The trial magistrate companylected preliminary evidence envisaged in Section 244 of the Code and then the case was posted for framing charge.
The trial companyrt adopted the procedure prescribed in Chapter XIX of the Code of Criminal Procedure for short the Code for trial of warrant cases instituted otherwise than on police report.
We may number give an outlay of the said factual position which the respondents, in their companynter affidavit, did number dispute.
On 5.1.1998, the accused filed a petition for discharging them.
An order of discharge of the accused after companylecting the evidence envisaged in Section 244 of the Code can be passed only when the magistrate companysiders, for reasons to be recorded, that numbercase against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his companyviction.
That petition was dismissed by the trial companyrt on 10.2.1998.
It was against the said order of the magistrate that the respondents moved the High Court and learned single Judge passed the impugned order.
State of Bihar has number challenged the judgment of a learned single Judge of the Patna High Court as per which the aforesaid criminal proceedings have been quashed.
The State thereupon moved the High Court in challenge of the said order of the Sessions Judge.
The reasoning of the learned single Judge for adopting such a step is the following Admittedly, the criminal case was registered against the petitioners on the basis of report on 22.2.1991 and companynizance was taken on 13.1.1992 on the basis of the charge sheet submitted by the Railway Police Force personnel.
An inquiry was companyducted under Section 8 of the said Act and on companypletion of the inquiry a companyplaint was filed in the companyrt of a judicial magistrate of First Class on 13.1.1992.
The magistrate took companynizance of the offence and issued proceedings against four persons arrayed in the companyplaint including the respondents in this appeal.
First respondent thereafter moved the Sessions Court in revision by challenging the order by which the magistrate took companynizance of the offence.
On 1.4.1994, the High Court overturned the said order of the Sessions Court.
The next stage should have companymenced in the trial companyrt soon after the receipt of the records from the High Court, but on account of the absence of one or the other accused the case remained in limbo till 14.10.1996 by which time alone all the accused made their appearance before the magistrate.
An FIR was registered in 1991 for the offence under Section 3 of the Railway Property Unlawful Possession Act, 1966, for short the RPUP Act .
On 24.7.1998, learned single Judge of the High Court quashed the criminal proceedings as per the impugned order.
Despite the legal position casting burden of proof on the person who is found in possession of railway property, the Sessions Judge had quashed the criminal proceedings on 29.5.1992.
The magistrate rejected the application and the said order of the magistrate was challenged before the High Court.
Thereafter, the case passed through many vicissitudes.
The companyplaint was filed on 13.1.1992 and process was issued against the four accused arrayed therein.
On 5.1.1998, the respondent moved an application in the trial companyrt praying that they may be discharged.
THOMAS, J. Leave granted.
The accused persons who succeeded greatly in procrastinating a criminal proceedings against them, later succeeded in getting the criminal proceedings quashed solely on the ground of procrastination of companyrt proceedings in the criminal case companycerned.
