Sita Ram Vs. Balbir @ Bali
that there is no jurisdiction to commit him for contempt as distinguished from a breach of the injunction, which has a technical meaning. A motion to commit a man for breach of an injunction, which is technically wrong unless he is bound by the injunction, is one thing; and a motion to commit a man for contempt of court, not because he is bound by the injunction by being party to the cause, but because he is conducting himself so as to obstruct the course of justice, is another and a totally different thing. The difference is very marked. In the one case the party who is bound by the injunction is proceeded against for the purpose of enforcing the Order of the Court for the benefit of the person who got it. In the other case, the Court will not allow its process to be set at naught and treated with contempt. B] In Z Ltd. v. A, (1982) 1 All ER 556 the plaintiff had obtained injunction against certain defendants and the assets of one such defendant against whom the injunction was granted, were held by a bank. The bank was served with a copy of the injunction but the concerned defendant had not yet been served. While considering the question whether any disposal of assets belonging to the defendant by the bank would make it liable for committing contempt of Court, it was stated as under: I think that the following propositions may be stated as to the consequences which ensue when there are acts or omissions which are contrary to the terms of injunction. (1) The person against whom the Order is made will be liable for contempt of Court if he acts in breach of the Order after having notice of it. (2) A third party will also be liable if he knowingly assists in the breach, that is to say if knowing the terms of the injunction he willfully assists the person to whom it was directed to disobey it. This will be so whether or not the person enjoined has had notice of the injunction... I will give my reasons for the second proposition and take first the question of prior notice to the defendant. It was argued that the liability of the third person arose because he was treated as aiding and abetting the defendant (i.e. was an accessory) and as the defendant could himself not be in breach unless he had notice it followed that there was no offence to which the third party could be an accessory. In my opinion this argument misunderstands the true nature of the liability of the third party. He is liable for contempt of court committed by himself. It is true that his conduct may very often be seen as possessing a dual character of contempt of court by himself and aiding and abetting the contempt by another, but the conduct will always amount to contempt by himself. It will be conduct which knowingly interferes with the administration of justice by causing the Order of the court to be thwarted. C] The extent of liability of third party in such actions was considered by the House of Lords in Attorney General v. Times Newspapers Ltd. and another, (1991) 2 All ER 398. In that case the Attorney General had brought action against two newspapers seeking permanent injunction restraining them from publishing material from a book written by a person who was formerly a member of the security service and by terms of his employment was bound by confidentiality which would stand breached if his memoirs were published. While the interlocutory injunctions restraining publication of the material pending trial of such action was granted against those two newspapers, three other newspapers published extensive extracts and summaries of the book following which proceedings for criminal contempt against them were brought by the Attorney General. At the trial of those proceedings those three other newspapers were held to be guilty of criminal contempt. Lord Brandon of Oakbrook concluded as under: ..................The claims of the Attorney General in the confidentiality actions were for permanent injunctions restraining the defendants from publishing what may conveniently be called Spycatcher material. The purpose of the Millet injunctions was to prevent the publication of any such material pending the trial of the confidentiality actions. The consequence of the publication of Spycatcher material by the publishers and editor of the Sunday Times before the trial of the confidentiality actions was to nullify, in part at least, the purpose of such trial because it put into the public domain part of the material which it was claimed by the Attorney General in the confidentiality actions ought to remain confidential. It follows that the conduct of the publishers and editor of the Sunday Times constituted the actus reus of impeding or interfering with the administation of justice by the court in the confidentiality actions. D] In a separate concurring opinion Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle stated as under: I turn to consider whether there is any reason why established principle should not be applied to the situation in this case. I do not accept the propostion that to apply established principles in the foregoing circumstances would effectively be to convert every injuction from an order in personam to an order contra mundum. That proposition ignores the distinction between the breach of an order by the person named therein and interference with the course of justice resulting from a frustration of the order by the third party. 25. In our view, the Medical Professionals namely Dr. Munish Prabhakar and Dr. K.S. Sachdev extended medical asylum to the respondent without there being any reason or medical condition justifying prolonged admission of the respondent as an indoor patient as a cover to defeat the Orders passed by this Court and the Trial Court, as stated above and thereby aided and assisted the respondent in violating the Order of this Court. By such conduct these Medical Professionals have obstructed administration of justice.
1[ds]21. The explanation offered by Dr. Munish Prabhakar and Dr. Sachdev that the respondent trapped the hospital and by non-payment of the bills kept prolonging his stay in the hospital does not inspire confidence at all. If the hospital was really a victim of the machinations of the respondent, at the first opportunity i.e. when requisition was made by the police on 13.02.2015, the hospital would have responded immediately. The requisition dated 13.02.2015 had informed the hospital that respondent was a proclaimed offender and that his custody was required. This requisition was close on the heels of the medical certificate dated 07.02.2015 and if that certificate was a correct one, the time was ripe for discharge of the respondent. However, as stated by Shashank Anand in his affidavit dated 02.07.2015, the hospital refused to discharge the respondent. The theory that the hospital was trapped by the designs of the respondent is a mere eye-wash and we reject the same. Thus, the inescapable conclusion is that the hospital extended protection and asylum to the respondent to defeat the Order passed by this Court as well as those passed by the Trial Court and thereby obstructed administration of justice22. Dr. Munish Prabhakar has been Medical Director of the hospital and as submitted by learned Senior Counsel on his behalf, he receives salary and some percentage of consultation charges recovered from the patients. Dr. K.S. Sachdev, on the other hand, has been the Managing Director of the Company which owns and runs said hospital. We have found that the continued admission for such a long period as indoor patient was not justifiable for any reason or medical condition of the respondent. Both these medical professionals are responsible for such prolonged admission which was actuated by only one reason which was to extend medical asylum to the respondent as a cover to defeat the orders passed by this Court and the Trial Court. In this process, these medical professionals not only helped the respondent in violating the Order of this court but they also obstructed administration of justice25. In our view, the Medical Professionals namely Dr. Munish Prabhakar and Dr. K.S. Sachdev extended medical asylum to the respondent without there being any reason or medical condition justifying prolonged admission of the respondent as an indoor patient as a cover to defeat the Orders passed by this Court and the Trial Court, as stated above and thereby aided and assisted the respondent in violating the Order of this Court. By such conduct these Medical Professionals have obstructed administration of justice
### Instruction:
Evaluate the case proceeding to forecast the court's decision (1 for yes, 0 for no), and elucidate the reasoning behind this prediction with important textual evidence from the case.

### Input:
that there is no jurisdiction to commit him for contempt as distinguished from a breach of the injunction, which has a technical meaning. A motion to commit a man for breach of an injunction, which is technically wrong unless he is bound by the injunction, is one thing; and a motion to commit a man for contempt of court, not because he is bound by the injunction by being party to the cause, but because he is conducting himself so as to obstruct the course of justice, is another and a totally different thing. The difference is very marked. In the one case the party who is bound by the injunction is proceeded against for the purpose of enforcing the Order of the Court for the benefit of the person who got it. In the other case, the Court will not allow its process to be set at naught and treated with contempt. B] In Z Ltd. v. A, (1982) 1 All ER 556 the plaintiff had obtained injunction against certain defendants and the assets of one such defendant against whom the injunction was granted, were held by a bank. The bank was served with a copy of the injunction but the concerned defendant had not yet been served. While considering the question whether any disposal of assets belonging to the defendant by the bank would make it liable for committing contempt of Court, it was stated as under: I think that the following propositions may be stated as to the consequences which ensue when there are acts or omissions which are contrary to the terms of injunction. (1) The person against whom the Order is made will be liable for contempt of Court if he acts in breach of the Order after having notice of it. (2) A third party will also be liable if he knowingly assists in the breach, that is to say if knowing the terms of the injunction he willfully assists the person to whom it was directed to disobey it. This will be so whether or not the person enjoined has had notice of the injunction... I will give my reasons for the second proposition and take first the question of prior notice to the defendant. It was argued that the liability of the third person arose because he was treated as aiding and abetting the defendant (i.e. was an accessory) and as the defendant could himself not be in breach unless he had notice it followed that there was no offence to which the third party could be an accessory. In my opinion this argument misunderstands the true nature of the liability of the third party. He is liable for contempt of court committed by himself. It is true that his conduct may very often be seen as possessing a dual character of contempt of court by himself and aiding and abetting the contempt by another, but the conduct will always amount to contempt by himself. It will be conduct which knowingly interferes with the administration of justice by causing the Order of the court to be thwarted. C] The extent of liability of third party in such actions was considered by the House of Lords in Attorney General v. Times Newspapers Ltd. and another, (1991) 2 All ER 398. In that case the Attorney General had brought action against two newspapers seeking permanent injunction restraining them from publishing material from a book written by a person who was formerly a member of the security service and by terms of his employment was bound by confidentiality which would stand breached if his memoirs were published. While the interlocutory injunctions restraining publication of the material pending trial of such action was granted against those two newspapers, three other newspapers published extensive extracts and summaries of the book following which proceedings for criminal contempt against them were brought by the Attorney General. At the trial of those proceedings those three other newspapers were held to be guilty of criminal contempt. Lord Brandon of Oakbrook concluded as under: ..................The claims of the Attorney General in the confidentiality actions were for permanent injunctions restraining the defendants from publishing what may conveniently be called Spycatcher material. The purpose of the Millet injunctions was to prevent the publication of any such material pending the trial of the confidentiality actions. The consequence of the publication of Spycatcher material by the publishers and editor of the Sunday Times before the trial of the confidentiality actions was to nullify, in part at least, the purpose of such trial because it put into the public domain part of the material which it was claimed by the Attorney General in the confidentiality actions ought to remain confidential. It follows that the conduct of the publishers and editor of the Sunday Times constituted the actus reus of impeding or interfering with the administation of justice by the court in the confidentiality actions. D] In a separate concurring opinion Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle stated as under: I turn to consider whether there is any reason why established principle should not be applied to the situation in this case. I do not accept the propostion that to apply established principles in the foregoing circumstances would effectively be to convert every injuction from an order in personam to an order contra mundum. That proposition ignores the distinction between the breach of an order by the person named therein and interference with the course of justice resulting from a frustration of the order by the third party. 25. In our view, the Medical Professionals namely Dr. Munish Prabhakar and Dr. K.S. Sachdev extended medical asylum to the respondent without there being any reason or medical condition justifying prolonged admission of the respondent as an indoor patient as a cover to defeat the Orders passed by this Court and the Trial Court, as stated above and thereby aided and assisted the respondent in violating the Order of this Court. By such conduct these Medical Professionals have obstructed administration of justice.

### Response:
1

### Explanation:
21. The explanation offered by Dr. Munish Prabhakar and Dr. Sachdev that the respondent trapped the hospital and by non-payment of the bills kept prolonging his stay in the hospital does not inspire confidence at all. If the hospital was really a victim of the machinations of the respondent, at the first opportunity i.e. when requisition was made by the police on 13.02.2015, the hospital would have responded immediately. The requisition dated 13.02.2015 had informed the hospital that respondent was a proclaimed offender and that his custody was required. This requisition was close on the heels of the medical certificate dated 07.02.2015 and if that certificate was a correct one, the time was ripe for discharge of the respondent. However, as stated by Shashank Anand in his affidavit dated 02.07.2015, the hospital refused to discharge the respondent. The theory that the hospital was trapped by the designs of the respondent is a mere eye-wash and we reject the same. Thus, the inescapable conclusion is that the hospital extended protection and asylum to the respondent to defeat the Order passed by this Court as well as those passed by the Trial Court and thereby obstructed administration of justice22. Dr. Munish Prabhakar has been Medical Director of the hospital and as submitted by learned Senior Counsel on his behalf, he receives salary and some percentage of consultation charges recovered from the patients. Dr. K.S. Sachdev, on the other hand, has been the Managing Director of the Company which owns and runs said hospital. We have found that the continued admission for such a long period as indoor patient was not justifiable for any reason or medical condition of the respondent. Both these medical professionals are responsible for such prolonged admission which was actuated by only one reason which was to extend medical asylum to the respondent as a cover to defeat the orders passed by this Court and the Trial Court. In this process, these medical professionals not only helped the respondent in violating the Order of this court but they also obstructed administration of justice25. In our view, the Medical Professionals namely Dr. Munish Prabhakar and Dr. K.S. Sachdev extended medical asylum to the respondent without there being any reason or medical condition justifying prolonged admission of the respondent as an indoor patient as a cover to defeat the Orders passed by this Court and the Trial Court, as stated above and thereby aided and assisted the respondent in violating the Order of this Court. By such conduct these Medical Professionals have obstructed administration of justice
