Fruit And Vegetable Merchants Union Vs. Delhi Improvement Trust
it is not considering a question of title. No matter what the title is of the person who owns the street, the section is only considering how much of the street shall vest in the urban authority ......" 19.That the word "vest" is a word of variable import is shown by provisions of Indian statutes also. For example, S. 56 of the Provincial Insolvency Act (5 of 1920) empowers the Court at the time of the making of the order of adjudication or thereafter to appoint a receiver for the property of the insolvent and further provides that "such property shall thereupon vest in such receiver". The property vests in the receiver for the purpose of administering the estate of the insolvent for the payment of his debts after realising his assets. The property of the insolvent vests in the receiver not for all purposes but only for the purpose of the Insolvency Act and the receiver has no interest of his own in the property. On the other hand, Ss. 16 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act (Act 1 of 1894), provide that the property so acquired, upon the happening of certain events, shall "vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances". In the cases contemplated by Ss. 16 and 17, the property acquired becomes the property of Government without any conditions or limitations either as to title or possession. The legislature has made it clear that the vesting of the property is not for any limited purpose or limited duration. It would thus appear that the word "vest" has not got a fixed connotation, meaning in all cases that the property is owned by the person or the authority in whom it vests. It may vest in title, or it may vest in possession, or it may vest in a limited sense, as indicated in the context in which it may have been used in a particular piece of legislation. The provisions of the Improvement Act, particularly Ss. 45 to 49 and 54 and 54-A when they speak of a certain building or street or square or other land vesting in a municipality or other local body or in a trust, do not necessarily mean that ownership has passed to any of them. 20. The question of the ownership of the structure built upon Government land by the Trust may be looked at from another point of view.We have already held that the Trust was in the position of a statutory agent of Government and had erected the structure with money belonging to Government but advanced at interest to the Trust. In such a situation the structure also would be the property of Government, though for the time being it may he at the disposal of the Trust for the purpose of managing it efficiently as a statutory body. Simply because the Trust erected the structure in question and later on paid up the amount advanced by Government for the purpose would not necessarily load to the legal inference that the structure was the property of the Trust.In this connection reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Bhatia Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. D. C. Patel, 1953 SCR, 185: (AIR 1953 SC 16 ) (G). The case is not on all fours with the facts of the present case. But the following observations of Das J. (as he then was) at P. 195 of the report are pertinent:"It is true that the lessee erected the building at his own cost but he did so for the lessor and on the lessors land on agreed terms. The fact that the lessee incurred expenses in putting up the building is precisely the consideration for the lessor granting him a lease for 999 years not only of the building but of the land as well at what may, for all we know, be a cheap rent which the lessor way not have otherwise agreed to do. By the agreement the building became the property of the lessor and the lessor demised the land and the building which, in the circumstances, in law and in fact belonged to the lessor. The law of fixtures under S. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act way be different from the English law, but S. 108 is subject to any agreement that the parties may choose to make. Here, by the agreement the building became part of the land and the property of the lessor and the lessee took a lease on that footing." 21. In our opinion, therefore, it cannot he said that either under the provisions of the Improvement Act or in accordance with the terms of the agreement (Ex. D-5) or the two taken together, the market became the property of the Trust. We have already noticed the relevant, portions of the correspondence that passed between Government and the Trust to show that though at the initial stages the Trust proposed that the ownership of the market should vest in the Trust the final terms agreed between the parties in accordance with the provisions of S. 54-A left the ownership with Government.We have come to this conclusion without reference to the admission of the plaintiff contained in para. 22 of the indenture (Ex. D-4) quoted above. It is therefore not necessary for us to consider the question raised by the learned Attorney-General that the plaintiff was bound by that admission or whether that admission is vitiated by any pressure of circumstances or duress as pleaded by the plaintiff. Certainly that admission is a piece of evidence which could be considered on its merits oven apart from the question of estoppel which had not been specifically pleaded or formed the subject matter of a separate issue. 22. In view of our finding that the market, as also the land on which it stands, is the property of Government, the conclusion follows that the operative provisions of the Control Act do not apply to the premises in question.
0[ds]It would thus appear that the power to transfer by way of sale, lease or otherwise vested in the Trust is not an unlimited or an unqualified power but a power circumscribed by such conditions as the Government or the Chief Commissioner, as the case may be, thought fit to impose.The imposition of those conditions is not consistent with the title to the property vesting absolutely in the Trust. On the other hand, the imposition of those conditions is more consistent with the proposition contended for by the learned Attorney-General on behalf of the respondent that the Trust was only constituted a statutory agent on behalf of the Government in accordance with the provisions of the Improvement Act and the terms of the indenture, Ex.. It is noteworthy that there are no provisions either in the Improvement Act or in the indenture, Ex. D-5 to the effect that the title to the Nazul Estate vested in the Trust.It must, therefore, be held that no grounds have been made out for holding that title to the land on which the market stands was conveyed by Government to the TrustThe Trust was to assume full liability for all expenditure to be incurred upon works of improvement and to arrange for the completion of those works to the satisfaction of Government. The Trust is also enjoined to maintain in accordance with the statutory rules separate accounts of all revenue realized from and all expenditure incurred upon, the said Nazul Estate and to pay to Government the sum of Rs. 2 lakhs being the equivalent of the net annual revenue in respect thereof subject to certain conditions, not material to this case14. It is clear upon the terms of the agreement shortly set out above that the market was constructed by the Trust on Government land with Government funds advanced by way of loan at interest. On those facts what is the legal position of the Trust vis-_is the government in respect of the ownership of the property? It is important, therefore, to determine the true nature of the initial relationship between the Government and the TrustIt is manifest upon a reading of the entire section that there are no express words of conveyance whereby title is transferred by Government to the Trust either absolutely or upon certain conditions.This argument assumes that the word "vest" necessarily signifies that title to the property resides in the Trust20. The question of the ownership of the structure built upon Government land by the Trust may be looked at from another point of view.We have already held that the Trust was in the position of a statutory agent of Government and had erected the structure with money belonging to Government but advanced at interest to the Trust. In such a situation the structure also would be the property of Government, though for the time being it may he at the disposal of the Trust for the purpose of managing it efficiently as a statutory body. Simply because the Trust erected the structure in question and later on paid up the amount advanced by Government for the purpose would not necessarily load to the legal inference that the structure was the property of the Trust.In this connection reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Bhatia Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. D. C. Patel, 1953 SCR, 185: (AIR 1953 SC 16  ) (G). The case is not on all fours with the facts of the present case21. In our opinion, therefore, it cannot he said that either under the provisions of the Improvement Act or in accordance with the terms of the agreement (Ex. D-5) or the two taken together, the market became the property of the Trust. We have already noticed the relevant, portions of the correspondence that passed between Government and the Trust to show that though at the initial stages the Trust proposed that the ownership of the market should vest in the Trust the final terms agreed between the parties in accordance with the provisions of S. 54-A left the ownership with Government.We have come to this conclusion without reference to the admission of the plaintiff contained in para. 22 of the indenture (Ex. D-4) quoted above. It is therefore not necessary for us to consider the question raised by the learned Attorney-General that the plaintiff was bound by that admission or whether that admission is vitiated by any pressure of circumstances or duress as pleaded by the plaintiff. Certainly that admission is a piece of evidence which could be considered on its merits oven apart from the question of estoppel which had not been specifically pleaded or formed the subject matter of a separate issue22. In view of our finding that the market, as also the land on which it stands, is the property of Government, the conclusion follows that the operative provisions of the Control Act do not apply to the premises in questionIt would thus appear that the word "vest" has not got a fixed connotation, meaning in all cases that the property is owned by the person or the authority in whom it vests. It may vest in title, or it may vest in possession, or it may vest in a limited sense, as indicated in the context in which it may have been used in a particular piece of legislation. The provisions of the Improvement Act, particularly Ss. 45 to 49 and 54 and 54-A when they speak of a certain building or street or square or other land vesting in a municipality or other local body or in a trust, do not necessarily mean that ownership has passed to any of them.
### Instruction:
Estimate the outcome of the case (positive (1) or negative (0) for the appellant) and then give a reasoned explanation by examining important sentences within the case documentation.

### Input:
it is not considering a question of title. No matter what the title is of the person who owns the street, the section is only considering how much of the street shall vest in the urban authority ......" 19.That the word "vest" is a word of variable import is shown by provisions of Indian statutes also. For example, S. 56 of the Provincial Insolvency Act (5 of 1920) empowers the Court at the time of the making of the order of adjudication or thereafter to appoint a receiver for the property of the insolvent and further provides that "such property shall thereupon vest in such receiver". The property vests in the receiver for the purpose of administering the estate of the insolvent for the payment of his debts after realising his assets. The property of the insolvent vests in the receiver not for all purposes but only for the purpose of the Insolvency Act and the receiver has no interest of his own in the property. On the other hand, Ss. 16 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act (Act 1 of 1894), provide that the property so acquired, upon the happening of certain events, shall "vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances". In the cases contemplated by Ss. 16 and 17, the property acquired becomes the property of Government without any conditions or limitations either as to title or possession. The legislature has made it clear that the vesting of the property is not for any limited purpose or limited duration. It would thus appear that the word "vest" has not got a fixed connotation, meaning in all cases that the property is owned by the person or the authority in whom it vests. It may vest in title, or it may vest in possession, or it may vest in a limited sense, as indicated in the context in which it may have been used in a particular piece of legislation. The provisions of the Improvement Act, particularly Ss. 45 to 49 and 54 and 54-A when they speak of a certain building or street or square or other land vesting in a municipality or other local body or in a trust, do not necessarily mean that ownership has passed to any of them. 20. The question of the ownership of the structure built upon Government land by the Trust may be looked at from another point of view.We have already held that the Trust was in the position of a statutory agent of Government and had erected the structure with money belonging to Government but advanced at interest to the Trust. In such a situation the structure also would be the property of Government, though for the time being it may he at the disposal of the Trust for the purpose of managing it efficiently as a statutory body. Simply because the Trust erected the structure in question and later on paid up the amount advanced by Government for the purpose would not necessarily load to the legal inference that the structure was the property of the Trust.In this connection reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Bhatia Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. D. C. Patel, 1953 SCR, 185: (AIR 1953 SC 16 ) (G). The case is not on all fours with the facts of the present case. But the following observations of Das J. (as he then was) at P. 195 of the report are pertinent:"It is true that the lessee erected the building at his own cost but he did so for the lessor and on the lessors land on agreed terms. The fact that the lessee incurred expenses in putting up the building is precisely the consideration for the lessor granting him a lease for 999 years not only of the building but of the land as well at what may, for all we know, be a cheap rent which the lessor way not have otherwise agreed to do. By the agreement the building became the property of the lessor and the lessor demised the land and the building which, in the circumstances, in law and in fact belonged to the lessor. The law of fixtures under S. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act way be different from the English law, but S. 108 is subject to any agreement that the parties may choose to make. Here, by the agreement the building became part of the land and the property of the lessor and the lessee took a lease on that footing." 21. In our opinion, therefore, it cannot he said that either under the provisions of the Improvement Act or in accordance with the terms of the agreement (Ex. D-5) or the two taken together, the market became the property of the Trust. We have already noticed the relevant, portions of the correspondence that passed between Government and the Trust to show that though at the initial stages the Trust proposed that the ownership of the market should vest in the Trust the final terms agreed between the parties in accordance with the provisions of S. 54-A left the ownership with Government.We have come to this conclusion without reference to the admission of the plaintiff contained in para. 22 of the indenture (Ex. D-4) quoted above. It is therefore not necessary for us to consider the question raised by the learned Attorney-General that the plaintiff was bound by that admission or whether that admission is vitiated by any pressure of circumstances or duress as pleaded by the plaintiff. Certainly that admission is a piece of evidence which could be considered on its merits oven apart from the question of estoppel which had not been specifically pleaded or formed the subject matter of a separate issue. 22. In view of our finding that the market, as also the land on which it stands, is the property of Government, the conclusion follows that the operative provisions of the Control Act do not apply to the premises in question.

### Response:
0

### Explanation:
It would thus appear that the power to transfer by way of sale, lease or otherwise vested in the Trust is not an unlimited or an unqualified power but a power circumscribed by such conditions as the Government or the Chief Commissioner, as the case may be, thought fit to impose.The imposition of those conditions is not consistent with the title to the property vesting absolutely in the Trust. On the other hand, the imposition of those conditions is more consistent with the proposition contended for by the learned Attorney-General on behalf of the respondent that the Trust was only constituted a statutory agent on behalf of the Government in accordance with the provisions of the Improvement Act and the terms of the indenture, Ex.. It is noteworthy that there are no provisions either in the Improvement Act or in the indenture, Ex. D-5 to the effect that the title to the Nazul Estate vested in the Trust.It must, therefore, be held that no grounds have been made out for holding that title to the land on which the market stands was conveyed by Government to the TrustThe Trust was to assume full liability for all expenditure to be incurred upon works of improvement and to arrange for the completion of those works to the satisfaction of Government. The Trust is also enjoined to maintain in accordance with the statutory rules separate accounts of all revenue realized from and all expenditure incurred upon, the said Nazul Estate and to pay to Government the sum of Rs. 2 lakhs being the equivalent of the net annual revenue in respect thereof subject to certain conditions, not material to this case14. It is clear upon the terms of the agreement shortly set out above that the market was constructed by the Trust on Government land with Government funds advanced by way of loan at interest. On those facts what is the legal position of the Trust vis-_is the government in respect of the ownership of the property? It is important, therefore, to determine the true nature of the initial relationship between the Government and the TrustIt is manifest upon a reading of the entire section that there are no express words of conveyance whereby title is transferred by Government to the Trust either absolutely or upon certain conditions.This argument assumes that the word "vest" necessarily signifies that title to the property resides in the Trust20. The question of the ownership of the structure built upon Government land by the Trust may be looked at from another point of view.We have already held that the Trust was in the position of a statutory agent of Government and had erected the structure with money belonging to Government but advanced at interest to the Trust. In such a situation the structure also would be the property of Government, though for the time being it may he at the disposal of the Trust for the purpose of managing it efficiently as a statutory body. Simply because the Trust erected the structure in question and later on paid up the amount advanced by Government for the purpose would not necessarily load to the legal inference that the structure was the property of the Trust.In this connection reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Bhatia Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. D. C. Patel, 1953 SCR, 185: (AIR 1953 SC 16  ) (G). The case is not on all fours with the facts of the present case21. In our opinion, therefore, it cannot he said that either under the provisions of the Improvement Act or in accordance with the terms of the agreement (Ex. D-5) or the two taken together, the market became the property of the Trust. We have already noticed the relevant, portions of the correspondence that passed between Government and the Trust to show that though at the initial stages the Trust proposed that the ownership of the market should vest in the Trust the final terms agreed between the parties in accordance with the provisions of S. 54-A left the ownership with Government.We have come to this conclusion without reference to the admission of the plaintiff contained in para. 22 of the indenture (Ex. D-4) quoted above. It is therefore not necessary for us to consider the question raised by the learned Attorney-General that the plaintiff was bound by that admission or whether that admission is vitiated by any pressure of circumstances or duress as pleaded by the plaintiff. Certainly that admission is a piece of evidence which could be considered on its merits oven apart from the question of estoppel which had not been specifically pleaded or formed the subject matter of a separate issue22. In view of our finding that the market, as also the land on which it stands, is the property of Government, the conclusion follows that the operative provisions of the Control Act do not apply to the premises in questionIt would thus appear that the word "vest" has not got a fixed connotation, meaning in all cases that the property is owned by the person or the authority in whom it vests. It may vest in title, or it may vest in possession, or it may vest in a limited sense, as indicated in the context in which it may have been used in a particular piece of legislation. The provisions of the Improvement Act, particularly Ss. 45 to 49 and 54 and 54-A when they speak of a certain building or street or square or other land vesting in a municipality or other local body or in a trust, do not necessarily mean that ownership has passed to any of them.
