Union Territory Of Goa, Daman And Diu And Anr Vs. Lakshmibai Narayan Patil Etc. Etc.Andsmt. Lakshmi Bai Patil
many other factors in formulating a scheme of agrarian reforms suitable to a particular State." * The decision, therefore, indicates that a flexible approach has to be adopted in deciding as to the nature of agrarian reform to be taken, rather than laying down a strait-jacket rule for universal application. The observations in Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra were also made while examining an Act fixing ceiling of holdings and in justification of the impugned provisions it was observed that the policy in this regard was initiated following the report of the Agricultural Labour Inquiry conducted in the 1960s and in implementation of this policy the Act under consideration was passed. The implication is that the fixation of ceiling was not essentially involved in agrarian reform but it had to be resorted of in the State of Maharashtra following the conclusion arrived at in the Agricultural Labour Inquiry. 13. The learned counsel for the respondents also placed two cases wherein Article 31-A was held to be inapplicable. In K. K. Kochuni v. State of Madras the question of Article 31-A did arise but in absolutely different context. The immediate predecessor of the petitioner K. K. Kochuni was the sthanee of the properties attached to the various sthanams held by him. On his death in 1925, the petitioner being the senior member became the sthanee and respondents 2 to 17 being the junior members of the tarwad did not get any interest in the properties. In an earlier litigation which was commenced following the passing of an Act in 1932, the petitioners exclusive right was established up to the Privy Council stage. It was held that the members of the tarwad had no interest therein. After the title of the sthanee was thus established, the Madras legislature passed the impugned Act in 1955, which declared that every sthanam satisfying certain conditions mentioned in the Act would be deemed and would always be deemed to have properties belonging to the tarwad. The petitioner K. K. Kochuni challenged the Act as ultra vires before this Court by an application under Article 32 of the Constitution. Two other petitions were also filed, one by his wife and daughters with respect to certain other properties gifted to them and the other by his son. In support of the constitutional validity of the Act it was argued on behalf of the respondents that the petitioners sthanam was an estate within the meaning of Article 31-A and, therefore, enjoyed the protection under that article. The argument was that a law relating inter se the rights of a proprietor in his estate and the junior members of his family was also covered by the wide phraseology used in clause (2)(b) of Article 31-A. This Court rejected the plea, holding that : (SCR p. 900)"The definition of "estate" refers to an existing law relating to land tenures in a particular area indicating thereby that the article is concerned only with the land tenure described as an "estate". The inclusive definition of the rights of such an estate also enumerates the rights vested in the proprietor and his subordinate tenure-holders. The last clause in that definition, viz., that those rights also include the rights or privileges in respect of land revenue, emphasizes the fact that the article is concerned with land tenure. It is, therefore, manifest that the said article deals with a tenure called "estate " and provides for is acquisition or the extinguishment or modification of the rights of the landholder or the various subordinate tenure-holders in respect of their rights in relation to the estate. The contrary view would enable the State to divest a proprietor of his estate and vest it in another without reference to any agrarian reform. It would also enable the State to compel a proprietor to divide his properties, though self-acquired, between himself and other members of his family or create interest therein in favour of persons other than tenants who had none before." * The court, thus held that Article 31-A(1)(a) will not apply to an Act which does not contemplate or seek to regulate the rights inter se between the landlords and tenants leaving all their characteristics intact. The court further considered the judgment in Sri Ram Ram Narain and distinguished it on the ground that under the Bombay Act certain rights were conferred on the tenants in respect of their Manufacturing Company v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. relied upon by Mr. Nariman is also of no help as the same was dealing with certain legislation in regard to mines and minerals. The question of interpreting Article 31-A(1)(a) did not arise there at all. 14. As has been discussed above, the title to the land shall vest in the tiller and the landlord shall get the compensation. Earlier also his right to resume the land for personal cultivation was considerably restricted by the provisions of the 1964 Act. As a result of the impugned Amendment Act he has been divested of this limited right for a price, and the tiller shall no more be under a threat of dispossession. The impugned provisions must therefore be accepted as measure of land reform. We reject the argument of the respondents that in absence of provisions fixing ceiling on the area of land which can be held by a person a statute cannot be accepted as a measure of land reform. The Fifth Amendment Act is, therefore, entitled to the protection of Article 31-A and it cannot be struck down on the ground of violation of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. The judgment of the Judicial Commissioner declaring the Act as ultra vires is accordingly set aside and the writ petitions filed by the respondents are dismissed. Consequently it is not necessary to deal with the writ petition (W.P. No. 864 of 1988) filed in this Court under Article 32 challenging the inclusion of the impugned Act in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution and the same is rejected.
1[ds]9. Article 31-A(1)(a) declares that no law providing for "the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinction or modification of any such rights", shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14 or Article 19. The Fifth Amendment Act has received the assent of the President as required by the first proviso. The expression estate is undisputedly applicable in the present case in view of the provisions of clause (2) of the said article. Although Article 31-A(1)(a) does not by express language restrict its application to a particular nature of law, it is now well settled that the protection of the Article is limited to the laws which serve the purpose of agrarian reform, and Mr. R. F. Nariman is right in relying upon the observations at page 901-F of the judgment in Godavari Sugar Mills Ltd. v. S. B. Kamble. The learned counsel has further urged that the other observations in this judgment support his main argument also that in absence of provisions for ceiling a statute cannot be held to be for agrarian reform. We are unable to agree. In that case the constitutional validity of the Act amending certain provisions of the Maharashtra Agricultural (Ceiling and Holdings) Act, 1961 was under challenge and it was sought to be saved inter alia with the aid of Article 31-A. While discussing the scope of Article 31-A, the court at page 902-F relied upon the decision in Balmadies Plantations Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu in the following terms : (SCC p. 710, parathe case of Balmadies Plantations Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu it was held while dealing with the provisions of Gudalur Janmam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act that the object and general scheme of the Act was to abolish intermediaries between the State and the cultivator and to help the actual cultivator by giving him the status of direct relationship between himself and the State. The Act, as such, in its broad outlines was held to be a measure of agrarian reform and protected by Article 31-A.As has been discussed above, the title to the land shall vest in the tiller and the landlord shall get the compensation. Earlier also his right to resume the land for personal cultivation was considerably restricted by the provisions of the 1964 Act. As a result of the impugned Amendment Act he has been divested of this limited right for a price, and the tiller shall no more be under a threat of dispossession. The impugned provisions must therefore be accepted as measure of land reform. We reject the argument of the respondents that in absence of provisions fixing ceiling on the area of land which can be held by a person a statute cannot be accepted as a measure of land reform. The Fifth Amendment Act is, therefore, entitled to the protection of Article 31-A and it cannot be struck down on the ground of violation of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. The judgment of the Judicial Commissioner declaring the Act as ultra vires is accordingly set aside and the writ petitions filed by the respondents are dismissed. Consequently it is not necessary to deal with the writ petition (W.P. No. 864 of 1988) filed in this Court under Article 32 challenging the inclusion of the impugned Act in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution and the same is rejected
### Instruction:
Judge the probable resolution of the case (approval (1) or disapproval (0)), and elaborate on this forecast by extracting and interpreting significant sentences from the proceeding.

### Input:
many other factors in formulating a scheme of agrarian reforms suitable to a particular State." * The decision, therefore, indicates that a flexible approach has to be adopted in deciding as to the nature of agrarian reform to be taken, rather than laying down a strait-jacket rule for universal application. The observations in Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra were also made while examining an Act fixing ceiling of holdings and in justification of the impugned provisions it was observed that the policy in this regard was initiated following the report of the Agricultural Labour Inquiry conducted in the 1960s and in implementation of this policy the Act under consideration was passed. The implication is that the fixation of ceiling was not essentially involved in agrarian reform but it had to be resorted of in the State of Maharashtra following the conclusion arrived at in the Agricultural Labour Inquiry. 13. The learned counsel for the respondents also placed two cases wherein Article 31-A was held to be inapplicable. In K. K. Kochuni v. State of Madras the question of Article 31-A did arise but in absolutely different context. The immediate predecessor of the petitioner K. K. Kochuni was the sthanee of the properties attached to the various sthanams held by him. On his death in 1925, the petitioner being the senior member became the sthanee and respondents 2 to 17 being the junior members of the tarwad did not get any interest in the properties. In an earlier litigation which was commenced following the passing of an Act in 1932, the petitioners exclusive right was established up to the Privy Council stage. It was held that the members of the tarwad had no interest therein. After the title of the sthanee was thus established, the Madras legislature passed the impugned Act in 1955, which declared that every sthanam satisfying certain conditions mentioned in the Act would be deemed and would always be deemed to have properties belonging to the tarwad. The petitioner K. K. Kochuni challenged the Act as ultra vires before this Court by an application under Article 32 of the Constitution. Two other petitions were also filed, one by his wife and daughters with respect to certain other properties gifted to them and the other by his son. In support of the constitutional validity of the Act it was argued on behalf of the respondents that the petitioners sthanam was an estate within the meaning of Article 31-A and, therefore, enjoyed the protection under that article. The argument was that a law relating inter se the rights of a proprietor in his estate and the junior members of his family was also covered by the wide phraseology used in clause (2)(b) of Article 31-A. This Court rejected the plea, holding that : (SCR p. 900)"The definition of "estate" refers to an existing law relating to land tenures in a particular area indicating thereby that the article is concerned only with the land tenure described as an "estate". The inclusive definition of the rights of such an estate also enumerates the rights vested in the proprietor and his subordinate tenure-holders. The last clause in that definition, viz., that those rights also include the rights or privileges in respect of land revenue, emphasizes the fact that the article is concerned with land tenure. It is, therefore, manifest that the said article deals with a tenure called "estate " and provides for is acquisition or the extinguishment or modification of the rights of the landholder or the various subordinate tenure-holders in respect of their rights in relation to the estate. The contrary view would enable the State to divest a proprietor of his estate and vest it in another without reference to any agrarian reform. It would also enable the State to compel a proprietor to divide his properties, though self-acquired, between himself and other members of his family or create interest therein in favour of persons other than tenants who had none before." * The court, thus held that Article 31-A(1)(a) will not apply to an Act which does not contemplate or seek to regulate the rights inter se between the landlords and tenants leaving all their characteristics intact. The court further considered the judgment in Sri Ram Ram Narain and distinguished it on the ground that under the Bombay Act certain rights were conferred on the tenants in respect of their Manufacturing Company v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. relied upon by Mr. Nariman is also of no help as the same was dealing with certain legislation in regard to mines and minerals. The question of interpreting Article 31-A(1)(a) did not arise there at all. 14. As has been discussed above, the title to the land shall vest in the tiller and the landlord shall get the compensation. Earlier also his right to resume the land for personal cultivation was considerably restricted by the provisions of the 1964 Act. As a result of the impugned Amendment Act he has been divested of this limited right for a price, and the tiller shall no more be under a threat of dispossession. The impugned provisions must therefore be accepted as measure of land reform. We reject the argument of the respondents that in absence of provisions fixing ceiling on the area of land which can be held by a person a statute cannot be accepted as a measure of land reform. The Fifth Amendment Act is, therefore, entitled to the protection of Article 31-A and it cannot be struck down on the ground of violation of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. The judgment of the Judicial Commissioner declaring the Act as ultra vires is accordingly set aside and the writ petitions filed by the respondents are dismissed. Consequently it is not necessary to deal with the writ petition (W.P. No. 864 of 1988) filed in this Court under Article 32 challenging the inclusion of the impugned Act in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution and the same is rejected.

### Response:
1

### Explanation:
9. Article 31-A(1)(a) declares that no law providing for "the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinction or modification of any such rights", shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14 or Article 19. The Fifth Amendment Act has received the assent of the President as required by the first proviso. The expression estate is undisputedly applicable in the present case in view of the provisions of clause (2) of the said article. Although Article 31-A(1)(a) does not by express language restrict its application to a particular nature of law, it is now well settled that the protection of the Article is limited to the laws which serve the purpose of agrarian reform, and Mr. R. F. Nariman is right in relying upon the observations at page 901-F of the judgment in Godavari Sugar Mills Ltd. v. S. B. Kamble. The learned counsel has further urged that the other observations in this judgment support his main argument also that in absence of provisions for ceiling a statute cannot be held to be for agrarian reform. We are unable to agree. In that case the constitutional validity of the Act amending certain provisions of the Maharashtra Agricultural (Ceiling and Holdings) Act, 1961 was under challenge and it was sought to be saved inter alia with the aid of Article 31-A. While discussing the scope of Article 31-A, the court at page 902-F relied upon the decision in Balmadies Plantations Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu in the following terms : (SCC p. 710, parathe case of Balmadies Plantations Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu it was held while dealing with the provisions of Gudalur Janmam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act that the object and general scheme of the Act was to abolish intermediaries between the State and the cultivator and to help the actual cultivator by giving him the status of direct relationship between himself and the State. The Act, as such, in its broad outlines was held to be a measure of agrarian reform and protected by Article 31-A.As has been discussed above, the title to the land shall vest in the tiller and the landlord shall get the compensation. Earlier also his right to resume the land for personal cultivation was considerably restricted by the provisions of the 1964 Act. As a result of the impugned Amendment Act he has been divested of this limited right for a price, and the tiller shall no more be under a threat of dispossession. The impugned provisions must therefore be accepted as measure of land reform. We reject the argument of the respondents that in absence of provisions fixing ceiling on the area of land which can be held by a person a statute cannot be accepted as a measure of land reform. The Fifth Amendment Act is, therefore, entitled to the protection of Article 31-A and it cannot be struck down on the ground of violation of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. The judgment of the Judicial Commissioner declaring the Act as ultra vires is accordingly set aside and the writ petitions filed by the respondents are dismissed. Consequently it is not necessary to deal with the writ petition (W.P. No. 864 of 1988) filed in this Court under Article 32 challenging the inclusion of the impugned Act in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution and the same is rejected
