Ahmedabad Rana Caste Association Vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat
of Income-tax v. Grain Merchants Association of Bombay, 6 ITR 427 = (AIR 1939 Bom 45 ) on the point. It was, however, observed that the section of the community sought to be benefited must be sufficiently defined and identifiable by some common quality of a public or impersonal nature. Where there was no common quality uniting the potential beneficiaries into a class the trust might not be regarded as valid. In the various orders the clause relating to the beneficiaries has not been clearly and accurately set out. In the petition of appeal dated October 7, 1968 the provisions of the constitution of the assessee are set out and with reference to the community it is stated, "Rana community means natives of Ahmedabad only and the other community brothers accepted by the community as per old rules of the community staying in Ahmedabad". It is common ground that the word "old rules" do not represent the correct translation of the original word in Gujarati which is Riwaj meaning custom. The learned Judges of the High Court also, who are conversant with that language, have proceeded on the basis that the correct rendering of the aforesaid word is custom or usage. That is why according to the High Court the definition comprises two classes of members of Rana caste residing in Ahmedabad, one class consisting of those who are natives of Ahmedabad while the other class consists of such persons who are admitted by the Rana caste according to the old custom or usage of the community. The reason which prevailed with the High Court for treating the second class as not being united with the first class by a common characteristic or attribute was that its members have to be accepted by the community according to the old custom or usage and that the entry of the members of this class into the Rana caste residing in Ahmedabad was dependent on the decision of the caste to admit them. We are altogether unable to concur in the approach or the conclusion of the High Court on the above point.6. We may usefully refer to the judgment of Lord Greene M. R. in re Compton, Powell v. Compton, 1945 Ch. 123. The Master of Rolls declared that no definition of what was meant by "a section of the public" had, so far as he was aware, been laid down. But he indicated that the trust of a public character is one in which the beneficiaries do not enjoy the benefit when they receive it by virtue of their character as individuals but by virtue of their membership of a specified class the common quality uniting potential beneficiaries into the class being essentially an impersonal one. This common quality he said was "definable by reference to what each has in common with the others and that is something into which their status as individuals does not enter." Andrew, L. C. J. accepted this statement of law without hesitation in Trustees of the Londonderry Presbyterian Church House v. Commrs. of Inland Revenue, (1946) 27 Tax Cas 431. What has to be seen in the present case is whether the members of the Rana caste who are not natives of Ahmedabad but who come to reside there and are accepted as members of that caste according to its usage and custom can be said to have a relationship which is an impersonal one dependent on their condition as members of the Rana community. We are unable to comprehend how such members of the Rana caste can be regarded as having been introduced into that caste by consideration of their personal status as individuals. As a matter of fact the predominant content and requirement of the class defining "beneficiaries" in the constitution of the assessee is the factum of their belonging to the Rana community of Ahmedabad. The common quality, therefore, uniting the potential beneficiaries into the class consists of being members of the Rana caste or community of Ahmedabad whether as natives or as being admitted to that caste or community under custom or usage. The mere fact that a person of the Rana community who is not an original native of Ahmedabad has to prove his credentials according to the custom and usage of that community to get admitted into that community cannot introduce a personal element. In Oppenheim v. Tobacco Securities Trust Co. Ltd., 1951 AC 297 the trustees were directed to apply certain income in providing for the education of children of employees or "former employees" of a British limited company or any of its subsidiary or allied companies. It was held by the House of Lords by a majority that though the group of persons indicated was numerous, the nexus between them was employment by particular employers and accordingly the trust did not satisfy the test of public benefit requisite to establish it as charitable. This is what Lord Simonds observed:-"A group of persons may be numerous but, if the nexus between them is their personal relationship to a single propositus or to several propositi, they are neither the community nor a section of the community for charitable purposes".The personal element or personal relationship which takes a group out of section of the community for charitable purposes is of the nature which is to be found in cases of the aforesaid type. We cannot possibly discover a similar element of personal nature in the members of the Rana Community who settle in Ahmedabad and have been accepted by the Rana community of that place as members of that community. As regards the acceptance of such persons as members of the community or caste, according to custom and usage,it is well known that whenever a question arises whether a person belongs to a particular community or caste the custom or usage prevailing in that community must play a decisive and vital part. That cannot be regarded as an element which would detract from the impersonal nature of the common quality.
1[ds]5. It is well settled by now and the High Court also has rightly taken that view that an object beneficial to a section of the public is an object of general public utility. To serve a charitable purpose it is not necessary that the object should be to benefit the whole of mankind or all persons in a particular country or State. It is sufficient if the intention to benefit a section of the public as distinguished from a specified individual iswas, however, observed that the section of the community sought to be benefited must be sufficiently defined and identifiable by some common quality of a public or impersonal nature. Where there was no common quality uniting the potential beneficiaries into a class the trust might not be regarded as valid. In the various orders the clause relating to the beneficiaries has not been clearly and accurately set out. In the petition of appeal dated October 7, 1968 the provisions of the constitution of the assessee are set out and with reference to the community it is stated, "Rana community means natives of Ahmedabad only and the other community brothers accepted by the community as per old rules of the community staying in Ahmedabad". It is common ground that the word "old rules" do not represent the correct translation of the original word in Gujarati which is Riwaj meaning custom. The learned Judges of the High Court also, who are conversant with that language, have proceeded on the basis that the correct rendering of the aforesaid word is custom or usage. That is why according to the High Court the definition comprises two classes of members of Rana caste residing in Ahmedabad, one class consisting of those who are natives of Ahmedabad while the other class consists of such persons who are admitted by the Rana caste according to the old custom or usage of the community. The reason which prevailed with the High Court for treating the second class as not being united with the first class by a common characteristic or attribute was that its members have to be accepted by the community according to the old custom or usage and that the entry of the members of this class into the Rana caste residing in Ahmedabad was dependent on the decision of the caste to admit them. We are altogether unable to concur in the approach or the conclusion of the High Court on the aboveare unable to comprehend how such members of the Rana caste can be regarded as having been introduced into that caste by consideration of their personal status as individuals. As a matter of fact the predominant content and requirement of the class defining "beneficiaries" in the constitution of the assessee is the factum of their belonging to the Rana community of Ahmedabad. The common quality, therefore, uniting the potential beneficiaries into the class consists of being members of the Rana caste or community of Ahmedabad whether as natives or as being admitted to that caste or community under custom or usage. The mere fact that a person of the Rana community who is not an original native of Ahmedabad has to prove his credentials according to the custom and usage of that community to get admitted into that community cannot introduce a personal element. In Oppenheim v. Tobacco Securities Trust Co. Ltd., 1951 AC 297   the trustees were directed to apply certain income in providing for the education of children of employees or "former employees" of a British limited company or any of its subsidiary or allied companies. It was held by the House of Lords by a majority that though the group of persons indicated was numerous, the nexus between them was employment by particular employers and accordingly the trust did not satisfy the test of public benefit requisite to establish it aspersonal element or personal relationship which takes a group out of section of the community for charitable purposes is of the nature which is to be found in cases of the aforesaid type. We cannot possibly discover a similar element of personal nature in the members of the Rana Community who settle in Ahmedabad and have been accepted by the Rana community of that place as members of that community. As regards the acceptance of such persons as members of the community or caste, according to custom and usage,it is well known that whenever a question arises whether a person belongs to a particular community or caste the custom or usage prevailing in that community must play a decisive and vital part. That cannot be regarded as an element which would detract from the impersonal nature of the commonthe present case the trust was created prior to First April 1962 and therefore no question arises of its not being entitled to the exemption if other conditions were satisfied even though it was created for the benefit of the Rana caste of Ahmedabad.
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of Income-tax v. Grain Merchants Association of Bombay, 6 ITR 427 = (AIR 1939 Bom 45 ) on the point. It was, however, observed that the section of the community sought to be benefited must be sufficiently defined and identifiable by some common quality of a public or impersonal nature. Where there was no common quality uniting the potential beneficiaries into a class the trust might not be regarded as valid. In the various orders the clause relating to the beneficiaries has not been clearly and accurately set out. In the petition of appeal dated October 7, 1968 the provisions of the constitution of the assessee are set out and with reference to the community it is stated, "Rana community means natives of Ahmedabad only and the other community brothers accepted by the community as per old rules of the community staying in Ahmedabad". It is common ground that the word "old rules" do not represent the correct translation of the original word in Gujarati which is Riwaj meaning custom. The learned Judges of the High Court also, who are conversant with that language, have proceeded on the basis that the correct rendering of the aforesaid word is custom or usage. That is why according to the High Court the definition comprises two classes of members of Rana caste residing in Ahmedabad, one class consisting of those who are natives of Ahmedabad while the other class consists of such persons who are admitted by the Rana caste according to the old custom or usage of the community. The reason which prevailed with the High Court for treating the second class as not being united with the first class by a common characteristic or attribute was that its members have to be accepted by the community according to the old custom or usage and that the entry of the members of this class into the Rana caste residing in Ahmedabad was dependent on the decision of the caste to admit them. We are altogether unable to concur in the approach or the conclusion of the High Court on the above point.6. We may usefully refer to the judgment of Lord Greene M. R. in re Compton, Powell v. Compton, 1945 Ch. 123. The Master of Rolls declared that no definition of what was meant by "a section of the public" had, so far as he was aware, been laid down. But he indicated that the trust of a public character is one in which the beneficiaries do not enjoy the benefit when they receive it by virtue of their character as individuals but by virtue of their membership of a specified class the common quality uniting potential beneficiaries into the class being essentially an impersonal one. This common quality he said was "definable by reference to what each has in common with the others and that is something into which their status as individuals does not enter." Andrew, L. C. J. accepted this statement of law without hesitation in Trustees of the Londonderry Presbyterian Church House v. Commrs. of Inland Revenue, (1946) 27 Tax Cas 431. What has to be seen in the present case is whether the members of the Rana caste who are not natives of Ahmedabad but who come to reside there and are accepted as members of that caste according to its usage and custom can be said to have a relationship which is an impersonal one dependent on their condition as members of the Rana community. We are unable to comprehend how such members of the Rana caste can be regarded as having been introduced into that caste by consideration of their personal status as individuals. As a matter of fact the predominant content and requirement of the class defining "beneficiaries" in the constitution of the assessee is the factum of their belonging to the Rana community of Ahmedabad. The common quality, therefore, uniting the potential beneficiaries into the class consists of being members of the Rana caste or community of Ahmedabad whether as natives or as being admitted to that caste or community under custom or usage. The mere fact that a person of the Rana community who is not an original native of Ahmedabad has to prove his credentials according to the custom and usage of that community to get admitted into that community cannot introduce a personal element. In Oppenheim v. Tobacco Securities Trust Co. Ltd., 1951 AC 297 the trustees were directed to apply certain income in providing for the education of children of employees or "former employees" of a British limited company or any of its subsidiary or allied companies. It was held by the House of Lords by a majority that though the group of persons indicated was numerous, the nexus between them was employment by particular employers and accordingly the trust did not satisfy the test of public benefit requisite to establish it as charitable. This is what Lord Simonds observed:-"A group of persons may be numerous but, if the nexus between them is their personal relationship to a single propositus or to several propositi, they are neither the community nor a section of the community for charitable purposes".The personal element or personal relationship which takes a group out of section of the community for charitable purposes is of the nature which is to be found in cases of the aforesaid type. We cannot possibly discover a similar element of personal nature in the members of the Rana Community who settle in Ahmedabad and have been accepted by the Rana community of that place as members of that community. As regards the acceptance of such persons as members of the community or caste, according to custom and usage,it is well known that whenever a question arises whether a person belongs to a particular community or caste the custom or usage prevailing in that community must play a decisive and vital part. That cannot be regarded as an element which would detract from the impersonal nature of the common quality.

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5. It is well settled by now and the High Court also has rightly taken that view that an object beneficial to a section of the public is an object of general public utility. To serve a charitable purpose it is not necessary that the object should be to benefit the whole of mankind or all persons in a particular country or State. It is sufficient if the intention to benefit a section of the public as distinguished from a specified individual iswas, however, observed that the section of the community sought to be benefited must be sufficiently defined and identifiable by some common quality of a public or impersonal nature. Where there was no common quality uniting the potential beneficiaries into a class the trust might not be regarded as valid. In the various orders the clause relating to the beneficiaries has not been clearly and accurately set out. In the petition of appeal dated October 7, 1968 the provisions of the constitution of the assessee are set out and with reference to the community it is stated, "Rana community means natives of Ahmedabad only and the other community brothers accepted by the community as per old rules of the community staying in Ahmedabad". It is common ground that the word "old rules" do not represent the correct translation of the original word in Gujarati which is Riwaj meaning custom. The learned Judges of the High Court also, who are conversant with that language, have proceeded on the basis that the correct rendering of the aforesaid word is custom or usage. That is why according to the High Court the definition comprises two classes of members of Rana caste residing in Ahmedabad, one class consisting of those who are natives of Ahmedabad while the other class consists of such persons who are admitted by the Rana caste according to the old custom or usage of the community. The reason which prevailed with the High Court for treating the second class as not being united with the first class by a common characteristic or attribute was that its members have to be accepted by the community according to the old custom or usage and that the entry of the members of this class into the Rana caste residing in Ahmedabad was dependent on the decision of the caste to admit them. We are altogether unable to concur in the approach or the conclusion of the High Court on the aboveare unable to comprehend how such members of the Rana caste can be regarded as having been introduced into that caste by consideration of their personal status as individuals. As a matter of fact the predominant content and requirement of the class defining "beneficiaries" in the constitution of the assessee is the factum of their belonging to the Rana community of Ahmedabad. The common quality, therefore, uniting the potential beneficiaries into the class consists of being members of the Rana caste or community of Ahmedabad whether as natives or as being admitted to that caste or community under custom or usage. The mere fact that a person of the Rana community who is not an original native of Ahmedabad has to prove his credentials according to the custom and usage of that community to get admitted into that community cannot introduce a personal element. In Oppenheim v. Tobacco Securities Trust Co. Ltd., 1951 AC 297   the trustees were directed to apply certain income in providing for the education of children of employees or "former employees" of a British limited company or any of its subsidiary or allied companies. It was held by the House of Lords by a majority that though the group of persons indicated was numerous, the nexus between them was employment by particular employers and accordingly the trust did not satisfy the test of public benefit requisite to establish it aspersonal element or personal relationship which takes a group out of section of the community for charitable purposes is of the nature which is to be found in cases of the aforesaid type. We cannot possibly discover a similar element of personal nature in the members of the Rana Community who settle in Ahmedabad and have been accepted by the Rana community of that place as members of that community. As regards the acceptance of such persons as members of the community or caste, according to custom and usage,it is well known that whenever a question arises whether a person belongs to a particular community or caste the custom or usage prevailing in that community must play a decisive and vital part. That cannot be regarded as an element which would detract from the impersonal nature of the commonthe present case the trust was created prior to First April 1962 and therefore no question arises of its not being entitled to the exemption if other conditions were satisfied even though it was created for the benefit of the Rana caste of Ahmedabad.
