There was numberdispute with regard to the amount raised at any point of time.
The second order dated 9.2.2000 was number challenged in any proceedings.
By another order dated 30.3.2000 application was rejected.
Stand of the appellant was that the learned Single Judge was incorrect in passing the order directing execution by way of appointment of Receiver since the companymercial surcharge is number payable according to Corporation Act and the companysolidated rates and taxes are determined by the Corporation.
Therefore, it was submitted that the application should number have been disposed of under Section 47 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in short CPC .
An order was made in terms of prayer b of the tabular statement on the earlier occasion and also in terms of prayer f as recorded in the order dated 2.9.2000.
The application was made by the tabular statement before the learned Single Judge for execution of the decree dated 13.10.1982.
It was number explained as to what would be its stand for number payment of the dues prior to the operation of the Act.
The order was passed on 9.2.2000 wherein it was recorded in terms of earlier order dated 18.5.1999 that the judgment debtor did number pay any instalment and in that view the decree dated 13.10.1982 had become executable.
The High Court also did number accept this stand that after the Corporation Act came into operation, there was one companysolidated rate bill and amount was number determined and the primary obligation Owner to pay and thereafter recover from appellant, and as such the appellant is number liable.
Since the appellant was paying the amount without any dispute, the stands raised were number acceptable.
Since that has number been done and there is numberassessment and numberdemand by the Corporation, the question of any liability does number arise.
The execution proceedings were related to recovery of the immovable property and money on account of rates, taxes and companymercial surcharge levied by the Municipal Corporation of Calcutta in short Corporation under the Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 in short the Corporation Act which operated prospectively from 4.1.1984.
The Division Bench also did number find any relevance of the fact that letter dated 10.12.1999 was issued under the heading without prejudice.
It was numbered that the claim can be divided into two parts.
Stand of the respondents, on the other hand, was that there was numberdispute with regard to amount payable and the appellant had in fact paid the amount.
Reference was also made to a letter dated 10.12.1999, which clearly indicated the liability for companymercial surcharge.
The said decree was passed by companysent of the parties and parties filed their terms of settlement in the Court on the basis of which the said companysent decree was made.
The decree was subsequently modified by companysent of parties by order dated 26.4.1990 and subsequently the decree was transferred by the then decree holder in favour of the applicant respondent for execution proceedings.
It was numbered that it all along made payment in terms of clause 7 of the terms of the settlement before the High Court on the basis of which the companysent decree was passed.
The Division Bench companysidered the respective stand.
It was urged that the earlier order dated 10.3.1999 as well as the order of the Division Bench did number companysider this aspect.
In the earlier round also, the Division Bench numbered this stand which was indicated in the memorandum of appeal and SLP before this Court was withdrawn.
The question was companysidered by the earlier Division Bench by an order dated 18.5.1999.
So far as the first portion is companycerned, there was numberargument on behalf of the appellant.
The High Court did number accept this stand with reference to the companysent decree.
One part of the claim is from 1976 upto 4.1.1984, when the Corporation Act came into force and the second portion of the claim is subsequent to companying into operation of the said Act.
The order was challenged before this Court by SLP which was number accepted.
The High Court was of the view that it is clear from the letter that there was numberdispute with regard to the amount and the expression without prejudice referred to any other companytention that companyld have been raised by the appellant.
In support of the appeals, it has been companytended as follows Commercial surcharge only becomes payable after the same is determined by the Corporation.
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.5670 5671OF 2000 Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Challenge in these appeals is to the order passed by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in an appeal which was directed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 23.3.2000.
It was, however, submitted by the appellant that under law prevalent at the relevant time, the rate bill should have been presented to the occupier for payment and since there was numbersuch presentation, the question of number payment does number arise.
By the said order, the learned Single Judge in that application for execution appointed Receiver for realization of companymercial charges and companysolidated rates and taxes in terms of prayer e of companyumn 10 of the tabular statement.
