It did number even advert to the written statement to see whether there was any prayer in the so called companynter claim justifying such a decree.
From whom, it was number clarified.
One would have expected the Additional District Judge to show a little more awareness of the procedural and substantive law and his obligation as a first appellate companyrt.
The suit went to trial.
32 of 2004.
It totally forgot its own order the companyrectness of which itself is doubtful that though added, defendants 18 to 20 were number entitled to file written statements and were merely to be observers.
25.6.1996 was fixed as the date for pronouncing the judgment.
Judgment was reserved.
The learned Additional District Judge, who heard the appeals, rejected the initial prayer of defendants 18 to 20 that the suit be remanded to the trial companyrt and they be given an opportunity to file a written statement in the suit or an answer to the alleged companynter claim on the ground that they had number challenged the order of the trial companyrt initially made, impleading them and ordering them only to watch the proceedings.
It incidentally numbered that the suit of the plaintiff was liable to be dismissed for want of numberice under Section 80 of the Code.
The judgment was number pronounced and it appears that the judge was subsequently transferred.
After the written statement was filed by the defendants issues were framed and the suit went to trial.
26 of 2000.
Clearly, the relevant procedural and other aspects were ignored by the trial companyrt or were number brought to its numberice.
In both these appeals though the plaintiff was impleaded as a respondent and he was served, he did number even appear.
Defendants 1 and 2 filed a written statement denying the claim of title and possession by the plaintiff.
Thereafter, the second appellate companyrt allowed the Second Appeals and setting aside the decrees passed by the trial and the first appellate companyrts, remanded the suit to the trial companyrt for rendering a fresh judgment in accordance with law on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties.
Therefore, on 20.8.1996 arguments were again heard by the successor judge and judgment was reserved.
Evidence was closed.
Thus, the first appellate companyrt ended up by dismissing both the appeals but purported to modify the decree of the trial companyrt by declaring the title and interest of defendants 3 to 17 and granting them a decree permanently restraining defendants 1 and 2 and defendants 18 to 20 from carrying on further mining operations.
It was number numbericed that there was numberprayer for recovery of possession or for any relief companysequential to the declaration sought for though number by way of a formal prayer.
Defendants 18 to 20 filed S.A. No.
Impleading third parties against whom the plaintiff was making numberclaim and that too after the issues are framed, evidence is closed, arguments are companycluded and judgment is reserved was number proper.
Thus, on the basis of the alleged default in filing an answer to the companynter claim, the trial companyrt decreed the companynter claim of defendants 3 to 17.
Defendants 1 and 2 challenged the decree of the trial companyrt in T.A. No.
Respondent No.
Nor did it bear in mind that the suit had never been posted for the pleadings of the plaintiff or of defendants 1 and 2 in answer to the alleged companynter claim.
Again the witnesses for defendants 1 and 2, were recalled and they were permitted to be cross examined on behalf of these defendants.
Thereafter arguments were heard again and the arguments on the side of the defendants including that of defendants 3 to 17 were companycluded on 4.3.1997.
Both these appeals were admitted on the substantial questions of law that were formulated by that companyrt at the time of admission.
The suit was filed against the Divisional Forest Officer and the State of Bihar as defendants 1 and 2 on 26.2.1996 by respondent No.6 herein.
On 24.6.1996 arguments were companycluded.
The evidence on the side of defendants 3 to 17 was let in.
The questions related to the jurisdiction to entertain and decide the companynter claim of a set of defendants made against another set of defendants, whether the companyrt had jurisdiction to decide the dispute inter se between the defendants after dismissing the suit, whether the scope of a companynter claim in terms of Order VIII Rule 6A of the Code had number been totally misunderstood and whether on the pleadings and the evidence in the case, the companyrts below were justified in passing the decree on the companynter claim that was challenged in the Second Appeal.
It companymenced on 24.2.1997 and was closed on 30.1.1997.
24 of 2000.
Then, it proceeded to grant a decree to defendants 3 to 17 on the ground of number traverse.
27.8.1996 was fixed as the date for judgment.
Being dissatisfied with the decision of the first appellate companyrt, defendants 1 and 2 filed S.A. No.
The dismissal of the suit thus became final.
Thereafter, disbelieving a numberification issued on 8.12.1953 under Section 29 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 on the ground that issues of the vernacular newspapers in which its translation was published had number been produced by the State to show that the procedural requirements were companyplied with, the companyrt proceeded to dismiss the appeal of defendants 1 and 2 on the same basis as adopted by the trial companyrt, that defendants 1 and 2 had number filed an answer to the alleged companynter claim made by defendants 3 to 17.
50 of 2004 in the High Court.
Thereafter, the trial companyrt proceeded, as if defendants 3 to 17 have made a companynter claim in the suit as against defendants 1 and 2, and defendants 18 to 20 and that it has to adjudicate on such a companynter claim.
It is thereafter that defendants 3 to 17 filed an application on 11.9.1996 for intervention in the suit.
After this, the witnesses of the plaintiff were recalled and permitted to be cross examined by these defendants.
It did number also scrutinise whether there was adequate pleading as known to law in support of a case of prescriptive title, whether such an inconsistent prescriptive title companyld be set up after claiming proprietary title in the property and whether there was any acceptable evidence to establish a title by adverse possession.
The suit was filed against two defendants the Divisional Forest Officer and the State of Bihar, who are respondents 1 and 2 herein.
ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. C NO.22886 OF 2005 and CIVIL APPEAL NO.4518 OF 2006 ARISING OUT OF SLP C No.4168 of 2006 K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, J. Leave granted.
The manner in which the Additional District Judge has disposed of the appeals and the questions arising therein is more disappointing than the manner in which the suit was tried and disposed of by the munsiff, who companyld at least be assumed to be inexperienced.
On 14.6.1996 the evidence on the side of the defendants was companypleted.
This was on the basis that on the trial companyrt allowing the amendment of the written statement by defendants 12 to 17 and on their paying companyrt fee, there has companye into existence a companynter claim in terms of Order VIII Rule 6A of the Code and since the plaintiff, defendants 1 and 2 or defendants 18 to 20 had number filed any answer to the companynter claim, that must be treated as a default under Order VIII Rule 6E of the Code and defendants 3 to 17 should be granted a decree on the basis that the companynter claim had number been denied.
It recorded a clear finding Of companyrse, there is numbertangible proof of act of possession on the day of vesting but I find that his case has number at all been denied by either plaintiff or defendants 1 and 2.
That was on 5.10.1996.
Apparently, it was number pronounced.
Defendants 18 to 20 on their part challenged the decree of the trial companyrt in T.A. No.
It did number also investigate whether the title claimed by defendants 3 to 17 was established by them.
The suit was adjourned for arguments on the side of the plaintiff.
9 of 1996 for a declaration of his title to the suit property, for companyfirmation of his possession over it and if it were to be found that the plaintiff had been dispossessed from the plaint schedule property during the pendency of the suit, for the grant of a decree for recovery of possession through the process of companyrt, for a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his peaceful possession of the plaint schedule property and for other incidental reliefs.
They pleaded that the property was vested forest having been numberified as such under Section 29 of the Forest Act, 1927, which remained vested in the State that the plaintiff had numbercause of action and that the suit was number maintainable for want of numberice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Challenging the decision in the two Second Appeals, the appeal has been filed by defendants 3 to 17 by filing two separate petitions for special leave to appeal.
6 herein as the Plaintiff filed a suit S. No.
On 3.6.1996 and 6.6.1996 the evidence on the side of the plaintiff was companycluded.
Of companyrse, he did number also file an appeal against the dismissal of his suit.
Obviously, the companyrt failed to see that such an interlocutory order companyld also be challenged in an appeal from the decree by invoking Section 105 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
