M/s. Radhakrishna Agarwal and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others
of the several persons is: selected by the State for a particular contractual transaction. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that there was a conflict between what was laid down here and the law declared by this Court in Erusian Equipment &Chemicals Ltd.s case (supra). We think that the two cases are distinguishable on facts. The propositions of law laid down in the two cases must be read in the context of facts established in each case. In any event, the cases before us do. not raise any question of discrimination alleged at the stage of entry into the contractual area which could attract the application of Article 14.In the cases before us, allegations on which a violation of Article 14 could be based are neither properly made nor established. Before any adjudication on the question whether Article 14 of the Constitution could possibly be said to have been violated, as between persons governed by similar contracts, they must be properly put in issue and established. Even if the appellants could be said to have raised any aspect of Article 14 of the Constitution and this Article could at all be held to operate within the contractual field whenever the State enters into such contracts, which we gravely doubt, such questions of fact do not appear to have been argued before the High Court. And, in any event, they are of such a nature that they cannot be satisfactorily decided without a detailed adduction of evidence, which is only possible in ordinary civil suits, to establish that the State, acting in its executive capacity through its Officers, has discriminated between parties identically situated. On the allegations and affidavit evidence before us we cannot reach such a conclusion. Moreover, as we have already indicated earlier, the correct view is that it is the contract and not the executive power, regulated by the Constitution, which governs the relations of the parties on facts apparent in the cases before us.15. The real object of the appellants seems to be to hold up any adjudication on the cases before us by taking shelter behind Article 14 so that the stay orders obtained by them, presumably on representations made to this Court that no aspect of enforcement of Article 14 of the Constitution was involved. We think that to accede to the prayer on behalf of the appellants to adjourn the hearing of these cases until after the Emergency is lifted and. yet to continue the stay orders is to permit a circumvention of the Constitutional mandate contained in Article 359 and to countenance a gross abuse of the processes of the Court.A rather desparate argument which has been addressed to us on behalf of the appellants is that they were entitled to an opportunity to. show cause against the cancellation of the leases. It was urged, on the strength of A.K. Kraipak &Ors. etc. v. Union of India &Ors., ([1970] 1 S.C.R. 457.) that the distinction made between administrative and quasi-judicial action is thin and a vanishing one. This argument appears to. u s to be wholly irrelevant inasmuch as a question of the distinction between an administrative and quasi-judicial decision can only arise in the exercise of powers under statutory provisions. Rules of natural just ice are attached to the performance of certain functions regulated by statutes or rules made thereunder involving decisions affecting rights of parties. When a contract is sought to be terminated by the Officers of the State, purporting to act under the terms of an agreement between parties, such action is not taken in purported exercise of a statutory power at all.16. In Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur, v. Shivakant Shukla, (A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1207 at 1288.)it was pointed out (at p. 1288):"The principles of natural justice which are so implied must always hang, if one may so put it, on pegs of statutory provisions or necessarily follow from them. They can also be said sometimes to be implied as necessary parts of the protection of equality and equal protection of laws conferred by Article 14 of the Constitution where one of the pillars of Diceys principles of the Rule of Law is found embodied. Sometimes, they may be implied and read the legislation dealing with rights protected by Article 19 of the Constitution. They could at times, be so implied because restrictions on rights conferred by Article 19 of the Constitution have to be reasonable".17. The limitations imposed by rules of natural justice cannot operate upon powers which are governed by the terms of an agreement exclusively. The only question which normally arises in such cases is whether the action complained of is or is not in consonence with the terms of the agreement. As already pointed out by us, even if by some stretch of imagination some case of unequal or discriminatory treatment by the officers of the State of persons governed by similar contracts is sought to be made out, a satisfactory adjudication upon the unusual facts of such a case would necessitate proper pleadings supported by accept- able evidence. In that case, the interim stay order or injunction could not be justified at all because so long as a Residential Order, under Article 359 of the Constitution, is operative, the enforcement of fundamental rights falling under Article 14 is suspended. In such cases even if a petition or suit is entertained and kept pending no stay order could be passed because that would amount to indirectly enforcing the fundamental rights conferred by Article 14 of the Constitution. It is only where a prima facie case for an injunction or stay can be made out, quite apart from a right covered by Article 14 of the Constitution or by any other fundamental right whose enforcement may have been suspended, that an injunction or stay could be granted at all on suitable terms. As we have already said it was on such an assumption that this Court had, apparently, granted the interim stay which must now be discharged.18.
0[ds]It is thus clear that the Erusian Equipment &Chemicals Ltd.s case (supra) involved discrimination at the very threshold or at the time of entry into the field of consideration of persons. with whom the Government could contract at all. At this stage, no doubt, the State acts purely in its executive capacity and is bound by the obligations which dealings of the State with the individual citizens import into every transaction entered into in exercise of its constitutional powers. But, after the State or its agents have entered into the field of ordinary contract, the relations are no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determines rights and obligations of the parties inter se. No question arises of violation of Article 14 or of any other constitutional provision when the State of its agents, purporting to act within this field, perform any act. In this sphere, they can only claim rights conferred upon them by contract and are bound by the terms of the contract only unless some statute steps in and confers some special statutory power or obligation on the State in the contractual field which is apart fromthe cases before us the contracts do not contain any statutory terms or obligations and no statutory power of obligation which could attract the application of Article 14 of the Constitution is involved here. Even in cases where the question is of choice or consideration of competing claims before an entry into the field of contract facts have to be investigated and found before the question , of a violation of Article 14 could arise. If those facts are disputed and require assessment of evidence the correctness of which can , only be tested satisfactorily by taking detailed evidence, involving examination and cross-examination of witnesses, the case could not be conveniently or satisfactorily decided in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. Such proceedings are summary proceedings reserved for extraordinary cases where the exceptional and what are described as, perhaps not quite accurately, "prerogative" powers of the Court are invoked. We are certain that the cases before us are not such in which powers under Article 226 of the Constitution could bedo not think that any of these cases could assist the appellants or is at all relevant. None of these cases lays down that, when the State or the officers purport to operate within the contractual field and the only grievance of the citizen could be that the contract between the parties is broken by the action complained of, the appropriate remedy is by way of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and not an ordinary suit. There is a formidable array of authority against any such apropositions of law laid down in the two cases must be read in the context of facts established in each case. In any event, the cases before us do. not raise any question of discrimination alleged at the stage of entry into the contractual area which could attract the application of Article 14.In the cases before us, allegations on which a violation of Article 14 could be based are neither properly made nor established. Before any adjudication on the question whether Article 14 of the Constitution could possibly be said to have been violated, as between persons governed by similar contracts, they must be properly put in issue and established. Even if the appellants could be said to have raised any aspect of Article 14 of the Constitution and this Article could at all be held to operate within the contractual field whenever the State enters into such contracts, which we gravely doubt, such questions of fact do not appear to have been argued before the High Court. And, in any event, they are of such a nature that they cannot be satisfactorily decided without a detailed adduction of evidence, which is only possible in ordinary civil suits, to establish that the State, acting in its executive capacity through its Officers, has discriminated between parties identically situated. On the allegations and affidavit evidence before us we cannot reach such a conclusion. Moreover, as we have already indicated earlier, the correct view is that it is the contract and not the executive power, regulated by the Constitution, which governs the relations of the parties on facts apparent in the cases beforereal object of the appellants seems to be to hold up any adjudication on the cases before us by taking shelter behind Article 14 so that the stay orders obtained by them, presumably on representations made to this Court that no aspect of enforcement of Article 14 of the Constitution was involved. We think that to accede to the prayer on behalf of the appellants to adjourn the hearing of these cases until after the Emergency is lifted and. yet to continue the stay orders is to permit a circumvention of the Constitutional mandate contained in Article 359 and to countenance a gross abuse of the processes of the Court.A rather desparate argument which has been addressed to us on behalf of the appellants is that they were entitled to an opportunity to. show cause against the cancellation of theof natural just ice are attached to the performance of certain functions regulated by statutes or rules made thereunder involving decisions affecting rights of parties. When a contract is sought to be terminated by the Officers of the State, purporting to act under the terms of an agreement between parties, such action is not taken in purported exercise of a statutory power atlimitations imposed by rules of natural justice cannot operate upon powers which are governed by the terms of an agreement exclusively. The only question which normally arises in such cases is whether the action complained of is or is not in consonence with the terms of the agreement. As already pointed out by us, even if by some stretch of imagination some case of unequal or discriminatory treatment by the officers of the State of persons governed by similar contracts is sought to be made out, a satisfactory adjudication upon the unusual facts of such a case would necessitate proper pleadings supported by accept- able evidence. In that case, the interim stay order or injunction could not be justified at all because so long as a Residential Order, under Article 359 of the Constitution, is operative, the enforcement of fundamental rights falling under Article 14 is suspended. In such cases even if a petition or suit is entertained and kept pending no stay order could be passed because that would amount to indirectly enforcing the fundamental rights conferred by Article 14 of the Constitution. It is only where a prima facie case for an injunction or stay can be made out, quite apart from a right covered by Article 14 of the Constitution or by any other fundamental right whose enforcement may have been suspended, that an injunction or stay could be granted at all on suitable terms. As we have already said it was on such an assumption that this Court had, apparently, granted the interim stay which must now be discharged.
### Instruction:
First, predict whether the appeal in case proceeding will be accepted (1) or not (0), and then explain the decision by identifying crucial sentences from the document.

### Input:
of the several persons is: selected by the State for a particular contractual transaction. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that there was a conflict between what was laid down here and the law declared by this Court in Erusian Equipment &Chemicals Ltd.s case (supra). We think that the two cases are distinguishable on facts. The propositions of law laid down in the two cases must be read in the context of facts established in each case. In any event, the cases before us do. not raise any question of discrimination alleged at the stage of entry into the contractual area which could attract the application of Article 14.In the cases before us, allegations on which a violation of Article 14 could be based are neither properly made nor established. Before any adjudication on the question whether Article 14 of the Constitution could possibly be said to have been violated, as between persons governed by similar contracts, they must be properly put in issue and established. Even if the appellants could be said to have raised any aspect of Article 14 of the Constitution and this Article could at all be held to operate within the contractual field whenever the State enters into such contracts, which we gravely doubt, such questions of fact do not appear to have been argued before the High Court. And, in any event, they are of such a nature that they cannot be satisfactorily decided without a detailed adduction of evidence, which is only possible in ordinary civil suits, to establish that the State, acting in its executive capacity through its Officers, has discriminated between parties identically situated. On the allegations and affidavit evidence before us we cannot reach such a conclusion. Moreover, as we have already indicated earlier, the correct view is that it is the contract and not the executive power, regulated by the Constitution, which governs the relations of the parties on facts apparent in the cases before us.15. The real object of the appellants seems to be to hold up any adjudication on the cases before us by taking shelter behind Article 14 so that the stay orders obtained by them, presumably on representations made to this Court that no aspect of enforcement of Article 14 of the Constitution was involved. We think that to accede to the prayer on behalf of the appellants to adjourn the hearing of these cases until after the Emergency is lifted and. yet to continue the stay orders is to permit a circumvention of the Constitutional mandate contained in Article 359 and to countenance a gross abuse of the processes of the Court.A rather desparate argument which has been addressed to us on behalf of the appellants is that they were entitled to an opportunity to. show cause against the cancellation of the leases. It was urged, on the strength of A.K. Kraipak &Ors. etc. v. Union of India &Ors., ([1970] 1 S.C.R. 457.) that the distinction made between administrative and quasi-judicial action is thin and a vanishing one. This argument appears to. u s to be wholly irrelevant inasmuch as a question of the distinction between an administrative and quasi-judicial decision can only arise in the exercise of powers under statutory provisions. Rules of natural just ice are attached to the performance of certain functions regulated by statutes or rules made thereunder involving decisions affecting rights of parties. When a contract is sought to be terminated by the Officers of the State, purporting to act under the terms of an agreement between parties, such action is not taken in purported exercise of a statutory power at all.16. In Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur, v. Shivakant Shukla, (A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1207 at 1288.)it was pointed out (at p. 1288):"The principles of natural justice which are so implied must always hang, if one may so put it, on pegs of statutory provisions or necessarily follow from them. They can also be said sometimes to be implied as necessary parts of the protection of equality and equal protection of laws conferred by Article 14 of the Constitution where one of the pillars of Diceys principles of the Rule of Law is found embodied. Sometimes, they may be implied and read the legislation dealing with rights protected by Article 19 of the Constitution. They could at times, be so implied because restrictions on rights conferred by Article 19 of the Constitution have to be reasonable".17. The limitations imposed by rules of natural justice cannot operate upon powers which are governed by the terms of an agreement exclusively. The only question which normally arises in such cases is whether the action complained of is or is not in consonence with the terms of the agreement. As already pointed out by us, even if by some stretch of imagination some case of unequal or discriminatory treatment by the officers of the State of persons governed by similar contracts is sought to be made out, a satisfactory adjudication upon the unusual facts of such a case would necessitate proper pleadings supported by accept- able evidence. In that case, the interim stay order or injunction could not be justified at all because so long as a Residential Order, under Article 359 of the Constitution, is operative, the enforcement of fundamental rights falling under Article 14 is suspended. In such cases even if a petition or suit is entertained and kept pending no stay order could be passed because that would amount to indirectly enforcing the fundamental rights conferred by Article 14 of the Constitution. It is only where a prima facie case for an injunction or stay can be made out, quite apart from a right covered by Article 14 of the Constitution or by any other fundamental right whose enforcement may have been suspended, that an injunction or stay could be granted at all on suitable terms. As we have already said it was on such an assumption that this Court had, apparently, granted the interim stay which must now be discharged.18.

### Response:
0

### Explanation:
in the contractual field which is apart fromthe cases before us the contracts do not contain any statutory terms or obligations and no statutory power of obligation which could attract the application of Article 14 of the Constitution is involved here. Even in cases where the question is of choice or consideration of competing claims before an entry into the field of contract facts have to be investigated and found before the question , of a violation of Article 14 could arise. If those facts are disputed and require assessment of evidence the correctness of which can , only be tested satisfactorily by taking detailed evidence, involving examination and cross-examination of witnesses, the case could not be conveniently or satisfactorily decided in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. Such proceedings are summary proceedings reserved for extraordinary cases where the exceptional and what are described as, perhaps not quite accurately, "prerogative" powers of the Court are invoked. We are certain that the cases before us are not such in which powers under Article 226 of the Constitution could bedo not think that any of these cases could assist the appellants or is at all relevant. None of these cases lays down that, when the State or the officers purport to operate within the contractual field and the only grievance of the citizen could be that the contract between the parties is broken by the action complained of, the appropriate remedy is by way of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and not an ordinary suit. There is a formidable array of authority against any such apropositions of law laid down in the two cases must be read in the context of facts established in each case. In any event, the cases before us do. not raise any question of discrimination alleged at the stage of entry into the contractual area which could attract the application of Article 14.In the cases before us, allegations on which a violation of Article 14 could be based are neither properly made nor established. Before any adjudication on the question whether Article 14 of the Constitution could possibly be said to have been violated, as between persons governed by similar contracts, they must be properly put in issue and established. Even if the appellants could be said to have raised any aspect of Article 14 of the Constitution and this Article could at all be held to operate within the contractual field whenever the State enters into such contracts, which we gravely doubt, such questions of fact do not appear to have been argued before the High Court. And, in any event, they are of such a nature that they cannot be satisfactorily decided without a detailed adduction of evidence, which is only possible in ordinary civil suits, to establish that the State, acting in its executive capacity through its Officers, has discriminated between parties identically situated. On the allegations and affidavit evidence before us we cannot reach such a conclusion. Moreover, as we have already indicated earlier, the correct view is that it is the contract and not the executive power, regulated by the Constitution, which governs the relations of the parties on facts apparent in the cases beforereal object of the appellants seems to be to hold up any adjudication on the cases before us by taking shelter behind Article 14 so that the stay orders obtained by them, presumably on representations made to this Court that no aspect of enforcement of Article 14 of the Constitution was involved. We think that to accede to the prayer on behalf of the appellants to adjourn the hearing of these cases until after the Emergency is lifted and. yet to continue the stay orders is to permit a circumvention of the Constitutional mandate contained in Article 359 and to countenance a gross abuse of the processes of the Court.A rather desparate argument which has been addressed to us on behalf of the appellants is that they were entitled to an opportunity to. show cause against the cancellation of theof natural just ice are attached to the performance of certain functions regulated by statutes or rules made thereunder involving decisions affecting rights of parties. When a contract is sought to be terminated by the Officers of the State, purporting to act under the terms of an agreement between parties, such action is not taken in purported exercise of a statutory power atlimitations imposed by rules of natural justice cannot operate upon powers which are governed by the terms of an agreement exclusively. The only question which normally arises in such cases is whether the action complained of is or is not in consonence with the terms of the agreement. As already pointed out by us, even if by some stretch of imagination some case of unequal or discriminatory treatment by the officers of the State of persons governed by similar contracts is sought to be made out, a satisfactory adjudication upon the unusual facts of such a case would necessitate proper pleadings supported by accept- able evidence. In that case, the interim stay order or injunction could not be justified at all because so long as a Residential Order, under Article 359 of the Constitution, is operative, the enforcement of fundamental rights falling under Article 14 is suspended. In such cases even if a petition or suit is entertained and kept pending no stay order could be passed because that would amount to indirectly enforcing the fundamental rights conferred by Article 14 of the Constitution. It is only where a prima facie case for an injunction or stay can be made out, quite apart from a right covered by Article 14 of the Constitution or by any other fundamental right whose enforcement may have been suspended, that an injunction or stay could be granted at all on suitable terms. As we have already said it was on such an assumption that this Court had, apparently, granted the interim stay which must now be discharged.
