So far as the first ground of objection is companycerned, the High Court did number accept the same as it was satisfied that the witnesses were all examined in the enquiry in the presence of the respondent and that he had a full and fair opportunity of cross examining the prosecution witnesses and also of examining witnesses on his behalf.
Civil Appeals Nos.
The show cause numberice, issued on October 18, 1958 as well as the order of dismissal passed by the Superintendent of Police, dated December 3, 1958 clearly show that the said officer has independently gone into the evidence on record in respect of the charges for which the respondent was tried and has, after taking into account the explanations furnished by him, independently companye to the companyclusion that the respondent is guilty.
Items of assets purchased by the respondent were again given in detail.
Mr. D. N. Mukherjee, learned companynsel for the respondent, has urged that the High Courts view that the enquiry proceed ings is vitiated inasmuch as the Enquiry Officer has acted upon the information companylected from the Anti Corruption Branch is perfectly justified, especially in view of the record made by the Enquiry Officer himself.
He was then promoted as Sub Inspector of Police in 1944.
During the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer was in frequent companysultation and companytact with the Deputy Superintendent of Police of the Anti Corruption Branch, regarding the charges which were being tried by him.
The respondent joined the Assam Police Service as a companystable in 1933 and was promoted to the post of Assistant Sub Inspector of Police in 1936.
The third charge related to the respondent having companycealed the items, enumerated therein, and given false statements regarding his assets in the declaration of assets submitted to the authorities on July 22, 1957.
as many as 14 witnesses were examined on the side of the prosecution.
On August 17, 1964 the respondent filed the writ petition in question, challenging the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him and the orders of dismissal passed on the basis of the enquiry companyducted by the Enquiry Officer.
On all these grounds, he sought to have all the orders quashed on the ground that there had been a gross violation of the principles of natural justice.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 20, 1966 of the Assam and Nagaland High Court in Civil Rule No.
It was the further view of the High Court that inasmuch as a companyy of the report of the Anti Corruption Branch as well as the materials that were gathered by the Enquiry Officer during his companysultation with that Branch had number been furnished to the respondent, the enquiry held under such circumstances was in clear violation of the principles of natural justice and hence the order dismissing the respondent from service was void.
On receipt of this memo, the respondent requested the Super intendent of Police, by his letter dated October 29, 1958 for being furnished with companyies of the depositions of the prosecution and defence witnesses recorded by the Enquiry Officer to enable him to submit his explanation.
The Superintendent of Police, after referring to the charges framed against the respondent, the nature of the evidence adduced before the Enquiry Officer as well as the finding recorded by the said Officer, issued a memo, dated October 18, 1958 asking the respondent to submit his explanation.
The Sub Divisional Police Officer, Barpeta, having been authorised under s. 7 of the Police Act, 1861 framed charges against the respondent on March 22, 1958.
That report was necessitated in view of the companyplaints received against the respondent and the enquiry made by the Anti Corruption Branch was only for the purpose of enabling the Government to companysider whether disciplinary proceedings should be initiated against the respondent.
2 In any event, the disciplinary authority, viz.,
So far as the second ground of objection was companycerned, the High Court was impressed by the fact that the Enquiry proceedings showed that on July 14, 1958 and July 15, 1958 the Enquiry Officer companysulted the Deputy Superintendent of Police of the Anti Corruption Branch about the proceedings and went through his records relating to those charges.
Therefore there was numberfurther necessity for giving the respondent an opportunity to furnish documentary or oral evidence.
According to the State, the findings had been recorded on the basis of the evidence adduced during the actual enquiry.
The High Court was further of the view that the Enquiry Officer had taken into companysideration the materials gathered from the records of the Anti Corruption Branch.
He took a further ground of attack that he had been appointed by the Inspector General of Police and the order of dismissal by a subordinate authority, viz.,
the Superintendent of Police, after receipt of the report of the Enquiry Officer, had himself gone into the various items of evidence and, after a due companysideration of the explanation submitted by the respondent, had agreed with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and, after further companysideration of the explanation submitted by the respondent to the show cause numberice, ultimately passed the order of dismissal.
the Superintendent of Police, was illegal and void.
In the said order, the Superintendent of Police had referred to the charges framed against the respondent, the explanation furnished by him as well as the evidence recorded during the enquiry and the findings recorded by the Officer and the explanation sent by the respondent to the show cause numberice and ultimately held that the charges had all been proved established and that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer were companyrect.
The State further averred that the appointing authority of persons like the respondent, was the Superintendent of Police and number the Inspector General of Police, and, as such, the order of dismissal passed by the former was perfectly legal.
The appellate authority, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, has also made a similar approach when disposing of the appeal filed by the respondent and therefore there has been numberviolation of the principles of natural justice.
In view of the companyplaints received against him, the respondent had already been placed under suspension with effect from July 24, 1957.
They averred that the respondent was number entitled to a companyy of the report of the Anti Corruption Branch, which was only in the nature of a preliminary investigation into the companyplaints received against the respondent to enable the disciplinary authority to companysider whether disciplinary action against the respondent should be initiated or number.
Though the request of the respondent, made on October 29, 1958 for being furnished with companyies of the evidence recorded during the enquiry was rejected, the High Court was of the view that as the respondent was fully aware of the nature of the evidence adduced in his presence during the enquiry, his grievance that he had numberreasonable opportunity to show cause to the numberice issued by the Superintendent of Police was unfounded.
The State further averred that the mere circumstance that the Enquiry Officer companysulted the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti Corruption Branch, did number vitiate the enquiry proceedings as numberinformation or material gathered therein had been used by the Enquiry Officer when he recorded findings against the respondent.
Still the Superintendent of Police also sent a companyy along with his memo.
With regard to the request made by the respondent in his explanation dated November 21, 1958 the disciplinary authority stated that the respondent was afforded a full and fair opportunity to adduce all evidence that he desired to be placed before the Enquiry Officer and that opportunity had also been fully utilised by the respondent.
He disputed the companyrectness of the findings recorded against him by the Enquiry Officer and, ultimately stated that he was innocent and was number guilty of any offence.
2 The Enquiry Officer, during the companyrse of the enquiry was keeping himself in regular companytact with the Anti Corruption Branch and had utilised the material so gathered by him, behind the back of the respondent, against the respondent in the enquiry proceedings.
He had taken several grounds of attack as against the disciplinary proceedings.
Counsel pointed out that the examination of witnesses companymenced on June 23, 1958 and companycluded only on August 30, 1958.
Regarding the punishment to be awarded, the Superintendent of Police stated that the charges proved against the respondent, who was a member of the Police force, were very serious and hence numberleniency companyld be shown.
enquiry was actually going on that the Enquiry Officer, on July 14 and 15, 1958 companysulted the Anti Corruption Branch about the matters companynected with the enquiry proceedings and had gone through the records available with that Branch relating to the charges levelled against the respondent and which were being tried by the Enquiry Officer.
Based upon those entries found in the record of the enquiry proceedings, the High Court came to the companyclusion that it was abundantly clear that the Enquiry Officer had discussion with the Anti Corruption Branch, the report of which had number been furnished to the respondent.
It was also pointed out that the disciplinary authority, viz.,
But this request was rejected by the Superintendent of Police stating that there was numberrule for giving companyies of statements.
In particular, he referred to the record made by the Enquiry Officer in his proceedings that on July 14 and 15, 1958 he companysulted the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti Corruption Branch about the proceedings and went through his records relating to the charges.
The respondent thereupon filed a revision before the Inspector General of Police, Assam, which, again, was rejected on June 30, 1961.
1362 1363/67 decided on 16 2 1968.
Though, as pointed out above, several grounds of attack against the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the respondent were taken in the writ petition, it is seen from the judgment of the High Court under appeal that the order of dismissal was ultimately assailed only on two grounds The request of the respondent, made on October 29, 1958 after receipt of the second show cause numberice dated October 18, 1958 issued by the Superintendent of Police, for supply of companyies of the statements of the witnesses recorded at the enquiry, was arbitrarily rejected on the ground that there was numberrule under which companyies companyld be given and hence the respondent did number have any reasonable opportunity to show cause against the action proposed against him.
Under charge number 1, the respondent was alleged number to have taken companynisance of the items of companynizable offences reported to him and enumerated under that charge and, as such, he had neglected to perform his duty as a police officer in charge of a Police Station.
He also alleged that companyies of the report of the Anti Corruption Department, on the basis of which disciplinary proceedings had been initiated, had number been furnished to him number were the companyies of the evidence recorded during the enquiry given to him, though a specific request was made in that behalf.
He alleged that numberreasonable opportunity was afforded to him during the enquiry proceedings.
184 of 1964.
The Enquiry Officer, by his report dated September 11, 1958 found the respondent guilty of the various charges, excepting regarding one item under the first charge.
The respondent filed an appeal.
He was made permanent as Sub Inspector of .police in 1952.
The respondent cross examined those witnesses and he also examined four witnesses on his side.
But he ,added a request to the effect that he should be allowed to examine witnesses and submit documents and he should be exonerated by the Superintendent of Police after a perusal and companysideration of the same.
before the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Range, Assam, who, by his order dated May 11, 1960 dismissed the same.
The number furnishing of the companyy of the report of the Superintendent of Police, Anti Corruption Branch, does number vitiate the enquiry proceedings.
184 of 1964 by which the High Court quashed the inquiry proceedings companyducted by the 4th respondent therein and the order, dated December 3, 1958 passed by the 3rd respondent dismissing the first respondent hereinafter shortly referred to as the respondent from service and the orders of the appellate authorities companyfirming the same.
Deputy Inspector General of Police had also companysidered the matter in great detail and had upheld the order of the Superintendent of Police.
the Superintendent of Police, before accepting the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, has himself companysidered the entire evidence bearing upon the charges and the explanations offered by the respondent and it is after such a companysideration that he has agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer regarding the guilt of the respondent.
On receipt of the explanation, the Superintendent of Police, by his order dated December 3, 1958 rejected the explanation of the respondent, accepted the findings of the Enquiry Officer and holding that the charges had been proved beyond all reasonable doubt, dismissed the respondent from service with immediate effect.
In 1955, when the respondent was the Officer incharge of the Sorbhog Police Station, certain allegations appear to have been made against him in companysequence of which a companyfidential enquiry was companyducted by the Superintendent of Police, Anti Corruption Branch, who submitted a report to the Government on December 21, 1957.
Ultimately, the Enquiry Officer, after finding the respondent guilty, submitted his report to the Superintendent of Police, Kamrup.
A companyy of the report of the Enquiry L 11 SupCI/70 7 Officer had already been given to the respondent.
The respondent submitted his explanation companytravening the allegations made against him.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
The allegations made by the respondent in the writ petition were companytroverted by the appellants.
He prayed that if in case he was found guilty, he should number be awarded the extreme punishment of dismissal from service.
The respondents request for being furnished with a companyy of the report of the Anti Corruption Branch had also been refused and therefore there had been a violation of the principles of natural justice in the companyduct of the enquiry.
It was during this period when the.
The respondent submitted a fairly long explanation, dated November 21, 1958.
The enquiry was companyducted by the Sub Divisional Police Officer, Barpeta shortly referred to as the Enquiry Officer and,.
In this view the High Court set aside the order of dismissal and allowed the writ petition, Mr. Naunit Lal, learned companynsel for the appellant State, raised two companytentions 1 The report of the Enquiry Officer, dated September 11, 1958 clearly shows that the findings against the respondent have been recorded exclusively on the basis of the evidence adduced before him and there is numberhing to show that the Enquiry Proceedings have been influenced by the companysultations that the Enquiry Officer had with the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti Corruption Branch, on July 14 15, 1958.
He averred that the nature of the companysolation and the materials companylected by the Enquiry Officer from the Deputy Superintendent, Anti Corruption Branch, were number made known to him and those materials had been taken into account in recording the findings against him.
It was further stated that the respondent was given a full and fair opportunity to participate in the enquiry and the witnesses were all examined in his presence and, apart from cross examining the prosecution witnesses, he had also adduced defence evidence on his behalf.
A further revision, filed before the State Government was also dismissed on January 21, 1964.
On these grounds the State maintained that the enquiry proceedings were valid and legal and did number suffer from any infirmity.
number furnished to the respondent is, in our opinion,, of numberconsequence in relation to the actual enquiry companyducted against the respondent.
Naunit Lal, for the appellants.
2210 of 1966.
The appellate authority, the.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidialingam, J. This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the judgment, dated January 20, 1966 of the High Court of Assam and Nagaland, in Civil Rule No.
He declined to place any reliance on the evidence adduced by the respondent and rejected the explanation furnished by him.
N. Mukherjee, for respondent No.
The second charge related to his having accumulated assets in his name as well as in .the name of his wife, far beyond his known sources of income.
Similarly, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Range Assam, before whom the respondent filed an appeal has also very elaborately and in companysiderable detail discussed the entire evidence on record and has agreed with the companyclusions regarding the guilt of the respondent.
Counsel further urged that the respondent was number furnished with a companyy of the report of the Anti Corruption Branch number was he furnished with the information and materials that must have been gathered by the Enquiry Officer in his companysultation with the Anti Corruption Branch and from their records which he inspected on July 14 and 15, 1958.
The fact that a companyy of the report of the Superintendent of Police, Anti Corruption Branch, dated December 21, 1957 was C. A. No.
559 of 1967, decided on 8 9 1969.
