Masood Ahmad Vs. Rent Control &amp; Eviction Officer &amp; Others
give preference to the landlord if he was satisfied that the landlord bonafide needed the accommodation for his personal occupation. It was submitted that demolition of the building followed by reconstruction therefore was not within the bona fide need of the landlord covered by Rule 6. Our attention was drawn to a judgment of the Allahabad High Court in H. M. Bux v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer ((1958) All LJ 45) where the High Court rejected the contention based on the dictum in an earlier decision in Gada Dhar Prasad Sharma v. District Magistrate, Lucknow ((1956) All LJ 694) that the landlord was "entitled to preference" under Rule 6 and "unless the Rent Control and Eviction Officer thinks that his need is not genuine in the sense that he dose not want to live in the house but wants to take it for somebody else it is incumbent on the Rent Control and Eviction officer to allot the landlord." In the view of the High Court in Buxs case there was no justification for holding that "except in the case in which the landlord wants the accommodation for the purpose of letting it out to another person, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is bound to conclude that the need of the landlord is genuine." According to the High Court; Letting out to another person could not be employed as the sole test for deciding whether the landlord is to be allowed the benefit of the rule. In our view the decision in Buxs case does not help the appellant before us as the High Court - in our view, rightly - pointed out that "each case must necessarily depend on its own facts". In this case, the facts are that two shops adjoining the accommodation in question are in the occupation of the landlord and the roof thereof has fallen. There is nothing to contradict the landlords case that the whole building is old and dilapidated and requires to be demolished and that he needed the premises for erecting a cinema house with office accommodation etc. Apparently the State Government was satisfied with this reason. We find ourselves unable to subscribe to the view that even if the building is in a dilapidated condition a portion whereof is without a roof and the landlord wants to put up a cinema theatre to carry on business he does not require the accommodation bona fide for his personal need. 9. Points (2) and (7) can be disposed of together. Our attention was drawn to the fact that the landlord had made an application for release of the accommodation in his favour as early as August 24, 1967. The letter was sent under certificate of posting bearing the postal mark of that date. We were also referred to annexure F to the counter affidavit of the landlord before the High Court purporting to show that the copy of the address written on the envelope of the letter to the officer bore the postal stamp of August 24. The State Government had sent for the entire record as well as the report of the officer on the application of the landlord and it was on a scrutiny of the entire facts and circumstances that the State Government took the view that the officer had failed to consider the application of the landlord. Nothing has been shown to us as to why we should reject the view of the State Government formed on the material before it. It is evident that the appellant had gone into possession even before the allotment order was made and was trying his best to hold on to it. The allotment order of October 21, was subject to the revisionary jurisdiction of the State Government under Section 7-F. Very wide powers are give to the State Government under this section and as the State Government directed the cancellation of the allotment in favour of the appellant on a perusal of the cancellation of the allotment in favour of the appellant on a perusal of the record including the report of the officer and the appellants memorandum putting forward all the grounds urged in his favour, the High Court rightly took the view that the order could not be questioned. 10. On the third point, counsel submitted that as the landlord must have been aware of the fact that the tenant was dead and the accommodation had fallen vacant and as he kept quiet even after the notification of vacancy by the Allotment Committee he cannot complain of the allotment in favour of the appellant. Moreover, it was urged, it was only after the allotment in favour of the appellant that the landlord sought to have an order of release in his favour; in consequence his application should have been thrown out by the State Government. No question of estoppel arises in this case. The State Government did not take the view that the landlords application was not made on August 24 and expressly found that the Officer had failed to consider it. 11. From the above, it is clear that the order under Section 7-F cannot be questioned on the ground that the State Government had failed to give reasons for rejecting the officers order. The State Government gave its reasons quite clearly when it noted that the landlords application had not been considered. The State Government also hold that the landlord needed the premises for reconstruction. This disposes of point (4). 12. In the above view of the matter points (5) and (6) do not call for consideration. The landlord had made an application which was not considered and if his application had been considered, his preferential right could not be ignored. We are not concerned to go into the question as to whether proceedings under Section 7-A can be properly instituted as this did not form the subject matter of the writ petition of the appellant nor was any relief asked for on any such ground.
0[ds]3. The order of the State Government shows that it was made on a perusal of the record. The view taken by the revising authority was that the landlords release application dated August 24, 1967 "was not considered by the opposite party (the appellant) was made to regularise the illegal occupation of the premises in dispute." According to the order "the opposite party was successful in securing an allotment order when he should in fact have been proceeded against under the provisions of the Actor illegal occupation with the assistance of the widow of the former tenant." In the result the State Government set aside the order of allotment and directed release of the accommodation in dispute to the landlord for reconstruction8. We are unable to find any merit in any of the submissions made on behalf of the appellant. On the first point, counsel submitted that it being the duty of the landlord and the tenant to notify the District Magistrate about the vacancy or the imminence thereof, the District Magistrate could only give preference to the landlord if he was satisfied that the landlord bonafide needed the accommodation for his personal occupation. It was submitted that demolition of the building followed by reconstruction therefore was not within the bona fide need of the landlord covered by Rule 6. Our attention was drawn to a judgment of the Allahabad High Court in H. M. Bux v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer ((1958) All LJ 45) where the High Court rejected the contention based on the dictum in an earlier decision in Gada Dhar Prasad Sharma v. District Magistrate, Lucknow ((1956) All LJ 694) that the landlord was "entitled to preference" under Rule 6 and "unless the Rent Control and Eviction Officer thinks that his need is not genuine in the sense that he dose not want to live in the house but wants to take it for somebody else it is incumbent on the Rent Control and Eviction officer to allot the landlord." In the view of the High Court in Buxs case there was no justification for holding that "except in the case in which the landlord wants the accommodation for the purpose of letting it out to another person, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is bound to conclude that the need of the landlord is genuine." According to the High Court;Letting out to another person could not be employed as the sole test for deciding whether the landlord is to be allowed the benefit of the ruleIn our view the decision in Buxs case does not help the appellant before us as the High Courtin our view, rightlypointed out that "each case must necessarily depend on its own facts". In this case, the facts are that two shops adjoining the accommodation in question are in the occupation of the landlord and the roof thereof has fallen. There is nothing to contradict the landlords case that the whole building is old and dilapidated and requires to be demolished and that he needed the premises for erecting a cinema house with office accommodation etc. Apparently the State Government was satisfied with this reason. We find ourselves unable to subscribe to the view that even if the building is in a dilapidated condition a portion whereof is without a roof and the landlord wants to put up a cinema theatre to carry on business he does not require the accommodation bona fide for his personal needIt is evident that the appellant had gone into possession even before the allotment order was made and was trying his best to hold on to it. The allotment order of October 21, was subject to the revisionary jurisdiction of the State Government under Section. Very wide powers are give to the State Government under this section and as the State Government directed the cancellation of the allotment in favour of the appellant on a perusal of the cancellation of the allotment in favour of the appellant on a perusal of the record including the report of the officer and the appellants memorandum putting forward all the grounds urged in his favour, the High Court rightly took the view that the order could not be questionedNo question of estoppel arises in this case. The State Government did not take the view that the landlords application was not made on August 24 and expressly found that the Officer had failed to consider it11. From the above, it is clear that the order under SectionF cannot be questioned on the ground that the State Government had failed to give reasons for rejecting the officers order. The State Government gave its reasons quite clearly when it noted that the landlords application had not been considered. The State Government also hold that the landlord needed the premises for reconstruction. This disposes of point (4)12. In the above view of the matter points (5) and (6) do not call for consideration. The landlord had made an application which was not considered and if his application had been considered, his preferential right could not be ignored. We are not concerned to go into the question as to whether proceedings under SectionA can be properly instituted as this did not form the subject matter of the writ petition of the appellant nor was any relief asked for on any such ground.
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give preference to the landlord if he was satisfied that the landlord bonafide needed the accommodation for his personal occupation. It was submitted that demolition of the building followed by reconstruction therefore was not within the bona fide need of the landlord covered by Rule 6. Our attention was drawn to a judgment of the Allahabad High Court in H. M. Bux v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer ((1958) All LJ 45) where the High Court rejected the contention based on the dictum in an earlier decision in Gada Dhar Prasad Sharma v. District Magistrate, Lucknow ((1956) All LJ 694) that the landlord was "entitled to preference" under Rule 6 and "unless the Rent Control and Eviction Officer thinks that his need is not genuine in the sense that he dose not want to live in the house but wants to take it for somebody else it is incumbent on the Rent Control and Eviction officer to allot the landlord." In the view of the High Court in Buxs case there was no justification for holding that "except in the case in which the landlord wants the accommodation for the purpose of letting it out to another person, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is bound to conclude that the need of the landlord is genuine." According to the High Court; Letting out to another person could not be employed as the sole test for deciding whether the landlord is to be allowed the benefit of the rule. In our view the decision in Buxs case does not help the appellant before us as the High Court - in our view, rightly - pointed out that "each case must necessarily depend on its own facts". In this case, the facts are that two shops adjoining the accommodation in question are in the occupation of the landlord and the roof thereof has fallen. There is nothing to contradict the landlords case that the whole building is old and dilapidated and requires to be demolished and that he needed the premises for erecting a cinema house with office accommodation etc. Apparently the State Government was satisfied with this reason. We find ourselves unable to subscribe to the view that even if the building is in a dilapidated condition a portion whereof is without a roof and the landlord wants to put up a cinema theatre to carry on business he does not require the accommodation bona fide for his personal need. 9. Points (2) and (7) can be disposed of together. Our attention was drawn to the fact that the landlord had made an application for release of the accommodation in his favour as early as August 24, 1967. The letter was sent under certificate of posting bearing the postal mark of that date. We were also referred to annexure F to the counter affidavit of the landlord before the High Court purporting to show that the copy of the address written on the envelope of the letter to the officer bore the postal stamp of August 24. The State Government had sent for the entire record as well as the report of the officer on the application of the landlord and it was on a scrutiny of the entire facts and circumstances that the State Government took the view that the officer had failed to consider the application of the landlord. Nothing has been shown to us as to why we should reject the view of the State Government formed on the material before it. It is evident that the appellant had gone into possession even before the allotment order was made and was trying his best to hold on to it. The allotment order of October 21, was subject to the revisionary jurisdiction of the State Government under Section 7-F. Very wide powers are give to the State Government under this section and as the State Government directed the cancellation of the allotment in favour of the appellant on a perusal of the cancellation of the allotment in favour of the appellant on a perusal of the record including the report of the officer and the appellants memorandum putting forward all the grounds urged in his favour, the High Court rightly took the view that the order could not be questioned. 10. On the third point, counsel submitted that as the landlord must have been aware of the fact that the tenant was dead and the accommodation had fallen vacant and as he kept quiet even after the notification of vacancy by the Allotment Committee he cannot complain of the allotment in favour of the appellant. Moreover, it was urged, it was only after the allotment in favour of the appellant that the landlord sought to have an order of release in his favour; in consequence his application should have been thrown out by the State Government. No question of estoppel arises in this case. The State Government did not take the view that the landlords application was not made on August 24 and expressly found that the Officer had failed to consider it. 11. From the above, it is clear that the order under Section 7-F cannot be questioned on the ground that the State Government had failed to give reasons for rejecting the officers order. The State Government gave its reasons quite clearly when it noted that the landlords application had not been considered. The State Government also hold that the landlord needed the premises for reconstruction. This disposes of point (4). 12. In the above view of the matter points (5) and (6) do not call for consideration. The landlord had made an application which was not considered and if his application had been considered, his preferential right could not be ignored. We are not concerned to go into the question as to whether proceedings under Section 7-A can be properly instituted as this did not form the subject matter of the writ petition of the appellant nor was any relief asked for on any such ground.

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3. The order of the State Government shows that it was made on a perusal of the record. The view taken by the revising authority was that the landlords release application dated August 24, 1967 "was not considered by the opposite party (the appellant) was made to regularise the illegal occupation of the premises in dispute." According to the order "the opposite party was successful in securing an allotment order when he should in fact have been proceeded against under the provisions of the Actor illegal occupation with the assistance of the widow of the former tenant." In the result the State Government set aside the order of allotment and directed release of the accommodation in dispute to the landlord for reconstruction8. We are unable to find any merit in any of the submissions made on behalf of the appellant. On the first point, counsel submitted that it being the duty of the landlord and the tenant to notify the District Magistrate about the vacancy or the imminence thereof, the District Magistrate could only give preference to the landlord if he was satisfied that the landlord bonafide needed the accommodation for his personal occupation. It was submitted that demolition of the building followed by reconstruction therefore was not within the bona fide need of the landlord covered by Rule 6. Our attention was drawn to a judgment of the Allahabad High Court in H. M. Bux v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer ((1958) All LJ 45) where the High Court rejected the contention based on the dictum in an earlier decision in Gada Dhar Prasad Sharma v. District Magistrate, Lucknow ((1956) All LJ 694) that the landlord was "entitled to preference" under Rule 6 and "unless the Rent Control and Eviction Officer thinks that his need is not genuine in the sense that he dose not want to live in the house but wants to take it for somebody else it is incumbent on the Rent Control and Eviction officer to allot the landlord." In the view of the High Court in Buxs case there was no justification for holding that "except in the case in which the landlord wants the accommodation for the purpose of letting it out to another person, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is bound to conclude that the need of the landlord is genuine." According to the High Court;Letting out to another person could not be employed as the sole test for deciding whether the landlord is to be allowed the benefit of the ruleIn our view the decision in Buxs case does not help the appellant before us as the High Courtin our view, rightlypointed out that "each case must necessarily depend on its own facts". In this case, the facts are that two shops adjoining the accommodation in question are in the occupation of the landlord and the roof thereof has fallen. There is nothing to contradict the landlords case that the whole building is old and dilapidated and requires to be demolished and that he needed the premises for erecting a cinema house with office accommodation etc. Apparently the State Government was satisfied with this reason. We find ourselves unable to subscribe to the view that even if the building is in a dilapidated condition a portion whereof is without a roof and the landlord wants to put up a cinema theatre to carry on business he does not require the accommodation bona fide for his personal needIt is evident that the appellant had gone into possession even before the allotment order was made and was trying his best to hold on to it. The allotment order of October 21, was subject to the revisionary jurisdiction of the State Government under Section. Very wide powers are give to the State Government under this section and as the State Government directed the cancellation of the allotment in favour of the appellant on a perusal of the cancellation of the allotment in favour of the appellant on a perusal of the record including the report of the officer and the appellants memorandum putting forward all the grounds urged in his favour, the High Court rightly took the view that the order could not be questionedNo question of estoppel arises in this case. The State Government did not take the view that the landlords application was not made on August 24 and expressly found that the Officer had failed to consider it11. From the above, it is clear that the order under SectionF cannot be questioned on the ground that the State Government had failed to give reasons for rejecting the officers order. The State Government gave its reasons quite clearly when it noted that the landlords application had not been considered. The State Government also hold that the landlord needed the premises for reconstruction. This disposes of point (4)12. In the above view of the matter points (5) and (6) do not call for consideration. The landlord had made an application which was not considered and if his application had been considered, his preferential right could not be ignored. We are not concerned to go into the question as to whether proceedings under SectionA can be properly instituted as this did not form the subject matter of the writ petition of the appellant nor was any relief asked for on any such ground.
