Shukla Manseta Industries Pvt. Ltd Vs. The Workmen Employed Under It
letter dated June 26, 1961 and if so, the award would have expired on August 26, 1961. Since, however, the settlement disposing of common points of dispute was terminated by a letter dated August 14, 1961 and thereby the settlement stood terminated only on October 14, 1961, the termination of the award by a letter dated June 26, 1961, during the operation of the settlement was held to be invalid. The facts of Bangalore Woollen, Cotton &Silk MU& case (supra) are, therefore, entirely different from those with which we are concerned in this appeal.The other decision namely, the Indian Link Chain Manufactures Ltd. v. Their workmen, ((1972)1 S.C.R. 790.) is also not directly to the point raised in this case.10. Our attention is drawn to a decision of the Calcutta High Court in the National Carbon Co. (India) Ltd. v. M. N. Gan, Judge, Labour Appellate Tribunal and Others, (A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 500 .) wherefrom reading paragraph 13 in the decision, Mr. Shroff sought to derive some assistance. We find that although the agreement, there, was statutorily continuing after its expiry on August 26, 1952, notice for terminating the agreement was given on September 6, 1952 and the High Court rightly accepted the notice as valid. The High Court also rightly disagreed with the views of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in India Reconstruction Corporation Limited ((1953) Labour Appeal Cases 563 (Cal.).) that an agreement with a fixed period expired by efflux of the period and was not statutorily continued. "The period aforesaid" in s. 19(2) will include not only the contractual period but also the statutory period of six months. This decision, therefore, leads no assistance to Mr. Shroff.11. Mr. Shroff also relied upon a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Deccan Tile Works v. Their Workmen (Tile Factories Workers Union, Samalkot) and two others([1960] 2 L.L.J. 298.) which does not at all lead assistance to his submission. Although the facts are not very clear from the report we find, the High Court has observed that-"obviously the management was not within its rights in terminating and unilaterally repudiating Ex. A. I" (the agreement).12. Section 19(2) does not entitle a party to a settlement to repudiate the settlement while the same is in operation. Giving advance notice within the ambit of the law is not repudiation of the settlement.Mr. Shroff next submits that section 19(2) should be given the, same meaning as section 19(6) since both these provisions are on the same subject dealing with the period of operation of settlement and award respectively. It is submitted that so far as an award is concerned under the second proviso to sub-section (3) of section 19, the appropriate Government may extend the period of operation by any period not exceeding one year at a time subject to a total period of operation not exceeding three years from the date on which it comes into operation. According to counsel since there is a power in the Government to extend the period of the award a notice of termination prior to the date of expiry of the award cannot be contemplated under the law and, since this is the position regarding an award, a settlement cannot be treated differently. We are unable to accede to this submission. Even if an- advance notice is given in the case of an award, provided the period of two months expires on the usual expiry of the award permitted by law and Government in exercise of its power extends the award in a given case, such a notice would be infructuous and inoperative under the law. The extension of the award by the Government in exercise of statutory power would prevail upon the action of the party to terminate the award by notice.13. Mr. Shroff relied upon a decision of the Patna High Court in Patn a Municipal, Corporation v. The Workmen of Patna Municipal , Corporation and others ([1970] Labour Industrial Cases 1236.) and read to us the following observation from that decision"A party to the award cannot terminate it so long it remains operative either during the period of one year or during the extended period under sub-section (3) of section 19".14. We do not read the above observation as supporting the submission of counsel that no advance notice can be given to terminate a settlement or an award provided the requisite period of two months required under section 19(2) expires on thee date of expiry of the settlement or award or thereafter. It is only if a notice under section 19(2) or 1 9(6) expires within the period of operation of the award or settlement, such a notice will be invalid under the law. In that event the settlement or the award will continue to be in operation and any reference by Government of a dispute during the period of settlement or an award without the same being terminated under the law will be invalid.In the instant case the notice under section 19(2) was given intimating the intention of the workers to terminate the award on a date when the agreed period would also expire. To repeat, there is no legal bar to give advance intimation about the intention to terminate the settlement on the expiry of the agreed period and to start negotiation for, a more favorable settlement immediately thereafter. The only condition that has to be fulfilled by such a notice is that the period of two months from the date of notice must end on the expiry of the settlement and not before it. In a given case it may be even advantageous to the parties who do not want to continue the settlement to strike a new bargain without loss of time so that unnecessary bickerings and resultant industrial unrest do not take place. In an industrial matter we are not prepared to subject a notice under section 19(2) to the irksome vagaries or tyranny of technicalities of a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.15.
0[ds]Under the provisions of section 19(2) it is clear that a settlement shall be binding for such period as is agreed upon by the parties and if there is no period mentioned in the agreement, for a period of six months from the date on which the settlement is signed by the parties. With regard to the period of operation of the settlement, section 19(2) confers a statutory continuity of the settlement even after the expiry of the period agreed upon until the expiry of two months from the date on which a written notice of the intention to terminate the settlement is given by one party to the other. It is, therefore, clear that when a period is fixed in settlement, the settlement remains in operation for the entire period and also thereafter until one or the other party gives written intimation of the intention to terminate the settlement and until expiry of two months from the date of suchobject of the above provision under section 19(2) is to ensure that once a settlement is arrived at there prevails peace, accord and cordiality between the parties during the period agreed upon and if the settlement does not require to be altered for some reason or the other the same climate prevails by extension of the settlement by operation of law. Section 19 is not a dead end freezing all manner of aspirations of labour or even, may be, sometime, hardship suffered by the employer on account of a settlement. There is an option given to either party to terminate the settlement by a written intimation after the expiry of two months from the date of such notice. This is in accord with the policy of settlement of industrial disputes which is the principal object underlying the provisions of the Act.Settlement between employers and workmen, if not duly terminated, will operate as inviolable conditions of service of workmen. Such settlements are only step-ups in labours progressive ascent to the goal of their ultimate Ideal, namely, a living wage with realisation of other aspirations including partnership with employer. How soon that goal will be reached will depend up on so many factors and other imponderables in the process of the nations achievement, with cooperation from all sectors, public and private, but each party being always alive to the larger national interest which includes thriving of the industry of which labour is an integralpolicy of the Act is to ban agitations over the matters covered by a settlement or by an award during the period specified under section 19(2) and section 19(6) respectively. To avoid uncertainty and speculation section 19 prescribed a terminus a quo and a terminus ad quem. If in a settlement there is no time limit agreed upon between the parties the period of operation is a space of six months from the date of signing of the settlement and will also last until the expiry of two months from the date of receipt of the notice of termination of the settlement. If the period is fixed it commences from the date as specified in the settlement and will theoretically end as agreed upon but shall continue to operate under the law until the expiry of the requisite period of two months by a clear writtenaward under section 19(3) of the Act has a longer period of operation, to start with, namely, one year from the date of the commencement of the award, which is on the expiry of 30 days from the date of publication of the award by the appropriate Government. As in the case of a settlement so also under section 19(6) the award continues to operate govern ing the conditions of service until the expiry of two months from the date of receipt of notice of termination of the award. Under the two provisos to sub-section (3) of section 19 Government hag the option to reduce or extend the period of operat ion of an award. This will be, however, always subject to sub-section (5) of section 19.Notice under section 19(2) or under section 19(6) is only for intimation of an intention to terminate a settlement or an award respectively. There is no legal impediment to give advance intimation of the aforesaid intention provided the contractual or statutory period of settlement is not thereby affected orif an- advance notice is given in the case of an award, provided the period of two months expires on the usual expiry of the award permitted by law and Government in exercise of its power extends the award in a given case, such a notice would be infructuous and inoperative under the law. The extension of the award by the Government in exercise of statutory power would prevail upon the action of the party to terminate the award bydo not read the above observation as supporting the submission of counsel that no advance notice can be given to terminate a settlement or an award provided the requisite period of two months required under section 19(2) expires on thee date of expiry of the settlement or award or thereafter. It is only if a notice under section 19(2) or 1 9(6) expires within the period of operation of the award or settlement, such a notice will be invalid under the law. In that event the settlement or the award will continue to be in operation and any reference by Government of a dispute during the period of settlement or an award without the same being terminated under the law will be invalid.In the instant case the notice under section 19(2) was given intimating the intention of the workers to terminate the award on a date when the agreed period would also expire. To repeat, there is no legal bar to give advance intimation about the intention to terminate the settlement on the expiry of the agreed period and to start negotiation for, a more favorable settlement immediately thereafter. The only condition that has to be fulfilled by such a notice is that the period of two months from the date of notice must end on the expiry of the settlement and not before it. In a given case it may be even advantageous to the parties who do not want to continue the settlement to strike a new bargain without loss of time so that unnecessary bickerings and resultant industrial unrest do not take place. In an industrial matter we are not prepared to subject a notice under section 19(2) to the irksome vagaries or tyranny of technicalities of a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Propertyfind that although the agreement, there, was statutorily continuing after its expiry on August 26, 1952, notice for terminating the agreement was given on September 6, 1952 and the High Court rightly accepted the notice as valid. The High Court also rightly disagreed with the views of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in India Reconstruction Corporation Limited ((1953) Labour Appeal Cases 563 (Cal.).) that an agreement with a fixed period expired by efflux of the period and was not statutorily continued. "The period aforesaid" in s. 19(2) will include not only the contractual period but also the statutory period of six months. This decision, therefore, leads no assistance to Mr. Shroff.
### Instruction:
Estimate the outcome of the case (positive (1) or negative (0) for the appellant) and then give a reasoned explanation by examining important sentences within the case documentation.

### Input:
letter dated June 26, 1961 and if so, the award would have expired on August 26, 1961. Since, however, the settlement disposing of common points of dispute was terminated by a letter dated August 14, 1961 and thereby the settlement stood terminated only on October 14, 1961, the termination of the award by a letter dated June 26, 1961, during the operation of the settlement was held to be invalid. The facts of Bangalore Woollen, Cotton &Silk MU& case (supra) are, therefore, entirely different from those with which we are concerned in this appeal.The other decision namely, the Indian Link Chain Manufactures Ltd. v. Their workmen, ((1972)1 S.C.R. 790.) is also not directly to the point raised in this case.10. Our attention is drawn to a decision of the Calcutta High Court in the National Carbon Co. (India) Ltd. v. M. N. Gan, Judge, Labour Appellate Tribunal and Others, (A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 500 .) wherefrom reading paragraph 13 in the decision, Mr. Shroff sought to derive some assistance. We find that although the agreement, there, was statutorily continuing after its expiry on August 26, 1952, notice for terminating the agreement was given on September 6, 1952 and the High Court rightly accepted the notice as valid. The High Court also rightly disagreed with the views of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in India Reconstruction Corporation Limited ((1953) Labour Appeal Cases 563 (Cal.).) that an agreement with a fixed period expired by efflux of the period and was not statutorily continued. "The period aforesaid" in s. 19(2) will include not only the contractual period but also the statutory period of six months. This decision, therefore, leads no assistance to Mr. Shroff.11. Mr. Shroff also relied upon a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Deccan Tile Works v. Their Workmen (Tile Factories Workers Union, Samalkot) and two others([1960] 2 L.L.J. 298.) which does not at all lead assistance to his submission. Although the facts are not very clear from the report we find, the High Court has observed that-"obviously the management was not within its rights in terminating and unilaterally repudiating Ex. A. I" (the agreement).12. Section 19(2) does not entitle a party to a settlement to repudiate the settlement while the same is in operation. Giving advance notice within the ambit of the law is not repudiation of the settlement.Mr. Shroff next submits that section 19(2) should be given the, same meaning as section 19(6) since both these provisions are on the same subject dealing with the period of operation of settlement and award respectively. It is submitted that so far as an award is concerned under the second proviso to sub-section (3) of section 19, the appropriate Government may extend the period of operation by any period not exceeding one year at a time subject to a total period of operation not exceeding three years from the date on which it comes into operation. According to counsel since there is a power in the Government to extend the period of the award a notice of termination prior to the date of expiry of the award cannot be contemplated under the law and, since this is the position regarding an award, a settlement cannot be treated differently. We are unable to accede to this submission. Even if an- advance notice is given in the case of an award, provided the period of two months expires on the usual expiry of the award permitted by law and Government in exercise of its power extends the award in a given case, such a notice would be infructuous and inoperative under the law. The extension of the award by the Government in exercise of statutory power would prevail upon the action of the party to terminate the award by notice.13. Mr. Shroff relied upon a decision of the Patna High Court in Patn a Municipal, Corporation v. The Workmen of Patna Municipal , Corporation and others ([1970] Labour Industrial Cases 1236.) and read to us the following observation from that decision"A party to the award cannot terminate it so long it remains operative either during the period of one year or during the extended period under sub-section (3) of section 19".14. We do not read the above observation as supporting the submission of counsel that no advance notice can be given to terminate a settlement or an award provided the requisite period of two months required under section 19(2) expires on thee date of expiry of the settlement or award or thereafter. It is only if a notice under section 19(2) or 1 9(6) expires within the period of operation of the award or settlement, such a notice will be invalid under the law. In that event the settlement or the award will continue to be in operation and any reference by Government of a dispute during the period of settlement or an award without the same being terminated under the law will be invalid.In the instant case the notice under section 19(2) was given intimating the intention of the workers to terminate the award on a date when the agreed period would also expire. To repeat, there is no legal bar to give advance intimation about the intention to terminate the settlement on the expiry of the agreed period and to start negotiation for, a more favorable settlement immediately thereafter. The only condition that has to be fulfilled by such a notice is that the period of two months from the date of notice must end on the expiry of the settlement and not before it. In a given case it may be even advantageous to the parties who do not want to continue the settlement to strike a new bargain without loss of time so that unnecessary bickerings and resultant industrial unrest do not take place. In an industrial matter we are not prepared to subject a notice under section 19(2) to the irksome vagaries or tyranny of technicalities of a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.15.

### Response:
0

### Explanation:
the same climate prevails by extension of the settlement by operation of law. Section 19 is not a dead end freezing all manner of aspirations of labour or even, may be, sometime, hardship suffered by the employer on account of a settlement. There is an option given to either party to terminate the settlement by a written intimation after the expiry of two months from the date of such notice. This is in accord with the policy of settlement of industrial disputes which is the principal object underlying the provisions of the Act.Settlement between employers and workmen, if not duly terminated, will operate as inviolable conditions of service of workmen. Such settlements are only step-ups in labours progressive ascent to the goal of their ultimate Ideal, namely, a living wage with realisation of other aspirations including partnership with employer. How soon that goal will be reached will depend up on so many factors and other imponderables in the process of the nations achievement, with cooperation from all sectors, public and private, but each party being always alive to the larger national interest which includes thriving of the industry of which labour is an integralpolicy of the Act is to ban agitations over the matters covered by a settlement or by an award during the period specified under section 19(2) and section 19(6) respectively. To avoid uncertainty and speculation section 19 prescribed a terminus a quo and a terminus ad quem. If in a settlement there is no time limit agreed upon between the parties the period of operation is a space of six months from the date of signing of the settlement and will also last until the expiry of two months from the date of receipt of the notice of termination of the settlement. If the period is fixed it commences from the date as specified in the settlement and will theoretically end as agreed upon but shall continue to operate under the law until the expiry of the requisite period of two months by a clear writtenaward under section 19(3) of the Act has a longer period of operation, to start with, namely, one year from the date of the commencement of the award, which is on the expiry of 30 days from the date of publication of the award by the appropriate Government. As in the case of a settlement so also under section 19(6) the award continues to operate govern ing the conditions of service until the expiry of two months from the date of receipt of notice of termination of the award. Under the two provisos to sub-section (3) of section 19 Government hag the option to reduce or extend the period of operat ion of an award. This will be, however, always subject to sub-section (5) of section 19.Notice under section 19(2) or under section 19(6) is only for intimation of an intention to terminate a settlement or an award respectively. There is no legal impediment to give advance intimation of the aforesaid intention provided the contractual or statutory period of settlement is not thereby affected orif an- advance notice is given in the case of an award, provided the period of two months expires on the usual expiry of the award permitted by law and Government in exercise of its power extends the award in a given case, such a notice would be infructuous and inoperative under the law. The extension of the award by the Government in exercise of statutory power would prevail upon the action of the party to terminate the award bydo not read the above observation as supporting the submission of counsel that no advance notice can be given to terminate a settlement or an award provided the requisite period of two months required under section 19(2) expires on thee date of expiry of the settlement or award or thereafter. It is only if a notice under section 19(2) or 1 9(6) expires within the period of operation of the award or settlement, such a notice will be invalid under the law. In that event the settlement or the award will continue to be in operation and any reference by Government of a dispute during the period of settlement or an award without the same being terminated under the law will be invalid.In the instant case the notice under section 19(2) was given intimating the intention of the workers to terminate the award on a date when the agreed period would also expire. To repeat, there is no legal bar to give advance intimation about the intention to terminate the settlement on the expiry of the agreed period and to start negotiation for, a more favorable settlement immediately thereafter. The only condition that has to be fulfilled by such a notice is that the period of two months from the date of notice must end on the expiry of the settlement and not before it. In a given case it may be even advantageous to the parties who do not want to continue the settlement to strike a new bargain without loss of time so that unnecessary bickerings and resultant industrial unrest do not take place. In an industrial matter we are not prepared to subject a notice under section 19(2) to the irksome vagaries or tyranny of technicalities of a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Propertyfind that although the agreement, there, was statutorily continuing after its expiry on August 26, 1952, notice for terminating the agreement was given on September 6, 1952 and the High Court rightly accepted the notice as valid. The High Court also rightly disagreed with the views of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in India Reconstruction Corporation Limited ((1953) Labour Appeal Cases 563 (Cal.).) that an agreement with a fixed period expired by efflux of the period and was not statutorily continued. "The period aforesaid" in s. 19(2) will include not only the contractual period but also the statutory period of six months. This decision, therefore, leads no assistance to Mr. Shroff.
