M/S. Cable Corpn. Of India Ltd Vs. Additional Commissioner Of Labour
matter or, as the case may be, cause it to be referred, to a Tribunal for adjudication.Provided that where a reference has been made to a Tribunal under this sub-section, it shall pass an award within a period of thirty days from the date of such reference." (Underlined for emphasis) 7. In Excel Wear v. Union of India and Ors. (1978 (4) SCC 224 ) this Court considered the legality of Section 25-O and 25-R as it stood then. It was held that those provisions were violative of Section 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the ‘Constitution). It was held that steps under Section 25-N as it stood then cannot be read into Section 25-O. 8. In Workmen of Meenakshi Mills Ltd. And Ors. v. Meenakshi Mills Ltd. And Anr. (1992 (3) SCC 336 ) the scope and ambit of Section 25-N as it stood then prior to its substitution by Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1984 was considered. Section 25-O was recast with effect from 21.8.1984 by Act 46 of 1982. Similarly, changes were brought in Section 25-N by Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. 18.8.1984. Under Section 25-N(5) finality is given subject to sub-section (6). A plain reading of the provision shows that two options are available i.e. to decide itself or refer to the Tribunal. It cannot be said that the Tribunal is an additional forum for fresh look at the matter. 9. In Orissa Textile and Steel case (supra) the constitutional validity of Section 25-O of the Act was under consideration. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed great reliance on paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 of the judgment to contend that this Court had accepted the interpretation given by the High Court. 11. On a close reading of the judgment it is clear that in the said case the issues presently under consideration did not fall for consideration. What was stated in essence was that the provisions for amended Section 25-O relates to review and reference would be in addition to judicial review under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. The Court was really considering the question as to whether provisions for review and reference were in addition to judicial review. It never said that they are cumulative and not alternative.12. The word ‘or is normally disjunctive and ‘and is normally conjunctive. But at times they are read as vice versa to give effect to the manifest intention of the Legislature as disclosed from the context. As stated by Scrutton, L.J.: "You do sometimes read ‘or as ‘and in a statute. But you do not do it unless you are obliged because ‘or does not generally mean ‘and and ‘and does not generally mean ‘or. And as pointed out by Lord Halsbury the reading of ‘or as ‘and is not to be resorted to, "unless some other part of the same statute or the clear intention of it required that to be done". But if the literal reading of the words produces an unintelligible or absurd result ‘and may be read for ‘or and ‘or for ‘and even though the result of so modifying the words is less favourable to the subject provided that the intention of the Legislature is otherwise quite clear. Conversely if reading of ‘and as ‘or produces grammatical distortion and makes no sense of the portion following ‘and, ‘or cannot be read in placed ‘and. The alternatives joined by ‘or need not always be mutually exclusive. 13. In Fakir Mohd. (dead) by Lrs. V Sita Ram (2002 (1) SCC 741 ) it was held that the word ‘or is normally disjunctive. The use of the word ‘or in a statute manifests the legislative intent of the alternatives prescribed under law. 14. Had the Legislature intended that the reference could be made after the Government or the Specified Authority deals with the review power, it would have said so specifically by specific words. It could have provided for a direct reference. The parameters of review are different from a reference.15. A plain reading of the provision makes the position clear that two courses are open. Power is conferred on the appropriate Government to either on its own motion or on an application made, review its order or refer the matter to the Tribunal. Whether one or the other of the courses could be adopted depends on the fact of each case, the surrounding circumstances and several other relevant factors.16. Under sub-section (6) of Section 25-N it is open to the appropriate Government or the Specified Authority to review its order granting or refusing to grant permission under sub-section (3).17. When the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e. they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. [See: State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh (AIR 2005 SC 294 ), Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta (2005 (2) SCC 271 )]. 18. In Sussex Peerage case (1844) 11 CI&F 85, at page 143 Tindal C.J. observed as follows: "If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves do alone in such cases best declare the intent of the lawgiver." 19. When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself.20. As observed in Nathi Devis case (supra) if the words used are capable of one construction, then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The spirit of the law may well be an elusive and unsafe guide and the supposed spirit can certainly be not given effect to in opposition to the plain language of the sections of the Act.
1[ds]11. On a close reading of the judgment it is clear that in the said case the issues presently under consideration did not fall for consideration. What was stated in essence was that the provisions for amended Section 25-O relates to review and reference would be in addition to judicial review under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. The Court was really considering the question as to whether provisions for review and reference were in addition to judicial review. It never said that they are cumulative and not alternative.12. The word ‘or is normally disjunctive and ‘and is normally conjunctive. But at times they are read as vice versa to give effect to the manifest intention of the Legislature as disclosed from the context. As stated by Scrutton, L.J.: "You do sometimes read ‘or as ‘and in a statute. But you do not do it unless you are obliged because ‘or does not generally mean ‘and and ‘and does not generally mean ‘or. And as pointed out by Lord Halsbury the reading of ‘or as ‘and is not to be resorted to, "unless some other part of the same statute or the clear intention of it required that to be done". But if the literal reading of the words produces an unintelligible or absurd result ‘and may be read for ‘or and ‘or for ‘and even though the result of so modifying the words is less favourable to the subject provided that the intention of the Legislature is otherwise quite clear. Conversely if reading of ‘and as ‘or produces grammatical distortion and makes no sense of the portion following ‘and, ‘or cannot be read in placed ‘and. The alternatives joined by ‘or need not always be mutually exclusive.Had the Legislature intended that the reference could be made after the Government or the Specified Authority deals with the review power, it would have said so specifically by specific words. It could have provided for a direct reference. The parameters of review are different from a reference.15. A plain reading of the provision makes the position clear that two courses are open. Power is conferred on the appropriate Government to either on its own motion or on an application made, review its order or refer the matter to the Tribunal. Whether one or the other of the courses could be adopted depends on the fact of each case, the surrounding circumstances and several other relevant factors.16. Under sub-section (6) of Section 25-N it is open to the appropriate Government or the Specified Authority to review its order granting or refusing to grant permission under sub-section (3).17. When the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e. they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences.When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself.20. As observed in Nathi Devis case (supra) if the words used are capable of one construction, then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The spirit of the law may well be an elusive and unsafe guide and the supposed spirit can certainly be not given effect to in opposition to the plain language of the sections of the Act.
### Instruction:
Determine the likely decision of the case (acceptance (1) or rejection (0)) and follow up with an explanation highlighting key sentences that support this prediction.

### Input:
matter or, as the case may be, cause it to be referred, to a Tribunal for adjudication.Provided that where a reference has been made to a Tribunal under this sub-section, it shall pass an award within a period of thirty days from the date of such reference." (Underlined for emphasis) 7. In Excel Wear v. Union of India and Ors. (1978 (4) SCC 224 ) this Court considered the legality of Section 25-O and 25-R as it stood then. It was held that those provisions were violative of Section 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the ‘Constitution). It was held that steps under Section 25-N as it stood then cannot be read into Section 25-O. 8. In Workmen of Meenakshi Mills Ltd. And Ors. v. Meenakshi Mills Ltd. And Anr. (1992 (3) SCC 336 ) the scope and ambit of Section 25-N as it stood then prior to its substitution by Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1984 was considered. Section 25-O was recast with effect from 21.8.1984 by Act 46 of 1982. Similarly, changes were brought in Section 25-N by Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. 18.8.1984. Under Section 25-N(5) finality is given subject to sub-section (6). A plain reading of the provision shows that two options are available i.e. to decide itself or refer to the Tribunal. It cannot be said that the Tribunal is an additional forum for fresh look at the matter. 9. In Orissa Textile and Steel case (supra) the constitutional validity of Section 25-O of the Act was under consideration. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed great reliance on paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 of the judgment to contend that this Court had accepted the interpretation given by the High Court. 11. On a close reading of the judgment it is clear that in the said case the issues presently under consideration did not fall for consideration. What was stated in essence was that the provisions for amended Section 25-O relates to review and reference would be in addition to judicial review under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. The Court was really considering the question as to whether provisions for review and reference were in addition to judicial review. It never said that they are cumulative and not alternative.12. The word ‘or is normally disjunctive and ‘and is normally conjunctive. But at times they are read as vice versa to give effect to the manifest intention of the Legislature as disclosed from the context. As stated by Scrutton, L.J.: "You do sometimes read ‘or as ‘and in a statute. But you do not do it unless you are obliged because ‘or does not generally mean ‘and and ‘and does not generally mean ‘or. And as pointed out by Lord Halsbury the reading of ‘or as ‘and is not to be resorted to, "unless some other part of the same statute or the clear intention of it required that to be done". But if the literal reading of the words produces an unintelligible or absurd result ‘and may be read for ‘or and ‘or for ‘and even though the result of so modifying the words is less favourable to the subject provided that the intention of the Legislature is otherwise quite clear. Conversely if reading of ‘and as ‘or produces grammatical distortion and makes no sense of the portion following ‘and, ‘or cannot be read in placed ‘and. The alternatives joined by ‘or need not always be mutually exclusive. 13. In Fakir Mohd. (dead) by Lrs. V Sita Ram (2002 (1) SCC 741 ) it was held that the word ‘or is normally disjunctive. The use of the word ‘or in a statute manifests the legislative intent of the alternatives prescribed under law. 14. Had the Legislature intended that the reference could be made after the Government or the Specified Authority deals with the review power, it would have said so specifically by specific words. It could have provided for a direct reference. The parameters of review are different from a reference.15. A plain reading of the provision makes the position clear that two courses are open. Power is conferred on the appropriate Government to either on its own motion or on an application made, review its order or refer the matter to the Tribunal. Whether one or the other of the courses could be adopted depends on the fact of each case, the surrounding circumstances and several other relevant factors.16. Under sub-section (6) of Section 25-N it is open to the appropriate Government or the Specified Authority to review its order granting or refusing to grant permission under sub-section (3).17. When the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e. they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. [See: State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh (AIR 2005 SC 294 ), Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta (2005 (2) SCC 271 )]. 18. In Sussex Peerage case (1844) 11 CI&F 85, at page 143 Tindal C.J. observed as follows: "If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves do alone in such cases best declare the intent of the lawgiver." 19. When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself.20. As observed in Nathi Devis case (supra) if the words used are capable of one construction, then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The spirit of the law may well be an elusive and unsafe guide and the supposed spirit can certainly be not given effect to in opposition to the plain language of the sections of the Act.

### Response:
1

### Explanation:
11. On a close reading of the judgment it is clear that in the said case the issues presently under consideration did not fall for consideration. What was stated in essence was that the provisions for amended Section 25-O relates to review and reference would be in addition to judicial review under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. The Court was really considering the question as to whether provisions for review and reference were in addition to judicial review. It never said that they are cumulative and not alternative.12. The word ‘or is normally disjunctive and ‘and is normally conjunctive. But at times they are read as vice versa to give effect to the manifest intention of the Legislature as disclosed from the context. As stated by Scrutton, L.J.: "You do sometimes read ‘or as ‘and in a statute. But you do not do it unless you are obliged because ‘or does not generally mean ‘and and ‘and does not generally mean ‘or. And as pointed out by Lord Halsbury the reading of ‘or as ‘and is not to be resorted to, "unless some other part of the same statute or the clear intention of it required that to be done". But if the literal reading of the words produces an unintelligible or absurd result ‘and may be read for ‘or and ‘or for ‘and even though the result of so modifying the words is less favourable to the subject provided that the intention of the Legislature is otherwise quite clear. Conversely if reading of ‘and as ‘or produces grammatical distortion and makes no sense of the portion following ‘and, ‘or cannot be read in placed ‘and. The alternatives joined by ‘or need not always be mutually exclusive.Had the Legislature intended that the reference could be made after the Government or the Specified Authority deals with the review power, it would have said so specifically by specific words. It could have provided for a direct reference. The parameters of review are different from a reference.15. A plain reading of the provision makes the position clear that two courses are open. Power is conferred on the appropriate Government to either on its own motion or on an application made, review its order or refer the matter to the Tribunal. Whether one or the other of the courses could be adopted depends on the fact of each case, the surrounding circumstances and several other relevant factors.16. Under sub-section (6) of Section 25-N it is open to the appropriate Government or the Specified Authority to review its order granting or refusing to grant permission under sub-section (3).17. When the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e. they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences.When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself.20. As observed in Nathi Devis case (supra) if the words used are capable of one construction, then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The spirit of the law may well be an elusive and unsafe guide and the supposed spirit can certainly be not given effect to in opposition to the plain language of the sections of the Act.
