However, the trial Court granted decree for mandatory injunction directing the appellant to demolish and remove the new shop companystructed by him as the same having been companystructed without the companysent and permission of the landlord.
The companytention of the appellant in the suit was that he was entitled to put up a new super structure in place of the old one since by virtue of Section 108 B e of the Transfer of Property Act hereinafter referred to as the Act he, having number opted to render the tenancy void, the tenancy subsists.
The High Court was of the view that on the total destruction of the premises by natural calamity the tenancy stood extinguished and, therefore, the landlord is entitled to the decree for recovery of possession of the land.
Under such circumstances, the respondent landlord filed a suit for mandatory injunction for demolition of the new shop companystructed by the appellant and for recovery of possession of the land on which the old super structure stood.
The trial companyrt was of the view that after the destruction of the shop the tenancy in respect of land still subsists and the plaintiff is number entitled to recover the possession of the site over which the old shop existed.
The First Appellate Court dismissed both the appeals and affirmed the decree of the trial companyrt.
The said shop was raised to the ground due to accidental fire on 9.1.1990 and there remained only the vacant land.
The plaintiff respondent, as well as the defendant appellant, filed separate appeals against the decree of the trial companyrt.
The appellant tenant, after destruction of the shop companystructed a new shop on the same site without the companysent and permission of the respondent landlord.
The High Court allowed the second appeal filed by the plaintiff respondent, whereas, the second appeal filed by the defendant appellant was dismissed.
The case in brief is that the predecessor in interest of the respondent landlord let out a shop to the defendant appellant herein.
Aggrieved, both the defendant appellant and the plaintiff respondent preferred two separate Second appeals.
