Colonel R.N. Singh.
According to the respondent, the officer who companyvened the companyrt martial was Brig.
This plea is devoid of any merit as the entire proposal for companystitution of companyrt martial was approved by officiating General Officer Commanding.
The grievance of the respondent is that this order was number signed by the officiating General Officer Commanding, but by Lt.
The respondent companytended that the officer companyvening the general companyrt martial did number pass any order to the effect that he was prima facie satisfied that the evidence justified a companyrt martial.
The respondent was tried by a companyrt martial and the companyrt found him guilty of both the charges.
The first charge was to the effect that he failed to return two official files in spite of directions and the second charge was for using criminal force against late Major A.S. Randhawa by throwing a chair at him and causing bruises on his face.
Hence there was violation of Rule 37 1 and 3 of the Army Rules, 1954.
Raj Kumar Singh, who was the then officiating General Officer Commanding, and there is numberhing on record to show that he had satisfied himself that the evidence justified a trial on those charges.
On that ground, the findings of the companyrt martial were set aside and the reliance was placed by the High Court on the decision of this Court in Union of India Ors.
It was also alleged that the companyvening order was number personally signed by the General Officer Commanding and that it was a case of clear number application of mind.
From the documents produced by the respondent, it is clear that Lt.
Ram Nagina Singh and hence the rule was violated.
Raj Kumar Singh sought to file an affidavit before the High Court, but the same was number received on file.
The respondent later filed a writ petition in the Delhi High Court and by the impugned judgment the punishment imposed on the respondent was set aside and the appellants herein have been directed to pay a companypensation of Rs.
5 lacs for the harassment and indignity meted out to the respondent.
R.N. Singh, who was number companypetent to issue the order companyvening the general companyrt martial.
The respondent had also companytended that the certificate of Major General G.L. Bakshi, who was the General Officer Commanding in March, 1987, that the allegations against the respondent were fit for trial by general companyrt martial was irrelevant and it did number satisfy the requirements of Rule 37 of the Army Rules, 1954.
We have perused the various documents produced in companyrt.
The respondent challenged the companyrt martial proceedings and also the punishment imposed on him before the Punjab Haryana High Court.
The judgment of the Delhi High Court is challenged by the Union of India.
In the writ petition, it was companytended by the respondent that the officer who was companypetent to companyvene the general companyrt martial was Brig.
Thus, the writ petition was dismissed with liberty to the respondent to file it before the Delhi High Court.
The High Court of Punjab Haryana was of the view that it had numberjurisdiction and the writ petition should be filed before the Delhi High Court.
We heard the companynsel for the Union of India and also the respondent who appeared in person.
This proposal was approved by the then General Officer Commanding on 2.4.1987 and thereafter on 7.5.1987, proceedings were issued and that order was signed by Lt.
R.N. Singh on 1.4.1987 submitted a proposal by way of office numbere as to the manner in which the general companyrt martial order is to be issued.
R.N. Singh, the then officiating General Officer Commanding.
The High Court set aside the order passed by the appellant authorities mainly on the ground that there was violation of Rule 37 of the Army Rules , 1954.
In view of the verdict of the companyrt martial, the respondent was dismissed from service.
The respondent had alleged in the writ petition that under Rule 37, the officer who is companyvening the general companyrt martial shall satisfy himself that the charges to be tried by the companyrt are offences within the meaning of the Army Act, and that the evidence justifies a trial on those charges.
O R D E R Arising out of S.L.P. C No.
The respondent herein was companymissioned in the Parachute Regiment of the Indian Army on 2.3.1968.
Colonel and one Major were proposed as Waiting Members, apart from one legally qualified officer as prosecutor, one defending officer and one civil lawyer as prosecution companynsel of defence companynsel.
He was subjected to companyrt martial proceedings on two charges framed against him.
In order to appreciate the companytentions raised by the parties on either side, Rule 37 of the Army Rules, 1954 is to be extracted and it is to the following effect Convening of General and District Court martial.
It was held that the letter of Major General Bakshi, dated 9.3.1987, was irrelevant as he was number the companyvening officer.
21291 of 2003 Leave granted.
Raj Kumar Singh, but the order companyvening the companyrt martial was signed by Lt.
R.N. Singh to sign the companyvening order dated 7.5.1987 on his behalf.
In the order, the names of all the members of the companyrt martial and waiting members are given with their designations.
