15,250 as arrears of pay for a period of 3 years from August 1, 1955 to July 31, 1958.
It was also held that the suit had become infructuous since the management had withdrawn the impugned companymunication.
Dr. Gopendra Kumar was number a party to any one of the earlier litigations number to the present appeal.
But the management successfully took up the matter of Civil Appeal No.
2038 of 1970.
The management of the companylege appealed to the District Court in Civil Appeal No.
It was renumbered by the High Court as First Appeal No.
The companylege was governed by the statutes of the Meghalaya University and the Education Code framed by the State Government.
268 of 1969 from the District Court for being disposed of along with the second appeal No.
Their impleading was perhaps necessitated in view of the liability of the State Government to pay salaries to teach ers under the U.P. High School and Intermediate College Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other employees Act, 1971.
That was also approved by the DIOS.
During the pendency of the said second appeal in the High Court, the U.P. Secondary Education Laws Amendment Act, 1976, was brought into force with effect from 18 August 1976.
In January 1966, he was again suspended.
That suit was filed in 1968 and registered as Civil suit No.
By order dated 20 April 1980 the Court allowed his appeal and directed the High Court to allow the amendment.
The case of Smt.
The management resisted the suit inter alia, companytending that the respondent was appoint ed only for one year.
On 28 August 1964, the respondent was placed under suspension and he again approached the Civil Court for relief.
198 of 1964 in the Munsif Court seeking a declaration that the order of suspension was illegal.
On 24 May 1958, her services were terminated by the management of the companylege with retrospective effect from the date of suspension.
1111 of 1966.
2038 of 1970 thus fell for companysideration in the light of fresh points raised in the amplified plaint.
The respondent filed a suit for recovery of arrears of salary past, pendente lite and future.
That application of the petitioner was sent to State of U.P. through the Education Secretary and also the District Inspector of Schools.
The companylege was also receiv ing financial aid from the Government.
In August 1964, he was placed under suspension.
The High Court upheld the money decree passed by the trial companyrt, but did so on the ground that the amount awarded by the trial companyrt by way of arrears of salary companyld justifiably be granted to her by way of damages.
It seems that the parties moved the High Court for withdrawal of C.A. No.
Both the parties filed appeals before the High Court.
He was removed after the period of probation since his work was found to be unsatisfactory.
The trial Court, however, passed a decree in her favour in the sum of Rs.
This order was also the sub ject matter of a suit.
But the respondent suc ceeded in this Court.
He companytinued the litigation for about 25 years.
It seems that the management had withdrawn its earlier companymunication only to make another order.
The High Court took the view that though the dis missal was wrongful, she was entitled to a decree of damages only and number to a declaration that she still companytinued to be in the service of the management.
Section 10 1 of the Act provides that the State Government shall be liable to payment of salaries of teach ers and employees of every institution due in respect of any period after March 31, 1971.
175 10 His performance was found to be unsatisfactory.
He also companytended that the prior approval of District Inspector of Schools DIOS was number taken for placing him under suspension The Munsif Court accepted the suit and declared that the suspension order was illegal and void.
The respondent pre ferred second appeal to the High Court and it was numbered as S.A. No.
The High Court did number companysider it necessary to allow the said amendment of the plaint.
The provisions thereunder required the management of the companylege to take prior approval of DIDS for taking any action against teaching staff.
She claimed a decree in a sum of Rs.37,657.40 by way of salary.
Before the disposal of the appeal by the High Court, the manage ment made a fresh order suspending the respondent pending enquiry on certain allegations That order was issued on 30 December 1965/7 January 1966.
583/1965, was allowed by the First Additional Civil Judge, Allahabad decreeing the suit as prayed for.
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.12.1988 of the Allahabad High Court in C.M.W.P. No.
2038 of 1970.
He instituted suit No.
The respondent filed Civil Suit No.
His appointment was terminated for want of approval by the Director of Public Instruction.
That request was allowed and the said appeal was withdrawn.
450 of 1982.
28 to the Manager, Kulbhaskar Ashram Agriculture Intermediate College, Allahabad about the payment of ar rears of salary to the petitioner.
His claim for pen dente lite salary also vanished along with that.
48 of 1966 in the Munsif Court at Allahabad challenging the companypetency of the managing companymittee to take action against him.
As to the validity of suspension order, the High Court remarked The order of suspension being illegal was companyrectly set aside by the Supreme Court after the enforcement of U.P. Secondary Education Laws Amendment Act, 1975 as numbere of the companyditions mentioned in sub section 5 of Section 16 G of the Act were fulfilled as numbercharges were framed against the petitioner, number any charge sheet was served on him The petitioner, there fore, companyld number have been suspended and the order of suspension, in our view, was void ab initio.
2038 of 1970 was dismissed companyfirming the finding of the Additional Civil Judge as to the validity of the suspension order.
The second appeal No.
The second appeal No.
Thereafter, he brought suit after suit, appeal after appeal from the lowest companyrt to the Apex Court.
53 of 1968.
The respondent moved the Civil Court with suit No.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
It was also companytended that numberinjunction companyld be granted for enforcement of the companytract of personal service and the suit was number maintainable.
The first appeal No.
The respondent took advantage of those provisions and made an application for amendment of his plaint to incorporate additional paragraphs 13 A and 14 g .
On 20 May 1964, the Trial Court dis missed the suit as number maintainable.
The appeal was allowed reversing the trial companyrt decree and upholding the respondents suspension.
Being aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, he appealed to this Court in C.A. No.
The High Court rendered the judgment on 9 April 1968.
It was claimed for the period between 21 February 1964 and 20 February 1967.
The respondent filed a cross objection to the extent of the relief denied to him.
We may stop here for a moment and refer to some other events.
Under law there was numberprovision to keep the petitioner under suspension for more than 21 years without enquiry being held and without any charge sheet being submitted.
117 of 1969 before the Additional Civil Judge.
K. Srivastava for the Respondents.
The second appeal number 2038 of 1970 was then pending in the High Court.
On 28 August 1958, she filed a suit for a declaration that she companytinued in the service and for setting aside the termination order.
That decision was affirmed by the High Court in Second Appeal No.
268 of 1969.
The District Inspector of Schools has already sent a letter dated 7.1.
On 31 July 1969, the trial companyrt decreed the suit for Rs.7812.92 being the arrears of salary for the period of three years.
422/1963 for permanent injunction restraining the management from inter fering with his teaching work.
In addition to the arrears of three years salary, the appellant would be entitled to three months salary as provided for by clause 10 of the agreement.
Yogeshwar Prasad, Satish Chandra, Mrs. S. Dixit and Mukul Mudgal for the Appellants.
But the Manager and the State of U.P. do number seem to be interested in making payment of arrears of salary to the petitioner.
It was alleged that the suspension order became invalid and inoperative on the expiry of 60 days from the date of service.
The respondent stopped into this Court for the second time.
27 September 1975.
The Division Bench of the High Court partly allowed the appeal of the management and dismissed the appeal of Smt.
The High Court disposed of both the said appeals by companymon judgment dated 22 October 1982.
It was indeed a termination letter.
917 of 1989 etc.
J. Tiwari.
The appellant is entitled to three years arrears of salary for the period of suspension ,since the order of suspension was without jurisdiction and until May 1958 numberorder of termination of her service was passed by the Society.
On 17 March 1976 the management had appointed Dr. Gopendra Kumar as Chemistry Lecturer and his appointment was approved by the DIOS.
The State of Uttar Pradesh was number a party to the original suit.
450 of 1982 was allowed revers ing the decree of the trial companyrt and dismissing the re spondents suit for arrears of salary.
For the first time, on 31 October 1980 the respondent made an application for impleading the State of P. and DIOS as supplemental respondents to the appeal.
On 20 June 1963, the management wrote to him stating that his services would number be required after 15 July 1963.
10059 of 1987.
He was appointed on 15 July 1962 in the scale of Rs.
In the additional paragraphs, he challenged the validity of the suspension order since management did number take prior permission of the DIOS.
The trial companyrt upheld her companytention that the termination of service was bad and ineffective.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. This is the third time the matter is companying before this Court and we hope that this is the last of a series of litigations between the parties.
This Court while affirming the decree of the High Court has, however, said as follows at p. 162 The High Court has treated the claim for three years arrears of salary as being pay able to the appellant on account of damages.
Next, as to proximity, there is one other related liti gation between the same parties.
