State Of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd
region incorporated in the new State was not discriminatory at the date when the reorganisation took place, it can never become discriminatory thereafter. The assumptions made by both the parties appear to be erroneous. The High Court was of the view that after expiry of a reasonable period during which the State has the opportunity of making necessary adaptations so as to make the Act applicable to the entirety of the new State, if the State fails to adapt the law, historical considerations which initially justified the classification must be deemed to have disappeared. That assumption without further enquiry may not be accepted as correct. It was necessary for the High Court to investigate whether at the date when the petition was filed, special treatment of the Bhopal region in the matter of levy of agricultural income-tax has a rational basis. That necessitated an enquiry into the structure of tax burden imposed directly or indirectly on or in respect of agricultural land or income from it in the different regions constituting the State. If for instance on account If disparity in the impost of land revenue and related taxes on land and income from land in other regions the ultimate burden on persons in the Bhopal region who were subjected to agricultural income-tax and agricultural land owners in the rest of the State did not disclose a pattern of wide variations, the mere existence of agricultural income impost in one region, and absence of such impost in another region may not necessarily justify an inference of unlawful discrimination. It was therefore necessary to ascertain the difference in the overall tax liability between persons similarly situated in the State of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of levy of agricultural tax. For that purpose an investigation was necessary whether the incidence of total burden on agriculturists was so disparate that an inference of unlawful discrimination may reasonably be made. The High Court had to ascertain the impact of diverse land taxes imposed on agricultural land in the four regions of the State and whether the burden between persons similarly circumstanced was substantially dissimilar and whether continuance of dissimilar levies was justified. If upon a thorough examination of the pattern of land taxes in different regions of the State it appeared to the Court that an unreasonably larger burden was sought to be continued upon this region, without any apparently justifiable ground, an inference of discrimination may arise.9. In adjudging reasonableness of classification for the purpose of taxation, the Courts recognise greater freedom in the Legislature and if the statute discloses a permissible policy of taxation, the Court will uphold it. The Courts undoubtedly lean more readily in favour of the presumption of constitutionality of a taxing statute but that is not to say that they will not strike down a statute unless it appears that the tax was imposed deliberately with the object of differentiating between persons similarly circumstances. We may state that the observations to the contrary that in matters of taxation a statute may not be struck down "unless the Court finds that" the tax "has been imposed with a deliberate intention of differentiating between individual and individual" in 1962-2 SCR 619 was not strictly necessary for deciding that case, and was not intended to lay down nay special test applicable to taxing statutes in their relation to Art. 14 of the Constitution.10. To arrive at a conclusion adverse to the State it was therefore necessary to decide whether the differentiation arising from the continuation of the levy of the agricultural income-tax was unfair and not supported by a reasonable standard, and the State having the requisite information and opportunity to make the imposts reasonably uniform, had failed or neglected to do so. No set formula can be devised for solving a problem of this character. It cannot be said that because a certain number of years have elapsed or that the State has made other laws uniform, the State has acted improperly in continuing an impost which operates upon a class of citizens more harshly than upon others.11. The petition filed by the Company was singularly deficient in furnishing particulars which would justify the plea of infringement of Art. 14 of the Constitution. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that to make out a case of denial of the equal protection of the laws under Art. 14 of the Constitution, a plea of differential treatment is by itself not sufficient. An applicant pleading that equal protection of the laws has been denied to him must make out that not only he had been treated differently form others but he had been so treated from persons similarly circumstanced without any reasonable basis, and such differential treatment is unjustifiably made. A mere plea that the Company and other agriculturists within the region of the former Bhopal State had to pay the agricultural income-tax whereas the agriculturists elsewhere had not to pay such tax, is not sufficient to make out a case of infringement of the fundamental right under Art. 14 of the Constitution.12. The State also did not place evidence before the High Court which would in the very nature of things be in its possession, showing a rational relation between the differential treatment and the classification and has also not placed any material before the Court throwing light on the question whether the continuance of the tax was justified: it merely chose to plead its case as on a demurrer. Both the State and the Company have by inadequate appreciation of the true position in law contributed to the manner in which the trial of the petition has proceeded. We would in the circumstances not be justified in dismissing the petition on a technical view of the burden of proof. We think that this is a case in which the parties should be given an opportunity to plead their respective cases adequately and to go to trial after the requisite evidence which has a bearing is brought before the Court.
1[ds]9. In adjudging reasonableness of classification for the purpose of taxation, the Courts recognise greater freedom in the Legislature and if the statute discloses a permissible policy of taxation, the Court will uphold it. The Courts undoubtedly lean more readily in favour of the presumption of constitutionality of a taxing statute but that is not to say that they will not strike down a statute unless it appears that the tax was imposed deliberately with the object of differentiating between persons similarly circumstances. We may state that the observations to the contrary that in matters of taxation a statute may not be struck down "unless the Court finds that" the tax "has been imposed with a deliberate intention of differentiating between individual and individual" in 1962-2 SCR 619  was not strictly necessary for deciding that case, and was not intended to lay down nay special test applicable to taxing statutes in their relation to Art. 14 of thebe too strongly emphasized that to make out a case of denial of the equal protection of the laws under Art. 14 of the Constitution, a plea of differential treatment is by itself not sufficient. An applicant pleading that equal protection of the laws has been denied to him must make out that not only he had been treated differently form others but he had been so treated from persons similarly circumstanced without any reasonable basis, and such differential treatment is unjustifiably made. A mere plea that the Company and other agriculturists within the region of the former Bhopal State had to pay the agricultural income-tax whereas the agriculturists elsewhere had not to pay such tax, is not sufficient to make out a case of infringement of the fundamental right under Art. 14 of the Constitution.12. The State also did not place evidence before the High Court which would in the very nature of things be in its possession, showing a rational relation between the differential treatment and the classification and has also not placed any material before the Court throwing light on the question whether the continuance of the tax was justified: it merely chose to plead its case as on a demurrer. Both the State and the Company have by inadequate appreciation of the true position in law contributed to the manner in which the trial of the petition has proceeded. We would in the circumstances not be justified in dismissing the petition on a technical view of the burden of proof. We think that this is a case in which the parties should be given an opportunity to plead their respective cases adequately and to go to trial after the requisite evidence which has a bearing is brought before the Court.
### Instruction:
Conjecture the end result of the case (acceptance (1) or non-acceptance (0) of the appeal), followed by a detailed explanation using crucial sentences from the case proceeding.

### Input:
region incorporated in the new State was not discriminatory at the date when the reorganisation took place, it can never become discriminatory thereafter. The assumptions made by both the parties appear to be erroneous. The High Court was of the view that after expiry of a reasonable period during which the State has the opportunity of making necessary adaptations so as to make the Act applicable to the entirety of the new State, if the State fails to adapt the law, historical considerations which initially justified the classification must be deemed to have disappeared. That assumption without further enquiry may not be accepted as correct. It was necessary for the High Court to investigate whether at the date when the petition was filed, special treatment of the Bhopal region in the matter of levy of agricultural income-tax has a rational basis. That necessitated an enquiry into the structure of tax burden imposed directly or indirectly on or in respect of agricultural land or income from it in the different regions constituting the State. If for instance on account If disparity in the impost of land revenue and related taxes on land and income from land in other regions the ultimate burden on persons in the Bhopal region who were subjected to agricultural income-tax and agricultural land owners in the rest of the State did not disclose a pattern of wide variations, the mere existence of agricultural income impost in one region, and absence of such impost in another region may not necessarily justify an inference of unlawful discrimination. It was therefore necessary to ascertain the difference in the overall tax liability between persons similarly situated in the State of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of levy of agricultural tax. For that purpose an investigation was necessary whether the incidence of total burden on agriculturists was so disparate that an inference of unlawful discrimination may reasonably be made. The High Court had to ascertain the impact of diverse land taxes imposed on agricultural land in the four regions of the State and whether the burden between persons similarly circumstanced was substantially dissimilar and whether continuance of dissimilar levies was justified. If upon a thorough examination of the pattern of land taxes in different regions of the State it appeared to the Court that an unreasonably larger burden was sought to be continued upon this region, without any apparently justifiable ground, an inference of discrimination may arise.9. In adjudging reasonableness of classification for the purpose of taxation, the Courts recognise greater freedom in the Legislature and if the statute discloses a permissible policy of taxation, the Court will uphold it. The Courts undoubtedly lean more readily in favour of the presumption of constitutionality of a taxing statute but that is not to say that they will not strike down a statute unless it appears that the tax was imposed deliberately with the object of differentiating between persons similarly circumstances. We may state that the observations to the contrary that in matters of taxation a statute may not be struck down "unless the Court finds that" the tax "has been imposed with a deliberate intention of differentiating between individual and individual" in 1962-2 SCR 619 was not strictly necessary for deciding that case, and was not intended to lay down nay special test applicable to taxing statutes in their relation to Art. 14 of the Constitution.10. To arrive at a conclusion adverse to the State it was therefore necessary to decide whether the differentiation arising from the continuation of the levy of the agricultural income-tax was unfair and not supported by a reasonable standard, and the State having the requisite information and opportunity to make the imposts reasonably uniform, had failed or neglected to do so. No set formula can be devised for solving a problem of this character. It cannot be said that because a certain number of years have elapsed or that the State has made other laws uniform, the State has acted improperly in continuing an impost which operates upon a class of citizens more harshly than upon others.11. The petition filed by the Company was singularly deficient in furnishing particulars which would justify the plea of infringement of Art. 14 of the Constitution. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that to make out a case of denial of the equal protection of the laws under Art. 14 of the Constitution, a plea of differential treatment is by itself not sufficient. An applicant pleading that equal protection of the laws has been denied to him must make out that not only he had been treated differently form others but he had been so treated from persons similarly circumstanced without any reasonable basis, and such differential treatment is unjustifiably made. A mere plea that the Company and other agriculturists within the region of the former Bhopal State had to pay the agricultural income-tax whereas the agriculturists elsewhere had not to pay such tax, is not sufficient to make out a case of infringement of the fundamental right under Art. 14 of the Constitution.12. The State also did not place evidence before the High Court which would in the very nature of things be in its possession, showing a rational relation between the differential treatment and the classification and has also not placed any material before the Court throwing light on the question whether the continuance of the tax was justified: it merely chose to plead its case as on a demurrer. Both the State and the Company have by inadequate appreciation of the true position in law contributed to the manner in which the trial of the petition has proceeded. We would in the circumstances not be justified in dismissing the petition on a technical view of the burden of proof. We think that this is a case in which the parties should be given an opportunity to plead their respective cases adequately and to go to trial after the requisite evidence which has a bearing is brought before the Court.

### Response:
1

### Explanation:
9. In adjudging reasonableness of classification for the purpose of taxation, the Courts recognise greater freedom in the Legislature and if the statute discloses a permissible policy of taxation, the Court will uphold it. The Courts undoubtedly lean more readily in favour of the presumption of constitutionality of a taxing statute but that is not to say that they will not strike down a statute unless it appears that the tax was imposed deliberately with the object of differentiating between persons similarly circumstances. We may state that the observations to the contrary that in matters of taxation a statute may not be struck down "unless the Court finds that" the tax "has been imposed with a deliberate intention of differentiating between individual and individual" in 1962-2 SCR 619  was not strictly necessary for deciding that case, and was not intended to lay down nay special test applicable to taxing statutes in their relation to Art. 14 of thebe too strongly emphasized that to make out a case of denial of the equal protection of the laws under Art. 14 of the Constitution, a plea of differential treatment is by itself not sufficient. An applicant pleading that equal protection of the laws has been denied to him must make out that not only he had been treated differently form others but he had been so treated from persons similarly circumstanced without any reasonable basis, and such differential treatment is unjustifiably made. A mere plea that the Company and other agriculturists within the region of the former Bhopal State had to pay the agricultural income-tax whereas the agriculturists elsewhere had not to pay such tax, is not sufficient to make out a case of infringement of the fundamental right under Art. 14 of the Constitution.12. The State also did not place evidence before the High Court which would in the very nature of things be in its possession, showing a rational relation between the differential treatment and the classification and has also not placed any material before the Court throwing light on the question whether the continuance of the tax was justified: it merely chose to plead its case as on a demurrer. Both the State and the Company have by inadequate appreciation of the true position in law contributed to the manner in which the trial of the petition has proceeded. We would in the circumstances not be justified in dismissing the petition on a technical view of the burden of proof. We think that this is a case in which the parties should be given an opportunity to plead their respective cases adequately and to go to trial after the requisite evidence which has a bearing is brought before the Court.
