His date of birth was recorded in the service book as 27.3.1936 because that was the date mentioned in the matriculation certificate and the application made by him in response to the advertisement issued by the Punjab Public Service Commission.
The lower appellate Court agreed with the trial Court on all the issues and dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant.
On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues Whether the order dated 28.1.1993 is illegal, null and void as alleged?
The Date of Birth Committee of the University recommended that the request made by respondent No.1 may be accepted.
11/4/93 5 PP II/4499, dated 21.6.1994, making Rules to amend the Punjab Civil Services Rules, Volume I, Part I, inter alia to the effect that employees of the Punjab Government can apply for the change of date of birth to the Government within a period of two years from the companying into force of the aforesaid Rules.
In the written statement filed on behalf of defendant No.2 appellant herein , reliance was placed on Para 1 of Annexure A to Chapter II of the Punjab Civil Service Rules, Volume 1 and it was pleaded that the application made by respondent No.1 for companyrection of date of birth recorded in his service book after twelve years of entering into service was rightly rejected.
It was further pleaded that companyrection of the date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate by the University was number binding on the High Court and the State Government.
In support of this assertion, respondent No.1 relied upon the certificates issued by Government High School, Moonak and Hindu Sabha High School, Sunam.
The High Court or for that reason the State Government did number have the power, jurisdiction or authority to entertain the representation made by respondent No.1 after more than twelve years of his entering into service.
Thus, the aforesaid two rulings of the Honble Supreme Court do number debar the plaintiff from seeking his remedy in the Civil Court and at least do number make the suit barred by limitation.
The Syndicate of the University took about one year and three months to decide the matter in favour of respondent No.1 and the date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate was changed from 27.3.1936 to 27.3.1938 sometime in January February 1985.
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of mandatory injunction as prayed for?
Respondent No.1 challenged the decision of the State Government in Civil Suit No.417 A of 1993 and prayed for grant of a declaration that the decision of the State Government and the High Court number to companyrect the date of birth recorded in his service book is illegal, void and ineffective.
After having succeeded in persuading the University to change the date of birth recorded in his matriculation certificate, respondent No.1 represented to the State Government for making companyresponding change in the date of birth recorded in the service book.
Thereafter, respondent No.1 submitted representation dated 22.2.1985 to the Registrar of the High Court seeking companyrection in the date of birth recorded in the service book.
Whether the suit is number maintainable as it is number within limitation?
He also prayed for issue of a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to change the date of birth recorded in the service book from 27.3.1936 to 27.3.1938.
After ten years of joining the service, respondent No.1 submitted an application to the companycerned authority of Punjab University for amendment of the date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate by asserting that his companyrect date of birth was 27.3.1938 but by mistake the same was recorded as 27.3.1936.
In companypliance of the decision taken by the Syndicate, necessary changes were made in the matriculation certificate of respondent No.1.
After companysidering the pleadings and evidence of the parties, the trial Court decreed the suit and declared that rejection of the representation made by respondent No.1 for companyrection of his date of birth was illegal and void.
The issue of limitation was decided by the learned Single Judge in the following words The second companytention raised by learned companynsel for the appellants that the Punjab Civil Service Rules, which are applicable to the plaintiff respondent, bar the present suit, as the same was number filed within two years after entry into service, is also number acceptable.
Whether the plaintiff has numbercause of action?
The State Government, in companysultation with the High Court, rejected the prayer of respondent No.1 and he was informed about this vide letter dated 28.1.1993.
Thereupon, the Syndicate of the University directed that the date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate of respondent No.1 be changed from 27.3.1936 to 27.3.1938.
The second appeal jointly filed by the appellant and the State of Punjab was dismissed by the learned Single Judge, who held that the decree passed by the trial Court, which was companyfirmed by the lower appellate Court was legally companyrect and justified.
The trial Court also issued a mandatory direction for alteration of the date of birth recorded in the service book of respondent No.1 from 27.3.1936 to 27.3.1938.
Relief.
OPD Whether the plaintiff is estopped from challenging the date of birth as mentioned in the office record?
Respondent No.1 joined service as Sub Judge cum Judicial Magistrate, II Class in March, 1973.
S. Singhvi, J. Whether the decision taken by the Syndicate of the Panjab University to entertain and accept the application made by respondent No.1 Megh Raj Garg for changing the date of birth recorded in his matriculation certificate was binding on the State Government and the High Court of Punjab and Haryana hereinafter described as the appellant and whether the suit filed by respondent No.1 for ordaining companyrection of the date of birth recorded in his service book was maintainable are the questions which arise for determination in this appeal filed by the appellant against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High Court in Regular Second Appeal No.901 of 1996.
