Ram Nath &amp; Others Vs. Union of India
violation of the provisions of the new Constitution but not when they are taken away by an Act in violation of Section 299 of the Government of India Act which has been repealed. The intention of the Constitution to protect each and everyone of the Acts specified in the Ninth Schedule from any challenge on the ground of violation of any of the fundamental rights secured under Part III of the Constitution, irrespective of whether they are pre-existing or new rights, placed beyond any doubt or question by the very emphatic language of article 13B which declares that none of the provisions of the specified Acts shall be deemed to be void or ever to have become void on the ground of the alleged violation of the rights indicated “notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal.” That intention is also emphasised by the positive declaration that “each of the said Acts or Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent Legislature to repeal or amend it continue in force.”11. This very question again surfaced in TheState of Uttar Pradesh and Others v. H.H.Maharaja Brijendra Singh, (1961) 1 SCR 362 in which constitutional validity of U.P. Land Acquisition (Rehabilitation of Refugees) Act, 1948 was questioned. The title of the Act impugned in that case clearly shows that it was in pari materia with the 1948 Act, both being enacted with a view to acquire power to acquire land for rehabilitation of refugees and that too in the same year. It may as well be mentioned that U.P. Act XXVI of 1948 is also inserted in the Ninth Schedule. The entry just precedes the 1948 Act. The High Court while upholding the validity of Section 11 which is in pari materia with Section 7 of 1948 Act struck down the two provisos to Section 11 similarly worded as the two provisoes to Section 7(l)(e). Both the provisoes are in pari materia with the impugned provisoes. This Court, reversing the decision of the High Court and following the decision in Dhirubha Devisingh Gohil’s case (Supra) while upholding the constitutional validity of the Act held that the protection under Art. 13B against the violation of the fundamental rights mentioned therein must extend to the rights under Section 299 of the Government of India Act also. The reasons which weighed with the Constitution Bench of this Court while upholding the validity of the U.P. Act will mutatis mutandis apply here and we must uphold the validity of the two provisoes on parity of reasoning.12. It is thus satisfactorily established that in view of the insertion of the 1948 Act in Ninth Schedule it enjoys the umbrella of protection of Art. 13B and therefore it is immune from the challenge as violating any of the provisions in Part 111 of the Constitution. In fact this should end the contro­versy,13. Mr. Dua however urged that in view of the decision of this Court in N.B.Jeejeebhoy v. AssistantCollector, Thana Prant, Thana, (1965) 1 SCR 636 wherein this Court struck down the Land Acquisition (Bombay Amendment) Act, 1948 as constitutionally invalid, would necessitate re-examination of the decisions in Dhirubha Devisingh Gohil’s case and Maharaja Brijendra Singh’s case. It was submitted that the decision in Jeejeebhoy’s case comes later in point of time both to the decision in Dhirubha Gohil’s and Maharaja Brijendra Singh’s case, and therefore the later decision should prevail with this Court. In Jeejeebhoy’s case, this Court repelled the contention that the Amendment Act is saved by Art. 31-A of the Constitution. The argument of the learned Attorney General that Section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935 declared a fundamental right of a citizen, that it is bodily lifted and introduced by the Constitution in Art. 31(2) thereof and that if Art. 31-A saved an attack against the Amending Act on the ground that it infringed Art. 31(2) thereof, it would equally save the attack based on the infringement of Section 299(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 was disposed of by merely observing that the argument is far fetched. It may however be mentioned that in this later decision, the decisions of the Constitution Bench in Dhirubha Devinsingh Gohil’s case and the Maharaja Brijendra Singh’s case were merely referred to but not overruled. They were distinguished on the ground that the statutes impugned in those cases enjoyed the protection of Art. 13B. That is a fact and would make all the difference. The impugned Act in Jeejeebhoy’s case did not enjoy the protection of the Ninth Schedule and Art. 13B, and therefore the decision in Jeejeebhoy’s case is hardly of any assistance.It was lastly urged that the decision of the larger Bench in RustomCavasjee Cooper v. Unionof India,(1970) 3 SCR 530 would clearly show that the decision of this Court in Stateof Gujarat v. ShantilalMangaldas and Others., (1969) 3 SCR 341 is no more good law-and therefore it is open to the Court to examine whether compensation offered by the relevant provisions of the statute is illusory or prescribe principles well recognised for valuation of land. In our opinion, this aspect is hardly relevant because once the impugned statute of the impugned provisions of the statute enjoy the protection of Art. 13B, it is not open to the Court to examine whether the principles for valuation therein prescribed are relevant to the land valuation because that question arises where a complaint as to be contravention of fundamental rights enacted in repealed Art. 31 can be entertained and examined. That complaint has to be rejected at the threshold as soon as it is pointed out that the impugned statute or the impugned provisions of statute enjoy the protection of Art. 13B. It may be mentioned that in Smt. Mohinder Kaur’s case, a Full Bench of Delhi High Court examined and upheld the constitutional validity of the two provisoes to Section 7(l)(e) of the 1948 Act. We agree with the view taken by the High Court and upheld the same.
0[ds]It was lastly urged that the decision of the larger Bench in RustomCavasjee Cooper v. Unionof India,(1970) 3 SCR 530     would clearly show that the decision of this Court in Stateof Gujarat v. ShantilalMangaldas and Others., (1969) 3 SCR 341     is no more good law-and therefore it is open to the Court to examinewhether compensation offered by the relevant provisions of the statute is illusory or prescribe principles well recognised for valuation of land. In our opinion, this aspect is hardly relevant because once the impugned statute of the impugned provisions of the statute enjoy the protection of Art. 13B, it is not open to the Court to examine whether the principles for valuation therein prescribed are relevant to the land valuation because that question arises where a complaint as to be contravention of fundamental rights enacted in repealed Art. 31 can be entertained and examined.That complaint has to be rejected at the threshold as soon as it is pointed out that the impugned statute or the impugned provisions of statute enjoy the protection of Art. 13B. It may be mentioned that in Smt. Mohindercase, a Full Bench of Delhi High Court examined and upheld the constitutional validity of the two provisoes to Section 7(l)(e) of the 1948 Act. We agree with the view taken by the High Court and upheld the same.The 1948 Act is admittedly inserted in the Ninth Schedule by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 which also simultaneously added Art. 13B. The Act finds its place at plecitum 16 in the Ninth Schedule. Once an Act is placed in the Ninth Schedule, Article 13B provides that either the act or any provision thereof shall not be deemed to be void or ever to have become void on the ground of such act or any provision thereof is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provision of Part III of the Constitution. Once the act is brought under the umbrella of protection of Art. 13B by inserting it in the Ninth Schedule, the act is not open to the challenge that it as a whole or any provision thereof violates or contravenes any of the fundamental rights contained in Part III of the Constitution. The allegation here is that the two provisoes violate the guarantee of fair compensation and therefore it constitutes deprivation of property without just compensation, a relic of Art 31(2) lifted from Section 299(2) ofthe Government of India Act, 1935.The 1948 Act is a pre-Constitution statute. It was therefore urged that it does not qualify for the protection of Art. 13B in as much as when enacted it was violative of Section 299(2) ofthe Government of India Act, 1935 and as it was void ab initio, it was not an existing law within the meaning of expression in Article 366(10) and therefore is not qualified for umbrella of protection enacted in Art. 13B.
### Instruction:
Hypothesize the court's verdict (affirmation (1) or negation (0) of the appeal), and then clarify this hypothesis by interpreting significant sentences from the case proceeding.

### Input:
violation of the provisions of the new Constitution but not when they are taken away by an Act in violation of Section 299 of the Government of India Act which has been repealed. The intention of the Constitution to protect each and everyone of the Acts specified in the Ninth Schedule from any challenge on the ground of violation of any of the fundamental rights secured under Part III of the Constitution, irrespective of whether they are pre-existing or new rights, placed beyond any doubt or question by the very emphatic language of article 13B which declares that none of the provisions of the specified Acts shall be deemed to be void or ever to have become void on the ground of the alleged violation of the rights indicated “notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal.” That intention is also emphasised by the positive declaration that “each of the said Acts or Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent Legislature to repeal or amend it continue in force.”11. This very question again surfaced in TheState of Uttar Pradesh and Others v. H.H.Maharaja Brijendra Singh, (1961) 1 SCR 362 in which constitutional validity of U.P. Land Acquisition (Rehabilitation of Refugees) Act, 1948 was questioned. The title of the Act impugned in that case clearly shows that it was in pari materia with the 1948 Act, both being enacted with a view to acquire power to acquire land for rehabilitation of refugees and that too in the same year. It may as well be mentioned that U.P. Act XXVI of 1948 is also inserted in the Ninth Schedule. The entry just precedes the 1948 Act. The High Court while upholding the validity of Section 11 which is in pari materia with Section 7 of 1948 Act struck down the two provisos to Section 11 similarly worded as the two provisoes to Section 7(l)(e). Both the provisoes are in pari materia with the impugned provisoes. This Court, reversing the decision of the High Court and following the decision in Dhirubha Devisingh Gohil’s case (Supra) while upholding the constitutional validity of the Act held that the protection under Art. 13B against the violation of the fundamental rights mentioned therein must extend to the rights under Section 299 of the Government of India Act also. The reasons which weighed with the Constitution Bench of this Court while upholding the validity of the U.P. Act will mutatis mutandis apply here and we must uphold the validity of the two provisoes on parity of reasoning.12. It is thus satisfactorily established that in view of the insertion of the 1948 Act in Ninth Schedule it enjoys the umbrella of protection of Art. 13B and therefore it is immune from the challenge as violating any of the provisions in Part 111 of the Constitution. In fact this should end the contro­versy,13. Mr. Dua however urged that in view of the decision of this Court in N.B.Jeejeebhoy v. AssistantCollector, Thana Prant, Thana, (1965) 1 SCR 636 wherein this Court struck down the Land Acquisition (Bombay Amendment) Act, 1948 as constitutionally invalid, would necessitate re-examination of the decisions in Dhirubha Devisingh Gohil’s case and Maharaja Brijendra Singh’s case. It was submitted that the decision in Jeejeebhoy’s case comes later in point of time both to the decision in Dhirubha Gohil’s and Maharaja Brijendra Singh’s case, and therefore the later decision should prevail with this Court. In Jeejeebhoy’s case, this Court repelled the contention that the Amendment Act is saved by Art. 31-A of the Constitution. The argument of the learned Attorney General that Section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935 declared a fundamental right of a citizen, that it is bodily lifted and introduced by the Constitution in Art. 31(2) thereof and that if Art. 31-A saved an attack against the Amending Act on the ground that it infringed Art. 31(2) thereof, it would equally save the attack based on the infringement of Section 299(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 was disposed of by merely observing that the argument is far fetched. It may however be mentioned that in this later decision, the decisions of the Constitution Bench in Dhirubha Devinsingh Gohil’s case and the Maharaja Brijendra Singh’s case were merely referred to but not overruled. They were distinguished on the ground that the statutes impugned in those cases enjoyed the protection of Art. 13B. That is a fact and would make all the difference. The impugned Act in Jeejeebhoy’s case did not enjoy the protection of the Ninth Schedule and Art. 13B, and therefore the decision in Jeejeebhoy’s case is hardly of any assistance.It was lastly urged that the decision of the larger Bench in RustomCavasjee Cooper v. Unionof India,(1970) 3 SCR 530 would clearly show that the decision of this Court in Stateof Gujarat v. ShantilalMangaldas and Others., (1969) 3 SCR 341 is no more good law-and therefore it is open to the Court to examine whether compensation offered by the relevant provisions of the statute is illusory or prescribe principles well recognised for valuation of land. In our opinion, this aspect is hardly relevant because once the impugned statute of the impugned provisions of the statute enjoy the protection of Art. 13B, it is not open to the Court to examine whether the principles for valuation therein prescribed are relevant to the land valuation because that question arises where a complaint as to be contravention of fundamental rights enacted in repealed Art. 31 can be entertained and examined. That complaint has to be rejected at the threshold as soon as it is pointed out that the impugned statute or the impugned provisions of statute enjoy the protection of Art. 13B. It may be mentioned that in Smt. Mohinder Kaur’s case, a Full Bench of Delhi High Court examined and upheld the constitutional validity of the two provisoes to Section 7(l)(e) of the 1948 Act. We agree with the view taken by the High Court and upheld the same.

### Response:
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### Explanation:
It was lastly urged that the decision of the larger Bench in RustomCavasjee Cooper v. Unionof India,(1970) 3 SCR 530     would clearly show that the decision of this Court in Stateof Gujarat v. ShantilalMangaldas and Others., (1969) 3 SCR 341     is no more good law-and therefore it is open to the Court to examinewhether compensation offered by the relevant provisions of the statute is illusory or prescribe principles well recognised for valuation of land. In our opinion, this aspect is hardly relevant because once the impugned statute of the impugned provisions of the statute enjoy the protection of Art. 13B, it is not open to the Court to examine whether the principles for valuation therein prescribed are relevant to the land valuation because that question arises where a complaint as to be contravention of fundamental rights enacted in repealed Art. 31 can be entertained and examined.That complaint has to be rejected at the threshold as soon as it is pointed out that the impugned statute or the impugned provisions of statute enjoy the protection of Art. 13B. It may be mentioned that in Smt. Mohindercase, a Full Bench of Delhi High Court examined and upheld the constitutional validity of the two provisoes to Section 7(l)(e) of the 1948 Act. We agree with the view taken by the High Court and upheld the same.The 1948 Act is admittedly inserted in the Ninth Schedule by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 which also simultaneously added Art. 13B. The Act finds its place at plecitum 16 in the Ninth Schedule. Once an Act is placed in the Ninth Schedule, Article 13B provides that either the act or any provision thereof shall not be deemed to be void or ever to have become void on the ground of such act or any provision thereof is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provision of Part III of the Constitution. Once the act is brought under the umbrella of protection of Art. 13B by inserting it in the Ninth Schedule, the act is not open to the challenge that it as a whole or any provision thereof violates or contravenes any of the fundamental rights contained in Part III of the Constitution. The allegation here is that the two provisoes violate the guarantee of fair compensation and therefore it constitutes deprivation of property without just compensation, a relic of Art 31(2) lifted from Section 299(2) ofthe Government of India Act, 1935.The 1948 Act is a pre-Constitution statute. It was therefore urged that it does not qualify for the protection of Art. 13B in as much as when enacted it was violative of Section 299(2) ofthe Government of India Act, 1935 and as it was void ab initio, it was not an existing law within the meaning of expression in Article 366(10) and therefore is not qualified for umbrella of protection enacted in Art. 13B.
