State Of Kerala And Anr Vs. The Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. Etc
standing in such portions of the private forests as are or may be assigned under Section 10. No such fund is created for the purpose of the trees standing in the reserve area. But that does not mean that the value of the trees in the reserve area can be utilized for purposes other than those specifically mentioned in Section 10. That will be part of the scheme and Government will have to make adequate provision as to how the value of the trees can be utilized for purposes directed towards the promotion of agriculture or welfare of the agricultural population or for purposes ancillary thereto. 21. Another objection was that assignment of land without demarcation and survey was impracticable and productive of strife. We do not see why assignment of land is impracticable in the absence of survey. Even before the introduction of the survey, lands had been assigned and cultivated by agriculturists. The process of assignment must involve demarcation of the land assigned. Sub-section (3) of Sec. 10 says the extent of private forests or lands comprised in private forests which may be assigned to each of the categories of persons specified in subsection (1) and the order of preference in which assignment may be made shall be such as may be prescribed. After determining the extent of the land to be assigned, the land, when assigned, will have to be inevitably demarcated by the officers who make the assignment. That is not an insuperable difficulty. As a matter of fact we know from the affidavit on behalf of the Government that about 3 lakh acres of forests land have been already distributed. Indeed steps should be taken for an early survey in the interest of law and order. But survey is not the sine qua non of any genuine scheme for distribution of land. We do not think that the High Court has given any substantial reasons for coming to the conclusion that the scheme of agrarian reform is a teasing illusion and a promise in un-reality. 22. In an attempt to show that the impugned Act was a piece of colourable legislation, reference was made to the Kerala Private Forests Acquisition Bill, 1968 L. A. Bill No. 33 of 1968 which provided for the acquisition of private forests on payment of compensation for the acquisition. That Bill, it is contended, was allowed to lapse and the present Act was enacted with the obvious intention of expropriating vast forest lands without paying compensation. We can hardly countenance such an argument. The question really is, in the first place, of the competence of the legislature to pass the impugned Act and, in the second, whether the Act is constitutional in the sense that it is protected by Section 31A (l). So far as the competence of the legislature is concerned, no objection is made before us. As to its constitutionality we have shown that the Act purports to vest the janmam rights to the forests in the Government as a step in the implementation of agrarian reform. If this could be constitutionally done by the legislature, the fact that at an earlier stage the Government was toying with the idea of paying compensation to owners of private forests is of little consequence. The dominant purpose of the impugned Act, as already pointed out, is to distribute forest lands for agricultural purposes after making reservations of portions of the forests for the benefit of the agricultural community. The fear is expressed that such a course if, genuinely implemented, may lead to deforestation on a large scale leading to soil erosion and silting of rivers and streams and will actually turn out to be detrimental to the interests of the agricultural community in the long run. It is undoubtedly true that reckless deforestation might lead to very unhappy results. But we have no material before us for expressing opinion on such a matter. It is for the legislature to balance the comparative advantages of a scheme like the one envisaged in the Act against the possible disadvantages of resulting deforestation. There are many imponderables to which we have no safe guides. It is presumed that the legislature knows the needs of its people and will balance the present advantages against possible future disadvantages. If there is pressure on land and the legislature feels that forest lands in some areas can be conveniently and, without much damage to the community as a whole, utilized for settling a large proportion of the agricultural population, it is perfectly open, under the constitutional powers vested in the legislature, to make a suitable law, and if the law is constitutionally valid this court can hardly strike it down on the ground that in the long run the legislation instead of turning out to be a boon will turn out to be a curse. 23. Mr. Menon who appeared for the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1398/72 put forward a plea of equitable estoppel peculiar to his client company. It appears that the Company established itself in Kerala for the production of rayon cloth pulp on an understanding that the Government would bind itself to supply the raw material. Later Government was unable to supply the material and by an agreement undertook not to legislate for the acquisition of private forests for a period of 60 years if the Company purchased forest lands for the purpose of its supply of raw-materials. Accordingly, the Company purchased 30,000 acres of private forests from the Nilambhuri Govila Kannan estate for Rs. 75/-lakhs and, therefore, it was argued that, so far as the company is concerned, the agreement not to legislate should operate as equitable estoppel against the States. We do not see how an agreement of the Government can preclude legislation on the subject. The High Court has rightly pointed out that the surrender by the Government of its legislative powers to be used for public good cannot avail the company or operate against the Government as equitable estoppel.
1[ds]15. It must be remembered that what is stated generally about the nature of the reserve forest lands in the old State of Travancore Cochin applies equally to the private forest lands of Malabar District because all these forests are contiguous and form one long belt of a mountainous terrain now forming part of the State of Kerala. It will be thus seen that all forest lands, whether reserve or private, have been applied for generations for the settlement of agriculturists whether such settlements were authorised or unauthorised. Vast areas in the forests were clear-felled, as the expression goes, for bringing patches and blocks of lands under agriculture. Several types of produce were obtained by agriculture and a large population lives on the same. Plantations of coffee, tea, rubber, cardamom and the like were grown on an extensive scale in these forests. In recent years Industrialists have taken leases of vast areas of these forests from their owners and a fraction of the same has been brought under cultivation by planting eucalyptus and other types of trees useful for paper and other industries. Large areas in these forests seem to be even now in their pristine form but are capable of being utilized by absorbing a large proportion of the population by settling them on the land. These forests, therefore, have attained a peculiar character owing to their geography and climate and the evidence available to us shows that vast areas of these forests are still capable of supporting a large agricultural populationThe definition of estate is an inclusive definition. In sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) certain categories of rights and lands are included in the definition of the word estateThe dominant purpose of the impugned Act, as already pointed out, is to distribute forest lands for agricultural purposes after making reservations of portions of the forests for the benefit of the agricultural community. The fear is expressed that such a course if, genuinely implemented, may lead to deforestation on a large scale leading to soil erosion and silting of rivers and streams and will actually turn out to be detrimental to the interests of the agricultural community in the long run. It is undoubtedly true that reckless deforestation might lead to very unhappy results. But we have no material before us for expressing opinion on such a matter. It is for the legislature to balance the comparative advantages of a scheme like the one envisaged in the Act against the possible disadvantages of resulting deforestation. There are many imponderables to which we have no safe guides. It is presumed that the legislature knows the needs of its people and will balance the present advantages against possible future disadvantages. If there is pressure on land and the legislature feels that forest lands in some areas can be conveniently and, without much damage to the community as a whole, utilized for settling a large proportion of the agricultural population, it is perfectly open, under the constitutional powers vested in the legislature, to make a suitable law, and if the law is constitutionally valid this court can hardly strike it down on the ground that in the long run the legislation instead of turning out to be a boon will turn out to be a curset appears that the Company established itself in Kerala for the production of rayon cloth pulp on an understanding that the Government would bind itself to supply the raw material. Later Government was unable to supply the material and by an agreement undertook not to legislate for the acquisition of private forests for a period of 60 years if the Company purchased forest lands for the purpose of its supply of raw-materials. Accordingly, the Company purchased 30,000 acres of private forests from the Nilambhuri Govila Kannan estate for Rs. 75/-lakhs and, therefore, it was argued that, so far as the company is concerned, the agreement not to legislate should operate as equitable estoppel against the States. We do not see how an agreement of the Government can preclude legislation on the subject. The High Court has rightly pointed out that the surrender by the Government of its legislative powers to be used for public good cannot avail the company or operate against the Government as equitable estoppelIt is thus clear to those who understand developmental dialectic and rural planning that agrarian reform is more humanist than mere land reform and scientifically viewed, covers not merely abolition of intermediary tenures, zamindaris and the like but re-structuring of village life itself taking in its broad embrace the socio-economic regeneration of the rural population.The Indian Constitution is a social instrument with an economic mission and the sense and sweep of its provisions must be gathered by judicial statesmen on that seminal footingWe, on our part, do not think there is any merit in it.Once we find the legislative area is barricaded by Art. 31A, it cannot be breached by Arts. 14, 19 and 31 and judicial break-in is constitutionally interdicted. But, at the same time, we must hasten to point out that Art. 31A is no charter of legislative freedom to refuse compensation altogether in every case. The Court may not strike down a statute for non-payment of compensation but the legislature is expected, except in exceptional sociohistorical setting, to provide just payment for the deprived persons. To exclude judicial review is not to black out the beneficent provisions of Articles 14, 19 and 31.May be the present legislation dealing with extensive antiquated Janman rights relates to the exceptional category. All that we can say is that this is an area where not the court but the elector is the proper corrective instrument.
### Instruction:
Predict whether the case will result in an affirmative (1) or negative (0) decision for the appeal, and then provide a thorough explanation using key sentences to support your prediction.

### Input:
standing in such portions of the private forests as are or may be assigned under Section 10. No such fund is created for the purpose of the trees standing in the reserve area. But that does not mean that the value of the trees in the reserve area can be utilized for purposes other than those specifically mentioned in Section 10. That will be part of the scheme and Government will have to make adequate provision as to how the value of the trees can be utilized for purposes directed towards the promotion of agriculture or welfare of the agricultural population or for purposes ancillary thereto. 21. Another objection was that assignment of land without demarcation and survey was impracticable and productive of strife. We do not see why assignment of land is impracticable in the absence of survey. Even before the introduction of the survey, lands had been assigned and cultivated by agriculturists. The process of assignment must involve demarcation of the land assigned. Sub-section (3) of Sec. 10 says the extent of private forests or lands comprised in private forests which may be assigned to each of the categories of persons specified in subsection (1) and the order of preference in which assignment may be made shall be such as may be prescribed. After determining the extent of the land to be assigned, the land, when assigned, will have to be inevitably demarcated by the officers who make the assignment. That is not an insuperable difficulty. As a matter of fact we know from the affidavit on behalf of the Government that about 3 lakh acres of forests land have been already distributed. Indeed steps should be taken for an early survey in the interest of law and order. But survey is not the sine qua non of any genuine scheme for distribution of land. We do not think that the High Court has given any substantial reasons for coming to the conclusion that the scheme of agrarian reform is a teasing illusion and a promise in un-reality. 22. In an attempt to show that the impugned Act was a piece of colourable legislation, reference was made to the Kerala Private Forests Acquisition Bill, 1968 L. A. Bill No. 33 of 1968 which provided for the acquisition of private forests on payment of compensation for the acquisition. That Bill, it is contended, was allowed to lapse and the present Act was enacted with the obvious intention of expropriating vast forest lands without paying compensation. We can hardly countenance such an argument. The question really is, in the first place, of the competence of the legislature to pass the impugned Act and, in the second, whether the Act is constitutional in the sense that it is protected by Section 31A (l). So far as the competence of the legislature is concerned, no objection is made before us. As to its constitutionality we have shown that the Act purports to vest the janmam rights to the forests in the Government as a step in the implementation of agrarian reform. If this could be constitutionally done by the legislature, the fact that at an earlier stage the Government was toying with the idea of paying compensation to owners of private forests is of little consequence. The dominant purpose of the impugned Act, as already pointed out, is to distribute forest lands for agricultural purposes after making reservations of portions of the forests for the benefit of the agricultural community. The fear is expressed that such a course if, genuinely implemented, may lead to deforestation on a large scale leading to soil erosion and silting of rivers and streams and will actually turn out to be detrimental to the interests of the agricultural community in the long run. It is undoubtedly true that reckless deforestation might lead to very unhappy results. But we have no material before us for expressing opinion on such a matter. It is for the legislature to balance the comparative advantages of a scheme like the one envisaged in the Act against the possible disadvantages of resulting deforestation. There are many imponderables to which we have no safe guides. It is presumed that the legislature knows the needs of its people and will balance the present advantages against possible future disadvantages. If there is pressure on land and the legislature feels that forest lands in some areas can be conveniently and, without much damage to the community as a whole, utilized for settling a large proportion of the agricultural population, it is perfectly open, under the constitutional powers vested in the legislature, to make a suitable law, and if the law is constitutionally valid this court can hardly strike it down on the ground that in the long run the legislation instead of turning out to be a boon will turn out to be a curse. 23. Mr. Menon who appeared for the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1398/72 put forward a plea of equitable estoppel peculiar to his client company. It appears that the Company established itself in Kerala for the production of rayon cloth pulp on an understanding that the Government would bind itself to supply the raw material. Later Government was unable to supply the material and by an agreement undertook not to legislate for the acquisition of private forests for a period of 60 years if the Company purchased forest lands for the purpose of its supply of raw-materials. Accordingly, the Company purchased 30,000 acres of private forests from the Nilambhuri Govila Kannan estate for Rs. 75/-lakhs and, therefore, it was argued that, so far as the company is concerned, the agreement not to legislate should operate as equitable estoppel against the States. We do not see how an agreement of the Government can preclude legislation on the subject. The High Court has rightly pointed out that the surrender by the Government of its legislative powers to be used for public good cannot avail the company or operate against the Government as equitable estoppel.

### Response:
1

### Explanation:
15. It must be remembered that what is stated generally about the nature of the reserve forest lands in the old State of Travancore Cochin applies equally to the private forest lands of Malabar District because all these forests are contiguous and form one long belt of a mountainous terrain now forming part of the State of Kerala. It will be thus seen that all forest lands, whether reserve or private, have been applied for generations for the settlement of agriculturists whether such settlements were authorised or unauthorised. Vast areas in the forests were clear-felled, as the expression goes, for bringing patches and blocks of lands under agriculture. Several types of produce were obtained by agriculture and a large population lives on the same. Plantations of coffee, tea, rubber, cardamom and the like were grown on an extensive scale in these forests. In recent years Industrialists have taken leases of vast areas of these forests from their owners and a fraction of the same has been brought under cultivation by planting eucalyptus and other types of trees useful for paper and other industries. Large areas in these forests seem to be even now in their pristine form but are capable of being utilized by absorbing a large proportion of the population by settling them on the land. These forests, therefore, have attained a peculiar character owing to their geography and climate and the evidence available to us shows that vast areas of these forests are still capable of supporting a large agricultural populationThe definition of estate is an inclusive definition. In sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) certain categories of rights and lands are included in the definition of the word estateThe dominant purpose of the impugned Act, as already pointed out, is to distribute forest lands for agricultural purposes after making reservations of portions of the forests for the benefit of the agricultural community. The fear is expressed that such a course if, genuinely implemented, may lead to deforestation on a large scale leading to soil erosion and silting of rivers and streams and will actually turn out to be detrimental to the interests of the agricultural community in the long run. It is undoubtedly true that reckless deforestation might lead to very unhappy results. But we have no material before us for expressing opinion on such a matter. It is for the legislature to balance the comparative advantages of a scheme like the one envisaged in the Act against the possible disadvantages of resulting deforestation. There are many imponderables to which we have no safe guides. It is presumed that the legislature knows the needs of its people and will balance the present advantages against possible future disadvantages. If there is pressure on land and the legislature feels that forest lands in some areas can be conveniently and, without much damage to the community as a whole, utilized for settling a large proportion of the agricultural population, it is perfectly open, under the constitutional powers vested in the legislature, to make a suitable law, and if the law is constitutionally valid this court can hardly strike it down on the ground that in the long run the legislation instead of turning out to be a boon will turn out to be a curset appears that the Company established itself in Kerala for the production of rayon cloth pulp on an understanding that the Government would bind itself to supply the raw material. Later Government was unable to supply the material and by an agreement undertook not to legislate for the acquisition of private forests for a period of 60 years if the Company purchased forest lands for the purpose of its supply of raw-materials. Accordingly, the Company purchased 30,000 acres of private forests from the Nilambhuri Govila Kannan estate for Rs. 75/-lakhs and, therefore, it was argued that, so far as the company is concerned, the agreement not to legislate should operate as equitable estoppel against the States. We do not see how an agreement of the Government can preclude legislation on the subject. The High Court has rightly pointed out that the surrender by the Government of its legislative powers to be used for public good cannot avail the company or operate against the Government as equitable estoppelIt is thus clear to those who understand developmental dialectic and rural planning that agrarian reform is more humanist than mere land reform and scientifically viewed, covers not merely abolition of intermediary tenures, zamindaris and the like but re-structuring of village life itself taking in its broad embrace the socio-economic regeneration of the rural population.The Indian Constitution is a social instrument with an economic mission and the sense and sweep of its provisions must be gathered by judicial statesmen on that seminal footingWe, on our part, do not think there is any merit in it.Once we find the legislative area is barricaded by Art. 31A, it cannot be breached by Arts. 14, 19 and 31 and judicial break-in is constitutionally interdicted. But, at the same time, we must hasten to point out that Art. 31A is no charter of legislative freedom to refuse compensation altogether in every case. The Court may not strike down a statute for non-payment of compensation but the legislature is expected, except in exceptional sociohistorical setting, to provide just payment for the deprived persons. To exclude judicial review is not to black out the beneficent provisions of Articles 14, 19 and 31.May be the present legislation dealing with extensive antiquated Janman rights relates to the exceptional category. All that we can say is that this is an area where not the court but the elector is the proper corrective instrument.
