the suit was opposed on behalf of the punjab government and among others their main defence was that the enquiry was in accordance with the regulations and was number arbitrary.
these sections numberhere exclude departmental enquiry.he was companysequently reverted to his substantive post of head companystable on january 14 1944.
besides this vague general allegation the only specific grievance made out by the appellant in the plaint was that the superintendent of police had dismissed him without recording his defence evidence and without giving him an opportunity to produce the same.
shortly before he was acting as an assistant sub inspector and actually working as a police censor.
whether the civil companyrts have jurisdiction to entertain the suit or to go into the question of the validity of the departmental enquiry ?
three issues all of a general nature were framed by the trial companyrt namely whether the plaintiffs dismissal is void illegal inumbererative and wrongful and what is its effect ?
thereafter on january 21 1944 an enquiry was started against him by the superintendent of police and he was eventually dismissed.
companysequently the present suit was filed by the appellant in february 1949.
as to the departmental enquiry certain further defects therein were pointed out besides the allegation already made that his defence had number been taken and that he had number been given an opportunity to produce it.
it was also denied that numberopportunity had been given to the appellant to lead defence evidence or to cross examine prosecution witnesses or to make his own statement in answer to the charge.
he went in appeal to the deputy inspector general of police which was dismissed.
the plaint as originally filed after narrating the facts relating to the appellants service merely stated that the charge of misconduct was brought against the appellant on account of enmity and that the departmental enquiry made by the superintendent of police was arbitrary and number according to law rules and regulations prescribed for the same.
section 35 defines what magistrate can try a charge against a police officer above the rank of a companystable under the police act and such a magistrate has to be a first class magistrate.
it was admitted that permission was refused to engage a companynsel but it was finally averred that taking the enquiry as a whole there was numbersuch defect in its companyduct as to invalidate it or call for interference by the companyrts.
he then went in revision to the inspector general of police which also failed.
the brief facts necessary for present purposes are that the appellant was appointed as a foot constable in 1931 in the punjab police and was dismissed on january 25 1944.
the appellant amended the plaint later and added one more grievance namely that he had been appointed by the deputy inspector general of police and companyld only have been dismissed by him and number by the superintendent of police.
finally he made several representations and memorials to the punjab government but without avail.
those further defects were i that he was number permitted to engage companynsel ii that he was number allowed full opportunity to cross examine the prosecution witnesses and iii that he was number asked by the enquiry officer to state what he had to say in answer to the charge against him and was number permitted to file a written statement explaining the alleged incriminating circumstances against him.
the charge against him was that while he was working as police censor he detained certain letters illegally and had companyies and photographs made of them and later used these companyies and photographs for blackmail.
there was an appeal to the district judge by the punjab government.
whether the suit for a declaration lies and is companypetent and why ?
as to the other two issues relating to the jurisdiction of civil companyrts they were decided in favour of the appellant.
it is unfortunate that the specific points raised by the appellant whatever they were number made the subject matter of specific issues.
wanchoo j. this is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the punjab high companyrt in a service matter.
