Automobile Products Of India Employees Union Vs. Association Of Engineering Workers, Bombayand Ors
certain proceedings under the said Act, and that the decisions arrived at or order made in such proceedings shall be binding on all the employees in such undertaking, and to that extent the provisions of the said Act shall stand amended. Section 21 then states that when there is a recognised union, no employee in the undertaking shall be allowed to appear or act or allow to be represented in any proceedings relating to unfair labour practices specified in Items 2 and 6 of Schedule IV of the Act except through the recognised union. The only exception to this rule is in the case of the undertakings governed by the Bombay Industrial Relations Act where the representatives of the employees under Section 30 of the Act are given the special privilege. It is not necessary to deal with the other provisions of the Act. 18. It is thus clear that the recognition or derecognition of a union under the Act is not a matter which concerns only the contesting unions or its members. It is a matter of utmost importance to the interests of all the workmen in the undertaking concerned and to the industry and society in general. No union is entitled to be registered as a recognised union under the Act merely because it satisfies membership qualification. The Industrial Court is forbidden from granting recognition to a union whatever its membership, if the Court is satisfied that it is disqualified for reasons mentioned under Section 12(5) and 12(6) or does not satisfy the conditions mentioned in Section 19. A period of two years must further have elapsed since the registration of the recognised union, if there is one, before an application for recognition of a new union is entertained. A union whose recognition is cancelled on the ground specified in clause (ii) of Section 13 cannot make a fresh application for a period of three months, and if its recognition is cancelled on any other ground it cannot make a fresh application for recognition for a period of one year from the date of the cancellation in the latter case without the permission of the court. In addition to the membership qualification, therefore, the Court has also to satisfy itself that the applicant-Union is not disentitled to recognition or to apply for recognition, under the other provisions of the Act. 19. As regards the membership qualification itself, the Act enjoins that for being recognised, the applicant-Union must have firstly a membership of a minimum of 30 per cent of the employees of the undertaking for the whole of the period of at least six calendar months preceding the month in which the application for recognition is made. When the applicant-Union seeks recognition for itself by displacing the existing recognised union, the applicant-Union has, in addition, to satisfy that not only it had 30 per cent of the membership during the six calendar months immediately precediately the calender months in which it made its application but had also a larger membership during the said period than the membership of the recognised union. Even with regard to membership, therefore, what has to be satisfied by the concerned union is not only its minimum qualifying membership but also its competing superiority in it over a continuous specified period. What should further be not lost sight of is the paramount fact that it is the membership of the workmen of the union over a period vouched by the relevant documents and not their vote on a particular day which under the Act gives the union its representative character. It is its representative character determined by such membership that gives a union a right to make the application for recognition. However overwhelming therefore the vote may be in its favour in a ballot, it will not entitle a union to recognition under the Act. The recognition by ballot or by any method other than that laid down in the Act is, therefore, alien to the Act. 20. The facts in the present case would reveal that what was done by the Industrial Court was to permit the registration of the Union as a recognised one by a method which was clearly alien to the Act. The Court in effect allowed the parties to circumvent the provisions of the Act and by adopting a simplistic method directed that whoever commanded a majority of votes of the employees voting on a particular day, would be entitled to the status of the recognised union. In effect, therefore, the Court ignored in particular the mandatory provisions of Section 10, 11, 12, 14 and 19 of the Act. Not only that, but by adopting this method, the Court also failed to find out whether any of those workers who voted were members of any of the two unions at any time including on the day of the ballot. This is apart from the fact that what has to be found is the exclusive membership of the contesting unions continuously over the specified period, the overlapping membership being ignored. 21. The consent of the parties to follow a procedure which is against the mandatory provisions of the Act, cannot cure the illegality. For reasons which we have indicated earlier the legislature did not opt for the ballot as a method for determining the representative character of the union and laid down an elaborate procedure with necessary safeguards, to do so. In the circumstances, to permit the parties by consent to substitute a procedure of their own is in effect to permit them to substitute the provisions of the Act. 22. Hence, we are of the view that the order of the Industrial Court granting recognition under the Act to the appellant-Union by following the method of ballot is prima facie illegal being in breach of the provisions of the Act. The High Court had, therefore, rightly interfered with the said order by relying on its earlier decision in the case of the Maharashtra General Kamgar Union 1983 MLJ 147).
0[ds]18. It is thus clear that the recognition or derecognition of a union under the Act is not a matter which concerns only the contesting unions or its members. It is a matter of utmost importance to the interests of all the workmen in the undertaking concerned and to the industry and society in general. No union is entitled to be registered as a recognised union under the Act merely because it satisfies membership qualification. The Industrial Court is forbidden from granting recognition to a union whatever its membership, if the Court is satisfied that it is disqualified for reasons mentioned under Section 12(5) and 12(6) or does not satisfy the conditions mentioned in Section 19. A period of two years must further have elapsed since the registration of the recognised union, if there is one, before an application for recognition of a new union is entertained. A union whose recognition is cancelled on the ground specified in clause (ii) of Section 13 cannot make a fresh application for a period of three months, and if its recognition is cancelled on any other ground it cannot make a fresh application for recognition for a period of one year from the date of the cancellation in the latter case without the permission of the court. In addition to the membership qualification, therefore, the Court has also to satisfy itself that the applicant-Union is not disentitled to recognition or to apply for recognition, under the other provisions of theAs regards the membership qualification itself, the Act enjoins that for being recognised, the applicant-Union must have firstly a membership of a minimum of 30 per cent of the employees of the undertaking for the whole of the period of at least six calendar months preceding the month in which the application for recognition is made. When the applicant-Union seeks recognition for itself by displacing the existing recognised union, the applicant-Union has, in addition, to satisfy that not only it had 30 per cent of the membership during the six calendar months immediately precediately the calender months in which it made its application but had also a larger membership during the said period than the membership of the recognised union. Even with regard to membership, therefore, what has to be satisfied by the concerned union is not only its minimum qualifying membership but also its competing superiority in it over a continuous specified period. What should further be not lost sight of is the paramount fact that it is the membership of the workmen of the union over a period vouched by the relevant documents and not their vote on a particular day which under the Act gives the union its representative character. It is its representative character determined by such membership that gives a union a right to make the application for recognition. However overwhelming therefore the vote may be in its favour in a ballot, it will not entitle a union to recognition under the Act. The recognition by ballot or by any method other than that laid down in the Act is, therefore, alien to theThe facts in the present case would reveal that what was done by the Industrial Court was to permit the registration of the Union as a recognised one by a method which was clearly alien to the Act. The Court in effect allowed the parties to circumvent the provisions of the Act and by adopting a simplistic method directed that whoever commanded a majority of votes of the employees voting on a particular day, would be entitled to the status of the recognised union. In effect, therefore, the Court ignored in particular the mandatory provisions of Section 10, 11, 12, 14 and 19 of the Act. Not only that, but by adopting this method, the Court also failed to find out whether any of those workers who voted were members of any of the two unions at any time including on the day of the ballot. This is apart from the fact that what has to be found is the exclusive membership of the contesting unions continuously over the specified period, the overlapping membership beingThe consent of the parties to follow a procedure which is against the mandatory provisions of the Act, cannot cure the illegality. For reasons which we have indicated earlier the legislature did not opt for the ballot as a method for determining the representative character of the union and laid down an elaborate procedure with necessary safeguards, to do so. In the circumstances, to permit the parties by consent to substitute a procedure of their own is in effect to permit them to substitute the provisions of theHence, we are of the view that the order of the Industrial Court granting recognition under the Act to the appellant-Union by following the method of ballot is prima facie illegal being in breach of the provisions of the Act. The High Court had, therefore, rightly interfered with the said order by relying on its earlier decision in the case of the Maharashtra General Kamgar Union 1983 MLJ 147).
### Instruction:
Conjecture the end result of the case (acceptance (1) or non-acceptance (0) of the appeal), followed by a detailed explanation using crucial sentences from the case proceeding.

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certain proceedings under the said Act, and that the decisions arrived at or order made in such proceedings shall be binding on all the employees in such undertaking, and to that extent the provisions of the said Act shall stand amended. Section 21 then states that when there is a recognised union, no employee in the undertaking shall be allowed to appear or act or allow to be represented in any proceedings relating to unfair labour practices specified in Items 2 and 6 of Schedule IV of the Act except through the recognised union. The only exception to this rule is in the case of the undertakings governed by the Bombay Industrial Relations Act where the representatives of the employees under Section 30 of the Act are given the special privilege. It is not necessary to deal with the other provisions of the Act. 18. It is thus clear that the recognition or derecognition of a union under the Act is not a matter which concerns only the contesting unions or its members. It is a matter of utmost importance to the interests of all the workmen in the undertaking concerned and to the industry and society in general. No union is entitled to be registered as a recognised union under the Act merely because it satisfies membership qualification. The Industrial Court is forbidden from granting recognition to a union whatever its membership, if the Court is satisfied that it is disqualified for reasons mentioned under Section 12(5) and 12(6) or does not satisfy the conditions mentioned in Section 19. A period of two years must further have elapsed since the registration of the recognised union, if there is one, before an application for recognition of a new union is entertained. A union whose recognition is cancelled on the ground specified in clause (ii) of Section 13 cannot make a fresh application for a period of three months, and if its recognition is cancelled on any other ground it cannot make a fresh application for recognition for a period of one year from the date of the cancellation in the latter case without the permission of the court. In addition to the membership qualification, therefore, the Court has also to satisfy itself that the applicant-Union is not disentitled to recognition or to apply for recognition, under the other provisions of the Act. 19. As regards the membership qualification itself, the Act enjoins that for being recognised, the applicant-Union must have firstly a membership of a minimum of 30 per cent of the employees of the undertaking for the whole of the period of at least six calendar months preceding the month in which the application for recognition is made. When the applicant-Union seeks recognition for itself by displacing the existing recognised union, the applicant-Union has, in addition, to satisfy that not only it had 30 per cent of the membership during the six calendar months immediately precediately the calender months in which it made its application but had also a larger membership during the said period than the membership of the recognised union. Even with regard to membership, therefore, what has to be satisfied by the concerned union is not only its minimum qualifying membership but also its competing superiority in it over a continuous specified period. What should further be not lost sight of is the paramount fact that it is the membership of the workmen of the union over a period vouched by the relevant documents and not their vote on a particular day which under the Act gives the union its representative character. It is its representative character determined by such membership that gives a union a right to make the application for recognition. However overwhelming therefore the vote may be in its favour in a ballot, it will not entitle a union to recognition under the Act. The recognition by ballot or by any method other than that laid down in the Act is, therefore, alien to the Act. 20. The facts in the present case would reveal that what was done by the Industrial Court was to permit the registration of the Union as a recognised one by a method which was clearly alien to the Act. The Court in effect allowed the parties to circumvent the provisions of the Act and by adopting a simplistic method directed that whoever commanded a majority of votes of the employees voting on a particular day, would be entitled to the status of the recognised union. In effect, therefore, the Court ignored in particular the mandatory provisions of Section 10, 11, 12, 14 and 19 of the Act. Not only that, but by adopting this method, the Court also failed to find out whether any of those workers who voted were members of any of the two unions at any time including on the day of the ballot. This is apart from the fact that what has to be found is the exclusive membership of the contesting unions continuously over the specified period, the overlapping membership being ignored. 21. The consent of the parties to follow a procedure which is against the mandatory provisions of the Act, cannot cure the illegality. For reasons which we have indicated earlier the legislature did not opt for the ballot as a method for determining the representative character of the union and laid down an elaborate procedure with necessary safeguards, to do so. In the circumstances, to permit the parties by consent to substitute a procedure of their own is in effect to permit them to substitute the provisions of the Act. 22. Hence, we are of the view that the order of the Industrial Court granting recognition under the Act to the appellant-Union by following the method of ballot is prima facie illegal being in breach of the provisions of the Act. The High Court had, therefore, rightly interfered with the said order by relying on its earlier decision in the case of the Maharashtra General Kamgar Union 1983 MLJ 147).

### Response:
0

### Explanation:
18. It is thus clear that the recognition or derecognition of a union under the Act is not a matter which concerns only the contesting unions or its members. It is a matter of utmost importance to the interests of all the workmen in the undertaking concerned and to the industry and society in general. No union is entitled to be registered as a recognised union under the Act merely because it satisfies membership qualification. The Industrial Court is forbidden from granting recognition to a union whatever its membership, if the Court is satisfied that it is disqualified for reasons mentioned under Section 12(5) and 12(6) or does not satisfy the conditions mentioned in Section 19. A period of two years must further have elapsed since the registration of the recognised union, if there is one, before an application for recognition of a new union is entertained. A union whose recognition is cancelled on the ground specified in clause (ii) of Section 13 cannot make a fresh application for a period of three months, and if its recognition is cancelled on any other ground it cannot make a fresh application for recognition for a period of one year from the date of the cancellation in the latter case without the permission of the court. In addition to the membership qualification, therefore, the Court has also to satisfy itself that the applicant-Union is not disentitled to recognition or to apply for recognition, under the other provisions of theAs regards the membership qualification itself, the Act enjoins that for being recognised, the applicant-Union must have firstly a membership of a minimum of 30 per cent of the employees of the undertaking for the whole of the period of at least six calendar months preceding the month in which the application for recognition is made. When the applicant-Union seeks recognition for itself by displacing the existing recognised union, the applicant-Union has, in addition, to satisfy that not only it had 30 per cent of the membership during the six calendar months immediately precediately the calender months in which it made its application but had also a larger membership during the said period than the membership of the recognised union. Even with regard to membership, therefore, what has to be satisfied by the concerned union is not only its minimum qualifying membership but also its competing superiority in it over a continuous specified period. What should further be not lost sight of is the paramount fact that it is the membership of the workmen of the union over a period vouched by the relevant documents and not their vote on a particular day which under the Act gives the union its representative character. It is its representative character determined by such membership that gives a union a right to make the application for recognition. However overwhelming therefore the vote may be in its favour in a ballot, it will not entitle a union to recognition under the Act. The recognition by ballot or by any method other than that laid down in the Act is, therefore, alien to theThe facts in the present case would reveal that what was done by the Industrial Court was to permit the registration of the Union as a recognised one by a method which was clearly alien to the Act. The Court in effect allowed the parties to circumvent the provisions of the Act and by adopting a simplistic method directed that whoever commanded a majority of votes of the employees voting on a particular day, would be entitled to the status of the recognised union. In effect, therefore, the Court ignored in particular the mandatory provisions of Section 10, 11, 12, 14 and 19 of the Act. Not only that, but by adopting this method, the Court also failed to find out whether any of those workers who voted were members of any of the two unions at any time including on the day of the ballot. This is apart from the fact that what has to be found is the exclusive membership of the contesting unions continuously over the specified period, the overlapping membership beingThe consent of the parties to follow a procedure which is against the mandatory provisions of the Act, cannot cure the illegality. For reasons which we have indicated earlier the legislature did not opt for the ballot as a method for determining the representative character of the union and laid down an elaborate procedure with necessary safeguards, to do so. In the circumstances, to permit the parties by consent to substitute a procedure of their own is in effect to permit them to substitute the provisions of theHence, we are of the view that the order of the Industrial Court granting recognition under the Act to the appellant-Union by following the method of ballot is prima facie illegal being in breach of the provisions of the Act. The High Court had, therefore, rightly interfered with the said order by relying on its earlier decision in the case of the Maharashtra General Kamgar Union 1983 MLJ 147).
