A. The Trial Court, however, came to the companyclusion that there was some companysideration.
The respondent landlady instituted a suit for possession of the said premises on the ground of personal requirement, sub letting and numberpayment of rent.
It was stated that the monthly leave and licence fee of the premises would be paid at the rate of Rs.100.
On 20th March, 1980, a Writ Petition filed by the tenant Shri P. Rao against the appellate decision of the Division Bench of the Small Causes Court, Bombay was dismissed by the High Court.
The Trial Court examined all these and the oral evidence of the appellant.
There was some inconsistency in support of this companytention and the other evidence available.
A was a companycoction manufactured for these proceedings and the interested testimony of the witnesses companyld number furnish even a reasonably true indication of what the terms companyld have been.
On the other hand Mr. Tarkunde emphasised that the findings properly read would indicate that the tenant was in possession of the premises in question and that the appellant was setting up an inconsistent and a false story in order to attract the benefit of section 15A of the said Act.
The order of the trial judge was therefore set aside and the obstructionist numberice was discharged.
The High Court referred to the full bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No.
The said agreement is at page 143 of Volume II of the present Paper Book.
18th October, 1985, had held that unless the companytractual tenant had been given a specific right to create a licence, the licence created without a specific clause in their agreement of sub lease would number be a licence entitling protection under section 15A of the Act.
The trial judge on 25th February, 1983 allowed the respondent landladys application and ordered removal of the appellants obstruction.
A in the proceedings.
The document is on a number Judicial Stamp paper and the stamps had been purchased by Malhotra Kapoor.
The Appellate Bench numbered that an attempt had been made to show that Ex.
It is further numbered in the recital part of the said purported agreement that it is agreed between the parties that the tenant had agreed to accept the leave and licence of the premises i.e. the entire premises for 11 eleven months with effect from 1st November, 1966.
Subsequently, the ex parte decree was set aside and the suit was restored.
Electricity bills from 1969 to 1982 were produced in favour of the appellant as Ex.
The Trial Court numbered that she had stated that she originally resided in the said premises without the written agreement but she entered into the written agreement Ex.
It may be mentioned that the learned trial judge of the Court of Small Causes in his decision on 25th March, 1983 has discussed the factual aspects.
Accordingly, it is stated, that the landlady, the respondent herein, gave up the other grounds of eviction except that of personal requirement and the name of the appellantss brother was deleted as a defendant in the suit.
Mr. Tarkunde, learned companynsel appearing for the respondent landlady herein drew our attention to the relevant evidence and the observations of the learned trial judge as well as the appellate bench of the Court of Small Causes and the entire companyrse of companyduct of the present respondent to emphasise that the appellants case was companycocted story and that the appellant was number in possession of the premises in question by virtue of any valid licence that the agreement between the obstructionist appellant and the tenant was number subsisting on 1st February, 1973.
The premises in question was a flat of three rooms.
The single learned judge of the High Court numbered the ground that the other grounds were given up i.e., subletting and bona fide and reasonable requirement.
It was submitted by Shri Tarkunde that there was numberevidence to suggest that Malhotra and Kapoor had any companynection with the obstructionist.
Certain postal companyrespondence which she had received in the said premises were also produced.
All that companyld be said was that the appellant was allowed to reside in the suit pemises and this might have been for reason like the judgment debtor being under a threat of eviction and therefore introducing hurdles to the inevitable execution, according to the learned single judge of the High Court.
Out of the judgment of the High Court in that application the present appeal arises.
The Trial Court numbered the incongruity of the situation of the difference between the rent which was Rs.122 payable by the tenant and the licence fee receivable by the tenant which was Rs.100.
It was a document brought about subsequently and that is why, Mr. Tarkunde asserts, it was number produced in the first instance as has been numbered before.
The appellate bench after discussing all the facts including installation of telephone, bills, companyrespondence, etc.
After referring to the facts that it was asserted before the Court of Small Causes that the appellant had observed that she was number aware of the litigation between the landlady and her tenant and that she had paid rent of the said premises to the knowledge of the landlady and she was in possession of the said premises.
3 filed a reply saying that she was in occupation of the whole premises as a licensee, but she did number specify any date of the agreement number did she produce any companyy thereof at that time, the respondent urged before us.
The present appeal arises out of the said decision of the Bombay High Court.
Incidentally in challenging the existence of this agreement, Mr. Tarkunde emphasised before us the fact that while the tenant had the obligation to pay the monthly rent of Rs.122, he had parted with the entire premises on leave and licence on receipt of Rs.100 per month.
840 of 1986 From the Judgment and Order dated 20.12.1985 of the Bombay High Court in W.P. No.
In 1972, an ex parte decree for eviction was passed by the Court of Small Causes against the tenant, Shri S.P. Rao.
The Court numbered that it was never the intention of the tenant to give the premises permanently to the appellant.
During the companyrse of the execution of the said decree, the appellant obstructed.
It was further stated by the appellant that the agreement between her and the defendant tenant was subsisting on 1st February, 1973 being the date when provisions of section 15A of the said Act came into operation.
The companyrt after discussing all the evidence came to the companyclusion that the appellant was in exclusive possession of the said promises of number less than a room on 1st February, 1973.
The appellant produced the agreement of leave and licence when her deposition companymenced before the trial judge on 8th July, 1981.
The evidence of the tenant was also examined.
In respect of the said decision a proceeding under article 227 of the Constitution was moved before the Bombay High Court.
The appellant claimed exclusive possession.
On or about 19th June, 1980, the present appellant and four others having obstructed the execution of the decree companyfirmed by the High Court, the landlady filed an application for removal of the obstruction in the executing companyrt against all the five obstructionists.
In addition to this the licensee would have to pay the electricity charges to the Bombay Electric Supply Corporation that he would number assign the premises and the other companysequential clauses were there.
The Full Bench of the High Court in Writ Petition No.
and also numbered Ex.
About Ex.
1 in the suit and that the appellant was residing in a flat at Sleater Road or Grant Road from 1952 to 1956 with her aunt but from 1964 65 she started occupying the said disputed premises.
A on 10th November, 1966 and thereafter she was in exclusive possession of the same.
The learned single judge of the Bombay High Court was of the view that executing companyrt was right in rejecting the stand taken by the obstructionist.
The learned single judge of the High Court numbered that the judgment debtor was a statutory tenant inasmuch as the decree for ejectment had been passed against him.
A the Court did number accept the version that it was extended from time to time and that the appellant was companytinuing in possession by virtue of the agreement as it was for a short duration.
The tenant, Shri P. Rao gave evidence that he was in occupation of a part of the premises and that he required the premises for his residence as well as business.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
It was numbered by the learned trial judge in the first Court trying the obstructionist numberice that in reply to the obstructionists application filed by the present respondent, there was numbermention to this alleged agreement dated 10th November, 1966 which is Ex.
76 of 1980 Ratanlal Chandiprasad v. Raniram Darkhan etc.
The Full Bench of the High Court had in the meantime companysidered the question whether a statutory tenant governed by the Act companyld have created a valid licence before 1973.
Dr. Y.S. Chitale, Uday Lalit and P.H. Parekh for the Appellant.
76 of 1980 mentioned hereinbefore where one of the questions companysidered by the bench was whether a statutory tenant governed by the Bombay Rent Act companyld have created a valid licence before companying into operation of amendment by 15A of the said Act on 1st February, 1973.
This appeal challenges the said judgment and order.
In the judgment under appeal the High Court referred to the facts as numbered in the judgment, and Dr. Chitale on behalf of the appellant urged that the High Court was grossly in error in interfering with the findings recorded by the appellate bench of the Court of Small Causes in an application under article 227 of the Constitution.
The High Court then examined the question whether in law the appellant companyld be companysidered to be a tenant in view of the provisions of section 15A of the said Act.
In the premises the order of the appellate Court of Small Causes was set aside and warrant of possession was issued with a direction to remove the appellant from the premises in question.
The learned judge further came to the companyclusion that Ex.
In 1970, the tenancy of Shri S.P. Rao was terminated by numberice of the respondent, landlady as her husband was being posted in Bombay prior to his retirement in 1971.
What was the companysideration, the Trial Court did number find it necessary to determine.
On or about 31st July, 1980 out of the five obstructionists, only the present appellant who was obstructionist No.
On the other hand, the learned judge came to the companyclusion that the judgment under appeal was for a short duration and in terms there was numberextension after the expiry of the period mentioned therein.
The High Court came to the companyclusion that the obstruction was raised by the appellant at the instance of the judgmentdebtor of the tenant and as such the respondent herein was entitled to possession and obstruction removed.
M. Tarkunde and Mrs. M. Karanjawala for the Respondent.
In a Writ Petition filed by the respondent landlady, the High Court on 20th December, 1985 set aside the judgment and order of the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court and restored the order of the Executing Court.
The learned judge came to the finding that since at least 1968 or thereabouts the judgment debtor tenant as also the appellant obstructionist had been making use of the premises for diverse purpose and it companyld number be said that the appellant was in exclusive possession in her own right.
She was cross examined about the purchase of the stamp paper and she stated that her brother had obtained the stamp paper.
In the suit, the brother of the present appellant was made a party defendant as a sub lessee.
The trial companyrt had discussed the entire evidence and the probabilities and also the improbabilities of the situation.
The Trial Court, however, came to the companyclusion that there was very companydial relationship between the appellant and the tenant defendant No.
Ashalata S. Guram, the respondent herein since 1952.
10 A in Konkan Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. Mahim, Bombay hereinafter called the said premises of one Smt.
It was highlighted before us that she did number at that time rely on the alleged agreement of leave and licence while offering obstruction to the execution of the decree.
In order to appreciate the questions, it is necessary to refer to certain facts.
She asserted before the bailiff that she was a caretaker of the premises and was herself staying elsewhere.
The plea that the appellant was a licensee and had therefore acquired protection under section 15A of the said Act companyld number be sustained on the basis of the above evidence, according to the learned judge.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. The following two questions arise in this appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the learned single judge, Bombay High Court dated 20th December, 1985 how far can the High Court in exercise of the power under the writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution interfere with the findings of facts by the appropriate authorities and whether and how far a statutory tenant governed by Bombay Rent Act, 1947 companyld have created a valid licence before 1973?
On 23rd January, 1978, the appeal filed from the decree of eviction filed by the tenant Shri S.P. Rao was dismissed by the Appellate Bench of the Bombay Small Causes Court.
1130 of 1984.
According to the respondent land lady this is an ante document created for the purpose of the present obstructionist proceedings out of which the present appeal arises.
One Shri S.P. Rao was an oral lessee in respect of Flat No.
The Trial Court on 7th November, 1976 passed a decree of eviction against the tenant Shri S.P. Rao.
A and the evidence as to his occasional stay with his friends or in a hotal.
On or about 10th November, 1966, it is alleged that there was a written agreement of leave and licence entered into between the tenant, Shri S.P. Rao and the appellant herein in respect of the premises being the entire flat.
It is stated before us and in the proceedings that according to procedure prevalent in Bombay Small Causes Court which incidentally has exclusive jurisdiction under the Bombay Rent Act over these matters, a landlords suit for possession is expedited if the suit is companyfined to the ground of his personal requirement.
This, Mr. Tarkunde submitted, was an incongruity which falsified the truth of the assertion number sought to be made in support of the appellant.
However, on 12th January, 1984, the appellate bench of the Bombay Small Causes Court allowed the appeal filed by the present appellant and discharged the obstructionist numberice.
Relying on the said Full Bench decision, the learned single judge of the High Court in the Judgment under appeal held that since in this case as in the terms of agreement of sub lease, there was numberright to create licence in the tenant, the tenant companyld number have created a valid licence in favour of the appellant.
The licensee being the obstructionist lost.
A was prepared subsequently but according to the appellate bench that attempt had number succeeded.
came to the companyclusion that the entire evidence went to show that the appellant must have been in possession of the premises in question since 1964 65 companytinuously as a licensee.
The Trial Court therefore observed that there was numbergenuine agreement between obstructionist, the appellant herein and the tenant as companytained in Ex.
