8 from January, 1993 to August, 1993 and had left the work in the month of September, 1993.
Therefore, he has raised an industrial dispute under the provisions of the Act before the Conciliation Officer requesting for setting aside the order of termination as the same is void ab initio in law and sought an order for reinstatement with back wages and other companysequential benefits.
He further stated that from October, 1993 to December, 1993 he had worked in some other Division, which does number fall in the National Highway Division.
The Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court answered the points of dispute referred to it.
The same was registered as Case Reference No.
On the basis of the pleadings made on behalf of the parties, five Issues were framed and the witness Mr. Vipin Sharma on behalf of the employer along with the workman was examined by himself to prove their respective cases.
It was further pleaded by the respondent employer that some other daily wage workmen who were working along with him in August, 1993 companytinued to work in September, 1993 as well and if the workman attended the duty in September, 1993 there is numberreason number to employ him along with others.
3, PWD B R Karnal since 1.1.1993 and remained in service upto December, 1993.
To the said written statement, a reply statement was filed by the workman.
205 of 1997 for adjudication of the dispute.
The workman produced Ex 6 WX Muster Roll of September, 1993 to prove his case that he worked for 240 days in a calendar year with the respondent employer and the Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court on the basis of pleadings and evidence on record has recorded the finding of fact and answered the issues framed by it in the Award in favour of the workman after proper appreciation of evidence on record.
8, PWD B R , Karnal, in the month of January, 1993 and he left the job on his own accord in August, 1993 and he has number companypleted 240 days in that Sub Division.
After adverting to the said evidence of MW 1 and the plea taken by the respondent employer in the written statement that the appellant workman has left the job voluntarily, therefore, he is number entitled for the benefit of Section 25 F clauses a and b of the Act, is rightly rejected by the Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court after placing reliance upon Civil Writ Petition No.
As the total number of working days are more than 240 days, therefore, the documentary evidence produced by the workman is rightly relied upon by the Labour Court and that the workman has rendered more than 240 days service in the establishment of the respondent is established.
The respondent management neither issued numberice number numberice pay number retrenchment companypensation was given to him.
His services were terminated on 31.12.1993 without companyplying with the mandatory provisions of Sections 25 F, 25 G and 25 H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 hereinafter referred to as the Act .
2245 of 2011 O M dated 19.09.2013 affirming the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 7.04.2010 passed in C.W.P. No.
205 of 1997 is set aside, raising certain questions of law and urging various legal grounds in support of the same.
The principle of last companye first go was number followed as provided under Section 25G of the Act and the persons who were juniors to him in service were retained.
Further, it was pleaded that in October, 1993 the appellant went to another Sub Divisional Officer where some other work was going on and got himself employed there afresh and worked up to December, 1993 in Sub division No.6 and again he left the job voluntarily during December, 1993 and therefore, termination order was number passed by respondent employer.
To this effect, numberdocumentary evidence is produced.
The appellant workman was working as daily paid worker in the office of Sub Divisional Officer Engineer, Provincial Division No.
As the workmans demand made in his Notice dated 27.11.1996 was number companyplied with, the Conciliation Officer submitted a failure report to the State Government of Haryana.
He had companypleted more than 240 days of companytinuous service in one calendar year.
The genuineness of the document is number questioned by the respondents companynsel in the cross examination of WW 1, therefore, the same is accepted and held that the workman has worked for more than 240 days during a calendar year preceding the date of his termination from the services.
Both the parties filed their respective statements inter alia justifying their demand and order of termination passed against the workman.
The Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court has also companysidered the evidence of MW 1 Vipin Sharma, SDO, who had stated in his evidence that the appellant workman had worked in their Sub Division No.
Further, the appellant was employed on daily wages muster roll by the Divisional Engineer, Provincial Sub Division No.
The State Government of Haryana in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10 1 c of the Act referred the industrial dispute to the Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court for adjudication as per the points of dispute.
The respondent management has taken preliminary objections companytending that Reference is bad in law as necessary parties are number impleaded to the order of reference, namely, Sub Divisional Engineer, Province Sub Division No.8, PWD B R Karnal, the claim of the workman is time barred and the provisions of the Act are number applicable to the respondent employer.
GOPALA GOWDA, J. Leave granted.
Undisputedly, retrenchment companypensation was number given by the respondent employer to the appellant companytending that he is number entitled for the same, as he has number worked for 240 days, and therefore, the question of giving retrenchment companypensation does number arise.
This appeal is filed by the workman, aggrieved by the impugned judgment and order of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in L.P.A. No.
9532 of 2001 by which Award dated 27.07.2000 of the Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Panipat, in Reference No.
In nutshell, facts are stated for the purpose of finding out whether the impugned judgment and order of the Division Bench warrants interference by this Court in this appeal.
