Chinnamarkathian Alias Muthu Gounder and Another Vs. Ayyavoo Alias Periana Gounder and Others
this appeal. These orders turn out, often enough to be expedient. Such procedural orders, though peremptory (conditional decrees apart) are, in essence, in terrorem, so that dilatory litigants might put themselves in order and avoid delay. T hey do not, however, completely, estop a court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the time fixed. For example it cannot be said that, if the appellant had started with the full money order to be paid and came well it time but was set upon and robbed by thieves on the day previous, he could not ask for extension of time, or that the Court was powerless to extend it. Such order are not like the law of the Medes and the Persians."12. The danger inherent in passing conditional orders becomes self-evident because that by itself may result in taking away jurisdiction conferred on the court for just decision of the case The true purport of conditional order is that such ord ers merely create something like a guarantee or sanction for obedience of the courts order but would not take away the Courts jurisdiction to act according to the mandate of the statute or on relevant equitable considerations if the statute does not deny such consideration. In order to avoid subsequent controversy sub- section (4)(b) envisages proceedings in two stages and that by itself inhibits passing of a conditional order. It is, therefore, not possible to accep t the construction canvassed for on behalf of the respondents.13. As analysed the scheme of sub-section (4)(b) of section 3 requires the Revenue Divisional Officer to determine, arrears, ascertain the exact amount payable by the tenant, fix the ti me for payment after taking into consideration the relevant circumstances of the landlord and the cultivating tenant and then stop there. There is no power in the Revenue Divisional Officer at that stage to pass an order for eviction.If the tenant deposits the amount or pays up the rent and repairs the default within the time fixed by the Revenue Divisional Officer, on an application of the tenant pointing out this fact, the original application of the landlord for eviction would have to be dismissed. If on the other hand the landlord points out to the Revenue Divisional Officer that the cultivating tenant has failed to comply with the order made by the Court and if after notice to the tenant and in the absence of a reque st for extension of time which again may be judicially examined, the default becomes wilful or contumacious. It is at that stage and at that stage alone that the Revenue Divisional Officer enjoys jurisdiction to order eviction. Such juris diction improperly exercised at an earlier stage would render the order without jurisdiction. Surprisingly the High Court reached the same conclusion but failed to follow it.14. In all the three cases the Revenue Divisional Officer determined the arr ears of rent and gave six weeks time to pay the same. Within the period of six weeks the cultivating tenants in each case approached the High Court and obtained conditional stay, the condition being to deposit the rent in arrears within the time presc ribed by the High Court and these orders have been complied with. If the Revenue Divisional Officer had not denied to himself the further jurisdiction to examine the situation as it emerged on the date of expiry of the period prescribed by him, it would have been brought to his notice that the eviction was unjustified in view of the orders made by the High Court. But as the order became effective according to the Revenue Divisional Officer on the mere failure to deposit the arrears found due by him, the order of eviction without jurisdiction became effective. The High Court held that there was no order of eviction but affirmed the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer as one for eviction.The question then is: What should be my approach in these appeals ? Frankly speaking, on my finding that the latter part of the Revenue Divisional Officers order that in the event of failure to deposit the amount within the time prescribed eviction wo uld follow, being without jurisdiction, I would be required to remand the matter to the Revenue Divisional Officer to proceed from that stage. However, I cannot overlook the fact that the initial proceedings before the Revenue Divisional O fficer started in 1961. Two decades have rolled by. The ground of eviction was a technical ground of default repaired by the orders of the High Court when the rent found in arrears was deposited. The landlords have been paid, may be not specifically withi n the time prescribed by the Revenue Divisional Officer but within the time prescribed by the High Court. It is not necessary to decide in this case whether the time prescribed by the Revenue Divisional Officer, if challenged in the superior court i.e. the High Court, the High Court would have jurisdiction to prescribe its own time calling upon the tenant to deposit the amount to repair the default. That question be kept open but in the facts of this case the amount having been deposited way back in 1961-62, it would be merely adding to the agony of the parties for a very technical consideration to remit the case to the Revenue Divisional Officer. In the facts of this case it would be an idle formality to remit the case to the Revenue Divisional Officer for the additional reason that he will have to fix a fresh date for deposit of the amount and the amount has already been deposited 19 to 20 years back. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case and the inevitable consequence flowing from the passage of time, I do not consider it just and proper to remit the case to the Revenue Divisional Officer. In my opinion the tenants have qualified for the protection of the Act and they were not liable to be evicted.
1[ds]It was a beneficient legislation for granting security or tenure to cultivating tenants of agricultural lands. It is a well-settled canon of construction that in construing the provisions of such enactments the court should adopt that construction which advances, fulfils and furthers the object of the Act rather than the one which would defeat the same and render the protection illusory.It is not in dispute that the tenants in each of th ese appeals are cultivating tenants and the lands of which they are tenants are lands covered by the Act. They are sought to be evicted on the only ground that they have committed default in payment of rent payable from year to year for a period o f threefact the High Court itself has taken this very view when it observed that the view taken by Srinivasan, J. was the correct one having regard to the avowed object of the Act, namely, preventing unreasonable eviction and affording protection to the tenants to retain the holdings s o long as interests of the landlord in the matter of the prompt payment of rent are safeguarded. At another stage, the High Court observed that the time that has to be given or allowed to the tenant to deposit the arrears is to be determined by co nsidering what is just and reasonable having regard to the relative circumstances of both the parties and by its very nature this must be elastic and flexible and not fixed or final. In other words, the High Court was of the opinion that the comp osite order is not contemplated by sub-section (4)(b) of section 3.If sub-section (4)(b) of section 3 does not contemplate passing of a composite order, what is the correct procedure that must be followed in a proceeding under that sub-section ? Tha t is self-evident from the language employed in that sub-section. After the application is received and the parties are summoned and representations are heard, the Court must determine whether the cultivating tenant is in arrears of rent. If the answer is in the affirmative, it has to determine the arrears in terms of its money value. Thereafter, the Revenue Divisional Officer must ascertain relative circumstances of the landlord and the tenant and as indicated hereinabove, these circumstances must be relatable to the need of the landlord for prompt payment and the present prevalent circumstances of the tenant relatable to his paying capacity. Thousand and one circumstances can be envisaged which may have a bearing on this aspect. After these circumstances are properly adjudicated and evaluated the Revenue Divisional Officer must fix time within which the tenant should pay the amount and repair thet the High Court itself has taken this very view when it observed that the view taken by Srinivasan, J. was the correct one having regard to the avowed object of the Act, namely, preventing unreasonable eviction and affording protection to the tenants to retain the holdings s o long as interests of the landlord in the matter of the prompt payment of rent are safeguarded. At another stage, the High Court observed that the time that has to be given or allowed to the tenant to deposit the arrears is to be determined by co nsidering what is just and reasonable having regard to the relative circumstances of both the parties and by its very nature this must be elastic and flexible and not fixed or final. In other words, the High Court was of the opinion that the comp osite order is not contemplated by sub-section (4)(b) of section 3.If sub-section (4)(b) of section 3 does not contemplate passing of a composite order, what is the correct procedure that must be followed in a proceeding under that sub-section ? Tha t is self-evident from the language employed in that sub-section. After the application is received and the parties are summoned and representations are heard, the Court must determine whether the cultivating tenant is in arrears of rent. If the answer is in the affirmative, it has to determine the arrears in terms of its money value. Thereafter, the Revenue Divisional Officer must ascertain relative circumstances of the landlord and the tenant and as indicated hereinabove, these circumstances must be relatable to the need of the landlord for prompt payment and the present prevalent circumstances of the tenant relatable to his paying capacity. Thousand and one circumstances can be envisaged which may have a bearing on this aspect. After these circumstances are properly adjudicated and evaluated the Revenue Divisional Officer must fix time within which the tenant should pay the amount and repair thewas seriously contended by Mr. Natesan as to what is there in the scheme of the Act and especially in the language of sub- section (4)(b) which would make it impermissible for the Revenue Divisional Officer simultaneously passing an order determining rent in arrears and directing that i f the tenant fails to pay the amount within the time prescribed by the Court eviction shall follow as a matter of course. If this construction of sub-section (4)(b) as canvassed by Mr. Natesan is adopted the Revenue Divisional Officer would be denying to himself a more beneficial jurisdiction conferred upon him, namely, to extend the time for making the payment if an evaluation of circumstances so placed before him he is satisfied that a further extension is not only just but not to grant it would be harsh and unjust and would be defeating the object for which the Act was enacted. An analogous provision may be noticed, It is a well accepted principle statutorily recognised in section 148 of theCode of Civil Procedure that where a period is fixed or granted by the court for doing any act prescribed or allowed by the Code, Court may in its discretion from time to time enlarge such period even though the period originally fixed or granted may expire. If a Court in exercis e of the jurisdiction can grant time to do a thing, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary curtailing, denying or withholding such jurisdiction, the jurisdiction to grant time would inhere in its ambit the jurisdiction to extend time initially fixed by it. Passing a composite order would be acting in a disregard of the jurisdiction in that while directing time simultaneously the court denies to itself the jurisdiction to extend time. The principle of equity is tha t when some circumstances are to be taken into account for fixing a length of time within which a certain action is to be taken, the Court retains to itself the jurisdiction to re-examine the alteration or modification of circumstances which may necessitated extension of time. If the Court by its own act denies itself the jurisdiction to do so, it would be denying to itself the jurisdiction which in the absence of a negative provision, it undoubtedly enjoys. Conditional orders, w ere held by this Court to be in terrorem, so that dilatory litigants might put themselves in order and avoid delay, but they do not completely estop a court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the timeall the three cases the Revenue Divisional Officer determined the arr ears of rent and gave six weeks time to pay the same. Within the period of six weeks the cultivating tenants in each case approached the High Court and obtained conditional stay, the condition being to deposit the rent in arrears within the time presc ribed by the High Court and these orders have been complied with. If the Revenue Divisional Officer had not denied to himself the further jurisdiction to examine the situation as it emerged on the date of expiry of the period prescribed by him, it would have been brought to his notice that the eviction was unjustified in view of the orders made by the High Court. But as the order became effective according to the Revenue Divisional Officer on the mere failure to deposit the arrears found due by him, the order of eviction without jurisdiction became effective. The High Court held that there was no order of eviction but affirmed the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer as one for eviction.The question then is: What should be my approach in these appeals ? Frankly speaking, on my finding that the latter part of the Revenue Divisional Officers order that in the event of failure to deposit the amount within the time prescribed eviction wo uld follow,  being without jurisdiction, I would be required to remand the matter to the Revenue Divisional Officer to proceed from that stage. However, I cannot overlook the fact that the initial proceedings before the Revenue Divisional O fficer started in 1961. Two decades have rolled by. The ground of eviction was a technical ground of default repaired by the orders of the High Court when the rent found in arrears was deposited. The landlords have been paid, may be not specifically withi n the time prescribed by the Revenue Divisional Officer but within the time prescribed by the High Court. It is not necessary to decide in this case whether the time prescribed by the Revenue Divisional Officer, if challenged in the superior court i.e. the High Court, the High Court would have jurisdiction to prescribe its own time calling upon the tenant to deposit the amount to repair the default. That question be kept open but in the facts of this case the amount having been deposited way back in 1961-62, it would be merely adding to the agony of the parties for a very technical consideration to remit the case to the Revenue Divisional Officer. In the facts of this case it would be an idle formality to remit the case to the Revenue Divisional Officer for the additional reason that he will have to fix a fresh date for deposit of the amount and the amount has already been deposited 19 to 20 years back. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case and the inevitable consequence flowing from the passage of time, I do not consider it just and proper to remit the case to the Revenue Divisional Officer. In my opinion the tenants have qualified for the protection of the Act and they were not liable to be evicted.
### Instruction:
Determine the likely decision of the case (acceptance (1) or rejection (0)) and follow up with an explanation highlighting key sentences that support this prediction.

### Input:
this appeal. These orders turn out, often enough to be expedient. Such procedural orders, though peremptory (conditional decrees apart) are, in essence, in terrorem, so that dilatory litigants might put themselves in order and avoid delay. T hey do not, however, completely, estop a court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the time fixed. For example it cannot be said that, if the appellant had started with the full money order to be paid and came well it time but was set upon and robbed by thieves on the day previous, he could not ask for extension of time, or that the Court was powerless to extend it. Such order are not like the law of the Medes and the Persians."12. The danger inherent in passing conditional orders becomes self-evident because that by itself may result in taking away jurisdiction conferred on the court for just decision of the case The true purport of conditional order is that such ord ers merely create something like a guarantee or sanction for obedience of the courts order but would not take away the Courts jurisdiction to act according to the mandate of the statute or on relevant equitable considerations if the statute does not deny such consideration. In order to avoid subsequent controversy sub- section (4)(b) envisages proceedings in two stages and that by itself inhibits passing of a conditional order. It is, therefore, not possible to accep t the construction canvassed for on behalf of the respondents.13. As analysed the scheme of sub-section (4)(b) of section 3 requires the Revenue Divisional Officer to determine, arrears, ascertain the exact amount payable by the tenant, fix the ti me for payment after taking into consideration the relevant circumstances of the landlord and the cultivating tenant and then stop there. There is no power in the Revenue Divisional Officer at that stage to pass an order for eviction.If the tenant deposits the amount or pays up the rent and repairs the default within the time fixed by the Revenue Divisional Officer, on an application of the tenant pointing out this fact, the original application of the landlord for eviction would have to be dismissed. If on the other hand the landlord points out to the Revenue Divisional Officer that the cultivating tenant has failed to comply with the order made by the Court and if after notice to the tenant and in the absence of a reque st for extension of time which again may be judicially examined, the default becomes wilful or contumacious. It is at that stage and at that stage alone that the Revenue Divisional Officer enjoys jurisdiction to order eviction. Such juris diction improperly exercised at an earlier stage would render the order without jurisdiction. Surprisingly the High Court reached the same conclusion but failed to follow it.14. In all the three cases the Revenue Divisional Officer determined the arr ears of rent and gave six weeks time to pay the same. Within the period of six weeks the cultivating tenants in each case approached the High Court and obtained conditional stay, the condition being to deposit the rent in arrears within the time presc ribed by the High Court and these orders have been complied with. If the Revenue Divisional Officer had not denied to himself the further jurisdiction to examine the situation as it emerged on the date of expiry of the period prescribed by him, it would have been brought to his notice that the eviction was unjustified in view of the orders made by the High Court. But as the order became effective according to the Revenue Divisional Officer on the mere failure to deposit the arrears found due by him, the order of eviction without jurisdiction became effective. The High Court held that there was no order of eviction but affirmed the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer as one for eviction.The question then is: What should be my approach in these appeals ? Frankly speaking, on my finding that the latter part of the Revenue Divisional Officers order that in the event of failure to deposit the amount within the time prescribed eviction wo uld follow, being without jurisdiction, I would be required to remand the matter to the Revenue Divisional Officer to proceed from that stage. However, I cannot overlook the fact that the initial proceedings before the Revenue Divisional O fficer started in 1961. Two decades have rolled by. The ground of eviction was a technical ground of default repaired by the orders of the High Court when the rent found in arrears was deposited. The landlords have been paid, may be not specifically withi n the time prescribed by the Revenue Divisional Officer but within the time prescribed by the High Court. It is not necessary to decide in this case whether the time prescribed by the Revenue Divisional Officer, if challenged in the superior court i.e. the High Court, the High Court would have jurisdiction to prescribe its own time calling upon the tenant to deposit the amount to repair the default. That question be kept open but in the facts of this case the amount having been deposited way back in 1961-62, it would be merely adding to the agony of the parties for a very technical consideration to remit the case to the Revenue Divisional Officer. In the facts of this case it would be an idle formality to remit the case to the Revenue Divisional Officer for the additional reason that he will have to fix a fresh date for deposit of the amount and the amount has already been deposited 19 to 20 years back. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case and the inevitable consequence flowing from the passage of time, I do not consider it just and proper to remit the case to the Revenue Divisional Officer. In my opinion the tenants have qualified for the protection of the Act and they were not liable to be evicted.

### Response:
1

### Explanation:
of the tenant relatable to his paying capacity. Thousand and one circumstances can be envisaged which may have a bearing on this aspect. After these circumstances are properly adjudicated and evaluated the Revenue Divisional Officer must fix time within which the tenant should pay the amount and repair thewas seriously contended by Mr. Natesan as to what is there in the scheme of the Act and especially in the language of sub- section (4)(b) which would make it impermissible for the Revenue Divisional Officer simultaneously passing an order determining rent in arrears and directing that i f the tenant fails to pay the amount within the time prescribed by the Court eviction shall follow as a matter of course. If this construction of sub-section (4)(b) as canvassed by Mr. Natesan is adopted the Revenue Divisional Officer would be denying to himself a more beneficial jurisdiction conferred upon him, namely, to extend the time for making the payment if an evaluation of circumstances so placed before him he is satisfied that a further extension is not only just but not to grant it would be harsh and unjust and would be defeating the object for which the Act was enacted. An analogous provision may be noticed, It is a well accepted principle statutorily recognised in section 148 of theCode of Civil Procedure that where a period is fixed or granted by the court for doing any act prescribed or allowed by the Code, Court may in its discretion from time to time enlarge such period even though the period originally fixed or granted may expire. If a Court in exercis e of the jurisdiction can grant time to do a thing, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary curtailing, denying or withholding such jurisdiction, the jurisdiction to grant time would inhere in its ambit the jurisdiction to extend time initially fixed by it. Passing a composite order would be acting in a disregard of the jurisdiction in that while directing time simultaneously the court denies to itself the jurisdiction to extend time. The principle of equity is tha t when some circumstances are to be taken into account for fixing a length of time within which a certain action is to be taken, the Court retains to itself the jurisdiction to re-examine the alteration or modification of circumstances which may necessitated extension of time. If the Court by its own act denies itself the jurisdiction to do so, it would be denying to itself the jurisdiction which in the absence of a negative provision, it undoubtedly enjoys. Conditional orders, w ere held by this Court to be in terrorem, so that dilatory litigants might put themselves in order and avoid delay, but they do not completely estop a court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the timeall the three cases the Revenue Divisional Officer determined the arr ears of rent and gave six weeks time to pay the same. Within the period of six weeks the cultivating tenants in each case approached the High Court and obtained conditional stay, the condition being to deposit the rent in arrears within the time presc ribed by the High Court and these orders have been complied with. If the Revenue Divisional Officer had not denied to himself the further jurisdiction to examine the situation as it emerged on the date of expiry of the period prescribed by him, it would have been brought to his notice that the eviction was unjustified in view of the orders made by the High Court. But as the order became effective according to the Revenue Divisional Officer on the mere failure to deposit the arrears found due by him, the order of eviction without jurisdiction became effective. The High Court held that there was no order of eviction but affirmed the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer as one for eviction.The question then is: What should be my approach in these appeals ? Frankly speaking, on my finding that the latter part of the Revenue Divisional Officers order that in the event of failure to deposit the amount within the time prescribed eviction wo uld follow,  being without jurisdiction, I would be required to remand the matter to the Revenue Divisional Officer to proceed from that stage. However, I cannot overlook the fact that the initial proceedings before the Revenue Divisional O fficer started in 1961. Two decades have rolled by. The ground of eviction was a technical ground of default repaired by the orders of the High Court when the rent found in arrears was deposited. The landlords have been paid, may be not specifically withi n the time prescribed by the Revenue Divisional Officer but within the time prescribed by the High Court. It is not necessary to decide in this case whether the time prescribed by the Revenue Divisional Officer, if challenged in the superior court i.e. the High Court, the High Court would have jurisdiction to prescribe its own time calling upon the tenant to deposit the amount to repair the default. That question be kept open but in the facts of this case the amount having been deposited way back in 1961-62, it would be merely adding to the agony of the parties for a very technical consideration to remit the case to the Revenue Divisional Officer. In the facts of this case it would be an idle formality to remit the case to the Revenue Divisional Officer for the additional reason that he will have to fix a fresh date for deposit of the amount and the amount has already been deposited 19 to 20 years back. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case and the inevitable consequence flowing from the passage of time, I do not consider it just and proper to remit the case to the Revenue Divisional Officer. In my opinion the tenants have qualified for the protection of the Act and they were not liable to be evicted.
