State Of Karnataka  Vs. Kgsd Canteen Employees Welfare Asson&amp;Ors
Court vis-a-vis the Civil Court highlighted the object of the Industrial Disputes Act stating: "The object of the Industrial Disputes Act, as its preamble indicates, is to make provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes, which means adjudication of such disputes also. The Act envisages collective bargaining, contracts between union representing the workmen and the management, a matter which is outside the realm of the common law or the Indian law of contract" 48. Keeping in view of the facts and circumstances of this case as also the principle of law enunciated in the above referred decisions of this Court, we are, thus, of the opinion that recourse to writ remedy was not apposite in this case. REGULARISATION 49. The question which now arises for consideration is as to whether the High Court was justified in directing regularization of the services of the Respondents. It was evidently not. In a large number of decisions, this Court has categorically held that it is not open to a High Court to exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India either to frame a scheme by itself or to direct the State to frame a scheme for regularising the services of ad hoc employees or daily wages employees who had not been appointed in terms of the extant service rules framed either under a statute or under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Such a scheme, even if framed by the State, would not meet the requirements of law as the executive order made under Article 162 of the Constitution of India cannot prevail over a statute or statutory rules framed under proviso to Article 309 thereof. The State is obligated to make appointments only in fulfilment of its constitutional obligation as laid down in Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India and not by way of any regularization scheme. In our constitutional schemes, all eligible persons similarly situated must be given opportunity to apply for and receive considerations for appointments at the hands of the authorities of the State. Denial of such a claim by some officers of the State times and again had been deprecated by this Court. In any view, in our democratic polity, an authority howsoever high it may be cannot act in breach of an existing statute or the rules which hold the field. 50. It is not necessary for us to dilate further on the issue as recently in State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi and Ors. [2005 (10) SCALE 286 ], it has been clearly held that the High Court has no jurisdiction to frame a scheme by itself or direct framing of such a scheme by the State. 51. In Mahendra L. Jain and Others v. Indore Development Authority and Others [(2005) 1 SCC 639] , it was categorically held: "The question, therefore, which arises for consideration is as to whether they could lay a valid claim for regularisation of their services. The answer thereto must be rendered in the negative. Regularisation cannot be claimed as a matter of right. An illegal appointment cannot be legalised by taking recourse to regularisation. What can be regularised is an irregularity and not an illegality. The constitutional scheme which the country has adopted does not contemplate any back-door appointment. A State before offering public service to a person must comply with the constitutional requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. All actions of the State must conform to the constitutional requirements. A daily-wager in the absence of a statutory provision in this behalf would not be entitled to regularisation. (See State of U.P. v. Ajay Kumar and Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya v. Bal Kishan Soni.)" 52. In Zakir Hussain (supra), even in relation to the temporary employee, it was stated: "The respondent is a temporary employee of the Corporation and a probationer and not a government servant and, therefore, is not entitled for any protection under Article 311 of the Constitution. He was a party to the contract. In view of the fact that the respondent was appointed on probation and the services were terminated during the period of probation simpliciter as the same were not found to be satisfactory, the appellant Corporation is not obliged to hold an enquiry before terminating the services. The respondent being a probationer has got no substantive right to hold the post and was not entitled to a decree of declaration as erroneously granted by the lower courts and also of the High Court." PARITY IN THE SCALE OF PAY 53. The contention that at least for the period they have worked they were entitled to the remuneration in the scale of pay as that of the government employees cannot be accepted for more than one reason. They did not hold any post. No post for the canteen was sanctioned by the State. According to the State, they were not its employees. Salary on a regular scale of pay, it is trite, is payable to an employee only when he holds a status. [See Mahendra L. Jain and Others (supra)] 54. The High Court was, thus, not correct in holding that the members of the First Respondent could be treated at par with the Hospitality Organization of the State of Karnataka. Such equation is impermissible in law. In the Hospitality Organization of the State, the posts might have been sanctioned. Only because, food is prepared and served, the same would not mean that a canteen run by a Committee can be equated thereto. SUBSEQUENT EVENT 55. Subsequent events which had taken place is also worth taking note of. The fact remains that the canteen now is closed. The judgment and order of the High Court, thus, otherwise also cannot be implemented. The employees concerned, therefore, cannot be directed to be reinstated in service. We have noticed, hereinbefore, that other proceedings have been initiated by them. The said proceedings may be disposed of in accordance with law. CONCLUSION
1[ds]19. In an affidavit filed before us, it is stated that the Karnataka Government Secretariat Employees Association which was running the canteen from 04.08.2000 to 31.03.2003 by a letter dated 10.03.2003, expressed its inability to run the canteen beyond 31.03.2003 and, thus, the canteen services were closed from 01.04.2003. It is further stated that the State Government demolished the main canteen building pursuant to the Government Note dated 04.08.2003. Certain litigations had thereafter been initiated before several authorities. A writ petition had also been filed by the Association before the High Court, which was marked as Writ Petition No.41207 of 2004 seeking direction to make the balance payment of LIC premium and contribution towards EPF for the period from 01.01.2003 to 31.03.200320. This Court evidently is not concerned with the pending litigation but we have noticed the said fact only for the purpose of showing that the State intended to run the canteen departmentally through a committee, but according to the State, the committee has a distinct and different existence or different entity than the Government21. The fact situation obtaining in this case already suggests that the State had no intention to run and maintain the canteen as a department. Had the intention of the State been to run the said canteen as one of its departments, the question of giving any grant or for that matter making of a provision for return of the furniture and equipments would not have arisen36. It was specifically noticed that the workmen of the Canteen and the contractor had entered into independent settlements without impleading the owner or occupier of the factory as a party therein which also went to show that the workmen were treating themselves the workmen of the contractor and not that of the owners37. We have referred to the aforementioned decisions in order to show that in each of the aforementioned cases the industrial adjudicator was required to apply the relevant tests laid down by this Court in the fact situation obtaining therein. Most of the cases referred to hereinbefore were considered by this Court in the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining therein and, thus, it is even not proper for the industrial adjudicator to apply the ratio of one decision to the exclusion of other without considering the facts and circumstances involved therein. The law, however, does not appear to be settled as to whether even in a case where the employer is required to run and maintain a canteen in terms of the provisions of the statute, the employees of the canteen would automatically be held to be the workers of the principal employer for all intent and purport and not for the purpose of the Factories Act alone. We, however, are not concerned with the said question in this matter and refrain ourselves from making any observation in respect thereof38. We, however, intend to point out that in a case of this nature even an industrial adjudicator may have some difficulty in coming to the conclusion that employees of a canteen for all intent and purport are employees of the principal employer40. In a case of this nature, where serious disputed questions fact were raised, in our opinion, it was not proper for the High Court for embark thereupon an exercise under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court in its judgment relied upon a large number of decisions of this Court, inter alia, in Reserve Bank of India (supra) and State Bank of India & Ors. v. State Bank of India Canteen Employees Union (Bengal Circle) and Ors. [AIR 2000 SC 1518 ] ignoring the fact that all such disputes were adjudicated in an industrial adjudication49. The question which now arises for consideration is as towhether the High Court was justified in directing regularization of the services of the. It was evidently not. In a large number of decisions, this Court has categorically held that it is not open to a High Court to exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India either to frame a scheme by itself or to direct the State to frame a scheme for regularising the services of ad hoc employees or daily wages employees who had not been appointed in terms of the extant service rules framed either under a statute or under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Such a scheme, even if framed by the State, would not meet the requirements of law as the executive order made under Article 162 of the Constitution of India cannot prevail over a statute or statutory rules framed under proviso to Article 309 thereof. The State is obligated to make appointments only in fulfilment of its constitutional obligation as laid down in Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India and not by way of any regularization scheme. In our constitutional schemes, all eligible persons similarly situated must be given opportunity to apply for and receive considerations for appointments at the hands of the authorities of the State. Denial of such a claim by some officers of the State times and again had been deprecated by this Court. In any view, in our democratic polity, an authority howsoever high it may be cannot act in breach of an existing statute or the rules which hold the field50. It is not necessary for us to dilate further on the issue as recently in State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi and Ors. [2005 (10) SCALE 286 ], it has been clearly held that the High Court has no jurisdiction to frame a scheme by itself or direct framing of such a scheme by the State53. The contention that at least for the period they have worked they were entitled to the remuneration in the scale of pay as that of the government employees cannot be accepted for more than one reason. They did not hold any post. No post for the canteen was sanctioned by the State. According to the State, they were not its employees. Salary on a regular scale of pay, it is trite, is payable to an employee only when he holds a status. [See Mahendra L. Jain and Others (supra)]54. The High Court was, thus, not correct in holding that the members of the First Respondent could be treated at par with the Hospitality Organization of the State of Karnataka. Such equation is impermissible in law. In the Hospitality Organization of the State, the posts might have been sanctioned. Only because, food is prepared and served, the same would not mean that a canteen run by a Committee can be equated thereto55. Subsequent events which had taken place is also worth taking note of. The fact remains that the canteen now is closed. The judgment and order of the High Court, thus, otherwise also cannot be implemented. The employees concerned, therefore, cannot be directed to be reinstated in service. We have noticed, hereinbefore, that other proceedings have been initiated by them. The said proceedings may be disposed of in accordance with law.
### Instruction:
Judge the probable resolution of the case (approval (1) or disapproval (0)), and elaborate on this forecast by extracting and interpreting significant sentences from the proceeding.

### Input:
Court vis-a-vis the Civil Court highlighted the object of the Industrial Disputes Act stating: "The object of the Industrial Disputes Act, as its preamble indicates, is to make provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes, which means adjudication of such disputes also. The Act envisages collective bargaining, contracts between union representing the workmen and the management, a matter which is outside the realm of the common law or the Indian law of contract" 48. Keeping in view of the facts and circumstances of this case as also the principle of law enunciated in the above referred decisions of this Court, we are, thus, of the opinion that recourse to writ remedy was not apposite in this case. REGULARISATION 49. The question which now arises for consideration is as to whether the High Court was justified in directing regularization of the services of the Respondents. It was evidently not. In a large number of decisions, this Court has categorically held that it is not open to a High Court to exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India either to frame a scheme by itself or to direct the State to frame a scheme for regularising the services of ad hoc employees or daily wages employees who had not been appointed in terms of the extant service rules framed either under a statute or under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Such a scheme, even if framed by the State, would not meet the requirements of law as the executive order made under Article 162 of the Constitution of India cannot prevail over a statute or statutory rules framed under proviso to Article 309 thereof. The State is obligated to make appointments only in fulfilment of its constitutional obligation as laid down in Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India and not by way of any regularization scheme. In our constitutional schemes, all eligible persons similarly situated must be given opportunity to apply for and receive considerations for appointments at the hands of the authorities of the State. Denial of such a claim by some officers of the State times and again had been deprecated by this Court. In any view, in our democratic polity, an authority howsoever high it may be cannot act in breach of an existing statute or the rules which hold the field. 50. It is not necessary for us to dilate further on the issue as recently in State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi and Ors. [2005 (10) SCALE 286 ], it has been clearly held that the High Court has no jurisdiction to frame a scheme by itself or direct framing of such a scheme by the State. 51. In Mahendra L. Jain and Others v. Indore Development Authority and Others [(2005) 1 SCC 639] , it was categorically held: "The question, therefore, which arises for consideration is as to whether they could lay a valid claim for regularisation of their services. The answer thereto must be rendered in the negative. Regularisation cannot be claimed as a matter of right. An illegal appointment cannot be legalised by taking recourse to regularisation. What can be regularised is an irregularity and not an illegality. The constitutional scheme which the country has adopted does not contemplate any back-door appointment. A State before offering public service to a person must comply with the constitutional requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. All actions of the State must conform to the constitutional requirements. A daily-wager in the absence of a statutory provision in this behalf would not be entitled to regularisation. (See State of U.P. v. Ajay Kumar and Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya v. Bal Kishan Soni.)" 52. In Zakir Hussain (supra), even in relation to the temporary employee, it was stated: "The respondent is a temporary employee of the Corporation and a probationer and not a government servant and, therefore, is not entitled for any protection under Article 311 of the Constitution. He was a party to the contract. In view of the fact that the respondent was appointed on probation and the services were terminated during the period of probation simpliciter as the same were not found to be satisfactory, the appellant Corporation is not obliged to hold an enquiry before terminating the services. The respondent being a probationer has got no substantive right to hold the post and was not entitled to a decree of declaration as erroneously granted by the lower courts and also of the High Court." PARITY IN THE SCALE OF PAY 53. The contention that at least for the period they have worked they were entitled to the remuneration in the scale of pay as that of the government employees cannot be accepted for more than one reason. They did not hold any post. No post for the canteen was sanctioned by the State. According to the State, they were not its employees. Salary on a regular scale of pay, it is trite, is payable to an employee only when he holds a status. [See Mahendra L. Jain and Others (supra)] 54. The High Court was, thus, not correct in holding that the members of the First Respondent could be treated at par with the Hospitality Organization of the State of Karnataka. Such equation is impermissible in law. In the Hospitality Organization of the State, the posts might have been sanctioned. Only because, food is prepared and served, the same would not mean that a canteen run by a Committee can be equated thereto. SUBSEQUENT EVENT 55. Subsequent events which had taken place is also worth taking note of. The fact remains that the canteen now is closed. The judgment and order of the High Court, thus, otherwise also cannot be implemented. The employees concerned, therefore, cannot be directed to be reinstated in service. We have noticed, hereinbefore, that other proceedings have been initiated by them. The said proceedings may be disposed of in accordance with law. CONCLUSION

### Response:
1

### Explanation:
the Government21. The fact situation obtaining in this case already suggests that the State had no intention to run and maintain the canteen as a department. Had the intention of the State been to run the said canteen as one of its departments, the question of giving any grant or for that matter making of a provision for return of the furniture and equipments would not have arisen36. It was specifically noticed that the workmen of the Canteen and the contractor had entered into independent settlements without impleading the owner or occupier of the factory as a party therein which also went to show that the workmen were treating themselves the workmen of the contractor and not that of the owners37. We have referred to the aforementioned decisions in order to show that in each of the aforementioned cases the industrial adjudicator was required to apply the relevant tests laid down by this Court in the fact situation obtaining therein. Most of the cases referred to hereinbefore were considered by this Court in the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining therein and, thus, it is even not proper for the industrial adjudicator to apply the ratio of one decision to the exclusion of other without considering the facts and circumstances involved therein. The law, however, does not appear to be settled as to whether even in a case where the employer is required to run and maintain a canteen in terms of the provisions of the statute, the employees of the canteen would automatically be held to be the workers of the principal employer for all intent and purport and not for the purpose of the Factories Act alone. We, however, are not concerned with the said question in this matter and refrain ourselves from making any observation in respect thereof38. We, however, intend to point out that in a case of this nature even an industrial adjudicator may have some difficulty in coming to the conclusion that employees of a canteen for all intent and purport are employees of the principal employer40. In a case of this nature, where serious disputed questions fact were raised, in our opinion, it was not proper for the High Court for embark thereupon an exercise under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court in its judgment relied upon a large number of decisions of this Court, inter alia, in Reserve Bank of India (supra) and State Bank of India & Ors. v. State Bank of India Canteen Employees Union (Bengal Circle) and Ors. [AIR 2000 SC 1518 ] ignoring the fact that all such disputes were adjudicated in an industrial adjudication49. The question which now arises for consideration is as towhether the High Court was justified in directing regularization of the services of the. It was evidently not. In a large number of decisions, this Court has categorically held that it is not open to a High Court to exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India either to frame a scheme by itself or to direct the State to frame a scheme for regularising the services of ad hoc employees or daily wages employees who had not been appointed in terms of the extant service rules framed either under a statute or under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Such a scheme, even if framed by the State, would not meet the requirements of law as the executive order made under Article 162 of the Constitution of India cannot prevail over a statute or statutory rules framed under proviso to Article 309 thereof. The State is obligated to make appointments only in fulfilment of its constitutional obligation as laid down in Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India and not by way of any regularization scheme. In our constitutional schemes, all eligible persons similarly situated must be given opportunity to apply for and receive considerations for appointments at the hands of the authorities of the State. Denial of such a claim by some officers of the State times and again had been deprecated by this Court. In any view, in our democratic polity, an authority howsoever high it may be cannot act in breach of an existing statute or the rules which hold the field50. It is not necessary for us to dilate further on the issue as recently in State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi and Ors. [2005 (10) SCALE 286 ], it has been clearly held that the High Court has no jurisdiction to frame a scheme by itself or direct framing of such a scheme by the State53. The contention that at least for the period they have worked they were entitled to the remuneration in the scale of pay as that of the government employees cannot be accepted for more than one reason. They did not hold any post. No post for the canteen was sanctioned by the State. According to the State, they were not its employees. Salary on a regular scale of pay, it is trite, is payable to an employee only when he holds a status. [See Mahendra L. Jain and Others (supra)]54. The High Court was, thus, not correct in holding that the members of the First Respondent could be treated at par with the Hospitality Organization of the State of Karnataka. Such equation is impermissible in law. In the Hospitality Organization of the State, the posts might have been sanctioned. Only because, food is prepared and served, the same would not mean that a canteen run by a Committee can be equated thereto55. Subsequent events which had taken place is also worth taking note of. The fact remains that the canteen now is closed. The judgment and order of the High Court, thus, otherwise also cannot be implemented. The employees concerned, therefore, cannot be directed to be reinstated in service. We have noticed, hereinbefore, that other proceedings have been initiated by them. The said proceedings may be disposed of in accordance with law.
