Karam Singh Sobti &amp; Anr Vs. Shri Pratap Chand &amp; Anr
the substantive provision contained in sub-s. (2) and the only way of harmonising the two is to accept the view which the Punjab High Court has accepted, namely, that the words "shall have regard to the provisions of this Act merely mean that "where the new Act has slightly modified or clarified the previous provisions, these modifications and clarifications should be applied. We see no other way of harmonising sub-s. (2) with the first proviso thereto.11. A similar expression occurring in S. 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act (LIV of 1948) was considered by this court in the Mysore State Electricity Board v. Bangalore Wollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd., C. A. Nos. 629 to 632 of 1961 D/- 15-11-1962 unreported: (now reported in AIR 1963 SC 1128 ). This court referred to the decision of the Privy Council in Ryots of Garabandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi, 70 Ind App 129: (AIR 1943 PC 164) and expressed agreement with the view of the Privy Council that the expression "have regard to or "having regard to has no more definite or technical meaning than that of ordinary usage, and only required that the provisions to which regard must be had should be taken into consideration. If the expression "have regard to in the first proviso to sub-s. (2) means that the provisions of the Control Act of 1958 shall apply to all such suits or proceedings as are referred to in sub-s. (2) except in the matter of jurisdiction of the civil court, then in reality the substantive provision of sub-s. (2) will be denuded of its full effect for all practical purposes. We do not think that it would be right to read the first proviso of sub-s. (2) in that way. It was argued before us that the first proviso related only to two matters, (a) fixation of standard rent and (b) eviction of a tenant, and the intention was that in these two matters only the provisions of the Control Act of 1958 would apply and not in others. If that was the intention, nothing would have been easier than to say in sub-s. (2) - "Notwithstanding such repeal, all suits and other proceedings under the said Act except those for fixation of standard rent and eviction of a tenant etc. Sub-s. (2) does not, however, say so, and if the first proviso is to be interpreted in the manner suggested by the appellant, the provisions as to jurisdiction in the new Act would affect the power of the civil court to pass a decree for eviction.12. We now turn to the decisions of the Punjab High Court. In Shri Krishna Aggarwal v. Satya Dev, 61 Pun LR 574 : (AIR 1959 Punj 501) it was held that the first proviso to sub-s. (2) of S. 57 was directory in character and not mandatory; therefore, the courts and authorities concerned had a discretion conferred on them to take into consideration the provisions of the new Act when it was considered necessary in a proper case and in the interest of justice. We do not wish, however, to base our decision on these grounds. We think that the proper way of reading sub-s. (2) and the first proviso thereto is to harmonise both in the best way possible. In Bulaqi Das Madan Mohan v. Ram Sarup, 62 Pun LR 231 the view expressed was that the proviso must have some meaning and force and the proviso intended that where the old provisions had been repeated with modifications, the old Act should be interpreted in the light of the modifications so long as they did not involve creating any rights and liabilities. A similar view was expressed by the same Judge in Shri Bimal Parshad Jain v. Shri Niadaramal, 62 Pun LR 664. The question was considered by a Division Bench in Shri Jhabar Mal Chokhani v. Shri Jinendra Pershad, 65 Pun LR 469. At pages 474 and 475 of the report Dulat, J. who spoke for the Bench said :"It would thus appear that apart from Gosain, J. the other learned Judges of this court have generally agreed that the proviso to s. 57, sub-section (2), does not demand that a suit for the eviction of a tenant filed under the previous Act of 1952 must be governed entirely by the provisions of the new Act but that, on the other hand, the provisions applicable continue to be the provisions of the old Act with this addition that, where the new Act has slightly modified or clarified the previous provisions, those modifications and clarifications should be applied, but, where entirely new rights and new liabilities have been created, the new provisions must not be allowed to override the provisions of the previous Act, and nearly all the cases have been decided on that basis.We agree with the view expressed by Dulat J. We also agree with the High Court that if the first proviso to sub-s. (2) of S. 57 is interpreted in the way contended for by the appellant here, it would really be giving effect to the provisions of the Control Act of 1958 retrospectively, though sub-s. (2) of S. 57 states in clear terms that all suits and proceedings pending at the commencement of the new Act will be dealt in accordance with the provisions of the old Act. This is really putting the same argument that the proviso must be read harmoniously with the substantive provision in another way.13. For the reasons given above we have come to the conclusion that in the present case the respondent-landlord is entitled to the benefit of cl. (c), sub-cl. (i), of the proviso to S. 13(1) of the Control Act of 1952 and the first proviso to sub-s. (2) of S. 57 of the Control Act of 1958 does not stand in his way. He is therefore, entitled to succeed, as the appellant has failed to make out any acquiescence by the landlord to the sub-letting in question.
1[ds]Two questions arise out of S. 57 . It is clear beyond dispute that had(2) of S.57 stood by itself, then the present case would be governed by the provisions of the Control Act of 1952, assuming that an application in revision is a proceeding within the meaning of theThere are however two provisos to(2) of S.57. It is the interpretation of these two provisos which had caused much difficulty in the present case.however, we decide against the appellant on the first question and hold that the application in revision, assuming it to be a proceeding within the meaning of(2), must be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Control Act of 1952, then the second question need not be decided by us in the present case.With the details of these provisions we are not concerned in the present case except to point out that the Control Act of 1958 made radical changes in the matter of eviction of tenants on the ground ofIn the matter ofthe relevant date was taken as June 9, 1952 the date on which the Control Act of 1952 came into force, and a distinction was made betweenbefore that date andafter that date. Abefore June 9, 1952 was treated as lawfulant was in occupation of the premises at the commencement of the Control Act of 1958; but aafter June 9, 1952 without the previous consent in writing of the landlord was treated as unlawful for the purposes of the Control Act, of 1958.10. Let us now consider S. 57, of the Control Act of 1958 against the background of the scheme of the two Control Acts, as stated above.The first sub-section of S. 57 repeals the Control Act of 1952 in so far as it is applicable to the Union territory of Delhi. If the repeal stood by itself the provisions of the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) would have applied with regard to the effect of the repeal and the repeal would not affect the previous operation of any enactment repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder or affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. The provisions of the General Clauses Act will not, however, apply where a different intention appears from the repealing enactment. Such an intention is clear from sub-s. (2) of S. 57 which contains the saving clause. It states in express terms that notwithstanding the repeal of the Control Act of 1952; all suits and proceedings under the Control Act of 1952 pending before any court or other authority at the commencement of the Control Act of 1958, shall be continued and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Control Act of 1952, as if the Control Act of 1952 had continued in force and the Control Act of 1958 had not been passed. Nothing can be more emphatic in the matter of a saving clause than what is contained in sub-s. (2) of S. 57. We had said earlier that had sub-s. (2) of S. 57 stood by itself without the provisos, then the incontestable position would have been that the present case would be governed by the provisions of the Control Act offirst proviso states inter alia that in the matter of eviction of a tenant from any premises to which S. 54 does not apply, the court or other authority shall have regard to the provisions of the Control Act of 1958. Section 54 need not be considered by us as it merely saves the operation of certain enactments which do not apply to the premises under ourare unable to agree that such is the meaning of the first proviso. We think that the first proviso must be read harmoniously with the substantive provision contained in sub-s. (2) and the only way of harmonising the two is to accept the view which the Punjab High Court has accepted, namely, that the words "shall have regard to the provisions of this Act merely mean that "where the new Act has slightly modified or clarified the previous provisions, these modifications and clarifications should be applied. We see no other way of harmonising sub-s. (2) with the first proviso thereto.We do not think that it would be right to read the first proviso of sub-s. (2) in that way. It was argued before us that the first proviso related only to two matters, (a) fixation of standard rent and (b) eviction of a tenant, and the intention was that in these two matters only the provisions of the Control Act of 1958 would apply and not in others. If that was the intention, nothing would have been easier than to say in sub-s. (2) - "Notwithstanding such repeal, all suits and other proceedings under the said Act except those for fixation of standard rent and eviction of a tenant etc. Sub-s. (2) does not, however, say so, and if the first proviso is to be interpreted in the manner suggested by the appellant, the provisions as to jurisdiction in the new Act would affect the power of the civil court to pass a decree for eviction.We do not wish, however, to base our decision on these grounds. We think that the proper way of reading sub-s. (2) and the first proviso thereto is to harmonise both in the best way possible. In Bulaqi Das Madan Mohan v. Ram Sarup, 62 Pun LR 231 the view expressed was that the proviso must have some meaning and force and the proviso intended that where the old provisions had been repeated with modifications, the old Act should be interpreted in the light of the modifications so long as they did not involve creating any rights and liabilities. A similar view was expressed by the same Judge in Shri Bimal Parshad Jain v. Shri Niadaramal, 62 Pun LR 664. The question was considered by a Division Bench in Shri Jhabar Mal Chokhani v. Shri Jinendra Pershad, 65 Pun LRagree with the view expressed by Dulat J. We also agree with the High Court that if the first proviso to sub-s. (2) of S. 57 is interpreted in the way contended for by the appellant here, it would really be giving effect to the provisions of the Control Act of 1958 retrospectively, though sub-s. (2) of S. 57 states in clear terms that all suits and proceedings pending at the commencement of the new Act will be dealt in accordance with the provisions of the old Act. This is really putting the same argument that the proviso must be read harmoniously with the substantive provision in another way.13. For the reasons given above we have come to the conclusion that in the present case the respondent-landlord is entitled to the benefit of cl. (c), sub-cl. (i), of the proviso to S. 13(1) of the Control Act of 1952 and the first proviso to sub-s. (2) of S. 57 of the Control Act of 1958 does not stand in his way. He is therefore, entitled to succeed, as the appellant has failed to make out any acquiescence by the landlord to the sub-letting in question.
### Instruction:
Speculate on the likely judgment (yes (1) or no (0) to the appeal) and then delve into the case proceeding to elucidate your prediction, focusing on critical sentences.

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the substantive provision contained in sub-s. (2) and the only way of harmonising the two is to accept the view which the Punjab High Court has accepted, namely, that the words "shall have regard to the provisions of this Act merely mean that "where the new Act has slightly modified or clarified the previous provisions, these modifications and clarifications should be applied. We see no other way of harmonising sub-s. (2) with the first proviso thereto.11. A similar expression occurring in S. 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act (LIV of 1948) was considered by this court in the Mysore State Electricity Board v. Bangalore Wollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd., C. A. Nos. 629 to 632 of 1961 D/- 15-11-1962 unreported: (now reported in AIR 1963 SC 1128 ). This court referred to the decision of the Privy Council in Ryots of Garabandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi, 70 Ind App 129: (AIR 1943 PC 164) and expressed agreement with the view of the Privy Council that the expression "have regard to or "having regard to has no more definite or technical meaning than that of ordinary usage, and only required that the provisions to which regard must be had should be taken into consideration. If the expression "have regard to in the first proviso to sub-s. (2) means that the provisions of the Control Act of 1958 shall apply to all such suits or proceedings as are referred to in sub-s. (2) except in the matter of jurisdiction of the civil court, then in reality the substantive provision of sub-s. (2) will be denuded of its full effect for all practical purposes. We do not think that it would be right to read the first proviso of sub-s. (2) in that way. It was argued before us that the first proviso related only to two matters, (a) fixation of standard rent and (b) eviction of a tenant, and the intention was that in these two matters only the provisions of the Control Act of 1958 would apply and not in others. If that was the intention, nothing would have been easier than to say in sub-s. (2) - "Notwithstanding such repeal, all suits and other proceedings under the said Act except those for fixation of standard rent and eviction of a tenant etc. Sub-s. (2) does not, however, say so, and if the first proviso is to be interpreted in the manner suggested by the appellant, the provisions as to jurisdiction in the new Act would affect the power of the civil court to pass a decree for eviction.12. We now turn to the decisions of the Punjab High Court. In Shri Krishna Aggarwal v. Satya Dev, 61 Pun LR 574 : (AIR 1959 Punj 501) it was held that the first proviso to sub-s. (2) of S. 57 was directory in character and not mandatory; therefore, the courts and authorities concerned had a discretion conferred on them to take into consideration the provisions of the new Act when it was considered necessary in a proper case and in the interest of justice. We do not wish, however, to base our decision on these grounds. We think that the proper way of reading sub-s. (2) and the first proviso thereto is to harmonise both in the best way possible. In Bulaqi Das Madan Mohan v. Ram Sarup, 62 Pun LR 231 the view expressed was that the proviso must have some meaning and force and the proviso intended that where the old provisions had been repeated with modifications, the old Act should be interpreted in the light of the modifications so long as they did not involve creating any rights and liabilities. A similar view was expressed by the same Judge in Shri Bimal Parshad Jain v. Shri Niadaramal, 62 Pun LR 664. The question was considered by a Division Bench in Shri Jhabar Mal Chokhani v. Shri Jinendra Pershad, 65 Pun LR 469. At pages 474 and 475 of the report Dulat, J. who spoke for the Bench said :"It would thus appear that apart from Gosain, J. the other learned Judges of this court have generally agreed that the proviso to s. 57, sub-section (2), does not demand that a suit for the eviction of a tenant filed under the previous Act of 1952 must be governed entirely by the provisions of the new Act but that, on the other hand, the provisions applicable continue to be the provisions of the old Act with this addition that, where the new Act has slightly modified or clarified the previous provisions, those modifications and clarifications should be applied, but, where entirely new rights and new liabilities have been created, the new provisions must not be allowed to override the provisions of the previous Act, and nearly all the cases have been decided on that basis.We agree with the view expressed by Dulat J. We also agree with the High Court that if the first proviso to sub-s. (2) of S. 57 is interpreted in the way contended for by the appellant here, it would really be giving effect to the provisions of the Control Act of 1958 retrospectively, though sub-s. (2) of S. 57 states in clear terms that all suits and proceedings pending at the commencement of the new Act will be dealt in accordance with the provisions of the old Act. This is really putting the same argument that the proviso must be read harmoniously with the substantive provision in another way.13. For the reasons given above we have come to the conclusion that in the present case the respondent-landlord is entitled to the benefit of cl. (c), sub-cl. (i), of the proviso to S. 13(1) of the Control Act of 1952 and the first proviso to sub-s. (2) of S. 57 of the Control Act of 1958 does not stand in his way. He is therefore, entitled to succeed, as the appellant has failed to make out any acquiescence by the landlord to the sub-letting in question.

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### Explanation:
betweenbefore that date andafter that date. Abefore June 9, 1952 was treated as lawfulant was in occupation of the premises at the commencement of the Control Act of 1958; but aafter June 9, 1952 without the previous consent in writing of the landlord was treated as unlawful for the purposes of the Control Act, of 1958.10. Let us now consider S. 57, of the Control Act of 1958 against the background of the scheme of the two Control Acts, as stated above.The first sub-section of S. 57 repeals the Control Act of 1952 in so far as it is applicable to the Union territory of Delhi. If the repeal stood by itself the provisions of the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) would have applied with regard to the effect of the repeal and the repeal would not affect the previous operation of any enactment repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder or affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. The provisions of the General Clauses Act will not, however, apply where a different intention appears from the repealing enactment. Such an intention is clear from sub-s. (2) of S. 57 which contains the saving clause. It states in express terms that notwithstanding the repeal of the Control Act of 1952; all suits and proceedings under the Control Act of 1952 pending before any court or other authority at the commencement of the Control Act of 1958, shall be continued and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Control Act of 1952, as if the Control Act of 1952 had continued in force and the Control Act of 1958 had not been passed. Nothing can be more emphatic in the matter of a saving clause than what is contained in sub-s. (2) of S. 57. We had said earlier that had sub-s. (2) of S. 57 stood by itself without the provisos, then the incontestable position would have been that the present case would be governed by the provisions of the Control Act offirst proviso states inter alia that in the matter of eviction of a tenant from any premises to which S. 54 does not apply, the court or other authority shall have regard to the provisions of the Control Act of 1958. Section 54 need not be considered by us as it merely saves the operation of certain enactments which do not apply to the premises under ourare unable to agree that such is the meaning of the first proviso. We think that the first proviso must be read harmoniously with the substantive provision contained in sub-s. (2) and the only way of harmonising the two is to accept the view which the Punjab High Court has accepted, namely, that the words "shall have regard to the provisions of this Act merely mean that "where the new Act has slightly modified or clarified the previous provisions, these modifications and clarifications should be applied. We see no other way of harmonising sub-s. (2) with the first proviso thereto.We do not think that it would be right to read the first proviso of sub-s. (2) in that way. It was argued before us that the first proviso related only to two matters, (a) fixation of standard rent and (b) eviction of a tenant, and the intention was that in these two matters only the provisions of the Control Act of 1958 would apply and not in others. If that was the intention, nothing would have been easier than to say in sub-s. (2) - "Notwithstanding such repeal, all suits and other proceedings under the said Act except those for fixation of standard rent and eviction of a tenant etc. Sub-s. (2) does not, however, say so, and if the first proviso is to be interpreted in the manner suggested by the appellant, the provisions as to jurisdiction in the new Act would affect the power of the civil court to pass a decree for eviction.We do not wish, however, to base our decision on these grounds. We think that the proper way of reading sub-s. (2) and the first proviso thereto is to harmonise both in the best way possible. In Bulaqi Das Madan Mohan v. Ram Sarup, 62 Pun LR 231 the view expressed was that the proviso must have some meaning and force and the proviso intended that where the old provisions had been repeated with modifications, the old Act should be interpreted in the light of the modifications so long as they did not involve creating any rights and liabilities. A similar view was expressed by the same Judge in Shri Bimal Parshad Jain v. Shri Niadaramal, 62 Pun LR 664. The question was considered by a Division Bench in Shri Jhabar Mal Chokhani v. Shri Jinendra Pershad, 65 Pun LRagree with the view expressed by Dulat J. We also agree with the High Court that if the first proviso to sub-s. (2) of S. 57 is interpreted in the way contended for by the appellant here, it would really be giving effect to the provisions of the Control Act of 1958 retrospectively, though sub-s. (2) of S. 57 states in clear terms that all suits and proceedings pending at the commencement of the new Act will be dealt in accordance with the provisions of the old Act. This is really putting the same argument that the proviso must be read harmoniously with the substantive provision in another way.13. For the reasons given above we have come to the conclusion that in the present case the respondent-landlord is entitled to the benefit of cl. (c), sub-cl. (i), of the proviso to S. 13(1) of the Control Act of 1952 and the first proviso to sub-s. (2) of S. 57 of the Control Act of 1958 does not stand in his way. He is therefore, entitled to succeed, as the appellant has failed to make out any acquiescence by the landlord to the sub-letting in question.
