M/S. Maharashtra State Seeds Corpn. Ltd Vs. Haridas
would arise only when the delinquent officer is exonerated either wholly or in part of the charges levelled against him whereas the disciplinary authority forms a different opinion. Most of the charges have been found proved and the Disciplinary Authority to that extent did not differ with the report of the Enquiry Officer. So far as the quantum of punishment proposed by the Enquiry Officer is concerned, if in terms of the rules, he had no authority to do so, the Managing Director was entitled to apply his own mind and could come to a conclusion as regard the quantum of punishment which should be imposed on the delinquent officer. He in that view of the matter was not obligated to assign any far less sufficient and cogent reason as it was not the requirement of law. In any view of the matter, from the second notice dated 22.3.1994 issued by the Managing Director of the Corporation it is evident that sufficient and cogent reasons have been assigned therein. 15. A departmental proceeding stricto sensu is not a judicial proceeding. 16. There is nothing in the rules to show that the disciplinary authority cannot consider the materials on record with a view to form an independent opinion as regard quantum of punishment to be imposed upon the delinquent employee. He might have committed a mistake in issuing the first show cause notice but by reason thereof he cannot be held to be wholly precluded from issuing the second show cause notice as thereby he intended to rectify the mistake committed by him. 17. In Indian Council of Agricultural Research and Another v. T.K. Suryanarayan and Others [(1997) 6 SCC 766] a promotion granted by a mistake in ignorance of the service rules was held to be capable of being rectified stating: Incorrect promotion either given erroneously by the Department by misreading the said Service Rules or such promotion given pursuant to judicial orders contrary to Service Rules cannot be a ground to claim erroneous promotion by perpetrating infringement of statutory service rules. In a court of law, employees cannot be permitted to contend that the Service Rules made effective on 1-10-1975 should not be adhered to because in some cases erroneous promotions had been given 18. In Poothundu Plantations Pvt. Ltd. v. Agricultural Income Tax Officer, Chittoor, Kerala State and others [(1996) 9 SCC 499] , it was stated: 4. There can be no doubt that only an apparent error of fact or law can be rectified by an officer. If the mistake of law has to be established by construing the words of a section to find its proper meaning, then such an error cannot normally be a rectifiable error under Section 36. If two views are possible, then obviously the error will not be an error apparent from the record. 19. As the Enquiry Officer had no jurisdiction to recommend any punishment to be imposed on the respondent by the disciplinary authority, he although acted thereupon at the first instance, could have corrected his mistake as the same was apparent on the face of the record. He, therefore, did not commit any illegality in issuing the second show cause notice as Enquiry Officer had no jurisdiction in that behalf. See M. Ahammedkutty Haji V. Tahsildar, Kozhikode, Kerala & Ors. [(2005) 3 SCC 351] . Mistake furthermore, may either be of law or fact. By reason of mistake on the part of the Enquiry Officer, the respondent could not have been inflicted with a minor penalty although he deserved a major penalty. If in law the quantum of punishment to be imposed upon a delinquent officer is within the exclusive domain of the disciplinary authority, unless otherwise delegated to any other authority, he alone could exercise the said jurisdiction and determine the same having regard the nature and guilty of the misconduct on the part of the delinquent officer as the Enquiry Officer or any other authority had no jurisdiction in relation thereto. The matter might have been different if prior to the imposition of penalty of dismissal from service against the 1st respondent, no opportunity of hearing had been given to him. Admittedly the second show cause notice was issued to him and he showed cause. It is also not contended that the order passed by the disciplinary authority suffers from the vice of non-application of mind. The principles of natural justice admittedly have been complied with. 20. The High Court proceeded on the basis that in absence of the specific provision the second show cause notice was impermissible. It failed to consider that there was no statutory interdict in this behalf. An administrative order can be recalled. A mistake can be rectified. The Managing Director of the Corporation as a disciplinary authority, it has not been shown to us, lacked inherent jurisdiction in relation thereto. 21. The 1st respondent held an office of trust. He distributed seeds to the farmers. He collected a huge amount from them. He not only defalcated a huge amount but also misappropriated some bags of seeds. It was in the aforementioned situation improper for the High Court to interfere with the quantum of punishment. It is now well settled that in a matter of disciplinary proceedings the High Court exercises a limited power. [See Govt. of A.P. & Ors. V. Mohad. Nasrullah Khan [ JT 2006 (2) SC 82 ], L. K. Verma V. H.M.T. Ltd. & Anr. [JT 2006 (2) SC 99 ], Karnataka Bank Ltd. V. A.L. Mohan Rao [(2006) 1 SCC 63] and Hombe Gowda Educational Trust & Anr. V. Sate of Karnataka & Ors. [(2006) 1 SCC 430] . The grounds for judicial review are limited. In Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank & anr. V. Munna Lal Jain [(2005) 10 SCC 84] this Court held that when the High Court intends to interfere with the quantum of punishment on the ground that the same is shockingly disproportionate, it must record reasons for coming to such a conclusion.
1[ds]12. It has not been shown to us, despite repeated query made in this behalf as to whether under the statutory rules, the Enquiry Officer was empowered to make any recommendation to the Disciplinary Authority as regard quantum of punishment to be imposed upon a delinquent employee. The High Court has noticed that the disciplinary proceedings are governed by the Manual of Departmental Enquiries. However, no provision therein has been pointed out to show that the Enquiry Officer was statutorily or otherwise empowered to make recommendations as regards quantum of punishment. Reference to Rule 42 of the said manual by the High court was wholly irrelevant as indisputably the procedures laid down therein for holding departmental enquiry had been complied with. It is not the case of the 1st respondent either before the High Court or before us that no charge was framed and communicated to him and he has not been given an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him. He admittedly participated in the departmental enquiry. It is also not his case that in the said departmental proceedings principles of natural justice had not been complied with19. As the Enquiry Officer had no jurisdiction to recommend any punishment to be imposed on the respondent by the disciplinary authority, he although acted thereupon at the first instance, could have corrected his mistake as the same was apparent on the face of the record. He, therefore, did not commit any illegality in issuing the second show cause notice as Enquiry Officer had no jurisdiction in that behalf. See M. Ahammedkutty Haji V. Tahsildar, Kozhikode, Kerala & Ors. [(2005) 3 SCC 351] . Mistake furthermore, may either be of law or fact. By reason of mistake on the part of the Enquiry Officer, the respondent could not have been inflicted with a minor penalty although he deserved a major penalty. If in law the quantum of punishment to be imposed upon a delinquent officer is within the exclusive domain of the disciplinary authority, unless otherwise delegated to any other authority, he alone could exercise the said jurisdiction and determine the same having regard the nature and guilty of the misconduct on the part of the delinquent officer as the Enquiry Officer or any other authority had no jurisdiction in relation thereto. The matter might have been different if prior to the imposition of penalty of dismissal from service against the 1st respondent, no opportunity of hearing had been given to him. Admittedly the second show cause notice was issued to him and he showed cause. It is also not contended that the order passed by the disciplinary authority suffers from the vice of non-application of mind. The principles of natural justice admittedly have been complied with20. The High Court proceeded on the basis that in absence of the specific provision the second show cause notice was impermissible. It failed to consider that there was no statutory interdict in this behalf. An administrative order can be recalled. A mistake can be rectified. The Managing Director of the Corporation as a disciplinary authority, it has not been shown to us, lacked inherent jurisdiction in relation thereto21. The 1st respondent held an office of trust. He distributed seeds to the farmers. He collected a huge amount from them. He not only defalcated a huge amount but also misappropriated some bags of seeds. It was in the aforementioned situation improper for the High Court to interfere with the quantum of punishment. It is now well settled that in a matter of disciplinary proceedings the High Court exercises a limited power
### Instruction:
First, predict whether the appeal in case proceeding will be accepted (1) or not (0), and then explain the decision by identifying crucial sentences from the document.

### Input:
would arise only when the delinquent officer is exonerated either wholly or in part of the charges levelled against him whereas the disciplinary authority forms a different opinion. Most of the charges have been found proved and the Disciplinary Authority to that extent did not differ with the report of the Enquiry Officer. So far as the quantum of punishment proposed by the Enquiry Officer is concerned, if in terms of the rules, he had no authority to do so, the Managing Director was entitled to apply his own mind and could come to a conclusion as regard the quantum of punishment which should be imposed on the delinquent officer. He in that view of the matter was not obligated to assign any far less sufficient and cogent reason as it was not the requirement of law. In any view of the matter, from the second notice dated 22.3.1994 issued by the Managing Director of the Corporation it is evident that sufficient and cogent reasons have been assigned therein. 15. A departmental proceeding stricto sensu is not a judicial proceeding. 16. There is nothing in the rules to show that the disciplinary authority cannot consider the materials on record with a view to form an independent opinion as regard quantum of punishment to be imposed upon the delinquent employee. He might have committed a mistake in issuing the first show cause notice but by reason thereof he cannot be held to be wholly precluded from issuing the second show cause notice as thereby he intended to rectify the mistake committed by him. 17. In Indian Council of Agricultural Research and Another v. T.K. Suryanarayan and Others [(1997) 6 SCC 766] a promotion granted by a mistake in ignorance of the service rules was held to be capable of being rectified stating: Incorrect promotion either given erroneously by the Department by misreading the said Service Rules or such promotion given pursuant to judicial orders contrary to Service Rules cannot be a ground to claim erroneous promotion by perpetrating infringement of statutory service rules. In a court of law, employees cannot be permitted to contend that the Service Rules made effective on 1-10-1975 should not be adhered to because in some cases erroneous promotions had been given 18. In Poothundu Plantations Pvt. Ltd. v. Agricultural Income Tax Officer, Chittoor, Kerala State and others [(1996) 9 SCC 499] , it was stated: 4. There can be no doubt that only an apparent error of fact or law can be rectified by an officer. If the mistake of law has to be established by construing the words of a section to find its proper meaning, then such an error cannot normally be a rectifiable error under Section 36. If two views are possible, then obviously the error will not be an error apparent from the record. 19. As the Enquiry Officer had no jurisdiction to recommend any punishment to be imposed on the respondent by the disciplinary authority, he although acted thereupon at the first instance, could have corrected his mistake as the same was apparent on the face of the record. He, therefore, did not commit any illegality in issuing the second show cause notice as Enquiry Officer had no jurisdiction in that behalf. See M. Ahammedkutty Haji V. Tahsildar, Kozhikode, Kerala & Ors. [(2005) 3 SCC 351] . Mistake furthermore, may either be of law or fact. By reason of mistake on the part of the Enquiry Officer, the respondent could not have been inflicted with a minor penalty although he deserved a major penalty. If in law the quantum of punishment to be imposed upon a delinquent officer is within the exclusive domain of the disciplinary authority, unless otherwise delegated to any other authority, he alone could exercise the said jurisdiction and determine the same having regard the nature and guilty of the misconduct on the part of the delinquent officer as the Enquiry Officer or any other authority had no jurisdiction in relation thereto. The matter might have been different if prior to the imposition of penalty of dismissal from service against the 1st respondent, no opportunity of hearing had been given to him. Admittedly the second show cause notice was issued to him and he showed cause. It is also not contended that the order passed by the disciplinary authority suffers from the vice of non-application of mind. The principles of natural justice admittedly have been complied with. 20. The High Court proceeded on the basis that in absence of the specific provision the second show cause notice was impermissible. It failed to consider that there was no statutory interdict in this behalf. An administrative order can be recalled. A mistake can be rectified. The Managing Director of the Corporation as a disciplinary authority, it has not been shown to us, lacked inherent jurisdiction in relation thereto. 21. The 1st respondent held an office of trust. He distributed seeds to the farmers. He collected a huge amount from them. He not only defalcated a huge amount but also misappropriated some bags of seeds. It was in the aforementioned situation improper for the High Court to interfere with the quantum of punishment. It is now well settled that in a matter of disciplinary proceedings the High Court exercises a limited power. [See Govt. of A.P. & Ors. V. Mohad. Nasrullah Khan [ JT 2006 (2) SC 82 ], L. K. Verma V. H.M.T. Ltd. & Anr. [JT 2006 (2) SC 99 ], Karnataka Bank Ltd. V. A.L. Mohan Rao [(2006) 1 SCC 63] and Hombe Gowda Educational Trust & Anr. V. Sate of Karnataka & Ors. [(2006) 1 SCC 430] . The grounds for judicial review are limited. In Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank & anr. V. Munna Lal Jain [(2005) 10 SCC 84] this Court held that when the High Court intends to interfere with the quantum of punishment on the ground that the same is shockingly disproportionate, it must record reasons for coming to such a conclusion.

### Response:
1

### Explanation:
12. It has not been shown to us, despite repeated query made in this behalf as to whether under the statutory rules, the Enquiry Officer was empowered to make any recommendation to the Disciplinary Authority as regard quantum of punishment to be imposed upon a delinquent employee. The High Court has noticed that the disciplinary proceedings are governed by the Manual of Departmental Enquiries. However, no provision therein has been pointed out to show that the Enquiry Officer was statutorily or otherwise empowered to make recommendations as regards quantum of punishment. Reference to Rule 42 of the said manual by the High court was wholly irrelevant as indisputably the procedures laid down therein for holding departmental enquiry had been complied with. It is not the case of the 1st respondent either before the High Court or before us that no charge was framed and communicated to him and he has not been given an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him. He admittedly participated in the departmental enquiry. It is also not his case that in the said departmental proceedings principles of natural justice had not been complied with19. As the Enquiry Officer had no jurisdiction to recommend any punishment to be imposed on the respondent by the disciplinary authority, he although acted thereupon at the first instance, could have corrected his mistake as the same was apparent on the face of the record. He, therefore, did not commit any illegality in issuing the second show cause notice as Enquiry Officer had no jurisdiction in that behalf. See M. Ahammedkutty Haji V. Tahsildar, Kozhikode, Kerala & Ors. [(2005) 3 SCC 351] . Mistake furthermore, may either be of law or fact. By reason of mistake on the part of the Enquiry Officer, the respondent could not have been inflicted with a minor penalty although he deserved a major penalty. If in law the quantum of punishment to be imposed upon a delinquent officer is within the exclusive domain of the disciplinary authority, unless otherwise delegated to any other authority, he alone could exercise the said jurisdiction and determine the same having regard the nature and guilty of the misconduct on the part of the delinquent officer as the Enquiry Officer or any other authority had no jurisdiction in relation thereto. The matter might have been different if prior to the imposition of penalty of dismissal from service against the 1st respondent, no opportunity of hearing had been given to him. Admittedly the second show cause notice was issued to him and he showed cause. It is also not contended that the order passed by the disciplinary authority suffers from the vice of non-application of mind. The principles of natural justice admittedly have been complied with20. The High Court proceeded on the basis that in absence of the specific provision the second show cause notice was impermissible. It failed to consider that there was no statutory interdict in this behalf. An administrative order can be recalled. A mistake can be rectified. The Managing Director of the Corporation as a disciplinary authority, it has not been shown to us, lacked inherent jurisdiction in relation thereto21. The 1st respondent held an office of trust. He distributed seeds to the farmers. He collected a huge amount from them. He not only defalcated a huge amount but also misappropriated some bags of seeds. It was in the aforementioned situation improper for the High Court to interfere with the quantum of punishment. It is now well settled that in a matter of disciplinary proceedings the High Court exercises a limited power
