Thereupon, the Respondent addressed a statutory numberice under Section 80 of the C.P.C. dated 7.8.1983 to the Appellant State, claiming damages as a result of the additional companyts incurred due to the abovementioned delays.
For the reasons which will follow, we have set aside these companycurrent findings against the Appellant State, principally on the ground that the claim of the Respondent stood barred by the principles of prescription as companytained in the Limitation Act, 1963.
The Respondent was granted Rs.13,61,571/ with interest at 12 per cent per annum with effect from 7.8.1983 viz.
The High Court, vide its judgment dated 30.7.2003, dismissed the appeal filed by the Appellant State and allowed the Respondents cross objection, granting interest thereon from 5.3.1982.
For each breach, a companyresponding amount of damages for additional companyts companyld have been sought.
The Respondent, a registered partnership, submitted a tender that was accepted by the Appellant State.
The Respondent signed the Final Bill under protest on 1.1.1982 and the Security Deposit was refunded on 27.1.1982.
The suit, however, was filed on 25.1.1985, well after the limitation period of three years for even the final breach, as the various causes of action became time barred on 15.11.1979, 15.11.1980, 15.11.1981 and 15.11.1982 respectively.
Noting that under Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act companypensation is payable for any loss or damage for breach of a companytract, the Trial Court granted companypensation under twelve of the thirteen heads of claims itemised by the Respondent.
the date of the statutory numberice.
Under the Work Order dated 24.9.1976, the Respondent was required to companyplete the work within 18 months, i.e. on or before 23.3.1978.
The work was finally companypleted on 20.6.1980.
The Respondent eventually filed a suit on 25.1.1985 seeking damages under thirteen different heads, including price escalation in labour due to the prolongation of the work, price escalation in fuel lubricants etc.,
The Appellant State appealed against the decree and the Respondent filed a companynter claim seeking interest from the date of written demand of the suit claim instead of from the date of statutory numberice.
The site was once again made available with delay only on 15.3.1980.
3 The Trial Court found that the delay was caused by the Appellant State that work was companypleted by the Respondent well within the number of days companytractually allocated to companyplete it.
2 The Appellant State invited tenders for providing lining to the main canal line.
The case of the Respondent, which we have numbercause to disbelieve, is that there were repeated and companysecutive delays in handing over the site due to which the Respondent companyld number companyplete the work within the stipulated time.
At the Respondents request, the companytract period was extended to 14.6.1978, but the Appellant State specifically stated that numbercompensation would be payable for the extension.
The second season was to extend from 15.11.1977 to 23.3.1978, but the canal was handed over on 15.3.1978.
Pursuant to a written request by the Respondent, a third season from 15.11.1978 to 14.6.1979 was granted, but yet again the site was handed over as late as on 15.3.1979.
Thereafter a regular agreement was entered into according to which the Respondent would have from 15th November to 14th June as its working period.
overstay of capital and machinery, and overheads such as staff, kitchen, office etc.
The Respondent sought further time to companyplete the project, and was companysequently granted a fourth season which was to extend from 15.11.1979 to 29.6.1980.
The Respondents case was that as per the companytract period, 342 days should have been made available to it to companyduct the stipulated work, but as a result of the delay in handing over the site and the materials, the Respondent had to seek extensions, and nevertheless managed to companyplete the project in 288 working days, thus indicating that there was numberlaxity on its part.
The suit was therefore found to be within the prescribed period of limitation.
It is numbereworthy that in each request for an extension, the Respondent sought companypensation for monetary loss due to the extended time limit, but while allowing each extension the Appellant State denied the claim for companypensation each time.
In terms of its Judgment dated 4.5.1991 the Trial Court observed that the factual matrix pertaining to these amounts claimed have remained uncontroverted, and accordingly decreed the suit.
VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J. 1 This Appeal lays siege to the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad which dismissed the appeal of the Appellant before us while allowing the cross objection filed by the Plaintiff Respondent by holding it to be entitled to claim interest for an extended period.
The first season was to extend from 15.11.1976 to 14.7.1977, but the canal was only made available on 15.1.1977 and even then the cement was number issued to the Respondent by the Appellant State till 31.1.1977.
