M/S. Bhagwati Prasad Pawan Kumar Vs. Union Of India
even after receiving the cheque the respondent prosecuted the suit for the balance of the amount. The Railway had led no evidence to show that the intention of the plaintiff was to accept the cheque in full and final settlement of its claim. On this finding, relying upon the principle laid down in Day vs. Mciea it was held that: "The question was thus primarily one of fact and since the defendant did not choose to lead any evidence on the point nor are there such circumstances brought on the record to lead to the conclusion that the cheque was accepted in discharge of the whole debt, I am unable to come to the conclusion that the acceptance of the cheque amounted to satisfaction of the whole claim." 17. The decision of this Court in AIR 1963 SC 250 : Lala Kapurchand Godha and others vs. Nawab Himayatalikhan Azamjah, may not be of much assistance as in that case apart from the fact that the appeal was decided with reference to Section 63 of the Contract Act, there was clear evidence on record that the plaintiffs therein had received the sum of Rs. 20 lakhs in full satisfaction of their claim and duly discharged the promissory notes by endorsement of "full satisfaction" and received payment in full. 18. Section 8 of the Contract Act provides for acceptance by performing conditions of a proposal. In the instant case, the Railways made an offer to the appellant laying down the condition that if the offer was not acceptable the cheque should be returned forthwith, failing which it would be deemed that the appellant accepted the offer in full and final satisfaction of its claim. This was further clarified by providing that the retention of the cheque and/ or encashment thereof will automatically amount to satisfaction in full and final settlement of the claim. Thus, if the appellant accepted the cheques and encashed them without anything more, it would amount to an acceptance of the offer made in the letters of the Railways dated April 7, 1993. The offer prescribed the mode of acceptance, and by conduct the appellant must be held to have accepted the offer and therefore, could not make a claim later. However, if the appellant had not encashed the cheques and protested to the Railways calling upon them to pay the balance amount, and expressed its inability to accept the cheques remitted to it, the controversy would have acquired a different complexion. In that event, in view of the express non acceptance of the offer, the appellant could not be presumed to have accepted the offer. What, however, is significant is that the protest and non acceptance must be conveyed before the cheques are encashed. If the cheques are encashed without protest, then it must be held that the offer stood unequivocally accepted. An offeree cannot be permitted to change his mind after the unequivocal acceptance of the offer. It is well settled that an offer may be accepted by conduct. But conduct would only amount to acceptance if it is clear that the offeree did the act with the intention (actual or apparent) of accepting the offer. The decisions which we have noticed above also proceed on this principle. Each case must rest on its own facts. The courts must examine the evidence to find out whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the conduct of the "offeree" was such as amounted to an unequivocal acceptance of the offer made. If the facts of the case disclose that there was no reservation in signifying acceptance by conduct, it must follow that the offer has been accepted by conduct. On the other hand if the evidence disclose that the "offeree" had reservation in accepting the offer, his conduct may not amount to acceptance of the offer in terms of Section 8 of the Contract Act. 19. Coming to the facts of this case if the appellant, before encashing the cheques, had sent the communication dated August 20, 1993, it could perhaps be argued that by retaining but not encashing the cheques, it did not intend to accept the offer made in the letter of the Railways dated April 7, 1993. At the same time if the evidence disclosed that it encashed the cheques and later sent a protest, it must be held that it had accepted the offer unconditionally by conveying its acceptance by the mode prescribed, namely by retaining and encashing the cheques, without reservation. Its subsequent change of mind and consequent protest did not matter. 20. In the instant case there is neither pleadings nor evidence on record as to the date on which the cheques were received and the date on which the same were sent for encashment. It is, therefore, not possible to record a categoric finding as to whether the letters of protest were written after encashing the cheques or before encashing the cheques. It was for the appellant to plead and prove that it had not accepted the offer and had called upon the Railways to pay the balance amount. This it must have done before encashing the cheques. If the appellant encashed the cheques and then wrote letters of protest to the Railways, it cannot be held that it had not accepted the offer by conduct, because at the time when it sent the cheques for encashment, it had not conveyed its protest to the offerer. In the absence of any pleading or evidence to establish that the encashment of the cheques was subsequent to the protest letters by the appellant, it is not possible to hold that by encashing the cheques the appellant had not adopted the mode of acceptance prescribed in the letters of the Railways dated April 7, 1993. In the absence of such evidence it must be held that by encashing the cheques received from the Railways, the appellant accepted the offer by adopting the mode of acceptance prescribed in the offer of the Railways. 21.
0[ds]Section 8 of the Contract Act provides for acceptance by performing conditions of a proposal. In the instant case, the Railways made an offer to the appellant laying down the condition that if the offer was not acceptable the cheque should be returned forthwith, failing which it would be deemed that the appellant accepted the offer in full and final satisfaction of its claim. This was further clarified by providing that the retention of the cheque and/ or encashment thereof will automatically amount to satisfaction in full and final settlement of the claim. Thus, if the appellant accepted the cheques and encashed them without anything more, it would amount to an acceptance of the offer made in the letters of the Railways dated April 7, 1993. The offer prescribed the mode of acceptance, and by conduct the appellant must be held to have accepted the offer and therefore, could not make a claim later. However, if the appellant had not encashed the cheques and protested to the Railways calling upon them to pay the balance amount, and expressed its inability to accept the cheques remitted to it, the controversy would have acquired a different complexion. In that event, in view of the express non acceptance of the offer, the appellant could not be presumed to have accepted the offer. What, however, is significant is that the protest and non acceptance must be conveyed before the cheques are encashed. If the cheques are encashed without protest, then it must be held that the offer stood unequivocally accepted. An offeree cannot be permitted to change his mind after the unequivocal acceptance of the offer. It is well settled that an offer may be accepted by conduct. But conduct would only amount to acceptance if it is clear that the offeree did the act with the intention (actual or apparent) of accepting the offer. The decisions which we have noticed above also proceed on this principle. Each case must rest on its own facts. The courts must examine the evidence to find out whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the conduct of the "offeree" was such as amounted to an unequivocal acceptance of the offer made. If the facts of the case disclose that there was no reservation in signifying acceptance by conduct, it must follow that the offer has been accepted by conduct. On the other hand if the evidence disclose that the "offeree" had reservation in accepting the offer, his conduct may not amount to acceptance of the offer in terms of Section 8 of the Contract Act19. Coming to the facts of this case if the appellant, before encashing the cheques, had sent the communication dated August 20, 1993, it could perhaps be argued that by retaining but not encashing the cheques, it did not intend to accept the offer made in the letter of the Railways dated April 7, 1993. At the same time if the evidence disclosed that it encashed the cheques and later sent a protest, it must be held that it had accepted the offer unconditionally by conveying its acceptance by the mode prescribed, namely by retaining and encashing the cheques, without reservation. Its subsequent change of mind and consequent protest did not matter20. In the instant case there is neither pleadings nor evidence on record as to the date on which the cheques were received and the date on which the same were sent for encashment. It is, therefore, not possible to record a categoric finding as to whether the letters of protest were written after encashing the cheques or before encashing the cheques. It was for the appellant to plead and prove that it had not accepted the offer and had called upon the Railways to pay the balance amount. This it must have done before encashing the cheques. If the appellant encashed the cheques and then wrote letters of protest to the Railways, it cannot be held that it had not accepted the offer by conduct, because at the time when it sent the cheques for encashment, it had not conveyed its protest to the offerer. In the absence of any pleading or evidence to establish that the encashment of the cheques was subsequent to the protest letters by the appellant, it is not possible to hold that by encashing the cheques the appellant had not adopted the mode of acceptance prescribed in the letters of the Railways dated April 7, 1993. In the absence of such evidence it must be held that by encashing the cheques received from the Railways, the appellant accepted the offer by adopting the mode of acceptance prescribed in the offer of the Railways
### Instruction:
Ascertain if the court will uphold (1) or dismiss (0) the appeal in the case proceeding, and then clarify this prediction by discussing critical sentences from the text.

### Input:
even after receiving the cheque the respondent prosecuted the suit for the balance of the amount. The Railway had led no evidence to show that the intention of the plaintiff was to accept the cheque in full and final settlement of its claim. On this finding, relying upon the principle laid down in Day vs. Mciea it was held that: "The question was thus primarily one of fact and since the defendant did not choose to lead any evidence on the point nor are there such circumstances brought on the record to lead to the conclusion that the cheque was accepted in discharge of the whole debt, I am unable to come to the conclusion that the acceptance of the cheque amounted to satisfaction of the whole claim." 17. The decision of this Court in AIR 1963 SC 250 : Lala Kapurchand Godha and others vs. Nawab Himayatalikhan Azamjah, may not be of much assistance as in that case apart from the fact that the appeal was decided with reference to Section 63 of the Contract Act, there was clear evidence on record that the plaintiffs therein had received the sum of Rs. 20 lakhs in full satisfaction of their claim and duly discharged the promissory notes by endorsement of "full satisfaction" and received payment in full. 18. Section 8 of the Contract Act provides for acceptance by performing conditions of a proposal. In the instant case, the Railways made an offer to the appellant laying down the condition that if the offer was not acceptable the cheque should be returned forthwith, failing which it would be deemed that the appellant accepted the offer in full and final satisfaction of its claim. This was further clarified by providing that the retention of the cheque and/ or encashment thereof will automatically amount to satisfaction in full and final settlement of the claim. Thus, if the appellant accepted the cheques and encashed them without anything more, it would amount to an acceptance of the offer made in the letters of the Railways dated April 7, 1993. The offer prescribed the mode of acceptance, and by conduct the appellant must be held to have accepted the offer and therefore, could not make a claim later. However, if the appellant had not encashed the cheques and protested to the Railways calling upon them to pay the balance amount, and expressed its inability to accept the cheques remitted to it, the controversy would have acquired a different complexion. In that event, in view of the express non acceptance of the offer, the appellant could not be presumed to have accepted the offer. What, however, is significant is that the protest and non acceptance must be conveyed before the cheques are encashed. If the cheques are encashed without protest, then it must be held that the offer stood unequivocally accepted. An offeree cannot be permitted to change his mind after the unequivocal acceptance of the offer. It is well settled that an offer may be accepted by conduct. But conduct would only amount to acceptance if it is clear that the offeree did the act with the intention (actual or apparent) of accepting the offer. The decisions which we have noticed above also proceed on this principle. Each case must rest on its own facts. The courts must examine the evidence to find out whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the conduct of the "offeree" was such as amounted to an unequivocal acceptance of the offer made. If the facts of the case disclose that there was no reservation in signifying acceptance by conduct, it must follow that the offer has been accepted by conduct. On the other hand if the evidence disclose that the "offeree" had reservation in accepting the offer, his conduct may not amount to acceptance of the offer in terms of Section 8 of the Contract Act. 19. Coming to the facts of this case if the appellant, before encashing the cheques, had sent the communication dated August 20, 1993, it could perhaps be argued that by retaining but not encashing the cheques, it did not intend to accept the offer made in the letter of the Railways dated April 7, 1993. At the same time if the evidence disclosed that it encashed the cheques and later sent a protest, it must be held that it had accepted the offer unconditionally by conveying its acceptance by the mode prescribed, namely by retaining and encashing the cheques, without reservation. Its subsequent change of mind and consequent protest did not matter. 20. In the instant case there is neither pleadings nor evidence on record as to the date on which the cheques were received and the date on which the same were sent for encashment. It is, therefore, not possible to record a categoric finding as to whether the letters of protest were written after encashing the cheques or before encashing the cheques. It was for the appellant to plead and prove that it had not accepted the offer and had called upon the Railways to pay the balance amount. This it must have done before encashing the cheques. If the appellant encashed the cheques and then wrote letters of protest to the Railways, it cannot be held that it had not accepted the offer by conduct, because at the time when it sent the cheques for encashment, it had not conveyed its protest to the offerer. In the absence of any pleading or evidence to establish that the encashment of the cheques was subsequent to the protest letters by the appellant, it is not possible to hold that by encashing the cheques the appellant had not adopted the mode of acceptance prescribed in the letters of the Railways dated April 7, 1993. In the absence of such evidence it must be held that by encashing the cheques received from the Railways, the appellant accepted the offer by adopting the mode of acceptance prescribed in the offer of the Railways. 21.

### Response:
0

### Explanation:
Section 8 of the Contract Act provides for acceptance by performing conditions of a proposal. In the instant case, the Railways made an offer to the appellant laying down the condition that if the offer was not acceptable the cheque should be returned forthwith, failing which it would be deemed that the appellant accepted the offer in full and final satisfaction of its claim. This was further clarified by providing that the retention of the cheque and/ or encashment thereof will automatically amount to satisfaction in full and final settlement of the claim. Thus, if the appellant accepted the cheques and encashed them without anything more, it would amount to an acceptance of the offer made in the letters of the Railways dated April 7, 1993. The offer prescribed the mode of acceptance, and by conduct the appellant must be held to have accepted the offer and therefore, could not make a claim later. However, if the appellant had not encashed the cheques and protested to the Railways calling upon them to pay the balance amount, and expressed its inability to accept the cheques remitted to it, the controversy would have acquired a different complexion. In that event, in view of the express non acceptance of the offer, the appellant could not be presumed to have accepted the offer. What, however, is significant is that the protest and non acceptance must be conveyed before the cheques are encashed. If the cheques are encashed without protest, then it must be held that the offer stood unequivocally accepted. An offeree cannot be permitted to change his mind after the unequivocal acceptance of the offer. It is well settled that an offer may be accepted by conduct. But conduct would only amount to acceptance if it is clear that the offeree did the act with the intention (actual or apparent) of accepting the offer. The decisions which we have noticed above also proceed on this principle. Each case must rest on its own facts. The courts must examine the evidence to find out whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the conduct of the "offeree" was such as amounted to an unequivocal acceptance of the offer made. If the facts of the case disclose that there was no reservation in signifying acceptance by conduct, it must follow that the offer has been accepted by conduct. On the other hand if the evidence disclose that the "offeree" had reservation in accepting the offer, his conduct may not amount to acceptance of the offer in terms of Section 8 of the Contract Act19. Coming to the facts of this case if the appellant, before encashing the cheques, had sent the communication dated August 20, 1993, it could perhaps be argued that by retaining but not encashing the cheques, it did not intend to accept the offer made in the letter of the Railways dated April 7, 1993. At the same time if the evidence disclosed that it encashed the cheques and later sent a protest, it must be held that it had accepted the offer unconditionally by conveying its acceptance by the mode prescribed, namely by retaining and encashing the cheques, without reservation. Its subsequent change of mind and consequent protest did not matter20. In the instant case there is neither pleadings nor evidence on record as to the date on which the cheques were received and the date on which the same were sent for encashment. It is, therefore, not possible to record a categoric finding as to whether the letters of protest were written after encashing the cheques or before encashing the cheques. It was for the appellant to plead and prove that it had not accepted the offer and had called upon the Railways to pay the balance amount. This it must have done before encashing the cheques. If the appellant encashed the cheques and then wrote letters of protest to the Railways, it cannot be held that it had not accepted the offer by conduct, because at the time when it sent the cheques for encashment, it had not conveyed its protest to the offerer. In the absence of any pleading or evidence to establish that the encashment of the cheques was subsequent to the protest letters by the appellant, it is not possible to hold that by encashing the cheques the appellant had not adopted the mode of acceptance prescribed in the letters of the Railways dated April 7, 1993. In the absence of such evidence it must be held that by encashing the cheques received from the Railways, the appellant accepted the offer by adopting the mode of acceptance prescribed in the offer of the Railways
