The Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Ltd Vs. The Industrial Tribunal Of Gujarat &amp; Ors
the services he had rendered in that Company, but the appellant Corporation was responsible for his retrenchment dues for the service which had been rendered by respondent No. 3 in the appellant Corporation. The prayer was that, as the appellant had refused him re-employment, arrangement should be made to pay his retrenchment dues according to Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Thus, both the respondents, in their claims put forward before the management of the appellant, requested for payment of retrenchment compensation and did not raise any dispute for reinstatement. Since no such dispute about reinstatement was raised by either of the respondents before the management of the appellant, it is clear that the State Government was not competent to refer a question of reinstatement as an industrial dispute for adjudication by the Tribunal. The dispute that the State Government could have referred competently was the dispute relating to payment of retrenchment compensation by the appellant to respondent No. 3 which had been refused. No doubt, the order of the State Government making the reference mentions that the Government had considered the report submitted by the Conciliation Officer under sub-section (4) of Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act, in respect of the dispute between the appellant and workmen employed under it, over the demand mentioned in the Schedule appended to that order; and, in the Schedule, the Government mentioned that the dispute was that of reinstatement of respondent No. 3 in the service of the appellant and payment of his wages from 21st February, 1958. It was urged by Mr. Gopalakrishnan on behalf of the respondents that this Court cannot examine whether the Government, in forming its opinion that an industrial dispute exists, came to its view correctly or incorrectly on the material before it. This proposition is, no doubt, correct; but the aspect that is being examined is entirely different. It may be that the Conciliation Officer reported to the Government that an industrial dispute did exist relating to the reinstatement of respondent No. 3 and payment of wages to him from 21st February, 1958 but when the dispute came up for adjudication before the Tribunal, the evidence produced clearly showed that no such dispute had ever been raised by either respondent with the management of the appellant.If no dispute at all was raised by the respondents with the management, any request sent by them to the Government would only be a demand by them and not an industrial dispute between them and their employer. An industrial dispute, as defined, must be a dispute between employers and employers, employers and workmen, and workmen and workmen. A mere demand to a Government, without a dispute being raised by the workmen with their employer, cannot become an industrial dispute.Consequently, the material before the Tribunal clearly showed that no such industrial dispute, as was purported to be referred by the State Government to the tribunal, had ever existed between the appellant Corporation and the respondents and the State Government, in making a reference, obviously committed an error in basing its opinion an material which was not relevant to the formation of opinion. The Government had to come to an opinion that an industrial dispute did exist and that opinion could only be formed on the basis that there was a dispute between the appellant and the respondents relating to reinstatement. Such material could not possibly exist when, as early as March and July. 1958. respondent No. 3 and respondent No 2 respectively had confined their demands to the management to retrenchment compensation only and; did not make any demand for reinstatement. On those facts it is clear that the reference made by the Government was not competent. The only reference that the Government could have made had to be related to payment of retrenchment compensation which was the only subject-matter of dispute between the appellant and the respondents. 5. So far as the third ground is concerned, it loses force and does not arise in view of our decision relating to the first ground. We have already held, when dealing with die first ground, that the appellant lent had neither dismissed respondent No. 3, nor had it discharged him from service. There was no question of wrongful dismissal or discharge by the appellant. It was not even a case of retrenchment, because respondent No 3 had willingly gone to join the service under Sindhu Hotchief. He obviously joined the service in Sindhu. Hotchief because of the financial advantages that were to accrue to him. In September, 1953, he was drawing a salary of Rs. 200/- p. m. in the scale of Rs. 150-10-250 while serving the appellant. The site allowance of 20 per cent., which he had been receiving earlier, had been discontinued from March, 1952 and he was not getting it at the time when he went to join Sindhu Hotchief, where he was given a start of Rs 240/- in the grade of Rs. 200-20-400. Consequently, in addition to the immediate rise in salary of Rs. 40/- p. m, he had the advantage of working in the higher grade in which, within two years, he exceeded the maximum of the stale in which he had been working with the appellant. He served Sindhu Hotchief for a period of about 41/2 years and became confirmed there in accordance with the terms and conditions which were offered to him by Sindhu Hotchief.In these circumstances, the respondents cannot urge that the services of respondent No. 3 were retrenched by the appellant, either when he went and joined Sindhu Hotchief, or when he wanted to get back to his post with the appellant. His appointment in the service of the appellant having terminated, no question could arise of retrenching him at the stage when he wanted to come back after serving. Sindhu Hotchief His services were, in fact, retrened by his new employer, Sindhu Hotchief, and from that Company he received retrenchment compensation. The third ground therefore, needs no consideration. 6.
1[ds]It is true that the form in which it was urged before the High Court was slightly different. There, the point raised was that a demand for reinstatement, when there had been retrenchment only and no discharge or dismissal, could not be held to constitute an industrial dispute. On the facts of the case as they appeared from the material before the Tribunal, it is now urged that, in fact, the demand, which was being pressed with the management by both the respondents, was in respect of retrenchment compensation and not reinstatement. The demand for reinstatement seems to have been given up, because the respondents realised that the services of respondent No. 3 had not been terminated by discharge or dismissal, but by retrenchment only and that retrenchment not being the result of any unfair labour practice or victimisation, respondent No. 3 could only claim retrenchment compensation. In the evidence given before the Tribunal, there were included two letters written by the two respondents containing the demand for retrenchment compensation. We have already referred to one of these letters which was sent on 7th March, 1958 by respondent No. 3 to the Administrative Officer of the appellant. The other letter was sent on 10th July, 1958 by the General Secretary of respondent No 2 in which again it was stated that Sindhu Hotchief had paid retrenchment; dues to respondent No. 3 in respect of the services he had rendered in that Company, but the appellant Corporation was responsible for his retrenchment dues for the service which had been rendered by respondent No. 3 in the appellant Corporation. The prayer was that, as the appellant had refused him re-employment, arrangement should be made to pay his retrenchment dues according to Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Thus, both the respondents, in their claims put forward before the management of the appellant, requested for payment of retrenchment compensation and did not raise any dispute for reinstatement. Since no such dispute about reinstatement was raised by either of the respondents before the management of the appellant, it is clear that the State Government was not competent to refer a question of reinstatement as an industrial dispute for adjudication by the Tribunal. The dispute that the State Government could have referred competently was the dispute relating to payment of retrenchment compensation by the appellant to respondent No. 3 which had been refused. No doubt, the order of the State Government making the reference mentions that the Government had considered the report submitted by the Conciliation Officer under sub-section (4) of Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act, in respect of the dispute between the appellant and workmen employed under it, over the demand mentioned in the Schedule appended to that order; and, in the Schedule, the Government mentioned that the dispute was that of reinstatement of respondent No. 3 in the service of the appellant and payment of his wages from 21st February, 1958. It was urged by Mr. Gopalakrishnan on behalf of the respondents that this Court cannot examine whether the Government, in forming its opinion that an industrial dispute exists, came to its view correctly or incorrectly on the material before it. This proposition is, no doubt, correct; but the aspect that is being examined is entirely different. It may be that the Conciliation Officer reported to the Government that an industrial dispute did exist relating to the reinstatement of respondent No. 3 and payment of wages to him from 21st February, 1958 but when the dispute came up for adjudication before the Tribunal, the evidence produced clearly showed that no such dispute had ever been raised by either respondent with the management of the appellant.If no dispute at all was raised by the respondents with the management, any request sent by them to the Government would only be a demand by them and not an industrial dispute between them and their employer. An industrial dispute, as defined, must be a dispute between employers and employers, employers and workmen, and workmen and workmen. A mere demand to a Government, without a dispute being raised by the workmen with their employer, cannot become an industrial dispute.Consequently, the material before the Tribunal clearly showed that no such industrial dispute, as was purported to be referred by the State Government to the tribunal, had ever existed between the appellant Corporation and the respondents and the State Government, in making a reference, obviously committed an error in basing its opinion an material which was not relevant to the formation of opinion. The Government had to come to an opinion that an industrial dispute did exist and that opinion could only be formed on the basis that there was a dispute between the appellant and the respondents relating to reinstatement. Such material could not possibly exist when, as early as March and July. 1958. respondent No. 3 and respondent No 2 respectively had confined their demands to the management to retrenchment compensation only and; did not make any demand for reinstatement. On those facts it is clear that the reference made by the Government was not competent. The only reference that the Government could have made had to be related to payment of retrenchment compensation which was the only subject-matter of dispute between the appellant and the respondents5. So far as the third ground is concerned, it loses force and does not arise in view of our decision relating to the first ground. We have already held, when dealing with die first ground, that the appellant lent had neither dismissed respondent No. 3, nor had it discharged him from service. There was no question of wrongful dismissal or discharge by the appellant. It was not even a case of retrenchment, because respondent No 3 had willingly gone to join the service under Sindhu Hotchief. He obviously joined the service in Sindhu. Hotchief because of the financial advantages that were to accrue to him. In September, 1953, he was drawing a salary of Rs. 200/- p. m. in the scale of Rs. 150-10-250 while serving the appellant. The site allowance of 20 per cent., which he had been receiving earlier, had been discontinued from March, 1952 and he was not getting it at the time when he went to join Sindhu Hotchief, where he was given a start of Rs 240/- in the grade of Rs. 200-20-400. Consequently, in addition to the immediate rise in salary of Rs. 40/- p. m, he had the advantage of working in the higher grade in which, within two years, he exceeded the maximum of the stale in which he had been working with the appellant. He served Sindhu Hotchief for a period of about 41/2 years and became confirmed there in accordance with the terms and conditions which were offered to him by Sindhu Hotchief.In these circumstances, the respondents cannot urge that the services of respondent No. 3 were retrenched by the appellant, either when he went and joined Sindhu Hotchief, or when he wanted to get back to his post with the appellant. His appointment in the service of the appellant having terminated, no question could arise of retrenching him at the stage when he wanted to come back after serving. Sindhu Hotchief His services were, in fact, retrened by his new employer, Sindhu Hotchief, and from that Company he received retrenchment compensation. The third ground therefore, needs no consideration.
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the services he had rendered in that Company, but the appellant Corporation was responsible for his retrenchment dues for the service which had been rendered by respondent No. 3 in the appellant Corporation. The prayer was that, as the appellant had refused him re-employment, arrangement should be made to pay his retrenchment dues according to Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Thus, both the respondents, in their claims put forward before the management of the appellant, requested for payment of retrenchment compensation and did not raise any dispute for reinstatement. Since no such dispute about reinstatement was raised by either of the respondents before the management of the appellant, it is clear that the State Government was not competent to refer a question of reinstatement as an industrial dispute for adjudication by the Tribunal. The dispute that the State Government could have referred competently was the dispute relating to payment of retrenchment compensation by the appellant to respondent No. 3 which had been refused. No doubt, the order of the State Government making the reference mentions that the Government had considered the report submitted by the Conciliation Officer under sub-section (4) of Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act, in respect of the dispute between the appellant and workmen employed under it, over the demand mentioned in the Schedule appended to that order; and, in the Schedule, the Government mentioned that the dispute was that of reinstatement of respondent No. 3 in the service of the appellant and payment of his wages from 21st February, 1958. It was urged by Mr. Gopalakrishnan on behalf of the respondents that this Court cannot examine whether the Government, in forming its opinion that an industrial dispute exists, came to its view correctly or incorrectly on the material before it. This proposition is, no doubt, correct; but the aspect that is being examined is entirely different. It may be that the Conciliation Officer reported to the Government that an industrial dispute did exist relating to the reinstatement of respondent No. 3 and payment of wages to him from 21st February, 1958 but when the dispute came up for adjudication before the Tribunal, the evidence produced clearly showed that no such dispute had ever been raised by either respondent with the management of the appellant.If no dispute at all was raised by the respondents with the management, any request sent by them to the Government would only be a demand by them and not an industrial dispute between them and their employer. An industrial dispute, as defined, must be a dispute between employers and employers, employers and workmen, and workmen and workmen. A mere demand to a Government, without a dispute being raised by the workmen with their employer, cannot become an industrial dispute.Consequently, the material before the Tribunal clearly showed that no such industrial dispute, as was purported to be referred by the State Government to the tribunal, had ever existed between the appellant Corporation and the respondents and the State Government, in making a reference, obviously committed an error in basing its opinion an material which was not relevant to the formation of opinion. The Government had to come to an opinion that an industrial dispute did exist and that opinion could only be formed on the basis that there was a dispute between the appellant and the respondents relating to reinstatement. Such material could not possibly exist when, as early as March and July. 1958. respondent No. 3 and respondent No 2 respectively had confined their demands to the management to retrenchment compensation only and; did not make any demand for reinstatement. On those facts it is clear that the reference made by the Government was not competent. The only reference that the Government could have made had to be related to payment of retrenchment compensation which was the only subject-matter of dispute between the appellant and the respondents. 5. So far as the third ground is concerned, it loses force and does not arise in view of our decision relating to the first ground. We have already held, when dealing with die first ground, that the appellant lent had neither dismissed respondent No. 3, nor had it discharged him from service. There was no question of wrongful dismissal or discharge by the appellant. It was not even a case of retrenchment, because respondent No 3 had willingly gone to join the service under Sindhu Hotchief. He obviously joined the service in Sindhu. Hotchief because of the financial advantages that were to accrue to him. In September, 1953, he was drawing a salary of Rs. 200/- p. m. in the scale of Rs. 150-10-250 while serving the appellant. The site allowance of 20 per cent., which he had been receiving earlier, had been discontinued from March, 1952 and he was not getting it at the time when he went to join Sindhu Hotchief, where he was given a start of Rs 240/- in the grade of Rs. 200-20-400. Consequently, in addition to the immediate rise in salary of Rs. 40/- p. m, he had the advantage of working in the higher grade in which, within two years, he exceeded the maximum of the stale in which he had been working with the appellant. He served Sindhu Hotchief for a period of about 41/2 years and became confirmed there in accordance with the terms and conditions which were offered to him by Sindhu Hotchief.In these circumstances, the respondents cannot urge that the services of respondent No. 3 were retrenched by the appellant, either when he went and joined Sindhu Hotchief, or when he wanted to get back to his post with the appellant. His appointment in the service of the appellant having terminated, no question could arise of retrenching him at the stage when he wanted to come back after serving. Sindhu Hotchief His services were, in fact, retrened by his new employer, Sindhu Hotchief, and from that Company he received retrenchment compensation. The third ground therefore, needs no consideration. 6.

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respect of the services he had rendered in that Company, but the appellant Corporation was responsible for his retrenchment dues for the service which had been rendered by respondent No. 3 in the appellant Corporation. The prayer was that, as the appellant had refused him re-employment, arrangement should be made to pay his retrenchment dues according to Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Thus, both the respondents, in their claims put forward before the management of the appellant, requested for payment of retrenchment compensation and did not raise any dispute for reinstatement. Since no such dispute about reinstatement was raised by either of the respondents before the management of the appellant, it is clear that the State Government was not competent to refer a question of reinstatement as an industrial dispute for adjudication by the Tribunal. The dispute that the State Government could have referred competently was the dispute relating to payment of retrenchment compensation by the appellant to respondent No. 3 which had been refused. No doubt, the order of the State Government making the reference mentions that the Government had considered the report submitted by the Conciliation Officer under sub-section (4) of Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act, in respect of the dispute between the appellant and workmen employed under it, over the demand mentioned in the Schedule appended to that order; and, in the Schedule, the Government mentioned that the dispute was that of reinstatement of respondent No. 3 in the service of the appellant and payment of his wages from 21st February, 1958. It was urged by Mr. Gopalakrishnan on behalf of the respondents that this Court cannot examine whether the Government, in forming its opinion that an industrial dispute exists, came to its view correctly or incorrectly on the material before it. This proposition is, no doubt, correct; but the aspect that is being examined is entirely different. It may be that the Conciliation Officer reported to the Government that an industrial dispute did exist relating to the reinstatement of respondent No. 3 and payment of wages to him from 21st February, 1958 but when the dispute came up for adjudication before the Tribunal, the evidence produced clearly showed that no such dispute had ever been raised by either respondent with the management of the appellant.If no dispute at all was raised by the respondents with the management, any request sent by them to the Government would only be a demand by them and not an industrial dispute between them and their employer. An industrial dispute, as defined, must be a dispute between employers and employers, employers and workmen, and workmen and workmen. A mere demand to a Government, without a dispute being raised by the workmen with their employer, cannot become an industrial dispute.Consequently, the material before the Tribunal clearly showed that no such industrial dispute, as was purported to be referred by the State Government to the tribunal, had ever existed between the appellant Corporation and the respondents and the State Government, in making a reference, obviously committed an error in basing its opinion an material which was not relevant to the formation of opinion. The Government had to come to an opinion that an industrial dispute did exist and that opinion could only be formed on the basis that there was a dispute between the appellant and the respondents relating to reinstatement. Such material could not possibly exist when, as early as March and July. 1958. respondent No. 3 and respondent No 2 respectively had confined their demands to the management to retrenchment compensation only and; did not make any demand for reinstatement. On those facts it is clear that the reference made by the Government was not competent. The only reference that the Government could have made had to be related to payment of retrenchment compensation which was the only subject-matter of dispute between the appellant and the respondents5. So far as the third ground is concerned, it loses force and does not arise in view of our decision relating to the first ground. We have already held, when dealing with die first ground, that the appellant lent had neither dismissed respondent No. 3, nor had it discharged him from service. There was no question of wrongful dismissal or discharge by the appellant. It was not even a case of retrenchment, because respondent No 3 had willingly gone to join the service under Sindhu Hotchief. He obviously joined the service in Sindhu. Hotchief because of the financial advantages that were to accrue to him. In September, 1953, he was drawing a salary of Rs. 200/- p. m. in the scale of Rs. 150-10-250 while serving the appellant. The site allowance of 20 per cent., which he had been receiving earlier, had been discontinued from March, 1952 and he was not getting it at the time when he went to join Sindhu Hotchief, where he was given a start of Rs 240/- in the grade of Rs. 200-20-400. Consequently, in addition to the immediate rise in salary of Rs. 40/- p. m, he had the advantage of working in the higher grade in which, within two years, he exceeded the maximum of the stale in which he had been working with the appellant. He served Sindhu Hotchief for a period of about 41/2 years and became confirmed there in accordance with the terms and conditions which were offered to him by Sindhu Hotchief.In these circumstances, the respondents cannot urge that the services of respondent No. 3 were retrenched by the appellant, either when he went and joined Sindhu Hotchief, or when he wanted to get back to his post with the appellant. His appointment in the service of the appellant having terminated, no question could arise of retrenching him at the stage when he wanted to come back after serving. Sindhu Hotchief His services were, in fact, retrened by his new employer, Sindhu Hotchief, and from that Company he received retrenchment compensation. The third ground therefore, needs no consideration.
