Ayodhya Prasad Vajpai Vs. State Of U.P. &amp; Anr
Samiti or any Khand notwithstanding the inadvisability of continuing it for administrative or other valid reason. The power exercised by the Government in issuing the two notifications flows clearly from the provisions of the law under which Government was acting.7. It is for this reason that the attack of Mr. Garg was next directed against Ss. 3 and 8 of the Act. He compared the power to make new Khands and to reorganise the old ones with the other scheme of the Act under which the Kshettra Samitis are required to function with right to hold property, to possess fund and to carry on administration. All this does not show that the power given by the Act to reconstitute Khands is in any way impaired or frustrated. The two powers are quite distinct. The first power exists when the Samitis are established and continue. The second power comes into play when the need for reconstitution of the Khand emerges. The provisions of Ss. 3 and 8 cannot thus be said to negative the other provisions to which our attention was drawn.8. It was next contended by Mr. Garg that Ss. 3 and 8 were invalid because they involved excessive delegation of legislatie functions to the State Government and being not supported by adequate safeguards or guides, must be struck down. This argument is not valid. The Act speaks for itself and is self-contained. Its policy is stated in clear terms and the power to create Khands must be read with the power to abolish Khands and create new Khands in their place. The details of how big a Khand should be, what territory it should involve and so on and so forth cannot be the subject of detailed legislation. The Act gives ample indication of what the purpose of making a Khand is and the duties which the Kshettra Samitis must perform. On this subject the legislaitve will have been sufficiently expressed and must, therefore, guide the State Government in making its notifications. This case is analogous to the one reported in State of Bhopal v. Champalal, (1964) 6 SCR 35 = (AIR 1965 SC 124 ). In that case it was observed that the preamble and long title of the Act made it clear that the enactment was for the reclamation and the development of the land by the eradication of Kans weed in certain areas in the State". The purpose being specified as the eradication of Kans in area infested with it, the Act was said to be valid although the selection of the land was left to the Executive. The legislative policy behind the provisions of law was held to be writ large on it and what remained or was left to the Executive was to carry out the mandate and give effect to the law to achieve the purpose of the Act.9. In present case also the underlying policy and the objective of the legislation is clearly set out and the details of the duties of the Kshettra Samitis are indicated. It has, however, been left to the State Government to determine what the Khands should be and how many Kshettra Samitis should be constituted in each district. This is not a subject for detailed legislation because it is eminently a matter which can be left to the determination of the Executive which is to act in conformity with the wishes of the local people, the political exigency of the situation and the requirements of administrative control. In our opinion, the Act has not erred by conceding unfettered or uncanalised power to the State Government as is contended. On the other hand it has itself spoken on the relevant subject in full detail so as to outline its own will which alone the Executive is supposed to implement.10. It was next contended that Ss. 3 and 8 violate Art. 14 because they furnish an indirect method of removal of the Pramukh, the Up-Pramukh and the Members of a Kshettra Samiti without having to take recourse to the provisions for their removal as laid down in the Act. Reliance in this connection is placed upon a decision of this Court in Ram Dial v. State of Punjab, (1965) 2 SCR 858 = (AIR 1965 SC 1518 ). That case is easily distinguishable.11. There the Punjab Municipalities Act contained two provisions for the removal of a member in the public interest. By one provision he was entitled to a hearing and by the other not. This Court held that as it was open to choose one method rather than the other and that there was room for arbitrary action. Here the provisions on the subject of removal of members of the Kshettra Samitis are not congruous with the subject of reoganisation of Khands. The two provisions operate in entirely different fields. One is concerned directly with the removal of the Pramukh, Up-Pramukh and the members. The other is directly concerned with the abolition of the Khands and reconstitution of different Khands. These are two different powers and cannot be compared at all. It may be that by abolishing a Khand and its Kshettra Samiti the members also must go, but that is a consequence of the exercise of quite a different power. Of course, if the action in abolishing the Khand could be shown to be directly connected with the removal of the Pramukh, Up-Pramukh or a member of the Kshettra Samiti the action of the Executive Government can be struck down as male fide. It was for this purpose that the appellant pleaded in the High Court mala fide on the part of the Government. The two judgments now under appeal negative the existence of any mala fide intention. No material was placed before us to establish mala fide nor could the findings be attacked since they were concurrently reached. In this view of the matter we must hold that the State Government in exercising its powers acted honestly and within the four corners of its jurisdiction.
0[ds]It is not necessary to refer to these sections because they are to be found in all legislation dealing with the establishment of corporate local self-Government bodies. The question is not whether Kshettra Samitis enjoy perpetual succession. The question iswhether the Kshettra Samitis once established enjoy perpetualThe scheme of the Act clearly indicates that the area of the district is required to be divided into many Khands with a Kshettra Samiti in each Khand. Sections 3, 4, 8 and 8-A confer power upon the State Government to alter the area of the Khand, constitute new Khands and re-establish old ones. This power is given by the legislature advisedly so that the working of democracy in the rural areas in the Kshettra Samitis and Zilla Parishads may be smooth and without difficulty. The reorganisation of the Khands may become necessary because of circumstances too numerous to mention here. Power has therefore, been reserved to Government to make the alterations as stated above. It will be seen that the latter part of S. 3 gives specific power to create new Khands in addition to the change of areas of the existing Khands which means that new Khands may be brought into existence and old Khands abolished. In fact, Ss. 4 and 8-A and the newly added proviso to Section 8 bear upon the abolition of existing Khands. In other words, what the State Government did was by an express grant from the legislature. The other provisions of the Act to which our attention was drawn merely indicate what Kshettra Samiti is required to do as long as the Kshettra Samiti exists. Similarly the term of the Kshettra Samitis is to apply to a Kshettra Samiti which is not abolished but continues. The perpetual succession in this context means succession of one Kshettra Samiti to another but in fact it does not entail perpetual existence of any Samiti or any Khand notwithstanding the inadvisability of continuing it for administrative or other valid reason. The power exercised by the Government in issuing the two notifications flows clearly from the provisions of the law under which Government wasthis does not show that the power given by the Act to reconstitute Khands is in any way impaired or frustrated. The two powers are quite distinct. The first power exists when the Samitis are established and continue. The second power comes into play when the need for reconstitution of the Khand emerges. The provisions of Ss. 3 and 8 cannot thus be said to negative the other provisions to which our attention wasargument is not valid. The Act speaks for itself and is self-contained. Its policy is stated in clear terms and the power to create Khands must be read with the power to abolish Khands and create new Khands in their place. The details of how big a Khand should be, what territory it should involve and so on and so forth cannot be the subject of detailed legislation. The Act gives ample indication of what the purpose of making a Khand is and the duties which the Kshettra Samitis must perform. On this subject the legislaitve will have been sufficiently expressed and must, therefore, guide the State Government in making its notifications. This case is analogous to the one reported in State of Bhopal v. Champalal, (1964) 6 SCR 35  = (AIR 1965 SC 124 ). In that case it was observed that the preamble and long title of the Act made it clear that the enactment was for the reclamation and the development of the land by the eradication of Kans weed in certain areas in the State". The purpose being specified as the eradication of Kans in area infested with it, the Act was said to be valid although the selection of the land was left to the Executive. The legislative policy behind the provisions of law was held to be writ large on it and what remained or was left to the Executive was to carry out the mandate and give effect to the law to achieve the purpose of the Act.9. In present case also the underlying policy and the objective of the legislation is clearly set out and the details of the duties of the Kshettra Samitis are indicated. It has, however, been left to the State Government to determine what the Khands should be and how many Kshettra Samitis should be constituted in each district. This is not a subject for detailed legislation because it is eminently a matter which can be left to the determination of the Executive which is to act in conformity with the wishes of the local people, the political exigency of the situation and the requirements of administrative control. In our opinion, the Act has not erred by conceding unfettered or uncanalised power to the State Government as is contended. On the other hand it has itself spoken on the relevant subject in full detail so as to outline its own will which alone the Executive is supposed to implement.There the Punjab Municipalities Act contained two provisions for the removal of a member in the public interest. By one provision he was entitled to a hearing and by the other not. This Court held that as it was open to choose one method rather than the other and that there was room for arbitrary action. Here the provisions on the subject of removal of members of the Kshettra Samitis are not congruous with the subject of reoganisation of Khands. The two provisions operate in entirely different fields. One is concerned directly with the removal of the Pramukh, Up-Pramukh and the members. The other is directly concerned with the abolition of the Khands and reconstitution of different Khands. These are two different powers and cannot be compared at all. It may be that by abolishing a Khand and its Kshettra Samiti the members also must go, but that is a consequence of the exercise of quite a different power. Of course, if the action in abolishing the Khand could be shown to be directly connected with the removal of the Pramukh, Up-Pramukh or a member of the Kshettra Samiti the action of the Executive Government can be struck down as male fide. It was for this purpose that the appellant pleaded in the High Court mala fide on the part of the Government. The two judgments now under appeal negative the existence of any mala fide intention. No material was placed before us to establish mala fide nor could the findings be attacked since they were concurrently reached. In this view of the matter we must hold that the State Government in exercising its powers acted honestly and within the four corners of itssection allows the State Government to divide the rural area of each district into Khands. It also enables the Government to change the name of a Kshettra Samiti and to make modifications in the areas and limits of the Khands and to create new Khands. Section 4 specifies the effect of changes in the Khands and the temporary and permanent consequences thereof are provided for. Section 5 then deals with the establishment and incorporation of Kshettra Samitis for each Khand bearing the name of the Khand for which it is established. It says inter alia that every Kshettra Samiti as a body corporate having perpetual succession and common seal and subject to any restrictions or qualifications imposed by any other enactments possesses the power to acquire, hold and dispose of property and to enter into contracts and may by its corporate name sue and be sued. Section 6 details the composition of Kshettra Samitis providing for elections and co-options. Section 7 lays down the procedure for the election of the Pramukhs and the Up-pramukhs of the Kshettra Samitis and its members and Section 9 in the same way deals with the term of the Pramukhs and the Up-Pramukhs. Section 10 then enables the Government to arrange for the constitution of the first Kshetra Samiti for every Khand and for the reconstitution thereof on the expiry of the first and each subsequent term or when otherwise required under the Act having regard to the provisions of Section 6. Sections 11-16 deal with the resignation of Pramukha, Up-Pramukhs and members, filling of casual vacancies, disqualifications for being chosen or co-opted as members, disputes as to membership or disqualification and motion of no-confidence in Pramukh or Up-Pramukh and removal of Pramukh or Up-Pramukh. In this way complete local self-government is established.
### Instruction:
Predict whether the case will result in an affirmative (1) or negative (0) decision for the appeal, and then provide a thorough explanation using key sentences to support your prediction.

### Input:
Samiti or any Khand notwithstanding the inadvisability of continuing it for administrative or other valid reason. The power exercised by the Government in issuing the two notifications flows clearly from the provisions of the law under which Government was acting.7. It is for this reason that the attack of Mr. Garg was next directed against Ss. 3 and 8 of the Act. He compared the power to make new Khands and to reorganise the old ones with the other scheme of the Act under which the Kshettra Samitis are required to function with right to hold property, to possess fund and to carry on administration. All this does not show that the power given by the Act to reconstitute Khands is in any way impaired or frustrated. The two powers are quite distinct. The first power exists when the Samitis are established and continue. The second power comes into play when the need for reconstitution of the Khand emerges. The provisions of Ss. 3 and 8 cannot thus be said to negative the other provisions to which our attention was drawn.8. It was next contended by Mr. Garg that Ss. 3 and 8 were invalid because they involved excessive delegation of legislatie functions to the State Government and being not supported by adequate safeguards or guides, must be struck down. This argument is not valid. The Act speaks for itself and is self-contained. Its policy is stated in clear terms and the power to create Khands must be read with the power to abolish Khands and create new Khands in their place. The details of how big a Khand should be, what territory it should involve and so on and so forth cannot be the subject of detailed legislation. The Act gives ample indication of what the purpose of making a Khand is and the duties which the Kshettra Samitis must perform. On this subject the legislaitve will have been sufficiently expressed and must, therefore, guide the State Government in making its notifications. This case is analogous to the one reported in State of Bhopal v. Champalal, (1964) 6 SCR 35 = (AIR 1965 SC 124 ). In that case it was observed that the preamble and long title of the Act made it clear that the enactment was for the reclamation and the development of the land by the eradication of Kans weed in certain areas in the State". The purpose being specified as the eradication of Kans in area infested with it, the Act was said to be valid although the selection of the land was left to the Executive. The legislative policy behind the provisions of law was held to be writ large on it and what remained or was left to the Executive was to carry out the mandate and give effect to the law to achieve the purpose of the Act.9. In present case also the underlying policy and the objective of the legislation is clearly set out and the details of the duties of the Kshettra Samitis are indicated. It has, however, been left to the State Government to determine what the Khands should be and how many Kshettra Samitis should be constituted in each district. This is not a subject for detailed legislation because it is eminently a matter which can be left to the determination of the Executive which is to act in conformity with the wishes of the local people, the political exigency of the situation and the requirements of administrative control. In our opinion, the Act has not erred by conceding unfettered or uncanalised power to the State Government as is contended. On the other hand it has itself spoken on the relevant subject in full detail so as to outline its own will which alone the Executive is supposed to implement.10. It was next contended that Ss. 3 and 8 violate Art. 14 because they furnish an indirect method of removal of the Pramukh, the Up-Pramukh and the Members of a Kshettra Samiti without having to take recourse to the provisions for their removal as laid down in the Act. Reliance in this connection is placed upon a decision of this Court in Ram Dial v. State of Punjab, (1965) 2 SCR 858 = (AIR 1965 SC 1518 ). That case is easily distinguishable.11. There the Punjab Municipalities Act contained two provisions for the removal of a member in the public interest. By one provision he was entitled to a hearing and by the other not. This Court held that as it was open to choose one method rather than the other and that there was room for arbitrary action. Here the provisions on the subject of removal of members of the Kshettra Samitis are not congruous with the subject of reoganisation of Khands. The two provisions operate in entirely different fields. One is concerned directly with the removal of the Pramukh, Up-Pramukh and the members. The other is directly concerned with the abolition of the Khands and reconstitution of different Khands. These are two different powers and cannot be compared at all. It may be that by abolishing a Khand and its Kshettra Samiti the members also must go, but that is a consequence of the exercise of quite a different power. Of course, if the action in abolishing the Khand could be shown to be directly connected with the removal of the Pramukh, Up-Pramukh or a member of the Kshettra Samiti the action of the Executive Government can be struck down as male fide. It was for this purpose that the appellant pleaded in the High Court mala fide on the part of the Government. The two judgments now under appeal negative the existence of any mala fide intention. No material was placed before us to establish mala fide nor could the findings be attacked since they were concurrently reached. In this view of the matter we must hold that the State Government in exercising its powers acted honestly and within the four corners of its jurisdiction.

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0

### Explanation:
negative the other provisions to which our attention wasargument is not valid. The Act speaks for itself and is self-contained. Its policy is stated in clear terms and the power to create Khands must be read with the power to abolish Khands and create new Khands in their place. The details of how big a Khand should be, what territory it should involve and so on and so forth cannot be the subject of detailed legislation. The Act gives ample indication of what the purpose of making a Khand is and the duties which the Kshettra Samitis must perform. On this subject the legislaitve will have been sufficiently expressed and must, therefore, guide the State Government in making its notifications. This case is analogous to the one reported in State of Bhopal v. Champalal, (1964) 6 SCR 35  = (AIR 1965 SC 124 ). In that case it was observed that the preamble and long title of the Act made it clear that the enactment was for the reclamation and the development of the land by the eradication of Kans weed in certain areas in the State". The purpose being specified as the eradication of Kans in area infested with it, the Act was said to be valid although the selection of the land was left to the Executive. The legislative policy behind the provisions of law was held to be writ large on it and what remained or was left to the Executive was to carry out the mandate and give effect to the law to achieve the purpose of the Act.9. In present case also the underlying policy and the objective of the legislation is clearly set out and the details of the duties of the Kshettra Samitis are indicated. It has, however, been left to the State Government to determine what the Khands should be and how many Kshettra Samitis should be constituted in each district. This is not a subject for detailed legislation because it is eminently a matter which can be left to the determination of the Executive which is to act in conformity with the wishes of the local people, the political exigency of the situation and the requirements of administrative control. In our opinion, the Act has not erred by conceding unfettered or uncanalised power to the State Government as is contended. On the other hand it has itself spoken on the relevant subject in full detail so as to outline its own will which alone the Executive is supposed to implement.There the Punjab Municipalities Act contained two provisions for the removal of a member in the public interest. By one provision he was entitled to a hearing and by the other not. This Court held that as it was open to choose one method rather than the other and that there was room for arbitrary action. Here the provisions on the subject of removal of members of the Kshettra Samitis are not congruous with the subject of reoganisation of Khands. The two provisions operate in entirely different fields. One is concerned directly with the removal of the Pramukh, Up-Pramukh and the members. The other is directly concerned with the abolition of the Khands and reconstitution of different Khands. These are two different powers and cannot be compared at all. It may be that by abolishing a Khand and its Kshettra Samiti the members also must go, but that is a consequence of the exercise of quite a different power. Of course, if the action in abolishing the Khand could be shown to be directly connected with the removal of the Pramukh, Up-Pramukh or a member of the Kshettra Samiti the action of the Executive Government can be struck down as male fide. It was for this purpose that the appellant pleaded in the High Court mala fide on the part of the Government. The two judgments now under appeal negative the existence of any mala fide intention. No material was placed before us to establish mala fide nor could the findings be attacked since they were concurrently reached. In this view of the matter we must hold that the State Government in exercising its powers acted honestly and within the four corners of itssection allows the State Government to divide the rural area of each district into Khands. It also enables the Government to change the name of a Kshettra Samiti and to make modifications in the areas and limits of the Khands and to create new Khands. Section 4 specifies the effect of changes in the Khands and the temporary and permanent consequences thereof are provided for. Section 5 then deals with the establishment and incorporation of Kshettra Samitis for each Khand bearing the name of the Khand for which it is established. It says inter alia that every Kshettra Samiti as a body corporate having perpetual succession and common seal and subject to any restrictions or qualifications imposed by any other enactments possesses the power to acquire, hold and dispose of property and to enter into contracts and may by its corporate name sue and be sued. Section 6 details the composition of Kshettra Samitis providing for elections and co-options. Section 7 lays down the procedure for the election of the Pramukhs and the Up-pramukhs of the Kshettra Samitis and its members and Section 9 in the same way deals with the term of the Pramukhs and the Up-Pramukhs. Section 10 then enables the Government to arrange for the constitution of the first Kshetra Samiti for every Khand and for the reconstitution thereof on the expiry of the first and each subsequent term or when otherwise required under the Act having regard to the provisions of Section 6. Sections 11-16 deal with the resignation of Pramukha, Up-Pramukhs and members, filling of casual vacancies, disqualifications for being chosen or co-opted as members, disputes as to membership or disqualification and motion of no-confidence in Pramukh or Up-Pramukh and removal of Pramukh or Up-Pramukh. In this way complete local self-government is established.
