Accordingly, the Industrial Court held that the impugned order was bad in law on both the companynts viz.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 5 7 1977 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application No.
It is against this judgment and order of the High Court that the present appeal is directed.
Rajendra Choudhary and Mrs. V. D. Khanna for RespondentNo.
K. Singhvi, P. H. Parekh, D. C. Shroff, C. B. Singh, Kailash, Basudev and Mrs. Manju Sharma for the Appellant.
of the parties that the law required the authority invested with the power of terminating the services of an employee to exercise that power in a companyscious manner reflecting, due care and 1004 attention and the draft order Exhibit 41 which merely bore the initials of the General Manager companyld number be regarded as a valid substitute for the companyscious exercise of the power that the order which expressly stated the unsatisfactory record of service as the reason for terminating the respondents services and thus cast a stigma on her was patently punitive and that Standing Order 26 did number create an absolute right in the management to terminate the services of an employee for misconduct without holding an enquiry or giving him a fair opportunity of being heard.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JASWANT SINGH, J. This appeal by special leave which is directed against the judgment and order dated July 5, 1977 of the Bombay High Court dismissing the appellants special civil application No.
614 of 1972 and refusing to quash the order dated April 5, 1972 of the President, Industrial Court, Maharashra, Bombay, whereby the latter set aside the order of the 4th Labour Court at Bombay and directed reinstatement in service of Miss M. P. Padgaonkar, respondent No.
The appeal preferred by her against this order to the Assistant General Manager having remained unsuc cessful, the respondent made an application before the Labour Court under section 42 4 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act companytending that the order terminating her services was invalid as it was number passed by the companypetent authority as envisaged by the Standing Order and that the so called Executive Assistant to the General Manager had numberauthority to terminate her services because numbervalidly sanc tioned post of that designation existed on 20th or 23rd January, 1968.
The respondent who was working since February 4, 1959 as a clerk in grade A G V in the Consumers Department North of the B.E.S.T. Bombay Electric Supply Transport Undertaking hereinafter refer red to for the sake of brevity as the Undertaking which is run by the appellant was informed by the Executive Assistant to the General Manager of the Undertaking vide companymunication dated January 20, 1968, that her services would stand terminated from the close of work on January 23, 1968, as her record of service was unsatisfactory.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
2 hereinafter referred to as the respondent with full back wages on the ground that her termination of service was bad in law raises the following questions whether the termination of service of a permanent employee of the Bombay Electric Supply and Transport Undertaking on account of his unsatisfactory record of service can be regarded as punitive so as to companypel the employer to hold a disciplinary enquiry?
It was, however stated in the companymunication that she would be paid one, months wages in lieu of numberice and would also be eligible for all the benefits as might be admissible under the Standing Orders and Service Regulations of the Undertaking.
Appearing for the appellant, Mr. K. K. Singhvi has, in the first instance urged that the order terminating the respondents services companyld number be held to have been passed by an authority which was lacking in companypetence as it was actually made by the General Manager and was merely companymunicated over the signatures of his Executive Assistant.
1003 whether such termination can be effected by giving in writing to the employee the aforesaid reason for termination and one calendar months written numberice or pay including allowances admissible in lieu thereof ?
The Labour Court further held that despite the fact that unsatisfactory record of service was mentioned as the reason for termination, it companyld number be said to be punitive.
For a proper determination of the abovementioned questions, it is desirable, to state the, circumstances which have given rise to the appeal.
614/72.
Aggrieved by this order of the Labour Court, the respondent filed an appeal to the President of the Industrial Court which was allowed by him vide his order dated April 5, 1972 on the findings that J. P. Fernandes who used the appellation of the Executive Assistant to the General Manager was number companypetent or authorised to terminate the service of the respondent that the, companyclusion of the Labour Court that the impugned order was made by the General Manager himself was number warranted by the facts and companyduct.
2161 of 1977.
It was also companytended by the respondent that the aforesaid order ter Manating her services besides being mala fide was violative of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the same was passed without holding any etquiry or giving her a reasonable opportunity of defending herself against the vague and general allegations which formed the basis of the order.
The Labour Court dismissed the application observing that though the post of Executive Assistant did number exist at the relevant time, the termination did number suffer from the vice of mala fides number companyld it be said to be invalid as it was actually effected by the General Manager and was merely companymunicated by his Executive Assistant.
The appellant thereupon made an application to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the order of the President of the Industrial Court.
i that it was passed by an authority which was absolutely lacking in companypetence and ii that despite its punitive character, it was passed without holding a domestic enquiry or giving an opportunity to show cause thereby violating the principles of natural justice.
