Vundavalli Ratna Manikyam &amp; another Vs. V.P.P.R.N. Prasada Rao
to perform his part of the contract and all throughout it was the plaintiff who challenged the acquisition proceedings which shows the bonafides on the part of the plaintiff, the High Court has rightly allowed the appeal and consequently has rightly decreed the suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981. 5.5 It is further submitted by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent herein - original plaintiff that as such there is no appeal preferred by the defendants challenging the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court insofar as dismissing their appeals being Tr.A.S. No. 439/2006 and Tr.A.S. No. 962/2013 by which the High Court specifically confirmed the findings on issue nos. 1 to 5 in O.S. No. 55/1986 and also confirmed the judgment and decree of permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiff in O.S. No. 94/1989. 5.6 It is further submitted by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent herein - original plaintiff that as such the plaintiff is in possession of the suit property since 1981 and therefore also the present appeal is required to be dismissed. 5.7 It is further submitted by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent herein - original plaintiff that even otherwise and with a view to put an end to the litigation the plaintiff is ready and willing to pay some more amount than what is required to be paid under the agreement to sell. 5.8 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the present appeal. 6. In reply, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants – original defendants has submitted that if the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is set aside and the property/land in question is reverted back to the appellants -, the appellants are ready and willing to pay a handsome amount to the plaintiff. 7. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties at length and perused and considered the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court as well as the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. 7.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that the original plaintiff instituted the suit for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981 (Ex.A1). It is not in dispute that under the agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981, the sale deed was to be executed within a period of four months from the date of execution of agreement to sell i.e. 7.5.1981. However, thereafter time was extended by a further period of eight months i.e. up to 6.5.1982. However, before any further steps could be taken by the plaintiff and the original vendor, the suit property was subjected to the acquisition by the State Government. It was the plaintiff who made a representation to the Assistant Collector and requested for deletion of the property from the acquisition. A similar representation was made by the original vendor also. It is required to be noted that in the representations both the vendor and the vendee specifically stated that the land in question has been sold in favour of the plaintiff and that he is in possession. Therefore, the original vendor as such admitted the execution of the agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981 as well as handing over the possession of the suit property to the plaintiff. Therefore, the learned trial Court as such rightly believed the execution of the agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981 as well as handing over of possession to the plaintiff. The same is rightly confirmed by the High Court. 7.2 However, the trial Court dismissed the suit solely on the ground that the suit for specific performance was barred by limitation applying Article 54 of the Limitation Act. On the other hand, it was the specific case on behalf of the plaintiff that in the facts and circumstances of the case Article 113 of the Limitation Act shall be applicable as the suit was filed within a period of three years when the right to sue accrued. According to the plaintiff, the right to sue accrued when the plaintiff served a notice upon the defendants to execute the sale deed and the defendants refused to execute the sale deed. At this stage, it is required to be noted that under the agreement to sell it was for the vendor to settle all the disputes in the property. As the land in question was subjected to the acquisition and thereafter the acquisition proceedings came to be quashed and set aside at the instance of the plaintiff in the year 1984/1985 and thereafter the plaintiff served a legal notice upon the defendants on 20.01.1986 calling upon the defendants to execute the sale deed which came to be refused by reply notice dated 31.1.1986 and thereafter the suit for specific performance was preferred, as rightly observed by the High Court, Article 113 of the Limitation Act would be applicable and not Article 54 of the Limitation Act as applied by the learned trial Court. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court in applying Article 113 of the Limitation Act. As observed hereinabove, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit solely on the ground that the suit is barred by limitation considering Article 54 of the Limitation Act though all other findings with respect to the execution of agreement to sell., the plaintiff was put in possession etc. were held to be in favour of the plaintiff. 7.3 Therefore applying Article 113 of the Limitation Act to the facts of the case on hand and the conduct of the plaintiff all throughout to protect not only his possession but to protect the property from acquisition and that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement to sell/contract, the High Court has rightly decreed the suit for specific performance. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court.
0[ds]7.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that the original plaintiff instituted the suit for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981 (Ex.A1). It is not in dispute that under the agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981, the sale deed was to be executed within a period of four months from the date of execution of agreement to sell i.e. 7.5.1981. However, thereafter time was extended by a further period of eight months i.e. up to 6.5.1982. However, before any further steps could be taken by the plaintiff and the original vendor, the suit property was subjected to the acquisition by the State Government. It was the plaintiff who made a representation to the Assistant Collector and requested for deletion of the property from the acquisition. A similar representation was made by the original vendor also. It is required to be noted that in the representations both the vendor and the vendee specifically stated that the land in question has been sold in favour of the plaintiff and that he is in possession. Therefore, the original vendor as such admitted the execution of the agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981 as well as handing over the possession of the suit property to the plaintiff. Therefore, the learned trial Court as such rightly believed the execution of the agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981 as well as handing over of possession to the plaintiff. The same is rightly confirmed by the High Court7.2 However, the trial Court dismissed the suit solely on the ground that the suit for specific performance was barred by limitation applying Article 54 of the Limitation Act. On the other hand, it was the specific case on behalf of the plaintiff that in the facts and circumstances of the case Article 113 of the Limitation Act shall be applicable as the suit was filed within a period of three years when the right to sue accrued. According to the plaintiff, the right to sue accrued when the plaintiff served a notice upon the defendants to execute the sale deed and the defendants refused to execute the sale deed. At this stage, it is required to be noted that under the agreement to sell it was for the vendor to settle all the disputes in the property. As the land in question was subjected to the acquisition and thereafter the acquisition proceedings came to be quashed and set aside at the instance of the plaintiff in the year 1984/1985 and thereafter the plaintiff served a legal notice upon the defendants on 20.01.1986 calling upon the defendants to execute the sale deed which came to be refused by reply notice dated 31.1.1986 and thereafter the suit for specific performance was preferred, as rightly observed by the High Court, Article 113 of the Limitation Act would be applicable and not Article 54 of the Limitation Act as applied by the learned trial Court. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court in applying Article 113 of the Limitation Act. As observed hereinabove, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit solely on the ground that the suit is barred by limitation considering Article 54 of the Limitation Act though all other findings with respect to the execution of agreement to sell., the plaintiff was put in possession etc. were held to be in favour of the plaintiff7.3 Therefore applying Article 113 of the Limitation Act to the facts of the case on hand and the conduct of the plaintiff all throughout to protect not only his possession but to protect the property from acquisition and that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement to sell/contract, the High Court has rightly decreed the suit for specific performance. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court.
### Instruction:
First, predict whether the appeal in case proceeding will be accepted (1) or not (0), and then explain the decision by identifying crucial sentences from the document.

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to perform his part of the contract and all throughout it was the plaintiff who challenged the acquisition proceedings which shows the bonafides on the part of the plaintiff, the High Court has rightly allowed the appeal and consequently has rightly decreed the suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981. 5.5 It is further submitted by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent herein - original plaintiff that as such there is no appeal preferred by the defendants challenging the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court insofar as dismissing their appeals being Tr.A.S. No. 439/2006 and Tr.A.S. No. 962/2013 by which the High Court specifically confirmed the findings on issue nos. 1 to 5 in O.S. No. 55/1986 and also confirmed the judgment and decree of permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiff in O.S. No. 94/1989. 5.6 It is further submitted by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent herein - original plaintiff that as such the plaintiff is in possession of the suit property since 1981 and therefore also the present appeal is required to be dismissed. 5.7 It is further submitted by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent herein - original plaintiff that even otherwise and with a view to put an end to the litigation the plaintiff is ready and willing to pay some more amount than what is required to be paid under the agreement to sell. 5.8 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the present appeal. 6. In reply, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants – original defendants has submitted that if the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is set aside and the property/land in question is reverted back to the appellants -, the appellants are ready and willing to pay a handsome amount to the plaintiff. 7. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties at length and perused and considered the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court as well as the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. 7.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that the original plaintiff instituted the suit for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981 (Ex.A1). It is not in dispute that under the agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981, the sale deed was to be executed within a period of four months from the date of execution of agreement to sell i.e. 7.5.1981. However, thereafter time was extended by a further period of eight months i.e. up to 6.5.1982. However, before any further steps could be taken by the plaintiff and the original vendor, the suit property was subjected to the acquisition by the State Government. It was the plaintiff who made a representation to the Assistant Collector and requested for deletion of the property from the acquisition. A similar representation was made by the original vendor also. It is required to be noted that in the representations both the vendor and the vendee specifically stated that the land in question has been sold in favour of the plaintiff and that he is in possession. Therefore, the original vendor as such admitted the execution of the agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981 as well as handing over the possession of the suit property to the plaintiff. Therefore, the learned trial Court as such rightly believed the execution of the agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981 as well as handing over of possession to the plaintiff. The same is rightly confirmed by the High Court. 7.2 However, the trial Court dismissed the suit solely on the ground that the suit for specific performance was barred by limitation applying Article 54 of the Limitation Act. On the other hand, it was the specific case on behalf of the plaintiff that in the facts and circumstances of the case Article 113 of the Limitation Act shall be applicable as the suit was filed within a period of three years when the right to sue accrued. According to the plaintiff, the right to sue accrued when the plaintiff served a notice upon the defendants to execute the sale deed and the defendants refused to execute the sale deed. At this stage, it is required to be noted that under the agreement to sell it was for the vendor to settle all the disputes in the property. As the land in question was subjected to the acquisition and thereafter the acquisition proceedings came to be quashed and set aside at the instance of the plaintiff in the year 1984/1985 and thereafter the plaintiff served a legal notice upon the defendants on 20.01.1986 calling upon the defendants to execute the sale deed which came to be refused by reply notice dated 31.1.1986 and thereafter the suit for specific performance was preferred, as rightly observed by the High Court, Article 113 of the Limitation Act would be applicable and not Article 54 of the Limitation Act as applied by the learned trial Court. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court in applying Article 113 of the Limitation Act. As observed hereinabove, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit solely on the ground that the suit is barred by limitation considering Article 54 of the Limitation Act though all other findings with respect to the execution of agreement to sell., the plaintiff was put in possession etc. were held to be in favour of the plaintiff. 7.3 Therefore applying Article 113 of the Limitation Act to the facts of the case on hand and the conduct of the plaintiff all throughout to protect not only his possession but to protect the property from acquisition and that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement to sell/contract, the High Court has rightly decreed the suit for specific performance. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court.

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### Explanation:
7.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that the original plaintiff instituted the suit for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981 (Ex.A1). It is not in dispute that under the agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981, the sale deed was to be executed within a period of four months from the date of execution of agreement to sell i.e. 7.5.1981. However, thereafter time was extended by a further period of eight months i.e. up to 6.5.1982. However, before any further steps could be taken by the plaintiff and the original vendor, the suit property was subjected to the acquisition by the State Government. It was the plaintiff who made a representation to the Assistant Collector and requested for deletion of the property from the acquisition. A similar representation was made by the original vendor also. It is required to be noted that in the representations both the vendor and the vendee specifically stated that the land in question has been sold in favour of the plaintiff and that he is in possession. Therefore, the original vendor as such admitted the execution of the agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981 as well as handing over the possession of the suit property to the plaintiff. Therefore, the learned trial Court as such rightly believed the execution of the agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981 as well as handing over of possession to the plaintiff. The same is rightly confirmed by the High Court7.2 However, the trial Court dismissed the suit solely on the ground that the suit for specific performance was barred by limitation applying Article 54 of the Limitation Act. On the other hand, it was the specific case on behalf of the plaintiff that in the facts and circumstances of the case Article 113 of the Limitation Act shall be applicable as the suit was filed within a period of three years when the right to sue accrued. According to the plaintiff, the right to sue accrued when the plaintiff served a notice upon the defendants to execute the sale deed and the defendants refused to execute the sale deed. At this stage, it is required to be noted that under the agreement to sell it was for the vendor to settle all the disputes in the property. As the land in question was subjected to the acquisition and thereafter the acquisition proceedings came to be quashed and set aside at the instance of the plaintiff in the year 1984/1985 and thereafter the plaintiff served a legal notice upon the defendants on 20.01.1986 calling upon the defendants to execute the sale deed which came to be refused by reply notice dated 31.1.1986 and thereafter the suit for specific performance was preferred, as rightly observed by the High Court, Article 113 of the Limitation Act would be applicable and not Article 54 of the Limitation Act as applied by the learned trial Court. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court in applying Article 113 of the Limitation Act. As observed hereinabove, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit solely on the ground that the suit is barred by limitation considering Article 54 of the Limitation Act though all other findings with respect to the execution of agreement to sell., the plaintiff was put in possession etc. were held to be in favour of the plaintiff7.3 Therefore applying Article 113 of the Limitation Act to the facts of the case on hand and the conduct of the plaintiff all throughout to protect not only his possession but to protect the property from acquisition and that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement to sell/contract, the High Court has rightly decreed the suit for specific performance. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court.
