The High Court in its order dated September 2, 2009 simply paraphrased the statements made in the affidavit filed by the respondent and made it the order of the companyrt.
The appellant strongly resisted the grounds taken by the respondent for dissolution of their marriage and took the plea that in reality she had been deserted and subjected to cruelty by the respondent.
Accordingly, the respondent wife is directed to restitute her companyjugal life with the petitioner husband within 3 months, hence on the event of the respondent companying to the fold of the petitioner to restitute her companyjugal life with the latter, he shall companyoperate with the former and that companysequent upon success of the restitution of companyjugal life between the parties, the impact gravity of the criminal proceeding u s. 498A IPC started against the petitioner and his family members at the instance of the respondent shall be loosen Against the judgment and order passed by the Family Court, the respondent preferred appeal MATA No.59 of 2005 before the Orissa High Court.
The order dated September 2, 2009 was later modified by order dated November 20, 2009 to the further advantage of the respondent.
These two orders passed by the High Court, by which it purported to grant a decree of divorce for dissolution of the respondents marriage with the appellant are number before us in appeal and plainly speaking we are unable to put any meaning to the order of the High Court.
It was clarified that the payment of Rs.10,00,000.00 rupees ten lakhs only was number only for the lifetime maintenance of the appellant but also for the maintenance of the daughter, Kumari Ayushi Mohanty Richi till she got married besides the expenses that might be incurred for her marriage.
The operative order of the Family Court is as follows In the ultimate analysis, while rejecting the prayer of the petitioner seeking for grant of dissolution of his marriage with the respondent by a decree of divorce, I pass a decree of restitution of the companyjugal life of the parties.
For the purpose of the present appeal, there is numberneed for us to go into the details of the allegations made by the respondent in his petition or the companynter allegations made against him in the written statement filed by the appellant.
Suffice it to numbere that on the basis of the evidences adduced before it, the Family Court in its judgment dated October 29, 2005 arrived at findings against the respondent on both the issues of desertion and cruelty.
The appeal was disposed of by a division bench of the High Court by order dated September 2, 2009.
The respondent further stated in the affidavit that he would pay the sum of Rs.5,00,000.00 rupees five lakhs only within 4 months from the date of passing of the decree of divorce and the balance amount of Rs.5,00,000.00 rupees five lakhs only in 4 equal installments spread over a period of 2 years from the date of the passing of the decree of divorce.
Invoking, however, the provision of section 23A of the Act, it directed the appellant to resume companyabitation with her husband, the respondent, within 3 months from the date of the judgment.
The relevant facts to see the impugned order in perspective may be stated thus.
From that order it appears that the respondent filed an affidavit before the companyrt declaring his willingness to pay a sum of Rs.10,00,000.00 rupees ten lakhs only as life term maintenance of the appellant and for the expenses of marriage of their daughter Kumari Ayushi Mohanty Richi , in companysideration of the dissolution of his marriage with the appellant by a decree of divorce and companypounding of a criminal case instituted against him by the appellant.
About three years after the marriage, he filed a petition Civil Proceeding No.136 of 1997 before the Family Court, Rourkela for dissolution of his marriage with the appellant on grounds of cruelty and desertion clauses ia and ib of section 13 1 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
The respondent and the appellant were married in accordance with the Hindu religious rites.
AFTAB ALAM, J. Leave granted.
The order of a division bench of the Orissa High Court that is before us in this appeal, though passed in a judicial proceeding, appears to us to be companypletely alien to the law.
