HAMID ALI KHAN (D) THROUGH LRS. &amp; ANR Vs. STATE OF U.P. &amp; ORS
these survey were sold for residential house. Being contiguous with the scheme area, these lands were projected as required on preparing an amended proposal. However, in the communication dated 06.10.2006 issued by the third respondent he refers to requirement of clean environment and therefore a cattle market of the animals in the housing area may not be proper. The same position is again reiterated as already noted in communication dated 10.10.2000 as well. The appellants had given a representation on 08.12.2006 to the Chief Secretary praying that the property may not be taken for the residential/commercial scheme. Therein, it is inter alia stated that the cattle market is located at one corner of the acquired land of 52.361 hectares. The appellants state about their readiness to construct a separate boundary wall. It is stated to be their only source of income. 35. It is to be noticed that the declaration under section 6 was issued only on the eve of expiry of one year from 11.4.2008. The urgency indicated in the file is to tide over the bar of issuance of declaration under section 6 beyond one year from 11.4.2008 the date on which notification under 4/17 was issued. There is no indication in the file about the urgency for issuing the declaration immediately after the notification under Section 4. In other words, the file does not reveal any urgency at all associated with the need to acquire the land immediately which constitutes the foundation for invoking the urgency clause. 36. We are at a loss as to what was the material which was relevant to a decision under section 17(4) of the Act. In this regard we may notice the following: Notification was issued under section 17(4) in October 2004 regard to 52 and odd hectares of land. The Section 6 declaration is made only in October 2005. The survey numbers in question in this case according to the respondent is located in the middle. However, it is not acquired on the basis that the said land was being used as cattle market (see communication dated 29.3.2006). The appellants have a definite case that possession itself was taken despite the availability of power to take possession immediately, only on 6.1.2006. The proposal to take the further land was taken in March, 2006 if not earlier. The reason given for acquiring the land is alleged construction of shops by the appellants and the contiguity of the land covered by the land earlier acquired with the land in question. On the other hand, the third respondent refers further to the need for clean environment which is in contradiction to the communication dated 29.3.2006. 37. What is relevant for the purpose of this case is to find the following: (1) Whether there were relevant material before ethe Government to invoke power under section 17(4)? (2) Lastly, whether the government applied its mind? 38. We have noticed the material which consists of the communications addressed to the second respondent and the communications by the third respondent. Apart from the same, the usual certificates/forms indicating inter alia that there was no place of worship located in the scheme was no doubt available. But the point is only whether there was material for dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5A and even, more importantly, whether the authority applied its mind to it. Even the notification under section 17(4) came to be issued after more than two years of the proposal sent sometime in March, 2006 if not earlier. We have already noted the fact that declaration under section 6 came to be issued only on 9.4.2009, just two days prior to the first anniversary of the date of notification under section 4. More importantly, we have noticed what finally impelled Government to issue the notification, namely, the apprehension that if it is not issued within one year of the section 4 notification the acquisition would lapse. This had nothing to do with urgency which would have manifested in the section 6 declaration being issued much earlier. This must also be viewed in the background that though the Section 4(1)/(17) Notification was earlier issued in regard to 52.361 hectares on 08.10.2004, the declaration under Section 6 was issued only on 07.10.2005. 39. The statutory authority under section 5A of the Act is expected to give a fair hearing. It can stand between an uncalled for proposal to acquire property. Disputed questions of facts in regard to the property to acquire the property are to be considered by the same Authority. Yet another pertinent aspect is the fact that the subject matter of the second acquisition was 2 and odd hectares. It was apparently just the appellants, who had to be given a hearing. 40. We would therefore think that in the facts of this case, having regard to the nature of the scheme, the delay with which section 6 declaration was issued, possession taken and the nature of the material on the basis of which the proposal was processed, the appellants are justified in contending that the notification under 17(4) dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5A was unjustified. 41. We may notice another aspect. This appeal arises from the order passed by the High Court in the year 2000. While issuing notice, this Court in the SLP stage ordered status quo as on 6.11.2009 be maintained. Thereafter, the leave was granted on 27.1.2012. The interim order was however directed to continue. It is after nearly 12 years that the case is finally being disposed of. In the meantime, the Land Acquisition Act was repealed and the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 has taken its place. Therefore, there is no question of the matter being considered for an inquiry being held under section 5A. We have also noted that there is no denial of the allegation in the writ petition about the lie of the property, viz., it not being in the middle of the scheme area.
1[ds]10. In Narayan Govind Gavate and Others v. State of Maharashtra and Others (1977) 1 SCC 133 ,  a Bench of 3 learned Judges was dealing with a notification issued under Section 17(4). The public purpose recited in the notification was development and utilisation of the land as a residential and industrial area. The lands were described as waste and arable land and urgency provision was invoked resulting in the notification being issued. This court inter alia held:10. It is true that, in such cases, the formation of an opinion is a subjective matter, as held by this Court repeatedly with regard to situations in which administrative authorities have to form certain opinions before taking actions they are empowered to take. They are expected to know better the difference between a right or wrong opinion than courts could ordinarily on such matters. Nevertheless, that opinion has to be based upon some relevant materials in order to pass the test which courts do impose. That test basically is: Was the authority concerned acting within the scope of its powers or in the sphere where its opinion and discretion must be permitted to have full play? Once the court comes to the conclusion that the authority concerned was acting within the scope of its powers and had some material, however meagre, on which it could reasonably base its opinion, the courts should not and will not interfere. There might, however, be cases in which the power is exercised in such an obviously arbitrary or perverse fashion, without regard to the actual and undeniable facts, or, in other words, so unreasonably as to leave no doubt whatsoever in the mind of a court that there has been an excess of power. There may also be cases where the mind of the authority concerned has not been applied at all, due to misunderstanding of the law or some other reason, to what was legally imperative for it to consider.24. Coming back to the cases before us, we find that the High Court had correctly stated the grounds on which even a subjective opinion as to the existence of the need to take action under Section 17(4) of the Act can be challenged on certain limited grounds. But, as soon as we speak of a challenge we have to bear in mind the general burdens laid down by Sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act. It is for the petitioner to substantiate the grounds of his challenge. This means that the petitioner has to either lead evidence or show that some evidence has come from the side of the respondents to indicate that his challenge to a notification or order is made good. If he does not succeed in discharging that duty his petition will fail.30. In the cases before us, if the total evidence from whichever side any of it may have come, was insufficient to enable the petitioners to discharge their general or stable onus, their petitions could not succeed. On the other hand, if, in addition to the bare assertions made by the petitioners, that the urgency contemplated by Section 17(4) did not exist, there were other facts and circumstances, including the failure of the State to indicate facts and circumstances which it could have easily disclosed if they existed, the petitioners could be held to have discharged their general onus.40. In the case before us, the public purpose indicated is the development of an area for industrial and residential purposes. This, in itself, on the face of it, does not call for any such action, barring exceptional circumstances, as to make immediate possession, without holding even a summary enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act, imperative. On the other hand, such schemes generally take sufficient period of time to enable at least summary inquiries under Section 5-A of the Act to be completed without any impediment whatsoever to the execution of the scheme. Therefore, the very statement of the public purpose for which the land was to be acquired indicated the absence of such urgency, on the apparent facts of the case, as to require the elimination of an enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act.42. All schemes relating to development of industrial and residential areas must be urgent in the context of the countrys need for increased production and more residential accommodation. Yet, the very nature of such schemes of development does not appear to demand such emergent action as to eliminate summary enquiries under Section 5-A of the Act. There is no indication whatsoever in the affidavit filed on behalf of the State that the mind of the Commissioner was applied at all to the question whether it was a case necessitating the elimination of the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. The recitals in the notifications, on the other hand, indicate that elimination of the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act was treated as an automatic consequence of the opinion formed on other matters. The recital does not say at all that any opinion was formed on the need to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. It is certainly a ease in which the recital was at least defective. The burden, therefore, rested upon the State to remove the defect, if possible, by evidence to show that some exceptional circumstances which necessitated the elimination of an enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act and that the mind of the Commissioner was applied to this essential question. It seems to us that the High Court correctly applied the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act to place the burden upon the State to prove those special circumstances, although it also appears to us that the High Court was not quite correct in stating its view in such a manner as to make it appear that some part of the initial burden of the petitioners under Sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act had been displaced by the failure of the State to discharge its duty under Section 106 of the Act. The correct way of putting it would have been to say that the failure of the State to produce the evidence of facts especially within the knowledge of its officials, which rested upon it under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, taken together with the attendant facts and circumstances, including the contents of recitals, had enabled the petitioners to discharge their burden under Sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act.11. In Pista Devi (supra), a Bench of two learned Judges came to consider the case involving dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act. The court noted the case related to Meerut city located in a densely populated part of the Uttar Pradesh which was found to be growing very fast. The problem of town planning and urban development had to be tackled. The Collector on the basis of proposal sent to him by the Meerut Development Authority wrote letter dated 13.12.1979 to the Commissioner and Secretary, Housing and Urban Development, Uttar Pradesh regarding acquisition of approximately 412 acres for a Housing Scheme. There was an acute shortage of houses, it was found. The collector gave the requisite certificate. The Government published a notification under section 4(1) of the Act and also dispensed with the enquiry under Section 5A which was published on 12th July, 1980. This was followed up by the declaration under Section 6 on 1.5.1981. The possession came to be taken and handed over to the Meerut Development Authority in July, 1982. It is in these circumstances that the notification under Section 17 of the Act was challenged. This Court distinguished Narayan Govind Gavate (supra) in the following words:..The provision of housing accommodation in these days has become a matter of national urgency. We may take judicial notice of this fact. Now it is difficult to hold that in the case of proceedings relating to acquisition of land for providing house sites it is unnecessary to invoke Section 17(1) of the Act and to dispense with the compliance with Section 5-A of the Act. Perhaps, at the time to which the decision in Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 1 SCC 133   : 1977 SCC (Cri) 49   : AIR 1977 SC 183   : (1977) 1 SCR 763  ] related the situation might have been that the schemes relating to development of residential areas in the urban centres were not so urgent and it was not necessary to eliminate the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. The acquisition proceedings which had been challenged in that case related to the year 1963. During this period of nearly 23 years since then the population of India has gone up by hundreds of millions and it is no longer possible for the Court to take the view that the schemes of development of residential areas do not appear to demand such emergent action as to eliminate summary inquiries under Section 5-A of the Act....7.…In a case of this nature where a large extent of land is being acquired for planned development of the urban area it would not be proper to leave the small portions over which some super-structures have been constructed out of the development scheme. In such a situation where there is real urgency it would be difficult to apply Section 5-A of the Act in the case of few bits of land on which some structures are standing and to exempt the rest of the property from its application. Whether the land in question is waste or arable land has to be judged by looking at the general nature and condition of the land…13. In Chameli Singh case (supra), a bench of 3 learned Judges again considered the question. The notification under Section 4 was dated 23.07.1983 and the declaration under section 6 was also published on the strength of notification under Section 17(4). Regarding the challenge to the notification under Section 17(4) this Court inter alia held as follows:3..When the Government forms an opinion that it is necessary to require immediate possession of the land for building houses for the Dalits, it forms the opinion of urgency to take immediate possession for the said purpose. Accordingly it is entitled to direct dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A and publish the declaration under Section 6 after the date of the publication of Section 4(1) notification.4. It is settled law that the opinion of urgency formed by the appropriate Government to take immediate possession, is a subjective conclusion based on the material before it and it is entitled to great weight unless it is vitiated by mala fides or colourable exercise of power. Article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares that everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well- being of himself and his family including food, clothing, housing, medical care and necessary social services.15. The question, therefore, is whether invocation of urgency clause under Section 17(4) dispensing with inquiry under Section 5-A is arbitrary or is unwarranted for providing housing construction for the poor. In Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi [(1975) 4 SCC 285]   (SCC at p. 290), a Constitution Bench of this Court had upheld the exercise of the power by the State under Section 17(4) dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A for the planned development of Delhi. In Pista Devi case [(1986) 4 SCC 251]   this Court while considering the legality of the exercise of the power under Section 17(4) exercised by the State Government dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A for acquiring housing accommodation for planned development of Meerut, had held that providing housing accommodation is national urgency of which court should take judicial notice. The pre- notification and post-notification delay caused by the officer concerned does not create a cause to hold that there is no urgency. Housing conditions of Dalits all over the country continue to be miserable even till date and is a fact of which courts are bound to take judicial notice. The ratio of Deepak Pahwa case [(1984) 4 SCC 308   : (1985) 1 SCR 588  ] was followed. In that case a three-Judge Bench of this Court had upheld the notification issued under Section 17(4), even though lapse of time of 8 years had occurred due to inter- departmental discussions before receiving the notification. That itself was considered to be a ground to invoke urgency clause. It was further held that delay on the part of the lethargic officials to take further action in the matter of acquisition was not sufficient to nullify the urgency which existed at the time of the issuance of the notification and to hold that there was never any urgency. In Jage Ram v. State of Haryana [(1971) 1 SCC 671]   this Court upheld the exercise of the power of urgency under Section 17(4) and had held that the lethargy on the part of the officers at an early stage was not relevant to decide whether on the day of the notification there was urgency or not. Conclusion of the Government that there was urgency, though not conclusive, is entitled to create weight. In Deepak Pahwa case [(1984) 4 SCC 308   : (1985) 1 SCR 588  ] this Court had held that very often persons interested in the land proposed to be acquired may make representations to the authorities concerned against the proposed writ petition that is bound to result in multiplicity of enquiries, communications and discussions leading invariably to delay in the execution of even urgent projects. Very often delay makes the problem more and more acute and increases urgency of the necessity for acquisition. In Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kishan [(1993) 2 SCC 84]   (SCC at p. 91), this Court had held that it must be remembered that the satisfaction under Section 17(4) is a subjective one and that so long as there is material upon which Government could have formed the said satisfaction fairly, the Court would not interfere nor would it examine the material as an appellate authority. In State of U.P. v. Keshav Prasad Singh [(1995) 5 SCC 587]   (SCC at p. 590), this Court had held that the Government was entitled to exercise the power under Section 17(4) invoking urgency clause and to dispense with inquiry under Section 5- A when the urgency was noticed on the facts available on record. In Narayan Govind Gavate case [(1977) 1 SCC 133   : 1977 SCC (Cri) 49   : (1997) 1 SCR 763] a three-Judge Bench of this Court had held that Section 17(4) cannot be read in isolation from Section 4(1) and Section 5-A of the Act. Although 30 days from the notification under Section 4(1) are given for filing objections under Section 5-A, inquiry thereunder unduly gets prolonged. It is difficult to see why the summary inquiry could not be completed quite expeditiously. Nonetheless, this Court held the existence of prima facie public purpose such as the one present in those cases before the Court could not be successfully challenged at all by the objectors. It further held that it was open to the authority to take summary inquiry under Section 5-A and to complete inquiry very expeditiously. It was emphasised that: (SCC p. 148, para 38)… The mind of the officer or authority concerned has to be applied to the question whether there is an urgency of such a nature that even the summary proceedings under Section 5-A of the Act should be eliminated. It is not just the existence of an urgency but the need to dispense with an inquiry under Section 5- A which has to be considered.14. This Court proceeded to consider the decisions in Gavate, Pista Devi and Rajasthan Housing Board. As far as Gavate was concerned, this Court pronounced as follows:16. It would thus be seen that this Court emphasised the holding of an inquiry on the facts peculiar to that case. Very often the officials, due to apathy in implementation of the policy and programmes of the Government, themselves adopt dilatory tactics to create cause for the owner of the land to challenge the validity or legality of the exercise of the power to defeat the urgency existing on the date of taking decision under Section 17(4) to dispense with Section 5-A inquiry.17. It is true that there was pre- notification and post-notification delay on the part of the officers to finalise and publish the notification. But those facts were present before the Government when it invoked urgency clause and dispensed with inquiry under Section 5-A. As held by this Court, the delay by itself accelerates the urgency: Larger the delay, greater be the urgency. So long as the unhygienic conditions and deplorable housing needs of Dalits, Tribes and the poor are not solved or fulfilled, the urgency continues to subsist. When the Government on the basis of the material, constitutional and international obligation, formed its opinion of urgency, the court, not being an appellate forum, would not disturb the finding unless the court conclusively finds the exercise of the power mala fide. Providing house sites to the Dalits, Tribes and the poor itself is a national problem and a constitutional obligation. So long as the problem is not solved and the need is not fulfilled, the urgency continues to subsist. The State is expending money to relieve the deplorable housing condition in which they live by providing decent housing accommodation with better sanitary conditions. The lethargy on the part of the officers for pre and post-notification delay would not render the exercise of the power to invoke urgency clause invalid on that account.18. In every acquisition by its very compulsory nature for public purpose, the owner may be deprived of the land, the means of his livelihood. The State exercises its power of eminent domain for public purpose and acquires the land. So long as the exercise of the power is for public purpose, the individuals right of an owner must yield place to the larger public purpose.18. In Anand Singh case (supra), a Bench of two learned Judges dealt with an acquisition for a residential colony for the Gorakhpur Development Authority. The notification was issued under Section 4 in 2003 and 2004. By the said notifications power was invoked under Section 17 (4), and the declaration also came to be issued under Section 6 on 28.12.2004. The contention of the Gorakhpur Development Authority was that many steps were taken in developing the land acquired in as much as water, land, electric lines, sewerage line, drainage etc. were laid and roads constructed out of the total outlay of merely Rs. 8 to 9 crores. An amount of excess of Rs. 5 crores were already spent and 60 per cent of the work was completed. The Court referred to Gavate, Pista Devi, Rajasthan Housing Boards, Chameli Singh and Om Prakash (supra) and held as follows: -41. The power of eminent domain, being inherent in the Government, is exercisable in the public interest, general welfare and for public purpose. Acquisition of private property by the State in the public interest or for public purpose is nothing but an enforcement of the right of eminent domain. In India, the Act provides directly for acquisition of particular property for public purpose. Though the right to property is no longer a fundamental right but Article 300-A of the Constitution mandates that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. That Section 5-A of the Act confers a valuable right to an individual is beyond any doubt. As a matter of fact, this Court has time and again reiterated that Section 5-A confers an important right in favour of a person whose land is sought to be acquired.42. When the Government proceeds for compulsory acquisition of a particular property for public purpose, the only right that the owner or the person interested in the property has, is to submit his objections within the prescribed time under Section 5-A of the Act and persuade the State authorities to drop the acquisition of that particular land by setting forth the reasons such as the unsuitability of the land for the stated public purpose; the grave hardship that may be caused to him by such expropriation, availability of alternative land for achieving public purpose, etc. Moreover, the right conferred on the owner or person interested to file objections to the proposed acquisition is not only an important and valuable right but also makes the provision for compulsory acquisition just and in conformity with the fundamental principles of natural justice.43. The exceptional and extraordinary power of doing away with an enquiry under Section 5-A in a case where possession of the land is required urgently or in an unforeseen emergency is provided in Section 17 of the Act. Such power is not a routine power and save circumstances warranting immediate possession it should not be lightly invoked. The guideline is inbuilt in Section 17 itself for exercise of the exceptional power in dispensing with enquiry under Section 5-A. Exceptional the power, the more circumspect the Government must be in its exercise. The Government obviously, therefore, has to apply its mind before it dispenses with enquiry under Section 5-A on the aspect whether the urgency is of such a nature that justifies elimination of summary enquiry under Section 5-A.44. A repetition of the statutory phrase in the notification that the State Government is satisfied that the land specified in the notification is urgently needed and the provision contained in Section 5-A shall not apply, though may initially raise a presumption in favour of the Government that prerequisite conditions for exercise of such power have been satisfied, but such presumption may be displaced by the circumstances themselves having no reasonable nexus with the purpose for which the power has been exercised. Upon challenge being made to the use of power under Section 17, the Government must produce appropriate material before the Court that the opinion for dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A has been formed by the Government after due application of mind on the material placed before it.46. As to in what circumstances the power of emergency can be invoked are specified in Section 17(2) but circumstances necessitating invocation of urgency under Section 17(1) are not stated in the provision itself. Generally speaking, the development of an area (for residential purposes) or a planned development of city, takes many years if not decades and, therefore, there is no reason why summary enquiry as contemplated under Section 5-A may not be held and objections of landowners/persons interested may not be considered. In many cases, on general assumption likely delay in completion of enquiry under Section 5-A is set up as a reason for invocation of extraordinary power in dispensing with the enquiry little realising that an important and valuable right of the person interested in the land is being taken away and with some effort enquiry could always be completed expeditiously.19. Thereafter, the court noticed the conflict between Gavate and Pista devi (supra) and held as follows: -47. The special provision has been made in Section 17 to eliminate enquiry under Section 5-A in deserving and cases of real urgency. The Government has to apply its mind on the aspect that urgency is of such nature that necessitates dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-A. We have already noticed a few decisions of this Court. There is a conflict of view in the two decisions of this Court viz. Narayan Govind Gavate [(1977) 1 SCC 133  : 1977 SCC (Cri) 49  ] and Pista Devi [(1986) 4 SCC 251]  . In Om Prakash [(1998) 6 SCC 1]   this Court held that the decision in Pista Devi [(1986) 4 SCC 251]   must be confined to the fact situation in those days when it was rendered and the two-Judge Bench could not have laid down a proposition contrary to the decision in Narayan Govind Gavate [(1977) 1 SCC 133  : 1977 SCC (Cri) 49  ] . We agree.48. As regards the issue whether pre- notification and post-notification delay would render the invocation of urgency power void, again the case law is not consistent. The view of this Court has differed on this aspect due to different fact situation prevailing in those cases. In our opinion such delay will have material bearing on the question of invocation of urgency power, particularly in a situation where no material has been placed by the appropriate Government before the Court justifying that urgency was of such nature that necessitated elimination of enquiry under Section 5-A.49. In a country as big as ours, a roof over the head is a distant dream for a large number of people. The urban development continues to be haphazard. There is no doubt that planned development and housing are matters of priority in a developing nation. The question is as to whether in all cases of planned development of the city or for the development of residential area, the power of urgency may be invoked by the Government and even where such power is invoked, should the enquiry contemplated under Section 5-A be dispensed with invariably. We do not think so. Whether planned development of city or development of residential area cannot brook delay of a few months to complete the enquiry under Section 5-A? In our opinion, ordinarily it can. The Government must, therefore, do a balancing act and resort to the special power of urgency under Section 17 in the matters of acquisition of land for the public purpose viz. planned development of city or for development of residential area in exceptional situation.51. It must, therefore, be held that the use of the power of urgency and dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-A by the Government in a routine manner for the planned development of city or development of residential area and thereby depriving the owner or person interested of a very valuable right under Section 5-A may not meet the statutory test nor could be readily sustained.20. The court in the said case permitted the appellants to represent to the states authority under Section 48 of the Act for release of their land.23. It is true again that the decisions in this Court appear to convey conflicting signals. However, there is a certain element of consensus on fundamental principles. The dichotomy essentially has to be resolved by carefully attending to the facts of each case. The decision of a Bench of three Judges in Gavate (supra) enunciates the principles relating to the manner in which a challenge to a notification under Section 17(4) must be approached in the matter of discharging the burden of proof. When a challenge is made to the invocation of power under Section 17 (4) the writ applicant cannot succeed on bare and bald assertions. The facts which are specifically within the exclusive knowledge of the state must be laid before the court on the basis of the principle in Section 106 of the Evidence Act. Existence of the exceptional circumstances justifying invoking of Section 17 (4) must be established in the wake of a challenge. The true concept unravelled by this Court in Gavate (supra) is the total evidence theory. In other words, on an appreciation of the evidence made available by all the parties it is open to the court to conclude that no occasion arose for resorting to the power under Section 17 (4) which indeed must be read as an exception to the general rule that the acquisition of property is made after affording an opportunity the person adversely affected to demonstrate that the acquisition was unjustified.27. A perusal of the files made available would reveal that on 14.1.2008, there is reference to the clarification by the Vice chairman as to the justification for acquiring of 2.692 hectares for the development of residential and commercial scheme and from the planning point of view. Thereafter referring to letter 8.2.2008 from the Vice chairman of the second respondent it is found that the land is situated in the middle of land acquired earlier and that the Vice chairman has requested that notification be issued at the earliest. The matter was put up before the Minister for issuance of the notification under section 4(1)/17 for acquiring the land. This is dated 19.2.2008. On 2.3.2008, the Special Secretary found that there was some request seeking exemption of the some land sought to be acquired which was examined by the Government in the enclosed file 2033LA/2006. The proposal for exemption was not allowed. The Principal Secretary (Planning) had referred to the rejection of application for exemption and therefore the matter was put up for notification under section 4(1)/17. On the very same day, the signature of the Minister was obtained. From this we are to infer that the Minister approved the proposal for issue of notification and it was issued thereafter on 11.4.2008.29. A perusal of the file notings would reveal that on 24.3.2009 it was noticed that as per the rules the notification under section 6/17 had to be issued before 11.4.2009 in view of the notification issued under 4(1)/17(4) on 11.4.2008. There is reference to Rs.37,76,711/- having been deposited by the second respondent constituting unnecessary expenditure, if the acquisition lapsed. On the said basis it was stated in view of the unavoidable situation of issuing the section 6/17 notification before 11.4.2009 it was proposed to issue the notification. Thereafter, it was found that in view of the elections being underway and enforcement of the election code, permission of the officer had to be obtained. The approval /signature of the Principal Secretary had to be obtained for issuing the Section 6/17 declaration. It is thereupon that the notification under Section 6 came to be issued on 9.4.2009.30. On the basis of the declaration, the possession of the land according to the second respondent was taken over on 27.7.2009 and the name of the second respondent was entered in the revenue record.32. A short counter affidavit was filed by the second respondent. There is no specific denial of the case set up by the appellants in paragraph 23, 24 and 27. If that be so on the unrebutted allegations an inference could be drawn that the case set up by the respondents that the properties in question were situated in the middle of the scheme area is incorrect.33. We must notice certain salient features. Perusal of the impugned notification under section 17(4) and even Section 6 declaration shows that the land in question is recited as being required for the public purpose of the Bulandshehar-Khurja Development Authority or for the Kalindi Kunj residential/ commercial (supplementary). It is further recited that as the Governor was convinced about the great necessity of the land and the provision of section 17 (1) of the Act being applicable and in view of the necessity, inquiry under section 5A was not applied on the basis that possibility of delay may be abandoned. It is further stated that land is required for Kalindi Kunj residential/commercial scheme. A perusal of the revised lay out plan inter alia would show that the scheme was a residential cum commercial scheme. It was to consist of park, community facilities such health, post office, social and cultural centre and educational centre. The land which was reserved for the residential area is shown as constituting 38.57% of the area of the scheme. The commercial part of the Scheme was to consist of 4.9% of the total area of the scheme. We make this observation to record our finding that the scheme is not a pure residential scheme. Secondly, the only case which the respondents have further is that under a scheme 5% of the plots are reserved for the landless. Therefore, this fact may stand out in sharp contrast with the scheme which fell for consideration before this Court in Chameli Singh (supra) wherein the power under section 17(4) was invoked for land for building houses for the dalits. Initially, the land in question, was not proposed to be acquired. The total land which was proposed to be acquired was fixed at 52 and odd hectares.34. A perusal of the communication dated 29.3.2006 from the second respondent Authority reveals that according to it, survey nos. 880 and 893 were being used for keeping a cattle market and therefore the lands were not required. It is further found that in the survey 13 shops were constructed and the land in these survey were sold for residential house. Being contiguous with the scheme area, these lands were projected as required on preparing an amended proposal. However, in the communication dated 06.10.2006 issued by the third respondent he refers to requirement of clean environment and therefore a cattle market of the animals in the housing area may not be proper. The same position is again reiterated as already noted in communication dated 10.10.2000 as well. The appellants had given a representation on 08.12.2006 to the Chief Secretary praying that the property may not be taken for the residential/commercial scheme. Therein, it is inter alia stated that the cattle market is located at one corner of the acquired land of 52.361 hectares. The appellants state about their readiness to construct a separate boundary wall. It is stated to be their only source of income.35. It is to be noticed that the declaration under section 6 was issued only on the eve of expiry of one year from 11.4.2008. The urgency indicated in the file is to tide over the bar of issuance of declaration under section 6 beyond one year from 11.4.2008 the date on which notification under 4/17 was issued. There is no indication in the file about the urgency for issuing the declaration immediately after the notification under Section 4. In other words, the file does not reveal any urgency at all associated with the need to acquire the land immediately which constitutes the foundation for invoking the urgency clause.36. We are at a loss as to what was the material which was relevant to a decision under section 17(4) of the Act. In this regard we may notice the following:Notification was issued under section 17(4) in October 2004 regard to 52 and odd hectares of land. The Section 6 declaration is made only in October 2005. The survey numbers in question in this case according to the respondent is located in the middle. However, it is not acquired on the basis that the said land was being used as cattle market (see communication dated 29.3.2006). The appellants have a definite case that possession itself was taken despite the availability of power to take possession immediately, only on 6.1.2006. The proposal to take the further land was taken in March, 2006 if not earlier. The reason given for acquiring the land is alleged construction of shops by the appellants and the contiguity of the land covered by the land earlier acquired with the land in question. On the other hand, the third respondent refers further to the need for clean environment which is in contradiction to the communication dated 29.3.2006.38. We have noticed the material which consists of the communications addressed to the second respondent and the communications by the third respondent. Apart from the same, the usual certificates/forms indicating inter alia that there was no place of worship located in the scheme was no doubt available. But the point is only whether there was material for dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5A and even, more importantly, whether the authority applied its mind to it. Even the notification under section 17(4) came to be issued after more than two years of the proposal sent sometime in March, 2006 if not earlier. We have already noted the fact that declaration under section 6 came to be issued only on 9.4.2009, just two days prior to the first anniversary of the date of notification under section 4. More importantly, we have noticed what finally impelled Government to issue the notification, namely, the apprehension that if it is not issued within one year of the section 4 notification the acquisition would lapse. This had nothing to do with urgency which would have manifested in the section 6 declaration being issued much earlier. This must also be viewed in the background that though the Section 4(1)/(17) Notification was earlier issued in regard to 52.361 hectares on 08.10.2004, the declaration under Section 6 was issued only on 07.10.2005.39. The statutory authority under section 5A of the Act is expected to give a fair hearing. It can stand between an uncalled for proposal to acquire property. Disputed questions of facts in regard to the property to acquire the property are to be considered by the same Authority. Yet another pertinent aspect is the fact that the subject matter of the second acquisition was 2 and odd hectares. It was apparently just the appellants, who had to be given a hearing.40. We would therefore think that in the facts of this case, having regard to the nature of the scheme, the delay with which section 6 declaration was issued, possession taken and the nature of the material on the basis of which the proposal was processed, the appellants are justified in contending that the notification under 17(4) dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5A was unjustified.41. We may notice another aspect. This appeal arises from the order passed by the High Court in the year 2000. While issuing notice, this Court in the SLP stage ordered status quo as on 6.11.2009 be maintained. Thereafter, the leave was granted on 27.1.2012. The interim order was however directed to continue. It is after nearly 12 years that the case is finally being disposed of. In the meantime, the Land Acquisition Act was repealed and the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 has taken its place. Therefore, there is no question of the matter being considered for an inquiry being held under section 5A. We have also noted that there is no denial of the allegation in the writ petition about the lie of the property, viz., it not being in the middle of the scheme area.
### Instruction:
Predict the outcome of the case proceeding (1 for acceptance, 0 for rejection) and subsequently provide an explanation based on significant sentences in the proceeding.

### Input:
these survey were sold for residential house. Being contiguous with the scheme area, these lands were projected as required on preparing an amended proposal. However, in the communication dated 06.10.2006 issued by the third respondent he refers to requirement of clean environment and therefore a cattle market of the animals in the housing area may not be proper. The same position is again reiterated as already noted in communication dated 10.10.2000 as well. The appellants had given a representation on 08.12.2006 to the Chief Secretary praying that the property may not be taken for the residential/commercial scheme. Therein, it is inter alia stated that the cattle market is located at one corner of the acquired land of 52.361 hectares. The appellants state about their readiness to construct a separate boundary wall. It is stated to be their only source of income. 35. It is to be noticed that the declaration under section 6 was issued only on the eve of expiry of one year from 11.4.2008. The urgency indicated in the file is to tide over the bar of issuance of declaration under section 6 beyond one year from 11.4.2008 the date on which notification under 4/17 was issued. There is no indication in the file about the urgency for issuing the declaration immediately after the notification under Section 4. In other words, the file does not reveal any urgency at all associated with the need to acquire the land immediately which constitutes the foundation for invoking the urgency clause. 36. We are at a loss as to what was the material which was relevant to a decision under section 17(4) of the Act. In this regard we may notice the following: Notification was issued under section 17(4) in October 2004 regard to 52 and odd hectares of land. The Section 6 declaration is made only in October 2005. The survey numbers in question in this case according to the respondent is located in the middle. However, it is not acquired on the basis that the said land was being used as cattle market (see communication dated 29.3.2006). The appellants have a definite case that possession itself was taken despite the availability of power to take possession immediately, only on 6.1.2006. The proposal to take the further land was taken in March, 2006 if not earlier. The reason given for acquiring the land is alleged construction of shops by the appellants and the contiguity of the land covered by the land earlier acquired with the land in question. On the other hand, the third respondent refers further to the need for clean environment which is in contradiction to the communication dated 29.3.2006. 37. What is relevant for the purpose of this case is to find the following: (1) Whether there were relevant material before ethe Government to invoke power under section 17(4)? (2) Lastly, whether the government applied its mind? 38. We have noticed the material which consists of the communications addressed to the second respondent and the communications by the third respondent. Apart from the same, the usual certificates/forms indicating inter alia that there was no place of worship located in the scheme was no doubt available. But the point is only whether there was material for dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5A and even, more importantly, whether the authority applied its mind to it. Even the notification under section 17(4) came to be issued after more than two years of the proposal sent sometime in March, 2006 if not earlier. We have already noted the fact that declaration under section 6 came to be issued only on 9.4.2009, just two days prior to the first anniversary of the date of notification under section 4. More importantly, we have noticed what finally impelled Government to issue the notification, namely, the apprehension that if it is not issued within one year of the section 4 notification the acquisition would lapse. This had nothing to do with urgency which would have manifested in the section 6 declaration being issued much earlier. This must also be viewed in the background that though the Section 4(1)/(17) Notification was earlier issued in regard to 52.361 hectares on 08.10.2004, the declaration under Section 6 was issued only on 07.10.2005. 39. The statutory authority under section 5A of the Act is expected to give a fair hearing. It can stand between an uncalled for proposal to acquire property. Disputed questions of facts in regard to the property to acquire the property are to be considered by the same Authority. Yet another pertinent aspect is the fact that the subject matter of the second acquisition was 2 and odd hectares. It was apparently just the appellants, who had to be given a hearing. 40. We would therefore think that in the facts of this case, having regard to the nature of the scheme, the delay with which section 6 declaration was issued, possession taken and the nature of the material on the basis of which the proposal was processed, the appellants are justified in contending that the notification under 17(4) dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5A was unjustified. 41. We may notice another aspect. This appeal arises from the order passed by the High Court in the year 2000. While issuing notice, this Court in the SLP stage ordered status quo as on 6.11.2009 be maintained. Thereafter, the leave was granted on 27.1.2012. The interim order was however directed to continue. It is after nearly 12 years that the case is finally being disposed of. In the meantime, the Land Acquisition Act was repealed and the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 has taken its place. Therefore, there is no question of the matter being considered for an inquiry being held under section 5A. We have also noted that there is no denial of the allegation in the writ petition about the lie of the property, viz., it not being in the middle of the scheme area.

### Response:
1

### Explanation:
the second respondent Authority reveals that according to it, survey nos. 880 and 893 were being used for keeping a cattle market and therefore the lands were not required. It is further found that in the survey 13 shops were constructed and the land in these survey were sold for residential house. Being contiguous with the scheme area, these lands were projected as required on preparing an amended proposal. However, in the communication dated 06.10.2006 issued by the third respondent he refers to requirement of clean environment and therefore a cattle market of the animals in the housing area may not be proper. The same position is again reiterated as already noted in communication dated 10.10.2000 as well. The appellants had given a representation on 08.12.2006 to the Chief Secretary praying that the property may not be taken for the residential/commercial scheme. Therein, it is inter alia stated that the cattle market is located at one corner of the acquired land of 52.361 hectares. The appellants state about their readiness to construct a separate boundary wall. It is stated to be their only source of income.35. It is to be noticed that the declaration under section 6 was issued only on the eve of expiry of one year from 11.4.2008. The urgency indicated in the file is to tide over the bar of issuance of declaration under section 6 beyond one year from 11.4.2008 the date on which notification under 4/17 was issued. There is no indication in the file about the urgency for issuing the declaration immediately after the notification under Section 4. In other words, the file does not reveal any urgency at all associated with the need to acquire the land immediately which constitutes the foundation for invoking the urgency clause.36. We are at a loss as to what was the material which was relevant to a decision under section 17(4) of the Act. In this regard we may notice the following:Notification was issued under section 17(4) in October 2004 regard to 52 and odd hectares of land. The Section 6 declaration is made only in October 2005. The survey numbers in question in this case according to the respondent is located in the middle. However, it is not acquired on the basis that the said land was being used as cattle market (see communication dated 29.3.2006). The appellants have a definite case that possession itself was taken despite the availability of power to take possession immediately, only on 6.1.2006. The proposal to take the further land was taken in March, 2006 if not earlier. The reason given for acquiring the land is alleged construction of shops by the appellants and the contiguity of the land covered by the land earlier acquired with the land in question. On the other hand, the third respondent refers further to the need for clean environment which is in contradiction to the communication dated 29.3.2006.38. We have noticed the material which consists of the communications addressed to the second respondent and the communications by the third respondent. Apart from the same, the usual certificates/forms indicating inter alia that there was no place of worship located in the scheme was no doubt available. But the point is only whether there was material for dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5A and even, more importantly, whether the authority applied its mind to it. Even the notification under section 17(4) came to be issued after more than two years of the proposal sent sometime in March, 2006 if not earlier. We have already noted the fact that declaration under section 6 came to be issued only on 9.4.2009, just two days prior to the first anniversary of the date of notification under section 4. More importantly, we have noticed what finally impelled Government to issue the notification, namely, the apprehension that if it is not issued within one year of the section 4 notification the acquisition would lapse. This had nothing to do with urgency which would have manifested in the section 6 declaration being issued much earlier. This must also be viewed in the background that though the Section 4(1)/(17) Notification was earlier issued in regard to 52.361 hectares on 08.10.2004, the declaration under Section 6 was issued only on 07.10.2005.39. The statutory authority under section 5A of the Act is expected to give a fair hearing. It can stand between an uncalled for proposal to acquire property. Disputed questions of facts in regard to the property to acquire the property are to be considered by the same Authority. Yet another pertinent aspect is the fact that the subject matter of the second acquisition was 2 and odd hectares. It was apparently just the appellants, who had to be given a hearing.40. We would therefore think that in the facts of this case, having regard to the nature of the scheme, the delay with which section 6 declaration was issued, possession taken and the nature of the material on the basis of which the proposal was processed, the appellants are justified in contending that the notification under 17(4) dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5A was unjustified.41. We may notice another aspect. This appeal arises from the order passed by the High Court in the year 2000. While issuing notice, this Court in the SLP stage ordered status quo as on 6.11.2009 be maintained. Thereafter, the leave was granted on 27.1.2012. The interim order was however directed to continue. It is after nearly 12 years that the case is finally being disposed of. In the meantime, the Land Acquisition Act was repealed and the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 has taken its place. Therefore, there is no question of the matter being considered for an inquiry being held under section 5A. We have also noted that there is no denial of the allegation in the writ petition about the lie of the property, viz., it not being in the middle of the scheme area.
