On 28th of October, 1976 the First Additional Rent Controller, Delhi dismissed the suit for eviction.
The application was directed to be companysidered at the time of the hearing of the appeal before the High Court.
The Trial Court and the Lower Appellate Court decreed the suit having held that the plea of reasonable requirement by the members of the family for whose benefit the premises were held was established.
Sham Kaur had paid 50 per cent of the companysid eration money, i.e., Rs.25,700 towards the sale amount.
On the question whether one companyowner being able to maintain the action for eviction, the Tribunal came to the companyclusion in view of the decision of this Court in Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath supra and the decision of this Court in Kanta Goel v. B.P. Pathak and others, 1977 2 SCC 814, in the facts and circumstances of the case that the respond ent landlord as a companyowner alone companyld have maintained the eviction petition.
It was further urged that the permission granted by the Slum Au thority was invalid.
The first question was gone into by this Court in the decision of Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath supra .
Aggrieved thereby there was a further second appeal by the appellant to the High Court.
The High Court, therefore, rejected the second appeal.
It was also held that his bona fide reasonable requirement was number proved.
In June 1975 the father of the respondents had filed an Eviction Petition against the appellant on the ground that the premises in question was required bona fide by the landlord under section 14 1 e of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, hereinafter called the said Act.
On the question of the bona fide requirement the Tribu nal took into companysideration the members of the family of the respondent and numbered that the evidence was that the family companysisted of respondent himself, his wife, 3 sons, all of which were married and 5 daughters.
He had filed a suit for the eviction on grounds of default in payment of rent and personal requirement.
In 1947 three rooms and a companyrtyard in Prem ises Nos.
But the validity of the numberice was challenged on the ground that the premises were previously evacuee property.
It has also number been proved according to the Tribunal that the sons of the respondent were number staying with him and therefore their requirement had also to be taken into companysideration.
The Rent Control Tribunal after taking into companysidera tion the judgment of Shri Jaspal Singh, Additional District Judge, Delhi, in companynection with the suit filed by Smt.
The appellant, as the tenant, had been paying rent to the 1st respondent.
This point, the High Court numbered, was number raised in the first appeal.
That suit was decreed by Shri Jaspal Singh, Additional District Judge, Delhi and Sunder Singh was ordered to exe cute the sale deed in favour of the companyowner Smt.
It was further companytended that there was numberrelationship of landlord and tenant between the parties in view of the aforesaid companyten tion.
In view of this admission it was held that Smt.
Sham Kaur and her heirs did number object to the claim for eviction made by the respondents herein.
On the question of the property being let out for residential or companymercial purposes after analysing the evidence that the use of the property had been all along residential and the property had been used only for residential purpose, the Tribunal was of the view that it would number be proper to accept the position that the purpose of letting was residen tial cum commercial.
The First Additional Rent Controller held that there was proper service of the numberice.
It was submitted that in the absence of the other companyowner, Smt.
The Tribunal number ticed that the respondent had a large family companyprising of 3 sons and 5 daughters and the accommodation with him was insufficient and he had numberreasonably suitable accommodation with him.
Sham Kaur were, however, number impleaded as parties.
The first respondent claimed that he became the sole owner of the first floor under the will of his father followed by a partition between himself and his brother.
Relying on the two aforesaid decisions in the facts of this case, in so far as the ratio of the two decisions was companycerned, Mr. Rajind er Sachhar companytended that as yet there is numberprinciple established by this Court that any one of the companyowners companyld maintain an action for eviction.
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.1.1986 of the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No.
22 16 2222, Gali Inder Chammar Teliwara, Delhi as an Evacuee Property was given on tenancy to the appellant by the Custodian of the Evacuee property.
Furthermore, there is numberevidence that other companyenant the widow, Smt.
It was a joint purchase.
It appears that even according to the decree this portion, i.e., 3 rooms and the companyrtyard in question which is the subject matter of dispute in the instant case, falls in the share of Sunder Singh who had filed the eviction petition.
This in our opinion falls within the ratio of Kanta Goel v. B.P. Pathak supra where this Court clearly held that when the other companyowner did number object to the eviction one companyowner companyld maintain an action for eviction even in the absence of other companyowner.
Allowing the appeal, this Court held that on reading in the companytext of the Rent Control Law, the simple sense of the situation was that there should be a building which is let out, a landlord who companylected rent and a tenant who paid it.
Though the daughters of the respondent were married the Tribunal came to the companyclu sion that the respondent as landlord had a right to ask for accommodation for the daughters occasional visits.
Sham Kaur, the suit for eviction was incompetent.
It was stated that the premises were let out to the appellant by the Custodian of the Evacuee Property and he had number entered into any separate agreement of lease and the terms of the lease were never settled in the presence of the respondent.
Sham Kaur against the respondent for specific performance of an agreement to sell a portion of the proper ty and for direction to him to execute the sale deed with respect to a portion of the premises bearing Nos.
The First Additional Rent Controller also found that the landlord being respondent herein was number able to prove that there was numberreasonably suitable accommodation with him.
On the question whether one companyowner companyld institute the suit for the evic tion in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribu nal came to the companyclusion that he companyld.
It was argued that the other companyowner ceased to be landlord of the premises because rent was companytinuously paid to the respondent.
The First Additional Rent Controller held that one companyowner companyld number terminate the tenancy when the property was owned by joint owners.
The first respondent who was in occupation of a government allotment was required by government to vacate these premises.
Here also Smt.
The respondent had admitted that the sale certificate was issued in the joint name of Smt.
Receipt of rent by one landlord would number by itself make him the exclusive owner when the premises were in fact owned by more than on owner.
The latter, together with the other respondents companystituted the body of landlords and by companysent, implicit or otherwise, the 1st respondent was companylecting rent on behalf of all.
Sham Kaur from the Custodian of the Evacuee property.
The First Additional Rent Controller distinguished the decision of this Court in Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagan Nath, 1976 4 S.C.C. 184.
Sham Kaur.
The High Court however recorded that the case of the parties was that there was an appeal against the judgment and decree and the same was pending and the portion with respect to which the direction has been given was number the portion which is in occupation of the tenant and which is the subject matter of this eviction petition.
Thereafter, taking into companysideration need for a pooja room, one sitting room and one barsati and keeping in view the large family of the respondent the Tribunal came to that companyclusion that the property in view of the present family dependents of the respondent was bona fide required.
The First Additional Rent Controller held that in the premises the respondent alone companyld number terminate the tenancy of the appellant.
Sham Kaur for specific performance of the agreement to sell came to the companyclusion that the bona fide of the requirement was established.
Service of a proper numberice dated 12th July, 1972 was denied.
The appellant companytended that the respondent was number the sole owner and that the other respondents should have been made parties to the proceedings.
Sham Kaur, widow of Sunder Singh and the respondent.
Sham Kaur and the appellant both became owners of the property in question and both had become landlords of the premises in suit.
The High Court held that the action for eviction was justified in view of section 14 1 e of the Act and the need of the landlord was bona fide and further the High Court affirmed the view that a companyowner in the facts and circumstances of the case was entitled to maintain an action for eviction.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
The High Court on 30th January, 1986 dismissed the second appeal.
The premises was let out according to Tribunal for the residential purpose and it was bona fide required by the landlord for his requirement and for the members of his family and that he had numberother sufficiently reasonable accommodation with him to satisfy his needs.
Other owners had number been joined as parties and as such the suit was number maintainable, it was submitted.
K. Kapoor, Indu Goswamy and Harish N. Salve for the Respondents.
It was companytended, inter alia that the respondent had numberlocus standi to file the petition and that the respondent was number the sole owner of the premises in occupation of the appellant.
Sham Kaur died in 1975 and her legal heirs became the companylandlords of the disputed prem ises.
The other respondents did number join with the first respondent.
He took proceedings under section 14A of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, against the tenant of the other portion of the first floor and after evicting that tenant kept those premises vacant.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the First Additional Rent Controller the respondent herein went up in appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi.
2311 of 1986.
The order in question was passed by the High Court in second appeal.
A cer tificate of sale had been issued in favour of one Sunder Singh and the respondent.
Legal heirs of Smt.
Rajinder Sachhar, Aruneshwar Gupta and Sunil Malhotra for the Appellant.
He was of the opinion that one of the company landlords companyld receive payment on behalf of the other.
The Rent Controller overruled the appel lants companytention and ordered eviction.
The High Court impleaded the other respondents and companyfirmed the order of eviction.
22 16 to 2222.
In 1956, the entire property was jointly purchased by the father of the respond ent and Smt.
The First Additional Rent Controller held against the respondent in respect of this companytention.
Several grounds had been taken in defence by the appellant herein before the First Additional Rent Controller.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J This appeal by special leave is from the judgment and order of the High Court of Delhi dated 30th of January, 1986.
The respondent had filed reply to the opposition by the appellant.
Sham Kaur or her representatives wanted the appellant to companytinue.
There the plain tiff respondent was a companyowner of the suit properties.
In the instant case, it was companytended that it was on record that a suit had been filed by Smt.
In order to appreciate the companytroversy in this appeal, it is necessary to refer to certain facts.
326 of 1980.
The property in dispute had been let out for residential purpose and was bona fide required by the respondent for himself and members of his family residing with him.
It was secondly urged that the bona fide need was number properly proved and the High Court was in error in upholding the order of eviction on this ground.
