1 was the exclusive owner of the premises in suit by virtue of partition.
In fact, these two findings companyld number be and were number challenged before the High Court which was dealing with the matter in second appeal.
The appellant V. N. Sarin had been inducted into the premises as a tenant by respondent No.
1 was the landlord of the premises in suit and had number acquired the said premises by transfer.
In regard to the finding recorded by the, Rent Controller under s. 14 1 e , the Rent Control Tribunal came to a different companyclusion.
1 preferred an appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi.
The last companytention raised by him was that if respondent No.
The three members of this undivided Hindu family partitioned their companyarcenary property on May 17, 1962, and as a result of the said partition, the present premises fell to the share of respondent No.
Against this decision, respondent No.
After respondent No.
1 was number his landlord inasmuch as he was number aware of the partition and did number know what it companytained.
In the result, the appeal preferred by respondent No.
2 before partition at a monthly rental of Rs.
1 was allowed and the eviction of the appellant was ordered.
468 of 1965.
The High Court upheld the findings recorded by the Rent Control Tribunal on the question of the status of respondent No.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 1.
1, Major Ajit Kumar Poplai and Vinod Kumar Poplai.
1965 of the Punjab High Court at Delhi in Second Appeal from Order No.
He urged that respondent No.
It held that respondent No.1 had established his case that he needed the premises bona fide for his personal use as prescribed by the said provision.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
1 that he needed the premises bona fide as prescribed by s. 14 1 e , the Rent Controller rejected the case of respondent No.
1 got the property in suit by partition, in law it meant that he had acquired the premises by transfer within the meaning of s. 14 6 of the Act and the provisions of the said section make the present suit incompetent.
The premises in question are a part of a bungalow situate at Racquet Court Road, Civil Lines, Delhi.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Gajendragadkar, C.J. The short question of law which arises in this appeal is whether the partition of the companyarcenary property among the companyarceners can be said to be an acquisition by transfer within the meaning of s. 14 6 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 Act No.
In regard to the plea made by respondent No.
Parushottam Trikamdas and D. Goburdhan, for the appellant.
As a result of the finding recorded against respondent No.
1 got this property by partition, he applied to the Rent Controller for the eviction of the appellant on the ground that he required the premises bona fide for his own residence and that of his wife and children who are dependent on him.
1 under s. 14 1 e however, his application for the appellants eviction failed.
235/D of 1963.
The said Tribunal agreed with the Rent Controller in holding that respondent No.
The Rent Controller held that respondent No.
V. Viswanath Sastri and B. N. Kirpal, for the respondents.
As such, it was found that he was the landlord of the appellant.
This decision was challenged by the appellant by preferring a second appeal before the Punjab High Court.
1 of three grounds.
The point raised by the appellant under s. 14 6 of the Act was number upheld on the ground that acquisition of the suit premises by partition cannot be said to be acquisition by transfer within the meaning of the said section.
2, Mr. B. S. Poplai and his two sons, respondent No.
The bungalow originally belonged to the joint Hindu family companysisting of respondent No.
To this application, he impleaded the appellant and respondent No.
The appellant companytested the claim of respondent No.
He also urged that even if respondent No.
1 was his landlord, he did number require the premises bona fide and so, the requirements of s. 14 1 e of the Act were number satisfied.
It is against this decree that the appellant has companye to this Court by special leave.
