Essco Fabs Pvt. Ltd.  Vs. State Of Haryana
‘urgency and ‘unforeseen emergency. In case of ‘urgency falling under sub-section (1) of Section 17 or of ‘unforeseen emergency covered by sub-section (2) of Section 17, special powers may be exercised by appropriate Government but as held by a three Judge Bench decisions before more than four decades in Nandeshwar Prasad and reiterated by a three Judge Bench decision in Mukesh Hans, even in such cases, inquiry and hearing of objections under Section 5A cannot ipso facto be dispensed with unless a notification under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act is issued. The legislative scheme is amply clear which merely enables the appropriate Government to issue such notification under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act dispensing with inquiry under Section 5A if the Government intends to exercise the said power. The use of the expression ‘may in sub-section (4) of Section 17 leaves no room of doubt that it is discretionary power of the Government to direct that the provisions of Section 5A would not apply to such cases covered by sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 17 of the Act. 45. In our opinion, therefore, the contention of learned counsel for the respondent authorities is not well founded and cannot be upheld that once a case is covered by sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 17 of the Act, sub-section (4) of Section 17 would necessarily apply and there is no question of holding inquiry or hearing objections under Section 5A of the Act. Acceptance of such contention or upholding of this argument will make sub-section (4) of Section 17 totally otiose, redundant and nugatory. 46. It is true that in Chameli Singh and Jai Narain, a two Judge Bench has observed that acquisition of land for housing accommodation or for construction of residential quarters for dalits and tribals can be said to be of an urgent nature falling under Section 17(1) of the Act. But as already held in Nandeshwar Prasad and Mukesh Hans, even in such cases, procedure required to be followed under Section 5A cannot be dispensed with unless notification under sub-section (4) of Section 17 is issued. In Mukesh Hans, the Court also held that the provision cannot be pressed in service by officers who were negligent and due to their lethargy, proceedings could not be initiated for a quite long time. 47. In the instant case, the facts are eloquent. Initial action of acquisition of land was taken as early as in 1982 but the proceedings lapsed. In 1991, when Essco made an application praying for change of user of land, it was rejected on the ground that the land was likely to be required for public purpose. Nothing, however, was done for about a decade. It is only in 2001 that again Notification under Section 4 was issued and urgency clause was applied. We are, therefore, satisfied that the ratio lad down in Mukesh Hans squarely applies to the facts of the case. No urgency clause could have been invoked by the respondents and inquiry and hearing of objections provided by Section 5A of the Act could not have been dispensed with. The actions of issuance of urgency clause under sub-section (4) of Section 17, dispensing with inquiry under Section 5A and issuance of final notification under sub-section (1) of Section 6 are required to be quashed and they are accordingly quashed.48. The learned counsel for the appellant also contended that even if it is held that the respondent could have issued final notification without holding inquiry and hearing of objections under Section 5A of the Act, the notification under Section 6 of the Act is illegal and unlawful in view of the fact that the said notification has not been issued after the last of the dates of the publication and giving of public notice referred to as "the date of publication of the notification" under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act. 49. It was submitted that even the said point is concluded by a decision of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. Radhey Shyam Nigam & Ors, (1989) 1 SCC 591. 50. The learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, relying on State of Haryana & Anr. v. Raghubir Dayal, (1995) 1 SCC 133 and Mohan Singh & Ors. v. International Airport Authority of India & Ors., (1997) 9 SCC 132 submitted that if urgency clause under Section 17(4) is applied by the appropriate Government, final notification under Section 6 of the Act can be issued on the next day of the issuance of preliminary notification under Section 4 of the Act. In the case on hand, the said procedure is followed. Notification under Section 4 was issued on August 1, 2001. Urgency clause was applied and the case was covered by Section 17 (4) of the Act. On the very next day i.e. on August 2, 2001, final notification under Section 6 was issued. Therefore, the procedure required by law has been strictly followed as held by this Court in Raghubir Dayal and Mohan Singh. 51. We would have entered into the said question had it been absolutely necessary for us to decide it in the case on hand. But as observed hereinabove, we are of the view that the appellants are entitled to succeed on the first ground that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the appropriate Government was not justified in invoking urgency clause under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act by dispensing with inquiry and hearing of objections under Section 5A of the Act and the final notification issued under Section 6 of the Act deserves to be set aside on that ground alone, we express no opinion one way or the other on the interpretation of the expression "the date of publication of the notification" used in sub-section (1) of Section 4, sub-section (4) of Section 17 and Section 6 of the Act.52. For the foregoing reasons, both
1[ds]In our opinion, therefore, the contention of learned counsel for the respondent authorities is not well founded and cannot be upheld that once a case is covered by sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 17 of the Act, sub-section (4) of Section 17 would necessarily apply and there is no question of holding inquiry or hearing objections under Section 5A of the Act. Acceptance of such contention or upholding of this argument will make sub-section (4) of Section 17 totally otiose, redundant andis true that in Chameli Singh and Jai Narain, a two Judge Bench has observed that acquisition of land for housing accommodation or for construction of residential quarters for dalits and tribals can be said to be of an urgent nature falling under Section 17(1) of the Act. But as already held in Nandeshwar Prasad and Mukesh Hans, even in such cases, procedure required to be followed under Section 5A cannot be dispensed with unless notification under sub-section (4) of Section 17 is issued. In Mukesh Hans, the Court also held that the provision cannot be pressed in service by officers who were negligent and due to their lethargy, proceedings could not be initiated for a quite longthe instant case, the facts are eloquent. Initial action of acquisition of land was taken as early as in 1982 but the proceedings lapsed. In 1991, when Essco made an application praying for change of user of land, it was rejected on the ground that the land was likely to be required for public purpose. Nothing, however, was done for about a decade. It is only in 2001 that again Notification under Section 4 was issued and urgency clause was applied. We are, therefore, satisfied that the ratio lad down in Mukesh Hans squarely applies to the facts of the case. No urgency clause could have been invoked by the respondents and inquiry and hearing of objections provided by Section 5A of the Act could not have been dispensed with. The actions of issuance of urgency clause under sub-section (4) of Section 17, dispensing with inquiry under Section 5A and issuance of final notification under sub-section (1) of Section 6 are required to be quashed and they are accordingly quashed.48. Thelearned counsel for the appellant also contended that even if it is held that the respondent could have issued final notification without holding inquiry and hearing of objections under Section 5A of the Act, the notification under Section 6 of the Act is illegal and unlawful in view of the fact that the said notification has not been issued after the last of the dates of the publication and giving of public notice referred to as "the date of publication of the notification" under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of thewould have entered into the said question had it been absolutely necessary for us to decide it in the case on hand. But as observed hereinabove, we are of the view that the appellants are entitled to succeed on the first ground that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the appropriate Government was not justified in invoking urgency clause under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act by dispensing with inquiry and hearing of objections under Section 5A of the Act and the final notification issued under Section 6 of the Act deserves to be set aside on that ground alone, we express no opinion one way or the other on the interpretation of the expression "the date of publication of the notification" used in sub-section (1) of Section 4, sub-section (4) of Section 17 and Section 6 of the Act.
### Instruction:
Conjecture the end result of the case (acceptance (1) or non-acceptance (0) of the appeal), followed by a detailed explanation using crucial sentences from the case proceeding.

### Input:
‘urgency and ‘unforeseen emergency. In case of ‘urgency falling under sub-section (1) of Section 17 or of ‘unforeseen emergency covered by sub-section (2) of Section 17, special powers may be exercised by appropriate Government but as held by a three Judge Bench decisions before more than four decades in Nandeshwar Prasad and reiterated by a three Judge Bench decision in Mukesh Hans, even in such cases, inquiry and hearing of objections under Section 5A cannot ipso facto be dispensed with unless a notification under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act is issued. The legislative scheme is amply clear which merely enables the appropriate Government to issue such notification under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act dispensing with inquiry under Section 5A if the Government intends to exercise the said power. The use of the expression ‘may in sub-section (4) of Section 17 leaves no room of doubt that it is discretionary power of the Government to direct that the provisions of Section 5A would not apply to such cases covered by sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 17 of the Act. 45. In our opinion, therefore, the contention of learned counsel for the respondent authorities is not well founded and cannot be upheld that once a case is covered by sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 17 of the Act, sub-section (4) of Section 17 would necessarily apply and there is no question of holding inquiry or hearing objections under Section 5A of the Act. Acceptance of such contention or upholding of this argument will make sub-section (4) of Section 17 totally otiose, redundant and nugatory. 46. It is true that in Chameli Singh and Jai Narain, a two Judge Bench has observed that acquisition of land for housing accommodation or for construction of residential quarters for dalits and tribals can be said to be of an urgent nature falling under Section 17(1) of the Act. But as already held in Nandeshwar Prasad and Mukesh Hans, even in such cases, procedure required to be followed under Section 5A cannot be dispensed with unless notification under sub-section (4) of Section 17 is issued. In Mukesh Hans, the Court also held that the provision cannot be pressed in service by officers who were negligent and due to their lethargy, proceedings could not be initiated for a quite long time. 47. In the instant case, the facts are eloquent. Initial action of acquisition of land was taken as early as in 1982 but the proceedings lapsed. In 1991, when Essco made an application praying for change of user of land, it was rejected on the ground that the land was likely to be required for public purpose. Nothing, however, was done for about a decade. It is only in 2001 that again Notification under Section 4 was issued and urgency clause was applied. We are, therefore, satisfied that the ratio lad down in Mukesh Hans squarely applies to the facts of the case. No urgency clause could have been invoked by the respondents and inquiry and hearing of objections provided by Section 5A of the Act could not have been dispensed with. The actions of issuance of urgency clause under sub-section (4) of Section 17, dispensing with inquiry under Section 5A and issuance of final notification under sub-section (1) of Section 6 are required to be quashed and they are accordingly quashed.48. The learned counsel for the appellant also contended that even if it is held that the respondent could have issued final notification without holding inquiry and hearing of objections under Section 5A of the Act, the notification under Section 6 of the Act is illegal and unlawful in view of the fact that the said notification has not been issued after the last of the dates of the publication and giving of public notice referred to as "the date of publication of the notification" under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act. 49. It was submitted that even the said point is concluded by a decision of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. Radhey Shyam Nigam & Ors, (1989) 1 SCC 591. 50. The learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, relying on State of Haryana & Anr. v. Raghubir Dayal, (1995) 1 SCC 133 and Mohan Singh & Ors. v. International Airport Authority of India & Ors., (1997) 9 SCC 132 submitted that if urgency clause under Section 17(4) is applied by the appropriate Government, final notification under Section 6 of the Act can be issued on the next day of the issuance of preliminary notification under Section 4 of the Act. In the case on hand, the said procedure is followed. Notification under Section 4 was issued on August 1, 2001. Urgency clause was applied and the case was covered by Section 17 (4) of the Act. On the very next day i.e. on August 2, 2001, final notification under Section 6 was issued. Therefore, the procedure required by law has been strictly followed as held by this Court in Raghubir Dayal and Mohan Singh. 51. We would have entered into the said question had it been absolutely necessary for us to decide it in the case on hand. But as observed hereinabove, we are of the view that the appellants are entitled to succeed on the first ground that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the appropriate Government was not justified in invoking urgency clause under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act by dispensing with inquiry and hearing of objections under Section 5A of the Act and the final notification issued under Section 6 of the Act deserves to be set aside on that ground alone, we express no opinion one way or the other on the interpretation of the expression "the date of publication of the notification" used in sub-section (1) of Section 4, sub-section (4) of Section 17 and Section 6 of the Act.52. For the foregoing reasons, both

### Response:
1

### Explanation:
In our opinion, therefore, the contention of learned counsel for the respondent authorities is not well founded and cannot be upheld that once a case is covered by sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 17 of the Act, sub-section (4) of Section 17 would necessarily apply and there is no question of holding inquiry or hearing objections under Section 5A of the Act. Acceptance of such contention or upholding of this argument will make sub-section (4) of Section 17 totally otiose, redundant andis true that in Chameli Singh and Jai Narain, a two Judge Bench has observed that acquisition of land for housing accommodation or for construction of residential quarters for dalits and tribals can be said to be of an urgent nature falling under Section 17(1) of the Act. But as already held in Nandeshwar Prasad and Mukesh Hans, even in such cases, procedure required to be followed under Section 5A cannot be dispensed with unless notification under sub-section (4) of Section 17 is issued. In Mukesh Hans, the Court also held that the provision cannot be pressed in service by officers who were negligent and due to their lethargy, proceedings could not be initiated for a quite longthe instant case, the facts are eloquent. Initial action of acquisition of land was taken as early as in 1982 but the proceedings lapsed. In 1991, when Essco made an application praying for change of user of land, it was rejected on the ground that the land was likely to be required for public purpose. Nothing, however, was done for about a decade. It is only in 2001 that again Notification under Section 4 was issued and urgency clause was applied. We are, therefore, satisfied that the ratio lad down in Mukesh Hans squarely applies to the facts of the case. No urgency clause could have been invoked by the respondents and inquiry and hearing of objections provided by Section 5A of the Act could not have been dispensed with. The actions of issuance of urgency clause under sub-section (4) of Section 17, dispensing with inquiry under Section 5A and issuance of final notification under sub-section (1) of Section 6 are required to be quashed and they are accordingly quashed.48. Thelearned counsel for the appellant also contended that even if it is held that the respondent could have issued final notification without holding inquiry and hearing of objections under Section 5A of the Act, the notification under Section 6 of the Act is illegal and unlawful in view of the fact that the said notification has not been issued after the last of the dates of the publication and giving of public notice referred to as "the date of publication of the notification" under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of thewould have entered into the said question had it been absolutely necessary for us to decide it in the case on hand. But as observed hereinabove, we are of the view that the appellants are entitled to succeed on the first ground that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the appropriate Government was not justified in invoking urgency clause under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act by dispensing with inquiry and hearing of objections under Section 5A of the Act and the final notification issued under Section 6 of the Act deserves to be set aside on that ground alone, we express no opinion one way or the other on the interpretation of the expression "the date of publication of the notification" used in sub-section (1) of Section 4, sub-section (4) of Section 17 and Section 6 of the Act.
