JOHN D SOUZA Vs. KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION
of 81 ft therefrom even after colliding with another bus coming from the front deserved serious consideration at the hands of the Tribunal. The nature of impact clearly demonstrates that the vehicle was being driven rashly or negligently. 33. The Three-Judge bench decisions of this Court in Punjab National Bank and Mysore Steel Works Pvt. Ltd. (supra), as well as the Division Bench judgment in Lalla Ram (supra) were unfortunately not cited before this Court in Cholan Roadways Ltd. There is yet no conflict of opinion as in Cholan Roadways Ltd. (supra) also this Court reiterated the past consistent view that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, the Industrial Tribunal is required to see only whether a prima facie case has been made out as regard to the requirement of domestic enquiry. Cholan Roadways nonetheless deals with only 1 st phase of the jurisdiction exercisable under Section 33(2)(b) and it falls short to elucidate as to whether, in the event of a defective domestic enquiry, the Labour Court/Tribunal can also the parties to adduce evidence. The 2 nd phase of Jurisdiction exercisable under Section 33(2)(b) was not debated in Cholan Roadways (supra) apparently for the reason that on facts this Court was satisfied that the delinquent workman was guilty of the misconduct attributed and proved against him in the domestic enquiry. On the other hand, Mysore Steel Works Pvt. Ltd. and Lalla Ram have gone a step ahead to hold that the Tribunal can permit the parties to adduce evidence if it finds that the domestic enquiry suffers from any defect or was violative of the principles of natural justice or was marred by unfair labour practice, it may then independently examine the evidence led before it to embark upon the question whether or not the punitive action deserves to be accorded approval. 34. It, thus, stands out that though the Labour Court or the Tribunal while exercising their jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) are empowered to permit the parties to lead evidence in respect of the legality and propriety of the domestic enquiry held into the misconduct of a workman, such evidence would be taken into consideration by the Labour Court or the Tribunal only if it is found that the domestic enquiry conducted by the Management on the scale that the standard of proof required therein can be `preponderance of probability and not a `proof beyond all reasonable doubts suffers from inherent defects or is violative of principles of natural justice. In other words, the Labour Court or the Tribunal cannot without first examining the material led in the domestic enquiry jump to a conclusion and mechanically permit the parties to lead evidence as if it is an essential procedural part of the enquiry to be held under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. 35. If the awards/orders of the Labour Court or the judgments passed by Learned Single Judge(s) and the Division Benches of the High Court are evaluated on these principles, it appears to us that all of them went partly wrong and their respective orders suffer from one or the other legal infirmity. While the Labour Court and the Learned Single Judge(s) have erroneously presumed that no enquiry can be held under Section 33(2)(b) without asking the parties to lead their evidence, the Learned Division Benches of the High Court have proceeded on the premise that in a prima facie fact finding enquiry under Section 33(2)(b) no evidence can be adduced or considered by the Labour Court except what is on the record of domestic enquiry. Both the views do not go hand in hand with the law laid down by this Court in Punjab National Bank, Mysore Steel Works Pvt. Ltd. and Lalla Rams cases (supra). The Division Bench of the High Court solely depended upon Martin Burn Ltd. and Cholan Roadways Ltd. (supra) to hold that the scope of enquiry under Section 33(2)(b) being limited to see that prima facie the enquiry is just and proper, the Labour Court is precluded from asking the parties to lead any other evidence. Such a view is not in confirmity with the exposition of law in Punjab National Bank, Mysore Steel Works Pvt. Ltd. and Lalla Rams cases, cited above. The Labour Court did not exceed its jurisdiction in permitting the parties to adduce the evidence before it though it erred in relying upon the same without holding that the enquiry was defective or the punitive action was vitiated for want of bona fides. The finding on issue No. 1 that the domestic enquiry was held in a proper and fair manner also acquires significance here. Still further, the scope and object of Section 33(2)(b) cannot be expanded to an extent that the very scheme of adjudication of an `industrial dispute under Sections 10(1)(c) and (d) read with Section 11A of the Act becomes superfluous. 36. It is for this precise reason that the Three-Judge Bench in Punjab National Bank (supra), after limiting the scope of enquiry under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, has categorically held that the order of dismissal even if approved under Section 33(2)(b), would not attain finality and that ....if an industrial dispute is raised on such a dismissal, the order of dismissal passed even with the requisite permission obtained under Section 33 has to face the scrutiny of Tribunal. 37. In Cholan Roadways Ltd. (supra) also, this Court gave opportunity to the workman to take recourse to such remedy as was available to under the laws for questioning the order of dismissal. 38. The Labour Court or Tribunal, therefore, while holding enquiry under Section 33(2)(b) cannot invoke the adjudicatory powers vested in them under Section 10(i)(c) and (d) of the Act nor can they in the process of formation of their prima facie view under Section 33(2)(b), dwell upon the proportionality of punishment, as erroneously done in the instant case, for such a power can be exercised by the Labour Court or Tribunal only under Section 11A of the Act.
1[ds]34. It, thus, stands out that though the Labour Court or the Tribunal while exercising their jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) are empowered to permit the parties to lead evidence in respect of the legality and propriety of the domestic enquiry held into the misconduct of a workman, such evidence would be taken into consideration by the Labour Court or the Tribunal only if it is found that the domestic enquiry conducted by the Management on the scale that the standard of proof required therein can be `preponderance of probability and not a `proof beyond all reasonable doubts suffers from inherent defects or is violative of principles of natural justice. In other words, the Labour Court or the Tribunal cannot without first examining the material led in the domestic enquiry jump to a conclusion and mechanically permit the parties to lead evidence as if it is an essential procedural part of the enquiry to be held under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act35. If the awards/orders of the Labour Court or the judgments passed by Learned Single Judge(s) and the Division Benches of the High Court are evaluated on these principles, it appears to us that all of them went partly wrong and their respective orders suffer from one or the other legal infirmity. While the Labour Court and the Learned Single Judge(s) have erroneously presumed that no enquiry can be held under Section 33(2)(b) without asking the parties to lead their evidence, the Learned Division Benches of the High Court have proceeded on the premise that in a prima facie fact finding enquiry under Section 33(2)(b) no evidence can be adduced or considered by the Labour Court except what is on the record of domestic enquiry. Both the views do not go hand in hand with the law laid down by this Court in Punjab National Bank, Mysore Steel Works Pvt. Ltd. and Lalla Rams cases (supra). The Division Bench of the High Court solely depended upon Martin Burn Ltd. and Cholan Roadways Ltd. (supra) to hold that the scope of enquiry under Section 33(2)(b) being limited to see that prima facie the enquiry is just and proper, the Labour Court is precluded from asking the parties to lead any other evidence. Such a view is not in confirmity with the exposition of law in Punjab National Bank, Mysore Steel Works Pvt. Ltd. and Lalla Rams cases, cited above. The Labour Court did not exceed its jurisdiction in permitting the parties to adduce the evidence before it though it erred in relying upon the same without holding that the enquiry was defective or the punitive action was vitiated for want of bona fides. The finding on issue No. 1 that the domestic enquiry was held in a proper and fair manner also acquires significance here. Still further, the scope and object of Section 33(2)(b) cannot be expanded to an extent that the very scheme of adjudication of an `industrial dispute under Sections 10(1)(c) and (d) read with Section 11A of the Act becomes superfluous38. The Labour Court or Tribunal, therefore, while holding enquiry under Section 33(2)(b) cannot invoke the adjudicatory powers vested in them under Section 10(i)(c) and (d) of the Act nor can they in the process of formation of their prima facie view under Section 33(2)(b), dwell upon the proportionality of punishment, as erroneously done in the instant case, for such a power can be exercised by the Labour Court or Tribunal only under Section 11A of the Act40. This is, however, not the end of the matter. We are not oblivious to the fact that the appellant attained the age of superannuation in the year 2010. There might be some substance in the allegation that he used to indulge in the acts of indiscipline, insubordination or may have absented himself from duties for a few days, there are, however, no allegations of financial irregularity or embezzlement of funds. It has come on record that when the proceedings were pending before the High Court, the parties were directed to mediate and submit their settlement proposals. The appellant also submitted his proposal which is on record, in which he demanded 75% of back wages whereas the Corporation agreed to pay 50% back wages to him. The settlement could not take place due to the difference in demand and offer to the extent of 25% back wages. Though the appellant seems to be in no mood to settle the dispute, we have not lost the hope and are sanguine that better sense will prevail upon both the parties and they will make an earnest and renewed effort through the Mediation Centre of High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore for amicable settlement of the dispute. This can only happen by adopting the give and take approach, especially to avoid prolonged litigation. The appellant may agree to take less than 75% back wages and the Corporation may incline to offer more than 50% back wages. Mediators will surely make efforts to bridge the gap and see that the dispute comes to an end. Both the parties, must also bear in mind that the recourse to `mediation suggested by us is one of the statutory mode prescribed for resolving an `industrial dispute under the Act.
### Instruction:
Project the court's decision (favor (1) or against (0) the appeal) based on the case proceeding, and subsequently give an in-depth explanation by analyzing relevant sentences from the document.

### Input:
of 81 ft therefrom even after colliding with another bus coming from the front deserved serious consideration at the hands of the Tribunal. The nature of impact clearly demonstrates that the vehicle was being driven rashly or negligently. 33. The Three-Judge bench decisions of this Court in Punjab National Bank and Mysore Steel Works Pvt. Ltd. (supra), as well as the Division Bench judgment in Lalla Ram (supra) were unfortunately not cited before this Court in Cholan Roadways Ltd. There is yet no conflict of opinion as in Cholan Roadways Ltd. (supra) also this Court reiterated the past consistent view that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, the Industrial Tribunal is required to see only whether a prima facie case has been made out as regard to the requirement of domestic enquiry. Cholan Roadways nonetheless deals with only 1 st phase of the jurisdiction exercisable under Section 33(2)(b) and it falls short to elucidate as to whether, in the event of a defective domestic enquiry, the Labour Court/Tribunal can also the parties to adduce evidence. The 2 nd phase of Jurisdiction exercisable under Section 33(2)(b) was not debated in Cholan Roadways (supra) apparently for the reason that on facts this Court was satisfied that the delinquent workman was guilty of the misconduct attributed and proved against him in the domestic enquiry. On the other hand, Mysore Steel Works Pvt. Ltd. and Lalla Ram have gone a step ahead to hold that the Tribunal can permit the parties to adduce evidence if it finds that the domestic enquiry suffers from any defect or was violative of the principles of natural justice or was marred by unfair labour practice, it may then independently examine the evidence led before it to embark upon the question whether or not the punitive action deserves to be accorded approval. 34. It, thus, stands out that though the Labour Court or the Tribunal while exercising their jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) are empowered to permit the parties to lead evidence in respect of the legality and propriety of the domestic enquiry held into the misconduct of a workman, such evidence would be taken into consideration by the Labour Court or the Tribunal only if it is found that the domestic enquiry conducted by the Management on the scale that the standard of proof required therein can be `preponderance of probability and not a `proof beyond all reasonable doubts suffers from inherent defects or is violative of principles of natural justice. In other words, the Labour Court or the Tribunal cannot without first examining the material led in the domestic enquiry jump to a conclusion and mechanically permit the parties to lead evidence as if it is an essential procedural part of the enquiry to be held under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. 35. If the awards/orders of the Labour Court or the judgments passed by Learned Single Judge(s) and the Division Benches of the High Court are evaluated on these principles, it appears to us that all of them went partly wrong and their respective orders suffer from one or the other legal infirmity. While the Labour Court and the Learned Single Judge(s) have erroneously presumed that no enquiry can be held under Section 33(2)(b) without asking the parties to lead their evidence, the Learned Division Benches of the High Court have proceeded on the premise that in a prima facie fact finding enquiry under Section 33(2)(b) no evidence can be adduced or considered by the Labour Court except what is on the record of domestic enquiry. Both the views do not go hand in hand with the law laid down by this Court in Punjab National Bank, Mysore Steel Works Pvt. Ltd. and Lalla Rams cases (supra). The Division Bench of the High Court solely depended upon Martin Burn Ltd. and Cholan Roadways Ltd. (supra) to hold that the scope of enquiry under Section 33(2)(b) being limited to see that prima facie the enquiry is just and proper, the Labour Court is precluded from asking the parties to lead any other evidence. Such a view is not in confirmity with the exposition of law in Punjab National Bank, Mysore Steel Works Pvt. Ltd. and Lalla Rams cases, cited above. The Labour Court did not exceed its jurisdiction in permitting the parties to adduce the evidence before it though it erred in relying upon the same without holding that the enquiry was defective or the punitive action was vitiated for want of bona fides. The finding on issue No. 1 that the domestic enquiry was held in a proper and fair manner also acquires significance here. Still further, the scope and object of Section 33(2)(b) cannot be expanded to an extent that the very scheme of adjudication of an `industrial dispute under Sections 10(1)(c) and (d) read with Section 11A of the Act becomes superfluous. 36. It is for this precise reason that the Three-Judge Bench in Punjab National Bank (supra), after limiting the scope of enquiry under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, has categorically held that the order of dismissal even if approved under Section 33(2)(b), would not attain finality and that ....if an industrial dispute is raised on such a dismissal, the order of dismissal passed even with the requisite permission obtained under Section 33 has to face the scrutiny of Tribunal. 37. In Cholan Roadways Ltd. (supra) also, this Court gave opportunity to the workman to take recourse to such remedy as was available to under the laws for questioning the order of dismissal. 38. The Labour Court or Tribunal, therefore, while holding enquiry under Section 33(2)(b) cannot invoke the adjudicatory powers vested in them under Section 10(i)(c) and (d) of the Act nor can they in the process of formation of their prima facie view under Section 33(2)(b), dwell upon the proportionality of punishment, as erroneously done in the instant case, for such a power can be exercised by the Labour Court or Tribunal only under Section 11A of the Act.

### Response:
1

### Explanation:
34. It, thus, stands out that though the Labour Court or the Tribunal while exercising their jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) are empowered to permit the parties to lead evidence in respect of the legality and propriety of the domestic enquiry held into the misconduct of a workman, such evidence would be taken into consideration by the Labour Court or the Tribunal only if it is found that the domestic enquiry conducted by the Management on the scale that the standard of proof required therein can be `preponderance of probability and not a `proof beyond all reasonable doubts suffers from inherent defects or is violative of principles of natural justice. In other words, the Labour Court or the Tribunal cannot without first examining the material led in the domestic enquiry jump to a conclusion and mechanically permit the parties to lead evidence as if it is an essential procedural part of the enquiry to be held under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act35. If the awards/orders of the Labour Court or the judgments passed by Learned Single Judge(s) and the Division Benches of the High Court are evaluated on these principles, it appears to us that all of them went partly wrong and their respective orders suffer from one or the other legal infirmity. While the Labour Court and the Learned Single Judge(s) have erroneously presumed that no enquiry can be held under Section 33(2)(b) without asking the parties to lead their evidence, the Learned Division Benches of the High Court have proceeded on the premise that in a prima facie fact finding enquiry under Section 33(2)(b) no evidence can be adduced or considered by the Labour Court except what is on the record of domestic enquiry. Both the views do not go hand in hand with the law laid down by this Court in Punjab National Bank, Mysore Steel Works Pvt. Ltd. and Lalla Rams cases (supra). The Division Bench of the High Court solely depended upon Martin Burn Ltd. and Cholan Roadways Ltd. (supra) to hold that the scope of enquiry under Section 33(2)(b) being limited to see that prima facie the enquiry is just and proper, the Labour Court is precluded from asking the parties to lead any other evidence. Such a view is not in confirmity with the exposition of law in Punjab National Bank, Mysore Steel Works Pvt. Ltd. and Lalla Rams cases, cited above. The Labour Court did not exceed its jurisdiction in permitting the parties to adduce the evidence before it though it erred in relying upon the same without holding that the enquiry was defective or the punitive action was vitiated for want of bona fides. The finding on issue No. 1 that the domestic enquiry was held in a proper and fair manner also acquires significance here. Still further, the scope and object of Section 33(2)(b) cannot be expanded to an extent that the very scheme of adjudication of an `industrial dispute under Sections 10(1)(c) and (d) read with Section 11A of the Act becomes superfluous38. The Labour Court or Tribunal, therefore, while holding enquiry under Section 33(2)(b) cannot invoke the adjudicatory powers vested in them under Section 10(i)(c) and (d) of the Act nor can they in the process of formation of their prima facie view under Section 33(2)(b), dwell upon the proportionality of punishment, as erroneously done in the instant case, for such a power can be exercised by the Labour Court or Tribunal only under Section 11A of the Act40. This is, however, not the end of the matter. We are not oblivious to the fact that the appellant attained the age of superannuation in the year 2010. There might be some substance in the allegation that he used to indulge in the acts of indiscipline, insubordination or may have absented himself from duties for a few days, there are, however, no allegations of financial irregularity or embezzlement of funds. It has come on record that when the proceedings were pending before the High Court, the parties were directed to mediate and submit their settlement proposals. The appellant also submitted his proposal which is on record, in which he demanded 75% of back wages whereas the Corporation agreed to pay 50% back wages to him. The settlement could not take place due to the difference in demand and offer to the extent of 25% back wages. Though the appellant seems to be in no mood to settle the dispute, we have not lost the hope and are sanguine that better sense will prevail upon both the parties and they will make an earnest and renewed effort through the Mediation Centre of High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore for amicable settlement of the dispute. This can only happen by adopting the give and take approach, especially to avoid prolonged litigation. The appellant may agree to take less than 75% back wages and the Corporation may incline to offer more than 50% back wages. Mediators will surely make efforts to bridge the gap and see that the dispute comes to an end. Both the parties, must also bear in mind that the recourse to `mediation suggested by us is one of the statutory mode prescribed for resolving an `industrial dispute under the Act.
