Union Of India  Vs. Hanuman Industries
of India vide NEC/PLAN/ii-23-2-2007. Thus the letter/notification dated 04-05-2010, did relate back to 23-02-2007 for all intents and purposes. Therefore the scheme, SPINE stood withdrawn and/or closed on and from 23-02-2007. As a corollary, on a cumulative reading of the letters dated 05-02-2007, 23-02-2007 and 04-05-2010 as well as the resolution dated 21-02-2007 it is indubitable that SPINE stood withdrawn and/or closed with effect from 23-02-2007. As adverted to hereinabove, by letter dated 01-10.2007, as a consequential step, the proposal which had remained unprocessed as per the standard procedures of the scheme were returned to the State Governments. The list of proposals remitted back admittedly included those amongst others of the respondents herein. It is thus patent that on such date i.e. 01-10-2007, the claims of the respondents had not been accepted and in view of the closure of the scheme, were returned to the respective State Governments. In this pronounced backdrop, the plea of the respondents that at the institution of the writ petitions in 2009, no decision had been taken rejecting their applications fades into insignificance, as those by implication had not been entertained under the scheme. 14.2 The letters dated 04-08-2006, 04-09-2007 and 12-09-2007 to which our attention has been drawn in course of the arguments, suffice it to mention, do not contain any assurance on the part of the implementing authorities promising grant of the subsidy allowance under the scheme or any other incentive to the respondent. No reference has been made before us of any other document qua the other respondents. We are thus constrained to hold that there was no promise on the part of the public functionaries in charge of implementation of SPINE to the respondents to extend benefits thereunder, inspite of the decision to withdraw or close the same with effect from 23-02-2007. 15. In M/s Motilal Padampt Sugar Mills Company supra, this Court, on an exhaustive survey of the law pertaining to the doctrine of promissory estoppel held that the same was an equitable doctrine that would yield when equity so required. While propounding that the same had been evolved to avoid injustice where it is demonstrated that a party acting on the words or conduct of another, amounting to clear and unequivocal promise and intended to create legal relations or effect legal relationships to arise in the future had altered his position, then the promise would be binding on the promisor and he would not be permitted to renege therefrom unless it would be inequitable to compel him to do so. While extending this doctrine to the Government as well, it was enunciated that if it can be shown that having regard to the facts as had subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the Court would not raise the equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against the Government. Their Lordships held that the doctrine of the promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case, because on the facts, equity would not require that the Government should be held bound by the promise made by it. That aside overriding public interest against enforcement of the doctrine qua the Government, it would be still competent for it to depart from the promise on giving reasonable notice which need not be a formal one, affording the promisee a reasonable opportunity of resuming his position was underlined. We consider it inessential to dilate on the other decisions cited on behalf of the respondents on this theme as these are in essence in reiteration of the above proposition. 16. The gravamen of the authorities pertaining to delay highlight in unison that the same has to be explained by cogent convincing and persuasive explanation to justify condonation thereof. The legal diktat being so fundamental that a detailed treatment of the decisions relied upon by the respondents in this regard is not warranted. 17. Noticeably, in the earlier round of litigation, there was no scope to examine the purport of the contents of the letter dated 04-05-2010, which to reiterate only affirmed the decision of withdrawal and closure of SPINE with effect from 23-02-2007. The contents of the said letter to repeat disclose in unequivocal terms that even prior thereto a decision to that effect had been taken on and from that date. This decision as referred to hereinabove amongst others also received media coverage. The plea that the respondents had no knowledge of the withdrawal/closure of SPINE then, is to say the least, unconvincing. We see no weighty or cogent reason for the respondents to wait till the earlier Special Leave Petition was dismissed on 01-05-2009 by this Court to embark upon their pursuit for redress in similar terms. Their writ petitions dated 27-08-2009 also do not evince that the same were filed after the letter/notification dated 04-05-2010. In our considered opinion therefore, the respondents were deliberately bidding time to seek judicial remedy in case their co-applicants under the scheme emerged successful in their adjudicative enterprise. As the initial decision conveyed by the letter dated 05-02-2007 to stop further sanction/disbursement of Grant-in-Aid under the scheme pending scrutiny of the report of the industrial units involved did eventually metamorphosise in the closure/withdrawal of the scheme, there is an apparent correlation between the intervening developments conveyed from time to time eventuating in such a conclusion. The merit of the factums leading to this decision however has not been questioned or impeached. 18. On a consideration of the totality of the aspects involved, we are thus of the unhesitant view that the respondents herein in view of their deliberate laches, negligence and inaction have disentitled themselves to the benefit of the adjudication in the earlier lis. In the accompanying facts and circumstances in our comprehension, it would be iniquitous and repugnant as well to the public exchequer to entertain the belated claim of the respondents on the basis of the doctrine of promissory estoppel which is even otherwise inapplicable to the case in hand.
1[ds]Admittedly, the respondents herein elected not to join them and instead, soon thereafter this Court affirmed the above verdict on, staked their claim on. There is evidently thus a time lag of more than two years by which the respondents? challenge was delayedThat aside overriding public interest against enforcement of the doctrine qua the Government, it would be still competent for it to depart from the promise on giving reasonable notice which need not be a formal one, affording the promisee a reasonable opportunity of resuming his position was underlined. We consider it inessential to dilate on the other decisions cited on behalf of the respondents on this theme as these are in essence in reiteration of the above propositionIn our considered opinion therefore, the respondents were deliberately bidding time to seek judicial remedy in case theirs under the scheme emerged successful in their adjudicative enterprise. As the initial decision conveyed by the letter dated7 to stop further sanction/disbursement ofd under the scheme pending scrutiny of the report of the industrial units involved did eventually metamorphosise in the closure/withdrawal of the scheme, there is an apparent correlation between the intervening developments conveyed from time to time eventuating in such a conclusion. The merit of the factums leading to this decision however has not been questioned or impeached18. On a consideration of the totality of the aspects involved, we are thus of the unhesitant view that the respondents herein in view of their deliberate laches, negligence and inaction have disentitled themselves to the benefit of the adjudication in the earlier lis. In the accompanying facts and circumstances in our comprehension, it would be iniquitous and repugnant as well to the public exchequer to entertain the belated claim of the respondents on the basis of the doctrine of promissory estoppel which is even otherwise inapplicable to the case in hand.
### Instruction:
Project the court's decision (favor (1) or against (0) the appeal) based on the case proceeding, and subsequently give an in-depth explanation by analyzing relevant sentences from the document.

### Input:
of India vide NEC/PLAN/ii-23-2-2007. Thus the letter/notification dated 04-05-2010, did relate back to 23-02-2007 for all intents and purposes. Therefore the scheme, SPINE stood withdrawn and/or closed on and from 23-02-2007. As a corollary, on a cumulative reading of the letters dated 05-02-2007, 23-02-2007 and 04-05-2010 as well as the resolution dated 21-02-2007 it is indubitable that SPINE stood withdrawn and/or closed with effect from 23-02-2007. As adverted to hereinabove, by letter dated 01-10.2007, as a consequential step, the proposal which had remained unprocessed as per the standard procedures of the scheme were returned to the State Governments. The list of proposals remitted back admittedly included those amongst others of the respondents herein. It is thus patent that on such date i.e. 01-10-2007, the claims of the respondents had not been accepted and in view of the closure of the scheme, were returned to the respective State Governments. In this pronounced backdrop, the plea of the respondents that at the institution of the writ petitions in 2009, no decision had been taken rejecting their applications fades into insignificance, as those by implication had not been entertained under the scheme. 14.2 The letters dated 04-08-2006, 04-09-2007 and 12-09-2007 to which our attention has been drawn in course of the arguments, suffice it to mention, do not contain any assurance on the part of the implementing authorities promising grant of the subsidy allowance under the scheme or any other incentive to the respondent. No reference has been made before us of any other document qua the other respondents. We are thus constrained to hold that there was no promise on the part of the public functionaries in charge of implementation of SPINE to the respondents to extend benefits thereunder, inspite of the decision to withdraw or close the same with effect from 23-02-2007. 15. In M/s Motilal Padampt Sugar Mills Company supra, this Court, on an exhaustive survey of the law pertaining to the doctrine of promissory estoppel held that the same was an equitable doctrine that would yield when equity so required. While propounding that the same had been evolved to avoid injustice where it is demonstrated that a party acting on the words or conduct of another, amounting to clear and unequivocal promise and intended to create legal relations or effect legal relationships to arise in the future had altered his position, then the promise would be binding on the promisor and he would not be permitted to renege therefrom unless it would be inequitable to compel him to do so. While extending this doctrine to the Government as well, it was enunciated that if it can be shown that having regard to the facts as had subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the Court would not raise the equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against the Government. Their Lordships held that the doctrine of the promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case, because on the facts, equity would not require that the Government should be held bound by the promise made by it. That aside overriding public interest against enforcement of the doctrine qua the Government, it would be still competent for it to depart from the promise on giving reasonable notice which need not be a formal one, affording the promisee a reasonable opportunity of resuming his position was underlined. We consider it inessential to dilate on the other decisions cited on behalf of the respondents on this theme as these are in essence in reiteration of the above proposition. 16. The gravamen of the authorities pertaining to delay highlight in unison that the same has to be explained by cogent convincing and persuasive explanation to justify condonation thereof. The legal diktat being so fundamental that a detailed treatment of the decisions relied upon by the respondents in this regard is not warranted. 17. Noticeably, in the earlier round of litigation, there was no scope to examine the purport of the contents of the letter dated 04-05-2010, which to reiterate only affirmed the decision of withdrawal and closure of SPINE with effect from 23-02-2007. The contents of the said letter to repeat disclose in unequivocal terms that even prior thereto a decision to that effect had been taken on and from that date. This decision as referred to hereinabove amongst others also received media coverage. The plea that the respondents had no knowledge of the withdrawal/closure of SPINE then, is to say the least, unconvincing. We see no weighty or cogent reason for the respondents to wait till the earlier Special Leave Petition was dismissed on 01-05-2009 by this Court to embark upon their pursuit for redress in similar terms. Their writ petitions dated 27-08-2009 also do not evince that the same were filed after the letter/notification dated 04-05-2010. In our considered opinion therefore, the respondents were deliberately bidding time to seek judicial remedy in case their co-applicants under the scheme emerged successful in their adjudicative enterprise. As the initial decision conveyed by the letter dated 05-02-2007 to stop further sanction/disbursement of Grant-in-Aid under the scheme pending scrutiny of the report of the industrial units involved did eventually metamorphosise in the closure/withdrawal of the scheme, there is an apparent correlation between the intervening developments conveyed from time to time eventuating in such a conclusion. The merit of the factums leading to this decision however has not been questioned or impeached. 18. On a consideration of the totality of the aspects involved, we are thus of the unhesitant view that the respondents herein in view of their deliberate laches, negligence and inaction have disentitled themselves to the benefit of the adjudication in the earlier lis. In the accompanying facts and circumstances in our comprehension, it would be iniquitous and repugnant as well to the public exchequer to entertain the belated claim of the respondents on the basis of the doctrine of promissory estoppel which is even otherwise inapplicable to the case in hand.

### Response:
1

### Explanation:
Admittedly, the respondents herein elected not to join them and instead, soon thereafter this Court affirmed the above verdict on, staked their claim on. There is evidently thus a time lag of more than two years by which the respondents? challenge was delayedThat aside overriding public interest against enforcement of the doctrine qua the Government, it would be still competent for it to depart from the promise on giving reasonable notice which need not be a formal one, affording the promisee a reasonable opportunity of resuming his position was underlined. We consider it inessential to dilate on the other decisions cited on behalf of the respondents on this theme as these are in essence in reiteration of the above propositionIn our considered opinion therefore, the respondents were deliberately bidding time to seek judicial remedy in case theirs under the scheme emerged successful in their adjudicative enterprise. As the initial decision conveyed by the letter dated7 to stop further sanction/disbursement ofd under the scheme pending scrutiny of the report of the industrial units involved did eventually metamorphosise in the closure/withdrawal of the scheme, there is an apparent correlation between the intervening developments conveyed from time to time eventuating in such a conclusion. The merit of the factums leading to this decision however has not been questioned or impeached18. On a consideration of the totality of the aspects involved, we are thus of the unhesitant view that the respondents herein in view of their deliberate laches, negligence and inaction have disentitled themselves to the benefit of the adjudication in the earlier lis. In the accompanying facts and circumstances in our comprehension, it would be iniquitous and repugnant as well to the public exchequer to entertain the belated claim of the respondents on the basis of the doctrine of promissory estoppel which is even otherwise inapplicable to the case in hand.
