J.H. Patel (D) BY LRS. &amp; Others Vs. Nuboard Manufacturing Co. Ltd. &amp; Others
"protected workmen" and that no prior approval was obtained to conduct any inquiry. 9. Mr. Sunny Chaudhary, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that undoubtedly the workmen had lodged the Complaint against the senior officers of the respondent Company in the Magistrates Court. This damaged the reputation of the Company, and this amounted to defamation and therefore the management was entitled to proceed at the departmental level. According to him, the conduct on the part of the workmen amounted to disorderly behaviour and although the management had passed the dismissal order merely on receiving the explanation from the workmen (and without holding an inquiry), evidence had been led before the Labour Court and after considering the evidence, the learned Judge had come to the conclusion that misconduct had been established. He submitted that therefore the Labour Court was wrong in awarding 50% compensation from the date of dismissal until the date of its judgment and the High Court was fully justified in passing the order that it had passed deleting the order of compensation which was awarded to the workmen. 10. We have noted the submissions of both the learned counsel. As far as the issue of the workmen being "protected workmen" is concerned, presently we are not required to go into that aspect. Similarly, as far as the issue of non obtaining prior approval is concerned, inasmuch as Section 6(E)(2)(b) of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act is pari passu to Section 32(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, undoubtedly the management was required to obtain the prior approval from the Labour Court inasmuch as an earlier proceeding was pending in the Labour Court. However, the consequence thereof cannot be that the management will be disentitled to prove the misconduct in Court. This has been the view taken by this Court in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Anr. Vs. Satya Prakash, (2013) 9 SCC 232 , which explains the law laid down earlier by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Jaipur Zila Sahkari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. Vs. Ram Gopal Sharma and Ors., (2002) 2 SCC 244. Therefore, the management cannot be faulted merely on that ground. 11. The fact, however, remains that the opportunity to prove the misconduct was made available to the management in the Labour Court in the present case. The employer examined two of their witnesses, namely Mr. A.H. Shah, Director (EW-1) and Mr. J.B. Dalal, Administrative Officer (E-2). However, from the judgment rendered by the Labour Court what we find is that there is no discussion, whatsoever, with respect to the evidence led by these two witnesses. The judgment does not contain any reason in support of the conclusion arrived at by the Labour Court that misconduct was proved before the Labour Court on the basis of the evidence which was led before it. The management chose to proceed departmentally against the workmen after the acquittal of its officers in the Criminal Court. It did not afford any opportunity to the workmen at the departmental level. Afterwards, when the dispute was taken to the Labour Court, it was the responsibility of the management to prove the misconduct in Court, and that ought to be done by leading evidence of the witnesses which, of course, they did. However, the evidence has to be discussed by the Labour Court. In the present case, there is no discussion whatsoever about the evidence as to why the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the misconduct is established. In the circumstances, the findings of the Labour Court cannot be sustained that the management had proved the misconduct. Inasmuch as the misconduct was not proved, the workmen were entitled to get the relief that they were seeking, namely the declaration that the termination of their services was bad in law and then the consequential relief. When the matter was carried to the High Court, the High Court also lost sight of that fact and, on the other hand, it deleted whatever compensation was awarded to the workmen by the Labour Court. In our view, the order of the High Court is erroneous on the very ground.12. In the circumstances, this appeal will have to be allowed which we hereby allow, set aside the order of the High Court as well as that of the Labour Court and decide the dispute raised by the workmen in their favour, namely that the termination of their services was unjustified on merits.13. Then we come to the aspect of relief. Out of three appellants before this Court, J.H. Patel has expired and his heirs are on record. Mr. Upadhyay does not dispute that as far as the other two workmen Mr. Asharam and Ram Kishan are concerned, they must have reached the age of superannuation. In the circumstances, we award compensation to these workmen towards back-wages quantified at 50%, with interest at 6% per annum, from the date of dismissal until the date of superannuation/death, whichever is earlier. 14. At this stage, on instructions, Mr. Chaudhary, learned counsel appearing for the respondents states that the first respondent Company is no longer functioning, and a proceeding is pending before the BIFR. He therefore makes a request that the back-wages be reduced to 40% and no interest be awarded thereon. Mr. Upadhyay learned counsel for the appellants submits that the appellants are agreeable to this suggestion provided the said amount is paid within a period of three months hereafter. In the circumstances, we give this option to the first respondent viz to pay 40% of the back-wages from the date of dismissal until the date of superannuation/death, whichever is earlier provided the amount is so paid within three months. If the compensation is so paid, the amount of interest will stand waived. In the event, however, the amount of 40% is not paid within a period of three months hereafter, the earlier part of the order, namely that respondent No.1 should pay 50% of the back-wages with 6% interest will be operative.
1[ds]In the present case, there is no discussion whatsoever about the evidence as to why the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the misconduct is established. In the circumstances, the findings of the Labour Court cannot be sustained that the management had proved the misconduct. Inasmuch as the misconduct was not proved, the workmen were entitled to get the relief that they were seeking, namely the declaration that the termination of their services was bad in law and then the consequential relief. When the matter was carried to the High Court, the High Court also lost sight of that fact and, on the other hand, it deleted whatever compensation was awarded to the workmen by the Labour Court. In our view, the order of the High Court is erroneous on the very ground.12. In the circumstances, this appeal will have to be allowed which we hereby allow, set aside the order of the High Court as well as that of the Labour Court and decide the dispute raised by the workmen in their favour, namely that the termination of their services was unjustified on merits.13. Then we come to the aspect of relief. Out of three appellants before this Court, J.H. Patel has expired and his heirs are on record. Mr. Upadhyay does not dispute that as far as the other two workmen Mr. Asharam and Ram Kishan are concerned, they must have reached the age of superannuation. In the circumstances, we award compensation to these workmen towards back-wages quantified at 50%, with interest at 6% per annum, from the date of dismissal until the date of superannuation/death, whichever is earlier.At this stage, on instructions, Mr. Chaudhary, learned counsel appearing for the respondents states that the first respondent Company is no longer functioning, and a proceeding is pending before the BIFR. He therefore makes a request that the back-wages be reduced to 40% and no interest be awarded thereon. Mr. Upadhyay learned counsel for the appellants submits that the appellants are agreeable to this suggestion provided the said amount is paid within a period of three months hereafter. In the circumstances, we give this option to the first respondent viz to pay 40% of the back-wages from the date of dismissal until the date of superannuation/death, whichever is earlier provided the amount is so paid within three months. If the compensation is so paid, the amount of interest will stand waived. In the event, however, the amount of 40% is not paid within a period of three months hereafter, the earlier part of the order, namely that respondent No.1 should pay 50% of the back-wages with 6% interest will be operative.
### Instruction:
Make a prediction on the court's ruling (acceptance (1) or rejection (0) of the petition), and then dissect the proceeding to provide a detailed explanation using key textual passages.

### Input:
"protected workmen" and that no prior approval was obtained to conduct any inquiry. 9. Mr. Sunny Chaudhary, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that undoubtedly the workmen had lodged the Complaint against the senior officers of the respondent Company in the Magistrates Court. This damaged the reputation of the Company, and this amounted to defamation and therefore the management was entitled to proceed at the departmental level. According to him, the conduct on the part of the workmen amounted to disorderly behaviour and although the management had passed the dismissal order merely on receiving the explanation from the workmen (and without holding an inquiry), evidence had been led before the Labour Court and after considering the evidence, the learned Judge had come to the conclusion that misconduct had been established. He submitted that therefore the Labour Court was wrong in awarding 50% compensation from the date of dismissal until the date of its judgment and the High Court was fully justified in passing the order that it had passed deleting the order of compensation which was awarded to the workmen. 10. We have noted the submissions of both the learned counsel. As far as the issue of the workmen being "protected workmen" is concerned, presently we are not required to go into that aspect. Similarly, as far as the issue of non obtaining prior approval is concerned, inasmuch as Section 6(E)(2)(b) of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act is pari passu to Section 32(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, undoubtedly the management was required to obtain the prior approval from the Labour Court inasmuch as an earlier proceeding was pending in the Labour Court. However, the consequence thereof cannot be that the management will be disentitled to prove the misconduct in Court. This has been the view taken by this Court in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Anr. Vs. Satya Prakash, (2013) 9 SCC 232 , which explains the law laid down earlier by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Jaipur Zila Sahkari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. Vs. Ram Gopal Sharma and Ors., (2002) 2 SCC 244. Therefore, the management cannot be faulted merely on that ground. 11. The fact, however, remains that the opportunity to prove the misconduct was made available to the management in the Labour Court in the present case. The employer examined two of their witnesses, namely Mr. A.H. Shah, Director (EW-1) and Mr. J.B. Dalal, Administrative Officer (E-2). However, from the judgment rendered by the Labour Court what we find is that there is no discussion, whatsoever, with respect to the evidence led by these two witnesses. The judgment does not contain any reason in support of the conclusion arrived at by the Labour Court that misconduct was proved before the Labour Court on the basis of the evidence which was led before it. The management chose to proceed departmentally against the workmen after the acquittal of its officers in the Criminal Court. It did not afford any opportunity to the workmen at the departmental level. Afterwards, when the dispute was taken to the Labour Court, it was the responsibility of the management to prove the misconduct in Court, and that ought to be done by leading evidence of the witnesses which, of course, they did. However, the evidence has to be discussed by the Labour Court. In the present case, there is no discussion whatsoever about the evidence as to why the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the misconduct is established. In the circumstances, the findings of the Labour Court cannot be sustained that the management had proved the misconduct. Inasmuch as the misconduct was not proved, the workmen were entitled to get the relief that they were seeking, namely the declaration that the termination of their services was bad in law and then the consequential relief. When the matter was carried to the High Court, the High Court also lost sight of that fact and, on the other hand, it deleted whatever compensation was awarded to the workmen by the Labour Court. In our view, the order of the High Court is erroneous on the very ground.12. In the circumstances, this appeal will have to be allowed which we hereby allow, set aside the order of the High Court as well as that of the Labour Court and decide the dispute raised by the workmen in their favour, namely that the termination of their services was unjustified on merits.13. Then we come to the aspect of relief. Out of three appellants before this Court, J.H. Patel has expired and his heirs are on record. Mr. Upadhyay does not dispute that as far as the other two workmen Mr. Asharam and Ram Kishan are concerned, they must have reached the age of superannuation. In the circumstances, we award compensation to these workmen towards back-wages quantified at 50%, with interest at 6% per annum, from the date of dismissal until the date of superannuation/death, whichever is earlier. 14. At this stage, on instructions, Mr. Chaudhary, learned counsel appearing for the respondents states that the first respondent Company is no longer functioning, and a proceeding is pending before the BIFR. He therefore makes a request that the back-wages be reduced to 40% and no interest be awarded thereon. Mr. Upadhyay learned counsel for the appellants submits that the appellants are agreeable to this suggestion provided the said amount is paid within a period of three months hereafter. In the circumstances, we give this option to the first respondent viz to pay 40% of the back-wages from the date of dismissal until the date of superannuation/death, whichever is earlier provided the amount is so paid within three months. If the compensation is so paid, the amount of interest will stand waived. In the event, however, the amount of 40% is not paid within a period of three months hereafter, the earlier part of the order, namely that respondent No.1 should pay 50% of the back-wages with 6% interest will be operative.

### Response:
1

### Explanation:
In the present case, there is no discussion whatsoever about the evidence as to why the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the misconduct is established. In the circumstances, the findings of the Labour Court cannot be sustained that the management had proved the misconduct. Inasmuch as the misconduct was not proved, the workmen were entitled to get the relief that they were seeking, namely the declaration that the termination of their services was bad in law and then the consequential relief. When the matter was carried to the High Court, the High Court also lost sight of that fact and, on the other hand, it deleted whatever compensation was awarded to the workmen by the Labour Court. In our view, the order of the High Court is erroneous on the very ground.12. In the circumstances, this appeal will have to be allowed which we hereby allow, set aside the order of the High Court as well as that of the Labour Court and decide the dispute raised by the workmen in their favour, namely that the termination of their services was unjustified on merits.13. Then we come to the aspect of relief. Out of three appellants before this Court, J.H. Patel has expired and his heirs are on record. Mr. Upadhyay does not dispute that as far as the other two workmen Mr. Asharam and Ram Kishan are concerned, they must have reached the age of superannuation. In the circumstances, we award compensation to these workmen towards back-wages quantified at 50%, with interest at 6% per annum, from the date of dismissal until the date of superannuation/death, whichever is earlier.At this stage, on instructions, Mr. Chaudhary, learned counsel appearing for the respondents states that the first respondent Company is no longer functioning, and a proceeding is pending before the BIFR. He therefore makes a request that the back-wages be reduced to 40% and no interest be awarded thereon. Mr. Upadhyay learned counsel for the appellants submits that the appellants are agreeable to this suggestion provided the said amount is paid within a period of three months hereafter. In the circumstances, we give this option to the first respondent viz to pay 40% of the back-wages from the date of dismissal until the date of superannuation/death, whichever is earlier provided the amount is so paid within three months. If the compensation is so paid, the amount of interest will stand waived. In the event, however, the amount of 40% is not paid within a period of three months hereafter, the earlier part of the order, namely that respondent No.1 should pay 50% of the back-wages with 6% interest will be operative.
