B.M. Malani Vs. Commr. of Income Tax &amp; Another
Phrases Permanent Edition Vol. 18 and Blacks Law Dictionary. It was furthermore submitted that had the shares and securities been sold when the request therefor was made, which was worth Rs. 30 lakhs at the relevant time, the tax burden of the appellant would have been reduced; particularly when after adjusting the amount of Rs.117.04 lakhs deposited by the appellant, only a sum of Rs. 40.73 lakhs remained due. 7. Ms. Rajni Ohri Lal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, however, drew our attention to the nature of the business, the appellant had been carrying on and the magnitude thereof to contend that the appellant did not suffer any genuine hardship. 8. The term ‘genuine as per the New Collins Concise English Dictionary is defined as under: ‘Genuine means not fake or counterfeit, real, not pretending (not bogus or merely a ruse)" For interpretation of the aforementioned provision, the principle of purposive construction should be resorted to. Levy of interest although is statutory in nature, inter alia for re-compensating the revenue from loss suffered by non-deposit of tax by the assessee within the time specified therefor. The said principle should also be applied for the purpose of determining as to whether any hardship had been caused or not. A genuine hardship would, inter alia, mean a genuine difficulty. That per se would not lead to a conclusion that a person having large assets would never be in difficulty as he can sell those assets and pay the amount of interest levied. The ingredients of genuine hardship must be determined keeping in view the dictionary meaning thereof and the legal conspectus attending thereto. For the said purpose, another well--known principle, namely, a person cannot take advantage of his own wrong, may also have to be borne in mind. The said principle, it is conceded, has not been applied by the courts below in this case, but we may take note of a few precedents operating in the field to highlight the aforementioned proposition of law. [See Priyanka Overseas Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & ors. 1991 Suppl. (1) SCC 102, para 39, Union of India & ors. v. Major General Madan Lal Yadav (Retd.) (1996) 4 SCC 127 at 142, paras 28 and 29, Ashok Kapil v. Sana Ullah (dead) & ors. (1996) 6 SCC 342 at 345, para 7, Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar (2003) 8 SCC 673 at 692, para 65, first sentence, Kusheshwar Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar & ors. (2007) 11 scc 447 , paras 13, 14 and 16). Thus, the said principle, in our opinion, should be applied even in a case of this nature. A statutory authority despite receipt of such a request could have kept mum. It should have taken some action. It should have responded to the prayer of the appellant.However, another principle should also be borne in mind, namely, that a statutory authority must act within the four corners of the statute. Indisputably, the Commissioner has the discretion not to accede to the request of the assessee, but that discretion must be judiciously exercised. He has to arrive at a satisfaction that the three conditions laid down therein have been fulfilled before passing an order waiving interest. Compulsion to pay any unjust dues per se would cause hardship. But a question, however, would further arise as to whether the default in payment of the amount was due to circumstances beyond the control of the assessee.Unfortunately, this aspect of the matter has not been considered by the learned Commissioner and the High Court in its proper perspective. The Department had taken the plea that unless the amount of tax due was ascertainable, the securities could not have been sold and the demand draft could not have been encashed. The same logic would apply to the case of the assessee in regard to levy of interest also. It is one thing to say that the levy of interest on the ground of non-payment of correct amount of tax by itself can be a ground for non-acceding to the request of the assessee as the levy is a statutory one but it is another thing to say that the said factor shall not be taken into consideration at all for the purpose of exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction on the part of the Commissioner. Appellant volunteered that the securities be sold. Why the said request of the appellant could not be acceded to has not been explained. It was a voluntary act on the part of the appellant. It was not even a case where sub-Section (3) of Section 226 of the Act was resorted to. As the offer was voluntary, the authorities of the Department subject to any statutory interdict could have considered the request of the appellant. It was probably in the interest of the revenue itself to realize its dues. Whether this could be done in law or not has not been gone into.9. The same ground, however, was not available to the appellant in respect of the demand draft, as in relation thereto no such request was made. The demand draft was in the name of a Company. It may be true that when any document is seized, a presumption is raised that the same belongs to the person from whose possession or control it was seized as is laid down in sub-Section (4A) of Section 132 of the Act, but such a presumption is a rebuttable one. In the absence of any request made by the Assessee himself, probably at that point of time, the same could not have been encashed. Appellant did not own the same in law. He did not make any request for its enchashment. Whether such a presumption should be raised or not was the subject matter of consideration by the Assessing Officer at the time of making its final assessment as the appellant himself filed an application before the Settlement Commission in terms of Section 245C(1) of the Act.
1[ds]The ingredients of genuine hardship must be determined keeping in view the dictionary meaning thereof and the legal conspectus attending thereto. For the said purpose, another well--known principle, namely, a person cannot take advantage of his own wrong, may also have to be borne in mind. The said principle, it is conceded, has not been applied by the courts below in this case, but we may take note of a few precedents operating in the field to highlight the aforementioned proposition ofthe said principle, in our opinion, should be applied even in a case of this nature. A statutory authority despite receipt of such a request could have kept mum. It should have taken some action. It should have responded to the prayer of the appellant.However, another principle should also be borne in mind, namely, that a statutory authority must act within the four corners of the statute. Indisputably, the Commissioner has the discretion not to accede to the request of the assessee, but that discretion must be judiciously exercised. He has to arrive at a satisfaction that the three conditions laid down therein have been fulfilled before passing an order waiving interest. Compulsion to pay any unjust dues per se would cause hardship. But a question, however, would further arise as to whether the default in payment of the amount was due to circumstances beyond the control of the assessee.Unfortunately, this aspect of the matter has not been considered by the learned Commissioner and the High Court in its proper perspective. The Department had taken the plea that unless the amount of tax due was ascertainable, the securities could not have been sold and the demand draft could not have been encashed. The same logic would apply to the case of the assessee in regard to levy of interest also. It is one thing to say that the levy of interest on the ground of non-payment of correct amount of tax by itself can be a ground for non-acceding to the request of the assessee as the levy is a statutory one but it is another thing to say that the said factor shall not be taken into consideration at all for the purpose of exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction on the part of the Commissioner. Appellant volunteered that the securities be sold. Why the said request of the appellant could not be acceded to has not been explained. It was a voluntary act on the part of the appellant. It was not even a case where sub-Section (3) of Section 226 of the Act was resorted to. As the offer was voluntary, the authorities of the Department subject to any statutory interdict could have considered the request of the appellant. It was probably in the interest of the revenue itself to realize its dues. Whether this could be done in law or not has not been gone into.9. The same ground, however, was not available to the appellant in respect of the demand draft, as in relation thereto no such request was made. The demand draft was in the name of a Company. It may be true that when any document is seized, a presumption is raised that the same belongs to the person from whose possession or control it was seized as is laid down in sub-Section (4A) of Section 132 of the Act, but such a presumption is a rebuttable one. In the absence of any request made by the Assessee himself, probably at that point of time, the same could not have been encashed. Appellant did not own the same in law. He did not make any request for its enchashment. Whether such a presumption should be raised or not was the subject matter of consideration by the Assessing Officer at the time of making its final assessment as the appellant himself filed an application before the Settlement Commission in terms of Section 245C(1) of the
### Instruction:
Conjecture the end result of the case (acceptance (1) or non-acceptance (0) of the appeal), followed by a detailed explanation using crucial sentences from the case proceeding.

### Input:
Phrases Permanent Edition Vol. 18 and Blacks Law Dictionary. It was furthermore submitted that had the shares and securities been sold when the request therefor was made, which was worth Rs. 30 lakhs at the relevant time, the tax burden of the appellant would have been reduced; particularly when after adjusting the amount of Rs.117.04 lakhs deposited by the appellant, only a sum of Rs. 40.73 lakhs remained due. 7. Ms. Rajni Ohri Lal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, however, drew our attention to the nature of the business, the appellant had been carrying on and the magnitude thereof to contend that the appellant did not suffer any genuine hardship. 8. The term ‘genuine as per the New Collins Concise English Dictionary is defined as under: ‘Genuine means not fake or counterfeit, real, not pretending (not bogus or merely a ruse)" For interpretation of the aforementioned provision, the principle of purposive construction should be resorted to. Levy of interest although is statutory in nature, inter alia for re-compensating the revenue from loss suffered by non-deposit of tax by the assessee within the time specified therefor. The said principle should also be applied for the purpose of determining as to whether any hardship had been caused or not. A genuine hardship would, inter alia, mean a genuine difficulty. That per se would not lead to a conclusion that a person having large assets would never be in difficulty as he can sell those assets and pay the amount of interest levied. The ingredients of genuine hardship must be determined keeping in view the dictionary meaning thereof and the legal conspectus attending thereto. For the said purpose, another well--known principle, namely, a person cannot take advantage of his own wrong, may also have to be borne in mind. The said principle, it is conceded, has not been applied by the courts below in this case, but we may take note of a few precedents operating in the field to highlight the aforementioned proposition of law. [See Priyanka Overseas Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & ors. 1991 Suppl. (1) SCC 102, para 39, Union of India & ors. v. Major General Madan Lal Yadav (Retd.) (1996) 4 SCC 127 at 142, paras 28 and 29, Ashok Kapil v. Sana Ullah (dead) & ors. (1996) 6 SCC 342 at 345, para 7, Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar (2003) 8 SCC 673 at 692, para 65, first sentence, Kusheshwar Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar & ors. (2007) 11 scc 447 , paras 13, 14 and 16). Thus, the said principle, in our opinion, should be applied even in a case of this nature. A statutory authority despite receipt of such a request could have kept mum. It should have taken some action. It should have responded to the prayer of the appellant.However, another principle should also be borne in mind, namely, that a statutory authority must act within the four corners of the statute. Indisputably, the Commissioner has the discretion not to accede to the request of the assessee, but that discretion must be judiciously exercised. He has to arrive at a satisfaction that the three conditions laid down therein have been fulfilled before passing an order waiving interest. Compulsion to pay any unjust dues per se would cause hardship. But a question, however, would further arise as to whether the default in payment of the amount was due to circumstances beyond the control of the assessee.Unfortunately, this aspect of the matter has not been considered by the learned Commissioner and the High Court in its proper perspective. The Department had taken the plea that unless the amount of tax due was ascertainable, the securities could not have been sold and the demand draft could not have been encashed. The same logic would apply to the case of the assessee in regard to levy of interest also. It is one thing to say that the levy of interest on the ground of non-payment of correct amount of tax by itself can be a ground for non-acceding to the request of the assessee as the levy is a statutory one but it is another thing to say that the said factor shall not be taken into consideration at all for the purpose of exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction on the part of the Commissioner. Appellant volunteered that the securities be sold. Why the said request of the appellant could not be acceded to has not been explained. It was a voluntary act on the part of the appellant. It was not even a case where sub-Section (3) of Section 226 of the Act was resorted to. As the offer was voluntary, the authorities of the Department subject to any statutory interdict could have considered the request of the appellant. It was probably in the interest of the revenue itself to realize its dues. Whether this could be done in law or not has not been gone into.9. The same ground, however, was not available to the appellant in respect of the demand draft, as in relation thereto no such request was made. The demand draft was in the name of a Company. It may be true that when any document is seized, a presumption is raised that the same belongs to the person from whose possession or control it was seized as is laid down in sub-Section (4A) of Section 132 of the Act, but such a presumption is a rebuttable one. In the absence of any request made by the Assessee himself, probably at that point of time, the same could not have been encashed. Appellant did not own the same in law. He did not make any request for its enchashment. Whether such a presumption should be raised or not was the subject matter of consideration by the Assessing Officer at the time of making its final assessment as the appellant himself filed an application before the Settlement Commission in terms of Section 245C(1) of the Act.

### Response:
1

### Explanation:
The ingredients of genuine hardship must be determined keeping in view the dictionary meaning thereof and the legal conspectus attending thereto. For the said purpose, another well--known principle, namely, a person cannot take advantage of his own wrong, may also have to be borne in mind. The said principle, it is conceded, has not been applied by the courts below in this case, but we may take note of a few precedents operating in the field to highlight the aforementioned proposition ofthe said principle, in our opinion, should be applied even in a case of this nature. A statutory authority despite receipt of such a request could have kept mum. It should have taken some action. It should have responded to the prayer of the appellant.However, another principle should also be borne in mind, namely, that a statutory authority must act within the four corners of the statute. Indisputably, the Commissioner has the discretion not to accede to the request of the assessee, but that discretion must be judiciously exercised. He has to arrive at a satisfaction that the three conditions laid down therein have been fulfilled before passing an order waiving interest. Compulsion to pay any unjust dues per se would cause hardship. But a question, however, would further arise as to whether the default in payment of the amount was due to circumstances beyond the control of the assessee.Unfortunately, this aspect of the matter has not been considered by the learned Commissioner and the High Court in its proper perspective. The Department had taken the plea that unless the amount of tax due was ascertainable, the securities could not have been sold and the demand draft could not have been encashed. The same logic would apply to the case of the assessee in regard to levy of interest also. It is one thing to say that the levy of interest on the ground of non-payment of correct amount of tax by itself can be a ground for non-acceding to the request of the assessee as the levy is a statutory one but it is another thing to say that the said factor shall not be taken into consideration at all for the purpose of exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction on the part of the Commissioner. Appellant volunteered that the securities be sold. Why the said request of the appellant could not be acceded to has not been explained. It was a voluntary act on the part of the appellant. It was not even a case where sub-Section (3) of Section 226 of the Act was resorted to. As the offer was voluntary, the authorities of the Department subject to any statutory interdict could have considered the request of the appellant. It was probably in the interest of the revenue itself to realize its dues. Whether this could be done in law or not has not been gone into.9. The same ground, however, was not available to the appellant in respect of the demand draft, as in relation thereto no such request was made. The demand draft was in the name of a Company. It may be true that when any document is seized, a presumption is raised that the same belongs to the person from whose possession or control it was seized as is laid down in sub-Section (4A) of Section 132 of the Act, but such a presumption is a rebuttable one. In the absence of any request made by the Assessee himself, probably at that point of time, the same could not have been encashed. Appellant did not own the same in law. He did not make any request for its enchashment. Whether such a presumption should be raised or not was the subject matter of consideration by the Assessing Officer at the time of making its final assessment as the appellant himself filed an application before the Settlement Commission in terms of Section 245C(1) of the
