J. Narayana Rao Vs. V.G. Basayarayappa &amp; Others
the old building stood had a value. In these circumstances the least amount of compunction payable to the appellant should be Rs. 21000 in round figures.7. On behalf of the plaintiff it was argued that the Munsiffs decision was correct and the High Court was justified in restoring it. The Subordinate Judge had arrived at the value of Rs. 25000 for the new building on worthless evidences of incompetent witnesses who were merely expressing loosely their estimate of the value of the said building. The date of election, in law, would be the date of eviction. The date of actual dispossession could not be the true date as such eviction must take place after the decree had been drawn up and enforced.8.In our opinion S. 51, Transfer of Property Act merely lays down an equitable principle and enables a Court to determine the equities between the parties. A decree in the form in which it has been passed in this case, which was a suit for redemption and possession could have been passed. We regard the decision of the Privy Council in 57 Ind. App 305: (A. I. R. 1930 PC 297) (A) as an authority which supports our opinion.We think, however, having regard to the provisions of S. 51, Transfer of Property Act, that if the evidence enable a Court to do so. It should assess the valuation of the improvement as at a date as near as possible to the date of actual eviction rather than the date of election as has been done in this case.9. Coming now to the evidence in the case, the appellant has created difficulties for himself in not producing his books of account,which would have enabled a Court to know exactly how much he had spent on improvement and thus assist it in arriving at the relevant conclusion in the case, namely, what was the saleable value of the improved property.SeeKidar Nath v. Mathu Mal,40 Cal 555 (B). Oral evidence, such as it is on the side of the appellant, is not very convincing. The only reliable evidence in the case is that of the Commissioner, P. W. 6, appointed by the court. He is a qualified person and has had to do valuation of buildings regularly in the course of his employment as an Executive Engineer of City Improvement Trust Board, Bangalore. A fair reading of his evidence does not disclose any substantial ground for disbelieving him. We proceed, therefore, to rest our decision on his evidence only and such other evidence as may support him. The Commissioner was examined in Court on 25-7-47. He had checked his measurements several times in January and February 1947. He has given the various rates prevailing in the various years and he has computed his valuation on that basis for the old building and the new construction.A comparative table as stated below may be convenient in order to understand his evidence.OLD BUILDINGNEW BUILDINGAs built in 1941-42 Rs. 4,522As build in 1942-43 Rs. 10,200" " " 1942-43 " 5,818" " " 1943-44 " 10,990" " " 1943-44 " 6,332" " on 5-6-44 " 10,990" " on 5-6-44 " 6,332" " " 30-6-45 " 18,840" " " 30-6-45 " 10,854" " in 1945-46 " 16,489" " in 1945-46 " 9,044" " on 1945-46 " 16,489" " in 1945-46 " 9,044" " on 16-7-46 " 20,776" " on 16-7-46 " 11,395If built in January and February 1947]..... 13,566If built in February 1947].... 24,733From this table the respective values of the old and the new building at the date of the preliminary decree, at the date of election by the plaintiff and at a time nearest to the dispossession of the appellant become apparent on the supposition that the buildings were build at those stages. There is no evidence as to the actual cost of constructing the old building or the new. Whatever the actual value of the old building may have been at the time of its demolition by the appellant, the appellants witness B. Sagappa, D. W. 10 has stated in the clearest terms that in1945 that building was worth Rs. 9,000/- to Rs. 10,000/-. This, in our opinion, supports the valuation of that building on 30-6-45 arrived at by the Commissioner. We would, therefore, rely on the calculation arrived at by the Commissioner and would conclude that at the time of the appellants purchase in August 1942 and at about the time of its demolition the old building was worth about Rs. 5,818/-. As a vendible subject the building as newly constructed would be worth about Rs, 24,733/- in February 1947. The improvement effected by the appellant therefore would amount to Rs. 18,915/- having regard to values in February 1947. It is impossible to ascertain with any degree of precision the exact value of the improvement in the absence of definite evidence. All that can be done is to arrive at a fair assessment on the materials available. We think the evidence of the commissioner gives sufficient data on which to proceed and there is no need to take additional evidence. In cases of this kind it is not the actual cost of improvement which concludes the matter. The principle on which one must proceed is what is the worth of the improvement in the property as a vendible subject. The value arrived at by the Courts below is not acceptable to us.10. We hold, on the evidence, that the value of the improvement effected by the appellant amounts to Rs. 19,000/- in round figures. That sum will be entered in the decree of the Court as the amount of compensation payable by the plaintiff to the appellant upon which the former would be entitled to possession. As the appellant has already been dispossessed, he would be entitled to restitution if the plaintiff fails to pay the balance due after deducting the amount of compensation already deposited in Court. We give the plaintiff time to pay the balance of the compensation on or before 30-11-1956.
1[ds]In any event the High Court erred in restoring the decision of the Munsiff. On the evidence, which was open to this Court to examine as the High Courts, Judgment was one of reversal, it would be clear that the newly constructed building, after demolishing the old one, was worth at the least Rs. 25000. The old building at the time of the appellants purchase was not worth more than Rs. 4,522. It had to be remembered that the appellant had purchased the property, including the land and the old building, for Rs. 8750. The land on which the old building stood had a value. In these circumstances the least amount of compunction payable to the appellant should be Rs. 21000 in roundour opinion S. 51, Transfer of Property Act merely lays down an equitable principle and enables a Court to determine the equities between the parties. A decree in the form in which it has been passed in this case, which was a suit for redemption and possession could have been passed. We regard the decision of the Privy Council in 57 Ind. App 305: (A. I. R. 1930 PC 297) (A) as an authority which supports our opinion.We think, however, having regard to the provisions of S. 51, Transfer of Property Act, that if the evidence enable a Court to do so. It should assess the valuation of the improvement as at a date as near as possible to the date of actual eviction rather than the date of election as has been done in this case.Coming now to the evidence in the case, the appellant has created difficulties for himself in not producing his books of account,which would have enabled a Court to know exactly how much he had spent on improvement and thus assist it in arriving at the relevant conclusion in the case, namely, what was the saleable value of the improved property.SeeKidar Nath v. Mathu Mal,40 Cal 555 (B). Oral evidence, such as it is on the side of the appellant, is not very convincing. The only reliable evidence in the case is that of the Commissioner, P. W. 6, appointed by the court. He is a qualified person and has had to do valuation of buildings regularly in the course of his employment as an Executive Engineer of City Improvement Trust Board, Bangalore. A fair reading of his evidence does not disclose any substantial ground for disbelieving him. We proceed, therefore, to rest our decision on his evidence only and such other evidence as may support him. The Commissioner was examined in Court onHe had checked his measurements several times in January and February 1947. He has given the various rates prevailing in the various years and he has computed his valuation on that basis for the old building and the new construction.We hold, on the evidence, that the value of the improvement effected by the appellant amounts to Rs. 19,000/in round figures. That sum will be entered in the decree of the Court as the amount of compensation payable by the plaintiff to the appellant upon which the former would be entitled to possession. As the appellant has already been dispossessed, he would be entitled to restitution if the plaintiff fails to pay the balance due after deducting the amount of compensation already deposited in Court. We give the plaintiff time to pay the balance of the compensation on or before
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the old building stood had a value. In these circumstances the least amount of compunction payable to the appellant should be Rs. 21000 in round figures.7. On behalf of the plaintiff it was argued that the Munsiffs decision was correct and the High Court was justified in restoring it. The Subordinate Judge had arrived at the value of Rs. 25000 for the new building on worthless evidences of incompetent witnesses who were merely expressing loosely their estimate of the value of the said building. The date of election, in law, would be the date of eviction. The date of actual dispossession could not be the true date as such eviction must take place after the decree had been drawn up and enforced.8.In our opinion S. 51, Transfer of Property Act merely lays down an equitable principle and enables a Court to determine the equities between the parties. A decree in the form in which it has been passed in this case, which was a suit for redemption and possession could have been passed. We regard the decision of the Privy Council in 57 Ind. App 305: (A. I. R. 1930 PC 297) (A) as an authority which supports our opinion.We think, however, having regard to the provisions of S. 51, Transfer of Property Act, that if the evidence enable a Court to do so. It should assess the valuation of the improvement as at a date as near as possible to the date of actual eviction rather than the date of election as has been done in this case.9. Coming now to the evidence in the case, the appellant has created difficulties for himself in not producing his books of account,which would have enabled a Court to know exactly how much he had spent on improvement and thus assist it in arriving at the relevant conclusion in the case, namely, what was the saleable value of the improved property.SeeKidar Nath v. Mathu Mal,40 Cal 555 (B). Oral evidence, such as it is on the side of the appellant, is not very convincing. The only reliable evidence in the case is that of the Commissioner, P. W. 6, appointed by the court. He is a qualified person and has had to do valuation of buildings regularly in the course of his employment as an Executive Engineer of City Improvement Trust Board, Bangalore. A fair reading of his evidence does not disclose any substantial ground for disbelieving him. We proceed, therefore, to rest our decision on his evidence only and such other evidence as may support him. The Commissioner was examined in Court on 25-7-47. He had checked his measurements several times in January and February 1947. He has given the various rates prevailing in the various years and he has computed his valuation on that basis for the old building and the new construction.A comparative table as stated below may be convenient in order to understand his evidence.OLD BUILDINGNEW BUILDINGAs built in 1941-42 Rs. 4,522As build in 1942-43 Rs. 10,200" " " 1942-43 " 5,818" " " 1943-44 " 10,990" " " 1943-44 " 6,332" " on 5-6-44 " 10,990" " on 5-6-44 " 6,332" " " 30-6-45 " 18,840" " " 30-6-45 " 10,854" " in 1945-46 " 16,489" " in 1945-46 " 9,044" " on 1945-46 " 16,489" " in 1945-46 " 9,044" " on 16-7-46 " 20,776" " on 16-7-46 " 11,395If built in January and February 1947]..... 13,566If built in February 1947].... 24,733From this table the respective values of the old and the new building at the date of the preliminary decree, at the date of election by the plaintiff and at a time nearest to the dispossession of the appellant become apparent on the supposition that the buildings were build at those stages. There is no evidence as to the actual cost of constructing the old building or the new. Whatever the actual value of the old building may have been at the time of its demolition by the appellant, the appellants witness B. Sagappa, D. W. 10 has stated in the clearest terms that in1945 that building was worth Rs. 9,000/- to Rs. 10,000/-. This, in our opinion, supports the valuation of that building on 30-6-45 arrived at by the Commissioner. We would, therefore, rely on the calculation arrived at by the Commissioner and would conclude that at the time of the appellants purchase in August 1942 and at about the time of its demolition the old building was worth about Rs. 5,818/-. As a vendible subject the building as newly constructed would be worth about Rs, 24,733/- in February 1947. The improvement effected by the appellant therefore would amount to Rs. 18,915/- having regard to values in February 1947. It is impossible to ascertain with any degree of precision the exact value of the improvement in the absence of definite evidence. All that can be done is to arrive at a fair assessment on the materials available. We think the evidence of the commissioner gives sufficient data on which to proceed and there is no need to take additional evidence. In cases of this kind it is not the actual cost of improvement which concludes the matter. The principle on which one must proceed is what is the worth of the improvement in the property as a vendible subject. The value arrived at by the Courts below is not acceptable to us.10. We hold, on the evidence, that the value of the improvement effected by the appellant amounts to Rs. 19,000/- in round figures. That sum will be entered in the decree of the Court as the amount of compensation payable by the plaintiff to the appellant upon which the former would be entitled to possession. As the appellant has already been dispossessed, he would be entitled to restitution if the plaintiff fails to pay the balance due after deducting the amount of compensation already deposited in Court. We give the plaintiff time to pay the balance of the compensation on or before 30-11-1956.

### Response:
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### Explanation:
In any event the High Court erred in restoring the decision of the Munsiff. On the evidence, which was open to this Court to examine as the High Courts, Judgment was one of reversal, it would be clear that the newly constructed building, after demolishing the old one, was worth at the least Rs. 25000. The old building at the time of the appellants purchase was not worth more than Rs. 4,522. It had to be remembered that the appellant had purchased the property, including the land and the old building, for Rs. 8750. The land on which the old building stood had a value. In these circumstances the least amount of compunction payable to the appellant should be Rs. 21000 in roundour opinion S. 51, Transfer of Property Act merely lays down an equitable principle and enables a Court to determine the equities between the parties. A decree in the form in which it has been passed in this case, which was a suit for redemption and possession could have been passed. We regard the decision of the Privy Council in 57 Ind. App 305: (A. I. R. 1930 PC 297) (A) as an authority which supports our opinion.We think, however, having regard to the provisions of S. 51, Transfer of Property Act, that if the evidence enable a Court to do so. It should assess the valuation of the improvement as at a date as near as possible to the date of actual eviction rather than the date of election as has been done in this case.Coming now to the evidence in the case, the appellant has created difficulties for himself in not producing his books of account,which would have enabled a Court to know exactly how much he had spent on improvement and thus assist it in arriving at the relevant conclusion in the case, namely, what was the saleable value of the improved property.SeeKidar Nath v. Mathu Mal,40 Cal 555 (B). Oral evidence, such as it is on the side of the appellant, is not very convincing. The only reliable evidence in the case is that of the Commissioner, P. W. 6, appointed by the court. He is a qualified person and has had to do valuation of buildings regularly in the course of his employment as an Executive Engineer of City Improvement Trust Board, Bangalore. A fair reading of his evidence does not disclose any substantial ground for disbelieving him. We proceed, therefore, to rest our decision on his evidence only and such other evidence as may support him. The Commissioner was examined in Court onHe had checked his measurements several times in January and February 1947. He has given the various rates prevailing in the various years and he has computed his valuation on that basis for the old building and the new construction.We hold, on the evidence, that the value of the improvement effected by the appellant amounts to Rs. 19,000/in round figures. That sum will be entered in the decree of the Court as the amount of compensation payable by the plaintiff to the appellant upon which the former would be entitled to possession. As the appellant has already been dispossessed, he would be entitled to restitution if the plaintiff fails to pay the balance due after deducting the amount of compensation already deposited in Court. We give the plaintiff time to pay the balance of the compensation on or before
