Kishan Chand  Vs. State Of U.P
Penal Code is declaratory of the vicarious liability of the members of an unlawful assembly for acts done in prosecution of the common object of that assembly or for such offences as the members of the unlawful assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object. If an unlawful assembly is formed with the common object of committing an offence, and if that offence is committed in prosecution of the object by any member of the unlawful assembly, all the members of the assembly will be vicariously liable for that offence even if one or more, but not all committed the offence. Again, if an offence is committed by a member of an unlawful assembly and that offence is one which the members of the unlawful assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object, every member who had that knowledge will be guilty of the offence so committed. But members of an unlawful assembly may have a community of object upto a certain point, beyond which they may differ in their objects, and the knowledge possessed by each member of what is likely to be committed in prosecution of their common object may vary not only according to the information at his command, but also according to the extent to which he shares the community of object and as a consequence of this the effect of Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code may be different on different members of the same unlawful assembly. Jahiruddin v. Queen Empress, ILR 22 Cal 306 . 24. In Shivalingappa Kallayanappa and Others v. State of Karnataka [1994 Supp (3) SCC 235], this Court opined: 9. From the above discussion it is established by the prosecution that A-1 to A-5 formed into an unlawful assembly variously armed and participated in the occurrence during which two deceased persons died and P.Ws. 2 to 4 received injuries. The next question is whether the common object of the unlawful assembly was to commit the murders. Whether there was such a common object or not, depends upon various factors. A-1 and A-2, though armed with axes, did not use the sharp side but only gave one or two blows on the heads with the butt ends. A-4 and A-5 who were armed with sticks dealt blows only on the legs and or on the hands which were not serious. A-3 did not participate in the attack on any of the two deceased persons. These circumstances show that the common object of the unlawful assembly cannot be said to be to cause murders and at any rate it cannot be said that all the accused shared the same and that they had knowledge that the two deceased persons would be killed and with that knowledge continued to be the members of the unlawful assembly. However, taking all the circumstances of the case into consideration, the common object can be held to be only to cause grievous hurt. A-1 and A-2, however, dealt blows with the butt ends of the axes on the two deceased persons and the injuries on the heads caused by them proved to be fatal. Having given our earnest consideration to this aspect of the case, we are of the view that A-1 and A-2 must be held liable for their individual acts and they would be liable to be punished under Section 302 I.P.C. and A-3 to A-5 under Sections 326/149 I.P.C. so far as the attack on the two deceased persons is concerned. 25. In Bunnilal Chaudhary v. State of Bihar [(2006) 10 SCC 639] , this Court held: 13 We may say here that it is now the settled law that under Section 149 IPC, the liability of other members for the offence committed during the continuance of the occurrence rests upon the fact whether the other persons knew before hand that the offence actually committed was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. Such knowledge may reasonably be collected from the nature of the assembly, arms or behaviour on or before the scene of occurrence. 26. In Sunil Balkrishna Bhoir v. The State of Maharashtra [2007 (7) SCALE 184 ], this Court held: 17. Section 149 per se constitutes a substantive offence. The object of this section is to make clear that an accused person whose case falls within its terms cannot put forward the defence that he did not, with his own hand, commit the offence committed in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly or such as the members of the assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object. Unlawful assembly was formed originally to assault and something might have happened all of a sudden. 27. In a case of this nature, the injuries on the part of the defence witnesses need not detain us as sufferance of such injuries at the hands of the prosecution witnesses had not been believed by both the courts below. We do not see any reason to differ with the said findings. 28. If Phool Chand was armed by the purported order passed by the Superintendent of Police that he should have assistance from the police officers. We fail to see any reason as to why he could not go to the police station and lodge a First Information Report. Why the injured persons did not go to a Government Hospital for getting themselves examined on that date itself. It betrays common sense as to why they had to go to a private doctor and that too on the next date. The accused persons even did not mind setting up a false plea to the effect that modesty of Smt. Shakuntala Devi had been outraged. The testimony of Smt. Shakuntala Devi has been discarded by the courts below. No attempt even had been made before us to assail the correctness of that part of the judgment. 29. For the reasons aforementioned, we do not
0[ds]In a case of this nature, the injuries on the part of the defence witnesses need not detain us as sufferance of such injuries at the hands of the prosecution witnesses had not been believed by both the courts below. We do not see any reason to differ with the said findingsIf Phool Chand was armed by the purported order passed by the Superintendent of Police that he should have assistance from the police officers. We fail to see any reason as to why he could not go to the police station and lodge a First Information Report. Why the injured persons did not go to a Government Hospital for getting themselves examined on that date itself. It betrays common sense as to why they had to go to a private doctor and that too on the next date. The accused persons even did not mind setting up a false plea to the effect that modesty of Smt. Shakuntala Devi had been outraged. The testimony of Smt. Shakuntala Devi has been discarded by the courts below. No attempt even had been made before us to assail the correctness of that part of the judgment
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Penal Code is declaratory of the vicarious liability of the members of an unlawful assembly for acts done in prosecution of the common object of that assembly or for such offences as the members of the unlawful assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object. If an unlawful assembly is formed with the common object of committing an offence, and if that offence is committed in prosecution of the object by any member of the unlawful assembly, all the members of the assembly will be vicariously liable for that offence even if one or more, but not all committed the offence. Again, if an offence is committed by a member of an unlawful assembly and that offence is one which the members of the unlawful assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object, every member who had that knowledge will be guilty of the offence so committed. But members of an unlawful assembly may have a community of object upto a certain point, beyond which they may differ in their objects, and the knowledge possessed by each member of what is likely to be committed in prosecution of their common object may vary not only according to the information at his command, but also according to the extent to which he shares the community of object and as a consequence of this the effect of Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code may be different on different members of the same unlawful assembly. Jahiruddin v. Queen Empress, ILR 22 Cal 306 . 24. In Shivalingappa Kallayanappa and Others v. State of Karnataka [1994 Supp (3) SCC 235], this Court opined: 9. From the above discussion it is established by the prosecution that A-1 to A-5 formed into an unlawful assembly variously armed and participated in the occurrence during which two deceased persons died and P.Ws. 2 to 4 received injuries. The next question is whether the common object of the unlawful assembly was to commit the murders. Whether there was such a common object or not, depends upon various factors. A-1 and A-2, though armed with axes, did not use the sharp side but only gave one or two blows on the heads with the butt ends. A-4 and A-5 who were armed with sticks dealt blows only on the legs and or on the hands which were not serious. A-3 did not participate in the attack on any of the two deceased persons. These circumstances show that the common object of the unlawful assembly cannot be said to be to cause murders and at any rate it cannot be said that all the accused shared the same and that they had knowledge that the two deceased persons would be killed and with that knowledge continued to be the members of the unlawful assembly. However, taking all the circumstances of the case into consideration, the common object can be held to be only to cause grievous hurt. A-1 and A-2, however, dealt blows with the butt ends of the axes on the two deceased persons and the injuries on the heads caused by them proved to be fatal. Having given our earnest consideration to this aspect of the case, we are of the view that A-1 and A-2 must be held liable for their individual acts and they would be liable to be punished under Section 302 I.P.C. and A-3 to A-5 under Sections 326/149 I.P.C. so far as the attack on the two deceased persons is concerned. 25. In Bunnilal Chaudhary v. State of Bihar [(2006) 10 SCC 639] , this Court held: 13 We may say here that it is now the settled law that under Section 149 IPC, the liability of other members for the offence committed during the continuance of the occurrence rests upon the fact whether the other persons knew before hand that the offence actually committed was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. Such knowledge may reasonably be collected from the nature of the assembly, arms or behaviour on or before the scene of occurrence. 26. In Sunil Balkrishna Bhoir v. The State of Maharashtra [2007 (7) SCALE 184 ], this Court held: 17. Section 149 per se constitutes a substantive offence. The object of this section is to make clear that an accused person whose case falls within its terms cannot put forward the defence that he did not, with his own hand, commit the offence committed in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly or such as the members of the assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object. Unlawful assembly was formed originally to assault and something might have happened all of a sudden. 27. In a case of this nature, the injuries on the part of the defence witnesses need not detain us as sufferance of such injuries at the hands of the prosecution witnesses had not been believed by both the courts below. We do not see any reason to differ with the said findings. 28. If Phool Chand was armed by the purported order passed by the Superintendent of Police that he should have assistance from the police officers. We fail to see any reason as to why he could not go to the police station and lodge a First Information Report. Why the injured persons did not go to a Government Hospital for getting themselves examined on that date itself. It betrays common sense as to why they had to go to a private doctor and that too on the next date. The accused persons even did not mind setting up a false plea to the effect that modesty of Smt. Shakuntala Devi had been outraged. The testimony of Smt. Shakuntala Devi has been discarded by the courts below. No attempt even had been made before us to assail the correctness of that part of the judgment. 29. For the reasons aforementioned, we do not

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### Explanation:
In a case of this nature, the injuries on the part of the defence witnesses need not detain us as sufferance of such injuries at the hands of the prosecution witnesses had not been believed by both the courts below. We do not see any reason to differ with the said findingsIf Phool Chand was armed by the purported order passed by the Superintendent of Police that he should have assistance from the police officers. We fail to see any reason as to why he could not go to the police station and lodge a First Information Report. Why the injured persons did not go to a Government Hospital for getting themselves examined on that date itself. It betrays common sense as to why they had to go to a private doctor and that too on the next date. The accused persons even did not mind setting up a false plea to the effect that modesty of Smt. Shakuntala Devi had been outraged. The testimony of Smt. Shakuntala Devi has been discarded by the courts below. No attempt even had been made before us to assail the correctness of that part of the judgment
