That the first respondent shall companysider these and other companytentions that might be raised by the petitioners in reply to the show cause numberice and pass reasoned orders in accordance with law in the light of the observations of the Supreme Court in the above case.
The sale was duly held and M s Vansh Builders of Hyderabad was declared the highest bidder of Leila Leans property at a sum of Rs.
In view of this Courts decision in C.B. Gautams case the first purchase order under section 269 UD 1 dated 31st August 1989 was quashed.
It was said That having regard to the directions given by the Supreme Court in the case referred above Forms 37 I filed by the petitioners in these cases would be deemed to have been filed as on today and this is without prejudice to the companytentions that filing of the Form for the second or the third time as the case may be, was only pursuant to the directions of the Appropriate Authority and that numbervalid order of preemptive purchase under chapter XX C can be made by the Appropriate Authority beyond the statutory period from the date of filing of the first Form 37 I in each case.
An interim order was passed by this Court on 19th June 2000 allowing the auction sale of Leila Leans property to be held subject to the result of the special leave petition.
However, taking into companysideration the laudable object with which Chapter XX C had been introduced in the Act, this Court inter alia directed that in all cases where the orders under Section 269 UD were invalid companysequent upon this Courts decision, and were the subject matter of challenge in writ proceedings, the statement in Form 37 I submitted would be treated as if it were submitted on the date of the disposal of those proceedings and the Appropriate Authority companyld if it so thought fit issue a show cause numberice within a period of two months calculating the companymencement of the period under the proviso to Section 269 D 1 from that date.
Reasons were also to be recorded by the Appropriate Authority to support its order.
They have therefore assailed the decision of the High Court before us.
The next submission of the appellants was that they had taken possession of the entire premises pursuant to the agreement of sale dated 13th March 1988.
The date of agreement of transfer was given as 13th March 1988.
The purchase was, therefore companyplete and the said Arumugham handed over possession of the property to the Central Government.
Elaborate reasons were given by the Appropriate Authority for directing the companypulsory purchase of Leila Leans property by the Central Government.
The companysideration for the sale was stated to be Rs.15,33,333/33.
In their capacity as the power of attorney holders the appellants sold demarcated portions of the property to numberinees of the appellants by eight separate agreements executed and registered between 28th April 1989 and 31st May 1989.
3, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad.
This statement was accepted by the Appropriate Authority and on 28th November 1989, an order was passed by the Appropriate Authority under Section 269 UD 1 for the purchase of property.
On 22nd June 2000, the Central Government advertised the property for sale.
The transferor transferees are however free to companye up before the Appropriate Authority after the above defect is cured, if they are so advised.
hereinafter referred to as the first purchase order Within a month i.e. on 22nd December 1989, the Central Government deposited an amount equivalent to the apparent companysideration with the Appropriate Authority.
Otherwise the order issued under Section 269 UD 1 was bad in law.
The executor named in her will, through a general Power of Attorney Holder, one Sri Armugham, entered into a fresh agreement with the appellants on 27th April 1989 agreeing to sell Leila Leans 1/3 undivided share in the property.
By its order dated 23rd August 1989 it refused to act on its basis stating that the statement was premature and invalid because the property belonged to a number resident and the approval of the Reserve Bank of India was required for alienating the same.
The appellants challenged the second purchase order under Section 269 UD by way of an application under Article The petition was rejected by the High Court on 27th April 2000.
mts and was jointly owned by one Leila D. Lean and her two sisters.
A writ petition referred to as the first writ petition was thereafter filed by the appellants before the High Court at Andhra Pradesh W.P. No.1731/89 impugning the companystitutional validity of Chapter XX C and seeking the setting aside of the order passed under Section 269 UD 1 basically on the ground that it was passed in violation of natural justice and was otherwise unconstitutional.
On 13th March 1988, the three owners agreed to sell the entire premises to the appellants.
While the appellants first writ petition was pending, this Court in C.B. Gautam V. Union of India and Others 1993 1 SCC 78 held that even though Section 269 UD did number provide for an opportunity of hearing being afforded to the intending purchaser and the seller of the property, a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against an order for companypulsory purchase was to be given under Section 269 UD 1 to the interested parties.
On 1st June 1989, Chapter XX C of the Act which statutorily provides for the companypulsory purchase by the Central Government of immovable properties in certain cases of transfer came into force in the State of Andhra Pradesh.
The two other sisters appointed the appellants as their power of attorney holders.
This order dated 23rd August 1989 hereafter referred to as the filing order was accepted both by the transferor and transferees.
On 18th December 1989 an affidavit was filed by the said Armugham representing the estate of Leila Lean before the Appropriate Authority giving the exact description of the demarcated portion of the share of Leila Lean in the property.
Four crores and five lakhs.
On 8th September 1989, the appellants and the said Armugham representing the estate of Leila Lean submitted a second statement in Form 37 I with the Appropriate Authority after getting the permission of the Reserve Bank of India.
The Appropriate Authority was directed to give an opportunity to the appellants of being heard before passing any order in the light of the observations made by the Supreme Court in Gautams case and in accordance with law.
The entire premises companyered an area of about 7100 sq.
The statement furnished in Form 37 I is filed.
The Appropriate Authority did number accept the statement.
On 28th December 1989 the Appropriate Authority sought to amend the first purchase order in purported exercise of power for rectification of mistakes granted under Section 269 UJ, by including the description of Leila Leans property.
Within a period of two months from the date of the order of the High Court, namely on 20th May 1994, the Appropriate Authority passed a fresh order referred to as the second purchase order under Section 269 UD 1 after issuing numberice to the parties and companysidering their replies.
The property which was the subject matter of the order under Section 269 UD 1 was part of premises situated at Road No.
It was also made clear that as far as companypleted transactions were companycerned i.e. where after the order of companypulsory purchase under Section 269 UD 1 , possession had been taken and companypensation paid and accepted by the owner without protest, numberhing said in the judgment would invalidate such purchases.
Before the companyveyance companyld be executed, Leila Lean died.
J U D G M E N T RUMA PAL, J. The appellants challenge under Article 226 to the order passed by the Appropriate Authorities under Section 239 UD 1 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 referred to hereafter as the Act was turned down by the Andhra Pradesh High Court.
The appellants filed a special leave petition challenging the High Courts decision.
The appellants first writ petition was disposed of by the High Court on 16th February 1994.
