Employers in relation to the Management of Sudamdih Colliery of M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd Vs. Their workmen represented by Rashtriya Colliery Mazdoor Sangh
it was noted at paragraph 6 as follows: "6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since heel) settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after a lapse of about seven years of the order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under that circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising an industrial dispute was ex-facie bad and incompetent." 13. In S.M. Nilajkar and others vs. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka (2003) (4) SCC 27 ) the position was reiterated as follows: (at para 17) "17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree. It is true, as held in M/s. Shalimar Works Ltd. vs. Their Workmen (supra) (AIR 1959 SC 1217 ), that merely because the Industrial Disputes Act does not provide for a limitation for raising the dispute it does not mean that the dispute can be raised at any time and without regard to the delay and reasons therefor. There is no limitation prescribed for reference of disputes to an industrial tribunal, even so it is only reasonable that the disputes should be referred as soon as possible after they have arisen and after conciliation proceedings have failed particularly so when disputes relate to discharge of workmen wholesale. A delay of 4 years in raising the dispute after even re-employment of the most of the old workmen was held to be fatal in M/s. Shalimar Works Limited vs. Their Workmen (supra) (AIR 1959 SC 1217 ), in Nedungadi Bank Ltd. vs. K.P. Madhavankutty and others (supra) AIR 2000 SC 839 , a delay of 7 years was held to be fatal and disentitled to workmen to any relief. In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and others vs. Union of India and others (supra) (1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief. Although the High Court has opined that there was a delay of 7 to 9 years in raising the dispute before the Tribunal but we find the High Court factually not correct. The employment of the appellants was terminated sometime in 1985-86 or 1986-87. Pursuant to the judgment in Daily Rated Casual Employees Under P & T Department vs. Union of India (supra) (AIR 1987 SC 2342 ), the department was formulating a scheme to accommodate casual labourers and the appellants were justified in awaiting the outcome thereof. On 16.1.1990 they were refused to be accommodated in the scheme. On 28.12.1990 they initiated the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act followed by conciliation proceedings and then the dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal deserve to be non suited on the ground of delay." 14. It appears that the Tribunal and the High Court did not consider the factual position in the background of the legal position as noted above. Of course at the point of time when the matter was decided Air Indias case (supra) held the field. But, in view of the pronouncement of the Constitution Bench in Steel Authoritys case (supra) the matter needs to be re-examined by the High Court. Though it was submitted by Mr. Upadhyay that there is a finding about the appellant having adopted a camouflage, there is no definite finding by the Tribunal and/ or the High Court in this regard. Mere reference to certain observations of this Court would not suffice without examination of the factual position. Additionally, the effect of omitting the names of the claimants whose cause was being espoused by the Union has not been considered by the High Court in the proper perspective. Similar is the position regarding purported settlement. In these peculiar circumstances, it would be appropriate for the learned Single Judge of the High Court to re-consider the matter. Accordingly, the matter is remitted to the High Court so that learned Single Judge can consider the matter afresh taking into account the principles set out above and consider their applicability to the background facts on the issues raised by the appellant. As the matter is pending since long, learned Chief Justice of the High Court is requested to allot the matter to a learned Single Judge who shall make an effort to dispose of the matter afresh within a period of six months from the date the matter is allotted by the learned Chief Justice.
1[ds]It appears that the Tribunal and the High Court did not consider the factual position in the background of the legal position as noted above. Of course at the point of time when the matter was decided Air Indias case (supra) held the field. But, in view of the pronouncement of the Constitution Bench in Steel Authoritys case (supra) the matter needs to be re-examined by the High Court. Though it was submitted by Mr. Upadhyay that there is a finding about the appellant having adopted a camouflage, there is no definite finding by the Tribunal and/ or the High Court in this regard. Mere reference to certain observations of this Court would not suffice without examination of the factual position. Additionally, the effect of omitting the names of the claimants whose cause was being espoused by the Union has not been considered by the High Court in the proper perspective. Similar is the position regarding purported settlement. In these peculiar circumstances, it would be appropriate for the learned Single Judge of the High Court to re-consider the matter. Accordingly, the matter is remitted to the High Court so that learned Single Judge can consider the matter afresh taking into account the principles set out above and consider their applicability to the background facts on the issues raised by the appellant. As the matter is pending since long, learned Chief Justice of the High Court is requested to allot the matter to a learned Single Judge who shall make an effort to dispose of the matter afresh within a period of six months from the date the matter is allotted by the learned Chief Justice
### Instruction:
Forecast the likely verdict of the case (granting (1) or denying (0) the appeal) and then rationalize your prediction by pinpointing and explaining pivotal sentences in the case document.

### Input:
it was noted at paragraph 6 as follows: "6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since heel) settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after a lapse of about seven years of the order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under that circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising an industrial dispute was ex-facie bad and incompetent." 13. In S.M. Nilajkar and others vs. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka (2003) (4) SCC 27 ) the position was reiterated as follows: (at para 17) "17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree. It is true, as held in M/s. Shalimar Works Ltd. vs. Their Workmen (supra) (AIR 1959 SC 1217 ), that merely because the Industrial Disputes Act does not provide for a limitation for raising the dispute it does not mean that the dispute can be raised at any time and without regard to the delay and reasons therefor. There is no limitation prescribed for reference of disputes to an industrial tribunal, even so it is only reasonable that the disputes should be referred as soon as possible after they have arisen and after conciliation proceedings have failed particularly so when disputes relate to discharge of workmen wholesale. A delay of 4 years in raising the dispute after even re-employment of the most of the old workmen was held to be fatal in M/s. Shalimar Works Limited vs. Their Workmen (supra) (AIR 1959 SC 1217 ), in Nedungadi Bank Ltd. vs. K.P. Madhavankutty and others (supra) AIR 2000 SC 839 , a delay of 7 years was held to be fatal and disentitled to workmen to any relief. In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and others vs. Union of India and others (supra) (1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief. Although the High Court has opined that there was a delay of 7 to 9 years in raising the dispute before the Tribunal but we find the High Court factually not correct. The employment of the appellants was terminated sometime in 1985-86 or 1986-87. Pursuant to the judgment in Daily Rated Casual Employees Under P & T Department vs. Union of India (supra) (AIR 1987 SC 2342 ), the department was formulating a scheme to accommodate casual labourers and the appellants were justified in awaiting the outcome thereof. On 16.1.1990 they were refused to be accommodated in the scheme. On 28.12.1990 they initiated the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act followed by conciliation proceedings and then the dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal deserve to be non suited on the ground of delay." 14. It appears that the Tribunal and the High Court did not consider the factual position in the background of the legal position as noted above. Of course at the point of time when the matter was decided Air Indias case (supra) held the field. But, in view of the pronouncement of the Constitution Bench in Steel Authoritys case (supra) the matter needs to be re-examined by the High Court. Though it was submitted by Mr. Upadhyay that there is a finding about the appellant having adopted a camouflage, there is no definite finding by the Tribunal and/ or the High Court in this regard. Mere reference to certain observations of this Court would not suffice without examination of the factual position. Additionally, the effect of omitting the names of the claimants whose cause was being espoused by the Union has not been considered by the High Court in the proper perspective. Similar is the position regarding purported settlement. In these peculiar circumstances, it would be appropriate for the learned Single Judge of the High Court to re-consider the matter. Accordingly, the matter is remitted to the High Court so that learned Single Judge can consider the matter afresh taking into account the principles set out above and consider their applicability to the background facts on the issues raised by the appellant. As the matter is pending since long, learned Chief Justice of the High Court is requested to allot the matter to a learned Single Judge who shall make an effort to dispose of the matter afresh within a period of six months from the date the matter is allotted by the learned Chief Justice.

### Response:
1

### Explanation:
It appears that the Tribunal and the High Court did not consider the factual position in the background of the legal position as noted above. Of course at the point of time when the matter was decided Air Indias case (supra) held the field. But, in view of the pronouncement of the Constitution Bench in Steel Authoritys case (supra) the matter needs to be re-examined by the High Court. Though it was submitted by Mr. Upadhyay that there is a finding about the appellant having adopted a camouflage, there is no definite finding by the Tribunal and/ or the High Court in this regard. Mere reference to certain observations of this Court would not suffice without examination of the factual position. Additionally, the effect of omitting the names of the claimants whose cause was being espoused by the Union has not been considered by the High Court in the proper perspective. Similar is the position regarding purported settlement. In these peculiar circumstances, it would be appropriate for the learned Single Judge of the High Court to re-consider the matter. Accordingly, the matter is remitted to the High Court so that learned Single Judge can consider the matter afresh taking into account the principles set out above and consider their applicability to the background facts on the issues raised by the appellant. As the matter is pending since long, learned Chief Justice of the High Court is requested to allot the matter to a learned Single Judge who shall make an effort to dispose of the matter afresh within a period of six months from the date the matter is allotted by the learned Chief Justice
