D. D. Suri Vs. A. K. Barren &amp; Ors
1966 he was appointed Commissioner Land Reforms.3. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed before us a chronology of events subsequent to December l966. Inter alia, it has been stated that in April 1967 the appellant wrote to the State Government complaining about interference in his work by Ramanathan, Member of the Board of Revenue Orissa. In the middle of 1967 the appellant was asked to make a report on the Transport Department. In his report he brought out certain matters against Ramanathan In August 1967 the Chief Secretary put up a notice to the Chief Minister to constitute a committee to review the work of the appellant. One of the members of that Committee was Ramanathan. In September 1967 the appellant made two representations against the personnel of the committee, in particular, with regard to the appointment of Ramanathan as a member of that Committee.4. In para 3 of the petition it was alleged that the appellant was subjected to a series of illegal and capricious acts committed by opposite parties particularly A. K. Barren, Chief Secretary to the Government of Orissa and S. K. Ghosh, Director of Vigilance in that State. These orders, according to the appellant. were actuated by "deepest malice and manifest mala fides". In para 4 it was alleged that on November 27, 1967 the appellants residence was surrounded by a force of about 50 police personnel and his house was searched for two days by K C. Patnaik, Deputy Superintendent of Police on the basis of the warrant of search purported to have been issued by D. P. Sharma, Additional District Magistrate for an alleged offence under Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with Section 5 (1) (d) (e) and Section 3 (a) of that Act. In para 5 It was alleged that on November 28, 1967 while the search was being conducted the appellant was served with an order of A. K Barren, Chief Secretary, suspending the appellant under Rule 7 (3) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1955 with effect from the date of the service of the order. During the period of suspension the appellant was not allowed to leave Cuttack except with the prior permission of the Chief Secretary. In Para 6 of the petition it was stated that although the order purported to have been issued under the abovementioned Rule which contemplated suspension pending disciplinary proceedings there were no proceedings which were in fact pending and therefore the order was altogether illegal. In the writ petition in other paragraphs it was alleged that on December 7, 1967 the Additional District Magistrate, Sambalpur, issued a search warrant on the application of Patnaik D. S. P. for the search of the locker which had been leased out by the appellant and his wife jointly in the Delhi Safe Deposit Janpath New Delhi. During the search of the appellants residence at Cuttack as well as the locker at Delhi the personal jewellery of the appellants wife was even seized and such articles and papers as had no connection whatsoever with the subjects matter of the allegations were taken into possession. In pare 28 quite a serious allegation was made against Ghosh, the Director of Vigilance. It was said that he had with the connivance of A K Barren posted a number of policemen in plain clothes to watch the appellants movements and he was subjected to a lot of harassment and humiliation. Even the letters sent by the appellant for posting were snatched from his servant and his in-coming mail was tampered with.5. It is unnecessary to set out the other facts alleged but we may extract the following portion from pare 30 of the petition (Annexure 2) of the appellant:"The petitioner submits that all the illegal orders relating to investigation by the Vigilance Police, searches of the petitioners residence at Cuttack and his Locker at New Delhi his suspension, the restraint on his movement, and the withdrawal of all facilities and entitlements of the petitioner were passed on or at the instance of opposite party No. 1 and with the active connivance and abetment of opposite party No. 2 both of whom have been maliciously hostile to the petitioner for a long time and have acted in collusion with the sole purpose of subjecting him to incalculable harm, harassment and mental torture for satisfaction of personal grudge."6. We are wholly unable to understand how in the presence of all the allegations which had been made in the petition including those of male fides by a senior member of the Indian Administrative Service against other senior Officers and the State Government the High Court was justified in dismissing the petition in limine by just writing the word "dismissed". The High Court did not even call for affidavits in reply to the allegations contained in the petition This Court has repeatedly laid down (see Gianchand v. State of Haryana, Civil Appeal No. 64 of 1970, D/- 21-8-1970 (SC) following Ram Saran Dass v. State of Punjab, Civil Appeal No. 36 of 1963, D/-16-9-1963 (SC))that in such circumstances the High Court ought to call upon the respondents to make a return and then consider whether allegations have been proved or not. If it is found that the appellant has made reckless allegations which are not founded on facts it would be in the fitness of things to take suitable action against him. But if on the other hand it is founded that there is no reason why the High Court should not grant him the necessary relief if a proper case is made out for doing so. It is quite possible that in a given case the proper course for a writ petitioner should be to seek relief by way of a suit if there are several disputed questions of fact but all these matters can be decided only if the petition is admitted and it is heard after the return has been filed by the respondents.
1[ds]6. We are wholly unable to understand how in the presence of all the allegations which had been made in the petition including those of male fides by a senior member of the Indian Administrative Service against other senior Officers and the State Government the High Court was justified in dismissing the petition in limine by just writing the word "dismissed". The High Court did not even call for affidavits in reply to the allegations contained in the petition This Court has repeatedly laid down (see Gianchand v. State of Haryana, Civil Appeal No. 64 of 1970, D/(SC) following Ram Saran Dass v. State of Punjab, Civil Appeal No. 36 of 1963,(SC))that in such circumstances the High Court ought to call upon the respondents to make a return and then consider whether allegations have been proved or not. If it is found that the appellant has made reckless allegations which are not founded on facts it would be in the fitness of things to take suitable action against him. But if on the other hand it is founded that there is no reason why the High Court should not grant him the necessary relief if a proper case is made out for doing so. It is quite possible that in a given case the proper course for a writ petitioner should be to seek relief by way of a suit if there are several disputed questions of fact but all these matters can be decided only if the petition is admitted and it is heard after the return has been filed by the respondents.
### Instruction:
Forecast the likely verdict of the case (granting (1) or denying (0) the appeal) and then rationalize your prediction by pinpointing and explaining pivotal sentences in the case document.

### Input:
1966 he was appointed Commissioner Land Reforms.3. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed before us a chronology of events subsequent to December l966. Inter alia, it has been stated that in April 1967 the appellant wrote to the State Government complaining about interference in his work by Ramanathan, Member of the Board of Revenue Orissa. In the middle of 1967 the appellant was asked to make a report on the Transport Department. In his report he brought out certain matters against Ramanathan In August 1967 the Chief Secretary put up a notice to the Chief Minister to constitute a committee to review the work of the appellant. One of the members of that Committee was Ramanathan. In September 1967 the appellant made two representations against the personnel of the committee, in particular, with regard to the appointment of Ramanathan as a member of that Committee.4. In para 3 of the petition it was alleged that the appellant was subjected to a series of illegal and capricious acts committed by opposite parties particularly A. K. Barren, Chief Secretary to the Government of Orissa and S. K. Ghosh, Director of Vigilance in that State. These orders, according to the appellant. were actuated by "deepest malice and manifest mala fides". In para 4 it was alleged that on November 27, 1967 the appellants residence was surrounded by a force of about 50 police personnel and his house was searched for two days by K C. Patnaik, Deputy Superintendent of Police on the basis of the warrant of search purported to have been issued by D. P. Sharma, Additional District Magistrate for an alleged offence under Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with Section 5 (1) (d) (e) and Section 3 (a) of that Act. In para 5 It was alleged that on November 28, 1967 while the search was being conducted the appellant was served with an order of A. K Barren, Chief Secretary, suspending the appellant under Rule 7 (3) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1955 with effect from the date of the service of the order. During the period of suspension the appellant was not allowed to leave Cuttack except with the prior permission of the Chief Secretary. In Para 6 of the petition it was stated that although the order purported to have been issued under the abovementioned Rule which contemplated suspension pending disciplinary proceedings there were no proceedings which were in fact pending and therefore the order was altogether illegal. In the writ petition in other paragraphs it was alleged that on December 7, 1967 the Additional District Magistrate, Sambalpur, issued a search warrant on the application of Patnaik D. S. P. for the search of the locker which had been leased out by the appellant and his wife jointly in the Delhi Safe Deposit Janpath New Delhi. During the search of the appellants residence at Cuttack as well as the locker at Delhi the personal jewellery of the appellants wife was even seized and such articles and papers as had no connection whatsoever with the subjects matter of the allegations were taken into possession. In pare 28 quite a serious allegation was made against Ghosh, the Director of Vigilance. It was said that he had with the connivance of A K Barren posted a number of policemen in plain clothes to watch the appellants movements and he was subjected to a lot of harassment and humiliation. Even the letters sent by the appellant for posting were snatched from his servant and his in-coming mail was tampered with.5. It is unnecessary to set out the other facts alleged but we may extract the following portion from pare 30 of the petition (Annexure 2) of the appellant:"The petitioner submits that all the illegal orders relating to investigation by the Vigilance Police, searches of the petitioners residence at Cuttack and his Locker at New Delhi his suspension, the restraint on his movement, and the withdrawal of all facilities and entitlements of the petitioner were passed on or at the instance of opposite party No. 1 and with the active connivance and abetment of opposite party No. 2 both of whom have been maliciously hostile to the petitioner for a long time and have acted in collusion with the sole purpose of subjecting him to incalculable harm, harassment and mental torture for satisfaction of personal grudge."6. We are wholly unable to understand how in the presence of all the allegations which had been made in the petition including those of male fides by a senior member of the Indian Administrative Service against other senior Officers and the State Government the High Court was justified in dismissing the petition in limine by just writing the word "dismissed". The High Court did not even call for affidavits in reply to the allegations contained in the petition This Court has repeatedly laid down (see Gianchand v. State of Haryana, Civil Appeal No. 64 of 1970, D/- 21-8-1970 (SC) following Ram Saran Dass v. State of Punjab, Civil Appeal No. 36 of 1963, D/-16-9-1963 (SC))that in such circumstances the High Court ought to call upon the respondents to make a return and then consider whether allegations have been proved or not. If it is found that the appellant has made reckless allegations which are not founded on facts it would be in the fitness of things to take suitable action against him. But if on the other hand it is founded that there is no reason why the High Court should not grant him the necessary relief if a proper case is made out for doing so. It is quite possible that in a given case the proper course for a writ petitioner should be to seek relief by way of a suit if there are several disputed questions of fact but all these matters can be decided only if the petition is admitted and it is heard after the return has been filed by the respondents.

### Response:
1

### Explanation:
6. We are wholly unable to understand how in the presence of all the allegations which had been made in the petition including those of male fides by a senior member of the Indian Administrative Service against other senior Officers and the State Government the High Court was justified in dismissing the petition in limine by just writing the word "dismissed". The High Court did not even call for affidavits in reply to the allegations contained in the petition This Court has repeatedly laid down (see Gianchand v. State of Haryana, Civil Appeal No. 64 of 1970, D/(SC) following Ram Saran Dass v. State of Punjab, Civil Appeal No. 36 of 1963,(SC))that in such circumstances the High Court ought to call upon the respondents to make a return and then consider whether allegations have been proved or not. If it is found that the appellant has made reckless allegations which are not founded on facts it would be in the fitness of things to take suitable action against him. But if on the other hand it is founded that there is no reason why the High Court should not grant him the necessary relief if a proper case is made out for doing so. It is quite possible that in a given case the proper course for a writ petitioner should be to seek relief by way of a suit if there are several disputed questions of fact but all these matters can be decided only if the petition is admitted and it is heard after the return has been filed by the respondents.
