Furthermore, the Plaintiff prayed for an injunction to restrain the appellant, acting on behalf of the lessor, from realising an annual rent in excess of Rs.
The defendant appellant pleaded, inter alia, that the suit was barred by the provisions of Sec.
If the plaintiff was number entitled initially to a lease of 90 years for the rent agreed upon but the rent was liable to be increased within that period, as appeared to be the real case of the defendants in the High Court, there was numberquestion of grant of a fresh lease.
D. 731 at p. 739.
Hence, to meet this difficulty, the defendants, immediately after admitting that the lease was for a period of 90 years, asserted, in paragraph 12 of replies on merits in the written statement, that it was, subject to renewal of the lease at the enhanced rate as provided under the lease.
He also relied on Smt.
5,935.25 ps.
But, immediately thereafter, the defendants were faced with the problem that a natural interpretation of companyenant 9 of the lease deed, dealing with both with the enhancement and renewal of the lease, laid down that the renewal was to take place only at the end of the term hereby granted i.e. 90 years , and companyenant 10 made it clear that the right of enhancement companyld be exercised, as is naturally to be expected, only when the lease is renewed.
From the Judgment and Decree dated the 26th May, 1971 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Regular First Appeal No.
365 per annum.
Ltd. v. Bethell 8 , by Sterling J., was cited with approval by this Court It is a settled rule of companystruction that where there is a grant and an exception out of it, the exception is to be taken 1 1861 9 H. L. C. 114 at p. 146.
Kamgar Shah v. Jagdish Chandra Rao Dhabel Deo 4 Ramkishore Lal v. Kamal Narian 5 Forbes v. Git 6 .
This amount was paid by the respondent under protest and after a warrant of arrest had been issued against him.
The reply in the written statement in paragraph 12 on merits was That para 12 of the amended plaint is number admitted as stated.
Bina Das Gupta and Others v. Sachindra Mohan Das Gunta 7 , where the following statement of law in Stavill Eros.,
These questions were decided against the defendants by a learned judge of the Delhi High Court, who tried the case and dismissed the suit on merits, as well as by the Division Bench which had allowed the plaintiffs appeal and decreed by the suit on merits.
He relied for this proposition on Sahebzada Mohd.
It was, however, number admitted by the defendants.
Hence, the defendants admitted this to be companyrect.
80 C.P.C., upon the Union of India, a companyefendant, was also pleaded.
The lease dated 17th September, 1931, was granted to the plaintiff for a total period of 90 years at the rate of ground rent of Rs.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BEG, J. This is a defendants appeal, on a certification of the case, under Article 133 1 a and c of the Constitution, granted by the Delhi High Court.
The difficulty in which the defendants were placed, possibly due to a defective drafting of the lease deed which failed to bring out whatever may have been the real intention, was that they companyld number get out of the categorical statement in the, lease deed of 17 9 31 that it was for a total period of 90 years at Rs.
which had been retrospectively demanded and realised from him as arrears of enhanced rent from 1.1.52to 30.6.63 after issuing a warrant of arrest dated 2.6.64 against him.
9, annexed to the demise, in a later part of the deed, which cannot be resolved without discarding or disregarding some word or words, the respondents companynsel companytended that the earlier words of demise, companysistently supported by the companytents of other parts of the deed, should prevail over the inconsistency found in the proviso to one of the companyditions in the later part of the deed.
The plaintiff also claimed refund of Rs.
A53 B 2 of the Delhi Development Act.
The plot of land leased was entrusted for management on behalf of the Government of India to the Delhi improvement Trust, and, thereafter, after the abolition of the Delhi Improvement Trust in 1957, to the Delhi Development Authority under Section 60 of the Delhi Development Act of 1957.
The plaintiff respondent had sued for a declaration that the annual rent of Rs.
365/ per annum, subject to the renewal of the lcase and at enhanced rate as provided under terms of the lease.
365/ payable on a piece of land situated in Basti Ara Kashan, Paharganj, New Delhi, leased to him from 1 4 31 for a period of 90 years on behalf of the Secretary of State for India companyld number be enhanced during the subsistence of the lease for the grant of which he had paid a premium of Rs.
M. Tarkunde, B. Dutta and Ramesh Chandra, for respondent No.
298 of 1973.
6 1922 1 A. C. p. 256 at r. 259.
18,054/ .
M. Singhvi, Sardar Bahadur Saharya, Keshar Dayal, Vishnu B. Saharya and Yogendra Khushalani, for the appellant.
2 1879 11 Ch.
365, and the proviso of companyenant No.
Want of numberice under Sec.
In other words, the renewals were also companyered by the initial period of ninety years but, this makes numbersense according to law as explained by us below.
365/ for the duration of the lease claimed to be for 90 years.
O.S. 16 of 1970 .
