GARWARE WALL ROPERS LTD Vs. COASTAL MARINE CONSTRUCTIONS ENGINEERING LTD
always presumes that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. These presumptions will have to be made in the case of rule-making authority also. On the construction suggested by the learned Attorney- General it is obvious that by merely making an application under clause (5) on the allegation that a dispute has arisen about the proposed action to dismiss workmen the employer can in every case escape the requirements of clause 23 and if for one reason or other every employer when proposing a dismissal prefers to proceed under clause 5(a) instead of making an application under clause 23, clause 23 will be a dead letter. A construction like this which defeats the intention of the rule-making authority in clause 23 must, if possible, be avoided.? (at page 193) In Chief Inspector of Mines v. Lala Karam Chand Thapar, (1962) 1 SCR 9 , the rule of harmonious construction was used to reconcile Section 31(4) of the Mines Act, 1952 and Section 24 of the General Clauses Act. This Court held: ?If the words of Section 31(4) are construed to mean that the regulations became part of the Act to the extent that when the Act is repealed, the regulations also stand repealed, a conflict at once arises between Section 31(4) and the provisions of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act. In other words, the Mines Act, 1923, while saying in Section 31(4) that the repeal of the Act will result in the repeal of the regulations, will be saying, in the provisions of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act as read into it, that on the repeal of the Act, when the Act is repealed and re-enacted, the regulations will not stand repealed but will continue in force till superseded by regulations made under the re-enacted Act. To solve this conflict the courts must apply the rule of harmonious construction. According to Mr Pathak we have perfect harmony if it is held that the provisions of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act will have effect only if the regulations are such as survive the repeal of the parent Act and at the same time, construe Section 31(4) to mean that the regulations became for all purposes part and parcel of the Act. To harmonise is not however to destroy. The so- called harmony on the learned counsels argument is achieved by making the provisions of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act nugatory and in effects destroying them in relation to the Mines Act, 1923. We have to seek therefore some other means of harmonising the two provisions. The reasonable way of harmonising that obviously suggests itself is to construe Section 31(4) to mean that the regulations on publication shall have for some purposes, say, for example, the purpose of deciding the validity of the regulations, the same effect as if they were part of the Act, but for the purpose of the continuity of existence, they will not be considered part of the Act, so that even though the Act is repealed, the regulations will continue to exist, in accordance with the provisions of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act. This construction will give reasonable effect to Section 31(4) of the Mines Act, 1923 and at the same time not frustrate the very salutary object of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act. ……? (at pp. 19-20) In Anwar Hasan Khan v. Mohd. Shafi, (2001) 8 SCC 540 , this Court succinctly laid down what is meant by the doctrine of harmonious construction, thus: "8. It is settled that for interpreting a particular provision of an Act, the import and effect of the meaning of the words and phrases used in the statute have to be gathered from the text, the nature of the subject-matter and the purpose and intention of the statute. It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that effort should be made in construing its provisions by avoiding a conflict and adopting a harmonious construction. The statute or rules made thereunder should be read as a whole and one provision should be construed with reference to the other provision to make the provision consistent with the object sought to be achieved. The well-known principle of harmonious construction is that effect should be given to all the provisions and a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a ?dead letter? is not harmonious construction. ……? One reasonable way of harmonising the provisions contained in Sections 33 and 34 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, which is a general statute insofar as it relates to safeguarding revenue, and Section 11(13) of the 1996 Act, which applies specifically to speedy resolution of disputes by appointment of an arbitrator expeditiously, is by declaring that while proceeding with the Section 11 application, the High Court must impound the instrument which has not borne stamp duty and hand it over to the authority under the Maharashtra Stamp Act, who will then decide issues qua payment of stamp duty and penalty (if any) as expeditiously as possible, and preferably within a period of 45 days from the date on which the authority receives the instrument. As soon as stamp duty and penalty (if any) are paid on the instrument, any of the parties can bring the instrument to the notice of the High Court, which will then proceed to expeditiously hear and dispose of the Section 11 application. This will also ensure that once a Section 11 application is allowed and an arbitrator is appointed, the arbitrator can then proceed to decide the dispute within the time frame provided by Section 29A of the 1996 Act.28. Arguments taken of prejudice, namely, that on the facts of this case, the appellant had to pay the stamp duty and cannot take advantage of his own wrong, are of no avail when it comes to the application of mandatory provisions of law.
0[ds]13. A reading of the Law Commission Report, together with the Statement of Objects and Reasons, shows that the Law Commission felt that the judgments in SBP & Co. (supra) and Boghara Polyfab (supra) required a relook, as a result of which, so far as Section 11 is concerned, the Supreme Court or, as the case may be, the High Court, while considering any application under Section 11(4) to 11(6) is to confine itself to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement and leave all other preliminary issues to be decided by the arbitrator. The question is as to whether the decision in SMS Tea Estates (supra) has also been done away with by the expression ?notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court? contained in Section 11(6A).It will be noticed from the aforesaid judgment that where an arbitration clause is contained in an agreement or conveyance, different consequences ensue depending on whether the agreement or conveyance is unregistered or unstamped. It is settled by SBP & Co. (supra) that Section 16 of the 1996 Act has full play only after the arbitral tribunal is constituted, without intervention of the Court under Section 11.view of the law laid down by seven-Judge Bench, it is difficult to accede to the argument made by the learned counsel on behalf of the respondent that Section 16 makes it clear that an arbitration agreement has an independent existence of its own, and must be applied while deciding an application under Section 11 of the 1996 Act.16. It will be seen that neither in the Statement of Objects and Reasons nor in the Law Commission Report is there any mention of SMS Tea Estates (supra). This is for the very good reason that the Supreme Court or the High Court, while deciding a Section 11 application, does not, in any manner, decide any preliminary question that arises between the parties. The Supreme Court or the High Court is only giving effect to the provisions of a mandatory enactment which, no doubt, is to protect revenue. SMS Tea Estates (supra) has taken account of the mandatory provisions contained in the Indian Stamp Act and held them applicable to judicial authorities, which would include the Supreme Court and the High Court acting under Section 11. A close look at Section 11(6A) would show that when the Supreme Court or the High Court considers an application under Section 11(4) to 11(6), and comes across an arbitration clause in an agreement or conveyance which is unstamped, it is enjoined by the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act to first impound the agreement or conveyance and see that stamp duty and penalty (if any) is paid before the agreement, as a whole, can be acted upon. It is important to remember that the Indian Stamp Act applies to the agreement or conveyance as a whole. Therefore, it is not possible to bifurcate the arbitration clause contained in such agreement or conveyance so as to give it an independent existence, as has been contended for by the respondent. The independent existence that could be given for certain limited purposes, on a harmonious reading of the Registration Act, 1908 and the 1996 Act has been referred to by Raveendran, J. in SMS Tea Estates (supra) when it comes to an unregistered agreement or conveyance. However, the Indian Stamp Act, containing no such provision as is contained in Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, has been held by the said judgment to apply to the agreement or conveyance as a whole, which would include the arbitration clause contained therein. It is clear, therefore, that the introduction of Section 11(6A) does not, in any manner, deal with or get over the basis of the judgment in SMS Tea Estates (supra), which continues to apply even after the amendment of Section 11(6A).17. Looked at from a slightly different angle, an arbitration agreement which is contained in an agreement or conveyance is dealt with in Section 7(2) of the 1996 Act. We are concerned with the first part of Section 7(2) on the facts of the present case, and therefore, the arbitration clause that is contained in the sub-contract in question is the subject matter of the present appeal. It is significant that an arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause ?in a contract?.When an arbitration clause is contained ?in a contract?, it is significant that the agreement only becomes a contract if it is enforceable by law. We have seen how, under the Indian Stamp Act, an agreement does not become a contract, namely, that it is not enforceable in law, unless it is duly stamped. Therefore, even a plain reading of Section 11(6A), when read with Section 7(2) of the 1996 Act and Section 2(h) of the Contract Act, would make it clear that an arbitration clause in an agreement would not exist when it is not enforceable by law. This is also an indicator that SMS Tea Estates (supra) has, in no manner, been touched by the amendment of Sectionfocus in Enercon (supra) was as to whether an arbitration clause will apply even if there is no concluded contract entered into between the parties. Since the ?Heads of Agreement? provided that disputes which arose out of the Memorandum of Understanding and negotiations relating to the Intellectual Property Licence Agreement (IPLA) were arbitrable, this Court held that the arbitration agreement in the facts of that case was separate from the main contract, making it a case which falls under the second part (and not under the first part) to Section 7(2), namely, that an arbitration agreement may be in the form of a separate agreement. This judgment, therefore, does not take the respondent very much further. It may only be noted that the judgment in Ashapura Mine-Chem Ltd. v. Gujarat Mineral Development Corporation, (2015) 8 SCC 193 merely followed Enercon (supra) and would be inapplicable for the same reasons outlined by usjudgment also makes it clear that the mischief that was sought to be remedied by the introduction of Section 11(6A) was contained in the judgments of SBP & Co. (supra) and Boghara Polyfab (supra). This judgment does not, in any manner, answer the precise issue that is before us.This judgment is important in that what was specifically under consideration was an arbitration clause which would get activated only if an insurer admits or accepts liability. Since on facts it was found that the insurer repudiated the claim, though an arbitration clause did ?exist?, so to speak, in the policy, it would not exist in law, as was held in that judgment, when one important fact is introduced, namely, that the insurer has not admitted or accepted liability. Likewise, in the facts of the present case, it is clear that the arbitration clause that is contained in the sub-contract would not ?exist? as a matter of law until the sub-contract is duly stamped, as has been held by us above. The argument that Section 11(6A) deals with ?existence?, as opposed to Section 8, Section 16, and Section 45, which deal with ?validity? of an arbitration agreement is answered by this Court?s understanding of the expression ?existence? in United India Insurance Co. (supra), as followed by us.Learned counsel for the respondent relied strongly upon Section 11(13) of the 1996 Act to show that the 60-day period would be breached if a document were to be impounded at the stage of a Section 11(6) application. Stamp duty, when paid with penalty (if any), would require adjudication by the stamp authorities, which would take far more than the 60-day period that is laid down by Section 11(13). Undoubtedly, Section 11(13), which was also introduced by Amendment Act 3 of 2016, was enacted keeping one of the important objectives of the 1996 Act in mind, namely, speedy disposal of disputes by the arbitral tribunal, and appointment of an arbitrator having to be made as expeditiously as possible, therefore. Thus, a harmonious construction needs to be given to the provisions of the Maharashtra Stamp Act and Section 11(13) of the 1996 Act by which, if it is possible, both provisions ought to be subserved. We have already seen that under the Maharashtra Stamp Act, the object of impounding an instrument that is unstamped is to ensure that stamp duty and penalty (if any) must be paid on such instrument before it is acted upon by any authority. Likewise, under Section 11(13) of the 1996 Act, an application made under Section 11 for appointment of an arbitrator should be disposed of as expeditiously as possible, and, in any event, an endeavour shall be made to dispose of such application at least within a period of 60 days from the date of service of notice on the opposite party.27. The doctrine of harmonious construction of statutes is strongly imbedded in our interpretative canon.reasonable way of harmonising the provisions contained in Sections 33 and 34 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, which is a general statute insofar as it relates to safeguarding revenue, and Section 11(13) of the 1996 Act, which applies specifically to speedy resolution of disputes by appointment of an arbitrator expeditiously, is by declaring that while proceeding with the Section 11 application, the High Court must impound the instrument which has not borne stamp duty and hand it over to the authority under the Maharashtra Stamp Act, who will then decide issues qua payment of stamp duty and penalty (if any) as expeditiously as possible, and preferably within a period of 45 days from the date on which the authority receives the instrument. As soon as stamp duty and penalty (if any) are paid on the instrument, any of the parties can bring the instrument to the notice of the High Court, which will then proceed to expeditiously hear and dispose of the Section 11 application. This will also ensure that once a Section 11 application is allowed and an arbitrator is appointed, the arbitrator can then proceed to decide the dispute within the time frame provided by Section 29A of the 1996 Act.28. Arguments taken of prejudice, namely, that on the facts of this case, the appellant had to pay the stamp duty and cannot take advantage of his own wrong, are of no avail when it comes to the application of mandatory provisions of law.
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Evaluate the case proceeding to forecast the court's decision (1 for yes, 0 for no), and elucidate the reasoning behind this prediction with important textual evidence from the case.

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always presumes that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. These presumptions will have to be made in the case of rule-making authority also. On the construction suggested by the learned Attorney- General it is obvious that by merely making an application under clause (5) on the allegation that a dispute has arisen about the proposed action to dismiss workmen the employer can in every case escape the requirements of clause 23 and if for one reason or other every employer when proposing a dismissal prefers to proceed under clause 5(a) instead of making an application under clause 23, clause 23 will be a dead letter. A construction like this which defeats the intention of the rule-making authority in clause 23 must, if possible, be avoided.? (at page 193) In Chief Inspector of Mines v. Lala Karam Chand Thapar, (1962) 1 SCR 9 , the rule of harmonious construction was used to reconcile Section 31(4) of the Mines Act, 1952 and Section 24 of the General Clauses Act. This Court held: ?If the words of Section 31(4) are construed to mean that the regulations became part of the Act to the extent that when the Act is repealed, the regulations also stand repealed, a conflict at once arises between Section 31(4) and the provisions of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act. In other words, the Mines Act, 1923, while saying in Section 31(4) that the repeal of the Act will result in the repeal of the regulations, will be saying, in the provisions of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act as read into it, that on the repeal of the Act, when the Act is repealed and re-enacted, the regulations will not stand repealed but will continue in force till superseded by regulations made under the re-enacted Act. To solve this conflict the courts must apply the rule of harmonious construction. According to Mr Pathak we have perfect harmony if it is held that the provisions of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act will have effect only if the regulations are such as survive the repeal of the parent Act and at the same time, construe Section 31(4) to mean that the regulations became for all purposes part and parcel of the Act. To harmonise is not however to destroy. The so- called harmony on the learned counsels argument is achieved by making the provisions of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act nugatory and in effects destroying them in relation to the Mines Act, 1923. We have to seek therefore some other means of harmonising the two provisions. The reasonable way of harmonising that obviously suggests itself is to construe Section 31(4) to mean that the regulations on publication shall have for some purposes, say, for example, the purpose of deciding the validity of the regulations, the same effect as if they were part of the Act, but for the purpose of the continuity of existence, they will not be considered part of the Act, so that even though the Act is repealed, the regulations will continue to exist, in accordance with the provisions of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act. This construction will give reasonable effect to Section 31(4) of the Mines Act, 1923 and at the same time not frustrate the very salutary object of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act. ……? (at pp. 19-20) In Anwar Hasan Khan v. Mohd. Shafi, (2001) 8 SCC 540 , this Court succinctly laid down what is meant by the doctrine of harmonious construction, thus: "8. It is settled that for interpreting a particular provision of an Act, the import and effect of the meaning of the words and phrases used in the statute have to be gathered from the text, the nature of the subject-matter and the purpose and intention of the statute. It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that effort should be made in construing its provisions by avoiding a conflict and adopting a harmonious construction. The statute or rules made thereunder should be read as a whole and one provision should be construed with reference to the other provision to make the provision consistent with the object sought to be achieved. The well-known principle of harmonious construction is that effect should be given to all the provisions and a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a ?dead letter? is not harmonious construction. ……? One reasonable way of harmonising the provisions contained in Sections 33 and 34 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, which is a general statute insofar as it relates to safeguarding revenue, and Section 11(13) of the 1996 Act, which applies specifically to speedy resolution of disputes by appointment of an arbitrator expeditiously, is by declaring that while proceeding with the Section 11 application, the High Court must impound the instrument which has not borne stamp duty and hand it over to the authority under the Maharashtra Stamp Act, who will then decide issues qua payment of stamp duty and penalty (if any) as expeditiously as possible, and preferably within a period of 45 days from the date on which the authority receives the instrument. As soon as stamp duty and penalty (if any) are paid on the instrument, any of the parties can bring the instrument to the notice of the High Court, which will then proceed to expeditiously hear and dispose of the Section 11 application. This will also ensure that once a Section 11 application is allowed and an arbitrator is appointed, the arbitrator can then proceed to decide the dispute within the time frame provided by Section 29A of the 1996 Act.28. Arguments taken of prejudice, namely, that on the facts of this case, the appellant had to pay the stamp duty and cannot take advantage of his own wrong, are of no avail when it comes to the application of mandatory provisions of law.

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contract?.When an arbitration clause is contained ?in a contract?, it is significant that the agreement only becomes a contract if it is enforceable by law. We have seen how, under the Indian Stamp Act, an agreement does not become a contract, namely, that it is not enforceable in law, unless it is duly stamped. Therefore, even a plain reading of Section 11(6A), when read with Section 7(2) of the 1996 Act and Section 2(h) of the Contract Act, would make it clear that an arbitration clause in an agreement would not exist when it is not enforceable by law. This is also an indicator that SMS Tea Estates (supra) has, in no manner, been touched by the amendment of Sectionfocus in Enercon (supra) was as to whether an arbitration clause will apply even if there is no concluded contract entered into between the parties. Since the ?Heads of Agreement? provided that disputes which arose out of the Memorandum of Understanding and negotiations relating to the Intellectual Property Licence Agreement (IPLA) were arbitrable, this Court held that the arbitration agreement in the facts of that case was separate from the main contract, making it a case which falls under the second part (and not under the first part) to Section 7(2), namely, that an arbitration agreement may be in the form of a separate agreement. This judgment, therefore, does not take the respondent very much further. It may only be noted that the judgment in Ashapura Mine-Chem Ltd. v. Gujarat Mineral Development Corporation, (2015) 8 SCC 193 merely followed Enercon (supra) and would be inapplicable for the same reasons outlined by usjudgment also makes it clear that the mischief that was sought to be remedied by the introduction of Section 11(6A) was contained in the judgments of SBP & Co. (supra) and Boghara Polyfab (supra). This judgment does not, in any manner, answer the precise issue that is before us.This judgment is important in that what was specifically under consideration was an arbitration clause which would get activated only if an insurer admits or accepts liability. Since on facts it was found that the insurer repudiated the claim, though an arbitration clause did ?exist?, so to speak, in the policy, it would not exist in law, as was held in that judgment, when one important fact is introduced, namely, that the insurer has not admitted or accepted liability. Likewise, in the facts of the present case, it is clear that the arbitration clause that is contained in the sub-contract would not ?exist? as a matter of law until the sub-contract is duly stamped, as has been held by us above. The argument that Section 11(6A) deals with ?existence?, as opposed to Section 8, Section 16, and Section 45, which deal with ?validity? of an arbitration agreement is answered by this Court?s understanding of the expression ?existence? in United India Insurance Co. (supra), as followed by us.Learned counsel for the respondent relied strongly upon Section 11(13) of the 1996 Act to show that the 60-day period would be breached if a document were to be impounded at the stage of a Section 11(6) application. Stamp duty, when paid with penalty (if any), would require adjudication by the stamp authorities, which would take far more than the 60-day period that is laid down by Section 11(13). Undoubtedly, Section 11(13), which was also introduced by Amendment Act 3 of 2016, was enacted keeping one of the important objectives of the 1996 Act in mind, namely, speedy disposal of disputes by the arbitral tribunal, and appointment of an arbitrator having to be made as expeditiously as possible, therefore. Thus, a harmonious construction needs to be given to the provisions of the Maharashtra Stamp Act and Section 11(13) of the 1996 Act by which, if it is possible, both provisions ought to be subserved. We have already seen that under the Maharashtra Stamp Act, the object of impounding an instrument that is unstamped is to ensure that stamp duty and penalty (if any) must be paid on such instrument before it is acted upon by any authority. Likewise, under Section 11(13) of the 1996 Act, an application made under Section 11 for appointment of an arbitrator should be disposed of as expeditiously as possible, and, in any event, an endeavour shall be made to dispose of such application at least within a period of 60 days from the date of service of notice on the opposite party.27. The doctrine of harmonious construction of statutes is strongly imbedded in our interpretative canon.reasonable way of harmonising the provisions contained in Sections 33 and 34 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, which is a general statute insofar as it relates to safeguarding revenue, and Section 11(13) of the 1996 Act, which applies specifically to speedy resolution of disputes by appointment of an arbitrator expeditiously, is by declaring that while proceeding with the Section 11 application, the High Court must impound the instrument which has not borne stamp duty and hand it over to the authority under the Maharashtra Stamp Act, who will then decide issues qua payment of stamp duty and penalty (if any) as expeditiously as possible, and preferably within a period of 45 days from the date on which the authority receives the instrument. As soon as stamp duty and penalty (if any) are paid on the instrument, any of the parties can bring the instrument to the notice of the High Court, which will then proceed to expeditiously hear and dispose of the Section 11 application. This will also ensure that once a Section 11 application is allowed and an arbitrator is appointed, the arbitrator can then proceed to decide the dispute within the time frame provided by Section 29A of the 1996 Act.28. Arguments taken of prejudice, namely, that on the facts of this case, the appellant had to pay the stamp duty and cannot take advantage of his own wrong, are of no avail when it comes to the application of mandatory provisions of law.
