yevoty, rapa Tv mpoaipeaww Kal rhv Siavoray, dxparis A€yerat. 

§ 13. ‘And also the opposite characters to these are equally prone to 
wrong-doing in cases where the pain or loss is for the moment (73), and 
the pleasure and profit later and more lasting: for this is the character of 
the ¢yxpareis, those that have acquired the habit of self-control, and of the 
wiser sort (men of more practical wisdom, ¢pémors), who pursue them in 
this order’. 

§ 14. ‘And those whose actions may possibly be thought to be due 
to chance, or to necessity, or to nature, or to habit, and who in general 
may be thought to have been guilty of error rather than of crime’. There 
is a variation here in the classification of these impelling causes of action 
from that laid down in c. 10.7, 8, which is singular even in a rhetorical 
treatise, considering that they stand so near together. Jn the former 
there are three (of the seven) which are independent of ourselves and our 
own will, (1) rvyn, and dvayxn subdivided into (2) Bia and (3) @ucis. Eos in 
the other list is classed with the voluntary sources of action, where we are 
ourselves the causes of them. Here ¢6os is referred to the other class, 
doubtless because habit when confirmed becomes a ‘second nature’, and 
action from habit is so far involuntary. Rhet. 111.3, and de Memoria, 
C. 2, gars 48n ro 60s. 

Gyaprety and adcceiy] refers to the well-known threefold gradation of 
wrong or criminality, (1) adruynyua, accidental injury, (2) auaprnpa, a mistake 
or error arising from ignorance of the circumstances of the case (Eth. N. 
HI 2), and (3) déxia, in which the mpoaipeors, the deliberate purpose, 
enters and constitutes an ra¢tentzonal wrong or crime, malice prepense. In 
Eth. Nic. v 10, a fourth degree is added, adixnpa, distinguished from d8udia 
in this, that though the act is voluntary and intentional at the moment, 
the intention is not preconceived and deliberate, the malice is not pre- 
pense; it is without mpoaipecis, defiberate purpose ; as an injury or death 
inflicted in a sudden fit of passion. 

§ 15. ‘And those that have the prospect of, anticipate, a merciful con- 
struction being put on their act by the judges’, On édmeixesa, see I 13.13, 
and Introd. on that passage, pp. 190—193. Itis thus defined in Eth. Nic. 
V 14, 1137 5 12, Sixacoy pév, ov TO nara vopov 8¢, GAN’ dravcpbwpa vopipoy 
&cxaiov, a rectification, ‘supply of the deficiencies, of thé strict letter of the 


234 PHTOPIKH A 12 § 16—18. 


yap ws dvayKaiov, womep oi méevnTes, 4 ws UirEp- 

16 BoAns, dorep of mAovotot. Kai ot opodpa evdoxt- 
pouvres Kai of aodddpa ddofouvres, ot pev ws ov 
Sofovtes, of S ws ovdev waddov SofovtTes. 

17 aUTot ev ovv oUTWws ExovTEs EmtxyEtpovaw, aoe- 
Kovot b€ Tovs TowovTOUS Kal TA TOLAUTA, TOUS EXOVTAS 
wy avroi évdceis 4 Eis TavayKata n Els UEepoxny i Eis 

18 droAavow, Kai TOUs 7dppw Kai Tous éyyus' TwY MEV 
yap 4 Anus Tayxeia, Twv 8 4 TYywwpia Bpadeia, viov p. 44. 


law, legal justice, 9 dAAeiwec did 75 Kabddov, Ib. V 27, 6 py depiBodixacos em 
TO xeipoy, dAN’ ddarrorixds, 1138.1. Soph. Oed. Col. 1127 (Oedipus), éwe) 
ro y eloeBei povots rap vpiv edpov dvOpdmay yd xal roumexés, mttlde 
gesinnung, kumanitat, gegeniiber starrem recht, Schneidewin ad loc. 
Soph. Fragm. Inc. 699 (709, Dind.) dalpova, ds ovre rdmtenés ovre THY yap 
older, pony 8 torepfe ryv awras dinny. 

‘Any deficiency which a man feels may incline him to commit wrong 
—for the purpose of supplying it. Such deficiency is of two kinds; either 
deficiency in what is necessary, as poverty, or in some excess, as wealth’. 
Rich men often feel a craving for something over and above their wealth, 

¢something superfluous, as power, honour, license. Thuc. III 45. 4 reads 

like a commentary on this topic, dAX’ 9 pev srevia dvayxy Ty Tokay wapéxou- 
ca, 4 8° dfovala Spe: rhy wAcovefiay xal hpovnpar: ‘great resources and the 
consequent license breed the grasping spirit (their natural progeny, rq) 
by insolence and pride’. Comp. also Pol. 11 7, quoted in § 17. 

§ 16. ‘And those in excessively high and in excessively low repute, 
the one as altogether unlikely, the other as no more likely than before, to 
incur the imputation of crime’. The first rely upon their character, either 
for the success of their attempt, which will put their victims off their 
guard, or for impunity by escaping suspicion; the second, having no 
character to lose, are emboldened by this to make new attempts, by 
which they may gain and cannot lose, because they cannot be in a worse 
position in the eyes of the world than they are already. 

§ 17. ‘Such are the dispositions which lead men to attempt wrong’. 
We now turn to the characters and dispositions, qualities and circum- 
stances which most expose men to wrong ; these are as follows : 

§ 18. ‘First, people that have what we want, either in respect of 
necessity or excess (superfluity), or of sensual enjoyment, whether remote 
or near; for the acquisition of the one is speedy, the vengeance of the 
other tardy: as when we Greeks spoil the Carthaginians’. ‘We Greeks’ 
are firates. Comp. Pol. 11 7, 1267 @ 2, od pdvov 8 of dvOpwwos bia rdvay- 
xaia ddixovow,...ddAd xal Sas yalpwos xai p7) émiOupdas (this is the craving 
after superfluities out of mere wantonness of appetite)...ov roivuy 81a raurny 
povoy, GAda xal dy dxiBupoiey va xalpwos rais dvev AuTay Hdovais. ri ov” 
dxos réy rpiay rourey; x.r.A. The difference of the two last of these lies 
jn this, that the one is the desire caused by the painful gap to supply the 


PHTOPIKH2 A 12 § 19, 20. 235 


e ~ t 
19 of ovAwvTEs ToUs Kapyndovious. Kai Tovs py evAa- 
~ A 
Beis unde puAaxtecous dA\Aa moreuTiKoUs* padtoy yap 
tA ~ ~ 
mavras Nabeiv. Kal Tous padupuous: émmedous yap 
q 9 ~ 4 A 2 a » ‘ 
To emegceNOetv. Kai Tous aioxuyTndous’ ov yap 
4 | 4 4 Q e a ~ 9 
20 MaynTiKol TEpt KEpdous. Kal TOUS UO TONG aoiKN- 
Gévras kai pn éme£eNOovtas ws Ovras Kata Thy 


deficiency ; the other is a desire of pleasures which have no such painful 
craving attendant upon them, such are the pleasures of taste, learning, 
knowledge, and, in general, intellectual pleasures. The cure recommended 
for this vicious desire is philosophy, which may be obtained from within 
and 3 avrov, without any extraneous aid. It seems therefore that this 
division does not exactly coincide with that of the Rhetoric, though there 
is a strong resemblance between them. 

§ 19. ‘And those who are not inclined to caution or precaution, but 
are of a confiding temper; for they are all easy to take by surprise’ (Aa- 
Geiv, ist. it is easy for the wrong-doer to escape their notice in attacking 
them). 

And the careless (indolent, easy-tempered); because the prosecution 
of an offence belongs to (the opposite character) the careful, anxious 
attentive. 

So Leech, in Pusch, Aug. 2,1862. Jnfuriate Captatn. ‘You scoundrel, 
I'll have you up as sure as you are born’. Cadman, ‘What, summons 
me! Oh no, you won’t, my Lord. You'll never take the trouble’. (Zx#t 
Cabman with 3s. 6d. over his fare.) 

And the sensitive, timid, retiring, shamefaced; because they are not 
‘ combative’, inclined to contest the point, to stand out, in the matter of 
gain. aloyurrndos, II 6. 27, 12. 10, it is characteristic of young men; 
whereas Eth. Nic. IV 15, 1128 5 20, specBurepow ovdeis dy draveceter Gre 
aloyvyrm\ds. Plat. Charm. 158 C, Legg. 11 665 E, aloxuvrmras qdovres. 
Vict. cites Aristoph. Equit. 264, xal oxomeis ye ray wodiraéy coris €orly dp- 
pony, wAoUCtos Kal py!) srornpds Kal Tpéuoy Ta Tpaypyara, 

§ 20. ‘And those who have been wronged by many and yet never 
prosecuted, or taken vengeance on, the aggressors, these being what the 
proverb calls Mystans' spoil’, that is, an easy prey. Muody dela dicttur de 
possesstone quae defensore caret et obnoxia est direptoré cusvis, Dissen ad 
Dem. de Corona, § 72; of anything that may be plundered with impunity, 
Liddell and Scott, Lex.; von allem durchaus pretsgegebenen, Rost u. 
Palm, Z. Harpocration and Suidas, s. vv., both explain the origin of the 
proverb to be the defenceless state of Mysia during the absence of their 
king Telephus, the famous beggar-hero of Euripides, and Horace’s type 
of a pauper. See also Stallbaum’s note on Gorgias 521 B, who quotes 
Olympiodorus (on the passage of Plato), ¥ swapowsla atrn dx rot Tyrépov 
doriy Evpiridou, dxei yap «r.A. Whatever may be the origin of this pro- 
verb, it certainly was not derived from Euripides’ play: for Harpocration 
expressly says that it is to be found in Strattis (the Comic poet) and 
Simonides dy ldpSots. This last is probably Simonides of Amorgos, a 


236 PHTOPIKHE A 12 §§ 21, 22. 


t 4 ae ~ , \ a , 

21 jTapoimiay Tovrous Mucwy delay. Kal ols pnoetrw- 
4 a 4 9 , A 9 / 

TOTE Kat ous TWOAAaKIss apdhotepa yap aduAakTo., 

A \ e 907 A ] e ) vA w A A 

2201 pev ws ovdeTroTe, of 8 ws OUK av ETL. Kat ToUS 


very early writer; but if it be the other Simonides, of Ceos, it is equally 
impossible that he could have derived it from Euripides, since he died 
when Euripides was a child. 

The above explanations seem to be founded upon the helpless condi- 
tion of the Mysian people under some special circumstances which 
deprived them of their ordinary means of self-defence. J should rather 
suppose that the proverb implies an imputation upon their sational cha- 
racter, because another proverbial expression, at least as common as this, 
represents the Mysians, as sharing with the Carians, the reputation of 
being the vilest and most contemptible of mankind; the property of such 
mean and cowardly wretches would naturally be az easy prey to any one 
who chose to take it. This imputation of cowardice or weakness is 
directly conveyed by Aristotle in the passage before us. This brings the 
two proverbs together as the expression of the same features of national 
character. This will furnish a sufficient explanation of Gorg. 521 B, e? 
oot Mucov ye Hocov xadeivy, and we need not have recourse with Stallbaum 
and Heindorf (ad loc. § 162) to the Muooy Aeiay to interpret it. This 
proverbial contempt for the Mysian character appears in Rhes. 251, Pl. 
Theaet. 209 (Schol. in Heindorf and Stallbaum), Magnes, (Com.) Fr. 
Poastriae (in Meineke’s Fragm. Comic. Gr. 11 11), Philemon, Sicel. fr. 3 
(Meineke u. s. IV 25), Menand. Androg. vil (Schol. Gory. u. s., and Mein. Iv 
86), and Menand. Fr. Inc. 481 (Mein. Iv 327), all in the words Muga 6 fo-xa- 
ros, ‘the last and lowest—even of the Mysians’, worthlessness can go no 
further. Cic. pro Flacco, 27. 65, guid in Graeco sermone tam tritum et 
celebratum est, quam si quis despicatus ducitur, ut ‘Mysorum ultimus? 
esse dicatur. Ib. 2. 3; 40. 100; Orat. VIII 27, guonam igitur modo audt- 
retur Mysus aut Phryx Athents, quum etiam Demosthenes, &¢. ad Quint. 
Fratr. 1 1.6 hominis ne Graect quidem, at Mysii aut Phrygit potius. 
(Erasm. Adag. Mysorum postremus, p. 354.) The other form of the pro- 
verb occurs in Dem. de Cor. p. 248, § 72, rj» Muody Aelay xadouperny, in 
Strattis, Medea, (fr. Harpocr.) Mein. 11 776. (Erasm. Adag. Mysorum 
pracda, p. 174.) 

§ 21. xai obs pySerarrore nal ovs modAdats] SC. fdixyKaot. Both those 
who have never yet been injured and those who have been often injured 
(by the proposed wrong-doer) are proper objects of wrong: both of them 
are likely to be unprepared or taken off their guard (see on advAaxra, § 5, 
supra), the one because they feel secure and are careless: from igno- 
rance of all injurious treatment, and the others because they have aJready 
had so much of it that they think they must now be exempt from it for 
the future ; that fortune or the Gods must be tired of persecuting them. 

of pév as ovdénore, of 8 as ovx ay éri] Sc. ddicovpevor. The participle 
will suit both constructions. Soph, Oed. Col. 965, ray’ dy re pnviovew els 
yévos madat expressing ‘likelihood’, and convertible with of rdy’ dy» rs 
pnvioey. (Hermann ad loc. 969.) Matth., G7. Gr. § 599 C, quotes this pas- 
sage as an illustration of ay with a participle signifying ‘mere possibility 


aft 


PHTOPIKHS A 12 § 23. 237 

Sia BeBAnpévous 4 evdiaBordous’ of ToLovToL yap ove 

mMpoutpouvrat, PoBovpevor Tous KpiTas, ovTe SuvavTat 

23 wel0ew wv of pirovpevor Kat POovovpevor ciciv. Kat 
mpos os Exovot mpohacw i} rpoyovwy Hh avTav 7 P. 1373. 

pirwy 7 TonocavTwy Kakws 1 MeAMAncavTwY 4 avTous 


or probability, a conjecture or a modest indefiniteness’, distinguishing 
this from the general case which is exemplified in § 598 6. There is no, 
ground for this distinction ; the particle in both alike has its usual condi- 
tional signification ; and the likelihood or probability and the rest is only 
one of the conditions under which the act is conceived. Here it ex- 
presses the opinion or expectation (ws) that they would be no longer 
likely to be exposed, or under such conditions or circumstances as would 
expose them, to wrong. 

§ 22. And those that have already been the subjects of hostile 
charges, suspicion, calumny (all included in d&aSadAew, ‘to set one man 
at variance with, or against, another’), and such as are especially exposed 
or liable to it (easily calumniated, &c.); for such as these have neither 
the will (to prosecute) from fear of the judges (who are prejudiced against 
them), nor are they able to persuade (the judges, for the same reason, if 
they brought this case before a court of law): and to this class belong all 
that are hated and envied. 

POovorvpevar] On the irregular passive, see Appendix B (at the end 
of this Book). 

§ 23. xai (a8cxotox rovrous) mpos obs Zxovor wpopacw] ‘and those again 
are liable to injury against whom there is (/¢. others have) any available 
pretext’ (real or supposed for attacking, or doing them wrong) ‘of injury 
received or threatened by their ancestors or themselves or their friends 
against themselves or their forefathers, or those whom they care for, 
(are interested in); because, as the proverb has it, villany only wants a 
pretext’. 

For pedAnoavrev Brandis’ Anonymus (ap. Schneidewin’s Philologus, 
IV, 1, p. 44) read peAernodyrey; no great improvement. 

pédrXew, to be about to do, hence of something smpending or threat- 
ening. Plat. Theaet. 148 E, of the intention; see Stallbaum’s note; of a 
threatening attitude or posture, peAAnows. Thuc. I 69, ov r7 durduer rind 
GAXG v7 peAAnoe: auvvdpevor, and IV 126, Brasidas (of the threatening 
demonstrations of the barbarians before the battle), ovro: 8€ ray peAAnow 
pdr Zxovcs rots dreipocs PoBepay. 

The proverb ‘any pretext will serve a knave’ is thus expressed by 
Menander, Thettale, Fr. 1. (Meineke IV 133), pexpa ye spodacis dors row 
pata xaxes, ap. Stob. Flor. tv 40. To the same effect, Eurip. Iph. Aul. 
1180, ¢rel Bpayeias spodacews evdei povor, éf’ 7 o éyd xa) waides ai Aedetp- 
pevas Sefopeba Séfy nv oe SéEarbac ypecy. 

Victorius refers to a story of Agathocles tyrant of Sicily, in Plutarch, 
as an illustration of this topic. It is told (in the de sera numinis vin- 
dicta 557 B) of the Corcyreans, "AyadoxAjs 8¢ o Zupaxociary rupavvos xal 
aby yédore xAevalow Kepxupaiove épwrorras, 8a ri wopOoin ri» vigoy avray, 








238 PHTOPIKHS A 12 §§ 24, 25. 


A 0 e rd 
i] Tpoyovous 7 wy KnOovTak woTEP ‘yap H Tapotmia, 
4 a“ a A 
24 mpohacews Setrat povov 1 wovnpia. Kat Tous éxOpous 
4 ‘ , : \ | A 2? iN > el 
Kat Tous didous* Tovs pev yap padiov, Tous 6 OU. 
4 A 3/7 4 A A \ ] ~ A 
Kat Tous addidous. Kal Tous pn Sewous etreiy 1 
~ av 9 2 ~ 9 c vA , 
mpaca’ 1 yap ovK éyxetpovow eretevat, n KaTaNAaT- 
; A ~ 
25 TOVTal, n OvdEY TEpaivovoly. Kat ois pn AvovTeNeEl 


Ere, v) Ala, elwev, ol warépes Upay vmedefavro réy ‘Obvocea’ and then of the 
people of Ithaca, xal ray "Idaxnacler cpoles ¢yxadovrrwy Sri mpoBara Aap- 
Badvovoww avray ol orparisrat, 6 8¢ vpérepos, pn, Bacideds eAOdy spos npas 
xal rov woieva wpoceferupAacer. And the last is repeated, Apophth. 
176 F. 

§ 24. ‘And friends as well as enemies; the former from the ease, the 
latter from the pleasure, of the undertaking and its success’, Theognis 
1219, dx4pow pév xadewor nal duopevel éfararjoa, Kupye’ didtov d€ ddr 
pgdior éfararay. Lysias, car’ ’Avdoxidou § 7, p. 103 ult. (of Andocides), ds 
réxyny ravrny exet, rovs pév dxOpovs pnder woceiy xaxov, rovs d¢ didous ors dy 
dvenra xaxcy. Victorius. ; 

‘And the friendless. And those who have zo skill and practice in 
speaking or action (business)’; (the opposite of them, of eisret» du»dpuevos nal 
ol sspaxrixol, are opposite also in disposition; they are of those that are 
inclined to do wrong, § 2); ‘for these either make no attempt at all to 
prosecute, or if they do make the attempt, soon come to an agreement, or 
if they do carry on the prosecution, produce no effect (bring it to no con- 
clusion, make nothing of it)’, These are the dwpdyyoves, the ordinary 
victims of the Cleons, and public informers, the oveodavra, and all other 
troublesome and mischievous people, who, like fever-fits or nightmares, 
rovs warépas + #yxor vierwp Kal rovs wanrouvs awérveyor, karaxXwvopuevol tr 
dm rais xolras én) rotow ampdypootw vpov dyrwpocias Kal mpocxAnces Kal 
paprupias cuvexoddwy (Arist. Vesp. 1039), and, ad» ri” avréy yes (Cleon) 
dapaypor oyra Kal xexnvora xarayayeoy dx xepporicou diataBey ryxuipioas... 
cal oxomeis ye TY TodITaY SoTis datly duvoxey, TAQUCLOS Kai 427) wornpds Kal 
rpéyor ra mpaypara, Equit. 261. On the impossibility of leading a quiet 
life at Athens, see Criton’s case in Xen. Mem. 11 9. 1, of8a 3¢ rrore avroy eat 
Kplrevos axovcavra os xadewov 6 Bios *AOjvgaw ein av8pi BovAopévy ra 
davrod mparrey. viv yap, &pn, eud reves ele dixas Gyovow, ovx ars adixovvra: 
Un’ duov, Ad’ Srs vopi{overww idvow dv pe dpyipsov teXéoa fh mpaypara Creu. 
It ends by Criton’s taking one of these ‘sycophants’ into his own service, 
like a dog, as he describes him, to keep off these wolves from his 
flocks. 

§ 25. And those to whom it is unprofitable to waste their time in 
waiting for the trial or payment of the fine or penalty, such as strangers 
and farmers (who live in the country, and are so completely occupied in 
the cultivation of their land, that they cannot afford to waste time in 
attending the law-courts in the city); such as these are inclined to settle 
their differences on easy terms (&aAveoOa:, to dissolve, break off, put an 
end to, and so make up, a quarrel), and readily leave off (drop) the prose- 


i) 








PHTOPIKHE A 12 § 26. 239 


/ ~ A Os A ¢ « , 
dtarpiBew émirnpovow 7 Sixny 7 ExTiow, olov oi Lévor 
kai avroupyoi: éml puxpm re yap SiadNvovrat Kal 


A x A , 
26 padiws kaTamavovTat. Kal Tous ToAXNa oiKnKOTAas, 


~ e ® ~ A , ~ ~ 

4 ToaUTAa Oia adikovYTaL’ éyyUs yap Tt SoKel Tou 
~ e ~ eee e 

un addueiv elvat, Otay Te TowvToy adecnOy Tis olov 
s ~ 4 @ ww 4 

eiwOer Kai avtos adueiys Aéyw S oiov ef tis Tov 


cution. ‘Strangers’, who are merely passing through Athens, and in- 
cessantly occupied either with business or sight-seeing, have of course no 
time to spare in dancing attendance at the law-courts; and ‘farmers’, 
‘cultivators of their own lana’, just as little, for the reason already men- 
tioned. These avrovpyoi, ‘independent cultivators’, constitute the djpoe 
yeapyixos, and are the best sort of democratical population, Pol. vi1 (v1) 4, 
init. BéArwros Sipos o yewpyixds cory, a statement often repeated. One 
of the reasons for this is, 1318 a 12, ded pév ydp ro woAAyy ovclay dew 
Zoxodos, sore py) wodAdacs exxAnoiafery, and the same would prevent them 
from waiting at the courts of law. This is confirmed by Eurip. Orest. 919, 
Oheydxis doru xdyopas xpaiver xvcAoy, avroupyos, oirep Kal povos oo{ovar yijy. 
To the same effect, Pol. v1 (IV) 6, sub init., the yeapyoi, Zxovow épyafopevos 
(ne, ov Suvavra: 8é cxodd{ew. Comp. Eur. Suppl. 420, yardvos 8 dxjp wévns 
...€pyev Umo oux dy Suvaro mpos ra xoiv’ dwoBdérey. The praises of 
agriculture and agriculturists are sung by Xenophon, Oecon. v1 §§ 8, 9, 10, 
XV g, and elsewhere. In Rhet. 11 4.9, the avrovpyol are distinguished 
from the yewpyxoi, the latter being confined to farmers and agricultural 
labourers, avrovpyoi being extended to all that work with their own hands. 
See Thuc. 1 141.3, and Arnold’s note. Thucydides does not observe 
Aristotle’s distinction, the avrovpyoi here are yeepyoi in the next chapter. 

§ 26. And those who have committed either many wrongs themselves, 
or wrongs of the same kind as they are now suffering: for it seems almost 
no injustice at all, when a man has the same wrong inflicted on him as he 
himself was in the habit of inflicting (upon others); an assault, for in- 
stance, committed on a man who is habitually guilty of wanton insolence 
or outrage. 

aleia and wBpis are thus legally distinguished. alla is Jersonal 
violence, a blow, or an assault, els rd od@pa alxi{erOas wAryais, Pol. VIII 
(v) 10, 1311 6 24, and is the subject of a 8ien or private action between 
citizen and citizen. dSpis is threefold, (1) d¢' aloxpoupylas, (2) did wAyyar 
(this is further defined pera spornAaxcopod, which distinguishes it from alaia), 
da AGyeor ; that is, a violation of the feeling of personal dignity and sense of 
honour, humiliating, degrading, scornful, wanton, language or acts; the 
mental injury constituting a great part of the offence. This appears in 
Aristotle’s definition of it, Rhet. 11 2.5, rd SAdwrew nal Aumeiy dd’ ole 
aloxuvn dori rq wacxorrt, py iva re yévnras avrg (not for any profit to him- 
self) dAX’ draws no6y (out of mere wantonness and pleasure in the insult 
itself). So that d8pis is a mixture of intentional insult and wantonness or 
‘wanton insult’. To the same effect is the observation in 1 13. 10, that it 
npocanpaives thy wpoaipeccy, ‘implies deliberate intention’. This then is the 


240 PHTOPIKHS A 12 §§ 27, 28. 


\ A a) , 

27 ciw0ora UBpiew aixioatTo. Kal TOUS H TWemoINnKOTAS 
~ s\ , aA 4 vA , 

kaxws 4 BovAnbevras 7 BovAoPevous 4 moincovTas’ 

of A 4 VY eg A A , 4 9? ‘ ~ ‘ 

éxet yap Kal To nov Kat TO Kadov, Kal éyyus TOU py 

~ A t ~ A / \ 

28 dducely aiverat. Kal ois yxapiwvvTra 4 ido 7 

/ ve 4 vv N ef t aA 

OavuaCopuevors 4 Epwuevors 4 Kupiots 4 OAWS pos ous 

~ 4 A a a ~ 
Caow avToi. Kat mpos ovs éotw émtekeias TvxElV. 


ground of the distinction between alxia and vfpis, and the reason for the 
latter being made the object of a ypagy, or public prosecution, the honour 
of the state being considered as compromised in the insult to one of its 
members. See further on this subject, Meier und Schémann Der A ttische 
Process, p. 319 seq. 

Hippodamus, the legislator of Miletus, who drew the plans and laid 
out the Piraeus, and was the architect of Thurii on its foundation, and of 
Rhodes, divided crimes into three kinds, as we learn from Pol. 118, 1267 6 
38. wep) dv yap al Sixat yivovrat, tpia rat’ elvat roy dprOpov, UBpw, BrAGBny, 
Oavaroy, i.e. (1) crimes by which the feelings are wounded and the sense 
of personal dignity wantonly outraged, (2) those which involve loss or 
damage to person or property, and (3) murder and homicide. 

§ 27. And (in the way of retaliation) those who have either already 
done, or have intended, or are intending, or will certainly do, us mischief : 
because this retaliation or compensation carries with it (€yes) not only 
pleasure (sensual or intellectual, chiefly the latter in this case) but also (a 
sense of) right (the stora/ object of conduct), and so it seems bordering 
upon almost no wrong at all. ‘Retaliation’ or ‘compensation’ is right 
upon principles of justice, ro dixatov; of which the ‘reciprocal’ or ‘retali- 
atory’ is one of the three kinds, Eth. Nic. v c.5, arising from the sub- 
division of the original two, davepyrinn, ‘distributive’, and d:opOwrian, 
‘corrective’; the latter having two divisions, (1) rectification of, or com- 
pensation for, /rauds and crimes, dvopOwrixy proper, and (2) ro dyrirerovOds 
(c. 8) the justice that regulates exchanges and commercial transactions. 

The difference between this topic and that of § 23, cai mpos obs €xover 
—xndoryras is, according to Victorius, that the motive or occasion of the 
wrong in either case is not the same. In the one the wrong-doer seeks 
a pretence or pretext for injuring his neighbour, in the other the occasion 
comes unsought; the wrong would not have been done had it not been 
provoked by previous injury. 

§ 28. xal ols xapiovvra:] and those by whom, i.e. by whose injury, 
they will oblige either their friends, or those whom they admire and 
respect, or love, or their masters (any one who has power over them) or 
those by whose opinions or authority they direct their life and conduct. 

mpos ods {aow] in reference to whom they live, who are their guides 
and authorities in life and action: or, on whom they depend, to whom 
they look for support or subsistence ; as a ‘dependant’ does. To which 
is opposed in I 9. 27, €AevOépou ro wy mpds GAAov (Hv, ‘independence’, 
avrapxeca, Where you don’t look to any one else but yourself. See the note 
there, p. 173. 


PHTOPIKHE A 12 § 29. 241 


\ #4 A 9 , F \ , 
29 KQL OLS AV ET/KEKANKOTES WOL Kal TpOdLAKEXWPNKOTES, 
< 4 A A ‘ 
oiov KaNdurros éroia ta mept Aiwva’ kai yap Ta 


xal mpus ovs] ‘those, in reference to whom’, that is in our relations (or 
dealings) with whom, it is possible (we may expect) to meet with indul- 
gence or merciful consideration. On émeixeca, see Introd. p. 190—93. 

Victorius, followed by Vater, would connect this clause immediately 
with the preceding, pos ove (dow avroi, nat mpos ovs x.r.A. in order to 
avoid a supposed repetition of a former topic, § 14, xat ois Gy rot émecxots 
ruxeiw. Vater, who supplies this explanation, forgets that the two topics 
are differently applied ; in § 14 the exfectation of indulgent consideration 
is assigned as a motive of action in the agent; in this section it is a ds- 
posttion in the patient which subjects him to wrong: though it is true 
that the feeling or tendency itself resides in both cases in the same 
person. Besides this, the union of these two seems to be an improper 
conjunction of two heterogeneous dispesitions, a sort of moral {etypa; 
taking a man for the guide of your life or depending upon him, and rely- 
ing upon his merciful consideration, are not closely enough connected to 
warrant their being classed together. I have therefore retained Bekker’s 
punctuation, which makes them separate topics. 

§ 29. And if we have had cause ef complaint against any one, or a 
previous difference with him, (we do to him) as Callippus did in the affair 
of Dion; for things of that kind (a wrong deed done under such circum- 
stances) appear to us (personally and at that time, not always or in 
general,) to border upon, bear a close resemblance to, acts altogether 
innocent. 

mpodiaxexopynxores] Scaywpeiy is used here as the neuter of &aywpifer, 
to separate. In this sense it is almost a dwaf Aeyopevov. No authority 
for this use of the word is given by Stephens or any other Lexicon earlier 
than Arrian. It represents morally and metaphorically a ‘split’, or 
‘separation’, ‘parting asunder’ of intercourse and interests between two 
friends. 

enol] The imperfect hcre seems unmeaning, as the act is only one. 
Spengel, in his Edition, 1867, has adopted without remark é¢roijae from 
Mss Q, Y>, Z?. 

KadXurmos...ra rept Aiwva} Plutarch. Vit. Dion. 1 982, de Sera Numinis 
Vindicta c. 16. The story is thus told by Victorius. Callippus was an 
Athenian, friend and companion of Dion during his stay at Athens, and 
the partner of his expedition to Sicily for the liberation of his native 
country. By his conduct and services he had ingratiated himself with 
Dion’s mercenaries, whom he incited to murder their general, and 
thereby made himself master of Syracuse. Before this, he had spread 
calumnious reports about Dion and excited the citizens against him. 
Dion being informed of this took no precautions for his own safety ; 
partly in scorn of the attempt, and partly because he was unwilling to 
preserve his own power and life at the expense of the destruction of his 
friends: the scheme accordingly took effect, and Dion was shortly after 
put to death. Aristotle says upon this that Callippus justified the act by 
arguing that as Dion had now knowledge of his designs, and his own life 


AR. I. 16 


242 PHTOPIKH A 12 § 30. 


30 rolavra éyyus TOU pn aodixely aiverat, Kat Tous 
e aN A , 
Um’ d\Awy MEAAOVTAS, GV pn aUvToOl, Ws oUKETL EvdEXO- 
, e/ , 9 , 
uevov Bovrevoacba, womwep AEevyerat Atveoidnuos 


was in danger, this anticipation of the other, was a mere measure of pre- 
caution or retaliation, and no crime at all. This suspicion of Callippus is 
the ground of his complaint and the occasion of the previous difference, 
or sundering of their apparent friendship. [Arnold Schaefer, Demo- 
sthenes und seine Zeit, I 2. p. 159, 160.] 

§ 30. Kal rove Um’ GAdwy péAdovras (ddixeioAa), Gy px) avrol (ddindow 
avrovs)]| Another motive in the aggressor to commit a wrong, another 
circumstance which renders its intended object especially liable to it, arises, 
when the victim is in such a position that the wrong wz// be done by 
somebody else (vx dAAwv) if we don’t do it ourselves, or take the initia- 
tive—this seems to us a justification of the act of aggression which in 
other circumstances would be a gross wrong—and the necessity of imme- 
diate action allows no time for deliberation. That this is a sort of justi- 
fication of such an act appears in the conduct attributed to Ainesidemus 
towards Gelo: the latter(tyrant of Syracuse) had anticipated him(the tyrant 
of Leontini) in reducing and enslaving some state that was neighbour of 
both: Aenesidemus sends a present to Gelo of eggs, cakes, and sweetmeats, 
the ordinary prize of the game of xorrafos, as a prize, in acknowledgment of 
his superior foresight, quickness and dexterity, shewn in his ‘anticipa- 
tion’ of himself, dr: épOacev, admitting at the same time that he had had 
an eye to it himself. This shows that Aenesidemus thought it ‘hardly a 
crime’, ¢yyis rou js) adieiv, a justifiable act; and also illustrates the 
extreme liability to aggression and wrong involved in the position of this 
‘neighbouring state’, which would have been wronged in any case by 
some one else, vm dAXwy péAAovras, at any rate, even if Gelo (who here 
represents the avroi, the man who- takes the initiative) had not done it 
himself. 

As Casaubon has observed, there is some object understood after d»- 
Sparodicapévyp. The simple rads or rivd modu, will answer the purpose. 
Nothing more is known about the circumstances of the case. 

The person here called Alveoidnpos, in Herod. Alynaiénpos, and in 
Pindar Alvnaidapos, is mentioned twice in Herodotus, VII 154 as the son 
of one Pataicus, and a member of the body-guard of Hippocrates, tyrant 
of Gela, and in c. 165, as the father of Thero, sovereign (novpapyos) of 
Agrigentum, to whom Pindar’s second Olympian Ode is dedicated. In 
Pindar his name occurs three times, but only as the father of Thero, OL 
11 46, 111.9, and of him and Xenocrates, Isthm. 11 41. To reconcile He- 
rodotus’ statement about him with that of Aristotle here, we may perhaps 
suppose that Aenesidemus had made himself master of Agrigentum, on 
the throne of which he was succeeded by his son Thero, before the 
period to which this story belongs. Aristotle’s narrative certainly repre- 
sents him as a sovereign prince, and not 2s a mere mercenary in ano- 
ther’s service. Victorius, followed by Schrader, calls him ‘tyrant of 
Leontini’, but gives no authority. 


PHTOPIKH® A 12 §§ 31, 32. 243 


a a 4 e 
Tédwu meat xortaBia advoparodicapéve, OTtP- 45- 
54 e | > A Ld | aA 9 s 
31 EpOacey, ws kai avros péAAwy. Kai ovs adicnoavTes 
c 4 4 tf @ e td » a 
Suvnoovrat woAAa Sixaa wpatrev, ws padiws taco- . 
e Ul e ~ ~ 
pevot, worrep Edn ‘lacwv 6 Gerrados Seiv adixeiv Ena, 
e/ a 4 4 A ~ aed ae 
32 Orws SuynTat Kai Oixata woNAG ToEly. Kal a WavTeEs 
vA 1 09 - > 4 r , ‘ of 
N word adixely eiwhaow ovyyvepns yap oiovrat 


xorrdfta] On the game of xérraBos, the modes of playing it, and its 
varieties, see Becker, Charicles, on the Greek Games, Excursus HI to Sc. VI, 
p. 349. Our information upon the subject is principally derived from 
Athen, XI 58, p. 479 C—E, and xy 1, 665 seq., and Pollux v1 109. We 
learn from Athenaeus, on the authority of Dicaearchus (479 D) that it was 
a Sicilian invention and most fashionable in that country, (cf. Xv 666 B), 
1] Tey KorraBov evpeais Sexedixy dors waidid, rairny mpdrev evpovrav Tuceav. 
Further we are told that the winner at the game received a prize, 667 D, 
rz 8¢ dOdov wpovnero rq ev mpoepevyp Tov KorraBoy mpoeipnxe pe Kal 6 ’Avri- 
gdms' ga ydp dor: cal wepparia nal rpayjpara, Similarly from Hegesander, 
479 D, rocavrn 8€ éyévero orovdi) mepi co émirjfdevpa dove els ra cupmdcia 
mapeodépey dOda xorrafia xadovpeva, From Gaisford’s observation that 
the form corrdfea occurs in at least three verses, in Ath. XV 666 E, 667 F, 
it seems that both this and xorraSioy were in use, Gaisford unne- 
cessarily infers from it that there was only one, and that «orrdBetoy. 

§ 31. And those to whom the wrong can be readily compensated, or 
more than compensated by just acts, because such wrongs admit of an 
easy cure ;—an instance of this is the saying of Jagon of Pherae, that we 
are bound to commit some wrongs in order that we may have the oppor- 
tunity of doing justice on a larger scale. The saying itself is to be found 
in somewhat different words in Plutarch, rod. wapayydAp. 817 F (Buhle), 
it was always applied, ¢¢' ols ¢Bidfero xal wapnvdydes revds del Aeyoudmny, 
to his various acts of oppression and annoyance, es dvayxaior ddixeiy rd 
puxpa rovs BovAopevous ra peyata &xaompayeiy. This is in fact Robin 
Hood's plea, that he robbed the rich to give to the poor. This topic may 
be further illustrated by Bassanio’s appeal to the judge, Merchant of 
Venice, Act Iv. Sc. 1, line 209, And I beseech you, Wrest once the law to 
your authority: To doa great right do a little wrong, And curb this 
cruel devil of his will. 

§ 32. Victorius observes that we here enter upon a new division of 
the chapter. The analysis has been hitherto confined to fersons prone to 
wrong and liable to wrong: it is now applied to certain classcs of things 
or circumstances which increase the liability to wrong, These ase kinds 
of ddw«7jpara. It is in fact a transition to the subject of the next chapter, 
Such are offences of very common occurrence; men are tempted to 
commit such because they think they shall meet with indulgence: pernle 
have become so familiar with the offence by constant associati«m ee 
that it has lost its repulsive character; and also they may aryue shat of 
‘all or many’ are guilty of it, it must be a human infirm.ty, asl ay ae 
natural defect is hardly to be called a vice. 


jf-—2 


244 PHTOPIKHS A 12 §§ 33—38. 


, e ~ ef 
33 TevEecOa. Kal ta padia Kpuvat To.aita 8 boa 
\ 9 4 t \ 3 6 aA ‘\ ? , 
Tax avaNioKeTat, Oiovy Ta edwWotua. H Ta EVvpETA- 
4 vA s\ A a 
34 BAnTa oxnpacw 7 Xpwmaow 7H KpaceoW, f] & TOAKa- 
~ ~ , 
Kou adavioa evropov' ToavTa bé ta evBaoTakTa 
\ 3» ~ , 9 c 1 =? 9 , 
35 Kal €v uxpols Tomas dpanCopueva. Kai ois adta:opa 
\ ef o 86” “~ ~ e/ 
Kal OMOLa TOAAG TpovTNpXE Tw adikovvTt. Kal doa 
3 e e ~ 
airyuvovTat ot adunOévres Ré€yev, Oloy yuvatkwy 
2 , e/ vA 9 e A vn , ec a \ed 
oikeiwy UBpes 7H Eis avTOUS 7 Eisvieis. Kal doa dido- 


§ 33. Crimes and the products of them that are easy to conceal, 
especially in the case of stealing, which is here most prominent in the 
author's thoughts. Such are things that are soon consumed, as eatables, 
or things that can be easily changed (in their appearance, without losing 
their value; so that they shall not be recognized, and the theft escape 
detection), in respect of their shape (as plate and coin by melting), or 
colour (cloth or silk by dyeing), or mixture (as liquids of all kinds). Vic- 
torius refers to Cic. de Fin. v 25. 74, of the Stoics, Afgue ut religui fures 
carum rerum quas ceperunt signa commutant, sic tlli ut sententits nostris 
(sc. Academicorum) fro suis uterentur nomina tanqguam rerum notas 
mutaverunt, There is about the same amount of resemblance in this 
topic to that of § 8, as we found in § 28 (g. v.) to that of § 14; the cir- 
cumstance is nearly the same, the application different. 

§ 34. Or things that are easy to make away with, put out of sight 
(efacer, cause to disappear) in many different ways; such are things por- 
table, which can be hid away in holes and corners (/## small places). 

§ 35. And things (stolen goods), 44e¢ others, of which the thief has 
already a good many in his possession, either exactly like (with no differ- 
ence at all between them) or nearly like (bearing a general resemblance, 
and so not easy to distinguish). The first is the case of coins or medals, 
and in general, things that are made in sets, one exactly like another. 

adiadopos, which in the sense here assigned to it seems to be a drag 
Aeyopevoy, is not to be confounded either with the logical signification of 
it—Anal. Post. 11 13, 97 5 31, €y rois xaOoAov f éy rots détadhopas, Top. 
A 7, adtadopa ro ei8os, dvOpwros, trmos; this is ‘without sfecyic difference’, 
‘an individual’—or with the meaning it bears in the Stoic philosophy, 
things ‘indifferent’, without any moral differences, neither good nor bad ; 
from which our sense of the word is derived. 

‘And things which the injured party is ashamed to reveal: as any 
outrage committed upon the women of one’s own family, or one’s self 
or one’s children’. Victorius quotes Lysias, c. Simon. § 3, padtora & 
ayavaxra, & BovAn, ort mepl rovovTey mpaypacroy eimety avayxacOnoopuat mpos 
Uuas Unep oy eyo aloyuvopevos, ef pedAotey roAAoi por cuveiver Oat, ver yopny 
adixoupevos- 

cal doa didodtxetv] doa cognate accusative for ocas dicas ; or perhaps 
the local accus., ‘the cases in which (as the seat of them) the litigious 
spirit is shewn’, Appendix B, note 1, at the end of this Book. 


PHTOPIKHSE A 13 §§1, 2. 245 
Sixeiv Sofetey av d éwekusvy Toaita Se Ta TE puKpa 
Kat é€—’ ois ovyyvoun. 

1 ws peév ouv EyovTes GdiKoUGt, Kai Wola Kal WOLOUS cuar. xi. 
kai Sia Ti, oxedov TauT éotive ta 8 adunpara = ie 
wavTa kai Ta SKawpara SeAwpev, dptapevor mpw- 

Tov evrevOev. wpiora Sn Ta dixata Kai Ta adiKxa 

2 Mpos TE vopous [Suvo] kai mpos o's €ort, Stxws. Aéyw 

Se vouov tov pev idtov Tov b€ Kowov, idtoy pev Tov 


‘And all cases in which prosecution would seem to indicate a litigious 
spirit in the prosecutor’; that is, where the offence is trifling, or, again, in 
the case of acts that deserve indulgence—some of which are mentioned 
in c. 13. 16,17. Victorius refers to Lysias, cara Qeops»norou A § 2, ¢yo &, 
el uév row davrov pe dwexrovévas yrigro, ovyyvepyny Gy elyow avrg rev eipn- 
peeve’ ovd’ ef rs GAAO rey dxoppyrey ixovca, ovx Gy éewe£nAOoy avrg, dve- 
AevOepoy yap Kai Aiay dedodsxoy eivas vopif xaxryopias dinaler Gas. 

The chapter concludes with a summary enumeration of its contents. 
‘So now of the characters and dispositions that incline men to crime, the 
several kinds of those crimes, the characters that invite crime, and the 
motives that incite to crime, we have given a tolerably complete (cxedo») 
account’, or analysis. 


CHAP. XIII. 


A connected sketch of the contents of the following chapter, a par- 
ticular account of éwieixeca or equity, and of the relations of the different 
kinds of ‘law’, will be found in the Introduction, p. 187—193, and on 
p- 239 (Appendix E to chap. X111). 

It analyses and classifies actions right and wrong, first from the 
strictly legal, and secondly from the eguitad/e or moral point of view. 
Equity is the principle of merciful consideration, that indulgent view of 
men's actions which makes allowance for human infirmities, looks rather 
to the intention than the act, and thus mitigates or corrects (€émavop@oi) 
the strict rigour of the ‘ written law’. 

§ 1. ‘In distinguishing or analysing wrong and right acts, let us 
commence with the following consideration’ (or, let us take the following 
for our starting-point). On dixcaiwpa here ‘an unjust act’, the opposite of 
adixnpua, and its various senses, see note on I 3. 9, p. 56. ‘ Accordingly the 
definition of justice and injustice has reference to two kinds of “law” 
(§ 2), and two kinds of persons (§ 3)’. The divisions of just and unjust 
depend upon their relation to two kinds of law, and two kinds of persons: 
wavra opi{era: Te rélet. 

§2. ‘I distinguish therefore two kinds of law, the special and the 
universal; and by special, I mean that which is determined in each 
people or nation (separately or individually) by themselves, (/¢. that 
which has for each class of people or nation its definition directed or 
referred to themselves,) by their own peculiar habits, customs, feelings, 
opinions, form of government, and this either unwritten or written’ (see 


246 PHTOPIKHS A 13 §2. 


e 7 e / ‘ e , ‘ a ‘ 4 
EKATTOLS WptTMEVOV TPOS AUTOUS, Kal TOUTOVY TOV [LEV 
wv 4 A A A s, 
aypadov tov Se yeypampevov, xowov S€ Tov KaTa 
, a” 4 A) 4 , , , 
guow. eEorTt yap, O pavyrevoyTai Tt wWavTes, pucet 
t A 
_ kowvov Oixaov Kai Gdtkoy, kav pnoeuia Kowwvia 7pos 
‘ T A 4 , 
a\AnXous n pndé aouvOyxn, oiov Kat 4 LodoxAeous 
» , , , 14 , , 
Avtiyoun paiverat ANeyoura, OTt Sikatov azreipnevov 
A A ~ 
Gavyar tov MoAvveixn, ais puce: Ov ToUTO Sikatoy" 
4 ~ 
ou yap Tt vuv ye KayGés, GAN’ cel roTeE 
- 4 
Ci Touro, Kovdels oidey EE STov hayn. 
~ o ~ a 
Kat ws "EpmedoxAns Neyer wept Tov pn KTElvEY TO 


in explanation of this, Introd. Appendix E p. 242—244); ‘and by universal 
law, the “law of Nature”.’ For there is, as all are instinctively convinced, 
a natural and universal notion of right and wrong, quite independent of 
any mutual communication (association, intercourse) or compact, such 
as Sophocles’ Antigone evidently alludes to, when she says that it is just, 
(right), though forbidden, (by the fosttrve law of Creon’s enactment) to 
bury Polynices, implying (ws, on the supposition that) that this is natu- 
rally right. 

Not of today nor yet of yesterday 

Is this, but everlasting ts tts life, 

And none doth know what time it came to light. 
And, as Empedocles says about killing living animals; for this is not 
vight for some and of right for others, ‘but this same law for all (this 
universal law) spreads without break or flaw’ (jvexéws, usually denvexos, ‘con- 
tinuously’) ‘ over the wide ruling sky and again over the boundless earth’. 

Law universal of no human birth 

Pervades the sovereign sky and boundless earth. 

On the distinction of the xowos and (80s vopos here taken, compare 
Eth. N. v ro (Eth. Eud. Iv 10) 1134 618 seq. quoted in Introduction, 
p- 241. The same distinction is found supra iio. 3 On ‘natural law’ 
see Whewell, Elements of Morality, § 380 seq. Duke of Argyll, Reign of 
Law, Definitions of Law, c. 2. 

payrevoyrat| of a presentiment or foreboding, or as here an instinctive 
conviction, a sort of divination ; see note on I 9. 40, xarapayrever Oat. 

"Avrtyown...Aéyovoa] Soph. Antig. 456. 

*Epme8oxdjs eyes] Empedocles, Fragm. lines 404—5. Karsten ad loc. 
p. 281 says, ‘ Scaliger ad vocabulum avyjjs in margine annotavit lect. ad ys. 
Codices variant (the best including A° appear to give avyjs); hoc perpe- 
ram recepit Bekkerus, quem plures sunt secuti, qui loci sensum parum 
habuerunt perspectum.’ Spengel follows Bekker in reading av yjjs. In 
illustration of the doctrine alluded to in the lines quoted, Karsten cites 
Diogenes Laertius, de Pythag. vill 13, gui dictt, eum vuelare GnrecOa 
trav (pwr, Kowov Sixatoy jyiv édxovrav tis Wuxfs; and Sextus Empiricus 
adv. Math. 1X 127, who says that the entire school of Pythagoras and 


PHTOPIKH® A 13 § 3. 247 


4 ~ N 9 A A , .Y ) ) 
éupuxov ToUTO yap ov Tiot pev Sixatoy Tiot 8 ov 
dixkaov, 

a\Na TO pev mrayTwv vouipoy dia T’ EvpupEedcovTos 

aiBépos rvexéws TéTaTa Sia 7 a@mA€Tov av ys. 

3 Kal ws év TH Meconnaxo Neyer AAKidapas...mpds ous 
de", diya wpirtat’ i yap mpos TO KoWwov H mpos Eva p. 46. 

1 +8ub, wrat infra. 

Empedocles, and all the Italians, assert that we have intercourse not 
only with the Gods and one another, but that this extends also to irra- 
tional animals; é ydp vmdpxew mvetpa ro dia wayros Tou xécpou dijKor 
Wouxijs rporov, ro xal dvovw jyas mpos éxeiva’ Sumep Kal areivorres aura... 
GoeBovpey. On the interpretation of avyjs Karsten has this note. ‘Ergo 
commune itllud ius pertinet da r’ alOépos i.e. per aerem (cf. annot. ad 
v. 105) quo omnes animantes vescuntur, &ar auyys per lucidum caclum 
(ut vs. 127) in quo Dii degunt’. The verse cited by Karsten in support of 
his interpretation of avyjs seems insufficient for its purpose ; the word there 
seems to have no other meaning than its ordinary one, ‘sunbeam or sun- 
light’; I doubt if avy; could stand for ‘heaven’; and perhaps it may be 
better to accept Bekker’s reading. 

On Alcidamas, see the article on the Sophistical Rhetoric, in the Cam- 
bridge Fournal of Classical and Sacred Philology, Vol. 11. No. 9, p. 263 
seq. and on the Megonmaxos Acyos, ib. p. 257. It is quoted again, II 23. I. 
Vater, and Spengel (Artium Scriplores p. 175), cite the anonymous Scho- 
liast, who supplies the missing quotation thus; €AevO¢pous ade mavras 6 
Geds, ovddva BorAoy } Hvais rewoinxev. 1t seems to be totally inapplicable to 
the topic which it professes to illustrate, and if it comes from the speech at 
all is at all events quite out of place here. Spengel (Prac/ ad Rhet. Gr. 
I vi) says of it, fictum non verum; but being as it is so utterly inappro- 
priate, it can hardly have been ‘manufactured’ for an occasion to which it 
is Not suitable. 

Of the ‘ Messeniac declamation’ the Schol. says that it was a peAer} 
Umrép Meconvioy drootncayrey Aaxedaipoviey xai 1) mecOopévww SovAcvecy, 
Conf. Sauppe, ad Alcid. Fragm. 1, Oratores Atticé 111 154. [Vahlen, der 
Rhetor Alkidamas, (Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Academie der 
Wissenschaften, Vienna, 1863, pp. 491—528, esp. p. 505). S.] 

§ 3. wpos obs 8¢ Siwpictra, dyads Siapiora, Vulg.—dixa spiora A’, 
adopted by Bekker and Spengel [ed. 1867], omitting the first dwpiorac: in 
Rhetores Graeci [1853] he reads |depiora] d:xas Siadpiorat, in conformity 
with §1. (I donot myself see why the first dsapeora: need be omitted with- 
out manuscript authority.) ‘In respect of the persons to whom it is re- 
ferred, this division of law is twofold, for the right and wrong, justice and 
injustice, in acts, are referred to (severally determined by, divided in relation 
to) either the public, society in general, the whole community (against whom 
the offence is supposed to be directed), or an individual member of it. 
And therefore just and unjust acts are divided into two classes, according 
as they are directed against a single and definite individual, or the com- 
munity at large. Adultery and assault are injuries or wrongs to the indi- 


248 PHTOPIKHS A 13 §§ 3, 4. 


~ A ~ , \ A a 
TWY KOLWwYOUVTWY, @ Sel TMpaTTEY Kal pn TpAaTTELV. 
‘ A , ~ my ] 
510 Kai Tdducnuata kai Ta Skawpatra Styws eore 
’ ~ ~ A s) \ ed A Lf 
adixety kal Sixatompayeiv’ 4 yap mpos Eva Kai wptoye- 
A , q , 
vov | pos TO KoWWOoV" 6 yap poLXEevWY Kal TUTTWY 
> ~ ‘ ~ e ? e A ‘ , b) 
adel Ta TwWY WpLoMEVWY, 6 OE LN OTPATEVOLEVOS TO 
4 
KOLVOD. 
e a s “~ 9 a , q ~ 
aravtwy bn Twv adiknuaTwv Sinpnuevwv, Kal Tov 
4 ow A ‘ A ~ oe A 4 ty) ‘! 
MEV OVTWY TpUS TO KOLVOV TwWY OE Wpos aNXAOV NH TPOS 
\ ~ 4 
aAous, avakaBovtes Ti €or TO adiketoba, NEyomev 


viduals, refusal to serve, or desertion, is a wrong to the entire community 
or nation’. This is the basis of the distinction in Attic jurisprudence be- 
tween the &ixn, the private civil action or suit of man against man, and the 
ypadgn, or public, criminal prosecution; since the latter is a state offence, 
common to the whole community, a public prosecution may be con- 
ducted by 6 BovAcpevos, ‘any one that pleases’, provided, that is, he be a 
qualified Athenian citizen. See further on this subject, in Introd. I 13, 
p. 187, and Meier u. Schémann, Der Attische Process, Bk. U1. § 2. Butt- 
mann ad Dem. Med. § 9. 

Accordingly 6 riwrey is Hable to a 8ixy aixlas; 6 4 orparevopevos, one 
that either declines to serve altogether, and so fails in his duty to society 
and his country, or a deserter, to a ypapy dorpareias or ActTorafiov. 
potyeia is here included with aixia in the class of wrongs that are the sub- 
ject of a diay or 8ixn Bia; under the ordinary classification it exposed the 
offender to a ypagy, a criminal prosecution, which, as it could be carried 
on by the husband or one of the near relations, might also properly be 
called i3{a. Meier u. Schémann, u.s., p. 163—4, 327 seq. In this case the 
state, as well as the husband, considered itself aggrieved as the guardian 
of public morals. In illustration of this twofold aspect of a crime, Victo- 
rius quotes Cic. in Verrem, Vv (III) 69, 161, guibus im rebus non solum 
jilto, Verres, sed etiam reipublicae fecisti inturiam: susceperas enim liberos 
non solum tibi sed etiam patriae. 

§ 4. ‘After this division, or classification, of wrong acts, some of 
which are directed against the entire community, and the others against 
one or more éxdividuals, \ct us first repeat our definition of rd ddiceto Oat, 
that we may know what being treated unjustly, or suffering wrong, is, 
and then proceed to the rest’. 

The introduction of dAXovus nate leads to a new distinction: a civil 
action between parties in their private capacity may be brought either 
against one or several, as when an action is brought against a club 
or commercial company or the partners in a firm: in cither case the 
offence which is the subject of it is private and particular, and directed 
against individuals, and both of them are distinguished from state 
offences. 

dvadaBerres] to repeat or resume (take up again) seems to be a refer- 
ence to I 10. 3, where ddixeiv, the exact opposite of adiuxetoOut, was defined, 


PHTOPIKHS A 13 §§ s—7. 249 
\ , 4 4 A > ~ Y e 8% e 8 
87a Aowra. eott 64 TO adiketoOat TO VIO ExoYTOS 
‘) 4 A A > ~ a , 
Ta d0iKa Tacyxew TO yap aoiKEely wpioTat WPOTEpOV 
, 
6éxovotov eivai. émet 8 advayxn Tov ddiKxovpevoy 
BrarrecOa xai dxovciws BAawrecOa, ai pev Bra- 
~ ? \ 
Bat éx twv mpoTepov Pavepai cicw: ta ydp ayala 
, 
kai Ta kaxa Oimpytat caf avta mporepov, Kai 
Vie , 4 4 ef ra # ef 5) » 7 
7 Ta ékovolia, OTt Eat boa EldoTES. WaT’ avayKN 
, 4 , av A A A 4 
wavTa Ta éykAnpaTa 7 wpos TO KoWwoVv H Tpos TO 


and the latter can readily be inferred from the former. This may be 
called a resumption, or, in a sense, a repetition of the preceding definition, 
or at all events of the same subject; and this seems to be confirmed by 
the reference, in the next sentence, to this very definition. On the entire 
question of the voluntary character of adixnua and aéiuia see Eth. Nic. 
Vv 11 (Bekk.): and that of vice in general is discussed in the same work, 
ut 7 (Bekk.). The conclusion in the two chapters of the Ethics is that 
which is here assumed to be the fact. 

§ 5. ‘To be wronged then is to be unjustly treated by a voluntary 
agent, for to do wrong has been previously defined to be voluntary’, 
1 10, 3. And since ‘doing’ and ‘suffering’, action and passion, are oppo- 
sites, and opposites fall under the same yévos, we may infer at once that 
if doing wrong is voluntary, suffering wrong is voluntary too—not in the 
patient of course, but in the agent. Comp. Eth. Nic. v 10, 1135 415, 
ovrey S€ ray Sixaiwy xal ddixay trav cipnuévow ddicxet pev nal Sixatompayes - 
Gray éxey ris avra mparrn’ Sray 8 axe ovr adie ovre Sicxarompayei 
GX’ 4h xara cupBeBneos ... ddixnua 3¢ nal Stxasorpaynua apiora: re éxov- 
cig nal dxovoig...dor’ frras re ddixov pev, Gdinnpa 0 ovre, day p}) To éxovctoy 
poo. 

§ 6. ‘Now injury, and injury against one’s will, being both of them 
necessary to the notion of injustice or wrong, it will be clear from what 
has preceded, what the injuries are (al BkaBa she injuries of different 
kinds which are contained in the notion); for things good and bad in 
themselves (as opposed to the comparative goods of c. 7) have been 
previously analysed (in c. 6), and of things voluntary it has been stated 
(c. 10 § 3) that they are things done with the full knowledge’ (of the 
special circumstances of the case. Eth. Nic. 1112). Spengel has adopted 
efpyra from MS A‘, for &ypnra: the Vulg., which Bekker retains. 

§ 7. ‘So that all charges (accusations, complaints of wrong) of every 
kind must be referred to two different distinctions, the first that of the 
persons offended, whether individuals and private persons, or the com- 
munity at large; and the second (4 «al, ‘or again’), in the nature of the 
act, whether it was done in ignorance or unintentionally (i.e. under com- 
pulsion, by a superior external force), or intentionally and with full 
knowledge; and of these last (éxovros «ai eldcros) either with de/tberate 
purpose, malice prepense, or under the influence of passion or excited 
feeling’. Bekker and Spengel have omitted cai with Mss Q, Y°, Z°, dcfore 


250 PHTOPIKHE A 13 §§ 8, 9. 


idiov elvat, Kai 4 ayvoou re 7 EKO : 
A 1] AYVOOUVYTOS KQL" AKOVTOS 9 EKOVTOS Kal 
? , 4 / A A , A A a 
e\0oTOs, Kai TOUTWY Ta MeV ApOEAOPMEVOU Ta Sé dia 
8aabos. epi ev ovv Oupot pnOnoeta ev ois rept 
ta 1a0y, woia Sé xpoatpovvra Kai wws ExovTes, 
ff , 5 \ > e@ ~ 
Qeipntat mporepov. émet 0 opodXoyourTes woAAaKts 
wempaxevat } TO éwiypaupa ovx OmoAoyovcww 7H TEpt 
1 4 xal d-yroobrros ¥ infra. 
dyvoovrros, or rather changed the order of # xai into cai #, and substituted 
xai for 7 after dyvootrros. This is certainly unnecessary, though perhaps 
preferable. The sense is perfectly good as I have translated, following 
MS A’, which appears to give the vulg. reading. The first xai is ‘again’, 
the second distinction: 4 dyveobrvros of course corresponds to # éxovros: 
dyvoovrros 4 dxovros is quite defensible, the two don’t always go together ; 
To axovovoy includes other things besides ignorance, é»ros rov dxovaiou rov 
Big xai 8 dyvoay, Eth. N. 111 3 init., the involuntary is due to external 
force or compulsion as well as to ignorance. This does not apply to 
éxovros xal el8éros, because knowledge and voluntary action always do 
go together; voluntary action implies full knowledge of the circumstances 
of the case, rd éxovotov ddfeer dy elvas od 5 dpyn dv avrg elddri ra na? 
éxaora ¢y ols 3 mpagcs. Eth. N., u.s., and see the preceding chapter 
on ignorance as the justification of an act. Of the two last classes of 
acts liable to ¢yxAnjpara, ra mpoeAopevov and rd da mabos, the former are 
acts done with mpoaipeois, the deliberate purpose or enlightened and 
deliberate intention which alone gives them their virtuous or vicious 
character, and stamps them as morally good or bad; the latter are acts 
due to the two impulses, here called ma@os, appetite and desire (emcOvpia), 
and ‘passion’, any sudden and violent, especially angry, excitement 
(Ovpcs). Acts of this latter kind cannot properly be said to be involun- 
tary, ov xadws Aéyera: axovora elvas tra bia Oupov fh be émcOvpiay, Eth. N. U1 
3, 1111 @ 24, because though they are done i# ignorance (ayvowv mpatre), 
or in the temporary blindness of a fit of passion, they are not due to 
ignorance, & dyvoay, ignorance is in no sense the cause of them, and 
therefore no justification, Ib. 1112. These are in fact the four degrees of 
criminality of Eth. Nic. v 10, on which, and on this subject in general, 
see Introd. p.18!—g. They are afterwards reduced to the ordinary three 
in § 16, 2#/ra. 

§ 8. Of Ovpos we shall have to speak when we come to treat of the 
wan or emotions in II 2—I1, where the second chapter gives the analysis 
of opy%, as it is there called. The motives and incentives to crimes and 
the intentions and dispositions of the criminals have been already dealt 
with (in cc. 10 and 12). 

§ 9. On this and the two following sections, which refer to what were 
subsequently called ordoes, status, the legal issues of cases, and by 
Aristotle dudicByricas, see Introd. p. 189, 190. 

‘But whereas it frequently happens that men when called to account 
for an imputed criminal act, admit the fact, but refuse to admit either the 
title, or name that has been applied to it’ (by the prosecutor namely, who 


PHTOPIKHS A 13§9. 251 


& To éxiypaupa, oiov AaBeiv pev GAN’ ov KAEvLat, P. 1374 
kat watatat mporepov GAN’ ovx UBpioa, Kai ovyye- 
verOat aAX’ ov poryevorat, 7 KAEYat GAN’ ovy iepoav- 
Anoa (ov yap Oeov 1), 7 éwepyacacGa pev GAN’ ov 


has had it registered under a certain name or title whereby it is referred 
to a certain class of crimes, and some particular tribunal, and has a 
special penalty attached to it: this is the ordots dpucj, status finitivus, 
nomen, or finitio, of the subsequent classifications), ‘or that which is con- 
tained under the title’ (that is, the description of the act which is supposed 
to correspond to the title, but may not actually do so): ‘a man may say, 
for instance, that he ‘took’ the thing but did not ‘steal’ it, or that he 
struck the first blow but was not guilty of wanton outrage, or that there 
was intercourse but no adultery, or that he was guilty of theft but not of 
sacrilege (because the thing stolen belonged to no god), or that he had 
committed a trespass but not on public lands, the state domains, or had 
conversed (held communication) with the enemy but was guilty of no 
treachery—from the frequent occurrence of these and similar distinctions 
it becomes necessary that it should be determined what theft és, and what 
&Bpis, and what adultery, and so on; in order that if we want to prove 
that the fact és so, or the reverse, we may be able to set in a clear light 
the real merits or rights (ro dixatoy) of the case’. 

The distinction of the éwriypaypa and epi o ro ériypappa | have already 
indicated. The one is the ordors cpixy, the name or Htle by which the 
act should be designated, which determines the court that it shall be tried 
in, and is represented in all the examples given except the case of tres- 
pass: the other is the description given of the act, as may be seen in the 
instance that illustrates it, the érespass (the name) is acknowledged, but 
the detailed account described it as a trespass upon the fudiic land, 
which is denied. This, if it corresponds to any of the ordges when they 
were regularly classified (on which see Introd. p. 397 seq. in Appendix E 
to Book 111), must be the oracts of quality, wodrns, guale: but it seems 
certain that in Aristotle’s time they had not yet been systematised and 
arranged under constant technical names. At all events, in this passage 
in the two last cases it seems that no very clear distinction is made out; 
or apparently intended, as appears from the mixing up together of the 
examples of both. Quint. 111 6.49, where Aristotle’s division of ordceis is 
noticed, must be referred, not to this passage, but to Rhet. 111 16.6, and 
17. 1. ‘ 

sardfa: mporepov] to be the aggressor in an affray. It is otherwise 
termed dpxew xeipev adixwy, II 24.9, Rhet. ad Alex. 26 (37). 39. 

émepyacacGas| Donaldson, New Cratylus § 174, has introduced this 
passage amongst his examples of a large family of verbs compounded 
with éi, in which the preposition corresponds to the Latin (and Enylish) 
inter (in composition), implying reciprocity, or mutual right or associa- 
tion, aS ¢mixoweria, tnfer-communion, émyapia, the right of t#fer-marriage, 
Rhet.1 14.5. It is quite true that érepyacia and édmepyaferOa (see the ex- 
amples in Donaldson, p. 296, and the Lexicons) are both used in this sense 


252 PHTOPIKH®, A 13 § 10. 


Snuooia, 4 Orerk€y Oat prev Tots ToAEmiows ANN’ OV TpO- 
Sovvat, da Tavta Seo av Kal wept TovTwy Swpicbat, 
Ti kAorn, Ti UBpis, Ti motyela, S7rws €ay TE UTapxeEW 
dav te pn Umapyewv BovrAwueba Sexvivar, Exwpev 
10 €udavie to Sixatov. éort S€ wavra ta To.avTa 
4 ~ ww T A ~ aA \ Wf zg .« 2 
WEpt TOU aouov €ivat Kal QavAov 4 pH adiucov® 1 ap- 
1 +-mepl od libri deteriores. 
for the right of inter-cultivation of land, just like éwwopula the right of 
mutual pasturage, as on a border territory. But here érepydcac6a must 
mean to encroach or trespass, otherwise it is no offence: and so the word 
is used by Aeschines, Ctesiph. § 113, of the Locrians of Amphissa who 
‘encroached upon’ the sacred soil of Crissa, by cultivating, Thucyd. 1 139, 
and elsewhere; as well as éxwopla and émwéepey, for a similar trespass on 
the pasturage of some one else. The primary sense must be no doubt 
that of reciprocal right or occupation, the interchange of cultivation. 
Perhaps the notion of going backwards and forwards over a border to 
cultivate land may have suggested the notion of trespassing, by extending 
the original signification to cases where there was no such right existing, 
or only in the trespasser’s imagination. 

I will add some instances of similar formations which are not given in 
the New Cratylus. 

érmadXarrev, Eur. Heracl. 836, wots éraddaybels wodi, ‘interchanged, 
interlaced’; common in Aristotle, Pol. 1 6 (quoted by Donaldson), c. 9, 
1257 6 35, ewadAarre: 9 xphotws x«.r.A. Ib. VI (IV) 10, 1295 29, dia ro ry 
Suvapty eradAarrey mos avroy, Ib. VII (VI) 1, 1317 @ 1, wowed rds wodsreias 
€ra\Aarreyv. Parva Naturalia, de longitate et brevitate vitae, c. 1, 464 
b 28, émnddarres ra voowdn ry how capara trois BpayvBios, de ortu anim. 
II I, 732015, éwadAafis, 733 2 27, émadAarrovow dAAnAots x... de insomniis 
11 18, 460 6 20, xal r7 emaddafes ray BaxriAwy ro dv 800 paiverar, Theophr. 
Hist. Pl. 1 3. 2. 

émipioyerOa, Thucyd. I 2 and 13, émapeyvivres, éripsoryovrey ; Herod. 
1 68, émpugin; Thuc. v 78, Xen. Cyr. vit 4. 5, Ar. Pol. Iv (vil) 6, 1327 @ 39: 
émépxerOas, Thucyd. IV 120, érnpyovro, ‘were going backwards and for- 
wards paying one another visits’: émxowoveiy, émixocywvia, Plat. Gorg. 
464 C, Soph. 251 D, 252 D, émxowovoba, Protag. 313 B, Ar. Top. A 2, 
123 @ 6, émtxowovovar yap of rorot, Anal. Post. A 11, 77 4 26, érix. racas al 
€mcorijpat dAAnAas, Rhet. ad Alex. § (6). 5. 

§ 10. ‘In all such cases the issue (the dispute, question in dispute, 
disputed point) turns upon this, whether namely (the accused party) is 
criminal and vicious or not; for the vice and injustice (of the act) lies in 
the deliberate purpose or intention, and names of this kind, such as wan- 
ton outrage and theft, connote (signify in addition to their direct and 
literal meaning) the deliberate intention or purpose; for the act of strik- 
ing is not in every case (co-extensive with) wanton outrage, but only if it 
was done with a particular object or purpose, of insulting the other for 
instance, or for bis own gratification (the wanton pleasure in the insult 
itself and in the humiliation it inflicts, dwws yop, Rhet. 11 2. 5). Nor is 


PHTOPIKHS A 13§10. 253 


gia Byrnois: év yap TH wWpoapéece 4 poxOnpia Kat 
doe ene 
3 ~ ~ ~ . 
TO doixely, Ta O€ TOLAUTA TwY GvoNaTwY ApoTonpai- 
a = ad rd > A > 

vel THY Tpoaipeciy, ciov UBpts Kat KAOTN* OU yap Et 

, ef s = 
ératate, mavrws UBpicev, GAN’ et Evexa TOU, Oiov 

~ fd o~ A a e ~ ) fd 
TOU aTiacat Ekelvov 4 avTOS noOnVat. oUdE TAYTWS, Pp. 47- 


surreptitious appropriation in every case theft, but only if the theft was 
for the injury of the other and for the thief’s own private use and advan- 
tage. And so the same rule that applies to these cases holds in like 
manner of all the rest’. 

epi ov. These words, suspected from Victorius downwards, omitted 
by A®° and three other Mss, and finally rejected by Bekker and Spengel, 
.were probably inserted by some transcriber or commentator who was 
doubtful about the construction. If they are omitted, the accusative, 
sdyra ra roavra, will be, as Victorius says, equivalent to xara wavra, ‘in 
all such cases’; which is thus grammatically to be explained. The accu- 
sative here follows the analogy of that class of accusatives which indicate 
the /ocal seat of any ‘affection’ in its widest sense, and follow passive and 
neuter verbs and adjectives, (rep@Ocis rovro, Eur. Ion 541, dra xareayores, 
Plat. Gorg. §15 E, ra dra xarayvurra, Protag. 342 B, dAryeiy rH xearn», 
vooeiy cpOadpovs, Bony dyabos Mevedaos, wodag axis "AxiAdAevs) and are 
themselves probably nothing but extensions of the ordinary cognate 
accusative; which passes frs¢ from the direct expression of the same 
notion as that in the verb, paiverOar paviay, réprecbar répyiy, to the indi- 
rect and general and indefinite neuter, paiveoOat rade, réprecOa rovro or 
raura (see Wunder on Oed. R. 259), and secondly into the expression of 
any eguivalent notion almost without limit, of which the seat of the affec- 
tion is one form. This is the explanation of Kiihner (§ 410 ansmerk. 5 of 
2nd ed.], Jelf, Gr. Gr. §§ 545, 6, and I think probably the true one. Here 
therefore mavra ra rowavra ‘all such instances’ are represented locally as 
the seats of the several apqioBnrnces, the points on which each case 
turns, or legal issues: s# ¢hem the points in dispute or issue are said 
to reside. 

dy yap Ti} mpoaperes y poxOnpia] See note on! 1. 14, and the passage 
there cited. One of them is Top. Z 12, 149 4 29, ov yap o AdOpa Aapfa- 
yov GAA’ o BovAcpevos Aabpa AapBaveww xrAérmns ¢oriv, Add Eth. Nic. lI 4, 
init. wept mpoatpécews...olxesoraroy yap elvat Soxet ry apety Kal paddov ra 
HOn xpivew ray mpagfewy. Ib. 1112 @ 2, r@ yap mpoaipeicOa rdyaba 4) ra 
caxd roi Ties eopev. Ib. V 10, 1135 625, ov yap dba poxOnplay 4 BAaBn. 
drav & éx mpoatpécews, ddixos cal poxOnpos. 11364 1, dv 8 de mpoaipecews 
Brawn ddxet. Rhet. 114. 1, 5 (implied). 

spocanpaiver| mept épynvelas c. 3,164 5, pia dé dors rd mpooonpaivoy 
xpovoy. Ib. lines 8,9, 13, 18, 24; ubi Ammonius, rpoconpalvew 8¢ rd mpds rp 
mpdros Ondouserp xara Sevrepov Aéyow xal GAXo re ovveudalvev. Eth. Eu- 
dem. I! 3, 1221 5.18 seq. (where much the same thing is said as in this 
passage of the Rhetoric in many more words). 

SSpis] See note on I 12. 26, 


254 PHTOPIKHS A 13 §§ 171, 12. 


Ww / , A 
et AdOpa EdaBev, Exrevev, GAN’ et Emi BAaBy kat 

nm e@ gm e t | 4 | ~ of 
opEerepioue éavTov. dpoiws O€ Kal mept Tw &AAwY 
wv 
Exel, WoED Kal WEpt TOUTWwY. 

a ~ 4 Ww 
I éret d€ Trav Sixaiwy kai Twv adixwy nv dvo edn 


‘ A A 4 A > ww ‘ A 
(Ta pev yap yeypappeva ta 0 aypada), wept wy pev 
oi vouor dyopevovow eipnra, tav 8 dypapwv duo 
>. A of ~ 9 A A ‘ e . 

izéotiv eldn’ Tavita 8 éoti Ta pev Ka vrepBoAnv 

ogderepiopds is ‘the making a thing one’s own’, appropriating it to 

one’s self, and one’s own use. Plato has oqerepif{eoOa:, and Arist. Pol. 

' vill (v) 11 sub fin. 1315 5 2, oderepiorjs. The meaning of the genitive 

davrot, which /ooks as if it meant ‘appropriation of oneself’, must be 

interpreted by the opposite 8Ad8y d\Aov, with which it is contrasted. As 

@\Xov after Bdafy is the objective genitive, injury to another, so éavrov 

after oderepiopos is the appropriation Zo yourself and your own benefit, 
appropriation for your own use and advantage. 

§ 11. $v] ‘there are, as we said’, viz. in §2. This however was not 
‘said’ precisely as it is here; ¢here, laws were divided into universal and 
special, and then the special subdivided into written (or positive law) and 
unwritten: and we now learn that the universal law is also unwritten, 
and that the special branch of the unwritten law, which must now be 
distinguished from the other, is to be found in that spirit of fairness and 
mercy and consideration, which consists in an inclination to relax the 
unnecessary rigour of the written code arising from its own imperfections, 
and at the same time to make due allowance for human errors and 
infirmities: all which is contained in the principles of equity, the un- 
written law which prescribes such a course of conduct in matters of 
doubt. I have observed in the Introduction p. 244 that we are probably 
to extend this subordinate kind of dypados voyo: so as to include all the 
prevailing feelings and opinions as to propriety and right and wrong in 
general which prevail in each sfecta/ state (and are therefore a kind of 
@cos vdpos, distinguished from the universal): of which indeed the views 
and feelings represented by equity form a very considerable part. 

§ 12. The two kinds of unwritten law are, frs¢ the universal law, the 
precepts of which suggest higher considerations and higher duties than 
mere legal obligations to pursue virtue and avoid vice, (this is what is 
meant by the ‘ excess, or higher degree, of virtue and vice’ above the legal 
standard, expressed in xa’ umepBoAny aperys xai xaxias, GuOd eximiam vir- 
tutem ant vitium inde continet, Victorius), obedience to which law is 
rewarded by praise and honour and gifts (the two kinds of rewards; the 
‘ gifts’ in this case being conferred of course not for their value as a pecu- 
niary compensation, but in so far as they are signs of moral approbation) 
and the breach or violation of it punished by (not fine or imprisonment 
or any personal penalty, as the violation of a /ega/ enactment, but by) cen- 
sure, reproach, dishonour (not deprivation of civil rights, which is a dega/ 
penalty): of such precepts examples are, gratitude to benefactors, the 
return or repayment of obligations (differing from the /eed/sng of gratitude), 


PHTOPIKHS A 13 § 12, 13. 255 


9 ~ a f ee) t » 9 4 \ 
aperns Kat xaxias, é’ ois ovetdn Kal Emawor Kai 
\ \ , ; \ of ~ 
aTimiat kal Tiysat Kal Swpeai, oiov TO yap exe TH 
, 9 “~ ‘) > , 
womoavrTt €y Kal avrTevroteiy Tov ev wWoinoavTa Kai 
A F ~ , \ wv ~ 
BonOnrixov eivat Tois pido Kai Soa adAXa Tolavra, 
a 4 ~ 39a ld 4 tA of 
Ta S€ Tov idiov voxou Kal yeypaypevov EAAEpA. 
a a 2 8 ~ ? > ” s) > & 
13 TO yap émenes Soxel Sixatov civat, ote Se émiekes 


the inclination and readiness to aid and defend one’s friends, and such 
like. It is remarkable that amongst the precepts of the universal law 
which we are all bound to obey Aristotle should have here omitted the 
duty of interring and‘ paying honour to the dead, so strikingly exemplified 
by the appeal of Antigone against Creon’s tyrannous proclamation in the 
play to which he himself had just called our attention (comp. Eur. Suppl. 
16—19, 526, 538), and still more so perhaps in the trial of the eight 
generals after Arginusae. 

The second kind of unwritten law is that which belongs to law special, 
and is what is omitted by (i.e. intended to supply the deficiencies of) the 
written law. 

Some of these universal principles of the popular morality are occa- 
sionally mentioned by the poets and other non-scientific writers: they are 
the most general rules of conduct which every one everywhere is sup- 
posed to recognise and obey. A short list of the most fundamental of them 
is given in the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 1 (2). 6, 7, which almost coincides with Ari- 
stotle’s in the Rhetoric, Sicasov pady ody dori rd rev Gravrey h To rev sAciaror 
€00s Gypadoy, dcopif{oy ra kad xa ra aloxpa. rovro 8 dori rd yovéas ripgy 
xal pirovus e sroceiy xal rois evepyeras yap aroddoras ravra yap Kal ra rav- 
roe Spota ov wpoorarroves ross avOpewas ol yeypapptvos vouos wotiy, GA’ 
ev6is dypddy cal xowg vou vopiferm. Eurip. Antiope, Fragm. XXxXVIlI 
(Dind.), rpeis elow dperal ras xpedy o° aoxeiy, réxvoy, Oeovs re rigy, Tovs 
re dvcavras yoveis, vopous re xowwous ‘EdAados. Comp. Xen. Memaor. Iv 4. 
19-24, where the same are mentioned with one or two additions. On 
the unwritten law in general, see Plato, Legg. v11 793 A, B, C; he says 
inter alia, ots sarpious vopous éxovopd{ovew, Becpo) otro: wdons elo) mods- 
relas perati wdvrey ovres ray dy ypappacs reOdvreav re xal neiuivey xal roy 
éri reOncopévey, drexves oloy warpta Kai wavraracw dpyaia vouipna, & ares 
perv reOevra nal dOicbévra waoy cetnpia mepixadiwarra tye mpds ros ypa- 
évras vspous, and he finally classes with the unwritten law the %n xa dms- 
8evyara, Aristotle’s second class of dypados vopo:, as I have mentioned in 
p. 243 of the Introduction. 

§ 13. On what follows, see Introd. pp. 191—2, on equity ; and the 14th 
chapter of the Nic. Eth. Book v. ‘For equity appears to be just (or a 
kind of justice), and it is the supplement to the written law that is equity 
(equitable). Comp. Eth. Nic. v 14, 1137 58, ro re yap émeixés Sixalou rivds 
Sy BeArioy dors Bixawwov, xal ovy as AAO rt yévos Sv BeArioy dors rot dalov. 
Ib. line 12, rd dmsecads Sixatoy pév Ear, ov Kara vopov B¢, ddX’ dravépbapa 
vopipov dixaiov. Line 26, xal forw avry 4 picts | rov dmcnove, dmarépOwua 
popov, 7 dAAeires Oca TO KaGodov. 


256 PHTOPIKHS A 13 §§ 13, 14. 


A A ‘_ id ld , 4 

TO Tapa Tov yeypaupevoy vouov Sikaov. cupBaiver 
‘ a \ \ o. \ \ a a 

6€ TOUTO Ta meV axovTwy Ta 6€ EKOVTWY TWV VvOLO- 
a“ » 7 A ef , e 7 s ef A 
Gerwv, akovrwy ev OTav Aan, ExovTwy 6 OTav py 

, / 9 9 ) as. A z , 
duvwytat Siopioat, aA’ advayKaioy pev 4 Kabodou 
9 ~ z , A A , e/ A 
eimreiv, yn O€, GAA’ wis Eml TO TON. Kai doa pH 

, ® a ~ 4 
pasiov Stopioa ot amepiav, ociov Td Tpwoat aidnpw 
~ e \ A \ 
anXikw Kat tom Titi. vUmodeimTot yap av oO aiwy 


14 diaptOuouvra. av ov 4 adiwpiotov, Sen Se vouobe- 


~ > ? e ~ > ~ e/ ral 4 
THA, avayKn amAws EiTEeivV, WoTE Kav SaKxTUALOV 


‘ This is done sometimes unintentionally, sometimes intentionally, on 
the part of the legislators, unintentionally when the omission escapes 
their notice, intentionally when they find it impossible to define or 
determine every thing (to provide by their definitions or determinations 
for all possible cases in detail), and are therefore obliged to lay down the 
rule as absolute (to pronounce universally), though it is not so in fact, but 
only true and fair for the most part’; and so fail to provide for excep- 
tional cases. Eth. Nic. v 14, 1137 6 15, é» ols ovy dvayrn pev elireiv xabcAov, 
py olow re 8¢ dpbds, ro os éxl ro moAV AapBaver 6 vopos, ovK ayvowr rd 
Gpaprayopuevoy, xal fori ovdey frrov cpOas’ ro yap audprnua ovK év T@ voy 
ovd dv r@ vopobéry GAN’ ev rH ices roo mpayparos éatw’ evOds yap ToLauTn 
1] Tev MpaxTey VAN éoriy. Pol. 111 11, 1282 6 2, so in the administration of 
government, and in enforcing obedience to the laws of the state, the 
sovereign power assumes the office of equity in the administration of 
justice; ef rods vopous elvac xupious Ketuévous dpOas, Tov Gpxovra dé, dy re 
els dy re mXelous dos, wept rovrewy elvat Kupious repli cowy éfaduvarovow ol 
vopot Adyety dxpiBas Bia ro pr padioy elvas kadoArov SnAcor epi wavrov. In 
Magna Moralia, 11 1, the author, in treating of émeixesa, says, & yap o 
vopoberns éEaduvarei xa’ exacra dxpiBas diopifery, dAAa KaGodov Aéyet, o ev 
rovrois wapaywpey, xal rav&’ aipovpevos & 6 vopobérns eBovdrcro pév TQ xa 
éxagra Scopicat, ove HodvvyOn 8é, 6 rowovros émeecens, and concludes, répy per 
yap pice nai os dAnOads Svtrwv Sixaiww ove eharrovrat, GAAd Toy KaTa vopoP, 
& 6 vopoberns eLadvvaray drédirev. On the defects of the written law, see 
also Rhet. I 1. 7. 

And not only is the legislator unable to provide for all exceptional 
cases to general rules, but also the infinity of particular circumstances 
which distinguish human actions and crimes precludes the possibility of 
his enumerating in detail all those varieties which in justice should have 
different degrees of punishment apportioned to them; as for instance, in 
enacting the prohibition of ‘wounding with an iron instrument’, to define 
the size and the kind of instrument in every case; for life is too short, 
and would fail a man in the attempt to reckon them all up in detail (on 
this case, which is given also by Quintilian, vii 6. 8, see Introd. p. 191). 

§ 14. If then it be thus impossible to determine all these particular 
and exceptional cases, and yet there is a necessity for legislation, the law 
must be expressed in general terms; so that if a man wearing an iron 


PHTOPIKHE A 13 §§15, 16. 257 


Exwy émapnrar Thy xXelpa ny wWaTagn, KaTa peév Tov 
yeypapupevov vowov évoyos éort kal aduxel, Kata Oe P. 13746. 
15 To dAnGes oUK GOIKEl, Kal TO ETLELKES TOUTO EOTIV. El 
& €ori To eipnuevov TO émenes, Pavepov moia éort 
Ta €MELKH Kal OUK EMLELKH, Kal TOLL OUK ETTLELKEIS aV~ 
16 Oowrrot Ed’ ois TE yap Sei ouvyyvwpny Exew, émexy 
TAUTQ, Kai TO Ta GuapTnuata Kal Ta aduKnpaTa py 
Tou ioov aftouv, unde b€ duaprnuara Kal Ta atuxn- 


ring lift his hand (to threaten) or strike another, by the writfen law (the 
letter of the law) he is liable (to the penalty), and has committed a crime, 
but in truth and in fact he is not guilty of a crime, and herein (rovro, in 
this fair interpretation of the act) lies equity’. 

§15. ‘Ifthen equity be such as we have described it, it is plain what 
sort of things (i.e. charges, imputed crimes) are equitable (i.e. suitable for 
equitable treatment), and the reverse, and what sort of men are not 
equitable’. And hence to the end of the chapter we have an analysis of 
the popular objects of equitable treatment, and the characteristics of it, 
or of the absence of it, the negative which may be inferred from the 
positive, in these subjects. 

§ 16. ‘(The first of these), the kinds of actions which are suitable 
objects of equity are such as these. Cases which ought to be treated 
with indulgence, and mistakes or evrers (implying ignorance in parti- 
culars, Eth. Nic. 1 2, on involuntary ignorance) and mere misfortunes, 
accidental, which should be carefully distinguished from actual crimes, 
and not visited with equal penalties: the latter of the two, accidental 
misfortunes, are such acts as are sudden and unexpected, or beyond 
calculation, and do not spring from a vicious habit or evil intention; 
errors are such as are not accidental, in the sense of unexpected and 
beyond calculation, and yet do not proceed from vice (in the same sense 
as before); but crimes are acts that are not without calculation (i.e. de- 
liberate), and are prompted by a vicious habit or inclination, because all 
wrong acts that are due to desire, proceed from this depraved will and 
moral judgment’. This is the usual classification of the degrees of 
criminality in actions; for acts, of which the mischievous consequences 
are purely accidental, and therefore altogether beyond our own control, 
and for mischievous acts committed under some mistake as to the par- 
ticular circumstances of the case (not of general moral principles, for 
which we are responsible), as when a man is killed with a gun that was 
not known to be loaded, we are mot responsible: what makes us re- 
sponsible for an act is not only the harm or injury that is its consequence, 
but the deliberate intention or purpose with which it was done (and in 
all cases where the wrong was prompted by desire, this is sure to be an 
evil one, ra yap 8 émOuplay dxo ovnpias) and full knowledge of all 
the circumstances of the case. In the treatment of this subject in Eth, 
Nic. V 10, a fourth degree is introduced between the error and the crime, 


AR. I. 17 


258 PHTOPIKH®S A 13 §§ 17, 18. 


° a » » 4 4 e/ S 4 b! 
pata? tori 0 aTvynpata pev doa Tapadoya Kat un 
\ eo ‘ , 
dmo poxOnpias, duaptnuara d6€ doa pn tapadoya 
od ef , , 
kai pn amo Trovnpias, adixnuata b€ boa pnTe Tapa- 
2 A 4 » 9 A \ A > » , 
Aoya dzo rovnpias 7 éotivs ta yap 6 émBupiav 
~ td 
17a70 Tovnpias. Kal TO Tos advOpwrivas cuyywooKe 
A .Y 4 ‘ 
émeies. Kal TO fn TOs Tov vofoy aAAa Tpos TOV 
a ~ 4 a v a 9 4 a 
vonoberny OKOTELV, KaL [Ln TPOS TOV Adyov aAAa@ Wpos p- 48: 
TyHv Stavotay TOU vouoberou, Kat un mpos m7 mpag 
18 d\A@ mpos THY mpoaiperw, Kal pn mpos TO HEpos 
ad\Ad mpos TO BAov, pnde Wolds Tis VUY, dAAA TrOtOS 


This is the case of a wrong act, as a homicide, done in a fit of passion 
6 Oup@ roid, 6 opyicas: this being done by a spontaneous impulse, and 
not after deliberation with malice prepense (ovx é«x mpovoias), is only an 
adixnya, a wrong no doubt, and a thing which ought not to have been 
done, but not punishable like the deliberate act; a homicide not a 
murder, Compare the treatment of this topic in Rhet. ad Alex. 4 (5). 
Q—I11. It seems to have been one of the stock topics of the rhetorical 
books. The degrees of criminality are there, as here, only three. 

§ 17. xal ro rois avOporivas cvyywooxeyv] ‘the indulgent considera- 
tion of human accidents and infirmities’, especially errors, in mitigation 
of the application of the strict letter of the law. On ra dvOpamwa, see 
note on 1 2.7, p.34. These Auman errors and infirmities in the culprit 
should be met by a corresponding Aumanity on the part of the judge, the 
opponent, and indeed men in general. Victorius quotes ‘Ter. Adelph. 111 4. 
24, persuasit nox amor vinum adolescentia: humanum est’ 16 8 é€a- 
papreiv cal rept ras mpagecs aryxety ov povov elvas avr@ idtioy (fabs), dAXG xai 
kosvov kai rev Sexafovray cat rev d\dwv avOpeérev, Rhet.ad Alex.-u.s. § 10. 

§ 17—18. ‘And to look (in interpreting the offence and the amount of 
the penalty), not to the law, but to the legislator, and not to the mere words 
(the letter) of the law, but to the mind (the intention) of the legislator’; 
(Gray ody Aéyn pév 6 vopos xabocAov, cupS7 8 éwt rovrov mapa rd xabdAov, 
rore opOas eyes f wapadeime 6 vopoberns xal fuaprey drAe@s elroy ésravop- 
Ooty rd ArehOev, O nav 6 vopobérns avros ovrws Ay etirot éxei wapady, xal el 
yoes évopobernoev dy. -Eth. Nic. V 14, 1137 420); ‘and (to look) not to the 
act (of the accused) but to the deliberate purpose or intention, and not to 
the part but to the whole’ (i.e. not to take a narrow view of the crimi- 
nality of the act by confining yourself to the consideration of the bare 
naked fact, or of some particular part or circumstance of it, which gives it 
a specially vicious appearance; but to look at it as a whole, to take into 
account the general character of the doer and all the attendant or sur- 
rounding circumstances which will throw light upon the intention of it, 
the purpose with which it was done), ‘and not merely to the gresent cha- 
racter of the offender but to the constant or usual character that he bore 
(to what sort of man he was, always or usually)’. 


PHTOPIKHS A 13 §§ 18, 19. 259 
? 9 i SN e > 4 \ 4 4 A 4 
TIS nv aéi nN WS Et TO WONV. Kal TO pynpovevey 
~ e ~ om o~ 
MadXov wy Exabey dyabov 4 Kkaxwyv, Kai ayabov wv 
of ~ A 9 4 ‘ \ >» £ ° , 
evade paddov 4 erroinoev. Kai To dvéxerOa adixou- 
A ~ a 
Hevov. Kat TO waddov Noye EHerAEw KpiverOa 74 Epryew. 
a \ ~ an 
19 kai To els Siarrav padXAov 7 eis Sixny BovAco Oat iévac’ 
4 4 4 | o~ 
6 yap Starrntns To émexes Opa, 6 S€ Stxaarys Tov 
, ef 
youov’ Kai Tovrou Evexa Staitntys evpebn, Srws TO 
EMLELKES LO-XUN. 
4 a ? -~ 9 ~ , X , 
WEept pew ouv Tewv émeKov drwpice Tov TpOTOY 


§ 18. ‘And to remember rather the good than the ill treatment you 
may have received, and the benefits that you have received rather than 
those that you have conferred’. 

padror 4 (dy, attracted, or &) droinoey.—ro Sixaor, Strict justice, the 
letter of the law, requires an even balance of benefits on both sides, on 
the reciprocal (retaliatory, tit for tat, far part) principle, ro dyrirewovbos, 
Eth. N. v 8.—dmceixeca, merciful indulgent consideration, remembers only 
the benefits and forgets the injuries; remembers kindnesses received, 
forgets those that it has bestowed. ¢ye vopifw rév pév €¥ wabarra dei 
pepvpoOa Troy wayra xpovov Tov 8é woujcarra evbus émideAnjoOat, el Bei roy 
py xpnorou row d¢ py puxpoWuxou woseiy Epyor dvOpamov. ro 8¢ ras ldias 
evepyecias Uropspyioxey cal Aéyew puxpou Beiv Spocy dors rq dvediferw- 
Dem. de Cor. p. 316. Victorius. 

kal ro dufyeeOas ddicovpevoy x.t.d.] ‘and to put up with injury or in- 
justice’, to endure it without retaliation, ‘and, the disposition or inclina- 
tion, to have a matter decided rather by word than deed’. 

Aoye xpiverOas] to decide a dispute by an amicable settlement, by ¢a/é- 
ing the matter over with the opposite party, or reasoning with him, rather 
than proceed ¢pyq, appeal, that is, to the «déma ratio, the voie du fait, 
and actually fight out the quarrel: or (in the case to which Victorius 
would confine it, that of a quarrel between two neighbouring states) an 
appeal to arms. ‘Omnia prius consilio experiri quam armis sapientem 
decet. Ter. Eun. tv 7.19. Apoll. Rhod. 111 185.’ Victorius. 

§ 19. ‘Or again’—a particular case of the same kind of general dispo- 
sition—‘to be more inclined to refer a matter to arbitration than to a 
court of law: for the arbitrator always takes the equitable view of the 
case, whereas the judge looks to the law’ (the letter, or literal interpreta- 
tion of the law, which he is bound by oath strictly to carry out and inter- 
pret to the best of his judgment). ‘In fact the very motive or intention of 
the invention of arbitration (the introduction of it into jurisprudence and 
social relations in general) was that equity should prevail’, 

d:copicbe}] note on efpyabe, 1 11. 29 ult. 

‘And so let this manner’ (this rough, hasty, popular sketch or outline) 
‘of describing (marking out the boundaries in detail, determining the 
boundaries of the whole and the several parts, defining, analysing, 

17—2 


260 _ PHTOPIKHE A 14§1. 


I rouTov, ddiknua dé peiCov bow av dao peiCovos 7] CHAP. x 
) np BM 3 " pe J 


= | 
aodiciass S10 Kal Ta éAaxiora péeyiora, oiov 6 MeAa- 
4 f V4 
vw ou KaANiorparos KaTnyopel, OTt TapeNoyioaTo 


describing, dopif{erOa:) equity suffice’ for the occasion ; for the use, that 
is, of the rhetorician, who requires no scientific treatment of the subject. 


CHAP. XIV. 

This chapter, a continuation of the preceding, contains the application 
of the ‘common topic’ of degree, ‘greater and less’, to the offences or 
crimes which formed the subject of the other. 

§1. ‘The magnitude of a wrong varies with the degree of the énjus- 
tice that prompts it’. There is here the same distinction taken between 
adixnua, a wrong done—an abstract wrong, regarded independently of 
the motive or intention—and the confirmed habit (the bad és), de- 
praved will and disposition implied in a&i«éa. The deliberate purpose, 
mpoaipecis, is the measure of moral worth, and distinguishes virtue from 
vice, Eth. Nic. V 10, 1135 620, orav 8é eidds pev ph mpoBovdevcas 8é 
(sparry tis), adixnua, olovy Goa re dia Bvpov xal dAAa waOn, Goa avayxaia 9 
dvoixa, cvpBaive rois a»Opanas’ ravra yap BAanrovres xai duapravovres 
adccovon péy, cal adianpara dori, ov pevror mw Gdixos 81a radra ovdé movnpot 
ov yap da 0x Onpiay 7 BAGBn* Gray 8 ex spoatpécews, Adixos xal poxOnpos. 

‘And therefore (sometimes) the smallest things are greatest’, acts 
apparently most trifling are sometimes indicative of the worst intentions 
and dispositions, ‘as is exemplified in Callistratus’ charge against Melano- 
pus, that he cheated the temple-builders of three consecrated half-obols’. 
Such a charge subjected the offender to a ypagy) lepov ypnuarev, Dem. de 
Fals. Leg. § 335 [=p. 435 § 293} The exact nature of the offence imputed 
to Melanopus cannot be ascertained: it was probably some fraud (pos- 
sibly an error construed as a crime,) in the settlement of accounts be- 
tween himself and the persons charged with the building or restoration 
of a temple, the vaoro:oi. 

The word vaorotoi appears to be an draf Aeydpevov. Stephens, 7hesau- 
rus 8.V., gives no other example. On the same analogy are formed retxo- 
grows, pyxavowowws, dyakparomaws. The office is described in Pol. vil (V1) 8, 
1322 5 19, oloy lepeis nal émipedyral rov wep ta kepa row caferOai re Ta 
unapxovra cai dvopbovcbas ra ristovra ray olxodopnpdrer cal ray ZAXwv Soa 
Téraxrat mpos revs Geovs. The word lepomowoi, which follows immediately, 
in line 24, is referred by Stahr (erroneously however) to this office of 
curator of sacred buildings, where -he translates it ‘ sempel-baumetster’. 

The magnitude of the vice is argued in this case from the trifling 
amount of the profit; if a man would commit so great a sin as sacrilege 
for three halfpence, how great must be the depravity of his character and 


‘intentions. Melanopus and Callistratus, as Victorius notes, are men- 


tioned together as ambassadors to Thebes by Xenoph., Hellen. v1 2 and 3; 
and by Plutarch, Vit. Demosth. (p. 851 F), represented as political rivals 
and opponents. On Callistratus, see note on I 7.13. 

wapedoyigaro] This verb has two different applications in conformity 
with the double sense of AoyiferOar and Aoytopés ; the two senses, though 
closely connected and often identified, are at all events distinguishable ; 





PHTOPIKH® A 14§1. 261 


a e , e 4 A t » Av a 
Tpia ruuwBéeALa iepa Tous vaorro.ovs’ emi Stkatoourns 
‘ # A ~ ~ a ~ 
d€ Tovvaytiov. ear 6€ Tavta éx TOU EvUTapXE TH 
; e \ , e , e ) , ve a 
duvaper' 0 yap Tpia ryuwBEerALa iepa KAE Was Kav OTLOUV 
+ ev 4 \oo@ \ o ‘a. 
adkcnoeev. OTe pev Oy oTw TO peEiCov, OTE O EK 


(t) ‘reasoning’ and (2) ‘calculation’; the wapa, which conveys the imputa- 
tion of fraud (napa, amiss, awry, wrong), being common to both. Here (as 
in Dem. c. Aphob. a’, p. 822. 25, where it stands for simple ‘misreckoning’, 
and Isocr. Panath. § 243, for ‘cheating’, ‘/rawdulent miscalculation’ in 
accounts) it has the latter sense. Elsewhere, and ssuadly, (at all events 
in Aristotle, as Rhet. 1 9. 29, 11 23. 3, 25. 10 dts, 111 12. 4, ef Passim,) it 
denotes ‘wrong, fallacious, false, reasoning’, a ‘fallacy’ in argument. 
Lastly fepa means ‘consecrated to sacred uses; devoted to the service of 
the gods or religion’. 

‘In the case of justice, the opposite is true’. That is, the magnitude 
or strength of the just and virtuous disposition, inclination, resolution, is 
shewn, not now in the trifling character of the temptation or motive by 
which it is led astray, but in the greatness of the temptation which it 
withstands. ‘ Ut qui ingentem vim auri, apud se nullo teste depositam, 
cum infitiari impune possit, reddidit, iustior sit necesse est quam si idem 
in exigua pecunia fecit.’ Victorius. Injustice varies inversely with the 
magnitude of the profit or advantage to be derived from it, the less the 
temptation the greater the sin; justice directly, the greater the profit 
and the consequent temptation to do wrong, the higher the virtue in fore- 
going it: as, the greater the deposit, the greater the justice in restoring it. 

‘The reason of this’ (raéra is ro ra dXaytora péiytora elvat) ‘is, that 
(the greater crime) is virtually latent (in the less); for one who could steal 
(4st. stole) three half-obols consecrated to religious uses would be capable 
of any other iniquity whatsoever’. The Svvayss, the indefinite latent 
capacity of vice, is tacitly opposed to the ¢vépyea, any possible enormity, 
to which it may, or may not, be developed. If a man will commit a 
crime which may be interpreted as sacrilege for such a trifle as three 
half-obols, he is plainly ‘capable’ of sacrilege in any degree of atrocity, 
where the profit and temptation are greater. 

On the subject of 8uvayis and évépyea, physical, moral, and metaphy- 
sical, the fundamental and all-pervading antithesis of the Aristotelian 
Philosophy, a commentary on Rhetoric is not the place to enter. It is 
explained by Trendelenburg, Comm. on de Anima, 1 1, Elem. Log. Arist. 
§ 6, p.61. 8vvapis is treated in Metaph. © 1—5, and évdpyea, ib. 6—9, on 
which consult Bonitz’s Commentary. Grant, Essays on Ethics, Essay Iv, 
pp. 181—201, 1st [or 2nd] ed., gives a full and clear account of the 
relation between them, and the doctrine in general, especially in its 
application to Moral Philosophy. Aristotle himself nowhere gives a com- 
plete and intelligible description of this antithesis and its bearings, but 
assumes the knowledge of it in all his writings. 

‘Now sometimes the degree of crime, the comparative criminality, 
may be determined in this way; in other cases it is decided, or estimated, 


by the (actual amount of the) harm or injury done’. éx ‘from’, means 


262 PHTOPIKHE A 14 § 2, 3. 


~ = 4 
Tov BAdGBous Kpiverat. Kal ov un dari ion Tiwpia, 
s A ~ 9 , 1 ft a) a 
2a\Aa taca €AaTTwY. Kal OU MN EoTIV taolss yade- 
A A A sa 7 4 A Ol \ 4 ~ 
WOv yap TO aouvaTov. Kai ov py gore Sixny AaPeiv 
A 4 A 
tov wa0ovra’ dviatov yap’ 4 yap Sixn Kai xoAaats 
PY] 1 3 \ \ >» \ >» \ e_\ 
iagis. Kat et o mabwy Kai adunOels avtros avTov 
: ? >» - wv A , ¢ , , 
Meyadws éxoAacev’ Ert yap peiCou 6 mrowjcas Sixatos 
~ e ~ e A 9 ? 
KoAac@nvat, olov ZodoxAns vireo Evxrnyovos auvnyo- 
’ Consecit F. Portus. xadewdr ydp xal ddvvaroy infra cum kobris. 


that the decision or estimate of the amount of criminality proceeds or is 
derived from the comparison of the injury or consequences resulting from 
the two acts. 

§ 2. ‘And when there is no punishment (in use) equal or adequate (to 
the offence), but any one (that exists or can be devised) is too slight for 
it’; supply ddixnpa peifoy fore 

‘And where the mischief done is incurable: for it is hard (or grievous), 
or indeed impossible’. To fill up the sense either repeat lac@a, ‘to find 
any adequate remedy or compensation’; or, from ov py ton ripepia, ‘to 
devise any adequate punishment’. Otherwise it may be supposed (though 
it is unnecessary) that Aristotle wrote d3dvparov, having duyyavory or some 
similar adjective in his mind, meaning ‘a helpless, hopeless, irremedi- 
able’ case. 

‘And again crimes for which no legal redress is to be obtained by the 
injured party: for such a wrong is incurable: because ‘justice’ (trial and 
sentence) and punishment are so many remedies’. On this doctrine of 
punishment, and the difference between xcAacis and ripepia, see above 
I 10.37, and Introd. p, 232. Cf. Ar. Eth. Nic. 11 2, 1104 6 16, pnwoves 
d¢ nal al xoAdceis yivopevas dia rovTer’ iarpeias yap rues eiow, ai de larpeias 
dia rev évavriov repixac: yiver Gas. 

‘And if (in consequence of the wrong done) the sufferer and the 
victim of the wrong inflicted some heavy punishment on himself; for the 
perpetrator of the act deserves a still severer punishment (than that which 
he thus unintentionally brought upon his victim): as Sophocles, in plead- 
ing the cause of Euctemon—after he had killed himself in consequence 
of the outrage he had sustained—said that he would not lay the penalty 
at a less amount than the sufferer had estimated it at for himself’, i. e. 
Euctemon by his suicide had virtually fixed the penalty of the offence at 
death. 

§ 3. Sixasos rodacOqvas] On this idiomatic usage of dixacos, and similar 
eonstructions—in which the adjective, instead of being expressed imper- 
sonally in the neuter, as dixaoy €or, is attracted as it were to the sub- 
ject of the sentence—especially with 8jAos and its compounds, davepos, 

" yeXoios, and such like, see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 297, comp. 549. 5. It is to be 
observed that the case of Sixasos is peculiar; this takes the infinitive, 
whereas all the rest are construed with the participle. To Matthiae’s 
examples add dfos, similarly constructed in Thuc. 1 70, sub init. dfcoe 
vopif{opey eivas trois wéAas Woyov édreveyxeiv; some Platonic examples in 


Ww 





PHTOPIKHS A 14§ 4. 263 


pwv, éwel dwerpactev éavtov vBpiobeis, ov TipNoeL P. 1375. 

4 én éNaTrovos 4 ov 6 waber éavTe ériunoev, Kal 6 
Stallbaum’s note on Gorg. 448 D; Soph. Aj. 634, xpelacey yap “Ade 
xevOwv, and Lobeck’s note; the proverb pi} «ives Kapapway, dxisnros yap 
Gyelvov: Dem. c. Aristocr. p. 641, q&ious frerGe dxovoavres; Arist. Nub. 
1241, Zevs yeAoius cpyvpevos: Ar. Eth. Nic. IV 7, 1123 5 34, yedotos gai- 
votro 6 peyadowuxos pi} dyabos dv: Pl. Phaedrus 236 D, yedoios gvopas... 
idcadrys avrovyedsafov. 

LopoxAyjs} Not the poet, but a statesman and orator advanced in life 
at the close of the Peloponnesian war. He was one of the ten mpéSovdor, 
Rhet. 111 18. 6, appointed by the Athenians, after the Sicilian disaster in 
413 B.C., to devise measures for the public safety, Thuc. vitr 1, Grote’s 

_ Hist. Gr. Pt. 1, ch. 61, Vol. vil, p. 499, and note: and afterwards one of 
the thirty tyrants, Xen. Hellen. 11 3. 2. This Sophocles is doubtless the 
same who is again mentioned, Rhet. 111 15. 3. He is there described as 
an old man, which agrees with the statement of Thucydides, u.s., that the 
spoBovdoe were an dpx) mpecBurépev dv8pav; and the ‘charge’ brought 
against him (Rhet. L c.) was probably connected with his conduct as a 
member of ‘ the thirty’. 

risnoey, ériunoev] In all causes civil as well as criminal which could 
be brought before an Athenian law-court, one point to be considered in 
the judgment was the ripnya or estimate, assessment, either of the kind 
or amount of the penalty in criminal prosecutions, or of the damages in 
civil actions. This gives rise to the division of all legal processes into 
Gyéves driunros and riyrof. In the former of these the penalty and 
damages are already fixed by law or by previous private arrangement 
(C. R. Kennedy), and are therefore ‘unassessable’ by the judges; in the 
repyrol dyeves of all kinds, the amount of the damages or penalty to be : 
awarded is at the discretion of the judges, who riudouw, estimate, assess, 
or fix the amount. This is the explanation of Harpocration, and Ulpian, 
followed by Meier & Schémann, Altischer Process, p. 171 note, Béckh 
Publ. Econ. Bk. Wl, c. 11 (p. 371 Engl. Transl.), and Hermann Po/. 
Antig. § 143.7—12. Suidas, and other ancient writers, invert this dis- 
tinction, and make ripnrot dyaves the cases in which the penalty is already 
fixed, and aripyros those in which it is open to adjudication. See Meier 
& Schémann, u. s., p. 171 note. 

On the whole subject see Meier & Schémann u.s. et seq. and MrC. R. 
Kennedy’s article in Smith’s Dict. Antig. p.970 (1st ed.) [p. 1131, 2nd ed, 
and cf. note on Dem. Select Private Orations, Part 11, Or. 55 § 18. S.} 

The accuser in a criminal process, where the penalty was not already 
fixed by law, himself in the first instance assessed its amount, which the 
judges confirmed or not as they thought proper. The first was called 
ripacv6a, the second ripay, in accordance with the usual distinction of the 
active and middle voice, as marking by their contrasted significations the 
functions of the judge and the parties in the case, dixafew and dudlerbat, 
xpivey and xpiverOar, &c.; the one administering justice and deciding the 
question, whilst the others ‘ get this done for them’ by the intervention of 
another. Aristotle has here neglected this ordinary distinction, for 
reasons best known to himself. As far as the phrase o waédy dripnoey 


264 PHTOPIKHS A 14§4 


~ ? A A] 
povos i mpwros Hn pet’ OAlywy Temoinxev. Kat TO 
, A 9 A e 4 , a , eA wv 
mo\Aakis TO avTo duapravew peya. Kai 8 0 av 
Cn7n6y nat evpeOy Ta Kkwdvovra kal CymoivTa, otov 
év”"Apyet Cymiovrat St dv av vopos TeOq Kal 8’ ovs TO 
6 


ig concerned, the reason might be, that the accuser is supposed to repre- 
sent the estimate by the deceased of his own wrongs as of equal authority 
with a judicial decision: but this will not apply to ripyoew, Sophocles’ 
own estimate. At the same time as ray and ripnya may denote an 
‘ estimate’ in general, the use of the verb here must be regarded rather as 
a departure from ordinary usage, than as a solecism, or violation of the 
laws of the language. 

On the cunmpyopor, see Schneider’s note on Pol. VI §. 10, vol. II, p. 391, 
and addenda, pp. 502—4. «umyopay here is not technical: there is no 
reason to suppose that it denotes one of the public ov»yopor, appointed 
by the state. 

Lastly, the entire topic, cal e? 6 radev—éeriuncev, is thus illustrated by 
Schrader: ‘Sexti Tarquinii flagitium ideo maius est, quod illius foeditate 
inducta Lucretia sibi ipsi vim intulit. (This is suggested by Victorius.) 
Et Appii Claudii decemviri sceleratum de L. Virginii filia iudicium eo 
sceleratius est, quoniam pater ilo commotus filiam interfecit (Liv. 111 48).’ 

§ 4. ‘And any crime that is unique, or the first of its. class (that has 
been committed), or has been seldem paralleled’. These three cases of 
especial prominence have been already applied to acts as topics of praise, 
1 9.38. See in illustration the references there given. 

‘And the frequent commission of the same offence magnifies it’: be- 
cause this shews the depraved Aaést, or confirmed state, the és which 
constitutes vice. ‘Nec enim is casu aut affectu, sed habitu et pravitate 
animi, delinquit.’ Schrader. 

‘And any crime for which any checks and preventives or penalties 
have been sought and found (invented. or discovered), as, for instance, at 
Argos a penalty is incurred by any one om whose account a law has: been 
enacted (i.e. one of the «wAurixol, or (if I may coin a word for the 
occasion) {nptwrixoi, vopor), or on whose account the prison was built’: 
supply €{npseOncav. This same topic has been already employed in the 
opposite sense, to heighten the praise due te an action, c.9 § 3& Schra- 
der quotes in illustration Lysias, Or. XXII § 16 (xara rév ocromwAewr), otra 
3¢ wadat mepl ris Tourev ravovpyias Kal xaxovolas | woAts Eyvexer, oor’ ext 
pev rois GAAots wviots drag tous Myopayopovs GuAaxas Kareornoare, emi dé 
Tavry povy TH Téxvy xwpis cirropvAaxas droxAnpovre; the appointment of 
a special board of officers for the control of the corn-market signalizes the 
special rascality of the dealers. 

§ 5. ‘And the more brutal the crime is, the worse’; that is, the nearer 
approach it makes to the conduct and instincts of a mere animal or brute, 
who is incapable of virtue and self-control; and the more cruel, savage, 
‘inhuman’ it is, more degraded below the level of humanity. 

There are three degrees in the scale of natures, moral and intellectual, 
(1) the beast, (2) the man, and (3) the god. Thus, Pol. 1 2, 1253 @ 27, it is 








PHTOPIKHS A 14§5. 265 


5 Seow Tptov wkodounOn. Kai TO OnpiwwdeaTepov adi- 


said of a man that is incapable of society, or is in want of nothing, being 
all-sufficient to himself, that he is 7 Onpiov 4 Geos : in respect of this com- 
plete independence he is either below or above all the various wants, in- 
stincts, affections, desires, aims, and aspirations that characterize humanity. 
Precisely the same view appears in the little disquisition on @npeorns at 
the opening of Book vii of the Nicom. Ethics, except that here the dis- 
tinction between the three natures is made to rest solely upon intellectual 
and moral virtue: this is human, whereas the beast and the god are alike 
incapable of it, the beast, from the defects already stated, being below the 
human standard, the gods above it. 

On this superiority of the gods to the practice of moral or human 
virtue and their entire independence of it, see Eth. Nic. x 8 A fine 
fragment of Cicero’s lost dialogue de Philosophia sive Hortensius, quoted 
by Augustine, de Trinitate X1V c.9, is manifestly borrowed, not translated, 
from this passage of Aristotle. It is printed in Nobbe’s edition of Cicero, 
p. 1171, fragm. 35. 

Here therefore ‘brutality’ consists in the absence of all capacity for 
virtue, moral and intellectual, and is consequently opposed to ri» Umip 
Mas dperny, Hpwcyy twa xat Geiay. This brutal nature, like the divine, is 
extremely rare amongst mankind. (This statement is qualified in Pol. 111 
11, 1281 F 19, Kairos ri Scahepovew Enos rev Onpiowy ws twos eleiv; dA 
wepi Te wAnOos avdey ebvas aAnOés xwdves 1d rex Ger). It is found chiefly in 
‘barbarians’. ‘Barbarous’ and ‘barbarity’ in fact express pretty nearly 
the same notion of character.) Again, the absence of all moderation in 
the indulgence of our desires and emotions and general want of self- 
controk is characteristic of the ‘brutal’ nature; Ib. c. 6, 1148 3 34, rd pdy 
oly dxeuw Exacta Tourey fe Trav cpov dott ris xaxias, kadamep nai Onprorns. 
And again, 1149 @ 4, waoa UxepBadXovea xat dhpocury nal 8eXia nal dxodacia 
cal yadeworns al pév Onpradesrs al 8¢ voonparedets elow. And these are then 
illustrated, 6 piv yap pooe roovros olos 8edsévas wavra, chy Yodnoy pis, 
Onprsdn Secdiay Secdos’...nai rer appovey ol per dx Gicews drAdyioror nal povov 
aioOyoe: (aovres Onpusders. (aleOnors is the characteristic of ‘animal life’ in 
general; that which distinguishes animals from plants. de Anima.) 
Brutal ‘tastes’ or instincts are illustrated a little earlier in the same 
chapter, 1048 5 20: seq. Brutal (or animal) pleasures are those which we 
have in common with the lower animals, the pleasures of feeling and 
taste; in the over-indulgence of which, this form of bestiality lics, 111 13, 
1118 a 23—64. Gaisford refers to Magna Moralia 11 § init., dors 84 4 
Onporns UwepBadXoved tis kaxia® Gray yap Twa mavrehes Baper haldoy ovd' 
dvOpendy paper elvas dAXd Onpior, de otcdy riva xaxlay Onpiérnra, ff 8! 
dyrixeipévy dperh tatty dotilv dvdvupos, fore b4 9 rowatry Unlp &ybpemoy oda, 
ofov npaay ris nai Ocia: expressions directly taken from the passages of 
Eth. N. vir just quoted. Finally, the instinctive dpégeae (Ouyds and 
dxOupia) belong to this animal part of our nature, and are therefore not 
always under our control; Pol. 111 16, 1267 a 28; where the divine part of 
our nature, the controlling, regulating, intelligent wis, is contrasted with 
the lower instincts of the brute elements of our nature, the emotional and 
appctitive. 


266 PHTOPIKHS A 14§ 5. 


~ ad , ~ a oad ¢ 
Knpa peiCov. Kat o ék mpovoias paddy. Kat O ot 
-~ ~ vA ~ 4 4 A 
dxovovtes PoBovvrat waddov 4 éAcovow. Kal Ta pev 
~ ea A f , A 
pnropika €aort ToravTa, Stt TOANA avnpnKxe Sikata 7 p. 49. 
« , i as ld A , 9 , 
vmepBEBnxev, oiov dpxous detas miores émvyapuias: 


‘And when it arises from or is due to malice aforethought’. mpovoia is 
the ‘forethought’, the dedzderate vicious Jurpose which constitutes ‘malice 
prepense’, aggravates a wrong act in proportion to its intensity and the 
length of time during which the evil intent has been nursed ; and converts 
an act otherwise innocent into a crime. The mpovoia is that which dis- 
tinguishes murder from homicide. It is in fact the moral mpoaipeots, dis- 
tinctive of vice and virtue, of which an account has been already given in 
the first note on this chapter. See the passage of Eth. Nic. v 10, there 
quoted. Comp. Rhet. 1 13.10. There éx mpovoias is identified with the 
(in Ethics) more ordinary ée wpoaspécews. Sray 8¢ éx spoaipécens (97 BAGSn). 
ddixos xal poyOnpds. 8:0 xadas ra ¢x Gypod (actions which are done in a 
state of violent excitement, under the impulse of overpowering passion, 
are considered as involuntary, and exempted from the penalty of crimes) 
ovx dx mpovolas xpiveras. The case quoted by Schrader from Magna 
Moralia I 17, of a woman who had caused the death of her lover by a 
love-potion which she had sent him only with the view of inflaming his 
passion, and was consequently acquitted by the court of Areopagus on 
the charge of murder, because the act was done without deliberate male- 
volent intent, is a case of apdprqya (one of those in which the wrong done 
does not amount to a crime), in which the mischief is done without due 
knowledge of the circumstances of the case. In Demosth. c. Aristocr. 
p. 634, there is a similar distinction between two kinds of ds8pogovia: in 
one sense the name is applied ¢n’ axovoig dovg, and to acts of this kind 
‘a wise and humane law’, vouos avOpwrives nai xades xeipevos, does not 
apply the name of murder; from this are immediately afterwards dis- 
tinguished of éx mpovoias (hovevoavres). Aeschines c. Ctesiph. § 212, efAnde 
Tpavparos éx mpovoias yeadas ypadopevos. Dinarch. c. Demosth. § 6, ray 
€x mpovoias dover. Compare Cic. de Off. 1 8, sub fin. Sed tn omné intustitia 
permultum interest utrum perturbatione aligua animt, guae plerumque 
brevis est et ad tempus, an consulto et cogitata fiat iniuria. Leviora 
enim sunt quae repentino aliquo motu accidunt quam ea quae meaitata ac 
pracparata inferuntur. 

‘And any act, or wrong done, which inspires the hearers rather 
with terror than compassion’, An act which tends to consequences 
which inspire terror, the stronger emotion, in those who may be exposed 
to the like treatment, must plainly be more striking in its character and 
important in its social effects, more noxious and prejudicial, and worse in 
general, than one which excites mere pity or sympathy with the sufferer, 
without raising alarm on account of what may follow to oneself. That 
which excites terror must be terrible; formidable and dangerous to the 
individual or society. An atrocious crime makes men tremble, and fear 
expels pity ; the stronger emotion overpowers the weaker. Comp. Rhet. 
11 8.5 and 82, ‘Amasts shed no tears when he saw his son led away to 


-PHTOPIKHE A 14§6. 267 


~ A ’ , e , ) { 2» -~ 
6 woAAwY yap aouKnuarwv vmepoxyn. Kei ro évTavba 
ov KoAa(ovrat of adixovvTes, Srrep Trovovaww ot vevdo- 


death, but wept when his friends asked an alms’: rotro pew yap dAcewvor, 
dxeivo 8¢ Sesvdv' ro yap Sewow Erepow Tov eAcevou Kai éxxpovorixay Tov éAdov 
cai wohAdas TH evavrip xpyoimoy. Victorius quotes Cic. Tusc. Qu. II 27, 
Constabat eos qui concidentem vulneribus Gn. Pompetum vidissent, quum 
in illo ipso acerbissimo miserrimogue spectaculo sibi limerent quod se 
classe hostium circumfusos viderent, nthil tum aliud egisse nisi ut remiges 
hortarentur, et ut salutem adipiscerentur fuga: posteaquam Tyrum 
venissent tum affitctari lamentarique cocpisse. 

‘And the rhetorical artifices or exaggerations’ (such as avéjces, 
Seaxdcets, rhetorical tricks for giving extra importance and interest to 
a subject; or for magnifying, exaggerating, intensifying the atrocity, 
enormity, of a crime), ‘for instance, that the accused (whose crime you 
desire to magnify) has subverted many principles (or obligations) of 
justice at once, or transgressed them; for instance, oaths, the right hand’ 
(pledge of faith, nal Sefcai ys drrérOpev, Il. B 341), ‘all confidence or good 
faith, all the laws of intermarriage, and the rest; for this is an excess of 
many crimes over the one which has really been committed’; or ‘a 
multiplication of one crime into many’. 

The exaggeration of this rhetorical fallacy lies in the enumeration, and 
apparent accumulation, of offences by division of the single offence into 
its parts, or the repetition—as in the instance—of the same offence under 
different names, which seems thus to swell its bulk and magnify its enor- 
mity. This is the reverse application of the same rhetorical artifice of 
exaggeration as has been already referred to in I 7. 31 (see note), the me- 
thods of diaipects els ra pépyn, ovwriBevas, and éwotxosopeix applied to the 
‘amplification’ of good things; the object and use of them being stated 
in nearly the same words, wAcsover yap Umrepexew Haiverat. 

dvape, ‘to take up, so as to remove, annul, or destroy’; here follere, 
subvertere, The simple verb, as well as the phrase dvaspety ex pécou— 
comp. Lat. de medio, e medio éollere (Cic., Liv.) is common in Demosth., 
Aesch. and the Orators, and occurs occasionally in other writers, as Plato 
and Xenophon, with words like vépous, ro Sixasoy, Stabyjanp, umobeous 
(Plato), or wodu, soXreiay, oAcyapyias (Xenoph.). 

Gaisford illustrates the various forms of pledges or guarantees here 
mentioned by a corresponding passage in Arist. Acharn. 306, was 8 é’ 
dy cakes A€yos dy, etwep cowciow y Gxag olow ors Bopos ovre wioris ov 
Opkos pévet. 

emcyapia, ius connubii, the right of intermarriage between different 
states, together with the rules and ebhganons which it entails, which are 
here in question. Qn the ‘reciprocal’ ém:, ‘infer’, see note on erepyaca- 
wOa 1 13.9, p. 251. 

§ 6. «cal ro dvravda (ddtcciy) ob «.r-A.] ‘and to commit acrime in the 
very place where offenders are punished’ is an aggravation of the crimi- 
nality ; ‘which is the case with perjurers or false witnesses: for where 
would a man sof commit a crime if he is ready to do it even in the very 
court of justice?’ This is the avgumentum a fortiori ; the rule, omne 


268 | PHTOPIKHE A 14 §§ 6, 7. 


“ ~ A nv , wv | 
HapTupouvTeEs* gov yap oUK av adunoeev, Et ye Kal 
fy “~ 3 fe. ‘>49 F id , r ‘ 
€v Tw OwkaoTnpilw; Kale ols aioxyuvn MadioTa. Kat 

’ ~ @ > , A ~ Jd 
et ToUTov Ud’ ov ev merovOey’ rAciw yap adixel, STL 
7 TE KAKWS TOLL Kal OTL OUK EV. Kai O Tapa Ta aypada 
4 4 A , ? 
dikaia’ dyeivovos yap pn Oe dvayKny Sixatoy elvac’ 


matus continel in se minus. ‘Hinc P, Clodii culpam amplificavit Cicero, 
cum insidiis Gn. Magnum per servum tollere eum voluisse pro Milone 
dicens criminatus est: /#sidiator erat tn foro collocatus, atgue in vesti-~ 
bulo ipso senatus’ [pro Milone § 19], Victorius. (Victorius has forgotten the 
still more striking Etzam tn senatum venst, &c.of the first speech against 
Catiline, § 2.) The sanctity of the place converts theft into sacrilege. 
The atrocity of the murder of ‘Zacharias the son of Barachias’ was 
heightened by the circumstance of its occurrence ‘between the temple 
and the altar’ (Matth. xxili. 35). 

‘Another aggravation of an offence is, where it is attended by dis- 
grace (to the victim); and this in proportion to its amount (paAc:ora)’. 
This, together with the wantonness, the unprovoked character of the 
aggression, is what converts a mere assault, alata, mto an act of dBpis, 2 
wanton outrage. See. Rhet. I! 2. 5, definition of vSpss, and 1 13.10; also 
note on I 12.26, p. 239. The wound inflicted om a man’s pride and sense 
of dignity, the injury to his feelings and honour, constitute a great aggra- 
vation of the offence. Ups is, ré BAdwreev nai Aumeiv €p’ ols aloyvvy 
€or) r@ macxovrs x.t.A. In 11 6. 2, aloxtvy is defined, Avy tis fh tapayy 
wept ra els ddokiav Gawopeva hepew Trav caxay 7) wapovray h yeyovorey } 
pedAGrrov...dwi Teis rovovrots Tay Kaxay dea aloxpa Soxei elyar 7} aUr@ fj wy 
dpovrifes, 

cal ef rovrov (48ixnxé ris)] ‘and another is, when the victim of his wrong 
has been his benefactor; for his offence is thereby multiplied; in that he 
not only does what ts wrong (positive wrong, a sin of commission), but 
also fails, omits, to do what is right (negative wrong, a sin of omission). 
The last explanatory clause is thus illustrated by Victorius from Cicero’s 
criticism of the third Stoic Paradox, § 25 ot: toa rad dyapripara cal ra 
raropOodpara. IJllud tamen interest quod in servo necando, si adsit in- 
turta, semel peccatur, in patris vita violanda multa peccantur; vio- 
latur 1s gui procreavit, ts gui aluit: ts qui erudivit, is gui in sede 
ac domo atgue in republica collocavit: multitudine peccatorum praestat 
(Umepéxes), cogue poena maiore dignus est. 

§7. ‘And an offence against the unwritten laws of right’ (is worse 
than the violation of a written or positive law): ‘because it is indicative of 
a better character and disposition, of a higher degree of virtue, to do 
right without compulsion’. (Any external force destroys the voluntary 
character of an act, and therefore its virtue. And if this voluntary obe- 
dience to the unwritten law implies a more virtuous disposition than that 
which is enforced by the positive enactments which have power to 
compel it, then the offosite is true, an act of disobedience to the un- 
written law is a worse offence, and a sign of a more vicious disposition, 


PHTOPIKH® A 14§7; 1§§1. 269 


UA J ? 4 > s @# a > 
Ta pev ouv yeypappeva EF dvaykns, Ta 0 aypada 
wv ld N td 2 4 a ? e 
ov. a&AXdov 6€ TpOTOV, Et Tapa Ta yEypampeva’ oO 
A A A 9 ~ A A r , 4 A a 
yap ta poBepa ddwv Kat ta émCnua Kai Ta py 

émiCyua adixnoeey av. 

4 b! > 2 s d a » a 

Wept Mev ovv adicnuaros peiCovos Kai éAaTTOVOS 


” 4 A ~ » 3» , 
ELpNTAL, ITEPL O€ TwV aTexvwv KkadouMevwy WiC TEWY CHAP. XV. 


than the violation of the other.) ‘Now the written laws are compulsory, 
the unwritten are not’. 

‘From another point of view’, (in another way of arguing or looking at 
the case; Rhetoric owdAoyi{erat rdvarria, 1 § 12) the crime is worse ‘if it be 
a breach of the written law: for (it may be argued) if a man does wrong 
when it is dangerous (fearful) and liable to penalty, (@ fortiort) he would 
do it when it is not’. This again is by the rule omne matus continet in 
sé minus ; the greater and more powerful inclination to wrong necessa- 
rily involves the less. 

oBepa] acts fearful, alarming, formidable, from the probable conse- 
quences. Supply the cogn. accus, ddscejpara. 

émi(nyua] Note on I 4.9, éwidoftoy, p. 66. 

eipyraz] ‘so much for’, ‘enough of’, ‘no more of’: note on elpicbe, 
III. 29. 


. CHAP. XV. 

The general sense and connexion of the contents of this chapter upon 
the areyvo: srioress of the practice of Rhetoric, those adjuncts of proof and 
external supports of the case, which consist in the various kinds of evi- 
dence which can be adduced by the pleader in confirmation of his state- 
ments and arguments, have been already given in the Introduction to 
this Commentary, pp. 193—207, to which I now refer and which I need 
not here repeat. They are called ‘unartistic’ or ‘inartificial’ because 
they are not due to the artist’s inventive skill, but are supplicd to him 
from the outside, as it were, of his art; and all that he has to do is to use 
them to the best advantage. Rhet.1 2.2. It is this distinction of two 
kinds of proof or modes of persuasion which explains the application of 
the term inventio by the Latin rhetoricians to that part of the art to 
which Aristotle first gave the name of dvreyvoe aiores, and the ttle of 
one of Cicero’s rhetorical treatises, the de Jnventione. The author him- 
self, l.c., applies the term evpeis to the dvreyvos wiores. 

In commenting therefore upon this chapter we shall have to occupy 
ourselves principally with the details of language, argument, and allu- 
sion, and so fill up the outline which has been sketched out in the Intro- 
duction. 

§1. ‘Next to the subjects already discussed’ (the @vreyvos wiores, 
the logical or dialectical proofs of Rhetoric and their topics in cc. 4---14), 
“we have to run over (give a hasty sketch, or summary of) what are called 
the unartistic proofs, or modes of persuasion, because’ (ydp, this is the 
appropriate place for them, because we have just been engaged upon the 





270 PHTOPIKHS A 15 § 2—5. 


EXOMEVOY éort Tw eipnpreveny émBpapeiv" idtar yap 
2avTat twv SiKavxwy. eiot d€ wévre Tov dptOpor, 
3 vouot papTupes avVOjKat Bacavor Spxos. mwpwrov Mev 

4 ~ 4 4 , 

OUV Trep vouwY EiTwMEY, THS YpnTTEOY Kal TPOTPE- 

~ A 

WovTa kai dwoTpervovTa Kai KaTnyopourTa Kat azro- 
4 Aoryoupevo vepov yap Ort, éay pev évavTios 7 

ryoupevov. pavep ¥ P ’ M ; 

@ S ~ ~ ~ 

O YeypaupEevos TH TpayeaTl, TW KOW VOM XPN- 

~ a , A 4 
5 aTEOv Kai Tois émeKerw ws Sikatorepors. Kat drt 


forensic branch of Rhetoric, and ‘these are peculiar to law proceedings 
(or forensic practice). On the treatment of these drexvot wlores by other 
writers on the subject see Introd. 205—207. 

wept 8¢ rév dréyvur...dmidpauetv] See note on I 9.14; on the redundant 
use of rrepi, urép, &c. 

éxépevov] with genit. partitive, ‘holding, hanging, on by (lit. to a part 

of,)’, ‘ clinging to’, ‘connected with’, ‘in succession to’, ‘following’. 
Very frequent in Herodotus. 

émdpapetvy] ‘to run over’, commonly in its literal signification takes 
the accusative, sometimes the dative. Here we may suppose that wep) row 
aréyvoy palouscras niorewy is substituted for the accusative: as it is also 
in pseudo-Demosth. epi roy mpds ’AAEav3poy cuvOnxady, 217. 7, pexpa 
émdpapovpat wept avrav modAdv Svrwv. This passage and Xen. Oecon. 
XV 1 are the only two instances that are given by the Laxicons of the 
metaphorical sense in which it occurs here. [Cf., however, Pol. 111 15, 
1286 a 7, Oewphaa nai ras dropias éridpapeiv ras évotcas, Index Aris- 
fotelicus. S.] Compare a similar use of éedOeiy of ‘ pursuing an inquiry’ or 
‘going over, reviewing, a subject’. Pol. 1 13, 1260 512, dv rots wept ras 
woditeias avayxatoy éredOeiy. Ib. VI (IV) 2, ult. wesparcoy dwedOeiy vives 
POopai «.r.dr. ef passim, 

§ 3 xpnoréow wporpémovra] i.e. wee dei twa xphobat avrois wporpé- 
gwovra. The verbal adjective can be resolved into &i with an indefinite 
object, with which the participle is made to ‘agree’. Demosth. Olynth. 
B. 21, 24, wodAny 8) my perdcracw xa) peydAny Sexréov thy peraBodsy 
elodépovras é£:dvras. Other examples in Matth. Gr. Gr. § 447. 4. 

It appears from the addition of sporpérovra and drorperovra that the 
first of the drexvos wiorecs, the laws, are not confined to forensic practice, 
but can also be used by the deliberative orator in addressing a public 
assembly: and this is true also of some kinds of witnesses, viz. the 
‘authorities’ appealed to in support of a statement, which may be as ser- 
viceable in enforcing considerations of public policy, the ovupdépov 4 
dovppopory, as the dixaoy # ddixov of a legal process in a court of justice; 
see §16. The original statement therefore of § 1, ida: yap atras rep 
Sixamney, requires modification. 

§ 4. dvavriog T@ wpaypzart| ‘opposed to the facts on our side, to our 
view of the case’, Comp. infr. § 12. 

§ 5. With ors here, and in the following topics, Aexr¢éoy or something 
similar must be supplied from xpnoréov, § 3—4. 


PHTOPIKHS A 15 §§ 6, 7. 271 
a 4 ~ ~ . ~ 
TO yvwun TH apioTn TOUT’ éoTi, TO fn TWavTEdGS 
6 xpnoOa Tots yeypapypeévors. Kal Ort TO pev émenes 
dei pevet Kai ovdewore petraBadrAEt, ovd 6 Koos 
(xara duow yap éorw), ot Sé yeypappévor mod- 
Aaxts: SOev cipnrar ta év TH Tooxdéous "Avreyovy: 
dmrodoyeirar yap bt EAayve wapa Tov Tou Kpéovros 
4 9 2 
vouov, aN’ ov mapa Tov aypadoy 
9 , -~ : , 5) > » 0 
OU yap Tt vuy ye Kayes, GNX’ ae ToTE. - P. 1375 3. 
~ » v 9 N > > Y 2 
TaUT Ouv éyw oUK EuedAov avdpos ovdEevos. 
Y ef \ > 9 ® 
7 Kat OTt TO Oixatoy ari arnbes Tt Kat cupdepov, cAN’ 
ov TO Soxovy war’ ov vopuos 6 yeypapmpevos: ov yap 


7d yvapn Ty dpicrg) Supply cpivew or ducafew; the former is expressed 
in Rhet, 11 25. 10, 76 yrepy ry dpiory xpive. This was the dicasts’ oath, 
taken when they entered the court. The usual form was yrepy 17 dexaso- 
rary. Dem. c. Aristocr. 652 sub fin. yoopy rp dicasorary dicdoew cpeopo- 
xaow (ol dixacrai), 7 8é ris yropns Sofa ad’ dy &y dxovewct napicrara... 
sag yap o pyre 8 éyOpay pyre 3¢ evvoray pyre 8c GAAny a3ixov xpohacw 
pndepiay, wap’ & ytyvecoca, Oépevos Thy Wihor evoreBet...drdr’ «i rie eldds 
éxeivous mpodedwxev § éLaxarg, ovros dor Evoxos ry apg’ c- Boeot. de Nom. 
1006. 27, dAAd phy dy 7 Gy pn dot ropes yropy Ty Scxasorary Sicdcer opo- 
poxare. adv. Lept. 493-1. Ar. Pol. 111 16, 1287 @ 25, GAA py Coa ye pF 
Soxet Sivarbar Scopif{ew oO vopos, ovd’ a»Operos ay Suvasro yrwpif{er. GAN’ 
émirndes madeioas 6 vopos édiornas ra Awa Ty Sixasorary yropy xpivew 
xa) dioixeiy rovs dpyovras, which explains the meaning and object of the 
oath. 

The form of the oath is found in Pollux vi1 10[6 8 dpxos fy rév 
dcucaoréy wepi per dy vopor eloi, Yngieiobas xara rovs vopous, wepi Od dy pi) 
eioi, yvopy ry Sixatordry); see Meier & Schémann, Aétischer Process, 
p. 128; comp. p. 135. 

TO pi) savreAws xpiobat rois yeypappevas] The meaning of the oath is, 
‘that the judges are not to employ, i.e. to enforce, to its full extent, in its 
strict and literal interpretation, the rigour of the written statute’. 

§6. ‘And that equity and the universal law are constant and un- 
changeable, like the laws of nature whose operation is uniform; to which 
the appeal is made in Sophocles’ Antigone (line 450 seq.) ; for her defence 
is, that the burial (of her brother) was indeed against Creon’s law, but 
not against that which is unwritten’. ovd o xowes (yeraBadrAc). 

§ 7. dAX’ ov rd Soxovy] Sixasoy drnOés dors «rr. ‘and that justice is 
something real, genuine, and salutary, but this sham, apparent justice 
(the rigorous interpretation) is not. And therefore the written Jaw, the 
letter of the statute, is not; because it sometimes—and this is one of the 
cases—does not do the proper work of the Jaw’, which is to do substan- 
tial, not merely apparent and fallacious justice, that which seems to be, 


272 PHTOPIKH> A 15 §§ 8, 9. 


moi TO Epyov TO TOU vouov. Kal OTL Wome apyv- 
poyvipwy O Kpttys €or, Srrws Staxpivn TO KiBondov 
8 Sixatov kal To dAnOés. Kal Stt BeATiovos ayspos TO 
Trois aypados  Tois yeypaupevors xpnoOa Kal éu- 


v7 ‘4 ~ A ‘ 
9 Mevew. kai €l 7rov évayTios vow EevdokimouvTt 4 Kal 


> N\ e ? 2 7 al \ , , v id D 
auTos avr olov évioTt O ev KeNEvEL KUpLa Elvat ATT p- so. 

~ A , A , \ 

av ovvOavra, o 8 amaryopever pn ovvTiber Oat mapa 


but is not justice. On the superiority of natural justice to positive en- 
actments, see Cicero, de Legg. 1 15, referred to in Introd. p. 194. 

‘And we may further argue that the judge is like an assayer of 
coin and appointed for the purpose of distinguishing dase justice from 
genuine’, 

dpyvpoyvopwv}] Moeris, Lex. Attic. (p. 50, ed. Koch) dpyupapo:Boi, ’Ar- 
rixos’ xoAAuBiorai (money-changers, who change large coin for small, 
xoAAufos), ‘EAAnuxas. dpyupoyvapoves, "Arrinds* Soxtuacrai, ‘EXAnmKos, and 
Pierson’s note, who refers to the pseudo-Platonic dialogue sep) dperis, 
378 D (Zurich ed. p. 867), dAAa pry cal epi ro xpvctoy Kat Td dpyvptoy 
elaly tpiv Soxcpacral, otrwes opavres xpivovos ro re BéArtoy Kai ro xeipor; 
Eloiv. Tivas ovy rovrous xadeis; 'Apyvpeyvdpovas. Pollux, vir § 170. To 
the same family of words belong mpoSaroyvapav Agam. 768 (see Blom- 
field’s Glossary) a ‘discerner of the flock’, one that can distinguish the 
several sheep of a flock; hence ‘a judge of character’; farroyyapey in the 
same metaphorical] sense, Aesch. Fragm. Tox. 224 Dind. Cf. pvotoyradpor, 
Ar. de Gen. Anim, IV 3. 32, and on ¢yotoyvwpoveiv, as an art (the study of 
character from the indications of the features and other external pecu- 
liarities), see Anal. Pr. 11 27, 70 6 7—38; and the treatise @uowyrmporea, 
printed with Aristotle’s works, Bekk. Vol. 11. p. 805. Compare Cic. de 
Fato, 5. 10 (quoted in Blomfield’s note, as ‘De Nat. Deor. 1 8’), Quid? 
Socratem nonne legimus, gquemadmodum notarit Zopyrus, phystognomon, 
gui se profiitcbatur hominum mores naturasque ex corpore ocults vultu 
Sronte pernoscere? Compare, lastly, the simple yvopev, Xen. Memor. 
I 4.5 (ap. Blomfield), of the tongue as distinguishing between sweet and 
bitter, and Agam. 1099, becdarav yudpov axpos. 

§ 8. See Introd. p. 194. Correct there the second line of the quota- 
tion, Hor. 1 Ep. 16, §2, which should be, fu nihil admittes in te formi- 
dine poenae: ‘tu’ is addressed to men in general, and therefore the 
second line speaks as generally as the first. Schrader appears to refer 
this topic to c. 7 § 12, nal duoiv dpyaiv rd dmo ris peifovos petfoy, for its 
authority ; the topic of § 16, cat dpery pr) dperis...rd ev yap réAos, to & ov 
réAos, is equally applicable. 

§ 9. ‘Or if the (written) law (which is against us) chance (ov) to be 
contradictory, either to any other law of repute, or to itself; as, for 
example, in some cases one law enacts the validity of all contracts what- 
soever, whilst the other (of the two opposite laws) forbids the contracting 
of any engagement contrary to the law (except those that the law allows)’. 
On this Victorius, ‘Exemplum hoc est legis legi repugnantis; dvrivopia 


PHTOPIKH®S A 15 §§ 10—12. 273 


“A , ef , 

10 Tov vouov. Kai et audpiBoros, wore orpepew Kai 
e “a Lo e 4 A F) A A A , 9 
Opav ép’ dmotépay Thy dywynv 4 TO Sixaoy épap- 

, av A , > / o 

11 ome 4 TO TuuhEpoy, EiTa TOUTW ypnoOa. Kail Ei Ta 

A 4 9 = , f , 
Mev mpayphata ed ois éTEOn O vomos MnKEeTt evel, O 

/ ~ ~ , 

dé vopos, reipaTeov TouTA SnAovv Kat payer Gat TAVTN 
4 , \ A € 4 FT A A 
12 pos Tov vomov. éav O€ 6 yeypaumevos 7 pos TO 


autem id vocatur. Alterius vero exemplum, cum lex aliqua secum ipsa 
discordat, omisit, ut rei sua vi satis notae’, 

§ 10. This very elliptical sentence must apparently be thus filled up. 
kai ef auiBoros (6 vopos, xpnaréov avrg from § 3, 4, or Aexréov), Bore (SO as 
to, in such a way as to...) orpédetw (avréy) xai opav x.7.A. ‘and if the law 
(which we have to interpret) be ambiguous, (we must deal with it, treat it, 
or interpret it) in such a way as to wrest (twist) it (in either direction 
according as it suits our purpose) and to see to which of the two construc- 
tions either strict justice (the /e¢/er of the law) or expediency, i.e. equity, 
(whichever of the two we are arguing for) will adapt itself, and then 
employ fhat’. ro cvpdépoy here stands for ‘ equity’, because by accom- 
modating itself to the varying circumstances of particular cases it is more 
‘generally serviceable’ than the stiff unbending letter of the law. dywy? 
(rod yopov) ‘leading’, ‘guiding’ of the law. This ‘leading of the law’ 
represents the law itself as leading those who have to use it by the ‘ inter- 
pretation’ or ‘construction’ that may be put upon it in one or another 
direction, and corresponds exactly to ductus in the phrase ductus littera- 
rum. The following passage of the Politics, vI (IV) 5, 1292412, throws 
light upon this use of dywyj, and as they mutually illustrate one another 
I will quote it entire. ov Sei 8€ AavOavew dre woAdaXod cupBEeBnxev wore 
Thy pev woXtrelay THy KaTa Tos vopous wy Snporikny etvat, Ba Sé TO FOos Kat 
Thy dywyny modirever Oat Snportxas, Gpoiws dé madty wap’ GAAots THY péeyv KaTa 
Tous vomous elvat rroAtreiay Snporixwrépay, T] 8 adywyi Kal rois €eaw oAvyap- 
xeivOa padrAov. Here again the dywyy is rod yvopov, the leading, direction 
given to, or interpretation put upon the law in the actual practice of the 
society. The difference which sometimes arises between ¢he theory of the 
constitution as laid down in the laws, and fhe actual administration and 
conduct of the government, is accounted for, first, by the character and 
habits of the people, either natural to them or as cultivated and formed 
by education ; and secondly, by the ‘ direction’ they give to, or the ‘inter- 
pretation’ they put upon, the actually existing laws, in accordance with 
the character which ‘key wish to give to the practical administration of 
the government. Compare xa& avrovs ayovot ryy modireiav, C. 11, 12964 
26, and Thuc. 11 65, of Pericles’ direction of the state policy, nal ov« 
Hyero padXAov vn’ avrod (rov wAydous) 7 avros Hye. 

dppiBoros] Ill 5. 4, aupiBoAra, ‘ambiguous phrases’. Rhet. ad Alex. 
25 (26). 1, Stahevywr ro auiBoroy, opposed to olkeia dvopara. Ib. 36 (37). 
22, 29. Comp. note on III 5. 4. 

§ 12. The highly condensed contents of this section, which gives the 
other side of the foregoing arguments for the treatment of laws, shewing 


AR. I, 18 


274 PHTOPIKHS A 15 §§ 12, 13. 


mpayea, TO TE yvwuN TH apiorn AEKTEOV BTL OU TOU 
mapa Tov vomov evexa dicate éeotiv, GAN’ iva, éav 
diryvonon Ti A€yEL O VOMOS, far} ErtopKH. Kal OTL Ov TO 
dadus dyabov aipetrat ovdeis, dAAa TO AUTH. Kal 
Ort ovdev Stapépea 7H pn KeioOar 4 wn xpncOa. Kal 
Sv év tais aAAas Téxvats ov AvatTEAE? Tapacogpi- 
CecOat Tov iatpov’ ov yap TocovTo Brame 1) duap- 
Tia Tov iaTpou doov TO EOiCerOat arreGeiv TH apXovTt. 
kat OTt TO TWY VOUwY copwTepov Cnreiv Eivat, TOUT 
dativ 6 év rots ératvoupevots voMoLs amrayopEvETat. 

13° kal mept pev Tav vopwy ovTw Siwpicbw: wept de 
papTupwv, paptupés eiot OiTTol, of pev wadatol ot de 
mpoodarot, Kai TOUTWY ot mev METEXOVTES TOU KIV- 
Suvov ot & éxros. A€yw O€ wadaovs ev TOUS TE 


how to argue when the written law is in our favour, have been developed 
in extenso in the Introd. p. 195—6, and we may now proceed to the details. 

mpos TO wpaypal ‘in favour of our case’ as rp mpaypars § 4. 

TO anhos, TO avT@] I 7. 35, kal ro avr@ Kal dwAa@s, and note there. 

sapacopifecba] ‘to attempt to outdo (to go beyond, mapa) the physi- 
cian (note the generic roy; one of the two uses of the definite article, to 
mark the member of a class) in skill and subtlety, ingenuity and clever- 
ness’, The proverb, ‘to be wiser than your physician’, is applied to 
&cdrae who pretend to rival the professors, reyvirat or cofoi, men of spe- 
cial knowledge, skill, and experience in any art or science. In Athen. 
p. 137 F, quoted by Victorius, the verb stands for ‘over refining’ in the 
art of cookery, rdv 8€ €y rp Avxel@ xpéas raptxnpoy eis raptxos dsarKeva- 
cayTa pacttywOnvat, és rapacodifopevoy mroynpas. 

TO TOY vOpwY coparepoy (nreiv eivas x.r.A.] Comp. Cleon ap. Thuc, 111 
37, of perv yap Tay Te vop@y coddreposr BovAovrat duiverOat...xat éx row roe- 
ovrov Ta moAAa odadAAover ras modes: and a little before, ravray dé decvd- 
raroy el...pndé yvoodpueba Ore xelpoot vopots axunjrois xpwpuevn mors xpei- 
orev ¢oriv } xados Exovow axvpots, auabia re pera cwdpoovyns dedipos- 
repov 9} Sefsiorms per dxodagias, x.r.A. Bacon, de Anugmentis, Lib. VIII. 
Aphor. 58 (Vol. 1. p. 816, ed. Ellis and Spedding), quotes this maxim as 
proverbial, ‘/icet enim non male dictum stt, neminem oportere legibus 
esse sapientiorem,’ on which Ellis has this note, ‘ Bacon refers perhaps 
to D’Argentré’s maxim, Stx/fa videtur sapientia quae lege vult sapien- 
tior viderit. In the passage from which these words are taken he is 
condemning the presumption of judges who depart from the text on the 
pretence of egutty—which is precisely what the advocate is supposed to 
be doing here,’ 

§ 13. Sswpicbw] See on I 11, 29, p. 224. 





PHTOPIKHY A 15 § 13. 275 


A \ ef Cd , > A , 
WomTas Kat Oowy aN\AwY yywpibwy Etol Kpioets Pave- 
, c A@ ~ ‘oO , , ? , \ 
pat, otov A@nvata ‘Ounpw maptupe éxpnoavTo rept 

~ , g ~ 

Zarapivos kai Tevediot Evayyos Mepiavdpw tre Ko- 

f \ ~ ~ A 
pwOiw mpos Xeyeeis. Kai KrNeopwv xata Kprriov 


cpicess gavepal] ‘decisions, judgments, published, or notorious’. 
Quint. V 11. 36, Adhibetur extrinsecus in causam et auctoritas. Haec 
secult Graccos, a guibus xpices aicuntur, indicia ant iudicationes vocant 
-..5t guid ita visum gentibus, populis, sapientibus viris, Claris civibus, illus- 
tribus poetis (all yrepiumn,) referri potest. 

olov ’APnvaios ‘Oujpp paprup: éxpnoavro wept Zadapivos] Quint. u. s. 
§ 40 (as an instance of the appeals to ‘authorities’ mentioned in § 36), 
Neque est ignobile exemplum, Megarcos ab Atheniensibus, quum de Sala- 
mine contenderent victos Homevri versu, qui tamen ipse non in omnt 
editione reperitur, significans Aiacem naves suas Atheniensibus tunxisse. 
The ‘versus’ or rather two verses here in question are, IL B 557—8, 
[Alas 8° dx Sadapivos ayev dvoxaidexa vias, orice 8 dywv, Ww’ "AOnvaiwy ioravro 
@aAayyes}] which were quoted by Solon (and said to have been interpolated 
by him in the text of Homer for that purpose, Diogenes Laertius, Vit. Sol. 
§ 48) as an ‘authority’ in favour of the Athenian claim to the possession 
of Salamis. See Heyne, Paley, and Trollope’s notes on the passage of 
Homer, Plut. Vit. Sol. c. 10, Strabo, Attica, 1x 1. Plutarch says that the 
current opinion in his time attributed the interpolation of the line (th: 
second of the two) to Solon, though the Athenians denied it: in Strabo’s 
time it was condemned by the critics: he enters at length into the ques- 
tion, and gives the reasons for rejecting the verse. Another well-known 
instance of the authority of a yvwpizos, or distinguished man, is the 
proverbial avrés épa, ipse dixit, of the disciples of Pythagoras. 

cat Tevédior évayxos x.r.A.] Of this event, ‘recent’ at the time of Ari- 
stotle’s writing, nothing more is known than we learn from this passage. 
‘Ex verbis his colligo’, says Victorius, ‘Tenedi insulae incolas cum 
Sigeensibus disceptantes usos et ipsos prisco teste Periandro: qui, quam- 
vis multis antea saeculis mortuus esset, poema reliquerat quo praecepta 
quaedam ad beate vivendum, vwoOqjnat vocatae a Graecis, continebantur. 
Laertius qui vitam ipsius scripsit hoc narrat: in eo autem, ut suspicari 
licet, aliquid fuit quod causam Tenediorum adiuvaret.’ 

KAcodov] a mischievous profligate demagogue, who took a leading part 
in public affairs at Athens during the latter years of the Peloponnesian War. 
He was tried and condemned by the Council during the siege of Athens 
in 405 B.C. One of the results of the political rivalry between him and 
Critias, one of the leaders of the opposite party, was this charge which he 
brought against him, at some time not ascertained. The various refer- 
ences to him in Aristophanes, Xenophon, and the Orators, will be found 
in the article on him in Smith’s Dict. of Biography, and other particulars 
respecting his habits and character in Meineke, Fragma. Com. Gracec. I 
p. 171 seq, in the account of the play bearing his name, which Plato the 
Comic poet wrote to assail him. 

Kyeriov] The person accuscd by Cleophon was the well-known oli- 


18—2 


276 PHTOPIKHS A 15 § 13. 


~ , 4 , 14 s . 
Trois LoAwvos €Aeyeios Exproato, AEywv OT Wadat 
) ‘ e > - ) A of 9 f , 
doeAyns 1] otKia* ov yap ay Torte érroinoe ZOAWY 

~ , A , 
eizrety or Kpitia aruppotpixt watpos axoverv. 


garchical leader, one of the thirty tyrants, maternal uncle of Plato the 
philosopher, and great-grand-nephew of Solon, Plat. Charm. 155 A. 
He was son of Callaeschrus, ibid. 153 C, who was the son of another 
Critias, son of Dropides, brother of Solon. Comp. Tim. 20 E. 

Cleophon, in his accusation, took occasion to quote ‘as from an 
authority’ some elegiac verses of Solon from whose family he was 
descended, to shew that reckless licentiousness was hereditary in the race. 

doedyns| Hesychius axcAaoros, dxabapros. Gram. ap. Bekk. Anecd.1 451, 
doeAyés, wav TO adbodpoyv kai Biatov, xai adoéAyea yf per’ éemnpenopod Kai 
Opacurnros Bia. Kai doeAyis 6 dvaywyos (intractable, unmanageable, like 
‘unbroken’ horses and dogs, Xenophon, from aye:y, ‘to train or educate’). 
Anpoabevns (c. Mid. 521. 2), cal 6 xapixds. “Qomep avépou éfaidyns aced- 
“yous yevouevov (Eupolis, Fr. Inc. xxv. Meineke, Vol. 11. p. 558). ofor 
aurcmuyos (or rd mviyos) ws aoeAyys (Pherecr. Fragm. Inc. XX1xX. Meineke, 
11 348). daedyés oxoppa, Eupolis, dés. Hence it appears that the pri- 
mary sense of the word is ‘untamed or untameable’, from a and OéAyew 
(on the analogy of dueyys ‘unmixed’, one who cannot be soothed, charmed, 
tamed; hence violent, extravagant, excessive—Arist. Plut. 559, mapa r@ 
Hey (AuUT@) yap modayparres nat yaorpadders cal maxvavnpot kal tiovés ciow 
aoeAyos, ‘extravagantly fat’-—and specially in the indulgence of the appe- 
tites and passions, reckless in character and conduct; licentious, profli- 
gate to excess. Arist. Pol. vill (v) 5, sub init. da ryv rav Snpaywyav 
dgédyeray, ‘license’ in conduct; ib. c. 6, 1305 4 40, yiyvovra: 8€ peraBodat 
THis odcyapyias Kai Grav avadkwowat Ta td:a (dvres aveAyas, ‘by a life of reck- 
less extravagance’. Plat. Rep. Iv 424 E (the word is rare in Plato). De- 
mosth. Olynth. 11 23. 19, Phil. Iv. 131. 11, c. Mid. 521.2 u.s.. ap. eundem 
doetyas (nv, diaxeio Oat, diayerv rov Biov, xpjoGai tim. 

eireiy por] This, and the following line of Solon’s elegy, is quoted, 
with two variations from Aristotle’s version, by Proclus ad Tim. 20 E, 

se a Kperin favdorpixs marpos dxovecy’ 
U yap apaprivom meioerat nyeport, 

the father of Critias being Solon’s brother, Dropides. These verses, 
which were probably intended by the author as a compliment to the 
father, are misconstrued by the malicious Cleophon into a reflection on 
the son, whose recklessness and licentiousness had brought upon him his 
father’s displeasure: the authority of Solon is appealed to to shew that 
the grandson inherited his grandfather’s vices. Whether supporpixe is 
another malicious perversion of Cleophon, on the hypothesis that red 
hair implies a licentious disposition, or depravity in general—as seems to 
have been the opinion of the Normans, who had the proverb, entre porl 
roux et félonie Sentreportent grant compagnie, (Wace, Roman de Rou, 
quoted by Sir F. Palgrave, Hist. of Norm. 11 721)—or Aristotle, quoting 
from memory, has misquoted, more suo, cannot now be ascertained. At 
all events it is unlikely that So/on intended any such imputation on Cri- 
tias’ character, whatever may have been the case with Cleophon; for 








PHTOPIKHS A 15 § 14. 277 


14 Wept MEV OUV THY YyEvOMEeVWY Of ToLOVTOL MapTuUpES, P. 1376. 
mepi S€ Twv éxomevwy Kai of ypnomodoyot, otov 
OemiorokAns, Stet vavxpayntéov, TO EvdAwov TeEixos 
Aeywy. Ett Kai ai Tapomiat, womep eipnTa, pap- 


Critias is evidently considered as a boy or very young man from the tone 
of the address or message, and Victorius shews from Theocr. Id. VIII. 3; 
Gude ray’ yrnv mupporpiye, dude dvydBw, that red hair in a boy in the eyes 
of the Greeks was a beauty and not a deformity. It seems to me that 
Solon wrote favOorpiy:, as Proclus gives it, and that the other reading is 
due either to Cleophon’s malice if we interpret it 22 deferius, or to Ari- 
stotle’s want of memory, if we take it as synonymous with favOérpiye. 
The evidence of Critias’ do¢éAyea derived from the verses is plainly a ’ 
false inference of Cleophon and not really contained in the original: the 
Statement in Plat. Charm. 157 E, that Solon wrote Elegies in praise of 
‘the house of Critias’, and spoke of its members as ‘distinguished by 
personal beauty and virtue and all other so-called happiness’, is altoge- 
ther against any such supposition. Victorius, who regards the inference 
drawn by Cleophon as justified by the language of the verses, endea- 
vours to reconcile this with the eulogistic character of the elegy, by the 
remark that Critias may have been an exception to the general good 
character of his family. Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr. p. 331, follows Proclus’ 
version. The other variation, eiweivy jot, and elrépevas, may be either 
another slip of Aristotle’s memory, or eisety pos a mere false reading of 
eimépevas, the one being very easily mistaken for the other. 

Lastly, poi, if it were retained, would be a good example of the da#:- 
vus ethicus corresponding in Greek to the familiar use of ‘me’ in the 
earlier English writers : as Shakespeare, Rob me the treasury ; He smiled 
me in the face (Dame Quickly of Falstaff); See how this river comes me 
cranking in (Hotspur). [Abbott’s Shaksf. Gr. § 220. S.] 

§ 14. xpnopoAcya}] amongst whom Themistocles is included as the 
interpreter of an oracle which referred to future events, wept rov dcopdvay, 
here denotes not merely professional soothsayers, but amateurs also who 
followed the diviner’s craft. Herod., vil 141, gives the oracle here quoted : 
the verses run thus, reixos Tpsroyeret EvAcvor S:80i evpvona Zevs poivoy 
dropOnrov redeOesv, TO oe Téexva TF OMjoe. C. 143 gives Themistocles’ inter- 
pretation. The professional interpreters of the oracles are called ypnopo- 
Aoyos by Herodotus. 

al rapoumiat, eowep eipyra) These words will not bear the ordinary 
interpretation of dowep eipnra, ‘as has been already said’, because this 1s 
not true. Therefore Victorius and Vater propose to render eonep as if it 
were otanep, Autuscemodt, ‘proverbs are also used as evidence, such as 
has been mentioned’, viz. evidence of the future; and Murctus proposed 
nat TO eowep eipnra, “and the ‘as has been said’,” any general remark 
that has been habitually made, whether proverbial or not. We may 
follow Victorius in his explanation, without however supposing that 
woonep is used in any but its literal and proper meaning ‘proverts wre 
evidence, in the way that has been stated’, evidenes: ‘that 19, of the future, 





278 : PHTOPIKHS A 15 §§ 14, 15. 


Tupia é€oriv’ olov ei tis cuuBovAever py TrovetaOae 
Pidov yepovTa, TOVUTW KapTUpEL fj Tapotmia, 
pnor’ ev Epdew yepovTa. 
kai TO TOUS Viovs dvatpEly WY Kal TOUS TATEpas, 
yntios Os TWaTépa KTEivas Taidas KaTaNElTel. 

15 mpoopata 8 Soot yvuwpimol Te Kexpikacw* xpnotpor 
yap ai TovTwY Kpioes Tos TEpt TwY avTaY audio Bn- 
Tovcw* otov EvBovdos év rots Stxacrnpios éxpnoato 


por’ «3 %pdew yépovra] Suidas, s. vv. dypnora et por’ et ephecy, 
quotes the proverb at length, in two different forms, both of them cor- 
rupt. The proverb conveys the maxim eis dypnora py avadioxer. Gais- 
ford from the materials supplied by Suidas has put together the following 
lines, pijror’ «6 épdey yépovra, pndé maida Baoxavoy py AaAnTiKgy yuvaixa, 
pnde yeirovos Kuva’ p2}) xuBepyiimny idumvoy, py) Addo komndarny. 

yyrios Os marépa Kreivas waidas xaradelwes] The verse is taken from 
Stasinus’ Cyfria: quoted by Clemens, Strom. v1 747. Diintzer, Fragm. 
Epic. Gr. p. 16. It is repeated 11 21.11. Herod. 1155, Cyrus to Croe- 
sus, on hearing of the revolt of the Lydians, opofws yap pot viv ye aivo- 
pat memonxévat, os ef tig warépa droxreivas Tov mai8wy avrov deicaro. Liv. 
XL 3, of Philip king of Macedon, father of Perseus, Postremo negare pro- 
palam cocpit satis tutum sibi guicquam esse nisi liberos corum, quos tnter- 
Jecisset, comprehensos in custodia haberet, et tempore alium alio tolleret 
(Victorius). Eur. Androm. 518, xat yap dvoia peyaAn Acinew €xOpovs €xOpay, 
éfov xreivecy xal oBov otxov adedécba. Comp. Toup. Emend. in Suid, 
11 185 (G.). Comp. Heracl. 1005, where it is put in the mouth of Eury- 
stheus ; and Herc. Fur. 168, in that of Lycus. Plutarch has the proverb, 
yexpos ov Saxves. 

§ 15. EvSovdos] "AvadAvoris (Widiopa ap. Dem. de Cor. § 29), a 
demagogue (so Harpocration and the Schol.), orator and political oppo- 
nent of Demosthenes, who mentions him very frequently in de Cor., de 
F. Leg., and elsewhere. This Eubulus is omitted in Smith’s Dict. of 
Biogr. ; but Baiter and Sauppe, in their excellent /udex Nominum (Orat. 
Att. 111. Ind. Nom. pp. 48, 9), have furnished a complete list of all the 
references to him from the Greek Orators, Scholiasts, and Lexicographers, 
which in some degree supplies the place of a biography. See also 
Ruhnken, Hist. Crit. Or. Gr. p. 146 [and especially Arnold Schaefer, 
Demosthenes und seine Zeit, 1 173—191. S.}. He is attacked and apo- 
strophized by Demosthenes, de F. Leg. §§ 290—293, and a passage of one of 
his speeches is referred to in §292. ‘ Eubulus in the law-court (at the trial) 
employed against Chares the saying of Plato (the Comic poet) against 
Archibius, that “the avowal of knavery (rascality) has grown in the 
city”.’ Meineke, in his Fragm, Comm. Gr. (Plat. Fragm. Inc. XL1.) 
Vol. 11 692, merely quotes this passage without attempting to restore the 
verse or explain the allusion. In his Hist. Crit. (Fr. Com. Gr. 1 161, 
note) he had proposed to substitute "Ayvpproy for ’ApyiStoy in the text of 


- &l- 





PHTOPIKHS A 15 §§ 16, 17. 279 


A , ¢ / — € 
kata Xapntos w TlAatwy ete mpos ’ApxtBiov, te 


é 


émidedwxev év Ti moAEL TO OMoNoyEiVv TovnpoUs Elvat. 
16 kat of peTexovTes TOU Kwduvov, av Sofwor vevderOat. 
of MEV OUY TOLOVTOL TwY ToOLOUTwWY OVOY padpTUpEs 
Elow, el yeryovey nH pn, Ef EoTW H pn, TEpl O€ TOU 
TWotov ov papTupes, Oiov et Sikaiov Hh AdiKOV, Et oUM- 
17 pepov 4 adovudopov of 8 amwhev Kai rept TovTwy 
mioroTatTo. mororatoa § oi mada: adiapbopor 
yap. moTwpata Sé epi papTupiwy papTupas pev 
bn Exovri, Ott €k TH eixoTwy Set Kpivety Kal TOUT’ 
éoti TO yuan TH dpiotn, Kai Ott ovK Eotw éLarra- 
THOR TA EKOTA ET! apyupiw, Kai OTL OVX aNloKETat 


Aristotle, an opinion which is afterwards retracted in the other place 
referred to. 

§ 16. xat of peréxovres...yrev8erOa] ‘Those who share the danger’ 
(with the person for whom they give evidence, i.e. are liable to the penal- 
ties of Weudouaprupia, as the other is to those of the offence with which 
he is charged) ‘if they be suspected of falsehood’, sc. mpooqaroi eias, are 
reckoned amongst ‘recent’ or contemporary witnesses. That they are so 
is shewn by their actual presence in court, and the risk they consequently 
run. See Introd. p. 196, for the explanation of the remainder of the sec- 
tion. 80€moacy. ‘quia si credantur etiam mendaces falsique, non tantum 
si fuerint, plectuntur.’ Victorius. 

With el cupdépov } adovszdopoy, which recognises this kind of 
drexvos riots aS available also in deliberative speaking, comp. § 3, and 
the note. 

§17. of drwOev] i.e., according to the Greek usage, those who give their 
evidence, not af a distance (as we say) but from a distance, measuring 
the distance from the object Zo the subject. See note on I 11. 16, p. 213. 

mororatot of makati] Living witnesses may be corrupted, bribed to 
give false evidence: the ancient witnesses or authorities, appealed to 
in confirmation of statements or opinions, are inaccessible to corruption, 
and therefore most to be relied on. 

miorwpa, Which seems to occur only in Aeschylus (Pers. 171 yypaAca 
miorepara, abstr. pro concr., for maroi yépovres, and Choeph. 977, Eumen. 
214, in the sense of ‘pledge, guarantee, assurance’) and in Empedocles 
and Clearchus and one or two late authors, is here no doubt connected 
with the rhetorical siorets, and means the assurances that are produced 
in the minds of the audience by the rhetorical proofs alleged. It can 
hardly be identifiable with the wiorecs themselves, though ‘proofs’ of 
some kind is the meaning required. 

ort ovx gorw é£anarjoa— Wevdopaptupiay] Compare Hermogenes, 
mept aoracewy (Speng. Rhet. Gr. 11 p. 144), 6 8€ xaryopay drodavet roy did 


280 ‘PHTOPIKHS A 15 § 18, 19. 

A 3 , ~ wv A A ed 

Ta eikoTa \pevoopapTupwwy* ExovTe b€ mpos py Exov= 
l4 9 e 0 \ > 8 1 OE aA ro) 

Ta, OTL OVX VrodiKa Ta ElKOTa, Kal OTt OUdEV av Edee 
~ ~ ? A a ~ > A 
18 uaprupiov, Et EK TWY NOYwY ixavov nv Dewpnoa. Etot 
aA A ~ A q ~ 
Sé ai paptupias at prev tept avTou at dé meEpi TOU 
aN A \ ~ aA 
audisBnrovvTos, Kai at pev TEpi TOU TpaypaToS at 

A ~ w / e/ sy 7 wv 
6€ wept Tov nOous, wore Pavepoy OTt ovdEeTTOT EaTtY 
adrropyoat aptupias ypnoiuns’ et py yap Kata TOU 

, av ~ ; , nv ~ 

TpayuaTos Hy avT@ Guodoyouperns n TH audicBr- 

~ 4 ~*~ wW vA 9 ~ 
Touvtt é€vavtTias, adAXNa mept tou HOovs 4 avTov Eis 
9 , sv ~ 9 ~ 3 4 \ 
19 émeixeray n TOU audiaByTovVTOS Ets PavACTNHTAa. Ta 


toy mpayparev Edeyxov afiomiororepoy rov oa rev papripwy’ ovTe yap 
menecopueva Ta Mpaypara ove xapiCopneva rp AécLee Womep of paprupes woAAanss, 
GAN’ ola dors hucet, toavta Kai éerafopeva Gaivera. Cic. pro Caelio, c. 9 
(quoted by Victorius), Eguidem vos abducam a testibus: neque huius 
tudicit veritatem, quae mutari nullo modo potest, in voluntate testium 
collocari sinam ,; quae facillime effingt, nullo negotio flecti ac detorqueri 
potest. Argumentis agemus,; signis omni luce clarioribus crimina refel- 
lemus; res cum re, causa cum causa, ratio cum ratione pugnabit. ‘Pro- 
babilities can’t be bribed to cheat (the judges), as witnesses can’. 

ovx vodka ra eixora] ‘probabilities are not responsible (liable to trial 
and penalty) like witnesses, and therefore less to be trusted’. vmodenos, 
formed upon the analogy of umevOuvos, vmairos, Umdoxtos, Umsorrovdos, 
Vrogpos (Ar. de Anima, II 9. 5), umaiOpios, vrooreyos, Uropopos; and fol- 
lowing that of éraircos, éme(npuos, émexaipos OF -xaiptos, emivoros, «.7-A. (liable 
or exposed to so and so); from vo sud, ‘under’, ‘subject to’, either lite- 
rally as vrocnus, or metaphorically as vmevuvos, Urodixos. It occurs in the 
Orators, frequently in Plat. Leges, Aesch. Eumen. 250, vmodexos Bere yeve- 
oa xepov, and Rhet. ad Alex. 4 (5). 6. 

§ 18. al peév wept avrov at 8 mepi rod dudioByrovvros] ‘ Evidence (may 
‘be brought) either for ourselves or against the opposite party’; the 
indeterminate epi, ‘about’, ‘concerning’, takes its specific meaning from 
the words with which it is immediately joined; like the chameleon its 
colour from the objects round it. wept rot mpayparos...rept rod 
yOous, ‘either to facts or character’; to support our own, and to inva- 
lidate and depreciate those of the opposite party. 

ei pi) ydp] (evropet tis, OF o augioByray, paprupias, with which épodo- 
youpéyns is supposed to agree). adda (at any rate, at least) sudaud# evropet 
ye... ‘For if we have no evidence as to the fact, either in agreement with 
our own side of the case, or opposed to that of the adverse party, at all 
events (we shall be sure to find plenty) as to character, (es, tending to, 
bearing on,) to establish, that is, either our own respectability or the oppo- 
nent’s worthlessness’. opoAoyoupéryns ‘in agreement with’, comp. 11 
22. 15, opodoyovpeva and (the opposite) dvopodcyovpera. In § 21 of this 
chapter, the sense is different, ‘admitted’, as in Plato and Arist. Rhet. 
1 13. 9 Ors. 


PHTOPIKH® A 15 §§ 19, 20, 21. 281 
5 a\Aa wept waptupos 7 pidou n €xOpou n petatu, 7 
evdokimouvTos | adofouvTos n petagu, kal boat addat 
ToavTat Siadopai, ex Twv avTwy ToTwy NEKTEoV EF 
olwy rep kai Ta évOuunpara AEyouev. 

20 wepi Sé THY GuvOnKwVv ToTaVTN TOU AOYyou xpos P. 1376 6. 
éotw dcov abfav 7 Kabatpelv 4 moras Toeiv fH a- 
wioTous, €ay ev AUTO UTapywot, TMirTaS Kal Kupias, 

2.émt 6€ Tov augisBnTovvTos TovvavTiov. mpos ev 
ovv TO mMioTas n arioTous KaTacKevaCew ovdey dia- p. 5 
Peper THs wept TOUS MapTUpas TpaymaTElas O7rotoL 
yap av TwWEs Wow oi Ervyeypampevor H PuAaTTOVTES, 


§ 19. éx rev avray rorey...\¢yopey] ‘(the arguments on these subjects) 
must be drawn from the same topics (i.e. the ¢«ié)) as those from which 
we derive our enthymemes also’. See Introd. p. 198. 

§ 20. wepiraey cvvOnxavy] On cuvOjna see note on I I. 9, wep) ra cuvad- 
Adypara. They are contracts, bonds, engagements, agreements of any 
kind between two or more parties. They are probably intended to 
include documentary evidence of all kinds, which is expressed by the 
Latin ¢aéulae of Cicero and Quintilian. See on this head Quint. v 5. 

avrg) ‘for oneself’. Add this to the instances of avrov, &c. for 
avrov and the rest, in notes on I I.12; I 7.35; and see the references 
there given. 

‘On the subject of contracts, arguments may be so far employed as to 
magnify or reduce (pull down, met. extenuate, depreciate, disparage 
(their value and importance), or (in other words) confirm or destroy their 
credit (or trustworthiness); if we have them (to produce) (ypicis éovs 
wove) we must argue for their credit and validity («vpias, their authort- 
tative character); in the case of (if they af4/y fo, are on the side of) the 
opposite party, the reverse’. 

§ 21. xaracxevafew] is a technical term of dialectics, denoting the con- 
structive process and object of argumentation or syllogism, viz. to esta- 
blish some fositive conclusion, to maintain or confirm a thesis; and 
opposed to avacxevafey, which represents the ‘subversive’, ‘destructive’ 
(dvacxevafeww ‘to undo’, comp. Avew ‘to break up, or dissolve_a thing into 
its elements’), ‘refutative’ syllogism or reasoning which proves a nega- 
tive. On these terms see further in Introd. p. 268, and note (on p. 267) 
on the same page. 

‘Now in regard of establishing their credit or discrediting them, the 
treatment of this in no respect differs from that of the witnesses; for 
according to the character of those whose names are attached to, sub- 
scribed to, (inscribed upon, as éwiypappa, the “¢/e of a crime or a legal 
prosecution, I 13. 9,) the document, or contract, or who have it in their 
keeping, the measure (degree) of credit or trustworthiness of the contract 
is determined (/7/. by them are the contracts made trustworthy)’. 


282 PHTOPIKH> A 15 §§ 21, 22. 


TovTos ai ouvOnkxat mirrai cio. opoNoyouperns 5 
clvat THs ouvOnKns, oixelas prev ovans av—ntEov 1 
yap ouvOnkn vopos é€oriv itos Kai KaTa pepos, Kal al 
Bev ovvOnKat ov Trotovat TOV vdpoy KUptoV, oi Sé vosoL 
Tas KaTa Tov vomov ovvOijxas. Kai dAwWs avTos 6 
vosos ouvOnkn Tis EO TIV, WOTE OS TIS ATLOTEL N aval- 
22 pet ouvOnxnv, Tous vduous dvaipet. Ett dé mpaTTEeTat 
Ta TOMA TwY GUvadAayMaTWY Kal Ta ExOvola KaTa 


rovros mora] is a somewhat irregular expression, meaning rogoyr@ 
mororépas eioty ai cuvOjxat Or Totairat Kai ai ovvOnjKa Te moral elvat. 

The degree of integrity of those who have the document in their 
custody is a measure of the probability of its having been tampered with 
or not. 

‘The existence of the contract being admitted, if the document be 
our own (§ 26), we must magnify it (cry it up; é#crease, exaggerate, its 
value and importance); for the contract (we may say) is a law, special 
and partial; and it is not the contracts that give authority, or validity, to 
the law, but the laws to the contracts which are made in conformity with 
them (legally)’, Either of these arguments may be urged to shew that 
a covenant has the sanction of law, and shares its authority. ‘And, 
speaking generally, the law itself is a kind of contract, and therefore any 
one who violates (disobeys) the provisions (understand ovs6jny after 
a@mvoret) of a contract or makes away with it, is in fact subverting, doing 
away with, the laws’, This doctrine has already been stated in other 
words, C. 13. 2, vopoy...tdiov pev row éxdorots apicpevow mpos avrovs. This 
is therefore the positive, written, local or national law, varying in differ- 
ent societies, and enacted by each of them severally for mutual conve- 
nience, under an implied contract to observe and maintain them. 

Analogous to this view of law as a contract is the theory, in Politics, 
of the Soctal Contract, which has been maintained by Locke, Rousseau, 
and many others. This view of the origin of the social organization and 
of government, is founded upon the natural freedom and equality of men; 
and assumes a common ‘agreement amongst the members of a state to 
live and act together for purposes of self-defence and mutual advantage 
in obedience to laws and an executive authority which the theory sup- 
poses to have emanated originally from themselves, and to be invalid 
without their consent. Similar to this are the ‘laws of war’, which give 
the conqueror certain rights over the conquered, amongst them that of 
enslaving; and result from a sort of international compact, or universal 
agreement. Polit. 1 6, sub init. 6 yap vopos dpodoyia ris dori, év @ Ta Kata 
WOAELOW KpaToUpeva THY Kparourray eivat haciv. Compare also Pol. 111 9, 
1280 4 10 seq. nal o vopos ovvOnxn, Kal xaOarep fn Avxodpay o cogiotns, 
€yyuntrns adAndos trav dixaiwy, dA’ ovx olos maseiy dyabous nat Sixaious roves 
groXiras. 

§ 22, ére 8€ mparrera: xr.A.] Transl. in Introd. p. 199. smparreras 
‘are transacted’. On ovpadAaypara, ‘the ordinary dealings’ of men with 





PHTOPIKH® A 15 §§ 22, 23. 283 


, e/ ; , ~ q 
ouwOnkas, MOTE AKUYpwY YiyVOMEVWY avatpEtTat 4 TpoOs 

, ~ 9 f i \ 74 
aAnAous xpeia tTwv avlpwrwy. kai Ta\d\a 6€ boa 
@ a 3 ~ 5 ~ Ww xX b 9 ' Zz 4 
23 dpmoTret, EmimroAns telv Eorw. av 0 évaytia n Kae 


one another, especially in trade and exchange of commodities, sec note on 
I 1.9. 

ral ra éxovora] ‘all voluntary transactions’, in general, is added 
because avvadAaypara may include ra dxovaca, frauds, crimes, offences, 
which may arise in men’s dealings with one another: Eth. Nic. Vv 5 
sub fin., 1131 @ 2, roy péy yap ovvaddayparay ra pev éxovora dott ta 8 
dxovowa’ éxovota pev ra roidSe, olov mpaots, wvy, Savetopds, eyyun, xpiacs, 
mapaxataénkn, picOwors’ éxovota 8¢ A€yerat, Ott H Gpxy TeY ovvadAdXayparwy 
Tourwy éxovoins, tov 8 éxovoiwy ra pév AaOpaia, ciov xAomNH, porxeia, papya- 
cela, nmpoaywyeia, 8ovAanaria, WevSouaprupia, ra 8é Biata, oioy uixia, 8eopos, 
Gavaros, dprayn, mipwots, kaxyyopia, TpornAakiapos. 

xpeia] ‘usus’ as. ypnoOa ‘uti’, ‘intercourse’, the wse that men make 
of one another. 

émimoAns ideiv Exrev] This phrase occurs again, Rhet. 11 16. 1, and 
Hist. Anim. 1X 38. 2, 9 pév ovv puppnxav épyagia naciv éorw érirodis 
ideiv. In Rhet. 11 23. 30, rd émtmoAdns elvas expresses ‘superficiality’. It 
seems to be said of things that ‘lie on the surface, things prominent and 
conspicuous, so as to be seen by every one’, oore reva Or wdvras ideiy 
aura. This explanation is confirmed by the substitution of ev@edpnra, to 
express the same notion, in § 25 s#/ra (so Victorius). If this be so, the 
verb should be written éorw, and not gory (for err) as in Bekker’s text. 

énuroAns] is the genitive of a substantive émroAy ‘a surface’, only used 
by later and non-Attic writers; ‘ veteribus illis...émuroAnjs adverbii vicem 
fuit, Herod. 1 187, Arist. Plut. 1207, Eccles, 1108, Thucyd. vi 96, et com- 
pluries Xenophon. Neque eius substantivi alius tum casus in usu fuit’, 
Lobeck ad Phryn. p. 126—7. It is an adverb of flace or position, after 
the analogy of ’A@nvey ‘at Athens’, Aas yetpos (Aesch. P. V. 720) ‘on the 
left hand’, &c.; see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 377: (this seems to be omitted in 
Jelf’s Grammar, though there are articles on the ‘genitive of position’; 
§ 524—528, which however is illustrated only by the genitive of relative 
position, not that which expresses place itself. The genitive, it is to be 
presumed, is in both cases partitive, denoting a point in space;) it is also 
after the analogy of the local adverbs, ov, dzrov, opov, ov8apzod, rot and ov, 

" @yxov, THAOV, wavrayov. émioAn itself not being in use, the substantive 

‘surface, superficies’ is formed by the addition of the definite article, as 
Plat. Phileb. 46 D, (omcrav) ro...€rimoAjs povov Seaxen. Ar. wept evurviay 2. 8, 
To émimoAns Tou évorrpov, ‘the surface of the mirror’. Its derivatives émc- 
moXatos and émmodafew (to be on the surface), have three different senses 
all arising from the properties attributable to things on the surface; either 
(1) ‘ popular’, ‘prevalent’, ‘fashionable’, ‘current’, like things that come to 
the top, come uppermost, and so ‘prevail’ over the rest, as 8dfa: padiora 
émtnodafovea, Arist. Eth. N.1 2, 1096 @ 30, émtroAd(ovros rov yeAoiov, ib. IV. 
14, 1128 @13, Hist. Anim. IV 1, 26, ro padtora émeroAafor ‘the most abundant 
kind’, VI 37. 2, de Gen. Anim. I 20. 11, ov pany émimoAd{ovai ye ai xabapoecs 
aonep avOpwrus: or (2) (if.indeed there be any difference between this 


284 PHTOPIKH® A 15 §§ 23, 24. 


\ ~ c ~ 4 / ra) 
Mera Twv angio BnrovvTwy, WpwTov MEV, ATED av TIS 
4 4 , a ~ é wv 
WpOs vojLov évavTiov paxeoaTo, TAVO dpuoTTE ato- 

A b ~ A f v A ~ a Ss 
Tov yap €t Tos Mev VOMOLS, av pn GpOws KEimEevoL Wor 
> > 8 / e , 5) nd ~ ? 
adn’ éFauaptwow ot TiBEuevot, ovK otoueBa Setv TeEi- 
~ A , ~ 9, ef ~ 
24 GecOai, tats dé cuvOyxats advayKaiov. e6 Ort Tov 
, 9 A A / 4 ~ 
dixaiov €ori BopaBevtns 6 Otkaorns* ovKOVY ToOUTO 
? r 9 e , ‘ 8 \ / 
OKETTEOV, GAN’ ws OiKatoTEpov. Kal TO pev Sikatoy 
9 Vf , ws 3s , vs s P 
OUK EoTt MeTaoTpEYa oT’ amaty OUT avayKn (Te- 


and the preceding) ‘conspicuous’, ‘prominent’, compared with such as are 
deep down, or buried, out of sight; Rhet. 4és, Hist. Anim. quoted above 
On émioAjs: and (3) ‘superficial’, opposed to Badus; either literally, de 
Insomn. (epi évumviwy) 2. 12, ovy cpolws elodverac 4 xnXis GAN’ émro- 
Aatorepov, or metaph., as Rhet. 111 11. 10, aAnOés xal py émimoAaoyv. II 23. 
30, above referred to. III 10. 4, ra émeroAaa ray évOuunparey, followed by 
the explanation, ¢mimoAaa yap A€youev ra mavri SpAa, cal @ pndev Sei (yTH- 
oa, is doubtful; for an enthymeme may be too easy to follow and there- 
fore unacceptable, either because it is intellectually ‘superficial’ (this I 
think is the more probable meaning, because more applicable to an in- 
tellectual process) or because it is ‘prominent and conspicuous’, saxée 
aux yeux, and therefore is &ndov wacw, Top. AI, 100627. Similarly in 
Pol. 111 3, 1276 2 19, 4 peéy obtw emtsroAaorarn THs aropias (nryais (the most 
obvious and apparent, the clearest and plainest) wep) rév ronov cal rovs 
dvOpdnovs éoriv, and again, ib. c. 12, 1282 6 30, 9 rovro émercAator rd Wei- 
dus; (evident on the surface). In these two last instances the literal sense 
of the word is uppermost. 

§ 23. ‘But if the contract or document be opposed to us, and (on the 
side) of the adverse party, first of all, the same arguments are suitable as 
may be used in contending against an adverse /aw’. amep is a cognate 
accusative extended by analogy from the direct cogn. acc. qumrep payny pa- 
xéoaro, for which the neuter plural, expressing the details of the conten- 
tion, or the arguments employed in it, is substituted. ‘For it is absurd to 
suppose that we are not bound to obey the laws, if their constitution is 
defective and the framers of them have been led into error, and yet that 
(in like cases) contracts are necessarily binding (that it is necessary to obey 
or observe them)’. [For xeiyevor...riOeuevos compare note on I 1.7,p.10. S.] 

§ 24. 6 dri] The gist of the topic is to be found in Introd. p. 200. 

BSpaBevris] the umpire in the games, who awards the prize to the suc- 
cessful candidate, i.e. to the most deserving, is here used as an image of 
the judge who dispenses justice to the competitors in a court of law. It 
is he that is to be appealed to, not a mere contract, which has no regard 
for the general principles of justice. Justice (ds S«atorepoy) must pre- 
vail over contracts when they are in conflict. Dem., Cl. 111 36. 7, has the 
verb in the same sense, ra rév GAAwyv dixata BpaBevery. BpaSeurns is the 
prose form; SpaB8evs belongs to the Poets. 

rovro] is ‘what we are talking about’, ‘that which is before us’, dec- 
xrixas; the contract, namely, and its contents. 





PHTOPIKH2 A 15 §§ 25, 26. 285 


A 4 ~ Y a 
25 puxos yap é€orww), cuvOnkat dé yiyvovra Kai éfara- 
, 4 \.. \ 
tTnGevtwy Kal dvayxacbevtrwyv. mpos S€ TovTOLs oKoO- 
~ f nv ~ / 4 A 
WElV El EvavTia EOTL TIL | TOV YEYPaMMEVwWY YOMwY 
=~ - ~ , sv ~ > / N 
TWY KOLWWY, Kai TWY YEYPaMMevwY 4 TOS OiKELoLS 7H 
~ 9 ‘4 of > w@ 4 e é 
Tots @\AoT pilots, Evrerra et aAAaIS GuVOnKats VoTEpats 
\ , v A it , wv 
i] WpoTepais’ n-yap et VoTEpat Kuplat, akupor O at 
, 5) , , ef 
MpoTepat, n at mporepa opbai, at & vaorepa rrra- 
, e , av T , wv A 4 
THKagly, OwoTépws av H Xpyo or. Ere é€ TO cup 
e - ® ~ ~ ~ e. : 
Pepov opav, el my EvavTiovTat TOs KpiTais, Kal Ooa 
id ~ A “ ? 
a\\a To1avTa: Kal yap TavTa evlewpnTa dpoiws. 
6 e oe , 4 4 > w oe 
2 ai d€ Bacwavot paptupia Ties elow, Exew dé 
~ A , e/ ) , ‘4 4 
doxovet TO moTov, STt dvayKn Tis TpOTETTIV. OvK- 
A MQ VN ~ ‘ , 
ovv xaderrov ovdeé mept TouTwy eimeiy Ta évdEeyo- 
te , e c ~ wv 
peva, €£ wy éav TE Urapywow oixeia ab-ew EoTw, 
e/ bY ~ 4 ~ ~ ? ? 
OTt aAnOeis wovat TWY papTUpLOY Eioly aUTaL éav TE P. 1377. 
, * \ \ a ~ P- 53: 
UTEVaVTiaL Wot Kal MeTa TOU augiaBnToUVTOS, Sta- 
, av > ~ / 9 of ~ 4 ~ 
Avon dv Tis TAANOH AEeywv Ka’ GrAoU TOU yéevous THY 


§ 25. ‘And again, justice cannot be perverted (have its nature altered) 
by fraud or compulsion like a contract, because it is natural (constancy 
and uniformity are characteristic of satsre); whereas contracts are un- 
dertaken, entered into, under the influence of deceit (under false pre- 
tences) and compulsion.’ The two genitives in construction follow cuvv@9- 
xa, ‘contracts of men deceived are made’. 

oixelots  dAXorpioss] ‘domestic or foreign’. 

To cuudépov} In arguing against the validity of a contract, you may 
take into account the consequences of carrying its provisions into effect, 
so far as they affect the judges, whose ‘interest’ or ‘advantage’ (or the 
reverse) may be involved in them: when these results happen to be 
adverse to the judges’ interest, arguments from this source may be em- 
ployed to invalidate the contract; ‘and all other topics of the same kind, 
(may be used) (which need not be enumerated) because they are equally 
easy to observe (with the preceding)’, too clear to need enumeration. 

§ 26. oixeiac] ‘of one’s own’, ‘on our side’, supr. § 21. 

Savor av Tis] Or AVeewy and dcaAvery, see Introd. p. 267 note. 

radn6y Aéywv] These words have been variously interpreted. Mu- 
retus omitted rdAn64, as contrary to Aristotle’s opinion on the subject of 
torture—which however must be gathered from the words of the text, and 
not assumed @ griori, and the text altered in conformity with the hypo- 
thesis—evidently supposing that if retained it must be construed with 
Scadvoe and not with Aéyor. There can be no doubt that the latter is 
right, and that the words do express Aristotle’s opinion upon the use of 


286 °  PHTOPIKHS A 15 §§ 26, 27. 


, a> ‘ t ? , \ on 
Bacavwy ovdev yap irTov dvayxaComeva Ta Vevdn 
/ N 9 ~ 4 a ry , 
Aéyouow n TadnOn, kai Staxaprepovytes pn AeEvyerv 
9 ~ | e ? a e 
TaAnOn, Kai padiws katavevdopuevot ws mravodmevot 
Garrov. Set & éyew éravaghepew emi ToavTa yeye- 
ynpéva wapaceiypata a ivacww ot Kpivoyres.! 
® ~ ~ vA A 
27. wept & dpxwv rerpaxyws Eore Seedcivy 4 yap 
, 4 a vA ANA a\ a \ a bY C4 
Oidwot kai AapBaver, 4 ovdETEpOV, 4) TO pEV TO O’ Ov—" 


[! + Sef 5d Adve Us ode elaly ddyOeis al Bdoavor woddol ev yap raxtdpores of 
cal \Bodéppor cal rais yuxais bvres Suvarol yewvalws éyxaprepovar rais dvdyxas, ol 
32 Secdol xal edAaBels wpd rou rds dvdyxas (dey alray Karadappovow wore odddr dare 
wicriv & Bacdyos. A‘). 


torture, by asserting the truth and right of the arguments directed against 
the use of it. [On ‘torture’ see C. R. Kennedy’s Demosthenes, Vol. Iv., 
pp. 382—391!, appendix. s.] 

S:axaprepourres] (thoroughly, 8a,) obstinately, resolutely, persisting, 
(holding out). z 

cal pqdiws xarapevdopevoi] ‘and ready to make false accusations (xard 
‘against others’) in the expectation of a speedier release’. 

On the passage which in ms A‘ concludes this section, and is printed 
in the note of the Oxford reprint of Bekker’s rst ed., see in Introd. p. 2or, 
and the note. It is omitted by Bekker. Spengel, On the Rhetoric, in 
Bav. Trans. 1851, p. 51, thinks that it is an extract from some other 
treatise on Rhetoric, introduced by the transcribers. The last sentence 
at al] events must be corrupt, being as it stands devoid of meaning and 
connexion with the preceding. Brandis in his tract in Schneidewin’s 
Philologus, V1. p. 43, informs us that his Anonymous Annotator found 
the passage in the MSS that he used, though he thinks that Victorius was 
right in rejecting it as an interpolation. Victorius, a man whose judg- 
ment is to be relied on, writes thus. ‘Delevi autem quia adulterinos 
putavi; aut enim ex alio scriptore artis haec pars sumta est (so Spengel), 
aut Scholion olim fuit quod importune post in contextum verborum Ari- 
stotelis translatum sit;...Qui accurate quae supra a philosopho iam tra- 
dita erant perpendit ipsius haec non esse manifesto intelligit; cuncta 
enim ille quae ad quaestiones pertinentia dicere voluerat iam explica- 
verat; sententia vero quae his viribus exponitur superioribus continetur; 
vox etiam iuncta illic est quae sermonem Aristotelis non redolet, viz. 
AcCodeppos (this applies still more strongly to warabappeiv); et omnis deni- 
que haec locutio, e. c. rais Wuyxais ovres duvaroi, locutionis Aristotelicae 
dissimilis videtur’. 

§ 27. sept opxy...dcereiv] On wepi, and other prepositions, redun- 
dant in the later Greek writers, see note on I 9.14, ‘oaths admit of a 
fourfold division’. 

On oaths, see the corresponding chapter of Quintilian, v6. Rhet. ad 
Alex. c. 17 (18). A full explanation of the connexion and general mean- 
ing of this and the following sections to the end of the Chapter will be 
found in the Introd. pp. 202—205, to which the reader is referred; so 


PHTOPIKH® A 15 §§ 28, 29. 287 


a vv A a a A / 
Kal Toutwy 4 Sidwot pev ov AauBavea dé, 7 AauBaver 
\ , ) 4 of fod ‘ ~ > 9 , 
sev didwor & ov. ert aAAWS Tapa TaUTA, EL OMw- 
e Ne 8 ) ma N e 3 98 , 9 
28 woorat OUTOS H UT’ avTOU fn UT’ éxelvov. ov didwort 
J e -~ A / A 4 
Mev ovyv, OTL padiws EmtopKovelw, Kal SioTt 6 MEV. CMo- 
A \ A , # 
Gas OUK arrodiéwot, Tous dé pn Gpooavros oleTaAL Ku- 
4 Ol , . 
TAadKaGEW. Kal WS OVTOS O KivduvOS KpEiTTWY O EV 
~ ~ ~ A 4 , -~ # 
29 Tots Oikagrais’ ToIs Mev yap miorever TH SO Ov. Ov 
, 14 ° 4 / \ > F 
AapBavea &, STt avrTi xpnuatwv Spxos. Kat OTt Et Hv 
~ , wv ~ \ e/ , 
airos, KaTwuooaTo av’ KpeirTOv yap EveKa Tov 


that we may confine ourselves here as before to the defat/s that require 
notice. One puzzling circumstance which pervades this Chapter, tending 
to confusion, and adding to the difficulties arising from the extreme bre- 
vity of the expression (‘drevts esse laborat obscurus fit’,is especially true of 
Aristotle here, as indeed in most of his writings,) it may be worth while 
to draw attention to; and that is, that throughout it both plaintiff and 
defendant are made to argue in the ¢Ard person; to avoid this, you may 
may be substituted for Aristotle’s Ae to designate the person who is in 
immediate possession of the argument, whichever side of the case he may 
be at the time maintaining. 

On the technical expressions belonging to dpeot, see note in Introd. 
Pp. 202, &d8ovae dpxoy, in Aristotle and the Orators, is to offer or fender an 
oath, AapzBaveey (or d€yerOa, in the Orators), to accept, or fake it. 

el dp@poora ovros] ‘when Zhis (the oath above mentioned) has been 
already taken by onc or other of the two parties’. cudpoora here is 
represented by yeyernpévos in § 32. 

§ 28. ovx awodi8mc:] Supply ra ypyyara (the deposit, or something 
else which the opponent is unjustly withholding), which is added in three 
MSS, apparently from a marginal gloss. 

The case is: you refuse to tender the oath to the adverse party be- 
cause it is of no use; he is so little embarrassed by scruples of consci- 
ence that he will take the oath and keep the money, so that you gain 
nothing by your motion. rovs de ‘but the judges, you think, if he do of 
swear, will decide against him’, 

Another reason, or topic, for refusing to tender the oath is, that ‘this 
form of risk’, the risk that one runs by leaving the matter to, by throwing 
oneself upon, the judges (6 «iv8uvos ovros 6 év Trois Sixacrais), is to be pre- 
ferred (xpeirrwy), viz. to the risk incurred of losing your suit by tendering 
oath to the adversary, who will probably perjure himself: you there- 
fore refer your case to the decision of the judges, because you can trust 
them, but not the other. 

§ 29. avri xpnpdrov] is, setting a pecuniary value upon the oath (esti- 
mating it against money, at so much money value), which is degrading to 
the dignity and sanctity of the oath, and ¢herefore it is that you refuse to 
take it, and not from any baser motive. 

Katopocato| xaropyuvas (dpxoy) occurs in Arist. Ran. 305, 306, appa- 


288 PHTOPIKH® A 15 § 29. 


~ > vA , > - A t 74 A 
pavAov etvat nj pndevoss Omooas wey ovv E€e, uy 

4 > # e/ A e >) f ") 
éuoras 8 ov.! ovTw be Ot’ dpeTnv av Ein, GAN’ ov Oe 

, ~ S e o 

émopxiay Td pn:* Kal TO TOU Zevodavous apuorret, 
e/ ) a , 4 ? ~ b) ) ~ ) 9 
OTe ovK ton mpoKAnats aitn doeBeEi mpos evoe3n, GAN 
e ~ 4 4 ~ , “A ~ 
Ouoia Kat et toxupos aoleyrn matafa 4 mAnyHvat 


1 od: infra. 2 uh. infra. 

rently as a mere synonym of the simple verb, A. xat6is xaropocoy. &. v4 
A’; A. dpocoy. =. ») Aia. With dpxoy and a second accus. of the thing 
sworn by, Eur. Hel. 835, dX’ ayvor Gpxoy aov xdpa xarapooa. The middle 
voice is found again in Herod. v1 65, but in a different sense ‘to swear 
against’, with a genitive following. Here, and in the two other cases 
quoted above, the xara seems to have an intensive force, expressing the 
‘binding force’ of an oath. This sense of «card comes from the original, 
physical, notion of ‘keeping down’. 

For the interpretation of this obscure topic, see Introd. p. 203. The 
obscurity is a little heightened by Bekker’s punctuation, and may be 
very slightly cleared up by reading pa dpocas 8 od (with colon instead of 
full stop) and at the end of the next clause ro 7. (with full stop instead of 
colon). There is a considerably closer connexion between the two 
clauses which he separates by a full stop, than there is between the two 
which are divided only by a colon. 

The intention of the topic is to shew the purity and disinterestedness 
of the speaker’s motives in refusing to take the oath. 

cal ro Tou Kevoddvous] Xenophanes of Colophon, the founder of the 
Eleatic school of Philosophy (Plat. Soph. 242 D, rd 8é wap’ nyiy ’EXeate- 
xoyv €bvos, dro Kevocavous...apf£ayevov)—of which Parmenides his follower 
was the most distinguished representative, who converted the theolo- 
gical conception of universal being, represented by Xenophanes as God, 
into the metaphysical conception of the Universe as One, éy ro dp— 
appears to have conveyed his philosophical doctrines in hexameter verse, 
an example subsequently followed by Parmenides and Empedocles. He 
also wrote elegies and iambics, the latter directed against Homer and 
Hesiod, whose manner of speaking about the Gods he disapproved, Diog. 
Laert. IX 2.18. The verse quoted ere is a trochaic tetrameter; on 
which Mullach remarks, Fragm. Phil. Gr. Xenoph. Fr. 25, p. 106, note, 
‘cuius versiculi hiatus in voce avrn caesurae excusationem habet, prima 
autem syllaba in doeSet producitur ad aliorum nominum velut a@davaros 
similitudinem’. So Karsten, Xenophanes, p. 79. The work which con- 
tained this verse is unknown. Mullach and Karsten agree in the opinion 
that this verse is all that belongs to Xenophanes in Aristotle’s reference ; 
the succeeding illustration is his own. All that is repeated in the con- 
verse of Xenophanes’ maxim, § 30, is what is contained in the verse itself. 
I have no doubt they are right. On Xenophanes and his philosophy, 
besides the two works already referred to, which contain collections of 
the surviving fragments, see the histories of Greek Philosophy, by 
Brandis, Zeller, Ritter, Butler, with Dr Thompson’s notes and the 
rest; also Grote’s Plato, Vol. 1. pp. 16—19. 


PHTOPIKH® A 15 §§ 30—3z2. 289 


/ ? ~ 
30 mpoxaAéoatto. et dé AauBavea, OTL morTEever avVTW, 
bd , 9 rd A 4 ~ , , 
eExetvw 0 OU. Kal TO TOU =EvoPavous peTaATTpEVaVTA 
, 74 af Fv aA e ‘ 2 \ ~ e 
haréov ottws icov eva av 6 pev daoeBns dda, 6 8 
>... A 9 , , A A , > 7 e A ¢ 
evore Bs duvun? Sevvov Te TO pn Dede avTOV, UTEP wy 
~ A e/ 
31 €xetvous a£iot duoaavras OuaCew. et de didwou, OTe 
9 A 4 ’ “ ~ > , \ of 9@ 4 
evoeBes TO OeNew Tots Oeois Emir pEerretv, Kat OTe ovdEv 
det avtov aAdNwy Kkpitwv Setcba avto yap didwor 
, / A , A ¢ 
32 Kpivev. Kai OTt aToTTOY TO py OerNELY GuyUvat TEpi wy 


Gn’ opola kai ei] In this illustration of Xenophanes’ dictum, the 
parallel case proposed by Aristotle, the strong man is the unscrupulous 
or godless man, who is ready to swear anything, true or false; he has 
the same advantage over the scrupulous, godfearing man, in a chal- 
lenge to swear, as the strong man would have ower the weak ina chal- 
lenge to fight. 

mwaragat } mAnyjva| These forms are in general use in Attic Prose as 
the aorist active and passive of rumrm. Eth. N. v 5. 4, p. 1132 4 28, ef 
dpxiy txav brdragev, ov dei dvriwAnyjvat, xal ei dpyovra brdrafe ov wAnyi- 
vat povoy det GAAG Kal xoAacOjva. Ib. V 4.4, p. 1132 @ 8, dvay 6 pev WANYG 
6 8€ ward£p, 9 nai xreivy 6 3. droOdvy. de Anima, B, 8, p. 419 4 15, Td Thtrrov 
kai 76 tvwrépevov followed by dy whyyjq, ib. p. 420 a 24, rvwrépevov xal 
témrov followed by day wardgy. For further illustrations see Dem. Select 
Private Orations, 11. pp. 207—211, Excursus on the defective verb ri- 
To. S.] 

§ 30. drs moreves air, éxeimp 8 ov] ‘that he can trust Aimse/f (not 
to swear to what he knows to be false), but not the other’. (In this case, 
if you accept the cath, or consent to swear) ‘Xenophanes’ dictum may be 
inverted (turned round to the other side), and you may say, that this Is 
the fair way of proceeding, for the godless man to tender the oath, and 
the godfearing to take it’; (because the latter won’t perjure himself, the 
other will). jeraorpéyas, in § 25, was used in a somewhat different sense 
*to pervert’ justice; ‘and (you may add) it is monstrous for you to refuse 
to take it yourse//, in a matter in which (dmép dy) you? require those gen- 
tlemen (the judges, namely,) to take an oath before they decide’. The 
judges were sworn upon entering the court to Ceci ‘according to the 
best of their judgment’, § 5, supra. 

§ 31. ‘If you tender the oath, (you argue) that to entrust the case to 
the decision of heaven is an act of piety; and that (your opponent) ought 
to require no other judges than himself; and therefore (/#. you say this 
because, yap) you offer him the decision of the matter’. Comp. Quint. v 
6.4, Ad is qui defert aliogui agere modeste videtur quum litis adversa- 
rium tudicem faciat, et eum cuius cognitio est onere liberat, gui profecto 
alieno tureiuvrando stari quam suo mavult, Victorius thinks that this is ~ 
borrowed from Aristotle. 


1 T have translated this ‘the adversary’ in the Introd. p. 203, but I now think 
that it should rather be referred to the same person as avréy. 


AR. I, 19 


290 PHTOPIKHS A. 15 §§ 32, 33. 


~ ? A ef - 
dAXous d£ioi duvivas. éwel d€ kal’ Exacrrov dSnAov 
~ é ~ ~ 
was AEKTEov, Kai ovvdvaCdpuevoy mus EKTEOV OnAov, 
4 , ‘ , 4 
otov et avros pev OerXee Aa Bavery didovac de pun, Kai 
| A 4 ry ra 
et Sidwor mev AauBaverw b€ un OéerAet, wai et NauBave 
‘ s , of s 9 \ ~ ? 
cai Sidovas OerAer etre pundéTEepov’ ex yap Tw eElpn- 
~ df A ‘ , 
Mévwy avayKn ouyKeiobat, wore Kai Tous oyous 
~ ~ , 4 \ #P * 
dvaykn ouyxetoOa éx Twv eipnucvev. éav de n YEyE- 
~ \ e/ , 
ynuevos Um’ avTOU Kal évayTios, OTt OUK é7topKia’ 
e A ~ ~ ) ~ e , 
Exova.ov yap TO aouKkeiv, TO O émropKety aoeKkeiv EoTi, 
A A 4 \ 9 , ? , 9 ~ F 
33 Ta 0€ Bia Kal awaty dxovoia. évTavla ovv cuvax- 
, q & » a 4 4 x ~ , ? . 9 
Téov Kai TO émopkeiv, OTL EaTe TO TH Ctavoia GAN’ Ov 
~ , \ \ ~ 3 , Ss » , 4 
TH OTOMATL. av O0€ TW aYTOIKI 7 GUWMOTMEVOS, OTL 


§ 32. vn’ avrov] ‘by yourself’, supra, § 20, note on I 1.12, 1 7. 35. 

éxovcwoy yap ro ddixeiv] On the ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ as 
affecting the character of actions, see Eth. Nic. III cc. 1, 2, 3, where the 
subject is thoroughly discussed ; and on the degrees of criminality, and 
the distinction of wrong actions done with malice prepense, éx srpovoias, 
or with deliberate purpose, mpoapéoee, and those which are due to acci- 
dent, mistake, drary, or the momentary blindness of passion, see Eth. N. 
Vv 10, both of which passages have already been more than once referred 
to. On Bia as a supposed source of action, I 10. 14, and the Appendix 
“On the seven sources of action’, Introd. p. 225. 

The term ‘injustice’ or ‘criminality’ can only be applied to actions 
voluntary in the proper sense of the word: the pleader who has executed 
two contracts, one conflicting with the other, and thus violated his en- 
gagements, argues that this was done in one or the other instance, either 
by force or fraud, compulsion or mistake, and that this exempts him 
from responsibility. 

§ 33. ovvaxréov] ocuvayes like ovAdoyiferOat, ev\AapBave, ovdAdeyes, 
cuvopay, cumdeiy, cumevas, &c., and similarly vomprehendcre, colligere, all 
convey the notion of ‘gathering’ facts together, for the purpose of com- 
parison, and so drawing a conclusion of some kind. ovvayew and ovddo- 
yiferOas are to ‘draw logical inferences’, from facts or premisses which 
you put together, and so by comparison are led to infer some general 
conclusion respecting them. 

To 17 Stavoig GAN’ ov rp ordpart] This is the famous 7 yA@oo’ cpedpoy” 
9 8€ dpyy avdporos, Eur. Hippol. 612. The success of Aristophanes, and 
the vulgar misapprehension arising chiefly therefrom, have brought on 
Euripides a most baseless charge of immorality, so far at least as it is 
grounded upon this line. Cicero, de Off. 111 29, has seen and exposed 
the fallacy. All the moralists without exception admit that the essence 
of a lie resides not in the words, but in the intention and moral pur- 
pose; and the verse when properly interpreted asserts no more than this. 


PHTOPIKHS A 15 § 33. 291 


, 8 am e 8 > s @ 5d ) A 
TWavTa avaipel 6 My Eupevwy ois wpooey Sia yap 
~ ~ ~ ae ~ 
TOVTO Kai Tots voMOLS XpwvTat OmocayTes. Kai “Uuas 
> ~ 9 4 4 
mev afiovpev éupeve ois duocavres StxaleTe, avtol 
? -9 ~ 99 4 A wv A : 
& ovx €upevouuev.” Kat daa av adda avfwy tis 
a 
el7reLev. 
4 A ? ~ > , 4 > 
[wept ev ovv tTwv atéexvwv Tiorewv eipnobw 
TOTAUTA.| 


See Paley’s note. It seems to me that the Hippolytus in its second and 
altered form, as we now have it, is, with the exception of the one fatal 
blot of Phaedra’s false charge which brings about the death of the hero, 
one of the most moral and high-toned, as it certainly is one of the very 
best, of the extant tragedies of Euripides. 

avatpei] supra § 21, avatpeiv ourOnxny, rovs vopous. 

nal Tois yopots yparrat opocayres| ‘the laws also (as well as other 
things) are not enforced till an oath has been taken’, ‘the laws in parti- 
cular are only enforced after an oath has been taken’. 

cai das pév] On the explanation of this topic, and of the var. lect. 
dppevotper and ¢upévovo.w, see Introd. pp.204—5. MS A‘ has dupévovow; 
the rest éypevotpmer, which Bekker retains. 

eipno8e) See on 1 13,29. 


19—2 


APPENDIX (A) 
ON 


A rr $17. 


, 4 -~ 9 ~ 
oropyn, €pws, pire, ayaray. 


[The following Appendix has already appeared as an article in 
the Journal of Philology, Vol. 1 No. 1 (1868), pp. 88—93.  s.] 


THERE are four terms in Greek which represent different states 
or degrees of affection, fondness, liking, love, in its most general 
acceptation. Of these oropy} and épus are co-ordinate terms, in this 
respect, that they both designate what Aristotle calls wa@y, instinctive 
affections, implanted in sentient beings by nature. 

oropyy is the natural and instinctive affection that subsists be- 
tween parent and child; irrational, but moral; an aAoyov wados, 
but yOixov. ydv ye marnp réxvoww ei oropyyv Exot, Philem. ap. Stob. 
Meineke, Fr. Comm. Gr. 1v 63. Fr. Inc. 108. orépyew, Oed. R. 1023, 
eorepfev of parental affection, Oed. Col. 1529. Plat. Legg. v1 754 B, 
xaOamep rais...orépyet ré Kal orépyerat umd Tov yevyyoarruv. Ar. Eth. 
N. IX 7, 1168 @ 2, orépyovres Gowep réxva: ib. line 7, orépye dy 10 
épyov, tovro 8¢ duaixey, which describes an instinctive feeling, though 
not here the specially parental; comp. vilt 14, 1161 2 18, of yovets pew 
yap orépyovot ta réxva...ra 5% réxva rovs yoveis: and line 25, of wey yap 
ebOus yevopeva orépyovow, for which immediately afterwards ¢rAciv is 
twice substituted, lines 27, 28. But the verb is by no means confined 
to this special sense, and passes readily into the more general significa- 
tion of ‘liking’ in the modified form of ‘acquiescence’ and ‘ tolera- 
tion’ (to acquiesce in, put up with, as aivety and ayargv); and is even 
applied to the sexual affection, as Xen. Symp. vir 14 and 21; and 
in Ar. Eth. N. viii 5, 1157 @ 29, it is used to express the instinctive 
liking or love which children feel for one another, 8¢ yd5ovqv adAyAous 
orépyovras, womep of raises: ows, again, the other form of instinctive 
or animal affection, is sometimes substituted for cropyy, as Eur. Fragm. 
Erecth. 19 (Dind.), ap. Stob. 77, p. 454, épdte yytpes maides’ as ovK 
xr’ Epws ToLovTos aAXos, olos 7diwy épay. 


oropyn, Eows, dideiv, ayarrav. 293 


épws differs from the preceding only in respect of its special 
direction and the absence of moral character: otherwise it 1s an 
dXoyos opefis, a natural, animal impulse ; the sexual form of érOvupia, 
or natural appetite. dre érGupla tus 0 Epws wavri SyAov, Plat. Phaedrus 
237 D. dovg Kat Avwy peutypévoy (the characteristic of éreAupia) 
épwra, Tim. 42 A; and though it is doubtless applied metaphorically, 
in the sense of a ‘ passionate desire’ similar to the animal appetite, 
to represent intellectual and moral desires, as when Plato says épay 
pabyoews, Ppovycews, roy kaday, yet I believe that when directly and 
literally applied to its object, it seldom or never means anything else. 
Arist. Eth. N. 1X 10, 1171 4 12, épav...brepBody yap ris elvat Bovderar 
girias, rovro 5& mpes Eva, is an exception; here épgy is said to be a 
kind of ¢:Aia : the individual passion opposed to ‘affection’ or ‘love’ 
in general. The reverse of this—the ordinary distinction of the two 
words—appears in Pl. Phaedrus, 231 C, rovrovs padsora pace pirciv ov 
dv épaoi, that is, they feel the highest (moral) affections for those who 
have inspired them with the sensual passion. Comp. 255 E, xaAc de 
nuroy Kai oleras ovx épwra adda diXlay elvar. Symp. 179 C, trepeBarero 
TH Pirig bia tov épwra, where épws represents the oropyy, or natural 
affection. Ib. 182 c, pirias, 6 59 padiora Gurci o tpws dgurorety. Ar. , 
Polit. 11 4, 1262 6 12, ws trav épewrav Sa 1d odddpa pireiy erPupov- 
tov cvpdivat, Eth. N. 1X 5, 1167 @ 3, douxe 59 apyy pirias chvat, wowrep 
tov épav, 7 Sua THs Gews ySovy. The distinction of gpws and ¢iriia 
appears very clearly in Eth. Nic. 1x 1, sub init., 1164 @ 3 seq., év dé 
TH épwru «.7.A. The application of the word to a higher and purer 
love, in such passages as Eur. Fragm. Dict. vir (Dind., Wagner), add’ 
gore Sy rts GAXos év Bporots epws, Yuyxis Sixaiws oudppovds re xayalys, 
Kat xpyv 6¢...rav esoeBovvruy oirwés ye oudpoves épgy: and Fragm. 
Oedip. 11 (Dind.), vir (Wagn.), évos & dpwros ovros ob pe 7d0v7" of 
pey xaxuv épwory, of d& tev xarav' o 5 els ro cddpov éx’ apernv aywy 
épws Cndwros avOpwrouw. This is no exception, for here it is still the 
animal impulse which is represented as sublimed and purified, and 
transformed (by a metaphor) into a moral appetite, just as the épws 
in Plato’s Phaedrus and Symposium is converted by the same process 
into a passton of philosophical enthusiasm. 

girciy and ¢Ala are designations of ‘love’ in its widest and most 
comprehensive sense. The verb may even stand as a synonym of 
épav, as Topic. A 15,106 d 2, re pav xara ryv Savory girciv To pucety 
evayriov, rp 8% xara THv cuparicny dvépyeay ovdév, where the 70 ¢durcly 
Kata THY owparuny évépyay is of course equivalent to épav. It also. 
includes the whole family of likings and fondnesses, natural and ac- 
quired, which are attached to special and particular classes of 
objects, expressed by compound adjectives; as iAoroovros, ‘one 


204 - APPENDIX (A). 


who is fond of so and so’, ddAvwos, gidimwros, dutormos, Prlorxos, 
prréraipos, didavros, &c. Ia the eighth and ninth books of the Nic. 
Eth. ¢Aia embraces every kind of moral and intellectual affection, 
instinctive or acquired, and is identified both with erépyew (vir 14, 
1161 @ 27, 28) and ayargv—see for example vit1 3, where all three 
are employed as equivalent terms (1156 @ 14,16), épav, the sensual 
appetite being expressly distinguished from them by its own name, 
52,4. In Plato, Phaedrus 241 C, D, it comprehends even gus, nv 
€pacrod didrlay, followed by a&s ruida Pidrodcry epacrai: and in 
the same verse ayarav is used in the same sense (ws Aveoe apy 
ayarac, ws maida dtAovoww épacra() In the Ethics therefore it 
expresses every shade and variety and gradation of the feeling of 
love in its moral and intellectual aspects from the instinctive affec- 
tion of the parent, to the highest and ideal form of love; which 
according to the Greek notion was not that which subsists between 
the two opposite sexes, but that between two members of the supe- 
rior sex; and again within that the friendship of two good men. 
The definition of Ata in the Rhetoric, 11 4. 2, is ‘the wishing any 
one what you think good, for his sake and not for your own® (this 
is repeated from the Ethics), ‘and the inclination or tendency to 
do such things to the best of your power’. This is disinterested 
affection, love in its moral aspect, and also in some degree intellec- 
tual, in so far as it implies choice: and in this respect corresponds 
with the Latin ailigere, or deligere, to choose the object of your 
affection, which impltes a judgment of his value. The analysis as well 
as the definition of the wa8es in the Rhetoric excludes all con- 
sideration of épws, and in fact it is treated rather as friendship than 
as love. 

We next come to the distinction between ¢iretv and ayorgy. 
Doderlein, Za#. Syrx. p. 103, and Rost and Palm in their Lexicon, 
connect ayargy with the root of dyapa: and its congeners: this would 
make the distinctive character of ayam@y an intellectual form of love 
derived from ‘admiration’ or a high estimate of the ments of the 
person loved. Whether this be the true derivation of the word or 
not, this notion of selection or affection, conceived, on the ground of 
admiration, respect, and esteem, certainly enters into its meaning. 
Xen. Mem. 11 7. 9 is decisive on this point. Speaking of the rela- 
tions of a master to his female servants, Socrates says, éay 5? rpocre- 
THTYS Orws évepyot dot, ov pev exewas Hiryous copay apedivovs ceavra 
ovoas’ éxeivac 5€ oe ayarnoovet aicfopevat xaiporra oe atrats. The 
same conception of value (estimation) and hence esteem, as the 
foundation of love—complete ¢:Ata—appears in a passage of Plato’s 
Lysis, 215 A, B, ta 89 rowitra rus dy ux adAqAwy ayarybey pydeniav 


oTopyn, Epes, direiv, ayarrayv. 295 


éxtxoupiay aAAnAots éxovra (the service rendered or benefit conferred 
Is the ground of the esteem and affection); o 5¢ ay rou Seopevos ovdd 
mT. ayargn ay. 6 58 py ayaray ovd dv dPrror. 

-I have looked over, with the help of an index, the instances of 
the word which occur in the Nicomachean Ethics, and find that in 
every case it may, and in many must, have this sense of an acquired 
affection, founded upon the judgment or intellectual faculty, which is 
indicated by the term ‘esteem’, and thereby distinguished from the 
irrational appetite épws, and the purely emotional, and usually moral 
affection, geAta, In 1 3, init. 1095 817, the esteem which the vulgar 
have for a life of sensual enjoyment is represented as the result of 
a judgment about pleasure: and the same is the case with 8¢ avrd 
ayararas at the end of the Chapter, ‘they are valued, prized, 
esteemed, in and for themselves’. In 111 13, 1118 4 4, it is distin- 
guished from yaipew, the instinctive affection, in the sense of to 
‘estimate or prize’; and at the end of c. 14 there is a very marked 
and decisive exemplification of this sense of the word, o yap ovrws 
éxwv padAov ayarg tas troavras ydovas tis agias, where the aéfia, 
‘their value’, shews clearly what determines the particular character 
of the affection. In further illustration of this I will merely refer to 
other places of the Ethics. In 1x 7, from 1167 4 32 onwards, four 
examples of the word in this signification occur nearly together: in 
one of them it is actually contrasted with @Actv: and xX 7, 1177 D2, 
and 9, 11794 28, where it is placed in juxtaposition with ridvras, 
another word which conveys the notion of ‘value’, are two clear 
instances, ayamgy therefore as contrasted with épay and duet repre- 
sents the Latin d4igere as opposed to amare’. 

It may be questioned whether this is the primary and original 
sense of ayaray, since the meaning that appears most prominently 
and conspicuously in the Homeric use of it and ayarafew is that 
of the external manifestations and signs of affection shewn in ‘ wel- 
coming ’* a friend or stranger, or in fondling and caressing as a 
father his child, Odys. 7’ 17: and the word is the precise counter- 
part of dorafeoGa. See the examples in Damm’s Lexicon, which all 
have this character; except Odys. ¢ 289, where it bears the sense, 
common in the later language, and shared with aivety and orépyev, 
of acquiescing in, putting up with, contentment. But as it seems 
easier and simpler to derive the notion of the external indications of 

1 Ernesti, Clav. Cic. s.v. dtligere magis ad indicium, amare vero ad intimum 
animi sensum pertine. See Déderlein, Lat. Syn. p. 97 seq., and Trench, Mew 
Test. Syn. p. 43 seq. 

* Dr Lightfoot in Cambridge Fournal of Classical and Sacred Philology, No. 7, 


Vol. 111 (1857) p. 92, regards this usage of Homer as determining the primary 
and original sense of the word. 


206 APPENDIX (A). 


welcome from an internal sense or judgment, previously acquired, of 
the worth or value of one whom you receive so kindly, than the 
reverse process, the derivation of the feeling, whether it be esteem or 
affection, from the external manifestations of it, I prefer regarding 
the intellectual judgment as the basis of the distinction between 
it and the other forms of affection, and ‘esteem’ as its primary and 
original signification. If Déoderlein’s derivation from d@yope, and 
words of that family, could be depended upon, no doubt would be 
left upon this question. 

In common usage, however, it is, like Activ, by no means con- 
fined to a single sense. In Plato’s Sympos. 180 8, it takes the place 
of épay in the representation of the lowest and most sensual form of 
the passion or appetite of love, orav o épwpevos toy épaarny ayar¢ 
9} Grav o épacris ta waidtxa. In Lucian, Ver. Hist. 1 25, we find 
similarly, éravas ayaraca tov veavicxoy. 

We therefore arrive at the conclusion in respect of these terms, 
expressive of different kinds of love or affection, that, although they 
are all of them more or less interchangeable in the ordinary lan- 
guage, yet in the strict and proper application of them they may be 
thus distinguished :— 

aoropyy and épws are alike in that they are natural, spontaneous, 
and instinctive; but épws is properly a sensual appetite, and oropyq 
a moral affection. 

¢Aia, the most comprehensive (in its ordinary use) of the four, 
belongs to the emotional part of our nature, includes all grades of the 
natural instinctive affection from a Itking for wine to the perfect 
fnendship (the highest form of love) between good man and good 
man; and in this its highest and normal sense acquires a moral 
aspect. 

ayargv (dyary does not appear in any writers earlier than those 
of [the Septuagint and] N. T.) gives the intellectual aspect of love, 
in the shape of esteem; no longer a mere emotion, but an affection 
acquired and conceived after an exercise of judgment, consisting in 
a valuation or estimate formed of the worth of the object of preference. 


APPENDIX (B) 
ON 


A 12 § 22. 


On an irregular formation of the Greck passive verb. 


[The following Appendix has, like the last, already been allowed 
to appear in the Journal of Philology, Vol. No. 1 (1868), pp. 93—97. 
The additions in square brackets are taken from the margin of Mr 
Cope’s own copy of the Journal, now in Mr Sandys’ possession. s.] 


PboveicOa, POovovpevor, is an example of the irregular formation 
of the passive, which is not seldom found in other Greek authors, but 
is So much more frequent in Aristotle’s writings that it may perhaps 
be regarded as one of the characteristics of his style. In the Greek 
Grammars that I have consulted, with the exception of that of Dr 
Donaldson, who only bestows on it a passing observation’, it is left 
unnoticed, and I will therefore illustrate it by some examples that I 
have collected. 

The best account of it that I have found is given in Madvig’s 
Latin Grammar, Ch. 111. on the dative case, § 244 b, and Obs. 3, 4, 
Engl. Transl. ; his explanation of the Latin usage will apply equally 
well to the Greek. 

The transitive verb, which expresses a direct action of subject 
on object—the relation of the two being inverted in the passive, in 
which agent becomes patient and patient agent, I strike A, A is 
struck by me—is the only kind that according to strict grammatical 
rule admits of the passive formation: verbs neuter, in which the 
action ends in itself, to walk, to run, and verbs which transmit the 
action, but s#directly—these are verbs which in Greek and Latin 
‘govern’ other cases than the accusative (the case which expresses 
the direct action)—cannot, properly speaking, be converted into 
passives. 


1 Greek Gram. § 43t. Obs. hh, if. 


298 APPENDIX (B). 


Speaking of the dative case, ‘the object of reference’, in Latin, 
Madvig says, § 244 b, “this cannot, like the proper object, become 
the subject with the passive, and such verbs (like those that are 
intransitive) can only be used impersonally in the passive, s2videtur, 
nemini nocetur.” (1am not sure that there is any exact analogy to - 
this in Greek, ayapraveras is a doubtful case.) Obs. 4 gives a few 
exceptions. ‘‘To make such a dative the subject, and to use the 
verb of it personally in the passive, is a rare irregularity ; s#videor, 
Horace, A. P. 56, credor, Ov. Trist. 111 10. 25, medendis corporibus, 
Liv. vitt 36,” add vegnari, Tac, Hist. 1 16, wirginibus bacchata 
Lacaenis Taygeta, Virg. Georg. 11 487, regnata, Hor. Od. 11 6. 11, I 
29. 27, Ovid. Heroid. x 69. 2, smperor, Hor. Ep. 1 5. 21. Heusinger 
ad Cic. de Off. 11 4 gives a list of neuter verbs which become passives, 
but does not make the necessary distinctions : most of those which 
he quotes are used as impersonals. [On Latin participles of this 
formation, see Munro, on Lucr. 11 156, 363. | 

Obs. 2, “ Some few verbs are used both with the accusative and 
the dative (in applymg this to the Greek, for dative, must be substi- 
tuted, ‘some other case with or without a preposition’,) without any 
perceptible difference in their signification, adulor, acmulor, despero, 
praestolor.” In Greek OopvBeicbar (jpas OopvBeirw, Plat. Phaedr. 245 
B), aperccrGar (apedrcty with accus. Herod. vii 163) are analogous. 

In English a similar license is admitted, particularly in verbs 
which are constructed with prepositions, ‘do as you would be done 
by’, or ‘done unto’, Locke, Zssay, Bk. 1 ch. 3, §§ 4 and 7, ‘to be sent 
for’, ‘gone for’, ‘looked for’, ‘to be relied upon’ (hence the vulgar 
reliable, unaccountable, and similar irregularities). See an observa- 
tion on this subject in Marsh’s Lect. on the Engl.. Language, Lect. 
xvill § 14. “‘The rejection of inflexions, and especially the want of 
a passive voice, have compelled the use of some very complex and 
awkward expressions...such a thing Aas been gone through with, to 
be taken notice of, to be lost sight of, are really compound, or rather 
agglutinate, passives, &c.” [See Thring, Exercises in Grammar, p. 3, 
‘I am told’.] 

I subjoin some instances of this irregular passive from various 
Greek authors. Euripides, Ion 87, Tlapyyoudes 8 aBarot xopudai 
catadapmopevat, 1b. 475, xopevonéves cpirod:, Iph. Taur. 367, avAcirar 
S¢ xray péAaOpov. 

Thuc. 1 126, émcrerpappevor tryv pvdaxyy, (“even the dative or 
genitive of the person, which had formed the object of the active 
verb, may become the subject of the passive. Thuc.1126. Xen. 
Anab. 1 6, 1, arorpnOévres rds xepadas', &c.” Donaldson, Gr. Gr. u.s.). 


1 I rather think that this is not the right explanation of the construction in 
these two cases; at all events it may be otherwise explained. The verbs éwcrpé- 


On an irregular formation of the Greek passive verb, 299 


The deponents aipeioGa: and aweioGa: are converted into passives 
in Xen.Memor. 111 2. 3, Ar. Pol. vi (tv) 45, 12994 19, alpowvras 52 
Kat xpeoBevrai (this may possibly be justified by the transitive use of 
uipev, but in a different sense, the middie being necessary to the notion 
of ‘choosing’, or ‘taking for oneself’). Plat. Phaedr. 69 B (in Ast’s 
note several other examples of wvetoGa: pass. from Xenoph. and Plat.) 
sim, axapvetoGar, passive, Ar. Anal. Pr. 1 32, 47 5 2, 3, 4. dvafa- 
Geis, Xen. de re equestr. 11 4, of a horse that is mounted (the 
regular constr. is avaBaivew ép immov, or éf Grrov). avaSaivew in 
Hom. with the accus. has a diff. sense, ‘to go up f0’.) adreAdobat, 
Conv. Iv 31. xaAeraiver$a:, to be regarded, or treated, with angry 
feeling, Plat. Rep. 1 337 A. owovdalerGa, to be eagerly pursued, 
(several other examples in Ast’s Lexicon s. v. éorovSacpyévous, Isocr. 
Panath. § 1 44) tb. vi 485 E, apedetofar (see above) vill 551 A, 
karagpoveiobar, ib. 556 D, xarayeAacOyvaz, Euthyphro. 3 Cc, rAnmpe- 
AcioOax, Phaedr. 275 ©, Dem. de Cor. § 155, (ina law). owovdclecGat, 
xatragppoveioGa, Ar. Rhet. 11 {2. 16], 3. 7, vmrepéxeoGar, Rhet. 1 
7- 2, 3, and Eth. N. iv 8, 1124 5 Lo, (vepéxeav re or twa do occur, 
but rarely). OopvBetoGa, 1 2. 10, 11 23. 30, Topic. A 12, 105 @ 16, 
Isocr. Panath. érnvypeévos xai reBopvBnpévos (on SopuBciobar see above). 
BonPeioba, Rhet. 11 6. 6, émixexeipyrar, 111 1. 3. drtBovdeverGat, Pol. 
vill (Vv) 10, 1311 5 35, POoveioOas, ib. 11, 1313 @ 23, murrever Oat, 
ib, 10, 1310 6 16. Xen. Symp. rv 29, Isocr. c. Demon. § 30, m- 
orevbévres, w. eipyv. § 76, Dem. c. Aristocr. p. 622, § 4. perdxeo Oat, 
‘to be participated in’, Arist. Metaph. A 9, 990 6 30, Top. A 121 
@12, Tov perexonevov Acyov, 126 a 18 and 21, Eth. Eud, 1 8, 2. 
mpoorarresGar, Top. E 129 a2 14, éirdrrecbat, Metaph. A 2, 982 
a18. évwxdpxeoGa (an unusually strange form), Anal. Post. 1 4, 73 
618. (Waitz ad loc.) xaryyopeiofa: passim ap. Arist. (Waitz ad 
Anal. Pr. 47 61.) [BonGeioPa, Rhet. 11 6. 6; wapynmeAnudvos, Eth. 
N. X 4, 1175 2 10; Plato, Crat. 404; évreGupnpévos (Heindorf ) Phace- 
drus, 246 c (with Thompson’s note); avdocera, Soph. Phil. 140; 
Homer, Od. Iv 177; wapadoyileras, de Soph. Elench. 165 @ 169, 
xexapio$w in Plato, Phaedrus, 2 5° C, 76 aloSavouevoy, Rep. 11. 375 A.| 
wey and droréuvew are both transitive, and therefore the passing form \a reyulnr, 
The accusative is the /oca/ accusative, which expresses the realof any affection oF 
quality, and follows adjectives and verbs neuter and passives Jelf (Kihner), Gir 
Gr. § 545. 6, supposes with great probability that this in a mere extension of the 
ordinary cognate accusative and its Varictics, dyabds roy Yuxhy, 7a wodsrind, 
dperny, &c. (Flat.), cards rd Tpdowwov, dd-yeiv ryy Keparty, 7h Supura, Adpeatas ri 
vwror, Tay 74 dra KQTeay67 ep ; Gorg. §15 4. aww dyads Mevéduns, whdue wriy 
"AXAXeds, and so on. By the same rule, rHy pudanhy alter dwererpappdvn tapneaney 
the seat of, the place as it were in Which it in depemited of Nem Ngreoh y three trnmd (vir, 
the watch) committed to them. [Similarly wiarebeatal v6, 10 be entin ded with 


something, the thing being the focal sat of tha trisat, Ghost den oboe My thom testa 
resides. } 


300 ’ APPENDIX (B). 


apaptraverOat certainly occurs as a pass., frequently in Sophocles 
and Plato, Eurip. Troad. 1028, Ar. Eth. Nic. Iv 9, 1125 @ 19, in 
the form ypaprnpévos; and in some other forms which are undoubt- 
edly passive; Xen. Mem. I 2. 9, dpapravopeva, bis, Arist. Eth. Nic. 
Ill 3, LIIX @ 35, apapryGervra, (also apapraverat, aS II 5, 1106 6 26, 
and elsewhere, which in this place from the opposition to xarop@otrat, 
line 30, seems more likely to be passive than middle): but in those 
cases where the choice between passive and middle is open, and the 
form does not determine it, as anzapraveras apapravopevos, it is often 
difficult to decide between the two. Homer certainly employs the 
middle, Od. 1x 512, auvapryocerfa ; and there seems no positive ob- 
jection to the interpretation of some of the forms employed by Plato 
and Aristotle as middle. (Ast in his Lexicon ranks all of them in 
Plato amongst the passives.) If the forms in question, apapraveoOat 
&c., are regarded as passive, the accusative, which in /¢his case 
becomes the nomin. to the passive verb, is the cognate, and not the 
direct, accusative. The object of the erroneous proceeding is the 
mistake that is made, apapravew apaprypa ; which becomes the sub- 
ject to the passive. 


APPENDIX (C) 


ON 


A 15 § 23. 


On €t Ov. 


Hermann on Viger, p. 833, n. 309, followed by Matthiae on Eur. 
Med. 87, defends this combination of e with the direct negative 
instead of yy against Elmsley, who holds it to be inadmissible, on 
the ground that, when it occurs, the negative does not belong to the 
hypothetical conjunction, but is attached closely to the word which 
it negatives, so as to combine with it one negative notion; as in 
Soph. Aj. 1131, ef rovs Oavevras ovn éds Oarrev wapuv ; where ovx és 
is equivalent to xwAves: in which cases the direct and not the hypo- 
thetical form of the negative is properly used to express an adstract 
negation. 

But this explanation, though it is well adapted to the passage 
of the Ajax’ quoted in support of it, is not universally applicable, 
and requires therefore to be supplemented by another and a dif- 
ferent solution. For example, in Plat. Phaedo 62 a, we have in 
two consecutive sentences, first ef ovdérore, and secondly ei p27) dowy 
éort, and both after the same word Gavpacrov. Now according to 
Hermann’s rule this py dovov should be ovx dovov, because the nega- 
tive here is just as much an abstract negation of dctov as ovx égy 
is of égy in the Ajax, the one ‘unhallowed’ as the other ‘to for- 
bid’: the same rule ought to be equally applicable to both; but 
it is not, and therefore this explanation of the distinction in this 
case breaks down. 

The explanation, that I would add, as more generally applicable, 
is this. It is universally acknowledged that ei does not always pre- 


2 Eur. Ion, 388, 
ws ef per ouxdr Lori, dyxw0y rddy, 
el 3 Ecru, EXOy pnrpds els Oy word, 
can doubtless be explained on this principle, And the same may be said of 
el 8 ovx qv, quoted by Herm. on Med. 348 (on Elms.) from Antiphan. ap. Athen. 
MII 99 A. 


302, APPENDIX (C). 


serve its hypothetical force, but may be put in the place of or: or ws 
to express a simple fact; or of érei, ‘since’, as a hypothetical con- 
sequence, where however no doudt is implied; or of worepov ‘ whe- 
ther’, as an alternative, after épwrav and similar verbs of questioning. 
See Matth. Gr. Gr. § 617. 2; Viger, p. 504, c. vill § 6. 3, and 
the passages quoted by Hoogeveen and Zeune in the note; Jelf 
(Kihner), Gr. Gr. § 804. 9; Buttm. Jad. fo Mid. «i pro or post 
eidévar, aicxuverOar (Buttm. does not mean that the usage is confined 
to these two verbs, but merely that these happened to be the only 
two instances of it in this speech of Dem.) ; Id. in Jud. ad Plat. dial. 
Iv ‘ei in re certa, et citra hypothesin, valet siguidem (da) Men. c. 3. 
d (p. 72 A) ef avevpyxa.’ Now it seems to me that whenever ei 
is used in this non-hypothetical sense, it naturally and properly is 
construed with the direct negative, just as dre and os, or éreé or 
aorepov, would be, and in the same sense. And I appeal again to 
the passage of the Phaedo, where, as I think, in default of this 
explanation, there is no reasonable way of accounting for the varia- 
tion of ov and py in the two cases after the same word, Oavpactov. 
In the first sentence the hypothesis is altogether discarded, and the 
translation is, ‘perhaps it will be surprising to you /Aa¢ this alone...and 
that it never happens, &c.’: in the second, the hypothetical form is 
retained, though the sense is lost, and ¢i is still ‘if’ ; ‘it seems perhaps 
surprising z/ (as is the fact nevertheless, of which however there is no 
doubt) it is not allowed to these same men to do themselves a service’, 
Now there is a special class of words, like aicypov, 8evov, atoror, 
Gavpacrov, Gavpafev, which are habitually followed (especially in the 
Orators) by e in the sense of dri, and are sometimes accompanied by 
its attendant ov: still, although exact accuracy seems to require the 
direct negative in these cases, the ordinary fondness for indefinite 
and hypothetical expressions, which has been noticed as character- 
istic of Greek habits of thought and speech (the use of the indefinite 
py, with relatives for instance, d py ocel, Ore S€ TovTo py zovodory, 
Dem. c. Lept. 464, et sim.), prevails so far that in the great majority 
of cases the py is retained. In Medea 87 (one of the lines on which 
Herm. writes his note) « rovode y evvys ovvex’ ob orépye: waryp; el is 
certainly equivalent to éreé, and ov technically correct (though Her- 
mann’s rule might also apply ; as is etzrep in the verse quoted Rhet. 
II, 23. 1, elmep yap ovdé x.7.A, This is so clear, that Elmsley, who 
condemns ei ov altogether, proposes to read here éwei for eizep. (Note 
ad Med. 87.) Hermann’s example from Thucyd. 1 121, Sewoy dy ein, 
ef of pév...oux amepovcw, ypets 5é...0vK apa SaravyGopev, which, accord- 
ing to him, are equivalent to xaprepyoovew and decopeba, is much 
more reasonably and naturally explained on the other principle; of 
the two verbs, the first being in fact no part of the hypothesis at all, 
and with the second ov being justified by the meaning of ei, which is 


On ei ov. 303 


equivalent to ore. Herm. adds, however (note on Elms. Med. 87), 
“Obiter adicimus, etiam ubi ¢ a7 significat (‘whether or no’, a 
common signification of the particle; where again no hypothesis is 
implied, not merely an alternative) recte sequi ov, ut apud Plat. 
Protag. 341 B, si nulla est negationis ad affirmationem oppositio.” 
ei ovx aigxvvopar. On Elms. Med. 348, he quotes, as exemplifying 
his rule, Hom. Od. f’ 274, ei 8 ov xeivou y' écat yovos xai Tyvedomeiys. 
This seems to me no instance of it at all; and as it is equally unex- 
plained on my principle, it must be regarded as an exceptional case, 
and remain without explanation. All the rest of the examples quoted 
by Herm. |. c. from Herodotus and the Orators, in illustration of his 
theory, (with one exception) are instances of ei ‘that’ after Setvor. 
The exception is Andoc. wepi trav puorypiwv § 33, ef dé ovdéy yuap- 
That €yw x.t.A. How this can be brought under Hermann’s rule I 
am quite at a loss to perceive; but on the other principle the 
explanation is most clear and satisfactory. Andocides is defending 
himself, and offers an alternative; el pév te noéBynxa 7...amoxreivaré 
pe. ef S€ ovdey ypapryral pow x.r.A. Who can doubt that in the latter 
member of the alternative the speaker means to represent this as no 
admissible hypothesis—in fact he says so himself, «cat rovro ipiv amo- 
dexvups cadws—and therefore no hypothesis at all? It is therefore 
to be rendered, ‘but the fact being that I have committed no 
offence’, and is a signal example of the inapplicability of Hermann’s 
rule. ; 

In Dem. c. Mid. 581. 1, we have ei 5¢ xarayvots adixeiy tore Sia’ 
tatr obvy tryKouce x.7.A., where ovx bryxouce forms no part of the sup- 
position, but is stated as a fact of past time, and contrasted with what 
he may fossid/y do at present. The same applies to Aesch. c. Ctesiph. 
§ 250, #7 ov Savoy Soxel tyiv...ob rapa Tey TuXOVTWY...TAUTa TIVES OUK 
éfapvotyra x.7.A. Arist. Pol. 1f 11, 1273 4 3, drowov yap ef wévys pay 
wy...pavrorepos 5 av od BovAnoerar Saxanycus. 

I will conclude this note with two examples of a parallel case in 
which dv with the optative is found following ¢, contrary to the ordi- 
nary rule of Greek grammar. One occurs in Dem. c. Lept. p. 475, 
ei p&dXovtes piv eb racxeav euxoddvryy ay rov tadta Aéyovta ryoiode, 
xi r@ 5 adeNéoOas x.7.X., where the contrasted wéy and 6€ (on which 
Buttm. Gr. Gr. and Jndex fo Mid.) shew that the first of the two 
members is independent of the supposition: the other in Aesch. c. 
Timarch. § 85, dromov ay etn, & 'AOyvaior, ei pydty pév...xat jo7) yevo- 
perys piv xpicews wept rod xpdypatos Aw dy K.T.A. 





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