Prabhu Vs. State Of U. P
the aforesaid two witnesses also establishes that the appellant and his father came to Bhagwan about a month and a half before the occurrence and asked for some land. Bhagwan refused to give any land to the appellant. We think that this motive has been established even though it would influence both the appellant and his father.7. The main difficulty in the case is that the evidence regarding the recovery of blood stained axe and blood stained. shirt and dhoti is not very satisfactory and the courts below were wrong in admitting certain statements alleged to have been made by the appellant in connection with that recovery. According to the recovery memo the two witnesses who were present when the aforesaid articles were produced by the appellant were Lal Bahadur Singh and Wali Mohamad. Lal Bahadur Singh was examined as prosecution witness No. 4. He did give evidence about the production of blood stained articles from his house by the appellant. The witness said that the appellant produced the articles from a tub on the eastern side of the house. The witness did not however, say that the appellant made any statements relating to the recovery. Wali Mohammad was not examined at all. One other witness Dodi Baksh Singh was examined as prosecution witness No. 3. This witness said that a little before the recovery the Sub-Inspector of Police took the appellant into custody and interrogated him ; then the a appellant gave out that the axe with which the murder had been committed and his blood stained shirt and dhoti were in the house and the appellant was prepared to produce them. These statements to which Dobi Baksh (P.W.3) deposed were not admissible in evidence. They were incriminating statements made to a police officer and were hit by ss.25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act. The statement that the axe was one with which the murder had been committed was not a statement which led to any discovery within the meaning of s.27 of the Evidence Act. Nor was the alleged statement of the appellant that the blood stained shirt and dhoti belonged to him was a statement which led to any discovery within the meaning of s.27. Section 27 provides that when any fact is deposed to and discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, -so much of such information, .whether it amounts to a confession or not, as, relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovery may be proved. In Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor ((1947) L.R. 74 I.A 65) the Privy Council considered the true interpretation of s.27 and said : "It is fallacious to treat the fact discove- red within the section as equivalent to the object produced ; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinc- tly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house does not lead to the discovery of a knife ; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added with which I stabbed A., these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant." (p.77) We are, therefore, of the opinion that the courts below were wrong in admitting in evidence the alleged statement of the appellant that the axe had been used to commit murder or the statement that the blood stained shirt and dhoti were his. If these statements are excluded and we think that they must be excluded, then the only evidence which remains is that the appellant produced from the house a blood stained axe and some blood stained clothes. The prosecution gave no evidence to establish whether the axe belonged to the appellant or the blood stained clothes were his.Therefore, the question before us is this. Is the production of the blood stained axe and clothes read in the light of the evidence regarding motive sufficient to lead to the conclusion that the appellant must be the murderer ? It is well-settled that circumstantial evidence must be much as to lead to a conclusion which on any reasonable hypothesis in consistent only with the guilt of the accused person and not with his innocence. The motive alleged in this case would operate not only on the appellant but on his father as well. From the mere production of the blood stained articles by the appellant one cannot come to the conclusion that the appellant committed the murder. Even if somebody else had committed the murder and the blood stained articles had been kept in the house, the appellant might produce the blood stained articles when interrogated by the Sub- Inspector of Police. It cannot be said that the fact of production is consistent only with the guilt of the appellant and inconstant with his innocence. We are of the opinion that the chain of circumstantial evidence is not complete in this case and the prosecution has unfortunately left missing links, probably because the prosecution adopted the shortout of ascribing certain statements to the appellant which were clearly inadmissible.8. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted to us that in State of U. P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya ((1961) 1 S.C.R. 14.) this Court accepted as sufficient evidence the production of a blood stained weapon. We are unable to agree.
1[ds]There can be no doubt that Bhagwan was murdered on the night in question. The postmortem examination disclosed that he had sustained as many as thirteen injuries, eleven of which were incised on different parts of the body. The injuries inflicted on the head and face had out through skull bones and the doctor who held the postmortem examination was of the opinion that Bhagwan had died as a result of fractures of the skull bones and hemorrhage and shock. There can, therefore, be no doubt that Bhagan was murdered. It is equally clear that nobody saw who killed Bhagwan. The evidence of Naiku (P.W.1) shows clearly enough that neither he nor other persons whom he called saw the appellant. The grand-child who was sleeping with Bhagwan was also fast asleep and did not even awake when the injuries were inflicted on Bhagwan. Bhagwan might or might not have raised shouts when the injuries were caused to him. The evidence of Naiku does not disclose that he heard any other sound excepting the sound of movement of steps of a person wearing shoes.We are satisfied that the evidence as to motive is satisfactory, Both Naiku (P.W.1) and Brij Lal (P.W.2) have stated about the motive. The appellant and his mother stayed with Bhagwan about four years ago in order to render assistance to Bhagwan in his cultivation. The appellant did not, however, do any work and was turned out. This is proved by the evidence of Naiku and Brij Lal. The evidence of the aforesaid two witnesses also establishes that the appellant and his father came to Bhagwan about a month and a half before the occurrence and asked for some land. Bhagwan refused to give any land to the appellant. We think that this motive has been established even though it would influence both the appellant and hismain difficulty in the case is that the evidence regarding the recovery of blood stained axe and blood stained. shirt and dhoti is not very satisfactory and the courts below were wrong in admitting certain statements alleged to have been made by the appellant in connection with that recovery. According to the recovery memo the two witnesses who were present when the aforesaid articles were produced by the appellant were Lal Bahadur Singh and Wali Mohamad. Lal Bahadur Singh was examined as prosecution witness No. 4. He did give evidence about the production of blood stained articles from his house by the appellant. The witness said that the appellant produced the articles from a tub on the eastern side of the house. The witness did not however, say that the appellant made any statements relating to the recovery. Wali Mohammad was not examined at all. One other witness Dodi Baksh Singh was examined as prosecution witness No. 3. This witness said that a little before the recovery the Sub-Inspector of Police took the appellant into custody and interrogated him ; then the a appellant gave out that the axe with which the murder had been committed and his blood stained shirt and dhoti were in the house and the appellant was prepared to produce them. These statements to which Dobi Baksh (P.W.3) deposed were not admissible in evidence. They were incriminating statements made to a police officer and were hit by ss.25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act. The statement that the axe was one with which the murder had been committed was not a statement which led to any discovery within the meaning of s.27 of the Evidence Act. Nor was the alleged statement of the appellant that the blood stained shirt and dhoti belonged to him was a statement which led to any discovery within the meaning ofare, therefore, of the opinion that the courts below were wrong in admitting in evidence the alleged statement of the appellant that the axe had been used to commit murder or the statement that the blood stained shirt and dhoti were his. If these statements are excluded and we think that they must be excluded, then the only evidence which remains is that the appellant produced from the house a blood stained axe and some blood stained clothes. The prosecution gave no evidence to establish whether the axe belonged to the appellant or the blood stained clothes were his.Therefore, the question before us is this. Is the production of the blood stained axe and clothes read in the light of the evidence regarding motive sufficient to lead to the conclusion that the appellant must be the murderer ? It is well-settled that circumstantial evidence must be much as to lead to a conclusion which on any reasonable hypothesis in consistent only with the guilt of the accused person and not with his innocence. The motive alleged in this case would operate not only on the appellant but on his father as well. From the mere production of the blood stained articles by the appellant one cannot come to the conclusion that the appellant committed the murder. Even if somebody else had committed the murder and the blood stained articles had been kept in the house, the appellant might produce the blood stained articles when interrogated by the Sub- Inspector of Police. It cannot be said that the fact of production is consistent only with the guilt of the appellant and inconstant with his innocence. We are of the opinion that the chain of circumstantial evidence is not complete in this case and the prosecution has unfortunately left missing links, probably because the prosecution adopted the shortout of ascribing certain statements to the appellant which were clearly inadmissible.
### Instruction:
Ascertain if the court will uphold (1) or dismiss (0) the appeal in the case proceeding, and then clarify this prediction by discussing critical sentences from the text.

### Input:
the aforesaid two witnesses also establishes that the appellant and his father came to Bhagwan about a month and a half before the occurrence and asked for some land. Bhagwan refused to give any land to the appellant. We think that this motive has been established even though it would influence both the appellant and his father.7. The main difficulty in the case is that the evidence regarding the recovery of blood stained axe and blood stained. shirt and dhoti is not very satisfactory and the courts below were wrong in admitting certain statements alleged to have been made by the appellant in connection with that recovery. According to the recovery memo the two witnesses who were present when the aforesaid articles were produced by the appellant were Lal Bahadur Singh and Wali Mohamad. Lal Bahadur Singh was examined as prosecution witness No. 4. He did give evidence about the production of blood stained articles from his house by the appellant. The witness said that the appellant produced the articles from a tub on the eastern side of the house. The witness did not however, say that the appellant made any statements relating to the recovery. Wali Mohammad was not examined at all. One other witness Dodi Baksh Singh was examined as prosecution witness No. 3. This witness said that a little before the recovery the Sub-Inspector of Police took the appellant into custody and interrogated him ; then the a appellant gave out that the axe with which the murder had been committed and his blood stained shirt and dhoti were in the house and the appellant was prepared to produce them. These statements to which Dobi Baksh (P.W.3) deposed were not admissible in evidence. They were incriminating statements made to a police officer and were hit by ss.25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act. The statement that the axe was one with which the murder had been committed was not a statement which led to any discovery within the meaning of s.27 of the Evidence Act. Nor was the alleged statement of the appellant that the blood stained shirt and dhoti belonged to him was a statement which led to any discovery within the meaning of s.27. Section 27 provides that when any fact is deposed to and discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, -so much of such information, .whether it amounts to a confession or not, as, relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovery may be proved. In Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor ((1947) L.R. 74 I.A 65) the Privy Council considered the true interpretation of s.27 and said : "It is fallacious to treat the fact discove- red within the section as equivalent to the object produced ; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinc- tly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house does not lead to the discovery of a knife ; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added with which I stabbed A., these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant." (p.77) We are, therefore, of the opinion that the courts below were wrong in admitting in evidence the alleged statement of the appellant that the axe had been used to commit murder or the statement that the blood stained shirt and dhoti were his. If these statements are excluded and we think that they must be excluded, then the only evidence which remains is that the appellant produced from the house a blood stained axe and some blood stained clothes. The prosecution gave no evidence to establish whether the axe belonged to the appellant or the blood stained clothes were his.Therefore, the question before us is this. Is the production of the blood stained axe and clothes read in the light of the evidence regarding motive sufficient to lead to the conclusion that the appellant must be the murderer ? It is well-settled that circumstantial evidence must be much as to lead to a conclusion which on any reasonable hypothesis in consistent only with the guilt of the accused person and not with his innocence. The motive alleged in this case would operate not only on the appellant but on his father as well. From the mere production of the blood stained articles by the appellant one cannot come to the conclusion that the appellant committed the murder. Even if somebody else had committed the murder and the blood stained articles had been kept in the house, the appellant might produce the blood stained articles when interrogated by the Sub- Inspector of Police. It cannot be said that the fact of production is consistent only with the guilt of the appellant and inconstant with his innocence. We are of the opinion that the chain of circumstantial evidence is not complete in this case and the prosecution has unfortunately left missing links, probably because the prosecution adopted the shortout of ascribing certain statements to the appellant which were clearly inadmissible.8. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted to us that in State of U. P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya ((1961) 1 S.C.R. 14.) this Court accepted as sufficient evidence the production of a blood stained weapon. We are unable to agree.

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### Explanation:
There can be no doubt that Bhagwan was murdered on the night in question. The postmortem examination disclosed that he had sustained as many as thirteen injuries, eleven of which were incised on different parts of the body. The injuries inflicted on the head and face had out through skull bones and the doctor who held the postmortem examination was of the opinion that Bhagwan had died as a result of fractures of the skull bones and hemorrhage and shock. There can, therefore, be no doubt that Bhagan was murdered. It is equally clear that nobody saw who killed Bhagwan. The evidence of Naiku (P.W.1) shows clearly enough that neither he nor other persons whom he called saw the appellant. The grand-child who was sleeping with Bhagwan was also fast asleep and did not even awake when the injuries were inflicted on Bhagwan. Bhagwan might or might not have raised shouts when the injuries were caused to him. The evidence of Naiku does not disclose that he heard any other sound excepting the sound of movement of steps of a person wearing shoes.We are satisfied that the evidence as to motive is satisfactory, Both Naiku (P.W.1) and Brij Lal (P.W.2) have stated about the motive. The appellant and his mother stayed with Bhagwan about four years ago in order to render assistance to Bhagwan in his cultivation. The appellant did not, however, do any work and was turned out. This is proved by the evidence of Naiku and Brij Lal. The evidence of the aforesaid two witnesses also establishes that the appellant and his father came to Bhagwan about a month and a half before the occurrence and asked for some land. Bhagwan refused to give any land to the appellant. We think that this motive has been established even though it would influence both the appellant and hismain difficulty in the case is that the evidence regarding the recovery of blood stained axe and blood stained. shirt and dhoti is not very satisfactory and the courts below were wrong in admitting certain statements alleged to have been made by the appellant in connection with that recovery. According to the recovery memo the two witnesses who were present when the aforesaid articles were produced by the appellant were Lal Bahadur Singh and Wali Mohamad. Lal Bahadur Singh was examined as prosecution witness No. 4. He did give evidence about the production of blood stained articles from his house by the appellant. The witness said that the appellant produced the articles from a tub on the eastern side of the house. The witness did not however, say that the appellant made any statements relating to the recovery. Wali Mohammad was not examined at all. One other witness Dodi Baksh Singh was examined as prosecution witness No. 3. This witness said that a little before the recovery the Sub-Inspector of Police took the appellant into custody and interrogated him ; then the a appellant gave out that the axe with which the murder had been committed and his blood stained shirt and dhoti were in the house and the appellant was prepared to produce them. These statements to which Dobi Baksh (P.W.3) deposed were not admissible in evidence. They were incriminating statements made to a police officer and were hit by ss.25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act. The statement that the axe was one with which the murder had been committed was not a statement which led to any discovery within the meaning of s.27 of the Evidence Act. Nor was the alleged statement of the appellant that the blood stained shirt and dhoti belonged to him was a statement which led to any discovery within the meaning ofare, therefore, of the opinion that the courts below were wrong in admitting in evidence the alleged statement of the appellant that the axe had been used to commit murder or the statement that the blood stained shirt and dhoti were his. If these statements are excluded and we think that they must be excluded, then the only evidence which remains is that the appellant produced from the house a blood stained axe and some blood stained clothes. The prosecution gave no evidence to establish whether the axe belonged to the appellant or the blood stained clothes were his.Therefore, the question before us is this. Is the production of the blood stained axe and clothes read in the light of the evidence regarding motive sufficient to lead to the conclusion that the appellant must be the murderer ? It is well-settled that circumstantial evidence must be much as to lead to a conclusion which on any reasonable hypothesis in consistent only with the guilt of the accused person and not with his innocence. The motive alleged in this case would operate not only on the appellant but on his father as well. From the mere production of the blood stained articles by the appellant one cannot come to the conclusion that the appellant committed the murder. Even if somebody else had committed the murder and the blood stained articles had been kept in the house, the appellant might produce the blood stained articles when interrogated by the Sub- Inspector of Police. It cannot be said that the fact of production is consistent only with the guilt of the appellant and inconstant with his innocence. We are of the opinion that the chain of circumstantial evidence is not complete in this case and the prosecution has unfortunately left missing links, probably because the prosecution adopted the shortout of ascribing certain statements to the appellant which were clearly inadmissible.
