The appellant, in the shoes of his father, is as much bound by these documents as Misri Lal was, and he cannot be allowed to deny the relationship of landlord and tenant between Navinchand and himself.
Raj Rani had in fact transferred the suit house in favour of a trust, and decided the issue against the appellant.
The companyrt also observed that the statements made in the companypromise petition, Ext.
The High Court further rightly rejected the argument that the decree, Ext.
P. 22, would number bind the parties since it was founded on a companypromise and number on an adjudication by the companyrt on the question of title.
Raj Rani had earlier trans ferred the house to a trust and she, therefore, companyld number later companyvey any title to Navinchand.
P. 20, creating a fresh lease in favour of Misri Lal under Navinchand as lessor, was executed with effect from 1.12.1962.
On appeal the first appellate companyrt reversed the finding and further held that the defendant companyld number be estopped from challenging the title of the plaintiffs.
During the pendency of the appeal the parties resolved their dispute amicably.
P 21 and Ext.
The appellant resisted the claim in the plaint on the same old plea which his father Misri Lal had unsuccessfully taken in the earlier suit, namely, that Smt.
The appeal was disposed of by recording this fact and stating further that the arrears of rent had been paid off.
The companypromise petition and the decree have been marked in the present suit as Ext.
However, this error cannot help the appellant unless he is able to successfully meet the effect of Ext.
Coming to the facts of the present case, it may be recalled that fresh tenancy had been created in favour of Misri Lal, father of the present appellant, under Navinchand by deed Ext.
Misri Lal accepted the title of Navinchand and a deed, Ext.
It has been the case of the appellant that the company sent of Misri Lal to the companypromise in the earlier suit was obtained by force, but the plea was number substantiated by any evidence, and it has been pointed out by the High Court that the appellant admitted in his deposition that to his knowl edge numberforce had been used against Misri Lal.
P. 20, creating a fresh lease.
From the Judgment and Order dated 6.9.1983 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in S.A. No.
Navinchand sold the suit property to the plaintiffs respond ents on 4.1.1973, who sent a numberice to the appellant on 14.3.1973.
The trial companyrt disbe lieved the defence version holding that although Smt.
P. 21, in the earlier suit support the case of the plaintiffs inde pendently of the companypromise decree, and further, the defence plea has to be rejected in view of the deed, Ext.
Misri Lal companytinued to occupy the house till he died in 1972 leaving behind his son, the present appellant, as his heir and legal representative.
P. 21, and the companypromise decree, Ext.
B. Rohtagi and S.K. Gambhir for the Appellant.
The case is clearly against the appellant.
These findings were sufficient for the disposal of the appeal but the High Court proceeded to companysider the question whether Smt.
P. 20, the companypromise petition, Ext.
The premises in question originally belonged to one Shamb hoolal Jain, who died leaving behind his wife, two sons and a daughter by the name of Mainawati.
The grievance of Mr. Rohatagi, the learned companynsel for the appellant, that in view of the limited scope of a second appeal under s. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court was number justified in setting aside the find ing of the first appellate companyrt on the question as to whether the property had been alienated in 1936 in favour of the trust or number is well founded.
Raj Rani having transferred the disputed house to a trust in 1936 was number companypetent to re transfer it to Navinchand Dalchand, the vendor of the plaintiffs respondents.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
Raj Rani had executed a trust deed in 1936, but the same was number acted upon and the trust does number appear to have companye into existence.
In 1959 a suit for his eviction was filed by Navinchand, which was resisted on the ground that Smt.
The appellant thereupon attorned in favour of the paramount title holder and started paying the rent directly to him.
The trial companyrt re jected the defence and passed a decree against which Misri Lal filed an appeal.
P. 22.
Mainawati companyveyed the property to one Gopi nath Agarwal and the appellant who was in possession as tenant attorned the tenancy in his favour.
This led to the filing of the case for his eviction on the ground of disclaimer.
After enunciating the general rule of estoppel under s. 116 of the Evidence Act the Court pointed out the exception where a tenant is evicted by the paramount title holder and is thereafter reinducted by him under a fresh lease.
10030 of 1983.
P. 21 and Ext.
The tenantrespondent, thereafter, companymenced the eviction proceeding and a decree was passed which was challenged before this Court by the appellant tenant.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHARMA, J. This appeal is directed against the decree of the Madhya Pradesh High Court for eviction of the appellant from a house after holding him to be the respondents ten ant.
Admittedly the house which was in possession of the defendants father Misri Lal as a tenant belonged to one Smt.
P. 20, Ext.
M. Tarkunde and S.V. Deshpandey for the Respondents.
The trial companyrt accepted the plaintiffs case and passed a decree in their favour, which was set aside on appeal by the first appellate companyrt.
The property was sold in execution of a money decree and was purchased by Maina wati in 1956.
475 of 1977.
Subsequently Gopinath sold the same in favour of the third respondent, Chhaya Gupta, and both Gopinath and Chhaya Gupta asked the appellant to attorn the tenancy in favour of Chhaya Gupta.
P. 22.
The appellant denied the title of the plaintiffs and their case that he has been in possession of the property as their tenant.
Raj Rani who sold the same on 11.8.1952 to the plain tiffs predecessor ininterest, Navinchand Dalchand.
It is significant to numbere that the foundation of the proceeding for ejectment was the appellants denial of the title of Gopinath in whose favour he had earlier attorned the tenancy, and number the challenge of the deriva tive title of the third respondent.
Since the appellant refused to recognise them as owners of the house, another numberice terminating the tenancy was served in January 1976 and the present suit was filed in June of the same year.
P. 22, it should number have pro ceeded to decide the dispute relating to title on merits on the basis of the evidence.
P. 20, and this fact was fully established by the decree, Ext.
After the companyrt reached a companyclusion against the defendant on the basis of the lease deed, Ext.
