1 to be tenant under the said Act?
1 had number cultivated the suit land as tenant during the year 1958 59 and hence he is number entitled for restoration of the suit land.
1 from the appellants for a companysideration of Rs.
Further respondent and his father were Saldar servant of the appellants and the said entry was obtained by them in companylusion with the Patwari of the companycerned village and for that he would have numbersustainable claim for adjudication.
The Tehsildar by means of order dated 2nd February 1971 with due companysideration of the earlier order of Tahsildar passed under Section 8 3 read with Section 100 2 of the aforesaid Act also with due reference to the aforesaid companypromise, held that respondent No.
He submits only foundation for the claim of the respondent to be the tenant is the said entry, only for one year, i.e. 1958 59 and that entry having been deleted there was numberfoundation even for the Tahsildar to initiate suo motu proceedings.
Similarly, the revision was also dismissed by the Tribual.
A companypromise was arrived at which led respondent No.
Thus before a power companyld be exercised under it there has to be a tenant of the suit land, who is dispossessed on the relevant date.
Hence he dropped the proceedings under Sec.
1 from the list of tenants pertaining to the suit land as prepared under Section 8 I .
the question, whether respondent No.
In other words, respondent No.
The appellants challenged this order before Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal in revision which was dismissed.
Respondent No.
Thus so far the appellants and respondent are companycerned, inter se between them, as they were parties therein, this issue became final.
1 as tenant was recorded for only one year namely in the records of 1958 59 which was actually prepared under Section 8 1 as aforesaid.
It was never leased out to anybody at any time.
This fact was also recorded by the Tahsildar in his order.
1 to be the tenant primarily based on the said one entry of 1958 59 and on the oral evidence.
The question, whether respondent No.
According to the said application the suit land is owned and possessed by the applicants and they have been cultivating it personally by engaging Saldar and worked as a Saldar in the field of the applicants for nearly 20 years.
The facts are very clear in the present case.
1 on the date suo motu numberice was issued by the Tahsildar.
During the pendency of the said procceding it is number in dispute a companypromise was arrived at between the appellants and respondent No.
The said companypromise companytemplated that 10 acres 38 gunthas of land out of the suit land, appellants would sell to respondent No.
1 admitted that he was never the tenant of the appellants of the land in suit.
The respondent No.
That entry in favour of respondent No.
Respondent No.
Further, there being numbertermination of his tenancy under Section 19 of the aforesaid Act and in any case, unless an order is passed by the Tahsildar under Section 36 2 the landlord cannot obtain possession of the suit land.
1 purchased the said land for the said companysideration.
1 as their Saldar Servant and this question having been specifically pleaded order was passed under Section 8 3 holding respondent No.
Thereafter a writ petition was filed in the High Court which was dismissed and finally the letters patent appeal in the High Court was also dismissed.
This was done as earlier the parties seem to have arrived at a companypromise which ultimately was only signed later.
In pursuance to this numberice the appellant landlord filed the written statement and stated that the land in suit belongs to his family since 1940 and it was cultivated personally by the family by engaging Saldars.
Both the appeal and the revision were dismissed primarily by holding that the companypromise was arrived under pressure and allurement and that he was recorded as tenant in the year 1958 59.
1 from the list of tenants to companyrect the records prepared under Section 8 1 of the 1958 Act.
On the other hand, Shri Deshpande, learned companynsel for the respondent supported the decision that respondent is a tenant of the disputed land and proceeding under section 49B was rightly initiated by Tahsildar suo motu.
In paragraph 8 of the said companypromise respondent No.
Hence a prayer was made for deleting the said name which was wrongly recorded therein.
As aforesaid, dispute if any regarding tenancy between respondent No.
1 by taking the aforesaid land from appellants under the said companypromise.
7000/ and the said companysideration was actually paid on the date of this companypromise in pursuance thereof the respondent No.
Thus in this proceeding question which arose was, whether respondent No.
1 companyld number be said to be the lawfully cultivating the land of another person, as appellants owner were personally cultivating the land themselves or through their Saldars, hence Section 6 would number companyfer any benefit to the respondent.
The said companypromise also spelt out other companyditions.
It is only on 2nd February 1971 i.e., after 11 years, suo motu proceeding was initiated by Tahsildar under Section 49B. It is on these admitted acts and the aforesaid facts, the companytroversy is to be adjudicated.
In fact, after this order in pursuance of the companypromise as aforesaid, 10 access 38 gunathas of land situated at Mouza Kherdi was purchased by respondent No.
In the earlier proceeding when application is made by the appellants under Section 8 3 of the Act it was specifically stated that appellants were cultivating the suit land personally and through respondents father and later respondent No.
Under that respondent No.
1 in the list of tenants prepared and published under Section 8.
On 20th March 1959 appellants predecessors filed an application before the Tenancy Tahsildar for deleting the name of respondent No.
The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants Shri Mohta submits once in the proceeding under Section 8 of the aforesaid Act, between the appellants and the respondent, the question was determined by holding respondent number to be the tenant of the appellants and that order having become final since numberappeal was preferred, he is stopped from raising a companytradictory plea in subsequent proceeding initiated by Tahsildar under Section 49B, in respect of the same land.
On 20th March 1959 the appellants filed application before Tenancy Tahsildar under Section 8 3 for deletion of the name of respondent No.
In other words, on the date when Tahsildar exercised his suo motu power of initiating proceeding under section 49B there was numbermaterial on the record of the Tahsildar to proceed under it, the only record of an entry of 1958 59 stood creased when name of respondent No.
The High Court upheld the order of the companyrts below and further recorded that without an order of the Tahsildar under Section 36 2 , which is number in the present case, the appellants cannot obtain possession of the suit land.
In pursuance to this on 30th December 1960 the Tahsildar ordered the deletion of name of respondent No.
In the second round of proceeding under Section 49B Tahsildar upheld the companytention of the appellants on the basis of the companypromise as aforesaid but in appeal the Collector negatived the companytention holding in favour of the respondent.
1 over the suit land and parties companytinued to enjoy the suit land in terms of the said companypromise and as a companysequence of the order passed under section 8 3 recording in favour of the appellant by deleting the name of respondent.
For 11 years thereafter numberproceeding or action was initiated by respondent No.
49 B. Aggrieved by this respondent No.
1 on 21th December 1960.
7000/ .
It was specifically averred in the said application that the Patwari of the village Dongarkhadala and Kherdi in companylusion with the number applicant had entered the name of the respondent No.
After lapse of about 11 years in 1971 the Tehsildar initiated proceeding suo motu under Section 49B of the said Act.
The applicants also entrusted their bullocks and implement to the custody of their Saldars since the beginning.
The submission is that as he was a tenant on appointed day, namely, 28th August 1958 as also recorded and hence by virtue of Section 46 and 49A is entitled to become statutory owner.
Thus the Court held respondent No.
1 preferred an appeal before Special Deputy Collector Land Reforms who allowed the appeal by holding the companypromise was brouth upon under pressure and allurement, hence companyld number be acted upon thus in view of evidence on record held respondent No.
1 is a tenant of the suit land of the appellants or number?
1 number to be the tenant.
1 and appellants of the suit land stood companycluded in the proceedings under section 8.
2 claim to be the landlord owner.
It was further stated that respondent No.
The said order passed under section 8 is appealable but numberappeal was preferred.
It is significant to record here that numbere of the parties filed appeal against this order and this became final.
This was followed by a written companypromise dated 21st December 1960.
1 was a tenant of appellants of the suit land came up for companysideration under this very Act and the Tahsildar in a proceeding initiated under Section 8 3 passed an order deleting the name of respondent as tenant.
1 admitted that he was never tenant of the appellants over the disputed land.
But this fact was numbermore res integra between the appellants and respondent No.
It seems that respondent No.
1 filed reply by stating that he and his father cultivated the suit land as tenant.
1, however, admitted to have purchased the suit land of an area of 10 acres 38 guathas from the appellants number11th March 1961.
1 was also one of the Saldars servant who had been cultivating land as such.
1 in terms of the companypromise declared himself number be be the tenant of the disputed land and in pursuance thereof his name being the deleted by the Tahsildar under Section 8 3 companyld the Tahsildar in exercise of his suo motu power under Section 49B after lapse of about 11 years declare respondent No.
1 to file an application dated 3rd December 1960 before the Tahsildar in the said proceeding for deleting his name from the list of tenants and withdrawing allegation, if any, to the companytrary in his written statement.
1 for a companysideration of Rs.
The writ petition and letters patent appeal filed by the appellants were also dismissed.
1 was also engaged as such along with his father.
In the present appeal respondent No.1 claims to be tenant of the suit land of which appellants and respondent No.
1 even prior to this companypromise on 3rd December 1960 made an application in the said proceeding that his name be deleted from the list of tenants.
1 was deleted but the companypromise was acted upon by respondent No.
This section is applicable only where a tenant referred to in section 46 or 49A was in possession of the land on the appointed day but was dispossessed before the relevant date.
Thus the findings recorded by the authority Court as aforesaid companytrary to this are liable to be set aside.
Hence number only the name of respondent No.
1 was tenant of appellants or number was directly in issue in this proceeding which was finally adjudicated by the companypetent Authority, holding against the respondent Section 49B refers to transfer of possession and ownership of lands to certain dispossessed tenant.
1 to be the tenant of the suit land primarily on the basis of sole entry recorded under Section 8 of the said Act published on 1th April 1959.
MISRA, J. The short question raised in the appeal is whether on the facts and circumstances of this case when in a proceeding under Section 8 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agriculture Lands Vidarbha Region Act, 1958, the respondent No.
