CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR THE FERTILIZERS AND CHEMICALS TRANVANCORE LTD Vs. GENERAL SECRETARY FACT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
Khadi & Village Industries Board vs. P. Kulothangan & Anr., (2004) 1 SCC 68. In this case also, this Court again examined the question as to whether the principle of res judicata including the principles of constructive res judicata applies to the industrial adjudication or not. Though this Court did not notice the law laid down in the case of R.C.Tiwari (supra), yet it took the same view, as is clear from Paras 10 and 11:"10. In our opinion, the appellant has correctly contended that the industrial dispute pertained to the same subject-matter dealt with in the earlier writ proceedings and was barred by the principles of res judicata. It is well established that although the entire Civil Procedure Code is not applicable to industrial adjudication, the principles of res judicata laid down under Section 11 of the Code are applicable1 including the principles of constructive res judicata. Thus in State of U.P. v. Nawab Hussain2 it was held that the dismissal of a writ petition challenging disciplinary proceedings on the ground that the charged officer had not been afforded reasonable opportunity to meet the allegations against him, operated as res judicata in respect of the subsequent suit in which the order of dismissal was challenged on the ground that it was incompetently passed. This Court also held: (SCC p. 808) It may be that the same set of facts may give rise to two or more causes of action. If in such a case a person is allowed to choose and sue upon one cause of action at one time and to reserve the other for subsequent litigation, that would aggravate the burden of litigation. Courts have therefore treated such a course of action as an abuse of its process. 11. The principle of res judicata operates on the court. It is the courts which are prohibited from trying the issue which was directly and substantially in issue in the earlier proceedings between the same parties, provided the court trying the subsequent proceeding is satisfied that the earlier court was competent to dispose of the earlier proceedings and that the matter had been heard and finally decided by such court. Here the parties to the writ petition filed by the respondent in the Madras High Court and the industrial dispute were the same. The cause of action in both was the refusal of the appellant to allow the respondent to rejoin service. The Madras High Court was competent to decide the issue which it did with a reasoned order on merits and after a contested hearing. This was not a case where the earlier proceedings had been disposed of on any technical ground as was the case in Workmen v. Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust3 and Pujari Bai v. Madan Gopal4. The ?lesser relief? of reinstatement which was the subject-matter of the industrial dispute had already been claimed by the respondent in the writ petition. This was refused by the High Court. The correctness of the decision in the writ proceedings has not been challenged by the respondent. The decision was, therefore, final. Having got an adverse order in the writ petition, it was not open to the respondent to reagitate the issue before the Labour Court and the Labour Court was incompetent to entertain the dispute raised by the respondent and redecide the matter in the face of the earlier decision of the High Court in the writ proceedings.?27. The third case is Executive Engineer, ZP Engg. Divn. & Anr. vs. Digambara Rao & Ors., (2004) 8 SCC 262. In this case also, this Court placing reliance on the decision in Kulothangan (supra) reiterated the same view, earlier taken by this Court in the case of R.C. Tiwari (supra) with these words:?15………..It is now well settled that the general principle of res judicata applies to an industrial adjudication.?28. Now coming to the facts of this case, it is not in dispute that the issue in relation to reduction of age from 60 to 58 years was raised by the Trade Unions/Respondents in the first round of litigation by filing the original petitions (O.P. Nos.14598, 14599 & 14976/2003) in the Kerala High Court. These writ petitions were dismissed by the Single Judge on merits by order dated 12.08.2003. The respondents/Trade Unions then carried the issue in intra court appeals (No.1565, 1595, 2112 & 2113/2003) before the Division Bench. The appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench by order dated 18.12.2003. The Trade Unions/respondents then filed special leave to appeals in this Court and by order dated 23.04.2004, this Court dismissed the SLPs and affirmed the order of the Division Bench. 29. In our view, the effect of passing of these orders was that the issue in relation to reduction of age from 60 to 58 years including all incidental issues arising therefrom, attained finality because they were already decided on the merits between the parties to the Lis. 30. In our opinion, no judicial forum at the instance of any party to the Lis had jurisdiction to try these issues again on its merits. It was barred for being tried again by virtue of principles of res judicata contained in Section 11 of the Code, which has also application to the labour/industrial proceedings. 31. In our opinion, the State had, therefore, no jurisdiction to make a reference(s) to the Labour Court under Section 10 of the ID Act to re-examine the question of age reduction made by the appellant(PSU). A fortiori, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the reference(s) to adjudicate the question(s) referred in the reference(s). 32. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court was not justified in setting aside the awards of the Labour Court, which had rightly held that it (Labour Court) had no jurisdiction to entertain the reference and nor it had the jurisdiction to answer it on merits. The High Court should have upheld the awards of the Labour Court.
1[ds]22. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case including the written submissions, we are inclined to allow these appeals and while setting aside the impugned order restore the awards dated 02.07.2008 and 02.08.2008 of the Labour Court.In our considered view, the question, as to whether the principle of res judicata defined in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ?the Code?) applies to the labour proceedings or not, remains no more res integra and stands answered by three decisions of this Court.Now coming to the facts of this case, it is not in dispute that the issue in relation to reduction of age from 60 to 58 years was raised by the Trade Unions/Respondents in the first round of litigation by filing the original petitions (O.P. Nos.14598, 14599 & 14976/2003) in the Kerala High Court. These writ petitions were dismissed by the Single Judge on merits by order dated 12.08.2003. The respondents/Trade Unions then carried the issue in intra court appeals (No.1565, 1595, 2112 & 2113/2003) before the Division Bench. The appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench by order dated 18.12.2003. The Trade Unions/respondents then filed special leave to appeals in this Court and by order dated 23.04.2004, this Court dismissed the SLPs and affirmed the order of the Division Bench.In our view, the effect of passing of these orders was that the issue in relation to reduction of age from 60 to 58 years including all incidental issues arising therefrom, attained finality because they were already decided on the merits between the parties to the Lis.In our opinion, no judicial forum at the instance of any party to the Lis had jurisdiction to try these issues again on its merits. It was barred for being tried again by virtue of principles of res judicata contained in Section 11 of the Code, which has also application to the labour/industrial proceedings.In our opinion, the State had, therefore, no jurisdiction to make a reference(s) to the Labour Court under Section 10 of the ID Act to re-examine the question of age reduction made by the appellant(PSU). A fortiori, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the reference(s) to adjudicate the question(s) referred in the reference(s).In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court was not justified in setting aside the awards of the Labour Court, which had rightly held that it (Labour Court) had no jurisdiction to entertain the reference and nor it had the jurisdiction to answer it on merits. The High Court should have upheld the awards of the Labour Court.
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Khadi & Village Industries Board vs. P. Kulothangan & Anr., (2004) 1 SCC 68. In this case also, this Court again examined the question as to whether the principle of res judicata including the principles of constructive res judicata applies to the industrial adjudication or not. Though this Court did not notice the law laid down in the case of R.C.Tiwari (supra), yet it took the same view, as is clear from Paras 10 and 11:"10. In our opinion, the appellant has correctly contended that the industrial dispute pertained to the same subject-matter dealt with in the earlier writ proceedings and was barred by the principles of res judicata. It is well established that although the entire Civil Procedure Code is not applicable to industrial adjudication, the principles of res judicata laid down under Section 11 of the Code are applicable1 including the principles of constructive res judicata. Thus in State of U.P. v. Nawab Hussain2 it was held that the dismissal of a writ petition challenging disciplinary proceedings on the ground that the charged officer had not been afforded reasonable opportunity to meet the allegations against him, operated as res judicata in respect of the subsequent suit in which the order of dismissal was challenged on the ground that it was incompetently passed. This Court also held: (SCC p. 808) It may be that the same set of facts may give rise to two or more causes of action. If in such a case a person is allowed to choose and sue upon one cause of action at one time and to reserve the other for subsequent litigation, that would aggravate the burden of litigation. Courts have therefore treated such a course of action as an abuse of its process. 11. The principle of res judicata operates on the court. It is the courts which are prohibited from trying the issue which was directly and substantially in issue in the earlier proceedings between the same parties, provided the court trying the subsequent proceeding is satisfied that the earlier court was competent to dispose of the earlier proceedings and that the matter had been heard and finally decided by such court. Here the parties to the writ petition filed by the respondent in the Madras High Court and the industrial dispute were the same. The cause of action in both was the refusal of the appellant to allow the respondent to rejoin service. The Madras High Court was competent to decide the issue which it did with a reasoned order on merits and after a contested hearing. This was not a case where the earlier proceedings had been disposed of on any technical ground as was the case in Workmen v. Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust3 and Pujari Bai v. Madan Gopal4. The ?lesser relief? of reinstatement which was the subject-matter of the industrial dispute had already been claimed by the respondent in the writ petition. This was refused by the High Court. The correctness of the decision in the writ proceedings has not been challenged by the respondent. The decision was, therefore, final. Having got an adverse order in the writ petition, it was not open to the respondent to reagitate the issue before the Labour Court and the Labour Court was incompetent to entertain the dispute raised by the respondent and redecide the matter in the face of the earlier decision of the High Court in the writ proceedings.?27. The third case is Executive Engineer, ZP Engg. Divn. & Anr. vs. Digambara Rao & Ors., (2004) 8 SCC 262. In this case also, this Court placing reliance on the decision in Kulothangan (supra) reiterated the same view, earlier taken by this Court in the case of R.C. Tiwari (supra) with these words:?15………..It is now well settled that the general principle of res judicata applies to an industrial adjudication.?28. Now coming to the facts of this case, it is not in dispute that the issue in relation to reduction of age from 60 to 58 years was raised by the Trade Unions/Respondents in the first round of litigation by filing the original petitions (O.P. Nos.14598, 14599 & 14976/2003) in the Kerala High Court. These writ petitions were dismissed by the Single Judge on merits by order dated 12.08.2003. The respondents/Trade Unions then carried the issue in intra court appeals (No.1565, 1595, 2112 & 2113/2003) before the Division Bench. The appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench by order dated 18.12.2003. The Trade Unions/respondents then filed special leave to appeals in this Court and by order dated 23.04.2004, this Court dismissed the SLPs and affirmed the order of the Division Bench. 29. In our view, the effect of passing of these orders was that the issue in relation to reduction of age from 60 to 58 years including all incidental issues arising therefrom, attained finality because they were already decided on the merits between the parties to the Lis. 30. In our opinion, no judicial forum at the instance of any party to the Lis had jurisdiction to try these issues again on its merits. It was barred for being tried again by virtue of principles of res judicata contained in Section 11 of the Code, which has also application to the labour/industrial proceedings. 31. In our opinion, the State had, therefore, no jurisdiction to make a reference(s) to the Labour Court under Section 10 of the ID Act to re-examine the question of age reduction made by the appellant(PSU). A fortiori, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the reference(s) to adjudicate the question(s) referred in the reference(s). 32. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court was not justified in setting aside the awards of the Labour Court, which had rightly held that it (Labour Court) had no jurisdiction to entertain the reference and nor it had the jurisdiction to answer it on merits. The High Court should have upheld the awards of the Labour Court.

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22. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case including the written submissions, we are inclined to allow these appeals and while setting aside the impugned order restore the awards dated 02.07.2008 and 02.08.2008 of the Labour Court.In our considered view, the question, as to whether the principle of res judicata defined in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ?the Code?) applies to the labour proceedings or not, remains no more res integra and stands answered by three decisions of this Court.Now coming to the facts of this case, it is not in dispute that the issue in relation to reduction of age from 60 to 58 years was raised by the Trade Unions/Respondents in the first round of litigation by filing the original petitions (O.P. Nos.14598, 14599 & 14976/2003) in the Kerala High Court. These writ petitions were dismissed by the Single Judge on merits by order dated 12.08.2003. The respondents/Trade Unions then carried the issue in intra court appeals (No.1565, 1595, 2112 & 2113/2003) before the Division Bench. The appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench by order dated 18.12.2003. The Trade Unions/respondents then filed special leave to appeals in this Court and by order dated 23.04.2004, this Court dismissed the SLPs and affirmed the order of the Division Bench.In our view, the effect of passing of these orders was that the issue in relation to reduction of age from 60 to 58 years including all incidental issues arising therefrom, attained finality because they were already decided on the merits between the parties to the Lis.In our opinion, no judicial forum at the instance of any party to the Lis had jurisdiction to try these issues again on its merits. It was barred for being tried again by virtue of principles of res judicata contained in Section 11 of the Code, which has also application to the labour/industrial proceedings.In our opinion, the State had, therefore, no jurisdiction to make a reference(s) to the Labour Court under Section 10 of the ID Act to re-examine the question of age reduction made by the appellant(PSU). A fortiori, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the reference(s) to adjudicate the question(s) referred in the reference(s).In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court was not justified in setting aside the awards of the Labour Court, which had rightly held that it (Labour Court) had no jurisdiction to entertain the reference and nor it had the jurisdiction to answer it on merits. The High Court should have upheld the awards of the Labour Court.
