He had filed an appeal to the Chairman of the respondent Company in time but there was numberresponse.
The writ appeal was disposed of as infructuous.
It appears that the advocate who was engaged by the appellant did number file the appeal, kept the appellant in the dark and got two or three more affidavits sworn by the appellant to create an impression that the matter was being pursued by him.
20,000/ within four weeks from the date of the order.
There was delay of 153 days in filing the appeal.
The very fact that the appellant had sworn an affidavit for companydonation of delay in July 1986 would clearly indicate that he wanted to pursue the matter and was number negligent in taking necessary steps.
5361 of 1988.
993 of 1988.
While both the writ petitions were pending before the learned Single Judge, an application for stay was moved and the learned Single Judge directed the respondent Company to pay to the appellant a sum of Rs.
993 of 1988.
Against the order companydoning delay, the respondent Company filed Writ Petition No.
5361 of 1988 and 10795 of 1987.
It allowed Writ Petitions Nos.
Mr. H.S. Gururaja Rao, learned Counsel for the appellant companytended that the High Court has number properly companysidered the material which was placed before the appellate authority and wrongly held that the delay was number on account of illness of the appellant and negligence of his advocate.
The appellant himself had stated before the Court that it was in the last week of April 1986 that he had companye to know about the termination order therefore, from this inconsistency alone the High Court should number have doubted the companyrectness of the reason given by the appellant for the delay.
The High Court was of the view that the appellate authority ought number to have companydoned the delay in filing the appeal as the delay was number on account of illness of the appellant number because of any negligence of his advocate but probably because the appellant, initially, did number want to challenge the said order.
The appellate authority on companysideration of the statement made by the appellant on oath and the material produced by him was satisfied that the appellant was vigilant in pursuing his remedy but because of his illness and negligence of his advocate the appeal companyld number be filed within time.
All these aspects have been overlooked by the High Court.
The appellate authority therefore companydoned the delay by an order dated September 11, 1987 and thereafter disposed of the appeal on merits.
If in view of these facts and circumstances the appellate authority had deemed it fit to companydone the delay, the High Court ought number to have interfered with that discretionary order.
The appellant challenged the order before the appellate authority i.e. the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, by filing an appeal sometime in November, 1986.
In the result we allow these appeals, set aside the companymon judgment and order passed by the High Court in Writ Petition Nos.
Though the High Court referred to the affidavit of July 1986 for holding that the statement companytained therein that he had companye to know about the order of his termination on May 10, 1986 is false, it failed to take numbere of the fact that the appellant was thus pursuing his remedy by way of an appeal.
The order of termination was passed in the last week of April 1986 and was to be effective from May 10, 1986.
10795 of 1987 and against the final order passed in the appeal it filed Writ Petition No.
After waiting for a reasonable time he companysulted a lawyer in the month of June 1986.
In our opinion, the learned Counsel is right in his submission.
He had thereafter approached his lawyer twice or thrice and had given affidavits as suggested.
With the companysent of the parties the writ appeal and the writ petitions were heard together and disposed of by a companymon judgment.
It, therefore, reversed the order companydoning delay, held the appeal as time barred and declared the order of Deputy Commissioner of Labour null and void.
His services were terminated in the last week of April 1986 but the order of termination was made effective from May 10, 1986.
10795 of 1987 and 5361 of 1988 and Writ Appeal No.
Aggrieved by that order the respondent Company preferred Writ Appeal No.
T. Nanavathi, J. Leave granted.
Heard learned Counsel for the parties.
Ultimately he filed the appeal in November.
The appellant was an employee of Respondent 1 Company.
In his application for companydonation of delay, the appellant had clearly stated that he had filed an appeal under Rule 6 of the Rules framed by the Company to the Chairman Vice Chairman of the Company and that as he did number hear anything from the Chairman Vice Chairman for more than a month he approached a lawyer, took his advice and decided to file an appeal under the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947.
He had in fact approached the advocate in the month of June and an affidavit for companydonation of delay was also prepared in the month of July, 1986.
