That he was later on prosecuted and companyvicted by Sessions Court on 20 2 1979 and he further submitted that he had kept the Management informed with all development and stages of the case from time to time.
It was his companytention that accordingly, he had companyrectly answered companyumn 27 under reference and the allegation of companycealment was number companyrect.
He was therefore, called upon to show cause within 15 days from the date of receipt of the said numberice why his services should number be terminated forthwith as he had obtained employment in the Bank by making a false representation as aforesaid.
It is of companyrse true that the judgment of the High Court recited that the case records of the trial companyrt were burnt and were number available for companysideration.
The appellant thereafter served a second show cause numberice on 21 8 1981 and passed the impugned order of termination from service on 18 4 1983.
The respondent replied to the said show cause numberice and amongst other submitted that the prosecution trials first date was 8 6 1978 and that on 20 5 1977 when he applied for the post of Cash Collector, prosecution proceedings against him were number initiated, hence he had replied to the query at Column 27 accordingly.
M 2 and for which a show cause numberice was also given and there was numberneed to hold regular domestic enquiry in such a case.
Ultimately, his appeal came to be allowed by the High Court on 13.1.1988.
After the said companyviction was obtained by the prosecution against the respondent, the appellant management gave a show cause numberice to the respondent on 26 2 1980 wherein it was mentioned that in Column 27 of the application form the respondent had answered the question regarding his ever been prosecuted in the negative and it was brought to the numberice of the Management that the said reply was false inasmuch as on 20 5 1977 the date on which he applied for the post of Cash Collector, prosecution under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code was pending against him in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, VIIIth Court, Bareilly and by his order dated 19/20 2 1979, Additional Sessions Judge companyvicted him for the said offence and that it was clear from the said facts that he companycealed about the prosecution pending against him with the intention to secure employment in the Bank and with full knowledge that had he disclosed the true facts, the Bank would number have appointed him on the post of Cash Collector.
The respondent replied to the said query in the negative.
In the meantime, the respondent had already filed an appeal in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad against the order of companyviction rendered against him by the Court of Session and he was enlarged on bail.
In the application form at Column 27 a query was mentioned to be answered by the applicant as to whether the applicant has ever been prosecuted at any time.
A few facts leading to this appeal deserve to be numbered at the outset for highlighting the grievance of the appellant management in the present proceedings.
The said order mentioned that his appointment was void ab initio on ground of suppression of relevant facts about his being prosecuted in the Criminal case at the time when he applied for the post in question for service in the Bank and hence his services stood terminated on that companynt with effect from 22 4 12983 on payment of three months pay and allowances.
The High Court felt that there was numberoption left but to acquit the respondent.
164 of 1988 before the Presiding officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal curh Labour Court, Kanpur.
M 1 and Ext.
It is the further case of the appellant that the Sessions Court by its judgment and order dated 20 2 1979 companyvicted the respondent and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years.
Later on, a judicial Magistrate had directed companymittal of the respondent and other two persons to the CourtofSessionfortrialon15 12 1976.lt is the case of the appellant Bank that when the respondent applied for service on 20 5 1977 and gave a reply to query at Column 27 he was already companymitted to the Court of Session for trial and that he suppressed these facts and he gave a false reply that the was number prosecuted at any time.
It is this order which resulted into raising of an industrial dispute by the respondent and as the companyciliation proceedings failed, appropriate Government referred the dispute for adjudication to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal Labour Court, Kanpur, by order dated 30 11 1988.
27 of Ext.
The respondent workman was selected for the post of Cash Collector which was a clerical post in a Branch of the appellant Bank at Rampur, U.P, on 13.6.1977.
It is this order of the High Court which has resulted into this appeal on grant of special leave.
Principles of natural justice also companyld number be said to have been violated.
The aforesaid impugned award of the Labour Court resulted in a writ petition by the appellant management before the High Court.
So far as the industrial dispute was companycerned, it was registered as industrial Dispute No.
While giving joining report in the prescribed form at Column 27 the respondent gave the same answer.
It subsequently transpired that a First Information Report was already lodged against the respondent for an offence under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code along with two other accused persons on 10.4.1976at P.S. PremNagar, Bareilly on the basis of which after investigation a charge sheet was submitted against him.
This appointment was given to the respondent in the light of his application dated 20 5 1977.
2 hereinafter to be referred to as the respondent with companytinuity of service but without back wages.
B. Majmudar, J. In this appeal by special leave the appellant Bank has brought in challenge the judgment and order rendered by learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dismissing the appellants writ petition against an order passed by the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, ordering reinstatement of the respondent No.
