M/s. Chhotobhai jethabhai Patel &amp; Company Vs. Industrial Court, Maharashtra Nagpur Bench, Nagpur &amp; Others
under the proviso to sub-section (4) of section 42, no agreement is arrived at in respect of an order, matter or change referred to in the said proviso." Clause D of S. 78 (1) was introduced in the Act of Maharashtra by Act. 22, 1965 . Sec. 31 of the Act of 1965 not only introduced Cl. D. but also made changes in paragraphs A and C thereof. The forerunner of Act 22 of 1965 i.e. Bill No. LXVI of 1964, the object of which was to make numerous changes in the Act shows in its Statement of Objects and Reasons that clause 31 of the Bill was meant to "enlarge the powers of the Labour Court under S. 78". According to this clause "The Labour Court is empowered (by paragraph D) to direct temporary withdrawal of any change the legality of which is a matter of issue in any proceedings before it, pending its final decision. The Labour Court was also thereby further empowered "to require an employer to reinstate an employee with full back wages or pay him wages and compensation not exceeding Rs. 2,500/- .... if the employee was dismissed, discharged" etc. 9. The Statement of Objects and Reasons amply demonstrates that by introducing paragraph D in S. 78 (1) the legislature was only seeking to arm the Labour Court with further and more effective powers to grant relief. 10. Under S. 79 (1) proceedings before a Labour Court in respect of disputes falling under clause (a) of paragraph A of sub-s. (1) of Section 78 must be commenced on an application made by any of the parties to the dispute etc. and under sub-s. (2) every application under sub-s. (1) has to be made in the prescribed form and manner. Under S. 84 an appeal lies to the Industrial Court against the decision of a Labour Court in respect of a matter falling under clause (a) or cl. (c) of paragraph A of sub-s. (1) of S. 78 except in the case of lock-out etc. or a decision of such court under paragraph C of sub-s. (1) of the said section. 11. Reading S. 78 as a whole, there is no doubt left in our minds that the legislature wanted the provision to be a comprehensive one. It contains all the powers of the Labour Court in the matter of all disputes mentioned and gives it jurisdiction to punish certain offences under the Act. It does not lay down the procedure for the attraction of such jurisdiction. So far as disputes are concerned the procedure is as laid down in S. 79. 12. It will be noted that no mention is made in S. 84 of paragraph D of S. 78 (1) but inasmuch as orders of dismissal, discharge, removal, retrenchment, termination of service or suspension of an employee would come under s. 78 (1) paragraph A, the legislature felt it unnecessary to make any mention of an order under paragraph D in S. 84 Paragraph D, so far as we can see, is not referred to anywhere else in the Act. 13. The question therefore narrows down to this i.e. whether the legislature by inserting paragraph D in S. 78 (1)intended to chalk out a wholly different course of action to that prescribed in Chapter VIII dealing with changes. In our view, there is nothing in the Act which warrants such a conclusion. The scheme of Chapter VIII seems to be that in regard to any "change" in an industrial matter there must be compliance with the provisions of that Chapter. In other words, effort must first be made by the employer intending to effect any change in respect of matters covered by S,. 42 (1) or an employee desiring a change in respect of any order passed by the employer under standing orders which would of necessity include an order of dismissal, to see whether it was possible to come to any agreement and an application to the labour court could only be resorted to after efforts had been made to settle the dispute and no agreement had been arrived at. 14. The scheme of S. 78 (1) seems to be that a Labour Court is to have power to decide all the disputes covered by paragraph A, Paragraph B thereof gives the Labour Court the power to try offences punishable under the Act and cognizance of such offences can only be taken under S. 82. Paragraphs C and D set out what relief the Labour Courts are empowered to give including directions as may be found necessary in that behalf. As already noted, the Statement of Objects and Reasons of clause 31 of the bill which later resulted in Act 22 of 1965, shows that the underlying idea was to enlarge the powers of the Labour Court. The Legislature nowhere intended to make a complete departure from the procedure to be adopted when powers under S. 78 (1) D were to be exercised. 15. Rule 55 of the Bombay, Industrial Relations Rules, 1947 shows how an application is to be made and the period within which it is to be made. 16. It must be held that a person who is dismissed would be an employee within the meaning of S. 3 (13) of the Act and we can see no valid reason for differentiating the case of a dismissed employee from one who complains of some other change. As the scheme of the Act is that disputes should be settled as far as possible and primarily through conciliation and agreement, it does not stand to reasons that an employee should be able to side-step all this by a direct reference to the Labour Court. A Labour Court is a creature of the statute and it can only exercise such jurisdiction as the statute confers on it. If there are certain pre-conditions to the exercise of its jurisdiction, it must refuse to entertain any such application unless such pre-conditions are first complied with.
1[ds]In our view, there is nothing in the Act which warrants such a conclusion. The scheme of Chapter VIII seems to be that in regard to any "change" in an industrial matter there must be compliance with the provisions of that Chapter. In other words, effort must first be made by the employer intending to effect any change in respect of matters covered by S,. 42 (1) or an employee desiring a change in respect of any order passed by the employer under standing orders which would of necessity include an order of dismissal, to see whether it was possible to come to any agreement and an application to the labour court could only be resorted to after efforts had been made to settle the dispute and no agreement had been arrived at14. The scheme of S. 78 (1) seems to be that a Labour Court is to have power to decide all the disputes covered by paragraph A, Paragraph B thereof gives the Labour Court the power to try offences punishable under the Act and cognizance of such offences can only be taken under S. 82. Paragraphs C and D set out what relief the Labour Courts are empowered to give including directions as may be found necessary in that behalf. As already noted, the Statement of Objects and Reasons of clause 31 of the bill which later resulted in Act 22 of 1965, shows that the underlying idea was to enlarge the powers of the Labour Court. The Legislature nowhere intended to make a complete departure from the procedure to be adopted when powers under S. 78 (1) D were to be exercised15. Rule 55 of the Bombay, Industrial Relations Rules, 1947 shows how an application is to be made and the period within which it is to be made16. It must be held that a person who is dismissed would be an employee within the meaning of S. 3 (13) of the Act and we can see no valid reason for differentiating the case of a dismissed employee from one who complains of some other change. As the scheme of the Act is that disputes should be settled as far as possible and primarily through conciliation and agreement, it does not stand to reasons that an employee should be able to side-step all this by a direct reference to the Labour Court. A Labour Court is a creature of the statute and it can only exercise such jurisdiction as the statute confers on it. If there are certain pre-conditions to the exercise of its jurisdiction, it must refuse to entertain any such application unless such pre-conditions are first complied with.
### Instruction:
Decide if the appeal in the case proceeding is more likely to be successful (1) or unsuccessful (0), and then justify your decision by focusing on essential sentences in the document.

### Input:
under the proviso to sub-section (4) of section 42, no agreement is arrived at in respect of an order, matter or change referred to in the said proviso." Clause D of S. 78 (1) was introduced in the Act of Maharashtra by Act. 22, 1965 . Sec. 31 of the Act of 1965 not only introduced Cl. D. but also made changes in paragraphs A and C thereof. The forerunner of Act 22 of 1965 i.e. Bill No. LXVI of 1964, the object of which was to make numerous changes in the Act shows in its Statement of Objects and Reasons that clause 31 of the Bill was meant to "enlarge the powers of the Labour Court under S. 78". According to this clause "The Labour Court is empowered (by paragraph D) to direct temporary withdrawal of any change the legality of which is a matter of issue in any proceedings before it, pending its final decision. The Labour Court was also thereby further empowered "to require an employer to reinstate an employee with full back wages or pay him wages and compensation not exceeding Rs. 2,500/- .... if the employee was dismissed, discharged" etc. 9. The Statement of Objects and Reasons amply demonstrates that by introducing paragraph D in S. 78 (1) the legislature was only seeking to arm the Labour Court with further and more effective powers to grant relief. 10. Under S. 79 (1) proceedings before a Labour Court in respect of disputes falling under clause (a) of paragraph A of sub-s. (1) of Section 78 must be commenced on an application made by any of the parties to the dispute etc. and under sub-s. (2) every application under sub-s. (1) has to be made in the prescribed form and manner. Under S. 84 an appeal lies to the Industrial Court against the decision of a Labour Court in respect of a matter falling under clause (a) or cl. (c) of paragraph A of sub-s. (1) of S. 78 except in the case of lock-out etc. or a decision of such court under paragraph C of sub-s. (1) of the said section. 11. Reading S. 78 as a whole, there is no doubt left in our minds that the legislature wanted the provision to be a comprehensive one. It contains all the powers of the Labour Court in the matter of all disputes mentioned and gives it jurisdiction to punish certain offences under the Act. It does not lay down the procedure for the attraction of such jurisdiction. So far as disputes are concerned the procedure is as laid down in S. 79. 12. It will be noted that no mention is made in S. 84 of paragraph D of S. 78 (1) but inasmuch as orders of dismissal, discharge, removal, retrenchment, termination of service or suspension of an employee would come under s. 78 (1) paragraph A, the legislature felt it unnecessary to make any mention of an order under paragraph D in S. 84 Paragraph D, so far as we can see, is not referred to anywhere else in the Act. 13. The question therefore narrows down to this i.e. whether the legislature by inserting paragraph D in S. 78 (1)intended to chalk out a wholly different course of action to that prescribed in Chapter VIII dealing with changes. In our view, there is nothing in the Act which warrants such a conclusion. The scheme of Chapter VIII seems to be that in regard to any "change" in an industrial matter there must be compliance with the provisions of that Chapter. In other words, effort must first be made by the employer intending to effect any change in respect of matters covered by S,. 42 (1) or an employee desiring a change in respect of any order passed by the employer under standing orders which would of necessity include an order of dismissal, to see whether it was possible to come to any agreement and an application to the labour court could only be resorted to after efforts had been made to settle the dispute and no agreement had been arrived at. 14. The scheme of S. 78 (1) seems to be that a Labour Court is to have power to decide all the disputes covered by paragraph A, Paragraph B thereof gives the Labour Court the power to try offences punishable under the Act and cognizance of such offences can only be taken under S. 82. Paragraphs C and D set out what relief the Labour Courts are empowered to give including directions as may be found necessary in that behalf. As already noted, the Statement of Objects and Reasons of clause 31 of the bill which later resulted in Act 22 of 1965, shows that the underlying idea was to enlarge the powers of the Labour Court. The Legislature nowhere intended to make a complete departure from the procedure to be adopted when powers under S. 78 (1) D were to be exercised. 15. Rule 55 of the Bombay, Industrial Relations Rules, 1947 shows how an application is to be made and the period within which it is to be made. 16. It must be held that a person who is dismissed would be an employee within the meaning of S. 3 (13) of the Act and we can see no valid reason for differentiating the case of a dismissed employee from one who complains of some other change. As the scheme of the Act is that disputes should be settled as far as possible and primarily through conciliation and agreement, it does not stand to reasons that an employee should be able to side-step all this by a direct reference to the Labour Court. A Labour Court is a creature of the statute and it can only exercise such jurisdiction as the statute confers on it. If there are certain pre-conditions to the exercise of its jurisdiction, it must refuse to entertain any such application unless such pre-conditions are first complied with.

### Response:
1

### Explanation:
In our view, there is nothing in the Act which warrants such a conclusion. The scheme of Chapter VIII seems to be that in regard to any "change" in an industrial matter there must be compliance with the provisions of that Chapter. In other words, effort must first be made by the employer intending to effect any change in respect of matters covered by S,. 42 (1) or an employee desiring a change in respect of any order passed by the employer under standing orders which would of necessity include an order of dismissal, to see whether it was possible to come to any agreement and an application to the labour court could only be resorted to after efforts had been made to settle the dispute and no agreement had been arrived at14. The scheme of S. 78 (1) seems to be that a Labour Court is to have power to decide all the disputes covered by paragraph A, Paragraph B thereof gives the Labour Court the power to try offences punishable under the Act and cognizance of such offences can only be taken under S. 82. Paragraphs C and D set out what relief the Labour Courts are empowered to give including directions as may be found necessary in that behalf. As already noted, the Statement of Objects and Reasons of clause 31 of the bill which later resulted in Act 22 of 1965, shows that the underlying idea was to enlarge the powers of the Labour Court. The Legislature nowhere intended to make a complete departure from the procedure to be adopted when powers under S. 78 (1) D were to be exercised15. Rule 55 of the Bombay, Industrial Relations Rules, 1947 shows how an application is to be made and the period within which it is to be made16. It must be held that a person who is dismissed would be an employee within the meaning of S. 3 (13) of the Act and we can see no valid reason for differentiating the case of a dismissed employee from one who complains of some other change. As the scheme of the Act is that disputes should be settled as far as possible and primarily through conciliation and agreement, it does not stand to reasons that an employee should be able to side-step all this by a direct reference to the Labour Court. A Labour Court is a creature of the statute and it can only exercise such jurisdiction as the statute confers on it. If there are certain pre-conditions to the exercise of its jurisdiction, it must refuse to entertain any such application unless such pre-conditions are first complied with.
