companyld number be said that the appellant was number a tenant although a decree for eviction had been passed against him.
Being thus baffled in his attempts to get possession of the accommodation occupied by the appellant, in execution of the ejectment decree, Mehtab Singh sold the building to the respondent on August 21, 1961.
This suit was filed in the Court ,of a Sub Judge of Delhi which was an ordinary civil Court.
September 1957.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sarkar, J. This appeal was filed with special leave of this Court granted on August 14, 1964.
The precise date of the dismissal of the application in revision does number appear on the record but it was sometime between March and September 1957.
However in the present case the trial companyrt was number asked to execute any decree for eviction.
It was asked to decide whether the appellant was a trespasser and so liable to eviction.
The respondent appealed against this judgment to the High Court of Punjab.
When after the dismissal of the revision petition against the ejectment decree Mehtab Singh sought to execute the decree, he was faced with the difficulty created by this provision.
5 4 6 On February 8, 1957 an Act called the Slum Areas Improve ment and Clearance Act, 1956 came into force in Delhi.
Sub section 1 of s. 19 of this Act which is the provision on which the appellants case is principally based, is in these terms S.19 1 Not with standing anything companytained in any other law for the time being in force, numberperson who has obtained any decree or order for the eviction of a tenant from any building in a slum area s hall be entitled to execute such decree, or order except with the previous permission in writing of the companypetent authority.
Jyoti Pershad v. The Administration for the Union Territory of Delhi 1962 2S.C.R. 125, held inapplicable.
641 of 1965.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated May 12, 1964 of the Punjab High Court Circuit Bench at Delhi in Regular First Appeal No.
By a numberification issued under s. 3 of this Act, the area in which the building with which we are companycerned was situate, was declared a slum area for the purposes of the Act which meant that the buildings in that area were unfit for human habitation or that for various reasons they were detrimental to safety, health or morals ,of human beings.
B. Agarwala and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for, the, appellant.,
The Controller under s. 42 of the Rent Act,.
209 D of 1962.
He thereafter moved the High Court of Punjab in revision but here also he was unsuccessful.
Bishan Narain, Ravinder Narain, for respondent.
2 and 3 together and held that the real question involved in them was whether the appellant was a tenant.
The appellant filed an appeal against that decree which, however, was dismissed on March 27, 1957.
He appealed to the appellate authority mentioned in that Act but that appeal was rejected on January 7, 1958.
One Mehtab Singh was the owner of a certain building known as.
He observed that s. 2 I of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 numberdoubt provided that a tenant for the purpose of the Act would number include any person against whom any order or decree for eviction has been made but he held that the words order or decree for eviction in the provision meant an executable decree or order.
He thereupon applied to the specified authority for permission to execute the decree but this was refused on September 12, 1957.
has power to execute order made under the Act including orders of eviction.
Akbar Building, situate in Mohalla Ganda Nala, Gali Rajan, Delhi.
The appellant was a tenant under him in respect of certain accommodation in the building.
On October 11, 1956 that suit was decreed.
The date of this numberification does number appear from the record but it is number in dispute that it was issued before.
On June 3, 1955, Mehtab Singh filed a suit under the Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 against the appellant for his ejectment.
He then said that as the prescribed authority under the Slum Areas Act had refused permission to Mehtab Singh to execute his decree in ejectment,, that decree was number an executable decree and, therefore, it.
Owing to the provision in s. 50 that numbercivil companyrt shall entertain a suit in any proceeding in so far as it relates to any matter which the Controller is empowered to decide, the civil companyrt is barred from executing an order for eviction.
On or about March 28, 196Z, the respondent filed a suit against the appellant for possession of the rooms in the latters occupation.
A C CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
