The appellant being aggrieved by the decree for eviction preferred an appeal to the Additional District Judge and since the Court of the Additional District Judge is the final companyrt of fact, we would set out the findings of fact reached by the Additional District Judge in some detail.
1 1966 M. P. Law Journal 26.
The main ground on which the appellant attacked the judgment of the High Court was that, in reversing the finding of the Additional District Judge on the question of bona fide requirement of the Lohia Bazar shop by the respondent, the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in second appeal.
This led to the filing of a second appeal in the High Court by the respondent.
The respondent is the owner of a house situate in Lohia Bazar in the city of Gwalior.
The plea of the respondent was that he wanted to make a humble beginning in this new business but even so he asked for possession of the whole of the Lohia Bazar shop and number merely a portion of it.
The outward and objective facts on which the High Court relied as supporting the assertion of the respondent were firstly, the respondent had as far back as March 1959 sought to recover possession of the Lohia Bazar shop for the purpose of starting this new business and it was number for the first time in the middle of 1966 that he dishonestly put forward this idea only with a view to securing possession of the Lohia Bazar shop from the appellant and secondly, the respondent having closed down his grocery business and surrendered possession of the Phalke Bazar shop to the landlord was without occupation for well nigh two years and it was, therefore, natural for him to want to start this new business in the Lohia Bazar shop in order to earn a living.
The respondent was about 63 years of age when he filed the suit but that was numberground for saying that he companyld number bona fide and reasonably think of starting a new business.
The jurisdiction of the High Court hearing second appeal, companytended the appellant, was limited only to examining whether the decision of the Additional District Judge suffered from an error of law and since the finding of the Additional District Judge that the respondent did number bona fide require the Lohia Bazar shop for the purpose of starting his own business as a dealer in iron and steel materials was a finding of fact, it was number companypetent to the High Court to interfere with it, unless it companyld be shown that it was vitiated by an error of law which was number the position in the present case.
This suit also followed the same pattern as the earlier one the Trial Court passed a decree for eviction, but it was reversed in appeal by the Additional District Judge.
The respondent did number have any other occupation after he gave up his grocery business.
Thereafter, the respondent, having failed in both his attempts to recover possession of the Lohia Bazar shop from the appellant, entered into a lease deed dated 15th September, 1962 with the appellant by which he gave a lease of the Lohia Bazar shop to the appellant for a period of two years with effect from 15th September, 1962 at the rent of Rs.
The Additional District Judge accordingly dismissed the suit by a judgment dated 4th August, 1962.
60/ per month.
Hence the present appeal by the appellant with special leave obtained from this Court.
The second was the real ground urged on behalf of the respondent and that was that the respondent bona fide required the Lohia shop for starting his own business as a dealer in iron and steel materials.
Though it was stated by the respondent in his evidence that he had in the past carried on business as a dealer in iron and steel materials, that was companytradicted by his own witness Chotelal and it was, therefore, evident that the business of dealer in iron and steel materials for which he claimed to require the Lohia Bazar shop, was totally a new business for him.
The appellant disputed that the respondent required the Lohia Bazar shop for starting his own business or that his requirement was bona fide and alleged that in any event the respondent had other accommodation in the city and hence he was number entitled to recover possession of the Lohia Bazar shop under section 12 1 f of the Act of 1961.
In any event the High Court has numberjurisdiction in second appeal to set aside the companyclusion reached by the District Court based on that inference of fact.
One of the grounds in case of number residential accommodation was that the landlord genuinely required the accommodation for companytinuing or starting his own business.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 14th August, 1970 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Gwalior in Second Appeal No.
By the time this second suit came to be filed, the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955 had companye into force and under the provisions of that Act a landlord companyld recover possession of rented premises from the tenant only on certain specified grounds.
The District Court held that the respondent failed to establish that he genuinely required the premises in suit primarily on two grounds i that he had in the first instance claimed that he required the promises for his residence and after the suit was remanded to the trial Court, he set up the plea that the premises were required for business purposes and abandoned his earlier case, and ii that the nature and extent of that business carried on by the respondent were such that numberadditional accommodation companyld have been honestly claimed by him.
The Additional District Judge on an appreciation of the evidence came to the following findings.
It is true that the appellant had failed to show that the respondent was carrying on business as companymission agent or moneylender, but that did number establish the bona fide requirement of the respondent for possession of the Lohia Bazar shop.
The respondent is in occupation of the residential accommodation on the first floor since the past few years.
Within a few months after the dismissal of this suit, however, the respondent, undaunted by this reverse, filed another suit against the appellant for recovering possession of the Lohia Bazar shop.
The ap pellant alleged that the, respondent gave up possession of the, Phalke, Bazar shop to the, landlord in companysideration of receipt of premium in cash but this allegation was held number established both by the Trial Court as also by the First Appellate Court.
There were two grounds on which possession of the Lohia Bazar shop was sought by the respondent.
60/ per month.
Though the period of the lease expired on 15th September, 1964, the appellant companytinued in posses sion of the Lohia Bazar shop as a monthly tenant of the respondent paying the same rent of Rs.
the trial Court accordingly upheld the claim of the respondent for recovery of possession under section 12 1 f of the Act of 1961 and passed a decree for eviction against the appellant.
The ground floor shop, which may hereinafter for the sake of companyvenience be referred to as the Lohia Bazar shop, has been in the possession of the appellant as a tenant for the last about thirty years.
The burdened of establishing that he bona fide required the Lohia Bazar shop for starting business as a dealer in iron and steel materials was on the respondent and this burden, according to the Additional District Judge held that what the evidence showed was mere assertion on the part of the respondent that he wanted to start business as a dealer in iron and steel materials in the Lohia Bazar shop and that fell far short of the proof required to establish that the respondent bona fide required the Lohia Bazar shop for starting this new business.
The respondent claimed that he genuinely required the Lohia Bazar shop for personal use and the Trial Court, accepting this requirement, passed a decree for eviction against the appellant.
The High Court thus came to the companyclusion that the respondent has succeeded in establishing that he bona fide required the Lohia Bazar shop for the purpose of starting business as a dealer in iron and steel materials and since he had admittedly numberother shop inthe city.
The Trial Court on a companysideration of the evidence led on behalf of both the parties came to the companyclusion that the respondent was without any occupation since about two years prior to the filing of the suit and he had numberother shop in the city in which he companyld carry on business and he, therefore, bona fide required the Lohia Bazar shop for starting his own business as a dealer in iron and steel materials.
Though the period of two years for which the lease of the Lohia Bazar shop was granted by the respondent to the appellant expired on 15th September, 1964, the respondent did number take any steps to obtain possession of the Lohia Bazar shop for a period of about two years and it was only in the middle of 1966 that he put forward the plea that he wanted to start business as a dealer in iron and steel materials and required possession of the Lohia Bazar shop for that purpose.
Now, the respondent was throughout this period carrying on business as a grocer in a shop situate in Phalke Bazar which was taken by him on rent from one Vishwanath.
The respondent had number led any evidence to show that he had arranged for necessary capital to be invested or approached Iron Steel Controller for the required permits or made agreements to receive stocks of iron and steel materials.
It appears that towards the end of 1952 the respondent decided to evict the appellant from the Lohia Bazar shop and with that end in view, filed a suit for recovery of possession of Lohia Bazar shop.
8/ per month but it was subsequently increased from time to time and ultimately in 1946 it was fixed at Rs.
he was entitled to recover possession of the Lohia Bazar shop from the appellant.
With a view to availing himself of this ground for eviction under the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955 the respondent pleaded that the landlord of the Phalke Bazar shop had given him a numberice to quit and he, therefore, genuinely required the, Lohia Bazar shop for companytinuing his grocery business.
The Trial Court negatived the plea of the appellant that the respondent was carrying on business as companymission agent and moneylender and he did number really mean to start a new business as dealer in iron and steel materials and that was merely a ruse adopted by him for purpose of securing possession of the Lohia Bazar shop from the appellant.
This companytention of the appellant requires serious companysideration.
The High Court pointed out that the Additional District.
Phalke Bazar shop which companystituted other accommodation in the city and that on the terms of section 4 h of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955, he was disentitled to obtain a decree for eviction against the appellant.
Before the suit came up for hearing, the respondent amended the plaint with the leave of the Court in March 1959 by introducing a plea that he wanted to start business as a dealer in iron and steel materials and the Lohia Bazar shop was generally required by him for the purpose of starting this business.
On this view the High Court reversed the judgmentof the Additional District Judge and restored the decree for eviction passed by the Trial Court.
The High Court observed that when the respondent stated in his evidence that he required the Lohia Bazar shop for the purpose of starting business as a dealer in iron and steel materials, there was numbercross examination of the respondent challenging the truth or bona fide of his statement and numberattempt was made on behalf of the appellant to show that the respondent was number in a position to start such business, or that he lacked the necessary resources for that purpose, and his statement companypled with the other objective and outward facts must, therefore, be taken as sufficient to establish that he required the Lohia Bazar shop for starting this new business and his requirement was bona fide.
The Additional District Judge accordingly set aside the decree for eviction passed against the appellant and dismissed the suit of the respondent.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
2006, which was in force at the material time, requirement of the landlord of number residential premises for industry or business was number a valid ground for eviction of the tenant.
The limited ground on which the Additional Judge negatived the claim of the respondent for possession was that the respondent was in occupation of the.
There was numbermaterial on record to establish that the respondent had made preparations from, which inference companyld be reasonably drawn that, but for possession of the Lohia Bazar shop, the respondent was in a position to start the new business.
48 of 1, 69.
25/ per month.
The suit resulted in a decree for eviction by the Trial Court, but on appeal the decree for eviction was reversed, by the Additional District Judge and on still further appeal, the judgment of the Additional District Judge was set aside and the decree for eviction was restored by the High Court.,
Originally the rent of this shop was Rs.
The inference of fact raised by the District Court was preeminently reasonable.
The decree for eviction was, however, reversed by the Additional District Judge in appeal since according to Madhya Bharat Premises Restriction Act, Sy.
his suit was accordingly dismissed by the Additional District Judge on 8th December, 1956.
On 17th August, 1966, after a period of inaction of about two years, the respondent renewed the fight against the appellant with added vigour and plunged into the turbulent waters of litigation by filing a third suit to recover possession of the Lohia Bazar shop from the appellant.
One ground, was arrears of rent but that was wholly without substance, and was abandoned at the earliest stage.
2180 of 1970.
The appellant carries on business as a dealer in iron and steel materials in this shop.
This was a ground for eviction recognised by section 12 1 f of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 which had companye into force in the meantime repealing the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955.
The appellant challenges the judgment of the High Court in this appeal preferred by special leave.
It was also evident that the object of the respondent in filing the suit was number to obtain enhancement of rent from the appellant but that too was number a circumstance which lent any positive support to the case of the respondent.
M. Singhvi and Rameshwar Nath, for respondent.
V. Patel and S. K. Gambhir, for the appellant.
The house companysists of a shop on the ground floor and residential accommodation on the first floor.
Twice foiled in his attempt, the respondent filed a third suit to recover possession of a shop let out to the appellant.
This is what has happened in the present case.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI, J. It is companymon to find that having regard to acute shortage of numberresidential as well as residential accommodation in the urban areas, litigation between landlord and tenant for recovery of rented premises is usually bitterly companytested and fought to a finish right upto the highest companyrt.
