Kangra Valley Slate Co. Ltd Vs. State Of Punjab &amp; Ors
acknowledging their receipts and disposal thereof was to see that the development of mines and exploitation of minerals took place both in a regulated manner and without any undue delay. R. 28 with which we are immediately concerned not only lays down the time within which a renewal application is to be made but also provides that if it is not disposed of before the expiry of the lease the period of the lease shall be deemed to have been extended for a further period of six months or ending with the date of the receipt of the orders of the State Government thereon whichever is shorter..The object of providing time limit for the renewal application was that sufficient time before the expiry of lease was available to the State Government to decide whether the renewal should be granted or not, for, if the renewal was not granted the land in question would be available for re-grant and the State Government would have to declare that the land was so available for re-grant, invite applications for the grant of the lease and follow the procedure laid down in the Act and the Rules therefore. It is obvious that if the time of six months prescribed in rules 22 and 28 was not available to the State Government it would not be possible for it to decide within time and to follow the procedure for granting a fresh lease to someone else. The result would be that mining operations would be delayed in that particular land and to, that extent the object of the Act and the duty imposed by s. 18 on the Central Government would be delayed or defeated. Considering the scheme and the object of the Act and the rules it is not possible to agree with Mr. Gupte that r. 28 was not intended to be mandatory and is only directory.8. Mr. Gupte next contended that r. 28 laying down the period 1 limitation for renewal application was ultra vires sec. 13(2) of the Act, as the time limit prescribed in the rule does not fall under any of the matters set out in that subsection. Assuming that it is so, sub-sec. 1 authorises the Central Government to make rules for regulating the grant of mining leases and the Central Government in pursuance of that power can make rules including the, one laying down the time within which a renewal application should be made. A grant of renewal of a lease is granting a mining lease, and therefore, fixing time within which an application for it should be made would be regulating the grant of a lease. A similar contention was considered in King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee(-7-2 I.A. 241 at 8) in connection with r. 25 of the Defence of India Rules made under S. 2 of the Defence of India Act, 1939, as amended in 1940, and the Privy Council held that though the rule did not fall under any of the matters enumerated in sub-sec. 2 of sec. 2, the rule was competent as it would be one which could be made under the generality of Powers contained in sub-sec. 1 of sec. 2.Their Lordships held that the function of sub-sec. 2 was merely an illustrative one considering that the rule making power was conferred by sub-sec. 1 and the rules referred to in the opening sentence of sub-sec. 2 were the rules which were authorised by and made under sub-sec. 1. Therefore, the provisions of sub-sec. 2 were not restrictive of sub-sec. 1 and that indeed was expressly stated by the words "without prejudice to the generality of the powers confer red by sub-sec. 1". The general language of sub-sec. 1, therefore, amply justified the terms of r. 26 and avoided the contention that it was not justified under sub-sec. 2. These observations were followed with approval in State of Kerala v. Shri M. Appukutty( [1963] Supp.1 C.R.563, 569, 570) where the vires of r. 17 of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules made under s. 19 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 9 of 1939 were challenged and the challenge was rejected. The argument, therefore, that r. 28 was invalid by reason of its not falling under any one of the matters set out in s. 13(2) is without substance.9. In the view that we take that r. 28 is a valid rule and that it is mandatory, the application was clearly beyond the time appointed under the rule, the company having failed to establish that it was made, as it alleged, on September 20, 1961. In that view it would not be necessary for us to go into the questions whether the order of the Central Government not being a speaking order was bad or whether the application by the company was not a valid one inasmuch as the company was not possessed a certificate of approval at the date when the application was made and its copy was, not annexed -thereto as required by Form J. Assuming that the application was a valid one and that the requirement of annexing the copy of the certificate of approval was not mandatory and assuming further that the order of the Central Government was not a valid one, the only thing that we could be asked to do would be to send back the matter to the Central Government directing it to pass a proper order. But in the view that we have taken of r. 28 and consequently of the application for renewal being time-barred, the Central Government can only reject once again the revision application adding in its order that the Director was right in rejecting the application as it was time-barred. Such an order of remand would serve no useful purpose so far as the appellant company is concerned. That being so, it is not worth our while to interfere under Art. 136 with the order of the Central Government and ask that Government to pass a fresh order.10.
0[ds]It is clear that the object of these rules laying down time limits for making applications, acknowledging their receipts and disposal thereof was to see that the development of mines and exploitation of minerals took place both in a regulated manner and without any undue delay. R. 28 with which we are immediately concerned not only lays down the time within which a renewal application is to be made but also provides that if it is not disposed of before the expiry of the lease the period of the lease shall be deemed to have been extended for a further period of six months or ending with the date of the receipt of the orders of the State Government thereon whichever is shorter..The object of providing time limit for the renewal application was that sufficient time before the expiry of lease was available to the State Government to decide whether the renewal should be granted or not, for, if the renewal was not granted the land in question would be available for re-grant and the State Government would have to declare that the land was so available for re-grant, invite applications for the grant of the lease and follow the procedure laid down in the Act and the Rules therefore. It is obvious that if the time of six months prescribed in rules 22 and 28 was not available to the State Government it would not be possible for it to decide within time and to follow the procedure for granting a fresh lease to someone else. The result would be that mining operations would be delayed in that particular land and to, that extent the object of the Act and the duty imposed by s. 18 on the Central Government would be delayed or defeated. Considering the scheme and the object of the Act and the rules it is not possible to agree with Mr. Gupte that r. 28 was not intended to be mandatory and is onlythe view that we take that r. 28 is a valid rule and that it is mandatory, the application was clearly beyond the time appointed under the rule, the company having failed to establish that it was made, as it alleged, on September 20, 1961. In that view it would not be necessary for us to go into the questions whether the order of the Central Government not being a speaking order was bad or whether the application by the company was not a valid one inasmuch as the company was not possessed a certificate of approval at the date when the application was made and its copy was, not annexed -thereto as required by Form J. Assuming that the application was a valid one and that the requirement of annexing the copy of the certificate of approval was not mandatory and assuming further that the order of the Central Government was not a valid one, the only thing that we could be asked to do would be to send back the matter to the Central Government directing it to pass a proper order. But in the view that we have taken of r. 28 and consequently of the application for renewal being time-barred, the Central Government can only reject once again the revision application adding in its order that the Director was right in rejecting the application as it was time-barred. Such an order of remand would serve no useful purpose so far as the appellant company is concerned. That being so, it is not worth our while to interfere under Art. 136 with the order of the Central Government and ask that Government to pass a fresh order.
### Instruction:
Hypothesize the court's verdict (affirmation (1) or negation (0) of the appeal), and then clarify this hypothesis by interpreting significant sentences from the case proceeding.

### Input:
acknowledging their receipts and disposal thereof was to see that the development of mines and exploitation of minerals took place both in a regulated manner and without any undue delay. R. 28 with which we are immediately concerned not only lays down the time within which a renewal application is to be made but also provides that if it is not disposed of before the expiry of the lease the period of the lease shall be deemed to have been extended for a further period of six months or ending with the date of the receipt of the orders of the State Government thereon whichever is shorter..The object of providing time limit for the renewal application was that sufficient time before the expiry of lease was available to the State Government to decide whether the renewal should be granted or not, for, if the renewal was not granted the land in question would be available for re-grant and the State Government would have to declare that the land was so available for re-grant, invite applications for the grant of the lease and follow the procedure laid down in the Act and the Rules therefore. It is obvious that if the time of six months prescribed in rules 22 and 28 was not available to the State Government it would not be possible for it to decide within time and to follow the procedure for granting a fresh lease to someone else. The result would be that mining operations would be delayed in that particular land and to, that extent the object of the Act and the duty imposed by s. 18 on the Central Government would be delayed or defeated. Considering the scheme and the object of the Act and the rules it is not possible to agree with Mr. Gupte that r. 28 was not intended to be mandatory and is only directory.8. Mr. Gupte next contended that r. 28 laying down the period 1 limitation for renewal application was ultra vires sec. 13(2) of the Act, as the time limit prescribed in the rule does not fall under any of the matters set out in that subsection. Assuming that it is so, sub-sec. 1 authorises the Central Government to make rules for regulating the grant of mining leases and the Central Government in pursuance of that power can make rules including the, one laying down the time within which a renewal application should be made. A grant of renewal of a lease is granting a mining lease, and therefore, fixing time within which an application for it should be made would be regulating the grant of a lease. A similar contention was considered in King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee(-7-2 I.A. 241 at 8) in connection with r. 25 of the Defence of India Rules made under S. 2 of the Defence of India Act, 1939, as amended in 1940, and the Privy Council held that though the rule did not fall under any of the matters enumerated in sub-sec. 2 of sec. 2, the rule was competent as it would be one which could be made under the generality of Powers contained in sub-sec. 1 of sec. 2.Their Lordships held that the function of sub-sec. 2 was merely an illustrative one considering that the rule making power was conferred by sub-sec. 1 and the rules referred to in the opening sentence of sub-sec. 2 were the rules which were authorised by and made under sub-sec. 1. Therefore, the provisions of sub-sec. 2 were not restrictive of sub-sec. 1 and that indeed was expressly stated by the words "without prejudice to the generality of the powers confer red by sub-sec. 1". The general language of sub-sec. 1, therefore, amply justified the terms of r. 26 and avoided the contention that it was not justified under sub-sec. 2. These observations were followed with approval in State of Kerala v. Shri M. Appukutty( [1963] Supp.1 C.R.563, 569, 570) where the vires of r. 17 of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules made under s. 19 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 9 of 1939 were challenged and the challenge was rejected. The argument, therefore, that r. 28 was invalid by reason of its not falling under any one of the matters set out in s. 13(2) is without substance.9. In the view that we take that r. 28 is a valid rule and that it is mandatory, the application was clearly beyond the time appointed under the rule, the company having failed to establish that it was made, as it alleged, on September 20, 1961. In that view it would not be necessary for us to go into the questions whether the order of the Central Government not being a speaking order was bad or whether the application by the company was not a valid one inasmuch as the company was not possessed a certificate of approval at the date when the application was made and its copy was, not annexed -thereto as required by Form J. Assuming that the application was a valid one and that the requirement of annexing the copy of the certificate of approval was not mandatory and assuming further that the order of the Central Government was not a valid one, the only thing that we could be asked to do would be to send back the matter to the Central Government directing it to pass a proper order. But in the view that we have taken of r. 28 and consequently of the application for renewal being time-barred, the Central Government can only reject once again the revision application adding in its order that the Director was right in rejecting the application as it was time-barred. Such an order of remand would serve no useful purpose so far as the appellant company is concerned. That being so, it is not worth our while to interfere under Art. 136 with the order of the Central Government and ask that Government to pass a fresh order.10.

### Response:
0

### Explanation:
It is clear that the object of these rules laying down time limits for making applications, acknowledging their receipts and disposal thereof was to see that the development of mines and exploitation of minerals took place both in a regulated manner and without any undue delay. R. 28 with which we are immediately concerned not only lays down the time within which a renewal application is to be made but also provides that if it is not disposed of before the expiry of the lease the period of the lease shall be deemed to have been extended for a further period of six months or ending with the date of the receipt of the orders of the State Government thereon whichever is shorter..The object of providing time limit for the renewal application was that sufficient time before the expiry of lease was available to the State Government to decide whether the renewal should be granted or not, for, if the renewal was not granted the land in question would be available for re-grant and the State Government would have to declare that the land was so available for re-grant, invite applications for the grant of the lease and follow the procedure laid down in the Act and the Rules therefore. It is obvious that if the time of six months prescribed in rules 22 and 28 was not available to the State Government it would not be possible for it to decide within time and to follow the procedure for granting a fresh lease to someone else. The result would be that mining operations would be delayed in that particular land and to, that extent the object of the Act and the duty imposed by s. 18 on the Central Government would be delayed or defeated. Considering the scheme and the object of the Act and the rules it is not possible to agree with Mr. Gupte that r. 28 was not intended to be mandatory and is onlythe view that we take that r. 28 is a valid rule and that it is mandatory, the application was clearly beyond the time appointed under the rule, the company having failed to establish that it was made, as it alleged, on September 20, 1961. In that view it would not be necessary for us to go into the questions whether the order of the Central Government not being a speaking order was bad or whether the application by the company was not a valid one inasmuch as the company was not possessed a certificate of approval at the date when the application was made and its copy was, not annexed -thereto as required by Form J. Assuming that the application was a valid one and that the requirement of annexing the copy of the certificate of approval was not mandatory and assuming further that the order of the Central Government was not a valid one, the only thing that we could be asked to do would be to send back the matter to the Central Government directing it to pass a proper order. But in the view that we have taken of r. 28 and consequently of the application for renewal being time-barred, the Central Government can only reject once again the revision application adding in its order that the Director was right in rejecting the application as it was time-barred. Such an order of remand would serve no useful purpose so far as the appellant company is concerned. That being so, it is not worth our while to interfere under Art. 136 with the order of the Central Government and ask that Government to pass a fresh order.
