On June 21, 1994 , which was the Valan day settlement day the appellant claimed reference to arbitration in regard to those items under bye law 38.
According to the bye laws of the respondent Association lie balance sheet, had to be submitted and money Kiplis vouchers had to be given.
8 to 12 or the transactions he had entered into on the ground that he disputed the transactions entered into with those defendants as they were fictitious and illegal.
The plea taken by the respondent was that the transactions in dispute were number phatak fictitious and inoperative that at the meeting on June 21, 1919.
The appellant had also added as parties in the suit defendants 8 to 12 but they are numberlonger parties as their names were struck off in the trial companynt.
The Committee heard the explanation and passed a resolution under byelaw 155 4 declaring the plaintiff a defaulter and it is this resolution which is the matter in companytroversy between the parties, On June.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated July 12, 1957, of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No.
He also prayed for reinstatement as a member of the respondent Association.
20, 1952, the appellant brought a suit for declaration that the resolution in dispute dated June 21, 1949, was bad in law, inoperative, ultra vires and number binding on the appellant and also for damages against the respondents.
The suit was tried by Tendolkar J. Several issues were raised but the appellant led numberevidence and respondents 1 to 8 examined Mr. Trikamdas Dwarkadas a solicitor of Bombay, who was present at the meeting of the Clearing House Com mittee oil June 21, 1949.
In this balance sheet which was submitted the appellant did number include the amounts which were due to defendants Nos.
71 of 1956.
1 in the appeal.
At 3 p. m. on the same day the appellant received a numberice from the Clearing House Committee, respondents 2 to 7 calling upon him to appear before them.
On June 13, the Hawala rate of these transactions was fixed and on June 14, 1949, the applicant I admitted a clearance sheet under bye law 131 of the bye laws of 1st.
respondent in which outstanding transactions for the Valan day settlement were entered.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAPUR.
All these transactions were Rajued tallied on the following day.
defendants 8 to 12 had companyplained that amounts of money had become payable to them from the appellant that at the said meeting the appellant had made it clear that he would number give any kaplis vouchers and had therefore defaulted and they were therefore entitled to declare him defaulter under bye law 155 4 of the respondent Association.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
The appellant appeared with his solicitor and companynsel, and his companytention before the Clearing House Committee was that it had numberjurisdiction to proceed with the matter because he was claiming arbitration and the dispute between him and defendants 8 to 12 had to be settled by the arbitrators.
The appellant entered into certain forward transactionswith defendants 8 to 12 during the period from May 30, 1949 to June 30, 1949.
V Viswanatha Sastri, N. P. Nathwani and K.L. Hathi, for respondent No.
On that day defendants 8 to 12 companyplained to the respondent Association that the appellant had number issued the necessary kaplis vouchers .
March 2.
1 in the suit and is respondent No.
They included the transactions which had been entered into with defendants 8 to 12.
437/60.
K. Daphtary, Solicitor, General of India, G. Patwardhan and Naunit Lal, or the, appellant.
The appellant, who was the plaintiff in the suit, was trading under the name and style of Messrs. Pratapray Manmohandas as a bullion merchant and trader in Bombay.
J. This is an appeal against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Bombay companyfirming the decree passed in its original jurisdiction.
He was a member of the Bombay Bullion Association Ltd., which was defendant No.
Respondents 2 to 7 defendants 2 to 7 and at all material times were members of the Clearing House Committee appointed under the Bye laws of the 1st respondent.
On June 6, 1956, the suit was dismissed and an appeal was taken to the Appeal Court which was also dismissed and the appellant has companye in appeal by Special Leave.
