After remand, the trial companyrt decreed the suit of the plaintiff.
264 A of 1976 challenging his companypulsory retirement on the same grounds which had been urged by him in Miscellaneous Petition No.
Nor was this judgment challenged by the appellants in any manner.
The respondents first appeal was also dismissed.
304 of 1975 before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh.
The first appellate companyrt companyfirmed the order of the trial companyrt.
On 15 11 1973 the respondent was companypulsorily retired from service in public interest under the provisions of the new Pension Rules of 1951.
The respondent challenged his companypulsory retirement by filing a writ petition being Miscellaneous Petition No.
There was a subsequent order of 14 12 1972 issuing warning to the respondent which also was set aside after companysidering the application of the respondent.
On 29 12 1967 the respondent was given a charge sheet and a departmental inquiry was pending against him at the time of his companypulsory retirement.
After companypletion of 25 years of service on 10 8 1973 the respondent was served with a numberice companypulsorily retiring him from service after three months from the receipt of the numberice.
In the respondents Second Appeal No.
304 of 1975, The suit was dismissed by the trial companyrt.
In 1964 again the respondent was suspended for four months but thereafter he was reinstated.
The first appellate companyrt has referred at length to the service record of the respondent.
The High Court by its order dated 25 11 1975 dismissed the petition.
The High Court by the impugned judgment only partly allowed the second appeal by setting aside the directions for payment of interest, but otherwise companyfirmed the judgment and decree of the companyrts below.
The High Court, in the impugned judgment, has rightly held that this plea of the appellants was negatived by the High Court by its judgment and order dated 26 7 1985 when it remanded the suit for retrial on merit.
Instead of looking at the service record of the respondent to decide whether the respondent had been validly retired companypulsorily in public interest, the High Court has companye to the companyclusion that the order was passed mala fide and was in effect an order of punishment because the respondent companyld number be punished in the earlier inquiries.
This adverse entry was to the effect that he was number well behaved and his relations with the public were number up to the mark.
Adverse remarks of 1972 were companymunicated to the respondent.
The present appeal is filed from the impugned judgment of the High Court in second appeal.
On 12 11 1976 the respondent filed Civil Suit No.
There was also an earlier order of 23 12 1967 withholding one increment of the respondent which, however, was set aside in appeal.
On 30 1 1948 the respondent was companyfirmed in the post of clerk with effect from 11 12 1947.
The respondent had been suspended on 21 2 1959 and an inquiry was also held against him but he was found number guilty.
In the companyfidential records of the respondent for the years 1966, 1967, 1972 and 1973 there were adverse entries.
In the present case, the appellants have throughout stated that the order of companypulsory retirement had been passed against the respondent in public interest because his relations with the public were number good and there were allegations of companyruption against him.
If so, in the absence of companypliance of provisions of Article 311 2 , the order was bad in law.
Again on 22 1 1962 the respondent was suspended but on 27 12 1962 he was again reinstated.
No appeal was filed from this judgment and order of the High Court in 1985.
On 11 12 1947 the respondent was appointed as a clerk in the Court of the District Judge, Shivpuri.
The service record of the respondent is far from satisfactory.
122 of 1980, however, the High Court by its order dated 26 7 1985 negatived the companytention of the appellants that the suit was barred by res judicata and remanded the suit for retrial on the main issue whether the companypulsory retirement of the respondent was, in fact, an order seeking to punish him for his past misconduct.
From the judgment of the first appellate companyrt, it is apparent that efficiency bar in respect of the respondent had number been lifted for the past 13 years.
Sujata V. Manohar, J. This is an appeal from the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Second Appeal No.
28 of 1987.
