Raja Suriya Pal Singh Vs. State Of U.P. &amp; Anr
and no court can annul the enactment of a legislative body acting within the legitimate scope of its sovereign competence. If therefore it be found that the subject-matter of a Crown grant is within the competence of a provincial legislature, nothing can prevent that legislature from legislating about it, unless the Constitution Act itself expressly prohibits legislation on the subject either absolutely or conditionally.38. Dr. Asthana, who appeared in Appeals Nos. 291 to 294 of 1951, argued the case of the religious institutions. He contended that the properties held by these institutions had already been dedicated for public purposes, that the income of these properties was being used for holding melas, feeding sadhus and other charitable purposes and that any reduction in that income would adversely affect those institutions and the properties that were already dedicated for public purposes could not be acquired under compulsory powers of acquisition. The argument is fallacious. A charity created by a private individual is not immune from the sovereigns power to compulsorily acquire that property for public purposes. It is incorrect to say that the vesting of these properties in the State under the provisions of the Act in any way affects the charity adversely because the net income that the institutions are deriving from the properties has been made the basis of compensation awarded to them.39. Mr. Varma, who appeared in Appeal No. 295 of 1951, raised several new and ingenious points, none of which, however, he was able to substantiate. He contended that the impugned Act may not be void but the notification which the Government was authorised to issue under the powers conferred on it by the statute would be void because the executive government could not infringe fundamental rights by a notification which remained unaffected by articles 31 (4), 31-A and 31-B. The argument does not seem to be valid because it suffers from the defect that if the statute is good, the notification which is of a consequential nature cannot be held to be bad it was next contended by the learned counsel that the zamindars had vested rights in existing law, namely, the Land Acquisition Act and the impugned statute could not deprive them of the benefits of the provisions of that Act. Similar argument was raised in the Bihar appeals and for the reasons given therein it is repelled. It was then contended that in view of the provisions of the Religious Endowments Act, lands of religious endowments could not be acquired under the provisions of the impugned statute. This contention seems to have been raised on some misapprehension as to the scope and extent of the Religious Endowments Act, XX of 1863. It is not proved that Act has any application to the properties sought to be acquired under the impugned Act. Moreover, that Act only deals with management of certain properties and does not stand in the way of their acquisition.40. Great effort was made by Mr. Varma to establish that the impugned Act was a piece of fraud on the Constitution. It was contended that the U.P. Government had been since a long time enacting laws with the fraudulent intention of depriving the zamindars of compensation by reducing their incomes,--he made mention of half a dozen Acts that were enacted in U.P. prior to the impugned Act. The argument, to my mind, is based on a confusion of thought. The enactments referred to were enacted by the legislature of U.P. between 1930 and 1940, before the Constitution came into force, and have no connection whatever with acquisition of properties.41. Mr. Varma attacked the validity of section 840 of the Act which enacts that-"where any orders had been made ................. or jurisdiction exercised under the provisions of the U.P. Agriculture Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act, 1949, the provisions of the said Act shall be so read and construed as if the amendments mentioned in Schedule IV had been made therein and were in force from the commencement of the said Act."42. It was contended that the U.P. Agriculture Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act, 1949 was an existing law in U.P. and had not been repealed by the impugned Act and that being so, this Act could not validate notifications made under that existing law. I have not been able to see the force of this suggestion. Be that as it may, the constitutionality of this section does not affect the legislation as a whole. The point was never raised before the High Court and has no substance.43. It was also contended that mere rights in land apart from the lands themselves could not be acquired under compulsory power and that the U.P. Legislature could not acquire proprietary rights in lands and leave the bhumidari rights with the landlords. This proposition sounds strange. It is open to Government to acquire the whole of the rights of an owner or a part of that right. Leasehold and other similar rights can always be acquired and if a person owns the totality of rights, it is not necessary to acquire the whole interest of that person if it is not needed for public purposes.44. Lastly, it was urged that in truth the legislation in question fell under legislative power conferred by entry 18 of List II and this power could only be exercised subject to the freedom guaranteed by article 19(f) of the Constitution, that the total abolition of the zamindaris could not be protected by the provisions of clause 6 of article 19 in that it could not be regarded a reasonable restriction on the exercise of the right to hold property. This argument loses sight of the fact that no help can be sought in these cases from any of the provisions of Part III; moreover, the legislation in question has been enacted under legislative powers given by entry 36 of List II and not under entry 18 of that List. Mr. Varma raised some other contentions also but during the discussion he eventually abandoned them.45.
0[ds]It is well-settled that recourse cannot be had to the spirit of the Constitution when its provisions are explicit in respect of a certain right or matter. When the fundamental law has not limited either in terms or by necessary implication the general powers conferred on the legislature, it is not possible to deduce a limitation from something supposed to be inherent in the spirit of the Constitution. This elusive spirit is no guide in this matter.truth is that Part III of the Constitution is an important and integral part of it and has not been repealed or abrogated by anything contained in article 31-A of the Constitution; on the other hand, article 31-A, while providing that no law providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate, shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any of the provisions of Part III, clearly provides that where such law is made by the legislature of a State, the provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such law having been reserved for the consideration of the President has received his assent. This proviso in express terms keeps alive the alternative provisions of Part III of the Constitution in article 31 (3) for judging whether the State law has or has not complied with the provisions of article 31 (2). The provisions of article 31(2). therefore, do not stand repealed by article 31-A. On the other hand, they are kept alive. The difference is that persons whose properties fall within the definition of the expression "estate" in article 31-A are deprived of their remedy under article 32 of the Constitution and the President has been constituted the sole judge of deciding whether a State law acquiring estates under compulsory power has or has not complied with the provisions of article 31 (2). The validity of the law in those eases depends on the subjective opinion of the President and is not justiciable. Once the assent is given, the law is taken to have complied with the provisions of article 31has, however, to be observed that these non-income fetching properties are integral parts of an estate as defined in article 31-A and it cannot be said when payment of compensation is provided for on the basis of the net income of the whole of the estate, that the legislation is of a confiscatory character. Different considerations might have prevailed if the estates as a whole were not being acquired but different pieces of property were made the subject-matter of acquisition. Properties comprised in an estate may be incomefetching and non-income fetching, the value of these to the owner in the market may well be on the basis of income and if the Act has laid down the principle of payment of compensation on the foot of net income, it cannot be said that the legislation is outside the ambit of entry 42 of Listthe provisions of articles 31-A and 31-B completely shelter this law from any attack based on any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. This proposition was not disputed. As the validity of the Act could not be impugned on any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution, that was the reason why the attack on its constitutionality was made on other grounds-ingenious but unsubstantial--lying outside the ambit Part65 in clear terms provides that there shall be paid to every intermediary as compensation the amount declared in that behalf underexpression "public purpose" is not capable of a precise definition and has not a rigid meaning. It can only be denned by a process of judicial inclusion and exclusion. In other words, the definition of the expression is elastic and takes its colour from the statute in which it occurs, the concept varying with the time and state of society and its needs. The point to be determined in each case is whether the acquisition is in the general interest of the community as distinguished from the private interest of an individual.In my opinion, legislation, which aims at elevating the status of tenants by conferring upon them the bhumidari rights to which status the big zamindars have also been levelled down cannot be said as Wanting in public purposes in a democratic State. It aims at destroying the inferiority complex in a large number of citizens of the State and giving them a status of equality with their former lords and prevents the accumulation of big tracts of land in the hands of a few individuals which is contrary to the expressed intentions of the Constitution.The Crown cannot deprive a legislature of its legislative authority by the mere fact that in the exercise of its prerogative it makes a grant of land within the territory over which such legislative authority exists and no court can annul the enactment of a legislative body acting within the legitimate scope of its sovereign competence. If therefore it be found that the subject-matter of a Crown grant is within the competence of a provincial legislature, nothing can prevent that legislature from legislating about it, unless the Constitution Act itself expressly prohibits legislation on the subject either absolutely orcharity created by a private individual is not immune from the sovereigns power to compulsorily acquire that property for public purposes. It is incorrect to say that the vesting of these properties in the State under the provisions of the Act in any way affects the charity adversely because the net income that the institutions are deriving from the properties has been made the basis of compensation awarded to them.
### Instruction:
Judge the probable resolution of the case (approval (1) or disapproval (0)), and elaborate on this forecast by extracting and interpreting significant sentences from the proceeding.

### Input:
and no court can annul the enactment of a legislative body acting within the legitimate scope of its sovereign competence. If therefore it be found that the subject-matter of a Crown grant is within the competence of a provincial legislature, nothing can prevent that legislature from legislating about it, unless the Constitution Act itself expressly prohibits legislation on the subject either absolutely or conditionally.38. Dr. Asthana, who appeared in Appeals Nos. 291 to 294 of 1951, argued the case of the religious institutions. He contended that the properties held by these institutions had already been dedicated for public purposes, that the income of these properties was being used for holding melas, feeding sadhus and other charitable purposes and that any reduction in that income would adversely affect those institutions and the properties that were already dedicated for public purposes could not be acquired under compulsory powers of acquisition. The argument is fallacious. A charity created by a private individual is not immune from the sovereigns power to compulsorily acquire that property for public purposes. It is incorrect to say that the vesting of these properties in the State under the provisions of the Act in any way affects the charity adversely because the net income that the institutions are deriving from the properties has been made the basis of compensation awarded to them.39. Mr. Varma, who appeared in Appeal No. 295 of 1951, raised several new and ingenious points, none of which, however, he was able to substantiate. He contended that the impugned Act may not be void but the notification which the Government was authorised to issue under the powers conferred on it by the statute would be void because the executive government could not infringe fundamental rights by a notification which remained unaffected by articles 31 (4), 31-A and 31-B. The argument does not seem to be valid because it suffers from the defect that if the statute is good, the notification which is of a consequential nature cannot be held to be bad it was next contended by the learned counsel that the zamindars had vested rights in existing law, namely, the Land Acquisition Act and the impugned statute could not deprive them of the benefits of the provisions of that Act. Similar argument was raised in the Bihar appeals and for the reasons given therein it is repelled. It was then contended that in view of the provisions of the Religious Endowments Act, lands of religious endowments could not be acquired under the provisions of the impugned statute. This contention seems to have been raised on some misapprehension as to the scope and extent of the Religious Endowments Act, XX of 1863. It is not proved that Act has any application to the properties sought to be acquired under the impugned Act. Moreover, that Act only deals with management of certain properties and does not stand in the way of their acquisition.40. Great effort was made by Mr. Varma to establish that the impugned Act was a piece of fraud on the Constitution. It was contended that the U.P. Government had been since a long time enacting laws with the fraudulent intention of depriving the zamindars of compensation by reducing their incomes,--he made mention of half a dozen Acts that were enacted in U.P. prior to the impugned Act. The argument, to my mind, is based on a confusion of thought. The enactments referred to were enacted by the legislature of U.P. between 1930 and 1940, before the Constitution came into force, and have no connection whatever with acquisition of properties.41. Mr. Varma attacked the validity of section 840 of the Act which enacts that-"where any orders had been made ................. or jurisdiction exercised under the provisions of the U.P. Agriculture Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act, 1949, the provisions of the said Act shall be so read and construed as if the amendments mentioned in Schedule IV had been made therein and were in force from the commencement of the said Act."42. It was contended that the U.P. Agriculture Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act, 1949 was an existing law in U.P. and had not been repealed by the impugned Act and that being so, this Act could not validate notifications made under that existing law. I have not been able to see the force of this suggestion. Be that as it may, the constitutionality of this section does not affect the legislation as a whole. The point was never raised before the High Court and has no substance.43. It was also contended that mere rights in land apart from the lands themselves could not be acquired under compulsory power and that the U.P. Legislature could not acquire proprietary rights in lands and leave the bhumidari rights with the landlords. This proposition sounds strange. It is open to Government to acquire the whole of the rights of an owner or a part of that right. Leasehold and other similar rights can always be acquired and if a person owns the totality of rights, it is not necessary to acquire the whole interest of that person if it is not needed for public purposes.44. Lastly, it was urged that in truth the legislation in question fell under legislative power conferred by entry 18 of List II and this power could only be exercised subject to the freedom guaranteed by article 19(f) of the Constitution, that the total abolition of the zamindaris could not be protected by the provisions of clause 6 of article 19 in that it could not be regarded a reasonable restriction on the exercise of the right to hold property. This argument loses sight of the fact that no help can be sought in these cases from any of the provisions of Part III; moreover, the legislation in question has been enacted under legislative powers given by entry 36 of List II and not under entry 18 of that List. Mr. Varma raised some other contentions also but during the discussion he eventually abandoned them.45.

### Response:
0

### Explanation:
It is well-settled that recourse cannot be had to the spirit of the Constitution when its provisions are explicit in respect of a certain right or matter. When the fundamental law has not limited either in terms or by necessary implication the general powers conferred on the legislature, it is not possible to deduce a limitation from something supposed to be inherent in the spirit of the Constitution. This elusive spirit is no guide in this matter.truth is that Part III of the Constitution is an important and integral part of it and has not been repealed or abrogated by anything contained in article 31-A of the Constitution; on the other hand, article 31-A, while providing that no law providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate, shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any of the provisions of Part III, clearly provides that where such law is made by the legislature of a State, the provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such law having been reserved for the consideration of the President has received his assent. This proviso in express terms keeps alive the alternative provisions of Part III of the Constitution in article 31 (3) for judging whether the State law has or has not complied with the provisions of article 31 (2). The provisions of article 31(2). therefore, do not stand repealed by article 31-A. On the other hand, they are kept alive. The difference is that persons whose properties fall within the definition of the expression "estate" in article 31-A are deprived of their remedy under article 32 of the Constitution and the President has been constituted the sole judge of deciding whether a State law acquiring estates under compulsory power has or has not complied with the provisions of article 31 (2). The validity of the law in those eases depends on the subjective opinion of the President and is not justiciable. Once the assent is given, the law is taken to have complied with the provisions of article 31has, however, to be observed that these non-income fetching properties are integral parts of an estate as defined in article 31-A and it cannot be said when payment of compensation is provided for on the basis of the net income of the whole of the estate, that the legislation is of a confiscatory character. Different considerations might have prevailed if the estates as a whole were not being acquired but different pieces of property were made the subject-matter of acquisition. Properties comprised in an estate may be incomefetching and non-income fetching, the value of these to the owner in the market may well be on the basis of income and if the Act has laid down the principle of payment of compensation on the foot of net income, it cannot be said that the legislation is outside the ambit of entry 42 of Listthe provisions of articles 31-A and 31-B completely shelter this law from any attack based on any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. This proposition was not disputed. As the validity of the Act could not be impugned on any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution, that was the reason why the attack on its constitutionality was made on other grounds-ingenious but unsubstantial--lying outside the ambit Part65 in clear terms provides that there shall be paid to every intermediary as compensation the amount declared in that behalf underexpression "public purpose" is not capable of a precise definition and has not a rigid meaning. It can only be denned by a process of judicial inclusion and exclusion. In other words, the definition of the expression is elastic and takes its colour from the statute in which it occurs, the concept varying with the time and state of society and its needs. The point to be determined in each case is whether the acquisition is in the general interest of the community as distinguished from the private interest of an individual.In my opinion, legislation, which aims at elevating the status of tenants by conferring upon them the bhumidari rights to which status the big zamindars have also been levelled down cannot be said as Wanting in public purposes in a democratic State. It aims at destroying the inferiority complex in a large number of citizens of the State and giving them a status of equality with their former lords and prevents the accumulation of big tracts of land in the hands of a few individuals which is contrary to the expressed intentions of the Constitution.The Crown cannot deprive a legislature of its legislative authority by the mere fact that in the exercise of its prerogative it makes a grant of land within the territory over which such legislative authority exists and no court can annul the enactment of a legislative body acting within the legitimate scope of its sovereign competence. If therefore it be found that the subject-matter of a Crown grant is within the competence of a provincial legislature, nothing can prevent that legislature from legislating about it, unless the Constitution Act itself expressly prohibits legislation on the subject either absolutely orcharity created by a private individual is not immune from the sovereigns power to compulsorily acquire that property for public purposes. It is incorrect to say that the vesting of these properties in the State under the provisions of the Act in any way affects the charity adversely because the net income that the institutions are deriving from the properties has been made the basis of compensation awarded to them.
