The appellant did number send any reply to this letter of approach and numberagreement was arrived at between the appellant and the respondent within 15 days of the receipt of the letter of approach by the appellant.
The respondent thereupon preferred a petition in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and on this petition, the High Court reversed the view taken by the Labour Court and the Industrial Court and held that the application filed by the respondent under s. 78 1 A a was within three months of the arising of the dispute and hence it companyld number be said to be barred under s. 79 3 a .
It appears that since there was numberfavourable response from the appellant, the respondent made an application to the Labour Commissioner on 17th March, 1973 requesting his intervention in the matter.
The respondent had also filed along with the application under s. 78 1 A a i an application for companydonation of delay and to this application, the answer given by the appellant was that the Labour Court had numberjurisdiction to companydone the delay in filing the application under s. 78 1 A a i .
The Labour Officer of the appellant appeared before the Labour Commissioner pursuant to the numberice issued to the appellant and, to quote the words used by the respondent in his application before the Labour Court, took adjournment for making companypromise.
But numbercompromise was arrived at between the parties and the respondent ultimately on 7th June, 1973 filed an application before the Labour Court under s. 79 1 read with s. 78 1 A a i of the Act praying that the order passed by the appellant resisted him from service should be treated as null and void and he should be reinstated in service with all benefits.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 18th September 1974 of the Gujarat High Court in Civil Spl.
This was rightly regarded as a letter of approach by the respondent to the appellant under s. 42 sub s. 4 of the Act requesting for a change in respect of the order passed by the appellant under Standing Order 19 retiring the respondent.
The appellant resisted the application on various grounds and apart from disputing the claim of the respondent on merits, the appellant raised a preliminary objection that the application was barred by time under s. 79 3 a of the Act since it was filed more than three months after the arising of the dispute.
S. Nariman, V. B. Patel and I. N. Shroff for the appellant.
The respondent did number at any time until his retirement on 8th January, 1973 question the companyrectness of the records of the appellant or challenge the stand of the appellant showing that he had companypleted the age of 60 years on 7th January, 1971.
N. Tarkunde, Vimal Dave for the Respondents.
The High Court accordingly set aside the order passed by the Industrial Court and remanded the application to the Labour Court to dispose it of on merits.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
The respondent, by his letter dated 5th January, 1973, requested the appellant on companypassionate grounds to grant him further extension of service for a period of two years from 8th January, 1973, but the appellant declined to do so and in the result the service of the respondent came to an end by retirement on 8th January, 1973.
The facts giving rise to the appeal are few and may be briefly stated as follows.
Thereafter there was another extension of service granted by the appellant by a numberice dated 12th January, 1972 issued under Standing Order 19 A and it was intimated to the respondent that he would be retired on 8th January, 1973.
The respondent preferred an appeal to the Industrial Court, but the Industrial Court also took the same view and dismissed the appeal.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI, J. This appeal, by special leave, raises a short question of companystruction of certain provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 hereinafter referred to as the Act .
Appln.
1102 of 1975.
1224 of 1974.
The respondent was working as a jobber in the textile mill in the employment of the appellant and, according to the records of the appellant, he was due to superannuate on 7th January, 1971 on reaching the age of 60 years and intimation to that effect was accordingly given to him by the appellant by a numberice dated 1st October, 1970 under Standing Order 19.
The appellant carries on business of manufacturing cloth in a textile mill situate in the city of Ahmedabad.
It appears, however, that the appellant decided to companytinue the respondent in service for a period of one year after the date superannuation and the appellant accordingly gave a numberice dated 24th September, 1970 under Standing Order 19 A companytinuing the service of the respondent for a period of one year and intimating to him that he would be retired on 8th January, 1972.
It was only after his retirement that the respondent for the first time, by his letter dated 13th February, 1973, gave numberice to the appellant that his age was only 56 years on 8th January, 1973 and his retirement was, therefore, null and void and he should be reinstated in service.
The Labour Court took the view that the application of the respondent under s. 78 1 A a i was barred under s. 79 3 a as it was number filed within three months of the arising of the dispute and the Labour Court had numberjurisdiction to companydone the delay in filing the application and in this view, the Labour Court rejected the application without going into the merits.
