Commissioner Of Income-Tax, U.P Vs. Kanpur Coal Syndicate
liable to the charge, under the head "every individual". Section 14 (2)(b) only says that if such an individual happens to be a member of an association of persons which has already been assessed, the tax would not be payable in respect of the share of his income again. That under the Act an assessment can be made on an association of persons as a unit or, alternatively, on the individual members thereof in respect of their respective shares of the income was assumed by this Court in commr, of Income-tax v. Raja Reddy Mallaram, (AIR 1964 SC 825 ). We, therefore, hold that S. 3 impliedly gives an option to an appropriate authority to assess the total income of either the association of persons or the members of such association individually.5. The next question is whether the said option is given only to the Income-tax Officer and is denied to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Appellate Tribunal. Under the Act the Income-tax officer, after following the procedure prescribed, makes the assessment under S. 23 of the Act. Doubtless in making the assessment at the first instance he has to exercise the option whether he should assess the association of persons or, the members thereof individually. It is not because that any section of the Act confers an exclusive power on him to do so, but because it is part of the process of assessment; that is to say, he has to ascertain who is the person liable to be assessed for the tax. If he seeks to assess an association of persons as an assessable entity, the said entity can object to the assessment, inter alia, on the ground that in the circumstances of the case the assessment should be made on the members of the association individually. The Income-tax officer may reject its, contention and may assess the total income of the association as such and impose the tax on it. Under S. 30 an assessee objecting to the amount of income assessed under S. 23 or the amount of tax determined under the said section or denying his liability to be assessed under the Act can prefer an appeal against the order of the Income-tax Officer to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. It is said that an order made by the Income-tax Officer rejecting the plea of an association of persons that the members thereof shall be assessed individually does not fall under one or other of the three heads mentioned above. What is the substance of the objection of the assessee? The assessee denies his liability to be assessed under the Act in the circumstances of the case and pleads that the members of the association shall be assessed only individually. The expression "denial of liability" is comprehensive enough to take in not only the total denial of liability but also the liability to tax under particular circumstances. In either case the denial is a denial of liability to be assessed under the provisions of the Act. In one case the assessee says that he is not liable to be assessed to tax under the Act, and in the other case the assessee denies his liability to tax under the provisions of the Act if the option given to the appropriate officer under the provisions of the Act is judicially exercised. We, therefore, hold that such an assessee has a right of appeal under S. 30 of the Act against the order of the Income-tax Officer assessing the association of members instead of the members thereof individually. If an appeal lies, S. 31 of the Act describes the powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in such an appeal. Under S. 31 (3) (a) in disposing of such an appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may, in the case of an order of assessment, confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment; under cl. (b) thereof he may set aside the assessment and direct the Income-tax Officer to make a fresh assessment. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner has, therefore, plenary powers in disposing of an appeal. The scope of his power is conterminous with that of the Income-tax Officer. He can do what the Income-tax Officer can do and also direct him to do what he has failed to do. If the Income-tax Officer has the option to assess one or other of the entities in the alternative, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner can direct him to do that he should have done in the circumstances of a case. Under S. 33 (1); an assessee objecting to an order passed by an Appellate Assistant Commissioner under S. 28 or S. 31 may appeal to the Appellate Tribunal within 60 days. of the date on which such order is communicated to him. Under S. 33 (4) "The Appellate Tribunal may, after giving both parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit, and shall communicate any such orders to the assessee and to the, Commissioner." Under S. 33 (5), "Where as the result of an appeal any change is made in the assessment of a firm or association of persons or a new assessment of a firm or association of persons is ordered to be made, the Appellate Tribunal may authoritse the Income-tax Officer to amend accordingly any assessment made on any partner of the firm or any member of the association". Under this section the Appellate Tribunal has ample power to set aside the assessment made on the association of persons and direct the Income-tax officer to assess the individuals or to direct the amendment of the assessment already made on the members. The comprehensive phraseology used, both in S. 31 and S. 33 of the Act does not countenance the attempt of the Revenue to restrict the power of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or of the Appellate Tribunal: both of them have power to direct the appropriate authority to assess the members individually instead of the association of persons as a unit.
1[ds]Section 3 imposes a tax upon a person in respect of his total income. The persons on whom such tax can be imposed are particularized therein, namely, Hindu undivided family, company, local authority, firm, association of persons, partners of firm or members of association individually. The section, therefore, does not in terms confer any power on any particular officer to assess one of the persons described therein, but is only a charging section imposing the levy of tax on the total income of an assessable entity described therein. The section expressly treats an association of persons and the individual members of an association as two distinct and different assessable entities. On the terms of the section the tax can be levied on either of the said two entities according to the provisions of the Act. There is no scope for the argument that under S. 3, the assessment shall be only on the association of persons as a unit though after such assessment the share of the income of a member of that association may be added to his other income under S. 14(2) of the Act, This construction would make the last words of the section, viz., "members of the association individually" a surplusage. This argument is also contrary to the express provisions of S. 3, which mark out the members of the association individually as a separate entity from the association of persons. Income of every person whether he is a member of an association or not is liable to the charge, under the head "every individual". Section 14 (2)(b) only says that if such an individual happens to be a member of an association of persons which has already been assessed, the tax would not be payable in respect of the share of his income again. That under the Act an assessment can be made on an association of persons as a unit or, alternatively, on the individual members thereof in respect of their respective shares of the income was assumed by this Court in commr, of Income-tax v. Raja Reddy Mallaram, (AIR 1964 SC 825 ). We, therefore, hold that S. 3 impliedly gives an option to an appropriate authority to assess the total income of either the association of persons or the members of such associationAppellate Assistant Commissioner has, therefore, plenary powers in disposing of an appeal. The scope of his power is conterminous with that of the Income-tax Officer. He can do what the Income-tax Officer can do and also direct him to do what he has failed to do. If the Income-tax Officer has the option to assess one or other of the entities in the alternative, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner can direct him to do that he should have done in the circumstances of a case. Under S. 33 (1); an assessee objecting to an order passed by an Appellate Assistant Commissioner under S. 28 or S. 31 may appeal to the Appellate Tribunal within 60 days. of the date on which such order is communicated to him. Under S. 33 (4) "The Appellate Tribunal may, after giving both parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit, and shall communicate any such orders to the assessee and to the, Commissioner." Under S. 33 (5), "Where as the result of an appeal any change is made in the assessment of a firm or association of persons or a new assessment of a firm or association of persons is ordered to be made, the Appellate Tribunal may authoritse the Income-tax Officer to amend accordingly any assessment made on any partner of the firm or any member of the association". Under this section the Appellate Tribunal has ample power to set aside the assessment made on the association of persons and direct the Income-tax officer to assess the individuals or to direct the amendment of the assessment already made on the members. The comprehensive phraseology used, both in S. 31 and S. 33 of the Act does not countenance the attempt of the Revenue to restrict the power of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or of the Appellate Tribunal: both of them have power to direct the appropriate authority to assess the members individually instead of the association of persons as a unit.the Act theofficer, after following the procedure prescribed, makes the assessment under S. 23 of the Act. Doubtless in making the assessment at the first instance he has to exercise the option whether he should assess the association of persons or, the members thereof individually. It is not because that any section of the Act confers an exclusive power on him to do so, but because it is part of the process of assessment; that is to say, he has to ascertain who is the person liable to be assessed for the tax. If he seeks to assess an association of persons as an assessable entity, the said entity can object to the assessment, inter alia, on the ground that in the circumstances of the case the assessment should be made on the members of the association individually. Theofficer may reject its, contention and may assess the total income of the association as such and impose the tax on it. Under S. 30 an assessee objecting to the amount of income assessed under S. 23 or the amount of tax determined under the said section or denying his liability to be assessed under the Act can prefer an appeal against the order of theOfficer to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. It is said that an order made by theOfficer rejecting the plea of an association of persons that the members thereof shall be assessed individually does not fall under one or other of the three heads mentioned above. What is the substance of the objection of the assessee? The assessee denies his liability to be assessed under the Act in the circumstances of the case and pleads that the members of the association shall be assessed only individually. The expression "denial of liability" is comprehensive enough to take in not only the total denial of liability but also the liability to tax under particular circumstances. In either case the denial is a denial of liability to be assessed under the provisions of the Act. In one case the assessee says that he is not liable to be assessed to tax under the Act, and in the other case the assessee denies his liability to tax under the provisions of the Act if the option given to the appropriate officer under the provisions of the Act is judicially exercised. We, therefore, hold that such an assessee has a right of appeal under S. 30 of the Act against the order of theOfficer assessing the association of members instead of the members thereof individually. If an appeal lies, S. 31 of the Act describes the powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in such an appeal. Under S. 31 (3) (a) in disposing of such an appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may, in the case of an order of assessment, confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment; under cl. (b) thereof he may set aside the assessment and direct theOfficer to make a fresh assessment.
### Instruction:
Conjecture the end result of the case (acceptance (1) or non-acceptance (0) of the appeal), followed by a detailed explanation using crucial sentences from the case proceeding.

### Input:
liable to the charge, under the head "every individual". Section 14 (2)(b) only says that if such an individual happens to be a member of an association of persons which has already been assessed, the tax would not be payable in respect of the share of his income again. That under the Act an assessment can be made on an association of persons as a unit or, alternatively, on the individual members thereof in respect of their respective shares of the income was assumed by this Court in commr, of Income-tax v. Raja Reddy Mallaram, (AIR 1964 SC 825 ). We, therefore, hold that S. 3 impliedly gives an option to an appropriate authority to assess the total income of either the association of persons or the members of such association individually.5. The next question is whether the said option is given only to the Income-tax Officer and is denied to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Appellate Tribunal. Under the Act the Income-tax officer, after following the procedure prescribed, makes the assessment under S. 23 of the Act. Doubtless in making the assessment at the first instance he has to exercise the option whether he should assess the association of persons or, the members thereof individually. It is not because that any section of the Act confers an exclusive power on him to do so, but because it is part of the process of assessment; that is to say, he has to ascertain who is the person liable to be assessed for the tax. If he seeks to assess an association of persons as an assessable entity, the said entity can object to the assessment, inter alia, on the ground that in the circumstances of the case the assessment should be made on the members of the association individually. The Income-tax officer may reject its, contention and may assess the total income of the association as such and impose the tax on it. Under S. 30 an assessee objecting to the amount of income assessed under S. 23 or the amount of tax determined under the said section or denying his liability to be assessed under the Act can prefer an appeal against the order of the Income-tax Officer to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. It is said that an order made by the Income-tax Officer rejecting the plea of an association of persons that the members thereof shall be assessed individually does not fall under one or other of the three heads mentioned above. What is the substance of the objection of the assessee? The assessee denies his liability to be assessed under the Act in the circumstances of the case and pleads that the members of the association shall be assessed only individually. The expression "denial of liability" is comprehensive enough to take in not only the total denial of liability but also the liability to tax under particular circumstances. In either case the denial is a denial of liability to be assessed under the provisions of the Act. In one case the assessee says that he is not liable to be assessed to tax under the Act, and in the other case the assessee denies his liability to tax under the provisions of the Act if the option given to the appropriate officer under the provisions of the Act is judicially exercised. We, therefore, hold that such an assessee has a right of appeal under S. 30 of the Act against the order of the Income-tax Officer assessing the association of members instead of the members thereof individually. If an appeal lies, S. 31 of the Act describes the powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in such an appeal. Under S. 31 (3) (a) in disposing of such an appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may, in the case of an order of assessment, confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment; under cl. (b) thereof he may set aside the assessment and direct the Income-tax Officer to make a fresh assessment. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner has, therefore, plenary powers in disposing of an appeal. The scope of his power is conterminous with that of the Income-tax Officer. He can do what the Income-tax Officer can do and also direct him to do what he has failed to do. If the Income-tax Officer has the option to assess one or other of the entities in the alternative, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner can direct him to do that he should have done in the circumstances of a case. Under S. 33 (1); an assessee objecting to an order passed by an Appellate Assistant Commissioner under S. 28 or S. 31 may appeal to the Appellate Tribunal within 60 days. of the date on which such order is communicated to him. Under S. 33 (4) "The Appellate Tribunal may, after giving both parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit, and shall communicate any such orders to the assessee and to the, Commissioner." Under S. 33 (5), "Where as the result of an appeal any change is made in the assessment of a firm or association of persons or a new assessment of a firm or association of persons is ordered to be made, the Appellate Tribunal may authoritse the Income-tax Officer to amend accordingly any assessment made on any partner of the firm or any member of the association". Under this section the Appellate Tribunal has ample power to set aside the assessment made on the association of persons and direct the Income-tax officer to assess the individuals or to direct the amendment of the assessment already made on the members. The comprehensive phraseology used, both in S. 31 and S. 33 of the Act does not countenance the attempt of the Revenue to restrict the power of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or of the Appellate Tribunal: both of them have power to direct the appropriate authority to assess the members individually instead of the association of persons as a unit.

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### Explanation:
argument is also contrary to the express provisions of S. 3, which mark out the members of the association individually as a separate entity from the association of persons. Income of every person whether he is a member of an association or not is liable to the charge, under the head "every individual". Section 14 (2)(b) only says that if such an individual happens to be a member of an association of persons which has already been assessed, the tax would not be payable in respect of the share of his income again. That under the Act an assessment can be made on an association of persons as a unit or, alternatively, on the individual members thereof in respect of their respective shares of the income was assumed by this Court in commr, of Income-tax v. Raja Reddy Mallaram, (AIR 1964 SC 825 ). We, therefore, hold that S. 3 impliedly gives an option to an appropriate authority to assess the total income of either the association of persons or the members of such associationAppellate Assistant Commissioner has, therefore, plenary powers in disposing of an appeal. The scope of his power is conterminous with that of the Income-tax Officer. He can do what the Income-tax Officer can do and also direct him to do what he has failed to do. If the Income-tax Officer has the option to assess one or other of the entities in the alternative, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner can direct him to do that he should have done in the circumstances of a case. Under S. 33 (1); an assessee objecting to an order passed by an Appellate Assistant Commissioner under S. 28 or S. 31 may appeal to the Appellate Tribunal within 60 days. of the date on which such order is communicated to him. Under S. 33 (4) "The Appellate Tribunal may, after giving both parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit, and shall communicate any such orders to the assessee and to the, Commissioner." Under S. 33 (5), "Where as the result of an appeal any change is made in the assessment of a firm or association of persons or a new assessment of a firm or association of persons is ordered to be made, the Appellate Tribunal may authoritse the Income-tax Officer to amend accordingly any assessment made on any partner of the firm or any member of the association". Under this section the Appellate Tribunal has ample power to set aside the assessment made on the association of persons and direct the Income-tax officer to assess the individuals or to direct the amendment of the assessment already made on the members. The comprehensive phraseology used, both in S. 31 and S. 33 of the Act does not countenance the attempt of the Revenue to restrict the power of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or of the Appellate Tribunal: both of them have power to direct the appropriate authority to assess the members individually instead of the association of persons as a unit.the Act theofficer, after following the procedure prescribed, makes the assessment under S. 23 of the Act. Doubtless in making the assessment at the first instance he has to exercise the option whether he should assess the association of persons or, the members thereof individually. It is not because that any section of the Act confers an exclusive power on him to do so, but because it is part of the process of assessment; that is to say, he has to ascertain who is the person liable to be assessed for the tax. If he seeks to assess an association of persons as an assessable entity, the said entity can object to the assessment, inter alia, on the ground that in the circumstances of the case the assessment should be made on the members of the association individually. Theofficer may reject its, contention and may assess the total income of the association as such and impose the tax on it. Under S. 30 an assessee objecting to the amount of income assessed under S. 23 or the amount of tax determined under the said section or denying his liability to be assessed under the Act can prefer an appeal against the order of theOfficer to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. It is said that an order made by theOfficer rejecting the plea of an association of persons that the members thereof shall be assessed individually does not fall under one or other of the three heads mentioned above. What is the substance of the objection of the assessee? The assessee denies his liability to be assessed under the Act in the circumstances of the case and pleads that the members of the association shall be assessed only individually. The expression "denial of liability" is comprehensive enough to take in not only the total denial of liability but also the liability to tax under particular circumstances. In either case the denial is a denial of liability to be assessed under the provisions of the Act. In one case the assessee says that he is not liable to be assessed to tax under the Act, and in the other case the assessee denies his liability to tax under the provisions of the Act if the option given to the appropriate officer under the provisions of the Act is judicially exercised. We, therefore, hold that such an assessee has a right of appeal under S. 30 of the Act against the order of theOfficer assessing the association of members instead of the members thereof individually. If an appeal lies, S. 31 of the Act describes the powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in such an appeal. Under S. 31 (3) (a) in disposing of such an appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may, in the case of an order of assessment, confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment; under cl. (b) thereof he may set aside the assessment and direct theOfficer to make a fresh assessment.
