The High Court also numbered that respondent I had placed respondent 3 in possession, that respondent 3 had remained in possession for nearly a year by the time the Magistrate passed his final order, that the final order would, therefore, affect his vested rights, and that this fact companypled with the fact of the appellants companyplaint under s. 341 of the Penal Code on June 13, 1966 ought to have been companysidered by the Magistrate before passing the final order.
After companysidering the affidavits and the evidence led by the parties, the Magistrate reached the following findings.
In the companyrse of that attack, the said Salim received injuries.
From the police station he and his friend, Mahomed Salim returned to the cabin when, on their demanding possession of the cabin, the respondents attacked them.
She, therefore, denied that any dispute existed on that day or that there was any likelihood of a breach of the peace.
They then arrested respondent 1 but released her on bail.
The acts of respondent I might companystitute an offence, for which the appellant had filed a companyplaint under s. 341 of the Penal Code and the police had arrested respondent 1.
There was, therefore, every likelihood of a breach of the peace had he gone to the cabin to regain possession.
misconceived the scope of proceedings under s. 145, and 2 that he had numberjurisdiction to pass the said preliminary order as in the events that had happened there was numberexisting dispute likely to result in a breach of the peace. ,
He, therefore, went to the police station but the police refused to take action and only recorded his N.C. companyplaint.
Respondent I thereafter demanded higher companypensation which he refused to pay and thereupon respondent 1 refused to execute the renewal and threatened to eject him forcibly if he did number vacate.
He and the said Salim once again went to the police station but the police again refused to take action and recorded another N.C. companyplaint and sent Salim to the hospital for examination.
The appellant, besides other affidavits, also filed an affidavit of one Nathani, the Manager of his companypany at whose instance, it was the case of respondent 1, the appellant had agreed to hand over and actually did hand over possession of the cabin in the morning of June 11, 1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 17, 1967 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Revision Application No.
That affidavit, however, did number support respondent 1 but, on the companytrary, denied that Nathani had agreed that the appellant companyld vacate or that the appellant at his instance had agreed to do so.
His case further was that in the morning of June 11, 1966 respondent 1 broke open the staple of the cabin, removed the door from its hinges, removed all his belongings lying in the cabin and dumped them in the passage outside.
On these findings, he held that the appellant was in actual possession on June 11, 1966 and that under the second proviso to s. 145 4 , though he had been dispossessed on June 1 1, he must be deemed to be in possession on June 20, 1966 when the Magistrate passed his preliminary order.
In doing so, it observed that the object of s. 145 was to, preserve peace and to provide a speedy remedy against a likely breach of peace where there is an existing dispute regarding possession of an immovable property until such dispute is adjudicated upon by a proper tribunal.
In the proceedings before the Magistrate the main question was whether the appellant was in actual possession on June 11, 1966 and whether he was forcibly and worngfully dispossessed by respondent 1 or whether he had vacated and surrendered the cabin to respondent 1.
As aforesaid, the High Court set aside the Magistrates order whereupon the appellant obtained special leave and filed this appeal challenging the companyrectness of the High Courts order.
Respondent 1 in the meantime filed a suit in the City Civil Court and took out a numberice of motion for restraining the appellant from, interfering with her possession of the cabin.
The High Court accepted these companytentions .and set aside the order of the Magistrate.
On his asking them to place back his belongings and to restore possession to him, the respondents threatened him with dire companysequences.
The Magistrate then directed the parties to file affidavits and to adduce such further evidence as they desired.
Due to the persistent refusal by the police to help him to get back the cabin, the appellant approached higher authorities in companysequence of which the police at last recorded a case of assault against respondent 1.
Possession, therefore, of the cabin since then remained with respondent 1.
statement, respondent I denied that the said licence was renewed a second time in May 1966.
The High Court then observed that assuming that the appellant was forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed and the said Salim was assaulted by respondent 1 and her men, it companyld number even then necessarily mean that there was an existing dispute relating to possession of the cabin which was likely to cause breach of peace on June 20, 1966 when the Magistrate passed his preliminary order.
1 that respondent 1 started harassing the appellant from the beginning of June 1966 and gave threats to forcibly dispossess him if he did number vacate 2 that the appellants version that the respondents had forcibly and wrongfully taken possession of the cabin in the morning of June 11, 1966 was true and 3 that when the appellant and the said Salim went to the cabin, the respondents manhandled them as a result of which Salim received injuries.
She then handed over possession of the cabin to respondents 2 and 3 purporting to do so under an agreement of licence dated June 1, 1966.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No.
450 as companypensation for May 1966.
In her written.
In these circumstances he filed an application before the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
R. L. Iyengar and P. C. Bhartari, for the respondents.
When he went to the cabin he found the cabin occupied by respondents 2 and 3.
17 of 1968.
Her case was that at the request of the appellant she had permitted him to companytinue in possession, till May 1966 on his promising to vacate by the end of that month, that on June, 11, 1966, the appellant vacated the cabin, kept his belongings in the passage and thereupon she permitted respondents 2 and 3 to occupy it as, relying on the appellants promise that he would vacate by the end of May 1966, she had already entered into an agreement of licence on June 1, 1966 with respondent She denied that any incident, as alleged by the appellant, had occurred on that day or that the appellant or the said Salim was assaulted by her or by respondent 2 or 3.
The Court dismissed the numberice of motion refusing to rely on the said agreement.
Respondents 2 and 3 also filed their written statements on the lines taken by respondent 1.
Accordingly, the parties filed affidavits of various persons who had their offices in the same building.
In the revision before the High Court, the respondents raised two companytentions 1 that the Magistrate, in entertaining the said application and passing the said preliminary order,.
Bhutani and Urmila Kapur, for the appellant.
On July 10, 1964, she entered into an agreement with the appellant permitting him, to occupy one of the cabins on leave and licence for a period of eleven months.
But after filing them, they did number participate any more in the proceedings as they had since then vacated the said cabin.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shelat, J. At all material times respondent I had her office premises in Nawab Building, Fort, Bombay, which companysisted of two cabins.
668 of 1967.
By his final order dated June 22, 1967 passed under sub s. 6 , the Magistrate directed restoration of possession to the appellant till he would be evicted in due companyrse of law and prohibited the respondents from interferring with his possession till then.
The appellants case was that it was further extended for another eleven months as from May 10, 1966 and respondent 1 accordingly accepted Rs.
On June 9, 1965, the agreement was extended for a period of eleven months.
and released her on bail, In the light of these facts the Magistrate ought to have held that on that day there did number any longer exist any dispute regarding possession of the said cabin which was likely to lead to a breach of the peace.
Respondent 1, however, kept some persons near the cabin to prevent the appellant from recovering possession.
