State of Punjab  Vs. Salil Sabhlok and Ors.
quo warranto but to other directions, orders or writs. In Dwarka Nath v. Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, D Ward, Kanpur and Anr. (supra), K. Subba Rao, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench, has explained the wide scope of the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution thus: This article is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it ex facie confers a wide power on the High Courts to reach injustice wherever it is found. The Constitution designedly used a wide language in describing the nature of the power, the purpose for which and the person or authority against whom it can be exercised. It can issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs as understood in England; but the scope of those writs also is widened by the use of the expression nature, for the said expression does not equate the writs that can be issued in India with those in England, but only draws an analogy from them. That apart, High Courts can also issue directions, orders or writs other than the prerogative writs. It enables the High Courts to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. Any attempt to equate the scope of the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution with that of the English Courts to issue prerogative writs is to introduce the unnecessary procedural restrictions grown over the years in a comparatively small country like England with a unitary form of government to a vast country like India functioning under a federal structure. Such a construction defeats the purpose of the article itself. To say this is not to say that the High Courts can function arbitrarily under this Article. Some limitations are implicit in the article and Ors. may be evolved to direct the article through defined channels. This interpretation has been accepted by this Court in T.C. Basappa v. Nagappa, 1955 1 SCR 250 : AIR 1954 SC 440 and Irani v. State of Madras 1962 (2) SCR 169 : AIR 1961 SC 1731 . Therefore, I hold that the High Court should not normally, in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution, interfere with the discretion of the State Government in selecting and appointing the Chairman of the State Public Service Commission, but in an exceptional case if it is shown that relevant factors implied from the very nature of the duties entrusted to Public Service Commissions under Article 320 of the Constitution have not been considered by the State Government in selecting and appointing the Chairman of the State Public Service Commission, the High Court can invoke its wide and extra-ordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution and quash the selection and appointment to ensure that the discretion of the State Government is exercised within the bounds of the Constitution. 35. Coming now to the facts of the present case, I find that the Division Bench of the High Court in its order dated 13.07.2011 has already held that the irregularities and illegalities alleged against Mr. Harish Dhanda have not been substantiated. I must, however, enquire whether the State Government took into consideration the relevant factors relating to his competency to act as the Chairman of the State Public Service Commission. We had, therefore, passed orders on 01.08.2012 calling upon the State of Punjab to produce before us the material referred to in para 69 of the judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court on the basis of which Mr. Harish Dhanda was selected for appointment as Chairman of the Punjab Public Service Commission. Pursuant to the order dated 01.08.2012, the State Government has produced the files in which the selection and appointment of Mr. Harish Dhanda was processed by the State Government. At page 26 of the file on the subject Appointment of Chairman of P.P.S.C.- Mr. S.K. Sinha, IAS, Mr. Harish Rai Dhanda, I find that a bio-data in one sheet has been placed at page 41 of the file, which reads as under: BIO DATA Harish Rai Dhanda S/o. Sh. Kulbhushan Rai Resident: The Retreat, Ferozepur Road, Ludhiana Date of Birth: 15th May, 1960 Attained Bachelor in Arts from SCD Government College, Ludhiana, Punjab University, (1979). Attained Bachelor in Laws from Law College, Punjab University (1982). Registered with Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana as Advocate in 1982. Practiced Law at District Courts, Ludhiana from 1982 to 2007. Elected as President of District Bar Association, Ludhiana for seven terms. Besides the aforesaid bio-data, there is a certificate dated 06.07.2011 given by the Speaker, Punjab Vidhan Sabha, certifying that Mr. Harish Rai Dhanda, MLA, has resigned from the membership of the 13th Punjab Legislative Assembly with effect from 06.07.2011 and that his resignation has been accepted by the Speaker. The aforesaid materials indicate that Mr. Harish Dhanda had B.A. and L.L.B Degrees and was practicing as an Advocate at the District Courts in Ludhiana and had been elected as the President of the District Bar Association, Ludhiana for seven terms and has been member of the Legislative Assembly. These materials do not indicate that Mr. Harish Dhanda had any knowledge or experience whatsoever either in administration or in recruitment nor do these materials indicate that Mr. Harish Dhanda had the qualities to perform the duties as the Chairman of the State Public Service Commission under Article 320 of the Constitution which I have discussed in this judgment. No other information through affidavit has also been placed on record before us to show that Mr. Harish Dhanda has the positive qualities to perform the duties of the office of the Chairman of the State Public Service Commission under Article 320 of the Constitution. The decision of the State Government to appoint Mr. Harish Dhanda as the Chairman of the Punjab Public Service Commission was thus invalid for non-consideration of relevant factors implied from the very nature of the duties entrusted to the Public Service Commissions under Article 320 of the Constitution.
1[ds]I have perused the writ petition CWP No. 11846 of 2011, which was filed before the High Court by the Respondent No. 1, and I find that in the first paragraph of the writ petition the Respondent No. 1 has stated that he was a public spirited person and that he had filed the writ petition for espousing the public interest and for the betterment of citizens of the State of Punjab. In the writ petition, the Respondent No. 1 has relied on the provisions of Articles 315, 316, 317, 318, 319 and 320 of the Constitution relating to Public Service Commissions to contend that the functions of the Public Service Commission are sensitive and important and it is very essential that a person, who is appointed as the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, must possess outstanding and high degree educational qualifications and a great amount of experience in the field of selection, administration and recruitment and he must also be a man of integrity and impartiality. The Respondent No. 1 has alleged in the writ petition that the State Government has not laid down any qualification for appointment to the post of Chairman of the Punjab Public Service Commission and is continuing to appoint persons to the post of Chairman of Public Service Commission on the basis of political affiliation. In the writ petition, the Respondent No. 1 has also given the example of Mr. Ravi Pal Singh Sidhu, who was appointed as the Chairman, Punjab Public Service Commission on the basis of political affiliation and the result was that during his period as the Chairman of the Punjab Public Service Commission, several cases of undeserving candidates being selected and appointed to the Public Service Commission in the State of Punjab came to light and investigations were carried out leading to filing of various criminal cases against the officials of the Public Service Commission as well Mr. Sidhu. The Respondent No. 1 has further stated in the writ petition that he has filed the writ petition after he read a news report titled: MLA Dhanda to be new PPSC Chairperson. He has stated in the writ petition that Mr. Harish Dhanda was an Advocate at Ludhiana before he ventured into politics and had unsuccessfully contested the Vidhan Sabha election before he was elected as MLA on the Shiromani Akali Dal ticket and that he had close political affiliation and affinity with high ups of the ruling party and that the ruling party in the State of Punjab has cleared his name for appointment as the Chairman of the Punjab Public Service Commission shortly. The Respondent No. 1 has also alleged in the writ petition various irregularities and illegalities committed by Mr. Harish Dhanda. He has further stated in the writ petition that his colleague has even sent a representation to the Governor of Punjab and the Chief Minister of Punjab against the proposed appointment of Mr. Harish Dhanda. He has accordingly prayed in the writ petition for a mandamus to the State of Punjab to frame Regulations governing the conditions of service and appointment of the Chairman and Members of the Punjab Public Service Commission and for an order restraining the State of Punjab from appointing Mr. Harish Dhanda as Chairman of the Punjab Public Service Commission. On a reading of the entire writ petition filed by the Respondent No. 1 before the High Court, I have no doubt that the Respondent No. 1 has filed this writ petition for espousing the cause of the general public of the State of Punjab with a view to ensure that a person appointed as the Chairman of the Punjab Public Service Commission is a man of ability and integrity so that recruitment to public services in the State of Punjab are from the best available talents and are fair and is not influenced by politics and extraneous considerations. Considering the averments in the writ petition, I cannot hold that the writ petition is just a service matter in which only the aggrieved party has the locus to initiate a legal action in the court of law. The writ petition is a matter affecting interest of the general public in the State of Punjab and any member of the public could espouse the cause of the general public so long as his bonafides are not in doubt. Therefore, I do not accept the submission of Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior Counsel appearing for the State of Punjab, that the writ petition was a service matter and the High Court was not right in entertaining the writ petition as a Public Interest Litigation at the instance of the Respondent No. 1. The decisions cited by Mr. Rao were in cases where this Court found that the nature of the matter before the Court was essentially a service matter and this Court accordingly held that in such service matters, the aggrieved party and not any third party can only initiate a legal action.As I have noticed, the Respondent No. 1 had, in the writ petition, relied on the constitutional provisions in Articles 315, 316, 317, 318, 319 and 320 of the Constitution to plead that the functions of the Public Service Commissions were of a sensitive and critical nature and hence the Chairman of the Public Service Commission must possess outstanding and high educational qualifications and a great amount of experience in the field of selection, administration and recruitment. The Respondent No. 1 has further pleaded in the writ petition that the State Government had on an earlier occasion made an appointment of a Chairman of the Punjab Public Service Commission on the basis of political affiliation and this has resulted in selection and appointment of undeserving persons to public service for extraneous considerations. Though Respondent No. 1 had alleged in the writ petition some irregularities and illegalities on the part of Mr. Harish Dhanda, who was proposed to be appointed as Chairman of the Public Service Commission by the State Government, the writ petition was not founded only on such irregularities and illegalities alleged against Mr. Harish Dhanda. In addition, the Respondent No. 1 had also alleged in the writ petition that Mr. Harish Dhanda was politically affiliated to the ruling party and was not selected for appointment as Chairman of the Public Service Commission on the basis of his qualifications, experience or ability which are necessary for the post of the Chairman of the Public Service Commission. Thus, even if the Division Bench had recorded a finding in the order dated 13.07.2011 that the irregularities and illegalities pointed out in the writ petition against Mr. Harish Dhanda do not stand substantiated, the writ petition could not be disposed of with the said finding only.25. It will be clear from the Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the order dated 13.07.2011 quoted above that the Division Bench of the High Court found that Article 316 of the Constitution, which provides for appointment of the Chairman and other Members of the Public Service Commission by the Governor, does not prescribe any particular procedure and took the view that, having regard to the purpose and nature of appointment, it cannot be assumed that power of appointment need not be regulated by any procedure. The Division Bench of the High Court was of the further view that the persons to be appointed must have competence and integrity, but how such persons are to be identified and selected must be considered by a Bench of three Judges and accordingly referred the matter to the three Judges. The Division Bench also referred the question to the larger Bench of three Judges as to whether the procedure adopted in the present case for appointing Mr. Harish Dhanda as the Chairman of the Punjab Public Service Commission was valid and if not, what is the effect of not following the procedure. I do not, therefore, find any merit in the submission of Mr. Rao that the Division Bench of the High Court having found in its order dated 13.07.2011 that the irregularities and illegalities pointed out in the writ petition against Mr. Harish Dhanda are unsubstantiated, should not have made an academic reference to the larger Bench of the High Court.In Mehar Singh Saini Chairman, HPSC In Re (supra), this Court noticed that the provisions of Article 316 of the Constitution do not lay down any qualification, educational or otherwise, for appointment to the Commission as Chairman and Members and made the following observations in Para 85 of the judgment as reported in the SCC:Desirability, if any, of providing specific qualification or experience for appointment as Chairman/members of the Commission is a function of Parliament. The guidelines or parameters, if any, including that of stature, if required to be specified, are for the appropriate Government to frame. This requires expertise in the field, data study and adoption of the best methodology by the Government concerned to make appointments to the Commission on merit, ability and integrity. Neither is such expertise available with the Court nor will it be in consonance with the constitutional scheme that this Court should venture into reading such qualifications into Article 316 or provide any specific guidelines controlling the academic qualification, experience and stature of an individual who is proposed to be appointed to this coveted office. of course, while declining to enter into such arena, we still feel constrained to observe that this is a matter which needs the attention of the Parliamentarians and quarters concerned in the Governments. One of the factors, which has persuaded us to make this observation, is the number of cases which have been referred to this Court by the President of India in terms of Article 317(1) of the Constitution in recent years. A large number of inquiries are pending before this Court which itself reflects that all is not well with the functioning of the Commissions.The observations of this Court in the aforesaid case of Mehar Singh Saini Chairman, HPSC In Re (supra) relate to qualification and experience for appointment as Chairman/Members of the Commission and have nothing to do with the questions relating to the procedure for identifying persons of integrity and competence to be appointed as Chairman of the Public Service Commission, which were referred by the Division Bench of the High Court to the Full Bench by the order dated 13.07.2011. Mr. Rao is, therefore, not right in his submission that in view of the law declared by this Court in Mehar Singh Saini, Chairman, HPSC In Re (supra), there was no necessity for the Division Bench to make a reference to the Full Bench by the order dated 13.07.2011.I have perused Rules 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the Punjab High Court Rules which relate to Full Bench and I do not find therein any provision which provides what matters a Full Bench comprising three Judges of the High Court will decide. Hence, the Division Bench of the High Court has the jurisdiction to decide a case, unless otherwise provided by law or by a special order of the Chief Justice and the jurisdiction of a Full Bench to decide matters will flow either from the order of the Chief Justice of the High Court or from the order of the Division Bench which makes a reference to the Full Bench. In the present case, there is no order of the Chief Justice making a reference but only the order dated 13.07.2011 of the Division Bench of the High Court making a reference to the Full Bench of three Judges of the High Court. Thus, I have to look at the order dated 13.07.2011 of the Division Bench to find out whether the Division Bench referred only specific questions to the Full Bench as contended by Mr. Rao or referred the entire case to the Full Bench as contended by Mr. Lalit.28. On a close scrutiny of Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the order dated 13.07.2011 of the Division Bench of the High Court which are extracted above, I find that the Division Bench of the High Court has referred only specific questions to the Full Bench: how persons of competence and integrity are to be identified and selected for appointment as Chairman of the Public Service Commission and if the procedure adopted for such appointment in the present case was not valid, the effect thereof. The Division Bench of the High Court has made it clear in Para 7 of its order dated 13.07.2001 that these questions need to be considered by a Bench of three Honble Judges. I, therefore, do not agree with Mr. Lalit that the Division Bench referred the entire case to the Full Bench by the order dated 13.07.2011. I further find that although the aforesaid specific questions relating to the procedure for identifying persons of competence and integrity for appointment as the Chairman of the Public Service Commission only were referred by the Division Bench of the High Court, the Full Bench, instead of deciding these specific questions referred to it, has given directions to the State of Punjab and the State of Haryana to follow a particular procedure for appointment of Members and Chairman of the Public Service Commission till such time a fair, rational, objective and transparent policy to meet the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution is made. I, therefore, agree with Mr. Rao that the Full Bench of the High Court has decided issues which were not referred to it by the Division Bench of the High Court and the judgment dated 17.08.2011 of the Full Bench of the High Court was without jurisdiction.A reading of Article 316 of the Constitution would show that it confers power on the Governor of the State to appoint the Chairman and other Members of a Public Service Commission. It has been held by this Court in Mohinder Singh Gill and Anr. v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Ors. (supra) that an authority has implied powers to make available and carry into effect powers expressly conferred on it. Thus, under Article 316 of the Constitution, the Governor of a State has not only the express power of appointing the Chairman and other Members of Public Service Commission but also the implied powers to lay down the procedure for appointment of Chairman and Members of the Public Service Commission and the High Court cannot under Article 226 of the Constitution usurp this constitutional power of the Government and lay down the procedure for appointment of the Chairman and other Members of the Public Service Commission. The Full Bench of the High Court, therefore, could not have laid down the procedure for appointment of the Chairman and Members of the Punjab Public Service Commission and the Haryana Public Service Commission by the impugned judgment dated 17.08.2011.30. Having held that the Full Bench of the High Court has in its judgment dated 17.08.2011 acted beyond its jurisdiction and has usurped the constitutional power of the Governor in laying down the procedure for appointment of the Chairman and Members of the Public Service Commission, I have to set aside the judgment dated 17.08.2011 of the Full Bench of the High Court. Thereafter, either of the two courses are open to me: remand the matter to the High Court for disposal of the writ petition in accordance with law or decide the writ petition on merits. To cut short the litigation, I proceed to decide the writ petition on merits instead of remanding the matter to the High Court.Considering this experience of the damage to recruitment to public services caused by appointing a person lacking in character as the Chairman of the Public Service Commission in the State of Punjab, when the Respondent No. 1 brought to the notice of the High Court through the writ petition that the State Government of Punjab proposed to appoint Mr. Harish Dhanda as the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, only because of his political affiliation, the Division Bench of the High Court rightly entertained the writ petition as a public interest litigation. The Division Bench of the High Court, however, found that no procedure for appointment of Chairman and Members of the Public Service Commission has been laid down in Article 316 of the Constitution and therefore posed the question in Paragraphs 6 and 7 of its order dated 13.07.2011 as to what should be the procedure for identifying and selecting persons of integrity and competence for appointment of Chairman of the Public Service Commission and referred the question to a larger Bench of three Judges. I have already held that it is for the Governor who is the appointing authority under Article 316 of the Constitution to lay down the procedure for appointment of the Chairman and Members of the Public Service Commission, but this is not to say that in the absence of any procedure laid down by the Governor for appointment of Chairman and Members of the Public Service Commission under Article 316 of the Constitution, the State Government would have absolute discretion in selecting and appointing any person as the Chairman of the State Public Service Commission. Even where a procedure has not been laid down by the Governor for appointment of Chairman and Members of the Public Service Commission, the State Government has to select only persons with integrity and competence for appointment as Chairman of the Public Service Commission, because the discretion vested in the State Government under Article 316 of the Constitution is impliedly limited by the purposes for which the discretion is vested and the purposes are discernible from the functions of the Public Service Commissions enumerated in Article 320 of the Constitution. Under Clause (1) of Article 320 of the Constitution, the State Public Service Commission has the duty to conduct examinations for appointments to the services of the State. Under Clause (3) of Article 320, the State Public Service Commission has to be consulted by the State Government on matters relating to recruitment and appointment to the civil services and civil posts in the State, on disciplinary matters affecting a person serving under the Government of a State in a civil capacity, on claims by and in respect of a person who is serving under the State Government towards costs of defending a legal proceeding, on claims for award of pension in respect of injuries sustained by a person while serving under the State Government and other matters. In such matters, the State Public Service Commission is expected to act with independence from the State Government and with fairness, besides competence and maturity acquired through knowledge and experience of public administration.32. I, therefore, hold that even though Article 316 does not specify the aforesaid qualities of the Chairman of a Public Service Commission, these qualities are amongst the implied relevant factors which have to be taken into consideration by the Government while determining the competency of the person to be selected and appointed as Chairman of the Public Service Commission under Article 316 of the Constitution. Accordingly, if these relevant factors are not taken into consideration by the State Government while selecting and appointing the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, the Court can hold the selection and appointment as not in accordance with the Constitution.I am of the considered opinion that the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, who along with its other members has to perform his duties under Article 320 of the Constitution with independence from the State Government cannot be equated with the Chief Secretary or the DG and IG Police, who are concerned solely with the administrative functions and have to work under the State Government. To ensure this independence of the Chairman and Members of the Public Service Commission, Clause (3) of Article 316 of the Constitution provides that a person shall, on expiration of his term of office be ineligible for reappointment to that office.I have already held that besides express restrictions in a statute or the Constitution, there can be implied restrictions in a statute and the Constitution and the statutory or the constitutional authority cannot in breach of such implied restrictions exercise its discretionary power. Moreover, Article 226 of the Constitution vests in the High Court the power to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. The power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is, thus, not confined to only writ of quo warranto but to other directions, orders or writs. In Dwarka Nath v. Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, D Ward, Kanpur and Anr. (supra), K. Subba Rao, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench, has explained the wide scope of the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution thus:This article is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it ex facie confers a wide power on the High Courts to reach injustice wherever it is found. The Constitution designedly used a wide language in describing the nature of the power, the purpose for which and the person or authority against whom it can be exercised. It can issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs as understood in England; but the scope of those writs also is widened by the use of the expression nature, for the said expression does not equate the writs that can be issued in India with those in England, but only draws an analogy from them. That apart, High Courts can also issue directions, orders or writs other than the prerogative writs. It enables the High Courts to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. Any attempt to equate the scope of the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution with that of the English Courts to issue prerogative writs is to introduce the unnecessary procedural restrictions grown over the years in a comparatively small country like England with a unitary form of government to a vast country like India functioning under a federal structure. Such a construction defeats the purpose of the article itself. To say this is not to say that the High Courts can function arbitrarily under this Article. Some limitations are implicit in the article and Ors. may be evolved to direct the article through defined channels. This interpretation has been accepted by this Court in T.C. Basappa v. Nagappa, 1955 1 SCR 250 : AIR 1954 SC 440 and Irani v. State of Madras 1962 (2) SCR 169 : AIR 1961 SC 1731 .Therefore, I hold that the High Court should not normally, in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution, interfere with the discretion of the State Government in selecting and appointing the Chairman of the State Public Service Commission, but in an exceptional case if it is shown that relevant factors implied from the very nature of the duties entrusted to Public Service Commissions under Article 320 of the Constitution have not been considered by the State Government in selecting and appointing the Chairman of the State Public Service Commission, the High Court can invoke its wide and extra-ordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution and quash the selection and appointment to ensure that the discretion of the State Government is exercised within the bounds of the Constitution.35. Coming now to the facts of the present case, I find that the Division Bench of the High Court in its order dated 13.07.2011 has already held that the irregularities and illegalities alleged against Mr. Harish Dhanda have not been substantiated. I must, however, enquire whether the State Government took into consideration the relevant factors relating to his competency to act as the Chairman of the State Public Service Commission. We had, therefore, passed orders on 01.08.2012 calling upon the State of Punjab to produce before us the material referred to in para 69 of the judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court on the basis of which Mr. Harish Dhanda was selected for appointment as Chairman of the Punjab Public Service Commission. Pursuant to the order dated 01.08.2012, the State Government has produced the files in which the selection and appointment of Mr. Harish Dhanda was processed by the State Government. At page 26 of the file on the subject Appointment of Chairman of P.P.S.C.- Mr. S.K. Sinha, IAS, Mr. Harish Rai Dhanda, I find that a bio-data in one sheet has been placed at page 41 of the file, which reads as under:BIO DATAHarish Rai Dhanda S/o. Sh. Kulbhushan RaiResident: The Retreat, Ferozepur Road, LudhianaDate of Birth: 15th May, 1960Attained Bachelor in Arts from SCD Government College, Ludhiana, Punjab University, (1979).Attained Bachelor in Laws from Law College, Punjab University (1982).Registered with Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana as Advocate in 1982.Practiced Law at District Courts, Ludhiana from 1982 to 2007.Elected as President of District Bar Association, Ludhiana for seven terms.Besides the aforesaid bio-data, there is a certificate dated 06.07.2011 given by the Speaker, Punjab Vidhan Sabha, certifying that Mr. Harish Rai Dhanda, MLA, has resigned from the membership of the 13th Punjab Legislative Assembly with effect from 06.07.2011 and that his resignation has been accepted by the Speaker. The aforesaid materials indicate that Mr. Harish Dhanda had B.A. and L.L.B Degrees and was practicing as an Advocate at the District Courts in Ludhiana and had been elected as the President of the District Bar Association, Ludhiana for seven terms and has been member of the Legislative Assembly. These materials do not indicate that Mr. Harish Dhanda had any knowledge or experience whatsoever either in administration or in recruitment nor do these materials indicate that Mr. Harish Dhanda had the qualities to perform the duties as the Chairman of the State Public Service Commission under Article 320 of the Constitution which I have discussed in this judgment. No other information through affidavit has also been placed on record before us to show that Mr. Harish Dhanda has the positive qualities to perform the duties of the office of the Chairman of the State Public Service Commission under Article 320 of the Constitution. The decision of the State Government to appoint Mr. Harish Dhanda as the Chairman of the Punjab Public Service Commission was thus invalid for non-consideration of relevant factors implied from the very nature of the duties entrusted to the Public Service Commissions under Article 320 of the Constitution.
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Assess the case to predict the court's ruling (favorably (1) or unfavorably (0)), and then expound on this prediction by highlighting and analyzing key textual elements from the proceeding.

### Input:
quo warranto but to other directions, orders or writs. In Dwarka Nath v. Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, D Ward, Kanpur and Anr. (supra), K. Subba Rao, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench, has explained the wide scope of the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution thus: This article is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it ex facie confers a wide power on the High Courts to reach injustice wherever it is found. The Constitution designedly used a wide language in describing the nature of the power, the purpose for which and the person or authority against whom it can be exercised. It can issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs as understood in England; but the scope of those writs also is widened by the use of the expression nature, for the said expression does not equate the writs that can be issued in India with those in England, but only draws an analogy from them. That apart, High Courts can also issue directions, orders or writs other than the prerogative writs. It enables the High Courts to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. Any attempt to equate the scope of the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution with that of the English Courts to issue prerogative writs is to introduce the unnecessary procedural restrictions grown over the years in a comparatively small country like England with a unitary form of government to a vast country like India functioning under a federal structure. Such a construction defeats the purpose of the article itself. To say this is not to say that the High Courts can function arbitrarily under this Article. Some limitations are implicit in the article and Ors. may be evolved to direct the article through defined channels. This interpretation has been accepted by this Court in T.C. Basappa v. Nagappa, 1955 1 SCR 250 : AIR 1954 SC 440 and Irani v. State of Madras 1962 (2) SCR 169 : AIR 1961 SC 1731 . Therefore, I hold that the High Court should not normally, in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution, interfere with the discretion of the State Government in selecting and appointing the Chairman of the State Public Service Commission, but in an exceptional case if it is shown that relevant factors implied from the very nature of the duties entrusted to Public Service Commissions under Article 320 of the Constitution have not been considered by the State Government in selecting and appointing the Chairman of the State Public Service Commission, the High Court can invoke its wide and extra-ordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution and quash the selection and appointment to ensure that the discretion of the State Government is exercised within the bounds of the Constitution. 35. Coming now to the facts of the present case, I find that the Division Bench of the High Court in its order dated 13.07.2011 has already held that the irregularities and illegalities alleged against Mr. Harish Dhanda have not been substantiated. I must, however, enquire whether the State Government took into consideration the relevant factors relating to his competency to act as the Chairman of the State Public Service Commission. We had, therefore, passed orders on 01.08.2012 calling upon the State of Punjab to produce before us the material referred to in para 69 of the judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court on the basis of which Mr. Harish Dhanda was selected for appointment as Chairman of the Punjab Public Service Commission. Pursuant to the order dated 01.08.2012, the State Government has produced the files in which the selection and appointment of Mr. Harish Dhanda was processed by the State Government. At page 26 of the file on the subject Appointment of Chairman of P.P.S.C.- Mr. S.K. Sinha, IAS, Mr. Harish Rai Dhanda, I find that a bio-data in one sheet has been placed at page 41 of the file, which reads as under: BIO DATA Harish Rai Dhanda S/o. Sh. Kulbhushan Rai Resident: The Retreat, Ferozepur Road, Ludhiana Date of Birth: 15th May, 1960 Attained Bachelor in Arts from SCD Government College, Ludhiana, Punjab University, (1979). Attained Bachelor in Laws from Law College, Punjab University (1982). Registered with Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana as Advocate in 1982. Practiced Law at District Courts, Ludhiana from 1982 to 2007. Elected as President of District Bar Association, Ludhiana for seven terms. Besides the aforesaid bio-data, there is a certificate dated 06.07.2011 given by the Speaker, Punjab Vidhan Sabha, certifying that Mr. Harish Rai Dhanda, MLA, has resigned from the membership of the 13th Punjab Legislative Assembly with effect from 06.07.2011 and that his resignation has been accepted by the Speaker. The aforesaid materials indicate that Mr. Harish Dhanda had B.A. and L.L.B Degrees and was practicing as an Advocate at the District Courts in Ludhiana and had been elected as the President of the District Bar Association, Ludhiana for seven terms and has been member of the Legislative Assembly. These materials do not indicate that Mr. Harish Dhanda had any knowledge or experience whatsoever either in administration or in recruitment nor do these materials indicate that Mr. Harish Dhanda had the qualities to perform the duties as the Chairman of the State Public Service Commission under Article 320 of the Constitution which I have discussed in this judgment. No other information through affidavit has also been placed on record before us to show that Mr. Harish Dhanda has the positive qualities to perform the duties of the office of the Chairman of the State Public Service Commission under Article 320 of the Constitution. The decision of the State Government to appoint Mr. Harish Dhanda as the Chairman of the Punjab Public Service Commission was thus invalid for non-consideration of relevant factors implied from the very nature of the duties entrusted to the Public Service Commissions under Article 320 of the Constitution.

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### Explanation:
Article 226 of the Constitution is, thus, not confined to only writ of quo warranto but to other directions, orders or writs. In Dwarka Nath v. Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, D Ward, Kanpur and Anr. (supra), K. Subba Rao, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench, has explained the wide scope of the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution thus:This article is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it ex facie confers a wide power on the High Courts to reach injustice wherever it is found. The Constitution designedly used a wide language in describing the nature of the power, the purpose for which and the person or authority against whom it can be exercised. It can issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs as understood in England; but the scope of those writs also is widened by the use of the expression nature, for the said expression does not equate the writs that can be issued in India with those in England, but only draws an analogy from them. That apart, High Courts can also issue directions, orders or writs other than the prerogative writs. It enables the High Courts to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. Any attempt to equate the scope of the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution with that of the English Courts to issue prerogative writs is to introduce the unnecessary procedural restrictions grown over the years in a comparatively small country like England with a unitary form of government to a vast country like India functioning under a federal structure. Such a construction defeats the purpose of the article itself. To say this is not to say that the High Courts can function arbitrarily under this Article. Some limitations are implicit in the article and Ors. may be evolved to direct the article through defined channels. This interpretation has been accepted by this Court in T.C. Basappa v. Nagappa, 1955 1 SCR 250 : AIR 1954 SC 440 and Irani v. State of Madras 1962 (2) SCR 169 : AIR 1961 SC 1731 .Therefore, I hold that the High Court should not normally, in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution, interfere with the discretion of the State Government in selecting and appointing the Chairman of the State Public Service Commission, but in an exceptional case if it is shown that relevant factors implied from the very nature of the duties entrusted to Public Service Commissions under Article 320 of the Constitution have not been considered by the State Government in selecting and appointing the Chairman of the State Public Service Commission, the High Court can invoke its wide and extra-ordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution and quash the selection and appointment to ensure that the discretion of the State Government is exercised within the bounds of the Constitution.35. Coming now to the facts of the present case, I find that the Division Bench of the High Court in its order dated 13.07.2011 has already held that the irregularities and illegalities alleged against Mr. Harish Dhanda have not been substantiated. I must, however, enquire whether the State Government took into consideration the relevant factors relating to his competency to act as the Chairman of the State Public Service Commission. We had, therefore, passed orders on 01.08.2012 calling upon the State of Punjab to produce before us the material referred to in para 69 of the judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court on the basis of which Mr. Harish Dhanda was selected for appointment as Chairman of the Punjab Public Service Commission. Pursuant to the order dated 01.08.2012, the State Government has produced the files in which the selection and appointment of Mr. Harish Dhanda was processed by the State Government. At page 26 of the file on the subject Appointment of Chairman of P.P.S.C.- Mr. S.K. Sinha, IAS, Mr. Harish Rai Dhanda, I find that a bio-data in one sheet has been placed at page 41 of the file, which reads as under:BIO DATAHarish Rai Dhanda S/o. Sh. Kulbhushan RaiResident: The Retreat, Ferozepur Road, LudhianaDate of Birth: 15th May, 1960Attained Bachelor in Arts from SCD Government College, Ludhiana, Punjab University, (1979).Attained Bachelor in Laws from Law College, Punjab University (1982).Registered with Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana as Advocate in 1982.Practiced Law at District Courts, Ludhiana from 1982 to 2007.Elected as President of District Bar Association, Ludhiana for seven terms.Besides the aforesaid bio-data, there is a certificate dated 06.07.2011 given by the Speaker, Punjab Vidhan Sabha, certifying that Mr. Harish Rai Dhanda, MLA, has resigned from the membership of the 13th Punjab Legislative Assembly with effect from 06.07.2011 and that his resignation has been accepted by the Speaker. The aforesaid materials indicate that Mr. Harish Dhanda had B.A. and L.L.B Degrees and was practicing as an Advocate at the District Courts in Ludhiana and had been elected as the President of the District Bar Association, Ludhiana for seven terms and has been member of the Legislative Assembly. These materials do not indicate that Mr. Harish Dhanda had any knowledge or experience whatsoever either in administration or in recruitment nor do these materials indicate that Mr. Harish Dhanda had the qualities to perform the duties as the Chairman of the State Public Service Commission under Article 320 of the Constitution which I have discussed in this judgment. No other information through affidavit has also been placed on record before us to show that Mr. Harish Dhanda has the positive qualities to perform the duties of the office of the Chairman of the State Public Service Commission under Article 320 of the Constitution. The decision of the State Government to appoint Mr. Harish Dhanda as the Chairman of the Punjab Public Service Commission was thus invalid for non-consideration of relevant factors implied from the very nature of the duties entrusted to the Public Service Commissions under Article 320 of the Constitution.
