K. K. Chari Vs. R. M. Seshadri
many as 45 Exs. one of which was the order of eviction obtained against him, being Ext 45. The respondent did not cross-examine the appellant. When the evidence of the landlord was before the court supported, as it was by, the innumerable exhibits filed by him, it can surely be stated that a stage had been reached when the Controller was called upon to apply his mind to the question whether the plea of the landlord that he required the premises for his own occupation was bona fide. There is the further circumstance that the tenant did not cross-examine the plaintiff. On the other hand, he entered into a compromise in and by which he withdrew his defence and submitted to a decree for eviction unconditionally His withdrawal of the defence, after the plaintiff had given evidence and filed exhibits in support of his plea, clearly shows that he accepted as true the claim of the landlord that he requires the premises bona fide for his own occupation. He has accepted the position that the landlord has made out the statutory requirement, entitling him to ask for possession of the premises. It is this unconditional withdrawal of the defence regarding the statutory condition pleaded by the landlord, and the compromise following it that was accepted by the court and a decree for eviction passed thereon. Under these circumstances, when the tenant has accepted the plea of the landlord, in our opinion, it is futile to hold that the Rent Controller must again embark upon an enquiry regarding the requirement of the landlord being bona fide and adjudicated upon the same. Ofcourse, if there is a dispute between the landlord and tenant, the court must decide the matter and adjudicate upon the plea of the landlord. 26. The true position appears to be that an order of eviction based on consent of the parties is not necessarily void if the jurisdictional fact viz. the existence of one or more of the conditions mentioned in S. l0 were shown to have existed when the Court made the order. Satisfaction of the Court, which is no doubt a prerequisite for the order of eviction, need not be by the manifestation home out by a judicial finding. If at some stage the Court was called upon to apply its mind to the question and there was sufficient material before it, before the parties invited it to pass an order in terms of their agreement, it is possible to postulate that the Court was satisfied about the grounds on which the order of eviction was based. 27. It is no doubt true that before making an order for possession the court is under a duty to satisfy itself as to the truth of the landlords claim if there is a dispute between the landlord and tenant. But if the tenant in fact admits that the landlord is entitled to possession on one or other of the statutory grounds mentioned in the Act it is open to the court to act on that admission and make an order for possession in favour of the landlord without further enquiry. It is no doubt true that each case will have to be decided on its own facts to find out whether there is any material to justify an inference that an admission, express, or implied, has been made by the tenant about the existence of one or other of the statutory grounds. But in the case on hand, we have already referred to the specific claim of the landlord as well as the fact of the tenant withdrawing his defence. According to us, such withdrawal of the defence expressly amounts to the tenant admitting that the landlord has made out his case regarding his requiring the premises for his own occupation being bona fide. In the three decisions of this Court, to which we have already referred, the position was entirely different. In none of those eases was there any material to show that the tenant had expressly or impliedly accepted the plea of the landlord as true. Therefore those decisions do not assist the respondent-tenant. 28. For all the reasons mentioned above, it cannot be held in the particular circumstances of this case, that the decree for eviction has been passed solely on the basis of the compromise entered into between the parties. On the other hand, it is clear from the various matters referred to, that the court was satisfied about the bona fide requirement of the landlord. Therefore, the decree for eviction is neither void nor inexecutable. 29. Mr. Tarkunde, learned counsel, contended that if the execution Court is to find out, whether the court, which passed the decree, was satisfied about the statutory requirement in a particular case, it will have to conduct a very elaborate enquiry. We are not impressed with this contention. Once it is accepted that the question about the decree being void and as such not executable on any ground available in law can be raised before the executing Court, it is needless to state that the executing Court will have to adjudicate upon that plea and for that purpose the relevant materials have to be considered. If that is so, there is no insurmountable difficulty, as envisaged by Mr. Tarkunde, in an executing Court considering whether a particular decree for eviction is void as being contrary to the relevant sections of the statute governing the matter. 30. Mr. Tarkunde, learned counsel, contended that the tenant had disputed the title of the landlord as well as the validity of the notice issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. As those matters have not been considered by the courts below, as requested that the proceedings may be remanded for this purpose. We are not inclined to accede to this request. The tenant raised these objections also in his original plea, but he has unconditionally withdrawn all his defence. That means those pleas also no longer survive for consideration.
1[ds]17. Our attention has been drawn to certain English decisions rendered under the Rent Restrictions Act, wherein it has been held that though the court has jurisdiction to order possession in favour of a landlord only on one or other of the specified statutory grounds, the court may act on an admission made by a tenant in that behalf and pass an order of eviction without being obliged to hear a case out. It is not necessary for us to refer to those decisions as in our opinion, the case on hand will have to be decided in accordance with the principles laid down by this Court18. There are three decisions of this Court which require to be considered. In Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat Dass, (1969) 2 SCR 432  , a decree for eviction passed on the basis of a compromise between the parties, was held by this Court, to be a nullity as contravening Section 13 (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952It will be seen from this decision that the decree was held to be a nullity because the landlord was not a party thereto, and also because the court had not satisfied itself that a ground for eviction, as required by the statute, existed. This decision is certainly an authority for the proposition that a court ordering eviction has to satisfy itself that a statutory ground of eviction has been made out by a landlord. How exactly that satisfaction is to be expressed by the court or gathered from the materials, has not been laid down in this decision, as this Court was not faced with such a problem20. In Kaushalya Devi v K. L. Bansal, (1969) 2 SCR 1048   = (AIR 1970 SC 838  ) the question again rose under the same Delhi statute regarding the validity of a decree passed for eviction on compromiseThe tenant did not vacate the premises within the time mentioned as per the compromise memo. On the other hand, he filed an application under Section 47, Civil Procedure Code, pleading that the decree is void as being in contravention of S. 13 of the Delhi statute. The High Court held that the decree was a nullity, as the order was passed solely on the basis of the compromise without indicating that any of the statutory grounds mentioned in Section 13 existed. Following the decision in Bahadur Singh, (1969) 2 SCR 432     this Court upheld the order of the High Court. Here again, it will be seen that the manner in which the courts satisfaction is to be expressed or gathered has not been dealt with21. A similar question came up again before this Court in Perozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal, AIR 1970 SC 794  . The landlord filed an application for eviction of the tenant on the ground that he had sublet the premises without obtaining his consent in writing. Subletting, without the consent of the landlord in writing, was one of the grounds under Section 13 (l) of the Delhi statute entitling a landlord to ask for eviction. The tenant denied the allegation that he had sublet the premises. Both the landlord and the tenant entered into a compromise and the court, after recording the same, passed the following orderAs the tenant did not surrender possession of the properties within the time mentioned in the compromise memo, the landlord levied execution. It was resisted by the tenant on various grounds one of which was that the decree for eviction was a nullity, being in contravention of Section 13 of the Delhi statute. This contention was accepted by the execution Court, as well as by the High Court. This Court, after a reference to the provisions of S. 13, held that a decree for recovery of possession can be passed only if the court concerned is satisfied that one or other of the grounds mentioned in the section is established. This Court, further observed :From the facts mentioned earlier, it is seen that at no stage, the Court was called upon to apply its mind to the question whether the alleged subletting is true or not. Order made by it does not show that it was satisfied that the subletting complained of has taken place, nor is there any other material on record to show that it was so satisfied. It is clear from the record that the court had proceeded solely on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties. That being so there can be hardly any doubt that the court was not competent to pass the impugned decree. Hence the decree under execution must be held to be a nullity22. Reference was also made to the two earlier decisions holding such decrees to be void. It is significant to note that this Court in the last mentioned decision referred to the facts leading upto the compromise decree, namely, the basis of the claim of the landlord, the denial by the tenant and both of them filing a memo of compromise without any reference to the plea of subletting made by the landlord. In the said decision this Court has held that the compromise decree is void, as there could have been no satisfaction of this Court regarding the statutory requirement in view of the following three circumstances:(1) At no stage the Court was called upon to apply its mind to the question whether the plea of subletting is true or not(2) The order made by the Court does not show that it was satisfied that the subletting complained of has taken place(3) There was no other material on record to show that the court was so satisfiedThe view of this Court further is that the decree for eviction has been passed solely on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties23. In the last decision, in our opinion, there is an indication as to how the satisfaction of a court can be expressed or gathered in a particular case. If a stage had been reached in a particular proceeding for a court to apply its mind regarding the existence of a statutory condition, it may be held that it was so satisfied about the plea of the landlord. Again from other material on record, it can be inferred that the court was so satisfied24. We are not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Tarkunde that the decree for eviction in the case before us has been passed solely on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties. No doubt a reading of the order of the court dated March 31, 1959,isolated from all other circumstances, may give the impression that the decree for eviction is passed because of the compromise between the parties. It is no doubt true that the order on the face of it does not show that the court has expressed its satisfaction that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. If the court had expressed its satisfaction in the order itself, that will conclude the matter. That the court was so satisfied can also be considered from the point of view whether a stage had been reached in the proceedings for the court to apply its mind to the relevant question? Other materials on record can also be taken into account to find out if the court was so satisfied. The High Court has proceeded on the basis that even if there was material before the court, when it passed the order of eviction by consent, from which it can be shown that the court was satisfied about the requirement of the landlord being bona fide, nevertheless such an order will be a nullity unless the Rent Controller has given his decision in favour of the landlord. In our opinion, this view is erroneousUnder these circumstances, when the tenant has accepted the plea of the landlord, in our opinion, it is futile to hold that the Rent Controller must again embark upon an enquiry regarding the requirement of the landlord being bona fide and adjudicated upon the same. Ofcourse, if there is a dispute between the landlord and tenant, the court must decide the matter and adjudicate upon the plea of the landlord26. The true position appears to be that an order of eviction based on consent of the parties is not necessarily void if the jurisdictional fact viz. the existence of one or more of the conditions mentioned in S. l0 were shown to have existed when the Court made the order. Satisfaction of the Court, which is no doubt a prerequisite for the order of eviction, need not be by the manifestation home out by a judicial finding. If at some stage the Court was called upon to apply its mind to the question and there was sufficient material before it, before the parties invited it to pass an order in terms of their agreement, it is possible to postulate that the Court was satisfied about the grounds on which the order of eviction was based28. For all the reasons mentioned above, it cannot be held in the particular circumstances of this case, that the decree for eviction has been passed solely on the basis of the compromise entered into between the parties. On the other hand, it is clear from the various matters referred to, that the court was satisfied about the bona fide requirement of the landlord. Therefore, the decree for eviction is neither void nor inexecutableWe are not impressed with this contention. Once it is accepted that the question about the decree being void and as such not executable on any ground available in law can be raised before the executing Court, it is needless to state that the executing Court will have to adjudicate upon that plea and for that purpose the relevant materials have to be considered. If that is so, there is no insurmountable difficulty, as envisaged by Mr. Tarkunde, in an executing Court considering whether a particular decree for eviction is void as being contrary to the relevant sections of the statute governing the matterAs those matters have not been considered by the courts below, as requested that the proceedings may be remanded for this purpose. We are not inclined to accede to this request. The tenant raised these objections also in his original plea, but he has unconditionally withdrawn all his defence. That means those pleas also no longer survive for consideration34. I am of opinion that in this approach learned Judge relied more on the form than the substance of the matter. The true approach has been pointed out by our learned brother, Vaidialingam, J. He has pointed out that while the decision in Bahadur Singhs case (1969) 2 SCR 432     was an authority for the proposition that a court ordering eviction has to satisfy itself that a statutory ground of eviction has been made out by a landlord how exactly that satisfaction was to be expressed by the court or gathered from the materials, has not been laid down in that decision; that in Kaushalya Devis case AIR 1970 SC 838   also the manner in which the courts satisfaction was to be expressed or gathered has not been dealt with; nor has the decision in Ferozi Lals case AIR 1970 SC 794   given an indication as to how the satisfaction of a court could be expressed or gathered in a particular case. He has pointed out that if a stage had been reached in a particular proceeding for a court to apply its mind regarding the existence of a statutory condition, it may be held that it was so satisfied about the plea of the landlord. Again, from other material on record it can be inferred that the court was so satisfied. He has also pointed out how in the particular circumstances of the present case as the tenant had withdrawn his defence and submitted to a decree for eviction unconditionally, he had accepted the claim of the landlord that he required the premises bona fide for his own occupation; that he has accepted the position that the landlord has made out the statutory requirement entitling him to ask for possession of the premises; that by this unconditional withdrawal of the defence regarding the statutory condition pleaded by the landlord, and the compromise following it that was accepted by the court, the tenant has accepted the plea of the landlord, and it is futile to hold that the Rent Controller must again embark upon an enquiry regarding the requirement of the landlord being bona fide and adjudicate upon the same. He has also pointed out that the true position appears to be that an order of eviction based on consent of the parties is not necessarily void if the jurisdictional fact, viz. the existence of one or more of the conditions mentioned in Section 10 were shown to have existed when the court made the order; that the satisfaction of the court, which is no doubt aprerequisite for the order of eviction, need not be by the manifestationborne out by a judicial finding; and that if at some stage the court was called upon to apply its mind to the question and there was sufficient material before it before the parties invited it to pass an order in terms of their agreement, it is possible to postulate that the court was satisfied about the grounds on which the order of eviction was based. He has further pointed out that if the tenant in fact admits that the landlord is entitled to possession on one or other of the statutory grounds mentioned in the Act, it is open to the court to act on that admission and make an order for possession in favour of the landlord without further enquiry It is on these grounds that he has come to the conclusion that the facts in this case satisfied these tests and, therefore, the order of the Madras High Court should be set aside. In so far as it is necessary for the purpose of this case this is a satisfactory conclusionAfter fully considering the matter I am definitely of the opinion that if the compromise decree is based on the grounds on which the landlord could claim a decree for eviction under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, then it is within the jurisdiction and competence of the Rent Controller to pass such a decree with a default clause; it is similarly competent for the civil court to execute such a decree when default has occurred. The proviso ton (2)of Section 13 of the Act is not attracted in such circumstances as no question of extending time granted to the tenant for putting the landlord in possession arises. In the result my answer to the two questions referred would be in the affirmative40. All these decisions amply support the proposition that I have put forward that an eviction order based on a compromise where the landlord has asked for possession on any one of the grounds on the basis of which he could ask for possession would be valid. This would, however, have to be considered when a proper occasion arises.
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many as 45 Exs. one of which was the order of eviction obtained against him, being Ext 45. The respondent did not cross-examine the appellant. When the evidence of the landlord was before the court supported, as it was by, the innumerable exhibits filed by him, it can surely be stated that a stage had been reached when the Controller was called upon to apply his mind to the question whether the plea of the landlord that he required the premises for his own occupation was bona fide. There is the further circumstance that the tenant did not cross-examine the plaintiff. On the other hand, he entered into a compromise in and by which he withdrew his defence and submitted to a decree for eviction unconditionally His withdrawal of the defence, after the plaintiff had given evidence and filed exhibits in support of his plea, clearly shows that he accepted as true the claim of the landlord that he requires the premises bona fide for his own occupation. He has accepted the position that the landlord has made out the statutory requirement, entitling him to ask for possession of the premises. It is this unconditional withdrawal of the defence regarding the statutory condition pleaded by the landlord, and the compromise following it that was accepted by the court and a decree for eviction passed thereon. Under these circumstances, when the tenant has accepted the plea of the landlord, in our opinion, it is futile to hold that the Rent Controller must again embark upon an enquiry regarding the requirement of the landlord being bona fide and adjudicated upon the same. Ofcourse, if there is a dispute between the landlord and tenant, the court must decide the matter and adjudicate upon the plea of the landlord. 26. The true position appears to be that an order of eviction based on consent of the parties is not necessarily void if the jurisdictional fact viz. the existence of one or more of the conditions mentioned in S. l0 were shown to have existed when the Court made the order. Satisfaction of the Court, which is no doubt a prerequisite for the order of eviction, need not be by the manifestation home out by a judicial finding. If at some stage the Court was called upon to apply its mind to the question and there was sufficient material before it, before the parties invited it to pass an order in terms of their agreement, it is possible to postulate that the Court was satisfied about the grounds on which the order of eviction was based. 27. It is no doubt true that before making an order for possession the court is under a duty to satisfy itself as to the truth of the landlords claim if there is a dispute between the landlord and tenant. But if the tenant in fact admits that the landlord is entitled to possession on one or other of the statutory grounds mentioned in the Act it is open to the court to act on that admission and make an order for possession in favour of the landlord without further enquiry. It is no doubt true that each case will have to be decided on its own facts to find out whether there is any material to justify an inference that an admission, express, or implied, has been made by the tenant about the existence of one or other of the statutory grounds. But in the case on hand, we have already referred to the specific claim of the landlord as well as the fact of the tenant withdrawing his defence. According to us, such withdrawal of the defence expressly amounts to the tenant admitting that the landlord has made out his case regarding his requiring the premises for his own occupation being bona fide. In the three decisions of this Court, to which we have already referred, the position was entirely different. In none of those eases was there any material to show that the tenant had expressly or impliedly accepted the plea of the landlord as true. Therefore those decisions do not assist the respondent-tenant. 28. For all the reasons mentioned above, it cannot be held in the particular circumstances of this case, that the decree for eviction has been passed solely on the basis of the compromise entered into between the parties. On the other hand, it is clear from the various matters referred to, that the court was satisfied about the bona fide requirement of the landlord. Therefore, the decree for eviction is neither void nor inexecutable. 29. Mr. Tarkunde, learned counsel, contended that if the execution Court is to find out, whether the court, which passed the decree, was satisfied about the statutory requirement in a particular case, it will have to conduct a very elaborate enquiry. We are not impressed with this contention. Once it is accepted that the question about the decree being void and as such not executable on any ground available in law can be raised before the executing Court, it is needless to state that the executing Court will have to adjudicate upon that plea and for that purpose the relevant materials have to be considered. If that is so, there is no insurmountable difficulty, as envisaged by Mr. Tarkunde, in an executing Court considering whether a particular decree for eviction is void as being contrary to the relevant sections of the statute governing the matter. 30. Mr. Tarkunde, learned counsel, contended that the tenant had disputed the title of the landlord as well as the validity of the notice issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. As those matters have not been considered by the courts below, as requested that the proceedings may be remanded for this purpose. We are not inclined to accede to this request. The tenant raised these objections also in his original plea, but he has unconditionally withdrawn all his defence. That means those pleas also no longer survive for consideration.

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On the other hand, it is clear from the various matters referred to, that the court was satisfied about the bona fide requirement of the landlord. Therefore, the decree for eviction is neither void nor inexecutableWe are not impressed with this contention. Once it is accepted that the question about the decree being void and as such not executable on any ground available in law can be raised before the executing Court, it is needless to state that the executing Court will have to adjudicate upon that plea and for that purpose the relevant materials have to be considered. If that is so, there is no insurmountable difficulty, as envisaged by Mr. Tarkunde, in an executing Court considering whether a particular decree for eviction is void as being contrary to the relevant sections of the statute governing the matterAs those matters have not been considered by the courts below, as requested that the proceedings may be remanded for this purpose. We are not inclined to accede to this request. The tenant raised these objections also in his original plea, but he has unconditionally withdrawn all his defence. That means those pleas also no longer survive for consideration34. I am of opinion that in this approach learned Judge relied more on the form than the substance of the matter. The true approach has been pointed out by our learned brother, Vaidialingam, J. He has pointed out that while the decision in Bahadur Singhs case (1969) 2 SCR 432     was an authority for the proposition that a court ordering eviction has to satisfy itself that a statutory ground of eviction has been made out by a landlord how exactly that satisfaction was to be expressed by the court or gathered from the materials, has not been laid down in that decision; that in Kaushalya Devis case AIR 1970 SC 838   also the manner in which the courts satisfaction was to be expressed or gathered has not been dealt with; nor has the decision in Ferozi Lals case AIR 1970 SC 794   given an indication as to how the satisfaction of a court could be expressed or gathered in a particular case. He has pointed out that if a stage had been reached in a particular proceeding for a court to apply its mind regarding the existence of a statutory condition, it may be held that it was so satisfied about the plea of the landlord. Again, from other material on record it can be inferred that the court was so satisfied. He has also pointed out how in the particular circumstances of the present case as the tenant had withdrawn his defence and submitted to a decree for eviction unconditionally, he had accepted the claim of the landlord that he required the premises bona fide for his own occupation; that he has accepted the position that the landlord has made out the statutory requirement entitling him to ask for possession of the premises; that by this unconditional withdrawal of the defence regarding the statutory condition pleaded by the landlord, and the compromise following it that was accepted by the court, the tenant has accepted the plea of the landlord, and it is futile to hold that the Rent Controller must again embark upon an enquiry regarding the requirement of the landlord being bona fide and adjudicate upon the same. He has also pointed out that the true position appears to be that an order of eviction based on consent of the parties is not necessarily void if the jurisdictional fact, viz. the existence of one or more of the conditions mentioned in Section 10 were shown to have existed when the court made the order; that the satisfaction of the court, which is no doubt aprerequisite for the order of eviction, need not be by the manifestationborne out by a judicial finding; and that if at some stage the court was called upon to apply its mind to the question and there was sufficient material before it before the parties invited it to pass an order in terms of their agreement, it is possible to postulate that the court was satisfied about the grounds on which the order of eviction was based. He has further pointed out that if the tenant in fact admits that the landlord is entitled to possession on one or other of the statutory grounds mentioned in the Act, it is open to the court to act on that admission and make an order for possession in favour of the landlord without further enquiry It is on these grounds that he has come to the conclusion that the facts in this case satisfied these tests and, therefore, the order of the Madras High Court should be set aside. In so far as it is necessary for the purpose of this case this is a satisfactory conclusionAfter fully considering the matter I am definitely of the opinion that if the compromise decree is based on the grounds on which the landlord could claim a decree for eviction under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, then it is within the jurisdiction and competence of the Rent Controller to pass such a decree with a default clause; it is similarly competent for the civil court to execute such a decree when default has occurred. The proviso ton (2)of Section 13 of the Act is not attracted in such circumstances as no question of extending time granted to the tenant for putting the landlord in possession arises. In the result my answer to the two questions referred would be in the affirmative40. All these decisions amply support the proposition that I have put forward that an eviction order based on a compromise where the landlord has asked for possession on any one of the grounds on the basis of which he could ask for possession would be valid. This would, however, have to be considered when a proper occasion arises.
