Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd Vs. The Income-Tax Officer, Nagpur
an assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year. Both these conditions are conditions precedent to be satisfied before the Income-tax Officer could have jurisdiction to issue a notice for the assessment or re-assessment beyond the period of four years but within the period of eight years, from the end of the year in question.Proceeding further the learned Judge observed:"The position therefore is that if there were in fact some reasonable grounds for thinking that there had been any nondisclosure as regards any primary fact, which could have a material bearing on the question of under-assessment that would be sufficient to give jurisdiction to the Income-tax Officer to issue the notices under Section 34. Whether these grounds were adequate or not for arriving at the conclusion that there was a non-disclosure of material facts would not be open for the Courts investigation. In other words, all that is necessary to give this special jurisdiction is that the Income-tax Officer had when he assumed jurisdiction some prima facie grounds for thinking that there had been some non-disclosure of material facts.12. Shah, J., (one of us) in his dissenting judgment has observed that the expression has reason to believe in Section 34 (1) (a) of the Indian Income-tax Act does not mean a purely subjective satisfaction of the Income-tax Officer but predicates the existence of reasons on which such belief has to be founded. That belief, therefore, cannot be founded on mere suspicion and must be based on evidence and any question as to the adequacy of such evidence is wholly immaterial at that stage. He further observed that where the existence of reasonable belief that there had been under-assessment due to non-disclosure by the assessee, which is a condition precedent to exercise of the power under Sec. 34 (1) (a) is asserted by the assessing authority and the record prima facie supports its existence, any enquiry as to whether the authority could reasonably hold the belief that the under-assessment was due to non-disclosure by the assessee of material facts necessary for the assessment must, be barred.13. In S. Narayanappa v. Commr. of Income-tax, Bangalore, (1967) 63 ITR 219 = (AIR 1967 SC 523 ) this Court held that the two conditions must be satisfied in order to confer jurisdiction on the Officer to issue the notice under Section 34 of the Income-tax Act in respect of assessments beyond the period of four years, but within a period of eight years, from the end of the relevant year, viz., (I) the Income-tax Officer must have reason to believe that income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax had been under-assessed and (ii) he must have reason to believe that such under-assessment had occurred by reasons of either (a) omission or failure on the part of the assessee to make a return of his income under Section 22 or (b) omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all the material facts necessary for his assessment for that year. Both these conditions are conditions precedent to be satisfied before the Income-tax Officer acquires jurisdiction to issue a notice under the section. If there are in fact some reasonable grounds for the Income-tax Officer to believe that there had been any non-disclosure as regards any fact, which could have a material bearing on the question of under-assessment, that would be sufficient to give jurisdiction to the Income-tax Officer to issue the notice under Section 34. Whether these grounds are adequate or not is not a matter for the Court to investigate. In other words, the sufficiency of the grounds which induced the Income-tax Officer to act is not a justiciable issue. It is of course open for the assessee to contend that the Income-tax Officer did not hold the belief that there had been such non-disclosure. In other words, the existence of the belief can be challenged by the assessee but not the sufficiency of the reasons for the belief. Therein it was observed that the expression reason to believe in Section 34 does not mean purely subjective satisfaction on the part of the Income-tax Officer. The belief must be held in good faith: it cannot be merely a pretence. It is open to the Court to examine whether the reasons for the belief have a rational connection or a relevant bearing to the formation of that belief are not extraneous or irrelevant to the purpose of the section. To this limited extent, the action of the Income-tax Officer in starting proceedings under Section 34 of the Act is open to challenge in a Court of law.14. The same view was again expressed by this Court in Kantamani Venkata Narayana and Sons v. First Venkata Narayana and Sons v. First Additional Income-tax Officer, Rajahmundry, (1967) 63 ITR 638 = (AIR 1967 SC 587 ).15.In the cases, the company in its writ petitions had repudiated the assertion of the Income-tax Officer that he had reason to believe that due to the omission or failure on the part of the company to give material facts, some income had escaped assessment. Under those circumstances one would have expected the officer who issued the notices under Section 34 (1)( (A) to file an affidavit setting out the circumstances under which he formed the necessary belief. We were told that one Mr. Pandey had issued the notices in question .That officer had not filed any affidavit in these proceedings. The proceedings recorded by him before issuing the notices have not been produced nor his report to the Commissioner or even the Commissioners sanction has not been produced. Hence it is not possible to hold that the Income-tax Officer had any reason to form the belief in question or the reasons before him were relevant for the purpose. We have no basis before us to hold that the Income-tax Officer had jurisdiction to issue the impugned notices. Hence the proceedings taken by him have to be quashed.
1[ds]15.In the cases, the company in its writ petitions had repudiated the assertion of the Income-tax Officer that he had reason to believe that due to the omission or failure on the part of the company to give material facts, some income had escaped assessment. Under those circumstances one would have expected the officer who issued the notices under Section 34 (1)( (A) to file an affidavit setting out the circumstances under which he formed the necessary belief. We were told that one Mr. Pandey had issued the notices in question .That officer had not filed any affidavit in these proceedings. The proceedings recorded by him before issuing the notices have not been produced nor his report to the Commissioner or even the Commissioners sanction has not been produced. Hence it is not possible to hold that the Income-tax Officer had any reason to form the belief in question or the reasons before him were relevant for the purpose. We have no basis before us to hold that the Income-tax Officer had jurisdiction to issue the impugned notices. Hence the proceedings taken by him have to be quashed.
### Instruction:
Ascertain if the court will uphold (1) or dismiss (0) the appeal in the case proceeding, and then clarify this prediction by discussing critical sentences from the text.

### Input:
an assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year. Both these conditions are conditions precedent to be satisfied before the Income-tax Officer could have jurisdiction to issue a notice for the assessment or re-assessment beyond the period of four years but within the period of eight years, from the end of the year in question.Proceeding further the learned Judge observed:"The position therefore is that if there were in fact some reasonable grounds for thinking that there had been any nondisclosure as regards any primary fact, which could have a material bearing on the question of under-assessment that would be sufficient to give jurisdiction to the Income-tax Officer to issue the notices under Section 34. Whether these grounds were adequate or not for arriving at the conclusion that there was a non-disclosure of material facts would not be open for the Courts investigation. In other words, all that is necessary to give this special jurisdiction is that the Income-tax Officer had when he assumed jurisdiction some prima facie grounds for thinking that there had been some non-disclosure of material facts.12. Shah, J., (one of us) in his dissenting judgment has observed that the expression has reason to believe in Section 34 (1) (a) of the Indian Income-tax Act does not mean a purely subjective satisfaction of the Income-tax Officer but predicates the existence of reasons on which such belief has to be founded. That belief, therefore, cannot be founded on mere suspicion and must be based on evidence and any question as to the adequacy of such evidence is wholly immaterial at that stage. He further observed that where the existence of reasonable belief that there had been under-assessment due to non-disclosure by the assessee, which is a condition precedent to exercise of the power under Sec. 34 (1) (a) is asserted by the assessing authority and the record prima facie supports its existence, any enquiry as to whether the authority could reasonably hold the belief that the under-assessment was due to non-disclosure by the assessee of material facts necessary for the assessment must, be barred.13. In S. Narayanappa v. Commr. of Income-tax, Bangalore, (1967) 63 ITR 219 = (AIR 1967 SC 523 ) this Court held that the two conditions must be satisfied in order to confer jurisdiction on the Officer to issue the notice under Section 34 of the Income-tax Act in respect of assessments beyond the period of four years, but within a period of eight years, from the end of the relevant year, viz., (I) the Income-tax Officer must have reason to believe that income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax had been under-assessed and (ii) he must have reason to believe that such under-assessment had occurred by reasons of either (a) omission or failure on the part of the assessee to make a return of his income under Section 22 or (b) omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all the material facts necessary for his assessment for that year. Both these conditions are conditions precedent to be satisfied before the Income-tax Officer acquires jurisdiction to issue a notice under the section. If there are in fact some reasonable grounds for the Income-tax Officer to believe that there had been any non-disclosure as regards any fact, which could have a material bearing on the question of under-assessment, that would be sufficient to give jurisdiction to the Income-tax Officer to issue the notice under Section 34. Whether these grounds are adequate or not is not a matter for the Court to investigate. In other words, the sufficiency of the grounds which induced the Income-tax Officer to act is not a justiciable issue. It is of course open for the assessee to contend that the Income-tax Officer did not hold the belief that there had been such non-disclosure. In other words, the existence of the belief can be challenged by the assessee but not the sufficiency of the reasons for the belief. Therein it was observed that the expression reason to believe in Section 34 does not mean purely subjective satisfaction on the part of the Income-tax Officer. The belief must be held in good faith: it cannot be merely a pretence. It is open to the Court to examine whether the reasons for the belief have a rational connection or a relevant bearing to the formation of that belief are not extraneous or irrelevant to the purpose of the section. To this limited extent, the action of the Income-tax Officer in starting proceedings under Section 34 of the Act is open to challenge in a Court of law.14. The same view was again expressed by this Court in Kantamani Venkata Narayana and Sons v. First Venkata Narayana and Sons v. First Additional Income-tax Officer, Rajahmundry, (1967) 63 ITR 638 = (AIR 1967 SC 587 ).15.In the cases, the company in its writ petitions had repudiated the assertion of the Income-tax Officer that he had reason to believe that due to the omission or failure on the part of the company to give material facts, some income had escaped assessment. Under those circumstances one would have expected the officer who issued the notices under Section 34 (1)( (A) to file an affidavit setting out the circumstances under which he formed the necessary belief. We were told that one Mr. Pandey had issued the notices in question .That officer had not filed any affidavit in these proceedings. The proceedings recorded by him before issuing the notices have not been produced nor his report to the Commissioner or even the Commissioners sanction has not been produced. Hence it is not possible to hold that the Income-tax Officer had any reason to form the belief in question or the reasons before him were relevant for the purpose. We have no basis before us to hold that the Income-tax Officer had jurisdiction to issue the impugned notices. Hence the proceedings taken by him have to be quashed.

### Response:
1

### Explanation:
15.In the cases, the company in its writ petitions had repudiated the assertion of the Income-tax Officer that he had reason to believe that due to the omission or failure on the part of the company to give material facts, some income had escaped assessment. Under those circumstances one would have expected the officer who issued the notices under Section 34 (1)( (A) to file an affidavit setting out the circumstances under which he formed the necessary belief. We were told that one Mr. Pandey had issued the notices in question .That officer had not filed any affidavit in these proceedings. The proceedings recorded by him before issuing the notices have not been produced nor his report to the Commissioner or even the Commissioners sanction has not been produced. Hence it is not possible to hold that the Income-tax Officer had any reason to form the belief in question or the reasons before him were relevant for the purpose. We have no basis before us to hold that the Income-tax Officer had jurisdiction to issue the impugned notices. Hence the proceedings taken by him have to be quashed.
