THANKAMONY AMMA Vs. OMANA AMMA N
matter was decided in favour of the appellants by both the courts below. 10. The scope of revisional powers under Section 20 of the Act came up for consideration in Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana and others (1993) 1 SCC 499. While considering whether the High Court could have reappreciated entire evidence, it was laid down:"20. We are afraid this approach of the High Court is wrong. Even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence, the High Court was not right in re- appreciating the entire evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the Commissioner?s report (Exts. C-1 and C-2 mahazar). In our considered view, the High Court had travelled far beyond the revisional jurisdiction. Even by the presence of the word ?propriety? it cannot mean that there could be a re- appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional court can come to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. Therefore, we are unable to agree with the reasoning of the High Court with reference to the exercise of revisional jurisdiction.?11. In Ubaiba v. Damodaran (1999) 5 SCC 645 exercise of revisional power was considered in the context of an issue whether the relationship of landlord- tenant existed or not. It was urged that whether such relationship existed would be a jurisdictional fact. This Court dealt with the matter as under:-"3. Mr K. Sukumaran, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant contended that however wide the jurisdiction of the revisional court under the Act in question may be, but it cannot have jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding upsetting the finding arrived at by the appellate authority and therefore the impugned order of the High Court is unsustainable in law. In support of this contention reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in the case of Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana 1 whereunder the selfsame provision of the Kerala Act was under consideration. This Court after noticing the word ?propriety? used in Section 20 came to the conclusion that the approach of the High Court was totally wrong and even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. The Court also further observed ?even by the presence of the word ‘propriety? it cannot mean that there could be any reappreciation of evidence?. The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand contended that the aforesaid decision will have no application to the case in hand where the dispute involved relates to a jurisdictional fact and according to the learned counsel where the dispute is in relation to a jurisdictional fact there should not be any fetter on the power of the revisional court even to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion. On being asked to support the aforesaid proposition no authority could be placed though on first principle learned counsel for the respondent argued as aforesaid. Having examined the rival submission and having gone through the decision of this Court referred to earlier we are of the considered opinion that though the revisional power under the Rent Act may be wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure it cannot be equated even with the second appellate power conferred on the civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure. Notwithstanding the use of the expression ?propriety? in Section 20, the revisional court therefore will not be entitled to reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion in place of the conclusion of the appellate authority. On examining the impugned judgment of the High Court in the light of the aforesaid ratio of this Court it is crystal clear that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by reappreciating the evidence and in coming to the conclusion that the relationship of landlord-tenant did not exist. In the circumstances, the impugned revisional order of the High Court is wholly unsustainable and we set aside the same and the order of the appellate authority is affirmed.12. A Constitution Bench of this Court considered the revisional powers of the High Court under Rent Acts operating in different States in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh (2014) 9 SCC 78. The decision in Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana and others 1 was again referred to in para 16. In para 38 it was observed:"38. Rukmini (1993) 1 SCC 499 holds, and in our view, rightly that even the wider language of Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act does not enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. We are in full agreement with the view of the three-Judge Bench in Rukmini 1 that the word ?propriety? does not confer power upon the High Court to reappreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion but its consideration of evidence is confined to find out legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned Kalyani Sulochana v. Saradamma, 1991 SCC OnLine Ker 213 : (1991) 2 KLJ 105 before it. We approve the view of this Court in Rukmini (1993) 1 SCC 499. ?13. Considering the instant matter in the backdrop of law laid down by this Court it must be stated that the findings rendered by the courts below were well supported by evidence on record and could not even be said to be perverse in any way. The High Court could not have re-appreciated the evidence and the concurrent findings rendered by the courts below ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction.
1[ds]10. The scope of revisional powers under Section 20 of the Act came up for consideration in Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana and others (1993) 1 SCC 499.   While considering whether the High Court could have reappreciated entire evidence, it was laidWe are afraid this approach of the High Court is wrong. Even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence, the High Court was not right in re- appreciating the entire evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the Commissioner?s report (Exts. C-1 and C-2 mahazar). In our considered view, the High Court had travelled far beyond the revisional jurisdiction. Even by the presence of the word ?propriety? it cannot mean that there could be a re- appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional court can come to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. Therefore, we are unable to agree with the reasoning of the High Court with reference to the exercise of revisional jurisdiction.In Ubaiba v. Damodaran (1999) 5 SCC 645 exercise of revisional power was considered in the context of an issue whether the relationship of landlord- tenant existed or not. It was urged that whether such relationship existed would be a jurisdictional fact. This Court dealt with the matter asMr K. Sukumaran, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant contended that however wide the jurisdiction of the revisional court under the Act in question may be, but it cannot have jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding upsetting the finding arrived at by the appellate authority and therefore the impugned order of the High Court is unsustainable in law. In support of this contention reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in the case of Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana 1 whereunder the selfsame provision of the Kerala Act was under consideration. This Court after noticing the word ?propriety? used in Section 20 came to the conclusion that the approach of the High Court was totally wrong and even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. The Court also further observed ?even by the presence of the word ‘propriety? it cannot mean that there could be any reappreciation of evidence?. The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand contended that the aforesaid decision will have no application to the case in hand where the dispute involved relates to a jurisdictional fact and according to the learned counsel where the dispute is in relation to a jurisdictional fact there should not be any fetter on the power of the revisional court even to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion. On being asked to support the aforesaid proposition no authority could be placed though on first principle learned counsel for the respondent argued as aforesaid. Having examined the rival submission and having gone through the decision ofthis Court referred to earlier we are of the considered opinion that though the revisional power under the Rent Act may be wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure it cannot be equated even with the second appellate power conferred on the civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure. Notwithstanding the use of the expression ?propriety? in Section 20, the revisional court therefore will not be entitled to reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion in place of the conclusion of the appellate authority. On examining the impugned judgment of the High Court in the light of the aforesaid ratio of this Court it is crystal clear that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by reappreciating the evidence and in coming to the conclusion that the relationship of landlord-tenant did not exist. In the circumstances, the impugned revisional order of the High Court is wholly unsustainable and we set aside the same and the order of the appellate authority is affirmed.A Constitution Bench of this Court considered the revisional powers of the High Court under Rent Acts operating in different States in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh (2014) 9 SCC 78.   The decision in Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana and others 1 was again referred to in para 16. In para 38 it wasRukmini (1993) 1 SCC 499 holds, and in our view, rightly that even the wider language of Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act does not enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. We are in full agreement with the view of the three-Judge Bench in Rukmini 1 that the word ?propriety? does not confer power upon the High Court to reappreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion but its consideration of evidence is confined to find out legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugnedKalyani Sulochana v. Saradamma, 1991 SCC OnLine Ker 213 : (1991) 2 KLJ 105     before it. We approve the view of this Court in Rukmini (1993) 1 SCC 499.  Considering the instant matter in the backdrop of law laid down by this Court it must be stated that the findings rendered by the courts below were well supported by evidence on record and could not even be said to be perverse in any way. The High Court could not have re-appreciated the evidence and the concurrent findings rendered by the courts below ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction.
### Instruction:
Predict whether the case will result in an affirmative (1) or negative (0) decision for the appeal, and then provide a thorough explanation using key sentences to support your prediction.

### Input:
matter was decided in favour of the appellants by both the courts below. 10. The scope of revisional powers under Section 20 of the Act came up for consideration in Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana and others (1993) 1 SCC 499. While considering whether the High Court could have reappreciated entire evidence, it was laid down:"20. We are afraid this approach of the High Court is wrong. Even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence, the High Court was not right in re- appreciating the entire evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the Commissioner?s report (Exts. C-1 and C-2 mahazar). In our considered view, the High Court had travelled far beyond the revisional jurisdiction. Even by the presence of the word ?propriety? it cannot mean that there could be a re- appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional court can come to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. Therefore, we are unable to agree with the reasoning of the High Court with reference to the exercise of revisional jurisdiction.?11. In Ubaiba v. Damodaran (1999) 5 SCC 645 exercise of revisional power was considered in the context of an issue whether the relationship of landlord- tenant existed or not. It was urged that whether such relationship existed would be a jurisdictional fact. This Court dealt with the matter as under:-"3. Mr K. Sukumaran, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant contended that however wide the jurisdiction of the revisional court under the Act in question may be, but it cannot have jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding upsetting the finding arrived at by the appellate authority and therefore the impugned order of the High Court is unsustainable in law. In support of this contention reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in the case of Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana 1 whereunder the selfsame provision of the Kerala Act was under consideration. This Court after noticing the word ?propriety? used in Section 20 came to the conclusion that the approach of the High Court was totally wrong and even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. The Court also further observed ?even by the presence of the word ‘propriety? it cannot mean that there could be any reappreciation of evidence?. The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand contended that the aforesaid decision will have no application to the case in hand where the dispute involved relates to a jurisdictional fact and according to the learned counsel where the dispute is in relation to a jurisdictional fact there should not be any fetter on the power of the revisional court even to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion. On being asked to support the aforesaid proposition no authority could be placed though on first principle learned counsel for the respondent argued as aforesaid. Having examined the rival submission and having gone through the decision of this Court referred to earlier we are of the considered opinion that though the revisional power under the Rent Act may be wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure it cannot be equated even with the second appellate power conferred on the civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure. Notwithstanding the use of the expression ?propriety? in Section 20, the revisional court therefore will not be entitled to reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion in place of the conclusion of the appellate authority. On examining the impugned judgment of the High Court in the light of the aforesaid ratio of this Court it is crystal clear that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by reappreciating the evidence and in coming to the conclusion that the relationship of landlord-tenant did not exist. In the circumstances, the impugned revisional order of the High Court is wholly unsustainable and we set aside the same and the order of the appellate authority is affirmed.12. A Constitution Bench of this Court considered the revisional powers of the High Court under Rent Acts operating in different States in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh (2014) 9 SCC 78. The decision in Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana and others 1 was again referred to in para 16. In para 38 it was observed:"38. Rukmini (1993) 1 SCC 499 holds, and in our view, rightly that even the wider language of Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act does not enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. We are in full agreement with the view of the three-Judge Bench in Rukmini 1 that the word ?propriety? does not confer power upon the High Court to reappreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion but its consideration of evidence is confined to find out legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned Kalyani Sulochana v. Saradamma, 1991 SCC OnLine Ker 213 : (1991) 2 KLJ 105 before it. We approve the view of this Court in Rukmini (1993) 1 SCC 499. ?13. Considering the instant matter in the backdrop of law laid down by this Court it must be stated that the findings rendered by the courts below were well supported by evidence on record and could not even be said to be perverse in any way. The High Court could not have re-appreciated the evidence and the concurrent findings rendered by the courts below ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction.

### Response:
1

### Explanation:
10. The scope of revisional powers under Section 20 of the Act came up for consideration in Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana and others (1993) 1 SCC 499.   While considering whether the High Court could have reappreciated entire evidence, it was laidWe are afraid this approach of the High Court is wrong. Even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence, the High Court was not right in re- appreciating the entire evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the Commissioner?s report (Exts. C-1 and C-2 mahazar). In our considered view, the High Court had travelled far beyond the revisional jurisdiction. Even by the presence of the word ?propriety? it cannot mean that there could be a re- appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional court can come to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. Therefore, we are unable to agree with the reasoning of the High Court with reference to the exercise of revisional jurisdiction.In Ubaiba v. Damodaran (1999) 5 SCC 645 exercise of revisional power was considered in the context of an issue whether the relationship of landlord- tenant existed or not. It was urged that whether such relationship existed would be a jurisdictional fact. This Court dealt with the matter asMr K. Sukumaran, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant contended that however wide the jurisdiction of the revisional court under the Act in question may be, but it cannot have jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding upsetting the finding arrived at by the appellate authority and therefore the impugned order of the High Court is unsustainable in law. In support of this contention reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in the case of Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana 1 whereunder the selfsame provision of the Kerala Act was under consideration. This Court after noticing the word ?propriety? used in Section 20 came to the conclusion that the approach of the High Court was totally wrong and even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. The Court also further observed ?even by the presence of the word ‘propriety? it cannot mean that there could be any reappreciation of evidence?. The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand contended that the aforesaid decision will have no application to the case in hand where the dispute involved relates to a jurisdictional fact and according to the learned counsel where the dispute is in relation to a jurisdictional fact there should not be any fetter on the power of the revisional court even to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion. On being asked to support the aforesaid proposition no authority could be placed though on first principle learned counsel for the respondent argued as aforesaid. Having examined the rival submission and having gone through the decision ofthis Court referred to earlier we are of the considered opinion that though the revisional power under the Rent Act may be wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure it cannot be equated even with the second appellate power conferred on the civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure. Notwithstanding the use of the expression ?propriety? in Section 20, the revisional court therefore will not be entitled to reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion in place of the conclusion of the appellate authority. On examining the impugned judgment of the High Court in the light of the aforesaid ratio of this Court it is crystal clear that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by reappreciating the evidence and in coming to the conclusion that the relationship of landlord-tenant did not exist. In the circumstances, the impugned revisional order of the High Court is wholly unsustainable and we set aside the same and the order of the appellate authority is affirmed.A Constitution Bench of this Court considered the revisional powers of the High Court under Rent Acts operating in different States in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh (2014) 9 SCC 78.   The decision in Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana and others 1 was again referred to in para 16. In para 38 it wasRukmini (1993) 1 SCC 499 holds, and in our view, rightly that even the wider language of Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act does not enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. We are in full agreement with the view of the three-Judge Bench in Rukmini 1 that the word ?propriety? does not confer power upon the High Court to reappreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion but its consideration of evidence is confined to find out legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugnedKalyani Sulochana v. Saradamma, 1991 SCC OnLine Ker 213 : (1991) 2 KLJ 105     before it. We approve the view of this Court in Rukmini (1993) 1 SCC 499.  Considering the instant matter in the backdrop of law laid down by this Court it must be stated that the findings rendered by the courts below were well supported by evidence on record and could not even be said to be perverse in any way. The High Court could not have re-appreciated the evidence and the concurrent findings rendered by the courts below ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction.
