Jai Mahal Hotels Pvt. Ltd Vs. Rajkumar Devraj
the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court is beyond the scope of Section 111 of the Companies Act. 15. We are of the opinion that there is no real dispute between the parties as held by the High Court. DR Group has furnished the succession certificate as well as the transfer deed executed by GD in their favour. The same had to be acted upon. Moreover, the civil court in interim application moved by the UD Group held that the UD Group had no prima facie case. The said order was required to be acted upon subject to any further order that may be passed in any pending proceedings between the parties. There is no conflicting order of any court or authority. There is thus, no complicated question of title. Moreover, there is no bar to adjudication for purposes of transfer of shares unless the court finds otherwise. The stay order obtained by GD herself could not debar her from making a statement to settle the matter. The judgments relied upon by the appellants have no application to such a fact situation. 16. In Ammonia (supra), the scope of jurisdiction of the Company Court to deal with an issue of rectification in the Register of Members maintained by the Company was considered. Following Public Passenger Service Ltd. vs. M.A. Khadar (AIR 1966 SC 489 ), it was held that jurisdiction under Section 155 was summary in nature. If for reasons of complexity or otherwise, the matter could be more conveniently decided in a suit, the Court may relegate the parties to such remedy. Subject to the said limitation, jurisdiction to deal with such matter is exclusively with the Company Court. It was observed : “31. ……..It cannot be doubted that in spite of exclusiveness to decide all matters pertaining to the rectification it has to act within the said four corners and adjudication of such matters cannot be doubted to be summary in nature. So, whenever a question is raised the court has to adjudicate on the facts and circumstances of each case. If it truly is rectification, all matters raised in that connection should be decided by the court under Section 155 and if it finds adjudication of any matter not falling under it, it may direct a party to get his right adjudicated by a civil court. Unless jurisdiction is expressly or implicitly barred under a statute, for violation or redress of any such right the civil court would have jurisdiction. ……..” 17. Thus, there is a thin line in appreciating the scope of jurisdiction of the Company Court/Company Law Board. The jurisdiction is exclusive if the matter truly relates to rectification but if the issue is alien to rectification, such matter may not be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Company Court/Company Law Board. 18. In Standard Chartered Bank (supra), scope of Section 111(7) was considered. It was observed that jurisdiction being summary in nature, a seriously disputed question of title could be left to be decided by the civil court. It was observed : “29 ……The nature of proceedings under Section 111 are slightly different from a title suit, although, sub-section (7) of Section 111 gives to the Tribunal the jurisdiction to decide any question relating to the title of any person who is a party to the application, to have his name entered in or omitted from the register and also the general jurisdiction to decide any question which it is necessary or expedient to decide in connection with such an application. It has been held in Ammonia Supplies Corpn. (P) Ltd. v. Modern Plastic Containers (P) Ltd. that the jurisdiction exercised by the Company Court under Section 155 of the Companies Act, 1956 (corresponding to Section 111 of the present Act, before its amendment by Act 31 of 1988) was somewhat summary in nature and that if a seriously disputed question of title arose, the Company Court should relegate the parties to a suit, which was the more appropriate remedy for investigation and adjudication of such seriously disputed question of title.” 19. In Luxmi Tea Company Limited and Bajaj Auto Ltd. (supra), it was observed that a company did not have any discretion in rectifying its register except to require the procedure being followed.20. In the present case, as already observed, there is no real dispute between the parties. The DR Group followed the due procedure. It had the succession certificate in its favour apart from the transfer deed from GD, who admittedly inherited rights from LMJS. Will in favour of GD is beyond any dispute. Thus, the DR Group derived rights from the GD by documents executed by her in her lifetime and conveyed to the Company. Even if the Will of GD is not taken into account, for purposes of issue of rectification, the documents executed by GD clearly entitled the DR Group to have the rectification made.21. The decisions in Mulraj, Manohar Lal, Ajudh Raj and Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka (supra) are of no relevance to a situation where the beneficiary of the interim order itself opts to proceed with the matter in respect of which stay is granted by higher Court. In the present case, GD having settled the matter and having herself sought rectification, the interim order granted at her instance could be no bar against the DR Group. The decisions sought are thus, of no relevance to such a situation.22. We sum up our conclusions as follows : (i) LMJS executed will in favour of his mother – GD which is not in dispute;(ii) GD and DR jointly obtained succession certificate;(iii) GD signed the transfer deeds and communicated the same to the Board of Directors; and(iv) The civil court vide order dated 28th July, 1991 declined to grant temporary injunction finding no prima facie case against the succession certificate. 23. In above circumstances, even in summary jurisdiction, the CLB had no justification to reject the claim of the DR Group. The High Court rightly reversed the said order.
0[ds]15. We are of the opinion that there is no real dispute between the parties as held by the High Court. DR Group has furnished the succession certificate as well as the transfer deed executed by GD in their favour. The same had to be acted upon. Moreover, the civil court in interim application moved by the UD Group held that the UD Group had no prima facie case. The said order was required to be acted upon subject to any further order that may be passed in any pending proceedings between the parties. There is no conflicting order of any court or authority. There is thus, no complicated question of title. Moreover, there is no bar to adjudication for purposes of transfer of shares unless the court finds otherwise. The stay order obtained by GD herself could not debar her from making a statement to settle the matter. The judgments relied upon by the appellants have no application to such a fact situation.Thus, there is a thin line in appreciating the scope of jurisdiction of the Company Court/Company Law Board. The jurisdiction is exclusive if the matter truly relates to rectification but if the issue is alien to rectification, such matter may not be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Company Court/Company Law Board.In Luxmi Tea Company Limited and Bajaj Auto Ltd. (supra), it was observed that a company did not have any discretion in rectifying its register except to require the procedure being followed.20. In the present case, as already observed, there is no real dispute between the parties. The DR Group followed the due procedure. It had the succession certificate in its favour apart from the transfer deed from GD, who admittedly inherited rights from LMJS. Will in favour of GD is beyond any dispute. Thus, the DR Group derived rights from the GD by documents executed by her in her lifetime and conveyed to the Company. Even if the Will of GD is not taken into account, for purposes of issue of rectification, the documents executed by GD clearly entitled the DR Group to have the rectification made.21. The decisions in Mulraj, Manohar Lal, Ajudh Raj and Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka (supra) are of no relevance to a situation where the beneficiary of the interim order itself opts to proceed with the matter in respect of which stay is granted by higher Court. In the present case, GD having settled the matter and having herself sought rectification, the interim order granted at her instance could be no bar against the DR Group. The decisions sought are thus, of no relevance to such a situation.22. We sum up our conclusions as followsLMJS executed will in favour of his mother – GD which is not in dispute;(ii) GD and DR jointly obtained succession certificate;(iii) GD signed the transfer deeds and communicated the same to the Board of Directors; and(iv) The civil court vide order dated 28th July, 1991 declined to grant temporary injunction finding no prima facie case against the succession certificate.In above circumstances, even in summary jurisdiction, the CLB had no justification to reject the claim of the DR Group. The High Court rightly reversed the said order.
### Instruction:
Judge the probable resolution of the case (approval (1) or disapproval (0)), and elaborate on this forecast by extracting and interpreting significant sentences from the proceeding.

### Input:
the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court is beyond the scope of Section 111 of the Companies Act. 15. We are of the opinion that there is no real dispute between the parties as held by the High Court. DR Group has furnished the succession certificate as well as the transfer deed executed by GD in their favour. The same had to be acted upon. Moreover, the civil court in interim application moved by the UD Group held that the UD Group had no prima facie case. The said order was required to be acted upon subject to any further order that may be passed in any pending proceedings between the parties. There is no conflicting order of any court or authority. There is thus, no complicated question of title. Moreover, there is no bar to adjudication for purposes of transfer of shares unless the court finds otherwise. The stay order obtained by GD herself could not debar her from making a statement to settle the matter. The judgments relied upon by the appellants have no application to such a fact situation. 16. In Ammonia (supra), the scope of jurisdiction of the Company Court to deal with an issue of rectification in the Register of Members maintained by the Company was considered. Following Public Passenger Service Ltd. vs. M.A. Khadar (AIR 1966 SC 489 ), it was held that jurisdiction under Section 155 was summary in nature. If for reasons of complexity or otherwise, the matter could be more conveniently decided in a suit, the Court may relegate the parties to such remedy. Subject to the said limitation, jurisdiction to deal with such matter is exclusively with the Company Court. It was observed : “31. ……..It cannot be doubted that in spite of exclusiveness to decide all matters pertaining to the rectification it has to act within the said four corners and adjudication of such matters cannot be doubted to be summary in nature. So, whenever a question is raised the court has to adjudicate on the facts and circumstances of each case. If it truly is rectification, all matters raised in that connection should be decided by the court under Section 155 and if it finds adjudication of any matter not falling under it, it may direct a party to get his right adjudicated by a civil court. Unless jurisdiction is expressly or implicitly barred under a statute, for violation or redress of any such right the civil court would have jurisdiction. ……..” 17. Thus, there is a thin line in appreciating the scope of jurisdiction of the Company Court/Company Law Board. The jurisdiction is exclusive if the matter truly relates to rectification but if the issue is alien to rectification, such matter may not be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Company Court/Company Law Board. 18. In Standard Chartered Bank (supra), scope of Section 111(7) was considered. It was observed that jurisdiction being summary in nature, a seriously disputed question of title could be left to be decided by the civil court. It was observed : “29 ……The nature of proceedings under Section 111 are slightly different from a title suit, although, sub-section (7) of Section 111 gives to the Tribunal the jurisdiction to decide any question relating to the title of any person who is a party to the application, to have his name entered in or omitted from the register and also the general jurisdiction to decide any question which it is necessary or expedient to decide in connection with such an application. It has been held in Ammonia Supplies Corpn. (P) Ltd. v. Modern Plastic Containers (P) Ltd. that the jurisdiction exercised by the Company Court under Section 155 of the Companies Act, 1956 (corresponding to Section 111 of the present Act, before its amendment by Act 31 of 1988) was somewhat summary in nature and that if a seriously disputed question of title arose, the Company Court should relegate the parties to a suit, which was the more appropriate remedy for investigation and adjudication of such seriously disputed question of title.” 19. In Luxmi Tea Company Limited and Bajaj Auto Ltd. (supra), it was observed that a company did not have any discretion in rectifying its register except to require the procedure being followed.20. In the present case, as already observed, there is no real dispute between the parties. The DR Group followed the due procedure. It had the succession certificate in its favour apart from the transfer deed from GD, who admittedly inherited rights from LMJS. Will in favour of GD is beyond any dispute. Thus, the DR Group derived rights from the GD by documents executed by her in her lifetime and conveyed to the Company. Even if the Will of GD is not taken into account, for purposes of issue of rectification, the documents executed by GD clearly entitled the DR Group to have the rectification made.21. The decisions in Mulraj, Manohar Lal, Ajudh Raj and Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka (supra) are of no relevance to a situation where the beneficiary of the interim order itself opts to proceed with the matter in respect of which stay is granted by higher Court. In the present case, GD having settled the matter and having herself sought rectification, the interim order granted at her instance could be no bar against the DR Group. The decisions sought are thus, of no relevance to such a situation.22. We sum up our conclusions as follows : (i) LMJS executed will in favour of his mother – GD which is not in dispute;(ii) GD and DR jointly obtained succession certificate;(iii) GD signed the transfer deeds and communicated the same to the Board of Directors; and(iv) The civil court vide order dated 28th July, 1991 declined to grant temporary injunction finding no prima facie case against the succession certificate. 23. In above circumstances, even in summary jurisdiction, the CLB had no justification to reject the claim of the DR Group. The High Court rightly reversed the said order.

### Response:
0

### Explanation:
15. We are of the opinion that there is no real dispute between the parties as held by the High Court. DR Group has furnished the succession certificate as well as the transfer deed executed by GD in their favour. The same had to be acted upon. Moreover, the civil court in interim application moved by the UD Group held that the UD Group had no prima facie case. The said order was required to be acted upon subject to any further order that may be passed in any pending proceedings between the parties. There is no conflicting order of any court or authority. There is thus, no complicated question of title. Moreover, there is no bar to adjudication for purposes of transfer of shares unless the court finds otherwise. The stay order obtained by GD herself could not debar her from making a statement to settle the matter. The judgments relied upon by the appellants have no application to such a fact situation.Thus, there is a thin line in appreciating the scope of jurisdiction of the Company Court/Company Law Board. The jurisdiction is exclusive if the matter truly relates to rectification but if the issue is alien to rectification, such matter may not be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Company Court/Company Law Board.In Luxmi Tea Company Limited and Bajaj Auto Ltd. (supra), it was observed that a company did not have any discretion in rectifying its register except to require the procedure being followed.20. In the present case, as already observed, there is no real dispute between the parties. The DR Group followed the due procedure. It had the succession certificate in its favour apart from the transfer deed from GD, who admittedly inherited rights from LMJS. Will in favour of GD is beyond any dispute. Thus, the DR Group derived rights from the GD by documents executed by her in her lifetime and conveyed to the Company. Even if the Will of GD is not taken into account, for purposes of issue of rectification, the documents executed by GD clearly entitled the DR Group to have the rectification made.21. The decisions in Mulraj, Manohar Lal, Ajudh Raj and Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka (supra) are of no relevance to a situation where the beneficiary of the interim order itself opts to proceed with the matter in respect of which stay is granted by higher Court. In the present case, GD having settled the matter and having herself sought rectification, the interim order granted at her instance could be no bar against the DR Group. The decisions sought are thus, of no relevance to such a situation.22. We sum up our conclusions as followsLMJS executed will in favour of his mother – GD which is not in dispute;(ii) GD and DR jointly obtained succession certificate;(iii) GD signed the transfer deeds and communicated the same to the Board of Directors; and(iv) The civil court vide order dated 28th July, 1991 declined to grant temporary injunction finding no prima facie case against the succession certificate.In above circumstances, even in summary jurisdiction, the CLB had no justification to reject the claim of the DR Group. The High Court rightly reversed the said order.
