Narayanappa Vs. Jainarayan Chunnilal Marwadi
1964 voluntarily. He rejected as an after though the story of the appellant that the surrender had been brought about as a result of procedure or undue influence exerted on him by representatives of Parubai - a story put forward by the appellant in his subsequent statement recorded on October 11, 1966 after remand. The matter was carried in appeal by the appellant. In appeal, the Special Deputy Collector took the view that the surrender deed was not executed voluntarily by the appellant as it was result of undue influence exerted on him by Parubais representatives who were present at the time of the execution. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal confirmed the finding of the Deputy Collector. The respondents preferred Special Civil Application 186 of 1969 under Article 227 challenging the order of Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and the High Court has set aside the orders of the Special Deputy Collector and the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and restored that of the Additional Tahsildar. It is this order passed by the High Court that has been challenged by the appellant before us in the appeal.3. Mr. Lokur appearing for the appellant has strenuously contended that after all both the Special Deputy Collector as well as the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and recorded a concurrent finding of fact that the deed of surrender was involuntary and it was the result of the undue influence exerted on him at the instance of Parubai and such finding of fact could not be interfered with by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. If the matter had really rested with the aspect of appreciation of evidence one way or the other there would have been considerable force in the contention of Mr. Lokur. However, what we find is that approach and appreciation of evidence on the part of the Special Deputy Collector and the Tribunal are vitiated by apparent errors of law committed by them while setting aside they Additional Tahsildars order. In the first place it was never the case of the appellant that there was any pressure or undue influence exerted on him in the matter of the execution of the deed of surrender; his initial case was it was voluntary and there was no pressure from any one and even on April 15, 1964 when he prevaricated he said it was executed by mistake, though voluntary character was not given up and it was only in October 1966 after remand that the case of undue influence was put forward - clearly an afterthought. But the Deputy Collector and Tribunal accepted the latter case by treating appellants earlier case and statement on April 15, 1964 as a nullity which was clearly an erroneous view in law. The Deputy Collector and Tribunal found fault with Tahsildars order by holding that he had committed a breach of Rule 11 without indication what particular provision thereof had been committed a breach of by the Additional Tahsildar. It was pointed out by Mr. Lokur on behalf of the appellant that under Rule 11 it was incumbent upon the tenancy authority to record the statement of the tenant in the absence of the landlords or his representative after taking the tenant into confidence and this procedure was not followed. It is clear that the Deputy Collector took the view, which was confirmed by the Tribunal, that the earlier statement of the appellant on April 15, 1964 was a nullity because it was recorded when Parubai was dead and in the absence of her successors and his subsequent statement dated October 11, 1966 had not been recorded in the absence of the respondents and hence there was a breach of Rule 11. In our opinion it is this erroneous view in law on the part of the Deputy Collector and the Tribunal that enabled the High Court to interfere with their orders. Parubai had died on April 8, 1964, i.e., just about a week before April 15, 1964 when the hearing was fixed and the proceedings had not abated by then and, therefore, simply because Parubai had died, the statement on oath recorded by Naib Tahsildar on April 15, 1964 could not be regarded as nullity. More so when it was required to be recorded in the absence of the landlord. That statement affirmed the voluntary character of the surrender deed but introduced the element of mistake without explaining what was the mistake about. Regarding the subsequent statement recorded on October 11, 1966 the same was really outside the scope of the remand order, for the matter had been remanded for recording the say of the landlord before deciding upon the character of surrender deed which had not been done as required by the proviso to Rule 11. But that apart the purpose of the provision in Rule 11, that a statement of tenant should be recorded in the absence of the landlord is only to provide a safeguard against the probable influence of the landlord at the time of recording the statement of the tenant. If that be the purpose, in out view, that purpose was more than achieved inasmuch as in that statement, notwithstanding the presence of the respondents, the appellant boldly came out with a case of undue influence for the first time giving up the case of mistake. Even so, the Deputy Collector and the Tribunal erroneously harped on the breach of Rule 11. In out view the Deputy Collector and the Tribunal entirely misunderstood the initial case of the appellant and committed an apparent error of law in treating his earlier statement as a nullity and proceeding on that wrong basis accepted the latter case of the appellant which was clearly an after thought. It was in that view of the matter that the High Court thought it fit to interfere with the orders of Deputy Collector and Tribunal. It was not, therefore, a case of merely reappreciating the evidence and interfering with a concurrent finding of fact recorded by the Deputy Collector and Tribunal.
0[ds]The Deputy Collector and Tribunal found fault with Tahsildars order by holding that he had committed a breach of Rule 11 without indication what particular provision thereof had been committed a breach of by the Additional Tahsildar. It was pointed out by Mr. Lokur on behalf of the appellant that under Rule 11 it was incumbent upon the tenancy authority to record the statement of the tenant in the absence of the landlords or his representative after taking the tenant into confidence and this procedure was not followed. It is clear that the Deputy Collector took the view, which was confirmed by the Tribunal, that the earlier statement of the appellant on April 15, 1964 was a nullity because it was recorded when Parubai was dead and in the absence of her successors and his subsequent statement dated October 11, 1966 had not been recorded in the absence of the respondents and hence there was a breach of Rule 11. In our opinion it is this erroneous view in law on the part of the Deputy Collector and the Tribunal that enabled the High Court to interfere with their orders. Parubai had died on April 8, 1964, i.e., just about a week before April 15, 1964 when the hearing was fixed and the proceedings had not abated by then and, therefore, simply because Parubai had died, the statement on oath recorded by Naib Tahsildar on April 15, 1964 could not be regarded as nullity. More so when it was required to be recorded in the absence of the landlord. That statement affirmed the voluntary character of the surrender deed but introduced the element of mistake without explaining what was the mistake about. Regarding the subsequent statement recorded on October 11, 1966 the same was really outside the scope of the remand order, for the matter had been remanded for recording the say of the landlord before deciding upon the character of surrender deed which had not been done as required by the proviso to Rule 11. But that apart the purpose of the provision in Rule 11, that a statement of tenant should be recorded in the absence of the landlord is only to provide a safeguard against the probable influence of the landlord at the time of recording the statement of the tenant. If that be the purpose, in out view, that purpose was more than achieved inasmuch as in that statement, notwithstanding the presence of the respondents, the appellant boldly came out with a case of undue influence for the first time giving up the case of mistake. Even so, the Deputy Collector and the Tribunal erroneously harped on the breach of Rule 11. In out view the Deputy Collector and the Tribunal entirely misunderstood the initial case of the appellant and committed an apparent error of law in treating his earlier statement as a nullity and proceeding on that wrong basis accepted the latter case of the appellant which was clearly an after thought. It was in that view of the matter that the High Court thought it fit to interfere with the orders of Deputy Collector and Tribunal. It was not, therefore, a case of merely reappreciating the evidence and interfering with a concurrent finding of fact recorded by the Deputy Collector and Tribunal.
### Instruction:
Forecast the likely verdict of the case (granting (1) or denying (0) the appeal) and then rationalize your prediction by pinpointing and explaining pivotal sentences in the case document.

### Input:
1964 voluntarily. He rejected as an after though the story of the appellant that the surrender had been brought about as a result of procedure or undue influence exerted on him by representatives of Parubai - a story put forward by the appellant in his subsequent statement recorded on October 11, 1966 after remand. The matter was carried in appeal by the appellant. In appeal, the Special Deputy Collector took the view that the surrender deed was not executed voluntarily by the appellant as it was result of undue influence exerted on him by Parubais representatives who were present at the time of the execution. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal confirmed the finding of the Deputy Collector. The respondents preferred Special Civil Application 186 of 1969 under Article 227 challenging the order of Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and the High Court has set aside the orders of the Special Deputy Collector and the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and restored that of the Additional Tahsildar. It is this order passed by the High Court that has been challenged by the appellant before us in the appeal.3. Mr. Lokur appearing for the appellant has strenuously contended that after all both the Special Deputy Collector as well as the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and recorded a concurrent finding of fact that the deed of surrender was involuntary and it was the result of the undue influence exerted on him at the instance of Parubai and such finding of fact could not be interfered with by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. If the matter had really rested with the aspect of appreciation of evidence one way or the other there would have been considerable force in the contention of Mr. Lokur. However, what we find is that approach and appreciation of evidence on the part of the Special Deputy Collector and the Tribunal are vitiated by apparent errors of law committed by them while setting aside they Additional Tahsildars order. In the first place it was never the case of the appellant that there was any pressure or undue influence exerted on him in the matter of the execution of the deed of surrender; his initial case was it was voluntary and there was no pressure from any one and even on April 15, 1964 when he prevaricated he said it was executed by mistake, though voluntary character was not given up and it was only in October 1966 after remand that the case of undue influence was put forward - clearly an afterthought. But the Deputy Collector and Tribunal accepted the latter case by treating appellants earlier case and statement on April 15, 1964 as a nullity which was clearly an erroneous view in law. The Deputy Collector and Tribunal found fault with Tahsildars order by holding that he had committed a breach of Rule 11 without indication what particular provision thereof had been committed a breach of by the Additional Tahsildar. It was pointed out by Mr. Lokur on behalf of the appellant that under Rule 11 it was incumbent upon the tenancy authority to record the statement of the tenant in the absence of the landlords or his representative after taking the tenant into confidence and this procedure was not followed. It is clear that the Deputy Collector took the view, which was confirmed by the Tribunal, that the earlier statement of the appellant on April 15, 1964 was a nullity because it was recorded when Parubai was dead and in the absence of her successors and his subsequent statement dated October 11, 1966 had not been recorded in the absence of the respondents and hence there was a breach of Rule 11. In our opinion it is this erroneous view in law on the part of the Deputy Collector and the Tribunal that enabled the High Court to interfere with their orders. Parubai had died on April 8, 1964, i.e., just about a week before April 15, 1964 when the hearing was fixed and the proceedings had not abated by then and, therefore, simply because Parubai had died, the statement on oath recorded by Naib Tahsildar on April 15, 1964 could not be regarded as nullity. More so when it was required to be recorded in the absence of the landlord. That statement affirmed the voluntary character of the surrender deed but introduced the element of mistake without explaining what was the mistake about. Regarding the subsequent statement recorded on October 11, 1966 the same was really outside the scope of the remand order, for the matter had been remanded for recording the say of the landlord before deciding upon the character of surrender deed which had not been done as required by the proviso to Rule 11. But that apart the purpose of the provision in Rule 11, that a statement of tenant should be recorded in the absence of the landlord is only to provide a safeguard against the probable influence of the landlord at the time of recording the statement of the tenant. If that be the purpose, in out view, that purpose was more than achieved inasmuch as in that statement, notwithstanding the presence of the respondents, the appellant boldly came out with a case of undue influence for the first time giving up the case of mistake. Even so, the Deputy Collector and the Tribunal erroneously harped on the breach of Rule 11. In out view the Deputy Collector and the Tribunal entirely misunderstood the initial case of the appellant and committed an apparent error of law in treating his earlier statement as a nullity and proceeding on that wrong basis accepted the latter case of the appellant which was clearly an after thought. It was in that view of the matter that the High Court thought it fit to interfere with the orders of Deputy Collector and Tribunal. It was not, therefore, a case of merely reappreciating the evidence and interfering with a concurrent finding of fact recorded by the Deputy Collector and Tribunal.

### Response:
0

### Explanation:
The Deputy Collector and Tribunal found fault with Tahsildars order by holding that he had committed a breach of Rule 11 without indication what particular provision thereof had been committed a breach of by the Additional Tahsildar. It was pointed out by Mr. Lokur on behalf of the appellant that under Rule 11 it was incumbent upon the tenancy authority to record the statement of the tenant in the absence of the landlords or his representative after taking the tenant into confidence and this procedure was not followed. It is clear that the Deputy Collector took the view, which was confirmed by the Tribunal, that the earlier statement of the appellant on April 15, 1964 was a nullity because it was recorded when Parubai was dead and in the absence of her successors and his subsequent statement dated October 11, 1966 had not been recorded in the absence of the respondents and hence there was a breach of Rule 11. In our opinion it is this erroneous view in law on the part of the Deputy Collector and the Tribunal that enabled the High Court to interfere with their orders. Parubai had died on April 8, 1964, i.e., just about a week before April 15, 1964 when the hearing was fixed and the proceedings had not abated by then and, therefore, simply because Parubai had died, the statement on oath recorded by Naib Tahsildar on April 15, 1964 could not be regarded as nullity. More so when it was required to be recorded in the absence of the landlord. That statement affirmed the voluntary character of the surrender deed but introduced the element of mistake without explaining what was the mistake about. Regarding the subsequent statement recorded on October 11, 1966 the same was really outside the scope of the remand order, for the matter had been remanded for recording the say of the landlord before deciding upon the character of surrender deed which had not been done as required by the proviso to Rule 11. But that apart the purpose of the provision in Rule 11, that a statement of tenant should be recorded in the absence of the landlord is only to provide a safeguard against the probable influence of the landlord at the time of recording the statement of the tenant. If that be the purpose, in out view, that purpose was more than achieved inasmuch as in that statement, notwithstanding the presence of the respondents, the appellant boldly came out with a case of undue influence for the first time giving up the case of mistake. Even so, the Deputy Collector and the Tribunal erroneously harped on the breach of Rule 11. In out view the Deputy Collector and the Tribunal entirely misunderstood the initial case of the appellant and committed an apparent error of law in treating his earlier statement as a nullity and proceeding on that wrong basis accepted the latter case of the appellant which was clearly an after thought. It was in that view of the matter that the High Court thought it fit to interfere with the orders of Deputy Collector and Tribunal. It was not, therefore, a case of merely reappreciating the evidence and interfering with a concurrent finding of fact recorded by the Deputy Collector and Tribunal.
